Commemorate 228: But What are We Commemorating?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 27, 2009
It's 228 again, i.e., February 28, the anniversary of the 228 Incident of 1947. This is the Ma administration's first 228. President Ma has ordered the 228 Foundation's 1.5 billion NT budget unfrozen, and plans drawn up for a national grade memorial hall.
Ma Ying-jeou feels bound by a deep sense of "original sin." His heartfelt desire to admit wrongdoing and apologize for 228 is palpable. Alas, he has never offered a balanced and objective assessment of 228. Meanwhile the Green Camp's calculated hate-mongering has ripped society apart. It has absolutely no intention of getting to the truth of the 228 Incident.
The 228 Incident is a political Gordian Knot, primarily because the truth has not been established. The ruling and opposition parties have remained bound by a variety of false and discredited explanations. Each side has its own prejudices. Each maintains its own position. Without a truthful explanation of 228, how can we commemorate 228?
Let's examine several explanations for the 228 Incident. One. The KMT's explanation. Initially the KMT considered 228 taboo. The KMT's explanation has been revised repeatedly. For example, Chinese Communists and Taiwan Communists took part in the 228 Incident, They were the best organized and most effective fighting force. But the KMT considered this part of the historical record taboo. It was afraid to lump Chinese Communists and Taiwan Communists together with the people of Taiwan. Over the past two decades, Lee Teng-hui tried to reestablish the historical facts. But because he himself was a part of the reunification vs. independence struggle, he too failed to lead the public out of this spiritual prison. Now Ma Ying-jeou is in office. He is the product of 228 reconciliation. But as mentioned earlier, although Ma earnestly seeks reconciliation, he lacks the ability to get at the truth.
Two. Beijing's explanation. From the beginning Beijing has viewed the 228 Incident as an extension of the civil war between the KMT and the CCP. It claims that mainland Chinese Communists and Taiwan Communists stood united, and constituted the main force of the 228 resistance army. Beijing commemorated the 228 Incident each year. Only when it was recast as an "ethnic" struggle over reunification vs. independence, did Beijing's commemoration of the event become more low-keyed, or even cease.
Three. The "228 Victim's Families" explanation. The death of their relatives cut them to the quick. It is natural for them to feel wronged and to want revenge. Over the past 60 years some have found peace. But others remain caught up in their grief. This has led to a variety of explanations. Today these rank among the chief explanations for 228.
Four. The "375 Landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects" explanation. Workers' and peasants' class consciousness during Japanese occupation was one of the pillars of the opposition movement. Two large organizations, the Cultural Association and the Farmers Cooperative were socialist oriented. Their protests were an important part of the 228 incident. The KMT government disappointed the public. Elderly sharecroppers experienced hardship and anxiety. Taiwan Retrocession failed to imbue the public with a feeling of genuine citizenship. Ironically, over the past several decades, most of the political spin on the 228 Incident has been orchestrated by descendants of 375 landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects. They have exploited resentments arising from 228 in order to exact revenge on behalf of 375 landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects. How can their explanations of 228 not lead to distortions of the truth?
The most influential explanation of the incident, and also the most distorted explanation, is the Taiwan Independence or DPP explanation. This explanation asserts that the 228 Incident was an anti-KMT movement, an anti-mainlander movement, an anti-China movement, therefore it is a Taiwan independence movement. It has linked Taiwan independence to the 228 Incident. From an historical and factual perspective, this "explanation" is sheer fabrication. It has no basis in reality. In 1947, when the 228 Incident erupted, Taiwan independence was not even an issue. Commemoration of the 228 Incident today hardly requires advocacy of Taiwan independence. One. This distorted explanation of the historical reality of 228 eradicates or downplays the role of the Chinese Communists in 228. It drops the civil war between the KMT and CCP down the memory hole. Two. The Taiwan independence movement denies the Chinese Communists any role in the 228 Incident. It blanks out the class consciousness of workers and peasants during the 228 Incident. Descendants of 375 landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects would later arrogate to themselves the right to interpret the 228 Incident. This is why to this day the Democratic Progressive Party remains a phony champion of socialism.
The moral of the 228 Incident is that incompetent rule harms the people. It forces them to rebel. But the specific reasons are complex and varied. Naturally our analysis of the various explanations is much too sketchy. Besides, more explanations of 228 have been offered. We merely wish to stress that each explanation is custom tailored, hence defective. That is why we must seek a comprehensive explanation, a true explanation. To ask people to commemorate 228 in the absence of a true explanation, a full explanation, is to ask people to kowtow before false idols fabricated by political charlatans.
In commemorating 228, we must reject the notion that of "mainlanders" are somehow riddled with "Original Sin," or that we must overthrow the Republic of China. This is not a truthful explanation of 228. Only a false explanation of 228 demands "ethnic" strife and Taiwan independence. In order to commemorate 228, isn't it necessary to first establish the facts surrounding 228?
Merely bowing and scraping and apologizing, without telling the whole story, will merely add fuel to the fire. It will merely play into continuing efforts to incite hatred. It will not establish the truth.
紀念二二八，但全貌真相是什麼？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.27 03:56 am
又到二二八。這是馬政府的第一個二二八，馬總統指示，二二八基金會預算總額十五億元解凍，並研籌「國家級」紀念館。
馬英九深受「原罪感」的綑縛，他對二二八認錯道歉的心意可感，卻迄無能力為二二八建立一個平衡的全論述；相對而言，綠營的政治操作，則以累積仇恨與撕裂社會為能事，亦迄無意願為二二八建立一個真論述。
二二八迄今仍是一個難解的政治繩結，主要是因二二八的真論述及全論述迄未建立，朝野始終陷於各種偽論述及殘論述之中，各懷成見、各執一詞所致。但若不能為二二八建立一個全論述及真論述，如何紀念二二八？
以下略論二二八的各種版本。先說國民黨版：最早，國民黨視二二八為禁忌，其用於政治操作的版本亦多經剪裁。僅舉一例，二二八事件中，中共與台共頗具角色，可謂是最具組織及武鬥最慘烈的勢力，但國民黨視此一部分史實為忌諱，唯恐將中共台共劃成與台灣人民同一邊。至近二十年來，李登輝雖曾嘗試還原史實，卻因後來自陷於統獨族群鬥爭，遂亦未能帶領國人走出心靈困境；及至馬英九出線，本即是二二八和解的產物，但如前所述，馬雖「和」意甚誠，卻似仍缺「解」的能力。
再說北京的版本：北京自始即將二二八視為國共鬥爭的延伸戰線。自認中共及台共非但站在台灣人民的統一戰線，且是二二八反抗義軍的主力。北京往昔年年大事紀念二二八，直至台灣內部的二二八論述轉向統獨族群內鬥，倡獨反統，北京的紀念活動始趨低調，甚至停息。
此外，亦有「二二八受難者家屬」的版本：由於親人死難，椎心刺骨，自有雪冤復仇的情愫；六十餘年來，有些人的思考尋得昇華，但有些人仍深陷傷痛，於是形成各種論述，如今亦是二二八的重要版本。另有「三七五地主及皇民」的版本：工農階級意識是日據時代政治反對運動的一大支柱。兩大組織，文化協會及農民組合，皆具社會主義色彩；因而，此類抗議思想亦是台灣民間在二二八事件中的重要內涵。換句話說，二二八事件當年，國民黨政府所以令人民失望，其中亦有老佃儂的愁苦與既光復卻仍沒有「真國民感」的悲憤。諷刺的是，此後數十年來，二二八的論述，卻是由三七五地主及皇民後裔勢力所主導，標舉二二八的仇怨，其實是為三七五地主及皇民復仇；這樣的二二八論述，如何能不扭曲？
對二二八事件影響最大卻亦是最扭曲的版本，則是台獨版或民進黨版。此版二二八論述的主體是：二二八→反國民黨→反外省人→反中國→所以要台獨。將二二八與台獨聯結，就史實論，根本是杜撰偽造，在現實上亦無邏輯可言。在二二八當年，台獨絕非主題；如今紀念二二八，亦不必然就應主張台獨。簡略而言，此一版本扭曲了二二八的二大史實：一、抹去或淡化中共台共在二二八的角色，使國共內戰的主線消失。二、因台獨諱言中共台共在二二八的角色，遂使二二八的工農階級意識未能凸顯，嗣後更被三七五地主及皇民之後裔主導了二二八的詮釋權；這亦是民進黨迄今仍是一個「偽社會主義者」的原因。
二二八的主體是失政傷民、官逼民反；但其錯綜複雜的內外因素，亦是經緯萬端。當然，此處對各種版本的解析太過簡略，且二二八亦不止這幾種版本而已；在此想要強調的是，各種版本均有剪裁、均有缺陷，所以必須設法建立一個全版本、真版本。若無真版本、全版本，卻謂要紀念二二八，那豈不是要叫人們向騙徒政客製造的偽神假廟磕頭頂禮？
紀念二二八，就要聲討外省人的「原罪」，就要推翻中華民國，這不是真版本；紀念二二八，就要撕裂族群，就要主張台獨，這也是偽論述。談紀念二二八，難道不應首先還原二二八的全貌真相嗎？
只會鞠躬道歉，不是全版本；只會挑撥仇恨，更不是真版本。
Friday, February 27, 2009
Thursday, February 26, 2009
Taiwan's Economy Cannot Withstand the Impact of ASEAN Plus One
Taiwan's Economy Cannot Withstand the Impact of ASEAN Plus One
China Times Daily editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 26, 2009
Businesses, think tanks, and political parties have all presented their positions on whether Taipei should sign a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with Beijing. In order to understand why both industries and the government feel such an urgent need to promote CECA, we must begin by looking at global economic trends.
In 2001, the mainland and Taiwan became part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). We initially assumed that under the WTO's multilateral agreements, our foreign trade would enjoy considerable protection. But negotiations over the Doha Agreements have remained stalled. Instead, regional economic interests have come to the fore. Two to three hundred governments have signed regional economic agreements with each other. The one that affects the Republic of China most is the East Asian Free Trade Zone, better known as ASEAN Plus One (ASEAN Plus Beijing) to be signed in January next year, or possibly ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN plus Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul).
Once the East Asia Free Trade Zone becomes official, most products traded within the region will be tariff free. Economies within the region will of course benefit. But those outside may be severely harmed. Taiwan's economy will bear the brunt of the impact. Most Taiwan companies' exports go to the mainland. Together with Hong Kong, the mainland accounts for nearly 40% of our exports. ASEAN accounts for over 10%. Once Taiwan is excluded from the East Asian Free Trade Area, over half of Taiwan's exports will be affected. If ASEAN Plus Three becomes a reality, exports to Japan and Korea, amounting to 10%, will bring the affected total to 60%.
This is a low margin era. Most businesses enjoy only single digit profit margins. Our competitors will pay no tariffs, while we are subjected to tariffs of 10% on textiles and 6.5% on petrochemical products. For manufacturers the danger is not thinner margins or fewer orders, the danger is having to close up shop after being eliminated from the market.
In the middle and long term, in order to maintain their profits and to survive, businesses will be forced to uproot themselves and relocate. They will be forced to invest and set up factories inside the East Asia Free Trade Zone. Investment and employment opportunities on Taiwan will sharply decline.
Can our economy withstand such an impact? The East Asian Free Trade Zone will soon be established. Economists' estimates of its impact on our economy may vary. But all agree that economic growth is declining while unemployment is rising. Regardless, the negative impact is not something the public wants to see. Nor is it something our constitutionally weakened economy can sustain. Once the negative impact is felt, those harmed will not be limited to industry. The economy as a whole and everyone in it will suffer.
Put simply, signing CECA is of the utmost urgency. The reason is not to strengthen economic and trade relations with the mainland, but to alleviate the negative impact of the East Asia Free Trade Zone on our economy. It is easy for politicians to demagogue the issue. But if the opposition DPP and TSU want to oppose CECA, they must offer us a viable alternative. They must tell us how to alleviate the destructive impact of the East Asia Free Trade Zone on our economy.
Let's get back to basics, to people's fundamental interests and to the public welfare. Comparative advantage and bilateral trade can create greater economic benefits. Some people want to open Taiwan up to more mainland products. This will severely impact Taiwan, and is clearly contrary to the principle of comparative advantage. A previous wave of raw material price increases triggered inflation. Before that the world enjoyed low-inflation economic growth. They could buy cheaper goods. They benefitted from newcomers joining the ranks of global production, including the mainland,
Now let's look at the changes in Taiwan's industrial base over the past twenty years. Companies producing labor-intensive, low value-added goods, were weeded out or relocated. The resources were made available to high-end, high value-added products, making possible today's Silicon Island. Globalization is subjecting Taiwan's businesses to global purchasing pressure and peer competition. Refuse to make use of the mainland's resources and markets, and one will find it difficult to survive in the global market. Industry trends over the past few years bears this out.
In short, the most pressing challenge for our economy is coping with ASEAN Plus One once it is initiated in January. The export competitiveness of our businesses has fallen sharply. Our economy faces marginalization. CECA is the most realistic solution. Opposition parties are worried about sovereignty and terminology. This is understandable. But solutions can be found during negotiations. To stubbornly dig in one's heels, while failing to alleviate the economic pressures caused by ASEAN Plus One is flagrantly irresponsible. We hope the ruling party will address internal differences and concerns. We hope it will make every effort to resolve and accommodate differences. It should also use the political opposition as the "bad cop," in order to fight for better terms.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.26
社論－台灣經濟禁不起「東協加一」的重擊
本報訊
為了是否該推動與大陸簽訂ＣＥＣＡ（綜合性經濟合作協定），從企業、經濟智庫、到各政黨，紛紛發言各陳己見。在此，我們必須從全球性的經濟趨勢發展談起，才能了解企業與政府，為了對推動ＣＥＣＡ有如此深的迫切、焦慮感。
當二○○一年，兩岸都加入世界貿易組織（ＷＴＯ）後，原本以為在ＷＴＯ加權下，我國的對外經貿可在多邊協定下享有相當的利益保障。但近年杜哈談判受阻停滯，反而是區域經濟利益興起，各國彼此簽訂的區域經濟協定已達二、三百件之多；而其中，對我國影響最巨大者，即是明年元月上路的「東協加一」（東協加大陸）或「東協加三」（東協加大陸、日本、韓國）的東亞自由貿易區。
在東亞自由貿易區正式上路後，區域內大部分產品的關稅都將降為零，區內各國當然因此受惠，但區外國家卻可能大受打擊，台灣是首當其衝。大陸已是台灣出口比重最高地區，加上香港後占我國出口比重近四成，東協也占一成多，因此一旦台灣被排拒在東亞自由貿易區之外，代表我國超過五成的出口都會受影響。如果是「加三」，再加上一成的對日、韓出口，那就是六成多的出口都受影響。
而在這個微利時代，企業獲利大都只有個位數，如果競爭對手是零關稅，我國則要被課以十％以上（紡織業）、六．五％（石化業）不等的關稅，對廠商而言，不是獲利降低多少，也不是訂單減少多少成的問題，而根本是生死淘汰的問題了。
更中長期影響則是：企業為維繫原有在東亞自由貿易區的市場，並保有獲利以生存，必然「連根拔起」，前往區域內的國家投資設廠，台灣的投資與就業機會必然銳減。
試問：台灣經濟禁得起這一重擊嗎？學界對東亞自由貿易區上路後，對台灣經濟的影響之估算，雖然有不同的數字，但一致指出是讓經濟成長率下降、失業升高。無論最後的負面影響多大，都不是國人所樂見，更非已體質虛弱的台灣經濟所能承受。一旦負面影響出現，受傷者不僅企業，而是台灣經濟與全體國民。
用最簡單與最直接的話來說，簽訂ＣＥＣＡ有急迫性，為的不是加強與大陸的經貿關係，而是為了突破與化解東亞自由貿易區對我經濟的負面影響。政治人物噴口水容易，在野黨如果強力反對，那就該為台灣指出一條可行的明路，告訴大家如何突破與化解東亞自由貿易區成型後對台灣經濟的殺傷力。
如果回歸最基本的經濟利益與國民福祉看，兩國貿易的比較利益原則，原本就可創造經濟體更大的利益。部分人士一味以開放更多大陸產品將對台灣造成重創，顯然有違此比較利益原則。在前波因原物料高漲引發的通膨發生前，全球都享有低通膨的經濟成長，民眾可購買更低廉的商品，其實就是受惠於包括大陸在內的後進國家的加入全球生產行列。
再回頭看過去廿年台灣的產業變遷，也是不斷把勞力密集、低附加價值的商品、較虛弱的產業淘汰外移，釋出的資源則發展更高階、附加價值大的產品，也因此能成就今日的矽島之名。更何況，全球化的今日，台灣企業面對全球買主的壓力與同行的競爭，不思更進一步利用大陸的資源與市場，就很難立足全球市場。過去幾年企業的發展與布局，即證明這點。
簡言之，台灣經濟最迫在眉梢的問題，就是要突破明年元月東協加一上路後，台灣企業出口競爭力的大幅下滑、台灣經濟邊緣化的危機與壓力。ＣＥＣＡ是一個目前最可能的答案。在野黨擔心主權、名稱問題，可以理解，也可以在談判中尋求解決，但一味反對、卻提不出其它化解東協加一產生的經濟壓力之方式，就顯得相當不負責。而對執政黨，我們也期望能正視內部可能的分歧與疑慮，盡力化解與包容；同時，更善引這股反對力量為談判籌碼，為台灣爭取更好的條件。
China Times Daily editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 26, 2009
Businesses, think tanks, and political parties have all presented their positions on whether Taipei should sign a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with Beijing. In order to understand why both industries and the government feel such an urgent need to promote CECA, we must begin by looking at global economic trends.
In 2001, the mainland and Taiwan became part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). We initially assumed that under the WTO's multilateral agreements, our foreign trade would enjoy considerable protection. But negotiations over the Doha Agreements have remained stalled. Instead, regional economic interests have come to the fore. Two to three hundred governments have signed regional economic agreements with each other. The one that affects the Republic of China most is the East Asian Free Trade Zone, better known as ASEAN Plus One (ASEAN Plus Beijing) to be signed in January next year, or possibly ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN plus Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul).
Once the East Asia Free Trade Zone becomes official, most products traded within the region will be tariff free. Economies within the region will of course benefit. But those outside may be severely harmed. Taiwan's economy will bear the brunt of the impact. Most Taiwan companies' exports go to the mainland. Together with Hong Kong, the mainland accounts for nearly 40% of our exports. ASEAN accounts for over 10%. Once Taiwan is excluded from the East Asian Free Trade Area, over half of Taiwan's exports will be affected. If ASEAN Plus Three becomes a reality, exports to Japan and Korea, amounting to 10%, will bring the affected total to 60%.
This is a low margin era. Most businesses enjoy only single digit profit margins. Our competitors will pay no tariffs, while we are subjected to tariffs of 10% on textiles and 6.5% on petrochemical products. For manufacturers the danger is not thinner margins or fewer orders, the danger is having to close up shop after being eliminated from the market.
In the middle and long term, in order to maintain their profits and to survive, businesses will be forced to uproot themselves and relocate. They will be forced to invest and set up factories inside the East Asia Free Trade Zone. Investment and employment opportunities on Taiwan will sharply decline.
Can our economy withstand such an impact? The East Asian Free Trade Zone will soon be established. Economists' estimates of its impact on our economy may vary. But all agree that economic growth is declining while unemployment is rising. Regardless, the negative impact is not something the public wants to see. Nor is it something our constitutionally weakened economy can sustain. Once the negative impact is felt, those harmed will not be limited to industry. The economy as a whole and everyone in it will suffer.
Put simply, signing CECA is of the utmost urgency. The reason is not to strengthen economic and trade relations with the mainland, but to alleviate the negative impact of the East Asia Free Trade Zone on our economy. It is easy for politicians to demagogue the issue. But if the opposition DPP and TSU want to oppose CECA, they must offer us a viable alternative. They must tell us how to alleviate the destructive impact of the East Asia Free Trade Zone on our economy.
Let's get back to basics, to people's fundamental interests and to the public welfare. Comparative advantage and bilateral trade can create greater economic benefits. Some people want to open Taiwan up to more mainland products. This will severely impact Taiwan, and is clearly contrary to the principle of comparative advantage. A previous wave of raw material price increases triggered inflation. Before that the world enjoyed low-inflation economic growth. They could buy cheaper goods. They benefitted from newcomers joining the ranks of global production, including the mainland,
Now let's look at the changes in Taiwan's industrial base over the past twenty years. Companies producing labor-intensive, low value-added goods, were weeded out or relocated. The resources were made available to high-end, high value-added products, making possible today's Silicon Island. Globalization is subjecting Taiwan's businesses to global purchasing pressure and peer competition. Refuse to make use of the mainland's resources and markets, and one will find it difficult to survive in the global market. Industry trends over the past few years bears this out.
In short, the most pressing challenge for our economy is coping with ASEAN Plus One once it is initiated in January. The export competitiveness of our businesses has fallen sharply. Our economy faces marginalization. CECA is the most realistic solution. Opposition parties are worried about sovereignty and terminology. This is understandable. But solutions can be found during negotiations. To stubbornly dig in one's heels, while failing to alleviate the economic pressures caused by ASEAN Plus One is flagrantly irresponsible. We hope the ruling party will address internal differences and concerns. We hope it will make every effort to resolve and accommodate differences. It should also use the political opposition as the "bad cop," in order to fight for better terms.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.26
社論－台灣經濟禁不起「東協加一」的重擊
本報訊
為了是否該推動與大陸簽訂ＣＥＣＡ（綜合性經濟合作協定），從企業、經濟智庫、到各政黨，紛紛發言各陳己見。在此，我們必須從全球性的經濟趨勢發展談起，才能了解企業與政府，為了對推動ＣＥＣＡ有如此深的迫切、焦慮感。
當二○○一年，兩岸都加入世界貿易組織（ＷＴＯ）後，原本以為在ＷＴＯ加權下，我國的對外經貿可在多邊協定下享有相當的利益保障。但近年杜哈談判受阻停滯，反而是區域經濟利益興起，各國彼此簽訂的區域經濟協定已達二、三百件之多；而其中，對我國影響最巨大者，即是明年元月上路的「東協加一」（東協加大陸）或「東協加三」（東協加大陸、日本、韓國）的東亞自由貿易區。
在東亞自由貿易區正式上路後，區域內大部分產品的關稅都將降為零，區內各國當然因此受惠，但區外國家卻可能大受打擊，台灣是首當其衝。大陸已是台灣出口比重最高地區，加上香港後占我國出口比重近四成，東協也占一成多，因此一旦台灣被排拒在東亞自由貿易區之外，代表我國超過五成的出口都會受影響。如果是「加三」，再加上一成的對日、韓出口，那就是六成多的出口都受影響。
而在這個微利時代，企業獲利大都只有個位數，如果競爭對手是零關稅，我國則要被課以十％以上（紡織業）、六．五％（石化業）不等的關稅，對廠商而言，不是獲利降低多少，也不是訂單減少多少成的問題，而根本是生死淘汰的問題了。
更中長期影響則是：企業為維繫原有在東亞自由貿易區的市場，並保有獲利以生存，必然「連根拔起」，前往區域內的國家投資設廠，台灣的投資與就業機會必然銳減。
試問：台灣經濟禁得起這一重擊嗎？學界對東亞自由貿易區上路後，對台灣經濟的影響之估算，雖然有不同的數字，但一致指出是讓經濟成長率下降、失業升高。無論最後的負面影響多大，都不是國人所樂見，更非已體質虛弱的台灣經濟所能承受。一旦負面影響出現，受傷者不僅企業，而是台灣經濟與全體國民。
用最簡單與最直接的話來說，簽訂ＣＥＣＡ有急迫性，為的不是加強與大陸的經貿關係，而是為了突破與化解東亞自由貿易區對我經濟的負面影響。政治人物噴口水容易，在野黨如果強力反對，那就該為台灣指出一條可行的明路，告訴大家如何突破與化解東亞自由貿易區成型後對台灣經濟的殺傷力。
如果回歸最基本的經濟利益與國民福祉看，兩國貿易的比較利益原則，原本就可創造經濟體更大的利益。部分人士一味以開放更多大陸產品將對台灣造成重創，顯然有違此比較利益原則。在前波因原物料高漲引發的通膨發生前，全球都享有低通膨的經濟成長，民眾可購買更低廉的商品，其實就是受惠於包括大陸在內的後進國家的加入全球生產行列。
再回頭看過去廿年台灣的產業變遷，也是不斷把勞力密集、低附加價值的商品、較虛弱的產業淘汰外移，釋出的資源則發展更高階、附加價值大的產品，也因此能成就今日的矽島之名。更何況，全球化的今日，台灣企業面對全球買主的壓力與同行的競爭，不思更進一步利用大陸的資源與市場，就很難立足全球市場。過去幾年企業的發展與布局，即證明這點。
簡言之，台灣經濟最迫在眉梢的問題，就是要突破明年元月東協加一上路後，台灣企業出口競爭力的大幅下滑、台灣經濟邊緣化的危機與壓力。ＣＥＣＡ是一個目前最可能的答案。在野黨擔心主權、名稱問題，可以理解，也可以在談判中尋求解決，但一味反對、卻提不出其它化解東協加一產生的經濟壓力之方式，就顯得相當不負責。而對執政黨，我們也期望能正視內部可能的分歧與疑慮，盡力化解與包容；同時，更善引這股反對力量為談判籌碼，為台灣爭取更好的條件。
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
How Would the DPP Have People Respond to ASEAN Plus Three?
How Would the DPP Have People Respond to ASEAN Plus Three?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 25, 2009
Last weekend the Presidential Office and the Straits Exchange Foundation held a Conference on Financial and Economic Affairs, and a Conference on National Affairs. The question of whether the Taipei and Beijing should sign a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) led to yet another confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties. The government intends to promote CECA. The Democratic Progressive Party and Taiwan Solidarity Union vehemently oppose it.
In fact, ASEAN plus One, the One being Beijing, or ASEAN plus Three, the Three being Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul, all came into being during the Democratic Progressive Party's eight year regime. An Internet search will show that during this eight-year period, both ruling and opposition party cognoscenti were aware of the situation. Even the Chen administration's economic and trade officials and research organizations issued stern warnings. But during its eight years in power, the DPP government deliberately sat on this life and death issue. It never warned the public about the dangers or put the issue up for public discussion. The situation has deteriorated to where it is now a matter of extreme urgency. The DPP not only refuses to apologize to the public for the past eight years, all it is willing to do is say "No!"
Next year ASEAN plus One will implement mutual exemption of tariffs. In 2012 ASEAN plus Three will do the same. The population of ASEAN plus Three totals two billion. It will be the world's most populous free trade body. If it develops into ASEAN plus Six, adding India, Australia, and New Zealand, its population will total 3.1 billion, over half the world. Taipei has close economic and trade ties to these Asia-Pacific nations. Exports and trade with them constitute over half of Taiwan's total exports and trade. We have to ask the DPP: If the public on Taiwan is excluded from an economic framework consisting of two to three billion people, does it have any chance of survival?
The Democratic Progressive Party may object to CECA. But it cannot deny the impact of ASEAN plus N on Taiwan's economic lifeblood. Therefore if the Democratic Progressive Party want to oppose CECA, it must offer the people an alternative.
The Democratic Progressive Party's fatal illness is that when asked to offer strategies for the nation's survival, it knows only how to say no. It is unable to offer any viable alternatives. For example, the DPP knows only how to repudiate the Republic of China, even when it is obvious that Taiwan Independence and the establishment of a Nation of Taiwan is not a viable alternative. Today, the Democratic Progressive Party opposes CECA. But it hasn't offered the public any alternative. Are we to understand that the DPP's "alternative" is Taiwan Independence and the establishment of a Nation of Taiwan?
Does the DPP intend to oppose CECA regardless of the consequences? Or is it willing to conditionally endorse CECA? For example, is the DPP opposed only to articles within CECA that it says "harm our sovereignty?" Is it willing to endorse CECA upon the condition that it does not "harm our sovereignty?" Is the DPP willing to endorse CECA on the express or tacit understanding that Beijing will not prevent Taipei's participation in ASEAN or Taipei's signing of FTAs with other nations, and that CECA will not run the risk of tying Taipei's hands. The DPP need no longer play the role of "Mr. No." It should consider playing a positive role, one that will win it points. If it wants to keep saying no, the Democratic Progressive Party must offer a viable alternative. It cannot "just say no."
Tsai Ing-wen said that CECA is not merely an economic and trade issue, that it is also a political issue involving sovereignty. But CECA is not a political issue. It is fundamentally an economic and trade issue. The Republic of China's sovereignty has often been distorted. This is so without CECA. It is not any more so with CECA. Put simply, as long as CECA does not specify reunification or One Country, Two Systems, as long as after signing CECA, the Republic of China continues to elect its own President, as long as the Legislative Yuan continues operating, business as usual, as long as the Judicial Yuan remains open for business, how exactly does CECA "harm our sovereignty?" If CECA helps Taipei avoid the risk of economic and trade marginalization, and allows it to participate in ASEAN plus N or the East Asian Economic Community, isn't it "increasing our sovereignty?"
CECA is not something that sprang out of a rock. It is an issue the DPP has attempted to squash for eight years. The Democratic Progressive Party was in power for eight years. It committed the colossal blunder of ignoring a problem, thereby allowing it to grow. Does it still insist on severing economic and trade links between Taipei and ASEAN?
The Democratic Progressive Party may object to CECA. But it must offer a responsible alternative. Please do not tell us that alternative is Taiwan independence. Because that will make our participation in ASEAN plus N even less likely!
民進黨應告訴國人如何因應東協加三
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.25 02:29 am
上周末的府會財經會議與民間國是會議，竟使兩岸是否簽訂ＣＥＣＡ（綜合性經濟合作協定），演成朝野下一波政治對決的主題。政府宣示將推動ＣＥＣＡ，民進黨及台聯則強烈反對。
其實，「東協加一」（加中國），或「東協加三」（加中、日、韓），皆是在民進黨主政八年期間，由萌芽、發展，至成形；只要上網搜尋，即知在這八年期間，朝野有識之士早已對此有所警覺，扁政府的經貿主管及研究單位亦不斷發出強烈警訊；但是，民進黨政府在這八年中卻始終故意隱藏攸關國家生死的此一議題，亦即從未警示國人並訴諸公共討論。如今，情勢已經惡化至燃眉之急，民進黨非但未對過去八年的貽誤向國人表達歉意，竟仍然只是一句：「反對！」
東協加一將在明年全面互免關稅，東協加三則在二○一二年；東協加三總人口達二十億，將是全球人口最多的自由貿易體；倘若再繼續發展成東協加六（再加印度、澳、紐），則人口將達三十一億，已逾全球半數。何況，台灣素與這些亞太國家有密切的經貿互動，無論出口或貿易總額均超越台灣全額之半。我們要問民進黨：台灣若被排除在這個二十億或三十億人口的經濟架構之外，還有沒有活命？
民進黨可以反對ＣＥＣＡ，但不能否認「東協加Ｎ」對台經貿命脈的影響。所以，民進黨若反對ＣＥＣＡ，就應告訴國人：替代策略何在？
民進黨的膏肓之患在於：對於國家生存路線，只會作負面論述，卻不能提出可行的替代方案。例如，民進黨只會否定中華民國，但其台獨建國卻分明不是可行的替代方案。如今，民進黨又要反對ＣＥＣＡ，但亦未告訴國人其替代方案是什麼？難道還是台獨建國？
民進黨難道無論如何都要反對ＣＥＣＡ？還是可以有條件地贊同ＣＥＣＡ？比如說，民進黨是否只是反對ＣＥＣＡ附加「傷害主權」的條款，但在「主權」不受傷害下即可同意ＣＥＣＡ？或者，民進黨亦可主張，兩岸簽定ＣＥＣＡ，應附有不阻擋台灣參與東協或與其他國家締結ＦＴＡ的明文或默契，而不使兩岸ＣＥＣＡ發生綑綁台灣的風險。我們認為，在ＣＥＣＡ這個議題上，民進黨不必再扮演「絕對負面」的消極角色，而可嘗試扮演為ＣＥＣＡ加分避險的積極角色。倘若仍一味反對，民進黨即須拿出可行的替代方案，不能空言反對。
蔡英文說，ＣＥＣＡ不只是一個經貿議題，也是一個牽涉主權的政治議題；但ＣＥＣＡ也畢竟不是一政治議題，而在根本上仍是一個經貿議題。誠然，中華民國的主權頗受扭曲，無ＣＥＣＡ已是如此，有ＣＥＣＡ則應力求勿加重扭曲。直截而言，只要ＣＥＣＡ不以統一或一國兩制為條件；且只要簽訂ＣＥＣＡ後，中華民國仍然直選總統，國會照常運作，法院照樣開門，則ＣＥＣＡ如何「傷害」主權？何況，倘若能借ＣＥＣＡ突破台灣經貿地位邊緣化的危機，亦即能參與東協加Ｎ（或構想中的「東亞經濟共同體」），則豈非「主權」的加分？
ＣＥＣＡ不是一個突然從石頭縫裡迸出的新議題，而其實是一個民進黨逃避掩藏了八年的潛議題。民進黨執政八年，犯下了聽任危機坐大卻置之不理的大錯，如今難道仍要蠻橫力主台灣與東亞經貿就此脫勾？
民進黨可以反對ＣＥＣＡ，但必須負責任地提出替代可行方案。不過，可別告訴我們，那個方案仍是台灣獨立建國；因為，那就更不可能參與東協加Ｎ了！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 25, 2009
Last weekend the Presidential Office and the Straits Exchange Foundation held a Conference on Financial and Economic Affairs, and a Conference on National Affairs. The question of whether the Taipei and Beijing should sign a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) led to yet another confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties. The government intends to promote CECA. The Democratic Progressive Party and Taiwan Solidarity Union vehemently oppose it.
In fact, ASEAN plus One, the One being Beijing, or ASEAN plus Three, the Three being Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul, all came into being during the Democratic Progressive Party's eight year regime. An Internet search will show that during this eight-year period, both ruling and opposition party cognoscenti were aware of the situation. Even the Chen administration's economic and trade officials and research organizations issued stern warnings. But during its eight years in power, the DPP government deliberately sat on this life and death issue. It never warned the public about the dangers or put the issue up for public discussion. The situation has deteriorated to where it is now a matter of extreme urgency. The DPP not only refuses to apologize to the public for the past eight years, all it is willing to do is say "No!"
Next year ASEAN plus One will implement mutual exemption of tariffs. In 2012 ASEAN plus Three will do the same. The population of ASEAN plus Three totals two billion. It will be the world's most populous free trade body. If it develops into ASEAN plus Six, adding India, Australia, and New Zealand, its population will total 3.1 billion, over half the world. Taipei has close economic and trade ties to these Asia-Pacific nations. Exports and trade with them constitute over half of Taiwan's total exports and trade. We have to ask the DPP: If the public on Taiwan is excluded from an economic framework consisting of two to three billion people, does it have any chance of survival?
The Democratic Progressive Party may object to CECA. But it cannot deny the impact of ASEAN plus N on Taiwan's economic lifeblood. Therefore if the Democratic Progressive Party want to oppose CECA, it must offer the people an alternative.
The Democratic Progressive Party's fatal illness is that when asked to offer strategies for the nation's survival, it knows only how to say no. It is unable to offer any viable alternatives. For example, the DPP knows only how to repudiate the Republic of China, even when it is obvious that Taiwan Independence and the establishment of a Nation of Taiwan is not a viable alternative. Today, the Democratic Progressive Party opposes CECA. But it hasn't offered the public any alternative. Are we to understand that the DPP's "alternative" is Taiwan Independence and the establishment of a Nation of Taiwan?
Does the DPP intend to oppose CECA regardless of the consequences? Or is it willing to conditionally endorse CECA? For example, is the DPP opposed only to articles within CECA that it says "harm our sovereignty?" Is it willing to endorse CECA upon the condition that it does not "harm our sovereignty?" Is the DPP willing to endorse CECA on the express or tacit understanding that Beijing will not prevent Taipei's participation in ASEAN or Taipei's signing of FTAs with other nations, and that CECA will not run the risk of tying Taipei's hands. The DPP need no longer play the role of "Mr. No." It should consider playing a positive role, one that will win it points. If it wants to keep saying no, the Democratic Progressive Party must offer a viable alternative. It cannot "just say no."
Tsai Ing-wen said that CECA is not merely an economic and trade issue, that it is also a political issue involving sovereignty. But CECA is not a political issue. It is fundamentally an economic and trade issue. The Republic of China's sovereignty has often been distorted. This is so without CECA. It is not any more so with CECA. Put simply, as long as CECA does not specify reunification or One Country, Two Systems, as long as after signing CECA, the Republic of China continues to elect its own President, as long as the Legislative Yuan continues operating, business as usual, as long as the Judicial Yuan remains open for business, how exactly does CECA "harm our sovereignty?" If CECA helps Taipei avoid the risk of economic and trade marginalization, and allows it to participate in ASEAN plus N or the East Asian Economic Community, isn't it "increasing our sovereignty?"
CECA is not something that sprang out of a rock. It is an issue the DPP has attempted to squash for eight years. The Democratic Progressive Party was in power for eight years. It committed the colossal blunder of ignoring a problem, thereby allowing it to grow. Does it still insist on severing economic and trade links between Taipei and ASEAN?
The Democratic Progressive Party may object to CECA. But it must offer a responsible alternative. Please do not tell us that alternative is Taiwan independence. Because that will make our participation in ASEAN plus N even less likely!
民進黨應告訴國人如何因應東協加三
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.25 02:29 am
上周末的府會財經會議與民間國是會議，竟使兩岸是否簽訂ＣＥＣＡ（綜合性經濟合作協定），演成朝野下一波政治對決的主題。政府宣示將推動ＣＥＣＡ，民進黨及台聯則強烈反對。
其實，「東協加一」（加中國），或「東協加三」（加中、日、韓），皆是在民進黨主政八年期間，由萌芽、發展，至成形；只要上網搜尋，即知在這八年期間，朝野有識之士早已對此有所警覺，扁政府的經貿主管及研究單位亦不斷發出強烈警訊；但是，民進黨政府在這八年中卻始終故意隱藏攸關國家生死的此一議題，亦即從未警示國人並訴諸公共討論。如今，情勢已經惡化至燃眉之急，民進黨非但未對過去八年的貽誤向國人表達歉意，竟仍然只是一句：「反對！」
東協加一將在明年全面互免關稅，東協加三則在二○一二年；東協加三總人口達二十億，將是全球人口最多的自由貿易體；倘若再繼續發展成東協加六（再加印度、澳、紐），則人口將達三十一億，已逾全球半數。何況，台灣素與這些亞太國家有密切的經貿互動，無論出口或貿易總額均超越台灣全額之半。我們要問民進黨：台灣若被排除在這個二十億或三十億人口的經濟架構之外，還有沒有活命？
民進黨可以反對ＣＥＣＡ，但不能否認「東協加Ｎ」對台經貿命脈的影響。所以，民進黨若反對ＣＥＣＡ，就應告訴國人：替代策略何在？
民進黨的膏肓之患在於：對於國家生存路線，只會作負面論述，卻不能提出可行的替代方案。例如，民進黨只會否定中華民國，但其台獨建國卻分明不是可行的替代方案。如今，民進黨又要反對ＣＥＣＡ，但亦未告訴國人其替代方案是什麼？難道還是台獨建國？
民進黨難道無論如何都要反對ＣＥＣＡ？還是可以有條件地贊同ＣＥＣＡ？比如說，民進黨是否只是反對ＣＥＣＡ附加「傷害主權」的條款，但在「主權」不受傷害下即可同意ＣＥＣＡ？或者，民進黨亦可主張，兩岸簽定ＣＥＣＡ，應附有不阻擋台灣參與東協或與其他國家締結ＦＴＡ的明文或默契，而不使兩岸ＣＥＣＡ發生綑綁台灣的風險。我們認為，在ＣＥＣＡ這個議題上，民進黨不必再扮演「絕對負面」的消極角色，而可嘗試扮演為ＣＥＣＡ加分避險的積極角色。倘若仍一味反對，民進黨即須拿出可行的替代方案，不能空言反對。
蔡英文說，ＣＥＣＡ不只是一個經貿議題，也是一個牽涉主權的政治議題；但ＣＥＣＡ也畢竟不是一政治議題，而在根本上仍是一個經貿議題。誠然，中華民國的主權頗受扭曲，無ＣＥＣＡ已是如此，有ＣＥＣＡ則應力求勿加重扭曲。直截而言，只要ＣＥＣＡ不以統一或一國兩制為條件；且只要簽訂ＣＥＣＡ後，中華民國仍然直選總統，國會照常運作，法院照樣開門，則ＣＥＣＡ如何「傷害」主權？何況，倘若能借ＣＥＣＡ突破台灣經貿地位邊緣化的危機，亦即能參與東協加Ｎ（或構想中的「東亞經濟共同體」），則豈非「主權」的加分？
ＣＥＣＡ不是一個突然從石頭縫裡迸出的新議題，而其實是一個民進黨逃避掩藏了八年的潛議題。民進黨執政八年，犯下了聽任危機坐大卻置之不理的大錯，如今難道仍要蠻橫力主台灣與東亞經貿就此脫勾？
民進黨可以反對ＣＥＣＡ，但必須負責任地提出替代可行方案。不過，可別告訴我們，那個方案仍是台灣獨立建國；因為，那就更不可能參與東協加Ｎ了！
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Wu Shu-chen Gives the Political Donation Law a Slap in the Face
Wu Shu-chen Gives the Political Donation Law a Slap in the Face
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2009
The Political Donation Law has been stalled in the Legislative Yuan for years. Now, finally, the Control Yuan has made public a list of political contributors. This has subjected the campaign contributions of corporate contributors to Blue and Green political parties and presidential candidates to the bright glare of the sun. Ironically, within 24 hours, Wu Shu-chen made a second revelation. She reportedly blew the whistle on 20 major contributors, who made three billion in campaign contributions. More importantly, Wu Shu-chen's hidden books were never reported to the Control Yuan, making clear her contempt for the law. For all intents and purposes, she gave the Political Donation Law a hard slap in the face.
In fact, ever since Chen's secret overseas money-laundering accounts were revealed last August 14, Chen Shui-bian has used campaign contributions to shield himself from prosecution. From the beginning he has insisted that money transferred overseas was leftover campaign contributions. In response to the Lungtan Corruption scandal, Chen Shui-bian referred to the money he received as "campaign contributions," and disowned all responsibility for it. A law ostensibly intended to make campaign contributions transparent, has become a tool for corruption. Where did our Political Donation Law go wrong?
Since the nineties, in pace with a raised political consciousness, the public has expressed its distaste for money politics. But apart from the Public Servant Property Declaration Act, other bills such as the Sunshine Law have failed to make it through the legislature. It was only in 2004, during President Chen Shui-bian's re-election campaign, that suspicions arose regarding Chen Yu-hao's campaign contributions to Chen Shui-bian. Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen flatly denied, again and again, that they had taken any money from Chen Yu-hao. Chen Shui-bian gave orders that Chen faction members of the Legislative Yuan sponsor a "stringent" Political Donation Law. Wu Shu-chen recently confessed to receiving billions in campaign contributions from conglomerates, many following Chen's "re-election" in 2004. Obviously, Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen never gave the Political Donation Law a second thought. Worse, they turned the Political Donation Law into a fig leaf to cover the Chen family's criminal activities.
Of course, the bosses of financial conglomerates in doubt about asking prices began delivering hundreds of millions to the president's official residence. They even deposited money in Chen's overseas accounts. To call these "campaign contributions" is more than a little far-fetched. Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen, in an attempt to paint others as black as himself, argued that these financial conglomerates gave even more to the KMT, but prosecutors have chosen to prosecute only them! What can we blame, but a Political Donation Law that has great ambitions but little ability.
Republic of China election campaigns, particularly presidential campaigns, are extremely expensive. The Political Donation Law stipulates that individuals may not contribute more than 100,000 NT in any given year. Profit-making enterprises may not contribute more than one million NT. Legislators did not set such stringent standards out of political idealism. In fact the complete lack of stringent standards was one of the preconditions for passage of the Political Donation Law.
In 1974 the United States "Federal Election Campaign Law" established a "Federal Election Commission." Commission members have professional staff and the right to investigate. Only that enables it to investigate false declarations. By contrast, look at our own Political Donation Law. The Control Yuan is charged with investigating campaign contributions. Control Yuan members have the right to investigate. But more than a few public officials have admitted both publicly and privately that the amount they declared is less than half of what they received. But has the Control Yuan investigated or prosecuted a single one of these?
And even if the Control Yuan decided to get tough, what tools does it have at hand? False declarations of campaign contributions by dishonest politicians and political parties, is punishable by a maximum of fine of 1,000,000 NT, approximately 30,000 US. Such a slap on the wrist provides politicians with a reason to lie, thereby breaking the law. Dlections are hotly contested on Taiwan. Therefore politicians have few scruples about fund-raising. Only then can they have access to immense political and economic benefits. After all, no one makes a serious effort to check. And in the event one is unlucky enough to be found out, the fine is a mere 1,000,000 NT. Politicians, know how to read a balance sheet, and have little trouble deciding which way to go.
Politicians are highly adaptable creatures. No matter how airtight the law might be, they will find loopholes, they will find a backdoor. In the painful aftermath of the Watergate scandal, the US decided to pass the "Federal Election Campaign Law." As we can see from this brief history, campaign reform is useless. The law is constantly rewritten. Election expenses increase geometrically. Obama's fund-raising has once again broken previous records.
Therefore, experts who have studied campaign contributions say the key to reform is transparency. Setting ultra-high standards is not as good as conceding that modest campaign contributions are a necessary evil, and adopting more realistic contribution limits. But false declarations must be severely punished. The Political Donation Law must no longer be a hypocritical law, a way for Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen to get off scot-free. These are factors the legislators amending the law must consider.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.24
社論－吳淑珍狠狠打了政治獻金法一個耳光
本報訊
政治獻金法立法多年後，監察院終於公布政治捐款專戶，讓各大企業捐助藍綠政黨及總統候選人的政治獻金，可以接受陽光的檢驗。諷刺的是，不到二十四小時，吳淑珍第二次陳報狀曝光，據傳共抖出二十位金主、三十億政治獻金；更重要的是，吳淑珍這本黑帳，從未向監察院申報，擺明完全視法律於無物，形同狠狠的打了政治獻金法一個耳光。
事實上，去年八月十四日扁海外洗錢密帳曝光以來，陳水扁就是援引政治獻金為自己辯護；一開始，他表示，這些匯往海外的錢，都是選舉結餘款，面對龍潭案的貪汙事證，陳水扁也以政治獻金推得一乾二淨。一部應該讓政治透明乾淨的法律，最後竟成為貪汙犯的藉口，我們的政治獻金法究竟出了什麼問題？
九○年代以來，隨著民主意識高漲，黑金政治深受民眾詬病，但是除了公職人員財產申報法外，政治獻金法等相關陽光法案，卻遲遲未能完成立法。一直到二○○四年，陳水扁競選總統連任時，面對收受陳由豪政治獻金疑雲，扁、珍不但多次斷然否認曾拿過陳由豪的錢，更在陳水扁命令下，在立法院由扁系立委提出並通過這一部「高標準」的政治獻金法；觀諸吳淑珍近來自承收受財團數十億政治獻金，其中不少是在二○○四年連任後發生，扁、珍心目中不但從無政治獻金法，政治獻金法更淪為掩護扁家犯罪的遮羞布。
當然，有對價嫌疑的金控大老闆紛紛送錢進官邸，動輒上億，甚至匯錢到海外帳戶，硬要說這些錢是政治獻金，未免太牽強。但是，為何扁珍可以振振有詞的說，這些財團送給國民黨更多，天下烏鴉一般黑，卻選擇性只辦他們一家人!我們這一部眼高手低的政治獻金法，難辭其咎。
以台灣選舉、尤其是總統選舉競選經費之龐大，政治獻金法卻規定，個人對參選人每年捐贈總額不得超過十萬元，營利事業不得超過一百萬。立委諸公定下如此嚴格的標準，並非著眼於政治清明的理想，事實上，整部政治獻金法，完全欠缺讓此一高標準實現的條件。
舉例言之，美國一九七四年的《聯邦選舉競選法》修正案中，特別設立「聯邦選舉委員會」，該委員會具調查權及專業幕僚，才可能落實對不實申報的查核；反觀我們的政治獻金法，受理政治獻金之申報機關是監察院，監委具調查權，而且負責公職人員財產申報，但是，自政治獻金法實施以來，不少立委公開私下都曾表示，他們申報的數字，不足實收的二分之一，但可曾見到監察院調查或處罰任何一個案例？
而即使監察院真的決定動大刀懲處，又有何工具可用？不誠實申報政治獻金的政治人物及政黨，只要面對最多一百萬元的行政罰鍰；如此不痛不癢的罰則，形同鼓勵政治人物說謊、進而犯法，因為，以台灣選舉競爭之激烈，政治人物當然寧願無所顧忌的募款，可以獲取龐大的政經利益；反正，不會有人認真去查，真的不幸被查到了，罰鍰不過一百萬。最具經濟理性的政客們，怎麼會不知道如何算這筆帳！
當然，政客是最具適應力的動物，再如何先進的政治獻金法制，他們都可以找到漏洞、繞道而行。美國在水門事件之後痛下決心立法的《聯邦選舉競選法》，就可以看出這一段獻金法制的「改革無用史」，法不斷的訂定，選舉經費也跟著等比級數上升，歐巴馬的募款經費再次破了前人的記錄。
因此，研究政治獻金的專家們建議，改革的核心在陽光及透明。與其定下超高標準防堵，還不如適度的承認政治獻金是必要之惡，採取較務實的捐款上限，但如果不誠實申報，將面臨嚴重的刑責。要讓我們的政治獻金法不再是一部偽善的法律，或成為扁珍脫罪的藉口，這些是立委諸公未來修法必須考慮的方向。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2009
The Political Donation Law has been stalled in the Legislative Yuan for years. Now, finally, the Control Yuan has made public a list of political contributors. This has subjected the campaign contributions of corporate contributors to Blue and Green political parties and presidential candidates to the bright glare of the sun. Ironically, within 24 hours, Wu Shu-chen made a second revelation. She reportedly blew the whistle on 20 major contributors, who made three billion in campaign contributions. More importantly, Wu Shu-chen's hidden books were never reported to the Control Yuan, making clear her contempt for the law. For all intents and purposes, she gave the Political Donation Law a hard slap in the face.
In fact, ever since Chen's secret overseas money-laundering accounts were revealed last August 14, Chen Shui-bian has used campaign contributions to shield himself from prosecution. From the beginning he has insisted that money transferred overseas was leftover campaign contributions. In response to the Lungtan Corruption scandal, Chen Shui-bian referred to the money he received as "campaign contributions," and disowned all responsibility for it. A law ostensibly intended to make campaign contributions transparent, has become a tool for corruption. Where did our Political Donation Law go wrong?
Since the nineties, in pace with a raised political consciousness, the public has expressed its distaste for money politics. But apart from the Public Servant Property Declaration Act, other bills such as the Sunshine Law have failed to make it through the legislature. It was only in 2004, during President Chen Shui-bian's re-election campaign, that suspicions arose regarding Chen Yu-hao's campaign contributions to Chen Shui-bian. Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen flatly denied, again and again, that they had taken any money from Chen Yu-hao. Chen Shui-bian gave orders that Chen faction members of the Legislative Yuan sponsor a "stringent" Political Donation Law. Wu Shu-chen recently confessed to receiving billions in campaign contributions from conglomerates, many following Chen's "re-election" in 2004. Obviously, Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen never gave the Political Donation Law a second thought. Worse, they turned the Political Donation Law into a fig leaf to cover the Chen family's criminal activities.
Of course, the bosses of financial conglomerates in doubt about asking prices began delivering hundreds of millions to the president's official residence. They even deposited money in Chen's overseas accounts. To call these "campaign contributions" is more than a little far-fetched. Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen, in an attempt to paint others as black as himself, argued that these financial conglomerates gave even more to the KMT, but prosecutors have chosen to prosecute only them! What can we blame, but a Political Donation Law that has great ambitions but little ability.
Republic of China election campaigns, particularly presidential campaigns, are extremely expensive. The Political Donation Law stipulates that individuals may not contribute more than 100,000 NT in any given year. Profit-making enterprises may not contribute more than one million NT. Legislators did not set such stringent standards out of political idealism. In fact the complete lack of stringent standards was one of the preconditions for passage of the Political Donation Law.
In 1974 the United States "Federal Election Campaign Law" established a "Federal Election Commission." Commission members have professional staff and the right to investigate. Only that enables it to investigate false declarations. By contrast, look at our own Political Donation Law. The Control Yuan is charged with investigating campaign contributions. Control Yuan members have the right to investigate. But more than a few public officials have admitted both publicly and privately that the amount they declared is less than half of what they received. But has the Control Yuan investigated or prosecuted a single one of these?
And even if the Control Yuan decided to get tough, what tools does it have at hand? False declarations of campaign contributions by dishonest politicians and political parties, is punishable by a maximum of fine of 1,000,000 NT, approximately 30,000 US. Such a slap on the wrist provides politicians with a reason to lie, thereby breaking the law. Dlections are hotly contested on Taiwan. Therefore politicians have few scruples about fund-raising. Only then can they have access to immense political and economic benefits. After all, no one makes a serious effort to check. And in the event one is unlucky enough to be found out, the fine is a mere 1,000,000 NT. Politicians, know how to read a balance sheet, and have little trouble deciding which way to go.
Politicians are highly adaptable creatures. No matter how airtight the law might be, they will find loopholes, they will find a backdoor. In the painful aftermath of the Watergate scandal, the US decided to pass the "Federal Election Campaign Law." As we can see from this brief history, campaign reform is useless. The law is constantly rewritten. Election expenses increase geometrically. Obama's fund-raising has once again broken previous records.
Therefore, experts who have studied campaign contributions say the key to reform is transparency. Setting ultra-high standards is not as good as conceding that modest campaign contributions are a necessary evil, and adopting more realistic contribution limits. But false declarations must be severely punished. The Political Donation Law must no longer be a hypocritical law, a way for Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen to get off scot-free. These are factors the legislators amending the law must consider.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.24
社論－吳淑珍狠狠打了政治獻金法一個耳光
本報訊
政治獻金法立法多年後，監察院終於公布政治捐款專戶，讓各大企業捐助藍綠政黨及總統候選人的政治獻金，可以接受陽光的檢驗。諷刺的是，不到二十四小時，吳淑珍第二次陳報狀曝光，據傳共抖出二十位金主、三十億政治獻金；更重要的是，吳淑珍這本黑帳，從未向監察院申報，擺明完全視法律於無物，形同狠狠的打了政治獻金法一個耳光。
事實上，去年八月十四日扁海外洗錢密帳曝光以來，陳水扁就是援引政治獻金為自己辯護；一開始，他表示，這些匯往海外的錢，都是選舉結餘款，面對龍潭案的貪汙事證，陳水扁也以政治獻金推得一乾二淨。一部應該讓政治透明乾淨的法律，最後竟成為貪汙犯的藉口，我們的政治獻金法究竟出了什麼問題？
九○年代以來，隨著民主意識高漲，黑金政治深受民眾詬病，但是除了公職人員財產申報法外，政治獻金法等相關陽光法案，卻遲遲未能完成立法。一直到二○○四年，陳水扁競選總統連任時，面對收受陳由豪政治獻金疑雲，扁、珍不但多次斷然否認曾拿過陳由豪的錢，更在陳水扁命令下，在立法院由扁系立委提出並通過這一部「高標準」的政治獻金法；觀諸吳淑珍近來自承收受財團數十億政治獻金，其中不少是在二○○四年連任後發生，扁、珍心目中不但從無政治獻金法，政治獻金法更淪為掩護扁家犯罪的遮羞布。
當然，有對價嫌疑的金控大老闆紛紛送錢進官邸，動輒上億，甚至匯錢到海外帳戶，硬要說這些錢是政治獻金，未免太牽強。但是，為何扁珍可以振振有詞的說，這些財團送給國民黨更多，天下烏鴉一般黑，卻選擇性只辦他們一家人!我們這一部眼高手低的政治獻金法，難辭其咎。
以台灣選舉、尤其是總統選舉競選經費之龐大，政治獻金法卻規定，個人對參選人每年捐贈總額不得超過十萬元，營利事業不得超過一百萬。立委諸公定下如此嚴格的標準，並非著眼於政治清明的理想，事實上，整部政治獻金法，完全欠缺讓此一高標準實現的條件。
舉例言之，美國一九七四年的《聯邦選舉競選法》修正案中，特別設立「聯邦選舉委員會」，該委員會具調查權及專業幕僚，才可能落實對不實申報的查核；反觀我們的政治獻金法，受理政治獻金之申報機關是監察院，監委具調查權，而且負責公職人員財產申報，但是，自政治獻金法實施以來，不少立委公開私下都曾表示，他們申報的數字，不足實收的二分之一，但可曾見到監察院調查或處罰任何一個案例？
而即使監察院真的決定動大刀懲處，又有何工具可用？不誠實申報政治獻金的政治人物及政黨，只要面對最多一百萬元的行政罰鍰；如此不痛不癢的罰則，形同鼓勵政治人物說謊、進而犯法，因為，以台灣選舉競爭之激烈，政治人物當然寧願無所顧忌的募款，可以獲取龐大的政經利益；反正，不會有人認真去查，真的不幸被查到了，罰鍰不過一百萬。最具經濟理性的政客們，怎麼會不知道如何算這筆帳！
當然，政客是最具適應力的動物，再如何先進的政治獻金法制，他們都可以找到漏洞、繞道而行。美國在水門事件之後痛下決心立法的《聯邦選舉競選法》，就可以看出這一段獻金法制的「改革無用史」，法不斷的訂定，選舉經費也跟著等比級數上升，歐巴馬的募款經費再次破了前人的記錄。
因此，研究政治獻金的專家們建議，改革的核心在陽光及透明。與其定下超高標準防堵，還不如適度的承認政治獻金是必要之惡，採取較務實的捐款上限，但如果不誠實申報，將面臨嚴重的刑責。要讓我們的政治獻金法不再是一部偽善的法律，或成為扁珍脫罪的藉口，這些是立委諸公未來修法必須考慮的方向。
Monday, February 23, 2009
A Bad Law is Not The Law
A Bad Law is Not The Law
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2009
Two years ago, one million people took to the streets to denounce corruption and demand that Ah-Bian step down. Prosecutors charged them with violating the Parade and Assembly Law. Yesterday the Taipei District Court Full Court pronounced Shih Ming-teh, Jane Tin-jie, Wei Qian Feng, Fan Ke-qin, Yao Li-ming, and 16 others not guilty. The legislature is considering amending the law. The court's ruling show how the Parade and Assembly Law has become an obstacle to the rule of law.
The court's not guilty ruling may have take some legal experts by surprise. They may even had take many of the defendants by surprise. One of the greatest challenges for the rule of law is the existence of a bad law. Is a bad law still the law? Or is a bad law not a law? In the West this philosophy of law dilemma has been debated for nearly a thousand years. Under such circumstances, judges must decide what constitutes a just ruling. In this case the Taipei District Court's three judges found the defendants not guilty. Their ruling implied that the Parade and Assembly Law was a bad law. But since the Legislative Yuan is amending the law, the trial court should not pre-empt it. Although the defendants asked the Grand Justices for a ruling on the constitutionality of the Parade and Assembly Law, the District Court did not stop its indictment proceedings. The judges adopted a conservative approach in dealing with their own constitutional review function. They dealt with the enforcement dilemma created by a bad law by presuming it was constitutional. They did not shirk their responsibility to be an impartial referee.
The Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law, not because some pundits have jumped to this conclusion, but ruling party succession leads to rival political parties taking turns making the identical accusations. Although this law purports to protect of freedom of assembly, it establishes all sorts of technical obstacles to freedome of assembly. In particular, it targets political rallies and marches. This case makes this unmistakably clear. The government agency in charge did not permit the Red Shirt Army to march because the Red Shirt Army had political motives, and was not merely participating in National Day celebrations. The agency's reasoning was inconsistent with due process. The way the Parade and Assembly Law is enforced makes it clear its intent was to limit political demonstrations. It doesn't matter if the demonstration is peaceful. Obviously a Parade and Assembly Law intended to suppress political expression conflicts with freedom of assembly and speech, core values guaranteed by the constitution. That is why the Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law that a nation under the rule of law cannot tolerate.
To peacefully assemble or march to express one's views about society or the government, is a legitimate activity that a democratic system must respect. Government should take the initiative to provide timely and appropriate venues for the public to peacefully exercise their right of public assembly. The more people assemble peacefully, the more obvious it is the system has political legitimacy. Millions of people taking to the streets may upset those in power. But those in power feeling upset is no reason to prohibit peaceful assembly. Over one million Red Shirt Army members repeatedly gathered on the streets of Taipei. Every time they concluded their activities peacefully. They were a model of mature large-scale political assembly. A handful of technical violations warrant, at best, a few fines. When the public protested against those in power, they weren't necessarily repudiating the lawful authority of the ruling administration. Once the ruling administration steps down, the Red Shirt Army's charges of corruption can be verified by means of the judicial process. Sure enough, their charges turned out to be neither groundless nor unfounded.
If corrupt rulers have yet to be convicted of corruption, yet the government suppresses peaceful protest, that proves the Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law that cannot be tolerated under constitutional government.
The courts once held that although the Parade and Assembly Law was a bad law, it was still the law. They imprisoned many people they shouldn't have. This time the court used its judgment. It applied the principle of proportionality. It refused to use a bad law to imprison political dissidents. It was a rare case of a double negative making a positive. If people understand how the protection of fundamental rights prevents the abuse of power and safeguards constitutional government. they will affirm the ruling. They will not challenge the court's decision. They will not cling to the outdated notion that a bad law is still the law. They will not prolong the political evil known as the Parade and Assembly Law.
The District Court ruling was well written. We look forward to the legislative branch reviewing and amending the Parade and Assembly Law as soon as possible. We would also remind public leaders that mass movements are unpredictable. Public leaders must exercise self-restraint, and help to maintain social order. Freedom of speech and social order are both rights protected by constitutional government. You can have your cake and eat it too. The court must stay the course, and have the guts to uphold justice. We hope the Legislative Yuan will follow the example set by the court when it acquitted the defendants. We hope it will swiftly pass an amendment, putting an end to the Parade and Assembly Law.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.23
社論－肯定一樁彰顯惡法非法的判決
本報訊
兩年前百萬紅衫軍群眾上街反貪倒扁遊行，遭到檢方以違反集遊法的罪名起訴，日昨台北地方法院合議庭宣判，施明德、簡錫?、魏千峰、范可欽、姚立明等十六人均無罪。正待立法院研議修法的集遊法，因為此項法院裁判，正好彰顯其已成為法治進步的絆腳石。
法院這項無罪判決，或許令一些法界人士感到意外，甚至超出諸多當事者的料想。此中對法治最大的挑戰，就是司法面對一部惡法，究竟該是以惡法亦法，還是惡法非法？這是在西方辯論達千年的法律哲學問題，必須要在法院法官決定什麼是「正義」的裁判過程中做取捨。本案由台北地院三位法官組成的合議庭做成的無罪判決，在判決當中含蓄地表達了集遊法可能是一部惡法，但應由立法院儘速從事修法審議，不應由個案審判的法院越俎代庖的意思。雖然本案中被告曾聲請大法官解釋集遊法違反憲法，地方法院並未停止訴訟程序；法官以保守而審慎的態度面對自身違憲審查功能，優先使用合憲解釋的方法處理惡法帶來的執法難題，但也不致違背司法交付正義裁判的責任。
集遊法是一部惡法，絕不只是來自輿論的輕率評價，而是政黨輪替的過程中，輪流下野的政黨異口同聲的指責。此法雖號稱是以保障集會遊行自由為其宗旨，卻設下種種技術障礙壓抑集會遊行活動，尤其以政治群眾集會遊行做為主要防範箝制的對象。此點在本案中展露無遺。法院認為主管機關以紅衫群眾活動具有政治意圖，與單純參與國慶活動有別，所以不許遊行。此一裁決不僅不符正當程序，也證實了現行集遊法下的執法行為，正是在限制政治意圖的遊行活動。一部不問手段是否和平，概以抑制政治意圖為能事的集遊法，當然牴觸了憲法保障集會遊行與言論自由的核心價值；說它是法治國家不容許存在的惡法，道理正在於此。
和平從事集會遊行，向政府或社會表達公民意見，是民主政治中必須受到尊重的正當活動。政府應主動提供適時且適當的場地促使集會遊行權利的和平行使。參加和平集會遊行的人數愈多，民主正當性愈益明顯；百萬人上街雖然必定使得執政者感到震懾，但是執政者的震懾，不是不許和平集會遊行的理由。紅衫群眾數以十萬、百萬計的人口幾度出現在台北街頭，每次又均能以和平的方式收場，其實堪稱大規模政治性集會遊行的成熟範例。若干技術性的違規舉動，充其量只該是施以行政罰而施以刑罰的理由。當年群眾對於執政者貪腐的抗議，未必非法否定執政者的合法統治；直到執政者下台之後，才有機會逐漸在司法的程序中驗證紅衫遊行控訴貪腐，既非空穴來風，也非杞人憂天。
現在如果貪腐的執政者尚未定罪，卻要用刑罰率先制裁和平遊行的抗議者，就足以證明集遊法確是一部絕不能見容於民主憲政的惡法了。
集遊惡法過去在法院的案例之中，受到惡法亦法的觀念作崇，曾使許多不該坐牢的人們坐牢，這次法院以清明的智慧，妥善運用比例原則，拒絕使用惡法繩之不該下獄的政治異議人士，是司法一次難得的擾亂反正。人們如果對於撐持民主憲政、保障基本權利、防止權力濫用的信念有所認識，就該給予極大的肯定，而不是帶著惡法亦惡的思想餘緒，質疑法院的判決，加深集遊惡法的政治罪孽。
地方法院的判決書寫得好，一面期待立法部門盡速審查集遊法的修正草案，一面提醒發起群眾集會遊行的社會意見領袖，瞭解群眾活動的不可預測性，應充分自制，配合維持社會秩序和平。言論自由與社會和平，是民主憲政保障集會遊行權利，可以兼得的魚與熊掌，集遊法見不及此，法院則持平穩重，發揮了司法正義應有的道德勇氣。希望立法院能在無罪判決聲中，見賢思齊，加速修法，結束集遊惡法肆虐的時代。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2009
Two years ago, one million people took to the streets to denounce corruption and demand that Ah-Bian step down. Prosecutors charged them with violating the Parade and Assembly Law. Yesterday the Taipei District Court Full Court pronounced Shih Ming-teh, Jane Tin-jie, Wei Qian Feng, Fan Ke-qin, Yao Li-ming, and 16 others not guilty. The legislature is considering amending the law. The court's ruling show how the Parade and Assembly Law has become an obstacle to the rule of law.
The court's not guilty ruling may have take some legal experts by surprise. They may even had take many of the defendants by surprise. One of the greatest challenges for the rule of law is the existence of a bad law. Is a bad law still the law? Or is a bad law not a law? In the West this philosophy of law dilemma has been debated for nearly a thousand years. Under such circumstances, judges must decide what constitutes a just ruling. In this case the Taipei District Court's three judges found the defendants not guilty. Their ruling implied that the Parade and Assembly Law was a bad law. But since the Legislative Yuan is amending the law, the trial court should not pre-empt it. Although the defendants asked the Grand Justices for a ruling on the constitutionality of the Parade and Assembly Law, the District Court did not stop its indictment proceedings. The judges adopted a conservative approach in dealing with their own constitutional review function. They dealt with the enforcement dilemma created by a bad law by presuming it was constitutional. They did not shirk their responsibility to be an impartial referee.
The Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law, not because some pundits have jumped to this conclusion, but ruling party succession leads to rival political parties taking turns making the identical accusations. Although this law purports to protect of freedom of assembly, it establishes all sorts of technical obstacles to freedome of assembly. In particular, it targets political rallies and marches. This case makes this unmistakably clear. The government agency in charge did not permit the Red Shirt Army to march because the Red Shirt Army had political motives, and was not merely participating in National Day celebrations. The agency's reasoning was inconsistent with due process. The way the Parade and Assembly Law is enforced makes it clear its intent was to limit political demonstrations. It doesn't matter if the demonstration is peaceful. Obviously a Parade and Assembly Law intended to suppress political expression conflicts with freedom of assembly and speech, core values guaranteed by the constitution. That is why the Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law that a nation under the rule of law cannot tolerate.
To peacefully assemble or march to express one's views about society or the government, is a legitimate activity that a democratic system must respect. Government should take the initiative to provide timely and appropriate venues for the public to peacefully exercise their right of public assembly. The more people assemble peacefully, the more obvious it is the system has political legitimacy. Millions of people taking to the streets may upset those in power. But those in power feeling upset is no reason to prohibit peaceful assembly. Over one million Red Shirt Army members repeatedly gathered on the streets of Taipei. Every time they concluded their activities peacefully. They were a model of mature large-scale political assembly. A handful of technical violations warrant, at best, a few fines. When the public protested against those in power, they weren't necessarily repudiating the lawful authority of the ruling administration. Once the ruling administration steps down, the Red Shirt Army's charges of corruption can be verified by means of the judicial process. Sure enough, their charges turned out to be neither groundless nor unfounded.
If corrupt rulers have yet to be convicted of corruption, yet the government suppresses peaceful protest, that proves the Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law that cannot be tolerated under constitutional government.
The courts once held that although the Parade and Assembly Law was a bad law, it was still the law. They imprisoned many people they shouldn't have. This time the court used its judgment. It applied the principle of proportionality. It refused to use a bad law to imprison political dissidents. It was a rare case of a double negative making a positive. If people understand how the protection of fundamental rights prevents the abuse of power and safeguards constitutional government. they will affirm the ruling. They will not challenge the court's decision. They will not cling to the outdated notion that a bad law is still the law. They will not prolong the political evil known as the Parade and Assembly Law.
The District Court ruling was well written. We look forward to the legislative branch reviewing and amending the Parade and Assembly Law as soon as possible. We would also remind public leaders that mass movements are unpredictable. Public leaders must exercise self-restraint, and help to maintain social order. Freedom of speech and social order are both rights protected by constitutional government. You can have your cake and eat it too. The court must stay the course, and have the guts to uphold justice. We hope the Legislative Yuan will follow the example set by the court when it acquitted the defendants. We hope it will swiftly pass an amendment, putting an end to the Parade and Assembly Law.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.23
社論－肯定一樁彰顯惡法非法的判決
本報訊
兩年前百萬紅衫軍群眾上街反貪倒扁遊行，遭到檢方以違反集遊法的罪名起訴，日昨台北地方法院合議庭宣判，施明德、簡錫?、魏千峰、范可欽、姚立明等十六人均無罪。正待立法院研議修法的集遊法，因為此項法院裁判，正好彰顯其已成為法治進步的絆腳石。
法院這項無罪判決，或許令一些法界人士感到意外，甚至超出諸多當事者的料想。此中對法治最大的挑戰，就是司法面對一部惡法，究竟該是以惡法亦法，還是惡法非法？這是在西方辯論達千年的法律哲學問題，必須要在法院法官決定什麼是「正義」的裁判過程中做取捨。本案由台北地院三位法官組成的合議庭做成的無罪判決，在判決當中含蓄地表達了集遊法可能是一部惡法，但應由立法院儘速從事修法審議，不應由個案審判的法院越俎代庖的意思。雖然本案中被告曾聲請大法官解釋集遊法違反憲法，地方法院並未停止訴訟程序；法官以保守而審慎的態度面對自身違憲審查功能，優先使用合憲解釋的方法處理惡法帶來的執法難題，但也不致違背司法交付正義裁判的責任。
集遊法是一部惡法，絕不只是來自輿論的輕率評價，而是政黨輪替的過程中，輪流下野的政黨異口同聲的指責。此法雖號稱是以保障集會遊行自由為其宗旨，卻設下種種技術障礙壓抑集會遊行活動，尤其以政治群眾集會遊行做為主要防範箝制的對象。此點在本案中展露無遺。法院認為主管機關以紅衫群眾活動具有政治意圖，與單純參與國慶活動有別，所以不許遊行。此一裁決不僅不符正當程序，也證實了現行集遊法下的執法行為，正是在限制政治意圖的遊行活動。一部不問手段是否和平，概以抑制政治意圖為能事的集遊法，當然牴觸了憲法保障集會遊行與言論自由的核心價值；說它是法治國家不容許存在的惡法，道理正在於此。
和平從事集會遊行，向政府或社會表達公民意見，是民主政治中必須受到尊重的正當活動。政府應主動提供適時且適當的場地促使集會遊行權利的和平行使。參加和平集會遊行的人數愈多，民主正當性愈益明顯；百萬人上街雖然必定使得執政者感到震懾，但是執政者的震懾，不是不許和平集會遊行的理由。紅衫群眾數以十萬、百萬計的人口幾度出現在台北街頭，每次又均能以和平的方式收場，其實堪稱大規模政治性集會遊行的成熟範例。若干技術性的違規舉動，充其量只該是施以行政罰而施以刑罰的理由。當年群眾對於執政者貪腐的抗議，未必非法否定執政者的合法統治；直到執政者下台之後，才有機會逐漸在司法的程序中驗證紅衫遊行控訴貪腐，既非空穴來風，也非杞人憂天。
現在如果貪腐的執政者尚未定罪，卻要用刑罰率先制裁和平遊行的抗議者，就足以證明集遊法確是一部絕不能見容於民主憲政的惡法了。
集遊惡法過去在法院的案例之中，受到惡法亦法的觀念作崇，曾使許多不該坐牢的人們坐牢，這次法院以清明的智慧，妥善運用比例原則，拒絕使用惡法繩之不該下獄的政治異議人士，是司法一次難得的擾亂反正。人們如果對於撐持民主憲政、保障基本權利、防止權力濫用的信念有所認識，就該給予極大的肯定，而不是帶著惡法亦惡的思想餘緒，質疑法院的判決，加深集遊惡法的政治罪孽。
地方法院的判決書寫得好，一面期待立法部門盡速審查集遊法的修正草案，一面提醒發起群眾集會遊行的社會意見領袖，瞭解群眾活動的不可預測性，應充分自制，配合維持社會秩序和平。言論自由與社會和平，是民主憲政保障集會遊行權利，可以兼得的魚與熊掌，集遊法見不及此，法院則持平穩重，發揮了司法正義應有的道德勇氣。希望立法院能在無罪判決聲中，見賢思齊，加速修法，結束集遊惡法肆虐的時代。
Friday, February 20, 2009
Are You Ready for A Long Dark Night?
Are You Ready for A Long Dark Night?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 20, 2009
We knew the numbers were not good. The economy experienced a significant 8.36% decline in the fourth quarter last year. This year's economic growth will be negative, and turn positive only in the fourth quarter. Growth for the year declined 2.97%. Nevertheless one cannot help being shocked at the seriousness of the crisis. Faced with this prolonged economic recession, the government must offer a more aggressive and comprehensive response.
The causes of the worst economic crisis in our history are obvious. The global economic crisis caused demand to disappear overnight. Taiwan's export-driven economy immediately dropped into an abyss. Exports have fallen dramatically. Profits and revenues have plummeted. Unemployment has risen. Unpaid leave is now common. This has led to the largest drop ever in private consumption and revenues. The future looks grim. Orders have evaporated. Private investment has been scaled back across the board.
Let's look at the numbers. January exports fell by 44.1%. Even discounting the effect of the Spring Festival, exports fell 34.9%. Exports are expected to fall by as much as 20% this year. Consumers may have 80 billion NT in consumer vouchers. But this year's growth rate is a mere 0.82%. Private investment is expected to fall 28%, having fallen over 40% in the first quarter.
Monetary policies such as interest rate cuts attempt to boost investment. Exchange rate policies such as currency devaluation attempt to promote exports. Consumer vouchers attempt to increase private consumption. But the impact of such policies is limited, because demand has evaporated. Currency devaluation cannot promote exports. The future looks grim. Zero interest rates cannot attract investments. Confidence has vanished. Once the consumer vouchers have been used up, private consumption will remain idle.
In other words, apart from the public sector, almost all economic growth has flamed out. How can one possibly be optimistic about the economy? Therefore, the government's responsibility is far greater than it was in the past. The effect of many policies may be just a drop in the bucket, but the government cannot refuse to act. Its actions must be more comprehensive and prudent. Only by doing the right thing when the economy has bottomed out, can it help the economy to rebound as soon as possible.
Interest rate cuts at a time like this cannot stimulate private investment. But at least they can give mortgage rates a breather. Allowing households to extend their mortgage policies will at least prevent the mortgage market from becoming another disaster area. Otherwise, mortgage defaults will surge. People will be left homeless, creating social problems. Large numbers of non-performing loans are another potentional landmine.
Currency devaluation cannot create foreign demand. But at least it can ensure that the most important engine of all, exports, will not simultaneous experience a sharp drop in demand. It will spare exports from a harsh exchange rate environment. According to domestic export forecasts for January, high tech products will decline. If the "Two Trillion, Twin Stars" industries, such as the LCD screen industry decline 70% or more, the entire DRAM industry will largely be done for.
The economic engine has flamed out. The most effective action the government can take is increase domestic demand, increase government procurement and public construction. It should do so promptly and aggressively. It should also vigorously promote economic openness and liberalization.
Faced with an unprecedented, protracted, and deep economic recession, the government must bolster the economy, creating a virtuous circle. Even more important, far more important than economic policy, is a comprehensive social safety net. Society must not be allowed to descend into chaos under the impact of this economic depression.
We have already seen a number of countries reel under the impact of the financial crisis. These include the comparatively backward economies of Latvia, Chile, Greece, and Iceland, where street protests have erupted. Waves of labor strikes have broken out in the Group of Seven, and even Britain and France. Dennis Blair, US Director of National Intelligence, warned that the economic turmoil triggered by the global economic crisis has become the United States' greatest security threat, more to be feared than terrorism.
People on Taiwan are good natured and rational. The rule of law is firmly established. The family structure remains strong. This enables family members to maintain a minimum standard of living during an economic downturn, when unemployment is on the rise. It can buffer some of the factors contributing to social unrest. The savings rate on Taiwan is high. This provides a certain amount of capital during a downturn. These are important assets during the global recession that will help maintain social order.
These are no guarantee that we will pass through the crisis without incident. If unemployment continues to surge, if people have no incomes, and even the basic cost of living increases, the result will be a decline in law and order. Even basic public safety will be difficult to maintain. The social structure is likely to collapse. Foreign investors will leave. Investments will vanish. The economy will be in serious trouble.
This chances of this worst case scenario happening on Taiwan is not high. But the government must take preventive measures. It must build a better social safety net, thereby stabilizing society and allowing everyone to safely pass through the storm. This is something the government must do. It may require substantial resources. But it is essential. Therefore the government must make prudent use of its resources, it must not throw money about, squandering precious resources.
DGBAS forecasts five consecutive quarters of negative growth. This will be the longest period of economic darkness in recorded history. Clearly we are in for a long, dark night. We can only bite the bullet and stay the course. Is the government ready? Can it lead? Can it help the people safely make it through this long dark night?
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.20
社論－漫漫長夜 準備好了嗎
本報訊
雖然早知道數字不會好看，但當看到台灣經濟去年第四季大幅衰退八．三六％，今年經濟將一路負成長到第四季才能轉正，全年衰退二．九七％的數字時，仍不得不震撼於這波海嘯的恐怖與嚴重。面對這波最嚴重且長期的經濟衰退，政府是該有更積極而全面的作為了。
這波台灣史上「最衰」的經濟情勢，成因很明顯：全球金融海嘯造成需求一夕消失，以出口帶動經濟的台灣，立即掉入深淵。出口大減，企業營收獲利大降、失業上升，無薪假遍及各企業，結果，另一個影響經濟最鉅的民間消費也銳減。而前景看空、訂單茫茫，民間投資當然也全面縮手。
看看數據吧！台灣一月出口衰退四四．一％，扣除春節因素後仍衰退三四．九％。預估今年全年出口要衰退二成之多。民間消費即使有八百億元的消費券力拉，今年成長率只有○．八二％。民間投資預估全年衰退二八％，第一季更是一口氣掉了四成之多。
此時不論是降息的貨幣政策，希望拉抬投資；或是貶值的匯率政策，想推出口一把；或甚至如消費券等增加民間消費等作法，能達到的效果都非常有限。因為，需求不見了，貶值也喚不回出口；前景暗淡，零利率也難拉回投資；信心沒了，消費券結束後，民間消費也只能持續低檔徘徊。
也就是說，除了政府公部門，幾乎所有的經濟成長引擎全部熄火，經濟怎麼可能會好？因此，政府的責任，將數倍於過去。雖然各項政策的效果可能都杯水車薪，但政府不能無作為，而是更要全面、審慎的去作。在景氣谷底時作對的事，才能讓台灣及早反彈走出衰退。
降息，固然在此時喚不回民間投資，但至少讓廣大的房貸戶喘口氣，加上各項讓房貸戶寬延展期的政策，至少避免房貸市場成為另一個重災區。否則，房貸違約率大增，不僅讓自住者流離失所、產生社會問題，大量呆帳湧入銀行，更是一個大地雷。
貶值，無法創造國外需求，但至少讓出口這個最重要的引擎，不會在需求銳減的同時，還要接受匯率較競爭對手國「不具競爭力」的殘酷環境。看一月的出口值中，各項科技產品的衰退幅度，如兩兆雙星的液晶螢幕衰退七成多等，ＤＲＡＭ則幾乎整個產業都快掛了。
在經濟引擎全面熄火之際，政府最能控制且發揮直接效益的，就是擴大內需、增加政府採購與公共建設，這都應積極、加速推動；而開放與自由化，也應持續而更大幅度的推動。
在面臨前所未有、既深且長的經濟衰退期，政府不僅要在經濟政策面努力支撐經濟，將經濟推向良性循環面，更重要─而且遠比經濟政策更重要的是：要有「全面性的社會關照」，絕對不能讓台灣社會，在這波經濟蕭條打擊下，陷入紛亂。
我們已經看到不少國家在金融海嘯衝擊下引發動亂。從經濟相對較落後的拉脫維亞、南美智利，到歐洲的希臘、冰島，都出現抗議活動；甚至七大工業國英、法，都出現罷工抗議潮。美國全球情報總監布萊爾日前才警告說，全球經濟危機引發的經濟動亂，已超過恐怖主義，成為美國面臨最大的安全威脅。
台灣人溫厚理性，法治有一定基礎；社會上的家庭結構仍強，可在景氣低迷、失業升高之際，容納家族成員，支持其基本生活，因而能吸收掉一定程度的動亂因子；經濟上台灣人的儲蓄率亦高，對抗不景氣有一定的資本。這些都是台灣在這波全球蕭條中，保持社會安定重要的資本。
但這不代表台灣社會就一定能安度危機。如果失業率持續飆漲、社會上無收入、基本生活都匱乏者大增，結果必然是：治安大壞，一般民眾連基本安全、安定的生活都難以維持，社會結構即可能崩解；然後是外資與外人撤離、投資消失，經濟更陷入困境。
這種「最壞的結果」，在台灣發生的機率也許不高，但我們仍提醒政府，應特別防患於未然。也因此，架構更完善的社會安全網，以穩定社會，讓全民安度海嘯，是政府刻不容緩的課題。這部分也許需要相當龐大的財政支持，但絕對有必要。也因此，政府更該審慎使用資源，切勿散彈亂發、浪費資源。
這波衰退，主計處預估會有連續五季負成長，創下史上最長的經濟黑暗期，顯然，這是一個漫漫長夜，全民只能咬牙共度黑夜。但，政府相關主事者，準備好了嗎？能否帶領、呵護著全民共同平安的度過這個長夜呢？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 20, 2009
We knew the numbers were not good. The economy experienced a significant 8.36% decline in the fourth quarter last year. This year's economic growth will be negative, and turn positive only in the fourth quarter. Growth for the year declined 2.97%. Nevertheless one cannot help being shocked at the seriousness of the crisis. Faced with this prolonged economic recession, the government must offer a more aggressive and comprehensive response.
The causes of the worst economic crisis in our history are obvious. The global economic crisis caused demand to disappear overnight. Taiwan's export-driven economy immediately dropped into an abyss. Exports have fallen dramatically. Profits and revenues have plummeted. Unemployment has risen. Unpaid leave is now common. This has led to the largest drop ever in private consumption and revenues. The future looks grim. Orders have evaporated. Private investment has been scaled back across the board.
Let's look at the numbers. January exports fell by 44.1%. Even discounting the effect of the Spring Festival, exports fell 34.9%. Exports are expected to fall by as much as 20% this year. Consumers may have 80 billion NT in consumer vouchers. But this year's growth rate is a mere 0.82%. Private investment is expected to fall 28%, having fallen over 40% in the first quarter.
Monetary policies such as interest rate cuts attempt to boost investment. Exchange rate policies such as currency devaluation attempt to promote exports. Consumer vouchers attempt to increase private consumption. But the impact of such policies is limited, because demand has evaporated. Currency devaluation cannot promote exports. The future looks grim. Zero interest rates cannot attract investments. Confidence has vanished. Once the consumer vouchers have been used up, private consumption will remain idle.
In other words, apart from the public sector, almost all economic growth has flamed out. How can one possibly be optimistic about the economy? Therefore, the government's responsibility is far greater than it was in the past. The effect of many policies may be just a drop in the bucket, but the government cannot refuse to act. Its actions must be more comprehensive and prudent. Only by doing the right thing when the economy has bottomed out, can it help the economy to rebound as soon as possible.
Interest rate cuts at a time like this cannot stimulate private investment. But at least they can give mortgage rates a breather. Allowing households to extend their mortgage policies will at least prevent the mortgage market from becoming another disaster area. Otherwise, mortgage defaults will surge. People will be left homeless, creating social problems. Large numbers of non-performing loans are another potentional landmine.
Currency devaluation cannot create foreign demand. But at least it can ensure that the most important engine of all, exports, will not simultaneous experience a sharp drop in demand. It will spare exports from a harsh exchange rate environment. According to domestic export forecasts for January, high tech products will decline. If the "Two Trillion, Twin Stars" industries, such as the LCD screen industry decline 70% or more, the entire DRAM industry will largely be done for.
The economic engine has flamed out. The most effective action the government can take is increase domestic demand, increase government procurement and public construction. It should do so promptly and aggressively. It should also vigorously promote economic openness and liberalization.
Faced with an unprecedented, protracted, and deep economic recession, the government must bolster the economy, creating a virtuous circle. Even more important, far more important than economic policy, is a comprehensive social safety net. Society must not be allowed to descend into chaos under the impact of this economic depression.
We have already seen a number of countries reel under the impact of the financial crisis. These include the comparatively backward economies of Latvia, Chile, Greece, and Iceland, where street protests have erupted. Waves of labor strikes have broken out in the Group of Seven, and even Britain and France. Dennis Blair, US Director of National Intelligence, warned that the economic turmoil triggered by the global economic crisis has become the United States' greatest security threat, more to be feared than terrorism.
People on Taiwan are good natured and rational. The rule of law is firmly established. The family structure remains strong. This enables family members to maintain a minimum standard of living during an economic downturn, when unemployment is on the rise. It can buffer some of the factors contributing to social unrest. The savings rate on Taiwan is high. This provides a certain amount of capital during a downturn. These are important assets during the global recession that will help maintain social order.
These are no guarantee that we will pass through the crisis without incident. If unemployment continues to surge, if people have no incomes, and even the basic cost of living increases, the result will be a decline in law and order. Even basic public safety will be difficult to maintain. The social structure is likely to collapse. Foreign investors will leave. Investments will vanish. The economy will be in serious trouble.
This chances of this worst case scenario happening on Taiwan is not high. But the government must take preventive measures. It must build a better social safety net, thereby stabilizing society and allowing everyone to safely pass through the storm. This is something the government must do. It may require substantial resources. But it is essential. Therefore the government must make prudent use of its resources, it must not throw money about, squandering precious resources.
DGBAS forecasts five consecutive quarters of negative growth. This will be the longest period of economic darkness in recorded history. Clearly we are in for a long, dark night. We can only bite the bullet and stay the course. Is the government ready? Can it lead? Can it help the people safely make it through this long dark night?
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.20
社論－漫漫長夜 準備好了嗎
本報訊
雖然早知道數字不會好看，但當看到台灣經濟去年第四季大幅衰退八．三六％，今年經濟將一路負成長到第四季才能轉正，全年衰退二．九七％的數字時，仍不得不震撼於這波海嘯的恐怖與嚴重。面對這波最嚴重且長期的經濟衰退，政府是該有更積極而全面的作為了。
這波台灣史上「最衰」的經濟情勢，成因很明顯：全球金融海嘯造成需求一夕消失，以出口帶動經濟的台灣，立即掉入深淵。出口大減，企業營收獲利大降、失業上升，無薪假遍及各企業，結果，另一個影響經濟最鉅的民間消費也銳減。而前景看空、訂單茫茫，民間投資當然也全面縮手。
看看數據吧！台灣一月出口衰退四四．一％，扣除春節因素後仍衰退三四．九％。預估今年全年出口要衰退二成之多。民間消費即使有八百億元的消費券力拉，今年成長率只有○．八二％。民間投資預估全年衰退二八％，第一季更是一口氣掉了四成之多。
此時不論是降息的貨幣政策，希望拉抬投資；或是貶值的匯率政策，想推出口一把；或甚至如消費券等增加民間消費等作法，能達到的效果都非常有限。因為，需求不見了，貶值也喚不回出口；前景暗淡，零利率也難拉回投資；信心沒了，消費券結束後，民間消費也只能持續低檔徘徊。
也就是說，除了政府公部門，幾乎所有的經濟成長引擎全部熄火，經濟怎麼可能會好？因此，政府的責任，將數倍於過去。雖然各項政策的效果可能都杯水車薪，但政府不能無作為，而是更要全面、審慎的去作。在景氣谷底時作對的事，才能讓台灣及早反彈走出衰退。
降息，固然在此時喚不回民間投資，但至少讓廣大的房貸戶喘口氣，加上各項讓房貸戶寬延展期的政策，至少避免房貸市場成為另一個重災區。否則，房貸違約率大增，不僅讓自住者流離失所、產生社會問題，大量呆帳湧入銀行，更是一個大地雷。
貶值，無法創造國外需求，但至少讓出口這個最重要的引擎，不會在需求銳減的同時，還要接受匯率較競爭對手國「不具競爭力」的殘酷環境。看一月的出口值中，各項科技產品的衰退幅度，如兩兆雙星的液晶螢幕衰退七成多等，ＤＲＡＭ則幾乎整個產業都快掛了。
在經濟引擎全面熄火之際，政府最能控制且發揮直接效益的，就是擴大內需、增加政府採購與公共建設，這都應積極、加速推動；而開放與自由化，也應持續而更大幅度的推動。
在面臨前所未有、既深且長的經濟衰退期，政府不僅要在經濟政策面努力支撐經濟，將經濟推向良性循環面，更重要─而且遠比經濟政策更重要的是：要有「全面性的社會關照」，絕對不能讓台灣社會，在這波經濟蕭條打擊下，陷入紛亂。
我們已經看到不少國家在金融海嘯衝擊下引發動亂。從經濟相對較落後的拉脫維亞、南美智利，到歐洲的希臘、冰島，都出現抗議活動；甚至七大工業國英、法，都出現罷工抗議潮。美國全球情報總監布萊爾日前才警告說，全球經濟危機引發的經濟動亂，已超過恐怖主義，成為美國面臨最大的安全威脅。
台灣人溫厚理性，法治有一定基礎；社會上的家庭結構仍強，可在景氣低迷、失業升高之際，容納家族成員，支持其基本生活，因而能吸收掉一定程度的動亂因子；經濟上台灣人的儲蓄率亦高，對抗不景氣有一定的資本。這些都是台灣在這波全球蕭條中，保持社會安定重要的資本。
但這不代表台灣社會就一定能安度危機。如果失業率持續飆漲、社會上無收入、基本生活都匱乏者大增，結果必然是：治安大壞，一般民眾連基本安全、安定的生活都難以維持，社會結構即可能崩解；然後是外資與外人撤離、投資消失，經濟更陷入困境。
這種「最壞的結果」，在台灣發生的機率也許不高，但我們仍提醒政府，應特別防患於未然。也因此，架構更完善的社會安全網，以穩定社會，讓全民安度海嘯，是政府刻不容緩的課題。這部分也許需要相當龐大的財政支持，但絕對有必要。也因此，政府更該審慎使用資源，切勿散彈亂發、浪費資源。
這波衰退，主計處預估會有連續五季負成長，創下史上最長的經濟黑暗期，顯然，這是一個漫漫長夜，全民只能咬牙共度黑夜。但，政府相關主事者，準備好了嗎？能否帶領、呵護著全民共同平安的度過這個長夜呢？
Thursday, February 19, 2009
If the Mountain Won't Come to Ma, Ma Must Go to the Mountain
If the Mountain Won't Come to Ma, Ma Must Go to the Mountain
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 19, 2009
This weekend the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) will hold a "People's Conference on National Affairs." DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen extended an invitation to President Ma Ying-jeou, and helpfully added, "If President Ma doesn't attend, then he is refusing to listen to the voice of the people." "If the Ma administration refuses to listen to the voice of the people, then it will be difficult to prevent the people from taking to the streets."
Chairman Tsai's declaration was a tad domineering in its tone. It even carried a veiled threat. Whether the conference will even achieve its expected goals remains in doubt. Nevertheless since the DPP has already offered him an invitation, President Ma may as well accept, demonstrating the magnanimity of a national leader.
Nineteen years ago, Lee Teng-hui responsed to public calls for reform. He wanted to use public opinion against conservative forces within the KMT. That led him to hold the first of such conferences. At the time, the DPP underwent heated internal debates on whether to participate. Huang Hsin-chieh and other moderates agreed to take part. Chiou I-jen and others who believed in working outside the system vehemently refused.
The ruling and opposition party members taking part in the Conference on National Affairs that year had different long term goals. But because they shared a common premise, they transformed the conference into an engine for democratic reform. They facilitated the direct election of the president and other major constitutional reforms.
Although his successor President Chen Shui-bian never convened a Conference on National Affairs, during his term of office he sponsored two National Finance Conferences, with the intention of imitating Lee Teng-hui. Responding to calls for him to rescue the economy, he invited ruling and opposition party leaders. But Chen Shui-bian betrayed the people's expectations. Neither National Finance Conference yielded any results. Cross-strait direct links and other major resolutions were shelved for eight years. They were realized only after the Ma Ying-jeou administration took over. The Second Financial Reform Program was a giant mess, left behind by the Chen administration.
Two former presidents held large scale Conferences on National Affairs. Evaluations of their worth have varied since they were first held. People differ on whether such political rituals as Conferences on National Affairs have any practical function. But the Republic of China now finds itself in a social and economic bind seldom seen in a hundred years. The public wants the ruling and opposition parties to work together, more urgently than ever. We recommend that President Ma attend the Conference on National Affairs, for the following five reasons.
One. The so-called People's Conference on National Affairs, is something ruling KMT leaders should have organized. They should have reached out to opposition parties. But since the DPP has already taken the initiative to hold such a conference, and to extend an open invitation to President Ma Ying-jeou, he might as well take advantage of it and attend. The conference would then be upgraded and integrated into the nation's political institutions. He would avoid giving offense and becoming a laughing stock. By listening to the people he would also display the magnanimity appropriate for a head of state.
Two. When Lee Teng-hui convened his Conference on National Affairs he needed outside assistance. He need people such as the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen, who wants to effect reforms. Lee Teng-hui was not afraid the Democratic Progressive Party would gain political status as a result of the Conference on National Affairs. Ma Ying-jeou has the support of a supermajority in the legislature. He need not worry that attending an event organized by Tsai Ing-wen will increase her power and prestige. President Ma should actively help the moderates within the Democratic Progressive Party. He should allow them to emerge from the shadows of the past, and to take a more moderate path.
Three. Since Chairperson Tsai has invited President President Ma to the event, he is the guest. She must therefore treat him as the president. She may not allow him to be treated disrespectfully or to be embarrassed. To do so would amount to a serious breach of etiquette, and she would find it hard to escape severe public condemnation.
Four. President Ma has never been much of a communicator. Whether the communication is intraparty or interparty, his record has been nothing to boast about. He has repeatedly invited Chairperson Tsai to the Presidential Palace to exchange views, to hold a "Two Yings Conference." But he always left the impression he was being condescending. Today, the mountain will not come to Ma. Therefore Ma must go to the mountain. He should personally attend the Conference on National Affairs. If Chairman Tsai refuses to open channels of communication with him, she will be the one to lose popular support.
Five. The government has prepared a number of programs to rescue the economy. But not one of them involved consultation with other parties. This Conference on National Affairs adresses financial and economic issues. Both the DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union are political parties within the system. If President Ma takes part in the Conference on National Affairs, the event will be seen as something contained within the system. It will reinforce the notion that the conclusions of the conference should be dealt with within the system. It may remedy many of the shortcomings in interparty programs intended to rescue the economy.
Entering an opposition party's conference is not that difficult. Reaching out to one's opponents in good faith is not that embarrassing. Listening to voices critical of oneself is not that distressing. President Ma should perceive the invitation as a rare opportunity, and calmly attend. Because when an opposition party invites the president to take part in a People's Conference on National Affairs President Ma can respond from his exalted position as head of state. If the mountain will not come to Ma, then Ma must go to the mountain.
給馬總統的建議：喚山不來則就山
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.19 04:04 am
民進黨與台聯將在周末舉行「民間國是會議」，蔡英文主席邀請馬總統與會；並謂：「如果馬總統不來，就是拒絕人民心聲。」「倘若馬政府不聆聽民意，群眾運動將很難避免。」
蔡主席的話雖略嫌霸氣，也不無威脅之意，而此次會議究竟能達成多少預期目標，甚至有沒有所謂的預期目標，也仍令人存疑；但即便如此，我們仍建議馬總統：民進黨既已遞出邀請函，馬總統即何妨堂堂皇皇欣然赴會，展現國家領導人廓然大公的氣度與高度。
十九年前，李登輝為回應民間改革期望，並欲藉民意壓制國民黨內的保守勢力，曾首度召開國是會議；當時民進黨內部為了應否參加也曾有過激烈爭論，最後黃信介等溫和派人士答應與會，邱義仁等主張體制外路線者則強烈反對。
當年參加國是會議的朝野人士，理念未盡相同，終極目標也可能有異，但在民主化改革的共同認知前提下，卻讓那次國是會議變成了改革台灣民主體制的發動機，推動完成了總統直選等重大的憲政改革工作。
繼任的陳水扁總統雖未召開過國是會議，但他任內舉辦的兩次全國財經會議，目的即在仿效李登輝，以廣邀朝野人士出席會議的形式回應民意對他拚經濟的呼籲。但陳水扁在會後卻背棄了民意期待，兩次財經會議幾乎無一項決議落實，兩岸直航三通等重大共識，擱置了八年後才由馬英九政府逐一實現，二次金改更成為扁政府遺留下來的大爛攤子。
前兩任總統為討論國是而召開大型會議，雖在當時與後來都有不同評價；對國是會議這個政治儀式到底能有多少實質功能，也一向有仁智之見；但台灣現今處於百年罕遇的社會經濟困境，期許朝野攜手可謂比任何時候更加迫切，因此我們建議馬總統能出席民間國是會議。理由有五點：
其一，所謂的國是會議，本應由執政的政府領導人號召籌辦，並主動向在野黨伸出和解之手；但民進黨現在既已主動舉辦，並公開邀請馬總統與會，馬總統若能借力使力，應邀出席，亦可將此次會議提升至國家民主機制的高度。既不會因婉拒失禮而落人話柄，又可展現國家元首願意聆聽多元民意的民主風度。
其二，當年李登輝召開國是會議時需要黨外的奧援，如今有意改革民進黨的蔡英文，也同樣需要黨外奧援。李登輝當年不怕民進黨因國是會議而抬高身價，馬英九如今執政已握有國會絕對多數，更不可能擔心替蔡英文「站台」而長她威風；馬總統甚至更應積極促成民進黨內溫和派的壯大，讓他們走出過去的陰影，邁向中道路線。
其三，蔡主席既邀馬總統為座上賓，來者是客，就理當以總統規格相待，絕不至於令會場上出現讓國家元首難堪的場面，否則不但嚴重失禮，也難逃輿論的嚴厲譴責。
其四，馬總統一向不是個稱職的「溝通者」，不論黨內溝通或黨際溝通，紀錄都乏善可陳。他雖多次邀蔡主席入府晤談，想促成「雙英會」，卻總給人居高臨下的感覺；如今若能「喚山不來則就山」，親赴民間國是會議，屆時蔡主席若再拒絕打開溝通管道，恐難獲民意認同。
其五，政府雖已擬訂了無數個金額動輒百億千億的救經濟方案，但其中無一項方案是依跨黨派決策過程所形成。此次民間國是會議排定的均屬財經民生議題，且民進黨與台聯均屬體制內政黨；馬總統參加民間國是會議，允宜以民主體制會議視之，再則對會中見解也應以體制內意見處理，或可補各種救經濟方案中跨黨派內涵略嫌不足的缺憾。
走進在野黨主場的會議，沒那麼困難；向反對自己的人伸出善意的手，沒那麼難堪；耳聽此起彼落批判自己的聲音，也沒那麼窘迫。馬總統不妨視此次邀請為難得的機遇，磊落從容地應邀出席；因為，當在野黨邀請總統參加民間國是會議，馬總統自當以國家元首的高度給予回應。喚山不來則就山！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 19, 2009
This weekend the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) will hold a "People's Conference on National Affairs." DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen extended an invitation to President Ma Ying-jeou, and helpfully added, "If President Ma doesn't attend, then he is refusing to listen to the voice of the people." "If the Ma administration refuses to listen to the voice of the people, then it will be difficult to prevent the people from taking to the streets."
Chairman Tsai's declaration was a tad domineering in its tone. It even carried a veiled threat. Whether the conference will even achieve its expected goals remains in doubt. Nevertheless since the DPP has already offered him an invitation, President Ma may as well accept, demonstrating the magnanimity of a national leader.
Nineteen years ago, Lee Teng-hui responsed to public calls for reform. He wanted to use public opinion against conservative forces within the KMT. That led him to hold the first of such conferences. At the time, the DPP underwent heated internal debates on whether to participate. Huang Hsin-chieh and other moderates agreed to take part. Chiou I-jen and others who believed in working outside the system vehemently refused.
The ruling and opposition party members taking part in the Conference on National Affairs that year had different long term goals. But because they shared a common premise, they transformed the conference into an engine for democratic reform. They facilitated the direct election of the president and other major constitutional reforms.
Although his successor President Chen Shui-bian never convened a Conference on National Affairs, during his term of office he sponsored two National Finance Conferences, with the intention of imitating Lee Teng-hui. Responding to calls for him to rescue the economy, he invited ruling and opposition party leaders. But Chen Shui-bian betrayed the people's expectations. Neither National Finance Conference yielded any results. Cross-strait direct links and other major resolutions were shelved for eight years. They were realized only after the Ma Ying-jeou administration took over. The Second Financial Reform Program was a giant mess, left behind by the Chen administration.
Two former presidents held large scale Conferences on National Affairs. Evaluations of their worth have varied since they were first held. People differ on whether such political rituals as Conferences on National Affairs have any practical function. But the Republic of China now finds itself in a social and economic bind seldom seen in a hundred years. The public wants the ruling and opposition parties to work together, more urgently than ever. We recommend that President Ma attend the Conference on National Affairs, for the following five reasons.
One. The so-called People's Conference on National Affairs, is something ruling KMT leaders should have organized. They should have reached out to opposition parties. But since the DPP has already taken the initiative to hold such a conference, and to extend an open invitation to President Ma Ying-jeou, he might as well take advantage of it and attend. The conference would then be upgraded and integrated into the nation's political institutions. He would avoid giving offense and becoming a laughing stock. By listening to the people he would also display the magnanimity appropriate for a head of state.
Two. When Lee Teng-hui convened his Conference on National Affairs he needed outside assistance. He need people such as the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen, who wants to effect reforms. Lee Teng-hui was not afraid the Democratic Progressive Party would gain political status as a result of the Conference on National Affairs. Ma Ying-jeou has the support of a supermajority in the legislature. He need not worry that attending an event organized by Tsai Ing-wen will increase her power and prestige. President Ma should actively help the moderates within the Democratic Progressive Party. He should allow them to emerge from the shadows of the past, and to take a more moderate path.
Three. Since Chairperson Tsai has invited President President Ma to the event, he is the guest. She must therefore treat him as the president. She may not allow him to be treated disrespectfully or to be embarrassed. To do so would amount to a serious breach of etiquette, and she would find it hard to escape severe public condemnation.
Four. President Ma has never been much of a communicator. Whether the communication is intraparty or interparty, his record has been nothing to boast about. He has repeatedly invited Chairperson Tsai to the Presidential Palace to exchange views, to hold a "Two Yings Conference." But he always left the impression he was being condescending. Today, the mountain will not come to Ma. Therefore Ma must go to the mountain. He should personally attend the Conference on National Affairs. If Chairman Tsai refuses to open channels of communication with him, she will be the one to lose popular support.
Five. The government has prepared a number of programs to rescue the economy. But not one of them involved consultation with other parties. This Conference on National Affairs adresses financial and economic issues. Both the DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union are political parties within the system. If President Ma takes part in the Conference on National Affairs, the event will be seen as something contained within the system. It will reinforce the notion that the conclusions of the conference should be dealt with within the system. It may remedy many of the shortcomings in interparty programs intended to rescue the economy.
Entering an opposition party's conference is not that difficult. Reaching out to one's opponents in good faith is not that embarrassing. Listening to voices critical of oneself is not that distressing. President Ma should perceive the invitation as a rare opportunity, and calmly attend. Because when an opposition party invites the president to take part in a People's Conference on National Affairs President Ma can respond from his exalted position as head of state. If the mountain will not come to Ma, then Ma must go to the mountain.
給馬總統的建議：喚山不來則就山
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.19 04:04 am
民進黨與台聯將在周末舉行「民間國是會議」，蔡英文主席邀請馬總統與會；並謂：「如果馬總統不來，就是拒絕人民心聲。」「倘若馬政府不聆聽民意，群眾運動將很難避免。」
蔡主席的話雖略嫌霸氣，也不無威脅之意，而此次會議究竟能達成多少預期目標，甚至有沒有所謂的預期目標，也仍令人存疑；但即便如此，我們仍建議馬總統：民進黨既已遞出邀請函，馬總統即何妨堂堂皇皇欣然赴會，展現國家領導人廓然大公的氣度與高度。
十九年前，李登輝為回應民間改革期望，並欲藉民意壓制國民黨內的保守勢力，曾首度召開國是會議；當時民進黨內部為了應否參加也曾有過激烈爭論，最後黃信介等溫和派人士答應與會，邱義仁等主張體制外路線者則強烈反對。
當年參加國是會議的朝野人士，理念未盡相同，終極目標也可能有異，但在民主化改革的共同認知前提下，卻讓那次國是會議變成了改革台灣民主體制的發動機，推動完成了總統直選等重大的憲政改革工作。
繼任的陳水扁總統雖未召開過國是會議，但他任內舉辦的兩次全國財經會議，目的即在仿效李登輝，以廣邀朝野人士出席會議的形式回應民意對他拚經濟的呼籲。但陳水扁在會後卻背棄了民意期待，兩次財經會議幾乎無一項決議落實，兩岸直航三通等重大共識，擱置了八年後才由馬英九政府逐一實現，二次金改更成為扁政府遺留下來的大爛攤子。
前兩任總統為討論國是而召開大型會議，雖在當時與後來都有不同評價；對國是會議這個政治儀式到底能有多少實質功能，也一向有仁智之見；但台灣現今處於百年罕遇的社會經濟困境，期許朝野攜手可謂比任何時候更加迫切，因此我們建議馬總統能出席民間國是會議。理由有五點：
其一，所謂的國是會議，本應由執政的政府領導人號召籌辦，並主動向在野黨伸出和解之手；但民進黨現在既已主動舉辦，並公開邀請馬總統與會，馬總統若能借力使力，應邀出席，亦可將此次會議提升至國家民主機制的高度。既不會因婉拒失禮而落人話柄，又可展現國家元首願意聆聽多元民意的民主風度。
其二，當年李登輝召開國是會議時需要黨外的奧援，如今有意改革民進黨的蔡英文，也同樣需要黨外奧援。李登輝當年不怕民進黨因國是會議而抬高身價，馬英九如今執政已握有國會絕對多數，更不可能擔心替蔡英文「站台」而長她威風；馬總統甚至更應積極促成民進黨內溫和派的壯大，讓他們走出過去的陰影，邁向中道路線。
其三，蔡主席既邀馬總統為座上賓，來者是客，就理當以總統規格相待，絕不至於令會場上出現讓國家元首難堪的場面，否則不但嚴重失禮，也難逃輿論的嚴厲譴責。
其四，馬總統一向不是個稱職的「溝通者」，不論黨內溝通或黨際溝通，紀錄都乏善可陳。他雖多次邀蔡主席入府晤談，想促成「雙英會」，卻總給人居高臨下的感覺；如今若能「喚山不來則就山」，親赴民間國是會議，屆時蔡主席若再拒絕打開溝通管道，恐難獲民意認同。
其五，政府雖已擬訂了無數個金額動輒百億千億的救經濟方案，但其中無一項方案是依跨黨派決策過程所形成。此次民間國是會議排定的均屬財經民生議題，且民進黨與台聯均屬體制內政黨；馬總統參加民間國是會議，允宜以民主體制會議視之，再則對會中見解也應以體制內意見處理，或可補各種救經濟方案中跨黨派內涵略嫌不足的缺憾。
走進在野黨主場的會議，沒那麼困難；向反對自己的人伸出善意的手，沒那麼難堪；耳聽此起彼落批判自己的聲音，也沒那麼窘迫。馬總統不妨視此次邀請為難得的機遇，磊落從容地應邀出席；因為，當在野黨邀請總統參加民間國是會議，馬總統自當以國家元首的高度給予回應。喚山不來則就山！
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
ProMOS vs. National Health Insurance
ProMOS vs. National Health Insurance:
How the Government Treats Big Business Differently Than Ordinary Citizen
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 18, 2009
Banks have agreed to loan ProMOS Technologies three billion NT. That was a first step in providing relief to the DRAM industry. On the same day, the Department of Health announced its "Health Care Reform Program." It would impose a "National Health Insurance Tax" on over two million people, to compensate for the Bureau of National Health Insurance deficit. These two seemingly unrelated events revealed the vast difference in the government's attitude toward Big Business and the ordinary citizen.
The DRAM industry has suffered hundreds of billions of dollars in losses. For the past few months, everyone including the President, the Premier, and the Minister of Economic Affairs, has promised to rescue the industry, and even promised hundreds of billions in National Development Funds to rebuild the industry. The government's concern for Big Business truly is all-encompassing. By contrast, the government wants to levy a National Health Insurance Tax on ordinary citizens who earn over 180,000 NT by moonlighting. It neither consulted the public before implementing this policy, nor explained its decision. It simply went ahead and did it. It immediately butchered the fatted calf it had selected. The Department of Health even had the chutzpah to refer to their callous move as "Health Care Reform."
Both the DRAM industry and health care involve deficits. But when large private sector businesses lose hundreds of billions, the government immediately offers relief. When the Bureau of National Health Insurance loses 20 billion, the government doesn't consider how to improve the system in order to control costs. Instead, it immediately reaches into the pockets of ordinary citizens to make up the shortfall. It bows and scrapes before Big Business. It looks down its nose at the little guy. Is this how a democratic government is supposed to treat its citizens, according to economic or social class?
Whether the government should ought to relief for ailing industries and whether it is obligated to ensure the solvency of the health care system are different matters. They require different solutions. It is not our intention to conflate the two. What we want to point out is that the government treats Big Business and the little guy very differently. From the perspective of social justice, this is intolerable.
The DRAM industry is important. But many DRAM companies have flatly refused to go along with the Ministry of Economic Affairs industry consolidation plan. The government's intervention has not been welcomed, and has been an exercise in frustration. By contrast, the National Health Insurance was originally supposed to be a health insurance policy. Yet the government has redefined it as social welfare. Everyone receives the same health care. Yet the government has continually raised the rates for users to make up for its own inability to fulfill its committments. Is this reasonable?
Look at some recent examples. Bank deposit interest rates are now close to zero. Yet bank credit card interest rates run as high as 20%. This is sheer exploitation, no different than loan-sharking. Last year, after FSC consultation, most banks grudgingly lowered their rates one or two percentage points. They were clearly going through the motions, and were still exploiting consumers. The banks are arrogant because the government has spoiled them for much too long. When the Special Investigation Unit investigated the Second Financial Reform scandal, it discovered that many banks resorted to bribery. By currying favor with Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen, they hoped to gain an edge over competitors during their acquisition efforts. Unfortunately, prosecutors are frightened of financial consortia. During their interrogations they dared not dig too deep. They merely went through the motions. Do the two examples we have examined, not confirm that the government bows and scrapes before financial consortia, but looks down its nose at ordinary citizens?
Taiwan's DRAM industry, is a monster created by the Chen administration, the product of "Two Trillion, Twin Stars" and anabolic steroids. Too many companies crowd the field, too much capital has been invested, and the technology is too heterogeneous. These companies are saddled with 400 billion in loans. They cannot produce efficiently, are underutilized, and lose money. The government can sink billions into them. They can help them squeak by, for now. But if they do not undergo radical restructuring, they will still be unable to compete with South Korea.
The best thing the government can do is to allow the market to eliminate the unfit. Natural selection will leave the strong standing, allowing them become the backbone of the industry. This way, Taiwan's DRAM industry will not collapse or disappear. It will fortify itself from within. Germany's Qimonda has declared bankruptcy, temporarily reducing pressure on the global DRAM industry. This is a good example of market selection. But if our government intervenes, if officials shoot off their mouths, not only will they provoke market speculation, they will throw a monkeywrench into any restructuring plans the industry already has in the pipeline. ProMOS Technologies has been saved, for the time being. But the entire industry is in a wait-and-see mode. The downside is great. The upside is non-existent.
The National Health Insurance system faces the same problem. If the government is sincere, the least it can do is offer a public accounting of the National Health Insurance system's finances. It should brief the people on where the money went. How much money did the National Health Insurance Bureau save through aggressive cost-cutting measures? What is needed to make up the deficit? If it can persuade the public, everyone is sure to do his best to ensure that the health care system does not fail. National Health Insurance Bureau workers received year-end bonuses equalling four months wages. Yet the Department of Health has, out of the blue, decided to wring "Health Insurance Taxes" from two million citizens. The system was clearly meant to be a form of insurance. Yet the government is redefining it as a form of taxation. How can this be justified?
茂德與健保：政府對企業和對人民的兩種面孔
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.18 03:45 am
銀行團同意增貸茂德卅億元，使ＤＲＡＭ產業的紓困案跨出了首步。同一天，衛生署宣布健保改革方案，將對兩百多萬民眾加抽「健保稅」，以彌補健保的虧損。兩件看似不相干的事件放在一起，卻對照出政府決策對待大企業與對待一般民眾態度的偌大反差。
幾個月來，對虧損上千億的ＤＲＡＭ產業，從總統、行政院長到經濟部長，無一不信誓旦旦宣稱「一定會救」，甚至預告將挹注千億國發基金協助業者重建。政府對大企業的眷顧，真是無微不至。相對的，政府要對「外快」年逾十八萬元的民眾加徵健保稅，既不徵詢民意、也不詳述原由，就逕行作成決策，馬上要動手宰割他們選定的肥羊。如此粗暴的行徑，衛生署竟美其名曰「健保改革」。
試想，同樣是虧損，幾家民營大企業的上千億虧損，政府自告奮勇要掏大錢去搶救；反觀國家健保的兩百億虧損，政府不思從制度面去檢討及改善成本控管，卻不由分說要強拔數百萬民眾的鵝毛來填補。對大企業恭、而對小百姓倨，這是民主政府施政的「階級禮儀」嗎？
產業紓困和健保財務是截然不同的事，應有不同的解決方法，我們無意混為一談。這裡要指出的是，政府的施政決策，存在嚴重的「重企業、輕庶民」的差別待遇；就社會正義的角度而言，這是難以忍受的事。
ＤＲＡＭ當然是重要產業，但若干企業根本拒絕經濟部所提的產業整合計畫，政府的介入即顯得極不適當也自討無趣。相形之下，健保原是一項健康保險，卻不斷被政府扭曲成社會福利；人民享受同樣的健康照護，政府卻不斷提高薪資所得者的支付額，以填補自己無力負擔的社會承諾，這又如何稱之為合理？
再看看最近的一些事例。目前國內銀行存款利率已近乎於零，但銀行信用卡循環利率均仍高達百分之廿，盤剝暴利，與地下錢莊無異。年前經過金管會協調，多數銀行僅勉強調降一兩個百分點，分明是虛應故事，對消費者仍高度剝削。銀行態度如此蠻橫，不是政府長期驕寵的結果嗎？相對而言，特偵組偵辦二次金改弊案，發現多家銀行以各種行賄手段討好扁珍，以遂購併銀行或取得其他便利之意圖；但檢方對金控財團似心存顧忌，只不斷在表層的訊問上打轉。兩相對照，豈不再度驗證政府對財團恭、對人民倨的兩種面孔？
台灣的ＤＲＡＭ產業，是扁政府時代吃了「兩兆雙星」的「激素」養出來的怪物，不僅家數過多、投資過大，技術也太蕪雜。如今這些企業背負著四千多億的沉重貸款，卻無法充分發揮生產效益，處於開工不足及虧損的局面。因此，若不進行體系重整，就算政府和銀行砸下千億銀彈，讓每家企業能撐過此時，未來仍不可能有足夠的競爭力與南韓爭勝。
政府最好的作法，原是讓市場進行自然汰劣，讓通過物競天擇的強者留下來成為主力；如此，台灣ＤＲＡＭ產業不會垮掉或消失，卻能錘鍛出更強悍的體質。德國的奇夢達宣告破產，使全球ＤＲＡＭ廠壓力瞬時大減，就是市場「天擇」的佳例。但是，我政府卻處處插手，官員又隨便放話，不僅喚起了股市的投機風潮，也使企業原本進行中的整併計畫變數頻生。如今，暫時保住茂德，但整個產業卻停在「群小逐鹿」的觀望局面，這真正是「短多、長空」。
健保的問題也一樣。政府如果夠用心，至少應將健保財務結構攤開來，告訴人民哪些錢花在哪裡，健保局近幾年又透過績效控管節約了多少經費，如今還有哪些缺口需要填補等等。若能說服民眾，大家都願盡己力來維持健保制度於不墜。問題是，健保局人員年領四月年終獎金，而衛生署竟憑空拿出一紙方案，逮住兩百萬民眾就要強抽「健保稅」。明明是「保險」，政府卻當「稅」來抽，這豈是名正言順？
How the Government Treats Big Business Differently Than Ordinary Citizen
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 18, 2009
Banks have agreed to loan ProMOS Technologies three billion NT. That was a first step in providing relief to the DRAM industry. On the same day, the Department of Health announced its "Health Care Reform Program." It would impose a "National Health Insurance Tax" on over two million people, to compensate for the Bureau of National Health Insurance deficit. These two seemingly unrelated events revealed the vast difference in the government's attitude toward Big Business and the ordinary citizen.
The DRAM industry has suffered hundreds of billions of dollars in losses. For the past few months, everyone including the President, the Premier, and the Minister of Economic Affairs, has promised to rescue the industry, and even promised hundreds of billions in National Development Funds to rebuild the industry. The government's concern for Big Business truly is all-encompassing. By contrast, the government wants to levy a National Health Insurance Tax on ordinary citizens who earn over 180,000 NT by moonlighting. It neither consulted the public before implementing this policy, nor explained its decision. It simply went ahead and did it. It immediately butchered the fatted calf it had selected. The Department of Health even had the chutzpah to refer to their callous move as "Health Care Reform."
Both the DRAM industry and health care involve deficits. But when large private sector businesses lose hundreds of billions, the government immediately offers relief. When the Bureau of National Health Insurance loses 20 billion, the government doesn't consider how to improve the system in order to control costs. Instead, it immediately reaches into the pockets of ordinary citizens to make up the shortfall. It bows and scrapes before Big Business. It looks down its nose at the little guy. Is this how a democratic government is supposed to treat its citizens, according to economic or social class?
Whether the government should ought to relief for ailing industries and whether it is obligated to ensure the solvency of the health care system are different matters. They require different solutions. It is not our intention to conflate the two. What we want to point out is that the government treats Big Business and the little guy very differently. From the perspective of social justice, this is intolerable.
The DRAM industry is important. But many DRAM companies have flatly refused to go along with the Ministry of Economic Affairs industry consolidation plan. The government's intervention has not been welcomed, and has been an exercise in frustration. By contrast, the National Health Insurance was originally supposed to be a health insurance policy. Yet the government has redefined it as social welfare. Everyone receives the same health care. Yet the government has continually raised the rates for users to make up for its own inability to fulfill its committments. Is this reasonable?
Look at some recent examples. Bank deposit interest rates are now close to zero. Yet bank credit card interest rates run as high as 20%. This is sheer exploitation, no different than loan-sharking. Last year, after FSC consultation, most banks grudgingly lowered their rates one or two percentage points. They were clearly going through the motions, and were still exploiting consumers. The banks are arrogant because the government has spoiled them for much too long. When the Special Investigation Unit investigated the Second Financial Reform scandal, it discovered that many banks resorted to bribery. By currying favor with Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen, they hoped to gain an edge over competitors during their acquisition efforts. Unfortunately, prosecutors are frightened of financial consortia. During their interrogations they dared not dig too deep. They merely went through the motions. Do the two examples we have examined, not confirm that the government bows and scrapes before financial consortia, but looks down its nose at ordinary citizens?
Taiwan's DRAM industry, is a monster created by the Chen administration, the product of "Two Trillion, Twin Stars" and anabolic steroids. Too many companies crowd the field, too much capital has been invested, and the technology is too heterogeneous. These companies are saddled with 400 billion in loans. They cannot produce efficiently, are underutilized, and lose money. The government can sink billions into them. They can help them squeak by, for now. But if they do not undergo radical restructuring, they will still be unable to compete with South Korea.
The best thing the government can do is to allow the market to eliminate the unfit. Natural selection will leave the strong standing, allowing them become the backbone of the industry. This way, Taiwan's DRAM industry will not collapse or disappear. It will fortify itself from within. Germany's Qimonda has declared bankruptcy, temporarily reducing pressure on the global DRAM industry. This is a good example of market selection. But if our government intervenes, if officials shoot off their mouths, not only will they provoke market speculation, they will throw a monkeywrench into any restructuring plans the industry already has in the pipeline. ProMOS Technologies has been saved, for the time being. But the entire industry is in a wait-and-see mode. The downside is great. The upside is non-existent.
The National Health Insurance system faces the same problem. If the government is sincere, the least it can do is offer a public accounting of the National Health Insurance system's finances. It should brief the people on where the money went. How much money did the National Health Insurance Bureau save through aggressive cost-cutting measures? What is needed to make up the deficit? If it can persuade the public, everyone is sure to do his best to ensure that the health care system does not fail. National Health Insurance Bureau workers received year-end bonuses equalling four months wages. Yet the Department of Health has, out of the blue, decided to wring "Health Insurance Taxes" from two million citizens. The system was clearly meant to be a form of insurance. Yet the government is redefining it as a form of taxation. How can this be justified?
茂德與健保：政府對企業和對人民的兩種面孔
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.18 03:45 am
銀行團同意增貸茂德卅億元，使ＤＲＡＭ產業的紓困案跨出了首步。同一天，衛生署宣布健保改革方案，將對兩百多萬民眾加抽「健保稅」，以彌補健保的虧損。兩件看似不相干的事件放在一起，卻對照出政府決策對待大企業與對待一般民眾態度的偌大反差。
幾個月來，對虧損上千億的ＤＲＡＭ產業，從總統、行政院長到經濟部長，無一不信誓旦旦宣稱「一定會救」，甚至預告將挹注千億國發基金協助業者重建。政府對大企業的眷顧，真是無微不至。相對的，政府要對「外快」年逾十八萬元的民眾加徵健保稅，既不徵詢民意、也不詳述原由，就逕行作成決策，馬上要動手宰割他們選定的肥羊。如此粗暴的行徑，衛生署竟美其名曰「健保改革」。
試想，同樣是虧損，幾家民營大企業的上千億虧損，政府自告奮勇要掏大錢去搶救；反觀國家健保的兩百億虧損，政府不思從制度面去檢討及改善成本控管，卻不由分說要強拔數百萬民眾的鵝毛來填補。對大企業恭、而對小百姓倨，這是民主政府施政的「階級禮儀」嗎？
產業紓困和健保財務是截然不同的事，應有不同的解決方法，我們無意混為一談。這裡要指出的是，政府的施政決策，存在嚴重的「重企業、輕庶民」的差別待遇；就社會正義的角度而言，這是難以忍受的事。
ＤＲＡＭ當然是重要產業，但若干企業根本拒絕經濟部所提的產業整合計畫，政府的介入即顯得極不適當也自討無趣。相形之下，健保原是一項健康保險，卻不斷被政府扭曲成社會福利；人民享受同樣的健康照護，政府卻不斷提高薪資所得者的支付額，以填補自己無力負擔的社會承諾，這又如何稱之為合理？
再看看最近的一些事例。目前國內銀行存款利率已近乎於零，但銀行信用卡循環利率均仍高達百分之廿，盤剝暴利，與地下錢莊無異。年前經過金管會協調，多數銀行僅勉強調降一兩個百分點，分明是虛應故事，對消費者仍高度剝削。銀行態度如此蠻橫，不是政府長期驕寵的結果嗎？相對而言，特偵組偵辦二次金改弊案，發現多家銀行以各種行賄手段討好扁珍，以遂購併銀行或取得其他便利之意圖；但檢方對金控財團似心存顧忌，只不斷在表層的訊問上打轉。兩相對照，豈不再度驗證政府對財團恭、對人民倨的兩種面孔？
台灣的ＤＲＡＭ產業，是扁政府時代吃了「兩兆雙星」的「激素」養出來的怪物，不僅家數過多、投資過大，技術也太蕪雜。如今這些企業背負著四千多億的沉重貸款，卻無法充分發揮生產效益，處於開工不足及虧損的局面。因此，若不進行體系重整，就算政府和銀行砸下千億銀彈，讓每家企業能撐過此時，未來仍不可能有足夠的競爭力與南韓爭勝。
政府最好的作法，原是讓市場進行自然汰劣，讓通過物競天擇的強者留下來成為主力；如此，台灣ＤＲＡＭ產業不會垮掉或消失，卻能錘鍛出更強悍的體質。德國的奇夢達宣告破產，使全球ＤＲＡＭ廠壓力瞬時大減，就是市場「天擇」的佳例。但是，我政府卻處處插手，官員又隨便放話，不僅喚起了股市的投機風潮，也使企業原本進行中的整併計畫變數頻生。如今，暫時保住茂德，但整個產業卻停在「群小逐鹿」的觀望局面，這真正是「短多、長空」。
健保的問題也一樣。政府如果夠用心，至少應將健保財務結構攤開來，告訴人民哪些錢花在哪裡，健保局近幾年又透過績效控管節約了多少經費，如今還有哪些缺口需要填補等等。若能說服民眾，大家都願盡己力來維持健保制度於不墜。問題是，健保局人員年領四月年終獎金，而衛生署竟憑空拿出一紙方案，逮住兩百萬民眾就要強抽「健保稅」。明明是「保險」，政府卻當「稅」來抽，這豈是名正言順？
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
The Chen Corruption Case: A Painful Lesson for Corporate Heads
The Chen Corruption Case: A Painful Lesson for Corporate Heads
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 17, 2009
Before the Chen Corruption Scandal exploded, who knew people could be so greedy? Before the Chen Corruption Scandal exploded, who knew government/business collusion could be so appallingly ugly?
Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen's power and greed were in direct proportional to each other. The greater their power, the more closely knit their government/business connections, the more insatiable their greed. When they first entered the political arena, they had yet to establish relations with wealthy industrialists. Their sponsors were primarily small and medium business owners who supported the "dang wai" movement. These people were close to the Chen family from early on. But as long as they did not allow themselves to be seduced by Chen Shui-bian's ever-growing power, as long as they did not attempt to gain illicit financial advantage, they were spared involvement in the Chen family's corruption scandals. Those who chose to become Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen's partners in crime, such as Wu Shu-chen's former classmate Tsai Mei-li, long supported each other out of friendship. Their association with the Chen family degenerated to the point where entire families became Chen family accomplices. They brought pressure to bear upon government agencies, they exploited their connections to win sweetheart contracts, they even brokered financial industry deals. By exploiting their political and business connections, they amassed vast sums of illicit wealth.
During Chen Shui-bian's term as Taipei Mayor the Chen family began collecting so-called "campaign contributions." They also began depositing their money offshore. But it wasn't until Chen Shui-bian's first term as president that people discovered to what depths this former crusader against "black gold" politics had sunk, and the depth of his involvement in government/business collusion. Only after the State Affairs Fund scandal erupted, did people realize Chen Shui-bian's self-imposed 50% pay cut upon taking office was an act. The State Affairs Funds the Chen family applied for and obtained using forged receipts far exceeded his salary. The Red Shirt Army movement to end corruption and depose Ah-Bian, held a month long sit-in at Ketagelan Boulevard. Chen Shui-bian blasted those who accused him of corruption. Wu Shu-chen meanwhile quietly busied herself moving money out of the country. This money came out of the pockets of industry tycoons. Based on figures Wu Shu-chen provided the Special Investigation Unit, the funds add up to at least 1.8 billion NT.
Industrial tycoons offered Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen anywhere from tens of millions to hundreds of millions in commissions, bribes, and corporate campaign contributions. The wives of wealthy cronies provided invoices for the State Affairs Fund. Construction company owners provided bribes to building committee jurors and government officials. The chairmen of holding companies involved in the Second Financial Reform scandal, and high-tech company heads, all made pilgrimages to the president's official residence, each with their own motives. Some were extremely wealthy. They merely enjoyed moving about within the circles of power. They considered it a matter of pride to be able to come and go from the president's official residence. These famous tycoons enjoyed showing off before the public. Others may not have wanted anything in particular from the Chen family. But because everyone was giving gifts, why not give one as well? Giving gifts was like taking out an insurance policy. Some may have been in financial straits. Some needed to expand their businesses. Giving large sums of money was like paying an admission price. It was a chance to get oneself out of a financial bind. Their motivations may have been different. Their eventual fates may also be different. For some of them, the jig is already up. For others, the alarms have just been sounded. But at this stage, they all wish they could turn the clock back.
Government/business collusion was not always as appallingly ugly as it was under the Chen regime. During Two Chiangs Era, government and business were kept entirely separate. Any official who dared to open the back door, who accepted entertainment or hospitality from merchants, would be in serious trouble once he was found out. Chiang Ching-kuo had a son-in-law who was a businessman, who brooded for years. When Lee Teng-hui assumed office government and business converged for the first time, he publicly declared "The Government's job is to help capitalists make money." He moved government/business collusion out of the back rooms and put it right on the table, for all the world to see. Government officials dining in public with business leaders became commonplace. KMT party enterprises boss Liu Tai-ying became the man at the heart of the government/business web. But although the gates to "black gold" had been thrown open, few political appointees had the audacity to set prices for government/business collusion. Still less did they have the audacity to secretly launder billions in illicit or illegal funds overseas. .
During the earlier part of Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office, Chen Shui-bian's template for government/business collusion was Lee Teng-hui. During the latter part of his term, the pupil surpassed the teacher. Government/business collusion has expanded from the first generation of wealthy tycoons, to the second generation. They have expanded from traditional industries to the financial industry and high-tech industries. The son of a category three impoverished household became the godfather of both the government and business realms. The result was, from the Presidential Office, through the Executive Yuan, and on down through the various ministries, Chen regime political appointees set a new record for incidents of corruption. Even he and his own family members have become defendants. A man who was once the president is now in jail. The details of his scandal have been circulated around the world. These shocking instances of government/business collusion have gradually been exposed. Admittedly, Chen Shui-bian victimized those corporate leaders. But weren't those corporate leaders also abetting Chen Shui-bian's crimes?
The Chen family scandal has provided us with an object lesson about government/business collusion. Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen's ugly greed has provided posterity with a cautionary tale. The ROC must move toward clean government. Those who wield power will invariably be tempted, but they may not barter power in exchange for wealth. Conversely, business owners must have the courage to "just say no" to those in authority. They may not exchange wealth for illicit business advantage.
The Chen family corruption case has provided a warning to those in authority, and an object lesson to those in business.
扁案也是企業老闆們的血淚教材
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.17 02:19 am
沒經過扁案，不知道人可以這麼貪；沒經過扁案，也不知道政商關係這隻巨獸，竟能如此醜惡恐怖。
扁珍的權力與貪欲互成正比，他們的權力愈大，政商網絡愈織愈密，貪欲也就愈大。初入政壇時，他們跟豪門巨富尚未攀上關係，金主多是義挺黨外的中小企業人士，這些早年和扁家熟識的人，只要沒被陳水扁愈來愈大的權力沖昏頭，未絞盡腦汁鑽營更大利益，幸皆未捲入扁家今天的貪瀆風暴。至於與扁珍一同腐化的人，如南港案中的吳淑珍同學蔡美利等人，則從早年的情義相挺，惡質演變到幾乎全家族都成了扁的共犯，施壓政府機關，特權招攬工程，甚至還當起了金錢遊戲的掮客，透過政商特權，四出藉端藉勢聚斂錢財。
扁家是從陳水扁在台北市長任內，開始陸續累積所謂的「政治獻金」，也開始陸續把錢移往海外。但直到陳水扁總統首任，恐沒人相信以批判黑金著稱的他竟會大搞政商關係，貪汙至此地步；國務機要費案爆發後，大家才知道原來陳水扁就任宣示薪水減半根本是玩假的，因為扁家運用發票按月抱走了遠超過他薪資的大筆國務費。紅衫軍反貪倒扁，靜坐凱道一個月，陳水扁人前聲色俱厲痛批指控他貪腐的人，吳淑珍人後卻悶聲不吭地拚命搬錢匯出，這些來自企業大老闆的錢，其數額在吳淑珍遞給特偵組的陳報狀裡，就至少有十八億之多。
那些向扁珍進奉上千萬到數億不等佣金、賄款或獻金的企業大老闆，從國務費案提供發票的貴婦人們，到南港案行賄評委與官員的營建業者，乃至二次金改涉案的金控董事長，以及高科技大老闆們，他們攀附官邸各有動機：有些人是擁有了財富，就愛圍著權力人物打轉，以進出官邸為榮，甚至以紅頂商人自居，炫耀於眾。另有些人雖對扁家無所求，但因為大家都給官邸送禮，自己豈可不送？彷彿送了禮就等於買了政治保險。再也有些人卻是為了企業的財務危機，或企業的擴展需要，捧著大筆鈔票買競標的入場券，或尋求財務解套的機會。他們的動機不同，後來的命運亦未必一樣，其中有些已經東窗事發，另有些尚在風聲鶴唳階段，但此際應皆是悔不當初。
台灣的政商關係原本並非如扁案中所暴露這般恐怖醜陋。兩蔣威權時代，政商涇渭分明，那是政商分離的年代；哪個官敢開敞後門，或與商賈殷勤酬酢，一經發現，其結果難有僥倖。蔣經國甚至因女婿是商人，而耿耿於懷多年。李登輝執政時代，政商首度合流，他不但曾公開說過「政府的責任就是替資本家賺錢」，也一改過去政治人物與商人的「後花園式」的關係，把政商關係堂而皇之搬上檯面，文武百官與工商人士餐聚也見怪不怪，國民黨黨營事業大掌櫃劉泰英更成為政商網絡的核心。但即使在黑金大門初開的那個年代，還少有哪個政務官敢搞對價關係的政商互動，遑論將數十億不義或不法之財，神不知鬼不覺地洗出海外。
陳水扁執政八年期間，初期搞政商關係以李登輝為師，後期則青出於藍，政商關係從豪門巨富第一代延伸至第二代，從傳統企業擴及到金融與高科技領域，三級貧戶之子儼然已成政商兩界的共主。其結果則是從府、院到部會，涉弊遭訴的政務官數目創下史上最高紀錄，到最後連他自己及其家人也成為貪汙罪的被告，堂堂總統下台後竟成階下囚，醜聞傳遍全球。這些駭人的政商共犯逐漸曝光，雖是陳水扁害了那些企業主，但亦何嘗不能說是那些企業主縱容了陳水扁？
扁家弊案是政商關係的負面教材，扁珍貪婪的嘴臉堪為來者鑑戒。台灣要走向清明政治，有權力者就得摒除金錢的誘惑，不可以權斂財；同樣的，企業主非但要有膽子對主政者的需索說不，亦不可用金錢汙染政治來換取不義不法的企業利益。
就政商關係言，扁案是從政者的前車之鑑，也是企業界的血淚教材。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 17, 2009
Before the Chen Corruption Scandal exploded, who knew people could be so greedy? Before the Chen Corruption Scandal exploded, who knew government/business collusion could be so appallingly ugly?
Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen's power and greed were in direct proportional to each other. The greater their power, the more closely knit their government/business connections, the more insatiable their greed. When they first entered the political arena, they had yet to establish relations with wealthy industrialists. Their sponsors were primarily small and medium business owners who supported the "dang wai" movement. These people were close to the Chen family from early on. But as long as they did not allow themselves to be seduced by Chen Shui-bian's ever-growing power, as long as they did not attempt to gain illicit financial advantage, they were spared involvement in the Chen family's corruption scandals. Those who chose to become Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen's partners in crime, such as Wu Shu-chen's former classmate Tsai Mei-li, long supported each other out of friendship. Their association with the Chen family degenerated to the point where entire families became Chen family accomplices. They brought pressure to bear upon government agencies, they exploited their connections to win sweetheart contracts, they even brokered financial industry deals. By exploiting their political and business connections, they amassed vast sums of illicit wealth.
During Chen Shui-bian's term as Taipei Mayor the Chen family began collecting so-called "campaign contributions." They also began depositing their money offshore. But it wasn't until Chen Shui-bian's first term as president that people discovered to what depths this former crusader against "black gold" politics had sunk, and the depth of his involvement in government/business collusion. Only after the State Affairs Fund scandal erupted, did people realize Chen Shui-bian's self-imposed 50% pay cut upon taking office was an act. The State Affairs Funds the Chen family applied for and obtained using forged receipts far exceeded his salary. The Red Shirt Army movement to end corruption and depose Ah-Bian, held a month long sit-in at Ketagelan Boulevard. Chen Shui-bian blasted those who accused him of corruption. Wu Shu-chen meanwhile quietly busied herself moving money out of the country. This money came out of the pockets of industry tycoons. Based on figures Wu Shu-chen provided the Special Investigation Unit, the funds add up to at least 1.8 billion NT.
Industrial tycoons offered Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen anywhere from tens of millions to hundreds of millions in commissions, bribes, and corporate campaign contributions. The wives of wealthy cronies provided invoices for the State Affairs Fund. Construction company owners provided bribes to building committee jurors and government officials. The chairmen of holding companies involved in the Second Financial Reform scandal, and high-tech company heads, all made pilgrimages to the president's official residence, each with their own motives. Some were extremely wealthy. They merely enjoyed moving about within the circles of power. They considered it a matter of pride to be able to come and go from the president's official residence. These famous tycoons enjoyed showing off before the public. Others may not have wanted anything in particular from the Chen family. But because everyone was giving gifts, why not give one as well? Giving gifts was like taking out an insurance policy. Some may have been in financial straits. Some needed to expand their businesses. Giving large sums of money was like paying an admission price. It was a chance to get oneself out of a financial bind. Their motivations may have been different. Their eventual fates may also be different. For some of them, the jig is already up. For others, the alarms have just been sounded. But at this stage, they all wish they could turn the clock back.
Government/business collusion was not always as appallingly ugly as it was under the Chen regime. During Two Chiangs Era, government and business were kept entirely separate. Any official who dared to open the back door, who accepted entertainment or hospitality from merchants, would be in serious trouble once he was found out. Chiang Ching-kuo had a son-in-law who was a businessman, who brooded for years. When Lee Teng-hui assumed office government and business converged for the first time, he publicly declared "The Government's job is to help capitalists make money." He moved government/business collusion out of the back rooms and put it right on the table, for all the world to see. Government officials dining in public with business leaders became commonplace. KMT party enterprises boss Liu Tai-ying became the man at the heart of the government/business web. But although the gates to "black gold" had been thrown open, few political appointees had the audacity to set prices for government/business collusion. Still less did they have the audacity to secretly launder billions in illicit or illegal funds overseas. .
During the earlier part of Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office, Chen Shui-bian's template for government/business collusion was Lee Teng-hui. During the latter part of his term, the pupil surpassed the teacher. Government/business collusion has expanded from the first generation of wealthy tycoons, to the second generation. They have expanded from traditional industries to the financial industry and high-tech industries. The son of a category three impoverished household became the godfather of both the government and business realms. The result was, from the Presidential Office, through the Executive Yuan, and on down through the various ministries, Chen regime political appointees set a new record for incidents of corruption. Even he and his own family members have become defendants. A man who was once the president is now in jail. The details of his scandal have been circulated around the world. These shocking instances of government/business collusion have gradually been exposed. Admittedly, Chen Shui-bian victimized those corporate leaders. But weren't those corporate leaders also abetting Chen Shui-bian's crimes?
The Chen family scandal has provided us with an object lesson about government/business collusion. Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen's ugly greed has provided posterity with a cautionary tale. The ROC must move toward clean government. Those who wield power will invariably be tempted, but they may not barter power in exchange for wealth. Conversely, business owners must have the courage to "just say no" to those in authority. They may not exchange wealth for illicit business advantage.
The Chen family corruption case has provided a warning to those in authority, and an object lesson to those in business.
扁案也是企業老闆們的血淚教材
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.17 02:19 am
沒經過扁案，不知道人可以這麼貪；沒經過扁案，也不知道政商關係這隻巨獸，竟能如此醜惡恐怖。
扁珍的權力與貪欲互成正比，他們的權力愈大，政商網絡愈織愈密，貪欲也就愈大。初入政壇時，他們跟豪門巨富尚未攀上關係，金主多是義挺黨外的中小企業人士，這些早年和扁家熟識的人，只要沒被陳水扁愈來愈大的權力沖昏頭，未絞盡腦汁鑽營更大利益，幸皆未捲入扁家今天的貪瀆風暴。至於與扁珍一同腐化的人，如南港案中的吳淑珍同學蔡美利等人，則從早年的情義相挺，惡質演變到幾乎全家族都成了扁的共犯，施壓政府機關，特權招攬工程，甚至還當起了金錢遊戲的掮客，透過政商特權，四出藉端藉勢聚斂錢財。
扁家是從陳水扁在台北市長任內，開始陸續累積所謂的「政治獻金」，也開始陸續把錢移往海外。但直到陳水扁總統首任，恐沒人相信以批判黑金著稱的他竟會大搞政商關係，貪汙至此地步；國務機要費案爆發後，大家才知道原來陳水扁就任宣示薪水減半根本是玩假的，因為扁家運用發票按月抱走了遠超過他薪資的大筆國務費。紅衫軍反貪倒扁，靜坐凱道一個月，陳水扁人前聲色俱厲痛批指控他貪腐的人，吳淑珍人後卻悶聲不吭地拚命搬錢匯出，這些來自企業大老闆的錢，其數額在吳淑珍遞給特偵組的陳報狀裡，就至少有十八億之多。
那些向扁珍進奉上千萬到數億不等佣金、賄款或獻金的企業大老闆，從國務費案提供發票的貴婦人們，到南港案行賄評委與官員的營建業者，乃至二次金改涉案的金控董事長，以及高科技大老闆們，他們攀附官邸各有動機：有些人是擁有了財富，就愛圍著權力人物打轉，以進出官邸為榮，甚至以紅頂商人自居，炫耀於眾。另有些人雖對扁家無所求，但因為大家都給官邸送禮，自己豈可不送？彷彿送了禮就等於買了政治保險。再也有些人卻是為了企業的財務危機，或企業的擴展需要，捧著大筆鈔票買競標的入場券，或尋求財務解套的機會。他們的動機不同，後來的命運亦未必一樣，其中有些已經東窗事發，另有些尚在風聲鶴唳階段，但此際應皆是悔不當初。
台灣的政商關係原本並非如扁案中所暴露這般恐怖醜陋。兩蔣威權時代，政商涇渭分明，那是政商分離的年代；哪個官敢開敞後門，或與商賈殷勤酬酢，一經發現，其結果難有僥倖。蔣經國甚至因女婿是商人，而耿耿於懷多年。李登輝執政時代，政商首度合流，他不但曾公開說過「政府的責任就是替資本家賺錢」，也一改過去政治人物與商人的「後花園式」的關係，把政商關係堂而皇之搬上檯面，文武百官與工商人士餐聚也見怪不怪，國民黨黨營事業大掌櫃劉泰英更成為政商網絡的核心。但即使在黑金大門初開的那個年代，還少有哪個政務官敢搞對價關係的政商互動，遑論將數十億不義或不法之財，神不知鬼不覺地洗出海外。
陳水扁執政八年期間，初期搞政商關係以李登輝為師，後期則青出於藍，政商關係從豪門巨富第一代延伸至第二代，從傳統企業擴及到金融與高科技領域，三級貧戶之子儼然已成政商兩界的共主。其結果則是從府、院到部會，涉弊遭訴的政務官數目創下史上最高紀錄，到最後連他自己及其家人也成為貪汙罪的被告，堂堂總統下台後竟成階下囚，醜聞傳遍全球。這些駭人的政商共犯逐漸曝光，雖是陳水扁害了那些企業主，但亦何嘗不能說是那些企業主縱容了陳水扁？
扁家弊案是政商關係的負面教材，扁珍貪婪的嘴臉堪為來者鑑戒。台灣要走向清明政治，有權力者就得摒除金錢的誘惑，不可以權斂財；同樣的，企業主非但要有膽子對主政者的需索說不，亦不可用金錢汙染政治來換取不義不法的企業利益。
就政商關係言，扁案是從政者的前車之鑑，也是企業界的血淚教材。
Monday, February 16, 2009
Do Not Allow CECA to Become an Ideological Struggle
Do Not Allow CECA to Become an Ideological Struggle
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 16, 2009
Six large labor and business organizations recently asked the government to sign a "Comprehensive Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Agreement" (CECA) with Beijing, as soon as possible. National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi and Minister of Economic Affairs Ying Chi-ming responded positively to such suggestions. Since the Beijing and Taipei have few disagreements on this issue, it can probably be incorporated into cross-Strait consultations between SEF and ARATS this year. But DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's immediately response was that it was "inadvisable." Clearly a consensus with the opposition DPP has yet to be reached.
Labor and business organizations' intense desire for CECA is not surprising. In recent years, ASEAN has accelerated the pace of regional integration. Taipei meanwhile, has been excluded. It has been left standing outside the door. On top of which, during the DPP's eight-year rule, not one single neighboring government signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with us. The DPP demagogued political issues, perpetuating cross-Strait political confrontation. The result was a period crucial to economic recovery was squandered on political struggle. This wasted time will be difficult to make up. Much of the KMT's cross-strait consultations after resuming office are in fact an effort to make up for lost time.
An even more pressing issue is the global economic crisis. Everyone knows Taiwan's economic lifeline is exports. This year the sector that shrank the fastest was the export sector. This is why not long ago many foreign institutions were pessimistic about Taiwan's economic performance this year. Taiwan's exports account for over 40% of total cross-Strait trade. The ASEAN plus three countries are gradually moving toward zero trade tariffs. Taipei does not enjoy such privileges. Taiwan's comparative advantage and competitive edge will be lost. This will accelerate its current marginalization, especially given the current situation. Europe and the United States, two major economies, are in serious recession, with no evidence of improvement in the short term. Protectionist sentiment simmers just beneath the surface. Taipei is caught in the middle. In the event Taipei comes up with "heads you win, tails I lose," its plight can be imagined.
When the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry responded to the six labor and business groups, it specifically referred to domestic sentiment in favor of CECA. And yet disagreement persists regarding the name of the agreement, how it is promoted, and its timing. Needless to say, this disagreement comes from the Green Camp. It worries that signing CECA will lead to the loss of "Taiwan's" sovereignty, and economic over-reliance on the mainland. In fact, when President Ma proposed that the two sides sign CECA, his chief concern was the potential diminution of ROC sovereignty. That is why he focused on abolishing cross-strait tariffs, trade and investment barriers, and on further liberalizing the free movement of high tech labor, investment funds, labor services, and merchandise. This gradually brings them in line with WTO norms, and with cross-strait economic and trade cooperation norms. Given Taiwan's past economic and trade flexibility in the global arena, such openness will provide increased opportunities. This will allow Taiwan-based businesses to position themselves in the new era of competitive trade. If they remain bound hand and foot, as they are currently, they will find themselves unable to advance or retreat. Much of Taiwan's current trade is heavily tilted toward the mainland. Over half of this tilt occurred under Democratic Progressive Party rule. Given the high degree of trade dependency, isn't the lack of even the most basic investment and trade agreements a serious problem, and the result of DPP dereliction?
The Ministry of Economic Affairs is not concerned about cross-strait political differences. It is concerned about ruling and opposition party differences. It is concerned particularly that the Democratic Progressive Party will persist in politicizing CECA. No matter how carefully the ruling KMT avoids sovereignty issues, the opposition DPP will sooner or later turn them into ideological issues. It did that last year, during the presidential election, by deliberately relabeling the "Cross-Strait Common Market" the "One China Market." A number of distorted interpretations of CECA have already been floated. If the ruling authorities wish to avoid a senseless debate over reunification vs independence between the ruling and opposition parties, it will have to make a real effort.
If the Democratic Progressive Party opposes CECA, it should not sing the same old ideological tune. Instead, it should offer its most convincing alternative. The public on Taiwan gave the Democratic Progressive Party an eight year opportunity. What did it get in return? East Asian regional economic integration is just around the corner. The global financial crisis has yet to subside. Taiwan's economy, dependent upon on the growth of exports, remains besieged on all sides. Signing CECA is merely one way to break through this seige. Besides, all cases involving tariff agreements must be approved by the Legislative Yuan. At that time all concerns will be addressed. If after all we have endured over the past eight years, we still cannot get past ideological struggles, that will be the real tragedy.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.16
別讓CECA再陷意識形態爭議
中時社論
六大工商團體日前建請政府盡快與對岸洽簽「兩岸綜合經貿協議（ＣＥＣＡ）」，針對此一呼籲，不論是國安會祕書長蘇起或是經濟部長尹啟銘等都立即給予了正面的回應，由於兩岸在這個議題上已沒有太大的分歧，可預見今年之內就有機會納入兩岸兩會的協商。然而從民進黨主席蔡英文第一時間就以「不宜」的反應看來，顯然這個議題在內部共識的營造上，還有許多變數。
工商團體會對兩岸洽簽ＣＥＣＡ懷有強烈的焦慮，並不令人意外。這幾年，隨著東協區域整合的步伐加快，台灣卻一直被排除參與門欄之外，再加上民進黨執政八年期間，不僅與鄰近國家洽簽自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）的成績掛零，更一再藉政治操作讓兩岸持續處於對立狀態，導致最該要拚經濟的時刻，全耗在拚政治上，這中間所蹉跎掉的歲月，是很難再彌補回來的。國民黨執政後所恢復的兩岸協商，有很大一部分其實是在趕進度。
當然更緊迫的因素，還是當下全球經濟的嚴峻形勢。誰都知道，台灣經濟的命脈在出口，而今年以來萎縮最快也是出口部門，前不久會有那麼多外資機構看衰台灣今年的經濟表現，關鍵也就在這裡。由於兩岸的貿易的比重，占台灣總出口的四成以上，一旦東協加三諸國間貿易逐漸走向零關稅，而台灣又享受不到這個優惠，可預見台灣所有比較有利的競爭優勢都將喪失，屆時只有加速被推向邊緣化。特別是碰到目前的局面，歐美兩大經濟體嚴重衰退，短期內根本看不到有好轉的跡象，貿易保護主義的誘惑也在暗中醞釀，台灣夾在這中間，萬一陷入兩頭落空的局面，處境之困頓可想而知。
經濟部在回應六大工商團體呼籲時，曾特別提到國內目前對洽簽ＣＥＣＡ的議題，不論就協定名稱、推動方式或是時機都還存有不同的聲音。這個「不同的聲音」，應該就是綠營的反應，擔心洽簽ＣＥＣＡ會導致台灣喪失主權、經濟過度依賴大陸等等。講實在話，馬總統當初會提出兩岸洽簽ＣＥＣＡ的擬議，著眼點之一正是在讓台灣規避主權被矮化的疑慮，將重點完全放在取消兩岸間包括關稅、經貿、投資等障礙，進一步開放技術人員、資金、勞務、商品等的自由流動，使其逐漸形成一個既符合ＷＴＯ準則，又符合兩岸現狀經貿合作的形態。以台灣過往在全球經貿布局的靈活度，這種開放將提供更多的機會，讓台灣在未來全新的經貿戰國時代中，尋找自己的定位，假如像目前這樣綁手綁腳下去，勢必自陷進退失據。要知道，台灣目前貿易比重會嚴重向大陸傾斜，有大半正是在民進黨執政期間發生，這麼大比例的貿易依存度，雙方連最起碼的投資與經貿互動協定都沒有，難道不是執政的怠惰？
可以說，經濟部的顧慮，並不在於兩岸立場的分歧，而是在於朝野立場的對立，特別是民進黨假如還是執著於從政治面去解讀ＣＥＣＡ，很可能在未來的時日，不論這個協議怎麼小心閃躲主權的爭議，終究還是會發展成意識形態的議題，正如同去年大選期間「兩岸共同市場」被曲解成「一中市場」一樣。而目前許多曲解ＣＥＣＡ的論述已經陸續出爐，執政當局如果要避免這個議題再次陷入無謂的統獨之爭，在爭取朝野對話的步伐上，恐怕要多加一把勁了。
當然，民進黨如果反對這個政策，除了重彈意識形態的老調外，最好也能提出足夠令人信服的論述，台灣人民已經給了民進黨八年的機會，結果又如何呢？如今東亞區域經濟整合在即，全球金融海嘯肆虐未退，台灣這個依賴貿易出口推動成長的經濟體，已經陷入四面楚歌的困境，爭取洽簽ＣＥＣＡ，也只是爭取突破困境的途徑之一而已。更何況所有涉及關稅的協議，本來就要經過立法院這一關，屆時該顧慮的因素都會有所考量，如果最後仍不免還是淪為意識形態的角力，那就真的令人非常遺憾了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 16, 2009
Six large labor and business organizations recently asked the government to sign a "Comprehensive Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Agreement" (CECA) with Beijing, as soon as possible. National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi and Minister of Economic Affairs Ying Chi-ming responded positively to such suggestions. Since the Beijing and Taipei have few disagreements on this issue, it can probably be incorporated into cross-Strait consultations between SEF and ARATS this year. But DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's immediately response was that it was "inadvisable." Clearly a consensus with the opposition DPP has yet to be reached.
Labor and business organizations' intense desire for CECA is not surprising. In recent years, ASEAN has accelerated the pace of regional integration. Taipei meanwhile, has been excluded. It has been left standing outside the door. On top of which, during the DPP's eight-year rule, not one single neighboring government signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with us. The DPP demagogued political issues, perpetuating cross-Strait political confrontation. The result was a period crucial to economic recovery was squandered on political struggle. This wasted time will be difficult to make up. Much of the KMT's cross-strait consultations after resuming office are in fact an effort to make up for lost time.
An even more pressing issue is the global economic crisis. Everyone knows Taiwan's economic lifeline is exports. This year the sector that shrank the fastest was the export sector. This is why not long ago many foreign institutions were pessimistic about Taiwan's economic performance this year. Taiwan's exports account for over 40% of total cross-Strait trade. The ASEAN plus three countries are gradually moving toward zero trade tariffs. Taipei does not enjoy such privileges. Taiwan's comparative advantage and competitive edge will be lost. This will accelerate its current marginalization, especially given the current situation. Europe and the United States, two major economies, are in serious recession, with no evidence of improvement in the short term. Protectionist sentiment simmers just beneath the surface. Taipei is caught in the middle. In the event Taipei comes up with "heads you win, tails I lose," its plight can be imagined.
When the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry responded to the six labor and business groups, it specifically referred to domestic sentiment in favor of CECA. And yet disagreement persists regarding the name of the agreement, how it is promoted, and its timing. Needless to say, this disagreement comes from the Green Camp. It worries that signing CECA will lead to the loss of "Taiwan's" sovereignty, and economic over-reliance on the mainland. In fact, when President Ma proposed that the two sides sign CECA, his chief concern was the potential diminution of ROC sovereignty. That is why he focused on abolishing cross-strait tariffs, trade and investment barriers, and on further liberalizing the free movement of high tech labor, investment funds, labor services, and merchandise. This gradually brings them in line with WTO norms, and with cross-strait economic and trade cooperation norms. Given Taiwan's past economic and trade flexibility in the global arena, such openness will provide increased opportunities. This will allow Taiwan-based businesses to position themselves in the new era of competitive trade. If they remain bound hand and foot, as they are currently, they will find themselves unable to advance or retreat. Much of Taiwan's current trade is heavily tilted toward the mainland. Over half of this tilt occurred under Democratic Progressive Party rule. Given the high degree of trade dependency, isn't the lack of even the most basic investment and trade agreements a serious problem, and the result of DPP dereliction?
The Ministry of Economic Affairs is not concerned about cross-strait political differences. It is concerned about ruling and opposition party differences. It is concerned particularly that the Democratic Progressive Party will persist in politicizing CECA. No matter how carefully the ruling KMT avoids sovereignty issues, the opposition DPP will sooner or later turn them into ideological issues. It did that last year, during the presidential election, by deliberately relabeling the "Cross-Strait Common Market" the "One China Market." A number of distorted interpretations of CECA have already been floated. If the ruling authorities wish to avoid a senseless debate over reunification vs independence between the ruling and opposition parties, it will have to make a real effort.
If the Democratic Progressive Party opposes CECA, it should not sing the same old ideological tune. Instead, it should offer its most convincing alternative. The public on Taiwan gave the Democratic Progressive Party an eight year opportunity. What did it get in return? East Asian regional economic integration is just around the corner. The global financial crisis has yet to subside. Taiwan's economy, dependent upon on the growth of exports, remains besieged on all sides. Signing CECA is merely one way to break through this seige. Besides, all cases involving tariff agreements must be approved by the Legislative Yuan. At that time all concerns will be addressed. If after all we have endured over the past eight years, we still cannot get past ideological struggles, that will be the real tragedy.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.16
別讓CECA再陷意識形態爭議
中時社論
六大工商團體日前建請政府盡快與對岸洽簽「兩岸綜合經貿協議（ＣＥＣＡ）」，針對此一呼籲，不論是國安會祕書長蘇起或是經濟部長尹啟銘等都立即給予了正面的回應，由於兩岸在這個議題上已沒有太大的分歧，可預見今年之內就有機會納入兩岸兩會的協商。然而從民進黨主席蔡英文第一時間就以「不宜」的反應看來，顯然這個議題在內部共識的營造上，還有許多變數。
工商團體會對兩岸洽簽ＣＥＣＡ懷有強烈的焦慮，並不令人意外。這幾年，隨著東協區域整合的步伐加快，台灣卻一直被排除參與門欄之外，再加上民進黨執政八年期間，不僅與鄰近國家洽簽自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）的成績掛零，更一再藉政治操作讓兩岸持續處於對立狀態，導致最該要拚經濟的時刻，全耗在拚政治上，這中間所蹉跎掉的歲月，是很難再彌補回來的。國民黨執政後所恢復的兩岸協商，有很大一部分其實是在趕進度。
當然更緊迫的因素，還是當下全球經濟的嚴峻形勢。誰都知道，台灣經濟的命脈在出口，而今年以來萎縮最快也是出口部門，前不久會有那麼多外資機構看衰台灣今年的經濟表現，關鍵也就在這裡。由於兩岸的貿易的比重，占台灣總出口的四成以上，一旦東協加三諸國間貿易逐漸走向零關稅，而台灣又享受不到這個優惠，可預見台灣所有比較有利的競爭優勢都將喪失，屆時只有加速被推向邊緣化。特別是碰到目前的局面，歐美兩大經濟體嚴重衰退，短期內根本看不到有好轉的跡象，貿易保護主義的誘惑也在暗中醞釀，台灣夾在這中間，萬一陷入兩頭落空的局面，處境之困頓可想而知。
經濟部在回應六大工商團體呼籲時，曾特別提到國內目前對洽簽ＣＥＣＡ的議題，不論就協定名稱、推動方式或是時機都還存有不同的聲音。這個「不同的聲音」，應該就是綠營的反應，擔心洽簽ＣＥＣＡ會導致台灣喪失主權、經濟過度依賴大陸等等。講實在話，馬總統當初會提出兩岸洽簽ＣＥＣＡ的擬議，著眼點之一正是在讓台灣規避主權被矮化的疑慮，將重點完全放在取消兩岸間包括關稅、經貿、投資等障礙，進一步開放技術人員、資金、勞務、商品等的自由流動，使其逐漸形成一個既符合ＷＴＯ準則，又符合兩岸現狀經貿合作的形態。以台灣過往在全球經貿布局的靈活度，這種開放將提供更多的機會，讓台灣在未來全新的經貿戰國時代中，尋找自己的定位，假如像目前這樣綁手綁腳下去，勢必自陷進退失據。要知道，台灣目前貿易比重會嚴重向大陸傾斜，有大半正是在民進黨執政期間發生，這麼大比例的貿易依存度，雙方連最起碼的投資與經貿互動協定都沒有，難道不是執政的怠惰？
可以說，經濟部的顧慮，並不在於兩岸立場的分歧，而是在於朝野立場的對立，特別是民進黨假如還是執著於從政治面去解讀ＣＥＣＡ，很可能在未來的時日，不論這個協議怎麼小心閃躲主權的爭議，終究還是會發展成意識形態的議題，正如同去年大選期間「兩岸共同市場」被曲解成「一中市場」一樣。而目前許多曲解ＣＥＣＡ的論述已經陸續出爐，執政當局如果要避免這個議題再次陷入無謂的統獨之爭，在爭取朝野對話的步伐上，恐怕要多加一把勁了。
當然，民進黨如果反對這個政策，除了重彈意識形態的老調外，最好也能提出足夠令人信服的論述，台灣人民已經給了民進黨八年的機會，結果又如何呢？如今東亞區域經濟整合在即，全球金融海嘯肆虐未退，台灣這個依賴貿易出口推動成長的經濟體，已經陷入四面楚歌的困境，爭取洽簽ＣＥＣＡ，也只是爭取突破困境的途徑之一而已。更何況所有涉及關稅的協議，本來就要經過立法院這一關，屆時該顧慮的因素都會有所考量，如果最後仍不免還是淪為意識形態的角力，那就真的令人非常遺憾了。
Friday, February 13, 2009
The Chen Family Gives Deep Greens a Slap in the Face
The Chen Family Gives Deep Greens a Slap in the Face
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 13, 2009
Wu Shu-chen, accompanied by her newly-recruited legal counsel, re-appeared in court, 788 days after her last appearance. She agreed to a "technical plea of guilty." She did not resort to her usual fainting tactics. For Deep Green Taiwan independence supporters, who did everything in their power to obstruct justice, watching Chen Shui-bian's wife and son plead guilty must have been a bolt out of the blue.
Wu Shu-chen could drag out the process and refuse to appear in court in part because of her physical condition, and in part because her Deep Green legal defense team worked hand in hand with the Chen family to politicize their indictment and spin their prosecution for corruption and money-laundering as "judicial persecution." The defense team's showmanship trumped the prosecution's professionalism. Nevertheless, once Chen Chih-chung and his wife asked for a plea bargain, the result was an internal uprising. Lee Sheng-hsiung and others terminated their client-attorney relationship with Wu Shu-chen. Within one short week, Wu Shu-chen quickly found replacements for all three members of her legal defense team. She decided to plead guilty to some of the charges against her. By then, the ugly face of the Chen family's corruption had been exposed. Do Taiwan independence supporters still wish to maintain that Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen were sacrificial martyrs nailed to the cross for supporting Taiwan Independence?
The stubborn illusions Deep Greens have regarding Chen Shui-bian are incomprehensible, particularly now that the Chen family scandals have been exposed by prosecutors. A bunch of pro-independence lawyers and Deep Green elements persist in white-washing Ah-Bian's crimes. One can only wonder what they are thinking. Lee Sheng-hsiung's statement upon terminating his relationship with the Chen family offers us an insight. He said being Ah-Chen's attorney was in effect, "leading the entire Chen family to the Lord." Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-Ching's confession precipitated an internal uprising. He could no longer act as Ah-Chen's attorney. Lee conflated the roles of legal counsel and spiritual advisor. He seemed more interested in abstract faith, to the point of neglecting his client's interests.
For Lee Sheng-hsiung, his role as Taiwan independence elder trumped his role as defense attorney. That may be the ultimate reason he opposed a guilty plea. Only by refusing to acknowlege the legitimacy of secular justice, could he depict criminal prosecution as "political persecution," and maintain the sanctity of Taiwan independence.
The problem with lawyers such as Lee Sheng-hsiung, is that their other roles have compromised their role as defense attorneys. Urging the Chen family to believe in the Lord, and helping the Chen family achieve spiritual tranquility, is noble. But ignoring real world circumstances, to the point of obdurately urging the Chen family not to admit guilt, runs counter to the goal of helping them seek redemption. Besides, defense attorneys have a sworn duty to use the legal tools at their disposal to safeguard the rights and interests of their clients. Advising a defendant not to plead guilty merely because doing so would undermine the attorney's political faith is both dereliction of duty and a violation of professional ethics.
Lee Sheng-hsiung and others could neither advance nor retreat. Their dilemma reflects the dilemma of Deep Green Taiwan independence thought and action. One. As a political movement Taiwan independence must offer a vision to attract followers. But Deep Greens have bet everything the farm on the hopelessly corrupt Ah-Bian. What are they doing, if not asking for trouble? Two. Any movement must constantly engage in soul-searching and fresh thinking in order to clarify its values and reaffirm its goals. But Deep Green Taiwan independence elements want only to deny the legitimacy of the political framework and the justice system. They even want to undermine such universal values as justice, integrity, conscience. In the process, they have merely marginalized themselves. Over the past eight years, "nativist" sentiment has indeed grown. But the Taiwan independence movement has simultaneously withered. One reason is the constraints of reality. Another reason is that Chen Shui-bian overplayed his hand. To continue putting Chen Shui-bian on a pedestal, this late in the game, is self-degradation.
Wu Shu-chen has pleaded guilty to some of the indictments against her. Now that she no longer needs to act out the role of "victim of political persecution," she seems more relaxed. It has now been established that Chen Chih-chung and his wife knew they were involved in money laundering. Wu Shu-chen knew she took money she shouldn't have. She can no longer feign innocence. She has in effect lowered the sacred banner that Taiwan independence elements raised. She has come back down to earth. She will have to pay a price, of course. But at least she can come back down to earth. She can resume the role of wife and mother. She need no longer remain imprisoned within Bao-lai Gardens, on the Deep Green sacrificial altar arranged for her by Taiwan independence elements.
Regardless of how genuine their repentance might be, Chen Chih-chung, Huang Jiu-ching, and Wu Shu-chen have pleaded guilty. At least they have acknowledged they can no longer deny legal responsibilty. By contrast, the blinkered, Deep Green supporters of Taiwan independence who continue to insist that Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen are victims of judicial persecution, are truly lost. They have no idea where their imaginary Nation of Taiwan can be found. Meanwhile, they have forsaken whatever fundamental moral and ethical beliefs they might once have held.
Take the following four values: law, democracy, morality, and religion. Which of these should lawyers value the most? Or, within the dark and endless tunnel that is Taiwan independence, can all of them be discarded?
扁家給了台獨深綠一記悶棍
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.13 02:37 am
距上次開庭七百八十八天，吳淑珍在新聘律師的陪伴下重新出庭；她使出「技術性認罪」，未再演出昏厥戰術。看到阿扁妻、子相繼認罪，千方百計阻撓司法偵辦的台獨深綠人士，恐怕有如五雷轟頂！
吳淑珍能拖那麼久不出庭，一方面是以身體狀況特殊為藉口，另方面則是政治色彩強烈的律師團配合扁家採取高度政治對抗策略，企圖將全案定位為「司法迫害」，以抵制偵審。這些律師在政治操作上的演出，尤勝過法律專業上的表現。然而，在陳致中夫婦驟然提出認罪協商後，此一布局已形同爆發內部叛變，李勝雄律師更因而與吳淑珍解除委任關係；短短一周，吳淑珍臨時更換了全部原聘的三名辯護律師，並走上當庭部分認罪之路。至此，扁家所涉貪瀆弊案的原形畢露，深綠還要堅稱扁珍是為台獨建國被釘上十字架的犧牲者嗎？
深綠對陳水扁何以存有如此執迷的幻想，令人難解。尤其在扁家弊案內情陸續遭檢方偵破之後，一批以獨派律師為核心的深綠人士卻還在為阿扁塗脂抹粉，已至不知所云的地步。這從李勝雄解除委任的聲明可窺見一斑：他聲稱擔任阿珍律師是為「帶領扁全家信主」，因致靚認罪導致扁家親情衝突，所以不再為珍辯護。他不僅將「律師」和「牧師」角色混為一談，似乎更到了只顧抽象信念、罔顧當事人權益的地步。
凌駕在李勝雄「律師」和「長老」身分之上的，其實是他「獨派大老」的角色，那可能才是他反對認罪的終極謎底：不承認世俗的司法審判，才能將弊案塑造成「政治迫害」，才能維持台獨信念的神聖性。
李勝雄等律師的問題，在於他們把自己的多重身分夾纏在辯護任務上。要勸服扁家信主、幫扁家獲得心靈平靜，這是高尚的關懷；但若罔顧現實情境，竟至堅持扁家不可認罪認錯的地步，這恐與協助懺悔的目標已背道而馳。再說，律師的天職既在運用司法工具以維護當事人權益，若竟一味根據律師自己所信奉的政治利益行事，不同意被告認罪；從專業上看，這恐怕是不稱職、也不道德的。
李勝雄等的進退失據，也正反映了深綠獨派的思想侷限和行動困境。第一，台獨作為政治運動，需要提供理想願景吸引群眾追隨；但深綠卻孤注一擲將所有賭注押在貪瀆無行的阿扁身上，豈非自貽伊戚？二，任何運動皆須不斷反省及更新論述，充實其價值和目標；但深綠獨派不僅企圖要全盤否認現行體制和司法，甚至要顛覆社會大眾所共信的正義、廉恥等價值，這等於是自我邊緣化。三，過去八年台灣本土意識確有深化，台獨運動卻反而倒退，除了現實條件所限，阿扁肆無忌憚地玩權弄術也是主因。如今還要將陳水扁奉為教主，更無異於自甘墮落。
從吳淑珍出庭並選擇性地認罪看，不須刻意表演「政治受難」戲碼的她，似乎顯得輕鬆許多。陳致中夫婦自知涉及洗錢的事證明確，吳淑珍當然更知道自己拿了不該拿的錢，無法繼續假裝無辜；所以，她把自己從獨派為扁家架設的「神聖家族」旗桿上降了下來。回到地面，她當然要付出代價，但她至少可以重回人間，回復其人妻及人母的天倫反應，不必自我囚禁在寶徠花園和台獨人士為她布置的深綠聖壇。
不管坦白了幾分，致靚和吳淑珍相繼認罪，至少表示他們亦知有無可遁逃的法律責任。相形之下，那些還矇著眼睛宣稱扁珍是遭受司法迫害的深綠台獨，才是真正的虛無主義者；他們想像中的國家還不知道在哪裡，卻連自己原本持守的道德信仰也都拋棄殆盡了。
請問：在法律、民主、道德、宗教四個選項中，一位律師的價值次序應當是什麼？或者，在幽深無盡的台獨隧道中，難道這些全都可以拋棄？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 13, 2009
Wu Shu-chen, accompanied by her newly-recruited legal counsel, re-appeared in court, 788 days after her last appearance. She agreed to a "technical plea of guilty." She did not resort to her usual fainting tactics. For Deep Green Taiwan independence supporters, who did everything in their power to obstruct justice, watching Chen Shui-bian's wife and son plead guilty must have been a bolt out of the blue.
Wu Shu-chen could drag out the process and refuse to appear in court in part because of her physical condition, and in part because her Deep Green legal defense team worked hand in hand with the Chen family to politicize their indictment and spin their prosecution for corruption and money-laundering as "judicial persecution." The defense team's showmanship trumped the prosecution's professionalism. Nevertheless, once Chen Chih-chung and his wife asked for a plea bargain, the result was an internal uprising. Lee Sheng-hsiung and others terminated their client-attorney relationship with Wu Shu-chen. Within one short week, Wu Shu-chen quickly found replacements for all three members of her legal defense team. She decided to plead guilty to some of the charges against her. By then, the ugly face of the Chen family's corruption had been exposed. Do Taiwan independence supporters still wish to maintain that Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen were sacrificial martyrs nailed to the cross for supporting Taiwan Independence?
The stubborn illusions Deep Greens have regarding Chen Shui-bian are incomprehensible, particularly now that the Chen family scandals have been exposed by prosecutors. A bunch of pro-independence lawyers and Deep Green elements persist in white-washing Ah-Bian's crimes. One can only wonder what they are thinking. Lee Sheng-hsiung's statement upon terminating his relationship with the Chen family offers us an insight. He said being Ah-Chen's attorney was in effect, "leading the entire Chen family to the Lord." Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-Ching's confession precipitated an internal uprising. He could no longer act as Ah-Chen's attorney. Lee conflated the roles of legal counsel and spiritual advisor. He seemed more interested in abstract faith, to the point of neglecting his client's interests.
For Lee Sheng-hsiung, his role as Taiwan independence elder trumped his role as defense attorney. That may be the ultimate reason he opposed a guilty plea. Only by refusing to acknowlege the legitimacy of secular justice, could he depict criminal prosecution as "political persecution," and maintain the sanctity of Taiwan independence.
The problem with lawyers such as Lee Sheng-hsiung, is that their other roles have compromised their role as defense attorneys. Urging the Chen family to believe in the Lord, and helping the Chen family achieve spiritual tranquility, is noble. But ignoring real world circumstances, to the point of obdurately urging the Chen family not to admit guilt, runs counter to the goal of helping them seek redemption. Besides, defense attorneys have a sworn duty to use the legal tools at their disposal to safeguard the rights and interests of their clients. Advising a defendant not to plead guilty merely because doing so would undermine the attorney's political faith is both dereliction of duty and a violation of professional ethics.
Lee Sheng-hsiung and others could neither advance nor retreat. Their dilemma reflects the dilemma of Deep Green Taiwan independence thought and action. One. As a political movement Taiwan independence must offer a vision to attract followers. But Deep Greens have bet everything the farm on the hopelessly corrupt Ah-Bian. What are they doing, if not asking for trouble? Two. Any movement must constantly engage in soul-searching and fresh thinking in order to clarify its values and reaffirm its goals. But Deep Green Taiwan independence elements want only to deny the legitimacy of the political framework and the justice system. They even want to undermine such universal values as justice, integrity, conscience. In the process, they have merely marginalized themselves. Over the past eight years, "nativist" sentiment has indeed grown. But the Taiwan independence movement has simultaneously withered. One reason is the constraints of reality. Another reason is that Chen Shui-bian overplayed his hand. To continue putting Chen Shui-bian on a pedestal, this late in the game, is self-degradation.
Wu Shu-chen has pleaded guilty to some of the indictments against her. Now that she no longer needs to act out the role of "victim of political persecution," she seems more relaxed. It has now been established that Chen Chih-chung and his wife knew they were involved in money laundering. Wu Shu-chen knew she took money she shouldn't have. She can no longer feign innocence. She has in effect lowered the sacred banner that Taiwan independence elements raised. She has come back down to earth. She will have to pay a price, of course. But at least she can come back down to earth. She can resume the role of wife and mother. She need no longer remain imprisoned within Bao-lai Gardens, on the Deep Green sacrificial altar arranged for her by Taiwan independence elements.
Regardless of how genuine their repentance might be, Chen Chih-chung, Huang Jiu-ching, and Wu Shu-chen have pleaded guilty. At least they have acknowledged they can no longer deny legal responsibilty. By contrast, the blinkered, Deep Green supporters of Taiwan independence who continue to insist that Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen are victims of judicial persecution, are truly lost. They have no idea where their imaginary Nation of Taiwan can be found. Meanwhile, they have forsaken whatever fundamental moral and ethical beliefs they might once have held.
Take the following four values: law, democracy, morality, and religion. Which of these should lawyers value the most? Or, within the dark and endless tunnel that is Taiwan independence, can all of them be discarded?
扁家給了台獨深綠一記悶棍
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.13 02:37 am
距上次開庭七百八十八天，吳淑珍在新聘律師的陪伴下重新出庭；她使出「技術性認罪」，未再演出昏厥戰術。看到阿扁妻、子相繼認罪，千方百計阻撓司法偵辦的台獨深綠人士，恐怕有如五雷轟頂！
吳淑珍能拖那麼久不出庭，一方面是以身體狀況特殊為藉口，另方面則是政治色彩強烈的律師團配合扁家採取高度政治對抗策略，企圖將全案定位為「司法迫害」，以抵制偵審。這些律師在政治操作上的演出，尤勝過法律專業上的表現。然而，在陳致中夫婦驟然提出認罪協商後，此一布局已形同爆發內部叛變，李勝雄律師更因而與吳淑珍解除委任關係；短短一周，吳淑珍臨時更換了全部原聘的三名辯護律師，並走上當庭部分認罪之路。至此，扁家所涉貪瀆弊案的原形畢露，深綠還要堅稱扁珍是為台獨建國被釘上十字架的犧牲者嗎？
深綠對陳水扁何以存有如此執迷的幻想，令人難解。尤其在扁家弊案內情陸續遭檢方偵破之後，一批以獨派律師為核心的深綠人士卻還在為阿扁塗脂抹粉，已至不知所云的地步。這從李勝雄解除委任的聲明可窺見一斑：他聲稱擔任阿珍律師是為「帶領扁全家信主」，因致靚認罪導致扁家親情衝突，所以不再為珍辯護。他不僅將「律師」和「牧師」角色混為一談，似乎更到了只顧抽象信念、罔顧當事人權益的地步。
凌駕在李勝雄「律師」和「長老」身分之上的，其實是他「獨派大老」的角色，那可能才是他反對認罪的終極謎底：不承認世俗的司法審判，才能將弊案塑造成「政治迫害」，才能維持台獨信念的神聖性。
李勝雄等律師的問題，在於他們把自己的多重身分夾纏在辯護任務上。要勸服扁家信主、幫扁家獲得心靈平靜，這是高尚的關懷；但若罔顧現實情境，竟至堅持扁家不可認罪認錯的地步，這恐與協助懺悔的目標已背道而馳。再說，律師的天職既在運用司法工具以維護當事人權益，若竟一味根據律師自己所信奉的政治利益行事，不同意被告認罪；從專業上看，這恐怕是不稱職、也不道德的。
李勝雄等的進退失據，也正反映了深綠獨派的思想侷限和行動困境。第一，台獨作為政治運動，需要提供理想願景吸引群眾追隨；但深綠卻孤注一擲將所有賭注押在貪瀆無行的阿扁身上，豈非自貽伊戚？二，任何運動皆須不斷反省及更新論述，充實其價值和目標；但深綠獨派不僅企圖要全盤否認現行體制和司法，甚至要顛覆社會大眾所共信的正義、廉恥等價值，這等於是自我邊緣化。三，過去八年台灣本土意識確有深化，台獨運動卻反而倒退，除了現實條件所限，阿扁肆無忌憚地玩權弄術也是主因。如今還要將陳水扁奉為教主，更無異於自甘墮落。
從吳淑珍出庭並選擇性地認罪看，不須刻意表演「政治受難」戲碼的她，似乎顯得輕鬆許多。陳致中夫婦自知涉及洗錢的事證明確，吳淑珍當然更知道自己拿了不該拿的錢，無法繼續假裝無辜；所以，她把自己從獨派為扁家架設的「神聖家族」旗桿上降了下來。回到地面，她當然要付出代價，但她至少可以重回人間，回復其人妻及人母的天倫反應，不必自我囚禁在寶徠花園和台獨人士為她布置的深綠聖壇。
不管坦白了幾分，致靚和吳淑珍相繼認罪，至少表示他們亦知有無可遁逃的法律責任。相形之下，那些還矇著眼睛宣稱扁珍是遭受司法迫害的深綠台獨，才是真正的虛無主義者；他們想像中的國家還不知道在哪裡，卻連自己原本持守的道德信仰也都拋棄殆盡了。
請問：在法律、民主、道德、宗教四個選項中，一位律師的價值次序應當是什麼？或者，在幽深無盡的台獨隧道中，難道這些全都可以拋棄？
The NCC: Helping to Trample Over Press Freedom?
The NCC: Helping to Trample Over Press Freedom?
China Times editorial
A Translation
February 9, 2009
The National Communication Commission (NCC) has just issued a new draft of its satellite radio and television law. National Communication Commission Chairperson Bonnie Peng was the odd person out. She was unable to prevent other members of the commission from passing the new law. All she could do was write a lengthy dissenting opinion.
Chairperson Bonnie Peng's dissent addressed freedom of speech and freedom of press issues. The new satellite radio and television law seems regressive, a throwback to a time when the Government Information Office's word was law. Judging by the revised draft law, current NCC members have a very different view of freedom of expression than previous NCC members. Back then the Grand Justices were concerned that apportioning membership on the NCC based on the political composition of the legislature was harmful to the independence of broadcast industry regulatory agencies. They declared that the establishment of the NCC unconstitutional. Now however, the NCC shares the Executive Yuan's attitude about commission appointments, and the administrative agencies' attitude about regulation. One can only wonder whether the Grand Justices feel a sense of frustration. If the Legislative Yuan passes the bill into law, the Grand Justices should review the law for violating constitutional guarantees of free speech.
Our concerns are hardly unfounded. The revised law contains serious threats to free speech. One. Article 21 authorizes regulatory agencies to rate radio and television programs, in addition to advertising. The slightest mistake on the part of the media, and regulatory agencies can use the rating process as a pretext to censor radio and television program content. A major firewall has already been breached.
Two. The law prohibits the broadcasting of news articles that have not been checked for accuracy. But the broadcasting of real-time radio and television programs can hardly wait while government agencies check the facts. The probable result will be that no news whatsoever can be broadcast. If the regulatory agency establishes its own standards, it could create a situation in which "those who obey may broadcast, but those who don't will be silenced." The chilling effect can easily be imagined.
Three. The law regulates product placement. This may not be a bad thing in itself. But Article II, paragraph 13 defines "product placement" too loosely, as "certain perspectives," and "the dissemination of information." This has far-reaching implications, and allows government agencies to regulate anything, to meddle in anything, and to be everywhere.
Four. The law mandates a so-called "right of reply." It expressly stipulates that "parties concerned" or "parties affected" can demand that the news story be censored or corrected. If the broadcaster refuses to address the matter as requested, the "parties concerned" or "parties affected" may file for an injunction. If the courts fail to understand their duty to defend freedom of speech, they may contribute to the suppression of free expression.
Five. Article 45 of the law stipulates that regulatory agencies may impose heavy fines on news sources who fail to verify the facts. This is a formal declaration that the era of broadcast news censorship, using "fact checking" as a pretext, has arrived. This constitutes control of editorial commentary. Don't think otherwise. Editorial content is based on fact. To demand that news reports must be absolutely true before they can be published, does not control only factual reporting, it also controls editorial commentary. For regulatory agencies to monitor the news means that freedom of the press on Taiwan has taken a giant step backward.
Six. Article 47 of the law authorizes regulatory agencies to inspect all program content and impound it if they see fit. The law originally applied only to advertising, but now news and other programming have are included. Scenes of police impounding contraband publications may soon reappear.
The morass of provisions in the revised law regarding "rights protection" and "penalties," authorizing regulatory agencies to clamp down, makes its intention perfectly clear. Such a comprehensive control mechanism brings back memories of the old Government Information Agency and Information Bureau.
The Criminal Code includes laws against defamation. The Civil Code provides for tort damages. The draft law implies that the court's burden isn't heavy enough already. Even more puzzling is the provision for injunctions, which originate in Anglo-American law, and are a discretionary power reserved for judges. Injunctions should only be handed down by the courts. Regulatory agencies may not abuse their authority clamping down on free expression. The draft law has been added to the court's power to issue injunctions. The NCC has been authorized to impound radio and television programs on its own initiative. The long arm of the state now extends into the electronic media. The courts are not intervening to prevent the government from abusing its power. They are behaving like the government's accomplices. Chairperson Bonnie Peng championed press freedom all her life. No wonder she spent the New Year's holiday writing her dissenting opinion.
If such a draft law passes, Chairperson Bonnie Peng will probably resign. Only such a gesture can express her outrage. For the sake of Bonnie Peng, who knows that the draft law must not pass, For the sake of free speech on Taiwan, individuals of conscience must sound the alarm!
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.09
通傳會真要扮演箝制新聞自由的幫凶？
中時社會
通傳會新版衛星廣播電視法草案出爐，不尋常的是，通傳會主委彭芸女士對此獨排眾議，但因無法阻攔其他委員以多數決通過修法草案，只能獨自寫下萬言的不同意見書。
彭芸主委所爭執的，主要是言論自由、新聞自由的觀念。新的衛廣法草案彷彿大開倒車，回到了新聞局主宰一切的時代。從修法草案看起來，第二屆通傳會委員對言論自由願意容許的程度，相較於第一屆通傳會委員顯然相當不同。當年大法官擔心依政黨比例方式產生的委員對於廣電主管機關的獨立性有害而宣告其組織違憲，現在通傳會對於行政院全權任命而與行政部門擅於管制的心態轉趨一致，不知道是否有噬臍莫及的感覺。可預見的是，這一份修法草案如果是在立法院中照案通過，不旋踵之間，大法官應該就有機會審查此法的內容有無嚴重違反憲法上言論自由的保障。
我們所以有如此把握，並非無因。此次修法草案中加入了許多高度威脅言論自由的規定，第一是授權主管機關將廣電節目（不只是廣告）分級（第廿一條），如果稍有不慎，政府部門極其容易藉著分級制度審查甚至箝制廣電節目內容，這是極其嚴重的關防，已遭逾越。
第二是禁止製播違反事實查證之新聞，對於即時播出的廣播電視新聞節目而言，如果主管機關認真要求查證，時效的掌握將會極其困難，其結果很可能是無新聞可播，如果主管機關自有尺度，就可能形成「順我者播、逆我者禁」的局面，寒蟬效應隨之而至，可以想見。
第三則是管制置入性行銷，這也許並非壞事，但是「置入性行銷」的定義過於寬鬆到「特定觀念」、「資訊」的「宣傳」（第二條十三款），就很可能株連甚廣，以至於主管機關可以無所不管、無所不問，而無所不在。
第四是所謂「回覆權」的規定，草案法條明文規定廣電節目所涉「當事人」或「利害關係人」得請求停播或更正，廣電事業拒依請求處理時，「當事人」或「利害關係人」即得向法院聲請定暫時狀態之假處分。可以預見的是，法院如果不能體會司法保障言論自由的義務，善盡其責任者，將來可能會有設置新聞法院來箝制言論自由的場景出現。
第五是主管機關可對違反事實查證原則之新聞處以高額罰鍰（第四十五條），正式宣告主管機關用「事實」管制廣電新聞的時代降臨。不要以為這不是在控制「評論」，評論都係以事實為根據，要求報導絕對真實，不只是控制事實報導，同時也是在控制評論。由行政機關監控新聞，台灣的新聞自由就是走上了回頭路。
第六是授權主管檢查所有節目內容並為扣押（第四十七條），原法規定只適用於廣告，現在新聞及其他節目也要涵蓋。當年警總動輒扣押違禁出版品的盛況，想必不久即將在通傳會重現。
其實，單從此次修法中關於「權利保護」，尤其是「罰則」章節加入密密麻麻的規定，主管機關加強箝制管控的弦歌雅意，不待知音即可辨識。此種舖天蓋地的管制機制，大概足可與昔日新聞局加上警備總部的時代相提並論。
不要忘了，刑法誹謗罪、民法侵權行為損害賠償的規定依然存在。此項修法草案似乎擔心法院的工作負擔不夠重，更令人不解的是，「假處分」規定是源自英美法法官保留原則的概念，也就是非經法院許可，政府部門不能自行動用公權力箝制言論自由。修法草案加入了法院假處分，卻又同時授權通傳會自行扣押廣電節目，政府的髒手隨時可以伸入廣電媒體，法院的介入不是在抑制政府濫權，反而像是要作政府的幫凶，彭芸主委教了一輩子的新聞自由，難怪要在過年期間動筆寫萬言的不同意見書。
如果這樣的修法草案可以通過，彭芸主委大概要辭卸其職，才能貫徹其學問良心。對於彭芸主委期期以為不可的修法草案，為了台灣的言論自由，有識之士鳴鼓而攻之可也！
China Times editorial
A Translation
February 9, 2009
The National Communication Commission (NCC) has just issued a new draft of its satellite radio and television law. National Communication Commission Chairperson Bonnie Peng was the odd person out. She was unable to prevent other members of the commission from passing the new law. All she could do was write a lengthy dissenting opinion.
Chairperson Bonnie Peng's dissent addressed freedom of speech and freedom of press issues. The new satellite radio and television law seems regressive, a throwback to a time when the Government Information Office's word was law. Judging by the revised draft law, current NCC members have a very different view of freedom of expression than previous NCC members. Back then the Grand Justices were concerned that apportioning membership on the NCC based on the political composition of the legislature was harmful to the independence of broadcast industry regulatory agencies. They declared that the establishment of the NCC unconstitutional. Now however, the NCC shares the Executive Yuan's attitude about commission appointments, and the administrative agencies' attitude about regulation. One can only wonder whether the Grand Justices feel a sense of frustration. If the Legislative Yuan passes the bill into law, the Grand Justices should review the law for violating constitutional guarantees of free speech.
Our concerns are hardly unfounded. The revised law contains serious threats to free speech. One. Article 21 authorizes regulatory agencies to rate radio and television programs, in addition to advertising. The slightest mistake on the part of the media, and regulatory agencies can use the rating process as a pretext to censor radio and television program content. A major firewall has already been breached.
Two. The law prohibits the broadcasting of news articles that have not been checked for accuracy. But the broadcasting of real-time radio and television programs can hardly wait while government agencies check the facts. The probable result will be that no news whatsoever can be broadcast. If the regulatory agency establishes its own standards, it could create a situation in which "those who obey may broadcast, but those who don't will be silenced." The chilling effect can easily be imagined.
Three. The law regulates product placement. This may not be a bad thing in itself. But Article II, paragraph 13 defines "product placement" too loosely, as "certain perspectives," and "the dissemination of information." This has far-reaching implications, and allows government agencies to regulate anything, to meddle in anything, and to be everywhere.
Four. The law mandates a so-called "right of reply." It expressly stipulates that "parties concerned" or "parties affected" can demand that the news story be censored or corrected. If the broadcaster refuses to address the matter as requested, the "parties concerned" or "parties affected" may file for an injunction. If the courts fail to understand their duty to defend freedom of speech, they may contribute to the suppression of free expression.
Five. Article 45 of the law stipulates that regulatory agencies may impose heavy fines on news sources who fail to verify the facts. This is a formal declaration that the era of broadcast news censorship, using "fact checking" as a pretext, has arrived. This constitutes control of editorial commentary. Don't think otherwise. Editorial content is based on fact. To demand that news reports must be absolutely true before they can be published, does not control only factual reporting, it also controls editorial commentary. For regulatory agencies to monitor the news means that freedom of the press on Taiwan has taken a giant step backward.
Six. Article 47 of the law authorizes regulatory agencies to inspect all program content and impound it if they see fit. The law originally applied only to advertising, but now news and other programming have are included. Scenes of police impounding contraband publications may soon reappear.
The morass of provisions in the revised law regarding "rights protection" and "penalties," authorizing regulatory agencies to clamp down, makes its intention perfectly clear. Such a comprehensive control mechanism brings back memories of the old Government Information Agency and Information Bureau.
The Criminal Code includes laws against defamation. The Civil Code provides for tort damages. The draft law implies that the court's burden isn't heavy enough already. Even more puzzling is the provision for injunctions, which originate in Anglo-American law, and are a discretionary power reserved for judges. Injunctions should only be handed down by the courts. Regulatory agencies may not abuse their authority clamping down on free expression. The draft law has been added to the court's power to issue injunctions. The NCC has been authorized to impound radio and television programs on its own initiative. The long arm of the state now extends into the electronic media. The courts are not intervening to prevent the government from abusing its power. They are behaving like the government's accomplices. Chairperson Bonnie Peng championed press freedom all her life. No wonder she spent the New Year's holiday writing her dissenting opinion.
If such a draft law passes, Chairperson Bonnie Peng will probably resign. Only such a gesture can express her outrage. For the sake of Bonnie Peng, who knows that the draft law must not pass, For the sake of free speech on Taiwan, individuals of conscience must sound the alarm!
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.09
通傳會真要扮演箝制新聞自由的幫凶？
中時社會
通傳會新版衛星廣播電視法草案出爐，不尋常的是，通傳會主委彭芸女士對此獨排眾議，但因無法阻攔其他委員以多數決通過修法草案，只能獨自寫下萬言的不同意見書。
彭芸主委所爭執的，主要是言論自由、新聞自由的觀念。新的衛廣法草案彷彿大開倒車，回到了新聞局主宰一切的時代。從修法草案看起來，第二屆通傳會委員對言論自由願意容許的程度，相較於第一屆通傳會委員顯然相當不同。當年大法官擔心依政黨比例方式產生的委員對於廣電主管機關的獨立性有害而宣告其組織違憲，現在通傳會對於行政院全權任命而與行政部門擅於管制的心態轉趨一致，不知道是否有噬臍莫及的感覺。可預見的是，這一份修法草案如果是在立法院中照案通過，不旋踵之間，大法官應該就有機會審查此法的內容有無嚴重違反憲法上言論自由的保障。
我們所以有如此把握，並非無因。此次修法草案中加入了許多高度威脅言論自由的規定，第一是授權主管機關將廣電節目（不只是廣告）分級（第廿一條），如果稍有不慎，政府部門極其容易藉著分級制度審查甚至箝制廣電節目內容，這是極其嚴重的關防，已遭逾越。
第二是禁止製播違反事實查證之新聞，對於即時播出的廣播電視新聞節目而言，如果主管機關認真要求查證，時效的掌握將會極其困難，其結果很可能是無新聞可播，如果主管機關自有尺度，就可能形成「順我者播、逆我者禁」的局面，寒蟬效應隨之而至，可以想見。
第三則是管制置入性行銷，這也許並非壞事，但是「置入性行銷」的定義過於寬鬆到「特定觀念」、「資訊」的「宣傳」（第二條十三款），就很可能株連甚廣，以至於主管機關可以無所不管、無所不問，而無所不在。
第四是所謂「回覆權」的規定，草案法條明文規定廣電節目所涉「當事人」或「利害關係人」得請求停播或更正，廣電事業拒依請求處理時，「當事人」或「利害關係人」即得向法院聲請定暫時狀態之假處分。可以預見的是，法院如果不能體會司法保障言論自由的義務，善盡其責任者，將來可能會有設置新聞法院來箝制言論自由的場景出現。
第五是主管機關可對違反事實查證原則之新聞處以高額罰鍰（第四十五條），正式宣告主管機關用「事實」管制廣電新聞的時代降臨。不要以為這不是在控制「評論」，評論都係以事實為根據，要求報導絕對真實，不只是控制事實報導，同時也是在控制評論。由行政機關監控新聞，台灣的新聞自由就是走上了回頭路。
第六是授權主管檢查所有節目內容並為扣押（第四十七條），原法規定只適用於廣告，現在新聞及其他節目也要涵蓋。當年警總動輒扣押違禁出版品的盛況，想必不久即將在通傳會重現。
其實，單從此次修法中關於「權利保護」，尤其是「罰則」章節加入密密麻麻的規定，主管機關加強箝制管控的弦歌雅意，不待知音即可辨識。此種舖天蓋地的管制機制，大概足可與昔日新聞局加上警備總部的時代相提並論。
不要忘了，刑法誹謗罪、民法侵權行為損害賠償的規定依然存在。此項修法草案似乎擔心法院的工作負擔不夠重，更令人不解的是，「假處分」規定是源自英美法法官保留原則的概念，也就是非經法院許可，政府部門不能自行動用公權力箝制言論自由。修法草案加入了法院假處分，卻又同時授權通傳會自行扣押廣電節目，政府的髒手隨時可以伸入廣電媒體，法院的介入不是在抑制政府濫權，反而像是要作政府的幫凶，彭芸主委教了一輩子的新聞自由，難怪要在過年期間動筆寫萬言的不同意見書。
如果這樣的修法草案可以通過，彭芸主委大概要辭卸其職，才能貫徹其學問良心。對於彭芸主委期期以為不可的修法草案，為了台灣的言論自由，有識之士鳴鼓而攻之可也！
Thursday, February 12, 2009
More Than Mere Legal Maneuveuring
More Than Mere Legal Maneuveuring
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 12, 2009
Wu Shu-chen has chosen to admit partial guilt, or to admit guilt as a legal ploy. Either way observers are nearly unanimous about her legal strategy and underlying motivation. They have pointed out the many ways in which Wu Shu-chen is covering up and contradicting herself. Here we would like to ask a hypothetical question. Suppose Wu Shu-chen's testimony is true. Suppose she really didn't engage in bribery and corruption? Suppose all she did was forge official documents and launder money? Suppose Ah-Bian has been seriously wronged? Suppose the poor man was actually kept in the dark all this time? Suppose he knew nothing? Suppose he should never have been detained? Suppose Wu Shu-chen's account is true? That raises an interesting question. Namely, has this man really been our President for the past eight years? Has this woman really been our First Lady?
Chen's legal defense team has been striving to create an image. According to this image, former President Chen has no standing at all at home. Wu Shu-chen wears the pants in the family. Chen Shui-bian never asks how Ah-Chen budgets their finances, Therefore Chen Shui-bian was in the dark about the receipts from the State Affairs Fund, and campaign contributions by business consortiums. Assuming this is all true, then we have to ask, is this really the kind of person has been governing our nation for the past eight years?
No normal department head of a public institution, no normal chief executive officer of a private corporation, no matter how much he loved his wife, would turn the entire household budget over to his wife to manage. He would certainly not dare put his wife in charge of the budget for the department or company he heads. He would not certainly not dare permit his wife to collect invoices from the wives of subordinates and submit them to his department or company for reimbursement. He would certainly not dare permit his wife to meddle in official departmental or company disputes. He would certainly not take orders from her on how to run the department or company he heads. It is not even necessary to explicitly forbid such conduct, because since time immemorial the line between public and private has never been in doubt.
The First Lady is severely handicapped. Wu Shu-chen must be assisted in all her movements by family members. She is so frail that when issued summons to appear in court, she asked to be excused 17 consecutive times, for reasons of health. Who knew she had the time and energy to intervene in the Nankang Exhibition Hall construction bidding process, and to order the Minister of the Interior to leak the list of review board members? She was not the least bit shy about mediating disputes between wealthy consortiums. She directly intervened in the Lungtan land auction process. If that was not enough, she unblinkingly collected hundreds of millions in "campaign contributions" then transferred them overseas into dummy accounts under her son's name. The prosecution has indicted her on all counts. Wu Shu-chen has admitted to them. Are these things permissible for the First Lady? Can these things be cavalierly rationalized away as "campaign contributions?"
Now let's look at the State Affairs Fund. Whether one wishes to cite the "big reservoir theory," or to attribute the problem to obsolete practices, as long as the expenses are in fact "Presidential Office official expenditures," they can more or less be justified. But by no amount of rationalization can justify putting the First Lady in charge of collecting receipts, or allowing her to fulfill a role akin to Yu Wen's. No amount of rationalization can justify permitting the First Lady to collect invoices from the wives of wealthy cronies for reimbursement, then making them available to former President Chen. If everything was as Wu Shu-chen said, if she did not embezzle even a single dollar, then Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-chen owe everyone on Taiwan an explanation. The State Affairs Fund should have been directly remitted to the president for his use. Why did it have to first pass through the president's official residence? No matter how tolerant voters may be of former President Chen's pecadillos, this is one they cannot possibly tolerate.
Let's return to the root of the problem. How could a president who was ostensibly elected by over half the voters, who swore an oath to uphold the constitution, who was endorsed by a political party that trumpets its moral rectitude, sink so low as to allow his wife to assume official functions and exercise official powers. How could he turn the machinery of the State Affairs Fund over to wife? How could he be totally unaware of his own wife's brazen involvement in public works bidding, issuing orders to department heads to leak secrets, and mediating disputes between wealthy consortiums? How could he know nothing about his spouse's laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars in cash and jewels all over the world. During his presidency Chen lived under the same roof with her, day after day, for eight years. The public is being asked to believe he was kept in the dark all this time. In fact the ones who were truly kept in the dark are ordinary members of the public.
Wu Shu-chen's testimony must not be dismissed as legal maneuveuring. It must not be dismissed as an effort to help her husband and son evade prosecution. It must not be dismissed as a way to allow Ah-Bian to distance himself from these crimes. Even assuming he could, what would be the point? If the evidence shows Chen Shui-bian was aware of everything that was going on, then he was her chief accomplice. If the evidence shows Chen Shui-bian was completely oblivous to what was happening for the past eight years, then he was an incompetent fool. The only question in the public's mind is, which one of these is the real Chen Shui-bian.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.12
這絕不只是一場司法攻防
中時社論
姑不論吳淑珍是選擇性認罪還是技術性認罪，這兩天論者幾乎口徑一致集中在她訴訟策略與動機上討論，確也點出不少吳淑珍辯詞中的掩飾與矛盾，但我們在這裡倒是想虛擬地假設一下：假如吳淑珍的「證詞」全都是真的，她確實沒貪汙也沒索賄，了不起只有偽造文書、洗洗錢而已；而且假如大家也真的都冤枉阿扁了，這位可憐的總統其實一直全都被矇在鼓裡，什麼都不知道，打開始根本就不該關他的。假如吳淑珍交代的就是事實的真相，那麼誰都可以繼續追問一個有趣的問題：難道過去八年，這就是我們的總統？這就是我們的第一夫人？
替扁辯護的律師團，一直努力在營造一種意象：陳前總統在官邸中是沒地位的，一切都是由吳淑珍發號施令的，而阿珍要怎麼調度錢財，阿扁是從不過問的，也因為這樣，所有國務機要費的領用，所有財團大戶的進貢，阿扁都是一概不知情的，假如這一切也都是千真萬確的，那我們還要再問一次：我們就是被這樣的總統治理了八年？
一個尋常公家機構的部門主管，或是一個私人企業的執行長，就算個性再怎麼懼內，再怎麼疼愛老婆，把家中所有用度的支配權全交給太太管，也不敢膽大到把他擔任主管的行政事務費，全權交給老婆具領，還聽任其大肆蒐集貴婦團的發票報銷吧？更不會容許老婆介入公務糾葛，甚至聽任其在家中遙控指揮吧？這種分際從不需要法律規定，因為不論古往今來，「公私分野」早就是政治上毋庸懷疑的定律了。
身為一位重度殘障的第一夫人，吳淑珍進出都需要家人照顧，身體衰弱到出個庭還要請十七次假，這樣的狀況，誰能想像她竟能興致勃勃地介入南港展覽館的工程招標，直接要求內政部長洩露審查委員的名單；她也毫不避諱地介入豪門的恩怨調停，直接干預龍潭一筆土地的標售，這樣還不夠，她還理直氣壯的收下數以億計的所謂「政治獻金」，用人頭匯到海外存到自己兒子的戶頭中。這一切的一切，不僅是檢方起訴的，也是吳淑珍自己承認的，那麼這一切的一切，是身為第一夫人被容許做的事嗎？「政治獻金」可以這樣被定義嗎？
再說國務機要費，不論是扯「大水庫理論」也好，是歸諸歷史共業也罷，只要確實都是「總統府公務支出」，一切都還說得過去。但再怎麼擴張解釋，也不致容許拿著領據領出來全交由第一夫人處理，不僅由第一夫人扮演類似余文的角色，蒐集貴婦團的發票報銷，也透過第一夫人撥交國務機要費給陳前總統支用。假如一切都如吳淑珍所指陳，她一塊錢也沒Ａ，那麼不論陳水扁還是吳淑珍，都該給全台灣老百姓一個具有說服性的解釋，為什麼依法該由總統直接支用的國務機要費，非要繞道先經由官邸撥交？選民再肯定陳前總統的操守，也不可能接受這種做法吧！
現在回到問題的本源，一個受到全國半數選民託付的總統，一個曾經對憲法宣誓過的總統，也是一個標榜廉潔價值的政黨所背過書的總統，怎麼會離譜到將行使職權的國務機要費全交由妻子支配？又怎麼會對自己妻子公然介入公共工程發包、號令部會首長洩密、調停財團利益分配…，完全渾然無所覺？對自己每天生活在同一個屋簷下親人，不斷將幾億幾億來源不明的錢財珠寶搬到全世界去洗，也統統一無所知？如果陳水扁做了八年總統，這一切的一切他竟能全都被矇在鼓裡，那麼，感到不解的，該是老百姓吧！
吳淑珍在法庭上的證言，絕不能只看做是一場單純的司法攻防，也不只是她究竟能替丈夫及兒子攬了多少罪，更不是扁能不能藉由她的證詞進行全面的切割，坦白說，就算成功切割了又怎麼樣？如果最終證明阿扁知道這一切，那不必懷疑他就是共同正犯；假如阿扁八年一路走來，對這一切統統一無所知，那也不必懷疑，他簡直是昏庸到極點。問題的關鍵恐怕是，大家究竟相信哪一個才是真的阿扁！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 12, 2009
Wu Shu-chen has chosen to admit partial guilt, or to admit guilt as a legal ploy. Either way observers are nearly unanimous about her legal strategy and underlying motivation. They have pointed out the many ways in which Wu Shu-chen is covering up and contradicting herself. Here we would like to ask a hypothetical question. Suppose Wu Shu-chen's testimony is true. Suppose she really didn't engage in bribery and corruption? Suppose all she did was forge official documents and launder money? Suppose Ah-Bian has been seriously wronged? Suppose the poor man was actually kept in the dark all this time? Suppose he knew nothing? Suppose he should never have been detained? Suppose Wu Shu-chen's account is true? That raises an interesting question. Namely, has this man really been our President for the past eight years? Has this woman really been our First Lady?
Chen's legal defense team has been striving to create an image. According to this image, former President Chen has no standing at all at home. Wu Shu-chen wears the pants in the family. Chen Shui-bian never asks how Ah-Chen budgets their finances, Therefore Chen Shui-bian was in the dark about the receipts from the State Affairs Fund, and campaign contributions by business consortiums. Assuming this is all true, then we have to ask, is this really the kind of person has been governing our nation for the past eight years?
No normal department head of a public institution, no normal chief executive officer of a private corporation, no matter how much he loved his wife, would turn the entire household budget over to his wife to manage. He would certainly not dare put his wife in charge of the budget for the department or company he heads. He would not certainly not dare permit his wife to collect invoices from the wives of subordinates and submit them to his department or company for reimbursement. He would certainly not dare permit his wife to meddle in official departmental or company disputes. He would certainly not take orders from her on how to run the department or company he heads. It is not even necessary to explicitly forbid such conduct, because since time immemorial the line between public and private has never been in doubt.
The First Lady is severely handicapped. Wu Shu-chen must be assisted in all her movements by family members. She is so frail that when issued summons to appear in court, she asked to be excused 17 consecutive times, for reasons of health. Who knew she had the time and energy to intervene in the Nankang Exhibition Hall construction bidding process, and to order the Minister of the Interior to leak the list of review board members? She was not the least bit shy about mediating disputes between wealthy consortiums. She directly intervened in the Lungtan land auction process. If that was not enough, she unblinkingly collected hundreds of millions in "campaign contributions" then transferred them overseas into dummy accounts under her son's name. The prosecution has indicted her on all counts. Wu Shu-chen has admitted to them. Are these things permissible for the First Lady? Can these things be cavalierly rationalized away as "campaign contributions?"
Now let's look at the State Affairs Fund. Whether one wishes to cite the "big reservoir theory," or to attribute the problem to obsolete practices, as long as the expenses are in fact "Presidential Office official expenditures," they can more or less be justified. But by no amount of rationalization can justify putting the First Lady in charge of collecting receipts, or allowing her to fulfill a role akin to Yu Wen's. No amount of rationalization can justify permitting the First Lady to collect invoices from the wives of wealthy cronies for reimbursement, then making them available to former President Chen. If everything was as Wu Shu-chen said, if she did not embezzle even a single dollar, then Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-chen owe everyone on Taiwan an explanation. The State Affairs Fund should have been directly remitted to the president for his use. Why did it have to first pass through the president's official residence? No matter how tolerant voters may be of former President Chen's pecadillos, this is one they cannot possibly tolerate.
Let's return to the root of the problem. How could a president who was ostensibly elected by over half the voters, who swore an oath to uphold the constitution, who was endorsed by a political party that trumpets its moral rectitude, sink so low as to allow his wife to assume official functions and exercise official powers. How could he turn the machinery of the State Affairs Fund over to wife? How could he be totally unaware of his own wife's brazen involvement in public works bidding, issuing orders to department heads to leak secrets, and mediating disputes between wealthy consortiums? How could he know nothing about his spouse's laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars in cash and jewels all over the world. During his presidency Chen lived under the same roof with her, day after day, for eight years. The public is being asked to believe he was kept in the dark all this time. In fact the ones who were truly kept in the dark are ordinary members of the public.
Wu Shu-chen's testimony must not be dismissed as legal maneuveuring. It must not be dismissed as an effort to help her husband and son evade prosecution. It must not be dismissed as a way to allow Ah-Bian to distance himself from these crimes. Even assuming he could, what would be the point? If the evidence shows Chen Shui-bian was aware of everything that was going on, then he was her chief accomplice. If the evidence shows Chen Shui-bian was completely oblivous to what was happening for the past eight years, then he was an incompetent fool. The only question in the public's mind is, which one of these is the real Chen Shui-bian.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.02.12
這絕不只是一場司法攻防
中時社論
姑不論吳淑珍是選擇性認罪還是技術性認罪，這兩天論者幾乎口徑一致集中在她訴訟策略與動機上討論，確也點出不少吳淑珍辯詞中的掩飾與矛盾，但我們在這裡倒是想虛擬地假設一下：假如吳淑珍的「證詞」全都是真的，她確實沒貪汙也沒索賄，了不起只有偽造文書、洗洗錢而已；而且假如大家也真的都冤枉阿扁了，這位可憐的總統其實一直全都被矇在鼓裡，什麼都不知道，打開始根本就不該關他的。假如吳淑珍交代的就是事實的真相，那麼誰都可以繼續追問一個有趣的問題：難道過去八年，這就是我們的總統？這就是我們的第一夫人？
替扁辯護的律師團，一直努力在營造一種意象：陳前總統在官邸中是沒地位的，一切都是由吳淑珍發號施令的，而阿珍要怎麼調度錢財，阿扁是從不過問的，也因為這樣，所有國務機要費的領用，所有財團大戶的進貢，阿扁都是一概不知情的，假如這一切也都是千真萬確的，那我們還要再問一次：我們就是被這樣的總統治理了八年？
一個尋常公家機構的部門主管，或是一個私人企業的執行長，就算個性再怎麼懼內，再怎麼疼愛老婆，把家中所有用度的支配權全交給太太管，也不敢膽大到把他擔任主管的行政事務費，全權交給老婆具領，還聽任其大肆蒐集貴婦團的發票報銷吧？更不會容許老婆介入公務糾葛，甚至聽任其在家中遙控指揮吧？這種分際從不需要法律規定，因為不論古往今來，「公私分野」早就是政治上毋庸懷疑的定律了。
身為一位重度殘障的第一夫人，吳淑珍進出都需要家人照顧，身體衰弱到出個庭還要請十七次假，這樣的狀況，誰能想像她竟能興致勃勃地介入南港展覽館的工程招標，直接要求內政部長洩露審查委員的名單；她也毫不避諱地介入豪門的恩怨調停，直接干預龍潭一筆土地的標售，這樣還不夠，她還理直氣壯的收下數以億計的所謂「政治獻金」，用人頭匯到海外存到自己兒子的戶頭中。這一切的一切，不僅是檢方起訴的，也是吳淑珍自己承認的，那麼這一切的一切，是身為第一夫人被容許做的事嗎？「政治獻金」可以這樣被定義嗎？
再說國務機要費，不論是扯「大水庫理論」也好，是歸諸歷史共業也罷，只要確實都是「總統府公務支出」，一切都還說得過去。但再怎麼擴張解釋，也不致容許拿著領據領出來全交由第一夫人處理，不僅由第一夫人扮演類似余文的角色，蒐集貴婦團的發票報銷，也透過第一夫人撥交國務機要費給陳前總統支用。假如一切都如吳淑珍所指陳，她一塊錢也沒Ａ，那麼不論陳水扁還是吳淑珍，都該給全台灣老百姓一個具有說服性的解釋，為什麼依法該由總統直接支用的國務機要費，非要繞道先經由官邸撥交？選民再肯定陳前總統的操守，也不可能接受這種做法吧！
現在回到問題的本源，一個受到全國半數選民託付的總統，一個曾經對憲法宣誓過的總統，也是一個標榜廉潔價值的政黨所背過書的總統，怎麼會離譜到將行使職權的國務機要費全交由妻子支配？又怎麼會對自己妻子公然介入公共工程發包、號令部會首長洩密、調停財團利益分配…，完全渾然無所覺？對自己每天生活在同一個屋簷下親人，不斷將幾億幾億來源不明的錢財珠寶搬到全世界去洗，也統統一無所知？如果陳水扁做了八年總統，這一切的一切他竟能全都被矇在鼓裡，那麼，感到不解的，該是老百姓吧！
吳淑珍在法庭上的證言，絕不能只看做是一場單純的司法攻防，也不只是她究竟能替丈夫及兒子攬了多少罪，更不是扁能不能藉由她的證詞進行全面的切割，坦白說，就算成功切割了又怎麼樣？如果最終證明阿扁知道這一切，那不必懷疑他就是共同正犯；假如阿扁八年一路走來，對這一切統統一無所知，那也不必懷疑，他簡直是昏庸到極點。問題的關鍵恐怕是，大家究竟相信哪一個才是真的阿扁！
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