Three Things the KMT and Hung Hsiu-chu Must Do

Three Things the KMT and Hung Hsiu-chu Must Do
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 14, 2015

Executive Summary: After some haggling, Hung Hsiu-chu has agreed to stop using the expression "One China, Same Interpretation" and to revert to using the party's "One China, Different Interpretations" and "1992 consensus". She will then become the official KMT presidential nominee at the National Party Congress, on July 19. The storm has temporarily subsided. Hung Hsiu-chu must now rally supporters inside and outside the party. The KMT must provide firm organizational backing. It must do so as soon as possible. It must not continue to "wait and see" .

Full Text Below:

After some haggling, Hung Hsiu-chu has agreed to stop using the expression "One China, Same Interpretation" and to revert to using the party's "One China, Different Interpretations" and "1992 consensus". She will then become the official KMT presidential nominee at the National Party Congress, on July 19. The storm has temporarily subsided. Hung Hsiu-chu must now rally supporters inside and outside the party. The KMT must provide firm organizational backing. It must do so as soon as possible. It must not continue to "wait and see" .

At the moment, the KMT is doing little to prepare. Its policy seems to be "Let's wait until Hung Hsiu-chu is officially nominated, then we'll see". Nor has the Hung Hsiu-chu campaign taken advantage of its momentum to win over rural blue camp and centrist voters. It has wasted a great deal of time. The election campaign is actually being waged on two levels. Dissent within the party is rampant. Under the circumstances, Hung can take advantage of outside support to force party dissidents to toe the line. If Hung lacks outside support, she will be forced to concede defeat. For now KMT leaders have adopted a "wait and see" posture. Hung Hsiu-chu's campaign strategy is unclear. But some naysayers are acting like buffoons, and stabbing Hung Hsiu-chi in the back. They are the main reason Hung Hsiu-chu has lost momentum.

Does the KMT want to build momentum? Does Hung Hsiu-chu want her campaign to get on track and make a breakthrough? If so, the KMT and the Hung campaign must do at least three things before the National Party Congress.

One. Hung Hsiu-chu and the KMT must establish a clearer and more effective division of labor to avoid a repeat of the One China, Same Interpretation dispute. Cross-Strait policy has long been a key issue in blue vs. green national elections. Ma Ying-jeou won twice because voters approved of his cross-Strait policy. Hung Hsiu-chu's One China, Same Interpretation policy is not wrong. But it is untested and hard to explain. This presents problems. Hung Hsiu-chu will cease using the term One China, Same Interpretation. That is a pragmatic compromise. But once Hung has taken a firm stand, she must go on the offensive. She must not permit herself to be caught defending a position. That is no way to win points.

On other public issues, the KMT can adopt a multifront attack strategy. Breakthroughs should be spearheaded by Hung Hsiu-chu. But during policy debates the party headquarters and think tanks can play the role of flankers and guards, providing her with ammunition and support. Hung Hsiu-chu's style is incisive, straightforward, and heartfelt. It is highly effective against "Content Free Tsai's" mealy mouthed equivocations and evasions. But when green camp spokespersons lash out at Hung, the party headquarters and think tanks must stand behind her. This division of labor must be quickly established and put into action.

Two. The Hung Hsiu-chu campaign must establish its own "command and control center" as soon as possible. Before her official nomination, her campaign was led by ad hoc campaign manager Lee Sichuan. But Lee is also KMT Secretary-General. He cannot devote all of his time to her campaign. Also, he may be adept at administration but he is not an experienced campaign manager. His time is limited. One cannot expect him to juggle party and campaign responsibilities.

The Hung Hsiu-chu campaign was in chaos following her breakthrough in the polls, mainly because it lacked a command and control center. As a result, it could not set the agenda. Hung Hsiu-chu must regroup as soon as possible. She must establish a command and control center that can locate resources and plan strategies. She must recruit someone with extensive campaign experience, as well as communication and coordination skills. That someone must communicate not just with KMT leaders, but also with the Ma administration, with KMT legislators, and even local KMT officials. Only then can the Hung campaign get back on track in the shortest possible time and resume battle stations.

Three. The Hung Hsiu-chu campaign must broaden participation. In particular, it must allow those with different voices to join the team. So far the Hung campaign has added only two spokespersons. The rest are all old faces from the primaries. Elected representatives inside and outside the party who support Hung Hsiu-chu can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The Hung campaign is too incestuous. It is unable to recruit outside talent. Hung Hsiu-chu has been criticized for drawing support solely from northern Taiwan. Hung's expertise is limited to educational issues. She even lacks the ability to communicate policy. This is the reason why.

Hung Hsiu-chu is Deputy Legislative Speaker. She is running for president, a much higher office. Past talent pools and social circles are insufficient to meet her needs. She desperately needs a swift infusion of new blood. Decision-making requires diversity. The Hung campaign must not be a one-man show. It must be tolerant and attentive to different points of view. This will minimize poor decisions attributable to blind spots. As a leader, Hung must enable people from different realms and different ideologies to take part in her campaign. Only this will convince voters that she has the character to be president.

Accomplishing these three things in short order will not be easy. Lest we forget, Tsai Ing-wen is playing a waiting game. She has the DPP at her beck and call, and can use it in service of her presidential campaign. If the KMT and the Hung Hsiu-chu campaign cannot cooperate, the election will be lost without a fight. This is why Hung Hsiu-chu and Kuomintang leaders must cooperate. Blue camp cooperation may not ensure victory. But if the blue camp falls apart, will it even survive?

國民黨和洪秀柱立即該做的三件事 2015-07-14聯合報 經過一番協商，洪秀柱不再提「一中同表」，並同意回歸黨的「一中各表」和「九二共識」立場；接下來，她將在七月十九日全國黨代表大會成為國民黨正式的總統提名人。風波雖暫平息，但洪秀柱要如何重新凝聚黨內外民意支持，國民黨要如何提供她有力的組織後援，則必須快馬加鞭進行，不可再觀望猶疑。 國民黨目前其實看不到太多備戰氣氛，各方態勢，似乎抱著一切「等洪秀柱正式提名再說」的心情。至於洪秀柱陣營，也未把握此一空檔積極造勢，主動下鄉爭取藍營及中間選民的支持，平白浪費了不少時間。事實上，選舉造勢是兩個不同層次的經營：在黨內雜音很多的情況下，候選人可以藉外部支持力量的營造，來促迫黨內異議者的歸附；否則，如果缺乏外部支持，就只好自己向反對者稱臣。但目前看來，國民黨中央心存觀望，洪秀柱陣營戰略不清，倒是一些唱反調的跳樑小丑眉飛色舞，見縫插針，這是洪秀柱氣勢下墜的主因。 從大局著眼，國民黨若希望打出一場有氣勢的選戰，洪秀柱若希望選戰能有節奏地開展和突破，至少有三件事，是國民黨和洪營在全代會前必須先努力做到的。 第一件事，在戰略上，洪秀柱和國民黨必須建立比較清楚有效的攻守分工，避免重演「一中同表」的類似爭執。兩岸政策的攻防，一直是藍綠在全國性選舉的重要議題，馬英九兩次勝選都與兩岸政策較受選民肯定有關。洪秀柱的「一中同表」主張，並非不可取，但可行性未經驗證及不易說明清楚，都是問題。洪秀柱不再提「一中同表」，是務實的妥協；但站穩立場之後，應適時向對手發動攻勢，不要一味陷於自辯，那無助於加分。 在其他民眾關心的公共議題上，洪營和國民黨可以採取「分進合擊」的方式：在點的突破上，由洪秀柱扮演先鋒；在政策架構的論辯上，則由黨部和智庫扮演側翼及後衛，提供彈藥支援。洪秀柱的特色是潑辣、直白、感性，用來戳破空心蔡的模糊、閃躲，頗有作用；但當綠營辯士出動時，就需要黨部和智庫的聲援。這類分工模式，必須設法建立，且迅速啟動。 第二件事，是洪秀柱的團隊必須盡快找到自己的「大腦中樞」。在正式提名前，是由李四川「暫代」競選辦公室總幹事。但李四川一則身兼國民黨秘書長，不可能全力投入辦公室事務；二則他長於行政事務，並非選戰老手，在短時間內要黨務和選戰兩頭兼顧，恐怕力有未逮。 民調破磚後，洪秀柱的選戰節奏顯得雜亂無章，主因就在缺乏作戰「大腦」，因此缺乏創造話題的能力。洪秀柱必須盡快覓得能夠整合各項競選資源，並且規劃選戰策略、步驟的「大腦」。這樣的人選，除了必須有豐富的選戰經驗，也須具備溝通、協調能力。而溝通的對象，不能只限於黨中央，更包括府院執政團隊、黨籍立委乃至地方人士。如此，才能讓選舉團隊在最短的時間內步入正軌，就作戰位置。 第三件事，是擴大團隊的參與，尤其是要容納「不一樣的聲音」到團隊內。到目前為止，洪秀柱的團隊除了加進兩位發言人，其餘幾乎都仍是初選階段的老面孔，黨內外為洪秀柱衝鋒陷陣的民代、同志屈指可數。主要原因，就是其團隊過於封閉，未能積極覓才使然。有人批評洪秀柱支持者「只限北部」、洪的專精領域「只限教育議題」，甚至「政策缺乏溝通」等，原因皆在此。 洪秀柱由立法院副院長躍居準總統參選人，層次大不相同，過去的人才庫、社交圈顯已不敷所需，必須快速大量注入新血。從決策的多元性考量，團隊不應該是一言堂，要有傾聽不同意見的氣度，才能降低決策盲點。從領導者的高度考量，必須要能夠吸納不同領域甚至意識形態者加入團隊，才能夠說服所有的選民，自己具有當總統的格局。 要在短時間內完成這三件事，並不容易。尤其別忘了，蔡英文不僅是以逸待勞，而且是手握舉黨之力為自己輔選；如果國民黨和洪秀柱無法迅速擺脫磨合不順的困境，這場選戰可以說已未戰先衰。正因如此，洪秀柱和國民黨中央更應開誠布公，攜手合作。試想：藍軍合作都未必打得贏，分裂的話，豈有活路？