Thursday, July 31, 2014

The Jiang Yi-hua Summons carries Grave Implications

The Jiang Yi-hua Summons carries Grave Implications
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 1, 2014


Summary: When the police expelled Sunflower Student Movement members who forcibly occupied the Executive Yuan offices, 23 people were injured. Five people, including Premier Jiang Yi-hua and National Police Administration Chief Wang Cho-chun have been summoned by the Taipei District Court, on suspicion of attempted murder. Premier Jiang and the others agreed to appear in court. The hearing lasted nearly eight and a half hours. The judge may summon Premier Jiang again. But if the charges fail to stick, the case will be dismissed.

Full Text Below:

When the police expelled Sunflower Student Movement members who forcibly occupied the Executive Yuan offices, 23 people were injured. Five people, including Premier Jiang Yi-hua and National Police Administration Chief Wang Cho-chun have been summoned by the Taipei District Court, on suspicion of attempted murder. Premier Jiang and the others agreed to appear in court. The hearing lasted nearly eight and a half hours. The judge may summon Premier Jiang again. But if the charges fail to stick, the case will be dismissed.

This was the first time a premier has ever been summoned to appear before the court as a defendant in a criminal case. To prevent students and other protestors from precipitating a conflict, the Zhong Zheng District Police Precinct Number 1 deployed over 200 officers to the scene. Approximately 100 students and other protestors said they intended to file suits against Premier Jiang. Fortunately, no violence ensued.

On March 24, protestors were expelled from the Executive Yuan. Huang Ming-chong, an associate research fellow at the Academia Sinica, and 23 other people were injured. Sunflower Student Movement lawyers went into action. A total of six criminal suits were filed. Different judges with the Taipei Court heard the cases. One of the cases named President Ma Ying-jeou as defendant. But the constitution stipulates that unless a sitting president is guilty of fomenting internal or external strife, he will remain immune from criminal prosecution as long as he is in office. As a result, Ma received a temporary waiver. But he may face litigation upon leaving office.

This case established many historical firsts, It highlighted the judge's boldness in the pursuit of social justice, and Premier Jiang's respect for justice. But it also left behind six serious constitutional, judicial, and political questions. It means no end of trouble. If the public is not vigilant, and watches from the sidelines while judicial and political manipulation establishes a precedent, political and judicial chaos will eventually spread and sink the nation.

The first question we must ask is whether a premier can be charged with a crime for carrying out his administrative duties. This is the first time a premier has been prosecuted in a criminal case for the performance of his official duties. A single incident resulted in six charges. The underlying motive is obvious. It is clearly an attempt to amplify the Sunflower Student Movement's impact on society. It is an attempt to make the executive branch and police afraid to enforce the law during future mass protests. It is an attempt to paralyze the government.

The latter is especially true. Future court cases will need to convene three, five, even seven times before they can be closed. The Sunflower Student Movement has ensured that dozens of court cases will be convened. The premier will become a permant resident in the courtroom. The aim of paralyzing the government will be achieved. Provided with such a template, any and all suits against civil servants will automatically name the premier of other government heads as defendants, forcing them to appear before the Legislative Yuan or judges. Government paralysis is just around the corner. Presiding judges will convene hearings and summon government heads even before the case goes ahead. Can any government operate under such conditions? Can Taiwan survive?

Second, according to this logic, the defendants and the administration are one and the same. Chief Executives must determine whether civil servants have violated the law by watching news reports. They must immediately order them to cease and desist. If they fail to do so, they will be considered accomplices and found guilty. The is the "chief culprit" logic of the Kaohsiung Formosa Incident. It held the chief executive criminally liable for everyone's conduct, and it is equally absurd. If prosecutors define crime this way, the consequenses will be unimaginable. The plaintiffs in these suits applied the same logic as the White Terror. Don't the plaintiffs realize prosecutors could well follow this precedent?

Third, when a large number of people occupy a government office, dispersing them may lead to injuries. If the police cannot expel them, then thousands of people can occupy the Legislative Yuan. the Executive Yuan, and even the courtrooms. As long as they sit and refuse to leave, they cannot be expelled. Chaos will be just around the corner. Labour can then occupy corporate headquarters, students can occupied campus buildings, debtors can occupied creditor's homes, and police cannot evict them. How can society possibly function?

Four, the plaintiffs argue that if the assembly is peaceful, they cannot be evicted, even if the occupation is illegal. But how can scaling a wall and occupying a government office constitute peaceful assembly? The protestors forced their way into government offices and occupied them. They say this conduct was peaceful and therefore they cannot be evicted. Can they break into homes and occupy them? Can they break into schools and occupy them? Can a row of people sitting hand in hard and resisting the police be termed peaceful? Police cannot of intentionally hit people. But they must never be afraid of dispersing people because someone may get hurt. To label that state violence is the reasoning of anarchists. Any nation with a government is going to have violence. The only question is whether that violence was legitimate, whether the timing was appropriate, and whether it complied with the principle of proportionality. The issue is not whether the police should enforce the law.

Five, The facts of the case are the same for both the plaintiff and the defendant. Not trying the cases together allows the plaintiff to play with the selection of judges and waste the resources of the legal system. The decision to hold separate trials must be questioned.

Six, In the past, former President Lee Teng-hui, President Ma Ying-jeou, and five premiers, were often named as defendants in lawsuits. But the court seldom if ever summoned them, because the cases obviously had nothing to do with them. According to the Criminal Procedure Law, plaintiffs may demand prosecution or file their own lawsuits. To avoid frivolous lawsuits, litigation laws stipulate that "unless absolutely necessary, judges may not summon the defendant in advance." Yet the very first thing the judges in this case did was to issue summons to the premier and chief of police. Suppose members of the public unhappy with government policy willfully file lawsuits against heads of state and government leaders? Suppose judges go along with them by summoning the defendants? Such lawsuits would become a means of unlawful prosecution.

Bloodshed is of course regrettable. But no country can allow its administrative centers to be occupied by mobs. Jiang Yi-hua is the premier. He was not wrong to order police to evict illegal occupiers from government buildings. If blood was shed, that is a police enforcement matter. If Jiang Yi-hua becomes a defendant in an attempted murder case, the trial will be a farce.

社論-江宜樺出庭的嚴重後遺症
2014年08月01日 04:09
編輯部

行政院長江宜樺、警政署長王卓鈞等5人,因警察驅離太陽花運動中攻占行政院辦公大樓的群眾,造成23人受傷事件,遭台北地院以涉嫌殺人未遂罪嫌傳訊。江揆等人坦然出庭,庭訊長達近8個半小時。法官不排除再次傳訊江揆等人,但若認定不成立,則會駁回自訴。

本案是閣揆首次因涉嫌刑事犯罪,以被告身分接受法院傳喚出庭。轄區中正一分局為避免學生和民眾前來抗議而發生衝突事件,出動了200多名警力維安,約百名學生和民眾到場表示支持狀告江揆,所幸沒有發生衝突。

324 政院驅離行動,造成中研院副研究員黃銘崇等23人受傷,在太陽花運動律師團操作下,共提出6件刑事案件自訴案,均在北院分由不同法官審理中,其中一案自訴 對象包括馬英九總統,但因《憲法》明定,現任總統任期內非因內亂外患罪不受刑事追訴,因而暫免出庭,但已留下他卸任後可能必須面對司法訴訟案件的伏筆。

本案創下許多歷史首次,雖已彰顯法官追求真實及社會正義的勇於任事態度,及江揆等人尊重司法的豁然大度,但同時也留下憲政、司法與政治的6大疑慮,恐怕後患無窮。社會若不以為意,坐視形成司法及政治運作慣例,則政治與司法亂局的死結將愈綁愈緊,國家終將沉淪。

我 們必須面對的第一個嚴肅問題是,行政院長可否因行政一體而一併論罪?本案是閣揆因公務員執行公務而成為刑事自訴案件被告的首次,且一事6案。其背後動機至 為明顯,顯然與企圖延續太陽花運動政治張力、造成未來行政及警政首長面對群眾抗爭事件時心生忌憚,並藉機癱瘓政府運作有關。

尤其後者,未 來每一個案子不開3、5、7次庭是不可能結案的,太陽花運動相關案件幾十個庭開下來,將把行政院長陷在法院中,癱瘓政府的目的就已經達到。如果有樣學樣, 凡是公務員違法事項,一概自訴行政院長或各級首長,要他們跑立法院之餘,連法院也跑不完,政府癱瘓指日可待。每一個受訴的法官,都自顧自開庭,傳政府首長 來問問再決定要不要受理,政府還能運作?台灣能受得了嗎?

第二、按照自訴人行政一體的邏輯,行政首長可以從媒體上看到公務員執勤時有違法 的可能,不立刻下令阻止就是共犯,就應該論罪。這個邏輯和美麗島案件首謀者,要為所有人的行為負刑責,不是一樣的荒謬嗎?檢察官如果也採取這樣的方法論 罪,那還得了?自訴人所為,不是在證明白色恐怖時代的論罪邏輯有理,不怕檢方有樣學樣嗎?

第三、群眾強占政府辦公場所,只要人多,因為驅 離可能傷人,警察就不可以驅離,那麼不管是立法院、行政院、甚至法院,只要有千百群眾呼嘯而來,坐著不走,就不可驅離,台灣無政府狀態,指日可待。勞工比 照聚眾占領企業總部、學生占領校舍、債權人占領債務人居所,警察都不可以執法驅離,社會又要如何運作?

第四、自訴人強調,只要是和平集 會,不管場所合不合法都不得強制驅離,翻牆強入霸占政府辦公場所,叫做和平集會嗎?強行進入政府機關霸占,說是和平不能驅離,那闖入而霸占民宅呢?闖入而 霸占學校呢?一排人坐著手勾手用力抗拒警察,能叫做和平嗎?警察執法當然不可以故意打人,但是絕不可能因為怕有人受傷就一概不得執行驅離,如果說這是國家 暴力,那是無政府主義者的道理,任何一個要有政府存在的國家,都會有暴力行為的存在,這只是一個執行程序是否合法、時機是否適當及手段是否符合比例原則的 問題,而非警察該不該執法的問題。

第五、在提告事實和被告相同下,未併案一起審,讓自訴人有「玩」選法官的訴訟策略空間,且有浪費司法資源之虞,法院分案顯然值得檢討。

第 六、過去,前總統李登輝、總統馬英九及五院院長,經常是自訴案被告的常客,但法院幾乎沒有傳喚他們出庭,因為這類自訴案一看就知道與他們無關。依據《刑事 訴訟法》,被害者可提告訴或自訴,為避免濫訴,訴訟法已規定法官「非有必要,不得先行傳訊被告」。本件自訴案法官第一次開庭就急著傳訊行政院長及警政首 長,日後若是民眾不滿國家政策動輒自訴元首及首長,法官依樣畫葫蘆傳訊被告,自訴豈不成為濫訴的工具?

流血衝突固然令人遺憾,但沒有任何國家能忍受行政中樞被群眾攻占;江宜樺身為行政院長,下令警方將非法占據者驅離並沒有錯,流血事件是警方執法有無過當的問題。如果江宜樺因為下令驅離就成為殺人罪被告,豈不荒唐。


President Ma Must Redouble His Efforts

President Ma Must Redouble His Efforts
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 31, 2014


Summary: The legislature has voted on the president's blue camp personnel appointments. Many in the blue camp defected. President Chang Po-ya and Vice President Sun Ta-chuan performed a "low altitude flyover." President Ma's nominations included 29 blue camp candidates, including president and vice president. Eleven were unceremoniously scrubbed. Politically, everyone views this as a major defeat for President Ma. In fact, this is a collective defeat for the KMT, including the smug, self-complacent KMT legislators who imagined they were "teaching Ma a lesson" by defecting.

Full Text Below:

The legislature has voted on the president's blue camp personnel appointments. Many in the blue camp defected. President Chang Po-ya and Vice President Sun Ta-chuan performed a "low altitude flyover." President Ma's nominations included 29 blue camp candidates, including president and vice president. Eleven were unceremoniously scrubbed. Politically, everyone views this as a major defeat for President Ma. In fact, this is a collective defeat for the KMT, including the smug, self-complacent KMT legislators who imagined they were "teaching Ma a lesson" by defecting.

The ruling KMT's job performance ratings and election prospects are not good. The KMT is like a diseased apple tree. Some KMT legislators knew the tree was sick. But instead of treating the disease, they shook the tree as hard as they could, and may have copped a few apples this way. This "shake the tree to cop a few apples" mentality has not changed with the KMT's misfortunes. If anything, it has gotten worse.

Partisan victories and defeats are hardly the most important factor. Will internal KMT disarray lead to a major defeat at the polls and cause it lose power? That is the KMT's problem. But the recent presidential blue camp appointments also offer an opportunity to reflect on structural problems. We have two recommendations, one for cases in general, and one for particular cases.

First take the general cases. Review the purpose of the Control Yuan, and clarify its raison d'etre.

Recent controversy over the Control Yuan personnel appointments triggered a debate over Control Yuan monitoring authority, and whether the Control Yuan itself is even needed. Consider the nature of Control Yuan monitoring. As this newspaper's editorials have consistently advocated, the Control Yuan does serve an important purpose. Most importantly, it overses abuse of power by the executive branch. It prevents the executive from harming the people's interests. This monitoring authority may be fo only symbolic value. But it could help keep the executive branch honest. From a psychological perspective, it may provide the people with a channel through which they can seek redress.

Now consider Control Yuan monitoring from a systemic perspective. A constitutional framework that separates powers into five branches is admittedly rare. Other countries do not have a branch of government that fulfills the role of the Control Yuan. Most make the monitoring function one of the powers of the legislature. Most do not establish an independent branch with this sort of constitutional authority. The monitoring authority is necessary. But should it be assigned to the legislature, or to another branch altogether? That is a question that can be discussed.

Independent Control Yuan constitutional authority includes operational blind spots. For example, Wang Chien-hsuan is retiring as President of the Control Yuan. But incorporating the Control Yuan's monitoring authority into the Legislative Yuan, also poses problems that must be considered. In particular, there is a problem with the caliber of those who constitute the legislature itself. Many question the soundness of granting the legislature this monitoring authority. It might not be the right way to improve the monitoring function.

Also, to reassign this monitoring authority, one must amend the constitution. In today's political climate, with extreme distrust between the ruling and opposition parties, any constitutional amendment would be impossible in the near future,

The conclusion should be clear. Monitoring authority is necessary. Reassigning monitoring authority is politically impossible for the time being. As such we should seek to maintain the five part separation of powers, and plug any loopholes in the Control Yuan, enabling it to function better.

Secondly, in particular cases, President Ma should abide by the constitution. He should be prudent in his Control Yuan nominations. As a national leader, he must engage in soul-searching over every issue. For President Ma, the Control Yuan nominations were his Waterloo. Naturally politics comes into play. There was the "September Storm," a legacy of the personal grudge between Ma and Wang. There was also the betrayal by Kuomintang legislators. The defectors' allegation that the nominees were "the worst" in the history of the Control Yuan, was cheap political rhetoric. Flames from the legislative approval battle consumed the issue of competence. The heart of the matter was ruling vs. opposition party conflict, and wrangling among factions within the KMT.

One fact is undeniable. Many of the nominees did have questionable records that opponents could cite as pretexts to reject them. President Ma must reflect upon this. President Ma must get up where he fell down. He must be guided by the constitution. He must draw up a list of new nominees. When vetting the candidates, he must be more cautious. He must not give his opponents any excuse for political mobilization. He must not leave the public with any negative impressions.

Naturally, given the current extremist political atmosphere, people of talent may see public sector employment as intimidating. Even assuming they have the courage to come forward, they can easily find themselves slapped with a blue or green label, and ground up by the system. Finding a Control Yuan member as superior and prestigious as Tao Pai-chuan is not easy. But this is exactly why President Ma must redouble his efforts.

DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen took advantage of President Ma's frustrations with Control Yuan nominations to suggest that "the vacancies should be filled by the next president." This is contrary to constitutional jurisprudence. It also evinces an unseemly smugness about who the next president might be. Her obstruction of the personnel appointments was motivated by selfish partisan political calculation. Is the DPP really concerned about Control Yuan nominee fitness? If it is, it should urge President Ma to offer a list of nominees more in line with public expectations. It should not leave people with the impression that the DPP only wants to seize power.

You win some, you lose some. President Ma must learn to take defeat in stride. He must reflect on the failure of his personnel appointments. He must compile a new list that the public can trust. He must use this lost battle to win back a city. He must defend the nation's constitution and turn the Control Yuan around.

社論-馬總統應加倍努力的功課
2014年07月31日 04:09
編輯部

監委人事同意權投票結果,藍營大跑票,正副院長張博雅、孫大川低空飛過,馬總統提名包括正副院長29位監委名單,硬生生被刷掉11位。在政治上,各方評論多認為這是馬總統的重大挫敗,但這其實也是國民黨集體的失敗,包括沾沾自喜認為教訓了馬總統的國民黨跑票立委。

執政氣勢、選戰情勢雙雙落底的執政黨,就像一顆生病的蘋果樹,但當國民黨部分立委知道蘋果樹病了,並不是去救治蘋果樹,而是努力去搖蘋果樹,能搖幾顆蘋果算幾顆。這種搖蘋果樹的心態,並沒有因為國民黨情勢低迷而有所改變,反而變本加厲。

不過,黨派利益的得失是最不重要的成分。國民黨的自亂陣腳會不會招致選戰上的自敗江山,這是國民黨自己要面對的。但此次監察委員人事案,也是反思結構的契機。在這裡,有通案與個案的兩個個建議與思考。

第一,在通案上,重新檢視監察院功能設計,釐清存在意義。

近來監察院人事風波,也引發監察權或監察院有無存在必要的討論。從監察權的本質來論,誠如本報社論的一貫主張,其存在確有重要價值,最重要的,就是節制行政部門濫用權力、避免行政機關侵害人民利益。就此而言,監察權的存在本身,就算只有象徵性,也有令行政部門警惕的守門員作用。而從民眾心理角度論,也等於多了一個申訴陳情管道,有助於申張社會正義。

從制度比較來看,五權分立的憲政體制確屬罕有,但其他國家並非沒有監察權之設置,只是大多將監察權納為國會功能之一,而非將監察權獨立成為憲政機關。由此可知,監察權有存在之必要,但監察權應劃歸立法院或自成獨立機關,則可以討論。

雖然,我們看到了監察院以獨立憲政機關運作上的諸多問題與盲點,一如卸任的王建煊院長所爆料,但將監察權統攝進立法院,也非沒有可慮之處。特別是立法院本身的問政品質,各界多所質疑,讓立法院擁有監察權,未必是提升監察權功能的保證。

此外,要將監察權的歸屬進行調整,必須修憲,以目前朝野極度對立且互不信任的政治氛圍,在可預見的短期內,修憲幾無可能。

這時的邏輯應該很清楚,在監察權有存在必要,而監察權改隸在政治上暫不可能的時候,我們要努力的,是督促維持五權架構的監察院強固補漏,發揮更大功能。

第二,在個案上,馬總統應本於憲法,周延審慎補提監委人事。身為國家領導人,凡事皆宜反躬自省。馬總統此次監委人事慘遭滑鐵盧,固然在政治上,一方面有九月風暴、馬王心結的遺緒因素,另一方面則有國民黨部分立委的扯後腿。或許,「史上最爛的監察委員名單」,其中的「最」字,是廉價的政治動員口號,同意權之火,焰蕊燒得是適任與否的問題,焰心則是黨與黨之間的對立,以及國民黨內派與派之間的角力。

但不可否認,許多被提名人,也確有一些行事風格的不佳紀錄成為反對者作文章的把柄,這一點馬總統也應反省。準此,馬總統在跌倒處爬起來,本於憲法,重新補提監委人事。但在人選的審薦上,則需更為周延謹慎,不要再讓反對者有政治動員的理由,更不宜讓社會有不良觀感。

當然,在當前極度對立的政治氛圍下,有德有才者或者視公職為畏途,就算有勇氣挺身而出,也很容易被貼上藍綠標籤、消費消耗。以此局勢要找到像第一屆監察委員陶百川那樣孚眾望的超然之士或不容易,但這難題也正是馬總統更要加倍努力的功課。

另外,民進黨主席蔡英文在馬總統監委人事提名受挫的此時,忙不迭地表示「缺額應由下屆總統提名」,不但有違憲政法理,那種彷彿勝券在握的志得意滿,也有失格局,坐實杯葛人事只是出於政治算計的一黨之私。民進黨若真的在意的是監委被提名人的適任性,應督促馬總統提出更符合社會期待的名單,而不是讓人覺得民進黨只是急於奪權謀位。

敗則敗矣,馬總統要學習的是敗中取進的道理,從這次人事提名的失敗中反省改進,以可昭公信的新名單,為這次的敗戰扳回一城,也為綱紀廢弛的監察院振衰起敝。

Tuesday, July 29, 2014

Must Taiwan be a Loser in Global Competition?

Must Taiwan be a Loser in Global Competition?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 30, 2014


Summary: The National Affairs Conference on Trade and Economics adjourned yesterday. The opposition DPP refused to participate. Controversial bills and government policy were left off the agenda. As a result the public paid little attention and the conference was relegated to the status of a giant debate. The conference reached nearly one hundred points of agreement, as well as a majority opinion. They all concerned basic principles, but will be hard to implement. Extensive discussions led to a feeling of urgency about Taiwan's economic difficulties. How can we maintain and increase our momentum? How can we find a winning strategy for Taiwan's economy? These are the Ma administration's biggest challenges.

Full Text Below:

The National Affairs Conference on Trade and Economics adjourned yesterday. The opposition DPP refused to participate. Controversial bills and government policy were left off the agenda. As a result the public paid little attention and the conference was relegated to the status of a giant debate. The conference reached nearly one hundred points of agreement, as well as a majority opinion. They all concerned basic principles, but will be hard to implement. Extensive discussions led to a feeling of urgency about Taiwan's economic difficulties. How can we maintain and increase our momentum? How can we find a winning strategy for Taiwan's economy? These are the Ma administration's biggest challenges.

The National Affairs Conference on Trade and Economics discussed two new issues. Taiwan's economic development strategy under globalization, and Taiwan's accession to regional economic integration and cross-Strait economic and trade policy. Put more bluntly, the question is how can Taiwan avoid becoming a loser in the new global economic foot race? How can it snatch victory from the jaws of defeat?

Following the financial tsunami, many nations committed to large-scale structural reforms. They enhanced their industrial competitiveness. This led to a significant restructuring of the global supply chain. Many nations chose to form alliances. This led to regional economic integration. These two trends intensified competition in the global economy. They resulted in swift and brutal changes in the world economic map. During the first wave of competition, the United States, the European Union, Japan, Mainland China, ASEAN, South Korea, and Singapore emerged as winners. They at least won more than they lost. Taiwan's position in the global supply chain however, was severely undermined. Taiwan has been increasingly marginalized by regional economic integration. Obviously it ranks among the losers.

Taiwan faces an increasingly grim situation. To win it must promote structural reforms. Long term domestic underinvestment and a brain drain are lethal for an economy. Insufficient diversification of industrial structure, excessive concentration of resources in ICT-related industries, and economic growth too dependent on a "Taiwan orders, overseas production" OEM export model, have deepened our economic vulnerability. They have led to a shortage of employment opportunities, income stagnation, unequal distribution of income, and sundry other problems. Therefore Taiwan must strive to create a favorable environment for investment, innovation, and entrepreneurship. We must promote industrial investment, job creation, boost wages, and halt the brain drain. We must change the pattern of industrial development, from an model driven by efficiency, to a model driven by innovation. The public supports these efforts. The key is how to implement them.

The biggest obstacle now is inertia and lack of determination. Take the recent improvement in our economy and the stock market boom. The main reason is the upcoming Apple iPhone 6 release and the rise of Mainland branded smart phones and tablet PCs. This has led to a significant increase in Taiwan OEM orders. This has stimulated exports and economic growth, and stimulated the Taiwan stock market. Following the 2010 financial tsunami, ICT industry exports rebounded sharply. This contributed to that year's 10,76% economic growth rate. But lo and behold, the result was lax efforts at structural reform, and even greater dependence on the OEM exports business model. Mainland brands are rapidly coming into their own. Taiwan accounts for an increasingly high percentage of its OEM production. Once once the Mainland acquires its own manufacturing capacity, it will be "Adios, Taiwan." Taiwan cannot turn defeat into victory through shortcuts. The government and private sector must eliminate inertia. We must change our growth model in order to become true winners.

A strong response to regional economic integration is another key to Taiwan's comeback. ROC-ROK FTA negotiations will be completed by the end of the year. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) should be ready by the end of next year. South Korea is Taiwan's biggest competitor in the Mainland market. Taiwan's main trading partners are all TPP, RCEP participating members. That is why President Ma Ying-jeou is concerned. This is a matter of life and death. This is why he has repeatedly called on the legislature to accelerate the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Bill, STA, and sign the MTA as soon as possible.

This of course is the chief bone of contention between the ruling and opposition parties. Will globalization boil down to Sinicization? Will Taiwan's cross-Strait trade do more good than harm or more harm than good? In the final analysis, the answer to the globalization vs. Sinicization question will depend on whether Taiwan can join the TPP and RCEP after signing the STA and MTA with the Mainland. If the answer is uncertain, if we cannot join in the short term, we must have a ready response. Only then can we avoid defeat at the hands of our competitors, and avoid "Sinicization." Will cross-Strait trade do more good than harm or more harm than good? The answer depends on the aforementioned structural reforms and the effective management of cross-Strait risks. If the public unites behind reforms, there will be no insurmountable difficulties.

Therefore, when confronting sensitive cross-Strait policy issues, neither the Ma administration's dogmatic policy advocacy nor the DPP's obstinate "oppose everything" policy are acceptable. Only pragmatic problem-solving can resolve concerns and break through the current political impasse.

全球新賽局下,台灣如何擺脫輸家命運
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.07.30 02:22 am

經貿國是會議日昨閉幕。這次會議因為沒有在野黨參加,具爭議性法案及政府具體施政又未納入討論,因而欠缺社會關注,淪為大型研討會。會中所提出近百項共同意見及多數意見,都為原則性建議,不易有效落實。惟透過廣泛討論,多少燃起各界對解決當前台灣經濟困境的急迫感,如何延續並擴大這股動能,為台灣經濟尋求贏的策略,是馬政府最大考驗。

細究經貿國是會議所探討的「全球化趨勢下台灣經濟發展策略」及「台灣加入區域經貿整合與兩岸經貿策略」兩大議題,換成更直白的問法,即是:面對全球經濟新賽局,台灣要如何做才能反敗為勝?

在金融海嘯後,各國無不致力大規模結構性改革,提升產業競爭力,導致全球供應鏈大幅調整;另一方面,各國紛紛採取對外結盟策略,形成區域經濟整合潮流。在這兩大趨勢激盪下,全球經濟進入到競爭更為殘酷激烈的新賽局,世界經濟版圖變動極為快速。在第一波賽局中,美國、歐盟、日本、中國大陸、東協、南韓、新加坡等可列為贏家或贏多輸少,但台灣在全球供應鏈地位大幅削弱,且在區域經濟整合中日益邊緣化,很明顯已落到輸家行列。

面對日益嚴峻的情勢,台灣要反敗為勝,首須大力推動結構性改革。國內長期投資不足,高級人力外流,是經濟最大致命傷;產業結構不夠多元化,資源過度集中在資通訊相關產業,經濟成長又過於依賴「台灣接單,海外生產」的代工出口模式,更加深經濟脆弱性,也造成就業機會不足、薪資停滯、所得分配不均等複雜問題。因此,台灣必須致力營造良好的投資及創業創新環境,全方位促進產業投資,創造工作機會,引導薪資上漲,留住人才,同時須致力改變產業發展模式,從「效率驅動」轉向「創新驅動」的模式。這些努力方向,社會上已有很高共識,重點是在如何落實推動。

目前,最大阻力就是惰性與決心不足。如最近我國經濟好轉及股市榮景,主因是美國蘋果公司iPhone 6即將面市及大陸智慧手機及平板電腦品牌崛起,大量增加台商代工訂單,進而帶動出口及經濟成長,並激勵台股勁揚。回顧二○一○年金融海嘯後,資通訊業出口大幅反彈,促成當年高達十.七六%的經濟成長率;結果,反而因此鬆懈了結構性改革的努力,對代工出口經營模式依賴愈深。現在大陸品牌快速崛起,台灣為其代工比例愈來愈高,等到大陸製造能力進一步提升,「台灣,再見」恐將成為夢魘。所以,台灣要反敗為勝沒有捷徑,唯有政府和民間擺脫惰性,下定決心改變發展模式,才能成為真正的贏家。

強有力地因應區域經濟整合趨勢,是台灣反敗為勝的另一關鍵。中韓FTA將於今年底前完成協商,「跨太平洋夥伴協定」(TPP)及「區域全面經濟夥伴協定」(RCEP)預計明年底前將達陣;南韓是台灣在大陸市場最大競爭對手,台灣主要貿易夥伴泰半皆是TPP、RCEP參與成員,所以,馬英九總統憂心台灣面臨生死存亡關頭,因而一再呼籲立法院加速通過「兩岸協議監督條例」及「兩岸服貿協議」,並及早完成「兩岸貨貿協議」簽署。

然而,這牽涉到當前朝野最核心的爭議,亦即是「全球化」是否會變質為「中國化」?兩岸經貿對台灣是「利多於弊」或「弊多於利」?追根究柢,「全球化」和「中國化」的爭議,關鍵在於台灣和大陸簽署實施服貿及貨貿協議後,能否順利加入TPP、RCEP?如果答案具高度不確定性,我們就必須備有短期內無法加入的完整因應方案,才能厚植不被競爭對手打敗的實力,也才不致趨向「中國化」。至於兩岸經貿是「利多於弊」或「弊多於利」,關鍵則是在於前述結構性改革的成敗及兩岸風險的有效控管。只要凝聚全民意志落實改革,絕非不可克服的困難。

是以,涉及兩岸的敏感政策,馬政府教條式的政策宣導及民進黨的「逢中必反」,皆非可取;唯有務實面對解決問題,化解疑慮,才是突破當前政治僵局的可行之道。

Monday, July 28, 2014

Indonesia's Democracy Is Consolidated, Taiwan's Democracy Is Calicified

Indonesia's Democracy Is Consolidated, Taiwan's Democracy Is Calicified
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2014


Summary: After nearly two weeks of counting ballots, the presidential election results for Indonesia, the fourth most populous nation in the world, have finally been announced. Joko "Jokowi" Widodo of the reformist Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P), emerged victorious over Prabowo Subianto of the conservative Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) by a 6% margin, or 8 million votes. Eight million votes in many small countries would be a huge margin. But because Indonesia has 180 million voters, that number is relatively small. Little wonder Prabowo refused to concede defeat, and asked the Constitutional Court to overturn the election results.

Full Text Below:

After nearly two weeks of counting ballots, the presidential election results for Indonesia, the fourth most populous nation in the world, have finally been announced. Joko "Jokowi" Widodo of the reformist Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P), emerged victorious over Prabowo Subianto of the conservative Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) by a 6% margin, or 8 million votes. Eight million votes in many small countries would be a huge margin. But because Indonesia has 180 million voters, that number is relatively small. Little wonder Prabowo refused to concede defeat, and asked the Constitutional Court to overturn the election results.

Jokowi is the son of a carpenter. Prabowo is military strongman Suharto's son in law. This election has been characterized as a battle between a commoner and an aristocrat. But closer examination reveals that the leader of Jokowo's PDI-P is former military strongman Sukarno's daughter Megawati. Therefore the presidential election should instead be characterized as a battle between the successors of two strongmen. Indonesia's military strongman dictatorship came to an end 16 years ago. But politics has yet to emerge from the shadow of these strongmen.

Over the past 16 years, Indonesia has held a string of democratic elections. But past presidents Habibie, Wahid, Megawati, and Yudhoyono, were all strongmen. Habibie was Vice President during the Suharto era. Megawati was the daughter of Sukarno. And Prabowo, who lost the recent election, is Suharto's son in law. No wonder some say that Indonesia is a democratic political experiment conducted under the shadow of strongmen. The specters of strongmen haunt Indonesia's democracy.

During this 16 year experiment in democracy, ruling vs. opposition party power struggles have bedeviled the country. Government efficiency has not improved. Instead it has deteriorated. The situation has enabled the political opposition to maliciously obstruct President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's attempts to govern. In addition, under Indonesian plutocracy, politics has not become any cleaner. It has become dirtier. Wahid was impeached for corruption and forced to step down. This led to further disappointment in democracy. During the recent election many Indonesians donned Suharto T-shirts that read, "When I was in power, life was better." This nostalgia for authoritarian ruler reflects Indonesians' disappointment and confusion about democracy.

This nostalgia has revealed Indonesians' longing for strongman politics, and their disgust with the chaos of democracy. Prabowo attempted to exploit his status as Suharto's son in law to win the election. Prabowo incited economic nationalism. He attacked large companies that took advantage of foreign market openings to grab Indonesian natural resources. He accused past rulers of selling state owned enterprises to foreign governments on the cheap. He adopted the demeanor of a strongman and promised to end political corruption, restore law and order, and pursue social justice. Prabowo packaged himself well. People almost forgot that he was one of the masterminds behind the 1998 special forces kidnapping of student dissenters. During the recent Indonesian presidential election nearly 30 million young people were first time voters. Most of them have no memory of past dictatorships. They are also the main victims of market openings and a widening wealth gap. Paradoxically these first time voters have become staunch supporters of Prabowo.

By contrast, consider Jokowi. During the election campaign he mostly touted his achievements as a local government head. For example, he successfully transformed the crime-ridden city of Surukarta into a cultural and artistic Mecca. By adopting this campaign strategu he turned the election into one about "democratic progress vs. democratic retrogression." In fact, many people worried if Prabowo were elected, Indonesian democracy would regress. As a result the "job performance card" won, and Jokowi came out ahead.

For Indonesia, Jokowi coming to power makes people both happy and worried. They are happy that Jokowi may be able to duplicate his success as mayor of Surukarta City and governor of Jakarta. They hope he can change Indonesia's culture of corruption and raise living standards for the impoverished majority. They are worried that Jokowi has experience only at the local government level. Also, he belongs to the PDI-P, a minority party in the legislature. Having a minority government will handicap his administration. Also, Jokowi must deal with former President Megawati and current Vice President Jusuf Kalla, both of whom are strongmen likely to resist his reforms.

Jokowi's victory represents the culmination of 16 years of democracy in Indonesia. Indonesia has transitioned from "democratic experimentation" to "democratic consolidation." By contrast, on Taiwan, democratization has been in effect for nearly three decades. There have been two changes in ruling parties. Yet the quality of democracy has remained the same. It is still characterized by coarseness, chicanery, disinformation, and mud-slinging. The opposition DPP refuses to abide by majority rule. It resorts to minority violence to obstruct economic and public welfare legislation. It even refuses to participate in a national policy conference, As a result, the government cannot implement policy. The ruling party lacks the guts and determination to win public support and trust. As a result, the machinery of state has ground to a halt. Compared to Indonesia, Taiwan must cope with ubiquitous political confrontation. It cannot take a single step forward. What, if anything is so wonderful about this sort of democracy?

看印尼民主鞏固,嘆台灣民主僵峙
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.07.29 03:19 am

歷經近兩周的開票,全球人口第四大國的印尼總統選舉結果揭曉,代表改革力量的民主奮鬥黨佐科威,以六%、八百萬票的差距贏了保守派的大印尼運動黨普拉波沃。八百萬票在許多中小型國家算是很大的差距,但對一億八千萬選民的印尼而言卻相對微小,也難怪普拉波沃不認輸,意圖上訴憲法法院推翻選舉結果。

佐科威是木匠之子,普拉波沃是軍事強人蘇哈托的女婿,有人形容這次大選是「平民對貴族」的戰爭。但仔細觀察,佐科威所屬的民主奮鬥黨,其黨魁是前軍事強人蘇卡諾的女兒梅嘉娃蒂,因此,這次的總統大選毋寧可以視為兩個強人的接力戰爭。印尼軍事強人獨裁統治雖已結束十六年,但政治上卻仍未擺脫強人的陰影。

過去十六年,印尼曾進行多次民主選舉,但歷任總統從哈比比、瓦西德、梅嘉娃蒂到尤多約諾,處處可見強人的身影:哈比比是蘇哈托時期的副總統,梅嘉娃蒂是蘇卡諾的女兒,而這次大選落敗的普拉波沃則是蘇哈托的女婿。難怪有人形容,印尼政治是在強人的陰影下進行的一場民主實驗,強人如同鬼魅般糾纏著印尼的民主腳步。

在這長達十六年的民主實驗當中,印尼在朝野對立及惡鬥下,行政效率非但未見提升,反而變得更為低落;此一態勢,讓現任總統尤多約諾在反對黨的惡意杯葛下,難以順利推動政令。此外,在為世族壟斷的經濟體制下,政治不但沒有變得清明廉能,反而更加沉淪;瓦希德因貪汙醜聞而被彈劾下台,便是一例。也由於對民主政治感到失望,不少印尼人民在這次大選中紛紛穿上印有蘇哈托肖像的T恤,上面寫著「在我統治時,更好」的口號。對獨裁統治者的緬懷追思,反映了印尼人民對民主的失望與迷茫。

也正是看準了印尼人懷念強人政治、厭憎民主亂象的心理,普拉波沃這次以蘇哈托女婿的身分投入大選,企圖利用情勢。普拉波沃以經濟民族主義的煽動言論,攻擊外國大企業利用市場開放竊奪印尼的天然資源,並指責歷任執政者賤賣國營企業給外國政府。他也以強人之姿,提出將極力消除政治腐敗,要恢復法律秩序,並追求社會的公平正義。普拉波沃的包裝,幾乎讓人忘記他曾是一九九八年出動特種部隊綁架異議學生的主謀之一。這次印尼大選有將近三千萬的年輕選民是「首投族」,他們絕大多數沒有過去獨裁政治的記憶,也是市場開放後貧富差距擴大的主要受害者;奇怪的是,這批首投族竟成為普拉波沃的堅定支持者。

反觀佐科威,在選舉過程中多半訴諸他擔任地方首長的傑出政績,例如他將犯罪猖獗的梭羅市成功改造成文化及藝術之都,此舉,成功將大選的主軸翻轉成為「進步的民主」與「倒退的民主」之爭。事實上,不少印尼人擔心普拉波沃當選會導致印尼民主倒退,也因此「政績牌」勝出,使佐科威脫穎而出。

佐科威上台,對印尼而言,一則以喜,一則以憂。喜的是,佐科威也許能複製他在梭羅市長及雅加達特別行政市長的成功經驗,改變印尼的貪腐惡習,並提升廣大窮人階級的生活水平;憂的是,佐科威畢竟只有地方執政經驗,而他所屬的「民主奮鬥黨」在國會居於少數,「朝小野大」的格局將不利於他的施政。同時,佐科威上有前總統梅嘉娃蒂及現任副總統卡拉兩大強人,這兩人極可能成為他推動改革的阻力。

佐科威這次的勝選,代表實施民主政治十六年的印尼,已經逐漸從「民主實驗」邁向「民主鞏固」。反觀台灣,雖已實施民主化將近三十年,且歷經兩度政黨輪替,遺憾的是,民主政治的品質與內涵始終未能更上層樓,而不斷在「你粗暴,我耍賴」、「你造謠、我抹黑」之間彼此牽拖。且看,在野黨不顧多數民意,利用「少數暴力」手段拖延各種經濟、民生法案,連國是會議都拒絕參加,使政府施政無處著力;而執政黨缺乏魄力與身段,無法爭取民眾的支持和信服,導致國家機器不斷空轉。比起印尼,台灣的政治只見處處僵峙、寸步難行,這樣的民主有何高明之處?

Sunday, July 27, 2014

Politics is the Art of Compromise

Politics is the Art of Compromise
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 28, 2014


Summary: The nine in one election is drawing closer. Voter support for the KMT remains low. The economic situation is gradually improving. The stock market has reached record highs. Unemployment has fallen. Consumer demand is increasing. The Legislative Yuan convened an extraordinary session today. Can the KMT respond to public opinion and accomplish something with a bill? That will be the key to reversing its fortunes in the year end election.

Full Text Below:

The nine in one election is drawing closer. Voter support for the KMT remains low. The economic situation is gradually improving. The stock market has reached record highs. Unemployment has fallen. Consumer demand is increasing. The Legislative Yuan convened an extraordinary session today. Can the KMT respond to public opinion and accomplish something with a bill? That will be the key to reversing its fortunes in the year end election.

Supporters of the KMT have long felt discontent. They voted for the KMT. They gave it a supermajority in the legislature. But to what end? The DPP invariably obstructs important bills. The KMT inevitably sits on its hands and feigns helplessness. With such a party enjoying a majority means nothing. KMT legislative impotence has demoralized the blue camp. It is the reason for pervasive blue camp defeatism.

Consider the first extraordinary session in mid-June. The DPP used a technical boycott to block blue camp job appointments. They prevented KMT legislators from obtaining ballots and marking them. They left behind a execrable constitutional precedent for legislative approval of personnel appointments. The decisive factor was not "powerful" DPP legislators. It was that some blue camp legislators had their own agenda. They constantly complained to higher ups. They hoped to force the KMT Central Committee to vote to scrub several presidential nominees for the Control Yuan.

This was reminiscent of a old Minnan dialect expression, "An eel with his head in the sand has no idea where to run to." Voter support for the KMT in the year end election has plummeted. Yet some eels still have their heads in the sand. They still hope to squeak by. The KMT is running on fumes. Yet these KMT legislators are hacking away at the KMT's roots, apparently having forgotten that they are the fruit of the Kuomintang tree.

Where one falls is where one must get up. KMT capital was eroded through defeat after defeat in the legislature. Therefore any reversal of its fortunes must be effected in the Legislative Yuan. The problem is that the majority Kuomintang lacks the ability to reconcile internal differences and summon the will to do battle. Can it push through three bills during the extraordinary session: the Control Yuan Personnel Approval Bill, the Cross-Strait Agreements Oversight Bill, and the FEPZ Bill? 

The KMT must reverse its fortunes via a strategic victory in the extraordinary session. It must "mobilize four corners" and "defend two things." To mobilize four corners means that the presidential office, the executive yuan, the party, and legislative session participants must be mobilized. They must coordinate their fight. The president must be resolute. He must be assertive and follow through. The Executive Yuan's arguments must be sound. They must communicate its intent. Kuomintang legislators must coordinate their fight. They must respond more swiftly to the DPP. One of the keys is legislative execution. Does the KMT have the will to fight to the bitter end? The extraordinary session is its last chance to fight back.

Assuming the mobilization of four corners can be implemented, the KMT must then defend two things. It must demand that the extraordinary session yield results. The first thing it must defend is Taiwan's economic competitiveness. Control Yuan personnel appointments involve the constitutional right of legislative approval. These must be passed. Two other cases include the Cross-Strait Agreements Oversight Bill and FEPZ bills. These are the lifeblood of Taiwan's future economic development. These are not about partisan electoral advantage. They affect the nation's ability to reverse its fortunes and regain its international competitiveness.

In particular, the ROC-ROK free trade agreement will be signed by year's end. Premier Jiang Yi-hua's warning that "We will be marginalized within the next 10 years" was not alarmism. If we continue our disastrous economic policies and allow the legislature to consume Taiwan's economic vitality through endless obstructionism, then "Taiwan's economic collapse" will no longer be a prediction, it will be a bitter consequence the people must endure. Therefore the second extraordinary session must show results. KMT legislators must realize that this not about partisan interests, but is part of a battle for the future of Taiwan.

The second thing they must defend, is the principles of democracy and majority rule in the legislature. Recently the KMT issued a press release strongly condemning the minority DPP for forcibly occupying the legislature 89 times over the past six years. But this number also has a negative meaning. It means that the majority Kuomintang was impotent to uphold democratic rule in the legislature 89 times.

We are not encouraging blue camp legislators to shed blood or to respond to violence with violence. Blue camp legislators must help each other. They must work together to maintain dignity and order in the legislature. As Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng indicated, blue camp legislators ought to be able to succeed. We urge President Ma and Speaker Wang to assume responsibility. The Cross-Strait Agreements Oversight Bill and FEPZ Bill are are important bills. Legislators should discuss them rationally. But if time is too short, they should be turned over to the next session for priority treatment. President Ma and Speaker Wang Ma must engage in give and take. They must allow the extraordinary session to accomplish something.

The DPP blindly persists in scorched earth protests. It refuses to engage in rational discussion. It refuses to accept majority rule. It persists in physical violence, occupying the podium, and obstructing legislative business. By bringing the legislature to a standstill, it makes bills and policies impossible to pass. It hopes that the nation will eventually sink into oblivion, collapse the nation's economy, and thereby bring down the Kuomintang. How can anyone who loves Taiwan do this?

Politics is the art of compromise, Let the legislators participating in this extraordinary session practice this art.

社論-政治是妥協的藝術
2014年07月28日 04:09
編輯部

九合一選舉愈來愈近,國民黨整體氣勢依然低迷,在國內經濟情勢日漸好轉,股市屢創新高、失業率逐漸降低、消費意願日漸提高之際,立法院今天登場的臨時會,國民黨能否回應民意,在法案上有所建樹,將是年底大選逆轉勝的關鍵契機。

長期以來,支持國民黨的群眾有個心頭上的不滿:投票給國民黨,讓國民黨取得國會多數席次有什麼用?重要法案只要民進黨杯葛就兩手一攤、束手無策。這樣的多數黨有不如無。國民黨立委在國會的孱弱表現,是藍營士氣不振、失敗主義瀰漫的重要關鍵。

以6月中旬的立法院第一次臨時會為例,民進黨技術性杯葛監委人事案,不讓國民黨立委領票、圈票,創下立法院表決人事同意權「開天窗」的憲政惡例。關鍵因素還不是民進黨立委「厲害」,而是一些藍營立委有自己的想法,頻向高層喊話,盼黨中央開放投票,好讓他們刷下幾個總統提名的監察委員。

但這真是應了一句台語俗諺:「蓋頭鰻,不知生死門。」年底選戰,國民黨氣勢已一洩千里,還有一群蓋頭鰻忙不迭地想「挫挫」國民黨已所剩無多的游絲之氣。這群立委在刨國民黨根的同時,好像都忘了自己是長在國民黨這棵樹上的果子。

然而,跌倒處就是站立處,正因為國民黨的資本,是在立法院中一場一場敗戰中賠光的,那麼,扭轉逆局的戰場自然無他,就在立法院。而關鍵就是,身為多數黨的國民黨,有沒有能力整合黨內歧見,拿出戰鬥意志,在臨時會中讓三大案:監察院人事同意權案、兩岸協議監督條例草案以及自由經濟示範區特別條例草案有所進展。

要在臨時會取得戰略性的逆轉勝,國民黨必須做到四角動員與二個捍衛。四角動員,指的是在這次臨時會中,府院黨會必須串連動員、整合戰力。總統的意志要堅定、統御要貫徹;行政院的論述要紮實、溝通要綿密;國民黨黨內立委的戰力要整合協調好,對民進黨的策略要強速回應。其中最重要的關鍵,是國會系統的執行力,也就是國民黨立委有無背水一戰的戰鬥意志,在臨時會的「最後機會」奮力一搏。

四角動員若能落實,接下來,國民黨就要在二個捍衛中,力求在臨時會交出成績單。第一個捍衛,是捍衛台灣經濟競爭力的大政策。除了監察院人事同意權關乎憲政運作必須如期通過外,另外兩大案:兩岸協議監督條例草案及自由經濟示範區特別條例草案,牽動台灣未來經濟發展的命脈,已不是一黨的選舉利益,而是整個國家能否在競爭力的劣局中翻轉的重要關鍵。

特別是年底中韓自由貿易協定即將完成簽署,行政院長江宜樺「未來10年之內會被邊緣化」的警語絕非恫嚇,如果我們繼續在重大的經濟政策上蹉跎,任由國會無止盡的杯葛耗掉台灣的經濟活力。「台灣經濟垮掉」將不會只是一種預言,而是全民要承受的苦果。所以,二次臨時會務要交出成績,國民黨立委必須意識到,這不是為一黨的利益拚搏,而是為台灣的前途戰鬥。

第二個捍衛,是捍衛國會多數決的民主大原則。日前國民黨發出新聞稿強烈抨擊,過去6年民進黨以少數霸占國會殿堂高達89次,然而,這個數字的反面意義是,身為多數黨的國民黨竟不能在國會捍衛多數決的民主ABC高達89次。

我們並不是鼓勵藍委要流血衝撞,以暴制暴。我們要呼籲的是,藍委要同舟共濟,同心協力維護國會尊嚴和議事秩序,王金平院長已經表態,相信監委同意權行使應該可以圓滿完成,但我們要呼籲馬總統及王院長,兩岸監督條例及示範區條例事關重大,應該在委員會理性討論,但時間如果來不及,就交由下會期院會優先法案處理。希望馬總統和王院長各讓一步,讓立法院臨時會有所建樹。

我們也要奉勸民進黨,一味採焦土抗爭,拒絕理性討論,拒絕多數決,以肢體衝撞、霸占主席台阻擾議事進行,讓立院空轉,致法案政策無以推動,終將使國家沉淪崩壞,皮之不存毛將焉附,以此手段鬥垮國民黨,拖垮國家經濟,豈是愛台灣者所應為!

政治是妥協的藝術,這次臨時會,立委們好好在立院開會吧。

Thursday, July 24, 2014

Legislative Despotism Will Throttle Taiwan's Future

Legislative Despotism Will Throttle Taiwan's Future
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 25, 2014


Summary: During recent debates over the workings of the ROC government, critics have often advanced a two-faced argument. On the one hand, they have accused the executive branch of impotence. On the other hand, they have accuse the executive branch of despotism. Consider the accusations of executive branch despotism. These were particularly strident during the Sunflower Student Movement protests. Some even shouted, "When dictatorship is a fact, revolution becomes a right." But is the executive branch in fact despotic and dictatorial?

Full Text Below:

During recent debates over the workings of the ROC government, critics have often advanced a two-faced argument. On the one hand, they have accused the executive branch of impotence. On the other hand, they have accuse the executive branch of despotism. Consider the accusations of executive branch despotism. These were particularly strident during the Sunflower Student Movement protests. Some even shouted, "When dictatorship is a fact, revolution becomes a right." But is the executive branch in fact despotic and dictatorial?

Given the current political environment on Taiwan, the problem with the executive branch is not despotism, but impotence. Allegations of despotism are absurd. Allegations of dictatorship are even further from the truth.

Both impotence and despotism are highly detrimental to national development. So why is the executive branch so impotent? To begin with, both its decision-making and execution have left much to be desired. Also, a genuine despot does reside among the Taiwan authorities. That despot is the Legislative Yuan. A despotic Legislative Yuan has seriously undermined Executive Yuan governance, and precipitated a major crisis in the nation's development.

We must identify the source of the government's impotence. We cannot afford to blindly lash out at the executive branch. Turning the executive branch into a whipping boy will not solve the problem of government impotence. It will not resolve the crisis threatening our country.

Legislative Yuan despotism on Taiwan came about gradually. Seven constitutional amendments altered the system's structural framework. They gradually expanded the powers of the legislature and judiciary. For example, In 2000, the National Assembly was stripped of its powers. In 2004, the 7th constitutional amendment abolished it altogether. The legislature is now the sole remaining elective body in the central government. Both its symbolic and substantive powers were expanded substantially.

Meanwhile, two ruling party changes have resulted in political party control of the government. The era of executive dominance is over. Ruling party lawmakers are still constrainted to some extent by party discipline. But the constraints have been significantly weakened. The legislative branch has grown stronger. It has long since ceased being a rubber stamp for the Executive Yuan.

This is evident from many major bills in recent years. When the executive and legislative branches disagree, the executive branch seldom prevails.

Earlier this year, the Legislative Yuan passed the "Communications Security and Surveillance Act." It amended the law to limit police access to phone records. The ostensible goal was the protection of human rights. In fact, it severely weakened the ability of prosecutors and police to carry out their duties. When the legislature was amending the law, the public urged legislators not to react emotionally to the Ma vs. Wang dispute. They urged legislators not to amend the law in such a manner that would led to recurring problems, prevent the maintenence of order, and even harm victims' rights. But ruling and opposition legislators were unmoved. They stubbornly insisted on amending the law as an act of vengeance. The political pressure was more than the executive branch could withstand. Sure enough, as soon as the law was passed, serious problems arose. Now the legislature has no choice. It must reconsider whether to pass the Communications Security and Surveillance Act.

This unprofessional and reckless legislative process, which did not even bother to consider consequences, was not limited to the Communications Security and Surveillance Act. It has happened with many important bills and policies, including income tax reform, pension reform, and the adjustment of gasoline prices and electricity rates. Every reform bill that goes through the legislature gets altered beyond recognition. They not only fail to achieve their original objectives, they actually end up being counterproductive.

The most worrisome is the STA, which remains stalled in the Legislative Yuan. The government has only until the end of the year to sign the ROC-ROK free trade agreement. President Ma has expressed "extreme anxiety."

Taiwan and South Korea export products to the Mainland. Anong these, the overlap is between 70 and 80 percent. South Korea is about to sign an FTA with the Mainland. Once it does, tariffs will be substantially reduced. Industries on Taiwan will face fierce competition. President Ma is not the only one who is anxious. Countless members of the public are concerned about the economic future of Taiwan.

But worrying is useless. Any bills affecting cross-Strait trade or relations fall victim to the legislature, which automatically resorts to its old trick of using brute force to occupy the podium. Over the past six years, the DPP has forcibly occupied the legislature 89 times. When the legislature spins its wheels, bills cannot get out the door. As a result, the entire nation winds up spinning its wheels.

This leads us to another form of minority despotism within the Legislative Yuan. As long as a policy fails to meet with ruling and opposition party approval, a minority can occupy the legislature, paralyze Executive Yuan policy and legislation. Legislators care nothing about the plight of the country. They care nothing about the fact that our competitors are passing us while we spin our wheels.

The Legislative Yuan is responsible for stalled bills. But the Executive Yuan gets the blame for Taiwan spinning its wheels. As the expression goes, "The black dog is the one chewing on one's leg, yet the white dog is the one hit with the stick."

The people need to realize that the acid test confronting them today is no longer a "boiling frog syndrome." The pot in front of them is already at a full boil. We truly cannot sit back and watch as legislative despotism undermines our nation's future..

There is only one way to set things right. The public on Taiwan must open its eyes. They must step forward and support policies they know to be right. They must firmly support the government's efforts on behalf of cross-Strait stability and free trade. They must help the nation move in the right direction, and recover its lost competitiveness. They must clarify who the real culprit is who is hindering our nation's development, and punish them at the ballot box.

社論-立法專擅 扼殺台灣未來
2014年07月25日 04:09
編輯部

在討論近來台灣政府運作的觀點中,常出現一種兩面性批評,一方面指責行政機關失能,另一方面又指責行政機關專擅。這種行政專擅的指控,在太陽花學運時尤其激烈,甚至喊出:「當獨裁成為事實,革命就是義務。」但行政機關真的專擅或獨裁嗎?

以當前台灣的政治生態來論,行政機關的問題不在專擅而在失能,謂之專擅已屬太過,以獨裁斷論,更是背離事實。

不管是失能或專擅,對國家發展都極為不利,而行政機關何以失能呢?除了決策品質與執行力不彰的問題之外,另一個重要因素是,台灣另有一個真正專擅的機關:立法院。專擅的立法院,嚴重拖垮了行政效能,陷國家發展於重大危機。

若未能正確認識政府失能的本源,就將砲口單一指向行政部門,只是讓行政部門變成出氣筒,無法解決行政失能的現象,更無法扭轉國家的危機。

台灣出現的立法專擅現象,是逐漸衍生的歷史過程。在制度結構面上,這和過去台灣7次修憲,立法權與司法權漸次獲得憲政制度上的權力擴張有關,例如,國民大會代表在民國89年第6次修憲被虛級化,到民國93年第7次修憲時則完全廢除,中央民意機關只剩下立法院,不論象徵或實質性的權力都大幅上升。

另一方面,經過2次政黨輪替,在政治文化上,以黨領政、行政權獨大的時代也一去不返,執政黨領袖透過黨紀約束黨籍立法委員的力量雖然仍在,但已大幅削弱,立法權日漸壯大,早已不是行政院的橡皮圖章。

這可以從近年來諸多重大法案,當行政與立法兩院意見不合,結果行政權經常討不到便宜得到驗證。

以今年初立法院通過《通訊保障及監察法》修正為例,修法限制警察取得人民電話通聯紀錄的權力,目的在保障人權,卻造成檢警執法能力嚴重削弱。在修法時,各界即不斷呼籲立法委員不要因為馬王之爭意氣用事,修出窒礙難行、妨害治安維護甚至傷害人民權益的惡法。但朝野立委不為所動,仍執意採取報復式修法。當時政治能量陷於谷底的行政部門也只能接受。生效後果然發生嚴重問題,現在立法院不得不重新檢討是否重修通保法。

這種不問專業、更不計後果的專擅議事,不只發生在通保法的修法上。許多重大法案與政策,包括證所稅、年金改革、油電價格合理化,每一項改革法案,只要經過立法院,就被修得面目全非,不但原來的改革目的沒有達到,反而引起反效果。

而其中,最讓人憂心的莫過於在立法院裡躺平的《兩岸服務貿易協議》。眼見年底將完成簽署的中韓自由貿易協定,馬總統表示「心急如焚」。

台灣與南韓外銷中國大陸的產品有7、8成相同,南韓完成中韓FTA的拼圖後,關稅大幅減少,台灣的產業將面臨生死存亡的激烈競爭。心急如焚的不只是馬總統,還有所有關心台灣經濟未來的民眾。

但著急何用?只要和兩岸有關的法案,立法院就是反覆跳針上演霸占主席台的戲碼。過去6年來,民進黨霸占國會即高達89次。國會空轉意謂政策法案出不了立法院的門,結果是國家空轉。

這又形成另一種立法院內部的少數專擅,只要政策不合在野黨意,就以少數霸占國會,癱瘓行政院的政策與法案。不在乎國家因此陷入空轉困境,也不在乎貿易對手在台灣空轉的同時大步超越我們。

卡住法案的是立法院,而最後承受台灣空轉、行政失能罵名的卻是行政院。變成了「黑狗扯後腿、白狗挨棒子」的責任混淆。

民眾必須意識到,眼前的嚴苛考驗已不是還可以慢慢耗等的「溫水煮青蛙」,而是就在一步前方的滾燙沸水。我們真的已經沒有多少時間與空間,繼續坐視立法專擅傷害國家的前景,坐視國會空轉耗掉台灣的未來。

要撥亂反正其路無他,台灣人民必須快快睜開雪亮的眼睛,挺身為對的政策擔當後盾,堅定支持政府穩定兩岸、加速自由貿易化進程的經濟政策,讓國家走上正確方向、追回失去的競爭力。同時,也要釐清誰是阻礙國家發展的真正元凶,用選票制裁。

Do Not Allow Taiwan to Become A Lonely Outsider

Do Not Allow Taiwan to Become A Lonely Outsider
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 24, 2014


Summary: The Hollywood film "Transformers 4" is performing well at the box office on the Chinese mainland, in Hong Kong, and on Taiwan. Many fans on Taiwan have praised the new cast, as well as the plot, which incorporates ancient legends. But they also have mixed feelings about this joint venture with the Chinese mainland, which is chock full of Chinese touches calculated to please Mainland audiences. The producers had their eyes on the Mainland market. They made no attempt to please Taiwan however, which has become a lonely outsider.

Full Text Below:

The Hollywood film "Transformers 4" is performing well at the box office on the Chinese mainland, in Hong Kong, and on Taiwan. Many fans on Taiwan have praised the new cast, as well as the plot, which incorporates ancient legends. But they also have mixed feelings about this joint venture with the Chinese mainland, which is chock full of Chinese touches calculated to please Mainland audiences. The producers had their eyes on the Mainland market. They made no attempt to please Taiwan however, which has become a lonely outsider.

The Mainland economy has grown swiftly. Many on Taiwan are oblivious to this fact. The rest of world however will not refrain from pandering to or exploiting the Mainland merely because some on Taiwan harbor hate it. The Mainland fully intends to pursue economic development regardless of how people on Taiwan might feel. Large nations pursuing economic development will conquer new territories. Take for example the recently established BRICS Development Bank. It is colliding head on with the European and American controlled World Bank and IMF. Despite this global reality, many on Taiwan remain immobilized by their "China Complex." They can no longer make rational decisions. Many policies have been stalled or delayed.

Contradictions such as these have persisted for many years. They persist even today. Two years ago, President Ma began his second term. The United Daily News Vision Workshop put forth its "Critical Two Years, Taiwan Fast Forward" initiative. We urged government and the private sector to take advantage of the coming two years, which was free of election concerns. We urged them to respond to the urgent internal and external economic situation brought on by regional economic integration. We urged them to promote radical transformation, and provide Taiwan with a sustainable future. During the "Taiwan Economic Summit" we and other participants issued seven major proposals. We urged the ruling and opposition parties to cease their bickering, initiate dialogue, and change their attitudes. We urged them to promote the rule of law, free markets, the free movement of people and capital. We urged them to begin follow up negotiations on ECFA as soon as possible, as well as Taiwan-Singapore and Taiwan-New Zealand trade negotiations. We urged them to communicate with the public over policy implementation, and to establish a Taiwan, Japan, Singapore cooperation platform. We urged them to develop long-term industrial development plans, change the OEM export model, develop a talent nurturing strategy, and restructure university education.

Two years later, visible progress has been made on policies that do not involve the Chinese mainland. They include the Taiwan-Singapore and Taiwan-New Zealand Economic Cooperation Agreements, Taiwan-Japan exchanges and cooperation and personnel policy, and higher education reform. By contrast, predictable obstacles have plagued other polices. The situation has not improved. if anything, it has worsened. Struggles for supremacy within the ruling party rage on. So blue vs. green partisan struggles. Many with agendas incite Sinophobia. One stumbling block has been laid upon another, forming an impenetrable stone wall. The STA has been mired in the Legislative Yuan for over a year. The FEPZ bill remains stalled. Clearly the "China Complex" is a chasm not easily bridged.

The "National Development Council Conference" is the Ma government's way of bridging this chasm. It has mostly addressed older issues. But those in the know nevertheless offered sound suggestions. They urged the ruling and opposition parties to move forward. Taiwan faces a far greater danger today than it did two years ago. The ROC and ROK will soon conclude an FTA. Second round negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership are coming up. Taiwan is perched on the brink of marginalization. This is not baseless alarmism. Will Taiwan slam the door shut on liberalization? Wil it choose to de-Sinicize and never deal with the Mainland again? Sooner or later Taiwan will be forced to confront reality. We will be forced to find a way forward. Therefore we offer the following suggestions.

One. We on Taiwan must view the Mainland in a neutral, rational manner. We must consider our own strengths and our competitors' strategies. We must formulate a rational foreign policy. We have lived through the March 18 student movement. The younger generation has clearly widened its exchanges with the Mainland. Therefore we must balance economic development with national security.

Two. The public must promote dialogue between the ruling and opposition parties. We must seek common ground while shelving differences. Those in power must adopt a humble and caring attitude. Those in the political opposition must behave like a loyal opposition. If those in the political opposition really care about Taiwan's future, they should begin by proposing a staged blueprint for economic development. They should prove that they have a holistic development strategy, and not oppose Ma and the Mainland at every turn out of sheer spite.

Three. The government must make even greater changes to Taiwan's economy. This is as important as liberalization. Over the past ten years, Taiwan has failed to transform its industries. It has failed to tap new means of growth. Industry finds it difficult to turn a profit. The brain drain continues. Externally we find ourselves under simultaneous attack from South Korea and the Chinese mainland. If we wish to overcome adversity, there are no shortcuts. Only continuous innovation and self-improvement offers us a chance to break through.

Four. The government must act. It must allow liberalization to bear fruit. It must extricate labor and vulnerable industries from the "Loser's Circle." It must help more middle class people into the "Winners Circle." In the short term, the government can draw on its financial resources. It can offer incentives, encourage business, and support labor. It can help vulnerable industries regroup. In the mid to long term, it must reform the tax system, educational system, and social welfare system. It must reduce income inequality. It must narrow the gap between rich and poor, thereby giving liberalization a broader base of support.

別讓台灣成為寂寞的局外人
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.07.24 02:10 am

好萊塢電影「變形金剛4」近期在兩岸三地展現驚人的吸金魅力。不少台灣影迷對這集劇情融入遠古傳說、演出陣容大換血讚譽有加,卻也對這部與中國大陸合拍的商業電影處處流露百般討好的「中國味」,另有一番複雜感受。製片商眼中的大陸市場何其大,而未被奉承的台灣,似乎成了寂寞的局外人。

隨著中國大陸經濟的快速崛起,許多台灣民眾已能體會到,世界並不會因為台灣喜不喜歡大陸,而停止討好或「利用」大陸。而大陸方面為了追求發展,也不會特別照顧台灣的感受,在發展大國經濟話語權上將不斷攻城掠地,例如近期促成金磚五國設立開發銀行,直接槓上向來由歐美掌握的世界銀行及國際貨幣基金。儘管國際現實如此,台灣卻容易受到「中國情結」的情緒牽引,無法果決地做出理性選擇及決策,以致許多政策停頓或延宕。

這樣的矛盾,其實已持續多年,於今尤烈。其實,兩年前當馬總統展開第二屆任期之初,聯合報系願景工程就提出「關鍵兩年,台灣快轉」的呼籲,敦促政府和民間善用沒有選舉干擾的關鍵兩年,因應內外在緊迫的經濟情勢與區域經濟整合潮流,推動轉骨工程,幫台灣開走出一條可長可久的路。當時在「為台灣經濟開路高峰會」上,與會人士最後提出七大宣言,包括朝野停止對峙,開啟對話;調整心態,推進法制、市場、人才及投資開放;儘速完成ECFA後續四大協商及台星、台紐經貿談判,並與社會溝通提出相關配套;建立台、日新合作平台;訂定中長期產業發展計畫,改變代工出口模式;以及訂立人才發展策略,推動大學教育轉型等。

兩年過去了,在「中國成分」較低的政策如台星、台紐經合協定、台日交流合作及人才政策、高教轉骨上,或多或少可見進展。相對的,當時預見的障礙亦如影隨形,非但未見改善,反而更形惡化,隨著執政黨內部的山頭戰爭白熱化、藍綠持續惡鬥,以及有心人士操弄「恐中」情結,一顆顆絆腳石儼然已排成了石頭陣。《兩岸服務貿易協議》卡在立院超過一年,《自由經濟示範區特別條例》停滯不前,顯示「中國障礙」是道不易跨越的鴻溝。

「經貿國是會議」是馬政府為跨越這道鴻溝提供的平台和橋梁,儘管談的多半是老問題,參與分區座談的有識之士仍苦口婆心地提出建言,並呼籲朝野快步前行;因為,今天台灣面臨的凶險,較兩年前有過之無不及。面對中韓自貿協定即將達陣,且「跨太平洋經濟夥伴關係」第二輪談判即將開展,台灣邊緣化的危機迫在眉睫,絕非危言聳聽。除非台灣自願關起大門徹底排斥自由化,或者決心選擇一條與大陸不相往來的「去中國化」路徑;否則,台灣終究必須正視自己所處的嚴峻形勢,找到前行的方向。以下四點,是我們的建議:

首先,台灣必須中性、理性看待大陸,依循我們自身的秉賦條件及競爭對手的可能戰略,設計出合理的對外交往劇本。歷經三一八學運,年輕世代對於與大陸交往的疑慮顯然加深,因此,這套劇本必須兼顧經濟發展與國家安全風險控管策略。

第二,全民應力促朝野對話,並追求「存異求同」的局部和解;執政者必須謙卑為懷,在野黨也必須扮演負責的忠誠反對黨。在野黨若真心關心台灣前途,不妨立即暖身,提出準執政階段的建設藍圖,說明自己有一個全盤的發展策略,而不只是逢馬必反、逢中必反的政治炒手。

第三,政府必須加強台灣經濟體質調整,這與自由化同等重要。過去十多年,台灣產業轉型不順,且未能挖掘經濟成長新動能,導致產業在微利中辛苦掙扎,人才則呈現淨流出,國際上則面臨南韓、大陸等對手的夾擊。台灣要擺脫困境,沒有捷徑,唯有不斷創新、自我提升,才有機會突圍。

第四,政府應採取積極作為,讓自由化果實可以雨露均霑,將勞工、弱勢產業從「輸者圈」救出,並推動更多的中產階級進入「贏者圈」。短期而言,政府可先動用財政資源,包括提供誘因,鼓勵企業挺勞工等,協助弱勢產業固本培元;中長期而言,則從調整租稅、教育及社會福利等制度,改善所得分配不均、縮小貧富差距,讓自由化的支持基礎更堅實。

Monday, July 21, 2014

Taiwan Independence as Ruling Premise: Tsai Ing-wen's Fantasy

Taiwan Independence as Ruling Premise:
Tsai Ing-wen's Fantasy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 21, 2014


Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has responded to proposals to freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. On the one hand she advocates Taiwan independence. On the other hand she refuses to nullify the Taiwan independence party platform. Tsai Ing-wen is unwilling to freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. She is also unwilling to discuss freezing the Taiwan independence party platform when other party members raise the issue. Therefore if the Democratic Progressive returns to power, cross-Strait relations will once again be frozen. When the public on Taiwan understands this political scenario, the political futures of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP will be a forgone conclusion. They will be frozen, right alongside the future of the public on Taiwan. Confronted with this frozen future, is Tsai Ing-wen determined to go her own way in perpetuity?

Full Text Below:

It is the eve of the DPP Party Congress. Tsai Ing-wen, who has long been a master of ambiguity, responded to proposals to freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. She said, "Political parties are organisms. They grow and they change." This seemed to suggest that the Taiwan independence party platform could be changed. She added, that "Democracy and progress have been our core values since the founding of the party. They will never change." She said "Our position on national sovereignty and the future of Taiwan will be decided by the people, That too will never change." This raises two questions. Has Taiwan independence been a core value of the DPP since its founding? Is clinging to Taiwan independence consistent with "the people deciding?" Tsai Ing-wen did not say, She offered no explanation. On the one hand, Tsai Ing-wen spoke of "change." On the other hand she spoke of "absolutely no change." What, if anything, will be changed? What, if anything, will be maintained? Nothing she said made any sense. We can only conclude that Tsai was sincere when she said the DPP "will never change" its commitment to Taiwan independence. By contrast, the Taiwan independence party platform is merely a side issue.

Two. Tsai Ing-wen dismissed claims that "If the DPP does not forsake Taiwan independence, it will not be able to deal with cross-Strait relations." She called this a "myth." She questioned the definition of Taiwan independence. She asked, "Are we not a sovereign and independent nation? Do not the vast majority of the people of Taiwan want to strengthen our sovereignty and participate in international exchanges?" Alas, Tsai forgot that she is not a scholar. Still less is she a reporter or pundit. Taiwan independence is part of the DPP party platform. How should Taiwan independence be defined? Is Taiwan a sovereign and independent nation? Those questions the DPP must decide for itself. It is not a question she should be asking an empty room. Compare Tsai Ing-wen's remarks with what she said in a recent magazine interview. They reveal just how deluded she is concerning the cross-Strait and international situation. She thinks the DPP need not do anything about its cross-Strait policy. She thinks that all the DPP needs to do is win the upcoming elections. The Mainland authorities will then bow to reality, Tsai Ing-wen is clearly living in a fantasy world of her own making, and not seeing clearly.

Three. Tsai Ing-wen said that "The Taiwan independence party platform was unveiled during the founding of the DPP. It is an ideal pursued by our generation of DPP leaders and the people of Taiwan." She surreptitiously substituded "Taiwanese consciousness" for "Taiwan independence party platform." She wondered how the DPP could possibly freeze or repeal it under the current circumstances. In short, Tsai Ing-wen revealed her ongoing attachment to Taiwan independence.

Three. Tsai trotted out the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. She said it was "the Taiwanese people's consensus." She said the DPP hopes to build on this "consensus." She said "I hope the two sides can enjoy a better, more stable interaction, increase mutual understanding, and build trust." Trotting out the Resolution on Taiwan's Future is an old trick the DPP resorts to when it faces doubts. Tsai Ing-wen herself insisted that a political leader must have the courage of her vision. She must be "confident, positive and pragmatic." The Resolution on Taiwan's Future and the Taiwan independence party platform flatly contradict each other. Can a political leader with the courage of her vision, confident, positive and pragmatic, flat out ignore this?

Tsai Ing-wen has vowed to lead DPP policy reform. Yet she refuses to re-evaluate the Taiwan independence party platform, to see if it is still worthy of DPP support, to see if it still meets current needs, and to see if it still has practical significance. Eventually, through debate the party arrived at a decision, which was communicated to its supporters. We feel compelled to pose a few questions to Tsai Ing-wen. One. The Taiwan independence party platform advocates independence, the founding a nation, and the authoring of a new constitution, "in accordance with the reality of Taiwan's sovereignty, thereby making the legal and political structure consistent with Taiwan's social reality." Put simply, this is the "rectification of names." We would like to ask Chairperson Tsai, is this what the DPP intends to do under her leadership?

Two. The Taiwan independence party platform asserts that "Taiwan's national territory and sovereignty must be redefined in accordance with the reality of Taiwan's sovereignty and sovereignty over people, such that cross-Strait exchanges may be conducted in accordance with international law." This subverts the Constitution of the Republic of China by redefining its national territory. It also uses the "two states theory" to deal with cross-Strait relations. We would like to ask Chairperson Tsai, is this what the DPP intends to do under her leadership?

Third. The Taiwan independence party platform advocates the founding a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan and the authoring of a new constitution, "based on the principle of citizen sovereignty. All residents of Taiwan will hold a referendum and reach a decision." This obviously contradicts the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, which states that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent state," and that "according to its current constitution, is known as the Republic of China." The Resolution on Taiwan's Future states that "Any changes regarding affecting the status quo, must be decided in a referendum by all the inhabitants of Taiwan." The Taiwan independence party platform, by contrast, calls for a constitutional referendum on Taiwan independence. We would like to ask Chairperson Tsai a question. Since the DPP upholds its beliefs, when does it plan to launch a constitutional referendum on Taiwan independence?

Tsai Ing-wen has responded to proposals to freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. On the one hand she advocates Taiwan independence. On the other hand she refuses to nullify the Taiwan independence party platform. Tsai Ing-wen is unwilling to freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. She is also unwilling to discuss freezing the Taiwan independence party platform when other party members raise the issue. Therefore if the Democratic Progressive returns to power, cross-Strait relations will once again be frozen. When the public on Taiwan understands this political scenario, the political futures of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP will be a forgone conclusion. They will be frozen, right alongside the future of the public on Taiwan.

Confronted with this frozen future, is Tsai Ing-wen determined to go her own way in perpetuity?

社論-「台獨上位論」是蔡英文的幻想
2014年07月21日 04:09
本報訊

民進黨全代會前夕,一貫政治措辭曖昧不清的蔡英文,針對「凍結台獨黨綱」案做出了回應。她說「政黨是有機體,它會成長,也會改變」,似乎肯定台獨黨綱是可以變的,她又說,「『民主』與『進步』,是我們創黨以來就堅持至今的核心價值,絕對不會改變」,「我們對國家主權與台灣前途由人民決定的立場,也絕對不會改變」。那麼,「台獨」是不是民進黨創黨以來的核心價值呢?堅持台獨立場,又是否符合「人民決定」的立場呢?蔡英文卻沒有說,也沒有解釋。蔡英文一方面說「會改變」,一方面又說「絕對不會改變」,到底改變什麼,堅持什麼,全都不說清楚。我們只能傾向認定,蔡口中的兩個「絕對不會改變」,是向全民也是向大陸宣示她的「台獨主張」不會改變,至於「台獨黨綱」那已經是次要問題了。

其次,蔡英文說「民進黨若不放棄台獨就無法處理好兩岸關係」的說法,「是一個迷思」。她質疑台獨的定義究竟為何?她又提問:「我們難道不是主權獨立的國家嗎?而強化主權、爭取實質的國際參與,難道不是絕大多數台灣人民的期待?」蔡英文忘記了,她不是學者,更不是記者或評論者,既然「台獨」列入民進黨的黨綱,台獨的定義,台灣是不是主權獨立的國家,要由民進黨自己定義,而不是對著空氣提問。無論如何,蔡英文這段話對照她日前接受雜誌專訪的談話內容,足以凸顯,她對於兩岸及國際局勢抱有錯誤的幻想,以為民進黨在兩岸路線上什麼事都不用做,只要大選勝利上台,大陸當局就會屈服於現實,我們必須指出,這絕對是蔡英文自己的幻想與認識不清,絕非事實。

第三,蔡英文又說「『台獨黨綱』是民進黨創黨時期所揭示的目標,也是我們這一代民進黨人以及台灣人民的追求與理想」,她還用「台灣意識」偷換「台獨黨綱」,並提問到:這樣的事實與狀態,要「如何去『凍結』?如何去『廢除』?」這裡,蔡英文繼續表明她的台獨主張。

最後,蔡英文搬出了「台灣前途決議文」,說這是「台灣人民的共識」,民進黨要在這個共識基礎上,「希望兩岸有更穩定、更優質的互動,能增加彼此瞭解、建立互信」。搬出「台灣前途決議文」是民進黨面對質疑時的老招數,但是一個有遠見有魄力,同時「自信、積極、務實」(蔡英文的自我期許)的政治領袖,難道可對「台灣前途決議文」與「台獨黨綱」之間的矛盾齟齬視而不見,不進行嚴肅處理嗎?

宣稱要帶領民進黨轉型的蔡英文從來不願回到「台獨黨綱」本身,去看它是否仍是民進黨的價值主張,去檢視它是否符合當前需要,是否仍具有現實的意義,最後經過黨內民主討論,做出決斷,並與支持者進行溝通。於是,我們不得不向蔡英文提出幾個問題:首先,「台獨黨綱」主張「依照台灣主權現實獨立建國,制定新憲,使法政體系符合台灣社會現實」,簡單來說,就是要「正名制憲」,請問蔡主席,這是她領導下民進黨的主張嗎?

其次,「台獨黨綱」主張「依照台灣主權現實重新界定台灣國家領域主權及對人主權之範圍,使台海兩岸得以依國際法建立往來之法秩序」,也就是不但要翻修中華民國憲法關於固有疆域的界定,更要以「兩國論」的原則來處理兩岸關係,請問蔡主席,這是民進黨現在的主張嗎?

第三,「台獨黨綱」主張「基於國民主權原理,建立主權獨立自主的台灣共和國及制定新憲法的主張,應交由台灣全體住民以公民投票方式選擇決定」這明顯和「台灣前途決議文」中「台灣是一主權獨立國家」,「依其目前憲法稱為中華民國」的表述明顯矛盾。「台灣前途決議文」是主張「任何有關獨立現狀的更動,都必須經由台灣全體住民以公民投票的方式決定」,「台獨黨綱」卻是要進行獨立制憲的公投,請問蔡主席,民進黨既然堅持理念,那將在什麼時機發動獨立制憲的公投?

蔡英文針對「凍結台獨黨綱」問題的發言,一方面是表態她支持台獨,一方面是表示她不願意處理「台獨黨綱」的問題。蔡英文既然不願主動「凍結台獨黨綱」,又不願在黨內人士提出「凍獨」時,主動進行廣泛民主討論,那麼,未來即使民進黨能夠執政,兩岸關係一定也是重回「冰凍期」,當台灣民眾明白這樣的政治圖像,蔡英文和民進黨的政治前途就已可論斷,絕對將會被台灣民眾「冰凍」起來。

面對「被凍」的未來,蔡英文還要一意孤行下去嗎?

Thursday, July 17, 2014

Foreign Exchange Reserves Reach New High; Risk Management Required

Foreign Exchange Reserves Reach New High; Risk Management Required
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 18, 2014


Summary: Given our huge foreign exchange reserves, we should be thinking on a grander scale. We should be thinking about how to make the best use of our foreign exchange reserves, This would increase the public welfare, and contribute to national security and stability.

Full Text Below:

As of late June, Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves amounted to US $ 423.454 billion, Foreign bonds and shares amounted to US $ 301.6 billion. Both reached new highs. Overal Asian foreign exchange reserves have reached a new high of US $ 7.47 trillion. In 2013, Asia accounted for 70% of all new foreign exchange reserves the world over. That included Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. All continued to establish new highs. Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves topped the four Asian tigers. The Mainland's foreign exchange reserves are approaching US $ 4 trillion.

Foreign exchange reserves are increasing. Most governments and most people see that as a good thing. It represents increased national wealth and increased national influence. It helps the government withstand financial crises. It reduces the impact of sudden capital flight. But excessive foreign exchange reserves make management of central bank foreign exchange reserves more difficult. This includes write-off costs, opportunity costs, and balance sheet risks. Large foreign exchange reserves can also create the illusion of safety in financial markets. They can reduce the incentive for financial reform, or delay it. Even worse, they can influence currency demand and supply decisions, especially in a floating exchange rate regime. That can complicate monetary policy decisions.

In recent years, real estate prices on Taiwan and the Mainland have skyrocketed. Some attribute this to the accumulation of large amounts of foreign exchange reserves. The real cause may be hot money made available by U.S. Quantitative Easying (QE). Foreign exchange reserves increased simultaneously, suggesting an equivalent increase in our own national currency. The speed and scale of the central bank write off was dwarfed by the increase in foreign exchange. This led to a substantial increase in the money supply, to abundant liquidity, and to low interest rates. Financial asset prices naturally increased. This imperceptibly accelerated the deterioration of society wide income distribution.

Financial asset prices can lead to a wealth effect. They can stimulate consumption and investment and promote economic growth. But on the whole, they tend to result in bubbles. They do more harm than good to a country's economic development. They are far less important to the real economy than financial asset price speculation. This is especially true since the United States released news that QE may cease by the end of this year, Absent the injection of massive liquidity, how long can the financial asset bubbles hold? That is truly worrisome. An asset bubble burst could usher in a new round of global financial crises. In other words, the rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by Asian countries could conceal enormous asset bubbles.

The global financial situation is optimistic but contains hidden risks. Those in power cannot afford to take these lightly. They must take precautions and develop workarounds. For example, they must use fiscal or monetary policy, or even financial or tax reform, to cool down the overheated housing and stock markets. They must cool financial asset prices. They must anticipate future asset bubbles. The government must never be blindly optimistic about the economic situation, and goad investors into making investments.

In response to the rapid rise in foreign exchange reserves, the government must consider how it will manage its huge foreign exchange assets. This newspaper has suggested that the government consider setting aside part of its foreign exchange reserves as a sovereign wealth fund. Currently more than 30 countries around the world have sovereign wealth funds, including Singapore, Kuwait, Brunei, Norway, and the United Arab Emirates. Total value is approximately U.S. $ 6.321 trillion. This is roughly equal to the market value of the global stock market.

The ROC has not yet established a sovereign wealth fund. But substantively speaking, it has sovereign fund investments. In recent years, central bank foreign exchange reserve operations have remained stable. The surplus has gone to the treasury. The contribution is NT $ 200 billion per year. This covers fiscal deficits. Suppose we change the operation of sovereign funds? Suppose the central bank comes up with half the foreign exchange reserves? Suppose in conjuction with the four major funds, it comes up with US $ 200 billion? It could organize them into a US $ 400 billion sovereign fund foreign exchange operation. This would enhance its performance and provide universal access. Assuming a 5% annual rate of return, it could inject NT $ 600 billion into the treasury. The government would not need to increase taxes. This could provide the government with the financial resources required for major construction projects and stimulate economic growth. The central bank would no longer need to give the surplus to the treasury, It could concentrate on its four major business objectives, as specified by central bank laws.

Planning for the Mainland led BRICS Development Bank and "emergency reserve fund" is in full swing. Its purpose is to provide funding required for developing countries outside the Infrastructure fund. This will also serve as a mechanisms for the prevention of financial crises. The source of funds in these countries is their huge foreign exchange reserves. Given practical considerations of international politics, Taiwan may not be able to join such an organization, at least not in the short term. But we must nevertheless consider how we can take advantage of our huge long-term foreign exchange reserves. We must cooperate with the Mainland and other Asian countries. We must integrate ourselves into the regional currency swap mechanism. With regional currency swap mechanisms, the bigger the reserve pool, the greater the member state's security. This would enable Taiwan to enjoy greater security.

Given our huge foreign exchange reserves, we should be thinking on a grander scale. We should be thinking about how to make the best use of our foreign exchange reserves, This would increase the public welfare, and contribute to national security and stability.

社論-外匯存底創新高 風險須管理
2014年07月18日 04:09
編輯部

截至6月底,台灣外匯存底達4234.54億美元,外資持有股債及新台幣存款餘額計3016億美元,雙雙創下新高。亞洲整體外匯存底也創下7.47兆美元歷史新紀錄。統計2013年全球新增的外匯存底中,亞洲就占了70%。包括台灣、香港、新加坡及南韓的外匯存底,均陸續寫下新紀錄,其中台灣外匯存底,高居四小龍之首,大陸外匯存底規模更已逼近4兆美元。

面對外匯存底的攀升,政府及民眾大多會以正面解讀,除代表一國財富及國力的提升外,也有助政府提高抵禦金融危機的能力,降低資本突然外逃的衝擊。但不容否認,持有過多的外匯存底,也會導致央行在外匯存底的運用及管理上,操作難度提高,包括沖銷成本、持有的機會成本及資產負債表風險等。此外,高外匯存底可能產生金融市場相對安全的假象,降低金融改革的誘因或拖延金融改革的時程。尤有甚者,甚至影響貨幣供需的決策,特別是在浮動匯率制度下,將使貨幣政策的形成更加複雜。

近年來,台灣及大陸房地產價格飆升,有一說就是緣於外匯存底大量的累積。當然,真正的遠因可能得追溯自美國QE所產生的龐大熱錢。由於在外匯存底累積的同時,意味著等值本國貨幣的釋出,在央行沖銷速度及規模遠不及外匯增加態勢下,將造成貨幣供給大幅增加。游資充斥,配合低利率的條件,金融資產價格自然水漲船高。無形中,也加速整體社會的所得分配惡化。

金融資產價格的上漲,雖然可以產生財富效果,刺激消費與投資,帶動經濟成長,但整體而言,其所形成的泡沫,對一國經濟發展是弊大於利,因為對實體經濟的幫助遠小於金融面的資產價格炒作。尤其是美國已釋出消息,可能在今年年底完全結束QE,在缺乏龐大流動性的挹注下,被吹大的金融資產泡沫還能撐多久,著實令人擔憂。一旦資產泡沫破滅,全球可能迎來新一輪的金融危機。換言之,亞洲國家外匯存底的快速累積,其實背後隱含的可能是巨大資產泡沫風險。

面對當前樂觀中帶著隱憂的國際金融情勢,主政者沒有輕忽的本錢,應未雨綢繆、及早研擬因應措施。例如,運用財政或貨幣政策,甚至實施金融或賦稅改革,將過熱的房市及股市降溫,讓金融資產價格稍微冷卻,預為因應未來可能發生的資產泡沫危機。政府絕不應一味鼓吹經濟情勢樂觀,煽動投資者進場投資。

為因應外匯存底的急速攀升,也應積極思考如何管理龐大的外匯資產。本報曾經建議,政府可以考慮提撥部分外匯存底成立主權財富基金。目前全球約有30多個國家設有主權基金,包括新加坡、科威特、汶萊、挪威、阿拉伯聯合大公國等,規模合計共約6.321兆美元,約等於全球股市一成市值。

而我國雖未成立主權基金,卻有行主權基金投資之實。近年央行利用外匯存底穩健操作,盈餘繳庫,一年約貢獻2000億台幣,彌補財政的赤字。若能改以主權基金的模式運作,由央行拿出一半的外匯存底,同時搭配四大基金拿出2000億美元,組個4000億美元的主權基金進行外匯操作,讓績效更提升,全民共享。倘若一年有個5%的報酬率,就有6000億新台幣可以挹注國庫,則政府不但不用加稅,還能作為政府推動重大建設所需的財源,刺激經濟成長,同時央行也可不需再兼顧盈餘繳庫,專心關注中央銀行法賦予的四大經營目標。

由大陸主導的「金磚國家開發銀行」(BRICS Development Bank)及「緊急儲備基金」正如火如荼地進行規畫,目的除致力於資助開發中國家所需的基礎建設基金外,也將作為防範金融危機的機制,其中資金來源就是這些國家龐大的外匯存底。基於國際政治現實的考量,短期台灣或許無法加入這樣的組織,但長期仍可思考如何利用龐大的外匯存底,與大陸及亞洲國家合作,積極融入區域換匯機制。以區域換匯機制的精神來看,若能做大外匯儲備庫,成員國就多一分保障,這樣對台灣的安全就有更深一層的保障。

面對龐大外匯存底,應有更高層次的思維,把外匯存底做最好的運用,一方面為台灣生民百姓創造福利,另方面為國家安全穩定貢獻更大力量。

Communications Security and Surveillance Act Undermines the Rule of Law

Communications Security and Surveillance Act Undermines the Rule of Law
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 17, 2014


Summary: The Legislative Yuan rationalized its intervention in the Wang Ker influence peddling scandal by arguing that the Special Investigation Unit and President Ma committed too many procedural errors. But the Communications Security and Surveillance Act concerns national law and public safety. It turns justice on its head. The only thing it is doing is hurting Taiwan.

Full Text Below:

The new "Communications Security and Surveillance Act" has been in effect for only two weeks. But it has already created difficulties for criminal prosecutors and police investigators. Even police emergency response personnel have run up against brick walls and found themselves unable to act. The new law will be difficult to enforce and represents faulty legislation. Ruling and opposition legislators acted recklessly during the Wang Ker influence peddling scandal. In order to exact revenge upon the Special Investigation Unit, they indiscriminately amended the law. They made it easier to commit crimes. Even worse, they made it harder to protect the rights of decent citizens.

The Tainan City Police Department recently received an emergency call. A chronically ill senior citizen ran away from home. His family sought police assistance locating his whereabouts. But according to the newly implemented Communications Security and Surveillance Act, the police may not access his phone records, or locate him via his mobile phone. They were required to first submit a written request to a judge, between 9:00 am and 5:00 pm. The judge failed to respond. All the police and the man's family could do was to send out email alerts. Eventually they found him, late at night, burning charcoal in a car. The police are concerned that if the law is not amended future rescue attempts could face similar delays.

As everyone knows, the intent of the Communications Security and Surveillance Act was to help Wang Jin-pyng and Ker Chien-ming evade prosecution during lost year's Ma vs. Wang political struggle. The legislature underwent major mobilization to exact revenge upon the Special Investigation Unit for wire-tapping Wang and Ker's conversations. Ruling and opposition party legislators colluded to overhaul the provisions of the Communications Security and Surveillance Act, to put an end to "all you can eat cases." They sharply limited prosecutorial latitude in wire-tapping. They imposed far more stringent requirements. Unless the crime was a felony, police could no longer access phone records. This move ostensibly protected human rights and citizen privacy. In fact it merely increased the number of hoops crime prosecutors and police investigators had to jump through. In effect, it provided a safety net for criminals. It even tied the hands and feet of police when responding to emergencies.

Law enforcement and judicial authorities were aware of the potential impact even before the Legislative Yuan amended the law. In particular, they were aware of the many new restrictions on the investigative process. These included cumbersome procedures before initiating investigations or obtaining wire-taps. Jurisdiction was limited to "one person, one case." The motive was to obstruct investigations. The result was to protect criminals. But many legislators were consumed by "anti-Ma" hatred. They turned a deaf ear to law enforcement. Therefore something seldom seen happened. Ruling and opposition party legislators worked hand in glove. They co-authored an amendment to the Communications Security and Surveillance Act that abused their power, undermined the rule of law, and harmed the public. Sure enough, as soon as the new law went into effect, its defects were immeidately obvious.

The general response to the new Communications Security and Surveillance Act may contribute to an increase in crime. One. Article XI states that only the most serious offenses qualify -- those that call for a minimum three year sentence. Only then can one ask a judge for access to communication records. As a result, many cases affecting the public interest, such as missing persons, fraud, and theft, will probably remain unsolved, seriously undermining order and harming the public.

Two. The "one person, one case" limitation on wire-taps is unreasonable. Many crimes are committed by groups, including conspiracies. Official collusion with business involves many people. The Communications Security and Surveillance Act stipulates that if prosecutors and police intercept information about another case, that information must submitted to a judge for approval within seven days. Only then can it be used in evidence. Violators are subject to three years imprisonment. In other words, if a prosecutor investigates a drug trafficking case, and his wire-tap undovers a murder, it cannot be used in evidence unless it is reported in a timely manner. The investigators may even be subject to prosecution. Such legislation protects criminals while tying the hands of law enforcement. How can it possibly increase public safety or protect the public interest? 

Three. The new law overestimates the probability of abuse of power by prosecutors and police and underestimates the consequences of negligence on the part of judges. Last year Taichung police investigated the murder of female college student named Chen. Four wiretap requests were rejected. The result was a six month long delay before the murder was solved. In the previously mentioned case, people in Tainan asked police to locate their father. The court was slow to respond. In fact, when the Communications Security and Surveillance Act was being amended, judges dismissed as many as 30% of investigators' wiretap requests. This could lead to a lower solution rate for criminal cases, including of bribery, fraud, and emergency rescue. Such cases could become insoluble.

Admittedly, prosecutors and police sometimes abuse wiretaps. They are sometimes sloppy and engage in false prosecution. They sometimes violate the law. When they do, executive and judicial agencies should punish them. The legislative branch should amend the laws to regulate them. But the amending of the Communications Security and Surveillance Act was a legislative hatchet job. It was nothing more than a flaunting of their authority. That was why they included Article 32, which states that "The Legislative Yuan shall send representatives to monitor wire-tapping agencies." The legislature clearly granted itself the authority to intervene in the criminal justice process. How can the public possibly accept this?

The Legislative Yuan rationalized its intervention in the Wang Ker influence peddling scandal by arguing that the Special Investigation Unit and President Ma committed too many procedural errors. But the Communications Security and Surveillance Act concerns national law and public safety. It turns justice on its head. The only thing it is doing is hurting Taiwan.

《通保法》傷害法治,關說案後遺症無窮
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.07.17 03:02 am

新版《通訊保障及監察法》甫上路半個月,除造成檢警偵辦犯罪的困難,連警方回應民眾緊急求助,都因動輒撞上法律銅牆而寸步難行。一項法令剛出爐即窒礙難行,反映了立法品質之低劣;顯示當初朝野立委在王柯關說案掀波時一味蠻幹,為了「修理」特偵組而濫行修法設置偵察關卡,除將助長犯罪,也將法修到難以保護善良百姓的地步。

台南市警方最近接獲民眾報案,一名老先生因久病厭世離家,家屬請求警方緊急協助尋找其下落。但根據新公布實施的《通保法》,警方無權調閱電話通聯紀錄,無法透過手機定位獲知其所在位置,須先提出書面聲請請求法官授權。從上午九時等到下午五時,法官仍未回覆;警方只能動用警力和家屬以土法協尋,終在深夜將在車中燒炭的老者尋獲。警方擔心,此一法律障礙若不能修法解決,未來類似救援事件均將面臨時機延誤之害。

眾所皆知,《通訊保障及監察法》的修法,是去年「馬王政爭」時,立委為了幫王金平和柯建銘報遭「特偵組」監聽的一箭之仇,而大動干戈。當時,朝野立委聯手大修《通保法》條文,為杜絕「一案吃到飽」,大幅限縮檢調的監聽權限,更嚴格規定除非重罪,警方不得調閱電話通聯紀錄。此舉,表面上美其名是為了「保障」民眾的人權及隱私;實質上,卻增加了檢警調偵查犯罪的層層障礙,形同在為罪犯布設安全網,連警方因應民眾緊急救援事件都綑手縛腳。

在立院修法期間,執法及司法部門均意識到新法可能對法治造成的衝擊;尤其,對偵查行動新增的諸多限制,例如聲請調閱或監聽的程序繁瑣,案件管轄以「一人一案」為限等,目的都在阻擾調查權的行使,其結果勢將演成變相的「保護罪犯」。然而,當時不少立委「反馬」情緒高漲,對於執法部門的意見充耳不聞;也因此,史上難得一見的「朝野立委合作」,卻寫下了一部「濫權、傷法、害民」的《通保法》修正案。果然,新法一上路,立即暴露出它的脆弱本質。

綜括各界反應,新版《通保法》可能助長犯罪之處包括:其一,第十一條規定「最重本刑三年以上之罪」才能向法官聲請調閱通聯紀錄,如此一來,許多與民眾權益息息相關的案件,例如失蹤、詐欺、竊盜案件等,破案機會均將因此變得極其渺茫,嚴重損及治安及民眾權益。

其二,監聽以「一人一罪一案」為限的規定不合情理,目前許多犯罪是集團型態,包括官商勾結等亦有多造涉案人;若依《通保法》規定,檢警調截獲另案資料須於七日內聲請法官認可,才能提為證據,違者可處三年以下徒刑。亦即,檢調若監聽販毒案而知悉殺人案,只因未及時申報,即無法當成證據,甚至偵查者還要被判刑。這樣的立法,對犯罪者極盡保護,對執法人員卻百般刁難,置治安與公共利益於何地?

其三,新法高估檢警調「濫權」的可能,卻輕忽法官怠忽處理的後果。去年台中警方偵辦陳姓女大學生命案,四度向法院申請監聽兇嫌均遭駁回,致使命案延誤半年多才告偵破;再如前述台南民眾請求警方協尋老父一案,法院也遲遲不作回覆。事實上,在《通保法》修法期間,法官駁回檢方聲請監聽案件已高達三成。這些,不僅可能導致犯罪案件的破案率降低,包括警方要查察賄選、協助民眾反詐騙、緊急救難,都將變成不可能的任務。

不可否認,檢警調如有濫權監聽、草率嫁禍、或踰越法律分際之舉,行政及司法部門皆應嚴予論處,立法部門也須適時修法予以規範。但從《通保法》的修正看,立委大刀亂砍,無非是要展示自己的權威,因此才會訂出第卅二條「立法院得隨時派員至執行通訊監察的機關監督」的條文。此舉,擺明是為自己預留「干預司法」的路徑,如何教民眾心服?

立法院透過政治運作把王柯關說案「合理化」,那只能怪特偵組和馬總統的處理留下太多程序瑕疵。但是,《通保法》事關國家法治與民眾安全,修到如此本末和輕重顛倒,恐怕只會貽害台灣!

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

Lien Sheng-wen has already played his Trump Card. Now What?

Lien Sheng-wen has already played his Trump Card. Now What?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 16, 2014


Summary: Election day is only four months away. Lien Sheng-wen must ensure that Taipei remains solidly in the blue camp. Time is running out. He must let people in Taipei to see his vision for the future as soon as possible, He must prove that he has the ability to be the "CEO of Taipei."

Full Text Below:

For two straight days, President Ma Ying-jeou has appeared at campaign rallies held by KMT candidate for Taipei Mayor Lien Sheng-wen. He has shown Lien how to wave a banner. He has even urged Lien to practice his campaign song. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin also attended these rallies. The onstage scenario showed that the KMT is fully backing Lien Sheng-wen.

Lien Sheng-wen even wore the vest that he had on when he was shot, saying that he was "once again donning his battle dress." He wanted to remind people of the shooting incident that happened four years ago.

One could say the blue camp has done everything in its power to reverse Lien Sheng-wen's increasingly unpromising political fortunes. That includes healing the rift between him and Ting Shou-chung. That includes Eric Chu continuing his campaign for Mayor of New Taipei City. By now, Ma has helped the Lien campaign twice in two days. The KMT is eager to dispel outside rumors of a grudge between Ma and Lien. So far the blue camp has made every effort to ensure a united front. Observers have no reason to fuss over imaginary grudges or conflicts. But the rumors also serve as a reminder. Can Lien Sheng-wen hold down Taipei for the blue camp? That will depend on him and him alone.

Put bluntly, no election campaign can rely entirely on party unity to generate momentum. No election campaign can rely entirely on backing from high officials to ensure victory. These factors are merely icing on the cake. They are unlikely to determine who will win. Therefore when observers exaggerate the political impact of Ma, Hao, and Lien standing shoulder to shoulder on the same dais, the Lien camp has no reason to get excited. After all, this is only July. The official campaign has yet to kick off. Usually those who rely on political endorsements, especially from the president, wait until the final stages of the campaign. Only then do they take center stage. This is merely the warm-up phase. Yet the trump card whic should have been saved for last, has already been played. Doesn't this amount to an advance admission of panic?

In the final analysis, it is the same in any election. The voters will choose the most suitable candidate. Which candidate has the most solid party backing is not the deciding factor. Still less is public endorsements from political big shots. The larger a candidate's campaign committee, the more star-studded the candidate's rallies, the less the spotlight will be on the candidate himself, in which case all those efforts will be for naught.

Furthermore, do not imagine that getting shot by an assassin while endorsing another candidate, will jog voter memories. Such non-essential factors will have little impact on the campaign in Taipei.

Taiwan's democratization involved three key presidents: Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Ma Ying-jeou. All three served as Mayor of Taipei. Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou competed fiercely for the position. The Taipei mayorship is a key position. To term it a stepping stone to the presidency is not an exaggeration. Therefore Taipei voters have good reason to be pickier and less forgiving than voters in other districts. They have been through many high-profile election campaigns. How can anyone expect them to uncritically vote the party line? How can anyone expect them to cast their ballots on the basis of who stood on whose dais during an election rally? Such expectations are simplistic. Worse, they insult the electorate in Taipei.

The answer is actually quite simple: back to basics. Lien Sheng-wen would do well to contemplate the following. He wants to be the "CEO of the nation's capital." But what what kind of vision is he offering citizens of Taipei? What does he intend to offer the voters of the nation's capital over the next four years, perhaps even the next eight years? Is he offering them a "new Taipei"? Is he better suited than his opponent to govern Taipei? These questions may seem simple, but in fact they are not. These are questions that Lien Sheng-wen must consider on his own. He cannot rely on his campaign committee to ghostwrite his answers. Otherwise, the first press conference, the first debate, or the first campaign speech that comes along, will let the cat out of the bag. The voters are not blind. They will not vote for a candidate who merely reads what his aides wrote on his behalf. They are even less likely to vote for a candidate who is unfamiliar with the administrative districts of Taipei. They will vote for someone with convictions, and who can actually implement his policies.

Over the past few years, in keeping with globalization, Taipei has been promoted as a major world-class metropolis. Several mayors have worked hard to establish Taipei's brand and status. By any number of criteria, including tourism, housing, environmental protection, transportation, and medical care, Taipei ranks near the top. In recent years, many important international events and activities have been held in Taipei. Taipei has its own fascinating urban style. People in Taipei are well aware of this and proud of it. Naturally they want a mayor who is up to the task. Over the next few months, voters will be subjecting Lien Sheng-wen and Ko Wen-je to the same acid test.

Election day is only four months away. Lien Sheng-wen must ensure that Taipei remains solidly in the blue camp. Time is running out. He must let people in Taipei to see his vision for the future as soon as possible, He must prove that he has the ability to be the "CEO of Taipei."

社論-打完危機牌 連勝文還剩什麼牌?
2014年07月16日 04:10
本報訊

一連兩天,總統馬英九為國民黨台北市長參選人連勝文造勢場子站台輔選,不僅指導連揮舞戰旗,還建議連勤練競選歌曲。台北市長郝龍斌也到場造勢,這幅畫面誰都看得出來,國民黨要全力拉抬連勝文選情。

連勝文還穿上昔日槍擊案那天的選舉背心,訴求「再穿戰袍」,期盼藉由4年前的那場槍擊案喚起民眾心裡的記憶。

可以這麼說,為了挽救連勝文日益低迷的選情,藍營能做的大概都做了!包括與丁守中化解初選傷痕,抬出朱立倫續戰新北市,如今再加上馬2天內2度站台輔選,試圖破除外界所謂「連馬心結」的傳言。走到這一步,藍營已經竭盡所能營造團結氣勢了,外界確實不必再在什麼「心結」、「矛盾」上做文章,但這也預告一個現實,接下來連勝文能不能為藍營守住北市,得要靠他自己了!

講得再直白一些,沒有一場選舉,是可以單單靠營造團結氣勢,或是高層人士密集站台就可以當選的,這些因素最多只有錦上添花的效果,不可能成為勝選的關鍵因素。所以,當外界放大「馬郝連同台」的政治效應時,坦白說,連勝文陣營還真是沒啥好興奮的,畢竟現在才7月,距離正式的競選期間都還有不算短的時日,一般玩這種政治A咖同台造勢的戲碼,特別是打「總統牌」,多半要等到選戰最後階段,才會陸續登場。如今等於還是在熱身起跑階段,就將這些本該是壓軸的戲碼全都搬演了,不等於是在提前告急嗎?

說到底還是那句話,任何選舉都一樣,選民選的是最適合的候選人,不是選誰的競選團隊最團結,更不是選哪個大咖會出面站台,如果競選團隊規模龐大,造勢場合眾星雲集,反倒是候選人本身不突出,那一切的努力最終都將會是徒勞的。

更別迷信當初助選站台挨過那一槍,可以有效喚起選民的記憶,這些非關選戰基本面的因素,對台北市的選戰而言,恐怕是特別不適用。

要知道,台灣民主化進程中的3位重要總統,從李登輝、陳水扁到馬英九,前後都擔任過台北市長,陳水扁與馬英九更是在激烈的競爭下出線,說台北市長的大位,是晉升國家元首的重要台階並不為過。因而台北市的選民,本來就有理由比其他縣市的選民更挑剔、甚至更嚴苛。而經歷過那麼多回合高檔的選戰後,試問今天憑什麼回過頭來要求選民依基本盤投票?甚至是依「誰在造勢台上挺他」投票?那不僅是簡化了這場選戰,也等於是羞辱了台北市的選民。

所以,答案其實很簡單,就是回歸到基本面。連勝文不妨重頭再思考如下的課題,要擔任首都的CEO,請問你究竟要給台北市民怎樣的願景?要提供給所有首都選民,在未來的4年,甚至未來8年一個怎樣的「新台北」?你要如何證明你比你的對手更適合來治理大台北?這些問題看似簡單,其實一點都不好回答,因為這些問題需要連勝文自己去思考,自己去應對,而不是依賴他的競選團隊去代筆,否則一次記者會的詢答,一次辯論會的交鋒,甚至一次造勢場的演講,都會徹底的洩底,選民的眼光永遠是雪亮的,他們不會挑一個只會照著幕僚代擬稿子念的候選人,更不會挑一個對台北各行政區還搞不清楚的人當市長,而是要挑一個有自己理念,並且會確實落實的候選人。

這幾年,隨著全球化的進程,台北早就晉級為國際級的重要大都會之一。而在幾位市長的辛勤經營下,台北已經建立其無可取代的品牌地位,在各種包括觀光、居住、環保、交通、醫療…的國際評比上,幾乎都名列前茅。近幾年更有許多重要的國際策展與活動,都選擇在台北舉辦,台北早就形成一種很特殊而迷人的城市風格,這一點,台北人心知肚明,也一直為此感到驕傲,他們當然更有理由去挑一個可以匹配這種品牌的市長。這一點,對連勝文適用,對柯文哲也同樣適用。未來幾個月,這種考驗將會更嚴苛!

距離投票只有4個多月,連勝文把台北市選情打回了藍營基本盤優勢地位,時間已非常緊迫,他必須盡快讓台北市民對未來有遠景,證明自己有能力做好台北市CEO。

Monday, July 14, 2014

How to Deal with Beijing-Washington Tensions

How to Deal with Beijing-Washington Tensions
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 15, 2014


Summary: The United States has no intention of coming in second. But it cannot contain Mainland China. Beijing hopes to reduce U.S. influence in the Asian-Pacific region. But it has no intention of making an enemy of Washington. As Xi Jinping said, Beijing-Washington confrontation would lead to global catastrophe. Bilateral relations have intensified. Can Taipei seek peaceful coexistence in such a difficult situation? Can it ensure a win-win outcome?

Full Text Below:

The sixth strategic and economic talk between Beijing and Washington was held  in Beijing on the 9th and 10th of July. Senior officials from both sides called the talks beneficial and effective. In fact, the bilateral talks yielded little of substance. The strategic dialogue between the two sides addressed 116 issues. They included the South China Sea disputes and Internet security. The two sides found themselves farther apart than ever. The talks ended the very next day. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christine Fox immediately issued three recommendations, Fox called on all parties to cease and desist from engaging in certain actions. She accused Beijing of unilateral provocations, and cast doubt on its willingness to comply with international law. The situation does not look promising for Beijing-Washington relations.

Let us return to the root of the problem. Strategic dialogue between Beijing and Washington began in August 2005. The purpose was to increase bilateral cooperation and promote peace in the Asian-Pacific region and the rest of the world. The two sides met a total of six times. They focused on increasing dialogue and mutual trust. They hoped to increase agreement, expand cooperation, and strengthen coordination and consultation. Beijing-Washington Strategic Economic Dialogue began in December 2006. The two sides met a total of five times. They addressed specific economic and trade issues, including aviation, services, banks, securities, RMB exchange rates, energy, environmental protection, trade and investment, food safety, and international economic cooperation. The issues discussed now differed little from what was discussed then.

The Bush administration, which included Bush himself and neoconservative cabinet members, harbored strong animosity and mistrust toward Beijing. Washington even saw Beijing as a strategic competitor. As a result, strategic talks between the two regimes were changed to dialogue between senior officials. The Obama administration eventually merged the two talks. This represented a major shift in Washington's thinking. Both sides sent their respective Secretaries of State. Vice Premier level officials attended. The two presidents gave important talks or interviews. The many high-ranking participants covered a wide range of topics. Clearly both sides attach great importance to the talks.

As in the past, Beijing said that the two sides stand at a turning point in history, and face many new opportunities. Beijing is willing to view the relationship from a strategic, long-term perspective. It is willing to look at the big picture, and seize the opportunity. It is willing to join the United States in creating a new future, It is willing to cooperate in a comprehensive and constructive manner. This reflects Beijing's current position and direction. This shows that it is sincere and has good intentions. This also shows that it remains firm on cerrain issues. Washington realizes that Beiing-Washington relations will shape the 21st century. This relationship is as important as any bilateral relationship in the world. Reality necessitates a partnership between the two. The two must also share responsibility. Beijing should relax controls on yuan exchange rates. It should exercise restraint in the South China Sea and other regions. It should play a role commensurate with its responsibilities. Washington's stance was quite clear.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry criticized what he termed Beijing's unilateral actions in the South China Sea. He said Beijing's "new fait accompli" in the Asian-Pacific region was unacceptable. Following the meeting, Washington immediately recommended three guidelines for the South China Sea, Washington also asked Beijing to resume bilateral negotiations on Internet security. Beijing instructed State Councilor Yang Jechi to express the Mainland position at a series of press conferences. Beijing greeted the new U.S. proposal coldly. As we can see Beijing does not intend to make any concessions on the disputes over territorial waters and other matters.

Washington has agreed to engage in bilateral Strategic and Economic Dialogue with Beijing. It is willing to engage in high level, large scale, high profile, talks. This means that Beijing-Washington relations have undergone a qualitative change as well as a quantitative change. Mainland China's strength can no longer be ignored. Washington cannot ignore Mainland China's growth, It can no longer fight or contain Beijing. Washington is now attempting to adopt a more pragmatic approach. It is attempting to develop constructive and friendly relations with Beijing. It is attempting to make Beijing more reasonable and responsible. It is attempting to further its integration into the international mainstream, and to make it accept international norms of behavior.

But the two sides have many problems. The two regimes have different views on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. They have different political and economic systems. They are at different stages of development. They have structural differences. The competitive nature of the relationship remains unchanged. The relationship between them is neither enemy nor friend, and both enemy and friend. The two sides realize that cooperation benefits both. Cooperation means win/win. Confrontation means lose/lose. The bilateral relationship involves both cooperation and competition. There is cooperation within the friction. There is friction within the cooperation. Sometimes the struggle overshadows the cooperation. Sometimes the cooperation overshadows the struggle. But the two sides need each other. Good relations between the two may not result in harmony. But bad relations will not necessarily lead to a complete breakdown.

The United States has no intention of coming in second. But it cannot contain Mainland China. Beijing hopes to reduce U.S. influence in the Asian-Pacific region. But it has no intention of making an enemy of Washington. As Xi Jinping said, Beijing-Washington confrontation would lead to global catastrophe. Bilateral relations have intensified. Can Taipei seek peaceful coexistence in such a difficult situation? Can it ensure a win-win outcome? Taipei will need political wisdom and diplomacy. Taipei lacks the wherewithal to achieve this. But it must not undermine Beijing-Washington relations. It must not be blindly optimistic regarding Beijing-Washington relations. It must assess the situation carefully. It must not sacrifice Taiwan's interests. These are the Republic of China's unwavering principles.

社論-如何面對中美關係趨於緊張?
2014年07月15日 04:10
編輯部

第六屆中美戰略與經濟會談於7月9日到10日在北京召開,雖然雙方高級官員都稱會談是有益且有成效,但實際上,這次雙邊對話成效甚少,從這次中美116項戰略對話成果清單中可以看出,雙方在南海爭議、網路安全等關鍵性戰略問題上甚至愈行愈遠。對話結束次日,美國副助理國務卿福克斯立即提出南海三不建議,呼籲各方自願凍結特定行動,並指中國的片面挑釁行為讓人懷疑其遵守國際法的意願。中美關係不容過度樂觀。

尋本溯源,中美之間的戰略對話最早始於2005年8月,目的在保持、擴大雙方的合作,促進亞太和世界的和平,後來一共進行了6次,重點在於深化對話與互信、希望增加共識、擴大合作、加強協調與磋商。至於中美經濟戰略對話則始於2006年12月,一共進行了5次,其中涉及的具體經貿問題,包括航空、服務、銀行、證券、人民幣匯率、能源、環保、貿易投資、食品安全,及國際經濟合作等領域,與如今所討論的問題其實差異不大。

布希政府時期,由於其本人和新保守主義分子對中共懷有強烈的敵意和不信任感,美國當時甚至把其視為戰略競爭者,所以兩國之間的戰略會談一度被改為資深官員對話。之後歐巴馬政府將兩者合而為一,這代表美國思維的一大轉變。雙方都派出國務卿、國務院副總理等級人士出席,兩國元首也循例發表重要談話或予以接見,由參與人員之多、級別之高、議題之廣可以看出,中美雙方對此對話機制的重視。

與過去一樣,北京主張,中美雙方正站在歷史新起點,面臨新機遇,大陸願站在戰略高度與長遠角度,把握大局,抓住機遇,與美國共創未來,建構積極合作、全面的中美關係。這反映出中共當前立場與方向,展現了誠意與善意,但在具體問題上並未鬆口。美國也認知到中美關係將形塑21世紀,其重要性不亞於世界上任何雙邊關係,此一現實將支撐兩國的伙伴關係,也是兩國應該共同承擔的責任,而中共應放寬人民幣匯率管制,在南海等問題上自我節制,扮演與其責任相稱角色,華府立場也相當明確。

美國國務卿凱瑞反對大陸在南海的單方面行動,認為其在亞太地區製造所謂「新既定事實」是不可接受的,會後美國隨即提出南海三項行動準則的建議,而且美方還要求大陸恢復與美國在網路安全問題上的雙邊磋商。而北京則由國務委員楊潔篪先在聯合記者會上多次重申中國政府的立場,後來也對美方新的提議冷然以對,由此可以看出北京在海域爭端等問題上並無讓步的打算。

坦白的說,美方同意與中共進行雙邊戰略與經濟對話,以如此高規格、大陣仗的方式,高調加以處理,意味著中美關係已由量變往質變的方向發展,中國的實力已然不容忽視,美國不能漠視中國大陸成長的事實,或仍以對抗、圍堵的方式對待北京。美國正努力嘗試,要以實事求是的態度,持平的與中共發展建設性的友好關係,讓中國扮演其力所能及的合理、負責任的角色,將其進一步融入國際主流社會,接受國際行為規範。

但是雙方問題仍在,兩國在人權、民主、法治等價值觀,不同政經體制、發展階段方面仍有結構性的問題,雙方互相競爭的本質不變,彼此關係仍是非敵非友、亦敵亦友、可敵可友,只不過雙方當前都已體認,合則兩利、分則兩害、鬥則雙輸的事實。雙方關係在某種程度上仍是既合作又鬥爭,也就是合作中有競爭,競爭中有摩擦,摩擦中得妥協,有時合作高過鬥爭,有時摩擦超過合作,但彼此相互需要,兩國關係好,不致於水乳交融,壞,不致於關係破裂。

美國無意屈居老二,但也無法圍堵中國,大陸希望降低美國在亞太地區的影響力,但也無意與美國為敵。誠如習近平所說,中美對抗將會成為世界性的災難,但當前兩國關係確實變得更為緊張,台灣如何在困難的局面下找到一條和平共處、互利雙贏的發展,當然需要高超的政治智慧與外交手法。台灣不但無能力,也不應該破壞中美關係的發展,更不宜對中美關係的健康、良性發展抱持盲目樂觀的態度,審時度勢謹慎作為,一切作為的前提是不以台灣的利益為代價,這才是中華民國堅持不變的立場與原則。