1949: Shattering the Myth of Winner Takes All
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
September 30, 2009
Tomorrow is the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. In two years, it will be the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China.
1949 was the beginning of divided rule across the Taiwan Strait. The 1949 Civil War marked fact the conclusion of the domestic and foreign troubles that have plagued China since the Opium War of 1840. Among these was the 1912 showdown between the monarchy and the republic. The republic won, only to be plagued by more domestic and foreign troubles. It won a costly victory over Japan. In 1949, capitalism had a showdown iwth communism. The Communist regime occupied the mainland, and the Kuomintang regime retreated to Taiwan.
In essence, 1949 was about military victory and defeat. The KMT's "Three People's Principles" and the CCP of the "Communism" were basically window dressing for a military struggle. The KMT's yet to be implemented "democracy" and the CCP's "Communism" were merely superficial features of the student movement, the labor movement, and demands for the "killing of landlords, and the division of their land." The victory or defeat of the KMT and CCP had little to do with the right and wrong of their "isms." At the time these "isms" were mere slogans. The main reason for the KMT's military defeat was that it was the ruling government of a nation in ruins from endless war, beginning with the Opium War and ending with the Second Sino-Japanese War. The sole task of the CCP, on the other hand, was rebellion.
The struggle between the KMT and the CCP did involve "isms." Their respective battle cries had to do with the question, "Whither China?" The military struggle determined victory and defeat. But it did not determine right and wrong between rival "isms." Ironically, the issue of right and wrong can be seen far more clearly 60 years later.
In fact, the Communists of Mao Zedong's generation never really understood what communism was. They had only a crude understanding of communism, or else deliberately distorted its meaning. The founding of the People's Republic of China government was followed by the Three Antis, Five Antis Campaigns, the Anti-Rightist Rectification Campaign, the Three Red Flags Movement (The General Line, the Great Leap Forward, and the People's Communes), and finally by the decade long debacle known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Was this really the meaning of Communism? Was this really how the Communist Party won the war against the KMT in 1949?
Winning does not make one a hero. Winning does not make one right. The Kuomintang lost the mainland for many reasons. For that it must take responsibility. It cannot shift all the blame onto the chaos that began with the Opium War and ended with the Second Sino-Japanese War. Besides, the Kuomintang made more mistakes on Taiwan, including the 2/28 Incident and the White Terror. But it also racked up an impressive record of achievements. These include democracy and the rule of law, direct presidential elections, changes in the ruling party, the criminal prosecution of a former president, and 60 years of free markets. This was the political and economic realm several generations of Chinese sought to achieve since the Opium War, the Self-Strengthening Movement, the Kang Youwei/Liang Qichao Reform Movement of 1898, the 1911 Revolution, the June 4th Movement, and the Chinese Civil War. The Taiwan region achieved free markets at least 30 years before the mainland. The Taiwan region lifted martial law and established democracy at least 20 years before the mainland. Moreover, during the past 60 years the Taiwan region has been on the track towards "progressive democracy." The mainland on the other hand, still has no timetable for the popular election of city mayors and county executives.
Some may say that the Taiwan region is too small. Its achievements count for little. But Singapore is small. Switzerland is small. Moreover, Taiwan's plight for the past 60 years has been difficult. Yet it was able to achieve freedom and democracy. Winning does not make one a hero. Being small does not make one wrong.
Sixty years ago, we decided between military victory and defeat. Sixty years later, we are deciding between political and economic right and wrong. The Beijing regime is now known in the Western world as an "enlightened despotism." For the CCP this is real progress. Homemade blast furnaces do not equal "Mr. Science," and the "Dictatorship of the Proletariate" does not equal "Mr. Democracy." Today those most able to help the Chinese people stand on their own two feet are not Mao Tse-tung's "class struggle" Communists. They are not the Communists who defeated the Kuomintang in 1949 by means of military force. They are Deng Xiaoping and the two generations of Communists who succeeded him. They are the Communists whose political and economic path more and more resembles that of the Taiwan region. In 1949 the KMT and CCP engaged in a life and death struggle over "isms." Today they are moving along the same track towards political democracy and economic freedom. The only difference is that the Taiwan region is a few steps ahead of the mainland. Furthermore, one can safely assert that Beijing must move increasingly toward democracy and freedom. It must increasingly relax its "Four Cardinal Principles." Only then can it truly undergo a "peaceful rise."
1949 was a long time ago. Today cross-Strait issues can no longer be resolved militarily. Internal and cross-Strait issues must be resolved in accordance with the principles of democracy and freedom. If Beijing believes cross-Straits issues are Chinese issues, then it can no longer use military force to determine victory or defeat. It must invoke democracy and freedom to determine right and wrong. By the same token, the public on Taiwan must be realize that when the Taiwan region implements democracy and freedom, its political and economic achievements provide a frame of reference for the whole of China. Taiwan can relate to the mainland on the basis of "neither reunification nor independence / both reunification and independence." It can relate to the mainland on the basis of an "ism," rather than the use of force. Taiwan independence, paradoxically, is the worst possible political strategy.
Tomorrow is the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. The aspect most worth celebrating is the metamorphosis of "Mao Zedong's Communist Party" into "Deng Xiaoping's Communist Party." Democracy and freedom have replaced Communist dogma in cross-Strait relations. The time has come to determine right and wrong, and renounce the use of force.
一九四九年：打破成王敗寇的迷思
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.09.30 04:26 am
明天是中華人民共和國建國六十周年；再過兩年，則是中華民國建國一百周年。
一九四九年，是兩岸分裂分治的開始。一九四九年的國共內戰，其實是一八四○年鴉片戰爭以降中國內憂外患的總結；其中，一九一二年是帝制與共和的對決，共和勝；接下來是內外交煎的民國，苦苦撐持至對日抗戰慘勝，到了一九四九年，則出現民主資本主義與共產主義的對決，結果共產黨政權席捲大陸，國民黨政權撤至台灣。
一九四九年在本質上是軍事鬥爭的勝敗。當年，國共雙方的「三民主義」與「共產主義」在大體上只是裝飾軍事鬥爭的口號；國民黨未行「民主」，共產黨的「共產主義」也只是學運、工運，與「殺地主／分田地」的皮毛而已。國共的勝敗，其實不在「主義」的是非正誤，因為當時兩邊的「主義」皆只是「標語」；主要的勝敗因素在於：國民黨是被鴉片戰爭至抗日戰爭蹂躪得不成形狀的中國之主政者，而共產黨當年唯一的任務就是叛變。
不過，當年國共鬥爭用於號召全民的真正主題，卻是「主義」，也就是「中國何處去」的問題。軍事鬥爭雖分出勝敗，然未在「主義」上分出是非。這個大是大非，反而在六十年後的今天看得比較清楚。
其實，毛澤東一輩的共產黨員，根本不知道什麼是共產主義，或是粗識共產主義而惡意誤用了共產主義。中華人民共和國建政後，三反、五反、反右整風、三面紅旗（總路線、大躍進、人民公社），接著又是十年浩劫文化大革命；試問：這就是共產主義嗎？共產黨在一九四九年就是憑著這樣的共產主義而贏得了國共戰爭嗎？
勿以勝敗論英雄，勿以勝敗論是非。國民黨政權失去大陸當然有諸多必須自負的責任，而不能全盤歸諸「自鴉片戰爭至抗日戰爭」云云，且國民黨在台主政也有二二八及白色恐怖等汙點；但是，現今的台灣在民主法治上的成就，如直選總統、如政黨輪替、如法院對犯罪的總統判刑，以及六十年來始終以自由經濟為主軸，這卻不啻是大致體現了自鴉片戰爭以來，從自強、變法、辛亥革命、五四運動到國共內戰，中國幾代人物所追求的政經境界。台灣在實現自由經濟上較大陸改革開放至少早了三十年，在解嚴實現全盤徹底的民主政治上則至今已早了二十一年，何況六十年來台灣皆在「漸進民主」的軌道上，而大陸連民選縣市長亦尚不知在何年何日。
也許有人說，台灣這麼小，不算什麼；但是，新加坡小，瑞士也小；何況，台灣六十年來的處境如此窘促艱難，卻能實現自由民主。不因勝敗論英雄，當然更不能因形體大小論是非。
六十年前見軍事勝負，六十年後論政經是非。北京政權現在被西方世界喻為「開明專制」，這是中共極大的進步。畢竟，土高爐不是「賽先生」，「無產階級專政」也不是「德先生」。今天真正可能使「中國人民站起來」的不是毛澤東那一批「以階級鬥爭為綱」的共產黨，亦即不是一九四九年以武力打敗國民黨那一批共產黨；而是鄧小平及其後兩個梯隊的共產黨，也就是政經腳步愈來愈像台灣的這個共產黨。一九四九年因「主義」分歧而你死我活的國共兩黨，如今卻皆在朝往政治民主及經濟自由的同一軌道上。只是，在這個方向上、路線上，台灣畢竟比大陸領先了好幾步；而且，應可斷言，北京必須愈來愈朝向民主自由，愈來愈鬆綁「四個堅持」，始有可能真正「和平崛起」。
一九四九年已遠，時至今日，兩岸關係愈發不可能用軍事解決，而必須用民主自由的法則來解決各自內部的問題及兩岸的問題。如果北京方面仍認為兩岸問題是「中國問題」，就不能再以武力論勝敗，而必須用民主自由來論是非。相對而言，台灣方面亦應自覺，當台灣落實民主自由的政經成就，能成為整個中國的參考架構，台灣始可能在兩岸關係中維持「不統不獨／亦統亦獨」，並找到不以武力而以「主義」立足的利基，台獨反而是台灣最脆弱的政治戰略。
中華人民共和國建國六十周年，最值得慶幸的是「毛澤東的共產黨」蛻變為「鄧小平的共產黨」；兩岸關係也因民主自由的思潮取代了共產主義教條，而到了應當訴諸是非、不可訴諸武力的時候。
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
Detention Law Reform vs. Solidarity with Ah-Bian
Detention Law Reform vs. Solidarity with Ah-Bian
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 29, 2009
The High Court continues to detain former President Chen Shui-bian. It has cited three reasons: He is a flight risk, he would destroy evidence, and he has been convicted of a felony. Chen Shui-bian has filed suit against U.S. President Barack Obama, demanding that the United States Military Government in Taiwan intervene and demand his release. He is arguing that during his administration he frequently acted on orders from the American Institute in Taiwan, therefore he should be considered an official of the United States government.
When the public learned of this development, they were incredulous that Chen Shui-bian, a former head of state, would go so far to free himself from custody. They had trouble believing he would take such an unwise action and trample the dignity of the Republic of China, a sovereign and independent nation. They could not understand the logic behind his claim that a US military court should exercise its jurisdiction and demand his release. Ah-Bian's overseas legal move merely makes the High Court's decision to keep him in custody for another three months, for fear that he might be a flight risk, seem more reasonable than ever.
To be fair, regardless of how ridiculous Chen's idea might be, the court should not detain him merely because he is disrespectful. Is he being detained because he has been found guilty of a felony and handed a life sentence? Is continued detention under the Code of Criminal Procedures consistent with the constitution? There is room for discussion. This has universal relevance, and is not something relevant only to Ah-Bian. The pre-trial detention system is overdue for comprehensive review. Is Chen being detained because he has hidden large sums of money overseas and may destroy evidence? Defendants have no legal obligation to provide evidence of their own guilt. Therefore this ruling is questionable. Concerns that Ah-Bian has squirreled large sums of money overseas, and therefore may be a flight risk, are consistent with common sense. Now Ah-Bian is appealing to Uncle Sam for help. Once he is released, might he seek political asylum at the American Institute in Taipei, and make it difficult to continue legal proceedings? That is actually a easier scenario for the court to imagine. If Chen Shui-bian wants to avail himself of another nation's judicial processes in order to evade prosecution, that is his right. But if he expects America to rescue him, he is indulging in wishful thinking, and will only make it more difficult for the courts on Taiwan to believe he is not a flight risk. He is merely shooting himself in the foot.
His politically foolish and morally unscrupulous moves will only make it more difficult for him to win public sympathy. The Democratic Progressive Party's response to Ah-Bian's folly will also test its political wisdom. Not long ago, DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen demanded a meeting with Lai Ying-chao, President of the Judicial Yuan. He turned her down. She then demanded his resignation. This was another breach of protocol that ought to be examined.
When the Chairman of the DPP demanded a meeting with the President of the Judicial Yuan, she boasted that she represented millions of people. She said "I am not just any passerby." She said her request should not be rejected. But what was the purpose of her demand for a meeting? The public knows only too well that it was to demand an immediate Grand Justice ruling on the constitutionality of Chou Chan-chun and Tsai Shou-hsung's review of the Chen corruption case. The Grand Justice's ruling would have a direct bearing on whether the local court was legal, and whether its ruling in the Chen corruption case was valid. The largest opposition party banged on the door of the Judicial Yuan, demanding a hearing. It demanded a constitutional interpretation on an ongoing case pertaining to Chen Shui-bian. The DPP claim that it was not interfering with the administration of justice convinces no one. In fact, it is hardly the only case that would have be made vulnerable to judicial interference.
The President of the Judicial Yuan politely refused to meet with the Chairman of the DPP, as was his right. Society expects judicial independence. President Lai's refusal to meet with Chairman Tsai, on the grounds of judicial independence, was proper and wise. The Chairman of the DPP is the one who deserves to be criticized for lacking restraint and exceeding her brief.
The Chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party President is not just any passerby. That is precisely why the Judicial Yuan must avoid the perception that political parties have hijacked the justice system. Otherwise one is merely repeating the same mistake made by the Kuomintang in the past, when it "owned the courts." Otherwise the DPP is merely calling the KMT black. DPP leaders have explicitly declared that their preeminent concern is the defense of human rights, that they are not merely trying to cover for Chen Shui-bian. The public is having trouble believing them, because recently every one of the DPP's human rights demands has revolved around the Chen corruption case. The DPP is working in lockstep with the Chen defense team. The public sees no effort on the part of the Democratic Progressive Party to improve human rights per se.
Over the past two years, over 10,000 people have been subject to pretrial detention. Close to that number have been detained this year alone. Over 3,000 people are currently being held in detention centers. Many have been detained merely because they were charged with a felony, or might collude with others to falsify their testimony. How many people besides Ah-Bian are being detained for all three reasons at the same time? The DPP expresses solidarity only with Chen Shui-bian. It gives no thought to demanding changes in the system of detention. That is why the public sees through its human rights lip service.
Chen Shui-bian enjoys freedom of expression. He has the right to denounce the justice system and run crying to a foreign government. What we want to know is whether the Democratic Progressive Party feels any political or moral obligation to uphold our national dignity?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.29
社論－推動修改羈押法制 比聲援扁更有意義
本報訊
高等法院以虞逃、滅證及重罪三個理由續押前總統陳水扁。陳水扁則於美國訴請美國總統歐巴馬啟動在台的美國軍事法庭介入，讓他解除羈押；理由是扁在位期間常依美國在台協會指示行事，因此應將之視為美國人員。
國人聆此消息，除了難以置信曾經擔任過國家元首的陳水扁，為了免受羈押而竟出此下策，踐踏台灣做為主權獨立國家的尊嚴一至於此以外，恐也不能理解他向美國主張藉由美國軍事法庭行使管轄權以及使他獲得釋放的法理邏輯。但是，扁的海外法律行動，卻已使得台灣高等法院以其有逃亡之虞而續押三個月的決定，似乎有了更多的支持理由。
平情而論，不論扁的主張有多荒謬，法院都不應只憑他是否對法庭態度恭謹而決定是否應該續行羈押。若是以他身犯已受無期徒刑宣判之重罪罪嫌為由續行羈押來看，所根據的刑事訴訟法重罪羈押的規定是否合憲，很有討論餘地，但這是一個通案問題而非扁的特殊遭遇，本該在審前羈押制度上全盤的檢討。以扁尚有鉅款隱匿海外認為是湮滅證據而予以續押的事由，恐怕也令因為被告在法律上並無提供自己有罪證據的義務而仍有見仁見智的商榷。海外尚有鉅款成為法院擔心扁會潛逃的動機，並非不符一般常識，現在扁的訴狀以美國山姆大叔為求救對象，一旦釋放可以躲入在台協會尋求政治庇護，形成訴訟難以進行，反而是法院不難想像的場景。陳水扁想要訴諸何國的司法程序以求脫困，那是他的權利，但他一廂情願越海投美救援之舉，使得其在台灣的法院中更難令人相信絕無逃亡企圖，似乎是個自搬磚頭砸腳的錯誤。
在政治道德愚不可及而又寡廉鮮恥的表現，當然更難獲得社會的同情；民進黨對於扁的愚行採取何種政治態度，也就備受政治智慧何在的質疑與考驗。不久前民進黨主席蔡英文求見司法院院長遭拒，呼籲賴英照院長辭職，則是另一個觸犯禁忌而應受檢驗的政黨舉措。
民進黨主席自稱代表數百萬民眾求見司法院院長，「我不是路人甲」，不應遭到拒絕，必須追問其求見的目的；眾所周知，此舉是為了要求司法院大法官儘速針對陳水扁方面聲請大法官針對周占春審理之扁案併入蔡守訓審理之案有無違憲做出解釋有關。大法官的解釋，可能直接關係到地方法院扁案審判庭組成是否合法、扁案判決是否有效的問題。第一大在野黨為此到司法院敲門求見，不但關係聲請釋憲的個案！也關係到陳水扁正在進行的司法審判，號稱不是要干預個案，說服力有限；此中可能受到干預的司法個案，其實不只一個。
司法院院長在禮貌接見與拒絕求見之間，應該有所選擇，這是思考司法獨立社會觀感必須謹慎的所在。賴院長決定以司法獨立為由拒見，是一個正確而且明智的決定。應該受到批判的，反而是不知節制，忘記政黨分寸的民進黨主席。
正因為民進黨主席不是路人甲，所以應該避免挾政黨努力駕凌司法的惡劣觀感，否則恐與當年國民黨自翊經營法院的錯誤，只是五十步與百步之比而已。民進黨口口聲聲是以人權保障為出發，不是為了陳水扁個人。所以難引起國人共鳴，是因為近期以來，所有的相關人權訴求，都只是圍繞著扁的個案打轉，與扁的個案策略呼應起舞，完全看不到民進黨有任何為改善人權制度而努力的行動。
別的不說，過去兩年，審判羈押的總人數都已超過萬人，今年亦已逼近此數，現在正在看守所中受到羈押者也在三千人以上；此中只因重罪或是串證之虞而遭到羈押者，大有人在，像扁一樣同時因有三個理由而遭羈押的究有幾人？民進黨單單聲援阿扁，卻不思推動修改羈押法制的途徑，會不會讓人在人權訴求上看破手腳？
陳水扁自有罵司法、告洋狀的言論自由與訴訟權，但我們要問的是，民進黨對於呵護台灣的尊嚴有沒有什麼應盡的政治道德責任？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 29, 2009
The High Court continues to detain former President Chen Shui-bian. It has cited three reasons: He is a flight risk, he would destroy evidence, and he has been convicted of a felony. Chen Shui-bian has filed suit against U.S. President Barack Obama, demanding that the United States Military Government in Taiwan intervene and demand his release. He is arguing that during his administration he frequently acted on orders from the American Institute in Taiwan, therefore he should be considered an official of the United States government.
When the public learned of this development, they were incredulous that Chen Shui-bian, a former head of state, would go so far to free himself from custody. They had trouble believing he would take such an unwise action and trample the dignity of the Republic of China, a sovereign and independent nation. They could not understand the logic behind his claim that a US military court should exercise its jurisdiction and demand his release. Ah-Bian's overseas legal move merely makes the High Court's decision to keep him in custody for another three months, for fear that he might be a flight risk, seem more reasonable than ever.
To be fair, regardless of how ridiculous Chen's idea might be, the court should not detain him merely because he is disrespectful. Is he being detained because he has been found guilty of a felony and handed a life sentence? Is continued detention under the Code of Criminal Procedures consistent with the constitution? There is room for discussion. This has universal relevance, and is not something relevant only to Ah-Bian. The pre-trial detention system is overdue for comprehensive review. Is Chen being detained because he has hidden large sums of money overseas and may destroy evidence? Defendants have no legal obligation to provide evidence of their own guilt. Therefore this ruling is questionable. Concerns that Ah-Bian has squirreled large sums of money overseas, and therefore may be a flight risk, are consistent with common sense. Now Ah-Bian is appealing to Uncle Sam for help. Once he is released, might he seek political asylum at the American Institute in Taipei, and make it difficult to continue legal proceedings? That is actually a easier scenario for the court to imagine. If Chen Shui-bian wants to avail himself of another nation's judicial processes in order to evade prosecution, that is his right. But if he expects America to rescue him, he is indulging in wishful thinking, and will only make it more difficult for the courts on Taiwan to believe he is not a flight risk. He is merely shooting himself in the foot.
His politically foolish and morally unscrupulous moves will only make it more difficult for him to win public sympathy. The Democratic Progressive Party's response to Ah-Bian's folly will also test its political wisdom. Not long ago, DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen demanded a meeting with Lai Ying-chao, President of the Judicial Yuan. He turned her down. She then demanded his resignation. This was another breach of protocol that ought to be examined.
When the Chairman of the DPP demanded a meeting with the President of the Judicial Yuan, she boasted that she represented millions of people. She said "I am not just any passerby." She said her request should not be rejected. But what was the purpose of her demand for a meeting? The public knows only too well that it was to demand an immediate Grand Justice ruling on the constitutionality of Chou Chan-chun and Tsai Shou-hsung's review of the Chen corruption case. The Grand Justice's ruling would have a direct bearing on whether the local court was legal, and whether its ruling in the Chen corruption case was valid. The largest opposition party banged on the door of the Judicial Yuan, demanding a hearing. It demanded a constitutional interpretation on an ongoing case pertaining to Chen Shui-bian. The DPP claim that it was not interfering with the administration of justice convinces no one. In fact, it is hardly the only case that would have be made vulnerable to judicial interference.
The President of the Judicial Yuan politely refused to meet with the Chairman of the DPP, as was his right. Society expects judicial independence. President Lai's refusal to meet with Chairman Tsai, on the grounds of judicial independence, was proper and wise. The Chairman of the DPP is the one who deserves to be criticized for lacking restraint and exceeding her brief.
The Chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party President is not just any passerby. That is precisely why the Judicial Yuan must avoid the perception that political parties have hijacked the justice system. Otherwise one is merely repeating the same mistake made by the Kuomintang in the past, when it "owned the courts." Otherwise the DPP is merely calling the KMT black. DPP leaders have explicitly declared that their preeminent concern is the defense of human rights, that they are not merely trying to cover for Chen Shui-bian. The public is having trouble believing them, because recently every one of the DPP's human rights demands has revolved around the Chen corruption case. The DPP is working in lockstep with the Chen defense team. The public sees no effort on the part of the Democratic Progressive Party to improve human rights per se.
Over the past two years, over 10,000 people have been subject to pretrial detention. Close to that number have been detained this year alone. Over 3,000 people are currently being held in detention centers. Many have been detained merely because they were charged with a felony, or might collude with others to falsify their testimony. How many people besides Ah-Bian are being detained for all three reasons at the same time? The DPP expresses solidarity only with Chen Shui-bian. It gives no thought to demanding changes in the system of detention. That is why the public sees through its human rights lip service.
Chen Shui-bian enjoys freedom of expression. He has the right to denounce the justice system and run crying to a foreign government. What we want to know is whether the Democratic Progressive Party feels any political or moral obligation to uphold our national dignity?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.29
社論－推動修改羈押法制 比聲援扁更有意義
本報訊
高等法院以虞逃、滅證及重罪三個理由續押前總統陳水扁。陳水扁則於美國訴請美國總統歐巴馬啟動在台的美國軍事法庭介入，讓他解除羈押；理由是扁在位期間常依美國在台協會指示行事，因此應將之視為美國人員。
國人聆此消息，除了難以置信曾經擔任過國家元首的陳水扁，為了免受羈押而竟出此下策，踐踏台灣做為主權獨立國家的尊嚴一至於此以外，恐也不能理解他向美國主張藉由美國軍事法庭行使管轄權以及使他獲得釋放的法理邏輯。但是，扁的海外法律行動，卻已使得台灣高等法院以其有逃亡之虞而續押三個月的決定，似乎有了更多的支持理由。
平情而論，不論扁的主張有多荒謬，法院都不應只憑他是否對法庭態度恭謹而決定是否應該續行羈押。若是以他身犯已受無期徒刑宣判之重罪罪嫌為由續行羈押來看，所根據的刑事訴訟法重罪羈押的規定是否合憲，很有討論餘地，但這是一個通案問題而非扁的特殊遭遇，本該在審前羈押制度上全盤的檢討。以扁尚有鉅款隱匿海外認為是湮滅證據而予以續押的事由，恐怕也令因為被告在法律上並無提供自己有罪證據的義務而仍有見仁見智的商榷。海外尚有鉅款成為法院擔心扁會潛逃的動機，並非不符一般常識，現在扁的訴狀以美國山姆大叔為求救對象，一旦釋放可以躲入在台協會尋求政治庇護，形成訴訟難以進行，反而是法院不難想像的場景。陳水扁想要訴諸何國的司法程序以求脫困，那是他的權利，但他一廂情願越海投美救援之舉，使得其在台灣的法院中更難令人相信絕無逃亡企圖，似乎是個自搬磚頭砸腳的錯誤。
在政治道德愚不可及而又寡廉鮮恥的表現，當然更難獲得社會的同情；民進黨對於扁的愚行採取何種政治態度，也就備受政治智慧何在的質疑與考驗。不久前民進黨主席蔡英文求見司法院院長遭拒，呼籲賴英照院長辭職，則是另一個觸犯禁忌而應受檢驗的政黨舉措。
民進黨主席自稱代表數百萬民眾求見司法院院長，「我不是路人甲」，不應遭到拒絕，必須追問其求見的目的；眾所周知，此舉是為了要求司法院大法官儘速針對陳水扁方面聲請大法官針對周占春審理之扁案併入蔡守訓審理之案有無違憲做出解釋有關。大法官的解釋，可能直接關係到地方法院扁案審判庭組成是否合法、扁案判決是否有效的問題。第一大在野黨為此到司法院敲門求見，不但關係聲請釋憲的個案！也關係到陳水扁正在進行的司法審判，號稱不是要干預個案，說服力有限；此中可能受到干預的司法個案，其實不只一個。
司法院院長在禮貌接見與拒絕求見之間，應該有所選擇，這是思考司法獨立社會觀感必須謹慎的所在。賴院長決定以司法獨立為由拒見，是一個正確而且明智的決定。應該受到批判的，反而是不知節制，忘記政黨分寸的民進黨主席。
正因為民進黨主席不是路人甲，所以應該避免挾政黨努力駕凌司法的惡劣觀感，否則恐與當年國民黨自翊經營法院的錯誤，只是五十步與百步之比而已。民進黨口口聲聲是以人權保障為出發，不是為了陳水扁個人。所以難引起國人共鳴，是因為近期以來，所有的相關人權訴求，都只是圍繞著扁的個案打轉，與扁的個案策略呼應起舞，完全看不到民進黨有任何為改善人權制度而努力的行動。
別的不說，過去兩年，審判羈押的總人數都已超過萬人，今年亦已逼近此數，現在正在看守所中受到羈押者也在三千人以上；此中只因重罪或是串證之虞而遭到羈押者，大有人在，像扁一樣同時因有三個理由而遭羈押的究有幾人？民進黨單單聲援阿扁，卻不思推動修改羈押法制的途徑，會不會讓人在人權訴求上看破手腳？
陳水扁自有罵司法、告洋狀的言論自由與訴訟權，但我們要問的是，民進黨對於呵護台灣的尊嚴有沒有什麼應盡的政治道德責任？
Monday, September 28, 2009
Rid the KMT of Factions, Now
Rid the KMT of Factions, Now
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 28, 2009
What does winning or losing an election mean? A single legislative seat? Or whether casinos will be built in a particular electoral district? On September 26, Yunlin held legislative by-elections and Penghu held a referendum on whether to legalize gambling. As it turned out, the KMT vote was split in the legislative by-elections, allowing the DPP nominee to ease himself into office. The results of the referendum, on the other hand, were contrary to expectations. Social movements staunchly opposed to legalized gambling prevented passage of the the referenda. Because most KMT officials supported legalization of gambling in Penghu, these local votes were characterized as "setbacks for the KMT," or even the "Ma administration's loss of power."
Based purely on the vote counts, the legislative seats, as well as the KMT's policy proposals, these inferences would be correct. But if one examines these two local votes at a deeper level, we may need to redefine victory and defeat.
Take the Yunlin legislative by-election. The by-election was necessary because the KMT candidate was declared ineligible following his conviction for bribery. KMT candidates in Yunlin must almost always accede to the demands of local factions. Toward the end of the Lee Teng-hui era, these local factions both depended on the KMT, and fed on the KMT. They have undergone very little change. Eventually they contributed to the downfall of the Lee Teng-hui regime, making it synonymous with "black gold." During the eight years since the change in ruling parties, some of these local factions have switched their allegiance to the DPP. Chiayi County has broken out of the stranglehold of these local factions. But most regions have changed little. They may be dependent on the KMT or independent candidates, but they are always making deals. These local political bosses are always hijacking the elections to maintain their local political and economic power base. Meanwhile, they eat away at the KMT. Yunlin County is a typical example. It is always Chang Jung-wei. It is always the Yunlin Irrigation Association. It is aways a case of "Meet my demands or I will back the DPP!" Chang Jung-wei definitely has power. His power, however, is always in the service of Chang Jung-wei. The Yunlin Irrigation Association is a local network cultivated by the KMT. But it is not that different from the Chang Jung-wei faction. For them, the KMT's raison d'etre is to ensure that the Chang Jung-wei faction or the Yunlin Irrigation Association does not fall.
These factions should change with the times in order to meet the needs of the people. They should establish clean government. If they were to do so, they would not constitute a problem. Unfortunately these local politicians who depend upon local factions for their survival, all play by the same old rules of the game. It makes no difference how well educated they may be, or how impressive their resume might look. Are the candidates unwilling to buy votes? No problem, the local political bosses who support them will do the buying for him. Is the candidate's son unwilling to buy votes? No problem, I'll buy votes for him. The local election system treats voters like idiots. Is it any wonder it suffered a defeat?
The Yunlin by-election has gained the DPP one more legislative seat. The impact of this one seat on the legislature is not that significant. The KMT still commands an overwhelming majority in the Legislative Yuan. The DPP is still a long way off from having enough seats to force a presidential recall. On the other hand, local factions now have the DPP in a stranglehold. The DPP would have been better off stiffening its resolve and declaring "honor before riches!" Ma Ying-jeou made just such a declaration during the controversy over the Hualien County party primaries. During the Yunlin County legislative by-election he demonstrated quiet determination, from beginning to end.
The Penghu referendum pertained to the legalization of gambling. Penghu's local politics are not as distinctive as Yunlin's. But neither is it that different. In the end, there is only the "King of Penghu." The local officials who surround the King of Penghu all sing the same tune. They want casinos. They began lobbying for casinos during the Lee Teng-hui era. During the eight year long Ah-Bian administration. these local politicians who depend upon the KMT, were miraculously able to gain the support of DPP heavyweights. Even former Vice President Annette Lu took the time out to make an inspection tour. But controversy over the casino has been too great. It has been repeatedly debated for over 10 years. But no one has been able to bring it to fruition.
President Ma Ying-jeou's campaign platform endorsed casinos in special districts on the outer islands, but only if local residents held a referendum. As with the Yunlin legislative by-election, Ma Ying-jeou remained silent from beginning to end. He allowed locals to make their own decisions. The King of Penghu had little chance to influence Ma Ying-jeou. Ma Ying-jeou expressed no opinions. KMT legislators' were also divided, and included both supporters and opponents. The legislature did not intervene in the referendum. It allowed local politics free reign. For the next three years at least, it will be unnecessary to waste energy debaing whether to build casinos on Penghu. Should other cities and counties should build casinos? Penghu County has established a precedent. A referendum is the easiest way to resolve disputes and achieve consensus.
The Kuomintang ruled on Taiwan for over half a century. Yet Black Gold brought this venerable party down overnight. The lesson is clear. The KMT has been back in power less than a year and a half. Yet the same special interests, the same outmoded ways of thinking are gradually re-emerging. The political calculations of local factions and party heads have never been based on deep convictions or high ideals. The results of the Yunlin County legislative by-election and the Penghu referendum have given the KMT a chance to re-examine their convictions and ideals, to recall the commitments they made back in 2008 in order to reclaim political power: integrity and reform.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.28
社論－國民黨擺脫派系羈絆 此其時矣
本報訊
選舉輸贏的定義是什麼？一席立委？還是在地方開辦一個國際賭場？九月廿六日這一天，雲林和澎湖，分別舉辦立委補選以及博弈公投，巧不巧，對人的選舉，國民黨分裂，讓民進黨提名者順利當選。至於對事的公投，出乎原先的預期，在反公投社運積極不放棄的宣揚下，開放博弈未能過關；又因為國民黨公職多支持澎湖開放博弈，這兩個地方性的選舉被界定為「國民黨的挫敗」，甚至是「馬政權的鬆動」。
如果單純從選舉得票數、國會席次以及國民黨政策主張而論，上述推論理所當然是對的。但是更深一層推究這兩地選舉的本質，輸贏的定義可能就得重新寫過。
以雲林立委補選來說，選舉的發端是因為國民黨參選人涉入賄選遭起訴判刑後，依法取消當選資格。國民黨參選人在雲林，幾乎從無例外必須妥協於地方派系的需求，從李登輝執政末期，這些依靠國民黨、卻又蠶食國民黨的地方派系，進步不大、幾無轉型，結果讓李登輝政權以「黑金」之名終結；八年政黨輪替，這些地方派系少數轉而靠攏民進黨，像嘉義縣，進而打破地方派系生態；但多數變化不大，不論是否依附國民黨，或以無黨籍之外，終究還是以派系協調、樁腳綁票的模式，維繫地方政商力量，同時，繼續啃食國民黨。雲林縣就是典型之一，永遠的張榮味、永遠的水利會、永遠擺不平就靠向民進黨，張榮味確有實力，他的實力卻永遠只為張派服務；水利會是國民黨培植的地方網絡，但和張派差別不大，對他們而言，國民黨存在的前提是：張派（或水利會）不倒。
如果派系能與時俱進，體會時代與人民需求，適應或重建一個乾淨的地方生態，派系不倒問題不大，偏偏這些依附於地方派系生存的政治人物，不論學歷有多高，經歷有多美，都得照著派系的規章辦事，候選人不買票？成，樁腳買；兒子不買票？好，老子買；拿地方民眾當白痴的競選文化，不敗才怪！
雲林補選讓民進黨多一席立委，這席立委於國會政黨生態影響不大，國民黨在立法院還是最大多數；民進黨席次距離所謂罷免總統，還很遙遠，與其一而再、再而三地被地方派系掐著脖子，不如鐵了心，「寧要清廉不要黑金！」馬英九在花蓮縣長黨內提名爭議中，曾經發過類似重語，雲林立委補選一役，從頭到尾他不加聞問，展現了他在沉默中的決心！
澎湖開放博弈則屬於事的公投，澎湖雖不至於像雲林地方生態如此壁壘分明，但差異沒這麼大，地方數來數去就是一位「澎湖王」，而圍繞在澎湖王身邊的地方公職口徑一致，要求設置賭場，早從李登輝時代就開始各路遊說，即使扁政府八年，這群依附於國民黨的地方人物，依舊神通廣大地取得民進黨重要人物的支持，連前副總統呂秀蓮都還煞有介事地考察過。但就因為賭場爭議過大，十多年來幾番討論，還是沒辦法付諸實現。
馬英九總統的競選政見雖然贊成離島設置博弈特區，但前提是要經過住民公投，與雲林立委補選一樣，馬英九從頭到尾並未再置一詞，完全放手讓地方人士自行裁奪，所謂的澎湖王，幾乎沒有在馬英九身上下工夫的空間；不但馬英九不多言，國民黨立委之間意見亦屬分歧，支持與反對者皆有之，國會亦未介入這次公投，讓地方公共事物有一個充分自主決擇的空間。至少未來三年，不必再費神費力在澎湖要不要設置賭場這件事上，至於其他縣市要不要設置賭場？有澎湖縣為前例，公投，就是一個最簡單化解爭議，取得最大共識的方法。
國民黨在台執政超過半世紀，「黑金」兩個字就能一夕整垮這個百年老黨，前車之鑑未遠，國民黨才拿回政權一年半不到，老勢力、舊思維，又逐漸顯現張牙舞爪之態；地方派系、政黨山頭背地裡撥打的算盤，從來不是信念和理想，雲林立委補選、澎湖公投的結果，正好給國民黨一個重新檢視信念和理想的機會，重回二○○八贏回政權之初衷：清廉、改革。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 28, 2009
What does winning or losing an election mean? A single legislative seat? Or whether casinos will be built in a particular electoral district? On September 26, Yunlin held legislative by-elections and Penghu held a referendum on whether to legalize gambling. As it turned out, the KMT vote was split in the legislative by-elections, allowing the DPP nominee to ease himself into office. The results of the referendum, on the other hand, were contrary to expectations. Social movements staunchly opposed to legalized gambling prevented passage of the the referenda. Because most KMT officials supported legalization of gambling in Penghu, these local votes were characterized as "setbacks for the KMT," or even the "Ma administration's loss of power."
Based purely on the vote counts, the legislative seats, as well as the KMT's policy proposals, these inferences would be correct. But if one examines these two local votes at a deeper level, we may need to redefine victory and defeat.
Take the Yunlin legislative by-election. The by-election was necessary because the KMT candidate was declared ineligible following his conviction for bribery. KMT candidates in Yunlin must almost always accede to the demands of local factions. Toward the end of the Lee Teng-hui era, these local factions both depended on the KMT, and fed on the KMT. They have undergone very little change. Eventually they contributed to the downfall of the Lee Teng-hui regime, making it synonymous with "black gold." During the eight years since the change in ruling parties, some of these local factions have switched their allegiance to the DPP. Chiayi County has broken out of the stranglehold of these local factions. But most regions have changed little. They may be dependent on the KMT or independent candidates, but they are always making deals. These local political bosses are always hijacking the elections to maintain their local political and economic power base. Meanwhile, they eat away at the KMT. Yunlin County is a typical example. It is always Chang Jung-wei. It is always the Yunlin Irrigation Association. It is aways a case of "Meet my demands or I will back the DPP!" Chang Jung-wei definitely has power. His power, however, is always in the service of Chang Jung-wei. The Yunlin Irrigation Association is a local network cultivated by the KMT. But it is not that different from the Chang Jung-wei faction. For them, the KMT's raison d'etre is to ensure that the Chang Jung-wei faction or the Yunlin Irrigation Association does not fall.
These factions should change with the times in order to meet the needs of the people. They should establish clean government. If they were to do so, they would not constitute a problem. Unfortunately these local politicians who depend upon local factions for their survival, all play by the same old rules of the game. It makes no difference how well educated they may be, or how impressive their resume might look. Are the candidates unwilling to buy votes? No problem, the local political bosses who support them will do the buying for him. Is the candidate's son unwilling to buy votes? No problem, I'll buy votes for him. The local election system treats voters like idiots. Is it any wonder it suffered a defeat?
The Yunlin by-election has gained the DPP one more legislative seat. The impact of this one seat on the legislature is not that significant. The KMT still commands an overwhelming majority in the Legislative Yuan. The DPP is still a long way off from having enough seats to force a presidential recall. On the other hand, local factions now have the DPP in a stranglehold. The DPP would have been better off stiffening its resolve and declaring "honor before riches!" Ma Ying-jeou made just such a declaration during the controversy over the Hualien County party primaries. During the Yunlin County legislative by-election he demonstrated quiet determination, from beginning to end.
The Penghu referendum pertained to the legalization of gambling. Penghu's local politics are not as distinctive as Yunlin's. But neither is it that different. In the end, there is only the "King of Penghu." The local officials who surround the King of Penghu all sing the same tune. They want casinos. They began lobbying for casinos during the Lee Teng-hui era. During the eight year long Ah-Bian administration. these local politicians who depend upon the KMT, were miraculously able to gain the support of DPP heavyweights. Even former Vice President Annette Lu took the time out to make an inspection tour. But controversy over the casino has been too great. It has been repeatedly debated for over 10 years. But no one has been able to bring it to fruition.
President Ma Ying-jeou's campaign platform endorsed casinos in special districts on the outer islands, but only if local residents held a referendum. As with the Yunlin legislative by-election, Ma Ying-jeou remained silent from beginning to end. He allowed locals to make their own decisions. The King of Penghu had little chance to influence Ma Ying-jeou. Ma Ying-jeou expressed no opinions. KMT legislators' were also divided, and included both supporters and opponents. The legislature did not intervene in the referendum. It allowed local politics free reign. For the next three years at least, it will be unnecessary to waste energy debaing whether to build casinos on Penghu. Should other cities and counties should build casinos? Penghu County has established a precedent. A referendum is the easiest way to resolve disputes and achieve consensus.
The Kuomintang ruled on Taiwan for over half a century. Yet Black Gold brought this venerable party down overnight. The lesson is clear. The KMT has been back in power less than a year and a half. Yet the same special interests, the same outmoded ways of thinking are gradually re-emerging. The political calculations of local factions and party heads have never been based on deep convictions or high ideals. The results of the Yunlin County legislative by-election and the Penghu referendum have given the KMT a chance to re-examine their convictions and ideals, to recall the commitments they made back in 2008 in order to reclaim political power: integrity and reform.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.28
社論－國民黨擺脫派系羈絆 此其時矣
本報訊
選舉輸贏的定義是什麼？一席立委？還是在地方開辦一個國際賭場？九月廿六日這一天，雲林和澎湖，分別舉辦立委補選以及博弈公投，巧不巧，對人的選舉，國民黨分裂，讓民進黨提名者順利當選。至於對事的公投，出乎原先的預期，在反公投社運積極不放棄的宣揚下，開放博弈未能過關；又因為國民黨公職多支持澎湖開放博弈，這兩個地方性的選舉被界定為「國民黨的挫敗」，甚至是「馬政權的鬆動」。
如果單純從選舉得票數、國會席次以及國民黨政策主張而論，上述推論理所當然是對的。但是更深一層推究這兩地選舉的本質，輸贏的定義可能就得重新寫過。
以雲林立委補選來說，選舉的發端是因為國民黨參選人涉入賄選遭起訴判刑後，依法取消當選資格。國民黨參選人在雲林，幾乎從無例外必須妥協於地方派系的需求，從李登輝執政末期，這些依靠國民黨、卻又蠶食國民黨的地方派系，進步不大、幾無轉型，結果讓李登輝政權以「黑金」之名終結；八年政黨輪替，這些地方派系少數轉而靠攏民進黨，像嘉義縣，進而打破地方派系生態；但多數變化不大，不論是否依附國民黨，或以無黨籍之外，終究還是以派系協調、樁腳綁票的模式，維繫地方政商力量，同時，繼續啃食國民黨。雲林縣就是典型之一，永遠的張榮味、永遠的水利會、永遠擺不平就靠向民進黨，張榮味確有實力，他的實力卻永遠只為張派服務；水利會是國民黨培植的地方網絡，但和張派差別不大，對他們而言，國民黨存在的前提是：張派（或水利會）不倒。
如果派系能與時俱進，體會時代與人民需求，適應或重建一個乾淨的地方生態，派系不倒問題不大，偏偏這些依附於地方派系生存的政治人物，不論學歷有多高，經歷有多美，都得照著派系的規章辦事，候選人不買票？成，樁腳買；兒子不買票？好，老子買；拿地方民眾當白痴的競選文化，不敗才怪！
雲林補選讓民進黨多一席立委，這席立委於國會政黨生態影響不大，國民黨在立法院還是最大多數；民進黨席次距離所謂罷免總統，還很遙遠，與其一而再、再而三地被地方派系掐著脖子，不如鐵了心，「寧要清廉不要黑金！」馬英九在花蓮縣長黨內提名爭議中，曾經發過類似重語，雲林立委補選一役，從頭到尾他不加聞問，展現了他在沉默中的決心！
澎湖開放博弈則屬於事的公投，澎湖雖不至於像雲林地方生態如此壁壘分明，但差異沒這麼大，地方數來數去就是一位「澎湖王」，而圍繞在澎湖王身邊的地方公職口徑一致，要求設置賭場，早從李登輝時代就開始各路遊說，即使扁政府八年，這群依附於國民黨的地方人物，依舊神通廣大地取得民進黨重要人物的支持，連前副總統呂秀蓮都還煞有介事地考察過。但就因為賭場爭議過大，十多年來幾番討論，還是沒辦法付諸實現。
馬英九總統的競選政見雖然贊成離島設置博弈特區，但前提是要經過住民公投，與雲林立委補選一樣，馬英九從頭到尾並未再置一詞，完全放手讓地方人士自行裁奪，所謂的澎湖王，幾乎沒有在馬英九身上下工夫的空間；不但馬英九不多言，國民黨立委之間意見亦屬分歧，支持與反對者皆有之，國會亦未介入這次公投，讓地方公共事物有一個充分自主決擇的空間。至少未來三年，不必再費神費力在澎湖要不要設置賭場這件事上，至於其他縣市要不要設置賭場？有澎湖縣為前例，公投，就是一個最簡單化解爭議，取得最大共識的方法。
國民黨在台執政超過半世紀，「黑金」兩個字就能一夕整垮這個百年老黨，前車之鑑未遠，國民黨才拿回政權一年半不到，老勢力、舊思維，又逐漸顯現張牙舞爪之態；地方派系、政黨山頭背地裡撥打的算盤，從來不是信念和理想，雲林立委補選、澎湖公投的結果，正好給國民黨一個重新檢視信念和理想的機會，重回二○○八贏回政權之初衷：清廉、改革。
Friday, September 25, 2009
In the National Interest: No Invitation to Kadeer
In the National Interest: No Invitation to Kadeer
WASHINGTON
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 25, 2009
The Green Camp recently invited the Dalai Lama, Tibetan spiritual leader, to visit Taiwan. Now it has extended an invitation to Xinjiang independence activist Rebiyah Kadeer. This time the invitation has nothing to do with humanitarianism. It has even less to do with religion. The Kaohsiung Film Festival is merely screening a documentary film on Rebiyah Kadeer. The invitation has provoked a backlash from the local Kaohsiung tourism industry. The Kaohsiung City Government responded by moving up the screening. Controversy has flared up, and the Green Camp is elated. The pro independence heavy metal band Chthonic visited Washington and invited Rebiyah Kadeer. Her visit is subject to the approval of the Ma administration. The Green Camp is watching to see how the Ma administration deals with this hot potato. They don't realize this hot potato is just like the Dalai Lama. It won't burn the Ma administration. It will only burn the DPP.
Rebiyah Kadeer is different from the Dalai Lama. Xinjiang's problems are different from Tibet's. Feverish Taiwan independence groups see the word "independence" and reflexively gave their approval. They have misunderstood the situation. They are harming the national interest. They are indulging in feel-good emotionalism, merely because of the word "independence." Their theatrics are futile and ignorant.
Kaohsiung City Mayor Chen Chu, eager to demonstrate her affinity with democracy, freedom, and human rights, made a special effort to see the Kadeer documentary ahead of time. After viewing the film, she said she and Kadeer were alike. According to the mainland, Kadeer did not come from a wealthy family. But thanks to reform and liberalization, a decade of struggle, and a special franchise granted by Beijing, she is now worth hundreds of millions of dollars. She is the richest woman in Xinjiang. Not only that, she was handpicked by the Beijing government and elected to the Eighth CPPCC National Committee. Apart from the fact that both Chen Chu and Rebiyah Kadeer both served time in prison, how is Chen Chu anything like Rebiyah Kadeer?
Not long ago, just before newly appointed Premier Wu Den-yih was interpolated in the Legislative Yuan, Green Camp legislators blasted Wu Den-yih for meeting with a "former CPPCC National Committee member." They accused Wu of colluding with Communists to sell out Taiwan. But isn't Kadeer a "former CPPCC National Committee member?" The Green Camp is cozying up to this life long beneficiary of Chinese Communist Party mentorship, and political and commercial sponsorship. Having benefitted, she is now biting the hand that fed her. In 1999 Kadeer was arrested for crimes against national security. In 2005 she was granted medical leave, and allowed to go to the United States. Before her departure, she promised "never again to participate in any activities that would endanger China's national security." But once she reached the United States, she plunged headlong into Xinjiang independence activities. In 2006 she was elected Chairman of the World Uyghur Congress. The World Uyghur Congress includes 20 East Turkistan separatist organizations in over 10 countries. It has engaged in terrorist attacks, and been identified as one of several terrorist organizations by Beijing. The 7/15 Incident and the recent needle attacks have provoked Beijing beyond its limits.
Taipei does not need to follow Beijing's lead. But neither does it need to deliberately invite Kadeer just in order to anger Beijing. The Dalai Lama spoke of love for peace. He has reiterated that he does not advocate Tibetan independence. He said he came to Taiwan solely to lead disaster victims in prayer. But why is Kadeer coming? What can she do for Taiwan? Preach Xinjiang independence? The intensity of the Xinjiang independence movement far exceeds anything the Green Camp can imagine. The Xinjiang independence movement sees independence for Xinjiang as a Jihad. Non-Muslim countries may not even assist or participate. But Xinjiang is not a region inhabited by only one ethnic group. It is true that Beijing has plans for Han Chinese to migrate to the region. But Xinjiang has long been home to Kazaks, Kirgiz, Kashgars and eight or nine other ethnic minorities. These ethnic minorities are scattered along Xinjiang's western border. They do not oppose the central government in Beijing. In fact they are responsible for garrisoning the Mainland Chinese border. The Xinjiang independence movement is based in southern Xinjiang, yet it often incites ethnic friction in northern Xinjiang. Is this really something pro-independence elements on Taiwan really want to see?
Green Camp organizations have Invited Kadeer. They hope the Ma administration will agree to her visit on the basis of "human rights." But if one wants to talk about human rights, why invite Rebiyah Kadeer? Why not invite pro-independence human rights icon Shih Ming-teh? After all, Shih was a "party outsider" and DPP Chairman who dedicated years of his life to human rights on Taiwan. The Green Camp has discarded its own human rights icon like an old pair of slippers. Instead it engages in Machiavellian calculation and underhanded political manipulation. It incites conflict within the community. It undermines cross-strait relations. But to what end? What is Taiwan to champions of Taiwan independence? Is it a land they can callously abuse?
When the Dalai Lama was about to visit Taiwan, the Presidential Office studied the matter for five or six hours, then gave its approval, on the basis of humanitarianism. It agreed on the basis of the welfare of the disaster victims. It followed through by treating religion as religion. It ensured that cross-Strait relations would not be damaged. Kadeer says she wants to visit Taiwan in December. The Ma administration has yet to express a position on the matter. It is over two months until December. Even if the Ma administration wants to drag its feet for two months before expressing an opinion, the Green Camp will not forsake this opportunity to play up the issue. It has demanded that the Executive Yuan provide an answer no later than Friday. Put bluntly, it wants Premier Wu to publicly respond during interpolation in the Legislative Yuan. It wants Wu to tell them whether the government dares to allow Kadeer to visit Taiwan? Is this hot potato hot? No it isn't!
Businessmen in Kaohsiung have risen in protest. They have demanded that the Kaohsiung City Government refrain from inciting controversy harmful to the local economy. So why is the Ma administration hesitating? The government must give priority to just one thing: the national interest. The Ma administration should come right out and tell the public that based on the national interest, it is not appropriate for Rebiyah Kadeer to visit Taiwan.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.25
社論－為國家利益 不宜讓熱比婭訪台
本報訊
繼邀訪西藏精神領袖達賴之後，綠營天外又飛來一筆，要邀請疆獨人士熱比婭訪台。這次既非關人道，更非關宗教，只不過是為了高雄影展安排播放熱比婭的紀錄片，引發在地觀光業者的反彈，高雄市政府改變方式提前播放。綠營見爭議而心喜，由閃靈樂團奔到華府力邀熱比婭，熱比婭能否來台，還是得看馬政府是否同意，綠營壁上觀看馬政府怎麼處理這個燙手山芋，全然不知，這個山芋和達賴一樣，燙不到馬政府，只會燙到民進黨。
熱比婭和達賴不同，新疆問題和西藏問題迥異，獨派團體一頭熱地見「獨」就貼，完全搞不清楚狀況，傷害國家利益，只為了「獨」給自己爽，不但無聊，甚且無知。
為了表明自己先行播放熱比婭紀錄片，無違民主、自由、人權價值的高雄市長陳菊，特別前往觀片，看完她說覺得熱比婭和她有點像，根據大陸方面的資料，熱比婭並非富裕家庭出身，但在改革開放後，經過十年拚搏，加上中共的特許，擁有數億身家，成為新疆女首富；非但如此，她還在中共的刻意培植下，當選第八屆全國政協委員。除了坐過牢，真不知陳菊到底覺得她與熱比婭哪一點像？
猶記不久前，新科行政院長吳敦義就任赴立法院總質詢前，綠委還舖天蓋地痛批吳敦義赴港見了「前政協委員」，質疑吳有通匪賣台之嫌，熱比婭不也是個「前政協委員」嗎？綠營熱臉貼上這位中共一路栽培的政商既得利益者，有何好得意忘形的？熱比婭在一九九九年因危害國家安全罪被捕；二○○五年她獲准保外就醫赴美，離境前，她的保證是「決不再參與危害中國國家安全的任何活動」，但她一到美國便投身疆獨活動，並在二○○六年當選世維會主席。世維會結合世界十多個國家廿多個東突分裂組織，並從事多起恐怖活動，是北京當局認定的恐怖組織之一。從七一五事件到最近依舊肇事不斷的刺針黨行動，都讓北京當局對熱比婭有著忍無可忍的憤怒。
台灣確實不必以北京馬首是瞻，但也沒必要純粹只為激怒北京而邀訪熱比婭吧？達賴說什麼終究還是以愛好和平為宗旨，多次申明不主張西藏獨立，遑論來台還是為了災民祈福；請問：熱比婭來台要幹啥？能幹啥？宣揚推動疆獨經驗？綠營難道不知道疆獨的激烈程度遠超過他們的想像，他們將爭取新疆獨立視同聖戰，甚至不容非回教國家協助或參與。但是，新疆不是單一民族區，除了中共有計畫移民實邊而遷入的漢人外，還有哈薩喀、吉爾吉斯、喀什喀爾等八、九個少數民族，這些少數民族，散居新疆西界，不但不挑戰北京中央，還為中共戍邊；此外，疆獨以南疆為大本營，卻常在北疆製造擾亂活動、族群衝突。這是獨派人士希望在台灣看到的景象嗎？
邀請熱比婭的綠營團體希望馬政府以「人權」理念，同意熱比婭訪台。如果要談人權，與其力邀熱比婭演講，為什麼不邀請曾經為黨外、民進黨、獨派奉獻畢生精華歲月的台灣人權指標人物、前民進黨主席施明德演講？綠營把自己的人權指標前輩棄之如蔽屣，卻在權謀算計下，搞政治小動作、製造社會內部爭議，激化兩岸關係，圖的到底是什麼？台灣，在獨派心目中，難道是一個隨便耍弄糟蹋的地方嗎？
達賴訪台，總統府高層會議五、六個小時研商後旋即拍板，決定在人道關懷、為災民祈福的立場上同意，後續處理上也維持宗教的歸宗教，讓兩岸關係不至因此受挫；熱比婭表達希望十二月來台的意願，馬政府到現在為止，並未對此做明確表示。距離十二月還有二個多月的時間，但即使馬政府想賴著、拖著，兩個月後再說，綠委也不會放過這個擴大爭議的機會，早早表明要行政院「最遲」在今（周五）日以前要給個答案。說穿了，就是要吳揆直接在立法院總質詢時公開答詢，政府敢不敢讓熱比婭訪台？這個山芋燙嗎？一點都不燙！
當高雄業者群起抗議要求市政府不要再製造不利民間經濟的爭端，馬政府還有什麼可猶豫的？政府必須優先考量只有一件事：國家利益。馬政府就應該直截了當告訴全民：基於國家利益，並不適宜讓熱比婭訪台。
WASHINGTON
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 25, 2009
The Green Camp recently invited the Dalai Lama, Tibetan spiritual leader, to visit Taiwan. Now it has extended an invitation to Xinjiang independence activist Rebiyah Kadeer. This time the invitation has nothing to do with humanitarianism. It has even less to do with religion. The Kaohsiung Film Festival is merely screening a documentary film on Rebiyah Kadeer. The invitation has provoked a backlash from the local Kaohsiung tourism industry. The Kaohsiung City Government responded by moving up the screening. Controversy has flared up, and the Green Camp is elated. The pro independence heavy metal band Chthonic visited Washington and invited Rebiyah Kadeer. Her visit is subject to the approval of the Ma administration. The Green Camp is watching to see how the Ma administration deals with this hot potato. They don't realize this hot potato is just like the Dalai Lama. It won't burn the Ma administration. It will only burn the DPP.
Rebiyah Kadeer is different from the Dalai Lama. Xinjiang's problems are different from Tibet's. Feverish Taiwan independence groups see the word "independence" and reflexively gave their approval. They have misunderstood the situation. They are harming the national interest. They are indulging in feel-good emotionalism, merely because of the word "independence." Their theatrics are futile and ignorant.
Kaohsiung City Mayor Chen Chu, eager to demonstrate her affinity with democracy, freedom, and human rights, made a special effort to see the Kadeer documentary ahead of time. After viewing the film, she said she and Kadeer were alike. According to the mainland, Kadeer did not come from a wealthy family. But thanks to reform and liberalization, a decade of struggle, and a special franchise granted by Beijing, she is now worth hundreds of millions of dollars. She is the richest woman in Xinjiang. Not only that, she was handpicked by the Beijing government and elected to the Eighth CPPCC National Committee. Apart from the fact that both Chen Chu and Rebiyah Kadeer both served time in prison, how is Chen Chu anything like Rebiyah Kadeer?
Not long ago, just before newly appointed Premier Wu Den-yih was interpolated in the Legislative Yuan, Green Camp legislators blasted Wu Den-yih for meeting with a "former CPPCC National Committee member." They accused Wu of colluding with Communists to sell out Taiwan. But isn't Kadeer a "former CPPCC National Committee member?" The Green Camp is cozying up to this life long beneficiary of Chinese Communist Party mentorship, and political and commercial sponsorship. Having benefitted, she is now biting the hand that fed her. In 1999 Kadeer was arrested for crimes against national security. In 2005 she was granted medical leave, and allowed to go to the United States. Before her departure, she promised "never again to participate in any activities that would endanger China's national security." But once she reached the United States, she plunged headlong into Xinjiang independence activities. In 2006 she was elected Chairman of the World Uyghur Congress. The World Uyghur Congress includes 20 East Turkistan separatist organizations in over 10 countries. It has engaged in terrorist attacks, and been identified as one of several terrorist organizations by Beijing. The 7/15 Incident and the recent needle attacks have provoked Beijing beyond its limits.
Taipei does not need to follow Beijing's lead. But neither does it need to deliberately invite Kadeer just in order to anger Beijing. The Dalai Lama spoke of love for peace. He has reiterated that he does not advocate Tibetan independence. He said he came to Taiwan solely to lead disaster victims in prayer. But why is Kadeer coming? What can she do for Taiwan? Preach Xinjiang independence? The intensity of the Xinjiang independence movement far exceeds anything the Green Camp can imagine. The Xinjiang independence movement sees independence for Xinjiang as a Jihad. Non-Muslim countries may not even assist or participate. But Xinjiang is not a region inhabited by only one ethnic group. It is true that Beijing has plans for Han Chinese to migrate to the region. But Xinjiang has long been home to Kazaks, Kirgiz, Kashgars and eight or nine other ethnic minorities. These ethnic minorities are scattered along Xinjiang's western border. They do not oppose the central government in Beijing. In fact they are responsible for garrisoning the Mainland Chinese border. The Xinjiang independence movement is based in southern Xinjiang, yet it often incites ethnic friction in northern Xinjiang. Is this really something pro-independence elements on Taiwan really want to see?
Green Camp organizations have Invited Kadeer. They hope the Ma administration will agree to her visit on the basis of "human rights." But if one wants to talk about human rights, why invite Rebiyah Kadeer? Why not invite pro-independence human rights icon Shih Ming-teh? After all, Shih was a "party outsider" and DPP Chairman who dedicated years of his life to human rights on Taiwan. The Green Camp has discarded its own human rights icon like an old pair of slippers. Instead it engages in Machiavellian calculation and underhanded political manipulation. It incites conflict within the community. It undermines cross-strait relations. But to what end? What is Taiwan to champions of Taiwan independence? Is it a land they can callously abuse?
When the Dalai Lama was about to visit Taiwan, the Presidential Office studied the matter for five or six hours, then gave its approval, on the basis of humanitarianism. It agreed on the basis of the welfare of the disaster victims. It followed through by treating religion as religion. It ensured that cross-Strait relations would not be damaged. Kadeer says she wants to visit Taiwan in December. The Ma administration has yet to express a position on the matter. It is over two months until December. Even if the Ma administration wants to drag its feet for two months before expressing an opinion, the Green Camp will not forsake this opportunity to play up the issue. It has demanded that the Executive Yuan provide an answer no later than Friday. Put bluntly, it wants Premier Wu to publicly respond during interpolation in the Legislative Yuan. It wants Wu to tell them whether the government dares to allow Kadeer to visit Taiwan? Is this hot potato hot? No it isn't!
Businessmen in Kaohsiung have risen in protest. They have demanded that the Kaohsiung City Government refrain from inciting controversy harmful to the local economy. So why is the Ma administration hesitating? The government must give priority to just one thing: the national interest. The Ma administration should come right out and tell the public that based on the national interest, it is not appropriate for Rebiyah Kadeer to visit Taiwan.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.25
社論－為國家利益 不宜讓熱比婭訪台
本報訊
繼邀訪西藏精神領袖達賴之後，綠營天外又飛來一筆，要邀請疆獨人士熱比婭訪台。這次既非關人道，更非關宗教，只不過是為了高雄影展安排播放熱比婭的紀錄片，引發在地觀光業者的反彈，高雄市政府改變方式提前播放。綠營見爭議而心喜，由閃靈樂團奔到華府力邀熱比婭，熱比婭能否來台，還是得看馬政府是否同意，綠營壁上觀看馬政府怎麼處理這個燙手山芋，全然不知，這個山芋和達賴一樣，燙不到馬政府，只會燙到民進黨。
熱比婭和達賴不同，新疆問題和西藏問題迥異，獨派團體一頭熱地見「獨」就貼，完全搞不清楚狀況，傷害國家利益，只為了「獨」給自己爽，不但無聊，甚且無知。
為了表明自己先行播放熱比婭紀錄片，無違民主、自由、人權價值的高雄市長陳菊，特別前往觀片，看完她說覺得熱比婭和她有點像，根據大陸方面的資料，熱比婭並非富裕家庭出身，但在改革開放後，經過十年拚搏，加上中共的特許，擁有數億身家，成為新疆女首富；非但如此，她還在中共的刻意培植下，當選第八屆全國政協委員。除了坐過牢，真不知陳菊到底覺得她與熱比婭哪一點像？
猶記不久前，新科行政院長吳敦義就任赴立法院總質詢前，綠委還舖天蓋地痛批吳敦義赴港見了「前政協委員」，質疑吳有通匪賣台之嫌，熱比婭不也是個「前政協委員」嗎？綠營熱臉貼上這位中共一路栽培的政商既得利益者，有何好得意忘形的？熱比婭在一九九九年因危害國家安全罪被捕；二○○五年她獲准保外就醫赴美，離境前，她的保證是「決不再參與危害中國國家安全的任何活動」，但她一到美國便投身疆獨活動，並在二○○六年當選世維會主席。世維會結合世界十多個國家廿多個東突分裂組織，並從事多起恐怖活動，是北京當局認定的恐怖組織之一。從七一五事件到最近依舊肇事不斷的刺針黨行動，都讓北京當局對熱比婭有著忍無可忍的憤怒。
台灣確實不必以北京馬首是瞻，但也沒必要純粹只為激怒北京而邀訪熱比婭吧？達賴說什麼終究還是以愛好和平為宗旨，多次申明不主張西藏獨立，遑論來台還是為了災民祈福；請問：熱比婭來台要幹啥？能幹啥？宣揚推動疆獨經驗？綠營難道不知道疆獨的激烈程度遠超過他們的想像，他們將爭取新疆獨立視同聖戰，甚至不容非回教國家協助或參與。但是，新疆不是單一民族區，除了中共有計畫移民實邊而遷入的漢人外，還有哈薩喀、吉爾吉斯、喀什喀爾等八、九個少數民族，這些少數民族，散居新疆西界，不但不挑戰北京中央，還為中共戍邊；此外，疆獨以南疆為大本營，卻常在北疆製造擾亂活動、族群衝突。這是獨派人士希望在台灣看到的景象嗎？
邀請熱比婭的綠營團體希望馬政府以「人權」理念，同意熱比婭訪台。如果要談人權，與其力邀熱比婭演講，為什麼不邀請曾經為黨外、民進黨、獨派奉獻畢生精華歲月的台灣人權指標人物、前民進黨主席施明德演講？綠營把自己的人權指標前輩棄之如蔽屣，卻在權謀算計下，搞政治小動作、製造社會內部爭議，激化兩岸關係，圖的到底是什麼？台灣，在獨派心目中，難道是一個隨便耍弄糟蹋的地方嗎？
達賴訪台，總統府高層會議五、六個小時研商後旋即拍板，決定在人道關懷、為災民祈福的立場上同意，後續處理上也維持宗教的歸宗教，讓兩岸關係不至因此受挫；熱比婭表達希望十二月來台的意願，馬政府到現在為止，並未對此做明確表示。距離十二月還有二個多月的時間，但即使馬政府想賴著、拖著，兩個月後再說，綠委也不會放過這個擴大爭議的機會，早早表明要行政院「最遲」在今（周五）日以前要給個答案。說穿了，就是要吳揆直接在立法院總質詢時公開答詢，政府敢不敢讓熱比婭訪台？這個山芋燙嗎？一點都不燙！
當高雄業者群起抗議要求市政府不要再製造不利民間經濟的爭端，馬政府還有什麼可猶豫的？政府必須優先考量只有一件事：國家利益。馬政府就應該直截了當告訴全民：基於國家利益，並不適宜讓熱比婭訪台。
Thursday, September 24, 2009
The Taiwan High Speed Rail Scandal: The Feelings of Ordinary Citizens
The Taiwan High Speed Rail Scandal: The Feelings of Ordinary Citizens
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 24, 2009
The Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation (THSRC) scandal has been the focus of recent public attention. According to the Control Yuan, over the past few years the Continental Engineering Corporation was awarded contracts worth 106.2 billion NT. The Evergreen Group was awarded contracts worth 76.4 billion NT. The Teco Group was awarded contracts worth 40 billion NT, and the Pacific Electric Wire and Cable Company was awarded contracts worth 30 billion NT. Assuming a 10 percent net profit, these projects have netted the original shareholders over 25 billion NT in profits. If we compare this figure to the amount these four original investors put in, they have already earned more than enough. Now that these original shareholders have earned more than their share, they want out. They have even affected an injured air. Their behavior is totally unacceptable. If we think of the THSRC scandal as a marriage, then the government was the father of the bride, one who saw dollar signs. This encouraged him to give his daughter to Continental Engineering Corporation. Now the THSRC's assets have become liabilities, and the daughter's honor has been compromised. Does the government really bear no responsibility?
The THSRC project has enabled the original shareholders to make a killing, then palm the losses off on the taxpayers. It has set a black-hearted precedent for future entrepreneurs to emulate. Businesses usually empty their coffers through an averaging process. Let's say that someone controls a conglomerate that includes Company A and Company B. He has total control over Company A, but less control over Company A's cash flow. He has greater control over Company B's cash flow. He assigns the profitable functions to Company A, and the unprofitable functions to Company B. When the profits from the two companies are averaged out, he makes a killing in Company A, and suffers minor losses in Company B. The conglomerate as a whole suffer losses, but he lines his own pockets. The law states that when someone hollows out a conglomerate in such a manner, he is guilty of breach of trust.
The major shareholders of the THSRC used a different method to cheat shareholders. First the original shareholders assigned the profitable operation to themselves. They lined their own pockets. Then they dumped the unprofitable operations on the government, forcing it to clean up their mess. The government has no choice but to take it over. In the end of course, the taxpayers are the ones who must pay through the nose. Some observers have characterized the THSRC as a meticulous plan to empty out the public coffers. These observers may only be speculating. But the evidence suggests their speculations are not groundless. Let us examine the evidence, one piece at a time.
First, when the THSRC bid on the project, it promised that "the government would not have to put up one cent, but would earn hundreds of billons in profits." Now it appears that promise was empty talk. Should the government allow iself to be played for a fool? Secondly, the promises made during its tender offer never became a binding part of the original shareholders' contract. Why not? Third, why did the original shareholders refuse to contribute to the numerous capital injections that followed? Were they truly committed to the marriage? Fourth, why are independent bank groups unwilling to make capital injections? Are they pessimistic about the company's future? Fifthly, all subsequent capital injections were made by quasi-public enterprises such as the Aviation Development Fund and the China Technical Consultants, Wasn't this a violation of the promise that "the government would not have to put up one cent?" Sixth, why has ridership fallen so short of the original estimates? Do the original shareholders really bear no responsibility? Seventh, it is a simple matter for a company calculate how much it must borrow to pay off the interest on its loans. Was the THSRC really unaware of how burdensome these interest payments would be?
Many doubts have surfaced. But most of these doubts were raised long ago. The Continental Engineering Corporation promised that the "government would not have to put up one cent, but would earn hundreds of billons in profits." Many expressed doubts. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications is now tearing its hair out in search of a way out. But observers are pessimistic. Intuitively speaking, if the THSRC still had a chance to make money, the original shareholders, foxy as they are, would be taking the lead, hope to rake in huge profits. The reason they are cashing in their chips and allowing the government to intervene, is that they consider the THSRC beyond hope. They have already milked the project for all it is worth. When the foxes abandon the corpse, can government officials really bring it back to life?
The government has been conned. It must now clean up the mess and ensure accountability. Cleaning up the mess means rethinking transportation policy and the public interest. Ensuring accountability means considering the feelings of ordinary citizens, not allowing con artists to get off scot-free. Ensuring responsibility must not be limited to punishing incompetent civil servants. Even more importantly, it means prosecuting those guilty of crimes such as breach of trust, embezzlement, and providing officials with false information. Sun Tao-chun owed less than 300 million in back taxes. Yet society denounced him mercilessly. Meanwhile the THSRC has left behind hundreds of billions in debt. Can it really be treated more leniently? Sun brought down the family business his father left him. The THSRC, on the other hand, undercut the credibility of the Republic of China government, and cheated millions of taxpayers out of their hard-earned money. It should be abundantly clear which is the more serious offense. Premier Wu is focusing his attention on the economic plight of the average citizen. Perhaps it's time he expressed concern over the average citizens' feelings about the THSRC scandal.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.24
面對高鐵爭議的幾點庶民感受
本報訊
台灣高鐵公司的案子最近顯然是輿論的焦點。依監察院的資料顯示，過去數年大陸工程承包了一○六二億工程，長榮集團承包七六四億，而東元電機與太電集團亦分別包到四百多億與三百多億。如果以百分之十的淨利粗估，這些工程至少也給幾家原始股東賺到了兩百五十餘億。這個數字較之於前述四家原始出資者的金額，其實已經綽綽有餘。高鐵幾位原始股東在賺飽之際宣稱要走人，還一副受盡委屈的表情，確實讓人難以接受。以婚嫁打個比方：政府當年就是看到原始股東誘人的回饋禮金，才把工程「嫁給」大陸集團。如今，聘金變負債、女兒也被人糟蹋了，當初騙婚的人難道就沒事了嗎？
像台灣高鐵公司這樣「先讓大股東賺飽，再讓全社會埋單」的事件，也算給經營企業者，樹立了一個黑心案例。一般企業掏空通常是水平式的：某甲所控之企業集團有Ａ、Ｂ兩家公司，甲皆有絕對的控制權；但甲在Ａ公司現金流量權較小，在Ｂ公司現金流量權較大，於是就把賺錢的生意交給Ａ公司做，但虧本生意則丟給Ｂ。兩相加減，某甲大賺Ａ而小賠Ｂ，結果是企業集團可能虧損，但某甲口袋滿滿。在法律上，這是某甲對企業集團的掏空與背信行為。
但台灣高鐵的營運模式與一般的水平掏空不同，是循時間垂直式的。高鐵原始股東「先將」賺錢的生意由自己承擔，將口袋塞滿鈔票；「然後」再將虧錢的營運留給政府承接爛攤子。後面不得不接收的政府顯然是有口難言，而最後承擔苦果的，當然還是全體納稅人。外界將高鐵今天的爛攤子描述成一個設計精良的掏空計畫，雖然是個假說，但是，支持這項假說的背後證據，卻一點都不模糊。且讓我們一項一項拿出來檢視。
第一，當年高鐵公司投標時「政府零出資、千億回饋金」的承諾，現在看起來簡直是空話。台灣政府該這樣被人耍弄嗎？第二，當年投標的承諾，事後竟然沒有辦法成為約束原始股東的契約內容，這是為什麼？第三，為什麼高鐵原始股東事後多次增資自己都置身事外？是否凸顯出自己對未來婚姻的心虛？第四，為什麼各獨立銀行團後來皆不願增資，是否表示他們也對未來不樂觀？第五，如果幾次重要的增資都是由航發會、中技社等泛公營機構奉命投入，這難道沒有實質違反「政府零出資」的承諾？第六，為什麼當初預估的乘載量與現在會差那麼多？難道原始股東都沒有責任？第七，一家公司借錢所負擔的利息預估，其實是非常簡單的財務分析。為什麼事前竟然無法預見今日的沉重利息負擔？
以上這麼多疑點，其實不是今天才有人提起，而是早在大陸工程提出「政府零出資、回饋一千億」時，民間就或多或少、陸陸續續地開始質疑。交通部現在正為這些坑坑洞洞煩惱，希望能找出一條生路，但外界咸感悲觀。直觀而言，如果高鐵未來確實還有賺錢的機會，那麼這一群比狐狸還精的原始股東，當然會身先士卒，自己去享受果實。他們之所以兩手一攤，讓政府插手救援，大概一則表示高鐵未來營運病入膏肓，二則表示他們獲利的「階段性任務」已經完成。當狐狸們撒手棄屍時，政府公務員還能扮大羅金仙嗎？
面對這樣一個騙婚疑案，我們認為政府必須同時在「善後」與「究責」兩方面雙管齊下。善後是交通政策與民生福祉的考量，而究責則是照顧庶民情感、不讓騙婚者置身事外。我們所謂究責，倒不只是侷限於懲處公務人員的顢頇無能，而更要著重此事可能涉及的背信、掏空與使公務員為不實登載等種種不法。孫道存欠稅不到三億，就被社會Ｋ到不行，但台灣高鐵背後卻是千億的大窟窿，豈能小覷？孫氏搞垮的是他父親留下來的家業，但台灣高鐵卻是糟蹋了台灣政府的ＢＯＴ威信與人民的納稅錢。兩相比較，孰輕孰重應是清楚分明。吳院長既然注重庶民經濟，是不是也該關切一下庶民的感覺呢？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 24, 2009
The Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation (THSRC) scandal has been the focus of recent public attention. According to the Control Yuan, over the past few years the Continental Engineering Corporation was awarded contracts worth 106.2 billion NT. The Evergreen Group was awarded contracts worth 76.4 billion NT. The Teco Group was awarded contracts worth 40 billion NT, and the Pacific Electric Wire and Cable Company was awarded contracts worth 30 billion NT. Assuming a 10 percent net profit, these projects have netted the original shareholders over 25 billion NT in profits. If we compare this figure to the amount these four original investors put in, they have already earned more than enough. Now that these original shareholders have earned more than their share, they want out. They have even affected an injured air. Their behavior is totally unacceptable. If we think of the THSRC scandal as a marriage, then the government was the father of the bride, one who saw dollar signs. This encouraged him to give his daughter to Continental Engineering Corporation. Now the THSRC's assets have become liabilities, and the daughter's honor has been compromised. Does the government really bear no responsibility?
The THSRC project has enabled the original shareholders to make a killing, then palm the losses off on the taxpayers. It has set a black-hearted precedent for future entrepreneurs to emulate. Businesses usually empty their coffers through an averaging process. Let's say that someone controls a conglomerate that includes Company A and Company B. He has total control over Company A, but less control over Company A's cash flow. He has greater control over Company B's cash flow. He assigns the profitable functions to Company A, and the unprofitable functions to Company B. When the profits from the two companies are averaged out, he makes a killing in Company A, and suffers minor losses in Company B. The conglomerate as a whole suffer losses, but he lines his own pockets. The law states that when someone hollows out a conglomerate in such a manner, he is guilty of breach of trust.
The major shareholders of the THSRC used a different method to cheat shareholders. First the original shareholders assigned the profitable operation to themselves. They lined their own pockets. Then they dumped the unprofitable operations on the government, forcing it to clean up their mess. The government has no choice but to take it over. In the end of course, the taxpayers are the ones who must pay through the nose. Some observers have characterized the THSRC as a meticulous plan to empty out the public coffers. These observers may only be speculating. But the evidence suggests their speculations are not groundless. Let us examine the evidence, one piece at a time.
First, when the THSRC bid on the project, it promised that "the government would not have to put up one cent, but would earn hundreds of billons in profits." Now it appears that promise was empty talk. Should the government allow iself to be played for a fool? Secondly, the promises made during its tender offer never became a binding part of the original shareholders' contract. Why not? Third, why did the original shareholders refuse to contribute to the numerous capital injections that followed? Were they truly committed to the marriage? Fourth, why are independent bank groups unwilling to make capital injections? Are they pessimistic about the company's future? Fifthly, all subsequent capital injections were made by quasi-public enterprises such as the Aviation Development Fund and the China Technical Consultants, Wasn't this a violation of the promise that "the government would not have to put up one cent?" Sixth, why has ridership fallen so short of the original estimates? Do the original shareholders really bear no responsibility? Seventh, it is a simple matter for a company calculate how much it must borrow to pay off the interest on its loans. Was the THSRC really unaware of how burdensome these interest payments would be?
Many doubts have surfaced. But most of these doubts were raised long ago. The Continental Engineering Corporation promised that the "government would not have to put up one cent, but would earn hundreds of billons in profits." Many expressed doubts. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications is now tearing its hair out in search of a way out. But observers are pessimistic. Intuitively speaking, if the THSRC still had a chance to make money, the original shareholders, foxy as they are, would be taking the lead, hope to rake in huge profits. The reason they are cashing in their chips and allowing the government to intervene, is that they consider the THSRC beyond hope. They have already milked the project for all it is worth. When the foxes abandon the corpse, can government officials really bring it back to life?
The government has been conned. It must now clean up the mess and ensure accountability. Cleaning up the mess means rethinking transportation policy and the public interest. Ensuring accountability means considering the feelings of ordinary citizens, not allowing con artists to get off scot-free. Ensuring responsibility must not be limited to punishing incompetent civil servants. Even more importantly, it means prosecuting those guilty of crimes such as breach of trust, embezzlement, and providing officials with false information. Sun Tao-chun owed less than 300 million in back taxes. Yet society denounced him mercilessly. Meanwhile the THSRC has left behind hundreds of billions in debt. Can it really be treated more leniently? Sun brought down the family business his father left him. The THSRC, on the other hand, undercut the credibility of the Republic of China government, and cheated millions of taxpayers out of their hard-earned money. It should be abundantly clear which is the more serious offense. Premier Wu is focusing his attention on the economic plight of the average citizen. Perhaps it's time he expressed concern over the average citizens' feelings about the THSRC scandal.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.24
面對高鐵爭議的幾點庶民感受
本報訊
台灣高鐵公司的案子最近顯然是輿論的焦點。依監察院的資料顯示，過去數年大陸工程承包了一○六二億工程，長榮集團承包七六四億，而東元電機與太電集團亦分別包到四百多億與三百多億。如果以百分之十的淨利粗估，這些工程至少也給幾家原始股東賺到了兩百五十餘億。這個數字較之於前述四家原始出資者的金額，其實已經綽綽有餘。高鐵幾位原始股東在賺飽之際宣稱要走人，還一副受盡委屈的表情，確實讓人難以接受。以婚嫁打個比方：政府當年就是看到原始股東誘人的回饋禮金，才把工程「嫁給」大陸集團。如今，聘金變負債、女兒也被人糟蹋了，當初騙婚的人難道就沒事了嗎？
像台灣高鐵公司這樣「先讓大股東賺飽，再讓全社會埋單」的事件，也算給經營企業者，樹立了一個黑心案例。一般企業掏空通常是水平式的：某甲所控之企業集團有Ａ、Ｂ兩家公司，甲皆有絕對的控制權；但甲在Ａ公司現金流量權較小，在Ｂ公司現金流量權較大，於是就把賺錢的生意交給Ａ公司做，但虧本生意則丟給Ｂ。兩相加減，某甲大賺Ａ而小賠Ｂ，結果是企業集團可能虧損，但某甲口袋滿滿。在法律上，這是某甲對企業集團的掏空與背信行為。
但台灣高鐵的營運模式與一般的水平掏空不同，是循時間垂直式的。高鐵原始股東「先將」賺錢的生意由自己承擔，將口袋塞滿鈔票；「然後」再將虧錢的營運留給政府承接爛攤子。後面不得不接收的政府顯然是有口難言，而最後承擔苦果的，當然還是全體納稅人。外界將高鐵今天的爛攤子描述成一個設計精良的掏空計畫，雖然是個假說，但是，支持這項假說的背後證據，卻一點都不模糊。且讓我們一項一項拿出來檢視。
第一，當年高鐵公司投標時「政府零出資、千億回饋金」的承諾，現在看起來簡直是空話。台灣政府該這樣被人耍弄嗎？第二，當年投標的承諾，事後竟然沒有辦法成為約束原始股東的契約內容，這是為什麼？第三，為什麼高鐵原始股東事後多次增資自己都置身事外？是否凸顯出自己對未來婚姻的心虛？第四，為什麼各獨立銀行團後來皆不願增資，是否表示他們也對未來不樂觀？第五，如果幾次重要的增資都是由航發會、中技社等泛公營機構奉命投入，這難道沒有實質違反「政府零出資」的承諾？第六，為什麼當初預估的乘載量與現在會差那麼多？難道原始股東都沒有責任？第七，一家公司借錢所負擔的利息預估，其實是非常簡單的財務分析。為什麼事前竟然無法預見今日的沉重利息負擔？
以上這麼多疑點，其實不是今天才有人提起，而是早在大陸工程提出「政府零出資、回饋一千億」時，民間就或多或少、陸陸續續地開始質疑。交通部現在正為這些坑坑洞洞煩惱，希望能找出一條生路，但外界咸感悲觀。直觀而言，如果高鐵未來確實還有賺錢的機會，那麼這一群比狐狸還精的原始股東，當然會身先士卒，自己去享受果實。他們之所以兩手一攤，讓政府插手救援，大概一則表示高鐵未來營運病入膏肓，二則表示他們獲利的「階段性任務」已經完成。當狐狸們撒手棄屍時，政府公務員還能扮大羅金仙嗎？
面對這樣一個騙婚疑案，我們認為政府必須同時在「善後」與「究責」兩方面雙管齊下。善後是交通政策與民生福祉的考量，而究責則是照顧庶民情感、不讓騙婚者置身事外。我們所謂究責，倒不只是侷限於懲處公務人員的顢頇無能，而更要著重此事可能涉及的背信、掏空與使公務員為不實登載等種種不法。孫道存欠稅不到三億，就被社會Ｋ到不行，但台灣高鐵背後卻是千億的大窟窿，豈能小覷？孫氏搞垮的是他父親留下來的家業，但台灣高鐵卻是糟蹋了台灣政府的ＢＯＴ威信與人民的納稅錢。兩相比較，孰輕孰重應是清楚分明。吳院長既然注重庶民經濟，是不是也該關切一下庶民的感覺呢？
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
Taiwan High Speed Rail: Opportunities and Challenges During Transition
Taiwan High Speed Rail: Opportunities and Challenges During Transition
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 23, 2009
The Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation (THSR) has been in business less than three years. But it is already in dire financial straits, and carrying as much as 400 billion NT in debt. The government has intervened and mediated between its five original shareholders. Yesterday it called a special board meeting and accepted Chairman Nita Ing's resignation. A special shareholders' meeting is scheduled for November 10. The board of directors will be restructured. Quasi-official publicly-owned shares represent over half the board seats. That means the government will in effect be taking over the THSR.
As the public is well aware, the Taiwan High Speed Rail system is the largest BOT (Build, Operate, Transfer) project in Taiwan's history. According to the original specifications, the winning bidder would acquire a 50-year franchise. Upon expiration, the system would be unconditionally transferred to the government. But plans are plans, and reality is reality. During the "B" stage, the Taiwan High Speed Rail system ran into trouble, and was completed with great difficulty. Less than three years into the "O" stage, it has already amassed losses amounting to two-thirds of its investment. Its prospects are dim. The five original shareholders refuse to increase their investment. Therefore the government has ordered China Steel, Taisugar, the China Aviation Development Foundation and other government-led private companies, to provide capital injections, assistance, and loan guarantees. Operating losses remain high. If the existing management team does not wash its hands of the project, if it does not unilaterally terminate its contracts, the government must clean up the mess and assume over 400 billion NT in debt. Legal disputes may arise between public and private shareholders. The Taiwan High Speed Rail system may be forced to shut down. To avoid such a lose-lose situation, the parties are undergoing mediation. The Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation will shorten the "O" stage and initiate the "T" stage ahead of schedule. This is probably the lesser of two evils.
The Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation franchise will be turned over to the government. This means the myth of "BOT" has been shattered. The agencies in charge of the takeover must ensure that the Taiwan High Speed Rail system continues to operate without interruption. They must improve the Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation's financial structure, enabling it to remain in operation indefinitely. Improving its financial structure means coping with over 400 billion NT in debt. It means raising enough capital to ensure its successful daily operation. The most direct method is capital reduction, capital injection, or assumption of the losses incurred by the publicly-owned shares. Such an approach will inevitably be criticized for using public funds to service the debt for the original shareholders. In the current atmosphere it is infeasible. Therefore Minister of Transportation and Communications Mao Chi-kuo has made it clear that the government takeover of the Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation will adhere to a "Three Noes Policy." The government "will not purchase, will not increase its investment, and will not convert its preferred shares."
In which case relieving the Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation's financial crisis will require the government to come forward and negotiate a new set of bank loans. Given current low interest rates, the THSR can use the new loans to pay off its old debts, thereby reducing its interest payments. Another approach is to extend the life of THSR capital depreciation and amortization. The THSR has been working toward these two approaches over the past year. So why are they dead ends? Because the banks are not optimistic about the financial prospects of private sector companies operating the THSR. They are reluctant to lower lending interest rates because they fear reduced income. As for extending the life of THSR capital depreciation and amortization, the base period was originally calculated on the basis of franchise operations. Naturally, officials cannot lightly agree to extending this period. If the THSR degenerates into an outright SOE, but co-ordinates its policies with public sector banks and the Ministry of Transportation, we can expect new loans and an extension of the life of THSR depreciation and amortization. This would alleviate the financial burden on THSR.
If the THSR becomes "quasi-public," it may benefit in these two areas. But to truly solve the problem of huge debts, or even achieve a surplus, it must increase profits and reduce losses. The THSR was under severe financial constraints from its very inception. But from the point of view of "commoners," its senior executive salaries are "fat cat" salaries. The board will be restructured. Operations will begin anew. The new management team must tell us how it intends to control personnel costs.
How will it increase capacity in order to increase revenue? A fare increase is clearly necessary. In this regard, new companies actually have a better chance than old companies. The domestic customer base will develop new travel habits. The establishment of Three Links will bring tourists and businessmen. This new management team must develop these customer sources. The quality of service of course must not be compromised.
Another way to increase revenue is to develop the areas around THSR stations. The original estimates for development of the areas around THSR stations were too optimistic. Future success remains dependent upon the fate of the local economy. The ownership of the land around THSR stations must be clarified. THSR operations are not the same as land development. Will the new management team be able to cope?
The myth that the THSR project would be BOT, therefore would not need government funding, has been shattered. The government however deserves credit for intervening before the situation became untenable. The new Taiwan High Speed Rail will be both publicly and privately operated. How will it escape its predicament? That will be its severest test.
中時電子報 新聞
工商時報 2009.09.23
社論－高鐵轉型轉運的契機與挑戰
本報訊
正式營運還不到3年的台灣高鐵，由於揹負高達4千多億元債務，經營陷入困境。經由政府出面與民間五大原始股東溝通協調，於昨天召開臨時董事會，接受董事長殷琪提出的請辭案，預計於11月10日召開股東臨時會，改組董事會，由泛官股代表掌握過半董事席位，正式代表政府「接管」高鐵。
眾所周知，台灣高鐵是我國歷來規模最大的BOT案，依照當初官方開出的規格，得標者將可取得50年的特許經營權，期限屆滿後則無條件移轉回歸給政府。但是規劃不敵現實，高鐵在「B」（興建）的階段固然是幾經波折，才勉強建造完成，而進入「O」（營運）的階段才不到3年，就已經虧損掉實收資本額的三分之二。眼見錢景無亮，五大原始股東拒絕再增資，反而迫使政府必須動員中鋼、台糖、航發會等官方主導的民間企業陸續參加認股注資，以及一再協助、擔保銀行團的聯貸。而今因為營運虧損迄未見改善，現有經營團隊如果撒手不管，或者宣告片面終止合約，則政府不但要承受高鐵所遺逾4,000億債務的爛攤子，還可能因官民之間的法律糾紛，導致高鐵營運停擺。因此為避免出現前述雙輸的局面，經由協商，高鐵公司縮短「O」的期程，提前「T」（移轉）給政府，其實應算是兩害相權下較佳的選擇了。
未來高鐵經營權的由民轉官，意謂著「BOT」神話的幻滅。接手的政府部門，除了要確保高鐵能夠不中斷地持續營運之外，當務之急則是要改善高鐵的財務結構，使其得以繼續營運下去。談到財務結構的改善，包括如何面對逾4,000億的債務，以及籌措足夠的資金使得高鐵日常營運能夠週轉得來，最直截了當的方式應該是透過減資、增資，或由政府官股認列財損。但這樣的做法，無可避免會被批評是以公帑幫原始股東償債，在當前的氛圍下並不可行。因此交通部長毛治國也明言政府介入接管高鐵，將依循「不收買、不增資、特別股不轉換」的所謂三不政策。
如是，則化解高鐵財務燃眉之急的做法，就是經由政府出面擔保，協調銀行團訂定新的聯貸案，依當前的低利率水平，讓高鐵可以借新還舊，減輕利息支出。另外一個做法，則是調整、延長高鐵資本折舊攤提年限。而前述這兩種做法，事實上也正是高鐵公司這一年來努力以赴的目標。至於為什麼走不通，關鍵在於銀行團對民營的高鐵公司營運前景不看好，以及不願因降低貸款利率而減少收入。至於延長折舊攤提年限，當初的計算基期是以特許營運年限為準，官方自然也不敢輕言同意更改延長。而今如果高鐵變質為實質公營，則以公營為主的銀行團和交通部配合政策，自然可望通過新聯貸案，以及延長折舊攤提年限，對減輕高鐵的財務負擔，自然有所裨益。
高鐵轉型為「準公營」之後，固然可望獲得前述兩方面的便利，但真要徹底解決龐大債務，甚至轉虧為盈，則在營運上如何開源節流，顯然還得再加把勁。以言節流，高鐵公司雖然從成立以來財務預估就很拮据，但是公司高級主管的薪資標準從「庶民」的角度來看，卻形同是養了一群「肥貓」。未來董事會改組，營運再出發，如何合理管控人事成本，新經營團隊自然不能沒有回應。
其次在開源方面，如何提升載客量以增加營收，顯然比提高票價更值得推動。就此而言，新公司其實比舊公司有較佳的機會，包括國內客群搭乘習慣的建立與深化，更包括兩岸大三通後帶來的觀光客源與商務客源，這部分自然是新經營團隊必須努力推動開發的。而其前提則是服務的品質不能打折扣。
另外一個開源之道則是加強站區的開發。關於站區開發，當初的預估於今看來未免樂觀，未來的成敗則相當程度取決於台灣經濟的榮枯，但有待釐清的則是站區土地所有權的歸屬，以及高鐵營運與土地開發專案不同，新經營團隊是否有此能耐兼顧。
高鐵BOT政府免出資的神話的確已經幻滅，不過政府選在情勢還不是完全不可為的時候進場，仍然值得肯定。新的台灣高鐵如何官民共治，走出困境，無疑是值得期待的嚴峻考驗。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 23, 2009
The Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation (THSR) has been in business less than three years. But it is already in dire financial straits, and carrying as much as 400 billion NT in debt. The government has intervened and mediated between its five original shareholders. Yesterday it called a special board meeting and accepted Chairman Nita Ing's resignation. A special shareholders' meeting is scheduled for November 10. The board of directors will be restructured. Quasi-official publicly-owned shares represent over half the board seats. That means the government will in effect be taking over the THSR.
As the public is well aware, the Taiwan High Speed Rail system is the largest BOT (Build, Operate, Transfer) project in Taiwan's history. According to the original specifications, the winning bidder would acquire a 50-year franchise. Upon expiration, the system would be unconditionally transferred to the government. But plans are plans, and reality is reality. During the "B" stage, the Taiwan High Speed Rail system ran into trouble, and was completed with great difficulty. Less than three years into the "O" stage, it has already amassed losses amounting to two-thirds of its investment. Its prospects are dim. The five original shareholders refuse to increase their investment. Therefore the government has ordered China Steel, Taisugar, the China Aviation Development Foundation and other government-led private companies, to provide capital injections, assistance, and loan guarantees. Operating losses remain high. If the existing management team does not wash its hands of the project, if it does not unilaterally terminate its contracts, the government must clean up the mess and assume over 400 billion NT in debt. Legal disputes may arise between public and private shareholders. The Taiwan High Speed Rail system may be forced to shut down. To avoid such a lose-lose situation, the parties are undergoing mediation. The Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation will shorten the "O" stage and initiate the "T" stage ahead of schedule. This is probably the lesser of two evils.
The Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation franchise will be turned over to the government. This means the myth of "BOT" has been shattered. The agencies in charge of the takeover must ensure that the Taiwan High Speed Rail system continues to operate without interruption. They must improve the Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation's financial structure, enabling it to remain in operation indefinitely. Improving its financial structure means coping with over 400 billion NT in debt. It means raising enough capital to ensure its successful daily operation. The most direct method is capital reduction, capital injection, or assumption of the losses incurred by the publicly-owned shares. Such an approach will inevitably be criticized for using public funds to service the debt for the original shareholders. In the current atmosphere it is infeasible. Therefore Minister of Transportation and Communications Mao Chi-kuo has made it clear that the government takeover of the Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation will adhere to a "Three Noes Policy." The government "will not purchase, will not increase its investment, and will not convert its preferred shares."
In which case relieving the Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation's financial crisis will require the government to come forward and negotiate a new set of bank loans. Given current low interest rates, the THSR can use the new loans to pay off its old debts, thereby reducing its interest payments. Another approach is to extend the life of THSR capital depreciation and amortization. The THSR has been working toward these two approaches over the past year. So why are they dead ends? Because the banks are not optimistic about the financial prospects of private sector companies operating the THSR. They are reluctant to lower lending interest rates because they fear reduced income. As for extending the life of THSR capital depreciation and amortization, the base period was originally calculated on the basis of franchise operations. Naturally, officials cannot lightly agree to extending this period. If the THSR degenerates into an outright SOE, but co-ordinates its policies with public sector banks and the Ministry of Transportation, we can expect new loans and an extension of the life of THSR depreciation and amortization. This would alleviate the financial burden on THSR.
If the THSR becomes "quasi-public," it may benefit in these two areas. But to truly solve the problem of huge debts, or even achieve a surplus, it must increase profits and reduce losses. The THSR was under severe financial constraints from its very inception. But from the point of view of "commoners," its senior executive salaries are "fat cat" salaries. The board will be restructured. Operations will begin anew. The new management team must tell us how it intends to control personnel costs.
How will it increase capacity in order to increase revenue? A fare increase is clearly necessary. In this regard, new companies actually have a better chance than old companies. The domestic customer base will develop new travel habits. The establishment of Three Links will bring tourists and businessmen. This new management team must develop these customer sources. The quality of service of course must not be compromised.
Another way to increase revenue is to develop the areas around THSR stations. The original estimates for development of the areas around THSR stations were too optimistic. Future success remains dependent upon the fate of the local economy. The ownership of the land around THSR stations must be clarified. THSR operations are not the same as land development. Will the new management team be able to cope?
The myth that the THSR project would be BOT, therefore would not need government funding, has been shattered. The government however deserves credit for intervening before the situation became untenable. The new Taiwan High Speed Rail will be both publicly and privately operated. How will it escape its predicament? That will be its severest test.
中時電子報 新聞
工商時報 2009.09.23
社論－高鐵轉型轉運的契機與挑戰
本報訊
正式營運還不到3年的台灣高鐵，由於揹負高達4千多億元債務，經營陷入困境。經由政府出面與民間五大原始股東溝通協調，於昨天召開臨時董事會，接受董事長殷琪提出的請辭案，預計於11月10日召開股東臨時會，改組董事會，由泛官股代表掌握過半董事席位，正式代表政府「接管」高鐵。
眾所周知，台灣高鐵是我國歷來規模最大的BOT案，依照當初官方開出的規格，得標者將可取得50年的特許經營權，期限屆滿後則無條件移轉回歸給政府。但是規劃不敵現實，高鐵在「B」（興建）的階段固然是幾經波折，才勉強建造完成，而進入「O」（營運）的階段才不到3年，就已經虧損掉實收資本額的三分之二。眼見錢景無亮，五大原始股東拒絕再增資，反而迫使政府必須動員中鋼、台糖、航發會等官方主導的民間企業陸續參加認股注資，以及一再協助、擔保銀行團的聯貸。而今因為營運虧損迄未見改善，現有經營團隊如果撒手不管，或者宣告片面終止合約，則政府不但要承受高鐵所遺逾4,000億債務的爛攤子，還可能因官民之間的法律糾紛，導致高鐵營運停擺。因此為避免出現前述雙輸的局面，經由協商，高鐵公司縮短「O」的期程，提前「T」（移轉）給政府，其實應算是兩害相權下較佳的選擇了。
未來高鐵經營權的由民轉官，意謂著「BOT」神話的幻滅。接手的政府部門，除了要確保高鐵能夠不中斷地持續營運之外，當務之急則是要改善高鐵的財務結構，使其得以繼續營運下去。談到財務結構的改善，包括如何面對逾4,000億的債務，以及籌措足夠的資金使得高鐵日常營運能夠週轉得來，最直截了當的方式應該是透過減資、增資，或由政府官股認列財損。但這樣的做法，無可避免會被批評是以公帑幫原始股東償債，在當前的氛圍下並不可行。因此交通部長毛治國也明言政府介入接管高鐵，將依循「不收買、不增資、特別股不轉換」的所謂三不政策。
如是，則化解高鐵財務燃眉之急的做法，就是經由政府出面擔保，協調銀行團訂定新的聯貸案，依當前的低利率水平，讓高鐵可以借新還舊，減輕利息支出。另外一個做法，則是調整、延長高鐵資本折舊攤提年限。而前述這兩種做法，事實上也正是高鐵公司這一年來努力以赴的目標。至於為什麼走不通，關鍵在於銀行團對民營的高鐵公司營運前景不看好，以及不願因降低貸款利率而減少收入。至於延長折舊攤提年限，當初的計算基期是以特許營運年限為準，官方自然也不敢輕言同意更改延長。而今如果高鐵變質為實質公營，則以公營為主的銀行團和交通部配合政策，自然可望通過新聯貸案，以及延長折舊攤提年限，對減輕高鐵的財務負擔，自然有所裨益。
高鐵轉型為「準公營」之後，固然可望獲得前述兩方面的便利，但真要徹底解決龐大債務，甚至轉虧為盈，則在營運上如何開源節流，顯然還得再加把勁。以言節流，高鐵公司雖然從成立以來財務預估就很拮据，但是公司高級主管的薪資標準從「庶民」的角度來看，卻形同是養了一群「肥貓」。未來董事會改組，營運再出發，如何合理管控人事成本，新經營團隊自然不能沒有回應。
其次在開源方面，如何提升載客量以增加營收，顯然比提高票價更值得推動。就此而言，新公司其實比舊公司有較佳的機會，包括國內客群搭乘習慣的建立與深化，更包括兩岸大三通後帶來的觀光客源與商務客源，這部分自然是新經營團隊必須努力推動開發的。而其前提則是服務的品質不能打折扣。
另外一個開源之道則是加強站區的開發。關於站區開發，當初的預估於今看來未免樂觀，未來的成敗則相當程度取決於台灣經濟的榮枯，但有待釐清的則是站區土地所有權的歸屬，以及高鐵營運與土地開發專案不同，新經營團隊是否有此能耐兼顧。
高鐵BOT政府免出資的神話的確已經幻滅，不過政府選在情勢還不是完全不可為的時候進場，仍然值得肯定。新的台灣高鐵如何官民共治，走出困境，無疑是值得期待的嚴峻考驗。
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
Shrill Demands for UN Membership are not Pragmatic Diplomacy
Shrill Demands for UN Membership are not Pragmatic Diplomacy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 22, 2009
Beginning In 1993, the Republic of China government in Taipei began actively seeking to rejoin the United Nations. For 16 years it knocked on the UN's door. This year, for the first time, it changed its strategy. It no longer asks its diplomatic allies in the General Assembly to petition on its behalf. Instead it seeks participation in the peripheral organizations. This change in approach has provoked some controversy. But the concept of "choosing one's battlefield" is the right one.
Over the past 16 years, Taipei has sought to rejoin the UN by means of high profile political gestures. It has urged its allies in the General Assembly to petition on behalf of Taipei. When Taipei and Beijing arranged their agendas, or when the General Assembly was in session, their allies would speak on their behalf. Other countries would also join the melee. Taipei meanwhile, would hold demonstrations outside the UN. Taipei has long made a mighty ruckus in its effort to gain readmission to the UN. Now that it has suddenly called a halt to such activities, the silence is deafening. Readmission to the United Nations has long been a public aspiration. Once the government says "Stop!" the public is bound to feel disappointed and dissatisfied.
But diplomats have explained clearly that this is merely a change in tactics. We are not forsaking our quest for readmission to the UN. But we are no longer asking diplomatic allies to petition on our behalf. Instead we are seeking a roundabout way to participate in organizations at the periphery of the United Nations. These include the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Taipei was successful in its effort to seek observer status in the World Health Organization in May of this year. Clearly it hopes to use this model to join other international organizations.
Choosing one's battles in this manner offers a greater chance of victory. It avoids major battles in which the result is certain defeat and pointless casualties. To determine whether such a change in tactics is cost-effective, one must compare gains and losses.
Taipei's past practice was a frontal assault with a great deal of fanfare. The goal was readmission to the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly was our stage. The advantage to this approach was that it was easy to attract attention and provoke debate. It prompted the international community to consider Taipei's aspirations, and consider better arrangements on behalf of Taipei in terms of its international status. In terms of initial impact, it was unquestionably an attention grabber.
But this tactic has disadvantages. Given Taipei's lack of international clout, the barriers are simply too high. Beijing has repeatedly checked our moves. It has also contributed to public frustration and anger. It has harmed cross-Strait relations and exacerbated conflict on Taiwan over the issue of reunification vs. independence. It has allowed diplomatic allies to take advantage of us by demanding "endorsement fees." It has squandered hard-earned taxpayer money. Each year, to ensure that a certain number of allies petitioned on our behalf, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would work itself to death. In terms of return on investment, this was an expensive and brutal tactic, with little chance of victory.
The new tactic is to temporarily avoid the main battlefield. It is to turn instead toward a number of peripheral organizations of practical significance for Taipei. These include the WHO, ICAO, UNFCCC, and other organizations affecting people's lives. If we can participate in these organizations, it will increase cooperation between Taipei and the international community. It will safeguard the interests of citizens of the Republic of China. Through increased interaction, it will make our existence increasingly felt in other countries and international organizations. It can also increase support for our formal acceptance.
Another advantage is that it concentrates our efforts and resources in practical exchanges and cooperation. By contrast, our previous attempts to gain readmission to the UN were nothing more than noisy rituals. The excitement soon died down. The boat would pass, leaving no trace on the water. It would be better to focus attention on a few peripheral organizations of vital interest to Taipei. It would be better to cultivate such exchanges and cooperation. This would give Taipei the opportunity to contribute and become a constructive member of the international community. This would enable Taipei and Beijing to inhabit an atmosphere of relative calm and rationality.
Of course, the new tactic has its risks. Taipei's participation requires Beijing's consent. Participation may involve bargaining. But basically the framework is Beijing's. Does this promote the Republic of China's national dignity, or does it sacrifice its sovereignty? This is a matter of debate. With the passage of time, will Taipei's participation lead to a "sub-sovereign" status? Will it become an obstacle to full sovereignty and dignity? Will Taipei's international space be decided by Beijing? These are matters of concern.
But considering the advantages and disadvantages, we support this new tactic. Because survival, prosperity, and dignity are the Republic of China's most basic national interests. Participation in the UN is merely one means of attaining this goal. The means are optional. To safeguard the Republic of China's legacy of democracy and civilization, we must prolong its survival. Increased international interaction will strengthen and deepen these values. Taipei's power is limited. A more economical use of its resources, and a more pragmatic approach to international exchanges, are to Taipei's advantage.
Of course, even if such a "regional power beseiging the central power" tactic works, the process will be long and arduous. We are bound to suffer setbacks. Our diplomacy must strike a balance between different interests. The new tactic for gaining readmission to the UN offers new opportunities, but also conceals new risks. Those calling the shots must carefully plan their steps. Only then will the new battlefield win new space.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.22
社論－敲鑼打鼓爭取入聯 絕非務實外交
本報訊
自一九九三年起台灣開始積極尋求重返聯合國，十六年來不斷叩門，今年首度改變策略，不再委請友邦在大會代為提案，改為尋求參與周邊組織。這項調整雖然引發若干爭議，但就「選擇戰場」的思維觀之，卻是正確的抉擇。
過去十六年來，台灣一直大動作地爭取入聯，敦請友邦在大會中提案、為台灣發聲，在安排議程及大會舉行時，兩岸更各自動員友邦代為發聲，加上其他參與討論或表達意見的國家，以及台灣宣達團在場外的熱鬧造勢，台灣的參與案在聯合國舞台上敲鑼打鼓了這麼久，如今突然偃兵息鼓，確實落差甚大。尤其重返聯合國一直是國人的渴望，一旦政府停下動作，難免有人感到失望與不滿。
但外交當局說明得很清楚，這只是策略的改變，並非放棄尋求入聯。我們不再委請友邦代為提案發言，而且迂迴地尋求參與聯合國若干周邊組織，包括國際民用航空組織（ＩＣＡＯ）、聯合國氣候變化綱要公約（ＵＮＦＣＣＣ）、國際海事組織等。很明顯的，這是想將我國今年五月獲邀以觀察員身分出席世界衛生組織年會的成功模式，進一步在其他官方國際組織中複製。
這其實是一種「選擇戰場」─選擇贏面較大的戰場，避免在必敗的大戰場上蒙受不必要的慘重傷亡。要評價這種策略調整是否合算，必須先比較得失。
過去的做法是大張旗鼓地直搗黃龍，以重返聯合國為目標、聯合國大會為舞台。好處是容易受到注目及討論，促使國際社會正視台灣的訴求，並且思考為台灣創造更好的國際地位安排。就一個初登場者而言，確實產生了先聲奪人的效果。
這種策略的缺點包括：對台灣的國際實力來說難度太高，中共一再的封殺，也造成台灣民眾的挫折與憤怒，影響到兩岸關係與台灣內部統獨對立。而友邦往往藉機索討「代言費」，耗損台灣納稅人大筆血汗錢，每年為了有多少友邦連署及發言的業績，外交部拚得嘔心瀝血，算得膽顫心驚。就投注的資源與獲利相比，這是一場高成本、低贏面的慘烈戰爭。
現在的新策略是暫時不進攻主戰場，轉而向幾個對台灣有實際意義的周邊組織下手。世衛、民航、氣候公約等都攸關民眾生活，若能參與，將有助於增加台灣與國際社會的合作，維護台灣民眾的權益。藉著愈來愈多的互動，希望讓台灣的存在逐漸為其他國家與國際組織認可，也讓正式接納台灣的主張得到更多支持。
另一個好處，則是這樣比較能把心力與資源投注在務實的交流合作中。與其把每年的入聯搞成大拜拜，熱鬧一場後船過水無痕，還不如把注意力放在幾個對台灣有切身利害的周邊組織，好好經營彼此的合作交流，讓台灣有機會做出貢獻，學習成為國際社會建設性的一員，也讓兩岸關係有個較平和理性的氣氛。
當然，新的策略也有其風險。因為台灣的參與是經由中共的同意，對於參與模式，兩岸雖然可以討價還價，但基本上是在中共設定的框架下。這究竟是增進了台灣的國家尊嚴，還是讓渡了部分主權地位，可能會引發爭議。而且時日一久，台灣參與模式的上限是否會鞏固成一種難以掙脫的「次主權」地位，反而阻擋了實現完全主權尊嚴的機會，甚至形成台灣的國際空間由中共決定的慣例，也必須格外注意。
然而，分析其中的利弊得失後，我們還是支持這項新的策略。因為生存、繁榮、尊嚴是台灣最基本的國家利益，參與聯合國只是達到目的的手段之一，而手段是可以有變通的。要維護台灣及其珍貴民主文明價值，就必須盡量延續生存，讓台灣做為一個主權國家的存在，在更多的國際互動中不斷強化，也讓我們的民主與文明的價值有機會深化。台灣力量有限，更經濟地運用資源，更務實地推動國際合作，對台灣最為有利。
當然，即使「從地方包圍中央」的策略奏效，都還會需要一段漫長艱苦的過程，其中也難免遭遇挫折倒退。我們的外交必須在各種利益得失中求取最好的平衡，現在的入聯新策略帶來了新的機會，但也隱藏新的風險，決策當局必須在審慎拿捏中積極開拓耕耘，才是善用轉進戰場後獲致的新空間。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 22, 2009
Beginning In 1993, the Republic of China government in Taipei began actively seeking to rejoin the United Nations. For 16 years it knocked on the UN's door. This year, for the first time, it changed its strategy. It no longer asks its diplomatic allies in the General Assembly to petition on its behalf. Instead it seeks participation in the peripheral organizations. This change in approach has provoked some controversy. But the concept of "choosing one's battlefield" is the right one.
Over the past 16 years, Taipei has sought to rejoin the UN by means of high profile political gestures. It has urged its allies in the General Assembly to petition on behalf of Taipei. When Taipei and Beijing arranged their agendas, or when the General Assembly was in session, their allies would speak on their behalf. Other countries would also join the melee. Taipei meanwhile, would hold demonstrations outside the UN. Taipei has long made a mighty ruckus in its effort to gain readmission to the UN. Now that it has suddenly called a halt to such activities, the silence is deafening. Readmission to the United Nations has long been a public aspiration. Once the government says "Stop!" the public is bound to feel disappointed and dissatisfied.
But diplomats have explained clearly that this is merely a change in tactics. We are not forsaking our quest for readmission to the UN. But we are no longer asking diplomatic allies to petition on our behalf. Instead we are seeking a roundabout way to participate in organizations at the periphery of the United Nations. These include the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Taipei was successful in its effort to seek observer status in the World Health Organization in May of this year. Clearly it hopes to use this model to join other international organizations.
Choosing one's battles in this manner offers a greater chance of victory. It avoids major battles in which the result is certain defeat and pointless casualties. To determine whether such a change in tactics is cost-effective, one must compare gains and losses.
Taipei's past practice was a frontal assault with a great deal of fanfare. The goal was readmission to the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly was our stage. The advantage to this approach was that it was easy to attract attention and provoke debate. It prompted the international community to consider Taipei's aspirations, and consider better arrangements on behalf of Taipei in terms of its international status. In terms of initial impact, it was unquestionably an attention grabber.
But this tactic has disadvantages. Given Taipei's lack of international clout, the barriers are simply too high. Beijing has repeatedly checked our moves. It has also contributed to public frustration and anger. It has harmed cross-Strait relations and exacerbated conflict on Taiwan over the issue of reunification vs. independence. It has allowed diplomatic allies to take advantage of us by demanding "endorsement fees." It has squandered hard-earned taxpayer money. Each year, to ensure that a certain number of allies petitioned on our behalf, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would work itself to death. In terms of return on investment, this was an expensive and brutal tactic, with little chance of victory.
The new tactic is to temporarily avoid the main battlefield. It is to turn instead toward a number of peripheral organizations of practical significance for Taipei. These include the WHO, ICAO, UNFCCC, and other organizations affecting people's lives. If we can participate in these organizations, it will increase cooperation between Taipei and the international community. It will safeguard the interests of citizens of the Republic of China. Through increased interaction, it will make our existence increasingly felt in other countries and international organizations. It can also increase support for our formal acceptance.
Another advantage is that it concentrates our efforts and resources in practical exchanges and cooperation. By contrast, our previous attempts to gain readmission to the UN were nothing more than noisy rituals. The excitement soon died down. The boat would pass, leaving no trace on the water. It would be better to focus attention on a few peripheral organizations of vital interest to Taipei. It would be better to cultivate such exchanges and cooperation. This would give Taipei the opportunity to contribute and become a constructive member of the international community. This would enable Taipei and Beijing to inhabit an atmosphere of relative calm and rationality.
Of course, the new tactic has its risks. Taipei's participation requires Beijing's consent. Participation may involve bargaining. But basically the framework is Beijing's. Does this promote the Republic of China's national dignity, or does it sacrifice its sovereignty? This is a matter of debate. With the passage of time, will Taipei's participation lead to a "sub-sovereign" status? Will it become an obstacle to full sovereignty and dignity? Will Taipei's international space be decided by Beijing? These are matters of concern.
But considering the advantages and disadvantages, we support this new tactic. Because survival, prosperity, and dignity are the Republic of China's most basic national interests. Participation in the UN is merely one means of attaining this goal. The means are optional. To safeguard the Republic of China's legacy of democracy and civilization, we must prolong its survival. Increased international interaction will strengthen and deepen these values. Taipei's power is limited. A more economical use of its resources, and a more pragmatic approach to international exchanges, are to Taipei's advantage.
Of course, even if such a "regional power beseiging the central power" tactic works, the process will be long and arduous. We are bound to suffer setbacks. Our diplomacy must strike a balance between different interests. The new tactic for gaining readmission to the UN offers new opportunities, but also conceals new risks. Those calling the shots must carefully plan their steps. Only then will the new battlefield win new space.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.22
社論－敲鑼打鼓爭取入聯 絕非務實外交
本報訊
自一九九三年起台灣開始積極尋求重返聯合國，十六年來不斷叩門，今年首度改變策略，不再委請友邦在大會代為提案，改為尋求參與周邊組織。這項調整雖然引發若干爭議，但就「選擇戰場」的思維觀之，卻是正確的抉擇。
過去十六年來，台灣一直大動作地爭取入聯，敦請友邦在大會中提案、為台灣發聲，在安排議程及大會舉行時，兩岸更各自動員友邦代為發聲，加上其他參與討論或表達意見的國家，以及台灣宣達團在場外的熱鬧造勢，台灣的參與案在聯合國舞台上敲鑼打鼓了這麼久，如今突然偃兵息鼓，確實落差甚大。尤其重返聯合國一直是國人的渴望，一旦政府停下動作，難免有人感到失望與不滿。
但外交當局說明得很清楚，這只是策略的改變，並非放棄尋求入聯。我們不再委請友邦代為提案發言，而且迂迴地尋求參與聯合國若干周邊組織，包括國際民用航空組織（ＩＣＡＯ）、聯合國氣候變化綱要公約（ＵＮＦＣＣＣ）、國際海事組織等。很明顯的，這是想將我國今年五月獲邀以觀察員身分出席世界衛生組織年會的成功模式，進一步在其他官方國際組織中複製。
這其實是一種「選擇戰場」─選擇贏面較大的戰場，避免在必敗的大戰場上蒙受不必要的慘重傷亡。要評價這種策略調整是否合算，必須先比較得失。
過去的做法是大張旗鼓地直搗黃龍，以重返聯合國為目標、聯合國大會為舞台。好處是容易受到注目及討論，促使國際社會正視台灣的訴求，並且思考為台灣創造更好的國際地位安排。就一個初登場者而言，確實產生了先聲奪人的效果。
這種策略的缺點包括：對台灣的國際實力來說難度太高，中共一再的封殺，也造成台灣民眾的挫折與憤怒，影響到兩岸關係與台灣內部統獨對立。而友邦往往藉機索討「代言費」，耗損台灣納稅人大筆血汗錢，每年為了有多少友邦連署及發言的業績，外交部拚得嘔心瀝血，算得膽顫心驚。就投注的資源與獲利相比，這是一場高成本、低贏面的慘烈戰爭。
現在的新策略是暫時不進攻主戰場，轉而向幾個對台灣有實際意義的周邊組織下手。世衛、民航、氣候公約等都攸關民眾生活，若能參與，將有助於增加台灣與國際社會的合作，維護台灣民眾的權益。藉著愈來愈多的互動，希望讓台灣的存在逐漸為其他國家與國際組織認可，也讓正式接納台灣的主張得到更多支持。
另一個好處，則是這樣比較能把心力與資源投注在務實的交流合作中。與其把每年的入聯搞成大拜拜，熱鬧一場後船過水無痕，還不如把注意力放在幾個對台灣有切身利害的周邊組織，好好經營彼此的合作交流，讓台灣有機會做出貢獻，學習成為國際社會建設性的一員，也讓兩岸關係有個較平和理性的氣氛。
當然，新的策略也有其風險。因為台灣的參與是經由中共的同意，對於參與模式，兩岸雖然可以討價還價，但基本上是在中共設定的框架下。這究竟是增進了台灣的國家尊嚴，還是讓渡了部分主權地位，可能會引發爭議。而且時日一久，台灣參與模式的上限是否會鞏固成一種難以掙脫的「次主權」地位，反而阻擋了實現完全主權尊嚴的機會，甚至形成台灣的國際空間由中共決定的慣例，也必須格外注意。
然而，分析其中的利弊得失後，我們還是支持這項新的策略。因為生存、繁榮、尊嚴是台灣最基本的國家利益，參與聯合國只是達到目的的手段之一，而手段是可以有變通的。要維護台灣及其珍貴民主文明價值，就必須盡量延續生存，讓台灣做為一個主權國家的存在，在更多的國際互動中不斷強化，也讓我們的民主與文明的價值有機會深化。台灣力量有限，更經濟地運用資源，更務實地推動國際合作，對台灣最為有利。
當然，即使「從地方包圍中央」的策略奏效，都還會需要一段漫長艱苦的過程，其中也難免遭遇挫折倒退。我們的外交必須在各種利益得失中求取最好的平衡，現在的入聯新策略帶來了新的機會，但也隱藏新的風險，決策當局必須在審慎拿捏中積極開拓耕耘，才是善用轉進戰場後獲致的新空間。
Monday, September 21, 2009
The Government Must Ensure that Officials Respect Human Rights
The Government Must Ensure that Officials Respect Human Rights
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 21, 2009
A few months ago, a high school heckled President Ma, demanding that he step down. He was taken away by the police for questioning and fingerprinting. Once President Ma learned of the incident, he instructed the National Police Administration to conduct a review. The NPA found that fingerprinting was an old habit with no basis in law. The National Police Administration issued a general order. Beginning on October 1, someone merely giving a statement would no longer be fingerprinted.
Police Academy Vice Chancellor Ye Yu-lan wrote a letter to the editor. He said that people whose identity cards were stolen have found themselves under suspicion of fraud and taken into custody by prosecutors and police. This has added insult to injury. Newly appointed Interior Minister Chiang Yi-hu said he hoped to amend the existing system. In the future suspects may complete their statements where they were initially questioned. Follow up sessions would follow the same procedure.
The above two police agencies are improving their case-handling procedures, consistent with respect for human rights. These may appear to be two different cases, but not if one looks at certain indicators in the government's human rights policy. More importantly, the Ministry of Justice, through the Legislative Yuan, passed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Convention. It held a six step "human rights advancement" government personnel training camp. Thousands of central and local government officials will receive training at this camp. On this year's International Human Rights Day, the Executive Yuan is expected to implement two laws. Two years later it will finish amending the laws as part of its comprehensive human rights plans.
On the opening day of the training camp, President Ma gave a personal speech. For half an hour he spoke on the need for the government to take human rights seriously. Only then would the Republic of China's achievements in democracy and the rule of law offer a truly national vision. President Ma pulled no punches. He said most civil servants don't know what human rights are, because our past education made little mention of it. Therefore civil servants must imagine how they would feel if their own human rights were violated. Only then can they feel the peoples' pain. Ma Ying-jeou's speech was sincere. Many of the public servants in the audience paid close attention. But others were yawning, proving that President Ma's observation that civil servants do not attach much importance to the observance of human rights was correct.
Why did President Ma what he did? Because he wanted to promote human rights in the Republic of China, and ensure that they meet international standards. Human rights are also part of his campaign platform. He has a duty to fulfill his campaign promises. Ma Ying-jeou is a student of the law. His long term mission has been the promotion of constitutional liberalism, the rule of law, and human rights. Leave aside his other campaign planks for the moment. The rule of law is his top priority. That is why during his first year he urged the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan to adopt the two conventions and the two Conventions on Law Enforcement. The two Conventions on Law Enforcement are to be amended within two years, as they do not conform with existing laws. This amounts to a human rights report card by which one can evaluate the rule of law and human rights during his four-year term. He must personally stand on the frontline, and cure government officials of their habit of ignorance of human rights, or even hostility towards human rights.
The objective of Ma Ying-jeou's human rights policy is not merely to enhance the Republic of China's international status. It is also to achieve genuine respect for human rights at home. Therefore it deserves our appreciation and support. President Ma is reaffirming that the Republic of China ought to be founded on such core values as human rights. This is a goal that transcends struggles over national identity. It is enough to establish a consensus. But on the other hand, the implementation of human rights on Taiwan is not without obstacles. That's because in the past human rights education was not sufficiently universal. Society lacked an awareness of human rights. Government officials in particular failed to understand human rights. Without an aggressive leadership promoting, demanding, and overseeing human rights, it will not be easy to promote human rights from scratch.
Within a traditional society, the government should set an example about how to think. Government self-criticism can help the community become aware of human rights. Within the Executive branch, the entities most concerned with the protection of human rights are the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of public organizations, public gatherings, and public demonstrations. The police, in turn, are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. The duties of prosecutors and the criminal justice system are closely related to the protection of human rights. The key to human rights and the rule of law is the presumption of innocence. Under this presumption, the burden of proof rests with the prosecution. Law enforcement officers often find this concept difficult to grasp. They often unconsciously make the mistake of assuming that the accused must prove his innocence. For example, they demand that all persons subject to interrogation be fingerprinted. Or they assume that anyone whose identity card has been stolen is an accomplice in a confidence game. This causes them to rush to judgment, and to have similar blind spots while handling such cases. Professor Ye Yu-lan has been educating police for years in his capacity as Human Rights Commissioner. Chiang Yi-hua, as former Minister for Research and Examination on the Council for Economic Planning, has chaired the Human Rights Commission. They are familiar with the obstacles and difficulties that lie in the way of President Ma's promotion of human rights. They must move aggressively at the macro level. They must understand the details at the micro level. They must increase respect for human rights. No one else can assume these responsibilities.
The promotion of human rights requires discovering the traps and blind spots in human rights education. Yesterday Premier Wu was being interpolated in the Legislative Yuan. He pointed out that even Chairman Trong Chai, who promoted human rights for many years, was sometimes guilty of mud-slinging. As this telling example showed, the promotion of human rights requires considerable self-examination and effort.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.21
社論－讓公務員重視人權 政府還得加把勁
本報訊
一名高三學生幾個月前向馬總統嗆聲要求下台，被警方帶走偵訊按捺指紋，馬總統得知後指示警政署檢討，發現按捺指紋只是沿襲舊習，缺乏法源依據。警政署發出通令，十月一日起，做筆錄不再按捺指紋。
警大副校長葉毓蘭投書報紙，身分證遭盜用的人因被依涉嫌九起詐欺移送檢警，南北奔波應訊，二度受害；新上任的內政部長江宜樺表示要修正現有制度，未來可以在當事人第一個應訊點做完筆錄，後續相同程序連線辦理。
以上兩起警政機關透過改善辦案流程，以符合尊重人權的做法，看似兩件小事，卻不妨看為是政府人權政策的某種指標；更重要的，則是法務部於立法院通過公民與政治權利國際公約與經濟社會與文化權利國際公約以及兩公約施行法之後，舉辦了六梯次「人權大步走」的政府人員培訓營，將有數千位中央及地方政府人員接受培訓，為行政院預計今年國際人權日實施的兩公約施行法，乃至兩年後全面修法完成的重大人權計畫暖身。
培訓營首日開講，馬總統親臨致詞，用半個鐘頭說明政府必須認真推動人權政策，台灣才能真正成就民主法治的國家願景。馬總統更不客氣的說，大部分公務員都不知道人權是怎麼回事，因為我們過去教育當中很少提到這一塊；因而公務員一定要將心比心，從自己的人權受侵害時設身處地，才能苦民所苦。馬英九在台上說的苦口婆心，台下的公務人員聚精會神的很多，但也有人在打起瞌睡。馬總統認為公務人員不重視人權的觀察，果然正確。
馬總統為什麼要這樣做？因為這是在推動台灣人權與國際標準接軌，也是他的競選政見，他有責任兌現他的選舉支票。馬英九習法出身，以推動自由主義憲法人權法治為長期的使命自許；別的政見不說，法治政見就是他的施政重點。因而他在就任第一年，催促行政院在立法院中通過兩公約以及兩公約施行法，施行法規定要在兩年內修改所有與此兩公約不符的現有法律；這是他四年任期可以檢驗的人權法治成績單，他必須親上一線，打破政府人員一向漠視甚至敵視人權政策的疏離與死寂。
馬英九的人權政策，不只是以對外開拓國際地位為唯一目標，還要切實地在國內實現實質的人權尊重，這一點應該受到肯定與支持。這項政策，馬總統也坦率直言是要賡續台灣以人權立國的核心價值，乃是超越鬥爭的國家目標，足以為台灣建立難得的價值共識；但是另一方面，在台灣落實人權不是沒有障礙，正是由於過去人權教育不夠普及，社會上的人權意識不足，政府人員更是普遍缺乏人權觀念，如果無人積極領導、推動，無人持續堅持、監督，從無到有，並不容易。
如果傳統社會觀念中政府應為民表率的思想仍有道理，政府以自我檢討的方式帶動社會人權意識進步，就是該做的重要功課。行政部門之中，與人權保障最有關係的部門，首推內政部與法務部。內政部主管的政務分歧，既是人民團體活動、集會遊行事務的主管機關，所轄警察系統又與法務部所轄檢調系統職司追訴犯罪的工作，均與人權保障息息相關。人權法治的關鍵原則就是推定無罪，指控者舉證，而檢警調人員卻也最難把握這些分寸，經常不自覺陷入要求被指控者自證無罪甚至有罪的錯誤。像是要求一切受偵訊者按捺指紋，或是將身分證遭盜用者一律假設是詐欺團體的同夥共犯，使其奔波應訊，都有類似的辦案盲點存在。葉毓蘭教授久在警察教育系統服務，擔任人權委員會委員，江宜樺部長原任研考會主委，主持人權委員會事務推行，熟諳馬總統推動人權工作的障礙與困難所在。積極從大處、從細處發現、改善人權待遇，責無旁貸。
推動人權政策，一定要從找出觀念陷阱與盲點的人權教育做起。日前吳揆在立法院答詢，指出連推動人權事務多年的蔡同榮主委，有時也不能免於揭發隱私等的錯誤政治示範，可謂一針見血地道出，人權工作需要多大的自省與努力。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 21, 2009
A few months ago, a high school heckled President Ma, demanding that he step down. He was taken away by the police for questioning and fingerprinting. Once President Ma learned of the incident, he instructed the National Police Administration to conduct a review. The NPA found that fingerprinting was an old habit with no basis in law. The National Police Administration issued a general order. Beginning on October 1, someone merely giving a statement would no longer be fingerprinted.
Police Academy Vice Chancellor Ye Yu-lan wrote a letter to the editor. He said that people whose identity cards were stolen have found themselves under suspicion of fraud and taken into custody by prosecutors and police. This has added insult to injury. Newly appointed Interior Minister Chiang Yi-hu said he hoped to amend the existing system. In the future suspects may complete their statements where they were initially questioned. Follow up sessions would follow the same procedure.
The above two police agencies are improving their case-handling procedures, consistent with respect for human rights. These may appear to be two different cases, but not if one looks at certain indicators in the government's human rights policy. More importantly, the Ministry of Justice, through the Legislative Yuan, passed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Convention. It held a six step "human rights advancement" government personnel training camp. Thousands of central and local government officials will receive training at this camp. On this year's International Human Rights Day, the Executive Yuan is expected to implement two laws. Two years later it will finish amending the laws as part of its comprehensive human rights plans.
On the opening day of the training camp, President Ma gave a personal speech. For half an hour he spoke on the need for the government to take human rights seriously. Only then would the Republic of China's achievements in democracy and the rule of law offer a truly national vision. President Ma pulled no punches. He said most civil servants don't know what human rights are, because our past education made little mention of it. Therefore civil servants must imagine how they would feel if their own human rights were violated. Only then can they feel the peoples' pain. Ma Ying-jeou's speech was sincere. Many of the public servants in the audience paid close attention. But others were yawning, proving that President Ma's observation that civil servants do not attach much importance to the observance of human rights was correct.
Why did President Ma what he did? Because he wanted to promote human rights in the Republic of China, and ensure that they meet international standards. Human rights are also part of his campaign platform. He has a duty to fulfill his campaign promises. Ma Ying-jeou is a student of the law. His long term mission has been the promotion of constitutional liberalism, the rule of law, and human rights. Leave aside his other campaign planks for the moment. The rule of law is his top priority. That is why during his first year he urged the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan to adopt the two conventions and the two Conventions on Law Enforcement. The two Conventions on Law Enforcement are to be amended within two years, as they do not conform with existing laws. This amounts to a human rights report card by which one can evaluate the rule of law and human rights during his four-year term. He must personally stand on the frontline, and cure government officials of their habit of ignorance of human rights, or even hostility towards human rights.
The objective of Ma Ying-jeou's human rights policy is not merely to enhance the Republic of China's international status. It is also to achieve genuine respect for human rights at home. Therefore it deserves our appreciation and support. President Ma is reaffirming that the Republic of China ought to be founded on such core values as human rights. This is a goal that transcends struggles over national identity. It is enough to establish a consensus. But on the other hand, the implementation of human rights on Taiwan is not without obstacles. That's because in the past human rights education was not sufficiently universal. Society lacked an awareness of human rights. Government officials in particular failed to understand human rights. Without an aggressive leadership promoting, demanding, and overseeing human rights, it will not be easy to promote human rights from scratch.
Within a traditional society, the government should set an example about how to think. Government self-criticism can help the community become aware of human rights. Within the Executive branch, the entities most concerned with the protection of human rights are the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of public organizations, public gatherings, and public demonstrations. The police, in turn, are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. The duties of prosecutors and the criminal justice system are closely related to the protection of human rights. The key to human rights and the rule of law is the presumption of innocence. Under this presumption, the burden of proof rests with the prosecution. Law enforcement officers often find this concept difficult to grasp. They often unconsciously make the mistake of assuming that the accused must prove his innocence. For example, they demand that all persons subject to interrogation be fingerprinted. Or they assume that anyone whose identity card has been stolen is an accomplice in a confidence game. This causes them to rush to judgment, and to have similar blind spots while handling such cases. Professor Ye Yu-lan has been educating police for years in his capacity as Human Rights Commissioner. Chiang Yi-hua, as former Minister for Research and Examination on the Council for Economic Planning, has chaired the Human Rights Commission. They are familiar with the obstacles and difficulties that lie in the way of President Ma's promotion of human rights. They must move aggressively at the macro level. They must understand the details at the micro level. They must increase respect for human rights. No one else can assume these responsibilities.
The promotion of human rights requires discovering the traps and blind spots in human rights education. Yesterday Premier Wu was being interpolated in the Legislative Yuan. He pointed out that even Chairman Trong Chai, who promoted human rights for many years, was sometimes guilty of mud-slinging. As this telling example showed, the promotion of human rights requires considerable self-examination and effort.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.21
社論－讓公務員重視人權 政府還得加把勁
本報訊
一名高三學生幾個月前向馬總統嗆聲要求下台，被警方帶走偵訊按捺指紋，馬總統得知後指示警政署檢討，發現按捺指紋只是沿襲舊習，缺乏法源依據。警政署發出通令，十月一日起，做筆錄不再按捺指紋。
警大副校長葉毓蘭投書報紙，身分證遭盜用的人因被依涉嫌九起詐欺移送檢警，南北奔波應訊，二度受害；新上任的內政部長江宜樺表示要修正現有制度，未來可以在當事人第一個應訊點做完筆錄，後續相同程序連線辦理。
以上兩起警政機關透過改善辦案流程，以符合尊重人權的做法，看似兩件小事，卻不妨看為是政府人權政策的某種指標；更重要的，則是法務部於立法院通過公民與政治權利國際公約與經濟社會與文化權利國際公約以及兩公約施行法之後，舉辦了六梯次「人權大步走」的政府人員培訓營，將有數千位中央及地方政府人員接受培訓，為行政院預計今年國際人權日實施的兩公約施行法，乃至兩年後全面修法完成的重大人權計畫暖身。
培訓營首日開講，馬總統親臨致詞，用半個鐘頭說明政府必須認真推動人權政策，台灣才能真正成就民主法治的國家願景。馬總統更不客氣的說，大部分公務員都不知道人權是怎麼回事，因為我們過去教育當中很少提到這一塊；因而公務員一定要將心比心，從自己的人權受侵害時設身處地，才能苦民所苦。馬英九在台上說的苦口婆心，台下的公務人員聚精會神的很多，但也有人在打起瞌睡。馬總統認為公務人員不重視人權的觀察，果然正確。
馬總統為什麼要這樣做？因為這是在推動台灣人權與國際標準接軌，也是他的競選政見，他有責任兌現他的選舉支票。馬英九習法出身，以推動自由主義憲法人權法治為長期的使命自許；別的政見不說，法治政見就是他的施政重點。因而他在就任第一年，催促行政院在立法院中通過兩公約以及兩公約施行法，施行法規定要在兩年內修改所有與此兩公約不符的現有法律；這是他四年任期可以檢驗的人權法治成績單，他必須親上一線，打破政府人員一向漠視甚至敵視人權政策的疏離與死寂。
馬英九的人權政策，不只是以對外開拓國際地位為唯一目標，還要切實地在國內實現實質的人權尊重，這一點應該受到肯定與支持。這項政策，馬總統也坦率直言是要賡續台灣以人權立國的核心價值，乃是超越鬥爭的國家目標，足以為台灣建立難得的價值共識；但是另一方面，在台灣落實人權不是沒有障礙，正是由於過去人權教育不夠普及，社會上的人權意識不足，政府人員更是普遍缺乏人權觀念，如果無人積極領導、推動，無人持續堅持、監督，從無到有，並不容易。
如果傳統社會觀念中政府應為民表率的思想仍有道理，政府以自我檢討的方式帶動社會人權意識進步，就是該做的重要功課。行政部門之中，與人權保障最有關係的部門，首推內政部與法務部。內政部主管的政務分歧，既是人民團體活動、集會遊行事務的主管機關，所轄警察系統又與法務部所轄檢調系統職司追訴犯罪的工作，均與人權保障息息相關。人權法治的關鍵原則就是推定無罪，指控者舉證，而檢警調人員卻也最難把握這些分寸，經常不自覺陷入要求被指控者自證無罪甚至有罪的錯誤。像是要求一切受偵訊者按捺指紋，或是將身分證遭盜用者一律假設是詐欺團體的同夥共犯，使其奔波應訊，都有類似的辦案盲點存在。葉毓蘭教授久在警察教育系統服務，擔任人權委員會委員，江宜樺部長原任研考會主委，主持人權委員會事務推行，熟諳馬總統推動人權工作的障礙與困難所在。積極從大處、從細處發現、改善人權待遇，責無旁貸。
推動人權政策，一定要從找出觀念陷阱與盲點的人權教育做起。日前吳揆在立法院答詢，指出連推動人權事務多年的蔡同榮主委，有時也不能免於揭發隱私等的錯誤政治示範，可謂一針見血地道出，人權工作需要多大的自省與努力。
Friday, September 18, 2009
Who is Being Used? Ah-Bian, or the DPP?
Who is Being Used? Ah-Bian, or the DPP?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 18, 2009
For the leader of a democratic nation to be involved in corruption is not news. On Taiwan however, the corruption of former President Chen Shui-bian and his family has left the Democratic Progressive Party in a quagmire, unable to extricate itself. Even more seriously, the DPP has retreated to populism and extremism in a desperate effort to save itself. As a result, two-party politics on Taiwan is headed toward extreme polarization, and the quality of its democracy is in for serious decline. An isolated presidental corruption case has set back the development of democracy. Such a scenario is difficult to imagine in other democratic countries.
The Chen corruption case is unquestionably responsible for the DPP's moral degradation. Before the DPP took office, its bottom line was political ethics came first, the letter of the law came second. Therefore if a party member's conduct was obviously flawed, party discipline took precedence over the law. During the Chen presidency, when evidence of his corruption emerged, this standard was eroded. But at least the DPP still affirmed that legal conviction was the lowest standard for the establishment of guilt.
Unfortunately when the Chen family, its relatives and cronies were indicted and sentenced for a string of major crimes, Chen Shui-bian and the DPP began singing an entirely different tune. Ah-Bian himself said he was guilty only of a "moral and culture crime." He has no criminal liability. Key Green Camp players have blasted the court's verdict as a "feudalistic" moral judgment, and not a legal decision. At this point, not only has the DPP revealed its moral vacuum, it has also twisted the meaning of the law, narrowly defining it as mere courtroom thrusts and parries. It has completely ignored the fact that morality is a cornerstone of the law.
Why can't a political party that bills itself as "democratic" and "progressive" extricate itself from the quagmire of the Chen corruption case? The DPP has plenty of talented people, most of whom have long experience. Why don't they realize they must disassociate themselves from Chen's corruption? Why have they allowed the party to become mired so inextricably in such a predicament? In the social sciences, their dilemma is referred to as a "shared tragedy,"
In his 1968 essay "The Tragedy of the Commons," economist Garrett Hardin observed that as long as property is held in common, it will surely be abused. The DPP's stealing of credit for the closely-related democratic movement is a classic example. A single organization monopolized a shared historical legacy by grossly distorting history.
Hsu Tien-tsai yesterday suggested emulating the Red Shirt Army, and launching a mass movement to support Ah-Bian. His suggestion was mocked as "using Chen Shui-bian." In fact, it would be more accurate to characterize such a ploy as "using the DPP." Long before Hsu Tien-tsai's suggestion, DPP leaders and elected officials were already "using the DPP." Political hopefuls arrived in droves at the detention center to pay homage to Ah-Bian. Either that, or they conspicuously waved placards and banners proclaiming their support for Ah-Bian during protest marches. The "Princes" of the DPP initiated an even higher-level power struggle. Whether one supported Ah-Bian became a bludgeon with which one could defeat one's opponent.
Behind closed doors these DPP key players surely realize that supporting corruption is disadvantageous to the DPP's long-term development. But these DPP key players are caught in a "prisoners dilemma." The DPP's public image is, after all, "common property." It may or may not provide any individual DPP official with any immediate and obvious benefits. On the other hand, as long as DPP officials stand behind Ah-Bian, they immediately receive support from extremist factions within the party. Given long term DPP factional struggles and impending party primaries, this trend is likely to worsen. Since the majority of DPP key players are preoccupied with personal power, the DPP as a whole will inevitably decline, undermining its long-term interests. This is classic case of the contradiction between collective interest and individual interest.
What concerns us is not the interests of the DPP elites. After all, the DPP is not merely the private property of a few hundred thousand party members. It is the result of countless peoples' concerted efforts. It is the result of their blood, sweat, and tears. But because of a party "oligopoly," the ruling DPP has departed from its early pledge of "integrity, diligence, love of the land." President Chen Shui-bian came to treat the DPP as his private property. On the surface his assumption of the party chairmanship was to unite the party and the administration. But in fact it was to turn the DPP into a tool to expand his personal power and to accumulate wealth. The Chen corruption case shows how business consortia exploited Ah-Bian's status as DPP party chairman. Personal bribes to Ah-Bian were passed off as "campaign contributions" to the DPP. The party chairmanship and campaign contributions became plausible pretexts for corruption.
Ah-Bian, his relatives, and his cronies have abused this common property. The countless high and low ranking officials who benefitted along with Chen Shui-bian are hardly going to object to the abuse of the DPP's good name. They are hardly going to object to the debasement of its "progressive" ideals. The damage done to the Republic of China's political culture has been inestimable.
The DPP's "common property" has been defiled. This may not concern the DPP's elites. But any rational political leader must consider the fact that "if one overturns the bird's nest, the eggs will not survive." They must break Chen Shui-bian's spell. They must liberate themselves. It is not that difficult. If DPP officials unite and disassociate themselves from Ah-Bian, the DPP can take its first step toward rebirth. But if the DPP considers only the selfish interests of its elites, then even something so simple becomes utterly impossible.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.18
社論－扁被消費 還是民進黨被消費
本報訊
國家領導人涉入貪腐，在任何民主國家都不是新鮮事，但在台灣，前總統陳水扁一家的貪汙情狀，竟然讓民進黨陷入泥淖、無法自拔；更嚴重的是，民進黨退縮以民粹、極端化自保，台灣的兩黨政治也因此走向極端對立，民主品質嚴重下降。一樁總統貪腐案竟讓民主發展倒退，這樣的演變，則是在其他民主國家難以想像的。
扁案造成民進黨道德淪喪的後果，這是無庸置疑的。執政前的民進黨，政治道德先行，將法律視為最後的底限，因此，黨員只要操守出現明顯瑕疵，黨紀必然先於法律處理；這套標準在扁總統任內出現涉貪傳聞時，就已見侵蝕，但是當時的民進黨至少還認定，應由法律做最後的判準。
可悲的是，當扁家及親信數大弊案陸續遭起訴及判決時，陳水扁及民進黨的調子也跟著逆轉，扁自認只是犯了「道德文化罪」，因此不必負司法上的刑責；綠營更有要員痛批司法判決是「封建」的道德審判，而不是法律判決。至此，民進黨不但完全道德虛無化，更錯誤解讀，將法律窄化成法庭攻防，完全疏忽道德也是法律的基礎。
以「民主」、「進步」為名的政黨，為何走不出扁案這一關？民進黨人才濟濟，多屬幹練之士，面臨扁案、為何連淺顯的切割道理都不懂，而讓舉黨掉入無法自拔的困局？在社會科學上，這樣的困境被稱為「共有的悲劇」，一九六八年經濟學家哈定發現，只要是共有的財產，就一定會被濫用，民進黨及密切相關的民主運動史，就是典型名器被個人佔用、濫用的歷史。
許添財日前有意效法紅衫軍、發起挺扁群眾運動，被譏諷為是在「消費陳水扁」，其實嚴格來說，這應稱為「消費民進黨」，而且早在許添財之前，民進黨大將及公職人員早已紛紛展開「消費民進黨」的作為。因此，要參選的人絡繹於途、赴看守所探視扁，不然就是在遊行場合刻意標舉挺扁急先鋒的旗號，民進黨的天王們展開的是更高層的權力鬥爭，挺不挺扁都可成為鬥跨對手的血滴子。
民進黨要角捫心自問，必然知道挺貪腐不利民進黨長期的發展，但是民進黨要角都掉入兩難的「囚犯困局」，畢竟，民進黨的公眾形象是典型的「公共財」，對個別公職人員未必有立即明顯的利益；相反的，只要他們個人挺扁，卻立刻可以受到黨內極端派支持，而在黨內初選出頭，此一趨勢更因民進黨長期的派系競爭而惡化。可以說，當多數的民進黨要角都斤斤計較個人權力時，整體民進黨也因此沉淪，長期也同樣傷害民進黨公職的利益。這是典型的集體理性與個人理性矛盾的例子。
但是我們要憂慮的，並不是民進黨菁英的利益而已，畢竟，民進黨並不是數十萬黨員的私產而已，它是無數人眾志成城、流血流汗的成果，但只因為政黨「寡頭壟斷」的特性，民進黨執政後已開始背離當年「清廉、勤政、愛鄉土」的誓言，而陳水扁總統後期更將民進黨當做個人私產，他兼任黨主席表面上是為了黨政一體，但實質上、民進黨卻成為他個人擴大權力及斂聚財產的工具，從這次扁案的審判過程就可以看到，不少財團利用扁當黨主席的模糊地帶，以「政治獻金」之名行賄賂之實，黨主席及政治獻金都為犯罪找到合理化的藉口。
扁及親信如此糟蹋公共財，跟著陳水扁坐享好處的大小官員們，更不會在意敗壞民進黨名器後，所謂的進步理念因此被汙名化，對台灣政治文化的傷害難以衡量。
民進黨此一「公共財」被敗壞，也許不是民進黨菁英在意的，但是任何理性的政治人物，也必然會考量「覆巢之下無完卵」的道理，要打破阿扁魔咒，躍出囚犯困境，其實很簡單，只要所有的民進黨要員團結一致與扁切割，就可踏出民進黨復興的第一步，只是，當民進黨菁英都只考量個人利益時，連此一簡單的道理，都未免顯得知易行難!
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 18, 2009
For the leader of a democratic nation to be involved in corruption is not news. On Taiwan however, the corruption of former President Chen Shui-bian and his family has left the Democratic Progressive Party in a quagmire, unable to extricate itself. Even more seriously, the DPP has retreated to populism and extremism in a desperate effort to save itself. As a result, two-party politics on Taiwan is headed toward extreme polarization, and the quality of its democracy is in for serious decline. An isolated presidental corruption case has set back the development of democracy. Such a scenario is difficult to imagine in other democratic countries.
The Chen corruption case is unquestionably responsible for the DPP's moral degradation. Before the DPP took office, its bottom line was political ethics came first, the letter of the law came second. Therefore if a party member's conduct was obviously flawed, party discipline took precedence over the law. During the Chen presidency, when evidence of his corruption emerged, this standard was eroded. But at least the DPP still affirmed that legal conviction was the lowest standard for the establishment of guilt.
Unfortunately when the Chen family, its relatives and cronies were indicted and sentenced for a string of major crimes, Chen Shui-bian and the DPP began singing an entirely different tune. Ah-Bian himself said he was guilty only of a "moral and culture crime." He has no criminal liability. Key Green Camp players have blasted the court's verdict as a "feudalistic" moral judgment, and not a legal decision. At this point, not only has the DPP revealed its moral vacuum, it has also twisted the meaning of the law, narrowly defining it as mere courtroom thrusts and parries. It has completely ignored the fact that morality is a cornerstone of the law.
Why can't a political party that bills itself as "democratic" and "progressive" extricate itself from the quagmire of the Chen corruption case? The DPP has plenty of talented people, most of whom have long experience. Why don't they realize they must disassociate themselves from Chen's corruption? Why have they allowed the party to become mired so inextricably in such a predicament? In the social sciences, their dilemma is referred to as a "shared tragedy,"
In his 1968 essay "The Tragedy of the Commons," economist Garrett Hardin observed that as long as property is held in common, it will surely be abused. The DPP's stealing of credit for the closely-related democratic movement is a classic example. A single organization monopolized a shared historical legacy by grossly distorting history.
Hsu Tien-tsai yesterday suggested emulating the Red Shirt Army, and launching a mass movement to support Ah-Bian. His suggestion was mocked as "using Chen Shui-bian." In fact, it would be more accurate to characterize such a ploy as "using the DPP." Long before Hsu Tien-tsai's suggestion, DPP leaders and elected officials were already "using the DPP." Political hopefuls arrived in droves at the detention center to pay homage to Ah-Bian. Either that, or they conspicuously waved placards and banners proclaiming their support for Ah-Bian during protest marches. The "Princes" of the DPP initiated an even higher-level power struggle. Whether one supported Ah-Bian became a bludgeon with which one could defeat one's opponent.
Behind closed doors these DPP key players surely realize that supporting corruption is disadvantageous to the DPP's long-term development. But these DPP key players are caught in a "prisoners dilemma." The DPP's public image is, after all, "common property." It may or may not provide any individual DPP official with any immediate and obvious benefits. On the other hand, as long as DPP officials stand behind Ah-Bian, they immediately receive support from extremist factions within the party. Given long term DPP factional struggles and impending party primaries, this trend is likely to worsen. Since the majority of DPP key players are preoccupied with personal power, the DPP as a whole will inevitably decline, undermining its long-term interests. This is classic case of the contradiction between collective interest and individual interest.
What concerns us is not the interests of the DPP elites. After all, the DPP is not merely the private property of a few hundred thousand party members. It is the result of countless peoples' concerted efforts. It is the result of their blood, sweat, and tears. But because of a party "oligopoly," the ruling DPP has departed from its early pledge of "integrity, diligence, love of the land." President Chen Shui-bian came to treat the DPP as his private property. On the surface his assumption of the party chairmanship was to unite the party and the administration. But in fact it was to turn the DPP into a tool to expand his personal power and to accumulate wealth. The Chen corruption case shows how business consortia exploited Ah-Bian's status as DPP party chairman. Personal bribes to Ah-Bian were passed off as "campaign contributions" to the DPP. The party chairmanship and campaign contributions became plausible pretexts for corruption.
Ah-Bian, his relatives, and his cronies have abused this common property. The countless high and low ranking officials who benefitted along with Chen Shui-bian are hardly going to object to the abuse of the DPP's good name. They are hardly going to object to the debasement of its "progressive" ideals. The damage done to the Republic of China's political culture has been inestimable.
The DPP's "common property" has been defiled. This may not concern the DPP's elites. But any rational political leader must consider the fact that "if one overturns the bird's nest, the eggs will not survive." They must break Chen Shui-bian's spell. They must liberate themselves. It is not that difficult. If DPP officials unite and disassociate themselves from Ah-Bian, the DPP can take its first step toward rebirth. But if the DPP considers only the selfish interests of its elites, then even something so simple becomes utterly impossible.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.18
社論－扁被消費 還是民進黨被消費
本報訊
國家領導人涉入貪腐，在任何民主國家都不是新鮮事，但在台灣，前總統陳水扁一家的貪汙情狀，竟然讓民進黨陷入泥淖、無法自拔；更嚴重的是，民進黨退縮以民粹、極端化自保，台灣的兩黨政治也因此走向極端對立，民主品質嚴重下降。一樁總統貪腐案竟讓民主發展倒退，這樣的演變，則是在其他民主國家難以想像的。
扁案造成民進黨道德淪喪的後果，這是無庸置疑的。執政前的民進黨，政治道德先行，將法律視為最後的底限，因此，黨員只要操守出現明顯瑕疵，黨紀必然先於法律處理；這套標準在扁總統任內出現涉貪傳聞時，就已見侵蝕，但是當時的民進黨至少還認定，應由法律做最後的判準。
可悲的是，當扁家及親信數大弊案陸續遭起訴及判決時，陳水扁及民進黨的調子也跟著逆轉，扁自認只是犯了「道德文化罪」，因此不必負司法上的刑責；綠營更有要員痛批司法判決是「封建」的道德審判，而不是法律判決。至此，民進黨不但完全道德虛無化，更錯誤解讀，將法律窄化成法庭攻防，完全疏忽道德也是法律的基礎。
以「民主」、「進步」為名的政黨，為何走不出扁案這一關？民進黨人才濟濟，多屬幹練之士，面臨扁案、為何連淺顯的切割道理都不懂，而讓舉黨掉入無法自拔的困局？在社會科學上，這樣的困境被稱為「共有的悲劇」，一九六八年經濟學家哈定發現，只要是共有的財產，就一定會被濫用，民進黨及密切相關的民主運動史，就是典型名器被個人佔用、濫用的歷史。
許添財日前有意效法紅衫軍、發起挺扁群眾運動，被譏諷為是在「消費陳水扁」，其實嚴格來說，這應稱為「消費民進黨」，而且早在許添財之前，民進黨大將及公職人員早已紛紛展開「消費民進黨」的作為。因此，要參選的人絡繹於途、赴看守所探視扁，不然就是在遊行場合刻意標舉挺扁急先鋒的旗號，民進黨的天王們展開的是更高層的權力鬥爭，挺不挺扁都可成為鬥跨對手的血滴子。
民進黨要角捫心自問，必然知道挺貪腐不利民進黨長期的發展，但是民進黨要角都掉入兩難的「囚犯困局」，畢竟，民進黨的公眾形象是典型的「公共財」，對個別公職人員未必有立即明顯的利益；相反的，只要他們個人挺扁，卻立刻可以受到黨內極端派支持，而在黨內初選出頭，此一趨勢更因民進黨長期的派系競爭而惡化。可以說，當多數的民進黨要角都斤斤計較個人權力時，整體民進黨也因此沉淪，長期也同樣傷害民進黨公職的利益。這是典型的集體理性與個人理性矛盾的例子。
但是我們要憂慮的，並不是民進黨菁英的利益而已，畢竟，民進黨並不是數十萬黨員的私產而已，它是無數人眾志成城、流血流汗的成果，但只因為政黨「寡頭壟斷」的特性，民進黨執政後已開始背離當年「清廉、勤政、愛鄉土」的誓言，而陳水扁總統後期更將民進黨當做個人私產，他兼任黨主席表面上是為了黨政一體，但實質上、民進黨卻成為他個人擴大權力及斂聚財產的工具，從這次扁案的審判過程就可以看到，不少財團利用扁當黨主席的模糊地帶，以「政治獻金」之名行賄賂之實，黨主席及政治獻金都為犯罪找到合理化的藉口。
扁及親信如此糟蹋公共財，跟著陳水扁坐享好處的大小官員們，更不會在意敗壞民進黨名器後，所謂的進步理念因此被汙名化，對台灣政治文化的傷害難以衡量。
民進黨此一「公共財」被敗壞，也許不是民進黨菁英在意的，但是任何理性的政治人物，也必然會考量「覆巢之下無完卵」的道理，要打破阿扁魔咒，躍出囚犯困境，其實很簡單，只要所有的民進黨要員團結一致與扁切割，就可踏出民進黨復興的第一步，只是，當民進黨菁英都只考量個人利益時，連此一簡單的道理，都未免顯得知易行難!
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
Worrisome Finances, Even More Worrisome Ministry of Finance
Worrisome Finances, Even More Worrisome Ministry of Finance
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 16, 2009
Rating agencies such as Fitch and Standard & Poor's have harshly criticized the Republic of China's fiscal and debt situation. In September, the Ministry of Finance, under orders from the Executive Yuan, responded with a great flourish, by offering a "sound financial policy." From a public relations perspective, the program does seems to be boosting morale. It includes ten strategies. It includes three core management strategies to help local governments develop their own financial resources. It includes a three part way to "save money, find money, and make money." We must however point out that the program is a patchwork quilt of confused concepts. It reveals an unwillingness to confront the problem of too low tax rates, or consider long-term changes to the tax structure. Its reveals an even more confused understanding of the nation's tax system.
For years the Republic of China's tax rate has been less than 15%. It is much lower than that of all economically advanced countries. With such a low tax rate, unless the size of the Republic of China government is ultra-small, it must face the dilemma of unsustainable government spending. Not only that, President Ma's campaign platform included "Twelve Love Taiwan Construction Projects." More recently an emergency response to the global economic downturn has necessitated even more public spending. These have left the nation's finances in dire straits. But irresponsible politicians are afraid to face the real problem. They only want to appease voters to protect their jobs. Over the past year, despite the financial crisis, the Ministry of Finance has talked only of tax cuts. Today, the deficit is obvious. Yet the ruling authorities are still playing strategic word games with Three Core Management Strategies and Twelve Love Taiwan Construction Projects. Such obstinacy is truly mind-boggling.
We have good reason for saying that the Ministry of Finance lacks the courage to face the problem. According to Minister of Finance Li, the government's fiscal deficit will be made up through a public offering. Minister Li said that if the government sells 40% of its holdings, it will have no impact on earnings. An IPO will be good for the government and good for the company. Minister Li considers this a "stock certificates for dollar bills" scheme. He has absolutely no understanding of the concept of "public shares." Listening to him makes one skin crawl. If the government's finances require nothing more than tax cuts during normal times, and public offerings during times of crisis, why does the government need a Ministry of Finance? Why bother to teach finance in the universities? Why does the Ma administration need a Tax Reform Commission? The commission has been meeting for over a year. And this is its contribution to the nation's finances? How ironic.
Using shares of stock to earn dividends, or selling shares of stock to raise cash, requires detailed consideration of both the amounts involved and the timing of the transactions. It is hardly as simple as what Minister Lee suggests when he says "selling 40% of the government's shares will have no impact on earnings." The government's chief of finance has no medium to long term planning. He wants to hastily sell 40% of a cash cow. We are simply dumbfounded. Besides, how will selling stock address the problem of excessively low tax rates? Selling our heritage during the second half of the year merely highlights the absurdity of the Ministry of Finance's tax cuts during the first half of the year.
Besides, not all state-owned enterprises should be sold. Some state-owned enterprises have public policy functions. Therefore, the sale of shares will lead to a fundamental conflicts between profit-making private sector share holders and the government. People buy stocks to make money. If private sector shareholders cannot influence government policy, that means their profits are being adversely affected. When this happens, the stock will lose its market value. They will no longer command high prices. If private sector shareholders overwhelm the public offering, that means the government's policy objectives have failed. That means the government's justifications for a public enterprise cannot withstand scrutiny. If the Ministry of Finance must make a public offering of government shares to raise money, and support its policy objectives, then it doesn't understand the reason for public shares. It is hallucinating. It is indulging in unrealistic fantasies.
Take TaiSugar (TSC) for example. In order to meet soil and water conservation policy objectives, the government may at time reforest TaiSugar land. But as readers can imagine, if TSC has private shares, private sector shareholders will oppose it, since reforestation earns not profits. Furthermore, some state-owned enterprises, such as the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Company, own large numbers of ancient artifacts. Often safeguarding historic artifacts interferes with the pursuit of profits. The hasty sale of public shares, without a sound understanding of the macro-level function of public enterprises, will merely lead to further controversy.
The high-profile political appointees on the political stage bear the greatest responsibility for the Republic of China's current financial difficulties. According to the Executive Yuan, the central government cannot come up with a budget for either next year or the year after. Such an urgent crisis requires people of ability. It requires people of vision to revise the tax plans. It does not require the reckless selling of public shares. Even with companies suitable for sale, killing the cash cow is a one time proposition. In terms of the national deficit, it is merely a drop in the bucket. It will not solve the nation's structural problems. If the Ministry of Finance implements its program, our sovereign rating for next year will not improve. We are concerned about the Republic of China's finances. But we are even more concerned about the mess that the Ministry of Finance refers to as a "sound program."
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.17
社論－我們擔心財政 更擔心財政部
本報訊
為因應惠譽、標準普爾等信評機構對台灣財政與舉債狀況的嚴厲批評，財政部承行政院之命，在九月上旬提出了洋洋灑灑的穩健財政方案。就文宣技巧而言，該方案似乎有啦啦隊的效果：要推動十大策略、三大核心管理、開拓地方自有財源、「省錢、找錢、賺錢」三路著手。但是容我們不客氣的指出，這個方案是個凌亂拼湊、觀念混淆的雜燴，既不願面對租稅負擔率偏低的問題，也不敢考慮中長期的租稅架構調整，對國家租稅的整體觀念更是混淆不清。
台灣的租稅負擔率長年來約不到十五％，比所有經濟先進國家都來得低。這麼低的稅負率表示：除非台灣政府規模超級迷你，否則無論如何都會面對政府支出難以為繼的窘境。不只如此，馬總統政見中所宣示要辦理的愛台十二建設、以及最近因為世界經濟不景氣而應急所需的公共支出，在在都使得政府財政捉襟見肘。但是不負責任的政客就是不敢面對真正的問題，只知道討好民眾、保住官位。財政部在過去一年即使財務危機已現，卻還是不斷地減稅、減稅、減稅。到如今財政缺口明白呈現，主事者卻還是在玩三大核心、十大策略的文字遊戲。這種牛皮糖式的惰性作為，真是令人大開眼界。
我們說財政部不敢面對問題，可是有憑有據的。依照財政部李部長目前的規畫，政府的財務缺口要靠釋股以為彌補。李部長說，政府所持股票若能賣掉四○％，對盈餘沒影響，釋股後ＩＰＯ，對公司好對政府也好。李部長認為這是「以股票換鈔票」，背後卻完全沒有「公股」的概念掌握，聽來令人毛骨悚然。如果國家財政大計就只是平時減稅、窮時釋股這麼簡單，那麼國家何必要設財政部？大學何必要教財政學？馬政府又何必要設置賦稅改革委員會？賦改會開會一年多，竟然把國家財政弄成這副田地，這是何等的諷刺？
在財務概念上，用股票賺股息或賣股票變現，都有數量與時機的細緻考量，絕對不是像李部長所想的那麼簡單，「賣掉四○％對盈餘沒影響」。如果國家的財政主管完全沒有中長期的規畫，只為了應急就倉卒賣掉四○％的金雞母，我們除了瞠目結舌，真不知道如何面對。再說，賣股票能夠解決租稅負擔率偏低的問題嗎？下半年賣祖產，不正凸顯出上半年初財政部主導降稅的荒謬嗎？
此外，國營事業股票並不是樣樣都適合出售。有些國營事業的存在有其公共政策目的，故釋股將引發牟利民間持有者與官股政策的根本衝突。民間購買股票當然是為了賺錢；假設民間購股者無法影響政府政策，表示其賺錢的目標會受到壓抑。此時，這股票就沒有市場價值，賣不到什麼好價錢。如果民間購股者壓過了公股股權，則表示政府政策目標失守，該事業就不再能支持公營目的。財政部既要釋出公股賺錢、又要維持政策目的，根本就弄不清楚公股背後的意義，是夢囈之詞，虛幻而不切實際。
以台糖為例，政府有時為了水土保持的政策目的，要將台糖土地拿去造林。但讀者當能想像，台糖若有民股，民股會誓死反對此種不賺錢的造林作為。此外，有些國營事業（如台灣菸酒公司）轄下有大筆古蹟，往往需因古蹟維護而妨礙利益追逐。貿然釋出公股而欠缺公有事業的理念宏觀，勢將引發另一波爭議。
台灣當前的財政困境，坦白說檯面上的主管政務官要負最大的責任。依行政院估算，中央政府的預算將在明年或後年就編不出來。這樣的迫切危機，需要有能力的人、有視野的稅改計畫來解決，絕不是貿然釋股所能成事。而即便是適合釋股的公司，殺金雞母也只有一次性收入，對於國家財政赤字也只是杯水車薪，根本無助於解決結構性的問題。我們幾可斷言，依財政部的方案執行，明年台灣的信評必然不可能改善。我們憂心台灣的財政，但更憂心財政部凌亂雜燴的所謂「健全方案」。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 16, 2009
Rating agencies such as Fitch and Standard & Poor's have harshly criticized the Republic of China's fiscal and debt situation. In September, the Ministry of Finance, under orders from the Executive Yuan, responded with a great flourish, by offering a "sound financial policy." From a public relations perspective, the program does seems to be boosting morale. It includes ten strategies. It includes three core management strategies to help local governments develop their own financial resources. It includes a three part way to "save money, find money, and make money." We must however point out that the program is a patchwork quilt of confused concepts. It reveals an unwillingness to confront the problem of too low tax rates, or consider long-term changes to the tax structure. Its reveals an even more confused understanding of the nation's tax system.
For years the Republic of China's tax rate has been less than 15%. It is much lower than that of all economically advanced countries. With such a low tax rate, unless the size of the Republic of China government is ultra-small, it must face the dilemma of unsustainable government spending. Not only that, President Ma's campaign platform included "Twelve Love Taiwan Construction Projects." More recently an emergency response to the global economic downturn has necessitated even more public spending. These have left the nation's finances in dire straits. But irresponsible politicians are afraid to face the real problem. They only want to appease voters to protect their jobs. Over the past year, despite the financial crisis, the Ministry of Finance has talked only of tax cuts. Today, the deficit is obvious. Yet the ruling authorities are still playing strategic word games with Three Core Management Strategies and Twelve Love Taiwan Construction Projects. Such obstinacy is truly mind-boggling.
We have good reason for saying that the Ministry of Finance lacks the courage to face the problem. According to Minister of Finance Li, the government's fiscal deficit will be made up through a public offering. Minister Li said that if the government sells 40% of its holdings, it will have no impact on earnings. An IPO will be good for the government and good for the company. Minister Li considers this a "stock certificates for dollar bills" scheme. He has absolutely no understanding of the concept of "public shares." Listening to him makes one skin crawl. If the government's finances require nothing more than tax cuts during normal times, and public offerings during times of crisis, why does the government need a Ministry of Finance? Why bother to teach finance in the universities? Why does the Ma administration need a Tax Reform Commission? The commission has been meeting for over a year. And this is its contribution to the nation's finances? How ironic.
Using shares of stock to earn dividends, or selling shares of stock to raise cash, requires detailed consideration of both the amounts involved and the timing of the transactions. It is hardly as simple as what Minister Lee suggests when he says "selling 40% of the government's shares will have no impact on earnings." The government's chief of finance has no medium to long term planning. He wants to hastily sell 40% of a cash cow. We are simply dumbfounded. Besides, how will selling stock address the problem of excessively low tax rates? Selling our heritage during the second half of the year merely highlights the absurdity of the Ministry of Finance's tax cuts during the first half of the year.
Besides, not all state-owned enterprises should be sold. Some state-owned enterprises have public policy functions. Therefore, the sale of shares will lead to a fundamental conflicts between profit-making private sector share holders and the government. People buy stocks to make money. If private sector shareholders cannot influence government policy, that means their profits are being adversely affected. When this happens, the stock will lose its market value. They will no longer command high prices. If private sector shareholders overwhelm the public offering, that means the government's policy objectives have failed. That means the government's justifications for a public enterprise cannot withstand scrutiny. If the Ministry of Finance must make a public offering of government shares to raise money, and support its policy objectives, then it doesn't understand the reason for public shares. It is hallucinating. It is indulging in unrealistic fantasies.
Take TaiSugar (TSC) for example. In order to meet soil and water conservation policy objectives, the government may at time reforest TaiSugar land. But as readers can imagine, if TSC has private shares, private sector shareholders will oppose it, since reforestation earns not profits. Furthermore, some state-owned enterprises, such as the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Company, own large numbers of ancient artifacts. Often safeguarding historic artifacts interferes with the pursuit of profits. The hasty sale of public shares, without a sound understanding of the macro-level function of public enterprises, will merely lead to further controversy.
The high-profile political appointees on the political stage bear the greatest responsibility for the Republic of China's current financial difficulties. According to the Executive Yuan, the central government cannot come up with a budget for either next year or the year after. Such an urgent crisis requires people of ability. It requires people of vision to revise the tax plans. It does not require the reckless selling of public shares. Even with companies suitable for sale, killing the cash cow is a one time proposition. In terms of the national deficit, it is merely a drop in the bucket. It will not solve the nation's structural problems. If the Ministry of Finance implements its program, our sovereign rating for next year will not improve. We are concerned about the Republic of China's finances. But we are even more concerned about the mess that the Ministry of Finance refers to as a "sound program."
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.17
社論－我們擔心財政 更擔心財政部
本報訊
為因應惠譽、標準普爾等信評機構對台灣財政與舉債狀況的嚴厲批評，財政部承行政院之命，在九月上旬提出了洋洋灑灑的穩健財政方案。就文宣技巧而言，該方案似乎有啦啦隊的效果：要推動十大策略、三大核心管理、開拓地方自有財源、「省錢、找錢、賺錢」三路著手。但是容我們不客氣的指出，這個方案是個凌亂拼湊、觀念混淆的雜燴，既不願面對租稅負擔率偏低的問題，也不敢考慮中長期的租稅架構調整，對國家租稅的整體觀念更是混淆不清。
台灣的租稅負擔率長年來約不到十五％，比所有經濟先進國家都來得低。這麼低的稅負率表示：除非台灣政府規模超級迷你，否則無論如何都會面對政府支出難以為繼的窘境。不只如此，馬總統政見中所宣示要辦理的愛台十二建設、以及最近因為世界經濟不景氣而應急所需的公共支出，在在都使得政府財政捉襟見肘。但是不負責任的政客就是不敢面對真正的問題，只知道討好民眾、保住官位。財政部在過去一年即使財務危機已現，卻還是不斷地減稅、減稅、減稅。到如今財政缺口明白呈現，主事者卻還是在玩三大核心、十大策略的文字遊戲。這種牛皮糖式的惰性作為，真是令人大開眼界。
我們說財政部不敢面對問題，可是有憑有據的。依照財政部李部長目前的規畫，政府的財務缺口要靠釋股以為彌補。李部長說，政府所持股票若能賣掉四○％，對盈餘沒影響，釋股後ＩＰＯ，對公司好對政府也好。李部長認為這是「以股票換鈔票」，背後卻完全沒有「公股」的概念掌握，聽來令人毛骨悚然。如果國家財政大計就只是平時減稅、窮時釋股這麼簡單，那麼國家何必要設財政部？大學何必要教財政學？馬政府又何必要設置賦稅改革委員會？賦改會開會一年多，竟然把國家財政弄成這副田地，這是何等的諷刺？
在財務概念上，用股票賺股息或賣股票變現，都有數量與時機的細緻考量，絕對不是像李部長所想的那麼簡單，「賣掉四○％對盈餘沒影響」。如果國家的財政主管完全沒有中長期的規畫，只為了應急就倉卒賣掉四○％的金雞母，我們除了瞠目結舌，真不知道如何面對。再說，賣股票能夠解決租稅負擔率偏低的問題嗎？下半年賣祖產，不正凸顯出上半年初財政部主導降稅的荒謬嗎？
此外，國營事業股票並不是樣樣都適合出售。有些國營事業的存在有其公共政策目的，故釋股將引發牟利民間持有者與官股政策的根本衝突。民間購買股票當然是為了賺錢；假設民間購股者無法影響政府政策，表示其賺錢的目標會受到壓抑。此時，這股票就沒有市場價值，賣不到什麼好價錢。如果民間購股者壓過了公股股權，則表示政府政策目標失守，該事業就不再能支持公營目的。財政部既要釋出公股賺錢、又要維持政策目的，根本就弄不清楚公股背後的意義，是夢囈之詞，虛幻而不切實際。
以台糖為例，政府有時為了水土保持的政策目的，要將台糖土地拿去造林。但讀者當能想像，台糖若有民股，民股會誓死反對此種不賺錢的造林作為。此外，有些國營事業（如台灣菸酒公司）轄下有大筆古蹟，往往需因古蹟維護而妨礙利益追逐。貿然釋出公股而欠缺公有事業的理念宏觀，勢將引發另一波爭議。
台灣當前的財政困境，坦白說檯面上的主管政務官要負最大的責任。依行政院估算，中央政府的預算將在明年或後年就編不出來。這樣的迫切危機，需要有能力的人、有視野的稅改計畫來解決，絕不是貿然釋股所能成事。而即便是適合釋股的公司，殺金雞母也只有一次性收入，對於國家財政赤字也只是杯水車薪，根本無助於解決結構性的問題。我們幾可斷言，依財政部的方案執行，明年台灣的信評必然不可能改善。我們憂心台灣的財政，但更憂心財政部凌亂雜燴的所謂「健全方案」。
The DPP Should Demand that Chen Shui-bian Cough Up the Money
The DPP Should Demand that Chen Shui-bian Cough Up the Money
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 16, 2009
Four members of the Chen family have received heavy sentences and stiff fines. But justice hasn't been done. The court is imposing stiff fines on the Chen family, confiscating Chen family assets, and imposing taxes on the Chen family's undeclared assets. But the court's rulings won't necessarily force the Chen family to cough up its ill-gotten gains.
First, let's clarify the district court's ruling on the money. The court held that Chen Shui-bian must serve a life sentenceand pay a 200 million NT fine. Wu Shu-chen must serve a life sentence and pay a 300 million NT fine. Chen Chih-chung must serve a two years six months sentence and pay a 150 million NT fine. Huang Jui-ching must serve a one year and eight months sentence and pay a 150 million NT fine. The four fines together add up to 850 million NT. Superficially the fine is intimidating, but in fact it's a toothless paper tiger. That's because the court is allowing them to work off their fines. No matter how much they have been fined, the longest any of them will have to work is six months. In other words, if the four of them refuse to cough up the money, each of them will only have to work for six months. They will then be free and clear. Do the math. What's another six months to them? Therefore this 850 million is as good as gone.
The court has imposed stiff fines on the Chen family, confiscated Chen family assets, and levied taxes on the Chen family's illegal income. Among them, Ah-Cheng and her accomplices are liable for 500 million NT. Chen Chih-chung, Huang Juiching is liable for 350 million NT. Together, they must cough up 850 million NT. If the Chen family fails to cough up this sum, the court will seek to recover the funds by liquidating Chen family assets. But according to media reports, the value of Chen family assets on Taiwan does not exceed 500 million NT. That is not enough. Also, before the justice system has a chance to confiscate the Chen family's wealth, it may be transferred. If it is, additional obstacles will arise. Therefore the Chen family knows this part of the game is lost. It is resigned to forfeiting its assets on Taiwan and being done with it. So what if it is fined 850 million NT?
Finally, Huang Jui-ching was given probation, but she must pay 200 million in fines. This is the government's only pressure point on the Chen family. If Huang Jui-ching refuses to cough up 200 million NT, her probation can be revoked. The result would be imprisonment along with Chen Chih-chung. The court allowed one member of the couple to enjoy conditional probation. But if the Chen family is ruthless enough, it may choose to serve the time instead, and this 200 million would be as good gone also.
As we can see, if we really want to recover the Chen family's ill-gotten gains, we must start with the money it has transferred overseas. The quickest way this money can be recovered, is if the Chen family cooperates fully. It must first plead guilty. This will establish the legal status of the funds. The Chen family must complete all procedures and submit all documents required by the justice system of foreign governments or foreign banks. Our own justice system can then use this evidence to recover the money. Of course to convince the Chen family to agreed to this, one must convince all of its members. Based on current observation, the most resistant member appears to be Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian's obstinacy is a result of the DPP's pusillanimity, together with the mob passions of a small number of Deep Green Ah-Bian supporters. The DPP however, is the key. The Democratic Progressive Party prattles on about procedural matters. It is either unwilling or afraid to confront Chen's corrupt behavior. This gives Chen Shui-bian with room to maneuver. It allows people who don't understand the issue to believe all sorts of lies. Annette Lu said she does not condone corruption, and that the Chen family must apologize. But this is not enough. The DPP must demand that the Chen family plead guilty and cooperate in recovering the embezzled funds. It must demand justice. If the Democratic Progressive Party does this, from top to bottom, Chen Shui-bian will be forced to confront the public. No matter what the DPP might think of the Chen corruption trial, it must demand that Chen Shui-bian return the money it has squirreled overseas. This is the bottom line.
If the Chen family remains obdurate to the bitter end, then the justice system has no choice but to prosecute it to the fullest extent of the law. It will then have to await the third instance court verdict. The court will ascertain that these funds were criminal proceeds. It will then recover them with the help of foreign governments. This will of course take a long time. Many obstacles may arise. For example, the DPP has repeatedly demanded Chen Shui-bian's release, Other Chen family members are not currently in custody. They cannot be forbidden to leave the country indefinitely. If they are, it will lead to political controversy. Once Chen family members are free to travel abroad, who knows what actions they will take while abroad. If they file suit against our justice system from overseas, then recovery of the embezzled funds will become a distant dream.
Imagine one day news stories of the Chen family living in the lap of luxury overseas. How will people feel? Having said that, we must once again condemn former Bureau of Investigation Chief Yeh Sheng-mao. The Egmont Group provided evidence that the Chen family was engaged in money-laundering. This corrupt bureau chief leaked the entire story to Chen Shui-bian. As a result the Chen family swiftly transferred its funds overseas, making it difficult to uncover the truth today. With such a Bureau of Investigation Chief, no wonder justice is so difficult to uphold, and the justice system is in such disrepute.
民進黨該教陳水扁把錢吐出來
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.09.16 03:09 am
扁家四人被判重刑及高額罰金，但社會正義並沒有得到伸張。因為，法院判的罰金、沒收、追繳及追徵，即使定讞，也未必能夠逼他們將貪汙得來的錢吐出來。
首先釐清法院判決有關錢的部分。法院判定陳水扁應執行刑是無期徒刑，併科二億元罰金；吳淑珍是無期徒刑，併科三億元罰金；陳致中則是有期徒刑二年六月，併科一億五千萬元罰金；黃睿靚一年八月，併科一億五千萬元罰金。四人罰金加起來高達八億，看起來很嚇人，但其實是沒有牙齒的紙老虎。因為這些罰金，法院皆准其易服勞役；且不管罰多少錢，四人折算的易服勞役最高都是六個月。也就是說，四人若不肯拿出錢來，每人只消服六個月的勞役就可抵帳了事。打打算盤，多這六個月他們會在乎嗎？因此，這八億也許就一筆勾消了。
接下來是法院判決應沒收、追繳或者追徵的各項犯罪不法所得。其中，扁珍和一干次級罪犯連帶負責的總共是五億元，陳致中、黃睿靚則是三億五千萬元，合計八億五千萬元。這部分扁家不拿出來的話，會被追徵財產。但是，扁家留在台灣的財產，據媒體報導價值不會超過五億元；非但不夠，而且司法機關還沒有去查扣，一旦有移轉，又將增添障礙。所以說，扁家心裡有數，這部分躲不過的，那就把留在台灣的家底都丟出去完事，判八億五千萬元又怎樣？
最後是黃睿靚被判緩刑，但須向公庫繳納二億元的部分。這是唯一對扁家有一點壓力的地方。黃睿靚不繳納二億元，其緩刑宣告可以撤銷，結果就是和陳致中一起坐牢。原先法院在他們夫婦之中擇一人給予有條件緩刑，但若扁家心夠狠，寧可坐牢也不在乎，那這二億元也就落空了。
從以上的整理可以得知：真正要追出扁家的貪汙所得，還是要從海外的錢下手。若要追回這些錢，最快的辦法就是扁家充分配合，先認罪，使這些錢的性質確定；且扁家完成並交出外國政府或司法機關、銀行要求的一切手續和文件，我國司法機關再據以索回款項。當然，要扁家同意這麼做，必須說服其全部成員；以目前情況看來，抗拒最力的人就是陳水扁。而陳水扁態度頑強，和民進黨的軟弱，以及部分深綠挺扁群眾的激情有著密切的關聯性。其中，民進黨又是關鍵。民進黨至今空談一些程序問題，始終不肯或不敢正面評價陳水扁的貪腐行為，這給了陳水扁操作的空間，也讓不明就裡的群眾產生幻想。呂秀蓮說，不挺貪腐，扁家應再道歉；但這還不夠，民進黨應該要求扁家認罪，立即配合追回贓款，以伸張社會正義。倘若民進黨上上下下都這麼說，陳水扁就必須面對國人。無論民進黨對扁案作何看法，應當叫陳水扁把海外的錢匯回，這是底線。
扁家若頑抗到底，那就只好走完司法程序，待三審判決確定，法院認定了那些贓款，再循國際互助途徑，追回款項。這當然要等待很長一段時間，中間變數也多。例如，民進黨一再叫嚷釋放陳水扁，其他扁家成員現在既未羈押，也不可能長期限制出境，否則又會引起紛爭；一旦扁家成員可以自由出入國門，則其在海外會採取什麼行動，殊難逆料。倘若他們在海外針對我國司法機關提出對應的訴訟，則拿回贓款恐怕就更遙遙無期了。
想像未來某一天，新聞報導：扁家某某在海外過著吃香喝辣的豪奢生活，國人將作何感想？說到這裡，就不能不再譴責前調查局長葉盛茂。當初艾格蒙聯盟提供扁家洗錢情資，這位媚上欺下的局長全部洩露給陳水扁，於是扁家趕緊在海外到處藏錢，至今真相難明。有這種調查局長，莫怪正義難伸，司法蒙羞。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 16, 2009
Four members of the Chen family have received heavy sentences and stiff fines. But justice hasn't been done. The court is imposing stiff fines on the Chen family, confiscating Chen family assets, and imposing taxes on the Chen family's undeclared assets. But the court's rulings won't necessarily force the Chen family to cough up its ill-gotten gains.
First, let's clarify the district court's ruling on the money. The court held that Chen Shui-bian must serve a life sentenceand pay a 200 million NT fine. Wu Shu-chen must serve a life sentence and pay a 300 million NT fine. Chen Chih-chung must serve a two years six months sentence and pay a 150 million NT fine. Huang Jui-ching must serve a one year and eight months sentence and pay a 150 million NT fine. The four fines together add up to 850 million NT. Superficially the fine is intimidating, but in fact it's a toothless paper tiger. That's because the court is allowing them to work off their fines. No matter how much they have been fined, the longest any of them will have to work is six months. In other words, if the four of them refuse to cough up the money, each of them will only have to work for six months. They will then be free and clear. Do the math. What's another six months to them? Therefore this 850 million is as good as gone.
The court has imposed stiff fines on the Chen family, confiscated Chen family assets, and levied taxes on the Chen family's illegal income. Among them, Ah-Cheng and her accomplices are liable for 500 million NT. Chen Chih-chung, Huang Juiching is liable for 350 million NT. Together, they must cough up 850 million NT. If the Chen family fails to cough up this sum, the court will seek to recover the funds by liquidating Chen family assets. But according to media reports, the value of Chen family assets on Taiwan does not exceed 500 million NT. That is not enough. Also, before the justice system has a chance to confiscate the Chen family's wealth, it may be transferred. If it is, additional obstacles will arise. Therefore the Chen family knows this part of the game is lost. It is resigned to forfeiting its assets on Taiwan and being done with it. So what if it is fined 850 million NT?
Finally, Huang Jui-ching was given probation, but she must pay 200 million in fines. This is the government's only pressure point on the Chen family. If Huang Jui-ching refuses to cough up 200 million NT, her probation can be revoked. The result would be imprisonment along with Chen Chih-chung. The court allowed one member of the couple to enjoy conditional probation. But if the Chen family is ruthless enough, it may choose to serve the time instead, and this 200 million would be as good gone also.
As we can see, if we really want to recover the Chen family's ill-gotten gains, we must start with the money it has transferred overseas. The quickest way this money can be recovered, is if the Chen family cooperates fully. It must first plead guilty. This will establish the legal status of the funds. The Chen family must complete all procedures and submit all documents required by the justice system of foreign governments or foreign banks. Our own justice system can then use this evidence to recover the money. Of course to convince the Chen family to agreed to this, one must convince all of its members. Based on current observation, the most resistant member appears to be Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian's obstinacy is a result of the DPP's pusillanimity, together with the mob passions of a small number of Deep Green Ah-Bian supporters. The DPP however, is the key. The Democratic Progressive Party prattles on about procedural matters. It is either unwilling or afraid to confront Chen's corrupt behavior. This gives Chen Shui-bian with room to maneuver. It allows people who don't understand the issue to believe all sorts of lies. Annette Lu said she does not condone corruption, and that the Chen family must apologize. But this is not enough. The DPP must demand that the Chen family plead guilty and cooperate in recovering the embezzled funds. It must demand justice. If the Democratic Progressive Party does this, from top to bottom, Chen Shui-bian will be forced to confront the public. No matter what the DPP might think of the Chen corruption trial, it must demand that Chen Shui-bian return the money it has squirreled overseas. This is the bottom line.
If the Chen family remains obdurate to the bitter end, then the justice system has no choice but to prosecute it to the fullest extent of the law. It will then have to await the third instance court verdict. The court will ascertain that these funds were criminal proceeds. It will then recover them with the help of foreign governments. This will of course take a long time. Many obstacles may arise. For example, the DPP has repeatedly demanded Chen Shui-bian's release, Other Chen family members are not currently in custody. They cannot be forbidden to leave the country indefinitely. If they are, it will lead to political controversy. Once Chen family members are free to travel abroad, who knows what actions they will take while abroad. If they file suit against our justice system from overseas, then recovery of the embezzled funds will become a distant dream.
Imagine one day news stories of the Chen family living in the lap of luxury overseas. How will people feel? Having said that, we must once again condemn former Bureau of Investigation Chief Yeh Sheng-mao. The Egmont Group provided evidence that the Chen family was engaged in money-laundering. This corrupt bureau chief leaked the entire story to Chen Shui-bian. As a result the Chen family swiftly transferred its funds overseas, making it difficult to uncover the truth today. With such a Bureau of Investigation Chief, no wonder justice is so difficult to uphold, and the justice system is in such disrepute.
民進黨該教陳水扁把錢吐出來
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.09.16 03:09 am
扁家四人被判重刑及高額罰金，但社會正義並沒有得到伸張。因為，法院判的罰金、沒收、追繳及追徵，即使定讞，也未必能夠逼他們將貪汙得來的錢吐出來。
首先釐清法院判決有關錢的部分。法院判定陳水扁應執行刑是無期徒刑，併科二億元罰金；吳淑珍是無期徒刑，併科三億元罰金；陳致中則是有期徒刑二年六月，併科一億五千萬元罰金；黃睿靚一年八月，併科一億五千萬元罰金。四人罰金加起來高達八億，看起來很嚇人，但其實是沒有牙齒的紙老虎。因為這些罰金，法院皆准其易服勞役；且不管罰多少錢，四人折算的易服勞役最高都是六個月。也就是說，四人若不肯拿出錢來，每人只消服六個月的勞役就可抵帳了事。打打算盤，多這六個月他們會在乎嗎？因此，這八億也許就一筆勾消了。
接下來是法院判決應沒收、追繳或者追徵的各項犯罪不法所得。其中，扁珍和一干次級罪犯連帶負責的總共是五億元，陳致中、黃睿靚則是三億五千萬元，合計八億五千萬元。這部分扁家不拿出來的話，會被追徵財產。但是，扁家留在台灣的財產，據媒體報導價值不會超過五億元；非但不夠，而且司法機關還沒有去查扣，一旦有移轉，又將增添障礙。所以說，扁家心裡有數，這部分躲不過的，那就把留在台灣的家底都丟出去完事，判八億五千萬元又怎樣？
最後是黃睿靚被判緩刑，但須向公庫繳納二億元的部分。這是唯一對扁家有一點壓力的地方。黃睿靚不繳納二億元，其緩刑宣告可以撤銷，結果就是和陳致中一起坐牢。原先法院在他們夫婦之中擇一人給予有條件緩刑，但若扁家心夠狠，寧可坐牢也不在乎，那這二億元也就落空了。
從以上的整理可以得知：真正要追出扁家的貪汙所得，還是要從海外的錢下手。若要追回這些錢，最快的辦法就是扁家充分配合，先認罪，使這些錢的性質確定；且扁家完成並交出外國政府或司法機關、銀行要求的一切手續和文件，我國司法機關再據以索回款項。當然，要扁家同意這麼做，必須說服其全部成員；以目前情況看來，抗拒最力的人就是陳水扁。而陳水扁態度頑強，和民進黨的軟弱，以及部分深綠挺扁群眾的激情有著密切的關聯性。其中，民進黨又是關鍵。民進黨至今空談一些程序問題，始終不肯或不敢正面評價陳水扁的貪腐行為，這給了陳水扁操作的空間，也讓不明就裡的群眾產生幻想。呂秀蓮說，不挺貪腐，扁家應再道歉；但這還不夠，民進黨應該要求扁家認罪，立即配合追回贓款，以伸張社會正義。倘若民進黨上上下下都這麼說，陳水扁就必須面對國人。無論民進黨對扁案作何看法，應當叫陳水扁把海外的錢匯回，這是底線。
扁家若頑抗到底，那就只好走完司法程序，待三審判決確定，法院認定了那些贓款，再循國際互助途徑，追回款項。這當然要等待很長一段時間，中間變數也多。例如，民進黨一再叫嚷釋放陳水扁，其他扁家成員現在既未羈押，也不可能長期限制出境，否則又會引起紛爭；一旦扁家成員可以自由出入國門，則其在海外會採取什麼行動，殊難逆料。倘若他們在海外針對我國司法機關提出對應的訴訟，則拿回贓款恐怕就更遙遙無期了。
想像未來某一天，新聞報導：扁家某某在海外過著吃香喝辣的豪奢生活，國人將作何感想？說到這裡，就不能不再譴責前調查局長葉盛茂。當初艾格蒙聯盟提供扁家洗錢情資，這位媚上欺下的局長全部洩露給陳水扁，於是扁家趕緊在海外到處藏錢，至今真相難明。有這種調查局長，莫怪正義難伸，司法蒙羞。
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
The Cabinet Must Not Deselect People of Talent
The Cabinet Must Not Deselect People of Talent
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 15, 2009
President Ma and Liu Chao-hsuan's public approval ratings have recovered substantially following the general resignation of the Liu cabinet. The TAIEX soared at the news. Clearly the public approved of the Liu cabinet's decision to assume responsibility for the 8/8 Flood by resigning en masse. But the day after the makeup of the new cabinet was announced, the court handed down its first instance verdict in the Chen corruption case. The public had no time to analyze and comment on the cabinet reshuffling. But the Chen corruption case has now receded from the headlines, and the cabinet reshuffling will have an impact on Taiwan's future. Therefore it is time we subjected it to further review.
Long before the 8/8 Flood, the public had already formed either positive or negative impressions of the Liu cabinet. Some cabinet members had poor public approval ratings. During the recent cabinet reshuffling, these cabinet members were replaced. They include Chen Chao-min, Chen Ching-hsiu, Francisco Ou, and Yin Chi-ming. Some cabinet members had very poor public approval ratings, but have unexpectedly been asked to stay on. Other cabinet members had good public approval ratings. Some of them were even model cabinet members. These include former Education Minister Cheng Jui-cheng and former Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning Chen Tian-chi. Yet for some unexplained reason, they have left. The majority of cabinet members' performance was not bad. They should have remained in office. The aforementioned cabinet reshuffling involved four types of cabinet members. Two types provoked the greatest anxiety. They were "those who should have left, but didn't," and "those who should not have left, but did." These two types were, in effect, deselections." Politically speaking, "deselections" are an extremely undesirable phenomenon. Whenever they occur, we should be alarmed.
Put plainly, deselections are a case of "selecting the bad" combined with "deselecting the good." It includes those who occupy positions of responsibility but do no work, and those whose hearts aren't in their jobs. They end up performing poorly and harming the nation. Many people on Taiwan miss the late President Chiang Ching-kuo because during his term of office he laid the foundations for Taiwan's economic development. This foundation was created by Sun Yun-suan, Li Kuo-ting and other capable and industrious ministers. Sun and Li were willing to dedicate their lives to the nation for two reasons. One, the legislature was not as fierce and crude as it is today. Two, they wielded clearly delegated powers, making it clear what their subordinates had to do. A healthy political culture can attract talented people from near and far. But an unhealthy political culture can result in the "deselection" of people of talent.
Take Chen Tian-chi for example, the cabinet's financial and economic "model student." Much to everyone's regret, he has resigned and returned to National Taiwan University to teach. Rationally speaking, why should he serve as a cabinet official when he can serve as a professor? Why attend endless meetings every day, eating greasy box lunches, sleeping fitfully at night, enduring verbal abuse in the Legislative Yuan, merely for three square meals a day? Such hardships make it difficult to maintain one's ideals. They make one fearful of the bureaucratic jungle. Most importantly, one may be willing to kill oneself in an effort to contribute to the greater good. But the environment will prevent one from accomplishing anything worthwhile. This deep divide between contribution and accomplishment makes serving in a cabinet a life-shortening experience. Accepting a cabinet position is not something a rational and competent economist is inclined to do. The Republic of China government lacks the objective conditions necessary to attract talented people. The only way to retain such people is appeals to idealism. When people who need to be kept on choose to leave, it means they have become bitterly disillusioned. For those in authority, this is definitely a warning sign.
Conversely, when those who ought to leave stay on, that constitutes another public setback, another crisis of confidence. Over the past year, the Blue and Green media, the financial press, domestic scholars and experts and foreign rating agencies, have repeatedly criticized the government's financial plans. They feel the serious public sector budget deficit bodes poorly for the nation's credit rating. Recently published international competitiveness ratings indicate that the Republic of China's ranking has improved. But that is primarily due to the Ma administration's deregulation of cross-Strait policy and gradual liberalization of industry. These are unrelated to the budget deficit. In terms of practical policy, the disaster relief efforts of the Ministry of Finance and the Department of Defense were roughly equal. But the result was Chen Chao-min stepped down, while Li Shu-teh stayed on.
The current cabinet reshuffling resulted in many cabinet members who should have departed staying on, and many cabinet members who should have stayed on, departing. The frustration felt by these cabinet members is of lesser importance. Of greater importance is public concern over the determination of Taiwan's financial and economic policies. In fact, the vast majority of the public has no personal relationship with the president, cabinet members, or other high-ranking officials. Who is in and who is out, who will stay and who will leave, makes no difference to them personally, All they know is how they feel about the administration. This may sound abstract, but at election time their feelings will be translated into votes. If qualified financial and economic experts desert the administration, many people may feel let down. For President Ma the most serious concern may be the loss of votes. To bring down the Republic of China's finances may take two or three years. But to leave people frustrated and disappointed about the economic outlook, will take no time at all.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.15
社論－閣員更替千萬不能有「反向選擇」
本報訊
這一次內閣總辭過後，馬總統與劉兆玄前院長的民調支持率皆明顯回升，台北股市亦以大幅上漲以為慶祝，顯示台灣人民大體對於內閣總辭負起水患救災責任，是給予肯定的。然由於在新閣名單底定之後第二天就恰逢扁案一審宣判，輿論也就來不及對內閣改組一事多所析論。現在，隨著扁案熱潮消褪，我們確實該對關係台灣未來發展的內閣重組，做進一步的檢視。
早在八八水患之前，坊間對於舊內閣成員的表現，早就有或褒或貶的評價。有些閣員的民間評價不佳，而也在此次改組中順勢去職，包括陳肇敏、陳清秀、歐鴻鍊、尹啟銘。有閣員民間評價頗差，但改組後意外獲得留任。有些閣員坊間評價不差，甚至列為閣員的模範生，如前教育部長鄭瑞城與前經建會主委陳添枝，他們都莫名其妙地走人。當然，大部分閣員表現不惡，都屬於應該留任者。在前述四類閣員洗牌類型中最令民眾不安的，應該是「該走的沒走、不該走的卻走了」這兩類，屬於標準的「反向選擇」。政治上若出現反向選擇，其實是極為糟糕的情境，值得警惕。
用白話文來說，反向選擇就是「來者不善、善者不來」。所謂善者不來，當然是指人才的裹足不前；而所謂來者不善，又是指政治上那些尸位素餐、曲意承歡之輩誤事誤國。蔣經國總統之所以令許多台灣人懷念，是因為他任內奠定了台灣經濟發展的基礎，而這個基礎，正是由孫運璿、李國鼎等能幹閣員所打拚出來的。孫、李等人之所以願意搏命奉獻，一則是由於當年的國會不像今日之剽悍與粗魯，二則是因為大老闆授權明確，使得下屬有清楚的打拚目標。良好的政治環境總能創造出這樣一個能人志士「近悅遠來」的情境，但是不好的政治環境就反而會造成人才的反向選擇。
以內閣的財經模範生陳添枝為例，其去職返回台大教書就令人相當惋惜。從理性的角度來看，好好一個教授不做，發神經去內閣做官？每天開不完的會、吃不完的油膩便當、睡不好的夜晚、按三餐挨立法院罵、難以堅持理想、令人戒慎恐懼的官場生態；最重要的是，賣命付出卻難有成就的大環境。這樣不成比例的「投入與產出」，是百分之百的折壽行業，理性與能幹的經濟學者一般而言是不會做的。台灣若沒有吸引人才從政的外在條件，那麼唯一能使人才投入的吸引力，就只有「理想」二字。當不該走的人才紛紛離去時，就表示他們的理想逐漸幻滅，對主政者而言，這絕對是個警訊。
相反的，如果該走的沒走，對人民而言那也是另一種挫折、另一種信心危機。過去一年，不論是立場偏藍偏綠的媒體、財經專業的報紙、國內的學者專家、國外的信評機構，都一再對台灣政府的財政規畫多所批評，認為公部門預算失衡、赤字嚴重，有極大的潛在信用危機。雖然最近公布的國際競爭力評比顯示台灣的排名有所進步，但那主要是與馬政府兩岸鬆綁、產業管制逐漸開放有關，而與財政赤字全不相干。就實際政策而言，財政部施政慌亂與國防部的救災表現不相上下，但結果卻是陳肇敏下、李述德留。
這一次內閣改組，許多人對於若干閣員「該走的沒走、不該走的卻走了」感到挫折。但對情緒挫折還算事小，重要的是，民眾也對於決定台灣財經政策的領導格局感到憂心。其實，對絕大多數人民而言，他們與總統或閣員等大官是沒有什麼交情的。誰上誰下、誰去誰留，都沒有什麼個人感情考量，唯一有的，就只是那難以名狀的「感覺」。這感覺雖說有些抽象，但在選舉時卻會轉換為具體的選票。財經人才留不住，許多人感到失望。但是對馬總統而言，也許更需要擔心的，是可能失去的「票」。 要把台灣的財政拖垮，可能還得要兩、三年的光陰，但要讓人民對經濟前景挫折失望，那卻是可以立竿見影的。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 15, 2009
President Ma and Liu Chao-hsuan's public approval ratings have recovered substantially following the general resignation of the Liu cabinet. The TAIEX soared at the news. Clearly the public approved of the Liu cabinet's decision to assume responsibility for the 8/8 Flood by resigning en masse. But the day after the makeup of the new cabinet was announced, the court handed down its first instance verdict in the Chen corruption case. The public had no time to analyze and comment on the cabinet reshuffling. But the Chen corruption case has now receded from the headlines, and the cabinet reshuffling will have an impact on Taiwan's future. Therefore it is time we subjected it to further review.
Long before the 8/8 Flood, the public had already formed either positive or negative impressions of the Liu cabinet. Some cabinet members had poor public approval ratings. During the recent cabinet reshuffling, these cabinet members were replaced. They include Chen Chao-min, Chen Ching-hsiu, Francisco Ou, and Yin Chi-ming. Some cabinet members had very poor public approval ratings, but have unexpectedly been asked to stay on. Other cabinet members had good public approval ratings. Some of them were even model cabinet members. These include former Education Minister Cheng Jui-cheng and former Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning Chen Tian-chi. Yet for some unexplained reason, they have left. The majority of cabinet members' performance was not bad. They should have remained in office. The aforementioned cabinet reshuffling involved four types of cabinet members. Two types provoked the greatest anxiety. They were "those who should have left, but didn't," and "those who should not have left, but did." These two types were, in effect, deselections." Politically speaking, "deselections" are an extremely undesirable phenomenon. Whenever they occur, we should be alarmed.
Put plainly, deselections are a case of "selecting the bad" combined with "deselecting the good." It includes those who occupy positions of responsibility but do no work, and those whose hearts aren't in their jobs. They end up performing poorly and harming the nation. Many people on Taiwan miss the late President Chiang Ching-kuo because during his term of office he laid the foundations for Taiwan's economic development. This foundation was created by Sun Yun-suan, Li Kuo-ting and other capable and industrious ministers. Sun and Li were willing to dedicate their lives to the nation for two reasons. One, the legislature was not as fierce and crude as it is today. Two, they wielded clearly delegated powers, making it clear what their subordinates had to do. A healthy political culture can attract talented people from near and far. But an unhealthy political culture can result in the "deselection" of people of talent.
Take Chen Tian-chi for example, the cabinet's financial and economic "model student." Much to everyone's regret, he has resigned and returned to National Taiwan University to teach. Rationally speaking, why should he serve as a cabinet official when he can serve as a professor? Why attend endless meetings every day, eating greasy box lunches, sleeping fitfully at night, enduring verbal abuse in the Legislative Yuan, merely for three square meals a day? Such hardships make it difficult to maintain one's ideals. They make one fearful of the bureaucratic jungle. Most importantly, one may be willing to kill oneself in an effort to contribute to the greater good. But the environment will prevent one from accomplishing anything worthwhile. This deep divide between contribution and accomplishment makes serving in a cabinet a life-shortening experience. Accepting a cabinet position is not something a rational and competent economist is inclined to do. The Republic of China government lacks the objective conditions necessary to attract talented people. The only way to retain such people is appeals to idealism. When people who need to be kept on choose to leave, it means they have become bitterly disillusioned. For those in authority, this is definitely a warning sign.
Conversely, when those who ought to leave stay on, that constitutes another public setback, another crisis of confidence. Over the past year, the Blue and Green media, the financial press, domestic scholars and experts and foreign rating agencies, have repeatedly criticized the government's financial plans. They feel the serious public sector budget deficit bodes poorly for the nation's credit rating. Recently published international competitiveness ratings indicate that the Republic of China's ranking has improved. But that is primarily due to the Ma administration's deregulation of cross-Strait policy and gradual liberalization of industry. These are unrelated to the budget deficit. In terms of practical policy, the disaster relief efforts of the Ministry of Finance and the Department of Defense were roughly equal. But the result was Chen Chao-min stepped down, while Li Shu-teh stayed on.
The current cabinet reshuffling resulted in many cabinet members who should have departed staying on, and many cabinet members who should have stayed on, departing. The frustration felt by these cabinet members is of lesser importance. Of greater importance is public concern over the determination of Taiwan's financial and economic policies. In fact, the vast majority of the public has no personal relationship with the president, cabinet members, or other high-ranking officials. Who is in and who is out, who will stay and who will leave, makes no difference to them personally, All they know is how they feel about the administration. This may sound abstract, but at election time their feelings will be translated into votes. If qualified financial and economic experts desert the administration, many people may feel let down. For President Ma the most serious concern may be the loss of votes. To bring down the Republic of China's finances may take two or three years. But to leave people frustrated and disappointed about the economic outlook, will take no time at all.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.15
社論－閣員更替千萬不能有「反向選擇」
本報訊
這一次內閣總辭過後，馬總統與劉兆玄前院長的民調支持率皆明顯回升，台北股市亦以大幅上漲以為慶祝，顯示台灣人民大體對於內閣總辭負起水患救災責任，是給予肯定的。然由於在新閣名單底定之後第二天就恰逢扁案一審宣判，輿論也就來不及對內閣改組一事多所析論。現在，隨著扁案熱潮消褪，我們確實該對關係台灣未來發展的內閣重組，做進一步的檢視。
早在八八水患之前，坊間對於舊內閣成員的表現，早就有或褒或貶的評價。有些閣員的民間評價不佳，而也在此次改組中順勢去職，包括陳肇敏、陳清秀、歐鴻鍊、尹啟銘。有閣員民間評價頗差，但改組後意外獲得留任。有些閣員坊間評價不差，甚至列為閣員的模範生，如前教育部長鄭瑞城與前經建會主委陳添枝，他們都莫名其妙地走人。當然，大部分閣員表現不惡，都屬於應該留任者。在前述四類閣員洗牌類型中最令民眾不安的，應該是「該走的沒走、不該走的卻走了」這兩類，屬於標準的「反向選擇」。政治上若出現反向選擇，其實是極為糟糕的情境，值得警惕。
用白話文來說，反向選擇就是「來者不善、善者不來」。所謂善者不來，當然是指人才的裹足不前；而所謂來者不善，又是指政治上那些尸位素餐、曲意承歡之輩誤事誤國。蔣經國總統之所以令許多台灣人懷念，是因為他任內奠定了台灣經濟發展的基礎，而這個基礎，正是由孫運璿、李國鼎等能幹閣員所打拚出來的。孫、李等人之所以願意搏命奉獻，一則是由於當年的國會不像今日之剽悍與粗魯，二則是因為大老闆授權明確，使得下屬有清楚的打拚目標。良好的政治環境總能創造出這樣一個能人志士「近悅遠來」的情境，但是不好的政治環境就反而會造成人才的反向選擇。
以內閣的財經模範生陳添枝為例，其去職返回台大教書就令人相當惋惜。從理性的角度來看，好好一個教授不做，發神經去內閣做官？每天開不完的會、吃不完的油膩便當、睡不好的夜晚、按三餐挨立法院罵、難以堅持理想、令人戒慎恐懼的官場生態；最重要的是，賣命付出卻難有成就的大環境。這樣不成比例的「投入與產出」，是百分之百的折壽行業，理性與能幹的經濟學者一般而言是不會做的。台灣若沒有吸引人才從政的外在條件，那麼唯一能使人才投入的吸引力，就只有「理想」二字。當不該走的人才紛紛離去時，就表示他們的理想逐漸幻滅，對主政者而言，這絕對是個警訊。
相反的，如果該走的沒走，對人民而言那也是另一種挫折、另一種信心危機。過去一年，不論是立場偏藍偏綠的媒體、財經專業的報紙、國內的學者專家、國外的信評機構，都一再對台灣政府的財政規畫多所批評，認為公部門預算失衡、赤字嚴重，有極大的潛在信用危機。雖然最近公布的國際競爭力評比顯示台灣的排名有所進步，但那主要是與馬政府兩岸鬆綁、產業管制逐漸開放有關，而與財政赤字全不相干。就實際政策而言，財政部施政慌亂與國防部的救災表現不相上下，但結果卻是陳肇敏下、李述德留。
這一次內閣改組，許多人對於若干閣員「該走的沒走、不該走的卻走了」感到挫折。但對情緒挫折還算事小，重要的是，民眾也對於決定台灣財經政策的領導格局感到憂心。其實，對絕大多數人民而言，他們與總統或閣員等大官是沒有什麼交情的。誰上誰下、誰去誰留，都沒有什麼個人感情考量，唯一有的，就只是那難以名狀的「感覺」。這感覺雖說有些抽象，但在選舉時卻會轉換為具體的選票。財經人才留不住，許多人感到失望。但是對馬總統而言，也許更需要擔心的，是可能失去的「票」。 要把台灣的財政拖垮，可能還得要兩、三年的光陰，但要讓人民對經濟前景挫折失望，那卻是可以立竿見影的。
Monday, September 14, 2009
Taiwan's Society and Culture Have Never Condoned Corruption
Taiwan's Society and Culture Have Never Condoned Corruption
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 14, 2009
Former President Chen Shui-bian is once again teaching us something new. He's teaching us the meaning of "social and cultural crimes." The law books contain no such term. Nevertheless Chen Shui-bian's neologism has attracted wide attention. Chen Shui-bian admits what he did was wrong. But he insists that his wrongdoing was a widespread social and cultural phenomenon. Everybody does it, therefore it was no big deal. Besides, if one insists on punishing offenders, Chen argues, then he is hardly the only one guilty of such offenses.
Chen Shui-bian is adept at inventing new terms. He is even more adept at sensing the public mood. He is attempting to create an escape clause for himself. Ever since the Chen corruption case broke, he and his family have astonished the public with their creativity. Every time the evidence proved they were guilty of a crime, they would then confess to that crime, and that crime only. Chen Shui-bian's shrewdest tactic of course, is equivocation. In other words, "We are all guilty." His strategy is to apologize, but never admit wrongdoing. His strategy is to admit wrongdoing, but never admit guilt. His strategy is to admit guilt, but always drag someone else down with him.
When investigators from the prosecutor's office discovered that the Chen family definitely transferred funds overseas, Chen Shui-bian immediately admitted that he "did things not permitted by the law." Chen Shui-bian is a linguistic magician. He is a master of psychology. Sometimes his words must be subjected to textual analysis. At other times they must be be read as metaphor. That's because he is adept at word games. If someone "does something not permitted by the law," did he do something illegal? Did he do something wrong? He chooses not to say. The ambiguities he has created during his prosecution have increasingly become the focus of attention. He and his family have constantly been sending out political feelers and monitoring the public mood, hoping to evade prosecution.
The Chen Shui-bian family has chosen to drag its feet when confronting the justice system. But the evidence has snowballed. The Chen family preyed upon business people without regard for their political affiliation. Whether they were Blue or Green made no difference. The Chen family was an equal opportunity extortionist. Deep Blue businesses were swallowed up the way a lion devours his kill. The scale of the Chen family's money-laundering and corruption was massive. Naturally it risked something going awry. When more and more evidence of Chen family crimes surfaced, Chen Shui-bian belatedly conceded that "Everyone does it. I'm no worse than anyone else." He deliberately conflated the distinction between the State Confidential Affairs Fund and the Discretionary Fund. He has attempted to twist the meaning of President Ma Ying-jeou's Big Reservoir Theory. He has attempted to rationalize his own crime and simultaneously take the offensive. His moves are generating considerable controversy.
The logic of the term "social and cultural crime" in this context is quite simple. Even though we took other people's money, we did so reluctantly. We took it because it was the custom. Had we refused to accept money-filled "hong bao" and gifts, it would have been considered impolite. By extension, Chen Shui-bian alleges that the State Confidential Expense Fund was merely a supplement to the president's salary. He even alleges that due to his official position, his identity, and his status, that the receipt of gifts, benefits, and even cash was perfectly proper, that given social and cultural norms, no crime was committed. Those who feel Chen Shui-bian did something wrong, must examine our society and our culture for their complicity in corruption. Otherwise if they wish to convict Chen Shui-bian, they must also convict a whole slew of past officials as well.
First Chen argued, "Was Ah-Bian really wrong?" Then Chen argued "Was Ah-Bian the only one who did wrong?" Chen Shui-bian is undeniably a shrewd political operator. Is "accepting bribes commonplace" on Taiwan today? Is "refusing to accept bribes impolite?" If it is, then why have hospitals repeatedly ordered medical personnel not to accept gifts of cash from patients and their families? Why bother with anti-corruption legislation? After all, accepting bribes is the social custom. Is society on Taiwan really this backward? The Chen family's selling of official positions and accepting of bribes was not something that took place in the remote past, when the public was confused and the law was unclear. It was something that happened recently. The Republic of China has been on the road to democracy and the rule of law for a long time. Yet Chen Shui-bian is alleging, without blushing or stammering, that gifts of cash are perfectly normal. That anyone could seriously argue that corruption was worse during the KMT era, therefore it is unfair to prosecute Chen Shui-bian today, boggles the mind. Why don't the people who advance such arguments simply say that He Sheng was vastly more corrupt, and that by contrast Chen Shui-bian's corruption is small potatoes?
Society's concept of justice advances with the times. Current laws must reflect current standards. Past offenses must be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law possible. One cannot use "People used to commit worse crimes" as a means of eluding prosecution for crimes committed today. Otherwise, every era will be forced to endure criminal conduct. Wrongdoers will simply argue "After all, wasn't this the way in the past?" Citing past reprobates to justify wrongdoing by current reprobates is just a little too convenient. Under such circumstances, would a nation still need the rule of law? Would social progress still be possible?
Taiwan has been struggling to rid itself of the negative custom of cash bribes and the culture of bribery. Such efforts may be inadequate. They may not have achieved the desired results. But the civil service system must strive for integrity. Today's society no longer permits abusing one's official position to enrich oneself. Chen Shui-bian's family and friends are guilty of corruption. They have been convicted and handed stiff sentences. Do we really intend to write off their corruption as nothing more than a product of our society and our culture?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.14
社論－台灣的社會文化 從未縱容過貪汙
本報訊
前總統陳水扁又為大家上了一課，這一課叫做「社會文化罪」。儘管法律上並無此詞，不過，陳水扁提出的這個說法還是引起了廣泛的討論。按照陳水扁的意思，他承認自己是錯了，但這個錯是社會很普遍常見的文化現象，也就是說大家都是這樣做的，這樣的話也就不能算是什麼了不起的大過犯；再說，假如要定罪，那該被定罪的人又何止陳水扁一個人呢。
阿扁非常擅長創造名詞，更擅長捕捉社會情緒，為自己打造絕佳的脫困之道。扁案爆發以來，他和他家人的創意不絕如縷，每每令人拍案驚奇。除了「證據到哪裡才承認到哪裡」的精明之外，陳水扁最高明的招數當然就是烏賊法，也就是說「大家都一樣啊。」他的策略是可以道歉，但絕不認錯，可以認錯，但絕不認罪，可以認罪但絕對要拉一個壂背。
在檢調查出扁家的確把錢匯出海外後，陳水扁第一時間的回應是「做了法律所不允許的事」，陳水扁是個語言學魔術師、更是心理學大師，他的話有時需要按字面分析，有時又要意在言外地解讀，因為他非常會玩文字遊戲──一個人做了法律所不允許的事到底有沒違法，到底算不算個罪呢？他選擇不予說明，留下的謎團在扁案審理的過程中不斷成為討論的焦點，他和他的家人就在種種政治利益和社會氣氛下，不斷見縫插針地尋找生機。
陳水扁家族可以選擇用擠牙膏的方式面對司法，但證據卻會滾雪球。既然他們藍綠企業家葷素不忌大通吃，什麼人的錢都敢收，而且愈是深藍的企業就愈是吃定了一樣的獅子大開口，把洗錢、貪腐的戰線拉那麼大，日後當然就要承擔任何一個角落都可能出包的風險。當愈來愈多證據顯示阿扁集團的犯行時，陳水扁就說「大家都是如此，我沒有更可惡。」他刻意把國務機要費和特別費混為一談，挪用馬英九總統的大水庫理論，讓他不但得以保護自己，還找到出招攻擊的機會，拳勢還虎虎生風。
「社會文化罪」也是在這樣的脈絡下出現的說法。這個邏輯很簡單：就算我們有收人家的錢，那也是不得已的啊，因為這個社會不就是這樣的嗎，不收一些紅包、禮物，不夠意思也不禮貌；延伸來看，陳水扁不但指稱國務費做為總統薪資實質補貼是理之當然，就連基於職務、身分、地位等收到的饋贈、好處乃至於金錢，也在社會文化的認知和理解中，沒有不得體更談不上是犯了什麼罪；認為阿扁這麼做不對的人，要檢討整個社會文化對貪汙意在言外的縱容，或者至少要定罪阿扁，也該一起揪出前朝一干人等才對。
從「阿扁錯了嗎？」到「錯的又不只是阿扁」，陳水扁不愧是高明的政治玩家。如果台灣社會到現在還有如他所言的這種「收受紅包很平常，不收就不禮貌」風氣，醫院何必三令五申嚴格監督醫事人員絕不可以收病人和家屬的紅包，也沒必要訂定貪汙治罪條例，反正收點好處是社會風氣嘛。台灣社會真的到現在還是如此嗎？陳水扁家族被查到賣官、收賄之類的事情可不是在民智未開、法律不明的時代，而就是最近的事。台灣在民主法治的路上都已經走了這麼多之後，陳水扁還可以臉不紅氣不喘地說收紅包、饋贈這種事本來就很正常，而竟然也還有人可以全無是非地指稱國民黨時代貪更多，抓陳水扁一個人不公平，云云；持這類論點的人何不乾脆說和珅貪更多，陳水扁貪的算什麼！
社會的正義公平道德尺度的確是隨著時代前進的，現在的法律是什麼，當然就要按現行的規範執行，過往的過錯能追多少就要追多少，斷不能以「從前的人錯更多」來做為脫罪的遁詞，否則不是每個時代都奈何不了不法之徒了嗎，因為每個做錯事的人都可以振振有詞說「以前不是這樣！」要找到過去的渾球來支持現在的渾帳，可太容易了。這樣的話，國家社會還需要法治嗎、還有任何進步的可能嗎？
台灣社會一直在努力擺脫積習已久的紅包、賄賂文化，儘管做的還非常不夠、很不到位，但公務體系朝向廉能努力是明確的方向，現在的社會已不容許這種以職務之便收取好處的文化了；從扁親信涉及貪汙、被判重刑來看，難道我們還要認可一切貪腐都可歸咎社會文化嗎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 14, 2009
Former President Chen Shui-bian is once again teaching us something new. He's teaching us the meaning of "social and cultural crimes." The law books contain no such term. Nevertheless Chen Shui-bian's neologism has attracted wide attention. Chen Shui-bian admits what he did was wrong. But he insists that his wrongdoing was a widespread social and cultural phenomenon. Everybody does it, therefore it was no big deal. Besides, if one insists on punishing offenders, Chen argues, then he is hardly the only one guilty of such offenses.
Chen Shui-bian is adept at inventing new terms. He is even more adept at sensing the public mood. He is attempting to create an escape clause for himself. Ever since the Chen corruption case broke, he and his family have astonished the public with their creativity. Every time the evidence proved they were guilty of a crime, they would then confess to that crime, and that crime only. Chen Shui-bian's shrewdest tactic of course, is equivocation. In other words, "We are all guilty." His strategy is to apologize, but never admit wrongdoing. His strategy is to admit wrongdoing, but never admit guilt. His strategy is to admit guilt, but always drag someone else down with him.
When investigators from the prosecutor's office discovered that the Chen family definitely transferred funds overseas, Chen Shui-bian immediately admitted that he "did things not permitted by the law." Chen Shui-bian is a linguistic magician. He is a master of psychology. Sometimes his words must be subjected to textual analysis. At other times they must be be read as metaphor. That's because he is adept at word games. If someone "does something not permitted by the law," did he do something illegal? Did he do something wrong? He chooses not to say. The ambiguities he has created during his prosecution have increasingly become the focus of attention. He and his family have constantly been sending out political feelers and monitoring the public mood, hoping to evade prosecution.
The Chen Shui-bian family has chosen to drag its feet when confronting the justice system. But the evidence has snowballed. The Chen family preyed upon business people without regard for their political affiliation. Whether they were Blue or Green made no difference. The Chen family was an equal opportunity extortionist. Deep Blue businesses were swallowed up the way a lion devours his kill. The scale of the Chen family's money-laundering and corruption was massive. Naturally it risked something going awry. When more and more evidence of Chen family crimes surfaced, Chen Shui-bian belatedly conceded that "Everyone does it. I'm no worse than anyone else." He deliberately conflated the distinction between the State Confidential Affairs Fund and the Discretionary Fund. He has attempted to twist the meaning of President Ma Ying-jeou's Big Reservoir Theory. He has attempted to rationalize his own crime and simultaneously take the offensive. His moves are generating considerable controversy.
The logic of the term "social and cultural crime" in this context is quite simple. Even though we took other people's money, we did so reluctantly. We took it because it was the custom. Had we refused to accept money-filled "hong bao" and gifts, it would have been considered impolite. By extension, Chen Shui-bian alleges that the State Confidential Expense Fund was merely a supplement to the president's salary. He even alleges that due to his official position, his identity, and his status, that the receipt of gifts, benefits, and even cash was perfectly proper, that given social and cultural norms, no crime was committed. Those who feel Chen Shui-bian did something wrong, must examine our society and our culture for their complicity in corruption. Otherwise if they wish to convict Chen Shui-bian, they must also convict a whole slew of past officials as well.
First Chen argued, "Was Ah-Bian really wrong?" Then Chen argued "Was Ah-Bian the only one who did wrong?" Chen Shui-bian is undeniably a shrewd political operator. Is "accepting bribes commonplace" on Taiwan today? Is "refusing to accept bribes impolite?" If it is, then why have hospitals repeatedly ordered medical personnel not to accept gifts of cash from patients and their families? Why bother with anti-corruption legislation? After all, accepting bribes is the social custom. Is society on Taiwan really this backward? The Chen family's selling of official positions and accepting of bribes was not something that took place in the remote past, when the public was confused and the law was unclear. It was something that happened recently. The Republic of China has been on the road to democracy and the rule of law for a long time. Yet Chen Shui-bian is alleging, without blushing or stammering, that gifts of cash are perfectly normal. That anyone could seriously argue that corruption was worse during the KMT era, therefore it is unfair to prosecute Chen Shui-bian today, boggles the mind. Why don't the people who advance such arguments simply say that He Sheng was vastly more corrupt, and that by contrast Chen Shui-bian's corruption is small potatoes?
Society's concept of justice advances with the times. Current laws must reflect current standards. Past offenses must be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law possible. One cannot use "People used to commit worse crimes" as a means of eluding prosecution for crimes committed today. Otherwise, every era will be forced to endure criminal conduct. Wrongdoers will simply argue "After all, wasn't this the way in the past?" Citing past reprobates to justify wrongdoing by current reprobates is just a little too convenient. Under such circumstances, would a nation still need the rule of law? Would social progress still be possible?
Taiwan has been struggling to rid itself of the negative custom of cash bribes and the culture of bribery. Such efforts may be inadequate. They may not have achieved the desired results. But the civil service system must strive for integrity. Today's society no longer permits abusing one's official position to enrich oneself. Chen Shui-bian's family and friends are guilty of corruption. They have been convicted and handed stiff sentences. Do we really intend to write off their corruption as nothing more than a product of our society and our culture?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.09.14
社論－台灣的社會文化 從未縱容過貪汙
本報訊
前總統陳水扁又為大家上了一課，這一課叫做「社會文化罪」。儘管法律上並無此詞，不過，陳水扁提出的這個說法還是引起了廣泛的討論。按照陳水扁的意思，他承認自己是錯了，但這個錯是社會很普遍常見的文化現象，也就是說大家都是這樣做的，這樣的話也就不能算是什麼了不起的大過犯；再說，假如要定罪，那該被定罪的人又何止陳水扁一個人呢。
阿扁非常擅長創造名詞，更擅長捕捉社會情緒，為自己打造絕佳的脫困之道。扁案爆發以來，他和他家人的創意不絕如縷，每每令人拍案驚奇。除了「證據到哪裡才承認到哪裡」的精明之外，陳水扁最高明的招數當然就是烏賊法，也就是說「大家都一樣啊。」他的策略是可以道歉，但絕不認錯，可以認錯，但絕不認罪，可以認罪但絕對要拉一個壂背。
在檢調查出扁家的確把錢匯出海外後，陳水扁第一時間的回應是「做了法律所不允許的事」，陳水扁是個語言學魔術師、更是心理學大師，他的話有時需要按字面分析，有時又要意在言外地解讀，因為他非常會玩文字遊戲──一個人做了法律所不允許的事到底有沒違法，到底算不算個罪呢？他選擇不予說明，留下的謎團在扁案審理的過程中不斷成為討論的焦點，他和他的家人就在種種政治利益和社會氣氛下，不斷見縫插針地尋找生機。
陳水扁家族可以選擇用擠牙膏的方式面對司法，但證據卻會滾雪球。既然他們藍綠企業家葷素不忌大通吃，什麼人的錢都敢收，而且愈是深藍的企業就愈是吃定了一樣的獅子大開口，把洗錢、貪腐的戰線拉那麼大，日後當然就要承擔任何一個角落都可能出包的風險。當愈來愈多證據顯示阿扁集團的犯行時，陳水扁就說「大家都是如此，我沒有更可惡。」他刻意把國務機要費和特別費混為一談，挪用馬英九總統的大水庫理論，讓他不但得以保護自己，還找到出招攻擊的機會，拳勢還虎虎生風。
「社會文化罪」也是在這樣的脈絡下出現的說法。這個邏輯很簡單：就算我們有收人家的錢，那也是不得已的啊，因為這個社會不就是這樣的嗎，不收一些紅包、禮物，不夠意思也不禮貌；延伸來看，陳水扁不但指稱國務費做為總統薪資實質補貼是理之當然，就連基於職務、身分、地位等收到的饋贈、好處乃至於金錢，也在社會文化的認知和理解中，沒有不得體更談不上是犯了什麼罪；認為阿扁這麼做不對的人，要檢討整個社會文化對貪汙意在言外的縱容，或者至少要定罪阿扁，也該一起揪出前朝一干人等才對。
從「阿扁錯了嗎？」到「錯的又不只是阿扁」，陳水扁不愧是高明的政治玩家。如果台灣社會到現在還有如他所言的這種「收受紅包很平常，不收就不禮貌」風氣，醫院何必三令五申嚴格監督醫事人員絕不可以收病人和家屬的紅包，也沒必要訂定貪汙治罪條例，反正收點好處是社會風氣嘛。台灣社會真的到現在還是如此嗎？陳水扁家族被查到賣官、收賄之類的事情可不是在民智未開、法律不明的時代，而就是最近的事。台灣在民主法治的路上都已經走了這麼多之後，陳水扁還可以臉不紅氣不喘地說收紅包、饋贈這種事本來就很正常，而竟然也還有人可以全無是非地指稱國民黨時代貪更多，抓陳水扁一個人不公平，云云；持這類論點的人何不乾脆說和珅貪更多，陳水扁貪的算什麼！
社會的正義公平道德尺度的確是隨著時代前進的，現在的法律是什麼，當然就要按現行的規範執行，過往的過錯能追多少就要追多少，斷不能以「從前的人錯更多」來做為脫罪的遁詞，否則不是每個時代都奈何不了不法之徒了嗎，因為每個做錯事的人都可以振振有詞說「以前不是這樣！」要找到過去的渾球來支持現在的渾帳，可太容易了。這樣的話，國家社會還需要法治嗎、還有任何進步的可能嗎？
台灣社會一直在努力擺脫積習已久的紅包、賄賂文化，儘管做的還非常不夠、很不到位，但公務體系朝向廉能努力是明確的方向，現在的社會已不容許這種以職務之便收取好處的文化了；從扁親信涉及貪汙、被判重刑來看，難道我們還要認可一切貪腐都可歸咎社會文化嗎？
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