Friday, July 31, 2009

A Dialogue between Two Kaohsiung Incident Defense Attorneys

A Dialogue between Two Kaohsiung Incident Defense Attorneys
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 31, 2009

Recently, at the scene of the Chen corruption trial, two legal professionals unexpectedly engaged in an impromptu dialogue. These two people were Lin Ching-kang and Chen Shui-bian.
Who is Lin Ching-kang? He graduated from National Taiwan University Law School a few years later than Chen Shui-bian. He was once Chen Shui-bian's room mate. Together they helped each other achieve their dreams for the future. When Lin Ching-kang was a first-year student at the National Taiwan University Law School, he had the second highest score on the National Judicial Examination. Out of thousands of candidates that year, only two were accepted. He joked that he was "Sun sen." His grades were of course not as distinguished as those of Chen Shui-bian, who graduated first in his class a few years earlier. Lin Ching-kang and Chen Shui-bian would later become part of the Kaohsiung Incident legal defense team. This was a breakthrough role for Chen Shui-bian, after which he became famous. Lin Ching-kang, on the other hand, remained politically obscure. He too passed the National Judicial Examination, First he became a judge. Back then political opposition defendants would denounce the court system, alleging "political persecution." Lin Ching-kang was one of the few judges who could look political opposition defendants straight in the eye and demand that they respect the rules of the court. Political opposition defendants who came before him knew his reputation for integrity. They knew he never practiced favoritism for "his own people."

Chen Shui-bian became president. Lin Ching-kang became a senior judge. The Ministry of Justice promoted a judicial reform program known as "Judges Have No Rank." He responded by requesting an immediate transfer from the Superior Court to a District Court. For years, he has contemplated the process of judicial reform. The court system is not without defects. Sometimes he became emotional. As a result he voluntarily requested a transfer from the court system to the prosecutorial system. For the sake of harmony, he served as Taipei District Prosecutor. Lin Ching-kang's experience is unusual in the judicial realm. He is certainly not unknown within the legal community. But the legal community doesn't really know that much about him. Who could have predicted that his two requests for transfer would lead to him investigating his former room mate Chen Shui-bian for corruption?

We do not intend to comment on what kind of verdict Chen Shui-bian's closing argument might lead to. But little known District Prosecutor Lin Ching-kang now finds himself head to head with widely known President Chen Shui-bian. After more than thirty years these former classmates paths have crossed again, and revealed a thought-provoking scene of desolation.

Lin Ching-kang has seldom prosecuted a defendant who has clearly contributed to Taiwan's democracy. But one cannot pardon his offenses on this basis. In fact Lin refuted a similar claim made by Wu Shu-chen the day before, when she argued that she too had contributed to democracy. In a rare departure from the norm, he wept in court. He recalled the ideals he once shared with the defendant when they were in school. He wondered why Chen Shui-bian had turned his back on his former ideals. He invoked the seldom heard language of religion in court. He explained to his old friend Chen Shui-bian why he had to unrelentingly prosecute Chen Shui-bian for his wrongdoing. He explained that he had to uphold the enduring values they once shared. In a rare departure from the norm, he repudiated charges that the prosecution was tainted by Blue vs. Green political considerations. He proclaimed that the case must be a starting point for the end of corruption. Chen Shui-bian's reply a few hours later, was identical to those offered by political opposition defendants in the past. He was unable to offer a coherent response to Lin Ching-kang's words of conscience.

Lin Ching-kang told Chen Shui-bian, "Mr. President, you had the power!" Lin Ching-kang and Chen Shui-bian are both men of the law. Both graduated as top students from National Taiwan University Law School. Both have wielded state power, in different forms. Chen Shui-bian was once head of state. He once wielded immense power. Yet he now faces prosecution. Lin Ching-kang went from judge to prosecutor. Compared to Chen Shui-bian, he is merely a judge. Yet now he has the power to prosecute Chen Shui-bian. Lin Ching-kang pointed out the key issues. What happens to a man of the law when he acquires power? Do his former ideals inform his use of power? Or does his newfound power make him forget his ideals?

Lin Ching-kang was not a defendant. Yet he burst into tears. Because he wielded state power, he was aware of how wrong a man can go if he forgets his ideals. In fact, he was weeping for the accused, Chen Shui-bian. He saw how vulnerable people were in the face of power, how power corrupts. He invoked the ideals the two shared in the past. He hoped to reawaken the defendant's conscience, to make him aware of his wrongdoing. But Chen Shui-bian's attempt to excuse his crimes, only let Lin Ching-kang down. After all, how many are able to withstand the the temptation of too much power?

Chen awaits the court's decision. His political character and his arrogance of power have shaken public confidence in the government. He has seriously undermined the image of the legal profession. He has made it difficult for his political party to extricate itself from its quagmire. Chen Shui-bian knows he ought to apologize to the people. But his apologies lack sincerity. Because of Chen, political and moral standards on Taiwan have descended into an abyss. Fortunately we have a prosecutor such as Lin Ching-kang. He has not forgotten the ideals he once pursued as a man of the law. He is fighting a rising tide. He is persisting in his attempt to save humanity. As a result people have discovered that power can still be exercised for the good. There are still people in government who value integrity. Men of the law can still restore hope. People can still rediscover the fond memories they had in the political opposition. Perhaps the Chen corruption case verdict really can serve as a starting point for the end of political corruption.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2009.07.31
社論-兩個美麗島大審律師的法庭對話
本報訊

日前,在扁案言詞辯論的現場,格外突出兩個法律人對照性,這兩個人即是林勤綱與陳水扁。

林勤綱何許人也?他是屆數較陳水扁低的台大法律系畢業生,在校期間曾與陳水扁為宿舍舍友,共同砥礪過法律人的理想與未來。林勤綱在就讀台大法研所一年級時以第二名通過國家律師高考,那一年數千考生中只錄取兩名,他遂以「孫山」自嘲,榜眼的成績當然不如數年前的榜首陳水扁來的耀眼。林勤綱和陳水扁稍後同是美麗島案律師團的成員,阿扁此後表現傑出而大紅大紫,林勤綱則在政治上默默無名。他也通過國家司法考試,先是擔任法官,在那個反對人士遭到追訴即以「司法迫害」譴責法院的年代,林勤綱曾是極少數能在法院裡,正色要求在野被告遵守法庭規則而莫敢不服的法官,被他審判的在野被告,誰都知道,他是一位剛正不阿,也從不徇私的「自己人」。

當陳水扁成為總統之後,林勤綱也已是資深的法官。他旋即響應司法院司法改革方案中「法官無高低」的觀念,自願從上級審法院請調擔任地方法院法官。不數年,他又有鑒於司法改革的過程中,審核系統之間不無嫌隙,有時甚或流於意氣之爭,於是再度自願請調,從院方轉任檢方,以謀和諧,擔任台北地檢署主任檢察官。林勤綱的經歷,在司法界算是異數;他在法界當然不是無名之輩,但社會上對他的認識不多。誰也不知道兩次請調,會讓他在數年後面對昔日舍友陳水扁學長,追究他貪汙罪嫌的刑事法律責任。

陳水扁案最後的言詞辯論,應該導致什麼樣的判決結果,我們無意置喙,但是默默無聞的林勤綱檢察官對上家喻戶曉的陳水扁總統,經過卅餘年的歷史滄桑,昔日學友狹路相逢,卻映照出悲涼的警世場景,發人深省。

林勤綱罕見地在庭上追述被告對台灣民主確有貢獻,但不能因此寬赦其犯法行為的法律責任,他事實上駁正了前一日吳淑珍自認對台灣民主甚有貢獻的辯詞;他罕見地在庭上聲淚俱下,追憶自己與被告求學期間的共同理想,質疑阿扁為何背棄了當年的願景;他罕見地在庭上使用宗教語言,向阿扁解釋身為老友,為何必須釘死阿扁的過錯,來彰顯那曾經樹立的美好價值;他罕見地駁斥外界對檢方藍綠有別的指控,聲言要以扁案做為終結貪腐的起點。之後陳水扁數小時的答辯,像過去在野被告一樣,對於林勤綱訴諸良心的責備,回應無力。

林勤綱在庭上對陳水扁說,「總統先生,權力可是出自於你啊!」林勤綱與陳水扁同是法律人,同是台大法律系畢業的高材生。他們先後掌握了國家不同的權力。陳水扁曾經貴為國家元首,一度大權在握,現在竟要面對司法的追述。林勤綱從法官改任檢察官,相對於昔年的阿扁,只是一位司法官,現在則是握有追訴陳水扁的權力。林勤綱直指問題的要害,曾經懷抱著理想的法律人,手中掌握到權力的時候,是理想支配著權力,還是隨著權力忘記了理想?

林勤綱不是被告,竟在法庭上痛哭流涕。他因公權力在握,深知如果忘記了原初理想,可能走上什麼樣的歧途;其實他是在為被告陳水扁痛哭流涕,他看到權力如何使人脆弱,如何使人腐化,他想要使用昔日的理想,試圖召喚被告良心發現,憬悟前非,阿扁兀自企圖脫罪的辯解,只怕要讓林勤綱失望了,畢竟權力的誘惑太大,禁得起考驗的能有幾人?

扁案的法律責任有待法院判決評價,但他涉案案情所顯示的政治品格與權力傲慢,已足使台灣人對於政府清廉的信心發生動搖,也已使得法律人的形象受到嚴重懷疑,更讓他所屬的政黨陷進退維谷而難以自拔的泥淖,陳水扁自己也知道該向國人道歉;然而他的道歉仍舊毫無誠意;台灣政治道德的標準已經因為他而降至谷底。所幸,我們在言詞辯論中看到了一位有性情的檢察官林勤綱,他沒有忘記法律人追求正直的原始理想,他試圖用手中的權力力挽狂瀾,他不放棄拯救人性的沉淪。於是,人們發現,權力行使之中仍然可能具有善良的品質,政府中仍然有人介意廉潔的可貴,法律人也可以令人重拾希望,甚至,人們可以尋找當年在野者的美好回憶。也許,扁案的司法判決,真的可以成為終結貪腐政治的起點…。

Thursday, July 30, 2009

Signing ECFA: Tactics and Strategy

Signing ECFA: Tactics and Strategy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 30, 2009

The Ministry of Economic Affairs has released a research report explaining the economic consequences of our participation in ECFA. The report describes the impact ECFA will have on our economy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs reports says that once Taipei and Beijing sign ECFA, the Taiwan region's GDP will rise at least 1.65 to 1.72 percentage points. But individual industries, such as electronics, textiles, and the petrochemical industry, may be both positively and negatively impacted. In addition to the aforementioned high profile impact on the GDP, the report also detailed the direction Taipei and Beijing may take regarding investments, the industry value chain, Early Harvests, dispute settlement, industrial cooperation, and relief mechanisms. At the tactical level, the Ministry of Economic Affairs current study on economic and trade development can be considered complete.
The tactical level refers to what Taipei must do and cannot avoid doing in response to the current international situation. Many once thought that when Taipei joined the WTO in 2002, it could smoothly integrate itself into the international trade environment. But actual developments have not been as expected. Early setbacks during the Uruguay Round talks led to a wave of regional trade agreements. The past two decades have seen the emergence of the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN, Mercosur, and a hundred complex, overlapping, and intertwining regional trade frameworks. These regional trade agreements offer terms of trade even more favorable than the WTO. They also eliminate the principle of "most favored nation" applicable to WTO Member States. This has isolated Taipei, which has only "entry level" WTO membership. Such a development obviously represents a hardship for Taipei.

Conceptually, these so-called regional trade agreements are little circles formed by a number of countries. Those within the circles are perceived as our own. Those outside the circle are perceived as outsiders. Aggressive countries such as Korea and Singapore are signing free trade agreements with other countries in every direction. They have joined a whole range of little circles. Everyone treats them as their own. Economic and trade activities always work to their benefit. But Taipei is internationally isolated. Many countries are reluctant to sign trade agreements with us. Over time, Taipei has been increasing regarded as an outsider. Within these circles insiders encounter few trade barriers. They enjoy low tariffs and participate in mutually beneficial economic and trade exchanges. Complex "rules of origin" have led to a number of countries setting up factories and investing within these circles. Economic and trade relations within these circles naturally tend to increase. By contrast, outsiders like Taipei will always be the ones to suffer. When it comes to economic and trade relations, we are relegated to feeding off table scraps left by insiders. Our situation is extremely disadvantageous.

As we know, ASEAN plus One is already in operation. ASEAN plus Three will begin operation next year. Almost every important country in East Asia will be included. The data reveals that the most important driving force behind ASEAN plus Three is the Chinese mainland. Circumstances have forced Japan and South Korea to join. One cannot rule out the possibility that Beijing is promoting the agreement to isolate Taipei. In the face of such adversity, if Taipei fails to break through, if Taipei fails to enter the circle, it will end up in an economic blind alley. Therefore tactically, signing ECFA in order to open up cross-strait economic and trade exchanges is a road we must take. Indeed, signing ECFA is the way out. It is the way to survival. Only this can ensure our economic survival. This is why we need the so-called "early harvest" provision. It is because we hope to catch up with South Korea.

But a mere tactical response to the two pronged attack by ASEAN plus One and ASEAN plus Three, is merely the passive amelioration of an unfavorable situation. It is not enough to open up new economic and trade horizons. Media reports have focused on the quantitative impact of signing ECFA on our GDP. These numbers may be easy to understand. But they are not the key to ECFA. The real challenge to our economic future is our industrial positioning and our economic niche. ECFA may help us remove roadblocks. But it is not clear whether our future positioning can be laid out in one fell swoop. The Executive Yuan has trumpeted its six new industries. What sort of bridge can Green Industries establish with the Chinese mainland? How can the biotech industry establish itself inside the mainland market? How will it apply to specific diseases? Can agriculture on the Chinese mainland develop e-resume control of satellite farms on Taiwan? Is there an economic niche for Chinese language literary output? Can international medical treatment attract mainland patients? These are all items on ECFA's cross-Strait agenda. We must take this opportunity to plan properly. The Ministry of Economic Affairs report still lacks structure, and requires further effort.

For the sake of our economy, signing ECFA with Beijing is a tactical necessity. It is also essential to our strategic positioning. We are pleased that the Government is taking steps in the right direction. We hope future negotiations are not limited to adding or subtracting existing industries. Given greater effort, new industries, along with new positioning and cooperation, can open up new possibilities for our economy in one fell swoop.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2009.07.30
社論-簽署ECFA的戰術與戰略觀
本報訊

經濟部日前公布了我國參與ECFA經濟後果的研究報告,分若干面向描述ECFA對台灣經濟的衝擊。經濟部的報告指出,台灣與對岸簽署ECFA,將使我國GDP上升至少一點六五到一點七二個百分點,但就個別產業而言,則電子、紡織、石化等各業不同,所受衝擊有正有負。除了前述眾所矚目的GDP衝擊之外,該研究報告亦詳述ECFA對服務業、投資、產業價值鏈、早期收穫、爭端解決、產業合作、救濟機制等兩岸可能簽署方向。就經貿發展戰術層次而言,經濟部目前提出的研究內容堪稱完備。

前文所謂戰術層次,是指ECFA實為台灣面對當前國際情勢所必須要做、不得不做的因應。原本,國人以為台灣自二○○二年加入WTO之後,能夠順利融入國際經貿環境,但事實的發展卻不如人意。在早年烏拉圭談判不順等因素的刺激下,國際上興起一波「區域貿易協定」的簽署風潮。二十年間,世界上已出現了歐盟、北美自由貿易協定、東協、南錐協定等百餘個區域貿易架構,繁複綿密且交互重疊。這些區域貿易協定所刻劃的貿易條件都比WTO更優惠,又能排除其他WTO會員國申請適用「最惠國原則」,故使台灣這樣的WTO「陽春」會員國形同孤立。這樣的局勢發展,對台灣顯然是十分艱困的。

在概念上,所謂區域貿易協定,就是若干國家之間結合而形成的小圈圈,圈內諸國視為自己人、圈內與圈外則彼此為「外人」。有些國家積極如韓國、新加坡者,就四處與別國簽署自由貿易協定,把自己劃在許多個國際小圈圈的交集之內,大家都視他們為自己人,經貿活動遂無往不利。但是像台灣這樣國際上相形孤立的國家,由於許多國家都不願意和台灣簽貿易協定,久而久之,台灣就被越來越多的國家視為外人。由於圈內自己人之間貿易障礙少、關稅低、經貿發展互利,復因「原產地規定」而造就出許多在圈內國家設廠投資的需求,彼此之間經貿自然日漸暢旺。相對而言,遭殃的則永遠是像台灣這樣的圈外人;在經貿選項上只能撿些圈內人吃剩的殘果餘羹來發展,殊為不利。

大家都知道,東協加一已開始運作,而東協加三即將於明年起生效,幾乎將東亞重要國家全數涵納在內。資料顯示,東協加三的最主要推手也就是中國大陸,日、韓迫於形勢才不得不積極加入。客觀而言,中國推動該協定背後的原因,也難謂沒有「孤立對手」的布局考量。台灣面對這樣的不利局勢,如果再不突圍、再不加入圈內競逐,則經貿上只有死路一條。因此,在戰術上,簽署ECFA以打開兩岸經貿局面是一條不得不走的路。的確,簽ECFA是突圍之路、生存之路,非如此不足以保台灣經濟之生機。正因為如此,才有所謂「早期收穫」之必要,希望讓台灣趕緊跟上韓國的腳步。

但是台灣單單在戰術面因應東協加一與東協加三之包圍夾擊,只是消極地改善客觀環境,尚不足以積極地開創經貿新局。媒體報導著重簽署ECFA對GDP影響百分比的數字效果;這數字固然簡單易懂,但ECFA的關鍵卻不止於此。台灣經濟未來真正的挑戰,在於我國的產業布局與切入利基。ECFA固然能幫台灣清除路障,但未來能不能藉勢一舉布局卻未見明朗。以行政院敲鑼打鼓的六大新興產業而言,究竟綠能產業能與對岸搭上什麼橋?生技業能如何切入對岸的廣大市場與特殊疾病?農業有沒辦法在中國大陸開拓電子履歷管控的台灣衛星農場?華人文創有沒有兩岸共同的利基?國際醫療能否吸引對岸華人的手術與健檢案例?這些都是兩岸ECFA談判所及的積極布局面向,必須要藉此機會妥為規畫。但目前經濟部的報告中,卻仍未見骨架,尚需進一步努力。

總之,對台灣經濟而言,與對岸簽署ECFA既是突圍戰術之必須、也是布局戰略之必要。我們樂見政府往這個正確的方向積極邁進,也希望未來的談判研議,不要侷限於現有產業的加減爭取,更能在新興產業布局方面再加琢磨、多所努力,庶幾一舉開創台灣經濟的新局面。

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

Who Will Do Justice to Our Democracy?

Who Will Do Justice to Our Democracy?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2009

"Haven't I contributed to Taiwan's democracy?" The Taipei District Court is trying former President Chen Shui-bian's family on four counts of corruption. Just before she was interrogated, former First Lady Wu Shu-chen spoke out. Wu Shu-chen was clearly indignant. Some people think the Chen family is making an emotional appeal prior to the first instance verdict. They think the Chen family is hoping to stir up old memories. They think it is turning the clock back to 24 years ago, when Wu Shu-chen suffered crippling spinal injuries in Tainan. They think it is turning the clock back to nine years ago, to the elation many experienced when the ROC underwent its first change in ruling parties. Perhaps the Chen family thinks this will inspire people to revise their image of the corrupt First Family. Wipe away the dust. Is the "Son of Taiwan" anywhere to be found? Is the heartfelt emotion between "Ah Bian and Ah-Cheng," the stuff of soap operas, anywhere to be found?

The Chen family is probably not alone in hoping to freeze that glorious moment in the history of democracy on Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian was not the only one who felt all was right with the world at that moment. How many champions of democracy felt unbounded gratification? How many people felt proud that "Taiwan" would henceforth go its own way? Wu Shu-chen naturally hoped to make an emotional appeal regarding the development of democracy on Taiwan. Wu Shu-chen was hardly alone in her desire. The development of democracy has touched many people, not just supporters of independence, not just supporters of Chen Shui-bian. Many of them truly want to shout "Yes!" Yes, Ah-Bian did nothing wrong. Yes, Ah-Cheng contributed to democracy on Taiwan. Unfortunately, the "Yes!" is stuck in their craw, and can't get out.

The wheels of time roll on relentlessly. They roll past the initial joy and pride at the first change in ruling parties. The Cape Seven Hundred Million, the Cape Hundreds of Millions, and the endless lies, have finally shaken us from our stupor. Wu Shu-chen said being bound to a wheelchair for 24 years was a fate worse than death. Wu Shu-chen reproached her husband for being a political animal and neglecting her. But many people are now sufficiently awake to respond to her emotional appeals with a clear head. We are sufficiently awake to draw clear lines of distinction. Prosecutors draw those lines in accordance with the law. For diehard supporters of the Ah-Bian family that line is about more than cold legal provisions. They draw those lines in accordance with human nature. But when it comes to the Chen family, public tolerance has reached its limit. And who is responsible for that?

The Chen case is now reaching its climax. But wheelchair bound Wu Shu-chen has never been the underdog. As Koo Chung-liang remarked, she has long been the power behind the throne, the one who has the final say on countless matters. When Chen Shui-bian was at the height of his power, wheelchair bound Ah-Cheng displayed a cheerful, cordial, humorous, and direct manner. During her visit to the United States, the media even described the First Lady as humorous and at ease. The media reported that the ruling and opposition parties in the United States were moved, and that she had won respect and dignity for "Taiwan." What a glorious time that was!

Wu Shu-chen's years in her wheelchair have been filled with glory and laughter. They were not all years of unspeakable pain spent consulting with anonymous psychiatrists. She has described Chen Shui-bian as a political animal. She said "Chen Shui-bian is tap water. He has no flavor. But without him, I cannot survive." Her daughter-in-law Huang Jui-ching was close to her, and gained her trust. Fear of Wu's wrath was not the only emotion Huang felt. That is why Wu took the precaution of putting half the money in her overseas accounts in her son's name. Wu Shu-chen also looked at Chao Chien-ming the way a mother-in-law looks at her son-in-law. She was not always denouncing him as an "ostrich with his head in the sand." Wu Shu-cheng's life has had its moments of joy, dignity, and honor. She possesses vast wealth. She wielded immense power. She has had so much. So what turned her life into what it is now? As she puts it, now all she wants is a bullet to the head to end her life. From Chen Shui-bian's "two bullets" to Wu Shu-chen's "one bullet," what did this family experience, what did this family do, that put the public through such an ordeal?

No one doubts that wheelchair bound Wu Shu-chen has endured a great deal of hardship, pain, and suffering. But no matter how tragic her plight might be, it cannot justify her illegal conduct. Chen Shui-bian was indeed a key figure in the island's democratization. But in a democratic society under the rule of law, no one has the right to engage in corruption. Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-chen are no exceptions. The justice system cannot write off the Chen family's crimes with a stroke of the pen, merely because wheelchair-bound Wu Shu-chen found life too dull, too bitter, and too tragic, or because Chen Shui-bian was the first president of the ROC following the change in ruling parties. Chen Shui-bian has long said "I believe in Taiwan." Wu Shu-chen and the members of the First Family need to understand that the society they claim to believe in has evolved to the point where it can examine such matters with a cool eye. People have enough discernment to know that a disgruntled spouse and a defacto Empress who brokers illegal deals are two different things, that wheelchairs and money laundering are also two different things.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2009.07.29
社論-歷史還珍公道?誰還台灣民主一個公道!
本報訊

「我對台灣的民主難道都沒有貢獻嗎?」台北地院審理前總統陳水扁家族四大案,偵訊前第一夫人吳淑珍召開言詞辯論庭時,吳淑珍顯然心有不平地如此提問。有人認為,這是扁家在一審宣判前的溫情策略,希望藉此喚起許多人的記憶:把時間拉回廿四年前吳淑珍在台南挨那一撞的椎心之痛,或是拉回九年前,台灣第一次政黨輪替的徹夜歡樂,或許這樣會讓很多人願意把他們一家人在許多人心中的貪腐形象做一個重新打理──撢一撢厚厚的灰塵,「台灣之子」還在嗎?「阿扁與阿珍」的親切情意還在嗎?

希望時間可以就凝結在台灣民主光榮時刻的人,恐怕並不只有陳水扁一家。因為在那樣的時光裡,不只有陳水扁睥睨天下的滿足,還有多少台灣民主前輩苦盡甘來的欣然寬慰,更有人們對台灣未來走自己的路的昂然光榮。當吳淑珍在法庭上理所當然地想對台灣民主發展討個人情時,想要無怨無悔地肯定回答的人,恐怕也不只吳淑珍、不只獨派人士、不只挺扁的人,許許多多曾為台灣民主成就感動的人們,真的也很想、很想說聲「是」。是的,阿扁沒有做錯,是的,阿珍對台灣民主有功勞……,只可惜,這樣的答案卻只如鯁在喉,說不出來就是說不出來。

因為時間的巨輪終究輾過了我們在世紀之初、政黨初次輪替時的喜悅和驕傲,因為海角七億、因為海角N億,因為無數的謊言,我們已經清醒了,清醒到,當吳淑珍說她坐了廿四年的輪椅生不如死,清醒到當吳淑珍數落政治動物的先生讓她寂寞,許多人都已經能夠冷靜面對了;我們給心裡的同情清清楚楚地畫上了一個界線,檢察官說的,那個界線在司法,對向來不吝嗇給扁家溫暖和支持的許多人而言,這個界線並不只是冷冰冰的法律條文而已,這個界線,其實更是在人性。對扁家,人們的不忍之情,已經走到了極限;這是誰造成的呢?

在扁案進入審理的高潮之前,坐在輪椅上的吳淑珍從來不是弱者,她是辜仲諒口中「很多事都要她拍板」才算數的真正有實權的人。當陳水扁在政壇上春風得意的那些日子,輪椅阿珍曾以開朗親切幽默直率著稱,出訪美國時,媒體甚至形容台灣第一夫人的風趣和自然,讓美國朝野為之感動,為台灣贏得尊重與尊嚴;那是多麼美好的時光啊!

吳淑珍輪椅上的歲月也有過風光歡笑,不全然是匿名看心理醫生的不堪苦境;現在她口中的政治動物陳水扁,過往她自己的形容是:「阿扁的人就像喝白開水一樣,喝起來沒味道,可是如果少了他,又活不下去」;她對媳婦黃睿靚,也曾有親密互動的信任,並不是只有因為擔心翻臉,所以把海外帳戶的錢一半存在自己兒子帳戶內的提防之心;吳淑珍對趙建銘也曾有「丈母娘看女婿,愈看愈有趣」的心情,並不是只有「蓋頭鰻不知死活」的狂罵;吳淑珍的人生有過笑容、有過尊榮,她擁有巨額財富,她有過至高權力;她擁有過這麼多、這麼多,然而,是什麼讓她的人生變成如今她自己說的,想有的只是一顆子彈,好結束人生?從陳水扁的兩顆子彈到吳淑珍的一顆子彈,這個家庭經歷了些什麼,做了些什麼,而台灣又被迫一起承受了什麼?

沒有人懷疑過,長期坐在輪椅上的吳淑珍肯定遭遇過很多挫折、痛苦和磨難,但不論有多大的不幸,並不能合理化犯法違紀的行為;陳水扁確實是台灣民主化歷程中關鍵的重要人物,但是在一個民主法治的社會裡,沒有任何人被允許可以理所當然擁有貪贓枉法的空間,陳水扁、吳淑珍當然不例外。台灣的司法終究不能因為吳淑珍廿四年的輪椅生活太悶太苦太可憐,不能因為陳水扁是台灣第一次政黨輪替後的總統,就把扁家所為一筆勾銷。一直以來常常喜歡口口聲聲說「相信台灣」的陳水扁、吳淑珍和第一家庭的成員們應該明白,他們所相信的台灣社會,確實已經走到了一個冷靜理性的疆界裡,人們可以分辨得出,不快樂的妻子和喬事情的皇帝娘是兩回事;輪椅和洗錢,也是兩回事。

Tuesday, July 28, 2009

Image is an Adjective, Leadership is a Verb

Image is an Adjective, Leadership is a Verb
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 28, 2009

When President Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election, he received 7,650,000 votes. The day before yesterday, when he won the KMT Party Chairmanship, he received 285,000 votes.
Why hasn't 7,650,000 votes enabled Ma Ying-jeou to successfully lead the country? The 7,650,000 votes Ma received during the presidential election was a shot in the arm. Are the 285,000 party member votes a sign that the shot is wearing off?

Ma Ying-jeou is assuming the party chairmanship in order to address a crisis in leadership. Before that, his leadership of Siew, Liu, Wu, and Wang was not a success. Now he will be a "full spectrum leader" for both the party and the government. What are his chances for success?

Ma Ying-jeou's advantage is his image. But his problem is his leadership. Image does not equal leadership. Leadership is a verb. Image must not remain an adjective. Ma Ying-jeou's image is not merely an adjective. His integrity and rectitude are rare character attributes and commendable social values. Ma's problem is how to lead his administration and the country as a whole. Leadership is of course, a verb, not an adjective.

Emperors of old spoke of being lonely at the top. It may have been an affectation, but it was also true. The most important attribute of a leader in a democratic society is leadership. A leader cannot stand atop the summit, concerned only about maintaining his Teflon image. A capable leader may be able to lead even without assuming the party chairmanship. An incapable leader may not be able to lead even if he does.

President Ma, now Chairman Ma, hopes to rebuild effective leadership. He has a million ways to go about it. But the most important and fundamental factors are talent and organization.

The first key to leadership is to recognize talent and make good use of it. For the Ma administration, recognizing and making good use of talent is a major problem. At the cabinet and party level, many officials can't even maintain their own public image, let alone make sound decisions and defend administration policy. On the one hand, the Ma administration fears change. On the other hand, it probably can't find qualified replacements. The result is incompetent officials sit idle, squandering the opportunity for reform and undermining the image of the administration. In terms of local talent, Taipei County Executive Chou Hsi-wei continues to "bring up the rear." Chou has undermined the administration at the national level. In Yunlin County an unqualified father is running for office "on behalf of his son." In Hualien and Taitung County, candidates of dubious talent have hijacked the nomination process. This has led to an even bigger shortfall between public expectations and political reality. If the Ma administration cannot resolve these problems relating to talent, it will not be able to improve its image and performance. If the Ma administration cannot improve its image and performance, it will find it all the more difficult to persuade people with talent to join the administration. The result will be a vicious circle.

In terms of organization, the biggest advantage of large organizations is their collective policy-making power. Through the wisdom of collective decision-making, and the power of organization, they are able to implement the best policies. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is huge. But when it was promoting ECFA, it produced policy pamphlets rife with errors. Clearly such an organization has problems. A handful of legislators on the legislative caucus manipulated and tampered with the Civil Service Neutrality Act. From the very beginning, a handful of legislators have monopolized the role of party spokesperson. The organization of the legislative caucus is also a problem.

Successful leadership must be based on the right talent and effective organization. In terms of talent, some officials occupying key positions have already "risen to the level of their incompetence." If these clearly unqualified officials are kept on, it will be a disservice to the nation. Put more plainly, the Ma administration's kindness towards these officials, amounts to cruelty toward the people. In terms of organization, those unable to contribute to organizational effectiveness must be eliminated. If the organization cannot correct and regulate itself, then feel-good governance will lead to national disaster.

Leadership does not mean Ma Ying-jeou must personally attend to everything. It means that he must recognize talent and make good use of it. He must oversee the performance of the organization as a whole. Alas, Ma Ying-jeou's Teflon mindset makes it difficult for him to adopt such an approach. He finds it easier to play it safe. Once party officials, government officials, or party cadres are found to be unqualified, the entire organization will it difficult to do their jobs. This may be one reason for its current difficulties. The talent lacks talent. The organization lacks organization. Add to this Ma Ying-jeou's Teflon mindset, and any problems will be difficult to remedy.

This is the crux of the matter. It is not a problem that can be solved by assuming the party chairmanship. Conduct a comprehensive review of party and government officials. Determine who should be removed from office. Only this will address the fundamental problems.

形象是形容詞,領導是動詞
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.07.28 04:51 am

在總統大選中贏得七六五萬張選票的馬英九總統,前天獲得二十八萬五千張黨員選票,當選國民黨主席。

為何七六五萬張公民選票還不夠讓馬英九成功地領導國家?總統大選的七六五萬張選票如果是一鼓作氣,則如今這二十八萬五千張黨員選票會不會是再而衰、三而竭?

馬英九是因出現「領導危機」才要兼任黨主席。此前,他「領導」蕭、劉、吳、王四人並不成功;現在他將「全面領導」黨政機構,勝算如何?

馬英九的優勢是「形象」,但問題卻在「領導」。「形象」不等於「領導」;「領導」是動詞,「形象」不能停留在只是形容詞。馬英九的形象,未必只是形容詞;他的「清」與「正」,皆是難能可貴的倫理品格及社會價值。問題卻在:他如何能夠「領導」起他的執政團隊,進而「領導」起整個國家;領導當然是動詞,而不是形容詞。

昔者帝王稱孤道寡,雖是謙抑,卻亦甚寫實;但在民主社會的國家元首,最重要的能力就是「領導」,不能成為只是佇立在孤峰頂上的不沾鍋。能領導者,不兼黨主席或許也能領導;無領導能力者,即使兼黨主席亦未必能領導。

馬總統(主席)欲重建其領導效能,經緯萬端;但最重要亦最根本者是在「人才」與「組織」。

「領導」的第一要領即在識才善任。馬團隊的「人才問題」是個大問題。在內閣及黨部的層次,有些首長連自己的社會形象都無力維護,更遑論準確決策及為政策辯護;但是,馬團隊一方面畏懼變動,另一方面大概是覓無替代人選,遂令這些不稱職者坐在那裡繼續損耗興革時機及政府聲譽。另就地方人才而言,台北縣「吊車瑋」幾乎牽動了國家全局,雲林縣「代子出征」,花蓮、台東皆被有爭議的縣長參選人挾持,更見其青黃不接的窘境。馬政府倘若不能在人才問題上得到解決,執政團隊的形象及績效即不易改善;而倘若執政團隊的形象及績效不能改善,就更難覓得優秀人才加入執政團隊。這將形成惡性循環的領導困境。

再論組織。組織的最大優勢是在「群策群力」;經由組織的智慧產生最佳的決策,並經由組織的力量完成最佳的執行。倘若一個偌大的經濟部,就ECFA卻竟搬出「一哥」與「發嫂」那種水準的政策說帖,這個「組織」顯然是有問題的;倘若立院黨團竟由少數幾名立委的左右而竄改通過了《公務人員行政中立法》,且始終由少數幾名立委襲奪了黨團的社會溝通角色,這個黨團的「組織」也是有問題的。

成功的領導必須建立在「適當的人才」與「有效能的組織」之上。就人才言,如今據要津者,皆已呈現出其才能的極限;若再留用那些明顯不適任者,就是誤國。說得簡白些,馬團隊對這些首長仁慈,即是對人民的殘忍。就組織言,對於那些不能產生「組織效益」的組織,也要使之上緊發條。如果組織不能產生「自我校正」、「自我完善」的機能,反會因「自我感覺良好」而成為國家治理的禍源。

所謂「領導」,應當不是要馬英九凡事親力親為;而主要在識才善任,體現組織的效能。但馬英九「不沾鍋」的風格,使他覓才的門路難以開闊,且易趨保守;一旦所選黨政首長或幹部不適任,整個組織亦難有表現。這可能正是形成當前困境的主因:當「人才」不勝任,「組織」效能低落,再加上馬英九的謹守分際「不沾鍋」,事情就難以收拾。

倘若這才是癥結所在,則恐非兼任黨主席就能解決問題;重新全面檢討黨政骨幹人事的去留,才是諸多根本要圖之一。

Monday, July 27, 2009

Don't Make Us Sigh and Shake Our Heads Again

Don't Make Us Sigh and Shake Our Heads Again
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 27, 2009

As expected, there were no surprises. Yesterday Ma Ying-jeou received 94% of the vote, and was elected Chairman of the KMT. This was quite different from eight years ago, during Lien Chan's tragi-heroic campaign for the party chairmanship. Back then the KMT was forced to hand over power because it had just lost the presidential election. This was quite different from four years ago, when Ma found himself in fierce competition with Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng. Ma Ying-jeou was the beneficiary of expectations the public had regarding KMT generational change and KMT internal reforms. This was quite different from two years ago, when Wu Poh-hsiung assumed the party chairmanship following an emergency by-election. The entire party was united. It wanted Ma Ying-jeou to safely weather the Discretionary Fund crisis, and win back political power. This time Ma was Head of State. He respectfully touched all the bases, soliciting everyones' support. With the exception of candidates for party representative, party insiders were lukewarm about the election. The general public was unconcerned as well.
The KMT has been back in power for one year. As president and party chairman, Ma Ying-jeou must be aware of changes in public sentiment. Public silence reflects public disappointment in the KMT. This disappointment is not the result of how the party or government is administered. It is the result of Ma Ying-jeou's manner of decision-making.

During Ma Ying-jeou's campaign for the party chairmanship the Department of Defense published a report, complete with numbers and the results of investigations into corruption. How did Ma Ying-jeou respond? He gave orders to continue checking, to continue checking on a regular basis. Death threats were sent and received within the Bureau of Armament and Acquisition (OLBAA). Infighting broke out within the Bureau of Military Intelligence. Security breaches were discovered within the Presidential Palace. How did Ma Ying-jeou respond? He said he would need a full month before proposing a solution. Fortunately the Legislative Yuan had already adjourned. But before it went into recess, the Legislative Yuan gave the "Civil Service Administrative Neutrality Act," a Third Reading, and applied the law even to academic research institutions. The Academia Sinica reacted with fury. The Examination Yuan could only apologize to the Academia Sinica. It lacked the courage to urge that the bill be amended. This bill was sponsored by the Executive Yuan, yet it behaved as if it had nothing to do with it. The KMT has the most seats in the national legislature. Yet it displayed no concern for the scholars' problem. Instead, it castigated Academia Sinica Chief Ong Chi-hiu. President Ma Ying-jeou should have attempted to make peace. Instead he said nothing. He may not even be aware of the bill. He may not have even seen it, even though it bears the seal of the Office of the President.

Just what has Ma Ying-jeou been doing all this time? He has been running around peddling his platform for party chairmanship. While Ma was in Hualien, a village leader attempted to present him with a petition. He was stopped by Ma's bodyguards. Since when did it become taboo for even party members to petition their own party chairman? Ma has been diligently filming "Governing the Nation: A Weekly Journal." Netizens have revealed that it was shot in advance. But that is hardly its biggest problem. The biggest problem is that after watching Ma Ying-jeou in his weekly chronicle, one cannot find any suggestion of how he intends to govern the nation. One cannot find any record of his political acomplishments. What problems has the President taken on and solved? What problems has the President singled out for emergency resolution? What problems does the President consider urgent? The answer is none. All we see is Ma Ying-jeou sharing his personal feelings. Ma's feelings about the Kaohsiung World Games, Ma's feelings about university students' choice of universities and choice of majors are all matters the President has a right to talk about. But do these matters really represent the President's strategy for governing the nation?

The shine is off Ma Ying-jeou's reforms. They are nowhere as resonant or moving as they once were. Many people no longer want to hear about them. Many people may listen politely to Ma Ying-jeou sharing his feelings. But after listening they merely sigh and tell themselves not to expect too much. Ma Ying-jeou wants to remain a Teflon president. That means he has no intention of doing too much. When members of the public sigh and express disappointment with Ma, they do so for good reason. For example, Ma Ying-jeou invited leaders of social movements to the Presidential Palace to discuss the Parade and Assembly Law. The result was a bill that ran counter to the wishes of the social movement leaders. The law has yet to be given its Third Reading in the Legislative Yuan. Reform-minded civic leaders dare not raise too much of a hue and cry. They have met with the President several times. So far, the talks have led nowhere. They have no idea whether President Ma Ying-jeou supports or opposes the reforms proposed by former Minister of Justice Ong Yueh-sheng. The Chen Shui-bian administration provoked intense controversy when he removed the sign on the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. Ma Ying-jeou once said that any changes would first be subject to a civic forum. Instead, the Ministry of Education held three seminars with experts, then rehung the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall sign. It did not even have the courage to tell the public. The majority of experts suggested making no moves for the time being.

Over the past year, the Ma Liu administration's manner of decision-making has raised serious doubts among the public. Once Ma Ying-jeou becomes party chairman, will he take responsibility for matters he cannot or will not take responsibility for now? Asking a political party that has recently reacquired power to recall the hardships it experienced when it was in the opposition, is clearly difficult. At the local level, most of the candidates who have thrown their hats in the ring and who can't be persuaded to withdraw, have been indicted for corruption or vote-buying. At the central level, all problems are perceived as other peoples' problems. Whenever controversies arise, the immediate reaction is to impose silence. The problems that have arisen arose during the past year. The criticism, "lacks drive," sums up the public's estimation of Ma Ying-jeou. Ma Ying-jeou has chosen to become Party Chairman. In order to ensure smooth operations within the party and the government, in order to speed up adminstrative processes within government and reform the party, Ma must be decisive. Starting today, he must stop mumbling to himself before the cameras. He must show the public that Ma Ying-jeou is a leader who is able to act.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2009.07.27
社論-莫再讓期待一再化成嘆息與搖頭
本報訊

一如預期,毫無意外,馬英九昨天以九成四的得票率,當選國民黨主席。迥異於八年前連戰競選黨主席時的悲壯,因為當時國民黨才因為敗選將政權拱手讓人;不同於四年前與立法院長王金平的激烈競爭,馬英九聚積社會對國民黨世代交替與黨務改革的龐大期待;更有別於兩年前吳伯雄臨危受命,補選黨主席,全黨有志一同,要讓馬英九安然渡過特別費危機,贏回政權;此番以國家元首身分,行禮如儀跑完每一場拜票行程,除了黨代表選舉,黨內參與感不強,遑論社會的關切。

做為重新執政的總統兼黨主席,馬英九不能不體會國民黨重掌政權這一年多來,社會氣氛的轉變,以及對國民黨期待落空後的沉默。箇中關鍵,可能不只在黨務、不只在政務,更重要的,在他個人的決策風格。

馬英九競選黨主席的這段期間,國防部公布了滿篇數據的查貪報告,馬英九指示:繼續查、定期查,然後,軍備局鬧出子彈恐嚇信、軍情局內鬥不休,總統府維安出現大漏洞,還要一個月,才能提出重新建制維安機制的報告。立法院幸好休會,不過,就在休會前,立法院三讀通過了《公務員行政中立法》,將律法舖天蓋地的加諸學術研究機構,中研院大反彈,考試院只敢前往中研院道歉,卻膽怯地不敢表態提出修法案,這個由行政院會領銜的法案,彷彿也沒行政院的事,至於國會最多席次的國民黨立委,不但沒意思為學者們解套,還痛罵中研院長翁啟惠一頓,理應調和各院的總統馬英九,到現在沒吭過一句話,甚至不知道,他到底看過這部經總統府蓋大印公布的法案了沒有?

馬英九到底在幹嘛?這段期間,他很用力的每個周末跑地方,發表他的黨主席政見,結果,人在花蓮,村長陳情,竟被隨扈擋駕,什麼時候,連黨員陳情都成了禁忌?他還很用心地拍攝《治國週記》,雖然被網友爆料是提前預錄,但最大的問題是:從馬英九坐著到站著的幾段週記裡,既看不出他的治國理念,更看不到他的治國實績,有哪一樁問題是經過總統關心而解決的?有哪一樁是他認為相關單位應該為人民解決的?或者,有什麼是他接下來一周急迫解決的?什麼都沒有!只有馬英九一個人說著他的感懷,高雄世運很感動、大學選系選校選人生,這些事總統不是不能談,但這就是總統的「治國大事」嗎?

馬英九的「改革」,因為「日久失修」,早不若當年響亮動人,很多人不想再聽了;馬英九的感懷,很多人勉強聽一聽,聽完只能嘆口氣告訴自己別期待太多,因為馬英九若非不沾鍋,就是不想用力。這些感嘆和批評並非無的放矢,隨便舉例,為了集遊法,馬英九出面在總統府邀請社團人士座談,結果產出的是一個與社團人士意見不同的法條,到現在立法院還沒三讀;民間司改人士不敢大張旗鼓,但也和總統見了幾次面,截至目前為止,尚處空談狀態,不確定前司法院長翁岳生的改革法案和圖像,到底馬英九總統支不支持;扁政府鬧出莫大爭議的民主紀念館拆牌風波,馬英九曾經說過要經過公民論壇的討論,結果,教育部辦完三場專家座談,迅雷不及掩耳地就把中正紀念堂的牌子給掛回去了,甚至不敢事前告訴社會大眾:專家意見主張暫且不動的居多數。

一年多來,馬劉政府的決策風格,讓社會大眾嚴重懷疑,總統都管不了或不想管的事,兼黨主席之後,馬英九會管、肯管嗎?要求一個重新掌握權力的政黨,不斷反省在野時臥薪嘗膽的滋味,顯然是困難的。在地方,擠破頭爭提名還屢勸不退的多是貪汙在案或賄選遭訴;在中央,遇事就是別人的事,有爭議先消音,所有的問題,就在這一年多時間中,快速累積。「缺乏魄力」這個評語,幾乎成了全國民眾對馬英九的刻板印象,馬英九既決定兼任黨主席,要透過黨政運作更順暢,加速推動政務、改革黨務,就得劍及履及,從今天開始,揚棄在鏡頭前喃喃自語,以實際作為告訴民眾:馬英九,是有行動力的領導人。

Thursday, July 23, 2009

Local Democracy? Or the Road to Black Gold?

Local Democracy? Or the Road to Black Gold?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 23, 2009

As former U.S. Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill once said, all politics is local. The importance of local politics goes without saying. But Taiwan's problem is that any discussion of local political issues always focuses on the needs of the politicians, rather than on the needs of the public. Several counties and cities will soon be upgraded. Several days ago rumors emerged that a number of politicians were promoting local elections for District Chiefs. This is a clear example.
Will District Chiefs in Directly Administered Municipalities be locally elected? If so, it would mean a change from what we have now. But it is not something we can't talk about. But the reason politicians are promoting District Chief elections is that once cities and counties are upgraded, many village, town, and city representatives will be out of a job. That is why representatives of four counties and municipalities scheduled for an upgrade have launchd a signature drive demanding local elections. We hope village, town, and city representatives can extend their terms or postpone any elections until the current system is repealed in 2014. Calls for District Chief elections appear to be designed with the needs of current village, town, and city representatives in mind.

Even a well-intentioned policy is likely to produce unintended results, and negative consequences. Therefore a policy rooted in ulterior motives is almost sure to end badly. If existing village, town, and city elections are used as the template for future District Chief elections, the fate of District Chief elections will be entirely predictable.

Fair or not, the main reason the KMT was accused of engaging in "money politics" in the past was local elections. Local elections were plagued by vote-buying and violence. The high costs of such election campaigns were recouped by means of public works projects, land speculation, and bid rigging, after the official was elected. None of this is news. These have long been part and parcel of corrupt local politics. For the public, this sort of local political participation in public policy is not a channel for public policy. It is the source of black gold. The result is a vicious circle. Good people are unwilling to return home to participate in local politics. The rosy pictures the public on Taiwan has of local self-government have been totally shattered.

It was precisely because local politics were plagued by such problems in the past, that members of the public called for the appointment of village and town representatives. But neither the KMT nor the DPP have been able to implement such a policy. The main reason they can't, is that local politicians and local factions are in bed together. Even national legislators and local political bosses influential in county and municipal elections are involved. That is why no one is able to change the system. That is why politics on Taiwan has always remained corrupt, from the local level all the way up to the center.

The public should of course be encouraged to participate in direct elections and political oversight. It is not necessary to throw the baby out with the bathwater. One need not reject District Chief elections entirely based on a past history of local corruption. We may wish to consult the precedent of Taipei and Kaohsiuing, two existing, ready-made examples of Directly Administered Municipalities. Their District Chiefs are appointed. But their administrative mechanisms seem to be working well. The past performance of civil servants in Taipei City left much room for improvement. But under pressure from an elected mayor, the attitude and performance of the District Office have clearly improved. It would appear that the direct election of District Chiefs is not the only way to improve the administrative efficiency of local government.

Some people think that citizens in the modern era can hardly be satisfied with the way government bureaucrats serve the public. They hope members of the public will use people power to demand municipal reform. But even under the existing system, city council members from all political parties actively participate in community campaigns affecting only individual boroughs. Needless to say, many community campaigns cross district lines. An individual's daily activies are not necessarily confined to any one district.

The local election of District Chiefs will not uphold the rights and interests of the public or enhance local self-government. The Taiwan provincial government was "streamlined" because the government had too many levels, and was a detriment to administrative efficiency. If District Chiefs are elected, this will create yet another level of government. For newly upgraded Directly Administered Municipalities hoping to make progress, such redundancies will create obstacles to administrative efficiency.

Kaohsiung County Magistrate Yang Chiu-hsing says that by law, the urban planning schemes promoted by most counties and cities must be approved by village and town governments. Many village and town governments are subject to substantial pressure from local political bosses. Therefore they find it difficult to make efficient use of their budgets. They find it difficult to promote the construction of important public works projects. We have with great difficulty eliminated one level of government. We look forward to an increase in administrative efficiency. How can we possibly agree to turn the clock back?

The most heavily criticized aspect of local politics was black gold politics. But it was hardly the only problem. By the time local governments divided the spoils, construction projects and resources were completely fragmented. Given such precedents, shouldn't we think long and hard about who would benefit before we demand District Chief elections?

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2009.07.24
社論-區長民選?還是黑金之路?
本報訊

就如前美國前眾議院議長歐尼爾所說,所有的政治都是地方政治,地方政治的重要性不言可喻,但是台灣的問題在於,對重大地方政治議題的討論,著眼的永遠是政治人物的需要,而不是民之所欲,日前傳出部分縣市在未來升格,若干基層政治人物有意推動區長民選,就是明顯例子。

未來直轄市的區長,是否採民選產生,雖與現制不同,但並非全不能討論,問題在於,政治人物目前考慮推動區長民選的動機,主要是著眼於縣市升格後、原鄉鎮市民代的出路,因此,才會出現升格的四縣市基層民代發動連署,希望鄉鎮市民代表能延任或延選,等到民國一○三年後再全部廢除,而因此繼起的區長民選,就頗有為現任鄉鎮市民代量身打造的考量。

一項政策即使立意良好,都可能會產生意外、不佳的後果,更何況,政策若是一開始的立意就別有用心,幾乎就注定難有好下場,可以說,如果以現有的鄉鎮市作為未來區長民選的藍圖,則區長民選的下場可以想見。

不論公不公平,過去國民黨被指為「黑金政治」,最主要的關鍵,正就是在於基層選舉,選舉時賄聲賄影、暴力陰影不斷;經過這樣昂貴的選舉,當選後藉勢包工程、炒作土地、工程綁標,就更不是新聞,這些作為老早就嚴重地敗壞地方政治。對人民而言,這種類型的地方政治不僅不是參與公共政策的管道,反而是黑金罪惡的淵藪,結果更是惡性循環,優秀的人才更不願返鄉從政,台灣人民對地方自治的美好想像,完全被摧毀。

正因為過往地方政治的諸多問題,過去才會出現「鄉鎮長官派」的芻議,但是,無論是國民黨、還是民進黨政府都無法貫徹,最主要的原因在於,基層政治人物不但和地方派系環環相扣,更是立委、縣市長選舉的重要「樁腳」,因此誰都動不得,但也因為如此,台灣的政治,就這樣一路從地方敗壞到中央。

當然,如果從鼓勵人民直接參與、監督政治的角度來看,未必要因噎廢食,非要以過去敗壞的地方政治,來否定區長民選之議。我們不妨以北、高現成的兩個直轄市例子來看,雖然是區長官派,但此一區長「行政機關化」的作法,似乎運作良好,事實上,早年台北市公務員服務績效有待改進,但是在民選市長的壓力下,各區公所的服務態度、績效,都有一定的進步,看來,區長民選並非改善地方政府行政效率的唯一條件。

也許有人認為,作為一個現代公民,當然不會以政府服務態度為滿足,還希望能以市民、公民的力量,來推動市政改革,不過,依目前的狀況,即使是僅和個別里相關的社區運動,都可見到各黨派市議員積極參與,更不用說,有許多市民運動其實是跨區的,常有的狀況是,市民的生活圈,未必侷限於一區。

可以說,推動區長民選,看不出對民眾權益或地方自治有必然助益。更重要的是,過去精省,就是因為政府層級太多,不利行政效率,未來如又採區長民選,又橫生一個政府層級,對於剛改制、希望能雄圖大展的直轄市,恐怕是疊床架屋,造成施政上的障礙。

高雄縣長楊秋興就說,一般縣市推動都市計畫,依法得經過鄉鎮公所程序,許多鄉鎮公所顧及龐大地方人情壓力,因此預算難以有效集中運用,而讓許多重要建設難以推動,如今好不容易減少一個層級,行政效率可望大幅增加,豈有走回頭路的道理。

確實,過去台灣基層政治最為人詬病之處,不只在於黑金政治,而在於各地分割資源後,建設、資源都因此零碎化。面臨這些前例,政治人物推動區長民選前,更應該好好深思,誰才是區長民選的獲利者?

Wednesday, July 22, 2009

Word Tank or Think Tank: The Democratic Progressive Party Must Choose

Word Tank or Think Tank: The Democratic Progressive Party Must Choose
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 22, 2009

DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has announced that the DPP will call for a public referendum at the end of this year, "asking the public whether it wishes to hold a referendum on ECFA." According to news reports, Green Camp supporters agreed about the need for a year-end referendum. But they disagreed about its content. Some wanted a referendum on "whether to sign ECFA." Others wanted a referendum on "whether to hold a referendum on ECFA." Based on this logic, one could even call for a referendum on whether to hold a referendum on "whether to hold a referendum on ECFA." Politicians could carry this logic to the nth power, to its absurd extreme. This would appear to be a real life case of "It's Taiwan's first time, and the world is watching."
The DPP loves public referenda. Superficially it does so to demagogue the issue of reunification vs. independence, to oversimplify complex issues, to incite mob sentiment, and to rally voters during election season. But at a deeper level, the DPP has more serious problem. During his election campaign Ma Ying-jeou put forth a cross-Strait agreement known as CECA. But the DPP referred to it in the Minan dialect, which makes it sound like "subordinate role." The Blue Camp promptly changed the name to ECFA, which sounds like "we will become even wealthier." The DPP has long resorted to such demagogic word games. For example, Chen Shui-bian's "active opening, effective management" and "active management, effective opening" word games led to economic stagnation even as they won votes. Hsieh Chi-wei, GIO Chief to Chen Shui-bian, was extremely clever with words. But what the DPP really needs is not Hsieh Chi-wei's "word tank," but a "think tank" able to promote Taiwan's economic development.

For years, the DPP has opposed economic and trade exchanges with mainland China. It has long claimed that increasing cross-Strait exchanges would lead to Taiwan becoming "pro China." It would lead us into a pitfall in which Beijing used Taiwan merchants to besiege Taipei. Its argument was not entirely without justification. It helped keep the ruling administration on its toes. But the Democratic Progressive Party think tank has always been afraid to face a key problem. If Taipei finds itself shut out of ASEAN, what will become of Taiwan's economy? What will the consequences be? Put simply, the Democratic Progressive Party is willing only to stress the danger of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. It is unwilling to confront the dangers to Taiwan if Taipei rejects cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. During the 2008 presidential campaign the Ma/Siew ticket spoke of a Closed Door Policy turning Taiwan into another Cuba. The Democratic Progressive Party could offer no response. Instead it proposed an "Ignore Beijing" economic development policy. This is the Democratic Progressive Party's real crisis.

The scholars the DPP relies upon most heavily come from the Taiwan Thinktank. The cross-Strait economic and trade development perspective they most frequently cite is the outdated "Factor Price Equalization Theorem." According to classical theory, If Taiwan and mainland China engage in free trade, our annual wages will be pulled down to the level of mainland China's. That the DPP would cite such an outdated, stone age theory in the twenty-first century, reveals the intellectual vacuum inside the DPP. The Taiwan Thinktank is behind the curve because it is intellectually indolent. It has no choice but to function as a "word tank" instead of a "think tank." It has no choice but to resort to demagoguery to ingratiate itself with its fundamentalist supporters. This is why the Democratic Progressive Party is no longer making any progress.

Anyone who has come in contact with trade literature in recent years knows that this is the era of the knowledge economy. Technological innovation proceeds rapidly. Advanced countries enjoy the advantage of constantly renewed technology, renewed production processes, renewed brands, and renewed value chains. These give them a head start. There is simply no such thing as enjoying "factor price equalization" with one's competitors. The framework this 50 year old trade theory describes is static. According to this theory, latecomers will eventually catch up with the pioneers. Therefore their income levels will eventually become equal. But in the era of the knowledge economy, the industrial structure undergoes rapid and dynamic evolution. Knowledge, coupled with increasing economies of scale, result in leaders leaving their competitors farther and farther behind. Under such circumstances, countries the world over have no choice. They must maintain their lead in certain areas of global production in order to survive.

Take Korea for example. They have never been afraid of the gravitational field created by the Chinese mainland. They are not afraid their average annual wages will be reduced to the level of mainland China's. They boldly signed an FTA with Beijing and ASEAN. South Korea understands that in order to master the knowledge-based economy in the era of globalization, they must not forsake any geographical or market advantage. They refuse to be penny wise and pound foolish. Koreans may not like Beijing. They may hate the fact that Beijing backs Pyongyang, which eyes Seoul with enmity. But Korean think tanks are nothing if not pragmatic. In the face of such challenges, they are not about to foolishly propose that they shut themselves behind closed doors for 50 years. Think tanks in Korea engage in serious research. The study the literature. They do not reduce their policies to clever word games. Leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party must choose between being a "think tank" (zi ku) and a "word tank" (zi ku). How they choose will determine the fate of the party.

字庫或智庫 民進黨必須做個選擇
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.07.22

民進黨主席蔡英文宣布,要以「ECFA該不該公投」為題,在年底舉行公投。據報載,綠營人士對於年底公投一事共識甚高,但究竟要以什麼題目或什麼題組去做公投闖關,卻頗多爭議。「要不要ECFA」可以公投、「要不要公投ECFA」也可以公投。若依此推理延伸,則「要不要公投『ECFA公投』」亦可公投。若是堆疊推演,政客們可以將議題平方公投、三次方公投……N次方公投,如此這般,也真是「台灣第一次、世界都在看」的奇蹟。

民進黨喜歡辦公投的原因,表面上看是為了操作統獨標籤、簡化語言、動員民粹、拉抬選情。但往更深一層探討,背後還有更嚴重的問題。馬英九在競選期間原本提出的兩岸協議名稱是CECA,但在民進黨冠以「小腳色」的閩南語諧音之後,藍軍遂改以「要更發」的字音取代。其實,在名稱與諧音上找巧門、佔先機,一向是民進黨訴諸民粹的必要手段。例如陳水扁在「積極開放、有效管理」與「積極管理、有效開放」之間玩文字遊戲,原地踏步卻也能騙到一些選票;但民進黨所真正欠缺的,倒不是謝志偉那一級諧音巧配的「字庫」,而是對台灣經濟發展擘劃的「智庫」論述能力。

多年來,民進黨一向反對台灣與中國大陸經貿往來,說加強兩岸往來會使台灣傾中、使我們掉進「以商圍政」的陷阱。這樣的論述不能說沒道理,也對於主政者有相當的惕勵作用。但民進黨智庫始終不敢面對的問題是:如果台灣自外於東亞經濟合作局勢,會有什麼下場、什麼後果?簡言之,民進黨只敢強調兩岸經貿往來的危險,卻不敢面對台灣拒絕往來的絕境。馬蕭團隊在競選期間提出台灣鎖國將會「古巴化」的論點,民進黨竟全無招架餘地,提不出一套「不理會中共」的經濟發展積極論述。這才是民進黨真正的危機。

民進黨最倚重的學者教授多在台灣智庫遊走,而他們對兩岸經貿發展最常引用的理論觀點,竟然是老掉牙的「要素報酬相等」理論。依據該古典學說,台灣若與中國大陸開放經貿往來,則我們的平均工資報酬將被拉到與中國相當的極低水準。然而,在廿一世紀還在套用這種過時的新石器時代論述,就知道民進黨智庫中智識的空虛。正因為智庫不用功、論述跟不上潮流,他們就只好不斷訴諸「字庫」,靠一些民粹語言博取基本盤的支持。這就是民進黨不長進的根源。

所有接觸過晚近貿易文獻的人都知道,在知識經濟時代,各種技術與創新更迭甚快,而先進國家的優勢即在於不斷在新技術、新製程、新品牌、新價值鏈上取得先機,根本不讓對手有機會與自己「報酬相等」。五十年前的貿易理論描述的是一個靜態的框架,故假以時日,後進者終將追上先行者,因而彼此薪資將趨於均平。但在知識經濟時代,產業結構動態演進迅速,再加上知識投入所具有的規模報酬遞增特色,領先者遂有將後進者越拋越遠的趨勢。在這樣的環境之下,全世界各國都沒有選擇,都必須要在世界產業競逐的某些區塊中保持領先,才能夠生存。

以韓國為例:他們從來就不怕中國大陸的磁吸,也不怕其國民薪資被中國拉平,而勇敢地與中國及東協簽署FTA。韓國了解,要在全球化時代掌握知識經濟的動能,就不能放棄任何地緣、任何市場的可能優勢,正是所謂「勿以善小而不為」。韓國人也不見得喜歡中共,他們也討厭有老共撐腰的北韓對他們虎視眈眈。但是無論如何,韓國人的智庫還是腳踏實地、面對挑戰,不會自閉於五十年前的愚蠢理論。正因為韓國的智庫認真地做研究、讀文獻,他們的政策就不致淪落為「字庫」巧句的排列組合。未來民進黨在「智庫」與「字庫」之間要如何選擇,才是該黨興衰的關鍵。

Monday, July 20, 2009

CHAIWAN: Hoping for a Miracle on University Campuses

CHAIWAN: Hoping for a Miracle on University Campuses
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 20, 2009

Beijing has announced that it will allow students from Taiwan to apply to Mainland universities on the basis of their Taiwan test scores. Will this turn the Mainland into a black hole that drains Taiwan of its brains? Or will it establish a new platform enabling win/win cross-Strait exchanges?

Cross-Strait problems cannot be satisfactorily resolved at this moment. For their solution, we must look to the future. We can only hope they will find resolution ten, twenty, thirty years, or even longer from now. In other words, we must look to future generations of young people on Taiwan and the Mainland. From this perspective, Beijing's decision to allow students from Taiwan to apply to Mainland universities on the basis of their Taiwan test scores is certain to set off a chain reaction. One can only hope that improved relations among universities across the Taiwan Strait will lead to improved cross-Strait relations.

After six decades of political turmoil, we have finally extricated ourselves from such outmoded thinking as "Retake the mainland!" and "Liberate Taiwan!" During the past two years the two sides have finally reached a new consensus regarding peace and reconciliation. This may be the best legacy the authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait can leave future generations. Alas, it may be the only legacy. Can future generations create a win/win scenario based on the current atmosphere of peace and reconciliation? That remains to be seen. This heavy responsibility will fall on the shoulders of the coming generation on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Therefore, we cautiously endorse Beijing's decision to allow students from Taiwan to apply to Mainland universities on the basis of their Taiwan test scores. We cautiously endorse the joint study of a "dual degree policy" being conducted by National Taiwan University and Beijing University. We cautiously endorse allowing Mainland students to study on Taiwan on the basis of their Mainland academic credentials. Closer interaction between universities on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait must not transform the Mainland into a giant black hole. It must lead to win/win cross-Strait exchanges.

Since the two sides can not solve problems through war, they must solve problems through peace. Because the two sides must have peace, therefore they must engage in exchanges. The two sides must engage in exchanges, but Taipei must not be swallowed up by Beijing. Taipei must retain the right to determine the nature of cross-Strait exchanges. This applies to cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. It also applies to cross-Strait academic exchanges. When it comes to economic and trade exchanges, Taipei may not have the advantage. But when it comes to academic exchanges, Taiwan's freedom and democracy give it valuable competitive advantages. In other words, If we want universities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to have a salutary effect on the humanities, we must look to Taiwan. This is something the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should work hard for.

If we want to integrate universities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the public on Taiwan and high school students and university students on Taiwan must be prepared. The public on Taiwan must appreciate the value of democracy and the rule of law. Democracy and the rule of law are the most precious belongings students from Taiwan will take with them to the Mainland. It will also be their most valuable medium of intellectual exchange on Mainland campuses. But if the parents of this generation of students from Taiwan distort the meaning of democracy, debase the rule of law, and turn their backs on the world, students from Taiwan will lose their psychological advantage. After all, cross-Strait university interaction is not limited to academic exchanges. Such interactions will also be the cradle of a cross-Strait political vision. Students from Taiwan are the guardians of a Chinese model of democracy. This is not something that needs to be trumpeted or overemphasized. That is precisely why it is so valuable in cross-Strait relations.

Future generations of high school and college students on Taiwan must become more involved in cross-Strait university exchanges. Global Vision magazine commissioned a survey of youth on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. It found that 65.3% of young people on Taiwan believe their biggest competitor is young people on the Mainland. This shows that young people on Taiwan have seen the warning signs. But the direct and indirect challenges the coming generation of young people on Taiwan face are not merely challenges in the job market. They also face powerful challenges to the values they have internalized on Taiwan. Are young people on Taiwan ready to face the future?

Twenty-five years from now, could a graduate of National Taiwan University who is a resident of Fujian, become the Governor of Fujian Province? Thirty years from now, could a graduate of Beijing University become a candidate for President of the Republic of China? These possibilities may be too much for our minds to take in. But they are not outside the realm of possibility.

The developments the two sides are pursuing may not be quite so dramatic. Rather, the question is whether the two sides can work together to create cross-Strait peace, democracy, prosperity, and set a humanist example for the world? Can universities on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait engage in the rational and idealistic pursuit of truth and knowledge, both independently and together?

Can CHAIWAN become a miracle? Can it set an example for the world? Can rational and idealistic universities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait give birth to such a phenomenon? We can of course hope. But our hopes may remain nothing more than hopes. After all, the future of the two sides will be determined by future generations of university students on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

CHAIWAN:一個寄望於兩岸大學校園的奇蹟
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.07.20 04:01 am

北京宣布將開放台灣學生憑學測成績申請就讀大陸大學;這將是大陸對台灣發生磁吸效應的新黑洞,或者是兩岸雙贏交流的新平台?

兩岸問題不可能在此刻當下圓滿解決,而必須寄望於未來,寄望於十年後,二、三十年後,或更久遠的將來,也就是將寄望於今後數代的兩岸青年。若從此一角度看北京採認學測成績為入學準據,及其勢將衍生的連鎖效應,不能不令人對今後兩岸的大學校園在改善兩岸關係上寄以深切期待。

歷經過去六十年的激盪衝擊,好不容易才從不共戴天的「反攻大陸」、「解放台灣」走了出來,兩岸一直到了最近這兩年才約略出現了「和平/和解」的青稚共識,這也許已是這一代兩岸當局能給後世兩岸子孫的最佳禮物了,但也恐只是僅此而已;未來將如何在這個「和平/和解」的氛圍中,共同創發出一個兩岸雙贏的願景與規制,則尚有待時日,而此一重大責任將會落在今後數代兩岸青年的肩頭。

因此,我們對北京採用台灣學測成績入學,及台大、北大研議合辦「雙聯學位」,及我方擬有條件承認大陸學歷與進一步開放陸生來台,皆持審慎支持的立場。我們的思考是:對台灣而言,未來交流互動日益密切的兩岸大學校園,不要淪為大陸磁吸效應的新黑洞,而應當使之成為兩岸雙贏交流的新平台。

兩岸不可用戰爭解決問題,所以要和平;兩岸要和平,所以要交流;兩岸要交流,但不要被大陸吞掉,而要維護台灣在處理兩岸終極關係的發言地位。此一原則適用於兩岸經貿交流,同樣也當然適用於未來兩岸大學校園的交流。何況,談到經貿交流,台灣未必有當然的優勢;但若論大學校園的交流,以台灣之自由民主,卻存有相當珍貴的相對優勢。也就是說,倘若寄望兩岸大學校園成為一個台灣能夠相對發生較佳影響的人文場域,這應當是合理的期待,亦是台灣朝野可以用心經營的一個新平台。

然而,若將兩岸大學校園視為一個平台,台灣社會與台灣未來的高中生及大學生皆宜有所準備,以資因應。就台灣社會言,應當更加珍惜台灣在民主法治上的成就,台灣的民主與法治將是台灣負笈大陸的「留學生」最珍貴的行李,也是他們在大陸校園中不言自喻的交流資產。然而,倘若這一代父母輩的台灣人,所表現的卻是扭曲的民主、被汙染的法治,及偏差的國際觀;恐將使台灣學生失去原本應有的心理優勢。畢竟,在兩岸大學校園的互動中,除了在學術課程的交流外,那也是未來兩岸願景的搖籃;台灣學生是「華人民主典範」的傳承者與守護者,不必渲染,不著斧鑿,他們在這個兩岸平台上的最大價值,正在於此。

今後數代的台灣高中生及大學生,應當更認真地參與兩岸交流互動的大學校園。《遠見雜誌》主持的一項兩岸年輕人調查顯示,六五‧三%的台灣年輕人認為,他們最大的競爭對手是大陸的年輕人。可見,台灣的年輕人其實已在環境中嗅得了此種警訊;但是未來數代台灣年輕人所面對的,尚不僅是個人在職場上必須直接或間接迎對大陸人的競爭挑戰,他們也將實際參與台灣價值與大陸磁吸的巨型拔河比賽。面對未來,台灣的年輕人準備好了嗎?

二十五年後,有無可能出現一個台大畢業的福建省民選省長?三十年後,有無可能出現一個北大畢業的直選中華民國總統?這些想像也許太過迂闊,卻未必不符邏輯。

但是,兩岸所追求的卻未必是此類戲劇性的發展;而是有無可能在以理智及理想為主流的兩岸大學校園裡,及在追求真理與知識的兩岸大學知識分子當中,能夠透過交流互動的知性平台,分別為兩岸,並共同為兩岸開創出一個和平、民主、繁榮與引領世界理想的人類文明典範?

CHAIWAN奇蹟,成為一個世界文明的新典範,有無可能在有理智與有理想的兩岸大學校園中孕育誕生?我們不妨心存此想,但其實也只能作此寄託而已。畢竟,兩岸的未來,必然是十之八九決定於今後兩岸數代大學生的手中!

Friday, July 17, 2009

A Japanese Master Recites the Scriptures for the DPP

A Japanese Master Recites the Scriptures for the DPP
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 17, 2009

Renowned Japanese futurist Kenichi Omae has accepted an invitation from the United Daily News to visit Taiwan in the near future. On the eve of his visit, he agreed to an interview with this paper. He reiterated his predictions for the Chinese mainland, and the challenges and opportunities they might present for Taiwan.
Omae pointed out that by 2010, Mainland China's economy would overtake Japan's. It would become the world's second largest economy. By 2055 it would be ten times as larger than today. Of course, Mainland China's economy is not without defects. Omae pointed out that in many sectors Mainland China is not doing as well as India. As for Taiwan, he believes Taipei must establish a "symbiotic relationship" with Beijing. Otherwise it will be forced to step aside.

Omae's observations can be divided into two categories. One. Explore trends relating to Mainland China's rise. Two. Determine Taiwan's long term responses. Of course longer term predictions can become colored by subjective judgments and speculations. Perhaps we can try to understand the context of his reasoning, without getting too fixated on the details. For example, 2055 is 46 years away. During this period economic growth, global warming, and population growth may affect the size of Mainland China's economy. In any event, the rate of Mainland China's economic growth is staggering. Omae recommends that Taipei think in terms of a confederation with Beijing. In the future, along with Tibet and Xinjiang, Taiwan may become a "Ten Percent Nation" on Mainland China's periphery. This is an example of Omae's creative thinking. It may be too early to lock ourselves into the framework of a confederation. But seeking a political solution for Taiwan is a challenge that cannot be avoided.

We may have different ideas about political and economic developments in 30 or 40 years. But in the short-term, given its immediate and pressing problems of survival and development, Taipei has little room to maneuver. Mainland China's economy will soon surpass Japan's, becoming Asia's largest economy. Under ASEAN plus One and ASEAN plus Three regional trade arrangements, nearly every nation with East Asian regional relations with Taipei will form alliances, and become part of an East Asian free trade zone. ASEAN plus Three members long ago began negotiating treaties over a variety of service industries and investments. When these treaties gradually start to come into effect in 2010, nearly every East Asian nation will become a Mainland Chinese factory and market "satellite." If we insist on staying outside this "economic galaxy," we will become the abandoned infant of the Asian economy, with no room whatsover for survival.

Omae said that for Taipei to be negotiating ECFA with Beijing now is already five years too late. If Taipei had faced the threat posed by ASEAN plus Three earlier, and abandoned its "No Haste, Be Patient" path sooner, it would still have room for strategic planning. We could still have given full play to the strengths of our industry. We could still have taken advantage of the many opportunities on Mainland China. But because we misjudged the situation at the time, we must now rely upon ECFA to obtain "Early Harvest" provisions from Beijing. Such aarly harvests mean that other countries are already enjoying the fruits of economic exchanges and free trade. All Taipei can do now is beg others to share and share alike. We long ago lost the chance to have our own exclusive share. Omae's remark about stepping aside confirms that the policy of "No Haste, Be Patient" was a mistake.

Of course, close interaction with Beijing is not without risks. Warnings issued by some of our friends in the Democratic Progressive Party may be closer to reality than the thinking of some KMT politicians. At worst, Beijing is certainly thinking in terms of using businessmen to beseige the government. It may be attempting to drive Taipei into desperate straits. We must not of course forget for a moment the risks involved in cross-Strait exchanges. But even more, we must not refuse to engage in cross-Strait exchanges merely because we suspect the other side's motives. The biggest blunder committed by Democratic Progressive Party officials is to jump from the observation that the other side is unfriendly, to the conclusion that we must refuse any contact with them, and must impose a Closed Door Policy. The public on Taiwan must recognize the potential risk of stepping into an economic trap set by Beijing. But even more, it must understand the risks to our economic survival posed by Taipei's economic Closed Door Policy under the ASEAN plus Three framework. If we do not engage in trade and economic exchanges with Beijing, the ASEAN plus Three countries will soon tell Taipei to step aside. What will Taipei do then? Once we find ourselves at an economic and trade impasse, our economy will decline. When that time comes, what will become of our ability to resist Beijing's demands? The Democratic Progressive Party constantly worries about Beijing using business to promote reunification. But if Taipei loses its economic power, what will happen to its political situation?

Omae pointed out that only when one has ensured one's economic survival, can one begin to explore one's political options. A foreign monk has offered his wisdom on cross-Strait economic and trade relations. The content of his sermon was down to earth. The tone of his sermon was low keyed. One can only hope that common sense, normally obliterated by Taiwan independence fundamentalism, will be given the chance to open a few eyes and ears.

日本和尚念經給民進黨聽
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.07.17 06:42 am


日本知名「趨勢大師」大前研一受本報系之邀即將來台訪問。他在訪台前夕接受本報專訪,再次談起他對中國大陸發展的預期,以及台灣可能的挑戰與機會。

大前指出,中國大陸的經濟規模即將在二○一○年超越日本,成為全世界第二大經濟體,更將在二○五五年擴張為目前的十倍。當然,中國經濟絕不是沒有缺點;大 前指出,在許多產業制高點的掌握上,中國還不如印度做得好。至於台灣的出路,他認為台灣必須想辦法與中國大陸「共生」,否則將來只有「靠邊站」。

大前的觀點可以切割成兩個面向解讀。其一是探討未來中國大陸繼續崛起的趨勢,其二則是就長期而言來計議台灣可能的因應方向。當然,太長期的發展多少都滲入 個人主觀的判斷與猜測,大家或可嘗試理解其推理脈絡,卻不必太計較細節。例如,從現在到二○五五年還有四十六年,其間經濟成長率的假想、全球暖化的程度、 人口成長的預估等,在在都會影響中國經濟的規模;唯無論如何,中國經濟的發展趨勢是驚人的。再如,大前建議台灣往「邦聯」的架構去思考,將來可能與西藏、 新疆等都成為中共周邊「百分之十」的國家,也是他的創意思維。我們固然不宜太早將自己鎖定在邦聯的框架下,但必須為台灣尋思可能的政治出路亦是無法迴避的 挑戰。

我們雖然可以對三、四十年後的政經發展情勢有諸多不同的情境設想,但是坦白地說:台灣對於短期的、迫在眉睫的生存發展問題,卻沒有多少轉圜的空間。中國大 陸經濟規模不但即將超越日本,成為亞洲最大的經濟體,而且在東協加一與加三的區域貿易安排之下,幾乎所有與台灣有東亞地緣關係的國家都將相互結盟,成為東 亞自由貿易區。除此之外,東協加三的成員也早就在談判各種服務業與投資互惠協定。等到這些條約在二○一○年起開始逐步生效,則東亞諸國幾乎全數成為中國大 陸工廠與市場的「衛星」。此時我們如果堅持要留在此一「經濟星系」之外,台灣將如亞洲經濟之棄嬰,絕對沒有生存的空間。

大前說,台灣現在與中共談判ECFA,其實已經晚了至少五年。如果早些正視東協加三的威脅、早些走出戒急用忍的歧路,台灣還有不少的布局機會,尚能充分發 揮我們的產業優勢,在中國大陸取得若干先機。正因為當初誤判局勢,才會落得今天要靠ECFA向中共爭取「早期收穫」條款的地步。蓋早期收穫就表示別國已然 預期享有的經貿果實,台灣只能拜託別國讓我們「一起分享」,早已不存在「獨自享受」的空間。大前「靠邊站」的結論,也正印驗了戒急用忍的政策錯誤。

當然,與中國大陸密切互動不是沒有風險的,這一點民進黨朋友所提出的警告,恐怕比部分國民黨政治人物的憧憬還要更接近現實。往壞處想,中共當然是心裡想著 「以商圍政」、腦子裡也許確實有「謀我日亟」的圖謀。我們對於兩岸交往的或有風險當然不能須臾或忘,但是更不能因為對岸可能的心懷鬼胎就拒絕往來。民進黨 政治人物所犯的最大錯誤,就是從「對岸不友善」的觀察,不假思索地跳躍到「不與對岸往來」的鎖國結論。台灣人民確應認清踏進中共經濟圈套的風險,但更要理 解台灣鎖國經濟在東協加三架構下的生存危機。如果我們不與中共經貿往來,以至於東協加三等經貿國家都向台灣說「請靠邊站」時,台灣究竟還有什麼活路?一旦 我們經貿沒有出路、經濟衰敗蕭條,到時候究竟我們對中共還有多少抗拒的條件與能力?民進黨人老是擔心對岸「以商促統」,但如果真的在經濟上喪失了實力,台 灣在政治上的處境又豈堪設想?

大前指出了台灣的經濟「生存」之路:謀得生存之後,台灣才能逐步折衝政治的空間。外來和尚談兩岸經貿,其內容平實、語調不高亢,只希望能對平日智慧受到遮蔽的基本教義派,能有些振聾啟瞶的作用。

Thursday, July 16, 2009

Open Our Hearts, Welcome Our Guests, Be Good Hosts

Open Our Hearts, Welcome Our Guests, Be Good Hosts
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 16, 2009

The Kaohsiung World Games opened today. Five thousand competitors and visitors from several hundred nations gathered in Kaohsiung. For the Republic of China, this was a rare event. In particular, after endless negotiations, President Ma Ying-jeou confirmed that he would preside over the opening ceremonies in his capacity as head of state. The public would be allowed to bring their own Republic of China national flags and cheer for Republic of China competitors. Citizens of the Republic of China would maintain their dignity on their own home court. These are all things worth celebrating.
Originally the International World Games Association refused to allow President Ma to officiate at the opening ceremonies. It was even rumored that Chang Yu, the PRC government's General Administrator of Sports would officiate, in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Olympic Committee. For the public on Taiwan, such an arrangement would have been unacceptable. After several months of negotiations, the International World Games Association, the Republic of China Olympic Committee, and the Kaohsiung Municipal Government arrived at a three sided compromise. The International World Games Association agreed to abandon precedent. Ma Ying-jeou would become the first president to preside over the World Games since they were held for the first time nine years ago. In the past, mayors or ministers chaired the event. One might say that during the current World Games the Republic of China established a new world record.

President Ma presided over the opening ceremonies. Members of the public were allowed to bring their own Republic of China national flags and cheer for the Republic of China team, This constituted a break from the rigid Olympic model, and established a new World Games model. This progress was not merely the fruit of efforts by three parties. It was also the result of goodwill on the part of a fourth party. Beijing did not object to the current arrangements. This was tantamount to an endorsement. In the past, Beijing blocked our appearance in international venues. This often provoked resentment on Taiwan. It provided pro-independence elements with a bully pulpit. This time, amidst an atmosphere of cross-Strait peace, the public on Taiwan witnessed with their own eyes Beijing's increasingly pragmatic approach to the World Games.

Kaohsiung is hosting the World Games. Everything it experienced, from competing for the right to host the event, to its planning and its execution, involved a kind of metamorphosis. Japanese architect Toyo Ito designed the main World Games Stadium to look like a soaring dragon, and enlivened the entire stadium district. Together with the newly completed mass rapid transit system, it has turned Kaohsiung into a new city. By hosting an international sports event, Kaohsiung has enhanced its image as a modern metropolis.

Partisan politics have long divided the island North and South. Hosting the World Games in the city of Kaohsiung, under the auspices of the Republic of China, has encouraged the Democratic Progressive Party, which has long rejected the Republic of China national flag, to treat it as their centerpiece. By inviting President Ma to officiate over the opening ceremony, they deserve commendation for transcending their old patterns as a "single party city." This will help bridge differences between North and South, and between Blue and Green.

Above all, the Kaohsiung Municipal Government has transcended the DPP's Closed Door mentality. In order to promote the World Games, Chen Chu was willing to incur the wrath of her own party. She visited the mainland and communicated with the Beijing authorities. She lobbied incessantly with the International World Games Association. She called for the participation of the Repubic of China president, and the display of the Republic of China national flag. Organizing international sporting events requires a broader outlook than partisan infighting. It requires a more diversified outlook than local machine politics. These represent a quantum leap in her level of tolerance and sense of inclusivity.

Kaohsiung harbor is a gateway to Taiwan. The DPP purports to be a "Nativist" political party. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu is a political figure from the Kaohsiung Incident era. Her background lends her participation in the World Games a special significance. During the opening ceremonies the traditional Chinese demi-god Na Zha entered the arena on a motorcycle. Puppet theater characters greeted the audience. Taiwan greeted the world. The world got a look at Taiwan. The public on Taiwan has long had a provincial worldview. The World Games has helped the public on Taiwan realize that opening one's doors to the world is not easy. One must first open the doors to one's heart.

Highly sensitive political issues such as the use of the Republic of China flag and the Republic of China president have been resolved, Now the question is how to properly fulfill our role as the host. Compared to the highly competitive Olympic Games, the World Games are more like a summer sports festival. The competitive events are lively and full of local color. Because they lack the tense atmosphere of the Olympic Games, competitors can take advantage of the occasion to make friends with each other. Hosting the World Games in Kaohsiung has provided us with an opportunity to promote the Republic of China on the international stage, More importantly it has allowed us to fulfill our role as host. Those who came to compete and those who came to watch were given VIP treatment, winning their friendship. The record breaking expenditure of the World Games, which cost tens of billions of dollars, were not squandered.

The World Games theme song was "I See the World." It symbolizes Kaohsiung's lofty ambitions. Therefore we appeal to the public on Taiwan. Set aside your prejudices. Be a proper host to the World Games. The public on Taiwan may have grievances about the Republic of China national flag and the Republic of China national anthem. The World Games may not be able to address these grievances. But we should at least strive to open the doors to our hearts, and win the friendship of our overseas guests.

打開心門,歡迎嘉賓,做好主人
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.07.16 06:14 am

高雄世運今天揭幕,百國五千選手嘉賓齊聚高雄競技交流,這是台灣罕見的國際盛事。尤其,經過不斷交涉,馬英九總統確定以元首身分宣布開幕,民眾可攜國旗進場加油,台灣人民的主場自尊得以維持,這些都是值得喜悅的事。

先前,世運協會總會一度拒絕由馬總統主持開幕,並傳出可能由中共體育總局副局長于再清以奧會副主席身分擔綱;如此無禮的安排,自然不能被國人接受。經過數月交涉,在世運總會、中華奧會及高雄市府「三方」的協調下,世運總會同意放棄「成規」,馬英九成為世運舉辦九屆以來首位主持開幕的總統(過去皆由市長或部長主持),堪稱台灣為本屆世運打破了第一項紀錄。

由馬總統宣布開幕,到觀眾可攜國旗進場加油,可謂是突破了以往僵硬的「奧會模式」,走出了新的「世運模式」。其間進展,除了「三方」的積極努力,可以想像應當還有「第四方」的善意。北京對目前這些安排迄無負面的反應,這是值得肯定的態度。過去中共在國際場合圍堵我國,往往只能更激起台灣民眾的反感,讓獨派人士有戲可唱;這次,在兩岸融冰的和平氛圍下,北京若對世運採取較務實作法,台灣人民當然都會看在眼裡。

高雄市承辦這次世運,從爭取、籌畫到執行,彷彿經歷了一場昇華蛻變。日本建築師伊東豐雄設計的世運主場館像一條令觀者心情隨之飛騰的巨龍,帶活了整個館區,加上新完工的捷運,煥然一新的市容,藉由主辦這一場國際大賽,使得高雄現代都會的形貌增色不少。

由於政黨政治的撕裂,台灣的南北兩極對立一直難以改善。高雄市主辦這次世運,在凸顯台灣主體性的前提下,使得長期被民進黨冷落的中華民國國旗成為視聽焦點,又積極安排馬總統出席開幕典禮,這種超乎「一黨一市」的格局值得肯定,對弭合南北及藍綠歧見應有一定助益。

最重要的是,高雄市政府走出了民進黨的鎖國封閉思維。陳菊為了行銷世運,甘犯黨內眾怒,登陸與對手多方溝通,並在元首與國旗問題上與世運總會不斷周旋。舉辦國際賽事,需要比政黨內鬥更寬廣的器識,比經營地方都會更多元的視野,這都是胸襟與格局的躍升。

高雄港都是台灣的大門,民進黨嘗自詡為代表本土的政黨,陳菊市長則是美麗島世代的政治人物;這樣的組合,使得此次世運別具意義。當開幕式的三太子神偶騎著電機車進場,霹靂布袋戲向觀眾問好;一種「台灣面對世界/世界看見台灣」的情緒必是油然而生。台灣的「國際觀」一向相當貧弱,透過這次世運會,全體台灣人應會感知:向世界打開大門並不那麼容易,更不容易的是首先要學會向世界打開自己的「心門」。

在國旗及元首與會等高度政治性問題解決之後,回歸正題就是如何善盡主辦城市的地主之誼了。比起競爭激烈的「奧運」,「世運」較像是個全球夏日運動嘉年華,奇巧的競技,充滿生活與地域文化的趣味;正由於不像奧運那麼劍拔弩張,與會者更能藉著競技切磋相互交流友誼。從這個觀點看,高雄主辦這次世運,除了趁機向國際行銷台灣,更重要的是扮演好地主國角色,使來台參賽、觀賽和採訪的友人皆能獲得賓至如歸的接待,並贏得他們的友誼。那麼,這場打破歷屆世運經費紀錄而耗資百億的世運會即不算虛擲。

本屆世運主題曲是「看見全世界」,象徵了高雄渴望展翅飛翔的雄心壯志;那麼,就請全台人民拋棄成見,共同當好世運的主人吧!無論台灣的「旗歌憂鬱症」是否從此可以豁然痊癒,至少大家要努力敞開心門,贏得各路海外嘉賓的友誼。

Wednesday, July 15, 2009

Chen Shui-bian Must Look the Courts and the Public in the Eye

Chen Shui-bian Must Look the Courts and the Public in the Eye
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 15, 2009

Chen Shui-bian's detention has been extended three times. It has gotten to the point where Chen finds it necessary to change his legal defense strategy. His original legal defense strategy was to plead not guilty and see eventual acquittal. His future defense strategy will probably focus on the verdict. hoping to obtain a pardon.
Chen Shui-bian's detention has been extended to September 25. By that time the courts may have returned a verdict in the first instance. Even if they have not, they may continue detaining him. The Full Court has extended Chen's detention for the third time. Based on the court's rulings, Chen Shui-bian is almost certain to demand a hearing. Chen Shui-bian is no longer wasting his energy seeking acquittal. Instead he seems to be concentrating on the verdict, hoping to obtain a pardon. He hopes to receive a more favorable decision, perhaps to pave the way for a pardon. The key to his strategy is to admit guilt in court and apologize to society.

The Full Court has extended his detention three times. It pointed out that Chen Shui-bian faces at least seven years for the felonies he committed. The Full Court's actions revealed the judges' thinking. Actually a number of Chen Shui-bian's crimes could lead to 20 or 30 year sentences. He has yet to be charged with crimes calling for life imprisonment. Previously Chen Shui-bian made numerous attempts to interfere with the judicial process. The Full Court was compelled to take this evidence of Chen's motives into consideration when deciding whether to extend his detention. If during the final stages of his trial Chen Shui-bian still refuses to show repentance and admit guilt, the Full Court may be compelled to increase the penalties imposed. The only way Chen Shui-bian can influence the judges now is to admit guilt and show repentance. He must cease slandering, attacking, insulting, and intimidating the judges. Does Chen Shui-bian really want to play power games with the court? Does he really want to test the judges' patience?

Chen Shui-bian may be found guilty. He may be given a heavy sentence. Chen Shui-bian himself suspects as much. Suppose Chen Shui-bian is sentenced to life or 30 years. He will find himself in a predicament. Should he appeal or should he seek a pardon? If he appeals, he cannot seek a pardon. Conversely, if he seeks a pardon, then he may not make an appeal. A pardon is a political gesture that must accord with the feelings of the public. If Chen Shui-bian refuses to admit guilt after being convicted in the first instance, how can the public agree to a pardon? At the very least Chen Shui-bian must admit guilt and apologize. To have any chance of a pardon he must forgo any appeals and make a number of political promises. Conversely, if he maintains his unrepentant attitude, how can the public possibly agree to a pardon? How can Ma Ying-jeou possibly justify giving him a pardon?

The Full Court extended the length of Chen's detention. It had much to say about Chen Shui-bian's interference with the judicial process. The Full Court said "if he was released the harm he could do to the administration of justice and the degree to which he could interfere with the judicial process was unimaginable." Such views went beyond the original reasons for his detention. The Full Court's attention is now on the need to ensure due process during the trial as a whole. As matters stand, Chen Shui-bian's political sleight of hand has backfired. Playing with fire has gotten him burned. If Chen Shui-bian refuses to come clean with the court and admit guilt, the judges may be forced by law to impose a heavier sentence. If Chen Shui-bian refuses to apologize to the public and express remorse, he may rule out any possibility of a pardon. The judges are permitted to consider only whether Chen Shui-bian undermined the administration of justice and interfered with the trial process. Society, on the other hand, is more concerned about whether Chen Shui-bian might trample over justice and divide society.

Chen Shui-bian has painted himself into a corner. He may be able to mobilize people such as Chen Chung-mo, convincing them to beseige to the courthouse. He may be able to mobilize people such as Tsai Chi-fang, convincing them to demand his release. But the verdict is not in their hands. The verdict is in the hands of the Full Court. Chen Shui-bian must think clearly, and act rationally. The time when he could obstruct justice has passed. For all his efforts, he has nothing to show. All he can look forward to now is the court's verdict and a presidential pardon. Anyone who hopes for a favorable court ruling must convince a judge of his repentance. Anyone who hpoes for a presidential pardon must admit guilt and convince the public that his expressions of remorse are sincere.

Chen Shui-bian chose the wrong legal defense strategy. He made the same mistakes he made when he was in power and ruled the nation. He made the mistake of sacrificing means for ends, right for wrong, and substance for form. He sought only quick fixes. He refused to consider the consequences. He engaged in deceit. He trampled over justice. Yesterday he controlled the machinery of state. Today he manipulated the wheels of justice. That is why he directed his appeals at a tiny minority of Deep Green True Believers gathered outside the courthouse. That is why he demonstrated nothing but contempt for the courts and the general public. We now know Chen Shui-bian's antics outside the courthouse will not reverse his fortunes. He must now look the courts and the public in the eye.

Chen Shui-bian must wake up to the fact that Chen Chung-mo is not in charge of the courts, and Tsai Chi-fang cannot give him a pardon.

陳水扁必須回頭面對法庭及主流社會
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.07.15 04:49 am

陳水扁三度延押,已經到了必須考慮改變訴訟策略的時間點。此前,他的訴訟策略著眼在無罪抗辯及開釋;今後的訴訟策略則應以面對判決及爭取特赦為計議。

此次延押使陳水扁的羈押期延長至九月二十五日,屆時一審可能已經審結判決;即使尚未審結,亦有可能再延押下去;依合議庭三度延押裁定的理路來看,陳水扁將從看守所提庭聆判的機率已在十之八九。所以,陳水扁今後似乎不必再在設法爭取開釋上徒耗心力,而應以面對判決及爭取特赦為計議。為爭取較有利的判決或為特赦鋪墊輿論基礎,其關鍵皆在:向法庭認罪,向社會道歉。

合議庭三次裁定延押,皆指出陳水扁所涉為七年以上徒刑之重罪;倘若這是透露了法官的心證,則陳水扁其實就有數罪併處二、三十年徒刑的可能性,何況他尚有被訴以最高處無期徒刑之罪。陳水扁此前操弄諸多手段以「干擾司法訴訟進行」,而使合議庭增添了必須延押的心證;倘若陳水扁在此判決的最後階段,仍然不肯悔罪認罪,恐也將逼使合議庭依法以犯後態度惡劣而加重刑罰。而陳水扁現今唯一尚能影響法官的方法,就是認罪的誠意及良好的犯後態度;而不是汙衊、攻擊、羞辱、恐嚇法官,且毫無認罪悛悔之意。陳水扁難道還要繼續用那些戲弄法庭的手法,來探測法官們心證的底蘊?

陳水扁可能被判有罪,亦可能被判重刑;連陳水扁自己亦有此種預感。假設,陳水扁被判無期徒刑或二、三十年有期徒刑;他將立即面對是否要上訴及是否要爭取特赦的困局。若要上訴,即不可能爭取特赦;反之,若要爭取特赦,即須首先放棄上訴。特赦是一政治舉措,必須斟酌社會感情的反應。陳水扁若在一審宣判前仍不認罪,難道社會能同意對一個不認罪者給予特赦?在想像中,陳水扁至少須以認罪道歉,放棄上訴,並作出若干政治承諾後,始有可能爭取特赦;反之,倘若仍是現今這種怙惡不悛的態度,社會大眾豈能同意特赦,而馬英九又豈有給予特赦的空間?

合議庭第三度延押裁定書,特別對陳水扁「干擾司法訴訟進行」的種種事實有所著墨;並稱「誠難想像如將之釋放,不知將以何種方式戕害司法,干擾審判」。這類的觀點已然超越了所謂羈押要件的例舉,而是從維護整體審判進行的最高法益著眼。事既至此,陳水扁的一切政治操作已然產生了玩火自焚的反效果。同理,陳水扁若再不向法院坦誠認罪,是否會迫使法官依法判以重刑?陳水扁若再不向社會懺悔道歉,會不會自絕了特赦的可能性?因為,法官只能斟酌陳水扁之「戕害司法/干擾審判」;但主流社會更將顧慮陳水扁的「蹂躪正義/撕裂社會」!

陳水扁將自己逼入了死胡同。即使他能動員城仲模等人到法院「侵門踏戶」,及發動蔡啟芳等人為他爭取開釋;但畢竟審判權不在這些人手中,而是操在合議庭的法官之手。陳水扁現在必須理性地意識到,他以干擾訴訟來爭取開釋的階段已經過去,且全無成效;今後他所面對的將是判決與特赦的問題,而欲爭取有利的判決就必須以良好態度說服法官,欲爭取特赦則必須以認罪誠意感動主流社會。

陳水扁在訴訟策略上所犯的錯誤,與他過去主政治國時期所犯諸多重大錯誤的形態如出一轍。其錯皆在逐末捨本、用奇捨正、尚虛棄實,只求一時急效而不計後果,沉溺於權謀而踐踏義理;過去他是如此操弄國家,如今他也這樣操弄司法。因而,他才會以法院外的深綠小眾為其訴求對象,而完全罔顧法庭及主流社會始是決定一切的關鍵因素。現在已經證實,陳水扁在法庭外的戲法完全左右不了大局,他必須重新回頭面對法庭及主流社會。

陳水扁應當覺悟:法院不是城仲模開的,特赦也不是蔡啟芳等人說了就算!

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

Diplomacy Must Be Conducted Standing Upright

Diplomacy Must Be Conducted Standing Upright
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 8, 2009

President Ma Ying-jeou has ended his six day "Journey of Enduring Friendship" and returned to Taipei. This brief, tightly scheduled visit to Central America was his second. It was dogged by one incident after another. Nevertheless, it consolidated our alliances and proclaimed our foreign policy. The previous "Journey of Enduring Relations" was dogged by earthquakes, detained bodyguards, and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega standing President Ma up. This trip was the same. It too was dogged by incidents from beginning to end.

First, a coup broke out in Honduras. President Manuel Zelaya was deposed and deported. Our government was forced to postpone our visit to Honduras. To everyone's surprise Zelaya appeared at at the Panamanian president's inauguration ceremony. When President Ma and his party arrived in Nicaragua, Zelaya made yet another appearance. Daniel Ortega was scheduled to greet President Ma at the airport and play host to him at the state banquet. But in order to discuss the matter of Zelaya's return to his country, he stood Ma up. President Ma was so angry he was tempted to terminate his visit. Our government even threatened to cut aid. Only then did Daniel Ortega come forward to apologize.

The timing of President Ma's state visit was unfortunate. It coincided with a coup in Honduras. As a result, Central America was in an tizzy. The international community was also affected. Add to this Zelaya flitting from here to there, and the situation was totally unpredictable. That original itinerary was affected. It couldn't be helped. It's like calling on someone at an appointed time, only to find a fire raging in his house. Everyone is busy running around dousing the flames, to the inevitable neglect of the guests.

This course, we can understand. Nevetheless the manner in which the Nicaraguan government handled the matter was truly discourteous. Daniel Ortega, who rose to power as a guerrilla, retains a rustic manner. His manner of doing business is unpredictable. Moreover, Latin America has never been known for its formality. Even assuming the schedule had to be changed, Nicaraguan officials should have notified us in advance. They could then have avoided a mess. They should have made arrangements in recompense, to demonstrate their respect for a visiting head of state.

If others conclude it makes no difference how they treat us, that they need not show us even the fundamental courtesies, they are demonstrating a lack of upbringing. They are also implying that they have nothing to fear from us, and can do anything they want to us. Such an attitude is the long term consequence of swallowing our pride in order to retain our diplomatic allies.

Cross-Strait diplomatic battles have been bloody affairs in the past. We have long been at a serious disadvantage. We have long feared that if we lose even a single ally, it will spell the end. Therefore we have been at a disadvantage in dealing with our allies. We have long had to swallow our grievances for the sake of the bigger picture. We have long had to exchange huge sums of money for diplomatic recognition and sponsorship by international organizations. Other parties knew Taipei could not afford to take a hard line, so they often take advantage of our weakness. They even pocketed our contributions and enriched themselves. Once these scandals erupted, even the image of the victim of such extortion was tarnished.

The President of Nicaragua treated the President of the Republic of China in such a cavalier manner, partly because he was busy with the matter of Zelaya. But his underlying attitude was: Taipei is a pushover. This time however, Daniel Ortega ran into a brick wall. President Ma was furious after being repeatedly stood up. He was prepared to end his visit to Nicaragua and leave. Had that happened, it would have been an embarrassment seldom encountered in International diplomacy. Taipei has long been afraid to take such a tough stand. No wonder Daniel Ortega rushed to apologize, and showed President Ma the respect he demanded.

The Republic of China has long been in a tough situation. That much is clear. Asymmetrical relations with our allies have continually undermined our national dignity and drained our economic lifeblood. The public on Taiwan has also been subjected to covert humiliations. This has morphed into anxiety about diplomatic isolation, and resentment against Beijing. Diplomacy is an extension of domestic affairs. Our diplomatic plight has a domestic impact.

The two sides have now reached a diplomatic truce. Taipei need not cave in to everyones' demands, as it did in the past. In response to unreasonable treatment, we can now speak up. Our allies must adapt to this change, because the past method of interaction was wrong. It was unsustainable. It was intolerable to the public on Taiwan, and our Central American allies were unhappy with their politicians pocketing the aid we gave them. President Ma's two visits have made our position quite clear, in both word and deed.

In the past, Republic of China presidents liked to use state visits as pretexts for personal political campaigns. Allies used the opportunity to raise prices. Now that the policy has changed, state visits can be practical affairs. The fanfare, hoopla, and transits through the United States no longer justify such visits. The diplomatic truce is of course not a diplomatic holiday. We must actively promote bilateral cooperation and exchanges, on the basis of equality and mutual respect. We must move away from cross-Strait conflict. Diplomacy must return to normal. Cooperation and assistance must continue, but on a healthier basis.

Foreign Minister Francisco Ou said he did not object to Beijing setting up economic and trade offices with our diplomatic allies. At one time this provoked a storm of controversy. It was rumored that the Presidential Office was unhappy. In fact, during his previous visit, President Ma said he did not oppose allies establishing economic and trade relations with Beijing. Francisco Ou was referring only to low-level trade bodies. He felt no need at the time to openly promote "dual recognition." The bilateral diplomatic truce must also be implemented on the basis of equality and mutual respect. Being afraid of upsetting Beijing would also be unhealthy. Taipei must stand straight. This true internationally, and this is true bilaterally.

推動外交 是該直起腰桿來了
2009-07-08
中國時報

馬英九總統一行六日結束「久誼之旅」返抵國門,這趟是在短時間內密集進行的第二次中美洲之行,雖然狀況連連,但仍發揮了鞏固邦誼、宣示外交政策之效。上次的「久睦之旅」接連遇到了地震、隨扈遭擋、尼加拉瓜總統奧蒂嘉放馬總統鴿子等事件,這次不遑多讓,而且一路「狀況不斷」。

先是宏都拉斯發生政變,總統賽拉亞遭罷黜並遣送出國,我國臨時取消訪宏行程。不料到了巴拿馬,賽拉亞卻突然現身巴國總統就職典禮。馬總統一行轉往尼加拉瓜,賽拉亞也來了,奧蒂嘉為了商量賽拉亞返國之事,原定的接機、國宴都爽約,氣得馬總統一度想中止訪問,我國甚至揚言不惜取消援助,這才讓奧蒂嘉出面道歉。

其實,馬總統此行的時機真是選得不太湊巧,正好遇上了宏都拉斯鬧政變,整個中美洲為此吵得沸沸揚揚,國際社會也為之騷動。加上賽拉亞在那裡飛來飛去,情勢完全無法掌握,原來的既定行程會受影響,也是沒有辦法的事。這就像按照約定時間到訪,結果人家家裡剛好失火,大伙兒跑來跑去忙著澆水救火,對貴賓難免有所怠慢。

這點我們固然可以體諒,但在處理上,尼加拉瓜的確也是不夠禮貌。打游擊出身的奧蒂嘉還帶著草莽氣,行事作風本就難料,何況拉丁美洲也向來不以一板一眼著稱;然而即使行程有變數,也應該事前通報,才不會臨時搞得人仰馬翻。而且應盡可能以其他安排來彌補,以示對到訪元首的尊重。

如果對方認為無論怎樣對待台灣都沒有關係,連基本的禮貌與尊重都不用表達,那不只是顯示其有欠教養,也意味著自以為在彼此的關係中有恃無恐,可以為所欲為。而這,是長期以來台灣為維持邦交忍氣吞聲所慣出來的惡劣習性。

過去兩岸的外交戰殺得慘烈,處於孤立劣勢的台灣深有「退此一國,即無死所」的恐懼,因此在與邦交國互動時居於劣勢,不斷委屈求全,以大筆金援交換外交承認及國際組織中的代言。對方既然知道台灣硬不起來,有時就會軟土深掘,甚至A掉台灣的捐款中飽私囊,東窗事發後連台灣這個被勒索的受害者也跟著形象受損。

尼加拉瓜對台灣總統的接待如此隨隨便便,固然也是因為在忙賽拉亞的事,但基本心態上,恐怕也是認為台灣「好脾氣」。但這次奧蒂嘉卻踢到了鐵板,馬總統對三番兩次被放鴿子十分生氣,甚至不惜提早結束行程離開尼國。果真如此,那就是國際外交上少見的難看場面了,而台灣向來不敢有此膽氣,也難怪奧蒂嘉最後趕來道歉,還了馬總統不少面子。

台灣向來的國際惡劣處境,可見一般。這種不對等的互動模式,不只持續讓國家尊嚴與經貿資源失血,也讓台灣民眾不斷遭到隱形的羞辱,進而轉化為對孤立的焦慮,以及對中共打壓的怨恨。外交是內政的延長,外交困境也會延伸成內政效應。

如今兩岸達成「外交休兵」的共識,台灣不必再和過去一樣任人予取予求,對於不合理的待遇,開始敢大聲起來。我們的邦交國,必須適應這樣的改變,因為過去的互動模式是不對、也難以持續的,不但台灣民意難以忍受,中美洲邦交國社會也對政客A走台灣援贈極度不滿。馬總統這兩次走訪我國的這塊邦交重鎮,已經以具體言行表達得很清楚了。

過去台灣總統喜歡藉出訪替個人造勢,邦交國投其所好抬價而沽,現在政策既變,出訪的安排可以更務實,排場、禮炮和過境美國,都不足以成為出訪的理由。但「外交休兵」並不是「外交休工」,雙邊的合作交流還是應該積極推動,只是必須以平等、相互尊重為前提。抽離了兩岸烽火,外交關係應該回歸本質,以較為健康的態度進行合作及援助。

此行外交部長歐鴻鍊說不反對中共在邦交國設經貿辦事處,曾經引發爭議,傳聞府方頗為不滿。其實馬總統上次出訪時也說過不反對友邦與中國發展經貿關係,歐鴻鍊指的應該只是低層級的貿易機構,他沒必要此時就明著推動「雙重承認」。兩岸之間要外交休兵,也應該要對等、相互尊重,自己動輒戰戰兢兢生怕惹中共生氣,同樣不是健康的互動模式。台灣要直起腰桿來,對國際與對中共皆是。

Monday, July 13, 2009

Using Taiwan Test Scores to Apply to Mainland Universities

Using Taiwan Test Scores to Apply to Mainland Universities
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 13, 2009


On the basis of one's test scores, students from Taiwan will be able to gain admission to any university on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. If one cannot get into National Taiwan University, one can get into Beijing University. If one cannot get into Tsinghua University in Hsinchu, one can get into Tsinghua University at Beijing. If one cannot get into the department of one's choice at National Chengchi University, one will be able to at Fudan University in Shanghai. For students from Taiwan, this is mighty tempting.

Mainland China's Vice Minister of Education Yuan Guiren announced this policy at the bilateral forum in Changsha. Students from Taiwan will be able to apply to Mainland universities using their Taiwan test scores. Some people think this will not impact universities on Taiwan. Others think this may lead to a wave of students studying on the Mainland over the next few years.

Let's talk about some peoples' doubts and fears. If this policy takes effect and spreads, every year as many as 10,000 students from Taiwan will chose to cross the "Blackwater Ditch" (Taiwan Strait) for four or more years of academic studies in Mainland cities. This means that a a significant proportion of young people from Taiwan would be "transferred" to the Chinese mainland. Since these students are the academic elites, how should we interpret such a population movement?

A deeper concern is that because the CCP is authoritarian, it can control the admissions process to elite Mainland universities. It can even give preferential treatment through scholarships. Will this increase the temptation for students from Taiwan to cross the Strait for higher learning? After these students cross the Strait, will these young people from Taiwan eventually wind up as Beijing's political bargaining chips?

This sort of negative thinking begins with the assumption that everything must always be to our disadvantage. As a result, its conclusion will always be that we must take every possible measure to confront and obstruct such a trend.

But one can also adopt a more positive point of view. The final result of bilateral exchanges will not necessarily manifest itself in one or two generations. We hope the two sides will fully understand each other during these one or two generations. Such an understanding is only possible when people on both sides have free access to each others' social environment, educational environment, and lifestyle. Only a generation that grows up in such an environment will be able to internalize and resolve the problems the two sides face.

Over the past sixty years, several generations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have remained mired in a zero sum game of hatred and confrontation. Governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait manipulated cross-Strait relations to their own political advantage. The public on both sides of the Taiwan Strait was relegated to the role of an amen chorus, waving flags and shouting angry slogans. If we believe the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should share a vision of peace and mutual prosperity, the first task is to increase bilateral exchanges, enabling the public on both sides to guide cross-Strait relations. If we think in these terms, open exchanges between universities on both sides is a forgone conclusion. Because as university students develop concepts of right and wrong, they will be the ones who introduce and implement a vision for the future. If the Taiwan side lacks confidence even in cross-Strait exchanges between university students, then it is going to have even less confidence in cross-Strait exchanges between ordinary members of the public.

This gesture by the Beijing authorities can be described as audacious. Beijing did not ask Taiwan to open its doors. Beijing opened its doors first. Students from Taiwan need not take any additional exams. Given such an opportunity, they are highly likely to consider such alternatives. Moreover, Beijing opened the door. Once opened, Taipei can hardly demand that Beijing to close it. In other words, the situation is out of Taipei's hands. Therefore, from Taipei's perspective, it must adopt a posture of greater openness. Otherwise it will merely wind up in a posture of passivity.

This gesture by Beijing will make it even more difficult for Taiwan to reject Mainland academic credentials, and to prohibit Mainland students from studying on Taiwan. Because even under the current system, 2000 students from Taiwan went to the Mainland to study. Now that students from Taiwan can gain admission to Mainland universities based solely on their Taiwan test scores, and receive all sorts of preferential treatment to boot, their ranks will rapidly increase. Refusal to recognize Mainland academic credentials will be both infeasible and pointless. If students from Taiwan study on the Mainland, but students from the Mainland are prohibited from studying on Taiwan, such a lop-sided situation will only be disadvantageous to Taiwan.

If the two sides of the Taiwan Strait do not wish to slam their doors shut and engage in confrontation, then they must open their doors and engage in cross-Strait exchanges. Economic and trade exchanges are good, but not as good as people to people exchanges. People to people exchanges on university campuses should be encouraged. After all, young people have a powerful sense of right and wrong, a global outlook, and hope for the future. We look forward to a future in which both sides can win and create mutual prosperity. We hope such a future will germinate and grow on university campuses on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

以台灣學測成績申請大陸大學之後
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.07.13 05:55 am

只需憑學測成績,即有可能躋身於兩岸任一所大學。如果上不了台大,卻可能上北大;如果可上新竹清華,卻亦可嚮往北京清華;如果政大選不上理想科系,卻可在上海復旦找到志願。這對於台灣學生來說,很難令人不心動。

大陸教育部副部長袁貴仁在長沙兩岸論壇上宣布這個政策,台灣學測成績可以用來申請大陸的大學。有人認為撼動不了台灣的大學,有人則認為這可能在幾年內將引發登陸的留學潮。

先談帶著些許憂慮疑懼的看法。倘若此一政策發酵擴散,以至於每年出現近萬或上萬的台灣莘莘學子,寧可西渡黑水溝,到大陸各城市以四年或更長歲月勤學苦讀,這意味著台灣將有極大比例的年輕人「輸出」到中國大陸,而這批學子如果又多是秀異的學生,則這樣的人口移動將作何解讀?

更深一層的顧慮則是,由於中共是專制政體,可以充分調度大陸名校名系的籌碼,甚至加以獎學金等的優遇,會不會對台灣學生提升了渡海留學的誘因?這一群橫渡海峽、負笈登陸的台灣青年,最後會不會成為北京當局的政治籌碼?

這類的負向思考,皆以對我必不利的懷疑論出發;其結論因而必是主張採取一切對抗與封鎖的措施,必欲阻止這個趨勢的放大與延伸。

然而,也可持比較正面與積極的觀點。兩岸之間的終局解決,必不在這一兩代人的手中出現;而當寄望於兩岸之間充分理解彼此、熟知彼此的世代之手。這樣的世代只能出現於兩岸人民皆能自由地在對方社會受教育與生活的環境之中;在這樣環境下長成的世代,才有可能發展出最妥適、最為兩岸皆能接受的終局解決模式。

六十年來,兩岸數代人物皆在「漢賊不兩立」的仇恨對立中度過;兩岸關係的主調分別操縱在兩岸政權的手中,兩岸人民只能相互銜恨作搖旗吶喊的角色。爾今,倘若認為兩岸應當以和平雙贏為共同願景,則首要之務自然是在增加兩岸人民的交流,使兩岸人民的心願能夠成為兩岸關係的領航因素。那麼,在此種思維下,兩岸大學的相互開放與交流,應當是必然及應然的趨勢。因為,大學生的是非對錯觀念已漸成熟,而大學生又是未來願景的引導者及實踐者。台灣方面倘若對兩岸大學生層次的校園交流亦缺乏自信,那就更不須提兩岸人民在其他方面的深度交流了。

北京當局的這一手,可謂「來勢洶洶」。並未要求台灣開門,而是北京自己先把門打開。台灣學生在不必另外考試的便利下,極有可能憑學測成績來考慮擺在面前的這種另類選擇。何況,門是北京開的,一旦打開,台北也不可能命他關上;換句話說,情勢已非操在台灣當局手中。所以,對台灣而言,欲因應此一新情勢,已只能朝開放的方向思考,否則將更加處於被動地位。

北京的此一舉動,將使得台灣方面拒絕承認大陸學歷,及反對陸生來台讀大學等主張更站不住腳。因為,即使在現行體制下,台灣去年登陸讀大學者就有二千人;未來開放憑台灣學測成績入學,再輔以各種優遇,人數當有顯著增加。而若未來人數快速累積,不承認大陸學歷的政策非但更不能維持,且即使維持亦無意義;至於若只是台生赴陸,而不進一步開放陸生來台,此種傾斜情勢之不利台灣,尤是不言可喻。

兩岸若不欲閉門對立,就須開門交流。經濟貿易的交流,其實不如人民的親身交流;而在人民的親身交流中,應當又以大學校園的交流最應鼓勵與期待。畢竟,青年有較正確的是非心、未來感與國際觀;我們深切期待,一個有益於雙贏共榮的兩岸憧憬,能在兩岸大學校園的深度互動交流中萌發成長。