The DPP Cheers Chen Chu to Avoid an Internal Debate
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2009
The final impact of Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland on the Democratic Progressive Party remains to be seen. But hardline Taiwan independence advocate Wang Hsing-nan's suggestion that Chen Chu be awarded the Blue Sky White Sun Medal to fellow hardline Taiwan independence advocate Chen Chu is truly laughable.
During Chen Chu's official visit to Beijing, she uttered the words, "our central government's President Ma Ying-jeou." Theoretically and substantively, it was tantamount to proclaiming to the Beijing authorities that the DPP has revised its definition of Taiwan independence.
When word of her remarks got back to Taipei, the Democratic Progressive Party virtually mobilized the entire party, praising Chen Chu for having the wisdom and courage to "assert our national sovereignty." The DPP deftly shifted the focus away from an issue that deserves deep thought and close consideration.
Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland should have motivated the DPP to conduct a major internal debate on national identity and cross-Strait policy. But now it seems the entire party has reached a quiet understanding. The DPP will put a lid on the entire affair and never mention it again. Even Taiwan independence elements are biting their tongues. Chen Chu's words: "our central government's President Ma Ying-jeou," was a potential source of inner-party turmoil. Even this has been blown up into a major political achievement. This is both pathetic and risible.
Let's take a closer look at Chen Chu's language. The Democratic Progressive Party continues to champion its Taiwan independence Party Platform and its Resolution for a Normal Nation. So why did Chen Chu reaffirm the Republic of China in front of the Beijing authorities? The DPP expressed gratitude and appreciation to Chen Chu for her impromptu statement. But let's look at the logical contradiction behind the DPP's position. Why does the DPP affirm the Republic of China in front of Beijing, but run wild through the streets of Taiwan waving "Nation of Taiwan" flags?
This behavior is typical of the Democratic Progressive Party. It seeks only to achieve an immediate impact. It refuses to confront its self-contradictions. Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland was a major event. Perhaps amidst the DPP's "Ah Q" applause, it lost sight of the larger issue. Perhaps the proposal that Chen Chu be awarded a medal, is merely a means of defusing its embarrassment. Perhaps this is the reason the DPP is reluctant and afraid to debate the issue.
Every time an opportunity arises for a debate, the DPP has demonstrated a remarkable ability to disappear. This is perhaps the reason the DPP has been able to repeatedly squeak by. But it is also the reason the DPP remains trapped and must continue looking for a way out. Therefore every time we see the pragmatist/reformists within the Democratic Progressive Party clash with the fundamentalists, they end up hugging each other moments later. Principles that should have been clarified, are deliberately kept muddy. The party is still being held hostage by a tiny number of radicals.
Over the past two decades, The KMT has undergone several major schisms. Jaw Shaw-kang split and formed the New Party. James Soong split and formed the People First Party. In general, the minority that split represented changing mainstream public opinion. Although the schisms brought down the KMT, they also checked tyrants within the party. Finally, after eight years out of office, the KMT has been rebuilt both in its form and in its values. Schisms within the Democratic Progressive Party, on the other hand, are quite different. Hardline advocates of Taiwan independence and hardline supporters of Chen Shui-bian are few and far between. They consider Chen Shui-bian their spiritual leader, but they lack bona fide leaders such as Jaw Shao-kang and James Soong. All they have is the likes of Koo Kuan-min and Huang Ching-ling. Worse still, they lack the wherewithal to split from the Democratic Progressive Party on their own initiative. The DPP does not dare to disassociate itself from them. They dare not disassociate themselves from the DPP. Therefore the DPP remains incapable of using Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland as a catalyst for internal debate. Taiwan independence elements within the Democratic Progressive Party need only raise high the Nation of Taiwan banner, and the Democratic Progressive Party will be forced to salute. It will forever remain their hostage, forever incapable of driving them out. So why bother to debate?
Tsai Ing-wen and Chen Chu took the Taiwan independence elements by surprise. Taiwan independence elements have been badly hurt, yet dare not complain. This truly is a miracle. Chen Chu kept her May 17 Mainland itinerary secret. Tsai Ing-wen ensured that the May 17 protest march ended peacefully. Taiwan independence elements felt they had been played for fools. Yet the leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party remains afraid to debate the issue. Why begin a major debate over a small number of hardline advocates of Taiwan independence and hardline supporters of Chen Shui-bian? The hardline advocates of Taiwan independence do not want to debate the DPP leadership. They merely want to take them hostage. Isn't this the very reason hardline advocates of Taiwan independence and hardline supporters of Chen Shui-bian are still able to hijack the DPP?
Chen Chu affirmed the Republic of China in front of the Beijing authorities. Her gesture must not be seen merely as an impromptu gesture. Rather, it sums up the DPP's dilemma. Unless the DPP resolves its internal contradictions, how can DPP supporters be expected "to grow," as Tsai Ing-wen hopes?
The DPP must conduct a comprehensive review of its position regarding national identity and cross-Strait policy. Only then will it be able to establish a viable program for governing the nation. It must not engage in self-deception by suggesting that Chen Chu be awarded a medal. Instead, it should do some serious soul-searching.
民進黨為陳菊喝采以迴避黨內大辯論
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.27 05:32 am
陳菊登陸在民進黨內發生的效應尚待觀察。但鐵桿台獨王幸男，主張頒贈青天白日勳章給同是鐵桿台獨陳菊的提議，卻令人啼笑皆非。
陳菊在北京官式訪問中，表達對「中央政府我們的馬英九總統」的政治認同，在邏輯上及實質上，皆不啻是向北京當局宣示民進黨的台獨主張已有修正。
消息傳回台北，民進黨幾乎全黨一致借力使力，盛讚陳菊「表達國家主權」的智勇；四兩撥千斤，就如此這般地將一個應當深刻思辨的題目轉移了焦點。
陳菊登陸理應帶動民進黨內對國家認同及兩岸政策的大辯論；但如今看來，全黨皆頗有默契地按住鍋蓋不容掀開，甚至獨派也默不吭聲。陳菊的一句「中央政府我們的馬英九總統」，竟然被渲染成重大的政治成就，頃刻間一場可能出現的黨內大風暴，儼然竟變成了皆大歡喜的舉黨光榮。可悲，亦復可笑。
細究陳菊的語言。民進黨迄今仍然主張台獨黨綱及正常國家決議文，但為何陳菊卻在北京當局面前表達對中華民國的認同？民進黨對陳菊這句話的臨場效應大表激賞，但真正的問題卻是必須回過頭來解釋這句話的邏輯矛盾。為何向北京宣示認同中華民國，卻在島內舉著台灣國的旌旗滿街跑？
這正是民進黨的一貫手法，任何說詞只講求片刻的當場效果，根本不問在整體邏輯上的自相矛盾。陳菊登陸的大事件，或許就在民進黨的阿Ｑ式喝采中，流失了大辯論的契機；而主張贈勳給陳菊，不只是用以化解尷尬，其實也是在提供不願大辯論、不敢大辯論的理由。
在每次可能出現大辯論的契機之時，民進黨皆有使之消失於無形的本事。這或許正是民進黨屢次皆能得過且過的道理，但這也正是民進黨迄今仍然覓無生路的原因。因而，每次見到民進黨內務實改革派與基本教義派劍拔弩張，但一轉眼就在一觸即發之際雙方又抱在一起；原本應說清楚的道理，還是沒有說清楚，整個黨也仍然被少數偏激勢力所挾持。
過去二十年，國民黨曾出現過幾次大分裂。趙少康另立新黨，宋楚瑜另立親民黨。大體而言，當時分裂出去的少數，反映了主流民意的趨勢；結果雖拖垮了國民黨，卻亦制裁了黨內的獨夫，最後經失去政權八年後，終於在今日重建了國民黨在形體及價值論述上的整合。但是，民進黨內的分裂因子卻大異其趣；極獨及挺扁者非但是少數，且他們除奉陳水扁為精神領袖外，沒有像趙少康、宋楚瑜那般的實際領導者（只有辜寬敏、黃慶林），更致命的是他們絕無可能自動從民進黨分裂而去。民進黨不敢與他們切割，他們更不可能與民進黨切割；故而，這一次民進黨似乎仍無可能藉陳菊登陸進行黨內大辯論，因為獨派只需在民進黨的遊行隊伍中繼續高舉台灣國的大纛巨旌，民進黨就只能拿香隨拜，永遠被附身挾持，趕它不走。何必辯論？
獨派這次被蔡英文及陳菊偷襲，受創深重，卻不敢呻吟，誠是奇觀。陳菊在五一七前隱瞞登陸行程，蔡英文在五一七又堅持和平收場；這些皆被獨派解讀為欺愚玩弄。但民進黨當局不敢大辯論，居於少數的極獨挺扁者又何必掀起大辯論？不要民進黨辯論，只要挾持民進黨，這種「分而不裂」的生態，豈不正是極獨挺扁者能挾持民進黨的原因？
陳菊當著北京當局宣示對中華民國的政治認同，絕不能只是視為臨場的機智表現；這其實正完全暴露了民進黨的進退維谷及左支右絀。若不將其間矛盾疏理清楚，民進黨的支持者如何能如蔡英文所期望地「成長」？
民進黨應對國家認同及兩岸政策的通盤論述進行全面檢討，以建立一個可大可久的國家治理方案。不可用對陳菊頒獎喝采來自欺欺人，而應深思猛省。
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Lausanne and Standard & Poor's Warning
Lausanne and Standard & Poor's Warning
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 26, 2009
International rating agencies seem to be out of step with Taiwan's political rhythms. Taiwan's stock market rose sharply. Media polls clearly show support for government leaders increasing. Yet on the first anniversary of President Ma's inauguration, these agencies issued a number of reports unfavorable to Taiwan.
On May 20, the Management School in Lausanne, Switzerland (IMD) released its Global Competitiveness Report. Taiwan fell 10 places. Moreover, Taiwan's setback was the largest of the Four Asian Tigers. It even lost out to mainland China. Standard & Poor's, the leading international credit rating agency, also released its "stress test" data assessments. Assuming that the economic recession lasts until 2012, it concluded that Taiwan's sovereign credit rating would drop five grades, to BBB. It would be bring up the rear in the Asian region. It would fall behind the Chinese mainland. These two messages were issued by an internationally respected rating agency, and merit serious consideration.
Let's look at the IMD and Standard & Poor's ratings. At first they seem to share no common ground. The IMD believes that five challenges face Taiwan: innovation and the attraction of talent, the creation of a sustainable environment, the promotion of cross-strait relations, effective corporate governance, and financial reforms. The Standard & Poor's assessment notes the budget deficit, debt structure, and financial system. Compare the two assessments and the obvious common ground is the government's finances. The Liu cabinet's debt crisis is undeniably Taiwan's Achilles Heel. The two assessments released on May 20 are not the only ones. The Standard & Poor's ratings earlier this year, and the Fitch credit rating last year, downgraded Taiwan's ratings due to the same concerns. The Ma administration's response to Taiwan's downgraded ratings has focused on Taiwan's R&D and innovation. Actually, all the administration's policies need money. A government's financial solvency is unquestionably more important than anything else.
We already know Taiwan's Achilles Heel. Therefore we hope the Ma administration will address the problem, and not offer some officialese excuse. For example, high-level cabinet members have cited "a depressed global economy, and increased government spending" as an excuse for Taiwan's worsening deficit. But this argument is at variance with the facts. The financial tsunami and economic depression have swept the globe. Every nation has responded by increasing government spending. So why have the ROC's finances deteriorated more than other countries, and resulted in a rapid downgrading of our sovereign credit rating? All nations face the same recession. So why have our finances deteriorated while our competitors' have improved? This reveals we have special problems that must be confronted honestly.
Over the past year, the harshest domestic criticism of the cabinet has been reserved for the international economic recession. This substantially increased the administration's public expenditures. Yet the administration chose to launch a series of tax cut measures, including income tax cuts, business tax cuts, inheritance tax cuts, and excise tax cuts. These amount to over 100 billion NT per annum, and represent a serious increase in our deficit. Increasing spending while reducing taxes is self-contradictory. Pleasing both sides is impossible. With the economic downturn at home and abroad, and reduced corporate profits, everyone wants a tax cut. Therefore the time is not right for tax cuts. But the Liu cabinet refused to listen, and insisted on looking into tax cuts. It was unable to say no to special interest groups. The predictable result was a loss of revenue, and a deterioration in the government's finances.
In addition to urgent financial problems, the ROC government needs to increase its efficiency and carry out basic infrastructure projects. The IMD rating included over 300 items. One third of these were a survey of opinion leaders. Government efficiency would not show up in the current economic data. But they would leave an impression in the minds of corporate leaders. For example, the Executive Yuan ritually launches a new industry every week. But much of the content is merely a repackaging of the policies of various ministries. It was in a hurry to release its economic recovery program before May 20. But it lacked depth and substance. The administration does not appear to have followed up on the first few policies it implemented. Various ministries often use product placement to promote their policies. But business leaders see right through the government's ineffectual show. This repackaging of the government's policies fail to achieve anything of substance. This is another crisis the Ma administration faces.
The TAIEX rallied just before May 20. But international rating agencies poured cold water on the rally. Anyone who looked only at the TAIEX would say the cabinet is doing better. Anyone who read only the IMD report would recommend that the Cabinet make immediate changes. The welfare of the public on Taiwan over the next few years depends upon how President Ma interprets this discordant data.
洛桑與標準普爾給台灣的評等警訊
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.26 04:01 am
國際間的評等機構似乎非常不配合台灣的政治節拍，竟然在台灣股市大漲、各媒體民調政府首長支持率明顯攀升、馬總統就職一周年之際，發布了諸多不利於台灣的訊息。
瑞士洛桑管理學院（ＩＭＤ）於五月廿日發布全球競爭力報告，台灣的排名驟然滑落十名。不只如此，台灣的退步在四小龍中幅度最大，更輸給中國大陸。另一方面，國際信評龍頭標準普爾也公布其「壓力測試」評估數據：該公司假設此波經濟衰退時間延長至二○一二年，發現屆時台灣的主權評等將大降五級，淪為ＢＢＢ的低劣等級，是亞洲地區的後段班，也落在中國大陸之後。這兩項訊息都是由具有國際公信力的機構所發，值得嚴肅解讀。
首先，看看ＩＭＤ評估與標準普爾評等的判準之間有沒有什麼交集。ＩＭＤ認為台灣面臨五項挑戰，分別是創新與吸引人才、永續環境的建立、兩岸關係的推展、公司治理的強化與財政改革的成效。至於標準普爾，其評估主要項目則為財政赤字、債務結構、金融體系等。將這兩組評估判準相比，我們當能發現，其最明顯的交集就是「政府財政」。不可諱言，劉內閣財政債務的危機，幾乎是台灣面對國外所有評等時的罩門，不但五二○公布的兩項評比受此拖累，今年稍早標準普爾與去年惠譽信評對台灣的降等，也都是基於相同的憂慮。馬政府日前對台灣評等下降的回應都集中在檢討台灣的「研發創新」；但其實政府的一切施政都需要錢，故政府財政的續航力，絕對比其他項目更為關鍵。
既然找到了台灣評等落後最關鍵的罩門，接下來我們則希望馬政府能解決問題，而不要做一些官樣文章式的辯解。內閣高層經常拿「國際景氣不佳、政府支出擴張」為藉口，來合理化台灣財政赤字的惡化；但這樣的說辭恐怕與實情有所差距。此次金融海嘯與經濟蕭條席捲全球，每個國家確都是以擴張政府支出的方式因應。但是，為什麼台灣的財政惡化硬是比別的國家嚴重，以致我們的排名急遽下滑呢？同樣面對蕭條，但「我消敵長」的客觀形勢，當然顯示台灣有其特別的問題，必須誠實面對。
在過去一年，國內輿論對內閣批評最嚴厲的，就是其在因應國際經濟蕭條、大幅擴增政府公共支出的同時，竟然又推出一連串的減稅措施，包括所得稅、營所稅、遺贈稅、貨物稅等等，累計金額每年達一千多億元，嚴重惡化財政。直觀而言，擴大支出與減少稅收是兩個背道而馳的政策，想要兩面討好注定是不可能的。本來，在國內外經濟不景氣、企業利潤縮減之際，大家都希望減稅，因此大環境原本就不適合討論稅改；而劉內閣既不聽建言執意要在此期間研議稅改，又無法對利益團體的減稅壓力說「不」，自然造成稅收流失、財政惡化的後果。
除了財政問題必須立即面對之外，台灣的政府效能與基礎建設等，也有不少值得改進的空間。在ＩＭＤ三百多條評比項目中，有三分之一是對意見領袖的問卷調查。像政府效能這一類的面向，並不會呈現在當前的經濟數據上，卻會在企業領袖心中留下客觀的印象。例如，雖然行政院行禮如儀地每周推出一項新興產業，但不少內容卻像是各部會施政計畫的包裝，急著想在五二○之前端出，殊少深刻周延的建設內涵，而最早推出數案的後續執行，亦不見追蹤成效。儘管各部會經常以置入性行銷的作法宣揚種種政策，但企業領袖依然看到政府效能不彰的景況。這些政府施政包裝與實際執行之間的落差，恐怕也反映了馬政府的另一種危機。
五二○前後台股熱呼呼地捧場，但外國評等機構卻澆下冷冽冽的冰水。只看台股的人會說內閣「漸入佳境」，只讀ＩＭＤ報告的人會建議內閣「立即調整」。台灣人民未來數年的福祉，端看馬總統要怎麼解讀這些不協調的數據了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 26, 2009
International rating agencies seem to be out of step with Taiwan's political rhythms. Taiwan's stock market rose sharply. Media polls clearly show support for government leaders increasing. Yet on the first anniversary of President Ma's inauguration, these agencies issued a number of reports unfavorable to Taiwan.
On May 20, the Management School in Lausanne, Switzerland (IMD) released its Global Competitiveness Report. Taiwan fell 10 places. Moreover, Taiwan's setback was the largest of the Four Asian Tigers. It even lost out to mainland China. Standard & Poor's, the leading international credit rating agency, also released its "stress test" data assessments. Assuming that the economic recession lasts until 2012, it concluded that Taiwan's sovereign credit rating would drop five grades, to BBB. It would be bring up the rear in the Asian region. It would fall behind the Chinese mainland. These two messages were issued by an internationally respected rating agency, and merit serious consideration.
Let's look at the IMD and Standard & Poor's ratings. At first they seem to share no common ground. The IMD believes that five challenges face Taiwan: innovation and the attraction of talent, the creation of a sustainable environment, the promotion of cross-strait relations, effective corporate governance, and financial reforms. The Standard & Poor's assessment notes the budget deficit, debt structure, and financial system. Compare the two assessments and the obvious common ground is the government's finances. The Liu cabinet's debt crisis is undeniably Taiwan's Achilles Heel. The two assessments released on May 20 are not the only ones. The Standard & Poor's ratings earlier this year, and the Fitch credit rating last year, downgraded Taiwan's ratings due to the same concerns. The Ma administration's response to Taiwan's downgraded ratings has focused on Taiwan's R&D and innovation. Actually, all the administration's policies need money. A government's financial solvency is unquestionably more important than anything else.
We already know Taiwan's Achilles Heel. Therefore we hope the Ma administration will address the problem, and not offer some officialese excuse. For example, high-level cabinet members have cited "a depressed global economy, and increased government spending" as an excuse for Taiwan's worsening deficit. But this argument is at variance with the facts. The financial tsunami and economic depression have swept the globe. Every nation has responded by increasing government spending. So why have the ROC's finances deteriorated more than other countries, and resulted in a rapid downgrading of our sovereign credit rating? All nations face the same recession. So why have our finances deteriorated while our competitors' have improved? This reveals we have special problems that must be confronted honestly.
Over the past year, the harshest domestic criticism of the cabinet has been reserved for the international economic recession. This substantially increased the administration's public expenditures. Yet the administration chose to launch a series of tax cut measures, including income tax cuts, business tax cuts, inheritance tax cuts, and excise tax cuts. These amount to over 100 billion NT per annum, and represent a serious increase in our deficit. Increasing spending while reducing taxes is self-contradictory. Pleasing both sides is impossible. With the economic downturn at home and abroad, and reduced corporate profits, everyone wants a tax cut. Therefore the time is not right for tax cuts. But the Liu cabinet refused to listen, and insisted on looking into tax cuts. It was unable to say no to special interest groups. The predictable result was a loss of revenue, and a deterioration in the government's finances.
In addition to urgent financial problems, the ROC government needs to increase its efficiency and carry out basic infrastructure projects. The IMD rating included over 300 items. One third of these were a survey of opinion leaders. Government efficiency would not show up in the current economic data. But they would leave an impression in the minds of corporate leaders. For example, the Executive Yuan ritually launches a new industry every week. But much of the content is merely a repackaging of the policies of various ministries. It was in a hurry to release its economic recovery program before May 20. But it lacked depth and substance. The administration does not appear to have followed up on the first few policies it implemented. Various ministries often use product placement to promote their policies. But business leaders see right through the government's ineffectual show. This repackaging of the government's policies fail to achieve anything of substance. This is another crisis the Ma administration faces.
The TAIEX rallied just before May 20. But international rating agencies poured cold water on the rally. Anyone who looked only at the TAIEX would say the cabinet is doing better. Anyone who read only the IMD report would recommend that the Cabinet make immediate changes. The welfare of the public on Taiwan over the next few years depends upon how President Ma interprets this discordant data.
洛桑與標準普爾給台灣的評等警訊
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.26 04:01 am
國際間的評等機構似乎非常不配合台灣的政治節拍，竟然在台灣股市大漲、各媒體民調政府首長支持率明顯攀升、馬總統就職一周年之際，發布了諸多不利於台灣的訊息。
瑞士洛桑管理學院（ＩＭＤ）於五月廿日發布全球競爭力報告，台灣的排名驟然滑落十名。不只如此，台灣的退步在四小龍中幅度最大，更輸給中國大陸。另一方面，國際信評龍頭標準普爾也公布其「壓力測試」評估數據：該公司假設此波經濟衰退時間延長至二○一二年，發現屆時台灣的主權評等將大降五級，淪為ＢＢＢ的低劣等級，是亞洲地區的後段班，也落在中國大陸之後。這兩項訊息都是由具有國際公信力的機構所發，值得嚴肅解讀。
首先，看看ＩＭＤ評估與標準普爾評等的判準之間有沒有什麼交集。ＩＭＤ認為台灣面臨五項挑戰，分別是創新與吸引人才、永續環境的建立、兩岸關係的推展、公司治理的強化與財政改革的成效。至於標準普爾，其評估主要項目則為財政赤字、債務結構、金融體系等。將這兩組評估判準相比，我們當能發現，其最明顯的交集就是「政府財政」。不可諱言，劉內閣財政債務的危機，幾乎是台灣面對國外所有評等時的罩門，不但五二○公布的兩項評比受此拖累，今年稍早標準普爾與去年惠譽信評對台灣的降等，也都是基於相同的憂慮。馬政府日前對台灣評等下降的回應都集中在檢討台灣的「研發創新」；但其實政府的一切施政都需要錢，故政府財政的續航力，絕對比其他項目更為關鍵。
既然找到了台灣評等落後最關鍵的罩門，接下來我們則希望馬政府能解決問題，而不要做一些官樣文章式的辯解。內閣高層經常拿「國際景氣不佳、政府支出擴張」為藉口，來合理化台灣財政赤字的惡化；但這樣的說辭恐怕與實情有所差距。此次金融海嘯與經濟蕭條席捲全球，每個國家確都是以擴張政府支出的方式因應。但是，為什麼台灣的財政惡化硬是比別的國家嚴重，以致我們的排名急遽下滑呢？同樣面對蕭條，但「我消敵長」的客觀形勢，當然顯示台灣有其特別的問題，必須誠實面對。
在過去一年，國內輿論對內閣批評最嚴厲的，就是其在因應國際經濟蕭條、大幅擴增政府公共支出的同時，竟然又推出一連串的減稅措施，包括所得稅、營所稅、遺贈稅、貨物稅等等，累計金額每年達一千多億元，嚴重惡化財政。直觀而言，擴大支出與減少稅收是兩個背道而馳的政策，想要兩面討好注定是不可能的。本來，在國內外經濟不景氣、企業利潤縮減之際，大家都希望減稅，因此大環境原本就不適合討論稅改；而劉內閣既不聽建言執意要在此期間研議稅改，又無法對利益團體的減稅壓力說「不」，自然造成稅收流失、財政惡化的後果。
除了財政問題必須立即面對之外，台灣的政府效能與基礎建設等，也有不少值得改進的空間。在ＩＭＤ三百多條評比項目中，有三分之一是對意見領袖的問卷調查。像政府效能這一類的面向，並不會呈現在當前的經濟數據上，卻會在企業領袖心中留下客觀的印象。例如，雖然行政院行禮如儀地每周推出一項新興產業，但不少內容卻像是各部會施政計畫的包裝，急著想在五二○之前端出，殊少深刻周延的建設內涵，而最早推出數案的後續執行，亦不見追蹤成效。儘管各部會經常以置入性行銷的作法宣揚種種政策，但企業領袖依然看到政府效能不彰的景況。這些政府施政包裝與實際執行之間的落差，恐怕也反映了馬政府的另一種危機。
五二○前後台股熱呼呼地捧場，但外國評等機構卻澆下冷冽冽的冰水。只看台股的人會說內閣「漸入佳境」，只讀ＩＭＤ報告的人會建議內閣「立即調整」。台灣人民未來數年的福祉，端看馬總統要怎麼解讀這些不協調的數據了。
Friday, May 22, 2009
Chen Chu Breaks the Ice
Chen Chu Breaks the Ice
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 22, 2009
Chen Chu departed from Kaohsiung In the morning. By the afternoon, she had arrived directly in Beijing and was meeting with Beijing Mayor Guo Jinlong. For the DPP, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland was an ice-breaker. It meant that the Green Camp's unconditional opposition to Beijing has changed. It is time for the DPP's inconsistent Mainland policy to undergo a major revision.
Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland has aroused much concern. The public does not oppose her visit. But it has been taken aback by the DPP's peculiar double standard. After all, the Green Camp just took to the streets on May 17 to denounce Ma for "selling out Taiwan." Then on May 21, its highest ranking public official led a delegation to Beijing. Even party elders and Taiwan independence elements are gnashing their teeth. How is the DPP to explain itself to the general public? Chen Chu's mainland visit reveals that the May 17 protest march had a tough shell, but a brittle core. It also revealed that the DPP's tortured rhetoric can no longer conceal its internal contradictions.
In fact, the DPP has become increasingly aware of the need for exchanges with the CCP. But politically they cling to their anti-Beijing rhetoric. They remain determined to depict the KMT's efforts to improve cross-Strait relations as "betraying Taiwan." Even more incredibly, the DPP clearly knew of Chen Chu's plan to visit the Mainland. But to avoid embarrassment during the protest march they suppressed this information. They assumed their head the sand tactics would allow them to squeak by. In fact, their strategy of self-deception merely made fools of Deep Green True Believers, casting them into a bottomless abyss of lost faith.
Chen Chu's trip was full of twists and turns. She has a powerful desire to play the role of an ice-breaker. But she also knows she faces enormous resistance, particularly from the Green Camp. Therefore she sneaked around and repeatedly changed her story. On May 17 Chen Chu joined the pro-independence march in Kaohsiung mid-stream. Then, under the pretext she was heading north to join the march in Taipei, she ran off. She never appeared at the main venue in Kaohsiung. Her exceptionally low-keyed behavior was an effort to avoid spoiling her chance to visit the Mainland. It was also an effort to avoid intensifying outside criticism of the DPP for saying one thing and doing another.
Nor should we overlook the high degree of goodwill shown toward Chen Chu. This was also a breakthrough for Beijing authorities vis a vis the DPP. They even granted her the courtesy of clearing customs without a "Taiwan Compatriot Entry Permit." They allowed her to enter as the "Mayor of Kaohsiung." They even put up billboards on streets in downtown Beijing urging the public to "See the World Games in Kaohsiung." These were compromises the two sides reached for the sake of this ice-breaking visit. Therefore, even though the International Real Estate Federation Awards Ceremony was postponed, Chen Chu still valued this hard-won opportunity and chose to attend as planned. Clearly bilateral relations is not just a "kill or be killed" zero-sum game.
The Kaohsiung World Games forced the Democratic Progressive Party to deal with Beijing. Perhaps this was accidental. But for the Democratic Progressive Party it is also an opportunity to make a breakthrough. Promoting the games necessitates more extensive and direct cross-Strait contacts and exchanges. But so does promoting the economy, trade, tourism, and cultural exchanges. Chen Chu's visit furthers the overall interests of Kaohsiung citizens. But so does the Ma administration's promotion of cross-Strait personnel, capital, and educational exchanges. Why must the DPP smear Ma's policy as "betraying Taiwan?" Since Chen Chu visited the Mainland with such awe-inspiring righteousness, what are we to make of the Green Camp's habit of equating "visiting the Mainland" with "sympathizing with Beijing," and "sympathizing with Beijing" with "betraying Taiwan?" Isn't this kind of thinking ready for the shredder?
Actually, the Mayor of Kaohsiung's visit to the Mainland is nine years too late. In July 2000, then Kaohsiung Mayor Frank Hsieh wanted to visit Xiamen as part of a Sister Cities exchange. He was prevented from doing so by newly inaugurated President Chen Shui-bian and Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen. The trip was aborted. The result was Chen Chu's ice-breaking visit nine years later. Nine years later, Taiwan independence player Chen Shui-bian is in prison for corruption. Party Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen has changed her position in support of Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland. From the DPP's perspective, it wasted nine years. As it waffled indecisively, it lost both political power and public support. Isn't it time the DPP amended its outdated Mainland policy?
For Taiwan, Chen Chu's visit carries greater significance than merely promoting the Kaohsiung World Games. It means the public interest is more important than personal ideology. With the participation of the Democratic Progressive Party, cross-Strait interaction will become more diverse. This is a plus. The DPP has stepped forward and met directly with Beijing. It is no longer hiding behind the KMT, sniping from the sidelines. This is something it must do to act responsibly. The only problem is, how will the Democratic Progressive Party convince grass-roots supporters to support Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland?
Chen Chu departed from Kaohsiung, made a detour to Ketagelan Boulevard, then arrived in Beijing. Chen Chu's ice-breaking trip was roundabout and rife with posturing. But the outside world should not rush to condemn the show Chen Chu put on. The bilateral strategic picture is clear. It will not unfold according to Chen Chu's personal whims.
陳菊破冰：從高雄繞凱道到北京
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.22 05:45 am
上午搭著直航飛機出發，下午在中國首都會見北京市長郭金龍，高雄市長陳菊這次登陸，堪稱是民進黨的「破冰之旅」。此行不啻意味綠營「逢中必反」的基調已然改寫，民進黨表裡不一的中國政策也到了需要大整修的時候了。
陳菊登陸之所以引起那麼大的關注，輿論焦點其實不在反對她登陸，而是對民進黨「反中」奇特的雙重標準感到錯愕。試想，綠營五一七才在街頭嗆馬賣台，五二一其最高公職人員隨即率團登陸，連黨內山頭及台獨社團對此都咬牙切齒，民進黨又要如何說服一般民眾？陳菊的大陸行，反襯了五一七的「外強中乾」，也凸顯民進黨左支右絀的論述再也掩不住其自我矛盾。
亦即，在現實上，民進黨內部亦愈來愈自覺有與中共交往之必要；但在政治操作上，卻又沿用其一成不變的反中論述，咬死國民黨改善兩岸關係的努力為「賣台」。更不可思議的是，民進黨明知陳菊的登陸計畫，卻為避開遊行的尷尬氣氛而刻意壓著消息，以為只要使出鴕鳥戰術，即可瞞天過海。這種自欺欺人策略，其實只是愚弄了深綠支持者，讓他們陷入信仰虛無的深淵。
陳菊此行充滿曲折，她有強烈意願扮演破冰角色，卻也知道自己面對著的鉅大阻力，尤以綠營為甚。因此，她隱隱掩掩，數易其口。五一七當天，陳菊在高雄的獨派遊行先是半途插隊，然後藉口北上會師半路落跑，根本未登上高雄主場。如此極盡低調，一則是為避免自己登陸的機會觸礁，二則也為避免加深外界對民進黨「說一套、做一套」的印象。
同樣不應忽略的，是中共當局為突破對民進黨的工作，對陳菊釋出的高度善意。包括給予她「免持台胞證」的通關禮遇、使用「高雄市長」身分，乃至在北京鬧街掛上「世運在高雄」的看板，都是雙方為這一破冰之旅達成的妥協。因此，儘管世界不動產聯盟的頒獎典禮已經延期，陳菊仍珍惜好不容易談妥的條件，選擇如期出訪。也可見，兩岸之間，並非只是「你死我活」的零和遊戲。
高雄世運把民進黨逼上與中國接觸之路，也許是偶然，卻也是民進黨尋求突破的一個契機。如果說運動會的促銷，需要兩岸更廣泛而直接的接觸和交流，那麼經貿、觀光、文化的交流又何嘗不是如此？如果陳菊的出訪是為了高雄市民的整體利益，那麼馬政府促成兩岸人員、資金、教育交流的一連串政策，民進黨又為何需強行貼上「賣台」的標籤？如果陳菊登陸如此正氣凜然，那麼，綠營長期以來編撰的「賣台公式」：「登陸」等於「親中」，「親中」等於「賣台」，還能不就地作廢嗎？
高雄市長登陸，其實是一個遲到九年的行程。公元兩千年七月，高雄市長謝長廷有意到廈門進行城市交流，遭剛上任的陳水扁總統和陸委會主委蔡英文阻擋，而未能成行；也因此，九年後才有陳菊的破冰之旅。九年之隔，「台獨玩家」陳水扁貪瀆繫獄，接任黨主席的蔡英文改變立場支持陳菊登陸；對民進黨而言，九年蹉跎，在搖擺中失去政權和民心，也該想一想其破舊的中國政策該怎麼修了吧！
對台灣而言，陳菊此行其實具有比促銷「高雄世運」更大的意義，那就是：從台灣的公共利益出發，比供奉個人信仰更重要。兩岸互動，有了民進黨的參與，可以發出更多元的聲音，這是正數。對民進黨而言，直接站出來面對中共，不要一味躲在國民黨身後亂放冷箭，那也是它終須承擔的責任。問題是，在輿論一片支持陳菊登陸之際，民進黨拿什麼去說服它的基層徒眾呢？
從高雄繞經凱道到北京，陳菊這趟破冰之旅走得崎嶇，也做足了姿態。外界也許不必急著對陳菊的表現下斷語，兩岸大勢的必趨必至，其實並不隨陳菊個人的意志為轉移。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 22, 2009
Chen Chu departed from Kaohsiung In the morning. By the afternoon, she had arrived directly in Beijing and was meeting with Beijing Mayor Guo Jinlong. For the DPP, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland was an ice-breaker. It meant that the Green Camp's unconditional opposition to Beijing has changed. It is time for the DPP's inconsistent Mainland policy to undergo a major revision.
Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland has aroused much concern. The public does not oppose her visit. But it has been taken aback by the DPP's peculiar double standard. After all, the Green Camp just took to the streets on May 17 to denounce Ma for "selling out Taiwan." Then on May 21, its highest ranking public official led a delegation to Beijing. Even party elders and Taiwan independence elements are gnashing their teeth. How is the DPP to explain itself to the general public? Chen Chu's mainland visit reveals that the May 17 protest march had a tough shell, but a brittle core. It also revealed that the DPP's tortured rhetoric can no longer conceal its internal contradictions.
In fact, the DPP has become increasingly aware of the need for exchanges with the CCP. But politically they cling to their anti-Beijing rhetoric. They remain determined to depict the KMT's efforts to improve cross-Strait relations as "betraying Taiwan." Even more incredibly, the DPP clearly knew of Chen Chu's plan to visit the Mainland. But to avoid embarrassment during the protest march they suppressed this information. They assumed their head the sand tactics would allow them to squeak by. In fact, their strategy of self-deception merely made fools of Deep Green True Believers, casting them into a bottomless abyss of lost faith.
Chen Chu's trip was full of twists and turns. She has a powerful desire to play the role of an ice-breaker. But she also knows she faces enormous resistance, particularly from the Green Camp. Therefore she sneaked around and repeatedly changed her story. On May 17 Chen Chu joined the pro-independence march in Kaohsiung mid-stream. Then, under the pretext she was heading north to join the march in Taipei, she ran off. She never appeared at the main venue in Kaohsiung. Her exceptionally low-keyed behavior was an effort to avoid spoiling her chance to visit the Mainland. It was also an effort to avoid intensifying outside criticism of the DPP for saying one thing and doing another.
Nor should we overlook the high degree of goodwill shown toward Chen Chu. This was also a breakthrough for Beijing authorities vis a vis the DPP. They even granted her the courtesy of clearing customs without a "Taiwan Compatriot Entry Permit." They allowed her to enter as the "Mayor of Kaohsiung." They even put up billboards on streets in downtown Beijing urging the public to "See the World Games in Kaohsiung." These were compromises the two sides reached for the sake of this ice-breaking visit. Therefore, even though the International Real Estate Federation Awards Ceremony was postponed, Chen Chu still valued this hard-won opportunity and chose to attend as planned. Clearly bilateral relations is not just a "kill or be killed" zero-sum game.
The Kaohsiung World Games forced the Democratic Progressive Party to deal with Beijing. Perhaps this was accidental. But for the Democratic Progressive Party it is also an opportunity to make a breakthrough. Promoting the games necessitates more extensive and direct cross-Strait contacts and exchanges. But so does promoting the economy, trade, tourism, and cultural exchanges. Chen Chu's visit furthers the overall interests of Kaohsiung citizens. But so does the Ma administration's promotion of cross-Strait personnel, capital, and educational exchanges. Why must the DPP smear Ma's policy as "betraying Taiwan?" Since Chen Chu visited the Mainland with such awe-inspiring righteousness, what are we to make of the Green Camp's habit of equating "visiting the Mainland" with "sympathizing with Beijing," and "sympathizing with Beijing" with "betraying Taiwan?" Isn't this kind of thinking ready for the shredder?
Actually, the Mayor of Kaohsiung's visit to the Mainland is nine years too late. In July 2000, then Kaohsiung Mayor Frank Hsieh wanted to visit Xiamen as part of a Sister Cities exchange. He was prevented from doing so by newly inaugurated President Chen Shui-bian and Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen. The trip was aborted. The result was Chen Chu's ice-breaking visit nine years later. Nine years later, Taiwan independence player Chen Shui-bian is in prison for corruption. Party Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen has changed her position in support of Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland. From the DPP's perspective, it wasted nine years. As it waffled indecisively, it lost both political power and public support. Isn't it time the DPP amended its outdated Mainland policy?
For Taiwan, Chen Chu's visit carries greater significance than merely promoting the Kaohsiung World Games. It means the public interest is more important than personal ideology. With the participation of the Democratic Progressive Party, cross-Strait interaction will become more diverse. This is a plus. The DPP has stepped forward and met directly with Beijing. It is no longer hiding behind the KMT, sniping from the sidelines. This is something it must do to act responsibly. The only problem is, how will the Democratic Progressive Party convince grass-roots supporters to support Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland?
Chen Chu departed from Kaohsiung, made a detour to Ketagelan Boulevard, then arrived in Beijing. Chen Chu's ice-breaking trip was roundabout and rife with posturing. But the outside world should not rush to condemn the show Chen Chu put on. The bilateral strategic picture is clear. It will not unfold according to Chen Chu's personal whims.
陳菊破冰：從高雄繞凱道到北京
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.22 05:45 am
上午搭著直航飛機出發，下午在中國首都會見北京市長郭金龍，高雄市長陳菊這次登陸，堪稱是民進黨的「破冰之旅」。此行不啻意味綠營「逢中必反」的基調已然改寫，民進黨表裡不一的中國政策也到了需要大整修的時候了。
陳菊登陸之所以引起那麼大的關注，輿論焦點其實不在反對她登陸，而是對民進黨「反中」奇特的雙重標準感到錯愕。試想，綠營五一七才在街頭嗆馬賣台，五二一其最高公職人員隨即率團登陸，連黨內山頭及台獨社團對此都咬牙切齒，民進黨又要如何說服一般民眾？陳菊的大陸行，反襯了五一七的「外強中乾」，也凸顯民進黨左支右絀的論述再也掩不住其自我矛盾。
亦即，在現實上，民進黨內部亦愈來愈自覺有與中共交往之必要；但在政治操作上，卻又沿用其一成不變的反中論述，咬死國民黨改善兩岸關係的努力為「賣台」。更不可思議的是，民進黨明知陳菊的登陸計畫，卻為避開遊行的尷尬氣氛而刻意壓著消息，以為只要使出鴕鳥戰術，即可瞞天過海。這種自欺欺人策略，其實只是愚弄了深綠支持者，讓他們陷入信仰虛無的深淵。
陳菊此行充滿曲折，她有強烈意願扮演破冰角色，卻也知道自己面對著的鉅大阻力，尤以綠營為甚。因此，她隱隱掩掩，數易其口。五一七當天，陳菊在高雄的獨派遊行先是半途插隊，然後藉口北上會師半路落跑，根本未登上高雄主場。如此極盡低調，一則是為避免自己登陸的機會觸礁，二則也為避免加深外界對民進黨「說一套、做一套」的印象。
同樣不應忽略的，是中共當局為突破對民進黨的工作，對陳菊釋出的高度善意。包括給予她「免持台胞證」的通關禮遇、使用「高雄市長」身分，乃至在北京鬧街掛上「世運在高雄」的看板，都是雙方為這一破冰之旅達成的妥協。因此，儘管世界不動產聯盟的頒獎典禮已經延期，陳菊仍珍惜好不容易談妥的條件，選擇如期出訪。也可見，兩岸之間，並非只是「你死我活」的零和遊戲。
高雄世運把民進黨逼上與中國接觸之路，也許是偶然，卻也是民進黨尋求突破的一個契機。如果說運動會的促銷，需要兩岸更廣泛而直接的接觸和交流，那麼經貿、觀光、文化的交流又何嘗不是如此？如果陳菊的出訪是為了高雄市民的整體利益，那麼馬政府促成兩岸人員、資金、教育交流的一連串政策，民進黨又為何需強行貼上「賣台」的標籤？如果陳菊登陸如此正氣凜然，那麼，綠營長期以來編撰的「賣台公式」：「登陸」等於「親中」，「親中」等於「賣台」，還能不就地作廢嗎？
高雄市長登陸，其實是一個遲到九年的行程。公元兩千年七月，高雄市長謝長廷有意到廈門進行城市交流，遭剛上任的陳水扁總統和陸委會主委蔡英文阻擋，而未能成行；也因此，九年後才有陳菊的破冰之旅。九年之隔，「台獨玩家」陳水扁貪瀆繫獄，接任黨主席的蔡英文改變立場支持陳菊登陸；對民進黨而言，九年蹉跎，在搖擺中失去政權和民心，也該想一想其破舊的中國政策該怎麼修了吧！
對台灣而言，陳菊此行其實具有比促銷「高雄世運」更大的意義，那就是：從台灣的公共利益出發，比供奉個人信仰更重要。兩岸互動，有了民進黨的參與，可以發出更多元的聲音，這是正數。對民進黨而言，直接站出來面對中共，不要一味躲在國民黨身後亂放冷箭，那也是它終須承擔的責任。問題是，在輿論一片支持陳菊登陸之際，民進黨拿什麼去說服它的基層徒眾呢？
從高雄繞經凱道到北京，陳菊這趟破冰之旅走得崎嶇，也做足了姿態。外界也許不必急著對陳菊的表現下斷語，兩岸大勢的必趨必至，其實並不隨陳菊個人的意志為轉移。
Ah-Bian Does Not Measure Up to Roh Moo-hyun
Ah-Bian Does Not Measure Up to Roh Moo-hyun
China Post editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 22, 2009
Former South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, amidst suspicions of bribery, lept off a cliff and committed suicide. He came from a poor family. He studied hard to pass the bar exams. He became a human rights lawyer and champion of clean government. His job performance while in power was mediocre. It went from good to bad. After he stepped down corruption scandals erupted. Because his wife and children demanded bribes from businessmen while he was in office, they became subjects of investigation. He says he was unaware that his family members extorted bribes. But he publicly said he could not face the public. He deeply regretted disappointing his fellow countrymen, and eventually chose suicide.
Roh Moo-hyun and Chen Shui-bian are similar in so many ways, making it difficult not to make comparisons. But no matter how similar their stories may be, one cannot deduce from Roh Moo-hyun's corruption whether Chen Shui-bian was also guilty of corruption.
Criminal cases must be turned over to the trial courts for judgment. The behavior of Chen Shui-bian and his family in the wake of the scandals have inevitably led the public to arrive at certain conclusions about whether Chen Shui-bian is guilty of corruption. Nevertheless we insist on upholding the principle of the presumption of innocence. We respect the judgment of the courts, and refuse to make rash judgments.
But we cannot deny that Roh Moo-hyun's feelings of remorse and decision to commit suicide, have held up a mirror to our own former head of state and his attitude while confronting his own corruption scandals.
We feel regret and sadness over Roh Moo-hyun' decision to end his own life. We would never encourage anyone to follow his example. But we must point out that Roh Moo-hyun's suicide has nothing to do with the administration of justice. It was purely a political and moral gesture. The public has long looked forward to the emergence of this sort of political ethics on Taiwan, but it has never made an appearance, leaving the public deeply disappointed.
President Chen Shui-bian left office in August of last year. Because he was unable to hide his overseas money-laundering, he confessed to committing illegal acts, and offered a public apology. This led to brief bout of criticism by the Green Camp. But the scope of the scandal continued to expand. The amount of money involved was appalling, and left Roh Moo-hyun far behind. Although the scandal became worse and worse, Chen Shui-bian's expression of remorse vanished like a puff of smoke. He maintained repeatedly he was innocent, and a victim of political persecution. Chen Shui-bian and Roh Moo-hyun were indeed quite different.
The Democratic Progressive Party organized a May 17 protest march. It took to the streets to denounce Ma Ying-jeou. It exercised the right of opposition parties to express dissent. What the public on Taiwan noted with a cold eye however, was the complete absence of DPP criticism of Chen Shui-bian's money-laundering scandal. On the contrary, Chairman Tsai Ing-wen accused the ruling KMT of violating Chen Shui-bian's human rights, in order to humiliate the Democratic Progressive Party. Whether the court's taking of Chen Shui-bian into custody constitutes an infringement of human rights is a serious issue that merits scrutiny. But whether Chen Shui-bian was taken into custody on orders from the ruling administration is a different matter entirely.
The evidence of Chen administration money-laundering is overwhelming. He established a vast number of overseas accounts. The amount of wealth he accumulated during his eight years in power is no secret. No evidence exists that ruling KMT officials have engaged in political persecution. Green Camp representatives accuse the ruling KMT of manipulating the judiciary and engaging in political persecution. They make unfounded accusations, but offer no evidence. As to how Ah-Bian, Ah-Cheng, and their children moved such vast sums of "campaign contributions" overseas, they remain silent. Contrast the two, and one is bound to find their allegations of political persecution and human rights violations utterly unconvincing.
Suppose the situation were reversed. Suppose Ma Ying-jeou had acquired vast sums of campaign contributions, or set up overseas accounts containing vast sums of money. Would the Green Camp criticize such abuses? Whenever the Green Camp utters the words "clean government," its political and moral double standards have opened it up to ridicule. The Presbyterian Church's accusation that the Democratic Progressive Party has failed to reflect upon Chen Shui-bian's mistakes is not without reason.
What about Chen Shui-bian himself? He has cited his illness, his medical treatment, and written books to accuse the courts of political persecution. His most recent tactic has been to fire his defense counsel, and refuse to talk with the public defender. This of course is his right as a criminal defendant. But isn't his strategy of forcing a showdown with the courts unbecoming of an attorney at law and an officer of the court, not to mention a former head of state? Chen Shui-bian may not act as if he doesn't care. But anyone in the know, must have some feelings about the matter.
A former head of state must face justice as a result of his money scandals. Instead he has given up his rights of as the accused to a legal defense. He has done so in defiance of common sense, for the sake of political posturing. Is he intentionally attempting to create enmity between himself and the court? Has he truly been wronged and helpless to seek legal redress? Or is he all too aware of his own guilt and imminent conviction, and therefore establishing a preemptive claim to political persecution? Has he completely lost his political and moral compass? Does he really expect the world to believe he is fighting for justice and the lofty ideal of human rights? How much political legitimacy does he still have? How many people will actually believe him?
No matter what attitude Chen Shui-bian assumes as he faces justice, the court's ruling, his guilt or innocence, his sentence light or heavy, will be subject to close scrutiny by the public, in accordance with the rule of law.
Preventing the abuse of power by political leaders attempting to enrich themselves and undermine the body politic by punishing them after they commit a crime is hardly the ideal solution. The ideal solution is to increase accountability by forcing politicians to demonstrate political integrity and abide by moral standards, by demanding that the ruling and opposition parties share responsibility. Chen Shui-bian does not measure up to Roh Moo-hyun. Let's hope that does not mean that Taiwan does not measure up to South Korea!
中時電子報 新聞
新聞速報 2009.05.25
扁不如盧 希望不代表台不如韓
【本報訊】
收賄醜聞纏身的南韓前總統盧武鉉，跳崖自殺身亡。他出身貧寒，發憤苦讀通過司法考試，旋以人權律師提倡清廉政治享名。執政時政績平平，先盛後衰，卸任後爆發貪汙醜聞，因妻兒近親於其任內向商人索賄，引起調查，他聲稱對家人收取錢財並不知情，但公開表示無顏面對國民，讓國人失望而深感抱歉，終究走上自殺的悲劇。
盧武鉉與陳水扁，有太多相似之處，很難不引起聯想比擬。但故事情節不論如何相似，總不能從盧武鉉究竟有無貪汙推論陳水扁有無貪汙。
刑事刑法案件，畢竟要交給負責審判的法院做最後認定，國人目睹陳水扁及其家人於案發後種種反應，即使不免對於陳水扁是否貪汙自有判斷，我們仍願堅持法律上無罪推定的原則，尊重法院裁判而不妄下斷語。
但是不容否認，盧武鉉悔恨交集的自盡，正是對照台灣卸任元首以什麼態度面對貪腐醜聞的一面明鏡。
我們為盧武鉉選擇自盡以謝感到惋惜與悲哀，也絕不鼓勵任何人加以效法；然而必須指出，盧武鉉的自盡，展現了一種與司法審判無關，純屬政治道德上的自我批判，這種政治倫理態度在台灣一直被期待卻未出現，令人自歎不如。
陳水扁曾經在去年八月總統卸任後，為了海外洗錢帳戶無法隱瞞而自承做了法律上不許可的事，一度向國人公開道歉，事後也曾短暫引發綠營的批判。可是，之後弊端醜聞愈大愈多，牽涉金額駭人，盧武鉉也瞠乎其後。案件內情雖然愈捅愈多，其自我反省卻有如曇花一現，不斷呈現的則是阿扁無罪而受盡政治司法迫害的臉孔。陳水扁與盧武鉉，確是大不相同！
民進黨舉辦五一七遊行上街嗆馬，行使在野黨的異議權利，台灣人民所冷眼觀察的，則是民進黨對於阿扁洗錢醜聞噤若寒蟬的批判缺席。蔡英文主席近日還大力批評對手藉著司法侵犯阿扁人權以羞辱民進黨。法院羈押阿扁迄今是否侵犯阿扁人權確實該嚴肅檢討對待，但是法院羈押阿扁是否受到執政者指使，則是不同的問題。
相較於陳府聚斂洗錢已知事證的疑雲重重，設置海外帳戶之多，在位八年積累之鉅，不是祕密，執政者指使法院從事政治迫害的指控，其實缺乏證據。綠營人士對於執政者控制司法、實施迫害，若可繪聲繪影，完全不需要證據；對於扁珍及其子女，如何可能有如此鉅額的政治獻金搬移海外的事實，卻是諱莫如深。兩相對照，必將使其任何司法人權的政治指控，失去說服力。
異地而處，假若是馬英九使用鉅額政治獻金設置海外帳戶，綠營將會以何種政治力量給予批判？失衡的雙重政治道德標準，實已使得民進黨今天在任何場合以「清廉」二字自許，都彷彿是惹人訕笑的自我嘲諷。長老教會指責民進黨未能表態反省阿扁犯的錯誤，不為無故。
陳水扁本人呢？稱病、就醫、出書的政治手段，嗆聲司法從事政治迫害；最近的新招則是解除辯護律師的委任，拒與公設辯護人接談，這當然都是他身為刑事被告自由選擇如何應訴的權利，但是不惜與法院決裂的策略行徑，是否有失律師政治家應有的專業水準？是否符合卸任元首應有的政治高度？陳水扁本人可否毫不在意，識者必不至於無所感覺。
卸任元首因自己的金錢醜聞而面對司法審判時，以不合社會常理的政治姿態放棄刑事司法被告的防禦權利，有意自陷於必與法院為敵的極端處境，究竟是否真是出自有冤難伸的無奈，還是自知難逃有罪判決，遂要以預先鋪設司法政治迫害說辭的政治伎倆？完全失去了政治道德上的自我批判能力，卻要世人以為他是在實現爭取司法人權的崇高理想，能有多少政治正當性？有多少人會真的相信？
不管陳水扁用什麼態度面對司法審判，法院對他的判決無論是有罪無罪，判輕判重，其實都必然會遭到社會輿論使用高度的法治標準加以檢驗。
用司法加施事後制裁來防範政治領袖濫權自肥，穢亂民主，其實只是治標的下策；提昇政黨政治中問責對手也反省自我的政治清廉道德標準，要求朝野共信共守，才是治本的上策。陳水扁不如盧武鉉，希望不代表台灣不如南韓！
China Post editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 22, 2009
Former South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, amidst suspicions of bribery, lept off a cliff and committed suicide. He came from a poor family. He studied hard to pass the bar exams. He became a human rights lawyer and champion of clean government. His job performance while in power was mediocre. It went from good to bad. After he stepped down corruption scandals erupted. Because his wife and children demanded bribes from businessmen while he was in office, they became subjects of investigation. He says he was unaware that his family members extorted bribes. But he publicly said he could not face the public. He deeply regretted disappointing his fellow countrymen, and eventually chose suicide.
Roh Moo-hyun and Chen Shui-bian are similar in so many ways, making it difficult not to make comparisons. But no matter how similar their stories may be, one cannot deduce from Roh Moo-hyun's corruption whether Chen Shui-bian was also guilty of corruption.
Criminal cases must be turned over to the trial courts for judgment. The behavior of Chen Shui-bian and his family in the wake of the scandals have inevitably led the public to arrive at certain conclusions about whether Chen Shui-bian is guilty of corruption. Nevertheless we insist on upholding the principle of the presumption of innocence. We respect the judgment of the courts, and refuse to make rash judgments.
But we cannot deny that Roh Moo-hyun's feelings of remorse and decision to commit suicide, have held up a mirror to our own former head of state and his attitude while confronting his own corruption scandals.
We feel regret and sadness over Roh Moo-hyun' decision to end his own life. We would never encourage anyone to follow his example. But we must point out that Roh Moo-hyun's suicide has nothing to do with the administration of justice. It was purely a political and moral gesture. The public has long looked forward to the emergence of this sort of political ethics on Taiwan, but it has never made an appearance, leaving the public deeply disappointed.
President Chen Shui-bian left office in August of last year. Because he was unable to hide his overseas money-laundering, he confessed to committing illegal acts, and offered a public apology. This led to brief bout of criticism by the Green Camp. But the scope of the scandal continued to expand. The amount of money involved was appalling, and left Roh Moo-hyun far behind. Although the scandal became worse and worse, Chen Shui-bian's expression of remorse vanished like a puff of smoke. He maintained repeatedly he was innocent, and a victim of political persecution. Chen Shui-bian and Roh Moo-hyun were indeed quite different.
The Democratic Progressive Party organized a May 17 protest march. It took to the streets to denounce Ma Ying-jeou. It exercised the right of opposition parties to express dissent. What the public on Taiwan noted with a cold eye however, was the complete absence of DPP criticism of Chen Shui-bian's money-laundering scandal. On the contrary, Chairman Tsai Ing-wen accused the ruling KMT of violating Chen Shui-bian's human rights, in order to humiliate the Democratic Progressive Party. Whether the court's taking of Chen Shui-bian into custody constitutes an infringement of human rights is a serious issue that merits scrutiny. But whether Chen Shui-bian was taken into custody on orders from the ruling administration is a different matter entirely.
The evidence of Chen administration money-laundering is overwhelming. He established a vast number of overseas accounts. The amount of wealth he accumulated during his eight years in power is no secret. No evidence exists that ruling KMT officials have engaged in political persecution. Green Camp representatives accuse the ruling KMT of manipulating the judiciary and engaging in political persecution. They make unfounded accusations, but offer no evidence. As to how Ah-Bian, Ah-Cheng, and their children moved such vast sums of "campaign contributions" overseas, they remain silent. Contrast the two, and one is bound to find their allegations of political persecution and human rights violations utterly unconvincing.
Suppose the situation were reversed. Suppose Ma Ying-jeou had acquired vast sums of campaign contributions, or set up overseas accounts containing vast sums of money. Would the Green Camp criticize such abuses? Whenever the Green Camp utters the words "clean government," its political and moral double standards have opened it up to ridicule. The Presbyterian Church's accusation that the Democratic Progressive Party has failed to reflect upon Chen Shui-bian's mistakes is not without reason.
What about Chen Shui-bian himself? He has cited his illness, his medical treatment, and written books to accuse the courts of political persecution. His most recent tactic has been to fire his defense counsel, and refuse to talk with the public defender. This of course is his right as a criminal defendant. But isn't his strategy of forcing a showdown with the courts unbecoming of an attorney at law and an officer of the court, not to mention a former head of state? Chen Shui-bian may not act as if he doesn't care. But anyone in the know, must have some feelings about the matter.
A former head of state must face justice as a result of his money scandals. Instead he has given up his rights of as the accused to a legal defense. He has done so in defiance of common sense, for the sake of political posturing. Is he intentionally attempting to create enmity between himself and the court? Has he truly been wronged and helpless to seek legal redress? Or is he all too aware of his own guilt and imminent conviction, and therefore establishing a preemptive claim to political persecution? Has he completely lost his political and moral compass? Does he really expect the world to believe he is fighting for justice and the lofty ideal of human rights? How much political legitimacy does he still have? How many people will actually believe him?
No matter what attitude Chen Shui-bian assumes as he faces justice, the court's ruling, his guilt or innocence, his sentence light or heavy, will be subject to close scrutiny by the public, in accordance with the rule of law.
Preventing the abuse of power by political leaders attempting to enrich themselves and undermine the body politic by punishing them after they commit a crime is hardly the ideal solution. The ideal solution is to increase accountability by forcing politicians to demonstrate political integrity and abide by moral standards, by demanding that the ruling and opposition parties share responsibility. Chen Shui-bian does not measure up to Roh Moo-hyun. Let's hope that does not mean that Taiwan does not measure up to South Korea!
中時電子報 新聞
新聞速報 2009.05.25
扁不如盧 希望不代表台不如韓
【本報訊】
收賄醜聞纏身的南韓前總統盧武鉉，跳崖自殺身亡。他出身貧寒，發憤苦讀通過司法考試，旋以人權律師提倡清廉政治享名。執政時政績平平，先盛後衰，卸任後爆發貪汙醜聞，因妻兒近親於其任內向商人索賄，引起調查，他聲稱對家人收取錢財並不知情，但公開表示無顏面對國民，讓國人失望而深感抱歉，終究走上自殺的悲劇。
盧武鉉與陳水扁，有太多相似之處，很難不引起聯想比擬。但故事情節不論如何相似，總不能從盧武鉉究竟有無貪汙推論陳水扁有無貪汙。
刑事刑法案件，畢竟要交給負責審判的法院做最後認定，國人目睹陳水扁及其家人於案發後種種反應，即使不免對於陳水扁是否貪汙自有判斷，我們仍願堅持法律上無罪推定的原則，尊重法院裁判而不妄下斷語。
但是不容否認，盧武鉉悔恨交集的自盡，正是對照台灣卸任元首以什麼態度面對貪腐醜聞的一面明鏡。
我們為盧武鉉選擇自盡以謝感到惋惜與悲哀，也絕不鼓勵任何人加以效法；然而必須指出，盧武鉉的自盡，展現了一種與司法審判無關，純屬政治道德上的自我批判，這種政治倫理態度在台灣一直被期待卻未出現，令人自歎不如。
陳水扁曾經在去年八月總統卸任後，為了海外洗錢帳戶無法隱瞞而自承做了法律上不許可的事，一度向國人公開道歉，事後也曾短暫引發綠營的批判。可是，之後弊端醜聞愈大愈多，牽涉金額駭人，盧武鉉也瞠乎其後。案件內情雖然愈捅愈多，其自我反省卻有如曇花一現，不斷呈現的則是阿扁無罪而受盡政治司法迫害的臉孔。陳水扁與盧武鉉，確是大不相同！
民進黨舉辦五一七遊行上街嗆馬，行使在野黨的異議權利，台灣人民所冷眼觀察的，則是民進黨對於阿扁洗錢醜聞噤若寒蟬的批判缺席。蔡英文主席近日還大力批評對手藉著司法侵犯阿扁人權以羞辱民進黨。法院羈押阿扁迄今是否侵犯阿扁人權確實該嚴肅檢討對待，但是法院羈押阿扁是否受到執政者指使，則是不同的問題。
相較於陳府聚斂洗錢已知事證的疑雲重重，設置海外帳戶之多，在位八年積累之鉅，不是祕密，執政者指使法院從事政治迫害的指控，其實缺乏證據。綠營人士對於執政者控制司法、實施迫害，若可繪聲繪影，完全不需要證據；對於扁珍及其子女，如何可能有如此鉅額的政治獻金搬移海外的事實，卻是諱莫如深。兩相對照，必將使其任何司法人權的政治指控，失去說服力。
異地而處，假若是馬英九使用鉅額政治獻金設置海外帳戶，綠營將會以何種政治力量給予批判？失衡的雙重政治道德標準，實已使得民進黨今天在任何場合以「清廉」二字自許，都彷彿是惹人訕笑的自我嘲諷。長老教會指責民進黨未能表態反省阿扁犯的錯誤，不為無故。
陳水扁本人呢？稱病、就醫、出書的政治手段，嗆聲司法從事政治迫害；最近的新招則是解除辯護律師的委任，拒與公設辯護人接談，這當然都是他身為刑事被告自由選擇如何應訴的權利，但是不惜與法院決裂的策略行徑，是否有失律師政治家應有的專業水準？是否符合卸任元首應有的政治高度？陳水扁本人可否毫不在意，識者必不至於無所感覺。
卸任元首因自己的金錢醜聞而面對司法審判時，以不合社會常理的政治姿態放棄刑事司法被告的防禦權利，有意自陷於必與法院為敵的極端處境，究竟是否真是出自有冤難伸的無奈，還是自知難逃有罪判決，遂要以預先鋪設司法政治迫害說辭的政治伎倆？完全失去了政治道德上的自我批判能力，卻要世人以為他是在實現爭取司法人權的崇高理想，能有多少政治正當性？有多少人會真的相信？
不管陳水扁用什麼態度面對司法審判，法院對他的判決無論是有罪無罪，判輕判重，其實都必然會遭到社會輿論使用高度的法治標準加以檢驗。
用司法加施事後制裁來防範政治領袖濫權自肥，穢亂民主，其實只是治標的下策；提昇政黨政治中問責對手也反省自我的政治清廉道德標準，要求朝野共信共守，才是治本的上策。陳水扁不如盧武鉉，希望不代表台灣不如南韓！
Thursday, May 21, 2009
Yeh Chin-chuan's Tears vs. the Youth Corps Member's Lap Dog
Yeh Chin-chuan's Tears vs. the Youth Corps Member's Lap Dog
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2009
Yeh Chin-chuan wept. Why he wept involves a complex political tale. But the plot of this complex political tale that unfolded in Geneva is actually quite simple. It was merely a noisy debate between two political groups.
One Huang Hai-ning and several other students organized a heckling team. They interrupted a dinner in Geneva hosted by Yeh Chin-chuan for the Ministers of Health of allied nations. They harangued Yeh Chin-chuan, demanding to know, "Under what name are you participating in the WHA?" Behind this rhetorical question however, was a prescripted agenda. Yeh must use the name "Republic of China" or "Taiwan" when participating in the WHA, otherwise he is "selling out Taiwan." That is why Huang continually screamed, "Yeh Chin-chuan, don't sell out Taiwan!" Yeh Chin-chuan was eventually driven to tears by her accusations.
Huang Hai-ning and others offered no logical arguments. They were perhaps adopting an all or nothing, do or die stance regarding participation in WHO activities. Failure to join using the official name of the nation constituted a national humiliation. It meant loss and defeat, even betrayal. The tune sung by Huang Hai-ning and others was full of solemnity and pathos. She was a former DPP Youth Corps member and the daughter of a retired DPP party worker.
Meanwhile, Yeh Chin-chuan was playing a different tune. He provided a dramatic counterpoint to Huang Hai-ning. He offered an entirely different logic. He adopted a low-keyed approach. His reasoning was that it is not necessary to join using the official name of the nation. After one has joined, the meaning of one's nation will become clear enough. Only then will one have the opportunity to proclaim what one is. Only then can one look forward to achieving one's goal.
Two entirely different ways of thinking collided in Geneva. It wasn't really a debate. It was merely a one-sided shouting of verbal abuse. But this is a serious topic worthy of serious thought. It should not be concluded amidst the smoke and confusion of whether to file a complaint and whether to step down. If it is given serious thought, then Yeh Chin-chuan's tears will not be wasted. Whereas the Youth Corps member's travel expenses from France to Switzerland will be.
These Youth Corps members' tune is something even Chen Shui-bian never took seriously. Chen Shui-bian once threatened to push for a "plebiscite on WHO membership." But he never followed through. Last year, he sent a letter to WHO Director-General Dr Margaret Chan, demanding "admission to the WHO in the name of Taiwan," and participation in WHO activities as an observer. Both of Chen Shui-bian's registered letters were eventually returned, unread. These lap dog wielding Youth Corps members, couldn't achieve anything more than Chen Shui-bian. Perhaps they were merely putting on a show. Perhaps they were making what they knew to be impossible demands upon Yeh Chin-chuan, demanding that he do what the Democratic Progressive Party couldn't do.
The interaction between the two groups was not a genuine debate. It was merely political theater, staged for domestic consumption. Its real significance was revealed the next day, during staged protests. Yeh Chin-chuan sat in the World Health Assembly as an official observer. Mainland Chinese Minister of Health Chen Zhu walked over to Yeh Chin-chuan, and was introduced. Yeh Chin-chuan and Chen Zhu greeted each other and conversed. The two men bridged a thirty-eight year gap, and made history.
Yeh Chin-chuan's four-minute speech received a full minute of applause. The scene carried real weight. In 1971 the United Nations General Assembly, at Albania's behest, adopted UN Resolution 2758, expelling Taipei from the United Nations, and replacing it with Beijing. Thirty-eight years later, Republic of China officials met for the first time with officials of the other side, at the same time, in the same room, inside a UN organization. Both sides used official titles while addressing each other. The scene was loaded with historical and political significance. If it turns out to be no match for a handful of noisy Youth Corps members, is that not Taiwan's loss?
Twice Chen Shui-bian sent letters applying for WHO membership. Twice they were returned. If they hadn't been, the first Director of Health to become a WHA observer might have been Twu Shing-Jer, instead of Yeh Chin-chuan. If Twu Shing-Jer had attended the WHA under the name of "Chinese Taipei," would the Youth Corps member armed with her lap dog still have rushed fto Geneva from Paris to heckle him?
If Twu Shing-Jer were still President Chen Shui-bian's Director of Health, would Twu Shing-Jer say that the new strain of influenza is best gift he could give President Chen Shui-bian? Six years ago, when Twu Shing-Jer was Director of Health, the public never heard him say SARS was a gift for President Chen Shui-bian.
The Youth Corps member asserted that Yeh Chin-chuan and Taiwan had been humiliated. But we hardly need Youth Corps members to remind us of that. Most of the public on Taiwan is aware of the humiliation involved in attending the WHA under the name "Chinese Taipei." Our nation is near suffocation. Yeh Chin-chuan wants to give it a chance to take a deep breath. Yet these Youth Corps members accuse him of enduring humiliation merely for the sake of survival. In the debate over national identity, haven't these always been the two views?
葉金川的眼淚與青年軍的寵物狗
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.21 05:18 am
葉金川臉龐滾下的淚，註解了讓他落淚的這道政治習題有多麼複雜難解；但這所謂難解的政治習題在日內瓦所呈現的語法卻很簡單清澈，它其實就是兩組政治賦格曲的詰辯，只是辯得十分聒譟嘈雜。
以女子黃海寧等幾名留學生組成的嗆聲隊伍，直搗日內瓦葉金川宴請友邦衛生部長的晚宴，對葉金川疾言厲色地質問，「用什麼身分參加世衛大會」？不必回答的這道題目背後，有一個早已設定好的標準：要用「中華民國」或「台灣」國家名義加入，否則即是賣台。於是，女子不斷叫嚷著「葉金川不要賣台」，而葉金川終為「賣台」的指控落淚。
黃海寧等人未述盡的命題邏輯，或許就是必以完整的國家姿態參加世衛，否則寧死不入。不以完整國家姿態加入，即是屈辱、折損與挫敗，甚至是背叛。這是黃海寧等人的賦格曲，曲式悲壯而高亢。何況，她有民進黨退職黨工及青年軍的背景。
但是，另一組賦格曲，即葉金川所彈奏者，卻是黃海寧等的對照，恰是完全不同的理路，它走的是低迴的路線，它的理路是：不必然以完全的國家姿態進入，但進入之後，國家的意涵方能顯現，而先有顯現，才能爭取表白的空間，有了表白的空間才有盼望，有了盼望才有趨近目標之可能。
兩組邏輯思路全然相悖的弦音，在日內瓦火爆對辯，甚至沒有真的對辯，而只是叫嚷與謾罵。然而，這畢竟是一件嚴肅而應認真思考的議題，不應在提告與否、下台與否的紛陳煙幕中，竟然就告結束；若如此，葉金川的英雄淚豈非白彈，而青年軍由法國兼程趕到瑞士的旅費亦是虛擲。
事實上，青年軍的曲式甚至連陳水扁都不曾真的演奏，陳水扁雖曾揚言要「全民公投入世衛」，卻未真做，去年致函世衛組織幹事長陳馮富珍提出「台灣名義入世衛案」，卻實際上是輔助一個台灣做為觀察員的備案。而陳水扁的親函終被雙掛號退回。因此手上抱著寵物狗的青年軍，是以一個陳水扁也並不可能真做，或是以表演性質假做的高難度要求，加之於葉金川身上，要葉承擔民進黨執政時亦未能執行的路線。
這裡即可看出，兩組賦格曲的詰辯並不真實存在，只不過是出口又回銷台灣內部的政治鬥爭而已。真正呈現意義的，卻是嗆聲隔日上演的，葉金川在世界衛生大會中以觀察員的身分坐在正式的席位上，而加碼的劇情則是，中國的衛生部長陳竺親自走到葉金川的身旁，由第三人介紹葉的正式官銜給陳，而陳竺與葉金川問候交談。葉金川與陳竺跨越了這一道三十八年的鴻溝，創造了歷史。
葉金川致詞四分鐘，會場掌聲一分鐘；這個場景才具有真實的重量。這是中華民國政府官員自一九七一年聯合國大會通過阿爾巴尼亞提案，作成二七五八號「排我納匪」決議案的三十八年後，兩岸官員首次在聯合國的專門組織機構內同時與會，並且彼此不避諱以正式官銜互動交語，這樣具有歷史與政治意涵的場景，如若竟然敵不過幾個青年軍的一陣喧囂，寧非台灣真正的悲哀？
倘若陳水扁二度寄交ＷＨＯ的入會申請函未被退回，第一個坐上ＷＨＡ觀察員席位的衛生署長可能就是涂醒哲，而不是葉金川。而若是涂醒哲以「中華台北」的名義坐進了ＷＨＡ的會場，會不會有一名手抱寵物狗的青年軍從巴黎趕往日內瓦嗆聲鬧場？
正如，倘若今日仍是涂醒哲擔任陳水扁總統的衛生署長，涂醒哲會說首例新流感是送給陳水扁總統的最佳禮物嗎？至少，在六年前涂醒哲任衛生署長時，國人未曾聽見他說ＳＡＲＳ是送給陳水扁總統的禮物。
青年軍是在凸顯葉金川與台灣的屈辱，但不用青年軍的提示，大多數的台灣人皆知台灣是在高度屈辱中以「中華台北」的名義坐進ＷＨＡ。葉金川要的是國家從窒息的國際汪洋中冒出頭吸口氣，但青年軍卻認為他泅水求生的姿態太過屈辱。對於國家認同的辯論，從來都是這兩種相對的觀點，難道不是嗎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2009
Yeh Chin-chuan wept. Why he wept involves a complex political tale. But the plot of this complex political tale that unfolded in Geneva is actually quite simple. It was merely a noisy debate between two political groups.
One Huang Hai-ning and several other students organized a heckling team. They interrupted a dinner in Geneva hosted by Yeh Chin-chuan for the Ministers of Health of allied nations. They harangued Yeh Chin-chuan, demanding to know, "Under what name are you participating in the WHA?" Behind this rhetorical question however, was a prescripted agenda. Yeh must use the name "Republic of China" or "Taiwan" when participating in the WHA, otherwise he is "selling out Taiwan." That is why Huang continually screamed, "Yeh Chin-chuan, don't sell out Taiwan!" Yeh Chin-chuan was eventually driven to tears by her accusations.
Huang Hai-ning and others offered no logical arguments. They were perhaps adopting an all or nothing, do or die stance regarding participation in WHO activities. Failure to join using the official name of the nation constituted a national humiliation. It meant loss and defeat, even betrayal. The tune sung by Huang Hai-ning and others was full of solemnity and pathos. She was a former DPP Youth Corps member and the daughter of a retired DPP party worker.
Meanwhile, Yeh Chin-chuan was playing a different tune. He provided a dramatic counterpoint to Huang Hai-ning. He offered an entirely different logic. He adopted a low-keyed approach. His reasoning was that it is not necessary to join using the official name of the nation. After one has joined, the meaning of one's nation will become clear enough. Only then will one have the opportunity to proclaim what one is. Only then can one look forward to achieving one's goal.
Two entirely different ways of thinking collided in Geneva. It wasn't really a debate. It was merely a one-sided shouting of verbal abuse. But this is a serious topic worthy of serious thought. It should not be concluded amidst the smoke and confusion of whether to file a complaint and whether to step down. If it is given serious thought, then Yeh Chin-chuan's tears will not be wasted. Whereas the Youth Corps member's travel expenses from France to Switzerland will be.
These Youth Corps members' tune is something even Chen Shui-bian never took seriously. Chen Shui-bian once threatened to push for a "plebiscite on WHO membership." But he never followed through. Last year, he sent a letter to WHO Director-General Dr Margaret Chan, demanding "admission to the WHO in the name of Taiwan," and participation in WHO activities as an observer. Both of Chen Shui-bian's registered letters were eventually returned, unread. These lap dog wielding Youth Corps members, couldn't achieve anything more than Chen Shui-bian. Perhaps they were merely putting on a show. Perhaps they were making what they knew to be impossible demands upon Yeh Chin-chuan, demanding that he do what the Democratic Progressive Party couldn't do.
The interaction between the two groups was not a genuine debate. It was merely political theater, staged for domestic consumption. Its real significance was revealed the next day, during staged protests. Yeh Chin-chuan sat in the World Health Assembly as an official observer. Mainland Chinese Minister of Health Chen Zhu walked over to Yeh Chin-chuan, and was introduced. Yeh Chin-chuan and Chen Zhu greeted each other and conversed. The two men bridged a thirty-eight year gap, and made history.
Yeh Chin-chuan's four-minute speech received a full minute of applause. The scene carried real weight. In 1971 the United Nations General Assembly, at Albania's behest, adopted UN Resolution 2758, expelling Taipei from the United Nations, and replacing it with Beijing. Thirty-eight years later, Republic of China officials met for the first time with officials of the other side, at the same time, in the same room, inside a UN organization. Both sides used official titles while addressing each other. The scene was loaded with historical and political significance. If it turns out to be no match for a handful of noisy Youth Corps members, is that not Taiwan's loss?
Twice Chen Shui-bian sent letters applying for WHO membership. Twice they were returned. If they hadn't been, the first Director of Health to become a WHA observer might have been Twu Shing-Jer, instead of Yeh Chin-chuan. If Twu Shing-Jer had attended the WHA under the name of "Chinese Taipei," would the Youth Corps member armed with her lap dog still have rushed fto Geneva from Paris to heckle him?
If Twu Shing-Jer were still President Chen Shui-bian's Director of Health, would Twu Shing-Jer say that the new strain of influenza is best gift he could give President Chen Shui-bian? Six years ago, when Twu Shing-Jer was Director of Health, the public never heard him say SARS was a gift for President Chen Shui-bian.
The Youth Corps member asserted that Yeh Chin-chuan and Taiwan had been humiliated. But we hardly need Youth Corps members to remind us of that. Most of the public on Taiwan is aware of the humiliation involved in attending the WHA under the name "Chinese Taipei." Our nation is near suffocation. Yeh Chin-chuan wants to give it a chance to take a deep breath. Yet these Youth Corps members accuse him of enduring humiliation merely for the sake of survival. In the debate over national identity, haven't these always been the two views?
葉金川的眼淚與青年軍的寵物狗
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.21 05:18 am
葉金川臉龐滾下的淚，註解了讓他落淚的這道政治習題有多麼複雜難解；但這所謂難解的政治習題在日內瓦所呈現的語法卻很簡單清澈，它其實就是兩組政治賦格曲的詰辯，只是辯得十分聒譟嘈雜。
以女子黃海寧等幾名留學生組成的嗆聲隊伍，直搗日內瓦葉金川宴請友邦衛生部長的晚宴，對葉金川疾言厲色地質問，「用什麼身分參加世衛大會」？不必回答的這道題目背後，有一個早已設定好的標準：要用「中華民國」或「台灣」國家名義加入，否則即是賣台。於是，女子不斷叫嚷著「葉金川不要賣台」，而葉金川終為「賣台」的指控落淚。
黃海寧等人未述盡的命題邏輯，或許就是必以完整的國家姿態參加世衛，否則寧死不入。不以完整國家姿態加入，即是屈辱、折損與挫敗，甚至是背叛。這是黃海寧等人的賦格曲，曲式悲壯而高亢。何況，她有民進黨退職黨工及青年軍的背景。
但是，另一組賦格曲，即葉金川所彈奏者，卻是黃海寧等的對照，恰是完全不同的理路，它走的是低迴的路線，它的理路是：不必然以完全的國家姿態進入，但進入之後，國家的意涵方能顯現，而先有顯現，才能爭取表白的空間，有了表白的空間才有盼望，有了盼望才有趨近目標之可能。
兩組邏輯思路全然相悖的弦音，在日內瓦火爆對辯，甚至沒有真的對辯，而只是叫嚷與謾罵。然而，這畢竟是一件嚴肅而應認真思考的議題，不應在提告與否、下台與否的紛陳煙幕中，竟然就告結束；若如此，葉金川的英雄淚豈非白彈，而青年軍由法國兼程趕到瑞士的旅費亦是虛擲。
事實上，青年軍的曲式甚至連陳水扁都不曾真的演奏，陳水扁雖曾揚言要「全民公投入世衛」，卻未真做，去年致函世衛組織幹事長陳馮富珍提出「台灣名義入世衛案」，卻實際上是輔助一個台灣做為觀察員的備案。而陳水扁的親函終被雙掛號退回。因此手上抱著寵物狗的青年軍，是以一個陳水扁也並不可能真做，或是以表演性質假做的高難度要求，加之於葉金川身上，要葉承擔民進黨執政時亦未能執行的路線。
這裡即可看出，兩組賦格曲的詰辯並不真實存在，只不過是出口又回銷台灣內部的政治鬥爭而已。真正呈現意義的，卻是嗆聲隔日上演的，葉金川在世界衛生大會中以觀察員的身分坐在正式的席位上，而加碼的劇情則是，中國的衛生部長陳竺親自走到葉金川的身旁，由第三人介紹葉的正式官銜給陳，而陳竺與葉金川問候交談。葉金川與陳竺跨越了這一道三十八年的鴻溝，創造了歷史。
葉金川致詞四分鐘，會場掌聲一分鐘；這個場景才具有真實的重量。這是中華民國政府官員自一九七一年聯合國大會通過阿爾巴尼亞提案，作成二七五八號「排我納匪」決議案的三十八年後，兩岸官員首次在聯合國的專門組織機構內同時與會，並且彼此不避諱以正式官銜互動交語，這樣具有歷史與政治意涵的場景，如若竟然敵不過幾個青年軍的一陣喧囂，寧非台灣真正的悲哀？
倘若陳水扁二度寄交ＷＨＯ的入會申請函未被退回，第一個坐上ＷＨＡ觀察員席位的衛生署長可能就是涂醒哲，而不是葉金川。而若是涂醒哲以「中華台北」的名義坐進了ＷＨＡ的會場，會不會有一名手抱寵物狗的青年軍從巴黎趕往日內瓦嗆聲鬧場？
正如，倘若今日仍是涂醒哲擔任陳水扁總統的衛生署長，涂醒哲會說首例新流感是送給陳水扁總統的最佳禮物嗎？至少，在六年前涂醒哲任衛生署長時，國人未曾聽見他說ＳＡＲＳ是送給陳水扁總統的禮物。
青年軍是在凸顯葉金川與台灣的屈辱，但不用青年軍的提示，大多數的台灣人皆知台灣是在高度屈辱中以「中華台北」的名義坐進ＷＨＡ。葉金川要的是國家從窒息的國際汪洋中冒出頭吸口氣，但青年軍卻認為他泅水求生的姿態太過屈辱。對於國家認同的辯論，從來都是這兩種相對的觀點，難道不是嗎？
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Standing on the Front Line, Responding to Public Expectations
Standing on the Front Line, Responding to Public Expectations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 20, 2009
President Ma Ying-jeou has been in office one year. The dominant feeling during this year has been frustration with the Ma administration for failing to live up to its potential.
President Ma's performance has fallen far short of public expectations. Two very different reasons are responsible for this, and both apply. First, President Ma erred, provoking public dissatisfaction. Secondly, on other issues, President Ma did not err. Instead, public expectations were unrealistic. In other words, some problems are due to President Ma's errors. Other problems are due to unrealistic public expectations.
President Ma Ying-jeou's main goal during the remainder of his term should be to identify the gaps between his performance and public expectations, and to fill them. If President Ma has erred, he must swiftly make amends. If the public has unrealistic expectations, he must communicate with the public and convince them otherwise. The president's performance will inevitably fall short of public expectations. But the shortfalls must be kept to a minimum.
Actually, when President Ma took office a year ago, the situation was more perious than first imagined. Taipei's relations with Beijing had reached new lows. Taipei's relations with Washington had also reached new lows. Taiwan's economic dependence on mainland China had reached new highs. The mainland's influence on Taiwan's political and economic lifeblood had also reached new highs. Cross-Strait relations had come to a head, and were ready for a showdown. Chen Shui-bian and the DPP had milked the national identity issue and "ethnic" relations issue for all they were worth. The Chen corruption case had devastated the system of legal justice and social justice beyond repair. Problems plagued the nation, inside and out. Add to this a global financial tsunami that occurs only once in a century. Faced with such perilous circumstances, what kind of president did Ma Ying-jeou aspire to be? What did the public expect Ma Ying-jeou to do? This is where the gap appeared.
What kind of President did Ma Ying-jeou aspire to be? The Chen Shui-bian regime was fierce, tyrannical, and reckless. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou was none of these things. He believed that people in political office must be upright, that integrity must be foremost. Chen Shui-bian was willing "to do whatever it takes." Ma Ying-jeou, by contrast, imposes limits upon himself. For example, Ma Ying-jeou declared that he was "retreating to the second line." The result was Liu Chao-hsuan became the most respected Premier in the past two decades. Ma never humiliated Vincent Siew the way Liu Tai-ying and Su Chi-cheng did. Ma never abused Premiers the way Chen Shui-bian did. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, in order to demagogue cross-Strait relations and Taipei-Washington relations, resorted to posturing and provoking external crises, to be used as political bargaining chips. Chen Shui-bian was fierce, tyrannical, and reckless to the extreme. During his "lost voyage" he ordered Air Force One flown to Libya as a gesture of protest. Ma Ying-jeou's policy was to transit on the west coast of the US, coming and going. Some suggested that he transit on the east coast, but he ignored such suggestions, saying he wanted to "keep things simple." Even Jason Hu felt Ma's style was "too bland." How does one explain Ma's style anyway?
What kind of president does the public expect Ma Ying-jeou to be? When Ma Ying-jeou said he was "retreating to the second line," the public subjected him to overwhelming criticism and ridicule. The public felt that the separation of powers between the president and the premier was something they needed to settle between themselves. But as the president, as the spiritual and political leader of the nation Ma had a responsibility to stand on the front line. Ma said "Chen Yunlin can address me as Mr. Ma," "Taiwan and mainland China are two regions," and "If re-elected I would not rule out political talks." President Ma probably felt he was merely stating some simple facts. But he really should have known his statement would provoke jibes about "Regional Administrator Ma." The public wonders how Ma can be so oblivious to the impact of his remarks. Chen Tsung-ming has refused to step down. The pre-trial investigation and the Chen corruption case have not progressed as the public hoped they would. Many people consider this President Ma's responsibility. Yet Ma's only response has been to say, "I respect the independence of the judiciary." Cross-Strait policy involves walking a tightrope. Some accuse him of "sympathizing with [Mainland] China, and selling out Taiwan." Others accuse him of promoting an "independent Taiwan and the two-states theory." As we can see, the public has sharply divergent expectations of Ma Ying-jeou.
Ma Ying-jeou got elected on the basis of his "Better Immediately!" campaign slogan. The subsequent gap between public expectations was of course, huge. Also, many factors, such as the rise and fall of cross-Strait relations were not under his control. The financial tsunami made matters worse. The Chen corruption case dragged on, making many people impatient. Faced with criticism from within and without, many members of the public almost hoped that Ma Ying-jeou would display a few "fierce, tyrannical, and reckless" traits. Instead, Ma Ying-jeou's forebearance was interpreted as weakness and incompetence. In fact Ma Ying-jeou could easily say the words or make the gestures needed to win over populist sentiment. So how did he get to be labeled as "weak and incompetent?" Is this the result of a gap in public expectations? Or is Ma Ying-jeou a person who simply will not live up to his potential?
What does Ma Ying-jeou expect of himself as a president? What does the public on Taiwan expect of him as a president? For the answers to these two questions, and to bridge the gap between public expectations and Ma's performance, we need to answer an even more fundamental question: Given the Republic of China's internal and external circumstances, what kind of leader does it need?
President Ma must stand on the front line. No matter what the separation of powers between the President and Premier might be, no matter how the party and government might interface, President Ma has symbolic and political responsibility to stand on the front line. He must stand on the front line. But Taiwan cannot endure another populist president who lives by demagoguery. Externally, he must persuade Beijing to maintain a win-win relationship. Internally, he must persuade Taiwan independence elements to see the error of their ways, and heal society's wounds. The president has taken a position on the front lines. He must be patient on the international front and forgiving on the domestic front. The president is standing on the front line, taking the point. It would be an easy matter for him to make a show of being a powerful leader, fierce, tyrannical, and reckless. But standing on the front line, taking the point, he must bite his tongue, he must make concessions. he must avoid doing the things he shouldn't do. That may well be beyond the abilities of ordinary mortals. To what extent must he remain silent? To what extent must he make concessions? How can he do what must be done, and refuse to do what must not be done? How can he avoid accusations that he has not lived up to his potential.
The public is frustrated with the Ma administration for not living up to its potential. The potential the public expects it to live up to may not be all that great. Ma Ying-jeou's own expectations may be simple and transparent. The problem is understanding our situation inside and out. What kind of potential should national leaders fulfill? Only after we have answered this question, can we fill the gap between public expectations and the president's performance.
站上第一線 回應恨鐵不成鋼的期待
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.20 05:46 am
馬英九總統就職一周年。這一年來令人感受最強烈的社會氛圍，或許就是恨鐵不成鋼。
馬總統的表現與社會期待出現巨大落差，其實有兩種迥然不同但同時並存的原因：一、馬總統的表現出錯，使社會失望；二、社會的期待可能有所偏誤，而馬總統的表現未必是錯。也就是說，有些問題出在馬總統的錯誤，有些問題出在社會的期待未必正確。
找出總統表現與社會期待的落差，並盡力修補其間的落差，應是馬英九未來任期的主要努力目標。如果是馬總統自己的錯誤，亟應改正；如果是社會期待的偏差，則須溝通及說服。總統表現與社會期待必定會有落差，但應使其間落差收縮至最小的程度。
一年前馬總統就任時的情勢，其實比想像中更要險峻。對外而言，台灣與中國大陸的關係惡化到谷底，與美國的關係亦空前惡劣；但相對地，台灣對大陸的經濟依賴度卻攀上前所未有的高點，大陸對台灣政經命脈的影響支配力則升至前所未有的高點。對內而言，則兩岸競合關係的爭議已至攤牌階段，陳水扁及民進黨對國家認同及族群關係的操作已在剃刀邊緣，而扁案對司法正義及社會公道的摧殘亦已到了無以復加的地步。內憂外患，遂使整個台灣陷於進退維谷的態勢；不僅如此，後來又加上一場百年罕見的全球金融海嘯。面對如此險峻的時勢，馬英九自己想要做一個怎樣的總統？國人又期待馬英九做一個怎樣的總統？前文所說的落差，遂告出現。
馬英九自己想做一個怎樣的總統？若與陳水扁之標榜「悍性／霸性／賭性」相較，馬英九似乎三者俱缺，他主張「政者正也」、「誠信第一」。陳水扁可謂「無所不用其極」，馬英九則是「有所不為」。例如，馬英九宣示「退居第二線」，使劉兆玄成為近二十年來最受總統尊重的行政院長；他未曾如蕭萬長被劉泰英、蘇志誠羞辱，也未曾如所有的行政院長皆被陳水扁糟蹋。再如，李扁皆以操作兩岸關係及台美關係為能事，裝腔作勢，藉挑激外部危機來做為自己的政治籌碼；陳水扁甚至將其「悍性／霸性／賭性」發揮到了極致，在「謎航之旅」把總統專機開到了利比亞，以示抗爭；但馬英九的政策卻是「美西去／美西回」，有人建議過境美國東岸，他卻連提都不提，謂為「單純化」。這樣的風格連胡志強都說「太平淡」，如何解釋這樣的風格？
相對而言，國人又期待馬英九做一個怎樣的總統？一句「退居第二線」，使馬英九面對排山倒海的抨擊與譏嘲。民間認為，總統與閣揆的權責分際是你們二人間事，但身為總統，在精神象徵及治國責任上皆必然要站在「第一線」。再如，主動表示「陳雲林可以稱我馬先生」、「台灣與中國大陸是兩個地區」、「若連任不排除觸及協商政治的議題」等等；馬總統可能覺得只是一根腸子通到底的事實陳述，但豈不知必然招致「馬區長」的譏嘲，而其實更多國人亦覺得總統發言豈能如此「白目」至作繭自縛的地步？又如，陳聰明不下台，扁案偵審的進度不符社會期待；許多國人認為責任在馬總統，他則始終以一句「尊重司法獨立」回應。再如，兩岸政策走鋼絲，有人指他「傾中賣台」，有人則指他是「獨台／兩國論」，可見社會對馬英九的期待分歧嚴重已至何等地步？
馬英九在「馬上好」的競選口號中當選，後來出現的社會期望落差自是非常之大。何況，兩岸形勢消長，諸多因素已非操之在我；復以金融海嘯狂襲，更是雪上加霜；而扁案遲久未決，亦引發部分國人極大的不耐。在如此內外交煎的情勢中，許多國人或許寄望馬英九能表現出一定程度的悍性、霸性及賭性，而馬英九的隱忍內斂則被解讀為懦弱無能。其實，以馬英九的條件，他或許僅憑說幾句話或作幾個姿態就能輕易為自己贏得民粹人氣，但何以如今「懦弱無能」居然成了他的政治標籤？這是社會期待的偏差？還是馬英九確實是一塊不可能錘鍊成精鋼的生鐵？
馬英九自期為怎樣的總統？台灣主流社會又期待他成為怎樣的總統？欲解答這兩個問題，並修補其間落差，其實應先回答另一個更高階的問題：台灣內外情勢走到今日地步，需要怎樣的國家領導人？
馬總統必須站上第一線。無論府閣分際如何，無論黨政介面如何；馬總統在精神象徵及治國責任上皆必須站上第一線。但站上第一線，台灣卻不可再出現一個以民粹操作為能事的總統。對外，要說服北京維持兩岸雙贏共生；對內，要感召台獨進行修正並撫平族群創傷。總統雖然站上第一線，但對外要忍，對內要讓；總統站在第一線的巔峰，極易表現其悍性、霸性與賭性的「能力」；但站在第一線的巔峰，要咬牙忍，願咬牙讓，能咬牙「有所不為」，那或許才是另一種非同一般的過人之能。但是，要忍到什麼地步，讓到什麼地步，要如何在「有所不為」中展現「大有為」，才不會滋生「恨鐵不成鋼」的抨擊與譏諷？
恨鐵不成鋼。社會期待的「鋼」或許是不拘一格的繞指鋼，馬英九自期的「鋼」卻可能是寧拙勿巧而幾乎可以透視的水晶鋼。問題是：先須確定台灣內外情勢走到今日，國家領導人應當是怎樣的「鋼」？解答了這個問題，才能修補其間的落差。
但無論如何，馬總統必須回應恨鐵不成鋼的社會期待。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 20, 2009
President Ma Ying-jeou has been in office one year. The dominant feeling during this year has been frustration with the Ma administration for failing to live up to its potential.
President Ma's performance has fallen far short of public expectations. Two very different reasons are responsible for this, and both apply. First, President Ma erred, provoking public dissatisfaction. Secondly, on other issues, President Ma did not err. Instead, public expectations were unrealistic. In other words, some problems are due to President Ma's errors. Other problems are due to unrealistic public expectations.
President Ma Ying-jeou's main goal during the remainder of his term should be to identify the gaps between his performance and public expectations, and to fill them. If President Ma has erred, he must swiftly make amends. If the public has unrealistic expectations, he must communicate with the public and convince them otherwise. The president's performance will inevitably fall short of public expectations. But the shortfalls must be kept to a minimum.
Actually, when President Ma took office a year ago, the situation was more perious than first imagined. Taipei's relations with Beijing had reached new lows. Taipei's relations with Washington had also reached new lows. Taiwan's economic dependence on mainland China had reached new highs. The mainland's influence on Taiwan's political and economic lifeblood had also reached new highs. Cross-Strait relations had come to a head, and were ready for a showdown. Chen Shui-bian and the DPP had milked the national identity issue and "ethnic" relations issue for all they were worth. The Chen corruption case had devastated the system of legal justice and social justice beyond repair. Problems plagued the nation, inside and out. Add to this a global financial tsunami that occurs only once in a century. Faced with such perilous circumstances, what kind of president did Ma Ying-jeou aspire to be? What did the public expect Ma Ying-jeou to do? This is where the gap appeared.
What kind of President did Ma Ying-jeou aspire to be? The Chen Shui-bian regime was fierce, tyrannical, and reckless. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou was none of these things. He believed that people in political office must be upright, that integrity must be foremost. Chen Shui-bian was willing "to do whatever it takes." Ma Ying-jeou, by contrast, imposes limits upon himself. For example, Ma Ying-jeou declared that he was "retreating to the second line." The result was Liu Chao-hsuan became the most respected Premier in the past two decades. Ma never humiliated Vincent Siew the way Liu Tai-ying and Su Chi-cheng did. Ma never abused Premiers the way Chen Shui-bian did. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, in order to demagogue cross-Strait relations and Taipei-Washington relations, resorted to posturing and provoking external crises, to be used as political bargaining chips. Chen Shui-bian was fierce, tyrannical, and reckless to the extreme. During his "lost voyage" he ordered Air Force One flown to Libya as a gesture of protest. Ma Ying-jeou's policy was to transit on the west coast of the US, coming and going. Some suggested that he transit on the east coast, but he ignored such suggestions, saying he wanted to "keep things simple." Even Jason Hu felt Ma's style was "too bland." How does one explain Ma's style anyway?
What kind of president does the public expect Ma Ying-jeou to be? When Ma Ying-jeou said he was "retreating to the second line," the public subjected him to overwhelming criticism and ridicule. The public felt that the separation of powers between the president and the premier was something they needed to settle between themselves. But as the president, as the spiritual and political leader of the nation Ma had a responsibility to stand on the front line. Ma said "Chen Yunlin can address me as Mr. Ma," "Taiwan and mainland China are two regions," and "If re-elected I would not rule out political talks." President Ma probably felt he was merely stating some simple facts. But he really should have known his statement would provoke jibes about "Regional Administrator Ma." The public wonders how Ma can be so oblivious to the impact of his remarks. Chen Tsung-ming has refused to step down. The pre-trial investigation and the Chen corruption case have not progressed as the public hoped they would. Many people consider this President Ma's responsibility. Yet Ma's only response has been to say, "I respect the independence of the judiciary." Cross-Strait policy involves walking a tightrope. Some accuse him of "sympathizing with [Mainland] China, and selling out Taiwan." Others accuse him of promoting an "independent Taiwan and the two-states theory." As we can see, the public has sharply divergent expectations of Ma Ying-jeou.
Ma Ying-jeou got elected on the basis of his "Better Immediately!" campaign slogan. The subsequent gap between public expectations was of course, huge. Also, many factors, such as the rise and fall of cross-Strait relations were not under his control. The financial tsunami made matters worse. The Chen corruption case dragged on, making many people impatient. Faced with criticism from within and without, many members of the public almost hoped that Ma Ying-jeou would display a few "fierce, tyrannical, and reckless" traits. Instead, Ma Ying-jeou's forebearance was interpreted as weakness and incompetence. In fact Ma Ying-jeou could easily say the words or make the gestures needed to win over populist sentiment. So how did he get to be labeled as "weak and incompetent?" Is this the result of a gap in public expectations? Or is Ma Ying-jeou a person who simply will not live up to his potential?
What does Ma Ying-jeou expect of himself as a president? What does the public on Taiwan expect of him as a president? For the answers to these two questions, and to bridge the gap between public expectations and Ma's performance, we need to answer an even more fundamental question: Given the Republic of China's internal and external circumstances, what kind of leader does it need?
President Ma must stand on the front line. No matter what the separation of powers between the President and Premier might be, no matter how the party and government might interface, President Ma has symbolic and political responsibility to stand on the front line. He must stand on the front line. But Taiwan cannot endure another populist president who lives by demagoguery. Externally, he must persuade Beijing to maintain a win-win relationship. Internally, he must persuade Taiwan independence elements to see the error of their ways, and heal society's wounds. The president has taken a position on the front lines. He must be patient on the international front and forgiving on the domestic front. The president is standing on the front line, taking the point. It would be an easy matter for him to make a show of being a powerful leader, fierce, tyrannical, and reckless. But standing on the front line, taking the point, he must bite his tongue, he must make concessions. he must avoid doing the things he shouldn't do. That may well be beyond the abilities of ordinary mortals. To what extent must he remain silent? To what extent must he make concessions? How can he do what must be done, and refuse to do what must not be done? How can he avoid accusations that he has not lived up to his potential.
The public is frustrated with the Ma administration for not living up to its potential. The potential the public expects it to live up to may not be all that great. Ma Ying-jeou's own expectations may be simple and transparent. The problem is understanding our situation inside and out. What kind of potential should national leaders fulfill? Only after we have answered this question, can we fill the gap between public expectations and the president's performance.
站上第一線 回應恨鐵不成鋼的期待
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.20 05:46 am
馬英九總統就職一周年。這一年來令人感受最強烈的社會氛圍，或許就是恨鐵不成鋼。
馬總統的表現與社會期待出現巨大落差，其實有兩種迥然不同但同時並存的原因：一、馬總統的表現出錯，使社會失望；二、社會的期待可能有所偏誤，而馬總統的表現未必是錯。也就是說，有些問題出在馬總統的錯誤，有些問題出在社會的期待未必正確。
找出總統表現與社會期待的落差，並盡力修補其間的落差，應是馬英九未來任期的主要努力目標。如果是馬總統自己的錯誤，亟應改正；如果是社會期待的偏差，則須溝通及說服。總統表現與社會期待必定會有落差，但應使其間落差收縮至最小的程度。
一年前馬總統就任時的情勢，其實比想像中更要險峻。對外而言，台灣與中國大陸的關係惡化到谷底，與美國的關係亦空前惡劣；但相對地，台灣對大陸的經濟依賴度卻攀上前所未有的高點，大陸對台灣政經命脈的影響支配力則升至前所未有的高點。對內而言，則兩岸競合關係的爭議已至攤牌階段，陳水扁及民進黨對國家認同及族群關係的操作已在剃刀邊緣，而扁案對司法正義及社會公道的摧殘亦已到了無以復加的地步。內憂外患，遂使整個台灣陷於進退維谷的態勢；不僅如此，後來又加上一場百年罕見的全球金融海嘯。面對如此險峻的時勢，馬英九自己想要做一個怎樣的總統？國人又期待馬英九做一個怎樣的總統？前文所說的落差，遂告出現。
馬英九自己想做一個怎樣的總統？若與陳水扁之標榜「悍性／霸性／賭性」相較，馬英九似乎三者俱缺，他主張「政者正也」、「誠信第一」。陳水扁可謂「無所不用其極」，馬英九則是「有所不為」。例如，馬英九宣示「退居第二線」，使劉兆玄成為近二十年來最受總統尊重的行政院長；他未曾如蕭萬長被劉泰英、蘇志誠羞辱，也未曾如所有的行政院長皆被陳水扁糟蹋。再如，李扁皆以操作兩岸關係及台美關係為能事，裝腔作勢，藉挑激外部危機來做為自己的政治籌碼；陳水扁甚至將其「悍性／霸性／賭性」發揮到了極致，在「謎航之旅」把總統專機開到了利比亞，以示抗爭；但馬英九的政策卻是「美西去／美西回」，有人建議過境美國東岸，他卻連提都不提，謂為「單純化」。這樣的風格連胡志強都說「太平淡」，如何解釋這樣的風格？
相對而言，國人又期待馬英九做一個怎樣的總統？一句「退居第二線」，使馬英九面對排山倒海的抨擊與譏嘲。民間認為，總統與閣揆的權責分際是你們二人間事，但身為總統，在精神象徵及治國責任上皆必然要站在「第一線」。再如，主動表示「陳雲林可以稱我馬先生」、「台灣與中國大陸是兩個地區」、「若連任不排除觸及協商政治的議題」等等；馬總統可能覺得只是一根腸子通到底的事實陳述，但豈不知必然招致「馬區長」的譏嘲，而其實更多國人亦覺得總統發言豈能如此「白目」至作繭自縛的地步？又如，陳聰明不下台，扁案偵審的進度不符社會期待；許多國人認為責任在馬總統，他則始終以一句「尊重司法獨立」回應。再如，兩岸政策走鋼絲，有人指他「傾中賣台」，有人則指他是「獨台／兩國論」，可見社會對馬英九的期待分歧嚴重已至何等地步？
馬英九在「馬上好」的競選口號中當選，後來出現的社會期望落差自是非常之大。何況，兩岸形勢消長，諸多因素已非操之在我；復以金融海嘯狂襲，更是雪上加霜；而扁案遲久未決，亦引發部分國人極大的不耐。在如此內外交煎的情勢中，許多國人或許寄望馬英九能表現出一定程度的悍性、霸性及賭性，而馬英九的隱忍內斂則被解讀為懦弱無能。其實，以馬英九的條件，他或許僅憑說幾句話或作幾個姿態就能輕易為自己贏得民粹人氣，但何以如今「懦弱無能」居然成了他的政治標籤？這是社會期待的偏差？還是馬英九確實是一塊不可能錘鍊成精鋼的生鐵？
馬英九自期為怎樣的總統？台灣主流社會又期待他成為怎樣的總統？欲解答這兩個問題，並修補其間落差，其實應先回答另一個更高階的問題：台灣內外情勢走到今日地步，需要怎樣的國家領導人？
馬總統必須站上第一線。無論府閣分際如何，無論黨政介面如何；馬總統在精神象徵及治國責任上皆必須站上第一線。但站上第一線，台灣卻不可再出現一個以民粹操作為能事的總統。對外，要說服北京維持兩岸雙贏共生；對內，要感召台獨進行修正並撫平族群創傷。總統雖然站上第一線，但對外要忍，對內要讓；總統站在第一線的巔峰，極易表現其悍性、霸性與賭性的「能力」；但站在第一線的巔峰，要咬牙忍，願咬牙讓，能咬牙「有所不為」，那或許才是另一種非同一般的過人之能。但是，要忍到什麼地步，讓到什麼地步，要如何在「有所不為」中展現「大有為」，才不會滋生「恨鐵不成鋼」的抨擊與譏諷？
恨鐵不成鋼。社會期待的「鋼」或許是不拘一格的繞指鋼，馬英九自期的「鋼」卻可能是寧拙勿巧而幾乎可以透視的水晶鋼。問題是：先須確定台灣內外情勢走到今日，國家領導人應當是怎樣的「鋼」？解答了這個問題，才能修補其間的落差。
但無論如何，馬總統必須回應恨鐵不成鋼的社會期待。
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Is "Sympathizing with China" synonymous with "Selling Out Taiwan?"
Is "Sympathizing with China" synonymous with "Selling Out Taiwan?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 19, 2009
The theme of the May 17 protest march was "Oppose Sympathizing with China, Defend Taiwan." Its four demands were "Defend Taiwan. Ensure Sovereignty. Help the Unemployed. Protect the Disadvantaged." Unfortunately the marchers were unaware of the internal contradictions in their own demands.
Their fundamental reasoning is that "Sympathizing with [Mainland] China" means one is incapable of "Defending Taiwan." Supposedly this has two harmful effects. First, sovereignty will be lost. Second, financial hardship will follow.
Why do we say the marchers' demands contain inherent contradictions? First of all, "Sympathizing with China" is not necessarily antithetical to "Defending Taiwan. Protecting Taiwan." If "Sympathizing with China" means establishing a policy of "Cross-Strait Goodwill," of creating a mutually-beneficial, win-win scenario, then "Sympathizing with [Mainland] China" is hardly going to bring disaster down upon Taiwan, and may well bring benefits. Equating "Sympathizing with China" with "selling out Taiwan" is a logical non sequiteur. Opinion polls show that although a majority of respondents believe the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy is indeed "Sympathizing with China," it also feels that such a policy benefits Taiwan. As we can see, "Sympathizing with China" is not necessarily "Selling out Taiwan." In fact, a policy of "Sympathizing with China" can also be rooted in a desire to "Defend Taiwan. Protect Taiwan." It can also be motivated by the real world advantages of "Defending Taiwan. Protecting Taiwan."
Will "Sympathizing with China" lead to a loss in sovereignty? To answer this question, we must first understand the Republic of China's current status regarding its sovereignty. The sovereignty of the Republic of China has been been dealt a series of traumatic blows. For example, it cannot join the United Nations. It must use the name "Chinese Taipei" when participating in certain international events. These are painful to our citizens. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy cannot fully express our sovereignty. But at least we can use the name "Chinese Taipei" while participating in WHA activities. At least no more nations have broken off diplomatic relations with us. At least we are establishing a framework for cross-Strait exchanges based on the premise of "1992 Consensus. One China, Different Interpretations," in which we refrain from repudiating each others‘ status. These subtle but significant achievements were hard won. But they have unquestionably enhanced our sovereignty. Nor has the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy undermined our sovereignty on Taiwan. The Republic of China flag continues to flutter above the Presidential Palace. Republic of China elections continue to be held, just as they always have been. The Republic of China Legislature continues to be plagued by opposition DPP antics such as locking the doors to the Legislature in protest. Tens of thousands of Mainland tourists come and go beneath the Republic of China flag every day. One could argue that the Republic of China's sovereignty has been significantly improved during this period.
Has "Sympathizing with China" led to economic difficulties? In fact, most people affirm the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy precisely because it contributes to Taiwan's economic development. The deepening of cross-Strait economic exchanges is bound to impact some sectors or businesses. We must respond appropriately. But the overall situation has unquestionably been beneficial to Taiwan. Besides, cross-Strait exchanges are an economic path we cannot refuse to take. On the one hand, the DPP complains of economic hardship. On the other hand, it contradicts itself by blasting any policy it accuses of "Sympathizing with China." Cross-Strait exchanges are essential to Taiwan's economy. On this we have a broad social consensus. This is why most people do not equate "Sympathizing with China" with "Selling out Taiwan." From an economic perspective, "Sympathizing with China" may even be motivated by a desire to "Defend Taiwan."
During the May 17 protest march, Yeh Chin-chuan led a delegation to the WHA. His trip touched on the matter of sovereignty. At the Cross-Strait Forum in Xiamen Wang Yi announced Beijing's "Eight Benefits for Taiwan" program. This, and the "Western Straits Economic Zone" were both the result of "economic exchanges." The Democratic Progressive Party says it champions our sovereignty. How then can it object to participation in the WHA? The DPP says it hopes to revive the economy. How then can it oppose Beijing's "Eight Benefits for Taiwan?"
The Democratic Progressive Party's vigilance regarding the risks of cross-Strait exchanges deserves affirmation. Yet its May 17 protest march was all about Taiwan independence. This is hardly the answer to the Republic of China's sovereignty and economic problems. The DPP sees the May 17 protest march as a case of successful political mobilization. But the protest march merely mired the DPP ever more deeply in Taiwan independence thinking. This poses a hidden danger for the DPP. The Ma administration proposes an amicable Mainland policy that "Sympathizes with China." If it can continue showing that dignity and sovereignty correlate positively with economic development, then the Democratic Progressive Party's strategy of equating "Sympathizing with China" with "Selling out Taiwan" will no longer be viable. How else can one explain Chen Chu's trip to the Mainland?
The May 17 protest march was a major revelation to both Beijing and Taipei. It implied that although the public opposes "Selling out Taiwan," it does not oppose "Sympathizing with China." What constitutes "Sympathizing with China?" What constitutes "Selling out Taiwan?" The Ma administration knows. So does Beijing. So does the public on Taiwan. That is why we advocate "inviting the other side to a dance," but do not advocate "inviting the other side to its own funeral."
「傾中」等於「賣台」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.19 05:55 am
「反傾中／護台灣」、「保台灣／顧主權／救失業／護弱勢」。這是五一七遊行的主題與四大訴求，卻可能有不自覺的內在矛盾。
這套論述的基本邏輯是：「傾中」就不能「保台」，其禍害有二：一、主權流失，二、造成經濟困境。
為何說這套論述有內在矛盾？首先，「傾中」未必與「保台／護台」是對立的概念。「傾中」倘若是指營造「兩岸親善」的政策思維，主張互惠雙贏；則「傾中」就未必會給台灣帶來災禍，反而可能帶來利益。因此，將「傾中」與「賣台」畫上等號，可能是一種錯誤的邏輯跳躍。民意調查顯示，多數受訪者雖認為馬政府的兩岸政策「傾中」，但多數受訪者亦表支持並認為對台灣有利。可見，「傾中」不必然就是「賣台」；其實，「傾中」政策，也可以建立在「保台／護台」的思維上，亦可追求「保台／護台」的實際效益。
「傾中」是否即會造成「主權」喪失？這先要認清中華民國的「主權」現狀。中華民國的主權現今已然處於受傷狀態，例如不能參加聯合國，或須以「中華台北」的名義參與特定國際活動，這些皆是國人心中之痛。然而，馬政府如今的兩岸政策，雖不能使主權的對外表現得到全面伸展，但至少亦初步獲得以「中華台北」名義參與ＷＨＡ的突破，且迄未進一步損傷建交國的數字，並嘗試以「九二共識／一中各表」或「互不否認」為兩岸交往的框架；這些細微但重大的成就皆得來不易，不能謂不是在「主權」方面的進展。另一方面，馬政府的兩岸政策，在主權的對內表現上更無任何損傷，總統府上的國旗依然招展，選舉照樣舉行，國會仍然出現在野黨鎖門抗爭的場景，何況每日數萬大陸觀光客在青天白日的國旗下來來往往……。或許可以這麼說，這段期間台灣的主權內外表現，反而已有約略進展。
再說，「傾中」是否造成經濟困境？其實，馬政府的兩岸政策受到多數人肯定的主要原因，正是認為有助於台灣的經濟發展。兩岸經濟交流深化，勢必對某些領域或行業產生衝擊，必須有所因應；但就大局而言則必對台灣有利，且兩岸交流亦是別無選擇的經濟出路。故而，民進黨一方面訴諸經濟困境，另一方面抨擊「傾中」政策，其中自生矛盾。因為，兩岸交流是台灣經濟不可或缺的要素，已是社會的常識與共識；這也正是民間認為「傾中」未必是「賣台」的主因。就經濟面看，「傾中」也許正因為要「保台」。
正當五一七遊行登場之際，葉金川率團參加ＷＨＡ，這是涉及「主權得失」的事件；而廈門海峽論壇，王毅又宣布「惠台八點」，再加上「海西經濟區」端上檯面，這則是「經濟交流」的事件。民進黨主張伸張主權，恐怕不能反對參與ＷＨＡ；主張振興經濟，則亦不可能一一批駁抵拒「惠台八點」。
民進黨對兩岸交流深化的風險意識是必須肯定的。然而，五一七遊行仍以台獨為主調，這對台灣的主權與經濟問題皆不是正確的解答；五一七遊行被民進黨解讀為成功的政治動員，但這場遊行使台獨論述繼續沉澱內化，卻是民進黨的隱憂；因為，馬政府主張兩岸友善的「傾中」政策，若能繼續被證實在主權尊嚴及經濟發展上皆是正數，民進黨將「傾中」與「賣台」畫上等號的論述戰略，即可能無以為繼。否則，如何解釋陳菊登陸？
當然，五一七遊行對兩岸當局亦皆有重大啟示。台灣人民或許不反對「傾中」，但必定反對「賣台」。至於，怎樣是「傾中」？怎樣是「賣台」？馬政府清楚，北京也清楚，台灣人民更是點滴在心頭一清二楚。這就是何以我們主張：要「與卿共舞」，不要「請君入甕」！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 19, 2009
The theme of the May 17 protest march was "Oppose Sympathizing with China, Defend Taiwan." Its four demands were "Defend Taiwan. Ensure Sovereignty. Help the Unemployed. Protect the Disadvantaged." Unfortunately the marchers were unaware of the internal contradictions in their own demands.
Their fundamental reasoning is that "Sympathizing with [Mainland] China" means one is incapable of "Defending Taiwan." Supposedly this has two harmful effects. First, sovereignty will be lost. Second, financial hardship will follow.
Why do we say the marchers' demands contain inherent contradictions? First of all, "Sympathizing with China" is not necessarily antithetical to "Defending Taiwan. Protecting Taiwan." If "Sympathizing with China" means establishing a policy of "Cross-Strait Goodwill," of creating a mutually-beneficial, win-win scenario, then "Sympathizing with [Mainland] China" is hardly going to bring disaster down upon Taiwan, and may well bring benefits. Equating "Sympathizing with China" with "selling out Taiwan" is a logical non sequiteur. Opinion polls show that although a majority of respondents believe the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy is indeed "Sympathizing with China," it also feels that such a policy benefits Taiwan. As we can see, "Sympathizing with China" is not necessarily "Selling out Taiwan." In fact, a policy of "Sympathizing with China" can also be rooted in a desire to "Defend Taiwan. Protect Taiwan." It can also be motivated by the real world advantages of "Defending Taiwan. Protecting Taiwan."
Will "Sympathizing with China" lead to a loss in sovereignty? To answer this question, we must first understand the Republic of China's current status regarding its sovereignty. The sovereignty of the Republic of China has been been dealt a series of traumatic blows. For example, it cannot join the United Nations. It must use the name "Chinese Taipei" when participating in certain international events. These are painful to our citizens. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy cannot fully express our sovereignty. But at least we can use the name "Chinese Taipei" while participating in WHA activities. At least no more nations have broken off diplomatic relations with us. At least we are establishing a framework for cross-Strait exchanges based on the premise of "1992 Consensus. One China, Different Interpretations," in which we refrain from repudiating each others‘ status. These subtle but significant achievements were hard won. But they have unquestionably enhanced our sovereignty. Nor has the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy undermined our sovereignty on Taiwan. The Republic of China flag continues to flutter above the Presidential Palace. Republic of China elections continue to be held, just as they always have been. The Republic of China Legislature continues to be plagued by opposition DPP antics such as locking the doors to the Legislature in protest. Tens of thousands of Mainland tourists come and go beneath the Republic of China flag every day. One could argue that the Republic of China's sovereignty has been significantly improved during this period.
Has "Sympathizing with China" led to economic difficulties? In fact, most people affirm the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy precisely because it contributes to Taiwan's economic development. The deepening of cross-Strait economic exchanges is bound to impact some sectors or businesses. We must respond appropriately. But the overall situation has unquestionably been beneficial to Taiwan. Besides, cross-Strait exchanges are an economic path we cannot refuse to take. On the one hand, the DPP complains of economic hardship. On the other hand, it contradicts itself by blasting any policy it accuses of "Sympathizing with China." Cross-Strait exchanges are essential to Taiwan's economy. On this we have a broad social consensus. This is why most people do not equate "Sympathizing with China" with "Selling out Taiwan." From an economic perspective, "Sympathizing with China" may even be motivated by a desire to "Defend Taiwan."
During the May 17 protest march, Yeh Chin-chuan led a delegation to the WHA. His trip touched on the matter of sovereignty. At the Cross-Strait Forum in Xiamen Wang Yi announced Beijing's "Eight Benefits for Taiwan" program. This, and the "Western Straits Economic Zone" were both the result of "economic exchanges." The Democratic Progressive Party says it champions our sovereignty. How then can it object to participation in the WHA? The DPP says it hopes to revive the economy. How then can it oppose Beijing's "Eight Benefits for Taiwan?"
The Democratic Progressive Party's vigilance regarding the risks of cross-Strait exchanges deserves affirmation. Yet its May 17 protest march was all about Taiwan independence. This is hardly the answer to the Republic of China's sovereignty and economic problems. The DPP sees the May 17 protest march as a case of successful political mobilization. But the protest march merely mired the DPP ever more deeply in Taiwan independence thinking. This poses a hidden danger for the DPP. The Ma administration proposes an amicable Mainland policy that "Sympathizes with China." If it can continue showing that dignity and sovereignty correlate positively with economic development, then the Democratic Progressive Party's strategy of equating "Sympathizing with China" with "Selling out Taiwan" will no longer be viable. How else can one explain Chen Chu's trip to the Mainland?
The May 17 protest march was a major revelation to both Beijing and Taipei. It implied that although the public opposes "Selling out Taiwan," it does not oppose "Sympathizing with China." What constitutes "Sympathizing with China?" What constitutes "Selling out Taiwan?" The Ma administration knows. So does Beijing. So does the public on Taiwan. That is why we advocate "inviting the other side to a dance," but do not advocate "inviting the other side to its own funeral."
「傾中」等於「賣台」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.19 05:55 am
「反傾中／護台灣」、「保台灣／顧主權／救失業／護弱勢」。這是五一七遊行的主題與四大訴求，卻可能有不自覺的內在矛盾。
這套論述的基本邏輯是：「傾中」就不能「保台」，其禍害有二：一、主權流失，二、造成經濟困境。
為何說這套論述有內在矛盾？首先，「傾中」未必與「保台／護台」是對立的概念。「傾中」倘若是指營造「兩岸親善」的政策思維，主張互惠雙贏；則「傾中」就未必會給台灣帶來災禍，反而可能帶來利益。因此，將「傾中」與「賣台」畫上等號，可能是一種錯誤的邏輯跳躍。民意調查顯示，多數受訪者雖認為馬政府的兩岸政策「傾中」，但多數受訪者亦表支持並認為對台灣有利。可見，「傾中」不必然就是「賣台」；其實，「傾中」政策，也可以建立在「保台／護台」的思維上，亦可追求「保台／護台」的實際效益。
「傾中」是否即會造成「主權」喪失？這先要認清中華民國的「主權」現狀。中華民國的主權現今已然處於受傷狀態，例如不能參加聯合國，或須以「中華台北」的名義參與特定國際活動，這些皆是國人心中之痛。然而，馬政府如今的兩岸政策，雖不能使主權的對外表現得到全面伸展，但至少亦初步獲得以「中華台北」名義參與ＷＨＡ的突破，且迄未進一步損傷建交國的數字，並嘗試以「九二共識／一中各表」或「互不否認」為兩岸交往的框架；這些細微但重大的成就皆得來不易，不能謂不是在「主權」方面的進展。另一方面，馬政府的兩岸政策，在主權的對內表現上更無任何損傷，總統府上的國旗依然招展，選舉照樣舉行，國會仍然出現在野黨鎖門抗爭的場景，何況每日數萬大陸觀光客在青天白日的國旗下來來往往……。或許可以這麼說，這段期間台灣的主權內外表現，反而已有約略進展。
再說，「傾中」是否造成經濟困境？其實，馬政府的兩岸政策受到多數人肯定的主要原因，正是認為有助於台灣的經濟發展。兩岸經濟交流深化，勢必對某些領域或行業產生衝擊，必須有所因應；但就大局而言則必對台灣有利，且兩岸交流亦是別無選擇的經濟出路。故而，民進黨一方面訴諸經濟困境，另一方面抨擊「傾中」政策，其中自生矛盾。因為，兩岸交流是台灣經濟不可或缺的要素，已是社會的常識與共識；這也正是民間認為「傾中」未必是「賣台」的主因。就經濟面看，「傾中」也許正因為要「保台」。
正當五一七遊行登場之際，葉金川率團參加ＷＨＡ，這是涉及「主權得失」的事件；而廈門海峽論壇，王毅又宣布「惠台八點」，再加上「海西經濟區」端上檯面，這則是「經濟交流」的事件。民進黨主張伸張主權，恐怕不能反對參與ＷＨＡ；主張振興經濟，則亦不可能一一批駁抵拒「惠台八點」。
民進黨對兩岸交流深化的風險意識是必須肯定的。然而，五一七遊行仍以台獨為主調，這對台灣的主權與經濟問題皆不是正確的解答；五一七遊行被民進黨解讀為成功的政治動員，但這場遊行使台獨論述繼續沉澱內化，卻是民進黨的隱憂；因為，馬政府主張兩岸友善的「傾中」政策，若能繼續被證實在主權尊嚴及經濟發展上皆是正數，民進黨將「傾中」與「賣台」畫上等號的論述戰略，即可能無以為繼。否則，如何解釋陳菊登陸？
當然，五一七遊行對兩岸當局亦皆有重大啟示。台灣人民或許不反對「傾中」，但必定反對「賣台」。至於，怎樣是「傾中」？怎樣是「賣台」？馬政府清楚，北京也清楚，台灣人民更是點滴在心頭一清二楚。這就是何以我們主張：要「與卿共舞」，不要「請君入甕」！
Monday, May 18, 2009
May 17: A Success If Concluded on May 18
May 17: A Success If Concluded on May 18
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 18, 2009
The Ma/Liu government has been in office for one year. On May 17 the DPP launched a "Denounce Ma, Defend Taiwan" protest march. Green Camp supporters have felt frustrated for the past year. They eagerly took to the streets despite the hot sun. Meanwhile, the Cross-Strait Forum opened on the Mainland. Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang, who rejoined the DPP during last year's presidential election, was also in attendance. He said that the Democratic Progressive Party could denounce Ma if it wanted, but "Opposing China" was pointless. President Ma Ying-jeou, target of the denunciations, chose to go south to the Hsingchu Technology Park. He said he understood the DPP's denunciations. He hoped the march could end peacefully. The low profile, moderate demeanor of the ruling KMT contrasted sharply with the high profile, combative demeanor of the opposition DPP.
The Taipei Police Department estimated fewer than 80,000 protestors. The Democratic Progressive Party claimed up to 600,000 people. It was obviously pleased with its mobilization. Leave aside whether 600,000 or 80,000 protestors attended. The Democratic Progressive Party can not evade the fact that the approval rating of Ma Ying-jeou, the target of their denunciations, has already rebounded from its low during last year's global financial tsunami. It now stands at over 55%. On the other hand, the latest TVBS poll puts DPP chairperson Tsai Ing-wen's approval ratings at a new low of 30%.
Core support for the Democratic Progressive Party remains stuck between 30 to 45%. It has not increased in over two decades. Eight years of Chen Shui-bian administration corruption may even have caused it to shrink. The Democratic Progressive Party is pleased with itself because Ketagelan Road is packed full of people. But let's not forget that: First, this crowd was bussed in from southern and central Taiwan. Secondly, this crowd represents the hard core of the Democratic Progressive Party's shrinking support. Thirdly, and most importantly, this crowd consists of Democratic Progressive Party True Believers. They cannot help the Democratic Progressive Party return to power.
The Democratic Progressive Party denounced the Ma administration for "selling out Taiwan." How exactly is Ma supposed to have sold Taiwan out? Director of Health Yeh Chin-chuan is in Geneva preparing to attend the WHO Conference. The Democratic Progressive Party complained that the official WHA website shows Taiwan as a province of China. Yeh Chin-chuan angrily shot back, "That happened in 2005. That was the handiwork of the incompetent Chen Shui-bian administration. Don't blame that on me!" Increasing the Republic of China's breathing room should transcend Blue and Green. It should be something upon which both camps agree. We have many different ways to go about it. The results may also be very different. The Republic of China has found a way to make contact with the international community. The only problem is the Democratic Progressive Party is unwilling to face up to it. They left a mess. Now the Ma administration must clean it up.
The Democratic Progressive Party has its own rationale vis a vis Beijing. When President Chen Shui-bian ran for president, he touted his "New Centrist Path." Unfortunately, despite eight years in power, Taiwan independence forces have left the party in a mess. Even though it is now in the opposition, it remains bound hand and foot. Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang denounced Ma Ying-jeou but also has dealings with the Mainland. Hsu has proposed "Boldly Going West." Some Democratic Progressive Party members have underground channels to Beijing, Shanghai, or Xiamen, But officially they must denounce deals with the mainland as "selling out Taiwan." Former Premier Frank Hsieh was also former Mayor of Kaohsiung. He had a chance to visit the mainland. But Chen Shui-bian stopped him dead in his tracks. On the eve of the May 17 "Denounce Ma" protest march, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu publicly confirmed that she would visit Beijing on May 21. This time, she will not be so unlucky as to encounter a president and party chairman who will forbid her from making the trip.
The two sides have carried on normal exchanges for years. Political and ideological interference aside, neither the Blue nor Green camps have "sold out Taiwan." This past year, the Ma administration has relaxed cross-Strait policy. But in fact, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party was unable to interrupt cross-strait exchanges during its eight years in office. The more tightly the government controled official exchanges, the closer non-governmental exchanges became. Increased cross-Strait relations are an irreversible trend. How can fanatical Democratic Progressive Party protests prevent them? Put bluntly, even pro-Taiwan independence businesses need the mainland market.
The Democratic Progressive Party may be satisfied with its 30% share of public support. But those in power cannot ignore the increasing rigid 30% Green Camp core support. We conducted a poll on the first anniversary of the Ma administration. Satisfaction with the Ma administration on cross-Strait policy and the outcome of recent consultations has risen significantly. It now exceeds 50%. Have these initiatives have put the sovereignty of the Republic of China at risk? The number that thinks so has also significantly increased. It now stands at 30%. The DPP cannot return to power based on the support of 30% of the electorate. But the 30% of the electorate denouncing Ma and opposing Beijing can polarize society. That may be why the Ma/Liu government's response to the May 17 protest march was so low keyed and moderate.
Taiwan has been politically liberalized for over 20 years. Social polarization reached its zenith under the Chen Shui-bian administration's eight years in office. The wounds inflicted on society by such divisions obviously cannot be healed overnight. As Premier Liu Chao-hsuan said, "Having different opinions is not a bad thing. Only this can force the government to watch its every step." Social consensus is also established step-by-step. The May 17 protest march should be seen as normal for a democracy. The success of May 17 should not measured by its numbers. It should be measured by whether it ends peacefully on May 18. Only such a result can rebuild public confidence in the Democratic Progressive Party.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.05.18
社論－五一八圓滿散場 五一七才算成功
本報訊
馬劉政府就職周年前夕，民進黨發動五一七嗆馬保台大遊行，鬱卒了一年的綠營民眾，頂著酷熱的驕陽，情緒興奮地重回街頭；同一時間，海峽論壇在對岸盛大開幕，去年總統大選才重回民進黨的前主席許信良自在與會，淡淡地建議民進黨：嗆馬可以，反中不必！被嗆的主角馬英九總統，選擇南下竹科，他對民進黨嗆馬表示理解，希望遊行順利落幕。低調溫和的執政者，與高調抗議的反對黨，恰成強烈對比。
儘管北市警方估計嗆馬民眾不到八萬人，民進黨宣稱高達六十萬人，對這場活動的動員，顯然是滿意的。但不論是八萬人或六十萬人，民進黨不能迴避的事實是：他們要嗆的馬英九，民意支持度和施政滿意度，已經從去年全球金融海嘯的低點攀升到五成五以上；至於民進黨主席蔡英文的滿意度，根據ＴＶＢＳ的最新民調，卻持續滑落到新低，只有百分之卅。
百分之卅到四十五，差不多就是民進黨創黨以來的基本盤，廿多年來沒什麼長進，經過八年執政，因為扁政府的貪腐，甚至還有萎縮的趨勢。當民進黨志得意滿於凱道擠滿人潮時，不要忘了：第一，這些群眾是公職一車一車從中南部載運上來的；第二，這些群眾只是民進黨萎縮中的基本盤；第三，也是最重要的，這群長久以來被民進黨以台灣主權圖騰所迷幻的群眾，沒有幫民進黨拓展重回執政的能量。
民進黨嗆馬政府賣台，到底賣了什麼？衛生署長葉金川正在日內瓦，準備出席世衛大會，民進黨痛批世衛大會官網上，台灣還是中國的一省，葉金川沒好氣地直接嗆回去：「那是二○○五年，扁政府無能的傑作，別賴在我頭上！」打開台灣的國際空間，不分藍綠，有志一同，但作法差很多，結果同樣差很多。台灣找得到國際社會的出口，只是民進黨不肯正視而已，至於他們搞出的爛攤子，只得後繼者收拾。
民進黨對中國不是沒有一套論述的邏輯，陳水扁競選總統「新中間路線」標舉得多麼高，偏偏八年執政，被獨派搞得七葷八素，到在野都還擺脫不了。嗆馬同時登陸的民進黨前主席許信良，早有大膽西進的主張，部分民進黨人即使私下同樣絡繹於北京、上海、或廈門，嘴上還是非得掛著登陸即賣台的扣紅言論。前行政院長謝長廷在高雄市長任內，本來有機會訪問大陸，被陳水扁硬生生擋了下來；就在五一七嗆馬前夕，高雄市長陳菊公開證實，五二一她也要赴北京，這一回，她不會再倒楣地碰上一位總統兼黨主席，不准她出訪。
兩岸正常交流多年，若非政治因素或意識形態的干擾，不論藍的、綠的，都構不成賣台，不要說馬政府這一年來兩岸政策鬆綁，事實上，民進黨八年執政兩岸亦無法中斷交流，官方管制再緊，民間交流卻愈密，兩岸關係不可逆的發展趨勢，豈是民進黨狂熱抗議能阻擋的？說穿了，即使是獨派企業，也需要大陸市場。
值得注意的是，民進黨可以滿足於已萎縮的百分之卅基本盤，執政者卻不能忽略可能愈趨僵化的百分之卅綠盤勢，根據本報最近一系列馬政府執政周年民調顯示，滿意於馬政府兩岸政策與協商成果者，比例明顯升高，都達到百分之五十以上；但是，問到這些舉措有沒有傷害台灣主權之虞？認為有傷害之虞比例同樣大幅升高，達到三成。民進黨靠不了三成熱情群眾的支持，重返執政；但三成僵硬嗆馬反中群眾，卻可能成為激化社會對立的一股力量，馬劉政府面對五一七遊行的低調溫和，與此應該也有關係。
台灣政治開放廿多年，社會激化對立以扁政府八年為最，政黨再輪替後，這樣的社會對立和分裂傷痕，顯然不是一時半刻能化解的，誠如行政院長劉兆玄所言，「有不同意見不是壞事，這才能讓政府步步為營。」社會共識的建立，也得步步為營，五一七遊行靜坐可以視為民主常態，重要的是：五一七是否成功不在人數，而在五一八好好散場，如此才能重建民眾對民進黨做為負責任政黨的信心。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 18, 2009
The Ma/Liu government has been in office for one year. On May 17 the DPP launched a "Denounce Ma, Defend Taiwan" protest march. Green Camp supporters have felt frustrated for the past year. They eagerly took to the streets despite the hot sun. Meanwhile, the Cross-Strait Forum opened on the Mainland. Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang, who rejoined the DPP during last year's presidential election, was also in attendance. He said that the Democratic Progressive Party could denounce Ma if it wanted, but "Opposing China" was pointless. President Ma Ying-jeou, target of the denunciations, chose to go south to the Hsingchu Technology Park. He said he understood the DPP's denunciations. He hoped the march could end peacefully. The low profile, moderate demeanor of the ruling KMT contrasted sharply with the high profile, combative demeanor of the opposition DPP.
The Taipei Police Department estimated fewer than 80,000 protestors. The Democratic Progressive Party claimed up to 600,000 people. It was obviously pleased with its mobilization. Leave aside whether 600,000 or 80,000 protestors attended. The Democratic Progressive Party can not evade the fact that the approval rating of Ma Ying-jeou, the target of their denunciations, has already rebounded from its low during last year's global financial tsunami. It now stands at over 55%. On the other hand, the latest TVBS poll puts DPP chairperson Tsai Ing-wen's approval ratings at a new low of 30%.
Core support for the Democratic Progressive Party remains stuck between 30 to 45%. It has not increased in over two decades. Eight years of Chen Shui-bian administration corruption may even have caused it to shrink. The Democratic Progressive Party is pleased with itself because Ketagelan Road is packed full of people. But let's not forget that: First, this crowd was bussed in from southern and central Taiwan. Secondly, this crowd represents the hard core of the Democratic Progressive Party's shrinking support. Thirdly, and most importantly, this crowd consists of Democratic Progressive Party True Believers. They cannot help the Democratic Progressive Party return to power.
The Democratic Progressive Party denounced the Ma administration for "selling out Taiwan." How exactly is Ma supposed to have sold Taiwan out? Director of Health Yeh Chin-chuan is in Geneva preparing to attend the WHO Conference. The Democratic Progressive Party complained that the official WHA website shows Taiwan as a province of China. Yeh Chin-chuan angrily shot back, "That happened in 2005. That was the handiwork of the incompetent Chen Shui-bian administration. Don't blame that on me!" Increasing the Republic of China's breathing room should transcend Blue and Green. It should be something upon which both camps agree. We have many different ways to go about it. The results may also be very different. The Republic of China has found a way to make contact with the international community. The only problem is the Democratic Progressive Party is unwilling to face up to it. They left a mess. Now the Ma administration must clean it up.
The Democratic Progressive Party has its own rationale vis a vis Beijing. When President Chen Shui-bian ran for president, he touted his "New Centrist Path." Unfortunately, despite eight years in power, Taiwan independence forces have left the party in a mess. Even though it is now in the opposition, it remains bound hand and foot. Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang denounced Ma Ying-jeou but also has dealings with the Mainland. Hsu has proposed "Boldly Going West." Some Democratic Progressive Party members have underground channels to Beijing, Shanghai, or Xiamen, But officially they must denounce deals with the mainland as "selling out Taiwan." Former Premier Frank Hsieh was also former Mayor of Kaohsiung. He had a chance to visit the mainland. But Chen Shui-bian stopped him dead in his tracks. On the eve of the May 17 "Denounce Ma" protest march, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu publicly confirmed that she would visit Beijing on May 21. This time, she will not be so unlucky as to encounter a president and party chairman who will forbid her from making the trip.
The two sides have carried on normal exchanges for years. Political and ideological interference aside, neither the Blue nor Green camps have "sold out Taiwan." This past year, the Ma administration has relaxed cross-Strait policy. But in fact, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party was unable to interrupt cross-strait exchanges during its eight years in office. The more tightly the government controled official exchanges, the closer non-governmental exchanges became. Increased cross-Strait relations are an irreversible trend. How can fanatical Democratic Progressive Party protests prevent them? Put bluntly, even pro-Taiwan independence businesses need the mainland market.
The Democratic Progressive Party may be satisfied with its 30% share of public support. But those in power cannot ignore the increasing rigid 30% Green Camp core support. We conducted a poll on the first anniversary of the Ma administration. Satisfaction with the Ma administration on cross-Strait policy and the outcome of recent consultations has risen significantly. It now exceeds 50%. Have these initiatives have put the sovereignty of the Republic of China at risk? The number that thinks so has also significantly increased. It now stands at 30%. The DPP cannot return to power based on the support of 30% of the electorate. But the 30% of the electorate denouncing Ma and opposing Beijing can polarize society. That may be why the Ma/Liu government's response to the May 17 protest march was so low keyed and moderate.
Taiwan has been politically liberalized for over 20 years. Social polarization reached its zenith under the Chen Shui-bian administration's eight years in office. The wounds inflicted on society by such divisions obviously cannot be healed overnight. As Premier Liu Chao-hsuan said, "Having different opinions is not a bad thing. Only this can force the government to watch its every step." Social consensus is also established step-by-step. The May 17 protest march should be seen as normal for a democracy. The success of May 17 should not measured by its numbers. It should be measured by whether it ends peacefully on May 18. Only such a result can rebuild public confidence in the Democratic Progressive Party.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.05.18
社論－五一八圓滿散場 五一七才算成功
本報訊
馬劉政府就職周年前夕，民進黨發動五一七嗆馬保台大遊行，鬱卒了一年的綠營民眾，頂著酷熱的驕陽，情緒興奮地重回街頭；同一時間，海峽論壇在對岸盛大開幕，去年總統大選才重回民進黨的前主席許信良自在與會，淡淡地建議民進黨：嗆馬可以，反中不必！被嗆的主角馬英九總統，選擇南下竹科，他對民進黨嗆馬表示理解，希望遊行順利落幕。低調溫和的執政者，與高調抗議的反對黨，恰成強烈對比。
儘管北市警方估計嗆馬民眾不到八萬人，民進黨宣稱高達六十萬人，對這場活動的動員，顯然是滿意的。但不論是八萬人或六十萬人，民進黨不能迴避的事實是：他們要嗆的馬英九，民意支持度和施政滿意度，已經從去年全球金融海嘯的低點攀升到五成五以上；至於民進黨主席蔡英文的滿意度，根據ＴＶＢＳ的最新民調，卻持續滑落到新低，只有百分之卅。
百分之卅到四十五，差不多就是民進黨創黨以來的基本盤，廿多年來沒什麼長進，經過八年執政，因為扁政府的貪腐，甚至還有萎縮的趨勢。當民進黨志得意滿於凱道擠滿人潮時，不要忘了：第一，這些群眾是公職一車一車從中南部載運上來的；第二，這些群眾只是民進黨萎縮中的基本盤；第三，也是最重要的，這群長久以來被民進黨以台灣主權圖騰所迷幻的群眾，沒有幫民進黨拓展重回執政的能量。
民進黨嗆馬政府賣台，到底賣了什麼？衛生署長葉金川正在日內瓦，準備出席世衛大會，民進黨痛批世衛大會官網上，台灣還是中國的一省，葉金川沒好氣地直接嗆回去：「那是二○○五年，扁政府無能的傑作，別賴在我頭上！」打開台灣的國際空間，不分藍綠，有志一同，但作法差很多，結果同樣差很多。台灣找得到國際社會的出口，只是民進黨不肯正視而已，至於他們搞出的爛攤子，只得後繼者收拾。
民進黨對中國不是沒有一套論述的邏輯，陳水扁競選總統「新中間路線」標舉得多麼高，偏偏八年執政，被獨派搞得七葷八素，到在野都還擺脫不了。嗆馬同時登陸的民進黨前主席許信良，早有大膽西進的主張，部分民進黨人即使私下同樣絡繹於北京、上海、或廈門，嘴上還是非得掛著登陸即賣台的扣紅言論。前行政院長謝長廷在高雄市長任內，本來有機會訪問大陸，被陳水扁硬生生擋了下來；就在五一七嗆馬前夕，高雄市長陳菊公開證實，五二一她也要赴北京，這一回，她不會再倒楣地碰上一位總統兼黨主席，不准她出訪。
兩岸正常交流多年，若非政治因素或意識形態的干擾，不論藍的、綠的，都構不成賣台，不要說馬政府這一年來兩岸政策鬆綁，事實上，民進黨八年執政兩岸亦無法中斷交流，官方管制再緊，民間交流卻愈密，兩岸關係不可逆的發展趨勢，豈是民進黨狂熱抗議能阻擋的？說穿了，即使是獨派企業，也需要大陸市場。
值得注意的是，民進黨可以滿足於已萎縮的百分之卅基本盤，執政者卻不能忽略可能愈趨僵化的百分之卅綠盤勢，根據本報最近一系列馬政府執政周年民調顯示，滿意於馬政府兩岸政策與協商成果者，比例明顯升高，都達到百分之五十以上；但是，問到這些舉措有沒有傷害台灣主權之虞？認為有傷害之虞比例同樣大幅升高，達到三成。民進黨靠不了三成熱情群眾的支持，重返執政；但三成僵硬嗆馬反中群眾，卻可能成為激化社會對立的一股力量，馬劉政府面對五一七遊行的低調溫和，與此應該也有關係。
台灣政治開放廿多年，社會激化對立以扁政府八年為最，政黨再輪替後，這樣的社會對立和分裂傷痕，顯然不是一時半刻能化解的，誠如行政院長劉兆玄所言，「有不同意見不是壞事，這才能讓政府步步為營。」社會共識的建立，也得步步為營，五一七遊行靜坐可以視為民主常態，重要的是：五一七是否成功不在人數，而在五一八好好散場，如此才能重建民眾對民進黨做為負責任政黨的信心。
Friday, May 15, 2009
Tsai Ing-wen's Justification as DPP Chairperson Shattered
Tsai Ing-wen's Justification as DPP Chairperson Shattered
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 15, 2009
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen visited Chen Shui-bian at the Taipei Detention Center. To understand the meaning of her gesture, we need ask only, "What would have happened if Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit Chen Shui-bian?"
Everyones' attention has been focused on President Ma Ying-jeou's first year in office. But DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has also been DPP Chairperson for one year. One year ago, Tsai Ing-wen vowed to lead the DPP toward an "Era without Chen Shui-bian." But one year later, as an anniversary present, Tsai Ing-wen has actually visited the Taipei Detention Center.
Pale Green elements at all levels, reformist elements within the party, centrist voters, and others who still have expectations of the Democratic Progressive Party, have hoped that as DPP Chairperson, Tsai Ing-wen could lead the DPP out of the shadow of Chen Shui-bian. When she took office a year ago, she said that only by soul-searching can the DPP regain the public trust. But yesterday, when Tsai Ing-wen marched into the Taipei Detention Center, she symbolically signaled that the hopes of distancing the DPP from Chen Shui-bian over the past year have been shattered. Tsai Ing-wen's justification as DPP Chairman has also been shattered.
Politicians who hold important positions know that their political image depends on an implicit contract with society. Tsai Ing-wen's political image was predicated upon ridding the Democratic Progressive Party of Chen influences, on meeting the needs of the party and the expectations of society. This is the contract Chairman Tsai Ing-wen reached with reformers within the party and mainstream society. Today however, Tsai Ing-wen submitted her instrument of surrender to Chen Shui-bian. Her raison d'etre as DPP Chairperson has been nullified. Did Tsai Ing-wen betray her promise to reform the Democratic Progressive Party? Or did the DPP destroy Tsai Ing-wen?
Looking back, what would have happened had Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit Chen Shui-bian? The problem is Chen Shui-bian has used the May 17 protest march to take Tsai Ing-wen hostage. Tsai Ing-wen envisioned the May 17 march as an opportunity to "Denounce Ma, Defend Taiwan." But Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence forces have used the event to "Denounce Tsai, Defend Ah-Bian." First, Taiwan independence elements threatened to stage their own, separate protest in southern Taiwan. Next, Chen Shui-bian called for north and south to join forces. He called for Taiwan independence forces in the south to end their march in Kaohsiung and head north. One can imagine the "support Chen Shui-bian" and "denounce Tsai" slogans and incidents that were likely to occur. During past demonstrations, Tsai Ing-wen forbade support Chen Shui-bian banners and gestures. But this line of defense has now been broken. If Tsai were to hold firm, the denunciations of Tsai on May 17 would be ugly indeed.
Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the Taipei Detention Center was an attempt to preempt potential protests against her during the march. Gathered crowds have repeatedly asked her why she hadn't visited Chen Shui-bian. They denounced her as "heartless," right to her face. If Tsai Ing-wen did not bow to them, all sorts of embarrassing denunciations of Tsai were likely to occur. But on the other hand, this May 17 "Denounce Ma" march has become a kind of anvil on which Tsai Ing-wen's political image is being reforged. Tsai Ing-wen has effectively shredded her contract with society. Tsai Ing-wen, from this day hence, will no longer be the Tsai Ing-wen on whom so many people pinned their hopes.
This visit was obviously arranged. Frank Hsieh was first in line. Su Tseng-chang was second, but could not see him due to visiting restrictions. As a result Tsai and Su both went yesterday. Hsieh, Su, and Tsai have not been to the Taipei Detention Center in over one hundred days. Obviously they each have their own political calculus. But for each of them to schedule visits now was of course by mutual agreement. Each of them is looking after his or her own interests. If we look at past protest marches, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP Central Committee's impregnable line of defense has now been breached in a hundred different places. Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence forces are now on the offensive. They once had to bite their tongues. Now they are the tail wagging the dog. Now they are in control. Taiwan independence forces want not merely to protest that Chen Shui-bian has been a victim of injustice. They want to hold Chen Shui-bian up as the spiritual leader of the DPP and the Taiwan independence movement. They have hijacked every Green Camp protest march held since last year's march on May 20. Again and again, they have used protests agains Ma as opportunities to further their own agenda. They have finally succeeded in forcing Tsai Ing-wen to visit the Taipei Detention Center. They have successfully transformed the protests into a denunciation of Tsai and a defense of Ah-Bian. Yesterday, when Tsai Ing-wen marched into the Taipei Detention Center, she effectively conceded leadership to Chen Shui-bian and the forces of Taiwan independence forces. Was this Tsai Ing-wen's intent when she orginally sought the party chairmanship last year? Is this the implicit contract drawn up between Tsai Ing-wen and reformers within the party and mainstream society?
We can now attempt to answer this question. What would have happened had Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit the Taipei Detention Center? Had she refused to visit the Taipei Detention Center, Taiwan independence forces would have used May 17 to force a showdown with her. She would have been put on the spot. The march would have been ruined. Therefore it is reasonable to speculate that Tsai Ing-wen visited the Taipei Detention Center in exchange for promises from Taiwan independence forces not to provoke a showdown on May 17. Tsai Ing-wen's status as chairperson and her political future requires the recognition and blessing of Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence elements.
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen's raison d'etre as DPP Party Chairperson was shattered.
蔡英文出任黨主席的應有意義已告破滅
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.15 06:03 am
蔡英文昨日赴北所探視陳水扁。欲解讀此事，可先反問：如果蔡英文不去看陳水扁，會怎樣？
大家都只注意馬英九總統就職一周年，其實蔡英文出任民進黨主席也已一周年了。一年前，蔡英文宣示要帶領民進黨邁向「沒有陳水扁的時代」；但是，一年後，蔡英文卻以赴北所探監作為她就職周年的政治獻禮。
蔡英文出任民進黨主席，對於不論淺綠階層、黨內改革派，或中間選民，及社會上對民進黨尚有善意期許者而言，最大的期待就是希望她能帶領民進黨走出陳水扁的陰影。正如她在一年前就職時所說：只有反省，重拾人民對民進黨的信賴。然而，當蔡英文昨日一腳踏進了北所，象徵著她一年來意欲與陳水扁切割的作為已經失敗；事既至此，蔡英文之所以出任民進黨主席的應有意義亦告破滅！
任何位居要津的政治人物，其政治品牌皆是建立在社會共同認知的政治契約之上；而蔡英文的政治品牌，無疑是建立在帶領民進黨「去扁化」的黨內實際需要及社會期待之上。這就是蔡英文主席與黨內改革派及台灣主流社會之間的政治契約。然而，如今蔡英文既然向陳水扁遞上降書，她出任民進黨主席的應有意義自告破滅。這是蔡英文辜負了她應當承擔的民進黨改革大業？還是民進黨毀了蔡英文？
回過頭來談，如果蔡英文不去看陳水扁，會怎樣？問題是在陳水扁藉五一七遊行挾持了蔡英文。蔡英文原以為五一七是「嗆馬保台」，但陳水扁及獨派卻將之用為「嗆蔡挺扁」的政治槓桿。第一步，獨派揚言南北拚場，分道揚鑣；第二步，陳水扁呼籲南北合流，獨派南場結束高雄遊行後北上會師。可以想像，屆時挺扁標語及嗆蔡的場景皆可能出現。在過去幾場遊行中，蔡英文曾禁止挺扁的標語及動作出現，但這個防線如今已經潰破，蔡若仍力拒，五一七嗆蔡的場面必定十分難看！
蔡英文赴北所探監，其實是對遊行中可能出現的嗆蔡場面預作安撫。過去，她曾多次被群眾質問：「為何不去看扁？」並當面斥她「無情」。蔡英文若再不向這些群眾低頭，五一七就可能出現極為難堪的嗆蔡場面。然而，如此一來，這一場「嗆馬」的五一七遊行，竟然成了蔡英文品牌形象的刀砧，不啻將出現蔡英文親手當眾撕毀其前述社會契約的場景。今後的蔡英文，已不可能再是從前那個令人有所期待的蔡英文了！
此次的探監動作，顯然經過安排。謝長廷排第一，蘇貞昌排第二天因禁見而沒有去成，遂成了蔡蘇昨日同行的場面。謝蘇蔡百餘日未探監，顯然各有盤算；但如今排班探監，則當然是經三人相互約定而一起撤守防線。觀察過去幾次遊行，蔡英文黨中央的防線由滴水不漏而至破洞百出，陳水扁及獨派的攻勢則是由幾至噤聲到如今尾巴搖狗、喧賓奪主。獨派不只是要聲援陳水扁的司法訴訟，而是根本認為陳水扁才是民進黨及台獨的精神領袖；他們挾持了去年五二○以來的每一場綠營遊行，一次又一次以嗆馬遊行來借力使力，至這次五一七終於把蔡英文逼到北所探監，將之轉化為成功的嗆蔡挺扁。蔡英文昨天走進了北所，形同承認了陳水扁及獨派不可取代的精神領導地位。這是蔡英文一年前出任黨主席的初衷嗎？這是蔡英文與黨內改革派及主流社會之間默認的政治契約嗎？
現在可以嘗試回答蔡英文若不探監會怎樣？若不探監，獨派會藉五一七與蔡攤牌，當場嗆蔡使她下不了台，也毀了大遊行。因而，若謂蔡英文探監其實是化解獨派不藉五一七與她撕破臉的交換條件，亦屬合理的推測。蔡英文的主席地位與政治生命，必須獲得陳水扁及獨派的認可與加持。
蔡英文之所以為蔡英文的意義，在昨天已告破滅！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 15, 2009
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen visited Chen Shui-bian at the Taipei Detention Center. To understand the meaning of her gesture, we need ask only, "What would have happened if Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit Chen Shui-bian?"
Everyones' attention has been focused on President Ma Ying-jeou's first year in office. But DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has also been DPP Chairperson for one year. One year ago, Tsai Ing-wen vowed to lead the DPP toward an "Era without Chen Shui-bian." But one year later, as an anniversary present, Tsai Ing-wen has actually visited the Taipei Detention Center.
Pale Green elements at all levels, reformist elements within the party, centrist voters, and others who still have expectations of the Democratic Progressive Party, have hoped that as DPP Chairperson, Tsai Ing-wen could lead the DPP out of the shadow of Chen Shui-bian. When she took office a year ago, she said that only by soul-searching can the DPP regain the public trust. But yesterday, when Tsai Ing-wen marched into the Taipei Detention Center, she symbolically signaled that the hopes of distancing the DPP from Chen Shui-bian over the past year have been shattered. Tsai Ing-wen's justification as DPP Chairman has also been shattered.
Politicians who hold important positions know that their political image depends on an implicit contract with society. Tsai Ing-wen's political image was predicated upon ridding the Democratic Progressive Party of Chen influences, on meeting the needs of the party and the expectations of society. This is the contract Chairman Tsai Ing-wen reached with reformers within the party and mainstream society. Today however, Tsai Ing-wen submitted her instrument of surrender to Chen Shui-bian. Her raison d'etre as DPP Chairperson has been nullified. Did Tsai Ing-wen betray her promise to reform the Democratic Progressive Party? Or did the DPP destroy Tsai Ing-wen?
Looking back, what would have happened had Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit Chen Shui-bian? The problem is Chen Shui-bian has used the May 17 protest march to take Tsai Ing-wen hostage. Tsai Ing-wen envisioned the May 17 march as an opportunity to "Denounce Ma, Defend Taiwan." But Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence forces have used the event to "Denounce Tsai, Defend Ah-Bian." First, Taiwan independence elements threatened to stage their own, separate protest in southern Taiwan. Next, Chen Shui-bian called for north and south to join forces. He called for Taiwan independence forces in the south to end their march in Kaohsiung and head north. One can imagine the "support Chen Shui-bian" and "denounce Tsai" slogans and incidents that were likely to occur. During past demonstrations, Tsai Ing-wen forbade support Chen Shui-bian banners and gestures. But this line of defense has now been broken. If Tsai were to hold firm, the denunciations of Tsai on May 17 would be ugly indeed.
Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the Taipei Detention Center was an attempt to preempt potential protests against her during the march. Gathered crowds have repeatedly asked her why she hadn't visited Chen Shui-bian. They denounced her as "heartless," right to her face. If Tsai Ing-wen did not bow to them, all sorts of embarrassing denunciations of Tsai were likely to occur. But on the other hand, this May 17 "Denounce Ma" march has become a kind of anvil on which Tsai Ing-wen's political image is being reforged. Tsai Ing-wen has effectively shredded her contract with society. Tsai Ing-wen, from this day hence, will no longer be the Tsai Ing-wen on whom so many people pinned their hopes.
This visit was obviously arranged. Frank Hsieh was first in line. Su Tseng-chang was second, but could not see him due to visiting restrictions. As a result Tsai and Su both went yesterday. Hsieh, Su, and Tsai have not been to the Taipei Detention Center in over one hundred days. Obviously they each have their own political calculus. But for each of them to schedule visits now was of course by mutual agreement. Each of them is looking after his or her own interests. If we look at past protest marches, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP Central Committee's impregnable line of defense has now been breached in a hundred different places. Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence forces are now on the offensive. They once had to bite their tongues. Now they are the tail wagging the dog. Now they are in control. Taiwan independence forces want not merely to protest that Chen Shui-bian has been a victim of injustice. They want to hold Chen Shui-bian up as the spiritual leader of the DPP and the Taiwan independence movement. They have hijacked every Green Camp protest march held since last year's march on May 20. Again and again, they have used protests agains Ma as opportunities to further their own agenda. They have finally succeeded in forcing Tsai Ing-wen to visit the Taipei Detention Center. They have successfully transformed the protests into a denunciation of Tsai and a defense of Ah-Bian. Yesterday, when Tsai Ing-wen marched into the Taipei Detention Center, she effectively conceded leadership to Chen Shui-bian and the forces of Taiwan independence forces. Was this Tsai Ing-wen's intent when she orginally sought the party chairmanship last year? Is this the implicit contract drawn up between Tsai Ing-wen and reformers within the party and mainstream society?
We can now attempt to answer this question. What would have happened had Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit the Taipei Detention Center? Had she refused to visit the Taipei Detention Center, Taiwan independence forces would have used May 17 to force a showdown with her. She would have been put on the spot. The march would have been ruined. Therefore it is reasonable to speculate that Tsai Ing-wen visited the Taipei Detention Center in exchange for promises from Taiwan independence forces not to provoke a showdown on May 17. Tsai Ing-wen's status as chairperson and her political future requires the recognition and blessing of Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence elements.
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen's raison d'etre as DPP Party Chairperson was shattered.
蔡英文出任黨主席的應有意義已告破滅
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.15 06:03 am
蔡英文昨日赴北所探視陳水扁。欲解讀此事，可先反問：如果蔡英文不去看陳水扁，會怎樣？
大家都只注意馬英九總統就職一周年，其實蔡英文出任民進黨主席也已一周年了。一年前，蔡英文宣示要帶領民進黨邁向「沒有陳水扁的時代」；但是，一年後，蔡英文卻以赴北所探監作為她就職周年的政治獻禮。
蔡英文出任民進黨主席，對於不論淺綠階層、黨內改革派，或中間選民，及社會上對民進黨尚有善意期許者而言，最大的期待就是希望她能帶領民進黨走出陳水扁的陰影。正如她在一年前就職時所說：只有反省，重拾人民對民進黨的信賴。然而，當蔡英文昨日一腳踏進了北所，象徵著她一年來意欲與陳水扁切割的作為已經失敗；事既至此，蔡英文之所以出任民進黨主席的應有意義亦告破滅！
任何位居要津的政治人物，其政治品牌皆是建立在社會共同認知的政治契約之上；而蔡英文的政治品牌，無疑是建立在帶領民進黨「去扁化」的黨內實際需要及社會期待之上。這就是蔡英文主席與黨內改革派及台灣主流社會之間的政治契約。然而，如今蔡英文既然向陳水扁遞上降書，她出任民進黨主席的應有意義自告破滅。這是蔡英文辜負了她應當承擔的民進黨改革大業？還是民進黨毀了蔡英文？
回過頭來談，如果蔡英文不去看陳水扁，會怎樣？問題是在陳水扁藉五一七遊行挾持了蔡英文。蔡英文原以為五一七是「嗆馬保台」，但陳水扁及獨派卻將之用為「嗆蔡挺扁」的政治槓桿。第一步，獨派揚言南北拚場，分道揚鑣；第二步，陳水扁呼籲南北合流，獨派南場結束高雄遊行後北上會師。可以想像，屆時挺扁標語及嗆蔡的場景皆可能出現。在過去幾場遊行中，蔡英文曾禁止挺扁的標語及動作出現，但這個防線如今已經潰破，蔡若仍力拒，五一七嗆蔡的場面必定十分難看！
蔡英文赴北所探監，其實是對遊行中可能出現的嗆蔡場面預作安撫。過去，她曾多次被群眾質問：「為何不去看扁？」並當面斥她「無情」。蔡英文若再不向這些群眾低頭，五一七就可能出現極為難堪的嗆蔡場面。然而，如此一來，這一場「嗆馬」的五一七遊行，竟然成了蔡英文品牌形象的刀砧，不啻將出現蔡英文親手當眾撕毀其前述社會契約的場景。今後的蔡英文，已不可能再是從前那個令人有所期待的蔡英文了！
此次的探監動作，顯然經過安排。謝長廷排第一，蘇貞昌排第二天因禁見而沒有去成，遂成了蔡蘇昨日同行的場面。謝蘇蔡百餘日未探監，顯然各有盤算；但如今排班探監，則當然是經三人相互約定而一起撤守防線。觀察過去幾次遊行，蔡英文黨中央的防線由滴水不漏而至破洞百出，陳水扁及獨派的攻勢則是由幾至噤聲到如今尾巴搖狗、喧賓奪主。獨派不只是要聲援陳水扁的司法訴訟，而是根本認為陳水扁才是民進黨及台獨的精神領袖；他們挾持了去年五二○以來的每一場綠營遊行，一次又一次以嗆馬遊行來借力使力，至這次五一七終於把蔡英文逼到北所探監，將之轉化為成功的嗆蔡挺扁。蔡英文昨天走進了北所，形同承認了陳水扁及獨派不可取代的精神領導地位。這是蔡英文一年前出任黨主席的初衷嗎？這是蔡英文與黨內改革派及主流社會之間默認的政治契約嗎？
現在可以嘗試回答蔡英文若不探監會怎樣？若不探監，獨派會藉五一七與蔡攤牌，當場嗆蔡使她下不了台，也毀了大遊行。因而，若謂蔡英文探監其實是化解獨派不藉五一七與她撕破臉的交換條件，亦屬合理的推測。蔡英文的主席地位與政治生命，必須獲得陳水扁及獨派的認可與加持。
蔡英文之所以為蔡英文的意義，在昨天已告破滅！
Thursday, May 14, 2009
A March Not Rooted in Self-Pity?
A March Not Rooted in Self-Pity?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 14, 2009
The DPP got its start on the streets. It has no other strengths. All it knows is how to butt heads with the system. To its embarrassment, 20 years after the party was founded, the political situation has changed. Most embarrassing of all, this 20 year period includes eight years of Democratic Progressive Party rule. Yet its eight years in power failed to teach the DPP the importance of obeying the law. The DPP often forgets that when it butts heads with the system, the DPP was at one time the defender of the system.
For politicians to suffer from amnesia is not surprising. For the sake of power, they must change with the political winds. They must always weave some sort of rationale to convince themselves they are always right, and their opponents are always wrong. Unfortunately for them, the public's memory is better than theirs. What they did and what they said, the public remembers. It has been nearly a year since the second change in ruling parties. On the eve of the first anniversary of the Ma/Liu government's inauguration, the Democratic Progressive Party is again taking to the streets. It is organizing a May 17 "Protest Ma, Defend Taiwan March." As the opposition party, opposition to the party in power is perfectly normal. The Democratic Progressive Party has called for full public mobilization. It has set quotas for the marchers, and quotas for the tour buses, lest the public forget the Democratic Progressive Party aptitude at "remaking the world."
This is the first street demonstration launched by the DPP since it lost power. The Democratic Progressive Party has also produced two promotional videos. The first asks people whether they had enough to eat? It mocks the Ma administration for the past year's economic recession. Unfortunately for the DPP, the stock market refused to cooperate. It rose eight days in a row. The second video features former DPP Chairman Huang Hsing-chieh. He called for the masses to summon their past enthusiasm. Twenty years ago he strenuously protested the "ten thousand year parliament." He won support for direct presidential elections. But people were unmoved. Without these two films, people might not have been so strongly reminded of how far the DPP degenerated once it tasted power. It might not have felt such anguish over the eight years Taiwan lost as a result of Democratic Progressive Party misrule.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. It trumpeted its defense of "Taiwan's sovereignty." Meanwhile, the ROC found itself in dire diplomatic straits. Cross-Strait relations became increasingly tense. We were unable to join the WHO. We even became known in the international community as a troublemaker. The DPP government built "international airports" in cities and counties all over the island. These airports soon resembled ghost towns. The DPP's talk of doubling tourism became an empty boast. Its "Two Trillion, Twin Stars" plan was a day late and a dollar short. In the end it was only the Ma administration's mainland policy that brought Taiwan and foreign capital back to the island, and Mainland tourists to Taiwan to boost spending. The Democratic Progressive Party is castigating the Ma administration for "selling out Taiwan" even as the ROC is preparing to attend the WHA as an observer.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. It shouted empty "wage war on behalf of the economy" slogans for eight years. In the end the only war it waged was on behalf of its own ideology. Now that it is again out of power, the Democratic Progressive Party has reverted to peddling its false idol of Taiwan independence. It is attempting to delude the public on Taiwan. DPP officials denounce the Ma administration for recognizing Mainland academic credentials, even as their own spouses work toward degrees at Mainland universities. DPP officials obstruct the opening of cross-strait economic and trade, even as its own officials conduct business on the Mainland. DPP officials shout themselves hoarse denouncing the Parade and Assembly Law as a relic of the martial law era. Meanwhile they forget that they were in power for eight years, during which they made not the slightest move to amend this unconstitutional law. DPP officials accuse the Ma administration of turning the clock back on democracy. Meanwhile have they ever reflected upon their own eight years in office? What if anything did they do for democracy? Twenty years after Taiwan's political liberalization, all they can do is spout the same old political platitudes, and play the same old political games.
For an opposition party to engage in confrontation is perfectly natural. But it must offer convincing reasons for its opposition. If it cannot offer hard data to prove its case, at least it should offer a reasoned argument. What is the DPP's argument? DPP officials have declared they will take to the streets. They may even even stay overnight. They boast that they are even "willing to be arrested and jailed." In order to avoid conflicts, the Taipei City Government has urged the KMT to withdraw its application for a similar permit on May 18. It is allowing the DPP to protest. But the DPP is utterly unappreciative. It is unwilling to abide by existing legal norms. it forgets that when the Red Shirt Army took to the streets to protest Chen Shui-bian and his family's corruption, the DPP invoked the very same law they oppose to prevent the Red Shirt Army from passing through cities and counties ruled by the Democratic Progressive Party.
The primary battlefield in a democracy is in the halls of parliament. Yet the DPP had the temerity to barricade itself inside the Legislature, preventing the Legislature from conducting business. Its primary motive in taking to the streets is to provoke violent conflict. When the Democratic Progressive Party was in power it sanctimoniously demanded that opposition parties behave as the "loyal opposition." But the Pan Blue opposition parties never barricaded themselves inside the Legislature by attaching locks to the doors of the Legislature. They never led the masses onto the streets for the express purpose of provoking violent clashes. Now that the DPP is in the opposition, it refuses to behave as a loyal opposition party. But the least it can do is behave as a responsible opposition party. If it has the ability to lead the masses onto the streets, it has the responsibilty to ensure that they safely return home. It should at least be able to find its own way home.
The ROC has undergone two ruling party changes. Its political system is not in danger of collapsing, dire warnings by the Democratic Progressive Party to the contrary notwithstanding. Instead, it is the Democratic Progressive Party that faces a crisis. The Democratic Progressive Party is doing nothing for the public on Taiwan. It is doing nothing for social progress. At least it should do something for itself. It should hold a peaceful demonstration. it should refrain from mawkish appeals to self-pity. It should ensure that incidents of violence do not leave an indelible stamp on the DPP's forehead reading, "The Party of Violence."
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.05.14
社論－走出悲情，辦個漂亮的遊行吧
本報訊
民進黨街頭起家，別的長處沒有，就是擅於衝撞體制，尷尬的是，創黨迄今廿多年，政治形勢丕變，更難堪的是，這中間還包括民進黨八年執政。八年執政，沒讓他們學會「守法」對民主政治的重要性，輕易就忘記了他們一意要衝撞的體制，曾是他們主事且捍衛過的體制。
政治人物或政黨有失憶症並不稀奇，為了權力，他們必須隨勢逆變，永遠找得到一套說詞說服自己永遠是對的，而競爭對手永遠是錯的，偏偏人民的記性永遠比政客要好，他們曾經做過的事、說過的話，民眾可不會輕易忘得了。政黨再輪替即將一年，就在馬劉政府就職一周年前夕，民進黨重回街頭，發動五一七嗆馬保台遊行，做為反對黨，站在執政者的對立面也是常態，民進黨為此要求公職全面動員，群眾有配額、遊覽車有配額，就怕群眾忘記民進黨「打出天下」的本事。
為了這場在野後第一次由黨發起的街頭遊行，民進黨還特別製作兩支宣傳影片，第一支以民眾互道「呷飽未」？諷刺馬劉政府上台一年來的經濟蕭條，偏偏股市很不給面子地連漲八天；第二支影片則請出前主席信介仙，呼喚支持群眾的往日熱情，廿年前民進黨力抗萬年國會、爭取總統直選的身形重現，卻感動不了人心。沒有這兩支影片，民眾或許還沒這麼強烈地感受到民進黨享受權力滋味時的墮落，對台灣因民進黨執政而失落的八年，這麼沉痛。
民進黨執政八年，高喊捍衛台灣主權的時候，台灣外交處境最困窘、兩岸關係最緊張、我們既無法參與世衛組織，甚至成國際間認定的「麻煩製造者」；民進黨政府任內興建各縣市的國際機場，都成了班機空蕩蕩的半報廢機場，觀光客倍增成為空談，兩兆雙星眼看著成為明日黃花，還是得靠馬政府的大陸政策，吸引台資回流、外資搶進、大陸觀光客刺激消費。當民進黨口沫橫飛痛罵馬政府出賣台灣的時候，台灣正準備以觀察員身分出席世衛大會。
民進黨執政八年，空喊拚經濟八年，拚得還是政治口水；在野之後，民進黨賣的還是主權圖騰，企圖以此迷幻台灣民眾，民進黨人一方面痛罵開放大陸學歷，自己的配偶卻早已赴大陸修習學位；他們一方面阻撓兩岸經貿開放政策，卻不乏在大陸經商之人；他們聲嘶力竭地指責戒嚴版集會遊行法，卻忘了自己執政八年，絲毫未曾動念修一修這個大法官解釋認為違憲的條文，民進黨人大剌剌地批評馬政府民主倒退，卻從未反省執政八年，到底為民主進步做了什麼事？讓台灣在政治開放廿多年後，還在老套的政治語言與遊戲中打轉。
在野黨搞對抗搞反對，天經地義，但是得拿出足以說服人的道理，沒有數據，好歹要有個說法，民進黨的說法在哪？民進黨揚言上街頭，還要徹夜靜坐，「被關也在所不惜」，台北市政府為避免衝突，勸退五一八也申請路權的國民黨，讓民進黨「嗆個夠」，民進黨卻完全不領情，就是不願遵循現行的法律規範，他們也忘了，當紅衫軍為了陳水扁及其親信家人的貪腐弊案上街頭時，甚至運用這個他們此時反對的法律，拒絕紅衫軍途經民進黨執政縣市。
民主運作主戰場在國會議事殿堂，民進黨人卻可以反鎖國會議事場上的大門，阻絕議事的進行；走上街頭還非要以釀成衝突為第一目標。民進黨執政時動輒呼籲在野黨要做個「忠誠的反對黨」，當時在野黨抗爭既不會反鎖國會議事場的大門，更不會帶了群眾上街頭以製造衝突為樂，如今在野，民進黨即使做不到他們口中的「忠誠反對黨」，至少學會做一個負責任的反對黨吧，既有本事帶群眾上街頭，就要有本事讓群眾平安回家，也要自己找到離開街頭的路。
當台灣民主已經歷兩次政黨輪替，台灣民主沒有民進黨危言聳聽的存亡關頭，倒是民進黨的發展到了關鍵時刻，民進黨不為台灣人民、不為社會發展，至少為自己做一件事：搞一次平安的集會遊行，不要再賣弄悲情，不要再有任何意外讓暴力黨的陰影，成為頭上撕都撕不掉的標籤。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 14, 2009
The DPP got its start on the streets. It has no other strengths. All it knows is how to butt heads with the system. To its embarrassment, 20 years after the party was founded, the political situation has changed. Most embarrassing of all, this 20 year period includes eight years of Democratic Progressive Party rule. Yet its eight years in power failed to teach the DPP the importance of obeying the law. The DPP often forgets that when it butts heads with the system, the DPP was at one time the defender of the system.
For politicians to suffer from amnesia is not surprising. For the sake of power, they must change with the political winds. They must always weave some sort of rationale to convince themselves they are always right, and their opponents are always wrong. Unfortunately for them, the public's memory is better than theirs. What they did and what they said, the public remembers. It has been nearly a year since the second change in ruling parties. On the eve of the first anniversary of the Ma/Liu government's inauguration, the Democratic Progressive Party is again taking to the streets. It is organizing a May 17 "Protest Ma, Defend Taiwan March." As the opposition party, opposition to the party in power is perfectly normal. The Democratic Progressive Party has called for full public mobilization. It has set quotas for the marchers, and quotas for the tour buses, lest the public forget the Democratic Progressive Party aptitude at "remaking the world."
This is the first street demonstration launched by the DPP since it lost power. The Democratic Progressive Party has also produced two promotional videos. The first asks people whether they had enough to eat? It mocks the Ma administration for the past year's economic recession. Unfortunately for the DPP, the stock market refused to cooperate. It rose eight days in a row. The second video features former DPP Chairman Huang Hsing-chieh. He called for the masses to summon their past enthusiasm. Twenty years ago he strenuously protested the "ten thousand year parliament." He won support for direct presidential elections. But people were unmoved. Without these two films, people might not have been so strongly reminded of how far the DPP degenerated once it tasted power. It might not have felt such anguish over the eight years Taiwan lost as a result of Democratic Progressive Party misrule.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. It trumpeted its defense of "Taiwan's sovereignty." Meanwhile, the ROC found itself in dire diplomatic straits. Cross-Strait relations became increasingly tense. We were unable to join the WHO. We even became known in the international community as a troublemaker. The DPP government built "international airports" in cities and counties all over the island. These airports soon resembled ghost towns. The DPP's talk of doubling tourism became an empty boast. Its "Two Trillion, Twin Stars" plan was a day late and a dollar short. In the end it was only the Ma administration's mainland policy that brought Taiwan and foreign capital back to the island, and Mainland tourists to Taiwan to boost spending. The Democratic Progressive Party is castigating the Ma administration for "selling out Taiwan" even as the ROC is preparing to attend the WHA as an observer.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. It shouted empty "wage war on behalf of the economy" slogans for eight years. In the end the only war it waged was on behalf of its own ideology. Now that it is again out of power, the Democratic Progressive Party has reverted to peddling its false idol of Taiwan independence. It is attempting to delude the public on Taiwan. DPP officials denounce the Ma administration for recognizing Mainland academic credentials, even as their own spouses work toward degrees at Mainland universities. DPP officials obstruct the opening of cross-strait economic and trade, even as its own officials conduct business on the Mainland. DPP officials shout themselves hoarse denouncing the Parade and Assembly Law as a relic of the martial law era. Meanwhile they forget that they were in power for eight years, during which they made not the slightest move to amend this unconstitutional law. DPP officials accuse the Ma administration of turning the clock back on democracy. Meanwhile have they ever reflected upon their own eight years in office? What if anything did they do for democracy? Twenty years after Taiwan's political liberalization, all they can do is spout the same old political platitudes, and play the same old political games.
For an opposition party to engage in confrontation is perfectly natural. But it must offer convincing reasons for its opposition. If it cannot offer hard data to prove its case, at least it should offer a reasoned argument. What is the DPP's argument? DPP officials have declared they will take to the streets. They may even even stay overnight. They boast that they are even "willing to be arrested and jailed." In order to avoid conflicts, the Taipei City Government has urged the KMT to withdraw its application for a similar permit on May 18. It is allowing the DPP to protest. But the DPP is utterly unappreciative. It is unwilling to abide by existing legal norms. it forgets that when the Red Shirt Army took to the streets to protest Chen Shui-bian and his family's corruption, the DPP invoked the very same law they oppose to prevent the Red Shirt Army from passing through cities and counties ruled by the Democratic Progressive Party.
The primary battlefield in a democracy is in the halls of parliament. Yet the DPP had the temerity to barricade itself inside the Legislature, preventing the Legislature from conducting business. Its primary motive in taking to the streets is to provoke violent conflict. When the Democratic Progressive Party was in power it sanctimoniously demanded that opposition parties behave as the "loyal opposition." But the Pan Blue opposition parties never barricaded themselves inside the Legislature by attaching locks to the doors of the Legislature. They never led the masses onto the streets for the express purpose of provoking violent clashes. Now that the DPP is in the opposition, it refuses to behave as a loyal opposition party. But the least it can do is behave as a responsible opposition party. If it has the ability to lead the masses onto the streets, it has the responsibilty to ensure that they safely return home. It should at least be able to find its own way home.
The ROC has undergone two ruling party changes. Its political system is not in danger of collapsing, dire warnings by the Democratic Progressive Party to the contrary notwithstanding. Instead, it is the Democratic Progressive Party that faces a crisis. The Democratic Progressive Party is doing nothing for the public on Taiwan. It is doing nothing for social progress. At least it should do something for itself. It should hold a peaceful demonstration. it should refrain from mawkish appeals to self-pity. It should ensure that incidents of violence do not leave an indelible stamp on the DPP's forehead reading, "The Party of Violence."
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.05.14
社論－走出悲情，辦個漂亮的遊行吧
本報訊
民進黨街頭起家，別的長處沒有，就是擅於衝撞體制，尷尬的是，創黨迄今廿多年，政治形勢丕變，更難堪的是，這中間還包括民進黨八年執政。八年執政，沒讓他們學會「守法」對民主政治的重要性，輕易就忘記了他們一意要衝撞的體制，曾是他們主事且捍衛過的體制。
政治人物或政黨有失憶症並不稀奇，為了權力，他們必須隨勢逆變，永遠找得到一套說詞說服自己永遠是對的，而競爭對手永遠是錯的，偏偏人民的記性永遠比政客要好，他們曾經做過的事、說過的話，民眾可不會輕易忘得了。政黨再輪替即將一年，就在馬劉政府就職一周年前夕，民進黨重回街頭，發動五一七嗆馬保台遊行，做為反對黨，站在執政者的對立面也是常態，民進黨為此要求公職全面動員，群眾有配額、遊覽車有配額，就怕群眾忘記民進黨「打出天下」的本事。
為了這場在野後第一次由黨發起的街頭遊行，民進黨還特別製作兩支宣傳影片，第一支以民眾互道「呷飽未」？諷刺馬劉政府上台一年來的經濟蕭條，偏偏股市很不給面子地連漲八天；第二支影片則請出前主席信介仙，呼喚支持群眾的往日熱情，廿年前民進黨力抗萬年國會、爭取總統直選的身形重現，卻感動不了人心。沒有這兩支影片，民眾或許還沒這麼強烈地感受到民進黨享受權力滋味時的墮落，對台灣因民進黨執政而失落的八年，這麼沉痛。
民進黨執政八年，高喊捍衛台灣主權的時候，台灣外交處境最困窘、兩岸關係最緊張、我們既無法參與世衛組織，甚至成國際間認定的「麻煩製造者」；民進黨政府任內興建各縣市的國際機場，都成了班機空蕩蕩的半報廢機場，觀光客倍增成為空談，兩兆雙星眼看著成為明日黃花，還是得靠馬政府的大陸政策，吸引台資回流、外資搶進、大陸觀光客刺激消費。當民進黨口沫橫飛痛罵馬政府出賣台灣的時候，台灣正準備以觀察員身分出席世衛大會。
民進黨執政八年，空喊拚經濟八年，拚得還是政治口水；在野之後，民進黨賣的還是主權圖騰，企圖以此迷幻台灣民眾，民進黨人一方面痛罵開放大陸學歷，自己的配偶卻早已赴大陸修習學位；他們一方面阻撓兩岸經貿開放政策，卻不乏在大陸經商之人；他們聲嘶力竭地指責戒嚴版集會遊行法，卻忘了自己執政八年，絲毫未曾動念修一修這個大法官解釋認為違憲的條文，民進黨人大剌剌地批評馬政府民主倒退，卻從未反省執政八年，到底為民主進步做了什麼事？讓台灣在政治開放廿多年後，還在老套的政治語言與遊戲中打轉。
在野黨搞對抗搞反對，天經地義，但是得拿出足以說服人的道理，沒有數據，好歹要有個說法，民進黨的說法在哪？民進黨揚言上街頭，還要徹夜靜坐，「被關也在所不惜」，台北市政府為避免衝突，勸退五一八也申請路權的國民黨，讓民進黨「嗆個夠」，民進黨卻完全不領情，就是不願遵循現行的法律規範，他們也忘了，當紅衫軍為了陳水扁及其親信家人的貪腐弊案上街頭時，甚至運用這個他們此時反對的法律，拒絕紅衫軍途經民進黨執政縣市。
民主運作主戰場在國會議事殿堂，民進黨人卻可以反鎖國會議事場上的大門，阻絕議事的進行；走上街頭還非要以釀成衝突為第一目標。民進黨執政時動輒呼籲在野黨要做個「忠誠的反對黨」，當時在野黨抗爭既不會反鎖國會議事場的大門，更不會帶了群眾上街頭以製造衝突為樂，如今在野，民進黨即使做不到他們口中的「忠誠反對黨」，至少學會做一個負責任的反對黨吧，既有本事帶群眾上街頭，就要有本事讓群眾平安回家，也要自己找到離開街頭的路。
當台灣民主已經歷兩次政黨輪替，台灣民主沒有民進黨危言聳聽的存亡關頭，倒是民進黨的發展到了關鍵時刻，民進黨不為台灣人民、不為社會發展，至少為自己做一件事：搞一次平安的集會遊行，不要再賣弄悲情，不要再有任何意外讓暴力黨的陰影，成為頭上撕都撕不掉的標籤。
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Good Cross-Strait Economic Relations Equals Good Cross-Strait Political Relations
Good Cross-Strait Economic Relations Equals Good Cross-Strait Political Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2009
ECFA is not on the agenda of the fourth round of talks later this year, leading to all sorts of speculation and debate. Some people think it has merely been postponed, not ruled out. Some people think Beijing has no intention of going along with it, and that ECFA is probably done for.
Over the past year, the two sides have made unprecedented progress in cross-Strait relations. But the rapid development of cross-Strait relations means economics must be brought in synch with politics. Some people think the Ma administration's concept of "first economics, then politics" is "only economics, no politics." They think the Ma administration is too pro-Beijing. They fear that if Taiwan's economy is integrated with the Mainland's, Taiwan's poltical system will be as well. Others think that the Ma administration's concept of "first economics, then politics" is perceived by Beijing as a variation of the two-states theory. They think cross-Strait mutual trust is on the brink of disintegration, and that is why the mainland has little interest in ECFA.
These two viewpoints differ sharply. But they are a matter of opinion. One side thinks Ma Ying-jeou is pro-Beijing, and therefore Taiwan will be swallowed up by the mainland. The other side thinks Ma Ying-jeou is pro-independence, and Beijing has targeted him for punishment.
Actually, the Ma administration is not the only one to endorse the concept of "first economics, then politics." The Beijing authorities also hold this view. Their intention is to ease the pressure on both sides, to create more breathing room, to separate economics from politics, and to give economics priority over politics. But what isn't political between the two sides? How can the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic interaction not have political repercussions? Are the three links purely economic? Aren't they political? Are financial agreement purely economic? Aren't they political?
The rapid institutionalization of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges over the past year was a highly political decision. The two sides knew what the political impact would be. The political impact may make Taiwan independence even less possible. But Beijing also knows it must forsake military force as a means of achieving reunification. Cross-Strait relations are currently in a state of "neither reunification, nor independence, both reunification, and independence." It is in an upward spriral, contained within a framework of peaceful development.
Such a strategy ensures that Taiwan is unable to declare independence, and that Beijing is unable to compel reunification. Beijing hopes that Taiwan independence sentiment on Taiwan will fade. The Ma administration hopes to turn cross-Strait hostility into a win-win scenario of peaceful coexistence. Beijing hopes of course to move toward reunification. It knows it must first convince the public on Taiwan. It must pass the test of democracy. The Ma administration does not advocate Taiwan independence. But "no independence" plus "no reunification" involves a delicate balance. Under the circumstances, Beijing knows that no government on Taiwan that advocates reunification can survive. The Ma administration also knows the "two states theory" cannot resolve the cross-Strait impasse.
In this delicate balance, what Taipei wants is for Beijing to realize that Taipei is not hostile toward it. What Beijing wants is for the public on Taiwan to understand that improved cross-Strait relations will enhance Taipei's dignity and interests. After all, the Taiwan region has a vibrant system of government. The majority of the public wants to maintain the status quo. Therefore the authorities in Taipei dare not engage in Taiwan independence. Nor can the authorities in Beijing demote the authorities in Taipei to the status of Beijing's "caretaker government." Beijing is unlikely to harbor such illusions. Therefore Beijing is unlikely to resort to violence to achieve reunification. It cannot turn Taipei into its charity case via procurement policies. That is not what the public on Taiwan wants from cross-Strait relations. Nor can it make the public on Taiwan feel good about cross-Strait relations by such means. Most importantly, it is not conducive to Taipei's survival and development. If the ROC finds it difficult to survive and develop because Beijing undermines cross-Strait relations, Beijing will also feel the pressure.
Therefore, we believe ECFA has merely been postponed, not necessarily ruled out. If our speculation is incorrect, we hope the situation can be turned around. After all, ECFA or CECA was Hu Jintao's idea, as formulated in his Six Points. High ranking officials in Beijing have repeatedly declared that "the name is not important." The authorities on both sides claim that ECFA is "economic in nature." But as we said earlier, it is essentially a political decision, and will have profound a political impact. Because of ECFA, the two sides will have a better framework for win/win, mutually beneficial peaceful development.
It is unnecessary to put bilateral opportunities and thinking over the past year into a stereotypical "reunification vs. independence" framework. As long as the two sides maintain good economic relations, there will be good political relations. The political impact will be positive. The result will be better than independence, and also better than reunification.
Therefore declaimers that the two sides are "only talking about economics and not politics" are untrue.
好的兩岸經濟關係，就是好的政治關係
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.13 04:38 am
ＥＣＦＡ未列入兩岸下半年第四次談判的議程，引發種種揣測及議論。有人認為只是推遲，而非破局；有人則認為北京方面已無意於此，ＥＣＦＡ恐怕沒戲唱了。
一年來，兩岸關係進展快速，確實展現出空前歷史機遇的氣勢。然而，伴隨著兩岸關係快速發展，卻也立即出現了經濟與政治如何協調整合的問題。有人認為，馬政府「先經濟／後政治」的主張，「只談經濟／不談政治」，將使馬政府太過傾中，而恐有「經濟被（大陸）內化／政治被消化」的疑慮。另有一類看法則認為，馬政府「先經濟／後政治」的態度，已被北京視為另類兩國論，兩岸互信瀕於解體，因而大陸方面已對ＥＣＦＡ的議題興趣缺缺。
這兩類議論皆甚尖銳深刻，卻見仁見智至南轅北轍的地步。一方認為馬英九傾中，將被大陸「消化」；另一方則認為馬英九傾獨，將受北京懲罰。
其實，「先經濟／後政治」不僅是馬政府的主張；中共領導人亦一向持此觀點。此類主張，用意是在緩解雙方壓力，創造空間；所以將「經濟」與「政治」作二分法，並作出「先／後」的區隔。然而，兩岸之間何事不含政治，何事不是政治？兩岸經濟互動的法制化，又何一不是政治所決定，更何一不會產生政治效應？三通只是經濟嗎？難道不是政治？金融協議又只是經濟嗎？難道不具政治效應？
一年來，兩岸經貿法制化的快速發展，原即是雙方高度政治性的決定，而其必然衍生的政治效應亦當在雙方的估算之中。此種政治效應，或許使得台獨變成更不可能，卻亦顯示北京已知必須駛離武力統一的軌轍；兩岸關係於「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」之間，在「和平發展框架」上呈螺旋上升狀態演進。
這樣的策略，應當是在「台灣不能台獨／北京不能武力統一」的包夾中形成的思考。北京方面希望台獨意識能夠在台灣淡化，而馬政府方面則希望化兩岸敵對為雙贏共存。北京當然希望朝統一方向發展，卻知首應說服台灣的民意，亦即通過台灣民主機制的檢驗；馬政府則不主張台獨，但「不獨」亦「不統」。這是一個「包夾中的平衡」。在現狀下，北京不會傻到認為一個主張「統一」的台灣政府能夠維持得下去；馬政府也不會愚至認為主張「兩國論」是解決兩岸僵局的處方。
在這個「包夾中的平衡」中，台灣要做到的是，使北京認為台灣對中國不是一個敵對的存在；北京要做到的則是，使台灣人民相信改善兩岸關係有助於提升台灣的尊嚴與利益。台灣畢竟是一極有活力的民主體制，多數民意主張維持現狀，台灣的主政者因此不可能冒進搞台獨，而北京亦不可能令台灣政府淪為北京的「看守政府」而妄想其尚能維持。所以，北京不至於用粗暴的手段求統一，也不可能使台灣淪為在北京施捨性「採購」政策下的餵養物。因為，那不是台灣人民要的兩岸關係，也不是能使台灣人民產生好感的兩岸關係。最重要的，那不是台灣能夠生存發展之道；台灣若因北京所扭曲的兩岸關係而難以生存發展，北京感受的壓力亦將相對升高。
因而，我們相信，ＥＣＦＡ只是推遲，而未必是破局；倘若我們的推測有誤，也希望情勢能夠迴轉。畢竟，ＥＣＦＡ或ＣＥＣＡ，是胡六點的主張；且北京高層還屢屢聲明「名稱不重要」。兩岸當局雖皆聲稱ＥＣＦＡ是「經濟性」的，但正如前文所言，在本質上卻是一個政治性的決定，且亦將產生深刻的政治效應。那個效應是：兩岸將因ＥＣＦＡ而有一個更能互利雙贏的和平發展框架。
不必再將一年以來的兩岸新機遇及新思維套進陳腐的「統／獨」公式中。只要兩岸能維持一個好的經濟互動關係，那就絕對也就是一個好的政治關係，亦必會發生好的政治效應。比獨好，也比統好！
所以，「只談經濟／不談政治」的說法，是說不通的。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2009
ECFA is not on the agenda of the fourth round of talks later this year, leading to all sorts of speculation and debate. Some people think it has merely been postponed, not ruled out. Some people think Beijing has no intention of going along with it, and that ECFA is probably done for.
Over the past year, the two sides have made unprecedented progress in cross-Strait relations. But the rapid development of cross-Strait relations means economics must be brought in synch with politics. Some people think the Ma administration's concept of "first economics, then politics" is "only economics, no politics." They think the Ma administration is too pro-Beijing. They fear that if Taiwan's economy is integrated with the Mainland's, Taiwan's poltical system will be as well. Others think that the Ma administration's concept of "first economics, then politics" is perceived by Beijing as a variation of the two-states theory. They think cross-Strait mutual trust is on the brink of disintegration, and that is why the mainland has little interest in ECFA.
These two viewpoints differ sharply. But they are a matter of opinion. One side thinks Ma Ying-jeou is pro-Beijing, and therefore Taiwan will be swallowed up by the mainland. The other side thinks Ma Ying-jeou is pro-independence, and Beijing has targeted him for punishment.
Actually, the Ma administration is not the only one to endorse the concept of "first economics, then politics." The Beijing authorities also hold this view. Their intention is to ease the pressure on both sides, to create more breathing room, to separate economics from politics, and to give economics priority over politics. But what isn't political between the two sides? How can the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic interaction not have political repercussions? Are the three links purely economic? Aren't they political? Are financial agreement purely economic? Aren't they political?
The rapid institutionalization of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges over the past year was a highly political decision. The two sides knew what the political impact would be. The political impact may make Taiwan independence even less possible. But Beijing also knows it must forsake military force as a means of achieving reunification. Cross-Strait relations are currently in a state of "neither reunification, nor independence, both reunification, and independence." It is in an upward spriral, contained within a framework of peaceful development.
Such a strategy ensures that Taiwan is unable to declare independence, and that Beijing is unable to compel reunification. Beijing hopes that Taiwan independence sentiment on Taiwan will fade. The Ma administration hopes to turn cross-Strait hostility into a win-win scenario of peaceful coexistence. Beijing hopes of course to move toward reunification. It knows it must first convince the public on Taiwan. It must pass the test of democracy. The Ma administration does not advocate Taiwan independence. But "no independence" plus "no reunification" involves a delicate balance. Under the circumstances, Beijing knows that no government on Taiwan that advocates reunification can survive. The Ma administration also knows the "two states theory" cannot resolve the cross-Strait impasse.
In this delicate balance, what Taipei wants is for Beijing to realize that Taipei is not hostile toward it. What Beijing wants is for the public on Taiwan to understand that improved cross-Strait relations will enhance Taipei's dignity and interests. After all, the Taiwan region has a vibrant system of government. The majority of the public wants to maintain the status quo. Therefore the authorities in Taipei dare not engage in Taiwan independence. Nor can the authorities in Beijing demote the authorities in Taipei to the status of Beijing's "caretaker government." Beijing is unlikely to harbor such illusions. Therefore Beijing is unlikely to resort to violence to achieve reunification. It cannot turn Taipei into its charity case via procurement policies. That is not what the public on Taiwan wants from cross-Strait relations. Nor can it make the public on Taiwan feel good about cross-Strait relations by such means. Most importantly, it is not conducive to Taipei's survival and development. If the ROC finds it difficult to survive and develop because Beijing undermines cross-Strait relations, Beijing will also feel the pressure.
Therefore, we believe ECFA has merely been postponed, not necessarily ruled out. If our speculation is incorrect, we hope the situation can be turned around. After all, ECFA or CECA was Hu Jintao's idea, as formulated in his Six Points. High ranking officials in Beijing have repeatedly declared that "the name is not important." The authorities on both sides claim that ECFA is "economic in nature." But as we said earlier, it is essentially a political decision, and will have profound a political impact. Because of ECFA, the two sides will have a better framework for win/win, mutually beneficial peaceful development.
It is unnecessary to put bilateral opportunities and thinking over the past year into a stereotypical "reunification vs. independence" framework. As long as the two sides maintain good economic relations, there will be good political relations. The political impact will be positive. The result will be better than independence, and also better than reunification.
Therefore declaimers that the two sides are "only talking about economics and not politics" are untrue.
好的兩岸經濟關係，就是好的政治關係
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.13 04:38 am
ＥＣＦＡ未列入兩岸下半年第四次談判的議程，引發種種揣測及議論。有人認為只是推遲，而非破局；有人則認為北京方面已無意於此，ＥＣＦＡ恐怕沒戲唱了。
一年來，兩岸關係進展快速，確實展現出空前歷史機遇的氣勢。然而，伴隨著兩岸關係快速發展，卻也立即出現了經濟與政治如何協調整合的問題。有人認為，馬政府「先經濟／後政治」的主張，「只談經濟／不談政治」，將使馬政府太過傾中，而恐有「經濟被（大陸）內化／政治被消化」的疑慮。另有一類看法則認為，馬政府「先經濟／後政治」的態度，已被北京視為另類兩國論，兩岸互信瀕於解體，因而大陸方面已對ＥＣＦＡ的議題興趣缺缺。
這兩類議論皆甚尖銳深刻，卻見仁見智至南轅北轍的地步。一方認為馬英九傾中，將被大陸「消化」；另一方則認為馬英九傾獨，將受北京懲罰。
其實，「先經濟／後政治」不僅是馬政府的主張；中共領導人亦一向持此觀點。此類主張，用意是在緩解雙方壓力，創造空間；所以將「經濟」與「政治」作二分法，並作出「先／後」的區隔。然而，兩岸之間何事不含政治，何事不是政治？兩岸經濟互動的法制化，又何一不是政治所決定，更何一不會產生政治效應？三通只是經濟嗎？難道不是政治？金融協議又只是經濟嗎？難道不具政治效應？
一年來，兩岸經貿法制化的快速發展，原即是雙方高度政治性的決定，而其必然衍生的政治效應亦當在雙方的估算之中。此種政治效應，或許使得台獨變成更不可能，卻亦顯示北京已知必須駛離武力統一的軌轍；兩岸關係於「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」之間，在「和平發展框架」上呈螺旋上升狀態演進。
這樣的策略，應當是在「台灣不能台獨／北京不能武力統一」的包夾中形成的思考。北京方面希望台獨意識能夠在台灣淡化，而馬政府方面則希望化兩岸敵對為雙贏共存。北京當然希望朝統一方向發展，卻知首應說服台灣的民意，亦即通過台灣民主機制的檢驗；馬政府則不主張台獨，但「不獨」亦「不統」。這是一個「包夾中的平衡」。在現狀下，北京不會傻到認為一個主張「統一」的台灣政府能夠維持得下去；馬政府也不會愚至認為主張「兩國論」是解決兩岸僵局的處方。
在這個「包夾中的平衡」中，台灣要做到的是，使北京認為台灣對中國不是一個敵對的存在；北京要做到的則是，使台灣人民相信改善兩岸關係有助於提升台灣的尊嚴與利益。台灣畢竟是一極有活力的民主體制，多數民意主張維持現狀，台灣的主政者因此不可能冒進搞台獨，而北京亦不可能令台灣政府淪為北京的「看守政府」而妄想其尚能維持。所以，北京不至於用粗暴的手段求統一，也不可能使台灣淪為在北京施捨性「採購」政策下的餵養物。因為，那不是台灣人民要的兩岸關係，也不是能使台灣人民產生好感的兩岸關係。最重要的，那不是台灣能夠生存發展之道；台灣若因北京所扭曲的兩岸關係而難以生存發展，北京感受的壓力亦將相對升高。
因而，我們相信，ＥＣＦＡ只是推遲，而未必是破局；倘若我們的推測有誤，也希望情勢能夠迴轉。畢竟，ＥＣＦＡ或ＣＥＣＡ，是胡六點的主張；且北京高層還屢屢聲明「名稱不重要」。兩岸當局雖皆聲稱ＥＣＦＡ是「經濟性」的，但正如前文所言，在本質上卻是一個政治性的決定，且亦將產生深刻的政治效應。那個效應是：兩岸將因ＥＣＦＡ而有一個更能互利雙贏的和平發展框架。
不必再將一年以來的兩岸新機遇及新思維套進陳腐的「統／獨」公式中。只要兩岸能維持一個好的經濟互動關係，那就絕對也就是一個好的政治關係，亦必會發生好的政治效應。比獨好，也比統好！
所以，「只談經濟／不談政治」的說法，是說不通的。
Peace Dividend, Capital Convergence
Peace Dividend, Capital Convergence
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2009
Huge Rise! Swift Rise! Wild Rise! Insane Rise! Reckless Rise! The Fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting reached four agreements and one consensus. Increasing stock market momentum then inspired the above headlines.
We have enjoyed an eight-day winning streak. This wave of stock market rises is a response to a changed reality. It also reflects the expectations of society. The phenomenon can be summed up as "peace dividend, capital convergence."
By "response to a changed reality," we mean that investors can see the practical results of the institutionalization of cross-Strait trade and economic interaction. By "expectations of society," we mean that the practical achievements may be less than perfect. But investor psychology has idealized its potential.
In fact, a huge gap remains between real word achievements and society's expectations, Investors refer to this wave of market rises as "market psychology." That means psychological factors have overridden actual market conditions. So the next question is, how can the energy behind this capital be directed into specific investments such as trade? Otherwise, if we remain stuck in speculation, the stock market will remain mere "market psychology." A stock market bubble can pop in the blink of an eye.
The atmosphere of a "peace dividend" has formed. But we talk about dividends, we should first establish what we mean by peace. Only then can we ensure that any dividend does not come to nothing. Peace should mean that cross-Strait relations will be conducted on the basis of the general welfare and rule by the people. It should eschew force and intrigue. This will avoid the dilemma of "who will gobble up whom." It should be a mutually beneficial "What's good for you is good for me, what's good for me is good for you" win/win scenario.
Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan said that for cross-Strait exchanges, rhythm is more important than tempo. Actually, for cross-Strait exchanges, melody is even more important than rhythm or tempo. As long as the melody is "peaceful development / win-win," and as long as we keep the public welfare and the rule of the people in mind, the rhythm and tempo will come naturally. Conversely, if we deviate from the theme of "peaceful development/ win-win," the rhythm and tempo are sure to lose synch, resulting in mere noise. In other words, without peace as the melody, any expectation of a dividend will be in vain.
The guiding theme of cross-Strait relations is the "peace dividend." At the operational level it is the "convergence of three forms of capital." The convergence of the three forms of capital creates a virtuous circle. The reality and imagined potential of mainland capital has restored the vitality and power of Taiwan capital. If Taiwan capital and mainland capital are invested in production, they will attract foreign capital. Three forms of capital will then converge. Two conditions are essential. First, the capital must not be "hot money." It must be invested in production, not merely be used to speculate. Second, foreign capital must pass certain benchmark tests. Inflows of foreign capital will prove that Taiwan's economy is showing genuine improvement. Of course this includes Taiwan's ability to successfully sign FTA with other countries.
Overall improvements and upgrades in cross-Strait relations and economic and trade exchanges should create a positive market trend. But some individuals are still opposed, still skeptical, still uneasy. That is because they lack confidence and harbor deep suspicions regarding cross-Strait "peaceful development / win-win." They worry, won't Taiwan will be gobbled up by the mainland? Won't Taiwan become feedstock for Beijing's "procurement policy?"
Such concerns are understandable. But there is no need for excessive pessimism. Beijing has chosen a cross-Strait policy of peaceful development over force. That means it must uphold the general welfare and the rule of the people. The framework for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations must maintain the dignity and defend the interests of the public on Taiwan. Beijing will of course express goodwill by allowing mainland tourists to come to Taiwan to spend money. It is unlikely to imagine that it can "buy" Taiwan by means of mainland capital. In fact Taiwan cannot be be supported by mainland capital alone. Therefore Beijing's policies must hew to the principle of "peaceful development / win-win." They must maintain the dignity of the public on Taiwan. The public on Taiwan must feel that a "peaceful development / win-win" cross-strait policy is trustworthy and worth pursuing.
When improving cross-Strait relations, peace is more important than money. Without genuine peace, any capital will be at political risk. Conversely, the establishment of a theme of "peaceful development / win-win" will surely honor peace, the rule of the people, and the public welfare. With peace as the melody, the rhythm and tempo will follow in due course.
和平紅利 三資匯流
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.12 03:28 am
大漲、急漲、暴漲、狂漲、飆漲。江陳會完成四大協議及一項共識，股市上漲的氣勢，令媒體的標題詞窮。
連漲八天，看回不回。這波股市漲勢，反應了現實的變化，也反映了社會心理的期待，可用八個字來形容，那就是：和平紅利，三資匯流。
所謂反應現實的變化，是指投資人看到了兩岸經貿互動法制化的具體成果；所謂反映社會心理的期待，則是指現實成就未必完足，但投資人的心理想像卻加以放大與美化。
其實，現實成就與社會心理期待之間，仍有極大的落差。市場人士將這波漲勢稱作「資金行情」，即是意謂心理因素高過真實的市場條件。今後的問題是：必須將這種「資金」的能量，落實在具體實際的投資生產等經貿成就上。否則，倘若只是停留在炒炒股票的「資金行情」，虛浮的股市表現，轉眼就能化為泡沫。
眼前確已出現「和平紅利」的氛圍。因而，首先要確立「和平」的內涵，「紅利」始不致落空。所謂「和平」，應是意味著兩岸關係的發展將以民生及民主為準則，而遠離武力及權謀。這將不再是「誰吃掉誰」的問題，而是一種「我為你好／你為我好」的追求，及互惠雙贏的信念。
陸委會主委賴幸媛曾說，兩岸交流，節奏比速度重要。其實，兩岸交流，旋律比節奏及速度都重要。若能維持「和平雙贏」的主旋律，以民生及民主為依歸，則自然會相應出現賞心悅耳的節奏及速度；反之，倘若偏離了「和平雙贏」的主旋律，即必將出現節奏失衡、速度失拍，以致荒腔走板的噪音。也就是說，「和平」的主旋律若走調，「紅利」亦必落空。
「和平紅利」是對兩岸大氛圍的主題定調，在運作層次則是「三資匯流」。對三資匯流，可有一個良性循環的憧憬，亦即：陸資已經發動的事實及將要發動的想像，可使台資恢復及增加活力與動力；台資及陸資若能落實在投資生產層次，又將吸引外資參與，於是三資匯流的景觀即可出現。其中有兩個關鍵：一、「資金」不能只是「熱錢」，必須引導落實在投資生產，而不可只是炒股炒樓。二、應以外資為測試成就的標尺，外資參與，始能顯示台灣經濟體質的真正改善；當然亦包括台灣能順利與他國簽訂ＦＴＡ。
兩岸總體關係的改善與經貿交流的提升，應是可以期待及祝福的大趨勢。但若有人仍然反對，仍然質疑，或仍然不放心；那是因為對於兩岸「和平雙贏」的主旋律沒有信心而深懷疑懼。例如：台灣會不會被大陸吃掉？台灣會不會成為北京「採購政策」下的被餵養物？
這樣的擔心是可以理解的，卻亦不必過度悲觀。北京既然決定在兩岸政策上以「和平」取代「武力」，即不能偏離民生與民主的準則；而應當全力維持一個能使台灣人民感到有尊嚴及有利益的「兩岸關係和平發展框架」。在這樣的政策原則下，就財經面而言，北京固然會以採購及陸客來台等表達善意，卻不至於妄想用陸資來「包養」台灣，而事實上台灣亦不是僅憑陸資所能養得起的。因而，北京的政策，應當是把持「和平雙贏」的最高原則，讓台灣能夠有尊嚴地自主發展；只要使台灣人民相信，此種「和平雙贏」的兩岸關係是值得信任及值得追求的即可。
兩岸關係的改善，「和平比資金重要」。倘若對「和平」沒有真正的信仰，「資金」反會成為政治風險。反之，若能建立「和平雙贏」的主旋律，而和平必然以民生及民主為依歸，則和平的主調既定，節奏及速度也都有了可資依憑的準據！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2009
Huge Rise! Swift Rise! Wild Rise! Insane Rise! Reckless Rise! The Fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting reached four agreements and one consensus. Increasing stock market momentum then inspired the above headlines.
We have enjoyed an eight-day winning streak. This wave of stock market rises is a response to a changed reality. It also reflects the expectations of society. The phenomenon can be summed up as "peace dividend, capital convergence."
By "response to a changed reality," we mean that investors can see the practical results of the institutionalization of cross-Strait trade and economic interaction. By "expectations of society," we mean that the practical achievements may be less than perfect. But investor psychology has idealized its potential.
In fact, a huge gap remains between real word achievements and society's expectations, Investors refer to this wave of market rises as "market psychology." That means psychological factors have overridden actual market conditions. So the next question is, how can the energy behind this capital be directed into specific investments such as trade? Otherwise, if we remain stuck in speculation, the stock market will remain mere "market psychology." A stock market bubble can pop in the blink of an eye.
The atmosphere of a "peace dividend" has formed. But we talk about dividends, we should first establish what we mean by peace. Only then can we ensure that any dividend does not come to nothing. Peace should mean that cross-Strait relations will be conducted on the basis of the general welfare and rule by the people. It should eschew force and intrigue. This will avoid the dilemma of "who will gobble up whom." It should be a mutually beneficial "What's good for you is good for me, what's good for me is good for you" win/win scenario.
Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan said that for cross-Strait exchanges, rhythm is more important than tempo. Actually, for cross-Strait exchanges, melody is even more important than rhythm or tempo. As long as the melody is "peaceful development / win-win," and as long as we keep the public welfare and the rule of the people in mind, the rhythm and tempo will come naturally. Conversely, if we deviate from the theme of "peaceful development/ win-win," the rhythm and tempo are sure to lose synch, resulting in mere noise. In other words, without peace as the melody, any expectation of a dividend will be in vain.
The guiding theme of cross-Strait relations is the "peace dividend." At the operational level it is the "convergence of three forms of capital." The convergence of the three forms of capital creates a virtuous circle. The reality and imagined potential of mainland capital has restored the vitality and power of Taiwan capital. If Taiwan capital and mainland capital are invested in production, they will attract foreign capital. Three forms of capital will then converge. Two conditions are essential. First, the capital must not be "hot money." It must be invested in production, not merely be used to speculate. Second, foreign capital must pass certain benchmark tests. Inflows of foreign capital will prove that Taiwan's economy is showing genuine improvement. Of course this includes Taiwan's ability to successfully sign FTA with other countries.
Overall improvements and upgrades in cross-Strait relations and economic and trade exchanges should create a positive market trend. But some individuals are still opposed, still skeptical, still uneasy. That is because they lack confidence and harbor deep suspicions regarding cross-Strait "peaceful development / win-win." They worry, won't Taiwan will be gobbled up by the mainland? Won't Taiwan become feedstock for Beijing's "procurement policy?"
Such concerns are understandable. But there is no need for excessive pessimism. Beijing has chosen a cross-Strait policy of peaceful development over force. That means it must uphold the general welfare and the rule of the people. The framework for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations must maintain the dignity and defend the interests of the public on Taiwan. Beijing will of course express goodwill by allowing mainland tourists to come to Taiwan to spend money. It is unlikely to imagine that it can "buy" Taiwan by means of mainland capital. In fact Taiwan cannot be be supported by mainland capital alone. Therefore Beijing's policies must hew to the principle of "peaceful development / win-win." They must maintain the dignity of the public on Taiwan. The public on Taiwan must feel that a "peaceful development / win-win" cross-strait policy is trustworthy and worth pursuing.
When improving cross-Strait relations, peace is more important than money. Without genuine peace, any capital will be at political risk. Conversely, the establishment of a theme of "peaceful development / win-win" will surely honor peace, the rule of the people, and the public welfare. With peace as the melody, the rhythm and tempo will follow in due course.
和平紅利 三資匯流
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.12 03:28 am
大漲、急漲、暴漲、狂漲、飆漲。江陳會完成四大協議及一項共識，股市上漲的氣勢，令媒體的標題詞窮。
連漲八天，看回不回。這波股市漲勢，反應了現實的變化，也反映了社會心理的期待，可用八個字來形容，那就是：和平紅利，三資匯流。
所謂反應現實的變化，是指投資人看到了兩岸經貿互動法制化的具體成果；所謂反映社會心理的期待，則是指現實成就未必完足，但投資人的心理想像卻加以放大與美化。
其實，現實成就與社會心理期待之間，仍有極大的落差。市場人士將這波漲勢稱作「資金行情」，即是意謂心理因素高過真實的市場條件。今後的問題是：必須將這種「資金」的能量，落實在具體實際的投資生產等經貿成就上。否則，倘若只是停留在炒炒股票的「資金行情」，虛浮的股市表現，轉眼就能化為泡沫。
眼前確已出現「和平紅利」的氛圍。因而，首先要確立「和平」的內涵，「紅利」始不致落空。所謂「和平」，應是意味著兩岸關係的發展將以民生及民主為準則，而遠離武力及權謀。這將不再是「誰吃掉誰」的問題，而是一種「我為你好／你為我好」的追求，及互惠雙贏的信念。
陸委會主委賴幸媛曾說，兩岸交流，節奏比速度重要。其實，兩岸交流，旋律比節奏及速度都重要。若能維持「和平雙贏」的主旋律，以民生及民主為依歸，則自然會相應出現賞心悅耳的節奏及速度；反之，倘若偏離了「和平雙贏」的主旋律，即必將出現節奏失衡、速度失拍，以致荒腔走板的噪音。也就是說，「和平」的主旋律若走調，「紅利」亦必落空。
「和平紅利」是對兩岸大氛圍的主題定調，在運作層次則是「三資匯流」。對三資匯流，可有一個良性循環的憧憬，亦即：陸資已經發動的事實及將要發動的想像，可使台資恢復及增加活力與動力；台資及陸資若能落實在投資生產層次，又將吸引外資參與，於是三資匯流的景觀即可出現。其中有兩個關鍵：一、「資金」不能只是「熱錢」，必須引導落實在投資生產，而不可只是炒股炒樓。二、應以外資為測試成就的標尺，外資參與，始能顯示台灣經濟體質的真正改善；當然亦包括台灣能順利與他國簽訂ＦＴＡ。
兩岸總體關係的改善與經貿交流的提升，應是可以期待及祝福的大趨勢。但若有人仍然反對，仍然質疑，或仍然不放心；那是因為對於兩岸「和平雙贏」的主旋律沒有信心而深懷疑懼。例如：台灣會不會被大陸吃掉？台灣會不會成為北京「採購政策」下的被餵養物？
這樣的擔心是可以理解的，卻亦不必過度悲觀。北京既然決定在兩岸政策上以「和平」取代「武力」，即不能偏離民生與民主的準則；而應當全力維持一個能使台灣人民感到有尊嚴及有利益的「兩岸關係和平發展框架」。在這樣的政策原則下，就財經面而言，北京固然會以採購及陸客來台等表達善意，卻不至於妄想用陸資來「包養」台灣，而事實上台灣亦不是僅憑陸資所能養得起的。因而，北京的政策，應當是把持「和平雙贏」的最高原則，讓台灣能夠有尊嚴地自主發展；只要使台灣人民相信，此種「和平雙贏」的兩岸關係是值得信任及值得追求的即可。
兩岸關係的改善，「和平比資金重要」。倘若對「和平」沒有真正的信仰，「資金」反會成為政治風險。反之，若能建立「和平雙贏」的主旋律，而和平必然以民生及民主為依歸，則和平的主調既定，節奏及速度也都有了可資依憑的準據！
Monday, May 11, 2009
Cross-Strait Relations: Time for Problem Solving
Cross-Strait Relations: Time for Problem Solving
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 11, 2009
The one year anniversary of the Ma administration's inauguration is approaching. Although the broad outlines remain unclear, President Ma's cross-Strait concepts and policies have increasingly diverged from the Green Camp's. These differences show up in the opening of cross-Strait transportation, tourism, finance, culture, and education. More importantly, the thinking behind Ma's policies is entirely different. President Ma's public declarations since April have made this abundantly clear. His rhetoric has two themes. One is that "geography trumps history." The other is "first economics, then politics." At first glance these two themes are nothing new. But in the context of cross-Straits relations over the past several decades, the differences are quite striking.
His emphasis on "geography over history" stresses Taiwan's geographical location, and not historical disputes. He hopes to take maximum advantage of the world's top five economic regions, including the US to the east, Japan to the north, the Mainland to the west, and ASEAN to the south. He hopes to make Taiwan the hub of these economic zones. Frankly, this is nothing new. Lee Teng-hui's so-called "Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center" plan and Chen Shui-bian's "global operations center" were also based on Taiwan's unique geographical location. Since this is nothing new, why has it remained stuck in the slogan stage over the past decade, regardless of how many "Such and Such Center" concepts have been floated? The key lies in not thinking in terms of historical disputes.
For a long time the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and politics on Taiwan have remained mired in historical enmities. Countless contradictions and tensions prevented normal interaction and dialogue. This made it impossible for cross-Strait relations to fully enter a post-Cold War, post-Civil War era. By the same token, the historical tragedy has prevented society on Taiwan from fully entering a post-authoritarian, post-colonial era. Japan's Representative to Taipei Masaki Saito said "Taiwan's status is undetermined." This Immediately triggered different reactions and suspicions. It makes no difference whether Saito made these remarks intentionally or accidentally. If the incident escalates, it will surely have serious political consequences. The Ma administration chose to cool matters immediately, The dispute ended quickly. If not for its "geography trumps history" thinking, it could have generated plenty of political hay.
If we want geography to trump history and maximize our marginal utility, we must of course think "first economics, then politics." Ma's public statements have repeatedly stressed that he will only deal with cross-Strait economic issues. After all, current cross-Strait economic issues, such as the signing of a MOU, which affects financial interaction, or ECFA, which affects broader economic cooperation, are complex and difficult enough. They cannot be rushed. They will require considerable consultation and communication. They will require the gradual establishment of relevant mechanisms. Perhaps this is why President Ma told the media in Singapore that he would consider discussing cross-Strait political issues only if he was re-elected in 2012. Perhaps this explains why so far President Ma has not made any high level reponse to the highly political "Hu's Six Points."
Ma's "first economics, then politics" thinking is also not novel or original. But it is an important reversal in the handling of cross-Strait issues. When politics trumped economics, cross-Strait relations remained mired in confrontation and demagoguery, rather than the solving of concrete problems. When the two sides could only engage in confrontation and demagoguery, cross-Strait relations could only remain hostile and trapped in a vicious circle of conflict. The same was true on Taiwan. It could never shake off mutual suspicion and mutual recriminations. A perfect example is the cross-Strait stalemate, which has extended to confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan over the past few years.
Once economics trumps politics, then cross-Strait relations ceases to be a tool for politicians to manipulate. It becomes a means of solving practical problems, one after another. Taiwan is no longer being manipulated by means of such political issues as plebiscites, the authoring of a new constitution, and the founding of a new nation. Such issues intensify cross-Strait conflict and increase confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties. Consultations on cross-Strait shipping, tourism, investment, academic credentials involve only rational calculation, not the manipulation of negative emotions. More importantly, it forces politicians who would plunge the world into chaos to withdraw from the political stage. It permits professionals with specific problem solving abilities to make their debut.
Of course, no one would be so obtuse as set aside all historical disputes on the basis that "geography trumps history." Nor would anyone deliberately ignore political factors because he advocated "first economics, then politics." Indeed many problems are difficult to de-politicize. A leader demonstrates his political wisdom by how he handles such difficulties.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.05.11
社論－讓兩岸邁入「解決實際問題」的循環
本報訊
距離就任滿周年的前夕，儘管輪廓還不是非常清晰，但馬總統有關兩岸政策的理念與作為，已經與綠營執政年代的差別越來越大，這種差別不僅僅是表現在通航、觀光、金融、文教等的鬆綁與開放上，更關鍵的還是政策背後的整個思維邏輯全都變了。檢視馬總統從四月以來的幾次公開發言，明眼人都看得出來，論述修辭中存在著兩個主軸，一個是「地理重於歷史」，一個是「經濟先於政治」，初乍看這兩組主軸其實並無任何出奇新穎之處，但若是放在過去幾十年兩岸關係史的脈絡上看，讓人可以想像的空間，就非常大了。
所謂「地理重於歷史」，強調的重點是台灣的「地理位置」，而不復再是它的歷史糾葛。即是希望能善用台灣東邊的美國，北邊的日本，西邊的大陸與南邊的東協等世界前五大的幾個經濟體，讓台灣成為串聯這些經濟區的樞紐中心。很坦白的說，這其實算不上什麼新思維，李登輝年代所謂「亞太營運中心」的規畫，陳水扁年代曾倡議的「全球運籌中心」構想，所設想的基礎不就是台灣特殊的地理位置嗎？既然這根本不是什麼「新發現」，為什麼過去十數年間不論提出多少「ＸＸ中心」的構想，都只能停留在口號的階段呢？關鍵就在歷史思維的糾葛。
過往很長的一段期間，歷史記憶其實持續著糾纏著兩岸之間與台灣內部，無數的矛盾與張力阻擋了正常的互動與對話，造成兩岸關係一直未能完全邁入後冷戰與後內戰的階段，同樣的也因為執著歷史悲情，讓台灣社會內部一直未曾完全擺脫後威權與後殖民的心靈。這一點從日本駐台代表齊藤正樹一席「台灣地位未定論」的發言，立即引發各方反應與猜忌即可見一班。誰都知道齊藤這番發言不論是有心還是無意，如果無限上綱的牽扯下去，絕對可以引發很大的後續政治效應，但馬政府選擇立即而主動的降溫，讓爭議迅速落幕，如果不是因為「地理重於歷史」的思維引導，還可以做的政治文章其實非常多。
而如果期待「地理」凌駕「歷史」的思維能夠發揮最大的邊際效用，當然就必須再配合「經濟先於政治」的思維邏輯。馬總統最近的幾次公開發言曾一再強調在他第一個任期內，只會處理兩岸的經濟議題。畢竟僅就當下兩岸經濟議題所涉層面，不論是簽訂涉及金融互動的ＭＯＵ，或是更廣泛經濟合作的ＥCＦＡ，其實都相當繁雜難解，操作上根本急不來，還需要相當長的時間去協商溝通，也需要各自逐步建立相關的配套機制。或許也因為這樣，馬總統才會對新加坡媒體說假如他在二○一二年獲得連任，才會讓兩岸協商「不排除觸及」政治議題。這一點或許也可以說明，何以迄今為止馬總統都未針對政治意涵甚高的「胡六點」，做出任何高規格的回應。
「先經濟後政治」的提法，同樣未予人新奇或創意之感，但卻是處理兩岸問題相當重要的翻轉。在政治思維全面凌駕經濟思維的年代，兩岸關係一直沉溺擴大對立的「議題操作」上，而非落實在具體的「問題解決」上。當兩岸間只存在爭議性議題的炒作，那麼兩岸關係當然也就只能陷入敵對與衝突的惡性循環，台灣內部同樣也就永遠擺脫不了彼此猜忌與詆毀的深淵，過去幾年台灣持續陷入的兩岸僵持與朝野對立，其實就是最鮮明的寫照。
一旦經濟思維先於政治操作，兩岸關係也就不再是政客操弄的工具，而是尋求解決一樁樁、一件件實際問題的平台。換言之，台灣不再藉由操作類如公投、制憲、建國等政治議題去激化兩岸衝突與朝野對立，而是務實的針對兩岸航運、觀光、投資、學歷認證等課題進行協商，這個過程只會有理性的利益算計，不會再有負面情緒的渲染與撩撥。更重要的是，它將讓那些惟恐天下不亂的政客們從舞台上撤出，讓更多有能力解決具體問題的專業人士有機會登場表現。
當然，沒有人會笨到主張只要「地理重於歷史」，所有的歷史糾葛就可擺在一旁，更不會因為有了「經濟先於政治」的前提，就可以刻意忽略政治因素的干擾，許多問題確實不容易切割，但領導者政治智慧的發揮，不正就是該表現在這些層面上！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 11, 2009
The one year anniversary of the Ma administration's inauguration is approaching. Although the broad outlines remain unclear, President Ma's cross-Strait concepts and policies have increasingly diverged from the Green Camp's. These differences show up in the opening of cross-Strait transportation, tourism, finance, culture, and education. More importantly, the thinking behind Ma's policies is entirely different. President Ma's public declarations since April have made this abundantly clear. His rhetoric has two themes. One is that "geography trumps history." The other is "first economics, then politics." At first glance these two themes are nothing new. But in the context of cross-Straits relations over the past several decades, the differences are quite striking.
His emphasis on "geography over history" stresses Taiwan's geographical location, and not historical disputes. He hopes to take maximum advantage of the world's top five economic regions, including the US to the east, Japan to the north, the Mainland to the west, and ASEAN to the south. He hopes to make Taiwan the hub of these economic zones. Frankly, this is nothing new. Lee Teng-hui's so-called "Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center" plan and Chen Shui-bian's "global operations center" were also based on Taiwan's unique geographical location. Since this is nothing new, why has it remained stuck in the slogan stage over the past decade, regardless of how many "Such and Such Center" concepts have been floated? The key lies in not thinking in terms of historical disputes.
For a long time the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and politics on Taiwan have remained mired in historical enmities. Countless contradictions and tensions prevented normal interaction and dialogue. This made it impossible for cross-Strait relations to fully enter a post-Cold War, post-Civil War era. By the same token, the historical tragedy has prevented society on Taiwan from fully entering a post-authoritarian, post-colonial era. Japan's Representative to Taipei Masaki Saito said "Taiwan's status is undetermined." This Immediately triggered different reactions and suspicions. It makes no difference whether Saito made these remarks intentionally or accidentally. If the incident escalates, it will surely have serious political consequences. The Ma administration chose to cool matters immediately, The dispute ended quickly. If not for its "geography trumps history" thinking, it could have generated plenty of political hay.
If we want geography to trump history and maximize our marginal utility, we must of course think "first economics, then politics." Ma's public statements have repeatedly stressed that he will only deal with cross-Strait economic issues. After all, current cross-Strait economic issues, such as the signing of a MOU, which affects financial interaction, or ECFA, which affects broader economic cooperation, are complex and difficult enough. They cannot be rushed. They will require considerable consultation and communication. They will require the gradual establishment of relevant mechanisms. Perhaps this is why President Ma told the media in Singapore that he would consider discussing cross-Strait political issues only if he was re-elected in 2012. Perhaps this explains why so far President Ma has not made any high level reponse to the highly political "Hu's Six Points."
Ma's "first economics, then politics" thinking is also not novel or original. But it is an important reversal in the handling of cross-Strait issues. When politics trumped economics, cross-Strait relations remained mired in confrontation and demagoguery, rather than the solving of concrete problems. When the two sides could only engage in confrontation and demagoguery, cross-Strait relations could only remain hostile and trapped in a vicious circle of conflict. The same was true on Taiwan. It could never shake off mutual suspicion and mutual recriminations. A perfect example is the cross-Strait stalemate, which has extended to confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan over the past few years.
Once economics trumps politics, then cross-Strait relations ceases to be a tool for politicians to manipulate. It becomes a means of solving practical problems, one after another. Taiwan is no longer being manipulated by means of such political issues as plebiscites, the authoring of a new constitution, and the founding of a new nation. Such issues intensify cross-Strait conflict and increase confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties. Consultations on cross-Strait shipping, tourism, investment, academic credentials involve only rational calculation, not the manipulation of negative emotions. More importantly, it forces politicians who would plunge the world into chaos to withdraw from the political stage. It permits professionals with specific problem solving abilities to make their debut.
Of course, no one would be so obtuse as set aside all historical disputes on the basis that "geography trumps history." Nor would anyone deliberately ignore political factors because he advocated "first economics, then politics." Indeed many problems are difficult to de-politicize. A leader demonstrates his political wisdom by how he handles such difficulties.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.05.11
社論－讓兩岸邁入「解決實際問題」的循環
本報訊
距離就任滿周年的前夕，儘管輪廓還不是非常清晰，但馬總統有關兩岸政策的理念與作為，已經與綠營執政年代的差別越來越大，這種差別不僅僅是表現在通航、觀光、金融、文教等的鬆綁與開放上，更關鍵的還是政策背後的整個思維邏輯全都變了。檢視馬總統從四月以來的幾次公開發言，明眼人都看得出來，論述修辭中存在著兩個主軸，一個是「地理重於歷史」，一個是「經濟先於政治」，初乍看這兩組主軸其實並無任何出奇新穎之處，但若是放在過去幾十年兩岸關係史的脈絡上看，讓人可以想像的空間，就非常大了。
所謂「地理重於歷史」，強調的重點是台灣的「地理位置」，而不復再是它的歷史糾葛。即是希望能善用台灣東邊的美國，北邊的日本，西邊的大陸與南邊的東協等世界前五大的幾個經濟體，讓台灣成為串聯這些經濟區的樞紐中心。很坦白的說，這其實算不上什麼新思維，李登輝年代所謂「亞太營運中心」的規畫，陳水扁年代曾倡議的「全球運籌中心」構想，所設想的基礎不就是台灣特殊的地理位置嗎？既然這根本不是什麼「新發現」，為什麼過去十數年間不論提出多少「ＸＸ中心」的構想，都只能停留在口號的階段呢？關鍵就在歷史思維的糾葛。
過往很長的一段期間，歷史記憶其實持續著糾纏著兩岸之間與台灣內部，無數的矛盾與張力阻擋了正常的互動與對話，造成兩岸關係一直未能完全邁入後冷戰與後內戰的階段，同樣的也因為執著歷史悲情，讓台灣社會內部一直未曾完全擺脫後威權與後殖民的心靈。這一點從日本駐台代表齊藤正樹一席「台灣地位未定論」的發言，立即引發各方反應與猜忌即可見一班。誰都知道齊藤這番發言不論是有心還是無意，如果無限上綱的牽扯下去，絕對可以引發很大的後續政治效應，但馬政府選擇立即而主動的降溫，讓爭議迅速落幕，如果不是因為「地理重於歷史」的思維引導，還可以做的政治文章其實非常多。
而如果期待「地理」凌駕「歷史」的思維能夠發揮最大的邊際效用，當然就必須再配合「經濟先於政治」的思維邏輯。馬總統最近的幾次公開發言曾一再強調在他第一個任期內，只會處理兩岸的經濟議題。畢竟僅就當下兩岸經濟議題所涉層面，不論是簽訂涉及金融互動的ＭＯＵ，或是更廣泛經濟合作的ＥCＦＡ，其實都相當繁雜難解，操作上根本急不來，還需要相當長的時間去協商溝通，也需要各自逐步建立相關的配套機制。或許也因為這樣，馬總統才會對新加坡媒體說假如他在二○一二年獲得連任，才會讓兩岸協商「不排除觸及」政治議題。這一點或許也可以說明，何以迄今為止馬總統都未針對政治意涵甚高的「胡六點」，做出任何高規格的回應。
「先經濟後政治」的提法，同樣未予人新奇或創意之感，但卻是處理兩岸問題相當重要的翻轉。在政治思維全面凌駕經濟思維的年代，兩岸關係一直沉溺擴大對立的「議題操作」上，而非落實在具體的「問題解決」上。當兩岸間只存在爭議性議題的炒作，那麼兩岸關係當然也就只能陷入敵對與衝突的惡性循環，台灣內部同樣也就永遠擺脫不了彼此猜忌與詆毀的深淵，過去幾年台灣持續陷入的兩岸僵持與朝野對立，其實就是最鮮明的寫照。
一旦經濟思維先於政治操作，兩岸關係也就不再是政客操弄的工具，而是尋求解決一樁樁、一件件實際問題的平台。換言之，台灣不再藉由操作類如公投、制憲、建國等政治議題去激化兩岸衝突與朝野對立，而是務實的針對兩岸航運、觀光、投資、學歷認證等課題進行協商，這個過程只會有理性的利益算計，不會再有負面情緒的渲染與撩撥。更重要的是，它將讓那些惟恐天下不亂的政客們從舞台上撤出，讓更多有能力解決具體問題的專業人士有機會登場表現。
當然，沒有人會笨到主張只要「地理重於歷史」，所有的歷史糾葛就可擺在一旁，更不會因為有了「經濟先於政治」的前提，就可以刻意忽略政治因素的干擾，許多問題確實不容易切割，但領導者政治智慧的發揮，不正就是該表現在這些層面上！
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