Cross-Strait Relations in the Wake of Lai Hsing-yuan's Appointment to Mainland Affairs Council Chairman
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 30, 2008
Lai Hsing-yuan will definitely head up the Mainland Affairs Council. Leave aside what political considerations were behind Ma Ying-jeou's move. Leave aside the controversy and backlash this appointment has elicited within the Blue camp. To focus exclusively on Lai Hsing-yuan herself is pointless. After all, MAC and SEF personnel have already been officially appointed. Future cross-strait policy will be handled by this group. The question now ought to be how to make this rag tag group into a well-organized team.
In other words, the next cause for concern, is not relations between Lai Hsing-yuan and Chiang Pin-kung, or relations between Lai Hsing-yuan and the rest of the Ma administration. The next cause for concern is relations between the MAC and the SEF, the future of cross-strait policy, the division of labor, and the modus operanda. More broadly speaking, this includes the modus operanda for the presidential palace, the National Security Council, the Executive Yuan, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Transportation, and other relevant ministries. How will they coordinate their efforts to promote cross-strait policy? From this point of view, to focus exclusively on Lai Hsing-yuan or to deliberately overestimate her role is unnecessary.
Frankly, the MAC and the SEF's two-track system design was a product of the special "cross-strait" situation. One set policy, the other carried it out. In cross-strait interactions they played the roles of "good cop" and "bad cop." This inevitably led to conflicts between the two. But in the end, they did enable cross-strait dialogue to take place, including the Koo-Wang during the early 90s. It was only the controversy over the Two States Theory and the subsequent ruling party change that mothballed this cross-straits mechanism for nearly 10 years. Ten years is a long time. People have passed away. Expertise has been lost and cross-strait mutual trust has been undermined. When we say we now want to "restart" cross-strait exchanges, we are not exaggerating.
But today's cross-strait situation is completely different from the way it was 10 years ago. MAC and SEF personnel have all been replaced. It would be impossible to replicate the decision-making process in place a decade ago. It makes no difference if we are comparing Chiang Pin-kung today to Koo Chen-fu yesterday, or even Lai Hsing-yuan today to Huang Kun-hui yesterday. Everything is different. Since it is so different, what should the cross-strait policy-making and implementation process be? That is the question Lai Hsing-yuan and Chiang Pin-kung will have to answer.
Some people are worried that having Lai Hsing-yuan at the head of the Mainland Affairs Council may affect the timetable for direct flights and mainland tourism, or even destroy the ongoing process of cross-strait reconciliation. The Taiwan stock exchange (TAIEX) plummeted for an entire day. Many political observers worry that Lai Hsing-yuan's EQ is too low. They worry that her pro-green stance will drag the entire Ma administration down. But is Lai Hsing-yuan that powerful? Based on interviews with the media, Lai Hsing-yuan is already on the same page as the Ma Hsiao team. She said she now agrees with Ma's "One China, Different Interpretations" premise. She said she approved of opening Taiwan to mainland tourism, to weekend charter flights, and to allowing the free exchange of NTD with RMB. These provisions are ready for implementation. They are already in full swing. She is confident they can be achieved.
As for raising the ceiling on mainland investments beyond the current 40 percent, recognizing mainland diplomas, she said she had reservations about them unless comprehensive plans were first drawn up. As we look at these policy statements, we can't see any big differences between Lai and Ma Ying-jeou's campaign platform.
The KMT's real cross-strait policy challenge is not that Lai Hsing-yuan will hijack the Ma Hsiao team's policy, but that the Blue camp can pull together and avoid having a carriage with too many horses pulling in too many directions. For example, the outgoing administration has yet to hand over power to the incoming administration. The new cross-strait exchange mechanism has yet to be established. Chiang Pin-kung, who has yet to be inaugurated as chairman of the SEF, went to the mainland to thank Taiwan businesspeople for their support. Former Party Chairman Lien Chan also led a delegation to Beijing to attend a Lien-Hu Summit. Current Party Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung lead a delegation that took part in a KMT-CCP Forum, If cross-strait relations can allow these Blue camp elders to fight over the spotlight, while the decision makers who must assume political responsibility are caught in a dilemma, then hasn't all hell broken loose? Frankly Lai Hsing-yuan is not the only person who must face the music. So must soon to be inaugurated President Ma.
How Beijing views Lai Hsing-yuan's appointment will also be worth noting. We await the consequences of Ma Ying-jeou's decision to appoint Green camp fighter Lai Hsing-yuan as cross-strait decision-maker. It is clear that Ma Ying-jeou is interested in uniting the Blue and Green camps behind his cross-strait policy. He represents the will of over 7 million Blue camp voters. But he does not want to ignore the concerns of 5 million voters. If Beijing cannot see this, if it cools cross-strait relations, then it is not seeing the bigger picture.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.04.30
如何看待賴幸媛掌陸委會後的兩岸關係
中時社論
賴幸媛確定出掌陸委會之後，姑不論馬英九這步棋背後的政治考量是什麼，也不論這項人事任命引發藍軍內部多少議論與反彈，持續將焦點鎖定在賴幸媛一個人身上，其實意義已經不大。畢竟陸委會與海基會的人事既然已經正式底定，未來處理兩岸政策的核心，就是這組搭配了。現在的問題焦點應該是：如何讓這個混雜編組的隊伍，變身成一支行動一致的團隊，才是未來真正需要面對的挑戰。
換言之，接下來最值得關注的，絕對不是賴幸媛與江丙坤之間，或是賴幸媛跟整個馬團隊之間將怎麼磨合，而是陸委會與海基會未來在兩岸政策上的角色分工、乃至運作機制會是什麼？或者更大範圍的說，這個運作機制在未來將與總統府國安會、行政院所屬的外交部、經濟部、內政部與交通部等相關部會間，怎麼步伐一致的推動兩岸政策？從這個角度看，刻意放大或高估賴幸媛一個人的角色，其實是不必要的。
不諱言說，當初陸委會與海基會這種雙軌的制度設計，本來就是為因應「兩岸」特殊情境的產物。它們一掌政策、一掌執行，在兩岸互動上各自扮演黑白臉，固然免不了鬧出過多次的「海陸大戰」，但畢竟還是在一九九○年代完成包括辜汪會談在內的多次兩岸對話。只不過歷經「兩國論」風波以及後來的政黨輪替，使得這套運作機制有近十年的歲月幾近完全停擺，十年可不是短暫的歲月，人事全非不說，經驗傳承乃至兩岸互信的建立也全部中斷。如今重新啟動相關機制，說是「重新出發」亦不為過。
只不過，如今的兩岸情勢，與十年前對比已經完全不一樣，重新人事布局的陸委會與海基會，也不可能再複製十年前的決策與運作模式，不論是江丙坤相較於當年辜振甫，亦或是賴幸媛相較於當年的黃昆輝，所面對課題其實是完全都不同了。既然不一樣，那麼新兩岸決策與執行模式又該是什麼？這個問題正就是賴幸媛與江丙坤在接下來所要回答的問題。
沒錯，有人擔憂賴幸媛出掌陸委會之後，可能會影響直航與陸客來台觀光的時程，甚至還會把已經融冰的兩岸關係再度摧毀掉，連台北股市都還為此慘跌了一天，也有不少政界人士擔心賴幸媛的ＥＱ太差，怕她親綠的立場會拖累整個馬團隊，問題是賴幸媛真有那麼大的能耐嗎？至少從賴幸媛接受記者訪談內容看來，她其實已經是站在馬蕭執政團隊的立場在思考了！她說她現在已經可以認同馬的「一中各表」概念，她也說開放觀光客來台、周末包機與開放人民幣兌換等政策，都是已經準備差不多的開放措施，也進入緊鑼密鼓階段，她有信心可以達成。至於調整對大陸投資四十％上限、開放大陸學歷等，則除非有完整配套，否則她依舊持保留態度。檢視這些立場表述，與馬英九在競選期間的主張，看得出有太大的差異嗎？
目前國民黨在兩岸政策上的真正挑戰，絕不是賴幸媛會不會以個人立場凌駕整個馬蕭團隊的政策，而是藍軍內部未來要怎麼齊一步伐，避免走上多頭馬車，一人一把號的困境。譬如說，僅僅只是目前，新舊政府都還未交接，新的兩岸互動機制也還未確定，尚未就職海基會董事長的江丙坤就已風塵樸樸的登陸謝票，已經卸下黨主席的連戰也率團赴北京進行「連胡會」，接下來還有現任黨主席吳伯雄要率團參與國共論壇，兩岸關係若是一再任由這些絡繹於兩岸的藍營大老在前面搶業績，讓真正必須負政治責任的決策者反而左支右絀、進退兩難，豈不是全都亂了套？坦言之，必須面對這個課題不只是賴幸媛，還有即將就職的馬總統。
至於北京當局方面，未來將會用怎樣的高度看待賴幸媛的這項人事任命，也非常值得觀察。馬英九爭取賴幸媛這位昔日綠營戰將主掌兩岸決策，會有怎樣的效應與後果，大家都在拭目以待。但顯然馬英九確有意將兩岸政策的操作，試著與藍綠民意板塊的和解串聯在一起，他當然代表著七百多萬選民的意志，但他也不想完全置另外五百多萬選民的憂慮於不顧，北京若是看不透這一點，就急著將兩岸關係降溫，也就喪失應有高度了。
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
On Ma Ying-jeou's Second Wave of Cabinet Appointments
On Ma Ying-jeou's Second Wave of Cabinet Appointments
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 29, 2008
The Ma administration has arrived. The Liu cabinet has announced its second wave of cabinet appointments. As we examine the roster for the new cabinet, we notice several characteristics: Plenty of PhDs. Plenty of school principals. Plenty of women. A record high number of women. Ma has unquestionably come through on his pledge to form a cabinet consisting of one-fourth women. His financial and economics consultants are old hands who can ensure a running start. Legislators, county magistrates, and mayors have not been appointed, in keeping with his promise to the voters. But these are all surface matters. More importantly, Ma Ying-jeou has revealed his political character. For certain positions, including several plagued by controversy over the past eight years, he made several risky appointments. How they will turn out remains to be seen.
Many people see Ma Ying-jeou as a moderate. But based on his cabinet appointments, it is obvious this "model student" has a rebellious side. During his first term as Taipei mayor, he appointed people who had constantly engaged in street protests. He appointed a labour movement leader head of the Bureau of Labour, an incendiary social critic head of the Bureau of Cultural Affairs, and a young student movement leader head of the Bureau of Civil Affairs. This time around Ma Ying-jeou has appointed public service lawyers who fought the government on behalf of the underprivileged. He appointed Wang Ching-feng, who went fought public prosecutors and police investigators over the 3/19 Shooting Incident, as Minister of Justice. By appointing all these social activists he is effectively colliding with the system, head on. Wang Ju-hsuan, who has no love for the KMT, has been appointed Chairman of the Council of Labor Affairs. Even Wang herself is probably wondering whether Ma wasn't crazy to give her the nod.
He has also appointed little-known leaders of parents groups and educational reform groups to his cabinet. The former president of National Chengchi University Cheng Jiu-Chen has been appointed Minister of Education. Chen Jiu-cheng is low-keyed by nature. He was labeled pro-Green because he wanted to eliminate partisan school songs. In fact he was merely a liberal academic. During the authoritarian era he traveled in "party outsider" political circles only because National Chengchi University disseminated his liberal concepts. During the DPP era he did not travel in official circles, nor did he participate in the Ministry of Education's noisy campaigns. He confined his commentary to civic fora in the capacity of a scholar. Cheng Jui-chen must familiarize himself with primary and secondary educational practices, and find practical solutions to controversial educational reform problems that have arisen over the past few years.
His second wave of cabinet appointments was even more radical. Ma Ying-jeou unexpectedly appointed Taiwan Solidarity Union legislator Lai Hsing-yuan Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, taking future premier Liu Chao-hsuan totally by surprise. Lai Hsing-yuan is a disciple of former President Lee Teng-hui. She was his aide when the KMT was still in office. For the past eight years the Taiwan Solidarity Union's cross-strait policy has been at loggerheads with the KMT's. Ma Ying-jeou was elected because a clear majority support and anticipate the opening of cross-straits exchanges. Lai Hsing-yuan says she shares Ma Ying-jeou's views. She says she agrees with "One China, Different Interpretations." She says she supports "No Reunification, No Independence, and No War." But her differences with Ma are far from trivial. After all, even Chen Shui-bian is nominally in agreement with Ma and Lai. Chen Shui-bian opposed the 1992 Consensus but did not oppose One China, Different Interpretations. Chen Shui-bian dug in his heels, ostensibly because Beijing wasn't allowing Taipei to have its own interpretation. The result was eight years of standoff and stagnation,
If Lai Hsing-yuan takes office, she will be required to resume cross-strait talks in June, and begin weekend direct charter flights in July. Is she really on the same page as Ma Ying-jeou? She blasted the KMT for helping fruit farmers sell their produce to the mainland. How does she feel about the Council of Agriculture completely changing its tune and subsidizing the sale of fruits from eight counties and cities to the mainland? Will she stay the course? Will she expand its scope? Even more importantly, the heart of the Ma administration's effort to boost Taiwan's economy is cross-strait policy. The Mainland Affairs Council is responsible for the liberalization of cross-strait policy, which impacts upon the Central Bank, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Council of Agriculture, even the Sports Commission. If Lai Hsing-yuan disagrees with administration policy, how will the Ma administration respond? If Lai Hsing-yuan agrees, how will she deal with the negative response from her former colleagues in the Legislative Yuan?
Ma Ying-jeou recruited Lai from the Taiwan Solidarity Union to create a greater consensus, to accommodate the feelings of the 5 million voters who didn't vote for him. This is laudable. But he must not forget the over 7 million voters who expect his administration to implement sound policies enabling Taiwan to return to normal as soon as possible. The new cabinet has many positions suitable for Lai Hsing-yuan. Why must she head the Mainland Affairs Council? Ma Ying-jeou made a risky appointment. We can only hope that he understands those risks. He must not force society to pay the price for unsuitable cabinet appointments. The new cabinet already has many positions whose sole purpose is to provide jobs for party cadres. Hopefully the new Premier will be an Premier for all the people, and not just a Premier for the ruling party,
The Government is supposed to serve the people. Its work is never done. The Chen Shui-bian regime filled government posts based on political considerations, and forced the entire nation to suffer the consequences. Once Ma's new cabinet appointments are complete, we are willing to give it our blessing. But we hope that the newly-appointed Premier will understand our concerns and consider the welfare of all the people, and that it will set aside politics and focus on policy.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.04.29
對新閣第二波人事的幾點看法
中時社論
馬政府到位！劉內閣二波人事公布，綜觀新閣名單，有幾個特色：博士多、校長多、女性更是創下歷史新高的多，完全達到馬英九選前、選後希望女性佔內閣四分之 一的宣示；財經小內閣則由老臣壓陣，確保立刻上手；立委與縣市長都未入閣，兌現重視選民的承諾。不過，這些特點都還是浮面的，更深沉的是，馬英九嶄露了他 的政治性格，在特定部會、尤其是過去八年爭議性大的部會，祭出險招，其成與敗格外值得觀察。
很多人認為馬英九素性溫和，但從他的用人， 不難看出這位政壇「模範生」骨子裡，藏都藏不了的叛逆性。就像他首任台北市長任內，找了專在街頭搞抗爭的工運人士出任勞工局長、寫文章火辣辣批判社會政治 現象的作家出任文化局長、還找一個年輕的學運分子出任民政局長。這一回，馬英九起用律師出身、為弱勢發聲槓上政府、為調查三一九案槓上檢警調的王清峰出任 法務部長，直接撞擊這個封閉系統；同樣是律師，活躍於社會團體，卻對國民黨沒太多好感的王如玄出任勞委會主委，連王如玄都懷疑自己會點頭是不是「瘋了」？
此外，還有家長團體、教改團體其實都不大認識的前政大校長鄭瑞城出任教育部長，鄭瑞城生性低調，因為他要改掉「黨校」的校歌，被校內部分人士標籤化為「親 綠」。但實際上，他只是一個單純的自由派學者，威權時代沒見他奔走於政治圈為黨外發言，只在政大傳遞他的自由派理念；民進黨時代他也沒汲汲於官場，或大聲 疾呼和爭議百出的教育部吵架，他還是以學者身分在民間論壇提出諍言。鄭瑞城的挑戰，除了他必須盡快熟悉中小學教育的實務外，就是怎麼在制度面上讓過去幾年 的教改爭議獲得合理解決。
更大膽的不止於此，第二波人事公布，馬英九出人意表地找上前台聯不分區立委賴幸媛出任陸委會主委，第一時間讓 準閣揆劉兆玄都感錯愕。賴幸媛系出前總統李登輝門下，國民黨執政時期就是李幕僚，但無可諱言，過去八年來，台聯的兩岸政策確實與國民黨格格不入，馬英九當 選很大部分原因在於支持者對兩岸開放有期待，賴幸媛固然聲稱和馬英九的理念相同，也同意「一中各表」，都主張不統不獨不武以台灣利益為上，但在這個大原則 大方向下，可討論的就多了。馬、賴的共識又何嘗不是扁的主張呢？扁所反對的是「九二共識」，可沒反對「一中各表」，陳水扁堅持的是因為對岸不讓我們自己表 述，就這麼吵八年，兩岸關係停滯不前。
賴幸媛上任後，立即要面對六月兩會復談、七月周末包機直航，她是否全盤接受？她曾經嚴詞痛批國民 黨協助農民水果登陸，面對農委會已經改弦更張要公款補助八縣市水果登陸，是否繼續或擴大辦理？更重要的，馬政府提振台灣經濟的核心，就是兩岸政策，陸委會 是各項開放措施主管機關包括：中央銀行、交通部、財政部、經濟部、農委會、金管會、甚至體委會能否開放的關鍵，如果賴幸媛有不同見解，馬政府該如何自處？ 如果賴幸媛沒有不同見解，她個人赴立法院備詢，面對舊日同僚的朝野立委們冷嘲熱諷，又該如何自處？
馬英九向台聯借將，為凝聚更大的社會 共識，照顧其他五百多萬票民眾的感情，確實值得肯定，但不要忘了，七百多萬選票期待馬政府的是「政策考量」，讓台灣在最短時間內重新上路，新閣有多少職務 都適合賴幸媛，何以非要她出掌陸委會？馬英九既出險招，只能期望馬政府做好風險管控，不要讓社會再為一個不適合的人事安排而付出代價。就像新內閣中仍有擺 明為了疏散黨工幹部的職務，但盼新任首長到位後，調整心態，扮演好稱職的全民首長，而非一黨之首長。
政府為人民服務，國政千緯萬端，過去扁政舖排人事，充斥政治考量，讓全民受盡煎熬，在新政府內閣人事布局底定後，我們仍願給予最大的祝福：希望所有新任首長體會我們的擔心，以全民福祉為念，拋開政治，專注於政策！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 29, 2008
The Ma administration has arrived. The Liu cabinet has announced its second wave of cabinet appointments. As we examine the roster for the new cabinet, we notice several characteristics: Plenty of PhDs. Plenty of school principals. Plenty of women. A record high number of women. Ma has unquestionably come through on his pledge to form a cabinet consisting of one-fourth women. His financial and economics consultants are old hands who can ensure a running start. Legislators, county magistrates, and mayors have not been appointed, in keeping with his promise to the voters. But these are all surface matters. More importantly, Ma Ying-jeou has revealed his political character. For certain positions, including several plagued by controversy over the past eight years, he made several risky appointments. How they will turn out remains to be seen.
Many people see Ma Ying-jeou as a moderate. But based on his cabinet appointments, it is obvious this "model student" has a rebellious side. During his first term as Taipei mayor, he appointed people who had constantly engaged in street protests. He appointed a labour movement leader head of the Bureau of Labour, an incendiary social critic head of the Bureau of Cultural Affairs, and a young student movement leader head of the Bureau of Civil Affairs. This time around Ma Ying-jeou has appointed public service lawyers who fought the government on behalf of the underprivileged. He appointed Wang Ching-feng, who went fought public prosecutors and police investigators over the 3/19 Shooting Incident, as Minister of Justice. By appointing all these social activists he is effectively colliding with the system, head on. Wang Ju-hsuan, who has no love for the KMT, has been appointed Chairman of the Council of Labor Affairs. Even Wang herself is probably wondering whether Ma wasn't crazy to give her the nod.
He has also appointed little-known leaders of parents groups and educational reform groups to his cabinet. The former president of National Chengchi University Cheng Jiu-Chen has been appointed Minister of Education. Chen Jiu-cheng is low-keyed by nature. He was labeled pro-Green because he wanted to eliminate partisan school songs. In fact he was merely a liberal academic. During the authoritarian era he traveled in "party outsider" political circles only because National Chengchi University disseminated his liberal concepts. During the DPP era he did not travel in official circles, nor did he participate in the Ministry of Education's noisy campaigns. He confined his commentary to civic fora in the capacity of a scholar. Cheng Jui-chen must familiarize himself with primary and secondary educational practices, and find practical solutions to controversial educational reform problems that have arisen over the past few years.
His second wave of cabinet appointments was even more radical. Ma Ying-jeou unexpectedly appointed Taiwan Solidarity Union legislator Lai Hsing-yuan Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, taking future premier Liu Chao-hsuan totally by surprise. Lai Hsing-yuan is a disciple of former President Lee Teng-hui. She was his aide when the KMT was still in office. For the past eight years the Taiwan Solidarity Union's cross-strait policy has been at loggerheads with the KMT's. Ma Ying-jeou was elected because a clear majority support and anticipate the opening of cross-straits exchanges. Lai Hsing-yuan says she shares Ma Ying-jeou's views. She says she agrees with "One China, Different Interpretations." She says she supports "No Reunification, No Independence, and No War." But her differences with Ma are far from trivial. After all, even Chen Shui-bian is nominally in agreement with Ma and Lai. Chen Shui-bian opposed the 1992 Consensus but did not oppose One China, Different Interpretations. Chen Shui-bian dug in his heels, ostensibly because Beijing wasn't allowing Taipei to have its own interpretation. The result was eight years of standoff and stagnation,
If Lai Hsing-yuan takes office, she will be required to resume cross-strait talks in June, and begin weekend direct charter flights in July. Is she really on the same page as Ma Ying-jeou? She blasted the KMT for helping fruit farmers sell their produce to the mainland. How does she feel about the Council of Agriculture completely changing its tune and subsidizing the sale of fruits from eight counties and cities to the mainland? Will she stay the course? Will she expand its scope? Even more importantly, the heart of the Ma administration's effort to boost Taiwan's economy is cross-strait policy. The Mainland Affairs Council is responsible for the liberalization of cross-strait policy, which impacts upon the Central Bank, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Council of Agriculture, even the Sports Commission. If Lai Hsing-yuan disagrees with administration policy, how will the Ma administration respond? If Lai Hsing-yuan agrees, how will she deal with the negative response from her former colleagues in the Legislative Yuan?
Ma Ying-jeou recruited Lai from the Taiwan Solidarity Union to create a greater consensus, to accommodate the feelings of the 5 million voters who didn't vote for him. This is laudable. But he must not forget the over 7 million voters who expect his administration to implement sound policies enabling Taiwan to return to normal as soon as possible. The new cabinet has many positions suitable for Lai Hsing-yuan. Why must she head the Mainland Affairs Council? Ma Ying-jeou made a risky appointment. We can only hope that he understands those risks. He must not force society to pay the price for unsuitable cabinet appointments. The new cabinet already has many positions whose sole purpose is to provide jobs for party cadres. Hopefully the new Premier will be an Premier for all the people, and not just a Premier for the ruling party,
The Government is supposed to serve the people. Its work is never done. The Chen Shui-bian regime filled government posts based on political considerations, and forced the entire nation to suffer the consequences. Once Ma's new cabinet appointments are complete, we are willing to give it our blessing. But we hope that the newly-appointed Premier will understand our concerns and consider the welfare of all the people, and that it will set aside politics and focus on policy.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.04.29
對新閣第二波人事的幾點看法
中時社論
馬政府到位！劉內閣二波人事公布，綜觀新閣名單，有幾個特色：博士多、校長多、女性更是創下歷史新高的多，完全達到馬英九選前、選後希望女性佔內閣四分之 一的宣示；財經小內閣則由老臣壓陣，確保立刻上手；立委與縣市長都未入閣，兌現重視選民的承諾。不過，這些特點都還是浮面的，更深沉的是，馬英九嶄露了他 的政治性格，在特定部會、尤其是過去八年爭議性大的部會，祭出險招，其成與敗格外值得觀察。
很多人認為馬英九素性溫和，但從他的用人， 不難看出這位政壇「模範生」骨子裡，藏都藏不了的叛逆性。就像他首任台北市長任內，找了專在街頭搞抗爭的工運人士出任勞工局長、寫文章火辣辣批判社會政治 現象的作家出任文化局長、還找一個年輕的學運分子出任民政局長。這一回，馬英九起用律師出身、為弱勢發聲槓上政府、為調查三一九案槓上檢警調的王清峰出任 法務部長，直接撞擊這個封閉系統；同樣是律師，活躍於社會團體，卻對國民黨沒太多好感的王如玄出任勞委會主委，連王如玄都懷疑自己會點頭是不是「瘋了」？
此外，還有家長團體、教改團體其實都不大認識的前政大校長鄭瑞城出任教育部長，鄭瑞城生性低調，因為他要改掉「黨校」的校歌，被校內部分人士標籤化為「親 綠」。但實際上，他只是一個單純的自由派學者，威權時代沒見他奔走於政治圈為黨外發言，只在政大傳遞他的自由派理念；民進黨時代他也沒汲汲於官場，或大聲 疾呼和爭議百出的教育部吵架，他還是以學者身分在民間論壇提出諍言。鄭瑞城的挑戰，除了他必須盡快熟悉中小學教育的實務外，就是怎麼在制度面上讓過去幾年 的教改爭議獲得合理解決。
更大膽的不止於此，第二波人事公布，馬英九出人意表地找上前台聯不分區立委賴幸媛出任陸委會主委，第一時間讓 準閣揆劉兆玄都感錯愕。賴幸媛系出前總統李登輝門下，國民黨執政時期就是李幕僚，但無可諱言，過去八年來，台聯的兩岸政策確實與國民黨格格不入，馬英九當 選很大部分原因在於支持者對兩岸開放有期待，賴幸媛固然聲稱和馬英九的理念相同，也同意「一中各表」，都主張不統不獨不武以台灣利益為上，但在這個大原則 大方向下，可討論的就多了。馬、賴的共識又何嘗不是扁的主張呢？扁所反對的是「九二共識」，可沒反對「一中各表」，陳水扁堅持的是因為對岸不讓我們自己表 述，就這麼吵八年，兩岸關係停滯不前。
賴幸媛上任後，立即要面對六月兩會復談、七月周末包機直航，她是否全盤接受？她曾經嚴詞痛批國民 黨協助農民水果登陸，面對農委會已經改弦更張要公款補助八縣市水果登陸，是否繼續或擴大辦理？更重要的，馬政府提振台灣經濟的核心，就是兩岸政策，陸委會 是各項開放措施主管機關包括：中央銀行、交通部、財政部、經濟部、農委會、金管會、甚至體委會能否開放的關鍵，如果賴幸媛有不同見解，馬政府該如何自處？ 如果賴幸媛沒有不同見解，她個人赴立法院備詢，面對舊日同僚的朝野立委們冷嘲熱諷，又該如何自處？
馬英九向台聯借將，為凝聚更大的社會 共識，照顧其他五百多萬票民眾的感情，確實值得肯定，但不要忘了，七百多萬選票期待馬政府的是「政策考量」，讓台灣在最短時間內重新上路，新閣有多少職務 都適合賴幸媛，何以非要她出掌陸委會？馬英九既出險招，只能期望馬政府做好風險管控，不要讓社會再為一個不適合的人事安排而付出代價。就像新內閣中仍有擺 明為了疏散黨工幹部的職務，但盼新任首長到位後，調整心態，扮演好稱職的全民首長，而非一黨之首長。
政府為人民服務，國政千緯萬端，過去扁政舖排人事，充斥政治考量，讓全民受盡煎熬，在新政府內閣人事布局底定後，我們仍願給予最大的祝福：希望所有新任首長體會我們的擔心，以全民福祉為念，拋開政治，專注於政策！
Monday, April 28, 2008
The DPP's Dilemma: Whether to Return to the Centrist Path?
The DPP's Dilemma: Whether to Return to the Centrist Path?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 28, 2008
Chen Shih-meng openly declared his support for Koo Kuan-min as DPP Chairman. This finally generated a few sparks in a relentlessly dull DPP Party Chairman Election. Chen Shih-meng openly challenged elements within the DPP who advocated the adoption of a more centrist path. Chen maintained that this would never redeem the DPP, and might even lead to everyone abandoning the DPP. Suddenly the struggle over the chairmanship of the DPP, had become a struggle between a "new centrist path" and opposition to a new centrist path. Leave aside for the moment whether this was actually the case. At least the DPP's options were finally on the table.
The current Party Chairman Election is atypical for the DPP. It is the first Party Chairman Election after the DPP's three major electoral defeats. It is one in which the Four Princes of the DPP are conspicuous by their absence. Factional rivalry is also at an all-time low. Not one of the candidates for chairman -- Koo and the two Tsais, belongs to the party's central power structure. Perhaps this is why the confrontation between the three, and the process by which the victor will emerge, are assuming forms unprecedented for the DPP.
The media has been comparing Koo and the two Tsais. Trong Tsai is viewed as a machine politician who depends upon the top down mobilization of party members and manipulation of party factions. Koo Kuan-min is viewed as the voice of Deep Green fundamentalism. Tsai Ying-wen is viewed as a centrist reformer. Each of the candidates represents one aspect of what the DPP stands for. Machine voters and factional voters have long been a problem for DPP party members and grass roots supporters. The ideological differences between Deep Green and Pale Green factions have long been part of the DPP's ideological spectrum. The DPP's post election reform, just so happens to touch upon these differences. And by sheer coincidence, each faction just happens to have a spokesman.
As a party that has suffered repeated defeats, DPP leaders are wracked with anxiety. In this, they are no different from other defeated parties in democratic nations. The DPP's anxiety takes two forms. One ascribes the party's defeat to problems with the current path. It calls for thoroughgoing path change. The other is just the opposite. It claims the party has been losing elections because it failed to adhere to its current path, therefore must increase its commitment to its current path. Many advocates of reform within the Democratic Progressive Party will be pinning their hopes on Tsai Ing-wen. They represent the first group. Chen Shih-meng has nominated Koo Kuan-min, and is openly blasting the "centrist path." They represent the second group. The different forms their anxieties take reflect the differences in their political paths.
The DPP's current plight can, to some extent, be compared to the former plight of the British Labor Party. Under the impact of Conservative Party Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's "Thatcher Revolution," the Labor Party experienced repeated setbacks. It also underwent internal struggles over the party's political path. The Labor Party's nomination process at the time used a form of "intra-party democracy." This meant party hardliners who were adept at mobilization gained the upper hand, from beginning to end. But the candidates fielded by these Labour Party fundamentalists were consistently defeated in national elections by the Conservative Party. The result was a decade in the political wilderness. Only when Tony Blair adopted a "Third Way" did the Labour Party return to political office. The story of the British Labor Party provides an object lesson for the still wavering DPP.
Perhaps it was because the three candidates for party chairman just happened to represent different faces of the DPP. Therefore whoever prevails will reflect DPP members' expectations about what kind of political party they wish to become. Whether they wish to remain mired in the swamp of machine politics and party factions, unable to extricate themselves. Whether the DPP should become a Deep Green political party. Whether the DPP should proceed down a new, broader, "centrist path." Put simply, the results of the party chairman election will decide whether the DPP will be a party that represents only party members, or a party that represents all people on Taiwan.
Because of this, we are happy to see Chen Shih-meng put the Centrist Path controversy on the bargaining table. At least this will allow the DPP to focus on the reasons for its defeat. After all, to argue about the extent of Chen Shui-bian's responsibility is a waste of valuable time and energy. So is arguing about the merits of the Blues Excluded clause. Should the DPP change its current party platform? What course of action meets with the expectations of the 5 million voters who cast their ballots for Hsieh? Perhaps those are the most serious issues facing the DPP.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.04.28
民進黨的難題：要不要重回中間路線？
中時社論
在陳師孟公開表態力挺辜寬敏之後，終於為一路沉悶的民進黨黨主席選舉，擦出了些許火花。陳師孟直接質疑民進黨內有關「朝中間路線調整」的論述，不僅認為如此將「找不回民進黨」，甚至會造成「大家要考慮放棄民進黨」！一時之間，民進黨黨主席之爭，彷彿變成「中間路線」與「反中間路線」在對決，實況是否如此暫且不論，至少這讓民進黨在怎麼決定它自己的未來上，有了更多想像空間。
某種程度上說，這屆黨主席的選舉，在民進黨黨史上顯得非常另類。它是民進黨連輸三場重要大選後的一次改選，也是檯面上所有天王都缺席的一次改選，更是派系較勁最淡薄的一次改選。而角逐黨主席的兩蔡一辜，一直以來都不屬於黨的權力核心，或許就是因為這樣，他們三個人的對決乃至最後由誰出線，都可以顯見出民進黨未來將呈現怎樣的風貌。
媒體在比較兩蔡一辜的條件時，習慣性會將蔡同榮歸類為依賴人頭黨員動員、操縱派系換票的政治人物，而辜寬敏則是反映深綠基本教義路線的代言人，至於蔡英文則代表著朝中間改革路線調整的代言人。耐人尋味的是，這三位候選人所象徵的，都算得上是民進黨面貌的一部分。民進黨現有的底層黨員結構，人頭黨員與山頭派系本來就是割捨不掉的一部分，而意識形態上深綠與淺綠的分殊，也一直都是民進黨理念光譜分布的現狀。大選過後民進黨的改革，也恰恰好都觸及了這幾個部分，只是沒有想到這麼湊巧，每一部分都剛巧有一個代言人出馬競選。
做為一個連續挫敗的政黨，民進黨內部所反映的焦慮，與民主國家所有敗退政黨所反映的焦慮其實都是一樣的。而這種焦慮恰好反映在兩種心理上，一種心理是認為黨的敗選是出在「現行路線有問題」，所以主張應全面調整路線。另一種心理則恰恰好相反，認為黨的敗選正是因為「對現有路線的堅持不夠」，因而必須更強化對既有路線的信仰。民進黨內許多主張改革的精英會寄希望於蔡英文，反映著正是前一種焦慮，而陳師孟會站出來挺辜寬敏，並公開痛批中間路線，所反映的也正是後一種焦慮心理。而這種焦慮的分歧也一定會反映在政黨的路線鬥爭上。
一九八 ○年代的英國工黨，部分程度上正可以拿來與民進黨目前的處境相對照。那時節在保守黨柴契爾首相旋風的衝擊下，工黨面臨連番的敗選，內部自然也出現了路線上的鬥爭。當時工黨的提名採取「黨內民主」的形式，這使得黨內動員性強的強硬派一路占上風，但這批代表工黨基本教義路線的候選人，在全國大選中卻被保守黨一路壓著打，結果硬是屈居十幾年的在野黨，直到布萊爾採取向中間調整的「第三條路」，才再度掌握執政權。英國工黨的故事，對目前還擺盪在要不要調整路線的民進黨，有沒有任何啟示呢？
或許正是因為三位黨主席的候選人，都恰好代表了民進黨的部分面貌，因而最後會是由誰出線，其實也反應了民進黨員對他們這個黨的期待與想像，他們想要未來的民進黨變成什麼樣的政黨？他們要不要民進黨繼續陷在人頭黨員與派系換票操作中不能自拔？要不要民進黨更進一步向深綠路線靠攏？還是要讓民進黨朝更寬廣的中間路線調整？講得更簡單一點，黨主席的選舉結果，將決定民進黨未來要做一個只是代表黨員的黨，還是爭取代表全台灣人的黨。
也因為這樣，我們倒是樂見陳師孟將「中間路線」議題搬到檯面上的做法，至少這可以讓民進黨針對敗選檢討的焦距更集中，畢竟都到了這個時候，再花一堆寶貴時間去爭辯陳水扁該負多少責任，根本是在浪費口水。同樣耗費一堆精神在爭論排藍民調究竟對不對的上面，也是在浪費智慧。而民進黨究竟該不該調整現有路線？該怎麼做才算是對五百多萬的選民有所交代？或許才真的是此刻的民進黨，最該嚴肅面對的課題。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 28, 2008
Chen Shih-meng openly declared his support for Koo Kuan-min as DPP Chairman. This finally generated a few sparks in a relentlessly dull DPP Party Chairman Election. Chen Shih-meng openly challenged elements within the DPP who advocated the adoption of a more centrist path. Chen maintained that this would never redeem the DPP, and might even lead to everyone abandoning the DPP. Suddenly the struggle over the chairmanship of the DPP, had become a struggle between a "new centrist path" and opposition to a new centrist path. Leave aside for the moment whether this was actually the case. At least the DPP's options were finally on the table.
The current Party Chairman Election is atypical for the DPP. It is the first Party Chairman Election after the DPP's three major electoral defeats. It is one in which the Four Princes of the DPP are conspicuous by their absence. Factional rivalry is also at an all-time low. Not one of the candidates for chairman -- Koo and the two Tsais, belongs to the party's central power structure. Perhaps this is why the confrontation between the three, and the process by which the victor will emerge, are assuming forms unprecedented for the DPP.
The media has been comparing Koo and the two Tsais. Trong Tsai is viewed as a machine politician who depends upon the top down mobilization of party members and manipulation of party factions. Koo Kuan-min is viewed as the voice of Deep Green fundamentalism. Tsai Ying-wen is viewed as a centrist reformer. Each of the candidates represents one aspect of what the DPP stands for. Machine voters and factional voters have long been a problem for DPP party members and grass roots supporters. The ideological differences between Deep Green and Pale Green factions have long been part of the DPP's ideological spectrum. The DPP's post election reform, just so happens to touch upon these differences. And by sheer coincidence, each faction just happens to have a spokesman.
As a party that has suffered repeated defeats, DPP leaders are wracked with anxiety. In this, they are no different from other defeated parties in democratic nations. The DPP's anxiety takes two forms. One ascribes the party's defeat to problems with the current path. It calls for thoroughgoing path change. The other is just the opposite. It claims the party has been losing elections because it failed to adhere to its current path, therefore must increase its commitment to its current path. Many advocates of reform within the Democratic Progressive Party will be pinning their hopes on Tsai Ing-wen. They represent the first group. Chen Shih-meng has nominated Koo Kuan-min, and is openly blasting the "centrist path." They represent the second group. The different forms their anxieties take reflect the differences in their political paths.
The DPP's current plight can, to some extent, be compared to the former plight of the British Labor Party. Under the impact of Conservative Party Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's "Thatcher Revolution," the Labor Party experienced repeated setbacks. It also underwent internal struggles over the party's political path. The Labor Party's nomination process at the time used a form of "intra-party democracy." This meant party hardliners who were adept at mobilization gained the upper hand, from beginning to end. But the candidates fielded by these Labour Party fundamentalists were consistently defeated in national elections by the Conservative Party. The result was a decade in the political wilderness. Only when Tony Blair adopted a "Third Way" did the Labour Party return to political office. The story of the British Labor Party provides an object lesson for the still wavering DPP.
Perhaps it was because the three candidates for party chairman just happened to represent different faces of the DPP. Therefore whoever prevails will reflect DPP members' expectations about what kind of political party they wish to become. Whether they wish to remain mired in the swamp of machine politics and party factions, unable to extricate themselves. Whether the DPP should become a Deep Green political party. Whether the DPP should proceed down a new, broader, "centrist path." Put simply, the results of the party chairman election will decide whether the DPP will be a party that represents only party members, or a party that represents all people on Taiwan.
Because of this, we are happy to see Chen Shih-meng put the Centrist Path controversy on the bargaining table. At least this will allow the DPP to focus on the reasons for its defeat. After all, to argue about the extent of Chen Shui-bian's responsibility is a waste of valuable time and energy. So is arguing about the merits of the Blues Excluded clause. Should the DPP change its current party platform? What course of action meets with the expectations of the 5 million voters who cast their ballots for Hsieh? Perhaps those are the most serious issues facing the DPP.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.04.28
民進黨的難題：要不要重回中間路線？
中時社論
在陳師孟公開表態力挺辜寬敏之後，終於為一路沉悶的民進黨黨主席選舉，擦出了些許火花。陳師孟直接質疑民進黨內有關「朝中間路線調整」的論述，不僅認為如此將「找不回民進黨」，甚至會造成「大家要考慮放棄民進黨」！一時之間，民進黨黨主席之爭，彷彿變成「中間路線」與「反中間路線」在對決，實況是否如此暫且不論，至少這讓民進黨在怎麼決定它自己的未來上，有了更多想像空間。
某種程度上說，這屆黨主席的選舉，在民進黨黨史上顯得非常另類。它是民進黨連輸三場重要大選後的一次改選，也是檯面上所有天王都缺席的一次改選，更是派系較勁最淡薄的一次改選。而角逐黨主席的兩蔡一辜，一直以來都不屬於黨的權力核心，或許就是因為這樣，他們三個人的對決乃至最後由誰出線，都可以顯見出民進黨未來將呈現怎樣的風貌。
媒體在比較兩蔡一辜的條件時，習慣性會將蔡同榮歸類為依賴人頭黨員動員、操縱派系換票的政治人物，而辜寬敏則是反映深綠基本教義路線的代言人，至於蔡英文則代表著朝中間改革路線調整的代言人。耐人尋味的是，這三位候選人所象徵的，都算得上是民進黨面貌的一部分。民進黨現有的底層黨員結構，人頭黨員與山頭派系本來就是割捨不掉的一部分，而意識形態上深綠與淺綠的分殊，也一直都是民進黨理念光譜分布的現狀。大選過後民進黨的改革，也恰恰好都觸及了這幾個部分，只是沒有想到這麼湊巧，每一部分都剛巧有一個代言人出馬競選。
做為一個連續挫敗的政黨，民進黨內部所反映的焦慮，與民主國家所有敗退政黨所反映的焦慮其實都是一樣的。而這種焦慮恰好反映在兩種心理上，一種心理是認為黨的敗選是出在「現行路線有問題」，所以主張應全面調整路線。另一種心理則恰恰好相反，認為黨的敗選正是因為「對現有路線的堅持不夠」，因而必須更強化對既有路線的信仰。民進黨內許多主張改革的精英會寄希望於蔡英文，反映著正是前一種焦慮，而陳師孟會站出來挺辜寬敏，並公開痛批中間路線，所反映的也正是後一種焦慮心理。而這種焦慮的分歧也一定會反映在政黨的路線鬥爭上。
一九八 ○年代的英國工黨，部分程度上正可以拿來與民進黨目前的處境相對照。那時節在保守黨柴契爾首相旋風的衝擊下，工黨面臨連番的敗選，內部自然也出現了路線上的鬥爭。當時工黨的提名採取「黨內民主」的形式，這使得黨內動員性強的強硬派一路占上風，但這批代表工黨基本教義路線的候選人，在全國大選中卻被保守黨一路壓著打，結果硬是屈居十幾年的在野黨，直到布萊爾採取向中間調整的「第三條路」，才再度掌握執政權。英國工黨的故事，對目前還擺盪在要不要調整路線的民進黨，有沒有任何啟示呢？
或許正是因為三位黨主席的候選人，都恰好代表了民進黨的部分面貌，因而最後會是由誰出線，其實也反應了民進黨員對他們這個黨的期待與想像，他們想要未來的民進黨變成什麼樣的政黨？他們要不要民進黨繼續陷在人頭黨員與派系換票操作中不能自拔？要不要民進黨更進一步向深綠路線靠攏？還是要讓民進黨朝更寬廣的中間路線調整？講得更簡單一點，黨主席的選舉結果，將決定民進黨未來要做一個只是代表黨員的黨，還是爭取代表全台灣人的黨。
也因為這樣，我們倒是樂見陳師孟將「中間路線」議題搬到檯面上的做法，至少這可以讓民進黨針對敗選檢討的焦距更集中，畢竟都到了這個時候，再花一堆寶貴時間去爭辯陳水扁該負多少責任，根本是在浪費口水。同樣耗費一堆精神在爭論排藍民調究竟對不對的上面，也是在浪費智慧。而民進黨究竟該不該調整現有路線？該怎麼做才算是對五百多萬的選民有所交代？或許才真的是此刻的民進黨，最該嚴肅面對的課題。
Friday, April 25, 2008
The New Administration's Diplomatic Challenges
The New Administration's Diplomatic Challenges
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 25, 2008
Although Washington is not allowing Ma Ying-jeou to visit the United States, it is sending a higher-ranking envoy than usual to his inauguration. On the one hand this defers to international realpolitik. One the other hand it expresses goodwill towards the new administration. The international community also welcomes the imminent return to rational and pragmatic diplomacy. The new administration's first challenge will be to revamp the ROC's diplomatic strategy. It must defend the nation's sovereignty, uphold its dignity, ensure its survival, and provide for its future development.
When the outcome of the presidential election was announced, the international community breathed a collective sigh of relief, and focused its attention on cross-strait reconciliation. Long ago planned but long delayed exchanges may soon take place. A new dawn is breaking on once troubled cross-strait relations. The atmosphere of growing optimism has even led to hopes for a diplomatic truce.
Such expectations are unrealistic and must not form the basis for diplomatic strategy. Beijing may display unprecedentes flexibility by allowing Vice President-elect Vincent Siew participate in the Boao Forum and an historic Hu Siew Summit. But such flexibility will probably not extend to the diplomatic arena. The CCP has long maintained distinct internal and external policies. It may treat compatriots on Taiwan more gently, but it is unrealisic to expect the CCP to accept the Republic of China's sovereignty in the international arena. The mainland China Ministry of Foreign Affairs has long maintained a hardline position regarding Taiwan. The mainland is currently experiencing a surge of nationalist sentiment reminiscent of the Boxer Rebellion. Under such circumstances the mainland authorities will be under pressure not to give way.
Moreover, given the mainland's economic rise, international developments have benefited the mainland authorities. They believe time is on their side. They want to avoid driving the public on Taiwan toward independence. Nevertheless they must provide incentives for the comparatively moderate Kuomintang government. Only then can the KMT influence the public on Taiwan. But how far Beijing is prepared to relax its attitude toward Taiwan, in what areas, and in what manner, remains unclear. Whatever it gives, it can take away. Therefore it is not something one can depend upon. We must not harbor any illusions. Otherwise we may harm the ROC's interests.
The ROC's diplomatic plight is the result of the disparity between its strength and the mainland's, and the CCP's insistence on playing a zero-sum game. Being weaker, we must make increase our strength and accumulate bargaining chips. Only then can we defend our sovereignty and ensure a modicum of breathing space in the international arena. Unfortunately the outgoing DPP's diplomatic efforts have been a complete waste. They have provided Chen Shui-bian with photo-ops and opportunities for electioneering, but little else. The ruling DPP has frittered away precious diplomatic capital accumulated through long years of hard work. Its Taiwan independence provocations have depleted the reserves of sympathy the international community once felt for the ROC, and undermined Taipei's once close relationship with Washington. Ma Ying-jeou is inheriting a foreign policy debacle. He must rebuild foreign relations from scratch. Although Taipei/Washington relations can be quickly rebuilt, relations with other nations will need considerably more effort. The unprecedented appointment of Latin American expert Francisco Ou as Minister of Foreign Affairs will return professionalism to diplomacy. It will also help manage crises that have arisen in our relations with allies in Latin America, our diplomatic stronghold.
The mainland's foreign policies are not under our control. Therefore one cannot expect major breakthroughs merely because our ruling administration and foreign policies have changed. But at least our diplomacy can get back on track. At least we can do what we ought to do, and not do what we ought not to do. At least we can begin giving priority to our long-term interests, adopting the most advantageous strategies for safeguarding the ROC's sovereignty, ensuring our survival, and providing for future development. At least the new administration will restore the dignity of professional diplomats, and allow our foreign policy to reflect the aspirations of 23 million Chinese on Taiwan.
In fact, the Republic of China's greatest asset is its values. We have relations with fewer countries than the mainland. We have even fewer votes in the United Nations. But the ROC has undergone a second change in ruling parties. It has demonstrated to the world that the Chinese people are capable of establishing a free, democratic, open, and mature society. To the world's advanced democracies, the continued existence of these values is something precious and worth defending.
The ROC understands the harsh reality of international realpolitik. But we have ignored the intangible values of civilized human society. We have failed to properly market the ROC's virtues. More can be written about this in the future. Because the ROC needs to survive internationally. we need the support of the major powers. Domestic opinion has an influence on decision-making within these major powers. If the ROC's civilized values meet with the approval of international public opinion, their government's foreign policy will reflect that opinion. Many political leaders' decision not to participate in the Beijing Olympics torch relay or the opening ceremonies were based on public opinion and domestic pressure. The ROC government is far more powerful than the Tibetan protestors. If Tibet can gain international sympathy, so can the ROC.
Faced with the rise of mainland China, the ROC finds itself in a position of political weakness. We have also lost our economic advantage. But we must not lose our self-confidence and fighting spirit. The ROC is valuable not merely for its tangible economic achievements, but also for its intangible civilized values. We must reaffirm the value of our continued existence. We must find new ways to market this beautiful island of Taiwan to the international community.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.04.25
新政府面對的外交挑戰
中時社論
美國華府最終雖沒讓馬英九訪美，但畢竟也提升了出席就職典禮的特使層次；一方面維持國際現實的框架，一方面對新政府表達出善意與期待。同樣的，國際社會也期待台灣外交回歸理性務實。如何重建外交策略，保護台灣的生存發展與主權尊嚴，將是新政府的重大課題。
從總統大選揭曉以來，鬆了一口氣的國際社會，紛紛把關注焦點擺在兩岸將走向和解上。就近來的發展看來確是如此，多項延宕許久的交流措施解禁有望，兩岸之間從山雨欲來一夕變成春暖花開，緩和的大氣氛在想像中一再加碼，乃至衍生出「外交休兵」的期待。
但是，這樣的期待其實是不切實際的，也不能作為外交策略的前提。雖然中共願意讓副總統當選人蕭萬長參加博鰲會議，並舉行歷史性的胡蕭會，立場上更展現出前所罕見的彈性，可這樣的彈性未必能見諸外交領域。因為中共一向內外有別，對台灣同胞講話可以軟一些，寬容度可以大一些，但在國際舞台上要接受台灣的主權國家地位，對中共當局來說還是非常困難的。不要說外交部門一向對台立場最為強硬，現在大陸近於義和團式的激烈民族情緒，也會對中共當局造成不能退讓的壓力。
何況，中國經濟崛起後，國際局勢一直朝對中共有利的局面發展，因此中共相信時間站在自己那一邊。儘管為了不刺激台灣鋌而走險尋求獨立，北京必須對路線比較和緩的國民黨政府提供一些鼓勵，才能讓這樣的路線在台灣內部有說服力，但到底願意放鬆到什麼程度、在哪些領域、以什麼方式，目前都還不清楚，也因為收放由人，隨時可以收回，所以不足以依賴，更不能有過多樂觀幻想，否則將對台灣的利益造成危害。
台灣的外交困境源自兩岸力量懸殊及中共堅持零和戰，居於弱勢的我們，必須盡一切努力壯大實力累積籌碼，才能在國際社會有起碼的生存空間與主權地位。遺憾的是這些年外交大搞虛功，為了供元首作秀或替政黨助選，把長年耕耘的外交資源無謂浪擲，還以挑釁的台獨操作耗損國際間對台灣的同情，破壞台美原本緊密的關係。如今馬英九接收的，是片滿目瘡痍的外交荒地，得從頭整地灌溉。雖然台美關係可以很快重建，但與其他國家的關係，卻需要投下更多心力。這次破天荒由拉美專家歐鴻鍊出任外交部長，除了回歸外交專業外，應該也是著眼於我國外交重鎮拉美已經烽火四起，必須緊急救火了。
國際環境與中共政策都非操之在我，因此很難期待外交處境因為政權輪替而出現重大突破，但至少應該要回歸外交正軌，做該做的事，不做不該做的事，以國家整體長遠利益為優先考量，選擇最有利的策略，來維護台灣的生存發展及主權地位。也期盼新政府能重建外交的專業尊嚴，讓外交政策能真正反映台灣二千三百萬人的心聲。
其實，台灣最大的資產在於「價值」。比邦交國，我們當然比不過中共；算票數，離聯合國也還差得遠。但再度政黨輪替的台灣，卻示範了華人社會也可以有如此自由、民主、開放、成熟的文明狀態，這些價值的繼續存在，對世界民主先進國家來說，是非常珍貴而且必須保護的。
台灣通常接觸到的是國際現實的苦澀面，忽略了無形的文明對人類社會的價值，也不懂得如何以此作為行銷台灣的賣點，未來在這方面其實可以多加著墨。因為台灣要維護國際生存，必定需要重要大國的支持，而這些大國的內部民意對決策頗具影響力，當台灣的文明價值得到民意認同時，政府的外交政策也必須作出回應。不少政治領袖決定不參與聖火傳遞或北京奧運開幕式，就是基於民意及輿論壓力，而西藏與中國力量之差距比台灣更大。西藏都可以得到國際同情，台灣當然不能妄自菲薄。
面對崛起的中國，台灣本來政治地位就居弱勢，如今經濟優勢也迅速流失，但不必因此失去自信和鬥志，因為台灣的價值不只在有形的經濟成就，更在無形的文明發展。我們在確認自己存在價值的同時，也應該以嶄新的策略，重新向國際社會行銷台灣這個美麗島。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 25, 2008
Although Washington is not allowing Ma Ying-jeou to visit the United States, it is sending a higher-ranking envoy than usual to his inauguration. On the one hand this defers to international realpolitik. One the other hand it expresses goodwill towards the new administration. The international community also welcomes the imminent return to rational and pragmatic diplomacy. The new administration's first challenge will be to revamp the ROC's diplomatic strategy. It must defend the nation's sovereignty, uphold its dignity, ensure its survival, and provide for its future development.
When the outcome of the presidential election was announced, the international community breathed a collective sigh of relief, and focused its attention on cross-strait reconciliation. Long ago planned but long delayed exchanges may soon take place. A new dawn is breaking on once troubled cross-strait relations. The atmosphere of growing optimism has even led to hopes for a diplomatic truce.
Such expectations are unrealistic and must not form the basis for diplomatic strategy. Beijing may display unprecedentes flexibility by allowing Vice President-elect Vincent Siew participate in the Boao Forum and an historic Hu Siew Summit. But such flexibility will probably not extend to the diplomatic arena. The CCP has long maintained distinct internal and external policies. It may treat compatriots on Taiwan more gently, but it is unrealisic to expect the CCP to accept the Republic of China's sovereignty in the international arena. The mainland China Ministry of Foreign Affairs has long maintained a hardline position regarding Taiwan. The mainland is currently experiencing a surge of nationalist sentiment reminiscent of the Boxer Rebellion. Under such circumstances the mainland authorities will be under pressure not to give way.
Moreover, given the mainland's economic rise, international developments have benefited the mainland authorities. They believe time is on their side. They want to avoid driving the public on Taiwan toward independence. Nevertheless they must provide incentives for the comparatively moderate Kuomintang government. Only then can the KMT influence the public on Taiwan. But how far Beijing is prepared to relax its attitude toward Taiwan, in what areas, and in what manner, remains unclear. Whatever it gives, it can take away. Therefore it is not something one can depend upon. We must not harbor any illusions. Otherwise we may harm the ROC's interests.
The ROC's diplomatic plight is the result of the disparity between its strength and the mainland's, and the CCP's insistence on playing a zero-sum game. Being weaker, we must make increase our strength and accumulate bargaining chips. Only then can we defend our sovereignty and ensure a modicum of breathing space in the international arena. Unfortunately the outgoing DPP's diplomatic efforts have been a complete waste. They have provided Chen Shui-bian with photo-ops and opportunities for electioneering, but little else. The ruling DPP has frittered away precious diplomatic capital accumulated through long years of hard work. Its Taiwan independence provocations have depleted the reserves of sympathy the international community once felt for the ROC, and undermined Taipei's once close relationship with Washington. Ma Ying-jeou is inheriting a foreign policy debacle. He must rebuild foreign relations from scratch. Although Taipei/Washington relations can be quickly rebuilt, relations with other nations will need considerably more effort. The unprecedented appointment of Latin American expert Francisco Ou as Minister of Foreign Affairs will return professionalism to diplomacy. It will also help manage crises that have arisen in our relations with allies in Latin America, our diplomatic stronghold.
The mainland's foreign policies are not under our control. Therefore one cannot expect major breakthroughs merely because our ruling administration and foreign policies have changed. But at least our diplomacy can get back on track. At least we can do what we ought to do, and not do what we ought not to do. At least we can begin giving priority to our long-term interests, adopting the most advantageous strategies for safeguarding the ROC's sovereignty, ensuring our survival, and providing for future development. At least the new administration will restore the dignity of professional diplomats, and allow our foreign policy to reflect the aspirations of 23 million Chinese on Taiwan.
In fact, the Republic of China's greatest asset is its values. We have relations with fewer countries than the mainland. We have even fewer votes in the United Nations. But the ROC has undergone a second change in ruling parties. It has demonstrated to the world that the Chinese people are capable of establishing a free, democratic, open, and mature society. To the world's advanced democracies, the continued existence of these values is something precious and worth defending.
The ROC understands the harsh reality of international realpolitik. But we have ignored the intangible values of civilized human society. We have failed to properly market the ROC's virtues. More can be written about this in the future. Because the ROC needs to survive internationally. we need the support of the major powers. Domestic opinion has an influence on decision-making within these major powers. If the ROC's civilized values meet with the approval of international public opinion, their government's foreign policy will reflect that opinion. Many political leaders' decision not to participate in the Beijing Olympics torch relay or the opening ceremonies were based on public opinion and domestic pressure. The ROC government is far more powerful than the Tibetan protestors. If Tibet can gain international sympathy, so can the ROC.
Faced with the rise of mainland China, the ROC finds itself in a position of political weakness. We have also lost our economic advantage. But we must not lose our self-confidence and fighting spirit. The ROC is valuable not merely for its tangible economic achievements, but also for its intangible civilized values. We must reaffirm the value of our continued existence. We must find new ways to market this beautiful island of Taiwan to the international community.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.04.25
新政府面對的外交挑戰
中時社論
美國華府最終雖沒讓馬英九訪美，但畢竟也提升了出席就職典禮的特使層次；一方面維持國際現實的框架，一方面對新政府表達出善意與期待。同樣的，國際社會也期待台灣外交回歸理性務實。如何重建外交策略，保護台灣的生存發展與主權尊嚴，將是新政府的重大課題。
從總統大選揭曉以來，鬆了一口氣的國際社會，紛紛把關注焦點擺在兩岸將走向和解上。就近來的發展看來確是如此，多項延宕許久的交流措施解禁有望，兩岸之間從山雨欲來一夕變成春暖花開，緩和的大氣氛在想像中一再加碼，乃至衍生出「外交休兵」的期待。
但是，這樣的期待其實是不切實際的，也不能作為外交策略的前提。雖然中共願意讓副總統當選人蕭萬長參加博鰲會議，並舉行歷史性的胡蕭會，立場上更展現出前所罕見的彈性，可這樣的彈性未必能見諸外交領域。因為中共一向內外有別，對台灣同胞講話可以軟一些，寬容度可以大一些，但在國際舞台上要接受台灣的主權國家地位，對中共當局來說還是非常困難的。不要說外交部門一向對台立場最為強硬，現在大陸近於義和團式的激烈民族情緒，也會對中共當局造成不能退讓的壓力。
何況，中國經濟崛起後，國際局勢一直朝對中共有利的局面發展，因此中共相信時間站在自己那一邊。儘管為了不刺激台灣鋌而走險尋求獨立，北京必須對路線比較和緩的國民黨政府提供一些鼓勵，才能讓這樣的路線在台灣內部有說服力，但到底願意放鬆到什麼程度、在哪些領域、以什麼方式，目前都還不清楚，也因為收放由人，隨時可以收回，所以不足以依賴，更不能有過多樂觀幻想，否則將對台灣的利益造成危害。
台灣的外交困境源自兩岸力量懸殊及中共堅持零和戰，居於弱勢的我們，必須盡一切努力壯大實力累積籌碼，才能在國際社會有起碼的生存空間與主權地位。遺憾的是這些年外交大搞虛功，為了供元首作秀或替政黨助選，把長年耕耘的外交資源無謂浪擲，還以挑釁的台獨操作耗損國際間對台灣的同情，破壞台美原本緊密的關係。如今馬英九接收的，是片滿目瘡痍的外交荒地，得從頭整地灌溉。雖然台美關係可以很快重建，但與其他國家的關係，卻需要投下更多心力。這次破天荒由拉美專家歐鴻鍊出任外交部長，除了回歸外交專業外，應該也是著眼於我國外交重鎮拉美已經烽火四起，必須緊急救火了。
國際環境與中共政策都非操之在我，因此很難期待外交處境因為政權輪替而出現重大突破，但至少應該要回歸外交正軌，做該做的事，不做不該做的事，以國家整體長遠利益為優先考量，選擇最有利的策略，來維護台灣的生存發展及主權地位。也期盼新政府能重建外交的專業尊嚴，讓外交政策能真正反映台灣二千三百萬人的心聲。
其實，台灣最大的資產在於「價值」。比邦交國，我們當然比不過中共；算票數，離聯合國也還差得遠。但再度政黨輪替的台灣，卻示範了華人社會也可以有如此自由、民主、開放、成熟的文明狀態，這些價值的繼續存在，對世界民主先進國家來說，是非常珍貴而且必須保護的。
台灣通常接觸到的是國際現實的苦澀面，忽略了無形的文明對人類社會的價值，也不懂得如何以此作為行銷台灣的賣點，未來在這方面其實可以多加著墨。因為台灣要維護國際生存，必定需要重要大國的支持，而這些大國的內部民意對決策頗具影響力，當台灣的文明價值得到民意認同時，政府的外交政策也必須作出回應。不少政治領袖決定不參與聖火傳遞或北京奧運開幕式，就是基於民意及輿論壓力，而西藏與中國力量之差距比台灣更大。西藏都可以得到國際同情，台灣當然不能妄自菲薄。
面對崛起的中國，台灣本來政治地位就居弱勢，如今經濟優勢也迅速流失，但不必因此失去自信和鬥志，因為台灣的價值不只在有形的經濟成就，更在無形的文明發展。我們在確認自己存在價值的同時，也應該以嶄新的策略，重新向國際社會行銷台灣這個美麗島。
Thursday, April 24, 2008
Will the Southern Front Disappear into 57 Document Shredders?
Will the Southern Front Disappear into 57 Document Shredders?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 24, 2008
President-elect Ma Ying-jeou will soon be inaugurated. Now in its final days, the outgoing Chen Shui-bian regime is implementing a "Scorched Earth Policy," deliberately leaving a mess for Ma to clean up. The mess includes artificially-low gasoline prices, the Suhua Highway, the Taiwan Goals arms procurement scandal, and the Sunny Bank scandal. The Presidential Office is even rumoured to have purchased 57 document shredders. Having learned from past mistakes, the Legislative Yuan is considering preventive legislation to deal with the transfer of presidential and vice presidential authority.
In fact every aspect of the handover, including those relating to personnel, budgets, policies, and confidential files, is covered by existing laws. The passage of new laws is unnecessary. The bizarre phenomenon taking place is the result of the outgoing Chen regime's refusal to obey the law. It is not the result of inadequate laws. If the outgoing Chen regime violates the law during the handover, it must bear full legal responsibility for its actions. It must not be exempt from prosecution merely because it has already stepped down.
Political appointees come and go depending upon which party is in office. Career civil servants on the other hand are subject to the Civil Service Promotion Act. They may not be arbitarily transferred. Their promotion within the civil service is subject to certain legal standards and procedures. Candidates for promotion must meet strict standards. Candidate promotion rosters must be approved by Candidate Review Boards. If authorities violate the law, they are subject to prosecution. DPP political appointees have illegally appointed relatives and cronies to positions of power. But the punishments meted out to them have been mere slaps on the wrist. The offending officials must not escape punishment. They must pay for their offenses -- with their careers. Civil servants are protected by the law. Therefore they must avoid political controversy and refuse to obey illegal orders from their superiors. Only this can ensure the stability and integrity of the civil service system.
Budgets and policies are two sides of the same coin. The government must formulate policies and draft budgets. It must then get them approved by the Legislative Yuan. Only then can it govern. Furthermore, the Council of Grand Justices considers budgets reviewed and adopted by the Legislative Yuan as "implementations of the law." These implementations must be in accordance with the law. The Budget Act also requires that concerned agencies implement the budget according to plan, on schedule, then evaluate the situation and send their findings to the Legislative Yuan. The budget may not be spent in advance. Any agencies that illegally spend their budgets in advance must be held legally liable.
The State Secrets Protection Act and the Archives Act explicitly define civil servants responsibilities. They must protect and manage official documents when they are transferred to another office, or resign from office. If they deliberately destroy official documents, or fail to destroy them in accordance with proper procedure, they may be criminally liable. The rumour that the Presidential Office has ordered 57 document shredders may be true or false. But if a future review of document numbers reveals files missing for no reason, those responsible will be criminally liable. Chen Shui-bian says his Confidential State Affairs Expenses funded a top secret "Southern Front." Chen Shui-bian says that the archiving of "Southern Front" documents met with the approval of the Council of Grand Justices. If so, the documents are subject to the terms of the aforementioned State Secrets Protection Act and Archives Act. If so, Chen Shui-bian is legally obligated to turn them over to his successor, intact. If they are destroyed, Chen may be criminally liable.
Therefore all aspects of the handover process are subject to legal constraints. The only question is whether the outgoing regime is obeying the law. If the new administration is guilty of illegal activity after taking office, it must be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, especially during the transition period. If it is found guilty of fraud or dereliction of duty, if it illegally bestows favors upon certain parties, or accepts kickbacks, it is guilty of corruption. Prosecutors may then prosecute those involved according to the law.
If the Legislature passes special legislation purely in response to the presidential election and the handover of authority, the constitutionality of this legislation may be challenged. Before the constitution was amended, depriving the legislature the right to approve the president's nominees for Premier, the Council of Grand Justices offered constitutional interpretations 387 and 419. They stressed that the Executive Yuan must answer to the Legislative Yuan. The Executive Yuan is obligated to resign en masse. Following a presidential election however, the Premier's resignation is merely a courtesy resignation. It is merely a method of coping with a political issue, rather than a solution for a constitutional issue. The Grand Justices failed to express an opinion after constitutional amendments deprived the Legislative Yuan of the right to approve the President's choices for Premier. In other words, the transfer of authority should have occurred after the Legislative Elections, not after the Presidential Election. Reckless and ill-considered constitutional amendments have created chaos. If the Legislature passes special legislation specifically in response to the Presidential Election, in response to the transfer of authority, they may add to the confusion, and further tilt the system toward a presidential system.
南線專案會消失在五十七台碎紙機中？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.24 02:58 am
總統當選人馬英九就職之前，陳水扁政權使出「三光政策」，又有油價擺爛，蘇花高突然轉向，及鐽震案、陽信案等不可思議的舉動，甚至傳出總統府添購了五十七台碎紙機。懲前毖後，立法院為此正就總統副總統交接問題制定專法，以為防制。
其實，政府交接的各方面，包括人事、預算、政策以及檔案機密，現行法律皆有規範，實無必要再立什麼專法。現今政府交接之際發生的種種怪現象，皆是現政府不守法的問題，而非法未規範。現政府若在移交時發生差錯，當然須負起法律責任，不會因為下台即了事。
以人事問題而言，政務官隨政黨進退固不待言；常任文官則受「公務人員陞遷法」的規範，不容任意調遷。依該法規定，文官的陞遷有一定的標準和程序，各機關皆須依法定標準編造順序名冊，送審議委員會評定；如辦理人員有違法行為須受懲處。民進黨政務官違法安插親信，懲處於他無關痛癢；但配合辦理的公務員則逃不過懲處，不可賠上自己的前途。文官依法受保障，本來就應避開政治爭議，並拒絕上級的違法命令；亦唯有如此，方能建立政府穩定健全的文官系統。
預算及政策則為一體之兩面。實際運作上，須由政府制定政策，編列預算，再經立法院同意，方得據以執行；且經立法院審議通過的預算，大法官會議認定為「措施性法律」，亦須依法執行。預算法並規定：各機關預算須按計畫和進度實施，並將實際狀況逐級考核送立法院備查，不得提前支用。因此，若確有將預算提前花光的行為，就是違法，應負法律責任。
至於政府檔案機密部分，國家機密保護法及檔案法都有明文規範公務人員於移交、離職時，保護、保管以便完整移交的義務；如有故意銷毀或不依程序銷毀的行為，均須負刑事責任。因此，所謂五十七台碎紙機的傳聞，不論真假，只要將來就文號查對，發現無故失蹤情形，則現今行事者都要負刑事責任。即以陳水扁國務機要費弊案涉及所謂「南線專案」的文件而言，既然陳水扁宣稱已依大法官解釋補核定文號，並向法院要求返還，則顯示已成為前述國家機密保護法及檔案法規範的對象，陳水扁必須原案移交，倘若故意銷毀，依法即須承擔刑事責任。
所以，從政府交接的各方面看來，法律均已有規範，問題只在現政府是否守法而已。倘若未來新政府就職，發現其中涉及不法，當然就要依法究辦。尤其是值此過渡期，若真的發生瀆職舞弊，如違法金援特定機構涉及圖利、購機涉及回扣等等，那更是貪瀆弊案，除了由檢察官依法偵辦，更無其他處置可言。
另外，若真的因總統改選制定交接專法，其在憲政上的意義亦須探討。因為，在修憲刪除立法院對行政院長同意權之前，大法官會議於釋字三八七、四一九號等解釋中，均一再強調行政院向立法院負責，立法院換屆改選，行政院必須總辭；總統改選，行政院長只是禮貌性辭職，如何處理則是政治問題而非憲法問題。但在修憲刪除立法院對行政院長同意權之後，大法官的解釋卻未就此問題再表立場。換言之，政府交接，本來應該是立法院改選後的議題，而非總統改選後的議題；修憲後卻變成曖昧不明。如今，若就總統改選制定交接專法，涉及前述政府換手交接範疇，等於以立法將此不明地帶確定下來，將使憲制進一步朝向總統制傾斜。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 24, 2008
President-elect Ma Ying-jeou will soon be inaugurated. Now in its final days, the outgoing Chen Shui-bian regime is implementing a "Scorched Earth Policy," deliberately leaving a mess for Ma to clean up. The mess includes artificially-low gasoline prices, the Suhua Highway, the Taiwan Goals arms procurement scandal, and the Sunny Bank scandal. The Presidential Office is even rumoured to have purchased 57 document shredders. Having learned from past mistakes, the Legislative Yuan is considering preventive legislation to deal with the transfer of presidential and vice presidential authority.
In fact every aspect of the handover, including those relating to personnel, budgets, policies, and confidential files, is covered by existing laws. The passage of new laws is unnecessary. The bizarre phenomenon taking place is the result of the outgoing Chen regime's refusal to obey the law. It is not the result of inadequate laws. If the outgoing Chen regime violates the law during the handover, it must bear full legal responsibility for its actions. It must not be exempt from prosecution merely because it has already stepped down.
Political appointees come and go depending upon which party is in office. Career civil servants on the other hand are subject to the Civil Service Promotion Act. They may not be arbitarily transferred. Their promotion within the civil service is subject to certain legal standards and procedures. Candidates for promotion must meet strict standards. Candidate promotion rosters must be approved by Candidate Review Boards. If authorities violate the law, they are subject to prosecution. DPP political appointees have illegally appointed relatives and cronies to positions of power. But the punishments meted out to them have been mere slaps on the wrist. The offending officials must not escape punishment. They must pay for their offenses -- with their careers. Civil servants are protected by the law. Therefore they must avoid political controversy and refuse to obey illegal orders from their superiors. Only this can ensure the stability and integrity of the civil service system.
Budgets and policies are two sides of the same coin. The government must formulate policies and draft budgets. It must then get them approved by the Legislative Yuan. Only then can it govern. Furthermore, the Council of Grand Justices considers budgets reviewed and adopted by the Legislative Yuan as "implementations of the law." These implementations must be in accordance with the law. The Budget Act also requires that concerned agencies implement the budget according to plan, on schedule, then evaluate the situation and send their findings to the Legislative Yuan. The budget may not be spent in advance. Any agencies that illegally spend their budgets in advance must be held legally liable.
The State Secrets Protection Act and the Archives Act explicitly define civil servants responsibilities. They must protect and manage official documents when they are transferred to another office, or resign from office. If they deliberately destroy official documents, or fail to destroy them in accordance with proper procedure, they may be criminally liable. The rumour that the Presidential Office has ordered 57 document shredders may be true or false. But if a future review of document numbers reveals files missing for no reason, those responsible will be criminally liable. Chen Shui-bian says his Confidential State Affairs Expenses funded a top secret "Southern Front." Chen Shui-bian says that the archiving of "Southern Front" documents met with the approval of the Council of Grand Justices. If so, the documents are subject to the terms of the aforementioned State Secrets Protection Act and Archives Act. If so, Chen Shui-bian is legally obligated to turn them over to his successor, intact. If they are destroyed, Chen may be criminally liable.
Therefore all aspects of the handover process are subject to legal constraints. The only question is whether the outgoing regime is obeying the law. If the new administration is guilty of illegal activity after taking office, it must be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, especially during the transition period. If it is found guilty of fraud or dereliction of duty, if it illegally bestows favors upon certain parties, or accepts kickbacks, it is guilty of corruption. Prosecutors may then prosecute those involved according to the law.
If the Legislature passes special legislation purely in response to the presidential election and the handover of authority, the constitutionality of this legislation may be challenged. Before the constitution was amended, depriving the legislature the right to approve the president's nominees for Premier, the Council of Grand Justices offered constitutional interpretations 387 and 419. They stressed that the Executive Yuan must answer to the Legislative Yuan. The Executive Yuan is obligated to resign en masse. Following a presidential election however, the Premier's resignation is merely a courtesy resignation. It is merely a method of coping with a political issue, rather than a solution for a constitutional issue. The Grand Justices failed to express an opinion after constitutional amendments deprived the Legislative Yuan of the right to approve the President's choices for Premier. In other words, the transfer of authority should have occurred after the Legislative Elections, not after the Presidential Election. Reckless and ill-considered constitutional amendments have created chaos. If the Legislature passes special legislation specifically in response to the Presidential Election, in response to the transfer of authority, they may add to the confusion, and further tilt the system toward a presidential system.
南線專案會消失在五十七台碎紙機中？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.24 02:58 am
總統當選人馬英九就職之前，陳水扁政權使出「三光政策」，又有油價擺爛，蘇花高突然轉向，及鐽震案、陽信案等不可思議的舉動，甚至傳出總統府添購了五十七台碎紙機。懲前毖後，立法院為此正就總統副總統交接問題制定專法，以為防制。
其實，政府交接的各方面，包括人事、預算、政策以及檔案機密，現行法律皆有規範，實無必要再立什麼專法。現今政府交接之際發生的種種怪現象，皆是現政府不守法的問題，而非法未規範。現政府若在移交時發生差錯，當然須負起法律責任，不會因為下台即了事。
以人事問題而言，政務官隨政黨進退固不待言；常任文官則受「公務人員陞遷法」的規範，不容任意調遷。依該法規定，文官的陞遷有一定的標準和程序，各機關皆須依法定標準編造順序名冊，送審議委員會評定；如辦理人員有違法行為須受懲處。民進黨政務官違法安插親信，懲處於他無關痛癢；但配合辦理的公務員則逃不過懲處，不可賠上自己的前途。文官依法受保障，本來就應避開政治爭議，並拒絕上級的違法命令；亦唯有如此，方能建立政府穩定健全的文官系統。
預算及政策則為一體之兩面。實際運作上，須由政府制定政策，編列預算，再經立法院同意，方得據以執行；且經立法院審議通過的預算，大法官會議認定為「措施性法律」，亦須依法執行。預算法並規定：各機關預算須按計畫和進度實施，並將實際狀況逐級考核送立法院備查，不得提前支用。因此，若確有將預算提前花光的行為，就是違法，應負法律責任。
至於政府檔案機密部分，國家機密保護法及檔案法都有明文規範公務人員於移交、離職時，保護、保管以便完整移交的義務；如有故意銷毀或不依程序銷毀的行為，均須負刑事責任。因此，所謂五十七台碎紙機的傳聞，不論真假，只要將來就文號查對，發現無故失蹤情形，則現今行事者都要負刑事責任。即以陳水扁國務機要費弊案涉及所謂「南線專案」的文件而言，既然陳水扁宣稱已依大法官解釋補核定文號，並向法院要求返還，則顯示已成為前述國家機密保護法及檔案法規範的對象，陳水扁必須原案移交，倘若故意銷毀，依法即須承擔刑事責任。
所以，從政府交接的各方面看來，法律均已有規範，問題只在現政府是否守法而已。倘若未來新政府就職，發現其中涉及不法，當然就要依法究辦。尤其是值此過渡期，若真的發生瀆職舞弊，如違法金援特定機構涉及圖利、購機涉及回扣等等，那更是貪瀆弊案，除了由檢察官依法偵辦，更無其他處置可言。
另外，若真的因總統改選制定交接專法，其在憲政上的意義亦須探討。因為，在修憲刪除立法院對行政院長同意權之前，大法官會議於釋字三八七、四一九號等解釋中，均一再強調行政院向立法院負責，立法院換屆改選，行政院必須總辭；總統改選，行政院長只是禮貌性辭職，如何處理則是政治問題而非憲法問題。但在修憲刪除立法院對行政院長同意權之後，大法官的解釋卻未就此問題再表立場。換言之，政府交接，本來應該是立法院改選後的議題，而非總統改選後的議題；修憲後卻變成曖昧不明。如今，若就總統改選制定交接專法，涉及前述政府換手交接範疇，等於以立法將此不明地帶確定下來，將使憲制進一步朝向總統制傾斜。
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
The 1992 Consensus: One Consensus, Two Interpretations?
The 1992 Consensus: One Consensus, Two Interpretations?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 23, 2008
During the Hu/Siew Summit at the Boao Forum, Vincent Siew proposed that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait "confront reality, create a better future, set aside differences, and seek a win/win scenario." Hu Jintao made no mention of the One China Principle. He didn't even mention his joint statement with George W. Bush regarding the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.
On the following day, during the Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Round Table, the Beijing Ministry of Commerce issued a press release mentioning the One-China Principle. Two hours later, Xinhua deleted the term from its news coverage. The Ministry of Commerce also removed the term from its website. Such developments suggest that differences over the One China Principle have been set aside. During a press conference State Council Office for Taiwan Affairs spokesman Li Weiyi told reporters that cross-strait relations "rested on the foundation of the 1992 Consensus."
The situation is somewhat chaotic. Have the two sides set aside their differences or not? If they have, have even the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations been set aside as well? Hu Jintao made no mention of the 1992 Consensus during the Hu/Siew Summit. Does that mean it has been set aside too? A few days later, the State Council Office of Taiwan Affairs mentioned the 1992 Consensus. Does that mean the 1992 Consensus is synonymous with One China, Different Interpretations? Are the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Expressions synonymous with "setting aside differences?" Was the disappearance of the One-China Principle from the Boao press temporary? If it appears again, does that mean the One China Principle is equivalent to the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations? Different Expressions does not negate One China. It merely notes that each side defines and understands "One China" differently.
The 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations seems to be in a tug of war with "setting aside differences." Hu Jintao failed to mention the 1992 Consensus or One China, Different Interpretations during the Boao Forum. But the One-China Principle was added to a press release afterwards. If this is what "setting aside differences" means, it is disingenuous, and may lead to problems down the line. This is not setting aside differences. This is sweeping them under the rug.
By contrast, the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations is a much better way of setting aside differences. On the one hand, the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations can be considered synonymous with "setting aside differences." On the other hand, the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations does not sweep differences under the rug. Instead, it incorporates both views. If the two sides have gone from affirming the 1992 Consensus to setting aside the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations, then that is sweeping differences under the rug, then that is a step back, not a step forward.
The Ma administration must be alert to the risks involved. It must not engage in self-deception. A better approach is to stick to the 1992 Consensus, to reinforce the 1992 Consensus and to stress Different Interpretations. The Ma administration must equate the One-China Principle with the 1992 Consensus and Different Interpretations. Only then can it set aside and resolve differences rather than cover them up. Only then can it avoid the risk of self-deception and eventual catastrophe.
The Ma administration and the Beijing authorities are attempting to reaffirm the legitimacy of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. They must also consolidate public support for the 1992 Consensus and for One China, Different Interpretations. A decade ago Lee Teng-hui was wallowing in "black gold" corruption and wilfully destroying the ROC Constitution. The DPP followed suit by forcing everyone into a simplistic "Loving Taiwan vs. Betraying Taiwan" dichotomy. The term "Republic of China" nearly became a dirty word. Candidates at KMT rallies dared not emphasize the formal name of the country or wave the national flag. The DPP had arrogated to itself the right to define the ethnic and national identity of the Chinese people on Taiwan. The DPP's Rectification of Names campaign, Anti-Chiang Purges, insults to Chiang's memory, demolition of Chiang's plaques, Join the UN Plebiscites, selective 228-oriented reading of history, and attempts to stuff the Republic of China down an Orwellian "Memory Hole" have left the nation prostrate and bleeding.
The Ma administration must make a commitment. It must identify with the Republic of China and heal the artificially-concocted "ethnic" and "national" divisions created by the Taiwan independence movement. Only by rehabilitating the Republic of China, can it properly defend One China, Different Interpretations and deal with its ramifications. The One-China Principle must include the Different Interpretations clause. The Ma administration must not treat the Republic of China as it has in the past, as Original Sin. It must not bob and weave. It must not attempt to muddle through. It must find the courage to reaffirm the moral and political legitimacy of the Republic of China. If it fails to do so, the public will not support the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. In that case, how can the Ma administration possibly expect Beijing to respect and abide by its terms?
Cross-strait relations must not be reduced to empty lip service. Any differences to be set aside must be set aside under the terms of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.
兩種不同的戰略：九二共識與擱置爭議
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.23 02:53 am
博鰲論壇胡蕭會，蕭萬長當著胡錦濤的面提出「十六字箴言」：「正視現實，開創未來，擱置爭議，追求雙贏。」胡錦濤則非但未提「一個中國原則」，亦未論及他在布胡熱線中說過的「九二共識」或「一中各表」。
但在次日的兩岸經貿圓桌會議後，北京商務部發表新聞稿，竟出現了「在一個中國的原則下」等語；兩小時後，新華社的報導又取消了這句話，商務部的網站也刪除此語。這麼一進一出之間，彷彿「一個中國原則」已成「被擱置的爭議」。然而，又隔幾天，國台辦發言人李維一在記者會中，卻又提及「在九二共識的基礎上」。
這是一個有點渾沌的情勢。兩岸當局是否已有「擱置爭議」的共識？若有，是否連「九二共識」及「一中各表」的「爭議」皆要「擱置」？胡錦濤在胡蕭會中未提「九二共識」，是否就是「擱置」的徵兆？不過，隔幾天國台辦何以又再提「九二共識」？那麼，「九二共識」是否已是「一中各表」的同位詞？而「九二共識」及「一中各表」，是否即是「擱置爭議」或「爭議已擱置」的同義表述？再者，「一個中國的原則」是否只是在博鰲新聞稿中暫時消失而已？倘若另日再出現，則未來的「一個中國原則」，是否也已包括了「九二共識／一中各表」？因為「各表」並未否定「一中」，只是對「一中」的認知與定義不同而已。
現在的情勢，彷彿是在「九二共識／一中各表」與「擱置爭議」之間出現拉鋸。我們認為：博鰲論壇未聞胡錦濤提起「九二共識」或「一中各表」，事後又更改了出現「一中原則」的新聞稿，這若就是所謂的「擱置爭議」，即未免太過權謀與矯情，將會為兩岸未來隱伏更多的危機。這不是「處理爭議」的正確方法，而只是以權謀手段「掩蓋爭議」而已。
相對而言，「九二共識／一中各表」，則較「擱置爭議」具建設性及發展性。一方面，如前所述，「九二共識／一中各表」原即可視為「擱置爭議」的同義表述；但另一方面，「九二共識／一中各表」卻未「掩蓋爭議」，而是一種「包容爭議」的表述方式。準此以論，兩岸當局若從「九二共識」轉入連「九二共識／一中各表」都被「擱置」或「掩蓋」的地步，這是倒退，而不是進步。
馬政府應當警覺「擱置爭議」的風險，不能因「擱置爭議」而自欺欺人。比較正確的做法是：固守「九二共識」的底線，並加強「九二共識」與其潛台詞「一中各表」的聯結，再努力建立「一中原則」與「九二共識／一中各表」的相容性。這樣才能在「擱置爭議」中，同時也「包容了爭議」、「處理了爭議」，庶不至於「掩蓋爭議」，而使台灣陷於「騙／養／套／殺」的風險。
此外，馬政府在與北京當局設法建立「九二共識／一中各表」的同時，亦須對內進行「九二共識／一中各表」的說服，以取得較穩固的社會支持。在十餘年前到大約四五年前，由於李登輝的黑金毀憲，及民進黨操作的「愛台／賣台」風潮，「中華民國」一度幾乎成為恥辱及不義的符號，連國民黨的集會與候選人也不敢標舉國號及國旗；又由於民進黨一度強勢主導了「國家及族群的詮釋權」，正名制憲、去蔣、鞭屍、拆匾、入聯公投、泛二二八史觀、去中華民國化，更使中華民國的國家認同創傷累累。
未來，馬政府應致力於中華民國的國家認同及族群關係的修補；唯有內部能將「中華民國認同」趨於穩固，始有操作「一中各表」甚至「一中原則」的主觀條件（「一中原則」應當亦不排斥「一中各表」）。馬政府倘若仍如過去那般簡直視「中華民國」為禁忌話題，能躲就躲，得過且過，未能在國民心理深處加強中華民國的合理性與正當性，則「九二共識／一中各表」將連台灣內部的基礎亦不穩固，遑論欲使北京當局尊重及遵守「九二共識／一中各表」？
兩岸情勢發展至今日地步，不宜倒退到一句更加虛無縹緲的「擱置爭議」；若要「擱置」，也應「擱置」在「九二共識／一中各表」之上。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 23, 2008
During the Hu/Siew Summit at the Boao Forum, Vincent Siew proposed that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait "confront reality, create a better future, set aside differences, and seek a win/win scenario." Hu Jintao made no mention of the One China Principle. He didn't even mention his joint statement with George W. Bush regarding the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.
On the following day, during the Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Round Table, the Beijing Ministry of Commerce issued a press release mentioning the One-China Principle. Two hours later, Xinhua deleted the term from its news coverage. The Ministry of Commerce also removed the term from its website. Such developments suggest that differences over the One China Principle have been set aside. During a press conference State Council Office for Taiwan Affairs spokesman Li Weiyi told reporters that cross-strait relations "rested on the foundation of the 1992 Consensus."
The situation is somewhat chaotic. Have the two sides set aside their differences or not? If they have, have even the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations been set aside as well? Hu Jintao made no mention of the 1992 Consensus during the Hu/Siew Summit. Does that mean it has been set aside too? A few days later, the State Council Office of Taiwan Affairs mentioned the 1992 Consensus. Does that mean the 1992 Consensus is synonymous with One China, Different Interpretations? Are the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Expressions synonymous with "setting aside differences?" Was the disappearance of the One-China Principle from the Boao press temporary? If it appears again, does that mean the One China Principle is equivalent to the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations? Different Expressions does not negate One China. It merely notes that each side defines and understands "One China" differently.
The 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations seems to be in a tug of war with "setting aside differences." Hu Jintao failed to mention the 1992 Consensus or One China, Different Interpretations during the Boao Forum. But the One-China Principle was added to a press release afterwards. If this is what "setting aside differences" means, it is disingenuous, and may lead to problems down the line. This is not setting aside differences. This is sweeping them under the rug.
By contrast, the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations is a much better way of setting aside differences. On the one hand, the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations can be considered synonymous with "setting aside differences." On the other hand, the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations does not sweep differences under the rug. Instead, it incorporates both views. If the two sides have gone from affirming the 1992 Consensus to setting aside the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations, then that is sweeping differences under the rug, then that is a step back, not a step forward.
The Ma administration must be alert to the risks involved. It must not engage in self-deception. A better approach is to stick to the 1992 Consensus, to reinforce the 1992 Consensus and to stress Different Interpretations. The Ma administration must equate the One-China Principle with the 1992 Consensus and Different Interpretations. Only then can it set aside and resolve differences rather than cover them up. Only then can it avoid the risk of self-deception and eventual catastrophe.
The Ma administration and the Beijing authorities are attempting to reaffirm the legitimacy of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. They must also consolidate public support for the 1992 Consensus and for One China, Different Interpretations. A decade ago Lee Teng-hui was wallowing in "black gold" corruption and wilfully destroying the ROC Constitution. The DPP followed suit by forcing everyone into a simplistic "Loving Taiwan vs. Betraying Taiwan" dichotomy. The term "Republic of China" nearly became a dirty word. Candidates at KMT rallies dared not emphasize the formal name of the country or wave the national flag. The DPP had arrogated to itself the right to define the ethnic and national identity of the Chinese people on Taiwan. The DPP's Rectification of Names campaign, Anti-Chiang Purges, insults to Chiang's memory, demolition of Chiang's plaques, Join the UN Plebiscites, selective 228-oriented reading of history, and attempts to stuff the Republic of China down an Orwellian "Memory Hole" have left the nation prostrate and bleeding.
The Ma administration must make a commitment. It must identify with the Republic of China and heal the artificially-concocted "ethnic" and "national" divisions created by the Taiwan independence movement. Only by rehabilitating the Republic of China, can it properly defend One China, Different Interpretations and deal with its ramifications. The One-China Principle must include the Different Interpretations clause. The Ma administration must not treat the Republic of China as it has in the past, as Original Sin. It must not bob and weave. It must not attempt to muddle through. It must find the courage to reaffirm the moral and political legitimacy of the Republic of China. If it fails to do so, the public will not support the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. In that case, how can the Ma administration possibly expect Beijing to respect and abide by its terms?
Cross-strait relations must not be reduced to empty lip service. Any differences to be set aside must be set aside under the terms of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.
兩種不同的戰略：九二共識與擱置爭議
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.23 02:53 am
博鰲論壇胡蕭會，蕭萬長當著胡錦濤的面提出「十六字箴言」：「正視現實，開創未來，擱置爭議，追求雙贏。」胡錦濤則非但未提「一個中國原則」，亦未論及他在布胡熱線中說過的「九二共識」或「一中各表」。
但在次日的兩岸經貿圓桌會議後，北京商務部發表新聞稿，竟出現了「在一個中國的原則下」等語；兩小時後，新華社的報導又取消了這句話，商務部的網站也刪除此語。這麼一進一出之間，彷彿「一個中國原則」已成「被擱置的爭議」。然而，又隔幾天，國台辦發言人李維一在記者會中，卻又提及「在九二共識的基礎上」。
這是一個有點渾沌的情勢。兩岸當局是否已有「擱置爭議」的共識？若有，是否連「九二共識」及「一中各表」的「爭議」皆要「擱置」？胡錦濤在胡蕭會中未提「九二共識」，是否就是「擱置」的徵兆？不過，隔幾天國台辦何以又再提「九二共識」？那麼，「九二共識」是否已是「一中各表」的同位詞？而「九二共識」及「一中各表」，是否即是「擱置爭議」或「爭議已擱置」的同義表述？再者，「一個中國的原則」是否只是在博鰲新聞稿中暫時消失而已？倘若另日再出現，則未來的「一個中國原則」，是否也已包括了「九二共識／一中各表」？因為「各表」並未否定「一中」，只是對「一中」的認知與定義不同而已。
現在的情勢，彷彿是在「九二共識／一中各表」與「擱置爭議」之間出現拉鋸。我們認為：博鰲論壇未聞胡錦濤提起「九二共識」或「一中各表」，事後又更改了出現「一中原則」的新聞稿，這若就是所謂的「擱置爭議」，即未免太過權謀與矯情，將會為兩岸未來隱伏更多的危機。這不是「處理爭議」的正確方法，而只是以權謀手段「掩蓋爭議」而已。
相對而言，「九二共識／一中各表」，則較「擱置爭議」具建設性及發展性。一方面，如前所述，「九二共識／一中各表」原即可視為「擱置爭議」的同義表述；但另一方面，「九二共識／一中各表」卻未「掩蓋爭議」，而是一種「包容爭議」的表述方式。準此以論，兩岸當局若從「九二共識」轉入連「九二共識／一中各表」都被「擱置」或「掩蓋」的地步，這是倒退，而不是進步。
馬政府應當警覺「擱置爭議」的風險，不能因「擱置爭議」而自欺欺人。比較正確的做法是：固守「九二共識」的底線，並加強「九二共識」與其潛台詞「一中各表」的聯結，再努力建立「一中原則」與「九二共識／一中各表」的相容性。這樣才能在「擱置爭議」中，同時也「包容了爭議」、「處理了爭議」，庶不至於「掩蓋爭議」，而使台灣陷於「騙／養／套／殺」的風險。
此外，馬政府在與北京當局設法建立「九二共識／一中各表」的同時，亦須對內進行「九二共識／一中各表」的說服，以取得較穩固的社會支持。在十餘年前到大約四五年前，由於李登輝的黑金毀憲，及民進黨操作的「愛台／賣台」風潮，「中華民國」一度幾乎成為恥辱及不義的符號，連國民黨的集會與候選人也不敢標舉國號及國旗；又由於民進黨一度強勢主導了「國家及族群的詮釋權」，正名制憲、去蔣、鞭屍、拆匾、入聯公投、泛二二八史觀、去中華民國化，更使中華民國的國家認同創傷累累。
未來，馬政府應致力於中華民國的國家認同及族群關係的修補；唯有內部能將「中華民國認同」趨於穩固，始有操作「一中各表」甚至「一中原則」的主觀條件（「一中原則」應當亦不排斥「一中各表」）。馬政府倘若仍如過去那般簡直視「中華民國」為禁忌話題，能躲就躲，得過且過，未能在國民心理深處加強中華民國的合理性與正當性，則「九二共識／一中各表」將連台灣內部的基礎亦不穩固，遑論欲使北京當局尊重及遵守「九二共識／一中各表」？
兩岸情勢發展至今日地步，不宜倒退到一句更加虛無縹緲的「擱置爭議」；若要「擱置」，也應「擱置」在「九二共識／一中各表」之上。
Tuesday, April 22, 2008
New Faces, New Thinking
New Faces, New Thinking
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 22, 2008
Incoming Premier Liu Chao-shiuan has just announced his first round of cabinet appointments. One can already guess what people are going to say about the appointments. Skeptics will say "old wine in old bottles," "nothing new," and "gerontocracy." Supporters on the other hand will say "tried and true," "the older the wine, the richer the bouquet," and "old hands know the ropes."
The first wave of cabinet appointments has been announced. Whether they were judicious choices or not, we don't know. We can only render a final verdict after the new cabinet has been in operation for a while and has accumulated a performance record.
The outstanding characteristic of the new cabinet is stability. Its defect, if any, is its lack of surprises. Let's talk about the incoming administration's cabinet appointments, beginning with Ma Ying-jeou's choice of Vincent Siew as his Vice Presidential running mate. When we look at Vincent Siew, we can't help thinking of Annette Lu. Siew's recent activities have inspired commentators to refer to him as a "quasi-president/quasi-premier." They even wonder whether he has overstepped his authority. Annette Lu, by contrast, was shackled for eight years by two words: "replacement president." This turned her into a "woman spurned," of which hell hath no fury. Let's contrast Liu Chao-shiuan with Chen Shui-bian's six Premiers. Tang Fei was appointed Premier because Chen needed a Blue camp leader for appearances. He was followed by Chang, Yu, Hsieh and Su, and Chang a second time. Again, for the sake of appearances. On the other hand, look at the SEF's Chiang Pin-kung. Contrast him with Chang Chun-hsiung and Hong Chi-chang, with Minister of Economic Affairs Yin Chi-ming, or with Chung Tsai-yi and Huang Ying-shan. Besides, the Chen Shui-bian government often appointed a figurehead as chief. The real "power behind the throne" was often his deputy. Contrast the past with the present. The incoming Ma administration's first wave of cabinet appointments are about substance and stability. The outgoing Chen regime's assignments were all about perception and novelty.
Vincent Siew is more stable than Annette Lu. Chung Tsai-yi is more novel than Yin Chi-ming. The roster of candidates for the Liu cabinet did not contain a single name that could be considered novel. Conversely not one of the Liu cabinet's appointments will disappoint the public when it comes to job performance. In other words: the Liu cabinet is not about new faces, it is all about new thinking.
When one looks at the new cabinet, one experiences a sense of deja vu. Much of the Liu cabinet served in the Lee Teng-hui administration. One could say that these people shared something in common -- they were all removed from office eight years ago. But most people would say this KMT elite was undermined by Lee Teng-hui's "black gold" corruption, by his concerted effort to destroy the ROC Constitution, and by his economically-suicidal cross-strait policy. Now, having endured eight years of hardship, the same faces have reappeared. They have been tempered by defeat, by being in the opposition. Can this new leadership adopt new thinking and lead the nation to a rebirth? That is the question the incoming Ma government must answer.
Lee Teng-hui undermined an entire generation of KMT elites. He also inflicted deep wounds on the nation. Now, eight years later, Ma Ying-jeou is giving these elites a new lease on life, a second chance to use their talent to save the nation in its hour of distress. The world will witness this historical paradox. Different leaders with different thinking, leading the same faces. Will they bring order to chaos? Turn defeat into victory?
Actually Ma Ying-jeou's past appointments did not fit neatly inside the box. They could be considered both orthodox and novel at the same time. Yeh Chin-chuan, Ou Ching-teh, Pai Hsiu-hsiung could be considered orthodox appointments. Ching Pu-tsung, Lung Ying-tai, Cheng Chun-chi could be consider novel appointments. The composition of the Liu cabinet appears to be orthodox rather than novel. Financial and economic appointments are at the core of the new administration. Yesterday two political appointees with financial backgrounds were announced. This represents orthodox thinking. Meanwhile, the appointment of Wang Ching-feng as Minister of Justice, of Wang Ju-hsuan as Chairperson for the Council of Labor Affairs, represent innovative thinking. This has become a topic of considerable discussion. The first impression the new cabinet gives is that it is stable but not entirely lacking in novelty.
It is often said that the KMT is loaded with talent. But the new cabinet leaves the impression of a discontinuity in leadership. The first wave of appointments yesterday left the Treasury, the Ministry of Defense, and the Mainland Affairs Council vacant. The Minister of Education in particular has attracted the attention of the public. The Minister of Education has yet to be announced. Work awaits, but talent is hard to find. Only when one is about to charge, does one realize one is short of experienced generals. This may be the greatest difficulty the incoming Ma/Siew administration faces.
The Ma administration faces an arduous challenge. It must bring a nation back from the dead. No one knows whether the team announced yesterday is up to the task. For the past decade, beginning with the Lee Teng-hiu regime and ending with the Chen Shui-bian regime, the machinery of government has been an instrument of political infighting and electioneering. Not only did the government cease to function, the two major parties sacrifice their Best and Brightest. We have no desire to criticize individual cabinet appointees. But we have high hopes for the new team's promise of "integrity, professionalism, and perseverance leading to equality and the rebirth of Taiwan."
The cabinet may be chosen by those in power. But whether the cabinet has governed successfully will be decided by the general public.
少見新面孔，盼有新思維！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.22 02:42 am
劉兆玄內閣首波人事發表，閉起眼睛也知評價如何。質疑者一定說，「舊瓶舊酒」、「了無新意」、「老人內閣」等等；支持者則會說，「穩健比新奇重要」、「酒愈陳愈香」、「老馬識途」、「馬上上路」云云。
然而，如今內閣首波名單已經公布，無論是祝福者或詛咒者，一切都要等待新閣實際運作後始能就其政績表現再作定論。
新閣的特質是「穩健」，缺陷是不夠「新奇」。新政府的人事布局，也許可從馬英九提名蕭萬長為副總統搭檔談起。看見蕭萬長，想到呂秀蓮。蕭近日表現活躍，被稱作「半個總統／半個閣揆」，甚至已有是否僭越的質疑；呂秀蓮則被「備位元首」四字壓在五指山下，作了八年的「深宮怨婦」。再將劉兆玄與扁政府六位閣揆比較，唐飛是因扁的「政治操作」所需而出任閣揆，接下來的張、游、謝、蘇、張，則亦無一不是以「政治操作」見長。再看海基會的江丙坤，也可與張俊雄及洪奇昌比較。至於經濟部長尹啟銘，亦與宗才怡、黃營杉不屬同一類型。除此，扁政府更常有「正首長」為「虛」，「副首長」為「實」的兩手操作。今昔對比，馬政府的首波人事，似以「實／穩」為標尺，扁政府則較多「虛／奇」的布局。
蕭萬長比呂秀蓮「穩健」，宗才怡比尹啟銘「新奇」。劉內閣名單既無令人眼睛一亮的「新奇」可言，就絕對不可在未來政務表現的「穩健」上令致國人失望。換句話說：劉內閣雖不是新面孔，但必須有新思維。
看新閣名單，確實令人有時光倒流的感覺。劉內閣的主幹皆曾在李登輝政府任職，或謂其實這些人皆應共同承擔八年前「失去政權」的「共業」；不過，一般認為，當年國民黨的菁英，是被李登輝「黑金毀憲」及錯謬的兩岸政策所誤。如今，穿越八年的滄桑變化，幾乎同樣的一批面孔，經歷失敗下野的錘鍊後，能否在新的領導及新的思維中，帶領國家新生再起，已是馬政府必須面對的嚴峻考驗。
李登輝毀了國民黨一代菁英，也使國家創鉅痛深；如今，馬英九在八年後從廢墟中尋找堪用之材，看看能否重建一代菁英的尊榮，進而挽救台灣於危境險地。世人將可從這一歷史弔詭中共同見證：不一樣的領導與思維，帶領同樣面孔的官員，能否出現治亂成敗截然不同的執政表現？
觀察馬英九過去的人事運作，其實也是不拘一格，可謂是「奇正互用」。葉金川、歐晉德、白秀雄等，可謂正著；而金溥聰、龍應台、鄭村棋等，則是奇招。但是，此次劉內閣的結構，卻似有「寧正勿奇」的思維；以財經小內閣為核心主體（昨日發布的兩名政務委員亦皆是財經背景），這是「正」的考量；然後始在法務部長王清峰、勞委會主委王如玄等員額上設法暈染一些「奇」的色彩，但這也成為昨日名單中較滋議論的部分。新閣給人的第一印象是：形格勢禁所以「求穩健」，籌碼不足所以「無新奇」。
常聞「國民黨人才濟濟」，但如今新閣組建過程所呈現的卻是「青黃不接」。昨日發布的首波名單中，財政部長、國防部長、陸委會主委等皆尚虛懸，尤其眾所矚目的教育部長亦未出爐。百政待舉，良才難覓；聞鼙鼓而思良將，這或許正是馬蕭劉當局現今的感慨吧。
馬政府面對的是一個要將國家起死回生的艱鉅工程，無人預知昨日發布的團隊能否膺此重任。過去十餘年，自李登輝末期至陳水扁八年，整個政府幾乎淪為政爭工具及選舉機器，非但國政失敗，也斷送了兩黨整代的政治菁英；現在，我們不想對內閣名單的個別人選品頭論足，但對新閣標榜的「廉能、專業，新團隊；永續、均富，新台灣」寄以期待。
畢竟，內閣名單由主政者決定，但對內閣未來執政成敗的評價卻是由民意及輿論決定。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 22, 2008
Incoming Premier Liu Chao-shiuan has just announced his first round of cabinet appointments. One can already guess what people are going to say about the appointments. Skeptics will say "old wine in old bottles," "nothing new," and "gerontocracy." Supporters on the other hand will say "tried and true," "the older the wine, the richer the bouquet," and "old hands know the ropes."
The first wave of cabinet appointments has been announced. Whether they were judicious choices or not, we don't know. We can only render a final verdict after the new cabinet has been in operation for a while and has accumulated a performance record.
The outstanding characteristic of the new cabinet is stability. Its defect, if any, is its lack of surprises. Let's talk about the incoming administration's cabinet appointments, beginning with Ma Ying-jeou's choice of Vincent Siew as his Vice Presidential running mate. When we look at Vincent Siew, we can't help thinking of Annette Lu. Siew's recent activities have inspired commentators to refer to him as a "quasi-president/quasi-premier." They even wonder whether he has overstepped his authority. Annette Lu, by contrast, was shackled for eight years by two words: "replacement president." This turned her into a "woman spurned," of which hell hath no fury. Let's contrast Liu Chao-shiuan with Chen Shui-bian's six Premiers. Tang Fei was appointed Premier because Chen needed a Blue camp leader for appearances. He was followed by Chang, Yu, Hsieh and Su, and Chang a second time. Again, for the sake of appearances. On the other hand, look at the SEF's Chiang Pin-kung. Contrast him with Chang Chun-hsiung and Hong Chi-chang, with Minister of Economic Affairs Yin Chi-ming, or with Chung Tsai-yi and Huang Ying-shan. Besides, the Chen Shui-bian government often appointed a figurehead as chief. The real "power behind the throne" was often his deputy. Contrast the past with the present. The incoming Ma administration's first wave of cabinet appointments are about substance and stability. The outgoing Chen regime's assignments were all about perception and novelty.
Vincent Siew is more stable than Annette Lu. Chung Tsai-yi is more novel than Yin Chi-ming. The roster of candidates for the Liu cabinet did not contain a single name that could be considered novel. Conversely not one of the Liu cabinet's appointments will disappoint the public when it comes to job performance. In other words: the Liu cabinet is not about new faces, it is all about new thinking.
When one looks at the new cabinet, one experiences a sense of deja vu. Much of the Liu cabinet served in the Lee Teng-hui administration. One could say that these people shared something in common -- they were all removed from office eight years ago. But most people would say this KMT elite was undermined by Lee Teng-hui's "black gold" corruption, by his concerted effort to destroy the ROC Constitution, and by his economically-suicidal cross-strait policy. Now, having endured eight years of hardship, the same faces have reappeared. They have been tempered by defeat, by being in the opposition. Can this new leadership adopt new thinking and lead the nation to a rebirth? That is the question the incoming Ma government must answer.
Lee Teng-hui undermined an entire generation of KMT elites. He also inflicted deep wounds on the nation. Now, eight years later, Ma Ying-jeou is giving these elites a new lease on life, a second chance to use their talent to save the nation in its hour of distress. The world will witness this historical paradox. Different leaders with different thinking, leading the same faces. Will they bring order to chaos? Turn defeat into victory?
Actually Ma Ying-jeou's past appointments did not fit neatly inside the box. They could be considered both orthodox and novel at the same time. Yeh Chin-chuan, Ou Ching-teh, Pai Hsiu-hsiung could be considered orthodox appointments. Ching Pu-tsung, Lung Ying-tai, Cheng Chun-chi could be consider novel appointments. The composition of the Liu cabinet appears to be orthodox rather than novel. Financial and economic appointments are at the core of the new administration. Yesterday two political appointees with financial backgrounds were announced. This represents orthodox thinking. Meanwhile, the appointment of Wang Ching-feng as Minister of Justice, of Wang Ju-hsuan as Chairperson for the Council of Labor Affairs, represent innovative thinking. This has become a topic of considerable discussion. The first impression the new cabinet gives is that it is stable but not entirely lacking in novelty.
It is often said that the KMT is loaded with talent. But the new cabinet leaves the impression of a discontinuity in leadership. The first wave of appointments yesterday left the Treasury, the Ministry of Defense, and the Mainland Affairs Council vacant. The Minister of Education in particular has attracted the attention of the public. The Minister of Education has yet to be announced. Work awaits, but talent is hard to find. Only when one is about to charge, does one realize one is short of experienced generals. This may be the greatest difficulty the incoming Ma/Siew administration faces.
The Ma administration faces an arduous challenge. It must bring a nation back from the dead. No one knows whether the team announced yesterday is up to the task. For the past decade, beginning with the Lee Teng-hiu regime and ending with the Chen Shui-bian regime, the machinery of government has been an instrument of political infighting and electioneering. Not only did the government cease to function, the two major parties sacrifice their Best and Brightest. We have no desire to criticize individual cabinet appointees. But we have high hopes for the new team's promise of "integrity, professionalism, and perseverance leading to equality and the rebirth of Taiwan."
The cabinet may be chosen by those in power. But whether the cabinet has governed successfully will be decided by the general public.
少見新面孔，盼有新思維！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.22 02:42 am
劉兆玄內閣首波人事發表，閉起眼睛也知評價如何。質疑者一定說，「舊瓶舊酒」、「了無新意」、「老人內閣」等等；支持者則會說，「穩健比新奇重要」、「酒愈陳愈香」、「老馬識途」、「馬上上路」云云。
然而，如今內閣首波名單已經公布，無論是祝福者或詛咒者，一切都要等待新閣實際運作後始能就其政績表現再作定論。
新閣的特質是「穩健」，缺陷是不夠「新奇」。新政府的人事布局，也許可從馬英九提名蕭萬長為副總統搭檔談起。看見蕭萬長，想到呂秀蓮。蕭近日表現活躍，被稱作「半個總統／半個閣揆」，甚至已有是否僭越的質疑；呂秀蓮則被「備位元首」四字壓在五指山下，作了八年的「深宮怨婦」。再將劉兆玄與扁政府六位閣揆比較，唐飛是因扁的「政治操作」所需而出任閣揆，接下來的張、游、謝、蘇、張，則亦無一不是以「政治操作」見長。再看海基會的江丙坤，也可與張俊雄及洪奇昌比較。至於經濟部長尹啟銘，亦與宗才怡、黃營杉不屬同一類型。除此，扁政府更常有「正首長」為「虛」，「副首長」為「實」的兩手操作。今昔對比，馬政府的首波人事，似以「實／穩」為標尺，扁政府則較多「虛／奇」的布局。
蕭萬長比呂秀蓮「穩健」，宗才怡比尹啟銘「新奇」。劉內閣名單既無令人眼睛一亮的「新奇」可言，就絕對不可在未來政務表現的「穩健」上令致國人失望。換句話說：劉內閣雖不是新面孔，但必須有新思維。
看新閣名單，確實令人有時光倒流的感覺。劉內閣的主幹皆曾在李登輝政府任職，或謂其實這些人皆應共同承擔八年前「失去政權」的「共業」；不過，一般認為，當年國民黨的菁英，是被李登輝「黑金毀憲」及錯謬的兩岸政策所誤。如今，穿越八年的滄桑變化，幾乎同樣的一批面孔，經歷失敗下野的錘鍊後，能否在新的領導及新的思維中，帶領國家新生再起，已是馬政府必須面對的嚴峻考驗。
李登輝毀了國民黨一代菁英，也使國家創鉅痛深；如今，馬英九在八年後從廢墟中尋找堪用之材，看看能否重建一代菁英的尊榮，進而挽救台灣於危境險地。世人將可從這一歷史弔詭中共同見證：不一樣的領導與思維，帶領同樣面孔的官員，能否出現治亂成敗截然不同的執政表現？
觀察馬英九過去的人事運作，其實也是不拘一格，可謂是「奇正互用」。葉金川、歐晉德、白秀雄等，可謂正著；而金溥聰、龍應台、鄭村棋等，則是奇招。但是，此次劉內閣的結構，卻似有「寧正勿奇」的思維；以財經小內閣為核心主體（昨日發布的兩名政務委員亦皆是財經背景），這是「正」的考量；然後始在法務部長王清峰、勞委會主委王如玄等員額上設法暈染一些「奇」的色彩，但這也成為昨日名單中較滋議論的部分。新閣給人的第一印象是：形格勢禁所以「求穩健」，籌碼不足所以「無新奇」。
常聞「國民黨人才濟濟」，但如今新閣組建過程所呈現的卻是「青黃不接」。昨日發布的首波名單中，財政部長、國防部長、陸委會主委等皆尚虛懸，尤其眾所矚目的教育部長亦未出爐。百政待舉，良才難覓；聞鼙鼓而思良將，這或許正是馬蕭劉當局現今的感慨吧。
馬政府面對的是一個要將國家起死回生的艱鉅工程，無人預知昨日發布的團隊能否膺此重任。過去十餘年，自李登輝末期至陳水扁八年，整個政府幾乎淪為政爭工具及選舉機器，非但國政失敗，也斷送了兩黨整代的政治菁英；現在，我們不想對內閣名單的個別人選品頭論足，但對新閣標榜的「廉能、專業，新團隊；永續、均富，新台灣」寄以期待。
畢竟，內閣名單由主政者決定，但對內閣未來執政成敗的評價卻是由民意及輿論決定。
Monday, April 21, 2008
Lifted: The Nativist Curse
Lifted: The Nativist Curse
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
2008.04.21 2:26 am
It is less than a month after the election. The new government has yet to be formed. But the atmosphere has already changed considerably. Vincent Siew's presence at the Boao Forum is already melting the ice in the Taiwan Strait. The stale air created by the DPP's eight year long Closed Door policy is dissipating. Under pressure from the new mandate, the old regime has offered to adopt the new regime's policies in advance. A constructive form of competition has already begun.
Examples of this competition abound. The incoming Ma/Siew administration is about to open the island to mainland tourists. In response, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu has urged a policy of "Southern Entry, Southern Departure." She hopes to increase business opportunities for Kaohsiung. Failing that, she urges a policy of "Northern Entry, Southern Departure." In the area of agriculture, Yunlin County hopes to hold a fruit festival timed to match the Beijing Olympics. County Magistrate Su Chi-feng personally led a delegation to Macao to solicit tourism. The Council of Agriculture, which struggled mightily to prevent the sale of Taiwan fruits to the mainland, has now reversed itself. It has decided to subsidize the sale of agricultural products from eight counties to the mainland.
Even some private sector pig farmers are chomping at the bit, shouting "Taiwan pigs must counterattack the mainland!" They hope to sell high quality Taiwan pork to the mainland. The incoming Ma/Siew administration has announced its intention to make the NTD and RMB convertible in July. In response, the Central Bank is buying RMB in advance. Although its response remains guarded, its attitude is eminently pragmatic.
Such changes are a form of "political exorcism." Over the past eight years, a "Nativist" consciousness and Taiwan independence Political Correctness took possession of the Taiwan public. Many normal economic and trade activities were seen as taboo. Opening up to the mainland was beyond the pale. Normal exchanges were forbidden. The Chen regime imposed a wide range of obstacles to cross-strait exchanges. In the end it merely limited its own options. Once the DPP lost the election, these taboos suddenly lost their power to intimidate. People suddenly realized cross-strait links weren't so frightening. Over the past eight years no one dared violate these taboos, despite the fact they had little justification, and weren't fraught with all the peril the DPP would have people believe.
Take Boao for example. The Hu/Siew summit was a rare event. But for the public on Taiwan, seeing the ruling DPP's blockade lifted, almost at the snap of one's fingers, was even more meaningful. The Chen regime drew a line in the sand.
Siew stepped right over it, then returned a conquering hero. The Green Camp accused Beijing of "demeaning" Siew. In reality, he was feted as a VIP. The DPP warned Siew that Beijing would humiliate him by forcing him to use a "Taiwan Compatriot Entry Permit." In reality, aides from the two sides solved that problem neatly through bilateral consultation. For the past eight years the DPP has been weaving horror stories. hoping to frighten the public. Its stories, unable to withstand the light of day, have turned to dust.
The process is worth reviewing. During the election, the ruling DPP demonized the Ma/Siew camp's "Cross-Strait Common Market" in every possible way. The DPP denounced it as a "Policy of Surrender," as a stalking horse for a "One-China Market." The Hsieh camp even composed a limerick: "Taiwan men will be unable to find work. Taiwan women will be unable to find husbands. Taiwan children will end up as child labor in Heilongjiang." One month later, DPP officials from the central government level to the municipal and county levels, are singing an entirely different tune. Now how interesting is that?
A press release issued by the mainland Ministry of Commerce after the Boao Forum was equally interesting. It included boilerplate regarding the "One China Principle." It was in close accord with the spirit of "One China, Different Interpretations." But Beijing was so concerned about Taipei's feelings, it deleted the "One China" terminology three hours later. Such flexibility has changed Beijing's rigid, hardline image, and left a positive impression on the Taiwan public. The political exorcism is having an impact on both sides of the strait.
The political exorcism originated from within civil society, and represents the collective will of the public. It was a rational, grass roots social movement. The ruling DPP overplayed its Nativist hand. The Chen regime's Closed Door policy alienated the electorate. The Green camp's Nativist and Taiwan independence rhetoric lost its magic spell. Once the spell of populism was broken, rational discourse returned. A return to rational discourse and normal party politics is a welcome change indeed.
After wandering through a political wasteland for eight years, we have finally emerged into the light. We are breathing fresh air, unpolluted by the rhetoric of populism. Many people are undoubtedly heaving deep sighs of relief. Over the past decade, how many people have been subjected to unprovoked taunts of "Chinese pigs, go back to where you came from!" Today, Taiwan pig farmers are shouting "Taiwan pigs must counterattack the mainland!" Such a simple change. Yet how many hearts has it touched? What a relief to inhabit a new era, free of political insults.
魔咒剝落：解讀近月的政治除魅現象
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.21 02:26 am
選後至今尚未滿月，新政府仍未籌組完成，但整體社會氣氛已有不小的變化。隨著蕭萬長博鰲行帶來兩岸融冰，台灣八年鎖國的窒悶似已陰霾盡散；而隨著民意的趨向開放，舊政府對新政府提出的若干主張也提前配合採行，顯示良性競爭的機關已經啟動。
具體的事例俯拾皆是。對應馬蕭的開放大陸觀光客來台，陳菊要爭取陸客「南進南出」或「北進南出」，增加高雄市的商機。在農產品方面，雲林縣將配合奧運登陸舉辦水果展售會，縣長蘇治芬更親自率團赴澳門行銷；而曾力阻台灣水果登陸的農委會，也決定斥資補助八縣農產品銷陸。
影響所及，連一些民間豬農都摩拳擦掌，聲稱「台灣豬要反攻大陸」，要將台灣優質豬肉賣到大陸。除此之外，對應馬蕭宣布七月將開放人民幣兌換，央行日昨決定先一步開放「買入」業務，雖嫌保守，但至少踏出務實的一步。
這樣的變化，簡單地說，就是一個「政治除魅」的過程。過去八年，在本土意識及台獨口號的催眠下，許多原本正常的經貿活動被當成禁忌，原本開放的言論領域被畫為禁區，原本簡單的交流事務讓人不敢碰觸；扁政府的諸多禁制羈礙了人民，最後也大大局限了自己的作為。民進黨敗選後，這些符咒一一剝落，人們才發現，過去八年大家不敢踏入的那個禁區，設禁的理由其實沒有那麼可信，也沒有民進黨宣稱的那麼多危險。
以博鰲會為例，蕭胡的會面固屬難得；但對台灣民眾而言，更重要的是，看到一個封鎖台灣的魔咒彈指之間即被解除。蕭萬長跨過扁政府拉起的「危險勿近」黃線，結果是豐收而歸；綠營指他遭到「矮化」，其實他是備受禮遇；民進黨認為絕對不可以拿那紙台胞證，其實透過雙方協商，交由幕僚代辦即輕易解決。民進黨八年來編出來嚇唬人民那套故事和邏輯，禁不起陽光曝曬，瞬間土崩瓦解。
這樣的「除魅」過程，深耐咀嚼。大選期間，馬蕭「兩岸共同市場」的主張被執政黨百般醜化，指為投降主義的「一中市場」，謝營甚至編出「查甫找無工，查某找無尪，囝仔要去黑龍江」的順口溜，極盡嘲諷及汙蔑。而不過短短一個多月的時光，民進黨從地方縣市到中央部會都陸續轉向，開始望向海峽對岸，這是多麼有趣的變化圖像！
同樣有意思的是，大陸商務部在博鰲會後發出官樣文章的「一個中國原則」的新聞稿，若依「一中各表」的精神，「對內說一套」其實是可以容忍的事；但北京為顧慮台灣方面的感受，在三個半小時內迅即刪除「一中」字眼。這樣的彈性，不僅一洗北京的僵固、死硬形象，也讓台灣民眾對其務實留下好評。可以說，「政治除魅」的作用，其實已開始在海峽兩岸同時發酵。
追根究柢，這場除魅的源頭，是台灣公民在大選的集體意志展現，它可以說是一場選民推動的「理性運動」。誤把「本土意識」玩成「鎖國政策」的扁政府遭到選民唾棄，它所賴以支撐的本土及台獨論述也為之斷裂；民粹碎裂、魔咒脫落之後，接下來自然是公民社會向理性回歸。從民主政治或政黨競爭的角度看，政策能夠回到理性辯論，政治能夠回歸良性競爭，這都是讓人樂觀且期待的發展。
走出政治硝煙蔽天的八年，呼吸沒有民粹粉塵的自由空氣，許多人都應該感到心胸開闊不少。回想過去族群對立的年代，多少人無端被罵「中國豬滾回去」，而如今竟有台灣養豬戶振臂高呼「台灣豬反攻大陸」；短短一句話，莞爾化開了多少人胸中的鬱結。沒有政治咒罵的日子，真清爽！
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
2008.04.21 2:26 am
It is less than a month after the election. The new government has yet to be formed. But the atmosphere has already changed considerably. Vincent Siew's presence at the Boao Forum is already melting the ice in the Taiwan Strait. The stale air created by the DPP's eight year long Closed Door policy is dissipating. Under pressure from the new mandate, the old regime has offered to adopt the new regime's policies in advance. A constructive form of competition has already begun.
Examples of this competition abound. The incoming Ma/Siew administration is about to open the island to mainland tourists. In response, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu has urged a policy of "Southern Entry, Southern Departure." She hopes to increase business opportunities for Kaohsiung. Failing that, she urges a policy of "Northern Entry, Southern Departure." In the area of agriculture, Yunlin County hopes to hold a fruit festival timed to match the Beijing Olympics. County Magistrate Su Chi-feng personally led a delegation to Macao to solicit tourism. The Council of Agriculture, which struggled mightily to prevent the sale of Taiwan fruits to the mainland, has now reversed itself. It has decided to subsidize the sale of agricultural products from eight counties to the mainland.
Even some private sector pig farmers are chomping at the bit, shouting "Taiwan pigs must counterattack the mainland!" They hope to sell high quality Taiwan pork to the mainland. The incoming Ma/Siew administration has announced its intention to make the NTD and RMB convertible in July. In response, the Central Bank is buying RMB in advance. Although its response remains guarded, its attitude is eminently pragmatic.
Such changes are a form of "political exorcism." Over the past eight years, a "Nativist" consciousness and Taiwan independence Political Correctness took possession of the Taiwan public. Many normal economic and trade activities were seen as taboo. Opening up to the mainland was beyond the pale. Normal exchanges were forbidden. The Chen regime imposed a wide range of obstacles to cross-strait exchanges. In the end it merely limited its own options. Once the DPP lost the election, these taboos suddenly lost their power to intimidate. People suddenly realized cross-strait links weren't so frightening. Over the past eight years no one dared violate these taboos, despite the fact they had little justification, and weren't fraught with all the peril the DPP would have people believe.
Take Boao for example. The Hu/Siew summit was a rare event. But for the public on Taiwan, seeing the ruling DPP's blockade lifted, almost at the snap of one's fingers, was even more meaningful. The Chen regime drew a line in the sand.
Siew stepped right over it, then returned a conquering hero. The Green Camp accused Beijing of "demeaning" Siew. In reality, he was feted as a VIP. The DPP warned Siew that Beijing would humiliate him by forcing him to use a "Taiwan Compatriot Entry Permit." In reality, aides from the two sides solved that problem neatly through bilateral consultation. For the past eight years the DPP has been weaving horror stories. hoping to frighten the public. Its stories, unable to withstand the light of day, have turned to dust.
The process is worth reviewing. During the election, the ruling DPP demonized the Ma/Siew camp's "Cross-Strait Common Market" in every possible way. The DPP denounced it as a "Policy of Surrender," as a stalking horse for a "One-China Market." The Hsieh camp even composed a limerick: "Taiwan men will be unable to find work. Taiwan women will be unable to find husbands. Taiwan children will end up as child labor in Heilongjiang." One month later, DPP officials from the central government level to the municipal and county levels, are singing an entirely different tune. Now how interesting is that?
A press release issued by the mainland Ministry of Commerce after the Boao Forum was equally interesting. It included boilerplate regarding the "One China Principle." It was in close accord with the spirit of "One China, Different Interpretations." But Beijing was so concerned about Taipei's feelings, it deleted the "One China" terminology three hours later. Such flexibility has changed Beijing's rigid, hardline image, and left a positive impression on the Taiwan public. The political exorcism is having an impact on both sides of the strait.
The political exorcism originated from within civil society, and represents the collective will of the public. It was a rational, grass roots social movement. The ruling DPP overplayed its Nativist hand. The Chen regime's Closed Door policy alienated the electorate. The Green camp's Nativist and Taiwan independence rhetoric lost its magic spell. Once the spell of populism was broken, rational discourse returned. A return to rational discourse and normal party politics is a welcome change indeed.
After wandering through a political wasteland for eight years, we have finally emerged into the light. We are breathing fresh air, unpolluted by the rhetoric of populism. Many people are undoubtedly heaving deep sighs of relief. Over the past decade, how many people have been subjected to unprovoked taunts of "Chinese pigs, go back to where you came from!" Today, Taiwan pig farmers are shouting "Taiwan pigs must counterattack the mainland!" Such a simple change. Yet how many hearts has it touched? What a relief to inhabit a new era, free of political insults.
魔咒剝落：解讀近月的政治除魅現象
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.21 02:26 am
選後至今尚未滿月，新政府仍未籌組完成，但整體社會氣氛已有不小的變化。隨著蕭萬長博鰲行帶來兩岸融冰，台灣八年鎖國的窒悶似已陰霾盡散；而隨著民意的趨向開放，舊政府對新政府提出的若干主張也提前配合採行，顯示良性競爭的機關已經啟動。
具體的事例俯拾皆是。對應馬蕭的開放大陸觀光客來台，陳菊要爭取陸客「南進南出」或「北進南出」，增加高雄市的商機。在農產品方面，雲林縣將配合奧運登陸舉辦水果展售會，縣長蘇治芬更親自率團赴澳門行銷；而曾力阻台灣水果登陸的農委會，也決定斥資補助八縣農產品銷陸。
影響所及，連一些民間豬農都摩拳擦掌，聲稱「台灣豬要反攻大陸」，要將台灣優質豬肉賣到大陸。除此之外，對應馬蕭宣布七月將開放人民幣兌換，央行日昨決定先一步開放「買入」業務，雖嫌保守，但至少踏出務實的一步。
這樣的變化，簡單地說，就是一個「政治除魅」的過程。過去八年，在本土意識及台獨口號的催眠下，許多原本正常的經貿活動被當成禁忌，原本開放的言論領域被畫為禁區，原本簡單的交流事務讓人不敢碰觸；扁政府的諸多禁制羈礙了人民，最後也大大局限了自己的作為。民進黨敗選後，這些符咒一一剝落，人們才發現，過去八年大家不敢踏入的那個禁區，設禁的理由其實沒有那麼可信，也沒有民進黨宣稱的那麼多危險。
以博鰲會為例，蕭胡的會面固屬難得；但對台灣民眾而言，更重要的是，看到一個封鎖台灣的魔咒彈指之間即被解除。蕭萬長跨過扁政府拉起的「危險勿近」黃線，結果是豐收而歸；綠營指他遭到「矮化」，其實他是備受禮遇；民進黨認為絕對不可以拿那紙台胞證，其實透過雙方協商，交由幕僚代辦即輕易解決。民進黨八年來編出來嚇唬人民那套故事和邏輯，禁不起陽光曝曬，瞬間土崩瓦解。
這樣的「除魅」過程，深耐咀嚼。大選期間，馬蕭「兩岸共同市場」的主張被執政黨百般醜化，指為投降主義的「一中市場」，謝營甚至編出「查甫找無工，查某找無尪，囝仔要去黑龍江」的順口溜，極盡嘲諷及汙蔑。而不過短短一個多月的時光，民進黨從地方縣市到中央部會都陸續轉向，開始望向海峽對岸，這是多麼有趣的變化圖像！
同樣有意思的是，大陸商務部在博鰲會後發出官樣文章的「一個中國原則」的新聞稿，若依「一中各表」的精神，「對內說一套」其實是可以容忍的事；但北京為顧慮台灣方面的感受，在三個半小時內迅即刪除「一中」字眼。這樣的彈性，不僅一洗北京的僵固、死硬形象，也讓台灣民眾對其務實留下好評。可以說，「政治除魅」的作用，其實已開始在海峽兩岸同時發酵。
追根究柢，這場除魅的源頭，是台灣公民在大選的集體意志展現，它可以說是一場選民推動的「理性運動」。誤把「本土意識」玩成「鎖國政策」的扁政府遭到選民唾棄，它所賴以支撐的本土及台獨論述也為之斷裂；民粹碎裂、魔咒脫落之後，接下來自然是公民社會向理性回歸。從民主政治或政黨競爭的角度看，政策能夠回到理性辯論，政治能夠回歸良性競爭，這都是讓人樂觀且期待的發展。
走出政治硝煙蔽天的八年，呼吸沒有民粹粉塵的自由空氣，許多人都應該感到心胸開闊不少。回想過去族群對立的年代，多少人無端被罵「中國豬滾回去」，而如今竟有台灣養豬戶振臂高呼「台灣豬反攻大陸」；短短一句話，莞爾化開了多少人胸中的鬱結。沒有政治咒罵的日子，真清爽！
Friday, April 18, 2008
To the DPP: Liberate Yourself from Your Own Bonds
To the DPP: Liberate Yourself from Your Own Bonds
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 18, 2008
At a moment when attention is focused on cross-strait relations after May 20, the Democratic Progressive Party, from top to bottom, seems intent on poor-mouthing the Boao Forum. The DPP's take on the forum departs sharply from mainstream 's consensus, and leaves the public with a powerful impression that the ruling DPP can hardly wait to resume the role of opposition party. It leaves the impression that as the two sides of the strait move toward reconciliation, the DPP is seeking emotional refuge in its familiar rhetorical framework.
If the Democratic Progressive Party's motive is merely to challenge the effectiveness of the Boao Forum, then it is perfectly justified. The problem is their rhetoric. None of it is new. All of it is old. First, Chen Shui-bian alleged that Vincent Siew was invited to this year's Boao Forum merely because Beijing wanted to draw attention away from the unrest in Tibet and the protests along the Olympic Torch Route. Chen Shui-bian even alleged that the front row where Vincent Siew sat during the opening ceremony was "Seating for Regional Governors." Annette Lu described the Boao Forum as "War of Reunification Political Theater." The DPP legislative caucus criticized the result of the Boao Forum as "Four Humiliations." In short, according to the DPP hierarchy, the forum was a complete bust.
Boao is merely a forum for friendship and dialogue. Whether it has the wherewithal to shift international attention from Tibet and the Olympic Torch Relay we leave to your common sense. The chief executives of the world's nations receive global intelligence reports every day. Yet Chen Shui-bian, in complete violation of common sense, could draw such an absurd conclusion. What is there left to say? The DPP described the seating arrangements as "Seating for Regional Governors." That was interesting. No matter how you slice it, Vincent Siew will not be Vice President for another month. One can argue endlessly about whether he should be treated as a vice president, a regional governor, or a chairman. Based on the seating arrangements for the opening ceremony or Hu Jintao's banquet table, one could arrive at two entirely different interpretations. Regional governors were hardly the only ones attending the forum. Many foreign officials and heads of state also sat in the front row or at the main table. Were they all "demoted" as well?
Another scene was even more interesting. After the closing ceremonies, a number of ruling Democratic Progressive Party Mayors and County Magistrates displayed an entirely different attitude than the Chen administration and the DPP Legislative Caucus. These local officials were concerned about getting their cut once direct flights were initiated and the floodgates to mainland tourists opened after May 20. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu took the lead, demanding that Kaohsiung be designated the port of entry and port of departure for mainland tourists. In other words, "Southern Entry, Southern Departure." Yunlin County Magistrate Su Chi-fen announced that he would personally lead a group to the mainland to solicit tourists. Chiayi County Magistrate Chen Ming-wen wanted Bu Tai Harbor designated a port of entry for direct cross-strait flights. According to the DPP's Conventional Wisdom, these Green Camp Mayors and County Magistrates were "openly colluding with the KMT," or worse, endorsing a "One-China Market." If Siew's participation in the Boao Forum was nothing more than "War of Reunification Political Theater," if Siew's participation meant he had been "demoted" to the status of a "Regional Governor," then weren't all these Green Camp Mayors and County Magistrates publicly endorsing Siew's "demotion?"
This is hardly the greatest irony. Promoting direct flights and letting in mainland tourists has been DPP policy for some time. Now that a breakthrough has finally been achieved, isn't that tantamount to implenting DPP policy? Is the DPP determined to negate the value of the breakthrough merely because it was made by the KMT? We don't want to accuse the DPP of being "sore losers," but can't the DPP see that it is already behind the curve relative to mainstream public opinion?
Some people may conclude that the DPP's poor-mouthing of the Boao Forum is mere show. That it is playing "bad cop." That cross-strait interactions have always involved someone playing "good cop" and someone else playing "bad cop." That may be true. But is the DPP determined to play only "bad cop" forever? If so, then it is relegating itself forever to a supporting role in perpetuity. As cross-strait relations evolve rapidly, the DPP will find itself increasingly marginalized.
An ever bigger problem for the DPP is its seeming inability to liberate itself from its own rhetorical shackles. At a time when the KMT is talking about scheduling weekend charter flights and establishing mechanisms for SEF/ARATS cooperation, the DPP is still harping about "Regional Governors" and "demotion." The times they are a changing. But the Democratic Progressive Party leadershop is seeking refuge in the mental prison created by its own election rhetoric, ignoring changes to the outside world.
Following the DPP's election debacle, some party members urged debate over the party's direction, as soon as possible. But these voices have died out. The DPP kept Taiwan ideologically bound and gagged for eight years. Now the public has liberated itself from these bonds. The DPP however, persists in incarcerating itself within its own ideological prison, determined to ignore changes to the outside world.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.04.18
民進黨別被自己的框架鎖住了
中時社論
就在各界忙於關注五二○之後各項兩岸議程的進度之際，民進黨從上到下一路唱衰博鰲論壇的語言，在眾多論述中顯得極為「別樹一格」，讓人很強烈的感受到這個其實還在執政的黨，已經迫不及待的想當在野黨，也迫不及待的想在這個兩岸正邁向和解之際，躲進自己所最熟悉的語言框架裡。
如果只是為了突出立場區隔，民進黨質疑博鰲論壇的成效當然是天經地義。很可惜的就在於他們所動員的修辭，幾乎全是了無新義的選舉語言。先是陳水扁總統公開挑明博鰲論壇今年會力邀蕭萬長出席，是由於中國為了要轉移西藏問題與奧運聖火的國際視聽；陳水扁還說蕭萬長在開幕式所坐的第一排根本就是「特首席」；呂副總統則將博鰲論壇形容成是一場中共的「統戰秀」；而民進黨立院黨團則是以「四個矮化」來批判這次博鰲論壇的成果，綜合他們評論，簡言之就是「一無是處」！
一個僅具聯誼與對話性質的博鰲論壇，究竟有無那麼大的能耐，可以轉移國際社會對西藏與奧運聖火議題的關注，是一個很基本的常識問題。一個國家元首每天所接收的全球情報資訊那麼多，能得出這般違反常識的結論，還能說什麼？至於接送機與座位安排的接待規格，被民進黨一再形容成是被「特首化」，這般的評論確實很有趣，蕭萬長不論怎麼說還有一個多月才是副總統，他此刻該被當作副總統、特首還是董事長，永遠有無窮想像的空間，譬如僅根據論壇開幕式的座位學，還是根據胡錦濤宴席主桌的座位學，就可以寫出兩篇完全不同的文章，問題只在於出席這場論壇的並不只有「特首」，還有許多國家的元首與官員，他們也有的是坐第一排，有的坐主桌，難道他們全都被「矮化」了嗎？
另外一組相對照的畫面更有趣。博鰲論壇落幕後，由於直航與開放陸客赴台觀光的議程已確定將在五二○之後陸續啟動，若干民進黨執政的地方縣市首長，立即表現出與民進黨完全不同的態度。高雄市長陳菊率先表態希望能讓赴台的大陸觀光客從高雄「南進南出」；雲林縣長蘇治芬則要親自帶團赴大陸招商，嘉義縣長陳明文則表態爭取將布袋港列入兩岸直航的港口之一。這些綠營執政縣市首長的言行，如果依民進黨當前主流的觀點，不僅是「公開的在與國民黨唱和」，甚至是在呼應「一中市場」了！如果蕭萬長的博鰲行只是場統戰秀，是去被中共「矮化」與「特首化」，那麼這些舞著綠營旗幟的縣市長，豈不是在行動上公開為蕭萬長此行背書？
更大矛盾還不在於此，推動直航乃至開放陸客觀光，其實早已經是民進黨規畫中的既定政策，如今終於獲得突破，不等於就是在落實民進黨的政策嗎？如果只因為這是由國民黨所促成的突破，所以才要竭盡所能降低它的正面意義？我們實在不想說這其中是否有「輸不起」的心態在作祟，但至少從民調的反應看來，民進黨難道還看不出，自己已經落在主流民意的後面了？
有人或許會從積極層面上認為，民進黨的「唱衰」，其實是在「扮黑臉」，反正歷來在兩岸互動上，總是有人要扮白臉，有人唱黑臉嘛！話是不錯，問題是在兩岸事務上，民進黨難道只能命定的選擇扮黑臉嗎？如果真是這樣，豈不是永遠自居為配角，那麼在未來兩岸事務的快速發展上，難道不會面臨日漸被邊緣化的處境？
更大的問題還是在於，民進黨在論述兩岸事務上似乎就是擺脫不了選舉語言的制約，當國民黨已經都將議題推進到周末包機的時程，兩岸兩會機制怎麼啟動之際，民進黨卻還是圍繞在「特首化」、「矮化」等選舉語言框架裡走不出來，換言之，不論時代正怎麼快速的向前推進，民進黨的領導層似乎只想躲在自己設定的語言框架裡，不想理會外在世界的變化了。
大選結束後，不少民進黨內的有識之士都在呼籲，應盡快啟動路線的辯論，但這種聲音目前似乎越來越微弱了，民進黨用一套意識形態綁了台灣八年，如今民意已經選擇擺脫了這個枷鎖，但民進黨卻依舊有許多人將自己繼續鎖在裡面，完全不想理會外在世界的變化！
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 18, 2008
At a moment when attention is focused on cross-strait relations after May 20, the Democratic Progressive Party, from top to bottom, seems intent on poor-mouthing the Boao Forum. The DPP's take on the forum departs sharply from mainstream 's consensus, and leaves the public with a powerful impression that the ruling DPP can hardly wait to resume the role of opposition party. It leaves the impression that as the two sides of the strait move toward reconciliation, the DPP is seeking emotional refuge in its familiar rhetorical framework.
If the Democratic Progressive Party's motive is merely to challenge the effectiveness of the Boao Forum, then it is perfectly justified. The problem is their rhetoric. None of it is new. All of it is old. First, Chen Shui-bian alleged that Vincent Siew was invited to this year's Boao Forum merely because Beijing wanted to draw attention away from the unrest in Tibet and the protests along the Olympic Torch Route. Chen Shui-bian even alleged that the front row where Vincent Siew sat during the opening ceremony was "Seating for Regional Governors." Annette Lu described the Boao Forum as "War of Reunification Political Theater." The DPP legislative caucus criticized the result of the Boao Forum as "Four Humiliations." In short, according to the DPP hierarchy, the forum was a complete bust.
Boao is merely a forum for friendship and dialogue. Whether it has the wherewithal to shift international attention from Tibet and the Olympic Torch Relay we leave to your common sense. The chief executives of the world's nations receive global intelligence reports every day. Yet Chen Shui-bian, in complete violation of common sense, could draw such an absurd conclusion. What is there left to say? The DPP described the seating arrangements as "Seating for Regional Governors." That was interesting. No matter how you slice it, Vincent Siew will not be Vice President for another month. One can argue endlessly about whether he should be treated as a vice president, a regional governor, or a chairman. Based on the seating arrangements for the opening ceremony or Hu Jintao's banquet table, one could arrive at two entirely different interpretations. Regional governors were hardly the only ones attending the forum. Many foreign officials and heads of state also sat in the front row or at the main table. Were they all "demoted" as well?
Another scene was even more interesting. After the closing ceremonies, a number of ruling Democratic Progressive Party Mayors and County Magistrates displayed an entirely different attitude than the Chen administration and the DPP Legislative Caucus. These local officials were concerned about getting their cut once direct flights were initiated and the floodgates to mainland tourists opened after May 20. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu took the lead, demanding that Kaohsiung be designated the port of entry and port of departure for mainland tourists. In other words, "Southern Entry, Southern Departure." Yunlin County Magistrate Su Chi-fen announced that he would personally lead a group to the mainland to solicit tourists. Chiayi County Magistrate Chen Ming-wen wanted Bu Tai Harbor designated a port of entry for direct cross-strait flights. According to the DPP's Conventional Wisdom, these Green Camp Mayors and County Magistrates were "openly colluding with the KMT," or worse, endorsing a "One-China Market." If Siew's participation in the Boao Forum was nothing more than "War of Reunification Political Theater," if Siew's participation meant he had been "demoted" to the status of a "Regional Governor," then weren't all these Green Camp Mayors and County Magistrates publicly endorsing Siew's "demotion?"
This is hardly the greatest irony. Promoting direct flights and letting in mainland tourists has been DPP policy for some time. Now that a breakthrough has finally been achieved, isn't that tantamount to implenting DPP policy? Is the DPP determined to negate the value of the breakthrough merely because it was made by the KMT? We don't want to accuse the DPP of being "sore losers," but can't the DPP see that it is already behind the curve relative to mainstream public opinion?
Some people may conclude that the DPP's poor-mouthing of the Boao Forum is mere show. That it is playing "bad cop." That cross-strait interactions have always involved someone playing "good cop" and someone else playing "bad cop." That may be true. But is the DPP determined to play only "bad cop" forever? If so, then it is relegating itself forever to a supporting role in perpetuity. As cross-strait relations evolve rapidly, the DPP will find itself increasingly marginalized.
An ever bigger problem for the DPP is its seeming inability to liberate itself from its own rhetorical shackles. At a time when the KMT is talking about scheduling weekend charter flights and establishing mechanisms for SEF/ARATS cooperation, the DPP is still harping about "Regional Governors" and "demotion." The times they are a changing. But the Democratic Progressive Party leadershop is seeking refuge in the mental prison created by its own election rhetoric, ignoring changes to the outside world.
Following the DPP's election debacle, some party members urged debate over the party's direction, as soon as possible. But these voices have died out. The DPP kept Taiwan ideologically bound and gagged for eight years. Now the public has liberated itself from these bonds. The DPP however, persists in incarcerating itself within its own ideological prison, determined to ignore changes to the outside world.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.04.18
民進黨別被自己的框架鎖住了
中時社論
就在各界忙於關注五二○之後各項兩岸議程的進度之際，民進黨從上到下一路唱衰博鰲論壇的語言，在眾多論述中顯得極為「別樹一格」，讓人很強烈的感受到這個其實還在執政的黨，已經迫不及待的想當在野黨，也迫不及待的想在這個兩岸正邁向和解之際，躲進自己所最熟悉的語言框架裡。
如果只是為了突出立場區隔，民進黨質疑博鰲論壇的成效當然是天經地義。很可惜的就在於他們所動員的修辭，幾乎全是了無新義的選舉語言。先是陳水扁總統公開挑明博鰲論壇今年會力邀蕭萬長出席，是由於中國為了要轉移西藏問題與奧運聖火的國際視聽；陳水扁還說蕭萬長在開幕式所坐的第一排根本就是「特首席」；呂副總統則將博鰲論壇形容成是一場中共的「統戰秀」；而民進黨立院黨團則是以「四個矮化」來批判這次博鰲論壇的成果，綜合他們評論，簡言之就是「一無是處」！
一個僅具聯誼與對話性質的博鰲論壇，究竟有無那麼大的能耐，可以轉移國際社會對西藏與奧運聖火議題的關注，是一個很基本的常識問題。一個國家元首每天所接收的全球情報資訊那麼多，能得出這般違反常識的結論，還能說什麼？至於接送機與座位安排的接待規格，被民進黨一再形容成是被「特首化」，這般的評論確實很有趣，蕭萬長不論怎麼說還有一個多月才是副總統，他此刻該被當作副總統、特首還是董事長，永遠有無窮想像的空間，譬如僅根據論壇開幕式的座位學，還是根據胡錦濤宴席主桌的座位學，就可以寫出兩篇完全不同的文章，問題只在於出席這場論壇的並不只有「特首」，還有許多國家的元首與官員，他們也有的是坐第一排，有的坐主桌，難道他們全都被「矮化」了嗎？
另外一組相對照的畫面更有趣。博鰲論壇落幕後，由於直航與開放陸客赴台觀光的議程已確定將在五二○之後陸續啟動，若干民進黨執政的地方縣市首長，立即表現出與民進黨完全不同的態度。高雄市長陳菊率先表態希望能讓赴台的大陸觀光客從高雄「南進南出」；雲林縣長蘇治芬則要親自帶團赴大陸招商，嘉義縣長陳明文則表態爭取將布袋港列入兩岸直航的港口之一。這些綠營執政縣市首長的言行，如果依民進黨當前主流的觀點，不僅是「公開的在與國民黨唱和」，甚至是在呼應「一中市場」了！如果蕭萬長的博鰲行只是場統戰秀，是去被中共「矮化」與「特首化」，那麼這些舞著綠營旗幟的縣市長，豈不是在行動上公開為蕭萬長此行背書？
更大矛盾還不在於此，推動直航乃至開放陸客觀光，其實早已經是民進黨規畫中的既定政策，如今終於獲得突破，不等於就是在落實民進黨的政策嗎？如果只因為這是由國民黨所促成的突破，所以才要竭盡所能降低它的正面意義？我們實在不想說這其中是否有「輸不起」的心態在作祟，但至少從民調的反應看來，民進黨難道還看不出，自己已經落在主流民意的後面了？
有人或許會從積極層面上認為，民進黨的「唱衰」，其實是在「扮黑臉」，反正歷來在兩岸互動上，總是有人要扮白臉，有人唱黑臉嘛！話是不錯，問題是在兩岸事務上，民進黨難道只能命定的選擇扮黑臉嗎？如果真是這樣，豈不是永遠自居為配角，那麼在未來兩岸事務的快速發展上，難道不會面臨日漸被邊緣化的處境？
更大的問題還是在於，民進黨在論述兩岸事務上似乎就是擺脫不了選舉語言的制約，當國民黨已經都將議題推進到周末包機的時程，兩岸兩會機制怎麼啟動之際，民進黨卻還是圍繞在「特首化」、「矮化」等選舉語言框架裡走不出來，換言之，不論時代正怎麼快速的向前推進，民進黨的領導層似乎只想躲在自己設定的語言框架裡，不想理會外在世界的變化了。
大選結束後，不少民進黨內的有識之士都在呼籲，應盡快啟動路線的辯論，但這種聲音目前似乎越來越微弱了，民進黨用一套意識形態綁了台灣八年，如今民意已經選擇擺脫了這個枷鎖，但民進黨卻依舊有許多人將自己繼續鎖在裡面，完全不想理會外在世界的變化！
Thursday, April 17, 2008
The Ways of Heaven are Hard to Decipher: The DPP made the Hu Siew Summit Possible
The Ways of Heaven are Hard to Decipher: The DPP made the Hu Siew Summit Possible
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 17, 2008
The DPP made the Hu Hsiao Summit possible. That is not an exaggeration.
In 2000, the Lien/Siew ticket was cheated out of its election victory. Lien and Siew each went their own way. In 2001, Siew organized the Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation. He served one term as Chen Shui-bian's Chief Economic Adviser. In 2005, Lien Chan, as Chairman of the Kuomintang, visited the mainland and established a KMT/CCP dialog mechanism. For several years, Lien and Siew went their own way, and shared little ground in common.
Who could have predicted that in 2008 Ma Ying-jeou would seek out Vincent Siew as his running mate? That the Ma/Siew ticket would score a resounding victory? That the mutual trust created between the KMT and CCP by Lien Chan's dialogue mechanism, in conjunction with Vincent Siew's cross-strait foundation, would enable the attention-grabbing Hu/Siew Summit to take shape, virtually overnight? Lien Chan's dialog mechanism, Vincent Siew's cross-strait foundation, and Ma's impending presidency were three separate paths. Yet they converged almost instantly. They became a "one-two punch." They played out a chapter of history that took the world by surprise.
The course of history is tortuous. Had the KMT not been out of power for eight years, would Lien Chan have been able to visit the mainland? Had the DPP not resorted to political trickery to remain in power in 2004, would Lien Chan's visit the mainland have acquired so much legitimacy with the public on Taiwan? Had the KMT not been out of power, would Vincent Siew have been "reduced" to lobbyist for a cross-strait common market? Could the KMT and the CCP have established such a well-oiled dialogue mechanism? Would party officials at the highest levels have enjoyed the opportunity for face-to-face interaction? Had the DPP not lost the hearts and minds of the people, would Ma Ying-jeou and his new cross-strait policy have met with the approval of so many voters? Without all these precedents, how could the Hu Siew Summit have taken place? How could the "Four Hopes" and "Four Constants" have made their debut?
The price paid, eight years in the political wilderness, was high. But the rewards have been commensurate. First. Events have confirmed that the path of Taiwan independence and the DPP's Closed Door Policy is a dead end. Maintaining the status quo and advocating cross-strait exchange can no longer be falsely equated with "betraying Taiwan." The Ma/Siew ticket's election victory has confirmed the legitimacy of cross-strait links. Second. The KMT and CCP party hierarchies have made good use of this eight year window of opportunity. After rare personal contacts and heartfelt exchanges, they have established a considerable degree of mutual trust. Third. The KMT was able to establish close contacts with the CCP only because it was out of power. Now that the KMT is again the ruling party, bilateral contacts can immediately and seamlessly be raised to the level of "ruling party to ruling party" contacts.
Without eight years of accumulated experience, today's scenario would have been impossible. Eight years of opposition KMT interaction with the CCP will enable the ruling KMT to interact smoothly and constructively with the CCP. Conversely, eight years of Democratic Progressive Party misrule has thoroughly discredited Taiwan independence and the DPP's Closed Door Policy. Eight years of DPP misrule has transformed the DPP into a reluctant but persuasive witness on behalf of the KMT's new cross-strait policy. For cross-strait relations, the past eight years have been a blessing in disguise.
As Beijing sees it, Taiwan independence momentum has been building over the past eight years. The Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution campaigns, the Plebiscite to Join the UN, and efforts to stuff the Republic of China down the Memory Hole, have forced Beijing to look more favorably on "maintaining the status quo." A Bush/Hu hotline exchange affirmed the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations, and that "opposing independence had higher priority than promoting reunification." Meanwhile on Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian's misrule and malfeasance, his campaigns to purge Chiang's legacy, insult Chiang's memory, demolish Chiang's name plaques, demagogue the 228 Incident, Rectify Names and Author of a New Constitution, hold Plebiscites to Join the UN, have infuriated the public, undermined the legitimacy of Taiwan independence, and provoked doubts about the DPP's Closed Door policy.
The two sides of the Taiwan Strait have taken note of two entirely opposite trends. The mainland authorities have noted the Taiwan independence movement's increased momentum. The public on Taiwan has noted the Taiwan independence movement's diminished credibility. Amidst these opposing trends, the KMT and the CCP have won over public opinion. The public has endorsed the KMT's policy of open exchanges. Ma Ying-jeou, as spokesman for a new cross-strait policy, emerged victorious in the presidential election. Who created this situation? Who but the DPP? Who but Chen Shui-bian?
After an eight-year War of Resistance against the DPP, the opposition KMT is again the ruling party. The KMT knows what it means to lose power. The CCP should take the KMT's experience to heart. It should remember that the people are the masters and government authority originates with them. After eight years of interaction, the leadership on both sides of the strait must behave not like rivals jockeying for advantage, but like stakeholders promoting mutual advantage. After all, the two sides have a common cause -- the welfare of the people. They may be opponents, but they are also allies. This precious eight year legacy is something that both sides should cherish and maintain.
As for the DPP, its eight years in power created the conditions that made the Hu Hsiao Summit a possibility and a reality. It makes no difference that it was the farthest thing from the DPP's intention. The indisputable fact is the DPP made it all possible.
天機莫測：民進黨促成了胡蕭會？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.17 02:43 am
民進黨促成了胡蕭會，此話怎講？
從二○○○年說起。「連蕭配」在總統大選慘敗，連蕭二人竟告分道揚鑣。二○○一年，蕭萬長自組「兩岸共同市場基金會」，一度並成為陳水扁的「總統首席經濟顧問」；連戰則在二○○五年以國民黨主席的身分訪問大陸，並成立「國共平台」。數年之間，連蕭各走各的路，看不出交集。
誰料，二○○八年馬英九竟然找上蕭萬長做競選搭檔，而「馬蕭配」又大勝，且以連戰的「國共平台」提供的互信基礎，及蕭萬長的「基金會」提供的題材，居然在一夕之間即湊成了舉世矚目的「胡蕭博鰲會」；至此，「連平台／蕭基金會／馬選總統」，原本三路「分進」，立即匯流而成「合擊」的交集場面，演出了令世人意外又驚嘆的一頁！
歷史的大道莫非是曲折的？如果不是因國民黨下野八年，連戰豈有可能訪問大陸？又如果不是民進黨的倒行逆施，連戰訪問大陸在台灣民間又豈有正當性？而若不是國民黨下野，蕭萬長又豈會「淪落」成「共同市場」鍥而不捨的兩岸說客？且國共兩黨之間又豈有可能搭起「平台」？兩黨最高階層又豈有機會面對面地頻密互動？而若非民進黨失盡人心，馬英九及其兩岸政策的變革又豈能獲得多數選民的背書？如果沒有了這一切，怎會有「胡蕭會」？又豈會有「四個希望」與「四個繼續」？
據此以論，八年的代價雖大，卻儼然已產生重大的報償：一、終於證實台獨鎖國的路行不通，使「維持現狀／開放交流」的兩岸政策不再被誣為「賣台」，且經馬蕭勝選建立了此一政策的民主正當性。二、國共高層人物利用這八年的「空窗期」，經歷了難得的親身交往，交換了「設身處地」的思維，並建立了一定程度的互信。三、國民黨因為下野才有與中共頻密接觸的機會，如今國民黨從在野黨又轉為執政黨，雙邊接觸層次亦告水漲船高，立即變成「執政黨對執政黨」，可謂是渾然天成的「無縫接軌」。
若無八年的點滴累積，不可能有今日局面。國民黨在野與中共互動了八年，累積了未來執政與中共互動的珍貴資產；而民進黨執政八年使台獨鎖國的政策宣告破產，無形中成為國民黨未來開創兩岸新局的最佳背書人。對兩岸來說，過去這八年可謂是因禍得福。
過去八年，從北京的角度看，台獨聲勢不斷升高，正名制憲，公投入聯，去中華民國化；這使得北京必須正視「維持現狀」，甚至在布胡熱線中出現「九二共識／一中各表」，政策主軸轉為「反獨先於促統」。從台灣內部的角度看，則由於陳水扁失政敗德，又將去蔣、鞭屍、拆匾、二二八、去中華民國、正名制憲，及入聯公投等，操作得民怨沸騰，致使台獨的道德性及正當性急劇耗弱，其鎖國的兩岸政策亦引發社會質疑。
於是，兩岸出現了兩條走向相對的動線：一條是中共認為台獨氣焰上升，一條是台灣民眾對台獨的評價下降；一長一消之間，國共平台在民意的支持中搭起，國民黨開放交流的政策獲得民主背書，馬英九亦以兩岸新局代言人的角色贏得總統大選。冥冥之中，請問誰是造成此一形勢的最主要推手？難道不正是民進黨？難道不正是陳水扁！
八年抗戰，國民黨從在野黨回復成執政黨，國民黨固然點滴在心頭，中共也應從國民黨「失去政權／重新執政」的鏡鑑中，體認民主與民本的真諦。經過八年互動，兩岸高層如今不應只是鉤心鬥角的鬥爭對手，而應當多少變成一種相互砥礪與相互提升的「利害關係人」（stakeholder），畢竟雙方的共同使命皆在造福人民。這種亦敵亦友的關係，可謂是八年形成的最珍貴資產，應當共同珍惜維護。
至於民進黨，執政八年累積了促成胡蕭會的一切條件，這究竟是有心栽花，還是無心插柳？
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 17, 2008
The DPP made the Hu Hsiao Summit possible. That is not an exaggeration.
In 2000, the Lien/Siew ticket was cheated out of its election victory. Lien and Siew each went their own way. In 2001, Siew organized the Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation. He served one term as Chen Shui-bian's Chief Economic Adviser. In 2005, Lien Chan, as Chairman of the Kuomintang, visited the mainland and established a KMT/CCP dialog mechanism. For several years, Lien and Siew went their own way, and shared little ground in common.
Who could have predicted that in 2008 Ma Ying-jeou would seek out Vincent Siew as his running mate? That the Ma/Siew ticket would score a resounding victory? That the mutual trust created between the KMT and CCP by Lien Chan's dialogue mechanism, in conjunction with Vincent Siew's cross-strait foundation, would enable the attention-grabbing Hu/Siew Summit to take shape, virtually overnight? Lien Chan's dialog mechanism, Vincent Siew's cross-strait foundation, and Ma's impending presidency were three separate paths. Yet they converged almost instantly. They became a "one-two punch." They played out a chapter of history that took the world by surprise.
The course of history is tortuous. Had the KMT not been out of power for eight years, would Lien Chan have been able to visit the mainland? Had the DPP not resorted to political trickery to remain in power in 2004, would Lien Chan's visit the mainland have acquired so much legitimacy with the public on Taiwan? Had the KMT not been out of power, would Vincent Siew have been "reduced" to lobbyist for a cross-strait common market? Could the KMT and the CCP have established such a well-oiled dialogue mechanism? Would party officials at the highest levels have enjoyed the opportunity for face-to-face interaction? Had the DPP not lost the hearts and minds of the people, would Ma Ying-jeou and his new cross-strait policy have met with the approval of so many voters? Without all these precedents, how could the Hu Siew Summit have taken place? How could the "Four Hopes" and "Four Constants" have made their debut?
The price paid, eight years in the political wilderness, was high. But the rewards have been commensurate. First. Events have confirmed that the path of Taiwan independence and the DPP's Closed Door Policy is a dead end. Maintaining the status quo and advocating cross-strait exchange can no longer be falsely equated with "betraying Taiwan." The Ma/Siew ticket's election victory has confirmed the legitimacy of cross-strait links. Second. The KMT and CCP party hierarchies have made good use of this eight year window of opportunity. After rare personal contacts and heartfelt exchanges, they have established a considerable degree of mutual trust. Third. The KMT was able to establish close contacts with the CCP only because it was out of power. Now that the KMT is again the ruling party, bilateral contacts can immediately and seamlessly be raised to the level of "ruling party to ruling party" contacts.
Without eight years of accumulated experience, today's scenario would have been impossible. Eight years of opposition KMT interaction with the CCP will enable the ruling KMT to interact smoothly and constructively with the CCP. Conversely, eight years of Democratic Progressive Party misrule has thoroughly discredited Taiwan independence and the DPP's Closed Door Policy. Eight years of DPP misrule has transformed the DPP into a reluctant but persuasive witness on behalf of the KMT's new cross-strait policy. For cross-strait relations, the past eight years have been a blessing in disguise.
As Beijing sees it, Taiwan independence momentum has been building over the past eight years. The Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution campaigns, the Plebiscite to Join the UN, and efforts to stuff the Republic of China down the Memory Hole, have forced Beijing to look more favorably on "maintaining the status quo." A Bush/Hu hotline exchange affirmed the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations, and that "opposing independence had higher priority than promoting reunification." Meanwhile on Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian's misrule and malfeasance, his campaigns to purge Chiang's legacy, insult Chiang's memory, demolish Chiang's name plaques, demagogue the 228 Incident, Rectify Names and Author of a New Constitution, hold Plebiscites to Join the UN, have infuriated the public, undermined the legitimacy of Taiwan independence, and provoked doubts about the DPP's Closed Door policy.
The two sides of the Taiwan Strait have taken note of two entirely opposite trends. The mainland authorities have noted the Taiwan independence movement's increased momentum. The public on Taiwan has noted the Taiwan independence movement's diminished credibility. Amidst these opposing trends, the KMT and the CCP have won over public opinion. The public has endorsed the KMT's policy of open exchanges. Ma Ying-jeou, as spokesman for a new cross-strait policy, emerged victorious in the presidential election. Who created this situation? Who but the DPP? Who but Chen Shui-bian?
After an eight-year War of Resistance against the DPP, the opposition KMT is again the ruling party. The KMT knows what it means to lose power. The CCP should take the KMT's experience to heart. It should remember that the people are the masters and government authority originates with them. After eight years of interaction, the leadership on both sides of the strait must behave not like rivals jockeying for advantage, but like stakeholders promoting mutual advantage. After all, the two sides have a common cause -- the welfare of the people. They may be opponents, but they are also allies. This precious eight year legacy is something that both sides should cherish and maintain.
As for the DPP, its eight years in power created the conditions that made the Hu Hsiao Summit a possibility and a reality. It makes no difference that it was the farthest thing from the DPP's intention. The indisputable fact is the DPP made it all possible.
天機莫測：民進黨促成了胡蕭會？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.17 02:43 am
民進黨促成了胡蕭會，此話怎講？
從二○○○年說起。「連蕭配」在總統大選慘敗，連蕭二人竟告分道揚鑣。二○○一年，蕭萬長自組「兩岸共同市場基金會」，一度並成為陳水扁的「總統首席經濟顧問」；連戰則在二○○五年以國民黨主席的身分訪問大陸，並成立「國共平台」。數年之間，連蕭各走各的路，看不出交集。
誰料，二○○八年馬英九竟然找上蕭萬長做競選搭檔，而「馬蕭配」又大勝，且以連戰的「國共平台」提供的互信基礎，及蕭萬長的「基金會」提供的題材，居然在一夕之間即湊成了舉世矚目的「胡蕭博鰲會」；至此，「連平台／蕭基金會／馬選總統」，原本三路「分進」，立即匯流而成「合擊」的交集場面，演出了令世人意外又驚嘆的一頁！
歷史的大道莫非是曲折的？如果不是因國民黨下野八年，連戰豈有可能訪問大陸？又如果不是民進黨的倒行逆施，連戰訪問大陸在台灣民間又豈有正當性？而若不是國民黨下野，蕭萬長又豈會「淪落」成「共同市場」鍥而不捨的兩岸說客？且國共兩黨之間又豈有可能搭起「平台」？兩黨最高階層又豈有機會面對面地頻密互動？而若非民進黨失盡人心，馬英九及其兩岸政策的變革又豈能獲得多數選民的背書？如果沒有了這一切，怎會有「胡蕭會」？又豈會有「四個希望」與「四個繼續」？
據此以論，八年的代價雖大，卻儼然已產生重大的報償：一、終於證實台獨鎖國的路行不通，使「維持現狀／開放交流」的兩岸政策不再被誣為「賣台」，且經馬蕭勝選建立了此一政策的民主正當性。二、國共高層人物利用這八年的「空窗期」，經歷了難得的親身交往，交換了「設身處地」的思維，並建立了一定程度的互信。三、國民黨因為下野才有與中共頻密接觸的機會，如今國民黨從在野黨又轉為執政黨，雙邊接觸層次亦告水漲船高，立即變成「執政黨對執政黨」，可謂是渾然天成的「無縫接軌」。
若無八年的點滴累積，不可能有今日局面。國民黨在野與中共互動了八年，累積了未來執政與中共互動的珍貴資產；而民進黨執政八年使台獨鎖國的政策宣告破產，無形中成為國民黨未來開創兩岸新局的最佳背書人。對兩岸來說，過去這八年可謂是因禍得福。
過去八年，從北京的角度看，台獨聲勢不斷升高，正名制憲，公投入聯，去中華民國化；這使得北京必須正視「維持現狀」，甚至在布胡熱線中出現「九二共識／一中各表」，政策主軸轉為「反獨先於促統」。從台灣內部的角度看，則由於陳水扁失政敗德，又將去蔣、鞭屍、拆匾、二二八、去中華民國、正名制憲，及入聯公投等，操作得民怨沸騰，致使台獨的道德性及正當性急劇耗弱，其鎖國的兩岸政策亦引發社會質疑。
於是，兩岸出現了兩條走向相對的動線：一條是中共認為台獨氣焰上升，一條是台灣民眾對台獨的評價下降；一長一消之間，國共平台在民意的支持中搭起，國民黨開放交流的政策獲得民主背書，馬英九亦以兩岸新局代言人的角色贏得總統大選。冥冥之中，請問誰是造成此一形勢的最主要推手？難道不正是民進黨？難道不正是陳水扁！
八年抗戰，國民黨從在野黨回復成執政黨，國民黨固然點滴在心頭，中共也應從國民黨「失去政權／重新執政」的鏡鑑中，體認民主與民本的真諦。經過八年互動，兩岸高層如今不應只是鉤心鬥角的鬥爭對手，而應當多少變成一種相互砥礪與相互提升的「利害關係人」（stakeholder），畢竟雙方的共同使命皆在造福人民。這種亦敵亦友的關係，可謂是八年形成的最珍貴資產，應當共同珍惜維護。
至於民進黨，執政八年累積了促成胡蕭會的一切條件，這究竟是有心栽花，還是無心插柳？
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
An SEF Chairman qualified to be Premier
An SEF Chairman qualified to be Premier
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 16, 2008
Ma Ying-jeou's summed up the Hu Siew Meeting at the Boao Forum by saying, "This was a successful meeting." But he added, "We have merely melted the tip of the iceberg." Siew agreed, "The iceberg is huge. It will take a while for the melting water to become a torrent." Ma and Siew agree. Cross-strait relations should proceed slowly but surely.
Ma and Siew's remarks show that they do not have an inflated view of the significance of the Hu Siew Meeting. They remain cautious about future developments. They know that "above the abyss, is a thin layer of ice." They are unwilling to exaggerate their success. They have not ignored the risks. But neither are they flinching from the challenge. The public probably does not want the new leadership to make any rash moves.
Ma Ying-jeou has appointed Chiang Pin-kung SEF chairman. This means that cross-strait relations in the wake of the Boao Forum will be based on economic and trade exchange instead of bickering over political symbolism. Chiang Pin-kung was on the short list of candidates for Premier. To appoint Chiang Pin-kung SEF Chairman is to appoint someone qualified to be Premier to the position. Koo Chen-fu came from a background of wealth. He was appointed to high office. Chiang Pin-kung, by contrast, came from a humble background. He worked his way up the ladder of government, one step at a time. He is a workaholic highly experienced in public policy and government administration. Chiang Pin-kung is unlike Chang Chun-hsiung. Former premier Chang Chun-hsiung was also an SEF Chief. But Chang was a politician, a "hollow radish." Chiang Pin-kung, on the other hand, is a many year veteran of economic and trade matters. In recent years he has accumulated even more first hand experience with Taiwan businessmen. The Straits Exchange Foundation will have fewer people from Koo Chen-fu's era. It will also have fewer people from Chang Chun-hsiung's era. We expect to see an SEF Chief who is "Chief Cook and Bottle Washer."
The ice in the Taiwan Strait is melting. The SEF is getting an infusion of new blood. The ice in the Taiwan Strait is not being melted merely to solve problems faced by Taiwan businessmen. It is being melted to solve problems faced by everyone on Taiwan. Opening Taiwan to the mainland opens Taiwan to the world. The synergy will create a win/win scenario for all. Taiwan can no longer afford to lose its economic lifeblood. It must recirculate that economic lifeblood in order to nourish the main body.
Economic and trade issues are the tip of Taiwan's cross-strait relations iceberg. Cross-strait relations meanwhile, are the tip of Taiwan's political and economic iceberg. If Taiwan fails to break down cross-strait economic and trade barriers, it will not be able to solve Taiwan's economic problems. But if it merely breaks down barriers to cross-strait economic and trade, it still won't be able to solve Taiwan's economic problems. For example, almost every year the American Chamber of Commerce and the European Chamber of Commerce have urged Taiwan to open direct links to the mainland. Obviously relaxing cross-strait economic and trade barriers helps more than just Taiwan businessmen and mainland businessmen. It increases economic and trade opportunities. It normalizes economic and trade relations in the Taiwan Strait. It creates conditions necessary for the transformation of Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific Regional Hub. Taiwan's political and economic problems be resolved only through cross-strait relations. Only cross-strait relations will enable people on Taiwan to go beyond cross-strait relations. Only then will Taiwan find salvation. Only then will Taiwan find a way out.
The atmosphere in the wake of the Boao Forum is overly optimistic. The business community was not alone. Even local Green camp officials such as Chen Chu and Su Chi-feng wanted to get in on the act, wanted their share of the booty. Ma and Siew offered timely reminders that "Melting the ice too quickly would create a flood" and that "haste makes waste." The appointment of the workaholic Chiang Pin-kung as SEF Chief offered cautious optimism that the ice might melt sooner rather than later. Community leaders need cooler heads than the general public. They must not allow enthusiasm to get the better of them.
The SEF was originally "a pair of white gloves," i.e., an intermediary. Chiang Pin-kung may indeed play such a role. But Chiang Pin-kung is an economic and trade expert with hands-on mainland experience. His role would hardly be limited to "a pair of white gloves." The late Koo Chen-fu lacked Chiang Pin-kung's hands-on experience. Koo Chen-fu never set foot on the mainland until 1998. Chiang Pin-kung will be visiting the mainland prior to May 20 in his capacity as KMT Vice Chairman. He will be thanking Taiwan businessmen for supporting the Ma/Siew ticket. Times truly have changed. We celebrate these changes in the SEF leadership.
Chiang Pin-kung is an SEF Chairman qualified to be Premier. The public hopes he will promote peaceful cross-strait exchanges. Even more, it hopes he will make good use of warmer cross-strait relations to improve world trade, strengthen Taiwan's role, and help solve Taiwan's political problems. The SEF is not an "Association for the Betterment of Taiwan Businessmen." It is an agent of national reconstruction. Chiang Pin-kung is an SEF Chairman qualfied to be Premier. The public has good reason for optimism.
Chiang Pin-kung may actually be able to make a greater contribution to his country as SEF Chairman than as Premier.
閣揆級的海基會董事長
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.16 02:37 am
馬英九對博鰲胡蕭會的評語是：「這是一次成功的會議。」但是，他又說：「冰山只融一小塊。」蕭萬長則稱：「冰山很大，一下子融化了會變成洪水。」馬蕭的共同見解是：「兩岸關係走得穩比走得快好。」
這樣的評語，顯示馬蕭對胡蕭會的成就未過度「膨風」，且對後續發展亦有「臨深淵，履薄冰」的戒慎恐懼之心；這樣的心情與態度，不高估成就（只融一小塊），不忘記風險（一下子融化了會變成洪水），且以不退縮、不冒進的步伐前進（走得穩比走得快好），應是國人所願見的穩健務實形象。
馬英九宣布由江丙坤出任海基會董事長，亦顯示「後博鰲」的兩岸關係重點，將由政治符號的爭議轉向經貿交流的開展。江丙坤原被認為是列在閣揆候選名單中的角色，以江丙坤掌海基會，不啻是「閣揆級」的董事長。江丙坤不像辜振甫，辜從高處來，往高處去；江則出身基層，一步一腳印地升至主持中樞政務，是一位從政策至實務皆相當老練的「工作型」人物。江丙坤也不像張俊雄，張俊雄雖曾以卸任閣揆出掌海基會，但張是政客出身，空心蘿蔔；江丙坤則是親身參與經貿國政多年的個中老手，在近年更累積了與台商現場親身第一手密切互動的珍貴經驗。今後，海基會將少了一些辜振甫時代的身段，也不再有張俊雄時代的尸位素餐，可望出現一位「從校長到敲鐘全能型的董事長」。
值此兩岸開始融冰，及海基會人事定案之際，我們願再提醒：兩岸融冰，不是只為了解決「台商」的問題，更是為了解決「台灣」的問題。台灣對大陸開放，是為了台灣要對世界開放；台灣對大陸開放，主要目的是為了增益台灣對世界接軌的條件。當台灣因透過對大陸開放，而提升了台灣對世界開放的條件，其最後綜效亦必可回過頭來增進兩岸雙贏。台灣的經濟即可不再只是「出血」，而能「循環」，滋養台灣的母體。
經貿問題只是兩岸關係的冰山一角，兩岸關係又只是台灣政經架構的冰山一角。如今的情勢是：台灣若不打通兩岸經貿障礙，就不能解決台灣政經難題；但若只是打通兩岸經貿障礙而已，亦不能解決台灣經貿難題。例如，幾乎每年的美國商會或歐洲商會皆力主三通直航，可見鬆綁兩岸經貿障礙，不只是著眼於台商與陸商，亦存有改善台灣世界經貿角色的契機；台灣若能藉助於兩岸經貿關係正常化的新生條件，將台灣轉型為「亞太平台」之類的區域樞紐角色，則台灣的政經難題才有得以化解的可能性。亦即：必須「穿過兩岸關係」，藉以「超越兩岸關係」，台灣才能得救，才有出路。
博鰲會後，社會上似乎出現了過度樂觀的氣氛，非但工商界表達一展身手的意願，連陳菊、蘇治芬等綠營地方首長也食指大動，急著想分一杯羹；因而，馬蕭及時提醒「一下子融了會變成洪水」，與「走得穩比走得快好」，且由「工作型／實力型」的江丙坤出掌海基會，這皆應是可以審慎寄望的發展。在冰山初融之際，主政者當然應當比民間更冷靜與穩健，不能熱暈頭，更不可一頭熱。
海基會原被視為「白手套」，江丙坤恐怕亦仍須扮演此一角色；但是，以江丙坤的經貿才具，與「現場／親身」的大陸經驗，他也不會「只是白手套而已」的角色。辜振甫沒有的「田野經驗」與「第一手的手感」，江丙坤都有；且看，辜振甫一直到一九九八年始能登陸訪問，而江丙坤在五二○前就要以「國民黨副主席」的身分赴大陸向台商「謝票」，時代真的變了，我們慶幸海基會主持者的典型也同步改變！
江丙坤是「閣揆級的海基會董事長」，國人希望他能促進兩岸和平交流，也更寄望他能善用兩岸關係來改善增強台灣的世界經貿角色，以有利於解決台灣的政經綜合難題。海基會不只是「台商」權益促進會，也是我們綜合國力的建構者；對於「閣揆級的海基會董事長」江丙坤，國人有理由寄以如此期望！
江丙坤若亦能以此自期，其對國家的貢獻，可能更勝閣揆。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 16, 2008
Ma Ying-jeou's summed up the Hu Siew Meeting at the Boao Forum by saying, "This was a successful meeting." But he added, "We have merely melted the tip of the iceberg." Siew agreed, "The iceberg is huge. It will take a while for the melting water to become a torrent." Ma and Siew agree. Cross-strait relations should proceed slowly but surely.
Ma and Siew's remarks show that they do not have an inflated view of the significance of the Hu Siew Meeting. They remain cautious about future developments. They know that "above the abyss, is a thin layer of ice." They are unwilling to exaggerate their success. They have not ignored the risks. But neither are they flinching from the challenge. The public probably does not want the new leadership to make any rash moves.
Ma Ying-jeou has appointed Chiang Pin-kung SEF chairman. This means that cross-strait relations in the wake of the Boao Forum will be based on economic and trade exchange instead of bickering over political symbolism. Chiang Pin-kung was on the short list of candidates for Premier. To appoint Chiang Pin-kung SEF Chairman is to appoint someone qualified to be Premier to the position. Koo Chen-fu came from a background of wealth. He was appointed to high office. Chiang Pin-kung, by contrast, came from a humble background. He worked his way up the ladder of government, one step at a time. He is a workaholic highly experienced in public policy and government administration. Chiang Pin-kung is unlike Chang Chun-hsiung. Former premier Chang Chun-hsiung was also an SEF Chief. But Chang was a politician, a "hollow radish." Chiang Pin-kung, on the other hand, is a many year veteran of economic and trade matters. In recent years he has accumulated even more first hand experience with Taiwan businessmen. The Straits Exchange Foundation will have fewer people from Koo Chen-fu's era. It will also have fewer people from Chang Chun-hsiung's era. We expect to see an SEF Chief who is "Chief Cook and Bottle Washer."
The ice in the Taiwan Strait is melting. The SEF is getting an infusion of new blood. The ice in the Taiwan Strait is not being melted merely to solve problems faced by Taiwan businessmen. It is being melted to solve problems faced by everyone on Taiwan. Opening Taiwan to the mainland opens Taiwan to the world. The synergy will create a win/win scenario for all. Taiwan can no longer afford to lose its economic lifeblood. It must recirculate that economic lifeblood in order to nourish the main body.
Economic and trade issues are the tip of Taiwan's cross-strait relations iceberg. Cross-strait relations meanwhile, are the tip of Taiwan's political and economic iceberg. If Taiwan fails to break down cross-strait economic and trade barriers, it will not be able to solve Taiwan's economic problems. But if it merely breaks down barriers to cross-strait economic and trade, it still won't be able to solve Taiwan's economic problems. For example, almost every year the American Chamber of Commerce and the European Chamber of Commerce have urged Taiwan to open direct links to the mainland. Obviously relaxing cross-strait economic and trade barriers helps more than just Taiwan businessmen and mainland businessmen. It increases economic and trade opportunities. It normalizes economic and trade relations in the Taiwan Strait. It creates conditions necessary for the transformation of Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific Regional Hub. Taiwan's political and economic problems be resolved only through cross-strait relations. Only cross-strait relations will enable people on Taiwan to go beyond cross-strait relations. Only then will Taiwan find salvation. Only then will Taiwan find a way out.
The atmosphere in the wake of the Boao Forum is overly optimistic. The business community was not alone. Even local Green camp officials such as Chen Chu and Su Chi-feng wanted to get in on the act, wanted their share of the booty. Ma and Siew offered timely reminders that "Melting the ice too quickly would create a flood" and that "haste makes waste." The appointment of the workaholic Chiang Pin-kung as SEF Chief offered cautious optimism that the ice might melt sooner rather than later. Community leaders need cooler heads than the general public. They must not allow enthusiasm to get the better of them.
The SEF was originally "a pair of white gloves," i.e., an intermediary. Chiang Pin-kung may indeed play such a role. But Chiang Pin-kung is an economic and trade expert with hands-on mainland experience. His role would hardly be limited to "a pair of white gloves." The late Koo Chen-fu lacked Chiang Pin-kung's hands-on experience. Koo Chen-fu never set foot on the mainland until 1998. Chiang Pin-kung will be visiting the mainland prior to May 20 in his capacity as KMT Vice Chairman. He will be thanking Taiwan businessmen for supporting the Ma/Siew ticket. Times truly have changed. We celebrate these changes in the SEF leadership.
Chiang Pin-kung is an SEF Chairman qualified to be Premier. The public hopes he will promote peaceful cross-strait exchanges. Even more, it hopes he will make good use of warmer cross-strait relations to improve world trade, strengthen Taiwan's role, and help solve Taiwan's political problems. The SEF is not an "Association for the Betterment of Taiwan Businessmen." It is an agent of national reconstruction. Chiang Pin-kung is an SEF Chairman qualfied to be Premier. The public has good reason for optimism.
Chiang Pin-kung may actually be able to make a greater contribution to his country as SEF Chairman than as Premier.
閣揆級的海基會董事長
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.16 02:37 am
馬英九對博鰲胡蕭會的評語是：「這是一次成功的會議。」但是，他又說：「冰山只融一小塊。」蕭萬長則稱：「冰山很大，一下子融化了會變成洪水。」馬蕭的共同見解是：「兩岸關係走得穩比走得快好。」
這樣的評語，顯示馬蕭對胡蕭會的成就未過度「膨風」，且對後續發展亦有「臨深淵，履薄冰」的戒慎恐懼之心；這樣的心情與態度，不高估成就（只融一小塊），不忘記風險（一下子融化了會變成洪水），且以不退縮、不冒進的步伐前進（走得穩比走得快好），應是國人所願見的穩健務實形象。
馬英九宣布由江丙坤出任海基會董事長，亦顯示「後博鰲」的兩岸關係重點，將由政治符號的爭議轉向經貿交流的開展。江丙坤原被認為是列在閣揆候選名單中的角色，以江丙坤掌海基會，不啻是「閣揆級」的董事長。江丙坤不像辜振甫，辜從高處來，往高處去；江則出身基層，一步一腳印地升至主持中樞政務，是一位從政策至實務皆相當老練的「工作型」人物。江丙坤也不像張俊雄，張俊雄雖曾以卸任閣揆出掌海基會，但張是政客出身，空心蘿蔔；江丙坤則是親身參與經貿國政多年的個中老手，在近年更累積了與台商現場親身第一手密切互動的珍貴經驗。今後，海基會將少了一些辜振甫時代的身段，也不再有張俊雄時代的尸位素餐，可望出現一位「從校長到敲鐘全能型的董事長」。
值此兩岸開始融冰，及海基會人事定案之際，我們願再提醒：兩岸融冰，不是只為了解決「台商」的問題，更是為了解決「台灣」的問題。台灣對大陸開放，是為了台灣要對世界開放；台灣對大陸開放，主要目的是為了增益台灣對世界接軌的條件。當台灣因透過對大陸開放，而提升了台灣對世界開放的條件，其最後綜效亦必可回過頭來增進兩岸雙贏。台灣的經濟即可不再只是「出血」，而能「循環」，滋養台灣的母體。
經貿問題只是兩岸關係的冰山一角，兩岸關係又只是台灣政經架構的冰山一角。如今的情勢是：台灣若不打通兩岸經貿障礙，就不能解決台灣政經難題；但若只是打通兩岸經貿障礙而已，亦不能解決台灣經貿難題。例如，幾乎每年的美國商會或歐洲商會皆力主三通直航，可見鬆綁兩岸經貿障礙，不只是著眼於台商與陸商，亦存有改善台灣世界經貿角色的契機；台灣若能藉助於兩岸經貿關係正常化的新生條件，將台灣轉型為「亞太平台」之類的區域樞紐角色，則台灣的政經難題才有得以化解的可能性。亦即：必須「穿過兩岸關係」，藉以「超越兩岸關係」，台灣才能得救，才有出路。
博鰲會後，社會上似乎出現了過度樂觀的氣氛，非但工商界表達一展身手的意願，連陳菊、蘇治芬等綠營地方首長也食指大動，急著想分一杯羹；因而，馬蕭及時提醒「一下子融了會變成洪水」，與「走得穩比走得快好」，且由「工作型／實力型」的江丙坤出掌海基會，這皆應是可以審慎寄望的發展。在冰山初融之際，主政者當然應當比民間更冷靜與穩健，不能熱暈頭，更不可一頭熱。
海基會原被視為「白手套」，江丙坤恐怕亦仍須扮演此一角色；但是，以江丙坤的經貿才具，與「現場／親身」的大陸經驗，他也不會「只是白手套而已」的角色。辜振甫沒有的「田野經驗」與「第一手的手感」，江丙坤都有；且看，辜振甫一直到一九九八年始能登陸訪問，而江丙坤在五二○前就要以「國民黨副主席」的身分赴大陸向台商「謝票」，時代真的變了，我們慶幸海基會主持者的典型也同步改變！
江丙坤是「閣揆級的海基會董事長」，國人希望他能促進兩岸和平交流，也更寄望他能善用兩岸關係來改善增強台灣的世界經貿角色，以有利於解決台灣的政經綜合難題。海基會不只是「台商」權益促進會，也是我們綜合國力的建構者；對於「閣揆級的海基會董事長」江丙坤，國人有理由寄以如此期望！
江丙坤若亦能以此自期，其對國家的貢獻，可能更勝閣揆。
Tuesday, April 15, 2008
Political Trickery must be Investigated to the Bitter End
Political Trickery must be Investigated to the Bitter End
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2008.04.15
Frank Hsieh has sued Chen Chun-sheng for alleged defamation of character and election law violations. Yesterday the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office decided not to prosecute Chen. Prosecutors took depositions from Lin Hung-ming and Chen Chun-sheng. Ten years ago Wu Dun-yih and Frank Hsieh were running against each other for Mayor of Kaohsiung. During the last two weeks it came to light that the doctored tapes implicating Wu Dun-yih in an extramarital affair "were indeed supplied by Frank Hsieh." Hsieh handed the tapes over to Chen Chun-sheng at Lin Hung-ming's home. Prior court findings have confirmed that the tape was spliced together. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office decision not to prosecute Chen clarifies a complicated and confusing decade long case. The doctored tape was probably responsible for Wu Dun-yih's defeat by a mere 5,000 votes. As the saying goes, "Justice delayed is justice denied."
In response to the prosecutors' decision not to prosecute Chen, Frank Hsieh's office said it would immediately meet with prosecutors. Hsieh's office said it wanted to prove that Chen Chun-sheng scripted the affair entirely by himself. Hsieh's office maintained that the master tape was not doctored. Hsieh's office alleged that the tapes the court identified as having been doctored were doctored by the Bureau of Investigation. Lin Hung-ming testified that the tape was handed to him at his house. Hsieh admitted he was present that night. But he said that the tapes were already present when he arrived on the scene. The day after prosecutors announced they were not going forward with the case, Frank Hsieh swore a blood oath that he was innocent.
Over the past decade, Taiwan's political culture has changed. It has changed from one of physical violence, vote buying and black gold politics, to one of political trickery. Wu Dun-yih's undeserved election loss in his bid for Kaohsiung Mayor was the first instance of this political trickery. This was followed by the Chung Hsing Bills case just before the 2000 Presidential Election, by the Two Bullets case the day before the 2004 Presidential Election, and by the Per Diem case on the eve of the 2006 Kaohsiung Mayoral Election. These were classic instances of political trickery that reversed the outcome of the election. Prosecutors have eventually gotten to the bottom of these cases. They have been through a decade of trials and tribulations. Politically speaking, the top dogs are now the under dogs, and the under dogs the top dogs.
It would be no exaggeration to say that Frank Hsieh's doctored tape rewrote Taiwan's history. It changed the Mayor of Kaohsiung. It foreshadowed ruling party change in 2000. Frank Hsieh was subsequently re-elected Mayor of Kaohsiung, appointed Premier, and ran for Taipei mayor. His nomination as the DPP's 2008 presidential candidate was made possible by his election as Kaohsiung Mayor. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office decision not to prosecute Chen acknowledges certain facts made clear in the depositions. If they were to go forward with the case, they would merely force Frank Hsieh into a public accounting.
After all, Hsieh has still not come clean on what he was doing with Chen and Lin when the tapes were delivered to Lin's home. What reason is there to believe that the tape was not doctored? Is Hsieh omniscient and ominpotent? How could he possibly know what happened during the Bureau of Investigation's forensic analysis? How did he find himself mired in such a political conspiracy? Who has it in for him following the 2008 Presidential Election debacle? Who would lay such a trap for him? Hsieh is unable to answer these and other questions. Instead he rejects the court's decisions. He rejects the prosecutors' decision not to go forward. He rejects the testimony of two key witnesses. He persists in opening another case, in a futile effort to drag out a process that is already over and done with. He denies leaving fingerprints on the tape. His denials convince no one, and underestimate the public's common sense.
Prosecutors have not decided not to prosecute Chen Chun-sheng. This means Frank Hsieh may be prosecuted instead. He will be forced to explain his role in the sex scandal tapes, and bear full legal responsibility. For the past decade politicians who have been investigated have gotten off scot-free. It is not difficult to predict the number of politicians will resort to political trickery in the future. Every politician who thinks he can get away with it.
One cannot rewrite history. But society may be able to gain some insights from this prolonged discovery process. Democracy provides no assurance that politicians will behave ethically. Politicians will do whatever it takes to win. If the electorate fails to demand ethical conduct from its political representatives, then it must be prepared to suffer the painful consequences. The truth must be uncovered by means of due process of law. This requires both political courage and time.
Two years ago Chen Chun-sheng testified before the Legislative Yuan that Frank Hsieh personally handed him the master tape of the fake scandal tape. If Frank Hsieh hadn't chosen to sue for defamation of character, prosecutors wouldn't have had the opportunity to examine the physical evidence. The job of government officials is to enforce the law. If they can't stand the heat, they should stay out of the kitchen. The justice system is the hottest part of the kitchen. We must not assume that if Hsieh had won the presidential election, prosecutors would have lacked the courage to prosecute to the fullest extent of the law. Nor should we fault prosecutors for waiting until after the election. We have no reason to assume that prosecutors are piling on Hsieh merely because he lost the election. The Chinese parable about the father and son riding a donkey to market tells us that whatever we do, someone will criticize our actions. One must do what one must do. The law has a long arm. Those who resort to political trickery to win elections and rewrite history must bear full legal responsibility. Those who should be prosecuted, must be prosecuted, no ifs, ands, or buts.
不論當年有無奧步，都該追究到底
中國時報
2008.04.15
台 北地檢署日前就謝長廷控告陳春生誹謗及違反選罷法案件，做成不起訴處分。檢方採信林宏明及陳春生二人的證詞，十年前吳敦義與謝長廷競選高雄市長，最後兩周 爆出吳敦義的緋聞錄音帶，「確實是謝長廷拿出來的」，地點是在林宏明宅。此前已有法院判決確認該捲錄音帶乃是經過變造剪接的錄音帶，北檢的不起訴處分進一 步澄清了十年以來撲朔迷離；如果那捲錄音帶的公布，就是吳敦義當年以不滿五千票些微差距敗選的原因，則如今除了遲來正義，還能挽回什麼？
針 對檢方的不起訴處分，謝長廷辦公室立即表示將提請檢方再議，以便證明陳春生是自導自演；他們繼續主張錄音帶的母帶是真的，而且指稱法院中鑑定為變造的錄音 帶曾經調查局剪接。不過，林宏明證稱交付錄音帶的地點是其住宅，謝長廷並不否認當晚確實到場，但說抵達時錄音帶已在現場。不起訴處分翌日，謝長廷更公開以 發毒誓的方式強調他的清白。
過去十年來，台灣的選舉景觀出現轉變，從暴力賄選黑金充斥，發展到選民聞選舉「奧步」而色變，就是以吳敦義在 緋聞錄音帶公布之後落選一役，首開先河。此後，兩千年大選之前的興票案，○四年大選前日的兩顆子彈，○六年高雄選舉前夕的走路工事件，都被看成某種「奧 步」扭轉選舉結果的經典案例。現在這樁事件經過司法程序逐漸水落石出，卻已屆十年寒暑，政治上已是桑田成為滄海，滄海又成桑田。
如果說這 捲緋聞錄音帶改寫了台灣的歷史，並不為過。當年高雄市長易手，正是二千年政黨輪替的先聲；以後謝長廷連任，再從高雄市長轉任閣揆，角逐台北市長，問鼎○八 年總統大選……也都從高雄市長勝選發端。如今台北地檢署不起訴處分採認的證詞及所彰顯的事實，就算持續走完司法訴訟，也該是謝長廷對高雄市民乃至台灣人民 必須有所交代的一樁歷史公案。
畢竟在北檢不起訴處分之後，謝長廷仍然未澄清自己為什麼會在交付錄音帶的當場與陳、林在林宏明的住宅晤面？ 有什麼理由確知確信該捲錄音帶是未經剪接的真帶？謝如何全知全能地了解調查局的錄音帶鑑定作業過程？自己怎麼又再陷入某種政治陰謀的天羅地網？是誰要在他 ○八年總統敗選後落井下石、羅織構陷？若不能回答以上諸多疑問？單純地否定法院判決、否定檢方的不起訴處分、否定兩位關鍵證人的證詞，不斷地開啟另一個程 序以延續一個結束的程序，來否定自己曾在錄音帶事件中留下涉事指紋，其實說服力軟弱，也低估了社會常識判斷的能力。
迴避不起訴處分呈現的 事實，將迫使謝長廷必須繼續面對接踵而來的法律訴訟，以釐清其在緋聞錄音帶事件中究竟應該負擔何種法律責任。如果可以憑著口說某種想像中的政治構陷否定十 年來的司法追查而不必負擔任何法律責任，以後台灣的選舉將有多少政客師其劣技，不難預卜；奧步選舉盛行，亦恐不知伊於胡底。
歷史不能重 寫，但台灣社會或可從這樁歷史公案真相揭露的漫長過程中，得到一些啟示：即便是民主政治，政客若是缺乏起碼的政治道德，也可能會為求勝利不擇手段。選民如 果放棄要求政治人物遵守起碼的政治道德，就要準備付出慘痛的集體代價。畢竟透過司法程序還原事實，既需要獨立公正的法治勇氣，也需要漫長的時間。
兩 年前陳春生在立法院中公開謝長廷親手交付緋聞錄音母帶，要不是謝決定控其誹謗，檢方也無偵查驗證的機會。政客的法律責任，就是執法者的功課；司法畢竟不能 怕熱而不進執法廚房。我們不會假設若是謝長廷贏得總統選舉，檢方將無做成同樣不起訴處分的執法勇氣；也不會挑戰檢方等到大選結束後才完成不起訴處分的執法 智慧；更無理由懷疑檢方的不起訴處分是對敗選者落井下石。父子騎驢不能免於旁人指點，該走的路還是要走；法網恢恢，疏而不漏，用選舉奧步改寫歷史的法律責 任，該用訴訟追究的還是要追究到底！
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2008.04.15
Frank Hsieh has sued Chen Chun-sheng for alleged defamation of character and election law violations. Yesterday the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office decided not to prosecute Chen. Prosecutors took depositions from Lin Hung-ming and Chen Chun-sheng. Ten years ago Wu Dun-yih and Frank Hsieh were running against each other for Mayor of Kaohsiung. During the last two weeks it came to light that the doctored tapes implicating Wu Dun-yih in an extramarital affair "were indeed supplied by Frank Hsieh." Hsieh handed the tapes over to Chen Chun-sheng at Lin Hung-ming's home. Prior court findings have confirmed that the tape was spliced together. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office decision not to prosecute Chen clarifies a complicated and confusing decade long case. The doctored tape was probably responsible for Wu Dun-yih's defeat by a mere 5,000 votes. As the saying goes, "Justice delayed is justice denied."
In response to the prosecutors' decision not to prosecute Chen, Frank Hsieh's office said it would immediately meet with prosecutors. Hsieh's office said it wanted to prove that Chen Chun-sheng scripted the affair entirely by himself. Hsieh's office maintained that the master tape was not doctored. Hsieh's office alleged that the tapes the court identified as having been doctored were doctored by the Bureau of Investigation. Lin Hung-ming testified that the tape was handed to him at his house. Hsieh admitted he was present that night. But he said that the tapes were already present when he arrived on the scene. The day after prosecutors announced they were not going forward with the case, Frank Hsieh swore a blood oath that he was innocent.
Over the past decade, Taiwan's political culture has changed. It has changed from one of physical violence, vote buying and black gold politics, to one of political trickery. Wu Dun-yih's undeserved election loss in his bid for Kaohsiung Mayor was the first instance of this political trickery. This was followed by the Chung Hsing Bills case just before the 2000 Presidential Election, by the Two Bullets case the day before the 2004 Presidential Election, and by the Per Diem case on the eve of the 2006 Kaohsiung Mayoral Election. These were classic instances of political trickery that reversed the outcome of the election. Prosecutors have eventually gotten to the bottom of these cases. They have been through a decade of trials and tribulations. Politically speaking, the top dogs are now the under dogs, and the under dogs the top dogs.
It would be no exaggeration to say that Frank Hsieh's doctored tape rewrote Taiwan's history. It changed the Mayor of Kaohsiung. It foreshadowed ruling party change in 2000. Frank Hsieh was subsequently re-elected Mayor of Kaohsiung, appointed Premier, and ran for Taipei mayor. His nomination as the DPP's 2008 presidential candidate was made possible by his election as Kaohsiung Mayor. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office decision not to prosecute Chen acknowledges certain facts made clear in the depositions. If they were to go forward with the case, they would merely force Frank Hsieh into a public accounting.
After all, Hsieh has still not come clean on what he was doing with Chen and Lin when the tapes were delivered to Lin's home. What reason is there to believe that the tape was not doctored? Is Hsieh omniscient and ominpotent? How could he possibly know what happened during the Bureau of Investigation's forensic analysis? How did he find himself mired in such a political conspiracy? Who has it in for him following the 2008 Presidential Election debacle? Who would lay such a trap for him? Hsieh is unable to answer these and other questions. Instead he rejects the court's decisions. He rejects the prosecutors' decision not to go forward. He rejects the testimony of two key witnesses. He persists in opening another case, in a futile effort to drag out a process that is already over and done with. He denies leaving fingerprints on the tape. His denials convince no one, and underestimate the public's common sense.
Prosecutors have not decided not to prosecute Chen Chun-sheng. This means Frank Hsieh may be prosecuted instead. He will be forced to explain his role in the sex scandal tapes, and bear full legal responsibility. For the past decade politicians who have been investigated have gotten off scot-free. It is not difficult to predict the number of politicians will resort to political trickery in the future. Every politician who thinks he can get away with it.
One cannot rewrite history. But society may be able to gain some insights from this prolonged discovery process. Democracy provides no assurance that politicians will behave ethically. Politicians will do whatever it takes to win. If the electorate fails to demand ethical conduct from its political representatives, then it must be prepared to suffer the painful consequences. The truth must be uncovered by means of due process of law. This requires both political courage and time.
Two years ago Chen Chun-sheng testified before the Legislative Yuan that Frank Hsieh personally handed him the master tape of the fake scandal tape. If Frank Hsieh hadn't chosen to sue for defamation of character, prosecutors wouldn't have had the opportunity to examine the physical evidence. The job of government officials is to enforce the law. If they can't stand the heat, they should stay out of the kitchen. The justice system is the hottest part of the kitchen. We must not assume that if Hsieh had won the presidential election, prosecutors would have lacked the courage to prosecute to the fullest extent of the law. Nor should we fault prosecutors for waiting until after the election. We have no reason to assume that prosecutors are piling on Hsieh merely because he lost the election. The Chinese parable about the father and son riding a donkey to market tells us that whatever we do, someone will criticize our actions. One must do what one must do. The law has a long arm. Those who resort to political trickery to win elections and rewrite history must bear full legal responsibility. Those who should be prosecuted, must be prosecuted, no ifs, ands, or buts.
不論當年有無奧步，都該追究到底
中國時報
2008.04.15
台 北地檢署日前就謝長廷控告陳春生誹謗及違反選罷法案件，做成不起訴處分。檢方採信林宏明及陳春生二人的證詞，十年前吳敦義與謝長廷競選高雄市長，最後兩周 爆出吳敦義的緋聞錄音帶，「確實是謝長廷拿出來的」，地點是在林宏明宅。此前已有法院判決確認該捲錄音帶乃是經過變造剪接的錄音帶，北檢的不起訴處分進一 步澄清了十年以來撲朔迷離；如果那捲錄音帶的公布，就是吳敦義當年以不滿五千票些微差距敗選的原因，則如今除了遲來正義，還能挽回什麼？
針 對檢方的不起訴處分，謝長廷辦公室立即表示將提請檢方再議，以便證明陳春生是自導自演；他們繼續主張錄音帶的母帶是真的，而且指稱法院中鑑定為變造的錄音 帶曾經調查局剪接。不過，林宏明證稱交付錄音帶的地點是其住宅，謝長廷並不否認當晚確實到場，但說抵達時錄音帶已在現場。不起訴處分翌日，謝長廷更公開以 發毒誓的方式強調他的清白。
過去十年來，台灣的選舉景觀出現轉變，從暴力賄選黑金充斥，發展到選民聞選舉「奧步」而色變，就是以吳敦義在 緋聞錄音帶公布之後落選一役，首開先河。此後，兩千年大選之前的興票案，○四年大選前日的兩顆子彈，○六年高雄選舉前夕的走路工事件，都被看成某種「奧 步」扭轉選舉結果的經典案例。現在這樁事件經過司法程序逐漸水落石出，卻已屆十年寒暑，政治上已是桑田成為滄海，滄海又成桑田。
如果說這 捲緋聞錄音帶改寫了台灣的歷史，並不為過。當年高雄市長易手，正是二千年政黨輪替的先聲；以後謝長廷連任，再從高雄市長轉任閣揆，角逐台北市長，問鼎○八 年總統大選……也都從高雄市長勝選發端。如今台北地檢署不起訴處分採認的證詞及所彰顯的事實，就算持續走完司法訴訟，也該是謝長廷對高雄市民乃至台灣人民 必須有所交代的一樁歷史公案。
畢竟在北檢不起訴處分之後，謝長廷仍然未澄清自己為什麼會在交付錄音帶的當場與陳、林在林宏明的住宅晤面？ 有什麼理由確知確信該捲錄音帶是未經剪接的真帶？謝如何全知全能地了解調查局的錄音帶鑑定作業過程？自己怎麼又再陷入某種政治陰謀的天羅地網？是誰要在他 ○八年總統敗選後落井下石、羅織構陷？若不能回答以上諸多疑問？單純地否定法院判決、否定檢方的不起訴處分、否定兩位關鍵證人的證詞，不斷地開啟另一個程 序以延續一個結束的程序，來否定自己曾在錄音帶事件中留下涉事指紋，其實說服力軟弱，也低估了社會常識判斷的能力。
迴避不起訴處分呈現的 事實，將迫使謝長廷必須繼續面對接踵而來的法律訴訟，以釐清其在緋聞錄音帶事件中究竟應該負擔何種法律責任。如果可以憑著口說某種想像中的政治構陷否定十 年來的司法追查而不必負擔任何法律責任，以後台灣的選舉將有多少政客師其劣技，不難預卜；奧步選舉盛行，亦恐不知伊於胡底。
歷史不能重 寫，但台灣社會或可從這樁歷史公案真相揭露的漫長過程中，得到一些啟示：即便是民主政治，政客若是缺乏起碼的政治道德，也可能會為求勝利不擇手段。選民如 果放棄要求政治人物遵守起碼的政治道德，就要準備付出慘痛的集體代價。畢竟透過司法程序還原事實，既需要獨立公正的法治勇氣，也需要漫長的時間。
兩 年前陳春生在立法院中公開謝長廷親手交付緋聞錄音母帶，要不是謝決定控其誹謗，檢方也無偵查驗證的機會。政客的法律責任，就是執法者的功課；司法畢竟不能 怕熱而不進執法廚房。我們不會假設若是謝長廷贏得總統選舉，檢方將無做成同樣不起訴處分的執法勇氣；也不會挑戰檢方等到大選結束後才完成不起訴處分的執法 智慧；更無理由懷疑檢方的不起訴處分是對敗選者落井下石。父子騎驢不能免於旁人指點，該走的路還是要走；法網恢恢，疏而不漏，用選舉奧步改寫歷史的法律責 任，該用訴訟追究的還是要追究到底！
Monday, April 14, 2008
Pragmatism and Win/Win Thinking: the New Theme of Cross-Strait
Pragmatism and Win/Win Thinking: the New Theme of Cross-Strait Relations
China Times Editorial
A Translation
April 14, 2008
When future historians write the history of cross-strait relations, what will they make of the Siew Hu Meeting at this year's Boao Forum? Will they see it as an ice-breaker following the big freeze that began in 2000? Will they see it as historic? As the highest level meeting between the two sides since 1949? Regardless of how they see it, one point is indisputable. The meeting is a turning point in cross-strait relations. It has changed the course of history.
Perhaps it was the timing. Perhaps it was historical inevitability. No cross-strait summit was in the cards. Yet on the eve of the KMT's return to power, it became a reality. The Boao Forum was originally a trade forum. Its primary function was to serve as a transnational networking platform.
Those invited were mostly economic and financial officials from various nations. The forum enjoyed a diversified and flexible public/private, bilateral/multilateral, political/economic status highly conducive to informal cross-strait dialogue. Siew is one of the VIPs who has been invited to every session. The only difference is that this year he will be sworn in as Vice President of the Republic of China a month from now. At the moment however, he remains a civilian. The timing has made it possible to avoid disputes over his official status. The two sides need no longer remain preoccupied with official identity and political status. All that needed to build goodwill now is a protocol for future interaction. The forum has established an atmosphere conducive to rapprochement. Who can deny that the "Siew Hu Meeting" is not the sequel to the Koo-Wang talks? That it constitutes another milestone in cross-strait historical development?
As we review cross-strait relations, we see how much time was wasted jockeying for position and quibbling over irrelevancies such as One China vs. Different Interpretations, cross-strait vs. two states, dialogue vs. negotiations, consensus vs. spirit, premise vs. topic. Who knows how much energy has been expended on these semantic issues alone? The result has been years of deadlock. The two sides are as far apart as ever. Nobody has convinced anybody. Nobody has taken advantage of anybody. This jockeying for position has solved nothing. At the Boao Forum, such issues were shelved. Everyone knew they existed, but nobody spoke of them.
What alternative do we have? The cross-strait status quo is the result of historical circumstances. The two sides are each subject to their own internal constraints. If every controversy must be resolved before we can take the next step, we will merely perpetuate the current stalemate. The wheels of history never cease turning. If a wide range of non-controversial issues can be resolved, via a win/win scenario, why cling stubbornly to one's entrenched position? Vincent Siew and Ma Ying-jeou have conveyed a message to the mainland: "Face reality squarely, create future opportunities, set aside disputes, and seeking win/win solutions." That just about says it all.
The language of the Siew Hu Meeting reflects a whole new mode of cross-strait interaction. The two sides no longer need to quibble endlessly over pointless semantic distinctions. They are now free to take effective action. Vincent Siew Hu shared his "Four Hopes" with Hu Jintao. He hoped for direct, cross-strait transportation links, mainland tourism to Taiwan, economic and trade normalization, and the resumption of consultations and negotiations. Hu Jintao responded clearly with his "Four Constants." Together they addressed pragmatic issues and narrowed the focus. As long as these hopes and constants prevail, even more substantive talks will follow.
Siew proposed "pursuing a win-win situation." Hu Jintao, in response, proposed "creating a win-win situation." This footnote to the summit gives us cause for optimism. The two sides have entered a new era of pragmatism. During the second half of this year various technical issues can be worked out. This pragmatism will become the dominant theme in cross-strait interaction for the next few years. As a result, we can anticipate creative breakthroughs to more difficult problems, such as membership in the WHA and APEC. The next stage will be a form of benign cross-strait interaction. It will also be a kind of a test.
The Wang-Koo Era is long past. The eight year long rhetorical stand-off will end one month from now. So will economic stagnation and political stalemate. The mainland has appointed Director Chen Yunlin of the State Council for Taiwan Affairs, an old hand at cross-strait affairs, as the next Chairman of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). On May 20, Taiwan will appoint new personnel to the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). When the two organizations resume cross-strait dialogue, they will usher in a new era of cross-strait relations.
讓務實與雙贏重回兩岸思維的主軸
中國時報
2008.04.14
嘗試預想一下，未來史家在書寫兩岸關係史之際，會怎樣評價這回博鰲論壇的「蕭胡會」？認為它是兩岸自二○○○年陷入低迷僵持後的一場「融冰會晤」，亦或是兩岸自一九四九年以來最高層級的「歷史性會晤」？不論評論視角的落點在哪裡，有一點應該是不會有分歧的：即這場會晤將是一個歷史轉捩點，接下來兩岸關係的歷史進程，確定會有完全不一樣的篇章了。
是時機巧合也好，是歷史機緣也罷，原本根本不會是排在近程階段的「兩岸高層會晤」，竟然就在國民黨重回執政的前夕，先行戲劇性地促成了。博鰲論壇原本是一個以經貿對話為主軸的跨國聯誼性平台，受邀者多為各國政經領袖，它在運作上享有的游走於官方與民間、雙邊與多邊、政治與經濟的多樣彈性，相當有利於此刻的兩岸進行非正式對話，而蕭萬長又是每屆都受邀出席的貴賓之一，這屆唯一不同的是，一個月後他將宣誓就職為中華民國的副總統，但此刻他依舊還維持著平民的身分，這種時間與身分的些微落差，讓兩岸現存的所有惱人爭議，都被巧妙地迴避掉了。雙方暫時都不必再在身分與定位上去「機關算盡」，只須在「互動規格」上去累積善意即可。不談別的，僅就營造氛圍而言，誰說這場會面，不是繼辜汪會談後，另一次兩岸重要的歷史進程呢？
回顧過往的兩岸關係，有大半歲月都是放著實質問題不解決，一路虛耗在「定位」的爭執上，例如到底是「一中」還是「各表」？是「兩岸」還是「兩國」？是「對話」還是「談判」？是「對等」還是「平等」？是「共識」還是「精神」？是「前提」還是「議題」？光是這些語言表述的形式，就不知已耗掉多少人的心力智慧，結果爭議了多年，依舊是兩道平行線，誰也沒說服誰，誰也沒占到誰的便宜，一直到今天這些累積出來的「定位」糾葛，其實一樁都沒有獲得解決。在這場博鰲論壇中，與其說它們都被擱置，還不如說讓一切都暫且「存而不論」吧！
畢竟不這麼做，還能有什麼更好的途徑呢？兩岸現狀是歷史所造成的，兩岸內部也都各自存有不同的結構制約，如果一切都要先等「爭議」達成共識後才能繼續走下一步，那麼恐怕也只有維持「僵持」一個選擇。但時代的巨輪畢竟是朝前運轉的，如果兩岸間的許多「非爭議領域」可以透過實質互惠達成雙贏，何苦還要死守在無解的定位爭議裡虛耗？從這一點看馬英九透過蕭萬長向大陸所傳達「正視現實、開創未來、擱置爭議、追求雙贏」的十六字箴言，不正是道盡了一切？
檢視這場蕭胡會所使用的語言，也充分呈現了與以往兩岸互動完全不同的風貌。雙方都不再執著於尚有爭議的「名詞」上咬文嚼字或各顯機鋒，也不再在無謂的「形容詞」上高來高去，而是多了積極正面的「動詞」，蕭萬長當著胡錦濤的面提出兩岸直航、陸客來台觀光、經貿正常化、恢復協商談判「四個希望」，而胡錦濤也以「四個繼續」明確加以回應，不僅鎖定的都是實質問題，而且也達到聚焦的效果，只要這些「希望」能夠「繼續」下去，後續更實質層級的商談，馬上就可以啟動了。
如果說，蕭萬長所揭示的「追求雙贏」，與胡錦濤所回應的「共創雙贏」，可以做為這次蕭胡高峰會的一個註腳，那麼或許我們可以在此樂觀的預期：一個兩岸邁入「務實」的年代，即將在今年下半年陸續開展，圍繞於功能性、技術性議題的協商，將成為主導今後幾年兩岸互動的主要議程。而同樣較為棘手的ＷＨＡ年會、ＡＰＥＣ年會等議程屆時有無更富創意的突破，對兩岸下一階段的良性互動，也將會是一項考驗。
無論如何，辜汪兩老把酒言歡的年代已遠，過去八年的言辭對立、僵持停滯歲月，亦將在一個月後譜上休止符。如今大陸將由嫻熟兩岸事務的國台辦主任陳雲林接任海協會會長，台灣在五二○之後亦可望有一個全新的海基會人事布局，當兩岸兩會開始重啟對話，也等於就預告一個與以往不一樣的「兩岸關係」，即將登場。
China Times Editorial
A Translation
April 14, 2008
When future historians write the history of cross-strait relations, what will they make of the Siew Hu Meeting at this year's Boao Forum? Will they see it as an ice-breaker following the big freeze that began in 2000? Will they see it as historic? As the highest level meeting between the two sides since 1949? Regardless of how they see it, one point is indisputable. The meeting is a turning point in cross-strait relations. It has changed the course of history.
Perhaps it was the timing. Perhaps it was historical inevitability. No cross-strait summit was in the cards. Yet on the eve of the KMT's return to power, it became a reality. The Boao Forum was originally a trade forum. Its primary function was to serve as a transnational networking platform.
Those invited were mostly economic and financial officials from various nations. The forum enjoyed a diversified and flexible public/private, bilateral/multilateral, political/economic status highly conducive to informal cross-strait dialogue. Siew is one of the VIPs who has been invited to every session. The only difference is that this year he will be sworn in as Vice President of the Republic of China a month from now. At the moment however, he remains a civilian. The timing has made it possible to avoid disputes over his official status. The two sides need no longer remain preoccupied with official identity and political status. All that needed to build goodwill now is a protocol for future interaction. The forum has established an atmosphere conducive to rapprochement. Who can deny that the "Siew Hu Meeting" is not the sequel to the Koo-Wang talks? That it constitutes another milestone in cross-strait historical development?
As we review cross-strait relations, we see how much time was wasted jockeying for position and quibbling over irrelevancies such as One China vs. Different Interpretations, cross-strait vs. two states, dialogue vs. negotiations, consensus vs. spirit, premise vs. topic. Who knows how much energy has been expended on these semantic issues alone? The result has been years of deadlock. The two sides are as far apart as ever. Nobody has convinced anybody. Nobody has taken advantage of anybody. This jockeying for position has solved nothing. At the Boao Forum, such issues were shelved. Everyone knew they existed, but nobody spoke of them.
What alternative do we have? The cross-strait status quo is the result of historical circumstances. The two sides are each subject to their own internal constraints. If every controversy must be resolved before we can take the next step, we will merely perpetuate the current stalemate. The wheels of history never cease turning. If a wide range of non-controversial issues can be resolved, via a win/win scenario, why cling stubbornly to one's entrenched position? Vincent Siew and Ma Ying-jeou have conveyed a message to the mainland: "Face reality squarely, create future opportunities, set aside disputes, and seeking win/win solutions." That just about says it all.
The language of the Siew Hu Meeting reflects a whole new mode of cross-strait interaction. The two sides no longer need to quibble endlessly over pointless semantic distinctions. They are now free to take effective action. Vincent Siew Hu shared his "Four Hopes" with Hu Jintao. He hoped for direct, cross-strait transportation links, mainland tourism to Taiwan, economic and trade normalization, and the resumption of consultations and negotiations. Hu Jintao responded clearly with his "Four Constants." Together they addressed pragmatic issues and narrowed the focus. As long as these hopes and constants prevail, even more substantive talks will follow.
Siew proposed "pursuing a win-win situation." Hu Jintao, in response, proposed "creating a win-win situation." This footnote to the summit gives us cause for optimism. The two sides have entered a new era of pragmatism. During the second half of this year various technical issues can be worked out. This pragmatism will become the dominant theme in cross-strait interaction for the next few years. As a result, we can anticipate creative breakthroughs to more difficult problems, such as membership in the WHA and APEC. The next stage will be a form of benign cross-strait interaction. It will also be a kind of a test.
The Wang-Koo Era is long past. The eight year long rhetorical stand-off will end one month from now. So will economic stagnation and political stalemate. The mainland has appointed Director Chen Yunlin of the State Council for Taiwan Affairs, an old hand at cross-strait affairs, as the next Chairman of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). On May 20, Taiwan will appoint new personnel to the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). When the two organizations resume cross-strait dialogue, they will usher in a new era of cross-strait relations.
讓務實與雙贏重回兩岸思維的主軸
中國時報
2008.04.14
嘗試預想一下，未來史家在書寫兩岸關係史之際，會怎樣評價這回博鰲論壇的「蕭胡會」？認為它是兩岸自二○○○年陷入低迷僵持後的一場「融冰會晤」，亦或是兩岸自一九四九年以來最高層級的「歷史性會晤」？不論評論視角的落點在哪裡，有一點應該是不會有分歧的：即這場會晤將是一個歷史轉捩點，接下來兩岸關係的歷史進程，確定會有完全不一樣的篇章了。
是時機巧合也好，是歷史機緣也罷，原本根本不會是排在近程階段的「兩岸高層會晤」，竟然就在國民黨重回執政的前夕，先行戲劇性地促成了。博鰲論壇原本是一個以經貿對話為主軸的跨國聯誼性平台，受邀者多為各國政經領袖，它在運作上享有的游走於官方與民間、雙邊與多邊、政治與經濟的多樣彈性，相當有利於此刻的兩岸進行非正式對話，而蕭萬長又是每屆都受邀出席的貴賓之一，這屆唯一不同的是，一個月後他將宣誓就職為中華民國的副總統，但此刻他依舊還維持著平民的身分，這種時間與身分的些微落差，讓兩岸現存的所有惱人爭議，都被巧妙地迴避掉了。雙方暫時都不必再在身分與定位上去「機關算盡」，只須在「互動規格」上去累積善意即可。不談別的，僅就營造氛圍而言，誰說這場會面，不是繼辜汪會談後，另一次兩岸重要的歷史進程呢？
回顧過往的兩岸關係，有大半歲月都是放著實質問題不解決，一路虛耗在「定位」的爭執上，例如到底是「一中」還是「各表」？是「兩岸」還是「兩國」？是「對話」還是「談判」？是「對等」還是「平等」？是「共識」還是「精神」？是「前提」還是「議題」？光是這些語言表述的形式，就不知已耗掉多少人的心力智慧，結果爭議了多年，依舊是兩道平行線，誰也沒說服誰，誰也沒占到誰的便宜，一直到今天這些累積出來的「定位」糾葛，其實一樁都沒有獲得解決。在這場博鰲論壇中，與其說它們都被擱置，還不如說讓一切都暫且「存而不論」吧！
畢竟不這麼做，還能有什麼更好的途徑呢？兩岸現狀是歷史所造成的，兩岸內部也都各自存有不同的結構制約，如果一切都要先等「爭議」達成共識後才能繼續走下一步，那麼恐怕也只有維持「僵持」一個選擇。但時代的巨輪畢竟是朝前運轉的，如果兩岸間的許多「非爭議領域」可以透過實質互惠達成雙贏，何苦還要死守在無解的定位爭議裡虛耗？從這一點看馬英九透過蕭萬長向大陸所傳達「正視現實、開創未來、擱置爭議、追求雙贏」的十六字箴言，不正是道盡了一切？
檢視這場蕭胡會所使用的語言，也充分呈現了與以往兩岸互動完全不同的風貌。雙方都不再執著於尚有爭議的「名詞」上咬文嚼字或各顯機鋒，也不再在無謂的「形容詞」上高來高去，而是多了積極正面的「動詞」，蕭萬長當著胡錦濤的面提出兩岸直航、陸客來台觀光、經貿正常化、恢復協商談判「四個希望」，而胡錦濤也以「四個繼續」明確加以回應，不僅鎖定的都是實質問題，而且也達到聚焦的效果，只要這些「希望」能夠「繼續」下去，後續更實質層級的商談，馬上就可以啟動了。
如果說，蕭萬長所揭示的「追求雙贏」，與胡錦濤所回應的「共創雙贏」，可以做為這次蕭胡高峰會的一個註腳，那麼或許我們可以在此樂觀的預期：一個兩岸邁入「務實」的年代，即將在今年下半年陸續開展，圍繞於功能性、技術性議題的協商，將成為主導今後幾年兩岸互動的主要議程。而同樣較為棘手的ＷＨＡ年會、ＡＰＥＣ年會等議程屆時有無更富創意的突破，對兩岸下一階段的良性互動，也將會是一項考驗。
無論如何，辜汪兩老把酒言歡的年代已遠，過去八年的言辭對立、僵持停滯歲月，亦將在一個月後譜上休止符。如今大陸將由嫻熟兩岸事務的國台辦主任陳雲林接任海協會會長，台灣在五二○之後亦可望有一個全新的海基會人事布局，當兩岸兩會開始重啟對話，也等於就預告一個與以往不一樣的「兩岸關係」，即將登場。
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