Dateline Taipei

New Cabinet: Courage and Communications Will See You Through

2012-02-13T02:31:00.001-08:00

New Cabinet: Courage and Communications Will See You Through
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 13, 2012

Summary: The Ma administration's second term.has begun. The new administrative team has assumed office. it inclues veterans and novices. This is the cabinet's second term. Therefore no one is going to accept the excuse that the cabinet is new and therefore lacks experience. The cabinet does not need "star players." Nor does it need designated fall guys to take the heat for their colleagues. Self confidence and a responsible attitude are the only qualities essential for the cabinet. As long as cabinet members understand their areas of responsibility, as long as they have confidence, as long as they assume responsibility, communications will be no problem.

Full Text below:

Just before the Legislative Yuan officially convened, the newly formed cabinet underwent a marathon, nine hour, weekend long "intensive training" session. They focused on a single idea: communications. This included communication with the public, communication with the legislature, communication with the media, and even internal communications witin the Executive Yuan itself. President Ma Ying-jeou may want cabinet members to take the lead in reaching out to the grassroots. Talking heads may demand that Ma keep up with current events and keep his his finger on the public pulse. But these are all technical details. A head of state must have confidence in the ability of government heads to handle those matters under their purvue. The key is a willingness to assume responsibility.

The Ma administration was hurt by criticisms directed against the cabinet during Typhoon Morakot. Since then, it has significantly increased the number of ministries and departments charged with visual communications and public relations. So much that its efforts eventually attracted the attention of the Control Yuan, which investigated and scaled back some of its excesses. Some ministry heads have established private channels of communication with talking heads, under the table. Theoretically this should enable them to convince the talking heads to say a few kind words about them before the TV cameras. At the very least this should convince the talking heads to criticize them less harshly. The results however, have been mixed. Attempts to secure support for administration policies have had limited success.

Just how should government heads communicate with the public? Current CEPD chairman Yin Chi-ming provides an excellent object lesson. The Ma administration made him Minister of Economic Affairs during its first term. The cabinet was reshuffled following Typhoon Morakot. Yin was made Minister without Portfolio. No one however, has ever explained why. One reason offered was that Yin was "ineffective in promoting a cross-Strait agreement on ECFA." But why weren't other cabinet members replaced? No one has ever explained why. Once Yin was made Minister without Portfolio, he no longer had to deal with the media. Nor did the media have time to seek him out. Six months before the presidential election. Yin Chi-ming buried his nose in his keyboard, blogging every day. He refuted DPP attacks on the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies. His firepower was so intense, the media could no longer ignore his existence. They had no choice but to visit his blog and leave their own comments.

Yin took substantive action, He showed that he was a political appointee fully capable of championing the administration's policies. But why was he so outspoken during the first two years of Ma's first term, only to later fall silent. Eventually some reporters criticized the administration for its "Silence of the Words." Actually Yin Chi-min reflected the twofold plight endured by many Ma administration political appointees. One. Many reporters in the front ranks lack professional experience. They simply could not understand his policy. Two. Many reporters pandered to popular sentiment. Policy debates garner low ratings. Naturally no one wants to calmy report them, let alone analyze them.

Some political appointees have the courage to assume responsibility. Take former Department of Health Director Yaung Chi-liang. He stood in the line of fire defending administration policy. But in the end he was still forced to resign. Sadly, no one remembers how staunchly he defended "second generation health care." All they remember is that he had the guts to stand up to the Taiwan independence "san min zhi" media, i.e., SET TV, Formosa TV, and the Liberty Times, Take Yin Chi-ming, who quietly blogged away. He blogged so much the media was forced to come back and seek him out. He penned thousands of words defending administration policy. Even if reporters didn't understand his meaning. at least they couldn't say they copied what he wrote down wrong. Finally, take the numerous former government heads who panic before the media. They hide from the media while in office. They run from the media when stepping down. Their guilty demeanor is utterly inappropriate for high-ranking officials. No wonder they have become the butt of media jokes.

In fact, political appointees and the media can communicate and interact in a more constructive fashion. Reporters are not academics or experts. They will inevitably ask stupid questions that leave the political appointee wondering whether to laugh or cry. But when asked senseless questions, political appointees must stand their ground and say "Thank you." They need not cover their faces and flee. They need not be so deficient in courage. When government heads avoid the media, it invariably means they will be both unpopular and unsuited for their jobs.

Recently Taiwan "celebrity" Makiyo and some friends got drunk and precipitated an incident. Recently Harvard graduate pro ball player Jeremy Lin became a star in the NBA. Political appointees must know what the public is talking about. But knowing what the public is talking about, does not t mean becoming the object of media attention. Last week a KMT Central Standing Committee Member wanted Party Chairman Ma Ying-jeou to express his views on Makiyo. President Ma surprised everyone. He said that when he he heard the term "Ma bang" he thought it meant the Ma family. Ma's humor was unfunny and pointless. Must the President respond even to celebrities who get drunk and make trouble? If so, then why not make the President clean every gutter in front of every house in the country?

Jeremy Lin is famous throughout the United States. The entire country is gripped by "Linsanity." But a president is responsible for a nation's affairs of state. To cast oneself as just another Jeremy Lin fan is trying too hard to share Jeremy Lin's spotlight. Jeremy Lin won several games in a row. The U.S. beef imports issue still awaits resolution. The 12 year compulsory education programe still needs promotion, Tax reform still needs to be added to the policy agenda. Foreseeable policy storms will not go away as a result of such distractions, One cannot fail to make preparations.

The Ma administration's second term.has begun. The new administrative team has assumed office. it inclues veterans and novices. This is the cabinet's second term. Therefore no one is going to accept the excuse that the cabinet is new and therefore lacks experience. The cabinet does not need "star players." Nor does it need designated fall guys to take the heat for their colleagues. Self confidence and a responsible attitude are the only qualities essential for the cabinet. As long as cabinet members understand their areas of responsibility, as long as they have confidence, as long as they assume responsibility, communications will be no problem.

新內閣勇於擔當溝通就不是問題
2012-02-13中國時報

在立法院新會期正式開議前，甫改組成軍的新內閣周末以馬拉松的九個小時，為閣員進行「密集特訓」，重點只有兩個字：溝通。不論是對民眾、對國會、對媒體、乃至行政院各部會的內部溝通。但不論是馬英九總統樂見閣員訂定自己的下鄉計畫，或名嘴提醒首長隨時盯緊時事，掌握民意脈動，均屬「技術問題」，首長們對所轄部會的政策是否有信心、有擔當才是最重要的。

馬政府自第一任莫拉克風災重創內閣團隊後，就視溝通與宣傳為要務，見諸於媒體者即各部會置入性報導大量增加，終至引起監察院的關切，乃至調查和糾正；檯面下，則各部會首長不乏私下與眾名嘴建立溝通管道，好一點可說服名嘴們在電視機前為己美言，再差至少爭取名嘴少罵自己幾句，結果是好壞參半，對政策順利獲得民意支持的效果有限。

政府首長到底該如何落實溝通？現任經建會主委尹啟銘可做為一個典型教案，馬政府第一任時他是經濟部長，莫拉克風災後內閣改組，他調任政務委員，其間原因究竟為何沒人說得出所以然，勉強要論就是「為兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ不力」，那為什麼其他閣員不更換呢？還是沒人說出一個道理。卸任部長後的尹啟銘轉任政務委員後，既不必面對媒體，也沒有媒體有這個閑情找他，尹啟銘在總統大選前後至少半年以上，每天悶著頭寫部落格，反批民進黨對馬政府兩岸政策的攻擊，火力強大到讓媒體不能忽視他的存在，回過頭抓他在部落格上的意見。

尹啟銘以實際行動證明自己是有絕佳辯護能力的政務官，問題是為什麼第一任前兩年敢言，之後反而噤聲，直到大選前才用「沉默的文字」進行政策攻擊？尹啟銘的狀況其實是許多馬政府政務官的困境，第一，不少媒體第一線記者缺乏足夠的專業，根本聽不懂他的政策；第二，媒體跟著民意感覺走，政策既無收視率，自然沒人肯冷靜報導，遑談分析。

於是勇於任事的政務官，上焉者如前衛生署長楊志良站在火線上為政策辯護，結果還是非離開官職不可，而且，沒人記得他用力推動的「二代健保」具體內容究竟為何，只記得他敢和「三民自」對抗；中焉者如尹啟銘，安靜的寫部落格，寫到讓媒體回過頭找他，而且，寫好千字政策辯護，就算記者聽不懂，至少不會抄錯；下焉者還有不少卸任部會首長見媒體如見鬼，上台時躲記者，下台時照樣跑給記者追，心虛的姿態全然不似一品大員，莫怪被媒體當成調笑的箭靶。

政務官與媒體其實可以有更健康的溝通和互動，媒體不是學者專家，難免出口問出許多讓人哭笑不得的問題，但是，身為政務官即使碰到無厘頭的問題，站定說聲「謝謝」即可，何須抱頭鼠竄，缺乏勇氣至此？當首長躲避媒體的那一刻，就註定自己必然是個不會受歡迎、也不適任的官員。

名嘴並以最近當紅的Makiyo與友人醉後鬧事事件與哈佛小子林書豪揚名ＮＢＡ為例，提點政務官要時時刻刻知道民眾關心的話題。然而，知道和了解發燒話題不表示要成為「媒體反應爐」，以上周國民黨中常會為例，有中常委要黨主席馬英九對Makiyo表達看法，馬總統則意外說出一段他聽到媒體「馬幫」的說法，以為馬家又出了什麼事，這則冷笑話簡直是無聊透頂，如果連藝人喝酒鬧事總統都要管，那不如叫總統管每個人家門口的水溝算了。

同樣的，林書豪揚名全美，舉國皆瘋狂，但是，身為主掌國家大政的執政團隊，把自己當成「一般球迷」即可，不必過度消費林書豪的光芒，畢竟不論林書豪連贏幾場球，美牛進口問題還是得解決，十二年國教還是得推動，稅制改革依舊擺在政策時程表上，可預見的政策風波不會因此而稍減，同樣不能不預為因應。

馬政府第二任，執政團隊就定位，有老手有新人，因為是連任內閣，沒有人會接受新閣員缺乏經驗的托詞，內閣不需要「明星球員」或者專為同僚擋砲火的稻草人，信心和擔當是內閣必須建立的整體特質，只要全體閣員對自己職權範圍內的業務與政策深入了解、充滿信心、勇於擔當，溝通就不會是問題。

Traitor? Turncoat? Feudal Thinking in the Modern Era

2012-02-09T20:13:00.001-08:00

Traitor? Turncoat? Feudal Thinking in the Modern Era
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 10, 2012

Summary: Former Kaohsiung County Chief Yang Chiu-hsing has been appointed Ma administration cabinet minister without portfolio, His former DPP comrades have excoriated him as a "turncoat." One could say the Green Camp "has a bee in its bonnet" about anyone becoming a "turncoat," and about anyone "not one of us," who therefore must be "one of them." By contrast, the Blue Camp has a more subtle issue with "traitors." This is a feudal conception of loyalty. As long as these two attitudes persist, politics on Taiwan cannot be rational.

Full Text below:

Former Kaohsiung County Chief Yang Chiu-hsing has been appointed Ma administration cabinet minister without portfolio, His former DPP comrades have excoriated him as a "turncoat." One could say the Green Camp "has a bee in its bonnet" about anyone becoming a "turncoat," and about anyone "not one of us," who therefore must be "one of them." By contrast, the Blue Camp has a more subtle issue with "traitors." This is a feudal conception of loyalty. As long as these two attitudes persist, politics on Taiwan cannot be rational.

As Yang Chiu-hsing noted, for politicians to switch political parties is nothing new. In other countries Britain's Winston Churchill and Japan's Ichiro Ozawa changed parties. On Taiwan, former President Lee Teng-hui, Huang Kun-hui, Chen Ming-wen, and Chang Hua-kuan changed parties. The political arena is filled with people who have changed political parties. The fact is, in modern democracies the nation trumps any party, Political parties are voluntary associations. If one remains in agreement, one stays. If one finds oneself in disagreement, one leaves. This ought to be the norm. Conversely, when one puts political party and ideology ahead of all else, and carelessly hurls feudalistic accusations of "turncoat" or "traitor," one is does more harm than good to one's party and one's nation. One merely demonstrates one's indifference to one's nation.

The general election has just concluded. DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen made a commitment during her presidential campaign, one that still rings in our ears. If the Democratic Progressive Party wins office, she vowed, the campaign committee will not be the ruling administration. Not will her administration transcend partisanship, she vowed, it will even form a grand coalition. What does it mean to "transcend partisanship?" What does it mean to "form a coalition?" Doesn't it mean co-operating and communicating with different political parties? Doesn't it mean recruiting the most talented individuals, regardless of party affiliation? When the DPP recruits people from other parties, the DPP praises them as "individuals of talent." But when the KMT recruits people from the DPP, the DPP swiftly denounces them as "turncoats."

The DPP once lacked governing experience. Its ruling administration had a serious shortage of individuals with talent. It desperately needed to transcend partisanship, Only then would these talented individuals be able to contribute at the crucial moment. The most obvious example was Tang Fei. During the 2000 change in ruling parties, the first in the Repubic of China's history, he served as Premier, even though he was ill at the time. The ruling DPP refused to agree to KMT demands for party to party consultations as a precondition of his recruitment. As a result Tang Fei found himself alone in the DPP cabinet for 140 days, after which he was denounced as a "stumbling block" and rushed off the stage. But during this first change in ruling parties, Tang Fei played an crucial role. He reassured the public. He even bolstered the morale of the armed forces. History will remember this.

Another example was Vice President Vincent Siew. When the Democratic Progressive Party was in office, Siew was not part of the government. Yet he was willing to act as economic advisor to the Chen Shui-bian adminstration. The pressing concern was the overall economy. When the DPP government was in office, it appointed New Party official Hau Lung-bin as EPA Chief. Hau defied the local political bosses and cleaned up the Erhjen Creek. As a result, public support for the administration soared. This was the most successful example of DPP transcending partisanship while recruiting talent.

The DPP must seek talent from outside the party. So why not the KMT? The Republic of China during election season may be a nation divided down the middle. But the Ma administration cannot be a government for half the people. The new government and the new cabinet must recruit the most qualified individuals for the job. If it can recruit from other parties, that will surely help it govern the nation. Even though the KMT is a century old political party, the new cabinet is not really a dyed in the wool Kuomintang cabinet. Yang Chiu-hsing was recruited from the DPP. Minister of the Interior Hong-Yuan Lee and MAC Vice Chairman Chen Chang Hsien-yao were recruited from the People First Party. Interior Minister Jiang Yi Hua and the majority of academics in the cabinet are independents.

Of course President Ma Ying-jeou's non-partisan staff have encountered obstacles within the party. In 2008, shortly after Ma took office. he nominated Green Camp leader Shen Fu-hsiung and Chen Hui-chang to the Control Yuan. Ma nominations were sharply rejected by Kuomintang legislators. Tang Fei helped stabilize the political situation. Yet KMT elders were still critical of his decision to serve the DPP. This preoccupation with "traitors" is completely out of touch with modern politics. In ancient times a minister would not serve two masters. But in modern democracies, political parties alternate, Individuals of talent do not belong to any one party, because they served the people.

By comparison, the DPP's preoccupation with "turncoats" is more serious. Party politics is about open competition between different political beliefs. But communications and consultation are also priorities for political parties. Alas, many Green Camp people see competition among political parties as battles between good and evil, between "them" and "us," Therefore they see no middle ground. To them, the KMT is the enemy, Anyone who suggests cooperation and communication with the KMT therefore, is a "traitor" and a "turncoat." Sad to say, political parties may use ideology to evaluate their opponents. But they also use it to persecute their own comrades. When political parties go down such a partisan road, they move farther and farther away from the people.

When Yang Chiu-hsing served as Kaohsiung County Chief, his governance was highly praised. He was referred to as the "five-star county chief," The Ma administration has recruited this individual of talent. The DPP ought to give him its blessing. More importantly, if one day the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will need to draw on talent from the KMT, This should give them pause. When such feudal concepts as "turncoats" and "traitors" persist with the DPP, it is going to have a hard time forming a competent ruling cabinet.

中時電子報新聞
中國時報　2012.02.10
社論－背骨？貳臣？現代還需要封建思想？
本報訊

前高雄縣長楊秋興出任新內閣政務委員，昔日民進黨戰友痛批他「背骨」；可以說，綠營有濃厚「背骨」情結：非我族類、其心必異；相對的，藍營則有微妙的「貳臣」情結，這是封建時代的忠君思想；只要這兩種情結還在，台灣就難有理性問政的一天。

正如楊秋興所說，政治人物轉換政黨並非新鮮事。在國外，從邱吉爾到日本的小澤一郎，在台灣，從前總統李登輝以下，到黃昆輝、陳明文、張花冠等人，政壇中轉換政黨者比比皆是，事實上，現代民主國家中，國家高於政黨，政黨是志願性社團，合則來、不合則去，應該是常態；相反的，當有人將政黨、意識形態無限上綱、動輒抬出「背骨」、「貳臣」如此封建的觀念時，則不啻是以黨害國、心中完全沒有國家的存在。

大選才剛結束，民進黨總統候選人蔡英文當時的承諾言猶在耳：如果民進黨執政，競選團隊不代表執政團隊，不但用人要超越黨派，甚至還要組成大聯合政府；何謂超黨派、何謂「聯合」，不就是要能與不同黨派溝通合作、跨黨派拔擢最適人才嗎？總不能民進黨任用他黨人才就是菁英，但被國民黨重用的民進黨人士，就成了「背骨」吧！

事實上，民進黨過去缺乏執政經驗，治國團隊嚴重不足，確實需要跨黨派用人，這些人才也都在關鍵時刻發揮作用。最明顯的例子就是唐飛，他在二千年台灣首次政黨輪替時，毅然抱病出任閣揆，即使當時民進黨政府不同意國民黨中央「黨進黨出」的做法，讓唐飛隻身入閣一百四十天後，就被當成絆腳石、匆匆下台；但是唐飛在台灣首次政黨輪替時，發揮的穩定民心、甚至軍心的關鍵力量，未來的歷史必然要記上一筆。

另一個例子是副總統蕭萬長，民進黨執政時，蕭萬長雖未進入政府，但是他之所以願意出任陳水扁政府的經濟顧問，念茲在茲的還是台灣的經濟大局。另外，民進黨政府當時任用新黨藉的郝龍斌出任環保署長，他不畏地方勢力整治二仁溪等作為，讓其民意支持度一度飆到最高，也是民進黨跨黨派用人的成功典範。

民進黨必須從黨外尋覓人才，國民黨何嘗不是如此？台灣在選舉時也許是一個五十對五十的國家，但馬總統治國，卻不能只做一位百分之五十的總統，因此新政府新內閣，用人除了要適才適所外，若能兼容各黨派，當然有助政府施政。確實，即使國民黨是百年政黨，新閣的國民黨屬性並不強，除了楊秋興曾是民進黨外，內政部長李鴻源、陸委會副主委張顯耀是親民藉，而內政部長江宜樺則和多數剛入閣的學者一樣，都是無黨藉。

當然，總統馬英九的跨黨派用人，也曾在黨內面臨重重阻力，二○○八年他上任後不久，提名屬性偏綠的沈富雄、陳耀昌擔任監委時，就硬生生被國民黨立委否決；唐飛即使對穩定政局有貢獻，國民黨仍有大老對其有微詞；這樣的「貳臣」情結，和現代政治完全脫節，過去是改朝換代，一臣不事二主；但現在是民主國家的政黨輪替，人才不屬於任何黨派，因為他們是為人民服務。

相較起來，民進黨的「背骨」情結更嚴重。政黨政治是本諸不同理念、公平競爭，但溝通協商也是政黨要務，只是，很多綠營人士卻將政黨競爭視為敵我、善惡之爭，因此毫無中間地帶，國民黨形同敵人，和國民黨溝通合作的就是「叛徒」、「背骨」；可悲的是，政黨可以用意識形態來檢驗對手，同樣也可以用來鬥爭同志，當政黨走上這樣黨同伐異的道路，也就離多數民意愈來愈遠。

楊秋興任高雄縣長時，多次得到施政第一的肯定，號稱五星級縣長，馬政府重用這樣的幹才，民進黨何妨祝福；更重要的是，假如有一天民進黨重新執政，屆時勢必也要借重國民黨的人才，他們現在該深思的是，當背骨、貳臣這樣的封建觀念揮之不去，民進黨恐伯無法組成像樣的治國團隊！

President's State of the Nation Address: Both the Administration and the Legislature Can Win

2012-02-09T05:23:00.001-08:00

President's State of the Nation Address:
Both the Administration and the Legislature Can Win
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 9, 2012

Summary: A State of the Nation Address will enable the public to judge whether the president's policies are consistent with the constitution. President Ma should be able to respond constructively. Ruling and opposition party legislators in the halls of parliament must understand the meaning of "affairs of state." They must not dwell on trivialities beneath consideration, or engage in Blue vs. Green partisan bickering. Otherwise, they will be incapable of checking President Ma Ying-jeou's charisma. They will undermine the image of the Legislative Yuan. They will do themselves more harm than good.

Full Text below:

Is the Legislative Yuan about to invite President Ma Ying-jeou to issue a State of the Nation Address? Both the ruling and opposition parties see this is as a good thing. The only question is whether legislators will have the opportunity to "interrogate" him. Will the President be treated like the Premier? Will he be required to respond to interrogation by legislators? The People First Party has proposed a compromise. Representatives from the Legislature will put forth "recommendations" just as the National Assembly did in the past. The President will offer a "consolidated reply." Can the president and the ruling and opposition parties accept such a compromise? That will depend on the success or failure of their negotiations. Before the President can visit the Legislative Yuan and report on the state of the nation, certain constitutional and procedural issues must be considered. The President and the Legislative Yuan may wish to establish an historical precedent. But they must think before acting.

The Presidential Office's initial response was that everything should be in accord with the constitution. It is waiting for the Legislative Yuan to act. According to the Constitution of the Republic of China, as amended, the relevant provisions are quite simple. They involve only one line: "When the Legislative Yuan convenes each year, it must listen to the President's State of the Nation Address." In other words, it is not the duty of the President to report to the Legislative Yuan on the State of the Nation. Its responsibilities to the Legislative Yuan are different from the Executive Yuan's. Reporting to the Legislative Yuan or being interrogated by the Legislative Yuan is a constitutional duty for the Premier and his cabinet. He may not be excused from this duty except under special circumstances. He must first obtain permission from the Legislative Yuan. He may not fudge, evade, or refuse to appear.

Before the National Assembly was abolished, the provisions of the constitution, as amended, were relatively clear. "When the National Assembly convenes, it is required to listen to the President's State of the Nation Address, consult on national affairs, and offer recommendations." Is the president obligated to respond? The constitution, as amended, contains no hard and fast stipulations. But when former President Lee Teng-hui offered a comprehensive response, and responded to the National Assembly, most of the public expressed approval.

After the National Assembly was abolished, its authority was integrated with the authority of the Legislative Yuan. The constitution, as amended, was simplified. But the "Powers of the Legislative Yuan Law" was made more explicit. Procedurally, it went in two directions. One. At least one fourth of the Legislature was required to introduce a bill, after which the rules committee would add it to the agenda. The "National Security Guidelines" would respond to the President's State of the Nation Address. Two. The President would be required to consult with the Legislative Yuan on major national policies, in accordance with his job responsibilities.

Would legislators "interrogate" him? The "Legislative Yuan Duties Enforcement Act" states that once the President makes his State of the Nation Address legislators must question him on any unclear parts of his address. The duration of their questioning, the number of questioners, the order in which they speak, their party affiliation, and other issues would be determined through party caucus consultations. Moreover, the law clearly stipulates that "the foregoing questioning by Legislators, with the consent of the President, will be incorporated into a supplementary report. "

Based on the above constitution and the legal provisions, the President's State of the Nation Address could be issued on his own initiative, or at the behest of others. President Ma is apparently waiting for the Legislative Yuan to make the first move. Will the Legislative Yuan and the President adopt a question and answer format? Actually, this is not up for debate. First, the legislators will ask questions. They will not "interrogate" the President. Secondly, should the comprehensive legislative question and answer session be compiled into a supplementary report? That will depend on whether the President agrees. In other words, whether the legislators will hold a question and answer session will be decided by the Legislative Yuan. But whether the president will respond will be up to him. Also, any question and answer session would be entirely different from an interrogation of the Premier.

After direct presidential elections were instituted. the constitution clearly stipulated that State of the Nation Addresses would be issued. But none have, ever. During former President Chen Shui-bian's term, he considered visiting the Legislative Yuan to issue a State of the Nation Address. But the Blue Camp majority had no intention of granting him this "honor." They added that if the President did come, but refused to be questioned, the session would be meaningless. The legislative caucus would not agree to a visit. The DPP meanwhile, cited the constitution. They insisted that for the President to be subjected to interrogation, it would undermine the Republic of China's constitutional framework.

Times have changed. The ruling and opposition parties have switched places. But the constitution has not changed. Ruling and opposition party legislators are clear about the conditions that must be met before the President can issue a State of the Nation Address. This is probably why DPP legislator Wu Ping-jui suggested inviting the President to issue a State of the Nation Address, but did not demand that the President respond, The legislators have no basis on which to make such a demand. Other DPP legislators who made sarcastic remarks should be ignored.

We look forward to the establishment of a constitutional precedent. We look forward to more mature interaction between the ruling and opposition parties. We look forward to rebuilding the image of the legislature. We look forward to the President visiting the Legislative Yuan and issuing a State of the Nation Address. After all, every four years we hold a presidential election. It consumes enormous human and material resources, and exacts a high cost on society. If we can implement an annual State of the Nation Address, it would underscore the significance of the presidential election. But given current grandstanding during question and answer sessions in the Legislative Yuan, is it difficult to be optimistic about the prospects of a State of the Nation Address.

The Legislative Yuan is the nation's highest elective body. A State of the Nation Address will enable the public to judge whether the president's policies are consistent with the constitution. President Ma should be able to respond constructively. More importantly, it will enable the public to evaluate the president's performance, as well as the performance of legislators. Ruling and opposition party legislators in the halls of parliament must understand the meaning of "affairs of state." They must not dwell on trivialities beneath consideration, or engage in Blue vs. Green partisan bickering. Otherwise, they will be incapable of checking President Ma Ying-jeou's charisma. They will undermine the image of the Legislative Yuan. They will do themselves more harm than good.

總統國情報告府院可共締雙贏
2012-02-09中國時報

立法院即將就是否邀請馬英九總統提出國情報告一事進行協商，朝野對此都認為是好事一樁，唯一的考量是到底立委能否提出「質詢」，而總統是否要如行政院長一般，對立委的質詢逐一答覆？親民黨團提出折衷案，比照當年國民大會，由代表們提出「建言」，並由總統「綜合答覆」，此案是否為總統與朝野黨團都能接受，還要看協商的狀況。然總統赴立法院國是報告仍有合憲與合理層面可供討論，不論是意圖創造歷史評價的馬總統或立法院，都應該更深一層思考。

總統府目前初步反應是一切依憲而行，靜待立法院決議。根據中華民國憲法增修條文，相關規定極為簡單，只有一句「立法院於每年集會時，得聽取總統國情報告」，換言之，向立法院提出國情報告並非總統的義務，迥然不同於行政院向立法院負責，不論是施政報告或備詢，都是閣揆與眾閣員們的憲法義務，非特殊需要未經立法院同意前，都不得蒙混、迴避、甚至拒絕前往。

國民大會未廢之前，憲法增修條文的規定還比較清楚，「國民大會集會時，得聽取總統國情報告，並檢討國是，提出建言。」至於總統答不答，並未強硬規範，但當年前總統李登輝採取綜合答覆的方式，滿足了國代需求，也得到多數民意好評。

國民大會廢了之後，國代這款職權隨同併到了立法院，增修條文雖然簡化之，但《立法院職權行使法》則有相應更明確的規定。程序上，有兩條路走：第一，四分之一以上立委提議並經院會決議後，由程序委員會排定議程，就「國家安全大政方計」聽取總統國情報告；第二，總統得就其職權相關的國家大政方針，得咨請立法院同意後進行。

至於立委是否「質詢」，在《立法院職權行使法》中也有如下規定：立法委員於總統國情報告完畢後，得就報告不明瞭處，提出問題；其發言時間、人數、順序、政黨比例等事項，由黨團協商決定。而且，明定「就前項委員發言，經總統同意時，得綜合再做補充報告」。

就上述憲與法的規範，總統國情報告可出於主動，也可出於被動。目前，馬總統顯然被動等立法院出招，但就立委與總統間是否採取一問一答形式進行，其實沒什麼商量空間，第一，立委是「提出問題」，而非「質詢」；第二，要不要綜合立委發問再做補充報告？端視總統同意與否。換言之，立委問不問，立法院決定了就算數，但總統答不答，可得尊重總統的決定，而且絕非如閣揆備詢般一問一答。

總統直選之後，國情報告雖明定於憲法之中，卻從未實現過。前總統陳水扁任內曾經想過赴立法院提出國情報告，但當時席次居多數的藍營立委無意給總統這項「殊榮」，同時提出如果總統要來不接受詢答就毫無意義，黨團不會同意。民進黨則以憲法為後盾，認為總統備詢是插手摧毀台灣憲政體制之舉。

時空背景縱有轉換，朝野易位，但憲法並未變動，所有可考慮、應考慮的條件和前提，朝野立委都了然於胸。相信這也是為什麼提案邀請總統國情報告的民進黨立委吳秉睿會表明不堅持總統答覆的原因，因為立委沒有堅持的道理，至於其他民進黨立委講任何風涼話，都沒有意義。

從建立憲政慣例與更成熟的朝野互動，乃至重建國會形象，總統赴立法院國情報告，可以樂觀期待。畢竟每四年一次總統大選，耗費巨大人力物力和社會成本，如果真能落實每年一次國情報告，也有助於落實總統大選的實質意義；但是，以目前的國會一問一答、譁眾取寵式的詢答品質，又很難讓人對國情報告的詢答寄予厚望。

立法院代表國家最高民意機關，透過國情報告讓國人更了解總統的國家大政方針合乎目前的憲政設計，相信馬總統可以寬闊對應；更重要的是，國人不但看總統的表現，也要看國會的表現，凡是站上國會議事殿堂發問的朝野立委要理解「國家大政」的內涵，不能圍繞著檔次未達水準的問題、或藍綠選舉的政治恩怨胡扯，否則既壓制不了馬英九總統的人氣，徒然讓國會形象再輸一城，那就得不償失了。

Uncover the Truth behind the TaiMed Corruption Scandal

2012-02-08T04:19:00.000-08:00

Uncover the Truth behind the TaiMed Corruption Scandal
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 8, 2012

Summary: During the election, the TaiMed corruption scandal underwent a number of dramatic ups and downs. The full picture remains murky. But the case concerns cabinet discipline and possible official misconduct. Therefore it must be pursued until the truth is uncovered. The public must be given a proper accounting.

Full Text below:

During the election, the TaiMed corruption scandal underwent a number of dramatic ups and downs. The full picture remains murky. But the case concerns cabinet discipline and possible official misconduct. Therefore it must be pursued until the truth is uncovered. The public must be given a proper accounting.

The scandal be divided into two parts. One. The Special Investigation Unit began investigating the TaiMed corruption scandal during the presidential campaign. The Special Investigation Unit opened the case and began gathering evidence. This was the correct approach. Had it failed to do so, had it delayed until after the election, it would surely be accused of "waiting to settle accounts." But since it already began its investigation, it merely underscores the need to offer the public a proper accounting.

Investigators may conclude that Tsai Ing-wen, Ho Mei-yueh, and others were not guilty of illegal conduct. But the investigation report must explain why the cabinet engaged in such questionable conduct. Therefore, even if the Special Investigation Unit eventually announces that it has chosen not to indict, it is nevertheless duty bound to investigate.

Two. The scandal involves both the Su Tseng-chang cabinet and the Chang Chun-hsiung cabinet. The cabinet members under suspicion should voluntarily come forward and offer frank accounts of their actions to the Special Investigation Unit. Tsai Ing-wen and Ho Mei-yueh insist they did nothing illegal. They insist that the scandal is not even a scandal. Since that is their story, they should offer the public a proper accounting, in accordance with the relevant legal statutes and administrative procedures. After all, this is hardly a routine matter. The public has a right to know. How can a corruption scandal as unthinkable as TaiMed possibly be passed off as "legal?" If more incidents like this occur in the future. will they too be passed off as "legal?"

We should harbor no preconceptions about whether the TaiMed corruption scandal is illegal. This was the consensus during the presidential campaign. That said, it is nevertheless a major scandal. It reveals that the cabinet was engaged in highly questionable conduct. Therefore the Special Investigation Unit must conduct a fair and impartial investigation. The parties under suspicion, including Tsai Ing-wen and Ho Mei-yueh, must come clean. They must present a full picture of the TaiMed corruption scandal. They should use the occasion to clarify the line between cabinet operations and the nation's laws. If they refuse, then the conduct of the cabinet will remain nothing more than black ops.

The TaiMed corruption scandal remains shrouded in mystery. For example, why did TaiMed win out against Nanhua? Was the contract in fact awarded by a secret three man coterie? The company name "TaiMed" appeared for the first time during the second secret contract meeting. The budget for the project was substantially increased. Yet it was never submitted to Premier Su Tseng-chang for approval. Was this actually in compliance with cabinet regulations? Tsai Ing-wen approved the TaiMed case herself. Soon after, she was made chairman of the TaiMed Company. Was the Tsai Ing-wen who approved TaiMed, the same legal entity who assumed the chairmanship of TaiMed? If she was not, then why was the project funded by the cabinet? If she was, then can Vice Premier Tsai explain why she disbursed government funds to TaiMed Chairman Tsai? Tsai later established the TaiMed biotech venture capital firm. She proposed that TaiMed establish a TaiMed biotechnology venture capital investment and management company. She arranged for the National Development Fund to invest billions, in advance, and to her company a 10 year, 1.32 billion dollar management fee, also in advance. Were Premier Su Tseng-chang and Premier Chang Chun-hsiung really unaware of the connection between the TaiMed biotechnology venture capital firm and TaiMed? Every one of these points is highly suspicious. The behavior of the suspects, including Tsai Ing-wen, Ho Mei-yueh, and David Ho, is equally suspicious. This is hardly an "attack upon the biotech industry." Concern for cabinet regulations hardly qualifies as an attack on the biotech industry.

Suspects in the TaiMed corruption scandal must clear up these questions. A nation's cabinet must not be permitted to evade prosecution merely by muddying the waters. The relevant legal norms are one thing. It is possible that everything was "legal." But the conduct of the cabinet is another matter altogether. No one believes such behavior can be tolerated by a nation's cabinet. Therefore the Special Investigation Unit, Tsai Ing-wen, Ho Mei-yueh, and other parties, must clear the air. Otherwise, the cabinet will be nothing more than a black ops organization.

We hope the Special Investigation Unit will take responsibility. It must provide the public with a truthful picture of its investigation results. Even if it chooses not to indict, it must make public its legal reasoning, and allow the public to evaluate what it did.

We hope Tsai Ing-wen will change her attitude. She refused to take responsibility for her conduct during the presidential campaign. She refused to voluntarily explain her conduct to the people. She should seize the initiative, preferably before being formally summoned by the Special Investigation Unit. She should avoid making allegations that the investigation is being conducted in secrecy, or that she is being "legally persecuted." Tsai Ing-wen appears ready to make another bid for the presidency in 2016. She should avoid repeating the history of the Chen corruption case. She should avoid burdening the general election with endless wrangling over judicial proceedings.

宇昌案應當水落石出
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.08

大選期間，宇昌案鬧得風風雨雨，但迄仍真相未明；然而，這畢竟是一個攸關內閣紀律及政務官操行的重大事件，仍應使之水落石出，對國人作出一個交代。

可分兩方面說。一方面，特偵組在選舉期間已著手偵辦宇昌案。在現今這個時點回頭來看，特偵組在當時就立案偵辦，查扣證物，應屬正確；倘非如此，若是延至選後發動，必貽「秋後算帳」的譏評；而如今既已啟動偵辦，即必須對國人交出一個清楚的結案報告。

當然，偵辦的結果，可能證實蔡英文、何美玥等未涉不法；但偵查報告亦須向國人說明，為何在內閣中會發生如此離奇之事。因而，即使最後特偵組公布的是一本「不起訴書」，這也是特偵組對國人應負的責任。

另一方面，此案跨越蘇貞昌內閣及張俊雄內閣；相關閣員及事務官今後在配合特偵組偵辦時，應主動坦率交代因果始末。尤其是蔡英文及何美玥二人，既自認未違法，也不是「弊案」，則亦應就相關的法律依據及行政程序向國人明白交代。因為，這絕對不是一個平常事件，國人有權利知道，像宇昌案這樣的奇事，如何可以「合法」地發生？尤其，今後若再發生此類事件，是否仍屬「合法」？

我們認為，現在不必對宇昌案是否違法的問題持有定見，這點在選舉期間即是輿論主流；但畢竟這是一個暴露出內閣操作出現重大疑義的事件，仍應在特偵組的公正偵辦，及當事者如蔡英文、何美玥的坦誠說明下，向社會呈現出宇昌案的真相與全貌。亦即，無論如何，皆應藉此案來釐清內閣操作在國家法律與閣員操守上的界際為何？倘非如此，內閣豈不成了一只大黑箱？

宇昌案疑竇重重。例如：為何宇昌案勝過南華案？是否在程序上真的只是經過「三人密簽」就成案？第二次密簽，首次出現TaiMed公司的名字，並大幅改變計畫成本，卻未呈蘇貞昌院長，這是否符合內閣規制？蔡英文自己批定TaiMed案，後來又出任所有以TaiMed為英文商號的公司之董事長；而那個「蔡英文批定」的TaiMed，與她後來「出任董事長」的TaiMed，在內閣的法律認定上是否為同一主體？若不是，為何由內閣撥款？若是，則蔡如何解釋「蔡副院長批給蔡董事長」？再者，蔡後來又自設台懋生技創投公司，並主張由台懋生技創投「投資並管理」宇昌公司，以此向國發基金請撥投資十億，並預付十年十三‧二億的管理費；此一「台懋生技創投公司」與宇昌公司的「聯結」，蘇內閣或張內閣知不知情？以上種種重大情節，無一不是疑竇叢生；而涉入的當事者，如蔡英文、何美玥、何大一所作所為，也無一不是疑點重重。這絕不是要「打擊」生技，而是內閣規制絕不能糊裡糊塗。

宇昌案必須解答這一切疑問，因為，國家內閣中絕不可容許有如此不清不白的事件。此事的法律規範界際是一回事，因為可能一切皆「合法」；但此事的閣員操守界際卻是另一回事，因為無人認為國家內閣中可以容許這類事件。故而，無論是特偵組的偵辦，及蔡英文、何美玥等當事者的說明，皆應為社會釐清事實，否則內閣即成了黑箱。

我們寄望特偵組能負起責任，務必要向國人作出一個呈現真相全貌的偵結報告，即使是一本「不起訴書」，也應讓國人一睹。

我們更希望蔡英文能改變在選季中不願面對此案的態度，主動向國人說明原委；且最好能在特偵組正式傳訊前即掌握主動，以免因涉偵察不公開而錯失時機，或又導入「司法追殺」的老梗。何況，依目前情勢看，蔡英文仍有投入二○一六年大選的可能性，切勿再演成如扁案一般將大選角力與司法程序糾纏不清的情勢。

The Cabinet Must Make Prosperity Perceptible

2012-02-07T01:15:00.001-08:00

The Cabinet Must Make Prosperity Perceptible
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 7, 2012

Summary: Yesterday the old cabinet stepped down and the new cabinet was sworn in. The incoming cabinet faces an entire range of domestic and foreign challenges. President Ma Ying-jeou has characterized the Sean Chen Cabinet as an "Peace of Mind Cabinet." He intends to publish an annual "happiness index" reflecting the people's true feelings. In particular, he intends to respond to public expectations concerning social justice. He intends to ensure that the people feel truly prosperous, both financially and psychologically.

Full Text below:

Yesterday the old cabinet stepped down and the new cabinet was sworn in. The incoming cabinet faces an entire range of domestic and foreign challenges. President Ma Ying-jeou has characterized the Sean Chen Cabinet as an "Peace of Mind Cabinet." He intends to publish an annual "happiness index" reflecting the people's true feelings. In particular, he intends to respond to public expectations concerning social justice. He intends to ensure that the people feel truly prosperous, both financially and psychologically.

The KMT's Ma/Wu ticket won its bid reelection in 2012, and was returned to power. But the DPP's Tsai/Su ticket received over six million votes. This shows that nearly half the voters supported the Green Camp. Ma Ying-jeou's first round cabinet appointments must take into account opposition party policy proposals, some of which resonated with the public. He has replaced quite a number of ministry personnel and political appointees. These reflect President Ma's response to outside concerns.

Inside the new cabinet, the fiscal and economic experts have been the quickest to organize. The European debt crisis affects the entire world, No nation can afford to ignore it. The new cabinet teams up Ying Chi-min, who is familiar with industrial development, with renowned fiscal affairs expert Sean Chen. It teams Chang Shan-cheng, who was lured away from industry, with Chu Ching-yi, who in recent years established a foundation for industrial technology. Clearly the fiscal and economic experts appointed complement each other. As Sean Chen said, a ball team cannot consist only of superstars such as Wang Chien-ming, It must include specialists with expertise who complement each other. The fiscal and economic experts appointed to the new cabinet illustrate this principle.

Fiscal and economic problems are a prime concern. The fiscal and economic experts in the cabinet make a strong team. But during the election the question most asked of the Ma/Wu ticket and the Tsai/Su ticket, was how they planned to deal with the issue of social justice. Before the election, a wave of entrepreneurs endorsed the 1992 Consensus, and publicly backed Ma. This consolidated support for Ma Ying-jeou. But it also raised questions about whether the Ma administration and big business were in bed with each other. It even raised questions about Sean Chen, and whether his "economic cabinet" was becoming a "conglomerate cabinet." Therefore, the proclamation that the new cabinet would be concerned about social justice, and cared about the feelings of ordinary people, was extremely important.

President Ma Ying-jeou wants the new cabinet to promote economic restructuring, tax reform, and to narrow the gap between rich and poor. Ma Ying-jeou spoke of "no longer being subject to re-election pressures." He may be bolder in his attitude, and more conscientious in his actions. He must tackle with tax reform, tax increases, and other long unresolved issues. Taxes and prices are extremely sensitive issues. If one lacks boldness and fails to plan ahead, it makes no difference who is in office. it makes no difference when one is taking action. The problems will remain insoluble. But the nation has its fiscal requirements. It must ensure social justice, It must ensure more equitable income distribution, A responsible government cannot avoid these issues. It must boldly confront them.

Christina Liu, the newly appointed Treasury Minister, has yet to take office. But tax reform and tax increases are already the talk of the town. This does not appear to be an accident. Consumer prices continue rising steadily. This represents a considerable challenge for the ruling administration, which must make ends meet, Newly appointed premier Sean Chen said "At the very least we must ensure that the middle class and the common people feel that the system is fair, and that their lives are prosperous." We must use taxation to diminish the public's sense that it has been exploited. This is something the new government needs to consider carefully. This cabinet has been characterized as a "peace of mind cabinet." Its intent is to give ordinary people and the middle-class peace of mind. Premier Chen stressed that future tax incentives should generate new employment opportunities. This would show that the new cabinet intends to improve the employment picture, that it intends to avoid "imperceptible improvements" and an "imperceptible recovery." After all, whether improvements in the economic environment are perceptible or imperceptible, depend on Increased or decreased employment opportunities. That is its most direct indicator. If we cannot provide people with jobs, we cannot talk about giving people peace of mind. We cannot talk about putting people's minds at ease.

Another important change in the Chen cabinet concerns the head of the cultural sector, This was obviously a response to outside concerns prior to the election. Lung Ying-tai is a person of standing in the community. She has vision, Huang Kuang-nan has been appointed minister without portfolio. He has seniority and connections in the art. cultural, and educational realms. These two appointees have considerable administrative experience. Personnel appointments made by these two people would reassure the cultural realm, and put peoples' minds at ease. They would reduce concern in the cultural realm. They would make way for a transition, and upgrade culture-related government agencies. They would make it possible to get more done, and allow soft power to enhance competition in the cultural realm.

The Chen Cabinet has emphasized its desire to provide people with prosperity. So-called "wealth" is not limited to tangible wealth. It includes psychological and cultural wealth. A wealthy and contented society must be rooted in social justice, humble leaders, and happy people. The cabinet has been reorganized, and is beginning anew. The cabinet appointments show that the ruling administration is doing its best to manifest its dreams. It hopes to realize its well-intended plans. This should do more than provide the public with peace of mind. This should make prosperity perceptible.

安心內閣須讓人民有感富足
2012-02-07中國時報

新舊內閣昨日交接，面對紛擾複雜的各種國內外挑戰，馬英九總統將陳?領軍的內閣團隊定位為「安心內閣」，並將於每年提出「幸福指數」，著重人民真實的感受，特別是要回應人民對社會公平正義的期望，讓民眾無論在財富及心理層面上，都能真的有富足感。

國民黨的馬吳配贏得二○一二選戰，取得政權，但民進黨的英嘉配也拿到超過六百萬的選票，顯示綠營的主張也得到近半選民的支持，馬英九在布局第一階段內閣人事的時候，當然必須參考在野黨引起較多共鳴的一些理念與政策主張，新內閣中更換幅度較大的部會、政務委員，也可以看見馬總統對外界關注的領域與議題的回應。

新內閣中，財經團隊最快建構完整，因為歐債問題已影響全球經濟，沒有哪個國家可以輕忽；新內閣以熟稔產業發展的尹啟銘搭配以金融見長的陳?，佐以自企業界挖角的張善政和近年來致力建構產業科技基礎環境的朱敬一，可看出財經人事的專業分工與專長互補，正如陳?所說，一個球隊，不能全是王建民，而應該是各有擅長的領域，並且能夠互相搭配。從新內閣的財經小團隊即確實可以看得出這樣的布局。

財經問題是當前的重大課題，新內閣組成的財經團隊也不可謂不算是「卡司堅強」，然而，在這次選舉中，馬吳與英嘉最常被提出來比較的是兩個團隊如何面對與處理社會公義這個問題。特別是選前一波企業家以支持九二共識的方式，公開挺馬，固然對馬英九的選情有正面效益，但也引發外界對馬政府是否是與資本家站在一起的若干疑慮，甚至憂心以陳?為首的「財經內閣」變相成為「財團內閣」，因此，新內閣關注社會公平正義，強調重視庶民感受，是非常重要的宣示。

馬英九總統期勉新內閣要努力推動經濟轉型、進行稅制改革、縮小貧富差距，似乎預告了「已無連任壓力」的馬英九，會以比較勇敢與認真的態度和行動，面對並處理稅改、加稅等多年懸而未決的問題。賦稅與物價極為敏感，可以說，如果沒有「練好膽子」、「做好配套規畫」，不論是誰執政、也不論是在什麼時候，這些問題都不好處理；然而，面對國家財政需要，以及落實社會正義、推動所得分配的合理化，負責任的政府卻也沒有理由永遠逃避，總該好好面對了。

新任財政部長劉憶如還沒上任，有關稅改、加稅問題即已引發滿城風雨，看來並非偶然。在民生物價蠢蠢欲動之際，執政者的智慧面臨相當大考驗，截長補短，讓新閣揆陳?所說：「至少要讓中產階級與庶民感受到公平與富足」，透過租稅手段挪去或者至少減低社會的「相對剝削感」，應是新政府需審慎思考的作為。所謂的安心內閣，不也就是要安庶民的心、安中產階級的心嗎！陳揆強調，未來若要推出什麼租稅優惠時，應思考是不是能相對創造出新的就業機會，這一方向的改變，也顯示新內閣施政將以提高就業為考量，以避免再出現所謂的「無感成長」、「無感復甦」，畢竟，所謂對經濟環境的有感或者是無感，「就業機會」的增減，是最直接的指標。若是不能給人民工作，就談不上讓人民安心，談不上讓人民放心了。

陳內閣另一個重要的變動是有關文化部門的主管，這很顯然也回應選前外界的高度關切，龍應台的格局、視野，加上擔任政務委員的黃光男在藝術、文化和教育界的輩分和人脈，以及兩人的行政經驗，使得這項人事安排，應可讓文化界「安心」並「放心」，至少可以降低文化界的紛擾情緒，給準備轉型、升格的文化部門，多一做事的空間，所謂的提昇文化競爭軟實力，也才有可能。

陳內閣強調「要帶給人民富足的生活」，而所謂的「富有」，不只是表現於有形的財富，也是心理上與文化上的「富有」，這樣的「富而滿足」是以社會的公義、執政者的謙卑與人民的幸福感為基礎的。內閣的改組再出發，從人事安排可見執政者的理念確實朝著這些方向努力，期望未來施政能更為落實種種立意良好的規畫，讓人民不只是「安心」和「放心」，更是「有感富足」。

The DPP Must Recognize the Republic of China, But Can It?

2012-02-05T20:48:00.000-08:00

The DPP Must Recognize the Republic of China, But Can It?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 6, 2012

Summary: The DPP 's post-election review has stalled. DPP leaders remain deadlocked over whether to accept the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. The DPP's dilemma is that one the one hand it must recognize the Republic of China. But on the other hand, it cannot recognize the Republic of China.

Full Text below:

The DPP 's post-election review has stalled. DPP leaders remain deadlocked over whether to accept the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.

Internally, the 1992 Consensus means accepting the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. It means accepting that the nation was born in 1912 of the Xinhai Revolution. It means accepting that a century of constitutional and political evolution resulted in the Republic of China we have today. For both Taipei and Beijing, the 1992 Consensus is an example of One China, Different Interpretations.

During the election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait rhetoric changed. She began arguing that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan." But this merely describes the geographical extent of the Republic of China's current jurisdiction. This has nothing to do with its political sovereignty. This evades the Republic of China's historical reality. In other words, the Republic of China that Tsai Ing-wen refers to is not the Republic of China as defined by the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. It is not the Republic of China of 1912, which evolved into the Republic of China we know today.

Tsai Ing-wen's "Republic of China" is yet another example of "backdoor listing." She pays lip service to the Republic of China. But she refuses to recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China. She refuses to use the Constitution of the Republic of China to resolve the cross-Strait dispute that has persisted since 1949. In other words, her "Republic of China" is the "Republic of China" of the "two states theory." It is not the "Republic of China" of One China, Different Interpretations.

This is the DPP's cross-Strait policy bottleneck. Tsai Ing-wen now argues that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan." On the surface she appears to have abandoned calls for the "Founding of a Republic of Taiwan," and the DPP's "Taiwan independence party platform." But she refuses to accept One China, Different Interpretations as the basis for cross-Strait interaction. She persists in repudiating the constitutional framework of the Republic of China.

Internally, Tsai Ing-wen's "Republic of China" departs from the Republic of China as defined by the Republic of China Constitution. In cross-Strait relations, it departs from the Republic of China as defined by One China, Different Intepretations. Therefore, her "Republic of China" is not the same as the Republic of China as defined by the Republic of China Constitution. Nor is it the Republic of China as defined by hard cross-Strait realpolitik. Her "Republic of China" is merely another variant of the Taiwan independence movement's "backdoor listing" tactic.

The DPP is currently reviewing its cross-Strait policy. Its fundamental problem however, is that refuses to recognize the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. Under this framework, cross-Strait policy means One China, Different Intepretations. But the DPP opposes One China, Different Interpretations. Therefore it repudiates the 1992 Consensus. But a more fundamental question looms. Since the DPP repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, how can it recognize the Republic of China, as defined by the Republic of China Constitution?

The global strategic picture as well as the state of the nation have evolved. The possibility of Taiwan independence today is zero. When Tsai Ing-wen argues that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan," she is merely reciting the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" is one step removed from Taiwan independence. But it has nothing to do with the Republic of China, as defined by the Republic of China Constitution, or with harsh cross-Strait reality.

Reformers within the Democratic Progressive Party know they must abandon their support for Taiwan independence. But they cannot bring themselves to do so. They are afraid to fully accept the Republic of China. This is the problem the DPP's post-election review is up against. Fully accepting the Republic of China, means fully accepting the Republic of China Constitution. Fully accepting the Republic of China Constitution, means accepting One China, Different Interpretations as the basis for cross-Strait interaction. This is what we said at the beginning. The DPP 's post-election review has stalled. It remains stalled over whether to accept the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.

The possibility of Taiwan independence is now zero. Looking to the future, cross-Strait economic and trade relations are bound to become closer. The pressure to resolve the cross-Strait political schism will intensify. The only way to respond to political pressures arising from cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, is to uphold One China, Different Interpetations, and the Republic of China Constitution. In other words, resisting the pressure to reunify, or promoting peaceful development, will require the Republic of China Constituion and One China, Different Interpretations. One cannot rely on Taiwan independence, the "two states theory," or "backdoor listing."

The DPP now has three cross-Strait policy options. One. It can cling to its "Taiwan independence party platform." I can insist that "Taiwan's status is undetermined," and that "The Republic of China is a foreign regime." Two. It can refuse to admit that the Republic of China dates back to the Xinhai Revolution of 1912. It can persist in perceiving the Republic of China through the lens of the 2/28 Incident of 1947. It can argue on the basis of geography that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan." It can persist in "backdoor listing" and continue opposing One China, Different Interpretations. Three. It can recognize the Republic of China Constitution. It can use One China, Different Intepretations and cross-Strait peaceful development to regulate cross-Strait relations. It can adopt a more rational approach in order to arrive at a clearer goal for cross-Strait developments.

The DPP's current posture combines option one and option two. But only option three offers the DPP a way out. Unfortunately the DPP has never been willing to recognize the Republic of China. This began during the "dang wai" era. It persisted for decades. National flags never appear at any of its mass rallies. This remains true even today. The DPP has never been willing to recognize the Republic of China. That is why it cannot lead its supporters in a new direction. The DPP cannot recognize the Republic of China because if it recognizes the Republic of China, it will lose its core support. This is the DPP's dilemma.

The DPP's dilemma is that one the one hand it must recognize the Republic of China. But on the other hand, it cannot recognize the Republic of China.

中華民國，民進黨是不是回不去了？
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.06

民進黨的選後檢討報告難產，問題仍然卡在是否接受「九二共識／一中各表」。

九二共識，對內而言，就是在中華民國憲法的架構下，接受一九一二年肇建、並歷經百年來憲政演化及政局變遷而發展至今的中華民國；九二共識，對兩岸而言，即是一中各表。

在選季，蔡英文的兩岸論述曾經發展至「台灣就是中華民國，中華民國就是台灣」的表述；但這只是從現實的地理概念來界定中華民國的現況，卻迴避了中華民國的歷史意涵。亦即，蔡英文並未正面接受這個中華民國是在中華民國憲法的架構下，所承繼並發展至今的中華民國。

蔡英文的「中華民國論」，仍是一種「借殼上市」。她雖表示接受中華民國，卻不肯接受以中華民國憲法的準據，來解決自一九四九年以來發展演化至今的兩岸關係；換句話說，她的「中華民國」，是「兩國論」的中華民國，而不是「一中各表」的中華民國。

這正是民進黨兩岸政策的瓶頸。蔡英文說「台灣就是中華民國，中華民國就是台灣」，看起來似已放棄了「建立台灣共和國」的《台獨黨綱》；但是，她拒絕以「一中各表」為兩岸互動的準據，這仍是否定及背離了「中華民國憲法」的架構。

因此，蔡英文的「中華民國」，對內是脫離了「中華民國憲法」的中華民國；對兩岸，則是脫離了「一中各表」的中華民國。所以，這樣的「中華民國」，其實不是憲法上及兩岸現實上的「中華民國」，而只是「借殼上市」的台獨化身。

民進黨此時檢討其兩岸政策，根本的問題即在要不要回歸到「中華民國憲法架構下」；在此一架構下，兩岸政策的準據即是「一中各表」。然而，民進黨因反對「一中各表」，所以否定「九二共識」；其更深一層的問題卻是，民進黨既否定「一中各表」，將如何回歸到中華民國憲法與中華民國？

世局國情發展至今，台獨的可能性已趨於零。蔡英文說「台灣就是中華民國，中華民國就是台灣」，只是趨從《台灣前途決議文》，且再離開了「台獨」一小步；但是，並未就此回歸到憲法上及兩岸現實上的「中華民國」。

然而，民進黨內的改革派均知必須脫離「台獨」，但又不願、不敢完全接受「中華民國」，這正是民進黨選後檢討的難題所在。因為，完全接受「中華民國」，即應完全接受「中華民國憲法」；而完全接受「中華民國憲法」，即是接受以「一中各表」為兩岸互動的準據。這正是文首所說，民進黨選後檢討報告難產，問題仍然卡在是否接受「九二共識／一中各表」的道理。

台獨的可能性已趨於零。瞻望未來，兩岸經貿關係必將愈來愈密切，而兩岸政治解決的壓力也將愈來愈大；但無論如何，因應兩岸經貿交流及政治壓力的唯一方案，皆在依據中華民國憲法的「一中各表」。也就是說，不論是欲抵拒「統一」的壓力，或要提升改善「和平發展」的品質，皆要依憑中華民國憲法及一中各表；不可能靠「台獨」、「兩國論」，或「借殼上市」。

此際，民進黨在兩岸政策上的選項有三：一、繼續維持《台獨黨綱》，主張「台灣地位未定論」，並認定「中華民國」為「外來政權」；二、否定「一九一二年辛亥革命的（延續式）中華民國史觀」，主張「一九四七年二二八事件的（斷裂式）中華民國史觀」，以「台灣就是中華民國，中華民國就是台灣」的「地理論」來「借殼上市」，並反對「一中各表」。三、完全回歸中華民國憲法，並以「一中各表」為兩岸「和平發展」的準據，藉以節制兩岸關係，「從合理的過程到改善之目的」。

民進黨現今的立場，其實是第一選項及第二選項的混合體；但只有第三選項才是民進黨的出路。問題卻在於，民進黨自黨外時代以來，花了幾十年時間，將其群眾帶到造勢活動中看不到一幅國旗的場面；如今倘不能使國旗重現其群眾場合，民進黨就不可能真正回到「中華民國」。因此，若不能改變那些群眾，民進黨就回不了中華民國；倘欲回到中華民國，民進黨即可能失去它的「基本盤」。這應即是民進黨當前面臨的兩難絕境。

也就是說，民進黨當前的問題是在：必須回到中華民國，但是否回不去了？

Untying the Three Knots in the US Beef Controversy

2012-02-03T21:36:00.000-08:00

Untying the Three Knots in the US Beef Controversy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 4, 2012

Summary: The new cabinet has yet to be inaugurated. But the question of whether to lift the ban on Clenbuteral treated U.S. beef is already looming. The issue has far-reaching consequences. Many conflicting forces are at work. The issues cannot be easily explained. But settling the matter as early as possible is better than letting it drag on indefinitely. Making the right trade-offs with Washington will require negotiating skill. It will also require sound communication within the Sean Chen cabinet.

Full Text Below:

The new cabinet has yet to be inaugurated. But the question of whether to lift the ban on Clenbuteral treated U.S. beef is already looming. The issue has far-reaching consequences. Many conflicting forces are at work. The issues cannot be easily explained. But settling the matter as early as possible is better than letting it drag on indefinitely. Making the right trade-offs with Washington will require negotiating skill. It will also require sound communication within the Sean Chen cabinet.

The general election just ended. Yet the U.S. government is already pressuring our government to permit the import of U.S. beef products. Many people are unhappy. They feel the U.S. is too overbearing, especially since U.S. beef imports were linked to the restart of the US-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). This reinforced the impression that the United States was applying undue pressure. The fact is beef imports are a routine trade issue. The issue could not been discussed rationally for two reasons. One. Clenbuterol involves food safety. Two. Last year Taiwan was caught up in election fever, in political rivalry between the ruling and opposition parties. Now that the elections are over, the issue can now be put back on the table.

To effectively address the problem of U.S. beef imports, we must first untie three knots. Only then can the government understand the bottom line and what principles is must adhere to. Only then will the public understand that its interests have not been sacrificed, and the dignity of the nation has not been impugned.

The first knot that must be untied involves trade and foreign relations. If we persist in seeing the ban on U.S. beef imports as diplomatic wrangling, then most people will demand that we boycott US beef to the bitter end, that we make every effort to safeguard our sovereignty and save face. But if we see the ban on U.S. beef imports as trade negotiations, as a bargaining chip in exchange for greater economic and trade benefits, such as the restart of TIFA, or even visa-free entry to the US, then the Clenbuterol controversy need not be seen as some sort of Quixotic battle for "national dignity".

The heart of the problem is U.S. beef. It has nothing to do with any other country's beef. It is a reflection of the special relationship between Taipei and Washington. This relationship includes trade, diplomatic, military and other long-term partnerships. This makes it different from relations with other countries. That said, we need not acquiesce to every US demand. Our government must weigh our larger interests and adhere to the principles of fair trade. It must demand that U.S. meat suppliers provide products whose quality is in line with our requirements. It need not blindly succumb. For example, the government can use domestic opposition as leverage. It can demand that American businesses provide their own meat inspection reports, instead of putting all the pressure on Taiwan.

The second knot to be untied is to distinguish between consumption and production, and to distinguish between beef, pork and other animal products. The domestic agricultural sector is strongly opposed to allowing the import of meats containing Clenbuterol, or with adopting the two-track system used in Japan. The main reason is that the domestic meat industry has successfully banned the use of Clenbuterol. It has an excellent reputation, at home and abroad. US beef imports must not be allowed to undermine that reputation. Therefore U.S. beef imports must not be allowed to negatively affect the domestic pork, poultry, and other meat industries. If our domestic meat industry is affected, then allowing imports would be an unwise move.

The government has decided to deal with the pork and beef issues separately, This is the right approach. Consider another perspective. The reason U.S. beef has a market on Taiwan is that many consumers consider U.S. beef higher in quality and better in taste, Domestic production of beef is limited. U.S. beef imports are unlikely to affect the domestic cattle industry. But they would meet the needs of consumers. From the consumer's perspective, this does not conflict with the interests of the ROC Swine Association.

The third knot that must be untied is whether "national health" would be sacrificed. Clenbuterol is not the same as mad cow disease. This is clear from the scientific research. That is why so many countries have minimum allowable standards. These are all available for reference. Allowing the use of Clenbuterol does not mean sacrificing the health of our citizens. As American Institute in Taiwan official Richard Bush put it. the U.S. would not sell its trading partners unsafe food. Whether the food is safe should be left to food safety experts. The government should allow experts to set standards within an internationally accepted range. Is should keep a close watch for any violations. It should require sellers of beef products to provide labels identifying their origin, enabling consumers to identify then purchase or boycott them. This way any concerns that the "National Health would be sacrificed" will be allayed.

The U.S. beef imports controversy has dragged on for years. Can it be resolved? This may well be an acid test for the Chen cabinet. One fear is that the government may be impatient, It may be tempted to operate under the table. Its decisions may not win public understanding and support, or even invite a backlash. An even greater fear is that officials will be afraid to act. Nothing will be done. They will continue spining their wheels. They will fail to live up to public expectations for the new cabinet. .

解開美牛問題的三個夾纏
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.02.04 01:43 am

新內閣還未正式就任，美牛瘦肉精是否解禁已經迎面而來。這個問題，因牽涉面向甚廣，在不同的力量拉扯下，其間理路就不容易三言兩語說清楚。但無論如何，問題若能早日妥善解決，總比拖在那裡好；至於應如何拿捏取捨，兼顧對外談判與對內溝通，就要看陳?內閣的功力了。

大選方才結束，美國政府即急急催逼我國開放美牛，一定讓許多民眾感到不悅，認為美方太霸道。尤其，美牛議題又一直與美簽的開放以及美台貿易及投資架構協定談判（ＴＩＦＡ）的重啟掛鉤，更加深了民眾對美國施壓的負面觀感。事實上，牛肉進口只是一般性的貿易行政事務，唯因瘦肉精的使用事關食品安全，加上去年整年台灣都處於朝野大選競爭的政治敏感氛圍，使得此一議題幾乎沒有理性討論的空間；也因此，如今選舉結束才又重新端上檯面。

要有效解決美牛問題，必須先釐清其間的三個夾纏，政府才知道什麼底線不可退讓、什麼原則應該堅持；民眾也才知道自己的權益有沒有受到犧牲、國家的尊嚴有沒有遭到傷害。

第一個要釐清的夾纏，是貿易與外交的權衡。如果把美牛解禁看成一次外交角力，那麼，多數國人一定主張杯葛到底，全力維護台灣主權和顏面。但如果將美牛看成一次貿易談判，藉此能換取更大的經貿利益（如重啟ＴＩＦＡ），乃至更早取得免美簽等待遇；那麼，瘦肉精問題就可以有更寬闊的思考，不必上綱為「國格」之爭。

這次的問題焦點是在「美國」「牛肉」，而不是其他任何國家的牛肉，反映的正是台美間的特殊關係，包括貿易、外交、軍事等長期夥伴關係，這不是任何國家可以比擬。但即使如此，我們也沒有必要對美方有求必應；政府可以做的，是權衡台灣的整體利益，堅持公平貿易的基本原則，要求美國肉商提供品質合乎我方要求的產品，而無需一味屈從。例如，政府甚至可以善用國內的反對力量為槓桿，要求美商自行提供肉品的查驗報告，而不必把全部壓力都放在台灣身上。

第二個要釐清的夾纏，是區隔消費和生產兩端，同時區隔牛肉和豬肉及其他畜產品。這次國內農業界強烈反對開放瘦肉精或採用日本的雙軌制，主要是我國畜牧業禁用瘦肉精有成，在國內外素負盛譽，不能因為美牛解禁，反而使我產業倒退。也因此，政府開放美牛，絕不能導致國內豬、雞等畜產受到衝擊；如果會影響國內畜產，那就是下策。

目前，政府已決定將豬、牛問題分開處理，這是正確的方向。再換一個角度看，美牛之所以在台灣有其市場，是許多消費者覺得美牛肉質更佳、更美味；但國內生產肉牛不多，進口美牛不致影響國內牛產業，卻可滿足消費者的需要。從消費觀點看，這與養豬協會的利益並不衝突。

第三個必須釐清的夾纏，是「國民健康」是否會被犧牲？瘦肉精和狂牛症不同，在科學上已有較明確的研究成果，也因此許多國家訂有最低容許標準，可供台灣參考；並非開放瘦肉精，就會犧牲國人健康。正如美國在台協會官員卜睿哲所說，美國不該向貿易夥伴出售不安全的食品，但食品安全與否，應該交由食品衛生專家決定。我政府要做的，就是根據國際間認可的範圍，由專家訂出標準，並在行政上嚴格把關，防杜一切違規。同時，可規定出售牛肉產品的商店應一律標示產地，供消費者辨識、選擇，甚至拒吃。如此一來，國民健康會被「犧牲」的疑慮，就可以在相當程度上化解。

美牛問題糾纏台美兩國多年，能否妥善解決，是陳?內閣的第一個試金石。最怕的是，政府流於躁進，在黑幕中作業，以致決策無法獲取民眾理解和支持，甚至反彈。更怕的是官員畏怯不前，什麼都不解決，把問題留在原地打轉，徒然辜負了社會對新內閣、新作為的期待。

U.S. Beef and Tax Increases Test the New Cabinet

2012-02-02T23:29:00.001-08:00

U.S. Beef and Tax Increases Test the New Cabinet
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 3, 2012

Summary: Prior to the general election, the political parties were at loggerheads with each other. They gave no quarter, and asked for none in return. But once the outcome of the election was confirmed, society on Taiwan quickly returned to normal. The ruling and opposition parties resumed their assigned roles, and prepared for their next mission. Neither the winning nor the losing camps showed signs of emotional backlash. Society as a whole faced the situation calmly. Such maturity and rationality is the pride of Taiwan. We should ask ourselves how we can move ahead given this shared asset.

Full Text Below:

Prior to the general election, the political parties were at loggerheads with each other. They gave no quarter, and asked for none in return. But once the outcome of the election was confirmed, society on Taiwan quickly returned to normal. The ruling and opposition parties resumed their assigned roles, and prepared for their next mission. Neither the winning nor the losing camps showed signs of emotional backlash. Society as a whole faced the situation calmly. Such maturity and rationality is the pride of Taiwan. We should ask ourselves how we can move ahead given this shared asset.

The KMT won the presidential election. But it received one million fewer votes than last time. Before the election the DPP assumed it would win by a small margin. Instead it lost by nearly 800,000 votes. Still, it gained 13 seats in the legislature. Before to the election, both camp floated rumors. But voters on Taiwan had minds of their own. They made choices reflecting their own priorities. The two parties made gains and suffered losses. This means Taiwan is unlikely to encounter another "winner-take-all" scenario again.

Both the Blue and Green camps need to conduct post-election soul-searching. President Ma Ying-jeou said that during the New Year holidays, he spent four days "sitting in the corner pondering his mistakes." He asked himself why the KMT received so many fewer votes. He reflected upon his new cabinet appointments. During the New Year's holiday Tsai Ing-wen traveled around Taiwan thanking voters for their support. She said times have changed, and the DPP must change with them.

This election has taught the two major parties the importance of cultivating a new generation of supporters. If a political party wishes to govern long term, it must have a large pool of talent to draw from. Such talent takes time and experience to cultivate. Therefore the Ma administration must make room for the younger generation when making its party and governmental appointments. Tsai Ing-wen said the DPP needs generational change. Her words and actions may make some "party elders" uncomfortable. But time waits for no man. As the saying goes, "The water from the upper reaches of the Yangtze push the waters from the lower reaches into the sea." Only this can inject new blood into a political party. Only this can provide a nation with fresh drive.

President Ma and newly appointed Premier Sean Chen have reshuffled the cabinet. Most outsiders give them a thumbs up. Of course some remain unhappy. They consider the magnitude of changes inadequate. But the president and vice president elect will take office on May 20. By that time, assuming the public still wants fresh blood and a new climate, there could be yet another major or minor cabinet shakeup. The time between early February and May is either short or long, depending on one's perception. During this time, Ma Ying-jeou will be conisidering new political appointments. Naturally he will be making both short and long-term plans. Therefore his current cabinet roster is understandable.

The public is watching the Ma administration like a hawk. To establish a dependable economic team at this stage, Ma must first fine tune his cabinet appointments. That is a relatively safe move. The public expects a fresh, forward looking administration. But it also needs experienced governance. All told, this is the best approach. There is no need for "reorganization and restructuring." After all the goal is not "change," but rather "improvement."

The DPP lost the presidential election. Soon afterwards, party members demanded a review. Some blamed Taiwan entrepreneurs. They even demanded boycotts. But Annette Lu wondered whether the DPP party chairman's powers were too sweeping. She reminded people that the real issue was whether to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Chen Ming-wen noted how supporters were torn between voting their hearts or voting their pocketbooks. Younger leaders even demanded that Tsai Ing-wen answer for the party's defeat, and explain why the election turned out the way it did. This led to internal debate over the DPP's power arrangements and its policy toward "[Mainland] China."

Tsai Ing-wen lost. But she still received over six million votes. She came within striking distance of the presidency. Tsai Ing-wen, DPP leaders, and DPP supporters may feel aggrieved. That is only human. But DPP leaders and DPP supporters must not forget their original intent. They must set aside their feelings of disappointment and loss, and regroup. Of course, there is always hope for the future.

Many consider the recent election a model of democracy. The winner was not arrogant. The loser was not sore. More importantly, the public on Taiwan remained law-abiding and rational. Together they established the indispenable "iron triangle of democracy."

The peaceful conclusion of the electoral process is merely the first chapter in the story. The election results are now known. How will the future unfold? The challenges have just begun. The new cabinet is still warming up. The U.S. beef controversy and the tax increase controvery loom. Now that Ma Ying-jeou has won, he must face this, the first test of his administration. Will he pass muster? The public is holding its collective breath. Many voters on Taiwan want to know whether the choice they made a month and a half ago was a wise one.

Of course none of these issues is new. The Ma administration has encountered them all before. The process may be tortuous. The questions may be old. But that does not mean the Ma administration already knows the answers. Problems arise quickly. Ruling administrations soon finds themselves beseiged. The new cabinet will officially take office next Monday. Perhaps this is too cruel. But didn't newly appointed Premier Sean Chen say that having an old hand at the helm was reassuring? The cabinet includes veteran financial and economic experts in addition to agricultural experts. Wasn't the reason for their appointment so they could hit the ground running? The second journey following the general election is about to begin.

美牛與加稅馬上考驗新內閣
2012-02-03中國時報

儘管大選前各政黨對立甚至廝殺，但是當選舉結果一確定，台灣社會很快地就恢復了平靜，朝野兩黨也「各就各位」，努力為下個階段的任務進行準備。無論是選贏的陣營還是選輸的陣營，都未見強烈反彈的情緒，整個社會也平心靜氣面對這全新的局面。這種成熟理性是台灣的驕傲，我們應思索如何以這樣的共同資產為基礎，繼續向前進。

國民黨雖然贏得總統大選，但選票較上次減少百萬票，而民進黨更是從選前預估會小贏的局面變成輸了近八十萬票，但立委席次則較上次增加了十三席。就算各陣營選前不斷進行各種放話，但看來台灣選民心中自有定見，做出了合於其價值的選擇。兩黨有得有失，說明台灣政治已很難有「贏家通吃」的傾斜局面。

也因此藍綠兩黨選後都得進行檢討與反省。馬英九總統說在新春假期裡，他用了四天時間「面壁思過」，思考國民黨票源流失的原因，也為年後布局新的人事；蔡英文則在年後的「謝票之旅」中表示，時代已經改變，民進黨必須轉型。

經歷這次選舉，兩黨都體會到培養新世代的重要。畢竟政黨如果想要永續經營，必須要有豐沛的人才庫，而人才需要時間與歷練的養成。因此馬政府在這次的黨政人事布局裡，為年輕世代留下了一些空間；蔡英文則表示，民進黨需要進行世代交替。或許這些措詞和動作，會令黨內的部分所謂大老感到不舒服，但這是時代的趨勢，後浪推前浪，政黨才會有新的生命力，國家也才會有新的動力。

外界對馬總統與準行政院長陳?這次的內閣人事改組多持正面肯定，當然也有些人不盡滿意，認為改變幅度不夠大。不過，需要注意的是，新任正副總統是五二○就任，到時候，民意如果要求「新人新氣象」，難保執政團隊又要來個幅度可大可小的換血！從二月初至五月，說長不長、說短不短，這個時候馬英九思考新的政黨人事，自然會有短中長期不同時程的規畫和布局，出現如此布局也是可以理解的。

在目前這個階段，建立一個穩定的經濟團隊，以及就民意關注度高、一定要有所安排的部會先行調整，應該算是比較穩當的做法；在想要耳目一新的民意期待與施政成熟度之間拿捏出一個適當比例才是上策，無須「為了改組而改組」，畢竟「改變」不是目的，「變好」才是。

民進黨在這次總統敗選後，黨內很快傳出檢討聲浪，雖有部分人士竟以企業為檢討的對象，甚至發起杯葛，但也有呂秀蓮就民進黨黨主席的權力是否過大，做出提醒；而針對是否應認同九二共識，陳明文也提出支持者有「要顧佛祖、還是要顧肚腹」的矛盾；甚至有新世代要求蔡英文必須提出具體的敗選檢討等等，說明這次選舉的結果，的確在民進黨內部引發對黨內權力結構機制，以及民進黨中國路線是否合宜的省思。

雖然蔡英文這次是輸了，但終究也拿下六百多萬票，在距離執政就只差這「最後一哩」的情況下，無論是蔡英文自己、民進黨人還是支持者，心有未甘以至於有些情緒性的反應，恐怕也是人情之常，只要民進黨人勿忘初心，拋下失望、失落，重新整軍，未來當然仍然問鼎有望。

很多人認為台灣這次選舉是非常優質的民主示範，這樣的成果，是由勝選一方所表現出來的不驕與敗選一方所表現出來的不餒，再加上，最重要的是，整個台灣人民的守法、理性，所共同創造的；這「民主的鐵三角」可說是缺一不可。

不過，選舉過程和平落幕也還只是整個故事的第一章，選舉結果出來後，台灣未來的路要怎麼走，挑戰才剛要開始─新內閣還在暖身，「美牛」與「加稅」兩大難題已迎面撲來，馬英九勝選後所要面對的這第一場考驗，能不能過關，大家正摒息以對；許多台灣人民想知道，半個多月前的選票抉擇是否明智。

當然，這兩大議題都不新鮮，之前馬政府也早已經歷，而且過程堪稱備受折磨；但就算是「考古題」，也不表示馬政府有充分的把握，問題如此迅速「兵臨城下」，對下個禮拜一才正式就任的新內閣來講，或許是有些殘忍，但是，準閣揆陳?不是說老船長能讓人安心嗎！團隊裡的經濟老兵加上農業專家，不就是準備好要來打這第一場硬仗嗎！台灣大選後的第二場驚奇之旅，即將展開！

The DPP Would Do Well to Listen to Different Voices

2012-02-02T00:22:00.002-08:00

The DPP Would Do Well to Listen to Different Voices
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 2, 2012

Summary: DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen conceded defeat in the recent general election. Her concession statement was affirmed on Taiwan. It also had far-reaching repercussions on the Mainland. It symbolized democracy on Taiwan. The voters voted against the DPP. That does not mean they "pandered to Mainland China and sold out Taiwan." If the DPP wants to begin anew it would do well to listen to different voices.

Full Text Below:

DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen conceded defeat in the recent general election. Her concession statement was affirmed on Taiwan. It also had far-reaching repercussions on the Mainland. It symbolized democracy on Taiwan. By doing so, Tsai Ing-wen behaved appropriately. Unfortunately this was soon followed by a vendetta against Taiwan entrepreneur Cher Wang and HTC brand mobile phones, by a DPP member of the Taipei City Council. It was followed also by Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to meet American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt. By refusing to meet with Burghardt, Tsai and the DPP have evinced a closed-minded, "pity poor me" attitude. This can only be detrimental to the political fortunes of the largest opposition party on Taiwan.

Following the election, the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan immediately began a second round of competition. The Ma administration announced a new cabinet. This new cabinet would begin implementing the administration's blueprint for a "Golden Decade." But the KMT government would not have the stage to itself. Sean Chen's cabinet must soon face the newly-elected legislature. The DPP will soon surface and play an important role in legislative oversight. When that happens, how will the ruling and opposition parties react to each other? What sort of sparks will fly? Will it be a case of the expert finessing the situation? Or will it be a case of "the scholar encounters the soldier?" The Chen cabinet cannot relax. It must begin work immediately. The same is true for the DPP leadership. It can no longer remain clueless. After all, thorough soul-searching by the DPP is also a priority.

This is why the "explanation" the DPP leadership offered for the DPP's defeat has left observers incredulous. According to reports, the DPP has offered two reasons for its defeat. Reason Number One. Former American Institute in Taiwan Director Douglas Paal publicly supported the 1992 Consensus prior to the election. This had a major impact on the general election. Reason Number Two. Rumors of voting irregularities on election day.

First, let us address the alleged voting irregularities. The quality of civil service personnel on Taiwan is high. So is the quality of civil service training. Allegations of large scale vote tampering, to the tune of hundreds of thousands of votes, are utterly nonsensical. The DPP's attitude is indistinguishable from an ostrich with its head in the sand.

The charges of voting irregularities are outrageous. That said, the list of reasons the DPP offered for its defeat put the U.S. government's attitude at the top of the list. This reveals an even more peculiar attitude. Dozens of entrepreneurial heavyweights came out in support of the 1992 Consensus. Yet the DPP singled out the United States for blame. Tsai Ing-wen even refused to meet with Raymond Burghardt, who was visiting at the time. What can one say? The DPP has long followed Uncle Sam's lead in diplomacy. Yet this was their reward. Their feelings can be summed up in the expression, "I gave my heart to the moon, but the moon cast its light in the gutter."

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP blame the United States. But why don't they ask themselves whether their perceptions and expectations of the United States were mistaken? During the debate over ECFA Tsai Ing-wen castigated the Ma administration. She accused it of pandering to Mainland China. She accused it of changing the strategic balance in the Asian-Pacific region. She implied that the relationship between the United States and Mainland China was a zero sum game. She implied that Taiwan was getting too chummy with Mainland China, and that this was something the U.S. and Japan do not welcome. But the United States and even Japan made clear their attitudes during the general election. They made it clear that US-China relations were be both competitive and cooperative, that it was not a zero-sum game. They made it clear that the US did not welcome heightened cross-Strait tensions. In fact, WikiLeaks revealed that the AIT Director conveyed this message to the DPP, well in advance of the election. But the DPP failed to get the message, intentionally or otherwise. As a result, it misjudged the situation and it paid the price.

More importantly, it matters not how much the DPP values the United States. As Raymond Burghardt pointed out, the United States does not have that much influence. The final choice was made by the public on Taiwan. The DPP can blame the United States. It can can blame Cher Wang, Terry Gou, and other entrepreneurs. But Americans did not vote in the election. Entrepreneurs on Taiwan had only one vote apiece. The DPP casts blame left and right. Instead it should try to understand why those who championed the 1992 Consensus were able to sway other voters.

For politicians, a presidential election is a winner take all proposition. But for voters, it is a referendum on the nation's future. Therefore, any blueprint for the nation's future, drafted by any campaign committee, must understand the problems. Only then can it offer realistic solutions. The DPP has a major problem. It might not talk about reunification vs. independence during its election campaigns. But it never stops thinking about it. The DPP painted the Ma administration as "reunificationist." It insisted that the 1992 Consensus would undermine "Taiwan's sovereignty." By doing so, it moved further and further away from public opinion. Because for voters on Taiwan, reunification vs independence long ceased being an issue. The Republic of China's sovereignty is not in jeopardy. Voters on Taiwan are concerned about other matters. They are concerned about their fate amidst globalization and Asian-Pacific regional competition. They are afraid of being marginalized. They want to find a new economic niche for themselves. The DPP fails to understand the problem. Naturally it is unable to render a correct diagnosis.

Election defeat is a painful experience. Especially since the DPP had such high hopes for this particular election. But as the saying goes, a day of jubilation is plenty. By the same token, a day of mourning is also plenty. A pragmatic political party should be willing to engage in earnest soul-searching. Only that will ensure future victory. But soul-searching is merely the first step. The DPP must take a bold step forward. It must listen to different voices. During the the election, Tsai Ing-wen promised that in the event the DPP won, it would form a coalition government. She promised to listen to different voices. The DPP should not renege on its commitment because it has lost instead of won.

The voters voted against the DPP. That does not mean they "pandered to Mainland China and sold out Taiwan." If the DPP wants to begin anew, it would do well to listen to different voices.

民進黨何妨聽取不同的聲音
2012-02-02中國時報

民進黨總統候選人蔡英文的敗選感言，不但在台灣備受肯定，甚至在對岸引起深遠的迴響，成為台灣民主的象徵；但在蔡英文的完美表現後，隨之而來的卻是民進黨市議員扺制企業家王雪紅旗下的ＨＴＣ品牌手機，以及這兩日的拒見美國在台協會主席薄瑞光事件，這其間流露出的受害、封閉心態，對最大反對黨未來的發展，可說是有害無益。

大選後，台灣的朝野政黨立即展開第二回合的競爭，馬政府風風火火啟動新閣，要開始著手完成黃金十年藍圖；但是，國民黨或馬政府不可能唱獨角戲，很快的，當陳內閣面對新國會，民進黨將浮出檯面，而且在國會監督中擔綱重要角色，屆時，朝野政黨會爆出何種火花？是高手過招？還是秀才遇到兵？如果說，陳內閣毫無喘息的空間，必須馬上上手；同樣的，民進黨的菁英們，也不能一出場就毫無章法，歸根究柢，民進黨的徹底反省檢討，同樣也是當務之急。

正因如此，民進黨中央日前提出的敗選檢討，特別令人錯愕；據報導，民進黨中央提出的兩項敗選原因，分別是一、前美國在台協會辦事處（ＡＩＴ）處長包道格選前公開支持九二共識，對大選造成影響；第二、投票當天傳出開票作業異常。

先就開票作業異常而言，以台灣公務人員的素質及訓練，任何人試圖在開票時大規模做手腳，做掉數十萬選票，皆是匪夷所思，民進黨若提出這樣的「檢討」，簡直和鴕鳥無異。

作票指控離譜，但民進黨敗選報告中優先挑出美國政府的態度，則更有特殊的情結。事實上，大選時有數十位重量級的企業家跳出來挺九二共識，民進黨中央獨責美國，蔡英文甚而拒絕和來訪的薄瑞光會面，只能說，民進黨自認外交向來以美國老大哥馬首是瞻，卻得到這樣的回報，頗有「我本將心向明月、奈何明月照溝渠」、感情受傷害之嘆。

但是，蔡英文或民進黨在責怪美國之前，何妨深思，他們對美國一直有錯誤的認知及期待。蔡英文曾在ＥＣＦＡ大辯論時批評，馬政府政策傾中，可能會改變亞太地區的戰略結構，言下之意，美中是零和關係，台灣太靠近中國，是美日所不樂見；但美國、甚至日本在大選期間所表現的，卻顯示出美中關係是既競爭又合作，並非零和之爭，兩岸關係緊張，非美國所樂見；事實上，維基解密透露，歷任ＡＩＴ處長早已向民進黨傳達這樣的訊息，民進黨不論是有心或無意，都因為誤判而付出慘痛的代價。

更重要的是，無論民進黨多看重美國，正如薄瑞光所說，美國人沒有那麼大的影響力，最後還是台灣人民所做的抉擇；民進黨可以怪美國，可以怪王雪紅、郭台銘等企業家，但美國人沒有選票，企業家頂多也是一人一票，民進黨與其怪東怪西，何不好好去了解，為何這些支持九二共識的聲音，能夠說服選民！

對政客來說，總統選舉輸贏無異是贏者全拿的零和競爭，但對選民而言，其實就是選擇一個心目中可行的國家方向；因此，任何競選團隊提出的治國藍圖中，必須包含正確的現狀，然後才可能開出務實的藥方。民進黨最大的問題在於，他們在這次大選雖然絕口不談統獨，但卻無法脫離統獨的架構來打選戰；當民進黨將馬政府都打成統派、九二共識會傷害主權時，其實和民意愈離愈遠；因為，對台灣選民來說，統獨早就不是問題，台灣主權也沒有受傷之虞，他們關心的是，台灣如何在全球化、亞太區域競爭中，不被邊緣化、重新找到利基；民進黨對現狀解讀錯誤，當然就無法提出正確診斷。

敗選當然是個傷痛的經驗，尤其民進黨對此次選舉寄望甚深；但就如大家經常說的，勝選高興一天就夠了，同樣的，敗選也是難過一天就夠了；務實的政黨會誠實檢討敗選原因，未來才可能勝選。但自己人的檢討，只是第一步，民進黨有必要跨出去，了解不同的聲音，正如大選時蔡英文曾經承諾，如果勝選將籌組大聯合內閣，包容各種不同聲音，這樣的承諾不該因為敗選而失效。

不挺民進黨，不代表這些人傾中賣台，民進黨要重新站起來，何妨先從聽取不同的聲音開始！

A New Cabinet, A New Political Climate: Just Do It!

2012-02-01T01:03:00.001-08:00

A New Cabinet, A New Political Climate: Just Do It!
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 1, 2012

Summary: There is no honeymoon period for a second term president, let alone a trial period. President Ma Ying-jeou's second term cabinet has a new lineup. It includes old veterans and new hires. It includes many outspoken individuals. It deserves our affirmation. The most important aspect of the newly formed cabinet however, is not whether it includes new faces. The important point is whether it can make a fresh start and more effectively implement administration policy. This will depend on whether cabinet members have the determination, initiative, and willingness to do what needs to be done. Only then can President Ma leave behind a legacy.

Full Text Below:

There is no honeymoon period for a second term president, let alone a trial period. President Ma Ying-jeou's second term cabinet has a new lineup. It includes old veterans and new hires. It includes many outspoken individuals. It deserves our affirmation. The most important aspect of the newly formed cabinet however, is not whether it includes new faces. The important point is whether it can make a fresh start and more effectively implement administration policy. This will depend on whether cabinet members have the determination, initiative, and willingness to do what needs to be done. Only then can President Ma leave behind a legacy.

When the cabinet reshuffle was first announced, Ma's choice financial and economic cabinet members was subject to considerable criticism. The reason was simple. With the exception of Academia Sinica member Kuan Chung-min, the cabinet was filled with old faces. But as cabinet member Sean Chen pointed out, given the European debt crisis, they could hardly risk naming an all new captain and an all new crew. The good thing about old faces is that they put people at ease. A ball team cannot consist entirely of Wang Chien-mings. Political appointees each have their own roles, their own duties. Only then can they work as a team. Only then will their fighting ability be optimal. Do not underestimate the importance of political appointees. Things do no get done by themselves. People get things done. Some people twiddle their thumbs. Others spontaneously seek out things that need to be done. Kuan Chung-min may be able to give the financial and economic cabinet the shot in the arm that it needs.

The list of new cabinet members includes many eye-catching names. It includes Chang Shan-cheng, who was lured back to Taiwan from Google. During his early years he was the National Science Council's Chief of Science and Technology. Following the 2000 change in ruling parties, he left public office and went into the private sector. He is experienced in both industry and government. The new list of cabinet members includes Chairman of the National Science Council and Academia Sinica member Chu Ching-yi. He and Chang were both Division Chiefs in Human Resources. They are good friends and interact well with each other. They should be able to upgrade the Ministry of Science and Technology and pioneer new horizons for Taiwan's technology industry.

Ma has also recruited Lung Ying-tai, from the University of Hong Kong. He has persuaded her to return to Taiwan to serve as Chairman of the Council for Cultural Affairs. She has written extensively. She is a heavy weight in humanist circles. She is outspoken to those in power. She is unafraid to admonish them, and has never been one to mince words. Years ago Ma persuaded her to return to Taiwan from Germany, where she was serving as Chief of the Bureau of Culture. She gave the Ma administration considerable face. Ma Ying-jeou has once again convinced her to serve his administration. Morale within the CCA has been low since last year's "Dreamer" controversy. The task will be arduous. But her appointment has raised public expectations for the soon to be upgraded Ministry of Culture.

Central University President Chiang Wei-ning is a dark horse who will serve as Minister of Education. He spoke frankly, saying he will have to do at least a week's worth of homework. The administration is about to promote its program of 12 year compulsory education. This includes "admissions without entrance exams," and "admissions on the basis of special merit" to be finalized in April, prior to May 20. Chiang must quickly familiarize himself with the situation, and make his decision before the deadline. This is an enormous challenge. But for the fleet of foot and swift to act, creative and effective Chiang Wei-ning, this should be no problem.

Former DPP Kaohsiung County Chief Yang Chiu-hsing has accepted a cabinet appointment. When interviewed he said he would pay special attention to Taiwan's agricultural systems, especially in southern Taiwan. He believes the KMT needs to do more in southern Taiwan. His thinking may make up for certain deficiencies in the KMT government. He and the new COA chairman Chen Pao-chi can complement each other.

When men and women of ability are willing to serve in the government, it means the government is one people can trust. But being an official on Taiwan is not easy. Above the political appointee is the President and the Premier. Below the political appointee is public opinion, Alongside the political appointee are one hundred fierce legislators. One either sits while being lectured, or stands while being scolded. Political appointees find it difficult to survive. As a result scholars and industrialists consider a political appointment risky business. Ma has presented a cabinet rich in new ideas. Clearly President Ma's people skills are appreciated, That is why so many people are willing to set aside their comfortable lives in academia or industry for an opportunity to show what they can do.

Having crossed the Rubicon, all Ma can do is continue advancing. The new cabinet has yet to take office, but it must face the European debt crisis, Taiwan's economy is about to flash blue, signaling a crisis. The larger environment is extremely unfavorable for the new cabinet. But the Ma administration is not under re-election pressure. No elections are schedule for the next two years, It should be able to quietly get things done. It should be free from excessive political interference.

Political appointees come and go, When they step down, their departure is handled discreetly. But once they have agreed to serve, they must be fully prepared psychologically, They must be determined to succeed and not accept failure. They must be determined to achieve results and to not surrender. The Ma administration's first term achievements were ridiculed as "wu gan," or "undetectable." The reason was that some officials were afraid or reluctant to defend the administration's policies. Yin Chi-ming has been reappointed Minister of Economic Affairs, probably because he vigorously defended ECFA during the reelection campaign.

Political appointees must of course do more than defend administration policies during election campaigns. They must assume final responsibility for their own policies. They must not reflexively kowtow to legislators. They must not reflexively run from the media. When offered suggestions or constructive criticism, they should respectfully listen. When attacked irrationally, they should step forward and say "no." If they do their jobs well, the public will applaud them. If they do their jobs poorly, they should quietly pack up and leave, They should not feel aggrieved. The Ma administration is not President Ma's personal adminstration. A government must assume responsibility for its political appointees. The president cannot sit at home year after year "reflecting upon his mistakes."

新內閣新氣象要敢作敢擔當
2012-02-01中國時報

連任者沒有蜜月期，遑論試驗期；馬英九總統第二任新內閣在開春後擺好陣容，老幹新枝，而且納入不少敢言之士，值得肯定。最重要的，內閣改組不在於閣員是否都是新面孔，而在於政府政策效能是否確實全新啟動，這就有賴所有閣員拿出魄力，肯擔當、肯負責，才能創造馬總統希望的歷史評價。

這次改組最早披露的財經小內閣，反而遭到較多批評。原因很簡單，除了中研院士管中閔出任政務委員外，都是老面孔搬風。然而，誠如閣揆陳?所言，面對歐債危機總不能都是新船長，老手的好處是讓民眾安心；一個球隊不可能個個都是王建民，政務官各司其職，各負其責，才能將團隊戰力發揮到最高。不要小看政務委員的功能，事情是人做的，有些人為官投閒置散，有些人天生就會找事做，管中閔或許就能為財經小內閣注入推力和動能。

新閣名單中有不少讓人眼睛一亮的人士。諸如從谷哥挖角回台灣的張善政出任政務委員，他早年即任國科會科技處長，二○○○年政黨輪替後離開公職，轉到民間公司任職，業界與政府歷練都夠豐富；新閣發布出任國科會主委的中研院士朱敬一當年與他同期擔任人文處長，兩人交誼甚深互動更佳，相信可以為升格後的科技部及台灣科技產業再升級，創造一番新局面。

此外，從香港大學延攬返台出任文建會主委的龍應台，著作豐沛，在人文圈分量極重，對權力者以敢言敢諫著稱，從來不是唯唯諾諾之輩。當年馬英九延攬她從德國返台出任文化局長，為馬市府團隊增添不少光釆，這回馬英九再次說服她為政府服務，還要重振文建會自去年夢想家爭議後的低迷士氣，任務艱鉅，卻讓大眾對未來升格後的文化部更加期待。

中央大學校長蔣偉寧則以黑馬之姿出任教育部長。他很誠實的說，他至少要花一個星期時間做功課，十二年國教推動在即，甚至包括「免試入學超額比序條件」、「特色招生辦法」都要在五二○前的四月就得定案，他得花最少的時間進入狀況，並在限期內做成決策，必然是極大的挑戰，但對衝勁十足、行動快速，講究創意和效率的蔣偉寧而言，應該不是大問題。

這次入閣的前民進黨籍高雄縣長楊秋興受訪時自陳要關注台灣的農業系統，特別是南台灣。他認為國民黨在南台灣還需要耕耘，他的思維可以挹注國民黨政府的不足，相信也能和學者出身的新任農委會主委陳保基相輔相成。

對社會大眾而言，能人幹士願意為政府服務，代表這個政府可以讓人信賴。然而，在台灣為官不易，政務官上有總統、院長，下有輿論監督，旁邊還有上百位火力勇猛的立法委員，官員不是坐著聽訓就得站著挨罵，「官不聊生」讓學界和業者視為官為畏途。這次能擺出不乏新意的布局，顯見馬總統為人還是受到肯定，才會讓這麼多人才願意放下自己熟悉的學術生活或在業界一展長才的機會。

既已做了過河卒子，只能拚命向前。新內閣還沒就任就要面對歐債風暴，台灣景氣逼近藍燈的危機，整體大環境對新內閣極為不利；但是，馬政府沒有連任壓力，兩年後才有選舉，相對可以安安靜靜做點事，不受到太多政治外力的干擾。

政務官來來去去，下台時要淡然處之，但既點頭上台，就得做好完全的心理準備，只許成功不許失敗，拿出不做出點成績絕不罷休的拚勁。馬政府第一任績被譏評為「無感」，和部分政務官不敢、不肯為政策辯護相關。這次重回內閣出任經建會主委的尹啟銘，相信和他在大選期間火力旺盛為ＥＣＦＡ政策辯護有關。

身為政務官不只在選舉期間才有需要辯護，時時刻刻都要為自己拍板定案的政策負責，不能見立委就彎腰，見媒體就落跑；但凡建議或批評，有道理者敬謹受教，沒道理者當然要挺身說「不」，做得好民眾自會給予掌聲，做不好二話不說請打包走人，沒有任何委屈可言。馬政府不是馬總統一人的政府，這個政府需要政務官共同擔起責任，總不能年年讓總統在家「閉門思過」。

Fling Open the Doors. Be a President for All the People

2012-01-31T00:32:00.000-08:00

Fling Open the Doors. Be a President for All the People
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 31, 2012

Summary: Voters have rewarded Ma Ying-jeou with a second term. Therefore he should be bolder. He should be more decisive. He should fling open the doors. He should take on greater challenges. He should make the difficult decisions, He should leave behind a better system of government. During the next four years President Ma will have the opportunity to leave behind his own legacy. President Ma, the eyes of the nation are upon you.

Full Text Below:

President Ma Ying-jeou has won his bid for reelection. The cabinet reshuffle is now in full swing. Voters have entrusted President Ma with another four-year term. He now faces many difficult challenges. Whatever leadership President Ma exhibits during his second term will have a major impact on the nation's future.

Over half the voters backed him. President Ma's policies have been affirmed. In particular, his promotion of cross-Strait reconciliation has received popular support. This means the public on Taiwan looks forward to more cross-strait exchanges and more beneficial results from these exchanges. The Ma administration must ensure that more people benefit from his policies. It must demonstrate vision. It must increase the level of cross-strait exchanges, It must promote exchanges between the younger generation. Besides promoting trade, investment, and procurement, it must enhance mutual understanding between the public on both sides. It must enable Taiwan to exert a positive influence on social evolution on the Chinese Mainland.

Cross-strait exchanges should be increased, because Taiwan has more experience with democracy and liberalization. Taiwan is implementing democratic values. It is demonstrating its spiritual strength. Therefore it can serve as a point of reference for the Mainland. Democracy and freedom include respect for human rights, pluralism and tolerance. They have enormous significance for cross-Strait conflict resolution and the cross-Strait consensus. If the two sides can gradually resolve their disputes, it will be a blessing not just to the public on Taiwan. It will be a blessing for the public on both sides of the Strait.

Ma Ying-jeou received 6.89 million votes and won a clear majority. But Tsai Ing-wen received 6.09 million votes. James Soong received 370,000 votes. Clearly 6.46 million voters did not want Ma Ying-jeou as their president, Many of them feel uneasy about the direction and pace of Ma's cross-Strait policy, These people are also President Ma's clients.

Ma Ying-jeou received 51% of the vote. He won. He must now strive to fulfill the role of a "president for all the people." He must dialogue with the remaining 48% of the electorate. He must listen to them. He must understand what they are saying He must actively communicate his policy, especially cross-Strait policy, He must resolve the concerns that motivated these people to vote against him. He must ease the obvious social schism between the Blue and Green halves of the community. After all, fierce internal opposition is certain to hobble cross-Strait policy.

Many of the votes cast for Ma Ying-jeou were cast on the basis of party affiliation. But a head of state represents a nation. He or she represents the interests of all the people. And so it is for the Republic of China. Once one becomes president, there can be no partisan bias. President Ma has been criticized for drawing from too limited a circle of experts. His confidants and staffers are too far removed from the grassroots, They are too inbred. Ma is a national leader. His decision-making must be even-handed. He must tolerate different ideas. He must respect opposing views. His greatest concern must be the future of the people as a whole. He must attend to the long-term well-being of the next generation, and the long term prosperity of the nation. During his second term President Ma will no longer face re-election pressures. But he will remain under public scrutiny. The public must remain vigilant and never relax. President Ma too cannot afford to relax.

The greatest difficulty Ma will encounter during his second term, will be the "lame duck effect" that will appear two years before leaving office. A struggle for succession will have begun. Fence-sitters will be seeing which way the wind blows. Policy may be difficult to implement. Political promises may be unconvincing. But this is precisely when President Ma should focus on structural and institutional matters. If he can lay the groundwork for sound policy, future policy will be easier to implement.

Demands for justice can move people because the gap between rich and poor has provoked enormous resentment. It is impossible to eliminate the gap between rich and poor. But it is possible to help the disadvantaged and salvage the social welfare system. The government has long been short of money and manpower. It must provide more resources and support.

An aging population and a declining birthrate have also cast a pall over our future, This is a trend that cannot be avoided and will be difficult to reverse. A nation consists of individual human beings, The problems faced by individual human beings are the nation's biggest problems. The government must make long term plans for a shrinking population. It must help schools transform themselves and teachers change occupations. It must enhance childcare services. It must build long term care systems. It must relax immigration rules to increase the population.

Voters have rewarded Ma Ying-jeou with a second term. Therefore he should be bolder. He should be more decisive. He should fling open the doors. He should take on greater challenges. He should make the difficult decisions, He should leave behind a better system of government. During the next four years President Ma will have the opportunity to leave behind his own legacy. President Ma, the eyes of the nation are upon you.

大開大闔扮好全民總統角色
2012-01-31中國時報

馬英九總統贏得連任之後，現正緊鑼密鼓進行內閣改組。面對選民再次付託的四年新任期，馬總統的挑戰與考驗相當艱鉅，而馬總統在第二任期內展現的領導能力與執政方向，更將對國家發展產生重大影響。

超過半數民意的背書，意味著馬總統的施政大方向獲得肯定，尤其推動兩岸和解交流更是得到大部分民眾的支持，而這也意味著，台灣民眾對兩岸交流帶來更多利益有所期待；在這方面，馬總統帶領的執政團隊一方面應該讓更多民眾感受到實質的獲益，一方面也應該以前瞻的眼光，深化兩岸交流層次，促進年輕世代的往來，在經貿、投資、採購之外，增進兩岸人民的相互了解，也讓台灣可以在中國大陸社會發展的過程中產生良性的影響力。

為什麼要深化兩岸交流的層次，因為在民主開放的道路上，台灣有比較多的經驗，台灣正在實踐的民主價值，以及從而彰顯的精神力量，是一個可以供中國大陸思考的方向。而民主自由理念蘊含的尊重、人權、多元與包容，對化解兩岸矛盾，構築共同思維有重大意義。兩岸之爭若能逐漸在理念接近中化解，將不僅是台灣全民之福，更是兩岸人民之福。

不過，馬英九雖然以六百八十九萬票的過半票數獲勝，但投給蔡英文的六百零九萬票，加上投給宋楚瑜的卅七萬票，意味著總共有六百四十六萬選民是很明確不要馬英九當總統的，而且其中有不少選民對馬政府兩岸政策的速度及方向，是感到不安的。這些人，一樣是馬總統的頭家。

馬英九固然得到了超過百分之五十一的選民支持，但在勝選之後，必須努力扮演一個「全民總統」的角色，與其餘百分之四十八的選民對話，傾聽他們的聲音，了解他們的想法，並且對自己的施政理念做更積極的溝通，尤其對於兩岸政策，必須努力化解這些沒有投票給他的民眾心裡的疑慮，並力圖緩和明顯藍綠各半的社會分裂態勢。畢竟，如果內部意見激烈對立，勢將牽絆兩岸政策的推進空間。

也許投票給馬英九的選民有特定的政黨屬性，但元首代表國家，也代表著全民的利益，以及台灣共同的命運，一旦成為總統，就不能有黨派之偏。過去馬總統曾被批評決策圈太狹窄，親近幕僚與基層有距離，又同質性太高，既然成為國家領袖，在決策時就須兼顧各方主張，包容不同理念，尊重反對意見，以全民的未來為最大依歸，也以下一代長遠福祉及國家的繁榮成長為自我期許。馬總統在第二任期已無連任壓力，但民眾的評價之眼，卻依舊時時緊盯毫不放鬆，馬總統當然也不能鬆懈。

第二任期的最大困難，是「跛鴨效應」可能在卸任的前兩年就浮現，因為接班角力戰已經蠢蠢欲動，西瓜派準備另覓明主，以致政策容易被視為難以持續，政治承諾也欠缺說服力。但此時馬總統更應該著重於結構性、制度性的問題，因為，如果能為好的政策打好基礎，日後施政便能更為順遂推展。

例如「公平正義」訴求之所以能夠打動人心，就是因為貧富差距激起了不少民怨，雖然貧富差距不可能消除，但扶持弱勢者、提供急難援助的社福體系，長期以來始終處於缺錢缺人的困境，需要政府更積極地提供資源與支持。

此外，人口老化與少子化的陰影，籠罩著台灣的未來，這是一個無法逃避、也難以扭轉的課題，國家是由一個個的人組成，人的問題，就是國家最大的問題。政府必須對人口問題做制度性的長遠規畫，包括如何協助學校轉型及教師轉業、如何加強幼兒托育服務、如何建立長照制度、如何放寬移民規定以引進人口等等。

其實獲得選民再度授權的第二任期，應該可以更有魄力、更決斷地大開大闔，挑戰一些比較困難的決定，為社會留下更多良好制度。全新的四年，將是馬總統為自己留下歷史軌跡的全新機會，全民正拭目以待。

DPP Dogma Must Defer to the Knowledge Economy

2012-01-29T20:26:00.000-08:00

DPP Dogma Must Defer to the Knowledge Economy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 30, 2012

Summary: During his New Year's Day speech, President Ma said that no political party can base its existence solely on memories of the 2/28 Incident. It must also ensure the well-being of future generations. In 1988, martial law was lifted on Taiwan. Babies born that year are now 24 years old. One quarter of the population on Taiwan has no memory of martial law. What these young people need is an opposition party with the courage to confront cross-Strait and international reality.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP lost. This proves yet again that cross-Strait policy and the economy are the DPP's Achilles Heel. The consensus was that the DPP's recent loss was related to unprecedented public declarations by entrepreneurs large and small regarding the 1992 Consensus. The provincial origin of these entrepreneurs was irrelevant. They included Taiwan and Mainland born entrepreneurs alike.

During the election, the DPP smeared these companies. It characterized them as wealthy conglomerates, and implied that they acquired their wealth illegitimately through government/business collusion. The DPP attempted to depict them as enemies of the people. But calm has returned following the election. The fact that so many entrepreneurs spoke in one voice should give the DPP pause. What these entrepreneurs said was: "Taiwan's economic development cannot sit idly by while the DPP works out its so-called Taiwan consensus."

Consider the big picture. The situation is very different from 30 years ago. Yet the DPP seems oblivious to this fact. Over the next few years, Taiwan has two clear rivals in Asia. One is South Korea. The other is Mainland China. Just before the election, outsiders wanted to know whether cross-Strait relations would be strained and the U.S. would be alarmed by a DPP victory. What was the DPP's response? Mainland China has no alternative. It must talk to Taiwan.

The DPP mistakenly assumed that Taiwan had no competitors. The DPP forgot that while the two sides were wasting time talking, South Korean companies were swooping in and making real progress on the Mainland. Seoul may soon sign an FTA with Beijing. South Korean and Mainland enterprises have progressed by leaps and bounds while the DPP casts about for some sort of "Taiwan consensus." What Taiwan companies want most is not special treatment from Beijing. What they want is peaceful cross-Strait relations and the opportunity to compete with South Korean and Mainland companies on an equal footing. In other words, competitors from South Korea need not waste time and energy overcoming political obstacles on Mainland China, but companies from Taiwan do. This wasted time constitutes an enormous burden on Taiwan's economy.

The DPP's second mistake was to assume that since cross-Strait exchanges will normalize eventually, Direct Links are not terribly urgent. DPP leaders assume that if they hold out longer at this stage, Taipei will gain more leverage during eventual negotiations. But this argument fails to factor in lost economic opportunities. The loss of economic strength is far more detrimental to one's bargaining power in the long run.

Given these logical fallacies, the DPP's greatest weakness in cross-Strait negotiations, remains its obliviousness to the importance of time and to the dynamic nature of industrial production.

The DPP has long lacked an genuinely independent and neutral think tank able to help it understand the issues. The party's think tank fails to stress knowledge and learning. Instead it stresses ideological correctness.

For example, its think tank still stresses "factor price equalization theory." It still maintains that exchanges between Taiwan and the Mainland must lower wages on Taiwan. But as everyone knows, this is outmoded industrial and agricultural society theory from 50 years ago. The world today is a knowledge economy. It competes on the basis of innovation. The international industrial environment is no longer a static arrangement that will lead to factor price equalization between Taiwan and the Mainland. On the contrary, technological innovation has been the rule the world over. The key determinant for economic achievement is "Who is the innovator?" Innovators invariably seize the lion's share of economic benefits.

Will worker salaries on the Mainland catch up to Taiwan? The answer will not be determined by whether we allow cross-Strait trade, but by whether Taiwan is more innovative than the Mainland. The DPP must understand that the best cross-Strait strategy is to maintain Taiwan lead in innovation amidst dynamic competition.

The Mainland is a serious economic threat to Taiwan. But it is a tremendous economic opportunity as well. For Taiwan brands, the Mainland is an essential test market. DPP academics must see the opportunities provided by the Mainland, and not merely the threats. If exchanges with the Mainland enable Taiwan to become a winner in the innovation economy, the DPP should choose an open door policy, instead of trying to apply a padlock to the island.

The DPP's cross-Strait policy needs new thinking, predicated upon a knowledge-based economy. Politically, the DPP should consider recognizing the 1992 consensus. What is the 1992 consensus? The older generation may have a strong sense of Taiwanese identity. They may have indelible memories of martial law oppression. They may feel that the wording of the 1992 consensus diminishes their political ideals. But the wording can also be interpreted as deliberate ambiguity that can buy time for Taiwan. It can enable Taiwan's democracy [Translator's note: strictly speaking this should be "republican government," not "democracy"] and economy to gain strength. It can provide more options for the younger generation.

During his New Year's Day speech, President Ma said that no political party can base its existence solely on memories of the 2/28 Incident. It must also ensure the well-being of future generations.

In 1988, martial law was lifted on Taiwan. Babies born that year are now 24 years old. One quarter of the population on Taiwan has no memory of martial law. What these young people need is an opposition party with the courage to confront cross-Strait and international reality.

民進黨兩岸論述需要知識經濟新思維
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.01.29

蔡英文與民進黨的挫敗，再次證實民進黨的罩門在兩岸和經濟。輿論指出，民進黨此番失利，多少與選前一大群無分本省、外省的大、小企業家們史無前例地表態挺九二共識有關。

競選時，民進黨將這些企業全部抹成財團，說他們在人民的對立面。但選後回歸冷靜，幾位企業家異口同聲的一句話，頗值民進黨深思，那句話就是：「台灣經濟發展，不能枯等台灣共識。」

從大環境來看，現在與三十年前大不相同，但民進黨似乎無此體會。未來數年，台灣在亞洲有兩個明顯的對手，一為韓國，一是中國大陸。當外界質疑「如果民進黨當選，兩岸關係將有些緊張，美國會有些恐慌」時，民進黨的回應竟然是：中國大陸沒有選擇，一定要跟台灣談。

這樣的回應犯了「假設競爭對手不存在」的謬誤。民進黨忘了，當兩岸蹉跎不談時，韓國必趁虛而入，與中國大陸迅速達成實質的進展。不久，韓國可能與大陸ＦＴＡ已經簽訂，韓國與大陸的企業在台灣尚不知如何凝聚「台灣共識」時早已一躍千里。台灣企業期待的不是大陸讓利的特殊待遇，而是必須能在兩岸關係和平的前提下，與韓國、中國大陸站在立足點的平等而已。換言之，倘若我們的競爭者如韓國，與中國大陸沒有對耗、沒有蹉跎、沒有虛功，而台灣卻有，則這樣的空窗期就是台灣經濟的巨大損失。

民進黨常見的第二個邏輯謬誤是，認為兩岸遲早會正常化往來，譬如三通其實不急，因為遲早會通。他們盤算，站在談判的角度，現階段多堅持一點，就能幫台灣爭取更多。然而，這樣的說法也忘了堅持等待而蹉跎虛耗的時間，會讓台灣喪失更多經濟機遇。一旦經濟實力流失，長期而言，對於整體談判更不利。

綜合以上兩個邏輯謬誤，我們必須指出：民進黨兩岸論述的最大弱點，就是欠缺時間軸線與產業動態的觀念。

民進黨一直缺乏一個獨立的、中性的真正智庫，去協助其分析思考。該黨現在的智庫不是強調智識學理，卻是在強化意識形態。

例如：他們的智庫迄今仍在強調「要素價格均等理論」，認為台灣與中國大陸交往之後，就會拉低台灣工資。殊不知，這是五十年前適用於工業與農業社會的理論。但如今全球已經是知識經濟時代，已經是用創新在競爭。國際產業環境早已不是在定型的技術結構下，使台灣與大陸要素價格漸趨均等。反之，全球各國的產業技術一直不斷的創新演進，決定經濟成果分配的關鍵是「誰是創新者」；創新者永遠能拿走大部分的經濟利益。

簡言之，決定台灣勞工薪水會不會被大陸趕上的關鍵，不是兩岸是否開放，而是台灣與大陸誰是創新者？民進黨應該理解，最好的兩岸策略就是設法讓台灣在動態競爭下，在若干領域成為創新者，從而保持領先。

不容諱言，儘管中國大陸對台灣是嚴重威脅，卻同時也是大好機會。對台灣品牌而言，中國大陸是個練兵不可或缺的市場，如何善用其機會，而不是單純只看見威脅，這是民進黨學者需要自我檢討的。如果與大陸往來，可以讓台灣成為創新經濟時代的贏家，民進黨該選擇的應是開放，而非鎖國。

民進黨的兩岸政策需要知識經濟時代的新思維；在政治上，民進黨也不妨從另一個面向認識九二共識。九二共識是什麼？對台灣主體意識強、戒嚴壓迫印象深刻的老一代來說，可能覺得是其政治理想被九二共識的文字限縮；但事實上，這些文字也可以被解讀為替台灣用模糊爭取時間，使台灣的民主與經濟得以強化，增加未來年輕族群「選項空間」的一種創造性模糊。

馬總統在元旦致詞時說，任何政黨的存在，都不只是為了有二二八歷史記憶者實現他們心目中的理想，而更是為了豐富下一個世代的選擇。

民國七十七年台灣解嚴，那年出生的嬰兒，今年都已經二十四歲了。也就是說台灣已有四分之一的人口沒有戒嚴的記憶，這群年輕的孩子需要的是一個勇敢面對兩岸與國際現實的反對黨。

Ma Ying-jeou's Million Vote Wake Up Call

2012-01-19T22:07:00.001-08:00

Ma Ying-jeou's Million Vote Wake Up Call
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 20, 2011

Summary: The recently concluded general election was a stormy process. Ma Ying-jeou had the advantage of the incumbency, Nevertheless his race against Tsai Ing-wen was closely fought. President Ma surely must have thought long and hard about why. Now he has been reelected. But President Ma received nearly 800,000 votes fewer than he did the first time. His lead shrunk by over one million votes. This was a wake up call that he must keep in mind. He must listen to others' heartfelt advice and make the necessary changes. Only then can he avoid repeating the same mistakes.

Full Text Below:

The recently concluded general election was a stormy process. Ma Ying-jeou had the advantage of the incumbency, Nevertheless his race against Tsai Ing-wen was closely fought. President Ma surely must have thought long and hard about why. Now he has been reelected. But President Ma received nearly 800,000 votes fewer than he did the first time. His lead shrunk by over one million votes. This was a wake up call that he must keep in mind. He must listen to others' heartfelt advice and make the necessary changes. Only then can he avoid repeating the same mistakes.

President Ma has certain strengths. He is an individual of integrity. He has done an outstanding job of maintaining cross-Strait peace, and upholding the public image of the President of the Republic of China. These are among the many reasons for his election victory. He has been reaffirmed by the voters. On the other hand, the Ma administration mishandled domestic issues. It left people the impression that it is slow to respond. This includes the pace of economic development. social policy, even its handling of individual cases. Sometimes it was indecisive. At other times it affected bureaucratic airs. This provoked public discontent. These are public grievances for which Ma Ying-jeou must accept unconditional responsibility.

The discrepancy between the Ma administration's governance internally vs. externally is the result of two problems. One. President Ma has not made the best use of the human talent available to him. Two. President Ma is often tone-deaf and color-blind. Regarding problem number one, the consensus is that the Ma administration is too inbred, too incestuous, hence too narrow in its vision. This leads to policy-making blind spots. To correct this problem, the cabinet must be reshuffled. Problem number two is Ma Ying-jeou's personal limitations resulting from his development as an individual. Some feel he lacks empathy for others. His manner is stiff. He is preoccupied with humility and moderation. As a result his cabinet was unable to exercise the necessary initiative. His administration conveyed the impression that it lacked drive and creativity. These shortcomings undermined his personal image and hurt his reelection prospects. These are problems he must address during his second term in office.

In short, during President Ma's first term, society was immersed in a "post-Chen" atmosphere. The number one concern was fighting corruption. Therefore President Ma's preoccupation with personal integrity was understandable. But when assessing a head of state, personal integrity is merely a baseline. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for good governance. President Ma must offer a more comprehensive, effective, and forward-looking strategy for national governance. Only then can he meet the public's expectations. Ma's first four year term was all about "healing" and "recuperation." President Ma used the time to put Taiwan back on track. During the next four years, he must set higher goals. This includes advancing a national vision, healing the "ethnic" (communal) rifts, and establishing a more equitable society. This will enable Taiwan to emerge from political wheel-spinning and realize its collective goal of national transformation. These are not goals that empty slogans such as "Create a Golden Decade" can communicate.

A new vision is clearly not something the Ma administration can achieve during its remaining time in office. Therefore, in addition to reshuffling his cabinet, President Ma must seek people of talent and virtue in the larger community. He must recruit more people of talent and virtue to act as his eyes and ears and his strategic advisors. This task is no less important that talking with leaders of the opposition every six months or so. More importantly, President Ma must confer the necessary authority and resources upon these experts. This will enable them to do their job, and spare him the need to personally attend to everything. Ma is a head of state. He must focus on the vital task of overall system management. He must not allow himself to become bogged down in administrative details. This requires inevitable trade-offs. Over the past three years, Ma Ying-jeou has made a Herculean effort to demonstrate his proficiency in all matters large and small. But he merely left the public with the impression that he is preoccupied with trivialities, that he lacks the stature and charisma appropriate to a head of state. This is a lesson he must learn.

The dust from the election has now settled. President Ma faces a new situation. In some respects, the situation is favorable. He still retains the support of over half the electorate. His party still commands a clear majority in the legislature. This will enable him to promote his policies. His policy of cross-Strait reconciliation has been vetted by the citizenry. He can cast aside the label of "selling out Taiwan" that Taiwan independence extremists attempted to attach to him. In other respects, the situation is unfavorable. Taiwan's north-south divide is increasingly evident. Blue vs. Green confrontation remains serious. Social inequality is increasing. All these problems are more serious than they were before. The European debt crisis and the sluggish world economy will make Taiwan's economic recovery more difficult. In addition, President Ma himself may be exempt from election pressures, But the situation within the Blue Camp remains unclear. Reform within the KMT still has a long way to go. These burdens allow little time for relaxation.

President Ma won a tense and hard fought race. He won public approval for a second term. But he also revealed his character flaws through his leadership style. Some have accused Ma Ying-jeou of "fear mongering" during the election campaign. The opposite is true. President Ma was far too low-keyed, far too defensive. This was the main reason for his diminished personal charisma. In particular, he persisted in repeating the same details over and over again. He left voters with the impression that he was long-winded, that he lacked vision, and that he was insulting people's intelligence. During his second term, he can continue reaching out to the public. But no matter what, he must reestablish his stature as a national leader.

We do not know whether President Ma wrote a concession speech before the votes were counted. But voters are fickle. He must remain humble and alert. That will be the key to success over the next four years.

百萬選民給馬英九的棒喝
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.01.20

這次大選過程驚濤駭浪，馬英九以現任元首的優勢，和蔡英文打到如此膠著，想必馬總統亦曾輾轉反側苦思其間原由。如今成功連任，但馬總統得票減少近八十萬票，領先票數更大跌一百多萬；對於這記當頭棒喝，他必須保持戒懼、聽取忠告並改變作為，才不致重蹈覆轍。

馬總統的長處，除了個人操守清廉，在維持兩岸和平及經營台灣總體形象上，也都明顯勝出，帶給台灣安定感和光榮感。從選舉結果看，這也是他得分的主要項目，受到選民肯定。相形之下，馬政府處理內政問題，則給人因應遲緩的感覺：包括財經發展的步調、社會政策的調整，乃至個別突發事件的處理，有時缺乏決斷，有時流於僚氣，引發民眾不滿。這也是馬英九必須概括承受的民怨。

對內及對外治理的落差，一則出在用人的未盡妥適，二則與馬總統個人的關切與風格有關。前者，外界普遍認為馬團隊核心決策圈太過窄促，同質性也太高，導致施政出現盲點而不自知；這點，有待內閣積極調整。後者，則因馬英九個人成長經驗的侷限，使他對社會某些角落或階層的同理心不足。加上其性格拘謹，過度強調謙抑與節制，導致團隊不敢放手施為，而顯得積極性、開創性不足。這些缺憾，都削弱了他個人的政治魅力，也拖累了選情，這是他第二任必須改善的工程。

簡言之，馬總統的第一屆任期，因社會正處於「後扁」的反貪腐氛圍，他特別強調個人操守，不難理解。但檢驗一個元首，個人「修身」畢竟只是最基本的一環；馬總統勢需拿出更全盤、更有效和更前瞻的「治國」方略，才能滿足民眾的期待。如果把首任四年定位為「療傷」和「調養」階段，馬總統把台灣的運轉帶回正常軌道；接下來的四年，應該定出更高的目標，包括國家願景的設定、族群裂痕的弭合、均衡社會的追求等，讓台灣從廿年的政治虛耗向有集體目標的國家轉型。這些，均非「打造黃金十年」那樣空泛的口號所能表達。

新願景的建立及推動，顯然不是馬政府現有團隊所能完成；因此，馬總統除了要慎思新內閣的布局，更要擴大向社會覓才、問賢的管道，讓更多賢德之士充當他的耳目和軍師。此一工作的重要性，絕不亞於每半年和在野黨領袖晤談。更重要的是，馬總統要將權力和資源任務托付給不同領域的專家來執行，而不必凡事躬親。身為元首，若不能提綱挈領統管大局，而陷入事務性的細節，最後必然顧此失彼。過去三年多，馬英九的鉅細靡遺，旨在表現他的熟練，卻讓民眾感到瑣碎，少了元首的高度及魅力。這是必須記取的教訓。

隨著大選底定，馬總統面對的是一番新形勢：從有利的面向看，他仍擁有過半選民的支持，在國會也仍掌握絕對優勢，這有利政策的推動。他的兩岸和解政策，通過了公民的驗收，他頭上的「賣台」標籤可以撕掉。從不利的面向看，台灣的南北分化日益明顯，藍綠對峙依然嚴重，社會貧富差距則愈發擴大，這都較以往棘手。而歐債危機及世界經濟的遲滯，也會加重台灣經濟復甦的壓力。此外，馬總統本人雖已無連任壓力，但藍軍內部接班形勢不明，國民黨內改革也還有長路要走，這些擔子一點都沒有輕鬆的餘地。

馬總統這場選舉，贏得驚險；他獲得了民眾的再度付託，卻也暴露他性格和領導風格上的缺陷。有人指責馬英九在選戰中「販賣恐懼」，事實正好相反，馬總統過度低調、過度辯解，才是他魅力流失的主因。尤其他喜歡再三反覆同一細節，讓選民覺得囉嗦與平庸，是在冒犯人民的智慧。在第二屆任期，他可以繼續追求親民，但無論如何必須把領導者的高度建立起來。

我們不知道馬總統在開票前是否曾預寫「落選感言」，但隨時保持那一刻對民心善變的敬畏和戒慎，將是未來四年成功之鑰。

The 1992 Consensus is the Taiwan Consensus

2012-01-19T00:11:00.001-08:00

The 1992 Consensus is the Taiwan Consensus
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 19, 2011

Summary: During the just concluded presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen lost to Ma Ying-jeou. She lost not as a result of her campaign strategy, but because the DPP's core concepts have diverged too far from the underlying cross-Strait reality. If the DPP seeks a return to power, it must first overcome this, its greatest hurdle.

Full Text Below:

During the just concluded presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen lost to Ma Ying-jeou. She lost not as a result of her campaign strategy, but because the DPP's core concepts have diverged too far from the underlying cross-Strait reality. If the DPP seeks a return to power, it must first overcome this, its greatest hurdle.

Some have criticized the "Taiwan consensus" as being too devoid of content. Some have criticized Tsai Ing-wen for refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Such pragmatic public concerns are valid. But the real problem is more fundamental. The raison d'etre of the DPP since its very founding, has been to sever the umbilical cord between Taiwan and Mainland China. It has been to establish an independent "Nation of Taiwan," that will insulate Taiwan from Mainland influence. The vast majority of DPP supporters embrace this dream. The achievement of this goal remains at the heart of the DPP.

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait have long been at loggerheads with each other. Many on Taiwan hate and mistrust the Mainland. Essentially the DPP advocates distancing Taiwan from the Mainland. For this, it has garnered considerable support. It can easily cast itself as a "champion of Taiwan." When cross-Strait relations are tense, the DPP can easily incite mob sentiment in order to rally public support. But when cross-Strait tensions are relaxed, and cross-Strait relations are warm, the DPP loses that support. It loses that support because its basic posture is diametrically opposed to the larger historical currents.

Ma Ying-jeou eventually prevailed amidst bitter fighting. Ma won not primarily because the voters supported the 1992 Consensus. Ma won because everyone wanted the two sides to increase cooperation and reduce tensions. Ma Ying-jeou used the 1992 Consensus and the one China constitution to lay a foundation for his cross-Strait policy. The Mainland is willing to go along with Ma's position. Ma's reasoning is able to withstand the test of constitutionalism and jurisprudence on Taiwan. As a result it has become the basis for bilateral exchanges and consultations. Therefore, Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy is practicable in the real world. Following the cross-Strait thaw, Taiwan has been the recipient of real world benefits. In the absence of better alternatives, most people see no reason to shout "Stop."

The DPP's fundamental policy toward the Mainland, is to see the other side as the enemy, one that must be resisted with all one's might, whose influence on Taiwan must be totally excluded, the way it was during the Cold War. But this is no longer the way things are. The world is changing. The tides are shifting. The Mainland is changing. Today's Mainland is not merely undergoing a swift economic rise. It is also becoming an important player on the international stage. Its society is changing. It will inevitably move toward liberalization. Current cross-Strait interactions are closely knit. This is unprecedented in Taiwan's history. Marriage, education, business, tourism, film and television arts have all made cross-Strait relations closer than ever. Some Mainland schools have even used Taiwan pop singer Jay Chou's lyrics as teaching material. Some Mainland students on Taiwan have become Internet celebrities. Cross-Strait relations long ago ceased being the way the DPP perceives them. They will be even more different in the future.

As a result of the DPP's basic posture, it refuses to keep up with these changes. Instead, it chooses to turn a blind eye to them. The DPP leaves people with the impression they would do everything in their power to forestall closer relations with the Mainland, merely to ensure Taiwan's separateness. But in an era of globalization and the Internet, exchanges are the norm. The closed-door policy is obsolete. People go where they want, and do what they wish. Due to cultural and ethnic affinity, economic dependence, and geographical proximity, exchanges between Taiwan and the Mainland are thriving. They will continue to deepen in the future. If the DPP refuses to face even this reality, how can it possibly offer a practical and feasible cross-Strait policy?

Ma Ying-jeou has found a way to communicate with the Mainland. He has found a common language. But the DPP's fundamental posture is too far removed from the Mainland's. It is unable to find common ground. Actually the KMT's cross-Strait rhetoric has undergone repeated revision over the decades. It has gone from denouncing Beijing as a "bandit regime," to silence regarding Beijing's jurisdiction over the Mainland, It has gone from "recovering the Mainland" to peaceful coexistence. Step by step, it has moved closer to reality, until eventually arriving at the 1992 Consensus. If the century-old KMT can make such a huge adjustment, why can't the DPP? Why can't the DPP be bolder and more flexible? Why isn't the DPP better able to respond to reality?

Frankly, the DPP's cross-Strait policy has never worked. Chen Shui-bian ruled for eight years. Cross-Strait relations remained frozen and stagnant. This was in part due to Mainland resistance. But it also shows how cross-Strait policy is the DPP's Achilles Heel. Even during the recent election, Tsai Ing-wen failed to advance any concrete, real world policy. The DPP's problem is that a ruling party must respond to the practical needs of the people. A political party incapable of dealing with cross-Strait issues, cannot meet the needs of the public on Taiwan.

In order to acquire the authority to govern, a political party must offer a workable and pragmatic cross-Strait policy. It must offer people solutions to their problems. It must protect their interests. It must seek out business opportunities. It must respond to future trends, and engage in advance planning. Political parties must confront the reality of people's needs. Only then can they provide them with the answers they seek. If the DPP wants the opportunity to serve the people, it must offer them an honest to god cross-Strait policy.

九二共識就已經是台灣共識
2012-01-19中國時報

這次總統大選，蔡英文輸給了馬英九，其實不是因為戰略失誤，而是受限於民進黨核心理念與兩岸現實的根本性差距。民進黨想重新執政，必須先克服這個最大難關。

有人批評「台灣共識」內容過於空洞，有人認為蔡英文否認「九二共識」，令務實派民眾擔憂，這些都沒錯，但更根本的是，民進黨創黨以來的存在基礎，就是要切斷台灣與中國臍帶，建立獨立的台灣國，讓台灣不再受中國大陸的力量左右。民進黨的支持者絕大多數都懷抱著這個夢想，而實現這個目標，則是民進黨最核心的存在價值。

兩岸過去長期對立，台灣有不少民眾既厭惡又不信任中國大陸，在基本理念上主張與中國拉開距離的民進黨，可以吸引到相當支持，也很容易被視為台灣的捍衛者。當兩岸關係緊張時，民進黨可以因此輕易得到民氣的匯集，問題是，當民意傾向兩岸和解加強交流時，民進黨就因為主戰的基本姿態與主和的大趨勢南轅北轍，而頓失空間。

馬英九之所以最後能在苦戰中勝出，與其說選民真的那麼支持「九二共識」，不如說大家都希望兩岸降低緊張增加合作，而馬英九以「九二共識」與「一中憲法」搭建起的兩岸政策，大陸可以勉強睜隻眼閉隻眼，台灣本身在憲法法理上也說得通，成為雙方交流協商的基礎。因此，馬英九這個兩岸政策，放在現實環境中是可以操作的。兩岸解凍後台灣感受到實質獲益，如果沒有更好的方案，大多數人覺得沒有理由叫停。

而民進黨對中國的基本政策，是把對方設定為敵人，必須全力對抗，並在台灣內部排斥其影響力，和當年冷戰時差不多。問題是，現實已經不是這樣了。世界在變、潮流在變、中國也在變，現在的中國大陸，不只經濟迅速崛起、成為國際舞台要角，內部社會也出現變化，而且必然會走向開放。目前兩岸互動之綿密深刻，是台灣歷史上所僅見，通婚、求學、經商、旅遊、影視藝文，彼此的關係愈來愈緊密。當大陸有學校拿周杰倫的歌詞入題時，當陸生在台體驗在網上爆紅時，現在的兩岸關係，早已不是民進黨原始設定的狀態了，而未來更不會是。

對於這個新態勢，民進黨卻因為自己的基本立場跟不上變化，而選擇視而不見，甚至讓人感覺民進黨如果做得到的話，會想阻撓兩岸交流避免關係拉近，以保持台灣的獨立性。但在這個全球化的網路時代，交流穿透是常態，閉關自守已過時。人的腳會自己走向想去的地方，基於文化、種族、經貿與地理上的接近性，台灣與大陸的交往，現在活絡，未來將更繼續擴大深化，如果連這個如此巨大的現實都不能面對，如何能夠提出務實可行的兩岸政策？

馬英九找到了和中國的共同語言，但民進黨的基本立足點和中國差太遠，目前找不到交集。其實，回顧國民黨的兩岸政策，數十年來也作了相當大的修正，從「匪偽政權」到不否定對方的治權，從「反攻大陸」到和平共存，一步一步朝現實靠攏，最後設計出「九二共識」處理模式。百年老店的國民黨都可以做這麼大的調整了，民進黨為什麼不能更大膽、更有彈性、也更能回應現實？

坦白講，民進黨的兩岸政策從來沒有成功過。陳水扁執政八年，兩岸關係冰凍停滯，這固然與中國當局的抵制有關，但也說明了兩岸政策的確是民進黨的罩門。而即使到了這次大選，蔡英文同樣沒提出什麼在現實中行得通的具體政策。問題是，執政黨必須解答人民的現實需要，一個無法處理兩岸問題的政黨，是不敷當前台灣人民需求的。

不要說想取得政權就必須提出務實可行的兩岸政策，光是要替人民解決問題、維護權益、爭取商機、並因應未來趨勢作前瞻性規畫，政黨就必須正視現實為人民的需求提供解答。民進黨想爭取為民服務的機會，就不能在兩岸政策上交白卷。

DPP Must Not Duck the Issue of Reunification

2012-01-18T00:20:00.000-08:00

DPP Must Not Duck the Issue of Reunification
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 18, 2011

Summary: During the 2012 presidential election, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen was highly vocal. In the end however, she lost by a 6% landslide margin. The Democratic Progressive Party longs to return to power. But the huge margin of victory shows that the biggest obstacle standing in the way of the DPP returning to office is not the DPP's election tactics, but its overly rigid ideology. The DPP must undergo a bold transformation. It must adopt a pragmatic cross-strait policy. More than the future of Taiwan is at stake. Also at stake is whether voters will ever entrust power to the DPP.

Full Text Below:

During the 2012 presidential election, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen was highly vocal. In the end however, she lost by a 6% landslide margin. The Democratic Progressive Party longs to return to power. But the huge margin of victory shows that the biggest obstacle standing in the way of the DPP returning to office is not the DPP's election tactics, but its overly rigid ideology. The DPP must undergo a bold transformation. It must adopt a pragmatic cross-strait policy. More than the future of Taiwan is at stake. Also at stake is whether voters will ever entrust power to the DPP.

The election result was an embarrassment to the DPP. During her campaign Tsai relentlessly castigated KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy. She said it undermined "Taiwan's sovereignty." She said it only looked after the interests of big business. She said it neglected the welfare of the majority of ordinary citizens. Yet Ma Ying-jeou received over half the vote. This shows that most voters did not buy into the DPP's simplistic and distorted spin control.

Does the DPP really believe in Taiwan's democracy? If it does, it should realize that over half the voters cannot possibly be guilty of "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." In fact, the election was essentially a referendum on the 1992 Consensus. The majority of voters demanded both national sovereignty and cross-Strait peace. The 1992 consensus perfectly fills the bill in both cases. Meanwhile, voters agreed that the incumbent deserved a second term. This election result shows that they think the path the nation is taking is correct, and that they are satisfied with the status quo.

Republic of China citizens have spoken. How will the DPP choose to interpret what they have said? Will it inadvertently or deliberately misinterpret what they have said? The DPP's decision will determine its fate as a political party. For example, will Deep Greens argue that Tsai Ing-wen lost support in the south because she did not campaign as vigorously as Chen Shui-bian did in 2000? The DPP may find itself hijacked by Taiwan independence extremists.

In fact, the election result was determined by a five to six percentage point swing vote, by so-called "economic voters" who voted their pocketbooks. During the local level five cities mayoral elections, these voters were willing to support the Democratic Progressive Party as a check on the ruling KMT. They enabled the DPP to win 49% of the vote. But a year later, during the central level elections, despite these voters' dissatisfaction with the Ma administration, they refused to vote for the DPP. The DPP was unable to win more than 45% of the vote. This was to be the fate of the Democratic Progressive Party in the central government level election.

Actually, DPP leaders know the main battle during the presidential election was fought over the swing vote. That is why one seldom saw DPP party flags at DPP election rallies. That is why Tsai Ing-wen made a point of proclaiming that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan." That is why she trotted out her "grand coalition" concept late in the campaign. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to accept the 1992 consensus. But the words "Taiwan independence" also vanished from Pan Green election rallies. Instead, Tsai Ing-wen touted her "Taiwan consensus." To some extent she was attempting to blur the line between Deep Green and swing voters. But her "Taiwan consensus" was devoid of substance. As a result it backfired. Voters were not reassured. They refused to give her carte blanche. Voters in 2000 had already given the DPP a chance, During his campaign, Chen Shui-bian proposed a "New Centrist Path." During his inauguration, he promised to abide by his "Five Noes." But less than four years later, he reneged on those promises. He even adopted an extremist, de jure Taiwan independence posture. The lesson is clear. The voters are clearly afraid. They fear that even if Tsai Ing-wen wins, the DPP may still cling to its rigid ideology.

This is another lesson learned from the election results. In future elections the DPP cannot rely on elections to motivate transformation, It must spell out its cross-Strait policy during the election campaign. Tsai Ing-wen has been party chairman for four years. During that time, she has deliberately avoided discussing cross-Strait policy, Evading the issues may temporarily keep peace within the DPP. But this sort of ambiguity will never win over rational swing voters.

Following the election, the DPP has been engaging in some soul-searching. It is clear that the pragmatists within the party are gaining ground. For example, DPP Central Standing Committee Member Tuan Yi-kang urged the DPP to be honest about the 1992 Consensus. DPP Legislator Chen Ming-wen was equally blunt. He said the DPP's China policy collides with reality. This is encouraging. But Tsai Ing-wen is about to leave office in May. Once she does, the DPP will elect its party chairman. As a matter or record, DPP leaders often pander to Deep Greens during internecine power struggles, using ideology as a tool for infighting. If so, the Democratic Progressive Party may find itself adopting an even more extremist Taiwan independence path. If it does, it will find it even harder to return to power.

Of course the future need not be so grim, For the next two years at least, no more elections are scheduled. Younger, middle-aged party leaders are looking to make their move. They may take advantage of the opportunity to discuss the DPP's cross-Strait policy direction. This however, may be difficult. The centrists and Taiwan independence extremists within the DPP are poles apart. But this is something the party must tackle, Otherwise the DPP will never break through Tsai Ing-wen's 45% ceiling. It will never return to power.

檢討兩岸路線民進黨不應迴避
2012-01-18中國時報

二○一二年的總統大選，呼聲甚高的民進黨總統候選人蔡英文，最後不但功敗垂成，而且還是以六個百分點吞下了敗績。這樣的差距標示出，民進黨未來要成為執政黨，最大的障礙不在於選舉的戰術層面，而在於民進黨僵固的意識形態；民進黨能不能勇敢轉型，走向務實的兩岸政策，攸關的不只是台灣的未來，也攸關選民敢不敢放心的將政權交給民進黨。

確實，這樣的選舉結果，對民進黨是很難堪的。在競選過程中，蔡英文多次批評國民黨總統候選人馬英九的兩岸政策，不但傷害台灣主權，而且只照顧大企業利益，沒有顧及大多數升斗小民的生活；但是馬英九仍然贏得過半支持，顯示多數選民並不接受民進黨這套簡化、扭曲的論述。

如果民進黨對台灣的民主有起碼的信心，他們應該了解，不可能會有過半選民支持他們口中傾中賣台的政權。事實上，這次的大選就是對九二共識的一次公投，多數選民既要主權尊嚴、也要兩岸和平共利，而九二共識正是可以兼顧二者的最適模式；同時，選民同意現任者連任，顯示的是，國家發展方向並未偏誤，他們對現狀還算是滿意的。

所以，台灣的民意已作出判決，民進黨要如何解讀至為重要，無心或蓄意的錯誤解讀，對一個政黨的發展，將有致命的後果。例如，深綠陣營如果認定蔡英文之所以無法將南部選票極大化，完全是因為她不像陳水扁當年那麼「衝」，未來的民進黨可能又要受到極獨路線的綁架。

事實上，主導這次大選結果的，還是為數五到六個百分點的中間選民，或是所謂的經濟選民。在五都這樣的地方選舉中，他們可以支持強力監督執政黨的民進黨，讓該黨拿下四成九的得票；但事隔一年，在中央級的選舉時，這些中間選民即使不滿意馬政府，但並未轉向民進黨。衝不破四成五，成了民進黨中央選舉的新宿命。

其實，民進黨領導人很清楚，這次總統大選的主要戰場就在中間選民，否則，不會在大型造勢場合罕見一隻黨旗；蔡英文也不必提出「台灣就是中華民國、中華民國就是台灣」，更在選舉後期提出「大聯合政府」主張。蔡英文不接受九二共識，但「台灣獨立」這樣的字眼，也在綠營選舉場合絕跡，蔡英文提出「台灣共識」，某種程度就是試圖以模糊化來兼顧深綠與中間選民；但台灣共識沒有實質內容，反而讓中間選民無法放心，不敢輕易的空白授權。因為，選民在二千年時已經給民進黨一次機會了，陳水扁在該次選舉提出新中間路線、就職時還宣示四不一沒有，卻不到四年就全盤推翻，還試圖走法理台獨的極獨路線；殷鑑不遠，蔡英文如果當選，民進黨是否能走出僵化的意識形態，選民顯然沒有信心。

所以，這次大選結果的另一個教訓在於，未來的民進黨不可能靠選舉來帶動轉型，他們一定要在選舉時提出清楚的兩岸政策；蔡英文擔任黨主席四年來，刻意迴避兩岸政策討論，也許一時之間讓民進黨維持表面的和諧，但這樣的模糊化，卻無法說服理性的中間選民。

從選後的一些反省聲浪中可以發現，民進黨務實派有抬頭的跡象。例如，民進黨中常委段宜康呼籲民進黨應誠實面對九二共識；立委陳明文也坦白說出，民進黨的中國政策和現實狀況衝突。這是可喜的一面，但令人憂慮的是，蔡英文卸任後，民進黨將於五月進行黨主席選舉；觀諸以前的例子，民進黨經常在權力競爭時，以路線之爭作為鬥爭工具；如果黨內有人刻意討好深綠來贏得黨主席職位，未來的民進黨可能更走向極獨，更不利執政。

當然，發展也不必然全是悲觀，至少未來二年沒有選舉，志在政途的中生代，也許可以趁著這段時間好好討論民進黨的兩岸路線。這很困難，因為民進黨內的中間派與極獨，目前連基本的共識都沒有；但這是一定要做的事，否則，民進黨可能突破不了蔡英文的四成五障礙，永遠和執政無緣。（大選系列社論二）

To Transform a Nation, Replace Its Structure

2012-01-17T04:09:00.001-08:00

To Transform a Nation, Replace Its Structure
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 17, 2011

Summary: The general election is over. Next on the agenda is a cabinet reshuffle. During President Ma's second four year term, he will not be burdened by the need to run for re-election. He can fulfill his ideals without the need for second-guessing. He can promote his agenda for the next four years. For example, he can promote the Golden Decade he described earlier, during press conferences. Over the past four years his actions could be described as "righting wrongs." Over the next four years, we hope he will be able to fulfill his promise to help Taiwan "experience a rebirth."

Full Text Below:

The general election is over. Next on the agenda is a cabinet reshuffle.

During President Ma's second four year term, he will not be burdened by the need to run for re-election. He can fulfill his ideals without the need for second-guessing. He can promote his agenda for the next four years. For example, he can promote the Golden Decade he described earlier, during press conferences. Over the past four years his actions could be described as "righting wrongs." Over the next four years, we hope he will be able to fulfill his promise to help Taiwan "experience a rebirth."

Actually, upon closer examination, Taiwan does not have four years to experience a rebirth and transformation. It only has two. It is now 2012, only two years away from the 2014 five cities mayoral elections. When that time comes, realpolitik will force compromises that interfere with policy. Therefore the Ma administration has only two years, starting now, in which to get things done. These two years will determine Ma Ying-jeou's place in history. He must adopt drastic measures. He must be vigorous and resolute. Otherwise the opportunity will be lost forever.

If you ask President Ma what his most significant achievements over the past four years were, his is likely to say: One. Opening up cross-Strait trade and promoting cross-Strait peace. Two. Eliminating corruption. But these two achievements were mainly the result of proper attitude rather than extradordinary ability. The president insisted on making peace. Tensions between the two sides relaxed. As long as the president avoids recruiting people who love money and are out for the money. his own example will ensure that his administration remains clean.

During the campaign, President Ma was most severely criticized for failing to recruit the right people and for lacking resolve. Truly enabling Taiwan to experience a rebirth will require a very different way of doing things. Merely having the right attitude and having determination will not be enough. Over the next two years, the Republic of China needs a premier and a cabinet with the ability and the vision to implement Ma's vision. When people say revitailzation requires talent, this is what they mean.

Now however, important cabinet ministries lack the creativity, innovativeness, and courage to help Taiwan experience a rebirth. Many Executive Yuan cabinet members are drawn from the Taipei City Government. All they know is how to follow orders handed down by the central government. They are incapable of creating a new framework for the central government. Everywhere one looks, one sees fiscal policy, educational policy, monetary policy, accounting and statistics, and environmental protection being dealt with by local bureaucrats with little understanding of the larger issues. This is the main reason Taiwan failed to experience a rebirth over the past four years. The cabinet also includes people recommended party and government elders. It includes people hand-picked by the president himself. But with few exceptions, they have been unremarkable. This phenomenon of course, is a reflection upon President Ma's own choice of subordinates and his own vision.

KMT rulers have perpetuated the myth that the KMT is "rich in human talent." But considered coolly, those the KMT can promote to the cabinet level were all nurtured by the party 20 to 30 years ago. At the time Taiwan had an authoritarian system. South Korea was not a threat. Mainland China was waking from its slumber. Externally, Taiwan had no powerful neighbors. Internally, Taiwan had an authoritarian government. Naturally the talent it nurtured 20 years ago was more authoritarian and less progressive in character. Anyone who betrayed an inclination for reform, such as Justice Minister Ma Ying-jeou, was discouraged. Ma's fate was to be pushed aside by Lee Teng-hui. Any political party 100 years old is certain to include sycophants and yes-men. Therefore President Ma must acknowledge that the assumption that the KMT is rich in talent is in fact a myth. It is nothing more than incest.

If President Ma really wants to recruit those members of the political opposition most worthy of consideration, he should do what Tsai Ing-wen talked about the week before the election, engage in "cross-party recruitment." When Chen Shui-bian was elected Taipei Mayor, and again when he was elected president, he recruited many people not from the DPP. These people of ability included Sheng-Cheng Hu, Ho Chen, Lin Chuan-hsien, and Chen Chien-jen. Despite minority rule, despite presidential corruption, these recruits performed their duties quite well. Outside observers gave it fairly high praise. If President Ma wants to make a significant change over the next two years, the first thing he must do is break the KMT's past pattern of recruitment. He must recruit people of ability regardless of party affiliation.

Over the past four years, President Ma's hands have been tied with regards recruiting. This of course has undermined his ability to lead. When his cabinet members lack vision, when they lack administrative ability, he is the one who must take the heat. He is the one forced to make erroneous decisions outside his expertise. When the cabinet is unable to propose bold reforms, how can he rise above mere number crunching and text editing? As a result, many people concluded that President Ma failed to implement any fundamental reforms during his first term, apart from cross-Strait affairs and clean government.

A president is supposed to rise above partisanship. As Gong Zizhen observed, he or she must be able to recruit talent without regard for red tape. President Ma may lament that talent is hard to find. But if we break down the barriers, Taiwan is an island rich with talent. The only question is how such people can be persuaded to serve. The answer to that will depend on Ma's determination and courage. Taiwan's "rebirth" will require structural changes in personnel. As Gong Zizhen suggested, society and the nation must undergo a shake out. Too bad that on the occasion of President Ma's re-election, Gong Zizhen did not say "I advise the President to order a shake out, and to recruit talent without regard for red tape."

國家想脫胎換骨人才要抽樑換棟
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.01.17 02:56 am

大選完成，下一個節目是內閣改組。

馬總統第二任的這四年，將是他沒有包袱、可以全力實現理想、推展政務的四年。一如他在先前黃金十年的記者會中所述，過去四年他所做的事情可以用「撥亂反正」四個字形容，而今後四年，他則希望能夠幫助台灣「脫胎換骨」。

但仔細思考，台灣得以進行脫胎換骨的改造時間，恐怕並沒有四年，而只有關鍵兩年。當下已是二○一二，距二○一四年下一屆五都選舉僅兩年餘，屆時勢必又有很多現實妥協羈絆政策推展，所以真正能夠做事的時間，或許就只有從現在起算的兩年。這兩年將是馬英九尋得其歷史定位關鍵的兩年；必須大刀闊斧、雷厲風行，否則轉眼即是時不我予。

若問馬總統過去四年的最顯著的政績為何，答案無非兩項：其一為兩岸的開放與和平，其二為政治的祛除貪腐。但這兩項政績的關鍵，主要都是態度問題，而非能力問題。總統堅持開放和平，則兩岸必趨和緩；總統只要不用愛財愛錢之人、自己以身作則，則政治必然清明。

大選期間，馬總統最受批評之處，在用人不當、斷事不決；因為，真正要使台灣脫胎換骨，就需要截然不同的格局，這絕非僅憑態度與決心所能成事。未來兩年，台灣必須要尋得有能力、有視野的閣揆與閣員，去布局、去開創、去改變、去落實。所謂中興以人才為本，就是這個意思。

然而，現在的重要部會閣員，坦言之，十之八九沒有這種開創、突破、勇敢精進、幫台灣脫胎換骨的能耐。行政院閣員中，不少來自台北市府團隊；他們的能力僅止於在中央給定的框架下折衝因應，卻無力到中央替國家開創一個理想的框架。舉凡財政、教育、金管、主計、環保，處處皆見地方行政官員之狹隘格局，這是四年來「胎不能脫、骨不能換」的根本原因。內閣中也有黨國大老推薦之輩，有總統自己欽點的人馬。但除了極少數例外，並無突出的表現。這樣的現象，當然反映馬總統用人的格局與視野。

國民黨的執政者常有一種迷思，認為國民黨黨內「人才濟濟」。但平心而論，國民黨今日能夠被拔擢成為閣員之人，都是二、三十年前開始培養的。當時台灣內部處於威權體系，而外在的韓國尚不構成威脅，中國大陸也只是大夢初醒。在外無強鄰、內有威權的大環境下，自然使得廿年前培育的人才在性格上「多融入威權、少積極進取」。在當年的環境下，稍有改革銳氣如法務部長馬英九者，其下場就是被李登輝所排擠，遑論其他。等而下之，百年政黨中當然也有若干逢迎諂媚之輩。所以，馬總統必須體認，國民黨「人才濟濟」其實是一種錯誤的迷思，甚至主要只是一本近親繁殖的譜系。

如果馬總統要真正擷取在野黨政見中最值得參考者，大概就是選前一周蔡英文所提的「跨黨派用人」。當年陳水扁選上台北市長、擔任總統，他所用的許多人都不是民進黨內之士。其中有些幹才如胡勝正、賀陳旦、林全、黃榮村、陳建仁等人，即使在朝小野大、總統貪腐的大環境下，也都做出不錯的成績，外界也給予相當好的口碑。馬總統若要在未來兩年做出重大改變，第一就是要突破國民黨過往用人的慣性，不分黨派延攬積極進取之輩。

過去四年，馬總統在用人方面自縛手腳，也當然影響其領導統御。當閣員視野狹限、統御無能時，主帥就不得不頻上火線、被迫做出並非其專精的錯誤決策。當閣員不能提出興革大方向時，主帥又焉能跳脫數字管理、文字刪修的格局？也正因為如此，許多人在馬總統第一任期間，除了兩岸開放與內政清廉，似乎說不出「脫胎換骨」的政績。

總統原本就該是跨黨派的，心中也原本就該如龔自珍所期，「我願天公重抖擻，不拘一格降人才」。馬總統或許會感慨人才難尋，其實若能打破一切藩籬，台灣真是「人才濟濟」的寶島；如何請出那些人才為這塊土地熱誠服務，端視領導者的誠意與魄力。所謂為台灣「脫胎換骨」，先要在人才架構上「抽樑換棟」。龔自珍的人才建言，也正是為社會國家「重新抖擻」而發。值此馬總統第二任當選之際，可借龔自珍的話說：「我勸總統重抖擻，不拘一格用人才」。

Doing the Right Thing Will Eventually Dissolve Hostility and Win Support

2012-01-16T06:28:00.001-08:00

Doing the Right Thing Will Eventually Dissolve Hostility and Win Support
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 16, 2011

Summary: Any presidential bid for re-election, is invariably a referendum on the incumbent. President Ma Ying-jeou was compelled to wage an uphill battle during his bid for re-election. Nevertheless in the end he won 52% of the vote. Clearly over half the voters were unwilling to risk overturning the cross-Strait status quo. They calculated that if they gave Ma Ying-jeou four more years, Taiwan could maintain the cross-Strait status quo and enjoy increased prosperity and growth.

Full Text Below:

Any presidential bid for re-election, is invariably a referendum on the incumbent. President Ma Ying-jeou was compelled to wage an uphill battle during his bid for re-election. Nevertheless in the end he won 52% of the vote. Clearly over half the voters were unwilling to risk overturning the cross-Strait status quo. They calculated that if they gave Ma Ying-jeou four more years, Taiwan could maintain the cross-Strait status quo and enjoy increased prosperity and growth.

What is the "cross-Strait status quo?" Actually, it is something dynamic, rather than static. The current cross-Strait situation is unlike the tense standoff in 2004. It is unlike the stagnant situation in 2008, just before Ma Ying-jeou was elected. The advantage of being in office, is that one can define the status quo, even change it. The Ma administration has indeed changed the status quo over the past four years, by means of its cross-Strait policy. It has resumed direct cross-Strait air links after a six decade hiatus. The two sides have signed sixteen agreements on legal cooperation, repatriation of criminals, and financial cooperation. After ECFA was signed, the Mainland made many concessions on tariffs.

This is why the election was so unprecedented. Many entrepreneurs stepped forward to openly support the 1992 Consensus. They saw the benefits of the new status quo. The DPP said the Ma administration benefited only "people with money." Not so. As HTC Chairman Cher Wang said, the day before the election, businesses need a stable environment to be sustainable. Taiwan is not a society riddled by class warfare. Businesses have the ability to remain in operation. Only then will everyone be able to profit. Over half the voters supported Ma, showing that most people long for a peace dividend.

Several presidential candidate policy presentations were held during the election. DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen pointedly criticized Ma Ying-jeou. She accused him of "governing by the numbers." She accused him of not understanding the feelings of ordinary people. But the election results prove that certains numbers do inspire feelings in people. These numbers were not limited to the 8 to 9% economic growth rate. People have had more visceral experiences than that. The Ma administration added 70 nations to the list granting visa-free travel treatment. The new nations include Japan, the UK, and the EU. It includes the United States, the country with which the Republic of China is the most closely connected. Last year, the Republic of China was added to the list of candidates for visa-free travel treatment. By the same token, soon after the two sides signed ECFA, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of China began talking about investment protection cooperation. The Republic of China may not escape marginalziation even after joining the WTO (World Trade Organization). But voters hope new opportunities will arise now that ECFA has been signed.

The cross-Strait peace dividend refers not just to economic interests. It also refers to Taipei's maneuvering room in the international arena. The backbone that supports all these developments is the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen's primary campaign theme during the election was "Is there really a 1992 Consensus?" But the question she should have been asking was "Should there be a 1992 Consensus?" or "How has the 1992 consensus benefited Taiwan?" As former American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Douglas Paal observed, the 1992 Consensus is a highly creative formulation. Its ambiguity permits both sides to maintain their sovereignty. It also enables them to solve practical problems. Paal, an outsider, has clearly delineated the impact of the 1992 Consensus.

The DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Perhaps the DPP concluded from the poll numbers in recent years that public allegiance to "Taiwan" has reached unprecedented levels. But perhaps they forgot another number. Public expectations for cross-Strait peace have also reached unprecedented levels. Before the election, former President Lee Teng-hui personally posted a newspaper ad supporting Tsai Ing-wen. He did not call on "the brave people of Taiwan" to stand and fight [Mainland] China. He merely stressed that history shows no matter who is elected, exchanges between Mainland China and Taiwan must continue. Only then are dramatic improvements in cross-Strait relations possible.

Tsai Ing-wen once criticized Ma Ying-jeou's "no reunification, no independence, no use of force" policy as self-contradictory. But it is no more self-contradictory than the two sides arguing over sovereignty while conducting peace talks. The raison d'etre of the 1992 Consensus, is to resolve the cross-Strait dilemma. Not only has it successfully shelved the dispute over sovereignty, it has also allowed smooth cross-Strait negotiations.

The DPP and Tsai refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus. But at the same time they are unable to offer an alternative for resolving cross-Strait differences. Instead they proposed a far too vague "Taiwan consensus," that provoked outside concern. As a result, during the critical, final moments of the presidential race, cross-Strait relations once again became the DPP's Achilles Heel.

The vote proved a point. The ruling Ma Ying-jeou administration may have lost some support. But disaffected Ma supporters did not necessarily vote for Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen received 45% of the vote, only slightly more than the DPP's core support, and less than the 49% it received during last year's five cities mayoral elections. So what is the difference between central and local level elections? The voters understand perfectly. During a presidential election, cross-Strait policy is at stake. Tsai Ing-wen refused to clarify her cross-Strait policy before the election. Therefore the voters were afraid to let her govern the country. They refused to allow the future of the two sides and Taiwan to enter a state of uncertainty.

Another election result, pertaining to cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, is also worth noting. The just ended presidential election maintained the basic pattern of a Blue Camp dominated northern Taiwan, and a Green Camp dominated southern Taiwan. But the key to Ma Ying-jeou's victory over Tsai Ing-wen is that he won big in the north, but only lost small in the south. Tsai was weak in the north. Yet she only managed to eke out a 30% share of the vote. By contrast, despite the fact that Ma was relatively weak in Kaohsiung and Pingtung, he nevertheless managed to garner 40% of the vote. The gap between the Two Yings in the south was much less than it was during the Blue vs. Green showdown in 2004.

How should one interpret these figures? The wrong interpretation could have fatal consequences for the future of the political parties. For example, the Green Camp could attribute its defeat to the sudden emergence of the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which received 9% of the political party vote. The DPP, by comparison, did not fare nearly so well. It could attribute this to Tsai Ing-wen's failure to adopt a hardline Taiwan independence stance, the way Chen Shui-bian and the DPP did during past elections. It could say this is why it failed to maximize its advantage in the south. But if the DPP interprets the election results this way, it won't be able to change its direction on cross-Strait policy over the next four years. It could find itself riven by internal divisions. When such a DPP challenges the KMT four years from now, it will only encounter the same cross-Strait bottleneck as in the past.

The KMT can be optimistic about one thing. Su Chun-ping, Chen Yi-chen, and other KMT "assassins" were sent into enemy territory, to run against an entrenched DPP. They failed to win. Nevertheless they acquitted themselves surprisingly well. This shows that if one offers the right candidates, one can always make inroads, no matter how hostile the territory. More importantly, the Ma administration has attached immense importance to the benefits showered upon the public by its cross-Strait policies. In the beginning, the benefits were not sufficiently widespread. The man in the street remained oblivious to its potential benefits. But the impact of Mainland tourists arriving on Taiwan, and cross-strait economic and trade, are among the reasons the Blue Camp was able to consolidate support in the south.

This should offer great encouragement to President Ma during his second term. This is not just about the Blue Camp winning back the south. This is about having the guts to do the right thing. Doing the right thing has the potential to win over even the most hostile voters one day. This is the real significance of President Ma's 52% election victory.

做對的事終能化解敵意贏得支持
2012-01-16中國時報

任何一場總統連任戰，都是對現任者的公投。總統馬英九這次連任戰打得辛苦，但最後仍能拿下五成二的選票，顯示過半的選民，不願意冒險讓兩岸現狀翻盤，他們相信，如果再給馬英九四年機會，台灣有機會在目前的兩岸現狀下，更進一步繁榮發展。

何謂兩岸現狀？現狀其實是流動的，台灣當前的兩岸情勢，別說是有別於二○○四年的劍拔弩張，和二○○八年馬英九當選前的停滯狀態，也有所不同；執政者的一個大優勢是，可以界定、甚至改變現狀。確實，馬政府四年來透過諸多兩岸政策，改變了兩岸現狀，這包括恢復斷航六十年的兩岸直航，以及在兩岸簽定十六項協議之後的司法互助、罪犯遣返、金融合作，還有ＥＣＦＡ簽定後，大陸在關稅方面的諸多讓利等。

這可以解釋，為何在這次大選，會史無前例、有那麼多企業家站出來挺九二共識，因為他們在這個新現狀中看到利基，但這並不是如民進黨所說，是馬政府釋放給「有錢人」的利多而已，正如選前一天站出來的宏達電董事長王雪紅所說的，企業需要一個安定的環境才能永續經營，台灣並不是一個階級對立的社會，企業能永續經營，全民才能獲利；這次過半選民的支持，顯示多數人對和平紅利是有所期待的。

大選時幾次政見發表會，民進黨總統候選人蔡英文都不忘批評馬英九，靠「數字治國」，無法了解庶民的感受；但是，從選舉的結果顯示，有些數字確實會打動人心，這些數字當然不只是八、九個百分點的經濟成長率，人民更有實際感受的可能是，馬政府任內增加了七十個免簽國，這不只包括日本、英國、歐盟等重要國家，連和台灣關係最緊密的美國，也在去年底將台灣列入免簽候選國；同樣的，在兩岸簽了ＥＣＦＡ之後，日本、紐西蘭和台灣開始談投資保障合作，選民也開始期待，台灣參加ＷＴＯ（世界貿易組織）後仍然無法避免了邊緣化命運，但洽簽兩岸ＥＣＦＡ之後，也許可開出一條機會之路。

可以說，所謂的兩岸和平紅利，指的不只是經濟利益，同時也是台灣的國際空間；而維繫這一切的支柱，就是九二共識。蔡英文將這次大選的主軸打成「到底有沒有九二共識」的考古學，但她更該面對的，是「該不該有九二共識」，或是「九二共識對台灣的效用」。正如美國在台協會台北辦事處前處長包道格接受訪問時所說，九二共識是一個非常具有創意的模式，中間容許模糊存在，讓各自的主權能維持，但實務議題又能夠得到解決；包道格是旁觀者清的說出了九二共識的效能。

民進黨不願接受九二共識；也許，民進黨從民調數字發現，這幾年來，民眾的台灣認同達到新高，但他們忘了另一個數字，民間對兩岸和平的期待也是新高；前總統李登輝選前親筆在各報登廣告支持蔡英文，他呼籲的可不是「勇敢的台灣人」，要站出來和中國對抗！連李登輝都只能強調，歷史證明不論誰當選，中國都必須與台灣交往，兩岸關係不會劇烈變動。

蔡英文曾經批評，馬英九的「不統、不獨、不武」是自相矛盾，但是，兩岸要同時進行主權爭議及和平協商，又何嘗不是矛盾，九二共識的最大意義在於，它化解了兩難之局，不但擱置主權爭議，也讓兩岸可以順利展開協商。

正因為民進黨及蔡英文不願接受九二共識，卻又提不出一套解決兩岸歧見的有效方法，反而提出內容空泛的「台灣共識」，徒增外界疑慮，因此總統選戰到最後關頭，兩岸再度成為民進黨的「罩門」。

選票流向也證明了這一點，執政的馬英九得票流失，但是失望的中間選民並未全盤流向蔡英文，蔡英文只拿到比民進黨基本盤好一點的四成五，也不如去年五都選舉時的四成九佳績；中央與地方選舉的差別在那裡？選民很清楚，總統大選攸關兩岸政策，蔡英文選前說不清兩岸政策，選民怎敢將國家託付給她，讓兩岸及台灣的未來，都進入不確定的狀態。

另一個和兩岸經貿交流有關的選舉數字，也值得觀察。這次的總統大選，還是維持了北藍南綠的基本結構，但是馬英九贏蔡英文的一個關鍵在於，他在北部維持大勝，在南部卻只是小輸，蔡在比較弱的北部，都只拿到三成多的選票；相對的，馬卻能在比較弱的大高雄及屏東都維持了四成的得票率，雙英在南部的差距遠遠小於二○○四年時的藍綠對決。

如何解讀這樣的數字？一個錯誤的解讀，對政黨發展可能有致命的後果。例如，綠營可能鑑於台聯異軍突起、拿到百分之九的政黨票，相對於民進黨不夠好看的成績，解讀這是因為蔡英文及民進黨不像陳水扁當年挑起的極獨路線，因此無法將南部選票極大化。如果民進黨如此解讀，則未來四年不但無法在兩岸方向轉型，民進黨內可能還會陷入路線分裂之爭，這樣的民進黨，四年後挑戰國民黨時，只怕會跟這次的民進黨碰到一樣的兩岸瓶頸。

國民黨可以樂觀的是，這次派到艱困選區的刺客蘇俊賓、陳以真等人，最後雖然沒有當選，但是選舉結果卻都不錯，可見選對人，再怎樣的鐵票區，都有機會鬆動；更重要的是政策，馬政府重視的兩岸利多，一開始並未擴散，升斗小民似乎無感，但藍營這次能穩住南部，陸客來台及兩岸經貿的效應，卻也是值得觀察的重點。

對連任的馬總統而言，這應該是最大的鼓舞。這不只是藍營是否能贏回南部的問題，更重要的是，只要是勇於執行對的政策，即使是最有敵意的選民，有一天也可能認同你，這才是五成二選票背後最大的意義。

1992 Consensus: Master Switch for Cross-Strait Relations

2012-01-12T20:26:00.001-08:00

1992 Consensus: Master Switch for Cross-Strait Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 13, 2011

Summary: The election is closely fought, Tomorrow the polls will open. Some voters will vote to keep the master switch on. Other voters will vote to turn it off. Nevertheless we would like to make this solemn 11th hour appeal, Tomorrow, no matter who is elected, he or she must not turn the 1992 Consensus master switch off. Some voters may not realize what is at stake, But if those in power allow the lights to go out, if they allow the cross-Strait meeting hall to descend into darkness, political and economic disaster will befall the nation, within and without.

Full Text Below:

Some say the 1992 Consensus is the master switch for cross-Strait relations.

Tomorrow is election day. The people will decide whether this master switch remains on, or is turned off.

The survival and prosperity of the Republic of China involves two fundamental issues. The first is allegiance to the nation and its constitution. The second is cross-Strait relations.

Consider the 1992 Consensus from the perspective of allegiance to the nation and its constitution. The 1992 Consensus upholds the Republic of China Constitution. Within, it reaffirms allegiance to the Republic of China. Without, it upholds the Republic of China's legal system. In other words, it rejects Taiwan independence.

Now consider the 1992 Consensus from the perspective of cross-Strait relations, or "one China, different interpretations." As mentioned earlier, the 1992 Consensus upholds the Republic of China Constitution, both internally and externally. The same is true for cross-Strait relations. The expression "one China, different interpretations," merely means that "[There is one China, but] we consider one China to be the Republic of China, while you consider one China to be the People's Republic of China." What the Ma administration calls "one China, different interpretations," is what Beijing calls "seeking common ground while shelving differences."

Repudiating the 1992 Consensus within amounts to repudiating the Constitution of the Republic of China. Repudiating the 1992 Consensus without amounts to turning one's back on the Republic of China's system of law. Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus amounts to abandoning our "one China, different interpretations" position on cross-Strait relations.

Some critics say the 1992 Consensus is the master switch for cross-Strait relations. Think of cross-Strait relations as a magnificent meeting hall. The lights are blazing. Row upon row of crystal chandeliers send out dazzling rays of light. These points of light include ECFA, Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, direct airline flights, the diplomatic truce, visa-free treatment from 124 nations, over 25 billion dollars in pineapple cake sales, a mania for milkfish, the Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement, the Taiwan-Hong Kong Air Pact, and the right to host the World University Games. These dazzling light fixtures have filled the hall with light.

This glowing scene is all made possible by the 1992 Consensus, by one China, different interpretations. The 1992 Consensus is the master switch for every one of these light fixtures. This is plain for all to see. In May 2008, the 1992 Consensus master switch was turned on. One light fixture after another began giving off light. Yet today, during the current presidential election, the most critical issue, incredibly, is whether to throw this master switch to the off position. The most critical argument, incredibly, is whether these brilliant lights will continue to shine after the master switch has been turned off.

Ma Ying-jeou proposes to keep 1992 Consensus master switch in the on position, so that all the lights continue to shine. He even proposes to increase the number of light sources. Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, insists on turning the 1992 Consensus master switch off, even though she still wants the lights to remain on!

For example, Tsai Ing-wen obstinately refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. But at the same time, she wants to retain ECFA. She wants to turn the master switch off, yet expects the crystal chandeliers to remain on. Anyone in his or her right mind knows this is impossible.

Today is the eve of election day. Allow us to once again invoke Chiang Pai-li's sage observation: Taiwan's political path must be congruent with its economic path. If the two remain congruent, we will remain strong. If the two become less congruent, we will become weak. If the two become totally incongruent, we will wither and die. The 1992 Consensus and one China, different interpretations equals congruency, Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus and Taiwan independence equals total incongruency.

The 1992 Consensus is not merely "cross-Strait policy." It is a comprehensive political and economic strategy for the nation's future. Therefore when evaluating the 1992 Consensus, we must look at more than ECFA and other economic and trade benefits. We must look at the cross-Strait peace dividend and the friendly environment it makes possible. We must look at the synergy created by the larger political and economic picture, within and witihout. The 1992 Consensus made possible the diplomatic truce. It benefited the nation as a whole. The 1992 Consensus led to improved Taipei/Washington/Beijing relations. The 1992 Consensus led to improved Taipei/Tokyo/Beijing relations. The 1992 Consensus led to the Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement. The 1992 Consensus led to visa-free treatment from 124 nations.

The 1992 Consensus is not merely the master switch for cross-Strait relations. The quality of cross-Strait relations affects the larger political and economic picture, within and without, for better or worse. The 1992 Consensus is also a catalyst for the nation's overall political and economic well-being, within and without.

If we fail to get a handle on cross-Strait relations, we cannot get a handle on the larger political and economic situation, within and without. Still less can we put our nation's affairs in order. Therefore flipping off the 1992 Consensus master switch off will have catastrophic consequences for the nation's overall political and economic well-being, within and without, The impact will hardly be limited to cross-Strait relations.

The upcoming presidential election is a choice between supporting the 1992 Consensus and opposing the 1992 Consensus. The ballots cast will determine whether the 1992 Consensus master switch remains on, or gets turned off. The voters can choose to keep it in the on position, They can also choose to switch it off.

The election is closely fought, Tomorrow the polls will open. Some voters will vote to keep the master switch on. Other voters will vote to turn it off. Nevertheless we would like to make this solemn 11th hour appeal, Tomorrow, no matter who is elected, he or she must not turn the 1992 Consensus master switch off.

Some voters may not realize what is at stake, But if those in power allow the lights to go out, if they allow the cross-Strait meeting hall to descend into darkness, political and economic disaster will befall the nation, within and without.

ON？OFF？九二共識是兩岸關係總開關【聯合報╱社論】 2012.01.13

有人說，「九二共識」是兩岸關係的總開關。

明天投票，全民將決定這個總開關的ＯＮ或ＯＦＦ！

中華民國的生存發展，有兩大基本課題：一、國憲認同；二、兩岸關係。

九二共識，就國憲認同言，就是護持中華民國憲法，對內維持中華民國的認同，對外持守中華民國的法統；也就是不贊同台獨路線。

九二共識，對兩岸關係言，即是「一中各表」。如前所述，對內對外皆持守中華民國憲法，因此在兩岸關係上亦然；所謂「一中各表」，就是「我是中華民國／你是中華人民共和國」；馬政府所稱「一中各表」，在北京稱作「求同存異」。

否定九二共識，即是對內否定中華民國的國憲認同，對外背離中華民國的法統，對兩岸否棄「一中各表」的立場表述。

有評論者說：九二共識是兩岸關係的總開關。這個比喻，是將兩岸關係喻為一座華麗的大廳堂；此刻正是華燈初上之際，一盞盞燈具綻放出熠熠光華；這些燈具，如ＥＣＦＡ、陸客來台、直航、外交休兵、一二四國免簽證、鳳梨酥產值逾二五○億、虱目魚狂賣、台日投資協議、台港新航約、取得世界大學運動會主辦權等等，將這一座廳堂映照得光燦奪目。

此一晶瑩璀璨的場景，一切皆因「九二共識／一中各表」而生；亦即，「九二共識」是這所有燈具的總開關。有目共睹，自二○○八年五月「九二共識」這個總開關撥到了ＯＮ的位置以後，一盞接一盞的華燈相繼點亮；但是，如今在這次總統大選中，最關鍵的一個爭論卻是：要不要把這個總開關撥至ＯＦＦ，以驗證這些璀璨的燈具會不會全盤熄滅？

馬英九主張，讓九二共識這個總開關維持在ＯＮ，以使所有燈具持續發光，且還可添置更多燈具；蔡英文則主張將九二共識這個總開關撥至ＯＦＦ，但她似又不想讓那些燈具熄滅。

例如，蔡英文說，她否定九二共識，但她要ＥＣＦＡ的運作延續下去。這樣的思考，就不啻是要ＯＦＦ掉總開關，卻仍要水晶燈繼續熠熠發光。用膝蓋想，也知這是不可能之事。

投票前夕，我們願再引改寫的蔣百里名句指出：台灣的政治路線必須與經濟路線合轍；兩者相合則強，相離則弱，相背則亡。「九二共識／一中各表」就是相合，「否定九二共識／台獨」就是相離相背。

「九二共識」不只是一個「兩岸政策」；它其實是一個「全方位」的「國家政經大戰略」。因此，評價「九二共識」，不能只見到「ＥＣＦＡ」等經貿交流的利益，而更應看到「九二共識」所創造的兩岸和平紅利及友善環境，對國家內外整體政經情勢所發生的綜合效益（synergy）。例如，因「九二共識」的外交休兵，對國家所產生的利益；又如，因「九二共識」而使台美中、台日中關係的巨幅改善；再如，因「九二共識」而帶來台日投資協議及一二四國免簽證等外交利益……。

所以，九二共識不但是兩岸關係的總開關；由於兩岸關係的品質必會牽動國家內外整體政經情勢的吉凶利害，所以「九二共識」其實也可謂是國家整體內外政經情勢的變壓器。

兩岸關係搞不定，國家整體內外政經情勢就無法穩定，更不易理順；所以，ＯＦＦ了九二共識，必使國家整體內外政經情勢皆受重大衝擊，其影響豈止在兩岸而已。

此次總統大選的本質，即是在「支持九二共識」及「否定九二共識」之間的抉擇。每一張選票皆可觸及「九二共識」這個總開關，選民可以讓它仍然維持在ＯＮ的位置，也可撳下ＯＦＦ。

選情緊繃，明天開票，有些選民仍主張ＯＮ，但也有些選民會按ＯＦＦ。但是，我們願在這最後關頭仍要鄭重呼籲，明天無論是誰當選，都不可對「九二共識」這個總開關按下ＯＦＦ之鍵。

有些選民或許不知其中利害，但主政者若面對一個燈熄光滅、烏漆墨黑的兩岸廳堂，則國家整體內外的政經情勢必不堪設想。

Vote For Someone Who Will Do You Some Good

2012-01-12T03:25:00.001-08:00

Vote For Someone Who Will Do You Some Good
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 12, 2011

Summary: DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Her election would inevitably throw a monkeywrench into cross-Strait relations. The global economic picture for this year is poor. Add to this a deadlock in cross-Strait relations, and the "peace dividend" would evaporate. The economy would suffer. Everyone would suffer. Therefore, do not say "It won't affect me." Listen to Wang Wen-yuan, president of Formosa Plastics, who said, "Vote for someone who will do you some good!"

Full Text Below:

We are about to cast our ballots in Saturday's general election. Some say it will make no difference who is elected; the lives of ordinary citizens will not be affected. But we say the election is not merely a political decision. It is a decision that will decide the future of cross-strait relations, that will impact the domestic economy.

The global economy suffered a downturn this year. Experts at home and abroad agree. The latest shocks originated in Europe. Late last year, nations across Europe administered a number of remedies for the European debt crisis. They increased relief funds to the monetary union. They injected nearly 100 billion Euros into the European Central Bank. They lowered interest rates. They tried a variety of methods. But will these prescriptions remedy the debt crisis in Europe? No one knows. We do know that the European economy is unlikely to perform well this year.

Almost all international institutions forecast either a recession or near zero growth for the EU. This includes even Germany and France, the two largest nations in the Eurozone. Two consecutive quarters of decline are likely. This may lead the economy into a recession. The financial system has been dragged down by the European debt crisis. It must undergo deleveraging. European financial markets must enter a period of lowered expectations. The negative impact of the European debt crisis and economic slowdown has already impacted Taiwan. During the first three quarters of last year, our exports to Europe enjoyed a 12.5% growth rate. Soon afterwards however, it fell. By December last year, it was negative 15.6%.

The economic data for the United States shows improvement. The latest unemployment figures have dropped to 8.5%. The recovery is fragile. It is good news meriting cautious optimism. But the European recession is more severe than expected. Will it frustrate a U.S. recovery? The Mainland economy has slowed significantly. Its estimated growth rate this year is now 8%. Everyone is wondering whether the Mainland will experience a hard or soft landing. If the landing is hard, the global economy could take another downturn.

This year's international economic trends show that Taiwan's economy faces serious challenges. If cross-Strait relations worsen, can Taiwan's economy still withstand the onslaught? People are genuinely worried. Some think they will not be affected. After all, Taiwan's economy survived eight years under Democratic Progressive Party rule. But this ignores the changes that have taken place in the global economy and cross-Strait economic and trade relations over the past several years.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, several emerging nations gained economic strength. The Mainland region of China is the most obvious example. The Mainland has become the world's second largest economy. It has also transformed itself from the world's factory into the world's market. Each year Mainland imports approach 1.7 trillion dollars, rivaling United States imports at 1.9 trillion dollars. Nations and corporations the world over consider the Mainland market a strategic goal.

After the KMT returned to office in 2008, the thaw in cross-Strait relations yielded a "peace dividend." It enabled the Mainland to send large scale procurement groups to Taiwan, to purchase 20 billion U.S. dollars in industrial, agricultural, and fishery products. It enabled 1.7 million tourists to boost Taiwan's economy. The ECFA early harvest list enabled companies on Taiwan to export a variety of products at reduced or even zero tariff rates to the Mainland, enhancing their competitiveness. This year the early harvest list will be expanded. More products from Taiwan will benefit. Over the past three years, Taiwan's economy has benefited from the cross-Strait thaw. These benefits have not been limited to conglomerates and big business. Even those who have not benefited directly, have benefitted indirectly from the general prosperity. Conversely, if cross-Strait relations are undermined, these economic benefits will shrink or disappear altogether. If the economy goes into recession, the general public will suffer as well.

For example, the Mainland would reduce its procurement of flat panels and other tech products. You may not work in the technology industry. But if the technology industry experiences a downturn, companies will be forced to do what they did during the financial crisis. They will institute lay-offs or unpaid leave. The employees affected will be forced to reduce consumption. In which case the restaurant, apparel, and other domestic, consumption-oriented industries will fall victim as well. If the number of Mainland tourists falls, the victims will not be limited to entrepreneurs who invested in the construction of hotels. The hotel workers they employe will also find themselves out of work. Travel industry guides, tour bus drivers, taxi drivers, even operators of tourist spots and night market vendors will fall prey. The lucky ones will earn less. The unlucky ones will find themselves on the street. When these people find themselves unemployed or earning less. they will consume less, Soon another group of people wiil suffer. This is how the economic knock-on effect works.

The numbers tell us that during an economic recession, the first victims, the ones that suffer the most, are not the wealthy, but the middle and lower class. They are the ones least able to survive the recession. During the 2001 and 2009 recessions, the gap between the rich and the poor, prior to government transfer payments, soared sharply.

DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Her election would inevitably throw a monkeywrench into cross-Strait relations. The global economic picture for this year is poor. Add to this a deadlock in cross-Strait relations, and the "peace dividend" would evaporate. The economy would suffer. Everyone would suffer. Therefore, do not say "It won't affect me." Listen to Wang Wen-yuan, president of Formosa Plastics, who said, "Vote for someone who will do you some good!"

好好選一個「對自己好」的對象
2012-01-12中國時報

本周六大選即將投票，或許仍有不少人說，誰當選還是一樣，對升斗小民不會有影響。不過，我們要說的是：選舉結果不但是政治上的決策，也會影響著兩岸關係走勢，更會衝擊著國內經濟。

今年全球經濟景氣低迷、震盪，幾乎已是國內外專家的共識了，而其震源是來自歐洲。去年下半年，雖然歐洲國家已針對歐債危機，開出各種「藥方」─從增加紓困基金到財政聯盟、再到近五千億歐元的注資歐洲銀行、調降利息，各種手法紛紛出籠。這些藥方是否能讓歐洲脫離歐債危機，猶在未知之數，但歐洲經濟今年難有表現，已是既定事實。

國際機構對歐盟的經濟預測，幾乎都是衰退或接近零成長，包括德、法兩個歐元區主要國家，很可能出現連續兩季的衰退，使經濟步入衰退。而金融體系因歐債拖累必須進行的去槓桿化過程，又讓歐洲金融市場進入縮收期。其實，歐債危機及其引發的歐洲經濟走緩的負面影響，已明顯反映在台灣身上。去年一到三季，我國對歐洲出口仍有十二．五％的成長率，但之後就日漸低迷；去年十二月已變成衰退十五．六％。

至於美國，經濟數據雖然好轉，最新的失業率已降到八．五％，進入「脆弱的復甦」，算是值得「審慎樂觀」的好消息；惟歐洲衰退如較預期嚴重，是否會讓美國的復甦受挫，仍須留意。大陸則經濟明顯減速，今年預估成長率大概降到八％；各界關注大陸會是「硬著陸」或「軟著陸」，如是硬著陸，全球經濟恐怕又將進入另一波下修。

從今年國際經濟大勢分析即可看出，今年台灣的經濟的確面臨嚴峻的挑戰。如果此時再加上兩岸關係生變的因素，台灣經濟是否能承受，實在讓人憂心。或許有人認為：不會影響到自己；而且過去民進黨執政八年，台灣經濟還是挺過來了。不過，我們要說的是：這種看法完全無視近幾年全球經濟與兩岸經貿關係的變化。

二○○八年金融海嘯之後，新興國家經濟實力抬頭，其中又以大陸最明顯。大陸不僅成為全球第二大經濟體，更由世界工廠轉型為世界市場；每年大陸進口金額一．七兆美元，已接近美國的一．九兆美元了。世界各國、全球各大企業，莫不視搶奪大陸市場為戰略目標。

二○○八年國民黨執政後，兩岸關係和緩帶來的「和平紅利」，讓大陸每年組成龐大的採購團，來台採購二百億美元包括工業產品與農漁業產品；一年一百七十萬的觀光客，提振了台灣的經濟；ＥＣＦＡ的早收清單，讓台灣各種產品能以更低或零關稅進入大陸市場，提升台灣商品的競爭力，今年並將續談擴大早收清單，讓更多台灣產品早日享受優惠。我們可以說，這三年台灣的經濟的確受惠於兩岸和緩帶來的利益，而且這個利益並非獨厚財團或大企業。民眾即使並非直接受惠，也因經濟表現佳而間接受惠─但反之亦是，如果兩岸關係生變，原本的經濟利益都將大幅減少或甚至完全消失，經濟走弱衰退，屆時也是民眾普遍都會受害。

例如，大陸減少採購台灣面板及各種科技產品，也許，你不在科技產業中；但科技產業下滑，企業只能如金融海嘯時一樣的裁員或大放無薪假，這些員工必然減少消費，那麼餐廳、服飾及其它內需消費產業，也要跟著受害。大陸觀光客減少，受害者不是那些這幾年投資興建旅館的企業家而已，他們雇用的員工也可能因而失業；旅行業的導遊、司機，甚至各觀光區、夜市的攤販、業者，難道不會跟著受害；輕者收入減少，重者失業。當有一批人失業或收入減少時，他們的消費必然減少，接著就再有另外一批人受害。經濟的連鎖效應就是這樣來的。

而且，從統計數據上可以看出，當經濟衰退時，第一個受害者─或是說受害最嚴重者，不是富人，而是中低收入者，他們是最無能力抗拒經濟衰退者。民國九十年及九十八年兩次經濟衰退，當年的政府移轉收支前的貧富差距倍數，立刻大幅飆高，即為明證。

民進黨總統候選人蔡英文不願承認「九二共識」，如當選必然導致兩岸關係生變。在今年全球經濟大環境已不佳下，如再加上兩岸關係再進入僵局，原有的「和平紅利」將消失，經濟必然大受衝擊，每個人都可能因而受害。所以，不要再說「不會影響我」。聽聽台塑總裁王文淵說的，選一個「對自己好」的對象吧！

Do Voters Really Want a Repeat of Minority Government?

2012-01-10T19:55:00.001-08:00

Do Voters Really Want a Repeat of Minority Government?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 11, 2011

Summary: DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen is a master at euphemisms. During the last presidential policy presentation, she suddenly proposed "negotiation style democracy." She touted the "spirit of a grand coalition." Essentially, she led voters concerned about the election around by the nose. Actually, Tsai Ing-wen had another agenda altogether. She and the DPP have never been able to calm public fears about one thing -- minority government. Even assuming she is elected president, the Democratic Progressive Party has no hope of winning a majority in the legislature. The Republic of China would once again have to endure minority government.

Full Text Below:

DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen is a master at euphemisms. During the last presidential policy presentation, she suddenly proposed "negotiation style democracy." She touted the "spirit of a grand coalition." Essentially, she led voters concerned about the election around by the nose. Actually, Tsai Ing-wen had another agenda altogether. She and the DPP have never been able to calm public fears about one thing -- minority government. Even assuming she is elected president, the Democratic Progressive Party has no hope of winning a majority in the legislature. The Republic of China would once again have to endure minority government.

To say that Tsai Ing-wen plays word games is not to single her out for criticism. Democracy has been around for two centuries. This includes the concept of a "grand coalition." They have all been implemented before. They all have precedents. They should not be invoked nilly-willy. They should not be invoked in order to mislead the public.

A so-called "grand coalition" usually refers to a coalition between the largest and second largest party in the legislature. Such a grand coalition commands far more than a simple majority. Often it commands a two-thirds super majority. This is not a normal situation. Why? Because the second largest party is also the main opposition party. It normally hopes the ruling party will make a mistake, enabling it to come to power the next time around. The only time it is willing to join the ruling administration, is when the nation in distress, when both the government and the opposition must deal with a national crisis. The most famous example of this occurred during World War II. The British Conservative Party held a majority. Nevertheless the Labor Party and the Liberal Party were willing to form a wartime cabinet. The same was true during the 1966 Soviet invasion of Prague. In response to the crisis, Germany's two largest political parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party, also established a coalition government.

The most recent example of a grand coalition in one of the major democracies, was Germany during the 2005 general election. Public opinion was divided. Neither the Christian Democratic Union nor the Social Democratic Party were able to command an absolute majority. Negotiations between the two parties led to a coalition government. Merkel's Christian Democratic Union held one more seat. This made her the Chancellor. But the Social Democrats obtained most of the cabinet posts. including those pertaining to diplomatic, financial, judicial, and other important matters. More importantly, any cabinet policies required a bipartisan consensus.

Contrast the theory and reality of grand coalitions outlined above, with Tsai Ing-wen's proposed coalition government. Tsai's proposal amounts to castles in the air. In order to form a grand coalition, the Democratic Progressive Party's coalition partners would not be the TSU, PFP, and other small parties. It would be the KMT. But why wouldn't the KMT follow the example set by the DPP? Why wouldn't it, as the largest opposition party, simply sit tight? Why wouldn't it avoid blame for the ruling DPP government's mistakes? This would enable it to return to power in the future. Why should it have to clean up the mess left by a coalition government?

Furthermore, a grand coalition government requires party to party negotiations for cabinet appointments and policy consultations. Recall the first time the Democratic Progressive Party assumed power. Chen Shui-bian shouted empty platitudes about an "all peoples government." But when the KMT called for party approval of cabinet appointments and dismissals, the DPP immediately accused the KMT of "trying to hog the entire dish." KMT elder Tang Fei stepped forward to inspire confidence in the fledgling DPP administration. Alone and isolated, he assumed the premiership, He headed a cabinet handpicked by Chen and the DPP. A mere 137 days later, the ruling DPP denounced Tang Fei as a "stumbling block." Given such precedents, who actually believes the DPP would ever grant important positions to other political parties?

The reality Tsai Ing-wen failed to mention, is that even if she is elected president, the DPP is unlikely to win a legislative majority. The nation would then revisit the chaos of 2000. The question now is not whether to form a coalition government. The question now is whether to have the majority party form a cabinet.

If Tsai Ing-wen were to ask former President Lee Teng-hui, the answer would be very clear. In 1997, following amendments to the constitution, the Republic of China's central government was leaning toward a dual leadership system, in the event the president fails to win a legislative majority. The amendments abolished the legislature's right to approve the president's choice of premier. But if the premier lacks support from a majority in the legislature, he will be paralyzed. Neither the Presidential Office nor the Executive Yuan would be able to advance policy. But this is a relatively minor matter. Other matters are more serious. An opposition-dominated legislature commands an advantage when passing legislation. This could lead to a tug of war in the executive branch. It could lead to a contest to see who can offer the most advantages. The government would be unable to implement policy. It would be unable to plan for the future.

The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years, It endured the fate of a minority government. Yet it refused to do things the proper way, It refused to hold party to party negotiations with the majority party in the legislature to reach negotiated solutions. Instead, it repeatedly concocted such ersatz entities as the "National Security Alliance," whose sole purpose was to induce individual KMT legislators to defect. The entire process was an abomination. The ruling DPP attempted to buy opposition legislators outright with cash. It used large bank loans as quid pro quo. It offered special advantages to businesses owned by individual legislators. Scandal after scandal erupted. This undermined the administration of government. It also undermined public confidence in the government.

The general election does more than elect a president. It also determines the composition of the legislature, and the configuration of the Central Government. Every presidential candidate has promised voters the moon. But can they actually deliver? The key is the configuration of the Central Government. The problem with Tsai Ing-wen is that she refuses to acknowledge the possibility of minority government. She refuses to follow the example set by President Ma. She should promise that if the DPP fails to win a legislative majority, it will form a cabinet with the opposition KMT. Instead, she has trotted out her utterly irrelevant "grand coalition government" to confuse the public.

This, minority government, is the truth that Tsai Ing-wen is afraid to face. Do Republic of China voters on really wish to relive the chaos of minority government?

選民還要重蹈少數政府困境?
2012-01-11中國時報

民進黨總統候選人蔡英文是玩弄名詞的高手，她在最後一場政見發表會，一下子丟出「協商式民主」、然後又是「大聯合政府精神」，讓關心選舉的選民跟著團團轉；其實，蔡英文意在言外、無法化解民眾疑慮的只有一件事，那就是即使她當選總統，民進黨無望在國會取得過半多數，台灣又將重蹈少數政府的困境。

說蔡英文玩弄名詞，並沒有刻意苛責她，畢竟，人類二百多年的民主運動史，包括「大聯合政府」這樣的概念，確實都曾被實踐過，都有確定的指涉，不宜濫用、刻意誤導。

所謂「大聯合政府」，通常指的是第一、二大黨的聯合，席次遠超過執政所需的半數，有時甚至超過三分之二；這是違反常態的聯合形態，因為，作為第二大黨的主要在野黨，都在等著執政黨犯錯，下次才可能執政，他們願意加入執政團隊，通常是因為國家處於緊急危難，朝野必須共赴國難；最著稱的例子就是第二次世界大戰期間，英國保守黨雖擁有多數席位，卻還是和工黨、自由黨組成戰時內閣；同樣的，一九六六年為了因應蘇聯入侵布拉格危機，德國的兩個主要政黨、基民黨及社民黨也合組大聯合政府。

主要民主國家最近一次的大聯合政府，是德國二○○五年大選，由於民意分歧，基民黨及社民黨兩黨都無法單獨過半，兩黨談判籌組大聯合政府，雖由多一席的基民黨梅克爾出任總理，但是社民黨取得多數席次，而且是外交、財政、司法等重要職務；更重要的是，內閣任何施政，都必須取得兩黨共識。

相較這些大聯合政府的理論及現實，蔡英文提出大聯合政府，可以說全在空中樓閣的階段。首先，若要籌組大聯合政府，民進黨在國會要聯合的對象不是台聯、親民黨等小黨，而必須是國民黨；但是，就國民黨而言，何不學過去的民進黨，穩坐最大在野黨的地位，不必承擔施政責任，將來還有重返執政的機會，何必去淌聯合政府的爛攤子？

其次，大聯合政府必然要透過黨對黨談判，進行職務分配、政策協商；觀諸民進黨首次執政前例，陳水扁當時喊出空泛的「全民政府」，國民黨要求黨進黨出，立即就遭致「全碗端去」的攻擊；當年的唐飛，以國民黨老臣身分出面為民進黨穩住政局，孤家寡人出任閣揆，幾乎由扁及民進黨決定了所有的閣員，但是只有一百三十七天，唐飛就成為民進黨施政的石頭；以這樣的前例，民進黨真的願意「施捨」重要職位給其他政黨嗎？

事實上，蔡英文沒有說出的真相是，她即使當選總統，民進黨可能無法取得國會多數，重蹈兩千年的亂局，這時的問題不在是否籌組聯合內閣，而在於是否由多數黨組閣。

蔡英文如果問問前總統李登輝，應該很清楚，一九九七年修憲後，台灣中央政府體制傾向雙首長制；一旦總統無法取得國會多數，即使修憲已取消國會的閣揆同意權，但是閣揆若不能得到國會多數支持，可說是寸步難行；所有的政策都出不了總統府或行政院，還算事小；更嚴重的是，屆時在野黨主控的國會，握有立法權的優勢，可能和行政部門在政策上較勁，競相釋出利多，國家施政必然因此割離破碎，不可能有前瞻性規畫。

民進黨過去執政八年，深受少數政府之苦。但是他們不願意採取正規的方式，與當時的國會多數黨，進行黨對黨協商談判解決；而是一再以籌組「國安聯盟」之名，事實上卻是對個別國民黨立委拉夫、進行招降納叛；其間過程可說是不堪聞問，有直接用錢收買的，有用巨額銀行貸款交換的，或是對立委個人企業直接給好處的。這些隔一段時間就爆出的醜聞，不但衝擊政府運作，也重挫人民對政府的信任感。

這一次的大選，不只要選出總統，也會決定國會的組成及中央政府的型態；每位總統候選人都對未來做出包山包海的承諾，但能不能真的落實，關鍵在於未來的中央政府型態。蔡英文的問題在於，她不肯誠實面對將來少數政府的可能性，不願效法馬總統宣示，若未能取得國會多數，將由在野黨組閣，而是拿出不相干的大聯合政府主張來混淆視聽。

這是蔡英文不敢說的少數政府真相，台灣的選民，還要再重蹈一次少數政府的亂局嗎？

Lee Teng-hui Past and Present: Clinging to Tsai Ing-wen, Distancing Himself from Chang Rong-fa

2012-01-10T04:04:00.001-08:00

Lee Teng-hui Past and Present:
Clinging to Tsai Ing-wen, Distancing Himself from Chang Rong-fa
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 10, 2011

Summary: Lee Teng-hui has endorsed Tsai Ing-wen. This shows that Tsai Ing-wen remains a captive of the Taiwan independence movement. Tsai Ing-wen has chosen Lee Teng-hui's path. She has repudiated the 1992 Consensus. She has chosen the path of Taiwan independence. Others however, have chosen Chang Rong-fa's path. They have chosen to support the 1992 Consensus. They have chosen to oppose Taiwan independence.

Full Text Below:

Everyone is wondering how Lee Teng-hui will show his support for Tsai Ing-wen this election season. Will he get down on his knees? Will he appear before the public in a wheelchair? Will he weep openly? Will he appear before the public gaunt and unshaven?

Meanwhile, in Taipei, during a KMT led march on Saturday, EVA Air Chairman Cheng Kuang-yuan made his way through a sea of red, white, and blue Republic of China flags, followed by a dozen or so people holding high Evergreen company banners.

Evergreen CEO Chang Rong-fa, once a staunch supporter of Lee Teng-hui, issued a statement. He expressed unreserved support for the 1992 Consensus. He said "If following the election the victor insists that there is no 1992 Consensus, Taiwan's economy will be in serious trouble." He added even more bluntly, that the so-called "Taiwan consensus" is merely Taiwan independence under another name. He said Taiwan must not declare independence. If it does, the economy will collapse.

Chang Rong-fa now stands in diametric opposition to Tsai Ing-wen and Lee Teng-hui. When Chang Rong-fa said "If following election the victor insists that there is no 1992 Consensus, Taiwan's economy will be in serious trouble," he was talking to Tsai Ing-wen. Lee Teng-hui is currently sick and bed-ridden, Yet he has repeatedly issued statements maintaining that there was never any 1992 Consensus.

Few people are as outspoken as Chang Rong-fa. He bluntly noted that the so-called "Taiwan consensus" is merely Taiwan independence by another name. Tsai Ing-wen is not about to admit that her "Taiwan consensus" is merely Taiwan independence under another name. She will insist instead that her "Taiwan consensus" is merely "the democratic process" under another name. She will insist instead that eventual reunification or one China, different interpretations are also options. But she will not dare to suggest that the DPP's Taiwan independence party platform, its Resolution for a Normal Nation, one nation on each side, or Taiwan independence, are also options. This reveals her embarrassment. As we all know, Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" has only one purpose -- to enable Taiwan independence advocates to reject the 1992 Consensus. The only purpose of Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" is to provide Taiwan independence advocates with rhetorical cover. Its only purpose is to allow her to avoid directly rejecting the 1992 Consensus. This is a fact that Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP cannot deny.

Chang Rong-fa's criticisms are well warranted. As he astutely noted, Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus because she remains committed to Taiwan independence. But she is afraid to openly acknowledge that she is promoting Taiwan independence. Therefore she is using her "Taiwan consensus" as a smokescreen.

Chang Rong-fa said that "If following the election the victor insists that there is no 1992 Consensus, Taiwan's economy will be in serious trouble." He said that "Taiwan must not seek independence. If it does, the economy will collapse." He was speaking his mind then as well. Most commentators are mealy-mouthed. Chang is markedly different. He punctured Tsai Ing-wen's balloon by pointing out the contradiction of honoring ECFA but simultaneously rejecting the 1992 Consensus.

When Tsai Ing-wen spoke of "Standing behind President Ma are people with money," she was referring to Chang Rong-fa. But Chang Rong-fa is concerned about more than his own businesses. He is concerned about Taiwan as a whole. He said that next to other economies the world over, Taiwan is relatively secure. He emphasized that "A key factor is the Mainland." Only the 1992 Consensus enables Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan and spend money. Only the 1992 consensus enables fruits and vegetables from Taiwan to be exported to the Mainland. In Chang Rong-fa's eyes, the spillover benefits of the ten trillion dollar ECFA production chain, directly or indirectly encompass every industry on Taiwan and all walks of life. So-called "people with money" are definitely not the only ones who benefit. Tsai Ing-wen tried to depict the 1992 Consensus as a "forfeiture of our sovereignty and a humiliation of our nation." She tried to depict it as "sugar-coated poison" or "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan."

If we use Lee Teng-hui as a reference point. Chang Rong-fa has been steadily drifting away from him. The two men are now poles apart. They have totally parted ways. But Tsai remains inextricably linked with Lee Teng-hui. She finds it impossible to shake off Lee Teng-hui. As a result, all she can do is embrace Lee Teng-hui, cling to Lee Teng-hui, and cling to Taiwan independence. What we see before us is Chang Rong-fa standing behind Ma Ying-jeou, and Lee Teng-hui standing behind Tsai Ing-wen.

This tableau is a microcosm of the presidential election. It represents our options in the presidential election. Chang Rong-fa has supported democracy on Taiwan since the "dang wai" era. Later he unreservedly supported Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. No one can accuse him of not "seeing the world through Taiwanese eyes." But the world has changed. Our circumstances have changed. Chang Rong-fa obviously has new opinions about Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. He obviously has new opinions about their policies as well as their character. That is why since 2008 he has been following the same path as Ma Ying-jeou.

Chang Yung-fa advocates adopting a "Taiwan perspective." But he opposes Taiwan independence. As a result, he has parted company with Lee and Chen. As Chang Rong-fa sees it, Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" is merely another euphemism for Taiwan independence.

Chang Rong-fa's perspective is reminiscent of what Chiang Pai-li wrote about a recent editorial. He wrote that Taiwan's political path must be congruent with its economic path. The more one departs from the other, the more swiftly Taiwan will perish.

The 1992 Consensus and one China, different interpretations is just that. It is congruency between Taiwan's political path and its economic path. Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus and advocacy of Taiwan independence, means a lack of congruence between Taiwan's political path and its economic path.

Lee Teng-hui has endorsed Tsai Ing-wen. This shows that Tsai Ing-wen remains a captive of the Taiwan independence movement. Tsai Ing-wen has chosen Lee Teng-hui's path. She has repudiated the 1992 Consensus. She has chosen the path of Taiwan independence. Others however, have chosen Chang Rong-fa's path. They have chosen to support the 1992 Consensus. They have chosen to oppose Taiwan independence.

李登輝今昔：蔡英文緊抱，張榮發遠離
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.01.10

眾人皆在猜測李登輝將在選季最後如何出面挺蔡英文，他會不會下跪？會不會坐輪椅？會不會流淚？會不會面容憔悴、不把鬍渣刮乾淨？

正當此際，在周六的台北遊行中，長榮航空董事長鄭光遠率隊擎著十餘面長榮旗幟，行走在青天白日滿地紅的國旗長河中。

早年力挺李登輝的長榮集團總裁張榮發出面稱，他力挺「九二共識」，「如果有人當選之後說沒有九二共識，台灣的經濟會很悽慘」。他甚至直截了當地說：台灣共識就是台獨；但台灣不可能獨立，否則經濟就會倒。

張榮發站在蔡英文與李登輝的對立面。因為，張榮發所指的「有人如果當選之後說沒有九二共識」，這個「有人」就是指蔡英文；而李登輝抱病臥床，還三番兩次發表聲明稱，沒有九二共識。

很少人能像張榮發這樣心直口快，他直指「台灣共識就是台獨」。蔡英文當然不會承認「台灣共識就是台獨」，她將「台灣共識」說成是一個「民主程序」，還說「終極統一或一中各表也可納入討論」，但她卻不敢提「台獨黨綱、正常國家決議文、一邊一國、台獨也可納入討論」，即可見其欲蓋彌彰的窘態；眾所共見，「台灣共識」是因台獨拒絕接受「九二共識」而發，且想作為台獨抵拒「九二共識」的障眼法或緩衝器，這卻是民進黨及蔡英文所無以否認的。

張榮發的批判有其理路，他是在指出：蔡英文因台獨而否定「九二共識」；卻又不敢直接主張台獨，所以改以「台灣共識」作為煙幕。

張榮發說，「如果說沒有九二共識，台灣的經濟會很悽慘」，又說「台灣不可能獨立，否則經濟就會倒」。這也是心直口快之論，與一般輿論文縐縐的迂迴矯情大異其趣；更是直接點破了蔡英文「反對九二共識／延續ＥＣＦＡ」之類的矛盾論調。

張榮發是蔡英文口中的「站在馬總統背後的有錢人」，但張榮發的關懷絕不只在他的自家產業，而是關切全台灣。他說，相較全球經濟環境，目前台灣算是比較安定，「很重要的原因是大陸」；在九二共識下，陸客才能來台觀光消費，台灣的蔬菜水果才能銷到大陸。也就是說，在張榮發眼中，這個總產值達十兆元的「ＥＣＦＡ產業鏈」的溢出效益，直接或間接地涵蓋了台灣各種行業，各個階層，絕非只對「有錢人」有利，更非蔡英文口中的「喪權辱國」、「糖衣毒藥」或「傾中賣台」。

以李登輝為基準，張榮發與李的距離是漸行漸遠，如今更已是南轅北轍、分道揚鑣；但蔡英文卻與李登輝難分難解，她因根本甩不掉李登輝，所以只能回過頭來抱住李登輝；抱住了李登輝，也就被台獨抱住。眼前的畫面是：站在馬英九背後的是張榮發，而站在蔡英文背後的是李登輝。

此一畫面其實正是此次總統大選的縮影，也正是這次總統大選的抉擇。張榮發自黨外時期即支持台灣民主運動，後來亦力挺李登輝及陳水扁，無人可以否定他的「台灣觀點」；但是，隨著世局及國情的變遷，張榮發顯然對李扁二人的政策及人格皆有新的思考，因此他自二○○八後選擇了馬英九的路線。

張榮發支持「台灣觀點」，但反對「台獨」，所以他向李扁二人揮手告別；在張榮發眼中，蔡英文的「台灣共識」，也只是在玩「台獨」的另一種花樣而已。

張榮發的觀點，與日前社論改用蔣百里的名言所見略同，那就是：台灣的政治路線必須與經濟路線合轍；兩者相合則強，相離則弱，相反則亡。

準此以言，「九二共識／一中各表」，就是政治路線與經濟路線相合；否定九二共識及主張台獨，則是政治路線與經濟路線相離及相背。

李登輝為蔡站台，證實了蔡無力擺脫台獨的挾持。此次大選，蔡英文選擇了李登輝「否定九二共識／挺台獨」的路，但也有人會選擇張榮發「支持九二共識／反台獨」的路吧！

Scrapping the 1992 Consensus Would Harm Everyone on Taiwan

2012-01-09T02:28:00.001-08:00

Scrapping the 1992 Consensus Would Harm Everyone on Taiwan
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 9, 2011

Summary: What will the repercussions of the presidential election be in the event one or the other candidate is elected? The answer is crystal clear. If one or the other political party is elected, economic policy, specifically income redistribution, will not undergo any immediate and significant changes. Cross-Strait relations however, will face a major watershed. We will either continue promoting cross-Strait reconciliation and cooperation, as we have for the past several years. Or, we will clash head on with the Mainland and cross-Strait relations will suffer a major setback. Reality is staring us in the face. When voters make their decision, they must not ignore reality. They must not indulge in wishful thinking.

Full Text Below:

What will the repercussions of the presidential election be in the event one or the other candidate is elected? The answer is crystal clear. If one or the other political party is elected, economic policy, specifically income redistribution, will not undergo any immediate and significant changes. Cross-Strait relations however, will face a major watershed. We will either continue promoting cross-Strait reconciliation and cooperation, as we have for the past several years. Or, we will clash head on with the Mainland and cross-Strait relations will suffer a major setback. Reality is staring us in the face. When voters make their decision, they must not ignore reality. They must not indulge in wishful thinking.

Every nation seeks to survive, prosper, and ensure that its citizens are treated with dignity. But merely wishing will not make it so. Every nation must adopt practical policies appropriate to its circumstances. We must understand our own situation before we can adopt the appropriate measures. Only then can we safeguard our nation's interests and promote our nation's prosperity.

President Ma Ying-jeou is seeking reelection. He and DPP presidential challenger Tsai Ing-wen, represent diametrically opposite cross-Strait policy paths. Ma Ying-jeou seeks continued reconciliation, exchanges, and cooperation; predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus and any opposes any changes resulting from its recognition.

The public on Taiwan wants to survive, prosper, and be treated with dignity. This is an aspiration shared by all the people. Increasing national prosperity means their own lives will also get better and better. The public on Taiwan faces a stark reality. In terms of history, culture, geography, economy, trade, non-governmental exchanges, and even sovereignty disputes, Taiwan and the Mainland are inseparable. This was true in the past. This is true in the present. And this will be true in the future. Particularly given the Mainland's growing international political power and economic influence, When Republic of China citizens on Taiwan determine their national destiny, the Mainland will always remain a factor.

Ma Ying-jeou seeks cross-strait reconciliation, based on the 1992 consensus and the ROC Constitution. The two sides may differ in their interpretations of the 1992 Consensus. One side may speak of "one China, different interpretations." The other side may speak of "different interpretations of one China." One side may speak of the Peoples Republic of China. The other side may speak of the Republic of China, But what is truly important, what is truly relevant to people's well-being, is that both sides are willing to reach some sort of consensus. Both sides are willing to allow the other to express its position, Both sides are willing to set aside disputes over sovereignty which cannot be currently resolved, and instead actively promote exchanges to improve relations.

By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen has on the one hand painted a rosy scenario. She has promised that, if elected, she will build a "Taiwan consensus." She has promised to continue holding consultations with the other side. She has promised to continue promoting cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, She has promised to continue improving cross-Strait relations. She has promised to avoid stagnation and backpedaling. On the other hand, Tsai Ing-wen has blasted Ma Ying-jeou for ahdering to the 1992 Consensus and to the other side's one China principle. She says "eventual reunification is the price we will have to pay." Her categorical repudiation of the 1992 Consensus tells us she would pull the basis for cross-Strait reconciliation from under our feet.

What would be the result? The Chen regime sealed Taiwan off from the Mainland for eight years. In the end, just how much did he promote our national interests, enhance our dignity, and bolster our sovereignty? The answer is still fresh in our memories. If Tsai Ing-wen has an alternative better than the 1992 Consensus we would of course welcome it. But so far we do not see how Tsai Ing-wen can abandon the 1992 Consensus and still persuade the Mainland to honor existing efforts at reconcilation.

Cross-Strait policy cannot be limited to building castles in the air, Everyone has pipe dreams, What matters is what is feasible in reality. When the Mainland authorities make decisions, they too must cope with internal pressures. If they mishandle the Taiwan issue, they could go down in infamy. By handling matters in accordance with the 1992 Consensus, the Mainland authorities can at least offer the Mainland public an accounting. But if the foundation for exchanges is demolished, it will undermine existing cooperation. It will mean a serious setback for the doves in the Chinese Communist Party. Achieving smooth cross-Strait relations has not been easy. One can only imagine how far they might be set back.

Recently, many entrepreneurs have expressed support for the 1992 Consensus and for cross-Strait peace, Nevertheless Tsai Ing-wen blasted Ma Ying-jeou, and accused him of chummying up to wealthy conglomerates. This was an attempt to incite class hatred, an attempt to distract the public from its concerns about the potentially catastrophic impact on cross-Strait relations. Entrepreneurs hope that Taiwan can continue to enjoy a peaceful and stable environment. They hope to enjoy greater opportunities for economic prosperity. How are their concerns any different from the general public's?

No one wants to relinquish national sovereignty. This determination is shared by everyone on Taiwan. But national sovereignty and the dignity enjoyed by a nation's citizens depend upon national strength. A weak and isolated nation will find survival and prosperity difficult to maintain, It will find it difficult to be treated with respect in the international community. Those at a disadvantage need greater wisdom, ingenuity, and courage than those in a position of strength. They cannot ignore reality. They cannot act blindly and rashly. The past three and a half years have offered countless opportunities for cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges and business opportunities. The Republic of China has achieved visa free travel status with over 100 different countries. The nation's survival, prosperity, and the dignity of its citizens have all been enhanced. Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy has proven effective and practicable in a real world context. Does Tsai Ing-wen really believe she can win over voters merely by painting the rosy scenarios described above, without bothering to offer a better alternative?

廢棄九二共識傷害台灣全民
2012-01-09中國時報

這次總統大選的抉擇究竟會帶來什麼影響，已經相當清楚，在經濟政策與所得分配上，不同的政黨執政未必會立即看到明顯的改變，但兩岸關係卻是面對著一個重大的分水嶺。或是繼續近年來和解合作的路線，或是陷入衝擊震盪與倒退。現實擺在眼前，選民在做決定時，不能有無視現實的一廂情願想法。

任何國家都要追求生存、發展與尊嚴。但願望歸願望，任何國家也都要在其所處的環境中操作，選擇適當可行的政策。因此，正確認識自我條件與外在環境，因應現實選擇合適措施，才能有效維護國家利益增進發展。

尋求連任的馬英九總統與民進黨總統候選人蔡英文，恰是代表了兩岸關係兩條方向不同的路線。馬英九提出的，是延續他以「九二共識」為基礎的和解、交流與合作；蔡英文代表的，則是不接受「九二共識」，及任何因之而來的變化。

台灣需要生存、發展與尊嚴，這是所有人共同的願望；大家也都希望，在國家愈來愈繁榮茁壯的同時，自己的生活也能愈來愈好。而台灣面對的現實環境是，無論在歷史、文化、地理、經貿、民間交流乃至主權爭議上，台灣與中國的關係千絲萬縷，過去、現在、未來，都不可能徹底切斷。尤其以中國日益增長的政經力量與國際影響力，台灣在決定國家走向時，都必須考慮並處理中國大陸這個變數。

馬英九以「九二共識」、中華民國憲法為架構，為兩岸和解找到了立足基礎。雖然兩岸對「九二共識」的解讀不同，一邊是「一中各表」一邊是「各表一中原則」，一邊是中華人民共和國一邊是中華民國，但真正重要、並攸關人民福祉的是，雙方願意在一個最起碼的模糊共識下，以容許對方各說各話的態度，放下目前解決不了的主權爭執，轉而積極推動交流改善關係。

相對的，蔡英文一方面畫出願景，表示若當選，會建立台灣共識，持續與對岸協商，讓兩岸經貿等交流持續推展，兩岸關係只會持續前進，不會停滯或倒退；但另一方面，又指責馬英九堅持九二共識是附和對岸的一中原則，將以「終極統一」為代價。這種全盤否定「九二共識」存在的立場，意味著將把現在兩岸和解的重要立足基礎，從我們的腳下抽走。

結果會如何？扁政府八年鎖國，到底增進了哪些國家利益與主權尊嚴，大家記憶猶新。蔡英文如果提得出一個比「九二共識」更好的處理方案，大家當然很歡迎，但是到目前為止，完全看不到廢棄了「九二共識」後，蔡英文有什麼足以說服中國延續現行和解政策的方案或論述。

兩岸政策不能只是空中樓閣，夢想人人會做，重點在於在現實中有效可行。中共當局在決策時，也必須面對自己內部的壓力與角力，如果台灣問題處理失了立場，豈非成了千古罪人？以「九二共識」模式處理，至少中共當局對內部交待得過去。如果毀棄了這個交流基礎，不只勢將衝擊現行各項合作交流，而且讓中共內部和解派受到挫折，好不容易獲致良性發展的兩岸關係，又不知要倒退到什麼地步。

近來許多企業家紛紛表態支持「九二共識」與兩岸和平，蔡英文卻批評為馬英九和大財團在一起，這是藉挑起階級對立掩蓋民間對兩岸衝擊的憂心。企業家希望台灣能繼續在和平穩定的環境下擴大發展機會，其心情與一般民眾有什麼不同？

沒有人願意出讓國家主權，這個骨氣，每個台灣人都有，然而，主權尊嚴是要靠國力支撐的，一個孱弱孤立的國家，生存發展既困難，又難以在國際間受到正視。國家尊嚴固然必須維護，但處於劣勢者，更需要智慧、手腕與勇氣，不能無視現實一味蠻幹。驗諸三年半來兩岸經貿交流的蓬勃商機、台灣在國際社會的參與乃至百國免簽的達成，國家的生存、發展、尊嚴都得到了強化，證明馬英九的兩岸政策是在現實環境中有效可行的。光是描繪空洞願景，卻端不出更好的替代方案，如何說服選民？

Businesses Hope the Government and Opposition will Value Cross-Strait Relations

2012-01-05T20:18:00.001-08:00

Businesses Hope the Government and Opposition will Value Cross-Strait Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 6, 2011

Summary: The 1992 Consensus makes subtle use of the term "one China, different interpretations" to set aside a half a century of cross-Strait political controversy, even while it helps maintain historical, cultural, and familial links. It is precisely these links that make peace and stability between Taiwan and Mainland China possible. It is the hope of the Chinese people as a whole, It is the hope of Chinese people on Taiwan.

Full Text Below:

Evergreen Group Chairman Chang Yung-fa has publicly endorsed the 1992 Consensus in no uncertain terms. Liao Ching-siang Liao, chairman of the Chi Mei Corporation, has also come forward and expressed his support. Soon after the candidates registered for the presidential election, one prominent business leader after another has expressed high hopes for cross-Strait relations. Ruling and opposition leaders vying for high office cannot afford to ignore the feelings of these business leaders, That is because these business leaders do not represent only "people with money." They are responsible for the livelihood of tens of thousands of their employees. DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen in particular, who still refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, must not overlook the interests of the people.

Liao Ching-siang is DPP candidate Lin Chia-lung's father in law. He is the right hand man of Hsu Wen-lung, founder of the Chi Mei corporation. During the 2000 ROC presidential election, Chi Mei and Eva were leading members of Chen Shui-bian's national policy advisory group. By any standard, whether "love of Taiwan" or the DPP's favorites, "nativist consciousness" and "Taiwanese consciousness," they qualify in spades. Their hearts are filled to overflowing with such sentiments. It is precisely because they have such strong feelings for Taiwan, that they understand what is most beneficial for Taiwan, The genuine and intense feelings they have for Taiwan, is not something politicians seeking election can fathom.

The DPP ruled for eight years, It had an historic opportunity to do something good for Taiwan. It had an opportunity to fulfill the expectations of the people of Taiwan. It had an opportunity to create a new cross-Strait relationship. Chen Shui-bian was prepared to accept Academia Sinica head Lee Yuan-tse's recommendations. He was prepared to recognize the "spirit of the 1992 talks." Unfortunately chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council Tsai Ing-wen prevented him from doing so. Lee Yuan-tse's bipartisan cross-Strait group came to nothing. As a result, cross-Strait relations remained tense and frozen, wracked by controversy.

The Lee Teng-hui era "spirit of the 92 talks" was interrupted during the eight year long Chen administration. But in 2005 KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan and Mainland General Secretary Hu Jintao reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus. This enabled the Ma administration to reestablish smooth relations with the Mainland soon after the KMT's return to power,

Without the 1992 Consensus, we would not have increasingly frequent cross-Strait direct flights, We would not have countless cottage industries, catering to wave upon wave of Mainland tourists, We would not have ECFA, which has enabled Taiwan products to flood the Mainland. We would not have the high-tech panel and appliance industries as bright spots in Taiwan's economy. When the financial tsunami struck, Mainland orders for home appliances kept us alive. These are all hard realities that Tsai Ing-wen cannot wish out of existence merely by closing her eyes.

Tsai Ing-wen may be determined to promote her "Taiwan consensus." But one cannot promote cross-Strait relations merely by wishful thinking. Taiwan may be divided by political differences. But consultations and negotiations with the outside requires one voice. This one voice must also be something the other can accept, Tsai Ing-wen wants to repudiate the 1992 Consensus. She even wants to repudiate the Republic of China, the one thing that the pro-reunification Blue Camp and the pro-independence Green Camp can agree on. Instead, she insists on underscoring how much her "Republic of China" and KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's "Republic of China" differ. If this is Tsai Ing-wen's notion of national identity, then it is unacceptable even to most people on Taiwan, let alone the Mainland. Given her position, how can she possibly win the trust of Beijing? How can she possibly promote peaceful cross-Strait dialogue?

Mainland China may not recognize the Republic of China. But it recognizes the 1992 Consensus. It agrees that the "one China" recognized on Taiwan is the Republic of China. It is willing to refrain from repudiating the Republic of China, As far as Taiwan is concerned, this is a trivial distinction, and this is a highly advantageous situation. Why is the Mainland willing to make concessions to us, based on the 1992 Consensus? The reason is simple. It is because the two sides accept the "one China" premise, We merely express it differently. This preserves the historical connections between the two sides. It also opens up new possibilities for the future of cross-Strait relations.

Put simply, the two sides were both part of one China in the past, before the advent of divided rule in 1949. The two sides may well be reunited as one China again in the future. For this there is no timetable. The 1992 Consensus reaffirms that the two sides do not see each other as outsiders. It is precisely because the 1992 Consensus reaffirms that the two sides are one people, that the Mainland is willing and able to offer terms more favorable than it offers to foreigner. It is willing to offer Taiwan a wide range of concessions. It is willing to offer concessions Taiwan businessmen. It is willing to make it easier for the general population on Taiwan to enter and exit the Mainland. If the people on Taiwan and the people on Mainland China were not one people, the Mainland would have to treat people from Taiwan the way it treats people from Japan, South Korea, Europe, or the US. There would be no concessions whatsover.

Politically, Taiwan and the Mainland have different national allegiances. But culturally, Taiwan cannot pretend it does not share a common heritage with the Mainland. Lest we forget, except for Taiwan's Aborigines, the ancestors of everyone on Taiwan came from the Mainland. The only difference is when. Taiwan's folk customs all come from "China Proper." Not only do we celebrate the same folk festivals, we even hold the same holidays, and worship the same gods. What beliefs did not originate on the Mainland?

The 1992 Consensus makes subtle use of the term "one China, different interpretations" to set aside a half a century of cross-Strait political controversy, even while it helps maintain historical, cultural, and familial links. It is precisely these links that make peace and stability between Taiwan and Mainland China possible. It is the hope of the Chinese people as a whole, It is the hope of Chinese people on Taiwan.

企業對兩岸關係期待朝野應重視
2012-01-06中國時報

繼長榮集團總裁張榮發公開力挺「九二共識」後，奇美實業董事長廖錦祥也出面表態，大選登記起跑後，國內知名企業紛紛表明他們對於兩岸關係的期待，競逐大位的朝野領袖不能無視於企業主的心聲，因為他們不只是「有錢人」，他們的肩上扛的是數以萬計的員工生計，特別是迄今猶否認「九二共識」的民進黨總統候選人蔡英文，萬萬不可輕忽人民的利益。

眾所周知，廖錦祥是民進黨立委候選人林佳龍的岳丈、奇美創辦人許文龍最重要的左右手，奇美與長榮都曾經是二千年總統大選時，陳水扁國政顧問團的龍頭成員，不論是愛台灣的心或民進黨最喜歡標榜的「本土意識」或「台灣意識」，他們不但不缺，甚至還充盈於心，正因為他們對台灣強烈的感情，讓他們更能體會什麼才是對台灣最有利的做法，這份對台灣真摰而強烈的感情，絕非政治人物的選舉算計可以比擬。

民進黨執政八年，本來很有機會為台灣、為曾經肩負台灣人民重大期待的民進黨創造一個歷史契機，帶領台灣開創一個嶄新的兩岸關係和進程，很遺憾的，當年陳水扁接受前中研院長李遠哲建議。準備接受「九二年對話的精神」，卻硬生生被時任陸委會主委的蔡英文擋下，李遠哲主持的跨黨派兩岸小組從此無疾而終。兩岸關係就此在緊張與持續的爭議中僵滯。

李登輝執政時期奠下的「九二精神」，在扁執政八年中斷，直到二○○五年才由國民黨榮譽主席連戰與大陸國家主席胡錦濤確認，並創造了「九二共識」這個名詞，國民黨重返執政後，馬政府得以在這個基礎下，順利開展兩岸關係。

沒有「九二共識」，就沒有如今愈見頻繁的兩岸直航航班、就沒有養活無數餐飲精品業的大陸觀光客、更沒有攸關台灣產品輸陸的兩岸經貿架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）、而台灣高科技亮點的面板和家電，在金融海嘯之際，亦拜大陸家電下鄉政策下大量採購而維繫生機，凡此種種，都不是蔡英文視而不見就不存在的事實。

蔡英文或許有心推動她心目中的「台灣共識」，但是，要知道兩岸關係不是台灣一廂情願說了算，台灣內部不論有任何政治上的歧見，對外協商談判都得找出一套說法，而這個說法還得對方能夠接受，蔡英文為了否定「九二共識」，甚至挑戰台灣不分藍綠和統獨的最大共識就是中華民國，反而強調自己的中華民國與國民黨總統候選人馬英九的中華民國不一樣，如果這是蔡英文的國家定位，連多數台灣人民都無法認同，又如何取信於北京她是能推展兩岸和平發展的對話對象？

大陸即使不承認中華民國，卻認可「九二共識」，同意台灣認知的「一個中國」就是中華民國，形同不否認中華民國，對台灣而言，以小事大，這是最有利的處境。大陸為什麼願意在「九二共識」的基礎下「讓利」，原因很簡單，因為雙方接受了「一個中國」的前提，但表述方式不同，既延續了兩岸的歷史淵源，也開啟了兩岸關係的未來遠景。

用最直接的方式表述，兩岸不論是過去曾經有過的一個中國（一九四九年兩岸分治前），或是（未來可能完成的一個中國）沒有時間表，在「九二共識」的基礎下，確認了兩岸都沒將彼此視為外人。也正因為兩岸是自己人，大陸才可以用較其他國際各國更優惠的條件，給予台灣各種方便，不論是對台商的優惠措施或者一般人民出入境的便利，如果台灣和大陸不是一家人，大陸對待台灣彷彿對待日韓或歐美，還有何讓利可言？

在政治上，台灣和大陸有不同的國家認同，但在文化上，台灣卻不能切斷與大陸之間相連的血脈。不要忘了，除了原住民之外，在台灣所有住民的祖先無不是自大陸渡海而來，只是時間先後有別；台灣民間習俗無不源自大陸中原，不但過的民俗節日相同，連我們逢年過節祭祀的神明，哪一尊不是來自大陸的信仰？

「九二共識」微妙地用「一個中國，各自表述」擱置兩岸對峙半世紀之外的政治爭議，維繫歷史、文化、血脈的繼續相連，並因為這樣的連結，讓台灣和大陸能夠和平穩定共榮，這是中國人的希望，更是台灣人的希望。

Taiwan's Economic Future Can Hardly be built on Pipe Dreams

2012-01-04T21:39:00.000-08:00

Taiwan's Economic Future Can Hardly be built on Pipe Dreams
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 5, 2011

Summary: Tsai Ing-wen boasts that "We will set the agenda within multilateral organizations. We will increase Taipei's space on the international stage." Is the ignorant? Is she naive? Or is she merely attempting to deceive outsiders and the general public? Tsai Ing-wen may have a dream. But Taiwan's economic future cannot be built on her personal, impracticable, unrealizable pipe dreams. She wants multilateral negotiations to replace bilateral and regional negotiations. In the end however, she will merely increase Taiwan's economic marginalization and isolation.

Full Text Below:

DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has issued numerous public statements during the recent presidential debates and policy presentations. Her ideas for Taiwan's economic future all call for organizing a negotiating team to "set the agenda" during negotiations within multilateral organizations. Is this a realistic solution? Is it practicable? Can it actually be implemented? Or is it all flash and no substance? Is it mere self-aggrandizement and self-deception? Will it put Taiwan's economy in grave danger?

Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly stressed the importance of multilateral organizations. Her goal is to get rid of the KMT created bilateral framework known as ECFA. When Ma and Tsai debated ECFA last year. Tsai Ing-wen harped on the importance of negotiations within multilateral organizations. She sternly rebuked Ma Ying-jeou. She said her scenario could be achieved during the WTO Doha Development Round negotiations. Her boast was of course nonsense. During the recent policy presentations, she once again vowed, "We will organize a strong negotiating team. The government will take the lead. It will work together with industry. We will strike in the international arena. We will set the agenda with multilateral organizations. We will increase Taiwan's international breathing space." She unquestionably has thing for negotiations within multilateral organizations.

Unfortunately, the global trend is running counter to Tsai Ing-wen's Goldilocks scenario. A number of multilateral economic and trade organizations have relations with us. The most important of course are the WTO (World Trade Organization) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). We have yet to become members. The United States is promoting the TPP (Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement). APEC remains a loose networking organization, irrelevant to our current discussion. The United States is promoting the TPP. Both Ma and Tsai say they intend to seek membership. But the TPP is an economic tool of Washington, designed to contain Beijing's influence in Asia. Its prospects remain uncertain. It is bound to become an arena in which the two giants, Beijing and Washington, jockey with each other for economic influence. Taipei cannot possibly hope to "set the agenda" here.

The WTO Doha Development Round of multilateral negotiations are still ongoing. They began in November 2001. Progress over the past decade has been slow. Results have been inconclusive. Over the past decade, negotiations were suspended twice. Negotiations were originally supposed to conclude in January 2005. But the deadline has been extended several times. No one knows when the talks will adjourn. In June this year, the Doha Development Round was changed. A compromise was reached. The rounds would be completed in phases. But WTO Secretary General Pascal Lamy says that only when agreement is reached on all issues will the talks be considered a success.

Compared this against the successful completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The Doha Development Round negotiations have encountered difficulties caused by external factors. The Uruguay Round negotiations were led by a small number of developed nations. The rest were mere followers. The Doha Development Round negotiations meanwhile, are subject to the growing strength of emerging countries. This has made already complex decision-making processes even more difficult. Agricultural and non agricultural market access are among the most divisive issues. The problems appear insoluble. Lamy described the impasse in negotiations as a Gordian Knot. An agreement was originally expected by the end of 2011. But this has once again been postponed.

The inescapable fact is that the Doha Development Round negotiations have stalled. Governments have switched to bilateral and regional trade agreements, and to various free-trade agreements (FTAs). As of this year, over 300 FTAs have been signed the world over, and the number continues to increase. South Korea and the European Union, India, the United States and other important countries have all signed FTAs. The Chinese Mainland and ASEAN's "East Asia Free Trade Area" has taken shape. It is being followed by Japan and South Korea's "ASEAN plus three." Tsai Ing-wen is enamored with negotiations within multilateral organizations. But such negotiations have made no progress. They have stalled across the board. Tsai Ing-wen's economic prescription reveals her utter ignorance of the strategic picture. If implemented, her economic prescription would leave Taiwan in dire straits.

Tsai Ing-wen is not merely ignorant about bilateral and regional negotiations around the globe. She is oblivious to the harsh international reality. Negotiations in multilateral organizations, as we all know, are conducted by the Big Guns. The major items on the agenda are always set by the major players. During such talks, the smaller countries can only nod in agreement. In future negotiations within multilateral organizations, the advanced nations of Europe and America will inevitably take the lead, along with the emerging BRIC economies and other countries with international influence. They will be the stars of the show. These countries have at least a trillion dollars or more in assets. The Taiwan Region of the ROC has an economy valued at $400 billion. By what stretch of the imagination can it "set the agenda" during negotiations within multilateral organizations? When has Taipei ever set the agenda during negotiations within multilateral organizations over the past several decades?

The DPP was in power for eight years. Tsai Ing-wen was vice premier for a year and a half. During that time, Taipei participated in negotiations within multilateral organizations. When did it ever "set the agenda?" Are we to understand that Taiwan's economic strength and international influence has suddenly grown by leaps and bounds over the past few years. Are we to understand that Taipei is now one of the Big Guns in the international arena, one able to "set the agenda?" Tsai Ing-wen boasts that "We will set the agenda within multilateral organizations. We will increase Taiwan's space on the international stage." Is the ignorant? Is she naive? Or is she merely attempting to deceive outsiders and the general public? Tsai Ing-wen may have a dream. But Taiwan's economic future cannot be built on her personal, impracticable, unrealizable pipe dreams. She wants multilateral negotiations to replace bilateral and regional negotiations. In the end however, she will merely increase Taiwan's economic marginalization and isolation.

台灣經濟前景不能建立在夢想上
2012-01-05中國時報

民進黨總統候選人蔡英文在多次公開發言中─包括辯論會與政見發表會上，對其未來的經濟主張，都曾提出要組織談判團，在多邊組織中「主導議題」。這到底是一個好藥方、可務實推動執行；還是一個華而不實、甚至自我膨脹、自我欺騙，反而置台灣經濟於險地的政策？

蔡英文所以再三強調多邊組織的重要，目的是破除國民黨主導的雙邊架構的ＥＣＦＡ。馬、蔡前年在ＥＣＦＡ辯論時，蔡英文就不斷強調多邊談判的重要，當時她更很權威的提醒馬英九，說當年ＷＴＯ的杜哈回合談判就可望成功─當然事實非如此。這次政見發表會時，她也再次提出「我們將會組織強而有力的談判團隊，由政府帶頭，跟企業一起打拚，在國際上衝鋒陷陣；我們會在多邊組織裡主導議題，創造台灣的空間。」她對多邊組織談判的確是情有獨鍾。

遺憾的是世界的趨勢顯然不是蔡英文腦中的圖像。在與我國有關的多邊經貿組織中，最重要的當然是ＷＴＯ（世界貿易組織）與ＡＰＥＣ（亞太經合會），勉強加一個我國尚未加入、美國力推中的ＴＰＰ（跨太平洋經濟夥伴協定）。ＡＰＥＣ猶是鬆散的對話聯誼組織，在此可略而不談。ＴＰＰ則雖然有美國力推，馬、蔡兩位候選人也都說要爭取加入，但實際情況則是ＴＰＰ是美國用以牽制大陸在亞洲經濟影響力的利器，前景未定，且註定是中、美兩大經濟體角力的場合，台灣要在其中「主導議題」，幾無可能。在此，我們還是看看ＷＴＯ的情況吧。

ＷＴＯ進行中的多邊談判─杜哈回合，從二○○一年十一月開始，至今冉冉十年過去，仍無結果。這十年間，曾有兩次談判中止，原訂二○○五年一月完成談判的最後期限也一延再延、終而不知何年可終止。今年六月，杜哈回合只好改以選擇分階段完成的妥協方案；但ＷＴＯ祕書長拉米也說，只有全部議題達成協議才算成功。

相較於烏拉圭回合談判順利完成，杜哈回合談判有其外在環境變化產生的困難。烏拉圭回合談判時，主要由少數幾個發達國家成員主導談判，其餘國家都是追隨者。但杜哈回合中，新興國家的力量日益壯大，讓決策過程變更複雜、更困難。其中農業與非農產品市場准入更是成員分歧最大之處，幾乎陷入無解困境。拉米就以「三角死結」形容談判僵局。原訂要在二○一一年底達成協議，結果還是要再延期。

擺在眼前的事實是，由於杜哈回合談判停滯難前，各國紛紛改採雙邊與區域性的貿易協定談判─即各類型的自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）為主。到今年為止，全球的ＦＴＡ已經有三百個之多了，而且還在持續增加中。看看南韓與歐盟、印度、美國等重要國家的ＦＴＡ紛紛上路，還有大陸與東協之間的「東亞自由貿易區」成型，隨後又啟動加上日本、韓國的「東協加三」，蔡英文獨鍾的多邊組織談判，卻毫無進展、全面停滯。蔡英文開出這帖昧於時勢的經濟藥方，豈不陷台灣於絕境？

蔡英文不僅昧於全球雙邊與區域談判的時勢，更完全昧於國際現實。坦白說，即使在多邊組織談判中，大家都知道，只有「大咖」才有下場玩的資格，永遠是主要大國在主導議題、談判角力，其它小國只有追隨附和的份。未來多邊組織中的要角，必然是歐美先進國家、及新興的金磚四國與其它經濟規模與國際影響力較大的國家，才是上場表演的主力。這些國家的經濟規模至少在一兆美元以上，經濟規模四千多億的台灣何德何能、能在多邊組織談判中主導議題？過去幾十年，台灣何時曾在多邊組織中主導議題過？

民進黨執政八年中、或是蔡英文任行政院副院長的一年半中，台灣在多邊組織談判中，發揮過什麼「主導議題」的角色？台灣的經濟實力與國際影響力，難道在這幾年中突飛猛進，有資格成為國際合縱連橫場上的「大咖」，所以能「主導議題」了？蔡英文承諾的「我們會在多邊組織裡主導議題，創造台灣的空間。」到底是不明世事、過於天真，還是說說用來騙外行人與一般民眾？蔡英文或許有此夢想，但台灣的經濟前景不能建立在她個人不切實際、完全不可能達到的夢想上。想以多邊組織談判取代雙邊與區域談判，最後可能讓台灣經濟更形邊緣、孤立化。

Is Tsai Ing-wen "People with Money?" Is Chang Rong-fa "People of Taiwan?"

2012-01-04T04:25:00.001-08:00

Is Tsai Ing-wen "People with Money?" Is Chang Rong-fa "People of Taiwan?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 4, 2011

Summary: After a number of business leaders openly endorsed Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen said: The people behind President Ma are all "people with money." The people behind Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, are "the people of Taiwan." Tsai was attempting to incite both "ethnic" conflict and class conflict. She was attempting to set "people with money" and "people without money" at each other's throats. She was attempting to set "the people of Taiwan" and "people not of Taiwan" at each others' throats.

Full Text Below:

After a number of business leaders openly endorsed Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen said: The people behind President Ma are all "people with money." The people behind Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, are "the people of Taiwan."

Tsai was attempting to incite both "ethnic" conflict and class conflict. She was attempting to set "people with money" and "people without money" at each other's throats. She was attempting to set "the people of Taiwan" and "people not of Taiwan" at each others' throats. Tsai even racheted up her demagoguery. Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric was a case of "two for the price of one." She insinuated that "people with money" are not "people of Taiwan." She insinuated that "the people of Taiwan" are "people without money." She insinuateed that "people with money" only know how to curry favor with the president, and are indifferent to "people without money."

Tsai Ing-wen's demagoguery reminds us of her very first tv ad: "I am Tsai Ing-wen, I am Taiwanese!" That was the opening shot in a campaign to demagogue "ethnic" identity. Now Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric is "two for the price of one." The public however would like to ask Tsai Ing-wen a question: Are you yourself "people with money," or "people without money?"

Tsai Ing-wen is the pampered princess of a wealthy family. Of course she is "people with money." Of course she is "Taiwanese." Therefore Tsai Ing-wen herself has shown that "Taiwanese" can also be "people with money." How many "people with money" on Taiwan, are "not people of Taiwan?" Why is Tsai Ing-wen stooping to such sleazy rhetoric? Why is she pitting those "people with money" who support Ma Ying-jeou's political and economic views against "Taiwanese?"

Given Tsai Ing-wen's "two for the price of one" rhetoric, we may wish to examine the long-standing relationship between political leaders and business tycoons. Chiang Ching-kuo dedicated his life to establishing a framework within which free enterprise could thrive. But he scrupulously avoided cultivating personal relationships with business leaders. Under Lee Teng-hui, all that changed. Lee was very chummy indeed with business people. Evergreen's Chang Rong-fa, Chi Mei's Hsu Wen-lung, and Yi Mei's Kao Chi-shang all publicly supported Lee. By the time Chen Shui-bian came to power, wealthy businessmen were driving up to Chen Shui-bian's Official Residence and delivering up cardboard boxes stuffed with cash. Under Ma Ying-jeou, the relationship between government officials and business leaders reverted to the way it was under Chiang Ching-kuo. Ma srcupulously avoided private contacts with business people. He became even warier of such contacts after taking flak for dining with Fubon Bank officials.

Ma's interaction with business leaders is limited to shared political and economic convictions regarding how to bolster the nation's economy. Ma's interaction with business leaders is as different from Chen Shui-bian's as night and day. Just listen to the entrepreneurs who have endorsed Ma Ying-jeou. They all offer the same reason for endorsing Ma: he is squeaky clean. The entrepreneurs who supported Chen Shui-bian and the DPP could never say that about their candidate.

Tsai Ing-wen says the people behind President Ma are all "people with money." Her implication is that the Ma administration is guilty of government business collusion. This accusation is unfair, not just to Ma Ying-jeou, but to the entrepreneurs Tsai has contemptuously labeled "ma you you" (a play on the name of famed cellist Yo-Yo Ma, meaning "friends of Ma"). Did they endorse Ma out of greed? Are they seeking backroom deals? Or did they endorse Ma simply because they fear for Taiwan and its people? The public knows they are far more concerned about saving Taiwan than they are about backing Ma Ying-jeou. Does Tsai Ing-wen really have no qualms about pitting "people with money" against "the people of Taiwan?"

When it comes to relations between government officials and business leaders, Ma Ying-jeou is the cleanest, most honest president since the lifting of martial law. He has virtually no private contacts with business leaders. This year is the first time since direct presidential elections were instituted that industry and business leaders have endorsed candidates so openly. Their shared motive for endorsing Ma is summed up in the newspaper ad posted by Ruentex Industries chief Yin Yan-liang: "Taiwan needs an open and stable policy environment. Taiwan can not afford stagnation and uncertainty in cross-Strait relations."

Evergreen's Chang Rong-fa was once a generous benefactor to Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. This is common knowledge. But Chang Rong-fa now says "Ma Ying-jeou has his shortcomings. But he is a leader with personal integrity who can be trusted." Such views cannot be dismissed as merely the views of "people with money." Such views reflect the views of "the people of Taiwan."

Every society has a pyramidal rich to poor hierarchy. Large corporations boast tens of thousands of employees. SMEs proliferate in the middle and lower reaches of the production chain. Any disturbance can easily increase or decrease GDP growth one to two percent. These employees, who number in the millions, are breadwinners for entire families. These business leaders are not merely seeking conditions favorable for themselves. They also speak for pineapple cake and night market vendors. Tsai Ing-wen has demonized these "people with money." She has depicted them as enemies of "the people of Taiwan." She has depicted them as enemies of "people without money."

Tsai Chieh-sheng, Tsai Ing-wen's father, started out as an auto repairman. He is a perfect example of how "people without money" in the Republic of China became "people with money" over the past 60 years. He is a perfect example of how Tsai Ing-wen became a "Taiwanese person with money." Why is Tsai classifying "people with money" who do not share her political and economic views as "not Taiwanese?" After all, Ma Ying-jeou is a presidential candidate who enjoys the support of approximately half the electorate. The vast majority of his supporters are not "people with money." Tsai Ing-wen cannot characterize any of them as "not Taiwanese."

It is normal for people to hold different political and economic views in a democratic society. But it is not normal to stoop to sleazy demagoguery. It is not normal to incite "ethnic" and class hatred. Tsai Ing-wen is "people with money." She is also "Taiwanese." But isn't Chang Rong-fa? Isn't Wang Wen-yuan? Isn't Yan Kai-tai? Aren't Bruce Cheng and Terry Gou?

Tsai Ing-wen, if you are elected president, which of these "people with money" will you denounce as "not Taiwanese?"

蔡英文是否有錢人？張榮發是否台灣人？
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.01.04

多名企業領袖相繼公開挺馬之後，蔡英文說：站在馬總統後面的都是有錢人，站在我蔡英文後面的是台灣人。

這是極不入流的族群及階級操作。階級操作，是把「有錢人」和「無錢人」對立起來；族群操作則是將「台灣人」與「非台灣人」對立起來。變本加厲的是，在蔡英文的此次「雙料操作」中，她要暗示的是：「有錢人」不是「台灣人」，「台灣人」都是「無錢人」；「有錢人」只會巴結總統，不知顧惜台灣的「無錢人」。

這樣的操作，令人想起了蔡英文的首支電視廣告說：「我是蔡英文，我是台灣人！」這是族群操作的起身砲；然而，如今又見蔡英文的「雙料操作」，國人可不可以問：蔡英文，妳是有錢人，還是無錢人？

蔡英文是富家千金，當然是有錢人；但蔡英文也當然是台灣人。由此可見，至少在蔡英文這個例子上，「台灣人」也可以是「有錢人」，而「有錢人」又誰不是「台灣人」？然而，為何蔡英文竟要如此不入流地將支持馬英九政經觀點的「有錢人」，與所謂的「台灣人」對立起來？

從蔡英文的「雙料操作」，不妨檢視歷來政治領袖與企業鉅子的關係。蔣經國一生為企業創造經營環境，但他與企業領袖幾無私交；李登輝與企業人物的往來密切，長榮張榮發、奇美許文龍、義美高志尚等皆曾公開力挺；至陳水扁時代，富商巨賈更是裝滿整車整箱的現鈔絡繹不絕地運往玉山官邸。到了馬英九，則從未聞他和企業人士的私密接觸；與富邦吃了幾餐飯被叮到滿頭包後，他更是高壘深溝，避之若浼。

大體而言，馬與企業領袖的互動，皆因政經觀點相同而相互拉抬國家經濟大局，此與陳水扁時代的政商勾結、狗苟蠅營，大相逕庭；只要看每一位出面力挺馬英九的企業家，第一個理由就指馬「清廉」，這就是當年挺扁挺民進黨的企業家絕對說不出口的理由。

蔡英文指馬英九背後站的都是有錢人，不外就是在暗示官商勾結、狗苟蠅營那回事。但這種說法，非但對馬英九不公平，也是對那些她口中的「馬友友」企業家的人格汙辱，難道他們挺馬，是因貪求私相授受，而不是為了台灣經濟全局與國家前途而為全民請命？任人皆知，他們救台灣的用心其實比挺馬更殷切，蔡英文何忍將這些「有錢人」與「台灣人」對立起來？

馬英九可謂是戒嚴後與企業領袖關係最清白廉潔的總統，彼此大多無私交密往；但今年卻也是歷屆總統直選中，工商領袖公開表態最踴躍的一次，他們共同的理由大致如潤泰尹衍樑在報上登的挺馬廣告所說：「台灣需要一個開放穩定的政策環境，……台灣不能再承受兩岸關係的停滯與不確定。」

例如，長榮張榮發過去挺李、挺扁是人所共知的；但如今張榮發卻說：「馬英九難免有缺點，卻是人格可信任的領導人。」這樣的觀點不能只視之為「有錢人」的觀點，自然也是反映了「台灣人」的信念。

當然，就經濟面看，任何社會皆呈貧富差異的金字塔狀；但現今每一個大企業，動輒均有數萬員工，中下游的中小企業更是瓜瓞綿延，動輒可牽動零點幾至一、二個ＧＤＰ的消長；而這些數以百萬計的員工，每一位都是一個家庭的經濟支撐；何況，這些企業領袖，不止為工商業力爭良好的政策環境，他們也為賣鳳梨酥者及六合夜市的攤商發言。這類的「有錢人」卻被蔡英文操作成與「台灣人」及「無錢人」站在對立面。

蔡英文的父親蔡潔生，是從修車工人起家，見證了中華民國六十餘年來「有錢人」與「無錢人」的流變；因而，蔡英文自己今天成了「有錢的台灣人」，卻何必將所有只因與其政經政見相左的其他「有錢人」打成「非台灣人」；何況，馬英九至少亦是擁有約半數選票支持的總統候選人，那些挺馬者絕大多數皆不是「有錢人」，但沒有一個可以被蔡英文斥以「不是台灣人」。

政經見解不同，是民主社會的常態，但不可玩弄成不入流的族群操作及階級操作。蔡英文是有錢人，也同時是台灣人；但難道張榮發不是？王文淵不是？嚴凱泰不是？鄭崇華、郭台銘不是？

請問蔡英文：若當選總統，妳能把這些「有錢人」哪一個不當成「台灣人」？

Democracy's Lament: The Theory that Policy Achievements are Useless

2012-01-02T22:45:00.001-08:00

Democracy's Lament: The Theory that Policy Achievements are Useless
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 3, 2011

Summary: Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen are in a tug of war. Observers are puzzled. They are trying to understand voter sentiment by examining the candidates' character, the accuracy of the polls, the voters' political coloration, and the rival political parties' campaign strategies. One of the most peculiar explanations for voter sentiment is Taichung City Mayor Jason Hu's "Policy Achievements are Useless Theory," which concludes that voters really do not care about the candidate's record of policy achievements.

Full Text Below:

Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen are in a tug of war. Observers are puzzled. They are trying to understand voter sentiment by examining the candidates' character, the accuracy of the polls, the voters' political coloration, and the rival political parties' campaign strategies. One of the most peculiar explanations for voter sentiment is Taichung City Mayor Jason Hu's "Policy Achievements are Useless Theory," which concludes that voters really do not care about the candidate's record of policy achievements.

Jason Hu's theory is based on his own experience as mayor last year, and on Ma Ying-jeou's lack of momentum this year. These led him to his current "Policy Achievements are Useless Theory." He says elections today are perverse, Voters turn a blind eye to performance. In the past, if a candidate's past performance was good, he stood a good chance of being reelected. But voters today are "unmoved" by a candidate's policy achievements. Consider Ma and Tsai for example. One of them has a glowing record of policy achievements. The other has absolutely nothing to show for her years in office. Yet a majority of the voters perceive "no difference" between the two.

Hu's interpretation, his personal experience, and his subjective judgments, are not necessarily accurate. But judging by the current campaign, this "Policy Achievements are Useless Theory" contains more than a kernel of truth. No matter how much President Ma does, no matter how his administration's policy path has benefited Taiwan, many voters simply do not care. In other words, amidst Blue vs. Green political rivalry, party loyalty far outweighs concern for policy achievements. An infamous Green Camp expression, "Even though our bellies may be empty, we still intend to vote for Ah-Bian" is the best evidence of this. The Chen family corruption scandals had absolutely no impact on voters' party loyalties. Swing voters meanwhile, became increasingly cynical. This was probably the biggest change for Taiwan's democracy.

Leave aside the question of whether Ma Ying-jeou or Tsai Ing-wen is more likely to win the election for the moment. If the "Policy Achievements are Useless Theory" is true, then what voters care about is not the candidate's performance or integrity. If true, what is the point of democracy on Taiwan? What is its purpose? What is its significance?

Leave aside the validity of the "Policy Achievements are Useless Theory" for the moment. Ma Ying-jeou has the power of the incumbency. Yet he continues to fight an uphill battle. This amounts to a wake-up call. Ma Ying-jeou has governed for the past three years. He has been harshly criticized not for his policy decisions, but for being "too wimpy," and for excessive concern for details at the expense of the Big Picture. On the one hand, this has not won him any fans in the Green Camp. On the other hand, this has lost him fans in the Blue Camp. Ma Ying-jeou earnestly aspires to be a "president for all the people." But his efforts have been for naught. Blue vs. Green polarization on Taiwan has not softened as a result of his moderate temperament. On the contrary, it has led to cease identifying with him. This is something he must consider.

Consider Ma's performance. President Ma promoted cross-Strait peace and negotiations. He enabled the ROC to avoid domestic struggle and provided it with international breathing room. He has obtained visa free treatment for ROC citizens in over 100 foreign countries. He promoted justice system reforms, residential tax reform, and even the abolition of tax exemption for military and civil service employees. He ensured stable development during the international financial crisis. These achievements may not warrant the term "brilliant successes." But compare it to the Chen era's Closed Door Policy, to its bull in a china shop diplomacy, to its endless domestic struggles, to its total inability to govern the nation, to its ubiquitous slogans. The Ma administration has at least put the country back on track. How should a normal political party govern? Are the voters "unmoved?" Do they wish to return to internecine struggles, to an endless succession of premiership appointments? Is that what the people consider "vitality?"

That said, a presidential election does not merely elect a national leader. More importantly, the electorate applies its collective intelligence during this political process. This is how the electorate establishes a sounder, more pluralistic society for itself and for the next generation. Democracy on Taiwan has undergone many changes. But Rome wasn't built in a day. Advances are followed by retreats. The road is strewn with tears. The fear is that people will not be able to withstand the heat, and will abandon the kitchen. That they will become cynical and lose heart. That they will conclude it "makes no difference" who wins. That they will conclude "crows the world over are equally black." Such disillusionment, such a loss of voters with minds of their own, is the greatest threat to democracy on Taiwan.

The "Policy Achievements are Useless Theory" is not a prediction, It is a curse. If people do not believe in performance, if politicians do not care about performance, then a political process without purpose will lead to nihilism. Democracy will leave behind only sadness. Tsai's policy achievements cannot be compared to Ma's. But let us compare them anyway. Let us compare the Ma administration's four years in office with the Chen administration's eight years in office. Both the quality and quantity offer concrete bases for comparison. The TaiMed biotech subsidies scandal has exposed Tsai Ing-wen's corrupt underbelly. She is no longer tabula rasa. She is no longer a dream candidate. Voters now have a basis by which they can assess the two candidates' character and integrity.

The current election appears calm on the surface. But beneath the surface, lurks frustration with the status quo and anxiety about the future. Will the future be better? The answer will not emerge from the mouths of politicians. Voters must subject the candidates' achievements and character to rigorous scrutiny. Only then can the future be better.

政績無用論：民主的詭異與哀愁
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.01.03 02:46 am

對於馬英九和蔡英文之間的選情拉鋸，外界都相當好奇，也試圖從人格特質、民調準確度、選民色彩及政黨選戰策略等方面尋找答案。其中最奇特的解讀，莫過於台中市長胡志強提出的「政績無用論」，認為選民根本不在乎政績。

胡志強是根據他自己去年市長選舉及今年馬英九的選情，推出「政績無用」的結論。他說，現在選舉很詭異，選民不看政績；以往候選人政績好，很容易勝出，但現在選民覺得什麼都「無感」。就像馬英九和蔡英文，一個政績如山，一個掛零，但多數選民卻覺得「沒差」。

胡志強的解讀，包含了他個人的經驗和主觀判斷，未必準確；但就選情觀察，這個「政績無用論」作為一種後設推論，卻隱然成立。不管馬總統做了多少事，他領導的團隊走的路線如何有利於台灣，許多選民就是不在乎。亦即，在藍與綠的競爭中，選民對政黨的認同強度遠大過對政績的認知。當年綠營那句名言「肚子扁扁，也要投阿扁」，就是最佳佐證。而歷經扁家貪瀆風暴，兩端選民的政黨偏好基本上沒有改變，中間選民卻變得更憤世嫉俗，這恐怕才是台灣民主的最大變數。

拋開馬英九和蔡英文的當選機率不談，如果政績無用論果真成立，選民要求的不是政績、關心的不是候選人的品格操守，那麼台灣民主追求的是什麼？政治目的和意義又何在？

不論「政績無用論」有幾分真實，對馬英九而言，握有執政優勢、選戰卻仍打得如此艱辛，自是一記當頭棒喝。事實上，執政三年多來，馬英九備受批評的，並非他的決策錯誤，而是他的性格過於溫和、闡述過於瑣碎與決策圈過於狹小；這一方面無助為他爭取到綠色選民的認同，另方面卻讓他流失泛藍的既有支持。馬英九心心念念要成為「全民總統」，結果卻力有未逮，台灣的藍綠對峙並未因為他的溫良恭儉讓而消弭，反而導致認同渙散，這是他應該深自反省之處。

事實上，若論政績，馬總統推動兩岸和平交流協商，他讓台灣在沒有內鬥煙硝中走出國際空間，達到一百多國免簽。他推動司法、住宅改革乃至取消軍公教免稅，並在國際金融危機中極力維持台灣的穩定發展。這些成績，或許稱不上是什麼光輝燦爛的成就；但若比起扁政府時代的鎖國，對外胡亂衝撞、對內惡鬥虛耗，治國無半步、口號卻滿天飛，馬政府至少把國家從脫軌失序狀態帶回正軌。對於一個正常治理的政黨，如果選民覺得「無感」，難道要重回內鬥連天、內閣連年更換的狀態，人民才能感覺到台灣的活力？

話說回來，總統大選不只是要選出一個國家領導人，更重要的是，全體選民從這個政治過程凝鍊更多智慧和理性。那樣，選民才能為自己和下一代打造更健康、多元的社會。回顧台灣的民主，今昔已有很大的變化；但這個進步的過程並非一步到位，而是有進有退、有恨有淚。最怕的是，人們承受不住選戰的腥膻與紛亂，而變得憤世嫉俗或灰心喪志，甚至覺得選誰都「沒差」，天下政治都一般黑。這種失去意志、失去主見的選民，才是台灣民主最大的威脅。

「政績無用論」不是一個預言，卻是一個詛咒：如果人民不相信政績，如果政治人物可以不在乎政績，那麼，失去目的的政治勢必走向虛無，民主將徒留哀愁。馬英九和蔡英文的政績，雖不等量，但仍可拿來比一比；馬政府四年和扁政府八年，在質量上都可提供更具體的比較。而隨著蔡英文治黨及宇昌案內幕的揭露，她已不再是夢幻人選白紙一片；在這個基礎上，馬、蔡兩人的行事風格也值得選民重新估量。

這次大選，表面上看似冷靜，深層卻掩藏著人們對現狀的無奈與對未來的不安。但未來會不會更好，答案不在政治人物的口號中，選民必須嚴格檢驗他們的政績與人格才行！

A Vote for James Soong is a Vote for Tsai Ing-wen

2012-01-02T02:17:00.000-08:00

A Vote for James Soong is a Vote for Tsai Ing-wen
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 2, 2011

Summary:James Soong must make his position clear. Is "Rejecting Ma, Defending Taiwan" really his strategy for saving the nation? Soong says that if he drops out of the race now, "What kind of a person would he be?" But suppose he and Tsai Ing-wen succeed in "Rejecting Ma, Defending Taiwan" and promoting Taiwan independence on January 14? He can stop wondering what kind of person he will be. He will go down in infamy as a "Wang Ching-wei and Wu Sangui," as a traitor and a turncoat, He will have to answer to Soong Ta, his late father, who defended the Republic of China with his life, in the world hereafter.

Full Text Below:

Some have said, "A vote for James Soong is a vote for Tsai Ing-wen," James Soong is threatening to sue them. But "A vote for James Soong is a vote for Tsai Ing-wen." This is all too clear.

This is the result of simple number crunching. The consensus is that Tsai Ing-wen could win as much as 47% of the vote, Ma Ying-jeou will then have to win 48%. Add 47% to 48% and one is left with 5%. In other words, if James Soong wins over 5% of the vote, Ma will lose.

We are assuming that Tsai Ing-wen could win 47% of the vote. Consider two points that support this possibility. One. In 2008 Frank Hsieh won 42% of the vote. The DPP currently enjoys more momentum than it did in 2008. Tsai Ing-wen currently enjoys more momentum than Frank Hsieh did in 2008. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen should be able to win at least 42% of the vote. Two. In 2004, Chen Shui-bian won 50.11% of the vote. The 3/19 Shooting Incident was a factor of course. But in the DPP still has the potential to win nearly 50% of the vote. The Democratic Progressive Party currently enjoys greater momentum than it did in 2004. Tsai Ing-wen currently enjoys greater momentum than Chen Shui-bian did in 2004. Therefore, Tsai has the potential to win nearly 50% of the vote. Given these parameters, the claim that Tsai Ing-wen could win 47% of the vote is highly persuasive.

As mentioned before, if Soong wins over 5% of the vote, Ma will lose. So the first question is, could Soong win 5% of the vote? The answer is yes, he could. Because 5% is 650,000 votes, Assume 150,000 votes island-wide. If James Soong receives 40 or more votes at each polling station, he can easily attain that number of votes. It is entirely possible.

In other words, whether Soong can win 5% of the vote is a matter of statistics. It is possible. In the 2006 Taipei mayoral election he won 4.1% of the vote. Conversely, if James Soong fails to win 5% of the vote, it means the electorate has matured and better understands world events. Now that would be a greater statistical and sociological anomaly. That would be far more improbable.

The only certainty in the current election, is that James Soong absolutely will not win. If Tsai wins 47% of the vote, Soong will have to win 48% of the vote. In other words, he would have to ensure that Ma wins less than 5% of the vote. But polls currently show Soong winning only 6 to 7% of the vote. Oddsmakers are giving him less than a 1% chance of victory. Some are giving him odds as low as 0.1%. Soong absolutely will not win. That much is certain. James Soong knows this perfectly well.

The vast majority of the votes Soong have won so far are Blue Camp votes. That is because Soong's campaign appeal is hardline reunificationist. No Green Camp voter is ever going to vote for Soong. Therefore every vote Soong wins will be a Blue Camp vote. Every vote Soong wins will increase the risk of Ma losing and and Tsai winning. Therefore a vote for James Soong is a vote for Tsai Ing-wen, This is a simple fact, about which there can be no doubt.

James Soong is deliberately undermining Ma and assisting Tsai. But he contradicts himself. James Soong's core values are allegiance to the Republic of China Constitution and promoting cross-Strait rapproachment. He publicly affirmed Ma's ECFA as a "important effort." He openly criticized Tsai for repudiating the 1992 Consensus. He said it would have "serious consequences." These represent Soong's core values, Yet he is persists in toppling Ma, who made an "important effort" and elevating Tsai, whose election will have "serious consequences." Is this not a contradiction?

Nobody knows that James Soong is unelectable better than James Soong. Nobody knows better than James Soong that a Tsai Ing-wen victory would have "serious consequences" for the nation's constitution and for cross-Strait relations. When someone asked James Soong about the "5% difference between life and death," he said "The important thing is not the 5%, but who can prevent Taiwan's decline." But James Soong is doing his utmost to unseat Ma Ying-jeou and to put Tsai Ing-wen in control of the Taiwan independence juggernaut. He is personally ensuring Taiwan's decline.

James Soong can nurse all sorts of personal grudges against his rivals. But if he still gives a damn about his country or his compatriots, he has no excuse to lead 5% of the voters down the primrose path. He has no excuse to create "serious consequences" leading to Taiwan's decline. James Soong clearly knows he is undermining the Republic of China and harming Taiwan. But his Blue Camp supporters think he is championing justice and saving the nation. Do they really knot know James Soong is taking advantage of them? Do they really not know they are helping to elevate Tsai Ing-wen to the office of Republic of China President?

The election is dangerously close. Unless Tsai Ing-wen breaks through the 50% mark and achieves an absolute majority, or receives less than 45% of the vote, James Soong's votes will decide whether Ma Ying-jeou is elected. One percent equals 130,000 votes. Never mind claims that 5% will decide life and death. One percent could be all that is necessary to decide the fate of Ma and Tsai.

James Soong must make his position clear. Is "Rejecting Ma, Defending Taiwan" really his strategy for saving the nation? Soong says that if he drops out of the race now, "What kind of a person would he be?" But suppose he and Tsai Ing-wen succeed in "Rejecting Ma, Defending Taiwan" and promoting Taiwan independence on January 14? He can stop wondering what kind of person he will be. He will go down in infamy as a "Wang Ching-wei and Wu Sangui," as a traitor and a turncoat, He will have to answer to Soong Ta, his late father, who defended the Republic of China with his life, in the world hereafter.

選宋楚瑜就是選蔡英文
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.01.02 03:10 am

有人說，「選宋楚瑜就是選蔡英文」，宋楚瑜揚言提告；然而，「選宋楚瑜就是選蔡英文」，已是昭然若揭的事實。

這是以數字推演出來的結論。一般的說法是：若以蔡英文的得票率為四十七％當做準據，則馬英九若要贏蔡英文，就至少必須得票四十八％。四十七加四十八，餘下的空間只有百分之五；也就是說，在此一架構下，宋楚瑜的得票若超過百分之五，馬必落選。

此一架構的假設前提是蔡英文得票四十七％。有兩個參考點，可以支持此項假設。一、謝長廷在二○○八得票約四十二％，而此時民進黨的氣勢勝二○○八的民進黨，此時蔡的聲勢勝二○○八的謝，因此蔡英文的得票至少可從四十二％起跳。二、陳水扁在二○○四年得票五十‧一一％，當年雖有三一九槍擊案影響，但無論如何皆顯示民進黨有得票近五十％的潛力；而此時民進黨的氣勢勝二○○四年，此時的蔡勝二○○四的扁，因此蔡的得票率亦有向五十％趨近的實力。從這兩個參數作出蔡英文得票四十七％的推論，具有說服力。

如前所述，在這個架構下，宋若得票超過五％，馬即落選。那麼，宋的得票會不會有五％呢？答案是有可能。因為，五％就是六十五萬票，若以全國一萬五千個票匭來計算，只要宋楚瑜在每一個票匭開出四十幾票，就能達到那個票數，怎謂沒有可能？

也就是說，宋要拿到五％選票，從統計的常態分布來看，是有可能的（他在二○○六台北市長選舉得票四‧一四％）；反過來說，如果宋楚瑜拿不到五％，則那種選民的表現所透露的對世局國情的深刻成熟思考，才是統計學及社會學上的異態，反而可以令人驚異不置。

此次選舉唯一可以確切預言之事，就是宋楚瑜絕對不會當選。因為，仍以蔡得票四十七％為準據，宋若要當選，須獲四十八％選票，也就是要將馬壓至五％以下；但如今宋的民調在六至七％徘徊，其看好率則在一％以下，甚至有時低至○‧一％。宋之絕對不會當選，是當然與必然之理，亦為宋楚瑜自己心知肚明之事。

此時宋能拉到的選票，絕對大多數應是泛藍的選票。因為，宋標舉的是極統觀點，不可能有泛綠選民把票投給宋；所以，宋拉到的每一張泛藍選票，都會造成使馬落選的壓力，亦將成為使蔡當選的助力。因此，選宋楚瑜就是選蔡英文，這個論點可謂理所當然，毫無疑問。

問題在於：宋楚瑜執意倒馬挺蔡，卻陷於自我矛盾之中。宋楚瑜的中心觀點仍在國憲認同與兩岸政策，他公開肯定馬的ＥＣＦＡ是「重大努力」，又公開指蔡之否定九二共識「後果嚴重」；倘若這是宋的真信仰，他卻要拉下「重大努力」的馬，而要拉上「後果嚴重」的蔡，這豈不是自相矛盾？

沒有人比宋楚瑜更知道他絕對不會當選，也很少人比宋楚瑜更知道蔡英文若當選，將在國憲認同及兩岸關係上發生的「嚴重後果」。有人問起「五％生死門」的問題，宋楚瑜說：「重要的不是五％，而是誰能不讓台灣趴下去！」但是，宋楚瑜如今正在做的事，就是要拚命拉下馬英九，將台灣綁在蔡英文的台獨戰車上，親眼目送台灣就這樣趴下去！

宋楚瑜如果有一丁點為國為民的不忍之念，即使他有千般百般的私仇私恨，也沒有理由裹惑五％的選民與他一起去製造「嚴重的後果」，「讓台灣趴下去」。宋楚瑜明明知道他自己是在摧毀國脈傷害台灣，但那些迄今仍支持他的泛藍選民，尚以為是在伸張正義救國家；那些泛藍選民難道知道：宋楚瑜現在要利用他們去做的，其實是等於要他們扶助蔡英文做中華民國總統？

選情緊繃，間不容髮。除非蔡英文可衝破五十％過半選票，或蔡英文的選票低於四十五％；否則，宋楚瑜的得票高低必定是馬英九能否當選的決定性因素。一％十三萬票，莫說五％是生死門，一％都可能決定馬蔡二人的生死。

宋楚瑜必須說明的是，「棄馬保台」難道就是他的救國方略？他說，現在如果不選了，「連人都做不成了」；但當他在一月十四日若與蔡英文共同實現了「棄馬保台」的台獨大業，莫說「人做不成」，當他揹上「汪精衛／吳三桂」的罵名，恐怕另日也無顏見他那為捍衛中華民國而浴血苦戰的亡父宋達於地下了！

Denigrating Direct Links while Celebrating Three Mini-links: Tsai Ing-wen's Fundamental Contradiction

2011-12-29T20:32:00.001-08:00

Denigrating Direct Links while Celebrating Three Mini-links: Tsai Ing-wen's Fundamental Contradiction
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 30, 2011

Summary: The two sides have now achieved comprehensive peace. They look forward to more win/win exchanges in the future. Even a minor setback could lead to significant losses. Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to overcome her biggest Achilles Heel during the last moments of her campaign. She is desperately attempting to prove that cross-Strait relations will remain peaceful even if she is elected. Ironically, her attempts to bind the Three Mini-links hand and foot failed. They could not prevent vitally important cross-strait exchanges.

Full Text Below:

History often surprises us, DPP leaders assumed the TaiMed corruption scandal was water under the bridge. Yet it became an albatross around their presidential candidate's neck. By contrast, when legislators from Kinmen and Matsu energetically promoted the Three Mini-links, the DPP want along reluctantly. Today however, Tsai Ing-wen is trumpeting it as one of her vanishingly few cross-Strait achievements. The DPP is now singing praises to the Three Mini-links. The DPP has consciously blanked out its former vilification of Direct Links. But the voters have not. From beginning to end, the DPP has flip-flopped on cross-Strait policy. It has been unable to unburden itself of its ideological baggage.

Twenty days before the election, Tsai Ing-wen made a special trip to Kinmen and issued a proclamation. She boasted that when she was Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, she overcame countless obstacles promoting the Three Mini-links. She lamented how she had to endure sexual innuendos such as "xiao san tong, tong xiao san." The reality is Blue Camp legislators from Kinmen and Matsu had to fight DPP legislators tooth and nail to pass the Three Mini-links. Now the DPP is actually trying to steal credit for their achievement. They cannot be happy about that.

Promoting the Three Mini-links required the "Offshore Development Regulations" as a legal basis. In March 2000, just before the DPP assumed power, legislators from Kinmen and Matsu joined forces and passed the Three Mini-links. The DPP regime may have promoted the Three Mini-links after it came to power, but only after binding it hand and foot. People from Taiwan could only invest in Mainland China with prior approval. Only veterans from Fujian could qualify for travel to and from the Mainland Region. Only in June 2008, after the Ma administration took office, did the program include both the Three Mini-links and "Three Mega-links" (i.e., Direct Links). Only then were the restrictions removed. Only then was everyone from the Taiwan Region permitted to travel to and from the Mainland Region. Only then could expanded cross-Strait exchanges take place.

The only reason the DPP was willing to promote the Three Mini-links, was that it was unwilling to promote cross-Strait Direct Flights. Under pressure from public opinion, it grudgingly consented to the Three Mini-links as an alternative. Some observers noted that the DPP was using the Three Mini-links to block Direct Links. Tsai Ing-wen now boasts that she championed the Three Mini-links. But when the DPP was in power, it imposed severe limitations on them. The DPP's underlying motive was to minimize contacts between people on the two sides, not to maximize their convenience.

This is how the DPP dealt with the Three Mini-links. Needless to say, the DPP's attitude toward Direct Links was far more hostile. During the 2008 presidential election, the DPP openly denounced cross-Strait Direct Flights, blaming them for hollowing out Taiwan's industry. According to WikiLeaks, on December 17, 2008, after the Ma administration officially inaugurated Direct Links, Tsai Ing-wen complained to the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). She said "Direct Links will harm businesses and consumers on Taiwan. The huge influx of [Mainland] Chinese goods may cause many businesses on Taiwan to fail."

Now, three years after Direct Links were inaugurated, Tsai Ing-wen's predictions have been proven totally wrong. Businesses have not closed down as a result of Direct Links. Consumers have not been harmed by Mainland Chinese consumer goods. Just the opposite. Cross-strait Direct Flights have have saved people an inestimable amount of time and energy. They have reduced the cost of doing business. They have become an essential right.

Only in April of this year did Tsai Ing-wen belatedly repudiate her previously held opposition. Only then, during the DPP's presidential primary debate, did she proclaim that if the Democratic Progressive Party returned to power in 2008, it would continue to allow Direct Flights and continue to allow Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan. The DPP violently opposed Direct Flights. Yet today Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to steal credit for them. In effect, she is rewriting the history of how Direct Flights came into existence.

How does Tsai Ing-wen compare to other DPP leaders? Frankly Tsai Ing-wen is so conservative in her outlook, she reeks of Cold War era "no contact, no negotiations, no compromise" sentiment. During her recent Kinmen proclamation, she went through the motions. She replicated Chen Shui-bian's "bold remarks" in Kinmen of 2002. But compare the substance. Chen Shui-bian actually proposed cross-Strait exchanges. He invited then Beijing leader Jiang Zemin to tea. Tsai Ing-wen by contrast, reluctantly agreed to severely hobbled Three Mini-links. Chen Shui-bian was actually more open-minded than Tsai Ing-wen.

Chen Shui-bian set forth his "Five Noes" and made his "bold remarks." He actually intended to promote cross-Strait reconciliation and a new cross-Strait scenario, But he was hijacked by Taiwan independence fundamentalists. He was unable to deliver. Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policies are actually more rigid than Chen's. When she was chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, she prevented Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus. When she became DPP chairman, she expelled DPP members who took part in exchanges between the KMT and the CCP. In 2009, she launched a public referendum opposing ECFA. She alleged that ECFA would force Taiwan to pay a painful economic and political price.

This is the real Tsai Ing-wen, a person sure to frighten away moderate and rational voters. Even Washington is concerned that if Tsai Ing-wen takes office, cross-Strait relations will become tense. This is why Tsai Ing-wen has been repeatedly fine-tuning her campaign message. For example, she has vowed to honor ECFA, even as she repudiates the 1992 Consensus. This is why during her trip to Kinmen the day before yesterday, she tried to pad her cross-Strait policy resume. She is desperate to prove that if she is elected, cross-Strait relations will not disintegrate.

The two sides have now achieved comprehensive peace. They look forward to more win/win exchanges in the future. Even a minor setback could lead to significant losses. Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to overcome her biggest Achilles Heel during the last moments of her campaign. She is desperately attempting to prove that cross-Strait relations will remain peaceful even if she is elected. Ironically, her attempts to bind the Three Mini-links hand and foot failed. They could not prevent vitally important cross-strait exchanges.

詆毀大三通頌揚小三通根本矛盾

2011-12-30中國時報

歷史的進展常常出人意料，當年讓民進黨人士看好的宇昌案，成為這次總統大選的包袱；相對的，當年因為金馬立委積極鼓吹，民進黨才勉強推動的小三通，竟成了蔡英文寥寥可數的兩岸政績；在頌揚小三通的同時，民進黨也許刻意遺忘他們當初如何詆毀大三通的，但選民卻不可能忘記，民進黨一路走來，在兩岸政策上左支右絀、無法擺脫意識形態包袱的窘境。

在大選前二十天，蔡英文專程跑到金門發表談話，自述當年擔任陸委會主委時、推動小三通過程的艱辛，還不惜講上「小三通，通三小」這樣的粗話，此言聽在當年和民進黨討價還價的金馬立委耳裡，即使不算是搶功，心中可能很不是滋味。

推動小三通所需要的法源依據《離島建設條例》，在民進黨上台前的二○○○年三月，由金馬立委及國民黨立委聯手表決通過；民進黨政府後來即使推動小三通，卻還是有諸多限制，只有經核准赴大陸投資台商、或福建籍榮民等，才能夠經「小三通」赴大陸地區；一直到馬政府上台的二○○○八年六月，推動擴大小三通方案，全面放寬台灣地區人民經「小三通」中轉大陸，進一步的兩岸交流才得以實現。

事實上，民進黨當初之所以願意推動小三通，正是因為不願推動兩岸直航，在民意的壓力下，不得不推出小三通作為替代品，有人形容這是用小三通杯葛大三通；因此，即使蔡英文自吹自擂的小三通，在民進黨執政時，還是劃地自限、以限制為出發點，而不是從人民的便利出發。

小三通如此，更別說民進黨對大三通的態度了。民進黨在二○○八年總統大選時，還直言兩岸直航會讓台灣產業空洞化，根據維基解密，馬政府正式開放三通直航後，蔡英文卻仍在二○○八年十二月十七日向美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）抱怨說，「直航將傷害台灣的企業與消費者，大量中國物品湧入，可能讓台灣許多企業倒閉。」

開放三通已達三年的今天回顧，蔡英文當年的預判完全錯誤，不但沒有企業因為直航而倒閉，消費者沒有受中國物品之害，相反的，兩岸直航為人民省下舟車勞頓的辛勞、節省了經商往來的成本，直航儼然已成為人民的基本權益。

事實上，今年四月時蔡英文已經完全否定自己過去的主張，她在民進黨總統初選辯論時說，如果民進黨二○○八年贏得政權，也會開放兩岸直航及開放觀光客來台；觀諸民進黨過去歷歷在目的反直航主張，蔡英文的說法，幾乎等同於篡改一頁正在發生的歷史！

坦白說，即使和民進黨歷來領導人的表現比較，蔡英文都是保守到近乎冷戰時期「不接觸、不談判、不妥協」的三不心態，例如，她這次的「金門談話」，形式上要效法的正是二○○二年的陳水扁金門「大膽」談話；但是，就內容來看，當時的陳水扁拋出的是兩岸互訪、邀請當時的中共領導人江澤民喝茶、談天；蔡英文卻只是對民進黨時代綁手綁腳的小三通表功，相比起來，陳水扁的格局還比蔡英文大得多！

從四不一沒有到「大膽談話」，陳水扁當年確實有意推動兩岸和解新局，但後來卻受到綠營基本教義派綁架、無以為繼；蔡英文的兩岸意識形態，則一開始就比陳水扁還僵化，她在扁朝擔任陸委會主委時，曾經阻擋扁接受九二共識；擔任民進黨黨主席時，更將參加國共交流的民進黨員開除黨籍；到了二○○九年，她都還要發動公投反ＥＣＦＡ，並認為ＥＣＦＡ會讓台灣付出慘痛的經濟及政治代價。

這樣「原汁原味」的蔡英文，勢必會將中間或理性選民嚇得退避三舍，甚至連美國都擔心蔡英文上台後，兩岸關係可能再度緊張；也因此，在選舉過程中，蔡英文不斷的進行微調，例如，要持續ＥＣＦＡ、但不願接受九二共識；前天的金門之行，更是試圖以薄弱的兩岸政績，來證明她當選後，兩岸關係不會倒退。

但是，兩岸已經走到全面和平交流的今天，將來更期待能進一步互利互惠，退一步都可能造成重大損失；蔡英文要在選戰最後關頭，克服民進黨選舉的最大罩門、證明她上台後兩岸仍然能夠和平發展，很顯然，她當年綁手綁腳的小三通，是無法撐起這樣舉足輕重的兩岸關係的！

Repudiating 1992 Consensus: Tsai Ing-wen Must Pull Back From the Abyss

2011-12-28T02:15:00.001-08:00

Repudiating 1992 Consensus: Tsai Ing-wen Must Pull Back From the Abyss
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 28, 2011

Summary: Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She even insists that Beijing does not recognize "one China, different interpretations." She is apparently afraid that Beijing might recognize "one China, different interpretations." She is unwilling to see it happen. Therefore if she is elected president, she will not only undermine the 1992 Consensus as a basis for dialogue, she will make it difficult to reaffirm "one China, different interpretations." This is the folly of ramming one's head against a brick wall. She should realize she is hurtling toward an abyss and pull back on the reins.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She even insists that Beijing does not recognize "one China, different interpretations." She is apparently afraid that Beijing might recognize "one China, different interpretations." She is unwilling to see it happen. Therefore if she is elected president, she will not only undermine the 1992 Consensus as a basis for dialogue, she will make it difficult to reaffirm "one China, different interpretations." This is the folly of ramming one's head against a brick wall. She should realize she is hurtling toward an abyss and pull back on the reins.

Actually, in recent months, Tsai Ing-wen has been stealthily leaning toward "one China, different interpretations." For example, she said "one China, different interpretations" could be included in any discussion of a "Taiwan consensus." She said that "The 1992 Consensus does not equal one China, different interpretations. If it did, why not simply refer to it as "one China, different interpretations." Why refer to it as the 1992 Consensus? These remarks suggest that if elected, she might attempt to return to "one China, different interpretations."

If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she will still attempt to use her "cross-Strait dialogue working group" to remedy her rift with Beijing, She will also attempt to use to use her "stable economic dialogue group" to remedy the economic crisis, Therefore she must return to the source. the Constitution of the Republic of China, She must persuade Beijing to recognize "one China, different interpretations" in accordance with the one China Constitution. Otherwise Tsai Ing-wen will have no way out on the issue of cross-Strait relations.

The 1992 Consensus is important because it facilitates Taipei's advocacy and Beijing's acceptance of "one China, different interpretations." In recent years, the Ma administration has treated the 1992 Consensus and "one China, different interpretations" as a package deal. Its relentless efforts have convinced Beijing to "seek common ground while setting aside differences," and to adopt a posture of "mutual non-denial." Ma Ying-jeou has not been 100% successful in convincing Beijing to recognize "one China, different interpretations." Nevertheless he has made substantial progress.

One reason Tsai Ing-wen cites for refusing to recognize "one China, different interpretations," is that Beijing has yet to publicly recognize "one China, different interpretations." Beijing's "seeking common ground while setting aside differences" may not equal "one China, different interpretations," at least not word for word. But it is extremely close to "one China, different interpretations." Besides, Tsai Ing-wen said only that Beijing does not recognize "one China, different interpretations." More importantly, Beijing has never criticized or repudiated the Ma administration's repeated advocacy of "one China, different interpretations," and its assertion that "the term one China refers to the Republic of China." After all, so-called "different interpretations" could be considered either "mutual recognition" or "mutual non-denial."

Besides, Beijing has publicly acknowledged "one China, different interpretations." It did so on two important occasions. The first was during the March 2008 hotline exchange, when Hu Jintao told President Bush, "The Chinese Mainland and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, This means that both sides recognize that there is only one China, but agree to interpret its meaning differently." The other was in May of this year, when Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said, "Although the two sides have different understandings of the meaning of one China, we can nevertheless seek common ground, This is the essence of the 1992 Consensus."

Should Tsai Ing-wen advocate "one China, different interpretations?" Whether she should, and whether Beijing has publicly recognized "one China, different interpretations" are entirely different matters. Whether Beijing ought to recognize the Republic of China is one thing, Whether Tsai Ing-wen ought to recognize the Republic of China is another thing altogether. After all, if Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the Republic of China, how can she run for president of the Republic of China?

As we pointed out earlier, the Ma administration has repeatedly advocated "one China, different interpretations," and insisted that "the term one China refers to the Republic of China." Yet Beijing has neither criticized nor repudiated Ma's statements. Ma has gradually convinced Beijing to "seek common ground while setting aside differences," and to address the issue rationally. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected and refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, she will have to reaffirm the "one China Constitution" and "one China, different interpretations." Unless of course, she is deliberately using "one nation on each side" and "Taiwan independence" to provoke a showdown with Beijing. But will Beijing lightly permit Tsai Ing-wen to retreat to "one China, different interpretations" or the "one China Constitution?" Or will Beijing take advantage of the situation to pressure Tsai Ing-wen into accepting "one China" or the "one China principle?" Will it refuse to let her to cling to "one China, different interpretations?"

Tsai Ing-wen herself said that "Beijing does not recognize one China, different interpretations." If Beijing refuses to allow Tsai Ing-wen to retreat to "one China, different interpretations," would that be Tsai Ing-wen's intention?

Consider Tsai Ing-wen's plight. Beijing could refuse to let her adopt a "one China, different interpretations" stance. If she recognizes the 1992 Consensus before the election, she can avoid that risk. But if she repudiates the 1992 Consensus before the election, she will have no room to retreat after the election. Bejing could pressure her to accept the "one China principle." Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT have achieved a measure of trust with Beijing. They have convinced Beijing to accept "one China, different interpretations," "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force," and even the assertion that "one China refers to the Republic of China," But Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have not achieved the same measure of trust. They might not be able to do what Ma and the KMT have been able to do. In fact, we can say with absolute assurance that they will not be able to what Ma and the KMT have been able to do.

If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she might destroy the 1992 Consensus as a means of "seeking common ground while setting aside differences." She must do everything possible to stabilize cross-Strait relations, Taiwan independence forces however, will not grant her much latitude. Beijing meanwhile, will adopt a two-pronged, carrot and stick, "listen to her words and look at her actions," strategy. It will be ready to touch Taipei's political and economic nerves. A newly elected President Tsai would be in a terrible dilemma. She would be beseiged from without and within. She would be unable to advance or retreat.

If Tsai Ing-wen is sufficiently deluded to lead the nation in the wrong direction, she will be beyond redemption. Does she truly not know she is hurtling toward an abyss? Does she truly not know she must pull back on the reins?

否定九二共識蔡英文應懸崖勒馬
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.12.28 02:07 am

蔡英文非但否定「九二共識」，甚至屢指北京不承認「一中各表」，狀似深恐或不樂見北京承認「一中各表」；因而，她若當選總統，非但將失去「九二共識」的對話基礎，甚至也將很難回到「一中各表」的操作空間。這是推車撞壁的愚妄行徑，應當懸崖勒馬。

近月以來，蔡英文其實有偷偷向「一中各表」靠攏的跡象；包括她說「一中各表可以納入台灣共識的討論」，又說「九二共識不等於一中各表，如果是，那就叫一中各表好了，何必說是九二共識」。這些，皆是她在若當選後可能嘗試回到「一中各表」的伏筆。

蔡英文若當選，她倘欲以「兩岸工作對話小組」補救她與北京的裂痕，又欲以「安定經濟對話小組」挽救經濟危機，她就絕對必須回到原原本本、原汁原味的中華民國憲法，並根據「憲法一中」向北京爭取「一中各表」，捨此蔡英文在兩岸問題上絕無活路。

「九二共識」之所以非常重要，在於它能便利載送及發展「一中各表」。這幾年來，馬政府以「九二共識」挾帶「一中各表」，與北京纏、鬥、魯、拗，終於使北京走向「求同存異」，其實也就是將北京帶入了「互不否認」的架構；馬英九雖未使「一中各表」完全成功，但已見極其重大的成就。

蔡英文否定「一中各表」，理由之一是，中國未公開承認過「一中各表」。但北京的「求同存異」，即使不是與「一中各表」字字相同，卻已十分接近「一中各表」。何況，蔡英文只說，北京未承認「一中各表」，但更重要的，卻是北京迄今從未批駁或否認過馬政府反覆主張的「一中各表」，及「一個中國就是中華民國」。豈不知，所謂的「各表」，可以是「相互承認」，也可以是「互不否認」。

何況，北京並非沒有公開承認過「一中各表」。最重要的有兩次：一次在二○○八年三月的熱線電話中，胡錦濤向小布希說：「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識的基礎上恢復談判，意即雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意其涵意各自表述。」另一次在今年五月，國台辦主任王毅說：「儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」

尤其，蔡英文應否主張「一中各表」，其實與北京是否公開承認「一中各表」根本是兩回事。因為，北京未承認「中華民國」是一回事，蔡英文應承認「中華民國」卻是另一回事。否則，蔡英文若不承認「中華民國」，又怎能選中華民國總統？

前文指出，馬政府反覆主張「一中各表」及「一個中國就是中華民國」，非但未見北京批駁否認，且已漸將中共帶向「求同存異」；衡情論理，蔡英文若當選，又否定九二共識，除非她欲以「一邊一國」或「台獨」與北京攤牌對撞，不然，她也必須回到「憲法一中」及「一中各表」。但是，屆時北京會不會輕易讓蔡英文回到「一中各表」或「憲法一中」？會不會趁勢迫使蔡英文直接接受「一個中國」或「一個中國原則」，連「一中各表」的餘地都不給她？

因為，蔡英文自己說的，「北京不承認一中各表」；而北京屆時若不給蔡英文「一中各表」的空間，豈不亦正合蔡英文之本意？

就蔡英文的處境而言，她倘接受「九二共識」，在若當選後或可避免「求一中各表而不可得」的危境；但如今她刻意自毀「九二共識」的操作空間，卻必將毫無緩衝地面臨「一中原則」的直接壓力。以民進黨及蔡英文的兩岸信任度言，馬英九及國民黨如今做得到的，如「一中各表」、「不統／不獨／不武」、「一個中國就是中華民國」，未來民進黨及蔡英文未必能做得到，甚至可斷言絕對做不到。

可以想像，蔡英文若當選，又自毀了「九二共識」這個「求同存異」的操作利器，她一方面必須千方百計去穩定兩岸關係，另一方面台獨勢力又不容她讓步太大，而再一方面北京則發動「聽其言／觀其行」的軟硬兩手策略，隨時可以扯動台灣的政經神經；那將是怎樣一個焦頭爛額的「蔡總統」？那又將是如何一個內憂外患、進退失據的台灣？

若是自誤誤國至此地步，蔡英文恐是九死莫贖，豈能不懸崖勒馬？

The Blue and Green Camps Should Talk Vision

2011-12-27T01:12:00.001-08:00

The Blue and Green Camps Should Talk Vision
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 27, 2011

Summary: Polling day is approaching. Blue vs. Green electioneering has turned to street fighting and hand to hand combat. The Two Yings can no longer maintain their former decorum. The debate now calls for relentlessly hitting the enemy where it hurts. The two camps are constantly testing out new election ploys. Attacks are being directed at the heart of the enemy camp with unprecedented frequency. The election campaign has everyone's nerves on edge.

Full Text Below:

Polling day is approaching. Blue vs. Green electioneering has turned to street fighting and hand to hand combat. The Two Yings can no longer maintain their former decorum. The debate now calls for relentlessly hitting the enemy where it hurts. The two camps are constantly testing out new election ploys. Attacks are being directed at the heart of the enemy camp with unprecedented frequency. The election campaign has everyone's nerves on edge.
Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen, and James Soong have participated in two presidential debates, one policy presentation, and one cultural issues Q&A. Wu Den-yih, Su Jia-chyuan, and Lin Ruey-shiung, the three vice presidential candidates, have participated in one vice presidential debate. Two more presidential policy presentations are planned. One more vice presidential policy presentation is planned.

The Taiwan Region of the Republic of China is geographically limited. The three campaigns have had plenty of opportunities to work the streets and the countryside, to hold rallies, and to speak their peace to voters. The president and vice president do not have much more to say. As a result, they merely present the same material, over and over again. It sometimes looks as if TaiMed and Fubon were running for Republic of China president. Voters want neither TaiMed nor Fubon. Nor do they want fortune tellers predicting the outcome of the election. They are deeply frustrated.

The Blue and Green camps are expending much effort gaining or maintaining the support of local bosses. Whenever they can, they pay visits to various and sundry elders, big shots, and professional organizations, beseeching them to step forward and support them. But really, what is the point? The Republic of China has undergone countless elections. The central government has undergone two ruling party changes. Local governments have gone from Blue to Green and back again. Voters are shrewder than ever. They are clearer than ever about what they want. Just how much influence do these "elders" still have? Just how much difference will gaining or maintaining their support make? What do voters really want? Isn't what they really want a ruling administration able to take care of them? Isn't what they really want a political leader who actually cares about them? What they don't want is politicians and political parties who work the crowds and spread money around only at election time.

Who are the politicians' most dependable, most powerful "local bosses?" Not the ward heelers who wine and dine them for a quid pro quo, but the people, ordinary men in the street. These are the politicians' real "local bosses." Politicians and political parties able to provide people with a better life will be the ones who win new voter support. Politicians and political parties able to bring peace and prosperity will be the ones who consolidate existing voter support.

The three presidential and vice presidential candidates have had many opportunities to address the public. Unfortunately, they used up most of that time denouncing each other, smearing each other. For supporters with firm convictions, "believers remain believers, unbelievers remain unbelievers." It is difficult to convert them to a different perspective.

Therefore searching for evidence and buying advertising is a waste of resources. During an election too many complex emotions are involved. Why not wait until the election is over, then allow the justice system to sort out the merits of their arguments? After all, it is less than 20 days before the election, No matter what conclusions one might reach, they are unlikely to quell the feelings of the masses.

Society on Taiwan is ruled by law. Why not allow scandals to be investigated by the justice system? Why must we fight over them tooth and nail, just before the general election? Who in the Blue and Green camps is willing to make the first concession, for the sake of the people? Who is willing to shelve past grievances, for the sake of the future? Only through sacrifices can one make gains.

Tsai Ing-wen once cast herself in the role of the real mother in the parable of King Solomon and the infant child. This provoked a wave of Blue Camp disdain. For both the KMT and the DPP, the real mother must be the hearts and minds of the people. They must care about social harmony and peace. They must be willing to allow controversial issues to die down. They must be willing to take a step back for the greater good.

The office of the president is responsible for the nation's economic development. Yet presidential candidates run around all day, wasting their time and energy. Their words and deeds should set an example for society. Yet all they do is denounce each other. Where leaders go, the public follows. No wonder society is increasingly cynical and violent. If the presidential and vice presidential candidates were more constructive in their choice of language, if they avoided naked intimidation and wild accusations, they might promote greater harmony within society.

If the candidates would sling a little less mud over the next ten days, if they would eschew empty rhetoric and ignorant rants, they might be able to enhance everyone's well-being. If so, would they still need to seek wisdom from sacred texts in Bhutan?

The election countdown has begun. Politicians are preparing to celebrate New Year's Eve. But have they thought about what kind of future we face?

If the Blue and Green camp presidential candidates are truly ready to fulfill the role of national leader, they should contemplate the challenge the future poses. They should already be in a compassionate state. Mere discretion is not enough. Where do they get the time and energy to make irresponsible remarks all day long?

Neither the TaiMed nor Fubon cases are Taiwan's most serious problem. There is no need to engage in shouting and name calling over them. Only 18 days remain til election day. Let the Blue and Green camps put the past behind them. Make room for the future. Get past petty grievances. Make room for greater possibilities.

別再罵了藍綠應多談願景
2011-12-27中國時報

隨著投票日的接近，藍綠相關競選活動也進入了巷戰和肉搏戰，不但雙英都已經忍不住卸下一直以來勉力維持的溫和與禮儀，言談間直搗黃龍，辛辣、挑釁頻頻出招；兩個陣營也不斷嘗試「開發新市場」，深入敵營的行動之激烈、頻繁，前所未見，選情已陷入膠著、緊繃狀態。

馬英九、蔡英文與宋楚瑜三位總統候選人已經歷了兩次辯論會與一次公辦政見發表會，一次文化界提問會，吳敦義、蘇嘉全和林瑞雄三位副總統選人也已進行過一次辯論會，預計未來總統候選人還有兩次政見發表會，副總統候選人有一場政見發表會。

台灣幅員不算太大，三組人馬不停蹄地掃街、下鄉、造勢，直接面對選民發表政見、政策的機會實在太多了，總統和副總統似乎也沒有那麼多話可以說，結果，一百句不過就是五十雙，翻來覆去總是那些話題，看來好像這次是「宇昌」跟「富邦」在選中華民國總統；就算不想選「宇昌」也不想選「富邦」，但是，難道人民會想選「推背圖」嗎？真教人為難啊。

藍綠陣營花那麼多功夫拔樁、固樁，一有空就去拜訪這大老、那個重量級大人物，要各式各樣的專業團體出面相挺，到底意義何在？台灣已經歷了許多次選舉，中央都已政黨輪替過兩次，地方藍天綠地也翻過盤，人民愈來愈精明、愈來愈清楚自己要的是什麼，這些所謂的大老還有多少影響力？拔椿、固椿到底有多少的功效？到底人民要的是什麼？是能照顧民生的執政者，要的是真正在乎人民的政治領導人，不是那些到了選舉才去走透透、撒錢的政黨和政治人物。

所以，政治人物最紮實有力的「樁腳」是誰？不是那些藉著選舉吃香的、喝辣的、「待價而沽」的「選棍們」，而是人民，一個一個真實平凡的小市民，才是政治人物的樁腳，能提供人民更好生活的政黨、政治人物就可以拔樁，能夠帶來國泰民安的政黨與政治人物就能夠固樁。

這段時間以來，三組總統和副總統候選人有很多公開發言的機會，可惜的是，他們卻花了大部分的時間彼此指責、互相抹黑，這些議題對心中早有定見的支持者來說，的確是「信者恆信、不信者恆不信」，怎麼樣都很難被說服去相信「另一套版本」。

因此，政黨花再多力氣去找證據、登廣告，都是浪費資源；選舉摻雜了太多複雜的情緒，是非曲直何不在選後交由司法單位處理，畢竟，選前這一、二十天，不論得出個什麼結論來，都難以平息群眾的情緒。

台灣是個法治社會，有弊案疑慮，交由司法處理有何不可，何必一定要趕在大選時刻爭個你死我活？藍綠陣營，誰願意為台灣人民先放下心中委屈、誰願意為了台灣的未來暫時擱置過去的恩怨？要有捨才有得。

之前蔡英文曾以「所羅門王前真正的母親」自居，引起藍營一陣不屑。不論國民黨還是民進黨，真正的母親是以百姓的心為心，顧念的是社會和諧與安寧，因此會願意在這麼有爭議的議題上暫時偃旗息鼓，為百姓的福祉先退一步。

身為國家經濟建設最高首長，終日奔波翻查資料，人才浪費莫此為甚；總統級候選人一言一行本該為社會表率，卻總是互相指責，風行草偃，難怪社會風氣日益乖戾暴力；如果總統、副總統候選人在選舉用語和議題選擇上能更正面、積極，而不是尖酸刻薄、臆測恐嚇、信口開河，當可為社會增加不少溫暖的力量。

如果候選人在接下來的十幾天裡能少噴一點口水和墨汁，少講一點沒有營養、沒有知識又兼不衛生的話，台灣的幸福指數應該就可以增加不少了，又何須千里迢迢去不丹取經？

選舉已進入倒數計時，政治人物在熱鬧準備跨年活動的同時，是否認真想過我們將要面對的是一個什麼樣的未來？

如果藍綠總統候選人真的是準備好要做一個國家領導人，那麼，想到未來的挑戰，心情應該早已如同臨淵履薄，戰戰兢兢都不夠，怎麼還有那麼多工夫和心情整天說三道四？

宇昌也好、富邦也罷，這些都不是台灣的「國仇家恨」，沒必要讓人民因此整天對峙、叫囂、對罵。還有十八天，藍綠請快跟往事告別，留點時間給未來；擺脫怨懟，留點空間給願景。

People with Money vs. the People of Taiwan: Orwellian Newspeak

2011-12-26T02:14:00.001-08:00

People with Money vs. the People of Taiwan: Orwellian Newspeak
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 26, 2011

Summary: A number of entrepreneurs have publicly expressed support for Ma Ying-jeou. Since then Tsai Ing-wen has added a new slogan to her campaign. She now says that "Ma Ying-jeou is surrounded people with money. Tsai Ing-wen is surrounded by the people of Taiwan." Such sophistry is highly inappropriate. Such a linguistic formulation amounts to Orwellian Newspeak.

Full Text Below:

A number of entrepreneurs have publicly expressed support for Ma Ying-jeou. Since then Tsai Ing-wen has added a new slogan to her campaign. She now says that "Ma Ying-jeou is surrounded people with money. Tsai Ing-wen is surrounded by the people of Taiwan." Such sophistry is highly inappropriate. Such a linguistic formulation amounts to Orwellian Newspeak.

Tsai Ing-wen is deliberately characterizing the entrepreneurs who support Ma Ying-jeou negatively, as "people with money," rather than affirmatively, as "entrepreneurs." She hopes to create an artificial dichotomy by characterizing those who support her as the "people of Taiwan." She is clearly using "people with money" as a term of opprobium. She is clearly attempting to incite class antagonisms between the bourgeoisie ("people with money") and the proletariat ("the common people"). She even added the phrase, "the people of Taiwan," in an attempt to incite antagonism between "people with money" (who "invest in the Mainland") and "people who lay down roots on Taiwan." She disguises her incitement of "ethnic" (social) antagonism by characterizing "people with money" as people who engage in land speculation, political cronyism, and who enjoy economic privilege.

But are Tsai Ing-wen's characterizations accurate? Are they fair?

Before Tsai Ing-wen made her remarks, a number of entrepreneurs spoke out, publicly expressing support for Ma Ying-jeou. They include Hong Hai's Terry Gou, Delta's Bruce Cheng, and Yulong's Kenneth K.T. Yen. These men do fit the definition of "people with money" completely, But they are obviously not the same "people with money" that Tsai Ing-wen referred to. Terry Gou pulled himself up by his bootstraps. He single-handedly built the largest manufacturing company on Taiwan. His foundries are among the best in the global electronics industry. He provides jobs for 800,000 employees the world over. Britain's Economist magazine lists him as one of the world's top ten employers. Terry Gou runs a tight ship. Some have called him "tyrannical." But he is totally dedicated. He is a rare kind of workaholic. He built a vast business empire. As a result Forbes magazine has listed him repeatedly as the richest man on Taiwan. But he has never engaged in real estate or land speculation. Still less has he ever played the stock market. In 2007 he donated 15 billion dollars to the National Taiwan University College of Medicine. He set a record for the largest corporate donation to the hospital in history. In 2008, he announced that he would donate 90% of his wealth to charitable causes. At the time he was worth an estimated 30 billion dollars. Today he is worth over 100 billion dollars.

Delta is a world-class component supplier. The components it produces are widely used in a variety of industries. Bruce Cheng is a veteran domestic entrepreneur. Within the domestic business world, he is its most environmentally conscious member. He has endowed schools and universities. He has provided aid to students. Delta has received numerous awards for corporate responsibility. During its early years, Kenneth K.T. Yen's Yulon Group was a state owned enterprise. Back then the government's policy was to protect national industries. But the automotive market was eventually decontrolled. The company soon reached its nadir. Kenneth Yen was not yet 30 when the company fell into his lap. He dived in. He restructured and expanded the company. Eventually Yulon returned to life. This bit of history is known among business leaders, as the "young master's revitalization." The Yulon Group has long-term commitments to support domestic basketball, child care for Aboriginal children, and other public welfare activities. The Yulon Group's "Wu Shun-wen News Award" is the ROC's counterpart to America's Pulitzer Prize.

The success that these entrepreneurs enjoy today, their accumulated wealth, is not the result of government/business collusion or economic privilege. Instead it is the result of their own efforts In a highly competitive domestic and international marketplace. After achieving success in business, they devoted themselves to contributing to society. These publicly respected entrepreneurs have declared their support for Ma Ying-jeou. What is shameful about that? What is wrong with that? Yet Tsai Ing-wen, through a single devious insinuation about "people with money," has tarred these entrepreneurs as robber barons. She has demonized these entrepreneurs, merely because they expressed support for Ma Ying-jeou. She has successfully manipulated the language. But she has done so in a highly unethical fashion.

What's even more absurd, is the fact that Tsai Ing-wen is also seeking support from "people with money." She is also seeking to convey the impression that industry leaders support Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen has set off on a five-day tour of various industries. She has received support from several technology companies and traditional companies. They have also come forward to offer their support. Are these company chairmen, general managers, and board directors paupers? Are they not "people with money?" Are entrepreneurs who support Ma the only ones who must fear being portrayed negatively as "people with money?" Are entrepreneurs who support Tsai the only "bona fide entrepreneurs?" Such definitions and distinctions are based purely on who supports whom. Is this right? Is this justified?

At least the entrepreneurs who support Ma have never had any private business dealings with the Ma family, At least the Ma family has never profited from these "people with money." That is hardly the case with Tsai Ing-wen in the TaiMed corruption scandal. Conclusive evidence has surfaced proving that the Tsai family profited through its connections with "people with money." They include Ying Yan-liang of the Ruentex Group, through whom Tsai Ing-wen pocketed over one billion dollars. Are there really no "people with money" on Tsai's side?

The entrepreneurs mentioned support Ma and not Tsai because the DPP's policies are far from reassuring, The DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Therefore a DPP victory would lead once again to cross-Strait deadlock, The benefits derived from three years of consultations would be greatly diminished or disappear altogether. Based on today's economic situation, next year's global trends, this means heavy losses for Taiwan's economy. Perhaps Tsai Ing-wen should think about these problems, instead of about how to manipulate the language.

有錢人vs.台灣人民是惡質語言操弄
2011-12-26中國時報

自幾位企業家公開表態支持馬英九後，蔡英文的競選詞語多了一項：「站在馬英九身邊的盡是有錢人，站在蔡英文身邊的則是台灣人民。」，對於這種說法，我們認為是一種極不恰當的語言操弄。

蔡英文刻意把支持馬英九的企業家，捨棄較正面的「企業家」一詞，而以「有錢人」三個字形容，來相對於她形容支持她的「台灣人民」對立起來，顯然把「有錢人」作為負面字眼形容；明著的意思當然是一種階級對立─資產階級（有錢人）與無產階級（一般庶民）的對立；而特別加上「台灣人民」，又把「到大陸投資」的「有錢人」與生根台灣的人民對立起來，它也同時隱含著族群的對立。其中更隱藏讓民眾聯想到過去那些藉著炒作地皮、官商勾結、經濟特權，而攢下一桶桶黃金的「有錢人」。

蔡英文的這種語言文字的隱喻，正確嗎？公平嗎？

在蔡英文講出這番話前公開表態支持馬英九的企業家，包括鴻海郭台銘、台達電鄭崇華、裕隆嚴凱泰等，百分之百合於「有錢人」的定義，但顯然不是蔡英文要隱喻暗示的「那種有錢人」。郭台銘白手起家，一手打造出台灣最大的製造業企業，在全球電子產業代工廠中也名列前茅；其在全球所雇用的員工數有八十萬人，被英國經學人雜誌列為全球前十大雇主。郭台銘治軍嚴謹，被評為「霸道」，但他全力投入工作，堪稱少見的工作狂。他打造的龐大事業，讓他多次成為富比世雜誌評選的台灣首富。但他從來不碰房地產與土地、更不炒作股票玩金錢遊戲。二○○七年，他捐出一五○億元給台大醫學院，創下全球企業對醫院最大的一筆捐贈；二○○八年，他宣布要捐出九成的財產（當年價值估計約三百億，今日估則超過千億元）從事公益。

台達電是世界級零組件產品供應商，所生產之零組件產品廣泛應用於各產業。鄭崇華則是國內元老級企業家，也是國內企業界中，最重視環保的企業家；他持續對各教育單位與大學捐贈，嘉惠學子，台達電更曾因善盡企業的社會責任而多次得獎。嚴凱泰的裕隆汽車集團，雖然早年曾在政府扶植民族工業政策下得到保護，但在汽車市場開放後即失去保護傘，使企業一度陷入低潮。嚴凱泰不到三十歲接班，全力投入整頓企業與發展，最後終於讓裕隆重振雄風，這段過程被企業界稱為「少主中興」。裕隆集團也長期投入支持國內籃球運動、關懷原住民孩童等公益活動；其集團的「吳舜文新聞獎」更是國內新聞界的標竿。

這些企業家成就今日的事業、累積了財富，靠的不是搞官商勾結、特權經濟，而是靠著自身努力，在競爭激烈的國內外市場中脫穎而出；他們事業成功後也不忘回饋社會。馬英九得到這些社會形象正面的企業家表態支持，不知那裡丟臉、又何錯之有？但蔡英文巧妙的一句「有錢人」的隱喻，把這些企業家都打成奸商、連帶讓得到其表態支持的馬英九變成失分─這是成功的語言文字操控，但卻極不道德。

更可笑的是蔡英文也同樣在爭取「有錢人」的支持。為營造產業界也挺蔡的形象，蔡英文展開一連五天的產業之旅，也得到一些科技、傳統產業企業的支持，出面表態支持者同樣有企業的董事長、總經理。難道，這些董、總座「很窮」、不是「有錢人」？或是，企業家挺馬後就變成是充滿負面隱喻的「有錢人」，挺蔡的才是純正的「企業家」？這個定義與分野，純然以挺誰為分類標準，這樣對嗎？說不過去吧？

甚至，我們可以說，那些挺馬的企業家，可沒誰與馬家有私人生意交易，馬家可沒由這些「有錢人」身上獲取家族利益；但蔡在宇昌案中，可是與「有錢人」潤泰集團尹衍樑有證據確鑿的「家族生意交易」，而且獲利一千多萬元。蔡的身邊沒有「有錢人」嗎？

其實，這些企業家挺馬不挺蔡，最重要的原因是對民進黨的兩岸政策不放心，因為民進黨不承認九二共識，將讓兩岸再陷僵局，過去三年的協商成果即使不化為烏有，也會大打折扣；以兩岸目前經濟格局與明年全球經濟大勢看，這將會對台灣經濟造成重創。或許，這才是蔡英文該好好思考的地方，而不是耍弄語言文字。

Republic of China Passports Now Visa-Free: Taipei Washington Relations Improve Yet Again

2011-12-22T20:00:00.001-08:00

Republic of China Passports Now Visa-Free: Taipei Washington Relations Improve Yet Again
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 23, 2011

Summary: Citizens must be fair in their evaluation of political leaders. The facts show Ma Ying-jeou has improved, not worsened cross-strait relations. He has created opportunities, not erected obstacles. President Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policies have improved the status quo. They have enhanced cross-Strait interaction. They have enabled the two sides to work together to create a better future with richer possibilities.

Full Text Below:

Yesterday American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Acting Director Eric H. Madison announced that the Republic of China is officially a candidate for the U.S. Visa Waiver Program. He said the Republic of China has made great social and political progress in recent years, as indicated by its economic progress. The rejection rate for Republic of China passport holders applying for visas to the United States fell to only 1.9% last year. The proportion of overstayers in the United States was even lower. Foreign Minister Yang Jin-tian responded. He said this shows that Republic of China passport security, visa rejection rates, border controls, and information sharing, all meet the requirements for visa-free treatment. He said Taipei/Washington relations will take another step forward as a result of this. This is just a major milestone for Taipei/Washington relations. It is also a major breakthrough with epoch-making significance for the Republic of China's international status and foreign relations.

Over the past few years, Republic of China citizens traveling abroad have been the recipients of much good news. In the past, Republic of China passport holders often endured discrimination. Foreign governments made things difficult for them. Now they enjoy visa-free treatment from over a hundred countries, Including the EU, Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and now, the United States, Republic of China citizens are now free to visit every major country they wish. Republic of China citizens can visit most countries on the world map, without first applying for a visa. .

This is a consequence of the Republic of China's economic strength. Our passport security technology is good, Our citizens are civilized. This makes other countries welcome them. But there is another important reason that cannot be denied. In the eyes of the international community, improved cross-Strait relations have reduced tensions between Taipei and Beijing. This has enabled other countries to develop relations with Taipei. They need no longer fear a backlash from Beijing. Over the past four years, President Ma Ying-jeou has successfully promoted cross-Strait reconciliation and implemented a diplomatic truce. For the Republic of China, this has opened the gates to the international community, These changes are obvious and far-reaching, They will be part of Ma's historical legacy.

Republic of China citizens have received much good news regarding visas. There have also been many breakthroughs for the Republic of China's participation in the international community. We can now participate in the WHA as an observer. Former Vice President Lien Chan was able to attend the APEC Leaders Summit Meeting, We were able to make contact with Singapore and New Zealand, and sign the Economic Partnership Agreement. We were able to sign investment agreements and aviation agreements with Japan. What does it mean to "defend our sovereignty," to "maintain our dignity," and to "promote our national interest?" If we break it down it, means enabling Republic of China citizens to be respected when they go out into the world. It means enabling the Republic of China to be seen and heard, Isn't that what it means to "defend our sovereignty," "maintain our dignity," and "promote our national interest?"

The Republic of China's diplomatic situation and cross-Strait relations are two sides of the same coin. When cross-strait relations are tense, diplomatic confrontation often consumes large amounts of our national resources, But this kind of desperate zero sum game is increasingly difficult to play. It cannot be sustained. Mainland China's strategic advantage is growing. Republic of China citizens on Taiwan are proud. No matter how tough the going gets, we will not bow down. But bowing down is unnecessary. With wisdom and skill, we can ensure smooth cross-Strait relations while opening our doors to foreign relations. Actually, doing so will better safeguard our interests than remaining trapped in an endless cross-Strait wrestling match.

Green Camp spin doctors love to accuse Ma Ying-jeou of "selling out Taiwan's sovereignty." DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen denounced Ma Ying-jeou during the TV debate. She accused him of "halving the strength of the nation." But does her charge contain any truth whatsoever? Let's conduct a quick reality check. When the DPP was in power, it adopted a strategy of reckless provocation and blind confrontation. This led to a freeze in cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, This turned the island of Taiwan into a hermit kingdom. This led to our marginalization in the global community. The DPP's "scorched earth diplomacy" left the diplomatic battlefield a smoking ruins. Other countries refused to be dragged into the conflict. But once President Ma Ying-jeou took office, cross-Strait reconciliation brought about economic exchanges and cooperation. It gave people on both sides a chance to freely exchange ideas and improve mutual understanding. It made possible exchanges between the Republic of China and the international community by removing a major obstacle. This gave us more breathing space. Make any "before and after comparison" you wish. We all remember how it was before, and how it is today. Does anyone really not see the immense changes that have taken place over the past three or four years?

Clearly Ma Ying-jeou has changed our cross-Strait policy. He found a way out of our past dilemma. He has a clear direction for the nation's future. He is implementing it, step by step, This is rare in a leader. Do our leaders have the ability to handle cross-Strait relations? Do they have the ability to ensure our economic development? These questions are of paramount importance.

Citizens must be fair in their evaluation of political leaders. The facts show Ma Ying-jeou has improved, not worsened cross-strait relations. He has created opportunities, not erected obstacles. President Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policies have improved the status quo. They have enhanced cross-Strait interaction. They have enabled the two sides to work together to create a better future with richer possibilities.

中時電子報新聞
中國時報　2011.12.23
社論－列入免簽候選台美關係再躍進
本報訊

美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）代理處長馬怡瑞（Eric H. Madison）昨天正式宣布，台灣正式納入美國免簽證計畫候選國。他表示台灣獲致的成就，展現了這些年來台灣在經濟、社會和政治各方面的進步；台灣民眾申請美簽的拒簽率在過去一年來降到僅一．九％，在美逾期居留的比例則更低。外交部長楊進添則回應表示，這項訊息的宣布顯示台灣在護照安全、簽證拒簽率、國境管控與各項資訊分享等皆符合加入免簽證的技術要件。他也指出台美關係進展將因這項舉動邁向更進一步。我們以為這不只是台美關係的一大里程碑，對台灣的國際地位與對外關係而言，更是一大突破，具有劃時代的重大意義。

這些年來，台灣民眾出國免簽證的好消息接連傳來，過去出門常受刁難歧視的中華民國護照，如今可以享受上百個國家免簽證入境的禮遇，其中包括了歐盟申根聯盟國家、英國、愛爾蘭、日本、澳洲、紐西蘭，如今加上美國，無異是國人最常去的主要國家都可以自由走透透。在世界地圖上，台灣人可以想去就去不必先申請簽證的區塊，已經佔了相當一大塊區域。

這固然是因為有台灣經濟實力作後盾，加上我國護照防偽技術好、國民素質高，讓對方國家樂意接納。但還有一個不容否認的重要原因，是兩岸關係改善降低了雙方在國際社會的對抗態勢，讓其他國家與台灣發展關係時，不必再處處忌憚北京的反彈。馬英九總統推動兩岸和解與外交休兵的政策，在近四年的落實下，已經為台灣打開了通往國際社會的門戶，這樣的轉變既明顯又影響深遠，將在歷史上留下他個人的遺產。

除了頻傳免簽的好消息之外，台灣參與國際社會還有許多突破，包括能夠以觀察員身分參與世衛大會、前副總統連戰出席亞太經合會議領袖峰會、與新加坡和紐西蘭洽簽經濟夥伴協議、與日本簽署投資協定及航空協定等等。什麼叫做維護主權尊嚴、促進國家利益？細數這些成果，都是讓台灣走出去並受到尊重，讓台灣被看見、聲音被聽到，不就是既維護了台灣的主權尊嚴，又促進了國家利益？

台灣的外交處境與兩岸關係一體兩面，兩岸關係緊張時，外交戰火常常消耗大量國家資源，但這樣的零和殊死戰，在中國日漸增長的政經戰略地位下，已經令台灣的戰況日趨艱困，甚至難以為繼。勇敢的台灣人是有骨氣的，再苦也不會屈膝低頭；但如果能以智慧與手腕，一方面讓兩岸關係得以順暢運作，一方面為對外關係打開門窗，其實比陷在角力戰中更能維護台灣利益。

綠營人士常愛指控馬英九出賣台灣主權，民進黨總統候選人蔡英文也在電視辯論中說馬英九害得國家「去一半」。但到底是不是如此，我們可以拿事實來檢驗。過去民進黨執政時，採取躁進挑釁、盲目對抗的策略，以致兩岸交流合作停頓，台灣陷於鎖國狀態，在全球發展中流於邊緣化地位，「烽火外交」也搞得外交戰場遍起狼煙，其他國家不太願意被波及。但馬英九總統上台後，兩岸關係和解帶來更蓬勃的經貿交流合作，雙方人民有機會更自在地交往並增進了解。台灣與國際社會的交往，也因為降低了一大障礙，而得到更多空間。前後任比一比，不過短短三、四年的時間，大家對過去記憶猶新，其間的差距誰看不出來？

很明顯的，馬英九為台灣換了個兩岸政策，也因此開創了新的活路。他對國家方向與基本政策有很清楚的中心思維，並且一步一步據以落實，就一個領導人來說，這是非常難得的。而對台灣來說，我們的領袖有沒有能力處理兩岸關係，有效維護台灣發展契機，也是非常重要的。

對政治領袖的評價必須公允，事實證明，馬英九讓兩岸關係成為台灣的正數，而非負數；是機會，而不再是障礙。馬英九總統的兩岸政策不只改變了現狀，也在更多的兩岸互動中，為兩岸共同開創一個更好的未來，留下了發展的契機。

Fubon vs. TaiMed: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing

2011-12-22T02:03:00.001-08:00

Fubon vs. TaiMed: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 22, 2011

Summary: Comparing Fubon and TaiMed is like comparing apples and oranges. Fubon is a cold dish warmed over, The TaiMed corruption scandal on the other hand, is something completely new. It is hot off the grill, Its full nature has yet to be discovered. The DPP persists in equating the two. But its efforts to conflate the two have been in vain. The DPP has succeeded only in turning itself into a sheep in wolf's clothing. The DPP's smokescreen will only obscure the DPP's escape route. The spectacle of the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen destroying their own political party and their own reputations, is truly staggering.

Full Text Below:

Comparing Fubon and TaiMed is like comparing apples and oranges. Fubon is a cold dish warmed over, The TaiMed corruption scandal on the other hand, is something completely new. It is hot off the grill, Its full nature has yet to be discovered. The DPP persists in equating the two. But its efforts to conflate the two have been in vain. The DPP has succeeded only in turning itself into a sheep in wolf's clothing.

The DPP has been trying to make something of the Fubon controversy. It is aggressively playing the "shark fin soup" card. Its goal is to draw attention away from the TaiMed corruption scandal. Its goal is to blacken Ma Ying-jeou's clean image, and to provide a safety hatch through which Tsai Ing-wen can escape the fire caused by her corruption.

But voters want the truth. The Green Camp's smokescreen is a means of sowing confusion. The Green Camp wants to create the impression that "They're both equally corrupt." The DPP's tactics are an admission of guilt. The methods they have adopted are an admission that they are attempting to dupe the voters. But the only result has been the destruction of social justice.

The merger between the Fubon Bank and the Bank of Taipei took place in 2002, during the Chen administration. The machinery of state, including the Executive Yuan, prosecutors, the Control Yuan, all went over the case with a fine tooth comb. They examined the case from the inside out, from top to bottom. They found nothing at all improper. Chen administration Minister of Finance Lin Chuan even heaped praise on it. He said the merger of the Fubon Bank with the Bank of Taipei was a successful example of "one plus one is greater than two."

So why is the Fubon case being dished up again, nearly a decade later, and being characterized as a huge scandal? Mainly because the DPP is finding it impossible to keep a lid on the TaiMed corruption scandal. The DPP has been caught off guard, and in desperation it is using the Fubon case as a smokescreen.

During last Saturday's election debate, Tsai Ing-wen personally accused Ma Ying-jeou of accepting 15 million dollars in campaign contributions from Fubon Bank in 2008. This touched off a firestorm of controversy. The very next day however, her accusations were proven to be completely mistaken. Fubon wanted to make a contribution. But Ma Ying-jeou turned it down, saying he was obligated to avoid conflicts of interest. Contrast this with Tsai Ing-wen's conduct in the TaiMed corruption scandal. Tsai personally approved the TaiMed project. She personally penned the relevant regulations, She personally made herself TaiMed board chairman. She personally established several family enterprises to invest in biotechnology, The Fubon and TaiMed cases are worlds apart. Tsai Ing-wen pointed the finger at the Fubon case. Instead she merely drew attention to her own wrongdoing in the TaiMed corruption scandal. Her handling of the matter was inept. She lost more than she gained.

The DPP's information was false, yet DPP spokesperons were overly eager to claim credit. They made the mistake of leveling slanderous accusations. They should have cut their losses. Instead, their feelings of humiliation made them apoplectic. So they dusted off a discredited old allegation regarding the Fubon case, and tried to ram it down the public's throat. Their methods merely revealed their impotence and lack of scruples.

The Green Camp demagogued non-issues such as Fubon Bank "campaign contributions," the shark fin soup banquet, and confidential documents. These were no different from the non-existent Chen Ying-chu "triad boss" incident. One. First, they attempted to smear Ma Ying-jeou by accusing him of accepting 300 million dollars in campaign contributions, including 15 million from Fubon Bank. This charge proved groundless. Two. They then accused Ma Ying-jeou of meeting with Chen Ying-chu, twice. How many times was he supposed to have met with Fubon? How many meals was he supposed to have eaten? They hurled all sorts of wild charges. Three. Eventually they learned that Chen Ying-chu was in fact a Green Camp sugar daddy. He was similar to Fubon Bank's Daniel Tsai. Wu Shu-cheng accepted at least 30 million dollars from him. She even praised him as the best candidate for finance minister, Now however, to attack Ma Ying-jeou, they are using him as a target.

If we compare and contrast Fubon case and the TaiMed case, we find the two are very different. One. The Fubon case has been subjected to repeated scrutiny. The TaiMed corruption scandal on the other hand, remains shrouded in mystery. It has never seen the light of day. Two. The merger between the Taipei Bank and the Fubon Bank underwent a public bid. The process was totally transparent, from start to finish. The purpose of the "highly confidential" documents was to prevent insider trading. Ma Ying-jeou had no family interests in the merger. By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen's "highly confidential" personal support for TaiMed enabled her to increase the value of Tsai family shares and make herself company chairman. Three. The benefits of the merger between the Fubon Bank and the Taipei Bank benefits are obvious, Every year it earns billons in revenue for the Taipei City Government. TaiMed by contrast, continues to bleed red ink. The government is stuck with the bill. Tsai Ing-wen meanwhile, personally benefits, to the tune of $20 million dollars.

TaiMed and Fubon reflect the difference in the Blue Camp and the Green Camp's way of handling things. One. The DPP relentlessly questions and denounces its opponents. It ignores questions it ought to answer. It never explains itself. It never offers any apologies. It even threatens critics, telling them "enough is enough." Two. The DPP takes cases it thoroughly investigated when it was in power, and rehashes and exploits them when it is in the opposition. Its smokescreen tactics demonstrate its contempt for voters. Does Tsai Ing-wen really think the public is incapable of discriminating between right and wrong? Three. The general election is only 20 days away. If Tsai Ing-wen were to offer a sincere apology, she might be able to clear up suspicions about the TaiMed corruption scandal. But the DPP insists on using the threadbare Fubon case to shift the focus of attention. Alas, it is merely confirming public suspicions regarding its guilt.

It matter not how adept the DPP might be at strategy. Democracy requires distinguishing between right and wrong. It requires calling a spade a spade, It requires honestly facing the public. The Green Camp alleges that the Blue Camp "planted misleading information" and "altered documents," Christina Liu did make honest mistakes for which she must assume political and legal responsibility. But the TaiMed corruption scandal involves dozens of cases of illegal conduct and malfeasance. Don't the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen owe citizens of the nation an honest accounting?

The DPP's smokescreen will only obscure the DPP's escape route. The spectacle of the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen destroying their own political party and their own reputations, is truly staggering.

富邦比宇昌：一隻色厲內荏的烏賊
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.12.22

富邦案和宇昌案是完全無法相提並論的事。富邦案是早已搾乾的菜又被搬出來擠汁，宇昌案則是一坨油滋滋形貌不詳的東西，仍有待剖析和檢驗。民進黨非要把兩者放到同一天平上去品頭論足，結果徒然顯示：自己頓時成了一隻色厲內荏的烏賊。

民進黨近日窮追富邦案，又狂打「魚翅宴」文宣，目的除在轉移宇昌案的焦點，也在抹黑馬英九的清廉形象，為身陷自肥火場的蔡英文衝開一扇逃生門。

但是，站在選民的角度，人們要的是「真相」；綠營的烏賊戰術卻是在混淆事實，想要製造「天下烏鴉一般黑」的假象。從動機看，民進黨的戰術反映的是它自己的心虛；從手段看，這是在欺矇選民；從結果看，這是在破壞社會正義。

其實，發生在二○○二年的富邦併北銀案，在扁政府時代，即歷經行政、檢調、監察等國家機器裡裡外外、四面八方的翻攪與調查，並未發現弊情。扁朝財政部長林全甚至曾誇讚，富邦併北銀是「一加一大於二」的成功典範。

但是，事隔近十年，富邦為何又變成民進黨口中的大弊案，被拿出來再炒一次？主要是因民進黨招架不住宇昌案，慌不擇路地要用富邦的陳年墨汁打煙幕戰。

上周六的大選辯論，由蔡英文親自拋出馬英九二○○八年收了富邦一千五百萬獻金的引爆火線，次日就被證實是個徹底的「烏龍」。事實是，富邦有意捐款，但遭馬英九以「利益迴避」為由，拒絕了那筆捐款。這比起蔡英文自己親批宇昌公文、親寫法案、親自當上宇昌董事長，還成立多個家族企業來投資生技，豈非天壤之別？蔡英文親自披掛掀開富邦之役，卻更反襯出自己缺乏分際、操守可議，真是偷雞不著蝕把米。

民進黨資訊不實卻貪功躁進，犯下這個含血噴人的烏龍，照理說應該「見壞就收」才是；但它竟然惱羞成怒，反將富邦的陳年舊案一古腦重新端出，硬要逼國人吃下這一桌餿飯殘羹。這種做法，只是愈發暴露其虛弱和失德。

綠營從富邦獻金案打到魚翅宴和機密公文，其實和先前的陳盈助「組頭事件」如出一轍：一、先抹黑馬英九收陳盈助三億獻金（收富邦一千五百萬），被證明是空穴來風。二、再咬馬英九為何兩年前與陳盈助見過兩次面（與富邦見過幾面？吃過幾次飯？胡攪一通）。三、最後，卻發現陳盈助是綠營金主的底蘊；這和富邦的蔡明忠一樣，當年吳淑珍至少收了他三千萬，還誇獎他是最佳財長人選，如今為了「打馬」卻把他當成箭靶。

若把富邦案和宇昌案拿來比一比，兩者其實大不相同：一，富邦已經過反覆檢驗；但宇昌卻疑雲重重，未見天日。二，北銀和富邦的合併，經過公開招標，程序一路透明，最後一份「極機密」的公文是為了防止內線交易，更未有馬英九家族私利牽涉其中；但蔡英文以「極機密」隻手扶植TaiMed，自己家族入股，自任董事長。三，富邦併北銀的效益明顯，每年為北市府帶入數十億收益；而宇昌連年虧損，政府被套牢，唯獨蔡英文一人獲利近二千萬元。

宇昌和富邦兩案的比較，正是藍綠兩營處事風格的對照。其一，民進黨不斷地質問、告發對手，對於自己應該答覆的疑問卻置之不理，不說明、也不道歉，還威嚇外界必須「適可而止」。其二，民進黨執政時徹查過的案子，在野時還要拿出來剝削一回，這種烏賊戰術是對選民的藐視，蔡英文真以為台灣人民那麼沒有分斷是非的能力嗎？其三，距離大選還有廿多日，蔡英文若誠懇說明並道歉，足夠她澄清宇昌案疑雲；但民進黨卻用富邦的舊案來轉移焦點，恐怕只是坐實了自己的心虛。

民進黨再長於策略，但民主終需回到政治是非的本質；就事論事，坦誠面對人民。綠營現在緊咬「誤植」與「變造」公文，此事劉憶如確實有錯，其政治及法律責任皆不能逃避；但除此以外，面對宇昌案的至少幾十個涉及違法或失德的疑竇重重，民進黨及蔡英文難道不應向國人坦誠作個交代嗎？

烏賊噴煙，最後恐怕會遮住了自己的出路；民進黨與蔡英文如此自毀黨格和人格，確實令人瞠目結舌。

Tsai Ing-wen Cannot Evade Questions About TaiMed

2011-12-21T01:08:00.001-08:00

Tsai Ing-wen Cannot Evade Questions About TaiMed
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 21, 2011

Summary: The presidential election is only 20 days away. The Blue and Green camps have begun bloody hand to hand combat, This may not lead to a lose/lose situation, but it will lead to voter disgust. But regardless, this election will determine the leader of our nation for the next four years, Can someone who cannot be trusted lead the nation? The ruling and opposition parties must live up to the strict standards the public has set for its national leaders.

Full Text Below:

A politician's most stringent test takes place during an election. That is when he or she is examined under a microscope by the entire nation. No candidate can avoid this close scrutiny of his or her conduct. This is true for the TaiMed corruption scandal. This is true for the Fubon shark fin soup banquet as well. Ruling and opposition party leaders competing for high office adopt certain attitudes during such scrutiny, Voters take into account these attitudes when casting their votes. KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou and DDP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen have revealed their respective strengths and weakness by the attitudes they adopted during such scrutiny.

Faced with fierce questioning over the TaiMed corruption scandal, the DPP responded by dredging up the shark fin soup banquet issue, an old issue that was resolved long ago. The DPP had nothing new to offer. Ma Ying-jeou responded calmly. He held a press conference. He sat patiently and allowed the media to question him, over and over again. Consider his attitude from the perspective of campaign strategy. Contrast this with Tsai Ing-wen's response to the TaiMed corruption scandal. Tsai's sole response was a statement saying she and her family did not profit illegally from TaiMed. As soon as she finished her statement, she turned and walked away. She refused to answer reporters' questions. Ma Ying-jeou's implicit message to the voters was: If Tsai Ing-wen has nothing to hide, why not clear the air?

Tsai Ing-wen angrily accused the Ma administration of using the machinery of government to harass her legally, and ruin her politically. But apply the same standards to both candidates. Surely no one has forgotten the recently concluded centennial celebrations? The show cost over 200 million dollars. CCA Chairman Emile Sheng stepped forward and responded to questioning by DPP, day after day. He voluntarily submitted himself to prosecutors for investigation. The prosecutors moved even more quickly in his case than they did in the TaiMed corruption scandal. Once prosecutors began questioning people and conducting searches, Emile Sheng voluntarily resigned. Throughout the process, he never uttered a single word accusing the DPP of electioneering, or the prosecutors of having ulterior motives for their investigation.

TaiMed was the Chen administration's major biotech project. Tsai Ing-wen went from being vice premier to board chairman of a biotech company. Since the vice premier was not the competent authority, she was not necessarily in violation of the articles prohibiting revolving door employment. But Tsai was up to her neck in the case. She participated fully in the authoring of the relevant legislation. She invested her family's money in the company. She definitely has a problem in terms of ethics and social perception. Government support for industry did not begin today. But public officials providing grants to private companies never became chairmen of the companies to which they provided grants. Public officials never owned a single share of stock in companies to which they provided grants. Still less did they invest their own family's funds.

The Tsai family sought funding from the National Development Fund. The change in ruling parties prevented the funds from actually being disbursed. After Tsai Ing-wen was elected DPP Chairman, she sold off her holdings. Clearly she understood that politics and business don't mix. But the Tsai family soon formed another company, also named TaiMed. Once again the family sought funding from the National Development Fund. This time the funding was approved and received. Even after Tsai Ing-wen stepped down as vice premier, she ordered National Development Fund officials to come to her residence and report on TaiMed matters, This, for the National Development Fund, was unprecedented, and of course, highly controversial.

Tsai Ing-wen insists that she did not violate civil service prohibitions against revolving door employment, because she sold her shares to private enterprise. She argues that the government did not actually disburse the funds, and that she did not actually profit from the transaction. But she could not explain her suddenly failure to avoid conflicts of interest. Perhaps she had no intention of remaining in politics. But if one returns to the political path, one can hardly excuse oneself by saying it was never a problem before. Now it has become a major problem. Why? Because now she is running for president.

If Tsai Ing-wen was not seeking high office. TaiMed would probably have remained unnoticed. But because she is running for president, she must subject herself to closer scrutiny than the average person. When Ma Ying-jeou ran for president in 2008, he had to endure the discretionary fund storm. He had to do ths same with the shark fin soup banquet. Ma Ying-jeou is merely seeking re-election. The DPP has been unable to dig up any dirt on him. So they dusted off an old issue and served it up again. Nevertheless Ma must patiently endure the ordeal, just as if he were starting from nothing.

DPP spin doctors have taken old news and maliciously presented it out of context. They have accused Ma Ying-jeou of twice attending banquets where shark fin soup was served. Was this merely an honest foul up, or a malicious attempt to frame Ma and discredit him? Ma Ying-jeou turned down Fubon's campaign contributions. Fubon's two company heads, one young and one old, made this clear, both inside and outside the courtroom. The only time Fubon ever made a campaign contribution to the KMT was in 2004. The receipt has been turned over to the court, Legislative Yuan President Wang Jin-pyng, who accepted the contribution, also stepped forward and explained. Yet the DPP's TV spots persist in rehashing this dead issue. Is this what Tsai Ing-wen meant by "negative campaigning?"

The DPP's negative campaigning is not confined to this. More recently DPP elder Frank Hsieh trotted out the old "Wu Den-yih scandal" tapes. Prominent TV spots cited it in an attempt to discredit the KMT. As far as the courts are concerned, the case is closed. Put simply, the tapes were faked, but they were not given to Chen Chun-sheng by Frank Hsieh. Hsieh claims the fake tapes led to his defeat in Taipei Mayoral Election. But Hsieh overlooks the fact that the gap between the winner and loser was too great. His defeat was not a result of the fraudulent tapes. The DPP's ads were of absolutely no benefit to Hsieh's campaign. Kaohsiung Mayor Wu Den-yih lost his bid for reelection that year as a result of the fake tapes. That was a real instance in which fake tapes determined the outcome of an election.

The presidential election is only 20 days away. The Blue and Green camps have begun bloody hand to hand combat, This may not lead to a lose/lose situation, but it will lead to voter disgust. But regardless, this election will determine the leader of our nation for the next four years, Can someone who cannot be trusted lead the nation? The ruling and opposition parties must live up to the strict standards the public has set for its national leaders.

面對宇昌案疑點蔡英文不能迴避
2011-12-21中國時報

選舉是對政治人物最嚴格的考驗，在全民監督下，沒有人能得逃得過相同的道德標準檢驗。宇昌案如此、富邦魚翅宴案亦復如此，競逐大位的朝野政治領袖們面對檢驗的態度，也是選民列為投票參考的因素。就此而言，國、民兩黨總統候選人馬英九與蔡英文的表現，高下立判。

面對宇昌案的凌厲質疑，民進黨拋出法院已經結案的魚翅宴老案。因為毫無新材料，馬英九自可從容以對；不但舉行記者會，還好整以暇地讓媒體一再提問；從選戰策略的角度，這當然是要對比上周蔡英文為宇昌案出面說明的態度。當時，蔡僅簡單強調自己和家族沒有不法圖利，話說完不容媒體發問逕自轉頭就走。馬英九意在言外想提醒選民的是：如果沒有爭議，為什麼不敢好好的把疑點說清楚？

蔡英文痛批馬政府運用國家機器對她進行政治和司法追殺。如果從同樣的標準檢驗，大家不會忘記，百年國慶才結束，為了晚會耗資二億多，文建會主委盛治仁每天對民進黨的疑問出面說明，更主動將自己移送檢調。檢調的動作遠比宇昌案更快，接案後即已展開約談和搜索；盛治仁更主動請辭下台，但沒有一句話批評民進黨將此案炒成選舉議題或檢調的司法偵查。

宇昌案是扁政府執政時期的生技大案，蔡英文從行政院副院長卸任轉職為生技公司董事長，因為副院長不是主管機關，確實未必有違反公務員旋轉門條款；但是蔡在此案中，從主導立法、全面參與、到投入家族資金，的確有政治道德和社會觀感的問題。雖然政府扶植政策性產業非始於今日，但過去從無扶植者搖身成為董事長的案例，甚至主事者一張股票都沒有，遑論投入家族資金。

此案因為政黨輪替，蔡氏家族向國發基金申請並核准的資金並未實際撥下；蔡英文在當選民進黨主席後，也全面出脫持股，顯然她也知道政治與經營企業勢難兩全的道理。但是，宇昌向國發基金申請資金核准並撥款後，另以蔡氏家族名義成立的台懋公司確實也又向國發基金請款。蔡英文副院長卸任後，甚至要求國發基金官員赴她的宅邸報告相關事宜，就程序上也算創下國發基金的先例，當然有爭議之處。

蔡英文能解釋她未違反公務員旋轉門，由於她的持股是賣給民間企業，政府資金並未實際核撥，也無圖利；但卻無法解釋為什麼她一念之間，竟疏忽了在此案上理應利益迴避的關節。或許當時她無意繼續從政，但踏上政治之途，她就不能責怪為什麼當時沒問題，此時卻成為大問題，原因很簡單：因為她此刻競選總統。

如果蔡英文並未競逐大位，宇昌案很可能就無人再提；但她既要競選總統，當然就得接受較諸常人更嚴格的檢驗。就像馬英九於二○○八年競選總統，要接受特別費案、魚翅宴案的檢驗一樣；即使馬英九競選連任，民進黨找不出新題材批評他，挖出舊案，他還是得耐著性子話說從頭一般。

民進黨人把舊日新聞稿惡意掐頭去尾，指涉馬英九魚翅宴不只吃了兩次，這算是烏龍爆料還是惡意栽贓抹黑？馬英九拒絕了富邦的政治獻金，富邦老少兩位企業主都在法庭內外說明，富邦只在二○○四年給國民黨政治獻金，收據已呈法院，經手的立法院長王金平也出面說明，民進黨依舊質疑還大刊廣告，這算不算是蔡英文口中的「負面選舉」？

民進黨「負面選舉」手法不只一端。最近，民進黨大老謝長廷同樣拿出過去所謂「吳敦義緋聞錄音帶」的舊案，大刊廣告以此案做為國民黨抹黑的例證。此案就司法已經結案的情況，簡單講就是緋聞錄音帶確為造假，但非謝長廷交付陳春生，謝認為此案造成他台北市長落選，謝忽略了他在台北市長選舉得票落差太大，豈是一案能構成的？民進黨刊登此一廣告，對選戰其實完全沒有正面效益，徒然讓人回想當年吳敦義高雄市長落選，還真是因為這捲假的錄音帶。

選戰最後廿多天，藍綠無可避免的進入文宣肉搏戰，就算搞不到兩敗俱傷，也得搞到讓選民兩相厭惡。但不論如何，最終當選者將是未來四年國家領導人，一個不被人民信賴的人如何帶領國家？朝野兩黨都得正視選民對國家領袖人格特質的嚴格要求。

Is TaiMed Really Not a Corruption Scandal?

2011-12-20T01:29:00.000-08:00

Is TaiMed Really Not a Corruption Scandal?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 20, 2011

Summary: Tsai Ing-wen claims that the TaiMed corruption scandal is neither scandalous nor illegal. Her two claims are debatable. Whether the TaiMed corruption scandal is a scandalous or illegal is not something she can decide by herself. Is the TaiMed corruption scandal scandalous? Perhaps that is matter of opinion. Is the TaiMed corruption scandal an actionable criminal case? The Special Investigation Unit has yet to provide an answer. But politicians who adopt such ridiculous and arrogant postures regarding their own actions, truly are a blight on democracy.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen claims that the TaiMed corruption scandal is neither scandalous nor illegal. Her two claims are debatable. Whether the TaiMed corruption scandal is a scandalous or illegal is not something she can decide by herself.

If the TaiMed corruption scandal involved violations of the law, it will become a criminal case. But even if it did not involve illegal acts, it could still be a scandal. According to the Ministry of Education Mandarin Dictionary, a scandal is an incident involving malfeasance or impropriety. Therefore the TaiMed corruption scandal is unquestionably scandalous. Whether it is an actionable criminal case remains to be seen, since it is still pending investigation.

Let us examine the facts of the TaiMed corruption scandal. When Tsai Ing-wen was vice premier, she personally authored the Biotech Drug Industry Regulations. Then, taking advantage of this ordinance, she personally issued a grant to TaiMed, aka Yu Chang, through the National Development Fund. Later, she invested Tsai family money in TaiMed, and served as its board chairman. Then, exploiting these same regulations, she founded the TaiMao Biotech Venture Capital Company. She sought one billion dollars from the National Development Fund, of which 875 million dollars was granted. The question we must now ask ourselves is whether this is merely a corruption scandal, or a criminal case?

First, assume for the sake of argument, that the TaiMed corruption scandal is not a criminal case. A vice premier wrote, directed, and acted in her own one woman self-enrichment show. She even involved David Ho and Ho Mei-yueh, and got them to use the machinery of state to bury the Nan Hua project. Does this not constitute a case of "malfeasance or impropriety?" Would this not be considered a "corruption scandal?"

Such appalling "malfeasance and improprieties" could take place within this "honorable" cabinet, Yet Tsai Ing-wen had the temerity to insist that the TaiMed corruption scandal was not scandalous. If she can get away with this, then from this day forward, any poliitical appointee can propose a Bill, then use the National Development Fund to set up a company, He or she can bypass audit procedures. His or her family members can invest their money. He or she can appoint himself company chairman. He or she can create a "venture capital company" and apply for a one billion dollar subsidy. As long as he or she frames her actions in euphemistic terms, then anything is legal. The entire nation's civil service can do the same. Can we really say the TaiMed corruption scandal is not scandalous?

Now let us ask whether the TaiMed corruption scandal should also be considered a criminal case. In other words, did it also involve illegal actitivity? The law most relevant to the TaiMed corruption scandal is the Biotech Drug Industry Regulations. But this "special law" is something Tsai Ing-wen pubicly acknowledges "personally authoring." She was personally responsible for the lack of revolving door restrictions, of restrictions against conflicts of interest, for its tax-free status, and for setting up a one billion dollar "biotech venture capital" clause. She complied with every one of these "special law" requirements. Under the circumstances, what good would it do to talk about legal violations? What would be the point? Clearly this was a law custom designed according to Tsai Ing-wen's specifications. Everything that would normally be considered illegal was predefined as "legal."

Many say Tsai Ing-wen stepped down as vice premier on May 21, 2007. They insist this dividing line absolves her of political and legal responsibility. This is indeed the "legal date." This is the date that would make her actions legal. Unfortunately it is not the "actual date." It is not the date that applies to her case in the real world. Tsai Ing-wen played a leading role in TaiMed, from beginning to end. On this point, no one has any doubts. The Nan Hua project was already two years old. It was on the verge of being approved. It was at this moment that Tsai Ing-wen suddenly and single-handedly promoted her Biotech Drug Industry Regulations. It was at this moment that she single-handedly established TaiMed, Does anyone actually believe that Tsai Ing-wen did not know that TaiMed would swallow up Nan Hua? That it would "hijack" it? Tsai retired on May 21. On July 6, Tsai met with Stephen Young. She publicly acknowledged that she had personally become involved the biotech drug industry, In August she sent a letter to the National Development Fund, seeking forty million dollars in start-up capital. How many days of gestation and run-in were required before the date shown on the documents? That is the gap between the "legal date" and "actual date." Tsai Ing-wen may not have imagined that she would step down on May 21, 2007. But she was making post-retirement arrangements for herself even when she was still in office. Could it be the retirement date was the date of her premiere? Could it be the script was already written? Otherwise how could events have worked out so well, without a single hitch?

At the heart of the dispute is Tsai Ing-wen's personal approval of TaiMed, TaiMed received 40 milion dollars in start-up capital from the National Development Fund, only three months after stepping down. Tsai Ing-wen was chairman of Yu Chang. Did she really not know that the "Yu Chang" company she headed was the very same company she personally approved -- TaiMed?

Whether the TaiMed corruption scandal becomes a criminal case depends on the legal evidence. Whether the TaiMed corruption scandal is considered a scandal will depend on whether one has a conscience and a sense of right and wrong. Is it a criminal case? Or is it "merely" a scandal? Tsai Ing-wen has failed to provide a satisfactory response to either possibility. Instead, she has the temerity to claim that all the attention is "killing the biotechnology industry," that the current administration is engaging in "political assassination." She is calling the pending investigation of her "a blight on democracy," She and her accomplices even hope to incite "Taiwanese outrage" and precipate an "ethnic" struggle over reunification vs. independence. The sole purpose of their insane demagoguery is merely to shift public attention awat from the facts around her legal gullt or innocence.

Is the TaiMed corruption scandal scandalous? Perhaps that is matter of opinion. Is the TaiMed corruption scandal an actionable criminal case? The Special Investigation Unit has yet to provide an answer. But politicians who adopt such ridiculous and arrogant postures regarding their own actions, truly are a blight on democracy.

宇昌案是不是弊案？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.12.20

蔡英文說，宇昌案不是弊案，亦未違法。這兩種說法，皆多可待商榷之處，亦均非蔡英文自己說了就算。

宇昌案若涉違法，那就成了「刑案」；但縱未涉違法，也可能是「弊案」。據教育部的國語辭典說，弊案是發生缺失或不正當的案件。準此，宇昌案當然是「弊案」；至於是否「刑案」，仍待偵辦，迄今尚無答案。

不妨再看一看宇昌案的主體架構：蔡英文任行政院副院長期間，親自撰寫主導《生技新藥產業條例》，再依據此一條例，親批以國發基金開設TaiMed（即宇昌），後來又以蔡家資金入股宇昌（即TaiMed），並任董事長；再依據同一條例，自設「台懋生技創投公司」，又向國發基金請款十億元，核准了八點七五億。現在要討論的是：這樣的案子是否「弊案」？是否「刑案」？

先假設不是刑案。請問：一位副閣揆，自導、自演、自肥到如此地步，何況其間還涉及何大一與何美玥等「運用國家機器」封殺南華案等行徑，這算不算是一件「發生缺失或不正當的案件」？算不算是一件「弊案」？

堂皇內閣之中，居然出現了如此駭人聽聞的「發生缺失或不正當的案件」；但蔡英文說，宇昌案不是「弊案」。此說若欲成立，除非蔡英文敢說，今後任何政務官均可自擬一個《條例》，再用國發基金設置一家公司，並排除一切審核程序，以自家資金入股，自任董事長，又再創「創投公司」請款十億；只要她敢說凡此皆屬正當，全國公務員皆可如此，那麼，宇昌案就不能說是「弊案」！

再論是否「刑案」，亦即是否違法？本案主要的法律準據即是《生技新藥產業條例》，但這部「特別法」卻是蔡英文承認係其「親手撰寫的」；其中包括排除旋轉門、利益迴避、免稅，及設立「生技創投」請款十億等，均是依據這個「特別法」的規定。在這樣的情境下，談「有無違法」，有何意義？因為，從現今的事實來看，這儼然是一部依照蔡英文的身形「量身裁製」的法律，一切「不合法的」均已被剪裁成「合法」。

再者，一般均將蔡英文於二○○七年五月二十一日卸副院長職，視為其政治及法律責任的分界點。這也許是事後從「法律日期」來看的景況，卻絕非案件發展的「事實日期」。蔡英文在全案中始終居於強勢主導角色，此點無人懷疑；而南華案在進行已有兩年之久，於幾乎已經批准之際，蔡英文竟同步一手親推《生技條例》，一手親批設置TaiMed，若謂蔡英文不知道「宇昌吃掉南華」的「劫鑣事件」，恐怕無人相信。再者，蔡在五月二十一日卸任，於七月六日見楊甦隸時已言明將親自投入新藥生技產業，八月即去函國發基金要求撥款四千萬元開辦費。在這些公文書上註明的日期之前，需有多少日子的醞釀期及磨合期，這才是「法律日期」與「事實日期」之間存有的落差與疑竇。蔡英文也許沒想到她會在二○○七年五月二十一日卸職，但這卻完全不能排除一切均是早已對準了她卸任後的安排。莫非卸任只是上演日期，但劇本早已寫好；否則豈可能如此環環相扣，一氣呵成？

最核心的爭議是：蔡英文親手批定了TaiMed，而居然在卸任三個月後就代表宇昌（即TaiMed）向國發基金請撥四千萬元開辦費。蔡英文難道不知，她任董事長的「宇昌」，正是她親批的TaiMed？

是否「刑案」，要看「法律證據」；但是否「弊案」，則只須自問良知與廉恥。現在，蔡英文無論對「刑案」或「弊案」的質疑，均未充分答辯；卻竟然將此案導向「扼殺生技產業」、「政治追殺」及「民主之恥」，其同案夥伴甚至欲將之推向「台灣人的憤怒」的族群統獨鬥爭；但如此瘋狂操弄，恐怕仍是「轉移焦點不能改變涉案或涉弊的事實」。

此案究竟是否「弊案」，容或見仁見智；是否「刑案」，亦仍待特偵組給答案。但毫無疑問的是，政治人物以如此離譜及傲慢的態度面對並操作自己所涉的如此嚴肅的民主法治巨案，可真是「民主之恥」！

Do Not Underestimate Importance of 1992 Consensus to Cross-Strait Relations

2011-12-19T01:51:00.000-08:00

Do Not Underestimate Importance of 1992 Consensus to Cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 17, 2011

Summary: National leaders represent the national will. They carry the nation's aspirations on their shoulders. They must be able to gain the people's trust. They must not provoke uncertainty. They must offer people a sense of security. We hope the presidential candidates will act responsibly and make a solemn promise to the people. If you win office, you will continue to honor the 1992 Consensus. If you win office, you will expand the scope of cross-Strait exchanges made possible by the 1992 Consensus.

Full Text Below:

Beijing's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) commemorated its 20th anniversary. Beijing's CPPCC Chairman Jia Qinglin issued a statement. He reminded everyone that the 1992 Consensus exists. It is a hard fact. Denying its existence will make cross-Strait negotiations impossible, It will make agreements reached during past consultations difficult to implement. It will lead to the recurrence of past cross-Strait tensions. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi stressed that "The 1992 Consensus must not be denied. Cross-Strait relations must not regress." This was followed by explicit expressions about the future of cross-Strait relations by even higher-level leaders in Beijing.

The presidential election is less than a month off. At this crucial moment, ruling and opposition party candidates must realize that the 1992 Consensus is the basis of mutual trust, and the path that will benefit Taiwan the most. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen in particular must think twice. She must recognize and reaffirm that the interests of the public on Taiwan transcends political ideology. She must make the pragmatic choices.

Several points in Jia Qinglin's remarks warrant attention. First, he reaffirmed the reality of the 1992 Consensus. He pointed out that in 1992, ARATS and the SEF reached an oral agreement on the One China Principle. This is what people today commonly refer to as the 1992 Consensus. This laid the political foundation for cross-Strait negotiations, This contributed to the Wang-Koo talks held the following year. This constituted an important step in cross-Strait relations. Secondly, he reiterated that cross-Strait negotiations are a priority. They are vital to the interests of compatriots on both sides of the Strait, Negotiations should actively consider the needs of most ordinary citizens, SMEs, and young people, Negotiations should expand cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, and expand the benefits to the public on both sides of the Strait. Thirdly, he explicitly said the two sides should avoid unnecessary friction in foreign affairs. He said he understood the concerns of Taiwan compatriots, including their desire to participate in international activities. He said Beijing was willing to make reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait consultations.

Jia Qinglin's remarks made no mention of the upcoming presidential election, But his remarks brimmed over with implied concern that cross-Strait relations might regress. Beijing apparently considers the 1992 Consensus its bottom line for further cross-Strait developments.

The global economy has yet to fully recover from the financial tsunami. The impact on the ROC over the past three years has been milder compared to other countries. That is because the government implemented various measures. Other factors also had a major role. These factors include stable cross-Strait relations, direct links, Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, and the sale of Taiwan's agricultural products, fish, and electrical appliances to the Mainland. The signing of ECFA has enabled Taiwan to attract more international funds. Looking to the future, we expect continued peaceful cross-Strait relations. This includes the ECFA early harvest list. Ninety-four percent of the items on the list will be tariff free in January, one month from now. The public on Taiwan will find it easier to enter and exit the Mainland. The Mainland is even considering importing rice from Taiwan. It is considering normalizing market-based procurement mechanisms for the purchase of a variety of products. These products are relevant to the pragmatic interests of the public on Taiwan. National leaders cannot afford to ignore them. Tsai Ing-wen stands a good chance of being elected. She too needs to think about what is more important. Is it realizing the DPP's goal of Taiwan independence? Or is it fulfiling the needs of the Taiwan public? Two weeks ago, on the eve of the televised presidential debate, Tsai Ing-wen held a press conference. She vowed that following the election she would form a "cross-Strait policy dialogue group." She would make the 1992 Consensus part of the discussions. These vows were part of an attempt to gain the confidence of swing voters. Unfortunately during the debate, Tsai Ing-wen completely reneged on her promises. She reverted to repudiating the 1992 Consensus, pouring cold water on centrist voters.

Without the 1992 Consensus, can the 17 agreements already signed remain in force? Over the past three years regular meetings and consultations between the ARATS and the SEF have been restored, How can they proceed? In the presence of ARATS Vice Chairman Jia Qinglin, SEF Chairman Li Ya-fei assured the Taiwan media that without the 1992 Consensus, regular meetings and consultations between the ARATS and the SEF "would definitely come to an end." The point is not that talks between the leaders of the two associations would come to end. The point is that the benefits conferred upon the public on both sides of the Strait would be lost, All sorts of of jobs beneficial to people on both sides of the Strait would vanish, Most importantly, the losses would affect not just cross-Strait relations, but Taiwan's economic situation.

As we all know, the debt crisis in Europe means the world faces another wave of financial crises, even more serious than the one precipitated by the Lehman Brothers scandal, Taiwan has limited resources. Loss of the Mainland market would sever one of its most important economic arteries. This is why academics and business experts are worried. Some of them are saying that "If Ma is reelected, the economic situation on Taiwan will be bad. But if Tsai Ing-wen is elected, the economic situation on Taiwan will be even worse." Recently Taiwan stocks fell more world stocks, This reflects the uncertainty Taiwan investors feel about the larger situation.

National leaders represent the national will. They carry the nation's aspirations on their shoulders. They must be able to gain the people's trust. They must not provoke uncertainty. They must offer people a sense of security. We hope the presidential candidates will act responsibly and make a solemn promise to the people. If you win office, you will continue to honor the 1992 Consensus. If you win office, you will expand the scope of cross-Strait exchanges made possible by the 1992 Consensus.

別低估九二共識維繫兩岸關係的重要性
2011-12-17中國時報

大陸海協會舉行廿週年紀念大會，大陸全國政協主席賈慶林發表談話，強調「九二共識」是一個客觀事實，否定「九二共識」，兩岸協商就難以為繼，已有的協商成果也將難以落實，兩岸關係勢將重現以往曾有過的動蕩不安。這是繼大陸國台辦主任王毅強調「九二共識不容否認，兩岸關係不容倒退」後，大陸更高層的領導人對兩岸走向再一次明確表態。

值此總統大選不到一個月的關鍵時刻，朝野候選人都不能不正視唯有維護「九二共識」這個兩岸互信基礎，才是最符合台灣利益的做法。特別是民進黨主席蔡英文更須慎重思考，台灣人民的利益理應超越政黨的意識形態，做出務實的抉擇。

賈慶林談話，幾點應特別注意。首先是他確認了「九二共識」存在的事實。他指出一九九二年海協會與台灣海基會經兩岸雙方分別授權，達成各自以口頭方式表述堅持一個中國原則的共識，也就是今天人們稱之的「九二共識」，由此奠定了兩岸協商的政治基礎，促成了次年汪辜會談的舉行，邁出了兩岸關係重要一步。其次他重申兩岸協商應當優先解決事關兩岸同胞切身利益的重要問題，積極考慮廣大基層民眾、中小企業和青年人的需求，使協商成果更加有利於擴大兩岸交流合作，更加廣泛地惠及兩岸民眾。再其次，他也明確主張兩岸在涉外事務中應避免不必要的內耗，同時也理解和重視台灣同胞關心參與國際活動的問題，願意通過兩岸協商作出合情合理的安排。

賈慶林上述談話雖未提及選舉，但憂心兩岸關係有可能倒退的寓意，卻瀰漫通篇談話中，可以這麼說，北京似乎已經將「九二共識」視為兩岸發展後續關係的最後底線了。

這三年多來，全球經濟局勢在金融海嘯重創後，始終復原無力，相對於其他國家，台灣受創有限，除了政府各種措施之外，很大部分得歸功於兩岸關係的穩定發展。直航三通、陸客來台、台灣農漁家電產品輸陸…，兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ後，讓台灣更具備吸引國際資金的條件，展望未來，如果兩岸關係持續和平穩健發展，可預期的，包括ＥＣＦＡ早收清單百分之九十四的項目在一個月後的明年元旦即可實施零關稅，未來台灣民眾出入境大陸更便捷，大陸甚至開始思考進口台灣稻米，並建立常態化、市場化的對台採購機制。凡此種種，無一不攸關台灣人民的實際利益。身為國家領導人，不能不以人民的利益為念，對於當選機會極大的蔡英文而言，同樣要思考當選總統究竟是為了實踐民進黨的台獨理念重要？還是維護台灣人民的利益重要？兩週前的總統大選電視辯論會前夕，蔡英文一度出面舉行記者會，表明當選後要組成「兩岸對話小組」，不排除把「九二共識」納入台灣共識的討論，這番這句話某種程度鼓舞中間選民的信心；遺憾的是，蔡英文在辯論會中又全盤推翻，依舊強硬地否認「九二共識」，彷彿當頭澆下一盆冷水。

沒有「九二共識」，已簽署的十七項協議還能繼續執行嗎？更不要提已經恢復三年多、成果豐碩的兩岸兩會領導人定期會談與協商，還能如何進行下去？海協會副會長李亞飛在賈慶林談話前與台灣媒體會面，感慨直言，「那肯定是要停了！」重點不是在兩岸兩會領導人的會談終止，重點在於這意味著兩岸關係勢將重挫，與兩岸人民利益相關的各種工作都將面臨停擺，這個重大變數，不只攸關兩岸關係，更攸關台灣經濟形勢。

眾所周知，在歐債風暴下，全球經濟局勢又將面臨一波較諸雷曼兄弟引爆的金融海嘯更嚴峻的挑戰，台灣資源有限，失去大陸市場就是切斷一條最重要的經濟血脈，這也是為什麼包括學者專家和企業界都極為憂心，甚至有「馬英九連任，經濟形勢與台灣處境壞；蔡英文當選，經濟形勢與台灣處境更壞」的感嘆。最近台股較諸世界各國呈現超跌情況，正是台灣投資人對整體情勢不確定感的投射。

國家領導人是國家意志的表徵，肩上扛的是全國人民的負託，必須能給予人民信賴感，而非不確定感。重要的是：請給人民安全感。請有志於大位總統候選人負責任的給予人民承諾：如果執政可以延續「九二共識」，並擴大「九二共識」所創造的兩岸交流成果。

The White Rose Becomes Tsai Yu Chang

2011-12-15T20:24:00.000-08:00

The White Rose Becomes Tsai Yu Chang
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 16, 2011

Summary: Tsai is now a presidential candidate. She was once the "White Rose," the "little dragon maid." She is now "Tsai 18", "Kong Xin Cai" (water spinach, a vegetable with hollow stems, suggesting a lack of substance) and "Tsai Yu Chang." Her personal image has been shattered. But if she is elected president, she may well shatter the Republic of China's image along with her own. The public is disillusioned. Three years ago everyone hoped that Tsai Ing-wen would reform the DPP. Today however, we know that the DPP has corrupted Tsai Ing-wen.

Full Text Below:

Our editorial on the 10th spoke of "Tsai Ing-wen's Three Illusions." Today's editorial speaks of "Tsai Ing-wen's Three Shattered Illusions."

During the December 3 presidential debate, Tsai Ing-wen expended the most energy defending herself on three issues. One. Cross-Strait relations. The evening before she proposed a "cross-Strait dialogue working group." The day of the debate, she talked up a storm, struggling mightily to explain her "Taiwan consensus." Two. Her image as a champion of justice. At least twice she reiterated that "My campaign committee is not the same as my cabinet." She even assured President Ma that "The person standing before you is Tsai Ing-wen, not Chen Shui-bian." Three. Her view of national governance. She said "The international community seldom recognizes our national flag and our national title. We have been able to do little about it. There is only one solution to these problems. A new political party must take office, A new president must lead Taiwan."

Tsai Ing-wen knows that these three issues are her three greatest weaknesses and three greatest embarrassments. She struggles to justify herself, but has trouble convincing listeners. This reflects her "three shattered illusions."

Three years ago, Tsai Ing-wen took on the role of DPP Chairman. This may have been her wish, or the wish of the public. Either way, the wish was that she would transform the DPP. The most important transformations the DPP needed to undergo concerned its views on cross-Strait relations, its image as a champion of justice, and its views on national governance. But during the debate President Ma zinged Tsai Ing-wen when he said "I, Ma Ying-jeou, reformed the Kuomintang, The DPP on the other hand, corrupted Tsai Ing-wen." Ma hit the nail on the head when he addressed these shattered illusions.

One. Cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, Tsai Ing-wen promises to maintain peaceful cross-Strait exchanges. On the other hand, she insists on repudiating the 1992 Consensus and reneging on her own commitments. Tsai Ing-wen categorically refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She stubbornly digs in her heels, no matter what the cost, She refuses to compromise with Beijing even as she promises to "actively seek opportunities for dialogue with the other side, and create possibilities for interaction with [Mainland] China," and set up a "working group on cross-Strait dialogue." Tsai Ing-wen knows that in the event she is elected president, she cannot afford a falling out with Beijing. Nevertheless she refuses to change her tune before the election. She would rather permit herself to be blackmailed by Beijing after the election. Anyone still hoping Tsai Ing-wen can smooth over relations with Beijing can forget about it.

Two. Tsai Ing-wen's image as a champion of justice. In early 2000, Chen Shui-bian's slogan was "We must rise to a higher level, not sink to a lower level." Now look at Tsai Ing-wen. She chose Su Jia-chyuan as her vice presidential running mate. She drew up a dubious list of nominees for legislator without porfolio. She adopted Chen Ying-chu's "two dollar yuan persimmons" election ploy. She is a suspect in the Yu Chang Technology Company scandal. Bullets are still flying. The public wonders whether she will pardon Chen Shui-bian. These are problems she has evaded and afraid to face. When Tsai Ing-wen reiterated that "My campaign committee is not the same as my cabinet," she was admitting that she was surrounded by shady characters and was unable to extricate herself. When Tsai Ing-wen insisted that "The person standing before you is Tsai Ing-wen, not Chen Shui-bian," what people saw standing behind her was "Chen Shui-bian and Company." Three years ago Tsai Ing-wen was known as the "White Rose." But over the past three years this image of her as a champion of justice has been shattered.

Three. Her vision for national governance. Tsai Ing-wen says if the DPP returns to power and she becomes president, the international community will recognize our national title and our national flag. She made these monumental, deceitful, and hollow boasts in broad daylight. How can anyone continue to believe that Tsai Ing-wen will govern on the basis of reason? Tsai Ing-wen cannot even bring herself to place a national flag on her own podium during DPP campaign rallies. Yet she makes these empty boasts. Just look at any DPP rally. One will not see a single ROC national flag present, Any expectations that Tsai Ing-wen will govern on the basis of reason have long been shattered.

Turn a cold eye on Tsai Ing-wen. She had a cleaner image than most other presidential candidates in recent memory. But her image was still muddy. Compare Tsai Ing-wen to Chen Shui-bian. On cross-strait relations, Chen Shui-bian proposed a "New Centrist Path" and "Five Noes." Tsai Ing-wen on the other hand refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus. This makes her the first presidential candidate to propose clashing head on with Beijing during an election campaign. How strange is that? Compare their images as champions of justice, When Chen Shui-bian was rising to power, he was perceived as the embodiment of 'honesty, dillgence, and patriotism." Tsai Ing-wen on the other hand, is associated with Su Jia-chyuan's corruption, with questionable nominations for legislator without portfolio, for an economically destructive persimmons campaign, and for involvement in the Yu Chang Technology Company scandal. How unexpected. Consider their views on national governance. Chen Shui-bian's campaign theme was "Hold on to your dreams, join hands with hope." Tsai Ing-wen's campaign theme is "Next stop, a showndown with Beijing!"

Tsai is now a presidential candidate. She was once the "White Rose," the "little dragon maid." She is now "Tsai 18", "Kong Xin Cai" (water spinach, a vegetable with hollow stems, suggesting a lack of substance) and "Tsai Yu Chang." Her personal image has been shattered. But if she is elected president, she may well shatter the Republic of China's image along with her own.

The public is disillusioned. Three years ago everyone hoped that Tsai Ing-wen would reform the DPP. Today however, we know that the DPP has corrupted Tsai Ing-wen.

當「白玫瑰」變成「蔡宇昌」
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.12.16

十日社論談「蔡英文的三個幻想」，今天談「蔡英文的三個幻滅」。

十二月三日的辯論會中，蔡英文對三個問題的辯護最力。一、兩岸關係：她前一晚拋出了「兩岸對話工作小組」，辯論當天又費了很多唇舌解釋「台灣共識」。二、公義形象：她至少說了兩次「我的競選團隊不等於治國團隊」，甚至告訴馬總統，「站在你面前的是蔡英文，不是陳水扁」。三、治理憧憬：她說：「我們的國旗和國號經常走不出去、也拿不出去；這些問題要解決，只有一個辦法，那就是換一個政黨來執政、換一個總統來領導台灣。」

蔡英文其實知道，這三大問題正是她所面臨的三大質疑，也是她的三大困窘；而從她力圖辯解卻又難以自圓其說的情狀來看，這也恰恰反映了她的「三大幻滅」。

三年多前，蔡英文就任民進黨主席，無論是她自己對自己的期許，或國人對她的寄望，都是盼能見到她帶領民進黨轉型，最重要的項目即是「兩岸關係／公義形象／治理憧憬」；但是，在辯論會中馬總統的一句話，「我馬英九改變了國民黨，而民進黨卻改變了蔡英文」，正是直接道出了這個「幻滅」。

一、兩岸關係：蔡英文一方面承諾一定會維持兩岸的和平交流，但另一方面她又以堅持否定「九二共識」來摧毀自己的承諾。蔡英文斬釘截鐵否定「九二共識」，這表示她不惜一切地固執己見，不與北京妥協；但她又宣稱「將積極尋求與對岸對話的機會／營造與中國互動的可能」，且稱將成立「兩岸對話工作小組」。這樣的矛盾，顯示蔡英文亦明知，她若當選也絕不能與北京鬧翻；但是，蔡英文卻仍選擇不在選前調整論述，而寧可到了若當選後讓自己受到北京的挾制。事態至此，若有人仍寄望蔡英文能夠平順處理兩岸關係的可能性，可謂已告全盤幻滅。

二、公義形象：陳水扁在二○○○年出頭時，打的是「要向上提升／不要向下沉淪」的口號；但看一看蔡英文，她卻有蘇嘉全這樣的副總統候選人搭檔，又有那一張充滿爭議的不分區立委名單，再有「陳盈助」、「兩元柿」那樣的選舉操作。何況，她自己又沾上「宇昌生技」的「量身自肥」議論，至今子彈仍在飛行之中；再加上是否特赦陳水扁這個「嚴肅的問題」，也讓她一直迴避而不敢面對。當蔡英文說「我的競選團隊不等於治國團隊」之時，她其實是在揭示她已陷於那些牛鬼蛇神的包圍挾持之中，不能自拔。聽蔡英文說「站在你面前的是蔡英文，不是陳水扁」，人們卻看到了站在她背後的「陳水扁們」；此對三年多前以「白玫瑰」之姿登場的蔡英文而言，不啻是公義形象的幻滅。

三、治理憧憬：蔡英文竟然說，換民進黨執政，換她當總統，她就能讓國號與國旗走出去，拿出去。光天化日下竟能說出這樣的假、大、空話，還能相信蔡英文宣示的任何治理憧憬嗎？因為，事實是，蔡英文連插一支大幅國旗在她的競選講台上都辦不到，卻怎麼會如此吹牛不打草稿？只要看民進黨造勢場合見不到一面國旗，即知蔡英文所宣稱的任何治理憧憬必告幻滅。

冷靜觀察蔡英文，即可發現，她是歷來較具實力的總統候選人中，形象顯得較「清新」，卻亦是形象相當「渾濁」的一位。若以陳水扁與蔡英文相比，在兩岸關係上，陳水扁冒出頭時，主張的是「新中間路線」、「四不一沒有」；蔡英文卻是「否定九二共識」，這使她儼然成為歷來第一位在競選時即主張與北京攤牌對撞的總統候選人，豈不古怪？在公義形象上，陳水扁崛起時楬櫫的是「清廉／勤政／愛鄉土」；蔡英文則是「蘇嘉全／不分區／牛心柿／宇昌案」，大異其趣！再就政治憧憬言，陳水扁發跡的主調是「有夢最美／希望相隨」；蔡英文的號召則不啻是：「下一站，與北京掀桌對幹！」

蔡英文現在是總統候選人，此時，她從「白玫瑰」、「小龍女」，到「蔡十八」、「空心蔡」、「蔡宇昌」的變化，只是她個人形象的幻滅；倘若她當選總統，這個幻滅即可能成為整個台灣的幻滅。

幻滅的整體流程是：三年前大家以為「蔡英文會改變民進黨」，如今卻證實「民進黨改變了蔡英文」。