Prudence and Patience to Reestablish Cross-strait Dialogue
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 31, 2008
The Republic of China Presidential Election has attracted the attention of the international media. Without exception, they have focused on cross-strait relations. Post-election indicators suggest fresh new prospects for cross-strait relations. First, George W. Bush and Hu Jintao declared, for the very first time, a shared commitment to the 1992 Consensus, entailing One China, Different Expressions. During an exclusive interview, Ma Ying-jeou followed suit, stressing that the common denominator between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei is "One China, Different Expressions." These post-election pronouncements tell us that the future of cross-strait relations will be quite different from the stagnation and recession of the past eight years.
Most intriguing of all is the 1992 consensus. The DPP originally dismissed it as "non-existent." Yet today Taipei, Beijing, and Washington all accept its language. The reason the 1992 consensus has roared back to life is quite simple. We have endured eight years of confrontation and deadlock. If that isn't enough to teach people the advantages of pragmatism, what is? Is the One China Principle a "prerequisite for discussions," or merely a possible "topic of discussion?" Are cross-strait relations "domestic relations," or "international relations?" If the two sides continue going back and forth on this issue and refuse to move on, then the only alternative is "perpetual confrontation." But the confrontation has already gone on for eight years. Does anyone really want this stalemate to continue?
After being abandoned by the DPP for eight years, the 1992 consensus and One China, Different Expressions have resurfaced. This amounts to a recognition of reality, to a pragmatic recognition of the status quo. Whoever wants insoluble issues of sovereignty to prevent the solution of other problems, basically has no desire to solve the problem of cross-strait relations. If the "Different Expressions" provision allows us to shelve the dispute over sovereignty, won't that allow everyone to breath a tremendous sigh of relief? Next up are direct flights, currency exchanges, investment protection, and tourism. As long as the underlying principle remains the same, and both sides use their heads, there should be no insoluble problems.
Of course there are also hidden concerns. Cross-strait relations cannot ignore international constraints. It also strikes a sensitive nerve in the island's politics. There is no denying that eight years under Democratic Progressive Party rule has led to irreversible changes. It is impossible to return entirely to a pre-2008 scenario. Even after Ma Ying-jeou is augurated and adopts a more pragmatic and flexible stance, it will not be possible to ignore opposition Green Camp pressure. Therefore Beijing's attitude will be crucial. If Beijing reintroduces the issue of sovereignty and subjects Taipei to humiliations, then Ma Ying-jeou may be forced to adopt a hard-line.
Beijing must understand that under Ma Ying-jeou the ROC government will no longer resort to provocations for political advantage in cross-strait issues. In other words, for the next four years at least, the ROC government will not exploit issues such as "Authoring a New Constitution," "Rectification of Names," or "Plebiscites on Joining the UN" to make trouble for Beijing. The ROC government will not deliberately raise regional tensions. But even a more pragmatic Ma Ying-jeou cannot turn a blind eye to the hundreds of missiles the mainland has aimed at Taiwan. Nor can he do nothing about the ROC's long-term exclusion from international organizations. And of course he cannot remain silent about the mainland's human rights policies.
If Beijing hopes for a breakthrough in cross-strait relations, it cannot offer merely pro forma expressions of goodwill during talks between leaders. If the mainland military insists on increasing the number of missiles targeting Taiwan, if it continues conducting military exercises directed against the ROC, if it continues undermining Tapei's diplomatic relations, if it continues obstructing Taipei's membership in the international community, it will be impossible for Ma Ying-jeou to throw open the doors of cross-strait policy.
Of course, June 20 is still a ways off. Although the DPP has already begun making pragmatic concessions in its cross-strait economic and trade policies, the two sides have been mired in a standoff for eight long years. During the past eight years significant changes have occurred. The parties who participated in the original cross-strait dialogue are long gone. Wang Daohan and Koo Cheng-fu are no longer among us. Their cross-strait dialogue and consultation framework may be difficult to reconstruct. Rebuilding a platform for cross-strait talks will require adjustments. To successfully negotiate this transition we will need not just goodwill, but patience, patience, and more patience.
Eight years of painful memories should have taught the KMT an important lesson. The smooth handling of cross-strait affairs will require the participation of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party. A cross-strait policy that excludes the DPP will be a source of ruling vs. opposition party conflict. By the same token, the DPP must modify its posture. It must awaken as soon as possible from its ideological stupor. It must actively participate in cross-strait affairs. It must accumulate practical experience. It cannot forever cling to its Closed Door Policies.
People on both sides of the strait hold high hopes for the future. Therefore the initial steps towards dialogue and consultation require even greater prudence and patience, even greater good will and wisdom.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.03.31
以審慎與耐心重啟兩岸對話
中時社論
全球輿論面對台灣大選的結果，無例外都是集中於兩岸關係，而大選後的若干跡象也確實顯示，一個全新的兩岸風貌似乎真的在成形。先是布胡熱線首度觸及「九二共識、一中各表」，而馬英九隨後在接受媒體專訪時也強調，能夠將美中台結合起來的黏著劑就是一中各表。這一系列在選後陸續釋出的訊息，也確實預示著未來的兩岸關係，將迥異於過去八年的停滯與低迷。
挺耐人尋味的是，原本被民進黨一路斥為「根本不存在」的九二共識，如今竟可能成為未來台美中三方都願意接受的表述語言。「九二共識」會由黑翻紅的理由其實也很簡單，經歷了八年的對立與僵持，難道還不夠讓人學習到「務實」？兩岸如果還要持續擺盪在「一中原則是前提還是議題」、「兩岸關係是國內關係還是國際關係」等循環糾纏中不願意走出來的話，兩岸就只能選擇「永續對立」一個答案，問題是都已經對立八年了，還有興致繼續僵持下去嗎？
如今，在被民進黨棄置八年後，「九二共識」與「一中各表」再度出土，所彰顯的最大意義其實就是務實的「承認現狀」。誰要再讓無解的主權議題橫在一切問題之前，誰就是表明了根本不想讓兩岸關係解套。如果可以循「各自表述」的方式擱置主權爭議，豈不是讓各方都鬆一口氣？接下來一連串包括直航、通匯、投資保障、觀光……等課題，只要開放的大原則不變，以雙方的智慧，有什麼難題會是解決不了的！
當然，樂觀之外，也不是沒有隱憂的。兩岸關係擺脫不了國際制約，也同樣時時刻刻牽動著島內政治的敏感神經。不諱言，經歷民進黨八年的執政，許多狀況已經改變，不可能再完全倒回八年前的情境。就職後的馬英九就算立場再務實靈活，也不可能不顧慮在野綠營的制衡。因而北京當局未來的態度也就變得很關鍵，如果北京當局未來在操作兩岸議題上，不經意間又祭出主權問題讓台灣「穿小鞋」，恐怕屆時馬英九也只能選擇「強硬」了。
北京當局應該清楚，馬英九主政後的台灣，不會再以挑釁式的手法去操作兩岸議題，換言之，至少未來四年台灣都不會再動輒以制憲、正名、公投綁大選……等操作去「製造麻煩」，故意挑起區域間的緊張關係。但即使再「務實」的馬英九，也不可能對大陸數百枚瞄準台灣的飛彈「視若無睹」，也不可能對長期被國際組織排除在外的處境「無所作為」，當然也不可能對大陸的人權措施完全「一語不發」。
也可以說，北京當局若是期待兩岸關係能在未來有所突破，不能只在領導人的談話中四平八穩的表達善意。如果軍方部門依舊堅持增加瞄準台灣飛彈的數目，持續舉行武力攻台的軍事演習；外交部門則依舊持續挖空台灣邦交的牆腳，持續打壓台灣對國際社會的參與，則期待馬英九能在未來的兩岸政策上做到大開大闔，其實是不可能的。
當然，距離五二○還有一段時間，儘管民進黨已經開始在兩岸經貿政策上做了務實的調整，但雙方畢竟是停滯了八年，這八年不僅是主客觀的情境大幅變化，八年前曾經參與對話的當事人也泰半物換星移、人事全非，昔日的辜汪兩老俱皆不在，昔日的對話模式也很難再拷貝，因而要重啟兩岸對話，要重建兩岸協商的平台，絕對還需要一段磨合期，要順利走過這個過渡期，需要的不僅只是善意，還絕對需要耐心，持續的耐心。
有了八年不堪回首的記憶，國民黨應該已經學習到一項最重要的教訓，未來要順利處理好兩岸事務，絕對要納入民進黨的參與，一個排除民進黨的兩岸政策，勢必將是未來朝野衝突的主要來源。同樣的民進黨也該調整其在野身段，盡早從意識形態的泥淖中覺醒過來，藉積極務實參與兩岸事務中累積經驗，總不能永遠都得頂著「鎖國」的大帽子吧！
許多人都對兩岸未來抱持著樂觀預期，正因為這樣，踏出對話協商的第一步反而需要更多的審慎，更多的耐心，更多的善意與更多的智慧。
Monday, March 31, 2008
Friday, March 28, 2008
One China, Different Expressions and the Cross-Strait Tango
One China, Different Expressions and the Cross-Strait Tango
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 28, 2008
Ma Ying-jeou and Vincent Siew have won the election. If the international media is in agreement about anything, it is that cross-strait relations will improve.
Actually this is merely a gut feeling, merely a hope, an attempt to turn desire into reality. Authorities on both sides have a lot of work to do. After all, it takes two to tango.
First, an equitable framework must be established. The mutually acceptable basis is the 1992 Consensus that entails One China, Different Expressions. Taipei has been saying One China, Different Expressions. Beijing has been saying Different Expressions of One China. But at least Beijing does not feel compelled to openly repudiate Taipei's One China, Different Expressions. It might be best to use the term 1992 Consensus as an umbrella for One China, Different Expressions and Different Expressions of One China. Each side can then have its own version as long as they do not openly disagree.
On this matter, Beijing must adopt a more tolerant policy. Cross-strait relations have been based on maintaining the status quo. Even Beijing's anti-secession law merely opposes de jure Taiwan independence. It cannot deny the existence of the Republic of China. After 20 years of cross-strait struggle, Beijing must admit that without the Republic of China there is no status quo. To maintain the status quo, one must maintain the existence of the Republic of China.
In the past, audiences at international matches held by the Republic of China were not allowed to wave ROC flags. This prohibition has been nullified by the practical impossibility of enforcement. Subtle developments such as these are beneficial to the development of One China, Different Expressions, and conducive to maintaining the status quo. Ma Ying-jeou has called for a diplomatic truce. Beijing's response will be an indicator of its willingness to respect the Republic of China's diplomatic space. If Beijing wants to maintain the status quo, it must not push Taipei too far.
Beijing's must relate to Taipei on the basis of One China, Different Expressions. If it fails to do so, Ma Ying-jeou will be unable to improve cross-strait relations. Once Ma Ying-jeou becomes president, he will have to consider three points. First, he must not casually propose arrangements such as his Cross-Strait Common Market. Instead he should first create an improved framework for interaction by opening up Three Links and Direct Flights. Lee Teng-hui trotted out his National Unification Guidelines years ago. The embarrassing result was a one man show. He could neither go forward or go back. Second, Ma must continue enhancing Taiwan's international trade role. He must help transform Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific Operational Center. Improved cross-strait relations will facilitate this goal. Cross-strait relations will then have a more solid foundation. Third, once Ma Ying-jeou becomes president, he must use "language appropriate to one's position" when making cross-strait comments.
Toward the end of his election campaign, Ma Ying-jeou issued a statement on Tibet. In terms of election strategy it was perhaps unavoidable. But calling Beijing "arrogant and stupid" was excessive. Stopping at "brutal and irrational" would have been more appropriate. Once Ma Ying-jeou becomes president, he must exercise discretion when referring to the Tiananmen Incident, Falun Gong protests, and Tibetan independence. After all, authorities on both sides must maintain a "hands off" policy regarding the others' "internal affairs." Neither side must allow the other to use its remarks for "internal consumption." Both must use "language appropriate to one's position." Otherwise, we are in no position to criticize Lee Teng-hui's remark that "No matter how big the Chinese Communists are, they can't be any bigger than my ****."
It takes two to Tango. if Beijing is unwilling to see a resurgence of pro-Taiwan independence sentiment, it must maintain a "Republic of China status quo." If Taipei hopes that cross-strait interaction will improve Taiwan's political and economic situation, it must not cling to the notion that "The mainland owes Taiwan." This is an opportunity for the two sides to improve relations. Authorities on both sides should avoid pointless controversy over political symbolism. First open up Three Links and Direct Flights. Establish a bridge. After all, the bridge is more important than its name.
Taiwan lifted martial law 20 years ago. In response to democracy, the mainland has undergone 30 years of liberalization and reform. It has returned to the grass roots. Authorities on both sides must recognize their responsibility to the people, the masters of the Chinese nation. If both sides fail to maintain the status quo, they will suffer the consequences. The music is playing. The world is watching. Let the cross-strait Tango begin.
一中各表‧兩岸探戈
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.28 02:37 am
馬蕭勝選，全球重要媒體的論評皆指出：兩岸關係將獲改善。
其實，這只是直覺，或者只是期盼；若要化作真實，仍須兩岸當局投注極大努力。畢竟，要兩個人才能跳探戈！
首先應當確立對等架構。「九二共識／一中各表」應是雙方必須接受的基礎；儘管台北一直說「一中各表」，北京迄今認係「各表一中」，但北京至少不必正面否認台北的「一中各表」。不妨就用「九二共識」來包容「一中各表」及「各表一中」，兩方各說各話，但皆不表異議即可。
在這一方面，北京必須營造較大的空間。兩岸關係走到今天，既以「維持現狀」為主軸，《反分裂國家法》亦只是反對「法理台獨」而已，即不能不面對中華民國的存在。經歷近二十年來的兩岸角力，北京必須承認：無中華民國即無現狀，要維持現狀就須維持中華民國。
例如，過去在台灣舉行的國際球賽亦不容觀眾攜中華民國國旗，但這項禁忌如今已被現實演變所破解。這類點點滴滴的微妙變化，應皆有益於「一中各表」的發展，亦有益於「維持現狀」。再如，馬英九呼籲「外交休兵」，這也將是北京是否尊重台灣外交空間的重要指標；北京若欲「維持現狀」，就不能逼人太甚。
北京必須至少在兩岸內部默認「一中各表」，倘非如此，恐怕馬英九會失去改善兩岸關係的空間。然而，相對而言，馬英九就任總統後，在處理兩岸關係時，亦宜有三點思考：一、不宜隨便畫「兩岸共同市場」之類的大餅，而應先多作些改善「互動架構」如三通直航的基本功。李登輝當年端出「國統綱領」，結果落得自拉自唱、進退維谷，可為殷鑑。二、仍應以創造台灣的國際經貿角色為主目標，如建設台灣為亞太平台，而以改善兩岸關係為促成此一目標的條件；如此兩岸關係始可能建構在更堅實的基石上。三、馬英九就任總統後，在發表關於兩岸的評論時，應斟酌其「角色語言」。
關於「角色語言」，可用馬英九在選季後期的「西藏談話」為例。馬英九當時的「西藏談話」，在選舉戰略上是不得不然，但無論如何恐怕皆多了「自大愚蠢」四字，若能說到「蠻橫無理」就打住，省去那四個字的贅語，也許就差不多了。馬英九接任總統後，對六四、法輪功、西藏等評論皆應謹慎；畢竟，兩岸當局對彼此的「內政」皆應維持距離，尤其必須避免以對方內政為內部的政治消費。這是「角色語言」的斟酌，否則如何批評李登輝說的「中共再大也不如我老爸大」？
要兩個人才能跳探戈。兩岸關係走到今日，北京若不願見台獨運動回潮，自須「維持」以「中華民國」為脊柱的「現狀」；台北若希望藉兩岸互動來改善台灣的政經處境，亦不可有「大陸欠台灣」的幻想。因此，在這雙方關係出現改善契機的時刻，兩岸當局應當節制在政治符號上的無謂爭議，先將三通直航的橋搭起來再說，畢竟橋的本身總比橋的名字來得實際吧！
台灣解嚴二十年，回應民主；大陸改革開放三十年，回歸民本。兩岸當局倘能相互體認各自對於民主及民本的責任，即知兩岸關係倘若失去「現狀」，對雙方皆將是難以收拾的災難。樂聲響起，全世界皆在注視這一場兩岸探戈即將開舞！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 28, 2008
Ma Ying-jeou and Vincent Siew have won the election. If the international media is in agreement about anything, it is that cross-strait relations will improve.
Actually this is merely a gut feeling, merely a hope, an attempt to turn desire into reality. Authorities on both sides have a lot of work to do. After all, it takes two to tango.
First, an equitable framework must be established. The mutually acceptable basis is the 1992 Consensus that entails One China, Different Expressions. Taipei has been saying One China, Different Expressions. Beijing has been saying Different Expressions of One China. But at least Beijing does not feel compelled to openly repudiate Taipei's One China, Different Expressions. It might be best to use the term 1992 Consensus as an umbrella for One China, Different Expressions and Different Expressions of One China. Each side can then have its own version as long as they do not openly disagree.
On this matter, Beijing must adopt a more tolerant policy. Cross-strait relations have been based on maintaining the status quo. Even Beijing's anti-secession law merely opposes de jure Taiwan independence. It cannot deny the existence of the Republic of China. After 20 years of cross-strait struggle, Beijing must admit that without the Republic of China there is no status quo. To maintain the status quo, one must maintain the existence of the Republic of China.
In the past, audiences at international matches held by the Republic of China were not allowed to wave ROC flags. This prohibition has been nullified by the practical impossibility of enforcement. Subtle developments such as these are beneficial to the development of One China, Different Expressions, and conducive to maintaining the status quo. Ma Ying-jeou has called for a diplomatic truce. Beijing's response will be an indicator of its willingness to respect the Republic of China's diplomatic space. If Beijing wants to maintain the status quo, it must not push Taipei too far.
Beijing's must relate to Taipei on the basis of One China, Different Expressions. If it fails to do so, Ma Ying-jeou will be unable to improve cross-strait relations. Once Ma Ying-jeou becomes president, he will have to consider three points. First, he must not casually propose arrangements such as his Cross-Strait Common Market. Instead he should first create an improved framework for interaction by opening up Three Links and Direct Flights. Lee Teng-hui trotted out his National Unification Guidelines years ago. The embarrassing result was a one man show. He could neither go forward or go back. Second, Ma must continue enhancing Taiwan's international trade role. He must help transform Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific Operational Center. Improved cross-strait relations will facilitate this goal. Cross-strait relations will then have a more solid foundation. Third, once Ma Ying-jeou becomes president, he must use "language appropriate to one's position" when making cross-strait comments.
Toward the end of his election campaign, Ma Ying-jeou issued a statement on Tibet. In terms of election strategy it was perhaps unavoidable. But calling Beijing "arrogant and stupid" was excessive. Stopping at "brutal and irrational" would have been more appropriate. Once Ma Ying-jeou becomes president, he must exercise discretion when referring to the Tiananmen Incident, Falun Gong protests, and Tibetan independence. After all, authorities on both sides must maintain a "hands off" policy regarding the others' "internal affairs." Neither side must allow the other to use its remarks for "internal consumption." Both must use "language appropriate to one's position." Otherwise, we are in no position to criticize Lee Teng-hui's remark that "No matter how big the Chinese Communists are, they can't be any bigger than my ****."
It takes two to Tango. if Beijing is unwilling to see a resurgence of pro-Taiwan independence sentiment, it must maintain a "Republic of China status quo." If Taipei hopes that cross-strait interaction will improve Taiwan's political and economic situation, it must not cling to the notion that "The mainland owes Taiwan." This is an opportunity for the two sides to improve relations. Authorities on both sides should avoid pointless controversy over political symbolism. First open up Three Links and Direct Flights. Establish a bridge. After all, the bridge is more important than its name.
Taiwan lifted martial law 20 years ago. In response to democracy, the mainland has undergone 30 years of liberalization and reform. It has returned to the grass roots. Authorities on both sides must recognize their responsibility to the people, the masters of the Chinese nation. If both sides fail to maintain the status quo, they will suffer the consequences. The music is playing. The world is watching. Let the cross-strait Tango begin.
一中各表‧兩岸探戈
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.28 02:37 am
馬蕭勝選，全球重要媒體的論評皆指出：兩岸關係將獲改善。
其實，這只是直覺，或者只是期盼；若要化作真實，仍須兩岸當局投注極大努力。畢竟，要兩個人才能跳探戈！
首先應當確立對等架構。「九二共識／一中各表」應是雙方必須接受的基礎；儘管台北一直說「一中各表」，北京迄今認係「各表一中」，但北京至少不必正面否認台北的「一中各表」。不妨就用「九二共識」來包容「一中各表」及「各表一中」，兩方各說各話，但皆不表異議即可。
在這一方面，北京必須營造較大的空間。兩岸關係走到今天，既以「維持現狀」為主軸，《反分裂國家法》亦只是反對「法理台獨」而已，即不能不面對中華民國的存在。經歷近二十年來的兩岸角力，北京必須承認：無中華民國即無現狀，要維持現狀就須維持中華民國。
例如，過去在台灣舉行的國際球賽亦不容觀眾攜中華民國國旗，但這項禁忌如今已被現實演變所破解。這類點點滴滴的微妙變化，應皆有益於「一中各表」的發展，亦有益於「維持現狀」。再如，馬英九呼籲「外交休兵」，這也將是北京是否尊重台灣外交空間的重要指標；北京若欲「維持現狀」，就不能逼人太甚。
北京必須至少在兩岸內部默認「一中各表」，倘非如此，恐怕馬英九會失去改善兩岸關係的空間。然而，相對而言，馬英九就任總統後，在處理兩岸關係時，亦宜有三點思考：一、不宜隨便畫「兩岸共同市場」之類的大餅，而應先多作些改善「互動架構」如三通直航的基本功。李登輝當年端出「國統綱領」，結果落得自拉自唱、進退維谷，可為殷鑑。二、仍應以創造台灣的國際經貿角色為主目標，如建設台灣為亞太平台，而以改善兩岸關係為促成此一目標的條件；如此兩岸關係始可能建構在更堅實的基石上。三、馬英九就任總統後，在發表關於兩岸的評論時，應斟酌其「角色語言」。
關於「角色語言」，可用馬英九在選季後期的「西藏談話」為例。馬英九當時的「西藏談話」，在選舉戰略上是不得不然，但無論如何恐怕皆多了「自大愚蠢」四字，若能說到「蠻橫無理」就打住，省去那四個字的贅語，也許就差不多了。馬英九接任總統後，對六四、法輪功、西藏等評論皆應謹慎；畢竟，兩岸當局對彼此的「內政」皆應維持距離，尤其必須避免以對方內政為內部的政治消費。這是「角色語言」的斟酌，否則如何批評李登輝說的「中共再大也不如我老爸大」？
要兩個人才能跳探戈。兩岸關係走到今日，北京若不願見台獨運動回潮，自須「維持」以「中華民國」為脊柱的「現狀」；台北若希望藉兩岸互動來改善台灣的政經處境，亦不可有「大陸欠台灣」的幻想。因此，在這雙方關係出現改善契機的時刻，兩岸當局應當節制在政治符號上的無謂爭議，先將三通直航的橋搭起來再說，畢竟橋的本身總比橋的名字來得實際吧！
台灣解嚴二十年，回應民主；大陸改革開放三十年，回歸民本。兩岸當局倘能相互體認各自對於民主及民本的責任，即知兩岸關係倘若失去「現狀」，對雙方皆將是難以收拾的災難。樂聲響起，全世界皆在注視這一場兩岸探戈即將開舞！
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Has the Outgoing Democratic Progressive Party Learned Its Lesson?
Has the Outgoing Democratic Progressive Party Learned Its Lesson?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 27, 2008
After the election debacle, Chen Shui-bian hid from public view, and the Four Princes of the DPP fell silent. The DPP has two months to luxuriate in its power. No one, it seems, is willing to urge the upper echelons of the party to reflect over its eight years of folly. It is amazing how little time it took for the DPP to fritter away the moral capital it earned during the "dang wai" (party outsider) era.
The DPP has dragged its feet on conducting an internal review for years. In 2004 Chen Shui-bian "narrowly won" amidst a mysterious shooting incident. In the four years since, the DPP has barely managed to hang on to Kaohsiung City. Its margins of victory have steadily diminished. These were warning signals, expressions of disappointment and discontent with the ruling DPP. Alas, the Democratic Progressive Party chose to rest on its laurels, by consolidating its core support. It had absolutely no intention of engaging in self-introspection.
Even now, the Green camp feels betrayed and bewildered by the electorate's "desertion." Some claim they failed to adequately "package" their political achievements. Some openly express disgust with the people of Taiwan. Some pass the buck to people who never even joined the party, such as Chuang Kuo-jung. Many more concentrate exclusively on fighting over official positions within the party hierarchy. No one engages in heartfelt introspection. The DPP was arrogant when it wielded power. It is resentful in the face of defeat and unresponsive in the face of public censure. Its behavior betrays its dictatorial mindset, and the hollowness of its progressive slogans.
Does the Democratic Progressive Party even know why it fell from grace? Does the Democratic Progressive Party know why its trump cards, its Sinopobia card, its McCarthyite smear card, its Nativist card, its "ethnicity" card all lost their magic this time? The DPP had better think through these questions before it launches a new wave of purges. Only then will it understand what role it must play in the future of Taiwan's politics.
What is the DPP's problem? One could say that it chose the wrong political path, but it would be more accurate to say that it lost touch with the people. First, Chen Shui-bian abandoned his "all people's government." He began inciting petty ethnic hatred, consciously adopting methods he knew would hurt people. He intentionally divided people on Taiwan into "us" and "them," leaving people queasy and anxious. Chen Shui-bian knew perfectly well that goals such as Taiwan independence were impossible to achieve. Yet he relentlessly demagogued the issue. He insulted the public's intelligence and feelings. A political party that plays people for fools, eventually plays itself for a fool.
Secondly, when Chen Shui-bian and other government officials were implicted time and again in corruption scandals, the DPP did not engage in self-introspection. It ignored right and wrong and backed Chen all the way. This was contrary to the people's expectations. When Green camp leaders of integrity were attacked and ostracized, the old and new "Three Stooges" suddenly became media darlings. How long did the DPP imagine the public would tolerate the DPP's decadence? The Chen regime repeatedly invoked Transitional Justice to rationalize unwarranted campaigns to "Rectify Names," to purge the legacy of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, to "de-Sinicize" Taiwan, and to engage in "historical revisionism" of public school textbooks. Such actions revealed the DPP's cold-blooded nature and affronted the public's moral sensibilities.
The ruling DPP lacked ability, but stubbornly refused to recruit from outside the party. It disrespected professionalism and abused its power by hiring political cronies and blood relatives. Bad money drove out good money, and the economy nose-dived into depression. The DPP has long boasted it had the gift of gab, and could make the people believe anything. Therefore it did not need to listen to the people. The DPP had toyed with the people's feelings for so long, and abused their trust for so long, it was only a matter of time before the people finally spurned the DPP.
For eight years, the DPP has been living in the past. On the one hand, it imagines that as long as it firmly affixes a label reading "Demon" on the KMT's forehead, it can endlessly defraud the people and win their unconditional support. On the other hand, it has retained its combative nature as an opposition party. It invests all its energies in endless struggles for power. It gives no thought to governing the nation. It remains incapable of responding to the people's desire for stability and prosperity. Living in the past has disconnected the DPP from the rest of the world, not to mention the public on Taiwan. Its "field army" governing style has caused no end of suffering and instability.
The DPP's plight is not the fault of Chen Shui-bian alone. Nor was it the fault of Chuang Kuo-jung and his ilk. It was the result of the entire party's willful self-delusion. Power corrupts. The DPP confirmed the truth of this addage by observing the KMT. Yet when the DPP acquired power, it confirmed the truth of this addage by its own actions, even more swiftly. The DPP does not need to issue solemn declarations about its reformist zeal or revolutionary courage. All it needs to do is engage in self-introspection. All it needs to do is realize how it betrayed the people, and why it has now been disowned by the people it betrayed.
The DPP, after eight years of gross misrule, will soon have to relinquish political power. Sad to say, the DPP still hasn't learned its civics lesson. What is gratifying though, is that the people are no longer willing to play the DPP's game. They are no longer willing to be True Believers in the DPP's fictitious "Future Nation of Taiwan." The people have chosen to live in the real world. To advance steadily towards the down to earth goal of peace and prosperity. It is now the Democratic Progressive Party's turn to decide what role it wants to play.
即將下台，民進黨學會了執政這一課嗎？
【聯合報 ╱社論】
2008.03.27 04:32 am
大敗之後，陳水扁刻意避免露臉，四大天王寂然無聲；這個僅剩兩個月權力大餐可享用的政黨，上層似乎無人願敦促全黨共同反省這八年的荒唐。很難想像，自黨外時代積累下來的進步精神，就這樣迅速耗光了。
民進黨該做的內部檢討，其實已拖了多年。二○○四年陳水扁在槍擊疑雲中驚險勝出後，四年以來，民進黨僅勉強維持住高雄市的一場勝選；一次次敗績，都是人民向執政黨表達失望與不滿的警訊。可惜，得意忘形的民進黨以坐擁基本盤顧盼自雄，對自己的作為毫無反省之意。
即使至今，綠營內部對選民的「遺棄」仍充滿怨懟與不解。有人宣稱是政績「包裝」不足，有人公然指責台灣人民令人失望，有人把責任推給未入黨的莊國榮，更多人只顧著謀奪黨中央的大位，沒有人誠懇反省。民進黨面對權位的傲慢，相對於它面對敗選的不甘和面對民意鞭策的無動於衷，充分反映它民主素養的缺乏，以及進步口號的空洞。
民進黨知道自己為何丟掉政權嗎？民進黨知道為何過去屢試不爽的恐嚇牌、抹黑牌、本土牌、族群牌這次卻全告失靈嗎？在展開新一波清算之前，民進黨最好把這些問題思考清楚，才能自知未來在台灣政治中該扮演什麼角色。
民進黨的問題，與其說是政治路線選擇失當，不如說是它的心遠遠背離了人民。首先，當陳水扁放棄「全民政府」路線，轉向族群動員，他等於選擇了傷害人民感情的手段，故意撕裂台灣。這帶給民眾極度的不安和焦慮。再說，扁政府明知入聯、台獨等訴求都是難以實現的目標，卻一再操弄，並樂此不疲；這不僅侮辱人民的智慧，也欺騙了百姓的感情。一個欺弄人民的政黨，最後也掉入自我欺騙的陷阱。
其次，當陳水扁及其政府官員不斷爆發貪腐醜聞，民進黨不僅不思反省，反而罔顧是非全力挺扁，這完全違背了民主政治的倫理和人民的道德期待。試想，綠營正派之士遭到批鬥及排擠，反而是新舊三寶者流相繼走紅，這種加速沉淪的醜態，人民能容忍到幾時？此外，扁政府反覆利用轉型正義之名，執行不必要的正名、去蔣、去中乃至刪修教科書的行動，不僅暴露民進黨的冷血，也一再挑戰民眾道德良知的底線。
再者，民進黨執政能力不足，卻無意廣納人才，不肯尊重專業，反而一再濫用朋黨親私。劣幣驅逐良幣的結果，是使國家經濟陷入衰退，使人民生活陷入困頓。民進黨一向自恃辯才無礙，以為人民很容易哄騙和說服，所以不需要傾聽人民的聲音。正因長期玩弄人民的感情、輕忽人民的期待、壓榨人民的善意，民進黨最後遭到選民唾棄自是勢所必然。
過去八年，民進黨把自己停格在一個過去的世界：一方面，以為只要把「惡魔」的標籤緊緊貼在國民黨頭上，自己就可以無盡騙取人民的支持；另一方面，它保持自己在野的戰鬥性格不變，耽溺於各面向的攻伐征戰，不思治國，亦無法回應人民對安定和繁榮的渴望。正因為這種「過去式」的執政觀點，使民進黨和世界脫節，和人民脫節；也因為其「野戰式」的執政性格，使人民受苦，使台灣動盪遭殃。
民進黨今天的困頓，不是陳水扁一人造成的，當然更不是莊國榮之流的責任，而是整個黨自我蒙蔽、集體催眠的結果。權力使人腐敗，民進黨從國民黨身上看到這個問題，卻用更短的時間親身驗證了這點。今天，民進黨不需要向人民宣示它有多大的改革勇氣和決心，它要做的就是自我反省，想清楚，自己如何背棄了人民，又為何被人民拋棄。
遺憾的是，執政八年，馬上就要交卸政權，民進黨卻還是沒學會執政這一課。而值得欣慰的是，人民不想陪民進黨在歷史的廢墟中徘徊，也不想再當虛無的「未來國家」的信徒；人民選擇活在當下，腳踏實地往可以預期的前景邁進。現在，輪到民進黨選擇自己的位置了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 27, 2008
After the election debacle, Chen Shui-bian hid from public view, and the Four Princes of the DPP fell silent. The DPP has two months to luxuriate in its power. No one, it seems, is willing to urge the upper echelons of the party to reflect over its eight years of folly. It is amazing how little time it took for the DPP to fritter away the moral capital it earned during the "dang wai" (party outsider) era.
The DPP has dragged its feet on conducting an internal review for years. In 2004 Chen Shui-bian "narrowly won" amidst a mysterious shooting incident. In the four years since, the DPP has barely managed to hang on to Kaohsiung City. Its margins of victory have steadily diminished. These were warning signals, expressions of disappointment and discontent with the ruling DPP. Alas, the Democratic Progressive Party chose to rest on its laurels, by consolidating its core support. It had absolutely no intention of engaging in self-introspection.
Even now, the Green camp feels betrayed and bewildered by the electorate's "desertion." Some claim they failed to adequately "package" their political achievements. Some openly express disgust with the people of Taiwan. Some pass the buck to people who never even joined the party, such as Chuang Kuo-jung. Many more concentrate exclusively on fighting over official positions within the party hierarchy. No one engages in heartfelt introspection. The DPP was arrogant when it wielded power. It is resentful in the face of defeat and unresponsive in the face of public censure. Its behavior betrays its dictatorial mindset, and the hollowness of its progressive slogans.
Does the Democratic Progressive Party even know why it fell from grace? Does the Democratic Progressive Party know why its trump cards, its Sinopobia card, its McCarthyite smear card, its Nativist card, its "ethnicity" card all lost their magic this time? The DPP had better think through these questions before it launches a new wave of purges. Only then will it understand what role it must play in the future of Taiwan's politics.
What is the DPP's problem? One could say that it chose the wrong political path, but it would be more accurate to say that it lost touch with the people. First, Chen Shui-bian abandoned his "all people's government." He began inciting petty ethnic hatred, consciously adopting methods he knew would hurt people. He intentionally divided people on Taiwan into "us" and "them," leaving people queasy and anxious. Chen Shui-bian knew perfectly well that goals such as Taiwan independence were impossible to achieve. Yet he relentlessly demagogued the issue. He insulted the public's intelligence and feelings. A political party that plays people for fools, eventually plays itself for a fool.
Secondly, when Chen Shui-bian and other government officials were implicted time and again in corruption scandals, the DPP did not engage in self-introspection. It ignored right and wrong and backed Chen all the way. This was contrary to the people's expectations. When Green camp leaders of integrity were attacked and ostracized, the old and new "Three Stooges" suddenly became media darlings. How long did the DPP imagine the public would tolerate the DPP's decadence? The Chen regime repeatedly invoked Transitional Justice to rationalize unwarranted campaigns to "Rectify Names," to purge the legacy of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, to "de-Sinicize" Taiwan, and to engage in "historical revisionism" of public school textbooks. Such actions revealed the DPP's cold-blooded nature and affronted the public's moral sensibilities.
The ruling DPP lacked ability, but stubbornly refused to recruit from outside the party. It disrespected professionalism and abused its power by hiring political cronies and blood relatives. Bad money drove out good money, and the economy nose-dived into depression. The DPP has long boasted it had the gift of gab, and could make the people believe anything. Therefore it did not need to listen to the people. The DPP had toyed with the people's feelings for so long, and abused their trust for so long, it was only a matter of time before the people finally spurned the DPP.
For eight years, the DPP has been living in the past. On the one hand, it imagines that as long as it firmly affixes a label reading "Demon" on the KMT's forehead, it can endlessly defraud the people and win their unconditional support. On the other hand, it has retained its combative nature as an opposition party. It invests all its energies in endless struggles for power. It gives no thought to governing the nation. It remains incapable of responding to the people's desire for stability and prosperity. Living in the past has disconnected the DPP from the rest of the world, not to mention the public on Taiwan. Its "field army" governing style has caused no end of suffering and instability.
The DPP's plight is not the fault of Chen Shui-bian alone. Nor was it the fault of Chuang Kuo-jung and his ilk. It was the result of the entire party's willful self-delusion. Power corrupts. The DPP confirmed the truth of this addage by observing the KMT. Yet when the DPP acquired power, it confirmed the truth of this addage by its own actions, even more swiftly. The DPP does not need to issue solemn declarations about its reformist zeal or revolutionary courage. All it needs to do is engage in self-introspection. All it needs to do is realize how it betrayed the people, and why it has now been disowned by the people it betrayed.
The DPP, after eight years of gross misrule, will soon have to relinquish political power. Sad to say, the DPP still hasn't learned its civics lesson. What is gratifying though, is that the people are no longer willing to play the DPP's game. They are no longer willing to be True Believers in the DPP's fictitious "Future Nation of Taiwan." The people have chosen to live in the real world. To advance steadily towards the down to earth goal of peace and prosperity. It is now the Democratic Progressive Party's turn to decide what role it wants to play.
即將下台，民進黨學會了執政這一課嗎？
【聯合報 ╱社論】
2008.03.27 04:32 am
大敗之後，陳水扁刻意避免露臉，四大天王寂然無聲；這個僅剩兩個月權力大餐可享用的政黨，上層似乎無人願敦促全黨共同反省這八年的荒唐。很難想像，自黨外時代積累下來的進步精神，就這樣迅速耗光了。
民進黨該做的內部檢討，其實已拖了多年。二○○四年陳水扁在槍擊疑雲中驚險勝出後，四年以來，民進黨僅勉強維持住高雄市的一場勝選；一次次敗績，都是人民向執政黨表達失望與不滿的警訊。可惜，得意忘形的民進黨以坐擁基本盤顧盼自雄，對自己的作為毫無反省之意。
即使至今，綠營內部對選民的「遺棄」仍充滿怨懟與不解。有人宣稱是政績「包裝」不足，有人公然指責台灣人民令人失望，有人把責任推給未入黨的莊國榮，更多人只顧著謀奪黨中央的大位，沒有人誠懇反省。民進黨面對權位的傲慢，相對於它面對敗選的不甘和面對民意鞭策的無動於衷，充分反映它民主素養的缺乏，以及進步口號的空洞。
民進黨知道自己為何丟掉政權嗎？民進黨知道為何過去屢試不爽的恐嚇牌、抹黑牌、本土牌、族群牌這次卻全告失靈嗎？在展開新一波清算之前，民進黨最好把這些問題思考清楚，才能自知未來在台灣政治中該扮演什麼角色。
民進黨的問題，與其說是政治路線選擇失當，不如說是它的心遠遠背離了人民。首先，當陳水扁放棄「全民政府」路線，轉向族群動員，他等於選擇了傷害人民感情的手段，故意撕裂台灣。這帶給民眾極度的不安和焦慮。再說，扁政府明知入聯、台獨等訴求都是難以實現的目標，卻一再操弄，並樂此不疲；這不僅侮辱人民的智慧，也欺騙了百姓的感情。一個欺弄人民的政黨，最後也掉入自我欺騙的陷阱。
其次，當陳水扁及其政府官員不斷爆發貪腐醜聞，民進黨不僅不思反省，反而罔顧是非全力挺扁，這完全違背了民主政治的倫理和人民的道德期待。試想，綠營正派之士遭到批鬥及排擠，反而是新舊三寶者流相繼走紅，這種加速沉淪的醜態，人民能容忍到幾時？此外，扁政府反覆利用轉型正義之名，執行不必要的正名、去蔣、去中乃至刪修教科書的行動，不僅暴露民進黨的冷血，也一再挑戰民眾道德良知的底線。
再者，民進黨執政能力不足，卻無意廣納人才，不肯尊重專業，反而一再濫用朋黨親私。劣幣驅逐良幣的結果，是使國家經濟陷入衰退，使人民生活陷入困頓。民進黨一向自恃辯才無礙，以為人民很容易哄騙和說服，所以不需要傾聽人民的聲音。正因長期玩弄人民的感情、輕忽人民的期待、壓榨人民的善意，民進黨最後遭到選民唾棄自是勢所必然。
過去八年，民進黨把自己停格在一個過去的世界：一方面，以為只要把「惡魔」的標籤緊緊貼在國民黨頭上，自己就可以無盡騙取人民的支持；另一方面，它保持自己在野的戰鬥性格不變，耽溺於各面向的攻伐征戰，不思治國，亦無法回應人民對安定和繁榮的渴望。正因為這種「過去式」的執政觀點，使民進黨和世界脫節，和人民脫節；也因為其「野戰式」的執政性格，使人民受苦，使台灣動盪遭殃。
民進黨今天的困頓，不是陳水扁一人造成的，當然更不是莊國榮之流的責任，而是整個黨自我蒙蔽、集體催眠的結果。權力使人腐敗，民進黨從國民黨身上看到這個問題，卻用更短的時間親身驗證了這點。今天，民進黨不需要向人民宣示它有多大的改革勇氣和決心，它要做的就是自我反省，想清楚，自己如何背棄了人民，又為何被人民拋棄。
遺憾的是，執政八年，馬上就要交卸政權，民進黨卻還是沒學會執政這一課。而值得欣慰的是，人民不想陪民進黨在歷史的廢墟中徘徊，也不想再當虛無的「未來國家」的信徒；人民選擇活在當下，腳踏實地往可以預期的前景邁進。現在，輪到民進黨選擇自己的位置了。
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
Six Preconditions for Political Transparency
Six Preconditions for Political Transparency
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 26, 2008
On March 23, the day after election day, this newspaper expressed the hope that Ma Ying-jeou would strive for both "political transparency and economic prosperity." Yesterday's editorial expressed the hope that Ma Ying-jeou would be a president who is both "a man of virtue and a man of ability."
Ma Ying-jeou must maintain his image as a man of virtue. His credentials as a political reformer depend on it. As Ma Ying-jeou attempts to establish an administration with ability, his image as a man of virtue will be the engine that makes political transparency and economic prosperity possible.
Eight years of turmoil have left Taiwan on its last legs. What follows are six preconditions for achieving political transparency and economic prosperity:
One. Clean Government: Ma Ying-jeou's greatest political asset is his integrity. Although he found himself mired in the discretionary fund controversy, people still believed in him. Ma Ying-jeou must safeguard his image as "Mr. Clean" in order to realize his dream of clean government. A president must not fabricate non-existent "Southern Fronts." The First Family must not include the likes of Wu Shu-chen, Chao Chien-ming, and Chao Yu-chu. The president's advisors must not include the likes of Chen Che-nan. Only if the president himself is above reproach, will he have the moral authority to demand that everyone in his administration follow suit.
Two. National Identity: Taiwan is already badly divided. Those who reject the Republic of China and demand the "Rectification of Names" concoct artificial distinctions between "alien regimes" and "native regimes," between "Taiwanese" and "non-Taiwanese." Ma Ying-jeou's resounding victory, in the face of efforts to stigmatize him as a "second-generation mainlander," as an "agent of an alien regime," has rescued Taiwan from its national and ethnic identity crisis. Ma Ying-jeou must persuade the public to reaffirm our national identity and mend society's divisions.
Three. Cross-strait Relations: The Republic of China's political and economic structure, constitutional foundations, and trade prospects are closely related to cross-strait relations. In order to reestablish healthy cross-strait relations, Ma Ying-jeou must "minimize risk and maximize opportunity." He must mobilize technological resources and human resources, internally and externally. He must seize the initiative. He must neither resign himself to fate, nor engage in wishful thinking.
Four. Economic Development: During the election Ma Ying-jeou's economic development proposals were seen as cross-strait / production / government-driven. They need to be globally / distribution / commerce-driven. The short and mid-term economic picture can be summed up as follows: A. Cross-strait trade relations must not entail unilateral hemorrhaging on the Taiwan side. The economic lifeblood must circulate. B. Taiwan must take into account distribution as well as production. It must not allow society to become even more "M-shaped."
Five. Educational Reform: Today's educational problems are not exclusively systemic. The "single syllabus, multiple texts" problem was caused by high-ranking educational officials. These officials are anything but models of emulation for teachers and students. Lee Yuan-tseh and Tu Cheng-sheng are the principle culprits behind the "educational reform" fiasco. They are to blame for the most outrageous debacle in Taiwan's educational history. The devastation these two have inflicted upon the educational sector is inestimable. For years, they rammed "constructive mathematics" down the throats of students. Teachers, students, and parents could only swallow their anger. Was this any way for professional educators to behave? Educators must be able to distinguish between right and wrong. Future educational reform must include systemic reforms. Professional educators must reclaim their spirit of self-introspection and self-betterment.
Six. Social Justice: The DPP has destroyed virtually every institution responsible for ensuring social justice, including the prosecutorial system, the Central Election Commission, the Control Yuan, the Council of Grand Justices, and the National Communications Commission. The DPP has manipulated the nation's banks, public utilities, and major media. It has "package-dealed" plebiscites with elections, undermining the spirit of the constitution, including provisions for free and fair elections and secret ballots. It has hijacked the machinery of state, including the Central Election Commission, turning it into a tool for political control. It has shamelessly subverted the justice system. Ma Ying-jeou must refrain from manipulating the machinery of state. He must guard against political influence. If the judiciary prosecutes government corruption, Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT must welcome such prosecutions. If the media investigates government malfeasance, Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT must welcome such investigations, and engage in reform. This is how a nation provides checks and balances against One Party Rule.
Eight years of turmoil have left Taiwan hanging by a thread. For all intents and purposes, Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT must bring Taiwan back from the dead. They must transform a corrupt government into clean government. They must transform "ethnic divisions" into social harmony. They must transform cross-strait hatred into cross-strait synergy. They must transform economic decline into economic renewal. They must transform "educational reform" into educational revitalization. They must transform miscarriages of justice into expressions of justice. What is this, if not reviving the dead?
Ma Ying-jeou does not have any magic pills. The KMT does not have any magic wands. The thrill of victory will not help them govern the country. Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT must find within themselves the determination to solve the Republic of China's problems, one problem at a time.
陽光政治的六項要務
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.26 03:34 am
二十三日開票次日，本報社論寄望馬英九能將「陽光政治／幸福台灣」懸為目標，昨日社論則期望馬英九能成為一個「好人／能人」的合體總統。
馬英九應善加維持其「好人」形象，這是政治改革與社會信任的重要憑藉，也是「陽光政治」的根本能源；馬英九亦當努力組織一個「能人政府」，這是「幸福台灣」的主要引擎。
八年翻攪，台灣已是千瘡百孔，病弱相尋。茲略論「陽光政治／幸福台灣」的六項要務：
一、清廉政府：雖然陷於特別費事件，馬英九的最大政治資產，就是國人相信他清廉。馬英九應當全力護持自身的清廉形象，並以建造一個清廉政府為目標。總統自己不可捏造「南線工作」，第一家庭中不可有「吳淑珍／趙建銘／趙玉柱」，總統親信中亦不可有「陳哲男」。只要總統自身以清廉自持，應當可使整個政府形成比較清白樸實的風氣。
二、國家認同：台灣已嚴重分裂，一方面國家認同出現了「中華民國／正名制憲」、「外來政權／本土政權」的分歧，另一方面族群關係出現了「台灣人／非台灣人」的撕裂。馬英九在「外省第二代」與「外來政權」的標籤下，高票當選為總統，可視為台灣族群問題與國家認同的重大救贖；因此應當以最大的努力，說服國人，感動國人，來鞏固國家認同，修補族群裂痕。
三、兩岸關係：台灣的政經架構，自憲政論述至經貿發展，皆與兩岸關係密切相關。兩岸關係若欲實現如馬英九所說「將風險降至最低，將機會升至最高」，必須有效調動內外的軟硬資源，主動面對；不能聽天由命，但也不能一廂情願。
四、經濟發展：馬英九在選季提出的經濟發展主張，被認為比較傾向「兩岸／生產／政府驅動」，似應藉由「全球／分配／民間驅動」來平衡。中短程的經濟情勢，或許可以簡化成兩個課題：甲、兩岸經貿不可再是台灣片面「出血」，必須創造「循環」；乙、台灣內部必須「生產與分配兼顧」，不可使Ｍ型社會更趨惡化。
五、教育改革：今日的教育問題，尚不止是在制度層面，如一綱多本等；而是整個教育部門的領導階層，已經不能做為全國師生的精神典範。李遠哲及杜正勝二人，長期作為教改的精神領袖，這實在是台灣教育史上的最大醜聞與悲劇。二人對教育界在精神上的摧殘實在可怕，如建構式數學施行多年，師生家長皆敢怒不敢言，這豈是以明辨是非為職志的教育界當有的反應？因而，未來的教改工作，除了在制度上補偏救弊外，更應尋回教育界內在的自我完善力量，以重建教育專業精神。
六、社會正義：民進黨幾乎摧殘了所有的「社會正義守護機制」，如檢察體系、中選會、監察院、大法官、ＮＣＣ等；更染指操弄銀行、公營事業、媒體。就以「公投綁大選」一例而言，撕毀了公正選舉、祕密投票的憲法精神，更將整個政府與中選會挾持為政爭的工具，徹底摧毀了社會公義，實在可恥可恨。馬英九不但應全力避免以國家機器來操縱、扭曲社會正義，更應藉各種「社會正義守護機制」來管控政治汙染。例如，司法部門若嚴查明辦政府貪腐事件，馬英九及國民黨應表示感謝；又如，媒體若嚴厲監督政府錯失，馬英九及國民黨應當聞過則喜，知所改正。這是制衡「一黨獨大」的重要防腐劑。
八年的翻攪，台灣沉淪已深；馬英九及國民黨面對的幾乎是「起死回生」的難題。應將政府貪腐變成清廉政府，將國家撕裂變成族群融合，將兩岸仇怨變成兩岸雙贏，將經濟衰敗變成經濟回春，將教改失敗變成教育振興，將正義淪喪變成回歸正義……。這難道不是「起死回生」的難題？
馬英九沒有還魂丹，國民黨也沒有仙女棒。勝選的喜悅對治國執政毫無用處，必須有肝腦塗地的決志，一步一腳印地為台灣全力以赴！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 26, 2008
On March 23, the day after election day, this newspaper expressed the hope that Ma Ying-jeou would strive for both "political transparency and economic prosperity." Yesterday's editorial expressed the hope that Ma Ying-jeou would be a president who is both "a man of virtue and a man of ability."
Ma Ying-jeou must maintain his image as a man of virtue. His credentials as a political reformer depend on it. As Ma Ying-jeou attempts to establish an administration with ability, his image as a man of virtue will be the engine that makes political transparency and economic prosperity possible.
Eight years of turmoil have left Taiwan on its last legs. What follows are six preconditions for achieving political transparency and economic prosperity:
One. Clean Government: Ma Ying-jeou's greatest political asset is his integrity. Although he found himself mired in the discretionary fund controversy, people still believed in him. Ma Ying-jeou must safeguard his image as "Mr. Clean" in order to realize his dream of clean government. A president must not fabricate non-existent "Southern Fronts." The First Family must not include the likes of Wu Shu-chen, Chao Chien-ming, and Chao Yu-chu. The president's advisors must not include the likes of Chen Che-nan. Only if the president himself is above reproach, will he have the moral authority to demand that everyone in his administration follow suit.
Two. National Identity: Taiwan is already badly divided. Those who reject the Republic of China and demand the "Rectification of Names" concoct artificial distinctions between "alien regimes" and "native regimes," between "Taiwanese" and "non-Taiwanese." Ma Ying-jeou's resounding victory, in the face of efforts to stigmatize him as a "second-generation mainlander," as an "agent of an alien regime," has rescued Taiwan from its national and ethnic identity crisis. Ma Ying-jeou must persuade the public to reaffirm our national identity and mend society's divisions.
Three. Cross-strait Relations: The Republic of China's political and economic structure, constitutional foundations, and trade prospects are closely related to cross-strait relations. In order to reestablish healthy cross-strait relations, Ma Ying-jeou must "minimize risk and maximize opportunity." He must mobilize technological resources and human resources, internally and externally. He must seize the initiative. He must neither resign himself to fate, nor engage in wishful thinking.
Four. Economic Development: During the election Ma Ying-jeou's economic development proposals were seen as cross-strait / production / government-driven. They need to be globally / distribution / commerce-driven. The short and mid-term economic picture can be summed up as follows: A. Cross-strait trade relations must not entail unilateral hemorrhaging on the Taiwan side. The economic lifeblood must circulate. B. Taiwan must take into account distribution as well as production. It must not allow society to become even more "M-shaped."
Five. Educational Reform: Today's educational problems are not exclusively systemic. The "single syllabus, multiple texts" problem was caused by high-ranking educational officials. These officials are anything but models of emulation for teachers and students. Lee Yuan-tseh and Tu Cheng-sheng are the principle culprits behind the "educational reform" fiasco. They are to blame for the most outrageous debacle in Taiwan's educational history. The devastation these two have inflicted upon the educational sector is inestimable. For years, they rammed "constructive mathematics" down the throats of students. Teachers, students, and parents could only swallow their anger. Was this any way for professional educators to behave? Educators must be able to distinguish between right and wrong. Future educational reform must include systemic reforms. Professional educators must reclaim their spirit of self-introspection and self-betterment.
Six. Social Justice: The DPP has destroyed virtually every institution responsible for ensuring social justice, including the prosecutorial system, the Central Election Commission, the Control Yuan, the Council of Grand Justices, and the National Communications Commission. The DPP has manipulated the nation's banks, public utilities, and major media. It has "package-dealed" plebiscites with elections, undermining the spirit of the constitution, including provisions for free and fair elections and secret ballots. It has hijacked the machinery of state, including the Central Election Commission, turning it into a tool for political control. It has shamelessly subverted the justice system. Ma Ying-jeou must refrain from manipulating the machinery of state. He must guard against political influence. If the judiciary prosecutes government corruption, Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT must welcome such prosecutions. If the media investigates government malfeasance, Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT must welcome such investigations, and engage in reform. This is how a nation provides checks and balances against One Party Rule.
Eight years of turmoil have left Taiwan hanging by a thread. For all intents and purposes, Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT must bring Taiwan back from the dead. They must transform a corrupt government into clean government. They must transform "ethnic divisions" into social harmony. They must transform cross-strait hatred into cross-strait synergy. They must transform economic decline into economic renewal. They must transform "educational reform" into educational revitalization. They must transform miscarriages of justice into expressions of justice. What is this, if not reviving the dead?
Ma Ying-jeou does not have any magic pills. The KMT does not have any magic wands. The thrill of victory will not help them govern the country. Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT must find within themselves the determination to solve the Republic of China's problems, one problem at a time.
陽光政治的六項要務
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.26 03:34 am
二十三日開票次日，本報社論寄望馬英九能將「陽光政治／幸福台灣」懸為目標，昨日社論則期望馬英九能成為一個「好人／能人」的合體總統。
馬英九應善加維持其「好人」形象，這是政治改革與社會信任的重要憑藉，也是「陽光政治」的根本能源；馬英九亦當努力組織一個「能人政府」，這是「幸福台灣」的主要引擎。
八年翻攪，台灣已是千瘡百孔，病弱相尋。茲略論「陽光政治／幸福台灣」的六項要務：
一、清廉政府：雖然陷於特別費事件，馬英九的最大政治資產，就是國人相信他清廉。馬英九應當全力護持自身的清廉形象，並以建造一個清廉政府為目標。總統自己不可捏造「南線工作」，第一家庭中不可有「吳淑珍／趙建銘／趙玉柱」，總統親信中亦不可有「陳哲男」。只要總統自身以清廉自持，應當可使整個政府形成比較清白樸實的風氣。
二、國家認同：台灣已嚴重分裂，一方面國家認同出現了「中華民國／正名制憲」、「外來政權／本土政權」的分歧，另一方面族群關係出現了「台灣人／非台灣人」的撕裂。馬英九在「外省第二代」與「外來政權」的標籤下，高票當選為總統，可視為台灣族群問題與國家認同的重大救贖；因此應當以最大的努力，說服國人，感動國人，來鞏固國家認同，修補族群裂痕。
三、兩岸關係：台灣的政經架構，自憲政論述至經貿發展，皆與兩岸關係密切相關。兩岸關係若欲實現如馬英九所說「將風險降至最低，將機會升至最高」，必須有效調動內外的軟硬資源，主動面對；不能聽天由命，但也不能一廂情願。
四、經濟發展：馬英九在選季提出的經濟發展主張，被認為比較傾向「兩岸／生產／政府驅動」，似應藉由「全球／分配／民間驅動」來平衡。中短程的經濟情勢，或許可以簡化成兩個課題：甲、兩岸經貿不可再是台灣片面「出血」，必須創造「循環」；乙、台灣內部必須「生產與分配兼顧」，不可使Ｍ型社會更趨惡化。
五、教育改革：今日的教育問題，尚不止是在制度層面，如一綱多本等；而是整個教育部門的領導階層，已經不能做為全國師生的精神典範。李遠哲及杜正勝二人，長期作為教改的精神領袖，這實在是台灣教育史上的最大醜聞與悲劇。二人對教育界在精神上的摧殘實在可怕，如建構式數學施行多年，師生家長皆敢怒不敢言，這豈是以明辨是非為職志的教育界當有的反應？因而，未來的教改工作，除了在制度上補偏救弊外，更應尋回教育界內在的自我完善力量，以重建教育專業精神。
六、社會正義：民進黨幾乎摧殘了所有的「社會正義守護機制」，如檢察體系、中選會、監察院、大法官、ＮＣＣ等；更染指操弄銀行、公營事業、媒體。就以「公投綁大選」一例而言，撕毀了公正選舉、祕密投票的憲法精神，更將整個政府與中選會挾持為政爭的工具，徹底摧毀了社會公義，實在可恥可恨。馬英九不但應全力避免以國家機器來操縱、扭曲社會正義，更應藉各種「社會正義守護機制」來管控政治汙染。例如，司法部門若嚴查明辦政府貪腐事件，馬英九及國民黨應表示感謝；又如，媒體若嚴厲監督政府錯失，馬英九及國民黨應當聞過則喜，知所改正。這是制衡「一黨獨大」的重要防腐劑。
八年的翻攪，台灣沉淪已深；馬英九及國民黨面對的幾乎是「起死回生」的難題。應將政府貪腐變成清廉政府，將國家撕裂變成族群融合，將兩岸仇怨變成兩岸雙贏，將經濟衰敗變成經濟回春，將教改失敗變成教育振興，將正義淪喪變成回歸正義……。這難道不是「起死回生」的難題？
馬英九沒有還魂丹，國民黨也沒有仙女棒。勝選的喜悅對治國執政毫無用處，必須有肝腦塗地的決志，一步一腳印地為台灣全力以赴！
Tuesday, March 25, 2008
Lessons for Ma Ying-jeou: Men of Virtue and Men of Ability
Lessons for Ma Ying-jeou: Men of Virtue and Men of Ability
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 25, 2008
"Love and trust" may have been Frank Hsieh's campaign slogan, but most voters think that given Ma Ying-jeou's character traits, it fits him better. "Reconciliation and coexistence" was another of Frank Hsieh's campaign slogans. But again, given Ma Ying-jeou's character traits, most voters think it fits him better as well.
Ma Ying-jeou's character traits were perhaps the main factor in his landslide victory. People have become aware of Ma Ying-jeou's distinctive character through contrast. They have contrasted his words and deeds with those of his political rivals -- Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Frank Hsieh. Many voters have little confidence in the KMT as a party, but are pinning their hopes on Ma Ying-jeou individually. Taiwan has endured 20 years of dirty politics, political decay, and power struggles. Ma Ying-jeou's personal austerity and moral rectitude have established a new political standard for the public on Taiwan.
Ma Ying-jeou has led the KMT to a great victory. We dare not say that after Ma Ying-jeou occupies the presidential office, his manner will not change. But most people chose Ma Ying-jeou because they wanted to establish a new standard for a national leader, one very different from the stereotype embodies by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. This is what Morris Chang meant when he hoped the public would choose a president whom young people could emulate.
The presidential election boiled down to a contest of character. It was an indictment of the character of politicians over the past 20 years, and a quest for redemption. Ma Ying-jeou's moral character is not in question. What is in question is whether he is an able leader in addition to being a virtuous leader.
During his campaign, Frank Hsieh blasted Ma Ying-jeou's "executive decision making ability." That was of course campaign rhetoric. But it is also a serious issue. After all, the public surely hopes that their president, in addition to being a man of virtue, will also be a man of ability.
An ideal president would be both virtuous and able. These traits need not be mutually exclusive. In fact, for a president to be virtuous is a form of ability in itself. Chen Shui-bian lacked the ability to be virtuous. Besides, if a president is not a man of virtue, but a man of ability, what will his ability be devoted to, other than to the doing of evil? To wit, the nightmare we have endured for the past eight years.
We hope that Ma Ying-jeou will be a man of virtue as well as a man of ability. By this we mean that he will exemplify the character required to lead a nation and a society, and also the ability to govern wisely and skillfully. Ma Ying-jeou has already proven himself on the first count. We look forward to seeing Ma Ying-jeou prove himself on the second count.
Over the past year, Ma Ying-jeou has lived with ordinary folk in southern Taiwan. He has endured the Discretionary Fund witch trial. These have been character-building experiences.
He planted rice, picked fruit, caught fish, mended clothing, cleared land. He learned how hard the lives of people at the bottom of the economic ladder were. He learned how physically and psychologically oppressive the apparatus of state could be, as he faced possible prosecution. He learned how to increase the nation's prosperity in the event he was elected president. He learned how to prevent the state from perpetrating social injustice. We await the arrival of a president who is both a man of virtue and a man of ability.
A president who is both a man of virtue and a man of ability may be able to develop Taiwan's potentional and increase Taiwan's social harmony. The DPP has debased the mantra "Love for Taiwan" until it is utterly meaningless. "Love for Taiwan" has become Orwellian Newspeak. It has come to mean the incitement of "ethnic (more precisely, "provincial") hatred" and the repudiation of one's own nation. Ma Ying-jeou might consider devoting a little time each month to charitable activities, to caring for the socially disadvantaged.
That would constitute genuine "Love for Taiwan." Taiwan's potential has been stifled for over a decade. Taiwan's doors have been closed for over a decade. Ma Ying-jeou should liberate Taiwan's potentional. Taiwan's potential is the people's potential.
During the recent election the public no longer trusted the Democratic Progressive Party. The public was undecided about the KMT. Ma Ying-jeou's character inspired hope, and Taiwan society clutched at straws. Will Ma Ying-jeou's character meet society's expectations? Will Ma Ying-jeou's ability meet society's expectations? No one knows.
"Dare to hope, follow your dream" was Chen Shui-bian's campaign slogan. Today, ironically, the public has pinned its hopes and dreams on Ma Ying-jeou. Chen Shui-bian betrayed those hopes and dreams. Will we find that Ma Ying-jeou has betrayed our hopes and dreams four or eight years from today?
馬英九課題：從「好人」到「能人」！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.25 02:19 am
「愛與信任」是謝長廷的競選標語，但多數選民可能會認為，馬英九的人格特質反而比較配；同樣，「和解共生」也是謝長廷的競選標語，但多數選民可能會覺得，馬英九的人格特質反而比較像。
馬 英九的人格特質應是他贏得壓倒性勝利的主因。例如，人們常在馬英九的政治對手身上，如李登輝、陳水扁及謝長廷的言行中，發現馬英九不同流俗的人格特質；又 如，人們或許對國民黨並無太大信任，卻將希望寄託在馬英九身上。台灣經歷了近二十年來烏煙瘴氣的政治沉淪與權謀惡鬥，馬英九的相對比較樸實、清澈的人格特 質，如今成為多數人民選擇的政治新品牌與台灣新價值。
我們不敢說，此時帶領國民黨贏得大勝的馬英九的人格特質，與坐上總統職位後的馬英九 的風格表現，會不會「一路走來，始終如一」；但可確信，多數人民選擇了馬英九作為國家元首，原因之一是希望看到馬英九能夠樹立與李登輝及陳水扁二位總統不 同典型的人格形象。張忠謀在選前說，希望選一個能做年輕人模範者當總統，也許就是此意。
總統大選，最後簡化成了「人格」的選舉；這是對過去二十年政治人格沉淪的控訴與救贖。不過，馬英九的人格特質並非沒有爭議，最突出的一個議題就是：他是一個「好人」，然而是不是一個「能人」？
這雖是選舉語言，例如謝長廷在選季就猛攻馬英九的「執行力」，但這畢竟也是一個嚴肅的議題。人民當然希望總統是一個「好人」，但執政治國的總統也應是一個「能人」。
在 一位理想的總統身上，「好人」與「能人」不應成為相互排斥的概念。其實，總統能做「好人」，即是一種珍貴的「能力」；如陳水扁者，就根本沒有做「好人」的 「能力」。何況，總統如果不是「好人」，卻竟然是一個「能人」，充滿著為非作歹的「能力」，那麼就回頭看看過去八年的噩夢吧！
我們寄望馬英九能做一個「好人／能人」的合體總統。此處所謂「能力」，一方面是指在人格形象上堪為國家社會表率的「能力」，這一點馬英九也許已有相當的可能性；另一方面則是執政治國的「政治能力」與「行政能力」，這一點則是馬英九尚待印證的部分。
近 年來，馬英九四處long stay，又遭遇特別費的官司，應當對其人格內涵有極大增益。他在插秧、摘果、捕魚、縫紉、拾荒等等親身體驗中，應當深感民生的艱辛；他在面對檢方起訴及 司法審判時，亦應深感國家機器對人民身心造成的巨大壓迫力。當了總統，如何為人民生計增加國家的助力，又如何為社會正義排除國家的操縱力；這些皆有待一位 「好人／能人」的合體總統。
「好人／能人」合體總統，也許應以開發「台灣的力量」與「台灣的愛」為基本職志。先說「台灣的愛」：「愛台 灣」一詞已被民進黨徹底糟蹋，竟然以挑激族群仇恨及否定國家為「愛台灣」；馬英九可考慮每月至少安排一次親身參與慈善田野活動，關懷社會弱勢，把「台灣的 愛」開發出來。至於「台灣的力量」：台灣的力量已內耗空轉了十餘年，也被鎖國政策禁錮了十餘年，馬英九應當是「台灣的力量」的解放者，而「台灣的力量」就 是「人民的力量」。
這次大選的社會氛圍其實大概是這樣的：民進黨已不可信任，國民黨也未有定評，馬英九的人格特質所引發的救贖幻象，遂成了台灣社會抓住的最後一根稻草。馬英九的人品能否回應這樣的社會憧憬？馬英九的能力能否滿足這樣的社會期待？一切皆尚是未知數。
「有夢最美，希望相隨。」這是陳水扁的競選標語，如今儼然卻是國人對馬英九的寄望。陳水扁辜負了大家，四年或八後的馬英九呢？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 25, 2008
"Love and trust" may have been Frank Hsieh's campaign slogan, but most voters think that given Ma Ying-jeou's character traits, it fits him better. "Reconciliation and coexistence" was another of Frank Hsieh's campaign slogans. But again, given Ma Ying-jeou's character traits, most voters think it fits him better as well.
Ma Ying-jeou's character traits were perhaps the main factor in his landslide victory. People have become aware of Ma Ying-jeou's distinctive character through contrast. They have contrasted his words and deeds with those of his political rivals -- Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Frank Hsieh. Many voters have little confidence in the KMT as a party, but are pinning their hopes on Ma Ying-jeou individually. Taiwan has endured 20 years of dirty politics, political decay, and power struggles. Ma Ying-jeou's personal austerity and moral rectitude have established a new political standard for the public on Taiwan.
Ma Ying-jeou has led the KMT to a great victory. We dare not say that after Ma Ying-jeou occupies the presidential office, his manner will not change. But most people chose Ma Ying-jeou because they wanted to establish a new standard for a national leader, one very different from the stereotype embodies by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. This is what Morris Chang meant when he hoped the public would choose a president whom young people could emulate.
The presidential election boiled down to a contest of character. It was an indictment of the character of politicians over the past 20 years, and a quest for redemption. Ma Ying-jeou's moral character is not in question. What is in question is whether he is an able leader in addition to being a virtuous leader.
During his campaign, Frank Hsieh blasted Ma Ying-jeou's "executive decision making ability." That was of course campaign rhetoric. But it is also a serious issue. After all, the public surely hopes that their president, in addition to being a man of virtue, will also be a man of ability.
An ideal president would be both virtuous and able. These traits need not be mutually exclusive. In fact, for a president to be virtuous is a form of ability in itself. Chen Shui-bian lacked the ability to be virtuous. Besides, if a president is not a man of virtue, but a man of ability, what will his ability be devoted to, other than to the doing of evil? To wit, the nightmare we have endured for the past eight years.
We hope that Ma Ying-jeou will be a man of virtue as well as a man of ability. By this we mean that he will exemplify the character required to lead a nation and a society, and also the ability to govern wisely and skillfully. Ma Ying-jeou has already proven himself on the first count. We look forward to seeing Ma Ying-jeou prove himself on the second count.
Over the past year, Ma Ying-jeou has lived with ordinary folk in southern Taiwan. He has endured the Discretionary Fund witch trial. These have been character-building experiences.
He planted rice, picked fruit, caught fish, mended clothing, cleared land. He learned how hard the lives of people at the bottom of the economic ladder were. He learned how physically and psychologically oppressive the apparatus of state could be, as he faced possible prosecution. He learned how to increase the nation's prosperity in the event he was elected president. He learned how to prevent the state from perpetrating social injustice. We await the arrival of a president who is both a man of virtue and a man of ability.
A president who is both a man of virtue and a man of ability may be able to develop Taiwan's potentional and increase Taiwan's social harmony. The DPP has debased the mantra "Love for Taiwan" until it is utterly meaningless. "Love for Taiwan" has become Orwellian Newspeak. It has come to mean the incitement of "ethnic (more precisely, "provincial") hatred" and the repudiation of one's own nation. Ma Ying-jeou might consider devoting a little time each month to charitable activities, to caring for the socially disadvantaged.
That would constitute genuine "Love for Taiwan." Taiwan's potential has been stifled for over a decade. Taiwan's doors have been closed for over a decade. Ma Ying-jeou should liberate Taiwan's potentional. Taiwan's potential is the people's potential.
During the recent election the public no longer trusted the Democratic Progressive Party. The public was undecided about the KMT. Ma Ying-jeou's character inspired hope, and Taiwan society clutched at straws. Will Ma Ying-jeou's character meet society's expectations? Will Ma Ying-jeou's ability meet society's expectations? No one knows.
"Dare to hope, follow your dream" was Chen Shui-bian's campaign slogan. Today, ironically, the public has pinned its hopes and dreams on Ma Ying-jeou. Chen Shui-bian betrayed those hopes and dreams. Will we find that Ma Ying-jeou has betrayed our hopes and dreams four or eight years from today?
馬英九課題：從「好人」到「能人」！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.25 02:19 am
「愛與信任」是謝長廷的競選標語，但多數選民可能會認為，馬英九的人格特質反而比較配；同樣，「和解共生」也是謝長廷的競選標語，但多數選民可能會覺得，馬英九的人格特質反而比較像。
馬 英九的人格特質應是他贏得壓倒性勝利的主因。例如，人們常在馬英九的政治對手身上，如李登輝、陳水扁及謝長廷的言行中，發現馬英九不同流俗的人格特質；又 如，人們或許對國民黨並無太大信任，卻將希望寄託在馬英九身上。台灣經歷了近二十年來烏煙瘴氣的政治沉淪與權謀惡鬥，馬英九的相對比較樸實、清澈的人格特 質，如今成為多數人民選擇的政治新品牌與台灣新價值。
我們不敢說，此時帶領國民黨贏得大勝的馬英九的人格特質，與坐上總統職位後的馬英九 的風格表現，會不會「一路走來，始終如一」；但可確信，多數人民選擇了馬英九作為國家元首，原因之一是希望看到馬英九能夠樹立與李登輝及陳水扁二位總統不 同典型的人格形象。張忠謀在選前說，希望選一個能做年輕人模範者當總統，也許就是此意。
總統大選，最後簡化成了「人格」的選舉；這是對過去二十年政治人格沉淪的控訴與救贖。不過，馬英九的人格特質並非沒有爭議，最突出的一個議題就是：他是一個「好人」，然而是不是一個「能人」？
這雖是選舉語言，例如謝長廷在選季就猛攻馬英九的「執行力」，但這畢竟也是一個嚴肅的議題。人民當然希望總統是一個「好人」，但執政治國的總統也應是一個「能人」。
在 一位理想的總統身上，「好人」與「能人」不應成為相互排斥的概念。其實，總統能做「好人」，即是一種珍貴的「能力」；如陳水扁者，就根本沒有做「好人」的 「能力」。何況，總統如果不是「好人」，卻竟然是一個「能人」，充滿著為非作歹的「能力」，那麼就回頭看看過去八年的噩夢吧！
我們寄望馬英九能做一個「好人／能人」的合體總統。此處所謂「能力」，一方面是指在人格形象上堪為國家社會表率的「能力」，這一點馬英九也許已有相當的可能性；另一方面則是執政治國的「政治能力」與「行政能力」，這一點則是馬英九尚待印證的部分。
近 年來，馬英九四處long stay，又遭遇特別費的官司，應當對其人格內涵有極大增益。他在插秧、摘果、捕魚、縫紉、拾荒等等親身體驗中，應當深感民生的艱辛；他在面對檢方起訴及 司法審判時，亦應深感國家機器對人民身心造成的巨大壓迫力。當了總統，如何為人民生計增加國家的助力，又如何為社會正義排除國家的操縱力；這些皆有待一位 「好人／能人」的合體總統。
「好人／能人」合體總統，也許應以開發「台灣的力量」與「台灣的愛」為基本職志。先說「台灣的愛」：「愛台 灣」一詞已被民進黨徹底糟蹋，竟然以挑激族群仇恨及否定國家為「愛台灣」；馬英九可考慮每月至少安排一次親身參與慈善田野活動，關懷社會弱勢，把「台灣的 愛」開發出來。至於「台灣的力量」：台灣的力量已內耗空轉了十餘年，也被鎖國政策禁錮了十餘年，馬英九應當是「台灣的力量」的解放者，而「台灣的力量」就 是「人民的力量」。
這次大選的社會氛圍其實大概是這樣的：民進黨已不可信任，國民黨也未有定評，馬英九的人格特質所引發的救贖幻象，遂成了台灣社會抓住的最後一根稻草。馬英九的人品能否回應這樣的社會憧憬？馬英九的能力能否滿足這樣的社會期待？一切皆尚是未知數。
「有夢最美，希望相隨。」這是陳水扁的競選標語，如今儼然卻是國人對馬英九的寄望。陳水扁辜負了大家，四年或八後的馬英九呢？
Monday, March 24, 2008
To the DPP: Come Home!
To the DPP: Come Home!
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 24, 2008
The election results have been announced, and Taiwan is off to a new start. We hope the KMT, which has regained political power, will correct the nation's forward course. Even more importantly, we hope the Democratic Progressive Party, which is again in the opposition, will correct its forward course and the direction in which it attempts to lead the masses.
The DPP's course correction may be even more important than the KMT's. Put simply, the KMT's future course should be the "Republic of China" path. Alas, the DPP persists in following its "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution" and "Nation of Taiwan" path. The 2008 Presidential Election was a showdown between the two paths. If in the wake of the election the Democratic Progressive Party's path remains unchanged, if the struggle between the two paths continues, the only difference will be that the ruling and opposition parties will have swapped places. In that case, Taiwan will continue to be a "carriage with horses at both ends," pulling in different directions. Its chassis will be pulled apart. Its direction will remain conflicted.
In the aftermath of the election, the DPP must re-examine its future path. It must also decide its future leaders. The DPP's first priority must be to clarify its sense of national identity. Only then can it determine whom its future leaders should to be, and what path it should follow.
Blue camp campaign rallies were, as in the past, a sea of red, white, and blue Republic of China flags. At Green camp campaign rallies, on the other hand, not a single Republic of China flag can be found. Eight years ago, when the Democratic Progressive Party was in the opposition, this was understandable. But eight years later, with the DPP in office, such scenes are incomprehensible. Every morning the Chen Shui-bian presidential office raises the national flag. For the past eight years, officials of the Pan Green ruling regime have been living off the earnings of Republic of China taxpayers. Yet the DPP persists in insulting the Republic of China, repudiating the Republic of China, refusing to wave the Republic of China flag. It persists in promoting the "Rectification of Names and the Authoring of a New Constitution." How can a nation withstand such divisions? How can it not spin its wheels?
Yesterday's editorial noted that the Democratic Progressive Party's position on national identity is one of Taiwan's most deeply-rooted problems. During the presidential election the Hsieh camp escalated ethnic conflict (or more precisely, "social divisions") and national identity issues to new highs. Yet when the returns were in, the Hsieh/Su ticket received only 42 percent of the votes. In effect, it merely hung on to its core support. The DPP lost the election. On the other hand, fundamentalist support remains strong. In the wake of the election, the question is: Does the Democratic Progressive Party want to changes its character? Does it have the capacity to change its character? Or will retain its past character?
Eight years ago, Chen Shui-bian received 39 percent of the vote during the 2000 Presidential Election. This newspaper noted that his election would be a test of the Republic of China's tolerance and resilience. Would the Republic of China be able to tolerate the Democratic Progressive Party, which advocates Taiwan independence? Would the Republic of China be resilient enough to withstand the onslaught of a DPP ruling party?
Today, eight years later, that question can be answered. Eight years ago the Republic of China's electoral system tolerated a pro-Taiwan independence Democratic Progressive Party. Chen Shui-bian even promoted a "New Centrist Path," declaring that he would "defend the Republic of China to the death." As we can see, the ROC has enormous tolerance for dissent. Eight years later, the Republic of China's electoral system repudiated the Hsieh/Su ticket's "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution." The Taiwan independence movement failed to undermine the Republic of China -- again. As we can see, the Republic of China is highly resilient. It is able to withstand disturbances initiated by the Taiwan independence movement.
For the past eight years, the Republic of China has tolerated the Democratic Progressive Party. It even gave the DPP eight years in which to integrate itself into the Republic of China. But the Democratic Progressive Party, after eight years in power, still refuses to recognize and integrate itself into the Republic of China. Instead, it has intensifed its efforts to "Rectify Names and Author a New Constitution" and to ram through its "Resolution for a Normal Nation." As a result, the Republic of China has, via democratic elections, voted the DPP out of office, and nullified its right to rule the nation.
The problem however, remains. Although the DPP must now step down, during the past eight years it has misused government resources to confound right and wrong and invert good and evil. It has anesthetized its supporters. It has argued that "Even if DPP officials are corrupt and incompetent, they are Taiwan's Native Sons." As a result, the DPP still receives 42 percent of the vote during a presidential election. DPP rallies, where huge crowds shed tears for the party, remain scenes in which not a single ROC flag can be seen.
Long ago, the Taiwan independence movement underwent a metamporphosis. The Taiwan independence movement once had two goals: First, overthrow the Republic of China, Second, resist the People's Republic of China. But the Taiwan independence movement has been unable to overthrow the Republic of China. It has only been able to divide the Republic of China. It has been unable to resist the People's Republic of China's political and economic pressures. It has only been able to increase cross-strait animosities. Yesterday's editorial noted that under DPP rule, Taiwan was subjected to three political curses. One. Indiscriminate "ethnic labels" (more precisely, "provincial labels"). Two. Vicious struggles over reunification vs. independence. Three. Accusations that others belong to an "alien regime." These three curses have sharply divided the Republic of China. These three curses are utterly ineffective against the People's Republic of China. The Taiwan independence movement has metamorphosed into a populist election tool. It is no longer a movement for national salvation.
Over the past two years the Taiwan independence movement has promoted some mind-boggling ideas. For example, Chen Shui-bian single-handedly promoted a massive PR campaign suggesting that the public ought to forgive DPP official corruption, merely because it champions Taiwan independence! It wants the public to believe that the DPP has an exclusive franchise on "Taiwanese values." The DPP is clearly incapable of governing the Republic of China. Yet it wants the public to believe that the problem is that "the Republic of China is not a normal country." The DPP remains mired in fantasy. It wants the public to equate Taiwan independence corruption with "Taiwanese values." Alas, a majority of voters gave the DPP an unambiguous answer during the legislative elections and the presidential election.
Even though the DPP has sunk this low, it still commands the loyalty of 40% of the public. They don't identify with this nation. They don't wave its national flag. They propose "rectifying its name." They even talk of taking to the streets in the wake of the election, of using all sorts of social movements as cover for Taiwan independence. Shouldn't the DPP forsake this mode of thinking? Doesn't it want to give up this way of thinking? Does it have the ability to forsake this mode of thinking?
This 42 percent of the public has been trained to think in these terms by the DPP. It is the DPP's most valuable political asset. But it is also the DPP's most burdensome piece of political baggage. Can the Taiwan independence overthrow the Republic of China? No, it cannot. Can a would-be "Nation of Taiwan" stand up against the People's Republic of China? No, it cannot. The Republic of China government is fully capable of defending its political sovereignty and its territorial jurisdiction over Taiwan. The Republic of China is fully capable of defending against the People's Republic of China. Besides dividing Taiwan internally, what is the Taiwan independence movement capable of? What is it good for?
If the DPP cannot redefine itself on the issue of national identity, if it remains trapped in its "Nation of Taiwan" pipe dreams, if it continues tearing the nation apart as before, then this 42% of the public on Taiwan that refuses to wave the ROC flag will decide whether Taiwan survives or perishes, rises or falls. If it refuses to consider itself Republic of China citizens, or if the Democratic Progressive Party does not allow it to recognize the Republic of China, then the Republic of China is not a country.
Over the past eight years, the Republic of China has fully accepted the Democratic Progressive Party. It has even handed the reins of government over to it. But eight years later, one will still not see a single ROC flag at DPP political rallies. The DPP continues to demand the "Rectification of Names." It continues to denounce anyone who advocates cross-strait exchanges as a "traitor to Taiwan." It is not that the Republic of China refuses to accept the Democratic Progressive Party. It is that the Democratic Progressive Party refuses to accept the Republic of China!
The Democratic Progressive Party says it loves Taiwan. If the DPP loves Taiwan, it should come home. Taiwan is home to 23 million Chinese. The name of its government is "Republic of China."
民進黨，回家吧！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.24 02:48 am
大選揭曉，台灣重新出發。這個時候，除了寄望重掌政權的國民黨準確調整國家前進的方向以外，其實更重要的是，亦須寄望再度在野的民進黨，也能重新調整其前進的方向，亦即重新調整帶領其群眾前進的方向。
相對而言，民進黨的重新定向，比國民黨的定向，也許對台灣未來政局更加重要。簡單地說，國民黨未來的定向，應是「中華民國路線」，但民進黨迄今仍採「正名制憲」的「台灣國路線」。這次大選，客觀意義上可謂就是這「兩條路線」的對決；倘若選後民進黨的定向仍然不變，這「兩條路線」的戰爭仍將延續，只是主客易場而戰罷了。倘係如此，台灣仍將是一部雙頭馬車，車體分裂如故，目標分歧如故。
選後，民進黨勢將檢討路線，也必將重新確定領導人。此時此刻，比什麼都重要的是，必須將國家認同標定清楚，如此始知今後的民進黨應由誰來領導？應走什麼路線？
這次大選的群眾造勢場景，仍如過去一般：藍營的場子，一片國旗旗海；綠營的場子，看不到一面國旗。倘若這是八年前民進黨在野時的場景，猶可理解；但這卻是民進黨執政八年後的場景，誠是不可思議。陳水扁的總統府日日升起國旗，綠朝官員領了八年的中華民國薪俸，但民進黨的國家論述竟然仍以羞辱中華民國、否定中華民國、拒持中華民國國旗，宣揚「正名制憲」為能事；試問：國家如何不分裂？又如何不陷於內耗空轉？
昨日社論指出，民進黨在國家認同上另持立場，是台灣政治的「深層難題」。此次大選，謝營將族群衝突及認同鬥爭升高到如此扭曲與激烈的高度，開票顯示謝蘇配仍可獲得四十二％的選票，扎扎實實地保住了「基本盤」。或許可以這麼說，民進黨雖輸了大選，但其「基本教義」仍甚強固。選後的課題是：民進黨想不想調整這種政黨體質？有無能力調整這種體質？或仍將利用並強化這種體質？
八年前，陳水扁在二○○○年以三十九％的得票率首次當選總統時，本報社論即曾指出：這將是一場「中華民國包容力與負載力的試煉」。所謂「包容力」，是說中華民國「包容」了主張台獨的民進黨；所謂的「負載力」，則是指不知中華民國能否承受得起民進黨以執政地位推動台獨運動的翻騰動盪？
八年後的今天，可以回答本報八年前的提問，那就是：八年前，中華民國的民主選舉制度，「包容」了主張台獨的民進黨，陳水扁亦曾標榜「新中間路線」，宣示「誓死捍衛中華民國」，可見中華民國有足夠的「包容力」；然而，八年後，中華民國又以民主選舉制度，否定了再唱「正名制憲」的民進黨政權，而中華民國終未被台獨路線所顛覆，可見中華民國的「負載力」亦是相當強固的，可以承受並能夠處理台獨的翻騰動盪。
這八年的故事是：中華民國接納了民進黨，甚至將政權交給了民進黨，也給了民進黨融入中華民國的八年光陰；然而，民進黨在執政八年後，卻仍然拒絕承認並融入中華民國，變本加厲地搞它的「正名制憲」與《正常國家決議文》，於是中華民國再以民主選舉的憲政機制，將民進黨請出了執政地位。
但是，問題還是沒有解決：民進黨雖然下野，八年來運用執政的資源，顛倒善惡是非，麻醉其支持者，「即使民進黨貪腐無能，仍是台灣的兒子」，於是在大選中維持了四十二％的得票率，及仍然不見一面國旗的為民進黨歡呼、亦為民進黨落淚的浩大的群眾場景！
民進黨的台獨運動早已變質。台獨運動原本有兩大目標：一、推翻中華民國，二、對抗中華人民共和國。但是，台獨卻無法推翻中華民國而只能撕裂中華民國，也對抗不了中華人民共和國的政經壓力，而只會增加兩岸的仇怨。昨日社論說，民進黨給台灣政治下了三個詛咒：一、族群標籤，二、統獨惡鬥，三、外來政權。這三個詛咒，無一不是全力撕裂中華民國，也無一可以有效對抗中華人民共和國。台獨運動變質至此地步，完全成了台灣選舉內鬥的民粹工具，禍國殃民，已不再是救國運動。
台獨運動近兩年的發展最是令人怵目驚心。陳水扁居然一手催動了一場鋪天蓋地的「台獨救貪腐」風潮。明明是民進黨舉朝上下大貪奇腐，卻要人民相信只有民進黨才是「台灣價值」無可取代的專利品牌；明明是民進黨沒有能力治理中華民國，卻要人民誤信問題出自中華民國不是「正常國家」。民進黨居然異想天開，要人民不計一切地接受以「貪腐的台獨」來代表「台灣價值」，但多數選民已在立委選舉與總統大選中給了民進黨毫不含糊的答案！
然而，沉淪至此的民進黨仍然獲有四成的社會支持；不認同這個國家，不持國旗，主張「正名制憲」，甚至揚言在選後走上街頭，也就是仍然要用形形色色的社會運動來包裝「台獨」。如今，我們要問：民進黨應不應改變這種思考？想不想改變這種思考？及有沒有能力改變這種思考？
這四十二％的民眾，被民進黨教育成如此，是民進黨的政治資產，但也是民進黨的政治包袱。台獨能推翻中華民國嗎？不能！台灣國能反制中華人民共和國嗎？也不能！難道中華民國即不能護持「台灣主體性」嗎？難道中華民國就不能對抗中華人民共和國嗎？於是，除了從內部撕裂台灣外，台獨幾乎已無其他作用。
民進黨若不能在國家論述上重新定位，仍然固持「台灣國迷思」，則社會撕裂如故，國家前途分歧如故；相對而言，這四十二％不拿國旗的台灣人，才是決定台灣興衰存亡的關鍵因素，他們若不願中華民國成為一個國家，或民進黨不准他們在名義或實質上承認中華民國是一個國家，中華民國是無法成為一個國家的！
過去八年，中華民國完全接納了民進黨，甚至將執政地位交給了它；但八年過後，民進黨的場子裡還是看不到一面國旗，還是要搞「正名制憲」，還是要將兩岸政策的相對思考說成「賣台集團」。不是中華民國不接納民進黨，是民進黨不接納中華民國！
愛台灣的民進黨，回家吧！台灣是我們兩千三百萬人的家，她的名字叫做中華民國！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 24, 2008
The election results have been announced, and Taiwan is off to a new start. We hope the KMT, which has regained political power, will correct the nation's forward course. Even more importantly, we hope the Democratic Progressive Party, which is again in the opposition, will correct its forward course and the direction in which it attempts to lead the masses.
The DPP's course correction may be even more important than the KMT's. Put simply, the KMT's future course should be the "Republic of China" path. Alas, the DPP persists in following its "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution" and "Nation of Taiwan" path. The 2008 Presidential Election was a showdown between the two paths. If in the wake of the election the Democratic Progressive Party's path remains unchanged, if the struggle between the two paths continues, the only difference will be that the ruling and opposition parties will have swapped places. In that case, Taiwan will continue to be a "carriage with horses at both ends," pulling in different directions. Its chassis will be pulled apart. Its direction will remain conflicted.
In the aftermath of the election, the DPP must re-examine its future path. It must also decide its future leaders. The DPP's first priority must be to clarify its sense of national identity. Only then can it determine whom its future leaders should to be, and what path it should follow.
Blue camp campaign rallies were, as in the past, a sea of red, white, and blue Republic of China flags. At Green camp campaign rallies, on the other hand, not a single Republic of China flag can be found. Eight years ago, when the Democratic Progressive Party was in the opposition, this was understandable. But eight years later, with the DPP in office, such scenes are incomprehensible. Every morning the Chen Shui-bian presidential office raises the national flag. For the past eight years, officials of the Pan Green ruling regime have been living off the earnings of Republic of China taxpayers. Yet the DPP persists in insulting the Republic of China, repudiating the Republic of China, refusing to wave the Republic of China flag. It persists in promoting the "Rectification of Names and the Authoring of a New Constitution." How can a nation withstand such divisions? How can it not spin its wheels?
Yesterday's editorial noted that the Democratic Progressive Party's position on national identity is one of Taiwan's most deeply-rooted problems. During the presidential election the Hsieh camp escalated ethnic conflict (or more precisely, "social divisions") and national identity issues to new highs. Yet when the returns were in, the Hsieh/Su ticket received only 42 percent of the votes. In effect, it merely hung on to its core support. The DPP lost the election. On the other hand, fundamentalist support remains strong. In the wake of the election, the question is: Does the Democratic Progressive Party want to changes its character? Does it have the capacity to change its character? Or will retain its past character?
Eight years ago, Chen Shui-bian received 39 percent of the vote during the 2000 Presidential Election. This newspaper noted that his election would be a test of the Republic of China's tolerance and resilience. Would the Republic of China be able to tolerate the Democratic Progressive Party, which advocates Taiwan independence? Would the Republic of China be resilient enough to withstand the onslaught of a DPP ruling party?
Today, eight years later, that question can be answered. Eight years ago the Republic of China's electoral system tolerated a pro-Taiwan independence Democratic Progressive Party. Chen Shui-bian even promoted a "New Centrist Path," declaring that he would "defend the Republic of China to the death." As we can see, the ROC has enormous tolerance for dissent. Eight years later, the Republic of China's electoral system repudiated the Hsieh/Su ticket's "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution." The Taiwan independence movement failed to undermine the Republic of China -- again. As we can see, the Republic of China is highly resilient. It is able to withstand disturbances initiated by the Taiwan independence movement.
For the past eight years, the Republic of China has tolerated the Democratic Progressive Party. It even gave the DPP eight years in which to integrate itself into the Republic of China. But the Democratic Progressive Party, after eight years in power, still refuses to recognize and integrate itself into the Republic of China. Instead, it has intensifed its efforts to "Rectify Names and Author a New Constitution" and to ram through its "Resolution for a Normal Nation." As a result, the Republic of China has, via democratic elections, voted the DPP out of office, and nullified its right to rule the nation.
The problem however, remains. Although the DPP must now step down, during the past eight years it has misused government resources to confound right and wrong and invert good and evil. It has anesthetized its supporters. It has argued that "Even if DPP officials are corrupt and incompetent, they are Taiwan's Native Sons." As a result, the DPP still receives 42 percent of the vote during a presidential election. DPP rallies, where huge crowds shed tears for the party, remain scenes in which not a single ROC flag can be seen.
Long ago, the Taiwan independence movement underwent a metamporphosis. The Taiwan independence movement once had two goals: First, overthrow the Republic of China, Second, resist the People's Republic of China. But the Taiwan independence movement has been unable to overthrow the Republic of China. It has only been able to divide the Republic of China. It has been unable to resist the People's Republic of China's political and economic pressures. It has only been able to increase cross-strait animosities. Yesterday's editorial noted that under DPP rule, Taiwan was subjected to three political curses. One. Indiscriminate "ethnic labels" (more precisely, "provincial labels"). Two. Vicious struggles over reunification vs. independence. Three. Accusations that others belong to an "alien regime." These three curses have sharply divided the Republic of China. These three curses are utterly ineffective against the People's Republic of China. The Taiwan independence movement has metamorphosed into a populist election tool. It is no longer a movement for national salvation.
Over the past two years the Taiwan independence movement has promoted some mind-boggling ideas. For example, Chen Shui-bian single-handedly promoted a massive PR campaign suggesting that the public ought to forgive DPP official corruption, merely because it champions Taiwan independence! It wants the public to believe that the DPP has an exclusive franchise on "Taiwanese values." The DPP is clearly incapable of governing the Republic of China. Yet it wants the public to believe that the problem is that "the Republic of China is not a normal country." The DPP remains mired in fantasy. It wants the public to equate Taiwan independence corruption with "Taiwanese values." Alas, a majority of voters gave the DPP an unambiguous answer during the legislative elections and the presidential election.
Even though the DPP has sunk this low, it still commands the loyalty of 40% of the public. They don't identify with this nation. They don't wave its national flag. They propose "rectifying its name." They even talk of taking to the streets in the wake of the election, of using all sorts of social movements as cover for Taiwan independence. Shouldn't the DPP forsake this mode of thinking? Doesn't it want to give up this way of thinking? Does it have the ability to forsake this mode of thinking?
This 42 percent of the public has been trained to think in these terms by the DPP. It is the DPP's most valuable political asset. But it is also the DPP's most burdensome piece of political baggage. Can the Taiwan independence overthrow the Republic of China? No, it cannot. Can a would-be "Nation of Taiwan" stand up against the People's Republic of China? No, it cannot. The Republic of China government is fully capable of defending its political sovereignty and its territorial jurisdiction over Taiwan. The Republic of China is fully capable of defending against the People's Republic of China. Besides dividing Taiwan internally, what is the Taiwan independence movement capable of? What is it good for?
If the DPP cannot redefine itself on the issue of national identity, if it remains trapped in its "Nation of Taiwan" pipe dreams, if it continues tearing the nation apart as before, then this 42% of the public on Taiwan that refuses to wave the ROC flag will decide whether Taiwan survives or perishes, rises or falls. If it refuses to consider itself Republic of China citizens, or if the Democratic Progressive Party does not allow it to recognize the Republic of China, then the Republic of China is not a country.
Over the past eight years, the Republic of China has fully accepted the Democratic Progressive Party. It has even handed the reins of government over to it. But eight years later, one will still not see a single ROC flag at DPP political rallies. The DPP continues to demand the "Rectification of Names." It continues to denounce anyone who advocates cross-strait exchanges as a "traitor to Taiwan." It is not that the Republic of China refuses to accept the Democratic Progressive Party. It is that the Democratic Progressive Party refuses to accept the Republic of China!
The Democratic Progressive Party says it loves Taiwan. If the DPP loves Taiwan, it should come home. Taiwan is home to 23 million Chinese. The name of its government is "Republic of China."
民進黨，回家吧！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.24 02:48 am
大選揭曉，台灣重新出發。這個時候，除了寄望重掌政權的國民黨準確調整國家前進的方向以外，其實更重要的是，亦須寄望再度在野的民進黨，也能重新調整其前進的方向，亦即重新調整帶領其群眾前進的方向。
相對而言，民進黨的重新定向，比國民黨的定向，也許對台灣未來政局更加重要。簡單地說，國民黨未來的定向，應是「中華民國路線」，但民進黨迄今仍採「正名制憲」的「台灣國路線」。這次大選，客觀意義上可謂就是這「兩條路線」的對決；倘若選後民進黨的定向仍然不變，這「兩條路線」的戰爭仍將延續，只是主客易場而戰罷了。倘係如此，台灣仍將是一部雙頭馬車，車體分裂如故，目標分歧如故。
選後，民進黨勢將檢討路線，也必將重新確定領導人。此時此刻，比什麼都重要的是，必須將國家認同標定清楚，如此始知今後的民進黨應由誰來領導？應走什麼路線？
這次大選的群眾造勢場景，仍如過去一般：藍營的場子，一片國旗旗海；綠營的場子，看不到一面國旗。倘若這是八年前民進黨在野時的場景，猶可理解；但這卻是民進黨執政八年後的場景，誠是不可思議。陳水扁的總統府日日升起國旗，綠朝官員領了八年的中華民國薪俸，但民進黨的國家論述竟然仍以羞辱中華民國、否定中華民國、拒持中華民國國旗，宣揚「正名制憲」為能事；試問：國家如何不分裂？又如何不陷於內耗空轉？
昨日社論指出，民進黨在國家認同上另持立場，是台灣政治的「深層難題」。此次大選，謝營將族群衝突及認同鬥爭升高到如此扭曲與激烈的高度，開票顯示謝蘇配仍可獲得四十二％的選票，扎扎實實地保住了「基本盤」。或許可以這麼說，民進黨雖輸了大選，但其「基本教義」仍甚強固。選後的課題是：民進黨想不想調整這種政黨體質？有無能力調整這種體質？或仍將利用並強化這種體質？
八年前，陳水扁在二○○○年以三十九％的得票率首次當選總統時，本報社論即曾指出：這將是一場「中華民國包容力與負載力的試煉」。所謂「包容力」，是說中華民國「包容」了主張台獨的民進黨；所謂的「負載力」，則是指不知中華民國能否承受得起民進黨以執政地位推動台獨運動的翻騰動盪？
八年後的今天，可以回答本報八年前的提問，那就是：八年前，中華民國的民主選舉制度，「包容」了主張台獨的民進黨，陳水扁亦曾標榜「新中間路線」，宣示「誓死捍衛中華民國」，可見中華民國有足夠的「包容力」；然而，八年後，中華民國又以民主選舉制度，否定了再唱「正名制憲」的民進黨政權，而中華民國終未被台獨路線所顛覆，可見中華民國的「負載力」亦是相當強固的，可以承受並能夠處理台獨的翻騰動盪。
這八年的故事是：中華民國接納了民進黨，甚至將政權交給了民進黨，也給了民進黨融入中華民國的八年光陰；然而，民進黨在執政八年後，卻仍然拒絕承認並融入中華民國，變本加厲地搞它的「正名制憲」與《正常國家決議文》，於是中華民國再以民主選舉的憲政機制，將民進黨請出了執政地位。
但是，問題還是沒有解決：民進黨雖然下野，八年來運用執政的資源，顛倒善惡是非，麻醉其支持者，「即使民進黨貪腐無能，仍是台灣的兒子」，於是在大選中維持了四十二％的得票率，及仍然不見一面國旗的為民進黨歡呼、亦為民進黨落淚的浩大的群眾場景！
民進黨的台獨運動早已變質。台獨運動原本有兩大目標：一、推翻中華民國，二、對抗中華人民共和國。但是，台獨卻無法推翻中華民國而只能撕裂中華民國，也對抗不了中華人民共和國的政經壓力，而只會增加兩岸的仇怨。昨日社論說，民進黨給台灣政治下了三個詛咒：一、族群標籤，二、統獨惡鬥，三、外來政權。這三個詛咒，無一不是全力撕裂中華民國，也無一可以有效對抗中華人民共和國。台獨運動變質至此地步，完全成了台灣選舉內鬥的民粹工具，禍國殃民，已不再是救國運動。
台獨運動近兩年的發展最是令人怵目驚心。陳水扁居然一手催動了一場鋪天蓋地的「台獨救貪腐」風潮。明明是民進黨舉朝上下大貪奇腐，卻要人民相信只有民進黨才是「台灣價值」無可取代的專利品牌；明明是民進黨沒有能力治理中華民國，卻要人民誤信問題出自中華民國不是「正常國家」。民進黨居然異想天開，要人民不計一切地接受以「貪腐的台獨」來代表「台灣價值」，但多數選民已在立委選舉與總統大選中給了民進黨毫不含糊的答案！
然而，沉淪至此的民進黨仍然獲有四成的社會支持；不認同這個國家，不持國旗，主張「正名制憲」，甚至揚言在選後走上街頭，也就是仍然要用形形色色的社會運動來包裝「台獨」。如今，我們要問：民進黨應不應改變這種思考？想不想改變這種思考？及有沒有能力改變這種思考？
這四十二％的民眾，被民進黨教育成如此，是民進黨的政治資產，但也是民進黨的政治包袱。台獨能推翻中華民國嗎？不能！台灣國能反制中華人民共和國嗎？也不能！難道中華民國即不能護持「台灣主體性」嗎？難道中華民國就不能對抗中華人民共和國嗎？於是，除了從內部撕裂台灣外，台獨幾乎已無其他作用。
民進黨若不能在國家論述上重新定位，仍然固持「台灣國迷思」，則社會撕裂如故，國家前途分歧如故；相對而言，這四十二％不拿國旗的台灣人，才是決定台灣興衰存亡的關鍵因素，他們若不願中華民國成為一個國家，或民進黨不准他們在名義或實質上承認中華民國是一個國家，中華民國是無法成為一個國家的！
過去八年，中華民國完全接納了民進黨，甚至將執政地位交給了它；但八年過後，民進黨的場子裡還是看不到一面國旗，還是要搞「正名制憲」，還是要將兩岸政策的相對思考說成「賣台集團」。不是中華民國不接納民進黨，是民進黨不接納中華民國！
愛台灣的民進黨，回家吧！台灣是我們兩千三百萬人的家，她的名字叫做中華民國！
Thursday, March 20, 2008
Countdown to Election Day -- Going After the Critical Votes
Countdown to Election Day -- Going After the Critical Votes
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 20, 2008
The two candidates, as part of their 2008 presidential campaigns, have consolidated their core support. Frank Hsieh has sunk his teeth into the "One China Market" and Tibet issues, and is not letting go. Ma Ying-jeou is attacking the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's dismal economic record, and asking for regime change. The two camps are now engaged in bloody fighting in the trenches. Who will emerge the victor will depend on the voters.
We are now less than 48 hours from the opening of the polls. Frank Hsieh holds two aces. The "One China Market" card and the Tibet card. He also holds two hot potatoes. Chuang Kuo-jung's injudicious use of obscenities during a DPP rally, and Chiang Hsia's remark that Blue camp supporters should not even be perceived as human beings. Fears about the impact of a One China Market on mainland labour and agricultural products have undoubtedly brought many central and southern Taiwan Green camp supporters back to the fold. Chuang Kuo-jung and Chiang Hsia's verbal blunders have frightened away many women voters, civil servants, and educators. Although the Hsieh camp is engaged in crisis management, the fallout has yet to settle.
The Ma camp has the advantage of being the frontrunner. But it has lacked creativity in its choice of campaign themes. The Hsieh camp meanwhile, has adopted a "smoke and mirrors" strategy and harped on the Tibet issue. The Ma camp has responded in kind, by upping the ante. It went so far as to say it was not ruling out boycotting the Olympics. But this merely offended the sports world and sports fans, and allowed the Hsieh camp to stick it to the Ma camp, yet again. Hsieh demanded to know whether Ma supported Tibetan independence, and wondered whether any peace treaty with the mainland authorities could be trusted. The Tibet issue alone forced the Ma camp to rush about putting out fires and frantically enage in damage control.
The Ma camp began its campaign with wishful thinking. It imagined that if it muddied the Hsieh camp's proposals, it would be able to skate by until election day, that the issues wouldn't have time to take effect. It didn't realize it would end up mired in a dilemma. Strictly speaking, both camps have committed blunders and have been forced to institute damage control. In the end, the voters will decide.
During the final countdown, the Ma and Hsieh camps have both turned their attention to regions where they are relatively weak, hoping to bolster their support at the municipal and county level. The Ma camp has set its sights on central and southern region counties and municipalities. It has been sweeping the streets in solidly Green districts such as Kaohsiung City, Kaohsiung County and Pingtung regions. Its election eve rallies will be held in Taichung and Kaohsiung. The Hsieh camp has set its sights on the youth vote and womens' vote, with central Taiwan and Taipei County as the keys regions. Its election eve rallies will be held at these locales.
Both camps have been bolstering their weak points even as they consolidate their core support. It is almost time for the final showdown. Only one candidate can be elected president. Both the Blue and Green camps have been under heavy pressure. The Green camp is determined to cling to political power. The Blue camp is determined to regain political power. Supporters' emotions in both camps have reached a high point.
No matter what, we urge everyone to treat your vote seriously. Put aside political squabbles. Show the world that you are the president's boss. Cast your vote only after you are clear in your mind. Then await the results. Regardless of the outcome, we must be willing to accept it. Only such a willingness becomes the citizens of a modern democracy. This is true for both the Ma and Hsieh camps.
今日晚報 2008.03.20
倒數翻牌時刻 關鍵搶票
【中時電子報／朱蒲青】
2008年總統大選後天投票，這場選戰打到現在，除了各自顧好基本盤之外，目前謝長廷緊咬一中市場及西藏問題發酵，馬英九則強打民進黨執政八年日子不好過，換黨做做看，雙方陣營激烈近身肉搏戰，到底誰上誰下，其結果就看選民如何決定手中這張選票的去向。
距離投票不到四十八小時的緊張時刻中，謝長廷手中握有兩張牌「一中市場」和「西藏事件」和二顆小炸彈「莊國榮粗話說」、「江霞失言風波」。一中市場所延伸 的開放大陸勞工和農產品，的確讓中南部的綠軍支持回籠，並凝聚中下階層的危機意識。但莊國榮和江霞的失言風波，卻嚇走婦女票和公教票，目前這個部分，謝營 雖做緊急處理，但後續擴散效應，仍待觀察。
馬陣營在選戰議題，除了保有先前的優勢之外，在議題操作表現比較沒創意，凡是謝營提出的主張，不是採取模糊策略，就是加碼因應，就舉「西藏事件」，馬營採 取催加油門，一路踩到底，提出不排除參加奧運，卻因此得罪體育界和熱愛體育的民眾，讓謝營藉此機會見縫插針，又打馬一著，趁勢逼問馬是否支持藏獨及質疑台 灣就算和中共簽署的和平協定，能相信中共不會撕毀承諾嗎？光是西藏事件，就讓馬營提但書忙撲火，進行損害管控。
馬營原本打的如意算盤是，模糊謝營的各項造勢和主張，就能平穩過度到投票前夕，至少不會讓議題發酵，沒想到卻陷入進退兩難的窘境。嚴格說起來，雙方陣營都有失分和搶救的步驟，但就看選民如何評斷。
在最後倒數時刻，馬、謝兩陣營不約而同，鎖定在自己比較弱的選區，以及可以再加強的縣市顧票，馬營擇定中、南部縣市，先狂掃高高屏綠軍鐵票區，再來最後一 個晚上造勢晚會，台中、高雄也是重點之所在。而謝營鎖定繼續攻佔青年和婦女選票，同時中部及台北縣市列為選戰決戰關鍵，因此造勢晚會也則定兩地為重點。
眼前兩陣營都在持續加強補弱、固守基本盤的動作，選戰已打到快要翻牌時刻，但只會有一個人當選總統，由於藍、綠兩陣營都承受相當重的壓力，綠軍要維繫政權，藍軍矢志奪回中央政權，連帶支持者的情緒也HIGH到高點。
但無論如何，我們都要呼籲眾民，選前要審慎看待手中這一票，撇開政治口水戰，展現「你是總統頭家」的架勢，衡量清楚之後，投下神聖的一票，然後靜待結果出爐，同時不管結果如何，都要歡喜接受，這才是作為現代國民應有的風度和民主典範，兩黨和馬、謝兩陣營都應如此。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 20, 2008
The two candidates, as part of their 2008 presidential campaigns, have consolidated their core support. Frank Hsieh has sunk his teeth into the "One China Market" and Tibet issues, and is not letting go. Ma Ying-jeou is attacking the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's dismal economic record, and asking for regime change. The two camps are now engaged in bloody fighting in the trenches. Who will emerge the victor will depend on the voters.
We are now less than 48 hours from the opening of the polls. Frank Hsieh holds two aces. The "One China Market" card and the Tibet card. He also holds two hot potatoes. Chuang Kuo-jung's injudicious use of obscenities during a DPP rally, and Chiang Hsia's remark that Blue camp supporters should not even be perceived as human beings. Fears about the impact of a One China Market on mainland labour and agricultural products have undoubtedly brought many central and southern Taiwan Green camp supporters back to the fold. Chuang Kuo-jung and Chiang Hsia's verbal blunders have frightened away many women voters, civil servants, and educators. Although the Hsieh camp is engaged in crisis management, the fallout has yet to settle.
The Ma camp has the advantage of being the frontrunner. But it has lacked creativity in its choice of campaign themes. The Hsieh camp meanwhile, has adopted a "smoke and mirrors" strategy and harped on the Tibet issue. The Ma camp has responded in kind, by upping the ante. It went so far as to say it was not ruling out boycotting the Olympics. But this merely offended the sports world and sports fans, and allowed the Hsieh camp to stick it to the Ma camp, yet again. Hsieh demanded to know whether Ma supported Tibetan independence, and wondered whether any peace treaty with the mainland authorities could be trusted. The Tibet issue alone forced the Ma camp to rush about putting out fires and frantically enage in damage control.
The Ma camp began its campaign with wishful thinking. It imagined that if it muddied the Hsieh camp's proposals, it would be able to skate by until election day, that the issues wouldn't have time to take effect. It didn't realize it would end up mired in a dilemma. Strictly speaking, both camps have committed blunders and have been forced to institute damage control. In the end, the voters will decide.
During the final countdown, the Ma and Hsieh camps have both turned their attention to regions where they are relatively weak, hoping to bolster their support at the municipal and county level. The Ma camp has set its sights on central and southern region counties and municipalities. It has been sweeping the streets in solidly Green districts such as Kaohsiung City, Kaohsiung County and Pingtung regions. Its election eve rallies will be held in Taichung and Kaohsiung. The Hsieh camp has set its sights on the youth vote and womens' vote, with central Taiwan and Taipei County as the keys regions. Its election eve rallies will be held at these locales.
Both camps have been bolstering their weak points even as they consolidate their core support. It is almost time for the final showdown. Only one candidate can be elected president. Both the Blue and Green camps have been under heavy pressure. The Green camp is determined to cling to political power. The Blue camp is determined to regain political power. Supporters' emotions in both camps have reached a high point.
No matter what, we urge everyone to treat your vote seriously. Put aside political squabbles. Show the world that you are the president's boss. Cast your vote only after you are clear in your mind. Then await the results. Regardless of the outcome, we must be willing to accept it. Only such a willingness becomes the citizens of a modern democracy. This is true for both the Ma and Hsieh camps.
今日晚報 2008.03.20
倒數翻牌時刻 關鍵搶票
【中時電子報／朱蒲青】
2008年總統大選後天投票，這場選戰打到現在，除了各自顧好基本盤之外，目前謝長廷緊咬一中市場及西藏問題發酵，馬英九則強打民進黨執政八年日子不好過，換黨做做看，雙方陣營激烈近身肉搏戰，到底誰上誰下，其結果就看選民如何決定手中這張選票的去向。
距離投票不到四十八小時的緊張時刻中，謝長廷手中握有兩張牌「一中市場」和「西藏事件」和二顆小炸彈「莊國榮粗話說」、「江霞失言風波」。一中市場所延伸 的開放大陸勞工和農產品，的確讓中南部的綠軍支持回籠，並凝聚中下階層的危機意識。但莊國榮和江霞的失言風波，卻嚇走婦女票和公教票，目前這個部分，謝營 雖做緊急處理，但後續擴散效應，仍待觀察。
馬陣營在選戰議題，除了保有先前的優勢之外，在議題操作表現比較沒創意，凡是謝營提出的主張，不是採取模糊策略，就是加碼因應，就舉「西藏事件」，馬營採 取催加油門，一路踩到底，提出不排除參加奧運，卻因此得罪體育界和熱愛體育的民眾，讓謝營藉此機會見縫插針，又打馬一著，趁勢逼問馬是否支持藏獨及質疑台 灣就算和中共簽署的和平協定，能相信中共不會撕毀承諾嗎？光是西藏事件，就讓馬營提但書忙撲火，進行損害管控。
馬營原本打的如意算盤是，模糊謝營的各項造勢和主張，就能平穩過度到投票前夕，至少不會讓議題發酵，沒想到卻陷入進退兩難的窘境。嚴格說起來，雙方陣營都有失分和搶救的步驟，但就看選民如何評斷。
在最後倒數時刻，馬、謝兩陣營不約而同，鎖定在自己比較弱的選區，以及可以再加強的縣市顧票，馬營擇定中、南部縣市，先狂掃高高屏綠軍鐵票區，再來最後一 個晚上造勢晚會，台中、高雄也是重點之所在。而謝營鎖定繼續攻佔青年和婦女選票，同時中部及台北縣市列為選戰決戰關鍵，因此造勢晚會也則定兩地為重點。
眼前兩陣營都在持續加強補弱、固守基本盤的動作，選戰已打到快要翻牌時刻，但只會有一個人當選總統，由於藍、綠兩陣營都承受相當重的壓力，綠軍要維繫政權，藍軍矢志奪回中央政權，連帶支持者的情緒也HIGH到高點。
但無論如何，我們都要呼籲眾民，選前要審慎看待手中這一票，撇開政治口水戰，展現「你是總統頭家」的架勢，衡量清楚之後，投下神聖的一票，然後靜待結果出爐，同時不管結果如何，都要歡喜接受，這才是作為現代國民應有的風度和民主典範，兩黨和馬、謝兩陣營都應如此。
Wednesday, March 19, 2008
Is Hsieh Waiting for Fortune to Smile on Him?
Is Hsieh Waiting for Fortune to Smile on Him?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 19, 2008
Election day is three days away. Will Taiwan undergo a second regime change?
Political scientist Samuel Huntington's trademark is the "Two Turnover Test." Huntington said that when a nation transitions from an "emergent democracy" to a "stable democracy," it must undergo two democratic and peaceful regime changes.
He said that after an emergent democracy's first regime change, the new regime often reverts to authoritarian rule, trampling over democratic institutions and undermining the rule of law. Therefore the nation must undergo a second regime change. Only after passing the Two Turnover Test can it move to the next stage, a stable democracy.
Huntington was a veteran political scientist whose academic research often cited the Republic of China as a real world test case. The ROC has followed the steps Huntington outlined. The ROC has gone from authoritarianism to an emergent democracy (first regime change), to betrayal by the new regime, and is currently moving toward a stable democracy (second regime change).
In 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected president in the ROC's first regime change. The core issue in this year's Blue vs. Green Presidential showdown is whether the ROC will undergo a second regime change.
Strictly speaking, the January 12 ROC Legislative Elections already ushered in a second regime change. The KMT won over two-thirds of the seats in the Legislative Yuan. The Blue camp won over three-quarters. In other words, the Democratic Progressive Party won less than one-quarter of the seats. The election returns were a draconian verdict rendered upon the Democratic Progressive Party's political legitimacy. Realistically speaking, the voters nullified the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's political credentials on January 12. They essentially announced a second regime change.
Metaphorically speaking, a DPP presidency is akin to an appendix. The question in the upcoming presidential election is whether the new body, consisting of a Pan Blue legislature enjoying a three-fourths majority, and a KMT cabinet, has any use for a leftover DPP appendix. Wouldn't it be better off with a whole new body? Wouldn't it be better to simply perform an appendectomy?
Frank Hsieh vowed to be a "Little President" who would fulfill a "Great Mission." He promised to be a "Passive President" who would "check and balance" a KMT cabinet and a KMT legislature. In fact, such an absurd arrangement would be contrary to all political sense. In the wake of eight constitutional "amendments," better described as constitutional perversions, such an arrangement would eventually precipitate a constitutional crisis. Show us the article in the Republic of China Constitution that calls for a president to check and balance the cabinet and the legislature? Even France's Fifth Republic relies on an alternative form of executive power to restrain its two chief executives, the president and the prime minister. Our constitution, in its current form, has no such provisions. Therefore such an arrangement would be a constitutional catastrophe waiting to happen. On January 12, 2008, the ROC underwent a second regime change. Is this second regime change to be confined to the cabinet and legislature, but not the executive?
Amending the constitution has led to disaster. The voters must decide whether they are going to fall for Frank Hsieh's "Little President with a Great Mission" pitch.
Following the lifting of martial law 20 years ago, the ROC underwent the step-by-step process Huntington outlined. It underwent its first regime change. It endured a new regime that betrayed democracy, undermined the rule of law, and subverted society's values. Sure enough, it is now undergoing a second regime change. But Huntington never expected those who amended (undermined) the Republic of China Constitution to provide themselves with a huge loophole, stipulating that the legislature would undergo change, but the presidency wouldn't. That the powers and responsibilities of the president, his cabinet, and the legislature would be left undefined. What should we call the consequences of this loophole? A consolidation of democracy? Or a constitutional crisis in the making?
Chen Shui-bian once boasted: "So what if l lucked out? The fact is I was elected. So what are you going to about it?" His attitude reflected the impudence of a street thug, and the same lack of responsibility. To him the election was all about trickery, about getting lucky. He felt not one iota of concern for constitutional rule. Now Frank Hsieh is waiting for fortune to smile on him, thinking to himself, "So what are you going to do about it?"
Confronted with such an attitude, even Huntington would be left speechless.
謝長廷正在等待他的「好運」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.19 02:41 am
距投票日還有三天， 台灣會不會出現「第二次政黨輪替」？
「兩次輪替檢定說」（two-turn-over test） 是政治學大師杭廷頓的著名學說。 他說，從「民主轉型」到「民主鞏固」， 必須以「政權經過兩次民主而和平的轉移」為基本要件。
杭氏指出，許多新興民主國家， 在發生「第一次政黨輪替」後， 取代舊政權的新政權往往反而與民主化背道而馳， 違反民主精神， 破壞民主法治機制， 因此必須再有「第二次政黨輪替」。 他說，經過「第二次政黨輪替」的「檢定」後， 「民主轉型」始可望達到「民主鞏固」。
杭氏不愧為大師， 在他的學術研究中， 台灣常常成為他的舉例， 而今日台灣政治民主化的道路， 也正一步一步穿過杭廷頓的預言： 威權政治→民主轉型（第一次政黨輪替）→新政權背叛民主→會不會發生 「第二次政黨輪替」（民主鞏固）？
二○○○年， 民進黨的陳水扁當選總統， 是「第一次政黨輪替」； 今年總統大選藍綠激戰， 核心議題正是「第二次政黨輪替」。
其 實， 就政治事實而言， 台灣在今年一月十二日的立法委員選舉中， 已經完成了「第二次政黨輪替」。 國民黨贏得立院逾三分之二的席次， 若以泛藍計則逾四分之三； 民進黨僅得不及四分之一席次。 這樣的投票結果， 當然是嚴厲無比的政治懲罰， 民進黨政權的代表性、 正當性已被選民重重地否定。 所以，就政治事實而言， 或就政權的「合法正當性」（Legitimacy）而言， 民進黨政權在一月十二日已被選民否棄， 亦即在事實上， 選民已經頒布了「第二次政黨輪替」的「令狀」。
因此， 若從現今的政府解剖圖來看， 總統職位如今只是民進黨舊體制僅存的最後一根盲腸； 這次總統大選的意義， 就某種角度言， 於是就成了要不要在新的體制中 （泛藍國會四分之三／國民黨組閣） 留下一根民進黨的總統盲腸？ 還是要顧全新體制的整合， 而一併割掉這根盲腸？
謝 長廷說，他要以「小總統」， 實踐「大使命」； 又說， 要以「消極總統」來「制衡」國民黨的內閣與國會。 這種災難性的場景， 恐怕有違政治生理； 但在八次修憲以致毀憲後， 若果真發生盲腸作祟為患的情事， 必會演成憲政危機。 用「總統」來「制衡」內閣及國會， 請問這是根據中華民國憲法的哪一條規定？ 即使法國的「第五共和制」中， 也是以「行政權換軌制」來節制「雙首長」的界際； 但是，我們的現行憲法卻全無此類規範， 以致一場憲政災難正在眼前醞釀。 在一月十二日， 台灣已經跨入「第二次政黨輪替」的門檻， 但難道內閣及國會要「第二次政黨輪替」， 卻只有總統「不輪替」？
修憲已經誤設了災難陷阱， 無人可以補救； 現在要由手中握有選票的選民， 來決定台灣要不要跳進這個 「小總統／大制衡」的火坑？
台 灣在解嚴後的二十年來， 一步步穿過杭廷頓所預言的道路， 曾經發生了「第一次政黨輪替」， 也曾經發生了新政權全面徹底地背叛了民主法治與台灣價值， 如今果然也跨入了「第二次政黨輪替」的新境……。 然而，杭廷頓始料未及的是： 台灣的修憲者在憲政中挖了一個 「國會大輪替／總統不輪替」及 「總統／內閣／國會／權責不明」的大火坑。 這將是「鞏固民主」， 或是「憲政災難」？
陳水扁有一句政治名言： 「阿嘸就算我好運，我就是當選了，嘸你嘜安吶？」 這是賭徒的口氣， 絕無一絲一毫的責任意識； 這也是將選舉全部歸諸技巧與手氣， 而無一絲一毫的憲政關懷。 現在，謝長廷也正在等待他的「好運」， 嘸你嘜安吶？
此情此景， 杭廷頓恐亦無言以對。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 19, 2008
Election day is three days away. Will Taiwan undergo a second regime change?
Political scientist Samuel Huntington's trademark is the "Two Turnover Test." Huntington said that when a nation transitions from an "emergent democracy" to a "stable democracy," it must undergo two democratic and peaceful regime changes.
He said that after an emergent democracy's first regime change, the new regime often reverts to authoritarian rule, trampling over democratic institutions and undermining the rule of law. Therefore the nation must undergo a second regime change. Only after passing the Two Turnover Test can it move to the next stage, a stable democracy.
Huntington was a veteran political scientist whose academic research often cited the Republic of China as a real world test case. The ROC has followed the steps Huntington outlined. The ROC has gone from authoritarianism to an emergent democracy (first regime change), to betrayal by the new regime, and is currently moving toward a stable democracy (second regime change).
In 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected president in the ROC's first regime change. The core issue in this year's Blue vs. Green Presidential showdown is whether the ROC will undergo a second regime change.
Strictly speaking, the January 12 ROC Legislative Elections already ushered in a second regime change. The KMT won over two-thirds of the seats in the Legislative Yuan. The Blue camp won over three-quarters. In other words, the Democratic Progressive Party won less than one-quarter of the seats. The election returns were a draconian verdict rendered upon the Democratic Progressive Party's political legitimacy. Realistically speaking, the voters nullified the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's political credentials on January 12. They essentially announced a second regime change.
Metaphorically speaking, a DPP presidency is akin to an appendix. The question in the upcoming presidential election is whether the new body, consisting of a Pan Blue legislature enjoying a three-fourths majority, and a KMT cabinet, has any use for a leftover DPP appendix. Wouldn't it be better off with a whole new body? Wouldn't it be better to simply perform an appendectomy?
Frank Hsieh vowed to be a "Little President" who would fulfill a "Great Mission." He promised to be a "Passive President" who would "check and balance" a KMT cabinet and a KMT legislature. In fact, such an absurd arrangement would be contrary to all political sense. In the wake of eight constitutional "amendments," better described as constitutional perversions, such an arrangement would eventually precipitate a constitutional crisis. Show us the article in the Republic of China Constitution that calls for a president to check and balance the cabinet and the legislature? Even France's Fifth Republic relies on an alternative form of executive power to restrain its two chief executives, the president and the prime minister. Our constitution, in its current form, has no such provisions. Therefore such an arrangement would be a constitutional catastrophe waiting to happen. On January 12, 2008, the ROC underwent a second regime change. Is this second regime change to be confined to the cabinet and legislature, but not the executive?
Amending the constitution has led to disaster. The voters must decide whether they are going to fall for Frank Hsieh's "Little President with a Great Mission" pitch.
Following the lifting of martial law 20 years ago, the ROC underwent the step-by-step process Huntington outlined. It underwent its first regime change. It endured a new regime that betrayed democracy, undermined the rule of law, and subverted society's values. Sure enough, it is now undergoing a second regime change. But Huntington never expected those who amended (undermined) the Republic of China Constitution to provide themselves with a huge loophole, stipulating that the legislature would undergo change, but the presidency wouldn't. That the powers and responsibilities of the president, his cabinet, and the legislature would be left undefined. What should we call the consequences of this loophole? A consolidation of democracy? Or a constitutional crisis in the making?
Chen Shui-bian once boasted: "So what if l lucked out? The fact is I was elected. So what are you going to about it?" His attitude reflected the impudence of a street thug, and the same lack of responsibility. To him the election was all about trickery, about getting lucky. He felt not one iota of concern for constitutional rule. Now Frank Hsieh is waiting for fortune to smile on him, thinking to himself, "So what are you going to do about it?"
Confronted with such an attitude, even Huntington would be left speechless.
謝長廷正在等待他的「好運」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.19 02:41 am
距投票日還有三天， 台灣會不會出現「第二次政黨輪替」？
「兩次輪替檢定說」（two-turn-over test） 是政治學大師杭廷頓的著名學說。 他說，從「民主轉型」到「民主鞏固」， 必須以「政權經過兩次民主而和平的轉移」為基本要件。
杭氏指出，許多新興民主國家， 在發生「第一次政黨輪替」後， 取代舊政權的新政權往往反而與民主化背道而馳， 違反民主精神， 破壞民主法治機制， 因此必須再有「第二次政黨輪替」。 他說，經過「第二次政黨輪替」的「檢定」後， 「民主轉型」始可望達到「民主鞏固」。
杭氏不愧為大師， 在他的學術研究中， 台灣常常成為他的舉例， 而今日台灣政治民主化的道路， 也正一步一步穿過杭廷頓的預言： 威權政治→民主轉型（第一次政黨輪替）→新政權背叛民主→會不會發生 「第二次政黨輪替」（民主鞏固）？
二○○○年， 民進黨的陳水扁當選總統， 是「第一次政黨輪替」； 今年總統大選藍綠激戰， 核心議題正是「第二次政黨輪替」。
其 實， 就政治事實而言， 台灣在今年一月十二日的立法委員選舉中， 已經完成了「第二次政黨輪替」。 國民黨贏得立院逾三分之二的席次， 若以泛藍計則逾四分之三； 民進黨僅得不及四分之一席次。 這樣的投票結果， 當然是嚴厲無比的政治懲罰， 民進黨政權的代表性、 正當性已被選民重重地否定。 所以，就政治事實而言， 或就政權的「合法正當性」（Legitimacy）而言， 民進黨政權在一月十二日已被選民否棄， 亦即在事實上， 選民已經頒布了「第二次政黨輪替」的「令狀」。
因此， 若從現今的政府解剖圖來看， 總統職位如今只是民進黨舊體制僅存的最後一根盲腸； 這次總統大選的意義， 就某種角度言， 於是就成了要不要在新的體制中 （泛藍國會四分之三／國民黨組閣） 留下一根民進黨的總統盲腸？ 還是要顧全新體制的整合， 而一併割掉這根盲腸？
謝 長廷說，他要以「小總統」， 實踐「大使命」； 又說， 要以「消極總統」來「制衡」國民黨的內閣與國會。 這種災難性的場景， 恐怕有違政治生理； 但在八次修憲以致毀憲後， 若果真發生盲腸作祟為患的情事， 必會演成憲政危機。 用「總統」來「制衡」內閣及國會， 請問這是根據中華民國憲法的哪一條規定？ 即使法國的「第五共和制」中， 也是以「行政權換軌制」來節制「雙首長」的界際； 但是，我們的現行憲法卻全無此類規範， 以致一場憲政災難正在眼前醞釀。 在一月十二日， 台灣已經跨入「第二次政黨輪替」的門檻， 但難道內閣及國會要「第二次政黨輪替」， 卻只有總統「不輪替」？
修憲已經誤設了災難陷阱， 無人可以補救； 現在要由手中握有選票的選民， 來決定台灣要不要跳進這個 「小總統／大制衡」的火坑？
台 灣在解嚴後的二十年來， 一步步穿過杭廷頓所預言的道路， 曾經發生了「第一次政黨輪替」， 也曾經發生了新政權全面徹底地背叛了民主法治與台灣價值， 如今果然也跨入了「第二次政黨輪替」的新境……。 然而，杭廷頓始料未及的是： 台灣的修憲者在憲政中挖了一個 「國會大輪替／總統不輪替」及 「總統／內閣／國會／權責不明」的大火坑。 這將是「鞏固民主」， 或是「憲政災難」？
陳水扁有一句政治名言： 「阿嘸就算我好運，我就是當選了，嘸你嘜安吶？」 這是賭徒的口氣， 絕無一絲一毫的責任意識； 這也是將選舉全部歸諸技巧與手氣， 而無一絲一毫的憲政關懷。 現在，謝長廷也正在等待他的「好運」， 嘸你嘜安吶？
此情此景， 杭廷頓恐亦無言以對。
Tuesday, March 18, 2008
The DPP's Plight, the Fruit of DPP Obstinacy
The DPP's Plight, the Fruit of DPP Obstinacy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 18, 2008
Over the past two or three weeks, political rallies sponsored by the Hsieh campaign have invoked the term "adversity." Two weeks ago the theme was "Marching against a Headwind [adverse wind]." Last week the theme was "Triumphing in the Face of Adversity." That the DPP has been shouting these slogans on its own initiative means the Hsieh/Su camp has indeed found itself mired in adversity. Slogans such as "Triumphing in the Face of Adversity" may indeed raise supporters' morale. But the question the DPP should be asking itself is: Why, after eight years in power, has the DPP found itself in such adverse circumstances? Are the Hsieh/Su campaign's policy prescriptions any better than the policies of the past eight years? Will the public on Taiwan be winners or losers if the DPP "triumphs in the face of adversity?"
Why have the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's election prospects taken such a downturn? In its search for the underlying cause, the media has arrived at two conclusions: One. An endless string of corruption scandals involving high officials of ruling regime have left an extremely negative impression on the public. Two. The cross-straits embargo has driven Taiwan companies from the island and left the island's economy in a deep depression. Take this newspaper's recent reports on Asian economies. Taiwan ranked next to last in average real wage growth rates last year. According to the overall economic data, Taiwan has experienced a serious shortage of domestic demand in recent years. GDP growth has been driven solely by exports. If we exclude outsourcing contracts to the Chinese mainland, the sole beneficiaries of these exports are managers of high-tech and high-end component manufacturing firms. The ruling DPP refuses to have business contacts with mainland China. The movement of passengers and freight is obstructed. Capital investment on the mainland is forbidden. The high growth, low wage market opportunities that the Chinese mainland offers have all been snatched up by others. The Green Camp may have global plans for Taiwan, but its rejection of the Chinese mainland is its biggest blind spot. This blind spot is not an opposition party invention. The American Chamber of Commerce and the European Chamber of Commerce have repeatedly made the same point to the Chen regime, to absolutely no effect.
The DPP hopes for a "Reversal of Fortune." Logically speaking it ought to reverse its strategy of ignoring the mainland Chinese market. After all, this strategy landed the island in its current economic depression and the DPP in it current political dilemma. Alas, all evidence suggests it hasn't changed its thinking one iota. Over the past two weeks, the Hsieh/Su campaign has relentlessly denounced the Ma/Siew campaign's "Cross-Strait Common Market." The Hsieh/Su campaign consistently paints any sort of cross-strait common market as the immediate exchange of labour, as immediate acceptance of professional certification, as the crowding out of local labor, as the equivalent of local unemployment. Such simplistic distortions totally ignore the reality of the European Common Market. They are part of the DPP's illiberal, anti-market, mentality. They are the reason no one can detect the slightest change in the DPP's position.
Readers who understand the EU know that the EU's employment laws and regulations are quite lenient. The free movement of labor between EU member states is subject to the consent of the respective national legislatures. In 2004 older EU member states allowed the Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, to join the European Union. They arranged a seven year buffer period for the opening of labour. If at the end of that seven year period, member nations still feared disruptions to their home markets, they retained the right to postpone any opening. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden are EU member nations which imposed no conditions whatsoever upon the free movement of labour. As of 2006 these three nations' migrant worker populations were 0.4%, 4%, 1. 9%, and 1%. As we can see, it is something of a stretch to claim that open labour markets amount to local labour unemployment. Besides, even if Taiwan and the mainland were to move toward a Common Market they would still have to undergo two protracted stages: a customs union and a Free Trade Area. These would take 20 years at least. The Hsieh camp has taken a cross-straits labor crisis that might arise only 20 years later, and painted it as the greatest unemployment crisis ever to confront Taiwan. This is a gross distortion and represents the DPP's same, obdurate "Just Say No" policy of the past eight years.
Secondly, just because European universities recognize each others' academic credentials does not mean these nations are going to forsake domestic employment regulations. Czech medical school graduates might pass physician's licensing examinations in Germany, but in the end they may not go to Germany and become physicians. They must wait until Germany's employment policies are liberalized. Conversely, if in order to ensure full domestic employment, one refuses to recognize high quality academic credentials, should Singapore refuse to recognize Beijing University academic credentials? Should Hong Kong refuse to recognize the academic credentials of American universities? The Hsieh/Su camp's attitude toward mainland academic credentials is so reactionary and distorted, one really has to wonder what if anything has changed in the DPP's cross-strait policy?
Cross-strait relations is an important and sensitive subject. Politicians must not approach cross-strait relations with ideological biases or wishful thinking. Cross-strait relations and exchanges must not be defined simplistically, demonized, or turned into objects of terror. If we ignore the practical experience of Europe, if we tell people that opening cross-strait exchanges will leave barbers and other professionals unemployed, then we are treating voters like fools. To demonize business exchanges in this manner is not merely "opposition to a One-China market." It is opposition to market freedom per se.
DPP leaders often say it is acceptable for the DPP to lose, but "Taiwan must not lose." We agree one hundred and ten percent. We hope that four years from today, no matter which party is in office, it will no longer find itself in mired in similar adversity. Eight years of adversity is enough.
中時電子報 中國時報
2008.03.18
何以會「逆」？有沒有「轉」？
中時社論
最近兩三周，謝長廷競選總部所主導的造勢活動，都與「逆」字有關，兩周之前是逆風行腳，上周末則是逆轉勝。就字義而言，既然對自己的群眾喊出逆轉勝的口號，就表示長昌陣營確實是處於逆境。逆轉勝的口號確實有振奮支持者人心的作用，但是我們想要仔細探索一下：為什麼民進黨執政八年卻把自己框在一個「逆境」？目前的長昌政策主張與過去八年究竟有沒有「轉」變？台灣又究竟有沒有可能獲「勝」？
民進黨執政八年為什麼會把自己的選情弄到如此一個逆境呢？追根究柢，媒體大致彙整為兩個因素：一是執政高官貪腐醜聞不斷，給人民極壞的印象，二是兩岸阻絕、台商出走、台灣經濟不振。以本報日前的報導為例，去年亞洲各國平均實質薪資成長率，台灣排名倒數第二。再以整體經濟數據來看，台灣最近數年國內需求嚴重不足，ＧＤＰ成長僅以對外出口單一引擎維持。這些出口訂單扣掉外包給中國大陸的代工，往往只剩下高科技元件製造業者與高階經理人能夠獲利。由於政策上不願意與中國大陸商業接觸、人貨航運阻隔、金融登陸布局裹足不前，於是將中國大陸這一塊高成長、低工資、大市場的商機拱手讓給他人。簡單的說，綠營對中國大陸市場的切割排拒，是台灣全球布局的最大盲點。這個盲點並不只是在野黨的觀點；美僑商會與歐僑商會亦多次指陳類似的看法。
民進黨想逆轉勝，照理說就要對造成當前經濟逆境、忽略中國市場的策略有所「轉」變才是；但遺憾的是，種種證據顯示他們並沒有什麼轉變。過去兩周，長昌總部不斷地在批評馬蕭的兩岸共同市場。長昌總部將共同市場描繪為兩岸勞工的立即流通、又把學歷承認等同於開放勞工、等同於就業排擠、等同於台灣人的失業。這樣的扭曲簡化，完全不理會歐洲共同市場的實際情況，基本上就是一個反市場、反開放的心態，也令人看不出來民進黨的切割扭曲觀點有什麼轉變。
對歐盟稍有了解的讀者都知道，歐盟的就業法規規範非常寬鬆。一般而言，歐盟成員國之間的勞工移動，都得經由各國國內立法的同意。在二○○四年歐盟舊成員國接受捷克、波蘭、拉脫維亞、斯洛伐克、愛沙尼亞、斯洛維尼亞、匈牙利、立陶宛這八國加入歐盟時，就訂下長達七年的勞工開放緩衝期，准許各國自行決定開放時程。七年之後，如果成員國有市場干擾的疑慮，也仍然有再緩開放的權力。歐盟中英國、愛爾蘭、瑞典是對勞工移動全不設禁的三國，但至二○○六年中這三國境內的移民勞工僅分別占○．四％、一．九％、一％，可見「開放勞工」與「本國工人失業」之間，真的有天壤之別。更何況，台灣就算與對岸往共同市場邁進，還要經過關稅同盟、自由貿易區這兩個冗長的階段，少說也是廿年光景。謝陣營把廿幾年後才可能出現的兩岸勞工移動，描述成台灣各行各業的大失業危機，這不但是扭曲，也與過去八年來民進黨的盲目拒中政策並無「轉」變。
其次，歐洲各大學之間承認學歷，但並不表示各國會放棄所有就業的國內規範。捷克的醫科畢業生即使在德國通過醫師證照考試，最終能不能到德國做醫師，還是要視德國的就業開放政策而定。反過來說，如果以保護就業的理由不承認高水準大學的學歷，那麼新加坡是否也該不承認北大學歷？香港是否也該不承認美國學歷？長昌陣營對於對岸學歷認證的態度竟是如此的保守與扭曲，也讓人難以理解民進黨的兩岸政策究竟「轉」變了什麼？
不諱言，兩岸關係是重要而敏感的議題。我們不認為政治人物可以依一己之意識形態，對兩岸關係有太多一廂情願的憧憬，但我們更不認同將兩岸市場或交易簡化、醜化、恐懼化的選戰策略。如果不理會歐洲的實際經驗，卻告訴人民：兩岸往來就會使理髮師等數十種專業人員都失業，那真的是幾近愚民式的選舉口號。把商業往來描述成這等妖魔，這恐怕不是「反一中市場」，根本就是「反市場」。
民進黨領導人常說，選舉輸沒關係，但「台灣不能輸」；我們十二萬分的同意。希望四年後的今天，屆時的執政黨不再處於逆境、不再需要逆轉。八年的台灣逆境，夠了！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 18, 2008
Over the past two or three weeks, political rallies sponsored by the Hsieh campaign have invoked the term "adversity." Two weeks ago the theme was "Marching against a Headwind [adverse wind]." Last week the theme was "Triumphing in the Face of Adversity." That the DPP has been shouting these slogans on its own initiative means the Hsieh/Su camp has indeed found itself mired in adversity. Slogans such as "Triumphing in the Face of Adversity" may indeed raise supporters' morale. But the question the DPP should be asking itself is: Why, after eight years in power, has the DPP found itself in such adverse circumstances? Are the Hsieh/Su campaign's policy prescriptions any better than the policies of the past eight years? Will the public on Taiwan be winners or losers if the DPP "triumphs in the face of adversity?"
Why have the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's election prospects taken such a downturn? In its search for the underlying cause, the media has arrived at two conclusions: One. An endless string of corruption scandals involving high officials of ruling regime have left an extremely negative impression on the public. Two. The cross-straits embargo has driven Taiwan companies from the island and left the island's economy in a deep depression. Take this newspaper's recent reports on Asian economies. Taiwan ranked next to last in average real wage growth rates last year. According to the overall economic data, Taiwan has experienced a serious shortage of domestic demand in recent years. GDP growth has been driven solely by exports. If we exclude outsourcing contracts to the Chinese mainland, the sole beneficiaries of these exports are managers of high-tech and high-end component manufacturing firms. The ruling DPP refuses to have business contacts with mainland China. The movement of passengers and freight is obstructed. Capital investment on the mainland is forbidden. The high growth, low wage market opportunities that the Chinese mainland offers have all been snatched up by others. The Green Camp may have global plans for Taiwan, but its rejection of the Chinese mainland is its biggest blind spot. This blind spot is not an opposition party invention. The American Chamber of Commerce and the European Chamber of Commerce have repeatedly made the same point to the Chen regime, to absolutely no effect.
The DPP hopes for a "Reversal of Fortune." Logically speaking it ought to reverse its strategy of ignoring the mainland Chinese market. After all, this strategy landed the island in its current economic depression and the DPP in it current political dilemma. Alas, all evidence suggests it hasn't changed its thinking one iota. Over the past two weeks, the Hsieh/Su campaign has relentlessly denounced the Ma/Siew campaign's "Cross-Strait Common Market." The Hsieh/Su campaign consistently paints any sort of cross-strait common market as the immediate exchange of labour, as immediate acceptance of professional certification, as the crowding out of local labor, as the equivalent of local unemployment. Such simplistic distortions totally ignore the reality of the European Common Market. They are part of the DPP's illiberal, anti-market, mentality. They are the reason no one can detect the slightest change in the DPP's position.
Readers who understand the EU know that the EU's employment laws and regulations are quite lenient. The free movement of labor between EU member states is subject to the consent of the respective national legislatures. In 2004 older EU member states allowed the Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, to join the European Union. They arranged a seven year buffer period for the opening of labour. If at the end of that seven year period, member nations still feared disruptions to their home markets, they retained the right to postpone any opening. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden are EU member nations which imposed no conditions whatsoever upon the free movement of labour. As of 2006 these three nations' migrant worker populations were 0.4%, 4%, 1. 9%, and 1%. As we can see, it is something of a stretch to claim that open labour markets amount to local labour unemployment. Besides, even if Taiwan and the mainland were to move toward a Common Market they would still have to undergo two protracted stages: a customs union and a Free Trade Area. These would take 20 years at least. The Hsieh camp has taken a cross-straits labor crisis that might arise only 20 years later, and painted it as the greatest unemployment crisis ever to confront Taiwan. This is a gross distortion and represents the DPP's same, obdurate "Just Say No" policy of the past eight years.
Secondly, just because European universities recognize each others' academic credentials does not mean these nations are going to forsake domestic employment regulations. Czech medical school graduates might pass physician's licensing examinations in Germany, but in the end they may not go to Germany and become physicians. They must wait until Germany's employment policies are liberalized. Conversely, if in order to ensure full domestic employment, one refuses to recognize high quality academic credentials, should Singapore refuse to recognize Beijing University academic credentials? Should Hong Kong refuse to recognize the academic credentials of American universities? The Hsieh/Su camp's attitude toward mainland academic credentials is so reactionary and distorted, one really has to wonder what if anything has changed in the DPP's cross-strait policy?
Cross-strait relations is an important and sensitive subject. Politicians must not approach cross-strait relations with ideological biases or wishful thinking. Cross-strait relations and exchanges must not be defined simplistically, demonized, or turned into objects of terror. If we ignore the practical experience of Europe, if we tell people that opening cross-strait exchanges will leave barbers and other professionals unemployed, then we are treating voters like fools. To demonize business exchanges in this manner is not merely "opposition to a One-China market." It is opposition to market freedom per se.
DPP leaders often say it is acceptable for the DPP to lose, but "Taiwan must not lose." We agree one hundred and ten percent. We hope that four years from today, no matter which party is in office, it will no longer find itself in mired in similar adversity. Eight years of adversity is enough.
中時電子報 中國時報
2008.03.18
何以會「逆」？有沒有「轉」？
中時社論
最近兩三周，謝長廷競選總部所主導的造勢活動，都與「逆」字有關，兩周之前是逆風行腳，上周末則是逆轉勝。就字義而言，既然對自己的群眾喊出逆轉勝的口號，就表示長昌陣營確實是處於逆境。逆轉勝的口號確實有振奮支持者人心的作用，但是我們想要仔細探索一下：為什麼民進黨執政八年卻把自己框在一個「逆境」？目前的長昌政策主張與過去八年究竟有沒有「轉」變？台灣又究竟有沒有可能獲「勝」？
民進黨執政八年為什麼會把自己的選情弄到如此一個逆境呢？追根究柢，媒體大致彙整為兩個因素：一是執政高官貪腐醜聞不斷，給人民極壞的印象，二是兩岸阻絕、台商出走、台灣經濟不振。以本報日前的報導為例，去年亞洲各國平均實質薪資成長率，台灣排名倒數第二。再以整體經濟數據來看，台灣最近數年國內需求嚴重不足，ＧＤＰ成長僅以對外出口單一引擎維持。這些出口訂單扣掉外包給中國大陸的代工，往往只剩下高科技元件製造業者與高階經理人能夠獲利。由於政策上不願意與中國大陸商業接觸、人貨航運阻隔、金融登陸布局裹足不前，於是將中國大陸這一塊高成長、低工資、大市場的商機拱手讓給他人。簡單的說，綠營對中國大陸市場的切割排拒，是台灣全球布局的最大盲點。這個盲點並不只是在野黨的觀點；美僑商會與歐僑商會亦多次指陳類似的看法。
民進黨想逆轉勝，照理說就要對造成當前經濟逆境、忽略中國市場的策略有所「轉」變才是；但遺憾的是，種種證據顯示他們並沒有什麼轉變。過去兩周，長昌總部不斷地在批評馬蕭的兩岸共同市場。長昌總部將共同市場描繪為兩岸勞工的立即流通、又把學歷承認等同於開放勞工、等同於就業排擠、等同於台灣人的失業。這樣的扭曲簡化，完全不理會歐洲共同市場的實際情況，基本上就是一個反市場、反開放的心態，也令人看不出來民進黨的切割扭曲觀點有什麼轉變。
對歐盟稍有了解的讀者都知道，歐盟的就業法規規範非常寬鬆。一般而言，歐盟成員國之間的勞工移動，都得經由各國國內立法的同意。在二○○四年歐盟舊成員國接受捷克、波蘭、拉脫維亞、斯洛伐克、愛沙尼亞、斯洛維尼亞、匈牙利、立陶宛這八國加入歐盟時，就訂下長達七年的勞工開放緩衝期，准許各國自行決定開放時程。七年之後，如果成員國有市場干擾的疑慮，也仍然有再緩開放的權力。歐盟中英國、愛爾蘭、瑞典是對勞工移動全不設禁的三國，但至二○○六年中這三國境內的移民勞工僅分別占○．四％、一．九％、一％，可見「開放勞工」與「本國工人失業」之間，真的有天壤之別。更何況，台灣就算與對岸往共同市場邁進，還要經過關稅同盟、自由貿易區這兩個冗長的階段，少說也是廿年光景。謝陣營把廿幾年後才可能出現的兩岸勞工移動，描述成台灣各行各業的大失業危機，這不但是扭曲，也與過去八年來民進黨的盲目拒中政策並無「轉」變。
其次，歐洲各大學之間承認學歷，但並不表示各國會放棄所有就業的國內規範。捷克的醫科畢業生即使在德國通過醫師證照考試，最終能不能到德國做醫師，還是要視德國的就業開放政策而定。反過來說，如果以保護就業的理由不承認高水準大學的學歷，那麼新加坡是否也該不承認北大學歷？香港是否也該不承認美國學歷？長昌陣營對於對岸學歷認證的態度竟是如此的保守與扭曲，也讓人難以理解民進黨的兩岸政策究竟「轉」變了什麼？
不諱言，兩岸關係是重要而敏感的議題。我們不認為政治人物可以依一己之意識形態，對兩岸關係有太多一廂情願的憧憬，但我們更不認同將兩岸市場或交易簡化、醜化、恐懼化的選戰策略。如果不理會歐洲的實際經驗，卻告訴人民：兩岸往來就會使理髮師等數十種專業人員都失業，那真的是幾近愚民式的選舉口號。把商業往來描述成這等妖魔，這恐怕不是「反一中市場」，根本就是「反市場」。
民進黨領導人常說，選舉輸沒關係，但「台灣不能輸」；我們十二萬分的同意。希望四年後的今天，屆時的執政黨不再處於逆境、不再需要逆轉。八年的台灣逆境，夠了！
Monday, March 17, 2008
A Watershed Decision: Forward or Reverse?
A Watershed Decision: Forward or Reverse?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 17, 2008
This was the last weekend before election day. In a contest of popularity and momentum, the entire island was abuzz with the sights and sounds of political mobilization. One side issued a call for "A Million High Fives, a Reversal of Fortune." The other side declared "Taiwan must Move Forward," hoping to counter a potential reversal of fortune for the DPP by moving the KMT forward. Four KMT legislators miscalculated. They paid an abortive visit to Frank Hsieh's election headquarters, giving Green Camp morale a significant boost. But the controversy also heightened a sense of crisis in the Blue Camp. The public was thought to be cooler to this election than any in recent memory. But in its final stages, voter sentiment has heated up. Less than a week remains. Republic of China voters will have to choose between moving forward or going back. Everything hinges on who will be able to move ROC voters this week.
To tell the truth, this is a very ugly election. Green Card allegations and other forms of muckraking dominated the first half. A controversy over a Cross-Strait Common Market dominates the second half. On the surface it is a debate over public policy. In fact it is a battle over reunfication vs. independence, in the guise of a debate over a "One-China Market." Frank Hsieh pays lip service to "reconciliation and coexistence." But the very manner in which he wages his campaign reveals he has no intention of reconciling, and has no desire to coexist. Ma Ying-jeou wants to talk about policy, about assuming responsibility. But he can't even assume responsibility for blunders committed by four legislators within his own camp. In other words, most of the time, this is an election that has totally lost its focus. In the end, the rival platforms have been reduced to "moving forward" or a "reversal of fortune." The election long ceased to be about the future of the country, and became about feelgood slogans.
Fine. Let's talk about feelings. Why should we choose the Green Camp's "Reversal of Fortune?" Why should we believe that the Blue Camp will necessarily be able to "move [Taiwan] forward?" We hate to say it, but such feelings cannot be based on hearsay evidence about green cards, or scare tactics about a "One China Market." Still less can they be about four KMT legislators who blundered by dropping in on Hsieh's campaign headquarters. What will happen to Taiwan if the Green Camp enjoys a "reversal of fortune?" What will happen to Taiwan if the Blue Camp succeeds in "moving forward?"
The theme of yesterday's Green Camp march was a "Reversal of [the DPP's] Fortune." No mention was made of reconciliation and coexistence. Instead, the Green camp reverted to form, harping on reunification vs. independence. Its only answer to the issue of economics was to "Say No to a One China Market" and to reiterate its "UN for Taiwan" [sic] demand, as an expression of its "Opposition to Chinese Hegemony." This was an appeal to hardcore Deep Green supporters. If Hsieh hopes win the presidency by relying on support from this segment of the political spectrum, it is hard to imagine him opening up cross-Straits exchanges. Remember the political momentum behind Chen Shui-bian in 2000? Even he was taken hostage by the Deep Greens. If Frank Hsieh wins the presidency by relying on this segment, he will be retracing Chen Shui-bian's footsteps.
Even more bizarre is Hsieh's interpretation of "checks and balances" and "one-party dominance." These, along with his "Save Taiwan, Save Democracy," appeal, form a bizarre jigsaw puzzle. Has any political party hoping to to assume power ever wanted "checks and balances?" Yes, the KMT is dominant within the Legislative Yuan. But its dominance is not the dominance it enjoyed under martial law, when new elections were postponed indefinitely. Its dominance is the direct result of ROC voters casting their ballots and making their choices. The question the DPP should be asking itself is why ROC voters have punished it by reducing it to the minor party it is today. What right does it have to disrespect the voters' decision? What right does it have to spin its contempt for the people's decision as some sort of noble effort to "Save Democracy?"
Suppose the DPP is allowed to enjoy a "Reversal of Fortune," just so Frank Hsieh can "check and balance" so-called "one-party dominance." How will the result differ from what we have now? When the KMT had even less control over the legislature, we endured an eight year long running battle between a Chen presidency and an opposition legislature. Would a Hsieh presidency, conducting another running battle with an ostensibly more dominant KMT, really result in "checks and balances?" If the DPP is allowed to enjoy a "Reversal of Fortune," then our eight year ordeal will be extended for at least another four years. Are ROC voters really that stupid? The Hsieh camp knows how to wage an election campaign. But will a shrewd campaign really capture the hearts and minds of ROC voters?
The Blue camp's "Taiwan must move Forward" campaign is reeling from the Green camp's "One China Market" spin control. The four KMT legislators who visited Hsieh campaign headquarters also lent a superficial plausibility to allegations of "one-party dominance." As Ma Ying-jeou marches forward, he must remain vigilant.
The Green Camp's demonization of a "One China Market" consists of nothing but malicious distortions. But why are so many people so quick to believe it? The four KMT legislators' visit to Hsieh headquarters was hardly a crime. So why has it had such an impact? Why did Ma Ying-jeou feel compelled to apologize at least seven times? One must never underestimate ROC voters' concerns. Any emotions that can be manipulated must never be underestimated.
Less than a week remains. The last round of political debates have ended. Polls may no longer be published. Over the past few days the Blue and Green camps have been attempting to win the hearts of voters. Do the voters wish to go forward or go back? The hearts of the voters already contain the answer.
關鍵抉擇：要逆轉勝？還是向前行？
中國時報
2008.03.17
比人氣，也比氣勢，投票前最後一個假日，全島都彌漫在街頭動員的喧囂裡。一邊要「百萬擊掌逆轉勝」，一邊則要「台灣向前行」，希望以「前進對抗逆轉」。靠著四個笨蛋踢館事件的發酵，讓綠營低迷的士氣顯著回升，也讓藍營的危機意識更形升高，這場原本被評為歷來「最冷的選舉」，終於在這最後階段熱起來了。在剩下不到一周的日子裡，台灣選民是要選擇前行還是逆轉，就看誰能夠在這一周真正觸動台灣人的心靈了。
講實在話，這確是一場很難看的選舉！綠卡與抓耙子等負面指控主導了前半場，後半場邁入兩岸共同市場的爭論，看似公共政策論辯，卻是藉著「一中市場」包裝著另類統獨大戰。選戰風格上，謝長廷嘴裡念著「和解共生」經，整個選戰操作模式恰恰反應他既無意和解，也不想共生；馬英九要談政策，要承擔責任，卻管不住自己陣營裡四個笨蛋做蠢事。換言之，在大多數的時間裡，這是場完全失焦的選舉。弄到最後，雙方已經將訴求簡化成是要「向前行」還是「逆轉勝」了，這早已不是在選擇哪一種治國藍圖好，而是在選擇哪一種「感覺」對了！
好吧，就只談感覺吧！我們憑什麼要選擇讓綠營「逆轉勝」？我們又憑什麼相信藍營一定能引領台灣「向前行」？很抱歉，這種感覺不是捕風捉影的綠卡，不是嚇唬人的一中市場，更不是四個笨蛋踢館所能左右的。台灣如果讓綠營逆轉勝會怎樣？能怎樣？台灣如果讓藍營引領著「向前行」又會是怎樣？
綠營昨日遊行所主打的「逆轉勝」，不再提什麼和解共生，而是重回「統獨」主旋律了，所訴求的「顧飯碗」，對應的是「反一中市場」；「要入聯」則對應著「反中國霸權」。這個訴求所企圖催化的還是深綠基本盤的熱情，如果謝長廷真的寄希望藉這個板塊的有效凝聚，一路送他進總統府，很難想像未來他還有可能在開放兩岸上做到大開大闔。試想以陳水扁當年的聲勢，都在深綠板塊的綁架下動彈不得，謝長廷如果再度藉著這個板塊當選，不正是逆轉回扁的路線嗎？
更奇怪是他所召喚的「要制衡」，以及所對應的「反一黨獨大」訴求，再配合「救台灣、救民主」的總訴求，拼湊出一組非常奇特的拼圖。試問：有哪個想要執政的政黨，心中最懸念的竟是「要制衡」？沒錯，國民黨在立法院的席次是「獨大」，但這回這個「獨大」，可不是當年戒嚴體制下不改選的「獨大」，而是台灣選民用選票選出來的「獨大」，你民進黨該追問的是為什麼被選民懲罰成今日的小黨，有什麼資格去反對選民用一張張票所做出抉擇？甚至還大言不慚的宣稱這種反對是在「救民主」？
試想，如果讓民進黨「逆轉勝」，只是要讓謝長廷去「制衡」，去「反一黨獨大」，那又跟現狀有什麼兩樣？陳水扁在國民黨不怎麼獨大的情形下，都讓朝野烽火連天了八年，未來面對一個更「獨大」的國民黨，謝長廷會制衡出一個不一樣局面嗎？如果「逆轉勝」的結局，只是讓過去八年的經驗起碼再延續四年，那麼台灣的選民為什麼要當「笨蛋」呢？謝陣營確實會打選戰，但漂亮的選戰背後，他們真的捕捉到了台灣的人心嗎？
至於藍營的「台灣向前行」，一方面在綠營強打「一中市場」下走得跌跌撞撞，另一方面「四個笨蛋」效應也確實催化了對「一黨獨大」的疑慮。馬英九在一路「向前行」之際，真的有必要警覺，就算綠營對「一中市場」的恫嚇策略，真是在惡意扭曲，為什麼還是有那麼多人寧願選擇相信？四個黨籍立委的「笨蛋行徑」，並不是滔天大罪，為什麼能釀成那麼的大效應，讓馬英九還要親上火線起碼道七次歉？這意味永遠不要低估台灣人民任何潛在的疑慮，只要是能被動員出來的任何感覺，都是不能輕忽的。
不到一周了，最後一場的政見辯論都收場了，民調也不准再公布了，這幾天藍綠所拚戰的，真的就只是捕捉選民當下最真實的感覺了，是要向前行，還是逆轉勝，選民心中或許已經有了答案。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 17, 2008
This was the last weekend before election day. In a contest of popularity and momentum, the entire island was abuzz with the sights and sounds of political mobilization. One side issued a call for "A Million High Fives, a Reversal of Fortune." The other side declared "Taiwan must Move Forward," hoping to counter a potential reversal of fortune for the DPP by moving the KMT forward. Four KMT legislators miscalculated. They paid an abortive visit to Frank Hsieh's election headquarters, giving Green Camp morale a significant boost. But the controversy also heightened a sense of crisis in the Blue Camp. The public was thought to be cooler to this election than any in recent memory. But in its final stages, voter sentiment has heated up. Less than a week remains. Republic of China voters will have to choose between moving forward or going back. Everything hinges on who will be able to move ROC voters this week.
To tell the truth, this is a very ugly election. Green Card allegations and other forms of muckraking dominated the first half. A controversy over a Cross-Strait Common Market dominates the second half. On the surface it is a debate over public policy. In fact it is a battle over reunfication vs. independence, in the guise of a debate over a "One-China Market." Frank Hsieh pays lip service to "reconciliation and coexistence." But the very manner in which he wages his campaign reveals he has no intention of reconciling, and has no desire to coexist. Ma Ying-jeou wants to talk about policy, about assuming responsibility. But he can't even assume responsibility for blunders committed by four legislators within his own camp. In other words, most of the time, this is an election that has totally lost its focus. In the end, the rival platforms have been reduced to "moving forward" or a "reversal of fortune." The election long ceased to be about the future of the country, and became about feelgood slogans.
Fine. Let's talk about feelings. Why should we choose the Green Camp's "Reversal of Fortune?" Why should we believe that the Blue Camp will necessarily be able to "move [Taiwan] forward?" We hate to say it, but such feelings cannot be based on hearsay evidence about green cards, or scare tactics about a "One China Market." Still less can they be about four KMT legislators who blundered by dropping in on Hsieh's campaign headquarters. What will happen to Taiwan if the Green Camp enjoys a "reversal of fortune?" What will happen to Taiwan if the Blue Camp succeeds in "moving forward?"
The theme of yesterday's Green Camp march was a "Reversal of [the DPP's] Fortune." No mention was made of reconciliation and coexistence. Instead, the Green camp reverted to form, harping on reunification vs. independence. Its only answer to the issue of economics was to "Say No to a One China Market" and to reiterate its "UN for Taiwan" [sic] demand, as an expression of its "Opposition to Chinese Hegemony." This was an appeal to hardcore Deep Green supporters. If Hsieh hopes win the presidency by relying on support from this segment of the political spectrum, it is hard to imagine him opening up cross-Straits exchanges. Remember the political momentum behind Chen Shui-bian in 2000? Even he was taken hostage by the Deep Greens. If Frank Hsieh wins the presidency by relying on this segment, he will be retracing Chen Shui-bian's footsteps.
Even more bizarre is Hsieh's interpretation of "checks and balances" and "one-party dominance." These, along with his "Save Taiwan, Save Democracy," appeal, form a bizarre jigsaw puzzle. Has any political party hoping to to assume power ever wanted "checks and balances?" Yes, the KMT is dominant within the Legislative Yuan. But its dominance is not the dominance it enjoyed under martial law, when new elections were postponed indefinitely. Its dominance is the direct result of ROC voters casting their ballots and making their choices. The question the DPP should be asking itself is why ROC voters have punished it by reducing it to the minor party it is today. What right does it have to disrespect the voters' decision? What right does it have to spin its contempt for the people's decision as some sort of noble effort to "Save Democracy?"
Suppose the DPP is allowed to enjoy a "Reversal of Fortune," just so Frank Hsieh can "check and balance" so-called "one-party dominance." How will the result differ from what we have now? When the KMT had even less control over the legislature, we endured an eight year long running battle between a Chen presidency and an opposition legislature. Would a Hsieh presidency, conducting another running battle with an ostensibly more dominant KMT, really result in "checks and balances?" If the DPP is allowed to enjoy a "Reversal of Fortune," then our eight year ordeal will be extended for at least another four years. Are ROC voters really that stupid? The Hsieh camp knows how to wage an election campaign. But will a shrewd campaign really capture the hearts and minds of ROC voters?
The Blue camp's "Taiwan must move Forward" campaign is reeling from the Green camp's "One China Market" spin control. The four KMT legislators who visited Hsieh campaign headquarters also lent a superficial plausibility to allegations of "one-party dominance." As Ma Ying-jeou marches forward, he must remain vigilant.
The Green Camp's demonization of a "One China Market" consists of nothing but malicious distortions. But why are so many people so quick to believe it? The four KMT legislators' visit to Hsieh headquarters was hardly a crime. So why has it had such an impact? Why did Ma Ying-jeou feel compelled to apologize at least seven times? One must never underestimate ROC voters' concerns. Any emotions that can be manipulated must never be underestimated.
Less than a week remains. The last round of political debates have ended. Polls may no longer be published. Over the past few days the Blue and Green camps have been attempting to win the hearts of voters. Do the voters wish to go forward or go back? The hearts of the voters already contain the answer.
關鍵抉擇：要逆轉勝？還是向前行？
中國時報
2008.03.17
比人氣，也比氣勢，投票前最後一個假日，全島都彌漫在街頭動員的喧囂裡。一邊要「百萬擊掌逆轉勝」，一邊則要「台灣向前行」，希望以「前進對抗逆轉」。靠著四個笨蛋踢館事件的發酵，讓綠營低迷的士氣顯著回升，也讓藍營的危機意識更形升高，這場原本被評為歷來「最冷的選舉」，終於在這最後階段熱起來了。在剩下不到一周的日子裡，台灣選民是要選擇前行還是逆轉，就看誰能夠在這一周真正觸動台灣人的心靈了。
講實在話，這確是一場很難看的選舉！綠卡與抓耙子等負面指控主導了前半場，後半場邁入兩岸共同市場的爭論，看似公共政策論辯，卻是藉著「一中市場」包裝著另類統獨大戰。選戰風格上，謝長廷嘴裡念著「和解共生」經，整個選戰操作模式恰恰反應他既無意和解，也不想共生；馬英九要談政策，要承擔責任，卻管不住自己陣營裡四個笨蛋做蠢事。換言之，在大多數的時間裡，這是場完全失焦的選舉。弄到最後，雙方已經將訴求簡化成是要「向前行」還是「逆轉勝」了，這早已不是在選擇哪一種治國藍圖好，而是在選擇哪一種「感覺」對了！
好吧，就只談感覺吧！我們憑什麼要選擇讓綠營「逆轉勝」？我們又憑什麼相信藍營一定能引領台灣「向前行」？很抱歉，這種感覺不是捕風捉影的綠卡，不是嚇唬人的一中市場，更不是四個笨蛋踢館所能左右的。台灣如果讓綠營逆轉勝會怎樣？能怎樣？台灣如果讓藍營引領著「向前行」又會是怎樣？
綠營昨日遊行所主打的「逆轉勝」，不再提什麼和解共生，而是重回「統獨」主旋律了，所訴求的「顧飯碗」，對應的是「反一中市場」；「要入聯」則對應著「反中國霸權」。這個訴求所企圖催化的還是深綠基本盤的熱情，如果謝長廷真的寄希望藉這個板塊的有效凝聚，一路送他進總統府，很難想像未來他還有可能在開放兩岸上做到大開大闔。試想以陳水扁當年的聲勢，都在深綠板塊的綁架下動彈不得，謝長廷如果再度藉著這個板塊當選，不正是逆轉回扁的路線嗎？
更奇怪是他所召喚的「要制衡」，以及所對應的「反一黨獨大」訴求，再配合「救台灣、救民主」的總訴求，拼湊出一組非常奇特的拼圖。試問：有哪個想要執政的政黨，心中最懸念的竟是「要制衡」？沒錯，國民黨在立法院的席次是「獨大」，但這回這個「獨大」，可不是當年戒嚴體制下不改選的「獨大」，而是台灣選民用選票選出來的「獨大」，你民進黨該追問的是為什麼被選民懲罰成今日的小黨，有什麼資格去反對選民用一張張票所做出抉擇？甚至還大言不慚的宣稱這種反對是在「救民主」？
試想，如果讓民進黨「逆轉勝」，只是要讓謝長廷去「制衡」，去「反一黨獨大」，那又跟現狀有什麼兩樣？陳水扁在國民黨不怎麼獨大的情形下，都讓朝野烽火連天了八年，未來面對一個更「獨大」的國民黨，謝長廷會制衡出一個不一樣局面嗎？如果「逆轉勝」的結局，只是讓過去八年的經驗起碼再延續四年，那麼台灣的選民為什麼要當「笨蛋」呢？謝陣營確實會打選戰，但漂亮的選戰背後，他們真的捕捉到了台灣的人心嗎？
至於藍營的「台灣向前行」，一方面在綠營強打「一中市場」下走得跌跌撞撞，另一方面「四個笨蛋」效應也確實催化了對「一黨獨大」的疑慮。馬英九在一路「向前行」之際，真的有必要警覺，就算綠營對「一中市場」的恫嚇策略，真是在惡意扭曲，為什麼還是有那麼多人寧願選擇相信？四個黨籍立委的「笨蛋行徑」，並不是滔天大罪，為什麼能釀成那麼的大效應，讓馬英九還要親上火線起碼道七次歉？這意味永遠不要低估台灣人民任何潛在的疑慮，只要是能被動員出來的任何感覺，都是不能輕忽的。
不到一周了，最後一場的政見辯論都收場了，民調也不准再公布了，這幾天藍綠所拚戰的，真的就只是捕捉選民當下最真實的感覺了，是要向前行，還是逆轉勝，選民心中或許已經有了答案。
Thursday, March 13, 2008
Will Losing Power induce the DPP to Change?
Will Losing Power induce the DPP to Change?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 13, 2008
Which presidential candidate, if elected, would bring greater disaster upon Taiwan? This is a question Frank Hsieh posed recently.
Frank Hsieh already has his own answer. He said that Ma Ying-jeou's election would precipitate "vicious struggles between pro-Ma and anti-Ma forces," similar to the pro-Chen and anti-Chen struggles over the past eight years. Taiwan would then remain mired in chaos. How convincing is Frank Hsieh's answer? That's up to the voters to decide. What's disturbing however, is the way Hsieh framed the question.
When people elect a president, what ought to matter is who can offer a brighter future for the nation and society, who can bring the people greater happiness. Many people are suffering as a result of the DPP's past eight years in office. Frank Hsieh failed to put forth a convincing blueprint for governing the nation. Instead he resorted to intimidation. In essence he issued a veiled threat that if the DPP lost the election, it had the ability to make plenty of trouble. Frank Hsieh predicted that if Ma Ying-jeou was elected, the DPP would launch a wholesale anti-Ma struggle movement, and not give Taiwan a minute of peace.
The term "vicious struggles" aptly describes the chaos on Taiwan over the past eight years. But for Frank Hsieh to promise vicious struggles in Taiwan's future, is something the people of Taiwan may have difficulty accepting. Frank Hsieh expressed no remorse for the vicious struggles engendered by DPP minority rule over the past eight years. Instead, he predicted that if he lost the election, the DPP would take to the streets, and partisan political struggles would become even more vicious. He was not intimidating the KMT. He was intimidating the people of Taiwan. Such rhetoric is truly chilling.
Frank Hsieh's proposition is: Give me power, and I will give you peace. Deny me power, and I will turn your world upside down. The most frightening aspect of Hsieh's "vicious struggle thesis" is that Hsieh sees politics as a struggle -- a vicious struggle. He utterly ignores the fact that politics ought to be about responsible governance and constructive achievements. This is not just a problem with Frank Hsieh. This is the most frightening characteristic of the DPP. Over the past eight years, the entire DPP has become addicted to waging vicious struggles against the political opposition. It has totally forgotten its solemn obligation to serve the people.
Frank Hsieh's "prophecy of defeat" has left many voters in a quandary. If Hsieh is elected, and this "Little President" attempts to fulfill his "Great Mission," he will precipitate vicious struggles. If Hsieh is not elected, he has threatened to take to the streets. The result will again be vicious struggles. These are the horns of the voters' dilemma.
If Frank Hsieh is elected president, we can anticipate vicious struggles. First. If Frank Hsieh is elected, it will amount to an endorsement of the DPP's conduct over the past eight years. Second. The Blue camp has a majority in the Legislative Yuan. An opposition majority in the legislature will merely intensify the Blue vs. Green struggle. If Hsieh is elected, these are the conditions that will prevail. What horrifies voters is Frank Hsieh's prediction that if he loses, voters can expect vicious struggles.
From Hsieh's prophecy we can conclude that whether there will be "vicious struggles" has nothing to do with whether Hsieh loses his bid for the presidency. Chen Shui-bian won his presidential bid. He has been in power for eight years. Vicious struggles have gone on for eight years. If Frank Hsieh is elected, vicious struggles will be even harder to avoid. Hsieh predicts that if he is not elected, there will be vicious struggles. Are we to understand that as long as the Democratic Progressive Party remains in existence, the people can look forward to nothing but vicious struggles?
If Frank Hsieh is elected, the nation will face divided government and vicious struggles. If Frank Hsieh is not elected, the DPP has promised to take to the streets and engage in vicious struggles. But there are struggles and then there are struggles. Ever since the DPP assumed power, it has abused the power of the state waging vicious struggles and engaging in rampant corruption. Over the past eight years, Taiwan has been bathed in blood and drowned in tears. If the DPP loses and is relegated to the status of an opposition party, the most harm it can do is behave like a "small-scale leftist movement" (Frank Hsieh's term) and engage in "street battles." Therefore the voters have a choice between two evils: a ruling DPP abusing state power, waging vicious struggles and engaging in rampant corruption, or an opposition DPP relegated to the status of a small scale leftist movement, provoking sporadic street battles.
Hsieh served once as premier and twice as DPP chairman. Yet today he appears willing to draw a sharp line in the sand between himself and the DPP. He even referred to himself as one of the Chen Shui-bian regime's victims. Hsieh predicted that if Ma Ying-jeou was elected, there would be endless, vicious struggles. In other words, Hsieh was promising that if he wasn't elected, there would be endless vicious struggles. This is something that reasonable members of the electorate simply cannot comprehend.
Even more baffling is Hsieh's perception of elections as "da jiang shan" (conquering rivers and mountains), i.e., founding a new dynastic order. Frank Hsieh's "prophecy of vicious post-election street battles" is an open admission. If the DPP loses the election, if it loses power, it has no intention of engaging in self-introspection. Instead it intends to engage in vicious struggles to the bitter end. What is this, if not "jiang shan yi gai, ben xing nan yi?" (Rivers and mountains are easier to change than an individual's nature."
Many people are curious. They want to know whether losing the mountains and rivers (losing power) will compel the DPP to change its nature, even one iota.
江山可丟，本性不改？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.13 03:23 am
誰當選總統，會給台灣帶來更大災難？這是謝長廷最近提出的問題。
謝長廷已有他自己的答案。他說，如果馬英九當選，一定會引發「挺馬／反馬」的「惡鬥」，和過去八年的「挺扁／反扁」亂局如出一轍，台灣會一直亂下去。謝長廷的答案是否有說服力，人民自有智慧評斷；但令人不安的，其實是他對問題的提法。
人民選舉總統，要問的是誰能為國家社會實現更大的願景，誰能帶給人民更大的幸福。然而，在有些國人對民進黨執政八年極感痛苦之際，謝長廷非但未能提出足以服人感人的治國藍圖，卻還運用恐嚇戰略，彷彿揚言即使民進黨敗選，仍有極大的能量可以興風作浪。謝長廷的預言是：一旦馬英九當選總統，民進黨將全力發動「反馬惡鬥」，鬥到台灣沒有寧日。
用「惡鬥」來形容過去八年的台灣亂局，也許不失貼切；但謝長廷如今又用「惡鬥」來預報台灣未來的政治氣象，台灣人民恐難接受。謝長廷對民進黨八年「朝小野大」的惡鬥不僅毫無反省，還預告他若敗選，民進黨必走上街頭，政黨惡鬥將更為慘烈。他恐嚇的不是國民黨，而是台灣人民；這種論調，真令人心寒髮指。
謝長廷的說法是：給我權力，我就給你平靜；不給我權力，我就鬧得你天下大亂。此種「惡鬥理論」最可怕之處，就是把政治看成是「鬥」，而且是「惡鬥」，卻完全忽略了積極面的「施政」和「建設」。這其實不止是謝長廷的問題，也是民進黨最可怕的一面。執政八年，整個黨紿終耽溺於朝野「惡鬥」，全力操作並經營每一場戰役；最後卻忘了面對人民，忘了人民的付託。
謝長廷的「敗選預言」，使不少選民陷於「雙重恐懼」。謝若當選，「小總統」施展「大使命」，自將掀起「惡鬥」；謝若敗選，又預告將走上街頭，仍是「惡鬥」。這豈不是「雙重恐懼」？
謝長廷當選總統，已可預見「惡鬥」。第一，謝長廷若勝選，等於宣告選民已為民進黨八年來的風格與路線背書。第二，由於藍軍在立法院現有的優勢，「朝更小，野更大」將使藍綠對峙愈發惡化。這些皆是謝若當選必生「惡鬥」的條件。然而，令選民驚悚的是，謝長廷預告，即使落選，仍將「惡鬥」。
由此可知，「惡鬥」其實無關「當選」或「落選」。陳水扁「當選」，執政了八年，也「惡鬥」了八年；謝長廷若「當選」，「惡鬥」更不可免；問題是，如今竟又預告，倘若「落選」，也將「惡鬥」。難道，面對民進黨，國人除了忍受「惡鬥」，已無可選擇？
謝長廷當選，國家必將面臨「分裂政府」的「惡鬥」；謝長廷落選，民進黨又預告「走上街頭」的「惡鬥」。不過，雖然皆是「惡鬥」，性質仍有不同。因為，民進黨「當選執政」，是拿著國家的公權力來進行「惡鬥」，並大搞貪腐，過去八年即是血淚斑斑的真實經驗；反之，民進黨若「落選在野」，卻頂多只是搞搞「小左派」（謝長廷語）的「街頭惡鬥」。因此，選民在「民進黨執政用公權力貪腐惡鬥」，與「民進黨在野用小左派街頭惡鬥」，仍可有「兩害相權取其輕」的選擇。
謝長廷曾擔任閣揆並兩度出任民進黨主席，今天卻能將自己與民進黨八年窳政切得一乾二淨，甚至聲稱自己是扁政府的「受害者」。當他宣告馬英九「當選」會惡鬥不止，其實正是宣告他若「落選」會惡鬥不止，這實在不是理性公民所能理解的了！
更令人匪夷所思的是，人謂「選舉」就是「打江山」，謝長廷的「敗選後街頭惡鬥預言」，竟然預先透露，即使敗選，丟了「江山」，亦不會自省改過，仍要「惡鬥」到底，這真是：「江山易改，本性難移！」
許多國人想要看一看，民進黨若丟了「江山」，能否稍改其「本性」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 13, 2008
Which presidential candidate, if elected, would bring greater disaster upon Taiwan? This is a question Frank Hsieh posed recently.
Frank Hsieh already has his own answer. He said that Ma Ying-jeou's election would precipitate "vicious struggles between pro-Ma and anti-Ma forces," similar to the pro-Chen and anti-Chen struggles over the past eight years. Taiwan would then remain mired in chaos. How convincing is Frank Hsieh's answer? That's up to the voters to decide. What's disturbing however, is the way Hsieh framed the question.
When people elect a president, what ought to matter is who can offer a brighter future for the nation and society, who can bring the people greater happiness. Many people are suffering as a result of the DPP's past eight years in office. Frank Hsieh failed to put forth a convincing blueprint for governing the nation. Instead he resorted to intimidation. In essence he issued a veiled threat that if the DPP lost the election, it had the ability to make plenty of trouble. Frank Hsieh predicted that if Ma Ying-jeou was elected, the DPP would launch a wholesale anti-Ma struggle movement, and not give Taiwan a minute of peace.
The term "vicious struggles" aptly describes the chaos on Taiwan over the past eight years. But for Frank Hsieh to promise vicious struggles in Taiwan's future, is something the people of Taiwan may have difficulty accepting. Frank Hsieh expressed no remorse for the vicious struggles engendered by DPP minority rule over the past eight years. Instead, he predicted that if he lost the election, the DPP would take to the streets, and partisan political struggles would become even more vicious. He was not intimidating the KMT. He was intimidating the people of Taiwan. Such rhetoric is truly chilling.
Frank Hsieh's proposition is: Give me power, and I will give you peace. Deny me power, and I will turn your world upside down. The most frightening aspect of Hsieh's "vicious struggle thesis" is that Hsieh sees politics as a struggle -- a vicious struggle. He utterly ignores the fact that politics ought to be about responsible governance and constructive achievements. This is not just a problem with Frank Hsieh. This is the most frightening characteristic of the DPP. Over the past eight years, the entire DPP has become addicted to waging vicious struggles against the political opposition. It has totally forgotten its solemn obligation to serve the people.
Frank Hsieh's "prophecy of defeat" has left many voters in a quandary. If Hsieh is elected, and this "Little President" attempts to fulfill his "Great Mission," he will precipitate vicious struggles. If Hsieh is not elected, he has threatened to take to the streets. The result will again be vicious struggles. These are the horns of the voters' dilemma.
If Frank Hsieh is elected president, we can anticipate vicious struggles. First. If Frank Hsieh is elected, it will amount to an endorsement of the DPP's conduct over the past eight years. Second. The Blue camp has a majority in the Legislative Yuan. An opposition majority in the legislature will merely intensify the Blue vs. Green struggle. If Hsieh is elected, these are the conditions that will prevail. What horrifies voters is Frank Hsieh's prediction that if he loses, voters can expect vicious struggles.
From Hsieh's prophecy we can conclude that whether there will be "vicious struggles" has nothing to do with whether Hsieh loses his bid for the presidency. Chen Shui-bian won his presidential bid. He has been in power for eight years. Vicious struggles have gone on for eight years. If Frank Hsieh is elected, vicious struggles will be even harder to avoid. Hsieh predicts that if he is not elected, there will be vicious struggles. Are we to understand that as long as the Democratic Progressive Party remains in existence, the people can look forward to nothing but vicious struggles?
If Frank Hsieh is elected, the nation will face divided government and vicious struggles. If Frank Hsieh is not elected, the DPP has promised to take to the streets and engage in vicious struggles. But there are struggles and then there are struggles. Ever since the DPP assumed power, it has abused the power of the state waging vicious struggles and engaging in rampant corruption. Over the past eight years, Taiwan has been bathed in blood and drowned in tears. If the DPP loses and is relegated to the status of an opposition party, the most harm it can do is behave like a "small-scale leftist movement" (Frank Hsieh's term) and engage in "street battles." Therefore the voters have a choice between two evils: a ruling DPP abusing state power, waging vicious struggles and engaging in rampant corruption, or an opposition DPP relegated to the status of a small scale leftist movement, provoking sporadic street battles.
Hsieh served once as premier and twice as DPP chairman. Yet today he appears willing to draw a sharp line in the sand between himself and the DPP. He even referred to himself as one of the Chen Shui-bian regime's victims. Hsieh predicted that if Ma Ying-jeou was elected, there would be endless, vicious struggles. In other words, Hsieh was promising that if he wasn't elected, there would be endless vicious struggles. This is something that reasonable members of the electorate simply cannot comprehend.
Even more baffling is Hsieh's perception of elections as "da jiang shan" (conquering rivers and mountains), i.e., founding a new dynastic order. Frank Hsieh's "prophecy of vicious post-election street battles" is an open admission. If the DPP loses the election, if it loses power, it has no intention of engaging in self-introspection. Instead it intends to engage in vicious struggles to the bitter end. What is this, if not "jiang shan yi gai, ben xing nan yi?" (Rivers and mountains are easier to change than an individual's nature."
Many people are curious. They want to know whether losing the mountains and rivers (losing power) will compel the DPP to change its nature, even one iota.
江山可丟，本性不改？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.13 03:23 am
誰當選總統，會給台灣帶來更大災難？這是謝長廷最近提出的問題。
謝長廷已有他自己的答案。他說，如果馬英九當選，一定會引發「挺馬／反馬」的「惡鬥」，和過去八年的「挺扁／反扁」亂局如出一轍，台灣會一直亂下去。謝長廷的答案是否有說服力，人民自有智慧評斷；但令人不安的，其實是他對問題的提法。
人民選舉總統，要問的是誰能為國家社會實現更大的願景，誰能帶給人民更大的幸福。然而，在有些國人對民進黨執政八年極感痛苦之際，謝長廷非但未能提出足以服人感人的治國藍圖，卻還運用恐嚇戰略，彷彿揚言即使民進黨敗選，仍有極大的能量可以興風作浪。謝長廷的預言是：一旦馬英九當選總統，民進黨將全力發動「反馬惡鬥」，鬥到台灣沒有寧日。
用「惡鬥」來形容過去八年的台灣亂局，也許不失貼切；但謝長廷如今又用「惡鬥」來預報台灣未來的政治氣象，台灣人民恐難接受。謝長廷對民進黨八年「朝小野大」的惡鬥不僅毫無反省，還預告他若敗選，民進黨必走上街頭，政黨惡鬥將更為慘烈。他恐嚇的不是國民黨，而是台灣人民；這種論調，真令人心寒髮指。
謝長廷的說法是：給我權力，我就給你平靜；不給我權力，我就鬧得你天下大亂。此種「惡鬥理論」最可怕之處，就是把政治看成是「鬥」，而且是「惡鬥」，卻完全忽略了積極面的「施政」和「建設」。這其實不止是謝長廷的問題，也是民進黨最可怕的一面。執政八年，整個黨紿終耽溺於朝野「惡鬥」，全力操作並經營每一場戰役；最後卻忘了面對人民，忘了人民的付託。
謝長廷的「敗選預言」，使不少選民陷於「雙重恐懼」。謝若當選，「小總統」施展「大使命」，自將掀起「惡鬥」；謝若敗選，又預告將走上街頭，仍是「惡鬥」。這豈不是「雙重恐懼」？
謝長廷當選總統，已可預見「惡鬥」。第一，謝長廷若勝選，等於宣告選民已為民進黨八年來的風格與路線背書。第二，由於藍軍在立法院現有的優勢，「朝更小，野更大」將使藍綠對峙愈發惡化。這些皆是謝若當選必生「惡鬥」的條件。然而，令選民驚悚的是，謝長廷預告，即使落選，仍將「惡鬥」。
由此可知，「惡鬥」其實無關「當選」或「落選」。陳水扁「當選」，執政了八年，也「惡鬥」了八年；謝長廷若「當選」，「惡鬥」更不可免；問題是，如今竟又預告，倘若「落選」，也將「惡鬥」。難道，面對民進黨，國人除了忍受「惡鬥」，已無可選擇？
謝長廷當選，國家必將面臨「分裂政府」的「惡鬥」；謝長廷落選，民進黨又預告「走上街頭」的「惡鬥」。不過，雖然皆是「惡鬥」，性質仍有不同。因為，民進黨「當選執政」，是拿著國家的公權力來進行「惡鬥」，並大搞貪腐，過去八年即是血淚斑斑的真實經驗；反之，民進黨若「落選在野」，卻頂多只是搞搞「小左派」（謝長廷語）的「街頭惡鬥」。因此，選民在「民進黨執政用公權力貪腐惡鬥」，與「民進黨在野用小左派街頭惡鬥」，仍可有「兩害相權取其輕」的選擇。
謝長廷曾擔任閣揆並兩度出任民進黨主席，今天卻能將自己與民進黨八年窳政切得一乾二淨，甚至聲稱自己是扁政府的「受害者」。當他宣告馬英九「當選」會惡鬥不止，其實正是宣告他若「落選」會惡鬥不止，這實在不是理性公民所能理解的了！
更令人匪夷所思的是，人謂「選舉」就是「打江山」，謝長廷的「敗選後街頭惡鬥預言」，竟然預先透露，即使敗選，丟了「江山」，亦不會自省改過，仍要「惡鬥」到底，這真是：「江山易改，本性難移！」
許多國人想要看一看，民進黨若丟了「江山」，能否稍改其「本性」？
Wednesday, March 12, 2008
A Little President, A Great Divide
A Little President, A Great Divide
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 12, 2008
Frank Hsieh has declared that he has a "Great Mission" to fulfill. He has also promised that if elected he will be a "Little President" or a "Passive President." Will he really?
The KMT has won over two-thirds of the seats in the Legislative Yuan. The Blue camp has won over three-quarters of the seats. This presents Frank Hsieh's presidential campaign with a dilemma. On the one hand, he must maintain a low profile, insisting that he would "relinquish executive power" and be a "Passive President." Otherwise, voters will be afraid that he will make trouble and not vote for him. On the other hand, he must maintain a high profile, stressing the "checks and balances" he would provide as a "Defender of Taiwan," as a man with a "Great Mission." He must underscore his irreconcilable differences with Ma Ying-jeou on major political issues. He must rattle the cages to win voter support.
A "Passive President" and "Aggressive Checks and Balances" are mutually contradictory, as are a "Little President" and a "Grand Mission." No matter how you look at it, if Frank Hsieh is elected he will not be either a "Little President" or a "Passive President." He will not allow the KMT to form a cabinet. He, like Chen Shui-bian before him, will insist on forming a DPP-led "minority government."
First. If Hsieh is elected, and the voter turnout is over 50%, the result will be spun as a "New Mandate." The DPP will argue that "checks and balances" are the supreme value. The DPP will argue that the public wants President Hsieh to "check and balance" the KMT's "Old Mandate" and destroy the KMT's "One Party Monopoly." Second. If Hsieh is elected, the DPP will assert that the public expects the DPP to "Defend Taiwan" and to "Rectify Names and Author a New Constitution." If President Hsieh does not wield executive power, how will he fulfill his "Grand Mission?" Third. If President Hsieh permits the KMT to form a Cabinet, that amounts to turning over the nation's political resources, including official positions and control of the state coffers, over to the KMT. How can the DPP, which demands its share of the booty, possibly tolerate or consent to this? Fourth. The Constitution stipulates that the president has the power to appoint the premier, without the consent of the legislature. If a President Hsieh were to insist that the Green Camp form a minority government, he would merely be complying with the constition. Fifth. Most important of all, Frank Hsieh is adept at political intrigue. He is highly combative. He is simply not the passive type. If over 50 per cent of the "New Mandate" makes him president, he simply will not allow the KMT to control the executive branch of government.
Frank Hsieh may promise to "relinquish executive power" and be a "Passive President" now. But once elected, he simply would not allow the KMT to form a cabinet. He simply would not be content to remain a "Little President." What Hsieh has in mind is a: Hsieh presidency + Pan Green cabinet + minority government + Kuomintang majority in the legislature + Pan Green supporters exerting political pressure by demonstrating in the streets.
The most likely political scenario at the moment is: Frank Hsieh's minority government will form a tag team with Pan Green demonstrators in the streets. Together they will conduct coordinated pincers attacks against the KMT and the Pan Blue majority legislature. They will attempt to coerce or induce a KMT/Pan Blue camp collapse. If President Hsieh permits the KMT to form a cabinet, how can he possibly "deconstruct" it?
After Frank Hsieh declared that he would be a "Passive President," he escalated his confrontation with the Blue camp. He adopted positions diametrically opposed to the Blue camp on virtually every issue. He floated a new slogan: "A Little President cannot shoulder Great Responsibilities." The prospect of Hsieh allowing the KMT to form a cabinet immediately took a major hit. After all, if Hsieh hands executive power over to the KMT, how can President Hsieh obstruct the KMT's "Twelve Pro-Taiwan Construction Projects?" How can he promote his "Prompt Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution?"
If Frank Hsieh is elected president, it won't matter whether he allows the KMT to form a cabinet. His election will inevitably lead to a "Great Schism" within the nation and society. If the KMT is allowed to form a cabinet, the result would be divided government with a Frank Hsieh presidency, a KMT Cabinet, and a KMT legislature. If the KMT is not allowed to form a cabinet, the result would be divided government with a Frank Hsieh presidency, minority government, and a KMT legislature. Hsieh's personal character and the DPP's party character mean there is no chance the Kuomintang will be allowed to form a cabinet. When the time comes, the DPP will do everything possible to destroy the three-fourths majority that the Blue camp enjoys within the legislature. It will stop at nothing to rip society apart. Taiwan will be relegated to political hell.
Frank Hsieh will not be content to remain a "Passive President." The DPP will not allow him to remain a "Little President." If Hsieh is elected, Taiwan will suffer the inevitable consequences.
A Little President? No chance. A Great Divide? Count on it.
豈有小總統？ 台灣大撕裂！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.12 03:32 am
宣稱肩負「大使命」的謝長廷倘若當選，真的會當一個「小總統」或「消極總統」嗎？
國民黨在立院贏得逾三分之二席次，若以泛藍計則逾四分之三，這使得競選總統的謝長廷陷入兩難。一方面，他必須放低姿態，宣稱將「釋出行政權」，做一個「消極總統」；否則，選民怕他當選後會作亂，不敢選他。但是，另一方面，他卻又拉高姿態，強調「制衡」，標舉「守護台灣」，宣示他負有「大使命」，並在重大政見上與馬英九展開勢不兩立的鬥爭，意圖藉此激發選情的動能，贏得選民的支持。
「消極總統」與「積極制衡」相互矛盾，「小總統」與「大使命」也兩相牴觸。從各種角度來看，謝長廷若當選皆未必會做一個「小總統」或「消極總統」。也就是說，屆時他未必會答應由國民黨組閣，而可能如陳水扁一般，仍堅持組成由民進黨主導的「少數政府」。理由如下：
一、謝若當選，得票率必超過五十％，這是「新民意」；可以解釋為，民意認為「制衡」是至高的價值，希望謝總統掌握行政權，來「制衡」國民黨贏得國會多數的「舊民意」，以解構國民黨的「一黨獨大」。二、同理，謝若當選，亦可解讀為選民對其「守護台灣」、「正名制憲」之付託；謝總統若不掌握行政權，如何實踐其「大使命」？三、謝總統若聽由國民黨組閣，形同將全部政治資源，包括官位及國庫，悉數交給國民黨操作，這豈是勢必要求分一杯羹的民進黨人所能容忍及同意？四、何況，憲法明定，總統擁有行政院長之任命權，無需國會同意；謝總統堅持由綠營組成「少數政府」，只是遵憲而行。五、最重要的是，謝長廷擅長權謀，鬥性十足，絕非「消極」之人，倘以五十％以上的「新民意」當選總統，豈能容國民黨掌控「最高行政機關」？
也就是說，謝長廷雖在此時宣示將作一個「釋出行政權」的「消極總統」；但在當選後，頗不可能聽由國民黨組閣，而甘為「小總統」。謝總統的統治架構極可能是：謝長廷總統＋綠色內閣＋少數政府＋國民黨佔多數的國會＋綠營的街頭運動。
屆時可能出現的政治景象是：謝長廷總統的少數政府，與綠營的街頭運動，兩頭包夾國民黨及泛藍占多數的國會，並嘗試以威迫利誘瓦解泛藍及國民黨。謝總統倘若聽由國民黨組閣，即不易解構國民黨。
謝長廷在宣示將做一個「消極總統」之後，卻一路將藍綠政見的對立升高到幾乎完全背道而馳的地步，並同時提出了「不是小總統／肩負大使命」的新口號；這使得謝總統交由國民黨組閣的可能性更加降低。否則，倘若將行政權交給國民黨，謝總統如何實現其反對「愛台十二項建設」的政見？又如何推動其「及早正名制憲」的政見？
謝長廷若當選總統，無論是否交由國民黨組閣，皆必將造成國家社會的「大撕裂」。倘若交由國民黨組閣，即形成「謝長廷總統／國民黨內閣／國民黨國會」的大撕裂；倘不交由國民黨組閣，即形成「謝長廷總統／少數政府／國民黨國會」的大撕裂。且就謝長廷的人格特質，及民進黨的政黨性格而言，其不交由國民黨組閣的可能性猶大於交出組閣權的可能性；屆時，民進黨橫柴入灶，必將千方百計撕裂泛藍居四分之三的國會，又不擇手段地撕裂社會，台灣恐將淪為政治煉獄。
謝長廷絕非甘為「消極總統」之人，民進黨也絕無可能讓他當「小總統」，謝若當選，撕裂台灣將是必然的後果。
豈有小總統？台灣大撕裂！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 12, 2008
Frank Hsieh has declared that he has a "Great Mission" to fulfill. He has also promised that if elected he will be a "Little President" or a "Passive President." Will he really?
The KMT has won over two-thirds of the seats in the Legislative Yuan. The Blue camp has won over three-quarters of the seats. This presents Frank Hsieh's presidential campaign with a dilemma. On the one hand, he must maintain a low profile, insisting that he would "relinquish executive power" and be a "Passive President." Otherwise, voters will be afraid that he will make trouble and not vote for him. On the other hand, he must maintain a high profile, stressing the "checks and balances" he would provide as a "Defender of Taiwan," as a man with a "Great Mission." He must underscore his irreconcilable differences with Ma Ying-jeou on major political issues. He must rattle the cages to win voter support.
A "Passive President" and "Aggressive Checks and Balances" are mutually contradictory, as are a "Little President" and a "Grand Mission." No matter how you look at it, if Frank Hsieh is elected he will not be either a "Little President" or a "Passive President." He will not allow the KMT to form a cabinet. He, like Chen Shui-bian before him, will insist on forming a DPP-led "minority government."
First. If Hsieh is elected, and the voter turnout is over 50%, the result will be spun as a "New Mandate." The DPP will argue that "checks and balances" are the supreme value. The DPP will argue that the public wants President Hsieh to "check and balance" the KMT's "Old Mandate" and destroy the KMT's "One Party Monopoly." Second. If Hsieh is elected, the DPP will assert that the public expects the DPP to "Defend Taiwan" and to "Rectify Names and Author a New Constitution." If President Hsieh does not wield executive power, how will he fulfill his "Grand Mission?" Third. If President Hsieh permits the KMT to form a Cabinet, that amounts to turning over the nation's political resources, including official positions and control of the state coffers, over to the KMT. How can the DPP, which demands its share of the booty, possibly tolerate or consent to this? Fourth. The Constitution stipulates that the president has the power to appoint the premier, without the consent of the legislature. If a President Hsieh were to insist that the Green Camp form a minority government, he would merely be complying with the constition. Fifth. Most important of all, Frank Hsieh is adept at political intrigue. He is highly combative. He is simply not the passive type. If over 50 per cent of the "New Mandate" makes him president, he simply will not allow the KMT to control the executive branch of government.
Frank Hsieh may promise to "relinquish executive power" and be a "Passive President" now. But once elected, he simply would not allow the KMT to form a cabinet. He simply would not be content to remain a "Little President." What Hsieh has in mind is a: Hsieh presidency + Pan Green cabinet + minority government + Kuomintang majority in the legislature + Pan Green supporters exerting political pressure by demonstrating in the streets.
The most likely political scenario at the moment is: Frank Hsieh's minority government will form a tag team with Pan Green demonstrators in the streets. Together they will conduct coordinated pincers attacks against the KMT and the Pan Blue majority legislature. They will attempt to coerce or induce a KMT/Pan Blue camp collapse. If President Hsieh permits the KMT to form a cabinet, how can he possibly "deconstruct" it?
After Frank Hsieh declared that he would be a "Passive President," he escalated his confrontation with the Blue camp. He adopted positions diametrically opposed to the Blue camp on virtually every issue. He floated a new slogan: "A Little President cannot shoulder Great Responsibilities." The prospect of Hsieh allowing the KMT to form a cabinet immediately took a major hit. After all, if Hsieh hands executive power over to the KMT, how can President Hsieh obstruct the KMT's "Twelve Pro-Taiwan Construction Projects?" How can he promote his "Prompt Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution?"
If Frank Hsieh is elected president, it won't matter whether he allows the KMT to form a cabinet. His election will inevitably lead to a "Great Schism" within the nation and society. If the KMT is allowed to form a cabinet, the result would be divided government with a Frank Hsieh presidency, a KMT Cabinet, and a KMT legislature. If the KMT is not allowed to form a cabinet, the result would be divided government with a Frank Hsieh presidency, minority government, and a KMT legislature. Hsieh's personal character and the DPP's party character mean there is no chance the Kuomintang will be allowed to form a cabinet. When the time comes, the DPP will do everything possible to destroy the three-fourths majority that the Blue camp enjoys within the legislature. It will stop at nothing to rip society apart. Taiwan will be relegated to political hell.
Frank Hsieh will not be content to remain a "Passive President." The DPP will not allow him to remain a "Little President." If Hsieh is elected, Taiwan will suffer the inevitable consequences.
A Little President? No chance. A Great Divide? Count on it.
豈有小總統？ 台灣大撕裂！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.12 03:32 am
宣稱肩負「大使命」的謝長廷倘若當選，真的會當一個「小總統」或「消極總統」嗎？
國民黨在立院贏得逾三分之二席次，若以泛藍計則逾四分之三，這使得競選總統的謝長廷陷入兩難。一方面，他必須放低姿態，宣稱將「釋出行政權」，做一個「消極總統」；否則，選民怕他當選後會作亂，不敢選他。但是，另一方面，他卻又拉高姿態，強調「制衡」，標舉「守護台灣」，宣示他負有「大使命」，並在重大政見上與馬英九展開勢不兩立的鬥爭，意圖藉此激發選情的動能，贏得選民的支持。
「消極總統」與「積極制衡」相互矛盾，「小總統」與「大使命」也兩相牴觸。從各種角度來看，謝長廷若當選皆未必會做一個「小總統」或「消極總統」。也就是說，屆時他未必會答應由國民黨組閣，而可能如陳水扁一般，仍堅持組成由民進黨主導的「少數政府」。理由如下：
一、謝若當選，得票率必超過五十％，這是「新民意」；可以解釋為，民意認為「制衡」是至高的價值，希望謝總統掌握行政權，來「制衡」國民黨贏得國會多數的「舊民意」，以解構國民黨的「一黨獨大」。二、同理，謝若當選，亦可解讀為選民對其「守護台灣」、「正名制憲」之付託；謝總統若不掌握行政權，如何實踐其「大使命」？三、謝總統若聽由國民黨組閣，形同將全部政治資源，包括官位及國庫，悉數交給國民黨操作，這豈是勢必要求分一杯羹的民進黨人所能容忍及同意？四、何況，憲法明定，總統擁有行政院長之任命權，無需國會同意；謝總統堅持由綠營組成「少數政府」，只是遵憲而行。五、最重要的是，謝長廷擅長權謀，鬥性十足，絕非「消極」之人，倘以五十％以上的「新民意」當選總統，豈能容國民黨掌控「最高行政機關」？
也就是說，謝長廷雖在此時宣示將作一個「釋出行政權」的「消極總統」；但在當選後，頗不可能聽由國民黨組閣，而甘為「小總統」。謝總統的統治架構極可能是：謝長廷總統＋綠色內閣＋少數政府＋國民黨佔多數的國會＋綠營的街頭運動。
屆時可能出現的政治景象是：謝長廷總統的少數政府，與綠營的街頭運動，兩頭包夾國民黨及泛藍占多數的國會，並嘗試以威迫利誘瓦解泛藍及國民黨。謝總統倘若聽由國民黨組閣，即不易解構國民黨。
謝長廷在宣示將做一個「消極總統」之後，卻一路將藍綠政見的對立升高到幾乎完全背道而馳的地步，並同時提出了「不是小總統／肩負大使命」的新口號；這使得謝總統交由國民黨組閣的可能性更加降低。否則，倘若將行政權交給國民黨，謝總統如何實現其反對「愛台十二項建設」的政見？又如何推動其「及早正名制憲」的政見？
謝長廷若當選總統，無論是否交由國民黨組閣，皆必將造成國家社會的「大撕裂」。倘若交由國民黨組閣，即形成「謝長廷總統／國民黨內閣／國民黨國會」的大撕裂；倘不交由國民黨組閣，即形成「謝長廷總統／少數政府／國民黨國會」的大撕裂。且就謝長廷的人格特質，及民進黨的政黨性格而言，其不交由國民黨組閣的可能性猶大於交出組閣權的可能性；屆時，民進黨橫柴入灶，必將千方百計撕裂泛藍居四分之三的國會，又不擇手段地撕裂社會，台灣恐將淪為政治煉獄。
謝長廷絕非甘為「消極總統」之人，民進黨也絕無可能讓他當「小總統」，謝若當選，撕裂台灣將是必然的後果。
豈有小總統？台灣大撕裂！
Tuesday, March 11, 2008
When You Win, Win with Grace. When You Lose, Lose with Style!
When You Win, Win with Grace. When You Lose, Lose with Style!
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 11, 2008
When you win, win with grace. When you lose, lose with style. At least one Blue camp leader and one Green camp leader have made the above point. In each case, their emphasis was on the word "lose." Just before the court handed down its ruling on the Kaohsiung Mayoral Election lawsuit, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu said politicians may lose, but they must not be sore losers. Beautifully put. So beautifully put some people wondered if Chen Chu knew the court's ruling in advance. Taichung Mayor Jason Hu of the Kuomintang made the same remark when he criticized politicians for dirty tricks. He said, "When you win, win with grace. When you lose, lose with style."
During the upcoming Presidential Election, both sides are determined to win. So why has "losing" become a topic? It is not because the Blue camp has maintained its lead over the Green camp in the polls. It is because the DPP has made a series of radical policy shifts, and the Hsieh camp has resorted to a string of desperate election tactics. Some of these tactics are so underhanded they don't even deserve to be called "tactics." Not just political observers, but even the man in the street have begun to sense an atmosphere of desperation within the Green camp.
Since the odor of defeat is beginning to permeate the atmosphere, why not think about how to lose gracefully?
The notion that Hsieh may lose is not the result of any such intimations from the Blue camp. It is the result of anxiety and confusion within the Green Camp. The most recent example was Lo Wen-chia's remark: "The DPP lost [the Legislative Election] on January 12, 2000. It cannot win [the Presidential Election] on March 22. The DPP's next opportunity will be four years from now."
But Lo Wen-chia's words were the lamentations of DPP renegade. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party is preparing for battle. It is counting on its monopoly over government resources. Its behavior is so erratic, it obviously no longer cares about its image. On the one hand is frantically trading "Benefits of the Week" for votes, including amnesty for Taiwan businessmen and relaxed ceilings for mainland investments. It is even accelerating the adoption of controversial development plans. Aside from currying favor with targeted voters, the DPP can offer no logical explanation for repudiating the policies it has clung to for the past eight years. Nor can it offer any assurances that it will deliver on its promises. The DPP's behavior smacks of sheer desperation.
Serious charges have been leveled against the DPP, the most serious of which involve a string of scandals. The DPP is suspected of emptying out the nation's coffers. First, the Chen regime ordered the Ministry of Defense to invest in Taiwan Goal, a "private sector company" in which the government owns less than half the shares. Next, it allowed the Sino Swearingen Aircraft Corp (SSAC) to acquire vast amounts of government assets at fire sale prices. Next, it allowed assets to be diverted from the Grand Hotel. Recently more cases have been uncovered in which certain individuals have been acting as "middlemen" for overseas investments. The specifics may differ, but all involve the transfer of wealth out of the state treasury into the pockets of shadowy figures. These companies were less than 50% government-owned. The ruling DPP relied on this loophole to fend off legislative oversight, even though the government was paying through the nose. What happened next was even more unspeakable. Witnessing the DPP's frantic efforts to empty the state coffers, one thinks of rats deserting a sinking ship, and stealing everything not bolted down in the process.
The strangest thing about all this is not the corruption. Corruption has long been a trademark of the Chen Shui-bian regime. What boggles the mind is the frantic "take the money and run" mood -- the air of impending doom. The DPP senses it will soon have to step down, and isn't bothering to pretend otherwise. The Chen Shui-bian regime isn't bothering to wage an election campaign. Instead, it is accelerating the rate at which it is emptying out the state coffers. It is, for all intents and purposes, conducting an "anti-campaign." Hsieh's campaign, meanwhile, has become more and more ridiculous. Hsieh began by advocating "reconciliation and coexistence," and by rejecting negative campaigning. But now he is attacking his opponent's daughter for attending a private school, and accusing his opponent's wife of stealing newspapers. He even trotted out fringe supporters willing to publicly slander Ma's family. These supporters included one "Professor Chang," who appeared with his face covered, and one "Mr. X," who appeared with a paper bag over his head. Even the Hsieh camp was embarrassed by such tactics. His campaign committee denied all responsibility and accused the Ma camp of authoring the tabloid smear stories and CDs on its own. The Green camp's dirty tricks have misfired badly. Could this be because the writing is already on the wall?
Hu said losers should lose gracefully. Admittedly he said this because KMT candidates were being smeared and his blood was up. Chen Chu, confident she would win the election lawsuit, held forth about "not being sore losers." Wasn't the idea to set higher standards for future elections? Wasn't everyone hoping that a mayoral candidate who won by a mere 1,000 votes would behave a little more graciously?
Political figures can't always expect to win and never lose. Naturally one celebrates when one has won. But suppose one loses? How does one lose with style? For that matter, how does one sow the seeds of a future victory? That is something worth thinking about.
If the DPP wins this battle, will it win with grace? Conversely, if it loses this battle, shouldn't the DPP give some thought to Lo Wen-chia's observation: "The DPP's next opportunity will be four years from now?"
贏要贏得漂亮，輸也要輸得漂亮！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.11 02:09 am
贏要贏得漂亮，輸也要輸得漂亮。這句話，至少一藍一綠兩位大將皆曾公開說過，且重點都在那個「輸」字。陳菊在高雄市長選戰官司二審宣判前說，政治人物就算輸，也要輸得起。話說得這麼漂亮，所以有人猜，是否陳菊對官司勝算已有十足把握。最近說此話的則是國民黨籍的台中市長胡志強，批評這次選戰奧步太多，打得難看，所以高呼「贏要贏得漂亮，輸也要輸得漂亮」。
總統選戰，兩方拚死求勝，何以「輸」卻成了話題？倒不是因藍綠雙方民調差距和勝負趨勢穩定，而是，從民進黨的連番政策動作，到謝陣營的種種選舉招數（或曰「不成招數」），不要說政治觀察家了，連尋常百姓都嗅出綠營之內似乎已有「莫非大勢已去？」的味道。
果若「輸」的氛圍已在醞釀之中，則難道不是該想想「怎樣輸得漂亮」的時候了？
感覺謝長廷可能要輸，不是出自藍營的詛咒，而是從綠營內的焦慮和慌亂顯現出來。最近的一個例子如羅文嘉所說：「民進黨已在一月十二日（立委選舉）輸掉，三二二（總統大選）不可能贏回，民進黨下次機會是在四年後。」
羅文嘉之言，尚只代表黨內一「寇」的感慨，而整個民進黨挾執政之資源，「備戰迎輸」的動作更是誇張到不顧形象。一方面是瘋狂地放送「每周大利多」，包括特赦台商、放寬登陸投資上限，乃至加速通過一些爭議性的開發計畫等等。除了討好特定選民之外，對自己過去八年政策「覺今是而昨非」的大轉彎，既無邏輯性的解釋，也未見得敢保證兌現的可能，簡直有點「跳樓大拍賣」的意味。
另一方面，民進黨最近受到指責最嚴重的，就是一連串的五鬼搬運事件。從國防部被指示投資、但官股不過半的鐽震「民間公司」開始，繼之以賤售鉅額投資的華揚史威靈、圓山飯店的資產挪移等，近日更被挖掘出多起由特定人士擔任「仲介」的海外投資計畫，案情雖各異，但皆不脫將國庫的錢投資或移轉於名目可疑的單位，又以「官股不過半」的手法形成「國庫出錢，國會無法監督」的局面，接下來的演化自然更是不堪聞問。這種急著將公家的錢往外搬的手法，令人聯想起沉船前狠撈最後一筆的景象。
最可怪者倒不是這些貪腐的情節，因為貪腐本就幾已成為扁政府的註冊商標。令人感到詭異的是那種「撈一筆油水再逃」的亡命心態，充滿了末日氣味。這使很多人懷疑，是否民進黨人自己都不遑掩飾地宣告著「預知下台物語」。扁政府不忙著輔選，反而以種種更加速的五鬼搬運計畫進行「反輔選」，令謝長廷陣營的選戰也越打越不成章法。謝長廷從倡議和解共生、不作負面競選開始，如今選戰手法卻惡濁到抹黑人家女兒特權上私校、太太偷報紙等等，又由外圍支持者或周邊單位找來蒙著臉的「張博士」及頭上套著紙袋的「Ｘ先生」作證誣人……，真是慘不忍睹。這種選戰手法的效果如何，連謝陣營自己也感心虛，因而才由競選總部出面喊冤，甚至說那些「週報」與「光碟」是馬營「自導自演」。綠營招數太亂，難道是因敗象已露？
胡志強呼籲「輸要輸得漂亮」，固然是因國民黨候選人被抹黑而說的氣話；而當初陳菊在對官司結局頗有信心之時稱「輸要輸得起」，不也是希望在僅以一千多票領先而當選市長的「贏得不夠漂亮」的局面下，重新樹立一個較為優質的形象？
政治人物不可能永遠贏而絕不輸，贏時的歡天喜地固然值得慶幸；萬一輸了，要怎樣留下漂亮背影，甚或乘勢埋下「我將再起」的種子，也是一門嚴肅功課。
民進黨倘若如此這般就打贏了這一仗，會不會贏得不夠漂亮？反之，如果可能輸掉這一仗，總該有些民進黨人要為羅文嘉所說的「四年後的機會」想一想吧！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 11, 2008
When you win, win with grace. When you lose, lose with style. At least one Blue camp leader and one Green camp leader have made the above point. In each case, their emphasis was on the word "lose." Just before the court handed down its ruling on the Kaohsiung Mayoral Election lawsuit, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu said politicians may lose, but they must not be sore losers. Beautifully put. So beautifully put some people wondered if Chen Chu knew the court's ruling in advance. Taichung Mayor Jason Hu of the Kuomintang made the same remark when he criticized politicians for dirty tricks. He said, "When you win, win with grace. When you lose, lose with style."
During the upcoming Presidential Election, both sides are determined to win. So why has "losing" become a topic? It is not because the Blue camp has maintained its lead over the Green camp in the polls. It is because the DPP has made a series of radical policy shifts, and the Hsieh camp has resorted to a string of desperate election tactics. Some of these tactics are so underhanded they don't even deserve to be called "tactics." Not just political observers, but even the man in the street have begun to sense an atmosphere of desperation within the Green camp.
Since the odor of defeat is beginning to permeate the atmosphere, why not think about how to lose gracefully?
The notion that Hsieh may lose is not the result of any such intimations from the Blue camp. It is the result of anxiety and confusion within the Green Camp. The most recent example was Lo Wen-chia's remark: "The DPP lost [the Legislative Election] on January 12, 2000. It cannot win [the Presidential Election] on March 22. The DPP's next opportunity will be four years from now."
But Lo Wen-chia's words were the lamentations of DPP renegade. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party is preparing for battle. It is counting on its monopoly over government resources. Its behavior is so erratic, it obviously no longer cares about its image. On the one hand is frantically trading "Benefits of the Week" for votes, including amnesty for Taiwan businessmen and relaxed ceilings for mainland investments. It is even accelerating the adoption of controversial development plans. Aside from currying favor with targeted voters, the DPP can offer no logical explanation for repudiating the policies it has clung to for the past eight years. Nor can it offer any assurances that it will deliver on its promises. The DPP's behavior smacks of sheer desperation.
Serious charges have been leveled against the DPP, the most serious of which involve a string of scandals. The DPP is suspected of emptying out the nation's coffers. First, the Chen regime ordered the Ministry of Defense to invest in Taiwan Goal, a "private sector company" in which the government owns less than half the shares. Next, it allowed the Sino Swearingen Aircraft Corp (SSAC) to acquire vast amounts of government assets at fire sale prices. Next, it allowed assets to be diverted from the Grand Hotel. Recently more cases have been uncovered in which certain individuals have been acting as "middlemen" for overseas investments. The specifics may differ, but all involve the transfer of wealth out of the state treasury into the pockets of shadowy figures. These companies were less than 50% government-owned. The ruling DPP relied on this loophole to fend off legislative oversight, even though the government was paying through the nose. What happened next was even more unspeakable. Witnessing the DPP's frantic efforts to empty the state coffers, one thinks of rats deserting a sinking ship, and stealing everything not bolted down in the process.
The strangest thing about all this is not the corruption. Corruption has long been a trademark of the Chen Shui-bian regime. What boggles the mind is the frantic "take the money and run" mood -- the air of impending doom. The DPP senses it will soon have to step down, and isn't bothering to pretend otherwise. The Chen Shui-bian regime isn't bothering to wage an election campaign. Instead, it is accelerating the rate at which it is emptying out the state coffers. It is, for all intents and purposes, conducting an "anti-campaign." Hsieh's campaign, meanwhile, has become more and more ridiculous. Hsieh began by advocating "reconciliation and coexistence," and by rejecting negative campaigning. But now he is attacking his opponent's daughter for attending a private school, and accusing his opponent's wife of stealing newspapers. He even trotted out fringe supporters willing to publicly slander Ma's family. These supporters included one "Professor Chang," who appeared with his face covered, and one "Mr. X," who appeared with a paper bag over his head. Even the Hsieh camp was embarrassed by such tactics. His campaign committee denied all responsibility and accused the Ma camp of authoring the tabloid smear stories and CDs on its own. The Green camp's dirty tricks have misfired badly. Could this be because the writing is already on the wall?
Hu said losers should lose gracefully. Admittedly he said this because KMT candidates were being smeared and his blood was up. Chen Chu, confident she would win the election lawsuit, held forth about "not being sore losers." Wasn't the idea to set higher standards for future elections? Wasn't everyone hoping that a mayoral candidate who won by a mere 1,000 votes would behave a little more graciously?
Political figures can't always expect to win and never lose. Naturally one celebrates when one has won. But suppose one loses? How does one lose with style? For that matter, how does one sow the seeds of a future victory? That is something worth thinking about.
If the DPP wins this battle, will it win with grace? Conversely, if it loses this battle, shouldn't the DPP give some thought to Lo Wen-chia's observation: "The DPP's next opportunity will be four years from now?"
贏要贏得漂亮，輸也要輸得漂亮！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.03.11 02:09 am
贏要贏得漂亮，輸也要輸得漂亮。這句話，至少一藍一綠兩位大將皆曾公開說過，且重點都在那個「輸」字。陳菊在高雄市長選戰官司二審宣判前說，政治人物就算輸，也要輸得起。話說得這麼漂亮，所以有人猜，是否陳菊對官司勝算已有十足把握。最近說此話的則是國民黨籍的台中市長胡志強，批評這次選戰奧步太多，打得難看，所以高呼「贏要贏得漂亮，輸也要輸得漂亮」。
總統選戰，兩方拚死求勝，何以「輸」卻成了話題？倒不是因藍綠雙方民調差距和勝負趨勢穩定，而是，從民進黨的連番政策動作，到謝陣營的種種選舉招數（或曰「不成招數」），不要說政治觀察家了，連尋常百姓都嗅出綠營之內似乎已有「莫非大勢已去？」的味道。
果若「輸」的氛圍已在醞釀之中，則難道不是該想想「怎樣輸得漂亮」的時候了？
感覺謝長廷可能要輸，不是出自藍營的詛咒，而是從綠營內的焦慮和慌亂顯現出來。最近的一個例子如羅文嘉所說：「民進黨已在一月十二日（立委選舉）輸掉，三二二（總統大選）不可能贏回，民進黨下次機會是在四年後。」
羅文嘉之言，尚只代表黨內一「寇」的感慨，而整個民進黨挾執政之資源，「備戰迎輸」的動作更是誇張到不顧形象。一方面是瘋狂地放送「每周大利多」，包括特赦台商、放寬登陸投資上限，乃至加速通過一些爭議性的開發計畫等等。除了討好特定選民之外，對自己過去八年政策「覺今是而昨非」的大轉彎，既無邏輯性的解釋，也未見得敢保證兌現的可能，簡直有點「跳樓大拍賣」的意味。
另一方面，民進黨最近受到指責最嚴重的，就是一連串的五鬼搬運事件。從國防部被指示投資、但官股不過半的鐽震「民間公司」開始，繼之以賤售鉅額投資的華揚史威靈、圓山飯店的資產挪移等，近日更被挖掘出多起由特定人士擔任「仲介」的海外投資計畫，案情雖各異，但皆不脫將國庫的錢投資或移轉於名目可疑的單位，又以「官股不過半」的手法形成「國庫出錢，國會無法監督」的局面，接下來的演化自然更是不堪聞問。這種急著將公家的錢往外搬的手法，令人聯想起沉船前狠撈最後一筆的景象。
最可怪者倒不是這些貪腐的情節，因為貪腐本就幾已成為扁政府的註冊商標。令人感到詭異的是那種「撈一筆油水再逃」的亡命心態，充滿了末日氣味。這使很多人懷疑，是否民進黨人自己都不遑掩飾地宣告著「預知下台物語」。扁政府不忙著輔選，反而以種種更加速的五鬼搬運計畫進行「反輔選」，令謝長廷陣營的選戰也越打越不成章法。謝長廷從倡議和解共生、不作負面競選開始，如今選戰手法卻惡濁到抹黑人家女兒特權上私校、太太偷報紙等等，又由外圍支持者或周邊單位找來蒙著臉的「張博士」及頭上套著紙袋的「Ｘ先生」作證誣人……，真是慘不忍睹。這種選戰手法的效果如何，連謝陣營自己也感心虛，因而才由競選總部出面喊冤，甚至說那些「週報」與「光碟」是馬營「自導自演」。綠營招數太亂，難道是因敗象已露？
胡志強呼籲「輸要輸得漂亮」，固然是因國民黨候選人被抹黑而說的氣話；而當初陳菊在對官司結局頗有信心之時稱「輸要輸得起」，不也是希望在僅以一千多票領先而當選市長的「贏得不夠漂亮」的局面下，重新樹立一個較為優質的形象？
政治人物不可能永遠贏而絕不輸，贏時的歡天喜地固然值得慶幸；萬一輸了，要怎樣留下漂亮背影，甚或乘勢埋下「我將再起」的種子，也是一門嚴肅功課。
民進黨倘若如此這般就打贏了這一仗，會不會贏得不夠漂亮？反之，如果可能輸掉這一仗，總該有些民進黨人要為羅文嘉所說的「四年後的機會」想一想吧！
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