Chen Shui-bian: What Kind of Leader would do This?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 30, 2007
Chen Shui-bian asked: What kind of leader would I be if I were to sacrifice my "Plebsicite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" for the sake of better treatment during my transit through the US? This is hardly the only way to look at the matter. What Chen Shui-bian should have asked was: What kind of person would use the plebsicite to influence the upcoming elections, damage Taipei/Washington relations, and turn his state visit to Central America into a farce?
Everything Chen did was for the sake of the "Plebsicite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." But the plebiscite is fundamentally a phony issue. Chen Shui-bian isn't going to all this trouble because he expects the plebiscite to succeed. All he really wants to do is elicit sympathy by butting his head against a wall. He is waiting for the plebiscite to go down in defeat. He will then milk the defeat for public sympathy, reaping the political benefits. Frank Hsieh told the US that Chen's attempt to "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" was doomed to failure. Clearly, "joining the UN" is a phony issue. Chen's formal application to "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" has already been rejected by the United Nations and sent back, unopened and unread. Clearly, the "holding of a plebiscite" is also a phony issue.
Chen Shui-bian is manipulating the "Plebsicite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" for entirely selfish motives. He hopes to give himself a complete makeover. He hopes to transform Chen Shui-bian the Kleptocrat into Chen Shui-bian the Champion of Taiwan independence. As the standard bearer for Taiwan independence, he can hijack the presidential election and control the post election political scene. That is why he is pushing the "Plebsicite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" without regard for the consequences. In fact, he knows perfectly well that his plebiscite can never succeed. He is merely hoping that its defeat will provoke public indignation. He knows perfectly well this is merely a short term electioneering move. Yet he has no hesitation about forcing the nation to pay a long term cost that may never be recouped.
Chen Shui-bian has severely damaged Taipei/Washington relations with his phony plebiscite. During his transit through the US the treatment he received was downgraded to new lows. When asked whether the US had insulted Chen Shui-bian, a US State Department spokesperson said "The US respects the people of Taiwan." US authorities urged Chen Shui-bian to display "leadership." The US was clearly implying that Chen Shui-bian was unfit to represent the people of Taiwan. The US State Department spokesperson essentially issued an ultimatum, demanding that Chen Shui-bian pull back from the precipice. Chen brought this humiliation upon himself. But Chen also damaged the friendship and trust between Taipei and Washington. How will Taipei get along with Washington after this? How will the Democratic Progressive Party? How will the Taiwan independence movement? Relations with Washington were sacrificed for a phony issue such as "Joining the UN under the Name of Taiwan." What kind of leader would do this?
Chen's plebiscite forced Central American allies to delete a clause stating that "Taiwan is an independent nation deserving of membership in international organizations such as the UN and WHO." Chiang Ching-kuo never resorted to "head of state diplomacy." He was "untopical." Lee Teng-hui had a passion for "head of state diplomacy." Theatrics became all the rage. Diplomacy degenerated into political theater. Diplomacy under Chen Shui-bian became a three ring circus. All for the sake of "domestic sales of commodities orginally produced for export." With much fanfare, Chen gave away nearly 10 billion dollars in aid to Honduras. Yet the following day, the clause supporting Taiwan's membership in the UN vanished from the joint communique. Honduran President Manuel Zelaya even ordered the broadcast signal cut during Chen Shui-bian's live speech. ROC allies refuse to support Chen's plebsicite. Those bribed refuse to stay bribed. Under these circumstances, what is the "Plebsicite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" except self-deception? Chen Shui-bian has turned Central and South America diplomacy into political theater. Now the government must cope with this "public bidding, private payola." The government's relationship with Central and South America is not diplomatic, it is pecuniary. That is why the Central America Summit dared to brazenly defy Chen Shui-bian. That is why the government's Central and South America diplomacy has reached the end of its rope. What kind of leader would do this?
Chen Shui-bian's "Plebsicite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" has demolished an international modus vivendi established through decades of hard work. The US has voiced its opposition. So have Japan, Russia, and the European Union. The United Nations has rejected Chen's formal application. The Central America Summit refused to stay bribed. In an open slap across Chen's face, it unilaterally altered the language of their joint communique. This time Chen Shui-bian has definitely overplayed his hand. By butting his head against a brick wall, he has put Taiwan at odds with the international modus vivendi. He hopes the "Taiwanese people" will feel victimized by the US, mainland China, the United Nations, the entire world. He intends to convert Taiwanese pathos into political support for himself and the Democratic Progressive Party, into sympathy for "humiliation endured for the greater cause." What kind of leader would do this?
When the US characterized Chen's "Plebsicite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" as detrimental to Taiwan's interests, it threw a monkeywrench into Chen Shui-bian's neat little script. The Central America Summit defied Chen Shui-bian by reneging on its promises. It refused to play along with Chen Shui-bian's political charade. Chen Shui-bian hopes to milk his plebiscite for all it is worth, over the ashes of Taiwan's international modus vivendi. What kind of leader would do this?
請問陳總統：這究竟算是什麼？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.30 03:24 am
陳水扁說，他倘若以放棄入聯公投，換取美國改善他的過境待遇，「我還算人嗎」？
然而，此事亦可從另一角度看。陳水扁倘若將「入聯公投」玩弄成選舉操作及政治權謀鬥爭，而以重創台美關係到此地步及出訪中美鬧出這麼大的笑話為代價，這又算是什麼？
一切皆因「入聯公投」而起，但「入聯公投」根本是個「假議題」。陳水扁絕非寄望「入聯成功」而如此大費周章，他其實只是要玩弄「撞牆外交」，待如願以償地造成「入聯失敗」，再以「公投」煽動民粹悲情，攫取其政治利益。謝長廷即曾對美國人說，「入聯」根本不會成功，只是選舉操作而已，可見「入聯」是個「假議題」；何況，根本尚未「公投」，「入聯」申請書卻已經遞出且亦已遭聯合國退件，可見連「公投」也是「假議題」。
陳水扁操弄入聯公投，完全出於自私自利的權謀動機。他亟欲將「貪腐的陳水扁」漂染成「台獨的陳水扁」，進而盤踞台獨旗手的制高點，用以挾持總統大選及選後政局，因此不計後果地炒作入聯公投。其實，如前所述，他明知不可能「入聯成功」，只是要炒作「入聯失敗」以煽動民憤；他亦明知這只是一時的選舉操作而已，卻不惜使國家付出難以彌償的長遠代價。
請問，為了「入聯公投」這個「假議題」，竟將台美關係毀壞到此地步，這算什麼？美國此次將陳水扁的過境待遇降至極低規格，在被詢及是否侮辱陳水扁時，國務院發言人竟稱「美國非常尊重台灣人民」；這是繼此前美國當局規勸陳水扁應展現「領導能力」後，不啻更露骨地否認了陳水扁有代表「台灣人民」的資格。如今，國務院更形同已對「入聯公投」發出懸崖勒馬的最後通牒。這固然是陳水扁自取其辱，但台美的友誼與信任被陳水扁毀壞到如此地步，台灣將如何與美國相處？民進黨將如何與美國相處？台獨又將如何與美國相處？為了「入聯假議題」而重傷了「台美真關係」，這算什麼？
再者，為了「入聯公投」這個「假議題」，此次出訪中美竟鬧出公報臨場刪文的大笑話，貽羞國際，這又算什麼？蔣經國未操作「元首外交」，確實「話題性」稍差；但自李登輝熱中「元首外交」以來，戲劇性固然驟然暴升，「元首外交」亦立即淪為政治戲台，至陳水扁更將「元首外交」操弄得猶如馬戲團出巡，一切皆以「出口轉內銷」為考量。此次在宏都拉斯，前一天鑼鼓喧天地剛送出逾百億的金援，第二天「支持台灣入聯」的文句竟在公報中臨場消失，甚至陳水扁發言亦由宏國總統賽拉亞下令斷訊。試問：倘若入聯議題連邦交國亦不支持，連花錢賄賂也買不通，則入聯豈非自欺欺人？陳水扁將中南美外交戲劇化後，搞到如今面臨這種「公開一起圍標，私下個別加碼」的狼狽情狀；台灣與中南美，可以斷言，除了金錢以外已無「外交」可言。這是中美峰會膽敢聯手在陳水扁面前臨時刪文的原因，更是台灣的中南美外交關係已瀕臨絕境的徵兆。請問，這又算什麼？
陳水扁炒作的「入聯公投」，不啻欲將台灣幾十年來辛苦經營的「國際維生架構」徹底摧毀。現在，不僅美國否定入聯公投，聯合國退件，日、俄、歐盟亦相繼表態反對；連欲花錢買通的中美峰會也臨場刪文，公開打了陳水扁一耳光。這一回，陳水扁的玩笑確實開過頭了，他將自己逼到幾乎與台灣整個「國際維生架構」為敵的地步，操弄「撞牆外交」，然後希望台灣人民能發出被美國、被中國、被聯合國、被全世界歧視的悲情，再將台灣悲情轉化成對民進黨、陳水扁「忍辱負重」的同情與支持。這難道不是老套？難道不是爛戲？請問：這又算什麼？
美國指「入聯公投」違反「台灣利益」，是正確破譯了陳水扁的劇本；中美峰會竟然當著陳水扁的面刪文食言，亦是拒演陳水扁的政治龍套。陳水扁欲以摧毀台灣的「國際維生架構」為代價，來炒作這個「入聯是假、公投亦假」的假議題，請問：這是什麼？這算什麼？
Thursday, August 30, 2007
Wednesday, August 29, 2007
America's Ultimatum: Does Taiwan still want the US as a Friend?
America's Ultimatum: Does Taiwan still want the US as a Friend?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 29, 2007
On the evening before Chen Shui-bian was scheduled to return from his state visits, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte issued a solemn admonition. He warned Chen Shui-bian not to hold a "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." He warned him not to change the status quo in the Taiwan Straits, and not to play fast and loose with America's friendship. In fact, it was nothing less than an ultimatum.
Negroponte defined Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" as "a step towards a declaration of independence of Taiwan, towards an alteration of the status quo." This essentially defined the contest of wills between the US and Chen Shui-bian. If the US allows Chen Shui-bian to promote his "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan," that will amount to a display of weakness, to looking on idly as Chen Shui-bian promotes Taiwan independence and changes the status quo. If, on the other hand, the US wants to prevent Chen Shui-bian from promoting Taiwan independence and changing the status quo, it must prevent him from holding the "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." Negroponte's remarks laid the US's cards on the table. Now it remains to be seen whether Chen Shui-bian or the US will be the first to fold.
During his interview with Hong Kong's Phoenix Television Network, the only issue Negroponte addressed was Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." Negroponte's comments were clearly intended for Beijing's ears. Mainland China opposes both "de jure independence" and "changing the status quo." Negroponte sees Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" as "a step towards a declaration of independence of Taiwan, towards an alteration of the status quo." This means the US agrees with mainland China's "line in the sand," and stands with the mainland on Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." We warned early on that Chen Shui-bian's "anti-China" moves had already morphed into "anti-America" moves. Consider this a confirmation.
Negroponte said, "This is a time for the authorities in Taiwan to behave in a responsible manner, to behave in a way that would advance the interests of Taiwan." In other words, the US believes that the Taiwan authorities' manipulation of the "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" is irresponsible and does not advance the interests of Taiwan. Negroponte even added that "We believe that pursuing a referendum of this kind could, as I said earlier, be interpreted as a step towards a declaration of independence, and we do not believe that that would be a constructive way on the part of the Taiwan authorities to pursue their interests." In other words, the US believes that Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" would not be advantageous even to the Taiwan authorities' own political objectives.
What most attracted attention during the interview was Negroponte's emphasis on Taipei's friendship with Washington. He said that "Taiwan has no better friend than the United States. We strongly support Taiwan's democracy. We support their economy. We're very impressed by their vibrant economy. And we're also, as you know, committed to the defense of Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act." But in a sudden shift, Negroponte pointed out that Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" was not in Taiwan's interest. His implication was that the Taiwan authorities were traitors to Taiwan's interests, and that the US was the true defender of Taiwan's interests. According to Negroponte's logic, the Taiwan authorities' "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" was in fact "harming Taiwan," while US efforts to stop Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" was "loving Taiwan." As we can see, the US was using this opportunity to speak directly to the public on Taiwan. It wants the public on Taiwan to believe that the US can discern Taiwan's interests better than Chen Shui-bian.
Towards the end of his interview, Negroponte suggested that the Taiwan authorities can benefit "from the friendship, the strong friendship of a country such as the United States" but "we believe that it has to be done in a serious and responsible way." In other words, Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" was not done in a serious and responsible way, and has damaged US friendship. Negroponte came straight to the point when he said "Taiwan has no better friend than the United States." He concluded by saying that "the strong friendship of a country such as the United States" must be maintained "in a serious and responsible way." Two threads ran through the interview. One was opposition to Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." The other was an emphasis on "US friendship." The subtext was: "Does Taiwan still want the US as a friend?"
Does Chen Shui-bian intend to force the public to choose between his "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" and friendly relations between Taipei and Washington? Is the future of Taiwan to be decided by Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan?" Or does it still depend on American friendship and support? Which is more important? Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan?" Or friendly relations between Taipei and Washington?
Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" will test US strategic clout in the Taiwan Strait. If the US is unable to kill the "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan," that means it is unable to rein in Chen Shui-bian, it is unable to rein in the Democratic Progressive Party, and unable to suppress Taiwan independence. It will be unable to provide mainland China with a satisfactory accounting, and will be unable to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. If Chen Shui-bian succeeds in holding his "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan," then US opposition to unilateral changes in the status quo will no longer have any meaning.
When Chen Shui-bian transited through the US and received the US representative, he wore a "Support Taiwan's Membership in the UN" sticker on his lapel. That constituted an open declaration of war on the US. When US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte spoke of "Taiwan's interests" and "US friendship," that constituted a direct response to Chen's challenge.
Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party have a way out. Their "Resolution for a Normal Nation" can be toned down. Their "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" can be called off. War and peace often turn on a whim. Does Taiwan still want the US as a friend? Does Chen Shui-bian really want to lead the people of Taiwan on a reckless Jihad against the US?
最後通牒：台灣還要美國這個朋友嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.29 03:50 am
陳水扁出訪返台前夕，美國副國務卿奈葛彭的談話語重心長，句句皆在規勸陳水扁從「入聯公投」懸崖勒馬，不要冒險改變台海現狀，不可玩弄美國的友誼。其實，這儼然已是一封最後通牒。
奈 葛彭升高姿態，將「入聯公投」定義為「朝向宣布台灣獨立及改變台海現狀的一步」。此一「定義」既成，也就形同訂定了美國與陳水扁對決的「勝負標準」。美國 若讓陳水扁推動「入聯公投」，就是向陳水扁示弱，亦是坐視陳水扁推動台獨及改變現狀；反之，美國若不容陳水扁推動台獨及改變現狀，就必須制止「入聯公 投」。奈葛彭的談話不啻與陳水扁攤牌：看陳水扁抵得住，還是美國撐得住？
奈葛彭接受香港鳳凰電視專訪，且以「入聯公投」為唯一詢答主題， 當然有說給中國當局聽的用意。中國反對「法理台獨」，亦反對「改變現狀」；奈葛彭如今將「入聯公投」視為「朝向宣布台獨及改變現狀的一步」，不啻表示美國 認同了中國的「紅線」，且在「入聯公投」上與中國共同持守此一「紅線」。我們很早就提出警告，陳水扁的「反中」操作，已經變質為「反美」，至此已告證實。
奈 葛彭說，此時此際，台灣當局的作為應有責任感，亦應求增進台灣的利益；換句話說，美國認為台灣當局操弄「入聯公投」，是不負責任且違反台灣利益的。甚至， 奈葛彭還說：「對台灣當局追求他們的利益而言，我不相信這（入聯公投）會是建設性的方式。」換句話說，美國認為，「入聯公投」甚至對「台灣當局」的政治目 的亦不利。
專訪中最令人注意的角度，是奈葛彭在訪問首尾皆強調台美友誼。他說，「台灣沒有比美國更好的朋友」，美國強烈支持台灣的民主和 經濟，也透過台灣關係法承諾防衛台灣；但是，話鋒一轉，奈葛彭又從各種角度指出「入聯公投」不符台灣的利益，彷彿台灣當局是台灣利益的背叛者，美國才是台 灣利益的維護者。於是，在奈葛彭的架構中，台灣當局的「入聯公投」其實是「害台灣」的，美國制止「入聯公投」則是「愛台灣」。由此可見，美國亦有透過這次 專訪與台灣人民對話的用意，希望台灣人民相信，美國比陳水扁更能認清台灣的利益。
奈葛彭在專訪結尾時表示，他認為台灣當局可以「從美國的 友誼中獲益」，「但我們相信必須用一種嚴肅和負責任的方式達成」。換句話說，「入聯公投」是「不嚴肅和不負責任的方式」，也傷害了「美國的友誼」。整場專 訪，以「台灣沒有比美國更好的朋友」開門見山，又以「必須用一種嚴肅和負責的方式達成（維持台美友誼）」收尾；全部問答以兩條軸線貫通，一條反對「入聯公 投」，一條強調「台美友誼」，絃外之音不啻就是：台灣還要不要美國這個朋友？
陳水扁難道要逼台灣人民在「入聯公投」與「台美友誼」之間作一選擇？台灣未來的禍福將決定於這場「入聯公投」？或仍須依靠美國友誼的支援？就「台灣利益」而言，就台灣的「國際維生架構」而言，「入聯公投」與「台美友誼」，輕重如何？虛實如何？
奈 葛彭的「哀的美敦書」不啻指出：美國將以能否制止「入聯公投」，來考驗美國在台海弈局中的角色。美國若壓不住入聯公投，也就壓不住陳水扁，也就壓不住民進 黨，也就壓不住台獨，也就不能向中國交代，也就不再能維持「反對任何一方片面改變現狀」的台海政策。美國與陳水扁的對決標準正是：陳水扁的「入聯公投」若 是勝出，即是「反對片面改變現狀」的美國台海政策落敗！
陳水扁去程過境美國，在專機上胸前貼著「入聯公投」貼紙接見美國代表，不啻是公然向美國當局宣戰；而美國當局在陳水扁回台前夕，由副國務卿拋出「台灣利益／美國友誼」的談話，則可視為正面迎戰的姿態。
陳水扁及民進黨不是沒有退路。《正常國家決議文》既可打折，則「入聯公投」的連署亦可煞車。和戰進退，俱在一念之間。台灣還要不要美國這個朋友？陳水扁難道真的要帶領全體台灣人民發動一場不計後果的反美大戰！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 29, 2007
On the evening before Chen Shui-bian was scheduled to return from his state visits, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte issued a solemn admonition. He warned Chen Shui-bian not to hold a "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." He warned him not to change the status quo in the Taiwan Straits, and not to play fast and loose with America's friendship. In fact, it was nothing less than an ultimatum.
Negroponte defined Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" as "a step towards a declaration of independence of Taiwan, towards an alteration of the status quo." This essentially defined the contest of wills between the US and Chen Shui-bian. If the US allows Chen Shui-bian to promote his "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan," that will amount to a display of weakness, to looking on idly as Chen Shui-bian promotes Taiwan independence and changes the status quo. If, on the other hand, the US wants to prevent Chen Shui-bian from promoting Taiwan independence and changing the status quo, it must prevent him from holding the "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." Negroponte's remarks laid the US's cards on the table. Now it remains to be seen whether Chen Shui-bian or the US will be the first to fold.
During his interview with Hong Kong's Phoenix Television Network, the only issue Negroponte addressed was Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." Negroponte's comments were clearly intended for Beijing's ears. Mainland China opposes both "de jure independence" and "changing the status quo." Negroponte sees Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" as "a step towards a declaration of independence of Taiwan, towards an alteration of the status quo." This means the US agrees with mainland China's "line in the sand," and stands with the mainland on Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." We warned early on that Chen Shui-bian's "anti-China" moves had already morphed into "anti-America" moves. Consider this a confirmation.
Negroponte said, "This is a time for the authorities in Taiwan to behave in a responsible manner, to behave in a way that would advance the interests of Taiwan." In other words, the US believes that the Taiwan authorities' manipulation of the "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" is irresponsible and does not advance the interests of Taiwan. Negroponte even added that "We believe that pursuing a referendum of this kind could, as I said earlier, be interpreted as a step towards a declaration of independence, and we do not believe that that would be a constructive way on the part of the Taiwan authorities to pursue their interests." In other words, the US believes that Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" would not be advantageous even to the Taiwan authorities' own political objectives.
What most attracted attention during the interview was Negroponte's emphasis on Taipei's friendship with Washington. He said that "Taiwan has no better friend than the United States. We strongly support Taiwan's democracy. We support their economy. We're very impressed by their vibrant economy. And we're also, as you know, committed to the defense of Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act." But in a sudden shift, Negroponte pointed out that Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" was not in Taiwan's interest. His implication was that the Taiwan authorities were traitors to Taiwan's interests, and that the US was the true defender of Taiwan's interests. According to Negroponte's logic, the Taiwan authorities' "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" was in fact "harming Taiwan," while US efforts to stop Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" was "loving Taiwan." As we can see, the US was using this opportunity to speak directly to the public on Taiwan. It wants the public on Taiwan to believe that the US can discern Taiwan's interests better than Chen Shui-bian.
Towards the end of his interview, Negroponte suggested that the Taiwan authorities can benefit "from the friendship, the strong friendship of a country such as the United States" but "we believe that it has to be done in a serious and responsible way." In other words, Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" was not done in a serious and responsible way, and has damaged US friendship. Negroponte came straight to the point when he said "Taiwan has no better friend than the United States." He concluded by saying that "the strong friendship of a country such as the United States" must be maintained "in a serious and responsible way." Two threads ran through the interview. One was opposition to Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." The other was an emphasis on "US friendship." The subtext was: "Does Taiwan still want the US as a friend?"
Does Chen Shui-bian intend to force the public to choose between his "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" and friendly relations between Taipei and Washington? Is the future of Taiwan to be decided by Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan?" Or does it still depend on American friendship and support? Which is more important? Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan?" Or friendly relations between Taipei and Washington?
Chen's "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" will test US strategic clout in the Taiwan Strait. If the US is unable to kill the "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan," that means it is unable to rein in Chen Shui-bian, it is unable to rein in the Democratic Progressive Party, and unable to suppress Taiwan independence. It will be unable to provide mainland China with a satisfactory accounting, and will be unable to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. If Chen Shui-bian succeeds in holding his "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan," then US opposition to unilateral changes in the status quo will no longer have any meaning.
When Chen Shui-bian transited through the US and received the US representative, he wore a "Support Taiwan's Membership in the UN" sticker on his lapel. That constituted an open declaration of war on the US. When US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte spoke of "Taiwan's interests" and "US friendship," that constituted a direct response to Chen's challenge.
Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party have a way out. Their "Resolution for a Normal Nation" can be toned down. Their "Plebiscite to join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" can be called off. War and peace often turn on a whim. Does Taiwan still want the US as a friend? Does Chen Shui-bian really want to lead the people of Taiwan on a reckless Jihad against the US?
最後通牒：台灣還要美國這個朋友嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.29 03:50 am
陳水扁出訪返台前夕，美國副國務卿奈葛彭的談話語重心長，句句皆在規勸陳水扁從「入聯公投」懸崖勒馬，不要冒險改變台海現狀，不可玩弄美國的友誼。其實，這儼然已是一封最後通牒。
奈 葛彭升高姿態，將「入聯公投」定義為「朝向宣布台灣獨立及改變台海現狀的一步」。此一「定義」既成，也就形同訂定了美國與陳水扁對決的「勝負標準」。美國 若讓陳水扁推動「入聯公投」，就是向陳水扁示弱，亦是坐視陳水扁推動台獨及改變現狀；反之，美國若不容陳水扁推動台獨及改變現狀，就必須制止「入聯公 投」。奈葛彭的談話不啻與陳水扁攤牌：看陳水扁抵得住，還是美國撐得住？
奈葛彭接受香港鳳凰電視專訪，且以「入聯公投」為唯一詢答主題， 當然有說給中國當局聽的用意。中國反對「法理台獨」，亦反對「改變現狀」；奈葛彭如今將「入聯公投」視為「朝向宣布台獨及改變現狀的一步」，不啻表示美國 認同了中國的「紅線」，且在「入聯公投」上與中國共同持守此一「紅線」。我們很早就提出警告，陳水扁的「反中」操作，已經變質為「反美」，至此已告證實。
奈 葛彭說，此時此際，台灣當局的作為應有責任感，亦應求增進台灣的利益；換句話說，美國認為台灣當局操弄「入聯公投」，是不負責任且違反台灣利益的。甚至， 奈葛彭還說：「對台灣當局追求他們的利益而言，我不相信這（入聯公投）會是建設性的方式。」換句話說，美國認為，「入聯公投」甚至對「台灣當局」的政治目 的亦不利。
專訪中最令人注意的角度，是奈葛彭在訪問首尾皆強調台美友誼。他說，「台灣沒有比美國更好的朋友」，美國強烈支持台灣的民主和 經濟，也透過台灣關係法承諾防衛台灣；但是，話鋒一轉，奈葛彭又從各種角度指出「入聯公投」不符台灣的利益，彷彿台灣當局是台灣利益的背叛者，美國才是台 灣利益的維護者。於是，在奈葛彭的架構中，台灣當局的「入聯公投」其實是「害台灣」的，美國制止「入聯公投」則是「愛台灣」。由此可見，美國亦有透過這次 專訪與台灣人民對話的用意，希望台灣人民相信，美國比陳水扁更能認清台灣的利益。
奈葛彭在專訪結尾時表示，他認為台灣當局可以「從美國的 友誼中獲益」，「但我們相信必須用一種嚴肅和負責任的方式達成」。換句話說，「入聯公投」是「不嚴肅和不負責任的方式」，也傷害了「美國的友誼」。整場專 訪，以「台灣沒有比美國更好的朋友」開門見山，又以「必須用一種嚴肅和負責的方式達成（維持台美友誼）」收尾；全部問答以兩條軸線貫通，一條反對「入聯公 投」，一條強調「台美友誼」，絃外之音不啻就是：台灣還要不要美國這個朋友？
陳水扁難道要逼台灣人民在「入聯公投」與「台美友誼」之間作一選擇？台灣未來的禍福將決定於這場「入聯公投」？或仍須依靠美國友誼的支援？就「台灣利益」而言，就台灣的「國際維生架構」而言，「入聯公投」與「台美友誼」，輕重如何？虛實如何？
奈 葛彭的「哀的美敦書」不啻指出：美國將以能否制止「入聯公投」，來考驗美國在台海弈局中的角色。美國若壓不住入聯公投，也就壓不住陳水扁，也就壓不住民進 黨，也就壓不住台獨，也就不能向中國交代，也就不再能維持「反對任何一方片面改變現狀」的台海政策。美國與陳水扁的對決標準正是：陳水扁的「入聯公投」若 是勝出，即是「反對片面改變現狀」的美國台海政策落敗！
陳水扁去程過境美國，在專機上胸前貼著「入聯公投」貼紙接見美國代表，不啻是公然向美國當局宣戰；而美國當局在陳水扁回台前夕，由副國務卿拋出「台灣利益／美國友誼」的談話，則可視為正面迎戰的姿態。
陳水扁及民進黨不是沒有退路。《正常國家決議文》既可打折，則「入聯公投」的連署亦可煞車。和戰進退，俱在一念之間。台灣還要不要美國這個朋友？陳水扁難道真的要帶領全體台灣人民發動一場不計後果的反美大戰！
Tuesday, August 28, 2007
Spinning Class Conflict as "Ethnic Conflict"
Spinning Class Conflict as "Ethnic Conflict"
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 28, 2007
While Chen Shui-bian was in Honduras doling out billions in aid, Chang Chun-hsiung was bickering with farmers in Hualien and Taitung until he was red in the face. His cabinet had reneged on its promise to provide 50,000 NT in emergency relief to farmers for every five hectares of land they owned. While the head of state was overseas throwing money around, playing Daddy Warbucks, the premier was back on the island catching flak from disaster stricken farmers. The contrast between the two scenarios was the height of irony.
The public watched as Chen Shui-bian opened wide and bit into a Taiwan guava grown in Honduras, and give a big thumbs up. It also remembered that the Chen regime forbade cross Straits agriculture exchanges. Even the shipping of Taiwan fruit to the mainland was ruthlessly blocked. Taiwan melon growers moan about flood damage. Pomelo growers groan about wind damage. Chen Shui-bian meanwhile is grinning from ear to ear, because Taiwan guavas have been successfully grown in South America. One can't help feeling one is in the Twilight Zone. Let's not forget that just before his departure, Chen allowed the import of ractopamine-contaminated US pork as a gesture of goodwill to Washington. By contrast, even mainland China forbade the import of ractopamine-laden US pork.
With his domestic approval rating at new lows, Chen Shui-bian hoped to use the pomp and circumstance of state visits to reaffirm his status as head of state. While Taiwan was inundated by floodwaters, caught up in the ractopamine-contaminated US pork dispute, and its farms suffering severe losses, Chen Shui-bian was scattering dollar bills along the way. Schoolchildren back home cannot afford nutritious lunches. Yet their parents must donate 30,000 computers to poor children in Honduras. No wonder villagers in rural Taiwan feel deprived. Why is Chen Shui-bian so generous to foreign allies, but so niggardly toward Taiwan's farmers?
The Democratic Progressive Party bills itself as a "native political authority." It counts on the farm vote to maintain its long term power. Yet the Democratic Progressive Party's relationship with the farm vote is peculiar, to say the least. It professes solidarity with farmers based on class origins. But in its bones, the DPP is a party of the capitalist class. It merely exploits peasants as political tools in its ersatz "Taiwanese, not Chinese" identity politics.
Every time an election rolls around, the Democratic Progressive Party pays lip service to its grass roots. But in truth the Democratic Progressive Party is in bed with the heads of major industries, big business, and financial groups. The Democratic Progressive Party leadership is drawn from attorneys, doctors, landlords, petty capitalists, and out of favor politicians. It is essentially a bourgeoise political organization. Even members of academia have trouble getting their foot in the door. What room is there for lowly peasants? The Democratic Progressive Party has neither the will nor the way to remedy the economic marginalization and hollowing out of Taiwan's countryside. Its only farm policy is to foment rural discontent, to get farmers to perceive their social disadvantage as an "ethnic disadvantage." That allows the DPP to evade the issue of class, and frame a class conflict as an ethnic conflict.
We must realize that the relationship between farmers and the government underwent a major change during the past 60 years. Many years ago the Kuomintang government implemented its "375 Rent Reduction" policy and its "Homestead Act," by which "those who work the land, will be given the land." Nearly 300,000 tenant farmer households benefitted from the KMT's policies. With the liberation of the farmer, the landlords and the Kuomintang became bitter enemies. But tenant farmers became the Kuomintang's supporters. Subsequent policy changes, by which agriculture subsidized fledgling industries, nelgected farmers' rights and interests, and the political climate in the countryside changed. The Democratic Progressive Party seized the opportunity to get its foot in the door. But it never had any intention of bettering the farmers' economic plight or elevating their social status. Its only goal was to incite farmers to hate "mainlanders."
Chen Shui-bian has been in power for seven years. He has enjoyed a virtual lock on the farm vote. Yet he has been at a total loss to do anything about the depressed state of the island's agricultural industry. Recent rezoning of agricultural land, making it available for commercial development, was billed as a "Benefits for All" policy. In fact it was merely another way of benefitting the bourgeoisie. What help is it to agriculture and rural development? Taiwan pig farmers are still recovering from the hoof and mouth disease debacle that occurred several years ago. Yet Chen Shui-bian, caving in to US pressure, rashly allowed the import of ractopamine-contaminated US pork, adding insult to injury. While visiting foreign countries, he scatters dollar bills like confetti. But when confronted with the plight of Taiwan's rural underclass, all he is willing to do is dole out "Subsidies to Elderly Farmers."
In years past, rural Taiwan had the capacity to absorb urban unemployment. But that capacity has been lost. News from the grassroots tells of drug dealing, theivery, robberies, and even murders, revealing that rural Taiwan is undergoing the same degeneration as the rest of society. Farm boy Yang Ju-men, with his "white rice bombs," exploded the Chen regime's lies long ago.
While Chang Chun-hsiung was nickle and diming farmers who demanded disaster relief, Chen Shui-bian was in Honduras, using public funds to donate 3,000 shiny new computer classrooms, equipped with 30,000 computers, in his own name. Has Chen Shui-bian forgotten that Taiwan also has poor people? That rural Taiwan is also on the wrong side of the digitial divide? That rural youth lack computers? A president who boasts that "Taiwan has embraced the world" has indeed embraced the world, and gotten its pockets picked in the process. Having bribed overseas allies for the sake of empty vanity, how will he look Taiwan's farmers in the eye?
農村變奏：「階級論述」變成「族群論述」
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.28 04:32 am
當陳水扁在宏都拉斯一出手就送出百億金援，張俊雄卻正在國內為他有沒有允諾過每公頃五萬的災害補助，和花東災農爭得面紅耳赤。國家元首在國外撒錢當大爺，行政院長卻在島內冷對災農苦情，內冷外熱的對照畫面，真是諷刺已極。
人們看到，陳水扁大口咬著在宏國栽出的台灣芭樂，一手比出「讚」的手勢；但也令人想起，莫說扁政府不准兩岸農業交流，連台灣水果輸出大陸，也曾大力阻擋。現在，當台灣瓜農為水患叫苦連天、柚農因風損欲哭無淚時，陳水扁卻為南美試種成功的台灣芭樂笑逐顏開，能不令人有時空錯置的感慨？更別忘了，他臨行前政策性開放瘦肉精向美國示好，但連中國大陸也禁止美瘦肉精豬肉進口。
國內聲望低落的陳水扁，欲藉外邦的掌聲來抬高身為元首的虛榮，這是可以理解的心情。但是，當台灣陷於水災，又捲入瘦肉精爭議，農村重創，陳水扁卻沿路大撒鈔票，而在國內學童吃不起營養午餐時，還捐贈三萬台電腦給宏國貧童，無疑已在台灣農村形成了「相對剝奪感」。陳水扁何以如此厚外邦，而薄台灣農村？
號稱「本土政權」，又長期靠著農業縣市維持其基本盤，但民進黨與農村農民的關係卻十分耐人玩味。若穿透「本土」的表象，民進黨在骨子裡其實是一個資產階級政黨，與其說它對農村懷有「階級關懷」，不如說它一直是將農村視為「族群政治」的工具。
每到選舉，民進黨在表象上是草根支持者；但在現實政治中，民進黨與工商企業、財團金主勾肩搭背的親密關係，那才是幕後的真相。其實以律師、醫師、地主、小資本家，乃至早年所謂「失意政客」為核心的民進黨領導階層，本質上是一個資產階級的組合；即連學界人士都不易插足廁身，遑論有基層農民與聞的空間。於是，對於台灣農村在「經濟階級」上的邊緣化與空洞化，民進黨根本無心亦無力改善；它的農村政策只是煽動農村，要農民將「階級弱勢」解讀為「族群弱勢」，亦即以「族群論述」來建立農村的政治角色，而迴避了「階級因素」。
要論農民與政治的關係，其實六十年來大有一番滄桑變化。當年，國民黨政府實施「三七五減租」及「公地放領」的耕者有其田政策，近卅萬戶佃農受益；農民解放，地主與國民黨成了世仇，但佃農成了國民黨的支持者。嗣後，在經濟發展走向「以農養工」的過程中，農民的權益逐漸受到忽視，農村的政治氛圍亦漸趨變化；民進黨於此時乘虛而入，但並未著意改善農村的階級處境，只是煽起了農村的族群仇恨。
陳水扁執政七年，坐擁農村鐵票，對台灣農村的凋敝和整個農業部門的委頓卻束手無策。包括最近農田釋出供作建地的「利多」政策，基本上也只是著眼於圖利資產階級的綁樁手段；從農業與農村之發展看，助益何在？尤其，台灣養豬戶在遭逢前幾年的口蹄疫大難之後，正待休養生息；但陳水扁卻為了迎合美國，輕率要開放瘦肉精使用，這不啻又是雪上加霜。出訪外國，只要撒錢就行；但面對台灣農村的階級困境，難道只是加發老農年金即可？
前些年台灣農村有吸收都會失業子弟的作用，但現在連這項功能都逐漸失去。農村基層不斷傳出吸毒、竊盜，乃至殺人弒親的犯罪事件，顯示台灣農村已隨著社會變遷而變調。離農子弟楊儒門，其實早用白米炸彈爆破了扁政府對農民的謊言。
當張俊雄在和農民稱斤論兩談三塊五塊的災後補助時，陳水扁正在宏國用公帑以他個人之名捐贈了三千所亮麗電腦教室，共三萬台電腦。陳水扁可記得台灣也有窮人，台灣農村一樣有數位落差問題，還有許多農村子弟沒有電腦可用？這個高唱「台灣走出去」的總統，的確把台灣資源拿出去大肆分送了；只是，他在海外賄賂外邦換來了個人的虛榮，卻有何面目歸來面對台灣的農村？
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 28, 2007
While Chen Shui-bian was in Honduras doling out billions in aid, Chang Chun-hsiung was bickering with farmers in Hualien and Taitung until he was red in the face. His cabinet had reneged on its promise to provide 50,000 NT in emergency relief to farmers for every five hectares of land they owned. While the head of state was overseas throwing money around, playing Daddy Warbucks, the premier was back on the island catching flak from disaster stricken farmers. The contrast between the two scenarios was the height of irony.
The public watched as Chen Shui-bian opened wide and bit into a Taiwan guava grown in Honduras, and give a big thumbs up. It also remembered that the Chen regime forbade cross Straits agriculture exchanges. Even the shipping of Taiwan fruit to the mainland was ruthlessly blocked. Taiwan melon growers moan about flood damage. Pomelo growers groan about wind damage. Chen Shui-bian meanwhile is grinning from ear to ear, because Taiwan guavas have been successfully grown in South America. One can't help feeling one is in the Twilight Zone. Let's not forget that just before his departure, Chen allowed the import of ractopamine-contaminated US pork as a gesture of goodwill to Washington. By contrast, even mainland China forbade the import of ractopamine-laden US pork.
With his domestic approval rating at new lows, Chen Shui-bian hoped to use the pomp and circumstance of state visits to reaffirm his status as head of state. While Taiwan was inundated by floodwaters, caught up in the ractopamine-contaminated US pork dispute, and its farms suffering severe losses, Chen Shui-bian was scattering dollar bills along the way. Schoolchildren back home cannot afford nutritious lunches. Yet their parents must donate 30,000 computers to poor children in Honduras. No wonder villagers in rural Taiwan feel deprived. Why is Chen Shui-bian so generous to foreign allies, but so niggardly toward Taiwan's farmers?
The Democratic Progressive Party bills itself as a "native political authority." It counts on the farm vote to maintain its long term power. Yet the Democratic Progressive Party's relationship with the farm vote is peculiar, to say the least. It professes solidarity with farmers based on class origins. But in its bones, the DPP is a party of the capitalist class. It merely exploits peasants as political tools in its ersatz "Taiwanese, not Chinese" identity politics.
Every time an election rolls around, the Democratic Progressive Party pays lip service to its grass roots. But in truth the Democratic Progressive Party is in bed with the heads of major industries, big business, and financial groups. The Democratic Progressive Party leadership is drawn from attorneys, doctors, landlords, petty capitalists, and out of favor politicians. It is essentially a bourgeoise political organization. Even members of academia have trouble getting their foot in the door. What room is there for lowly peasants? The Democratic Progressive Party has neither the will nor the way to remedy the economic marginalization and hollowing out of Taiwan's countryside. Its only farm policy is to foment rural discontent, to get farmers to perceive their social disadvantage as an "ethnic disadvantage." That allows the DPP to evade the issue of class, and frame a class conflict as an ethnic conflict.
We must realize that the relationship between farmers and the government underwent a major change during the past 60 years. Many years ago the Kuomintang government implemented its "375 Rent Reduction" policy and its "Homestead Act," by which "those who work the land, will be given the land." Nearly 300,000 tenant farmer households benefitted from the KMT's policies. With the liberation of the farmer, the landlords and the Kuomintang became bitter enemies. But tenant farmers became the Kuomintang's supporters. Subsequent policy changes, by which agriculture subsidized fledgling industries, nelgected farmers' rights and interests, and the political climate in the countryside changed. The Democratic Progressive Party seized the opportunity to get its foot in the door. But it never had any intention of bettering the farmers' economic plight or elevating their social status. Its only goal was to incite farmers to hate "mainlanders."
Chen Shui-bian has been in power for seven years. He has enjoyed a virtual lock on the farm vote. Yet he has been at a total loss to do anything about the depressed state of the island's agricultural industry. Recent rezoning of agricultural land, making it available for commercial development, was billed as a "Benefits for All" policy. In fact it was merely another way of benefitting the bourgeoisie. What help is it to agriculture and rural development? Taiwan pig farmers are still recovering from the hoof and mouth disease debacle that occurred several years ago. Yet Chen Shui-bian, caving in to US pressure, rashly allowed the import of ractopamine-contaminated US pork, adding insult to injury. While visiting foreign countries, he scatters dollar bills like confetti. But when confronted with the plight of Taiwan's rural underclass, all he is willing to do is dole out "Subsidies to Elderly Farmers."
In years past, rural Taiwan had the capacity to absorb urban unemployment. But that capacity has been lost. News from the grassroots tells of drug dealing, theivery, robberies, and even murders, revealing that rural Taiwan is undergoing the same degeneration as the rest of society. Farm boy Yang Ju-men, with his "white rice bombs," exploded the Chen regime's lies long ago.
While Chang Chun-hsiung was nickle and diming farmers who demanded disaster relief, Chen Shui-bian was in Honduras, using public funds to donate 3,000 shiny new computer classrooms, equipped with 30,000 computers, in his own name. Has Chen Shui-bian forgotten that Taiwan also has poor people? That rural Taiwan is also on the wrong side of the digitial divide? That rural youth lack computers? A president who boasts that "Taiwan has embraced the world" has indeed embraced the world, and gotten its pockets picked in the process. Having bribed overseas allies for the sake of empty vanity, how will he look Taiwan's farmers in the eye?
農村變奏：「階級論述」變成「族群論述」
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.28 04:32 am
當陳水扁在宏都拉斯一出手就送出百億金援，張俊雄卻正在國內為他有沒有允諾過每公頃五萬的災害補助，和花東災農爭得面紅耳赤。國家元首在國外撒錢當大爺，行政院長卻在島內冷對災農苦情，內冷外熱的對照畫面，真是諷刺已極。
人們看到，陳水扁大口咬著在宏國栽出的台灣芭樂，一手比出「讚」的手勢；但也令人想起，莫說扁政府不准兩岸農業交流，連台灣水果輸出大陸，也曾大力阻擋。現在，當台灣瓜農為水患叫苦連天、柚農因風損欲哭無淚時，陳水扁卻為南美試種成功的台灣芭樂笑逐顏開，能不令人有時空錯置的感慨？更別忘了，他臨行前政策性開放瘦肉精向美國示好，但連中國大陸也禁止美瘦肉精豬肉進口。
國內聲望低落的陳水扁，欲藉外邦的掌聲來抬高身為元首的虛榮，這是可以理解的心情。但是，當台灣陷於水災，又捲入瘦肉精爭議，農村重創，陳水扁卻沿路大撒鈔票，而在國內學童吃不起營養午餐時，還捐贈三萬台電腦給宏國貧童，無疑已在台灣農村形成了「相對剝奪感」。陳水扁何以如此厚外邦，而薄台灣農村？
號稱「本土政權」，又長期靠著農業縣市維持其基本盤，但民進黨與農村農民的關係卻十分耐人玩味。若穿透「本土」的表象，民進黨在骨子裡其實是一個資產階級政黨，與其說它對農村懷有「階級關懷」，不如說它一直是將農村視為「族群政治」的工具。
每到選舉，民進黨在表象上是草根支持者；但在現實政治中，民進黨與工商企業、財團金主勾肩搭背的親密關係，那才是幕後的真相。其實以律師、醫師、地主、小資本家，乃至早年所謂「失意政客」為核心的民進黨領導階層，本質上是一個資產階級的組合；即連學界人士都不易插足廁身，遑論有基層農民與聞的空間。於是，對於台灣農村在「經濟階級」上的邊緣化與空洞化，民進黨根本無心亦無力改善；它的農村政策只是煽動農村，要農民將「階級弱勢」解讀為「族群弱勢」，亦即以「族群論述」來建立農村的政治角色，而迴避了「階級因素」。
要論農民與政治的關係，其實六十年來大有一番滄桑變化。當年，國民黨政府實施「三七五減租」及「公地放領」的耕者有其田政策，近卅萬戶佃農受益；農民解放，地主與國民黨成了世仇，但佃農成了國民黨的支持者。嗣後，在經濟發展走向「以農養工」的過程中，農民的權益逐漸受到忽視，農村的政治氛圍亦漸趨變化；民進黨於此時乘虛而入，但並未著意改善農村的階級處境，只是煽起了農村的族群仇恨。
陳水扁執政七年，坐擁農村鐵票，對台灣農村的凋敝和整個農業部門的委頓卻束手無策。包括最近農田釋出供作建地的「利多」政策，基本上也只是著眼於圖利資產階級的綁樁手段；從農業與農村之發展看，助益何在？尤其，台灣養豬戶在遭逢前幾年的口蹄疫大難之後，正待休養生息；但陳水扁卻為了迎合美國，輕率要開放瘦肉精使用，這不啻又是雪上加霜。出訪外國，只要撒錢就行；但面對台灣農村的階級困境，難道只是加發老農年金即可？
前些年台灣農村有吸收都會失業子弟的作用，但現在連這項功能都逐漸失去。農村基層不斷傳出吸毒、竊盜，乃至殺人弒親的犯罪事件，顯示台灣農村已隨著社會變遷而變調。離農子弟楊儒門，其實早用白米炸彈爆破了扁政府對農民的謊言。
當張俊雄在和農民稱斤論兩談三塊五塊的災後補助時，陳水扁正在宏國用公帑以他個人之名捐贈了三千所亮麗電腦教室，共三萬台電腦。陳水扁可記得台灣也有窮人，台灣農村一樣有數位落差問題，還有許多農村子弟沒有電腦可用？這個高唱「台灣走出去」的總統，的確把台灣資源拿出去大肆分送了；只是，他在海外賄賂外邦換來了個人的虛榮，卻有何面目歸來面對台灣的農村？
Monday, August 27, 2007
Checkbook Diplomacy: Account Overdrawn
Checkbook Diplomacy: Account Overdrawn
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 27, 2007
President Chen Shui-bian's recent state visit to Central America was trouble-ridden from beginning 'til end. The visit has done more harm than good. His "transit diplomacy" was doomed from the start. It threw dollar bills at everyone but got nothing in return, not even symbolic gestures. Even upon arrival, all Chen discussed with the media was domestic affairs. As usual, he came out guns blazing, firing in all directions. No surprises there.
Ever since assuming the office of president, Chen Shui-bian has wanted nothing more than to conduct state visits. Particularly to Central American allies whose geographical location provide him with an excuse to transit the US. These nations are the object of repeat visits. But after seven years, his treatment during transit, as well as the Republic of China's diplomatic status have steadily declined. His state visits were once occasions for Green camp gloating. Now they are public humiliations better forgotten. This so-called "graduation trip" is turning out to be yet another hollow charade. To save face, Chen insists on going through the motions. But the reality is not so easy to laugh off.
The purpose of this visit to El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, was not to bask in twenty-one gun salutes and the red carpet treatment, but to extinguish diplomatic fires. From the beginning this visit was shrouded by dark clouds. Two of them. The first cloud was President Chen's aggressive promotion of his "Plebiscite to Join the UN under the name of Taiwan." This severely damaged relations with the US, and even motivated the US to retaliate. The second cloud was Costa-Rica's shift toward Beijing. The Central American tectonic plate was beginning to slip. These two clouds constitute an unprecedented crisis for the Republic of China. If we review President Chen's actions, he obviously has no plans to repair relations between Taipei and Washington. He is relying exclusively on checkbook diplomacy to temporarily shore up relations with Taipei's Central American allies. Forget permanent cures. These don't even qualify as stopgap measures. Chen's bungling has laid bare the ROC's diplomatic crisis for all to see.
Chen Shui-bian has repeatedly abused Washington's goodwill, by using his transits through the US to consolidate popular support for his own presidency. Now an offended Washington is using his own weapon against him. It is using lowered levels of treatment to punish him. Many things in life have an odd symmetry to them. If you exploit transit diplomacy to elevate your status, you provide others a means to diminish your status. They can pull the red carpet from under you and let you take a tumble. Chen Shui-bian says he "endured humiliation for a higher cause." In fact he "brought humiliation upon himself." Worse yet, he resorted to yet another ruse to win sympathy for himself as a sacrificial martyr for Taiwan independence. Taipei/Washington relations are no longer even a consideration for Chen Shui-bian.
Halfway through his trip, Chen Shui-bian had issued checks amounting to 300 million US. Projects underwritten include a hydro-electric plant for Honduras and low interest loans for a high school computer center. Officially, hundreds of millions in aid were doled out. The actual amount is probably far higher. If this money actually improved the lives of the local populace, consolidated bilateral relations, and won international support for the Republic of China, it might be worth it. Unfortunately during Chen Shui-bian's summit with Central American heads of state, they vetoed the Chen regime's sole request, that they endorse his application for UN membership under the name of Taiwan. Honduras cancelled three joint press conferences with Chen in a row. Reporters from Taiwan were so frustrated they walked out in protest.
Economic conditions on Taiwan of late have been less than ideal. Entire families have been committing suicide by carbon monoxide inhalation at an alarming rate. Yet the Chen regime continues giving away huge sums of hard-earned taxpayer money, hoping for diplomatic support in return. When allies demand money, they receive it without hesitation. Meanwhile official summit resolutions are treated like hot potatoes. If this is not a warning signal, what is? Even more worrisome is that Nicaragua, Panama, and Guatemala failed to petition on behalf of Chen's "Plebsicite to join the UN in the Name of Taiwan." Reports are the Panamanian government refused even to allow the president's plane to transit Panama. These countries must take United Nations peacekeeping and Security Council matters into consideration. These are carrots and sticks that Beijing has but Taipei doesn't. The ambivalence displayed by Taipei's Central American allies suggests that bilateral relations are shaky.
Is this all Chen Shui-bian has to show for his diplomatic efforts? That depends on how Chen sees the role of diplomacy. For Chen Shui-bian, the power of his political office comes first, Democratic Progressive Party electoral victories come next, the national interest and the public welfare come last. This is the first time the Democratic Progressive Party has been in power. It has always constituted a minority in the legislature. Its crisis awareness is acute. It lacks confidence in its political accomplishments. That is why Chen Shui-bian resorts to any and all means to protect himself and ensure victory. Chen and the DPP live one day at a time. Their calculations are forever short term. A person without a long term strategy, will invariably find himself bedeviled by short term crises. If one is forever making short term calculations, one can never make long term plans. As a result, one's strategic situation steadily deteriorates, until everything goes awry at the same time, and all one can do is fight one fire after another.
Seven years of repeat visits to allies really didn't require Chen Shui-bian's participation each and every time. Looking back it was all for internal consumption, never for long term strategic positioning. It was nothing more than a stage on which to rally domestic support. The result has been the squandering of national resources in exchange for international embarrassment. Chen loves to transit the US. But his motive is to elevate his own status, not to bolster Taipei/Washington relations. His aggressive promotion of plebiscites, his termination of the National Unification Council, his "Plebiscite to join the UN in the Name of Taiwan," all put his personal political victories above Taipei/Washington relations. He has long regarded the national interest as his personal bank account. On the one hand he spends freely, as if there was no tomorrow. On the other hand, he never makes any deposits. For seven years, he has been living off the capital. Any future head of state who inherits his mess will find the account marked "overdrawn."
Chen refused to put on a tie. Instead, he sported a "Support Taiwan's Bid to join the UN" sticker to his lapel. He threatened to film a commercial saying Costa Rican coffee tasted bad. Apart from diminishing the prestige of the presidency, all he did was make himself an international laughing stock. Choosing to rail against the newly formed Ma/Hsiao ticket and the media from overseas, merely confirmed that foreign diplomacy has never been Chen Shui-bian's highest priority.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.08.27
這趟出訪加速透支了外交資源
中時社論
陳水扁總統這趟出訪中美洲，似乎一路諸事不順，效果更是憂多喜少。過境外交從一開始就玩不成，灑大把銀子卻連個起碼象徵回饋都掙不到，臨到與媒體互動暢談的還是「內政」，而且同樣是火力四射，完全沒讓人意外！
從就任總統以來，陳水扁就熱中出訪，尤其是能讓他過境美國的中美洲友邦，更是頻頻登門的對象。但七年下來，過境待遇和台灣的外交局勢卻是日走下坡，他的元首外交也從風光得意到灰頭土臉。這趟所謂畢業旅行的出訪更形同雞肋，為了面子還得勉強作樂在其中狀，真實情況卻讓人笑不出來。
這次出訪薩爾瓦多、宏都拉斯和尼加拉瓜，已不是為了享受禮炮和紅地毯，而是緊急進行外交固盤。此行一開始就籠罩在兩重陰影下，一是陳總統強推台灣入聯公投，嚴重損壞台美關係，招致美方報復；二是哥斯大黎加倒向中共，中美洲外交板塊開始流失，兩者對台灣來說都是空前嚴重的危機。但細看陳總統的作為，顯然並不打算修補台美關係，對中美洲友邦也只靠開支票暫時保平安。不要說治本，連治標都談不上，等於將台灣當前的外交危機讓國人看得一清二楚。
往昔陳水扁多次利用美國對台灣的善意，拿過境美國的待遇替個人造勢，如今得罪美國後，美國以子之矛攻子之盾，壓低過境待遇來懲罰他。很多事情是相對的，想用過境來替自己墊腳，相對地，也給人家一個抽墊子讓你跌一跤的機會。陳水扁自稱「忍辱負重」，但其實是自取其辱，甚至想以苦肉計營造自己為台灣受辱的形象。台美關係，真的已不在陳水扁考量之內了。
而行程走到一半，陳水扁開出了三億美元的支票，項目包括投資宏都拉斯水力發電廠、國中小電腦中心低利貸款等。總計百億台幣的援助，數額實在高得驚人，如果確能改善當地民眾生活，並且鞏固彼此關係，進而在國際間為台灣提供相對的支持，倒也值得，問題是，這次陳水扁與中美洲元首的高峰會上，卻否決了我們唯一要求的支持台灣參與聯合國案。而宏都拉斯三度取消總統記者會，也氣得台灣記者集體退席抗議。
台灣這些年來經濟狀況並不好，三不五時就來個全家燒炭，但扁政府還是大筆送出納稅人的血汗錢，無非想換來外交支持。結果，友邦要錢毫不猶豫，一個官樣文章的高峰會決議都推三阻四，這對台灣來說，怎麼不是嚴重的警訊？更令人擔心的是，台灣入聯提案，尼加拉瓜、巴拿馬、瓜地馬拉都沒有連署，據說巴拿馬甚至拒絕總統專機過境。雖然各國有聯合國維和或爭取安理會席位的考量，但這些都是中共可以獎懲而台灣無能為力的，友邦此時的曖昧態度，意味著雙方關係已經不穩了。
陳水扁拚外交拚得這般用力，怎是這結局呢？這要從他怎麼看待外交談起。對陳水扁來說，自己的權位居第一，其次是民進黨勝選，然後才是國家利益與人民生計。民進黨第一次執政，在國會始終是少數，生存危機感很強，對政績也沒有自信，所以陳水扁會不擇手段地自保及求勝。過一關算一關之下，永遠都在短線操作。人無遠慮，必有近憂。因為總在搶短，不作長遠經營，於是局勢就愈來愈差，到了後期百病俱發，只能一天到晚忙著救火。
七年來頻頻走訪友邦，並非都得要陳水扁本人御駕親征不可，但回頭看來其目的全是為了內部消費，不是為了長遠的外交布局，只是拿出訪當作對內造勢甚至放話的舞台。結果耗掉了大量的國家資源，換得的卻是愈見困窘的國際處境。他喜歡過境美國，目的也在於自抬身價，而不是為台美關係著想。至於強推公投、終統、台灣入聯，也是把個人與勝選置於台美關係之上。他長期把國家利益當成個人政治帳戶，一面毫無節制地揮霍，一面又不往帳戶裡存錢，吃了七年的老本，等於將未來元首的外交帳戶都透支掉了。
不打領帶、貼上入聯貼紙見客，聲稱要拍廣告說哥斯大黎加咖啡難喝等等，除了降低元首格調，只能貽笑國際，而選在國外痛批馬蕭與媒體，更證明「外交」從不是陳水扁的優先考量。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 27, 2007
President Chen Shui-bian's recent state visit to Central America was trouble-ridden from beginning 'til end. The visit has done more harm than good. His "transit diplomacy" was doomed from the start. It threw dollar bills at everyone but got nothing in return, not even symbolic gestures. Even upon arrival, all Chen discussed with the media was domestic affairs. As usual, he came out guns blazing, firing in all directions. No surprises there.
Ever since assuming the office of president, Chen Shui-bian has wanted nothing more than to conduct state visits. Particularly to Central American allies whose geographical location provide him with an excuse to transit the US. These nations are the object of repeat visits. But after seven years, his treatment during transit, as well as the Republic of China's diplomatic status have steadily declined. His state visits were once occasions for Green camp gloating. Now they are public humiliations better forgotten. This so-called "graduation trip" is turning out to be yet another hollow charade. To save face, Chen insists on going through the motions. But the reality is not so easy to laugh off.
The purpose of this visit to El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, was not to bask in twenty-one gun salutes and the red carpet treatment, but to extinguish diplomatic fires. From the beginning this visit was shrouded by dark clouds. Two of them. The first cloud was President Chen's aggressive promotion of his "Plebiscite to Join the UN under the name of Taiwan." This severely damaged relations with the US, and even motivated the US to retaliate. The second cloud was Costa-Rica's shift toward Beijing. The Central American tectonic plate was beginning to slip. These two clouds constitute an unprecedented crisis for the Republic of China. If we review President Chen's actions, he obviously has no plans to repair relations between Taipei and Washington. He is relying exclusively on checkbook diplomacy to temporarily shore up relations with Taipei's Central American allies. Forget permanent cures. These don't even qualify as stopgap measures. Chen's bungling has laid bare the ROC's diplomatic crisis for all to see.
Chen Shui-bian has repeatedly abused Washington's goodwill, by using his transits through the US to consolidate popular support for his own presidency. Now an offended Washington is using his own weapon against him. It is using lowered levels of treatment to punish him. Many things in life have an odd symmetry to them. If you exploit transit diplomacy to elevate your status, you provide others a means to diminish your status. They can pull the red carpet from under you and let you take a tumble. Chen Shui-bian says he "endured humiliation for a higher cause." In fact he "brought humiliation upon himself." Worse yet, he resorted to yet another ruse to win sympathy for himself as a sacrificial martyr for Taiwan independence. Taipei/Washington relations are no longer even a consideration for Chen Shui-bian.
Halfway through his trip, Chen Shui-bian had issued checks amounting to 300 million US. Projects underwritten include a hydro-electric plant for Honduras and low interest loans for a high school computer center. Officially, hundreds of millions in aid were doled out. The actual amount is probably far higher. If this money actually improved the lives of the local populace, consolidated bilateral relations, and won international support for the Republic of China, it might be worth it. Unfortunately during Chen Shui-bian's summit with Central American heads of state, they vetoed the Chen regime's sole request, that they endorse his application for UN membership under the name of Taiwan. Honduras cancelled three joint press conferences with Chen in a row. Reporters from Taiwan were so frustrated they walked out in protest.
Economic conditions on Taiwan of late have been less than ideal. Entire families have been committing suicide by carbon monoxide inhalation at an alarming rate. Yet the Chen regime continues giving away huge sums of hard-earned taxpayer money, hoping for diplomatic support in return. When allies demand money, they receive it without hesitation. Meanwhile official summit resolutions are treated like hot potatoes. If this is not a warning signal, what is? Even more worrisome is that Nicaragua, Panama, and Guatemala failed to petition on behalf of Chen's "Plebsicite to join the UN in the Name of Taiwan." Reports are the Panamanian government refused even to allow the president's plane to transit Panama. These countries must take United Nations peacekeeping and Security Council matters into consideration. These are carrots and sticks that Beijing has but Taipei doesn't. The ambivalence displayed by Taipei's Central American allies suggests that bilateral relations are shaky.
Is this all Chen Shui-bian has to show for his diplomatic efforts? That depends on how Chen sees the role of diplomacy. For Chen Shui-bian, the power of his political office comes first, Democratic Progressive Party electoral victories come next, the national interest and the public welfare come last. This is the first time the Democratic Progressive Party has been in power. It has always constituted a minority in the legislature. Its crisis awareness is acute. It lacks confidence in its political accomplishments. That is why Chen Shui-bian resorts to any and all means to protect himself and ensure victory. Chen and the DPP live one day at a time. Their calculations are forever short term. A person without a long term strategy, will invariably find himself bedeviled by short term crises. If one is forever making short term calculations, one can never make long term plans. As a result, one's strategic situation steadily deteriorates, until everything goes awry at the same time, and all one can do is fight one fire after another.
Seven years of repeat visits to allies really didn't require Chen Shui-bian's participation each and every time. Looking back it was all for internal consumption, never for long term strategic positioning. It was nothing more than a stage on which to rally domestic support. The result has been the squandering of national resources in exchange for international embarrassment. Chen loves to transit the US. But his motive is to elevate his own status, not to bolster Taipei/Washington relations. His aggressive promotion of plebiscites, his termination of the National Unification Council, his "Plebiscite to join the UN in the Name of Taiwan," all put his personal political victories above Taipei/Washington relations. He has long regarded the national interest as his personal bank account. On the one hand he spends freely, as if there was no tomorrow. On the other hand, he never makes any deposits. For seven years, he has been living off the capital. Any future head of state who inherits his mess will find the account marked "overdrawn."
Chen refused to put on a tie. Instead, he sported a "Support Taiwan's Bid to join the UN" sticker to his lapel. He threatened to film a commercial saying Costa Rican coffee tasted bad. Apart from diminishing the prestige of the presidency, all he did was make himself an international laughing stock. Choosing to rail against the newly formed Ma/Hsiao ticket and the media from overseas, merely confirmed that foreign diplomacy has never been Chen Shui-bian's highest priority.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.08.27
這趟出訪加速透支了外交資源
中時社論
陳水扁總統這趟出訪中美洲，似乎一路諸事不順，效果更是憂多喜少。過境外交從一開始就玩不成，灑大把銀子卻連個起碼象徵回饋都掙不到，臨到與媒體互動暢談的還是「內政」，而且同樣是火力四射，完全沒讓人意外！
從就任總統以來，陳水扁就熱中出訪，尤其是能讓他過境美國的中美洲友邦，更是頻頻登門的對象。但七年下來，過境待遇和台灣的外交局勢卻是日走下坡，他的元首外交也從風光得意到灰頭土臉。這趟所謂畢業旅行的出訪更形同雞肋，為了面子還得勉強作樂在其中狀，真實情況卻讓人笑不出來。
這次出訪薩爾瓦多、宏都拉斯和尼加拉瓜，已不是為了享受禮炮和紅地毯，而是緊急進行外交固盤。此行一開始就籠罩在兩重陰影下，一是陳總統強推台灣入聯公投，嚴重損壞台美關係，招致美方報復；二是哥斯大黎加倒向中共，中美洲外交板塊開始流失，兩者對台灣來說都是空前嚴重的危機。但細看陳總統的作為，顯然並不打算修補台美關係，對中美洲友邦也只靠開支票暫時保平安。不要說治本，連治標都談不上，等於將台灣當前的外交危機讓國人看得一清二楚。
往昔陳水扁多次利用美國對台灣的善意，拿過境美國的待遇替個人造勢，如今得罪美國後，美國以子之矛攻子之盾，壓低過境待遇來懲罰他。很多事情是相對的，想用過境來替自己墊腳，相對地，也給人家一個抽墊子讓你跌一跤的機會。陳水扁自稱「忍辱負重」，但其實是自取其辱，甚至想以苦肉計營造自己為台灣受辱的形象。台美關係，真的已不在陳水扁考量之內了。
而行程走到一半，陳水扁開出了三億美元的支票，項目包括投資宏都拉斯水力發電廠、國中小電腦中心低利貸款等。總計百億台幣的援助，數額實在高得驚人，如果確能改善當地民眾生活，並且鞏固彼此關係，進而在國際間為台灣提供相對的支持，倒也值得，問題是，這次陳水扁與中美洲元首的高峰會上，卻否決了我們唯一要求的支持台灣參與聯合國案。而宏都拉斯三度取消總統記者會，也氣得台灣記者集體退席抗議。
台灣這些年來經濟狀況並不好，三不五時就來個全家燒炭，但扁政府還是大筆送出納稅人的血汗錢，無非想換來外交支持。結果，友邦要錢毫不猶豫，一個官樣文章的高峰會決議都推三阻四，這對台灣來說，怎麼不是嚴重的警訊？更令人擔心的是，台灣入聯提案，尼加拉瓜、巴拿馬、瓜地馬拉都沒有連署，據說巴拿馬甚至拒絕總統專機過境。雖然各國有聯合國維和或爭取安理會席位的考量，但這些都是中共可以獎懲而台灣無能為力的，友邦此時的曖昧態度，意味著雙方關係已經不穩了。
陳水扁拚外交拚得這般用力，怎是這結局呢？這要從他怎麼看待外交談起。對陳水扁來說，自己的權位居第一，其次是民進黨勝選，然後才是國家利益與人民生計。民進黨第一次執政，在國會始終是少數，生存危機感很強，對政績也沒有自信，所以陳水扁會不擇手段地自保及求勝。過一關算一關之下，永遠都在短線操作。人無遠慮，必有近憂。因為總在搶短，不作長遠經營，於是局勢就愈來愈差，到了後期百病俱發，只能一天到晚忙著救火。
七年來頻頻走訪友邦，並非都得要陳水扁本人御駕親征不可，但回頭看來其目的全是為了內部消費，不是為了長遠的外交布局，只是拿出訪當作對內造勢甚至放話的舞台。結果耗掉了大量的國家資源，換得的卻是愈見困窘的國際處境。他喜歡過境美國，目的也在於自抬身價，而不是為台美關係著想。至於強推公投、終統、台灣入聯，也是把個人與勝選置於台美關係之上。他長期把國家利益當成個人政治帳戶，一面毫無節制地揮霍，一面又不往帳戶裡存錢，吃了七年的老本，等於將未來元首的外交帳戶都透支掉了。
不打領帶、貼上入聯貼紙見客，聲稱要拍廣告說哥斯大黎加咖啡難喝等等，除了降低元首格調，只能貽笑國際，而選在國外痛批馬蕭與媒體，更證明「外交」從不是陳水扁的優先考量。
Thursday, August 23, 2007
From Political Appointee to Company Director
From Political Appointee to Company Director
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 23, 2007
Yeh Chu-lan has withdrawn from the "Hsieh/Yeh ticket." In exchange, she has been appointed Secretary General of the Presidential Office. Word has emerged from the Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation that many out of work political appointees will become independent board members and receive handsome salaries. Ordinary shareholders are blasting this flagrant patronage. Last year the Presidential Palace declared it was "expressing its determination to push through reforms." It would no longer appoint highly paid presidential advisors. Yesterday however, word emerged that the Presidential Palace had already budgeted 7.2 billion NT for a new crop of presidential advisors and would soon begin hiring.
These three news items may appear unrelated. In fact they are closely linked. Chen Shui-bian regards government positions as personal rewards for services rendered. He awards these positions according to his personal whims. The negative example he has set no longer requires comment. Six reorganizations of the cabinet in seven years have created an army of former appointees. This army is now invading the private sector. The line between government and business is now thoroughly blurred. Under such circumstances, ringing slogans about reform merely ring hollow.
The money-losing Taiwan High Speed Rail has 24 vice-presidents. Each of them receives a mind-boggling average annual salary of 63.7 million NT (2 million US) a year. Three of these independent board members receive between two and five million NT. The Taiwan High Speed Rail is hardly an isolated case. Investigators report that former political appointees now serving as independent board members are too numerous to list. Former Executive Yuan Secretary General Wei Chi-lin is single-handedly serving on five boards. The Chen regime has had six Ministers of Finance. They have all joined holding companies, banks, and corporations and been appointed board chairmen.
This is remarkable for two reasons. First, the original reason for having independent board members was to increase internal oversight in order to better manage the company. But many businesses deliberately solicited former political appointees for such posts. Their motive was to solicit favors from the government based on the former political appointees' "guanxi." They hoped to ensure smooth sailing for their companies or receive advance notice of policy developments. Given such realities, how are independent board members who are so handsomely remunerated, so comfortably settled into their featherbeds, to act as independent overseers and fulfill their duty as internal watchdogs?
Second, according to the "Revolving Door Provisions" of the Civil Service Act, no departing official may not accept a company director or company official position in any industry he supervised during his term of office, for a period of three years. When the Democratic Progressive Party was out of office, it adopted a hard line on this matter. It was relentless in its crusade against Kuomintang patronage. Even lowly section chiefs were exempt. But now, an army of former appointees is being directly assigned to any number of state and private sector positions, by none other than the president himself. Many people within these businesses welcome the arrival of this army with open arms, totally ignoring the "Revolving Door Provision." They leave the government sector to join the business sector. They trample over the rule of law. They abandon their defense against political patronage. When the Democratic Progressive Party was out of office it championed one set of principles. Now that it is in power, it champions an entirely different set of principles. How sad is that?
From a more elevated perspective, it is not hard to see that the Chen regime's incompetence during its seven years in power has frittered away the nation's economic future. It has seriously undermined the Republic of China's once disciplined and efficient system of government, including the autonomy of its financial and economic decision-making agencies and the neutrality of the civil service. Who knows how long it will take to repair the destructive effects of Chen Shui-bian's two terms in power?
Consider three related questions: First, Chen Shui-bian repeatedly reorganized his cabinet during his seven years in office in order to create jobs for cronies. He abused people of talent. He demonstrated his contempt for civil service professionals. He undermined the stability and continuity of the nation's administrative system. Chen Shui-bian's ubiquitous meddling, combined with the Democratic Progressive Party's populist demagoguery, offered political appointees no room for independent, ethical, and responsible policy making. What kind of rational decision-making can one engage in, if every week one has to meet Prime Minister Chang Chun-hsiung's absurd demands for "A Benefit a Week?"
Second, the Chen regime corrupts people with remarkable speed and efficiency. The number of people willing to become cabinet ministers are as numerous as lemmings. Many covet these official positions. They know if they lose their government post for no reason, they will be immediately become board chairmen. Given such a vicious cycle, the cabinet is nothing but a "mass production machine for board chairmen." Looking back over the past seven years, one wonders, how such an arrangement can possibly cultivate people of ability. Chen Shui-bian's national policy advisory group was formed seven years ago. Within months advisors were leaving left and right. Now because of the upcoming election, Chen is recruiting new members. Isn't it obvious he is using public funds to buy himself political bosses who can deliver the vote?
Third, the army of political appointees manufactured by the Chen regime is now invading the business sector. They are unlikely to increase the quality of corporate management. They are likely to become albatrosses around management's neck. Generously provided with high salaries, these independent board members have become corporate gatekeepers. Whom among them remembers that once upon a time they were whistleblowers? The relationship between government officials and company officials has become an expanding gray area wide open to abuse. Is the Democratic Progressive Party truly unaware to this fact?
On stage, the curtain is about to ring up on the drama of the presidential election. But to those in the know, what is happening backstage, in dark corners where the spotlights cannot reach, far more frightening changes are going on.
政務官不政務，獨立董事不獨立
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.23 03:42 am
在葉菊蘭退出「謝葉配」而換得總統府祕書長一職之際，台灣高鐵也傳出多位卸任高官出任獨立董監事坐領高薪，而遭到小股東砲轟的事件。與此同時，總統府去年宣稱為「彰顯改革決心」不再聘任的資政，昨天也傳出已編列七千二百萬元預算，將恢復遴聘。
以上三則消息看似無關，實則脈絡相連。陳水扁將政府職位當成私人酬庸亂撒亂送，惡例多端，已不待言。而他七年六度改組釋出的大量政務官，則藉著內閣「過水」竄流至民營企業，將官商之間的權責界線弄得犬牙交錯。在這種情況下，信誓旦旦的改革口號，皆因官商界際渾沌，而流為空言。
虧損累累的高鐵，廿四位副總以上高層主管平均年薪達六百卅七萬元，令人咋舌；三位各有來頭的獨立董事，酬勞則在二百至五百萬元之間。不僅高鐵，經記者追查，卸任高官出任企業獨立董監事者不勝枚舉：曾任行政院祕書長的魏啟林即一人身兼五職，而扁政府任內曾六易財長，卸任後幾全數進了金控、銀行及企業擔任董事長。
在此，令人好奇的有二：其一，獨立董監事設置的初衷，原在增加內部監督，以健全公司治理。但許多企業刻意延攬卸任高官出任，目的均在乞助於其昔日之權力關係，協助企業排難解紛，或先一步獲知政策消息。在這樣的現實下，那些坐享高薪的獨立董監事，既已身陷「金沙發」，將如何扮演「獨立」監督的內部制衡角色？
其二，根據公務員服務法的「旋轉門條款」，公務員離職三年內，不得擔任其任內職務直接相關之企業董監事等職位。民進黨在野時，對此曾鞭策甚厲，對國民黨的酬庸人事窮追猛打，連科長級人員都不放過。但如今，眾多卸任政務官不僅可經總統直接欽點安插各公民營職務，許多人更在企業爭相迎迓下欣然登堂入室，根本無視於「旋轉門」之存在。出官入商，這不僅是對法制的傲慢與踐踏，實已形同對官商「利益輸送」防線的撤守。民進黨在野說一套，在朝做一套，可悲至此！
站高一點看，人們不難看出：扁政府執政七年的無能及失效，不僅虛耗了人民的機會和時光，更以嚴重的政治干預侵害了台灣行政體系原有的自律效能酖酖包括財經決策的獨立，以及專業官僚的中立。亦即，陳水扁兩任執政的破壞性後果，不知需要多麼長期的修補才能復元。
這裡，有三個環環相扣的問題：第一，陳水扁任內頻繁的內閣改組及因人設事，不僅是對人才的濫用，也是對公職的輕蔑，更是對國家政務穩定性、延續性的破壞。陳水扁的凡事插手，加上民進黨泛政治化及民粹式的問政手法，政務官幾乎沒有獨立決策的空間，遑論責任倫理。試想，每周要滿足府方為張揆訂下「一利多」要求的內閣部長們，還能有什麼理性決策？
第二，以扁政府蹧蹋人才之速率，願意入閣為官者仍多如過江之鯽，許多人無非覬覦那一頂官帽；即使無故丟官，也能立刻安插搖身變成企業董事長。在這種惡性循環下，內閣儼然是「董事長快速製造機」，但回顧這七年，何曾產生甚麼讓人驚艷的秀異之士？七年前以國政顧問團之清新，不數月即離心離德；如今為大選要再廣招資政，豈不擺明就是拿公帑收買選舉樁腳？
第三，扁政府拋出的政務官大量流入商界，未必有助於提升企業治理，卻嚴重增加了行政管理的困擾與負擔。在高薪渥遇的供養下，獨立董監事變成企業的「門神」，誰記得自己曾是「吹哨者」的角色？從官場漫向民間企業的權力關係，徒然擴大了法治的灰色地帶，這點，民進黨能一無所覺？
舞台上，總統選舉的大戲正熱鬧上演。但對有心的民眾而言，戲台幕後那些鎂光燈沒照到的角落，有更令人驚悚的變化在進行。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 23, 2007
Yeh Chu-lan has withdrawn from the "Hsieh/Yeh ticket." In exchange, she has been appointed Secretary General of the Presidential Office. Word has emerged from the Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation that many out of work political appointees will become independent board members and receive handsome salaries. Ordinary shareholders are blasting this flagrant patronage. Last year the Presidential Palace declared it was "expressing its determination to push through reforms." It would no longer appoint highly paid presidential advisors. Yesterday however, word emerged that the Presidential Palace had already budgeted 7.2 billion NT for a new crop of presidential advisors and would soon begin hiring.
These three news items may appear unrelated. In fact they are closely linked. Chen Shui-bian regards government positions as personal rewards for services rendered. He awards these positions according to his personal whims. The negative example he has set no longer requires comment. Six reorganizations of the cabinet in seven years have created an army of former appointees. This army is now invading the private sector. The line between government and business is now thoroughly blurred. Under such circumstances, ringing slogans about reform merely ring hollow.
The money-losing Taiwan High Speed Rail has 24 vice-presidents. Each of them receives a mind-boggling average annual salary of 63.7 million NT (2 million US) a year. Three of these independent board members receive between two and five million NT. The Taiwan High Speed Rail is hardly an isolated case. Investigators report that former political appointees now serving as independent board members are too numerous to list. Former Executive Yuan Secretary General Wei Chi-lin is single-handedly serving on five boards. The Chen regime has had six Ministers of Finance. They have all joined holding companies, banks, and corporations and been appointed board chairmen.
This is remarkable for two reasons. First, the original reason for having independent board members was to increase internal oversight in order to better manage the company. But many businesses deliberately solicited former political appointees for such posts. Their motive was to solicit favors from the government based on the former political appointees' "guanxi." They hoped to ensure smooth sailing for their companies or receive advance notice of policy developments. Given such realities, how are independent board members who are so handsomely remunerated, so comfortably settled into their featherbeds, to act as independent overseers and fulfill their duty as internal watchdogs?
Second, according to the "Revolving Door Provisions" of the Civil Service Act, no departing official may not accept a company director or company official position in any industry he supervised during his term of office, for a period of three years. When the Democratic Progressive Party was out of office, it adopted a hard line on this matter. It was relentless in its crusade against Kuomintang patronage. Even lowly section chiefs were exempt. But now, an army of former appointees is being directly assigned to any number of state and private sector positions, by none other than the president himself. Many people within these businesses welcome the arrival of this army with open arms, totally ignoring the "Revolving Door Provision." They leave the government sector to join the business sector. They trample over the rule of law. They abandon their defense against political patronage. When the Democratic Progressive Party was out of office it championed one set of principles. Now that it is in power, it champions an entirely different set of principles. How sad is that?
From a more elevated perspective, it is not hard to see that the Chen regime's incompetence during its seven years in power has frittered away the nation's economic future. It has seriously undermined the Republic of China's once disciplined and efficient system of government, including the autonomy of its financial and economic decision-making agencies and the neutrality of the civil service. Who knows how long it will take to repair the destructive effects of Chen Shui-bian's two terms in power?
Consider three related questions: First, Chen Shui-bian repeatedly reorganized his cabinet during his seven years in office in order to create jobs for cronies. He abused people of talent. He demonstrated his contempt for civil service professionals. He undermined the stability and continuity of the nation's administrative system. Chen Shui-bian's ubiquitous meddling, combined with the Democratic Progressive Party's populist demagoguery, offered political appointees no room for independent, ethical, and responsible policy making. What kind of rational decision-making can one engage in, if every week one has to meet Prime Minister Chang Chun-hsiung's absurd demands for "A Benefit a Week?"
Second, the Chen regime corrupts people with remarkable speed and efficiency. The number of people willing to become cabinet ministers are as numerous as lemmings. Many covet these official positions. They know if they lose their government post for no reason, they will be immediately become board chairmen. Given such a vicious cycle, the cabinet is nothing but a "mass production machine for board chairmen." Looking back over the past seven years, one wonders, how such an arrangement can possibly cultivate people of ability. Chen Shui-bian's national policy advisory group was formed seven years ago. Within months advisors were leaving left and right. Now because of the upcoming election, Chen is recruiting new members. Isn't it obvious he is using public funds to buy himself political bosses who can deliver the vote?
Third, the army of political appointees manufactured by the Chen regime is now invading the business sector. They are unlikely to increase the quality of corporate management. They are likely to become albatrosses around management's neck. Generously provided with high salaries, these independent board members have become corporate gatekeepers. Whom among them remembers that once upon a time they were whistleblowers? The relationship between government officials and company officials has become an expanding gray area wide open to abuse. Is the Democratic Progressive Party truly unaware to this fact?
On stage, the curtain is about to ring up on the drama of the presidential election. But to those in the know, what is happening backstage, in dark corners where the spotlights cannot reach, far more frightening changes are going on.
政務官不政務，獨立董事不獨立
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.23 03:42 am
在葉菊蘭退出「謝葉配」而換得總統府祕書長一職之際，台灣高鐵也傳出多位卸任高官出任獨立董監事坐領高薪，而遭到小股東砲轟的事件。與此同時，總統府去年宣稱為「彰顯改革決心」不再聘任的資政，昨天也傳出已編列七千二百萬元預算，將恢復遴聘。
以上三則消息看似無關，實則脈絡相連。陳水扁將政府職位當成私人酬庸亂撒亂送，惡例多端，已不待言。而他七年六度改組釋出的大量政務官，則藉著內閣「過水」竄流至民營企業，將官商之間的權責界線弄得犬牙交錯。在這種情況下，信誓旦旦的改革口號，皆因官商界際渾沌，而流為空言。
虧損累累的高鐵，廿四位副總以上高層主管平均年薪達六百卅七萬元，令人咋舌；三位各有來頭的獨立董事，酬勞則在二百至五百萬元之間。不僅高鐵，經記者追查，卸任高官出任企業獨立董監事者不勝枚舉：曾任行政院祕書長的魏啟林即一人身兼五職，而扁政府任內曾六易財長，卸任後幾全數進了金控、銀行及企業擔任董事長。
在此，令人好奇的有二：其一，獨立董監事設置的初衷，原在增加內部監督，以健全公司治理。但許多企業刻意延攬卸任高官出任，目的均在乞助於其昔日之權力關係，協助企業排難解紛，或先一步獲知政策消息。在這樣的現實下，那些坐享高薪的獨立董監事，既已身陷「金沙發」，將如何扮演「獨立」監督的內部制衡角色？
其二，根據公務員服務法的「旋轉門條款」，公務員離職三年內，不得擔任其任內職務直接相關之企業董監事等職位。民進黨在野時，對此曾鞭策甚厲，對國民黨的酬庸人事窮追猛打，連科長級人員都不放過。但如今，眾多卸任政務官不僅可經總統直接欽點安插各公民營職務，許多人更在企業爭相迎迓下欣然登堂入室，根本無視於「旋轉門」之存在。出官入商，這不僅是對法制的傲慢與踐踏，實已形同對官商「利益輸送」防線的撤守。民進黨在野說一套，在朝做一套，可悲至此！
站高一點看，人們不難看出：扁政府執政七年的無能及失效，不僅虛耗了人民的機會和時光，更以嚴重的政治干預侵害了台灣行政體系原有的自律效能酖酖包括財經決策的獨立，以及專業官僚的中立。亦即，陳水扁兩任執政的破壞性後果，不知需要多麼長期的修補才能復元。
這裡，有三個環環相扣的問題：第一，陳水扁任內頻繁的內閣改組及因人設事，不僅是對人才的濫用，也是對公職的輕蔑，更是對國家政務穩定性、延續性的破壞。陳水扁的凡事插手，加上民進黨泛政治化及民粹式的問政手法，政務官幾乎沒有獨立決策的空間，遑論責任倫理。試想，每周要滿足府方為張揆訂下「一利多」要求的內閣部長們，還能有什麼理性決策？
第二，以扁政府蹧蹋人才之速率，願意入閣為官者仍多如過江之鯽，許多人無非覬覦那一頂官帽；即使無故丟官，也能立刻安插搖身變成企業董事長。在這種惡性循環下，內閣儼然是「董事長快速製造機」，但回顧這七年，何曾產生甚麼讓人驚艷的秀異之士？七年前以國政顧問團之清新，不數月即離心離德；如今為大選要再廣招資政，豈不擺明就是拿公帑收買選舉樁腳？
第三，扁政府拋出的政務官大量流入商界，未必有助於提升企業治理，卻嚴重增加了行政管理的困擾與負擔。在高薪渥遇的供養下，獨立董監事變成企業的「門神」，誰記得自己曾是「吹哨者」的角色？從官場漫向民間企業的權力關係，徒然擴大了法治的灰色地帶，這點，民進黨能一無所覺？
舞台上，總統選舉的大戲正熱鬧上演。但對有心的民眾而言，戲台幕後那些鎂光燈沒照到的角落，有更令人驚悚的變化在進行。
Wednesday, August 22, 2007
A National Level Financial Holding Company equals Disaster
A National Level Financial Holding Company equals Disaster
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 22, 2007
The Executive Yuan suddenly announced last week that it would merge the Bank of Taiwan, the Land Bank of Taiwan, and The Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China (EXIM), into a "Three in One" national level Taiwan financial holding company. The process would begin by the end of this year, and would be completed within three years. Global financial markets are still reverberating from the aftershocks of the US subprime market collapse. Yet the ruling DPP considers this the centerpiece of its resuscitated "Second Financial Reform" program. One really has to wonder "What were they thinking?" If this is merely talk, merely Chen Shui-bian desperately striving to leave himself a "legacy," or yet another ruling DPP election ploy, so be it. If it isn't, if they actually mean to implement it, it will be a national level disaster.
Global financial markets have been caught in the maelstrom caused by the US subprime mortgage crisis. Capital has dried up. The market has undergone wild swings. Investors have panicked. Liquidity has evaporated. Central bankers the world over have been forced to collectively intervene. The major markets are still shaking. Global assets are seeking new price levels. National governments are in full battle array. Yet the Executive Yuan announces an utterly irrelevant plan for a national level financial holding company. It merrily announces to the whole world its grand dreams, as if it were talking in its sleep. The Executive Yuan's timing is so inappropriate, it leaves one dumbfounded at the government's inability to evaluate its situation, and makes one doubt its crisis management skills.
Frankly speaking, the policy is unintelligible. According to the Executive Yuan, the "Three in One" national level financial holding company's capital assets will amount to 100 billion. Its banking assets will amount to 158.8 billion US. It will become the 89th largest bank in the world, surpassing even Singapore's largest bank. It will be the first multi-core financial holding company combining finance, enterprise finance, foreign exchange, negotiable securities, and insurance. But apart from trumpeting the large numbers and the wide range of services, the Executive Yuan hasn't offered any concrete and convincing justification for the merger, or explained how it would increase the nation's competitiveness. Just as the "Second Financial Reform" was subject to unrealistic time constraints, so the national level financial holding company plan lacks a comprehensive policy justification. It is a merger purely for the sake of a merger. It too will probably have its schedule cut in half. It too will probably share the same disastrous fate.
Besides being unintelligible, the policy is inconsistent. The Economic Development Advisory Conference researched this matter long ago. The Bank of Taiwan and the Land Bank of Taiwan should not be treated as policy tools, but should simply be privatized. Last year the Economic Development Advisory Conference suggested that there was no need for a national level financial holding company. The suggestion was not included in the text of the resolution in order to keep all options open. The Land Bank of Taiwan once commissioned Goldman Sachs to research the possible benefits of a merger with Bank of Taiwan. Goldman Sachs' conclusion was that it should privatize first. Although everyone has advised against such a merger, the Executive Yuan has persisted. This further underscores the fact that the national level financial holding company proposal is not endorsed by financial experts and would do nothing for the nation's competitiveness. Its only justification is to add a gold star to Chen Shui-bian's report card just before he steps down, or to light the fuse that will set off a war over financial reform.
If the establishment of national level financial holding company is nothing more than armchair strategizing by a ruling regime facing a difficult election, then one may as well play along with it. After all, forming a financial holding company is no easy matter. The worst fear is that the ruling regime, motivated by selfish political considerations, might actually force the three banks to merge before the end of the year. Once the proposal becomes an accomplished fact, that will mark the beginning of a disaster.
The inefficiency of state owned banks is legend. Leave aside financial innovation, market flexibility, and other demanding criteria. Just look at the "First Financial Reform," which forked over trillions in public funds to cover non-performing government loans. State owned banks have difficultly avoiding political influence. One can hardly expect the merger of the Bank of Taiwan, the Land Bank of Taiwan, and the Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China to result in more efficient management, and not merely because of inbreeding. Even more to be feared is that following the merger, the combined "Three in One" entity will become a sitting duck for behind-the-scenes manipulators. Not only will it attract political patronage, it will generate losses comparable to the "First Financial Reform." Taxpayers will get stuck with the bill, and this national level project will become a national level disaster.
A national level financial holding company may well bring about economic disaster. The efficient operation of a financial system is essential to economic development, and can be compared to the free flow of blood in the human body. If a national level financial holding company controlling nearly two tenths of Taiwan's savings could be efficiently managed, it would become a model for company management. If it can't, it will bring calamity down on the economy. It may be too early to say with certainty that a national level financial holding company will be a failure. But based on the Executive Yuan's "Three in One" principles that it will not cut staff, will not be privately operated, and will not be listed on the stock market, such a national level financial holding company not only won't fly, it will drag everyone down with it.
國家級金控是災難的開始
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.22 03:10 am
行政院上周突然宣布，要把台灣銀行、土地銀行及中國輸出入銀行「三合一」，成立國家級的台灣金控公司，而且限時今年底啟動、三年內完成。值此全球金融體系動盪不安之際，這項被視為二次金改重新上路的指標之作，顯得突兀且不知所云；若這只是為了成就陳水扁總統好大喜功的心態，或執政黨的另一選戰伎倆，說說就算了，自是幸事；因為，果若去做，那將是國家級災難的開始。
最近全球金融體系都籠罩在美國次級房貸風暴的狂風驟雨裡，資產泡沫遽破、市場暴起暴落、投資人慌不擇路、流動性全面退潮的考驗接踵而至，讓全球央行總裁的集體焦慮不幸成真，被迫聯手入市搶救。在各大市場驚魂未定、全球資產正尋求重新定價、各國政府莫不嚴陣以待的緊要關口，行政院卻不著邊際地宣布籌組國家級金控的政策，甚至陶陶然於將晉身全球百大的夢言囈語；這不只是時機上的不當與突兀，也讓人對政府的情勢辨識能力瞠目結舌，更不免懷疑其危機應變能力了。
坦率地說，這是一個不知所云的政策。依行政院所言，三合一後的國家級金控資本額一千億元，其銀行資產規模達一千五百八十八億美元，將躋身全球第八十九大，甚至超越新加坡第一大銀行，並將是首家同時擁有消費金融、企業金融、外匯、證券及保險等多核心業務的金控。但除了資產數字、業務項目相加的成果，行政院並沒有針對合併綜效、必要性及國家競爭力提升的實益，提出更具體、更有力的說明。一如二次金改的限時減半政策，國家級金控的設立也缺乏完整的政策論述，在為合併而合併之下，恐也將如限時減半一樣，落得一敗塗地的下場。
除了不知所云，這還是個前後不一的政策。經建會早就做過研究，將台銀、土銀列為不具政策性任務、應予民營化的對象；去年經續會也曾主張國家級金控無設立必要性，之後為保留彈性才未列入決議；土銀更曾委託美商高盛專案研究與台銀合併的效益，所獲結論也是民營化為先。然而，儘管眾人皆曰不宜，行政院還是執意推行，益發凸顯此一國家級金控的設立，無關專業與國家競爭力，而只是為了妝點陳水扁卸任時金改成績單的政治祭品，或點燃金改選戰話題的引信。
果若國家級金控的設立只是當政者面臨選舉將屆的紙上談兵，倒不妨隨它炒作罷了，畢竟一家金控的成形並非易事；怕就怕執政者基於一己政治私利考量，將三家公營銀行在年底前強行送作堆，一旦生米煮成熟飯，那才是一連串災難的開始。
公營銀行的經營效率向受詬病，不談金融創新、市場靈活性等積極面評價，僅看一次金改時動用上兆元公共資金打消政治特權貸款等不良債權的規模，就足以說明公營銀行經營難脫政治干擾的現實困境所在。台銀、土銀與輸銀的合併，不只是因近親繁殖，而難以期待新合體的經營體質提升；更可怕的是，三合一後的新合體提供了政治黑手更大的操控空間，不僅會吸附、製造更多的政治米蟲，且其所生損失也如一次金改，將由全民埋單，成為國家財政的災難。
國家級金控可能帶來的另一災難，是對經濟的傷害。學理上常以血液之於人體，比喻金融體系的運行效率對經濟發展的重要性，如果掌握台灣近二成存放款資源的國家級金控能夠以高效率經營，為市場建立優質金控應有的公司治理及行為典範，那自是經濟之福；反之，就是經濟之禍了。現在論斷國家級金控的成敗或言之過早，但依行政院所訂下的不裁員、不民營化、不上市等三合一原則，國家級金控恐怕不只成為跳不動的大象，還會把大家一起拖下水！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 22, 2007
The Executive Yuan suddenly announced last week that it would merge the Bank of Taiwan, the Land Bank of Taiwan, and The Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China (EXIM), into a "Three in One" national level Taiwan financial holding company. The process would begin by the end of this year, and would be completed within three years. Global financial markets are still reverberating from the aftershocks of the US subprime market collapse. Yet the ruling DPP considers this the centerpiece of its resuscitated "Second Financial Reform" program. One really has to wonder "What were they thinking?" If this is merely talk, merely Chen Shui-bian desperately striving to leave himself a "legacy," or yet another ruling DPP election ploy, so be it. If it isn't, if they actually mean to implement it, it will be a national level disaster.
Global financial markets have been caught in the maelstrom caused by the US subprime mortgage crisis. Capital has dried up. The market has undergone wild swings. Investors have panicked. Liquidity has evaporated. Central bankers the world over have been forced to collectively intervene. The major markets are still shaking. Global assets are seeking new price levels. National governments are in full battle array. Yet the Executive Yuan announces an utterly irrelevant plan for a national level financial holding company. It merrily announces to the whole world its grand dreams, as if it were talking in its sleep. The Executive Yuan's timing is so inappropriate, it leaves one dumbfounded at the government's inability to evaluate its situation, and makes one doubt its crisis management skills.
Frankly speaking, the policy is unintelligible. According to the Executive Yuan, the "Three in One" national level financial holding company's capital assets will amount to 100 billion. Its banking assets will amount to 158.8 billion US. It will become the 89th largest bank in the world, surpassing even Singapore's largest bank. It will be the first multi-core financial holding company combining finance, enterprise finance, foreign exchange, negotiable securities, and insurance. But apart from trumpeting the large numbers and the wide range of services, the Executive Yuan hasn't offered any concrete and convincing justification for the merger, or explained how it would increase the nation's competitiveness. Just as the "Second Financial Reform" was subject to unrealistic time constraints, so the national level financial holding company plan lacks a comprehensive policy justification. It is a merger purely for the sake of a merger. It too will probably have its schedule cut in half. It too will probably share the same disastrous fate.
Besides being unintelligible, the policy is inconsistent. The Economic Development Advisory Conference researched this matter long ago. The Bank of Taiwan and the Land Bank of Taiwan should not be treated as policy tools, but should simply be privatized. Last year the Economic Development Advisory Conference suggested that there was no need for a national level financial holding company. The suggestion was not included in the text of the resolution in order to keep all options open. The Land Bank of Taiwan once commissioned Goldman Sachs to research the possible benefits of a merger with Bank of Taiwan. Goldman Sachs' conclusion was that it should privatize first. Although everyone has advised against such a merger, the Executive Yuan has persisted. This further underscores the fact that the national level financial holding company proposal is not endorsed by financial experts and would do nothing for the nation's competitiveness. Its only justification is to add a gold star to Chen Shui-bian's report card just before he steps down, or to light the fuse that will set off a war over financial reform.
If the establishment of national level financial holding company is nothing more than armchair strategizing by a ruling regime facing a difficult election, then one may as well play along with it. After all, forming a financial holding company is no easy matter. The worst fear is that the ruling regime, motivated by selfish political considerations, might actually force the three banks to merge before the end of the year. Once the proposal becomes an accomplished fact, that will mark the beginning of a disaster.
The inefficiency of state owned banks is legend. Leave aside financial innovation, market flexibility, and other demanding criteria. Just look at the "First Financial Reform," which forked over trillions in public funds to cover non-performing government loans. State owned banks have difficultly avoiding political influence. One can hardly expect the merger of the Bank of Taiwan, the Land Bank of Taiwan, and the Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China to result in more efficient management, and not merely because of inbreeding. Even more to be feared is that following the merger, the combined "Three in One" entity will become a sitting duck for behind-the-scenes manipulators. Not only will it attract political patronage, it will generate losses comparable to the "First Financial Reform." Taxpayers will get stuck with the bill, and this national level project will become a national level disaster.
A national level financial holding company may well bring about economic disaster. The efficient operation of a financial system is essential to economic development, and can be compared to the free flow of blood in the human body. If a national level financial holding company controlling nearly two tenths of Taiwan's savings could be efficiently managed, it would become a model for company management. If it can't, it will bring calamity down on the economy. It may be too early to say with certainty that a national level financial holding company will be a failure. But based on the Executive Yuan's "Three in One" principles that it will not cut staff, will not be privately operated, and will not be listed on the stock market, such a national level financial holding company not only won't fly, it will drag everyone down with it.
國家級金控是災難的開始
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.22 03:10 am
行政院上周突然宣布，要把台灣銀行、土地銀行及中國輸出入銀行「三合一」，成立國家級的台灣金控公司，而且限時今年底啟動、三年內完成。值此全球金融體系動盪不安之際，這項被視為二次金改重新上路的指標之作，顯得突兀且不知所云；若這只是為了成就陳水扁總統好大喜功的心態，或執政黨的另一選戰伎倆，說說就算了，自是幸事；因為，果若去做，那將是國家級災難的開始。
最近全球金融體系都籠罩在美國次級房貸風暴的狂風驟雨裡，資產泡沫遽破、市場暴起暴落、投資人慌不擇路、流動性全面退潮的考驗接踵而至，讓全球央行總裁的集體焦慮不幸成真，被迫聯手入市搶救。在各大市場驚魂未定、全球資產正尋求重新定價、各國政府莫不嚴陣以待的緊要關口，行政院卻不著邊際地宣布籌組國家級金控的政策，甚至陶陶然於將晉身全球百大的夢言囈語；這不只是時機上的不當與突兀，也讓人對政府的情勢辨識能力瞠目結舌，更不免懷疑其危機應變能力了。
坦率地說，這是一個不知所云的政策。依行政院所言，三合一後的國家級金控資本額一千億元，其銀行資產規模達一千五百八十八億美元，將躋身全球第八十九大，甚至超越新加坡第一大銀行，並將是首家同時擁有消費金融、企業金融、外匯、證券及保險等多核心業務的金控。但除了資產數字、業務項目相加的成果，行政院並沒有針對合併綜效、必要性及國家競爭力提升的實益，提出更具體、更有力的說明。一如二次金改的限時減半政策，國家級金控的設立也缺乏完整的政策論述，在為合併而合併之下，恐也將如限時減半一樣，落得一敗塗地的下場。
除了不知所云，這還是個前後不一的政策。經建會早就做過研究，將台銀、土銀列為不具政策性任務、應予民營化的對象；去年經續會也曾主張國家級金控無設立必要性，之後為保留彈性才未列入決議；土銀更曾委託美商高盛專案研究與台銀合併的效益，所獲結論也是民營化為先。然而，儘管眾人皆曰不宜，行政院還是執意推行，益發凸顯此一國家級金控的設立，無關專業與國家競爭力，而只是為了妝點陳水扁卸任時金改成績單的政治祭品，或點燃金改選戰話題的引信。
果若國家級金控的設立只是當政者面臨選舉將屆的紙上談兵，倒不妨隨它炒作罷了，畢竟一家金控的成形並非易事；怕就怕執政者基於一己政治私利考量，將三家公營銀行在年底前強行送作堆，一旦生米煮成熟飯，那才是一連串災難的開始。
公營銀行的經營效率向受詬病，不談金融創新、市場靈活性等積極面評價，僅看一次金改時動用上兆元公共資金打消政治特權貸款等不良債權的規模，就足以說明公營銀行經營難脫政治干擾的現實困境所在。台銀、土銀與輸銀的合併，不只是因近親繁殖，而難以期待新合體的經營體質提升；更可怕的是，三合一後的新合體提供了政治黑手更大的操控空間，不僅會吸附、製造更多的政治米蟲，且其所生損失也如一次金改，將由全民埋單，成為國家財政的災難。
國家級金控可能帶來的另一災難，是對經濟的傷害。學理上常以血液之於人體，比喻金融體系的運行效率對經濟發展的重要性，如果掌握台灣近二成存放款資源的國家級金控能夠以高效率經營，為市場建立優質金控應有的公司治理及行為典範，那自是經濟之福；反之，就是經濟之禍了。現在論斷國家級金控的成敗或言之過早，但依行政院所訂下的不裁員、不民營化、不上市等三合一原則，國家級金控恐怕不只成為跳不動的大象，還會把大家一起拖下水！
Tuesday, August 21, 2007
Prosecutors Play Dice with Constitutional Government
Prosecutors Play Dice with Constitutional Government
United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 21, 2007
The Taipei Public Prosecutor, in a display of flagrant contempt for due process, has appealed the Ma Ying-jeou case. This is an act of retaliation by a minority of prosecutors abusing the appeals system, treating it as their own private means for revenge. It is also a political conspiracy on the part of high ranking prosecutors to drag the entire judiciary into the presidential election.
Some consider the Discretionary Fund a "substantive subsidy." Others consider it "public funds." Still others consider it "indeterminate in nature." The prosecutorial system can hold any one of these positions. But it cannot hold more than one of these positions. Otherwise how can it possibly provide a single standard of justice? Hou Kuan-jen has been accused of tampering with Ma Ying-jeou's depositions. These are serious charges. Hou Kuan-jen must be subjected to a thorough investigation to maintain public trust in the prosecutorial system. If one or two individuals can declare Hou Kuan-jen not guilty and attack the court's findings, then the appeals system has become the public prosecutors' private instrument for revenge. First: No unified opinion. Second: No internal investigation. These two points alone reveal that the public prosecutor's superiors authorized the appeal without concern for due process. Apparently they have no qualms about shoving the entire judicial system out the door into a political maelstrom.
Prosecutors who refuse to own up to their responsibility as prosecutors, who appeal unfavorable verdicts without regard for due process, clearly hope to turn the appeals process into a political confrontation. The presidential election is seven months away. The presidential inauguration is nine months away. The Taipei Public Prosecutor's Office is desperately buying time. It appealed first, and came up with reasons later. It hopes to turn the appeals process into a constitutional crisis over the verdict and the timing of the verdict. The appeal has become a high stakes political gamble.
Public debate and the District Court's verdict have already made the picture quite clear. The High Court's verdict will soon become obvious. When the verdict will be make public is not so obvious. If the verdict is "not guilty," but not made public until after the election, that will be disadvantageous to Ma Ying-jeou. If the verdict is "guilty," but not made public until after the election, that will be disadvantageous to Frank Hsieh. If Ma is found guilty after registering as a candidate, he will forfeit his candidacy. If Ma is found guilty after he being elected president, he will forfeit his presidency. Under such circumstances, it makes no difference whether Ma is found guilty or not guilty. It makes no difference whether the verdict is made public before or after the presidential election. The election result will be contested, and political unrest will follow.
Double or nothing. That is the prosecutor's attitude. The prosecutorial system has betrayed its professional responsibility. It has failed to clarify the legal status of the Discretionary Fund. It is evading its duty to investigate charges that the public prosecutor tampered with the defendant's depositions. It is playing dice with the justice system and the nation's welfare. These prosecutors may think they are gambling only with their own legal reputations and political futures. In fact they are gambling away the nation's system of criminal justice and constitutional government.
As they see it, their high stakes gamble favors the prosecutorial system. The appeals process has many possible outcomes. Only one, being pronounced not guilty before the election, will be advantageous to Ma Ying-jeou. All other outcomes: being pronounced guilty before the election, being pronounced not guilty after the election, being pronounced guilty after the election but before assuming office, are disadvantageous to him. In other words, an appeal may not be able to bring down Ma Ying-jeou by means of the criminal justice system. But it may be able to bring down Ma Ying-jeou by means of the electoral system. In their eyes, the appeals process is not just a legal struggle, it is also a political struggle. Forcing the collegiate bench into the maelstrom of the presidential election mires Ma Ying-jeou in a political deadlock.
The prosecutorial system must first fulfill its professional responsibilities by reaching a unified opinion. It must fulfill its disciplinary responsibilities by conducting an internal investigation of Hou Kuan-jen. If the prosecution files an appeal after that, it may do so honorably and forthrightly. But it has not reached a unified opinion. It has not conducted an internal investigation. It has heedlessly and arbitarily filed an appeal. This is the behavior of triad thugs bent on revenge. This is the behavior of political opportunists willing to precipitate a political bloodbath to hide their own shortcomings. In order to prosecute a political enemy over a Discretionary Fund whose status remains indeterminate in nature, in order to shield a controversial Hou Kuan-jen, they are willing to gamble the nation's system of presidential elections and constitutional government. "Bad faith" does not begin to describe what is in their hearts.
The gaming table has two ends. At one end sits Hou Kuan-jen. who from the very beginning has politicized the Ma Ying-jeou case, and debased himself by becoming a political goon for his superiors in the prosecutorial system. At the other end sits the nation's system of criminal justice, constitutional law, and free and fair elections. So let's place our bets. So let's roll the dice. If the judiciary can bet against Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-chen, it should have no trouble betting against Hou Kuan-jen and Chen Tsong-ming.
憲政豪賭：馬案二審的幾種排列組合
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.21 03:05 am
台北地檢署未經正當程序，逕就馬案提起上訴。這是少數檢察人員濫將訴訟制度當作個人報復之手段，亦是相關檢察上級蓄意要將整個司法體制捲入總統大選漩渦的政治陰謀。
特別費的屬性出現爭議，有認係「實質補貼」者，有認係「公款」者，亦有認係「屬性不明確」者；檢察體系固可持任何見解，但不能不對內統一見解，否則如何稱「檢察一體」？至於對侯寬仁涉及製作不實筆錄，亦應進行內部調查，以昭公信；倘若只憑一二人即可私自認定侯寬仁沒錯，並火速上訴來攻擊司法審判，則訴訟制度豈不成了檢察官個人的報復工具？僅看上述二點，一未統一見解，二未內部調查，相關檢察上級自屬並未善盡正當程序即批准上訴，不啻欲將整個司法體系捲入不堪設想的政治漩渦。
這些拒問檢察體制自身責任、亦拒經內部正當程序即提起上訴者，顯然是欲將上訴操作成一場政治豪賭。此時距總統大選尚有七個月，距總統就職亦有九個月；北檢於第一時間，在「後備理由」的倉卒狀態下火速上訴，用心即在爭取時間，欲強逼二審陷於「判有罪／判無罪」及「選前判決／選後判決」的憲政困境中。亦即，馬案二審已成了一場政治豪賭。
其實，本案經過輿論激盪，及一審推敲，已是脈絡分明；因而，二審應當很快就能形成「有罪／無罪」的心證，難處是在「選前判／選後判」。例如，若二審的心證是「無罪」，卻延至「選後判」，將不利馬英九；倘「有罪」，亦延至「選後判」，則不利謝長廷。何況，馬若在完成候選登記後被判有罪，將喪失候選資格；若當選，卻在選後至就職前判有罪，亦將喪失當選資格。事態至此，無論就「判有罪／判無罪」及「選前判／選後判」作出何種排列組合，皆將形成大選爭議及政治風潮。
賭輸加碼，這是檢察體系此刻的心態。檢察體系自棄釐清「特別費屬性不明確」的專業責任，又迴避對檢察官筆錄造假進行風紀調查，竟然逕自一腳就將整個司法體系與整個國家踢進一場政治賭博。這一小撮檢察人員，只是賭他們個人的法律見解與政治評價，但整個司法正義及憲政安全，卻也已被他們逼上了賭桌，淪為社會共業的賭注。
上訴者的眼中，這場豪賭的贏面似在檢察體系。在二審判決的各種排列組合中，唯有「無罪／選前判」一種模式，對被告馬英九有利；其餘，「有罪／選前判」、「無罪／選後判」，及「有罪／選後至就職前判」等排列組合，皆不利馬英九。也就是說，上訴者即使不能在司法上立即擊垮馬英九（如「有罪／選前判」），亦可能在政治上拖垮馬英九（如「無罪／選後判」等）。在上訴者眼中，上訴不只是訴訟動作，更是政治鬥爭；逼二審合議庭捲入總統大選的風暴，亦逼馬英九陷於各種排列組合的二審政治僵局之中。
如果檢方先統一見解，善盡了專業責任；及先對侯寬仁作過內部調查，善盡了風紀管制；則檢方此時上訴，即是正大光明的舉措；但一未統一見解，二未內部調查，卻蠻橫粗暴地上訴，這就不啻是幫派報仇的行徑，亦即是不惜掀起政治鬥爭來為自己遮醜護短。檢察當局為了一個「屬性不明確」的特別費，為了一個極具爭議性的侯寬仁，竟將攸關整個國家安危的總統大選及憲政正義率爾推上了政治賭桌，這又豈僅是居心叵測而已？
在這張賭桌的兩頭，一頭是自始就將馬案政治化的侯寬仁，及淪為政治打手的檢察上級；另一頭則是司法正義及總統大選所涉憲政公義。豪賭吧，下注吧，司法既能與陳水扁及吳淑珍對賭，則被迫與侯寬仁及陳聰明對賭亦非意外！
United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 21, 2007
The Taipei Public Prosecutor, in a display of flagrant contempt for due process, has appealed the Ma Ying-jeou case. This is an act of retaliation by a minority of prosecutors abusing the appeals system, treating it as their own private means for revenge. It is also a political conspiracy on the part of high ranking prosecutors to drag the entire judiciary into the presidential election.
Some consider the Discretionary Fund a "substantive subsidy." Others consider it "public funds." Still others consider it "indeterminate in nature." The prosecutorial system can hold any one of these positions. But it cannot hold more than one of these positions. Otherwise how can it possibly provide a single standard of justice? Hou Kuan-jen has been accused of tampering with Ma Ying-jeou's depositions. These are serious charges. Hou Kuan-jen must be subjected to a thorough investigation to maintain public trust in the prosecutorial system. If one or two individuals can declare Hou Kuan-jen not guilty and attack the court's findings, then the appeals system has become the public prosecutors' private instrument for revenge. First: No unified opinion. Second: No internal investigation. These two points alone reveal that the public prosecutor's superiors authorized the appeal without concern for due process. Apparently they have no qualms about shoving the entire judicial system out the door into a political maelstrom.
Prosecutors who refuse to own up to their responsibility as prosecutors, who appeal unfavorable verdicts without regard for due process, clearly hope to turn the appeals process into a political confrontation. The presidential election is seven months away. The presidential inauguration is nine months away. The Taipei Public Prosecutor's Office is desperately buying time. It appealed first, and came up with reasons later. It hopes to turn the appeals process into a constitutional crisis over the verdict and the timing of the verdict. The appeal has become a high stakes political gamble.
Public debate and the District Court's verdict have already made the picture quite clear. The High Court's verdict will soon become obvious. When the verdict will be make public is not so obvious. If the verdict is "not guilty," but not made public until after the election, that will be disadvantageous to Ma Ying-jeou. If the verdict is "guilty," but not made public until after the election, that will be disadvantageous to Frank Hsieh. If Ma is found guilty after registering as a candidate, he will forfeit his candidacy. If Ma is found guilty after he being elected president, he will forfeit his presidency. Under such circumstances, it makes no difference whether Ma is found guilty or not guilty. It makes no difference whether the verdict is made public before or after the presidential election. The election result will be contested, and political unrest will follow.
Double or nothing. That is the prosecutor's attitude. The prosecutorial system has betrayed its professional responsibility. It has failed to clarify the legal status of the Discretionary Fund. It is evading its duty to investigate charges that the public prosecutor tampered with the defendant's depositions. It is playing dice with the justice system and the nation's welfare. These prosecutors may think they are gambling only with their own legal reputations and political futures. In fact they are gambling away the nation's system of criminal justice and constitutional government.
As they see it, their high stakes gamble favors the prosecutorial system. The appeals process has many possible outcomes. Only one, being pronounced not guilty before the election, will be advantageous to Ma Ying-jeou. All other outcomes: being pronounced guilty before the election, being pronounced not guilty after the election, being pronounced guilty after the election but before assuming office, are disadvantageous to him. In other words, an appeal may not be able to bring down Ma Ying-jeou by means of the criminal justice system. But it may be able to bring down Ma Ying-jeou by means of the electoral system. In their eyes, the appeals process is not just a legal struggle, it is also a political struggle. Forcing the collegiate bench into the maelstrom of the presidential election mires Ma Ying-jeou in a political deadlock.
The prosecutorial system must first fulfill its professional responsibilities by reaching a unified opinion. It must fulfill its disciplinary responsibilities by conducting an internal investigation of Hou Kuan-jen. If the prosecution files an appeal after that, it may do so honorably and forthrightly. But it has not reached a unified opinion. It has not conducted an internal investigation. It has heedlessly and arbitarily filed an appeal. This is the behavior of triad thugs bent on revenge. This is the behavior of political opportunists willing to precipitate a political bloodbath to hide their own shortcomings. In order to prosecute a political enemy over a Discretionary Fund whose status remains indeterminate in nature, in order to shield a controversial Hou Kuan-jen, they are willing to gamble the nation's system of presidential elections and constitutional government. "Bad faith" does not begin to describe what is in their hearts.
The gaming table has two ends. At one end sits Hou Kuan-jen. who from the very beginning has politicized the Ma Ying-jeou case, and debased himself by becoming a political goon for his superiors in the prosecutorial system. At the other end sits the nation's system of criminal justice, constitutional law, and free and fair elections. So let's place our bets. So let's roll the dice. If the judiciary can bet against Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-chen, it should have no trouble betting against Hou Kuan-jen and Chen Tsong-ming.
憲政豪賭：馬案二審的幾種排列組合
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.21 03:05 am
台北地檢署未經正當程序，逕就馬案提起上訴。這是少數檢察人員濫將訴訟制度當作個人報復之手段，亦是相關檢察上級蓄意要將整個司法體制捲入總統大選漩渦的政治陰謀。
特別費的屬性出現爭議，有認係「實質補貼」者，有認係「公款」者，亦有認係「屬性不明確」者；檢察體系固可持任何見解，但不能不對內統一見解，否則如何稱「檢察一體」？至於對侯寬仁涉及製作不實筆錄，亦應進行內部調查，以昭公信；倘若只憑一二人即可私自認定侯寬仁沒錯，並火速上訴來攻擊司法審判，則訴訟制度豈不成了檢察官個人的報復工具？僅看上述二點，一未統一見解，二未內部調查，相關檢察上級自屬並未善盡正當程序即批准上訴，不啻欲將整個司法體系捲入不堪設想的政治漩渦。
這些拒問檢察體制自身責任、亦拒經內部正當程序即提起上訴者，顯然是欲將上訴操作成一場政治豪賭。此時距總統大選尚有七個月，距總統就職亦有九個月；北檢於第一時間，在「後備理由」的倉卒狀態下火速上訴，用心即在爭取時間，欲強逼二審陷於「判有罪／判無罪」及「選前判決／選後判決」的憲政困境中。亦即，馬案二審已成了一場政治豪賭。
其實，本案經過輿論激盪，及一審推敲，已是脈絡分明；因而，二審應當很快就能形成「有罪／無罪」的心證，難處是在「選前判／選後判」。例如，若二審的心證是「無罪」，卻延至「選後判」，將不利馬英九；倘「有罪」，亦延至「選後判」，則不利謝長廷。何況，馬若在完成候選登記後被判有罪，將喪失候選資格；若當選，卻在選後至就職前判有罪，亦將喪失當選資格。事態至此，無論就「判有罪／判無罪」及「選前判／選後判」作出何種排列組合，皆將形成大選爭議及政治風潮。
賭輸加碼，這是檢察體系此刻的心態。檢察體系自棄釐清「特別費屬性不明確」的專業責任，又迴避對檢察官筆錄造假進行風紀調查，竟然逕自一腳就將整個司法體系與整個國家踢進一場政治賭博。這一小撮檢察人員，只是賭他們個人的法律見解與政治評價，但整個司法正義及憲政安全，卻也已被他們逼上了賭桌，淪為社會共業的賭注。
上訴者的眼中，這場豪賭的贏面似在檢察體系。在二審判決的各種排列組合中，唯有「無罪／選前判」一種模式，對被告馬英九有利；其餘，「有罪／選前判」、「無罪／選後判」，及「有罪／選後至就職前判」等排列組合，皆不利馬英九。也就是說，上訴者即使不能在司法上立即擊垮馬英九（如「有罪／選前判」），亦可能在政治上拖垮馬英九（如「無罪／選後判」等）。在上訴者眼中，上訴不只是訴訟動作，更是政治鬥爭；逼二審合議庭捲入總統大選的風暴，亦逼馬英九陷於各種排列組合的二審政治僵局之中。
如果檢方先統一見解，善盡了專業責任；及先對侯寬仁作過內部調查，善盡了風紀管制；則檢方此時上訴，即是正大光明的舉措；但一未統一見解，二未內部調查，卻蠻橫粗暴地上訴，這就不啻是幫派報仇的行徑，亦即是不惜掀起政治鬥爭來為自己遮醜護短。檢察當局為了一個「屬性不明確」的特別費，為了一個極具爭議性的侯寬仁，竟將攸關整個國家安危的總統大選及憲政正義率爾推上了政治賭桌，這又豈僅是居心叵測而已？
在這張賭桌的兩頭，一頭是自始就將馬案政治化的侯寬仁，及淪為政治打手的檢察上級；另一頭則是司法正義及總統大選所涉憲政公義。豪賭吧，下注吧，司法既能與陳水扁及吳淑珍對賭，則被迫與侯寬仁及陳聰明對賭亦非意外！
Monday, August 20, 2007
If You can't control Corruption, How can You control Flooding?
If You can't control Corruption, How can You control Flooding?
United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 20, 2007
Typhoon Sepat has arrived. Fortunately its intensity has diminished. Also, strict measures in various locales have reduced the damage caused by the disaster. But the southern and central regions of the island have suffered repeated flood and wind damage. Many villages and towns have been devastated. Some victims say their world has been shattered. For Taiwan, typhoons are unavoidable natural disasters. But for certain regions, year after year of flooding is the result of man made disasters. When we address the problem of flooding, the important point is not flood control technology. To address the problem at its source, we must address the human factors.
This summer's floods in the southern and central regions were serious. Even before Typhoon Sepat struck, these regions had already become "Waterworld." From Yunlin and Chiayi, to Kaohsiung and Pingtung, no community escaped disaster. Even Kaohsiung City's Ai River overflowed. Flooding in Meinung was the worst in 50 years. Inhabitants said they had developed "flood phobia." One could say that the disaster was caused by torrential rains. But the amount of rainfall failed to break any records. Put simply, the drainage system in many places was inadequate, and essential flood control measures were not implemented. This is why many experts have come right out and declared that the disaster was man made, not natural.
President Chen Shui-bian, Prime Minister Chang Chun-hsiung, and other senior central government officials visited these rural disaster sites recently, promising to underwrite flood control measures. But the key to flood control isn't money. Last year the legislature passed the "Statute Governing Flood Management," with a budget of 1.16 billion NT. Every one of the counties and municipalities flooded this year received generous flood control funding. Yunlin County even declared 2007 its official "Flood Control Year." Obviously their flood control measures failed. So where did their flood control funds go?
Every dollar of the vast sums earmarked for flood control was hard-earned taxpayer money. Every step of the flood control process, from legislation to implementation, was riddled with selfish plunder by corrupt politicians. The Democratic Progressive Party's intitial proposal for its "Eight Year, 80 Billion" Flood Control budget was, as its name suggests, 80 billion. Last January, on the final day of the Legislative Yuan's extraordinary session, ruling and opposition party lawmakers upped the amount to over 110 billion NT. To people who had pinned their hopes on flood control, this was the Legislative Yuan's darkest day. Because these sorts of sweeheart deals, hammered out in smoke-filled rooms, were exactly what they were worried about. The lessons of history are right under our noses. Previous flood control budgets were often chopped up into scores of contracts, each under 1 million Yuan. This allowed them to get them around legal requirements mandating open bidding, and created a paradise for political patronage. As this paper noted at the time, how can one control river flooding by doling out contracts to scores of contractors, each with budget of 1 million NT ($30,000 US)?
The 30 billion NT budget for the first phase of this eight year flood control project was passed last July. The total sum is to be be raised by means of a bond issue. Local government flood control plans included the construction of pavilions, arched bridges, the renovation of nearby temples and their surroundings, the development of tourism, the clean up of garbage, and the beautification of farmlands. Much of their planning has nothing to do with flood control. Obviously no one is focused on flood control. Everyone is worried about getting a piece of the pie.
But the really big "sharks" within the construction industry only surfaced this month, when public prosecutors cast their dragnet. Chang Tzu-hou and Hou Ho-hsiung of the Ministry of Economic Affairs have been implicated in these "Eight year, 80 billion" flood control projects. In accordance with embezzlement laws they have been detained by public prosecutors. According to prosecutors, Hou Ho-hsiung abused his authority to grant sweetheart deals. First he demanded that the authorities award small 1 million NT ($30,000 US) contracts to scores of contractors. He then helped designated contractors make sweetheart deals. The provincial water supply company and the River Administration Bureau have been implicated in these cases. A year and half ago this newspaper asked how can one control flooding by doling out contracts to scores of contractors, each with budget of 1 million NT ($30,000 US)? Now, between this year's unusually serious floods in southern and central Taiwan and Hou Ho-hsiung's indictment, we have our answer.
The wind and rain arrived on August 18, in the early hours of the morning. Many victims were still up their necks in flood water at the time. Su Tseng-chang had just returned from the US. Frank Hsieh had just gone to the airport to greet him. Their meeting was for all intents and purposes the first political rally held by the Hsieh/Su ticket. Frank Hsieh took pains to stress that Su Tseng-chang's return to Taiwan was by no means for the sake of the election. It was to participate in collective prayer "for the people." It was to show that candidates of the Democratic Progressive Party "feel your pain." But ordinary people feeling the pain inflicted by the flood felt Hou Ho-hsiung and his ilk were to blame. They couldn't have failed to notice that Hou Ho-hsiung is Frank Hsieh's trusted subordinate. Hou was Hsieh's deputy mayor in Kaohsiung, and Hsieh recommended Hou for the position of Minister of Financial Affairs. Taiwan's frequent floods are caused by official corruption related to flood control projects. Su Tseng-chang and Frank Hsieh are both former prime ministers. The corruption occurred on their watch. Can they really escape responsibility for these man made disasters? Aren't high minded expressions of concern and pious participation in prayer activities, after the fact, more than a little ironic?
The typhoon season has provided the people with a way out. First one must address the problem of a political culture dominated by greed and corruption. Only then can one address the problem of flooding and govern the nation.
颱風省思：不治貪腐，如何治水？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.20 06:05 am
颱風聖帕來襲，所幸強度略為減弱，加上各地嚴密的防颱措施，使災情儘可能地降低。不過，中南部地區歷經接二連三的水患及風災，許多鄉鎮飽受蹂躪，有人甚至以「國在山河破」形容其慘狀。台灣受到颱風侵襲，乃難以避免之天災；但部分地區連年來遇水成災，卻多半由於人禍所致。颱風季節談治水問題，重點不只在工程技術層面；正本清源，必須探究其中的人謀不臧。
今夏的中南部地區水患嚴重，早在聖帕來襲之前即已淹成水鄉澤國，從雲嘉到高屏，無一倖免。高雄市連愛河都氾濫，美濃的淹水程度則稱五十年來最嚴重，居民紛紛說「淹怕了」。雖說因豪雨而成災，卻又並未見降雨量創紀錄；簡單地說，還是很多地方的排水系統不良，及河川疏濬工程該做而沒做所致。這就是很多專家直指的水災「人禍」成因。
總統陳水扁、行政院長張俊雄等中央高官，近日紛紛下鄉訪視災情，並承諾負擔治水經費等等。不過，治水的關鍵問題不在沒錢。「水患治理特別條例」去年才由立法院通過，規模高達一千一百六十億元，今年大淹水的這些地方縣市，沒有一個不曾分到相當的治水經費。雲林縣甚且將今年二○○七年標舉為「治水元年」。但顯然，治水尚未成功，大筆的治水經費用到哪裡去了？
巨額的治水特別預算，沒有一塊錢不是人民的血汗錢；但從編製到執行過程，沒有一個環節不見充滿了政客的掠奪私心。去年一月，立法院臨時會的最後一天，朝野立委聯手將民進黨最初提出的「八年八百億」治水預算加碼到一千一百多億元。在人民對治水期盼殷切之下，輿論卻稱這是立法院「最黑暗的一天」，因為擔心就此開啟治水工程「切段發包，密室分贓」的效果。殷鑑不遠，早先的治水預算往往被切割成工程金額在一百萬元以下，以規避公開招標，結果成了綁樁和圖利的天堂。「一條河被切割成無數個百萬元以下的工程，分別發包出去，如何達成治水效果？」本報當時的新聞稿中這樣追問。
這筆八年治水經費當中的第一期三百多億元預算，在去年七月通過，全數以舉債方式支應。而當時各地方政府提報的治水方案，已見建造涼亭拱橋、整治廟宇周邊環境、配合發展觀光、農場垃圾場美化工程等與治水全然無關的規畫設計；顯然覬覦經費大餅、等待分食者已眾。
不過，真正大尾的所謂「工程鯊魚」，直到本月份才在檢調追查下現身。經濟部常次侯和雄涉嫌介入這八年千億的多筆治水工程，依貪汙治罪條例遭檢方聲押。根據檢方的說明，侯和雄圖利的手段乃利用職權，先是要求所屬單位將發包工程切割在百萬元以下，再協助特定廠商綁標，涉及弊案包括省自來水公司及河川局等多項計畫。本報一年半前即已追問「一條河被切割成無數個百萬元以下的工程，分別發包出去，如何達成治水效果？」的問題，在今年異常嚴重的中南部水患及侯和雄涉嫌貪汙的事實中，得到了答案！
風雨交加的八月十八日清晨，很多水患地區民眾仍身陷「水深火熱」的災情之時，蘇貞昌自美返台，謝長廷親往機場迎接，等於是謝蘇配的第一場造勢。謝長廷並特意強調，蘇貞昌返台並非專為選舉，還要參加很多（為民）祈福活動；以凸顯民進黨候選人關懷民間疾苦之意。但舉凡受水患之苦而認為應咎責於侯和雄等人的老百姓，不會不注意到，侯和雄乃謝長廷親信，從高雄市副市長而後受謝拔擢為經濟部常次的事實。對於台灣地區出於人禍的頻繁水患，前後任行政院長並任用貪官治水的蘇、謝等人豈能無責？事後再高調表示關切災情，積極參與祈福活動，難道不是更顯諷刺？
颱風季節為民祝禱：先治貪腐分贓的政治風氣，才能治水治國。
United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 20, 2007
Typhoon Sepat has arrived. Fortunately its intensity has diminished. Also, strict measures in various locales have reduced the damage caused by the disaster. But the southern and central regions of the island have suffered repeated flood and wind damage. Many villages and towns have been devastated. Some victims say their world has been shattered. For Taiwan, typhoons are unavoidable natural disasters. But for certain regions, year after year of flooding is the result of man made disasters. When we address the problem of flooding, the important point is not flood control technology. To address the problem at its source, we must address the human factors.
This summer's floods in the southern and central regions were serious. Even before Typhoon Sepat struck, these regions had already become "Waterworld." From Yunlin and Chiayi, to Kaohsiung and Pingtung, no community escaped disaster. Even Kaohsiung City's Ai River overflowed. Flooding in Meinung was the worst in 50 years. Inhabitants said they had developed "flood phobia." One could say that the disaster was caused by torrential rains. But the amount of rainfall failed to break any records. Put simply, the drainage system in many places was inadequate, and essential flood control measures were not implemented. This is why many experts have come right out and declared that the disaster was man made, not natural.
President Chen Shui-bian, Prime Minister Chang Chun-hsiung, and other senior central government officials visited these rural disaster sites recently, promising to underwrite flood control measures. But the key to flood control isn't money. Last year the legislature passed the "Statute Governing Flood Management," with a budget of 1.16 billion NT. Every one of the counties and municipalities flooded this year received generous flood control funding. Yunlin County even declared 2007 its official "Flood Control Year." Obviously their flood control measures failed. So where did their flood control funds go?
Every dollar of the vast sums earmarked for flood control was hard-earned taxpayer money. Every step of the flood control process, from legislation to implementation, was riddled with selfish plunder by corrupt politicians. The Democratic Progressive Party's intitial proposal for its "Eight Year, 80 Billion" Flood Control budget was, as its name suggests, 80 billion. Last January, on the final day of the Legislative Yuan's extraordinary session, ruling and opposition party lawmakers upped the amount to over 110 billion NT. To people who had pinned their hopes on flood control, this was the Legislative Yuan's darkest day. Because these sorts of sweeheart deals, hammered out in smoke-filled rooms, were exactly what they were worried about. The lessons of history are right under our noses. Previous flood control budgets were often chopped up into scores of contracts, each under 1 million Yuan. This allowed them to get them around legal requirements mandating open bidding, and created a paradise for political patronage. As this paper noted at the time, how can one control river flooding by doling out contracts to scores of contractors, each with budget of 1 million NT ($30,000 US)?
The 30 billion NT budget for the first phase of this eight year flood control project was passed last July. The total sum is to be be raised by means of a bond issue. Local government flood control plans included the construction of pavilions, arched bridges, the renovation of nearby temples and their surroundings, the development of tourism, the clean up of garbage, and the beautification of farmlands. Much of their planning has nothing to do with flood control. Obviously no one is focused on flood control. Everyone is worried about getting a piece of the pie.
But the really big "sharks" within the construction industry only surfaced this month, when public prosecutors cast their dragnet. Chang Tzu-hou and Hou Ho-hsiung of the Ministry of Economic Affairs have been implicated in these "Eight year, 80 billion" flood control projects. In accordance with embezzlement laws they have been detained by public prosecutors. According to prosecutors, Hou Ho-hsiung abused his authority to grant sweetheart deals. First he demanded that the authorities award small 1 million NT ($30,000 US) contracts to scores of contractors. He then helped designated contractors make sweetheart deals. The provincial water supply company and the River Administration Bureau have been implicated in these cases. A year and half ago this newspaper asked how can one control flooding by doling out contracts to scores of contractors, each with budget of 1 million NT ($30,000 US)? Now, between this year's unusually serious floods in southern and central Taiwan and Hou Ho-hsiung's indictment, we have our answer.
The wind and rain arrived on August 18, in the early hours of the morning. Many victims were still up their necks in flood water at the time. Su Tseng-chang had just returned from the US. Frank Hsieh had just gone to the airport to greet him. Their meeting was for all intents and purposes the first political rally held by the Hsieh/Su ticket. Frank Hsieh took pains to stress that Su Tseng-chang's return to Taiwan was by no means for the sake of the election. It was to participate in collective prayer "for the people." It was to show that candidates of the Democratic Progressive Party "feel your pain." But ordinary people feeling the pain inflicted by the flood felt Hou Ho-hsiung and his ilk were to blame. They couldn't have failed to notice that Hou Ho-hsiung is Frank Hsieh's trusted subordinate. Hou was Hsieh's deputy mayor in Kaohsiung, and Hsieh recommended Hou for the position of Minister of Financial Affairs. Taiwan's frequent floods are caused by official corruption related to flood control projects. Su Tseng-chang and Frank Hsieh are both former prime ministers. The corruption occurred on their watch. Can they really escape responsibility for these man made disasters? Aren't high minded expressions of concern and pious participation in prayer activities, after the fact, more than a little ironic?
The typhoon season has provided the people with a way out. First one must address the problem of a political culture dominated by greed and corruption. Only then can one address the problem of flooding and govern the nation.
颱風省思：不治貪腐，如何治水？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.20 06:05 am
颱風聖帕來襲，所幸強度略為減弱，加上各地嚴密的防颱措施，使災情儘可能地降低。不過，中南部地區歷經接二連三的水患及風災，許多鄉鎮飽受蹂躪，有人甚至以「國在山河破」形容其慘狀。台灣受到颱風侵襲，乃難以避免之天災；但部分地區連年來遇水成災，卻多半由於人禍所致。颱風季節談治水問題，重點不只在工程技術層面；正本清源，必須探究其中的人謀不臧。
今夏的中南部地區水患嚴重，早在聖帕來襲之前即已淹成水鄉澤國，從雲嘉到高屏，無一倖免。高雄市連愛河都氾濫，美濃的淹水程度則稱五十年來最嚴重，居民紛紛說「淹怕了」。雖說因豪雨而成災，卻又並未見降雨量創紀錄；簡單地說，還是很多地方的排水系統不良，及河川疏濬工程該做而沒做所致。這就是很多專家直指的水災「人禍」成因。
總統陳水扁、行政院長張俊雄等中央高官，近日紛紛下鄉訪視災情，並承諾負擔治水經費等等。不過，治水的關鍵問題不在沒錢。「水患治理特別條例」去年才由立法院通過，規模高達一千一百六十億元，今年大淹水的這些地方縣市，沒有一個不曾分到相當的治水經費。雲林縣甚且將今年二○○七年標舉為「治水元年」。但顯然，治水尚未成功，大筆的治水經費用到哪裡去了？
巨額的治水特別預算，沒有一塊錢不是人民的血汗錢；但從編製到執行過程，沒有一個環節不見充滿了政客的掠奪私心。去年一月，立法院臨時會的最後一天，朝野立委聯手將民進黨最初提出的「八年八百億」治水預算加碼到一千一百多億元。在人民對治水期盼殷切之下，輿論卻稱這是立法院「最黑暗的一天」，因為擔心就此開啟治水工程「切段發包，密室分贓」的效果。殷鑑不遠，早先的治水預算往往被切割成工程金額在一百萬元以下，以規避公開招標，結果成了綁樁和圖利的天堂。「一條河被切割成無數個百萬元以下的工程，分別發包出去，如何達成治水效果？」本報當時的新聞稿中這樣追問。
這筆八年治水經費當中的第一期三百多億元預算，在去年七月通過，全數以舉債方式支應。而當時各地方政府提報的治水方案，已見建造涼亭拱橋、整治廟宇周邊環境、配合發展觀光、農場垃圾場美化工程等與治水全然無關的規畫設計；顯然覬覦經費大餅、等待分食者已眾。
不過，真正大尾的所謂「工程鯊魚」，直到本月份才在檢調追查下現身。經濟部常次侯和雄涉嫌介入這八年千億的多筆治水工程，依貪汙治罪條例遭檢方聲押。根據檢方的說明，侯和雄圖利的手段乃利用職權，先是要求所屬單位將發包工程切割在百萬元以下，再協助特定廠商綁標，涉及弊案包括省自來水公司及河川局等多項計畫。本報一年半前即已追問「一條河被切割成無數個百萬元以下的工程，分別發包出去，如何達成治水效果？」的問題，在今年異常嚴重的中南部水患及侯和雄涉嫌貪汙的事實中，得到了答案！
風雨交加的八月十八日清晨，很多水患地區民眾仍身陷「水深火熱」的災情之時，蘇貞昌自美返台，謝長廷親往機場迎接，等於是謝蘇配的第一場造勢。謝長廷並特意強調，蘇貞昌返台並非專為選舉，還要參加很多（為民）祈福活動；以凸顯民進黨候選人關懷民間疾苦之意。但舉凡受水患之苦而認為應咎責於侯和雄等人的老百姓，不會不注意到，侯和雄乃謝長廷親信，從高雄市副市長而後受謝拔擢為經濟部常次的事實。對於台灣地區出於人禍的頻繁水患，前後任行政院長並任用貪官治水的蘇、謝等人豈能無責？事後再高調表示關切災情，積極參與祈福活動，難道不是更顯諷刺？
颱風季節為民祝禱：先治貪腐分贓的政治風氣，才能治水治國。
Thursday, August 16, 2007
Let the Discretionary Fund Battle End Here
Let the Discretionary Fund Battle End Here
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 16, 2007
Ma Ying-jeou has been found not guilty in the first instance of the Discretionary Fund case. Can we call a halt to this pointless confrontation and say "This ends here"? Judging by the reaction from the prosecutor, the Green camp, and above all the Hsieh camp, apparently not. Apparently this was merely the first round. Far more pointless confrontation lies ahead of us.
If the prosecutor appeals the verdict and demands a retrial in the High Court, the Republic of China's court of second instance, the real flash point will be its verdict early next year. In which case Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang truly can afford to be happy for only one day. Because this amounts to advance notification that from the end of this year until the election, the only issue is going to be the Ma Ying-jeou Discretionary Fund issue. The legislative election will revolve endlessly around this issue. So will the presidential election. The term "pointless confrontation" will be inadequate to describe Taiwan's political scene.
To flex their political muscles or even to save face, the prosecutors have abundant motive for demanding an appeal. Especially public prosecutor Hou Kuan-jen, who must confront the barrage of accusations within the court's written judgment. He has reacted, calling it "unacceptable" and "inconsiderate." If he fails to appeal it might be perceived as an admission of defeat. Unfortunately if Hou Kuan-jen insists on filing an appeal, the resulting dispute is going to be far more than a "pointless confrontation." Hou Kuan-jen may not give a damn about outside objections to the human rights violations he committed during his prosecution of the case. But he has no choice but to consider the potential repercussions of his obstinate demand for a retrial.
Between Ma Ying-jeou's indictment and the court of first instance's written judgment, a truth has emerged. Hou Kuan-jen's legal opinion on the Discretionary Fund Case differs from the Ministry of Justice's, It differs from fellow public prosecutor Eric Chen's, It differs from Tainan Public Prosecutor Chen Ming-chin's. It differs from presiding judge Tsai Shou-hsun's. Those who differ with Hou Kuan-jen differ from each other only in minor details. In short, Hou Kuan-jen is alone in his opinion. But so far the Ministry of Justice and the High Court Prosecutor's Office have made no effort to reach a consensus on the legal status of the Discretionary Fund. In other words, Hou Kuan-jen is clinging to his idiosyncratic opinion in the hope that a High Court judge will share his viewpoint. If this happens, local prosecutors in the north and south will hold conflicting opinions. High Court prosecutors will hold conflicting opinions. Judges will hold conflicting opinions. Different officials using Discretionary Funds in the same manner could receive diametrically opposite indictments from different prosecutors, and even diametrically opposite written judgments from different judges. If this doesn't constitute chaos, what does? If the ROC judicial system permits this scenario to materialize, then the curses uttered by Hsieh camp legislator Wang Shih-chien, Hsieh Hsing-ni, and Lin Kuo-ching will come true.
The public has seen the relish with which Hou Kuan-jen prosecuted the Ma Ying-jeou Discretionary Fund Case. It has seen his obvious reluctance to prosecute the Green Princes of the DPP. The court of first instance has handed down a verdict in the Ma Ying-jeou Discretionary Fund case. Hou Kuan-jen has declared that it is inapplicable to the Green Princes of the DPP. He has declared that "the case is already far along, and involved parties will be subpoenaed in the near future." In other words, if the not guilty verdict in the Ma Ying-jeou Discretionary Fund case doesn't let the Four Green Princes of the DPP off the hook, the general public will most assuredly fix on two points. Point One: Will Hou Kuan-jen prosecute Ma Ying-jeou full force in the second instance? Will he attempt to bring the prosecution of the Four Green Princes of the DPP up to speed? How will he explain himself if the gap between his handling of the Four Green Princes of the DPP and his handling of Ma Ying-jeou grows ever wider? Point Two: Will he use the same reasoning while prosecuting the Four Green Princes of the DPP? Will he prosecute the Four Green Princes of the DPP over the question of receipts? Will he prosecute them with the same eagerness he prosecuted Ma Ying-jeou? Will he prosecute them for embezzlement, abuse of authority, and betray of public trust? Only Hou Kuan-jen knows.
The Green camp naturally wants to appeal Ma Ying-jeou's Discretionary Fund case. Theoretically an appeal will hobble Ma Ying-jeou during next year's election, the way it has over the past year. If only Ma Ying-jeou could be found guilty just before the election, they could win without a fight. Unfortunately this is wishful thinking. What if the second verdict finds Ma Ying-jeou innocent, just as before? Are they going to curse the judiciary again? If the Green Princes of the DPP are indicted for embezzlement or betrayal of public trust, won't all the mud the Green camp has flung at Ma Ying-jeou wind up on the Green Princes of the DPP? They will find out soon enough.
Naturally Ma Ying-jeou wants this pointless confrontation to end. No defendant found not guilty in his first trial wants a retrial. But even supposing Ma's characterization of the proceedings as "pointless confrontation" is overstated, appealing the Discretionary Fund case will only land everyone in the same hot water. If that happens, no one will be able to gloss over the problem with euphemisms. Therefore, a word of warning to the public prosecutors. The issue is not about semantics, but real world consequences. Let the Discretionary Fund battle end here.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.08.16
是該讓特別費的紛擾「到此為止」了
中時社論
馬英九特別費案一審的無罪宣判，真的能讓所有的「虛耗」就這麼「到此為止」嗎？看看檢方的即時反應，再看看綠營，特別是謝系人馬的即時反應，用常識都可以判斷，這場「虛耗」或許才算剛結束第一回合，更慘烈的「虛耗」恐怕還在後頭呢！
如果檢方上訴二審勢在必行，按照某些論者所研判的時間表，明年初的二審判決才是真正決戰點，那麼馬英九與國民黨確實只須高興一天就夠了，因為那樣等於預告，從今年底到明年初的選舉，還是只剩下「馬英九特別費案」一個議題，立委選舉將繞著它爭吵不休，總統選舉也只根據它做主軸，屆時台灣政壇的景況，何只是「虛耗」兩字所能形容？
沒錯，為了職權行使需要，甚至就算為討回面子，檢方都有理由會選擇上訴二審，特別是侯寬仁檢察官面對判決書中對他的所有指責，明顯做出「不能接受」的反應，甚至直指其「不夠厚道」，若是就此放棄上訴豈不形同認輸？問題在於，侯寬仁若是執意上訴二審，後續所可能引發的爭議，恐怕比「虛耗」還嚴重，侯寬仁可以不理會外界對他在偵辦過程中，種種違反人權作為的質疑，但他卻不能不顧及他執意挺進二審後的其它負面效應。
從檢方對馬英九特別費案的起訴書到法官的一審判決書，不難得出一個清楚的結論：侯寬仁對首長特別費的見解，不僅與法務部研究的結論不同，與他在特偵組同僚陳瑞仁檢察官的見解不同，也與南檢陳明進檢察官的見解不同，如今再加上與地院承審法官蔡守訓的見解也不同，而與侯寬仁不同的所有見解大致都「大同小異」，幾乎只有侯一人在「獨排眾議」。而到現在為止，法務部與高檢署都無意要「統一見解」。換言之，如果要讓侯寬仁帶著他對特別費的「獨到見解」闖進二審，無異是期待能在高院的二審中，恰好碰上一位欣賞侯寬仁獨到見解的法官，如果這個預期真能實現，那就等於說法界對首長特別費的見解，不僅是南北檢不同調、院檢不同調、法院系統也出現不同調，同樣都是首長特別費案，既可以出現立論南轅北轍的兩份起訴書，也可以出現各自表述的兩份判決書，這不是天下大亂嗎？台灣司法若是容許這般場景出現，那麼謝系立委王世堅、謝欣霓與林國慶等人的咀咒，就全部都成真了。
其次，在過去一年中，大家都目睹了侯寬仁檢察官在偵辦馬英九特別費案上所展現的「效率」，也親歷了他對偵辦其它綠天王特別費進度上的「緩慢」。如今馬英九特別費案的一審判決結果出爐了，侯寬仁明白表示其不適用於其它綠天王，還表示「偵辦已成熟，近期將陸續傳喚當事人到案說明」；換言之，馬英九特別費案的判決結果，如果並未能讓綠營四天王的特別費案解套，那麼接下來社會大眾肯定會盯緊兩個焦點：一個焦點是，侯寬仁未來究竟是針對馬英九的二審上全力「拚進度」，還是在偵辦四位綠天王上趕緊「補進度」？如果兩者的進度落差越來越大，他給的說法會是什麼？第二個焦點是，他是否也會用他對特別費一貫的「獨到見解」，細追四大天王「以領據核銷特別費流向」的部分？甚至以與馬英九一樣的偵辦效率，不惜以貪汙、侵占、背信等連續犯來起訴綠營四天王？這個問題的答案，恐怕也只有侯寬仁一個人能回答。
綠營上下目前的主流見解，當然都是力主要將馬英九的特別費案上訴到二審。理論上這好像可以像過去一年一樣，讓特別費案繼續如絆馬索般將馬英九套到明年大選前，如果能剛好在大選前夕讓馬英九被判有罪，那等於就是不戰而勝了！問題在於這僅只是最樂觀的預期，如果二審判決馬英九依舊是無罪呢？再凶狠的咀咒一次司法嗎？如果任何一位綠天王也被依貪汙或背信起訴，綠營當初所有對馬英九的語言糟蹋，是否可以整套加以適用在綠天王身上？這個問題可能馬上就得面臨了。
馬英九盼望能將一切虛耗能「到此為止」，當然有他個人自私的考量，誰會願意打贏了一審還要進入二審？問題是就算撇開「虛耗」這種高調不論，真的將特別費案的戰線拉到二審，只會讓各方都全面陷入困局，屆時可不是一句「歷史共業」就能解套了。因而寄語特偵組的檢察官們，不為「虛耗」，就只為實際考量，能不能就讓特別費的紛擾「到此為止」吧！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 16, 2007
Ma Ying-jeou has been found not guilty in the first instance of the Discretionary Fund case. Can we call a halt to this pointless confrontation and say "This ends here"? Judging by the reaction from the prosecutor, the Green camp, and above all the Hsieh camp, apparently not. Apparently this was merely the first round. Far more pointless confrontation lies ahead of us.
If the prosecutor appeals the verdict and demands a retrial in the High Court, the Republic of China's court of second instance, the real flash point will be its verdict early next year. In which case Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang truly can afford to be happy for only one day. Because this amounts to advance notification that from the end of this year until the election, the only issue is going to be the Ma Ying-jeou Discretionary Fund issue. The legislative election will revolve endlessly around this issue. So will the presidential election. The term "pointless confrontation" will be inadequate to describe Taiwan's political scene.
To flex their political muscles or even to save face, the prosecutors have abundant motive for demanding an appeal. Especially public prosecutor Hou Kuan-jen, who must confront the barrage of accusations within the court's written judgment. He has reacted, calling it "unacceptable" and "inconsiderate." If he fails to appeal it might be perceived as an admission of defeat. Unfortunately if Hou Kuan-jen insists on filing an appeal, the resulting dispute is going to be far more than a "pointless confrontation." Hou Kuan-jen may not give a damn about outside objections to the human rights violations he committed during his prosecution of the case. But he has no choice but to consider the potential repercussions of his obstinate demand for a retrial.
Between Ma Ying-jeou's indictment and the court of first instance's written judgment, a truth has emerged. Hou Kuan-jen's legal opinion on the Discretionary Fund Case differs from the Ministry of Justice's, It differs from fellow public prosecutor Eric Chen's, It differs from Tainan Public Prosecutor Chen Ming-chin's. It differs from presiding judge Tsai Shou-hsun's. Those who differ with Hou Kuan-jen differ from each other only in minor details. In short, Hou Kuan-jen is alone in his opinion. But so far the Ministry of Justice and the High Court Prosecutor's Office have made no effort to reach a consensus on the legal status of the Discretionary Fund. In other words, Hou Kuan-jen is clinging to his idiosyncratic opinion in the hope that a High Court judge will share his viewpoint. If this happens, local prosecutors in the north and south will hold conflicting opinions. High Court prosecutors will hold conflicting opinions. Judges will hold conflicting opinions. Different officials using Discretionary Funds in the same manner could receive diametrically opposite indictments from different prosecutors, and even diametrically opposite written judgments from different judges. If this doesn't constitute chaos, what does? If the ROC judicial system permits this scenario to materialize, then the curses uttered by Hsieh camp legislator Wang Shih-chien, Hsieh Hsing-ni, and Lin Kuo-ching will come true.
The public has seen the relish with which Hou Kuan-jen prosecuted the Ma Ying-jeou Discretionary Fund Case. It has seen his obvious reluctance to prosecute the Green Princes of the DPP. The court of first instance has handed down a verdict in the Ma Ying-jeou Discretionary Fund case. Hou Kuan-jen has declared that it is inapplicable to the Green Princes of the DPP. He has declared that "the case is already far along, and involved parties will be subpoenaed in the near future." In other words, if the not guilty verdict in the Ma Ying-jeou Discretionary Fund case doesn't let the Four Green Princes of the DPP off the hook, the general public will most assuredly fix on two points. Point One: Will Hou Kuan-jen prosecute Ma Ying-jeou full force in the second instance? Will he attempt to bring the prosecution of the Four Green Princes of the DPP up to speed? How will he explain himself if the gap between his handling of the Four Green Princes of the DPP and his handling of Ma Ying-jeou grows ever wider? Point Two: Will he use the same reasoning while prosecuting the Four Green Princes of the DPP? Will he prosecute the Four Green Princes of the DPP over the question of receipts? Will he prosecute them with the same eagerness he prosecuted Ma Ying-jeou? Will he prosecute them for embezzlement, abuse of authority, and betray of public trust? Only Hou Kuan-jen knows.
The Green camp naturally wants to appeal Ma Ying-jeou's Discretionary Fund case. Theoretically an appeal will hobble Ma Ying-jeou during next year's election, the way it has over the past year. If only Ma Ying-jeou could be found guilty just before the election, they could win without a fight. Unfortunately this is wishful thinking. What if the second verdict finds Ma Ying-jeou innocent, just as before? Are they going to curse the judiciary again? If the Green Princes of the DPP are indicted for embezzlement or betrayal of public trust, won't all the mud the Green camp has flung at Ma Ying-jeou wind up on the Green Princes of the DPP? They will find out soon enough.
Naturally Ma Ying-jeou wants this pointless confrontation to end. No defendant found not guilty in his first trial wants a retrial. But even supposing Ma's characterization of the proceedings as "pointless confrontation" is overstated, appealing the Discretionary Fund case will only land everyone in the same hot water. If that happens, no one will be able to gloss over the problem with euphemisms. Therefore, a word of warning to the public prosecutors. The issue is not about semantics, but real world consequences. Let the Discretionary Fund battle end here.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.08.16
是該讓特別費的紛擾「到此為止」了
中時社論
馬英九特別費案一審的無罪宣判，真的能讓所有的「虛耗」就這麼「到此為止」嗎？看看檢方的即時反應，再看看綠營，特別是謝系人馬的即時反應，用常識都可以判斷，這場「虛耗」或許才算剛結束第一回合，更慘烈的「虛耗」恐怕還在後頭呢！
如果檢方上訴二審勢在必行，按照某些論者所研判的時間表，明年初的二審判決才是真正決戰點，那麼馬英九與國民黨確實只須高興一天就夠了，因為那樣等於預告，從今年底到明年初的選舉，還是只剩下「馬英九特別費案」一個議題，立委選舉將繞著它爭吵不休，總統選舉也只根據它做主軸，屆時台灣政壇的景況，何只是「虛耗」兩字所能形容？
沒錯，為了職權行使需要，甚至就算為討回面子，檢方都有理由會選擇上訴二審，特別是侯寬仁檢察官面對判決書中對他的所有指責，明顯做出「不能接受」的反應，甚至直指其「不夠厚道」，若是就此放棄上訴豈不形同認輸？問題在於，侯寬仁若是執意上訴二審，後續所可能引發的爭議，恐怕比「虛耗」還嚴重，侯寬仁可以不理會外界對他在偵辦過程中，種種違反人權作為的質疑，但他卻不能不顧及他執意挺進二審後的其它負面效應。
從檢方對馬英九特別費案的起訴書到法官的一審判決書，不難得出一個清楚的結論：侯寬仁對首長特別費的見解，不僅與法務部研究的結論不同，與他在特偵組同僚陳瑞仁檢察官的見解不同，也與南檢陳明進檢察官的見解不同，如今再加上與地院承審法官蔡守訓的見解也不同，而與侯寬仁不同的所有見解大致都「大同小異」，幾乎只有侯一人在「獨排眾議」。而到現在為止，法務部與高檢署都無意要「統一見解」。換言之，如果要讓侯寬仁帶著他對特別費的「獨到見解」闖進二審，無異是期待能在高院的二審中，恰好碰上一位欣賞侯寬仁獨到見解的法官，如果這個預期真能實現，那就等於說法界對首長特別費的見解，不僅是南北檢不同調、院檢不同調、法院系統也出現不同調，同樣都是首長特別費案，既可以出現立論南轅北轍的兩份起訴書，也可以出現各自表述的兩份判決書，這不是天下大亂嗎？台灣司法若是容許這般場景出現，那麼謝系立委王世堅、謝欣霓與林國慶等人的咀咒，就全部都成真了。
其次，在過去一年中，大家都目睹了侯寬仁檢察官在偵辦馬英九特別費案上所展現的「效率」，也親歷了他對偵辦其它綠天王特別費進度上的「緩慢」。如今馬英九特別費案的一審判決結果出爐了，侯寬仁明白表示其不適用於其它綠天王，還表示「偵辦已成熟，近期將陸續傳喚當事人到案說明」；換言之，馬英九特別費案的判決結果，如果並未能讓綠營四天王的特別費案解套，那麼接下來社會大眾肯定會盯緊兩個焦點：一個焦點是，侯寬仁未來究竟是針對馬英九的二審上全力「拚進度」，還是在偵辦四位綠天王上趕緊「補進度」？如果兩者的進度落差越來越大，他給的說法會是什麼？第二個焦點是，他是否也會用他對特別費一貫的「獨到見解」，細追四大天王「以領據核銷特別費流向」的部分？甚至以與馬英九一樣的偵辦效率，不惜以貪汙、侵占、背信等連續犯來起訴綠營四天王？這個問題的答案，恐怕也只有侯寬仁一個人能回答。
綠營上下目前的主流見解，當然都是力主要將馬英九的特別費案上訴到二審。理論上這好像可以像過去一年一樣，讓特別費案繼續如絆馬索般將馬英九套到明年大選前，如果能剛好在大選前夕讓馬英九被判有罪，那等於就是不戰而勝了！問題在於這僅只是最樂觀的預期，如果二審判決馬英九依舊是無罪呢？再凶狠的咀咒一次司法嗎？如果任何一位綠天王也被依貪汙或背信起訴，綠營當初所有對馬英九的語言糟蹋，是否可以整套加以適用在綠天王身上？這個問題可能馬上就得面臨了。
馬英九盼望能將一切虛耗能「到此為止」，當然有他個人自私的考量，誰會願意打贏了一審還要進入二審？問題是就算撇開「虛耗」這種高調不論，真的將特別費案的戰線拉到二審，只會讓各方都全面陷入困局，屆時可不是一句「歷史共業」就能解套了。因而寄語特偵組的檢察官們，不為「虛耗」，就只為實際考量，能不能就讓特別費的紛擾「到此為止」吧！
Wednesday, August 15, 2007
A Unified Opinion before Any Appeal
A Unified Opinion before Any Appeal
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 15, 2007
The Taipei District Court has found Ma Ying-jeou innocent. Conversely, by implication, it has found that Public Prosecutor Hou Kuan-ren twisted the law and engaged in false prosecution. It is time for Ma Ying-jeou to heal his wounds. It is also time for prosecutors to feel shame, acknowledge wrongdoing, and engage in some serious soul searching.
The average person is probably more concerned about whether Ma Ying-jeou is found guilty or innocent. We are more concerned about whether this case has revealed arrogance of power and shameless political bias. Now that the public prosecutor has lost the first instance, he must decide whether to appeal within ten days. We strenuously urge prosecutors to arrive at a uniform opinion on the Discretionary Fund before any decision to appeal, in order to avoid compounding past mistakes.
Hou Kuan-ren refused to work with other prosecutors to arrive at a unified opinion before proceding with the Discretionary Fund case. He went after Ma Ying-jeou on his own. The result was a bizarre prosecutorial "north/south divide." The court has recognized the Discretionary Fund as a "substantive subsidy." Prosecutors however have still not reached a consensus. Hou Kuan-ren continues to sit on the "Four Princes of the DPP" Special Expenses Cases, making zero progress. The presiding judge repudiated Hou Kuan-ren's spin on the Discretionary Fund case. Hou's spin isn't even shared by his fellow prosecutors, many of whom are diametrically opposed. Hou Kuan-ren couldn't wait to jump on the Ma Ying-jeou case. The "Four Princes of the DPP" case meanwhile, has been shoved into the back of who knows what disused file cabinet. Under such circumstances, how can Hou possibly appeal the Ma Ying-jeou case? How can he justify doing so? How can he maintain that his handling of this case bears the slightest resemblance to justice?
Besides, the court's written judgement notes that Hou Kuan-ren committed serious systemic and procedural violations. Systemicaly, as noted earlier, the court upheld the "substantive subsidy" thesis. Procedurally, Hou Kuan-ren's depositions for Ma Ying-jeou and Wu Li-ju were riddled with out of context quotes and leading questions. Therefore they lacked evidentiary force. Prosecutorial solidarity means prosecutors must offer a single standard of justice. All prosecutors must apply the same standards during their prosecutions. Prosecutorial solidarity does not mean that prosecutors should maintain a united front to cover for each others' failings. Prosecutors are supposed to be guardians of justice, not obdient henchmen of a privileged nomenklatura. Hou Kuan-ren's systemic and procedural violations reveal both macro and micro level problems. Prosecutors under Chen Tsung-ming's charge should stop what they are doing immediately. They should reflect on their past behavior, arrive at a consensus, then decide whether to appeal. After all, the prosecutorial system must not rubber stamp Hou Kuan-ren's individual opinions and positions. It must uphold the dignity of the justice system as a whole. Only then can it decide whether to appeal.
The written judgement expressed a number of views worth noting. First, the judge pointed out the public prosecutor's self contradiction. Ma Ying-jeou co-defendant Yu Wen was accused of falsely applying for 50,000 NT in petty cash from the Discretionary Fund. The public prosecutor, in his bill of indictment, wrote "Because the mayor had already verified his figures with his accountants, we had no idea where to begin checking Yu Wen's application for 50,000 NT in petty cash." This revealed that the public prosecutor knew perfectly well how the system worked. That was why he did not investigate any further. It would have been a simple matter for a public prosecutor to investigate Ma Ying-jeou the way he investigated a mid level official such as Yu Wen. In short, the public prosecutor contradicted himself on the Discretionary Fund Case.
The court's written judgement also cites the bill of indictment in the State Affairs Confidential Expenses Case. The court noted that when the same High Court Public Prosecutor's Office Anti-Corruption Center dealt with the State Affairs Confidential Expenses Case, its premise was that such usage "did not constitute criminal intent" and therefore did not dig any deeper than that. The public prosecutor adopted an extremely lenient attitude. The judge cited this as one reason to adopt an equally lenient attitude in Ma Ying-jeou's Discretionary Fund Case. In other words, the written judgement pointed out the discrepancy in the way the public prosecutor dealt with the State Affairs Confidential Expenses Case and the way it dealt with Ma Ying-jeou's Discretionary Fund Case. This of course was exactly what the public had been wondering about all along.
Furthermore, the chief prosecutor in this case could have adopted a different position on the Discretionary Fund. The written judgement mentions procedural problems in the way this case was handled. The prosecutor must face up to these problems and not evade them. One. The written judgment lists in detail discrepancies between witness Wu Li-ju's deposition and the investigation records, in addition to those the defense attorneys noted earlier. The judge's conclusion? The prosecutor's deposition was "riddled with suppositions, failed to wait for the defendant to respond, and treated grunts as answers." The prosecutor's deposition "lacked substance, and took quotes out of context." Two. The public prosecutor claimed that Ma Ying-jeou admitted the "Discretionary Fund was public money." When the judge checked the records however, he found that the public prosecutor was again making all sorts of suppositions while deposing Ma Ying-jeou. Ma Ying-jeou admitted to no such thing. The public prosecutor's bill of indictment did not jibe with Ma Ying-jeou's deposition, and "distorted the defendant's statements in a high handed manner." This constitutes a harsh condemnation of the public prosecutor. Prosecutors must deal with this matter before any appeal can have legitimacy.
As for the Discretionary Fund, the collegiate bench has accepted the "substantive subsidy" thesis. The court's written judgement notes that the Executive Yuan has never clarified the legal status of the Discretionary Fund. Official salaries could not be increased, but everyone still wanted a substantive subsidy. The provision that "Half the expenditures in one's Discretionary Fund account do not require receipts," was an expedient means of providing such a substantive subsidy. As long as officials abided by this rule, they were not in violation of the law. In the judge's opinion the system's established precedents created a legal pitfall. Therefore the system was to blame, and not any individual officials. This was poles apart from Hou Kuan-ren's wild accusations that Ma "resorted to deceit to acquire illicit wealth."
In short, public prosecutor Hou Kuan-ren perpetrated a long list of shocking systemic and procedural violations while prosecuting this case. He obstinately refused to consult with other prosecutors in order to arrive at a unified opinion. He forged depositions. His behavior left onlookers flabbergasted. If the prosecution wishes to appeal Ma Ying-jeou's case, then Hou Kuan-ren must indict the "Four Princes of the DPP." He simply cannot appeal the Ma Ying-jeou case, while refusing to even indict the "Four Princes of the DPP." Even if the prosecutorial system is unable to arrive at a single standard, can Hou Kuan-ren be permitted to apply two sets of standards? Would Hou Kuan-ren have us believe his sole duty is to prosecute the Ma Ying-jeou case? Is he a "single-purpose" prosecutor who has nothing else to do but to "get" Ma Ying-jeou?
According to precedent, if a public prosecutor loses a case in the first instance, he retains the right to appeal. But only if a public prosecutor is fulfilling his duty, not if he is embarked on a stubborn quest for vengeance. We hoped from the very beginning of this case, that prosecutors would engage in self introspection and admit possible mistakes. If in the course of the trial they discovered any systemic or procedural violations, they should not repeat their mistakes, but should acknowledge and correct them. After all, the purpose of the prosecutorial system is not to enable an individual prosecutor to save face. It is to ensure justice by maintaining the integrity of the judiciary. Therefore prosecutors should first reach a consensus. Only then should they decide whether to appeal.
Reaction from the Democratic Progressive Party following yesterday's judgment was intense. Some made "funeral arrangements" for the judiciary. Some snarled "Why don't we just go ahead and exonerate all mainlanders, and sentence all Taiwanese to death?" Make no mistake about it. The Democratic Progressive Party's response to the court's decision was not a declaration that the judiciary had died. It was a declaration that the Democratic Progressive Party wanted the judiciary dead. When presiding judge Tsai Shou-hsun got wind of the DPP's remarks, he smiled brightly and said, "I'm from Hsikou Village, Chiayi County. I'm Taiwanese."
Judge Tsai's casual remark revealed just how absurd politics on Taiwan had become, and the depths to which the justice system had sunk.
先定統一見解 再決定檢方是否上訴
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.15 03:25 am
台北地方法院判決馬英九無罪，相對而言，亦是形同認定了檢察官侯寬仁的枉法濫訴。現在是馬英九繫案經年後療傷止痛的時刻，更應是司法檢察當局知恥知病、深切反省的時刻。
一般人也許比較在乎馬英九有罪或無罪的判決，我們則更關切本案所揭露的檢察機關倨傲偏執的惡質。一審宣判，檢察官須在十日內決定是否上訴二審；我們強烈主張，檢察機關應當先對特別費的性質作出統一見解，然後再決定是否上訴，切勿一錯再錯。
侯寬仁拒絕先就特別費的性質作出統一見解，就逕自起訴馬英九，結果演成檢察機關「南北不同調」的怪事；如今法院已認定特別費有「實質補貼之屬性」，但檢察機構迄今非但仍未作出統一見解，且侯寬仁竟將「四大天王」特別費案捏在手中，至今毫無進展。也就是說，侯寬仁對特別費性質之認定，非但已被法官否定，甚至在檢察體系中亦有南轅北轍的異議；而侯寬仁在辦案程序上，馬案辦得迅雷不及掩耳，對「四大天王案」卻迄仍隱匿不發。試問，在這種情勢下，檢察官若要就馬案上訴二審，如何自圓其說，又如何符合司法正義？
何況，就本案而論，法院判決書指出，侯寬仁在實體與程序上皆有重大違誤。實體部分，如前所述，法院採認「實質補貼說」；程序部分，法院則認定侯寬仁對馬英九及吳麗洳的筆錄，皆有斷章取義誘人入罪之處，因此不具證據能力。我們認為，「檢察一體」的精神，應是指全體檢察人員在追求司法正義上的立場是一致的，而絕不是指全體檢察人員不惜枉法濫訴亦應採一致立場，護短到底，擇惡固執到底。檢察機關是司法正義的守護者，而不是嚴守幫規家法的幫派集團。侯寬仁對此案辦到實體程序兩違、宏觀微觀兩失的地步，陳聰明以降的檢察機關實應停下腳步，反省悔過，先定出統一見解，再決定上訴與否。畢竟，檢察當局不能為侯寬仁個人的見解及主張背書到底，而應站到國家司法正義與尊嚴的高度上，再決定應否上訴！
本案判決書中有幾個觀點，值得注意。首先，法官指出了檢察官的自相矛盾，判決書說：馬英九同案被告余文，被控以不實領據支領特別費五萬元充為零用金部分，檢察官在起訴書中亦說「因以市長特別費犒賞核銷之會計程序至此已全部完成，故余文按月領得五萬元後之實際支用情形嗣後均無從稽查」；顯然連檢察官自己也知道領據核銷制度的設計及意旨，故未深入追查。否則，以余文中階官員收入固定，檢察官要像追查馬英九那樣查明該五萬元流向應非難事。也就是說，就馬英九案同一案件而言，檢察官對領據核銷特別費性質的認知，自己就有矛盾。
其次，判決書又引據國務機要費案起訴書而指出：同一高檢署查黑中心偵辦的國務機要費弊案，檢察官認為領據核銷的一半「無違法性認識」、「無不法所有意圖」，並未深入追查，檢察官顯採從寬認定；法官以此作為對馬英九領據核銷特別費應採從寬認定的理由之一。換言之，判決書點明了檢方在國務機要費案和馬英九特別費案寬嚴標準不一的問題，而這正是輿論一再質疑檢方的重點。
再者，本案承辦檢方固可對特別費採不同見解，但判決書中提出的辦案程序正義問題，檢方必須正視，無可迴避。包括：一、判決書詳列證人吳麗洳偵查筆錄和勘驗結果不同的地方，較諸早前律師指出的更多，而法官對檢方筆錄的結論是「問題以理論上的假設性語氣提出，中間應答略去，以嗯對等語助詞為答案」，為「實務上未見，確屬斷章取義」。二、檢察官指馬英九自白「特別費為公款」，法官查對筆錄，認為當時檢察官又是以假設語氣與馬英九對話，馬英九並未自白；檢察官起訴書所載與筆錄不符，是「擅自詮釋被告供述而曲解」。這是對檢察官的嚴厲譴責，檢方當局必須有所處理，才有上訴的正當性。
至於特別費的性質，合議庭採「實質補貼說」。判決書指出，行政院長期未將特別費法制化，原因就是首長待遇無法調高，而欲有所補貼；至於設計一半以領據核銷，正是維持實質補貼的權宜作法；也就是說，依此權宜行事的首長，自然不必承擔違法責任。法官的見解，已與「制度陷阱說」及「歷史共業說」接近；將責任歸諸制度，而非課諸首長個人，更與侯寬仁「利用詐術，盜取財物」的見解迥然而異。
總之，檢察官侯寬仁在本案實體及程序上的違失實在駭人聽聞，始爾拒絕統一見解，繼之筆錄造假，皆屬匪夷所思。倘若檢察當局欲對馬案上訴，則侯寬仁至少亦應就其手中的「四大天王案」迅速結案，總不能說馬案進入二審，但「四大天王案」仍被侯寬仁置於冰箱。如果整個檢察體系不能建立共同標準，但侯寬仁個人總不能也有兩套標準吧，難道侯寬仁是只敢辦馬案、只會辦馬案的「專科檢察官」嗎？
據謂，在過去紀錄中，公訴檢察官一審敗訴，尚無放棄上訴的前例；但這只能是彰顯檢察官的堅持職守，切不可變成檢察官的擇惡固執。我們寄望，自本案開始，檢察體系亦應有自省、認錯的精神，倘在訴訟過程中發現在實體或程序上確有重大違失，即不應一錯再錯，而應迷途知返；畢竟，檢察體系的最高目標，不應是迴護個別檢察官的顏面，而應在追求及維護司法的正義及尊嚴！因此，本案進行至此，檢方當然應該先作出統一見解，再決定是否上訴。
昨日宣判後，民進黨果然反彈強烈。有人為司法「送終」，有人說「外省人就判無罪，台灣人就死了好」。這已是民進黨對司法判決的制式反應，不是司法已死，而是民進黨要司法死。審判長蔡守訓聞此，只是淡淡一笑，慢條斯理地說：「我是嘉義縣溪口鄉人，我是台灣人啦！」
蔡法官自然流露的一語，道盡了政治的荒謬及司法的悲涼。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 15, 2007
The Taipei District Court has found Ma Ying-jeou innocent. Conversely, by implication, it has found that Public Prosecutor Hou Kuan-ren twisted the law and engaged in false prosecution. It is time for Ma Ying-jeou to heal his wounds. It is also time for prosecutors to feel shame, acknowledge wrongdoing, and engage in some serious soul searching.
The average person is probably more concerned about whether Ma Ying-jeou is found guilty or innocent. We are more concerned about whether this case has revealed arrogance of power and shameless political bias. Now that the public prosecutor has lost the first instance, he must decide whether to appeal within ten days. We strenuously urge prosecutors to arrive at a uniform opinion on the Discretionary Fund before any decision to appeal, in order to avoid compounding past mistakes.
Hou Kuan-ren refused to work with other prosecutors to arrive at a unified opinion before proceding with the Discretionary Fund case. He went after Ma Ying-jeou on his own. The result was a bizarre prosecutorial "north/south divide." The court has recognized the Discretionary Fund as a "substantive subsidy." Prosecutors however have still not reached a consensus. Hou Kuan-ren continues to sit on the "Four Princes of the DPP" Special Expenses Cases, making zero progress. The presiding judge repudiated Hou Kuan-ren's spin on the Discretionary Fund case. Hou's spin isn't even shared by his fellow prosecutors, many of whom are diametrically opposed. Hou Kuan-ren couldn't wait to jump on the Ma Ying-jeou case. The "Four Princes of the DPP" case meanwhile, has been shoved into the back of who knows what disused file cabinet. Under such circumstances, how can Hou possibly appeal the Ma Ying-jeou case? How can he justify doing so? How can he maintain that his handling of this case bears the slightest resemblance to justice?
Besides, the court's written judgement notes that Hou Kuan-ren committed serious systemic and procedural violations. Systemicaly, as noted earlier, the court upheld the "substantive subsidy" thesis. Procedurally, Hou Kuan-ren's depositions for Ma Ying-jeou and Wu Li-ju were riddled with out of context quotes and leading questions. Therefore they lacked evidentiary force. Prosecutorial solidarity means prosecutors must offer a single standard of justice. All prosecutors must apply the same standards during their prosecutions. Prosecutorial solidarity does not mean that prosecutors should maintain a united front to cover for each others' failings. Prosecutors are supposed to be guardians of justice, not obdient henchmen of a privileged nomenklatura. Hou Kuan-ren's systemic and procedural violations reveal both macro and micro level problems. Prosecutors under Chen Tsung-ming's charge should stop what they are doing immediately. They should reflect on their past behavior, arrive at a consensus, then decide whether to appeal. After all, the prosecutorial system must not rubber stamp Hou Kuan-ren's individual opinions and positions. It must uphold the dignity of the justice system as a whole. Only then can it decide whether to appeal.
The written judgement expressed a number of views worth noting. First, the judge pointed out the public prosecutor's self contradiction. Ma Ying-jeou co-defendant Yu Wen was accused of falsely applying for 50,000 NT in petty cash from the Discretionary Fund. The public prosecutor, in his bill of indictment, wrote "Because the mayor had already verified his figures with his accountants, we had no idea where to begin checking Yu Wen's application for 50,000 NT in petty cash." This revealed that the public prosecutor knew perfectly well how the system worked. That was why he did not investigate any further. It would have been a simple matter for a public prosecutor to investigate Ma Ying-jeou the way he investigated a mid level official such as Yu Wen. In short, the public prosecutor contradicted himself on the Discretionary Fund Case.
The court's written judgement also cites the bill of indictment in the State Affairs Confidential Expenses Case. The court noted that when the same High Court Public Prosecutor's Office Anti-Corruption Center dealt with the State Affairs Confidential Expenses Case, its premise was that such usage "did not constitute criminal intent" and therefore did not dig any deeper than that. The public prosecutor adopted an extremely lenient attitude. The judge cited this as one reason to adopt an equally lenient attitude in Ma Ying-jeou's Discretionary Fund Case. In other words, the written judgement pointed out the discrepancy in the way the public prosecutor dealt with the State Affairs Confidential Expenses Case and the way it dealt with Ma Ying-jeou's Discretionary Fund Case. This of course was exactly what the public had been wondering about all along.
Furthermore, the chief prosecutor in this case could have adopted a different position on the Discretionary Fund. The written judgement mentions procedural problems in the way this case was handled. The prosecutor must face up to these problems and not evade them. One. The written judgment lists in detail discrepancies between witness Wu Li-ju's deposition and the investigation records, in addition to those the defense attorneys noted earlier. The judge's conclusion? The prosecutor's deposition was "riddled with suppositions, failed to wait for the defendant to respond, and treated grunts as answers." The prosecutor's deposition "lacked substance, and took quotes out of context." Two. The public prosecutor claimed that Ma Ying-jeou admitted the "Discretionary Fund was public money." When the judge checked the records however, he found that the public prosecutor was again making all sorts of suppositions while deposing Ma Ying-jeou. Ma Ying-jeou admitted to no such thing. The public prosecutor's bill of indictment did not jibe with Ma Ying-jeou's deposition, and "distorted the defendant's statements in a high handed manner." This constitutes a harsh condemnation of the public prosecutor. Prosecutors must deal with this matter before any appeal can have legitimacy.
As for the Discretionary Fund, the collegiate bench has accepted the "substantive subsidy" thesis. The court's written judgement notes that the Executive Yuan has never clarified the legal status of the Discretionary Fund. Official salaries could not be increased, but everyone still wanted a substantive subsidy. The provision that "Half the expenditures in one's Discretionary Fund account do not require receipts," was an expedient means of providing such a substantive subsidy. As long as officials abided by this rule, they were not in violation of the law. In the judge's opinion the system's established precedents created a legal pitfall. Therefore the system was to blame, and not any individual officials. This was poles apart from Hou Kuan-ren's wild accusations that Ma "resorted to deceit to acquire illicit wealth."
In short, public prosecutor Hou Kuan-ren perpetrated a long list of shocking systemic and procedural violations while prosecuting this case. He obstinately refused to consult with other prosecutors in order to arrive at a unified opinion. He forged depositions. His behavior left onlookers flabbergasted. If the prosecution wishes to appeal Ma Ying-jeou's case, then Hou Kuan-ren must indict the "Four Princes of the DPP." He simply cannot appeal the Ma Ying-jeou case, while refusing to even indict the "Four Princes of the DPP." Even if the prosecutorial system is unable to arrive at a single standard, can Hou Kuan-ren be permitted to apply two sets of standards? Would Hou Kuan-ren have us believe his sole duty is to prosecute the Ma Ying-jeou case? Is he a "single-purpose" prosecutor who has nothing else to do but to "get" Ma Ying-jeou?
According to precedent, if a public prosecutor loses a case in the first instance, he retains the right to appeal. But only if a public prosecutor is fulfilling his duty, not if he is embarked on a stubborn quest for vengeance. We hoped from the very beginning of this case, that prosecutors would engage in self introspection and admit possible mistakes. If in the course of the trial they discovered any systemic or procedural violations, they should not repeat their mistakes, but should acknowledge and correct them. After all, the purpose of the prosecutorial system is not to enable an individual prosecutor to save face. It is to ensure justice by maintaining the integrity of the judiciary. Therefore prosecutors should first reach a consensus. Only then should they decide whether to appeal.
Reaction from the Democratic Progressive Party following yesterday's judgment was intense. Some made "funeral arrangements" for the judiciary. Some snarled "Why don't we just go ahead and exonerate all mainlanders, and sentence all Taiwanese to death?" Make no mistake about it. The Democratic Progressive Party's response to the court's decision was not a declaration that the judiciary had died. It was a declaration that the Democratic Progressive Party wanted the judiciary dead. When presiding judge Tsai Shou-hsun got wind of the DPP's remarks, he smiled brightly and said, "I'm from Hsikou Village, Chiayi County. I'm Taiwanese."
Judge Tsai's casual remark revealed just how absurd politics on Taiwan had become, and the depths to which the justice system had sunk.
先定統一見解 再決定檢方是否上訴
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.15 03:25 am
台北地方法院判決馬英九無罪，相對而言，亦是形同認定了檢察官侯寬仁的枉法濫訴。現在是馬英九繫案經年後療傷止痛的時刻，更應是司法檢察當局知恥知病、深切反省的時刻。
一般人也許比較在乎馬英九有罪或無罪的判決，我們則更關切本案所揭露的檢察機關倨傲偏執的惡質。一審宣判，檢察官須在十日內決定是否上訴二審；我們強烈主張，檢察機關應當先對特別費的性質作出統一見解，然後再決定是否上訴，切勿一錯再錯。
侯寬仁拒絕先就特別費的性質作出統一見解，就逕自起訴馬英九，結果演成檢察機關「南北不同調」的怪事；如今法院已認定特別費有「實質補貼之屬性」，但檢察機構迄今非但仍未作出統一見解，且侯寬仁竟將「四大天王」特別費案捏在手中，至今毫無進展。也就是說，侯寬仁對特別費性質之認定，非但已被法官否定，甚至在檢察體系中亦有南轅北轍的異議；而侯寬仁在辦案程序上，馬案辦得迅雷不及掩耳，對「四大天王案」卻迄仍隱匿不發。試問，在這種情勢下，檢察官若要就馬案上訴二審，如何自圓其說，又如何符合司法正義？
何況，就本案而論，法院判決書指出，侯寬仁在實體與程序上皆有重大違誤。實體部分，如前所述，法院採認「實質補貼說」；程序部分，法院則認定侯寬仁對馬英九及吳麗洳的筆錄，皆有斷章取義誘人入罪之處，因此不具證據能力。我們認為，「檢察一體」的精神，應是指全體檢察人員在追求司法正義上的立場是一致的，而絕不是指全體檢察人員不惜枉法濫訴亦應採一致立場，護短到底，擇惡固執到底。檢察機關是司法正義的守護者，而不是嚴守幫規家法的幫派集團。侯寬仁對此案辦到實體程序兩違、宏觀微觀兩失的地步，陳聰明以降的檢察機關實應停下腳步，反省悔過，先定出統一見解，再決定上訴與否。畢竟，檢察當局不能為侯寬仁個人的見解及主張背書到底，而應站到國家司法正義與尊嚴的高度上，再決定應否上訴！
本案判決書中有幾個觀點，值得注意。首先，法官指出了檢察官的自相矛盾，判決書說：馬英九同案被告余文，被控以不實領據支領特別費五萬元充為零用金部分，檢察官在起訴書中亦說「因以市長特別費犒賞核銷之會計程序至此已全部完成，故余文按月領得五萬元後之實際支用情形嗣後均無從稽查」；顯然連檢察官自己也知道領據核銷制度的設計及意旨，故未深入追查。否則，以余文中階官員收入固定，檢察官要像追查馬英九那樣查明該五萬元流向應非難事。也就是說，就馬英九案同一案件而言，檢察官對領據核銷特別費性質的認知，自己就有矛盾。
其次，判決書又引據國務機要費案起訴書而指出：同一高檢署查黑中心偵辦的國務機要費弊案，檢察官認為領據核銷的一半「無違法性認識」、「無不法所有意圖」，並未深入追查，檢察官顯採從寬認定；法官以此作為對馬英九領據核銷特別費應採從寬認定的理由之一。換言之，判決書點明了檢方在國務機要費案和馬英九特別費案寬嚴標準不一的問題，而這正是輿論一再質疑檢方的重點。
再者，本案承辦檢方固可對特別費採不同見解，但判決書中提出的辦案程序正義問題，檢方必須正視，無可迴避。包括：一、判決書詳列證人吳麗洳偵查筆錄和勘驗結果不同的地方，較諸早前律師指出的更多，而法官對檢方筆錄的結論是「問題以理論上的假設性語氣提出，中間應答略去，以嗯對等語助詞為答案」，為「實務上未見，確屬斷章取義」。二、檢察官指馬英九自白「特別費為公款」，法官查對筆錄，認為當時檢察官又是以假設語氣與馬英九對話，馬英九並未自白；檢察官起訴書所載與筆錄不符，是「擅自詮釋被告供述而曲解」。這是對檢察官的嚴厲譴責，檢方當局必須有所處理，才有上訴的正當性。
至於特別費的性質，合議庭採「實質補貼說」。判決書指出，行政院長期未將特別費法制化，原因就是首長待遇無法調高，而欲有所補貼；至於設計一半以領據核銷，正是維持實質補貼的權宜作法；也就是說，依此權宜行事的首長，自然不必承擔違法責任。法官的見解，已與「制度陷阱說」及「歷史共業說」接近；將責任歸諸制度，而非課諸首長個人，更與侯寬仁「利用詐術，盜取財物」的見解迥然而異。
總之，檢察官侯寬仁在本案實體及程序上的違失實在駭人聽聞，始爾拒絕統一見解，繼之筆錄造假，皆屬匪夷所思。倘若檢察當局欲對馬案上訴，則侯寬仁至少亦應就其手中的「四大天王案」迅速結案，總不能說馬案進入二審，但「四大天王案」仍被侯寬仁置於冰箱。如果整個檢察體系不能建立共同標準，但侯寬仁個人總不能也有兩套標準吧，難道侯寬仁是只敢辦馬案、只會辦馬案的「專科檢察官」嗎？
據謂，在過去紀錄中，公訴檢察官一審敗訴，尚無放棄上訴的前例；但這只能是彰顯檢察官的堅持職守，切不可變成檢察官的擇惡固執。我們寄望，自本案開始，檢察體系亦應有自省、認錯的精神，倘在訴訟過程中發現在實體或程序上確有重大違失，即不應一錯再錯，而應迷途知返；畢竟，檢察體系的最高目標，不應是迴護個別檢察官的顏面，而應在追求及維護司法的正義及尊嚴！因此，本案進行至此，檢方當然應該先作出統一見解，再決定是否上訴。
昨日宣判後，民進黨果然反彈強烈。有人為司法「送終」，有人說「外省人就判無罪，台灣人就死了好」。這已是民進黨對司法判決的制式反應，不是司法已死，而是民進黨要司法死。審判長蔡守訓聞此，只是淡淡一笑，慢條斯理地說：「我是嘉義縣溪口鄉人，我是台灣人啦！」
蔡法官自然流露的一語，道盡了政治的荒謬及司法的悲涼。
Tuesday, August 14, 2007
Taipei County wins the Lottery but can't collect the Prize
Taipei County wins the Lottery but can't collect the Prize
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 14, 2007
Taipei County's elevation to the status of Directly Administered Municipality means it has gained admission to an exclusive club consisting of the two wealthy metropolises, Taipei City and Kaohsiung City. At least that's what some people imagined. Who knew the central government had no follow up plans whatsoever? Instead it turned to Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, demanding that they cough up funds already allocated to them and share them with Taipei County. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu expressed her displeasure by threatening to boycott Frank Hsieh's election campaign.
Chen Chu's anger is understandable. Counties and municipalities hope to have their legal status elevated because they wish to improve their economic prospects. They want comprehensive plans and concrete support, not reckless haste. They don't need pandering to voters without regard for the consequences. If the promotion of Taipei County requires the demotion of Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, what is that except "redistributing the poverty?"
Taipei County's promotion means it qualifies for 30 billion in central government funding. But most of that funding has already been canceled. Meanwhile, it has now become liable for central government expenditures such as health insurance and low income welfare subsidies. The result is it won't be enjoying any benefits whatsoever. This is like winning the lottery, uncorking the champagne, only to find out one won't be receiving any prize money, but must pay taxes on one's "winnings." Taipei City and Kaohsiung City are even worse off. Others win the lottery, but instead of getting to share the wealth, they get to share the poverty. They must endure a loss of tens of billions from their original budgets. What logic is there in this kind of policy making?
Taipei City, Taipei County, and Kaohsiung City are all opposed to the Executive Yuan's "equal division of spoils." The Executive Yuan's shell game has exposed the Chen regime's attitude for what it is -- superficially respectful but actually contemptuous. For years the Democratic Progressive Party harped on the necessity of promoting Taipei County to a Directly Administered Municipality. Every time an election rolled around, major or minor, this battle cry was heard. During his term as Taipei County Commissioner Su Tseng-chang repeatedly accused the Kuomintang of "obstructing" Taipei County's elevation in status. Chen Shui-bian repeatedly stressed that what Taipei County wanted was not to be merged into Taipei City, but to be independently promoted. Only three months ago, when the Legislative Yuan passed its Land Administration Act confirming Taipei County's promotion, the Chen regime attempted to claim credit. But now that it is unable to come up with funding, the central government is using the fact that Taipei County's elevation in status was "not an Executive Yuan inititative" as an excuse to do nothing. What is one to conclude from all this, except that the Democratic Progressive Party's sanctimonious demands were nothing but empty posturing?
Never last when taking credit. Always first when disowning responsibility. The public has long since seen through the Democratic Progressive Party's disingenuous sophistry. Democratic Progressive Party elders have long accused the Kuomintang of "favoring the north at the expense of the south." But once it was in power, they cited this as an excuse to persecute "mainlander" dominated Taipei City, to cut its funding, to humiliate these inhabitants of the nation's capital. But leave this aside for the moment. Chen Shui-bian has been in power for seven years. In all those years, what has he done to redress the imbalance between north and south? How does taking 10 billion from Kaohsiung's budget redress the imbalance between north and south?
The Chen regime's populist demagoguery may provoke a short term north vs. south confrontation. But it cannot promote southern Taiwan's long term prosperity. The ruling regime's talk of a "satellite capital" and of "sharing the national treasures" have encouraged people to migrate to the nation's capital. Taipei County now has over 3.6 million people. The central government has no choice but to promote it. But as we now see, it was all for show. Now Taoyuan County, with a population approaching 2 million, also wants in. When the time comes, can funds divided four ways really provide for Taipei City, Taipei County, Kaohsiung City, and Taoyuan County?
One could argue that the Democratic Progressive Party "expedited" Taipei County's elevation in status. The facts suggest otherwise, and expose the ruling DPP's hypocritical posturing for what it is. They show how opportunistic the DPP party hierarchy is when their members jockey with each other for short term political advantage. DPP policy makers no longer have any patience for long-term planning. Instead they behave as if they were street entertainers out for a quick buck plying their trade to passersby. This kind of "political achievement" is ubiquitous. Recently completed cultural centers have become disused "Halls for Mosquitos." Newly completed airports offer only one flight a day. Ordinary people have become marks at the mercy of con artists. What they envisioned was a wad of cash. What they got was disposable drink containers packaged to resemble a wad of cash.
Take the long debated subject of casinos for example. In a surprise move, Pingtung and Chiayi announced their intention to legalize gambling. Penghu reacted violently. If the ruling regime intended to grant gambling licenses to Pingtung and Chiayi on the main island, how did it expect casinos on the outer islands of Penghu to survive? The elevation of Taipei County's legal status and the establishment of casinos on Penghu are the same. They are both cases of having the name but not the game.
When Taipei County was elevated to the status of Directly Administered Municipality, county residents thought they had just caught the brass ring. The brass ring would turn out to be brass plate over base metal. This is the sort of metal the Democratic Progressive Party is made of. Why should Taipei and Kaohsiung be required to make good on the ruling DPP's rubber check? Chen Chu has asked the central government an embarrassing question. Now everybody is waiting to hear Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and Frank Hsieh's answers.
北縣升格：中頭彩卻領不到獎金
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.14 03:41 am
台北縣升格為準直轄市，以為就此可以鯉躍龍門，和北高兩市同登「富都」俱樂部；沒想到，中央根本沒有任何配套的規劃，竟要求北高吐出既有的統籌分配款，和北縣瓜分。陳菊為此大表不悅，揚言將拒絕接受謝長廷的大選輔選工作，作為抵制。
陳菊的憤怒，不是全無道理。縣市渴望升格，自是為追求更美好的前景；但這需要中央全盤的擘劃與客觀條件的支撐，而非盲動躁進，乃至為討好選民而瞻前不顧後。如果北縣升格，卻要北高二市降格，那豈不成了買空賣空的「均貧」主義？
對台北縣來說，升格雖可領取三百億統籌分配款，但一般補助款卻將被取消，還得另行承擔中央移轉的勞健保及低收入補助等法定支出，實際上什麼好處也沒撈到。這就好像中了頭彩，鞭炮也放了，卻領不到獎金，還先被扣了稅款。北高兩市更慘，別人中了樂透，他們無緣分享卻遭牽連受懲，平白要少掉幾百億原有預算。這種政策，道理何在？
當北高三縣市有志一同反對行政院的「均分」作法時，也恰恰反襯了扁政府「前恭後倨」的矇騙作風。多年來，民進黨不斷推動北縣升格直轄市，歷屆大小選舉無不以此為號召；蘇貞昌在縣長任內曾一再指責國民黨「阻擋」北縣升格，陳水扁更多次強調台北縣爭取的不是「縣市合併」，而是要「單獨升格」。事實上，三個月前，立院通過地制法確定北縣升格時，扁政府還大肆自吹自擂；如今輪到統籌款喬不攏，中央竟馬上推說這次升格「不是行政院主導」。言下之意，難道民進黨要北縣升格是玩假的？
居功永遠不落人後，卸責總是搶在第一；民進黨的矯飾詭辯，已經讓人民看破手腳。更矛盾的是，民進黨長年指責國民黨「重北輕南」，它執政後也不斷以此為由打壓台北市，削減其經費，羞辱首都市民。但除了這些無關痛癢的表面文章外，陳水扁執政七年多，對平衡南北又做了什麼？試問，再抽掉高雄市百億預算，於南北平衡何益？
完全沒有！扁政府的民粹手法固能一時間煽動南北對峙，卻無助於為南台灣開創有持久效益的榮景；再加上打造「副都心」的炒作，以及都心國寶地的釋出等，都形同在變相召喚人民往台灣頭移動。台北縣擠進三百六十萬多人口，逼著中央不得不讓它升格，但結果顯示，竟不過是徒獲虛名，毫無實益。而接下來，還有人口逼近兩百萬的桃園也在等著變成直轄市，屆時，四等分的統籌分配款能餵飽北北高桃四個「直轄市」嗎？
如果說民進黨最早「催生」了台北縣的升格，眼前的事實卻是它完全沒有能力「接生」這個寶貝。這除了暴露執政黨的虛矯身段外，更致命的是，在短視近利的政黨競爭下，政策已經失去了長期規劃的耐心和穩健，而流於街頭賣藝式的取巧及浮誇。這類「政績」，觸目皆是。如文化中心成了蚊子館，亦如有些機場每天只飛一個班機。老百姓就像碰到金光黨，原以為能得到一疊疊鈔票，打開後發現竟然只是偽裝成鈔票的利樂包飲料。
以討論多年的賭場開放議題為例，最近竟傳出除了離島澎湖，連屏東、嘉義也將開放特許，惹得澎湖大力反彈。主政者是在趁機給屏東、嘉義一些口惠，但本島若有了賭場，離島澎湖的賭場還活得下去嗎？北縣升格，與澎湖賭場，有名無實，豈不是異曲同工？
台北縣贏得準直轄市的榮銜，沒想到只拿到一頂鍍金桂冠；這頂露餡的桂冠，完全反映了民進黨執政的「成色」不足。政府的空頭支票，憑什麼要北高兩市幫它刷卡埋單？陳菊提出這個沉痛的問題，大家都在等著看扁蘇謝三人要怎麼答。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 14, 2007
Taipei County's elevation to the status of Directly Administered Municipality means it has gained admission to an exclusive club consisting of the two wealthy metropolises, Taipei City and Kaohsiung City. At least that's what some people imagined. Who knew the central government had no follow up plans whatsoever? Instead it turned to Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, demanding that they cough up funds already allocated to them and share them with Taipei County. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu expressed her displeasure by threatening to boycott Frank Hsieh's election campaign.
Chen Chu's anger is understandable. Counties and municipalities hope to have their legal status elevated because they wish to improve their economic prospects. They want comprehensive plans and concrete support, not reckless haste. They don't need pandering to voters without regard for the consequences. If the promotion of Taipei County requires the demotion of Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, what is that except "redistributing the poverty?"
Taipei County's promotion means it qualifies for 30 billion in central government funding. But most of that funding has already been canceled. Meanwhile, it has now become liable for central government expenditures such as health insurance and low income welfare subsidies. The result is it won't be enjoying any benefits whatsoever. This is like winning the lottery, uncorking the champagne, only to find out one won't be receiving any prize money, but must pay taxes on one's "winnings." Taipei City and Kaohsiung City are even worse off. Others win the lottery, but instead of getting to share the wealth, they get to share the poverty. They must endure a loss of tens of billions from their original budgets. What logic is there in this kind of policy making?
Taipei City, Taipei County, and Kaohsiung City are all opposed to the Executive Yuan's "equal division of spoils." The Executive Yuan's shell game has exposed the Chen regime's attitude for what it is -- superficially respectful but actually contemptuous. For years the Democratic Progressive Party harped on the necessity of promoting Taipei County to a Directly Administered Municipality. Every time an election rolled around, major or minor, this battle cry was heard. During his term as Taipei County Commissioner Su Tseng-chang repeatedly accused the Kuomintang of "obstructing" Taipei County's elevation in status. Chen Shui-bian repeatedly stressed that what Taipei County wanted was not to be merged into Taipei City, but to be independently promoted. Only three months ago, when the Legislative Yuan passed its Land Administration Act confirming Taipei County's promotion, the Chen regime attempted to claim credit. But now that it is unable to come up with funding, the central government is using the fact that Taipei County's elevation in status was "not an Executive Yuan inititative" as an excuse to do nothing. What is one to conclude from all this, except that the Democratic Progressive Party's sanctimonious demands were nothing but empty posturing?
Never last when taking credit. Always first when disowning responsibility. The public has long since seen through the Democratic Progressive Party's disingenuous sophistry. Democratic Progressive Party elders have long accused the Kuomintang of "favoring the north at the expense of the south." But once it was in power, they cited this as an excuse to persecute "mainlander" dominated Taipei City, to cut its funding, to humiliate these inhabitants of the nation's capital. But leave this aside for the moment. Chen Shui-bian has been in power for seven years. In all those years, what has he done to redress the imbalance between north and south? How does taking 10 billion from Kaohsiung's budget redress the imbalance between north and south?
The Chen regime's populist demagoguery may provoke a short term north vs. south confrontation. But it cannot promote southern Taiwan's long term prosperity. The ruling regime's talk of a "satellite capital" and of "sharing the national treasures" have encouraged people to migrate to the nation's capital. Taipei County now has over 3.6 million people. The central government has no choice but to promote it. But as we now see, it was all for show. Now Taoyuan County, with a population approaching 2 million, also wants in. When the time comes, can funds divided four ways really provide for Taipei City, Taipei County, Kaohsiung City, and Taoyuan County?
One could argue that the Democratic Progressive Party "expedited" Taipei County's elevation in status. The facts suggest otherwise, and expose the ruling DPP's hypocritical posturing for what it is. They show how opportunistic the DPP party hierarchy is when their members jockey with each other for short term political advantage. DPP policy makers no longer have any patience for long-term planning. Instead they behave as if they were street entertainers out for a quick buck plying their trade to passersby. This kind of "political achievement" is ubiquitous. Recently completed cultural centers have become disused "Halls for Mosquitos." Newly completed airports offer only one flight a day. Ordinary people have become marks at the mercy of con artists. What they envisioned was a wad of cash. What they got was disposable drink containers packaged to resemble a wad of cash.
Take the long debated subject of casinos for example. In a surprise move, Pingtung and Chiayi announced their intention to legalize gambling. Penghu reacted violently. If the ruling regime intended to grant gambling licenses to Pingtung and Chiayi on the main island, how did it expect casinos on the outer islands of Penghu to survive? The elevation of Taipei County's legal status and the establishment of casinos on Penghu are the same. They are both cases of having the name but not the game.
When Taipei County was elevated to the status of Directly Administered Municipality, county residents thought they had just caught the brass ring. The brass ring would turn out to be brass plate over base metal. This is the sort of metal the Democratic Progressive Party is made of. Why should Taipei and Kaohsiung be required to make good on the ruling DPP's rubber check? Chen Chu has asked the central government an embarrassing question. Now everybody is waiting to hear Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and Frank Hsieh's answers.
北縣升格：中頭彩卻領不到獎金
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.14 03:41 am
台北縣升格為準直轄市，以為就此可以鯉躍龍門，和北高兩市同登「富都」俱樂部；沒想到，中央根本沒有任何配套的規劃，竟要求北高吐出既有的統籌分配款，和北縣瓜分。陳菊為此大表不悅，揚言將拒絕接受謝長廷的大選輔選工作，作為抵制。
陳菊的憤怒，不是全無道理。縣市渴望升格，自是為追求更美好的前景；但這需要中央全盤的擘劃與客觀條件的支撐，而非盲動躁進，乃至為討好選民而瞻前不顧後。如果北縣升格，卻要北高二市降格，那豈不成了買空賣空的「均貧」主義？
對台北縣來說，升格雖可領取三百億統籌分配款，但一般補助款卻將被取消，還得另行承擔中央移轉的勞健保及低收入補助等法定支出，實際上什麼好處也沒撈到。這就好像中了頭彩，鞭炮也放了，卻領不到獎金，還先被扣了稅款。北高兩市更慘，別人中了樂透，他們無緣分享卻遭牽連受懲，平白要少掉幾百億原有預算。這種政策，道理何在？
當北高三縣市有志一同反對行政院的「均分」作法時，也恰恰反襯了扁政府「前恭後倨」的矇騙作風。多年來，民進黨不斷推動北縣升格直轄市，歷屆大小選舉無不以此為號召；蘇貞昌在縣長任內曾一再指責國民黨「阻擋」北縣升格，陳水扁更多次強調台北縣爭取的不是「縣市合併」，而是要「單獨升格」。事實上，三個月前，立院通過地制法確定北縣升格時，扁政府還大肆自吹自擂；如今輪到統籌款喬不攏，中央竟馬上推說這次升格「不是行政院主導」。言下之意，難道民進黨要北縣升格是玩假的？
居功永遠不落人後，卸責總是搶在第一；民進黨的矯飾詭辯，已經讓人民看破手腳。更矛盾的是，民進黨長年指責國民黨「重北輕南」，它執政後也不斷以此為由打壓台北市，削減其經費，羞辱首都市民。但除了這些無關痛癢的表面文章外，陳水扁執政七年多，對平衡南北又做了什麼？試問，再抽掉高雄市百億預算，於南北平衡何益？
完全沒有！扁政府的民粹手法固能一時間煽動南北對峙，卻無助於為南台灣開創有持久效益的榮景；再加上打造「副都心」的炒作，以及都心國寶地的釋出等，都形同在變相召喚人民往台灣頭移動。台北縣擠進三百六十萬多人口，逼著中央不得不讓它升格，但結果顯示，竟不過是徒獲虛名，毫無實益。而接下來，還有人口逼近兩百萬的桃園也在等著變成直轄市，屆時，四等分的統籌分配款能餵飽北北高桃四個「直轄市」嗎？
如果說民進黨最早「催生」了台北縣的升格，眼前的事實卻是它完全沒有能力「接生」這個寶貝。這除了暴露執政黨的虛矯身段外，更致命的是，在短視近利的政黨競爭下，政策已經失去了長期規劃的耐心和穩健，而流於街頭賣藝式的取巧及浮誇。這類「政績」，觸目皆是。如文化中心成了蚊子館，亦如有些機場每天只飛一個班機。老百姓就像碰到金光黨，原以為能得到一疊疊鈔票，打開後發現竟然只是偽裝成鈔票的利樂包飲料。
以討論多年的賭場開放議題為例，最近竟傳出除了離島澎湖，連屏東、嘉義也將開放特許，惹得澎湖大力反彈。主政者是在趁機給屏東、嘉義一些口惠，但本島若有了賭場，離島澎湖的賭場還活得下去嗎？北縣升格，與澎湖賭場，有名無實，豈不是異曲同工？
台北縣贏得準直轄市的榮銜，沒想到只拿到一頂鍍金桂冠；這頂露餡的桂冠，完全反映了民進黨執政的「成色」不足。政府的空頭支票，憑什麼要北高兩市幫它刷卡埋單？陳菊提出這個沉痛的問題，大家都在等著看扁蘇謝三人要怎麼答。
Monday, August 13, 2007
Seven Years of Diplomatic Humiliation
Seven Years of Diplomatic Humiliation
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 13, 2007
While in Singapore, Frank Hsieh referred to the status quo that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is purportedly maintaining, as a state of independence. Chen Shui-bian meanwhile embarked on his last state visit of his second and final term. Before departure he described his visit as "humiliation in the national interest." This contrasts with Frank Hsieh's decidedly pragmatic stance regarding relations with close Asian neighbors and with Beijing. Some analysts interpret Chen Shui-bian's visit as an attempt to establish an "historical legacy" for his eight years on office.
Nobody can predict how future historians will evaluate Chen Shui-bian. But if his place in history is to be evaluated on the basis of his seven years of foreign diplomacy, we need not wait until historians pass judgement. We can give him a failing grade right now.
During his term of office President Chen has conducted a total of ten state visits, including this one. Each visit was given a long-winded, saccharine title, such as "Journey of Democracy, Diplomacy and Friendship" or "Journey of Democracy and Goodwill" or "Journey to Create Mutual Benefit and Embrace the World" or "Journey to Enhance Popularity." But no matter what names they were given, the destination of these state visits was never the point. The point was always which US cities one was transiting, both coming and going. Eventually Washington caught on to the DPP's real agenda and began playing this game too. As a result it became a barometer of the state of Washington-Taipei relations. It became an index of how much clout Chen Shui-bian had in Washington.
Let's take "Transit Diplomacy" as the measure of Chen's alleged legacy. During ten visits, Chen Shui-bian transited New York twice. Once in 2001, and once in 2003. In 2006, during his "Journey to Enhance Popularity," he was forced to detour through places such as Holland and Libya. The media labeled this fiasco the "Journey to Nowhere." After ten visits, Washington, DC, the actual destination of Chen Shui-bian's "Transit Diplomacy," has gotten farther and farther instead of closer and closer. The current visit is being touted as his "Farewell Visit," yet he is allowed to stop only briefly for refueling in Alaska, well outside the continental United States. He is not even allowed to spend the night. The level of treatment is the lowest in seven years. After seven years of diplomatic games, and ten state visits, what does Chen have to show for it except what he himself acknowledges as a "humiliation?" What other way is there to put it?
Let's take the issue of firming up relations with allied nations for example. Eight of these ten visits were to Central and South America. Obviously the region is of strategic importance to ROC diplomacy. President Chen must be present at the inaugurations of Central and South American presidents. Nor can he afford to be absent from Central American summit meetings. Yet despite all these efforts, all one hears is that "diplomatic relations with Nicaragua are in danger," or "diplomatic relations with Panama are on the verge of collapse." This forces the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to up the ante to shore up relations with these two countries behind the scenes. To everyones' surprise, Costa Rica, with which the ROC maintained friendly relations for half a century, broke off relations. Even more embarrassing was that it chose to announce the break during June this year, almost exactly one year after President Chen attended the Costa Rican president's inauguration ceremony. During Chen's "Journey of Friendship to Central and South American Allies," Saint Lucia cancelled at the last minute. Nicaragua, which was forced to receive President Chen twice in the same year, also appeared reluctant. After eight presidential visits, this last bastion of official ROC diplomacy appears ready to fall.
Regarding participation in international organizations, Not only have years of ruling DPP efforts to gain entry to the United Nations been exercises in futility, so have attempts to rejoin the WHO. Most importantly, in the past we had international support. Over the past two years, these voices of support have not been heard. The result of this year's "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" has been to push Washington even farther from Taipei. This year's treatment of Chen during his transit through the US is one indicator. Chen Shui-bian wrote to the United Nations asking to join under the name of "Taiwan," only to have it summarily rejected by trhe UN Secretary General and returned, unread. On top of which the growing global consensus in recent years has been, "Taiwan is the troublemaker." Few feel any sympathy for the international isolation of the Taiwan authorities. Is this the payoff for all those years of diplomatic game playing?
Many commentators invariably bring up Chinese Communist Party pressure. This accusation is not without basis. But when formulating ROC diplomatic strategy, any "Chinese Communist Party pressure" must be considered a constant, not a variable. Since the 70s, the cross Straits diplomatic tug of war has usually resulted in stalemate. Beijing has never once relented in its diplomatic pressure on Taipei. It made no difference whether the ruling party was Blue or Green. Therefore any responsible administration must seek maximum advantage in the face of this diplomatic pressure. It can hardly point to this pressure as an excuse to wallow in self pity and demand sympathy. Still less can it use it as a excuse to shirk responsibility.
Frank Hsieh made a point of stressing his cross Straits policy while in Singapore. He demonstrated his understanding of the dynamic relationship between the ROC's foreign policy and cross Straits policy. Chen Shui-bian only has a short time left in office. We don't know how long his diplomatic strategy can continue to tie down Frank Hsieh hand and foot. We don't know whether Frank Hsieh will regard Chen Shui-bian's diplomatic legacy as an asset or a liability. But as a voice of public opinion, we earnestly urge the ruling DPP to let professional diplomats engage in diplomacy. The ROC's diplomatic strategy can no longer be "dollar diplomacy" with no upper limit. It can no longer be "transit diplomacy" to enhance the prestige of the head of state. It can no longer be "scorched earth diplomacy" that plays on populist mob sentiment. It can no longer be "victim diplomacy" that deliberately invites humiliation in order to elicit sympathy. The purpose of diplomacy is to maximize the national interest. It must not become a public relations tool by which the head of state can enhance his personal image. It cannot become the ruling party's election tool. The ROC's diplomatic plight is difficult enough as it is. Its diplomatic resources are rapidly diminishing. We truly cannot afford to squander them in an ad libbed and spendthrift manner.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.08.13
七年多的外交操作只化作一句「忍辱負重」？
中時社論
當謝長廷在新加坡指稱民進黨的「維持現狀」就是獨立之際，陳水扁也展開了他任內最後一次的元首出訪，行前他自己形容此行是為國家利益「忍辱負重」。相較於謝長廷積極向亞洲近鄰傳達他在兩岸立場上的「務實」，陳水扁的出訪則被部分論者詮釋為是在尋求他八年任期的「歷史定位」。
沒人能準確預測未來的史家會怎麼為陳水扁「定位」，但如果只是論斷這七年多來他為台灣所拚出怎樣的外交成績單，大概等不到史家的審判，現在就是個不及格的成績了。
細數陳總統任內的出訪，連這次總共十次，每回出訪都有一套辭藻華麗的稱呼，什麼「合作共榮、睦誼之旅」、「攜手同慶、欣榮之旅」、「共創雙贏、胸懷世界之旅」、「興揚之旅」…等等，而不論名稱被叫得有多好聽，出訪目的地從來就不是重點，去回程能過境美國那個城市才是重點，玩多了以後，華府也開始認真相應操作，竟使它真的成為美台關係的晴雨計，更成為陳水扁在華府究竟有多少分量的具體指標。
好吧，就拿「過境外交」的帳面成績當指標論斷吧，這十次出訪，陳水扁曾在二○○一年與○三年兩度風光地過境紐約，也曾在二○○六年的「興揚之旅」中狼狽到在空中且戰且走，繞行到荷蘭、利比亞等地，被媒體形容成是「迷航之旅」。十次出訪下來，陳水扁過境外交的定點，卻是距離華府愈來愈遠，這次號稱為畢業旅行，但只能停留美國境外的阿拉斯加，同時不准過夜，堪稱是史無前例的最低規格。七年多的經營，十次出訪經驗的積累，換來就是這般「忍辱負重」的自評，還能怎麼說呢？
再以鞏固邦誼來說吧，這十次出訪有八次是去中南美，可見這個區域是台灣外交的重鎮。陳總統不僅總統就職典禮一定參加、中美洲高峰會更是從不缺席，這般辛勤的經營，結果卻是經常聽聞「尼加拉瓜的邦交岌岌可危」、「巴拿馬的邦交搖搖欲墜」，逼得外交單位不斷幕後加碼，好不容易暫時穩住了這兩國，意外斷交的竟是與我國邦誼長達半世紀的哥斯大黎加，而更難堪的是該國選在今年六月宣布斷交，距離陳總統去年參加哥國總統的就職典禮，剛好滿一年。而這趟的「中南美友邦之旅」，不僅預定受訪的聖露西亞臨陣取消，尼加拉瓜也為了同一年要接待陳總統兩次而顯得不太情願，這塊台灣正式外交的最後堡壘，經總統八次出訪鞏固的結果，情勢竟是緊繃到令人越來越不安。
在國際組織的參與方面，這幾年在執政黨操作下的結果，不僅加入聯合國徒勞無功，重返ＷＨＯ也一樣挫折連連，重點是前幾年還有國際聲援，這兩年則幾乎已未曾再聽聞，今年操作「公投入聯」的結果，讓華府與台北的心理距離更遠，這次的過境待遇就是指標之一；而陳水扁致函聯合國要求「以台灣名義加入」，結果卻是被秘書處以極其無理的程序蠻橫退件。加之近年國際輿論多針對台灣是否為「麻煩製造者」加以著墨，鮮少對台灣的孤立處境給予同情聲援，這麼多年的經營，該是換得這樣的成果嗎？
許多論者經常提到中共的封鎖與打壓，這個指控確實道出了大部分的事實，但思考台灣外交的戰略時，「中共的打壓」本來就該視為常數，而不是變數。畢竟從一九七○年代以來，兩岸的外交攻防從來就是零和的，北京對台北外交空間的打壓從來沒手軟過，更不會看你執政者是藍是綠而有所不同，因而任何負責任的執政者，該是怎麼在這種外交封鎖與打壓中步步為營，尋求台灣最大的實質利益，而不是將這種打壓轉化到國內去生產悲情，更不能視之為卸責的藉口。
謝長廷刻意選在新加坡談他的兩岸政策，顯示他已意識到當下台灣外交政策與兩岸政策之間的動態連結性，我們不知道陳水扁的外交戰略，在他剩下的任期還能綁住謝長廷多久，我們也不知道謝長廷將陳水扁這筆外交遺產，視為是資產還是負債。站在民間輿論的立場，我們倒是很想誠懇地呼籲：讓外交回歸專業吧！讓台灣的外交經營，從彰顯元首聲望的過境外交、烽火衝撞的民粹外交、無窮加碼的金錢外交，乃至自取其辱的悲情外交中解脫出來吧！外交永遠是在追求最大的國家利益，不該是元首操作個人形象公關的工具，更不該是內部選舉動員的槓桿，台灣的外交處境已經夠艱困，外交資源更是日漸匱乏，真的禁不起一而再、再而三即興式的揮霍了！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 13, 2007
While in Singapore, Frank Hsieh referred to the status quo that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is purportedly maintaining, as a state of independence. Chen Shui-bian meanwhile embarked on his last state visit of his second and final term. Before departure he described his visit as "humiliation in the national interest." This contrasts with Frank Hsieh's decidedly pragmatic stance regarding relations with close Asian neighbors and with Beijing. Some analysts interpret Chen Shui-bian's visit as an attempt to establish an "historical legacy" for his eight years on office.
Nobody can predict how future historians will evaluate Chen Shui-bian. But if his place in history is to be evaluated on the basis of his seven years of foreign diplomacy, we need not wait until historians pass judgement. We can give him a failing grade right now.
During his term of office President Chen has conducted a total of ten state visits, including this one. Each visit was given a long-winded, saccharine title, such as "Journey of Democracy, Diplomacy and Friendship" or "Journey of Democracy and Goodwill" or "Journey to Create Mutual Benefit and Embrace the World" or "Journey to Enhance Popularity." But no matter what names they were given, the destination of these state visits was never the point. The point was always which US cities one was transiting, both coming and going. Eventually Washington caught on to the DPP's real agenda and began playing this game too. As a result it became a barometer of the state of Washington-Taipei relations. It became an index of how much clout Chen Shui-bian had in Washington.
Let's take "Transit Diplomacy" as the measure of Chen's alleged legacy. During ten visits, Chen Shui-bian transited New York twice. Once in 2001, and once in 2003. In 2006, during his "Journey to Enhance Popularity," he was forced to detour through places such as Holland and Libya. The media labeled this fiasco the "Journey to Nowhere." After ten visits, Washington, DC, the actual destination of Chen Shui-bian's "Transit Diplomacy," has gotten farther and farther instead of closer and closer. The current visit is being touted as his "Farewell Visit," yet he is allowed to stop only briefly for refueling in Alaska, well outside the continental United States. He is not even allowed to spend the night. The level of treatment is the lowest in seven years. After seven years of diplomatic games, and ten state visits, what does Chen have to show for it except what he himself acknowledges as a "humiliation?" What other way is there to put it?
Let's take the issue of firming up relations with allied nations for example. Eight of these ten visits were to Central and South America. Obviously the region is of strategic importance to ROC diplomacy. President Chen must be present at the inaugurations of Central and South American presidents. Nor can he afford to be absent from Central American summit meetings. Yet despite all these efforts, all one hears is that "diplomatic relations with Nicaragua are in danger," or "diplomatic relations with Panama are on the verge of collapse." This forces the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to up the ante to shore up relations with these two countries behind the scenes. To everyones' surprise, Costa Rica, with which the ROC maintained friendly relations for half a century, broke off relations. Even more embarrassing was that it chose to announce the break during June this year, almost exactly one year after President Chen attended the Costa Rican president's inauguration ceremony. During Chen's "Journey of Friendship to Central and South American Allies," Saint Lucia cancelled at the last minute. Nicaragua, which was forced to receive President Chen twice in the same year, also appeared reluctant. After eight presidential visits, this last bastion of official ROC diplomacy appears ready to fall.
Regarding participation in international organizations, Not only have years of ruling DPP efforts to gain entry to the United Nations been exercises in futility, so have attempts to rejoin the WHO. Most importantly, in the past we had international support. Over the past two years, these voices of support have not been heard. The result of this year's "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" has been to push Washington even farther from Taipei. This year's treatment of Chen during his transit through the US is one indicator. Chen Shui-bian wrote to the United Nations asking to join under the name of "Taiwan," only to have it summarily rejected by trhe UN Secretary General and returned, unread. On top of which the growing global consensus in recent years has been, "Taiwan is the troublemaker." Few feel any sympathy for the international isolation of the Taiwan authorities. Is this the payoff for all those years of diplomatic game playing?
Many commentators invariably bring up Chinese Communist Party pressure. This accusation is not without basis. But when formulating ROC diplomatic strategy, any "Chinese Communist Party pressure" must be considered a constant, not a variable. Since the 70s, the cross Straits diplomatic tug of war has usually resulted in stalemate. Beijing has never once relented in its diplomatic pressure on Taipei. It made no difference whether the ruling party was Blue or Green. Therefore any responsible administration must seek maximum advantage in the face of this diplomatic pressure. It can hardly point to this pressure as an excuse to wallow in self pity and demand sympathy. Still less can it use it as a excuse to shirk responsibility.
Frank Hsieh made a point of stressing his cross Straits policy while in Singapore. He demonstrated his understanding of the dynamic relationship between the ROC's foreign policy and cross Straits policy. Chen Shui-bian only has a short time left in office. We don't know how long his diplomatic strategy can continue to tie down Frank Hsieh hand and foot. We don't know whether Frank Hsieh will regard Chen Shui-bian's diplomatic legacy as an asset or a liability. But as a voice of public opinion, we earnestly urge the ruling DPP to let professional diplomats engage in diplomacy. The ROC's diplomatic strategy can no longer be "dollar diplomacy" with no upper limit. It can no longer be "transit diplomacy" to enhance the prestige of the head of state. It can no longer be "scorched earth diplomacy" that plays on populist mob sentiment. It can no longer be "victim diplomacy" that deliberately invites humiliation in order to elicit sympathy. The purpose of diplomacy is to maximize the national interest. It must not become a public relations tool by which the head of state can enhance his personal image. It cannot become the ruling party's election tool. The ROC's diplomatic plight is difficult enough as it is. Its diplomatic resources are rapidly diminishing. We truly cannot afford to squander them in an ad libbed and spendthrift manner.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.08.13
七年多的外交操作只化作一句「忍辱負重」？
中時社論
當謝長廷在新加坡指稱民進黨的「維持現狀」就是獨立之際，陳水扁也展開了他任內最後一次的元首出訪，行前他自己形容此行是為國家利益「忍辱負重」。相較於謝長廷積極向亞洲近鄰傳達他在兩岸立場上的「務實」，陳水扁的出訪則被部分論者詮釋為是在尋求他八年任期的「歷史定位」。
沒人能準確預測未來的史家會怎麼為陳水扁「定位」，但如果只是論斷這七年多來他為台灣所拚出怎樣的外交成績單，大概等不到史家的審判，現在就是個不及格的成績了。
細數陳總統任內的出訪，連這次總共十次，每回出訪都有一套辭藻華麗的稱呼，什麼「合作共榮、睦誼之旅」、「攜手同慶、欣榮之旅」、「共創雙贏、胸懷世界之旅」、「興揚之旅」…等等，而不論名稱被叫得有多好聽，出訪目的地從來就不是重點，去回程能過境美國那個城市才是重點，玩多了以後，華府也開始認真相應操作，竟使它真的成為美台關係的晴雨計，更成為陳水扁在華府究竟有多少分量的具體指標。
好吧，就拿「過境外交」的帳面成績當指標論斷吧，這十次出訪，陳水扁曾在二○○一年與○三年兩度風光地過境紐約，也曾在二○○六年的「興揚之旅」中狼狽到在空中且戰且走，繞行到荷蘭、利比亞等地，被媒體形容成是「迷航之旅」。十次出訪下來，陳水扁過境外交的定點，卻是距離華府愈來愈遠，這次號稱為畢業旅行，但只能停留美國境外的阿拉斯加，同時不准過夜，堪稱是史無前例的最低規格。七年多的經營，十次出訪經驗的積累，換來就是這般「忍辱負重」的自評，還能怎麼說呢？
再以鞏固邦誼來說吧，這十次出訪有八次是去中南美，可見這個區域是台灣外交的重鎮。陳總統不僅總統就職典禮一定參加、中美洲高峰會更是從不缺席，這般辛勤的經營，結果卻是經常聽聞「尼加拉瓜的邦交岌岌可危」、「巴拿馬的邦交搖搖欲墜」，逼得外交單位不斷幕後加碼，好不容易暫時穩住了這兩國，意外斷交的竟是與我國邦誼長達半世紀的哥斯大黎加，而更難堪的是該國選在今年六月宣布斷交，距離陳總統去年參加哥國總統的就職典禮，剛好滿一年。而這趟的「中南美友邦之旅」，不僅預定受訪的聖露西亞臨陣取消，尼加拉瓜也為了同一年要接待陳總統兩次而顯得不太情願，這塊台灣正式外交的最後堡壘，經總統八次出訪鞏固的結果，情勢竟是緊繃到令人越來越不安。
在國際組織的參與方面，這幾年在執政黨操作下的結果，不僅加入聯合國徒勞無功，重返ＷＨＯ也一樣挫折連連，重點是前幾年還有國際聲援，這兩年則幾乎已未曾再聽聞，今年操作「公投入聯」的結果，讓華府與台北的心理距離更遠，這次的過境待遇就是指標之一；而陳水扁致函聯合國要求「以台灣名義加入」，結果卻是被秘書處以極其無理的程序蠻橫退件。加之近年國際輿論多針對台灣是否為「麻煩製造者」加以著墨，鮮少對台灣的孤立處境給予同情聲援，這麼多年的經營，該是換得這樣的成果嗎？
許多論者經常提到中共的封鎖與打壓，這個指控確實道出了大部分的事實，但思考台灣外交的戰略時，「中共的打壓」本來就該視為常數，而不是變數。畢竟從一九七○年代以來，兩岸的外交攻防從來就是零和的，北京對台北外交空間的打壓從來沒手軟過，更不會看你執政者是藍是綠而有所不同，因而任何負責任的執政者，該是怎麼在這種外交封鎖與打壓中步步為營，尋求台灣最大的實質利益，而不是將這種打壓轉化到國內去生產悲情，更不能視之為卸責的藉口。
謝長廷刻意選在新加坡談他的兩岸政策，顯示他已意識到當下台灣外交政策與兩岸政策之間的動態連結性，我們不知道陳水扁的外交戰略，在他剩下的任期還能綁住謝長廷多久，我們也不知道謝長廷將陳水扁這筆外交遺產，視為是資產還是負債。站在民間輿論的立場，我們倒是很想誠懇地呼籲：讓外交回歸專業吧！讓台灣的外交經營，從彰顯元首聲望的過境外交、烽火衝撞的民粹外交、無窮加碼的金錢外交，乃至自取其辱的悲情外交中解脫出來吧！外交永遠是在追求最大的國家利益，不該是元首操作個人形象公關的工具，更不該是內部選舉動員的槓桿，台灣的外交處境已經夠艱困，外交資源更是日漸匱乏，真的禁不起一而再、再而三即興式的揮霍了！
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