tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-75555947360491759052024-02-20T17:53:14.667-08:00Dateline Taipei從臺北看天下 . chinese language newspaper editorials . translated by bevin chu . no endorsement of the editorials should be inferredBevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.comBlogger2396125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-41719041869741571712016-12-29T17:39:00.000-08:002016-12-29T17:42:53.681-08:00Dateline Taipei Bids Farewell<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OJKMji2688M">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OJKMji2688M</a><br />
<b>"We'll Meet Again", sung by Vera Lynn</b><br />
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<b>Dateline Taipei Bids Farewell</b><br />
<b>December 30, 2016</b><br />
<b>Taipei, China</b><br />
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As of today, Dateline Taipei will cease publication.<br />
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Why?<br />
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The Green Terror, of course. So much for freedom of expression under Green Government.<br />
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Thank you all for your support over the years.<br />
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To quote an old WWII era song, made famous by the British singer Vera Lynn,<br />
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<i>We'll meet again,<br />Don't know where, don't know when,<br />But I know we'll meet again, some sunny day.<br /><br />Keep smiling through,<br />Just like you always do,<br />Till the blue skies drive the dark clouds, far away.<br /><br />So will you please say hello,<br />To the folks that I know,<br />Tell them I won't be long,<br />They'll be happy to know that as you saw me go<br />I was singing this song.<br /><br />We'll meet again,<br />Don't know where, don't know when,<br />But I know we'll meet again, some sunny day.</i><br />
<i><br /></i>
-- Bevin ChuBevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-2283355875190591302016-12-28T19:28:00.001-08:002016-12-28T19:28:16.982-08:00<b>Taiwan's Membership in International Organizations: David Lee Reveals the Truth</b><br />
<b>China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 29, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: The Tsai Trump phone call opened Pandora's Box. How will Taiwan deal with the consequences? That is difficult to predict. But the Mainland has already begun building a high wall to defend one China. Such is the paradox of history. The KMT, which steadfastly defended one China and befriended the Mainland, ironically ensured Taiwan's autonomy. The DPP, which obstinately opposed one China and incited cross-Strait conflict, ironically accelerated the process of cross-Strait reunification.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs David Lee has responded to Control Yuan inquiries about the difficulties Taiwan has encountered attempting to join international organizations. He admitted that United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and Mainland insistence on the one China principle have had an effect. With the exception of the WTO and APEC, membership in international organizations is difficult without Beijing's approval. David Lee's remarks made Taiwan independence advocates very uncomfortable. They inadvertently shattered their carefully crafted illusion. Lee believes Taiwan has the right to join the United Nations and other international organizations, regardless of whether the Mainland approves. He said Taiwan could not join these organizations only because the Kuomintang was incompetent and weak when it was in office.<br />
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Lies are eventually exposed. Such lies, spread by the DPP after assuming power, cannot withstand scrutiny. The DPP will not be able to continue passing the buck to the KMT. The DPP now enjoys “total governance”. Therefore it must assume “total responsibility”. When it is unable to join international organizations, when diplomatic allies break off relations, it will have to accept responsibility. Some DPP leaders are attempting to shape public opinion. For example, Sao Tome and Principe has severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan. DPP leaders insist this is good for Taiwan, because these countries cannot help Taiwan. Ending diplomatic relations reduces our expenditures. Taiwan needs only to improve relations with major nations, they say. But six months ago, these same people were blasting the Ma administration because Gambia established diplomatic relations with the Mainland. They blamed the Ma government's diplomatic truce for the loss.<br />
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In fact, their allegation that small nations cannot help us join international organizations is self-contradictory. Political realities mean that Taiwan must rely on diplomatic partners in the United Nations or other international organizations to increase its exposure, or submit membership requests. As members of these organizations, these nations have the right to invite Taiwan to join. They may not be able to persuade other nations to accept Taiwan. But their requests are an indispensable first step.<br />
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The United States Congress often passes legislation that supports Taiwan's accession to international organizations. But these are mostly symbolic gestures, with no binding effect on the executive branch. The United States never advances such proposals in international organizations, still less help Taiwan join them. In other words, even from the most utilitarian perspective of diplomatic relations, few nations consider themselves obliged to help Taiwan.<br />
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Many in the DPP persist in self-deception. This hampers Taiwan's understanding of the international situation. It also blinds people to the subtle cross-Strait balance of power. The Mainland has announced the resumption of diplomatic relations with Sao Tome. Many consider this irrelevant. Many mock it. They assume it will further alienate Taiwan from the Mainland. They fail to realize that years of cross-Strait interaction has familiarized the Mainland with Taiwan. The Mainland understands the impact of cross-Strait exchanges and military threats on Taiwan's public opinion. Why has the Mainland exerted diplomatic pressure on Taiwan? Why has it dispatched military aircraft to circle Taiwan? The underlying reason of course is that the Tsai government has refused to recognize the 1992 consensus. But from a tactical perspective, the answer can be found in Mainland policy toward Taiwan, which is carefully measured.<br />
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In the past, the two sides have often engaged in diplomatic warfare. During the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian eras, Taiwan benefited from its economic strength. This enabled it to compete for diplomatic relations with the Mainland. It both gained and lost, but gains outweighed the losses. The Ma government proposed a diplomatic truce. It did so as a gesture of goodwill towards the Mainland. Now however, Taiwan no longer has the ability to compete with the Mainland for diplomatic relations. Never mind diplomatic truce. Taiwan can only hope that the Mainland refrains from competing for diplomatic relations. If the Mainland proceeds, Taiwan can only sit back and watch as other nations drift away, unable to do anything in response. This is the most serious crisis facing Taiwan today. This is the shrill warning the Mainland has issued to Taiwan with the Sao Tome and Principe diplomatic break. David Lee is on the frontlines of this diplomatic battlefield. He feels all of this deeply. That is why he did not deny that Taiwan's participation in international organizations requires Mainland consent. He revealed the reality of Taiwan's plight. The same is true of the imbalance in military strength.<br />
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The DPP government finds itself in a dilemma. How will it respond? Other than engage in self-deception, it can do nothing. The DPP government can only take one of two paths. The first is to humble itself and take a hard look at the KMT government's cross-Strait and foreign policies. It must not turn a blind eye to KMT successes in its struggle with the Mainland, merely because of partisan rivalry. It must seek a new consensus with the Mainland, and return to the proper path. The other is to continue blindly down its current path, amidst cross-Strait tensions, toward eventual decline. The Mainland may use the opportunity to continue its attacks, eventually completing the diplomatic and military encirclement of Taiwan. Eventually Taiwan will no longer have any chips to play, and will be forced to accept "reunification without dignity".<br />
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President Tsai may attempt to take a third path, namely to maintain the ambiguous status quo. But evolutionary changes have proven that external forces will inexorably erode this ambiguity. The Tsai Trump phone call opened Pandora's Box. How will Taiwan deal with the consequences? That is difficult to predict. But the Mainland has already begun building a high wall to defend one China. As the Mainland sees it, the path of ambiguity will eventually merge with the second path.<br />
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Such is the paradox of history. The KMT, which steadfastly defended one China and befriended the Mainland, ironically ensured Taiwan's autonomy. The DPP, which obstinately opposed one China and incited cross-Strait conflict, ironically accelerated the process of cross-Strait reunification.<br />
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李大維揭穿的國際空間真相<br />
2016/12/29 中國時報<br />
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外交部長李大維答覆監察院詢問有關台灣參與國際組織所面臨的困難及因應作為時,坦言受聯合國大會2758號決議及大陸堅持一中原則影響,除WTO、APEC外,要參與其他國際組織,除非獲得北京允許,否則有相當的困難。李大維這番言論讓獨派很不舒服,他無意間戳破了獨派一直以來所編織的幻夢,認為台灣有權利參與聯合國及各類國際組織,無須理會大陸,台灣之所以無法加入,是國民黨執政時期的無能和軟弱所所致。<br />
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謊言終究要被揭開,民進黨的上台讓這種論調再也無法自圓其說,更讓民進黨無法繼續牽拖國民黨,既然完全執政,就要對無法加入國際組織或「被斷交」負起完全責任。現在一些民進黨人開始引導輿論走向,例如聖多美普林西比同台灣斷交,硬說對台灣是一件好事,因為這些國家對台灣無關緊要,斷交反而可以減少金援支出,台灣只要做好與主要大國改善關係工作即可。可就在半年前,同樣一批人還針對甘比亞與大陸建交,指責馬政府外交休兵是失敗的政策。<br />
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事實上,小國無用論與加入國際組織目標背道而馳,從政治現實面來看,台灣要在聯合國或者其他國際組織增加曝光率,或提出參與活動提案,都必須委託邦交國,他們作為這些組織會員國,有權提案邀請台灣加入,雖然他們無法說服各國接受,卻是不可缺少的第一步。<br />
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至於美國國會常常通過支持台灣加入國際組織的法案,實際上都屬於政治表態行為,根本對行政部門無約束力,美國也不會在國際組織中提出相關提案,遑論幫助台灣加入。換句話說,即便從最功利的角度來審視邦交國,也並非很多人所不屑一顧那樣只是台灣的負債。<br />
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許多民進黨人自欺欺人,不但影響了台灣對國際局勢的認知,更讓自己失去了對兩岸力量對比失衡的敏感。大陸宣布與聖多美復交,很多人認為無關緊要,更有很多人諷刺這只會讓台灣更疏離大陸。但他們沒有注意到,大陸經過多年的兩岸互動,早已熟知斷交、軍事威脅等行動對台灣社會輿論的衝擊,既然如此,為何大陸最近還要在外交上施壓台灣,甚至派出軍機、航母繞行台灣?從大背景來看,當然與蔡政府拒不承認九二共識有關,但從具體策略來看,卻可以從中發現大陸對台政策的節奏感。<br />
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過去兩岸常有外交爭奪戰,李、扁時期受惠台灣雄厚的經濟實力,還有一定本領與大陸爭奪邦交國,雖然有失有得,畢竟還能有所斬獲;馬政府主動提出外交休兵,還具有對大陸釋出善意的意涵。如今台灣再也沒有能力與大陸競逐邦交國,談不上外交休兵,只能被動寄希望大陸不要爭奪邦交國,如果大陸不配合,也只能束手坐等邦交國流失,毫無反制能力。這才是當下台灣最大的危機所在,這也是大陸通過與聖多美復交所要提供給台灣的最大警訊。身處外交戰場第一線的李大維自然感悟最深,所以他不諱言台灣參與國際組織需要經過大陸同意,這無非就是揭示當前台灣的真實處境。至於軍事實力對比失衡的困境同樣如此。<br />
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困局中的民進黨政府該如何因應?除了掩耳盜鈴式自欺欺人之外,恐怕也是束手無策。擺在民進黨政府面前的只有兩條路,一是真正以謙卑的態度重新審視國民黨政府時期的兩岸政策和對外政策,不要因為政黨對立就對國民黨的成功經驗視而不見,並努力與大陸發展新共識,重新回到正確的道路,另一條路則是繼續一意孤行,讓台灣繼續在兩岸關係緊張對立的道路上向下沉淪,大陸也藉此機會不斷出擊,逐步完成對台灣的外交和軍事包圍,到一定階段台灣沒有討價還價能力時,只好接受「沒有尊嚴的統一」。<br />
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蔡總統可能打算選擇第三條路,就是模糊到底的維持現狀,但局勢演變已經證明,自己想模糊,但外力總會干擾這種模糊。「英川通話」打開了潘朵拉的魔盒,台灣如何自處尚難預料,大陸卻已經開始築起維護一中的高牆,因為在大陸看來,模糊之路終究要跟第二條路合流。<br />
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歷史的弔詭恰恰在此,堅持一中的國民黨因為友善大陸反而保證了台灣的自主性,堅決反對一中的民進黨卻因為挑起了兩岸對立,反而推進了兩岸統一的進程。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-84932797169837084072016-12-27T21:57:00.002-08:002016-12-27T21:57:14.994-08:00Collective Silence Among Taiwan Independence Elders<b>Collective Silence Among Taiwan Independence Elders</b><br />
<b>China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 28, 2016</b><br />
<br />
Executive Summary: The DPP, and in particular Taiwan independence elders, have a better understanding of the trilateral relationship between the United States, Mainland China, and Taiwan than the masses. Naturally they have a better understanding of the impossibility of Taiwan independence. They know they cannot achieve it. The reason has nothing to do with ideals, and everything to do with personal power and special interests. They have no objection to sacrificing Taiwan's future and cross-Strait peace for their own selfish interests. Fortunately, we have entered an era of great change. Many black swans have appeared. The global picture is changing. This has revealed much of this hypocrisy for what it is.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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President Tsai has been in office for a while now. The blue camp is very unhappy with her. Even the green camp has blasted her relentlessly. Of course the latter have entirely different reasons for their discontent. They have no desire to replace her. They are merely unhappy with her policy of "maintaining the status quo". That is not what they want. More importantly, Ms. Tsai has appointed large numbers of bureaucrats, many of whom hail from the blue camp, or are “Mainlanders”. This has angered Taiwan independence elders, who denounce them as “Old Blue Males”. Put simply, the Tsai Ying-wen government is insufficiently committed to the cause of Taiwan independence for their tastes.<br />
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Paradoxically however, President Tsai successfully phoned US President-elect Donald Trump. Trump later issued a series of challenges to the US government's one China policy. Logically speaking, Taiwan independence elements should be dancing with joy. But they were unusually low-keyed. In fact, news of the the "Tsai Trump phone call" provoked intense debate. Many assumed that the incoming Republican government would change China policy and provide Taiwan with new opportunities. But this enthusiasm quickly evaporated. Taiwan independence elder Wu Li-pei may have told reporters he didn't mind being America's pawn. But others remained silent.<br />
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What accounts for this strange phenomenon? The explanation is simple. Many have warned that if Taiwan is reduced to a bargaining chip between the United States and the Mainland, or a pawn in the United States' attempt to “contain” the Mainland, the first victim will be Taiwan. Republican government policy toward China has conistently started hard but ended soft, started hostile but ended friendly. More importantly, Trump is a businessman. He is likely to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in order reach a deal with the Mainland, and win concessions or cooperation from the Mainland on other issues. Most people on Taiwan have noticed that Trump himself came right out and said as much on Twitter.<br />
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Today's Taiwan independence movement has a distinguishing characteristic. It is led by people knowledgeable about the United States, and chummy with the United States. These people differ from earlier Taiwan independence advocates, who were Japanese imperial subjects. Today the most influential Taiwan independence elders are those who have studied and worked in the United States. They had successful careers in the United States. They also have many political contacts. They have studied the United States' cross-Strait policy in-depth. They have a clear understanding of the one China policy. Therefore, when Trump issued a series of reckless statements, they were keenly aware of the dangers.<br />
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When Obama came out and reiterated the US government's long held stance on the Taiwan issue, these Taiwan indepdence elders did not make a peep. They knew these developments would have a serious impact on their pursuit of Taiwan independence. They knew that the United States' cross-Strait position includes maintaining the status quo, strategic ambiguity, and even open opposition to Taiwan independence. It also includes ensuring Taiwan's autonomy. This autonomy enables Taiwan's autonomy to pass for sovereignty, and to defy the Mainland's goal of reunification. Trump's approach has shattered the tacit understanding underlying the triangular relationship between the United States, Mainland China, and Taiwan. It as forced Obama to stand up and eliminate the ambiguity. This is not good for Taiwan, which has benefited from strategic ambiguity. Taiwan independence elders understand this paradoxical situation better than anyone.<br />
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President Tsai has a similar understanding. Following the Tsai Trump phone call, she exercised considerable restraint. She urged DPP legislators to cool their rhetoric, and not exaggerate the significance of the phone call. She was aware of the possible consequences, especially the reaction from the Mainland. She knew the United States would lose the benefit of strategic ambiguity. From this perspective, President Tsai and Taiwan independence elders understand each other perfectly.<br />
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If that is the case, why are Taiwan independence elders so unhappy with the Tsai administration? Why are they openly criticizing her? Since President Tsai was elected, a series of events have left them frustrated. Taiwan independence elders assumed that as long as they remained steadfast in their support for Taiwan independence and the DPP, they would be on the receiving end of government patronage. But lo and behold, President Tsai's concern for continuity of government, led her to rehire so-called "Old Blue Males". This of course, undermined the Taiwan independence elders' interests, and led to inevitable discord.<br />
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But isn't this the way it has always been with the DPP? The DPP has used Taiwan independence. It has incited internal conflict over reunification vs. independence. It has used so-called “ethnic” opposition to win votes. Every time an election has rolled around it has done so without fail. It simply cannot hold itself back. But when the KMT echoes its claims, or even raises the ante, the DPP shows its true colors. The DPP has flip-flopped repeatedly on amending the “referendum law". This parallels the Taiwan independence elders' ambivalence in the face of Trump's words and deeds.<br />
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In other words, the DPP, and in particular Taiwan independence elders, have a better understanding of the trilateral relationship between the United States, Mainland China, and Taiwan than the masses. Naturally they have a better understanding of the impossibility of Taiwan independence. They know they cannot achieve it. The reason has nothing to do with ideals, and everything to do with personal power and special interests. They have no objection to sacrificing Taiwan's future and cross-Strait peace for their own selfish interests. Fortunately, we have entered an era of great change. Many black swans have appeared. The global picture is changing. This has revealed much of this hypocrisy for what it is.<br />
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集體沉默的台獨大老們<br />
2016/12/28 中國時報<br />
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蔡總統就任以來,不但藍營對她深深不滿,連綠營內部都批評不斷,當然後者的出發點還不至於想取而代之,而是認為「維持現狀」政策不能代表他們的真實想法。更重要的是,在人事安排上,蔡總統任用大量官僚體系出身者,其中很多不是有藍營背景就是外省人,讓獨派大為光火,所謂「老藍男」的指摘,也是出自這些人之口。簡單說,獨派認為蔡英文政府「不夠獨」。<br />
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弔詭的是,當蔡總統與美國總統當選人川普成功通話,接著川普還發表一系列質疑美國一中政策的言論,照理說,獨派應該興高采烈隨之起舞,但這段時間,獨派卻異常低調。事實上,「英川通話」訊息一出,台灣內部確曾激起一陣熱議,很多人認為未來共和黨政府將會調整中國政策,將是台灣的機會。但這股風潮很快就被平息下去,除了獨派大老吳澧培在接受採訪時說出不反對當美國的棋子以外,其他人多保持沉默。<br />
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為什麼會出現如此奇怪的現象?其原因並不難理解,很多人已經提出警告,認為若台灣真的成為美國與大陸談判的籌碼,或者充當美國對抗大陸的棋子,首當其衝受害的當然只能是台灣。這不僅是因為共和黨政府歷來對中政策都會走過先硬後軟、先敵對後友好的路徑,更重要的是,川普的商人性格讓其更傾向於拿台灣來與大陸做交易,來爭取大陸在其他問題上的讓步或者配合,最讓台灣人有感的是,川普本人在社交平台上已經用近乎直白的語言指陳此事。<br />
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台灣獨派有一大特色,那就是知美派或者親美派當道,與最早期帶有濃厚日本皇民色彩的獨派不同,現在檯面上分量較高的獨派大老,通常都有美國的求學和事業背景,不僅在美國事業有成,也在美國政壇擁有大量人脈,對美國的兩岸政策也有著深入的鑽研,因而對美國的一中政策也有著清楚的認知。因此,當川普出現一系列暴衝言行後,他們也都能敏銳地意識到危機所在。<br />
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甚至歐巴馬站出來詳細闡述美國政府對台灣問題的一貫主張時,即便知道這對他們追求台獨的想法會有嚴重衝擊,他們也並未多置一詞。他們知道,美國對兩岸議題的態度就是維持現狀、戰略模糊,即便明言反對台獨,但美國政府也在實際動作上支持台灣的自主權不受侵犯,這也讓台灣得以擁有足夠的空間將這種自主權闡釋成為主權,以便與大陸的統一訴求相抗衡。但川普的作法打破了這一默契,導致了美、中、台三邊微妙關係的公開化,迫使歐巴馬不得不站出來打破這種模糊,這對從模糊中受益的台灣來說當然不是什麼好事。這一弔詭的演變過程,獨派恐怕比誰都更加了解。<br />
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蔡總統與他們的認知頗為類似,所以「英川通話」之後,蔡總統保持了高度的克制,並要求黨籍立委降低調門,不要過度宣揚此次通話的意義,也正是因為意識到危機的可能性,特別是來自大陸的反制,會讓美方失去過去的模糊空間。從這個角度看,蔡總統與獨派是有著充分的默契。<br />
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既然如此,為何獨派又表現出對蔡總統施政的強烈不滿,甚至不惜公開加以批評。從蔡總統勝選以來,包括近來的一系列表現來看,獨派恐怕只是醉翁之意不在酒,一直以來的台獨主張看似堅定不移,其實不過是他們爭取權力的憑藉,在他們看來,牢牢站穩獨派立場,並充當民進黨執政的基本盤,就可以獲得執政後的人事資源,而蔡總統出於穩定執政的考量,重用所謂「老藍男」,當然就損害到他們的利益,雙方有所齟齬也就在所難免。<br />
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而獨派的這些作法難道不正是民進黨一直以來的路數嗎?民進黨以訴諸台獨的立場,引爆台灣內部統獨之爭來升高族群對立,以達到凝聚更多選票的目的,每次選舉都屢試不爽,但當國民黨技術性地附和他們的主張,甚至要往前推一把時,他們的真面目就暴露出來,《公投法》修正議題上民進黨的進退失據,其實同樣可解釋獨派大老面對川普言行的糾結。<br />
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換言之,比起追隨他們的普羅大眾,民進黨特別是獨派大老們對當下美、中、台三邊關係了解得更為深入,對台獨的不可能性也當然知之甚詳,但明知不可為而為之,不是因為什麼理想,而終究是權力和利益的紛爭。只是他們為了自己的權與利,而不惜犧牲台灣的發展前途及兩岸關係的光明前景,未免過於自私了一些。好在如今已進入大變革的時代,許多黑天鵝的出現在讓世界格局處於變動的同時,也讓許多虛偽矯飾無所遁形。<br />
<br />Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-69160507794486942732016-12-26T21:59:00.003-08:002016-12-26T21:59:26.936-08:00Food Imports from Fukushima Prove that “Taiwan-Japanese Partnership” is a Cruel Hoax<b>Food Imports from Fukushima Prove that “Taiwan-Japanese Partnership” is a Cruel Hoax</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 27, 2016</b><br />
<br />
Executive Summary: A Japanese academic recently commented on Taiwan-Japan relations and the ban on food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster areas. He said "Japan is too strong and Taiwan is too eager to lift the ban on food products from the Fukushima nuclear disaster areas”. This is the best description yet of current Taiwan-Japan relations. Can Japan forgo its status as the “superior” in the relationship? Will it listen to public opinion on Taiwan? Can the DPP review the relationship between Taiwan and Japan in a pragmatic manner? Must it insist on pursuing a united front with Japan against Mainland China? Unless the DPP can cease its unilateral desire to pander to Japan in order to oppose Mainland China, it will continue to sacrifice ROC national interests.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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Public hearings were recently convened on food imports from nuclear disaster areas in Japan. Public protests have erupted one after another, and are unlikely to end any time soon. Meanwhile the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has confirmed that the Japanese government is angry because Taiwan continues to limit food imports from nuclear disaster areas in Japan. Therefore Japan has suspended the "Taiwan-Japan Economic Partnership Committee", and ended "Taiwan-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement" (EPA) negotiations. Earlier rumors that the government sought to allow food imports from nuclear disaster areas in Japan, in exchange for Japan signing the EPA, were apparently well founded.<br />
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Actually this is not the first time Taiwan and Japan have clashed since Tsai Ing-wen came to power. The "Taiwan-Japan Cooperation Dialogue on Ocean Affairs" was originally scheduled for late July. It was postponed to late October over the South China Sea “arbitration” case. When it convened in late October, observers wondered whether the government intended to trade our territorial sovereignty for mere fishing privileges in Cong Zhi Niao Reef, aka “Okinotoroshima”. The meeting was hastily concluded, and each side provided its own media spin. Taiwan-Japan negotiations have repeatedly run aground. One can only wonder how the DPP must feel, having long professed its undying friendship for Japan.<br />
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Think back to Tsai Ing-wen's visit to Japan last July. The Japanese had high expectations from the DPP as ruling party. Abe's younger brother, Shinohiko, accompanied Tsai Ing-wen on a visit to Abe's hometown, to highlight friendship between the DPP and Japan. The Japanese government deliberately arranged an “unexpected meeting” between Tsai and Abe in a restaurant penthouse, to show the close alliance between the two sides. Alas, Japan's lofty expectations have been tempered by harsh political realities, and the tacit understanding between the two sides has yet to withstand the test of public opinion on Taiwan.<br />
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The October "Taiwan-Japan Conference on Ocean Affairs Cooperation Dialogue" has concluded with nothing to show. Many in the DPP assume the reason was KMT objections and anti-Japanese sentiment. In fact, most people on Taiwan consider Cong Zhi Niao Reef sovereignty and fishing rights to be inseparable. They refuse to trade territorial sovereignty for mere fishing privileges. That is clearly how the public feels. The ruling DPP has accused the KMT of irrational obstructionism over food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster areas. In fact the public vehemently opposes the importation of food products from Japan's nuclear disaster areas. The KMT holds a minority of the seats in the legislature. It is hardly in a position to manipulate public opinion.<br />
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This shows that current problems in Taiwan-Japan relations are not due to intense opposition from the KMT. Nor are they due to close relations between the Taiwan and Japanese governments, but rather the long-standing, unequal relationship between Taiwan and Japan. The public on Taiwan is angry at the Tsai government for blindly kowtowing to Japan. It has lashed out in response. Current problems in Taiwan-Japan relations are the result of a disconnect between the framework of the relationship and the reality.<br />
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First consider the framework of the unequal relationship between Taiwan and Japan. The DPP and the Japanese government may share anti-China sentiments. But the relationship between the DPP and Japan has long been an unequal one. The Japanese government has always taken its national interests as its starting point. It has always presumed to be Taiwan's superior and dictated Taiwan's role. The DPP has used Japan as a weapon against Mainland China. But it has utterly neglected Taiwan's own interests. When Taiwan seeks more from Japan than Japan seeks from Taiwan, the DPP's wishful thinking becomes apparent. The DPP ignores Japan's pragmatism. Japan insists that Taiwan must first lift its ban on food imports from the Fukushima nuclear disaster area. Only then will Japan consent to resume negotiations over the Taiwan-Japan economic and trade agreement. This is why.<br />
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Second, the Taiwan government and the Japanese government have both ignored public opinion on Taiwan. Japan has relied too much on DPP government authority, and ignored the volatility of public opinion on Taiwan. Public support for Tsai Ing-wen has plummeted, avalanche like, in three short months. This has made it difficult, if not impossible for Tsai Ing-wen to lift the ban on food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster areas.<br />
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Third, the DPP has underestimated the intensity of domestic public opinion against food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster areas. In a panic, the Tsai government convened 10 public hearings over three short days, in the hope that it could ram the bill through the legislature. This heavy handed, top down approach provoked a powerful backlash, increasing opposition. During the "Taiwan-Japan Economic and Trade Conference", the Chairman of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (GIEF) Yasuo Fukuoka, violated a tacit agreement to avoid criticizing Taiwan. He was impatient with the Tsai government's tardy handling of the situation. In the process he revealed Japan's political arrogance.<br />
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A Japanese academic recently commented on Taiwan-Japan relations and the ban on food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster areas. He said "Japan is too strong and Taiwan is too eager to lift the ban on food products from the Fukushima nuclear disaster areas”. This is the best description yet of current Taiwan-Japan relations. Can Japan forgo its status as the “superior” in the relationship? Will it listen to public opinion on Taiwan? Can the DPP review the relationship between Taiwan and Japan in a pragmatic manner? Must it insist on pursuing a united front with Japan against Mainland China? Unless the DPP can cease its unilateral desire to pander to Japan in order to oppose Mainland China, it will continue to sacrifice ROC national interests.<br />
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反核食揭露台日夥伴關係的假面<br />
2016-12-27 聯合報<br />
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反核食公聽會最近重新召開,持續發生民眾抗議場面,一時恐難善了。與此同時,外交部也證實,日本政府因不滿台灣持續管制日本核災食品,因此暫停召開「台日經濟夥伴委員會」,進而使「台日經濟夥伴協議」(EPA)談判宣告停擺。先前傳出蔡政府擬以解禁日本核食以換取台日簽署EPA,如今看來,並非空穴來風。<br />
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這其實不是蔡英文上台後台日兩國首度觸礁事件。原本預定在今年七月底召開的「台日海洋事務合作對話會議」,即因為南海仲裁案出爐,而被推遲到十月底舉行。十月底召開時,更因為外界質疑蔡政府擬以沖之鳥的「主權換漁權」,而讓這項會議在各說各話下倉促落幕。台日談判接連觸礁,對一向自詡為親日的民進黨政府,真是情何以堪。<br />
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回顧去年七月蔡英文的訪日之行,日方為了表示對民進黨即將執政的高度期待,不僅由安倍的胞弟岸信夫全程陪同蔡英文參訪安倍的故鄉,以凸顯民進黨與日本情誼之深厚;日本政府更刻意安排蔡英文與安倍在餐廳閣樓的「不期而遇」,以顯示雙方緊密的價值同盟。然而,日本再高的期待似乎不敵政治現實的考驗,雙方再多的默契仍必須接受台灣民意的試煉。<br />
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十月的「台日海洋事務合作對話會議」不了了之,民進黨不少人認為,是國民黨杯葛及社會親中反日的意識形態作祟所致。事實上,堅持沖之鳥的主權與漁權不可分割,一直是台灣多數民眾的基本態度;不以主權交換漁權,也是國內民意的最大公約數。至於解禁日本核食的難產,執政黨將之歸咎於國民黨的無理杯葛,事實上,若非民眾對日本核食具有強烈反感,已淪為國會少數的國民黨恐無能力指引民意。<br />
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由此可見,當前台日關係的難題,並不在於國民黨的強力反對,也不在於台日政府關係不夠緊密,而是在台日長期不對等的關係下,台灣民意對於蔡政府對日本的盲目屈從感到不滿,並因而反撲,這是結構面與現實面碰撞的結果。<br />
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首先,談台日不對等關係的結構面。蔡政府上台之後,民進黨與日本政府雖具有共同的反中立場,但台日間不對等關係的格局並未因之改變,日本仍一如過去完全以其國家利益為出發點,且以「上國」之姿來指導台灣。至於民進黨,則和以往一樣,把日本當成抗衡中國的利器,卻對台灣自身的利益缺乏完整考量。也正因為如此,在台灣有求於日本多於日本有求於台灣時,會讓民進黨對日本有一廂情願的幻覺,從而輕忽日本務實的本性。日本堅持台灣先要解禁福島核災食品,台日兩國才有可能啟動台日經貿協議談判,原因正在於此。<br />
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其次,談台日兩國政府忽視台灣民意的現實面。日本過度「靠勢」民進黨執政的權力,卻忽視台灣民意的多變性。安倍政府以為,完全執政的蔡英文應該是無所不能;殊不知,蔡英文的民意支持度在短短三個月即面臨雪崩式下滑,這讓蔡英文面對解禁日本核食議題顯得難以著力。<br />
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另一方面,民進黨也低估了國內民意對於進口核災食品的反對。蔡政府在三天內匆匆開了十場公聽會,急欲強行通過此案,這種霸王硬上弓的作風反而助長了反撲的火勢,使事態擴大。日本交流協會會長大橋光夫在「台日經貿會議」上,違背默契說出責備台灣的重話,當然是對蔡政府的處理能力感到不耐,卻也暴露了日本高調指導政局的傲慢。<br />
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一位日本學者最近評論台日關係說:「在解禁福島食品輸台問題上,日本太強勢,台灣太急促。」這正是對當前台日關係的最佳寫照。日本若不能放下「上國」的身段,好好傾聽台灣民意,只會讓台日兩國人民的情感越來越遠;反觀,民進黨若不能務實地看待台日關係,只片面追求聯日抗中,恐將喪失國家利益。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-35631941088627783392016-12-22T22:12:00.003-08:002016-12-22T22:12:48.320-08:00One China Policy and the Washington, Beijing, Taipei Relationship<b>One China Policy and the Washington, Beijing, Taipei Relationship</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 22, 2016</b><br />
<br />
Executive Summary: Will Donald Trump abandon the one China policy? He has at least loosened it. Some predict he will eventually return to the one China policy. Others think he may even restore diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and defend Taiwan. These are all mere speculation, because Trump is highly unpredictable.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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Will Donald Trump abandon the one China policy? He has at least loosened it. Some predict he will eventually return to the one China policy. Others think he may even restore diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and defend Taiwan. These are all mere speculation, because Trump is highly unpredictable.<br />
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The following is an attempt to analyze the situation from the perspective of Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.<br />
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Trump's action can be viewed from three levels. On the first level, he sees himself as the "Kim Jong-un of the United States". He wants to dominate the situation with slippery but shallow rhetoric. To some extent, he has already done this. But this sort of "ranting politics" can only increase hostility, worsen the situation, and leave problems unresolved. On the second level, we have the commercialization of the one China policy. In fact, Trump wants to commercialize all international strategic cooperation, including the relationship between the United States and South Korea and Japan. If Beijing wants the United States to abide by the one China policy, it must pay a “user fee”. But this approach, as Richard Bush noted, would forfeit the moral high ground, thereby undermining the one China policy. Moreover, the US-China economic and trade relationship, generally speaking, is mutually beneficial. Harming Mainland China will not necessarily benefit the US. The room for political intervention is limited.<br />
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The third level demands close attention. Is Trump using non-recognition of the one China policy to prevent China's rise? First of all, if the United States abandons its one China policy, will that really stop China's rise? Second, if Trump does not want the US to be the world's policeman, but abandons the one China policy and stirs up trouble in the Asia-Pacific region, won't he be adding fuel to the fire? Third, abandoning the one China policy in order to change US China economic and trade relations, is no way to solve the problem. Fourth, abandoning the one China policy will seriously undermine US-China relations. Trump is a businessman. Does he really want such a lose/lose outcome? Trump's move cannot prevent China's rise. Even abandoning the one China policy cannot prevent China's eventual rise. If Trump does this, he will be no wiser than Kim Jong-un.<br />
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Beijing's response can also be viewed from three levels. On the first level, it can refuse to lower itself to the level of a Kim Jong-un. It can exercise restraint in its official words and deeds. It can use its official media to respond to Trump personally. This would effectively talk down to Trump. On the second level, if the one China policy is “negotiable”, and can be abandoned, it will highlight the United States' moral perfidy. Beijing would emerge the winner. If the one China policy is reduced to a matter of quid pro quo, to the level of a business deal, Beijing actually holds plenty of chips. On the third level, Beijing and the United States can continue to clash without severing relations. Taiwan will remain constrained by the one China principle. It will prevent the realization of Taiwan independence. If the US abandons its one China policy, that will not change the cross-Strait strategic scenario. This would then test Trump's bottom line. Does he want to resolve the cross-Strait issue, or worsen cross-Strait relations?<br />
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Taiwan's response can also be viewed from three levels. On the first level, the Tsai government and much of the public do not consider Trump's move undiluted good news. They are deeply alarmed. Their reaction is the result of years of experience, in office and out. On the second level, Trump is selling the one China policy not just to Beijing, but also to Taipei. This policy is a double-edged sword, and is being sold to two buyers. The loss of the moral high ground and the sense of responsibility in US China policy would constitute a huge loss for Taiwan and pose a hidden danger.<br />
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The most serious problem will be found on the third level. As previously noted, Trump has desecrated the formerly sacrosanct one China policy. How will the Tsai government interpret this? Will it take advantage of this? Will Tsai move toward the "Republic of China” and “one China, different interpretations”? Or will she move toward backdoor listing or de jure Taiwan independence? It all depends on whether the Tsai government will correctly assess its strategic situation.<br />
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At this point, the Tsai government may be able to take advantage of the "Republic of China” and “one China, different interpretations”. But if it continues to resort to backdoor listing and de-Sinicization, or if it fails to prevent a "national referendum" on Taiwan independence, it will place Taiwan in danger.<br />
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As the above situation shows, we must see whether Washington, Beijing, and Taipei can correctly assess their own strategic circumstances. This will determine what they do. Does Trump want to prevent the rise of China? If he does, he must do certain things. Common sense would suggest that he does not. But Trump is not bound by common sense. Will Beijing tolerate backdoor listing or Taiwan independence? That too will require different strategies. All one can be certain of, is that Beijing will not accept it. As for Taiwan, Trump has shaken the one China policy. Will Tsai attempt to dispense with the one China principle? Or will she safeguard cross-Strait relations by returning to the one China principle and one China, different interpretations? This too requires the serious evaluation of different strategies.<br />
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The Tsai government must ask itself what it must do in response to cross-Strait realities, regardless of what Trump does.<br />
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一中政策 美中台三邊三層次<br />
2016-12-22 聯合報<br />
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川普不知會不會拋棄一中政策,至少他已鬆動了一中政策。有人預言他終究會回到一中政策,但也有人勁爆推測他甚至可能與台灣恢復邦交,並協防台灣。這些猜測皆是未知數,因為他是川普,他的特徵是不可預測。<br />
以下,試從美中台三方面分析情勢:<br />
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川普的操作,有三個層次。第一層,他將自己當作「美國的金正恩」,想用滑邊但不具縱深的語言去左右情勢。在某種程度上,他似已做到了這一點。但這種「罵街政治」,其實可能只是提升敵意、惡化情勢,沒有解決問題的效能。第二層,將一中政策商品化。事實上,川普也想將一切國際戰略合作商品化──包括美國與韓日的關係,如果北京想要美國維繫一中政策,也必須「使用者付費」。但如此一來,就如卜睿哲所說,一中政策就失去了道德高度,成為對一中政策的最大傷害。何況,美中經貿現況,大致上是在互利情勢上進行,損人未必利己,政治介入的空間有限。<br />
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必須嚴肅面對的是第三層,川普是否要藉此阻擋或摧毀中國崛起。一、美國拋棄一中政策,就真能阻擋中國崛起嗎?二、川普不願做世界警察,但拋棄一中政策攪動了亞太情勢,豈不是澆油救火?三、放棄一中政策,與調整美中經貿關係恐怕不是一路的問題。四、放棄一中政策,將嚴重撕裂美中關係,川普這個生意人,難道有魚死網破的意志?倘若川普的操作,不具摧毀中國崛起的縱深,或即使拋棄一中政策也終究阻擋不了中國的崛起,一切就可能回到金正恩的層次。<br />
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北京的操作,也有三個層次。第一層,拒絕與「金正恩」一般見識,官方的言行節制,用官媒及個體回應川普,這是下駟對上駟。第二層,如果一中政策有了「可交易性」,顯示美國並非在道德責任上持守一中政策,這反而成為北京的收穫。既然是交易,在商言商,北京的籌碼還算寬裕。第三層,北京與美國可以維持鬥而不破的局面,但若能繼續將台灣框限在「一中原則」中,使台獨不致實現,則美國即使放棄一中政策,也不能改變兩岸情勢,這就考驗川普操作的縱深如何。他到底想化解兩岸問題,或惡化兩岸關係?<br />
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台灣的操作,也可從三個層次談。第一層,無論蔡政府或社會輿論,非但未將川普的操作視為片面的喜訊,反而多所戒懼,這是朝野多年憂懼歷練而漸趨成熟的表徵。第二層,川普非但要將一中政策作價賣給北京,也要將它賣給台灣;一個政策,正反兩面,賣給兩個買主。美國一中政策道德性與責任感的喪失,是台灣最大的損失與隱患。<br />
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最嚴重的在第三層。前文指出,川普畢竟搖撼了原本如神主牌一般的一中政策,蔡政府如何解讀及運用其中可能出現的空間?是朝「中華民國/一中各表」的方向走?還是朝借殼上市或法理台獨的方向走?這就要看蔡政府如何正確評估自己可能操作的戰略縱深。<br />
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此時,蔡政府或許可以趁勢爭取「中華民國/一中各表」的空間,但若繼續操作借殼上市的去中國化,或無力防止獨派「國歌公投」等操作,皆將使台灣陷於僵局危地。<br />
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以上情勢,要看美中台三方如何各自正確評估自己的戰略縱深。所謂縱深,就是你到底要如何。川普是否會以摧毀中國崛起為目標,那將有不同的操作。合理的預估是他不會,但川普不能以常理計。北京是否會以容許台灣借殼上市或台獨為縱深,那也會有不同的操作。唯可確定,北京不會接受。至於台灣,在川普作態要搖動一中政策時,蔡政府究竟想趁勢甩掉「一中原則」,或反而必須回到「一中原則/一中各表」以維護兩岸關係,以免被川普玩弄,這也是對於不同戰略縱深的嚴肅考量。<br />
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蔡政府必須評估,不論川普要怎麼玩弄,兩岸到底要如何?<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-28118492087885705582016-12-22T20:08:00.003-08:002016-12-22T20:08:33.187-08:00Diplomatic Setbacks: The Tsai Government Must Consider the National Interest<b>Diplomatic Setbacks: The Tsai Government Must Consider the National Interest</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 23, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: After eight years of diplomatic truce, Sao Tome and Principe have suddenly broken off relations with Taipei. Many are angry and uneasy. Beijing persuaded a diplomatic ally to switch sides because the Tsai government refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. That was entirely predictable. The Trump Tsai phone call resulted in Trump opening fire on the Mainland, and accelerated the process.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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After eight years of diplomatic truce, Sao Tome and Principe have suddenly broken off relations with Taipei. Many are angry and uneasy. Beijing persuaded a diplomatic ally to switch sides because the Tsai government refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. That was entirely predictable. The Trump Tsai phone call resulted in Trump opening fire on the Mainland, and accelerated the process.<br />
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The first domino has fallen. if we do not want to see a second or even third and fourth domino fall, what countermeasures must the Tsai government take? Unfortunately, public statements by President Tsai personally and others following high-level national security meetings, indicate that no new strategies are in sight. All we see are replays of the "Pity poor Taiwan” card from the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian eras. This is more regrettable than any severing of diplomatic ties with Taiwan.<br />
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Sao Tome and Principe broke off relations with Taipei. President Tsai called on government agencies charged with national security and foreign affairs to consider countermeasures. She made three points. One. The government will help allies via “pragmatic diplomacy”. But it need not compete with Beijing over checkbook diplomacy. Two. Cross-Strait relations do not conflict with participation in international affairs. The government considers Beijing's handling of the one China principle regrettable. Three. Government agencies charged with fiscal and economic affairs should continue to focus on foreign exchange matters and their impact on the stock market. These three points are tired cliches. Not one of them has any relevance to events over the past 20 years. The government is merely consoling itself. The presidential office even resorted to indignation and sensationalism to fan public sentiment. It retreated instead of advanced in its thinking.<br />
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Sao Tome and Principle broke off relations with Taipei. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs underscored Sao Tome and Principe's demand for 200 million USD in financial aid. It created the impression among the Taiwan public that Sao Tome and Principle was "greedy", and "unscrupulous". But this is the reality of international politics. This tiny island took advantage of the contradiction between the Mainland and Taiwan. It used it as leverage. This is the way small nations pursue their national interests. The Tsai government can only blame the diplomatic quarrel between the two sides of the Strait. This presented other nations with opportunities to exploit. Besides, how is this any different from the Tsai government's pandering to the United States and Japan?<br />
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Furthermore, so-called "checkbook diplomacy" is ugly beyond compare. But suppose we use it in a positive manner, for humanitarian assistance? Suppose we use it to help our allies grow their economies, or establish medical or educational facilities? This would increase our participation in international activities and our international visibility. Unfortunately, when Taiwan was knee deep in money, we merely bought other nations off with money. We failed to establish a reputation as an international benefactor. Taiwan is no longer so flush. We can no longer compete with the Mainland in checkbook diplomacy. We now blame our allies for demanding too much money. If we fail to resolve these contradictions as Taiwan's economic competitiveness declines and our diplomatic arrogance increases, how can we possibly address our diplomatic plight?<br />
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The loss of diplomatic relations with Sao Tome and Principe is not that frightening. After all, it is only a tiny island off the coast of Africa with 150,000 people and 1,000 hectares of land area. The question is, who do we have to lose before we really begin to worry? Who do we have to maintain diplomatic relations with before we really feel we have dignity? Political debate on Taiwan has long been a mile wide and an inch deep. The government's reaction to severed diplomatic relations has been to blame Beijing, denounce those nations that broke off relations, or issue panicky and empty declarations. Seldom if ever has the government reflected upon or changed its strategy and tactics. This time was no exception. Even more surprising, David Lee insisted that the severed relations had no relationship with the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen said the move was directed against everyone in the nation. How can people this evasive honestly confront reality?<br />
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Severed diplomatic relations are not that frightening. What is frightening is the government's aimlessness and blindness, and its ability to lead people around by the nose. Take cross-Strait relations. The ROC must strive for equality, dignity, and visibility. That goes without saying. But the international reality means that equality, dignity, and visibility cannot be achieved through confrontation or impassioned propaganda. It can only be achieved by quietly working behind the scenes on critical issues. The DPP, sad to say, is not good at this. The DPP demands instant results. The DPP is good at springing short-term surprises and launching surprise attacks. These tactics, unfortunately, do not work well on the diplomatic front. Even if they win battles, they cannot win wars. This is clear from the defeats at the WHO annual meeting, the ICAO Assembly, and Interpol.<br />
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Tsai Ing-wen needs to be less DPP-centric, and more concerned with the national interest. Only then will she be able to see what her diplomatic strategy ought to be.<br />
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外交受挫 政府要務實思考國家利益<br />
2016-12-23 聯合報<br />
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歷經八年外交休兵的平靜,台灣突然面對聖多美普林西比宣布斷交,許多民眾難免感到憤怒與不安。事實上,在蔡政府拒絕承認九二共識後,中共藉機奪取我邦交國以為威嚇,已在預料之中;只不過,「川蔡通電」觸發川普對中國大陸開砲,加速了台聖斷交的過程。<br />
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在第一張骨牌倒下後,如果我們不願意再看到第二張、甚至第三、第四張骨牌繼續被推倒;那麼,蔡政府可有什麼對策?遺憾的是,從蔡總統的談話及隨後召開的國安高層會議,民眾看不到新思維或新戰略,只看到李、扁時代的「悲情牌」借屍還魂。這點,其實是比台灣「被斷交」還可悲的事。<br />
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在台聖宣告斷交後,蔡總統召集國安、外交部門研商對策,並作出三點裁示。第一,要本著平等互惠的「踏實外交」原則協助友邦發展,但不必與中共作金錢競逐;第二,兩岸的國際參與彼此並無衝突,中共操作「一中原則」令人遺憾;第三,財經部門應持續關注外交事件對股匯市的影響。這三項裁示皆是萬古老調,沒有一點超越近廿年的思維,而比較像是政府的自我寬慰;甚至,總統府用了義憤填膺的煽情手法來訴諸選民,心態上反顯得倒退。<br />
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這次聖多美普林西比與我斷交,外交部刻意強調聖國索求兩億美元之金援未遂,意圖製造民眾對該國「貪得無饜」、「見利忘義」之惡感。事實上,回到國際政治的現實,這個蕞爾小島利用一中一台的矛盾居間槓桿取利,這是小國追逐國家利益之道;要怪只能怪兩岸畸形的外交競逐,提供了該國鑽營的機會。何況,蔡政府親美媚日以抗中的身段,與此有多少差別?<br />
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進一步看,所謂「金錢外交」,今天看來固然醜陋無比,但如果善用其光明面進行海外人道援助,協助友邦發展經濟、醫療或教育等建設,其實可以為台灣創造可觀的國際參與成績,也是提升國家能見度的好機會。遺憾的是,在台灣錢「淹腳目」的時代,我們只想用暴發戶手段花錢買外交,卻未能積極經營海外援助的形象;而如今台灣手頭不再寬裕,在經援資金上競爭不過對岸,遂反過來責怪友邦需索無度。這樣的矛盾情結若不設法解開,台灣物質上的競爭條件變弱,外交上的自大心態卻日甚一日,我們的外交困境如何可能有解?<br />
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失去聖多美普林西比的邦交,其實並沒有那麼可怕;畢竟,這只是個人口才十五萬、面積僅一千公頃的非洲外海小島。問題是,我們要失去誰,才會真正感到憂心?我們要維持與誰的邦交,才讓台灣感到尊嚴?多年來,在台灣的淺碟政治下,政府對斷交的反應,除了指責中共、謾罵斷交對象作情緒發洩,或者說些處變不驚的空話,很少從基本國家戰略面來反省及調整政府的目標和手段;這次的反應,幾不例外。更令人吃驚的是,李大維說斷交「無關九二共識」,蔡英文說打壓是針對全體國人;這樣東遮西掩的邏輯,又怎麼可能有誠懇面對現實的心?<br />
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斷交並不可怕,可怕的是政府漫無目標的盲動,又胡亂號召人民跟隨它走向不知何方。以兩岸關係為例,台灣當然必須極力爭取對等與尊嚴,爭取國家的能見度。但在國際現實環境中,所謂對等尊嚴與能見度,並非僅靠著對抗或激情喊話即能達成,而必須隱微地在關鍵處下工夫,必須靠長期的經營耕耘成果。但是,這些正好是急功近利、貪功躁進的民進黨最不擅長的事。民進黨喜歡的是短線驚奇,擅長的是發動奇襲;然而,這些招術在外交陣線往往卻不管用,就算儌倖贏得一役,也贏不了戰爭。這些,從世衛組織年會、國際民航組織大會,國際刑警組織大會的交鋒落敗,其實已一目了然。<br />
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蔡英文只要少一點民進黨自我中心、多一點國家利益考量,外交戰略自然能更清晰。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-55287668552841713652016-12-20T23:02:00.003-08:002016-12-20T23:02:39.361-08:00Washington's Status Quo Approximates Beijing's One Country, Two Systems<b>Washington's Status Quo Approximates Beijing's One Country, Two Systems</b><br />
<b>China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 20, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: The East Asian and global strategic situation is changing. Relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei are sure to become more turbulent. Taiwan has no say in the changes that may be coming. The only thing it can do is clarify its position, drop anchor, and avoid being tossed by the waves. Taiwan must grasp two principles. Principle One. It must continue to issue goodwill gestures toward the Mainland, and improve public understanding. Two. Its diplomacy must be independent. It must not opportunistically cozy up to the United States and Japan. The status quo closely approximates one China, two systems. Therefore it must not lightly depart from the status quo.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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During a year end White House press conference, President Barack Obama talked about relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. He said Washington's one China policy has maintained the status quo among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Obama stressed that Washington's one China policy ensured stability in the Taiwan Strait. He hoped to dispel Donald Trump's doubts about the One China Policy. But Obama also blurted out the “unmentionable secret” in the three-way relationship among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.<br />
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According to Obama, Washington's one China policy acknowledges that both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist that there is only one China, and as long as people on Taiwan enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, they will not declare independence. Since Washington and Taipei broke off diplomatic ties, Washington has been using the one China policy to control cross-Strait relations. It has urged Beijing to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully. It has also urged Taipei not to go down the road toward Taiwan independence.<br />
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Taiwan independence elements are indignant. They think Obama disrespected public opinion on Taiwan. But their criticisms selectively ignore Taiwan's political realities. During the presidential election, candidates from both parties either sent representatives to Washington to explain their cross-Strait policy stance, or went there in person. Had Washington concluded that their stance was contrary to US policy, it would have objected publicly. This could have impacted the election.<br />
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Tsai Ing-wen's defeat in 2012 was a clear example. During the 2016 election, Washington vetted Tsai Ing-wen. That was a clear example of the opposite result. In fact, if a sitting ROC president defies US policy, the US will also "manage" him or her, the way it did when Chen Shui-bian was president. In other words, no political party on Taiwan, advocating any sort of policy, can refuse to "maintain the status quo" in cross-Strait relations. The US government is committed to safeguarding the principle that "Both sides of the Strait are Chinese, both sides of the Strait are one country". It is also committed to the premise that "The two sides each have their own model of government. Taiwan has its own mode of development”.<br />
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Specifically, the US presents two-way guarantees and norms for the two sides of the Strait. For the Mainland, the US acknowledges that both sides of the Strait are part of one country. Washington may not be involved in resolving the Taiwan issue. But it clearly makes every effort to ensure that Taiwan does not move toward independence. The United States is committed to maintaining the status quo on Taiwan, without interference from the Mainland, and to ensuring that Taiwan enjoyes a high degree of autonomy.<br />
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To some extent, the One China Policy maintained by the US over the past 40 years amounts to "one country, two systems". That “both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist that there is only one China” implies “one China”, and “autonomy for Taiwan” implies “two systems”. The real dispute is merely over who represents China? The Mainland has never repudiated one country, two systems. Deng Xiaoping said that under one country, two systems, Taiwan could retain its military. Some worry that one country, two systems would reduce Taiwan to the status of Hong Kong. But Xi Jinping has said that Taiwan's one country, two systems would differ from Hong Kong and Macao's. In other words, what sort of entity would Taiwan be? The Mainland has not actually delineated this.<br />
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For the Mainland, when it comes to Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan, the key issue is sovereignty and national unity. As long these remain under the one China framework, internal differences will be respected. That is the core meaning of one country, two systems. Unfortunately, it has become Politically Incorrect on Taiwan, rendering rational evaluation and debate impossible.<br />
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Throw off the shackles of “us vs. them” thinking, and one country, two systems will not be as intolerable as people on Taiwan have imagined. One country, two systems has run into problems in Hong Kong. But it has been in effect nearly 20 years, and maintained freedom and prosperity for Hong Kong society. This shows that the system is sound. Furthermore, the Republic of China exercises sovereignty over the Taiwan Region and its nationals. Any arrangement or change involving sovereignty would require the consent of the entire population. This is entirely different from the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to the Mainland in 1997. Taipei must consider the pros and cons of one country, two systems objectively. It must establish the most favorable conditions under such a system, rather than rejecting it out of hand.<br />
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The key is the DPP government and whether it is willing to reach a consensus with the Mainland on the one China principle. According to Obama, cross-Strait relations and the Washington Taipei relationship are based on the one China framework. If the DPP government insists on rejecting the one China framework, it will lose any footing it might have had in cross-Strait relations. More troublesome still, cross-Strait relations are now riddled with uncertainty. President elect Trump has indicated his willingness to make a deal with the Mainland over the one China policy. The Mainland has two choices. One choice is to make a deal with the US. The US would abandon its one China policy. Taiwan would be forced to accept "reunification without dignity". The other choice is to issue a warning to Taiwan, or even move against Taiwan, and deprive the US of its bargaining chip.<br />
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The East Asian and global strategic situation is changing. Relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei are sure to become more turbulent. Taiwan has no say in the changes that may be coming. The only thing it can do is clarify its position, drop anchor, and avoid being tossed by the waves. Taiwan must grasp two principles. Principle One. It must continue to issue goodwill gestures toward the Mainland, and improve public understanding. Two. Its diplomacy must be independent. It must not opportunistically cozy up to the United States and Japan. The status quo closely approximates one China, two systems. Therefore it must not lightly depart from the status quo.<br />
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美國的維持現狀 大陸的一國兩制<br />
2016/12/21 中國時報<br />
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歐巴馬在白宮年終記者會罕見談到美中台關係,強調是在美國一個中國政策原則下,維持了美中台之間的「不改變現狀」默契。歐巴馬的用意在強調,美國一中政策是維繫台海穩定的基礎,希望平衡川普對一中政策的質疑。不過,歐巴馬也說出了美中台三邊關係「不能說的祕密」。<br />
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依據歐巴馬的敘述,美國一中政策的核心在「認知海峽兩岸中國人均堅持一個中國」,同時「台灣人民同意,只要能在某種程度自主下持續運作,就不會宣布獨立」。自美台斷交後,美國一直藉此管控兩岸關係,不光敦促大陸應和平解決,也要求台灣不能走台獨之路。<br />
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台灣獨派對歐巴馬的說法不以為然,認為沒有尊重台灣民意,但這種批評是選擇性忽略台灣的政治現實。歷次總統大選期間,兩黨候選人都親自或派代表赴美說明兩岸政策立場,美國若認為違反美國政策,就會以某種形式表達立場,就會對選情造成一定的影響。<br />
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2012年蔡英文落選就是鮮明例子,2016年大選美國表態支持蔡英文,又是鮮明的反向例子。甚至在職總統若違反美國政策,美國也會出手「管理」,陳水扁時代事蹟昭昭。亦即台灣無論哪一黨,無論他們主張何種政策,在兩岸關係真實作為上,不會跳脫「維持現狀」框架。可以說,美國政府致力維護的是「兩岸都是中國人、兩岸一國」及「兩岸採行不同運作方式,台灣是自有發展方式的實體」。<br />
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具體而言,美國對兩岸提出雙向保證與規範,對大陸而言,美國認知兩岸同屬一國,美國雖不介入台灣問題的解決,但明確反對並極力確保台灣不會走向獨立。對台灣而言,美國致力維持台灣政治運作現狀不受大陸干預,保障台灣的高度自治。<br />
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其實,某種程度而言,美國過去40年來致力的「美國版一中政策」,某種程度就是「一國兩制」,「兩岸均堅持一個中國」就是「一國」,「獨立運作實體」就是「兩制」,爭議只是誰代表中國?大陸從未否定一國兩制台灣的實體地位,鄧小平曾經說過,台灣若施行「一國兩制」將可以保有自己的軍隊。有的人擔心實施「一國兩制」,台灣會變成香港,但習近平也說過,台灣實施的「一國兩制」,有別於香港、澳門,台灣有自己的模式,換句話說,台灣是一個什麼樣的實體,大陸並沒有劃出界線。<br />
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就大陸而言,無論是港澳問題還是台灣問題,最重要是主權完整和國家統一,只要是在一中框架之下,內部運作都會予以尊重。這是「一國兩制」的核心意涵,可惜在台灣早已成為政治不正確,失去理性評估、討論的意願與能力。<br />
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若拋開敵我意識的桎梏,應該會發現「一國兩制」並不像台灣社會想像的那麼不堪。「一國兩制」在香港的運作雖然遭遇了一些問題,但也持續運行接近20年,並延續了香港社會的生活自由與經濟繁榮,足以說明這一制度的合理性。何況台灣主權屬於中華民國及其國民,任何涉及主權的安排與改變,都須經全體國民同意,這與香港主權屬於英國,97年由英國政府移交中國完全不同。台灣應該客觀思考一國兩制的利弊得失,創造最有利的條件,而非對抗性全盤否定。<br />
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現在的關鍵在於,民進黨政府是否願意與大陸就一中原則達成共識。依據歐巴馬的陳述,兩岸關係及美台關係基礎在一中框架,民進黨政府若堅持拒絕接受一中框架,不但兩岸關係失去依附,美台關係也可能地動山搖。更麻煩的是,兩岸關係已陷入高度不確定性與一定的危險性,即將就任美國總統的川普卻表明願與大陸交易一個中國政策。大陸可能有兩個選擇,一是與美國交易,美國放棄一中政策,台灣接受「沒有尊嚴的統一」命運,一是對台灣殺雞儆猴,甚至直取台灣,讓美國失去交易籌碼。<br />
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東亞及全球戰略格局正在重新調整,美中台關係勢必劇烈動盪,台灣在這場可能地動山搖的變動中完全沒有發言權,唯一可以做的是明確自己的定位,放下船錨,不隨海潮波濤擺盪。台灣應把握兩個原則,一、持續對大陸發出善意訊號,發展民共共識,二、獨立外交,切勿趁勢倒向美日。對大陸而言,現狀距離一國兩制最近,不可輕言打破。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-42982552862810686392016-12-19T20:20:00.001-08:002016-12-19T20:20:18.288-08:00Beware the New Disguise for State Violence<b>Beware the New Disguise for State Violence</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 20, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: Most state violence during the authoritarian era was inflicted in the name of "national security" and "social stability". Even the hoarding of rice could lead to prosecution. As we think back, such measures were unreasonable. But amidst the turbulence of the era, it was seen as a means of social control. Today, Taiwan has undergone 30 years of democratization. Is it not shameful for the government to shout "transitional justice" while purging political opponents, evicting people from their property, bulldozing their homes, and climbing over each other to occupy official positions? Tsai would have us believe that state violence exists only in the history books. In fact, at the urging of the DPP, the specter of state violence has reemerged, cloaked in new camouflage, woven whole cloth from "transitional justice".<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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In recent years, democracy has been in retreat. This has become a matter of global concern, and Taiwan is no exception. In a recent speech on World Human Rights Day, President Tsai reiterated the importance of "transitional justice", the need to confront history and ascertain the truth, in order to prevent the recurrence of state violence. Her speech was pretty. But if she thinks state violence exists only history books, she has blinded herself to reality. In fact, when Ms. Tsai took office seven months ago, signs of the new government's state violence were everywhere. The people saw this all too clearly.<br />
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When Tsai Ing-wen first came to power, she called for “qian bei, qian bei, zai qian bei”, i.e., "humility, humility, and more humility". But the moment she felt her hold on power was secure, she and the DPP began practicing a different sort of “qian bei, qian bei, zai qian bei”, i.e., “a thousand cups, a thousand cups, and a thousand cups more". She and the DPP became drunk, both from the alcohol they imbibed during celebratory feasts, and from the power they now abuse so flagrantly. "Transitional justice" has become the Tsai government's prime mover, its political pretext to proceed at full speed and run amok. Meanwhile many developments have left people in shock. Tsai and the DPP have lined their pockets, purged their opponents, ignored the law, and treated the public with contempt, all in the name of "transitional justice". In short, even as Tsai Ing-wen points to history and condemns "state violence", she commits new forms of state violence, about which she appears utterly oblivious.<br />
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The most obvious example is her use of the CIPAS to conduct a political purge of the Kuomintang. The public hoped to see KMT party assets dealt with in a reasonable and transparent manner. Doing so would enable party politics to begin anew on a level playing field. But Wellington Koo wielded power as if it were an executioner's axe. Any business or individual who had anything to do with the KMT was summoned, stigmatized, and accused. Even when the High Administrative Court and Supreme Administrative Court ruled that Koo had conducted himself improperly, he continued to act as if he was above the law. During the entire process, President Tsai and the DPP said nothing. What was this, if not naked state violence?<br />
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Such cases are ubiquitous. They differ only in degree. For example, the DPP was in office only three months when without any debate, it abused its majority in the legislature to abolish the Special Investigation Group. But the original proposal to establish the Special Investigation Group came from the DPP. The reason given then, was that high-ranking officials were guilty of corruption or dereliction of duty. But when the Special Investigation Group investigated Chen Shui-bian, it led to his imprisonment. The DPP wanted revenge, so it abolished the Special Investigation Group on its own. The DPP sees government institutions as tools to be used for the benefit of the party. It establishes them when it wants. It abolishes them when it wants. Its authoritarian mentality makes that of the Two Chiangs era pale by comparison.<br />
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Another example is the ruling DPP's seizure of state owned enterprises and even NGOs. These seizures are so flagrant they provoke disgust. If a new ruling party wants to assign credible individuals to head up state owned enterprises, that is perfectly understandable. But the successor's ability must be subject to careful evaluation. Many Tsai government appointments were made merely to mollify certain factions, or to reward certain cronies for their “cooperation”. This is hardly conducive to the development of the public sector. Even worse, some entities had term limits to avoid political controversy. Yet the ruling DPP used all manner of underhanded means to take them over. They include the Central News Agency, the Chinese Cultural Association, and the Taipei Agricultural Marketing Company. The Tsai government has repeatedly abused state power, and revealed zero tolerance for democracy.<br />
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Recently Chu Chi-yang, chairman of the Fair Friend Group, resigned as vice chairman of the Kuomintang think tank. The main reason was that the Fair Friend Group recently applied three times for bank loans, and all three times his applications were rejected. He then realized his presence was detrimental to the company. The Fair Friend Group has an annual turnover of over 40 billion dollars in machine tool business. Absent outside pressure, no bank would refuse to loan it money. When the CCP pressures pro-green camp Taiwan businessmen, the Tsai government takes its hostility out on pro-blue camp businessmen, and brutally oppresses them. Under such pressures from regimes on both sides of the Strait, how can businesses possibly enjoy normal development?<br />
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Most state violence during the authoritarian era was inflicted in the name of "national security" and "social stability". Even the hoarding of rice could lead to prosecution. As we think back, such measures were unreasonable. But amidst the turbulence of the era, it was seen as a means of social control. Today, Taiwan has undergone 30 years of democratization. Is it not shameful for the government to shout "transitional justice" while purging political opponents, evicting people from their property, bulldozing their homes, and climbing over each other to occupy official positions? Tsai would have us believe that state violence exists only in the history books. In fact, at the urging of the DPP, the specter of state violence has reemerged, cloaked in new camouflage, woven whole cloth from "transitional justice".<br />
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注意「國家暴力」幽靈的新偽裝<br />
2016-12-20 聯合報<br />
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近年「民主在退潮」成為全球矚目的話題,台灣也不例外。蔡英文總統最近在世界人權日發表演說,再度強調「轉型正義」的重要,必須要還原歷史、找出真相,阻止國家暴力再度發生。演說固然動聽,但若以為國家暴力只存在於歷史之中,恐怕就犯了「對現實盲目」的謬誤。事實上,蔡英文上任七個月,政府新形式的「國家暴力」痕跡斑斑,人民其實都看在眼裡。<br />
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蔡英文上台時雖呼籲「謙卑,謙卑,再謙卑」,但一實際拿到政權,民進黨就上演了「千杯,千杯,再千杯」的傲慢戲碼。「轉型正義」作為蔡政府的政治發動機,一路往前推進,橫行無阻。然而,其間也出現了不少讓民眾錯愕與驚心的現象,一些遂行己利、打擊對手、漠視法制、蔑視民意的作為,都在「轉型正義」招牌的掩護下公然進行。簡言之,當蔡英文一手指著歷史罵「國家暴力」時,另一手其實是在製造新形式的國家暴力,她自己對此卻彷彿毫無自覺。<br />
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最明顯的例子,首推「黨產會」對國民黨無所不用其極的追殺和羞辱。本來,人們極期待看到國民黨黨產問題有一個合理而透澈的清理,讓政黨政治回歸公平的起跑點;但顧立雄的做法,卻是拿著御賜寶劍大開殺戒,只要跟國民黨沾上一點邊的企業或個人,都遭到傳喚、汙名與株連。甚至,當高等行政法院及最高行政法院裁定其做法不當,顧立雄還要蠻幹到底,自以為比法律還大;而在此過程中,蔡總統及整個民進黨對此皆默不作聲。這種行徑,不是赤裸裸的國家暴力是什麼?<br />
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這類事例俯拾即是,只是程度不同。例如,民進黨執政僅三個月,未經任何討論程序,即仗著國會多數優勢廢掉特偵組。然而當初提議成立特偵組的正是民進黨,說要專辦高官的貪腐失職;結果只因特偵組辦到陳水扁鎯鐺入獄,民進黨今天便「有仇報仇」,私刑將它廢了。這種把國家體制當成本黨工具的行徑,要設就設、要廢就廢,其威權心態比起兩蔣時代恐怕猶有過之。<br />
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再看,民進黨執政後對公營事業乃至民間社團的強取豪奪,更到了吃相難看的地步。隨著政黨輪替,執政者指派可信的人出任公營事業主管,當然是可以理解的事;但是,接替者的能力與才德是否足堪勝任,仍必須經過慎選,不可草率。但蔡政府任命的許多人事,卻只是為了滿足派系索求,或出於獎功賞勞的目的,對於公營事業本身的發展並無助益。更惡劣的是,對於一些為避免政治紛擾而設計了「任期制」的職務,執政者竟以各種手段強逼強取,從中央社、中華文化總會、台北農產運銷公司等的董座之爭,在在暴露蔡政府濫用國家權力,毫無民主氣度可言。<br />
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最近,友嘉集團董事長朱志洋辭去國民黨智庫副董事長,其主因,是友嘉集團最近向銀行申請三筆貸款均遭拒絕,他意識到自己的角色對公司不利。友嘉是年營業額四百多億元的工具機事業,若非相關部門施壓,往來銀行不可能無故拒絕其貸款。試想,正當親綠台商遭到中共施壓之際,台灣政府如果也將政治敵意對準友藍企業,粗暴打壓;在兩岸政權交相傾軋下,企業如何正常發展?<br />
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威權年代的國家暴力,多半是在「國家安全」與「社會安定」的大帽子底下進行,連囤積米糧都可能遭到法辦。如今回顧,或許覺得極不合理,但在當年的動盪情勢下,卻是政府遂行社會控制的手段。而時至今日,台灣民主化已經卅年,但政府一邊喊著「轉型正義」,一邊卻仍繼續施行鬥爭對手、強徵民產、強拆民宅、強奪職位等惡劣作為,豈不可恥?蔡英文以為國家暴力只存在於歷史,事實上,在民進黨的催喚下,國家暴力的幽靈正以新的偽裝出現;而它的披風,正是用「轉型正義」的符咒織成。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-81472173472141953152016-12-18T21:28:00.000-08:002016-12-18T21:28:02.205-08:00PLA Air Force Planes Circle Taiwan: Do Not Respond With Frivolity <b>PLA Air Force Planes Circle Taiwan: Do Not Respond With Frivolity </b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 17, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: PLA Air Force planes circled Taiwan as a symbolic gesture. They were saber rattling. But tension between the US and China will turn Taiwan into a front line where the two sides clash. If we refuse to understand that we are merely a pawn, but instead self-righteously imagine that we enjoy leverage, and pat ourselves on the back, we can only be described as stupid beyond belief.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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Last week, four PLA Air Force bombers and electronic reconnaissance planes flew through the Miyako Strait into the western Pacific Ocean. They proceed southward through the Bashi Channel, then flew westward back to the Mainland. They set a record by circling Taiwan twice in two weeks. Defense Minister Feng Shi-kuan said the PLA may increase the frequency of such flights in the future. The PLA may even circle Taiwan once a month. ROC military officials think the PLA Air Force may even use tankers, so that fighters can accompany them for the entire duration of the flight.<br />
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Beginning in 2013, PLA Air Force planes have been patrolling the first island chain, from the northern end of Taiwan to the southern end, on a regular basis. This time the PLA planes changed the way they flew. They did not return the way they came. The planes took off from the south, and returned in the north. They took off from the north, and returned in the south. From a military training perspective, this was nothing new. Bombers and electronic reconnaissance aircraft are big and slow. In the event of war, unless ROC military air defense systems have disintegrated, PLA Air Force planes, even accompanied by tankers and fighters, will not be able to come and go freely from the east. In any event, taking a different route back after circling Taiwan, has gotten the attention of Taipei, Washington, and Tokyo.<br />
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Since taking office, the Tsai government has refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. This has changed cross-Strait relations. Following the Trump Tsai phone call, Trump and his administration have challenged the One China principle repeatedly. Therefore Beijing's preemptive saber rattling is not hard to understand. The saber rattling has gotten peoples' attention, without the need to issue any actual threats. Its intent is psychological intimidation.<br />
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The PLA Air Force's long range flights, cannot avoid entering Japan's air defense identification zone. An ADIZ is not sovereign airspace. It has no legal status. It is international airspace. An ADIZ however, is an international demarcation of one's “turf”. It is a show of one's hand in a test of strength. If military aircraft enter one's ADIZ without a response, one will be seen as a paper tiger. Therefore, as long as PLA Air Force planes fly through the Miyako Strait, the Japanese must dispatch interceptors to greet them. This may exhaust Japanese interceptors dispatched from the Ryukyus, but they must assert their claim over this airspace.<br />
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Taipei has a much smaller ADIZ. Therefore it has no problem with intrusions. But if cross-Strait relations continue to deteriorate, CCP confidence in the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue might weaken. The situation in the Western Pacific could become tense due to the collision between Washington and Beijing. Flights around Taiwan will become more frequent. They will come closer and closer. They may even enter out ADIZ in the name of freedom of navigation in international airspace. The Ministry of Defense has declared that if PLA Air Force planes enter our ADIZ, we “will not fear, will not evade, will not show weakness". He also declared that if PLA planes must ditch at sea, we will abide by humanitarian principles. But just how should these "three noes" be implemented? In the event of an accident, how should the crisis be resolved? Agencies charged with national security must be thoroughly briefed. They should establish a tacit agreement among all parties, even Beijing.<br />
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Militarily speaking, "secret weapons" and "saber rattling" should be used each in their own turn. One must not be too quick to back down. But neither should one prematurely reveal one's trump cards. This time, agencies charged with national security made public for the first time information regarding the PLA Air Force flights around Taiwan. This was a marked change from its past secrecy. They seized the propaganda initiative. They reminded people of the possible consequences. But they must also guard against pride and complacency. When they publicly disclose such information, they reveal their own hand as well. They must not repeat Lee Teng-hui's blunder. During the Taiwan Strait missile crisis, he revealed that the PLA was "merely firing blanks". They must not repeat Chen Shui-bian's blunder, when he revealed knowledge of PLA missile locations in Fujian. By doing so, he blew the cover of ROC agents on the Mainland. Past experience suggests that the military is conservative and patient. But Feng Shi-kuan told the Legislative Yuan he was confident we could shoot down any PLA planes that entered our ADIZ". We must be wary of such unguarded outbursts.<br />
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Even more worrying, some high-level government aides shot off their mouths pandering to deep green voters. They said "We locked on to PLA military aircraft, forcing them to depart". On top such ignorant boasts about military affairs, they red-baited the former Ma government, accusing it of being afraid to say anything. In particular, after Trump questioned the One China Principle, the Green Camp could barely contain itself. It was prepared to lead an "Anti-China Jihad", and brushed aside all concern for Taiwan's security. Given their state of mind, how can there be any national security?<br />
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PLA Air Force planes circled Taiwan as a symbolic gesture. They were saber rattling. But tension between the US and China will turn Taiwan into a front line where the two sides clash. If we refuse to understand that we are merely a pawn, but instead self-righteously imagine that we enjoy leverage, and pat ourselves on the back, we can only be described as stupid beyond belief.<br />
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共機繞台敲山震虎,勿輕佻以對<br />
2016-12-17 聯合報<br />
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上周中共空軍四架轟炸機與電偵機,飛越宮古水道進入西太平洋,再南下經巴士海峽西飛大陸,創下半月內兩度「繞台飛行」的紀錄。國防部長馮世寬坦承,不排除未來共軍提高訓練頻率,甚至可能每月繞台一次。軍方官員也研判,共機日後甚至將帶上空中加油機,戰鬥機便可全程伴飛。<br />
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二○一三年起,共機分從台灣南北兩端飛出第一島鏈,已成常態。這次,解放軍將「原路去回」改為「南出北回」與「北出南回」的繞行,就軍事演訓角度,並無創新之處。且轟炸機與電偵機都是大型慢速機,一旦爆發戰事,除非我國軍防空體系瓦解,否則,就算有加油機與戰鬥機隨行,也不可能堂皇進出台灣東方。但無論如何,較之原路去回,「共機繞台一周」對台灣甚至美、日在宣傳層面都有一定衝擊。<br />
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蔡政府上任以來,因拒絕承認九二共識,使得兩岸關係丕變。加以川蔡通話後,川普及其執政團隊數度挑戰一中原則,因此北京提前施展「敲山震虎」動作,不難理解。「敲山震虎」之舉,既製造聲勢,卻無強烈實質敵對之意,意在心理威嚇。<br />
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共機遠海長航的路線,必然飛越日本防空識別區。但識別區並非領空,不具法理地位,仍然是國際空域。一個國家公告劃設防空識別區,一方面是對外宣示地盤,另方面卻也是將自身實力端上檯面與他人「梭哈」。如果劃了識別區,卻又仍憑他國軍機任意去來,本身毫無因應動作,就會被看成紙老虎。因此,只要共機飛臨宮古水道,日方明知無權阻攔,仍必派出戰機近距離監控,儘管駐琉球戰機疲於奔命,也要宣示自己在這片空域的話語權。<br />
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對我方而言,因防空識別區當初劃設範圍較小,尚無遭共機闖入問題。但是,如果兩岸關係持續低迷,中共對和平解決台灣問題的信心減弱,西太平洋局勢又因華府與北京的權力碰撞而益加緊繃,共機繞飛台灣的機率將愈來愈頻繁,航路也會愈來愈貼近,甚至以國際空域自由航行為名切入我方防空識別區。國防部宣稱,共機若進入我識別區,我將「不畏懼、不迴避、不示弱」;也稱共機如在外海故障,將依人道原則救援。但「三不」究竟要如何實際操作,一旦發生意外要如何化解危機,國安單位須有周全思量,甚至設法與包括北京在內的各方建立默契。<br />
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在軍事上,「藏鋒」與「示威」應交互為用;在「勢」不可輕易示弱,在「實」不可輕易讓人看穿底牌。這次,國安單位第一時間決定公布共軍繞台飛行訊息,一改以往諱莫如深的態度,固在宣傳上搶得先機,也有提醒國人憂患意識的效果。然而,在博得好評之餘,須避免得意忘形;在公開與私下透露消息之時,切莫暴露自己對敵情掌握能力的高低,以免重演李登輝宣稱台海飛彈危機「只是啞彈」,及陳水扁細數福建飛彈陣地部署狀況,導致國軍情蒐系統遭到重創的覆轍。從過往經驗看來,軍方個性保守,不致太過躁進;但馮世寬在立院宣稱「有信心擊落進入防空識別區共機」,暴露其口無遮攔,必須警惕。<br />
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更值得憂心的,是政府高層某些狂熱幕僚忙不迭地放話,除迎合深綠選民口味,講出「我方鎖定中國軍機迫使離去」這種軍事無知的大話,更將公布共軍演訓套上「馬政府過去都不敢講」的紅帽。尤其,在川普公開嗆聲一中原則後,綠營興奮之情溢於言表,一副要毛遂自薦扮演「反中聖戰」支點之姿,完全不以台灣安全為慮。這種心態,究竟置國家安全於何地?<br />
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共機繞台雖只是「敲山震虎」的象徵性動作,卻可看出:美中關係緊張,台灣必成為雙方交鋒之前線,首當其衝。如果我們不能明白自己只是「棋子」,卻還自以為是「槓桿」,而樂在其中,只能說是愚不可及。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-28726019303179842502016-12-15T18:26:00.004-08:002016-12-15T18:26:45.149-08:00Peace is the Highest Value: Beware the Charybdis of US Arms Sales <b>Peace is the Highest Value: Beware the Charybdis of US Arms Sales </b><br />
<b>China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 16, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: If the government's “national defense autonomy” proposal can be implemented smoothly, it will undoubtedly reduce Taiwan's need for US arms purchases, and reduce pressure on the defense budget. But this is not what the US side wants to see. Trump in particular, is committed to arms sales to Taiwan. In such a case, the Tsai government must choose between supporting domestic manufacture and US arms purchases.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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US president-elect Donald Trump has touched a sensitive nerve by calling attention to cross-Strait issues. One cannot assume that this will be his policy upon taking office. But Trump himself and his appointments of key White House staff members and national security advisors do not bode well. The three way interaction among Washington, Beijing, Taipei may be troubled.<br />
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After speaking with President Tsai, Trump Tweeted that the US sells billions of dollars in arms to Taiwan every year. This explains why he picked up the phone, and raised speculation that he would increase arms sales to Taiwan upon taking office. Trump even questioned the need for the United States to adhere to the One China Policy. His main purpose however, was to adopt a hard bargaining position, in the hope of linking the One China Policy to Sino-US trade negotiations. Trump is aware of the importance of the One China Policy. But he intends to use it as a bargaining chip in exchange for other concessions. He simultaneously used the opportunity to increase US strategic commitment to Mainland China, allowing for greater latitude in US policy toward Taiwan.<br />
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In fact, the US government has long adhered to the One China Policy. But it has also had its own counter-strategies. The United States government is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act and will resist any resort to force or other high-handed means to endanger the safety and socio-economic system of the public on Taiwan. This is a commonly held perception on Taiwan. The United States will help in the event of cross-Strait crisis. But this does not mean that the United States will send troops to confront the Mainland directly. The main idea is to enhance Taiwan's independent defense capability. The most important means of achieving this, is arms sales to Taiwan. But pressure from the Mainland and the international situation, limits the quality and quantity of US arms sold to Taiwan. They do not fully meet Taiwan's needs, and are often delayed for various reasons.<br />
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The government's budget is limited, and the funds earmarked for national defense have been inadequate. Since democratization, the defense budget has declined relative to GDP. It has remained close to 2% in recent years, far below US expectations. The United States has long urged Taiwan to increase the percentage of defense budget to 3%. US Department of Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asian Affairs Abraham Denmark recently took part in a think tank forum. He made clear that the Mainland has undergone military modernization and is determined to reunify China. Taiwan must make preparations and invest in order to contain aggression. Taiwan's defense budget has not kept pace with the threat, and therefore must be increased.<br />
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President Tsai declared her commitment to this goal during her election campaign. At this moment, the Tsai government's defense policy and the United States government's policy for Taiwan are aligned. Trump's words and deeds have not broken out of this US government framework. They actively promote it. Increasing tensions in US-China relations will make arms sales to Taiwan easier. Either that, or they may enable the US to extract concessions from the Mainland in other areas. In any event this strategy is favorable to the US.<br />
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The problem is mainly on the Taiwan side. President Tsai declared her desire for "national defense autonomy". She wants “domestic manufacture of warplanes” and “domestic manufacture of warships”. She wants a win-win situation whereby she can upgrade Taiwan's armaments, while developing the defense industry. But Taiwan is limited in its R & D capability and experience. It can implement localization only in limited areas. It may be able to realize small-scale projects such as the Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng III Mobile Launch Vehicles. Important projects include the Air Force next-generation military trainer. The Han Hsiang Company would make replacements for the AT-3 trainer and F-5E/F fighters. But R&D time and capacity constraints, and the transition period required, mean that foreign arms purchases would still be needed to fill the gap. The design and construction of submarines still presents many difficulties for Taiwan, which must rely on the US for technical support. Taiwan remains dependent upon the US for missiles, helicopters, and other weapons and equipment. In the short term, these must be purchased from the United States. They cannot change our dependence on the United States. Taiwan also finds itself in at a disadvantage when bargaining over high-priced weapons from the United States.<br />
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If the government's proposal can be implemented smoothly, it will undoubtedly reduce Taiwan's need for US arms purchases, and reduce pressure on the defense budget. But this is not what the US side wants to see. Trump in particular, is committed to arms sales to Taiwan. Also, weapons projects would be based on R&D progress on Taiwan. Promoting the domestic manufacture of weapons systems would enable Taiwan to produce competitive weapons, as it has in the past. In such a case, the Tsai government must choose between supporting domestic manufacture and US arms purchases.<br />
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President Tsai wants national defense autonomy to develop the relevant industries. She faces constraints from internal R&D technical capacity. More importantly, she faces constraints from the United States. If Taiwan is subject to US policy needs, any efforts toward national defense autonomy will be in vain. More importantly, Taiwan's budget is limited. Many needs must be met. Social welfare, national pensions, health care reform, and other needs, all require funding. Adequate funding is also needed to cope with the temporary turmoil caused by reform. Clearly the government lacks the capacity to increase the defense budget. Still less can it afford to flip-flop between the localization of the arms industry and US arms purchases.<br />
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The Tsai government faces a dilemma. It must extricate itself from this whirlpool. The best way to do this, is to institutionalize peaceful cross-Strait relations and end cross-Strait military confrontation.<br />
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和平是王道 警惕對美軍購漩渦<br />
2016/12/16 中國時報<br />
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美國總統當選人川普接連挑起兩岸問題的敏感神經,雖然不能就此論斷他就任以後的對中政策,但從川普本人及他任命白宮重要幕僚與國安團隊要角的言談,可以清楚嗅出令人不安的氣息,美中台三角互動關係將進入多事之秋。<br />
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川普在與蔡總統通電話之後,就在推特上以美國每年對台軍售數十億美元作為理由,說明他為什麼該接這通電話,引發外界對他強化對台軍售動機的猜測。後續川普進一步質疑美國堅持一中政策的必要性,但他主要思路是將其視為一種交易,希望將一中政策納入中美有關貿易的談判之中。川普並非不知道一中政策的重要,而是打算拿來交換其他問題的解決,同時,也可以藉此機會拉高美國對中政策的戰略縱深,讓美國的對台政策可以更為游刃有餘。<br />
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事實上,美國政府雖然堅持一中政策,但一直以來都有自己的應對策略。美國政府受到《台灣關係法》的約束,會抵抗任何訴諸武力或使用其他高壓手段,而危及台灣人民安全及社會經濟制度的行動。這也構成台灣社會普遍認知,一旦兩岸出現危機,美國會出手相助,但這並不意味著美國會為此直接派兵與大陸正面對抗。美國的主要思路是提升台灣的自主國防能力,其最重要的實現形式就是對台軍售。只是受限於來自大陸的壓力和國際局勢,美國對台軍事的品質和數量並不完全符合台灣的需求,且常常因為種種原因而延宕。<br />
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對台灣來說,政府財政預算有限,投入國防的資金一直難以滿足需求,而自從民主化以來國防預算占GDP的比重更是一直在下降,近年來已經接近2%,遠低於美國對台灣的期許。一直以來,美國都要求台灣將國防預算的比重提高到3%,美國國防部主管亞洲事務的副助理部長鄧志強近日在參與智庫論壇時即明確表示,大陸的軍事現代化和統一決心,使得台灣在準備和投資遏制侵略的能力變得義不容辭,而台灣的國防預算沒有跟上威脅的演進,因此應該增加。<br />
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對此,蔡總統在競選期間也曾明確承諾要達到這個目標,現階段蔡政府的國防政策與美國的對台政策在方向上是一致的。而川普的言行,也並未跳脫出美國政府的這一框架,反而是在積極推動。透過升高美中關係的緊張局勢,可以讓對台軍售更為順利地推動,或者藉此換取大陸在別的議題上讓步,無論如何這都是對美方穩贏的策略。<br />
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問題主要在台灣這一邊。蔡總統宣告全力推動「國防自主」,並期望通過「國機國造」和「國艦國造」項目來實現提升軍備能力與發展國防工業的雙贏局面。但台灣受限於研發能力和經驗的不足,只能在有限幾個領域實現國產化,目前有實現前景的主要是雄二、雄三機動發射車等小規模項目,重要項目則有空軍下一代高教機,由漢翔公司負責,逐步取代AT-3教練機和F-5E/F戰鬥機,但即便如此,因為研發時程和產能的限制,機型轉換的間隙可能仍需要對外採購來填補。至於潛艦的設計建造,台灣也同樣面臨重重困難,仍須依賴美方的技術支持。至於飛彈、直升機等武器裝備,還是只能仰賴對美採購,短期內不可能改變依賴美國的局面,台灣對美國的高價武器也難有討價還價的能力。<br />
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政府的這一構想如果能夠順利實現,無疑會減少台灣對美國軍購的需求,降低國防預算的支出壓力,這一局面並非美方所樂見,尤其是川普致力於推動對台軍售,在相關武器項目上也會根據台灣方面研製的進度採取相應措施,比如推銷台灣有機會取得進展的武器項目以達到競爭目的,這在過去也是所在多有。在這種情況下,蔡政府必須在支持國產與對美軍購兩者之間做出取捨。<br />
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蔡總統想要透過國防自主來發展相關產業的構想,不光要受到內部研發技術能力的限制,更重要的是要面對來自美國的阻礙,若台灣要受制於美國的政策需要,相關努力很容易就付諸東流。更重要的是,台灣的財政預算十分有限,又有龐大的社會福利需求,後續國民年金、健保改革等議題都牽涉到財政資金的分配,需要政府給予足夠的資金保障應對改革帶來的暫時動盪。在這種情況下,顯然沒有餘力再進一步提升國防預算的比重,更無法承受在國產化與美國軍備之間搖擺的政策損失。<br />
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面臨此種困局,蔡政府必須設法跳出這一漩渦,根本之道還是實現兩岸關係和平發展的制度化,消解兩岸軍事對峙的氛圍,如此才不至於在國防預算上空耗資源。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-43440562556922562722016-12-14T20:53:00.001-08:002016-12-14T22:54:36.380-08:00Taiwan Must “Know Thyself”<b>Taiwan Must “Know Thyself”</b><br />
<b>China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 15, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: Former Vice President Annette Lu published an article in the China Times yesterday. She said there was no reason to be excited about the Trump Tsai phone call. On the contrary, she voiced unease, and called on President Tsai to be prepared for the storm that is about to hit. As a veteran green camp political leader, Annette Lu's reaction was level-headed. She hoped that President Tsai would "know thyself”. If Tsai is willing to be a bargaining chip for the US, she will not merely break with the Mainland, she will also have to pay the US protection money. Therefore she would be well advised to let cross-Strait problems be solved by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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When president elect Donald Trump openly questioned the Mainland's “one China policy” the official response from the Tsai government was quite low-key. To everyone's surprise, Taiwan independence elders were uniformly silent. Instead, it was the Western media that seemed determined to make the most of the issue, especially the New York Times, which accused Trump of provoking China over its most sensitive core interest. If he persisted, the Mainland would have many bargaining chips it could use, and Taiwan would be its first victim. The Times noted several of these. They included trade sanctions, investment slowdowns, aid to North Korea, and aid to Iran. Among these, Taiwan most fears a Mainland launched diplomatic war that deprives Taiwan of its diplomatic allies. The Mainland could also limit investments on Taiwan and the number of Mainland tourists to Taiwan, thereby undermining Taiwan's economy.<br />
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The New York Times does not support Trump. Nor has it ever hesitated to criticize the Mainland. Trump's use of the One China Policy as a bargaining chip makes people shudder. Clear-minded people know it was not exaggerating. The Mainland is fully capable of punishing Taiwan. That was never in question. The only question is whether it wants to. The Trump Tsai phone call may have given Taiwan independence elements some cheap thrills. It may have held out hope that Taiwan would become a bargaining chip the US uses to check and balance the Mainland. But the question is, at what price?<br />
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What is a bargaining chip? It is the ante a gambler puts up before a bet, in the hope of making a greater gain. The concept of bargaining chips applies in many other areas, including international politics. Bargaining chips are often viewed as units of trade among players. All this talk about bargaining chips however, presumes that Taiwan's current and future status will not determined by Taiwan itself, but by the major powers. The United States has long treated Taiwan as a bargaining chip between the Mainland and the United States. This did not begin today. It began with the outbreak of the Korean War. Taiwan became the United States' unsinkable aircraft carrier in the first island chain, part of its plan to contain the Mainland. Its fate was sealed back then. Past US presidents have allowed Taiwan to save face. Trump did not. He made Taiwan's status explicit. The situation is now abundantly clear. In the current Great Game of Nations, is Taiwan a player? Or merely a bargaining chip? If the former, then it must possess the strategic wisdom to play with others. If the latter, then all it can do is wait and hope that others will be merciful.<br />
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Do not say that Taiwan is too small, and therefore lacks the means to play among the major powers, or that it cannot afford to play. Many small nations in the world today lack even Taiwan's resources. Yet they are still able to play among the major powers. Leave aside North Korea for the moment. Singapore has less territory and fewer people than Taiwan. But who can deny its key role in the Southeast Asian Great Game? During the Chiang Ching-kuo era, the United States feared the Mainland, and refused to sell second-generation fighters to Taiwan. Old F-104 fighters crashed often, and were derided as "widow makers". Taiwan's own IDF showed the United States that Taiwan could produce its own fighters. Therefore the US sold the F-16 to Taiwan, to the benefit of US arms merchants. During the Two Chiangs era, Taiwan remained dependent upon the United States. Nevertheless it maintained its Chinese identity.<br />
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Taiwan must not resign itself to being a bargaining chip. The reason is simple. A player retains the initiative. A bargaining chip passively permits others to do with it as they will. When one is reduced to the status of a bargaining chip, do not assume that the players will feel any sympathy for you. As long as you can be traded for something more profitable, you will be. Never forget that Trump is a businessman. For businessmen, the main theme is trade. His eyes will always be focused on the interests of the United States, never on those of Taiwan. If Trump really “loved Taiwan”, he would proclaim that "Taiwan is the 51st state of the United States" and that Taiwan is protected. Is Trump about to do that?<br />
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Following the Trump Tsai phone call, Trump repeatedly railed against Mainland China. It appeared as if a sudden change had suddenly come over US-China relations. If some people on Taiwan are excited about this, their reaction can only be described as foolish. How do they know he is not merely bargaining with the Mainland? Is it not obvious Trump is using the Trump Tsai phone call as leverage, to raise the price during negotiations with the Mainland? If the Mainland is willing to pay Trump's asking price, who says the Taiwan chip will not be sacrificed and traded? The New York Times has already listed the Mainland's other chips. Has Taiwan counted its own chips? Do they really outnumber the other side's chips ?<br />
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As history can attest, numerous US presidents have loudly criticized the Mainland before taking office, and left Taiwan with high expectations. But when push came to shove, the presidents who inflicted the most damage to Taiwan, were often the ones who criticized the most loudly. Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and Bush Jr. all did the same with the Mainland. Is Trump really going to be the lone exception? Especially since this time the outcry was the loudest. Therefore, will the injury visited upon Taiwan also be the greatest?<br />
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Former Vice President Annette Lu published an article in the China Times yesterday. She said there was no reason to be excited about the Trump Tsai phone call. On the contrary, she voiced unease, and called on President Tsai to be prepared for the storm that is about to hit. As a veteran green camp political leader, Annette Lu's reaction was level-headed. She hoped that President Tsai would "know thyself”. If Tsai is willing to be a bargaining chip for the US, she will not merely break with the Mainland, she will also have to pay the US protection money. Therefore she would be well advised to let cross-Strait problems be solved by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.<br />
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台灣要確實認識自己<br />
2016/12/15 中國時報<br />
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美國總統當選人川普公開挑戰大陸「一中政策」,台灣官方反應相當低調,令人意外的是,獨派大老居然一片沉寂,反而西方媒體彷彿炸了鍋,尤其《紐約時報》,直指川普碰觸了中國最敏感的「核心利益」,如果執意而為,大陸手上有不少牌可以回敬,台灣可能首當其衝先受害。紐時點出大陸可能操作的幾張牌,如經貿制裁、投資放緩、經援北韓、拉攏伊朗等,其中台灣最不想聽到應該是,大陸很可能發動外交戰,加緊挖角台灣邦交國,以及限制對台投資和赴台遊客數量,打擊台灣經濟。<br />
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《紐約時報》並不挺川普,批評大陸向來也不假辭色,這次在評論川普所謂一中政策「談判籌碼說」時,直白得讓人不寒而慄!腦筋清醒的人都知曉,紐時並沒有亂說,大陸要不要懲罰台灣,從來就不是能不能的問題,而是要不要的問題!蔡川通話或許讓獨派人士感到興奮,甚至盼望台灣成為美國制衡大陸的籌碼,問題是,台灣承受得起代價嗎?<br />
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什麼是籌碼?是賭徒在賭桌做為下注的本錢,目的是希望在對賭時獲取更大的利益,今天這概念被用在更多層面,包括在國際政治的博奕上,籌碼往往被隱喻成玩家對奕的交易單位。籌碼說表示台灣的地位與前途不操之在己,應由大國決定。美國把台灣視為中美關係的籌碼,並非始自今日,從韓戰爆發台灣成為美國遏制陸權大國第一島鏈的不沉航母時,就已經注定,只是歷任美國總統為盟國保留顏面,川普只是把話明說了。現在問題很清楚了,當前大國博奕中,台灣究竟定位自己是玩家?還是籌碼?如果是前者,還得要看你有沒有足夠的戰略智慧跟人家玩,如果是後者,那麼就等著任人宰割吧!<br />
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不要說台灣很小,在大國之間玩不動,也玩不起,當今世上有多少小國,掌握的資源可能還不及台灣,照樣在大國之間玩得虎虎生風?北韓就不提了,新加坡的面積與人口都不及台灣,有誰能否定它在東南亞博奕中的關鍵角色?蔣經國時代,美國忌憚大陸,拒絕出售第二代戰機給台灣,老舊F-104戰機事故頻頻,有「寡婦飛機」謔稱,台灣發憤圖強自行生產了IDF,美國眼看台灣可以自力生產,又強賣了F-16給台灣,圖利美國軍火商。兩蔣時代台灣依附美國,但仍然堅持自己中國人的身分。<br />
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台灣不可自居籌碼!原因很簡單,做玩家主動權在自己手上,做籌碼是你被動地讓人家玩,當自己被淪為籌碼之際,就請不要假定玩家會對你心存善念,因為只要可換得更大利益,你是隨時可以被交易的!永遠不要忘記一點,川普是商人,商人遊戲的主旋律是交易,眼中永遠只有美國的利益,永遠不會是台灣的利益。川普如果真的「愛台灣」,就宣布「台灣是美國第51州」,保護台灣,但川普會嗎?<br />
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蔡川通話後,川普不斷對大陸嗆聲,一副美中關係即將發生突變的態樣,台灣若有人因此而大感興奮,那恐怕也只能用愚蠢來形容!你怎麼知道他不是在對大陸喊價?有了蔡川通話做為槓桿,川普豈不是正好可以對大陸抬高價碼?如果大陸所提供的報酬夠大夠好,誰說台灣做為籌碼不能被犧牲、被交易?《紐約時報》不是早已羅列出大陸可以操縱的其他籌碼,台灣有真的秤過自己的分量,贏得過其他籌碼嗎?<br />
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歷史的經驗班班可考,多少美國總統在就任前大聲批判大陸,讓台灣懷了挺大的樂觀期待,最後對台灣傷害最大的,往往就是這些聲量最大的總統,從尼克森、卡特、雷根、柯林頓到小布希,都曾與大陸做過類似交易,川普有可能例外嗎?特別是這次喊價更高過以往,對台灣傷害會不會也更大呢?<br />
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呂前副總統日昨在《中國時報》發表文章,對蔡川通話效應不見興奮,反而表達了不安,呼籲蔡總統要嚴肅面對即將席捲而來的風浪。呂秀蓮身為綠營資深政治人物,反應極其冷靜,期待蔡總統也要「確實認識自己」,如果自甘當美國籌碼,不但會與大陸決裂,還要付保護費,兩岸問題還是放到兩岸平台解決吧。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-24161055401085430472016-12-13T19:30:00.000-08:002016-12-13T19:30:47.952-08:00Political Wildfire, Economic Freeze<b>Political Wildfire, Economic Freeze</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 13, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: The Trump Tsai phone call thrilled everyone within the DPP. But the Tsai government must realize that no amount of political stimulants can unfreeze Taiwan's economy. If President Tsai refuses to change her political posture, and the DPP refuses to change its brazenly self-serving ways, but instead sets political wildfires everywhere it goes, the public will turn its back on them in short order. People are tightening their belts. Businesses are struggling to stay afloat. Meanwhile the ruling party bickers over who will be appointed to what position of power. One cannot help asking, just who was the third change in ruling parties for?<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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Frankly, we have no idea whether the Lin Chuan cabinet can be considered a “cabinet comprised of financial and economic experts”. For the past half year, it has shown hardly any financial or economic pronouncements. Amidst wave after wave of political proclamations, the entire cabinet has been demoted to the status of “gofer” for the Presidential Office. On the one hand, it must take orders from the DPP legislative caucus. On the other hand, it must be the whipping boy for Taiwan independence elders. The cabinet is even finding it difficult to serve as gatekeeper, let alone act on its own initiative. The smile on Lin Chuan's face remains. But the cabinet's fumbling reveals its enervated state.<br />
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Looking back over the past seven months, it is clear that Taiwan has been wracked by internal and external strife. Cross-Strait relations have been frozen. South China Sea arbitration has failed. Labor has gone on strike. Protests follow, one after another. Businesses have closed. Disputes rage over the importation of food products from Japan's nuclear disaster areas. The recent Trump Tsai phone call even led to PLA Air Force planes circling Taiwan. Not a day goes by without public anxiety, unease, and suspicions. Yet despite this political wildfire, the government has done nothing to address people's economic plight. The economy remains frozen. The problem is that when the new government came to power, it single-mindedly promoted its own political agenda. It was utterly indifferent to the people's livelihood and their economic future. The inevitable result was the president's poll numbers went straight down.<br />
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Tsai Ying-lin trusted and relied on the Lin Chuan cabinet. The cabinet ought to enjoy ample latitude. So why in actual practice has the Lin Chuan cabinet become so passive, even irrelevant? There are three reasons.<br />
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Reason One. Lin is too weak. In the face of Tsai Ying-wen's strong leadership and DPP special interests, he has lost almost all initiative and will. It is all he can do to be carried along by political currents, while bobbing up and down in the waves. Other cabinet members are limited by their lack of experience and insight, or cowed by DPP political flak. They dare not advance their own ideas. This reflects the authoritarian structure of the Tsai regime and the aggressive nature of the DPP. The "old blue men" elements within the Lin cabinet are merely scapegoats.<br />
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Reason Two. Tsai Ying-wen lacks any sense of how to lead the nation. The moment the president came to power, she immediately rewrote cross-Strait relations. Internally, she rummaged through old records in order to settle old scores. She hastily pandered to the United States and Japan and sundry Social Justice Warriors. Under the circumstances, Taiwan's economy and the people's livelihood were naturally relegated to the bottom of her to do list. For the past seven months, the cabinet has been busy implementing President Tsai's policies, then struggling to clean up the mess they left behind. Where is she going to find time to revitalize the economy?<br />
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Reason Three. The Democratic Progressive Party considers itself more important than the nation. When considering fiscal matters, it is more concerned with how to benefit the party than the people's livelihood or the interests of the nation. Recently, major public works projects planned by the Tsai government include moving the Taoyuan Railway underground, raising the Chiayi Railway above ground, building the Taichung Shanshou Line and the Lugang Historical Scenic Area. Every one of these projects is in a county or city ruled by the DPP. These projects cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Yet the decisions were made in haste. The amount of economic momentum they have generated is questionable. Another example is the rise in produce prices after typhoons. The DPP thought only about how to acquire the rights to operate fruit and vegetable companies, not how bring down the price of fruits and vegetables. With such a selfish attitude, how can it possibly think about the future of Taiwan's economy?<br />
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Taiwan's economy faces two major variables. Variable One. Cross-Strait relations have been flash frozen. The result has been greatly reduced Mainland tourism, leading to a tourism industry recession. The tourism industry is suffering. TransAsia Airways has exited the industry. The DPP is reaping what it sowed. Beijing has recently increased pressure on large corporations, and even resorted to saber rattling. It is difficult to be optimistic. Variable Two. Donald Trump is inciting the rise of international trade protectionism. Leave aside the stilborn TPP for the moment. Taiwan's foreign trade will face more stringent challenges. The Tsai government's "New Southern Strategy" has yet to be implemented. Its Five Major Innovative Industries initiative, plus New Agriculture and the Recirculating Economy, remain paper projects. It is unlikely that over the next two years, the people will actually feel any benefits. This is probably the main reason for President Tsai's drop in popularity.<br />
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The Trump Tsai phone call thrilled everyone within the DPP. But the Tsai government must realize that no amount of political stimulants can unfreeze Taiwan's economy. If President Tsai refuses to change her political posture, and the DPP refuses to change its brazenly self-serving ways, but instead sets political wildfires everywhere it goes, the public will turn its back on them in short order. People are tightening their belts. Businesses are struggling to stay afloat. Meanwhile the ruling party bickers over who will be appointed to what position of power. One cannot help asking, just who was the third change in ruling parties for?<br />
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政治野火旺,經濟放冷灶<br />
2016-12-14 聯合報<br />
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老實說,我們不知道林全內閣到底算不算「財經內閣」,因為半年多來,民眾幾乎看不到什麼財經作為。在一波又一波的政治喧囂中,整個內閣幾淪為總統府的「行政執行處」,這一頭受民進黨立院黨團使喚,那一頭被獨派大老當成出氣包;內閣連基本把關的守勢都難以維持,遑論主動出擊。儘管林全臉上的微笑沒有消失,對照紛亂的行政步調,不免顯得虛弱。<br />
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回顧過去七個月,台灣內外紛擾不斷。從兩岸關係急凍、南海仲裁失利、勞工罷工及抗爭不斷、企業關門收攤、日本核食進口爭議,乃至最近川蔡通話引發的共機繞台風波,民眾幾乎無日不在焦慮、不安、猜疑中度過。然而,在這片燎原的政治野火中,大家卻看不到政府對經濟民生事務有任何著墨,經濟仍是一口冷灶。問題是,新政府上台,若一心一意炒作自己屬意的政治議題,對人民生活及經濟前景毫無關注,總統的民調直直落,恐怕是必然的結果。<br />
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以蔡英文對林全的信賴和倚重,照理說,內閣應該不是沒有發揮的空間。但是,為什麼在實際運作中,林內閣的表現卻顯得如此消極與被動,甚至不著邊際?其中原因,可以從三點觀察。<br />
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其一,林全的政治性格太弱,在面對蔡英文的強勢領導及民進黨的利益掛帥下,幾乎完全失去了主動的意志,只能被政治議題帶著走,在其間載沉載浮。至於其他閣員,或受限於經驗和見識,或被民進黨的政治砲火震懾,更不敢提出自己的主張。這種情況,其實是蔡政府的威權結構與民進黨的好鬥性格使然,林內閣的「老藍男」成分只是代罪羔羊罷了。<br />
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其二,蔡英文的決策領導,缺乏本末先後的治國瞻矚。總統一上台,不僅立刻改寫兩岸關係,內政上什麼陳年舊帳都要翻箱倒櫃掏出來清算,還要忙著討好美日及各路社運團體。在這種情況下,台灣經濟和人民生活的議題,當然就被排到施政議程表的尾巴去了。試想,過去七個月,內閣光是忙著執行蔡總統決策及收拾其善後都來不及,哪有餘裕思考振興經濟之道?<br />
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其三,民進黨「黨大於國」的政治思維,對財經議題的思考向以如何「有利於自己」為先,而不是考慮民生或國家。最近蔡政府規畫的一些重大公共建設,包括桃園鐵路地下化、嘉義鐵路高架化、台中山手線、鹿港歷史風景區,幾無例外都落在民進黨執政縣市。這些工程動輒耗資上千億,在決策草率下,能創造什麼經濟動能,令人高度存疑。再如颱風後的菜價上漲問題,民進黨想到的,竟只是如何把果菜公司的經營權搶到手,而不是如何把菜價平抑下去。這種只圖近利的自私心態,又如何會想到台灣經濟的未來?<br />
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台灣經濟面對的是兩大變數:一是兩岸關係急凍,導致陸客大減及觀光產業衰退,旅遊業叫苦、復興航空解散,惡果已現。最近,中共更逐漸將壓力對準大企業,且動用軍事威嚇,前景難以樂觀。第二,是川普帶動的國際貿易保護主義興起,撇開TPP破局不談,台灣對外貿易將遭遇更嚴苛的挑戰。蔡政府的「新南向」政策迄今未見開展,五大創新產業雖加上「新農業」和「循環經濟」兩項,也仍然只是紙上作業,未來兩年內,恐怕都無法讓人民對振興經濟「有感」。這點,恐怕才是蔡總統民意直落最大的罩門。<br />
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最近川蔡通話雖讓民進黨上下一陣振奮,但冷靜下來之後,蔡政府應該意識到:再多的政治「興奮劑」,其實已治不了台灣經濟的冷感症候群。蔡總統若不重新整理她自己的主政步調,民進黨如果不收斂自利的驕兵嘴臉,卻每天在那裡以燃放政治野火為樂,很快就會被人民厭棄。人民都在勒緊褲帶,商家都在苦撐待變,卻只見執政黨在那裡爭官封位,不可一世;試問:第三度政黨輪替,究竟為了誰?<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-4772421705470014322016-12-12T22:35:00.003-08:002016-12-12T22:35:37.051-08:00DPP Using Democracy to Bury Democracy <b>DPP Using Democracy to Bury Democracy </b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 13, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: Through the abuse of mass movements, the abuse of executive power, and violations of the rule of law, the DPP has cast a shadow over Taiwan's democracy. Ironically, mass movements, executive discretion, and majority rule were originally norms within a democracy. But the DPP has used all three in its effort to “use democracy to bury democracy". Unless the DPP pulls back from the precipice, Taiwan's democracy will be reduced to populism, and authoritarian will soon rear its ugly head.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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After three changes in ruling parties, the Republic of China is now regarded as a model for the transformation of an authoritarian state into a democratic state. Unfortunately this third change in ruling parties, which has allowed the DPP to enjoy “total government”, has not consolidated democracy. Instead it has facilitated a reaction against democracy. It has enabled the DPP to “use democracy to bury democracy”.<br />
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This so-called "using democracy to bury democracy" uses democratic procedures to take a nation back down the road toward authoritarianism. The overthrow of the Weimar Republic in Germany offers a clear reminder of how nations may fall. First, consider how the DPP abused mass movements. The DPP has long resorted to taking to the streets. The mass movements it led have never abjured violence. The first time it assumed power it had an opportunity to change the constitution. But once it lost power, it reverted to its old ways. During the eight year long Ma era, mass movements escalated. They became the means by which the DPP engineered its return to power. They also undermined democracy and the rule of law.<br />
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For example, in 2008, Chen Yunlin, chairman of the Mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, paid a visit to Taiwan. The DPP led a series of protests that ended in bloodshed. Back then DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen embraced violence, claiming that "[the Ma government] forced people to take to the streets. That was the greatest violence". During the latter half of the Ma era, the DPP and DPP affiliated pressure groups led an endless series of "Occupy" movements. Once the DPP came to power, these illegal activities became immune from prosecution. The DPP even expressed approval of these movements, even though they trampled over the rule of law. Recently, while protesting the Labor Law Amendment Act, labor groups assaulted DPP Chief Convener Ko Chien-min. The Presidential Office and the DPP led Legislative Yuan unanimously condemned the violence. But the public was unmoved. The reason was simple. Everyone knew that the DPP has long been the chief instigator of street protests and illegal acts of violence.<br />
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Consider the matter from another level. Now that it is the ruling party, the DPP is free to abuse state authority. When the US government fined Mega Bank for money laundering, the DPP used the incident as a pretext to accuse the KMT of money laundering. Investigations have discovered that former Mega Bank board chairman Tsai Yu-tsai did indeed violate the law. But his violations had no connection whatsoever with alleged “KMT money laundering".<br />
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Consider another matter. TransAsia Airways is exiting the airline industry. The Tsai government wanted to show how efficiently it could handle the matter. It announced that "The Ministry of Justice will freeze the TransAsia Airways trust fund". But how can an executive branch entity freeze funds? It then announced that "China Airlines will take over all of TransAsia Airway's air routes". But how can executive an branch entity take over international and cross-Strait air routes? These two cases are clear evidence that the executive branch has abused its authority for political purposes, and undermined the principle of "governing in accordance with the rule of law".<br />
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But the DPP's worst abuse of democracy is its direct enacting of laws contrary to democratic principles, in order to crack down on political opponents and consolidate its power. The DPP has repeated such practices again and again since seizing “total government” power. For example, the passage of the Act Governing the Handling of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations trampled over existing laws and even the Constitution. It not only presumed guilt, it even imposed ex post facto law extending back seven decades. It made itself judge, jury, and executioner. It combined the executive and judicial functions into one, allowing the CIPAS chairman to run amoke, even while claiming that he was “implementing transitional justice".<br />
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Under the same slogan, the Transitional Justice Ordinance, even more wide-reaching and limitless, is gaining momentum. Once the law is passed, an even larger, even less constrained "Transitional Justice Commitee" will investigate all cases of what it considers to be "unjust". The targets will not be limited to political parties. They will include any individuals or groups with the same history or background. Those targeted may be subjected to brutal Red Guard style inquisitions, then judged guilty without trial. Even if they are acquitted, the process will defame them in the court of public opinion.<br />
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In addition to transitional justice legislation, there is "loyalty legislation". DPP legislators are accusing retired generals of disloyalty by forming a United Front with the Mainland. They are demanding the revision of the Cross-Strait Relations Ordinance. They would forbid retired generals from visiting the Mainland for life. The would even make prosecution retroactive. In cases where "national loyalty" is difficult to define, the result would be political inquisitions, and anything the targeted individual did over the past 20 years would be dug up and used against him. The passage of this law will mark the beginning of another white terror.<br />
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Through the abuse of mass movements, the abuse of executive power, and violations of the rule of law, the DPP has cast a shadow over Taiwan's democracy. Ironically, mass movements, executive discretion, and majority rule were originally norms within a democracy. But the DPP has used all three in its effort to “use democracy to bury democracy". Unless the DPP pulls back from the precipice, Taiwan's democracy will be reduced to populism, and authoritarian will soon rear its ugly head.<br />
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「以民主埋葬民主」的三部曲<br />
2016-12-13 聯合報<br />
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台灣歷經三次政黨輪替,稱得上是威權國家轉型為民主國家的典範之一。但第三次政黨輪替,民進黨的完全執政非但未能鞏固民主,反而使民主發展出現了逆流,漸漸出現「以民主埋葬民主」的趨勢。<br />
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所謂「以民主埋葬民主」,即透過民主程序,讓國家倒回威權、專制之路;當年德國威瑪民主的傾覆,堪為殷鑑。首先,是民進黨對群眾運動的濫用。民進黨過去靠街頭運動起家,主導的群眾運動始終不脫暴力色彩;首度執政原是改變體質的契機,但失去政權後,竟又回到這條路線。在馬政府執政的八年,群眾運動不斷升級,成為民進黨重返執政的助力,卻也使民主法治受到重創。<br />
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舉例而言,二○○八年大陸海協會長陳雲林來台,民進黨主導的一系列抗議活動多次以流血收場。當時,民進黨主席蔡英文擁抱暴力,宣稱「讓人民走上街頭,才是最大的暴力」。在馬政府後期,各種「占領」行動,在民進黨及其周邊組織支持下不斷延燒。俟民進黨執政後,對這些違法活動概不追究,甚至踐踏法治對脫序運動者表示嘉許。日前的勞基法修法,勞團拉扯民進黨總召柯建銘,府院黨一致「譴責暴力」,卻無法引起社會共鳴;究其原因,正是社會各界咸知民進黨才是促使街頭運動與違法或暴力結合的禍首。<br />
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從第二個層面看,是透過執政的優勢,在行政作為上濫權。例如清查兆豐銀的遭美重罰的洗錢案,先預設特定目的無限上綱,意圖找到「國民黨洗錢」的把柄。調查迄今,兆豐金前董事長蔡友才雖確涉違法,卻與民進黨設定的「國民黨洗錢」沾不上關係。<br />
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再如,處理復興航空解散時,政府為表現自己「明快處理」,竟宣布由「法務部凍結復興航空信託基金」。問題是,凍結任何基金,豈是行政部門可以任意為之?繼又宣布「華航接手興航所有路線」,但國際及兩岸航線豈是行政部門可以私相授受?此二例,都是行政部門為達政治目的而濫權,傷害「依法行政」原則的明證。<br />
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民進黨侵犯民主最惡劣的手法,是直接透過粗暴的立法手段,訂定違反民主法則的法令,據以打擊政敵,遂行其統治權力的穩固。這類例子,在民進黨完全執政後,一而再、再而三地出現。例如,不當黨產條例之立法,可謂超越了現行所有法令乃至憲法,不僅採取「有罪推定」原則,追溯期更長達七十年,更賦與「黨產會」警察兼法官的角色,集行政、司法功能於一身,僅憑主委一人之意志即能橫行無阻,卻厚顏宣稱是為了「轉型正義」。<br />
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在同一口號下,牽涉範圍更廣、更無限上綱的「促進轉型正義條例」,也正蓄勢待發。一旦立法完成,一個更大型、更無所限制的「促轉會」也將以正義為名,調查一切被它認定為「不合正義」的情事。而且,其對象不限於政黨,而是所有曾經歷那段歷史的個人或團體,任何人都可能遭到紅衛兵式的粗暴調查,然後輕率地入罪;或者就算未被定罪,也在「公審」過程把人鬥臭。<br />
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除了轉型正義立法,還有「忠誠立法」。民進黨立委指控,退休將領赴大陸參加「統戰活動」是不忠行為,因此要求修改《兩岸人民關係條例》,將管制退將赴大陸的年限推至「終身」,而且「溯及既往」。在「國家忠誠」難以定義的情況下,只怕最後變成「政治審查」,且過去二十年的行為都將被追溯。此案一旦修法完成,甚至將是另一次白色恐怖的來臨。<br />
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透過濫用群眾運動、行政濫權和違反法治原則的立法,民進黨在執政半年內,已讓台灣民主蒙上陰影。諷刺的是,無論群眾運動、行政裁量或多數立法,原都是民主的常態,但民進黨卻將之譜成「以民主埋葬民主」的三部曲。若不懸崖勒馬,只怕台灣民主淪為民粹、威權的日子很快就會到來。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-76590721972921037972016-12-11T22:40:00.003-08:002016-12-17T06:52:34.517-08:00Trump Tsai Fever: Short Term Rewards, Long Term Risks <b>Trump Tsai Fever: Short Term Rewards, Long Term Risks</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 9, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: Trump Tsai fever rages on. But blowback is gathering strength. The government cannot afford to look only at superficial political gains. It must pay attention to the impact of Trump's policies on our economy as well. It must respond early, in order to find a better way and to end uncertainty in Taiwan's economy.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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Donald Trump will not take office for another month. Yet his election victory has already had a major impact on the global economic and political order, in many respects. The Taiwan issue was not originally a matter of concern for the incoming Trump government. But the Trump Tsai phone call blew the matter out of proportion, and upset relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. For the Tsai government, the incident may be a minor diplomatic victory. But for the people, greater uncertainty in cross-Strait relations is certain to make Taiwan's economic challenges even more daunting.<br />
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Following the Trump Tsai phone call, Trump and his administration used social media to accuse Mainland China of manipulating exchange rates, dumping products in the United States, and stealing American jobs. Trump issued a series of provocations. The US media predicted that Trump would continue to opeate in this manner after taking office. US-China relations will therefore be riddled with friction and uncertainty. In other words, if the Trump Tsai phone call benefits the Tsai government, and US-China relations became tense, the Mainland will exact revenge. Taiwan will be a fish in a barrel. The result will be a short term gains at the expense of long term losses.<br />
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The response from Beijing in the wake of the Trump Tsai phone call has been restrained. That is because Beijing sees Trump as merely a "president elect", and is in no hurry for a showdown. Beijing may have exercised restraint. But affiliated organizations, including party media channels, have not held back. They are even prepared to respond to a pro-Taiwan policy on the part of Trump once he takes office. If and when it becomes necessary, Beijing will lash out at Taiwan, politically or economically. The Tsai government must not misjudge the situation.<br />
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Mainland China, which has become economically powerful in recent years, often uses economic leverage to strongarm opponents. For example, South Korea agreed to allow the United States to deploy the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea earlier this year. Beijing launched a diplomatic counterattack. It also forbade the airing of South Korean film and television programs on the Mainland. This and other economic sanctions exerted indirect pressure on South Korea. In the case of Taiwan, Beijing often applies pressure on Taiwan businessmen at critical moments, as a form of psychological warfare. For example, just before the Anti-Secession Law was passed in 20015, Hsu Wen-lung, former chairman of Chi Mei, was pressured into to publishing an open letter in support of the CCP's Anti-Secession Law.<br />
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This practice of "using business to influence politics" was replayed this year. The star of this year's show was the Hai Pa Wang Company, owned and operated by Tsai Ing-wen's family. The company's investments on the Mainland were audited for tax evasion, and its products were investigated for failure to meet health standards. Hai Pa Wang was forced to issue a public statement saying that "both sides of the Strait are part of one China". Meanwhile, Taiwan Semiconductor Chairman Morris Chang and Giant Tour Chairman Liu Chin-piao have reportedly resigned as presidential consultants. In fact the two resigned before the Hai Pa Wang incident, and before Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun said he "opposed allowing Taiwan businessmen who advocate Taiwan independence to make money on the Mainland”. In any event, these changes and cross-Strait relations have become increasingly sensitive, and are directly and indirectly linked. They will inevitably undermine public confidence in the government.<br />
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Over the past two weeks, PLA Air Force warplanes have twice circumnavigated Taiwan, indicating that Beijing's intimidation against Taiwan has escalated to military means. Such intimidation is mostly symbolic, but will only increase in the foreseeable future. Taiwan cannot afford to be optimistic or naive.<br />
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Trump has declared that he will abolish the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). If it is replaced by bilateral economic and trade agreements, the United States is bound to exert major pressure on smaller nations, in order to reap economic and trade benefits beyond those provided by the TPP. Naturally this does not favor smaller nations. Protectionist barriers to US trade will inevitably be raised, and trade friction between the United States and China will inevitably increase. This will have a major impact on Taiwan, which remains highly dependent upon exports to the US and the Mainland. Hon Hai intends to invest in the United States. This is something the business community must do to cope with the Trump government's new economic policies.<br />
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Under the circumstances, the Tsai government must deal with the aftermath of the Trump Tsai phone call. She must minimize the impact on cross-Strait relations, and avoid harming Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland. The US will focus its attention on exports from Taiwan over the next few years. Government ministries charged with economics and finance must have a response ready during bilateral trade negotiations on everything from pork to arms purchases. The government must develop a strategy for balance of trade issues between the US and Taiwan consistent with Taiwan's best interests.<br />
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Trump Tsai fever rages on. But blowback is gathering strength. The government cannot afford to look only at superficial political gains. It must pay attention to the impact of Trump's policies on our economy as well. It must respond early, in order to find a better way and to end uncertainty in Taiwan's economy.<br />
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川蔡熱對台灣經濟是「短多長空」<br />
2016-12-12 聯合報<br />
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川普還有一個多月才要上任,但其當選已為全球政經秩序帶來嚴重衝擊,且遍及各個領域。台灣議題原非美國新人新政的焦點,但在「川蔡通電」經放大解讀後,美中台三角關係頓時風起雲湧。對蔡政府而言,這在外交上或許有少許加分作用;但對人民而言,兩岸關係的不確定因素升高,勢必使經濟面的挑戰愈發艱鉅。<br />
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川普與蔡英文通電之後,川普與其團隊密集地利用社群網路與媒體發聲批評中國大陸操縱匯率、對美傾銷產品、搶走美國人工作等等,一連串動作皆充滿挑釁意味。美國媒體評論都認為,川普就任後若仍維持這種風格,美中關係將進入一個不確定性高、且充滿摩擦的階段。亦即,「川蔡電」雖為蔡政府加分,但美中關係若轉趨緊張,大陸一旦採取報復行動,反而可能讓台灣遭到池魚之殃,這將是「短多長空」的局面。<br />
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「川蔡電」後,北京的反應尚稱克制,因為中共認為川普目前只是「總統當選人」,不急著現在就跟他攤牌。北京政權雖然克制,但一些官方外圍組織、包括特定黨媒卻已露出口風,包括要對川普執政後可能的友台政策做好準備,必要時將在政治或經濟上打擊台灣,並警告蔡政府不要誤判情勢。<br />
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利用經濟上的優勢向對手施壓,是近年經濟崛起的中國常用的手段。例如,今年韓國同意美國在其境內部署薩德反飛彈系統,北京除在外交上給予反擊,也透過封殺韓國影視節目等經濟制裁方式,間接向韓國施壓。對於台灣,北京也常在關鍵時刻向台商施壓,以達到心理戰的目的。例如,二○○五年在台灣舉行反「反分裂國家法」遊行前,奇美前董事長許文龍被迫發表支持中共《反分裂國家法》的公開信,就是一個令人印象深刻的例子。<br />
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這類「以商逼政」的案例,今年又見重演。這次的主角,是與蔡英文家族關係密切的海霸王,該公司在大陸的投資遭到查稅,並傳出產品品質不合規定;為此,海霸王被迫在媒體上發表公開聲明,稱該公司支持「兩岸同屬一中」政策。與此同時,台積電董事長張忠謀、巨大董事長劉金標又先後傳出請辭總統府資政,儘管兩人辭職其實早在「海霸王事件」之前,也早於國台辦主任張志軍「反對支持台獨的台商到大陸賺錢」的談話;無論如何,這些變化與兩岸關係轉趨敏感都有直接間接的關聯,必然影響民眾對政府的信心。<br />
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再看,最近半個月內,共軍戰機兩度「繞台飛行」,顯示北京對台灣的威嚇行動已經「升級」,進階到軍事手段。這些恫嚇,雖然多為象徵性動作,但在未來可預見的期間內,恐怕只會升高,不會減緩,台灣似乎沒有樂觀或天真的餘地。<br />
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川普已宣稱要廢除跨太平洋夥伴協定(TPP),若改以雙邊經貿談判取代,美方必然會以大壓小,牟取超乎TPP條件的經貿利益,這對小國當然不利。可以預見,未來美國經貿保護主義的藩籬必然高築,美、中之間的貿易摩擦也將升高;這對高度倚賴對美、中出口的台灣,必然深受衝擊。鴻海傳出有意赴美投資,其實也是企業界因應川普新政不得不走的布局。<br />
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在這種情況下,蔡政府必須謹慎處理「川蔡電」的後續效應,以降低對兩岸關係的衝擊,同時避免大陸台商受到牽累。財經部會必須就我可能遭美方盯上的出口產業擬好應對策略,對於未來數年我與美國的雙邊經貿談判,小至美豬、大至軍購,政府也應重新擬定戰略,在美台經貿天秤上找到符合台灣發展利益的最大公約數。<br />
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「川蔡電」的熱潮還在延燒,但反撲的力道也將泉湧而至。政府不能只看到浮面的政治效應,更要留意川普新政對我國經濟的衝擊並提早因應,才能在其不確定性中幫台灣經濟找到趨吉避凶之路。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-73510798145596994132016-12-08T22:25:00.002-08:002016-12-08T22:25:56.833-08:00Strategic Implications of PLA Air Force Circumnavigation of Taiwan <b>Strategic Implications of PLA Air Force Circumnavigation of Taiwan </b><br />
<b>China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 9, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: Since taking office, the Tsai government has made an effort to develop the military hardware and shipbuilding industries. It has made gains in military procurements from the United States. But this is a declaration of military strength. It is of no help whatsoever to the real goal of national defense, peace and prosperity. Since time immemorial, the highest ideal in warfare, has been "to win without fighting”. For Taiwan, it is the only option.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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PLA Air Force military aircraft flew through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel across the first island chain, and eventually rendezvoused off the eastern coast of Taiwan. Japanese military aircraft rushed to intercept them. The ROC Air Force maintained long-range monitoring but did not intercept them. This raised many questions.<br />
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First of all, consider the significance of the Mainland military aircraft circumnavigation of Taiwan. Was this a paramilitary operation, or was it a political statement? If it was the former, then the ROC Air Force should have taken decisive military action to ensure our national security. Failure to act would have been a dereliction of duty. Military dereliction of duty is a serious matter.<br />
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In this case, Mainland military aircraft did not enter the ROC air defense identification zone. Nor did they cross the midline of the Taiwan Strait. The flight was clearly a political statement rather than a military action. This Mainland military show of force directed at Taiwan, the United States and Japan, was unprecedented. Over the past eight years, cross-Strait relations have greatly improved, Military confrontations have greatly eased. But that does not mean the Mainland has reduced its military build up or deployment against Taiwan. On the contrary, the Mainland's economic strength has grown by leaps and bounds. Its military strength has kept pace. The cross-Strait military balance has been lopsided for quite some time. More importantly, Mainland military preparations are no longer verbal declarations and responses to isolated political events. They are no longer emergency responses, but part of normal readiness.<br />
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The two missile crises in 1995 and 1996, which the public on Taiwan still remembers clearly, were the Mainland's response to Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States and the presidential election. Events have shown that such military actions failed to produce results. Instead, they increased public resentment against the Mainland. The Mainland has made timely adjustments, and is less inclined to resort to military action. During the Hu Jintao era, it stressed its commitment to peaceful cross-Strait relations. The Mainland position is that "We have made no commitment to abandon the use of force". But this has gradually faded from its official discourse.<br />
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During the missile crises, the United States dispatched aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait. This thorn in the Mainland's side accelerated the Mainland's commitment to military reform and weapons and equipment updates. The Mainland now has an aircraft carrier group and a space force. This time PLA military aircraft circumnavigated Taiwan from north to south, on both sides of the island. It was the most intensive military exercise in nearly 20 years. It revealed the extent of Mainland military preparations. Similar incidents will happen more often in the future. Taiwan must awaken to this reality.<br />
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Of course, we have also noted the Japanese response to this incident. ROC and Japanese air defense identification zones abut each other. Mainland military aircraft flew outside the eastern edge of the ROC air defense identification zone. This meant it flew inside Japan's air defense identification zone. The Japanese Air Force immediately intercepted. This showed that the Japanese are closely monitoring Mainland military actions. It means that once the People's Liberation Army takes military action on the eastern coast of Taiwan, it faces a threat from the rear by US and Japanese forces. From this perspective, the cross-Strait military balance of power has not drastically changed the overall regional strategic military balance. Taiwan is not actually under that great a military threat.<br />
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Mainland military strength has grown by leaps and bounds. The Japanese military is exhausted. The Mainland passed through the Tsugaru Strait and Miyako Strait. It passed through Diaoyutai Island waters, as a matter of routine. Japan pays close attention to this, but no longer responds. US forces in Japan also refrain from confronting the Mainland military head on. From this perspective, even if the strategic balance in the western Pacific does not change in the short term, United States and Japanese influence on cross-Strait relations will gradually decline. Ultimately Taiwan will be forced to focus on the Mainland, as the US and Japan lose their determination to lend their strategic support to Taiwan.<br />
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Many people dream that the United States and Japan will rush to Taiwan's aid. But this will not happen. Many Taiwan independence advocates are unafraid of cross-Strait military conflict. They remember the previous Taiwan Strait missile crises. They remember the US aircraft carrier support. These people are convinced that in the event of a cross-Strait war, the United States and Japan will immediately rush to defend Taiwan. They are convinced that even though Taiwan's military strength has deteriorated, that will not affect Taiwan's security. But current reality clearly contradicts their assumptions. As recent events have shown, the United States and Japan will find it increasingly difficult to remain as involved as they were in the past. They will be reduced to passivity. If people on Taiwan are pinning their hopes on unrealistic expectations of foreign support, they are merely revealing defects in their strategic thinking.<br />
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Therefore one must consider the actual situation in cross-Strait military strength. Even if one factors the US and Japan into the strategic picture, the result does not favor Taiwan. Mainland military aircraft circumnavigating the island is sufficient to demonstrate the pressure it can exert on Taiwan. Mainland military aircraft refrained from entering the ROC air defense identification zone. They also refrained from crossing the center line of the Strait. This shows the flight was merely a political statement. PLA Air Force restraint was a show of rationality.<br />
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Since taking office, the Tsai government has made an effort to develop the military hardware and shipbuilding industries. It has made gains in military procurements from the United States. But this is a declaration of military strength. It is of no help whatsoever to the real goal of national defense, peace and prosperity. Since time immemorial, the highest ideal in warfare, has been "to win without fighting”. For Taiwan, it is the only option.<br />
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從國家戰略高度看共機繞島事件<br />
2016/12/9 中國時報<br />
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大陸解放軍軍機分別由宮古海峽和巴士海峽穿越第一島鏈,最後在台灣東部會合,日本軍機緊急起飛攔截伴飛,我空軍則維持遠距監控並未伴飛,引發許多質疑。<br />
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首先應探究大陸軍機繞島飛行事件的意義,究竟是準軍事行動,或政治宣示行為,如果是前者,我空軍理應果斷採取相對應的軍事行為,以確保國家安全。應行動未行動是失職,軍人失職是非常嚴重的行為。<br />
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不過,這次事件,大陸軍機未進入我防空識別區,亦未穿越海峽中線,可以研判,此舉政治宣示性質大於軍事行為,目的在向台灣及美、日兩國宣示大陸軍事能量今非昔比。過去8年兩岸關係大幅推進,軍事對峙氛圍也有所緩解,但這並不意味著大陸放鬆了軍事建設及對台軍事部署,恰恰相反,隨著大陸經濟實力的大幅躍升,其軍事實力也在突飛猛進,兩岸軍事對比早已失衡。更重要的是,大陸的軍事準備不再停留在口頭宣示和針對個別政治事件的緊急應對,而是進入常態化備戰階段。<br />
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台灣民眾記憶猶新的1995年和1996年兩次飛彈危機,是大陸針對李登輝訪美和總統大選的應對作法,事實證明軍事動作不僅沒有發揮效果,反而助長了台灣民眾對大陸的反感。對此大陸及時做出調整,此後即較少公開訴諸軍事動作。到胡錦濤時代,進一步宣告要致力於兩岸關係和平發展,「不承諾放棄使用武力」的說法雖未被摒棄,但也逐漸淡出官方論述。<br />
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飛彈危機期間美國派出航母進入台灣海峽,也讓大陸深感芒刺在背,因而加速軍事革新,致力於武器裝備更新,現在又組建航母編隊及外太空武力,對台軍事力量今非昔比。這次軍機繞飛行動,解放軍完成從台灣南北兩側的閉環,正是大陸近20年軍事實力提升的集中表現,也展現大陸的常態化軍事準備。相信今後類似事件還會經常發生,台灣對此必須清醒認識。<br />
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當然,我們也注意到日軍對此事件的應對作為。台日防空識別區相鄰,大陸軍機沿我東部海岸防空識別區線外飛行,意味進入日本防空識別區,日空軍乃緊急升空伴飛,顯示日軍對大陸軍事行為滴水不漏的嚴密監控。這也意味一旦解放軍有意在台灣東部海岸採取軍事動作,要面對來自後方美、日軍隊的威脅。如此觀之,縱使海峽兩岸軍事實力對比失衡,從整體的區域戰略格局來看,這種戰略平衡的狀態並未發生劇變,台灣也不至於實質進入軍事威脅的困境之中。<br />
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大陸軍事實力突飛猛進,讓日本軍隊疲於奔命,大陸接連穿過津輕海峽、宮古海峽,更在釣魚台水域常態巡航,日本除了密切關注以外也無更多應對作為,駐日美軍也基本採取克制態度,未與大陸軍隊正面對峙。從這個角度看,即便西太平洋戰略平衡短期內不會改變,但美、日對台海兩岸的影響能力也逐漸下降,最終將不得不將主要精力放在與大陸的博弈,失去戰略支援台灣的決心。<br />
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這意味許多人幻想美、日馳援台灣的局面不可能再度發生,很多台獨主張者不怕兩岸軍事衝突,基本上都是來自上次海峽飛彈危機的經驗,看到美國航母的支援,讓這些人更加深信,一旦兩岸開戰,美、日會立即協防台灣,即便台灣軍事實力每況愈下,也不影響台灣的安全。但如今的局面顯然與他們的想像背道而馳,從近年來的幾次事件來看,美、日很難再如過去那樣直接介入,反而都只能採取被動因應的作法。台獨若將自己的希望寄託在不切實際的外來支援上,只會凸顯他們戰略思維的脆弱。<br />
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因此考量兩岸軍事對比的實際狀況,即便加入美、日因素後的整體戰略格局,也同樣不利於台灣,大陸軍機繞島飛行足以證明其軍事能量對台灣軍事壓力的實質存在。但大陸軍機並未進入我防空識別區,也未穿過海峽中線,只是單純政治宣示性質,空軍的克制動作顯得理性。<br />
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蔡政府上台以來致力於推動國機國造和國艦國造,對美軍事採購也有新的進展,但這更多是提升軍力的宣示,對改變兩岸軍事失衡格局沒有任何助益,根本之道仍在於以和平發展為目標的國防建設,「不戰而屈人之兵」自古以來都是戰爭的最高境界,對台灣來說,更是唯一選擇。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-30953297949718953562016-12-07T21:59:00.000-08:002016-12-17T06:53:53.540-08:00Trump Tsai Fever: Enjoy the Moment Before the Bubble Bursts<b>Trump Tsai Fever: Enjoy the Moment Before the Bubble Bursts</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 7, 2016</b><br />
<br />
Executive Summary: Trump is arrogant and egotistical. Under his administration, the US will probably lack a clear and stable policy stance. He may adopt a confrontational strategy against the Mainland. He may provide Taiwan with a little more international breathing room. But his opportunism and caprice could result in him abandoning Taiwan at any time. Taiwan must assess the situation. It must take note of trends. It must not be reduced to a bubble in a breaking wave.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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Tsai Ying-wen and Donald Trump spoke over the phone, and provoke a firestorm among the US, the Mainland, and Taiwan. Two things are certain. One. The Trump administration is a loose cannon, and does not care whether it collides head on with Mainland China. Two. Trump has no intention of following Obama's Asian-Pacific policy. Washington's diplomatic conventions mean nothing to him. So the next question is: What role does Taiwan play in this picture, and how can it derive the most benefit?<br />
<br />
The Trump Tsai phone call provoked intense international concern. First impressions<br />
suggest that it was a diplomatic victory for Taiwan. One. It raised Taiwan's international profile. Two. It established a channel for future communication with the new Trump administration. Three. The subsequent tug of war between the US and the Mainland give Taiwan an extra chip in cross-Strait relations. These can be considered positive developments.<br />
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But the person responsible for this Trump Tsai Fever is wild man Donald Trump. People everywhere remain skeptical about his consistency and the potential consequences of the incident. The key is whether Trump consciously used Taiwan to provoke the Mainland, or whether he was steered wrong by aides. Trump is reckless and often repeats the same mistakes. He has the instincts of a businessman. His support for Taiwan will not be based on considerations of justice. It will be based solely on calculations of advantage. If we wish to talk about advantages, the Mainland can provide thousands of times the advantages of Taiwan. This is a reality the Tsai government must acknowledge.<br />
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Consider what happened after the Trump Tsai phone call. The attitudes adopted by the US, the Mainland, and Taiwan, are intriguing. The Trump camp is still experiencing the thrill of victory. It has countered Beijing's protests head on. His economic advisers even spouted obscenities such as "F**k 'em". The Obama administration was shocked by the Trump Tsai phone call. On the one hand, it was concerned that Obama's Asian rebalancing policy would go down the drain. On the other hand, it reiterated the "one China principle" to mollify Beijing. Beijing's reaction, by contrast, was not to blame Trump, but Taiwan, for “engaging in trickery”. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs even asked Washington to deny Tsai transit privileges when she visits Nicaragua next month. Tsai told an American reporter that the phone call was merely a reflection of Taiwan's respect for the US elections, and did not represent any change in policy.<br />
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The DPP was initially elated. But Tsai Ing-wen has turned low-key. Clearly invisible diplomatic pressures have been brought to bear. Three days ago, Tsai's visit to Nicaragua and three other nations was supposed to transit New York. Political pundits speculated that she might even meet with Trump. The latest news however, is that she will not transit New York, but Houston and San Francisco instead. There will be no Trump Tsai meeting. The reason should not be hard to imagine. The current US president is Barack Obama. Before the official handover, Washington is not about to allow a replay of the Trump Tsai phone call that undermines Obama's authority ahead of schedule.<br />
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What worries many in the political world is that Beijing may not stop at interfering with Tsai's trip to Central America. They may take revenge and embarrass her. They may turn ROC diplomatic allies. Nicaragua in particular, may change diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. If not for the Ma government's diplomatic truce, it would have recognized Beijing already. Therefore, the Tsai government must maintain a low profile. Otherwise, a phone call and less than a day's euphoria, may result in a string of retaliatory moves whose cost are not worth the candle.<br />
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Taiwan's prolonged diplomatic isolation has led some to use a points system or shallow pro forma ritual to tally wins and losses. For example: What title was given to some representative from Taiwan taking part in some international activity? How many national flags were displayed during some international event? Whom did James Soong meet and greet at APEC? Which cities did the president transit? Such petty pro forma gains and losses, sway popular sentiment again and again. Such clashes are not unimportant. But in terms of the ROC's survival and development, their form outweighs their substance. Far more important is strategy. Do we have a strategy that is more inclusive, one that is more politically and economically sophisticated, and more indicative of the nation's progress? We need a strategy that is less prone to intimidation, frustration, or incitement. This is why we have repeatedly stressed that cross-Strait policy is so important.<br />
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Trump is arrogant and egotistical. Under his administration, the US will probably lack a clear and stable policy stance. He may adopt a confrontational strategy against the Mainland. He may provide Taiwan with a little more international breathing room. But his opportunism and caprice could result in him abandoning Taiwan at any time. Taiwan must assess the situation. It must take note of trends. It must not be reduced to a bubble in a breaking wave.<br />
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川蔡熱:抓穩潮流,勿成泡沫<br />
2016-12-08 聯合報<br />
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蔡英文和川普一通電話,在美中台之間捲起千堆雪。可以確定的有二:一是川普及其團隊是「自走砲」作風,根本不在乎與中共正面衝突;二是川普完全無意追隨歐巴馬的亞太政策,華府那一套外交規範也管不住川普團隊。接下來要問的是:台灣在這樣的變局中,該如何抓住自己的角色和利益?<br />
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從第一印象看,「川蔡電」引起如此熱烈的國際關注,對台灣而言,這次外交出擊可謂斬獲不菲。包括:第一,放大了台灣的能見度;第二,建立了未來與川普新政府溝通的管道;第三,由於美中的拉扯,或使台灣在兩岸關係中有出現新空間的機會。這些,都可說是正面的成果。<br />
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然而,正因為煽起這次「川蔡熱」效應的主角是狂人川普,儘管野火狂燒,各界對這種操作的一致性及可能後果不免抱持懷疑。其中關鍵,不在川普是否有意識地利用台灣向中共挑釁,或者他是否受到幕僚誤導;而在他過度輕率且易於反覆的性格,加上其商人本能的利益取向,他對台灣的支持絕對不會有「義」的考量,而將只有「利」的盤算。而若要談利,中國大陸能夠提供的誘因,絕對比台灣大上千百倍。這點,是蔡政府必須認清的現實。<br />
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觀察川蔡通話後的發展,美中台三方的態度均堪玩味。川普陣營方面始終未脫亢奮狀態,對北京的抗議直接反擊,其經濟顧問更粗話開罵「去他的」。歐巴馬政府則對川蔡通電難掩震驚,一方面憂心歐巴馬的亞洲再平衡政策將盡付東流,一方面則不斷重申「一中原則」安撫北京。相形之下,北京的反應則顯得有所選擇,並未大力指責川普,卻歸咎「台灣搞小動作」,中共外交部甚至進一步要求華府勿讓蔡英文下月出訪尼加拉瓜時過境美國。至於蔡英文,則在接受美國記者訪問時說,那通電話只是表達台灣對美國選舉的尊重,並不代表政策轉變;言下,顯得相當保留。<br />
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從民進黨第一時間的喜不自勝,到蔡英文後來轉為低調,可以窺知看不見的外交壓力已經泉湧而至。三日前,蔡英文出訪尼加拉瓜等三國的行程原稱要「過境紐約」,政壇甚至猜測她將在那裡會見川普。最新的消息則說,她不會過境紐約,而是過境休士頓和舊金山,同時也不會有「川蔡會」。這樣的變化應是不難想像:目前美國還是歐巴馬當家,在正式交接之前,華府當然不會讓「川蔡電」的意外重演,讓歐巴馬提前破功。<br />
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更讓政界擔心的,是中共除了干擾蔡英文的中美洲行程,會不會下重手以「奪取邦交」的方式作為報復,來使她難堪?尤其,尼加拉瓜近年屢傳外交生變的可能,若非馬政府的「外交休兵」政策,早就投靠對岸了。因此,蔡政府此刻除了小心為上,保持低調也是必要的。否則,為了一通電話,快樂不到一天,接下來可能要面對連串的報復,將得不償失。<br />
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長期以來,由於台灣外交上的孤立,人們似乎已習慣仰賴若干點狀或淺層的儀式交鋒來計算得失。例如:台灣代表在國際組織拿到了什麼頭銜,某場國際賽事又亮了幾面國旗,宋楚瑜在APEC和誰照面,元首過境外交又前進了什麼城市;小小的形式得失,一再牽動國人的心。這類儀式性交鋒不能說不重要,但放在台灣生存發展的戰略脈絡中看,其實點綴性質大過實質。更重要的,是我們有沒有一套涵括面更大、政經縱深更厚、有效性更持久的策略,作為指引國家前進的方針,而不需要動輒因受到恐嚇、挫折、或慫恿而浮沉不定。這也是我們一再強調兩岸政策非常重要的原因所在。<br />
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以川普的自大狂暴,他主政後的美國恐怕不會有清晰、穩定的路線。他對中國採取對抗策略,或許能提供台灣多一點國際空間;但以他的投機與善變,也隨時可以棄台灣於不顧。明智之計,台灣必須審慎評估,把握潮流,但千萬小心,別淪為浪尖的泡沫。<br />
<br />Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-17559627772358803202016-12-07T00:15:00.003-08:002016-12-07T00:15:17.290-08:00Hipster Politics: Reality Bites<b>Hipster Politics: Reality Bites</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 7, 2016</b><br />
<br />
Executive Summary: Unrest has persisted for nine months. It is time the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" drama ended. But has the DPP learned prudence and humility? Has it learned to avoid making trouble for itself? Has it learned that double standards are chickens that will eventually come home to roost? Tsai Ing-wen's "hipster politics" is clearly incapable of dealing with social reality. When it is necessary to persuade the public, do not resort to shouting slogans.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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The president handed down an edict. She declared that the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" rule must pass. Yesterday the Legislative Yuan mobilized. Heavy crowd control barriers were installed, and police stood guard, ready to block labor protestors. Inside the legislature, blue and green legislators fought over control of the podium. Despite nine months of political wrangling, the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" dispute still had to be settled in such a crude fashion. This reflects the government's failure to communicate with the public. It also shows that “hipster politics” is incapable of dealing with harsh reality.<br />
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The year is nearing its end. If the government fails to resolve these problems by then, the number of public protests will be too long to print out. Employees and employers will not know what to do. The government has rammed the amendment through. Observers know why. The amendment process was an embarrassment, mainly due to DPP manipulation. For one, because when it was in the opposition, it behaved like a thug. Now that it in office, it must make 180 degree reversals in its policy course. For another, the DPP loves to show off before workers, but it has no idea how to strike a proper balance. In the end, all it can do is make reckless decisions in the heat of the moment.<br />
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During March of this year, former Minister of Labor Chen Hsiung-wen reduced the number of working hours per week in exchange for the elimination of seven legal holidays. He wanted labor and public servants to share the same holidays. But this policy was blocked by the DPP in the Legislative Yuan, on the pretext that it harmed the rights and interests of eight million workers. The newly installed DPP gloated. It now had the “total government” it longed for. It assumed the move would please labor. Therefore it gave labor carte blanche. Who knew that nine months later, different holidays for labor, public servants, and teachers would lead to social unrest. In the end, the Tsai government was forced to eliminate the seven legal holidays. Nine months later, the DPP was forced to make a 180 degree about face. The DPP was now reaping what it sowed.<br />
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Even more noteworthy is the government's changing attitude towards labor. Yesterday's deference has become today's arrogance. When the DPP was out of power, labor stood by it, shoulder to shoulder. Therefore the Tsai government was presumed to be a friend to labor. As soon as it rose to power, it expressed solidarity with labor. For example, the president illegally met with the boss of Far Eastone, and demanded that he help the government resolve the toll collectors strike. This opened a Pandora's box, by encouraging labor protests. When China Airlines flight attendants went on strike, Tsai Ying-wen boarded a chartered plane and proclaimed "You are not alone!” As a result, Ho Nuan-hsuan gave the flight attendants everything they demanded. One month later however, the flight attendants on Tsai's chartered plane were fired from the union.<br />
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The government's support for labor is praiseworthy. But policy decisions are a complicated process. If they are badly handled, if they are tailor made for specific individuals, if they are biased or even hostile, they can wreak havoc. For example, the DPP vehemently opposed Chen's elimination of seven legal holidays. But later this became a bitter pill the party itself had to swallow. Before, it repeatedly offered concessions to specified groups. The “squeaky wheel gets the grease”, after all. But more importantly, when a government finds itself at rope's end, goodwill gestures are futile. All it can do is get tough and clean up the mess. This time labor waged a month long hunger strike, but the ruling DPP completely ignored it.<br />
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Over the past few months Tsai frequently addressed labor. She said "Labor is the DPP's partner" and that "Labor occupies the softest spot in our hearts". In her eagerness to chummy up to them, she was a fount of “hipster rhetoric”. In the end though, the legislature was forced to erect heavy metal barriers to keep labor protestors far from the premises. Labor demanded seven legal holidays. But the government foisted its “three special holidays for new labor" scheme on them. The entire process was a waste of time, and left labor permanently aggrieved. Tsai's “hipster politics” ran up against reality, and fell flat on its face. That much is crystal clear.<br />
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Even more noteworthy was the Labor Law incident. Attention was focused on the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" and "seven legal holidays” issues. Structural gains and losses in the amendment were ignored. For example, while horse trading over the work week, the ruling party increased the rates for overtime hours. But this is fruit that not every worker will see or eat. Many local governments do not carry out labor inspections at all. How can officials know that overtime benefits due laborers are accurately credited to their accounts?<br />
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Unrest has persisted for nine months. It is time the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" drama ended. But has the DPP learned prudence and humility? Has it learned to avoid making trouble for itself? Has it learned that double standards are chickens that will eventually come home to roost? Tsai Ing-wen's "hipster politics" is clearly incapable of dealing with social reality. When it is necessary to persuade the public, do not resort to shouting slogans.<br />
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「文青政治」終須面對的冷酷現實<br />
2016-12-07 聯合報<br />
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在總統「一例一休非過不可」的命令下,立法院昨天重兵部署:院外是重重鐵柵及員警戒備,防堵示威勞工;院內則是藍綠立委衝突叫罵,爭奪主席台。歷經九個月拉鋸,一例一休之爭仍須以如此粗暴的方式完成立法,除反映政府的社會溝通失敗,也說明「文青政治」假裝溫暖的腔調應付不了冷酷的現實。<br />
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轉眼已至年底,國假問題若再不解決,不僅民間連行事曆都印不出來,廣大的勞工和企業雇主也將無所適從;因此,政府急著通過修法,外界不難理解。這次修法鬧得如此狼狽,主要是肇因於民進黨的討巧操弄:一方面是在野時一味蠻橫托大,到了執政後竟繞不過這個髮夾彎;二方面是喜歡向勞工賣弄交情,卻在必須決斷時不知如何求取平衡,最終只能訴諸蠻幹。<br />
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今年三月,勞動部前部長陳雄文以「降低每周工時」的方式換取刪除七天國假,希讓勞工和公教人員休假同步;然而,此政策卻在立院遭民進黨攔下,認為損及八百萬勞工權益。當時,剛剛取得完全執政的民進黨躊躇滿志,自以為可以加碼演出討好勞工,因而誇下繼續放假的海口。誰料,九個月來,勞、公、教國假不一的問題弄得社會紛擾不斷,蔡政府最後仍須食言砍掉這七天國假。這場九個月還繞不過的髮夾彎,正是民進黨自食其果的官場現形記。<br />
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更值得注意的是,政府對待勞工的態度,已陷入一種前恭後倨的窘境。民進黨在野的拚搏,一直有勞團相伴,也因此蔡政府將勞團視為友軍,一上台就向勞工示好。例如,總統以超乎法制的手法約見遠傳老闆,要求和政府共同出資解決國道收費員問題;這種法外施恩作法,打開了鼓勵勞工抗爭的潘朵拉之盒。再如,華航空服員罷工時,蔡英文在專機上喊話:「不會讓你們感到孤單」;結果,造成何煖軒在和空服員談判時照單全收,一個月後,專機空服員卻遭工會除名。<br />
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政府對勞工友善,原是值得肯定的事;但在複雜的決策過程中,如不妥善拿捏,或者流於針對性、偏向性的討好,甚至信口開河,都可能引發難以收拾的後遺症。例如,先前民進黨強硬反對陳雄文刪除七天假,到後來就變成自食其言的苦果;先前一再向特定團體示好讓步,就得到了「會吵才有糖吃」的效果。更有甚者,當政府疲於奔命、乃至釋放善意亦無補於事時,竟只能祭出冷酷手段以收拾殘局。就像這次,勞團絕食近月,而執政者幾乎不聞不問。<br />
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回顧過去數月,蔡英文頻頻對勞工喊話,稱「勞工是民進黨的夥伴」,「勞工是我們心中最軟的那塊」,充滿了「文青腔調」的拉攏意味。遺憾的是,到頭來,立法院仍必須以重重鐵柵拒勞工於千里之外;勞工要求七天國假,政府卻用「新勞工三天特休」搪塞,不僅雙方白忙一場,更留下難以消除的心結。從這點看,「文青政治」長於修辭卻拙於現實應對的窘境,已一目了然。<br />
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更值得注意的是,這次勞基法修法事件,因一直被聚焦在「一例一休」及「七天國假」的焦點上,至於整體修法的結構性得失,則似乎完全未受到應有的討論。例如,在一例一休討價還價的過程中,雖然執政黨提高了不同加班工時的累進加發乘數,然而,這是不是每個勞工「看得到、也吃得到」的果實,恐怕還有很大的疑問。原因是,許多地方政府根本不進行勞動檢查,官員如何知道勞工未依法休假應享有的加班待遇,能夠如實落入他們的口袋?<br />
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擾攘了九個月,一例一休事件也到了該落幕的時候。問題在,民進黨是否從中學到了審慎與謙卑,是否學到了避免「庸人自擾」及「兩套標準」的一課。蔡英文的「文青政治」,顯然已應付不了社會現實,在必須以理說服民眾的時候,請不要再用矯柔做作的喊話來敷衍。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-7063544578395792092016-12-05T22:34:00.002-08:002016-12-05T22:34:26.465-08:00Trump Intends to Change Sino-US Relations: Taiwan Must Beware<b>Trump Intends to Change Sino-US Relations: Taiwan Must Beware</b><br />
<b>China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 6, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: How should Taiwan deal with the new Sino-US strategic scenario after Trump takes office? This question will severely test the Tsai government's wisdom. Trump's national security team dispatched Henry Kissinger to Beijing, while simultaneously publicizing Tsai Ing-wen's phone call to Trump online. Trump placed emphasis on the "democratically elected president of Taiwan", then Tweeted about Mainland China, saying that China did not report its actions to the United States in advance. This shows that Trump's little drama was carefully orchestrated, not improvised. The Tsai government must realize that the new Trump government is a savvy decision-maker. The Tsai government must plan ahead. It must adopt a flexible "friendly with the US, at peace with the Mainland” strategy. Otherwise Taiwan may not be able to weather the Trump political storm.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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US President-elect Donald Trump calls himself an "America Firster". Tsai Ing-wen's phone call to Trump made waves in the Asian-Pacific region. Trump Tweeted that when Mainland China acted, it did not consult with the United States first, therefore why must he report to Mainland China before picking up the phone? The international media is saying that Trump deliberately provoked Mainland China, and that the US and Mainland China may begin a "new cold war". It is saying that Trump deliberately poured gasoline on the fire regarding bilateral economic and trade relations, investments, and the conflict in the South China Sea, threatening peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.<br />
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The outgoing Obama administration immediately declared that the one China policy stance of the US, which is based on the "one law and three communiques", remains unchanged. But once Trump comes to power, will he change China policy? That prospect has many worried. How should Taiwan deal with the new and changing situation? Considerable brainstorming will be needed to negotiate this passage.<br />
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Trump's national security adviser, Michael Flynn, noted that the United States' biggest advantage is that world leaders do not know what it intends to do. Flynn's mentality reflects the new government's "America First" strategic posture. It sees China as a competitor. Before coming to power, Flynn is challenging Mainland China over the Taiwan issue, RMB exchange rates, trade and investment barriers, South China Sea military expansion, and other issues. He is accumulating bargaining chips for future negotiations. At the same time, the new government will give priority to US economic, trade and security interests. It will use tax cuts to return 2 trillion dollars in multinational capital to the US, and impose heavy taxes on US companies who move their manufacturing plants overseas, as part of his "Make America Great Again" goal.<br />
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On the matter of international security, Trump does not want America to remain the "world's policeman". He wants allies to share the cost of their own security. He wants to use flexible strategies to ensure Asian-Pacific “Managable Instability”. An Asian-Pacific region arms race would enable the United States to increase US arms exports and reduce its trade deficit. It would enable the US to once again become a safe haven for Asian-Pacific capital, technology, and personnel. It would make United States issued bonds and real estate more popular, and accelerate Trump's "America First" industrial recovery plan, by injecting huge amounts of capital and talent.<br />
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The new government will also seek to win over Russian President Putin, reshape the US-Russian strategic cooperation framework, in order to apply pressure on Mainland China. This would enable the United States to gain a strategic advantage when negotiating with Mainland China. The Trump government's strategic goal is to make the United States the world's most secure and prosperous place. This will make the world's capital, technology, and talent flock to the United States, providing Americans with more high-quality job opportunities.<br />
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Sino-US relations are in a highly indeterminate state. Taiwan is caught in the middle. It can choose to rely entirely on the United States. It can play along with the new Trump government's challenge to Mainland China. But this risks turning Taiwan into America's cannon fodder or America's pawn. Or Taiwan can choose to respond to Mainland President Xi Jinping's appeal to a "shared destiny". It can establish a new cross-Strait consensus that upholds one China. It can publicly reaffirm that people on both sides of the Strait belong to one China. It can even stress that the two sides can cooperate in building a democratic China. This would provide a way out of the cross-Strait impasse, and a way out for Taiwan as well.<br />
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The current disparity in the two sides' strength, coupled growing tensions between the US and Mainland China, have already done in the Tsai government's national security strategy. Does Tsai really believe that if the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have nothing to do with each other, that Taiwan can develop its economy through economic and trade interactions with the United States and Japan? That is simply impossible. Mainland China has become the world's second largest economy, Taiwan's largest trading partner, and the primary source of its trade surplus. Any US Expeditionary Force in the Western Pacific would face a PLA with a home court military advantage. It would no longer be assured of victory. Therefore, if Taiwan voluntarily forsakes the Mainland market, or even makes the Mainland its military enemy, the cost will be hard to bear. Moreover, the new Trump government strategic posture emphasize "America First". It will use Taiwan merely as a pawn or bargaining chip. Once it decides that the cost of using Taiwan is too high, it will adopt a quid pro quo trading strategy, and sell Taiwan out. Does the Tsai government really believe that once Trump becomes President of the United States, Sino-US rivalry will enable Taiwan to cozy up to the US and Japan and contain Mainland China? If she does, she is dreaming. War in the Taiwan Strait would only spell disaster for Taiwan's economy and security.<br />
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How should Taiwan deal with the new Sino-US strategic scenario after Trump takes office? This question will severely test the Tsai government's wisdom. Trump's national security team dispatched Henry Kissinger to Beijing, while simultaneously publicizing Tsai Ing-wen's phone call to Trump online. Trump placed emphasis on the "democratically elected president of Taiwan", then Tweeted about Mainland China, saying that China did not report its actions to the United States in advance. This shows that Trump's little drama was carefully orchestrated, not improvised. The Tsai government must realize that the new Trump government is a savvy decision-maker. The Tsai government must plan ahead. It must adopt a flexible "friendly with the US, at peace with the Mainland” strategy. Otherwise Taiwan may not be able to weather the Trump political storm.<br />
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川普意在翻轉中美關係 台灣要謹慎<br />
2016/12/6 中國時報<br />
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美國總統當選人川普自稱是「美國優先」主義者,在「英川通話」掀起亞太新波瀾之際,他又在推特嗆聲中國亂搞也沒先問過美國,為什麼自己接個電話還要先報備。目前,國際主流媒體均以川普刻意觸怒中國為切入點,認為美中關係可能進入「新冷戰」時期。川普刻意在雙邊經貿、投資利益矛盾及南海議題火上澆油,為亞太地區和平穩定埋下火種。<br />
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即將卸任的歐巴馬政府立即宣示,美國基於「一法三公報」的一個中國政策立場不變。但川普上台後會不會改變對中國的政策,才是多數人關注的重點。台灣要如何應對山雨欲來的新變局,恐怕要多集思廣益,才能安然度過新風暴。<br />
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川普的國家安全顧問佛林指出,美國現在最大的優勢就是,世界各國領導人都搞不清楚美國準備怎麼做。佛林的心態正反映出川普新政府強調「美國優先」的決心與戰略布局方向,準備把中國當成競爭對象,在上台前就從台灣問題、人民幣匯率、貿易與投資壁壘,以及南海軍事擴張等議題,開始挑戰中國的底線,並為今後展開談判交易墊高籌碼。同時,川普新政府將以美國經貿與安全利益為優先考量,祭出減稅措施吸引2兆美元的跨國企業資金回流,並針對製造工廠外移的美國企業課徵重稅,以落實「讓美國再度強大」的目標。<br />
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在國際安全議題上,川普不想再當「世界警察」,準備要求盟國友邦增加分攤安全成本,並將運用細緻靈活策略,塑造亞太地區「可管理的不穩定」(Managable Instability),讓亞太各國展開軍備競賽,而美國不僅可以趁國際情勢動盪之際,增加美製武器出口以減少貿易赤字,更可以再度成為亞太資金、技術與人才的避風港,讓美國發行的公債與房地產成為搶手貨,並促使「美國優先」的製造業復興計畫獲得龐大資金與人才挹注,加速進行。<br />
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此外,川普新政府將積極拉攏俄羅斯總統普丁,重新發展美俄戰略合作架構,進而對中國形成新壓力,為美國與中國談判周旋時,取得新的國際戰略優勢地位。川普新政府的強國戰略目標,就是要打造美國成為世界最安全繁榮的地方,讓全世界的資金、技術與人才湧向美國,為美國人創造更多優質工作機會。<br />
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當中美關係將進入高度不確定狀態之際,台灣處在中美兩強夾縫中,一則可以選擇完全依賴美國,配合川普新政府挑戰中國的策略,但卻必須擔負淪為美國炮灰或馬前卒的風險。台灣亦可選擇回應大陸國家主席習近平的「命運共同體」思維,建立可以體現一中內涵的兩岸新共識,公開支持「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」的立場,甚至進一步強調兩岸可以合作建設「民主中國」,為台海兩岸主權對峙僵局解套,也為台灣找到新出路。<br />
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當前,兩岸綜合國力差距懸殊,加上美中關係恐趨向緊張,已讓蔡政府的國家安全戰略左支右絀。蔡政府若認為,兩岸不往來,台灣仍可透過美、日經貿互動發展經濟,這已不切實際,因為現今中國大陸已成為世界第二大經濟體,也是台灣最大的貿易夥伴與順差來源,而且美國遠征軍在西太平洋沿岸,面對共軍的主場優勢時,已不再擁有絕對勝算。所以,台灣若自絕於大陸市場,甚至在軍事上與大陸為敵,代價恐難承擔。更何況川普新政府強調「美國優先」的戰略布局,只會把台灣當成棋子或籌碼,一旦認為利用台灣的成本過高,恐會改採「交易策略」,用台灣換取對美國更有利的標的物。倘若蔡政府判斷川普上任美國總統後,中美競逐可以支撐台灣的「親美日、抗中」戰略主軸,一廂情願為美國圍堵中國,只怕會讓台海兵凶戰危,為台灣帶來經濟與安全的雙重災難。<br />
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對台灣而言,如何應對川普上台後的中美博弈新局,將嚴峻考驗蔡政府的能力與智慧。川普的國安團隊同時派出季辛吉訪問北京,並主動公布「英川通話」,強調「民主選舉產生的台灣總統」,隨後又在推特向中國嗆聲「中國亂搞也沒向美國報告」,這在在顯示川普的戲劇性演出經過精心設計,應非即興之作。蔡政府若不願正視川普新政府深沉精明的決策風格,並及早規畫「友美和中」的靈活策略因應新變局,台灣恐難逃川普風暴肆虐。<br />
<br />Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-19731361722257758032016-12-04T23:21:00.002-08:002016-12-04T23:21:30.184-08:00Can the DPP and CCP Reach a New Cross-Strait Consensus? <b>Can the DPP and CCP Reach a New Cross-Strait Consensus? </b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>December 3, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: Zhou Zhihuai is the Director of the Taiwan Institute of Social Sciences of the Mainland based Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhou publicly declared that "What I want to stress, is that substitutes can be found for the 1992 Consensus. We do not oppose the creation of creative alternatives to the 1992 Consensus. We can form new commonly agreed upon expressions as the political basis for the development of cross-Strait relations."<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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Zhou Zhihuai is the Director of the Taiwan Institute of Social Sciences of the Mainland based Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhou publicly declared that "What I want to stress, is that substitutes can be found for the 1992 Consensus. We do not oppose the creation of creative alternatives to the 1992 Consensus. We can form new commonly agreed upon expressions as the political basis for the development of cross-Strait relations."<br />
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Zhou said "The Mainland's willingness to establish a new consensus on cross-Strait policy is every bit as strong as its determination to safeguard the consensus reached in 1992."<br />
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This is the first time that the Mainland has made clear that the 1992 Consensus can be replaced, and that it has no objection to the creation of an "alternative consensus", a "new shared interpretation", or "new cross-Strait consensus". Zhou Zhaihuai is considered the Mainland's chief Taiwan policy expert. His declaration is undoubtedly a policy statement, and should be treated seriously. Consider the following points.<br />
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One. What did Zhou mean when he said substitutes for the wording of the 1992 Consensus are acceptable? He meant that substitutes for the two words “1992 Consensus” are acceptable. Zhou reiterated that "the affirmation that the Mainland and Taiwan both belong to one country" is a key element that cannot be replaced. He said the new cross-Strait consensus must reaffirm the One China Principle, oppose Taiwan independence, and oppose de-Sinicization. This being the case, why not continue using the term “1992 Consensus”? After all, any new consensus would have to make these conditions regarding the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus even more explicit.<br />
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Two. Zhou's declaration included “One China Principle”, "two sides, one nation", "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one country", and "(Taiwan) may as well learn to get along with the Mainland under a One China framework”. But he did not explicitly define "one country". He left room for compromise.<br />
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The Ma government championed the 1992 Consensus, and refrained from contradicting Beijing. It qualified its position by stipulating that it championed "one China, different interpretations". Does the Tsai government intend to repudiate the "one China / one country" concept? If not, then what is its alternative? The Tsai government need not use the term "one China, different interpretations". But what alternative does it have? If it forfeits the 1992 Consensus, what will happen to “one China, different interpretations”?<br />
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3. Zhou said the Mainland's bottom line in its Taiwan policy is opposition to Taiwan independence. His new cross-Strait terminology merely stipulates that "the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one country". But will the Mainland follow up by adding the clause "opposition to Taiwan independence"?<br />
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Ma Ying-jeou advocated "no reunification, no independence, no use of force". This is an affirmation plus a repudiation. Only by saying "no independence", was it able to say "no reunification". If Tsai accepts the idea that "the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one country", she must address the problem of “one China, different interpretations”. The contradictions in Taiwan independence will then resurface.<br />
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Four. Zhou advocates the establishment of a "new cross-Strait framework” or “cross-Strait consensus". He recommends that think tanks from both sides of the Strait "strive to reach a tacit understanding". He said "This understanding need not be a written agreement, or even a verbal agreement. But it is essential". He said “Cross-Strait exchanges and controllable contacts can be conducted only under specified conditions”.<br />
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Outsiders may not immediately understand the gap between “a consensus that does not require even a verbal agreement”, and "a new understanding of cross-Strait talks and a new cross-Strait consensus". Do "contacts through buffers” and “controllable contacts" mean that the two sides should arrange for secret exchanges outside the two cross-Strait agencies? If so, how can the Tsai government gain the trust of the general public, or allay suspicions within the Green Camp?<br />
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Five. Zhou Zhihuai said "The KMT occupies a special place in the history of cross-Strait peace, and cannot be replaced". The Mainland considers the KMT just as irreplaceable as “both sides of the Strait are part of one country". This and other remarks by Zhou Zhihuai were probably meant for the ears of the Tsai government, which is intent on exterminating the KMT. If the KMT is weakened too much, the cross-Strait framework created by the KMT-CCP civil war will also evaporate. Beijing may consider the DPP vendetta against the KMT an attempt to sever a historical connection between the two sides. Therefore as the DPP attempts to exterminate the KMT, it should not ignore the possible consequences.<br />
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Zhou has released a political trial balloon, a deliberate attempt to resolve the cross-Strait impasse. Meanwhile, the premise that "both sides of the Strait are part of one China" remains irreplaceable, and is a way to force the Tsai government to negotiate, or else.<br />
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If the Tsai government refuses to respond, if no response is forthcoming, how can it answer to the public? If it decides to respond, what will its bottom line be? Now that the gauntlet has been thrown down, the government can no longer afford to ignore it.<br />
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民共另建兩岸新共識的可能性<br />
2016-12-03 聯合報<br />
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大陸社科院台研所所長周志懷公開表示:「我想強調的是『九二共識』文字表述的可替代性,我們並不反對在九二共識之外,建立具有創造性的替代性共識,在兩岸關係發展的政治基礎問題上形成新的共同表述。」<br />
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他說:「大陸建構兩岸新共識的政策創新動能,並不弱於維護九二共識的決心。」<br />
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這是大陸方面首次明確表示「九二共識」文字表述的可替代性,並明言不反對在「九二共識」之外,另建「替代性共識」、「新的共同表述」或「兩岸新共識」。由於周志懷的職位被視為首席涉台智囊,他的喊話無疑具有政策釋放意味,宜慎重看待。茲略述幾點看法:<br />
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一、揆其語意,所謂九二共識文字表述的可替代性,應是指九二函電的相關表述以及「九二共識」這四個字的可替代性。但周亦反覆指出,「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家的內涵」,則是不可替代的核心要素。他所謂的兩岸新共識,已定性為體現一中原則、反對台獨、反對去中國化的兩岸新共識。倘是如此,則何不繼續使用九二共識即可?而新共識要如何文字堆砌始能完整表述這些核心內涵?<br />
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二、在周的談話中,雖有「一中原則」、「兩岸一國」、「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家」、「(台灣)不如在一個中國框架下學會如何與大陸相處」等用語,但他並未明示「一國」的定義,這應是存留的空間。<br />
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馬政府主張「九二共識」,且未反駁北京的那類用語,但以「一中各表」加以平衡。蔡政府要不要反駁「一中/一國」的概念?如果不反駁,又要以什麼來平衡?蔡政府或許可以不用「一中各表」四字,但其「替代性」的表述是什麼?失去九二共識之皮,一中各表毛將焉附?<br />
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三、周說,大陸對台政策的底線思維是反對台獨。但他提出的兩岸新論述,只見正面表述「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家」等等,但會不會後續再增添「反對台獨」的負面表述?<br />
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馬英九主張「不統/不獨/不武」,這是正負俱陳的表述。因為說了「不獨」,才能說「不統」;倘只說「不統」,而不說「不獨」,在兩岸就擺不平。蔡政府若接受了「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家」,一方面有如何伸展「一中各表」的難題,且後續台獨黨綱的矛盾勢將浮現。<br />
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四、周志懷主張建立「兩岸新論述/兩岸新共識」,又倡議兩岸智庫對話「力爭達成默契」,並說「這一默契並非一紙協議,甚至連口頭協議都不是,但它至關重要」。他又說,「在一定條件下,兩岸可進行傳話性接觸與可控性接觸」。<br />
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外界一時不易理解,從「連口頭協議都不是的默契」到「兩岸新論述/兩岸新共識」之間,其中的缺口存有何種過程及意義?而所謂「傳話性接觸/可控性接觸」,是否意指兩岸兩辦兩會之外的「密使」往來。倘是如此,蔡政府如何取得台灣人民的信任,又如何處理綠營內部的猜疑,會不會橫生枝節?<br />
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五、周志懷說,「國民黨在兩岸關係和平發展中的歷史與特殊作用不可替代」,其高度竟與「兩岸一國」的「不可替代」居於同一階位。若與周志懷其他部分談話合併解讀,應是針對蔡政府如今意圖滅絕國民黨的動作而發。國民黨如果過度弱化,國共內戰的兩岸架構亦告解構;北京可能視此為民進黨欲切斷兩岸的歷史臍帶。因而,民進黨追殺國民黨,應勿忘唇亡齒寒的效應。<br />
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周志懷在此時釋出這個政治氣球,一方面可視為有意化解兩岸僵局,但另一方面由於「兩岸一中」的前提仍是不可替代,也可視為促迫蔡政府進行談判及攤牌的動作。<br />
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蔡政府若不回應,事態當會有不回應的演化,然則該當如何肆應?若是回應,則最高目標是什麼?最低底線又是什麼?如今已聞轅門叫陣,恐怕也不能相應不理了。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-50172252125781818292016-12-01T21:35:00.002-08:002016-12-01T21:35:37.052-08:00Tsai Ying-wen's Autocratic Overreach <b>Tsai Ying-wen's Autocratic Overreach </b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>November 30, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: No matter how many grand plans one might have for the nation, Tsai Ing-wen's blueprint for reform has already provoked violence and chaos. The public cannot swallow it. In fact, even the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan have no idea where they are going. At this point, President Tsai must shift gears and change direction. She must re-prioritize her decision-making. More importantly, she must ensure that her administration understands her policy path. They cannot afford to look up to the sky and not pay attention to their feet on the ground.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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Recently the streets of Taipei have overflowed with protesters. The number of protesters continues to rise. Labor organizations have protested the longer work week. Gay rights activists have protested the lack of same-sex marriages. Consumers have protested the importation of food products from Japan's nuclear disaster area. More recently, TransAsia Airways workers have protested the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and KMT party workers have protested CIPAS nationalization of KMT assets. This does not even include military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers, who have called a temporary truce. President Tsai Ing-wen remains committed to her reformist crusade. She assumes it is the quickest way to a new Taiwan. But with brush fires breaking out everywhere, and protests erupting all around, she is seriously testing the public's patience.<br />
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There is no doubt that this rash of protests on Taiwan is the result of political deadlock. The reason for the deadlock is Tsai's autocratic reforms, combined with her incompetent governance. If Tsai were a charismatic leader, and her administration comprised of experienced political veterans, she might get away with her “reform of the week” crusade. But Tsai Ing-wen's support comes from an array of finger-pointing Taiwan independence elders. Her administration is staffed by panicked and confused cabinet members. Under the circumstances how can the Tsai government possibly impose her half-baked policies with a heavy hand? How can she possibly expect the public to swallow them?<br />
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One month after taking office, Tsai Ing-wen's approval rating was 60%. Six months after taking office, her approval rating was down to 30%. We have no idea how Tsai Ing-wen is interpreting this public disappointment. Is she kidding herself when she says "Reforms invariably encounter setbacks"? Is she flattering herself when she says "Reactionary forces are lashing back"? Either way, the moment President Tsai falls back on such psychological defense mechanisms, she is likely to lose sight of her original goal. All of Tsai Ing-wen's pledges can be summed up in her May 20 inaugural address, when she said "What people are looking for is a solution to their problems". But what has the government actually done over the past six months to help people solve their problems? Has it merely created more problems?<br />
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Tsai's reforms have provoked public protests for three reasons. First, her reforms were not properly planned. She failed to consider the pros and cons of her reforms. She presented no clear blueprint, therefore people remained skeptical. Second, the Tsai government refused to listen to the views of different segments of society. She resisted open dialogue with the public. Third, during decision-making, she used all manner unscrupulous means to pander to the DPP at the expense of democracy and the rule of law.<br />
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In fact, the recent protests are not necessarily in opposition to Tsai government reforms per se. They are in opposition to reforms whose goals are none too clear, or whose means are far too autocratic. They are in opposition to partisan vendettas disguised as reform, with the government trampling over democracy and the rule of law. Tsai Ing-wen's flowery rhetoric, arrant overreach, and forked tongue, have all been fatal to her image.<br />
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During the recent controversy over same-sex marriage, the Tsai Ing-wen government never consulted with the public. It never even asked the cabinet or the DPP legislative caucus for a draft version. Instead, it allowed Yu Mei-jen to present a common law draft version, to be rammed through the legislature. Naturally this caused public panic. Same-sex marriage is an issue unrelated to blue vs. green ideology. Taiwan society is becoming more open. It has gradually become one of the most open in Asia. The younger generation is far friendlier toward gays than previous generations. If the government is well prepared and communicates effectively, Taiwan can take a giant step forward in same-sex marriage compared to its neighbors. But Yu Mei-jen ignored the need for public consultation. She took the lead in ramming the bill through the legislature. Meanwhile, Tsai Ying-wen feined neutrality. The result was proponents and opponents at dagger points, taking to the streets and screaming at each other. This was a negative development no one wanted to see.<br />
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As such, however the chips fall, serious disagreements have divided society and the generations. Such an outcome is the inevitable consequence of poor governance. Consider internal dissent on this issue just within the DPP itself. Legislators without portfolio are out in front leading the charge. Legislators who represent regional constituents on the other hand, are in the rear, dragging their feet. Divisions among the public run deep. How can Tsai Ing-wen pretend not to see?<br />
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No matter how many grand plans one might have for the nation, Tsai Ing-wen's blueprint for reform has already provoked violence and chaos. The public cannot swallow it. In fact, even the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan have no idea where they are going. At this point, President Tsai must shift gears and change direction. She must re-prioritize her decision-making. More importantly, she must ensure that her administration understands her policy path. They cannot afford to look up to the sky and not pay attention to their feet on the ground.<br />
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改革暴衝:蔡英文的眼高手低<br />
2016-12-02 聯合報<br />
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最近台北街頭每天充塞著抗爭群眾,且隊伍不斷增加。從勞工的一例一休之爭,同性婚姻的正反兩軍之戰,民眾抵制日本核虞食品的示威活動,最近又新添了興航員工突襲民航局、及國民黨黨工包圍黨產會的抗議事件。這些,都還沒算上暫時休兵的軍公教隊伍。儘管蔡英文總統仍耽溺於她的改革大業,以為可以在最短的時間打造一個全新的台灣,但隨著烽火連綿,抗爭四起,她也嚴重考驗著民眾的耐性。<br />
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毫無疑問,台灣社會這種抗爭四起的現象,正是「政治塞車」的後遺症;而政治之所以塞車,則是「改革暴衝」加上「行政無能」的結果。假使蔡英文是一位魅力領袖,而她的執政團隊又是支經驗老到的精兵,或許還可堪當其「每周一改革」的志業。而如今的景象卻是,蔡英文背後站著成排指指點點的獨派大老,其行政團隊則是一群面露惶恐、不知所措的閣員;在這種情況下,蔡政府要用雷霆手段推動一堆半生不熟的政策,如何教民眾吞得下去?<br />
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從執政滿月時逾六成的支持度,跌到執政半年後僅剩三成的滿意度,我們不知道蔡英文如何解讀民意對她的失望:是要以「改革總會遭遇反挫」故作鎮定呢;或要以「保守勢力反撲」來自我增強?無論如何,一旦蔡總統陷入這樣的心理防衛機制,她極可能就失卻了自己的初衷。在五二○就職演說中,蔡英文所有的承諾可化約為一句話:「人民期待的,就是解決問題」;但執政半年來,政府究竟幫台灣解決了什麼問題,或者反而製造了更多問題?<br />
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改革之所以會發生暴衝,原因有三:第一,在改革構思上,缺乏審慎的計議和利弊分析,因提不出清晰的推動藍圖,讓民眾心生疑懼。第二,在政治過程中,政府一意孤行,缺乏聆聽社會不同意見的胸襟,亦不願虛心與民眾溝通對話;第三,在決策操作上,為達一己政黨之目的,不擇手段,踰越民主法治界線而在所不惜。<br />
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事實上,民眾近期抗爭不斷,未必是反對蔡政府的改革本身,而是反對改革的目標太不明確,或是反對改革的手段太過粗暴,或者反對藉改革之名行鬥爭之實,甚至是不滿政府踐踏民主法治。這些情況,對映蔡英文口口聲聲華麗的文青詞藻,她的「眼高手低」,乃至「心口不一」,皆是其致命傷。<br />
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以最近同性婚姻的爭議為例,蔡英文政府從未就此議題進行任何社會溝通,甚至未及待內閣提出政院版本或立院黨團提民進黨版本草案,即讓尤美女帶著她的「民法版」草案直接闖關,這當然會引起社會大眾的慌亂。同性婚姻是一個無關藍綠的議題,以台灣社會的開放性,走到今天,已漸漸成為亞洲最開放的國家之一,年輕世代對同志的友善程度也大大超越上一代。如果政府做好準備,經過有效溝通,台灣不無可能在同性婚姻立法上超越鄰國,邁開一大步。然而,在社會溝通付諸闕如下,尤美女帶頭闖關,蔡英文態度曖昧;結果造成正反兩派人馬劍拔弩張,甚至上街對嗆,互相鄙視,這是大家不樂見的反向發展。<br />
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如此一來,無論此一法案最後以何種方式收場,對社會及世代都將是一場嚴重的撕裂;這樣的結局,就是惡劣操作的必然後果。只消看民進黨內部對此議題的分歧,不分區立委在前方衝刺,區域立委在後方拉扯,即可知民間歧見之深;對此,蔡英文可以裝作看不見嗎?<br />
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無論胸中還有多少治國大計,她的改革藍圖已經出現頻頻暴衝並導致社會混亂,不僅民眾消化不良,事實上連行政和立法部門都不知道自己將走向何方。此際,蔡總統必須調整她施政的速度和方向,重新整理決策的優先順序。更重要的,是要確保她的執政團隊有能力掌握政策走向,不要眼睛望著天空,卻不留心自己腳下步履是否穩妥。<br />
<br />Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-91185366139506608442016-11-30T23:22:00.003-08:002016-11-30T23:22:31.161-08:00Collective Silence: An Accomplice in Party Assets Committee Constitutional Violations<b>Collective Silence: An Accomplice in Party Assets Committee Constitutional Violations</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>November 30, 2016</b><br />
<br />
Executive Summary: Hannah Eulan, a German political theorist, cited the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi war criminal, to show that when the majority of individuals in society refuse to think, collective madness will ultimately push the whole society to commit the ultimate crime. "In politics, obedience is tantamount to support." People must not assume this matter has nothing to do with them. Some people on Taiwan still regard the KMT as a “bandit regime” and seek to remove it. But next to the DPP, the KMT pales by comparison. When Taiwan's democratic values and constitutional foundations are eroded, public silence will be the chief culprit. <br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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According to the Executive Yuan Ill-gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee, or CIPAS, the Central Investment Company and the Hsinyutai Company must be nationalized in accordance with the Act Governing the Handling of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations. CIPAS arrived at this decision last week, and alleged that the Central Investment Company and Hsinyutai Company were illicit creations of the KMT. Premier Lin immediately convened the relevant ministries to discuss the matter, and form a takeover team. The actions of CIPAS have provoked a series of public controversies. Its procedures have been illegal, even unconstitutional. Yet CIPAS chairman Wellington Koo refuses to relent. President Tsai and the DPP bear the greatest responsibility. But the public cannot assume that such matters do not concern them, and stand idly by doing nothing.<br />
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Since CIPAS began operations, it has assumed that it is above the law. It has acted in complete disregard of legal procedures and justice. In September it ordered the Bank of Taiwan and Bank Sinopac to freeze the KMT's accounts. The Taipei High Administrative Court ruled that order issued by CIPAS was illegal. It ruled that the KMT is legally allowed to withdraw funds. But CIPAS ignored the court's ruling, and continued its freeze on KMT accounts in the two banks. CIPAS considers itself above the courts, hence entitled to ignore the court's decisions.<br />
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Last week, CIPAS decided that the Central Investments Company and Hsinyutai Company must be nationalized. This too, was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. According to Wellington Koo, the two companies are the products of past party-state equivalence, when the government and state owned entities were interconnected, and a single party could use its dominant position to acquire illicit assets. Nationalization, Koo argues, is therefore the fulfillment of transitional justice. But the KMT acquired these assets before the Republic of China Constitution was amended on December 25, 1947. Therefore these assets are not covered by current constitutional provisions. They must be dealt with in accordance with the General Outline of the Constitution for the Political Tutelage Period of the Republic of China. The General Outline stipulated that the party and the government are one. The Party Assets Act was not in effect at the time. Any ruling must therefore abide by the General Outline, according to which “the party leads the government”. Besides, the KMT brought the gold and the government assets to Taiwan from the Mainland.<br />
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According to CIPAS, the Central Investment Company sold 200 million NT in bonds in 1971. Before that, KMT party owned businesses showed only a small two year surplus. CIPAS claims that the Central Investment Company, founded in 1971, is a KMT<br />
affiliate organization. But the Company Law and Public Organizations Law then in effect did not expressly prohibit political parties from investing. The Public Organizations Law allowed the formation of organizations outside the party only after 1971. CIPAS claims that the China Investment Company was created by the sale of 200 million in bonds. Nevertheless it cannot ignore the shareholders' investments, the board of supervisors' oversight, and other capital injections. Not to mention the fact that its subsidiaries are independent legal entities and independent shareholder groups. The Constitution protects their property rights as well.<br />
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Finally, Executive Yuan and CIPAS spokesmen have repeatedly argued that according to the Administrative Procedure Law, Section 116, the China Investment Company and Hsinyutai Company shares must be nationalized. They will not stop because the KMT files suit. The KMT may call for a constitutional amendment, but it will not influence the CIPAS one iota. The DPP thumbs its nose at the justice system, and issues threats against the justice system, even as it holds high the banner of transitional justice. It abuses its executive power to defy the judicial process. Even if future courts render adverse judgments, such judgments can be challenged as improper.<br />
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Even more astonishing is the attitude of CIPAS regarding the burden of proof, the presumption of guilt, and the right to remain silent. It ignores due process and does whatever it pleases. CIPAS even demands the authority to conduct searches of "premises where it is not welcome" despite insufficient evidence, based on the presumption of guilt.<br />
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Searches of public organizations for evidence of illegal conduct require police officials to present sufficient evidence to the court for the issuance of search warrants, in order to protect innocent parties. Today however, CIPAS can unilaterally presume illicit conduct and ignore judicial rulings. It can use the Act Governing the Handling of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations to ram through tailor made legislation. It can presume guilt, enforce ex post facto laws, and ignore statutes of limitations. These provisions have been in force for 71 years. CIPAS is using a single law to destroy our entire judicial system.<br />
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At the core of democracy is the rule of law. Legal abuses by CIPAS reveal how the DPP government is destroying the basic values of democracy. The reason CIPAS is so bold, is of course President Tsai Ing-wen and her policy of transitional justice. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP government are the driving force behind this subversion of democracy. They bear responsibility for the destruction of democracy.<br />
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Hannah Eulan, a German political theorist, cited the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi war criminal, to show that when the majority of individuals in society refuse to think, collective madness will ultimately push the whole society to commit the ultimate crime. "In politics, obedience is tantamount to support." People must not assume this matter has nothing to do with them. Some people on Taiwan still regard the KMT as a “bandit regime” and seek to remove it. But next to the DPP, the KMT pales by comparison. When Taiwan's democratic values and constitutional foundations are eroded, public silence will be the chief culprit. <br />
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社論》集體緘默是黨產會毀憲幫凶<br />
2016/11/30 下午 07:54:26 主筆室<br />
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行政院不當黨產處理委員會上周決議,中央投資公司、欣裕台公司為國民黨不當黨產,依據《不當黨產處理條例》,兩公司股權將移轉國有。行政院院長林全隨即邀集相關部會討論,決定立即成立接管小組接管。由於黨產會的連續作為引發各界爭議,不僅程序違法,甚至有違憲之虞,但是黨產會主委顧立雄仍然一意孤行,蔡總統和民進黨必須負起最大責任,民眾更不能認為事不關己而袖手旁觀。<br />
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黨產會自從開始運作以來,就像拿了尚方寶劍一樣,全然不顧法律程序和正義,9月間就逕自發函台灣銀行和永豐銀行,不得隨意讓國民黨提領存款;後經台北高等行政法院認定其合法性有疑義,國民黨依法可以動用存款,但黨產會對兩銀行祭出暫停提領匯出的行政處分,持續凍結國民黨帳戶至今,這種無視於法院裁決的行徑,簡直就是法院的太上皇。<br />
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上周黨產會將中投公司和欣裕台公司收歸國有的決議,也違背了憲法精神。首先,根據顧立雄的宣示,這是過去黨國一體的年代,政府與國家組織交互連結,單一政黨利用主導地位,所獲得不法資源,收歸國有是轉型正義的真諦。但是國民黨取得財產大都在民國36年12月25日行憲以前,該時期並非在現行憲法規範下,因此應依當時等同憲法的《中華民國訓政時期約法》處理。約法規定黨政一體,現行《不當黨產處理條例》逾越憲法行憲時期,則需遵循約法「以黨領政」的規範,更何況當時國民黨從大陸攜來黃金與政府財產互有挹注。<br />
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其次,依據黨產會調查,中投為國民黨於1971年購置2億元公債所成立,之前黨營事業僅有2年小有盈餘。黨產會認定民國60年成立的中投公司是國民黨附隨組織,可是依照當時的《公司法》與《人民團體法》均未明文禁止政黨投資;《人團法》更是民國60年才有開放黨外組黨之雛議。因此,縱然黨產會認定中投公司是由購置2億元公債而來,不能全盤否認股東的投資、蕫監事會的經營與其他資金的挹注,更不用說轉投資的子公司仍具有獨立的法人人格與獨立的股東會,這些都是憲法保障人民財產權的範圍。<br />
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最後,行政院或黨產會發言人一再強調,依《行政訴訟法》第116條規定,中投與欣裕台股權收歸國有的處分之執行,不會因國民黨提起行政訴訟而停止;也預測縱使國民黨聲請釋憲,也不會影響黨產會作業進度。這種無視司法並揚言挑戰司法、高舉轉型正義大旗的黨產會,將以行政權力對抗司法程序,縱然未來法院有不利判決,都可質疑法院判決不當。<br />
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令人驚愕的是,黨產會以「舉證責任倒置」、「有罪推定」與「排除緘默」等不當手段,毋須踐履正當程序便可恣意妄為;連黨產會本欲行使黨史館的調閱權或搜索權,都能夠以「不去一個不歡迎我們的地方」、「已經掌握相關事證因此不去」等,以有罪推定的立場放話表態,令人匪疑所思。<br />
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我國法律對於人民團體的行政檢查或是違法事證之調查,檢警人員進行搜索都要以足夠證據向法院申請核發「搜索票」,以利當事人自我無罪之保護。而今,黨產會卻能片面認定不當,無視司法審查到這種地步。以《不當黨產處理條例》個別性、針對性立法,又採用「有罪推定」、「溯及既往」、「排除消滅時效」等手段追究71年之久,難道不是用極權式不當的特別法去破壞我國的司法體系嗎?<br />
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民主的核心價值就是法治,黨產會的濫權讓我們活生生地見識到民進黨政府的行事是如何在崩解民主的基本價值,黨產會敢於如此膽大妄為,當然是秉持著蔡英文總統推動轉型正義的政策,蔡英文和民進黨政府就是民主逆流的推手,應該負起裂解民主的責任。<br />
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德裔政治理論思想家漢娜‧鄂蘭以納粹戰犯阿道夫‧艾希曼的審判為例,說明當社會上的大多數個人不思考,集體的瘋狂,最終將把整個社會推向極致的犯罪,她說「在政治中,服從就等於支持。」民眾不要以為事不關己,在台灣社會固然有一部分人視國民黨為寇讎,必欲除之而後快,但是相較於國民黨,民進黨的作為更值得深思,當台灣的民主價值和憲政基礎被侵蝕的時候,沉默就會是最大的幫凶。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-56131989176365836272016-11-29T21:50:00.002-08:002016-11-29T21:50:17.945-08:00Is the Sacrificial Pawn Determined to be a Starving Sentry?<b>Is the Sacrificial Pawn Determined to be a Starving Sentry?</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>November 30, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: The Economist Special Edition featured a Tarot card on the cover. It predicted global trends for 2017. It invoked "Planet Trump" as a metaphor for the setback he poses for globalism. The process of regional integration is confusing, disorderly, and intense. Yet Taiwan remains ignorant of the cards it holds. Tsai Ying-wen must wake up and clear her head, lest she follow in Chen Shui-bian's footsteps. She must cast off her illusions and boldly proclaim which path she intends to take. Otherwise, she will become a puppet of deep green pressure groups. The window of opportunity is closing rapidly. She had better complete her test paper, lest her Asian tiger be reduced to a sick cat.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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Donald Trump wants the US out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). That is no longer in doubt. Taiwan is stunned. The situation is grim. If the Tsai Ing-wen government sweeps the problem under the rug and does nothing, Tsai's popularity will hit rock bottom. If she attempts to push through reforms after she has lost popular support, it will be too late.<br />
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Trump's election victory marks a dramatic reversal in global political tides. Since the end of World War II, the US has dominated global affairs. This domination is now on “Pause”. Meanwhile, Mainland China's "Chinese Dream" has begun to see the light of day. The Mainland is using a variety of means to shape the world to its liking. Trump's New Isolationism and Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream clearly indicate who is pulling back and who is moving forward.<br />
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Obama's withdrawal from the Middle East was a precursor of this strategic withdrawal. Hillary Clinton authored Obama's "Asian Rebalancing" strategy to suppress China's rise. But based on its behavior in the South China Sea, the United States' bark is worse than its bite. The TPP, its most important containment tactic, is already unsustainable.<br />
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Furthermore, during the same period, Mainland China set forth its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. It successfully promoted its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) project. Even Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and other US allies have joined. In the South China Sea, it has consolidated its strategic position through island building. This year, for the very first time, it hosted the G20 Summit, the most important platform for global governance.<br />
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The world has arrived at a major watershed. The Chinese Dream and the New Isolationism now stand side by side. A new bipolar world is emerging. Yet Tsai's policy remains rigidly anchored in the old world. Tsai sees only Hillary Clinton, who appears to retain the luster of global hegemony. She does not see that the colors of the US Empire have already begun to fade.<br />
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Tsai Ing-wen failed to see the signs. She bet everything on the United States. Needless to say, Trump's opposition to the TPP has impacted Taiwan.<br />
The TPP is ostensibly an “economic agreement”. But Hillary Clinton's economic adviser John W. Holmes described it as the "Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty", as a coalition designed to contain China. Alas, the TPP has collapsed even before it could take shape. Taiwan has consequently become an economic and strategic orphan.<br />
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Following the collapse of the TPP, the global focus shifted to the Regional Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) and the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area (FTAAP) initiatives, both of which are dominated by Mainland China. Taiwan probably will be denied entry. Attempts to sign bilateral agreements will probably be met with frustration. Yet according to the October issue of The Economist, Tsai Ying-wen has affected a carefree manner and declared her intent to promote bilateral and multilateral economic and trade agreements. She even boasted that she would restore Taiwan to her former status as one fo the four Asian tigers.<br />
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There are two possible explanations for Tsai's attitude. First, The Tsai government is blind. It does not see that Taiwan is already in its death throes. Second, Tsai Ing-wen knows that Taiwan's condition is critical, but she remains a hostage to ideology. She wants to procrastinate, and whistle in the dark. If the Tsai government is blind, will the fate of the tourism industry and the dissolution of TransAsia Airways shock the Tsai government into awareness? If Tsai already understands the situation, then Taiwan has become a sacrificial pawn to the TPP. Must we tighten our belts, and continue to serve as the United States' starving sentinel in Asia?<br />
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Tsai Ying-wen has a responsibility to make the right decisions in the face of cold reality. The new global paradigm shows that Taiwan cannot renounce bilateral agreements. But more importantly, Taiwan must take part in RCEP and FTAAP regional integration. Such an about face is not that difficult. Tsai need only follow through on her inaugural address. She need only reaffirm that she is abiding by the Constitution, and that cross-Strait relations are not relations between different states.<br />
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Beijing's recent actions are worth noting. Xi Jinping met with Hung Hsiu-chu in Beijing early this month. In mid-May he embarrassed Ma Ying-jeou in Malaysia, when he omitted “different interpretations” from the 1992 Consensus", leaving only "one China". By contrast, he did not shut James Soong out of APEC in Peru. Before James Soong left for Lima, he declared that "both sides of the Strait belong to one China” and reiterated his “opposition to Taiwan independence". Xi praised Hung, blocked Ma, and met Soong. Beijing is probably waiting for Tsai Ing-wen to complete the unanswered questions on her test paper.<br />
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The Economist Special Edition featured a Tarot card on the cover. It predicted global trends for 2017. It invoked "Planet Trump" as a metaphor for the setback he poses for globalism. The process of regional integration is confusing, disorderly, and intense. Yet Taiwan remains ignorant of the cards it holds. Tsai Ying-wen must wake up and clear her head, lest she follow in Chen Shui-bian's footsteps. She must cast off her illusions and boldly proclaim which path she intends to take. Otherwise, she will become a puppet of deep green pressure groups. The window of opportunity is closing rapidly. She had better complete her test paper, lest her Asian tiger be reduced to a sick cat.<br />
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做了棄卒,還要當饑餓哨兵?<br />
2016-11-30 聯合報<br />
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川普要退出「跨太平洋夥伴協定(TPP)」,已無懸念,台灣頓失所依。形勢嚴峻,蔡英文的政府若僅故作鎮靜,仍毫無作為,她的聲望恐將一路探底,而當她失去民心,再作任何變革,亦都將藥石罔效。<br />
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川普當選是世界浪潮反轉的戲劇性一幕,美國從二戰末期開始主導世局的全球主義,在這一刻突然劃上休止符;而中國大陸卻欲迎向其「中國夢」黎明前的微光,用不同的倡議,嘗試塑造這個世界。川普的新孤立主義,與習近平的「中國夢」,鮮明地呈現了彼消此長的情狀。<br />
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美國從歐巴馬中東撤軍就預示了這個戰略收縮的趨勢。希拉蕊.柯林頓雖替歐巴馬制定了「亞洲再平衡」戰略,以遏制中國崛起,但從南海較量中可看出,美國已是色厲內荏,TPP就是其遏制手段的主角,如今卻難以為繼。<br />
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況且,同一期間,中國大陸提出一帶一路倡議,成功推動亞投行,連英法德義等美國盟友都集體加入,南海造島穩步形成戰略固守;今年更首次舉辦全球治理最重要的平台G20峰會。<br />
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世界正走上一個重大的分水嶺,當「中國夢」與「新孤立主義」並存,一個新的兩極體系的世界將逐步成形;但蔡英文的政策卻還僵固地留守在舊世界裡,只注目於柯林頓身上儼然還在閃爍的世界霸權餘暉,卻看不見美利堅帝國已經嚴重褪色。<br />
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當蔡英文誤讀了趨勢又單邊押寶美國,當然就造成了川普反TPP主張一夕成真對台灣的衝擊效應。這個曾被柯林頓經濟顧問霍爾邁茨形容為「亞洲版北大西洋公約」的經濟協定,其實是一個包圍與遏制中國的聯盟,當它未成形即告瓦解,台灣頃刻成了經濟與戰略上的國際孤兒。<br />
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TPP瓦解後,全球目光轉向「區域全面經濟夥伴協定(RCEP)」以及倡議中的「亞太自由貿易區(FTAAP)」,兩者都由中國大陸主導,台灣恐皆不得其門而入;至若洽簽雙邊協定之路,也恐更加坎坷。蔡英文竟猶一派輕鬆狀,宣稱要推動雙邊與多邊經貿協定,甚至早在十月交給英國《經濟學人》有關明年趨勢的專文裡,夸言要把台灣再變為猛虎。<br />
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這等情境可有兩解:其一,蔡政府已如盲瞽,看不見台灣面臨危殆之境;其二,蔡英文雖知台灣已體弱病虛,卻被意識形態挾制,觀望瞻顧,但求拖延,走在暗夜裡,只好吹哨壯膽。若是前者,從觀光慘業到興航解散所揭露的經濟真相,能否搖醒昏睡的蔡政府?若是後者,則試問,難道台灣成了TPP的棄卒後,還要勒緊褲帶,無怨無悔地繼續在亞洲充當美國的饑餓哨兵?<br />
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作為執政者,蔡英文的職責是面對冷酷的現實作出正確的決策。全球的新格局已經揭示,台灣不能放棄雙邊協定,但更須全力尋求加入RCEP與FTAAP的區域整合。這個轉身對蔡英文而言,其實並不真的那麼困難,只要在她就職演說基礎上往前一步,表明依據憲法,兩岸並非兩國關係即可。<br />
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北京近期幾個動作值得注意。習近平月初在北京接見了洪秀柱,月中卻讓馬英九在馬來西亞碰了一鼻子灰,儼然是要從「九二共識」中剔除「各表」,只留「一中」;但同時間,則未對蔡英文派往秘魯APEC的宋楚瑜橫加干預,而宋楚瑜行前複誦「兩岸一中、反對台獨」卻留下一些線索。捧洪、卡馬、會宋,北京應是在看蔡英文何時填上那份「未完成的答卷」。<br />
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《經濟學人》專刊封面以塔羅牌為背景,占卜二○一七全球趨勢,其中「川普星球」隱喻著一個全球治理的黯淡開端。區域整合進程撲朔迷離,無序博弈更形激烈,台灣卻不自知手上只剩什麼牌。蔡英文必須清醒地認知,若不想步陳水扁後塵,就必須拋棄虛幻主張,大膽更張路線,否則因循泄沓以致失機僨事,她將淪為深綠裹脅的政治傀儡。機會之窗稍縱即逝,莫待答卷收走,猛虎餓成病貓。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-80119874105122501582016-11-28T18:40:00.002-08:002016-11-28T18:40:18.081-08:00How Should Taiwan Respond to US Withdrawal from TPP? <b>How Should Taiwan Respond to US Withdrawal from TPP? </b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>November 26, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: Once the United States pulls out of Asia, confrontation between the US and Mainland China is expected to ease. Taiwan will feel less pressure to choose sides. This is a turning point. Taiwan can use this to review its one-sided foreign policy and adopt a Taiwan-centric rebalancing policy. The crux of the problem is the DPP government's anti-Mainland attitude. It lacks the courage to face reality. Since May, the Tsai government has repeatedly misjudged the international situation. It shows no signs of change. As a result, it can only paint itself further into a corner. Think about it. How can a government that pointedly ignores Mainland China, Asia's largest economy, possibly champion Asian co-operation?<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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Donald Trump has publicly announced that he will pull the US out of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) on the very day he takes office. Shinzo Abe, who was still rushing about, could not conceal his dismay. A TPP without the US is meaningless. Tsai Ing-wen, who was attending the Asia-Pacific Chamber of Commerce, used the opportunity to urge Asian nations to follow through on economic integration. Her words were pretty. But does the president really think anyone will respond?<br />
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Trump's personnel appointments show that for the next four years the United States will be under the sway of the far right. For the world at large, Trump's announcement that he will pull the US out of the TPP, signaled the beginning of America's "new isolationism". The global trade order will be seriously impacted. For Taiwan in particular, heavily reliant on exports to the United States, restarting an economy that has been stalled for years will be harder than ever.<br />
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The TPP was the single-handed creation of the United States. Its purpose was to counter Mainland China's RCEP. This cross border economic agreement was originally between New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, and Brunei. It was later expanded, becoming a TPP with 12 member nations. The TPP was more a strategic goal than an economic partnership. Obama's Asian Rebalancing strategy forced nations on both sides of the Pacific to choose sides. When the US retreated, Malaysia and Vietnam jumped ship and returned to the RCEP. Only Japan drew its sword and looked around with alarm. Taiwan was even more embarrassed. For years it waited patiently for the second round, hoping to join. Now its dream has been shattered. Where will it go from here?<br />
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Japan is obsessed with the TPP. It desperately wants to ally with the United States to contain Mainland China. It wants TPP to cement the relationship between the two nations. Abenomics sees TPP as part of its economic strategy. It wants to use trade liberalization to promote economic restructuring. But the TPP has run aground. This will greatly diminish Abe's economic power. It will also undermine the US-Japan strategic partnership. Japan will be the biggest victim of the US withdrawal from the TPP.<br />
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The TPP was originally a set of economic “rules of the game” for small nations. It set a high threshold. It imposed high standards. It removed all tariff barriers, no exceptions. It fully liberalized financial services, telecommunications and other service industries as well. This favored small nations, but disfavored large nations. The United States sacrificed its domestic market for the sake of TPP. No wonder Trump thinks the TPP is a disaster for the United States.<br />
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Long time strategic deployment and hegemonic intervention by the United States has prevented Asia from forming its own free trade area. Now however, the US is withdrawing from the TPP. The Mainland Chinese-led RCEP will rush in to fill this vacuum. Mainland China is conducting itself in a low-keyed manner. It has declared its intent to continue Asian integration. It has stressed that the real leader of the RCEP is ASEAN. But with the United States withdrawal from the TPP, Mainland China will undoubtedly be the biggest beneficiary.<br />
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Once Trump takes office, it will be “America First”. He will not sacrifice US economic interests in order to maintain global hegemony. Instead, economic development will come first. The United States will change from military hegemonism to trade hegemonism. This will change the strategic map for global political and economic power, and determine Taiwan's fate.<br />
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What impact will an Asia without the TPP have on Taiwan? When the DPP took office, it brought cross-Strait relations to a standstill. It blindly followed in Japan's footsteps, and deliberately ignored the Mainland led RCEP and ASEAN. It bet Taiwan's foreign trade chips on the TPP. The TPP dream has now evaporated. Taiwan's sole alternative is to return to bilateral FTAs. Sadly, the DPP refuses to rethink Taiwan's development strategy based on the Big Picture. Instead, it is betting on the Taiwan-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. It has forgotten that Taiwan has failed to improve its long-term deficit relationship with Japan. Its eagerness to become an economic vassal is the main cause of Taiwan's current plight.<br />
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In fact, once the United States pulls out of Asia, confrontation between the US and Mainland China is expected to ease. Taiwan will feel less pressure to choose sides. This is a turning point. Taiwan can use this to review its one-sided foreign policy and adopt a Taiwan-centric rebalancing policy. The crux of the problem is the DPP government's anti-Mainland attitude. It lacks the courage to face reality. Since May, the Tsai government has repeatedly misjudged the international situation. It shows no signs of change. As a result, it can only paint itself further into a corner.<br />
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Think about it. How can a government that pointedly ignores Mainland China, Asia's largest economy, possibly champion Asian co-operation?<br />
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美國退出TPP,台灣因應之道何在?<br />
2016-11-26 聯合報<br />
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川普公開宣稱,他上任首日,就將宣布美國退出「跨太平洋戰略經濟夥伴協議」(TPP)。對此,仍在奔走的安倍難掩失望說,一個沒有美國的TPP即失去意義。蔡英文則藉著出席亞太工商總會的機會喊話,盼亞洲國家扮演經濟整合角色。話雖說得漂亮,但蔡總統認為空氣中將傳來什麼樣的回聲?<br />
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從川普連日任命的人事看,未來四年,美國已無法免於極右派當道的命運。對世界而言,川普宣布退出TPP,更吹響了美國「新孤立主義」的號角,全球貿易秩序將受嚴重衝擊。對於高度倚賴對美出口的台灣而言,在低谷徘徊多年的經濟,恐怕更難有起色。<br />
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從協議本質看,TPP是由美國一手形塑,目的是為了抗衡中國大陸引領的RCEP。美國把原由紐西蘭、智利、新加坡、汶萊四國組成的跨國經濟協議,擴大成擁有十二個會員國的TPP,這即註定TPP是一個「戰略目標」大於「經濟夥伴關係」的組織。在歐巴馬的「亞洲再平衡」大旗下,太平洋兩岸的國家不得不選邊站;但當美國勢力消褪後,馬來西亞及越南便決定跳船選擇回到RCEP,唯獨日本還在拔劍四顧心茫茫。更尷尬的是台灣,多年來一心一意等著爭取第二輪入會,如今目標變成泡影,我們要朝哪裡前進?<br />
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日本之所以執著於TPP,除了為聯美抗中,更把它當成日美關係的黏著劑。安倍經濟學也把TPP當成經濟戰略的一環,要以貿易自由化來帶動經濟結構改革。如今TPP觸礁,不但將使安倍經濟學的威力大打折扣,美日戰略夥伴關係也勢必受到衝擊,日本將成為美國退出TPP的最大受害者。<br />
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從協議內容看,TPP原是小國間的經濟遊戲規則,強調高門檻的規範標準,不僅要一視同仁撤除關稅壁壘,還要全面開放金融、電信等服務產業;這對小國有利,卻對大國不利。亦即,美國其實是以犧牲國內市場來換取TPP的主導權;也難怪,川普認為TPP對美國將是一場災難。<br />
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長期以來,在美國的戰略部署與霸權干預下,亞洲一直無法形成自己的自由貿易區,如今美國要退出TPP,中國引領的RCEP將適時填補這個真空。中國雖然在此際表現得相當低調,聲稱將持續推動「亞洲一體化」政策,也強調東協才是RCEP真正的主導者;但美國退出TPP,中國無疑將是最大受益者。<br />
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可以預見的是,川普上台後,在美國利益優先下,將不會再犧牲自身經濟利益來維持其世界霸權的角色。同時,在經濟發展為先的原則下,美國將從軍事霸權主義轉為貿易霸權主義,這將改變全球政經權力版圖,也左右著台灣的命運。<br />
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一個沒有TPP的亞洲,對台灣將產生什麼影響?民進黨上台後,不僅將兩岸關係帶入僵局,更一味追隨日本的腳步,刻意忽視中國和東協主導的RCEP,把台灣對外經濟的籌碼全押在TPP。而今TPP的美景幻滅,台灣恐怕只能走回雙邊FTA的道路。可悲的是,民進黨不思從整體形勢重新思考台灣的發展戰略,卻轉而寄希望於「台日經濟夥伴協議」,似渾然忘了台灣對日本長期的逆差關係無能改善,卻自甘淪為經濟附庸,正是當前深陷困境的主要肇因。<br />
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事實上,美國一旦退出亞洲,美中對峙可望趨於緩和,台灣面臨選邊的壓力將會減小。這原是一個轉機,台灣可趁此檢討過去一面倒的對外政策,轉而採取以台灣為中心的「再平衡」政策。癥結在,民進黨政府在反中思維作祟下,始終缺乏面對現實的勇氣。五月以來,蔡政府面對國際情勢頻頻誤判,卻看不出它有調整的跡象;其結果,只會把自己逼到死角。<br />
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試想,一個無視亞洲最大經濟體中國存在的政府,又如何倡言亞洲共同合作呢?<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-36799603486609392922016-11-28T01:35:00.002-08:002016-11-28T01:35:23.612-08:00Totalitarian Means For Desirable Reforms<b>Totalitarian Means For Desirable Reforms</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>November 28, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: We must reform. But we must not resort to the abuse power, populist demagoguery, or totalitarian means. These inevitably lead to the collapse of democracy, the abrogation of the rule of law, and the destruction of constitutional rule. We believe Tsai is sincere in her desirre for reform. But if she acts in haste, if she behaves tyrannically and recklesslessly, if she breaks the law and tramples over the Constitution, even good intentions will pave the way to hell.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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The “Ill-gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee”, aka “Party Assets Committee”, has decided to confiscate the Kuomintang's Central Investment Company (CIC), and Hsinyutai Company. Even the KMT's Central Party Headquarters Building is being "nationalized". Wellington Koo, chairman of the Party Assets Committee, said that enforcement of the Party Assets Regulations is the final mile towards democracy. We think Wellington Koo and the Party Assets Committee are busy carving a tombstone for democracy and the rule of law, and that the Party Assets Regulations are an epitaph for democracy and the rule of law.<br />
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Those in the know have long advised the KMT to summon up the courage to reform, clarify the historical record, and give the party a fresh start. Doing so would have liberated the party from its historical burdens, and enabled it to begin anew. It would also establish a more equitable environment for intraparty competition. Alas, the KMT could not bring itself to give up short term advantages. It ignored long term risks. It could not bring itself to cease suckling at the party assets teat. It could not bring itself to sever its links to special interests. Naturally it could not avoid relentless green camp attacks during election season. Following its election defeat, the KMT is like a dog without a master. Its home has been invaded, and its property has been looted. Unwilling to part with its assets, it brought this disaster upon itself. It has only itself to blame.<br />
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That said, the Party Assets Committee, under the aegis of the Executive Yuan, has exceeded its authority. It has ignored the distinction between executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It has ignored the need for detailed investigation and due process of law. It has presumed guilt and imposed ex post facto law in order to designate KMT assets as “illicit”. In the name of the Republic of China, it invades homes and seizes property via asset forfeiture. The KMT has lost its party assets. That is nothing to lament. But the collapse of democracy can only turn peoples' hearts to dust. The collapse of the rule of law can only leave people heartbroken.<br />
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Wellington Koo is holding high the banner of justice. But what many see is the DPP's determination to cling to power indefinitely, by annihilating the KMT, by severing its arteries and cutting off its lifeblood. But given current political realities, the elimination of one of the blue and green parties will lead to one party rule and the overthrow of democracy. If the DPP succeeds in destroying the KMT, it alone will rule the roost. Democracy will be deprived of checks and balances. That is not a good thing. The DPP may be able to monopolize power for a while. But without the checks and balances provided by partisan rivalry, it will find it difficult to hold on to power indefinitely. Any attempt to do so will destroy democracy in the process.<br />
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The key is that the ends do not justify the means. Reform is necessary, but it must not be achieved by totalitarian means. Transitional justice is a noble goal. But it cannot justify the abuse of power or the violation of law and the constitution. Wellington Koo struts about haughtily, full of himself. He sees due process as a nuisance. He sees court decisions as irrelevant. He sees democracy and the rule of law as clods of dirt. He postures as a champion of justice. Anticipating the legal battle ahead, he lectures the KMT about "recognizing the true meaning of transitional justice". He instructs the courts to "appreciate the value of transitional justice". Wellington Koo wields the Party Assets Committee like a battle axe, swinging it wildly this way and that. Today's Taiwan now resembles the Chinese Mainland, during the Cultural Revolution, when an ill wind swept away all traces of democracy and the rule of law.<br />
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But most frightening of all, is Koo's attitude toward power. Tsai Ing-wen spoke of "humility, humility, and more humility". The slogan has lost all meaning. Like “communication, communication, and more communication", it is a wilted flower. The democratic values championed by the DPP when it was in the opposition, the principle of the rule of law and due process, have all become stumbling blocks now that the DPP is the ruling party. The DPP demands “total government”. How can it tolerate having its power locked away in a prison cell? The DPP demands swift justice. Why must it wait around while the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly? Since reform is sacrosanct, so what if one's methods are a little totalitarian? So what if the DPP regime must trample over the rule of law? With such a mentality, the emergence of power hungry demagogues such as Wellington Koo and the Party Assets Committee are inevitable.<br />
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The DPP has the KMT by the throat. The KMT may wish for a desperate last stand. Alas, even that would be difficult. As an old saying puts it, “The mountains and waters will meet again". Never burn one's bridges. Life always holds out new opportunities. Humiliations endured today will be rewarded ten times over tomorrow. The KMT may live or die. It may be reduced to Ah Q-style “spiritual victories”. But the most disturbing development is that under democracy, party politics has led to an endless cycle of revenge.<br />
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In fact, democracy, the rule of law, and constitutional rule, make up an inviolable line in the sand. Once that line has been crossed, it is all too easy to march down the road toward unlimited power and authoritarian dictatorship. It is all too easy to become caught up in populist demagoguery and political chaos. It is all too easy for society to break apart, for old hatreds to resurface, and for cycles of violence to prevail, leaving never a moment's peace.<br />
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We must reform. But we must not resort to the abuse power, populist demagoguery, or totalitarian means. These inevitably lead to the collapse of democracy, the abrogation of the rule of law, and the destruction of constitutional rule. We believe Tsai is sincere in her desirre for reform. But if she acts in haste, if she behaves tyrannically and recklesslessly, if she breaks the law and tramples over the Constitution, even good intentions will pave the way to hell.<br />
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神聖的改革,卻用極權手段達成<br />
2016-11-28 聯合報<br />
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黨產會決議沒收國民黨的中投公司和欣裕台公司,連國民黨中央黨部也「收歸國有」。黨產會主委顧立雄侈言不當黨產條例的落實,是走向民主的最後一哩路;我們則擔心,顧立雄和黨產會的橫行,正在砌起民主法治的第一塊墓碑,而鐫刻其上的黨產條例,也將是民主法治的第一篇墓誌銘。<br />
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識者早就勸告國民黨拿出改革勇氣,清理歷史遺緒,讓黨產歸零,不僅丟掉包袱,重新出發,也建立更公平的政黨競爭環境。但國民黨難捨近利,無視長害,既然戒不掉黨產奶嘴,切不斷利益糾葛,當然就掙不脫綠營選舉時的一路夾纏,更躲不過民進黨掌權後的政治追殺。敗選後的國民黨,已若喪家之犬,而今更被逼向抄家滅產的絕境,當捨不捨,招禍取咎,無不自己也。<br />
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然而,黨產會以行政院下屬機關,跨越行政、立法、司法分際,毋需詳實調查,不理程序正義,不但有罪推定,還要法溯既往,逕自「判決」國民黨黨產來源「不當」,更假中華民國之名,奪產抄家,沒收充公。國民黨黨產敗散不足惜,民主坍塌才教人心灰,法治裂崩也教人心憂,憲政破毀更教人心痛。<br />
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顧立雄高舉轉型正義大纛,許多人看到的卻是民進黨為永保執政,必欲殲滅國民黨的意圖,切其金脈,斷其命脈。但以當前現實政治而言,藍綠兩大黨去其一,政黨政治即告失衡,民主體制隨時可能傾覆。果真國民黨橫遭滅門,民進黨一黨獨大,民主政治的運作,缺乏實質制衡力量,洵非好事;而民進黨即使能夠總攬權力於一時,缺乏政黨的自主競爭,也難永保政權,卻先葬送了民主。<br />
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問題的關鍵,在於手段的正當性。改革是必要的,但不能以極權手段來達成;轉型正義目標崇高,更不能以濫權踰法違憲手段為之。然而,從訂頒黨產條例到黨產會成立,政治針對性極強,清算鬥爭味極濃;尤其顧立雄,恃其剛悍,顧盼自雄,既視程序正義如敝屣,復視法院判決如無物,更視民主法治如草芥;卻一副大義凜然之貌,對可預期的法律戰,一方面教訓國民黨要「體認轉型正義的真諦」,一方面指導法院要「體會轉型正義的價值」。顧立雄掄著黨產條例大刀,耍得虎虎生風,於是現代台灣,吹起半世紀前的大陸文革歪風,橫掃一切民主法治。<br />
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但最可怕的,還是面對權力的心態。蔡英文叮囑「謙卑、謙卑、再謙卑」,已如馬耳東風;「溝通、溝通、再溝通」,更成明日黃花。民進黨在野時捍衛的民主價值、法治原則與程序正義,當政後統統成為施政的絆腳石。完全執政,豈容權力被關進制度的牢籠裡?既曰正義,何須等待正當的行政與司法程序?改革神聖,手段極權、踰越法治又何妨?有這種心態,就會有黨產會和顧立雄這種權力怪獸。<br />
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狠遭掐喉的國民黨,要背水一戰都很難施展。不過,國民黨撂了一句話,「山水有相逢」。這既是勸人行事應留餘地,不要做得太絕,因為人生總有相遇的機會;也是揚言忍一時屈辱,未來十倍奉還。然而,不論國民黨能否置之死地而後生,或者終究淪為阿Q式的精神勝利戰法,令人悚然而驚的是,在民主政治體制下,我國的政黨競爭難道最後會走向相互報復的循環?<br />
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事實上,民主的原則、法治的精神、憲政的分際,都有一條不容踰越的紅線。一旦紅線遭到破壞,就很容易走向擴權濫權、專制獨裁的道路,或者陷入民粹當道、政治失序的亂象;更且演變成社會對立撕裂,仇恨因陳相襲,終致循環報復,永無寧日。<br />
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我們要改革,但不要濫權或民粹,更不要極權手段,而致民主崩解,法治蕩然,憲政破毀。我們相信蔡英文的改革動機,但要提醒的是,如果操之過切,鴨霸蠻幹,越法踰憲,即使是善意,也可能鋪成一條通往地獄的道路。<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7555594736049175905.post-57617366945701314252016-11-24T21:21:00.002-08:002016-11-24T21:21:28.590-08:00Seizing Power Like an Octopus, Governing Like a Blind Swordsman<b>Seizing Power Like an Octopus, Governing Like a Blind Swordsman</b><br />
<b>United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) </b><br />
<b>A Translation </b><br />
<b>November 25, 2016</b><br />
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Executive Summary: The DPP government has taken over General Association of Chinese Culture (GACC). It has scored a major victory. But before it could even celebrate, TransAsia Airways' announcement that it was going out of business plunged it into a black hole. Executive Yuan incompetence has people shaking their heads and sighing in dismay. These two developments offer us a striking contrast. The DPP's lust for power vastly exceeds its ability to govern. The DPP may be able to seize power like an octopus, but it governs like a blind swordsman.<br />
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Full Text Below:<br />
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The DPP government has taken over General Association of Chinese Culture (GACC). It has scored a major victory. But before it could even celebrate, TransAsia Airways' announcement that it was going out of business plunged it into a black hole. Executive Yuan incompetence has people shaking their heads and sighing in dismay. These two developments offer us a striking contrast. The DPP's lust for power vastly exceeds its ability to govern. The DPP may be able to seize power like an octopus, but it governs like a blind swordsman.<br />
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Looking ahead, these two incidents hardly represent the the limits of Taiwan's social chaos. For example, labor protests over working hours continue unabated. Public hearings on the importation of food products from Japan's nuclear disaster areas drag on. Unfortunately another earthquake just struck Fukushima. Differences within the DPP over same-sex marriage remain unresolved. The administration and the legislature each have their own ideas on the matter. A number of green camp legislators are indifferent to public opinion. They would ram the bill through the legislature and precipitate social chaos. Some problems were the result of recklessness, others the result of expedience, and still others were the result of reformist zeal. The problem is that some of them violate the DPP's core values, while others ignore the democratic process. It is only natural that such actions would provoke a backlash.<br />
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In the DPP's struggle over the GACC, the winner takes all. That determination has already been made. The ruling administration resorted to all manner of devices to bring the GACC under its control. It offered inducements to dilute and divide the opposition. Politicians, businessmen, and culturati surrendered en masse, forcing Liu Chao-hsuan to withdraw. On such an occasion, Tsai Ing-wen can of course declare victory. But is relying on power to drive one's opponents into a corner, and leaving not quarter, really the kind of victory President Tsai wants?<br />
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The DPP may want to look at the matter from another angle. What sort of impression has this victory left in the minds of the people? When people look at how this battle was fought, they are bound to have questions. First, Tsai Ing-wen has created over 600 new members where there was only 200. This may be a shrewd move. But as the saying goes, “Men of principle seek wealth only through honorable means”. Second, the DPP has long despised Chinese culture. Liu Sh-ifang considers Chinese yo-yos and calligraphy Chinese culture, and would slash the budget for the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in response. So why did the DPP fight a major battle to seize control of the GACC in the first place? For the sake of culture? Which culture? Third, in recent years the GACC has morphed into a civic organization. The DPP government acquired enormous power from the change in ruling parties. But was it really necessary for it to abuse this power to take over the GACC? Furthermore, did President Tsai really need to lead the charge? Fourth, party and government sources say that gaining control over the GACC would transform it into a cross-Strait communication channel. President Tsai refuses to take the 1992 Consensus superhighway, yet would wend her way down the GACC footpath in order to connect with the Mainland? Who's kidding whom?<br />
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The Presidential Office seized control of GACC with unseemly haste. The Executive Yuan dealt with the TransAsia Airways company closing with complete cluelessness. Both actions showed that the ruling administration's lust for power far exceeds its ability to govern. An airline announcing that it is closing up shop is a serious matter, not just for passengers and employees, but for financial institutions and the stock market. Yet government agencies remained utterly clueless, and passed the buck onto the Civil Aviation Authority. Nor was that all. The next day the Lin Chuan cabinet misspoke and flip-flopped repeatedly. It announced that the airline would undergo "reorganization". Then just as abruptly, it announced that the government would "take it over completely". Spokesman Hsu Kuo-jung was even slapped in the face by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, which said China Airlines would only take two routes, and would not take over completely. These developments show that although the Tsai government is in power, it has no clue how to govern, let alone solve the problems of the nation and society.<br />
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The question one must ask is this. During ruling party changes, government agencies replace only the top one-tenth of all political appointees. The rest of the administrative structure remains unchanged. Why has the TransAsia Airways incident caused the entire government to malfunction? There are roughly three reasons. First, the Tsai government has relentlessly concentrated power at the top. All major policy decisions require her personal approval. This prevents middle-level officials from exercising their initiative and professional judgment. Second, the DPP is characterized by “political colors above all”. It considers only ideological orientation and ignores right and wrong. As a result, middle and lower echelon officials and officials who are not "our people" dare not express their views. Third, no professional information and advice is available to inform its decision-making. Naturally, like a blind swordsman, it can only hack away at the air.<br />
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Tsai and members of her administration harbor a delusion. They think the purpose of governing is to implement reforms. They are mistaken. A ruling administration that cannot even ensure political stability, that cannot even uphold the rule of law and ensure economic security, has no business running about shouting “Reform! Reform!” as political cover.<br />
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抓權如八爪章魚,施政卻像盲劍客<br />
2016-11-25 聯合報<br />
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民進黨政府剛在「中華文化總會」的戰場大獲全勝,但還來不及慶祝,隨即陷入了復興航空宣布停飛的黑洞,行政院的表現只能讓人搖頭嘆氣。前後二事對照,留給社會大眾鮮明的對比:權力欲望和行政能力完全不成正比,爭權攬權如同八爪章魚,施政作為卻像盲劍客。<br />
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放眼望去,台灣社會的紛紛擾擾,又豈止這兩樁?比方說,吵嚷多時的一例一休之爭,勞工的抗爭仍未止息;日本核虞食品是否解禁,公聽會尚未開完,不幸又遇上福島再次地震;同性婚姻的問題,黨內的歧見尚未解決,政院版也另有主張,卻有少數綠委不顧社會溝通要強行偷渡民法條文,引起偌大風波。這些紛擾,有的是出於輕率,有的是便宜行事,或許也有改革心切。問題在,其中有的違背了民進黨原來主張的價值,有的跳過了必要的民主程序,想要蠻幹,當然會引起反彈。<br />
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在「中華文化總會」的主導權之爭中,以勝負論英雄,顯然高下已判。執政者極盡稀釋、拉攏、分化之手段,必欲將文化總會納入自己麾下,隨即有政客、企業界、文化人接受招降納叛,逼得劉兆玄棄甲曳兵而去;此刻,蔡英文當然可以昂首高呼勝利。然而,仗恃權勢在每個角落把對手殺到寸草不留,就是蔡總統想要展示的勝利嗎?<br />
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民進黨不妨換個角度想想,這場勝利在民間留下的是什麼印象?民眾看這場爭奪戰,勢必有幾個質疑:一,操作蔡英文為首的六百多名新會員,去灌爆原來只有兩百多會員的文總,雖是致命狠招,但不符「君子愛財,取之有道」的原則。二,民進黨一向切割中華文化,劉世芳還以「扯鈴」和「書法」是中華文化為由要刪除僑委會預算,然則民進黨如此大陣仗去搶奪文總,又為了什麼文化?三,文化總會近年已轉型為民間社團,政府有必要以政黨輪替為由強以政治力量去染指、征服嗎?何況竟由蔡總統帶頭發動。四,黨政人士稱,拿下文化總會,是要以文化為橋梁作為兩岸溝通管道;然而,蔡總統放著「九二共識」的大道不走,卻侈言要用文總的小橋來打通兩岸經脈,豈不是天方夜譚?<br />
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無論如何,從總統府對奪取文總的用心之深,操作之急,對照近日行政院處理復興航空事件的茫無頭緒,徹底暴露了政府團隊的權力與能力顯不相稱。航空公司宣告停飛是一件嚴重的事,牽動的不只是旅客和員工權益,還可以引起金融機構及股票市場的連鎖效應;然而,政府部門對此事一問三不知,交通部更退避三舍,把責任全推給民航局。不僅如此,在隔日的處理,林全內閣的應對也顯得言不及義,顛三倒四,忽而說要改提「重整」,忽而說要政府「全面接手」,皆未能切中要害;發言人徐國勇甚至遭交通部打臉,說華航只接兩條航線,而非全面接手。這些現象都顯示,蔡政府雖然大權在握,卻不知道如何運用手中權力來平順行政,遑論解決國家社會的問題。<br />
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要問的是:一次政黨輪替,政府部門充其量更換了上層十分之一的政務官人事,其他的行政架構都維持不變;為何一次興航事件,就讓政府整個周轉失靈?粗略分析,原因大致有三:第一,蔡政府的執政特質,是不斷地把權力向上收攏,由總統一人對所有大政拍板定案,如此一來便大大壓抑了中層官員的專業判斷。第二,民進黨的政治特質,往往只問顏色而不問是非,這使得中下層官員乃至「非我族類」的政務官不敢表達主張。第三,沒有專業資訊及意見支撐的政治決策,當然就像盲劍客,只能對空亂砍。<br />
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蔡英文和她的團隊有一個迷思,以為執政的目的就是為了改革。她錯了!一個執政團隊如果連什麼叫「穩健行政」都不知道,如果連給人民一個安定的生活與法治都做不到,卻不斷用改革為幌子四處攬權,那就太遜了!<br />
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Bevin Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03212261042382022326noreply@blogger.com0