Tuesday, January 31, 2012

Fling Open the Doors. Be a President for All the People

Fling Open the Doors. Be a President for All the People
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 31, 2012

Summary: Voters have rewarded Ma Ying-jeou with a second term. Therefore he should be bolder. He should be more decisive. He should fling open the doors. He should take on greater challenges. He should make the difficult decisions, He should leave behind a better system of government. During the next four years President Ma will have the opportunity to leave behind his own legacy. President Ma, the eyes of the nation are upon you.

Full Text Below:

President Ma Ying-jeou has won his bid for reelection. The cabinet reshuffle is now in full swing. Voters have entrusted President Ma with another four-year term. He now faces many difficult challenges. Whatever leadership President Ma exhibits during his second term will have a major impact on the nation's future.

Over half the voters backed him. President Ma's policies have been affirmed. In particular, his promotion of cross-Strait reconciliation has received popular support. This means the public on Taiwan looks forward to more cross-strait exchanges and more beneficial results from these exchanges. The Ma administration must ensure that more people benefit from his policies. It must demonstrate vision. It must increase the level of cross-strait exchanges, It must promote exchanges between the younger generation. Besides promoting trade, investment, and procurement, it must enhance mutual understanding between the public on both sides. It must enable Taiwan to exert a positive influence on social evolution on the Chinese Mainland.

Cross-strait exchanges should be increased, because Taiwan has more experience with democracy and liberalization. Taiwan is implementing democratic values. It is demonstrating its spiritual strength. Therefore it can serve as a point of reference for the Mainland. Democracy and freedom include respect for human rights, pluralism and tolerance. They have enormous significance for cross-Strait conflict resolution and the cross-Strait consensus. If the two sides can gradually resolve their disputes, it will be a blessing not just to the public on Taiwan. It will be a blessing for the public on both sides of the Strait.

Ma Ying-jeou received 6.89 million votes and won a clear majority. But Tsai Ing-wen received 6.09 million votes. James Soong received 370,000 votes. Clearly 6.46 million voters did not want Ma Ying-jeou as their president, Many of them feel uneasy about the direction and pace of Ma's cross-Strait policy, These people are also President Ma's clients.

Ma Ying-jeou received 51% of the vote. He won. He must now strive to fulfill the role of a "president for all the people." He must dialogue with the remaining 48% of the electorate. He must listen to them. He must understand what they are saying He must actively communicate his policy, especially cross-Strait policy, He must resolve the concerns that motivated these people to vote against him. He must ease the obvious social schism between the Blue and Green halves of the community. After all, fierce internal opposition is certain to hobble cross-Strait policy.

Many of the votes cast for Ma Ying-jeou were cast on the basis of party affiliation. But a head of state represents a nation. He or she represents the interests of all the people. And so it is for the Republic of China. Once one becomes president, there can be no partisan bias. President Ma has been criticized for drawing from too limited a circle of experts. His confidants and staffers are too far removed from the grassroots, They are too inbred. Ma is a national leader. His decision-making must be even-handed. He must tolerate different ideas. He must respect opposing views. His greatest concern must be the future of the people as a whole. He must attend to the long-term well-being of the next generation, and the long term prosperity of the nation. During his second term President Ma will no longer face re-election pressures. But he will remain under public scrutiny. The public must remain vigilant and never relax. President Ma too cannot afford to relax.

The greatest difficulty Ma will encounter during his second term, will be the "lame duck effect" that will appear two years before leaving office. A struggle for succession will have begun. Fence-sitters will be seeing which way the wind blows. Policy may be difficult to implement. Political promises may be unconvincing. But this is precisely when President Ma should focus on structural and institutional matters. If he can lay the groundwork for sound policy, future policy will be easier to implement.

Demands for justice can move people because the gap between rich and poor has provoked enormous resentment. It is impossible to eliminate the gap between rich and poor. But it is possible to help the disadvantaged and salvage the social welfare system. The government has long been short of money and manpower. It must provide more resources and support.

An aging population and a declining birthrate have also cast a pall over our future, This is a trend that cannot be avoided and will be difficult to reverse. A nation consists of individual human beings, The problems faced by individual human beings are the nation's biggest problems. The government must make long term plans for a shrinking population. It must help schools transform themselves and teachers change occupations. It must enhance childcare services. It must build long term care systems. It must relax immigration rules to increase the population.

Voters have rewarded Ma Ying-jeou with a second term. Therefore he should be bolder. He should be more decisive. He should fling open the doors. He should take on greater challenges. He should make the difficult decisions, He should leave behind a better system of government. During the next four years President Ma will have the opportunity to leave behind his own legacy. President Ma, the eyes of the nation are upon you.

大開大闔 扮好全民總統角色
2012-01-31中國時報

馬英九總統贏得連任之後,現正緊鑼密鼓進行內閣改組。面對選民再次付託的四年新任期,馬總統的挑戰與考驗相當艱鉅,而馬總統在第二任期內展現的領導能力與執政方向,更將對國家發展產生重大影響。

超過半數民意的背書,意味著馬總統的施政大方向獲得肯定,尤其推動兩岸和解交流更是得到大部分民眾的支持,而這也意味著,台灣民眾對兩岸交流帶來更多利益有所期待;在這方面,馬總統帶領的執政團隊一方面應該讓更多民眾感受到實質的獲益,一方面也應該以前瞻的眼光,深化兩岸交流層次,促進年輕世代的往來,在經貿、投資、採購之外,增進兩岸人民的相互了解,也讓台灣可以在中國大陸社會發展的過程中產生良性的影響力。

為什麼要深化兩岸交流的層次,因為在民主開放的道路上,台灣有比較多的經驗,台灣正在實踐的民主價值,以及從而彰顯的精神力量,是一個可以供中國大陸思考的方向。而民主自由理念蘊含的尊重、人權、多元與包容,對化解兩岸矛盾,構築共同思維有重大意義。兩岸之爭若能逐漸在理念接近中化解,將不僅是台灣全民之福,更是兩岸人民之福。

不過,馬英九雖然以六百八十九萬票的過半票數獲勝,但投給蔡英文的六百零九萬票,加上投給宋楚瑜的卅七萬票,意味著總共有六百四十六萬選民是很明確不要馬英九當總統的,而且其中有不少選民對馬政府兩岸政策的速度及方向,是感到不安的。這些人,一樣是馬總統的頭家。

馬英九固然得到了超過百分之五十一的選民支持,但在勝選之後,必須努力扮演一個「全民總統」的角色,與其餘百分之四十八的選民對話,傾聽他們的聲音,了解他們的想法,並且對自己的施政理念做更積極的溝通,尤其對於兩岸政策,必須努力化解這些沒有投票給他的民眾心裡的疑慮,並力圖緩和明顯藍綠各半的社會分裂態勢。畢竟,如果內部意見激烈對立,勢將牽絆兩岸政策的推進空間。

也許投票給馬英九的選民有特定的政黨屬性,但元首代表國家,也代表著全民的利益,以及台灣共同的命運,一旦成為總統,就不能有黨派之偏。過去馬總統曾被批評決策圈太狹窄,親近幕僚與基層有距離,又同質性太高,既然成為國家領袖,在決策時就須兼顧各方主張,包容不同理念,尊重反對意見,以全民的未來為最大依歸,也以下一代長遠福祉及國家的繁榮成長為自我期許。馬總統在第二任期已無連任壓力,但民眾的評價之眼,卻依舊時時緊盯毫不放鬆,馬總統當然也不能鬆懈。

第二任期的最大困難,是「跛鴨效應」可能在卸任的前兩年就浮現,因為接班角力戰已經蠢蠢欲動,西瓜派準備另覓明主,以致政策容易被視為難以持續,政治承諾也欠缺說服力。但此時馬總統更應該著重於結構性、制度性的問題,因為,如果能為好的政策打好基礎,日後施政便能更為順遂推展。

例如「公平正義」訴求之所以能夠打動人心,就是因為貧富差距激起了不少民怨,雖然貧富差距不可能消除,但扶持弱勢者、提供急難援助的社福體系,長期以來始終處於缺錢缺人的困境,需要政府更積極地提供資源與支持。

此外,人口老化與少子化的陰影,籠罩著台灣的未來,這是一個無法逃避、也難以扭轉的課題,國家是由一個個的人組成,人的問題,就是國家最大的問題。政府必須對人口問題做制度性的長遠規畫,包括如何協助學校轉型及教師轉業、如何加強幼兒托育服務、如何建立長照制度、如何放寬移民規定以引進人口等等。

其實獲得選民再度授權的第二任期,應該可以更有魄力、更決斷地大開大闔,挑戰一些比較困難的決定,為社會留下更多良好制度。全新的四年,將是馬總統為自己留下歷史軌跡的全新機會,全民正拭目以待。

Sunday, January 29, 2012

DPP Dogma Must Defer to the Knowledge Economy

DPP Dogma Must Defer to the Knowledge Economy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 30, 2012

Summary: During his New Year's Day speech, President Ma said that no political party can base its existence solely on memories of the 2/28 Incident. It must also ensure the well-being of future generations. In 1988, martial law was lifted on Taiwan. Babies born that year are now 24 years old. One quarter of the population on Taiwan has no memory of martial law. What these young people need is an opposition party with the courage to confront cross-Strait and international reality.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP lost. This proves yet again that cross-Strait policy and the economy are the DPP's Achilles Heel. The consensus was that the DPP's recent loss was related to unprecedented public declarations by entrepreneurs large and small regarding the 1992 Consensus. The provincial origin of these entrepreneurs was irrelevant. They included Taiwan and Mainland born entrepreneurs alike.

During the election, the DPP smeared these companies. It characterized them as wealthy conglomerates, and implied that they acquired their wealth illegitimately through government/business collusion. The DPP attempted to depict them as enemies of the people. But calm has returned following the election. The fact that so many entrepreneurs spoke in one voice should give the DPP pause. What these entrepreneurs said was: "Taiwan's economic development cannot sit idly by while the DPP works out its so-called Taiwan consensus."

Consider the big picture. The situation is very different from 30 years ago. Yet the DPP seems oblivious to this fact. Over the next few years, Taiwan has two clear rivals in Asia. One is South Korea. The other is Mainland China. Just before the election, outsiders wanted to know whether cross-Strait relations would be strained and the U.S. would be alarmed by a DPP victory. What was the DPP's response? Mainland China has no alternative. It must talk to Taiwan.

The DPP mistakenly assumed that Taiwan had no competitors. The DPP forgot that while the two sides were wasting time talking, South Korean companies were swooping in and making real progress on the Mainland. Seoul may soon sign an FTA with Beijing. South Korean and Mainland enterprises have progressed by leaps and bounds while the DPP casts about for some sort of "Taiwan consensus." What Taiwan companies want most is not special treatment from Beijing. What they want is peaceful cross-Strait relations and the opportunity to compete with South Korean and Mainland companies on an equal footing. In other words, competitors from South Korea need not waste time and energy overcoming political obstacles on Mainland China, but companies from Taiwan do. This wasted time constitutes an enormous burden on Taiwan's economy.

The DPP's second mistake was to assume that since cross-Strait exchanges will normalize eventually, Direct Links are not terribly urgent. DPP leaders assume that if they hold out longer at this stage, Taipei will gain more leverage during eventual negotiations. But this argument fails to factor in lost economic opportunities. The loss of economic strength is far more detrimental to one's bargaining power in the long run.

Given these logical fallacies, the DPP's greatest weakness in cross-Strait negotiations, remains its obliviousness to the importance of time and to the dynamic nature of industrial production.

The DPP has long lacked an genuinely independent and neutral think tank able to help it understand the issues. The party's think tank fails to stress knowledge and learning. Instead it stresses ideological correctness.

For example, its think tank still stresses "factor price equalization theory." It still maintains that exchanges between Taiwan and the Mainland must lower wages on Taiwan. But as everyone knows, this is outmoded industrial and agricultural society theory from 50 years ago. The world today is a knowledge economy. It competes on the basis of innovation. The international industrial environment is no longer a static arrangement that will lead to factor price equalization between Taiwan and the Mainland. On the contrary, technological innovation has been the rule the world over. The key determinant for economic achievement is "Who is the innovator?" Innovators invariably seize the lion's share of economic benefits.

Will worker salaries on the Mainland catch up to Taiwan? The answer will not be determined by whether we allow cross-Strait trade, but by whether Taiwan is more innovative than the Mainland. The DPP must understand that the best cross-Strait strategy is to maintain Taiwan lead in innovation amidst dynamic competition.

The Mainland is a serious economic threat to Taiwan. But it is a tremendous economic opportunity as well. For Taiwan brands, the Mainland is an essential test market. DPP academics must see the opportunities provided by the Mainland, and not merely the threats. If exchanges with the Mainland enable Taiwan to become a winner in the innovation economy, the DPP should choose an open door policy, instead of trying to apply a padlock to the island.

The DPP's cross-Strait policy needs new thinking, predicated upon a knowledge-based economy. Politically, the DPP should consider recognizing the 1992 consensus. What is the 1992 consensus? The older generation may have a strong sense of Taiwanese identity. They may have indelible memories of martial law oppression. They may feel that the wording of the 1992 consensus diminishes their political ideals. But the wording can also be interpreted as deliberate ambiguity that can buy time for Taiwan. It can enable Taiwan's democracy [Translator's note: strictly speaking this should be "republican government," not "democracy"] and economy to gain strength. It can provide more options for the younger generation.

During his New Year's Day speech, President Ma said that no political party can base its existence solely on memories of the 2/28 Incident. It must also ensure the well-being of future generations.

In 1988, martial law was lifted on Taiwan. Babies born that year are now 24 years old. One quarter of the population on Taiwan has no memory of martial law. What these young people need is an opposition party with the courage to confront cross-Strait and international reality.

民進黨兩岸論述需要知識經濟新思維
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.01.29

蔡英文與民進黨的挫敗,再次證實民進黨的罩門在兩岸和經濟。輿論指出,民進黨此番失利,多少與選前一大群無分本省、外省的大、小企業家們史無前例地表態挺九二共識有關。

競選時,民進黨將這些企業全部抹成財團,說他們在人民的對立面。但選後回歸冷靜,幾位企業家異口同聲的一句話,頗值民進黨深思,那句話就是:「台灣經濟發展,不能枯等台灣共識。」

從大環境來看,現在與三十年前大不相同,但民進黨似乎無此體會。未來數年,台灣在亞洲有兩個明顯的對手,一為韓國,一是中國大陸。當外界質疑「如果民進黨當選,兩岸關係將有些緊張,美國會有些恐慌」時,民進黨的回應竟然是:中國大陸沒有選擇,一定要跟台灣談。

這樣的回應犯了「假設競爭對手不存在」的謬誤。民進黨忘了,當兩岸蹉跎不談時,韓國必趁虛而入,與中國大陸迅速達成實質的進展。不久,韓國可能與大陸FTA已經簽訂,韓國與大陸的企業在台灣尚不知如何凝聚「台灣共識」時早已一躍千里。台灣企業期待的不是大陸讓利的特殊待遇,而是必須能在兩岸關係和平的前提下,與韓國、中國大陸站在立足點的平等而已。換言之,倘若我們的競爭者如韓國,與中國大陸沒有對耗、沒有蹉跎、沒有虛功,而台灣卻有,則這樣的空窗期就是台灣經濟的巨大損失。

民進黨常見的第二個邏輯謬誤是,認為兩岸遲早會正常化往來,譬如三通其實不急,因為遲早會通。他們盤算,站在談判的角度,現階段多堅持一點,就能幫台灣爭取更多。然而,這樣的說法也忘了堅持等待而蹉跎虛耗的時間,會讓台灣喪失更多經濟機遇。一旦經濟實力流失,長期而言,對於整體談判更不利。

綜合以上兩個邏輯謬誤,我們必須指出:民進黨兩岸論述的最大弱點,就是欠缺時間軸線與產業動態的觀念。

民進黨一直缺乏一個獨立的、中性的真正智庫,去協助其分析思考。該黨現在的智庫不是強調智識學理,卻是在強化意識形態。

例如:他們的智庫迄今仍在強調「要素價格均等理論」,認為台灣與中國大陸交往之後,就會拉低台灣工資。殊不知,這是五十年前適用於工業與農業社會的理論。但如今全球已經是知識經濟時代,已經是用創新在競爭。國際產業環境早已不是在定型的技術結構下,使台灣與大陸要素價格漸趨均等。反之,全球各國的產業技術一直不斷的創新演進,決定經濟成果分配的關鍵是「誰是創新者」;創新者永遠能拿走大部分的經濟利益。

簡言之,決定台灣勞工薪水會不會被大陸趕上的關鍵,不是兩岸是否開放,而是台灣與大陸誰是創新者?民進黨應該理解,最好的兩岸策略就是設法讓台灣在動態競爭下,在若干領域成為創新者,從而保持領先。

不容諱言,儘管中國大陸對台灣是嚴重威脅,卻同時也是大好機會。對台灣品牌而言,中國大陸是個練兵不可或缺的市場,如何善用其機會,而不是單純只看見威脅,這是民進黨學者需要自我檢討的。如果與大陸往來,可以讓台灣成為創新經濟時代的贏家,民進黨該選擇的應是開放,而非鎖國。

民進黨的兩岸政策需要知識經濟時代的新思維;在政治上,民進黨也不妨從另一個面向認識九二共識。九二共識是什麼?對台灣主體意識強、戒嚴壓迫印象深刻的老一代來說,可能覺得是其政治理想被九二共識的文字限縮;但事實上,這些文字也可以被解讀為替台灣用模糊爭取時間,使台灣的民主與經濟得以強化,增加未來年輕族群「選項空間」的一種創造性模糊。

馬總統在元旦致詞時說,任何政黨的存在,都不只是為了有二二八歷史記憶者實現他們心目中的理想,而更是為了豐富下一個世代的選擇。

民國七十七年台灣解嚴,那年出生的嬰兒,今年都已經二十四歲了。也就是說台灣已有四分之一的人口沒有戒嚴的記憶,這群年輕的孩子需要的是一個勇敢面對兩岸與國際現實的反對黨。

Thursday, January 19, 2012

Ma Ying-jeou's Million Vote Wake Up Call

Ma Ying-jeou's Million Vote Wake Up Call
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 20, 2011

Summary: The recently concluded general election was a stormy process. Ma Ying-jeou had the advantage of the incumbency, Nevertheless his race against Tsai Ing-wen was closely fought. President Ma surely must have thought long and hard about why. Now he has been reelected. But President Ma received nearly 800,000 votes fewer than he did the first time. His lead shrunk by over one million votes. This was a wake up call that he must keep in mind. He must listen to others' heartfelt advice and make the necessary changes. Only then can he avoid repeating the same mistakes.

Full Text Below:

The recently concluded general election was a stormy process. Ma Ying-jeou had the advantage of the incumbency, Nevertheless his race against Tsai Ing-wen was closely fought. President Ma surely must have thought long and hard about why. Now he has been reelected. But President Ma received nearly 800,000 votes fewer than he did the first time. His lead shrunk by over one million votes. This was a wake up call that he must keep in mind. He must listen to others' heartfelt advice and make the necessary changes. Only then can he avoid repeating the same mistakes.

President Ma has certain strengths. He is an individual of integrity. He has done an outstanding job of maintaining cross-Strait peace, and upholding the public image of the President of the Republic of China. These are among the many reasons for his election victory. He has been reaffirmed by the voters. On the other hand, the Ma administration mishandled domestic issues. It left people the impression that it is slow to respond. This includes the pace of economic development. social policy, even its handling of individual cases. Sometimes it was indecisive. At other times it affected bureaucratic airs. This provoked public discontent. These are public grievances for which Ma Ying-jeou must accept unconditional responsibility.

The discrepancy between the Ma administration's governance internally vs. externally is the result of two problems. One. President Ma has not made the best use of the human talent available to him. Two. President Ma is often tone-deaf and color-blind. Regarding problem number one, the consensus is that the Ma administration is too inbred, too incestuous, hence too narrow in its vision. This leads to policy-making blind spots. To correct this problem, the cabinet must be reshuffled. Problem number two is Ma Ying-jeou's personal limitations resulting from his development as an individual. Some feel he lacks empathy for others. His manner is stiff. He is preoccupied with humility and moderation. As a result his cabinet was unable to exercise the necessary initiative. His administration conveyed the impression that it lacked drive and creativity. These shortcomings undermined his personal image and hurt his reelection prospects. These are problems he must address during his second term in office.

In short, during President Ma's first term, society was immersed in a "post-Chen" atmosphere. The number one concern was fighting corruption. Therefore President Ma's preoccupation with personal integrity was understandable. But when assessing a head of state, personal integrity is merely a baseline. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for good governance. President Ma must offer a more comprehensive, effective, and forward-looking strategy for national governance. Only then can he meet the public's expectations. Ma's first four year term was all about "healing" and "recuperation." President Ma used the time to put Taiwan back on track. During the next four years, he must set higher goals. This includes advancing a national vision, healing the "ethnic" (communal) rifts, and establishing a more equitable society. This will enable Taiwan to emerge from political wheel-spinning and realize its collective goal of national transformation. These are not goals that empty slogans such as "Create a Golden Decade" can communicate.

A new vision is clearly not something the Ma administration can achieve during its remaining time in office. Therefore, in addition to reshuffling his cabinet, President Ma must seek people of talent and virtue in the larger community. He must recruit more people of talent and virtue to act as his eyes and ears and his strategic advisors. This task is no less important that talking with leaders of the opposition every six months or so. More importantly, President Ma must confer the necessary authority and resources upon these experts. This will enable them to do their job, and spare him the need to personally attend to everything. Ma is a head of state. He must focus on the vital task of overall system management. He must not allow himself to become bogged down in administrative details. This requires inevitable trade-offs. Over the past three years, Ma Ying-jeou has made a Herculean effort to demonstrate his proficiency in all matters large and small. But he merely left the public with the impression that he is preoccupied with trivialities, that he lacks the stature and charisma appropriate to a head of state. This is a lesson he must learn.

The dust from the election has now settled. President Ma faces a new situation. In some respects, the situation is favorable. He still retains the support of over half the electorate. His party still commands a clear majority in the legislature. This will enable him to promote his policies. His policy of cross-Strait reconciliation has been vetted by the citizenry. He can cast aside the label of "selling out Taiwan" that Taiwan independence extremists attempted to attach to him. In other respects, the situation is unfavorable. Taiwan's north-south divide is increasingly evident. Blue vs. Green confrontation remains serious. Social inequality is increasing. All these problems are more serious than they were before. The European debt crisis and the sluggish world economy will make Taiwan's economic recovery more difficult. In addition, President Ma himself may be exempt from election pressures, But the situation within the Blue Camp remains unclear. Reform within the KMT still has a long way to go. These burdens allow little time for relaxation.

President Ma won a tense and hard fought race. He won public approval for a second term. But he also revealed his character flaws through his leadership style. Some have accused Ma Ying-jeou of "fear mongering" during the election campaign. The opposite is true. President Ma was far too low-keyed, far too defensive. This was the main reason for his diminished personal charisma. In particular, he persisted in repeating the same details over and over again. He left voters with the impression that he was long-winded, that he lacked vision, and that he was insulting people's intelligence. During his second term, he can continue reaching out to the public. But no matter what, he must reestablish his stature as a national leader.

We do not know whether President Ma wrote a concession speech before the votes were counted. But voters are fickle. He must remain humble and alert. That will be the key to success over the next four years.

百萬選民給馬英九的棒喝
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.01.20

這次大選過程驚濤駭浪,馬英九以現任元首的優勢,和蔡英文打到如此膠著,想必馬總統亦曾輾轉反側苦思其間原由。如今成功連任,但馬總統得票減少近八十萬票,領先票數更大跌一百多萬;對於這記當頭棒喝,他必須保持戒懼、聽取忠告並改變作為,才不致重蹈覆轍。

馬總統的長處,除了個人操守清廉,在維持兩岸和平及經營台灣總體形象上,也都明顯勝出,帶給台灣安定感和光榮感。從選舉結果看,這也是他得分的主要項目,受到選民肯定。相形之下,馬政府處理內政問題,則給人因應遲緩的感覺:包括財經發展的步調、社會政策的調整,乃至個別突發事件的處理,有時缺乏決斷,有時流於僚氣,引發民眾不滿。這也是馬英九必須概括承受的民怨。

對內及對外治理的落差,一則出在用人的未盡妥適,二則與馬總統個人的關切與風格有關。前者,外界普遍認為馬團隊核心決策圈太過窄促,同質性也太高,導致施政出現盲點而不自知;這點,有待內閣積極調整。後者,則因馬英九個人成長經驗的侷限,使他對社會某些角落或階層的同理心不足。加上其性格拘謹,過度強調謙抑與節制,導致團隊不敢放手施為,而顯得積極性、開創性不足。這些缺憾,都削弱了他個人的政治魅力,也拖累了選情,這是他第二任必須改善的工程。

簡言之,馬總統的第一屆任期,因社會正處於「後扁」的反貪腐氛圍,他特別強調個人操守,不難理解。但檢驗一個元首,個人「修身」畢竟只是最基本的一環;馬總統勢需拿出更全盤、更有效和更前瞻的「治國」方略,才能滿足民眾的期待。如果把首任四年定位為「療傷」和「調養」階段,馬總統把台灣的運轉帶回正常軌道;接下來的四年,應該定出更高的目標,包括國家願景的設定、族群裂痕的弭合、均衡社會的追求等,讓台灣從廿年的政治虛耗向有集體目標的國家轉型。這些,均非「打造黃金十年」那樣空泛的口號所能表達。

新願景的建立及推動,顯然不是馬政府現有團隊所能完成;因此,馬總統除了要慎思新內閣的布局,更要擴大向社會覓才、問賢的管道,讓更多賢德之士充當他的耳目和軍師。此一工作的重要性,絕不亞於每半年和在野黨領袖晤談。更重要的是,馬總統要將權力和資源任務托付給不同領域的專家來執行,而不必凡事躬親。身為元首,若不能提綱挈領統管大局,而陷入事務性的細節,最後必然顧此失彼。過去三年多,馬英九的鉅細靡遺,旨在表現他的熟練,卻讓民眾感到瑣碎,少了元首的高度及魅力。這是必須記取的教訓。

隨著大選底定,馬總統面對的是一番新形勢:從有利的面向看,他仍擁有過半選民的支持,在國會也仍掌握絕對優勢,這有利政策的推動。他的兩岸和解政策,通過了公民的驗收,他頭上的「賣台」標籤可以撕掉。從不利的面向看,台灣的南北分化日益明顯,藍綠對峙依然嚴重,社會貧富差距則愈發擴大,這都較以往棘手。而歐債危機及世界經濟的遲滯,也會加重台灣經濟復甦的壓力。此外,馬總統本人雖已無連任壓力,但藍軍內部接班形勢不明,國民黨內改革也還有長路要走,這些擔子一點都沒有輕鬆的餘地。

馬總統這場選舉,贏得驚險;他獲得了民眾的再度付託,卻也暴露他性格和領導風格上的缺陷。有人指責馬英九在選戰中「販賣恐懼」,事實正好相反,馬總統過度低調、過度辯解,才是他魅力流失的主因。尤其他喜歡再三反覆同一細節,讓選民覺得囉嗦與平庸,是在冒犯人民的智慧。在第二屆任期,他可以繼續追求親民,但無論如何必須把領導者的高度建立起來。

我們不知道馬總統在開票前是否曾預寫「落選感言」,但隨時保持那一刻對民心善變的敬畏和戒慎,將是未來四年成功之鑰。

The 1992 Consensus is the Taiwan Consensus

The 1992 Consensus is the Taiwan Consensus
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 19, 2011

Summary: During the just concluded presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen lost to Ma Ying-jeou. She lost not as a result of her campaign strategy, but because the DPP's core concepts have diverged too far from the underlying cross-Strait reality. If the DPP seeks a return to power, it must first overcome this, its greatest hurdle.

Full Text Below:

During the just concluded presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen lost to Ma Ying-jeou. She lost not as a result of her campaign strategy, but because the DPP's core concepts have diverged too far from the underlying cross-Strait reality. If the DPP seeks a return to power, it must first overcome this, its greatest hurdle.

Some have criticized the "Taiwan consensus" as being too devoid of content. Some have criticized Tsai Ing-wen for refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Such pragmatic public concerns are valid. But the real problem is more fundamental. The raison d'etre of the DPP since its very founding, has been to sever the umbilical cord between Taiwan and Mainland China. It has been to establish an independent "Nation of Taiwan," that will insulate Taiwan from Mainland influence. The vast majority of DPP supporters embrace this dream. The achievement of this goal remains at the heart of the DPP.

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait have long been at loggerheads with each other. Many on Taiwan hate and mistrust the Mainland. Essentially the DPP advocates distancing Taiwan from the Mainland. For this, it has garnered considerable support. It can easily cast itself as a "champion of Taiwan." When cross-Strait relations are tense, the DPP can easily incite mob sentiment in order to rally public support. But when cross-Strait tensions are relaxed, and cross-Strait relations are warm, the DPP loses that support. It loses that support because its basic posture is diametrically opposed to the larger historical currents.

Ma Ying-jeou eventually prevailed amidst bitter fighting. Ma won not primarily because the voters supported the 1992 Consensus. Ma won because everyone wanted the two sides to increase cooperation and reduce tensions. Ma Ying-jeou used the 1992 Consensus and the one China constitution to lay a foundation for his cross-Strait policy. The Mainland is willing to go along with Ma's position. Ma's reasoning is able to withstand the test of constitutionalism and jurisprudence on Taiwan. As a result it has become the basis for bilateral exchanges and consultations. Therefore, Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy is practicable in the real world. Following the cross-Strait thaw, Taiwan has been the recipient of real world benefits. In the absence of better alternatives, most people see no reason to shout "Stop."

The DPP's fundamental policy toward the Mainland, is to see the other side as the enemy, one that must be resisted with all one's might, whose influence on Taiwan must be totally excluded, the way it was during the Cold War. But this is no longer the way things are. The world is changing. The tides are shifting. The Mainland is changing. Today's Mainland is not merely undergoing a swift economic rise. It is also becoming an important player on the international stage. Its society is changing. It will inevitably move toward liberalization. Current cross-Strait interactions are closely knit. This is unprecedented in Taiwan's history. Marriage, education, business, tourism, film and television arts have all made cross-Strait relations closer than ever. Some Mainland schools have even used Taiwan pop singer Jay Chou's lyrics as teaching material. Some Mainland students on Taiwan have become Internet celebrities. Cross-Strait relations long ago ceased being the way the DPP perceives them. They will be even more different in the future.

As a result of the DPP's basic posture, it refuses to keep up with these changes. Instead, it chooses to turn a blind eye to them. The DPP leaves people with the impression they would do everything in their power to forestall closer relations with the Mainland, merely to ensure Taiwan's separateness. But in an era of globalization and the Internet, exchanges are the norm. The closed-door policy is obsolete. People go where they want, and do what they wish. Due to cultural and ethnic affinity, economic dependence, and geographical proximity, exchanges between Taiwan and the Mainland are thriving. They will continue to deepen in the future. If the DPP refuses to face even this reality, how can it possibly offer a practical and feasible cross-Strait policy?

Ma Ying-jeou has found a way to communicate with the Mainland. He has found a common language. But the DPP's fundamental posture is too far removed from the Mainland's. It is unable to find common ground. Actually the KMT's cross-Strait rhetoric has undergone repeated revision over the decades. It has gone from denouncing Beijing as a "bandit regime," to silence regarding Beijing's jurisdiction over the Mainland, It has gone from "recovering the Mainland" to peaceful coexistence. Step by step, it has moved closer to reality, until eventually arriving at the 1992 Consensus. If the century-old KMT can make such a huge adjustment, why can't the DPP? Why can't the DPP be bolder and more flexible? Why isn't the DPP better able to respond to reality?

Frankly, the DPP's cross-Strait policy has never worked. Chen Shui-bian ruled for eight years. Cross-Strait relations remained frozen and stagnant. This was in part due to Mainland resistance. But it also shows how cross-Strait policy is the DPP's Achilles Heel. Even during the recent election, Tsai Ing-wen failed to advance any concrete, real world policy. The DPP's problem is that a ruling party must respond to the practical needs of the people. A political party incapable of dealing with cross-Strait issues, cannot meet the needs of the public on Taiwan.

In order to acquire the authority to govern, a political party must offer a workable and pragmatic cross-Strait policy. It must offer people solutions to their problems. It must protect their interests. It must seek out business opportunities. It must respond to future trends, and engage in advance planning. Political parties must confront the reality of people's needs. Only then can they provide them with the answers they seek. If the DPP wants the opportunity to serve the people, it must offer them an honest to god cross-Strait policy.

九二共識就已經是台灣共識
2012-01-19中國時報

這次總統大選,蔡英文輸給了馬英九,其實不是因為戰略失誤,而是受限於民進黨核心理念與兩岸現實的根本性差距。民進黨想重新執政,必須先克服這個最大難關。

有人批評「台灣共識」內容過於空洞,有人認為蔡英文否認「九二共識」,令務實派民眾擔憂,這些都沒錯,但更根本的是,民進黨創黨以來的存在基礎,就是要切斷台灣與中國臍帶,建立獨立的台灣國,讓台灣不再受中國大陸的力量左右。民進黨的支持者絕大多數都懷抱著這個夢想,而實現這個目標,則是民進黨最核心的存在價值。

兩岸過去長期對立,台灣有不少民眾既厭惡又不信任中國大陸,在基本理念上主張與中國拉開距離的民進黨,可以吸引到相當支持,也很容易被視為台灣的捍衛者。當兩岸關係緊張時,民進黨可以因此輕易得到民氣的匯集,問題是,當民意傾向兩岸和解加強交流時,民進黨就因為主戰的基本姿態與主和的大趨勢南轅北轍,而頓失空間。

馬英九之所以最後能在苦戰中勝出,與其說選民真的那麼支持「九二共識」,不如說大家都希望兩岸降低緊張增加合作,而馬英九以「九二共識」與「一中憲法」搭建起的兩岸政策,大陸可以勉強睜隻眼閉隻眼,台灣本身在憲法法理上也說得通,成為雙方交流協商的基礎。因此,馬英九這個兩岸政策,放在現實環境中是可以操作的。兩岸解凍後台灣感受到實質獲益,如果沒有更好的方案,大多數人覺得沒有理由叫停。

而民進黨對中國的基本政策,是把對方設定為敵人,必須全力對抗,並在台灣內部排斥其影響力,和當年冷戰時差不多。問題是,現實已經不是這樣了。世界在變、潮流在變、中國也在變,現在的中國大陸,不只經濟迅速崛起、成為國際舞台要角,內部社會也出現變化,而且必然會走向開放。目前兩岸互動之綿密深刻,是台灣歷史上所僅見,通婚、求學、經商、旅遊、影視藝文,彼此的關係愈來愈緊密。當大陸有學校拿周杰倫的歌詞入題時,當陸生在台體驗在網上爆紅時,現在的兩岸關係,早已不是民進黨原始設定的狀態了,而未來更不會是。

對於這個新態勢,民進黨卻因為自己的基本立場跟不上變化,而選擇視而不見,甚至讓人感覺民進黨如果做得到的話,會想阻撓兩岸交流避免關係拉近,以保持台灣的獨立性。但在這個全球化的網路時代,交流穿透是常態,閉關自守已過時。人的腳會自己走向想去的地方,基於文化、種族、經貿與地理上的接近性,台灣與大陸的交往,現在活絡,未來將更繼續擴大深化,如果連這個如此巨大的現實都不能面對,如何能夠提出務實可行的兩岸政策?

馬英九找到了和中國的共同語言,但民進黨的基本立足點和中國差太遠,目前找不到交集。其實,回顧國民黨的兩岸政策,數十年來也作了相當大的修正,從「匪偽政權」到不否定對方的治權,從「反攻大陸」到和平共存,一步一步朝現實靠攏,最後設計出「九二共識」處理模式。百年老店的國民黨都可以做這麼大的調整了,民進黨為什麼不能更大膽、更有彈性、也更能回應現實?

坦白講,民進黨的兩岸政策從來沒有成功過。陳水扁執政八年,兩岸關係冰凍停滯,這固然與中國當局的抵制有關,但也說明了兩岸政策的確是民進黨的罩門。而即使到了這次大選,蔡英文同樣沒提出什麼在現實中行得通的具體政策。問題是,執政黨必須解答人民的現實需要,一個無法處理兩岸問題的政黨,是不敷當前台灣人民需求的。

不要說想取得政權就必須提出務實可行的兩岸政策,光是要替人民解決問題、維護權益、爭取商機、並因應未來趨勢作前瞻性規畫,政黨就必須正視現實為人民的需求提供解答。民進黨想爭取為民服務的機會,就不能在兩岸政策上交白卷。

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

DPP Must Not Duck the Issue of Reunification

DPP Must Not Duck the Issue of Reunification
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 18, 2011

Summary: During the 2012 presidential election, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen was highly vocal. In the end however, she lost by a 6% landslide margin. The Democratic Progressive Party longs to return to power. But the huge margin of victory shows that the biggest obstacle standing in the way of the DPP returning to office is not the DPP's election tactics, but its overly rigid ideology. The DPP must undergo a bold transformation. It must adopt a pragmatic cross-strait policy. More than the future of Taiwan is at stake. Also at stake is whether voters will ever entrust power to the DPP.


Full Text Below:

During the 2012 presidential election, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen was highly vocal. In the end however, she lost by a 6% landslide margin. The Democratic Progressive Party longs to return to power. But the huge margin of victory shows that the biggest obstacle standing in the way of the DPP returning to office is not the DPP's election tactics, but its overly rigid ideology. The DPP must undergo a bold transformation. It must adopt a pragmatic cross-strait policy. More than the future of Taiwan is at stake. Also at stake is whether voters will ever entrust power to the DPP.

The election result was an embarrassment to the DPP. During her campaign Tsai relentlessly castigated KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy. She said it undermined "Taiwan's sovereignty." She said it only looked after the interests of big business. She said it neglected the welfare of the majority of ordinary citizens. Yet Ma Ying-jeou received over half the vote. This shows that most voters did not buy into the DPP's simplistic and distorted spin control.

Does the DPP really believe in Taiwan's democracy? If it does, it should realize that over half the voters cannot possibly be guilty of "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." In fact, the election was essentially a referendum on the 1992 Consensus. The majority of voters demanded both national sovereignty and cross-Strait peace. The 1992 consensus perfectly fills the bill in both cases. Meanwhile, voters agreed that the incumbent deserved a second term. This election result shows that they think the path the nation is taking is correct, and that they are satisfied with the status quo.

Republic of China citizens have spoken. How will the DPP choose to interpret what they have said? Will it inadvertently or deliberately misinterpret what they have said? The DPP's decision will determine its fate as a political party. For example, will Deep Greens argue that Tsai Ing-wen lost support in the south because she did not campaign as vigorously as Chen Shui-bian did in 2000? The DPP may find itself hijacked by Taiwan independence extremists.

In fact, the election result was determined by a five to six percentage point swing vote, by so-called "economic voters" who voted their pocketbooks. During the local level five cities mayoral elections, these voters were willing to support the Democratic Progressive Party as a check on the ruling KMT. They enabled the DPP to win 49% of the vote. But a year later, during the central level elections, despite these voters' dissatisfaction with the Ma administration, they refused to vote for the DPP. The DPP was unable to win more than 45% of the vote. This was to be the fate of the Democratic Progressive Party in the central government level election.

Actually, DPP leaders know the main battle during the presidential election was fought over the swing vote. That is why one seldom saw DPP party flags at DPP election rallies. That is why Tsai Ing-wen made a point of proclaiming that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan." That is why she trotted out her "grand coalition" concept late in the campaign. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to accept the 1992 consensus. But the words "Taiwan independence" also vanished from Pan Green election rallies. Instead, Tsai Ing-wen touted her "Taiwan consensus." To some extent she was attempting to blur the line between Deep Green and swing voters. But her "Taiwan consensus" was devoid of substance. As a result it backfired. Voters were not reassured. They refused to give her carte blanche. Voters in 2000 had already given the DPP a chance, During his campaign, Chen Shui-bian proposed a "New Centrist Path." During his inauguration, he promised to abide by his "Five Noes." But less than four years later, he reneged on those promises. He even adopted an extremist, de jure Taiwan independence posture. The lesson is clear. The voters are clearly afraid. They fear that even if Tsai Ing-wen wins, the DPP may still cling to its rigid ideology.

This is another lesson learned from the election results. In future elections the DPP cannot rely on elections to motivate transformation, It must spell out its cross-Strait policy during the election campaign. Tsai Ing-wen has been party chairman for four years. During that time, she has deliberately avoided discussing cross-Strait policy, Evading the issues may temporarily keep peace within the DPP. But this sort of ambiguity will never win over rational swing voters.

Following the election, the DPP has been engaging in some soul-searching. It is clear that the pragmatists within the party are gaining ground. For example, DPP Central Standing Committee Member Tuan Yi-kang urged the DPP to be honest about the 1992 Consensus. DPP Legislator Chen Ming-wen was equally blunt. He said the DPP's China policy collides with reality. This is encouraging. But Tsai Ing-wen is about to leave office in May. Once she does, the DPP will elect its party chairman. As a matter or record, DPP leaders often pander to Deep Greens during internecine power struggles, using ideology as a tool for infighting. If so, the Democratic Progressive Party may find itself adopting an even more extremist Taiwan independence path. If it does, it will find it even harder to return to power.

Of course the future need not be so grim, For the next two years at least, no more elections are scheduled. Younger, middle-aged party leaders are looking to make their move. They may take advantage of the opportunity to discuss the DPP's cross-Strait policy direction. This however, may be difficult. The centrists and Taiwan independence extremists within the DPP are poles apart. But this is something the party must tackle, Otherwise the DPP will never break through Tsai Ing-wen's 45% ceiling. It will never return to power.

檢討兩岸路線 民進黨不應迴避
2012-01-18中國時報

二○一二年的總統大選,呼聲甚高的民進黨總統候選人蔡英文,最後不但功敗垂成,而且還是以六個百分點吞下了敗績。這樣的差距標示出,民進黨未來要成為執政黨,最大的障礙不在於選舉的戰術層面,而在於民進黨僵固的意識形態;民進黨能不能勇敢轉型,走向務實的兩岸政策,攸關的不只是台灣的未來,也攸關選民敢不敢放心的將政權交給民進黨。

確實,這樣的選舉結果,對民進黨是很難堪的。在競選過程中,蔡英文多次批評國民黨總統候選人馬英九的兩岸政策,不但傷害台灣主權,而且只照顧大企業利益,沒有顧及大多數升斗小民的生活;但是馬英九仍然贏得過半支持,顯示多數選民並不接受民進黨這套簡化、扭曲的論述。

如果民進黨對台灣的民主有起碼的信心,他們應該了解,不可能會有過半選民支持他們口中傾中賣台的政權。事實上,這次的大選就是對九二共識的一次公投,多數選民既要主權尊嚴、也要兩岸和平共利,而九二共識正是可以兼顧二者的最適模式;同時,選民同意現任者連任,顯示的是,國家發展方向並未偏誤,他們對現狀還算是滿意的。

所以,台灣的民意已作出判決,民進黨要如何解讀至為重要,無心或蓄意的錯誤解讀,對一個政黨的發展,將有致命的後果。例如,深綠陣營如果認定蔡英文之所以無法將南部選票極大化,完全是因為她不像陳水扁當年那麼「衝」,未來的民進黨可能又要受到極獨路線的綁架。

事實上,主導這次大選結果的,還是為數五到六個百分點的中間選民,或是所謂的經濟選民。在五都這樣的地方選舉中,他們可以支持強力監督執政黨的民進黨,讓該黨拿下四成九的得票;但事隔一年,在中央級的選舉時,這些中間選民即使不滿意馬政府,但並未轉向民進黨。衝不破四成五,成了民進黨中央選舉的新宿命。

其實,民進黨領導人很清楚,這次總統大選的主要戰場就在中間選民,否則,不會在大型造勢場合罕見一隻黨旗;蔡英文也不必提出「台灣就是中華民國、中華民國就是台灣」,更在選舉後期提出「大聯合政府」主張。蔡英文不接受九二共識,但「台灣獨立」這樣的字眼,也在綠營選舉場合絕跡,蔡英文提出「台灣共識」,某種程度就是試圖以模糊化來兼顧深綠與中間選民;但台灣共識沒有實質內容,反而讓中間選民無法放心,不敢輕易的空白授權。因為,選民在二千年時已經給民進黨一次機會了,陳水扁在該次選舉提出新中間路線、就職時還宣示四不一沒有,卻不到四年就全盤推翻,還試圖走法理台獨的極獨路線;殷鑑不遠,蔡英文如果當選,民進黨是否能走出僵化的意識形態,選民顯然沒有信心。

所以,這次大選結果的另一個教訓在於,未來的民進黨不可能靠選舉來帶動轉型,他們一定要在選舉時提出清楚的兩岸政策;蔡英文擔任黨主席四年來,刻意迴避兩岸政策討論,也許一時之間讓民進黨維持表面的和諧,但這樣的模糊化,卻無法說服理性的中間選民。

從選後的一些反省聲浪中可以發現,民進黨務實派有抬頭的跡象。例如,民進黨中常委段宜康呼籲民進黨應誠實面對九二共識;立委陳明文也坦白說出,民進黨的中國政策和現實狀況衝突。這是可喜的一面,但令人憂慮的是,蔡英文卸任後,民進黨將於五月進行黨主席選舉;觀諸以前的例子,民進黨經常在權力競爭時,以路線之爭作為鬥爭工具;如果黨內有人刻意討好深綠來贏得黨主席職位,未來的民進黨可能更走向極獨,更不利執政。

當然,發展也不必然全是悲觀,至少未來二年沒有選舉,志在政途的中生代,也許可以趁著這段時間好好討論民進黨的兩岸路線。這很困難,因為民進黨內的中間派與極獨,目前連基本的共識都沒有;但這是一定要做的事,否則,民進黨可能突破不了蔡英文的四成五障礙,永遠和執政無緣。(大選系列社論二)

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

To Transform a Nation, Replace Its Structure

To Transform a Nation, Replace Its Structure
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 17, 2011

Summary: The general election is over. Next on the agenda is a cabinet reshuffle. During President Ma's second four year term, he will not be burdened by the need to run for re-election. He can fulfill his ideals without the need for second-guessing. He can promote his agenda for the next four years. For example, he can promote the Golden Decade he described earlier, during press conferences. Over the past four years his actions could be described as "righting wrongs." Over the next four years, we hope he will be able to fulfill his promise to help Taiwan "experience a rebirth."

Full Text Below:

The general election is over. Next on the agenda is a cabinet reshuffle.

During President Ma's second four year term, he will not be burdened by the need to run for re-election. He can fulfill his ideals without the need for second-guessing. He can promote his agenda for the next four years. For example, he can promote the Golden Decade he described earlier, during press conferences. Over the past four years his actions could be described as "righting wrongs." Over the next four years, we hope he will be able to fulfill his promise to help Taiwan "experience a rebirth."

Actually, upon closer examination, Taiwan does not have four years to experience a rebirth and transformation. It only has two. It is now 2012, only two years away from the 2014 five cities mayoral elections. When that time comes, realpolitik will force compromises that interfere with policy. Therefore the Ma administration has only two years, starting now, in which to get things done. These two years will determine Ma Ying-jeou's place in history. He must adopt drastic measures. He must be vigorous and resolute. Otherwise the opportunity will be lost forever.

If you ask President Ma what his most significant achievements over the past four years were, his is likely to say: One. Opening up cross-Strait trade and promoting cross-Strait peace. Two. Eliminating corruption. But these two achievements were mainly the result of proper attitude rather than extradordinary ability. The president insisted on making peace. Tensions between the two sides relaxed. As long as the president avoids recruiting people who love money and are out for the money. his own example will ensure that his administration remains clean.

During the campaign, President Ma was most severely criticized for failing to recruit the right people and for lacking resolve. Truly enabling Taiwan to experience a rebirth will require a very different way of doing things. Merely having the right attitude and having determination will not be enough. Over the next two years, the Republic of China needs a premier and a cabinet with the ability and the vision to implement Ma's vision. When people say revitailzation requires talent, this is what they mean.

Now however, important cabinet ministries lack the creativity, innovativeness, and courage to help Taiwan experience a rebirth. Many Executive Yuan cabinet members are drawn from the Taipei City Government. All they know is how to follow orders handed down by the central government. They are incapable of creating a new framework for the central government. Everywhere one looks, one sees fiscal policy, educational policy, monetary policy, accounting and statistics, and environmental protection being dealt with by local bureaucrats with little understanding of the larger issues. This is the main reason Taiwan failed to experience a rebirth over the past four years. The cabinet also includes people recommended party and government elders. It includes people hand-picked by the president himself. But with few exceptions, they have been unremarkable. This phenomenon of course, is a reflection upon President Ma's own choice of subordinates and his own vision.

KMT rulers have perpetuated the myth that the KMT is "rich in human talent." But considered coolly, those the KMT can promote to the cabinet level were all nurtured by the party 20 to 30 years ago. At the time Taiwan had an authoritarian system. South Korea was not a threat. Mainland China was waking from its slumber. Externally, Taiwan had no powerful neighbors. Internally, Taiwan had an authoritarian government. Naturally the talent it nurtured 20 years ago was more authoritarian and less progressive in character. Anyone who betrayed an inclination for reform, such as Justice Minister Ma Ying-jeou, was discouraged. Ma's fate was to be pushed aside by Lee Teng-hui. Any political party 100 years old is certain to include sycophants and yes-men. Therefore President Ma must acknowledge that the assumption that the KMT is rich in talent is in fact a myth. It is nothing more than incest.

If President Ma really wants to recruit those members of the political opposition most worthy of consideration, he should do what Tsai Ing-wen talked about the week before the election, engage in "cross-party recruitment." When Chen Shui-bian was elected Taipei Mayor, and again when he was elected president, he recruited many people not from the DPP. These people of ability included Sheng-Cheng Hu, Ho Chen, Lin Chuan-hsien, and Chen Chien-jen. Despite minority rule, despite presidential corruption, these recruits performed their duties quite well. Outside observers gave it fairly high praise. If President Ma wants to make a significant change over the next two years, the first thing he must do is break the KMT's past pattern of recruitment. He must recruit people of ability regardless of party affiliation.

Over the past four years, President Ma's hands have been tied with regards recruiting. This of course has undermined his ability to lead. When his cabinet members lack vision, when they lack administrative ability, he is the one who must take the heat. He is the one forced to make erroneous decisions outside his expertise. When the cabinet is unable to propose bold reforms, how can he rise above mere number crunching and text editing? As a result, many people concluded that President Ma failed to implement any fundamental reforms during his first term, apart from cross-Strait affairs and clean government.

A president is supposed to rise above partisanship. As Gong Zizhen observed, he or she must be able to recruit talent without regard for red tape. President Ma may lament that talent is hard to find. But if we break down the barriers, Taiwan is an island rich with talent. The only question is how such people can be persuaded to serve. The answer to that will depend on Ma's determination and courage. Taiwan's "rebirth" will require structural changes in personnel. As Gong Zizhen suggested, society and the nation must undergo a shake out. Too bad that on the occasion of President Ma's re-election, Gong Zizhen did not say "I advise the President to order a shake out, and to recruit talent without regard for red tape."

國家想脫胎換骨 人才要抽樑換棟
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.01.17 02:56 am

大選完成,下一個節目是內閣改組。

馬總統第二任的這四年,將是他沒有包袱、可以全力實現理想、推展政務的四年。一如他在先前黃金十年的記者會中所述,過去四年他所做的事情可以用「撥亂反正」四個字形容,而今後四年,他則希望能夠幫助台灣「脫胎換骨」。

但仔細思考,台灣得以進行脫胎換骨的改造時間,恐怕並沒有四年,而只有關鍵兩年。當下已是二○一二,距二○一四年下一屆五都選舉僅兩年餘,屆時勢必又有很多現實妥協羈絆政策推展,所以真正能夠做事的時間,或許就只有從現在起算的兩年。這兩年將是馬英九尋得其歷史定位關鍵的兩年;必須大刀闊斧、雷厲風行,否則轉眼即是時不我予。

若問馬總統過去四年的最顯著的政績為何,答案無非兩項:其一為兩岸的開放與和平,其二為政治的祛除貪腐。但這兩項政績的關鍵,主要都是態度問題,而非能力問題。總統堅持開放和平,則兩岸必趨和緩;總統只要不用愛財愛錢之人、自己以身作則,則政治必然清明。

大選期間,馬總統最受批評之處,在用人不當、斷事不決;因為,真正要使台灣脫胎換骨,就需要截然不同的格局,這絕非僅憑態度與決心所能成事。未來兩年,台灣必須要尋得有能力、有視野的閣揆與閣員,去布局、去開創、去改變、去落實。所謂中興以人才為本,就是這個意思。

然而,現在的重要部會閣員,坦言之,十之八九沒有這種開創、突破、勇敢精進、幫台灣脫胎換骨的能耐。行政院閣員中,不少來自台北市府團隊;他們的能力僅止於在中央給定的框架下折衝因應,卻無力到中央替國家開創一個理想的框架。舉凡財政、教育、金管、主計、環保,處處皆見地方行政官員之狹隘格局,這是四年來「胎不能脫、骨不能換」的根本原因。內閣中也有黨國大老推薦之輩,有總統自己欽點的人馬。但除了極少數例外,並無突出的表現。這樣的現象,當然反映馬總統用人的格局與視野。

國民黨的執政者常有一種迷思,認為國民黨黨內「人才濟濟」。但平心而論,國民黨今日能夠被拔擢成為閣員之人,都是二、三十年前開始培養的。當時台灣內部處於威權體系,而外在的韓國尚不構成威脅,中國大陸也只是大夢初醒。在外無強鄰、內有威權的大環境下,自然使得廿年前培育的人才在性格上「多融入威權、少積極進取」。在當年的環境下,稍有改革銳氣如法務部長馬英九者,其下場就是被李登輝所排擠,遑論其他。等而下之,百年政黨中當然也有若干逢迎諂媚之輩。所以,馬總統必須體認,國民黨「人才濟濟」其實是一種錯誤的迷思,甚至主要只是一本近親繁殖的譜系。

如果馬總統要真正擷取在野黨政見中最值得參考者,大概就是選前一周蔡英文所提的「跨黨派用人」。當年陳水扁選上台北市長、擔任總統,他所用的許多人都不是民進黨內之士。其中有些幹才如胡勝正、賀陳旦、林全、黃榮村、陳建仁等人,即使在朝小野大、總統貪腐的大環境下,也都做出不錯的成績,外界也給予相當好的口碑。馬總統若要在未來兩年做出重大改變,第一就是要突破國民黨過往用人的慣性,不分黨派延攬積極進取之輩。

過去四年,馬總統在用人方面自縛手腳,也當然影響其領導統御。當閣員視野狹限、統御無能時,主帥就不得不頻上火線、被迫做出並非其專精的錯誤決策。當閣員不能提出興革大方向時,主帥又焉能跳脫數字管理、文字刪修的格局?也正因為如此,許多人在馬總統第一任期間,除了兩岸開放與內政清廉,似乎說不出「脫胎換骨」的政績。

總統原本就該是跨黨派的,心中也原本就該如龔自珍所期,「我願天公重抖擻,不拘一格降人才」。馬總統或許會感慨人才難尋,其實若能打破一切藩籬,台灣真是「人才濟濟」的寶島;如何請出那些人才為這塊土地熱誠服務,端視領導者的誠意與魄力。所謂為台灣「脫胎換骨」,先要在人才架構上「抽樑換棟」。龔自珍的人才建言,也正是為社會國家「重新抖擻」而發。值此馬總統第二任當選之際,可借龔自珍的話說:「我勸總統重抖擻,不拘一格用人才」。

Monday, January 16, 2012

Doing the Right Thing Will Eventually Dissolve Hostility and Win Support

Doing the Right Thing Will Eventually Dissolve Hostility and Win Support
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 16, 2011

Summary: Any presidential bid for re-election, is invariably a referendum on the incumbent. President Ma Ying-jeou was compelled to wage an uphill battle during his bid for re-election. Nevertheless in the end he won 52% of the vote. Clearly over half the voters were unwilling to risk overturning the cross-Strait status quo. They calculated that if they gave Ma Ying-jeou four more years, Taiwan could maintain the cross-Strait status quo and enjoy increased prosperity and growth.

Full Text Below:

Any presidential bid for re-election, is invariably a referendum on the incumbent. President Ma Ying-jeou was compelled to wage an uphill battle during his bid for re-election. Nevertheless in the end he won 52% of the vote. Clearly over half the voters were unwilling to risk overturning the cross-Strait status quo. They calculated that if they gave Ma Ying-jeou four more years, Taiwan could maintain the cross-Strait status quo and enjoy increased prosperity and growth.

What is the "cross-Strait status quo?" Actually, it is something dynamic, rather than static. The current cross-Strait situation is unlike the tense standoff in 2004. It is unlike the stagnant situation in 2008, just before Ma Ying-jeou was elected. The advantage of being in office, is that one can define the status quo, even change it. The Ma administration has indeed changed the status quo over the past four years, by means of its cross-Strait policy. It has resumed direct cross-Strait air links after a six decade hiatus. The two sides have signed sixteen agreements on legal cooperation, repatriation of criminals, and financial cooperation. After ECFA was signed, the Mainland made many concessions on tariffs.

This is why the election was so unprecedented. Many entrepreneurs stepped forward to openly support the 1992 Consensus. They saw the benefits of the new status quo. The DPP said the Ma administration benefited only "people with money." Not so. As HTC Chairman Cher Wang said, the day before the election, businesses need a stable environment to be sustainable. Taiwan is not a society riddled by class warfare. Businesses have the ability to remain in operation. Only then will everyone be able to profit. Over half the voters supported Ma, showing that most people long for a peace dividend.

Several presidential candidate policy presentations were held during the election. DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen pointedly criticized Ma Ying-jeou. She accused him of "governing by the numbers." She accused him of not understanding the feelings of ordinary people. But the election results prove that certains numbers do inspire feelings in people. These numbers were not limited to the 8 to 9% economic growth rate. People have had more visceral experiences than that. The Ma administration added 70 nations to the list granting visa-free travel treatment. The new nations include Japan, the UK, and the EU. It includes the United States, the country with which the Republic of China is the most closely connected. Last year, the Republic of China was added to the list of candidates for visa-free travel treatment. By the same token, soon after the two sides signed ECFA, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of China began talking about investment protection cooperation. The Republic of China may not escape marginalziation even after joining the WTO (World Trade Organization). But voters hope new opportunities will arise now that ECFA has been signed.

The cross-Strait peace dividend refers not just to economic interests. It also refers to Taipei's maneuvering room in the international arena. The backbone that supports all these developments is the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen's primary campaign theme during the election was "Is there really a 1992 Consensus?" But the question she should have been asking was "Should there be a 1992 Consensus?" or "How has the 1992 consensus benefited Taiwan?" As former American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Douglas Paal observed, the 1992 Consensus is a highly creative formulation. Its ambiguity permits both sides to maintain their sovereignty. It also enables them to solve practical problems. Paal, an outsider, has clearly delineated the impact of the 1992 Consensus.

The DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Perhaps the DPP concluded from the poll numbers in recent years that public allegiance to "Taiwan" has reached unprecedented levels. But perhaps they forgot another number. Public expectations for cross-Strait peace have also reached unprecedented levels. Before the election, former President Lee Teng-hui personally posted a newspaper ad supporting Tsai Ing-wen. He did not call on "the brave people of Taiwan" to stand and fight [Mainland] China. He merely stressed that history shows no matter who is elected, exchanges between Mainland China and Taiwan must continue. Only then are dramatic improvements in cross-Strait relations possible.

Tsai Ing-wen once criticized Ma Ying-jeou's "no reunification, no independence, no use of force" policy as self-contradictory. But it is no more self-contradictory than the two sides arguing over sovereignty while conducting peace talks. The raison d'etre of the 1992 Consensus, is to resolve the cross-Strait dilemma. Not only has it successfully shelved the dispute over sovereignty, it has also allowed smooth cross-Strait negotiations.

The DPP and Tsai refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus. But at the same time they are unable to offer an alternative for resolving cross-Strait differences. Instead they proposed a far too vague "Taiwan consensus," that provoked outside concern. As a result, during the critical, final moments of the presidential race, cross-Strait relations once again became the DPP's Achilles Heel.

The vote proved a point. The ruling Ma Ying-jeou administration may have lost some support. But disaffected Ma supporters did not necessarily vote for Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen received 45% of the vote, only slightly more than the DPP's core support, and less than the 49% it received during last year's five cities mayoral elections. So what is the difference between central and local level elections? The voters understand perfectly. During a presidential election, cross-Strait policy is at stake. Tsai Ing-wen refused to clarify her cross-Strait policy before the election. Therefore the voters were afraid to let her govern the country. They refused to allow the future of the two sides and Taiwan to enter a state of uncertainty.

Another election result, pertaining to cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, is also worth noting. The just ended presidential election maintained the basic pattern of a Blue Camp dominated northern Taiwan, and a Green Camp dominated southern Taiwan. But the key to Ma Ying-jeou's victory over Tsai Ing-wen is that he won big in the north, but only lost small in the south. Tsai was weak in the north. Yet she only managed to eke out a 30% share of the vote. By contrast, despite the fact that Ma was relatively weak in Kaohsiung and Pingtung, he nevertheless managed to garner 40% of the vote. The gap between the Two Yings in the south was much less than it was during the Blue vs. Green showdown in 2004.

How should one interpret these figures? The wrong interpretation could have fatal consequences for the future of the political parties. For example, the Green Camp could attribute its defeat to the sudden emergence of the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which received 9% of the political party vote. The DPP, by comparison, did not fare nearly so well. It could attribute this to Tsai Ing-wen's failure to adopt a hardline Taiwan independence stance, the way Chen Shui-bian and the DPP did during past elections. It could say this is why it failed to maximize its advantage in the south. But if the DPP interprets the election results this way, it won't be able to change its direction on cross-Strait policy over the next four years. It could find itself riven by internal divisions. When such a DPP challenges the KMT four years from now, it will only encounter the same cross-Strait bottleneck as in the past.

The KMT can be optimistic about one thing. Su Chun-ping, Chen Yi-chen, and other KMT "assassins" were sent into enemy territory, to run against an entrenched DPP. They failed to win. Nevertheless they acquitted themselves surprisingly well. This shows that if one offers the right candidates, one can always make inroads, no matter how hostile the territory. More importantly, the Ma administration has attached immense importance to the benefits showered upon the public by its cross-Strait policies. In the beginning, the benefits were not sufficiently widespread. The man in the street remained oblivious to its potential benefits. But the impact of Mainland tourists arriving on Taiwan, and cross-strait economic and trade, are among the reasons the Blue Camp was able to consolidate support in the south.

This should offer great encouragement to President Ma during his second term. This is not just about the Blue Camp winning back the south. This is about having the guts to do the right thing. Doing the right thing has the potential to win over even the most hostile voters one day. This is the real significance of President Ma's 52% election victory.

做對的事 終能化解敵意贏得支持
2012-01-16中國時報

任何一場總統連任戰,都是對現任者的公投。總統馬英九這次連任戰打得辛苦,但最後仍能拿下五成二的選票,顯示過半的選民,不願意冒險讓兩岸現狀翻盤,他們相信,如果再給馬英九四年機會,台灣有機會在目前的兩岸現狀下,更進一步繁榮發展。

何謂兩岸現狀?現狀其實是流動的,台灣當前的兩岸情勢,別說是有別於二○○四年的劍拔弩張,和二○○八年馬英九當選前的停滯狀態,也有所不同;執政者的一個大優勢是,可以界定、甚至改變現狀。確實,馬政府四年來透過諸多兩岸政策,改變了兩岸現狀,這包括恢復斷航六十年的兩岸直航,以及在兩岸簽定十六項協議之後的司法互助、罪犯遣返、金融合作,還有ECFA簽定後,大陸在關稅方面的諸多讓利等。

這可以解釋,為何在這次大選,會史無前例、有那麼多企業家站出來挺九二共識,因為他們在這個新現狀中看到利基,但這並不是如民進黨所說,是馬政府釋放給「有錢人」的利多而已,正如選前一天站出來的宏達電董事長王雪紅所說的,企業需要一個安定的環境才能永續經營,台灣並不是一個階級對立的社會,企業能永續經營,全民才能獲利;這次過半選民的支持,顯示多數人對和平紅利是有所期待的。

大選時幾次政見發表會,民進黨總統候選人蔡英文都不忘批評馬英九,靠「數字治國」,無法了解庶民的感受;但是,從選舉的結果顯示,有些數字確實會打動人心,這些數字當然不只是八、九個百分點的經濟成長率,人民更有實際感受的可能是,馬政府任內增加了七十個免簽國,這不只包括日本、英國、歐盟等重要國家,連和台灣關係最緊密的美國,也在去年底將台灣列入免簽候選國;同樣的,在兩岸簽了ECFA之後,日本、紐西蘭和台灣開始談投資保障合作,選民也開始期待,台灣參加WTO(世界貿易組織)後仍然無法避免了邊緣化命運,但洽簽兩岸ECFA之後,也許可開出一條機會之路。

可以說,所謂的兩岸和平紅利,指的不只是經濟利益,同時也是台灣的國際空間;而維繫這一切的支柱,就是九二共識。蔡英文將這次大選的主軸打成「到底有沒有九二共識」的考古學,但她更該面對的,是「該不該有九二共識」,或是「九二共識對台灣的效用」。正如美國在台協會台北辦事處前處長包道格接受訪問時所說,九二共識是一個非常具有創意的模式,中間容許模糊存在,讓各自的主權能維持,但實務議題又能夠得到解決;包道格是旁觀者清的說出了九二共識的效能。

民進黨不願接受九二共識;也許,民進黨從民調數字發現,這幾年來,民眾的台灣認同達到新高,但他們忘了另一個數字,民間對兩岸和平的期待也是新高;前總統李登輝選前親筆在各報登廣告支持蔡英文,他呼籲的可不是「勇敢的台灣人」,要站出來和中國對抗!連李登輝都只能強調,歷史證明不論誰當選,中國都必須與台灣交往,兩岸關係不會劇烈變動。

蔡英文曾經批評,馬英九的「不統、不獨、不武」是自相矛盾,但是,兩岸要同時進行主權爭議及和平協商,又何嘗不是矛盾,九二共識的最大意義在於,它化解了兩難之局,不但擱置主權爭議,也讓兩岸可以順利展開協商。

正因為民進黨及蔡英文不願接受九二共識,卻又提不出一套解決兩岸歧見的有效方法,反而提出內容空泛的「台灣共識」,徒增外界疑慮,因此總統選戰到最後關頭,兩岸再度成為民進黨的「罩門」。

選票流向也證明了這一點,執政的馬英九得票流失,但是失望的中間選民並未全盤流向蔡英文,蔡英文只拿到比民進黨基本盤好一點的四成五,也不如去年五都選舉時的四成九佳績;中央與地方選舉的差別在那裡?選民很清楚,總統大選攸關兩岸政策,蔡英文選前說不清兩岸政策,選民怎敢將國家託付給她,讓兩岸及台灣的未來,都進入不確定的狀態。

另一個和兩岸經貿交流有關的選舉數字,也值得觀察。這次的總統大選,還是維持了北藍南綠的基本結構,但是馬英九贏蔡英文的一個關鍵在於,他在北部維持大勝,在南部卻只是小輸,蔡在比較弱的北部,都只拿到三成多的選票;相對的,馬卻能在比較弱的大高雄及屏東都維持了四成的得票率,雙英在南部的差距遠遠小於二○○四年時的藍綠對決。

如何解讀這樣的數字?一個錯誤的解讀,對政黨發展可能有致命的後果。例如,綠營可能鑑於台聯異軍突起、拿到百分之九的政黨票,相對於民進黨不夠好看的成績,解讀這是因為蔡英文及民進黨不像陳水扁當年挑起的極獨路線,因此無法將南部選票極大化。如果民進黨如此解讀,則未來四年不但無法在兩岸方向轉型,民進黨內可能還會陷入路線分裂之爭,這樣的民進黨,四年後挑戰國民黨時,只怕會跟這次的民進黨碰到一樣的兩岸瓶頸。

國民黨可以樂觀的是,這次派到艱困選區的刺客蘇俊賓、陳以真等人,最後雖然沒有當選,但是選舉結果卻都不錯,可見選對人,再怎樣的鐵票區,都有機會鬆動;更重要的是政策,馬政府重視的兩岸利多,一開始並未擴散,升斗小民似乎無感,但藍營這次能穩住南部,陸客來台及兩岸經貿的效應,卻也是值得觀察的重點。

對連任的馬總統而言,這應該是最大的鼓舞。這不只是藍營是否能贏回南部的問題,更重要的是,只要是勇於執行對的政策,即使是最有敵意的選民,有一天也可能認同你,這才是五成二選票背後最大的意義。

Thursday, January 12, 2012

1992 Consensus: Master Switch for Cross-Strait Relations

1992 Consensus: Master Switch for Cross-Strait Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 13, 2011

Summary: The election is closely fought, Tomorrow the polls will open. Some voters will vote to keep the master switch on. Other voters will vote to turn it off. Nevertheless we would like to make this solemn 11th hour appeal, Tomorrow, no matter who is elected, he or she must not turn the 1992 Consensus master switch off. Some voters may not realize what is at stake, But if those in power allow the lights to go out, if they allow the cross-Strait meeting hall to descend into darkness, political and economic disaster will befall the nation, within and without.

Full Text Below:

Some say the 1992 Consensus is the master switch for cross-Strait relations.

Tomorrow is election day. The people will decide whether this master switch remains on, or is turned off.

The survival and prosperity of the Republic of China involves two fundamental issues. The first is allegiance to the nation and its constitution. The second is cross-Strait relations.

Consider the 1992 Consensus from the perspective of allegiance to the nation and its constitution. The 1992 Consensus upholds the Republic of China Constitution. Within, it reaffirms allegiance to the Republic of China. Without, it upholds the Republic of China's legal system. In other words, it rejects Taiwan independence.

Now consider the 1992 Consensus from the perspective of cross-Strait relations, or "one China, different interpretations." As mentioned earlier, the 1992 Consensus upholds the Republic of China Constitution, both internally and externally. The same is true for cross-Strait relations. The expression "one China, different interpretations," merely means that "[There is one China, but] we consider one China to be the Republic of China, while you consider one China to be the People's Republic of China." What the Ma administration calls "one China, different interpretations," is what Beijing calls "seeking common ground while shelving differences."

Repudiating the 1992 Consensus within amounts to repudiating the Constitution of the Republic of China. Repudiating the 1992 Consensus without amounts to turning one's back on the Republic of China's system of law. Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus amounts to abandoning our "one China, different interpretations" position on cross-Strait relations.

Some critics say the 1992 Consensus is the master switch for cross-Strait relations. Think of cross-Strait relations as a magnificent meeting hall. The lights are blazing. Row upon row of crystal chandeliers send out dazzling rays of light. These points of light include ECFA, Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, direct airline flights, the diplomatic truce, visa-free treatment from 124 nations, over 25 billion dollars in pineapple cake sales, a mania for milkfish, the Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement, the Taiwan-Hong Kong Air Pact, and the right to host the World University Games. These dazzling light fixtures have filled the hall with light.

This glowing scene is all made possible by the 1992 Consensus, by one China, different interpretations. The 1992 Consensus is the master switch for every one of these light fixtures. This is plain for all to see. In May 2008, the 1992 Consensus master switch was turned on. One light fixture after another began giving off light. Yet today, during the current presidential election, the most critical issue, incredibly, is whether to throw this master switch to the off position. The most critical argument, incredibly, is whether these brilliant lights will continue to shine after the master switch has been turned off.

Ma Ying-jeou proposes to keep 1992 Consensus master switch in the on position, so that all the lights continue to shine. He even proposes to increase the number of light sources. Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, insists on turning the 1992 Consensus master switch off, even though she still wants the lights to remain on!

For example, Tsai Ing-wen obstinately refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. But at the same time, she wants to retain ECFA. She wants to turn the master switch off, yet expects the crystal chandeliers to remain on. Anyone in his or her right mind knows this is impossible.

Today is the eve of election day. Allow us to once again invoke Chiang Pai-li's sage observation: Taiwan's political path must be congruent with its economic path. If the two remain congruent, we will remain strong. If the two become less congruent, we will become weak. If the two become totally incongruent, we will wither and die. The 1992 Consensus and one China, different interpretations equals congruency, Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus and Taiwan independence equals total incongruency.

The 1992 Consensus is not merely "cross-Strait policy." It is a comprehensive political and economic strategy for the nation's future. Therefore when evaluating the 1992 Consensus, we must look at more than ECFA and other economic and trade benefits. We must look at the cross-Strait peace dividend and the friendly environment it makes possible. We must look at the synergy created by the larger political and economic picture, within and witihout. The 1992 Consensus made possible the diplomatic truce. It benefited the nation as a whole. The 1992 Consensus led to improved Taipei/Washington/Beijing relations. The 1992 Consensus led to improved Taipei/Tokyo/Beijing relations. The 1992 Consensus led to the Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement. The 1992 Consensus led to visa-free treatment from 124 nations.

The 1992 Consensus is not merely the master switch for cross-Strait relations. The quality of cross-Strait relations affects the larger political and economic picture, within and without, for better or worse. The 1992 Consensus is also a catalyst for the nation's overall political and economic well-being, within and without.

If we fail to get a handle on cross-Strait relations, we cannot get a handle on the larger political and economic situation, within and without. Still less can we put our nation's affairs in order. Therefore flipping off the 1992 Consensus master switch off will have catastrophic consequences for the nation's overall political and economic well-being, within and without, The impact will hardly be limited to cross-Strait relations.

The upcoming presidential election is a choice between supporting the 1992 Consensus and opposing the 1992 Consensus. The ballots cast will determine whether the 1992 Consensus master switch remains on, or gets turned off. The voters can choose to keep it in the on position, They can also choose to switch it off.

The election is closely fought, Tomorrow the polls will open. Some voters will vote to keep the master switch on. Other voters will vote to turn it off. Nevertheless we would like to make this solemn 11th hour appeal, Tomorrow, no matter who is elected, he or she must not turn the 1992 Consensus master switch off.

Some voters may not realize what is at stake, But if those in power allow the lights to go out, if they allow the cross-Strait meeting hall to descend into darkness, political and economic disaster will befall the nation, within and without.

ON?OFF?九二共識是兩岸關係總開關 【聯合報╱社論】 2012.01.13

有人說,「九二共識」是兩岸關係的總開關。

明天投票,全民將決定這個總開關的ON或OFF!

中華民國的生存發展,有兩大基本課題:一、國憲認同;二、兩岸關係。

九二共識,就國憲認同言,就是護持中華民國憲法,對內維持中華民國的認同,對外持守中華民國的法統;也就是不贊同台獨路線。

九二共識,對兩岸關係言,即是「一中各表」。如前所述,對內對外皆持守中華民國憲法,因此在兩岸關係上亦然;所謂「一中各表」,就是「我是中華民國/你是中華人民共和國」;馬政府所稱「一中各表」,在北京稱作「求同存異」。

否定九二共識,即是對內否定中華民國的國憲認同,對外背離中華民國的法統,對兩岸否棄「一中各表」的立場表述。

有評論者說:九二共識是兩岸關係的總開關。這個比喻,是將兩岸關係喻為一座華麗的大廳堂;此刻正是華燈初上之際,一盞盞燈具綻放出熠熠光華;這些燈具,如ECFA、陸客來台、直航、外交休兵、一二四國免簽證、鳳梨酥產值逾二五○億、虱目魚狂賣、台日投資協議、台港新航約、取得世界大學運動會主辦權等等,將這一座廳堂映照得光燦奪目。

此一晶瑩璀璨的場景,一切皆因「九二共識/一中各表」而生;亦即,「九二共識」是這所有燈具的總開關。有目共睹,自二○○八年五月「九二共識」這個總開關撥到了ON的位置以後,一盞接一盞的華燈相繼點亮;但是,如今在這次總統大選中,最關鍵的一個爭論卻是:要不要把這個總開關撥至OFF,以驗證這些璀璨的燈具會不會全盤熄滅?

馬英九主張,讓九二共識這個總開關維持在ON,以使所有燈具持續發光,且還可添置更多燈具;蔡英文則主張將九二共識這個總開關撥至OFF,但她似又不想讓那些燈具熄滅。

例如,蔡英文說,她否定九二共識,但她要ECFA的運作延續下去。這樣的思考,就不啻是要OFF掉總開關,卻仍要水晶燈繼續熠熠發光。用膝蓋想,也知這是不可能之事。

投票前夕,我們願再引改寫的蔣百里名句指出:台灣的政治路線必須與經濟路線合轍;兩者相合則強,相離則弱,相背則亡。「九二共識/一中各表」就是相合,「否定九二共識/台獨」就是相離相背。

「九二共識」不只是一個「兩岸政策」;它其實是一個「全方位」的「國家政經大戰略」。因此,評價「九二共識」,不能只見到「ECFA」等經貿交流的利益,而更應看到「九二共識」所創造的兩岸和平紅利及友善環境,對國家內外整體政經情勢所發生的綜合效益(synergy)。例如,因「九二共識」的外交休兵,對國家所產生的利益;又如,因「九二共識」而使台美中、台日中關係的巨幅改善;再如,因「九二共識」而帶來台日投資協議及一二四國免簽證等外交利益……。

所以,九二共識不但是兩岸關係的總開關;由於兩岸關係的品質必會牽動國家內外整體政經情勢的吉凶利害,所以「九二共識」其實也可謂是國家整體內外政經情勢的變壓器。

兩岸關係搞不定,國家整體內外政經情勢就無法穩定,更不易理順;所以,OFF了九二共識,必使國家整體內外政經情勢皆受重大衝擊,其影響豈止在兩岸而已。

此次總統大選的本質,即是在「支持九二共識」及「否定九二共識」之間的抉擇。每一張選票皆可觸及「九二共識」這個總開關,選民可以讓它仍然維持在ON的位置,也可撳下OFF。

選情緊繃,明天開票,有些選民仍主張ON,但也有些選民會按OFF。但是,我們願在這最後關頭仍要鄭重呼籲,明天無論是誰當選,都不可對「九二共識」這個總開關按下OFF之鍵。

有些選民或許不知其中利害,但主政者若面對一個燈熄光滅、烏漆墨黑的兩岸廳堂,則國家整體內外的政經情勢必不堪設想。

Vote For Someone Who Will Do You Some Good

Vote For Someone Who Will Do You Some Good
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 12, 2011

Summary: DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Her election would inevitably throw a monkeywrench into cross-Strait relations. The global economic picture for this year is poor. Add to this a deadlock in cross-Strait relations, and the "peace dividend" would evaporate. The economy would suffer. Everyone would suffer. Therefore, do not say "It won't affect me." Listen to Wang Wen-yuan, president of Formosa Plastics, who said, "Vote for someone who will do you some good!"

Full Text Below:

We are about to cast our ballots in Saturday's general election. Some say it will make no difference who is elected; the lives of ordinary citizens will not be affected. But we say the election is not merely a political decision. It is a decision that will decide the future of cross-strait relations, that will impact the domestic economy.

The global economy suffered a downturn this year. Experts at home and abroad agree. The latest shocks originated in Europe. Late last year, nations across Europe administered a number of remedies for the European debt crisis. They increased relief funds to the monetary union. They injected nearly 100 billion Euros into the European Central Bank. They lowered interest rates. They tried a variety of methods. But will these prescriptions remedy the debt crisis in Europe? No one knows. We do know that the European economy is unlikely to perform well this year.

Almost all international institutions forecast either a recession or near zero growth for the EU. This includes even Germany and France, the two largest nations in the Eurozone. Two consecutive quarters of decline are likely. This may lead the economy into a recession. The financial system has been dragged down by the European debt crisis. It must undergo deleveraging. European financial markets must enter a period of lowered expectations. The negative impact of the European debt crisis and economic slowdown has already impacted Taiwan. During the first three quarters of last year, our exports to Europe enjoyed a 12.5% growth rate. Soon afterwards however, it fell. By December last year, it was negative 15.6%.

The economic data for the United States shows improvement. The latest unemployment figures have dropped to 8.5%. The recovery is fragile. It is good news meriting cautious optimism. But the European recession is more severe than expected. Will it frustrate a U.S. recovery? The Mainland economy has slowed significantly. Its estimated growth rate this year is now 8%. Everyone is wondering whether the Mainland will experience a hard or soft landing. If the landing is hard, the global economy could take another downturn.

This year's international economic trends show that Taiwan's economy faces serious challenges. If cross-Strait relations worsen, can Taiwan's economy still withstand the onslaught? People are genuinely worried. Some think they will not be affected. After all, Taiwan's economy survived eight years under Democratic Progressive Party rule. But this ignores the changes that have taken place in the global economy and cross-Strait economic and trade relations over the past several years.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, several emerging nations gained economic strength. The Mainland region of China is the most obvious example. The Mainland has become the world's second largest economy. It has also transformed itself from the world's factory into the world's market. Each year Mainland imports approach 1.7 trillion dollars, rivaling United States imports at 1.9 trillion dollars. Nations and corporations the world over consider the Mainland market a strategic goal.

After the KMT returned to office in 2008, the thaw in cross-Strait relations yielded a "peace dividend." It enabled the Mainland to send large scale procurement groups to Taiwan, to purchase 20 billion U.S. dollars in industrial, agricultural, and fishery products. It enabled 1.7 million tourists to boost Taiwan's economy. The ECFA early harvest list enabled companies on Taiwan to export a variety of products at reduced or even zero tariff rates to the Mainland, enhancing their competitiveness. This year the early harvest list will be expanded. More products from Taiwan will benefit. Over the past three years, Taiwan's economy has benefited from the cross-Strait thaw. These benefits have not been limited to conglomerates and big business. Even those who have not benefited directly, have benefitted indirectly from the general prosperity. Conversely, if cross-Strait relations are undermined, these economic benefits will shrink or disappear altogether. If the economy goes into recession, the general public will suffer as well.

For example, the Mainland would reduce its procurement of flat panels and other tech products. You may not work in the technology industry. But if the technology industry experiences a downturn, companies will be forced to do what they did during the financial crisis. They will institute lay-offs or unpaid leave. The employees affected will be forced to reduce consumption. In which case the restaurant, apparel, and other domestic, consumption-oriented industries will fall victim as well. If the number of Mainland tourists falls, the victims will not be limited to entrepreneurs who invested in the construction of hotels. The hotel workers they employe will also find themselves out of work. Travel industry guides, tour bus drivers, taxi drivers, even operators of tourist spots and night market vendors will fall prey. The lucky ones will earn less. The unlucky ones will find themselves on the street. When these people find themselves unemployed or earning less. they will consume less, Soon another group of people wiil suffer. This is how the economic knock-on effect works.

The numbers tell us that during an economic recession, the first victims, the ones that suffer the most, are not the wealthy, but the middle and lower class. They are the ones least able to survive the recession. During the 2001 and 2009 recessions, the gap between the rich and the poor, prior to government transfer payments, soared sharply.

DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Her election would inevitably throw a monkeywrench into cross-Strait relations. The global economic picture for this year is poor. Add to this a deadlock in cross-Strait relations, and the "peace dividend" would evaporate. The economy would suffer. Everyone would suffer. Therefore, do not say "It won't affect me." Listen to Wang Wen-yuan, president of Formosa Plastics, who said, "Vote for someone who will do you some good!"

好好選一個「對自己好」的對象
2012-01-12中國時報

本周六大選即將投票,或許仍有不少人說,誰當選還是一樣,對升斗小民不會有影響。不過,我們要說的是:選舉結果不但是政治上的決策,也會影響著兩岸關係走勢,更會衝擊著國內經濟。

今年全球經濟景氣低迷、震盪,幾乎已是國內外專家的共識了,而其震源是來自歐洲。去年下半年,雖然歐洲國家已針對歐債危機,開出各種「藥方」─從增加紓困基金到財政聯盟、再到近五千億歐元的注資歐洲銀行、調降利息,各種手法紛紛出籠。這些藥方是否能讓歐洲脫離歐債危機,猶在未知之數,但歐洲經濟今年難有表現,已是既定事實。

國際機構對歐盟的經濟預測,幾乎都是衰退或接近零成長,包括德、法兩個歐元區主要國家,很可能出現連續兩季的衰退,使經濟步入衰退。而金融體系因歐債拖累必須進行的去槓桿化過程,又讓歐洲金融市場進入縮收期。其實,歐債危機及其引發的歐洲經濟走緩的負面影響,已明顯反映在台灣身上。去年一到三季,我國對歐洲出口仍有十二.五%的成長率,但之後就日漸低迷;去年十二月已變成衰退十五.六%。

至於美國,經濟數據雖然好轉,最新的失業率已降到八.五%,進入「脆弱的復甦」,算是值得「審慎樂觀」的好消息;惟歐洲衰退如較預期嚴重,是否會讓美國的復甦受挫,仍須留意。大陸則經濟明顯減速,今年預估成長率大概降到八%;各界關注大陸會是「硬著陸」或「軟著陸」,如是硬著陸,全球經濟恐怕又將進入另一波下修。

從今年國際經濟大勢分析即可看出,今年台灣的經濟的確面臨嚴峻的挑戰。如果此時再加上兩岸關係生變的因素,台灣經濟是否能承受,實在讓人憂心。或許有人認為:不會影響到自己;而且過去民進黨執政八年,台灣經濟還是挺過來了。不過,我們要說的是:這種看法完全無視近幾年全球經濟與兩岸經貿關係的變化。

二○○八年金融海嘯之後,新興國家經濟實力抬頭,其中又以大陸最明顯。大陸不僅成為全球第二大經濟體,更由世界工廠轉型為世界市場;每年大陸進口金額一.七兆美元,已接近美國的一.九兆美元了。世界各國、全球各大企業,莫不視搶奪大陸市場為戰略目標。

二○○八年國民黨執政後,兩岸關係和緩帶來的「和平紅利」,讓大陸每年組成龐大的採購團,來台採購二百億美元包括工業產品與農漁業產品;一年一百七十萬的觀光客,提振了台灣的經濟;ECFA的早收清單,讓台灣各種產品能以更低或零關稅進入大陸市場,提升台灣商品的競爭力,今年並將續談擴大早收清單,讓更多台灣產品早日享受優惠。我們可以說,這三年台灣的經濟的確受惠於兩岸和緩帶來的利益,而且這個利益並非獨厚財團或大企業。民眾即使並非直接受惠,也因經濟表現佳而間接受惠─但反之亦是,如果兩岸關係生變,原本的經濟利益都將大幅減少或甚至完全消失,經濟走弱衰退,屆時也是民眾普遍都會受害。

例如,大陸減少採購台灣面板及各種科技產品,也許,你不在科技產業中;但科技產業下滑,企業只能如金融海嘯時一樣的裁員或大放無薪假,這些員工必然減少消費,那麼餐廳、服飾及其它內需消費產業,也要跟著受害。大陸觀光客減少,受害者不是那些這幾年投資興建旅館的企業家而已,他們雇用的員工也可能因而失業;旅行業的導遊、司機,甚至各觀光區、夜市的攤販、業者,難道不會跟著受害;輕者收入減少,重者失業。當有一批人失業或收入減少時,他們的消費必然減少,接著就再有另外一批人受害。經濟的連鎖效應就是這樣來的。

而且,從統計數據上可以看出,當經濟衰退時,第一個受害者─或是說受害最嚴重者,不是富人,而是中低收入者,他們是最無能力抗拒經濟衰退者。民國九十年及九十八年兩次經濟衰退,當年的政府移轉收支前的貧富差距倍數,立刻大幅飆高,即為明證。

民進黨總統候選人蔡英文不願承認「九二共識」,如當選必然導致兩岸關係生變。在今年全球經濟大環境已不佳下,如再加上兩岸關係再進入僵局,原有的「和平紅利」將消失,經濟必然大受衝擊,每個人都可能因而受害。所以,不要再說「不會影響我」。聽聽台塑總裁王文淵說的,選一個「對自己好」的對象吧!

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

Do Voters Really Want a Repeat of Minority Government?

Do Voters Really Want a Repeat of Minority Government?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 11, 2011

Summary: DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen is a master at euphemisms. During the last presidential policy presentation, she suddenly proposed "negotiation style democracy." She touted the "spirit of a grand coalition." Essentially, she led voters concerned about the election around by the nose. Actually, Tsai Ing-wen had another agenda altogether. She and the DPP have never been able to calm public fears about one thing -- minority government. Even assuming she is elected president, the Democratic Progressive Party has no hope of winning a majority in the legislature. The Republic of China would once again have to endure minority government.

Full Text Below:

DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen is a master at euphemisms. During the last presidential policy presentation, she suddenly proposed "negotiation style democracy." She touted the "spirit of a grand coalition." Essentially, she led voters concerned about the election around by the nose. Actually, Tsai Ing-wen had another agenda altogether. She and the DPP have never been able to calm public fears about one thing -- minority government. Even assuming she is elected president, the Democratic Progressive Party has no hope of winning a majority in the legislature. The Republic of China would once again have to endure minority government.

To say that Tsai Ing-wen plays word games is not to single her out for criticism. Democracy has been around for two centuries. This includes the concept of a "grand coalition." They have all been implemented before. They all have precedents. They should not be invoked nilly-willy. They should not be invoked in order to mislead the public.

A so-called "grand coalition" usually refers to a coalition between the largest and second largest party in the legislature. Such a grand coalition commands far more than a simple majority. Often it commands a two-thirds super majority. This is not a normal situation. Why? Because the second largest party is also the main opposition party. It normally hopes the ruling party will make a mistake, enabling it to come to power the next time around. The only time it is willing to join the ruling administration, is when the nation in distress, when both the government and the opposition must deal with a national crisis. The most famous example of this occurred during World War II. The British Conservative Party held a majority. Nevertheless the Labor Party and the Liberal Party were willing to form a wartime cabinet. The same was true during the 1966 Soviet invasion of Prague. In response to the crisis, Germany's two largest political parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party, also established a coalition government.

The most recent example of a grand coalition in one of the major democracies, was Germany during the 2005 general election. Public opinion was divided. Neither the Christian Democratic Union nor the Social Democratic Party were able to command an absolute majority. Negotiations between the two parties led to a coalition government. Merkel's Christian Democratic Union held one more seat. This made her the Chancellor. But the Social Democrats obtained most of the cabinet posts. including those pertaining to diplomatic, financial, judicial, and other important matters. More importantly, any cabinet policies required a bipartisan consensus.

Contrast the theory and reality of grand coalitions outlined above, with Tsai Ing-wen's proposed coalition government. Tsai's proposal amounts to castles in the air. In order to form a grand coalition, the Democratic Progressive Party's coalition partners would not be the TSU, PFP, and other small parties. It would be the KMT. But why wouldn't the KMT follow the example set by the DPP? Why wouldn't it, as the largest opposition party, simply sit tight? Why wouldn't it avoid blame for the ruling DPP government's mistakes? This would enable it to return to power in the future. Why should it have to clean up the mess left by a coalition government?

Furthermore, a grand coalition government requires party to party negotiations for cabinet appointments and policy consultations. Recall the first time the Democratic Progressive Party assumed power. Chen Shui-bian shouted empty platitudes about an "all peoples government." But when the KMT called for party approval of cabinet appointments and dismissals, the DPP immediately accused the KMT of "trying to hog the entire dish." KMT elder Tang Fei stepped forward to inspire confidence in the fledgling DPP administration. Alone and isolated, he assumed the premiership, He headed a cabinet handpicked by Chen and the DPP. A mere 137 days later, the ruling DPP denounced Tang Fei as a "stumbling block." Given such precedents, who actually believes the DPP would ever grant important positions to other political parties?

The reality Tsai Ing-wen failed to mention, is that even if she is elected president, the DPP is unlikely to win a legislative majority. The nation would then revisit the chaos of 2000. The question now is not whether to form a coalition government. The question now is whether to have the majority party form a cabinet.

If Tsai Ing-wen were to ask former President Lee Teng-hui, the answer would be very clear. In 1997, following amendments to the constitution, the Republic of China's central government was leaning toward a dual leadership system, in the event the president fails to win a legislative majority. The amendments abolished the legislature's right to approve the president's choice of premier. But if the premier lacks support from a majority in the legislature, he will be paralyzed. Neither the Presidential Office nor the Executive Yuan would be able to advance policy. But this is a relatively minor matter. Other matters are more serious. An opposition-dominated legislature commands an advantage when passing legislation. This could lead to a tug of war in the executive branch. It could lead to a contest to see who can offer the most advantages. The government would be unable to implement policy. It would be unable to plan for the future.

The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years, It endured the fate of a minority government. Yet it refused to do things the proper way, It refused to hold party to party negotiations with the majority party in the legislature to reach negotiated solutions. Instead, it repeatedly concocted such ersatz entities as the "National Security Alliance," whose sole purpose was to induce individual KMT legislators to defect. The entire process was an abomination. The ruling DPP attempted to buy opposition legislators outright with cash. It used large bank loans as quid pro quo. It offered special advantages to businesses owned by individual legislators. Scandal after scandal erupted. This undermined the administration of government. It also undermined public confidence in the government.

The general election does more than elect a president. It also determines the composition of the legislature, and the configuration of the Central Government. Every presidential candidate has promised voters the moon. But can they actually deliver? The key is the configuration of the Central Government. The problem with Tsai Ing-wen is that she refuses to acknowledge the possibility of minority government. She refuses to follow the example set by President Ma. She should promise that if the DPP fails to win a legislative majority, it will form a cabinet with the opposition KMT. Instead, she has trotted out her utterly irrelevant "grand coalition government" to confuse the public.

This, minority government, is the truth that Tsai Ing-wen is afraid to face. Do Republic of China voters on really wish to relive the chaos of minority government?

選民還要重蹈少數政府困境?
2012-01-11中國時報

民進黨總統候選人蔡英文是玩弄名詞的高手,她在最後一場政見發表會,一下子丟出「協商式民主」、然後又是「大聯合政府精神」,讓關心選舉的選民跟著團團轉;其實,蔡英文意在言外、無法化解民眾疑慮的只有一件事,那就是即使她當選總統,民進黨無望在國會取得過半多數,台灣又將重蹈少數政府的困境。

說蔡英文玩弄名詞,並沒有刻意苛責她,畢竟,人類二百多年的民主運動史,包括「大聯合政府」這樣的概念,確實都曾被實踐過,都有確定的指涉,不宜濫用、刻意誤導。

所謂「大聯合政府」,通常指的是第一、二大黨的聯合,席次遠超過執政所需的半數,有時甚至超過三分之二;這是違反常態的聯合形態,因為,作為第二大黨的主要在野黨,都在等著執政黨犯錯,下次才可能執政,他們願意加入執政團隊,通常是因為國家處於緊急危難,朝野必須共赴國難;最著稱的例子就是第二次世界大戰期間,英國保守黨雖擁有多數席位,卻還是和工黨、自由黨組成戰時內閣;同樣的,一九六六年為了因應蘇聯入侵布拉格危機,德國的兩個主要政黨、基民黨及社民黨也合組大聯合政府。

主要民主國家最近一次的大聯合政府,是德國二○○五年大選,由於民意分歧,基民黨及社民黨兩黨都無法單獨過半,兩黨談判籌組大聯合政府,雖由多一席的基民黨梅克爾出任總理,但是社民黨取得多數席次,而且是外交、財政、司法等重要職務;更重要的是,內閣任何施政,都必須取得兩黨共識。

相較這些大聯合政府的理論及現實,蔡英文提出大聯合政府,可以說全在空中樓閣的階段。首先,若要籌組大聯合政府,民進黨在國會要聯合的對象不是台聯、親民黨等小黨,而必須是國民黨;但是,就國民黨而言,何不學過去的民進黨,穩坐最大在野黨的地位,不必承擔施政責任,將來還有重返執政的機會,何必去淌聯合政府的爛攤子?

其次,大聯合政府必然要透過黨對黨談判,進行職務分配、政策協商;觀諸民進黨首次執政前例,陳水扁當時喊出空泛的「全民政府」,國民黨要求黨進黨出,立即就遭致「全碗端去」的攻擊;當年的唐飛,以國民黨老臣身分出面為民進黨穩住政局,孤家寡人出任閣揆,幾乎由扁及民進黨決定了所有的閣員,但是只有一百三十七天,唐飛就成為民進黨施政的石頭;以這樣的前例,民進黨真的願意「施捨」重要職位給其他政黨嗎?

事實上,蔡英文沒有說出的真相是,她即使當選總統,民進黨可能無法取得國會多數,重蹈兩千年的亂局,這時的問題不在是否籌組聯合內閣,而在於是否由多數黨組閣。

蔡英文如果問問前總統李登輝,應該很清楚,一九九七年修憲後,台灣中央政府體制傾向雙首長制;一旦總統無法取得國會多數,即使修憲已取消國會的閣揆同意權,但是閣揆若不能得到國會多數支持,可說是寸步難行;所有的政策都出不了總統府或行政院,還算事小;更嚴重的是,屆時在野黨主控的國會,握有立法權的優勢,可能和行政部門在政策上較勁,競相釋出利多,國家施政必然因此割離破碎,不可能有前瞻性規畫。

民進黨過去執政八年,深受少數政府之苦。但是他們不願意採取正規的方式,與當時的國會多數黨,進行黨對黨協商談判解決;而是一再以籌組「國安聯盟」之名,事實上卻是對個別國民黨立委拉夫、進行招降納叛;其間過程可說是不堪聞問,有直接用錢收買的,有用巨額銀行貸款交換的,或是對立委個人企業直接給好處的。這些隔一段時間就爆出的醜聞,不但衝擊政府運作,也重挫人民對政府的信任感。

這一次的大選,不只要選出總統,也會決定國會的組成及中央政府的型態;每位總統候選人都對未來做出包山包海的承諾,但能不能真的落實,關鍵在於未來的中央政府型態。蔡英文的問題在於,她不肯誠實面對將來少數政府的可能性,不願效法馬總統宣示,若未能取得國會多數,將由在野黨組閣,而是拿出不相干的大聯合政府主張來混淆視聽。

這是蔡英文不敢說的少數政府真相,台灣的選民,還要再重蹈一次少數政府的亂局嗎?

Lee Teng-hui Past and Present: Clinging to Tsai Ing-wen, Distancing Himself from Chang Rong-fa

Lee Teng-hui Past and Present:
Clinging to Tsai Ing-wen, Distancing Himself from Chang Rong-fa
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 10, 2011

Summary: Lee Teng-hui has endorsed Tsai Ing-wen. This shows that Tsai Ing-wen remains a captive of the Taiwan independence movement. Tsai Ing-wen has chosen Lee Teng-hui's path. She has repudiated the 1992 Consensus. She has chosen the path of Taiwan independence. Others however, have chosen Chang Rong-fa's path. They have chosen to support the 1992 Consensus. They have chosen to oppose Taiwan independence.

Full Text Below:

Everyone is wondering how Lee Teng-hui will show his support for Tsai Ing-wen this election season. Will he get down on his knees? Will he appear before the public in a wheelchair? Will he weep openly? Will he appear before the public gaunt and unshaven?

Meanwhile, in Taipei, during a KMT led march on Saturday, EVA Air Chairman Cheng Kuang-yuan made his way through a sea of red, white, and blue Republic of China flags, followed by a dozen or so people holding high Evergreen company banners.

Evergreen CEO Chang Rong-fa, once a staunch supporter of Lee Teng-hui, issued a statement. He expressed unreserved support for the 1992 Consensus. He said "If following the election the victor insists that there is no 1992 Consensus, Taiwan's economy will be in serious trouble." He added even more bluntly, that the so-called "Taiwan consensus" is merely Taiwan independence under another name. He said Taiwan must not declare independence. If it does, the economy will collapse.

Chang Rong-fa now stands in diametric opposition to Tsai Ing-wen and Lee Teng-hui. When Chang Rong-fa said "If following election the victor insists that there is no 1992 Consensus, Taiwan's economy will be in serious trouble," he was talking to Tsai Ing-wen. Lee Teng-hui is currently sick and bed-ridden, Yet he has repeatedly issued statements maintaining that there was never any 1992 Consensus.

Few people are as outspoken as Chang Rong-fa. He bluntly noted that the so-called "Taiwan consensus" is merely Taiwan independence by another name. Tsai Ing-wen is not about to admit that her "Taiwan consensus" is merely Taiwan independence under another name. She will insist instead that her "Taiwan consensus" is merely "the democratic process" under another name. She will insist instead that eventual reunification or one China, different interpretations are also options. But she will not dare to suggest that the DPP's Taiwan independence party platform, its Resolution for a Normal Nation, one nation on each side, or Taiwan independence, are also options. This reveals her embarrassment. As we all know, Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" has only one purpose -- to enable Taiwan independence advocates to reject the 1992 Consensus. The only purpose of Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" is to provide Taiwan independence advocates with rhetorical cover. Its only purpose is to allow her to avoid directly rejecting the 1992 Consensus. This is a fact that Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP cannot deny.

Chang Rong-fa's criticisms are well warranted. As he astutely noted, Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus because she remains committed to Taiwan independence. But she is afraid to openly acknowledge that she is promoting Taiwan independence. Therefore she is using her "Taiwan consensus" as a smokescreen.

Chang Rong-fa said that "If following the election the victor insists that there is no 1992 Consensus, Taiwan's economy will be in serious trouble." He said that "Taiwan must not seek independence. If it does, the economy will collapse." He was speaking his mind then as well. Most commentators are mealy-mouthed. Chang is markedly different. He punctured Tsai Ing-wen's balloon by pointing out the contradiction of honoring ECFA but simultaneously rejecting the 1992 Consensus.

When Tsai Ing-wen spoke of "Standing behind President Ma are people with money," she was referring to Chang Rong-fa. But Chang Rong-fa is concerned about more than his own businesses. He is concerned about Taiwan as a whole. He said that next to other economies the world over, Taiwan is relatively secure. He emphasized that "A key factor is the Mainland." Only the 1992 Consensus enables Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan and spend money. Only the 1992 consensus enables fruits and vegetables from Taiwan to be exported to the Mainland. In Chang Rong-fa's eyes, the spillover benefits of the ten trillion dollar ECFA production chain, directly or indirectly encompass every industry on Taiwan and all walks of life. So-called "people with money" are definitely not the only ones who benefit. Tsai Ing-wen tried to depict the 1992 Consensus as a "forfeiture of our sovereignty and a humiliation of our nation." She tried to depict it as "sugar-coated poison" or "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan."

If we use Lee Teng-hui as a reference point. Chang Rong-fa has been steadily drifting away from him. The two men are now poles apart. They have totally parted ways. But Tsai remains inextricably linked with Lee Teng-hui. She finds it impossible to shake off Lee Teng-hui. As a result, all she can do is embrace Lee Teng-hui, cling to Lee Teng-hui, and cling to Taiwan independence. What we see before us is Chang Rong-fa standing behind Ma Ying-jeou, and Lee Teng-hui standing behind Tsai Ing-wen.

This tableau is a microcosm of the presidential election. It represents our options in the presidential election. Chang Rong-fa has supported democracy on Taiwan since the "dang wai" era. Later he unreservedly supported Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. No one can accuse him of not "seeing the world through Taiwanese eyes." But the world has changed. Our circumstances have changed. Chang Rong-fa obviously has new opinions about Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. He obviously has new opinions about their policies as well as their character. That is why since 2008 he has been following the same path as Ma Ying-jeou.

Chang Yung-fa advocates adopting a "Taiwan perspective." But he opposes Taiwan independence. As a result, he has parted company with Lee and Chen. As Chang Rong-fa sees it, Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" is merely another euphemism for Taiwan independence.

Chang Rong-fa's perspective is reminiscent of what Chiang Pai-li wrote about a recent editorial. He wrote that Taiwan's political path must be congruent with its economic path. The more one departs from the other, the more swiftly Taiwan will perish.

The 1992 Consensus and one China, different interpretations is just that. It is congruency between Taiwan's political path and its economic path. Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus and advocacy of Taiwan independence, means a lack of congruence between Taiwan's political path and its economic path.

Lee Teng-hui has endorsed Tsai Ing-wen. This shows that Tsai Ing-wen remains a captive of the Taiwan independence movement. Tsai Ing-wen has chosen Lee Teng-hui's path. She has repudiated the 1992 Consensus. She has chosen the path of Taiwan independence. Others however, have chosen Chang Rong-fa's path. They have chosen to support the 1992 Consensus. They have chosen to oppose Taiwan independence.

李登輝今昔:蔡英文緊抱,張榮發遠離
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.01.10

眾人皆在猜測李登輝將在選季最後如何出面挺蔡英文,他會不會下跪?會不會坐輪椅?會不會流淚?會不會面容憔悴、不把鬍渣刮乾淨?

正當此際,在周六的台北遊行中,長榮航空董事長鄭光遠率隊擎著十餘面長榮旗幟,行走在青天白日滿地紅的國旗長河中。

早年力挺李登輝的長榮集團總裁張榮發出面稱,他力挺「九二共識」,「如果有人當選之後說沒有九二共識,台灣的經濟會很悽慘」。他甚至直截了當地說:台灣共識就是台獨;但台灣不可能獨立,否則經濟就會倒。

張榮發站在蔡英文與李登輝的對立面。因為,張榮發所指的「有人如果當選之後說沒有九二共識」,這個「有人」就是指蔡英文;而李登輝抱病臥床,還三番兩次發表聲明稱,沒有九二共識。

很少人能像張榮發這樣心直口快,他直指「台灣共識就是台獨」。蔡英文當然不會承認「台灣共識就是台獨」,她將「台灣共識」說成是一個「民主程序」,還說「終極統一或一中各表也可納入討論」,但她卻不敢提「台獨黨綱、正常國家決議文、一邊一國、台獨也可納入討論」,即可見其欲蓋彌彰的窘態;眾所共見,「台灣共識」是因台獨拒絕接受「九二共識」而發,且想作為台獨抵拒「九二共識」的障眼法或緩衝器,這卻是民進黨及蔡英文所無以否認的。

張榮發的批判有其理路,他是在指出:蔡英文因台獨而否定「九二共識」;卻又不敢直接主張台獨,所以改以「台灣共識」作為煙幕。

張榮發說,「如果說沒有九二共識,台灣的經濟會很悽慘」,又說「台灣不可能獨立,否則經濟就會倒」。這也是心直口快之論,與一般輿論文縐縐的迂迴矯情大異其趣;更是直接點破了蔡英文「反對九二共識/延續ECFA」之類的矛盾論調。

張榮發是蔡英文口中的「站在馬總統背後的有錢人」,但張榮發的關懷絕不只在他的自家產業,而是關切全台灣。他說,相較全球經濟環境,目前台灣算是比較安定,「很重要的原因是大陸」;在九二共識下,陸客才能來台觀光消費,台灣的蔬菜水果才能銷到大陸。也就是說,在張榮發眼中,這個總產值達十兆元的「ECFA產業鏈」的溢出效益,直接或間接地涵蓋了台灣各種行業,各個階層,絕非只對「有錢人」有利,更非蔡英文口中的「喪權辱國」、「糖衣毒藥」或「傾中賣台」。

以李登輝為基準,張榮發與李的距離是漸行漸遠,如今更已是南轅北轍、分道揚鑣;但蔡英文卻與李登輝難分難解,她因根本甩不掉李登輝,所以只能回過頭來抱住李登輝;抱住了李登輝,也就被台獨抱住。眼前的畫面是:站在馬英九背後的是張榮發,而站在蔡英文背後的是李登輝。

此一畫面其實正是此次總統大選的縮影,也正是這次總統大選的抉擇。張榮發自黨外時期即支持台灣民主運動,後來亦力挺李登輝及陳水扁,無人可以否定他的「台灣觀點」;但是,隨著世局及國情的變遷,張榮發顯然對李扁二人的政策及人格皆有新的思考,因此他自二○○八後選擇了馬英九的路線。

張榮發支持「台灣觀點」,但反對「台獨」,所以他向李扁二人揮手告別;在張榮發眼中,蔡英文的「台灣共識」,也只是在玩「台獨」的另一種花樣而已。

張榮發的觀點,與日前社論改用蔣百里的名言所見略同,那就是:台灣的政治路線必須與經濟路線合轍;兩者相合則強,相離則弱,相反則亡。

準此以言,「九二共識/一中各表」,就是政治路線與經濟路線相合;否定九二共識及主張台獨,則是政治路線與經濟路線相離及相背。

李登輝為蔡站台,證實了蔡無力擺脫台獨的挾持。此次大選,蔡英文選擇了李登輝「否定九二共識/挺台獨」的路,但也有人會選擇張榮發「支持九二共識/反台獨」的路吧!

Monday, January 9, 2012

Scrapping the 1992 Consensus Would Harm Everyone on Taiwan

Scrapping the 1992 Consensus Would Harm Everyone on Taiwan
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 9, 2011

Summary: What will the repercussions of the presidential election be in the event one or the other candidate is elected? The answer is crystal clear. If one or the other political party is elected, economic policy, specifically income redistribution, will not undergo any immediate and significant changes. Cross-Strait relations however, will face a major watershed. We will either continue promoting cross-Strait reconciliation and cooperation, as we have for the past several years. Or, we will clash head on with the Mainland and cross-Strait relations will suffer a major setback. Reality is staring us in the face. When voters make their decision, they must not ignore reality. They must not indulge in wishful thinking.

Full Text Below:

What will the repercussions of the presidential election be in the event one or the other candidate is elected? The answer is crystal clear. If one or the other political party is elected, economic policy, specifically income redistribution, will not undergo any immediate and significant changes. Cross-Strait relations however, will face a major watershed. We will either continue promoting cross-Strait reconciliation and cooperation, as we have for the past several years. Or, we will clash head on with the Mainland and cross-Strait relations will suffer a major setback. Reality is staring us in the face. When voters make their decision, they must not ignore reality. They must not indulge in wishful thinking.

Every nation seeks to survive, prosper, and ensure that its citizens are treated with dignity. But merely wishing will not make it so. Every nation must adopt practical policies appropriate to its circumstances. We must understand our own situation before we can adopt the appropriate measures. Only then can we safeguard our nation's interests and promote our nation's prosperity.

President Ma Ying-jeou is seeking reelection. He and DPP presidential challenger Tsai Ing-wen, represent diametrically opposite cross-Strait policy paths. Ma Ying-jeou seeks continued reconciliation, exchanges, and cooperation; predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus and any opposes any changes resulting from its recognition.

The public on Taiwan wants to survive, prosper, and be treated with dignity. This is an aspiration shared by all the people. Increasing national prosperity means their own lives will also get better and better. The public on Taiwan faces a stark reality. In terms of history, culture, geography, economy, trade, non-governmental exchanges, and even sovereignty disputes, Taiwan and the Mainland are inseparable. This was true in the past. This is true in the present. And this will be true in the future. Particularly given the Mainland's growing international political power and economic influence, When Republic of China citizens on Taiwan determine their national destiny, the Mainland will always remain a factor.

Ma Ying-jeou seeks cross-strait reconciliation, based on the 1992 consensus and the ROC Constitution. The two sides may differ in their interpretations of the 1992 Consensus. One side may speak of "one China, different interpretations." The other side may speak of "different interpretations of one China." One side may speak of the Peoples Republic of China. The other side may speak of the Republic of China, But what is truly important, what is truly relevant to people's well-being, is that both sides are willing to reach some sort of consensus. Both sides are willing to allow the other to express its position, Both sides are willing to set aside disputes over sovereignty which cannot be currently resolved, and instead actively promote exchanges to improve relations.

By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen has on the one hand painted a rosy scenario. She has promised that, if elected, she will build a "Taiwan consensus." She has promised to continue holding consultations with the other side. She has promised to continue promoting cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, She has promised to continue improving cross-Strait relations. She has promised to avoid stagnation and backpedaling. On the other hand, Tsai Ing-wen has blasted Ma Ying-jeou for ahdering to the 1992 Consensus and to the other side's one China principle. She says "eventual reunification is the price we will have to pay." Her categorical repudiation of the 1992 Consensus tells us she would pull the basis for cross-Strait reconciliation from under our feet.

What would be the result? The Chen regime sealed Taiwan off from the Mainland for eight years. In the end, just how much did he promote our national interests, enhance our dignity, and bolster our sovereignty? The answer is still fresh in our memories. If Tsai Ing-wen has an alternative better than the 1992 Consensus we would of course welcome it. But so far we do not see how Tsai Ing-wen can abandon the 1992 Consensus and still persuade the Mainland to honor existing efforts at reconcilation.

Cross-Strait policy cannot be limited to building castles in the air, Everyone has pipe dreams, What matters is what is feasible in reality. When the Mainland authorities make decisions, they too must cope with internal pressures. If they mishandle the Taiwan issue, they could go down in infamy. By handling matters in accordance with the 1992 Consensus, the Mainland authorities can at least offer the Mainland public an accounting. But if the foundation for exchanges is demolished, it will undermine existing cooperation. It will mean a serious setback for the doves in the Chinese Communist Party. Achieving smooth cross-Strait relations has not been easy. One can only imagine how far they might be set back.

Recently, many entrepreneurs have expressed support for the 1992 Consensus and for cross-Strait peace, Nevertheless Tsai Ing-wen blasted Ma Ying-jeou, and accused him of chummying up to wealthy conglomerates. This was an attempt to incite class hatred, an attempt to distract the public from its concerns about the potentially catastrophic impact on cross-Strait relations. Entrepreneurs hope that Taiwan can continue to enjoy a peaceful and stable environment. They hope to enjoy greater opportunities for economic prosperity. How are their concerns any different from the general public's?

No one wants to relinquish national sovereignty. This determination is shared by everyone on Taiwan. But national sovereignty and the dignity enjoyed by a nation's citizens depend upon national strength. A weak and isolated nation will find survival and prosperity difficult to maintain, It will find it difficult to be treated with respect in the international community. Those at a disadvantage need greater wisdom, ingenuity, and courage than those in a position of strength. They cannot ignore reality. They cannot act blindly and rashly. The past three and a half years have offered countless opportunities for cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges and business opportunities. The Republic of China has achieved visa free travel status with over 100 different countries. The nation's survival, prosperity, and the dignity of its citizens have all been enhanced. Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy has proven effective and practicable in a real world context. Does Tsai Ing-wen really believe she can win over voters merely by painting the rosy scenarios described above, without bothering to offer a better alternative?

廢棄九二共識 傷害台灣全民
2012-01-09中國時報

這次總統大選的抉擇究竟會帶來什麼影響,已經相當清楚,在經濟政策與所得分配上,不同的政黨執政未必會立即看到明顯的改變,但兩岸關係卻是面對著一個重大的分水嶺。或是繼續近年來和解合作的路線,或是陷入衝擊震盪與倒退。現實擺在眼前,選民在做決定時,不能有無視現實的一廂情願想法。

任何國家都要追求生存、發展與尊嚴。但願望歸願望,任何國家也都要在其所處的環境中操作,選擇適當可行的政策。因此,正確認識自我條件與外在環境,因應現實選擇合適措施,才能有效維護國家利益增進發展。

尋求連任的馬英九總統與民進黨總統候選人蔡英文,恰是代表了兩岸關係兩條方向不同的路線。馬英九提出的,是延續他以「九二共識」為基礎的和解、交流與合作;蔡英文代表的,則是不接受「九二共識」,及任何因之而來的變化。

台灣需要生存、發展與尊嚴,這是所有人共同的願望;大家也都希望,在國家愈來愈繁榮茁壯的同時,自己的生活也能愈來愈好。而台灣面對的現實環境是,無論在歷史、文化、地理、經貿、民間交流乃至主權爭議上,台灣與中國的關係千絲萬縷,過去、現在、未來,都不可能徹底切斷。尤其以中國日益增長的政經力量與國際影響力,台灣在決定國家走向時,都必須考慮並處理中國大陸這個變數。

馬英九以「九二共識」、中華民國憲法為架構,為兩岸和解找到了立足基礎。雖然兩岸對「九二共識」的解讀不同,一邊是「一中各表」一邊是「各表一中原則」,一邊是中華人民共和國一邊是中華民國,但真正重要、並攸關人民福祉的是,雙方願意在一個最起碼的模糊共識下,以容許對方各說各話的態度,放下目前解決不了的主權爭執,轉而積極推動交流改善關係。

相對的,蔡英文一方面畫出願景,表示若當選,會建立台灣共識,持續與對岸協商,讓兩岸經貿等交流持續推展,兩岸關係只會持續前進,不會停滯或倒退;但另一方面,又指責馬英九堅持九二共識是附和對岸的一中原則,將以「終極統一」為代價。這種全盤否定「九二共識」存在的立場,意味著將把現在兩岸和解的重要立足基礎,從我們的腳下抽走。

結果會如何?扁政府八年鎖國,到底增進了哪些國家利益與主權尊嚴,大家記憶猶新。蔡英文如果提得出一個比「九二共識」更好的處理方案,大家當然很歡迎,但是到目前為止,完全看不到廢棄了「九二共識」後,蔡英文有什麼足以說服中國延續現行和解政策的方案或論述。

兩岸政策不能只是空中樓閣,夢想人人會做,重點在於在現實中有效可行。中共當局在決策時,也必須面對自己內部的壓力與角力,如果台灣問題處理失了立場,豈非成了千古罪人?以「九二共識」模式處理,至少中共當局對內部交待得過去。如果毀棄了這個交流基礎,不只勢將衝擊現行各項合作交流,而且讓中共內部和解派受到挫折,好不容易獲致良性發展的兩岸關係,又不知要倒退到什麼地步。

近來許多企業家紛紛表態支持「九二共識」與兩岸和平,蔡英文卻批評為馬英九和大財團在一起,這是藉挑起階級對立掩蓋民間對兩岸衝擊的憂心。企業家希望台灣能繼續在和平穩定的環境下擴大發展機會,其心情與一般民眾有什麼不同?

沒有人願意出讓國家主權,這個骨氣,每個台灣人都有,然而,主權尊嚴是要靠國力支撐的,一個孱弱孤立的國家,生存發展既困難,又難以在國際間受到正視。國家尊嚴固然必須維護,但處於劣勢者,更需要智慧、手腕與勇氣,不能無視現實一味蠻幹。驗諸三年半來兩岸經貿交流的蓬勃商機、台灣在國際社會的參與乃至百國免簽的達成,國家的生存、發展、尊嚴都得到了強化,證明馬英九的兩岸政策是在現實環境中有效可行的。光是描繪空洞願景,卻端不出更好的替代方案,如何說服選民?