Confronting Reality: The 16-Character Formula
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 31, 2008
Why has the minuscule difference between "zhong hua tai bei" and "zhong guo tai bei" provoked such heated arguments?
Let's begin by examining the "16-character formulas."
Taipei and Beijing each have their own 16-character formulas. Taipei's 16-character formula is what Vincent Siew spoke of at the Boao Forum: "Confront reality, create the future, shelve disputes, seek win-win." Beijing's 16-character formulat is what Hu Jintao told Lien Chan during the Lien/Hu Summit: "Establish mutual trust, shelve disputes, seek common ground, create win-win."
What the two sides have in common is "shelving disputes and seeking (or creating) win-win." Where the two sides differ, is that Taipei stresses "confronting reality," whereas Beijing stresses "building trust."
When Taipei stresses confronting reality, it means One China, Different Interpretations. It means that the existence of the Republic of China is a hard reality that Beijing must confront. When Beijing stresses building trust, it means the One China Principle, or opposition to de jure Taiwan independence.
One China, Different Expressions includes the One China Principle. But does the One China Principle include One China, Different Expressions? This remains uncertain. This brings us back to the issue of confronting reality or maintaining the status quo. From Taipei's perspective, if one eliminates the Republic of China, then one has changed reality. From Beijing's perspective, if one eliminates the Republic of China then one has failed to maintain the status quo.
Following Taiwan's second change of ruling parties, the Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution Path and the Nation of Taiwan Path have been temporarily relegated to the sidelines. Ma Ying-jeou's Republic of China Path involves: One. Defending the Republic of China and the Constitution of the Republic of China. Not championing the Rectification of Names and the Authoring of a New Constitution. Not advocating a Nation of Taiwan. Two. Under the premise of One China, Different Interpretations, increasing exchanges with the mainland, and seeking win-win. In other words, confronting reality and creating win-win.
So far the public on Taiwan approves of the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy. This is why Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT won the Legislative Yuan Elections and the Presidential Election at the beginning of the year. This is also why the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy must continue receiving public support in the future. The Republic of China Path must be erected on the same foundation. It must recognize the Republic of China's system of democracy.
When a majority on Taiwan believes that the Republic of China Path protects the Taiwan region's interests and dignity, it will remain viable. But if it is unable to maintain the Taiwan region's interests and dignity, the public will question this path. Even the Ma Ying-jeou administration, which champions this path, will find it difficult to stay on this path.
A recent example is the dispute over "zhong hua tai bei" vs. "zhong guo tai bei." Actually, for the national team to be named Chinese Taipei (zhong hua tai bei) was humiliating enough. If is is now changed to Chinese Taipei (zhong guo tai bei) It may be necessary to boycott the Olympics. Based on its 16-character formula, Taipei's back is already against the wall, and it has no more room to retreat. Based on its 16-character formula, Beijing must not take a mile after being given an inch. The Beijing authorities regard their own change in terminology as "outside the scope of the agreement," and as "an expression of goodwill."
Taipei must procure arms from Washington. Taipei hopes to join the United Nations. Taipei's arms purchases will never reach the level where it can achieve a conventional attack capability. Arms purchases provide mainly psychological support. As for joining the United Nations, Taipei is already riding the tiger. One cannot simply shout stop and expect everything to screech to a halt. Defending Chinese Taipei (zhong hua tai bei), purchasing arms from Washington, declaring a diplomatic truce, and seeking to participate in United Nations activities, are measures the Ma administration must adopt in order to confront reality and maintain the status quo. With regards the development of cross-Strait relations, the Beijing authorities must shelve disputes and seek common ground. Otherwise how can one create win-win?
Taipei and Beijing each have their own 16-character formula. Beijing's version stresses building trust. Its intention is to oppose de jure Taiwan independence. Taipei's version stresses confronting reality. Its intention is to defend the Republic of China. In fact, confronting reality and defending the Republic of China, and building trust and opposing de jure Taiwan independence overlap to a considerable degree. Without the Republic of China there is no possibility of building trust. The Beijing authorities should adopt the same perspective in response to the "zhong hua tai bei" vs."zhong guo tai bei" controversy. It should also adopt the same perspective in response to arms purchases from Washington, a diplomatic truce, and United Nations issues.
After all, the Republic of China is a democracy. Only when the Taiwan region believes that the Republic of China can protect Taiwan's interests and dignity, will it support the Republic of China Path vis a vis cross-Strait policy. Taipei and Beijing each have their own 16-character formula. If the Beijing authorities cannot confront reality, how can it build trust with the public on Taiwan?
正視現實：兩岸「十六字訣」的共同前提
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.07.31 03:13 am
「中華台北／中國台北」，一字之差，為何爭得面紅耳赤？可從兩岸的「十六字訣」談起。
兩岸各有十六字訣。台灣方面的十六字箴言，是蕭萬長在博鰲所說：「正視現實，開創未來，擱置爭議，追求雙贏。」大陸方面的十六字方針，則是胡錦濤在連胡會所說：「建立互信，擱置爭議，求同存異，共創雙贏。」
兩相對照，雙方一致的觀點是「擱置爭議，追求（共創）雙贏」。雙方不同的表述則在：台灣強調「正視現實」，大陸主張「建立互信」。
台灣強調「正視現實」，引申之義就是「一中各表」，因為「中華民國」正是必須「正視」的「核心現實」。大陸主張「建立互信」，引申之義就是「一中原則」，亦即反對「法理台獨」。
如今的問題是：「一中各表」包容了「一中原則」，但「一中原則」是否容納了「一中各表」，尚欠明朗。這就回到了是否要「正視現實」的問題，也就是回到了是否要「維持現狀」的問題；畢竟，對於台灣而言，若無「中華民國」，「現實」就會改變；對於北京當局而言，若無「中華民國」，「現狀」亦無以「維持」。
台灣在「二次政黨輪替」後，「正名制憲」的「台灣國路線」暫告隱退，如今馬英九政府的「中華民國路線」之核心政策是：一、護守中華民國與中華民國憲法的「現實」與「現狀」，不主張「正名制憲」，不主張「台灣國」；二、願意在「一中各表」的原則下，與大陸擴大交流，追求雙贏。換句話說，這就是：「正視現實，共創雙贏」。
馬政府的兩岸政策，迄今仍受台灣民意的相當肯定，這也是馬英九及國民黨年初贏得立委選舉及總統大選的原因。基於同樣的原理，馬政府的兩岸政策未來能否持續開展進行，仍然須以獲得台灣民意的支持為前提。也就是說，前述「中華民國路線」的建立與持續，皆須築基於同一原理，那就是：必須獲得台灣民主體制的認同。
當多數台灣民眾認為，「中華民國路線」能夠維護台灣的利益與尊嚴，這個路線自然得以成立並持續；但若認為，此一路線不能維持台灣的利益與尊嚴，這個路線就會被民意質疑，甚至主張此一路線的馬英九政府亦將難以維持。
最近的事例是「中華台北／中國台北」之爭。其實，國家的隊名變成「中華台北」，已是極大屈辱；若再被改成「中國台北」，恐怕只有退賽一途。這件事，從台灣版的「十六字訣」言，已退無可退；從大陸版的「十六字訣」言，亦不可得寸進尺。北京當局此次能在「協議範圍以外」的媒體用語亦加調整，自應視為「釋出善意」。
這樣的思考，亦可推演至已經迫在眉睫的台美軍購及參與聯合國議題等。台美軍購不可能達到具備主動攻擊能力的水準，卻是台灣主體性的心理支撐；至於參與聯合國，在台灣已是勢成騎虎的政治議題，恐怕亦不能喊停就停。這些舉措，自護守「中華台北」，至台美軍購、外交休兵及參與聯合國等，皆是馬政府因「正視現實／維持現狀」而不可不為，且就兩岸關係的發展看來，大抵亦是北京當局必須「擱置爭議／求同存異」之處，否則如何「共創雙贏」？
兩岸的「十六字訣」，大陸版以「建立互信」始，其意是反對走向「法理台獨」；台灣版則以「正視現實」始，其意是在維護「中華民國」。其實，「正視現實／維護中華民國」與「建立互信／反對法理台獨」存有頗大的交集地帶；因為，無「中華民國」即無「建立互信」之憑藉可言。北京當局應當以這樣的思維，來回應「中華台北／中國台北」的爭議；並以同樣的思維，來面對台美軍購、外交休兵及聯合國議題。
畢竟，台灣是一個民主體制，唯當台灣的民意認為「中華民國」能夠維護台灣的利益與尊嚴，才可能支持「中華民國路線」的兩岸政策。就此以言兩岸的「十六字訣」，北京當局若不能「正視現實」，將如何與台灣的民意「建立互信」？
Thursday, July 31, 2008
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
The Tax Reform Commission's Ad Hoc Tax Cuts are A Sham
The Tax Reform Commission's Ad Hoc Tax Cuts are A Sham
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 30, 2008
The Executive Yuan Tax Reform Commission will meet this Thursday for the second time. Reportedly, it will propose a variety of tax cuts. These tax cuts would go into effect once the Statute for Upgrading Industries has been sunsetted. Treasury officials said these programs will be submitted to the Tax Reform Commission no later than the end of the year.
What's baffling is that even after the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted, no consensus will exist regarding which items, such as research and innovation, will remain tax exempt. This makes it difficult to estimate how much tax revenues will increase once the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted. Since the revenue forecast is uncertain, how can one estimate how much to cut taxes? Even assuming one ends up with a surplus after the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted, why is it being used to cut inheritance taxes and business taxes? Why not cut stock transaction taxes and business taxes? How do Treasury officials know that these changes will be submitted to the Tax Reform Commission "no later than the end of the year?" The Ministry of Finance announced the Tax Reform Commission's direction and timetable for the next half-year even before the Tax Reform Commission had time to hold its first formal meeting. No wonder the private sector Tax Reform Union says the Tax Reform Commission is a sham.
Actually, when Premier Liu Chao-hsuan had breakfast with business tycoons last Wednesday, he had already announced a number of Tax Reform Commission "conclusions." Premier Liu said that cutting inheritance taxes and business taxes was the government's intention and the government's policy. The relevant tax cuts would be confirmed within three to six months. Premier Liu even said, "The Tax Reform Commission's conclusions will not disappoint." The Premier's statement of course came from the Ministry of Finance's chief of staff. How did the Ministry of Finance know in advance what the Tax Reform Commission's conclusions would be, whether they would disappoint, and how soon they would arrive at a conclusion? The public's views on tax reform are diametrically opposed to the government's. Some people propose cutting business taxes and inheritance taxes. Others propose keeping them the same. Given the government's tax goals, tax reform is essentially a zero-sum game. One person's gain is another person's loss. If the intent of tax reform is to ensure that the captains of industry and commerce are happy, then the private sector Tax Reform Union will inevitably be disappointed. The conclusions of the Tax Reform Commission's future meetings, were announced in advance, by the Executive Yuan. They were not discussed by the Tax Reform Commission. The Executive Yuan did not talk to Tax Reform Commission consultants. Tax Reform Commission consultants were not asked their opinion. These commission members and consultants have all been silenced. Doesn't this prove the meeting was a sham?
The Ministry of Finance predicted that the Tax Reform Commission would cut business taxes and inheritance taxes. It also knew in advance that stock transaction taxes would not be on the agenda. An appropriate cut in capital gains tax, along with a cut in stock transaction tax would be enormously helpful to small investors. It would only have had a minor impact on wealthy investors. Besides, the capital gains tax may help wealthy businessmen avoid taxes, and is also to blame for the current, unequal tax burden. Yet TSMC CEO Morris Chang has yet again proposed imposing a capital gains tax. The Ministry of Finance however, says that is not part of its plans. The Executive Yuan also has no response. Why does the Executive Yuan respond warmly to some demands put forth by industry and trade leaders, but stonewall when it comes to others? A breakfast meeting with industry and trade leaders, making so many conflicting demands, miraculously settled a whole range of tax reform issues. Doesn't this prove the meeting was a sham?
Last Thursday the entire cabinet went up Yangminshan to undergo group training. Premier Liu said that henceforth the Executive Yuan would function normally. It would stop running around attempting to put out fires. We agree with his thinking. Tax policy and tax planning should be handled in just such a manner. Although different taxes are subject to different laws and regulations, they are inextricably linked. They must not be dealt with piecemeal, one at a time. Property taxes in particular, require normalcy and a strategic plan. They must not be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. If the Ministry of Finance and the Tax Reform Commission are serious about carrying out Premier Liu's plans, they must first abandon their piecemeal approach to tax reform. They should not rush to introduce piecemeal tax reform at a news conference or a breakfast with trade and industry leaders. In fact, one of the original reasons for establishing a Tax Reform Commission was to stop making piecemeal reforms and draw up comprehensive plans. Once the Tax Reform Commission has been established, the Executive Yuan or the Ministry of Finance, when confronted by conflicting demands, need only say "All these issues are being deliberated" and "A comprehensive solution will be announced next summer." It should not panic every time someone complains, leaving itself a nervous wreck.
Tax Reform Commission members have been made officials of every economics and finance related cabinet. Many former ministers experienced in tax policy, industry and trade leaders, and elected officials meanwhile, have been relegated to the status of advisors. Three oddly titled "Highest Advisors," with limited authority have been named. A bloated commission, with over 40 legislators, wealthy businessmen, scholars, ministers, spokespersons for disadvantaged groups, will be given to sharp differences in views. The Ministry of Finance is continuing its guerrilla attacks. The private sector Tax Reform Union and members of the public have blasted the Tax Reform Commission. They consider the commission a sham. We do not want to be pessimistic. But when we consider the Executive Yuan and the Ministry of Finance's recent statements and the organization's redundant nature, we can't help worrying about its future.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.30
賦改會打減稅游擊戰 就是玩假的
中時社論
行政院賦稅改革委員會第二次會議，將於本周四召開。據報導，會中將提出促產條例落日後的種種降稅方案。財政部官員說，這些方案最慢年底提報賦改會確認。
令人困惑的是，促產條例落日之後究竟還有哪些免稅項目（例如研發創新）保留，賦改會都還沒共識，當然也就難以估算會因促產落日而增加多少稅收。既然稅收預 估不確定，又要如何估算降稅的幅度呢？就算促產條例落日多出來一筆稅收，又為什麼是用來降遺贈稅與營所稅？為什麼不是用來降證交稅、營業稅？財政部官員又 如何知道這些變動方向「最慢年底」會由賦改會通過呢？財政部在賦改會正式開會做第一次討論前，就事先宣布賦改會半年後的改革方向與時間表，也難怪民間稅改 聯盟要批評：賦改會是玩假的。
其實，在上周三行政院長劉兆玄與工商鉅子早餐會時，就已經宣示了若干賦改會的「結論」。劉院長指出，遺贈 稅、營所稅往下調，是政府的方向也是政策，若干調稅案三至六個月就會確定。劉院長甚至表示：「賦改會的結論，不會讓你們失望。」行政院長的發言，當然是來 自財政部的幕僚。奇怪的是，賦改會的結論如何、會不會令人失望、多久之後會做成結論，財政部何以事前預知？民間目前對稅改的意見南轅北轍，有人主張降營所 稅與遺贈稅，也有人主張不降。在給定的國家稅收目標下，稅目稅率的改革幾乎像是一個零和賽局─有人高興就有人失望。如果稅改的方向是保證讓工商大老闆高 興，那就一定會讓民間稅改聯盟失望。賦改會未來開會的結論，行政院先行宣布，沒有經委員會討論、沒有諮議該會諮議委員、沒有詢問該會顧問，這些委員與顧問 卻人人噤聲，這像不像是玩假的？
財政部不但能預知調降營所稅與遺贈稅的賦改會結論，也事前對資本利得稅表示並非規畫議題。開徵資本利得 稅如果與適當的免稅額搭配，並同時減降證交稅，那麼對於大多數散戶投資人而言，都絕對是利多，只對於富人大戶有影響。此外，資本利得稅徒然造成富商巨賈方 便的避稅管道，也是當前租稅負擔不均的罪魁禍首。但是，在台積電張忠謀再次主張課徵資本利得稅之後，財政部卻表示這不在規畫之中，而行政院長對此也沒有任 何回應。我們不了解，為什麼工商大老的某些要求，行政院就熱情回應，而其他要求就冷凍處理？如果一次工商早餐會冷熱之間就搞定了這麼多稅改議題，這像不像 是玩假的？
在上周四行政院全體閣員上山「集訓」之前，劉院長表示他以後要打正規戰，不要再陷在游擊戰的泥淖之中；我們非常同意這樣的布 局與思考。就稅制稅政的規畫而言，它是最適合正規作戰的。租稅稅目雖然雜列在不同的法規之中，但彼此之間牽一髮而動全身，不宜片面地、切割地宣布。租稅變 動更要有正規軍的全面戰略觀念，而不可沉溺於局部的叢林戰役。如果財政部與賦改會要認真執行、貫徹劉院長的正規軍作戰計畫，就該率先拋棄切割式變動稅目稅 率的思考，不要急著在一次次記者會或工商大老餐敘時，推出零碎的稅改議題。其實，成立賦改會的原始目的之一，就是要暫停各方片斷支節的降稅要求，而做全面 的規畫。在賦改會成立後，行政院或財政部面對外界需索，就只能說「一切都在整體研議」、「明年夏天會推出整套方案」等說明，而不該如響斯應、東叩西鳴，自 亂陣腳。
賦改會的委員會納入了所有的財經閣員，卻把許多租稅資歷豐富的歷任部長、工商大老、民意代表列為諮詢委員。在委員之外，又加上 了三位名稱怪異、功能有限的「最高顧問」。這麼一個四十餘人的龐大會議，裡面有立委、富商、學者、部長、弱勢代表，陣容龐大臃腫。賦改會內意見差異尖銳， 外則由財政部不斷事先宣告游擊戰戰場。民間稅改聯盟和輿論最近一直在批評賦改會，認為這個會是玩假的。我們不想做這樣悲觀的推論，但是看看行政院與財政部 最近的發言，再端詳該會疊床架屋的組織設計，我們真的開始憂慮這個委員會未來的走向。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 30, 2008
The Executive Yuan Tax Reform Commission will meet this Thursday for the second time. Reportedly, it will propose a variety of tax cuts. These tax cuts would go into effect once the Statute for Upgrading Industries has been sunsetted. Treasury officials said these programs will be submitted to the Tax Reform Commission no later than the end of the year.
What's baffling is that even after the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted, no consensus will exist regarding which items, such as research and innovation, will remain tax exempt. This makes it difficult to estimate how much tax revenues will increase once the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted. Since the revenue forecast is uncertain, how can one estimate how much to cut taxes? Even assuming one ends up with a surplus after the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted, why is it being used to cut inheritance taxes and business taxes? Why not cut stock transaction taxes and business taxes? How do Treasury officials know that these changes will be submitted to the Tax Reform Commission "no later than the end of the year?" The Ministry of Finance announced the Tax Reform Commission's direction and timetable for the next half-year even before the Tax Reform Commission had time to hold its first formal meeting. No wonder the private sector Tax Reform Union says the Tax Reform Commission is a sham.
Actually, when Premier Liu Chao-hsuan had breakfast with business tycoons last Wednesday, he had already announced a number of Tax Reform Commission "conclusions." Premier Liu said that cutting inheritance taxes and business taxes was the government's intention and the government's policy. The relevant tax cuts would be confirmed within three to six months. Premier Liu even said, "The Tax Reform Commission's conclusions will not disappoint." The Premier's statement of course came from the Ministry of Finance's chief of staff. How did the Ministry of Finance know in advance what the Tax Reform Commission's conclusions would be, whether they would disappoint, and how soon they would arrive at a conclusion? The public's views on tax reform are diametrically opposed to the government's. Some people propose cutting business taxes and inheritance taxes. Others propose keeping them the same. Given the government's tax goals, tax reform is essentially a zero-sum game. One person's gain is another person's loss. If the intent of tax reform is to ensure that the captains of industry and commerce are happy, then the private sector Tax Reform Union will inevitably be disappointed. The conclusions of the Tax Reform Commission's future meetings, were announced in advance, by the Executive Yuan. They were not discussed by the Tax Reform Commission. The Executive Yuan did not talk to Tax Reform Commission consultants. Tax Reform Commission consultants were not asked their opinion. These commission members and consultants have all been silenced. Doesn't this prove the meeting was a sham?
The Ministry of Finance predicted that the Tax Reform Commission would cut business taxes and inheritance taxes. It also knew in advance that stock transaction taxes would not be on the agenda. An appropriate cut in capital gains tax, along with a cut in stock transaction tax would be enormously helpful to small investors. It would only have had a minor impact on wealthy investors. Besides, the capital gains tax may help wealthy businessmen avoid taxes, and is also to blame for the current, unequal tax burden. Yet TSMC CEO Morris Chang has yet again proposed imposing a capital gains tax. The Ministry of Finance however, says that is not part of its plans. The Executive Yuan also has no response. Why does the Executive Yuan respond warmly to some demands put forth by industry and trade leaders, but stonewall when it comes to others? A breakfast meeting with industry and trade leaders, making so many conflicting demands, miraculously settled a whole range of tax reform issues. Doesn't this prove the meeting was a sham?
Last Thursday the entire cabinet went up Yangminshan to undergo group training. Premier Liu said that henceforth the Executive Yuan would function normally. It would stop running around attempting to put out fires. We agree with his thinking. Tax policy and tax planning should be handled in just such a manner. Although different taxes are subject to different laws and regulations, they are inextricably linked. They must not be dealt with piecemeal, one at a time. Property taxes in particular, require normalcy and a strategic plan. They must not be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. If the Ministry of Finance and the Tax Reform Commission are serious about carrying out Premier Liu's plans, they must first abandon their piecemeal approach to tax reform. They should not rush to introduce piecemeal tax reform at a news conference or a breakfast with trade and industry leaders. In fact, one of the original reasons for establishing a Tax Reform Commission was to stop making piecemeal reforms and draw up comprehensive plans. Once the Tax Reform Commission has been established, the Executive Yuan or the Ministry of Finance, when confronted by conflicting demands, need only say "All these issues are being deliberated" and "A comprehensive solution will be announced next summer." It should not panic every time someone complains, leaving itself a nervous wreck.
Tax Reform Commission members have been made officials of every economics and finance related cabinet. Many former ministers experienced in tax policy, industry and trade leaders, and elected officials meanwhile, have been relegated to the status of advisors. Three oddly titled "Highest Advisors," with limited authority have been named. A bloated commission, with over 40 legislators, wealthy businessmen, scholars, ministers, spokespersons for disadvantaged groups, will be given to sharp differences in views. The Ministry of Finance is continuing its guerrilla attacks. The private sector Tax Reform Union and members of the public have blasted the Tax Reform Commission. They consider the commission a sham. We do not want to be pessimistic. But when we consider the Executive Yuan and the Ministry of Finance's recent statements and the organization's redundant nature, we can't help worrying about its future.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.30
賦改會打減稅游擊戰 就是玩假的
中時社論
行政院賦稅改革委員會第二次會議，將於本周四召開。據報導，會中將提出促產條例落日後的種種降稅方案。財政部官員說，這些方案最慢年底提報賦改會確認。
令人困惑的是，促產條例落日之後究竟還有哪些免稅項目（例如研發創新）保留，賦改會都還沒共識，當然也就難以估算會因促產落日而增加多少稅收。既然稅收預 估不確定，又要如何估算降稅的幅度呢？就算促產條例落日多出來一筆稅收，又為什麼是用來降遺贈稅與營所稅？為什麼不是用來降證交稅、營業稅？財政部官員又 如何知道這些變動方向「最慢年底」會由賦改會通過呢？財政部在賦改會正式開會做第一次討論前，就事先宣布賦改會半年後的改革方向與時間表，也難怪民間稅改 聯盟要批評：賦改會是玩假的。
其實，在上周三行政院長劉兆玄與工商鉅子早餐會時，就已經宣示了若干賦改會的「結論」。劉院長指出，遺贈 稅、營所稅往下調，是政府的方向也是政策，若干調稅案三至六個月就會確定。劉院長甚至表示：「賦改會的結論，不會讓你們失望。」行政院長的發言，當然是來 自財政部的幕僚。奇怪的是，賦改會的結論如何、會不會令人失望、多久之後會做成結論，財政部何以事前預知？民間目前對稅改的意見南轅北轍，有人主張降營所 稅與遺贈稅，也有人主張不降。在給定的國家稅收目標下，稅目稅率的改革幾乎像是一個零和賽局─有人高興就有人失望。如果稅改的方向是保證讓工商大老闆高 興，那就一定會讓民間稅改聯盟失望。賦改會未來開會的結論，行政院先行宣布，沒有經委員會討論、沒有諮議該會諮議委員、沒有詢問該會顧問，這些委員與顧問 卻人人噤聲，這像不像是玩假的？
財政部不但能預知調降營所稅與遺贈稅的賦改會結論，也事前對資本利得稅表示並非規畫議題。開徵資本利得 稅如果與適當的免稅額搭配，並同時減降證交稅，那麼對於大多數散戶投資人而言，都絕對是利多，只對於富人大戶有影響。此外，資本利得稅徒然造成富商巨賈方 便的避稅管道，也是當前租稅負擔不均的罪魁禍首。但是，在台積電張忠謀再次主張課徵資本利得稅之後，財政部卻表示這不在規畫之中，而行政院長對此也沒有任 何回應。我們不了解，為什麼工商大老的某些要求，行政院就熱情回應，而其他要求就冷凍處理？如果一次工商早餐會冷熱之間就搞定了這麼多稅改議題，這像不像 是玩假的？
在上周四行政院全體閣員上山「集訓」之前，劉院長表示他以後要打正規戰，不要再陷在游擊戰的泥淖之中；我們非常同意這樣的布 局與思考。就稅制稅政的規畫而言，它是最適合正規作戰的。租稅稅目雖然雜列在不同的法規之中，但彼此之間牽一髮而動全身，不宜片面地、切割地宣布。租稅變 動更要有正規軍的全面戰略觀念，而不可沉溺於局部的叢林戰役。如果財政部與賦改會要認真執行、貫徹劉院長的正規軍作戰計畫，就該率先拋棄切割式變動稅目稅 率的思考，不要急著在一次次記者會或工商大老餐敘時，推出零碎的稅改議題。其實，成立賦改會的原始目的之一，就是要暫停各方片斷支節的降稅要求，而做全面 的規畫。在賦改會成立後，行政院或財政部面對外界需索，就只能說「一切都在整體研議」、「明年夏天會推出整套方案」等說明，而不該如響斯應、東叩西鳴，自 亂陣腳。
賦改會的委員會納入了所有的財經閣員，卻把許多租稅資歷豐富的歷任部長、工商大老、民意代表列為諮詢委員。在委員之外，又加上 了三位名稱怪異、功能有限的「最高顧問」。這麼一個四十餘人的龐大會議，裡面有立委、富商、學者、部長、弱勢代表，陣容龐大臃腫。賦改會內意見差異尖銳， 外則由財政部不斷事先宣告游擊戰戰場。民間稅改聯盟和輿論最近一直在批評賦改會，認為這個會是玩假的。我們不想做這樣悲觀的推論，但是看看行政院與財政部 最近的發言，再端詳該會疊床架屋的組織設計，我們真的開始憂慮這個委員會未來的走向。
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
President Ma's State Visits and the Meaning of Diplomatic Truce
President Ma's State Visits and the Meaning of Diplomatic Truce
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2008
In mid-August President Ma Ying-jeou will visit Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. This will be his first trip outside the country after becoming president. During this trip he can realize his concept of a "diplomatic truce." The outcome will be an important indicator of his policy's success or failure.
The Ma administration's biggest difference with the Chen administration, is that the Ma administration is not irreconciliably hostile towards mainland China. Ma hopes to dissolve cross-Strait confrontation, promote cooperation, and increase Taiwan's room for development. On the diplomatic front, Ma has renounced his predecessor's "scorched earth diplomacy," which only wound up burning the ROC's fingers. Nor is Ma adopting his predecessor's "transit diplomacy," which abused the hospitality of our diplomatic allies. Ma's visits are no longer subterfuges. They are merely means of facilitating his transit through the United States. They are unlike Chen's visits, which squandered energy and resources merely to upgrade Chen's city of transit and duration of transit.
This change is correct. The Chen Shui-bian administration turned "transit diplomacy" from a positive into a negative. Besides allowing Chen to bask in glory, it had no real diplomatic function. Chen Shui-bian's plane was parked on the tarmac. By sheer coincidence, Air Force One, the U.S. President's plane, parked next to it. Chen chose to play up this triviality, as if it had some sort of special political significance. This sort of "transit diplomacy" has become a self-deceptive, nauseating farce. The result has been the breakdown of mutual trust and serious damage to Taipei-Washington relations. With each transit, Chen Shui-bian's treatment went from bad to worse. It went from being invited to baseball games and steak dinners, to being shunted off to Alaska to endure the cold arctic winds. Taipei-Washington relations are warming up again. It might be better not to put invest too much emotion into Ma's upcoming transit through the US. Allow it to be remain a plain and simple transit, and allow people to catch their breath.
A "diplomatic truce" is not fruit one can pick off a tree. The Ma administration must have no illusions about that.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou's basic direction is correct. His long struggle to maintain diplomatic relations in Latin America, has made him deeply aware that vicious cross-Strait diplomatic struggles have left both sides wounded. They have wasted resources. They make no sense. They have harmed our international image. He believes that whether we have 23 or 30 allies makes little difference. Quarrels in international organizations over nomenclature and protocol have paralyzed ROC diplomacy, and have been of little help to the people. These concepts, coming from a veteran diplomat, are more avant garde, innovative, and pragmatic than the public on Taiwan is accustomed to.
The problem is it takes two to Tango. A truce requires both sides to lay down their arms. In the cross-Strait diplomatic war, Taipei finds itself at a major disadvantage. Past investments of resources were intended to prevent the total loss of sovereignty and international living space. Our survival hung by a thread. We had no capital to squander, or latitude for mistakes.
In the absence of specific concessions by Beijing, it is too early for Taipei to declare a truce. Doing so may inflict serious harm upon ourselves. Even if Beijing were to fall asleep at the wheel and lose several allies, it wouldn't harm their international stature. Taipei, by contrast, is hanging on for dear life. If 23 allies are reduced to 13 allies, or 3 allies, this could delegitimize us as a regime. This has already become an international law issue. Beijing has power. Once we make concessions, they may counterattack. If the ROC pulls back its line of defense, regaining ground may be even more difficult.
Therefore, we hope that before any "diplomatic truce" is implemented, we focus on communication and persuasion, and not make costly unilateral concessions. After all, this is another way to safeguard our national sovereignty and survival. We must never confuse means with ends.
President Ma's trip is hardly a junket. First, he must consolidate Taiwan's diplomatic standing in Latin America. He must improve the ROC's image, which has been tainted by numerous bribery scandals. Since President Ma has an aptitude for foreign relations, he can be an effective PR man. He can win the support of Latin American allies. He can even win the support of local populations. Cross-Strait relations have been signifcantly improved. Beijing wants the Olympic Games to be a total success, and is worried about negative developments. This is an ideal opportunity for the ROC to strengthen its diplomatic hand.
President Ma must also improve communications with the United States. As a result of the new administration taking office, cross-Strait relations are no longer on red alert. But the closer Taipei and Beijing get. the bigger the problem for the United States. Washington is no longer as sure as it once was whether Taipei is on its side, or Beijing's side. President Ma has not made his position clear. So far the new administration's policy is giving people the impression that it is leaning all the way toward Beijing, without any reservations or safeguards.
But the United States is Taiwan's most important supporter, militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Ever since reports of frozen arms sales, the United States has been waiting for the Ma administration to give the US an accounting. If he has a chance, during his transit through the United States, President Ma can do much in this respect. He can also help the public on Taiwan better understand. The President is someone who must take on major tasks. Instead of worrying about such details as saving money on charter flights, he should spend his energy thinking about the direction in which the nation must develop.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.29
從馬總統出訪談「外交休兵」的真義
中時社論
馬英九總統將於八月中旬率團訪問巴拉圭和多明尼加，這是他就任總統後的首次出國，也是一次實踐「外交休兵」理念的出訪。後續發展結果如何，將具有重要的指標意義。
馬政府和扁政府最大的不同，在於對中國不再採取全面敵對的態度，希望化解兩岸對立增進合作，進一步促成台灣更大的發展空間。在外交方面，揚棄到處放火最後把自己燒得焦頭爛額的「烽火外交」，也不再走喧賓奪主用過境待遇自吹自擂的「過境外交」老路，轉而將出訪單純化，過境美國時以便利、自然為主，不會像過去那樣用盡力氣耗費資源在禮遇、停留地點與天數、會晤層級上。
這項改變是正確的，因為過去扁政府已經把「過境外交」的價值從正操作到負，最後除了自己往自己臉上貼金之外，在外交上已經沒有實質功能了。當扁搭乘的專機在停機坪上恰巧停在美國總統專機「空軍一號」的旁邊，都可以被渲染成別具政治意義，這種過境外交已經變成了自欺欺人的噁心鬧劇。尤其最後台美關係因互信破裂而嚴重毀損，陳水扁的過境待遇跟著每下愈況，從看棒球、吃牛排淪落到在阿拉斯加「閃」冬風，如今台美關係重起爐灶，元首過境這檔子事，不妨先卸下過多的政治負載，讓它回歸單純與理性，對大家都是一種喘息。
然而，「外交休兵」並不是束手就擒，馬政府可千萬不要搞錯了。
外交部長歐鴻鍊提出的理念基本方向是對的，他長年在拉美固守邦交，深感兩岸外交惡鬥讓雙方都受害，浪費資源又毫無意義，而且傷害國際形象。他認為，邦交國是廿三還是卅個，並沒有太多差別；在國際組織爭吵名稱與儀節，既癱瘓了台灣的外交，也無法替人民帶來幫助。這些觀念雖出自一位老外交官之口，和社會習慣的思路相比，卻是比較前進創新且務實的。
問題在於一個巴掌拍不響，要休兵，得雙方都放下武器。在兩岸的外交戰中，台灣處於嚴重不利局勢，之前之所以投注大量資源心力，也是為了避免岌岌可危的主權地位與國際生存空間被完全吞噬掉。這是千鈞一髮的求生，沒有太多揮霍或犯錯的本錢。
在沒有得到中共具體讓步之前，台灣太早即自行休兵，可能會對自己造成嚴重的傷害。因為中共外交對台部門即使睡個幾年覺，就算丟了幾個邦交國吧，也無損於其舉足輕重的國際地位；但台灣的外交版圖可是寸土寸金，每一寸都在咽喉上。廿三個邦交國如果掉到十三或三個，是否還能構成合法政權的定義，已經會成為國際法上需要爭辯的議題了。而且，中共以其實力，讓步之後很容易就能反攻，台灣的陣線如果後退了，要再搶回可就難上加難。
因此，我們希望「外交休兵」在付諸實行前，要先把重點放在理念溝通與說服上，不能變成不划算的片面退讓。畢竟這是用另一種方式來維護國家主權與生存機會，手段與目的之間的從屬位階不能混淆。
馬總統此行並不輕鬆，首先，他必須鞏固台灣在拉美的外交地盤，改善因多項獻金醜聞而被汙名化的台灣形象。馬總統個人既有涉外的能力，希望他能多多替台灣做有效的公關工作，爭取拉美友邦的民意支持，甚至去當地民間「long stay」搏感情也可以。現在兩岸關係大為改善，中共又力求奧運圓滿成功而投鼠忌器，正是台灣趁隙補強外交陣地的絕佳時機。
馬總統另外一件要做的事，是加強與美國的溝通。兩岸關係固然因新政府上台而暫時解除警報，但台灣和中共愈走愈近，對美國來說，也是一個大問題。因為台灣現在到底屬於自己這一邊、還是中共那一邊，已經不如過去那麼有把握了。偏偏馬總統一直沒有提出個清楚的論述，新政府至今的施政也讓人覺得向中共一路倒，沒有自我校正或警惕的機制。
但無論在軍事、經濟或國際空間上，美國都是台灣的最重要支持，從傳出凍結軍售之說以來，美國都在等待馬政府給個說法。如果有機會的話，這次過境美國時，馬總統倒是可以在這方面多多釋疑，順便也讓台灣民眾有更多了解。總統是要做大事的人，與其在搭包機省錢之類的小細節上斤斤計較，不如把心力花在經營國家發展的大方向。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2008
In mid-August President Ma Ying-jeou will visit Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. This will be his first trip outside the country after becoming president. During this trip he can realize his concept of a "diplomatic truce." The outcome will be an important indicator of his policy's success or failure.
The Ma administration's biggest difference with the Chen administration, is that the Ma administration is not irreconciliably hostile towards mainland China. Ma hopes to dissolve cross-Strait confrontation, promote cooperation, and increase Taiwan's room for development. On the diplomatic front, Ma has renounced his predecessor's "scorched earth diplomacy," which only wound up burning the ROC's fingers. Nor is Ma adopting his predecessor's "transit diplomacy," which abused the hospitality of our diplomatic allies. Ma's visits are no longer subterfuges. They are merely means of facilitating his transit through the United States. They are unlike Chen's visits, which squandered energy and resources merely to upgrade Chen's city of transit and duration of transit.
This change is correct. The Chen Shui-bian administration turned "transit diplomacy" from a positive into a negative. Besides allowing Chen to bask in glory, it had no real diplomatic function. Chen Shui-bian's plane was parked on the tarmac. By sheer coincidence, Air Force One, the U.S. President's plane, parked next to it. Chen chose to play up this triviality, as if it had some sort of special political significance. This sort of "transit diplomacy" has become a self-deceptive, nauseating farce. The result has been the breakdown of mutual trust and serious damage to Taipei-Washington relations. With each transit, Chen Shui-bian's treatment went from bad to worse. It went from being invited to baseball games and steak dinners, to being shunted off to Alaska to endure the cold arctic winds. Taipei-Washington relations are warming up again. It might be better not to put invest too much emotion into Ma's upcoming transit through the US. Allow it to be remain a plain and simple transit, and allow people to catch their breath.
A "diplomatic truce" is not fruit one can pick off a tree. The Ma administration must have no illusions about that.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou's basic direction is correct. His long struggle to maintain diplomatic relations in Latin America, has made him deeply aware that vicious cross-Strait diplomatic struggles have left both sides wounded. They have wasted resources. They make no sense. They have harmed our international image. He believes that whether we have 23 or 30 allies makes little difference. Quarrels in international organizations over nomenclature and protocol have paralyzed ROC diplomacy, and have been of little help to the people. These concepts, coming from a veteran diplomat, are more avant garde, innovative, and pragmatic than the public on Taiwan is accustomed to.
The problem is it takes two to Tango. A truce requires both sides to lay down their arms. In the cross-Strait diplomatic war, Taipei finds itself at a major disadvantage. Past investments of resources were intended to prevent the total loss of sovereignty and international living space. Our survival hung by a thread. We had no capital to squander, or latitude for mistakes.
In the absence of specific concessions by Beijing, it is too early for Taipei to declare a truce. Doing so may inflict serious harm upon ourselves. Even if Beijing were to fall asleep at the wheel and lose several allies, it wouldn't harm their international stature. Taipei, by contrast, is hanging on for dear life. If 23 allies are reduced to 13 allies, or 3 allies, this could delegitimize us as a regime. This has already become an international law issue. Beijing has power. Once we make concessions, they may counterattack. If the ROC pulls back its line of defense, regaining ground may be even more difficult.
Therefore, we hope that before any "diplomatic truce" is implemented, we focus on communication and persuasion, and not make costly unilateral concessions. After all, this is another way to safeguard our national sovereignty and survival. We must never confuse means with ends.
President Ma's trip is hardly a junket. First, he must consolidate Taiwan's diplomatic standing in Latin America. He must improve the ROC's image, which has been tainted by numerous bribery scandals. Since President Ma has an aptitude for foreign relations, he can be an effective PR man. He can win the support of Latin American allies. He can even win the support of local populations. Cross-Strait relations have been signifcantly improved. Beijing wants the Olympic Games to be a total success, and is worried about negative developments. This is an ideal opportunity for the ROC to strengthen its diplomatic hand.
President Ma must also improve communications with the United States. As a result of the new administration taking office, cross-Strait relations are no longer on red alert. But the closer Taipei and Beijing get. the bigger the problem for the United States. Washington is no longer as sure as it once was whether Taipei is on its side, or Beijing's side. President Ma has not made his position clear. So far the new administration's policy is giving people the impression that it is leaning all the way toward Beijing, without any reservations or safeguards.
But the United States is Taiwan's most important supporter, militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Ever since reports of frozen arms sales, the United States has been waiting for the Ma administration to give the US an accounting. If he has a chance, during his transit through the United States, President Ma can do much in this respect. He can also help the public on Taiwan better understand. The President is someone who must take on major tasks. Instead of worrying about such details as saving money on charter flights, he should spend his energy thinking about the direction in which the nation must develop.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.29
從馬總統出訪談「外交休兵」的真義
中時社論
馬英九總統將於八月中旬率團訪問巴拉圭和多明尼加，這是他就任總統後的首次出國，也是一次實踐「外交休兵」理念的出訪。後續發展結果如何，將具有重要的指標意義。
馬政府和扁政府最大的不同，在於對中國不再採取全面敵對的態度，希望化解兩岸對立增進合作，進一步促成台灣更大的發展空間。在外交方面，揚棄到處放火最後把自己燒得焦頭爛額的「烽火外交」，也不再走喧賓奪主用過境待遇自吹自擂的「過境外交」老路，轉而將出訪單純化，過境美國時以便利、自然為主，不會像過去那樣用盡力氣耗費資源在禮遇、停留地點與天數、會晤層級上。
這項改變是正確的，因為過去扁政府已經把「過境外交」的價值從正操作到負，最後除了自己往自己臉上貼金之外，在外交上已經沒有實質功能了。當扁搭乘的專機在停機坪上恰巧停在美國總統專機「空軍一號」的旁邊，都可以被渲染成別具政治意義，這種過境外交已經變成了自欺欺人的噁心鬧劇。尤其最後台美關係因互信破裂而嚴重毀損，陳水扁的過境待遇跟著每下愈況，從看棒球、吃牛排淪落到在阿拉斯加「閃」冬風，如今台美關係重起爐灶，元首過境這檔子事，不妨先卸下過多的政治負載，讓它回歸單純與理性，對大家都是一種喘息。
然而，「外交休兵」並不是束手就擒，馬政府可千萬不要搞錯了。
外交部長歐鴻鍊提出的理念基本方向是對的，他長年在拉美固守邦交，深感兩岸外交惡鬥讓雙方都受害，浪費資源又毫無意義，而且傷害國際形象。他認為，邦交國是廿三還是卅個，並沒有太多差別；在國際組織爭吵名稱與儀節，既癱瘓了台灣的外交，也無法替人民帶來幫助。這些觀念雖出自一位老外交官之口，和社會習慣的思路相比，卻是比較前進創新且務實的。
問題在於一個巴掌拍不響，要休兵，得雙方都放下武器。在兩岸的外交戰中，台灣處於嚴重不利局勢，之前之所以投注大量資源心力，也是為了避免岌岌可危的主權地位與國際生存空間被完全吞噬掉。這是千鈞一髮的求生，沒有太多揮霍或犯錯的本錢。
在沒有得到中共具體讓步之前，台灣太早即自行休兵，可能會對自己造成嚴重的傷害。因為中共外交對台部門即使睡個幾年覺，就算丟了幾個邦交國吧，也無損於其舉足輕重的國際地位；但台灣的外交版圖可是寸土寸金，每一寸都在咽喉上。廿三個邦交國如果掉到十三或三個，是否還能構成合法政權的定義，已經會成為國際法上需要爭辯的議題了。而且，中共以其實力，讓步之後很容易就能反攻，台灣的陣線如果後退了，要再搶回可就難上加難。
因此，我們希望「外交休兵」在付諸實行前，要先把重點放在理念溝通與說服上，不能變成不划算的片面退讓。畢竟這是用另一種方式來維護國家主權與生存機會，手段與目的之間的從屬位階不能混淆。
馬總統此行並不輕鬆，首先，他必須鞏固台灣在拉美的外交地盤，改善因多項獻金醜聞而被汙名化的台灣形象。馬總統個人既有涉外的能力，希望他能多多替台灣做有效的公關工作，爭取拉美友邦的民意支持，甚至去當地民間「long stay」搏感情也可以。現在兩岸關係大為改善，中共又力求奧運圓滿成功而投鼠忌器，正是台灣趁隙補強外交陣地的絕佳時機。
馬總統另外一件要做的事，是加強與美國的溝通。兩岸關係固然因新政府上台而暫時解除警報，但台灣和中共愈走愈近，對美國來說，也是一個大問題。因為台灣現在到底屬於自己這一邊、還是中共那一邊，已經不如過去那麼有把握了。偏偏馬總統一直沒有提出個清楚的論述，新政府至今的施政也讓人覺得向中共一路倒，沒有自我校正或警惕的機制。
但無論在軍事、經濟或國際空間上，美國都是台灣的最重要支持，從傳出凍結軍售之說以來，美國都在等待馬政府給個說法。如果有機會的話，這次過境美國時，馬總統倒是可以在這方面多多釋疑，順便也讓台灣民眾有更多了解。總統是要做大事的人，與其在搭包機省錢之類的小細節上斤斤計較，不如把心力花在經營國家發展的大方向。
Friday, July 25, 2008
Decriminalize Defamation, Now!
Decriminalize Defamation, Now!
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 25, 2008
President Ma has withdrawn the lawsuits he filed during the run-up to the presidential election, when the two camps filed a series of suits and countersuits against each other. Chen Shui-bian on the other hand, has decided to file a new lawsuit of his own. Chen had been summoned by the court to testify in the Lafayette Arms Procurement defamation lawsuit. He was physically assaulted as he approached the courthouse. Who knows the amount of legal resources squandered because politicians cannot refrain from endless recriminations? This is one of the biggest blind spots in the system. The justice system has never understood that defamation is a civil offense, and should not be considered a criminal offence. We have not been able to decriminalize defamation, the way other countries have, and restore it to the status of civil law. As a result Taiwan has paid a huge social cost. The issue requires serious soul-searching.
Several years ago some knowledgeable parties proposed decriminalizing defamation. They claimed that defining defamation as a criminal offense was unconstitutional, and petitioned the Grand Justices for a constitutional interpretation. The Grand Justices ruled that the law was not unconstitutional, and that the petitioners' reasoning was specious. The Grand Justices ruled that criminal penalties could help make up for inadequacies in civil compensation. Their ruling reflects an outdated mindset that regards criminal penalties as a form of vengeance. The Grand Justices ignored the fundamental difference between civil law and criminal law. Civil law is about compensation. Criminal law is about punishment. The forgot that criminal penalties contain a hidden danger. They allow state power to intrude into civil disputes, but do not allow the aggrieved parties to obtain genuine relief.
The Grand Justices do not consider laws defining defamation as a criminal offense unconstitutional. But that does not mean defamation cannot or should not be decriminalized. The reason is simple. Defamation harms an individual's reputation and legal interests. Civil law is perfectly capable of providing adequate relief. State intervention and criminal proceedings are unnecessary. They merely make conflict resolution even more difficult. Politicians resort to defamation lawsuits every day. One case gets filed on the heels of another. They yearn to see their opponents in prison. Meanwhile society must dance to their tune, unable to find a minute's peace. This is something everyone clearly sees.
Those who least ought to resort to criminal prosecution in defamation cases are precisely those most prone to use them -- public figures and politicians. Politicians, whether administrative officials, Members of Parliament, or political party leaders, wield immense power. On the one hand, their words and deeds should be subject to closer scrutiny than those of the general public. They also have an obligation to be more tolerant of criticism. On the other hand, they are more media savvy. They are far more adept than the general public at using media spin-control to defend themselves. Their ability to protect themselves by such means is often greater than any compensation they might derive after a long, drawn out court decision. If they resort to civil suits merely to demand monetary compensation, that is a legitimate exercise of their rights. But if they use criminal penalties to throw others in prison, that is a horse of a different color.
Take Chen Shui-bian for example. A number of years ago he was sued for defamation. He got a taste of what "political persecution" was like. But when he came to power, his administration did not champion the decriminalization of defamation. Those in power continued to charge member of the political opposition with the crime of defamation. Now that Chen is again in the opposition, he once again faces the threat of criminal penalties for defamation. If convicted, he will probably accuse the court of political persecution. The problem is not the fairness of the court's judgments. The problem is the legal system has provided politicians with a weapon they can use to exact revenge against their opponents, by threatening them with prison terms. It has also provided politicians who lose such lawsuits the opportunity to accuse the ruling authorities of exerting undue influence on the administration of justice, and to challenge the independence of the judiciary. If such lawsuits involved only civil litigation, there would be no allegations of political persecution. The problem would be far simpler. Society would be quieter and more peaceful.
Do not assume that civil compensation is incapable of redressing grievances, or that civil compensation cannot compensate for injury. After all, the courts can require those convicted to publish the judgement or an apology in the media. That is one way resolve the problem, via reconciliation. If the celing for compensation has been set too low, the laws may be amended, raising the limit. The courts can also stipulate punitive damages. Punitive damages and criminal penalties are different. Punitive damages are paid to the victim. Criminal penalties are paid into the state treasury. The victim is an individual. What right does the government have to pocket the fines?
There has already been more than one change in ruling parties. Society has made considerable progress. But politicians continue to file defamation lawsuits against each other. The government has limited legal resources. The damage done to the justice system and the government's credibility is incalculable. The political stage is a game of musical chairs. When people are in office they may be plaintiffs. But when people are out of office they may well end up as defendants. Round and round, back and forth. Politicians have turned the nation's system of criminal law into a weapon against their enemies. Hasn't society suffered enough?
It is high time defamation was decriminalized and redefined as a tort law issue. President Ma has withdrawn his lawsuit. Will he follow through and urge the Ministry of Justice and the Legislative Yuan to promote the decriminalization of defamation?
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.25
推動誹謗除罪化，此其時矣
中時社論
馬總統撤回了選舉期間因為兩陣營相互攻詰而提告的案件；陳水扁則於卸任後受法院傳喚出庭而遭人襲擊，決定再興訴訟。他是因公開指述拉法葉案弊端而吃上了誹謗官司。為了政治人物無止無休的唇槍舌劍，法院不知賠上多少司法資源，這其中最大的制度盲點，在於現行法制始終不能認清誹謗行為的本質是民事侵權行為，不該被認為是刑事犯罪。結果至今不能如其它國家一樣除罪化、回歸民事審理，讓台灣付出了鉅大的社會成本，這是在此要認真檢討的課題。
誹謗罪除罪化，數年前曾有識者鼓吹其事。一度挑戰誹謗罪刑事立法為違憲而聲請大法官解釋，大法官則不以之為違憲，所持的理由則是似是而非。大法官認為刑事制裁可以彌補民事賠償之所窮。這可謂是將刑事制裁視做報復的思維依舊揮之不去，大法官不但忽略了民事是賠償、刑事是懲罰的根本差異，而且忘記了刑事懲罰藏著國家公權力介入民事糾紛的隱患，卻並不能讓受害的當事人獲得真正的實質救濟。
即使大法官不以誹謗罪是違憲立法，也不代表誹謗不能或不該除罪。道理很簡單，誹謗是傷害個人名譽法益的行為，可由民事訴訟提供足夠的救濟，不需要國家公權力用刑事訴訟的方式介入，徒增更多的怨懟難以化解。政治人物以誹謗罪名興訟，無日無之，一波未平，一波又起，必欲對手身陷囹圄，社會受其牽引舞弄，難有寧時，已經不需要更多的證明。
最最不該動用刑事制裁追訴誹謗刑責的，恰恰就是最愛動用誹謗刑事訴訟的公眾領袖與政治人物。政治人物不管是行政首長、國會議員或是政黨領袖，其實都是權傾一時的實力人物。一方面他們的所言所行，都該比一般平民受到更多的公評，也就應該更有容忍的責任，另一方面他們動見觀瞻，遠比一般平民更容易藉由媒體舞台發聲自辯自衛，所能得到的防護效果有時更甚於曠日費時的法院判決。如果只是訴諸民事法院，要求金錢賠償，猶屬正當權利之行使；一旦動用刑事訴訟欲陷他人於牢獄之災，那就是另一種評價了。
以陳水扁為例，他當年因為誹謗罪吃了刑事官司，嘗到了「政治迫害」的滋味。可是當他上台執政，政府並未大力推動誹謗除罪化，在野者繼續被當政者用誹謗罪訴追；今天他又下野了，再度面臨誹謗罪的威脅，一旦成罪，恐怕又要指責法院政治迫害。問題可能不在法院依法判決公不公正，而是在於法律制度為政治人物的恩怨情仇，提供了藉用手中權力，加施敵手牢獄威脅的機會；也提供了敗訴的政治人物指責當權者影響司法、挑戰司法獨立的溫床。如果只用民事訴訟解決，就不會有政治監獄迫害的指控，問題單純得多，社會也會安靜平和許多。
不要以為民事救濟的賠償有時難以濟事。賠償請求不足以平復傷害。還可以用媒體刊登判決書甚或是以和解道歉的方式解決問題。賠償法定金額過低，可以修法明訂提升其額度，明白規定容許請求懲罰性賠償也無不可。懲罰性賠償仍與刑事制裁不同。懲罰性賠償是由受害人取得，刑事罰金則是由國庫受付。試問，受害者為個人，國家拿走罰金，有什麼道理可言？
政黨輪替，不只一回了。社會進步了許多，可是政治人物利用誹謗刑事官司冤冤相報的場景與業障，始終揮之不去，國家訴訟資源事小，司法乃至政府公信力的損害事大。上台下台如走馬燈的政治人物，上台時告人或看人被告，下台時成為被告，上上下下，告來告去，將國家刑事執法公器演成了互相傷害的工具，社會受害還不夠深嗎？
誹謗，到了還其本質為民事侵權行為，刑事上除罪化的時候了！撤回告訴的馬總統，要不要功德做到底，建議法務部與立法院，推動誹謗除罪化的善舉？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 25, 2008
President Ma has withdrawn the lawsuits he filed during the run-up to the presidential election, when the two camps filed a series of suits and countersuits against each other. Chen Shui-bian on the other hand, has decided to file a new lawsuit of his own. Chen had been summoned by the court to testify in the Lafayette Arms Procurement defamation lawsuit. He was physically assaulted as he approached the courthouse. Who knows the amount of legal resources squandered because politicians cannot refrain from endless recriminations? This is one of the biggest blind spots in the system. The justice system has never understood that defamation is a civil offense, and should not be considered a criminal offence. We have not been able to decriminalize defamation, the way other countries have, and restore it to the status of civil law. As a result Taiwan has paid a huge social cost. The issue requires serious soul-searching.
Several years ago some knowledgeable parties proposed decriminalizing defamation. They claimed that defining defamation as a criminal offense was unconstitutional, and petitioned the Grand Justices for a constitutional interpretation. The Grand Justices ruled that the law was not unconstitutional, and that the petitioners' reasoning was specious. The Grand Justices ruled that criminal penalties could help make up for inadequacies in civil compensation. Their ruling reflects an outdated mindset that regards criminal penalties as a form of vengeance. The Grand Justices ignored the fundamental difference between civil law and criminal law. Civil law is about compensation. Criminal law is about punishment. The forgot that criminal penalties contain a hidden danger. They allow state power to intrude into civil disputes, but do not allow the aggrieved parties to obtain genuine relief.
The Grand Justices do not consider laws defining defamation as a criminal offense unconstitutional. But that does not mean defamation cannot or should not be decriminalized. The reason is simple. Defamation harms an individual's reputation and legal interests. Civil law is perfectly capable of providing adequate relief. State intervention and criminal proceedings are unnecessary. They merely make conflict resolution even more difficult. Politicians resort to defamation lawsuits every day. One case gets filed on the heels of another. They yearn to see their opponents in prison. Meanwhile society must dance to their tune, unable to find a minute's peace. This is something everyone clearly sees.
Those who least ought to resort to criminal prosecution in defamation cases are precisely those most prone to use them -- public figures and politicians. Politicians, whether administrative officials, Members of Parliament, or political party leaders, wield immense power. On the one hand, their words and deeds should be subject to closer scrutiny than those of the general public. They also have an obligation to be more tolerant of criticism. On the other hand, they are more media savvy. They are far more adept than the general public at using media spin-control to defend themselves. Their ability to protect themselves by such means is often greater than any compensation they might derive after a long, drawn out court decision. If they resort to civil suits merely to demand monetary compensation, that is a legitimate exercise of their rights. But if they use criminal penalties to throw others in prison, that is a horse of a different color.
Take Chen Shui-bian for example. A number of years ago he was sued for defamation. He got a taste of what "political persecution" was like. But when he came to power, his administration did not champion the decriminalization of defamation. Those in power continued to charge member of the political opposition with the crime of defamation. Now that Chen is again in the opposition, he once again faces the threat of criminal penalties for defamation. If convicted, he will probably accuse the court of political persecution. The problem is not the fairness of the court's judgments. The problem is the legal system has provided politicians with a weapon they can use to exact revenge against their opponents, by threatening them with prison terms. It has also provided politicians who lose such lawsuits the opportunity to accuse the ruling authorities of exerting undue influence on the administration of justice, and to challenge the independence of the judiciary. If such lawsuits involved only civil litigation, there would be no allegations of political persecution. The problem would be far simpler. Society would be quieter and more peaceful.
Do not assume that civil compensation is incapable of redressing grievances, or that civil compensation cannot compensate for injury. After all, the courts can require those convicted to publish the judgement or an apology in the media. That is one way resolve the problem, via reconciliation. If the celing for compensation has been set too low, the laws may be amended, raising the limit. The courts can also stipulate punitive damages. Punitive damages and criminal penalties are different. Punitive damages are paid to the victim. Criminal penalties are paid into the state treasury. The victim is an individual. What right does the government have to pocket the fines?
There has already been more than one change in ruling parties. Society has made considerable progress. But politicians continue to file defamation lawsuits against each other. The government has limited legal resources. The damage done to the justice system and the government's credibility is incalculable. The political stage is a game of musical chairs. When people are in office they may be plaintiffs. But when people are out of office they may well end up as defendants. Round and round, back and forth. Politicians have turned the nation's system of criminal law into a weapon against their enemies. Hasn't society suffered enough?
It is high time defamation was decriminalized and redefined as a tort law issue. President Ma has withdrawn his lawsuit. Will he follow through and urge the Ministry of Justice and the Legislative Yuan to promote the decriminalization of defamation?
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.25
推動誹謗除罪化，此其時矣
中時社論
馬總統撤回了選舉期間因為兩陣營相互攻詰而提告的案件；陳水扁則於卸任後受法院傳喚出庭而遭人襲擊，決定再興訴訟。他是因公開指述拉法葉案弊端而吃上了誹謗官司。為了政治人物無止無休的唇槍舌劍，法院不知賠上多少司法資源，這其中最大的制度盲點，在於現行法制始終不能認清誹謗行為的本質是民事侵權行為，不該被認為是刑事犯罪。結果至今不能如其它國家一樣除罪化、回歸民事審理，讓台灣付出了鉅大的社會成本，這是在此要認真檢討的課題。
誹謗罪除罪化，數年前曾有識者鼓吹其事。一度挑戰誹謗罪刑事立法為違憲而聲請大法官解釋，大法官則不以之為違憲，所持的理由則是似是而非。大法官認為刑事制裁可以彌補民事賠償之所窮。這可謂是將刑事制裁視做報復的思維依舊揮之不去，大法官不但忽略了民事是賠償、刑事是懲罰的根本差異，而且忘記了刑事懲罰藏著國家公權力介入民事糾紛的隱患，卻並不能讓受害的當事人獲得真正的實質救濟。
即使大法官不以誹謗罪是違憲立法，也不代表誹謗不能或不該除罪。道理很簡單，誹謗是傷害個人名譽法益的行為，可由民事訴訟提供足夠的救濟，不需要國家公權力用刑事訴訟的方式介入，徒增更多的怨懟難以化解。政治人物以誹謗罪名興訟，無日無之，一波未平，一波又起，必欲對手身陷囹圄，社會受其牽引舞弄，難有寧時，已經不需要更多的證明。
最最不該動用刑事制裁追訴誹謗刑責的，恰恰就是最愛動用誹謗刑事訴訟的公眾領袖與政治人物。政治人物不管是行政首長、國會議員或是政黨領袖，其實都是權傾一時的實力人物。一方面他們的所言所行，都該比一般平民受到更多的公評，也就應該更有容忍的責任，另一方面他們動見觀瞻，遠比一般平民更容易藉由媒體舞台發聲自辯自衛，所能得到的防護效果有時更甚於曠日費時的法院判決。如果只是訴諸民事法院，要求金錢賠償，猶屬正當權利之行使；一旦動用刑事訴訟欲陷他人於牢獄之災，那就是另一種評價了。
以陳水扁為例，他當年因為誹謗罪吃了刑事官司，嘗到了「政治迫害」的滋味。可是當他上台執政，政府並未大力推動誹謗除罪化，在野者繼續被當政者用誹謗罪訴追；今天他又下野了，再度面臨誹謗罪的威脅，一旦成罪，恐怕又要指責法院政治迫害。問題可能不在法院依法判決公不公正，而是在於法律制度為政治人物的恩怨情仇，提供了藉用手中權力，加施敵手牢獄威脅的機會；也提供了敗訴的政治人物指責當權者影響司法、挑戰司法獨立的溫床。如果只用民事訴訟解決，就不會有政治監獄迫害的指控，問題單純得多，社會也會安靜平和許多。
不要以為民事救濟的賠償有時難以濟事。賠償請求不足以平復傷害。還可以用媒體刊登判決書甚或是以和解道歉的方式解決問題。賠償法定金額過低，可以修法明訂提升其額度，明白規定容許請求懲罰性賠償也無不可。懲罰性賠償仍與刑事制裁不同。懲罰性賠償是由受害人取得，刑事罰金則是由國庫受付。試問，受害者為個人，國家拿走罰金，有什麼道理可言？
政黨輪替，不只一回了。社會進步了許多，可是政治人物利用誹謗刑事官司冤冤相報的場景與業障，始終揮之不去，國家訴訟資源事小，司法乃至政府公信力的損害事大。上台下台如走馬燈的政治人物，上台時告人或看人被告，下台時成為被告，上上下下，告來告去，將國家刑事執法公器演成了互相傷害的工具，社會受害還不夠深嗎？
誹謗，到了還其本質為民事侵權行為，刑事上除罪化的時候了！撤回告訴的馬總統，要不要功德做到底，建議法務部與立法院，推動誹謗除罪化的善舉？
Thursday, July 24, 2008
A Government In a State of Perpetual Emergency is a Government That Cannot Stand
A Government In a State of Perpetual Emergency is a Government That Cannot Stand
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 24, 2008
As part of its short-term effort to boost the economy, the Liu cabinet has been pursuing additional budget cuts since taking office. It has proposed an increase in the budget to stimulate domestic demand. It never expected to come under severe criticism. All its plans have undergone additions, deletions, and amendments. After exhaustive efforts, they passed a third reading in the Legislative Yuan. The July 18 floods inundated central and southern Taiwan. The Liu cabinet immediately changed its mind. It prepared to divert funds to stimulate domestic demand to flood control, unexpectedly poking a hornet's nest. Not only did the Green camp not support it, even the Blue camp blasted it, going so far as to call it "arguably in violation of the law."
Is the reallocation of funds for stimulating domestic demand to disaster relief and flood control illegal? According to the Executive Yuan it is in compliance with the Disaster Prevention and Relief Law. It is exempt from the requirments of the Budget Act. The Executive Yuan's interpretation is correct, but only on condition it is exempt from the Budget Act. First, the disaster has to be of a large enough magnitude. A disaster relief committee must then be formed. It must submit disaster relief plans. The plans must be reported to the Executive Yuan. The plans must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. Second, in the event disaster relief funds allocated by all levels of government are insufficient to cover they needs arising from a disaster, the annual revenues and expenses may be adjusted, but only in response to special circumstances. Only then will it be exempt from the provisions of the Budget Act.
Based on the above, do the July 18 floods meet the requirements for an emergency response above and beyond those provided by the Disaster Prevention and Relief Law? The July 18 flood was the result of Typhoon Kalmaegi. Taiwan has typhoons every year, and never only one. Every year between July and September is typhoon season. Typhoon related disasters are to be expected. The only difference is the severity of the disasters. Therefore governments at all levels, from central to local, budget the necessary funds every year. These include subsidies for crop damage and revenue loss. The difference between the Liu cabinet and past cabinets is that it has relaxed the requirements for agricultural subsidies. Even if one fails to meet the requirements, one can still apply for the subsidies. President Ma wants the Executive Yuan to consider whether private floodgates can be included in the subsidies. No matter what, when it comes to disaster relief and disaster recovery governments at all levels must fulfill their respective duties and responsibilities. Whether they have "adequate funds" must be determined through Executive Yuan calculations. They must not divert funds from other budgets before first making calculations, or before the original budget has been exhausted.
Of course, flood control and disaster recovery are not equivalent and should not be spoken of in the same breath. Flood control is a major undertaking. Years ago James Soong was Governor of Taiwan. His first act in office was to provide an eight year, 50 billion dollar budget for Kaoping Creek flood control. The budget was billed as a dedicated, pioneering flood control effort, and caused quite a stir. By comparison the DPP government's special budget for Keelung River flood control, which cost 40 billion, isn't even worth mentioning. No matter what, one can imagine the scale of flood control projects. Tens of billions of dollars merely to tame a river or a creek. How many rivers and creeks in central and southern Taiwan does the Executive Yuan expect to tame with its 40 billion allocation? Premier Liu said that merely to purchase the land will cost 500 billion. Forty billion is not enough even for a single county.
Flood control projects are major undertakings. They are long-term projects. Building dikes, dredging, and when necessary, even making large-scale relocations. For example, the Yunlin coast is subject to long-term settlement. It is also a traditional low-lying waterway. During moderate rains it floods. During heavy rains it invariably leads to disaster. In the event of a record 100 year rainfall, no matter how high one makes the dikes, one cannot prevent a potential deluge. Years ago, James Soong allocated 4 billion to occupational retraining for farmers and fishermen. He dredged fish farm ponds to control floods and to prevent the intrusion of sea water. His plan was soon scrapped. It cost four billion back then. Today it would cost many times more. Do we want to do it? Would it be part of a long-term flood control plan? Clearly this is not merely a matter of diverting 40 billion dollars from the budget.
The Executive Yuan must face a number of challenges and problems. The typhoon season has begun. Typhoon Kalmaegi has gone, but who knows when the next typhoon will arrive? If heavy rains again lead to disaster, how much of the budget will remain? How much can be allocated? Before the onset of the next typhoon, what contingency plans will minimize potential disasters?
Amidst widespread skepticism, the Executive Yuan changed its spin. It stressed that only part of the budget will be devoted to stimulating domestic demand. However local governments faced with inadequate funds for disaster relief may apply. If that is the case, what will happen to the original half-year plan to stimulate domestic demand? Doesn't this validate the criticisms leveled by members of both the ruling and opposition camps, who said that this item in the budget was not needed? Also, according to the Disaster Prevention and Relief Law, when funding is inadequate to cover "adjusted annual income and expenditures," and the annual budget process is still in progress, any attempt to balance the budget should divert funds from the annual budget. The previous administration's eight year, 100 billion budget is still in effect. Many local governments haven't even had a chance to issue contracts. These were long ago included in the budget. Why can't we start with these? Why must we divert funds earmarked for the stimulation of domestic demand?
The Ma administration has been in office for two months. It must clean up the ungodly mess left by its predecessor. Its six-month emergency plan involves the stimulation of domestic demand. But six months have yet to pass, and it has already launched an emergency flood control plan and budget. How long does the Ma administration intend to remain in a state of emergency? Flood control is a long-term major infrastructure project. Flood control cannot respond to emergencies and cannot solve emergencies. A government in a perpetual state of emergency, is a government that cannot stand.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.24
只知短期應急 無法站穩馬步
中時社論
為了短期應急，提振景氣，劉內閣才上任就追加減預算，並提出擴大內需預算案，沒想到程序上遭到嚴厲質疑，所有的計畫幾番增刪修改，費盡力氣好不容易在立法院完成三讀。七一八水災灌爆中南台，劉內閣立刻動念，準備挪用擴大內需預算治水，沒想到捅了個馬蜂窩，不但綠營不支持，連藍營都強烈批評，甚至直言「確實有違法爭議。」
挪用擴大內需於救災治水，到底違了什麼法？行政院的說法是根據災害防救法，可以排除預算法的規定。行政院的說法沒錯，但排除預算法是有前提的，第一，那是災害得要重大到一定程度，必須成立救災委員會，提列救災計畫，計畫必須報院，還得送立法院；第二，各級政府編列的災害防救經費，如有不敷支應災害發生時之所需，視情形調整當年度收支移緩濟急，才得不受預算法的限制。
從上述前提來看，七一八水災到不到這個排除預算法以應急的標準？七一八水災是因為卡玫基颱風而致，台灣年年有颱風，颱風還總不只一個，每年七到九月，就是颱風季節，遇颱成災幾成慣例，差別僅在災害輕重。所以，各級政府從中央到地方，每年無不編列相關預算，從農損到稅務補貼，劉內閣與往例不同的是，他把農損補貼放寬了，未達農損標準者，還是可以申請；馬總統則要行政院考量，民眾的排水閥是否也可列入補貼，但不論如何，就救災復原部分，各級政府各司其職，各負權責之後，到底是否「不敷支應」？還得行政院算盤撥完之後再說，總不能算盤還沒撥，原編列預算尚未用盡，即刻挪用其他預算吧。
當然，治水不能和損害復原部分相提並論。治水，是一樁大工程，當年宋楚瑜擔任省長，上任第一件事就是編列了八年五百億預算，為的是整治高屏溪，這筆預算堪稱是專責治水預算之先河，當年造成大轟動；民進黨政府的基隆河整治特別預算案四百多億，都是後話了。但不論如何，可以想見治水工程之龐大，數百億元不過整治一條河、一條溪。如今行政院要挪用四百多億，想整治中南部多少溪河呢？劉揆自己都說，光是徵收用地就得五千億，四百多億一個縣市都不頂用。
治水不但是樁大工程，還得是長期工程，建堤防、搞疏浚，甚至必要時還得考量是否進行大規模的遷移。舉例來說，雲林沿海長期地層下陷，又是地勢低窪的傳統水路，大雨都能淹水，豪雨焉能不成災？遑論遇到破百年的瞬時雨量，堤防建得再高，都擋不了龐然水勢。當年，宋楚瑜曾經以四十億經費規畫輔導農漁民轉業，直接將漁塭挖深，做為防止海水倒灌的「治洪區」，這個計畫隨著廢省而報廢，當年的四十億，即使今日再要做，所需經費勢必不只數倍之多，但要不要做呢？在不在長期治水防洪的規畫之內呢？這些顯然都不是挪用區區四百多億預算能為之事。
行政院面對的挑戰和麻煩是：颱風季才開始，卡玫基走了，下一個颱風不知何時會來，萬一又是豪雨成災，還能挪用什麼預算？多少預算？在下一個颱風來臨前，有什麼應急的辦法，讓可能的災害降到最低？
在各界一片質疑聲中，行政院稍為調整說法，強調不是所有的擴大內需預算都可挪用，而是供地方政府在災害防救經費不敷使用時才可申請，那原來用在擴大內需的半年計畫是不是就免談了？那這不坐實擴大內需預算推動時朝野的批評：沒編這個預算的必要！此外，照災害防救法規定，經費不敷支應時是「調整當年度收支」，年度預算仍在進行中，要勻支不也該從年度預算中挪移嗎？遑論前政府的八年一千多億預算，照正常也還在進行中，許多工程甚至地方政府都還未能發包，這些早列入計畫和預算的工程項目，不能先做嗎？非得挪用擴大內需預算才能做嗎？
馬政府上任兩個月，面對一個百廢待舉的局面，擴大內需是應急的半年期計畫，半年猶未到，卻又要推出應急的治水計畫和預算，馬政府到底要應急到何時？治水，是長期的大工程，絕對應不了急更治不了急，一個只知應急的政府，是不可能站穩馬步的。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 24, 2008
As part of its short-term effort to boost the economy, the Liu cabinet has been pursuing additional budget cuts since taking office. It has proposed an increase in the budget to stimulate domestic demand. It never expected to come under severe criticism. All its plans have undergone additions, deletions, and amendments. After exhaustive efforts, they passed a third reading in the Legislative Yuan. The July 18 floods inundated central and southern Taiwan. The Liu cabinet immediately changed its mind. It prepared to divert funds to stimulate domestic demand to flood control, unexpectedly poking a hornet's nest. Not only did the Green camp not support it, even the Blue camp blasted it, going so far as to call it "arguably in violation of the law."
Is the reallocation of funds for stimulating domestic demand to disaster relief and flood control illegal? According to the Executive Yuan it is in compliance with the Disaster Prevention and Relief Law. It is exempt from the requirments of the Budget Act. The Executive Yuan's interpretation is correct, but only on condition it is exempt from the Budget Act. First, the disaster has to be of a large enough magnitude. A disaster relief committee must then be formed. It must submit disaster relief plans. The plans must be reported to the Executive Yuan. The plans must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. Second, in the event disaster relief funds allocated by all levels of government are insufficient to cover they needs arising from a disaster, the annual revenues and expenses may be adjusted, but only in response to special circumstances. Only then will it be exempt from the provisions of the Budget Act.
Based on the above, do the July 18 floods meet the requirements for an emergency response above and beyond those provided by the Disaster Prevention and Relief Law? The July 18 flood was the result of Typhoon Kalmaegi. Taiwan has typhoons every year, and never only one. Every year between July and September is typhoon season. Typhoon related disasters are to be expected. The only difference is the severity of the disasters. Therefore governments at all levels, from central to local, budget the necessary funds every year. These include subsidies for crop damage and revenue loss. The difference between the Liu cabinet and past cabinets is that it has relaxed the requirements for agricultural subsidies. Even if one fails to meet the requirements, one can still apply for the subsidies. President Ma wants the Executive Yuan to consider whether private floodgates can be included in the subsidies. No matter what, when it comes to disaster relief and disaster recovery governments at all levels must fulfill their respective duties and responsibilities. Whether they have "adequate funds" must be determined through Executive Yuan calculations. They must not divert funds from other budgets before first making calculations, or before the original budget has been exhausted.
Of course, flood control and disaster recovery are not equivalent and should not be spoken of in the same breath. Flood control is a major undertaking. Years ago James Soong was Governor of Taiwan. His first act in office was to provide an eight year, 50 billion dollar budget for Kaoping Creek flood control. The budget was billed as a dedicated, pioneering flood control effort, and caused quite a stir. By comparison the DPP government's special budget for Keelung River flood control, which cost 40 billion, isn't even worth mentioning. No matter what, one can imagine the scale of flood control projects. Tens of billions of dollars merely to tame a river or a creek. How many rivers and creeks in central and southern Taiwan does the Executive Yuan expect to tame with its 40 billion allocation? Premier Liu said that merely to purchase the land will cost 500 billion. Forty billion is not enough even for a single county.
Flood control projects are major undertakings. They are long-term projects. Building dikes, dredging, and when necessary, even making large-scale relocations. For example, the Yunlin coast is subject to long-term settlement. It is also a traditional low-lying waterway. During moderate rains it floods. During heavy rains it invariably leads to disaster. In the event of a record 100 year rainfall, no matter how high one makes the dikes, one cannot prevent a potential deluge. Years ago, James Soong allocated 4 billion to occupational retraining for farmers and fishermen. He dredged fish farm ponds to control floods and to prevent the intrusion of sea water. His plan was soon scrapped. It cost four billion back then. Today it would cost many times more. Do we want to do it? Would it be part of a long-term flood control plan? Clearly this is not merely a matter of diverting 40 billion dollars from the budget.
The Executive Yuan must face a number of challenges and problems. The typhoon season has begun. Typhoon Kalmaegi has gone, but who knows when the next typhoon will arrive? If heavy rains again lead to disaster, how much of the budget will remain? How much can be allocated? Before the onset of the next typhoon, what contingency plans will minimize potential disasters?
Amidst widespread skepticism, the Executive Yuan changed its spin. It stressed that only part of the budget will be devoted to stimulating domestic demand. However local governments faced with inadequate funds for disaster relief may apply. If that is the case, what will happen to the original half-year plan to stimulate domestic demand? Doesn't this validate the criticisms leveled by members of both the ruling and opposition camps, who said that this item in the budget was not needed? Also, according to the Disaster Prevention and Relief Law, when funding is inadequate to cover "adjusted annual income and expenditures," and the annual budget process is still in progress, any attempt to balance the budget should divert funds from the annual budget. The previous administration's eight year, 100 billion budget is still in effect. Many local governments haven't even had a chance to issue contracts. These were long ago included in the budget. Why can't we start with these? Why must we divert funds earmarked for the stimulation of domestic demand?
The Ma administration has been in office for two months. It must clean up the ungodly mess left by its predecessor. Its six-month emergency plan involves the stimulation of domestic demand. But six months have yet to pass, and it has already launched an emergency flood control plan and budget. How long does the Ma administration intend to remain in a state of emergency? Flood control is a long-term major infrastructure project. Flood control cannot respond to emergencies and cannot solve emergencies. A government in a perpetual state of emergency, is a government that cannot stand.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.24
只知短期應急 無法站穩馬步
中時社論
為了短期應急，提振景氣，劉內閣才上任就追加減預算，並提出擴大內需預算案，沒想到程序上遭到嚴厲質疑，所有的計畫幾番增刪修改，費盡力氣好不容易在立法院完成三讀。七一八水災灌爆中南台，劉內閣立刻動念，準備挪用擴大內需預算治水，沒想到捅了個馬蜂窩，不但綠營不支持，連藍營都強烈批評，甚至直言「確實有違法爭議。」
挪用擴大內需於救災治水，到底違了什麼法？行政院的說法是根據災害防救法，可以排除預算法的規定。行政院的說法沒錯，但排除預算法是有前提的，第一，那是災害得要重大到一定程度，必須成立救災委員會，提列救災計畫，計畫必須報院，還得送立法院；第二，各級政府編列的災害防救經費，如有不敷支應災害發生時之所需，視情形調整當年度收支移緩濟急，才得不受預算法的限制。
從上述前提來看，七一八水災到不到這個排除預算法以應急的標準？七一八水災是因為卡玫基颱風而致，台灣年年有颱風，颱風還總不只一個，每年七到九月，就是颱風季節，遇颱成災幾成慣例，差別僅在災害輕重。所以，各級政府從中央到地方，每年無不編列相關預算，從農損到稅務補貼，劉內閣與往例不同的是，他把農損補貼放寬了，未達農損標準者，還是可以申請；馬總統則要行政院考量，民眾的排水閥是否也可列入補貼，但不論如何，就救災復原部分，各級政府各司其職，各負權責之後，到底是否「不敷支應」？還得行政院算盤撥完之後再說，總不能算盤還沒撥，原編列預算尚未用盡，即刻挪用其他預算吧。
當然，治水不能和損害復原部分相提並論。治水，是一樁大工程，當年宋楚瑜擔任省長，上任第一件事就是編列了八年五百億預算，為的是整治高屏溪，這筆預算堪稱是專責治水預算之先河，當年造成大轟動；民進黨政府的基隆河整治特別預算案四百多億，都是後話了。但不論如何，可以想見治水工程之龐大，數百億元不過整治一條河、一條溪。如今行政院要挪用四百多億，想整治中南部多少溪河呢？劉揆自己都說，光是徵收用地就得五千億，四百多億一個縣市都不頂用。
治水不但是樁大工程，還得是長期工程，建堤防、搞疏浚，甚至必要時還得考量是否進行大規模的遷移。舉例來說，雲林沿海長期地層下陷，又是地勢低窪的傳統水路，大雨都能淹水，豪雨焉能不成災？遑論遇到破百年的瞬時雨量，堤防建得再高，都擋不了龐然水勢。當年，宋楚瑜曾經以四十億經費規畫輔導農漁民轉業，直接將漁塭挖深，做為防止海水倒灌的「治洪區」，這個計畫隨著廢省而報廢，當年的四十億，即使今日再要做，所需經費勢必不只數倍之多，但要不要做呢？在不在長期治水防洪的規畫之內呢？這些顯然都不是挪用區區四百多億預算能為之事。
行政院面對的挑戰和麻煩是：颱風季才開始，卡玫基走了，下一個颱風不知何時會來，萬一又是豪雨成災，還能挪用什麼預算？多少預算？在下一個颱風來臨前，有什麼應急的辦法，讓可能的災害降到最低？
在各界一片質疑聲中，行政院稍為調整說法，強調不是所有的擴大內需預算都可挪用，而是供地方政府在災害防救經費不敷使用時才可申請，那原來用在擴大內需的半年計畫是不是就免談了？那這不坐實擴大內需預算推動時朝野的批評：沒編這個預算的必要！此外，照災害防救法規定，經費不敷支應時是「調整當年度收支」，年度預算仍在進行中，要勻支不也該從年度預算中挪移嗎？遑論前政府的八年一千多億預算，照正常也還在進行中，許多工程甚至地方政府都還未能發包，這些早列入計畫和預算的工程項目，不能先做嗎？非得挪用擴大內需預算才能做嗎？
馬政府上任兩個月，面對一個百廢待舉的局面，擴大內需是應急的半年期計畫，半年猶未到，卻又要推出應急的治水計畫和預算，馬政府到底要應急到何時？治水，是長期的大工程，絕對應不了急更治不了急，一個只知應急的政府，是不可能站穩馬步的。
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
A Taiwan Businessman's Newspaper Ad and the Rule of Law
A Taiwan Businessman's Newspaper Ad and the Rule of Law
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 23, 2008
Yesterday Taiwan businessman Wu Chen-shun bought a full-page ad on page A14 of the United Daily News. He related bizarre and painful experience of doing business in Qingdao, on the mainland. He openly called for authorities on both sides of the Strait to ensure justice on his behalf.
Reading the full-page ad Wu Chen-shun took out is shocking enough. We lack first-hand information about the incident. But the ad included a letter to SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung and to ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin, saying: "Please contact concerned departments as soon as possible to ascertain the facts, and deal with the matter in accordance with the law." This suggests that Wu Chen-shun's petition has considerable basis in fact.
Since cross-Strait exchanges began, many inspiring stories have emerged, such as that of Master Kong, the instant noodles maker. But at times reports have also emerged of disputes and even tragedies involving mainland officials. We are convinced that these negative incidents are not something the Beijing authorities want to see happening. Some cases of official corruption the Beijing authorities have found particularly intolerable. If the Beijing authorities can uncover the truth in such incidents, and ensure justice, not only will the rights and interests of Taiwan businessmen will be protected, it would amount to a feather in the Beijing authorities' cap. It would benefit cross-Strait relations. It would also help the Beijing authorities to establish clean government and to improve their public image.
Wu Chen-shun's tale leaves one shocked and incredulous. In 1993 he was invited to Qingdao City in Shandong Province by leaders at various levels. He registered three companies In Qingdao, one after the other. Over time he invested 100 million USD. He calculated that if he enhanced the prosperity of the Laoshan region, land prices would soar.
His nightmare began in May 2004. First he was accused of "owning a private army, firearms, and rocket launchers that could reach Beijing in 10 minutes." After the charges were proven to be baseless, new charges were brought, and he was remanded to a detention center in Jinan. "I do not know why I am being held. I do not know when I will be released." Due to mistreatment in the detention center, he climbed the prison wall and escaped. He said: "Who would have imagined that a person in charge of a company worth billions would wind up fleeing in the middle of the night like a common criminal? During my escape, I fell into a three-story-high valley and was almost killed. They sent out nearly 1,000 police and police dogs, recaptured me, and threw me back in the detention center."
Eventually, Wu Chen-shun was released. He had been detained for seven months. He was released on grounds that "following a prolonged investigation, he was found innocent of criminal activity." When he emerged from his dungeon, Wu Chen-shun discovered his businesses had been looted. His six major assets had been transferred to or auctioned off to certain parties by all means available. For example, within four days, his Qingdao International Beer City, in which he had invested 500 million yuan, accumulated 509 million in debt and went bankrupt. Five hundred acres of land were resold. His Edinburgh Garden, with 162 acres of land, was transferred to someone else on the morning just before he was released.
Wu Chen-shun's experience is reminiscent of what many Taiwan businessmen have encountered in the past. The legal process is ugly. Wu Chen-shun said he didn't know why he had been detained, or why he was later released. He was unable to report the case to any of the various departments, such as the Public Security Bureau, Public Prosecutors, or the Courts. Still less was he able to file a complaint. Other cases like this often involve local party and government officials. The party machinery and government machinery automatically favor the victimizer, and become an accomplice in the crime. The victim ends up like a bug splattered on a windshield. Often the bigger the interests at stake, the worse political persecution the victim encounters. In the case of Wu Chen-shun, it led to the incredible scenario of a businessman in charge of billions being forced to flee in the middle of the night.
Cross-Strait exchanges are increasing rapidly. Both Taiwan investments on the mainland and mainland investments on Taiwan involve individual cases of commercial exchange. They promote a win/win cross-Strait scenario. They enhance cross-Strait peace and friendship. Authorities on both sides of the Strait hope that people-to-people cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges will enhance cross-Strait relations. Their most basic responsibility is to ensure that decent, honest people are protected by the rule of law.
In fact, the "rule of law" that Hu Jintao champions is basic. The result must be the legal protection of Taiwan businessmens' rights and interests. If the rule of law can be implemented, Taiwan businessmen's rights will naturally be protected. The Beijing authorities' concept of the "rule of law" must not be destroyed by evil individuals. This is true for both Taiwan businessmen and for people on the mainland. We must speak up, not merely on behalf of Wu Chen-shun and other Taiwan businessmen. We must look forward to the promulgation of the rule of law on the Chinese mainland.
從一則台商陳情廣告談起
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.07.23 03:12 am
台商吳振順昨日在本報Ａ14版刊登全版廣告，痛陳他在大陸青島投資經商的離奇經歷，並公開呼籲兩岸政府為他主持公道。
讀罷吳振順的全版陳情書，令人震驚至難以置信的地步。我們雖對整個事件無第一手資料，但廣告附帶刊出了海基會董事長江丙坤致海協會會長陳雲林的函文，「敬請惠洽相關部門儘速查明事實真相，依法妥慎處理」，可徵吳振順的陳情應有相當憑據。
兩岸開放交流以來，雖有許多令人欣慰的傳奇故事，如康師傅；但也時常傳出糾紛，甚至悲劇，其中亦往往涉及大陸官方人士。我們相信，那些負面事件皆非北京當局所願見，且在有些事件中傳出的官方貪腐情事尤非北京當局所能容忍；北京當局若能對此類事件查明真相內情，主張公道正義，非但台商權益可獲保護，且亦是北京政府整飭吏治的正大作為。這不但有益兩岸關係，更必有助於北京當局端正政風，改善形象。
吳振順的故事，讀來令人驚愕不置。他在一九九三年受山東省及青島市各級領導「盛情邀請」，在青島前後註冊了三家公司，陸續投資了一億美元；他認為，帶動了嶗山一帶的繁榮，地價飛漲。
噩夢發生在二○○四年五月。起先，他被檢舉「擁有私人軍隊、槍械，火箭炮十分鐘內可以打到北京」。查無此事後，又以其他罪名，押入濟南看守所；「不知何以被關，不知何時才能獲釋」。後因難熬看守所中待遇，某日他竟翻牆越獄。他說：「誰能想到一個坐擁上百億公司的負責人，竟會在深夜狼狽地逃亡？在過程中我還掉進三層樓高的山谷，差點活活摔死……他們出動了近千名公安及警犬……又把我抓回了看守所裡。」
最後，吳振順被釋放時，距他被押已七個月。釋放的理由是「經長期調查，沒有犯罪」。出了黑牢，吳振順才發現他的事業已經完全解構，「六大資產」被「這些人」「用盡各種手段」過戶、拍賣、轉移。例如，在四天之內，將他投資五億元的「青島國際啤酒城」，以九百萬元債務，宣告破產，將五百畝土地轉售；又如，他擁有的「愛丁堡花園」，一六二畝土地，則在他被釋放前的當日早上被人過戶。
吳振順的事例，與過去聽聞的台商遭遇有頗多類似之處。例如，法律程序皆十分粗陋，如吳振順稱不知何以被羈押，亦不知何故被釋放；甚至在「公／檢／法」各部門，無法報案，更無法立案。又如，類此案件常有地方黨政人員涉入，以致黨政機器一面倒向加害者，成了共犯結構，被害人自是螳臂不能擋車；且往往牽涉利益愈大者，被害人遭遇的政治迫害愈大。以吳振順之例而言，居然造成了「一個坐擁上百億公司的負責人，竟然深夜（越獄）狼狽逃亡」的場景，真是匪夷所思。
兩岸交流正在快速提升，無論是台商赴大陸投資，或陸商來台灣經商，其中每一個商貿交流的個案，皆是促進兩岸互惠雙贏的元素，亦是增進兩岸和平友好的題材；兩岸當局在寄望雙方人民經貿交流能為兩岸互動累積成效時，最基本的責任是應當使雙方善良人民受到法治的保護。
其實，胡錦濤所主張的「以法治國」是根本，台商權益的法律保障則是結果。若能實現「以法治國」，台商的法律保障即是水到渠成。北京當局的「以法治國」理念，不容地方不肖人士破壞；不論是對台商，或對大陸人民。準此以論，我們其實不只是要為吳振順等台商個案說話，而更是對中國大陸的法治發展寄以期待。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 23, 2008
Yesterday Taiwan businessman Wu Chen-shun bought a full-page ad on page A14 of the United Daily News. He related bizarre and painful experience of doing business in Qingdao, on the mainland. He openly called for authorities on both sides of the Strait to ensure justice on his behalf.
Reading the full-page ad Wu Chen-shun took out is shocking enough. We lack first-hand information about the incident. But the ad included a letter to SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung and to ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin, saying: "Please contact concerned departments as soon as possible to ascertain the facts, and deal with the matter in accordance with the law." This suggests that Wu Chen-shun's petition has considerable basis in fact.
Since cross-Strait exchanges began, many inspiring stories have emerged, such as that of Master Kong, the instant noodles maker. But at times reports have also emerged of disputes and even tragedies involving mainland officials. We are convinced that these negative incidents are not something the Beijing authorities want to see happening. Some cases of official corruption the Beijing authorities have found particularly intolerable. If the Beijing authorities can uncover the truth in such incidents, and ensure justice, not only will the rights and interests of Taiwan businessmen will be protected, it would amount to a feather in the Beijing authorities' cap. It would benefit cross-Strait relations. It would also help the Beijing authorities to establish clean government and to improve their public image.
Wu Chen-shun's tale leaves one shocked and incredulous. In 1993 he was invited to Qingdao City in Shandong Province by leaders at various levels. He registered three companies In Qingdao, one after the other. Over time he invested 100 million USD. He calculated that if he enhanced the prosperity of the Laoshan region, land prices would soar.
His nightmare began in May 2004. First he was accused of "owning a private army, firearms, and rocket launchers that could reach Beijing in 10 minutes." After the charges were proven to be baseless, new charges were brought, and he was remanded to a detention center in Jinan. "I do not know why I am being held. I do not know when I will be released." Due to mistreatment in the detention center, he climbed the prison wall and escaped. He said: "Who would have imagined that a person in charge of a company worth billions would wind up fleeing in the middle of the night like a common criminal? During my escape, I fell into a three-story-high valley and was almost killed. They sent out nearly 1,000 police and police dogs, recaptured me, and threw me back in the detention center."
Eventually, Wu Chen-shun was released. He had been detained for seven months. He was released on grounds that "following a prolonged investigation, he was found innocent of criminal activity." When he emerged from his dungeon, Wu Chen-shun discovered his businesses had been looted. His six major assets had been transferred to or auctioned off to certain parties by all means available. For example, within four days, his Qingdao International Beer City, in which he had invested 500 million yuan, accumulated 509 million in debt and went bankrupt. Five hundred acres of land were resold. His Edinburgh Garden, with 162 acres of land, was transferred to someone else on the morning just before he was released.
Wu Chen-shun's experience is reminiscent of what many Taiwan businessmen have encountered in the past. The legal process is ugly. Wu Chen-shun said he didn't know why he had been detained, or why he was later released. He was unable to report the case to any of the various departments, such as the Public Security Bureau, Public Prosecutors, or the Courts. Still less was he able to file a complaint. Other cases like this often involve local party and government officials. The party machinery and government machinery automatically favor the victimizer, and become an accomplice in the crime. The victim ends up like a bug splattered on a windshield. Often the bigger the interests at stake, the worse political persecution the victim encounters. In the case of Wu Chen-shun, it led to the incredible scenario of a businessman in charge of billions being forced to flee in the middle of the night.
Cross-Strait exchanges are increasing rapidly. Both Taiwan investments on the mainland and mainland investments on Taiwan involve individual cases of commercial exchange. They promote a win/win cross-Strait scenario. They enhance cross-Strait peace and friendship. Authorities on both sides of the Strait hope that people-to-people cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges will enhance cross-Strait relations. Their most basic responsibility is to ensure that decent, honest people are protected by the rule of law.
In fact, the "rule of law" that Hu Jintao champions is basic. The result must be the legal protection of Taiwan businessmens' rights and interests. If the rule of law can be implemented, Taiwan businessmen's rights will naturally be protected. The Beijing authorities' concept of the "rule of law" must not be destroyed by evil individuals. This is true for both Taiwan businessmen and for people on the mainland. We must speak up, not merely on behalf of Wu Chen-shun and other Taiwan businessmen. We must look forward to the promulgation of the rule of law on the Chinese mainland.
從一則台商陳情廣告談起
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.07.23 03:12 am
台商吳振順昨日在本報Ａ14版刊登全版廣告，痛陳他在大陸青島投資經商的離奇經歷，並公開呼籲兩岸政府為他主持公道。
讀罷吳振順的全版陳情書，令人震驚至難以置信的地步。我們雖對整個事件無第一手資料，但廣告附帶刊出了海基會董事長江丙坤致海協會會長陳雲林的函文，「敬請惠洽相關部門儘速查明事實真相，依法妥慎處理」，可徵吳振順的陳情應有相當憑據。
兩岸開放交流以來，雖有許多令人欣慰的傳奇故事，如康師傅；但也時常傳出糾紛，甚至悲劇，其中亦往往涉及大陸官方人士。我們相信，那些負面事件皆非北京當局所願見，且在有些事件中傳出的官方貪腐情事尤非北京當局所能容忍；北京當局若能對此類事件查明真相內情，主張公道正義，非但台商權益可獲保護，且亦是北京政府整飭吏治的正大作為。這不但有益兩岸關係，更必有助於北京當局端正政風，改善形象。
吳振順的故事，讀來令人驚愕不置。他在一九九三年受山東省及青島市各級領導「盛情邀請」，在青島前後註冊了三家公司，陸續投資了一億美元；他認為，帶動了嶗山一帶的繁榮，地價飛漲。
噩夢發生在二○○四年五月。起先，他被檢舉「擁有私人軍隊、槍械，火箭炮十分鐘內可以打到北京」。查無此事後，又以其他罪名，押入濟南看守所；「不知何以被關，不知何時才能獲釋」。後因難熬看守所中待遇，某日他竟翻牆越獄。他說：「誰能想到一個坐擁上百億公司的負責人，竟會在深夜狼狽地逃亡？在過程中我還掉進三層樓高的山谷，差點活活摔死……他們出動了近千名公安及警犬……又把我抓回了看守所裡。」
最後，吳振順被釋放時，距他被押已七個月。釋放的理由是「經長期調查，沒有犯罪」。出了黑牢，吳振順才發現他的事業已經完全解構，「六大資產」被「這些人」「用盡各種手段」過戶、拍賣、轉移。例如，在四天之內，將他投資五億元的「青島國際啤酒城」，以九百萬元債務，宣告破產，將五百畝土地轉售；又如，他擁有的「愛丁堡花園」，一六二畝土地，則在他被釋放前的當日早上被人過戶。
吳振順的事例，與過去聽聞的台商遭遇有頗多類似之處。例如，法律程序皆十分粗陋，如吳振順稱不知何以被羈押，亦不知何故被釋放；甚至在「公／檢／法」各部門，無法報案，更無法立案。又如，類此案件常有地方黨政人員涉入，以致黨政機器一面倒向加害者，成了共犯結構，被害人自是螳臂不能擋車；且往往牽涉利益愈大者，被害人遭遇的政治迫害愈大。以吳振順之例而言，居然造成了「一個坐擁上百億公司的負責人，竟然深夜（越獄）狼狽逃亡」的場景，真是匪夷所思。
兩岸交流正在快速提升，無論是台商赴大陸投資，或陸商來台灣經商，其中每一個商貿交流的個案，皆是促進兩岸互惠雙贏的元素，亦是增進兩岸和平友好的題材；兩岸當局在寄望雙方人民經貿交流能為兩岸互動累積成效時，最基本的責任是應當使雙方善良人民受到法治的保護。
其實，胡錦濤所主張的「以法治國」是根本，台商權益的法律保障則是結果。若能實現「以法治國」，台商的法律保障即是水到渠成。北京當局的「以法治國」理念，不容地方不肖人士破壞；不論是對台商，或對大陸人民。準此以論，我們其實不只是要為吳振順等台商個案說話，而更是對中國大陸的法治發展寄以期待。
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
Administrative Matters May Take a Back Seat, but National Affairs Must Take a Front Seat
Administrative Matters May Take a Back Seat, but National Affairs Must Take a Front Seat
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 22, 2008
According to a survey conducted by the China Times Public Opinion Survey Center, since Ma Ying-jeou became president two months ago, his approval rating has dropped to 36 percent, possibly the lowest in his political career. The survey also found that KMT legislators, Premier Liu Chao-hsuan, and the Executive Yuan's approval ratings are even lower. Nevertheless, over 55% of the people still have confidence in the Ma administration's future governance. Over half the people feel satisfied with the Ma administration's handling of cross-Strait relations. Nearly half the people do not think that President Ma should continue his "long stay" in the countryside, seven percent more than those who think he should. Most intriguing of all, only 30% were in favor of President Ma retreating to the second-line on issues other than national defence and foreign affairs. Nearly 40% were not in favor of him turning those responsibilities over to the Executive Yuan. This tells us that the public on Taiwan does not fully understand the nature of democracy.
After President Ma took office, he said that according to the Constitution, national defence and foreign affairs are the president's responsibility. On other issues, the President ought to retreat to the second-line, and the Premier ought to be in charge. This is the President's understanding of his duties under the Constitution. Currently more people disapprove of his decision than approve. Normally the public tends to agree with the president's understanding of the Constitution. This is not a matter of asking to public to amend the Constitution. The public considers the president correct in his understanding of the Constitution. At the same time it disapproves of his decision to retreat to the second line out of respect for the Constitution. What exactly does that mean?
Not long ago the China Times said that Ma's so-called retreat to the second-line is a concept that requires clarification. When the President retreats to the second-line, he is defending the Constitution and acknowledging his proper role. It does not mean the President should be indifferent to the Executive Yuan's duties. A President who retreats to the second-line must still empathize with the people's suffering. When the nation finds itself in difficulty, he must stand up and bolster public morale. During times of peace he must remain vigilant. He must stabilize the nation. As Head of State, the President must set the major objectives and determine the larger direction for the nation's development. He must become a stabilizing force for the political situation. In reality, a President who has retreated to the second line must at times stand on the front line, uniting the people.
President Chen and President Ma must understand of constitutional separation of powers between the President and the Executive Yuan. They may not ignore the provisions of the Constitution merely because they are democratically elected. They may not usurp powers not delegated to them, merely because they received a majority of the votes. This is something that President Ma, who studied law, wishes to uphold. It is also something that voters may be neglecting. To put it bluntly, voters who support the President must not encourage the President to violate the rule of law, violate the Constitution, exceed his rightfully delegated powers, and make decisions he is not authorized to make. The Constitution tells people how to elect a President. It also tells the President what he may and may not do. The President must act in accordance with the Constitution. Democracy must not be a system in which a president, once elected, is able to set the Constitution to one side.
In a democracy the people choose their leaders. When these leaders' peform their duties, two problems may arise. One, they may accomplish something of value. The other, they may exceed their authority. To accomplish something of value, requires leadership, determination, and administrative ability. To avoid exceeding one's authority, requires self-control, a refusal to abuse power, and a refusal to be corrupted by money. The best elected leaders possess both virtues. The worst elected leaders lack both virtues. Such leaders are both incompetent and corruptible. In the event we cannot have both, is it better to have a leader who is competent, or a leader who incorruptible? A feudal society that does not insist on democracy may prefer a leader who is competent. But Taiwan is a democracy unwilling to turn back the clock. The President must be both competent and incorruptible. Failing that, an incompetent president is preferable to a corrupt president. The worst of all worlds is a President who is both incompetent and corrupt. Taiwan has had more than a little experience with just such a President.
Besides an elected President, The Constitution also provides for a Premier. The Premier is the head of the Executive Yuan. He is responsible for leading the cabinet in accordance with the law. People who elect their own leaders will sooner or later elect a popular but mediocre leader. If a Zhu Geliang is elected, that is good. But a Zhu Geliang might not run for office. If a Liu Bei is elected, then in accordance with the Constitution, he can still appoint a Zhu Geliang as a professional administrator. Liu Bei knew enough to respect Zhu Geliang. That fact is extremely important. In today's democracy, a popular President who respects diversity, who can win the trust of the people, who abides by the Constitution, who knows how to use talent, who respects expertise, is far more worthy of recognition than someone is is arbitrary and who has contempt for the rule of law. Taiwan's democracy requires further consolidation. What kind of president it needs requires further thought.
No matter what kind of President the people of Taiwan want, we already have a President who has three years and 10 months left in his term. He has formed a professional team of administrators. The public on Taiwan wants a President who can solve people's problems. The public hopes the President will exercise self-restraint. The President must not "rule by doing nothing." But he must not violate the Constitution in order to accomplish something of value. A President who exceeds his Constitutional authority, no matter how promising he might be as an administrator, would not be a blessing for Taiwan. When President Ma sees his poll results, he will feel pressured to do something. But he must also know when not to do anything.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.22
政務退二線 國家大政仍應上一線
中時社論
本報民意中心調查顯示，馬英九總統就任兩個月，施政滿意度跌到卅六％，可能是他從政以來的歷史新低。此一調查也發現，國民黨立委、劉兆玄院長以及行政團隊 的表現，民意評價更低，但是民眾對於馬政府未來施政，仍有超過五成五的人具有信心，也有半數以上的民眾對於馬政府經營兩岸關係的做法感到滿意，還有接近半 數的民眾不以為馬總統現在應該繼續下鄉進行long stay，超過贊成者七個百分點。最耐人尋味的是，只有三成的人贊成馬總統在國防外交以外的問題上站在二線；對交由行政院負責不表贊成的民眾，則接近四 成。此問題充分反映了台灣在民主政治進程上，可能還有需要反思的觀念。
馬總統就任後表示，依據憲法國防外交是總統職權；其他問題，總統 站在二線，而由行政院院長負責；這是總統對於憲法上總統職權功能的理解。現在表示不贊成的人多過贊成的人，依正常判斷，當然不會是因一般民眾並不同意總統 的憲法認知。這個題目，不是在問民眾該不該修改憲法，如果民眾既不以為總統的憲法認識錯誤，又不贊成總統尊重憲法守在二線，其中究竟代表了什麼涵意？
不久之前，我們也曾表達看法，所謂退居二線，是個應該釐清的概念。總統退居二線是要謹守憲法上的權力分寸，但也不是說總統就對應由行政院團隊負責之事，漠 不關心；退居二線的總統還是應該疾民之苦，在國家處境陷入困局的時候站出來振作民心士氣，在順遂平穩的時候知道要居安思危。不論是什麼時候，總統都該站在 穩定大局的高度，以國家元首的身分指出整體發展的總目標與大方向，成為政治局面穩定的力量。在實質政務上退居二線的總統，仍該是在各種公開場合站上一線凝 聚民氣的國家元首。
我們也必須指陳，馬總統正確地理解到憲法上總統與行政院的權限有其分工之處，不能只因為他是全民選出的總統，就將憲 法的規定拋諸腦後，靠著選票的加持，侵奪並不屬於他的權力。這是習法出身的馬總統的法治堅持，卻反而可能是總統選民忽略的地方。說得直白一些，總統的選民 經過思考之後，不該會去支持總統不守法治，不守憲法，去接不該由他掌握的權力，去做不該由他做的決定。憲法，不但告訴人們總統怎麼選，也告訴總統能做什 麼，不能做什麼。總統，應該按照憲法行事；民主政治不該是選出總統，就把憲法擺在一邊。
民主政治由人民選擇領袖，有兩項可能相互衝突的 指標，一是他是否有為，一是他是否有守。有為，是有領導魄力與執行能力；有守，則是自我把持，不濫用權力，不貪汙歛財。上選的國家元首，當然是既有為，又 有守。下下之選，則是不但無能，而且不守分際。有為有守若是不能得兼，是寧取有為呢？還是寧取有守？不堅持民主的封建社會，可能寧取有為；可是台灣已是不 許回頭的民主政治，總統要就是有為有守，不然也該是無能而有守。最怕是碰到無能而又無守的總統，這點台灣不是沒有經驗。
在民選總統之 外，憲法上確還有位負責領導內閣依法行政的行政院長。從長遠看，人民選舉領袖，總有選出人氣充足，但才具平庸者的時候。諸葛亮當選，固然很好；但諸葛亮未 必參選。當選的若是劉備，依照憲法，也還有任命諸葛亮作為專業經理人的機會。劉備懂得尊重諸葛亮，其實極為重要。現在民主政治，面向多元，贏得人民信賴的 人氣總統，謹守憲法分寸，識人善任，尊重專才，要遠比乾綱獨斷，視法治如無物者，值得肯定許多。台灣的民主仍須鞏固，究竟需要那一種總統，應該深思。
不管台灣人想要那一種總統，我們已經有了一位任期還有三年十個月的總統，也已組成了一支專業行政團隊。台灣人無非想要總統解民倒懸，我們也希望總統有為有 守，總統既不該無為而治，更不可為了展現有為，就不守憲法分際。不守憲法分際的總統，再怎麼有為，也非台灣之福，馬總統看到民調結果，必須有所做為，也還 是要有所不為。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 22, 2008
According to a survey conducted by the China Times Public Opinion Survey Center, since Ma Ying-jeou became president two months ago, his approval rating has dropped to 36 percent, possibly the lowest in his political career. The survey also found that KMT legislators, Premier Liu Chao-hsuan, and the Executive Yuan's approval ratings are even lower. Nevertheless, over 55% of the people still have confidence in the Ma administration's future governance. Over half the people feel satisfied with the Ma administration's handling of cross-Strait relations. Nearly half the people do not think that President Ma should continue his "long stay" in the countryside, seven percent more than those who think he should. Most intriguing of all, only 30% were in favor of President Ma retreating to the second-line on issues other than national defence and foreign affairs. Nearly 40% were not in favor of him turning those responsibilities over to the Executive Yuan. This tells us that the public on Taiwan does not fully understand the nature of democracy.
After President Ma took office, he said that according to the Constitution, national defence and foreign affairs are the president's responsibility. On other issues, the President ought to retreat to the second-line, and the Premier ought to be in charge. This is the President's understanding of his duties under the Constitution. Currently more people disapprove of his decision than approve. Normally the public tends to agree with the president's understanding of the Constitution. This is not a matter of asking to public to amend the Constitution. The public considers the president correct in his understanding of the Constitution. At the same time it disapproves of his decision to retreat to the second line out of respect for the Constitution. What exactly does that mean?
Not long ago the China Times said that Ma's so-called retreat to the second-line is a concept that requires clarification. When the President retreats to the second-line, he is defending the Constitution and acknowledging his proper role. It does not mean the President should be indifferent to the Executive Yuan's duties. A President who retreats to the second-line must still empathize with the people's suffering. When the nation finds itself in difficulty, he must stand up and bolster public morale. During times of peace he must remain vigilant. He must stabilize the nation. As Head of State, the President must set the major objectives and determine the larger direction for the nation's development. He must become a stabilizing force for the political situation. In reality, a President who has retreated to the second line must at times stand on the front line, uniting the people.
President Chen and President Ma must understand of constitutional separation of powers between the President and the Executive Yuan. They may not ignore the provisions of the Constitution merely because they are democratically elected. They may not usurp powers not delegated to them, merely because they received a majority of the votes. This is something that President Ma, who studied law, wishes to uphold. It is also something that voters may be neglecting. To put it bluntly, voters who support the President must not encourage the President to violate the rule of law, violate the Constitution, exceed his rightfully delegated powers, and make decisions he is not authorized to make. The Constitution tells people how to elect a President. It also tells the President what he may and may not do. The President must act in accordance with the Constitution. Democracy must not be a system in which a president, once elected, is able to set the Constitution to one side.
In a democracy the people choose their leaders. When these leaders' peform their duties, two problems may arise. One, they may accomplish something of value. The other, they may exceed their authority. To accomplish something of value, requires leadership, determination, and administrative ability. To avoid exceeding one's authority, requires self-control, a refusal to abuse power, and a refusal to be corrupted by money. The best elected leaders possess both virtues. The worst elected leaders lack both virtues. Such leaders are both incompetent and corruptible. In the event we cannot have both, is it better to have a leader who is competent, or a leader who incorruptible? A feudal society that does not insist on democracy may prefer a leader who is competent. But Taiwan is a democracy unwilling to turn back the clock. The President must be both competent and incorruptible. Failing that, an incompetent president is preferable to a corrupt president. The worst of all worlds is a President who is both incompetent and corrupt. Taiwan has had more than a little experience with just such a President.
Besides an elected President, The Constitution also provides for a Premier. The Premier is the head of the Executive Yuan. He is responsible for leading the cabinet in accordance with the law. People who elect their own leaders will sooner or later elect a popular but mediocre leader. If a Zhu Geliang is elected, that is good. But a Zhu Geliang might not run for office. If a Liu Bei is elected, then in accordance with the Constitution, he can still appoint a Zhu Geliang as a professional administrator. Liu Bei knew enough to respect Zhu Geliang. That fact is extremely important. In today's democracy, a popular President who respects diversity, who can win the trust of the people, who abides by the Constitution, who knows how to use talent, who respects expertise, is far more worthy of recognition than someone is is arbitrary and who has contempt for the rule of law. Taiwan's democracy requires further consolidation. What kind of president it needs requires further thought.
No matter what kind of President the people of Taiwan want, we already have a President who has three years and 10 months left in his term. He has formed a professional team of administrators. The public on Taiwan wants a President who can solve people's problems. The public hopes the President will exercise self-restraint. The President must not "rule by doing nothing." But he must not violate the Constitution in order to accomplish something of value. A President who exceeds his Constitutional authority, no matter how promising he might be as an administrator, would not be a blessing for Taiwan. When President Ma sees his poll results, he will feel pressured to do something. But he must also know when not to do anything.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.22
政務退二線 國家大政仍應上一線
中時社論
本報民意中心調查顯示，馬英九總統就任兩個月，施政滿意度跌到卅六％，可能是他從政以來的歷史新低。此一調查也發現，國民黨立委、劉兆玄院長以及行政團隊 的表現，民意評價更低，但是民眾對於馬政府未來施政，仍有超過五成五的人具有信心，也有半數以上的民眾對於馬政府經營兩岸關係的做法感到滿意，還有接近半 數的民眾不以為馬總統現在應該繼續下鄉進行long stay，超過贊成者七個百分點。最耐人尋味的是，只有三成的人贊成馬總統在國防外交以外的問題上站在二線；對交由行政院負責不表贊成的民眾，則接近四 成。此問題充分反映了台灣在民主政治進程上，可能還有需要反思的觀念。
馬總統就任後表示，依據憲法國防外交是總統職權；其他問題，總統 站在二線，而由行政院院長負責；這是總統對於憲法上總統職權功能的理解。現在表示不贊成的人多過贊成的人，依正常判斷，當然不會是因一般民眾並不同意總統 的憲法認知。這個題目，不是在問民眾該不該修改憲法，如果民眾既不以為總統的憲法認識錯誤，又不贊成總統尊重憲法守在二線，其中究竟代表了什麼涵意？
不久之前，我們也曾表達看法，所謂退居二線，是個應該釐清的概念。總統退居二線是要謹守憲法上的權力分寸，但也不是說總統就對應由行政院團隊負責之事，漠 不關心；退居二線的總統還是應該疾民之苦，在國家處境陷入困局的時候站出來振作民心士氣，在順遂平穩的時候知道要居安思危。不論是什麼時候，總統都該站在 穩定大局的高度，以國家元首的身分指出整體發展的總目標與大方向，成為政治局面穩定的力量。在實質政務上退居二線的總統，仍該是在各種公開場合站上一線凝 聚民氣的國家元首。
我們也必須指陳，馬總統正確地理解到憲法上總統與行政院的權限有其分工之處，不能只因為他是全民選出的總統，就將憲 法的規定拋諸腦後，靠著選票的加持，侵奪並不屬於他的權力。這是習法出身的馬總統的法治堅持，卻反而可能是總統選民忽略的地方。說得直白一些，總統的選民 經過思考之後，不該會去支持總統不守法治，不守憲法，去接不該由他掌握的權力，去做不該由他做的決定。憲法，不但告訴人們總統怎麼選，也告訴總統能做什 麼，不能做什麼。總統，應該按照憲法行事；民主政治不該是選出總統，就把憲法擺在一邊。
民主政治由人民選擇領袖，有兩項可能相互衝突的 指標，一是他是否有為，一是他是否有守。有為，是有領導魄力與執行能力；有守，則是自我把持，不濫用權力，不貪汙歛財。上選的國家元首，當然是既有為，又 有守。下下之選，則是不但無能，而且不守分際。有為有守若是不能得兼，是寧取有為呢？還是寧取有守？不堅持民主的封建社會，可能寧取有為；可是台灣已是不 許回頭的民主政治，總統要就是有為有守，不然也該是無能而有守。最怕是碰到無能而又無守的總統，這點台灣不是沒有經驗。
在民選總統之 外，憲法上確還有位負責領導內閣依法行政的行政院長。從長遠看，人民選舉領袖，總有選出人氣充足，但才具平庸者的時候。諸葛亮當選，固然很好；但諸葛亮未 必參選。當選的若是劉備，依照憲法，也還有任命諸葛亮作為專業經理人的機會。劉備懂得尊重諸葛亮，其實極為重要。現在民主政治，面向多元，贏得人民信賴的 人氣總統，謹守憲法分寸，識人善任，尊重專才，要遠比乾綱獨斷，視法治如無物者，值得肯定許多。台灣的民主仍須鞏固，究竟需要那一種總統，應該深思。
不管台灣人想要那一種總統，我們已經有了一位任期還有三年十個月的總統，也已組成了一支專業行政團隊。台灣人無非想要總統解民倒懸，我們也希望總統有為有 守，總統既不該無為而治，更不可為了展現有為，就不守憲法分際。不守憲法分際的總統，再怎麼有為，也非台灣之福，馬總統看到民調結果，必須有所做為，也還 是要有所不為。
Monday, July 21, 2008
A Diplomatic Truce and the Cross-Strait Tango
A Diplomatic Truce and the Cross-Strait Tango
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 21, 2008
Any "diplomatic truce" must begin with a "cross-Strait truce." Without a cross-Strait truce, forget about a diplomatic truce.
A fresh breeze appears to be blowing through the realm of cross-Strait diplomacy. In August President Ma will transit the United States. What level of treatment will Ma Ying-jeou receive from Washington? Will the ROC be able to maintain diplomatic relations with Paraguay? In September the ROC will attempt to "join the UN," i.e., become a WHO member. Will it succeed? U.S. arms sales to the ROC remain complex and confusing. For the Ma administration, these are all unknown quantities. They may even be powerful, ticking time bombs.
A diplomatic truce is a choice for which there is no alternative. Consider the current crisis in Paraguay. Paraguay's new president Fernando Lugo has demanded 71 million USD to maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC. If Taipei knuckles under, it will merely inspire sundry extortionists to up their demands. Besides, public opinion on Taiwan will not tolerate this. If Taipei refuses, Paraguay could break off diplomatic relations at any moment. If such a crisis had occurred in the past, it would merely have provided more fodder for the media. Now the situation is different, because the Ma administration has already called for a diplomatic truce.
Minister for Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou said that Paraguay is our sole ally in South America. If it goes, the two sides will resume a diplomatic war. A public backlash on Taiwan is also a possibility. Although Lugo has been hinting to Beijing that Paraguay is open to a counteroffer, Beijing's response has been muted. Beijing knows if the situation degenerates to that level, the impact on cross-Strait relations will be damaging, both psychologically and substantively.
In the past, cross-Strait diplomatic struggles focused on restricting cross-Strait relations. But cross-Strait relations being what they are now, if diplomatic struggles escalate, they are bound to undermine still fragile mutual trust. Achieving today's cross-Strait relations was no easy task. If extortionate demands from Paraguay drive a wedge between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, it will be an unfunny joke. A less profitable deal cannot be imagined.
The improvement of cross-Strait relations involves more than just direct charter flights and mainland tourists visiting Taiwan. Economics, trade, culture, society, diplomacy, and the international community must be taken into account. A full range of integrated systems must be established. Peaceful, win-win, cross-Strait relations must be the highest goal. If Paraguay's attempt to drive a wedge between Taipei and Beijing harms cross-Strait relations, then we must treat cross-Strait relations as more important than diplomatic relations with Paraguay.
Such appeals are of course directed at the Beijing authorities. The Ma administration advocates a diplomatic truce. This is a risky policy, because it is something not entirely within our grasp. If the Ma administration encounters a major setback in its attempt to negotiate a diplomatic truce, for whatever reason, for example, being unwilling to submit to blackmail, it is bound to touch off a domestic political crisis. That in turn is bound to affect cross-Strait relations. That said, the deterioration of cross-Strait relations is not something the Beijing authorities welcome either.
Take the recent "zhong hua tai bei" vs. "zhong guo tai bei" dispute. In Beijing's eyes, the two terms may well be merely two translations into Chinese. But to the public on Taiwan, it could be seen as a breach of trust. After all, President Hu Jintao proposed "establishing mutual trust, shelving disputes, setting aside differences, creating a win/win situation."
Cross-Strait relations are developing rapidly. That is when they are the most fragile. We have repeatedly reminded Beijing that with regards cross-Strait relations, Taiwan's system of democracy must be granted central importance. The Beijing authorities must not merely grapple with the Taiwan authorities, they must dialogue directly with the public on Taiwan. If at at time when cross-Strait relations are improving, they steal away Paraguay, it will be a setback not only for the Taiwan authorities, it will also hurt the feelings of the public on Taiwan. The "zhong hua tai bei" vs. "zhong guo tai bei" problem is not just a problem for the Taiwan authorities. Beijing must also consider the traumatic impact on the public on Taiwan. Beijing is "pinning its hopes on the public on Taiwan." In that case, it ought to respond to the "aspirations of the public on Taiwan."
During the early stages of cross-Strait opening, authorities on both sides were groping for solutions. This cross-Strait Tango requires that both sides know the dance steps. Hu Jintao's aspirations for cross-Strait relations were expressed in his 16 character formulation. But if even the "zhong hua tai bei" vs. "zhong guo tai bei" controversy cannot be resolved. If cross-Strait relations can be manipulated by Paraguay, then the hard-won results of cross-Strait interaction will be significantly harmed. That would be a tragedy.
Only a cross-Strait truce will allow a diplomatic truce. Hu Jintao offered his 16 character formulation. If the Beijing authorities can walk the walk as well as talk the talk, then a cross-Strait truce is probable, and a diplomatic truce is possible. Conversely, if a diplomatic truce is not possible, then a cross-Strait truce will be be difficult at best. So will "establishing mutual trust, shelving disputes, setting aside differences, creating a win/win situation."
外交休兵與兩岸探戈
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.07.21 04:25 am
「外交休兵」要從「兩岸休兵」做起；兩岸不休兵，外交也就休不了兵。
兩 岸關係的外交領域，儼然出現了一股山雨欲來風滿樓的氛圍。八月馬英九總統過境美國的「規格」高下，與巴拉圭的邦交能否保住，九月「入聯」議題的動靜如何， 有否參與ＷＨＯ的機會，及台美軍售問題的撲朔迷離等等；對馬政府而言，這些皆是未定之數，也可能皆是一顆強烈的不定時炸彈。
外交休兵是一 個無可奈何的選擇。即以眼前的巴拉圭危機而言，新總統魯戈對台灣開出七千一百萬美元的價碼；台灣若給他，只會使各方勒索者未來競相抬高行情，何況台灣輿論 亦不會答應；倘若不允，則隨時有斷交的可能。這類危機如果發生在過去，只不過是再增添一則複製的故事而已；但是，如今的時空情境卻已不同，因為馬政府已經 喊出了「外交休兵」的口號！
外交部長歐鴻鍊稱，巴拉圭是我在南美唯一友邦，倘若失守，兩岸必將再度掀起外交戰；這也恐是屆時面對國內政情 的必要反應。相對而言，雖然魯戈不斷向北京示好表態，但北京的態度卻似頗有保留；因為，北京亦知，情勢倘若發展到那個地步，對整體的兩岸關係，在心理上及 實質上，必將是一個嚴峻的衝擊。
過去，兩岸的外交角力，主要著眼在制約兩岸關係；但是，現今兩岸關係已經走到如此境地，倘再出現激烈的外交角力，卻必將傷害猶甚脆弱的互信。兩岸關係好不容易達成今日的成果，倘若斷送在離間勒索的巴拉圭之手中，那真是一個笑話，天下沒有這麼划不來的買賣。
兩 岸關係進展至今日地步，不能只看包機直航、陸客遊台；而是須將經濟、貿易、文化、社會、外交、國際社會皆納入考慮，設法建立一個全方位的整合體系，一切皆 以兩岸「和平雙贏」為最高目標。譬如說，巴拉圭的離間勒索對兩岸關係若是一個傷害，就應將兩岸關係放在高於巴拉圭的地位。
當然，這些話是 對北京當局說的。馬政府主張「外交休兵」，其實是一高風險的政策，因為情勢並非操之在我；可以預見，倘若馬政府在「外交休兵」上遭到重大挫敗，無論出自何 種理由（例如不願向勒索低頭），皆必將引爆國內政治危機，因此亦必然會影響到兩岸關係。然而，兩岸關係的倒退，應非北京當局所樂見。
不說別的，僅舉近日所出現的「中華台北」，與「中國台北」的爭議而言。在北京眼中，也許這兩個名詞皆是「中文譯名」；但看在台灣民眾眼中，卻是對胡錦濤主席所主張的「建立互信／擱置爭議／求同存異／共創雙贏」之扭曲，甚至是背信。
兩 岸關係正值快速發展之時，這也卻是最為脆弱之際。我們多次提醒北京當局，在處理兩岸關係時，應將台灣的民主體制置於核心地位；北京當局不能只與台灣的政府 進行角力，而須與台灣的人民直接對話。例如，倘在今日兩岸關係改善之際，挖走巴拉圭；不僅是台灣政府的挫折，也是對台灣人民情感的傷害。又如，將「中華台 北」改成「中國台北」；也不只是給台灣政府出難題，亦是對台灣人民情感的衝擊。北京既「寄希望於台灣人民」，自當回應「台灣人民之所希望」。
兩岸情勢初開，兩岸當局皆在摸索；這場「兩岸探戈」，須有相互認同的舞步。我們認為，胡錦濤的十六字箴言，如果連在「中華台北／中國台北」的爭議上皆不能體現，或如果竟禁受不起巴拉圭的操弄，而致今日好不容易出現的兩岸互動成果受到重大傷害，那將是莫大的遺憾。
「兩岸休兵」才有「外交休兵」。胡錦濤十六字箴言若能「言顧行／行顧言」，則「兩岸休兵」有望，「外交休兵」也就順理成章；反之，倘若「外交不休兵」，兩岸也就難以休兵，亦即難以「建立互信／擱置爭議／求同存異／共創雙贏」了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 21, 2008
Any "diplomatic truce" must begin with a "cross-Strait truce." Without a cross-Strait truce, forget about a diplomatic truce.
A fresh breeze appears to be blowing through the realm of cross-Strait diplomacy. In August President Ma will transit the United States. What level of treatment will Ma Ying-jeou receive from Washington? Will the ROC be able to maintain diplomatic relations with Paraguay? In September the ROC will attempt to "join the UN," i.e., become a WHO member. Will it succeed? U.S. arms sales to the ROC remain complex and confusing. For the Ma administration, these are all unknown quantities. They may even be powerful, ticking time bombs.
A diplomatic truce is a choice for which there is no alternative. Consider the current crisis in Paraguay. Paraguay's new president Fernando Lugo has demanded 71 million USD to maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC. If Taipei knuckles under, it will merely inspire sundry extortionists to up their demands. Besides, public opinion on Taiwan will not tolerate this. If Taipei refuses, Paraguay could break off diplomatic relations at any moment. If such a crisis had occurred in the past, it would merely have provided more fodder for the media. Now the situation is different, because the Ma administration has already called for a diplomatic truce.
Minister for Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou said that Paraguay is our sole ally in South America. If it goes, the two sides will resume a diplomatic war. A public backlash on Taiwan is also a possibility. Although Lugo has been hinting to Beijing that Paraguay is open to a counteroffer, Beijing's response has been muted. Beijing knows if the situation degenerates to that level, the impact on cross-Strait relations will be damaging, both psychologically and substantively.
In the past, cross-Strait diplomatic struggles focused on restricting cross-Strait relations. But cross-Strait relations being what they are now, if diplomatic struggles escalate, they are bound to undermine still fragile mutual trust. Achieving today's cross-Strait relations was no easy task. If extortionate demands from Paraguay drive a wedge between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, it will be an unfunny joke. A less profitable deal cannot be imagined.
The improvement of cross-Strait relations involves more than just direct charter flights and mainland tourists visiting Taiwan. Economics, trade, culture, society, diplomacy, and the international community must be taken into account. A full range of integrated systems must be established. Peaceful, win-win, cross-Strait relations must be the highest goal. If Paraguay's attempt to drive a wedge between Taipei and Beijing harms cross-Strait relations, then we must treat cross-Strait relations as more important than diplomatic relations with Paraguay.
Such appeals are of course directed at the Beijing authorities. The Ma administration advocates a diplomatic truce. This is a risky policy, because it is something not entirely within our grasp. If the Ma administration encounters a major setback in its attempt to negotiate a diplomatic truce, for whatever reason, for example, being unwilling to submit to blackmail, it is bound to touch off a domestic political crisis. That in turn is bound to affect cross-Strait relations. That said, the deterioration of cross-Strait relations is not something the Beijing authorities welcome either.
Take the recent "zhong hua tai bei" vs. "zhong guo tai bei" dispute. In Beijing's eyes, the two terms may well be merely two translations into Chinese. But to the public on Taiwan, it could be seen as a breach of trust. After all, President Hu Jintao proposed "establishing mutual trust, shelving disputes, setting aside differences, creating a win/win situation."
Cross-Strait relations are developing rapidly. That is when they are the most fragile. We have repeatedly reminded Beijing that with regards cross-Strait relations, Taiwan's system of democracy must be granted central importance. The Beijing authorities must not merely grapple with the Taiwan authorities, they must dialogue directly with the public on Taiwan. If at at time when cross-Strait relations are improving, they steal away Paraguay, it will be a setback not only for the Taiwan authorities, it will also hurt the feelings of the public on Taiwan. The "zhong hua tai bei" vs. "zhong guo tai bei" problem is not just a problem for the Taiwan authorities. Beijing must also consider the traumatic impact on the public on Taiwan. Beijing is "pinning its hopes on the public on Taiwan." In that case, it ought to respond to the "aspirations of the public on Taiwan."
During the early stages of cross-Strait opening, authorities on both sides were groping for solutions. This cross-Strait Tango requires that both sides know the dance steps. Hu Jintao's aspirations for cross-Strait relations were expressed in his 16 character formulation. But if even the "zhong hua tai bei" vs. "zhong guo tai bei" controversy cannot be resolved. If cross-Strait relations can be manipulated by Paraguay, then the hard-won results of cross-Strait interaction will be significantly harmed. That would be a tragedy.
Only a cross-Strait truce will allow a diplomatic truce. Hu Jintao offered his 16 character formulation. If the Beijing authorities can walk the walk as well as talk the talk, then a cross-Strait truce is probable, and a diplomatic truce is possible. Conversely, if a diplomatic truce is not possible, then a cross-Strait truce will be be difficult at best. So will "establishing mutual trust, shelving disputes, setting aside differences, creating a win/win situation."
外交休兵與兩岸探戈
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.07.21 04:25 am
「外交休兵」要從「兩岸休兵」做起；兩岸不休兵，外交也就休不了兵。
兩 岸關係的外交領域，儼然出現了一股山雨欲來風滿樓的氛圍。八月馬英九總統過境美國的「規格」高下，與巴拉圭的邦交能否保住，九月「入聯」議題的動靜如何， 有否參與ＷＨＯ的機會，及台美軍售問題的撲朔迷離等等；對馬政府而言，這些皆是未定之數，也可能皆是一顆強烈的不定時炸彈。
外交休兵是一 個無可奈何的選擇。即以眼前的巴拉圭危機而言，新總統魯戈對台灣開出七千一百萬美元的價碼；台灣若給他，只會使各方勒索者未來競相抬高行情，何況台灣輿論 亦不會答應；倘若不允，則隨時有斷交的可能。這類危機如果發生在過去，只不過是再增添一則複製的故事而已；但是，如今的時空情境卻已不同，因為馬政府已經 喊出了「外交休兵」的口號！
外交部長歐鴻鍊稱，巴拉圭是我在南美唯一友邦，倘若失守，兩岸必將再度掀起外交戰；這也恐是屆時面對國內政情 的必要反應。相對而言，雖然魯戈不斷向北京示好表態，但北京的態度卻似頗有保留；因為，北京亦知，情勢倘若發展到那個地步，對整體的兩岸關係，在心理上及 實質上，必將是一個嚴峻的衝擊。
過去，兩岸的外交角力，主要著眼在制約兩岸關係；但是，現今兩岸關係已經走到如此境地，倘再出現激烈的外交角力，卻必將傷害猶甚脆弱的互信。兩岸關係好不容易達成今日的成果，倘若斷送在離間勒索的巴拉圭之手中，那真是一個笑話，天下沒有這麼划不來的買賣。
兩 岸關係進展至今日地步，不能只看包機直航、陸客遊台；而是須將經濟、貿易、文化、社會、外交、國際社會皆納入考慮，設法建立一個全方位的整合體系，一切皆 以兩岸「和平雙贏」為最高目標。譬如說，巴拉圭的離間勒索對兩岸關係若是一個傷害，就應將兩岸關係放在高於巴拉圭的地位。
當然，這些話是 對北京當局說的。馬政府主張「外交休兵」，其實是一高風險的政策，因為情勢並非操之在我；可以預見，倘若馬政府在「外交休兵」上遭到重大挫敗，無論出自何 種理由（例如不願向勒索低頭），皆必將引爆國內政治危機，因此亦必然會影響到兩岸關係。然而，兩岸關係的倒退，應非北京當局所樂見。
不說別的，僅舉近日所出現的「中華台北」，與「中國台北」的爭議而言。在北京眼中，也許這兩個名詞皆是「中文譯名」；但看在台灣民眾眼中，卻是對胡錦濤主席所主張的「建立互信／擱置爭議／求同存異／共創雙贏」之扭曲，甚至是背信。
兩 岸關係正值快速發展之時，這也卻是最為脆弱之際。我們多次提醒北京當局，在處理兩岸關係時，應將台灣的民主體制置於核心地位；北京當局不能只與台灣的政府 進行角力，而須與台灣的人民直接對話。例如，倘在今日兩岸關係改善之際，挖走巴拉圭；不僅是台灣政府的挫折，也是對台灣人民情感的傷害。又如，將「中華台 北」改成「中國台北」；也不只是給台灣政府出難題，亦是對台灣人民情感的衝擊。北京既「寄希望於台灣人民」，自當回應「台灣人民之所希望」。
兩岸情勢初開，兩岸當局皆在摸索；這場「兩岸探戈」，須有相互認同的舞步。我們認為，胡錦濤的十六字箴言，如果連在「中華台北／中國台北」的爭議上皆不能體現，或如果竟禁受不起巴拉圭的操弄，而致今日好不容易出現的兩岸互動成果受到重大傷害，那將是莫大的遺憾。
「兩岸休兵」才有「外交休兵」。胡錦濤十六字箴言若能「言顧行／行顧言」，則「兩岸休兵」有望，「外交休兵」也就順理成章；反之，倘若「外交不休兵」，兩岸也就難以休兵，亦即難以「建立互信／擱置爭議／求同存異／共創雙贏」了。
Saturday, July 19, 2008
President Ma Should Promptly Declassify the State Confidential Expenses Case Files
President Ma Should Promptly Declassify the State Confidential Expenses Case Files
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 18, 2008
The High Court has ruled that Chen Shui-bian's classification of incriminating evidence in the State Confidential Expenses scandal as "Top Secret," was legally invalid. Not long ago, the Presidential Office announced that "no Southern Front project file has ever been found." Under the circumstances, President Ma Ying-jeou should make clear that the State Confidential Expenses scandal has nothing to do with state secrets. Prosecutors should investigate and prosecute the case in strict accordance with the law.
As Chen Shui-bian attempts to evade prosecution, he has two magic talismans. One is Wu Shu-chen's health. This allows her to repeatedly file motions for continuances. The other is Chen's classification of incriminating evidence in the State Confidential Expenses scandal as "Top Secret," just prior to leaving office, and demanding that they be returned to him. Wu Shu-chen refused to appear in court, citing health problems. Yet she was healthy enough to go to the polls to vote, not once, but twice. The court has responded by forbidding her to leave the country. The court's actions can be regarded as countermeasures. The High Court rejected Chen Shui-bian's demand for the return of evidence. It also ruled that Chen's classification the evidence against him as "state secrets" was invalid to begin with. This was a slap in Chen Shui-bian's face.
Earlier, the High Court Prosecutor's Office Special Investigative Unit notified the Office of the President, demanding that the transcripts in the State Confidential Expenses scandal be declassified and asked whether there was any such thing as a "Southern Front" project. President Ma Ying-jeou's response was that he would not declassify the files, but would allow the courts to introduce them in evidence. He explained that among the documents turned over to his administration by the outgoing DPP government, he found no "Southern Front" project. If there is no such thing as the "Southern Front" project, then Chen Shui-bian's so-called "Top Secret" files, including receipts and transcripts, are purely evidence in a court case. As the High Court pointed out, the evidence and transcripts were simply evidence in a criminal case. According to the State Secrets Protection Act, they should not have been classified as secret in the first place. President Ma chose not to declassify them, but agreed to allow the courts to use them in evidence. Superficially, this satisfies the needs of the judiciary. In reality, it evades the responsibility to right a wrong, and the President's constitutional duty to safeguard the nation's laws. That is why Ma has been the subject of public criticism.
Furthermore, if Chen Shui-bian's illegal classification of incriminating evidence is not nullified, technically speaking the evidence is still a "state secret." The Judiciary may have qualms about prosecuting. For example, the trial could not be public, not one word could be leaked, and the verdict would be subject to all sorts of restrictions. The public would be kept in the dark about the details of the State Confidential Expenses trial. They would be unable to judge for themselves whether Chen Shui-bian's sentence is too lenient or too severe. This alone shows that President Ma's handling of the matter runs counter to voter aspirations in the wake of ruling party change.
The High Court ruled that Chen Shui-bian's classification of incriminating evidence is "null and void." It said the articles and transcripts were material evidence in a criminal case. President Chen Shui-bian had no right to resort to such legerdemain to cover up crimes. The Judiciary hs determined that Chen Shui-bian's actions were illegal. So why is President Ma still so worried about declassifying the evidence? President Ma should promptly declare that since there is no "Southern Front" project, the evidence Chen Shui-bian classified in the State Confidential Expenses scandals are not state secrets. As soon as they are officially declassified, there will no longer be any excuse to delay prosecuting this case. An investigation and trial could begin right away, without interference. Otherwise, if President Ma refuses to take action, Chen Shui-bian will resist the High Court's ruling to the bitter end, regardless of whether he has the right to appeal or whether an appeal would be reasonable. He will continue to drag out the investigation and the trial, and in the process, subverting the cause of justice.
The High Court's decision reflects the demands of the Supreme Court. It has passed judgment on Chen Shui-bian's demand for the return of documents he classified as "Top Secret" The High Court pointed out that Chen Shui-bian's actions were invalid, and rejected his demand for their return. It also rendered an interpretation on the presidential privilege of secrecy. It did not say that the president may demand the "return of so-called secret evidence that has already been submitted to the court." This shows that court transcripts are not classified documents. After all, if they were classified documents, wouldn't their use in criminal proceedings constitute a mishandling of the affairs of state? Chen Shui-bian has always been adept at finding legal loopholes. One might say that this time the Courts are turning Chen's tricks against him.
The investigation and trial of criminal scandals is serious business -- the upholding of justice. Every citizen has an obligation to pursue the truth, let alone the President, who must shoulder the heavy responsibility of defending the constitution and the rule of law. If he is timid and lacks the courage to what's right, then he is a man without principles.
Under the circumstances, President Ma must take clear and decisive action. Otherwise he must assume responsibility for delaying justice, for covering up the truth, and for obstructing justice.
馬總統應明快解除國務費案機密核定
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.07.18 02:35 am
高等法院裁定：陳水扁將國務機要費弊案證據、筆錄核定為「絕對機密」，是無效的行政處分。不久前，總統府亦曾宣布「查無南線專案檔案」。情勢演變至此，馬英九總統應該明確宣示，國務機要費弊案卷證並無任何國家機密存在，司法機關應依法進行審理。
陳水扁抵抗法院的兩大法寶，一是吳淑珍以健康理由不斷「請假」；一是離職前將國務機要費弊案證據、筆錄核定為「絕對機密」，並要求返還。吳淑珍拒不出庭，卻兩度公開投票，法院因而予以限制出境處分，可以算是法院對其行為的「反制」。而高院這次裁定駁回陳水扁的請求，且認為當初其核定無效，更是重重打了陳水扁一記耳光。
此前，高檢署特偵組具函總統府，要求就國務機要費弊案證據、筆錄「解密」，並詢問有無南線專案。馬英九總統的反應是：不解密，但同意司法機關使用卷證；另外則公開說明，民進黨政府交接，查無所謂「南線專案」的檔案。倘若南線專案並不存在，那陳水扁核定的所謂「絕對機密」，應是指法院審理卷證內的證據（發票）、筆錄等資料。如今，高等法院指出，這些證據、筆錄，只是單純的刑事案件卷證資料；則依國家機密保護法，本來就不可以核定為機密。因而，馬總統不解密但同意使用的處理方式，表面看來是滿足了司法機關的需要，但卻迴避了糾正不法措施、維護國家法紀的憲政責任，因此受到了社會的批評。
另一方面，陳水扁的違法核定若不予解除，則「形式」上「國家機密」還是存在，司法機關偵審仍有顧忌；例如，不能公開審理、資料不可外洩片言隻字，未來判決書記載有種種限制。從而，對於國務機要費弊案的審理，國人即無從知悉進展及內容，也無法據以評判陳水扁貪腐行為的是非輕重。就此而言，馬總統的處置也違背了選民投票推動政黨輪替的政治付託。
如今，高院既然裁定陳水扁的核定是「無效的行政處分」，並稱扣案的證據和筆錄是刑案事證，陳水扁總統不能用以掩飾犯罪；是則司法機關都對陳水扁的核定認定為違法了，對馬總統而言，解除其形式上的機密核定，尚有何顧慮可言？因而，馬總統應該迅速宣布，既然查無南線專案，國務機要費弊案的扣案證據筆錄亦經法院認為陳水扁的核定無效，則當立即在形式上解除其機密核定，使本案不存在任何延宕的藉口，審理偵查可以迅速展開，不受干擾。否則，馬總統若仍不採任何行動，陳水扁對高院的裁定又再頑抗到底，不論其是否有權再抗告、再抗告是否合法、有無理由，都將繼續拖延本案審判和偵查，國家司法正義勢將備受踐踏摧殘。
高等法院作出的裁定，是應最高法院的要求，就陳水扁要求返還核定之絕對機密，為實體上的裁判。高院除了指出陳水扁的核定無效，駁回返還的要求外；還強調大法官關於總統機密特權的解釋，並沒有說「已提交到法院的所謂機密證據筆錄可以要求返還」；又針對陳水扁自己主張「幕僚未及時呈報核定機密至核定有所遲延」，指明這顯示案內證據筆錄不是機密，否則豈不誤了國家大事？這對一向擅長運用巧門的陳水扁來說，可謂「以子之矛，攻子之盾」的回應。
對於刑事弊案的偵查審判，是伸張國家法紀的嚴肅工作，任何國人都有協助追究真相的義務，何況是肩負憲政法治重任的總統？倘若畏首畏尾，不敢公正以對，即是鄉愿！
值此情勢，馬總統應有明確迅速的行動，否則就要擔負延誤審判、掩蓋真相、阻撓正義的責任。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 18, 2008
The High Court has ruled that Chen Shui-bian's classification of incriminating evidence in the State Confidential Expenses scandal as "Top Secret," was legally invalid. Not long ago, the Presidential Office announced that "no Southern Front project file has ever been found." Under the circumstances, President Ma Ying-jeou should make clear that the State Confidential Expenses scandal has nothing to do with state secrets. Prosecutors should investigate and prosecute the case in strict accordance with the law.
As Chen Shui-bian attempts to evade prosecution, he has two magic talismans. One is Wu Shu-chen's health. This allows her to repeatedly file motions for continuances. The other is Chen's classification of incriminating evidence in the State Confidential Expenses scandal as "Top Secret," just prior to leaving office, and demanding that they be returned to him. Wu Shu-chen refused to appear in court, citing health problems. Yet she was healthy enough to go to the polls to vote, not once, but twice. The court has responded by forbidding her to leave the country. The court's actions can be regarded as countermeasures. The High Court rejected Chen Shui-bian's demand for the return of evidence. It also ruled that Chen's classification the evidence against him as "state secrets" was invalid to begin with. This was a slap in Chen Shui-bian's face.
Earlier, the High Court Prosecutor's Office Special Investigative Unit notified the Office of the President, demanding that the transcripts in the State Confidential Expenses scandal be declassified and asked whether there was any such thing as a "Southern Front" project. President Ma Ying-jeou's response was that he would not declassify the files, but would allow the courts to introduce them in evidence. He explained that among the documents turned over to his administration by the outgoing DPP government, he found no "Southern Front" project. If there is no such thing as the "Southern Front" project, then Chen Shui-bian's so-called "Top Secret" files, including receipts and transcripts, are purely evidence in a court case. As the High Court pointed out, the evidence and transcripts were simply evidence in a criminal case. According to the State Secrets Protection Act, they should not have been classified as secret in the first place. President Ma chose not to declassify them, but agreed to allow the courts to use them in evidence. Superficially, this satisfies the needs of the judiciary. In reality, it evades the responsibility to right a wrong, and the President's constitutional duty to safeguard the nation's laws. That is why Ma has been the subject of public criticism.
Furthermore, if Chen Shui-bian's illegal classification of incriminating evidence is not nullified, technically speaking the evidence is still a "state secret." The Judiciary may have qualms about prosecuting. For example, the trial could not be public, not one word could be leaked, and the verdict would be subject to all sorts of restrictions. The public would be kept in the dark about the details of the State Confidential Expenses trial. They would be unable to judge for themselves whether Chen Shui-bian's sentence is too lenient or too severe. This alone shows that President Ma's handling of the matter runs counter to voter aspirations in the wake of ruling party change.
The High Court ruled that Chen Shui-bian's classification of incriminating evidence is "null and void." It said the articles and transcripts were material evidence in a criminal case. President Chen Shui-bian had no right to resort to such legerdemain to cover up crimes. The Judiciary hs determined that Chen Shui-bian's actions were illegal. So why is President Ma still so worried about declassifying the evidence? President Ma should promptly declare that since there is no "Southern Front" project, the evidence Chen Shui-bian classified in the State Confidential Expenses scandals are not state secrets. As soon as they are officially declassified, there will no longer be any excuse to delay prosecuting this case. An investigation and trial could begin right away, without interference. Otherwise, if President Ma refuses to take action, Chen Shui-bian will resist the High Court's ruling to the bitter end, regardless of whether he has the right to appeal or whether an appeal would be reasonable. He will continue to drag out the investigation and the trial, and in the process, subverting the cause of justice.
The High Court's decision reflects the demands of the Supreme Court. It has passed judgment on Chen Shui-bian's demand for the return of documents he classified as "Top Secret" The High Court pointed out that Chen Shui-bian's actions were invalid, and rejected his demand for their return. It also rendered an interpretation on the presidential privilege of secrecy. It did not say that the president may demand the "return of so-called secret evidence that has already been submitted to the court." This shows that court transcripts are not classified documents. After all, if they were classified documents, wouldn't their use in criminal proceedings constitute a mishandling of the affairs of state? Chen Shui-bian has always been adept at finding legal loopholes. One might say that this time the Courts are turning Chen's tricks against him.
The investigation and trial of criminal scandals is serious business -- the upholding of justice. Every citizen has an obligation to pursue the truth, let alone the President, who must shoulder the heavy responsibility of defending the constitution and the rule of law. If he is timid and lacks the courage to what's right, then he is a man without principles.
Under the circumstances, President Ma must take clear and decisive action. Otherwise he must assume responsibility for delaying justice, for covering up the truth, and for obstructing justice.
馬總統應明快解除國務費案機密核定
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.07.18 02:35 am
高等法院裁定：陳水扁將國務機要費弊案證據、筆錄核定為「絕對機密」，是無效的行政處分。不久前，總統府亦曾宣布「查無南線專案檔案」。情勢演變至此，馬英九總統應該明確宣示，國務機要費弊案卷證並無任何國家機密存在，司法機關應依法進行審理。
陳水扁抵抗法院的兩大法寶，一是吳淑珍以健康理由不斷「請假」；一是離職前將國務機要費弊案證據、筆錄核定為「絕對機密」，並要求返還。吳淑珍拒不出庭，卻兩度公開投票，法院因而予以限制出境處分，可以算是法院對其行為的「反制」。而高院這次裁定駁回陳水扁的請求，且認為當初其核定無效，更是重重打了陳水扁一記耳光。
此前，高檢署特偵組具函總統府，要求就國務機要費弊案證據、筆錄「解密」，並詢問有無南線專案。馬英九總統的反應是：不解密，但同意司法機關使用卷證；另外則公開說明，民進黨政府交接，查無所謂「南線專案」的檔案。倘若南線專案並不存在，那陳水扁核定的所謂「絕對機密」，應是指法院審理卷證內的證據（發票）、筆錄等資料。如今，高等法院指出，這些證據、筆錄，只是單純的刑事案件卷證資料；則依國家機密保護法，本來就不可以核定為機密。因而，馬總統不解密但同意使用的處理方式，表面看來是滿足了司法機關的需要，但卻迴避了糾正不法措施、維護國家法紀的憲政責任，因此受到了社會的批評。
另一方面，陳水扁的違法核定若不予解除，則「形式」上「國家機密」還是存在，司法機關偵審仍有顧忌；例如，不能公開審理、資料不可外洩片言隻字，未來判決書記載有種種限制。從而，對於國務機要費弊案的審理，國人即無從知悉進展及內容，也無法據以評判陳水扁貪腐行為的是非輕重。就此而言，馬總統的處置也違背了選民投票推動政黨輪替的政治付託。
如今，高院既然裁定陳水扁的核定是「無效的行政處分」，並稱扣案的證據和筆錄是刑案事證，陳水扁總統不能用以掩飾犯罪；是則司法機關都對陳水扁的核定認定為違法了，對馬總統而言，解除其形式上的機密核定，尚有何顧慮可言？因而，馬總統應該迅速宣布，既然查無南線專案，國務機要費弊案的扣案證據筆錄亦經法院認為陳水扁的核定無效，則當立即在形式上解除其機密核定，使本案不存在任何延宕的藉口，審理偵查可以迅速展開，不受干擾。否則，馬總統若仍不採任何行動，陳水扁對高院的裁定又再頑抗到底，不論其是否有權再抗告、再抗告是否合法、有無理由，都將繼續拖延本案審判和偵查，國家司法正義勢將備受踐踏摧殘。
高等法院作出的裁定，是應最高法院的要求，就陳水扁要求返還核定之絕對機密，為實體上的裁判。高院除了指出陳水扁的核定無效，駁回返還的要求外；還強調大法官關於總統機密特權的解釋，並沒有說「已提交到法院的所謂機密證據筆錄可以要求返還」；又針對陳水扁自己主張「幕僚未及時呈報核定機密至核定有所遲延」，指明這顯示案內證據筆錄不是機密，否則豈不誤了國家大事？這對一向擅長運用巧門的陳水扁來說，可謂「以子之矛，攻子之盾」的回應。
對於刑事弊案的偵查審判，是伸張國家法紀的嚴肅工作，任何國人都有協助追究真相的義務，何況是肩負憲政法治重任的總統？倘若畏首畏尾，不敢公正以對，即是鄉愿！
值此情勢，馬總統應有明確迅速的行動，否則就要擔負延誤審判、掩蓋真相、阻撓正義的責任。
Thursday, July 17, 2008
Perspectives on the Current Economic Difficulties
Perspectives on the Current Economic Difficulties
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 17, 2008
The Ma Ying-jeou administration has been in office less than two months, but it has run smack dab into the worst international recession in 20 years. The timing couldn't be worse.
The public on Taiwan may have been carried away by campaign ads promising that "everything will be better as soon as Ma takes over." This caused the TAIEX to rise disproportionately relative to international indices on March 22. But because international oil prices remained high and the DPP caretaker government deliberately froze gasoline prices, the Ma administration faced sharp pressure to increase gasoline prices the moment it came into office. Even though the Liu cabinet had two months to plan for the announced price hike, it waited too long to implement it. People began hoarding. When the Liu cabinet suddenly moved up the date of the price hike, it shook people's confidence. This was followed controversies over the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other officials' Green Cards. The Tax Reform Commission was suspected of being a rubber stamp. The Su Hua Highway Alternate Plan came under fire. The Premier was booed when he visited the countryside. The Liu cabinet began to look like a beating victim. In addition, the Legislative Yuan's failure to confirm Shen Fu-hsiung, and the dispute over Chang Chun-yen exposed the disunity within the KMT. Finally, the "Housebound President" stepped up to the firing line, and lifted controls on mainland investments. Only to run head on into the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae debt crisis, which abruptly knocked Ma's countermeasures for a loop. By this time, the public on Taiwan's confidence in the new government was in tatters. This is something the Ma administration must face up to.
Faced with this grim international situation, the President and the Premier will have to rethink their overall strategy. The source of the international economic downturn is continued high oil prices that may reach new highs. Under pressure from increasing oil prices, both the European and US economies are in a downturn. These in turn ensure that the shadow of the subprime mortgage crisis will linger. Some suspect that crude oil prices have been subject to manipulation, and that the bubble will soon collapse. But until oil prices stabilize, the global economy will remain under a dark cloud. Landmines such as the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae crises will continue to explode. The President and the Premier will have to remain calm. They must not attempt to offer the public unrealistic expectations that "the economy will improve immediately." Only by frankly and honestly laying out the facts of the international situation to the public can they get out from under the populist obligation to "save the stock market and win the confidence of the people." Officials need not go on television to tell people to "buy the dips" or feed them propaganda. They need not hastily introduce one half-baked panacea after another.
During such a downturn, what can the government do? It can seek truth from facts, practice its basic skills, and improve the health of the economy. The "supply side" impact of rising oil prices on the economy will make the total supply curve contract leftward. The Liu cabinet's only response currently is to expand domestic demand. It is attempting to increase aggregate demand. But those who understand the principles of economics know that although expanding domestic demand will help increase income, it will inevitably push up prices. Therefore, the Liu cabinet faces a dilemma. To avoid recession it will have to put up with price increases. To stabilize prices it will have to endure doldrums. The Liu cabinet finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. The increase in domestic demand is the reason it faces a conflict between prosperity and inflation.
If the new government expands domestic demand by repairing funeral parlours and paving roadways, such a policy will merely increase aggregate demand and raise prices. But if the government increases domestic demand at all levels of government, converts to solar panels and replaces energy-consuming equipment, constructs and maintains bicycle paths, speeds up completion of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant safety check process, or even increases subsidies for those who use public transportation, it will increase domestic demand and aggregate demand at the same time. This will ease the community's reliance on energy. It is tantamount to reducing the impact of oil price hikes and weakening the impact of crude oil supply shortages. Therefore, as long as the government adjusts its pattern of expenditures, it need not remain fixated on its original plan. During the election campaign oil prices had yet to skyrocket. Various carbon reduction and energy-saving equipment expenditures will reduce the conflict between increased prosperity and lower prices.
When we look at other Asian countries under pressure from international crude oil prices, we find that Japan's inflation rate is the lowest. Over the past five months it has remained below 1%. This is because Japan invested a great deal of effort in carbon reduction, energy savings, and the development of alternative energy sources. Japan's efforts in energy conservation and carbon reduction have finally paid off in the era of high oil prices. Japan has to a considerable extent, defused the impact of high oil prices. Taiwan has a small scale free market economy. It will inevitably face wave upon wave of international raw material price increases. If it can calmly face recalcitrant international economic disadvantages, and concentrate on reducing carbon and saving energy, its current difficulties will become an opportunity for economic reconstruction. We cannot revive our economy immediately. But we can reduce carbon and save energy immediately, and thereby reconstitute our economy.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.17
面對當前經濟困境的幾點看法
中時社論
馬英九政府上台不及兩個月，似乎碰上近廿年來國際經濟最差的時期，真可以說是「天不時，地不利」。
三二二之後，台灣民眾也許被「我們準備好了」、「馬上好」的競選廣告衝昏了頭，以致股票市場相對於國際盤形成超漲。但是隨著國際油價居高不下、民進黨看守政府又執行油價凍漲政策，遂使馬政府一上台就面對大幅調漲油價的壓力。劉內閣雖然有足足兩個月的時間做規畫，但在執行時卻又發生宣告漲價之等待期過長、民眾囤積、突然宣布提前等插曲，漸漸動搖了民眾信心。接著，則是外交部長等官員的綠卡風波、賦改會被質疑是大拜拜、蘇花替代道路爭議、閣揆下鄉被嗆等事件，使劉內閣一直處於挨打狀態。此外，沈富雄在立院落馬與張俊彥的個人爭議，也使得國民黨內不團結的爭議表面化。好不容易，宅男總統跳上火線，端出大陸投資鬆綁一道大菜，卻恰好碰上美國房地美與房利美債券危機，猛然打翻了一盤美餚。至此，台灣民眾對於新政府的執政信心似有潰散之勢，馬政府必須要嚴肅面對。
面對如此嚴峻的國際形勢，總統與閣揆都必須要重新思考其布局與策略。今天國際經濟不景氣的源頭，當然就是居高不下、甚至還有可能再創新高的油價。在石油漲價的壓力下，整體歐美的經濟都不景氣，進而也使次貸、二房風暴的陰影揮之不去。雖然有人判斷原油漲價有炒作的嫌疑，也有泡沫崩潰的預期，但是在油價回復平穩之前，國際經濟就絕對是一片愁雲慘霧，也不時會有諸如二房風暴這一類的地雷會出現。而對這種不利情勢，總統與閣揆都必須要坦然面對，不要企圖再去維持民眾「經濟馬上好」的虛幻預期。唯有把國際情勢的實情攤開，向人民坦白，才能擺脫救股市、挽信心的民粹陰影，不必由官員上電視告訴人民逢低買進或信心喊話，也不必倉卒地推出一張張政策王牌。
在這樣的低迷時期，政府能夠做什麼呢？我們認為，這是政府實事求是、苦練基本功、改善經濟體質的好時候。油價上漲在經濟上實為「供給面」的衝擊，使得社會的總合供給曲線收縮左移。目前劉內閣唯一的對策就是擴大內需，企圖將社會總合需求往上提升。但是略知經濟學原理的人都了解，擴大內需固然有助於所得上升，但卻不可避免地進一步推升物價。於是，劉內閣面臨的困境是：要避免不景氣就得忍受物價上漲，而要平抑物價就得忍受不景氣，兩者之間糾結難解、進退維谷。但是我們認為，之所以會面對前述景氣與通膨的衝突，其關鍵在於擴大內需的內涵。
如果新政府擴大內需方案的內容僅是些維修殯儀館、鋪建馬路等支出，則這樣的政策當然就只會推升總合需求、助漲物價。但是，如果政府的擴大內需是用在各級政府全面改裝太陽能板、汰換耗電耗能設備、修建腳踏車休閒便道、加速核四安檢完工時程、甚至提高搭乘大眾運輸之補助，則這些擴大內需項目在推升總合需求的同時，也舒緩了社會對能源的倚賴，形同減少了原油漲價的衝擊，也就減弱了原來供給面衝擊的壓力。因此，只要對支出方式做些調整，不要執著於原來馬蕭競選（當時油價尚未暴漲）時的建設內容，多在各種節能減碳的設備上做支出，則就能減弱景氣與物價之間的尖銳對決。
環視亞洲諸國，在一片國際原油漲價的壓力下，日本的物價上漲率是最低的，過去五月個都在一％上下。究其原由，就是因為日本先前在節能減碳、開發替代能源上做了許多的投資與努力。日本過去節能減碳的努力，終於在高油價時代得到了補償，使日本相當程度地化解了高油價的衝擊。台灣是個小型開放經濟，將來仍舊不免要面對一波接一波的國際原物料漲價風潮。今天若能平心面對難以扭轉的國際經濟劣勢，潛心在島內推動節能減碳的建設，那麼當前的困境，倒不失為一個修練經濟體質的好機會。我們的經濟恐怕不容易馬上好；但是要不要馬上節能減碳、更新體質，卻仍是操之在我的。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 17, 2008
The Ma Ying-jeou administration has been in office less than two months, but it has run smack dab into the worst international recession in 20 years. The timing couldn't be worse.
The public on Taiwan may have been carried away by campaign ads promising that "everything will be better as soon as Ma takes over." This caused the TAIEX to rise disproportionately relative to international indices on March 22. But because international oil prices remained high and the DPP caretaker government deliberately froze gasoline prices, the Ma administration faced sharp pressure to increase gasoline prices the moment it came into office. Even though the Liu cabinet had two months to plan for the announced price hike, it waited too long to implement it. People began hoarding. When the Liu cabinet suddenly moved up the date of the price hike, it shook people's confidence. This was followed controversies over the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other officials' Green Cards. The Tax Reform Commission was suspected of being a rubber stamp. The Su Hua Highway Alternate Plan came under fire. The Premier was booed when he visited the countryside. The Liu cabinet began to look like a beating victim. In addition, the Legislative Yuan's failure to confirm Shen Fu-hsiung, and the dispute over Chang Chun-yen exposed the disunity within the KMT. Finally, the "Housebound President" stepped up to the firing line, and lifted controls on mainland investments. Only to run head on into the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae debt crisis, which abruptly knocked Ma's countermeasures for a loop. By this time, the public on Taiwan's confidence in the new government was in tatters. This is something the Ma administration must face up to.
Faced with this grim international situation, the President and the Premier will have to rethink their overall strategy. The source of the international economic downturn is continued high oil prices that may reach new highs. Under pressure from increasing oil prices, both the European and US economies are in a downturn. These in turn ensure that the shadow of the subprime mortgage crisis will linger. Some suspect that crude oil prices have been subject to manipulation, and that the bubble will soon collapse. But until oil prices stabilize, the global economy will remain under a dark cloud. Landmines such as the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae crises will continue to explode. The President and the Premier will have to remain calm. They must not attempt to offer the public unrealistic expectations that "the economy will improve immediately." Only by frankly and honestly laying out the facts of the international situation to the public can they get out from under the populist obligation to "save the stock market and win the confidence of the people." Officials need not go on television to tell people to "buy the dips" or feed them propaganda. They need not hastily introduce one half-baked panacea after another.
During such a downturn, what can the government do? It can seek truth from facts, practice its basic skills, and improve the health of the economy. The "supply side" impact of rising oil prices on the economy will make the total supply curve contract leftward. The Liu cabinet's only response currently is to expand domestic demand. It is attempting to increase aggregate demand. But those who understand the principles of economics know that although expanding domestic demand will help increase income, it will inevitably push up prices. Therefore, the Liu cabinet faces a dilemma. To avoid recession it will have to put up with price increases. To stabilize prices it will have to endure doldrums. The Liu cabinet finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. The increase in domestic demand is the reason it faces a conflict between prosperity and inflation.
If the new government expands domestic demand by repairing funeral parlours and paving roadways, such a policy will merely increase aggregate demand and raise prices. But if the government increases domestic demand at all levels of government, converts to solar panels and replaces energy-consuming equipment, constructs and maintains bicycle paths, speeds up completion of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant safety check process, or even increases subsidies for those who use public transportation, it will increase domestic demand and aggregate demand at the same time. This will ease the community's reliance on energy. It is tantamount to reducing the impact of oil price hikes and weakening the impact of crude oil supply shortages. Therefore, as long as the government adjusts its pattern of expenditures, it need not remain fixated on its original plan. During the election campaign oil prices had yet to skyrocket. Various carbon reduction and energy-saving equipment expenditures will reduce the conflict between increased prosperity and lower prices.
When we look at other Asian countries under pressure from international crude oil prices, we find that Japan's inflation rate is the lowest. Over the past five months it has remained below 1%. This is because Japan invested a great deal of effort in carbon reduction, energy savings, and the development of alternative energy sources. Japan's efforts in energy conservation and carbon reduction have finally paid off in the era of high oil prices. Japan has to a considerable extent, defused the impact of high oil prices. Taiwan has a small scale free market economy. It will inevitably face wave upon wave of international raw material price increases. If it can calmly face recalcitrant international economic disadvantages, and concentrate on reducing carbon and saving energy, its current difficulties will become an opportunity for economic reconstruction. We cannot revive our economy immediately. But we can reduce carbon and save energy immediately, and thereby reconstitute our economy.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.17
面對當前經濟困境的幾點看法
中時社論
馬英九政府上台不及兩個月，似乎碰上近廿年來國際經濟最差的時期，真可以說是「天不時，地不利」。
三二二之後，台灣民眾也許被「我們準備好了」、「馬上好」的競選廣告衝昏了頭，以致股票市場相對於國際盤形成超漲。但是隨著國際油價居高不下、民進黨看守政府又執行油價凍漲政策，遂使馬政府一上台就面對大幅調漲油價的壓力。劉內閣雖然有足足兩個月的時間做規畫，但在執行時卻又發生宣告漲價之等待期過長、民眾囤積、突然宣布提前等插曲，漸漸動搖了民眾信心。接著，則是外交部長等官員的綠卡風波、賦改會被質疑是大拜拜、蘇花替代道路爭議、閣揆下鄉被嗆等事件，使劉內閣一直處於挨打狀態。此外，沈富雄在立院落馬與張俊彥的個人爭議，也使得國民黨內不團結的爭議表面化。好不容易，宅男總統跳上火線，端出大陸投資鬆綁一道大菜，卻恰好碰上美國房地美與房利美債券危機，猛然打翻了一盤美餚。至此，台灣民眾對於新政府的執政信心似有潰散之勢，馬政府必須要嚴肅面對。
面對如此嚴峻的國際形勢，總統與閣揆都必須要重新思考其布局與策略。今天國際經濟不景氣的源頭，當然就是居高不下、甚至還有可能再創新高的油價。在石油漲價的壓力下，整體歐美的經濟都不景氣，進而也使次貸、二房風暴的陰影揮之不去。雖然有人判斷原油漲價有炒作的嫌疑，也有泡沫崩潰的預期，但是在油價回復平穩之前，國際經濟就絕對是一片愁雲慘霧，也不時會有諸如二房風暴這一類的地雷會出現。而對這種不利情勢，總統與閣揆都必須要坦然面對，不要企圖再去維持民眾「經濟馬上好」的虛幻預期。唯有把國際情勢的實情攤開，向人民坦白，才能擺脫救股市、挽信心的民粹陰影，不必由官員上電視告訴人民逢低買進或信心喊話，也不必倉卒地推出一張張政策王牌。
在這樣的低迷時期，政府能夠做什麼呢？我們認為，這是政府實事求是、苦練基本功、改善經濟體質的好時候。油價上漲在經濟上實為「供給面」的衝擊，使得社會的總合供給曲線收縮左移。目前劉內閣唯一的對策就是擴大內需，企圖將社會總合需求往上提升。但是略知經濟學原理的人都了解，擴大內需固然有助於所得上升，但卻不可避免地進一步推升物價。於是，劉內閣面臨的困境是：要避免不景氣就得忍受物價上漲，而要平抑物價就得忍受不景氣，兩者之間糾結難解、進退維谷。但是我們認為，之所以會面對前述景氣與通膨的衝突，其關鍵在於擴大內需的內涵。
如果新政府擴大內需方案的內容僅是些維修殯儀館、鋪建馬路等支出，則這樣的政策當然就只會推升總合需求、助漲物價。但是，如果政府的擴大內需是用在各級政府全面改裝太陽能板、汰換耗電耗能設備、修建腳踏車休閒便道、加速核四安檢完工時程、甚至提高搭乘大眾運輸之補助，則這些擴大內需項目在推升總合需求的同時，也舒緩了社會對能源的倚賴，形同減少了原油漲價的衝擊，也就減弱了原來供給面衝擊的壓力。因此，只要對支出方式做些調整，不要執著於原來馬蕭競選（當時油價尚未暴漲）時的建設內容，多在各種節能減碳的設備上做支出，則就能減弱景氣與物價之間的尖銳對決。
環視亞洲諸國，在一片國際原油漲價的壓力下，日本的物價上漲率是最低的，過去五月個都在一％上下。究其原由，就是因為日本先前在節能減碳、開發替代能源上做了許多的投資與努力。日本過去節能減碳的努力，終於在高油價時代得到了補償，使日本相當程度地化解了高油價的衝擊。台灣是個小型開放經濟，將來仍舊不免要面對一波接一波的國際原物料漲價風潮。今天若能平心面對難以扭轉的國際經濟劣勢，潛心在島內推動節能減碳的建設，那麼當前的困境，倒不失為一個修練經濟體質的好機會。我們的經濟恐怕不容易馬上好；但是要不要馬上節能減碳、更新體質，卻仍是操之在我的。
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
More Than One Restriction Needs to Be Relaxed
More Than One Restriction Needs to Be Relaxed
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 16, 2008
Limits on mainland investment have been in place for over 11 years. This week, after Minister of Economic Affairs Yin Chi-ming reports to President Ma Ying-jeou, the Executive Yuan is expected to formally relax restrictions. The relaxation will be of considerable magnitude. This means the government is willing to lift restrictions, to give businesses more space, and to allow Taiwan to compete directly with the mainland. Such courage and self-confidence should be affirmed. Next, the government should ascertain Taiwan's role in the cross-Strait division of labor, and improve Taiwan's investment environment and competitiveness.
Even more importantly, in addition to relaxing restrictions and lifting limits on investment in the mainland, the government must change the mindset that imposed these controls and restrictions in the first place.
Government has basically confirmed that it will adopt its previous "regressive approach." The 40% ceiling for net business investments on the mainland will be relaxed to 60%. But businesses with operational headquarters on Taiwan will be exempt from any limits. This provision means that in practice most medium and large-scale businesses will be nearly free of all limits on maximum investment. Future restrictions on business investment in the mainland, will apply mainly to specific industries based on technology restrictions.
Cross-Strait investment policy over the past few years was the result of a series of links in a chain. Basically, high tech and other highly capitalized, large scale industries, were prohibited or restricted from investing in the mainland from early on. This includes the petrochemical, automotive, and semiconductor industries. Later on, after repeated appeals from industry insiders, they were gradually opened up. In terms of funding, the government used the regressive approach. The ceiling was set at 40% of total net worth. All restrictions and controls originated from concerns over capital outflows. They hoped that restrictions on enterprises would increase investment in Taiwan, and simultaneously prevent the mainland from acquiring Taiwan's capital and technology, from making rapid progress, and from posing a threat to Taiwan.
Over the past 10 years, these policies must be adjudged a total failure. They inflicted no damage upon the mainland, but enormous damage upon Taiwan. The mainland enjoyed rapid double-digit growth and progress. It received 50 to 60 billion US dollars a year in foreign direct investment. Its economy and technology has progressed to the point where it is already able to implement better environmental protection and labour conditions.
What about Taiwan? Did it benefit? Excessively harsh and unreasonable restrictions on certain types of investments led to a loss of mainland development and growth opportunities for Taiwan-based enterprises in the automotive, petrochemical, and semiconductor industries. Because the government lifted restrictions at a snail's pace, Taiwan-based businesses missed these precious opportunities. Instead, small and medium-sized traditional industries that the government never paid any attention to, were not subject to such limitations. They benefitted from the mainland's growth and became large scale enterprises.
The 40% restriction on total investment, hobbled the development of businesses on the mainland. Even the development of industries with no technological relationship to national security, such as department stores and the food industries, were strangled to death by these restrictions. Many Taiwan businessmen with successful developments on the mainland needed additional capital for expansion. . To raise this capital they had to list on the stock market. But due to the 40% ceiling on investments they could not list on the TAIEX. So they listed in Hong Kong, Singapore or on the mainland. Those who understand capital markets know that given today's globalization, wherever a business lists, that's where its roots are. Where it sets up factories is secondary. The government imposed a 40% ceiling on investments on the mainland, thinking it could force businesses to sink their roots on Taiwan. Instead, the result was everyone was uprooted, forced to go to Hong Kong, Singapore, and the mainland and sink their roots there. One link in the chain links to the next. Together they strangled these businesses to death. Taiwan's economy is now on life support. Capital markets have atrophied. What is such a policy, but the height of absurdity?
The government should also relax existing restrictions on various industries. Apart from a small number of industries and technologies that have a real impact on national security, restrictions on the rest should all be lifted. Frankly, we don't see how housebound bureaucrats, who sit in their offices, far from the marketplace, who have never had to compete for their survival, are qualified to make decisions on behalf of those fighting on the frontlines, competing in the global economy. Who are they do decide which investments or technologies may be transferred to the mainland, or that the time is not right for any particular investment. The government should not be so lacking in confidence. it should not assume that any relaxation will lead to a mass exodus. The government recently announced its intention to allow businesses to build 12" wafer plants on the mainland. The response of Taiwan manufacturers was that they would wait for the appropriate time to make any such investments. Obviously, these industries have their own considerations and timing.
Based on government's dismal record in "managing" business investments, and its controlling and restrictive mindset, we ought to say "No more!" The government should focus on rebuilding Taiwan's investment environment and enhancing its competitiveness. It must improve or upgrade the infrastructure, the government's administrative efficiency, the legal system, tax rates, human resources, and even the environment. If it does a good job, businesses will naturally want to stay.
For businesses, liberalization means they are no longer bound hand and foot. It means they have more opportunities, and also more challenges. Isn't that true for government as well?
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.16
該鬆綁放寬者豈祇一項？
中時社論
在經濟部長尹啟銘向總統馬英九報告確認後，綁住企業十一年以上的大陸投資金額上限，可望在本周行政院會中正式通過放寬鬆綁。這次放寬的幅度相當大，代表政府願意解除行政限制，給予企業更大的空間，同時也讓台灣的投資環境，直接面對與大陸的競爭，這種勇氣與自信，值得肯定。政府接著就要為台灣在兩岸分工互補中尋找定位，並全力提升台灣的投資環境與競爭力。
而更重要的是我們必須強調，政府要鬆綁、放寬者，不祇是區區的一個投資大陸金額限制規定，更重要的是過去那種管理、管制、限制的心態，更要「放寬、鬆綁」。
政府原則上已確定，過去以「累退方式」訂定、以企業淨值四○％為赴大陸投資金額上限之規定，將放寬為一律以六○％為上限；但對在台設營運總部的企業，則將不設金額限制。此一規定，在實務上，則是對大部分中大型企業而言，幾乎都可脫離投資金額上限的限制了。未來，企業赴大陸投資的限制，主要將是來自針對各產業類別、種類與技術層次的限制。
回顧過去幾年的兩岸投資政策，幾乎是由一環扣一環的限制所構成。基本面上，對稍具技術性與資本較大之產業，早期幾乎全部列為禁止或限制類，如石化、汽車、半導體…等，後來在業者一再陳情下才逐漸開放；資金面上，對企業以累退方式計算，最高不得超過淨值的四 ○％上限。所有限制與管制，其基本出發點就是擔心台灣資金外流、期望藉著限制手段讓企業增加在台投資；同時也要避免大陸取得台灣的技術與資金而快速進步，對台灣造成威脅。
冉冉十多年過去，這些政策的結果與效果，可說完全失敗。我們可以總結一句：未必損人卻必定不利己。大陸仍快速以兩位數的成長率成長與進步，每年從全球吸收了五、六百億美元的外人直接投資；整個經濟體與技術的進步已經到可以實施更好的環保與勞工條件。
台灣呢？受惠了嗎？因為對投資類別過分嚴苛且不合理的限制，國內企業失去一個在大陸發展壯大的機會；從汽車、石化、到半導體等科技產業，全部都因政府限制與開放的牛步化，使國內企業坐失先機。反而有些政府從來不放在心上、未受到限制的中小型傳統企業，藉著大陸成長為大型企業。
四○％的投資金額限制，則限死了企業在大陸的發展腳步，即使與技術層次、國家安全毫無關係的百貨、食品等產業，在大陸積極拓展之際，也被這個緊箍咒限死。而更嚴重者，許多在大陸發展有成的台商，在企業需要上市籌資以進一步壯大時，卻因四○％上限而無法回台上市，選擇在港、星或大陸掛牌。懂資本市場的人都知道，在全球化的今日，企業在哪裡掛牌，根就在哪裡，在哪設廠反而次要。結果是：政府訂四○％上限想逼企業根留台灣，結果卻是大夥連根拔起，跑去港、星、大陸生根了。一環扣一環，整死企業、也搞得台灣經濟奄奄一息、資本市場相對萎縮；這種政策，豈不荒謬？
而當放寬金額限制之後，政府亦該同時大幅放寬現有各種產業類別之限制。除了極少數的確對國家安全有影響之產業與技術外，其餘限制全部都該解除。坦白說，我們無法想像、或認同，那些坐辦公室、與市場距離遙遠、從來甭接受競爭試煉的「宅男公務員」，可代那些第一線拚鬥、與全球競爭的企業決定哪些投資、哪些技術，是可以登陸；哪些則「尚未到適當的投資時機」。政府，更不該信心缺乏到以為有任何放寬後，企業會「跑光光」。日前政府宣布有意開放企業赴大陸投資十二吋晶圓廠，結果國內廠商都表示將待「適當時機再去投資設廠」，顯然，企業自有其市場考量與步調。
看看過去政府「管理」企業投資行為的成果，政府過去那種管理、管制、限制的心態與態度，可以休矣！未來，政府應專注在打造台灣的投資環境與競爭力上，從基礎建設、行政效率、法令制度、到稅率、人力資源、甚至生活環境，都需改善提升。作得好，企業自然留下來。
開放，對企業而言，當手腳不被綁住時，是更多的機會，但也是更多的挑戰。對政府而言，又何嘗不是如此？
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 16, 2008
Limits on mainland investment have been in place for over 11 years. This week, after Minister of Economic Affairs Yin Chi-ming reports to President Ma Ying-jeou, the Executive Yuan is expected to formally relax restrictions. The relaxation will be of considerable magnitude. This means the government is willing to lift restrictions, to give businesses more space, and to allow Taiwan to compete directly with the mainland. Such courage and self-confidence should be affirmed. Next, the government should ascertain Taiwan's role in the cross-Strait division of labor, and improve Taiwan's investment environment and competitiveness.
Even more importantly, in addition to relaxing restrictions and lifting limits on investment in the mainland, the government must change the mindset that imposed these controls and restrictions in the first place.
Government has basically confirmed that it will adopt its previous "regressive approach." The 40% ceiling for net business investments on the mainland will be relaxed to 60%. But businesses with operational headquarters on Taiwan will be exempt from any limits. This provision means that in practice most medium and large-scale businesses will be nearly free of all limits on maximum investment. Future restrictions on business investment in the mainland, will apply mainly to specific industries based on technology restrictions.
Cross-Strait investment policy over the past few years was the result of a series of links in a chain. Basically, high tech and other highly capitalized, large scale industries, were prohibited or restricted from investing in the mainland from early on. This includes the petrochemical, automotive, and semiconductor industries. Later on, after repeated appeals from industry insiders, they were gradually opened up. In terms of funding, the government used the regressive approach. The ceiling was set at 40% of total net worth. All restrictions and controls originated from concerns over capital outflows. They hoped that restrictions on enterprises would increase investment in Taiwan, and simultaneously prevent the mainland from acquiring Taiwan's capital and technology, from making rapid progress, and from posing a threat to Taiwan.
Over the past 10 years, these policies must be adjudged a total failure. They inflicted no damage upon the mainland, but enormous damage upon Taiwan. The mainland enjoyed rapid double-digit growth and progress. It received 50 to 60 billion US dollars a year in foreign direct investment. Its economy and technology has progressed to the point where it is already able to implement better environmental protection and labour conditions.
What about Taiwan? Did it benefit? Excessively harsh and unreasonable restrictions on certain types of investments led to a loss of mainland development and growth opportunities for Taiwan-based enterprises in the automotive, petrochemical, and semiconductor industries. Because the government lifted restrictions at a snail's pace, Taiwan-based businesses missed these precious opportunities. Instead, small and medium-sized traditional industries that the government never paid any attention to, were not subject to such limitations. They benefitted from the mainland's growth and became large scale enterprises.
The 40% restriction on total investment, hobbled the development of businesses on the mainland. Even the development of industries with no technological relationship to national security, such as department stores and the food industries, were strangled to death by these restrictions. Many Taiwan businessmen with successful developments on the mainland needed additional capital for expansion. . To raise this capital they had to list on the stock market. But due to the 40% ceiling on investments they could not list on the TAIEX. So they listed in Hong Kong, Singapore or on the mainland. Those who understand capital markets know that given today's globalization, wherever a business lists, that's where its roots are. Where it sets up factories is secondary. The government imposed a 40% ceiling on investments on the mainland, thinking it could force businesses to sink their roots on Taiwan. Instead, the result was everyone was uprooted, forced to go to Hong Kong, Singapore, and the mainland and sink their roots there. One link in the chain links to the next. Together they strangled these businesses to death. Taiwan's economy is now on life support. Capital markets have atrophied. What is such a policy, but the height of absurdity?
The government should also relax existing restrictions on various industries. Apart from a small number of industries and technologies that have a real impact on national security, restrictions on the rest should all be lifted. Frankly, we don't see how housebound bureaucrats, who sit in their offices, far from the marketplace, who have never had to compete for their survival, are qualified to make decisions on behalf of those fighting on the frontlines, competing in the global economy. Who are they do decide which investments or technologies may be transferred to the mainland, or that the time is not right for any particular investment. The government should not be so lacking in confidence. it should not assume that any relaxation will lead to a mass exodus. The government recently announced its intention to allow businesses to build 12" wafer plants on the mainland. The response of Taiwan manufacturers was that they would wait for the appropriate time to make any such investments. Obviously, these industries have their own considerations and timing.
Based on government's dismal record in "managing" business investments, and its controlling and restrictive mindset, we ought to say "No more!" The government should focus on rebuilding Taiwan's investment environment and enhancing its competitiveness. It must improve or upgrade the infrastructure, the government's administrative efficiency, the legal system, tax rates, human resources, and even the environment. If it does a good job, businesses will naturally want to stay.
For businesses, liberalization means they are no longer bound hand and foot. It means they have more opportunities, and also more challenges. Isn't that true for government as well?
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.16
該鬆綁放寬者豈祇一項？
中時社論
在經濟部長尹啟銘向總統馬英九報告確認後，綁住企業十一年以上的大陸投資金額上限，可望在本周行政院會中正式通過放寬鬆綁。這次放寬的幅度相當大，代表政府願意解除行政限制，給予企業更大的空間，同時也讓台灣的投資環境，直接面對與大陸的競爭，這種勇氣與自信，值得肯定。政府接著就要為台灣在兩岸分工互補中尋找定位，並全力提升台灣的投資環境與競爭力。
而更重要的是我們必須強調，政府要鬆綁、放寬者，不祇是區區的一個投資大陸金額限制規定，更重要的是過去那種管理、管制、限制的心態，更要「放寬、鬆綁」。
政府原則上已確定，過去以「累退方式」訂定、以企業淨值四○％為赴大陸投資金額上限之規定，將放寬為一律以六○％為上限；但對在台設營運總部的企業，則將不設金額限制。此一規定，在實務上，則是對大部分中大型企業而言，幾乎都可脫離投資金額上限的限制了。未來，企業赴大陸投資的限制，主要將是來自針對各產業類別、種類與技術層次的限制。
回顧過去幾年的兩岸投資政策，幾乎是由一環扣一環的限制所構成。基本面上，對稍具技術性與資本較大之產業，早期幾乎全部列為禁止或限制類，如石化、汽車、半導體…等，後來在業者一再陳情下才逐漸開放；資金面上，對企業以累退方式計算，最高不得超過淨值的四 ○％上限。所有限制與管制，其基本出發點就是擔心台灣資金外流、期望藉著限制手段讓企業增加在台投資；同時也要避免大陸取得台灣的技術與資金而快速進步，對台灣造成威脅。
冉冉十多年過去，這些政策的結果與效果，可說完全失敗。我們可以總結一句：未必損人卻必定不利己。大陸仍快速以兩位數的成長率成長與進步，每年從全球吸收了五、六百億美元的外人直接投資；整個經濟體與技術的進步已經到可以實施更好的環保與勞工條件。
台灣呢？受惠了嗎？因為對投資類別過分嚴苛且不合理的限制，國內企業失去一個在大陸發展壯大的機會；從汽車、石化、到半導體等科技產業，全部都因政府限制與開放的牛步化，使國內企業坐失先機。反而有些政府從來不放在心上、未受到限制的中小型傳統企業，藉著大陸成長為大型企業。
四○％的投資金額限制，則限死了企業在大陸的發展腳步，即使與技術層次、國家安全毫無關係的百貨、食品等產業，在大陸積極拓展之際，也被這個緊箍咒限死。而更嚴重者，許多在大陸發展有成的台商，在企業需要上市籌資以進一步壯大時，卻因四○％上限而無法回台上市，選擇在港、星或大陸掛牌。懂資本市場的人都知道，在全球化的今日，企業在哪裡掛牌，根就在哪裡，在哪設廠反而次要。結果是：政府訂四○％上限想逼企業根留台灣，結果卻是大夥連根拔起，跑去港、星、大陸生根了。一環扣一環，整死企業、也搞得台灣經濟奄奄一息、資本市場相對萎縮；這種政策，豈不荒謬？
而當放寬金額限制之後，政府亦該同時大幅放寬現有各種產業類別之限制。除了極少數的確對國家安全有影響之產業與技術外，其餘限制全部都該解除。坦白說，我們無法想像、或認同，那些坐辦公室、與市場距離遙遠、從來甭接受競爭試煉的「宅男公務員」，可代那些第一線拚鬥、與全球競爭的企業決定哪些投資、哪些技術，是可以登陸；哪些則「尚未到適當的投資時機」。政府，更不該信心缺乏到以為有任何放寬後，企業會「跑光光」。日前政府宣布有意開放企業赴大陸投資十二吋晶圓廠，結果國內廠商都表示將待「適當時機再去投資設廠」，顯然，企業自有其市場考量與步調。
看看過去政府「管理」企業投資行為的成果，政府過去那種管理、管制、限制的心態與態度，可以休矣！未來，政府應專注在打造台灣的投資環境與競爭力上，從基礎建設、行政效率、法令制度、到稅率、人力資源、甚至生活環境，都需改善提升。作得好，企業自然留下來。
開放，對企業而言，當手腳不被綁住時，是更多的機會，但也是更多的挑戰。對政府而言，又何嘗不是如此？
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
Liberation from the Conundrum of the "Father and Son Riding a Donkey"
Liberation from the Conundrum of the "Father and Son Riding a Donkey"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 15, 2008
The Ma administration has been in office 55 days. Less than 10 days after taking office, DPP legislators began shouting "Step down, step down!" Today, even Pan Blue elders are openly urging a "cabinet reshuffle." So what's wrong with this picture? What's wrong with this solid phalanx of opinion?
Today's political scene is an illustration of the old Chinese parable about "The Father and Son Riding the Donkey." No matter who does or doesn't ride the donkey on the way to the market, somebody is going to find reason to criticize them. If the ruling administration and its critics cannot distinguish between core issues and peripheral issues, between "what" issues and "how" issues, between long term issues and short term issues, it will find it difficult to escape the dilemma of the Father and Son Riding the Donkey to the market.
Actually President Ma has not changed his core positions since the election. He has by and large honored his campaign promises. For example: 1. The public on Taiwan has finally liberated itself from divisive struggles over national and ethnic identity. It need no longer endure endless arguments about who "loves Taiwan" and who is "betraying Taiwan," or about the "Republic of China" vs. "Taiwan." 2. Although the performance of the Ma administration has plenty of room for improvement, at least we need no longer endure such buffoons as Tu Cheng-sheng, Hsieh Chi-wei, and Chuang Kuo-rong. Comparatively speaking, the government's image is vastly improved. 3. Taipei and Beijing now have an opportunity for cross-strait reconciliation. Taiwan is finally able to enjoy more relaxed cross-strait relations, open up, and attempt to rebuild its regional political and economic role. In other words, at the very least, the Ma administration is doing three things. It is healing the nation's wounds, reestablishing clean government, and improving cross-strait relations. Therefore it should be given a positive evaluation. After all, it is precisely these three areas that have bedeviled Taiwan politically and economically for the past 10 years.
So far the Ma administration has encountered four kinds of problems. 1. Blue vs. Green Problems. The appointment of Lai Hsing-yuan, the nomination of Shen Fu-hsiung and Chang Chun-yen touched off a storm of controversy. Actually, these appointments were motivated by a relatively lofty political vision. But President Ma failed to handle and communicate the matter properly. The KMT legislative caucus and the KMT Central Committee felt slighted and resentful. Consequently what should have been a happy story degenerated into a farce. But at the conceptual level, the general public appreciates the good intentions behind these appointments. Their dissatisfaction is with the KMT, which degenerated into petty bickering.
2. Communication Problems. Shen Fu-hsiung's failure to be confirmed is the clearest example of such a failure in communication. Examples of this kind are too numerous to list. For example, the controversy over the Su Hua Highway vs. the Su Hua Highway Alternative Plan. The Executive Yuan managed to turn an escape hatch into a pitfall. Other cases include Chen Wu-shoung's unfortunate use of the qualifier, "merely," Chen Chao-min's untimely reference to the 319 Shooting Incident, and Liu Chao-hsuan's lament that "giving up one's green card was a sacrifice." Sound bites such as these bit the Ma administration on its tender parts.
3. Administrative Problems. Administrative problems are manifold. For example, the previously mentioned escape hatch turned pitfall. The Ma administration seems to have dug a disproportionate number of such pitfalls for itself. The Su-Hua Highway vs. the Su Hua Highway Alternate Plan pitfall was self-made. The Green Card incident was another instance of digging its own pit, then jumping in. So were the controversies of the hoarding of gasoline and fertilizer. The July 4 declaration that direct charter flights were not a gift from Hu Jintao was also a self-made pitfall. A pitfall currently being dug is the "diplomatic truce." Who knows when the Ma administration is going to fall in?
4. Policymaking Problems. Faced with an economic crisis the world has not seen for decades, the policies one makes are of paramount importance. Take for example fuel price strategy, tax structure, industrial competitiveness, problems with an M-Shaped Society and changes to cross-strait political and economic relations. Whether such policies are correct is a matter of opinion. These policymaking problems did not receive as much media coverage as the aforementioned Shen Fu-hsiung nomination, six hour long gas lines, and the Su Hua Highway Alternate Plan. The Democratic Progressive Party's criticisms never rose above the level of opposition party carping. As a result, worrisome blind spots regarding the ruling administration's policymaking process remain.
To sum up, in order to escape the "damned if you do and damned if you don't" conundrum beleaguering the Father and Son Riding a Donkey to the market, the Ma administration must not treat peripheral values as core values. For example, Chen Wu-shoung was guilty of nothing more than a slip of the tongue. The ruling administration need not treat his remarks as if they were meant maliciously. After all, he did not say that "The Pacific Ocean has no lid on it." The ruling administration need not treat "how" issues as if they were "what" issues. For example, the handling of Diane Lee's nationality. For the ruling administration this was merely a "how" issue that it unwittingly turned into a "what" issue. If both critics and the ruling administration can sharpen the distinctions between core issues, "what" issues, and long term issues on the one hand, versus peripheral issues, "how" issues, and short term issues on the other, then the Father and Son Riding a Donkey conundrum may soon be resolved.
To resolve these issues, the ruling administration must decide who will stand on the "Front Line" and who will stand on the "Second Line." It must decide how to liason between the KMT and the Ma administration, and where to draw the line between the KMT and the Ma administration. Solving this problem will not solve all its problems. But if it fails to solve this problem, it will continue to be bedeviled by the conundrum of the Father and Son Riding a Donkey, in terms of philosophy, policy, communications, and operations.
如何跳脫「父子騎驢」的困局？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.07.15 04:11 am
馬政府就職五十五天。自上任不到十天起，民進黨立委就不時喊出「下台，下台」；至今，連藍營大老也公開主張「內閣改組」。這般恍如「牆倒眾人推」的景象，究竟出了什麼問題？
今日政局是一個「父子騎驢／人人笑罵」的政治劇場。批評者對「父／子／驢」的關係各有主張；主政團隊對「父／子／驢」的關係也莫衷一是。在這種情勢下，倘若主政團隊及批評者，不能對「核心／邊緣」、「本質／方法」、「長久／短暫」等元素作出區別，恐怕各自皆難跳出「父子騎驢」的困局。
其實，馬總統自競選期間以來所主張的核心政治承諾，迄今並未背離，且已相當程度地體現。例如：一、台灣社會終於跳脫國家認同及族群鬥爭的痛苦撕裂；不再見到「愛台／賣台」、「中華民國／台灣國」的相互攻擊。二、政府官員的行政表現雖大有改善空間，但已不見「上杜下謝又連莊」那種類型的人物，使政府的形象比較質樸。三、兩岸出現和解契機，台灣也終於能在更加鬆綁開放的兩岸關係上嘗試重建其區域政經角色。也就是說，馬政府至少在「療治國家撕裂
／建立質樸政府／改善兩岸關係」三方面，應可獲得正面評價；而這三方面可謂正是過去十餘年來台灣政經的心腹病灶所在。
相對而言，馬政府迄今的問題大略可分四個類型：一、藍綠思維的問題：任命賴幸媛，及提名沈富雄、張俊彥，皆引發大風暴。其實，這些人事安排確有比較高遠的政治瞻矚，但因馬總統的操作與溝通兩皆失敗，而國民黨中央及黨團又因種種「相對剝奪感」而障蔽了心竅，遂致原本一段佳話變成了如今一場鬧劇。但是，就理念層面言，一般社會大眾不是不能體會這類人事安排的善意，反而是對國民黨因此內訌表達不齒。
二、溝通拙劣的問題：沈富雄中箭落馬，就是一個溝通失敗的顯例；而類此事件已至不勝枚舉的地步。例如，「蘇花高／蘇花替」的爭議，行政院竟把一個「巧門」變成了「陷阱」。其餘的事例，如陳武雄的「而已」，陳肇敏的「三一九感言」，劉兆玄的「棄綠卡是犧牲」等等，這類sound bite，皆狠狠地在馬政府身上「咬」了一口。
三、操作能力的問題：操作問題是多方面的，例如前段談到的「陷阱」，馬政府自掘陷阱的事例似乎比例過高。「蘇花高／蘇花替」，是自掘陷阱；綠卡事件也是自己挖坑往裡跳，汽油及肥料出現囤積，亦是如此。逕自宣布七月四日包機直航，倘非胡錦濤送禮，更是大陷阱；眼前另一口自掘的陷阱則是「外交休兵」，不知何時將墜落其中。
四、政策抉擇的問題：面對數十年來僅見的世界經濟危機，政策的抉擇關係重大。例如油價策略、稅賦結構、產業競爭力、Ｍ型社會問題及調整兩岸政經關係等，皆是可以見仁見智的政策抉擇問題。但是，這類問題反而不如前述「沈富雄提名」及「車龍排隊六小時」、「蘇花替」等受到媒體關切，而民進黨的批評也未能超脫「反對黨八股」；因而，關於政策抉擇的盲點，頗有令人擔憂之處。
綜上所論，若欲跳出「父子騎驢」的困境，就批評者言，不必將「邊緣」上的差錯，放大為「核心」上的問題；例如將陳武雄的一句「而已」的失言，放大為存有惡意，畢竟他不是說「太平洋沒蓋子」。就執政團隊言，則不要因「方法」上的差錯，貽誤成「本質」上的問題；例如李慶安國籍事件，對執政團隊言，原是處理程序的「方法」問題，如今卻可能演變成「本質」問題。倘若批評者與主政團隊，皆能深化「核心／本質／長久」的元素，並精緻化「邊緣／方法／短暫」的元素，「父子騎驢」的困局或可望改善。
在這些問題之上，最重要的仍是執政團隊必須整理「第一線／第二線」及「黨政聯結／黨政分離」的戰略架構問題。解決了這個問題，並不能解決所有的問題。但若不能解決這個問題，在理念上、政策上、溝通上及操作上，必仍將是「父子騎驢」的局面。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 15, 2008
The Ma administration has been in office 55 days. Less than 10 days after taking office, DPP legislators began shouting "Step down, step down!" Today, even Pan Blue elders are openly urging a "cabinet reshuffle." So what's wrong with this picture? What's wrong with this solid phalanx of opinion?
Today's political scene is an illustration of the old Chinese parable about "The Father and Son Riding the Donkey." No matter who does or doesn't ride the donkey on the way to the market, somebody is going to find reason to criticize them. If the ruling administration and its critics cannot distinguish between core issues and peripheral issues, between "what" issues and "how" issues, between long term issues and short term issues, it will find it difficult to escape the dilemma of the Father and Son Riding the Donkey to the market.
Actually President Ma has not changed his core positions since the election. He has by and large honored his campaign promises. For example: 1. The public on Taiwan has finally liberated itself from divisive struggles over national and ethnic identity. It need no longer endure endless arguments about who "loves Taiwan" and who is "betraying Taiwan," or about the "Republic of China" vs. "Taiwan." 2. Although the performance of the Ma administration has plenty of room for improvement, at least we need no longer endure such buffoons as Tu Cheng-sheng, Hsieh Chi-wei, and Chuang Kuo-rong. Comparatively speaking, the government's image is vastly improved. 3. Taipei and Beijing now have an opportunity for cross-strait reconciliation. Taiwan is finally able to enjoy more relaxed cross-strait relations, open up, and attempt to rebuild its regional political and economic role. In other words, at the very least, the Ma administration is doing three things. It is healing the nation's wounds, reestablishing clean government, and improving cross-strait relations. Therefore it should be given a positive evaluation. After all, it is precisely these three areas that have bedeviled Taiwan politically and economically for the past 10 years.
So far the Ma administration has encountered four kinds of problems. 1. Blue vs. Green Problems. The appointment of Lai Hsing-yuan, the nomination of Shen Fu-hsiung and Chang Chun-yen touched off a storm of controversy. Actually, these appointments were motivated by a relatively lofty political vision. But President Ma failed to handle and communicate the matter properly. The KMT legislative caucus and the KMT Central Committee felt slighted and resentful. Consequently what should have been a happy story degenerated into a farce. But at the conceptual level, the general public appreciates the good intentions behind these appointments. Their dissatisfaction is with the KMT, which degenerated into petty bickering.
2. Communication Problems. Shen Fu-hsiung's failure to be confirmed is the clearest example of such a failure in communication. Examples of this kind are too numerous to list. For example, the controversy over the Su Hua Highway vs. the Su Hua Highway Alternative Plan. The Executive Yuan managed to turn an escape hatch into a pitfall. Other cases include Chen Wu-shoung's unfortunate use of the qualifier, "merely," Chen Chao-min's untimely reference to the 319 Shooting Incident, and Liu Chao-hsuan's lament that "giving up one's green card was a sacrifice." Sound bites such as these bit the Ma administration on its tender parts.
3. Administrative Problems. Administrative problems are manifold. For example, the previously mentioned escape hatch turned pitfall. The Ma administration seems to have dug a disproportionate number of such pitfalls for itself. The Su-Hua Highway vs. the Su Hua Highway Alternate Plan pitfall was self-made. The Green Card incident was another instance of digging its own pit, then jumping in. So were the controversies of the hoarding of gasoline and fertilizer. The July 4 declaration that direct charter flights were not a gift from Hu Jintao was also a self-made pitfall. A pitfall currently being dug is the "diplomatic truce." Who knows when the Ma administration is going to fall in?
4. Policymaking Problems. Faced with an economic crisis the world has not seen for decades, the policies one makes are of paramount importance. Take for example fuel price strategy, tax structure, industrial competitiveness, problems with an M-Shaped Society and changes to cross-strait political and economic relations. Whether such policies are correct is a matter of opinion. These policymaking problems did not receive as much media coverage as the aforementioned Shen Fu-hsiung nomination, six hour long gas lines, and the Su Hua Highway Alternate Plan. The Democratic Progressive Party's criticisms never rose above the level of opposition party carping. As a result, worrisome blind spots regarding the ruling administration's policymaking process remain.
To sum up, in order to escape the "damned if you do and damned if you don't" conundrum beleaguering the Father and Son Riding a Donkey to the market, the Ma administration must not treat peripheral values as core values. For example, Chen Wu-shoung was guilty of nothing more than a slip of the tongue. The ruling administration need not treat his remarks as if they were meant maliciously. After all, he did not say that "The Pacific Ocean has no lid on it." The ruling administration need not treat "how" issues as if they were "what" issues. For example, the handling of Diane Lee's nationality. For the ruling administration this was merely a "how" issue that it unwittingly turned into a "what" issue. If both critics and the ruling administration can sharpen the distinctions between core issues, "what" issues, and long term issues on the one hand, versus peripheral issues, "how" issues, and short term issues on the other, then the Father and Son Riding a Donkey conundrum may soon be resolved.
To resolve these issues, the ruling administration must decide who will stand on the "Front Line" and who will stand on the "Second Line." It must decide how to liason between the KMT and the Ma administration, and where to draw the line between the KMT and the Ma administration. Solving this problem will not solve all its problems. But if it fails to solve this problem, it will continue to be bedeviled by the conundrum of the Father and Son Riding a Donkey, in terms of philosophy, policy, communications, and operations.
如何跳脫「父子騎驢」的困局？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.07.15 04:11 am
馬政府就職五十五天。自上任不到十天起，民進黨立委就不時喊出「下台，下台」；至今，連藍營大老也公開主張「內閣改組」。這般恍如「牆倒眾人推」的景象，究竟出了什麼問題？
今日政局是一個「父子騎驢／人人笑罵」的政治劇場。批評者對「父／子／驢」的關係各有主張；主政團隊對「父／子／驢」的關係也莫衷一是。在這種情勢下，倘若主政團隊及批評者，不能對「核心／邊緣」、「本質／方法」、「長久／短暫」等元素作出區別，恐怕各自皆難跳出「父子騎驢」的困局。
其實，馬總統自競選期間以來所主張的核心政治承諾，迄今並未背離，且已相當程度地體現。例如：一、台灣社會終於跳脫國家認同及族群鬥爭的痛苦撕裂；不再見到「愛台／賣台」、「中華民國／台灣國」的相互攻擊。二、政府官員的行政表現雖大有改善空間，但已不見「上杜下謝又連莊」那種類型的人物，使政府的形象比較質樸。三、兩岸出現和解契機，台灣也終於能在更加鬆綁開放的兩岸關係上嘗試重建其區域政經角色。也就是說，馬政府至少在「療治國家撕裂
／建立質樸政府／改善兩岸關係」三方面，應可獲得正面評價；而這三方面可謂正是過去十餘年來台灣政經的心腹病灶所在。
相對而言，馬政府迄今的問題大略可分四個類型：一、藍綠思維的問題：任命賴幸媛，及提名沈富雄、張俊彥，皆引發大風暴。其實，這些人事安排確有比較高遠的政治瞻矚，但因馬總統的操作與溝通兩皆失敗，而國民黨中央及黨團又因種種「相對剝奪感」而障蔽了心竅，遂致原本一段佳話變成了如今一場鬧劇。但是，就理念層面言，一般社會大眾不是不能體會這類人事安排的善意，反而是對國民黨因此內訌表達不齒。
二、溝通拙劣的問題：沈富雄中箭落馬，就是一個溝通失敗的顯例；而類此事件已至不勝枚舉的地步。例如，「蘇花高／蘇花替」的爭議，行政院竟把一個「巧門」變成了「陷阱」。其餘的事例，如陳武雄的「而已」，陳肇敏的「三一九感言」，劉兆玄的「棄綠卡是犧牲」等等，這類sound bite，皆狠狠地在馬政府身上「咬」了一口。
三、操作能力的問題：操作問題是多方面的，例如前段談到的「陷阱」，馬政府自掘陷阱的事例似乎比例過高。「蘇花高／蘇花替」，是自掘陷阱；綠卡事件也是自己挖坑往裡跳，汽油及肥料出現囤積，亦是如此。逕自宣布七月四日包機直航，倘非胡錦濤送禮，更是大陷阱；眼前另一口自掘的陷阱則是「外交休兵」，不知何時將墜落其中。
四、政策抉擇的問題：面對數十年來僅見的世界經濟危機，政策的抉擇關係重大。例如油價策略、稅賦結構、產業競爭力、Ｍ型社會問題及調整兩岸政經關係等，皆是可以見仁見智的政策抉擇問題。但是，這類問題反而不如前述「沈富雄提名」及「車龍排隊六小時」、「蘇花替」等受到媒體關切，而民進黨的批評也未能超脫「反對黨八股」；因而，關於政策抉擇的盲點，頗有令人擔憂之處。
綜上所論，若欲跳出「父子騎驢」的困境，就批評者言，不必將「邊緣」上的差錯，放大為「核心」上的問題；例如將陳武雄的一句「而已」的失言，放大為存有惡意，畢竟他不是說「太平洋沒蓋子」。就執政團隊言，則不要因「方法」上的差錯，貽誤成「本質」上的問題；例如李慶安國籍事件，對執政團隊言，原是處理程序的「方法」問題，如今卻可能演變成「本質」問題。倘若批評者與主政團隊，皆能深化「核心／本質／長久」的元素，並精緻化「邊緣／方法／短暫」的元素，「父子騎驢」的困局或可望改善。
在這些問題之上，最重要的仍是執政團隊必須整理「第一線／第二線」及「黨政聯結／黨政分離」的戰略架構問題。解決了這個問題，並不能解決所有的問題。但若不能解決這個問題，在理念上、政策上、溝通上及操作上，必仍將是「父子騎驢」的局面。
Monday, July 14, 2008
Do Not Allow the Name Game to Undermine Cross-Strait Good Will
Do Not Allow the Name Game to Undermine Cross-Strait Good Will
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 14, 2008
Emotions have been running high recently between Taipei and Beijing over the issue of Taiwan's participation in the Olympics. State Council for Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi is changing the signs at the Beijing Olympic International Press Centre, from "zhong hua tai bei" to "zhong guo tai bei." His explanation was that the English term "Chinese Taipei" translates as "zhong guo tai bei" and therefore ought not to be interpreted as a case of Beijing "demeaning Taiwan." Yesterday President Ma formally responded to Yang Yi's statement. He said that the use of "zhong hua tai bei" by both sides was already the consensus. Introducing "zhong guo tai bei" would touch off a new round of controversy. President Ma urged Beijing "Don't be like that." This round of verbal jousting shows that although the two sides are eager to preserve the friendly atmosphere that now prevails, their bottom line -- what they are willing to tolerate, is coming into play.
Senior diplomat Wang Yi is a veteran of numerous diplomatic encounters with Taipei. Given his background, does anyone believe he could be so amateurish as to believe there is no difference between "zhong hua tai bei" and "zhong guo tai bei?" The term "zhong hua tai bei" has long been the custom for Taipei's participation in international sporting events. Changing it to "zhong guo tai bei" reduces it to the same level as Hong Kong and Macao. How can one not suspect Beijing of attempting to "demean Taiwan?" If Beijing really believes this is "a minor matter," then they have seriously underestimated Taiwan's sensitivity. If President Ma cannot get "zhong guo tai bei" changed back to "zhong hua tai bei," and allows the Olympic delegation to attend under such conditions, he will be blasted by the political opposition. This would compel President Ma to adopt a hard line on the matter.
Beijing's behavior is truly baffling. It knows perfectly well that a single word is enough to provoke a political dispute. Yet it cannot resist the temptation to give Taiwan a hard time. One really has to wonder why. Wouldn't it be better to allow the team from Taiwan to feel good about participating in the Beijing Olympics? Must it make them set out full of regrets, and return full of frustration? Moreover, the Republic of China national team has used the name "Chinese Taipei" to participate in international sporting events for over 20 years. The Taipei side is the one that has been forced to bend all this time. If it is now to be designated as "zhong guo tai bei," and demoted to the same level as the Hong Kong and Macao delegations, will anyone believe this is not an attempt to "demean Taiwan?" Put bluntly, if this problem can not be resolved in a reasonable manner before the opening of the Olympic Games in August, it will become a ticking time bomb.
The tensions from this controversy underscore the fragility of cross-Strait relations. To re-establish a friendly bilateral atmosphere will require much effort, wisdom, and patience. To undermine such an atmosphere however, merely requires one wrong move.
No one will deny that cross-Strait relations are currently moving towards reconciliation. Over the past few days, Mainland tourists have successfully completed their first trip. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is planning to further relax limits to investment in Mainland businesses. Restrictions on cross-Strait financial and economic relations, trade, and tourism have been loosened more in the past two months than they were in the past eight years. Everyone can see that authorities on both sides of the Strait are hoping to maintain this atmosphere. This has been the easy part. Whether such an atmosphere can be sustained over the next few months will be the acid test.
First, in early August, President Ma is likely to visit the Republic of China's Central and South American allies. His transit through the United States will raise the issue of Ma's status and treatment by Washington. It will attract Beijing's concern. It will become the focus of universal attention. It will be followed by the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September. Will the Ma administration continue to demand membership in the United Nations? This is a highly sensitive matter. Finally, there is the sticky matter of Washington's arms sales to Taipei. Word has leaked that Beijing is applying pressure behind the scenes. Add all these up, and it is easy to that the real test for cross-strait relations has just begun.
Many issues are interrelated. If Beijing deliberately gives Taiwan's delegation to the Beijing Olympics a hard time, and uses the Open Ceremony to woo the Republic of China's allies; if it uses President Ma's transit through the United States to embarrass him; President Ma will be hampered in his efforts to open cross-Strait links. It will then be impossible for President Ma to demonstrate good will in September on the issue of membership in the United Nations. The pressure he will face is entirely predictable.
Therefore, one must not underestimate the sensitivity Taipei has about the name it must use to participate in the Olympics. Whether "zhong hua tai bei" or "zhong guo tai bei" demeans Taiwan is not merely a matter of Chinese translation. It is not something the Beijing leadership can take for granted. It is something the public on Taiwan feels in its gut. In order to avoid more serious controversy in the future, Ma president is right to tell Beijing, "Don't be like that!"
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.14
別讓名稱爭議再破壞兩岸氣氛
中時社論
為了台灣參加奧運的名稱問題，兩岸最近不帶火氣地過了一招。國台辦發言人楊毅就北京奧運國際新聞中心將「中華台北」標示為「中國台北」一事，解釋其都是英文Chinese Taipei的中文譯文，不能說是北京在「矮化台灣」，針對楊毅的說法馬總統日前也有了正式回應，指兩岸對使用「中華台北」上早有共識，「中國台北」將會引發新的爭議，馬總統昐望北京「不要這樣」。這場隔空的對話，清楚透露兩岸雙方都想維持目前友善的氣氛，但雙方能夠容忍的底線也正逐漸浮現張力。
講實在話，以王毅資深外交官的背景，往昔在外交戰場早與台北過招多次，怎麼可能會外行到認為Chinese Taipei譯成「中華台北」或「中國台北」沒有差別？將早已成為台灣參與國際賽事慣例的「中華台北」改成與港澳同級的「中國台北」，怎麼會沒有「矮化台灣」之嫌？北京當局如果認為這只是「小事一樁」，不必大驚小怪，那他們就真低估了這個問題在兩岸及台灣內部的敏感性。馬總統如果在「中國台北」無從改回「中華台北」的情況下，就授旗讓奧運代表團出發，肯定會被在野黨罵到翻，屆時等於得逼著馬總統選擇「立場強硬」了。
北京的這種做法確實令人不解，明明知道儘管只是「一字之差」，已經足夠能牽動敏感的政治糾葛，卻還是忍不住要給台灣「穿小鞋」，這真是何必呢？讓來自台灣奧運代表團帶著愉快的心情參加奧運不好嗎？非要弄到代表團帶著遺憾出發，憋著一肚子氣回家嗎？更何況台灣國家代表隊使用「中華台北」名義參加國際賽會的模式，已經都廿多年了，面對這種只能使用中華奧會旗歌的處境，感到委曲且必須容忍的一直是台灣這邊，如果這次再被冠上「中國台北」，與港澳代表團放在一塊，試問如果這不叫做「矮化」，能夠說服誰呢？講直接一點，如果八月奧運揭幕前，這個問題還不能合理解決，遲早將會是個政治「未爆彈」！
從這樁孕育後續張力的爭議中，不難看出兩岸關係的脆弱性。要重建雙方友善的氛圍得花多大工夫，多大智慧，甚至多大耐心，但要破壞這種氛圍，卻往往可能只是舉手之勞那般容易。
沒有人會否認，目前的兩岸關係正朝著和解的方向在走。就在這幾天，大陸觀光首發團已順利完成行程，經濟部也計畫進一步放寬企業赴大陸投資的上限，兩岸這兩個月在經貿與觀光上的鬆綁，整體成效甚至超過了過去八年。而任誰也都看得出來，兩岸當局都想努力維持這種氛圍。只不過截至目前為止，這都只能算是兩岸議程中最單純、也最容易處理的一部分，未來幾個月，這種氛圍能否真正持續，才算邁入真正嚴酷考驗的階段。
先是八月初，馬總統很可能將出訪中南美邦交國，屆時馬上就會面臨過境美國的「接待規格」問題，而北京將會「關切」到怎樣的程度，勢必會是各界關注的焦點。緊接著面對九月間的聯合國大會，馬政府還要不要繼續推動「入聯」，也會是個敏感度極高的課題。最後再加上陷入膠著的華府對台軍售，也不斷傳出有北京在幕後使力的痕跡。將這些林林總總的事件加總起來，就不難發現，兩岸關係的真正考驗，或許才剛剛開始。
不諱言說，許多事情就是環環相扣的。如果北京刻意要在參與北京奧運的名稱上給台灣「穿小鞋」，又利用奧運開幕式的機會挖台灣邦交國的牆腳，更運用影響力讓馬總統過境美國的規格「很難堪」，那麼馬總統在開放兩岸問題的決策空間勢必將被大幅擠壓，期待馬總統在九月間在「入聯」問題上能夠大開大闔的表現善意，恐怕根本不可能，甚至不必預測就會知道他將面臨怎樣的壓力了。
所以，千萬別低估台灣參加奧運使用名稱問題的敏感性，使用「中華台北」或是「中國台北」是不是在矮化台灣，絕不是中文翻譯的問題，更不是北京領導階層的「想當然爾」， 而是台灣民眾的具體感受問題，為了避免未來引發更大的爭議，馬總統說得對，北京真的「不要這樣」！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 14, 2008
Emotions have been running high recently between Taipei and Beijing over the issue of Taiwan's participation in the Olympics. State Council for Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi is changing the signs at the Beijing Olympic International Press Centre, from "zhong hua tai bei" to "zhong guo tai bei." His explanation was that the English term "Chinese Taipei" translates as "zhong guo tai bei" and therefore ought not to be interpreted as a case of Beijing "demeaning Taiwan." Yesterday President Ma formally responded to Yang Yi's statement. He said that the use of "zhong hua tai bei" by both sides was already the consensus. Introducing "zhong guo tai bei" would touch off a new round of controversy. President Ma urged Beijing "Don't be like that." This round of verbal jousting shows that although the two sides are eager to preserve the friendly atmosphere that now prevails, their bottom line -- what they are willing to tolerate, is coming into play.
Senior diplomat Wang Yi is a veteran of numerous diplomatic encounters with Taipei. Given his background, does anyone believe he could be so amateurish as to believe there is no difference between "zhong hua tai bei" and "zhong guo tai bei?" The term "zhong hua tai bei" has long been the custom for Taipei's participation in international sporting events. Changing it to "zhong guo tai bei" reduces it to the same level as Hong Kong and Macao. How can one not suspect Beijing of attempting to "demean Taiwan?" If Beijing really believes this is "a minor matter," then they have seriously underestimated Taiwan's sensitivity. If President Ma cannot get "zhong guo tai bei" changed back to "zhong hua tai bei," and allows the Olympic delegation to attend under such conditions, he will be blasted by the political opposition. This would compel President Ma to adopt a hard line on the matter.
Beijing's behavior is truly baffling. It knows perfectly well that a single word is enough to provoke a political dispute. Yet it cannot resist the temptation to give Taiwan a hard time. One really has to wonder why. Wouldn't it be better to allow the team from Taiwan to feel good about participating in the Beijing Olympics? Must it make them set out full of regrets, and return full of frustration? Moreover, the Republic of China national team has used the name "Chinese Taipei" to participate in international sporting events for over 20 years. The Taipei side is the one that has been forced to bend all this time. If it is now to be designated as "zhong guo tai bei," and demoted to the same level as the Hong Kong and Macao delegations, will anyone believe this is not an attempt to "demean Taiwan?" Put bluntly, if this problem can not be resolved in a reasonable manner before the opening of the Olympic Games in August, it will become a ticking time bomb.
The tensions from this controversy underscore the fragility of cross-Strait relations. To re-establish a friendly bilateral atmosphere will require much effort, wisdom, and patience. To undermine such an atmosphere however, merely requires one wrong move.
No one will deny that cross-Strait relations are currently moving towards reconciliation. Over the past few days, Mainland tourists have successfully completed their first trip. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is planning to further relax limits to investment in Mainland businesses. Restrictions on cross-Strait financial and economic relations, trade, and tourism have been loosened more in the past two months than they were in the past eight years. Everyone can see that authorities on both sides of the Strait are hoping to maintain this atmosphere. This has been the easy part. Whether such an atmosphere can be sustained over the next few months will be the acid test.
First, in early August, President Ma is likely to visit the Republic of China's Central and South American allies. His transit through the United States will raise the issue of Ma's status and treatment by Washington. It will attract Beijing's concern. It will become the focus of universal attention. It will be followed by the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September. Will the Ma administration continue to demand membership in the United Nations? This is a highly sensitive matter. Finally, there is the sticky matter of Washington's arms sales to Taipei. Word has leaked that Beijing is applying pressure behind the scenes. Add all these up, and it is easy to that the real test for cross-strait relations has just begun.
Many issues are interrelated. If Beijing deliberately gives Taiwan's delegation to the Beijing Olympics a hard time, and uses the Open Ceremony to woo the Republic of China's allies; if it uses President Ma's transit through the United States to embarrass him; President Ma will be hampered in his efforts to open cross-Strait links. It will then be impossible for President Ma to demonstrate good will in September on the issue of membership in the United Nations. The pressure he will face is entirely predictable.
Therefore, one must not underestimate the sensitivity Taipei has about the name it must use to participate in the Olympics. Whether "zhong hua tai bei" or "zhong guo tai bei" demeans Taiwan is not merely a matter of Chinese translation. It is not something the Beijing leadership can take for granted. It is something the public on Taiwan feels in its gut. In order to avoid more serious controversy in the future, Ma president is right to tell Beijing, "Don't be like that!"
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.07.14
別讓名稱爭議再破壞兩岸氣氛
中時社論
為了台灣參加奧運的名稱問題，兩岸最近不帶火氣地過了一招。國台辦發言人楊毅就北京奧運國際新聞中心將「中華台北」標示為「中國台北」一事，解釋其都是英文Chinese Taipei的中文譯文，不能說是北京在「矮化台灣」，針對楊毅的說法馬總統日前也有了正式回應，指兩岸對使用「中華台北」上早有共識，「中國台北」將會引發新的爭議，馬總統昐望北京「不要這樣」。這場隔空的對話，清楚透露兩岸雙方都想維持目前友善的氣氛，但雙方能夠容忍的底線也正逐漸浮現張力。
講實在話，以王毅資深外交官的背景，往昔在外交戰場早與台北過招多次，怎麼可能會外行到認為Chinese Taipei譯成「中華台北」或「中國台北」沒有差別？將早已成為台灣參與國際賽事慣例的「中華台北」改成與港澳同級的「中國台北」，怎麼會沒有「矮化台灣」之嫌？北京當局如果認為這只是「小事一樁」，不必大驚小怪，那他們就真低估了這個問題在兩岸及台灣內部的敏感性。馬總統如果在「中國台北」無從改回「中華台北」的情況下，就授旗讓奧運代表團出發，肯定會被在野黨罵到翻，屆時等於得逼著馬總統選擇「立場強硬」了。
北京的這種做法確實令人不解，明明知道儘管只是「一字之差」，已經足夠能牽動敏感的政治糾葛，卻還是忍不住要給台灣「穿小鞋」，這真是何必呢？讓來自台灣奧運代表團帶著愉快的心情參加奧運不好嗎？非要弄到代表團帶著遺憾出發，憋著一肚子氣回家嗎？更何況台灣國家代表隊使用「中華台北」名義參加國際賽會的模式，已經都廿多年了，面對這種只能使用中華奧會旗歌的處境，感到委曲且必須容忍的一直是台灣這邊，如果這次再被冠上「中國台北」，與港澳代表團放在一塊，試問如果這不叫做「矮化」，能夠說服誰呢？講直接一點，如果八月奧運揭幕前，這個問題還不能合理解決，遲早將會是個政治「未爆彈」！
從這樁孕育後續張力的爭議中，不難看出兩岸關係的脆弱性。要重建雙方友善的氛圍得花多大工夫，多大智慧，甚至多大耐心，但要破壞這種氛圍，卻往往可能只是舉手之勞那般容易。
沒有人會否認，目前的兩岸關係正朝著和解的方向在走。就在這幾天，大陸觀光首發團已順利完成行程，經濟部也計畫進一步放寬企業赴大陸投資的上限，兩岸這兩個月在經貿與觀光上的鬆綁，整體成效甚至超過了過去八年。而任誰也都看得出來，兩岸當局都想努力維持這種氛圍。只不過截至目前為止，這都只能算是兩岸議程中最單純、也最容易處理的一部分，未來幾個月，這種氛圍能否真正持續，才算邁入真正嚴酷考驗的階段。
先是八月初，馬總統很可能將出訪中南美邦交國，屆時馬上就會面臨過境美國的「接待規格」問題，而北京將會「關切」到怎樣的程度，勢必會是各界關注的焦點。緊接著面對九月間的聯合國大會，馬政府還要不要繼續推動「入聯」，也會是個敏感度極高的課題。最後再加上陷入膠著的華府對台軍售，也不斷傳出有北京在幕後使力的痕跡。將這些林林總總的事件加總起來，就不難發現，兩岸關係的真正考驗，或許才剛剛開始。
不諱言說，許多事情就是環環相扣的。如果北京刻意要在參與北京奧運的名稱上給台灣「穿小鞋」，又利用奧運開幕式的機會挖台灣邦交國的牆腳，更運用影響力讓馬總統過境美國的規格「很難堪」，那麼馬總統在開放兩岸問題的決策空間勢必將被大幅擠壓，期待馬總統在九月間在「入聯」問題上能夠大開大闔的表現善意，恐怕根本不可能，甚至不必預測就會知道他將面臨怎樣的壓力了。
所以，千萬別低估台灣參加奧運使用名稱問題的敏感性，使用「中華台北」或是「中國台北」是不是在矮化台灣，絕不是中文翻譯的問題，更不是北京領導階層的「想當然爾」， 而是台灣民眾的具體感受問題，為了避免未來引發更大的爭議，馬總統說得對，北京真的「不要這樣」！
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