Grand Justices must be Defenders of the Republic of China Constitution
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 28, 2007
The Legislative Yuan yesterday exercised its power to approve the president's choices for the Vice President of the Judicial Yuan and eight Grand Justices. Each of the nominees was voted up or down individually, on a "one man, one vote" basis. The result was the Vice President of the Judicial Yuan and four Grand Justices were approved, but four other nominees for Grand Justice were not.
The Council of Grand Justices has 15 members, eight of whose terms overlap the terms of the other seven. Beginning in 2003, eight members began serving four year terms. The other seven began serving eight year terms. When the four year terms of the eight members expire, their replacements will serve eight year terms. Henceforth every four years, half the members (i.e., eight or seven) of the Council of Grand Justices will be replaced. The current personnel replacement is the first of its kind. The system was designed to prevent any single president from nominating the entire Council of Grand Justices. But in fact Chen Shui-bian nominated the first 15 members. And he is now nominating the first eight replacements. Chen Shui-bian is highly controversial. His legitimacy is in serious question. Therefore the nomination and approval process for the Grand Justices, and how they interpret the constitution once they are seated on the bench, will inevitably provoke widespread debate and intense controversy.
The Grand Justices must be Defenders of the Republic of China Constitution. From their lofty perches, the Grand Justices must have a farsighted, visionary understanding of the requirements of Constitutional Republicanism. The Grand Justices must have the moral courage to implement the letter and spirit of the nation's basic law. Otherwise they don't deserve their exalted status. The current Council of Grand Justices has left the public deeply disillusioned. Their interpretations of the constitution reflect surrender to political expedience and obedience to political authority.
Consider the following three interpretations of the constitution: 1. The 319 Truth Commission Case, 2. The National Communications Commission (NCC) Case, and 3. The State Affairs Confidential Expense Case. The 319 Shooting Incident cast serious doubt on the legitimacy of Chen Shui-bian's second term in office. The case was assigned to ordinary law enforcement agencies, including the National Security Bureau, local police, investigators, and prosecutors. Because those suspected of a crime were entrusted to investigate the crime, the public found it impossible to lend any credence to the process. Every day the case remained uninvestigated, was another day Chen Shui-bian remained under suspicion. Obviously this undermined both the legitimacy of his regime and its ability to govern. A special investigative agency established by the Legislature, consisting of both ruling and opposition party members, was the only feasible solution, the only one that stood a chance of gaining the public's trust. But the DPP chose to stonewall, invoking a non-existent and ludicrous "administrative right of resistance." After which it demanded a constitutional interpretation. Grand Justices telephoned legislators attempting to exert undue pressure on them. They even attempted to nullify the constitutionally delegated investigative powers of the Legislature, in order to squelch the Truth Commission. The Grand Justices intended to give Chen Shui-bian a helping hand. In fact they merely guaranteed that Chen Shui-bian would never regain any political legitimacy. That his regime would spin its wheels for the next several years, to the detriment of the nation, and even to the detriment of Chen himself. This is mere one example of the Grand Justices' pusillanimity and myopia under the pressures of realpolitik.
The composition of the NCC is determined differently from other institutions. The reason is governments in recent years have refused to govern in accordance with law. Instead they have manipulated administrative agencies in accordance to their private whims. The opposition parties could no longer allow the Executive Yuan to monopolize the nomination process. They demanded a role for the legislature in determining the composition of the NCC. Given today's political reality, such demands are eminently reasonable. The Executive Yuan, through the Central Election Commission, illegally linked "referenda," more accurately referred to as "plebiscites," with the 2003 presidential election. Yet the Grand Justices turned a blind eye to this unconstitutional behavior. They refused to acknowledge the need for an independent NCC. They hid behind the pretense of "maintaining the separation of powers." They denied the right of the Legislative Yuan to participate in the process. This is how the Grand Justices rationalize their behavior.
The Grand Justices did not prevent the courts from trying suspects in the State Affairs Confidential Expense Case. What the Grand Justices did instead, was invent a "Executive Secrets Privilege," and special evidence and evidentiary procedures, providing Chen Shui-bian with a convenient escape clause. They enabled Chen to use secrecy laws to make all evidence and court records that could convict him unavailable, permanently, in perpetuity, thereby achieving the goal of preventing the case from going to trial. The Grand Justices' "interpretation" of law was tantamount to "making" of law. They were "legislating from the bench." They were willing to be used by Chen Shui-bian. They were eager to be used by Chen Shui-bian. This is a clear illustration of how the Grand Justices' behavior has undermined justice in the State Affairs Confidential Expense Case.
The nominees for the next Council of Grand Justices are mired in controversy. The newly approved Grand Justices will be interpreting the constitution at least until the current president's four years term of office expires. In other words, Grand Justices whom Chen Shui-bian nominated, will interpret the constitution under the next president. The people only can hope that Chen Shui-bian's constitutional abuses will not spread to future Grand Justices, and undermine the future of constitutional government.
大法官應擔當中華民國憲法的守護者
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.28 03:23 am
立法院昨日行使司法院正副院長及八位大法官同意權，全體被提名人均採「一票一人」個別同意，結果正副院長及四位大法官過關，四位大法官被提名人遭到否決。
這是自九十二年起，大法官採十五人之中八人任期與七人任期交錯制以來（即九十二年大法官八人任期四年，七人任期八年，八人屆滿之後亦改為任期八年，使大法官爾後均每四年半數更替），首次換屆。此制設計目的在於避免大法官均由同一總統提名，但首屆十五人以及此次更換的八人，卻均由陳水扁提名，而陳水扁確是爭議極大、統治正當性備受質疑者，因而大法官的提名及同意，乃至釋憲職權之行使，也連帶受到社會輿論頗多訾議。
大法官是中華民國憲法之守護者；站在這樣的高度，大法官對民主憲政秩序自當有高瞻遠矚的見識，亦應有貫徹憲法精神的道德勇氣，否則即不配享有如此崇高的地位和榮耀。然而，在本屆大法官任內發生的許多重大事件中，大法官釋憲的結果，卻常見屈從於政治現實或統治權力，令國人十分失望。
茲舉三件釋憲為例：三一九真調會釋憲案、ＮＣＣ釋憲案，及國務機要費釋憲案。三一九事件是導致陳水扁第二任期統治正當性動搖的重大事件。此一事件竟交由通常的國家機制如警調、國安機關以及檢察官來處理，由於受調查者正是掌握權力者，較有事實上的困難，且難以獲得社會信任。然若此一事件一日不獲徹底調查，陳水扁即一日受到質疑，此必將影響政府的施政能力與統治正當性。因此，由國會主導設置調查機制，朝野黨派均派員參與，正是唯一可行的、能獲得公信力的調查設計。然而，民進黨政府一方面以自創的「行政抵抗權」杯葛，一方面聲請釋憲；結果，大法官不但有人在立法院審議真調會條例時打電話給立委關說，還作出了自行將真調會侷限於「國會調查權」的解釋，扼殺了真調會。大法官這種行為看似幫了陳水扁的大忙，實際上卻是使陳水扁重獲統治正當性的機會也因而喪失，其政權陷於這幾年來的內耗空轉，於國家及於其個人其實均大大不利。這是大法官懦弱短淺，受到政治現實牽制的一例。
ＮＣＣ的組成方式之所以與一般機關均不相同，背景因素是政府近年來不依法行政的事例罄竹難書，對諸多行政系統內的合議機關竟亦任意操控，立法院在野黨派遂要求ＮＣＣ的組成必須由立法院參與，不能同意由行政院一手控制。這樣的訴求，在今日政治情勢下，是有一定道理的。行政院透過中選會操作公投綁大選，就是一例。然而，大法官對這樣的政治現實卻視而不見，亦不能接受ＮＣＣ的特殊性，一味以形式上的權力分立為由，否定立法院參與的正當性。這是大法官所為解釋侷限性的一例。
至於國務機要費的釋憲案，大法官雖然並未阻止審判；但大法官解釋中，創設所謂總統「機密特權」以及特別的取證程序，後來仍被陳水扁「鑽巧門」，企圖用核定絕對機密、永久保密的方式，封鎖全部證據及筆錄，達到阻止審判的目的。近來大法官釋憲習於「造法」，卻因此被陳水扁利用，甚或甘受陳水扁利用，以致間接影響了國務機要費弊案的審判，亦即影響了正義的實現，此案即是鮮明的例證。
如今，下屆大法官在爭議中產生了新的人選。新任的大法官將要擔任釋憲工作，至少到下任總統的四年任期屆滿為止。換言之，將是陳水扁提名的大法官，要在新的總統治下行使釋憲職權。國人只能期望陳水扁毀憲玩法的惡劣風氣，不要感染到未來的大法官，亦不要繼續汙染傷害未來的憲政。
Saturday, September 29, 2007
Thursday, September 27, 2007
How many More Times do We need to Play these Word Games?
How many More Times do We need to Play these Word Games?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 27, 2007
President Chen Shui-bian has modified the wording of the Democratic Progressive Party's "Resolution for a Normal Nation." On September 30, the DPP National Congress will retain Chen's version of the resolution. It will not replace it with Yu's version. In remarkably short order, the DPP has resolved its tempest in a teapot. It now has an officially sanctioned version it can present to the US, to Taiwan independence organizations, and to indicted Chairman Yu Hsi-kuen, who has been forced to resign over the Discretionary Fund case. The DPP may be committed to Taiwan independence, and it may be determined to engage in reckless brinksmanship. But how many such games must it play before it becomes a responsible ruling party?
This is reminiscent of how Chen Shui-bian got rid of the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Chen replaced the language of the resolution with radical Taiwan independence rhetoric. The new wording asserted that Taiwan was already a sovereign and independent country. It asserted that any changes required a plebiscite by the entire population of the country. This time is no different. Internal and external factors, as well as election considerations, have forced pro-independence factions to tone down Yu's version of the Resolution for a Normal Nation. The toned down version remains within the bounds established by the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. It remains within the bounds established by the DPP's document "The Founding of a Republic of Taiwan." Yu Hsi-kuen acquiesced with a smile. His response reflected the Democratic Progressive Party's recognition of reality.
The new version "acknowledges that the name Republic of China is difficult to use in international society." It does not deny that the name of the nation is the Republic of China. It advocates joining international organizations under the name of Taiwan. It advocates "swiftly completing the rectification of names, the authoring of a new new constitution, the holding of a plebiscite, demonstrating that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." It quietly avoids such sensitive topics such as "the rectification of the name of the nation to Taiwan." In the new version, the "rectification of names" is not directly linked to the "change in the name of the nation." Plebiscites are not directly linked to Taiwan independence. Chen Shui-bian is playing word games. He is allowing Taiwan independence zealots to imagine they had gotten what they demanded. But what they got was imaginary.
Are such imaginary victories enough for pro-independence elements? In 1999, the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" softened the rhetoric of its "Taiwan Independence Party Constitution." This allowed the DPP to win the 2000 Presidential Election. This allowed a party that repudiates the existence of the Republic of China to become the ruling party of the Republic of China, under the ageis of the Constitution of the Republic of China. Like it or not, DPP party members cannot deny that they once were, or still are, officials of the Republic of China.
The problem is the DPP is acutely aware of the impact of such variables on electoral success and failure, including changes to their Taiwan independence Party Constitution. What the DPP has never been able to come to grips with is that it is already the ruling party, that it is in charge of the nation, that it has been in power for over seven years. The DPP constantly waffles. It denies the legitimacy of the nation for which it has already officially assumed responsibility. The legitimacy of the Republic of China is treated as a punching bag. Every so often the DPP must give it a punch, usually when an election rolls around. Taiwan, as fate would have it, has no shortage of elections. This idiosyncracy means the ruling DPP government will remain forever subject to political interference.
Following regime change, the DPP, motivated by its anti-nuclear ideology, halted construction on the Number Four Nuclear Plant. This decision, unrelated to the issue of reunification vs. independence, resulted in the DPP getting off to a shaky start. This state of affairs persisted for several years. It was followed by endless "rectification of names" controversies, "authoring of a new constitution" controversies, "changing the name of the nation" controversies. Every controversy shook the market. Domestically, economic development was held hostage. Internationally, diplomatic relations became progressively more difficult. Forget Taipei/Washington relations. Even normal diplomatic relations became increasingly arduous.
Viewed positively, Chen's version of the Resolution for a Normal Nation finally acknowledges the international pressure. Chen mobilized pro-independence organizations to march in favor of the "rectification of names." But he pragmatically limited it to domestic consumption. Take the DPP's campaign theme for 2008 for example. Its "Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name Taiwan" does not involve authoring a new constitution or changing the name of the nation.
Let's not worry about whether such concessions will mollify the US. The question is, will they mollify voters who have already endured over seven years of ideologically motivated DPP misrule? The DPP was founded 21 years ago. It has been in office for over seven years. How many more years will it be before it realizes enough is enough? Confronted with a crisis, the DPP gladly accepted Chen's version of the Resolution for a Normal Nation. This temporarily relieved the election crisis for DPP presidential and vice presidential candidates Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang. But what about after the election? Hsieh and Su are different from Chen. They announced their candidacy after Chen was already in power for over than seven years. They face more serious problems than Chen. If Hsieh and Su are elected, will Taiwan have to endure eight more years of endless amendments to the constitution; of endless threats to author a new constitution, rectify names, and change the name of the nation; of endless controversy and agitation?
Yu's version of the Resolution for a Normal Nation was a "UXB," an unexploded bomb. That Chen and Hsieh joined hands to defeat it is no doubt cause for rejoicing. But how many more UXBs remain? A responsible ruling party, a responsible leader, a political leader preparing to compete for the nation's highest office, really ought to consider the well-being the people. They really shouldn't be wasting time and energy playing meaningless but dangerous word games.
Courtesy the China Times.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.09.27
這種「決議文」的文字震盪遊戲還要玩幾回？
中時社論
不論是對美國交代、對獨派交代、或者對因特別費遭起訴請辭的黨主席游錫？交代，民進黨在陳水扁總統出手整合並調整文字後，確認九三○全代會不再有所謂的「游版正常國家決議文」，取而代之的是「扁版正常國家決議文」，在極短時間中，化解一場民進黨茶壺裡的風暴，問題是，做為一個台獨意識如此堅定，一而再、再而三向統獨紅線挑戰的政黨，還要玩多少次這樣的把戲，才能真正成為負責任的執政黨？
一如當年陳水扁出手調整台灣前途決議文，將激進的台獨主張，以文字微調，承認台灣已是主權獨立國家，所有有關獨立現狀的更動，都須全體住民以公民投票方式決定；這一回又是在內外形勢與選舉考量下，將獨派堅持的「游版決議文」再做文字微調，而調整之後的文字，既未超過台灣前途決議文，更未超過建黨時明確標舉「建立台灣共和國」的黨綱，游錫？最後含笑接受，反應的是民進黨認知現實的基本性格。
在這份新版決議文中，「體認中華民國這個國號已很難在國際社會使用」，但卻未否認中華民國現有國號這個事實；進一步主張以台灣名義加入國際組織，「早日完成台灣正名，制定新憲法，在適當時機舉行公民投票，以彰顯台灣為主權獨立的國家。」但含蓄地化解了「國家（或國號）應正名為台灣」的敏感話題，在上述文字中，正名並未與改國號直接掛鉤、公投並未直接與台獨掛鉤，某種程度可以說，陳水扁又玩了一次文字遊戲，讓所有台獨的想像在此中得到滿足，但所有的想像只能是想像。
這樣的想像對獨派人士是否就足夠了呢？一九九九年，台灣前途決議文緩和了台獨黨綱的激進本質，讓民進黨贏得二千年總統大選，讓一個否定中華民國的政黨，從而成為在中華民國憲法下宣誓就職的政府，不論民進黨人是否歡喜甘願，他們無法否認自己曾經或還是中華民國的政務官。
麻煩的是，民進黨永遠可以敏感的知覺選舉成敗的各種變數，包括他們得微調台獨黨綱；但民進黨卻始終無法調適或相信自己已經是一個執政黨，是統籌國是的政府，執政七年多，民進黨反反覆覆地挑戰他們已經進入的這個國家：中華民國體制的正當性，就像打擺子般，時不時就得來一次，發作時間又經常性地與選舉連結，偏偏台灣就是不缺選舉，這個莫名其妙的特性，讓民進黨政府的政策永遠受到政治因素的嚴重干擾。
政黨輪替之初，民進黨因為廢核的神主牌，硬是停建核四，這個無涉統獨的一項政策作為，已經讓民進黨執政跨出步履蹣跚的第一步，讓接續的幾年始終搖搖擺擺；再加上接下來不斷出現的正名、制憲、改國號等政治爭議，每一次爭議在內就是造成市場震盪，經濟發展始終因此受困；在外就是對外關係愈漸艱難，台美關係不用說了，連正常邦交都愈見費力。
這一次「扁版決議文」出爐，從好的一方面看，是陳水扁終於體會到國際壓力，務實地將概括於台灣正名之下的所有社會動員，調整框限於內部消費之用：就是一個民進黨打二○○八年選戰的主軸吧，這個主軸是以入聯公投為核心，無涉制憲改國號。
這樣的調整，能否說服美國姑且不論，問題是，已經忍受七多年意識形態治國的中間選民能被說服嗎？建黨廿一年、執政七年多的民進黨，還要搞多少年才肯罷休？刻正焦頭爛額拚搏大選的民進黨正副總統參選人謝長廷和蘇貞昌，理應欣然接受「扁版決議文」，為他們化解了暫時的選舉危機，但是，大選之後呢？謝蘇和扁不同的是，他們的參選是在扁執政七年多之後，他們會比扁面對更深一層的問題：謝蘇若當選，台灣社會是否還要再來一趟八年，反反覆覆陷入修制憲正名改國號的爭議與震盪？
扁謝聯手拆解「游版決議文」這個未爆彈，一場風波消弭於無形固然值得慶幸，但更重要的是，台灣的未爆彈到底拆解了沒有？做為負責任的執政黨、負責任的領導人、準備競逐國家大位的政治領袖，真的要為台灣想想，在這些毫無意義卻製造緊張的文字遊戲上，還要虛耗多少時間與精力！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 27, 2007
President Chen Shui-bian has modified the wording of the Democratic Progressive Party's "Resolution for a Normal Nation." On September 30, the DPP National Congress will retain Chen's version of the resolution. It will not replace it with Yu's version. In remarkably short order, the DPP has resolved its tempest in a teapot. It now has an officially sanctioned version it can present to the US, to Taiwan independence organizations, and to indicted Chairman Yu Hsi-kuen, who has been forced to resign over the Discretionary Fund case. The DPP may be committed to Taiwan independence, and it may be determined to engage in reckless brinksmanship. But how many such games must it play before it becomes a responsible ruling party?
This is reminiscent of how Chen Shui-bian got rid of the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Chen replaced the language of the resolution with radical Taiwan independence rhetoric. The new wording asserted that Taiwan was already a sovereign and independent country. It asserted that any changes required a plebiscite by the entire population of the country. This time is no different. Internal and external factors, as well as election considerations, have forced pro-independence factions to tone down Yu's version of the Resolution for a Normal Nation. The toned down version remains within the bounds established by the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. It remains within the bounds established by the DPP's document "The Founding of a Republic of Taiwan." Yu Hsi-kuen acquiesced with a smile. His response reflected the Democratic Progressive Party's recognition of reality.
The new version "acknowledges that the name Republic of China is difficult to use in international society." It does not deny that the name of the nation is the Republic of China. It advocates joining international organizations under the name of Taiwan. It advocates "swiftly completing the rectification of names, the authoring of a new new constitution, the holding of a plebiscite, demonstrating that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." It quietly avoids such sensitive topics such as "the rectification of the name of the nation to Taiwan." In the new version, the "rectification of names" is not directly linked to the "change in the name of the nation." Plebiscites are not directly linked to Taiwan independence. Chen Shui-bian is playing word games. He is allowing Taiwan independence zealots to imagine they had gotten what they demanded. But what they got was imaginary.
Are such imaginary victories enough for pro-independence elements? In 1999, the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" softened the rhetoric of its "Taiwan Independence Party Constitution." This allowed the DPP to win the 2000 Presidential Election. This allowed a party that repudiates the existence of the Republic of China to become the ruling party of the Republic of China, under the ageis of the Constitution of the Republic of China. Like it or not, DPP party members cannot deny that they once were, or still are, officials of the Republic of China.
The problem is the DPP is acutely aware of the impact of such variables on electoral success and failure, including changes to their Taiwan independence Party Constitution. What the DPP has never been able to come to grips with is that it is already the ruling party, that it is in charge of the nation, that it has been in power for over seven years. The DPP constantly waffles. It denies the legitimacy of the nation for which it has already officially assumed responsibility. The legitimacy of the Republic of China is treated as a punching bag. Every so often the DPP must give it a punch, usually when an election rolls around. Taiwan, as fate would have it, has no shortage of elections. This idiosyncracy means the ruling DPP government will remain forever subject to political interference.
Following regime change, the DPP, motivated by its anti-nuclear ideology, halted construction on the Number Four Nuclear Plant. This decision, unrelated to the issue of reunification vs. independence, resulted in the DPP getting off to a shaky start. This state of affairs persisted for several years. It was followed by endless "rectification of names" controversies, "authoring of a new constitution" controversies, "changing the name of the nation" controversies. Every controversy shook the market. Domestically, economic development was held hostage. Internationally, diplomatic relations became progressively more difficult. Forget Taipei/Washington relations. Even normal diplomatic relations became increasingly arduous.
Viewed positively, Chen's version of the Resolution for a Normal Nation finally acknowledges the international pressure. Chen mobilized pro-independence organizations to march in favor of the "rectification of names." But he pragmatically limited it to domestic consumption. Take the DPP's campaign theme for 2008 for example. Its "Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name Taiwan" does not involve authoring a new constitution or changing the name of the nation.
Let's not worry about whether such concessions will mollify the US. The question is, will they mollify voters who have already endured over seven years of ideologically motivated DPP misrule? The DPP was founded 21 years ago. It has been in office for over seven years. How many more years will it be before it realizes enough is enough? Confronted with a crisis, the DPP gladly accepted Chen's version of the Resolution for a Normal Nation. This temporarily relieved the election crisis for DPP presidential and vice presidential candidates Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang. But what about after the election? Hsieh and Su are different from Chen. They announced their candidacy after Chen was already in power for over than seven years. They face more serious problems than Chen. If Hsieh and Su are elected, will Taiwan have to endure eight more years of endless amendments to the constitution; of endless threats to author a new constitution, rectify names, and change the name of the nation; of endless controversy and agitation?
Yu's version of the Resolution for a Normal Nation was a "UXB," an unexploded bomb. That Chen and Hsieh joined hands to defeat it is no doubt cause for rejoicing. But how many more UXBs remain? A responsible ruling party, a responsible leader, a political leader preparing to compete for the nation's highest office, really ought to consider the well-being the people. They really shouldn't be wasting time and energy playing meaningless but dangerous word games.
Courtesy the China Times.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.09.27
這種「決議文」的文字震盪遊戲還要玩幾回？
中時社論
不論是對美國交代、對獨派交代、或者對因特別費遭起訴請辭的黨主席游錫？交代，民進黨在陳水扁總統出手整合並調整文字後，確認九三○全代會不再有所謂的「游版正常國家決議文」，取而代之的是「扁版正常國家決議文」，在極短時間中，化解一場民進黨茶壺裡的風暴，問題是，做為一個台獨意識如此堅定，一而再、再而三向統獨紅線挑戰的政黨，還要玩多少次這樣的把戲，才能真正成為負責任的執政黨？
一如當年陳水扁出手調整台灣前途決議文，將激進的台獨主張，以文字微調，承認台灣已是主權獨立國家，所有有關獨立現狀的更動，都須全體住民以公民投票方式決定；這一回又是在內外形勢與選舉考量下，將獨派堅持的「游版決議文」再做文字微調，而調整之後的文字，既未超過台灣前途決議文，更未超過建黨時明確標舉「建立台灣共和國」的黨綱，游錫？最後含笑接受，反應的是民進黨認知現實的基本性格。
在這份新版決議文中，「體認中華民國這個國號已很難在國際社會使用」，但卻未否認中華民國現有國號這個事實；進一步主張以台灣名義加入國際組織，「早日完成台灣正名，制定新憲法，在適當時機舉行公民投票，以彰顯台灣為主權獨立的國家。」但含蓄地化解了「國家（或國號）應正名為台灣」的敏感話題，在上述文字中，正名並未與改國號直接掛鉤、公投並未直接與台獨掛鉤，某種程度可以說，陳水扁又玩了一次文字遊戲，讓所有台獨的想像在此中得到滿足，但所有的想像只能是想像。
這樣的想像對獨派人士是否就足夠了呢？一九九九年，台灣前途決議文緩和了台獨黨綱的激進本質，讓民進黨贏得二千年總統大選，讓一個否定中華民國的政黨，從而成為在中華民國憲法下宣誓就職的政府，不論民進黨人是否歡喜甘願，他們無法否認自己曾經或還是中華民國的政務官。
麻煩的是，民進黨永遠可以敏感的知覺選舉成敗的各種變數，包括他們得微調台獨黨綱；但民進黨卻始終無法調適或相信自己已經是一個執政黨，是統籌國是的政府，執政七年多，民進黨反反覆覆地挑戰他們已經進入的這個國家：中華民國體制的正當性，就像打擺子般，時不時就得來一次，發作時間又經常性地與選舉連結，偏偏台灣就是不缺選舉，這個莫名其妙的特性，讓民進黨政府的政策永遠受到政治因素的嚴重干擾。
政黨輪替之初，民進黨因為廢核的神主牌，硬是停建核四，這個無涉統獨的一項政策作為，已經讓民進黨執政跨出步履蹣跚的第一步，讓接續的幾年始終搖搖擺擺；再加上接下來不斷出現的正名、制憲、改國號等政治爭議，每一次爭議在內就是造成市場震盪，經濟發展始終因此受困；在外就是對外關係愈漸艱難，台美關係不用說了，連正常邦交都愈見費力。
這一次「扁版決議文」出爐，從好的一方面看，是陳水扁終於體會到國際壓力，務實地將概括於台灣正名之下的所有社會動員，調整框限於內部消費之用：就是一個民進黨打二○○八年選戰的主軸吧，這個主軸是以入聯公投為核心，無涉制憲改國號。
這樣的調整，能否說服美國姑且不論，問題是，已經忍受七多年意識形態治國的中間選民能被說服嗎？建黨廿一年、執政七年多的民進黨，還要搞多少年才肯罷休？刻正焦頭爛額拚搏大選的民進黨正副總統參選人謝長廷和蘇貞昌，理應欣然接受「扁版決議文」，為他們化解了暫時的選舉危機，但是，大選之後呢？謝蘇和扁不同的是，他們的參選是在扁執政七年多之後，他們會比扁面對更深一層的問題：謝蘇若當選，台灣社會是否還要再來一趟八年，反反覆覆陷入修制憲正名改國號的爭議與震盪？
扁謝聯手拆解「游版決議文」這個未爆彈，一場風波消弭於無形固然值得慶幸，但更重要的是，台灣的未爆彈到底拆解了沒有？做為負責任的執政黨、負責任的領導人、準備競逐國家大位的政治領袖，真的要為台灣想想，在這些毫無意義卻製造緊張的文字遊戲上，還要虛耗多少時間與精力！
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
To Win the Center, Pacify the Deep Greens
To Win the Center, Pacify the Deep Greens
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 26, 2007
While Ma Ying-jeou is aggressively courting "native" as well as "nativist" voters, Frank Hsieh is playing the "cross Straits" card. Many of the positions Hsieh has advocated over the past two or three years have disappeared from the Green camp's agenda. These include direct air links and opening the island to mainland capital. Frank Hsieh stressed that he wanted to "do everything in his power to seek dialogue and the negotiations, in order to promote peace in the Taiwan Straits." It is hard to imagine what would have happened if Hsieh had proposed such positions, which amount to heresy with today's Green camp, during the Democratic Progressive Party presidential primaries?
Frank Hsieh is obviously appealing to centrist voters. But many centrist voters probably want to ask Frank Hsieh a simple question: Your position makes sense. But have you explained it to Deep Green True Believers? Have you explained it to those voters who took to the streets demanding a "Plebiscite to Join the UN?" To those pro independence organizations who met Chairman Yu Hsi-kuen at the airport? To those pirate radio stations that denounced the "11 Brigands" and "Zhong Guo Qin?" Do they support direct flights? Do they welcome mainland capital?
Hsieh's problem isn't how to appeal to centrist voters. His problem is how to persuade Deep Green voters, how to obtain their understanding and endorsement. His problem is how to reconcile his cross Straits direct links proposals with Deep Green "nativist" doctrine. His problem is how to prove that his positions are not typical election promises to be forgotten overnight. Hsieh should realize that Ma Ying-jeou can deliver on this promise. But isn't it strange that over the past seven years, Chen Shui-bian couldn't?
Kuomintang spokesperson Su Chun-pin put his finger on the issue: "It is not possible for Frank Hsieh to be a more enthusiastic advocate of a 'new centrist path' today than Chen was seven years ago," What's more, Chen Shui-bian didn't promote his cross Straits policy only seven years ago, during his "new centrist path" phase. He promoted it several years in a row, during New Year's Day addresses, during Lunar New Year's Eve talks, during National Day addresses. But to what result? The closer Chen gets to stepping down, the more he has become a trouble-maker in the eyes of Washington and Beijing, someone who is promoting "unilateral changes to the status quo." This proves that Chen Shui-bian's campaign pledges were mere electioneering, to be forgotten as soon as he attained office. Therefore what reason do centrist voters have to believe that Frank Hsieh will do what A Bian didn't?
True, Frank Hsieh is not Chen Shui-bian. With his "One China Constitution," "reconciliation and coexistence," and "cross Straits direct links," Frank Hsieh has long maintained a safe distance between himself and Chen Shui-bian on cross Straits policy. His path differs in many respects with the orthodox Green path. That is why Frank Hsieh has more maneuvering room than the other Green Princes. The problem is Chen Shui-bian has hijacked the Green camp. He controls the power and influence of its many factions. Not one of them is able to make the slightest progress on cross Straits policy. They have even begun backpedaling. Frank Hsieh has yet to get his own house in order. How can he reconcile his cross Straits direct links proposals with those of Party Chairman Yu, nativist organizations, and pirate radio stations? With the "Plebiscite to Join the UN" President Chen has been advocating? With the aggressive promotion of "Resolution for a Normal Nation?" Many people harbor serious doubts. Hsieh had better convince them first.
To reconcile the differences between his proposals and current reality to the public at large is not going to be easy. Don't forget how Frank Hsieh practiced "reconciliation and coexistence" when he held the position of premier. Nobody doubted Frank Hsieh's sincerity. But Government Information Office Chief Yao Wen-chih single-handedly destroyed any possibility of "reconciliation and coexistence" betwen the government and the public. Yet Hsieh allowed Yao and the GIO to become the focus of Blue vs. Green conflict. Many legislators flying Hsieh's banner do not flinch from the coarsest possible language during factional infighting. It is hard to reconcile such behavior with "reconciliation and coexistence." Based on such experiences, not only must Frank Hsieh prove his sincerity vis a vis his cross Straits direct links proposal. He must also prove his sincerity vis a vis his desire to form a "coalition government" after the election. He can't just talk about it.
Frank Hsieh's situation today is completely different from Chen Shui-bian's situation yesterday, when Chen proposed his "new centrist path" Back then Chen Shui-bian did not have to deal with opposition from Green Princes within the party. Today Frank Hsieh must contend with reactions from the Yu Hsi-kuen faction, which is promoting its "Resolution for a Normal Nation." He also must contend with Chen Shui-bian's "Plebiscite to Join the UN" movement. He must smooth over the reaction from the Yu faction. Otherwise toward the end of September, a newly resigned Yu Hsi-kuen is not about to let matters rest. Hsieh must continue deferring to Chen Shui-bian, who is about to assume control of the party machine. A president who has monopolized the resources of both the party and the government, is also a president who has no desire to become a lame duck before it's time. When the time comes, and Chen Shui-bian insists on promoting his "Plebiscite to Join the UN" that will become Frank Hsieh's campaign theme. So the question is: Will Frank Hsieh, who advocates direct flights and the influx of mainland capital, have any room left to maneuver?
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.09.26
要爭取中間選民，先擺平深綠板塊吧！
中時社論
就在馬英九積極經營本土票源的同時，謝長廷也積極打出了他的「兩岸牌」，許多主張在最近兩、三年的綠營論述中已近乎絕跡，如開放直航、如開放陸資登台等， 謝長廷同時強調他要「盡最大努力尋求對話與談判，以便讓台海和平」。很難想像這種在當前綠營近乎「異端」的論述，如果選在民進黨總統黨內初選階段時提出， 會是個什麼光景？
誰都看得出來，謝長廷此刻的出招，意在召喚中間選民。但多數中間選民或許也會向謝長廷回問一句很簡單的問題：你的主張 確有道理，但請問你與所有深綠支持者都溝通好了嗎？特別是，那些上街相挺「公投入聯」的選民，那些到機場迎接游主席的獨派團體，以及那些曾經用力聲討「十 一寇」、「中國琴」的地下電台等，他們今天都已經口徑一致的支持直航？歡迎陸資？
所以問題的重點也出來了，謝長廷有關兩岸開放論述的著 力點，根本不是要怎麼去向中間選民「訴求」，而是要怎麼去向深綠選民「說服」，取得這些選民的諒解與認同，讓他的兩岸開放論述與深綠的本土論述可以整合， 如此才能證明他的所有這些主張，並不是曇花一現的選舉語言。要知道這一點馬英九是絕對做不到的。但同樣弔詭的是過去七年多，陳水扁也一樣沒做到，不是嗎？
國民黨發言人蘇俊賓的一句話點到了核心：「今天的謝長廷不會比七年前的陳水扁更主張中間路線」；更有甚者，陳水扁有關兩岸開放的論述，並不只在他七年前的 「新中間路線」中揭示過，更在數年中的元旦講話、除夕談話、國慶祝詞等多次重申過。結果呢？越是到任期屆滿前，陳水扁越是將自己變成為美、中眼中意圖「片 面改變現狀」的「麻煩製造者」，證明當年陳水扁的所有政見、承諾與保證，都是用過即丟的選舉語言。那麼有什麼理由要中間選民相信，當年阿扁說到沒做到的， 謝長廷就一定能說到做到！
沒錯，謝長廷不是陳水扁，從「憲法一中」、「和解共生」到「兩岸開放」，謝長廷一路走來的政策路線，與陳水扁 一直維持著安全距離，與綠營的正統路線相較也多了些許異質性，這也是謝長廷相較於其他綠天王有更大彈性遊走空間的原因。問題是，以陳水扁昔日在綠營曾凌駕 一切派系權勢的影響力，都無法在兩岸政策開放上推進任何一步，甚至還走回頭路，謝長廷目前連內部整合都尚待努力，他要怎麼向各方證明：我的兩岸開放論述， 就是目前正在主導「公投入聯」的陳總統主張，也是力推「正常國家決議文」，即將卸任的游主席之主張，更是那些本土社團與地下電台的主張？如果這一部分還有 疑慮，那麼就請先說服他們吧！
要化解這種主張與實踐之間的矛盾，並不是件容易的工作。還記得謝長廷在擔任閣揆期間，曾怎麼落實他的「和 解共生」主張？沒有人懷疑那時節謝長廷的誠意，但當時的內閣團隊中，僅一個新聞局長姚文智就幾乎摧毀了整個朝野「和解共生」氛圍，但謝卻聽任其成為藍綠衝 突的焦點。而掛著謝系招牌的多位立委，在發動黨派攻擊時所用政治語言之粗鄙、不留餘地，真的很難讓人與和解共生聯想在一起。從這個經驗被喚起，謝長廷不僅 對他的兩岸開放論述，甚至他表示在當選後要成立「聯合政府」的倡儀，都得要花更多的工夫證明，這一切並不只是說說而已。
要知道，現時的 謝長廷，與當年倡議「新中間路線」的陳水扁相較，處境完全不同；當年陳水扁在黨內可沒有任何天王在前後掣肘，如今的謝長廷，要面對游系黨機器所推動的「正 常國家決議文」的反撲，又要應付陳水扁主導的「公投入聯」運動。他必須撫平游系的反彈，否則九月底後卸任的游錫？不會與他善罷干休；他必須持續尊重即將接 掌黨機器的陳水扁，一個即將黨政資源一把抓的總統，也是一個不想太早跛腳的總統。如果屆時陳水扁堅持推動「公投入聯」才該是謝長廷唯一的競選主軸，試問謝 長廷此刻所揭示的直航與開放陸資等主張，還有任何發揮的空間嗎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 26, 2007
While Ma Ying-jeou is aggressively courting "native" as well as "nativist" voters, Frank Hsieh is playing the "cross Straits" card. Many of the positions Hsieh has advocated over the past two or three years have disappeared from the Green camp's agenda. These include direct air links and opening the island to mainland capital. Frank Hsieh stressed that he wanted to "do everything in his power to seek dialogue and the negotiations, in order to promote peace in the Taiwan Straits." It is hard to imagine what would have happened if Hsieh had proposed such positions, which amount to heresy with today's Green camp, during the Democratic Progressive Party presidential primaries?
Frank Hsieh is obviously appealing to centrist voters. But many centrist voters probably want to ask Frank Hsieh a simple question: Your position makes sense. But have you explained it to Deep Green True Believers? Have you explained it to those voters who took to the streets demanding a "Plebiscite to Join the UN?" To those pro independence organizations who met Chairman Yu Hsi-kuen at the airport? To those pirate radio stations that denounced the "11 Brigands" and "Zhong Guo Qin?" Do they support direct flights? Do they welcome mainland capital?
Hsieh's problem isn't how to appeal to centrist voters. His problem is how to persuade Deep Green voters, how to obtain their understanding and endorsement. His problem is how to reconcile his cross Straits direct links proposals with Deep Green "nativist" doctrine. His problem is how to prove that his positions are not typical election promises to be forgotten overnight. Hsieh should realize that Ma Ying-jeou can deliver on this promise. But isn't it strange that over the past seven years, Chen Shui-bian couldn't?
Kuomintang spokesperson Su Chun-pin put his finger on the issue: "It is not possible for Frank Hsieh to be a more enthusiastic advocate of a 'new centrist path' today than Chen was seven years ago," What's more, Chen Shui-bian didn't promote his cross Straits policy only seven years ago, during his "new centrist path" phase. He promoted it several years in a row, during New Year's Day addresses, during Lunar New Year's Eve talks, during National Day addresses. But to what result? The closer Chen gets to stepping down, the more he has become a trouble-maker in the eyes of Washington and Beijing, someone who is promoting "unilateral changes to the status quo." This proves that Chen Shui-bian's campaign pledges were mere electioneering, to be forgotten as soon as he attained office. Therefore what reason do centrist voters have to believe that Frank Hsieh will do what A Bian didn't?
True, Frank Hsieh is not Chen Shui-bian. With his "One China Constitution," "reconciliation and coexistence," and "cross Straits direct links," Frank Hsieh has long maintained a safe distance between himself and Chen Shui-bian on cross Straits policy. His path differs in many respects with the orthodox Green path. That is why Frank Hsieh has more maneuvering room than the other Green Princes. The problem is Chen Shui-bian has hijacked the Green camp. He controls the power and influence of its many factions. Not one of them is able to make the slightest progress on cross Straits policy. They have even begun backpedaling. Frank Hsieh has yet to get his own house in order. How can he reconcile his cross Straits direct links proposals with those of Party Chairman Yu, nativist organizations, and pirate radio stations? With the "Plebiscite to Join the UN" President Chen has been advocating? With the aggressive promotion of "Resolution for a Normal Nation?" Many people harbor serious doubts. Hsieh had better convince them first.
To reconcile the differences between his proposals and current reality to the public at large is not going to be easy. Don't forget how Frank Hsieh practiced "reconciliation and coexistence" when he held the position of premier. Nobody doubted Frank Hsieh's sincerity. But Government Information Office Chief Yao Wen-chih single-handedly destroyed any possibility of "reconciliation and coexistence" betwen the government and the public. Yet Hsieh allowed Yao and the GIO to become the focus of Blue vs. Green conflict. Many legislators flying Hsieh's banner do not flinch from the coarsest possible language during factional infighting. It is hard to reconcile such behavior with "reconciliation and coexistence." Based on such experiences, not only must Frank Hsieh prove his sincerity vis a vis his cross Straits direct links proposal. He must also prove his sincerity vis a vis his desire to form a "coalition government" after the election. He can't just talk about it.
Frank Hsieh's situation today is completely different from Chen Shui-bian's situation yesterday, when Chen proposed his "new centrist path" Back then Chen Shui-bian did not have to deal with opposition from Green Princes within the party. Today Frank Hsieh must contend with reactions from the Yu Hsi-kuen faction, which is promoting its "Resolution for a Normal Nation." He also must contend with Chen Shui-bian's "Plebiscite to Join the UN" movement. He must smooth over the reaction from the Yu faction. Otherwise toward the end of September, a newly resigned Yu Hsi-kuen is not about to let matters rest. Hsieh must continue deferring to Chen Shui-bian, who is about to assume control of the party machine. A president who has monopolized the resources of both the party and the government, is also a president who has no desire to become a lame duck before it's time. When the time comes, and Chen Shui-bian insists on promoting his "Plebiscite to Join the UN" that will become Frank Hsieh's campaign theme. So the question is: Will Frank Hsieh, who advocates direct flights and the influx of mainland capital, have any room left to maneuver?
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.09.26
要爭取中間選民，先擺平深綠板塊吧！
中時社論
就在馬英九積極經營本土票源的同時，謝長廷也積極打出了他的「兩岸牌」，許多主張在最近兩、三年的綠營論述中已近乎絕跡，如開放直航、如開放陸資登台等， 謝長廷同時強調他要「盡最大努力尋求對話與談判，以便讓台海和平」。很難想像這種在當前綠營近乎「異端」的論述，如果選在民進黨總統黨內初選階段時提出， 會是個什麼光景？
誰都看得出來，謝長廷此刻的出招，意在召喚中間選民。但多數中間選民或許也會向謝長廷回問一句很簡單的問題：你的主張 確有道理，但請問你與所有深綠支持者都溝通好了嗎？特別是，那些上街相挺「公投入聯」的選民，那些到機場迎接游主席的獨派團體，以及那些曾經用力聲討「十 一寇」、「中國琴」的地下電台等，他們今天都已經口徑一致的支持直航？歡迎陸資？
所以問題的重點也出來了，謝長廷有關兩岸開放論述的著 力點，根本不是要怎麼去向中間選民「訴求」，而是要怎麼去向深綠選民「說服」，取得這些選民的諒解與認同，讓他的兩岸開放論述與深綠的本土論述可以整合， 如此才能證明他的所有這些主張，並不是曇花一現的選舉語言。要知道這一點馬英九是絕對做不到的。但同樣弔詭的是過去七年多，陳水扁也一樣沒做到，不是嗎？
國民黨發言人蘇俊賓的一句話點到了核心：「今天的謝長廷不會比七年前的陳水扁更主張中間路線」；更有甚者，陳水扁有關兩岸開放的論述，並不只在他七年前的 「新中間路線」中揭示過，更在數年中的元旦講話、除夕談話、國慶祝詞等多次重申過。結果呢？越是到任期屆滿前，陳水扁越是將自己變成為美、中眼中意圖「片 面改變現狀」的「麻煩製造者」，證明當年陳水扁的所有政見、承諾與保證，都是用過即丟的選舉語言。那麼有什麼理由要中間選民相信，當年阿扁說到沒做到的， 謝長廷就一定能說到做到！
沒錯，謝長廷不是陳水扁，從「憲法一中」、「和解共生」到「兩岸開放」，謝長廷一路走來的政策路線，與陳水扁 一直維持著安全距離，與綠營的正統路線相較也多了些許異質性，這也是謝長廷相較於其他綠天王有更大彈性遊走空間的原因。問題是，以陳水扁昔日在綠營曾凌駕 一切派系權勢的影響力，都無法在兩岸政策開放上推進任何一步，甚至還走回頭路，謝長廷目前連內部整合都尚待努力，他要怎麼向各方證明：我的兩岸開放論述， 就是目前正在主導「公投入聯」的陳總統主張，也是力推「正常國家決議文」，即將卸任的游主席之主張，更是那些本土社團與地下電台的主張？如果這一部分還有 疑慮，那麼就請先說服他們吧！
要化解這種主張與實踐之間的矛盾，並不是件容易的工作。還記得謝長廷在擔任閣揆期間，曾怎麼落實他的「和 解共生」主張？沒有人懷疑那時節謝長廷的誠意，但當時的內閣團隊中，僅一個新聞局長姚文智就幾乎摧毀了整個朝野「和解共生」氛圍，但謝卻聽任其成為藍綠衝 突的焦點。而掛著謝系招牌的多位立委，在發動黨派攻擊時所用政治語言之粗鄙、不留餘地，真的很難讓人與和解共生聯想在一起。從這個經驗被喚起，謝長廷不僅 對他的兩岸開放論述，甚至他表示在當選後要成立「聯合政府」的倡儀，都得要花更多的工夫證明，這一切並不只是說說而已。
要知道，現時的 謝長廷，與當年倡議「新中間路線」的陳水扁相較，處境完全不同；當年陳水扁在黨內可沒有任何天王在前後掣肘，如今的謝長廷，要面對游系黨機器所推動的「正 常國家決議文」的反撲，又要應付陳水扁主導的「公投入聯」運動。他必須撫平游系的反彈，否則九月底後卸任的游錫？不會與他善罷干休；他必須持續尊重即將接 掌黨機器的陳水扁，一個即將黨政資源一把抓的總統，也是一個不想太早跛腳的總統。如果屆時陳水扁堅持推動「公投入聯」才該是謝長廷唯一的競選主軸，試問謝 長廷此刻所揭示的直航與開放陸資等主張，還有任何發揮的空間嗎？
Thursday, September 20, 2007
Promoting Plebiscites vs. Growing the Economy
Promoting Plebiscites vs. Growing the Economy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 20, 2007
While receiving Taiwan business representatives the other day, Chen Shui-bian criticized a Blue Camp television advertisement. In this Kuomintang produced ad, a Korean businessperson criticizes Taiwan, saying it has become too politicized, and that the government has neglected the economy. He says that Taiwan's competitiveness is the lowest among the four Asian dragons. In fact, he says, Taiwan no longer qualifies as an Asian dragon. In response to this ad, President Chen cited economic growth rates, consumer price indices, unemployment rates, and the reactions of global economic fora. He said the data proved that Taiwan's economic performance was actually better than South Korea's. Therefore the Blue Camp ad was a typical case of "Poormouthing Taiwan."
Over the past year, President Chen Shui-bian has repeatedly contradicted himself. His public remarks have been riddled with internal contradictions. People have become so accustomed to his doubletalk, they no longer consider it noteworthy. Even Uncle Sam considers him a headache. Many people tune him out in order to spare themselves the frustration. But when A Bian gushes about Taiwan's economy in such glowing terms, and dismisses anyone who complains as "Poormouthing Taiwan," we have no choice but to respond.
When appraising a nation's economy, one usually relies on certain economic indicators. These include GDP growth rates, price indices, unemployment rates, and consumer confidence indices. If one wishes to examine an economy in greater detail, one must include consumer spending, investment outlays, and exports. Only then can one discern the significance of the numbers. As everyone knows, the numbers for Taiwan's GDP growth over the past few years don't look that bad. But most of that growth was derived from exports. Domestic consumption and investment growth were extremely low. Fourth quarter investment grew slightly last year. But compared to growth in the distant past, the discrepancy was huge. Let's look at the unemployment figures. What's behind these numbers? To what extent do Taiwan's numbers reflect the Executive Yuan's artificial stimulus packages? This needs clarification. Unemployed workers hired by the government and assigned to data entry or spraying insecticide to prevent Dengue fever are "employed" in the short-term. But long-term their inclusion in the ranks of the employed is fraudulent.
If we really want to diagnose Taiwan's economic health, we must look at all the data, not just those that catch the eye but whose significance is dubious. Taiwan's economic growth is concentrated on export sales. Domestic consumer spending and investment is clearly in decline. This reflects serious problems. Why do Taiwan's consumers lack confidence? Even if Taiwan's wage inequality is less serious than South Korea's, why has it suddenly worsened in recent years? What is the potential risk when Taiwan's GDP growth depends solely on exports? Why are domestic and foreign enterprises unwilling to list on the TAIEX, but instead opt for Hong Kong or Singapore? Why is Taiwan's financial market unable to make the world's top 100 list? Once the ASEAN plus Three free trade region takes shape, what will happen to Taiwan's export dependent economic engine? If this single engine falters, how can Taiwan's economy continue to fly? These are hidden concerns beyond the one-sided data President Chen cited. If people voice doubts, whether they are South Korean or African, the government should graciously respond "Thank you." If it reflexively rejects all dissent as "Poormouthing Taiwan," or lashes back with the accusation "You don't love Taiwan," then it is acting remarkably like a fascist regime.
Over the past two weeks, this newspaper has issued special editions investigating Taiwan's prospects. On September 10 we pointed out that it is natural for Taiwan to want to build its own brand. It is natural for Taiwan to want to seize the initiative and get a leg up in the knowledge economy. But a brand cannot be disconnected from it means of production upstream or its markets downstream. Therefore brand building must be international in nature. That was the theme of our September 17 edition. Take Acer as an example. It must set up production in the most suitable location in the world. It must take advantage of every opportunity to market its products to every corner of the globe. Only then can it become a great brand. If the government forbids a business to shift its production to certain locales, or market its products to certain regions, even if its restrictions seem minor, it will impose an intolerable burden on a business's brand strategy. For Taiwan's economy it amounts to a knife through the heart.
The Democratic Progressive Party has been in power for over seven years. Has it has been a benefit or a detriment to Taiwan businesses? Don't bother dredging up economic statistics. Just look at all the businesses leaving in droves, and the market mired in recession. If economic problems weren't so difficult to solve, why would A Bian bother provoking Uncle Sam with his meaningless "Plebiscite to Join the UN?" After seven years in power, all the DPP can do is demagogue the "nativization, rectification of names" issue. Is this not an open admission that economic issues are too difficult and painful for the government to tackle?
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.09.20
辦公投與拚經濟：虛實之間的取捨
中時社論
陳水扁總統日前在接見台商代表時，提出他對藍營某一件電視廣告內容的批評。在該件國民黨製作的廣告中，某一位韓籍商人透過口述指台灣最近幾年政治議題太多，而政府整體之經濟建設不力，以致於台灣在競爭力方面落在亞洲四小龍之後，甚至是掉落在龍群之外。對於這樣的批評，陳總統則以經濟成長率、物價指數、失業率、世界經濟論壇等總體指標作回應。他認為這些數據都顯示台灣經濟表現其實優於韓國，所以藍營的廣告是標準的「唱衰台灣」。
在過去一年中，陳水扁總統前後不一、內容矛盾的發言所在多有，各界都已經見怪不怪。對於這樣一位連老美都感到頭疼的總統，許多人民原本對其言論都寧願視而不言，以免自尋煩惱。但是阿扁把台灣經濟講得「甲勇」，更把對台灣經濟有意見的人描述為唱衰台灣，我們就不得不加以評論了。
評估一個國家經濟的好壞，一般常以若干經濟指標做基礎，包括ＧＤＰ成長率、物價指數、失業率、消費者信心指數等。如果要再細分細看，則ＧＤＰ成長率之中又包含民間消費、投資支出與出口等項目，分別可以探討其個別數據的意義。如所周知，過去幾年台灣的ＧＤＰ成長在數字上看還不算差，但是絕大多數的成長率都是來自於出口，而國內消費與投資的成長卻是非常低。即使是去年第四季投資成長小有提升，但是與早年動輒兩位數相比，還是有天壤之別。再以失業率的數據來看，台灣的數字背後究竟有多少是來自於行政院促進就業方案的浮面刺激，也有待釐清。如果有失業人口被政府雇去輸入電腦資料或噴灑登革熱藥水，他們短期會被歸為就業，但就中長期而言，這些就業人口絕對是虛假的數字。
我們要強調的是，如果真的要分析台灣經濟的體質好不好、衰不衰，就要把各種統計數據全部攤開來看，而不是只抓少數亮眼的、意義不足的、在年份上截頭去尾的數字來討論。當台灣經濟成長集中在外銷且國內消費投資明顯衰退時，它當然反映一些嚴重的問題。為什麼台灣消費者信心不足？即使台灣的所得分配不均目前仍較韓國為優，為什麼最近幾年在急劇地惡化？當台灣以出口單一引擎勉力支撐ＧＤＰ成長時，會有什麼潛在的風險？為什麼國內外企業都不願意在台灣掛牌上市，而選擇香港、新加坡？為什麼國際上將台灣金融環境排到世界百名以外？一旦東協加三自由貿易區成型，會不會衝擊到台灣的出口引擎？如果單一引擎受損，台灣的經濟要怎麼飛？凡此種種，都是在陳總統所引片面數據之外的隱憂。如果有人提出疑慮，不論講話的人是韓國人或非洲人，政府都該感謝雅言才是。如果對於異音就打為「唱衰台灣」之輩，再加上「不愛台灣」的隱喻，這就像是法西斯作為了。
在過去兩周，本報系都以專刊的方式探索台灣的希望。在九月十日我們指出，台灣當然希望建立品牌，俾能在知識經濟時代掌握先機與優勢。但是品牌無論如何不能脫離上游的生產與下游的市場，因此品牌的建立，必須要以貼近國際為前提，這也是本報九月十七日的探討主題。就以宏碁為例吧，它必須在全世界最適合代工的地方生產、以各種行銷方式銷售到全世界最有機會的每一個角落，才可能成就宏碁品牌。反過來說，如果政府不准企業去特定地點生產銷售、或是訂下種種不合理的運輸限制，即使只是一小部分的拘束，對企業的品牌策略都是難以承受之重，對於台灣經濟則是錐心刺骨之痛。
民進黨執政七年多來，對台灣企業的全球布局是利是弊，也許我們不必拘泥經濟數字，只要看看廠商出走與上市上櫃的蕭條，就已經一葉知秋。坦白說，如果不是經濟議題難以著力，阿扁又何必去炒作一個惹怒老美、虛無空泛的入聯公投呢？如果七年執政下來，就只能炒「本土、正名」這一道虛菜，這不是恰好驗證了其他經濟議題的沉痛與不堪了嗎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 20, 2007
While receiving Taiwan business representatives the other day, Chen Shui-bian criticized a Blue Camp television advertisement. In this Kuomintang produced ad, a Korean businessperson criticizes Taiwan, saying it has become too politicized, and that the government has neglected the economy. He says that Taiwan's competitiveness is the lowest among the four Asian dragons. In fact, he says, Taiwan no longer qualifies as an Asian dragon. In response to this ad, President Chen cited economic growth rates, consumer price indices, unemployment rates, and the reactions of global economic fora. He said the data proved that Taiwan's economic performance was actually better than South Korea's. Therefore the Blue Camp ad was a typical case of "Poormouthing Taiwan."
Over the past year, President Chen Shui-bian has repeatedly contradicted himself. His public remarks have been riddled with internal contradictions. People have become so accustomed to his doubletalk, they no longer consider it noteworthy. Even Uncle Sam considers him a headache. Many people tune him out in order to spare themselves the frustration. But when A Bian gushes about Taiwan's economy in such glowing terms, and dismisses anyone who complains as "Poormouthing Taiwan," we have no choice but to respond.
When appraising a nation's economy, one usually relies on certain economic indicators. These include GDP growth rates, price indices, unemployment rates, and consumer confidence indices. If one wishes to examine an economy in greater detail, one must include consumer spending, investment outlays, and exports. Only then can one discern the significance of the numbers. As everyone knows, the numbers for Taiwan's GDP growth over the past few years don't look that bad. But most of that growth was derived from exports. Domestic consumption and investment growth were extremely low. Fourth quarter investment grew slightly last year. But compared to growth in the distant past, the discrepancy was huge. Let's look at the unemployment figures. What's behind these numbers? To what extent do Taiwan's numbers reflect the Executive Yuan's artificial stimulus packages? This needs clarification. Unemployed workers hired by the government and assigned to data entry or spraying insecticide to prevent Dengue fever are "employed" in the short-term. But long-term their inclusion in the ranks of the employed is fraudulent.
If we really want to diagnose Taiwan's economic health, we must look at all the data, not just those that catch the eye but whose significance is dubious. Taiwan's economic growth is concentrated on export sales. Domestic consumer spending and investment is clearly in decline. This reflects serious problems. Why do Taiwan's consumers lack confidence? Even if Taiwan's wage inequality is less serious than South Korea's, why has it suddenly worsened in recent years? What is the potential risk when Taiwan's GDP growth depends solely on exports? Why are domestic and foreign enterprises unwilling to list on the TAIEX, but instead opt for Hong Kong or Singapore? Why is Taiwan's financial market unable to make the world's top 100 list? Once the ASEAN plus Three free trade region takes shape, what will happen to Taiwan's export dependent economic engine? If this single engine falters, how can Taiwan's economy continue to fly? These are hidden concerns beyond the one-sided data President Chen cited. If people voice doubts, whether they are South Korean or African, the government should graciously respond "Thank you." If it reflexively rejects all dissent as "Poormouthing Taiwan," or lashes back with the accusation "You don't love Taiwan," then it is acting remarkably like a fascist regime.
Over the past two weeks, this newspaper has issued special editions investigating Taiwan's prospects. On September 10 we pointed out that it is natural for Taiwan to want to build its own brand. It is natural for Taiwan to want to seize the initiative and get a leg up in the knowledge economy. But a brand cannot be disconnected from it means of production upstream or its markets downstream. Therefore brand building must be international in nature. That was the theme of our September 17 edition. Take Acer as an example. It must set up production in the most suitable location in the world. It must take advantage of every opportunity to market its products to every corner of the globe. Only then can it become a great brand. If the government forbids a business to shift its production to certain locales, or market its products to certain regions, even if its restrictions seem minor, it will impose an intolerable burden on a business's brand strategy. For Taiwan's economy it amounts to a knife through the heart.
The Democratic Progressive Party has been in power for over seven years. Has it has been a benefit or a detriment to Taiwan businesses? Don't bother dredging up economic statistics. Just look at all the businesses leaving in droves, and the market mired in recession. If economic problems weren't so difficult to solve, why would A Bian bother provoking Uncle Sam with his meaningless "Plebiscite to Join the UN?" After seven years in power, all the DPP can do is demagogue the "nativization, rectification of names" issue. Is this not an open admission that economic issues are too difficult and painful for the government to tackle?
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.09.20
辦公投與拚經濟：虛實之間的取捨
中時社論
陳水扁總統日前在接見台商代表時，提出他對藍營某一件電視廣告內容的批評。在該件國民黨製作的廣告中，某一位韓籍商人透過口述指台灣最近幾年政治議題太多，而政府整體之經濟建設不力，以致於台灣在競爭力方面落在亞洲四小龍之後，甚至是掉落在龍群之外。對於這樣的批評，陳總統則以經濟成長率、物價指數、失業率、世界經濟論壇等總體指標作回應。他認為這些數據都顯示台灣經濟表現其實優於韓國，所以藍營的廣告是標準的「唱衰台灣」。
在過去一年中，陳水扁總統前後不一、內容矛盾的發言所在多有，各界都已經見怪不怪。對於這樣一位連老美都感到頭疼的總統，許多人民原本對其言論都寧願視而不言，以免自尋煩惱。但是阿扁把台灣經濟講得「甲勇」，更把對台灣經濟有意見的人描述為唱衰台灣，我們就不得不加以評論了。
評估一個國家經濟的好壞，一般常以若干經濟指標做基礎，包括ＧＤＰ成長率、物價指數、失業率、消費者信心指數等。如果要再細分細看，則ＧＤＰ成長率之中又包含民間消費、投資支出與出口等項目，分別可以探討其個別數據的意義。如所周知，過去幾年台灣的ＧＤＰ成長在數字上看還不算差，但是絕大多數的成長率都是來自於出口，而國內消費與投資的成長卻是非常低。即使是去年第四季投資成長小有提升，但是與早年動輒兩位數相比，還是有天壤之別。再以失業率的數據來看，台灣的數字背後究竟有多少是來自於行政院促進就業方案的浮面刺激，也有待釐清。如果有失業人口被政府雇去輸入電腦資料或噴灑登革熱藥水，他們短期會被歸為就業，但就中長期而言，這些就業人口絕對是虛假的數字。
我們要強調的是，如果真的要分析台灣經濟的體質好不好、衰不衰，就要把各種統計數據全部攤開來看，而不是只抓少數亮眼的、意義不足的、在年份上截頭去尾的數字來討論。當台灣經濟成長集中在外銷且國內消費投資明顯衰退時，它當然反映一些嚴重的問題。為什麼台灣消費者信心不足？即使台灣的所得分配不均目前仍較韓國為優，為什麼最近幾年在急劇地惡化？當台灣以出口單一引擎勉力支撐ＧＤＰ成長時，會有什麼潛在的風險？為什麼國內外企業都不願意在台灣掛牌上市，而選擇香港、新加坡？為什麼國際上將台灣金融環境排到世界百名以外？一旦東協加三自由貿易區成型，會不會衝擊到台灣的出口引擎？如果單一引擎受損，台灣的經濟要怎麼飛？凡此種種，都是在陳總統所引片面數據之外的隱憂。如果有人提出疑慮，不論講話的人是韓國人或非洲人，政府都該感謝雅言才是。如果對於異音就打為「唱衰台灣」之輩，再加上「不愛台灣」的隱喻，這就像是法西斯作為了。
在過去兩周，本報系都以專刊的方式探索台灣的希望。在九月十日我們指出，台灣當然希望建立品牌，俾能在知識經濟時代掌握先機與優勢。但是品牌無論如何不能脫離上游的生產與下游的市場，因此品牌的建立，必須要以貼近國際為前提，這也是本報九月十七日的探討主題。就以宏碁為例吧，它必須在全世界最適合代工的地方生產、以各種行銷方式銷售到全世界最有機會的每一個角落，才可能成就宏碁品牌。反過來說，如果政府不准企業去特定地點生產銷售、或是訂下種種不合理的運輸限制，即使只是一小部分的拘束，對企業的品牌策略都是難以承受之重，對於台灣經濟則是錐心刺骨之痛。
民進黨執政七年多來，對台灣企業的全球布局是利是弊，也許我們不必拘泥經濟數字，只要看看廠商出走與上市上櫃的蕭條，就已經一葉知秋。坦白說，如果不是經濟議題難以著力，阿扁又何必去炒作一個惹怒老美、虛無空泛的入聯公投呢？如果七年執政下來，就只能炒「本土、正名」這一道虛菜，這不是恰好驗證了其他經濟議題的沉痛與不堪了嗎？
Wednesday, September 19, 2007
Chao Yi-an asks: What's this for?
Chao Yi-an asks: What's this for?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 19, 2007
On September 15, the day of the "March to Join the UN," Chen Shui-bian boasted that "everyone in the Chen family able to walk" had showed up. His sons and daughters, and his sons-in-law and daughters-in-law formed a veritable phalanx. His grandson Chao Yi-an and Chao Yi-ting became the focus of media attention.
Little An An in particular became a media darling. Every time television anchors mentioned him, their faces revealed a mixture of affection and pity. Chen Shui-bian had been up to his neck in scandals. Now, riding the wave of the "Plebiscite to Join the UN," he was suddenly "Standing Tall."
We have no idea what sort of advanced classes Chen family elders have been providing Chao Yi-an, who is not yet six. But based on Chao Yi-an's age, he probably doesn't understand the fact and fiction behind the "Plebiscite to Join the UN." He merrily waved a Green flag, turned to DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh beside him and asked: "What's this (Plebiscite to Join the UN) sticker for?"
The adults nearby laughed at little An An's question. Nobody bothered giving him a serious explanation. But one day, 10, 20, even 30 years from now, an intellectually mature Chao Yi-an may confront the reality of Taiwan. He may recall the march his elders took him on, and find the answer he was seeking!
But until that day, 10, 20, 30 years from now, can the Taiwan independence movement's "rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution" be considered a success? Will a "Nation of Taiwan" exist? Or will Taiwan be thoroughly marginalized and suffocated? Will Taiwan and mainland China establish a win/win framework for their mutual benefit? Will Chao Yi-an's grandfather Chen Shui-bian become the Father of a "Nation of Taiwan?" Or will he become Taiwan's Public Enemy, responsible for Taiwan's destruction and decline? Will Chao Yi-an's grandfather Chen Shui-bian, his grandmother Wu Shu-cheng, his paternal grandfather Chao Yu-chu, and his father Chao Chien-min, be found not guilty? Or will they be convicts serving time for corruption?
During political marches, whether Blue or Green, children are invariably the focus of media attention. The innocence of little children always provides such a striking contrast with the dark underbelly of politics. Other children may be nothing more than the rank and file of a Blue Army or Green Army. But Chao Yi-an as "First Grandson" has been branded for life. By the time he becomes an adult, will Chao Yi-an be an honored citizen of a "Nation of Taiwan?" Will he be proud of his grandfather's meritorious service and this historic event? Will he have departed for distant shores? Will he look back at a marginalized, crumbling Taiwan? Will he consider his family background and this event something to be ashamed of?
Chen Shui-bian desperately hopes to change history's appraisal of him from "corrupt kleptocrat" to "champion of independence." Everyone in the Chen family able to walk took to the streets, raising the banner of Taiwan independence. Their real purpose was to use the occasion to jettison the image of a corrupt Chen Shui-bian, an unethical Chen Shui-bian. But will waving a magic wand made in Taiwan in fact transform Chen Shui-bian the Kleptocrat into Chen Shui-bian the Champion of Taiwan Independence?
Who can tell Chao Yi-an the purpose of this "March for a Plebiscite to Join the UN?" Should we tell him what Chen Shui-bian said? That "Nothing's going to happen. We're simply going to end up where we started." After all, when Chen Shui-bian said "Nothing's going to happen. We're simply going to end up where we started," he meant that when the march was over, there would still be no "Nation of Taiwan," there would still be no change in the name of the country, and there would still be no UN membership. What we really want to know is, what's going to happen to the corrupt Chen family? Nothing? What about Chen Shui-bian's rampant misrule, which has precipitated a national disaster? Is it too merely going to end up where it started?
On September 15, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators will stick up for Chen Shui-bian. But Chao Yi-an, who is not yet six, might not. They may be able to dress him up in a green "Taiwan for UN" T-shirt. But they won't be able to stop him from asking "What's this for?" For that matter, do the hundreds of thousands of adults whom Chen Shui-bian has led into the streets by the nose truly understand what the march if for? For whom they are marching? Are they really marching to found a "Nation of Taiwan?" Does founding a "Nation of Taiwan" mean that one "loves Taiwan? Or is Chen Shui-bian merely using them? Are they merely helping "Chen Shui-bian the Kleptocrat" turn himself into "Chen Shui-bian the Champion of Taiwan independence?"
When Chao Yi-an grows up and becomes aware of his family's reputation, what will he make of his grandfather's misrule and his grandmother's corruption? What will he make of his father and paternal grandfather's conspiratorial relationship with the First Family? What will be make of his mother Chen Hsing-yu's public falling out with her father-in-law? Will he think of Taiwan independence as "saving Taiwan, loving Taiwan?" Or will he think or Taiwan independence as "deception of oneself, and deception of others?" When the time comes Chao Yi-an to find an answer, questions will abound, and they won't be confined to "What's this sticker for?"
Chen Shui-bian may be able to fool his followers and supporters part of the time. But he prorbably won't be able to fool Chao YI-an for another 10, 20, 30 years.
Some day, Chen Shui-bian will either be known as the Father of a "Nation of Taiwan," or as the con artist and criminal responsible for Taiwan's disintegration. On that day, we will have our answer. Until that day, if Chao Yi-an asks "What's this for?" he may be asking in vain.
趙翊安問：這個貼紙是做什麼的？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.19 02:51 am
九一五入聯公投大遊行，如陳水扁所說，他們一家「能走路的」都去了。子女媳婿一列排開，金孫趙翊安與趙翊廷尤其成為電視鏡頭的焦點。
小安安更是媒體寵兒，電視主播一說到他，都嘴角含笑，眉露愛憐。藉著入聯公投噴發的氣勢，一度陷於貪腐陰霾的陳水扁一家，儼然又「堂堂正正」地站出來了！
不知陳家長輩對不滿六歲的趙翊安曾作何種「行前教育」？但以趙翊安的年歲，大概不太容易瞭解「入聯公投」的是非真偽，難怪他一面興奮地搖著綠旗，一面仰頭問身邊的謝長廷：「這個（入聯公投）貼紙是做什麼的？」
當時，他身邊的成人們被小安安逗得相視哄笑，當然沒有人會認真去解釋他的疑惑。不過，總有那麼一天，十年後、二十年後，或三十年後，當心智漸趨成熟的趙翊安面對十、二十、三十年後的台灣，他或許會回想到當年由家中長輩帶去參加的這場大遊行，屆時他也許就會找到他自己的答案！
到了那一天，十年、二十年、三十年後，台灣正名制憲成功了嗎？台灣國建立了嗎？或台灣已徹底邊緣化而奄奄一息？或台灣與中國大陸建立了雙贏互惠的互動架構？到了那一天，趙翊安的外公陳水扁將是台灣國的國父，或將是使台灣撕裂而趨向敗亡的台灣大罪人？趙翊安的外公陳水扁、外婆吳淑珍、爺爺趙玉柱及父親趙建銘，是被證實無罪無辜，或是正在服刑或刑期已滿的貪汙犯？
在政治遊行場合，無論藍綠，兒童皆是鏡頭焦點；因為，童稚的天真，與陰晦的政治極易呈現強烈的對比。然而，其他的兒童或許只是遊行隊伍中的驚鴻一瞥，但趙翊安「第一金孫」的身世卻是他終身的烙印。待他成人後，趙翊安將是身處光榮的台灣國的領土之上，而以父祖的功勳及這場大遊行為榮？或屆時他已旅寄海外，遙望著邊緣化、甚或敗亡的台灣，而以父祖的罪孽及這場大遊行為羞恥憾恨？
陳水扁亟欲將「貪腐的道德評價」，操作轉變成「台獨的道德評價」。當陳家「能走路的」都走上街頭，標舉著「台獨的道德」，他們是欲藉此甩掉應對「貪腐的道德評價」所負的責任。貪腐的陳水扁，不道德的陳水扁，難道就此搖身一變成為台獨的陳水扁，道德的陳水扁？
誰能告訴趙翊安，為何要舉行這場「入聯公投大遊行」？難道要以陳水扁所說的回答他：只是為了「什麼事都不會發生，一切將回到原點」而遊行？何況，陳水扁所說的「什麼事都不會發生，一切將回到原點」，只是指最後還是沒有台灣國，沒有改國號，沒有入聯；但是，難道經過這次遊行，陳水扁一家的貪腐也就「什麼事都不曾發生」，陳水扁失政敗德所造成的國災民禍也能「一切皆回到原點」？
九一五，即使十數萬遊行者皆為陳水扁背書，但不滿六歲的趙翊安恐怕不能。因為，他雖被人穿上入聯的「青蛙Ｔ恤」，卻不解地問：「這個貼紙是做什麼的？」何況，那些跟著陳水扁上街的十數萬成人，難道真正明白他們為何遊行？為誰遊行？難道真是為了建立台灣國？難道建立台灣國又真是愛台灣？又難道只是被陳水扁欺愚利用，欲將「貪腐的陳水扁」翻製變造成一個「台獨的陳水扁」而已？
等到趙翊安長大，意識到他的家庭烙印，他將對外公的失政敗德及外婆所涉匪夷所思的貪腐案作何想法？他又將對父親及爺爺攀附上第一家庭後的人生悲劇有何想法？他又將對其母陳幸妤屢屢在公眾場合失態及與公公反目有何想法？他將認為台獨是救台灣、愛台灣，或認為台獨是「自欺欺人」……。可以確定的是，屆時等待趙翊安自己去尋找答案的問題有很多很多，絕對不僅只有：「這個貼紙是做什麼的？」
陳水扁在如今一時一地或許可以騙過他所有的追隨者及支持者，但是他也許騙不過十年、二十年、三十年後心智漸趨成熟的趙翊安。
屆時，陳水扁是台灣國的國父，或是造成台灣分崩離析的台獨騙子及台灣罪人，應當已有答案。到那個時候，趙翊安若再自問「這個貼紙是做什麼的」，或許已是多此一問，枉此一問了！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 19, 2007
On September 15, the day of the "March to Join the UN," Chen Shui-bian boasted that "everyone in the Chen family able to walk" had showed up. His sons and daughters, and his sons-in-law and daughters-in-law formed a veritable phalanx. His grandson Chao Yi-an and Chao Yi-ting became the focus of media attention.
Little An An in particular became a media darling. Every time television anchors mentioned him, their faces revealed a mixture of affection and pity. Chen Shui-bian had been up to his neck in scandals. Now, riding the wave of the "Plebiscite to Join the UN," he was suddenly "Standing Tall."
We have no idea what sort of advanced classes Chen family elders have been providing Chao Yi-an, who is not yet six. But based on Chao Yi-an's age, he probably doesn't understand the fact and fiction behind the "Plebiscite to Join the UN." He merrily waved a Green flag, turned to DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh beside him and asked: "What's this (Plebiscite to Join the UN) sticker for?"
The adults nearby laughed at little An An's question. Nobody bothered giving him a serious explanation. But one day, 10, 20, even 30 years from now, an intellectually mature Chao Yi-an may confront the reality of Taiwan. He may recall the march his elders took him on, and find the answer he was seeking!
But until that day, 10, 20, 30 years from now, can the Taiwan independence movement's "rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution" be considered a success? Will a "Nation of Taiwan" exist? Or will Taiwan be thoroughly marginalized and suffocated? Will Taiwan and mainland China establish a win/win framework for their mutual benefit? Will Chao Yi-an's grandfather Chen Shui-bian become the Father of a "Nation of Taiwan?" Or will he become Taiwan's Public Enemy, responsible for Taiwan's destruction and decline? Will Chao Yi-an's grandfather Chen Shui-bian, his grandmother Wu Shu-cheng, his paternal grandfather Chao Yu-chu, and his father Chao Chien-min, be found not guilty? Or will they be convicts serving time for corruption?
During political marches, whether Blue or Green, children are invariably the focus of media attention. The innocence of little children always provides such a striking contrast with the dark underbelly of politics. Other children may be nothing more than the rank and file of a Blue Army or Green Army. But Chao Yi-an as "First Grandson" has been branded for life. By the time he becomes an adult, will Chao Yi-an be an honored citizen of a "Nation of Taiwan?" Will he be proud of his grandfather's meritorious service and this historic event? Will he have departed for distant shores? Will he look back at a marginalized, crumbling Taiwan? Will he consider his family background and this event something to be ashamed of?
Chen Shui-bian desperately hopes to change history's appraisal of him from "corrupt kleptocrat" to "champion of independence." Everyone in the Chen family able to walk took to the streets, raising the banner of Taiwan independence. Their real purpose was to use the occasion to jettison the image of a corrupt Chen Shui-bian, an unethical Chen Shui-bian. But will waving a magic wand made in Taiwan in fact transform Chen Shui-bian the Kleptocrat into Chen Shui-bian the Champion of Taiwan Independence?
Who can tell Chao Yi-an the purpose of this "March for a Plebiscite to Join the UN?" Should we tell him what Chen Shui-bian said? That "Nothing's going to happen. We're simply going to end up where we started." After all, when Chen Shui-bian said "Nothing's going to happen. We're simply going to end up where we started," he meant that when the march was over, there would still be no "Nation of Taiwan," there would still be no change in the name of the country, and there would still be no UN membership. What we really want to know is, what's going to happen to the corrupt Chen family? Nothing? What about Chen Shui-bian's rampant misrule, which has precipitated a national disaster? Is it too merely going to end up where it started?
On September 15, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators will stick up for Chen Shui-bian. But Chao Yi-an, who is not yet six, might not. They may be able to dress him up in a green "Taiwan for UN" T-shirt. But they won't be able to stop him from asking "What's this for?" For that matter, do the hundreds of thousands of adults whom Chen Shui-bian has led into the streets by the nose truly understand what the march if for? For whom they are marching? Are they really marching to found a "Nation of Taiwan?" Does founding a "Nation of Taiwan" mean that one "loves Taiwan? Or is Chen Shui-bian merely using them? Are they merely helping "Chen Shui-bian the Kleptocrat" turn himself into "Chen Shui-bian the Champion of Taiwan independence?"
When Chao Yi-an grows up and becomes aware of his family's reputation, what will he make of his grandfather's misrule and his grandmother's corruption? What will he make of his father and paternal grandfather's conspiratorial relationship with the First Family? What will be make of his mother Chen Hsing-yu's public falling out with her father-in-law? Will he think of Taiwan independence as "saving Taiwan, loving Taiwan?" Or will he think or Taiwan independence as "deception of oneself, and deception of others?" When the time comes Chao Yi-an to find an answer, questions will abound, and they won't be confined to "What's this sticker for?"
Chen Shui-bian may be able to fool his followers and supporters part of the time. But he prorbably won't be able to fool Chao YI-an for another 10, 20, 30 years.
Some day, Chen Shui-bian will either be known as the Father of a "Nation of Taiwan," or as the con artist and criminal responsible for Taiwan's disintegration. On that day, we will have our answer. Until that day, if Chao Yi-an asks "What's this for?" he may be asking in vain.
趙翊安問：這個貼紙是做什麼的？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.19 02:51 am
九一五入聯公投大遊行，如陳水扁所說，他們一家「能走路的」都去了。子女媳婿一列排開，金孫趙翊安與趙翊廷尤其成為電視鏡頭的焦點。
小安安更是媒體寵兒，電視主播一說到他，都嘴角含笑，眉露愛憐。藉著入聯公投噴發的氣勢，一度陷於貪腐陰霾的陳水扁一家，儼然又「堂堂正正」地站出來了！
不知陳家長輩對不滿六歲的趙翊安曾作何種「行前教育」？但以趙翊安的年歲，大概不太容易瞭解「入聯公投」的是非真偽，難怪他一面興奮地搖著綠旗，一面仰頭問身邊的謝長廷：「這個（入聯公投）貼紙是做什麼的？」
當時，他身邊的成人們被小安安逗得相視哄笑，當然沒有人會認真去解釋他的疑惑。不過，總有那麼一天，十年後、二十年後，或三十年後，當心智漸趨成熟的趙翊安面對十、二十、三十年後的台灣，他或許會回想到當年由家中長輩帶去參加的這場大遊行，屆時他也許就會找到他自己的答案！
到了那一天，十年、二十年、三十年後，台灣正名制憲成功了嗎？台灣國建立了嗎？或台灣已徹底邊緣化而奄奄一息？或台灣與中國大陸建立了雙贏互惠的互動架構？到了那一天，趙翊安的外公陳水扁將是台灣國的國父，或將是使台灣撕裂而趨向敗亡的台灣大罪人？趙翊安的外公陳水扁、外婆吳淑珍、爺爺趙玉柱及父親趙建銘，是被證實無罪無辜，或是正在服刑或刑期已滿的貪汙犯？
在政治遊行場合，無論藍綠，兒童皆是鏡頭焦點；因為，童稚的天真，與陰晦的政治極易呈現強烈的對比。然而，其他的兒童或許只是遊行隊伍中的驚鴻一瞥，但趙翊安「第一金孫」的身世卻是他終身的烙印。待他成人後，趙翊安將是身處光榮的台灣國的領土之上，而以父祖的功勳及這場大遊行為榮？或屆時他已旅寄海外，遙望著邊緣化、甚或敗亡的台灣，而以父祖的罪孽及這場大遊行為羞恥憾恨？
陳水扁亟欲將「貪腐的道德評價」，操作轉變成「台獨的道德評價」。當陳家「能走路的」都走上街頭，標舉著「台獨的道德」，他們是欲藉此甩掉應對「貪腐的道德評價」所負的責任。貪腐的陳水扁，不道德的陳水扁，難道就此搖身一變成為台獨的陳水扁，道德的陳水扁？
誰能告訴趙翊安，為何要舉行這場「入聯公投大遊行」？難道要以陳水扁所說的回答他：只是為了「什麼事都不會發生，一切將回到原點」而遊行？何況，陳水扁所說的「什麼事都不會發生，一切將回到原點」，只是指最後還是沒有台灣國，沒有改國號，沒有入聯；但是，難道經過這次遊行，陳水扁一家的貪腐也就「什麼事都不曾發生」，陳水扁失政敗德所造成的國災民禍也能「一切皆回到原點」？
九一五，即使十數萬遊行者皆為陳水扁背書，但不滿六歲的趙翊安恐怕不能。因為，他雖被人穿上入聯的「青蛙Ｔ恤」，卻不解地問：「這個貼紙是做什麼的？」何況，那些跟著陳水扁上街的十數萬成人，難道真正明白他們為何遊行？為誰遊行？難道真是為了建立台灣國？難道建立台灣國又真是愛台灣？又難道只是被陳水扁欺愚利用，欲將「貪腐的陳水扁」翻製變造成一個「台獨的陳水扁」而已？
等到趙翊安長大，意識到他的家庭烙印，他將對外公的失政敗德及外婆所涉匪夷所思的貪腐案作何想法？他又將對父親及爺爺攀附上第一家庭後的人生悲劇有何想法？他又將對其母陳幸妤屢屢在公眾場合失態及與公公反目有何想法？他將認為台獨是救台灣、愛台灣，或認為台獨是「自欺欺人」……。可以確定的是，屆時等待趙翊安自己去尋找答案的問題有很多很多，絕對不僅只有：「這個貼紙是做什麼的？」
陳水扁在如今一時一地或許可以騙過他所有的追隨者及支持者，但是他也許騙不過十年、二十年、三十年後心智漸趨成熟的趙翊安。
屆時，陳水扁是台灣國的國父，或是造成台灣分崩離析的台獨騙子及台灣罪人，應當已有答案。到那個時候，趙翊安若再自問「這個貼紙是做什麼的」，或許已是多此一問，枉此一問了！
Monday, September 17, 2007
A Plebiscite hijacks an Election, A Bian hijacks the People
A Plebiscite hijacks an Election, A Bian hijacks the People
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 17, 2007
After two frantic demonstrations, one Green and one Blue, ruling government and opposition party leaders seem pleased with the results. But many people may be tempted to ask: Now what? Do political leaders on Taiwan have nothing more important to attend to? Is the "Plebiscite to Join the UN" the only topic they intend to tackle between now and March next year? Unfortunately the answer appears to be yes.
Judging by the result, the biggest winner is Chen Shui-bian. Everyone else was a loser. Remember the same time last year? Public outrage over ruling DPP corruption, brought to a head by the Red Shirt Army, nearly drove Chen out of office. Yet today he has succeeded into shifting the focus from "anti-corruption" to a "Plebiscite to Join the UN." Once he was being passively attacked. Now he has seized the offensive. He has turned his vistor status into a home field advantage. The "Hsieh/Su ticket" been demoted to the status of supporting players. Even the "Ma/Hsiao ticket" can only join the parade. With the result so rewarding for him, what reason does Chen Shui-bian have not to milk it for all it's worth?
Everyone capable of rational thought knows perfectly well that the "Plebiscite to Join the UN" is an absurd charade. From beginning to end it has been a phony issue manipulated for election purposes. Those in the know, know that the plebiscite is a case of the "Emperor's New Clothes." But what of it? If the emperor knows no shame, and insists on going through the motions of donning his "new clothes," can others refuse to play along?
It makes no difference how long Chen Shui-bian remains president. Every day he remains in the presidential palace, he will abuse his authority to the fullest, The term "lame duck" is not in his dictionary. If he wants to exploit the "Plebiscite to Join the UN" for political advantage, he will abuse the power of his office mobilizing the machinery of government. It makes no difference how many people commit suicide by carbon monoxide every day. It makes no difference how many hundreds of millions in tax money are squandered on the "Plebiscite to Join the UN." It makes no difference how many political posters and advertisements peoples are forced to see and hear. Once he "Plebiscite to Join the UN" demonstration is given the green light, two hundred million NT in tax money will be consumed in the blink of an eye. How much more money will be squandered? Who knows? Haven't central government authorities been complaining about budgets being tight? So why is that whenever President Chen issues an order, money is suddenly no object?
Many people want to scream: "I'm mad as hell and I'm not going to take it any more!" So many matters are more important and urgent than the "Plebiscite to Join the UN." What is the purpose of sweeping aside these matters and compelling the entire nation to pursue this unachievable goal? The answer is this: When someone is unwilling to leave office and face possible prosecution for corruption, why would he pay the slightest attention to your protests? When he has successfully rallied Deep Green mob sentiment, why would he ever yell "Stop."
After repeated warnings from US officials, many people worried that Washington/Taipei relations would suffer, Not only was Chen Shui-bian unconcerned, he repeatedly sounded the call to arms. He assumed an air of casual defiance, as if ready and willing to have it out with the US and mainland China. We shouldn't be surprised. Because the more the US and mainland China lash out at him, the more sympathy he will gain from an angry public. Any diplomatic mess can be left to his successor. As he figures it, no matter how big a mess he leaves, he won't need to take any responsibility whatsoever. Why should he fear when it's "Heads I win, tails you lose?"
The hotter the "Plebiscite to Join the UN" burns, the dimmer Hsieh and Su's lights burn. What do any factional rivalries or grievances that Hsieh and Su have count for now? The pair have been demoted to the status of Ping and Pang in Turandot, to Chen's attendants. During "Plebiscite to Join the UN" rallies, the keynote speaker is always Chen Shui-bian. Hsieh and Su can forget about competing. Both have been marginalized. Chen and Chen alone is masterminding this election.
Many people are also criticizing Ma Ying-jeou and Vincent Siew for meekly joining the parade. Not only have Ma and Siew lost their home court advantage, they have alienated Deep Blue voters. The question is, did they have a choice? In 2004, the Lien/Soong ticket focused on the economy. An absurd plebiscite followed by an even more absurd "assassination attempt" pushed substantive debate off the table. Chen Shui-bian has invested all of the government's resources into the "Plebiscite to Join the UN." The US and mainland China have been forced to dance to his tune. Ma and Siew may scream about the economy until they are hoarse, but will voters care? If they refuse to knuckle under, if on September 15, they refuse to join the parade, they will receive no media coverage whatsoever. If on the other hand they take to the streets wearing blue and white "Made in Taiwan" rubber sandals, it makes no difference how ridiculous they might look. At least they will get half of the media coverage. Whether they can shift the focus of debate is another matter altogether.
See what we mean? This is our plight. A president whose term in office ends in half a year, cannot control his own son in law's insider trading or account for the irregularities in his own State Affairs Confidential Expense case. Yet he can hijack the Democratic Progressive Party, hijack the Executive Yuan, hijack Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang, hijack the Kuomintang and the Ma/Siew ticket, even hijack the ordinary citizen. Right now nobody can tell A Bian to shut up. Nobody can tell him to cease and desist. In the coming half year, we will witness a presidential election being hijacked by a plebiscite. We will do so as A Bian's hostages.
中國時報
2007.09.17
是公投綁大選，也是阿扁綁全民
中時社論
兩場激情的動員之後，朝野領袖似乎都對效果頗為滿意，但是很多人此刻都很想問一句：接下來呢？是不是從此刻到明年三月，台灣已沒有其他更重要的事，就只有「公投入聯」這檔事？很遺憾，照這個趨勢繼續走下去，好像答案就是這樣！
從最終的效果看來，最大的贏家當然是陳水扁一人獨得！有人還記得去年的此刻嗎？那時節紅衫軍所掀起的反貪腐怒潮，幾乎將他衝下台，如今他將議題焦點成功的從「反貪腐」扭轉成「公投入聯」，從被動挨打變成主動出擊，從「客場劣勢」轉成「主場優勢」，不僅讓「長昌配」淪為配角，「馬蕭配」也只能拿香跟拜，有如此豐碩的成果，請問陳水扁有什麼理由不玩下去？
是的，所有懂得理性思考的人，都清楚這場「入聯公投」的虛妄性與荒謬性，是從頭到尾在配合選舉操作的假議題。但就算有識者指出它根本就是「國王的新衣」又有何用？如果被剝光的國王自己根本不覺羞慚，還是要硬穿他的「新衣」繼續走秀，其他人能夠不跟嗎？
要知道，不管陳水扁還要做多久的總統，只要他在總統府上班一天，他就會將他的權力使用到極致，在他字典中從來沒有「跛鴨」這兩字。他要玩「公投入聯」，他就一定藉由他職位上優勢，驅動整個國家機器全部投入。所以不論民間每天燒炭身亡的數字是不是在攀高，幾億幾億國民納的稅金都會投進「公投入聯」運動上，標語貼紙廣告早就充斥所有人的視聽空間了，一場入聯公投的遊行，兩億的國家預算眼睛眨都不眨一下就全砸了下去，接下來還要耗費多少錢誰也不知道，中央政府總預算不是一直吃緊嗎？問題是，陳總統一聲令下，多少錢也得配合，不是嗎？
問題就是這麼簡單，很多人都想吶喊：「我受夠了！」當下的台灣比「公投入聯」還重要的議題實在太多了，把一堆急迫的問題擱著不管，卻要傾舉國之力去追求一個根本達不到的目標，這是在幹嘛呢？問題是，當一個面對貪腐訴訟都不肯下台的總統，他會理你嗎？當他已激起深綠選民的熱情之際，他還會住手嗎？
在美國官員一而再、再而三的提出警語後，許多人擔心關心美台關係將因此受到傷害，但陳水扁不僅不怕，還一再公開嗆聲叫陣，一副不惜與美中兩大超強開幹也無所懼的氣魄，他當然可以什麼都不怕，因為此刻美中的施壓力道越大，收割民意反彈成果的是他，未來善後的則是下一任總統！此刻的他就算把外交爛攤子捅得更大，都不必負任何責任，有這種無本生意，試問他何所懼？
注意到沒有？公投入聯炒越熱，蘇謝兩人的身影也就愈黯淡，先前蘇謝有過什麼派系宿怨，有過什麼誤解心結，現在還重要嗎？不重要了，他們兩人早淪為阿扁身旁的哼哈二將，所有公投入聯的造勢場合，壓軸的永遠是陳水扁，蘇謝也不必比什麼大小了，反正一塊都被邊緣化了，這是場陳水扁一個人在玩的選舉！
也有不少人在批評馬蕭何必「拿香跟拜」？不僅喪失主場優勢，也激怒深藍選民，問題是他們有選擇嗎？二○○四年的連宋配談民生議題談得還少嗎？一場荒誕的諮詢性公投外加兩顆子彈，還不是摧枯拉朽，擋都擋不住？當陳水扁祭出所有資源在玩入聯公投之際，當美、中兩大超強都被逼隨之起舞之際，馬蕭兩人扯破喉嚨去喊拚經濟，有人會搭理嗎？他們如果不拿香跟拜，九一五也不辦遊行，整個視聽空間他們連邊都沾不到，他們穿著「藍白拖」上街，自不自然是另一回事，起碼守住半場優勢，至於他們能否再轉移焦點，那得看他們自己的能耐了。
看清楚沒有？這就是我們處境，一個任期只剩半年的總統，沒本事管束他自己女婿炒內線，也沒本事交代他的國務機要費去向，卻有本事綁架民進黨、綁架行政院、綁架長昌配，進一步綁架國民黨與馬蕭配，最後就是全民被綁架！此刻沒有人能叫阿扁住嘴，也沒人能叫他住手，未來半年，我們不僅要在公投綁大選的歲月中度過，也要在阿扁綁全民的氛圍中度過！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 17, 2007
After two frantic demonstrations, one Green and one Blue, ruling government and opposition party leaders seem pleased with the results. But many people may be tempted to ask: Now what? Do political leaders on Taiwan have nothing more important to attend to? Is the "Plebiscite to Join the UN" the only topic they intend to tackle between now and March next year? Unfortunately the answer appears to be yes.
Judging by the result, the biggest winner is Chen Shui-bian. Everyone else was a loser. Remember the same time last year? Public outrage over ruling DPP corruption, brought to a head by the Red Shirt Army, nearly drove Chen out of office. Yet today he has succeeded into shifting the focus from "anti-corruption" to a "Plebiscite to Join the UN." Once he was being passively attacked. Now he has seized the offensive. He has turned his vistor status into a home field advantage. The "Hsieh/Su ticket" been demoted to the status of supporting players. Even the "Ma/Hsiao ticket" can only join the parade. With the result so rewarding for him, what reason does Chen Shui-bian have not to milk it for all it's worth?
Everyone capable of rational thought knows perfectly well that the "Plebiscite to Join the UN" is an absurd charade. From beginning to end it has been a phony issue manipulated for election purposes. Those in the know, know that the plebiscite is a case of the "Emperor's New Clothes." But what of it? If the emperor knows no shame, and insists on going through the motions of donning his "new clothes," can others refuse to play along?
It makes no difference how long Chen Shui-bian remains president. Every day he remains in the presidential palace, he will abuse his authority to the fullest, The term "lame duck" is not in his dictionary. If he wants to exploit the "Plebiscite to Join the UN" for political advantage, he will abuse the power of his office mobilizing the machinery of government. It makes no difference how many people commit suicide by carbon monoxide every day. It makes no difference how many hundreds of millions in tax money are squandered on the "Plebiscite to Join the UN." It makes no difference how many political posters and advertisements peoples are forced to see and hear. Once he "Plebiscite to Join the UN" demonstration is given the green light, two hundred million NT in tax money will be consumed in the blink of an eye. How much more money will be squandered? Who knows? Haven't central government authorities been complaining about budgets being tight? So why is that whenever President Chen issues an order, money is suddenly no object?
Many people want to scream: "I'm mad as hell and I'm not going to take it any more!" So many matters are more important and urgent than the "Plebiscite to Join the UN." What is the purpose of sweeping aside these matters and compelling the entire nation to pursue this unachievable goal? The answer is this: When someone is unwilling to leave office and face possible prosecution for corruption, why would he pay the slightest attention to your protests? When he has successfully rallied Deep Green mob sentiment, why would he ever yell "Stop."
After repeated warnings from US officials, many people worried that Washington/Taipei relations would suffer, Not only was Chen Shui-bian unconcerned, he repeatedly sounded the call to arms. He assumed an air of casual defiance, as if ready and willing to have it out with the US and mainland China. We shouldn't be surprised. Because the more the US and mainland China lash out at him, the more sympathy he will gain from an angry public. Any diplomatic mess can be left to his successor. As he figures it, no matter how big a mess he leaves, he won't need to take any responsibility whatsoever. Why should he fear when it's "Heads I win, tails you lose?"
The hotter the "Plebiscite to Join the UN" burns, the dimmer Hsieh and Su's lights burn. What do any factional rivalries or grievances that Hsieh and Su have count for now? The pair have been demoted to the status of Ping and Pang in Turandot, to Chen's attendants. During "Plebiscite to Join the UN" rallies, the keynote speaker is always Chen Shui-bian. Hsieh and Su can forget about competing. Both have been marginalized. Chen and Chen alone is masterminding this election.
Many people are also criticizing Ma Ying-jeou and Vincent Siew for meekly joining the parade. Not only have Ma and Siew lost their home court advantage, they have alienated Deep Blue voters. The question is, did they have a choice? In 2004, the Lien/Soong ticket focused on the economy. An absurd plebiscite followed by an even more absurd "assassination attempt" pushed substantive debate off the table. Chen Shui-bian has invested all of the government's resources into the "Plebiscite to Join the UN." The US and mainland China have been forced to dance to his tune. Ma and Siew may scream about the economy until they are hoarse, but will voters care? If they refuse to knuckle under, if on September 15, they refuse to join the parade, they will receive no media coverage whatsoever. If on the other hand they take to the streets wearing blue and white "Made in Taiwan" rubber sandals, it makes no difference how ridiculous they might look. At least they will get half of the media coverage. Whether they can shift the focus of debate is another matter altogether.
See what we mean? This is our plight. A president whose term in office ends in half a year, cannot control his own son in law's insider trading or account for the irregularities in his own State Affairs Confidential Expense case. Yet he can hijack the Democratic Progressive Party, hijack the Executive Yuan, hijack Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang, hijack the Kuomintang and the Ma/Siew ticket, even hijack the ordinary citizen. Right now nobody can tell A Bian to shut up. Nobody can tell him to cease and desist. In the coming half year, we will witness a presidential election being hijacked by a plebiscite. We will do so as A Bian's hostages.
中國時報
2007.09.17
是公投綁大選，也是阿扁綁全民
中時社論
兩場激情的動員之後，朝野領袖似乎都對效果頗為滿意，但是很多人此刻都很想問一句：接下來呢？是不是從此刻到明年三月，台灣已沒有其他更重要的事，就只有「公投入聯」這檔事？很遺憾，照這個趨勢繼續走下去，好像答案就是這樣！
從最終的效果看來，最大的贏家當然是陳水扁一人獨得！有人還記得去年的此刻嗎？那時節紅衫軍所掀起的反貪腐怒潮，幾乎將他衝下台，如今他將議題焦點成功的從「反貪腐」扭轉成「公投入聯」，從被動挨打變成主動出擊，從「客場劣勢」轉成「主場優勢」，不僅讓「長昌配」淪為配角，「馬蕭配」也只能拿香跟拜，有如此豐碩的成果，請問陳水扁有什麼理由不玩下去？
是的，所有懂得理性思考的人，都清楚這場「入聯公投」的虛妄性與荒謬性，是從頭到尾在配合選舉操作的假議題。但就算有識者指出它根本就是「國王的新衣」又有何用？如果被剝光的國王自己根本不覺羞慚，還是要硬穿他的「新衣」繼續走秀，其他人能夠不跟嗎？
要知道，不管陳水扁還要做多久的總統，只要他在總統府上班一天，他就會將他的權力使用到極致，在他字典中從來沒有「跛鴨」這兩字。他要玩「公投入聯」，他就一定藉由他職位上優勢，驅動整個國家機器全部投入。所以不論民間每天燒炭身亡的數字是不是在攀高，幾億幾億國民納的稅金都會投進「公投入聯」運動上，標語貼紙廣告早就充斥所有人的視聽空間了，一場入聯公投的遊行，兩億的國家預算眼睛眨都不眨一下就全砸了下去，接下來還要耗費多少錢誰也不知道，中央政府總預算不是一直吃緊嗎？問題是，陳總統一聲令下，多少錢也得配合，不是嗎？
問題就是這麼簡單，很多人都想吶喊：「我受夠了！」當下的台灣比「公投入聯」還重要的議題實在太多了，把一堆急迫的問題擱著不管，卻要傾舉國之力去追求一個根本達不到的目標，這是在幹嘛呢？問題是，當一個面對貪腐訴訟都不肯下台的總統，他會理你嗎？當他已激起深綠選民的熱情之際，他還會住手嗎？
在美國官員一而再、再而三的提出警語後，許多人擔心關心美台關係將因此受到傷害，但陳水扁不僅不怕，還一再公開嗆聲叫陣，一副不惜與美中兩大超強開幹也無所懼的氣魄，他當然可以什麼都不怕，因為此刻美中的施壓力道越大，收割民意反彈成果的是他，未來善後的則是下一任總統！此刻的他就算把外交爛攤子捅得更大，都不必負任何責任，有這種無本生意，試問他何所懼？
注意到沒有？公投入聯炒越熱，蘇謝兩人的身影也就愈黯淡，先前蘇謝有過什麼派系宿怨，有過什麼誤解心結，現在還重要嗎？不重要了，他們兩人早淪為阿扁身旁的哼哈二將，所有公投入聯的造勢場合，壓軸的永遠是陳水扁，蘇謝也不必比什麼大小了，反正一塊都被邊緣化了，這是場陳水扁一個人在玩的選舉！
也有不少人在批評馬蕭何必「拿香跟拜」？不僅喪失主場優勢，也激怒深藍選民，問題是他們有選擇嗎？二○○四年的連宋配談民生議題談得還少嗎？一場荒誕的諮詢性公投外加兩顆子彈，還不是摧枯拉朽，擋都擋不住？當陳水扁祭出所有資源在玩入聯公投之際，當美、中兩大超強都被逼隨之起舞之際，馬蕭兩人扯破喉嚨去喊拚經濟，有人會搭理嗎？他們如果不拿香跟拜，九一五也不辦遊行，整個視聽空間他們連邊都沾不到，他們穿著「藍白拖」上街，自不自然是另一回事，起碼守住半場優勢，至於他們能否再轉移焦點，那得看他們自己的能耐了。
看清楚沒有？這就是我們處境，一個任期只剩半年的總統，沒本事管束他自己女婿炒內線，也沒本事交代他的國務機要費去向，卻有本事綁架民進黨、綁架行政院、綁架長昌配，進一步綁架國民黨與馬蕭配，最後就是全民被綁架！此刻沒有人能叫阿扁住嘴，也沒人能叫他住手，未來半年，我們不僅要在公投綁大選的歲月中度過，也要在阿扁綁全民的氛圍中度過！
Thursday, September 13, 2007
US: Chen Shui-bian has betrayed Taiwan's Interests
US: Chen Shui-bian has betrayed Taiwan's Interests
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 13, 2007
Thomas J. Christensen is US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Christensen's comments on the "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" reveal a central theme: The US considers Chen Shui-bian a betrayer of Taiwan's interests. [Note: according to the ROC Constitution, the "referendum" is actually a "plebiscite"]
By extension, the US believes that the Taiwan independence movement has also betrayed Taiwan's interests. By further extension, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which advocates Taiwan independence, is also a traitor to Taiwan's interests.
Over the past 15 days, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, White House National Security Council senior official Dennis Wilder, and now John Christensen, have commented on the "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan." All three expressed the same viewpoint. The "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" amounts to a "referendum for Taiwan Independence." It changes the name of the nation and it changes the status quo. And Taiwan independence is not in Taiwan's interest.
Christensen underscored the significance of the three officials' comments. The US has already drawn a clear distinction between Chen Shui-bian and the Chen regime on the one hand, and the "Taiwan people" on the other hand. The US opposes Chen Shui-bian's manipulative "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan." It has reiterated its friendship with the "Taiwan people" and is attempting to communicate directly with the "Taiwan people." It unreservedly pointed out that the Chen regime's "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" has betrayed "the interests of the Taiwan people."
Christensen did not mince words expressing disappointment with the Chen regime. He said he had no desire to pubicly disparage the Chen regime's policies. But he had exhausted all private means of persuasion and was compelled to ensure that the "Taiwan people" understood America's point of view. He said "we anticipate that Taiwan’s perceptive, intelligent citizens will see through the rhetoric and make a sound judgment that the referendum does not serve their interests because it will be fundamentally harmful to Taiwan’s external relations."
These three spokespersons for the US emphasized the friendship and commitments the "American people" have made to the "Taiwan people." All three officials stressed that what the US refers to as "Taiwan's interests" truly are Taiwan's interests. By implication they were stressing that Chen Shui-bian was a betrayer of Taiwan's interests. They were saying that when the time comes, the Taiwan people must choose between Taiwan's interests and Chen Shui-bian's interests.
According to these three spokespersons, maintaining peace in the Taiwan Straits and safeguarding Taiwan's democracy and prosperity are in the interests of the Taiwan people. therefore it has betrayed the interests of the Taiwan people. Christensen came right out and denounced the "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" as motivated merely by "short-term political gain" and intended merely for internal consumption. The "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" will limit, not expand Taiwan’s international space. It will be regarded as a violation of a pledge to the US and to the international community. His unspoken implication was: Does Taiwan still want American as its friend? Does Taiwan want to defy the entire international community?
Christensen publicly debunked "rumors" that the US and the Chinese Communist Party had "coordinated" Taiwan Straits policy. He told Chen Shui-bian there is no need for a "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" to exploit "Sinophobia." The first thing Chen ought to confront is the "anti-Americanism" he provoked. Christensen said that Washington's Taiwan Straits policy was not guided by Taipei. Chen Shui-bian should not imagine that he could dictate US policy in the Taiwan Straits. Christensen said "we do not accept the argument that provocative assertions of Taiwan independence are in any way conducive to maintenance of the status quo or peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait." His implication was that Chen Shui-bian had better not imagine he could drag the US down with it.
Christensen debunked the Taiwan independence movement's self-pitying "international orphan" act. He said that Taiwan became a first world, democratic, commercial powerhouse under the status quo. By implication, under the "status quo of the Republic of China." This status quo is the cornerstone of Taiwan's democracy and prosperity. Yet the Taiwan independence movement wants to change this status quo. Christensen rejected the accusation that the U.S. position on the referendum constitutes interference in Taiwan’s democracy. He rejected Chen's claims that "democracy recognizes no limitations." He said the reality is that democracies can and do disagree over policies. While democracy can advocate Taiwan independence, democracy can also oppose Taiwan independence. The DPP would have the world believe that "opposition to Taiwan independence is opposition to democracy." Obviously the US doesn't agree.
Christensen elaborated on the ROC's national defense and military affairs. He pointed out something everyone knows: If one's Taiwan Straits policy is mistaken, then all one's armaments are in vain. Christensen emphasized international reality. He did not comment on Taiwan's crisis of national identity. But he might well have. After all, when one has no idea whom one is fighting for, or what one is fighting for, what is the purpose of an extravagant defense budget?
Christensen said that needlessly provocative actions by Taipei strengthen Beijing’s hand in limiting Taipei's international space, and scare away potential friends who might help Taipei. This heart-to-heart talk focused on "Taiwan's interests." So how did Chen Shui-bian respond to US concerns over the "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan?" He said: "Who's afraid of whom?"
Sixty years of Washington/Taipei relations. Erased by a single "Who's afraid of whom?" from Chen Shui-bian. Is this in the interest of the Chinese people on Taiwan?
美國觀點：陳水扁是台灣利益的背叛者
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.13 03:41 am
細讀美國國務院東亞副助卿柯慶生對「入聯公投」的評論，若要從中歸納出一個核心觀點，那就是：美國認為，陳水扁是台灣利益的背叛者。
若再引伸其可以演繹的意義，那就是：美國認為，台獨是台灣利益的背叛者，主張台獨的民進黨也是台灣利益的背叛者。
十五天內，國務院奈葛彭、白宮韋德寧，與此番柯慶生密集接續對「入聯公投」發言，而三人論述的主旨皆呈現同一觀點，那就是：「入聯公投」是變更國號與改變現狀的「台獨公投」，而台獨是違反台灣利益的。
柯慶生並將三人論述的一個共同點再加強調。那就是，美國在「入聯公投」事件中，已將陳水扁、陳水扁政府與「台灣人民」作出區隔。美國反對陳水扁操弄「入聯公投」，但也重申與「台灣人民」的友誼；並嘗試直接與「台灣人民」對話，毫不保留地指出陳水扁政府的「入聯公投」已違反「台灣人民的利益」。
柯慶生亦毫不掩飾對陳水扁政府的失望。他說，他並不願公開表達與陳水扁政府的政策歧見，而是在窮盡了所有的私密途徑後始被迫出此，俾使台灣民眾明白美國的看法。他甚至說：「希望台灣人民能夠看穿（入聯公投）這套政治說辭……，並能明確分辨這項公投不符台灣利益，因為它將根本傷害台灣對外關係。」
代表美官方發言的這三人，皆一再強調「美國人民」對「台灣人民」的友誼及承諾。當三人反覆陳述美國所稱的「台灣利益」始是真正的「台灣利益」、又同時隱指陳水扁其實是「台灣利益」的背叛者之時，儼然是在訴諸台灣民眾，值此關鍵時刻，應在美國或陳水扁何者正確解讀並維護台灣利益，作一裁判及選擇。
在三人的論述中，維持台海的和平與安全以保障台灣的民主與繁榮，就是台灣人民的利益；但「入聯公投」的台獨動作，將危及台海的和平與安全，因此違反了台灣人民的利益。柯慶生更直接指出，「入聯公投」只是為了「短期政治利益」，只有「內部政治操作的效用」；但是，就台灣人民的利益而言，「入聯公投」將使台灣的國際處境更形惡化；因為，那會被視為，發動「入聯公投」者不能嚴肅面對他們對美國及國際社會的承諾。言下之意即是，台灣還要不要美國這個朋友？台灣難道要對整個國際社會造反？
柯慶生又公開澄清美國與中共「協調」台海政策的「謠言」；其弦外之音是，告訴陳水扁，勿須將「入聯公投」操作成「反中議題」，先應面對他正在發動的「反美風潮」。再者，柯慶生又說，美國的台海政策亦不須由台北來「界定」；這更是要陳水扁別想在台海政策上對美國下指導棋。緊接此話，柯慶生又說，「美國不接受台獨的挑釁有助於維持台海現狀及兩岸和平的論點」；言下之意正是，陳水扁勿妄想拖美國下水。
柯慶生並直言拆穿台獨以「國際孤兒」訴諸政治悲情的手法。他說，台灣成為世界一流的民主政體及繁榮經濟，皆是立足在「現狀」之上。若引伸此言，則應是指立足於「中華民國」的「現狀」，即是台灣民主與繁榮的基石，台獨則是欲改變此一「現狀」。柯慶生更反駁美國「干涉內政」及「民主沒有紅線」的說法。他說，在民主政治中，當然可以反對政策；此意是指，民主可以主張台獨，民主也可以反對台獨。如今民進黨操作成「反台獨即是反民主」的政治氛圍，顯非美國所能認同。
柯慶生亦以相當篇幅論述台灣的國防與軍事。他指出了一個常識：倘若台海政策錯誤，再強的軍備亦枉然。唯柯慶生強調的是國際情勢，卻未論及台灣的國家認同錯亂至此，既不知為誰而戰，亦不知為何而戰，更如何奢論國防？
柯慶生說，無必要的挑釁將強化北京限制台灣空間的腕力，並嚇跑可能幫助台灣的潛在朋友。這些肺腑之言，自皆是以「台灣利益」為著眼。但是，且聽陳水扁昨日對美國關切「入聯公投」如何回應，他說：「怕什麼怕！」
六十年的美台關係，就被陳水扁一句「怕什麼怕」貶成了一文不值，這是否符合台灣利益？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 13, 2007
Thomas J. Christensen is US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Christensen's comments on the "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" reveal a central theme: The US considers Chen Shui-bian a betrayer of Taiwan's interests. [Note: according to the ROC Constitution, the "referendum" is actually a "plebiscite"]
By extension, the US believes that the Taiwan independence movement has also betrayed Taiwan's interests. By further extension, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which advocates Taiwan independence, is also a traitor to Taiwan's interests.
Over the past 15 days, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, White House National Security Council senior official Dennis Wilder, and now John Christensen, have commented on the "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan." All three expressed the same viewpoint. The "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" amounts to a "referendum for Taiwan Independence." It changes the name of the nation and it changes the status quo. And Taiwan independence is not in Taiwan's interest.
Christensen underscored the significance of the three officials' comments. The US has already drawn a clear distinction between Chen Shui-bian and the Chen regime on the one hand, and the "Taiwan people" on the other hand. The US opposes Chen Shui-bian's manipulative "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan." It has reiterated its friendship with the "Taiwan people" and is attempting to communicate directly with the "Taiwan people." It unreservedly pointed out that the Chen regime's "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" has betrayed "the interests of the Taiwan people."
Christensen did not mince words expressing disappointment with the Chen regime. He said he had no desire to pubicly disparage the Chen regime's policies. But he had exhausted all private means of persuasion and was compelled to ensure that the "Taiwan people" understood America's point of view. He said "we anticipate that Taiwan’s perceptive, intelligent citizens will see through the rhetoric and make a sound judgment that the referendum does not serve their interests because it will be fundamentally harmful to Taiwan’s external relations."
These three spokespersons for the US emphasized the friendship and commitments the "American people" have made to the "Taiwan people." All three officials stressed that what the US refers to as "Taiwan's interests" truly are Taiwan's interests. By implication they were stressing that Chen Shui-bian was a betrayer of Taiwan's interests. They were saying that when the time comes, the Taiwan people must choose between Taiwan's interests and Chen Shui-bian's interests.
According to these three spokespersons, maintaining peace in the Taiwan Straits and safeguarding Taiwan's democracy and prosperity are in the interests of the Taiwan people. therefore it has betrayed the interests of the Taiwan people. Christensen came right out and denounced the "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" as motivated merely by "short-term political gain" and intended merely for internal consumption. The "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" will limit, not expand Taiwan’s international space. It will be regarded as a violation of a pledge to the US and to the international community. His unspoken implication was: Does Taiwan still want American as its friend? Does Taiwan want to defy the entire international community?
Christensen publicly debunked "rumors" that the US and the Chinese Communist Party had "coordinated" Taiwan Straits policy. He told Chen Shui-bian there is no need for a "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan" to exploit "Sinophobia." The first thing Chen ought to confront is the "anti-Americanism" he provoked. Christensen said that Washington's Taiwan Straits policy was not guided by Taipei. Chen Shui-bian should not imagine that he could dictate US policy in the Taiwan Straits. Christensen said "we do not accept the argument that provocative assertions of Taiwan independence are in any way conducive to maintenance of the status quo or peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait." His implication was that Chen Shui-bian had better not imagine he could drag the US down with it.
Christensen debunked the Taiwan independence movement's self-pitying "international orphan" act. He said that Taiwan became a first world, democratic, commercial powerhouse under the status quo. By implication, under the "status quo of the Republic of China." This status quo is the cornerstone of Taiwan's democracy and prosperity. Yet the Taiwan independence movement wants to change this status quo. Christensen rejected the accusation that the U.S. position on the referendum constitutes interference in Taiwan’s democracy. He rejected Chen's claims that "democracy recognizes no limitations." He said the reality is that democracies can and do disagree over policies. While democracy can advocate Taiwan independence, democracy can also oppose Taiwan independence. The DPP would have the world believe that "opposition to Taiwan independence is opposition to democracy." Obviously the US doesn't agree.
Christensen elaborated on the ROC's national defense and military affairs. He pointed out something everyone knows: If one's Taiwan Straits policy is mistaken, then all one's armaments are in vain. Christensen emphasized international reality. He did not comment on Taiwan's crisis of national identity. But he might well have. After all, when one has no idea whom one is fighting for, or what one is fighting for, what is the purpose of an extravagant defense budget?
Christensen said that needlessly provocative actions by Taipei strengthen Beijing’s hand in limiting Taipei's international space, and scare away potential friends who might help Taipei. This heart-to-heart talk focused on "Taiwan's interests." So how did Chen Shui-bian respond to US concerns over the "referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan?" He said: "Who's afraid of whom?"
Sixty years of Washington/Taipei relations. Erased by a single "Who's afraid of whom?" from Chen Shui-bian. Is this in the interest of the Chinese people on Taiwan?
美國觀點：陳水扁是台灣利益的背叛者
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.13 03:41 am
細讀美國國務院東亞副助卿柯慶生對「入聯公投」的評論，若要從中歸納出一個核心觀點，那就是：美國認為，陳水扁是台灣利益的背叛者。
若再引伸其可以演繹的意義，那就是：美國認為，台獨是台灣利益的背叛者，主張台獨的民進黨也是台灣利益的背叛者。
十五天內，國務院奈葛彭、白宮韋德寧，與此番柯慶生密集接續對「入聯公投」發言，而三人論述的主旨皆呈現同一觀點，那就是：「入聯公投」是變更國號與改變現狀的「台獨公投」，而台獨是違反台灣利益的。
柯慶生並將三人論述的一個共同點再加強調。那就是，美國在「入聯公投」事件中，已將陳水扁、陳水扁政府與「台灣人民」作出區隔。美國反對陳水扁操弄「入聯公投」，但也重申與「台灣人民」的友誼；並嘗試直接與「台灣人民」對話，毫不保留地指出陳水扁政府的「入聯公投」已違反「台灣人民的利益」。
柯慶生亦毫不掩飾對陳水扁政府的失望。他說，他並不願公開表達與陳水扁政府的政策歧見，而是在窮盡了所有的私密途徑後始被迫出此，俾使台灣民眾明白美國的看法。他甚至說：「希望台灣人民能夠看穿（入聯公投）這套政治說辭……，並能明確分辨這項公投不符台灣利益，因為它將根本傷害台灣對外關係。」
代表美官方發言的這三人，皆一再強調「美國人民」對「台灣人民」的友誼及承諾。當三人反覆陳述美國所稱的「台灣利益」始是真正的「台灣利益」、又同時隱指陳水扁其實是「台灣利益」的背叛者之時，儼然是在訴諸台灣民眾，值此關鍵時刻，應在美國或陳水扁何者正確解讀並維護台灣利益，作一裁判及選擇。
在三人的論述中，維持台海的和平與安全以保障台灣的民主與繁榮，就是台灣人民的利益；但「入聯公投」的台獨動作，將危及台海的和平與安全，因此違反了台灣人民的利益。柯慶生更直接指出，「入聯公投」只是為了「短期政治利益」，只有「內部政治操作的效用」；但是，就台灣人民的利益而言，「入聯公投」將使台灣的國際處境更形惡化；因為，那會被視為，發動「入聯公投」者不能嚴肅面對他們對美國及國際社會的承諾。言下之意即是，台灣還要不要美國這個朋友？台灣難道要對整個國際社會造反？
柯慶生又公開澄清美國與中共「協調」台海政策的「謠言」；其弦外之音是，告訴陳水扁，勿須將「入聯公投」操作成「反中議題」，先應面對他正在發動的「反美風潮」。再者，柯慶生又說，美國的台海政策亦不須由台北來「界定」；這更是要陳水扁別想在台海政策上對美國下指導棋。緊接此話，柯慶生又說，「美國不接受台獨的挑釁有助於維持台海現狀及兩岸和平的論點」；言下之意正是，陳水扁勿妄想拖美國下水。
柯慶生並直言拆穿台獨以「國際孤兒」訴諸政治悲情的手法。他說，台灣成為世界一流的民主政體及繁榮經濟，皆是立足在「現狀」之上。若引伸此言，則應是指立足於「中華民國」的「現狀」，即是台灣民主與繁榮的基石，台獨則是欲改變此一「現狀」。柯慶生更反駁美國「干涉內政」及「民主沒有紅線」的說法。他說，在民主政治中，當然可以反對政策；此意是指，民主可以主張台獨，民主也可以反對台獨。如今民進黨操作成「反台獨即是反民主」的政治氛圍，顯非美國所能認同。
柯慶生亦以相當篇幅論述台灣的國防與軍事。他指出了一個常識：倘若台海政策錯誤，再強的軍備亦枉然。唯柯慶生強調的是國際情勢，卻未論及台灣的國家認同錯亂至此，既不知為誰而戰，亦不知為何而戰，更如何奢論國防？
柯慶生說，無必要的挑釁將強化北京限制台灣空間的腕力，並嚇跑可能幫助台灣的潛在朋友。這些肺腑之言，自皆是以「台灣利益」為著眼。但是，且聽陳水扁昨日對美國關切「入聯公投」如何回應，他說：「怕什麼怕！」
六十年的美台關係，就被陳水扁一句「怕什麼怕」貶成了一文不值，這是否符合台灣利益？
Wednesday, September 12, 2007
Grand Justices amidst a Constitutional Crisis
Grand Justices amidst a Constitutional Crisis
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 12, 2007
The Legislative Yuan has decided to exercise its right of advise and consent over the presidential appointment of Judicial Yuan Grand Justices, Control Yuan officials, and the Auditor General. Whether the opposition party will approve any or all of the president's nominees is uncertain.
The Grand Justices' legal opinion in Case No. 632 states: "[Regarding the appointment of Control Yuan personnel] the constitution does not permit the Legislative Yuan to passively forfeit its power of advise and consent." As it turns out, the political opposition is changing its strategy. From a constitutional perspective, the Grand Justices are correct. But from a practical perspective, the dilemma is rooted in Chen Shui-bian's incompetence and corruption. Any solution will need to balance both the requirements of constitutionalism and the requirements of justice.
The legislature delayed exercised its power of advise and consent in the appointment of Control Yuan officials for many years, because it suspected Chen Shui-bian's motives for nominating financial conglomerate head Yin Chi. Chen's list of nominees was controversial and disappointed public expectations. The opposition party within the Legislative Yuan refused to consider Chen's nominees. For years Chen Shui-bian responded in kind by refusing to nominate any alternates. As a result, the Control Yuan has been deadlocked.
Chen Shui-bian's term is nearing its end. Control Yuan officials are not alone. The terms of half the Grand Justices and the Auditor General are also nearing their ends. Chen Shui-bian has expressed a willingness to submit a new list of nominees for the Control Yuan. The opposition party has agreed to evaluate his nominees. The Legislative Yuan has decided to exercise its power of advise and consent. First it intends to tackle the nominees for Grand Justice and the Auditor General. The circumstances today, however, are somewhat different. Back then Chen Shui-bian's nominations were suspect because of whom he nominated and how he nominated them. Now Chen Shui-bian's nominations are controversial because of his personal corruption and incompetence. Recently Chen Shui-bian went so far as to publicly insult the judiciary over the State Affairs Confidential Expense scandal. Under the circumstances, how can anyone trust him to nominate new Grand Justices? Furthermore, Chen Shui-bian's list of nominees reveals flagrant political bias. It invites public controversy over the professionalism and competence of political appointees. Therefore the Legislative Yuan's refusal to consider Chen's nominations may not accord with the Grand Justices' interpretation of the constitution. But for the legislature to repeatedly cave in and rubberstamp anyone nominated is hardly an acceptable alternative. The opposition party must give careful thought to how this matter should be handled.
The Grand Justices' legal opinion in Case No. 632 reads: "[Regarding the appointment of Control Yuan personnel] the constitution does not permit the Legislative Yuan to passively refuse to exercise its power of advise and consent." If the Legislative Yuan considers the nomination inappropriate, it is within its rights to veto the nomination. There is no question of whatsoever of "violating the constitution." If a veto impacts the Grand Justices' performance of their duties, the only choice the president has is to nominate another candidate. The Grand Justices' legal opinion in Case No. 632 also states that "The constitution does not permit the president to passively refuse to nominate another individual." The constitution cannot simultaneously tolerate the president violating the constitution while objecting to the legislature violating the constitution.
How many nominees for Grand Justice the Legislative Yuan may veto, and how many candidates the president must renominate, may be in dispute. The Grand Justices' legal opinion in Case No. 632 should be based on the impact on the Grand Justices' fulfillment of their duties. According to the rules, an interpretation of the constitution requires a quorum comprising two thirds of the "current number" of Grand Justices. If two thirds of the "current number" express an opinion, then the opinion stands. But if the "current number" of Grand Justices has already fallen below this number, this may affect the proper functioning of the Council of Grand Justices. The question is, what do we mean by the "current number?" According to the constitution, if the "current number" is 15 persons. Two thirds means 11 persons. Eight nominees have been submitted for legislative approval. If five or more nominees are rejected, the shortfall must be made up by the president. But suppose the "current number" is taken to mean "those currently serving." Suppose eight persons are nominated, and only one or two are approved. Then there will only be 10 Grand Justices. A two thirds quorum, consisting of only seven persons, would be interpreting the constitution. Is this few too few? Should the numbers be supplemented by new nominations? This issue will surely be subject to political interference.
The Grand Justices are the Guardian Angels of constitutionalism. The Control Yuan is the nation's "Internal Affairs Division." Chen Shui-bian, a destroyer of the constitution and an abuser of the authority of his office, will be nominating these officials. That is a national tragedy. The opposition party respects the Grand Justices' interpretation. It may be obligated to exercise its power of advise and consent. But the defense of constitutionalism requires checks and balances. If unqualifed persons are nominated, the legislature must cite their reasons, then veto any such nominees. The public will understand. For the legislature to constantly cave in would constitute a gross dereliction of duty, and would warrant harsh public condemnation.
在憲政亂流中提名大法官
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.12 02:55 am
司法院大法官、監察院以及審計長人事同意案，立法院已決定行使同意權，但在野黨是否將不同意部分甚或全部人選，則尚屬未定。
此一演變固與大法官釋字六三二號解釋指「（就監察院人事）立法院消極不行使同意權……為憲法所不許」有關，但在野黨改變了杯葛的策略更為關鍵因素。因為， 就憲法體制而言，大法官所言雖有其依據；但就實際情勢來看，眼下的問題卻是陳水扁失政敗德所造成的。今後如何處理，恐怕還是要在憲政體制和公平正義之間求 得平衡。
回顧監察院人事同意權延宕多年之背景，起因是陳水扁在提名過程中讓財團人士殷琪參與其事，引發質疑；且最後入選名單有相當大的爭議，不孚眾望，立法院在野黨遂拒絕審議。而陳水扁多年來亦以強硬態度應對，拒不重新提名，以致監察院停擺迄今。
如今，陳水扁任期已近尾聲，而非僅監察院，大法官（半數）及審計長等人事均已屆期，陳水扁乃表示願改變監院名單，在野黨亦表示不再杯葛，立法院遂決定行使 同意權，且先處理大法官及審計長之人事案。然而，現今情勢又與當初有所不同；當初是因陳水扁提名過程及名單均有爭議；如今則更因陳水扁貪腐纏身，執政失去 正當性所致。陳水扁近日甚至因其國務機要費案件，出言辱及司法，在此情況下，由其提名大法官，實難獲得社會信任。更何況，在陳水扁提出的大法官名單中，確 有政治立場偏頗、擔任政務官時引起物議的人士濫竽其間。因而，拒不審議固與大法官釋憲不符，但一味妥協、全數通過亦顯不恰當，如何妥適處理，在野黨自應慎 重考慮。
就此而言，大法官釋字六三二號解釋僅謂立法院消極不行使同意權為憲法所不許；唯倘若立法院認為提名不當、予以否決，則無「違憲」問題可言。若因否決而發生 影響大法官會議之功能，總統唯有重新提名一途，否則即屬大法官釋字六三二號解釋所謂「總統消極不為提名……為憲法所不許」的情況，變成總統違憲而非立院違 憲。
至於大法官被提名人選，立法院否決到多少人數，總統必須重新提名，恐怕會有爭議。參照大法官釋字六三二號解釋，應以是否影響大法官的功能為準；而依照大法 官審理案件法的規定，釋憲須有「現有總額」三分之二以上大法官出席、出席三分之二以上通過，則通過人數在此標準以下，可認定為影響其功能。問題是：何謂 「現有總額」？倘以憲法規定人數為準，則「總額」為十五人，三分之二以上須十一人，此次提名八人，則若不通過者超過四人，達到五人或以上，即須由總統補提 名。但「總額」若以「實際在職」人數為準，則本次提名八人，若僅一或二人通過，連同在職者，則為不到十人；三分之二出席，就成了七人亦可釋憲，如此人數是 否過少，應否補提名？此一爭議如何認定，必受政治鬥爭之干擾。
大法官是憲政正義的守護神，監察院則職司風憲；如今卻讓毀憲亂政至此地步的陳水扁行使提名，實是國家的悲劇。在野黨為尊重大法官解釋，或許不能拒審；但為 維護憲政，必須嚴予把關。若有不適任人士，只要有具體的理由，即應否決，社會大眾定能接受；倘若一味放水，反而是立院放棄責任，將受輿論責難。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 12, 2007
The Legislative Yuan has decided to exercise its right of advise and consent over the presidential appointment of Judicial Yuan Grand Justices, Control Yuan officials, and the Auditor General. Whether the opposition party will approve any or all of the president's nominees is uncertain.
The Grand Justices' legal opinion in Case No. 632 states: "[Regarding the appointment of Control Yuan personnel] the constitution does not permit the Legislative Yuan to passively forfeit its power of advise and consent." As it turns out, the political opposition is changing its strategy. From a constitutional perspective, the Grand Justices are correct. But from a practical perspective, the dilemma is rooted in Chen Shui-bian's incompetence and corruption. Any solution will need to balance both the requirements of constitutionalism and the requirements of justice.
The legislature delayed exercised its power of advise and consent in the appointment of Control Yuan officials for many years, because it suspected Chen Shui-bian's motives for nominating financial conglomerate head Yin Chi. Chen's list of nominees was controversial and disappointed public expectations. The opposition party within the Legislative Yuan refused to consider Chen's nominees. For years Chen Shui-bian responded in kind by refusing to nominate any alternates. As a result, the Control Yuan has been deadlocked.
Chen Shui-bian's term is nearing its end. Control Yuan officials are not alone. The terms of half the Grand Justices and the Auditor General are also nearing their ends. Chen Shui-bian has expressed a willingness to submit a new list of nominees for the Control Yuan. The opposition party has agreed to evaluate his nominees. The Legislative Yuan has decided to exercise its power of advise and consent. First it intends to tackle the nominees for Grand Justice and the Auditor General. The circumstances today, however, are somewhat different. Back then Chen Shui-bian's nominations were suspect because of whom he nominated and how he nominated them. Now Chen Shui-bian's nominations are controversial because of his personal corruption and incompetence. Recently Chen Shui-bian went so far as to publicly insult the judiciary over the State Affairs Confidential Expense scandal. Under the circumstances, how can anyone trust him to nominate new Grand Justices? Furthermore, Chen Shui-bian's list of nominees reveals flagrant political bias. It invites public controversy over the professionalism and competence of political appointees. Therefore the Legislative Yuan's refusal to consider Chen's nominations may not accord with the Grand Justices' interpretation of the constitution. But for the legislature to repeatedly cave in and rubberstamp anyone nominated is hardly an acceptable alternative. The opposition party must give careful thought to how this matter should be handled.
The Grand Justices' legal opinion in Case No. 632 reads: "[Regarding the appointment of Control Yuan personnel] the constitution does not permit the Legislative Yuan to passively refuse to exercise its power of advise and consent." If the Legislative Yuan considers the nomination inappropriate, it is within its rights to veto the nomination. There is no question of whatsoever of "violating the constitution." If a veto impacts the Grand Justices' performance of their duties, the only choice the president has is to nominate another candidate. The Grand Justices' legal opinion in Case No. 632 also states that "The constitution does not permit the president to passively refuse to nominate another individual." The constitution cannot simultaneously tolerate the president violating the constitution while objecting to the legislature violating the constitution.
How many nominees for Grand Justice the Legislative Yuan may veto, and how many candidates the president must renominate, may be in dispute. The Grand Justices' legal opinion in Case No. 632 should be based on the impact on the Grand Justices' fulfillment of their duties. According to the rules, an interpretation of the constitution requires a quorum comprising two thirds of the "current number" of Grand Justices. If two thirds of the "current number" express an opinion, then the opinion stands. But if the "current number" of Grand Justices has already fallen below this number, this may affect the proper functioning of the Council of Grand Justices. The question is, what do we mean by the "current number?" According to the constitution, if the "current number" is 15 persons. Two thirds means 11 persons. Eight nominees have been submitted for legislative approval. If five or more nominees are rejected, the shortfall must be made up by the president. But suppose the "current number" is taken to mean "those currently serving." Suppose eight persons are nominated, and only one or two are approved. Then there will only be 10 Grand Justices. A two thirds quorum, consisting of only seven persons, would be interpreting the constitution. Is this few too few? Should the numbers be supplemented by new nominations? This issue will surely be subject to political interference.
The Grand Justices are the Guardian Angels of constitutionalism. The Control Yuan is the nation's "Internal Affairs Division." Chen Shui-bian, a destroyer of the constitution and an abuser of the authority of his office, will be nominating these officials. That is a national tragedy. The opposition party respects the Grand Justices' interpretation. It may be obligated to exercise its power of advise and consent. But the defense of constitutionalism requires checks and balances. If unqualifed persons are nominated, the legislature must cite their reasons, then veto any such nominees. The public will understand. For the legislature to constantly cave in would constitute a gross dereliction of duty, and would warrant harsh public condemnation.
在憲政亂流中提名大法官
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.12 02:55 am
司法院大法官、監察院以及審計長人事同意案，立法院已決定行使同意權，但在野黨是否將不同意部分甚或全部人選，則尚屬未定。
此一演變固與大法官釋字六三二號解釋指「（就監察院人事）立法院消極不行使同意權……為憲法所不許」有關，但在野黨改變了杯葛的策略更為關鍵因素。因為， 就憲法體制而言，大法官所言雖有其依據；但就實際情勢來看，眼下的問題卻是陳水扁失政敗德所造成的。今後如何處理，恐怕還是要在憲政體制和公平正義之間求 得平衡。
回顧監察院人事同意權延宕多年之背景，起因是陳水扁在提名過程中讓財團人士殷琪參與其事，引發質疑；且最後入選名單有相當大的爭議，不孚眾望，立法院在野黨遂拒絕審議。而陳水扁多年來亦以強硬態度應對，拒不重新提名，以致監察院停擺迄今。
如今，陳水扁任期已近尾聲，而非僅監察院，大法官（半數）及審計長等人事均已屆期，陳水扁乃表示願改變監院名單，在野黨亦表示不再杯葛，立法院遂決定行使 同意權，且先處理大法官及審計長之人事案。然而，現今情勢又與當初有所不同；當初是因陳水扁提名過程及名單均有爭議；如今則更因陳水扁貪腐纏身，執政失去 正當性所致。陳水扁近日甚至因其國務機要費案件，出言辱及司法，在此情況下，由其提名大法官，實難獲得社會信任。更何況，在陳水扁提出的大法官名單中，確 有政治立場偏頗、擔任政務官時引起物議的人士濫竽其間。因而，拒不審議固與大法官釋憲不符，但一味妥協、全數通過亦顯不恰當，如何妥適處理，在野黨自應慎 重考慮。
就此而言，大法官釋字六三二號解釋僅謂立法院消極不行使同意權為憲法所不許；唯倘若立法院認為提名不當、予以否決，則無「違憲」問題可言。若因否決而發生 影響大法官會議之功能，總統唯有重新提名一途，否則即屬大法官釋字六三二號解釋所謂「總統消極不為提名……為憲法所不許」的情況，變成總統違憲而非立院違 憲。
至於大法官被提名人選，立法院否決到多少人數，總統必須重新提名，恐怕會有爭議。參照大法官釋字六三二號解釋，應以是否影響大法官的功能為準；而依照大法 官審理案件法的規定，釋憲須有「現有總額」三分之二以上大法官出席、出席三分之二以上通過，則通過人數在此標準以下，可認定為影響其功能。問題是：何謂 「現有總額」？倘以憲法規定人數為準，則「總額」為十五人，三分之二以上須十一人，此次提名八人，則若不通過者超過四人，達到五人或以上，即須由總統補提 名。但「總額」若以「實際在職」人數為準，則本次提名八人，若僅一或二人通過，連同在職者，則為不到十人；三分之二出席，就成了七人亦可釋憲，如此人數是 否過少，應否補提名？此一爭議如何認定，必受政治鬥爭之干擾。
大法官是憲政正義的守護神，監察院則職司風憲；如今卻讓毀憲亂政至此地步的陳水扁行使提名，實是國家的悲劇。在野黨為尊重大法官解釋，或許不能拒審；但為 維護憲政，必須嚴予把關。若有不適任人士，只要有具體的理由，即應否決，社會大眾定能接受；倘若一味放水，反而是立院放棄責任，將受輿論責難。
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
The Olympic Flame Dispute: No ROC Flag, No Status Quo
The Olympic Flame Dispute: No ROC Flag, No Status Quo
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 11, 2007
The Olympic Flame controversy has, no pun intended, flared up once more. This time the cause is the upcoming presidential election and escalating moves toward Taiwan independence. This time the controversy is not limited to whether the Republic of China (ROC) flag may appear along the route of the Olympic Flame. This time Beijing must choose between the Republic of China and a would be "State of Taiwan."
When Taiwan independence was hidden and covert, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hemmed in the Republic of China (ROC) using every means at its disposal. The CCP's attacks against the ROC, its denial of the ROC's legitimacy, became a major factor in the development of Taiwan independence. Each time the CCP diminished the ROC, it aggrandized Taiwan independence. The situation has worsened to the point where the CCP must see that the harder it comes down on the ROC, the more it boosts Taiwan independence.
The Olympic Flame controversy is a clear illustration. In the past, the CCP maintained a Closed Door Policy. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait had no contacts and no exchanges. The internal politics of the Taiwan region were relatively simple. The "Olympic Committee Model" was still internationally viable, right up to the opening of cross Straits exchanges. Taiwan's internal political struggles then became more complex and bitter. Attempts to prevent spectators on Taiwan from waving ROC flags naturally provoked protests. The word now is that Beijing wants to prevent the appearance of ROC flags along the route of the Olympic Flame. This shows even more clearly the changes since the formulation of the "Olympic Committee Model." After all, the original intent was to limit only the flags and anthems used by the local sponsor of the sports event. Extending these limitations to the spectators is unreasonable. Extending these limitiations to the streets of Taiwan along the route of the Olympic Flame is totally unacceptable.
The CCP opposes Taiwan independence. But it must leave the Taiwan region an alternative. Apart from the Republic of China, there is no alternative. The situation in the Taiwan Straits was once a standoff between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the ROC. But now the CCP must make a choice between the ROC and a would be "State of Taiwan." As many point out, if Beijing cannot tolerate the sight of red, white and blue ROC flags along the route of the Olympic Flame, would it prefer the sight of streets lined wtih green "State of Taiwan" flags?
We have entered an era that "does not permit unilateral changes to the status quo." We have entered an era in which we must choose between the "Republic of China" (status quo) or a would be "State of Taiwan" (changing the status quo). Beijing has decided that only de jure independence in the form of "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution" is true Taiwan independence. Preserving the ROC is not Taiwan independence. Therefore Beijing ought to allow the ROC to survive with dignity. If the ROC is no longer able to survive, then Taiwan independence will gather increasing momentum. And the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will inevitably clash one day.
The impact of the "Olympic Flame/ROC flag" controversy is every bit as serious as the "Join the UN/Rejoin the UN" controversy. Many regard the "Join the UN/Rejoin the UN" as an election ploy, merely a Blue vs. Green political tug-of-war. The "Join the UN/Rejoin the UN" issue may involve issues of national dignity and national identity. But it is primarily a Blue vs. Green test of strength. By contrast, the "Olympic Flame/ROC flag" battle will take place on Taiwan soil, along Taipei streets. If the ROC flag is banned, if public and private bodies along the route of the Olympic Flame are compelled to lower their ROC flags, it will certainly turn into a direct test of strength between Beijing authorities and the public on Taiwan. The psychological impact on Taiwan society will be inestimable. If the Beijing authorities forbid the display of ROC flags along the route of the Olympic Flame, they will antagonize everyone on Taiwan, Blue and Green alike.
How the "Olympic Flame/ROC flag" incident will play out is not yet clear. Ma Ying-jeou and Frank Hsieh have said they will carry ROC flags with them when they welcome the Olympic Flame. Ma Ying-jeou announced his "Five Principles concerning the Flag and the Anthem." He proposed that henceforth sporting events and the audience be separated. That way the audience will not be denied the right to wave flags and sing the anthem. We fear altercations within the grandstands at Olympic venues. This sort of backlash from the "Olympic Flame/ROC flag" incident is inevitable.
These changes in the Taiwan Straits situation have occurred because the DPP is currently in power. For the DPP, the only distinction remaining between the "Republic of China" and "Taiwan independence" is a paper distinction, the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." If the Republic of China flag continues flying over the presidential palace and other government buildings, then the Republic of China's status quo can be maintained. But if the Beijing authorities forbid the flying of the ROC flag along the route of the Olympic Flame, it will seriously impact the status quo. It will add fuel to the fire of Taiwan independence, and provoke demands for change. The Beijing authorities must understand that the ROC, with its red, white, and blue flag, is an important factor in the maintenance of the status quo.
The status quo in the Taiwan Strait is: The Republic of China or a would be "State of Taiwan?" Which offers a way out? Beijing must choose between the Republic of China and a would be "State of Taiwan." If it opposes changes to the status quo but prohibits the appearance of the ROC flag along the route of the Olympic Flame, then the "status quo" will be difficult to maintain, and the cross Straits crisis will inevitably become more serious.
Without the Republic of China flag, there is no "status quo" in the Taiwan Straits.
聖火紀事：沒有國旗，豈有現狀？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.11 03:34 am
奧運聖火，又生波折。此事發生在因總統大選而台獨操作升高之際，所涉及的已不僅是聖火來台沿途可否出現國旗的問題，而是北京的台海政策必須在中華民國與台灣國之間作一抉擇的問題。
往昔，在台獨隱伏之時，中共全面圍堵中華民國；而中共打壓和否定中華民國，亦成為台獨發展的主要背景因素。中共每削減中華民國一分，就為台獨增添一分。爾今情勢急轉直下，惡化至如此地步，中共當局應當已經看出這個蹺蹺板；愈打壓中華民國，台獨的聲勢就愈高漲。
聖火爭議是一鮮明例證。過去，中共鎖國，兩岸不接觸、不交流，台灣內部政治亦相對較為單純之時，「奧會模式」在國際場合尚可維持；及至兩岸開放交流，台灣內部的政治鬥爭既複雜又尖銳，欲限制在台灣本土觀看比賽的民眾亦不可持國旗，自然屢生爭議。如今，竟又傳出北京方面有禁止聖火沿途出現國旗的主張，更加顯示時空的變異已經超出了當年制定「奧會模式」時的想像。畢竟，原是針對賽事當局及參賽者規定的旗歌限制，欲延伸至賽場觀眾已非合理，如今若再欲擴大至聖火沿途的台灣城市空間，這自是絕無可能接受之事。
中共反對台獨，但總要讓台灣有一條路可走，而捨中華民國之外，別無他途。過去，台海情勢或許是中華人民共和國與中華民國的對決，但如今則已成中共須在中華民國或台灣國之間作一抉擇之勢。正如許多人指出，聖火來台，若不容出現青天白日滿地紅國旗，難道北京希望看到沿路皆是台灣國的旗幟迎接聖火？
海峽情勢進入「不容片面改變現狀」的時代，其實就是已經進入必須在「中華民國」（現狀）或「台灣國」（改變現狀）之間作一抉擇的階段。北京當局既認定「正名制憲」的「法理台獨」才是「台獨」，而「中華民國」非屬台獨；則北京理當讓「中華民國」能夠維持生機與尊嚴。若中華民國亦無活路，自使台獨的聲勢攀高不下，如此則兩岸難免會有對撞的一天。
「聖火／國旗」事件的影響未必小於「入聯／返聯」議題。許多人皆視「入聯／返聯」為選戰手法，只是藍綠的政治拔河而已；因而，「入聯／返聯」雖亦涉及國家尊嚴及民族主義的操作，但仍以藍綠相互角力的成分居大。相對而言，「聖火／國旗」事件，將以台灣本土台北市的開放空間為事件現場，倘竟禁止出現國旗，又命沿路公私機構降旗，必將形成北京當局與台灣民眾的直接角力，對台灣社會的心理衝擊將不堪設想。北京當局若有聖火沿途禁旗主張，不啻是與全體台灣民眾為敵，藍綠皆然。
如今，「聖火／國旗」事件將如何演化尚未明朗，馬英九及謝長廷卻皆已表態將持國旗迎聖火；而馬英九更宣示「旗歌五原則」，主張今後應將「賽事」與「觀眾」區隔，不能剝奪觀眾持國旗、唱國歌的權利。如此一來「聖火／國旗」之事猶不知如何發展，未來比賽現場觀眾席上的旗歌爭議卻已可預料將層出迭見。這是「聖火／國旗」事件引發的反彈，無可回逆。
台海情勢丕變，由於民進黨取得執政地位，如今「中華民國」與「台獨」的分際，其實只剩下一紙之隔的「正名制憲」四字而已。倘若中華民國的國旗仍能每日升上總統府及所有政府機構的旗桿，中華民國的「現狀」即差堪維持；而若北京當局竟欲在聖火沿途禁止國旗出現，其立即效應必是對「現狀」的重大衝擊，亦是為台獨改變現狀的訴求火上加油。準此以言，北京當局應知：中華民國及青天白日旗皆為維持現狀的重要支柱！
台灣如今的政治主題儼然已是：中華民國與台灣國，何者才是台灣的出路？因此，北京當局的台海政策，亦必須在中華民國與台灣國之間作一抉擇。倘若一方面「反對改變現狀」，另一方面又禁止聖火沿途出現國旗，則「現狀」既難維持，兩岸的困局也就必然更趨嚴峻。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 11, 2007
The Olympic Flame controversy has, no pun intended, flared up once more. This time the cause is the upcoming presidential election and escalating moves toward Taiwan independence. This time the controversy is not limited to whether the Republic of China (ROC) flag may appear along the route of the Olympic Flame. This time Beijing must choose between the Republic of China and a would be "State of Taiwan."
When Taiwan independence was hidden and covert, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hemmed in the Republic of China (ROC) using every means at its disposal. The CCP's attacks against the ROC, its denial of the ROC's legitimacy, became a major factor in the development of Taiwan independence. Each time the CCP diminished the ROC, it aggrandized Taiwan independence. The situation has worsened to the point where the CCP must see that the harder it comes down on the ROC, the more it boosts Taiwan independence.
The Olympic Flame controversy is a clear illustration. In the past, the CCP maintained a Closed Door Policy. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait had no contacts and no exchanges. The internal politics of the Taiwan region were relatively simple. The "Olympic Committee Model" was still internationally viable, right up to the opening of cross Straits exchanges. Taiwan's internal political struggles then became more complex and bitter. Attempts to prevent spectators on Taiwan from waving ROC flags naturally provoked protests. The word now is that Beijing wants to prevent the appearance of ROC flags along the route of the Olympic Flame. This shows even more clearly the changes since the formulation of the "Olympic Committee Model." After all, the original intent was to limit only the flags and anthems used by the local sponsor of the sports event. Extending these limitations to the spectators is unreasonable. Extending these limitiations to the streets of Taiwan along the route of the Olympic Flame is totally unacceptable.
The CCP opposes Taiwan independence. But it must leave the Taiwan region an alternative. Apart from the Republic of China, there is no alternative. The situation in the Taiwan Straits was once a standoff between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the ROC. But now the CCP must make a choice between the ROC and a would be "State of Taiwan." As many point out, if Beijing cannot tolerate the sight of red, white and blue ROC flags along the route of the Olympic Flame, would it prefer the sight of streets lined wtih green "State of Taiwan" flags?
We have entered an era that "does not permit unilateral changes to the status quo." We have entered an era in which we must choose between the "Republic of China" (status quo) or a would be "State of Taiwan" (changing the status quo). Beijing has decided that only de jure independence in the form of "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution" is true Taiwan independence. Preserving the ROC is not Taiwan independence. Therefore Beijing ought to allow the ROC to survive with dignity. If the ROC is no longer able to survive, then Taiwan independence will gather increasing momentum. And the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will inevitably clash one day.
The impact of the "Olympic Flame/ROC flag" controversy is every bit as serious as the "Join the UN/Rejoin the UN" controversy. Many regard the "Join the UN/Rejoin the UN" as an election ploy, merely a Blue vs. Green political tug-of-war. The "Join the UN/Rejoin the UN" issue may involve issues of national dignity and national identity. But it is primarily a Blue vs. Green test of strength. By contrast, the "Olympic Flame/ROC flag" battle will take place on Taiwan soil, along Taipei streets. If the ROC flag is banned, if public and private bodies along the route of the Olympic Flame are compelled to lower their ROC flags, it will certainly turn into a direct test of strength between Beijing authorities and the public on Taiwan. The psychological impact on Taiwan society will be inestimable. If the Beijing authorities forbid the display of ROC flags along the route of the Olympic Flame, they will antagonize everyone on Taiwan, Blue and Green alike.
How the "Olympic Flame/ROC flag" incident will play out is not yet clear. Ma Ying-jeou and Frank Hsieh have said they will carry ROC flags with them when they welcome the Olympic Flame. Ma Ying-jeou announced his "Five Principles concerning the Flag and the Anthem." He proposed that henceforth sporting events and the audience be separated. That way the audience will not be denied the right to wave flags and sing the anthem. We fear altercations within the grandstands at Olympic venues. This sort of backlash from the "Olympic Flame/ROC flag" incident is inevitable.
These changes in the Taiwan Straits situation have occurred because the DPP is currently in power. For the DPP, the only distinction remaining between the "Republic of China" and "Taiwan independence" is a paper distinction, the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." If the Republic of China flag continues flying over the presidential palace and other government buildings, then the Republic of China's status quo can be maintained. But if the Beijing authorities forbid the flying of the ROC flag along the route of the Olympic Flame, it will seriously impact the status quo. It will add fuel to the fire of Taiwan independence, and provoke demands for change. The Beijing authorities must understand that the ROC, with its red, white, and blue flag, is an important factor in the maintenance of the status quo.
The status quo in the Taiwan Strait is: The Republic of China or a would be "State of Taiwan?" Which offers a way out? Beijing must choose between the Republic of China and a would be "State of Taiwan." If it opposes changes to the status quo but prohibits the appearance of the ROC flag along the route of the Olympic Flame, then the "status quo" will be difficult to maintain, and the cross Straits crisis will inevitably become more serious.
Without the Republic of China flag, there is no "status quo" in the Taiwan Straits.
聖火紀事：沒有國旗，豈有現狀？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.11 03:34 am
奧運聖火，又生波折。此事發生在因總統大選而台獨操作升高之際，所涉及的已不僅是聖火來台沿途可否出現國旗的問題，而是北京的台海政策必須在中華民國與台灣國之間作一抉擇的問題。
往昔，在台獨隱伏之時，中共全面圍堵中華民國；而中共打壓和否定中華民國，亦成為台獨發展的主要背景因素。中共每削減中華民國一分，就為台獨增添一分。爾今情勢急轉直下，惡化至如此地步，中共當局應當已經看出這個蹺蹺板；愈打壓中華民國，台獨的聲勢就愈高漲。
聖火爭議是一鮮明例證。過去，中共鎖國，兩岸不接觸、不交流，台灣內部政治亦相對較為單純之時，「奧會模式」在國際場合尚可維持；及至兩岸開放交流，台灣內部的政治鬥爭既複雜又尖銳，欲限制在台灣本土觀看比賽的民眾亦不可持國旗，自然屢生爭議。如今，竟又傳出北京方面有禁止聖火沿途出現國旗的主張，更加顯示時空的變異已經超出了當年制定「奧會模式」時的想像。畢竟，原是針對賽事當局及參賽者規定的旗歌限制，欲延伸至賽場觀眾已非合理，如今若再欲擴大至聖火沿途的台灣城市空間，這自是絕無可能接受之事。
中共反對台獨，但總要讓台灣有一條路可走，而捨中華民國之外，別無他途。過去，台海情勢或許是中華人民共和國與中華民國的對決，但如今則已成中共須在中華民國或台灣國之間作一抉擇之勢。正如許多人指出，聖火來台，若不容出現青天白日滿地紅國旗，難道北京希望看到沿路皆是台灣國的旗幟迎接聖火？
海峽情勢進入「不容片面改變現狀」的時代，其實就是已經進入必須在「中華民國」（現狀）或「台灣國」（改變現狀）之間作一抉擇的階段。北京當局既認定「正名制憲」的「法理台獨」才是「台獨」，而「中華民國」非屬台獨；則北京理當讓「中華民國」能夠維持生機與尊嚴。若中華民國亦無活路，自使台獨的聲勢攀高不下，如此則兩岸難免會有對撞的一天。
「聖火／國旗」事件的影響未必小於「入聯／返聯」議題。許多人皆視「入聯／返聯」為選戰手法，只是藍綠的政治拔河而已；因而，「入聯／返聯」雖亦涉及國家尊嚴及民族主義的操作，但仍以藍綠相互角力的成分居大。相對而言，「聖火／國旗」事件，將以台灣本土台北市的開放空間為事件現場，倘竟禁止出現國旗，又命沿路公私機構降旗，必將形成北京當局與台灣民眾的直接角力，對台灣社會的心理衝擊將不堪設想。北京當局若有聖火沿途禁旗主張，不啻是與全體台灣民眾為敵，藍綠皆然。
如今，「聖火／國旗」事件將如何演化尚未明朗，馬英九及謝長廷卻皆已表態將持國旗迎聖火；而馬英九更宣示「旗歌五原則」，主張今後應將「賽事」與「觀眾」區隔，不能剝奪觀眾持國旗、唱國歌的權利。如此一來「聖火／國旗」之事猶不知如何發展，未來比賽現場觀眾席上的旗歌爭議卻已可預料將層出迭見。這是「聖火／國旗」事件引發的反彈，無可回逆。
台海情勢丕變，由於民進黨取得執政地位，如今「中華民國」與「台獨」的分際，其實只剩下一紙之隔的「正名制憲」四字而已。倘若中華民國的國旗仍能每日升上總統府及所有政府機構的旗桿，中華民國的「現狀」即差堪維持；而若北京當局竟欲在聖火沿途禁止國旗出現，其立即效應必是對「現狀」的重大衝擊，亦是為台獨改變現狀的訴求火上加油。準此以言，北京當局應知：中華民國及青天白日旗皆為維持現狀的重要支柱！
台灣如今的政治主題儼然已是：中華民國與台灣國，何者才是台灣的出路？因此，北京當局的台海政策，亦必須在中華民國與台灣國之間作一抉擇。倘若一方面「反對改變現狀」，另一方面又禁止聖火沿途出現國旗，則「現狀」既難維持，兩岸的困局也就必然更趨嚴峻。
Monday, September 10, 2007
The Final Showdown between the Republic of China and the "Nation of Taiwan"
The Final Showdown between the Republic of China and the "Nation of Taiwan"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 08, 2007
The upcoming presidential election is being defined as a final showdown between the Republic of China and a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." It was inevitable that it would come to this.
First, let's look at what it has come to. On the day of the Hu/Bush summit, Chen Shui-bian was in Nantou, where he repeated 13 times, "We demand Taiwan independence!" (The only thing he didn't say was "So what are you going to do about it?) Frank Hsieh declared that if he was elected he would become the "President of the Nation of Taiwan." Later he amended his statement, saying that "Taiwan is the Republic of China." But the Republic of China is of course not the "Nation of Taiwan." The "Plebiscite to Join the UN" is no longer a means of pretending one is "not seeking Taiwan independence," but merely a means of "joining the UN under a new name." As matters stand, the rhetoric and thinking of those on the political stage is now aligned with that of the Green camp's pirate radio stations. The Nation of Taiwan has now revealed its true face.
Chen Shui-bian has hijacked the Democratic Progressive Party. As long as he can use "Chen Shui-bian the Champion of Taiwan Independence" to rescue "Chen Shui-bian the Kleptocrat who faces Indictment," his strategy will not change. This presidential election will be turned into a showdown between the "Nation of Taiwan" and the Republic of China. Therefore, even if Frank Hsieh is elected, he will not be able to start anew "March next year" as he promised in the US. Who doesn't know that so-called Taiwan independence "elders" have already warned him: "If you don't promote the "rectification of names" and the "authoring of a new constitution," we are going to put the screws to you." Therefore, the theme of the upcoming election has already been set. The Democratic Progressive Party has already defined Taiwan's political scenario as a showdown between the "Nation of Taiwan" and the Republic of China.
Next, let's look at why it has come to this. The "Nation of Taiwan" has not shown its face for some time. Instead, it has been reincarnated under various aliases, as "nativization," as "Taiwan uber alles," as "loving Taiwan," as "Taiwanese pathos," as "normalization of the nation," as the "rectification of names," and as the "authoring a new new constitution." The same applies to the "Plebiscite to Join the UN." From the very beginning Chen Shui-bian insisted that it "has nothing to do with Taiwan independence," and that he "has not violated the Five Noes." Ever since the Democratic Progressive Party assumed power, it has been playing word games. Switching back and forth between the "Nation of Taiwan" and the "Republic of China," turning black into white. The result is the public on Taiwan has not been able to distinguish between the two. Now however, the "Nation of Taiwan" has revealed its true face. The public no longer has any reason not to make a clear choice. Therefore, the upcoming presidential election will inevitably become a final showdown between the Republic of China and the "Nation of Taiwan." Everyone has made his position clear. No need to remain in hiding any longer. No need to use a smoke screen.
This time Chen Shui-bian's Taiwan independence moves cannot be dismissed as mere "election ploys." One cannot assume that after March next year everything will simply return to the way it was. This time Chen's Taiwan independence moves involve his prosecution for corruption and his legacy. He is fighting for his political life. How else can he hijack the Democratic Progressive Party? How else can he deal with corruption indictments after leaving office? This time Chen Shui-bian's goal is to create a political and social psychological breakthrough for Taiwan independence by means of the upcoming election. He hopes to ensure his status as the standard bearer for Taiwan independence after stepping down. Therefore, the "Nation of Taiwan" is not a phony agenda that will automatically vanish once the election passes. Instead, it must be seen as a permanent break with the Republic of China, a path of no return. This election is the final showdown between the Republic of China and a would be "Nation of Taiwan." It is also a showdown between a president of the Republic of China and a would be president of a would be "Nation of Taiwan." This is what it has come to, and this is what it had to come to.
Looking back at the vicissitudes of the past eight years, we see that Chen Shui-bian once advocated a "new centrist path." He pledged "Five Noes." But now he is moving toward "Four Demands," toward a "Plebiscite to Join the UN" and a "Plebiscite for Taiwan Independence." During these eight long years, Chen Shui-bian has by increments adopted an ever more radical posture as cover for his gross incompetence and brazen malfeasance. Centrist voters have been bitterly let down. On the other hand, Chen Shui-bian has finally removed his political camouflage. He has revealed his Taiwan independence colors. For the first time, the public has the opportunity to make a clear choice between a would be "Nation of Taiwan" and the Republic of China. This is a turning point worth celebrating. The election is seven months away. This gives the public a chance to consider their feelings about a would be "Nation of Taiwan" and the Republic of China, and make a calm and reasoned choice.
The Nation of Taiwan has come out of the closet. It is no longer pretending to toe the "new centrist path." It is no longer pretending to honor the "Five Noes." The issue in the upcoming election is going to be: "The Republic of China or the Nation of Taiwan? Make your choice!" Which "country" will win? No one knows. Any would be "Nation of Taiwan" has an Achilles heel. Otherwise its champions would not have had to hide their real agenda along the way. But the case for the Republic of China also has vulnerabilties. Otherwise its defenders would not come across so mealy-mouthed and defensive.
The upcoming presidential election has been defined as a final showdown between the Republic of China and a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." Whoever fears to step onto this battlefield, whoever lacks the ability to direct this battle, will be the loser.
一場中華民國與台灣國的決戰
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.08 05:28 am
這場總統大選已經定位為中華民國與台灣國的決戰，且也必須定位為中華民國與台灣國的決戰。
「已經定位」是實然面，「必須定位」則為應然面。
先談「已經定位」。雪梨布胡會當天，陳水扁在南投說了十三次「我們就是台獨」（他只是沒說「嘸你嘜安吶」），謝長廷則宣示他選的是「台灣國總統」（後來，他修正說「台灣就是中華民國」，但「中華民國」畢竟不是「台灣國」），再加上「入聯公投」也不再以「不是台獨」來遮掩，而逕指是以「新國家的名義入聯」。事態至此，檯面人物的語言及思維已與綠營地下電台完全一致，台灣國儼然已以本來面目亮相。
民進黨被陳水扁挾持，只要他以「台獨的陳水扁」來挽救「貪腐的陳水扁」之大戰略不變，這場總統大選就必然被他導向「台灣國」與「中華民國」的決戰。因而，縱使謝長廷勝選，謝也絕無可能使一切在「明年三月以後」歸零（他訪美時如此說）；豈未聞如今已有所謂台獨「大老」警告謝長廷：「你當總統不搞這些（正名制憲），我們也會逼你搞！」所以，自這場大選至大選以後，台灣的政局皆已被民進黨定位為台灣國與中華民國的決戰。
再談「必須定位」。長期以來，「台灣國」並未以本來面目現身；而是以「本土化」、「主體性」、「愛台灣」、「台灣悲情」、「國家正常化」、「正名制憲」等「化名」與「化身」示人；甚至此次「入聯公投」，陳水扁一開始亦稱「無關台獨」，「未違反四不」。民進黨主政以來，始終在「中華民國」與「台灣國」之間穿出穿進，搞得虛實莫辨，真偽難分；影響所及，台灣民眾也一直未能在台灣國與中華民國之間作一認真的思辨。然而，如今情勢發展至此，「台灣國」既以本來面目示人，則國人也就沒有不作抉擇的餘地。因此，這次總統大選也就「必須定位」為中華民國與台灣國的決戰；大家都把話說清楚，勿再猶抱琵琶半遮面，也不要再打煙幕戰。
不可將陳水扁此番的台獨操作視為僅是「選舉議題」，而認為「明年三月以後」一切即可復原；因為，這次台獨操作，涉及陳水扁的貪腐官司及歷史定位，可謂是他政治生命的生死掙扎，不如此他如何挾持民進黨，不如此他又如何對付卸任後的貪腐追訴？陳水扁此時的目標是：透過此次大選，在政治上及社會心理上造成為台獨衝破「紅線」的效應，藉以確保他在卸任後維持台獨旗手的地位；就此而言，「台灣國」絕不會是大選過後就自動消失的「假議題」，而可視為自此與中華民國分道揚鑣的不歸路。
這次選舉是中華民國與台灣國的決戰，也是中華民國總統與台灣國總統的決戰。已經如此定位，亦必須如此定位。
回顧八年來的滄桑變化，陳水扁曾有「新中間路線」的思維，亦有「四不一沒有」的承諾，如今卻走向「四要」，及以「入聯公投」包裝「台獨公投」；漫漫八年，陳水扁一步步走上以更激進的姿態來掩飾其失政敗德的路子，中間選民對他的期待亦付諸東流，此皆十分可惜之事。但是，反過來說，陳水扁最後終於卸去一切偽裝的政治胭脂，以台獨的真面目亮相，卻亦使國人第一次有機會在台灣國與中華民國之間作一思辨與抉擇，這卻是一個值得國人慶幸的契機。何況，此時距大選尚有七個月，國人可將台灣國與中華民國置於胸臆腦際，慢慢咀嚼反芻，然後好整以暇地作出冷靜明智的抉擇。
台灣國已以本來面目亮相，沒有「新中間路線」的幻影，亦不再有「四不一沒有」的虛晃。這次大選的主題就是：中華民國與台灣國，你選何國？至於究竟最後何「國」勝出，恐無人可以逆料。畢竟，「台灣國」的論述者有其罩門，否則即不必一路遮遮掩掩，不肯以本來面目示人；而「中華民國」的論述者亦有弱點，否則即不會始終說不清楚，處處陷於挨打的狀態。
然而，無論如何，這次選舉已是一場中華民國與台灣國的決戰；誰不敢進入這個戰場，或沒有能力經營此一戰場，即是失敗者，就是輸家。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 08, 2007
The upcoming presidential election is being defined as a final showdown between the Republic of China and a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." It was inevitable that it would come to this.
First, let's look at what it has come to. On the day of the Hu/Bush summit, Chen Shui-bian was in Nantou, where he repeated 13 times, "We demand Taiwan independence!" (The only thing he didn't say was "So what are you going to do about it?) Frank Hsieh declared that if he was elected he would become the "President of the Nation of Taiwan." Later he amended his statement, saying that "Taiwan is the Republic of China." But the Republic of China is of course not the "Nation of Taiwan." The "Plebiscite to Join the UN" is no longer a means of pretending one is "not seeking Taiwan independence," but merely a means of "joining the UN under a new name." As matters stand, the rhetoric and thinking of those on the political stage is now aligned with that of the Green camp's pirate radio stations. The Nation of Taiwan has now revealed its true face.
Chen Shui-bian has hijacked the Democratic Progressive Party. As long as he can use "Chen Shui-bian the Champion of Taiwan Independence" to rescue "Chen Shui-bian the Kleptocrat who faces Indictment," his strategy will not change. This presidential election will be turned into a showdown between the "Nation of Taiwan" and the Republic of China. Therefore, even if Frank Hsieh is elected, he will not be able to start anew "March next year" as he promised in the US. Who doesn't know that so-called Taiwan independence "elders" have already warned him: "If you don't promote the "rectification of names" and the "authoring of a new constitution," we are going to put the screws to you." Therefore, the theme of the upcoming election has already been set. The Democratic Progressive Party has already defined Taiwan's political scenario as a showdown between the "Nation of Taiwan" and the Republic of China.
Next, let's look at why it has come to this. The "Nation of Taiwan" has not shown its face for some time. Instead, it has been reincarnated under various aliases, as "nativization," as "Taiwan uber alles," as "loving Taiwan," as "Taiwanese pathos," as "normalization of the nation," as the "rectification of names," and as the "authoring a new new constitution." The same applies to the "Plebiscite to Join the UN." From the very beginning Chen Shui-bian insisted that it "has nothing to do with Taiwan independence," and that he "has not violated the Five Noes." Ever since the Democratic Progressive Party assumed power, it has been playing word games. Switching back and forth between the "Nation of Taiwan" and the "Republic of China," turning black into white. The result is the public on Taiwan has not been able to distinguish between the two. Now however, the "Nation of Taiwan" has revealed its true face. The public no longer has any reason not to make a clear choice. Therefore, the upcoming presidential election will inevitably become a final showdown between the Republic of China and the "Nation of Taiwan." Everyone has made his position clear. No need to remain in hiding any longer. No need to use a smoke screen.
This time Chen Shui-bian's Taiwan independence moves cannot be dismissed as mere "election ploys." One cannot assume that after March next year everything will simply return to the way it was. This time Chen's Taiwan independence moves involve his prosecution for corruption and his legacy. He is fighting for his political life. How else can he hijack the Democratic Progressive Party? How else can he deal with corruption indictments after leaving office? This time Chen Shui-bian's goal is to create a political and social psychological breakthrough for Taiwan independence by means of the upcoming election. He hopes to ensure his status as the standard bearer for Taiwan independence after stepping down. Therefore, the "Nation of Taiwan" is not a phony agenda that will automatically vanish once the election passes. Instead, it must be seen as a permanent break with the Republic of China, a path of no return. This election is the final showdown between the Republic of China and a would be "Nation of Taiwan." It is also a showdown between a president of the Republic of China and a would be president of a would be "Nation of Taiwan." This is what it has come to, and this is what it had to come to.
Looking back at the vicissitudes of the past eight years, we see that Chen Shui-bian once advocated a "new centrist path." He pledged "Five Noes." But now he is moving toward "Four Demands," toward a "Plebiscite to Join the UN" and a "Plebiscite for Taiwan Independence." During these eight long years, Chen Shui-bian has by increments adopted an ever more radical posture as cover for his gross incompetence and brazen malfeasance. Centrist voters have been bitterly let down. On the other hand, Chen Shui-bian has finally removed his political camouflage. He has revealed his Taiwan independence colors. For the first time, the public has the opportunity to make a clear choice between a would be "Nation of Taiwan" and the Republic of China. This is a turning point worth celebrating. The election is seven months away. This gives the public a chance to consider their feelings about a would be "Nation of Taiwan" and the Republic of China, and make a calm and reasoned choice.
The Nation of Taiwan has come out of the closet. It is no longer pretending to toe the "new centrist path." It is no longer pretending to honor the "Five Noes." The issue in the upcoming election is going to be: "The Republic of China or the Nation of Taiwan? Make your choice!" Which "country" will win? No one knows. Any would be "Nation of Taiwan" has an Achilles heel. Otherwise its champions would not have had to hide their real agenda along the way. But the case for the Republic of China also has vulnerabilties. Otherwise its defenders would not come across so mealy-mouthed and defensive.
The upcoming presidential election has been defined as a final showdown between the Republic of China and a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." Whoever fears to step onto this battlefield, whoever lacks the ability to direct this battle, will be the loser.
一場中華民國與台灣國的決戰
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.08 05:28 am
這場總統大選已經定位為中華民國與台灣國的決戰，且也必須定位為中華民國與台灣國的決戰。
「已經定位」是實然面，「必須定位」則為應然面。
先談「已經定位」。雪梨布胡會當天，陳水扁在南投說了十三次「我們就是台獨」（他只是沒說「嘸你嘜安吶」），謝長廷則宣示他選的是「台灣國總統」（後來，他修正說「台灣就是中華民國」，但「中華民國」畢竟不是「台灣國」），再加上「入聯公投」也不再以「不是台獨」來遮掩，而逕指是以「新國家的名義入聯」。事態至此，檯面人物的語言及思維已與綠營地下電台完全一致，台灣國儼然已以本來面目亮相。
民進黨被陳水扁挾持，只要他以「台獨的陳水扁」來挽救「貪腐的陳水扁」之大戰略不變，這場總統大選就必然被他導向「台灣國」與「中華民國」的決戰。因而，縱使謝長廷勝選，謝也絕無可能使一切在「明年三月以後」歸零（他訪美時如此說）；豈未聞如今已有所謂台獨「大老」警告謝長廷：「你當總統不搞這些（正名制憲），我們也會逼你搞！」所以，自這場大選至大選以後，台灣的政局皆已被民進黨定位為台灣國與中華民國的決戰。
再談「必須定位」。長期以來，「台灣國」並未以本來面目現身；而是以「本土化」、「主體性」、「愛台灣」、「台灣悲情」、「國家正常化」、「正名制憲」等「化名」與「化身」示人；甚至此次「入聯公投」，陳水扁一開始亦稱「無關台獨」，「未違反四不」。民進黨主政以來，始終在「中華民國」與「台灣國」之間穿出穿進，搞得虛實莫辨，真偽難分；影響所及，台灣民眾也一直未能在台灣國與中華民國之間作一認真的思辨。然而，如今情勢發展至此，「台灣國」既以本來面目示人，則國人也就沒有不作抉擇的餘地。因此，這次總統大選也就「必須定位」為中華民國與台灣國的決戰；大家都把話說清楚，勿再猶抱琵琶半遮面，也不要再打煙幕戰。
不可將陳水扁此番的台獨操作視為僅是「選舉議題」，而認為「明年三月以後」一切即可復原；因為，這次台獨操作，涉及陳水扁的貪腐官司及歷史定位，可謂是他政治生命的生死掙扎，不如此他如何挾持民進黨，不如此他又如何對付卸任後的貪腐追訴？陳水扁此時的目標是：透過此次大選，在政治上及社會心理上造成為台獨衝破「紅線」的效應，藉以確保他在卸任後維持台獨旗手的地位；就此而言，「台灣國」絕不會是大選過後就自動消失的「假議題」，而可視為自此與中華民國分道揚鑣的不歸路。
這次選舉是中華民國與台灣國的決戰，也是中華民國總統與台灣國總統的決戰。已經如此定位，亦必須如此定位。
回顧八年來的滄桑變化，陳水扁曾有「新中間路線」的思維，亦有「四不一沒有」的承諾，如今卻走向「四要」，及以「入聯公投」包裝「台獨公投」；漫漫八年，陳水扁一步步走上以更激進的姿態來掩飾其失政敗德的路子，中間選民對他的期待亦付諸東流，此皆十分可惜之事。但是，反過來說，陳水扁最後終於卸去一切偽裝的政治胭脂，以台獨的真面目亮相，卻亦使國人第一次有機會在台灣國與中華民國之間作一思辨與抉擇，這卻是一個值得國人慶幸的契機。何況，此時距大選尚有七個月，國人可將台灣國與中華民國置於胸臆腦際，慢慢咀嚼反芻，然後好整以暇地作出冷靜明智的抉擇。
台灣國已以本來面目亮相，沒有「新中間路線」的幻影，亦不再有「四不一沒有」的虛晃。這次大選的主題就是：中華民國與台灣國，你選何國？至於究竟最後何「國」勝出，恐無人可以逆料。畢竟，「台灣國」的論述者有其罩門，否則即不必一路遮遮掩掩，不肯以本來面目示人；而「中華民國」的論述者亦有弱點，否則即不會始終說不清楚，處處陷於挨打的狀態。
然而，無論如何，這次選舉已是一場中華民國與台灣國的決戰；誰不敢進入這個戰場，或沒有能力經營此一戰場，即是失敗者，就是輸家。
Friday, September 7, 2007
A Remedial Class on Transitional Justice
A Remedial Class on Transitional Justice
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 06, 2007
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party has had seven different Government Information Office (GIO) Chiefs since it assumed power. Every one of them has been, shall we say, unique. From "The Shooter," who mimicked gunning down reporters at a press conference, to "The Ribbon Cutter," who presided over ribbon cutting ceremonies for illegal pirate radio stations. From "The Terminator" who shut down cable television networks offensive to the ruling DPP, to "The Broker," who negotiated deals for those he was supposed to be regulating. But the most "unique" GIO Chief of all, has to be Hsieh Chi-wei, who has outdone them all.
Why is Hsieh Chi-wei so insufferably arrogant? Hsieh is proud of the fact that he studied German literature in Germany. Because he studied German literature in Germany, he presumes that he is qualified to hold forth on "transitional justice." That, and because he enticed a former East Germany premier with a large sum of money to come to Taiwan and demand that the KMT account for its party assets. He and Chen Shui-bian, who knows nothing about Germany whatsoever, are singing the identical tune. They are demanding that "half of the officials of the judiciary be purged" and that all officials of the judiciary be compelled to declare their party affiliation on the Internet.
How much Hsieh Chi-wei knows about German literature we can't say. But based on the nonsense he has spouted about "transitional justice," he knows nothing about German history, and even less about German politics and law. He is depending solely on his authority as government spokesman to assert that Germany is the way he says it is. He is a disgrace to every scholar who has ever studied in Germany.
Those who have studied transitional justice know that next to Latin America, the most discussed region is Eastern Europe, including Germany. This region has undergone a metamorphosis from socialism to capitalism. These post communist countries must sort out private property, public property and party property. They must right miscarriages of justice. They must investigate refugees gunned down while fleeing from behind the Iron Curtain. They must separate the sheep from the goats. They must also deal with the mountain of dossiers compiled by their secret police. As of today, Eastern Europeans have talked a lot about transitional justice. but those who have actually done something about it are few and far between. It is not that the scope of social reforms is not extensive enough, or that understanding is not deep enough. The problem is transitional justice depends upon the transformation of society as a whole.
So-called transitional justice, is simply making right today what was wrong yesterday. When we encounter a society undergoing transformation, when what I am today emerged from what I was yesterday, just how am I to carry out transitional justice? Is a new generation supposed to exact vengeance on the previous generation? Are some individuals playing by old rules, supposed to turn around and exact vengeance on others? When everyone is pointing the finger at everyone else, transitional justice becomes a form of soul searching. We must never allow a new generation to commit the same mistakes over and over again.
In all of Eastern Europe, only Germany was able to achieve some degree of transitional justice. The reason is simple. Germany reformed by means of merger, in reality, annexation. West Germany's capitalist system replaced East Germany's socialist system in toto. That is why post reunification Germany had good reason to eliminate judges whose heads were filled with socialist ideology. That is why their ranks had to be replaced by judges from West Germany. No other Eastern European country was able to achieve this.
The ROC's tranformation was less radical than Eastern Europe's. Our economy was always capitalist. Our political system was always "democratic gradualism." Therefore following democratization, most of our legal and social institutions needed no further modification. Most importantly, our transition was different from East Germany's. It was the same as other Eastern European countries. It was a collective transformation, akin to the transformation of a caterpillar into a butterfly. The old rules of the game may have been riddled with injustices, yet the society as a whole advanced from the past to the present. So the question is, precisely who has the right to demand transitional justice from whom? New landlords who worship the old land ownership policies? Corporate heads who depend on old incentives to seize international market share? What right does someone who was once a Kuomintang cell leader, who made it into National Taiwan University because he scored well on Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, who was able to buy a house before all his classmates because he studied Martial Law era maritime law, presume to demand the purging of half the officials within the justice system? Is Chen Shui-bian, a potential defendant in the State Affairs Confidential Expenses case, to decide which half of the officials in the judiciary should be purged? Will these include the presiding judges in his corruption trial?
Had Hsieh Chi-wei really studied Germany history, he would know how vigorously Helmut Kohl sponsored Lothar de Maizie, the last prime minister of East Germany, following the reunification of East and West Germany. This was especially odd, considering how ministers who had been in office for only two months were quietly relieved of their duties. The reason was that East Germany's Ministry for State Security (Stasi) had a dossier filled with senstive information on Kohl. This former Prime Minister, the victim of a ruthless purge, probably never imagined that an Eastern Bloc government undergoing transitional justice would have a Bureau of Information Chief willing to pay him bundles of money to lecture on "transitional justice."
The transitional justice that Taiwan needs requires the kind of soul searching that is carved indelibly into one's bones and into one's heart. What is needed is an evolutionary metamorphosis, not two wrongs that will never make a right, not an endless cycle of tit for tat. An ignorant Hsieh Chi-wei is unqualified to discuss transitional justice. He and the irredeemably corrupt Chen Shui-bian are birds of a feather who are unqualified to criticize the justice system. They can only demean justice.
為謝志偉補課：何謂「德國轉型正義」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.06 03:06 am
民進黨執政以來已經換掉七名新聞局長，而從「比槍」局長，到（為地下電台）「剪綵」局長，再從「關台」局長，到「喬事」局長，個個前無古人，卻絕對不愁後無來者。唯以狂妄的程度而言，謝志偉毫無疑問又創造了另外一個前無古人的紀錄！
謝志偉憑什麼狂妄？用他的冷笑話來講，就是「留德」青山在。只因在德國學習德國文學，他就敢大談「轉型正義」，並重金禮聘一位「前東德總理」來台灣暢言「清算黨產」，又和完全不瞭解德國的陳水扁一唱一和，要學德國「清算檯面上一半的司法官」，而且要所有司法官上網公布自己的黨籍。
不知謝志偉的德國文學學得怎樣，但非常確定的是，從他滿口柴胡的「轉型正義」就知道，他不懂德國的歷史，更不懂德國的政治和法律，只憑他佔據了政府發言人的地位，儼然以為他說德國如何德國就是如何。這簡直丟光了所有留德學者的臉。
研究轉型正義的人都知道，在拉丁美洲之後，今天世界上最認真在談轉型正義的地方，就是從社會主義體制蛻變為資本主義體制的東歐，包含德國。後共產國家有私產、公產和黨產攪在一塊的問題，有冤假錯案平反的問題，有投奔自由遭到格殺的究責問題，有各種舊時代的功績罪過如何重新評等的問題，還有公安部門巨量的各種「黑材料」如何善後的問題。然而一直到今天，東歐人談了很多，真正能夠「處理」的轉型正義，卻是寥寥可數。原因絕對不在社會轉型的幅度還不夠大，或者對正義的領悟還不夠深，而在其轉型基本上是建立在整個社會的「蛻變」上。
所謂轉型正義，就是對今是昨非的徹底釐清，然而碰到蛻變型的轉型社會，今日的我就是從昨日的我蛻變而來，正義的清算要如何執行？是讓下一代的人清算上一代的人？還是讓舊遊戲規則下的一部分人回頭來清算另一部分人？在人人指向人人而是非犬牙交錯的困境下，轉型正義實際上變成了刻骨銘心的靈魂搜尋：千萬不要讓下一代人重蹈覆轍！
整個東歐唯一能多做一點的就是德國，原因很簡單，只有德國是通過合併（實際上是兼併）達成轉型的國家，資本主義的西德體制由外而內地加在東德的社會體制上，所以統一後的德國才有餘裕可以淘汰一半頭腦已經被社會主義醬透的司法官，因為還有西德的法官可以立刻補位，僅僅這一點，就沒有任何其他的東歐國家可以做得到。
台灣的社會轉型，與東歐比較，相形之下幅度較小：我們在經濟上從來就是資本主義體制，我們的民主轉型也被稱作「漸進式民主」。也因此在民主化以後，我們絕大多數的法律與重要社經機制不需要作任何調整。更重要的是，我們的轉型剛好和東德不一樣，而和所有其他東歐國家一樣，是一種集體的蛻變，如蛹之蛻化成蝶。所以，從今天的眼光來看，舊的遊戲規則雖有諸多不義之處，但整個社會由過去走向現在，請問，誰有資格去向誰執行轉型正義？是拜舊土地政策之賜的新地主？或是靠舊獎勵政策而搶進國際市場的企業主？請問，憑什麼曾經做過國民黨小組長、因為三民主義拿到高分而考上台大、因為熟讀熟用「戒嚴時代」的海商法才比所有同學先買房子的陳水扁，有權利主張清算一半的司法官？難道要由國務機要費案的「潛在被告」陳水扁來決定哪一半的司法官應被清算？包不包括將審判他的法官？
如果真正研究過德國轉型的歷史，謝志偉不會不知道末代東德總理麥齊爾先生為什麼在兩德統一後受到柯爾總理大力扶持，卻只作了兩個月的部長就黯然去職，因為他作東德公安部「爪耙子」的資料被人掀了出來。這位遭到無情清算的前總理大概從來沒想到，遠東會有另一個轉型民主國家的新聞局長，肯花大筆鈔票找他去當「轉型正義」的宣講師！
台灣所需要的轉型正義，正是刻骨銘心的靈魂搜尋，更是蛻變以後的精神昇華，而不是掌權者清算在野者的反覆輪迴。無知的謝志偉沒有資格談轉型正義，就和陷入集團性貪腐泥淖的陳水扁，沒有資格批評司法一樣；他們只會汙衊正義，糟蹋司法。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 06, 2007
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party has had seven different Government Information Office (GIO) Chiefs since it assumed power. Every one of them has been, shall we say, unique. From "The Shooter," who mimicked gunning down reporters at a press conference, to "The Ribbon Cutter," who presided over ribbon cutting ceremonies for illegal pirate radio stations. From "The Terminator" who shut down cable television networks offensive to the ruling DPP, to "The Broker," who negotiated deals for those he was supposed to be regulating. But the most "unique" GIO Chief of all, has to be Hsieh Chi-wei, who has outdone them all.
Why is Hsieh Chi-wei so insufferably arrogant? Hsieh is proud of the fact that he studied German literature in Germany. Because he studied German literature in Germany, he presumes that he is qualified to hold forth on "transitional justice." That, and because he enticed a former East Germany premier with a large sum of money to come to Taiwan and demand that the KMT account for its party assets. He and Chen Shui-bian, who knows nothing about Germany whatsoever, are singing the identical tune. They are demanding that "half of the officials of the judiciary be purged" and that all officials of the judiciary be compelled to declare their party affiliation on the Internet.
How much Hsieh Chi-wei knows about German literature we can't say. But based on the nonsense he has spouted about "transitional justice," he knows nothing about German history, and even less about German politics and law. He is depending solely on his authority as government spokesman to assert that Germany is the way he says it is. He is a disgrace to every scholar who has ever studied in Germany.
Those who have studied transitional justice know that next to Latin America, the most discussed region is Eastern Europe, including Germany. This region has undergone a metamorphosis from socialism to capitalism. These post communist countries must sort out private property, public property and party property. They must right miscarriages of justice. They must investigate refugees gunned down while fleeing from behind the Iron Curtain. They must separate the sheep from the goats. They must also deal with the mountain of dossiers compiled by their secret police. As of today, Eastern Europeans have talked a lot about transitional justice. but those who have actually done something about it are few and far between. It is not that the scope of social reforms is not extensive enough, or that understanding is not deep enough. The problem is transitional justice depends upon the transformation of society as a whole.
So-called transitional justice, is simply making right today what was wrong yesterday. When we encounter a society undergoing transformation, when what I am today emerged from what I was yesterday, just how am I to carry out transitional justice? Is a new generation supposed to exact vengeance on the previous generation? Are some individuals playing by old rules, supposed to turn around and exact vengeance on others? When everyone is pointing the finger at everyone else, transitional justice becomes a form of soul searching. We must never allow a new generation to commit the same mistakes over and over again.
In all of Eastern Europe, only Germany was able to achieve some degree of transitional justice. The reason is simple. Germany reformed by means of merger, in reality, annexation. West Germany's capitalist system replaced East Germany's socialist system in toto. That is why post reunification Germany had good reason to eliminate judges whose heads were filled with socialist ideology. That is why their ranks had to be replaced by judges from West Germany. No other Eastern European country was able to achieve this.
The ROC's tranformation was less radical than Eastern Europe's. Our economy was always capitalist. Our political system was always "democratic gradualism." Therefore following democratization, most of our legal and social institutions needed no further modification. Most importantly, our transition was different from East Germany's. It was the same as other Eastern European countries. It was a collective transformation, akin to the transformation of a caterpillar into a butterfly. The old rules of the game may have been riddled with injustices, yet the society as a whole advanced from the past to the present. So the question is, precisely who has the right to demand transitional justice from whom? New landlords who worship the old land ownership policies? Corporate heads who depend on old incentives to seize international market share? What right does someone who was once a Kuomintang cell leader, who made it into National Taiwan University because he scored well on Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, who was able to buy a house before all his classmates because he studied Martial Law era maritime law, presume to demand the purging of half the officials within the justice system? Is Chen Shui-bian, a potential defendant in the State Affairs Confidential Expenses case, to decide which half of the officials in the judiciary should be purged? Will these include the presiding judges in his corruption trial?
Had Hsieh Chi-wei really studied Germany history, he would know how vigorously Helmut Kohl sponsored Lothar de Maizie, the last prime minister of East Germany, following the reunification of East and West Germany. This was especially odd, considering how ministers who had been in office for only two months were quietly relieved of their duties. The reason was that East Germany's Ministry for State Security (Stasi) had a dossier filled with senstive information on Kohl. This former Prime Minister, the victim of a ruthless purge, probably never imagined that an Eastern Bloc government undergoing transitional justice would have a Bureau of Information Chief willing to pay him bundles of money to lecture on "transitional justice."
The transitional justice that Taiwan needs requires the kind of soul searching that is carved indelibly into one's bones and into one's heart. What is needed is an evolutionary metamorphosis, not two wrongs that will never make a right, not an endless cycle of tit for tat. An ignorant Hsieh Chi-wei is unqualified to discuss transitional justice. He and the irredeemably corrupt Chen Shui-bian are birds of a feather who are unqualified to criticize the justice system. They can only demean justice.
為謝志偉補課：何謂「德國轉型正義」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.06 03:06 am
民進黨執政以來已經換掉七名新聞局長，而從「比槍」局長，到（為地下電台）「剪綵」局長，再從「關台」局長，到「喬事」局長，個個前無古人，卻絕對不愁後無來者。唯以狂妄的程度而言，謝志偉毫無疑問又創造了另外一個前無古人的紀錄！
謝志偉憑什麼狂妄？用他的冷笑話來講，就是「留德」青山在。只因在德國學習德國文學，他就敢大談「轉型正義」，並重金禮聘一位「前東德總理」來台灣暢言「清算黨產」，又和完全不瞭解德國的陳水扁一唱一和，要學德國「清算檯面上一半的司法官」，而且要所有司法官上網公布自己的黨籍。
不知謝志偉的德國文學學得怎樣，但非常確定的是，從他滿口柴胡的「轉型正義」就知道，他不懂德國的歷史，更不懂德國的政治和法律，只憑他佔據了政府發言人的地位，儼然以為他說德國如何德國就是如何。這簡直丟光了所有留德學者的臉。
研究轉型正義的人都知道，在拉丁美洲之後，今天世界上最認真在談轉型正義的地方，就是從社會主義體制蛻變為資本主義體制的東歐，包含德國。後共產國家有私產、公產和黨產攪在一塊的問題，有冤假錯案平反的問題，有投奔自由遭到格殺的究責問題，有各種舊時代的功績罪過如何重新評等的問題，還有公安部門巨量的各種「黑材料」如何善後的問題。然而一直到今天，東歐人談了很多，真正能夠「處理」的轉型正義，卻是寥寥可數。原因絕對不在社會轉型的幅度還不夠大，或者對正義的領悟還不夠深，而在其轉型基本上是建立在整個社會的「蛻變」上。
所謂轉型正義，就是對今是昨非的徹底釐清，然而碰到蛻變型的轉型社會，今日的我就是從昨日的我蛻變而來，正義的清算要如何執行？是讓下一代的人清算上一代的人？還是讓舊遊戲規則下的一部分人回頭來清算另一部分人？在人人指向人人而是非犬牙交錯的困境下，轉型正義實際上變成了刻骨銘心的靈魂搜尋：千萬不要讓下一代人重蹈覆轍！
整個東歐唯一能多做一點的就是德國，原因很簡單，只有德國是通過合併（實際上是兼併）達成轉型的國家，資本主義的西德體制由外而內地加在東德的社會體制上，所以統一後的德國才有餘裕可以淘汰一半頭腦已經被社會主義醬透的司法官，因為還有西德的法官可以立刻補位，僅僅這一點，就沒有任何其他的東歐國家可以做得到。
台灣的社會轉型，與東歐比較，相形之下幅度較小：我們在經濟上從來就是資本主義體制，我們的民主轉型也被稱作「漸進式民主」。也因此在民主化以後，我們絕大多數的法律與重要社經機制不需要作任何調整。更重要的是，我們的轉型剛好和東德不一樣，而和所有其他東歐國家一樣，是一種集體的蛻變，如蛹之蛻化成蝶。所以，從今天的眼光來看，舊的遊戲規則雖有諸多不義之處，但整個社會由過去走向現在，請問，誰有資格去向誰執行轉型正義？是拜舊土地政策之賜的新地主？或是靠舊獎勵政策而搶進國際市場的企業主？請問，憑什麼曾經做過國民黨小組長、因為三民主義拿到高分而考上台大、因為熟讀熟用「戒嚴時代」的海商法才比所有同學先買房子的陳水扁，有權利主張清算一半的司法官？難道要由國務機要費案的「潛在被告」陳水扁來決定哪一半的司法官應被清算？包不包括將審判他的法官？
如果真正研究過德國轉型的歷史，謝志偉不會不知道末代東德總理麥齊爾先生為什麼在兩德統一後受到柯爾總理大力扶持，卻只作了兩個月的部長就黯然去職，因為他作東德公安部「爪耙子」的資料被人掀了出來。這位遭到無情清算的前總理大概從來沒想到，遠東會有另一個轉型民主國家的新聞局長，肯花大筆鈔票找他去當「轉型正義」的宣講師！
台灣所需要的轉型正義，正是刻骨銘心的靈魂搜尋，更是蛻變以後的精神昇華，而不是掌權者清算在野者的反覆輪迴。無知的謝志偉沒有資格談轉型正義，就和陷入集團性貪腐泥淖的陳水扁，沒有資格批評司法一樣；他們只會汙衊正義，糟蹋司法。
Setting Limits on Democracy?
Setting Limits on Democracy?
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 09, 2007
Chen Shui-bian said that "one cannot set limits on democracy." Chen is wrong. The survival of a nation requires the setting of limits. If certain policies run the risk of harming or even destroying the nation, of course they must be off limits.
Chen Shui-bian argues that Taiwan independence is the result of "Taiwan's democratic political development." He argues that the US cannot on the one hand support "Taiwan's democracy" and on the other hand oppose Taiwan independence. Therefore he opposes US attempts to set limits on "Taiwan's democracy." He argues that Taiwan independence must be given the green light.
Under the democracy that prevails in regions controlled by the Republic of China, it is permissible to advocate Taiwan independence. One cannot forbid the advocacy of Taiwan independence in the public forum. But whether Taiwan independence accords with the requirements of national survival, and is something that political leaders should be promoting, is another matter altogether. Are Taiwan independence ideologues truly unaware that Taiwan independence will bring calamity? Are they truly determined to bring about their own destruction?
Following the First World War, the shackles imposed by the Treaty of Versailles reduced Germany to the status of an "abnormal country." As a result, in accordance with democratic procedures, and inside the political framework of the Weimar Republic, a political party that advocated anti-Semitism and foreign expansionism appeared, the Nazi Party. In other words, Germany at that time set no limits on the Nazi Party. But in retrospect, we see that Hitler was using democracy to hijack the German nation, to exceed the limits of what was in the interest of Germany's national survival. The Nazis used democracy to prevail politically. By the time they had achieved their dreams, they had destroyed the German nation.
Today the Republic of China government faces a similar situation. Question One: Are the Chinese people on Taiwan really prepared to pay any price for Taiwan independence, and even break with the US? Question Two: Does Taiwan independence in fact accord with the requirements of the nation's survival?
In response to the first question, Chen Shui-bian professes confidence. He argues that opinion polls confirm a trend toward Taiwan independence. Regarding this, we have reservations. Chen Shui-bian is clearly attempting to inflate the significance of "Taiwanese consciousness," spinning it as "Taiwan independence consciousness." He is manipulating "Taiwanese consciousness," using it to justify his own "Taiwan independence consciousness." Is the public on Taiwan so ignorant as to break with the US over the issue of Taiwan independence? Surely not? On the other hand, Hitler was able to hijack Germany by means of the democratic process and lead it toward Nazism. Would it be so surprising if Chen Shui-bian hijacked Taiwan by means of the democratic process and led it toward Taiwan independence? Therefore the second question is the key. Does Taiwan independence accord with the strategic requirements of the Republic of China's survival? Did Nazism accord with the requirements of Germany's national survival?
To assert that "one cannot set limits on democracy" is populist demagoguery. Suppose someone advocates "exempting everyone from paying taxes?" Obviously democracy has limits. Suppose someone advocates "resorting to force to compel a corrupt president to step down?" Obviously democracy has limits. National leaders must defend democracy. They must never lead the nation toward disaster in the name of democracy. Hitler violated this rule. He exceeded this limit. So have innumerable mini-Hitlers in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Their crime was always the same: They used democracy to destroy the nation.
If Chen Shui-bian were still a dissident leader during the "party outsider" era, he would be free to shout "Long live Taiwan independence!" But Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party are the Republic of China's ruling elite. Yet they are still lying to themselves and the public. They are leading the nation to the brink of disaster.
Can one set limits on democracy? Of course one can. Of course one must. One must set limits on the authority of leaders in positions of power. They must not be permitted to put the survival of the nation at risk. Chen Shui-bian must ask himself whether he has exceeded these limits, whether he has put the survival of the nation at risk.
To escape responsibility for the crisis of authority caused by his greed and corruption, Chen shifted public attention to his "Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." On the one hand he insisted that his "Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" had nothing to do with Taiwan independence. On the other hand he aggressively pushed his "Four Demands" and "UN membership under a New National Title." When he did this, did he exceed these limits? When his "Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" caused a rift in Taipei/Washington relations, when US trust was shattered, when Taipei found itself at loggerheads with its most important international backer, did he exceed these limits? On the one hand Chen Shui-bian admits that "Taiwan independence is both self-deception and deception of others." On the other hand he continues throwing gasoline on the flames of Taiwan independence. When he does this, is he exceeding these limits?
Democracy allows a variety of different viewpoints. In this respect, it sets no limits. But political leaders' actions must be limited. They cannot be permitted to engage in mass deception. Their national policies must have limits. They must maximize national welfare and minimize national misfortunes. They must not be permitted to lead the nation down the path to oblivion.
It is one thing to hold forth on how "One cannot set limits on democracy." But Chen Shui-bian has exceeded every one of his limits. He has exceeded his moral limits. He has exceeded his legal limits. He has led the nation to brink of disaster.
民主無紅線，國家政策不能沒有紅線！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.05 03:17 am
陳水扁說，民主不可畫「紅線」。這話說得沒錯。但是，國家的生存政策卻不能沒有「紅線」；如果某種國家政策可能導致國家重傷或敗亡，當然必須畫下「紅線」。
陳水扁現在的說法不啻指出：台獨是台灣民主政治發展的歸趨，美國不可一方面支持台灣民主，另一方面卻反對台獨；因此，他反對美國給台灣民主畫上任何「紅線」，主張非給台獨「開綠燈」不可。
在台灣的民主運作中，當然會出現台獨的主張；不可能畫一紅線，禁止在民主論壇中出現台獨主張。不過，台獨是否適合成為台灣主政者執意推動的國家生存策略，那卻是另一回事。難道明知台獨會禍及台灣，也要自尋死路？
例如，在第一次世界大戰後，由於凡爾賽條約的束縛，使德國淪為「不正常國家」；因此，在威瑪共和的體制中，經民主機制，出現了納粹黨，主張反猶太的種族主義及對外侵略。也就是說，就「民主」而言，德國當時並未為納粹畫下「紅線」；但是，如今回顧，希特勒卻是假借「民主」，挾持著德國踰越了國家生存策略的「紅線」。納粹雖假借「民主」而得逞，但毀了國家。
如今，台灣儼然也面臨了類似的情境：一、台灣的「民主」是否真正不惜代價地支持台獨（包括不惜與美國反目）？二、台獨是否為符合台灣利益的國家生存策略？
對上述第一個問題，陳水扁頗有自信，他舉出許多民調來證實傾向台獨的民意高漲。對於此點，我們略有保留。陳水扁顯然是將普遍存在的「台灣意識」扭曲並擴張解釋為「台獨意識」；且其實際操作手段，亦是假借「台灣意識」來為他的「台獨意識」背書。難道台灣民眾會愚昧至不惜與美國翻臉也要搞台獨？不過，退一步說，希特勒既能經由民主機制將德國帶往納粹運動，則若謂陳水扁亦能經由民主操作將台灣推向台獨運動，似也不足為奇。於是，第二個問題遂成關鍵：台獨是否為符合台灣利益的國家生存政策？此一問題，正如應問納粹是否為符合德國國家利益的生存政策？
所謂民主沒有「紅線」，其實是一種民粹論述。如果出現主張「全民免稅」的「民主」，自然會有「紅線」；如果出現主張「以暴動逼迫貪腐總統下台」的「民主」，自然也會有「紅線」。國家主政者當然應當護持「民主」，唯他的「紅線」應在不可藉民主之名將國家帶向導致敗亡的道路。希特勒犯過這種錯，且在亞非拉一幕接一幕的民主悲劇中，更曾出現過無數小一號的希特勒。他們千篇一律的罪行是：騙過民主，輸了國家！
陳水扁若仍是「黨外」時代的民運人士，大可高喊「台獨萬歲」；但是，陳水扁與民進黨已是中華民國的執政者，竟仍玩弄「自欺欺人」的台獨騙術，那就是踩過了「紅線」。
即使民主沒有紅線，但主政者的執政責任及政治道德卻不能沒有紅線，國家的生存政策更不能沒有紅線。陳水扁應當自問：是否已踰越了執政者對國家責任及政治道德的紅線？是否已踩過了國家生存策略的紅線？
例如，陳水扁為了掙脫他因貪腐而造成的權力危機，竟轉移焦點將國家捲入「入聯公投」的台獨風暴中，這是否踰越了政治道德的紅線？另如，陳水扁一方面偽稱「入聯公投」不是操弄台獨，但另一方面又揚言「四要」，「是以新的國家名義入聯」，這是否踰越了政治誠信的紅線？再如，「入聯公投」使台美友誼受到重傷，台美信任形同崩盤，且使台灣最重要的「國際維生支柱」美國與台灣反目，更使台灣突然站在反美的立場，這是否踰越了執政責任的紅線？又如，陳水扁一方面自承「台獨是自欺欺人」，另一方面又對台獨政策火上加油，這是否踰越了國家生存政策的紅線？
民主容許見仁見智，沒有紅線；但主政者的執政責任卻不能沒有紅線，不可自欺欺人，愚民以逞；尤其，主政者主導的國家政策更不能沒有紅線，必須趨吉避凶，造福禳禍，不可「自欺欺人」，陷國家於危境死地。
民主沒有紅線，盡可各抒己見，放言高論。但陳水扁作為一名主政者，卻踰越了政治道德的紅線，踰越了執政責任的紅線，也踰越了國家生存政策的紅線。
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 09, 2007
Chen Shui-bian said that "one cannot set limits on democracy." Chen is wrong. The survival of a nation requires the setting of limits. If certain policies run the risk of harming or even destroying the nation, of course they must be off limits.
Chen Shui-bian argues that Taiwan independence is the result of "Taiwan's democratic political development." He argues that the US cannot on the one hand support "Taiwan's democracy" and on the other hand oppose Taiwan independence. Therefore he opposes US attempts to set limits on "Taiwan's democracy." He argues that Taiwan independence must be given the green light.
Under the democracy that prevails in regions controlled by the Republic of China, it is permissible to advocate Taiwan independence. One cannot forbid the advocacy of Taiwan independence in the public forum. But whether Taiwan independence accords with the requirements of national survival, and is something that political leaders should be promoting, is another matter altogether. Are Taiwan independence ideologues truly unaware that Taiwan independence will bring calamity? Are they truly determined to bring about their own destruction?
Following the First World War, the shackles imposed by the Treaty of Versailles reduced Germany to the status of an "abnormal country." As a result, in accordance with democratic procedures, and inside the political framework of the Weimar Republic, a political party that advocated anti-Semitism and foreign expansionism appeared, the Nazi Party. In other words, Germany at that time set no limits on the Nazi Party. But in retrospect, we see that Hitler was using democracy to hijack the German nation, to exceed the limits of what was in the interest of Germany's national survival. The Nazis used democracy to prevail politically. By the time they had achieved their dreams, they had destroyed the German nation.
Today the Republic of China government faces a similar situation. Question One: Are the Chinese people on Taiwan really prepared to pay any price for Taiwan independence, and even break with the US? Question Two: Does Taiwan independence in fact accord with the requirements of the nation's survival?
In response to the first question, Chen Shui-bian professes confidence. He argues that opinion polls confirm a trend toward Taiwan independence. Regarding this, we have reservations. Chen Shui-bian is clearly attempting to inflate the significance of "Taiwanese consciousness," spinning it as "Taiwan independence consciousness." He is manipulating "Taiwanese consciousness," using it to justify his own "Taiwan independence consciousness." Is the public on Taiwan so ignorant as to break with the US over the issue of Taiwan independence? Surely not? On the other hand, Hitler was able to hijack Germany by means of the democratic process and lead it toward Nazism. Would it be so surprising if Chen Shui-bian hijacked Taiwan by means of the democratic process and led it toward Taiwan independence? Therefore the second question is the key. Does Taiwan independence accord with the strategic requirements of the Republic of China's survival? Did Nazism accord with the requirements of Germany's national survival?
To assert that "one cannot set limits on democracy" is populist demagoguery. Suppose someone advocates "exempting everyone from paying taxes?" Obviously democracy has limits. Suppose someone advocates "resorting to force to compel a corrupt president to step down?" Obviously democracy has limits. National leaders must defend democracy. They must never lead the nation toward disaster in the name of democracy. Hitler violated this rule. He exceeded this limit. So have innumerable mini-Hitlers in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Their crime was always the same: They used democracy to destroy the nation.
If Chen Shui-bian were still a dissident leader during the "party outsider" era, he would be free to shout "Long live Taiwan independence!" But Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party are the Republic of China's ruling elite. Yet they are still lying to themselves and the public. They are leading the nation to the brink of disaster.
Can one set limits on democracy? Of course one can. Of course one must. One must set limits on the authority of leaders in positions of power. They must not be permitted to put the survival of the nation at risk. Chen Shui-bian must ask himself whether he has exceeded these limits, whether he has put the survival of the nation at risk.
To escape responsibility for the crisis of authority caused by his greed and corruption, Chen shifted public attention to his "Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan." On the one hand he insisted that his "Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" had nothing to do with Taiwan independence. On the other hand he aggressively pushed his "Four Demands" and "UN membership under a New National Title." When he did this, did he exceed these limits? When his "Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" caused a rift in Taipei/Washington relations, when US trust was shattered, when Taipei found itself at loggerheads with its most important international backer, did he exceed these limits? On the one hand Chen Shui-bian admits that "Taiwan independence is both self-deception and deception of others." On the other hand he continues throwing gasoline on the flames of Taiwan independence. When he does this, is he exceeding these limits?
Democracy allows a variety of different viewpoints. In this respect, it sets no limits. But political leaders' actions must be limited. They cannot be permitted to engage in mass deception. Their national policies must have limits. They must maximize national welfare and minimize national misfortunes. They must not be permitted to lead the nation down the path to oblivion.
It is one thing to hold forth on how "One cannot set limits on democracy." But Chen Shui-bian has exceeded every one of his limits. He has exceeded his moral limits. He has exceeded his legal limits. He has led the nation to brink of disaster.
民主無紅線，國家政策不能沒有紅線！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.09.05 03:17 am
陳水扁說，民主不可畫「紅線」。這話說得沒錯。但是，國家的生存政策卻不能沒有「紅線」；如果某種國家政策可能導致國家重傷或敗亡，當然必須畫下「紅線」。
陳水扁現在的說法不啻指出：台獨是台灣民主政治發展的歸趨，美國不可一方面支持台灣民主，另一方面卻反對台獨；因此，他反對美國給台灣民主畫上任何「紅線」，主張非給台獨「開綠燈」不可。
在台灣的民主運作中，當然會出現台獨的主張；不可能畫一紅線，禁止在民主論壇中出現台獨主張。不過，台獨是否適合成為台灣主政者執意推動的國家生存策略，那卻是另一回事。難道明知台獨會禍及台灣，也要自尋死路？
例如，在第一次世界大戰後，由於凡爾賽條約的束縛，使德國淪為「不正常國家」；因此，在威瑪共和的體制中，經民主機制，出現了納粹黨，主張反猶太的種族主義及對外侵略。也就是說，就「民主」而言，德國當時並未為納粹畫下「紅線」；但是，如今回顧，希特勒卻是假借「民主」，挾持著德國踰越了國家生存策略的「紅線」。納粹雖假借「民主」而得逞，但毀了國家。
如今，台灣儼然也面臨了類似的情境：一、台灣的「民主」是否真正不惜代價地支持台獨（包括不惜與美國反目）？二、台獨是否為符合台灣利益的國家生存策略？
對上述第一個問題，陳水扁頗有自信，他舉出許多民調來證實傾向台獨的民意高漲。對於此點，我們略有保留。陳水扁顯然是將普遍存在的「台灣意識」扭曲並擴張解釋為「台獨意識」；且其實際操作手段，亦是假借「台灣意識」來為他的「台獨意識」背書。難道台灣民眾會愚昧至不惜與美國翻臉也要搞台獨？不過，退一步說，希特勒既能經由民主機制將德國帶往納粹運動，則若謂陳水扁亦能經由民主操作將台灣推向台獨運動，似也不足為奇。於是，第二個問題遂成關鍵：台獨是否為符合台灣利益的國家生存政策？此一問題，正如應問納粹是否為符合德國國家利益的生存政策？
所謂民主沒有「紅線」，其實是一種民粹論述。如果出現主張「全民免稅」的「民主」，自然會有「紅線」；如果出現主張「以暴動逼迫貪腐總統下台」的「民主」，自然也會有「紅線」。國家主政者當然應當護持「民主」，唯他的「紅線」應在不可藉民主之名將國家帶向導致敗亡的道路。希特勒犯過這種錯，且在亞非拉一幕接一幕的民主悲劇中，更曾出現過無數小一號的希特勒。他們千篇一律的罪行是：騙過民主，輸了國家！
陳水扁若仍是「黨外」時代的民運人士，大可高喊「台獨萬歲」；但是，陳水扁與民進黨已是中華民國的執政者，竟仍玩弄「自欺欺人」的台獨騙術，那就是踩過了「紅線」。
即使民主沒有紅線，但主政者的執政責任及政治道德卻不能沒有紅線，國家的生存政策更不能沒有紅線。陳水扁應當自問：是否已踰越了執政者對國家責任及政治道德的紅線？是否已踩過了國家生存策略的紅線？
例如，陳水扁為了掙脫他因貪腐而造成的權力危機，竟轉移焦點將國家捲入「入聯公投」的台獨風暴中，這是否踰越了政治道德的紅線？另如，陳水扁一方面偽稱「入聯公投」不是操弄台獨，但另一方面又揚言「四要」，「是以新的國家名義入聯」，這是否踰越了政治誠信的紅線？再如，「入聯公投」使台美友誼受到重傷，台美信任形同崩盤，且使台灣最重要的「國際維生支柱」美國與台灣反目，更使台灣突然站在反美的立場，這是否踰越了執政責任的紅線？又如，陳水扁一方面自承「台獨是自欺欺人」，另一方面又對台獨政策火上加油，這是否踰越了國家生存政策的紅線？
民主容許見仁見智，沒有紅線；但主政者的執政責任卻不能沒有紅線，不可自欺欺人，愚民以逞；尤其，主政者主導的國家政策更不能沒有紅線，必須趨吉避凶，造福禳禍，不可「自欺欺人」，陷國家於危境死地。
民主沒有紅線，盡可各抒己見，放言高論。但陳水扁作為一名主政者，卻踰越了政治道德的紅線，踰越了執政責任的紅線，也踰越了國家生存政策的紅線。
Tuesday, September 4, 2007
Painting Judges Blue will only Destroy the Justice System
Painting Judges Blue will only Destroy the Justice System
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 4, 2007
How difficult is it to destroy the Republic of China's (ROC) system of justice? Apparently not that difficult. All you have to do is accuse judges of being Pan Blue in their political affiliation. Just look at how judges have been vilified over the past two days. First the president went on TV and alleged that seventy to eighty percent of all judges were Pan Blues. He accused them of being concerned only with Blue and Green, not black and white. The president no sooner finished his diatribe, than the Executive Yuan conveniently chimed in. The Government Information Office (GIO) called a press conference demanding that the Kuomintang (KMT) make public how many Judicial Yuan officials have been party members since martial law was lifted. The GIO demanded that any judge who had participated in a court case involving political figures disclose his party affiliation, if any, on the Internet. Rather than quietly await a possible guilty verdict, why not launch a preemptive attack by accusing the entire judicial system of Pan Blue political bias?
How much have members of ROC judicial system, from high level administrators to district court judges, quietly sacrificed over the years to establish an independent and professional judiciary? How much wisdom and intellect has been invested in judicial reform? Now that it is time to reap the rewards, all it takes nullify the entire legal community's years of sacrifice, is a single speech from President Chen and a single press conference from the GIO. With such a president and such a ruling party taking the lead in destroying the destroying public trust in the nation's judiciary, what point is there in judicial reform?
After this, how will judges be able to try political cases? We already have our answer. Any verdict favorable to the Green Camp will be trumpeted as "Solomonic," as the "Triumph of Justice." Any verdict favorable to the Blue Camp will be castigated as "concerned only about Blue and Green, indifferent about black and white," or even denounced as the "Demise of the Judiciary." The judge will be asked to reveal his party affiliation. He may even be publicly slandered and vilified. A nation's judges are only permitted to find opposition party leaders guilty. They are not permitted to rule against ruling party officials. Is this the "Triumph of Justice?" What word is there for this kind of intimidation of judges, other than "Political Terror?" Can judges be liberated from political influence? If judges live in fear, can they really champion justice for the common man?
Remember the KMT/PFP lawsuit to nullify Chen Shui-bian's "election" in 2004? The court ruled against the KMT/PFP. Following the court's decision the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ringingly declared that the judiciary had returned a just verdict, granting Chen the justice he deserved. Using President Chen and the DPP's logic, couldn't the KMT dismiss the judges' ruling back then as "concerned only with Blue and Green, indifferent to black and white?" Couldn't it have demanded that the presiding judge make a public admission of his political affiliation?
If President Chen were really concerned about "judicial intervention in politics," that would be one thing. Alas his tirade against the judiciary contained an escape clause. Last month he publicly accused the judiciary of attempting to influence the presidential campaign. He touched off a storm of controversy in legal circles. His allegations were considered attempts to influence the verdict in the Ma Ying-jeou case. This time he publicly accused seventy to eighty percent of the members of the judiciary of harboring Pan Blue partisan political bias. Suddenly changing the subject, he said that he once promised to resign if found guilty in the State Affairs Confidential Expense case. He said that as long as the judiciary is independent and not subject to Blue, Green, or Red Shirt Army political influence, then of course his promise to resign is binding upon him. But then he added "If this is not the case however, then I would have to reconsider." Isn't his meaning clear enough? If when the time comes the judge in Chen's State Affairs Confidential Expense case finds him guilty, Chen intends to accuse the judge of Pan Blue political bias, citing it as an excuse to renege on his promise to resign. We can now safely predict the kind of vilification the judge in Chen's State Affairs Confidential Expense case will be subjected to in the event he rules against Chen and disappoints Green Camp expectations.
Government Information Office Bureau Chief Hsieh Chi-wei joined the lynch mob. He publicly demanded that judges presiding over trials of political figures reveal their political affiliation on the Internet. What he failed to do was to cite any legal basis for such demands. Still less did he consult Article 80 of the Constitution: "Judges must transcend partisanship, rule independently based on the law, and resist any and all interference." Instead he righteously intoned: This is "transitional justice." We feel compelled to respond: "Transitional justice? Transitional justice? How many injustices do you intend to commit in the name of transitional justice?" The ruling party, not content to destroy the judicial system, now wants tarnish the concept of "transitional justice." Nobody denies that during the martial law era the judicial system was under the thumb of the party/state system. But if the "lifting of martial law" qualified as a form of transition, wasn't its biggest contribution, wasn't the most important "justice" it established, the elimination of "Big Brother" from inside your head? Even judges' heads? Now the ruling DPP wants to use these obscene methods to intimidate judges. What is this, but brand new "Big Brothers," this time in Green uniforms?"
As he ponders the realpolitik of his political power, we hope Chen Shui-bian and the Green Camp will cease its abuse of the judiciary. Perhaps this is an unrealistic hope. The legal community must prepare for vicious attacks. Given the political climate, the only way judges can withstand vilification is to rededicate themselves to comporting themselves more professionally and rendering more independent judgments.
中國時報 2007.09.04
政治抹藍法官 只會摧毀司法
中時社論
要摧毀台灣的司法很困難嗎？好像一點都不難，給所有法官扣頂藍帽子就成了！看看這兩天法官們是怎麼被政治糟蹋：先是總統上特定電視台接受專訪，直指法官超過七八成都偏藍，還說司法只問顏色，不問是非；總統話才剛說完，行政院立即有效率的配合，新聞局馬上就開記者會要求國民黨公布解嚴至今在司法部門有多少黨員？更要求凡涉及政治人物司法案件的法官，應上網公布其黨籍或有無黨籍。反正千言萬語一句話，與其靜待司法判決，不如先藉「政治抹藍」毀掉司法！
過去幾年，台灣的司法體系從司法行政高層到基層法官，為營造一個獨立、專業的審判空間，曾經默默付出多少努力？一樁樁司改方案的推出，又是費盡多少智慧與心力？如今正逢成果收割之際，就陳總統的這麼一句話，新聞局的這麼一場記者會，整個法界夙夜匪懈的付出與奉獻，就這麼輕易地給歸零了！試問：有這樣的總統，有這樣的執政黨在帶頭摧毀司法官的形象，司法改革努力個半天究竟是所為何來？
至今而後，法官還能怎樣審理政治案件呢？答案不已經在那兒了嗎？凡是判綠營勝訴的，就是「公正不阿」，就是「彰顯正義」，而凡是判藍營勝訴的，就是「只問顏色，不問是非」，甚至是「司法死了」，必須公布法官黨藉，甚至不惜公開將之詆毀鬥臭。一個國家的法官只准判在野黨有罪，不准判執政黨敗訴，這還能叫「司法正義」嗎？這種威嚇能不叫所有司法官都面臨「寒蟬效應」嗎？能不讓所有法官在審理相關案件時心中全無陰影嗎？如果司法官都開始害怕，他們還能為弱勢小民伸張正義嗎？
還記得國親對陳水扁所提的「當選無效」訴訟嗎？當時法院判國親敗訴定讞，民進黨在判決後立即聲明司法已經還了陳總統一個公道，如果沿用陳總統與民進黨今天的邏輯，國民黨是不是也可用同樣的推理，硬指法官的判決是「只問顏色，不問是非」？甚至強要承審法官公布黨籍呢？
其實陳總統若真是為「司法介入政治」憂心或許還好，問題是他對司法的指控還是預埋了重要伏筆，一個多月前他就曾公開指控司法人員企圖左右各黨總統候選人的競選活動，當時已經引發法界爭議，被認為是企圖影響馬案判決；這次他又公開說有超過七、八成的司法人員可能立場偏藍，接下來語鋒一轉，表示他曾說國務機要費案一審有罪就下台，如果司法人員獨立超然，不受藍綠、政治、輿論、紅衫軍等影響，他說過的話當然算話，但「如果顛倒，就要考慮」。這不等於已經挑明了說了嗎？如果屆時法官對國務機要費案的一審判決有罪，他大可以法官立場偏藍為由，名正言順地拒絕下台了！我們現在或許就可以模擬一下，屆時審理國務機要費的法官所做出的判決，若是既不符扁意，又不符綠營預期，他會怎樣地被修理！
同樣加入羞辱法官的是行政院新聞局長謝志偉，他公開要求處理政治人物司法案件的法官須上網公布其黨籍或有無黨籍，卻不交代這種做法的依據在哪裡？更不問憲法第八十條早已經揭示：「法官須超出黨派以外，依據法律獨立審判，不受任何干涉。」卻振振有詞地美其名曰：這是「轉型正義」。我們真想在這說一句：「轉型正義、轉型正義，如今台灣多少罪惡假汝之名而行！」執政黨摧毀司法還不滿足，還想把「轉型正義」這個概念也一併玷汙掉。沒人否認戒嚴時期的司法確曾受到黨國體制的箝制，而如果「解嚴」算做是一種轉型，那麼它最大的貢獻，所塑造的最重要「正義」，不就是將人們（包括法官）心中的「小警總」都去除了？如今執政黨藉由這種下流手段公開威嚇法官，不正是擺明要將全新的「綠色小警總」，重新樹立在所有法官的心中嗎？
在捍衛政權的現實考量下，期待陳水扁與綠營此刻停止糟蹋司法，恐怕是奢求，反倒是法界得要對未來更凶險的攻擊做好心理準備了。而在這種政治惡質的環境下，法官們也惟有以更專業的判決、更獨立的審判，才能回應所有政治的抹黑。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 4, 2007
How difficult is it to destroy the Republic of China's (ROC) system of justice? Apparently not that difficult. All you have to do is accuse judges of being Pan Blue in their political affiliation. Just look at how judges have been vilified over the past two days. First the president went on TV and alleged that seventy to eighty percent of all judges were Pan Blues. He accused them of being concerned only with Blue and Green, not black and white. The president no sooner finished his diatribe, than the Executive Yuan conveniently chimed in. The Government Information Office (GIO) called a press conference demanding that the Kuomintang (KMT) make public how many Judicial Yuan officials have been party members since martial law was lifted. The GIO demanded that any judge who had participated in a court case involving political figures disclose his party affiliation, if any, on the Internet. Rather than quietly await a possible guilty verdict, why not launch a preemptive attack by accusing the entire judicial system of Pan Blue political bias?
How much have members of ROC judicial system, from high level administrators to district court judges, quietly sacrificed over the years to establish an independent and professional judiciary? How much wisdom and intellect has been invested in judicial reform? Now that it is time to reap the rewards, all it takes nullify the entire legal community's years of sacrifice, is a single speech from President Chen and a single press conference from the GIO. With such a president and such a ruling party taking the lead in destroying the destroying public trust in the nation's judiciary, what point is there in judicial reform?
After this, how will judges be able to try political cases? We already have our answer. Any verdict favorable to the Green Camp will be trumpeted as "Solomonic," as the "Triumph of Justice." Any verdict favorable to the Blue Camp will be castigated as "concerned only about Blue and Green, indifferent about black and white," or even denounced as the "Demise of the Judiciary." The judge will be asked to reveal his party affiliation. He may even be publicly slandered and vilified. A nation's judges are only permitted to find opposition party leaders guilty. They are not permitted to rule against ruling party officials. Is this the "Triumph of Justice?" What word is there for this kind of intimidation of judges, other than "Political Terror?" Can judges be liberated from political influence? If judges live in fear, can they really champion justice for the common man?
Remember the KMT/PFP lawsuit to nullify Chen Shui-bian's "election" in 2004? The court ruled against the KMT/PFP. Following the court's decision the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ringingly declared that the judiciary had returned a just verdict, granting Chen the justice he deserved. Using President Chen and the DPP's logic, couldn't the KMT dismiss the judges' ruling back then as "concerned only with Blue and Green, indifferent to black and white?" Couldn't it have demanded that the presiding judge make a public admission of his political affiliation?
If President Chen were really concerned about "judicial intervention in politics," that would be one thing. Alas his tirade against the judiciary contained an escape clause. Last month he publicly accused the judiciary of attempting to influence the presidential campaign. He touched off a storm of controversy in legal circles. His allegations were considered attempts to influence the verdict in the Ma Ying-jeou case. This time he publicly accused seventy to eighty percent of the members of the judiciary of harboring Pan Blue partisan political bias. Suddenly changing the subject, he said that he once promised to resign if found guilty in the State Affairs Confidential Expense case. He said that as long as the judiciary is independent and not subject to Blue, Green, or Red Shirt Army political influence, then of course his promise to resign is binding upon him. But then he added "If this is not the case however, then I would have to reconsider." Isn't his meaning clear enough? If when the time comes the judge in Chen's State Affairs Confidential Expense case finds him guilty, Chen intends to accuse the judge of Pan Blue political bias, citing it as an excuse to renege on his promise to resign. We can now safely predict the kind of vilification the judge in Chen's State Affairs Confidential Expense case will be subjected to in the event he rules against Chen and disappoints Green Camp expectations.
Government Information Office Bureau Chief Hsieh Chi-wei joined the lynch mob. He publicly demanded that judges presiding over trials of political figures reveal their political affiliation on the Internet. What he failed to do was to cite any legal basis for such demands. Still less did he consult Article 80 of the Constitution: "Judges must transcend partisanship, rule independently based on the law, and resist any and all interference." Instead he righteously intoned: This is "transitional justice." We feel compelled to respond: "Transitional justice? Transitional justice? How many injustices do you intend to commit in the name of transitional justice?" The ruling party, not content to destroy the judicial system, now wants tarnish the concept of "transitional justice." Nobody denies that during the martial law era the judicial system was under the thumb of the party/state system. But if the "lifting of martial law" qualified as a form of transition, wasn't its biggest contribution, wasn't the most important "justice" it established, the elimination of "Big Brother" from inside your head? Even judges' heads? Now the ruling DPP wants to use these obscene methods to intimidate judges. What is this, but brand new "Big Brothers," this time in Green uniforms?"
As he ponders the realpolitik of his political power, we hope Chen Shui-bian and the Green Camp will cease its abuse of the judiciary. Perhaps this is an unrealistic hope. The legal community must prepare for vicious attacks. Given the political climate, the only way judges can withstand vilification is to rededicate themselves to comporting themselves more professionally and rendering more independent judgments.
中國時報 2007.09.04
政治抹藍法官 只會摧毀司法
中時社論
要摧毀台灣的司法很困難嗎？好像一點都不難，給所有法官扣頂藍帽子就成了！看看這兩天法官們是怎麼被政治糟蹋：先是總統上特定電視台接受專訪，直指法官超過七八成都偏藍，還說司法只問顏色，不問是非；總統話才剛說完，行政院立即有效率的配合，新聞局馬上就開記者會要求國民黨公布解嚴至今在司法部門有多少黨員？更要求凡涉及政治人物司法案件的法官，應上網公布其黨籍或有無黨籍。反正千言萬語一句話，與其靜待司法判決，不如先藉「政治抹藍」毀掉司法！
過去幾年，台灣的司法體系從司法行政高層到基層法官，為營造一個獨立、專業的審判空間，曾經默默付出多少努力？一樁樁司改方案的推出，又是費盡多少智慧與心力？如今正逢成果收割之際，就陳總統的這麼一句話，新聞局的這麼一場記者會，整個法界夙夜匪懈的付出與奉獻，就這麼輕易地給歸零了！試問：有這樣的總統，有這樣的執政黨在帶頭摧毀司法官的形象，司法改革努力個半天究竟是所為何來？
至今而後，法官還能怎樣審理政治案件呢？答案不已經在那兒了嗎？凡是判綠營勝訴的，就是「公正不阿」，就是「彰顯正義」，而凡是判藍營勝訴的，就是「只問顏色，不問是非」，甚至是「司法死了」，必須公布法官黨藉，甚至不惜公開將之詆毀鬥臭。一個國家的法官只准判在野黨有罪，不准判執政黨敗訴，這還能叫「司法正義」嗎？這種威嚇能不叫所有司法官都面臨「寒蟬效應」嗎？能不讓所有法官在審理相關案件時心中全無陰影嗎？如果司法官都開始害怕，他們還能為弱勢小民伸張正義嗎？
還記得國親對陳水扁所提的「當選無效」訴訟嗎？當時法院判國親敗訴定讞，民進黨在判決後立即聲明司法已經還了陳總統一個公道，如果沿用陳總統與民進黨今天的邏輯，國民黨是不是也可用同樣的推理，硬指法官的判決是「只問顏色，不問是非」？甚至強要承審法官公布黨籍呢？
其實陳總統若真是為「司法介入政治」憂心或許還好，問題是他對司法的指控還是預埋了重要伏筆，一個多月前他就曾公開指控司法人員企圖左右各黨總統候選人的競選活動，當時已經引發法界爭議，被認為是企圖影響馬案判決；這次他又公開說有超過七、八成的司法人員可能立場偏藍，接下來語鋒一轉，表示他曾說國務機要費案一審有罪就下台，如果司法人員獨立超然，不受藍綠、政治、輿論、紅衫軍等影響，他說過的話當然算話，但「如果顛倒，就要考慮」。這不等於已經挑明了說了嗎？如果屆時法官對國務機要費案的一審判決有罪，他大可以法官立場偏藍為由，名正言順地拒絕下台了！我們現在或許就可以模擬一下，屆時審理國務機要費的法官所做出的判決，若是既不符扁意，又不符綠營預期，他會怎樣地被修理！
同樣加入羞辱法官的是行政院新聞局長謝志偉，他公開要求處理政治人物司法案件的法官須上網公布其黨籍或有無黨籍，卻不交代這種做法的依據在哪裡？更不問憲法第八十條早已經揭示：「法官須超出黨派以外，依據法律獨立審判，不受任何干涉。」卻振振有詞地美其名曰：這是「轉型正義」。我們真想在這說一句：「轉型正義、轉型正義，如今台灣多少罪惡假汝之名而行！」執政黨摧毀司法還不滿足，還想把「轉型正義」這個概念也一併玷汙掉。沒人否認戒嚴時期的司法確曾受到黨國體制的箝制，而如果「解嚴」算做是一種轉型，那麼它最大的貢獻，所塑造的最重要「正義」，不就是將人們（包括法官）心中的「小警總」都去除了？如今執政黨藉由這種下流手段公開威嚇法官，不正是擺明要將全新的「綠色小警總」，重新樹立在所有法官的心中嗎？
在捍衛政權的現實考量下，期待陳水扁與綠營此刻停止糟蹋司法，恐怕是奢求，反倒是法界得要對未來更凶險的攻擊做好心理準備了。而在這種政治惡質的環境下，法官們也惟有以更專業的判決、更獨立的審判，才能回應所有政治的抹黑。
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