Thursday, June 30, 2011

Next, Recover Funds Embezzled by Lee Teng-hui

Next, Recover Funds Embezzled by Lee Teng-hui
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 1, 2011

Lee Teng-hui and Liu Tai-ying used secret National Security Bureau accounts to embezzle over $7.79 million USD from the nation's coffers. As a result, they have been indicted by the Special Investigation Unit for corruption, money laundering, and other felonies.

When one stops to think about it, this case is truly bizzarre. Consider the way the case developed. Chen Shui-bian had a falling out with Lee Teng-hui. He repeatedly leveled allegations of embezzlement against Lee. That led to the Special Investigation Unit investigation. This major scandal occurred in 1999. But the indictment was delayed until today. During this period political considerations by opportunistic or fence-sitting justice officials prevented prosecution. All those involved, as well as those indicted, should enage in serious soul-searching.

The Special Investigation Unit discovered that Lee Teng-hui abused his authority to enrich himself at the public trough. In 1994, Lee Teng-hui took 10,5 million USD from secret national security accounts, ostensibly for foreign relations. Between 1995 and 1997, then National Security Bureau (NSB) Chief Ying Chung-wen made up the shortfall, using of NSB funds. The shortfall was only 89 million NTD. But Lee Teng-hui, Liu Tai-ying, and Ying Chung-wen arranged for the purchase of a building for the Taiwan Research Institute, to be used as a political base after their retirement. The two knew perfectly well that the NSB had already made up most of the funds. But they demanded that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cough up over 10 million USD anyway, and return it to the National Security Bureau. From the very beginning , they made up their minds to wait until the Ministry of Foreign Affairs handed the money over. They themselves would return only the final shortfall in the secret national security account -- 89 million NTD. The remaining 200 million NTD, or 7.79 million USD, was diverted into Lee's private accounts. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially objected. But President Lee Teng-hui instructed Presidential Office Chief Su Chih-cheng to repeatedly pressure the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the end, it agreed to pay back the money, and to act as the fall guy.

To cover up Lee's corruption, Liu Tai-ying and Yin Chung-wen agreed to use Hsu Ping-chiang and Liu Kuan-chun. In the name of an NSB secret mission, they ordered a domestic bank to open a U.S. account under a pseudonym. Then in the name of the National Security Bureau, they ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to transfer funds into that account. This would avoid an Internal audit by the National Security Bureau. Once the funds were transferred, a small amount was withdrawn and put back in the NSB secret account. Yin Chung-wen instructed Hsu Ping-chiang to issue 7500 travelers checks, totalling 7.5 million USD, along with 290,000 USD in cash, stuff them into two large fruit cartons, and deliver them to Liu Tai-ying. Apparently corrupt officals on Taiwan share certain predilictions. They love stuffing their dirty money into fruit cartons. President Lee Teng-hui and the National Security Bureau were no exception.

This huge sum of money in Liu Tai-ying's hands was hard to deal with. As a result, Liu Tai-ying sought out Yin Yan-liang for help in laundering the money. First, Liu Tai-ying used 400,000 USD for private purposes. Then he turned the remainder over to Yin. Yin used a number of dummy accounts to "donate" the money to the Taiwan Research Institute. At this point, Lee mysteriously misappropriated most of the stolen money, and Liu Tai-ying secretly pocketed some of the money as well.

In 2002, Liu Kuan-chun ran from the law. The media began reporting problems with the national security secret account, Hsu Ping-chiang realized he had been used. He sought out Yin Chung-wen, and asked him to straighten the matter out. In order to cover up Lee's crimes, Yin Chung-wen sought out Liu Tai-ying, and asked him to backdate receipts. He turned them over to Hsu Ping-chiang, who then turned them over to the National Security Bureau. Together they visited Ta Hsi in Taoyuan County, to meet with Lee Teng-hui and discuss how to falsify documents. They lied, claiming that the National Security Bureau had provided grants to the Taiwan Research Institute. They falsified evidence repeatedly. But the conspirators were unable to keep their story straight. This led prosecutors to conclude they were guilty.

Actually, the media reported on the case in 2002. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office Investigated. The pertinent facts were rendered crystal clear. But prosecutors were subject to political interference, The only one indicted was Hsu Ping-chiang, a minor player. Yin Chung-wen was already deceased. Lee Teng-hui and Liu Tai-ying were not even mentioned. Such selective prosecution meant that the truth of the case could not emerge. Hsu Ping-chiang was merely following orders. That made it difficult to charge him with any crimes. As expected, Hsu Ping-chiang was found not guilty. The real perpetrators were not indicted until today.

By prosecuting this case, the Special Investigation Unit is "locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen." It is finally upholding justice. Most controversial of all is the National Security Bureau. Hsu Ping-chiang had been indicted. The Taiwan Research Institute improperly obtained public funds. These were established facts. The money had been fraudulently acquired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The National Security Bureau had hand delivered it to the Taiwan Research Institute. The National Security Bureau must bear responsibility. It must recover the money. But over the years, the National Security Bureau did nothing. It watched idly as public funds were embezzled. The prosecution has finally charged Lee Teng-hui with a crime. Now, does the NSB intend to recover the stolen money or not?

下一步,向李登輝追回贓款
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.07.01 03:02 am

李登輝和劉泰英因國安秘帳案,共謀侵吞國庫美金七百七十九萬餘元,遭特偵組起訴貪污、洗錢等重罪。

說來這真是一個弔詭。本案有今日發展,居然是因陳水扁與李登輝反目而多次提出指控,才帶動了特偵組的偵辦。這樁發生在民國八十八年間的重大弊案,遲至今日始偵結起訴,其間因種種政治因素考慮而曾干擾辦案的當政者,或投機觀望的司法工作者,實應與涉案人一同深刻自省。

特偵組調查結果顯示,此案是李登輝利用職權以假公濟私的騙案。八十三年間,李登輝以外交需要為由所動用國安秘帳的那一筆一千零五十萬美元,其實在八十四到八十六年,已由當時的國安局長殷宗文逐年以國安局預算結餘補回,尾帳差額只有台幣八千九百萬餘元。但李登輝和劉泰英、殷宗文為安排李在退休後購置大樓設立台綜院為政治基地,竟在明知國安局已補回秘帳大多數墊款的情況下,仍然要求外交部拿出全額墊款即一千餘萬美元,還給國安局;他們一開始即打定主意,待外交部交出錢來,就只把國安秘帳的最後差額台幣八千九百萬餘元還回去,其餘的二億多台幣即美金七百七十九萬餘元,則挪為私用。本來有意見的外交部,在李登輝指令時任總統辦公室主任的蘇志誠再三要求外交部的情況下,只好同意還錢,做了冤大頭。

為掩飾貪污行為,劉泰英、殷宗文又商量好,利用徐炳強、劉冠軍等人先以國安局機密任務為名,指令某國內銀行開立使用化名的美金帳戶,再以國安局名義,要求外交部將錢匯入那個安排好的帳戶,以避開國安局內部的稽查。匯入之後,除了少部分提領歸還國安秘帳尾帳,其餘的錢則由殷宗文指示徐炳強開成七千五百張共七百五十萬美元的旅行支票,以及美金二十九萬餘元的現金,裝入兩只大水果盒,交付給劉泰英。看來,貪污犯罪似乎有相同的習慣,喜歡使用水果盒裝錢,總統及國安局級別的貪污也不例外。

這一大筆錢到了劉泰英手上,也很不好處理;於是,劉泰英找尹衍樑來洗錢、漂白。劉泰英先私用了其中四十餘萬美元,將其餘的錢交給尹,尹再借用許多人頭「回捐」給了台綜院。事情至此,似乎神不知鬼不覺地,李登輝挪用了大部分的贓款,劉泰英也私自分了一些甜頭。

九十一年間,因劉冠軍犯罪逃亡案,媒體開始報導國安秘帳問題,徐炳強發現自己被利用了,找上殷宗文要求處理;殷宗文為了掩飾犯罪,遂帶徐找劉泰英簽了倒填日期的收據,給徐炳強帶回國安局。他們又一同到桃園大溪見李登輝,共同商議假造公文,謊稱是國安局補助台綜院云云。然而,這種種事後假造證據的行為,最終都成了這夥共犯無法自圓其說而遭檢察官認定犯罪的理由。

其實,在九十一年間,媒體報導此案,台北地檢署偵辦之際,相關案情已經十分明朗;只不過當年的檢方受到政治干預,遂只起訴了小角色徐炳強,而殷宗文已死亡,至於李登輝和劉泰英則連提都未提。如此切割式地起訴,使案情不能完整呈現,且徐炳強當年係奉命行事,本來就很難構成罪行,果不其然徐炳強判決無罪確定。真正的犯罪者,至今日才受到追訴。

檢方由特偵組亡羊補牢,偵結起訴本案,終使本案回歸司法正義。最可議的是國安局,當年徐炳強遭起訴時,已使台綜院不當取得公款成為確定的事實;而這筆由外交部詐來的錢,既然是國安局一手交到台綜院的,國安局即責無旁貸,應加以討回;但國安局這麼多年來,卻毫無動作,坐視公帑遭侵占。現在檢方既已起訴,國安局難道還能不追回這筆贓款嗎?

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Candidates for Elective Office Holding Government Positions: Not A Problem

Candidates for Elective Office Holding Government Positions: Not A Problem
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 30, 2011

Ma Ying-jeou and Wu Den-yi have formed a presidential/vice presidential ticket. Now the DPP is insisting that Wu Den-yih may not "run for elective office while holding down a government position." It is demanding that he immediately resign as premier, to preclude the abuse of administrative resources, and unfair election results. In response, Wu Den-yih has argued that "the law does not prohibit" candidates from holding down a government position. But he promised to maintain administrative neutrality.

Experience and logic tell us that '
The proposition that "candidates for elective office may not hold government positions" is a phony one. The DPP's demands are completely unreasonable. But Wu Den-yih's response left something to be desired also. The most obvious example is the last presidential election. The DPP's Hsieh/Su ticket did not include anyone in a government position. But Premier Chang Chun-hsiung, at the behest of Chen Shui-bian, abused the power of his office by offering "a perk a week," in a flagrant attempt to buy off the voters. That was the real catastrophe. Superficially the issue is "candidates for elective office who hold government positions." In reality the issue is the abuse of government resources with utter impunity. Does the ROC really wish to revisit this nightmare?

Now consider the matter from the perspective of political theory, The proposition that a "candidate for elective office may not hold a government position," is riddled with internal contradictions. First of all, in a democratic election, anyone seeking re-election as Chief Executive is clearly a candidate for elective office who holds down a government position." The DPP knows perfectly well that it cannot possibly demand that President Ma disqualify himself as as a candidate merely because he holds down a government position. Yet it makes this demand of his running mate. This puts the cart before the horse, and is utterly illogical. Secondly, under a democracy, the ruling party assumes total responsibility for any of its administration's failures. It accepts the judgment of the voters. When an opposition party takes aim at a specific individual however, its motive is clearly to engage in political harassment. Thirdly, the issue is not whether a candidate for elective office may hold down a government position. The issue is whether he or she has maintained administrative neutrality.

Suppose four years ago President Ma had emulated President Chen's strategy with Chang Chun-hsiung? Suppose he refrained from appointing Wu Den-yih premier, thereby enabling Wu to concentrate on the election? Suppose he had instead appointed a new, interim premier to handle the transition, specifically to dole out benefits for the sake of Ma's campaign? Suppose he had written voters a stack of rubber checks, to be paid for by what unknown party, by what unknown date? This "candidates for elective office may not hold government positions" rhetoric is ludicrous. Who has the cheek to say it is in the interests of the public?

Chang Chun-hsiung made a comeback. He doled out "a perk a week," throwing money about left and right. Even more frightening however, was the atmosphere of confrontation during the general election. The Chen regime totally ignored the public condemnation. It did whatever it pleased. After the Green Camp lost the election, Chang Chun-hsiung withdrew from politics. He evaded all responsibility. The candidate may not have held a government position. But holders of government positions engaged in rampant misconduct. Clearly the demand that "candidates for elective office may not hold government positions" is utterly beside the point.

Let's take a closer look. In May 2007 Su Tseng-chang resigned as premier. He resigned not because he was to be Frank Hsieh's running mate in the general election. He resigned not because he was taking the initiative to avoid a conflict of interest. He resigned because even though he enjoyed the advantage of being the premier, he still lost to Frank Hsieh in the party primaries. He resigned because he had no choice. Therefore helped Chen Shui-bian regroup and do battle. Yet the DPP would have the public believe that Chang Chun-hsiung's return as premier set an example worthy of emulation. The DPP would have the public believe that it demonstrated a commitment to the principle that "candidates for elective office may not hold government positions." That is simply a lie.

Lest we forget, in April that same year, Su Tseng-chang put on a show. He presented himself as a champion of the notion that "candidates for elective office may not hold government positions." But Chen Shui-bian asked him to stay on, and that was the end of that charade. Ironically, when Su Tseng-chang wanted to quit as premier, it was not to demonstrate strict adherence to the principle of political neutrality. It was because several presidential aspirants joined forces with DPP Chairman Pro Tem Trong Chai. They turned the screws and demanded his resignation, to ensure fairness in the party primaries. Therefore the DPP's insistence that "candidates for elective office may not hold government positions" was nothing more than the result of an internecine power struggle.

Furthermore, during the 2008 general election, Chen Shui-bian could no longer run for re-election. But he continued using the power of the presidency to manipulate the election. He used government resources to launch his "referenda" and to create chaos. As we can see, the problem is not candidates for elective office who hold government positions. The problem is officials who hold government positions abusing their power, even when they are not candidates for elective office. The problem is the government and the ruling party's lack of political integrity. The DPP is guilty of so many past abuses. Yet it can boast, with a straight face, and without changing color, that its "candidates for elective office did not hold government positions." One simply must learn how they do it.

The proposition that "candidates for elective office may not hold government positions" is utterly phony. The ruling and opposition parties must not turn it into a political football. It is farce that need be enacted only once, to know that it was a mistake. We need not play it out a second time. If Wu Den-yih reneges on his commitment to administrative neutrality, the public will render its judgment on election day. But being a candidate for elective office while holding down a government position in not a problem.

帶職參選的爭論是一個假議題
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.30

「馬吳配」成形後,民進黨要求吳敦義不能「帶職參選」,應立即辭去閣揆,以免濫用行政資源,造成選舉不公。對此,吳敦義則辯稱「法律沒有禁止」帶職參選,也承諾會謹守行政中立。

其實,不論從經驗法則或從政治邏輯看,所謂「不能帶職參選」,都是個假議題;民進黨的要求完全無理,但吳敦義的回答也不很對味。最明顯的例子是,上屆總統大選,民進黨的「謝蘇配」都未有公職在身,但回鍋閣揆張俊雄在陳水扁授意下濫用「一周一利多」的政策大放送助選,那才是可怕的災難。表面上是「不帶職參選」,實際上卻肆無忌憚地濫用國家資源,台灣還要重回這個噩夢嗎?

從政治原理看,「不能帶職參選」的語境和邏輯都充滿著悖論。第一,在民主選舉制度中,任何尋求連任的行政首長,都必然是帶職參選。民進黨深知無法要求馬總統不帶職參選,卻要求其搭檔的副手迴避,無疑是本末倒置、邏輯不通。第二,在民主政治中,執政黨本需概括承受全部執政責任,接受選民檢驗;反對黨針對特定個人而發,目的只在政治干擾。第三,問題不在是否帶職參選,而在是否行政中立。

如果馬總統取法四年前陳水扁任用張俊雄的策略,讓吳敦義免兼行政院長,專心競選;同時任命一名過渡性之新揆,專門配合馬吳配的選戰策略釋放利多,向民眾開出一堆不知要由誰兌現的美麗支票。這種荒謬的「不帶職參選」演出,誰敢說更符合台灣人民的利益?

張俊雄那次回鍋,除了「每周一利多」的大手筆撒錢到不可開交之外,更可怕的是,在大選對峙的氣氛下,整個社會輿論對扁政府的針砭已形同失效,只能任其為所欲為。綠營敗戰後,張俊雄隱退政壇,要如何追究他的責任?參選者不帶職,但在職者卻胡作非為,這種「不帶職參選」有何意義?

進一步觀察,二○○七年五月蘇貞昌之所以辭去行政院長,並不是因為要搭配謝長廷角逐大選,主動作出「不帶職參選」的選擇;而是因為他挾閣揆之優勢,卻在黨內初選敗給謝長廷,只好黯然交出閣揆,方便陳水扁重新布置戰局。故而,張俊雄回鍋擔任閣揆,若要誇示為民進黨「不帶職參選」的範例,分明就是名不副實。

更別忘了,那年四月,蘇貞昌確有過一次未遂的「不帶職參選」演出,卻遭陳水扁「慰留」收場。諷刺的是,那次蘇貞昌要辭去閣揆職務,也根本不是為了向台灣民眾彰顯什麼行政中立,而是因為黨內幾個同樣有志總統大位的天王們聯合代理黨主席蔡同榮共同施壓,要求他辭職,以便初選能公平競爭。由此可見,民進黨的「不帶職參選」的台詞,說穿了不過是其鬥爭助興的狼煙罷了。

再說,二○○八大選,陳水扁已不能競選連任,但不斷地以總統地位操縱選舉,例如動用國家資源發動「入聯公投」等,鬧得天翻地覆;可見,問題其實不在候選人是否帶職參選,政府中不參選者若要濫權操縱選舉反而更可怕,因此,問題是在政府與執政黨的政治誠信。但是,有這麼多不堪檢視的過去,民進黨依然能把「不帶職參選」的神話說得那麼臉不紅氣不喘,值得人們深加探究。

是否帶職參選,既然根本是個假議題,朝野沒有理由借題發揮。一首荒謬練習曲,彈過一次就知道是個錯誤,自不必再練第二回。吳敦義若未謹守行政中立的承諾,就留待輿論聲討,但帶職參選不是問題。

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

The Two Yings Should Hold No Less than Four Debates

The Two Yings Should Hold No Less than Four Debates
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 29, 2011

Ma spokesman Yin Wei has challenged the DPP to a debate on ECFA. Tsai Ing-wen said "Many people want to debate Ma. Let private citizens debate him first."

Yin Wei's move was of course tactical, But the fact that he could provoke Tsai Ing-wen into such a response, is already a victory. Tsai Ing-wen should have said that once the election had began in earnest, she would debate Ma in depth. Recently she expressed "a willingness to sit down with [Mainland] China and discuss a sustainable framework for cross-Strait interaction." But now she wants the Ma campaign to debate private citizens. Tsai is clearly hedging her bets, both left and right. Yin Wei's tactical move flushed Tsai Ing-wen from her cover. It highlighted Tsai's evasiveness and her cowardice behind her bravado. Tsai continues to refuse to debate. The public is unlikely to understand or approve.

The two Yings showdown is the biggest difference between previous presidential elections. The candidates truly ought to engage in political debate. The Democratic Progressive Party held its presidential primaries in April. It held four debates over 12 days. By this standard, the two Yings ought to hold at least four debates during the presidential campaign. Actually this is far too few. But four ought to be the very minimum.

We suggest that the candidates hold at least four debates. The topic for these debates should be 1. Cross-Strait policy, 2. Allegiance to the nation and the constitution 3. Economic policy, 4. Other major national policy matters. One look at this framework is enough to tell us that four debates is insufficient. But four debates should be the minimum. Otherwise it will be difficult to expose the similarities and differences between the two candidates' platforms. It would betray the voters.

Cross-Strait policy, allegiance to the nation and the constitution, and economic policy are where Ma and Tsai and differ the most. Therefore these should be the topics debated. The debate should be in-depth. It must get to the bottom of the matter. The debate must address the issues. Failure to do so would leave the candidates' positions unarticulated. It would leave any shortcomings concealed and easy to evade. It would make it difficult to distinguish between truth and falsehood. Take cross-Strait policy. Ma Ying-jeou upholds the 1992 Consensus, one China, different interpretations, and no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. Tsai Ing-wen rejects the 1992 Consensus. She refuses to uphold the principle of"no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. Take allegiance to the nation and the constitution. Ma demands adherence to the "constitutional framework of the Republic of China." Tsai, by contrast, says the "Republic of China is a government in exile." Take economic policy. Ma wants to continue current policy. Tsai, on the other hand, proposes a "localized economy." She opposes "economic growth as a priority." She wants to overturn the "industry first, agriculture second" policy. She opposes "export-orientation." As we can see, Ma and Tsai are literally poles apart on these policies that bear on our national prosperity, How can we not hold debates over these ideas? How can we hold fewer than four debates?

Ma and Tsai are running for president. They are competing for the opportunity to determine national policy for the next four years. The two presidential candidates seek four years in power. The very least they can do is take two hours out to explain where they stand on cross-Straits relations, on allegiance to the nation and the constitution, on economic policy. We are essentially giving them four years in power in exchange for two hours of debate. Do the voters really have no right to expect a debate? Do the presidential candidates really have the right to refuse?

Debates should address specific topics. The "candidate interaction cross-examination" process used during the 2008 presidential debates should be preserved. This is one of the best ways to probe a political candidate. Otherwise, it will be too easy for a candidate to speak a totally different language, and talk right past the voters. For the most part, questions from the audience should be asked by professional journalists. Their record has been imperfect. But they may be better at grasping the essence than experts and scholars. As for the recent practice of allowing the public to ask questions, it may appear "democratic." But the debate is likely to degenerate into chaos, enabling candidates to evade serious questions. The debate would then be a total waste. This option should be discarded.

Two debates were held during the 2008 presidential election. Frank Hsieh predicted that Ma Ying-jeou would default on his "6:3:3" promises. His prediction came true. Frank Hsieh also predicted that if Ma were elected, cross-Strait direct flights would be delayed 10 years. But less than a year later, direct flights were a reality. Hsieh blasted what he termed a "one China market." He even characterized the general election as "a referendum on the one China market." He warned that "Taiwan men will be unable to find work. Taiwan women will be unable to find husbands. Taiwan children will end up as child labor in Heilongjiang.” The dire scenario painted by Frank Hsieh failed utterly to materialize. Ma Ying-jeou clearly won Frank Hsieh's "referendum."

The political differences between Ma and Tsai are even greater than those between Ma and Hsieh. The KMT and DPP are diametrically opposed on issues such as cross-Strait relations, allegiance to the nation and constitution, and economic policy, Ma seeks re-election. Tsai seek to displace him. Their policy platforms must be make clear to voters. They must publicly debate their pros and cons. After all, whoever wins the presidential election will not merely seize power. He or she will represent the will of the people regarding national policy.

During its party primaries, the Democratic Progressive Party held four debates, merely to nominate the party's candidate. Ma and Tsai are now running for president. They warrant more than four debates. Certainly they warrant no less than four debates. Ma and Tsai have the responsibility to work together to upgrade the quality of the election. Four debates is the very least they should offer voters.

雙英至少應有四場政見辯論會
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.29

馬辦發言人殷瑋邀請民進黨辯論ECFA,蔡英文說「很多人想跟馬辦辯論,民間人士先開始」。

殷瑋所為當然是一個戰術性的動作,但他能引出蔡英文的這一句話,已經賺到了。照理說,蔡英文應稱,進入選舉程序後,即可與馬英九深入辯論;但她日前說「願與中國坐下來談可長可久的兩岸互動架構」,現在竟又要馬辦與民間辯論,皆是顧左右而言他。殷瑋的這個動作,再次凸顯了蔡英文的躲藏閃避與色厲內荏;蔡若對政見辯論續採這種排拒態度,恐難獲得民意的理解與認同。

雙英對決,可謂是歷屆總統直選中競選政見差異最大的一次,因而候選人也最應進行政見辯論。四月的民進黨總統初選,在十二天內舉行了四場政見辯論會;依照這個標準,雙英的總統大選,四場政見辯論會仍嫌不足,但至少亦應有四場才行。

我們的建議是:至少辦四場辯論會,且四場各定專題,一場是兩岸政策,一場是國憲認同,一場是經濟路線,再一場是其他重大國政。見此架構,即知四場辯論也不夠;但至少要有四場,否則難以呈現兩位總統候選人的政見異同,不能向選民交代。

兩岸政策、國憲認同及經濟路線,是馬蔡二人政見出現最大差異處;自應設定專題,深入辯論,打破砂鍋辯到底。如果不進行專題辯論,候選人的主張不能完整呈現,其缺陷卻極易閃躲掩藏;難以建立真相,探求是非利鈍。例如,在兩岸政策,馬英九主張「九二共識,一中各表」、「不統,不獨,不武」,蔡英文則不承認「九二共識」,亦不呼應「不統,不獨,不武」;就國憲認同言,馬言必稱「在中華民國憲法架構下」,蔡則曾謂「中華民國是流亡政府」;以經濟路線而言,馬主張維持目前的全方位政策,蔡則強調「在地經濟」,反對「成長掛帥」,並主張翻轉「重工輕農」,反對「出口導向」。自以上略舉即可看出,馬蔡二人在這些國家命脈政策上的差異極大,簡直已是南轅北轍;豈能不進行「專題辯論」?又豈可少於四場辯論?

馬蔡競選總統,即是競奪四年的主政地位。那麼,兩位總統候選人,為四年主政,就兩岸、國憲、經濟三大政策路線,至少應各以一場兩小時的專題辯論向選民交代清楚,這形同是「你給我兩小時辯論,我給你四年主政」,難道選民不應要求辯論?又難道總統候選人可以抵拒辯論?

除應設定「專題辯論」外,亦當延續二○○八年總統大選政見辯論的「候選人交互詰問」,這是探測候選人政見深度的最佳方法;否則即易形成雞同鴨講、全無交集的場面。再者,現場提問者,宜以專業媒體人為主;他們的表現雖未臻理想,卻可能較專家學者的提問能掌握要領。至於近年試行的「公民提問」,也許民主意味較高,卻使問答成為雞零狗碎、實問虛答,形同虛耗了一場辯論,或許不必再採。

二○○八年的總統大選,舉辦了兩場政見辯論會。謝長廷在政見會中預言,馬英九的「六三三」會跳票,這個預言已經應驗。至於謝長廷又說,馬當選後,兩岸直航要十年,但馬上任後不到一年即直航告成。再者,謝猛轟「一中市場」,甚至謂大選即是對「一中市場」的「公民投票」,且又稱台灣將「查埔找無工,查某找無尪,少年囝仔去到黑龍江」,如今情勢顯亦不如謝長廷所言,而馬英九則贏得了謝長廷所說的「公民投票」。

如今馬蔡之間的政見歧異更遠逾於馬謝當年,而國民黨在兩岸、國憲及經濟上的政策路線,更與民進黨已形同南轅北轍。因此,馬欲連任,或蔡欲取而代之,皆應就政策內容向選民說清楚,並公開辯論其是非利鈍;畢竟,總統大選不是誰能奪到權力而已,而是要看誰的國家政策能獲民意支持。

連民進黨總統初選亦有四場政見辯論會,馬蔡總統大選更應有超過四場的辯論會,或至少不應少於四場。馬蔡二人有責任共同提升大選品質,應將四場辯論會作為向選民負責的最起碼回應。

Monday, June 27, 2011

The Free and Independent Travel Policy: It's Working

The Free and Independent Travel Policy: It's Working
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 28, 2011

The Free and Independent Travel Policy is now in effect. The first batch of 273 tourists from the Chinese mainland will arrive on Taiwan today. Many people regard this as a business opportunity, But even more importantly, the Free and Independent Travel Policy for tourists from the Chinese mainland will enable the establishment of direct dialogue between people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. It will provide them with an opportunity to communicate, and also an opportunity to establish cross-Strait peace.

Authorities on the two sides have a tacit understanding. The Free and Independent Travel Policy will initially be limited to 500 visitors a day. This is not spelled out explicitly in the provisions. Therefore it can be readily increased in the future. Based on 500 visitors a day, and a stay lasting 15 days, on any given day 7,500 visitors from the Chinese mainland will be traveling around on Taiwan under the Free and Independent Travel Policy. If the quota is increased to 1000 visitors a day, on any given day 15,000 visitors from the Chinese mainland will be traveling about on Taiwan under the Free and Independent Travel Policy. Add 4,000 to 5,000 visitors a day traveling around on Taiwan with tour groups, which stay on Taiwan seven to ten days. That means on any given day 40,000 to 50,000 tourists from the Chinese mainland are on visiting Taiwan. Over 36 million tourists from the Chinese mainland visited Hong Kong last year. Among these, 14.2 million visited under the aegis of the Free and Independent Travel Policy. Altogether, they spent around 750 billion NT. That means Taipei's Mainland tourist market has plenty of room for growth.

This is indeed a huge business opportunity, But the significance of tourists from the Chinese mainland, especially those traveling under the aegis of the Free and Independent Travel Policy, is not primarily business related. Rather, it is an opportunity for people to dialogue with each other. Consider the business opportunities. Everyone from the central government to local governments, is eager for visitors from the Chinese mainland. Even Tainan City Mayor Lai Ching-teh (DPP) complains about the lack of direct flights between Tainan and the Chinese mainland. The world's largest Dior flagship store will soon open in the Taipei 101 Building. EVA Air will soon invest 100 billion NT on 20 to 25 new airliners, to accomodate tourists from the Chinese mainland who wish to visit Taiwan. Even the 7-ELEVEN chain is preparing 60,000 "Free and Independent Travel Policy Gift Packages." These are all opportunities created by the Free and Independent Travel Policy. But the significance of the Free and Independent Travel Policy is hardly limited to cross-Strait business opportunities. If we look at the Free and Independent Travel Policy from the economic side alone, we are being far too myopic.

What have visitors from the Chinese mainland experienced? What insights have they gained? Taiwan has picturesque scenery. But so does the Chinese mainland. The Chinese mainland has second-tier cities that surpass Taipei and Kaohsiung economically. Tourists from the Chinese mainland come not to marvel at the scenery. They come not in pursuit of fashion. They come mainly because Taiwan and the Chinese mainland share the same history and cultural heritage. Today, the two sides are engaged in subtle political and economic coopetition. The most important experiences and insights tourists from the Chinese mainland have gained concern the contemplation of history and the exploration of culture. Pineapple cakes and oyster omelets fascinate tourists from the Chinese mainland not necessarily because they like the taste, but because they represent Taiwan. When tourists from the Chinese mainland digest their food, they are digesting 60 plus years of shared history, and of love and hate.

Most visitors from the Chinese mainland are private citizens. When they experience real life on Taiwan under the "Free and Independent Travel Policy" they are able to each people on Taiwan as human beings, heart to heart. They are able temporarily to escape official influence. They are no longer bound by travel agencies. They are engaged in "Free and Independent Travel." These few days may be the freest they have experienced their entire life. Today's Taiwan may or may not be different from, or better than the Chinese mainland. But if it is, it will not be a result of its scenery or its high-rise towers. It will not be a result of its oyster omelets or pineapple cakes. It will be a result of its Free and Independent Travel Policy, which enables visitors from the Chinese mainland to experience something unprecedented in 5000 years of Chinese history: democracy and freedom.

In a well known TV commercial, a tourist from the Chinese mainland says, "This we have on the Mainland. But this we do not." The Chinese mainland is a society that has everything. The only thing it doesn't have is democracy and freedom. For example, tourists from the Chinese mainland love to watch the 8pm evening political call in shows. That is something Taiwan has that the Chinese mainland does not. It is rumored that most visitors from the Chinese mainland feel that democracy on Taiwan is "compelling." But few believe that democracy and freedom can work on the Chinese mainland. But the most important experience and insight Taiwan can leave visitors, is the conviction that the quality and nature of democracy and freedom on Taiwan are such that they would work on the Chinese mainland.

Tourists from the Chinese mainland are passionate. They are easily moved. Many tourists from the Chinese mainland have the highest praise for bus passengers who give up their seats to the infirm, and escalator users who stand on the right. When businesses wait for tourists from the Chinese mainland to pay their bills, everyone on Taiwan should arrive at a tacit understanding. Why not greet tourists from the Chinese mainland with a free and democratic society? That way, when they leave Taiwan, what they will remember the most clearly will not be oyster omlets or pineapple cake, but democracy and freedom.

Do not fail the people who have made human contact. Do not betray the hearts and minds of the people as they dialogue with each other. Tourists from the Chinese mainland may take home with them pineapple cakes. These will last a few days at most. But if they come to respect and cherish freedom and democracy on Taiwan, that will be more important to cross-Strait peace than any business opportunities,

自由,真行!
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.28

陸客來台自由行首發二七三位旅客今日到訪。許多人視此為商業機會,但更重要的是,陸客自由行開創了兩岸人民直接對話交流的機會,為兩岸和平增添契機。

依兩岸主管機關的默契,自由行初期開放每日五百人,但未載於明文規定,以便未來放寬加碼。以每日五百人計,十五天的停留期首尾相加,同日即有七千五百陸客在台自由行;若加至每日一千人,同日即有一萬五千的自由行陸客。倘再加上每日四、五千人團進團出、行程七至十天的「團客」,則同日即有四、五萬陸客在台旅遊。而若以香港去年陸客逾三千六百萬人次,其中自由行一千四百二十萬人次,總消費額達七千五百億台幣計,台灣的「陸客市場」仍大有發展空間。

這確實是龐大的商機,但陸客來台,尤其是自由行,最重大的意義尚不在商機,而在「人民對話」的契機。就商機言,從中央政府到地方政府皆在迎接陸客,連台南市長賴清德也抱怨為何沒有班機;全球最大的Dior旗艦店將在一○一大樓開張,長榮航空為因應大陸市場將以千億資金添購廿至廿五架新客機,連7-ELEVEN也準備六萬份「自由行大禮包」……。這些皆是從商機看陸客自由行,但自由行對兩岸的意義絕不僅是商機而已;如果僅從經濟面看陸客自由行,視域未免太狹隘了。

陸客來台能有何感受與領悟?台灣山水的奇與秀,大陸也有;大陸二線城市的市容市況,亦有超越台北及高雄者。陸客未必是為奇山秀水而來,也未必是為追慕新潮時尚而來。主要原因是在於,台灣和大陸有歷史與人文的關聯,如今又處於政治、經濟的微妙競合關係。陸客來台,最重要的感受與領悟,應在歷史的思考與人文的探索;正如鳳梨酥、蚵仔煎,它的「台味」恐比「美味」對陸客更具魅力,使陸客在咀嚼食物時,同時也咀嚼著兩岸六十餘年來百味雜陳的是非恩怨。

由於來客主要是大陸平民,在進入真正的台灣民間社會「自由行」之時,可以用「民心」來對比「民心」,用「民意」來對比「民意」;他們暫時脫離了官方影響,也不必被旅行社拘束。在自由行的數日中,可能是這位陸客此生在兩岸思考上最「自由」的幾天,而台灣今日真正能異於中國大陸、優於中國大陸者,其實不在奇山秀水、高樓華廈,亦不在蚵仔煎、鳳梨酥,而是在向自由行的陸客展現中國五千年來前所未見的景象:民主與自由!

套一句廣告中陸客的台詞:「這個我們大陸也有,但這個我們沒有。」大陸已是什麼都有的社會,唯一沒有的就是民主與自由。例如,陸客來台在晚上八點爭看的政論叩應節目,才是台灣有、而大陸沒有的景觀。據說,大多數的陸客覺得,台灣的民主自由很給力(帶勁),但少有人認為這種民主自由能行諸中國大陸。其實,台灣若想給來客留下最重大的感受與領悟,那就是希望有朝一日能使陸客覺得:台灣的民主自由,有品質,有境界,也能行諸中國大陸。

陸客是熱情的,容易感動的。許多陸客對台灣公車讓座、捷運手扶梯站立右側及排隊,讚不絕口;當商家等待陸客付帳的時候,全體台灣人民應有一個共識與默契,大家何不協力以反映一個高品質的民主自由社會來迎接陸客,讓他們在離台時,行囊中最可回味的不只是鳳梨酥,而是有品質的民主與有品質的自由。

不要辜負了「民心對民心,民意對民意」的「人民對話」;陸客帶回的鳳梨酥擺不了幾天,但若能使他們對台灣的自由民主,心存尊重與珍惜,這才是重要性遠逾於商機的兩岸和平契機。

Friday, June 24, 2011

The Issue is Policy Achievements, not Current Responsibilities

The Issue is Policy Achievements, not Current Responsibilities
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 25, 2011

It has now been confirmed. Premier Wu Den-yih will be Ma Ying-jeou's running mate in his 2012 re-election bid. Also, Wu will not resign from his current position. The Green Camp has blasted him for holding on to his current position while running for vice president. They say this could undermine his neutrality as premier. Some in the Blue Camp are concerned that Wu may draw fire for this.

Actually, many government leaders have run for elective office while holding on to their current positions. This really shouldn't be an issue. For example, In 1996, during the first direct presidential election, the ruling KMT nominated President Lee Teng-hui as its presidential candidate, and Premier Lien Chan as its vice presidential candidate. No one in the entire country objected. In 2000, during the second direct presidential election, Lee Teng-hui reached his term limits. The ruling Kuomintang nominated Vice President Lien Chan for president, and as his vice presidential running mate, Premier Vincent Siew. Again, no one in the entire country objected. The reason was simple. When challenged by an opposition party, the ruling party runs on its record. This is standard party politics. If one wishes to challenge the ruling party's performance record, who is one going to challenge, if not those currently in office?

The first ruling party change in 2000 was followed by the 2004 presidential election. The incumbents, Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu, formed a ticket and ran for re-election. Both had job responsibilities. But no one asked them to resign. If every time an election comes around, elective officials must resign, how can a nation's government continue to operate? The DPP ruled for eight years. It changed premiers six times. The "party princes" took turns serving as premier. This may have mollified the party princes. But it led to major policy failure during the party's eight years in power.

By the time of the 2008 presidential election, Chen and Lu had both reached their term limits. The DPP nominated two former premiers, Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang. To some extent this reflected the approach of the DPP party factions and party Elders. This enabled Chang Chun-hsiung, who had served as premier, to return to power. This allowed Hsieh and Su to dedicate themselves totally to the election campaign, and to avoid direct attacks by the KMT opposition in the legislature.

The affairs of the state should not be interrupted by elections. If a premier wishes to run for president, he may have to make appearances everywhere. But if he is merely the vice presidential candidate, the problem is not nearly so serious. After all, the vice presidency is merely a supporting role. The presidential candidate is the star of the show.

Of course, if the KMT or President Ma Ying-jeou feel that Wu Den-yih's candidacy makes him a target in the DPP's legislative campaign, it can ask him to resign. But that would be a political calculation. It would be irresponsible. As leaders of the ruling administration, Ma Ying-jeou's choice of Premier Wu as his running mate was motivated by his job performance. It was made to see whether the public approved of the Ma admininstration's job performance. This battle will be fought in the legislature.

From this perspective, the DPP has no reason to oppose or criticize Premier Wu's vice presidential bid. Instead, it should welcome it. Tsai Ing-wen and her running mate will be attending rallies all over Taiwan. Ma Ying-jeou's running mate, meanwhile, will be chained to the legislature, and attacked by DPP legislators from all sides. Any accomplishments cited by the KMT as part of it reelection bid, will be subject to harsh scrutiny in the Legislative Yuan. Wu Den-yih will have to stand on the front lines, and welcome the DPP's fire. If the Ma administration's job performance fails to win public approval, can Premier Wu and his cabinet resign en masse to take the blame? In other words, Wu Den-yih as vice presidential candidate, has become a member of Ma's election campaign. He is helping it formulate strategies and tactics. He is duty bound not to resign. He must become the Ma/Wu ticket's most eloquent champion.

Wu Den-yih is running while still in office. Could this lead to a violation of adminstrative neutrality? It could. But hopefully, it will not. For political appointees within the Executive Yuan, it is no problem whatsoever. Even if President Ma's running mate were not the premier, they would still be helping President Ma's reelection campaign. Suppose Wu Den-yih resigns, the premier is changed, and the cabinet is reshuffled? A newly appointed cabinet would need to get on track immediately, and trumpet the Ma administration's achievements. This has nothing to do administrative neutrality, and everything to do with party politics.

The DPP was in power for eight years. Consider the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections. Which one of these did not involve the full marshalling of the ruling party's administrative resources? The Referendum to Enter the UN alone aroused controversy. But the DPP failed to engage in the slightest soul-searching.

Of course, just because the DPP did something wrong, does not mean that the KMT should be permitted to do it as well. For example, the Ma administration must not mobilize civil servants to campaign on its behalf, to wave flags, and to shout slogans. Still less can it divert government resources to underwrite election propaganda. Former Xinbei City Bureau of Civil Affairs Chief Li Chien Lung invited over one hundred township mayors, county chiefs, city mayors, and borough chiefs to lunch with Ma and Wu. This activity was held after working hours. The invited guests were township mayors, county chiefs, and city mayors. Strictly speaking, they were not civil servants. But since these offices are now appointive offices. discretion should be the watchword. The DPP has demanded prosecution. Li Chien-Long immediately resigned his position.

As soon as Premier Wu was confirmed as Ma's running mate, he announced that he would maintain strict political neutrality. He would make no illegal use of administrative resources. His campaigning would not create delays or obstacles to the implementation of government policy. Premier Wu said the DPP should not fear that he cannot deliver. Democracy on Taiwan is diversified. Questionable conduct cannot escape public notice. Premier Wu will of course not betray his commitments. He will not give the DPP an opportunity to discredit him.

帶職參選不是重點 政績才是關鍵
2011-06-25 中國時報

行政院長吳敦義確定將與國民黨二○一二總統參選人馬英九搭檔競選連任,而且,不會辭職。對他帶職參選這件事綠營批評不少,認為有行政不中立之虞,藍營內部也有擔心他因此成為箭靶的聲音。

做為現任首長,帶職參選例子所在多有,其實不值得討論,隨便舉例,一九九六年首次總統民選,執政的國民黨推出的組合就是現任總統李登輝,搭配現任行政院長連戰,舉國並無異聲;二○○○年第二次總統直選,李登輝任期屆滿,執政的國民黨推出現任副總統連戰,搭配現任行政院長蕭萬長,同樣沒有任何爭議。原因很簡單,執政者以政績接受在野黨挑戰,本屬政黨政治之常態,既要挑戰政績,不衝著現任要衝著誰呢?

二○○○年政黨輪替之後,二○○四年總統大選,現任的陳水扁與呂秀蓮搭檔競選連任,都是帶職參選,沒人會要求他們辭職,如果一遇選舉,現任都辭職,國家政務還能繼續推動嗎?民進黨執政八年,換了六任行政院長,讓黨內天王輪流出任閣揆,擺平了天王,卻讓八年執政期間,重大政策七零八落。

至於二○○八年總統大選,陳呂任期屆滿,民進黨推出謝長廷、蘇貞昌兩位前任行政院長搭檔競選,某種程度是民進黨擺平黨內派系和大老勢力的方法,讓當過行政院長的張俊雄回鍋坐鎮,謝蘇則全心投入選戰,避開在野的國民黨在國會直接攻擊。

從政務不因選舉而中斷的角度,行政院長如果競選總統,可能出現分身乏術的狀況,但若只是扮演副總統候選人的角色,問題不大,畢竟副手只是配角,總統候選人才是主角。

當然,國民黨或馬英九總統若認為吳敦義帶職參選,直接面對民進黨的國會攻勢,可能招架不住,而要吳揆請辭避開炮火,也是一個方法,但這是選舉戰術考量,反而不負責任。做為現任執政者,馬英九選擇吳揆做為他連任的搭檔,就是要以此驗證馬政府的政績,民意是否認可馬執政團隊的表現,最直接的攻守戰場就是在立法院。

從這個角度分析,民進黨不但不必反對或批評吳揆帶職參選,反而應該大表歡迎。當蔡英文和她的副手全台趴趴走爭取民意支持的時刻,馬英九的副手卻被綁在立法院,面對民進黨立委的全面襲擊,凡是國民黨提出的政績表現,在立法院都得遭到嚴苛的檢視,吳敦義只能站在國會第一線,迎戰民進黨的炮火,如果馬政府政績不被民意認可,吳揆帶領的行政團隊能辭其咎嗎?換言之,吳敦義以副手身分直接進入馬競選團隊,協助籌畫戰略戰術;在外則義不容辭,非得成為馬吳配最直接的炮手兼辯士。

至於吳敦義帶職參選會不會造成行政不中立?這可能是個問題,卻也不是問題。對行政院各部會政務官而言,完全不是問題,就算馬總統的搭檔不是閣揆,他們都得為馬總統連任提供政策辯護,因為他們執行的正是馬政府的政策,即使吳敦義辭職,閣揆更迭,內閣改組,新上任的團隊都得在第一時間立刻接軌,宣揚馬政府的政績,這和行政是否中立無關,而與政黨政治的精神有關。

民進黨執政八年,就以○四與○八年兩次總統大選為例,哪一次不是行政資源全面投入?光是入聯公投一項就備受爭議,也沒見民進黨反省。

當然,民進黨做錯的事,不表示國民黨可以做,比方說,馬政府絕對不可以動員公務員輔選站台,搖旗吶喊,更不可以挪移政府預算做為選舉宣傳。最近新北市前民政局長李乾龍以全國鄉鎮市長聯誼會名義,邀請百餘位鄉鎮市長、區長聚餐,馬、吳先後出席,儘管此一活動係公餘時間辦理,受邀鄉鎮市區長也不是狹義的公務員,但既改為官派,就得慎重,民進黨提出告發後,李乾龍立刻請辭即為一例。

吳揆在確定與馬總統搭檔後,明確宣示絕對嚴守行政中立,不會違法動用行政資源,也不會因參選而延誤、妨礙政府施政。民進黨不必擔心吳揆說到做不到,以台灣民主發展的多元化,任何可能引起爭議的做為,都難逃民眾的耳目,吳揆當不至於毀其承諾,搬石頭讓民進黨有機會砸。

Thursday, June 23, 2011

One Country, Two Governments: Blossoms from a Dead Branch

One Country, Two Governments: Blossoms from a Dead Branch
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 24, 2011

Chu Shulong is a professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Chu published a paper at the Brookings Institute in Washington, advancing a "one country, two governments" concept. He urges the two sides to maintain the status quo of "one China, different interpretations." He says they should accept each other and recognize each other as the "central government" within "one China."

In the past, Beijing was strongly opposed to "one country, two governments." Chu Shulong knows this. Nevertheless he came forward with this proposal. He has promoted it three times in three years. Policymakers in Beijing however, have yet speak out against his proposal. As a result, scholars on Taiwan suspect Chu Shulong is "testing the waters." Their judgment is consistent with past experience.

Are policymakers in Beijing intentionally releasing a trial balloon? Perhaps they are playing along with the release of a trial balloon? Will this this line of thought become Beijing's policy? If so, it would be the biggest change in Beijing's policy in 60 years. To use Chu Shulong's language, the "central governments" in Taipei and Beijing must go from mutual denial of each other's status as a central government, to mutual acknowledgement of each other's status as a central government. Chu said that for officials on the two sides to address each other's leaders as "Mister" is abnormal. What he means is that when Chen Yunlin met Ma Ying-jeou, he should have referred to him as "President Ma."

Actually, Chu Shulong's understanding is a variation on the "big roof theory." Many variations of this cross-Strait perspective exist, on Taiwan and internationally. Even on the Mainland one hears talk of a "national sphere theory," of "Confronting the Existence of the Republic of China," and of how "Beheading (the Republic of China) is not easy." They all go around in circles. But they all arrive at the same spot. Today, Chu Shulong's proposal has caught the public eye, because for Beijing, "one country, two governments" remains taboo. Also, "one country, two governments" cuts the Gordian Knot at the crux of the cross-Strait impasse. Both the government and the opposition on the Mainland must surmount this political taboo. They must transform "one country, two governments" into a long-term solution for the cross-Strait impasse. This would constitute a macro level contribution to cross-Strait development.

Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office has refrained from commenting on Chu Shulong's proposal. Chu Shulong has not been shy about the topic, and continues to grant interviews. This suggests that the incident may have gone beyond the "testing the waters" stage. We suggest that the Taiwan Affairs Office respond with something along the lines of "we respect diversity of thought," or with a mantra such as "all issues are open to discussion." Otherwise it should continue saying "no comment." It should not burn its bridges, because "one country, two governments" does not violate the "one China principle."

The ROC government is holding its presidential election. This is not the time to discuss issues such as "one country, two governments." But if "one country, two governments" becomes a topic in future cross-Strait policy discussions, it will inevitably reduce consideration of Taiwan Independence as an possibility. The "one country, two governments" proposal may not be 100% consistent with the "one China, different interpretations." But it could be considered a variation on "one China, different interpretations." We should view it positively, as well-meaning. Both "one country, two governments" and "one China, two governments" start by recognizing the status quo. They maintain the status quo, then attempt to improve the situation; Therefore if actual policy debate begins, and a well thought out policy is presented, most of the public on Taiwan will understand and accept it.

Chu Shulong insists that "one country, two governments" already exists. The KMT government in Nanjing at one time recognized the CCP's Border Region Government. He said that "one country, two governments" has already been incorporated into the "five visions" issued by the KMT and CCP, and many other arguments advanced by Beijing, He said the two sides "already see things this way, but have yet to implement them." His perspective is credible. There is evidence for it. Yesterday this newspaper published an editorial, reiterating a "third concept of China, a China with divided rule, but undivided sovereignty and territory." At the macro level, this could be considered part of "one country, two governments." The difference between the two is that the "third concept of China" has slightly different connotations.

Actually, "one country, two governments" is the most straightforward "big roof theory." But past political constraints made mention of it taboo, As a result, a wide range of euphemisms for "one country, two governments" that shied from using the expression "one country, two governments." began to appear. Everyone assumed the expression "one country, two governments" could not longer be used. But Chu Shulong reintroduced it into the cross-Strait dialogue. Was he really "testing the waters?" Or did both the government and the opposition on the Chinese mainland give this taboo word a free pass? If so, this may enable the two sides to seek common solutions to cross-Strait problems.

If one examines the details of the "big roof theories," and "one country, two governments," one discovers a multitude of variations on "one country, two governments." None of them however, are at odds with the main thrust of the cross-Strait thought, without which there can be no solution. The "one country, two governments" concept was considered dead. Now however, it has once again made headlines. It can be likened to a bloom emerging from a dead branch, It comes as something of a shock, but also as a ray of hope.

一國兩府‧枯樹生花
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.06.24 02:55 am

北京清華大學教授楚樹龍在華府智庫布魯金斯研究院撰文,提出「一國兩府」概念,主張兩岸應協議維持「一中各表」的台海現狀,進而相互接受及相互承認對方是「『一個中國』之內的『中央政府』」。

大陸方面過去強烈反對「一國兩府」,楚樹龍對此不可能不知;但他出面公開作此主張,且連續三年說了三次,皆未見北京政策當局出面阻擋。因而,此間學者認為楚樹龍的說法「可能是從外圍試水溫」;在某種程度上,這樣的判斷符合經驗法則。

倘若這真是北京政策當局有意施放或無意阻擋的政治氣球,而如果此一思維未來能成為北京當局的政策方向,這無疑將是六十餘年來大陸方面最大的政策創新。用楚樹龍的語言來說,這就是要兩岸各自的「中央政府」從「相互否認」轉變成「相互承認」;他說,現在兩岸官員互稱對方領導人為「先生」,是不正常,不應該的。他所指的應當是:陳雲林見馬英九,應該稱「馬總統」。

其實,楚樹龍的見解即是「泛屋頂理論」,在台灣及國際上有極多兩岸論述皆可歸入此一類型;甚至在大陸上也有「國家球體理論」、「正視中華民國存在問題」,及「不宜採砍頭論(砍中華民國的頭)」等說法,迂迴曲繞,但皆為同一指向。如今,楚樹龍的說法之所以奪目,是因「一國兩府」本在大陸當局是重度禁忌詞,而「一國兩府」又毫無修飾地掀開了兩岸困局的癥結;倘若能夠自此使大陸朝野打破了這個政治禁忌,並使「一國兩府」之類的議論成為兩岸朝野共謀長遠方案的思考課題,這就對大局大勢極有裨益。

所以,北京國台辦迄今對楚樹龍的消息見報不作評論,而楚樹龍亦不避諱就此議題繼續接受專訪,皆可能使此事發生超越「試水溫」的作用。因此,我們建議國台辦應可考慮作出「尊重多元思維」之類的回應,或不妨使出「什麼問題都可以談」的口頭禪,以預留地步;否則亦應繼續「不作評論」,不要自斷後路。因為,「一國兩府」無違「一中原則」。

台灣正進入總統大選,不是討論「一國兩府」這類議題的時機。然而,如果「一國兩府」未來成為兩岸政策議題,必然將進一步壓縮台獨論述的空間;而「一國兩府」雖未必與「一中各表」完全符合,但可視為「一中各表」的一個可能形態。若從正面及善意的角度來看,「一國兩府」或「一中兩府」,是從承認現狀出發,朝向維持現狀及改善現狀;因此,可以推測,若能進入真實的政策辯論,且有平衡的配套,台灣多數民意對此或有理解及接納的可能。

楚樹龍直言無諱地說,「一國兩府」早已存在,國民黨南京政府即承認過中共的邊區政府。他又說,一國兩府,其實在國共「五大願景」及北京當局的其他許多論述中,「都已這麼看了,但還沒有這麼作」;此說亦信而有徵,可以參閱昨日本報社論。而本報昨日社論再次強調的「一個分治而不分裂的第三概念中國」,在大體系上亦可涵括「一國兩府」的主張,二者的差異可能是在對「第三概念的中國」內涵的認知不同。

其實,「一國兩府」是最直白的「泛屋頂理論」;卻因過去的政治限囿而成為禁忌詞,於是才有諸多「不說一國兩府,其實就是一國兩府」的修飾詞彙出現。如今,楚樹龍把這個大家都覺得已經不能再使用的「一國兩府」的舊詞彙,又帶回到兩岸議題的詞典中;倘若這真有「試水溫」的作用,倘若這對大陸朝野真是一次「禁忌詞的特赦」,應可為兩岸共謀解決方案添增許多智慧與契機。

猶如所有的「泛屋頂理論」,「一國兩府」的細節猶待探究,而「一國兩府」也可能有多種版本;但這皆無礙它是兩岸方案的主要思維方向,捨此無解。乍見以為早已死滅的「一國兩府」又上報紙頭條標題,猶如看見枯樹生花,有驚疑,也有期待。

Wednesday, June 22, 2011

A Peace Agreement: An Interim Solution

A Peace Agreement: An Interim Solution
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 23, 2011

The whistleblower website WikiLeaks has published a message sent by the US Department of State. The message said that Mainland Chinese President Hu Jintao established a research group in 2006, in the hope of making a major breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. It said he hoped to find a cross-Strait framework acceptable to both sides, midway between the "one country, two systems" model and the "two states" model.

Based on what we know of Hu Jintao's actions on cross-Strait relations over the years, the report seems credible. On March 22, 2008, Ma Ying-jeou was elected president of the ROC. Four days later, on March 26, President Hu Jintao spoke on the hotline with US President George W. Bush. Hu said that "The Chinese mainland and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, The parties acknowledge that there is only one China, but agree to define the term in their own way." Nine months later, on New Year's Eve, Hu announced his "Hu Six Points." Hu said that "The nation faces special political circumstances. It is not yet reunified. Nevertheless the two sides can begin pragmatic discussions." Hu Jintao's two statements represent some of the most innovative thinking on cross-Strait policy in a long time.

During the March Bush/Hu hotline conversation, Hu referred to "one China, different interpretations." On New Year's Eve, when Hu announced his Hu Six Points, he conceded that the nation was not yet reunified, and that it faces special political circumstances, but that pragmatic discussions could nonetheless begin. His remarks had two implications. One. He conceded that the nation is not yet reunified. He implied that the special political circumstances were acceptable, and must be accepted. Hu formally reaffirmed his previous statement, "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they nevertheless remain part of one China." In the past, this was unacceptable, because "not yet reunified" was considered acquiescence to divided rule. Two. Hu went so far as to speak of special political circumstances and pragmatic discussions. In effect, he conceded that there were options in cross-Strait political relations other than reunification. One could imagine political relations under special circumstances in which the nation is not yet reunified.

Consider Hu Jintao's policy from this newspaper's long-held perspective on cross-strait relations. We would say that Hu has moved from "goal orientation" to "process orientation." He has moved from "reunification" to "reconnection." His is contemplating a "third concept of China" that transcends both the ROC and the PRC. He understands the "glass theory," which states that the ROC is the glass, and Taiwan is the water. As long is the glass remains intact, the water is contained within the glass. Once the glass is broken, the water runs off.

According to WikiLeaks, Hu Jintao is seeking a solution midway between the "one country, two systems" model, and the "two states" model. Hong Kong's "one country, two systems" model cannot be applied to the ROC, It is hard to imagine the Republic of China not holding presidential elections, and instead electing a Special Executive. If the "two states theory" means "one nation on each side," that is unacceptable to both the government and the opposition on the Chinese mainland. The model midway between the "one country, two systems" model and the "two states" model is midway between "total reunification" and a "permanent split." It is a means of establishing political relations between the two sides under circumstances in which the nation is not yet reunified. It is a way to ensure that "although the two sides are not yet reunified, they are still part of one China." It is a way to ensure "different interpretations."

In fact, the phrase "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they nevertheless remain part of one China" is the same as "one China, different interpretations." This however, is confined to the level of thinking and language. It has yet to be legalized and institutionalized. Hu Jintao is probably referring to this when he speaks of pragmatic discussions.

The first thought that comes to mind is a "quasi-confederation." This newspaper proposes a new three part statement of principles. "There is only one China in the world. The ROC and the PRC are both part of that one China. China's territory and sovereignty are indivisible." Scholars speak of "one China, three constitutions." All of these can be considered a "quasi-confederation." This however, may be aiming too high. This may be hard to achieve. What is needed is an "interim solution" to serve as a turning point.

A peace agreement would be just such an interim solution. A quasi-confederation would require a "third constitution" and a joint-confederation hierarchy. That would be no simple task. But the two sides could sign a peace agreement, in their capacity as warring parties in a civil war. They could do so on the basis of "one China, different interpretations," as expressed in both sides' constitutions. They could commit to a long term cease-fire and peace. They could establish a long term, bilateral, cabinet level "cross-strait peace and development conference." This might allow the two sides to legalize and institutionalize the concepts expressed in such phrases as "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they nevertheless remain part of one China," "special circumstances," and "one China, different interpretations."

If we wish to sign a peace agreement, we must first agree on its central premise. For example, it may not be possible for the two sides to reach an accord as "Republic of China President Ma Ying-jeou" and as "Peoples Republic of China President Hu Jintao." But it may be possible for them to reach an accord as "the Taiwan authorities' President Ma Ying-jeou" and as "the Mainland authorities' President Hu Jintao." Absent agreement on this most basic of conditions, no peace agreement is possible.

If the authorities on the two sides are willing to pursue the matter, we hope they start soon. The two sides should refer to each other as "the Taipei authorities" and as "the Beijing authorities." For example, as "the Taipei authorities' Department of Health," "the Taiwan authorities' Economic Minister," "the Beijing authorities' Ministry of Culture" and "the Beijing authorities' State Council." They could even refer to each other as "the Taiwan authorities' President Ma" and "the Mainland authorities' President Hu." Hopefully the two sides will make good use of the opportunities afforded them in the next four to five years. If so, they can move toward signing a cross-Strait peace agreement. If by then they have not achieved a quasi-confederation, the two sides can still refer to each other as "the Taiwan authorities' President" and "the Mainland authorities' President" in their capacity as "warring parties in a civil war."

Consider the big picture. The two sides are engaged in coopetition. They have now reached a take profit point and a stop-loss point. A peace agreement is an interim solution that could consolidate the "special circumstances." It could uphold "a third concept of a China under divided rule, but undivided sovereignty."

The two sides enjoy a four or five year window of opportunity. They can begin by referring to each other as "the Taiwan authorities" and "the Mainland authorities." They can expedite an interim solution. They can establish a framework for peaceful development "under divided administration, but undivided sovereignty." They can establish mutual goodwill, change people's hearts and minds, and trade time for space. They can transform cross-Strait negotiations into a rational process. They can clarify their goals. We do not know whether the two sides in fact enjoy a four or five year window of opportunity. But if they do, this is it.

和平協議就是中程方案
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.23

爆料網站「維基解密」公布美國外交電文稱:大陸國家主席胡錦濤,為在兩岸問題取得重大突破,於二○○六年成立研究小組,期望在「一國兩制」與「兩國論」之間找到一個兩岸都能接受的模式。

從這些年來胡錦濤的兩岸施為來看,此說應當可信。二○○八年三月二十二日,馬英九當選中華民國總統,四天後,三月二十六日,胡錦濤主席在熱線電話中對美國總統布希說:「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識基礎上恢復談判,雙方承認只有一個中國,但同意對其定義各自表述。」九個月後,十二月三十一日除夕,胡錦濤在「胡六點」指出;「兩岸可以就在國家尚未統一前的特殊情況下的政治關係展開務實探討。」胡錦濤的這兩次談話,應可視為其兩岸政策的主要創新思維。

三月的布胡熱線談話,就是「一中各表」;而上引除夕「胡六點」所述,則是胡錦濤再次確認了「在國家尚未統一前的特殊情況」之存在,並謂可「務實探討」此一「特殊情況」下的「政治關係」。此意是說:一、承認「國家尚未統一」是可以接受及必須接受的「特殊情況」,亦即正式確定胡錦濤此前所主張的「儘管尚未統一,仍是一個中國」;這在過去是不行的,因為「尚未統一」是不容接受的「分裂分治」。二、至於進一步主張可就此一「特殊情況」的「政治關係」務實探討,即是表明,兩岸的「政治關係」未必只有「統一」一個念想,而是可以想像建立一個「在國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係」。

若以本報對兩岸議題的一貫看法對胡錦濤的政策思維進行解讀,我們認為:胡錦濤應是從「目的論」轉向了「過程論」,從「統一論」轉到了「連結論」,且腦中存有一個超越中華民國與中華人民共和國的「第三概念的中國」,亦深知「杯子理論」的道理:中華民國是杯,台灣是水;杯在水在,杯破水覆。

「維基解密」說,胡錦濤想在「一國兩制」與「兩國論」之間找到方案。香港的「一國兩制」不可行,因為不易想像要中華民國不選總統,而改選特首;至於「兩國論」如果是指「一邊一國」,亦非大陸朝野所能接受。而所謂「在一國兩制與兩國論之間」的方案,應就是「在完全統一及永遠分裂之間」的方案,也就是欲設法建立一個「在國家尚未統一前特殊情況下的政治關係」,以確保「儘管尚未統一,仍是一個中國」,亦即確保「一中各表」。

其實,「儘管尚未統一,仍是一個中國」,就是「一中各表」。只是,這些皆迄仍停留在思維及語言層次,沒有法制化及機構化。胡錦濤意欲「務實探討」者,應即指此。

第一個進入人們腦際者,應是「泛邦聯模式」。本報主張的新新三句「世界上只有一個中國,中華民國與中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國,中國的領土與主權不容分割」,及學者鼓吹的「一中三憲」,可謂皆是「泛邦聯模式」。然而,此恐懸鵠過高,不易企及;須有一個「中程方案」作為轉折。

這個「中程方案」就是「和平協議」。因為「泛邦聯模式」須有「第三憲」及合組邦聯機構,皆非易事;但兩岸若在「內戰交戰政府」的對等地位上簽署「和平協議」,載明以雙方憲法的「一中各表」為連結與基礎,達成永遠停戰及共維和平的信諾,而在雙邊內閣層次建立常設的「兩岸和平發展會議」,或許就能使「儘管尚未統一,仍是一個中國」及「一中各表」的「特殊情況」得以法制化及機構化。

若欲簽署「和平協議」,首須確立「議和主體」。譬如說,若不能以「中華民國總統馬英九」及「中華人民共和國主席胡錦濤」的地位簽署,至少應以「台灣當局:總統馬英九」及「大陸當局:國家主席胡錦濤」落款。倘若沒有這個最基本的條件,和平協議絕無可能簽得成。

如果這是兩岸當局認為可以追求的方案,我們希望從最近的將來開始,兩岸雙方應以台北當局及北京當局互稱,例如稱「台北當局的衛生署」或「台灣當局的經濟部長」等,及「北京當局的文化部」或「大陸當局的國務院」等,甚至相對稱呼「台灣當局馬總統」與「大陸當局胡主席」。進一步言,倘若未來兩岸還能維持四、五年的機遇期,則可朝簽定兩岸「和平協議」的方向努力,屆時若未達成邦聯一類的架構,簽署雙方在「內戰交戰政府」的框架下,即可考慮以「台灣當局:總統/大陸當局:主席」互稱。

就大局大勢言,兩岸在雙邊競合關係上,目前可謂皆已面臨了最佳的「停利點」及「停損點」。「和平協議」即是可將此一「特殊情況」穩固化的「中程方案」,以確保「一個分治而不分裂的第三概念的中國。」

再重複一次:如果兩岸尚有四、五年的機遇期,可從互稱台灣當局、大陸當局起步,及早建立一個「中程方案」,確立「分治而不分裂」的和平發展框架;雙方皆可藉以累積善意,感化人心,「以時間換取空間」,將兩岸關係導向「合理的過程」,以通往「改善之目的」。我們不知還有沒有這四、五年的時機,但這必定是最後一個機會。

Tuesday, June 21, 2011

Tsai Ing-wen Eager to Talk to Beijing: But Why Not Talk to the Voters First?

Tsai Ing-wen Eager to Talk to Beijing:
But Why Not Talk to the Voters First?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 22, 2011

During her recent trip to the Philippines, Tsai Ing-wen said that the DPP is willing to sit down with Beijing and discuss a "sustainable" framework for cross-Strait interaction. But the presidential election is only six months away. Why doesn't Tsai Ing-wen share her "sustainable" framework for cross-Strait interaction with her fellow citizens of the ROC? Or does Beijing rank higher in her political hierarchy than qualified voters of the ROC?

Tsai Ing-wen said she has been totally clear about her cross-Strait principles. She said some people have accused her of being deliberately ambiguous. She said her accusers are deliberately choosing not to understand.

Just what is Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy? She has voiced her opinion on a number of issues. One. She rejects the 1992 Consensus. Two. She is considering demanding a referendum on ECFA, or demanding that ECFA be sent back to the legislature for review. Third. She once said that "If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will continue the former administration's cross-Strait policy." Four. She proposes "Peace with differences. Peace while seeking common ground." Five. She has denied saying that the Macao model could replace the existing consultation mechanism. Six. She would replace a growth and export oriented economy with a "locally based economy."

Can these mutually contradictory statements really be considered "totally clear?" Can listeners really be accused of "deliberately choosing not to understand?" One. Tsai rejects the 1992 Consensus, purportedly because it "forfeits sovereignty and humiliates the nation." But where is her alternative? Two. Tsai insists that ECFA "panders to [Mainland] China and sells out Taiwan." But what does she plan to do about it? Does she intend to demand a referendum? Does she intend to send it back to the Legislative Yuan for review? Third, She says she intends to continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy. if so, why not continue the previous administration's "One China, Different Interpretations" policy as well? Why not continue its policy of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force?" If Tsai does not continue these policies, how can she continue the 15 agreements predicated upon these policies? Four. What exactly is "Peace with differences. Peace while seeking common ground?" What are the "differences?" What is "seeking common ground?" How exactly does she intend to go about "seeking common ground?" If she rejects the 1992 Consensus, can there be any peace to speak of? Five. She apparently realizes the Macao model is not feasible. Does she intend to preserve the existing consultation mechanism? Will Chen Yunlin be allowed to visit? When the time comes, will "President Tsai" once again climb onto a sound truck, to bait this visitor from the Mainland? Six. Does Tsai really believe that a "locally based economy" can do away with cross-Strait exchanges? If so, she should take a gander at the waves of Mainland tourists ascending to the top of the Taipei 101 Building and crowding the night markets.

Leave her ambiguous rhetoric aside for the moment. Tsai Ing-wen also says that "The ROC is a government in exile." But she has yet to explain herself. She remains totally unclear on whether she even recognizes the ROC. In which case, how can she possibly be clear on her cross-Strait policy? Also, what has become of Tsai Ing-wen's "Political Platform for the Coming Decade, Cross-Strait Edition" which she trumpeted for the past three years? It is not merely unclear. It has evaporated into thin air. Nothing more has been heard about it.

Tsai Ing-wen says she thinks the two sides need a "sustainable" mechanism for cross-Strait interaction. Is Tsai a rational and responsible presidential candidate? If so, then shouldn't she present her "sustainable" mechanism for cross-Strait interaction to the people? Only that would be consistent with the principles of "democracy, transparency, oversight" that Tsai purports to uphold. How can she seek to "sit down and talk" with the authorities in Beijing, when the general election is looming, and she continues to bob and weave and evade the issue?

Consider the cross-Strait views that Tsai Ing-wen have voiced lately. She has commented on the 1992 Consensus, on One China, Different Interpretations, on no [immeidate] reunification, no independence, no use of force, on ECFA and the 15 agreements, on direct flights and the influx of Mainland tourists, on the diplomatic truce, on ARATS and the SEF, and on the cross-Strait economic cooperation committee. To her, none of these are "sustainable" mechanisms for cross-Strait interaction. Even the Republic of China, in her eyes, is a "government in exile." It too, fails to qualify as a "sustainable" mechanism for cross-Strait interaction. What exactly does Tsai Ing-wen consider a "sustainable" cross-Strait solution? Before she talks to Beijing shouldn't she report to the people first?

Tsai Ing-wen is directing her rhetorical barrage at Beijing, She is attempting to force Beijing to respond to a "different sort of DPP." But Tsai Ing-wen has joined herself at the hip with Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, Koo Kwan-min and the Taiwan independence movement. Her campaign workers are either Chen supporters or Hsieh supporters. They are either Koo supporters or Taiwan independence activists. That being the case, how exactly is the DPP any different? Tsai Ing-wen stopped Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus in 2000. Even today she continues to reject it. How exactly is she any different?

Tsai Ing-wen remains unclear on cross-Strait policy. She is attempting to run for president on a deliberately ambiguous campaign platform. She may be trying to deceive Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, Koo Kwan-min and the Taiwan independence movement. She may be trying to deceive the authorities in Beijing. She is definitely trying to deceive ROC voters. Voters who support Tsai Ing-wen, especially advocates of Taiwan independence, are willing to support her merely so they can win the election and hustle her into the office of the president. Their strategy is to first win the election by deceiving the public. The details can be hashed out later. If that is the case, then Tsai Ing-wen's election bid is nothing more than a giant scam. If it is not exposed for what it is before the election, it will be exposed for what it is after she is elected.

Tsai Ing-wen says Beijing is willing to listen to the Democratic Progressive Party. But Beijing has already stated that "Cross-Strait exchanges are based entirely on the 1992 Consensus." Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen must first explain her "sustainable" cross-Strait policy to the voters. Today she disingenuously harangues Beijing with her rhetoric. What is she doing, but revealing her hidden insecurities?

蔡英文欲與北京談,何不先對選民說?
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.22

蔡英文在訪菲律賓期間說:民進黨願與中國坐下來,談論「可長可久」的互動架構。然而,距今只有六個多月就要總統大選了,蔡英文何不先將她腹笥中「可長可久」的兩岸互動架構向國人公告?難道在她的政治階序中,中國當局的地位要高於選民?

蔡英文還說,她對兩岸問題的處理原則一直很清楚,有人認為不清楚,是因為他們故意不看清楚它。

蔡英文的兩岸政策是什麼?其已經發布者是:一、反對九二共識;二、ECFA公投是一個選項,或交付立法院重審;三、曾稱「民進黨若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」;四、宣示「和而不同,和而求同」;五、否定可用澳門模式取代兩岸現行協商架構;六、以「在地經濟」,取代成長掛帥與出口導向。

這些矛盾百出的說法難道可稱是「一直很清楚」?或是有人「故意不去看清楚」?試問:一、反對「喪權辱國」的「九二共識」,其替代方案是什麼?二、「傾中賣台」的ECFA究竟存廢如何?還要不要公投?或是丟給立法院重審?三、若延續前朝兩岸政策,為何不延續「一中各表」、「不統,不獨,不武」這些前提政策?而若不延續這些前提,又豈能延續在此基礎上建立的十五項協議?四、什麼叫做「和而不同,和而求同」?「不同」何在?「求同」者何?又如何「求同」?倘否定九二共識,還有「和」可言麼?五、若認為澳門模式不可行,是否延續現行協商架構?陳雲林能否來訪?屆時「蔡總統」仍將站在戰車上以滿街狼藉相迎?六、「在地經濟」難道就不必以兩岸交流支持?看一看一○一大樓及六合夜市的陸客潮吧。

這些「不清不楚」的說詞暫且不論,蔡英文又說「中華民國是一個流亡政府」,迄今亦未見其本人作出解釋;但倘若連對「中華民國」的認同亦不清不楚,遑論能有什麼清楚的兩岸政策?還有,蔡英文喊了三年的「十年政綱兩岸篇」爾今進度如何?則非但不清不楚,簡直是憑空蒸發,全無下文了。

蔡英文認為兩岸應有一「可長可久」的互動架構。然則,若要作一個理性的負責任的總統參選人,自然應先將此一「可長可久」的互動架構報告國人,這才符合蔡英文始終標榜的「民主/透明/監督」原則;豈能先向中國當局放話要「坐下來談」,卻迄今仍在大選政見中閃爍其詞、避重就輕?

以蔡英文迄今發布的兩岸主張來看,「九二共識,一中各表」、「不統,不獨,不武」、ECFA等十五項協議、直航與陸客來台、外交休兵、兩會架構,及兩岸經濟合作委員會等,似皆非「可長可久」的互動架構,亦非有益於「可長可久」的先行架構,甚至連「中華民國」這個「流亡政府」,亦非兩岸「可長可久」的互動體制;那麼,蔡英文所謂的「可長可久」的兩岸方案究竟是什麼?在她與中國談以前,竟難道不應先向國人報告?

蔡英文向中國喊話,提示北京要面對一個「不一樣的民進黨」。但是,蔡英文如今非但與「扁李謝辜獨」合體,連工作層次的人馬也非扁即謝,非辜即獨;然則,民進黨究竟有什麼「不一樣」?而蔡英文自二○○○年阻擋陳水扁承認「九二共識」以來,迄今亦仍然否定「九二共識」,又有何「不一樣」?

蔡英文不把兩岸政策說清楚,欲以這種不清不楚的手法投入總統大選;她不是想騙「扁李謝辜獨」,就是想騙北京當局,更不啻是在騙全體選民;而在支持蔡英文的選民之中,尤其是獨派,亦不乏支持她先把大選騙過去再說,先把大選騙到手再說。倘係如此,蔡英文的這場選戰即是一個擺明了的大騙局,若不在選舉投票前被拆穿,也必會在她若當選後被拆穿。

蔡英文說,民進黨願傾聽北京的聲音,但北京已經公開說「兩岸一切交流成效皆以九二共識為基礎」。因此,蔡英文應先就其「可長可久」的兩岸政策向選民說清楚,爾今竟裝聾賣傻地兀自向北京喊話,豈不徒顯其色厲內荏?

Monday, June 20, 2011

Garrison Troops: Demonstrate Sovereignty Over the South China Sea

Garrison Troops: Demonstrate Sovereignty Over the South China Sea
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 21, 2011

More disputes have arisen over the South China Sea. The Republic of China is a nation that borders the South China Sea. It also occupies its largest island -- Taiping Island. From any perspective -- symbolism, sovereignty, or actual control -- the ROC undeniably has rights in the region. The ROC must not be silent on the matter of the South China Sea. But it must be judicious about how it expresses that sovereignty.

Nations claiming sovereignty in the South China Sea have recently begun increasing their military presence. They have engaged in military exercises, to prevent sudden military crises. For the first time, Beijing has entered South China Sea waters, and visited islands in the South China Sea. For three days and nights, it conducted maritime military exercises in regional waters. The Philippines, which is militarily weak, also dispatched old World War II warships to patrol the South China Sea. Vietnam has been among the most active nations in the region. It has held live-fire exercises. It has also implemented conscription. It has allegedly stationed troops on a Taiping Island sandbar. It is conducting reconnaissance, using high-tech electronic devices.

The Republic of China has also responded to the recent situation. Our Coast Guard regularly cruises the Tungsha and Nansha Islands ("Spratly Islands"). It sends a supply ship to the Tungsha Islands once a month. Taiping Island is more distant. Supply ships visit with the cooperation of the military each March, June, and September. The "Blue Sea 92" project was carried out in late June of this year. Chen Kung class, Chung Ho class, and 2000 ton "Satellite" Coast Guard cutters set out and performed their regular duties.

According to media reports, the Department of Defense will also be providing Seagull class missile boats, M41A3 Walker Bulldog tanks, and other weapons to forces stationed on Taiping Island. The Department of Defense denies these reports, calling them pure fiction. The Department of Defense said that the personnel stationed on Tungsha and Nansha Island are Coast Guard personnel. The Department of Defense says it has not dispatched troops to the islands.

Our government's initial response has been appropriately cautious. It has denied any military buildup, out of fear that other countries would take countermeasures. The ROC government would then be blamed for triggering an arms race. Actually, we have been sending supply ships to the islands every three months, for years. To suddenly halt such shipments for fear of criticism, would be an overreaction. It would unwisely sacrifice our rights, for no purpose. The long term challenge for the ROC is how to underscore our sovereignty and to ensure that we are heard on the issue of the South China Sea.

The Republic of China's official position on South China Sea sovereignty is based on its historical territory during the 1940s. The Southeast Asian countries are most concerned about the U-shaped map. That map represents Beijing's position on South China Sea sovereignty. When the DPP was in power, it attempted to draw a line between itself and Beijing on the issue, by making changes. In February 2008, Chen Shui-bian twice set foot on Taiping Island to trumpet his "Nansha Initiative." He called on countries neighboring the South China Sea to abide by the UN Charter and the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, and to ensure the peaceful settlement of South China Sea disputes. He said the ROC was willing to accept the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, on the basis of sovereign equality. He said the ROC was willing to participate in the "South China Sea Code of Conduct" then under development. But cross-Strait tensions were running high at the time, and no country was willing to respond to Chen Shui-bian's proposal, for fear of offending Beijing.

When the KMT returned to power, our government's position on the South China Sea issue changed. The government reaffirmed that the islands belong to the Republic of China. The Ma administration repeatedly protested violations of ROC sovereignty in the South China Sea. It called upon countries to abide by the UN Charter and the principles and spirit of the United Nations Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It urged the shelving of disputes, consultations and dialogue, and peaceful settlement of South China Sea disputes, avoiding unilateral moves that might undermine peace in the region.

Taipei has asserted its sovereignty over the Tungsha and Nansha Islands, in the name of the Republic of China. Beijing has asserted its sovereignty over the Hsisha Islands ("Paracel Islands") in the name of the Peoples Republic of China. Oddly enough, neither side has protested the other's position. This has caused other countries to doubt Taipei's position. Privately they have criticized Taipei, saying it has allowed itself to be influenced by Beijing. But realistically speaking, we would find it difficult to retreat from our long held position. We would be criticized on Taiwan for forsaking our established borders, as clearly delineated in the Republic of China Constitution. We would also find it impossible to explain our position to Beijing. Are we edging toward Taiwan independence? We would be caught on the horns of a dilemma.

That said, the Republic of China controls Taiping Island. That in itself amounts to a clear assertion of our sovereignty. Taiping Island is the region's sole source of freshwater. It is one of the few points in the South China Sea with runways for aircraft. It is small compared to other countries' islets and and reefs. But it has far greater strategic value. In future negotiations on the South China Sea, Taipei cannot be ignored.

How precisely will Taipei seek a seat at the negotiating table? For the ruling administration, this may be a dangerous trap. Handled improperly, it could leave the public deeply disaffected.

Taipei is not a member of the United Nations. We have no way to submit our government's data on our exclusive economic zone to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Protests from Beijing also make it impossible to negotiate with neighboring countries over maritime demarcations. They make it impossible for Taipei to sit at the same table with other Southeast Asian countries during negotiations on the South China Sea.

Any long term solution to this problem must begin with cross-Strait relations. Beijing must feel confident that Taipei is not attempting to create either "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." In the short term, there will probably be no complications.

First, regarding our declaration of sovereignty, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes less and less mention of our historical territory. Instead, it has repeated its basic position on the South China Sea four times. "The ROC possesses sovereignty, but it sets aside disputes, reciprocates peacefully, and is willing to develop resources jointly." Our government must further allay the concerns of other countries. It must understand Southeast Asia's perspective. For example, it has reaffirmed its commitment to the South China Sea Code of Conduct.

Secondly, we should underscore our sovereignty as much possibly can. We can follow the example set by other nations. We can announce that we are granting approval for oil and gas mining. We can draw up plans for combating terrorism and piracy. We can conduct maritime search and rescue, humanitarian relief efforts, and joint naval exercises. We can dispatch our new underwater "Sea Research V" vessel to the South China Sea to conduct marine-related scientific investigation. We can draft plans for South China Sea bases. We can declare out territorial sea baseline. We can even restore the garrisons we once had. We can station Marines on Taiping Island, thereby expressing our determination to defend our sovereignty.

Thirdly, we must actively foster public interest in the South China Sea. We must ensure that the public supports the government's position on the South China Sea. Beijing and Hanoi are actively drawing up plans for travel and study to the region. Tourism involve risks. State sponsorship seems appropriate. For example, young people may wish to visit the South China Sea for summer eco-leisure activities. Enabling them to do so would encourage the younger generation to understand and attach importance to the South China Sea.

彰顯南海主權 何妨恢復駐軍
2011-06-21 中國時報

南海問題又起爭端,我國是南中國海鄰國之一,又實際佔據著最大的太平島,無論從主權象徵,或是從實際控制來說,都有不容否認的權利。我們認為,台灣不應該對南海問題沉默,但是怎樣表達,卻是敏感、需要斟酌注意的。

南海主權主張國,近日紛紛開始增加兵力,從事演習,以預防突發的軍事危機。中國大陸剛首次在海南島與南海地區水域,進行三天三夜的「環海南島」的海上實兵演練;實力薄弱的菲律賓,也派了二次大戰的老軍艦,前往南海巡邏戒備;其中以越南最為積極,除了宣布實彈演習、實施徵兵,據說還在我南沙太平島駐守部隊旁的敦謙沙洲,以高性能電子設備實施偵蒐。

針對近日情勢,我國也有相關因應。海巡署定期巡弋東沙、南沙群島,其中東沙每一個月運補一次,南沙太平島則因距離較遠,與國軍配合,每年三、六、九月執行運補作業;今年六月底的「碧海92號」專案,將編組成功級、中和級軍艦以及二千噸級偉星號海巡艦艇共同前往,執行海域巡弋任務。

有媒體報導國防部同時也將提供海鷗級飛彈快艇、M41A3型戰車等武器,給太平島駐守部隊使用。國防部特別澄清,報導純屬虛構,並非事實;國防部也指出,目前駐守東、南沙為海巡士兵,國防部並未派駐軍隊。

我們認為,目前我方的初步反應是適當謹慎的,否認增強軍力,是因為擔心其他各國會有相應的對策,台灣會被指責是始作俑者,引發軍備競賽。但三個月一次的運補行之有年,如果此刻擔心各國批評就不去,是因噎廢食,徒然放棄我方的權益,反而不智。但長遠來看,如何彰顯主權,以及在南海爭議中,爭取台灣的話語權,才是棘手的。

我國正式主權立場,仍是採取四○年代的歷史疆域,即東南亞國家最在意的U型圖,這也是北京方面的主權立場。民進黨執政期間,為了有所區隔,曾經作了調整。二○○八年二月,陳水扁二度登上太平島,發表《南沙倡議》,呼籲南海周邊國家依據《聯合國憲章》與《聯合國海洋公約》和平解決南海爭端;台灣願意在主權平等的基礎上,接受《南海各方行為宣言》的內容,並希望參與正在研擬中的《南海行為準則》。但是當時兩岸關係緊張,沒有國家願意呼應陳水扁的主張,得罪北京。

國民黨執政後,對南海問題的立場有所調整,不斷重申這些島嶼主權屬於「中華民國」。馬政府除了對相關國家侵犯南海主權,多次表達抗議,並呼籲有關國家應依據《聯合國憲章》、《聯合國海洋公約》及《南海各方行為宣言》的原則與精神,擱置爭議,通過協商與對話,和平解決南海爭端,避免採取任何影響南海地區安全和平的單邊措施。

然而尷尬的是,不管是台灣方面對東沙、中沙兩群島和南沙的太平島以「中華民國」行使主權,還是中國大陸對西沙群島行使主權,雙方都沒有就對方的行為表示抗議,這也讓其他國家對台灣的立場有疑慮,私下批評被中國所影響。但現實上來說,我方很難從此立場退卻或改變,因為對內,會被批評放棄中華民國憲法中所說的「固有疆界」;對外,難以向中國交代,是否將走向台獨,陷於兩面受敵的窘境。

雖然如此,但我所占有的太平島卻是最真切的主權行使象徵。這是唯一有淡水來源,少數有飛機跑道的南海據點,比起其他國家的小島礁,戰略價值高了許多。任何未來南海問題的談判,不應該忽視台灣。

但是未來台灣如何才能上談判桌?對當政者來說,這是個危險的陷阱,處理不當,勢必會讓國人失望。

台灣受限於不是聯合國會員,無法向聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會提交我專屬經濟海域的數據;也因為中國的抗議,無法與鄰近國家進行海域劃界談判;更不用說讓台灣與其他東南亞各國在同一談判桌上,討論南海問題。

未來這問題要解套,長期來看,還是必須從兩岸關係著手,讓中國大陸不懷疑台灣方面刻意要造成兩個中國或一中一台的印象;但是短期來看,此刻應有不會節外生枝的和緩對策。

其一,關於主權宣示方面,我外交部對歷史疆域已經越來越少提,反而先後四次表明「主權在我、擱置爭議、和平互惠、共同開發」的南海基本原則,但要進一步去除其他國家的疑慮,就必須切入東南亞所理解的規範,譬如重申遵守《南海行為準則宣言》。

其二,在我方可以控制範圍內,盡量從事彰顯主權的行為。譬如參照其他各國成例,公布核准油氣開採礦區的規定,規畫相關海域進行有關反恐、打擊海盜、海上搜救與人道救援之聯合海上演練,以及派遣新下水的「海研五號」前往南海特定海域進行海洋科學調查,並規畫南海領海基點、基線的公布。甚至恢復駐軍,以最精銳的陸戰隊防衛太平島,以宣示決心。

其三,要積極培養民眾對南海的興趣,以形成政府南海政策的民意基礎。目前中國及越南都積極規畫旅遊與考察,有鑒於旅遊有若干風險,還是宜由國家來主辦,譬如年輕人赴南海進行暑期生態休閒活動,以喚起年輕世代對南海的瞭解與重視。

Sunday, June 19, 2011

Ma and Wu: A Winning Ticket?

Ma and Wu: A Winning Ticket?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 20, 2011

No one was surprised when President Ma Ying-jeou formally announced that Premier Wu Den-yih would be his vice presidential running mate. Vice President Vincent Siew attended the press conference. The implication was that he was passing on the torch, and that the watchword was party unity. A Ma/Wu ticket comes neither as a shock, nor as a revelation. It is a sound and logical choice. As Ma Ying-jeou's deputy, Wu Den-yih has joined the campaign while still burdened with his responsibilities as premier. He will have to make an all out effort. Ma defended the government's record, attempting to consolidate voter support.

Most people know that Premier Wu has a way with words, When he was still in college he wrote an essay entitled "The Cross National Taiwan University Graduates Must Bear." It attracted the attention of none less than Chiang Ching-kuo. Before graduating, he wrote an "Open Letter to President Yan Cheng-hsing," entitled "Resign Your Position, Sort Out the Problems at National Taiwan University," welcoming the newly arrived NTU president. At the time, Yan Cheng-hsing was simultaneously holding down positions as Atomic Energy Commissioner and as President of the Executive Yuan Zhongshan Academy of Sciences. Yan called Wu into his office, and listened to what Wu had to say. Two weeks later, he resigned his part-time positions. He devoted his full attention to the National Taiwan University graduation ceremony. Such an exchange was unheard of back then. Even today it strikes one as improbable.

Wu Den-yih's parents were victims of the White Terror. In response to the article he wrote, Chiang Ching-kuo received Wu, humbly and graciously. This left Wu with a highly favorable impression of the Kuomintang. Wu Den-yih once worked at the China Times. But he did not remain a reporter very long. Chiang Ching-kuo hoped to inject new blood into the Taipei City KMT. Then Director of the Youth Corps Lee Huan dropped in on Wu. He wanted to recruit him. Wu Den-yih was taken aback. First of all, he was not from Taipei. Secondly, he had no money and no contacts. Lee Huan told him "If you have no money, all you need is ambition. If you have no contacts, all you need is character. If you are not from Taipei, all you need is to be from Taiwan."

Lee Huan's response was classic. How long has it been since anyone in the KMT has recruited a young person of courage, but without money or contacts? Lee Huan's words inspired Wu Den-yih to take up politics. Henceforth Wu would be known by his nickname, "Wu Kuo-yu," or "Tilapia Wu," after the fish. The implication was that Wu, like a Tilapia, was a hardy. He was always able to adopt to different environments, and make a soft landing, despite always being "parachuted in."

During his term as Taipei City Councilor, Wu Den-yih revealed that the Taipei Yanping branch bank was missing 250 million NT. Back then, that was a huge sum. Most serious of all, the branch manager was a "member of the royal family." He was Chiang Ching-kuo's cousin. That made no difference to Wu Den-yih. The branch manager was sacked and punished just the same. The general manager of the Taipei Bank was punished for inadequate oversight. Other national amd provincial banks were also investigated. Soon afterwards, Lee Huan and Song Shi-hsuan told him, "Well done. You eliminated a public menace. No need to be afraid that you offended anyone."

Upon expiration of his eight year term as Taipei City Councilor, Wu was drafted as Nantou County Chief. Locals mocked him as an "air dropped candidate." The election was hard fought. Among those running for local office at that time was Ilan County Chief Chen Ding-nan. Four years later, both won by landslides. Wu Den-yih spent the same amount on his campaign as before, but won 96 percent of the vote. As one can see, the people of Nantou County held him in the highest esteem. Eight years later, Wu and Chen were named the two best local government heads, by two separate opinion polls.

Many people know that Chen Ding-nan challenged the system of authoritarian rule, He declared war against the Star Chamber. But in fact, so did Wu Den-yi. A civil servant with the Nantou County Government was accused of corresponding with his mother on the Chinese mainland. Wu Den-yih read the accusation. He took time to understand the situation. Without a word, he burned both letters. He established a repuation as someone who listened to the people of the county. A young mother recalled how roads in Nantou County were difficult to navigate. They lacked street lights. She petitioned the county government. To her surprise, she received a personal response from the county chief himself, updating her on the construction progress. This left a deep impression on her. It showed her Wu Den-yih cared.

Soon afterwards, as mayor of a directly administered municipality, Wu Den-yih traveled south to Kaohsiung. Politically, he was a lone wolf. He had nothing to offer local political bosses, That hurt him badly in Kaohsiung. When he was Mayor of Kaohsiung, he liberalized the voting process, His opponent, Frank Hsieh, fabricated audio tapes, creating an election scandal. By the time the tapes were exposed as fakes, it was too late. Wu Den-yih's political fortune had reached its nadir. The KMT also had to confront the pain of ruling party change. Wu Den-yih immediately returned home, and ran for the legislature. He boldly entered the Legislative Yuan, becoming one of the staunchest fighters for the KMT during its time in the opposition.

Years of successes and failures at the county and municipal level, have made Wu Den-yih sensitive to the public mood. Now he has stepped up to the front lines. Now Wu Den-yih's political record, including his time as premier, will be put under the microscope, He may be the most important factor in Ma Ying-jeou's bid for re-election. He will inevitably be caught up in the contest. He need not worry about transition or succession. The Ma/Wu ticket is set. This ticket may give the KMT a new lease on life. The decision is up to the voters.

馬吳配能否勝選 考驗才要開始
2011-06-20 中國時報

毫無意外地,馬英九總統正式對外宣布,他將邀請現任行政院長吳敦義搭檔競選連任,副總統蕭萬長連袂出席記者會,意味傳承和團結。「馬吳配」跌不破眾人的眼鏡,談不上讓人眼睛一亮,卻是當下合乎邏輯的穩妥布局。做為馬英九的副手,吳敦義帶職參選,勢必得要全面發揮戰鬥力,為馬政府的政績辯護,並以此爭取選民支持。

多數人都知道吳揆口才便給,但他能在就學期間以〈台大人的十字架〉一文,受到蔣經國的賞識,並崛起政壇,絕非只靠一張嘴而已;他在大學畢業前,還以一篇〈辭去兼職,辦好台大─向閻振興校長進一言〉,「歡迎」才到任的台大校長。當時,閻振興同時兼任行政院原子能委員會主委和中山科學院院長,閻把他找進辦公室,聽吳侃侃而談後,於半個月內先後辭去兩個兼職,以專任台大校長的身分主持畢業典禮。這樣的對話場景,甭說是當年,連現今都是罕見的。

吳敦義家中長輩也曾受過白色恐怖之苦,他自己坦言蔣經國因為一篇文章接見他時的親切謙和,讓他對國民黨有了好感。吳敦義曾在中國時報任職,但擔任記者的生涯並不長,蔣經國希望國民黨在台北市能推出試驗性的新人,當時的救國團主任李煥找上門來,吳敦義錯愕不已,一來他不是台北人,二來他沒錢沒人脈,李煥告訴他:「沒錢有志氣就好,沒人脈有人品就好,不是台北人沒關係,只要住在台灣就好!」

李煥此言迄今仍是經典,試問:多少年了,國民黨務系統沒人再有此膽識,啟用沒錢沒人脈的年輕人!就是李煥這番話,從此讓吳敦義踏上政治這條路,也從此有了「吳郭魚」的綽號,意思是他是能在各種不同環境、擁有最強存活能力的民選政治人物,永遠能順利達陣的「空降部隊」。

台北市議員任內,吳敦義揭發台北銀行延平分行被掏空二億五千萬,這在當年是多麼大的數字,最嚴重的是該分行經理竟是皇親國戚─蔣經國的表弟!吳敦義照打不誤,此人遭撤職查辦,北銀總經理亦以監督不周受連帶處分,其他國、省營行庫則同步調查。不久後,李煥和宋時選分別告訴他,「做得好,為民除害,不必怕得罪什麼人。」

八年台北市議員期滿,他被徵召回南投參選縣長,被家鄉人譏評為「空降」,選得並不輕鬆,同期競選地方首長者還有宜蘭縣長陳定南;四年後,兩人分別高票連任,吳敦義以同額競選、百分之九十六的高得票率勝選,可見他在南投縣民心中的地位;八年後,吳、陳兩人分別被民意調查基金會評選為縣市首長中兩位績效最佳的「首席」。

很多人知道陳定南挑戰威權體制,向人二室宣戰,其實,當年吳敦義也因為縣內一位公務員和滯留大陸的母親通信,吳敦義接到檢舉信,了解情況後,二話不說,同樣一把火燒掉了人二資料。他創下與縣民有約,親身聆聽民意,一位年輕媽媽回憶,當年南投山路難行,連路燈都沒有,她向縣府陳情,沒想到縣長親自回信,告訴她工程進度,讓她對吳敦義的用心印象深刻。

緊接著,吳敦義又以官派直轄市長身分,南下高雄,他的政治孤鳥性格,不與地方政治家族利益交換,使他在高雄受傷頗重,特別在高雄市長開放民選一役,他的對手謝長廷以一捲造假的緋聞錄音帶重創其選情,雖然事後證明錄音帶是假的,卻再還不了吳敦義一個公道。吳敦義面臨政治生命的低潮期,國民黨同樣面臨政權更迭之痛,吳敦義立刻回鄉參選立委,迅速挺起腰桿,進入立法院,成為國民黨在野期間的國會主戰力之一。

多年地方縣市長成功與失敗的經歷,讓吳敦義能更敏銳地回應民意需求。當然,既然已經登上火線,吳敦義的從政紀錄與閣揆政績也勢必將被放大檢視,他可能是馬英九競選連任最關鍵的一門重砲,但也難免捲入殺伐激烈的選戰對決中。不必考慮是過渡還是接班,馬吳配的陣式已經排開,這個組合能否為國民黨打開另一個新局,就看選民的評判了。

Friday, June 17, 2011

Young Graduates Seek Employment Overseas

Young Graduates Seek Employment Overseas
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 17, 2011

June is when college students graduate. President Ma Ying-jeou and Vice President Vincent Siew spent most of this last weekend visiting universities and giving graduating students pep talks. But the the financial tsunami has taken its toll. Graduates emerging from college campuses today suffer from high unemployment. Even those who have found work, must endure low starting salaries.

The unemployment rate on Taiwan is seasonal. Between June and August, over 200,000 students graduate from college. They join the ranks of job seekers. The unemployment rate soars accordingly. That the unemployment rate increases between June and August each year is nothing to fear. That is merely a seasonal phenomenon. Of more concern is the period just before graduation. In late 2008, the financial tsunami slowed. Its impact however, is still felt on the job market. The United States and Europe both suffer from youth unemployment. The situation on Taiwan is no different. Today the youth unemployment rate is still higher than before the financial tsunami, by 1 to 2 percentage points. Many aspiring young people with Masters degrees and Doctorates are finding their ambitions thwarted by circumstances, Many of them held lofty ideals, only to have their dreams shattered. They look at the soaring cost of urban housing, and depression overwhelms them, We know how they feel.

According to DGBAS statistics, young people on Taiwan between 20 and 24 suffered a 12.4% unemployment rate in April. The 25 to 29-year-old youth unemployment rate was 7.2%. Youth unemployment remains much higher than the overall average. Worse still, the employment survey covered not just domestic employment. but overseas employment. In other words, take away overseas employment opportunities, and the unemployment rate for young people on Taiwan today would be even higher.

The government is trying to understand these unemployment and employment trends. Each month it surveys 20,000 households regarding their employment situation. The survey counts the number of people registered at any particular household, rather than its long term residents. Anyone registered as a member of a household on Taiwan is counted. It matters not whether he or she works in Shanghai, Kunshan, Singapore, or Ho Chi Minh City. He or she is counted as part of Taiwan's workforce. This accounting approach, which includes overseas employment, naturally helps reduce the unemployment rate on Taiwan. But in fact these were not employment opportunities created on Taiwan.

Precisely how many people from Taiwan are employed overseas? We have no exact figures, only occasional studies, conducted by various agencies. But the DGBAS surveyed various industries. In recent years, overseas employment has continued to increase. Between January 2008 and March 2011, surveys of households showed that private employment increased by 300,000. Industry surveys showed an increase of only 19 million people employed. Surveys of households included overseas employment. Surveys of Industry included only domestic employment. If not for increased overseas employment, such discrepancies would not have appeared.

Now increase the time frame to ten years. Over the past decade surveys of industry show employment increasing by only 90 million people. Since surveys of households show employment increasing by 140 million people, the gap between the two is even more apparent. This shows that for nearly a decade overseas employment has been increasing. When the government boasts that employment has increased and unemployment has declined, we must not be too happy. This probably includes the contribution of overseas employment. We on Taiwan have not created any significant employment opportunities.

Some may argue that surveys of households include foundations, research institutions, cram schools, and religious groups. In part this is because industry surveys failed to include them. Naturally differences will arise between the two. But we find it hard to believe that over the past decade surveys of households showed 500,000 more people employed than surveys of industry. We find it hard to believe that the number of teachers, priests, and monks increased so drastically. If our above reasoning is correct, then the statistical difference is the result of significant changes in overseas employment over this period.

It is important to distinguish between domestic employment and foreign employment. High-ranking officials have long assumed that long term employment growth means that government policies took effect. In fact such growth was probably the result of increased overseas employment, and utterly unrelated to government policies. Domestic employment must be distinguished from foreign employment. Otherwise it will be difficult to verify the effectiveness of industrial policies and employment policies. The government will then misjudge how ordinary people actually feel.

How can the government distinguish between domestic and overseas employment? It must get to the root of the statistical sample. It must count the number of long term residents rather than the number of people registered at any particular household. This will enable it to better estimate domestic and overseas employment. It will also enable it to better estimate the total number of jobs created by various counties and municipalities. But so far the government has not compelled those working or studying in other counties and municipalities to register where they work. Currently the government has only household registry data, and no long term resident data. Overseas workers who fail to return to Taiwan within two years are reclassified as non-residents. Otherwise, they remain registered residents. The government must make changes. It must cease using household registries as its statistical base. Domestically, doing so fails to show employment opportunities within various counties and municipalities. Internationally, it fails to account for the number of people employed overseas.

Accurate employment statistics will enable the government to more readily count absentee ballots for future presidential or legislative elections. The government must compile statistics on the long term residents. These statistics will be vital when estimating the economic strength of our nation, The ruling administration must take on this task. It must make comprehensive plans, give the problem higher priority, and form inter-ministerial groups to ensure its early completion.

中時電子報 新聞
工商時報  2011.06.17
畢業時節談青年人海外就業增加趨勢
本報訊

每年六月是各大學畢業的時節,馬英九總統及蕭萬長副總統週末的行程大都前往各大學,給即將畢業的學子們一些勉勵。然而受到前幾年金融海嘯的影響,今天走出校園的社會新鮮人,非但失業率較以往為高,而且起薪也普遍偏低。

台灣的失業率走勢有很明顯的季節性,每年從六月到八月,在二十多萬學子走出校園、加入尋職行列後,失業率總會一路升高。事實上每年六至八月失業率升高並不足懼,這只是季節因素使然。比較值得注意的反而是在畢業前的這段時期,雖然2008年底這一波金融海嘯的衝擊已經趨緩,但是在就業市場上的影響仍在。非但美、歐為青年人失業問題困擾不已,台灣情況亦然。如今青年人的失業率依然比金融海嘯前高出1到2個百分點,多少獲取碩、博士學位的青年有志難伸,多少懷抱遠大理想者失望落寞,回首遙望都市裡狂漲的房價,心情之沮喪,不言可喻。

依主計處統計,台灣20至24歲的青年人四月份失業率12.4%,25至29歲的青年人失業率7.2%,失業情況遠高於全體平均水準。然而,更值得注意的是,這項就業調查統計非僅涵蓋國內就業,也包括海外就業。換言之,若沒有海外就業機會,台灣今天青年的失業率乃至於全體失業率,勢必還要更高。

政府為了解失業及就業變化,每月會調查兩萬戶家庭的就業情況進行推估。由於調查的母體係戶籍人口而非常住人口,因此只要此人的戶籍在台灣,不論其人是在上海、昆山、新加坡、胡志明市就業,全數計入台灣的就業人口。如此算法,海外就業自然也有助於降低台灣的失業率,惟事實上這並非是台灣境內所創造的就業機會。

台灣的海外就業人數究竟有多少?至今仍無確切的統計,只有相關單位零星的研究。但我們可以藉由比對主計處訪自廠商面的受僱人員調查發現,近年海外就業情況仍持續升溫。自2008年1月至2011年3月這段期間,從家庭面訪查的受私人僱用人數增加了30萬,但自廠商面調查的受僱人數卻只增加19萬人。自家庭面推估的受僱人數包括海外就業,而自廠商面推估的受僱人數僅限於國內,若非海外就業人口持續增加,不致出現如此歧異的走勢。

我們若把時間數列拉長至十年,近十年廠商面調查的受私人僱用人數只增加90萬人,而自家庭面調查的受僱人數卻增加了140萬人,兩者之間差距更為明顯。這說明近十年隨著海外就業日趨普遍,當政府發布就業人數增加、失業率下滑時,先不要太高興,這極可能是來自海外就業的貢獻,而不是國內創造了什麼可觀的就業機會。

或許有人會說,自家庭面推估的受僱人數涵蓋了財團法人、研究機構、補習班、宗教團體,這部份是自廠商面推計時所沒有納入的,因此兩者自然會有差異。但我們很難相信這十年來家庭面調查比廠商面調查多出的50萬受僱人數,是因為老師、牧師、和尚大幅增加所致。如果上述推論是正確的,那麼這兩項統計差異的根本原因,就在於此一期間國人在海外的就業人數已出現重大變化。

我們認為,釐清國內就業與海外就業是非常重要的統計工作。長期以來當就業人數成長,府院高層總以為政府政策奏效,但事實上非常有可能是拜海外就業成長所賜,與政府相關政策未必有關。若不釐清國內就業與海外就業,非但難以核實產業政策與就業政策的成效,也將錯估庶民的心中感受。

如何釐清國內就業與海外就業?正本清源之道是將調查的母體,由現行戶籍人口改為常住人口,如此非但可以推估出國內及海外就業人數,也可以正確地推計各縣市所創造的就業機會。不過,礙於政府迄今並未強制赴外縣市工作、就學者必須赴工作所在地的戶政單位登記,以致如今台灣僅有戶籍人口資料,並沒有常住人口統計,而赴海外工作者除非兩年不曾返台被除籍,否則仍在戶籍人口之列。由此可知,如果不改弦易轍,仍舊根據戶籍人口做為母體進行調查,對內將無法清楚呈現各縣市的就業機會,對外則無法掌握海外就業人數究有多少。

我們認為,不論是基於掌握正確的就業統計,或是讓未來總統、立委不在籍投票更順利進行,建立常住人口資料已勢在必行。這項攸關國勢統計的重要工作,執政當局非但要加以正視,而且必須提升層級組成跨部會小組全力規劃,以促其早日完成。

Thursday, June 16, 2011

Judges Law: Assurances and Expectations

Judges Law: Assurances and Expectations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 16, 2011

After much hardship and nearly 24 years time, the Judges Law is finally seeing the light of day. It has been passed by the legislature. If it were brandy, it would be "XO," or Vieille Reserve.

Over 24 years, the draft bill for the Judges Law was witness to many social changes. Different values led to trade-offs and tug of wars, and finally to today's result. Judges enjoy a status not accorded most civil servants. But their impartiality and their ability to monitor themselves have been called into question. They now face harsh outside scrutiny.

The Judges Law has made it through the legislature. It first appeared in 1987, 1988. We hope the Judges Law will define the status of judges, segregating them from ordinary civil servants, and underscoring the independence of judicial authority. The law was drafted just as martial law was being lifted. Party politics was still in its embryonic stage. Judges were attempting to break free from a powerful executive. The most controversial aspect of the draft bill set limits on judges' participation in political parties, judges' authority to choose their own assignments, and the authority exercised by judge's councils.

Party politics and judicial independence have evolved. Judges and political parties interact with each other. Concerns about interaction between the administration of justice and the sentencing process have diminished. Outside interference has disappeared. But judges are still incapable of disciplining themselves. Observers have begun demanding efficiency, quality, and integrity. They have begun demanding a system of oversight for judges that includes outsiders. As a result, a system of oversight has been brought forth to discipline judges, drawn from the civil service. Discipline, appointments, and transfers will be turned over to this system of oversight, underscoring the judges' independence.

Judges are striving to maintain their independence. But they have failed to uphold social justice. Judges set themselves above others. They receive salaries far larger than others. When the system of oversight deals with judicial misconduct, the Executive Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan will be reluctant to rubber stamp its findings. Judges cannot brush aside the dissimilar law that enables prosecutors to cover for judges. Unsatisfactory performance increases the need to oversee judges. The selection of outside personnel to oversee judges will require Control Yuan intervention. The Judicial Personnel Committee must be reformed. At one time lower level judges used this committee to resist pressure from higher level judges. They flexed their reformist muscles, from the bottom up. The doors must be thrown open. Outsiders must be permitted to participate, investigate, and oversee qualifying examinations and transfers for judges.

This is all rather ironic. Judges engaged in collective corruption. They handled sexual assault cases inappropriately. They handed down vastly differing sentences for the same crime. The public could no longer look on passively. Out of touch judges resigned under pressure. The Judges Law, which repeatedly failed to pass, received a new lease on life.

The birth of the Judges Law has affirmed the independent status of judges. It has established a system of oversight, and generous provisions for early retirement. As we can see, the public still respects the judiciary. It still grants them unique assurance not granted most civil servants. But their integrity, their right to discipline themselves, and their job proficiency will all be subject to close scrutiny. Demands that judges be subject to oversight, have resulted in legal opinions that threaten judicial independence. Judges feel pressured. They feel shame. If judges are to discipline themselves, oversight must be fast acting and effective. A system of self-discipline must be worked out. Otherwise outsider oversight will be futile. Who is qualified to be an outsider overseer? Which matters must be overseen? Will the Personnel Evaluation Committee include outsiders who will undermine its independence?

The oversight process will be time consuming. Once the oversight process is established, judges guilty of misconduct will be turned over to the system of oversight. Can the system of oversight exact punishments closer to public expectations? Can it eliminate unfit judges? Will the public believe that judicial self-discipline has led to change? That needs to be seen.

The Judges Law has thrown open a door. Judges, lawyers, and legal scholars will be recruited. They will acquire greater access to the court system. They will loosen up the rigid court system. Court verdicts must not be the product of legal hacks, painting by the numbers. Academic theory and practical application must come together. The court system must become more human, and closer to the people.

The Judges Law cannot solve all the problems undermining the credibility of the judicial system. But the ruling and opposition parties have successfully passed the bill, after twenty years of effort. We anticipate a brighter future for the justice system. Judges should be grateful for the trust the public has given them. They must join those seeking justice within the legal system. The Judges Law has established an independent judiciary. Judges must abide by judicial ethics. They must keep their distance from political parties. They must stay away from the lure of money. They must avoid violating people's rights. They must not procrastinate. They must not abuse their power. They must offer sophisticated legal opinions, fulfill their jobs in a professional manner, and serve as guardians of justice.

The Judges Law has been passed. The people have had their eyes opened. They await increased oversight. Judges enjoy special pay, special retirement benefits, and special disciplinary procedures. But their extraordinary independence implies extraordinary responsibilities. The Judges Law gestated for 24 years. It is a law meant to protect. It is also a law meant to eliminate. Judges must not exceed their brief. Only then can they maintain genuine independence.

法官法的保障與期許
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.16

千萬難。經過近廿四年光陰,法官法終於得見天日,完成立法;如果是酒,也是超級XO了。

廿四年歲月,法官法草案歷經社會變遷,不同種價值的取捨、拉鋸,遂成今日的面貌。法官有別一般公務員的地位正式確立,但因自我監督及裁判品質受到高度疑慮,面臨了外部人員入侵檢視的嚴厲挑戰。

法官法立法之舉,初見於民國七十六、七年間,希望藉由法官法,使法官的職等、俸給與公務員分離,彰顯司法權的獨立性。此法草擬之際,台灣剛解嚴,政黨競爭初萌芽,法官試圖從強大的行政權中掙脫;草案中爭議最烈者,首屬法官參與政黨的份際,及法官自主決定事務,與法官會議的權限等。

隨著政黨政治、法官審判獨立空間的成熟,法官與政黨、司法行政與審判之間的互動尺度,受到的關切漸少。但外在干預消失,法官自律的功能卻遲遲未現,外界開始要求裁判的效率、品質,以及最基本的清廉。建立有外部人員參與的評鑑法官機制之訴求,堂皇現身。於是,相應的職務法庭,在法官的憂患意識下推出。職務法庭,把法官懲戒從公務員懲戒事項中獨立出來,與其他的監督、任免、調動事由,一併交給由法官組成的法庭審理,主要也在彰顯法官的獨立性。

法官極力維護獨立,裁判表現卻無法撐起社會公義的一片天。無論是法官不列職等、薪俸自成體系,或由專屬的職務法庭處理犯錯的法官,行政院、考試院、監察院都不肯爽快點頭同意。法官非但推不開性質並不完全相同的檢察官「棲身」法官法,更因表現未盡人意,致法官評鑑事由範圍擴大,連參與評鑑外部人員的選拔,立監院都要插手。甚至法官人事審議委員會都要變革,這個曾是基層法官對抗長官高權,展現由下而上改革力量的戰場,都須敞開大門讓外部委員加入,與聞、監督法官的考核、調動等事務。

說來也著實是諷刺。在法官集體貪瀆、性侵案件適法性、量刑高低頻出包,社會威逼不肖、恐龍法官退場的壓力下,幾度闖關失敗的法官法,反得新生。

法官法初登場,確立了法官獨立身份的俸給、職務法庭齊備,並有較目前優渥的退養規定,可見社會仍然願意尊重司法,給與法官迥異於一般公務員的特別保障。相對的,法官基本的操守、自我治理、提高裁判品質的能力都受到嚴厲檢驗。對法官評鑑規範的要求,一度進逼到法律見解,觸及法官審判獨立界限,法官備感壓力,且該汗顏。試想,法官若能自律,司法行政監督得以有效迅速發揮,自行處分體系裡的莠類,外部評鑑根本無用武之地,何需為了哪些人可以聲請評鑑、哪些人足任評鑑委員,哪些事項應付評鑑,人審會有無外部委員加入影響獨立性而吵翻天?

評鑑過程冗長,縱或評鑑成立,將有違失行為的法官送交職務法庭;然職務法庭能否樹立較現行公懲會更足服眾,懲處、淘汰不適任法官的的標準,讓社會感受到法官嚴格律己的改變,恐仍猶待實例驗證。

法官法開啟的另一扇門,是法官多元晉用管道,律師、學者有更多機會進入審判體系,鬆動日益僵化的審判思維。審判不應是制式判決的法匠操觚,經由學術及實務的多重激盪,希望能讓審判多些人味,更貼近人民。

法官法無法解決近來司法公信盪於谷底的所有問題,但朝野在法案起草廿多年後攜手完成立法,至少代表大家皆有司法要更好的共同期待。法官應該珍惜這樣的託付,莫放棄加入司法正義行列的美好初衷,在法官法確立的獨立空間裡,遵守法官倫理規範,與政黨保持距離,遠離金錢誘惑,避免重大違失影響人民權益,不遲延,不濫權,精進法律見解,善盡專業,守護正義。

法官法雖然通過,民間睜大眼睛,等著加碼監督的力量卻不會停歇;法官享有特別薪給退休、懲戒程序,獨立審判權利的背後,也有特別的責任。走過廿四年長程才誕生的法官法,是保障法,也是淘汰法,法官惟有不獨大,不張狂,才能保有真正的獨立。