Is There Such a Thing as "Non-Utopian Taiwan Independence?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 31, 2009
Lin Cho-shui is known as the "master theoretician of the Taiwan independence movement." Lin recently coined a new term, "utopian Taiwan independence."
Lin Cho-shui once called Chen Shui-bian a traitor to Taiwan independence, because the type of Taiwan independence Ah-Bian advocated was "radical Taiwan independence," "rash Taiwan independence," and "populist nationalism." Lin Cho-shui said he advocated "measured Taiwan independence," and "moderate Taiwan independence." The problem is, Lin Cho-shui is very clear about what Chen Shui-bian's "aggressive Taiwan independence" is. But he has never been terribly clear about the principles and details of his own "measured Taiwan independence."
Lin's newly minted term, "utopian Taiwan independence" has the same problem. Lin says there are two kinds of "utopian Taiwan independence." The first is faith in the "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory." The second is faith in a "tripartite alliance between Taiwan independence, Tibetan independence, and Xinjiang independence." Lin Cho-shui considers both kinds of Taiwan independence utopian dreams that will come to naught. But he has yet to explain what he considers "non-utopian Taiwan independence," and whether any form of Taiwan independence can be considered non-utopian?
After 20 odd years of intense three way struggles between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing, the definition of Taiwan independence has been distilled down to "de jure Taiwan independence." In other words, the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution" equals Taiwan independence. Any failure to rectify names and eliminate the Republic of China amounts to a failure to achieve Taiwan independence. If one looks at the big picture, domestically and internationally, those who advocate the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution" are engaged in "utopian Taiwan independence." But on the other hand, can any form of "measured Taiwan independence" or "moderate Taiwan independence" which does not demand the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution" honestly be considered "Taiwan Independence?"
Trong Chai accused Ma Ying-jeou of treason. His charge demonstrates the plight of the Taiwan independence movement. Trong Chai is a Deep Green Taiwan independence extremist. He repudiates outright the legitimacy of the Republic of China. If he is accusing Ma Ying-jeou of betraying the Republic of China, then Trong Chai himself is a traitor. Trong Chai is a champion of "utopian Taiwan independence." He is also a champion of a "virtual Republic of China." He is unable to achieve Taiwan independence, but at the same time his actions are throttling the Republic of China.
In fact the big picture, domestically and internationally has ensured that "utopian Taiwan independence" will remain just that, utopian. Today, according to Lin Cho-shui, the Taiwan independence movement has been reduced to the role of lackeys for the Tibetan and Xinjiang independence movements, How sad is that?
The DPP's arguments for Taiwan independence are embodied in three major documents. Their "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" calls for the founding of a new and independent nation. Their "Resolution for a Normal Nation" calls for the early rectification of names of the authoring of a new constitution. It may be classified as "aggressive Taiwan independence." Their "Resolution on the Nation's Future" argues that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. Its current name is the Republic of China." This is Lin Cho-shui's last refuge for "measured Taiwan independence." But if "aggressive Taiwan independence" is utopian, then the implication that "Taiwan is currently known as the Republic of China. But in the future will no longer be known as the Republic of China" is also utopian. The practical effect of such arguments is that Taiwan independence cannot be achieved, but neither can the Republic of China be reaffirmed. This is a realistic depiction of Taiwan today.
The DPP must decide whether it wishes to participate in Taiwan's political and economic development under the name the "Republic of China" or the "Nation of Taiwan." The bigger picture suggests there is no longer any real difference between utopian Taiwan independence and non-utopian Taiwan independence, between radical Taiwan independence and non-radical Taiwan independence. The Republic of China is the Republic of China. Taiwan independence is Taiwan independence. If the DPP fails to establish a clear benchmark, it will remain trapped in a quagmire. It will not be able to achieve Taiwan independence, nor will it be able to reaffirm the Republic of China. Consider the Dalai Lama and Rebiyah Kadeer. Here the thinking of the Republic of China differs from the thinking of the Taiwan independence movement. The Republic of China and the Taiwan independence movement have very different benchmarks by which they deal with ECFA. They have very different ways of dealing with Chen Shui-bian's corruption trial, with relations between ethnic groups, with relations with Washington and Tokyo, and with relations with Beijing across the Taiwan Strait. These all require consistent standards. The public on Taiwan will trust the DPP only if it believes the DPP is operating under the premise that our nation is the Republic of China, and not some non-existent "Nation of Taiwan." Only then will it receive the trust and support of mainstream society. The Democratic Progressive Party has long relied on supporters of Taiwan independence to win Republic of China political office. The record shows this approach is a self-contradictory dead end. Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office was a fiasco. Does the DPP intend to keep believing in utopia?
As noted earlier, any scenario not involving the "rectification of names and the authoring of new constitution" is not "de jure Taiwan independence." It is not Taiwan independence, period. On the other hand, if the DPP ceases championing the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution," it is swinging from one form of utopianism to another form of utopianism. In which case, why not amend its three major Taiwan independence documents, and reaffirm the Republic of China? As a UDN editorial noted earlier, the DPP must not treat the Republic of China as a "backdoor listing." It must grant it full recognition and invest its energy into ensuring its well-being and prosperity.
Otherwise, can the DPP really tell the public that there is such a thing as "non-utopian Taiwan independence?"
還有不是空想的台獨嗎？
【聯合報 ╱社論】
2009.10.31
有「台獨理論大師」稱號的林濁水，最近又創了個新詞彙：空想台獨主義。
林濁水原本聲稱，陳水扁是台獨的罪人，因為扁所主張的台獨是「激進台獨」、「冒進台獨」，是「民粹的民族主義」；而他林濁水所主張者，則是「穩健台獨」、「溫和台獨」。問題是：林濁水對陳水扁的「冒進台獨」刻畫得十分清晰，但對他自己主張的所謂「穩健台獨」的內涵與規格，卻從未交代清楚。
新詞彙「空想的台獨」也有同樣的問題。他說，空想主義有兩種：一是台灣地位未定論，二是台藏疆三獨合流。林濁水認為這二者皆是不能成事的「空想」，但他卻亦未交代什麼是「非空想的台獨」，以及究竟還有沒有「不是空想的台獨」？
經台美中三方二十餘年來的強烈激盪，台獨的定義已經化約至「法理台獨」。也就是說，「正名制憲」就是台獨，「不正名制憲／維持中華民國」就不是台獨。如今從內外大局大勢來看，凡主張「正名制憲」的台獨，其實皆是「空想的台獨」；反過來說，所謂的「穩健台獨」、「溫和台獨」，若不主張「正名制憲」，則難道還能叫做「台獨」嗎？
蔡同榮指馬英九叛國，正顯示台獨的困境。蔡同榮是深綠極獨，根本否認中華民國；他若指馬英九背叛中華民國，則蔡同榮自己其實才是大叛國者。如蔡同榮者，非但是「空想的台獨」，且也是「空想的中華民國維護者」；他們不可能實現台獨，且其所作所為亦在扼殺中華民國。
「空想的台獨」，其實是因內外大局大勢已使「台獨成為空想」。如今的台獨，居然如林濁水所指已經淪為只是藏獨及疆獨的轎夫，何其可悲？
民進黨的台獨論述有三大章典。《台獨黨綱》主張建立新而獨立的國家，《正常國家決議文》則主張及早正名制憲，皆可劃入「冒進台獨」的範疇；至於《國家前途決議文》主張「台灣是主權獨立的國家／現在名叫中華民國」，則是林濁水等人的所謂「穩健台獨」的最後依附。問題是：「冒進台獨」若是「空想」，則「現在名叫中華民國／未來可以不叫中華民國」的潛台詞，恐怕仍是「空想」；而此類論述的現實效應是「台獨不能實現／中華民國也不能鞏固」，這正是今日台灣社會的真實寫照。
民進黨必須決定，今後究竟是以「中華民國」或「台灣國」的基準，來參與台灣的政經發展。其實，大局大勢演化至今，台獨已無空想、非空想之別，亦無激進、穩健之別。中華民國就是中華民國，台獨就是台獨；若不建立一個明確的基準，民進黨仍將陷於「台獨不能實現／中華民國也不能鞏固」的泥淖中。例如：如何思考達賴與熱比婭的問題，中華民國的思考與台獨的思考就存有差異；如何處理ＥＣＦＡ的問題，中華民國與台獨亦是兩個截然不同的判斷基準。甚至民進黨如何處理與陳水扁的關係，如何處理族群關係，如何處理美日關係與兩岸關係，皆應先建立其一致的基準。只有在台灣的主流民意相信民進黨是從中華民國的基準上問政，而不是站在台灣國的「空想」上問政之時，始能獲得主流社會的信任與支持。民進黨向來欲以號召台獨群眾來贏取中華民國的政權，事實證明，這是自相矛盾的死路。陳水扁八年執政已經慘敗一次，民進黨難道仍將「空想」？
如前所述，只要不是「正名制憲」，不是「法理台獨」，就不是台獨；而民進黨若不再主張「正名制憲」，也就不必再從一種「空想」擺盪至另一種「空想」，則何不修改三大台獨章典，回歸中華民國？正如本報社論日前所說：民進黨對中華民國，勿「借殼上市」，應「認股共營」。
否則，民進黨能否告訴國人：何謂「不是空想的台獨」？
Saturday, October 31, 2009
Friday, October 30, 2009
Pseudo-DPP, Ersatz KMT
Pseudo-DPP, Ersatz KMT
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 30, 2009
A group of Green Camp officials in Chiayi, led by former Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Ho Jin-song, openly criticized the DPP candidate for County Executive. They accused County Executive Chen Ming-wen and candidate for County Executive Chang Hua-kuan of being "pseudo-DPP" members. They said Chen and Chang were trying to obtain the party's political backing by switching their party affiliations. Especially worth pondering was that they made their debut the same day they defected from KMT candidate Hsiao Teng-piao's campaign.
By coincidence, amidst the three-way struggle between the Blue and Green camps in Hualien, rumors of a "Green Hsieh Alliance" have emerged. The DPP will allegedly ally itself with Chang Chih-ming, who quit the party to run on his own. Chang Chi-ming is regarded as Hsieh Sheng-shan's successor. He may throw his support behind the Democratic Progressive Party's candidate for Mayor of Hualien, in exchange for Tsai Ing-wen's support. How much support Chang Chih-ming actually has is hard to tell. But the DPP is betting on Hsieh Sheng-shan based on his residual value as a Kuomintang member for half his life.
Compare this to the storm currently raging over the fixing of baseball games. The political arena has a long history of apostasy, changes in allegiance, and even defections in the heat of battle. The difference is that players who fix baseball games are criminally liable. If they are discovered, not only will the fans reject them, they will never be able to play professional baseball again. By contrast, political apostates can apparently do whatever they wish. They can openly defy party discipline and betray the party's principles, yet they always seem to have elaborate rationalizations for what they have done.
Fixing baseball games is not the same thing as political defections. But what difference is there between a politician defecting from his own party in the heat of battle, and a ball player ignoring his coach's instructions but instead taking orders from a triad boss on the sidelines?
Eight years ago, Chen Ming-wen took off his Blue KMT robe and raised the Green DPP banner. He helped Chiayi County become a Green domain for the first time. The DPP boasted that "party politics had put an end to local factional politics." But eight years have passed. Has Chiayi County put an end to local factions? Hardly. If anything, the political ecology has become even more complex. Green camp officials in Chiayi are accusing Chen Ming-wen and others of being "Pseudo-DPP" members. Not only do their ideologies clash, other more complex factors are involved. These self-styled "Veterans of the Democratic Progressive Party" are throwing their support behind Hsiao Teng-piao, who just removed his Blue KMT robe. This proves that in Chiayi County, "party politics" is nothing more than a rumor in the wind, with no basis in reality.
The current campaign has seen widespread rebellion within the KMT. This shows that even after twenty years of hard work, party politics is merely skin deep. Internal strife within the Green Camp further illustrates this phenomenon of "in the same business, but working toward different objectives." This is not just the KMT's problem. For the KMT, long-term entanglement with local factions eventually left it at the mercy of local factions. This is the thorniest issue Ma Ying-jeou must face. The DPP meanwhile, has spread itself too thin. It was unwilling to cultivate new talent. Instead it adopted a strategy of recruiting Blue Camp defectors. It is perishing because its ideology and its methods are incompatible. This will eventually lead to a schism.
Consider the internal strife within the Green Camp in Chiayi County. Is Chen Ming-wen a "pseudo-DPP" member? Or are those denouncing him "pseudo-DPP" members? In all likelihood, even the DPP leadership doesn't know. Never mind that while the Democratic Progressive Party was in power it used every trick in the book to incite Blue Camp defections. Chen Ming-wen's original reason for defecting to the Green Camp was that he sensed the emotional fervor behind the support for Chen Shui-bian, and jumped on the bandwagon. But that was then. The Ah-Bian craze has died down. What the public wants now is soul-searching. The public wants the mess Ah-Bian left behind cleaned up. But the Democratic Progressive Party has absolutely no response to such public expectations. In particular, toward the end of Ah-Bian's term of office, countless loyal and upright members of the Democratic Progressive Party were forced to leave. Today, the DPP leadership can no longer speak of the "Democratic Progressive Party spirit." Party members are still arguing over who is the "real" DPP candidate in Chiayi County. One really has to laugh.
Ironically, while the Green camp is condemning "pseudo-DPP" members, so many Blue camp officials are "ersatz-KMT" members, no one even cares. Cheng Yung-chin is a local leader of the ruling KMT. Yet he threw his support behind a candidate who refused to participate in the party primaries. As a result, his party membership was revoked. That was hardly an injustice. If Hsieh Shen-shan falls into the "Green Hsieh Alliance" trap, isn't that a confession he was merely pretending to be a KMT member for the past several decades?
A number of years ago, martial law was lifted, democracy was rampant, politicians ran wild, alliances were forged, then dissolved. One still enaged in ideological disputes. Such disputes promoted democracy. But today, political apostasy is motivated by power lust and self-interest. It undermines party politics and the system of democracy. Those who have trouble understanding cause and effect need only look at the fixing of professional baseball games. A few bad apples can ruin the entire game of professional baseball and shatter public faith in sportsmanship. The same applies to politics.
「假民進黨」與「偽國民黨」
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.30 04:36 am
以民進黨前立委何金松為首的一批嘉義綠營人士，日前公開抨擊縣長陳明文及縣長候選人張花冠是「假民進黨」，靠著轉換黨派色彩來攫取政治利益。值得玩味的是，他們當天現身的檯子，卻是退出國民黨參選的蕭登標總部。
無獨有偶，在藍營三雄相爭的花蓮，傳出了「綠謝合」的風聲；即民進黨將和退黨參選的張志明結盟，被謝深山視為「接班人」的張志明，可能為民進黨花蓮市長候選人站台，以換取蔡英文的表態支持。張志明的實力到底如何，外界看不出來；但民進黨看中的，應是謝深山以他半生做為國民黨員所經營的殘餘價值吧。
比起棒壇正鬧得沸沸揚揚的「假球風波」，政壇的變臉、易幟乃至陣前倒戈叛降的事件，更是歷史悠久得多。不同的是，球員打假球有刑事責任，一被查出，不僅遭球迷唾棄，在棒壇也將永無立錐之地；而政治變臉卻似乎可隨心所欲而為，不論拋棄黨紀黨德的姿態多難看，變節者總有一套自圓其說的道理。
將「打假球」與「政治變臉」相提並論，雖不盡對稱；但試想：同志臨陣造自己政黨的反，這跟球員在球場上不看教練指揮、卻聽候場邊黑幫小弟的指令，有何兩樣？
八年前，陳明文脫下藍袍改掛綠旗，幫綠營締造嘉義縣的首度變天，民進黨曾大誇海口，說這具有「政黨政治終結地方派系」的意義。但八年過去，嘉義的地方派系終結了嗎？不僅沒有，而且利益生態變得更形複雜。這次，嘉義綠營人士指控陳明文等是「假民進黨」，除了理念不合，也許有更複雜的背景；但這批自稱「民進黨老兵」的人，卻跑去為剛脫下藍袍的蕭登標站台，正證明嘉義的「政黨政治」只不過是風中的傳說，一點根也沒有。
這次選舉，國民黨內叛聲四起，顯示台灣耕耘廿多年的政黨政治只是虛有其表；而綠營的內訌，更說明這種「同營異心」的現象，亦不只是國民黨一黨的問題。在國民黨而言，長期與地方派系合縱連橫的結果，最後卻遭派系牽制、反噬，這是馬英九如今必須惶恐面對的棘手問題。在民進黨而言，則是在擴張過程裡不願務實培養人才，卻大肆招降納叛策略吸納藍軍叛將，卒至理念和作法均難契合，而終歸要分道揚鑣。
以嘉義綠營的內訌為例，到底陳明文是「假民進黨」，或者指控他的那一方才是「假民進黨」，恐怕連民進黨中央也沒有辦法說得分明。且不說民進黨在執政過程中使用過多少招降納叛伎倆，陳明文當初之所以投效綠營，主要是看到群眾對陳水扁瘋狂追隨的熱力，而意識到自己必須跟上這股「潮流」。曾幾何時，「瘋扁」的狂潮早已退燒，取而代之的，是社會大眾要求反省、清理阿扁餘緒的聲音，民進黨對此卻毫無招架之力。尤其，在扁任內末期的紛爭中，多少民進黨忠貞、正直之士被迫退黨；如今，黨中央連什麼是「民進黨精神」都已經說不出口，同志還在爭誰是嘉義「正統」，委實令人啞然失笑。
諷刺的是，當綠營在聲討「假民進黨」時，藍營裡的「偽國民黨」卻已經多到讓人懶得追問了。鄭永金身為執政黨首長，卻去支持不參加黨內初選的違紀參選者，因此而遭撤銷黨籍，有什麼冤可喊？而若謝深山最後投入「綠謝合」的陷阱，不也是形同自承戴了數十年國民黨假面具？
早些年，在解嚴前後的民主狂飆期，政治人物跳來跳去、分分合合，尚有理念之爭，可謂是民主的推進器；但時至今日，這類變臉變節者，已大多出於權力傾軋及私利算計，只是蹧蹋政黨政治和台灣民主而已。不明白其間因果的人，請看看職棒假球事件吧：幾個害群之馬就能毀掉整個職棒和人們相信的運動精神，道理是一樣的！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 30, 2009
A group of Green Camp officials in Chiayi, led by former Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Ho Jin-song, openly criticized the DPP candidate for County Executive. They accused County Executive Chen Ming-wen and candidate for County Executive Chang Hua-kuan of being "pseudo-DPP" members. They said Chen and Chang were trying to obtain the party's political backing by switching their party affiliations. Especially worth pondering was that they made their debut the same day they defected from KMT candidate Hsiao Teng-piao's campaign.
By coincidence, amidst the three-way struggle between the Blue and Green camps in Hualien, rumors of a "Green Hsieh Alliance" have emerged. The DPP will allegedly ally itself with Chang Chih-ming, who quit the party to run on his own. Chang Chi-ming is regarded as Hsieh Sheng-shan's successor. He may throw his support behind the Democratic Progressive Party's candidate for Mayor of Hualien, in exchange for Tsai Ing-wen's support. How much support Chang Chih-ming actually has is hard to tell. But the DPP is betting on Hsieh Sheng-shan based on his residual value as a Kuomintang member for half his life.
Compare this to the storm currently raging over the fixing of baseball games. The political arena has a long history of apostasy, changes in allegiance, and even defections in the heat of battle. The difference is that players who fix baseball games are criminally liable. If they are discovered, not only will the fans reject them, they will never be able to play professional baseball again. By contrast, political apostates can apparently do whatever they wish. They can openly defy party discipline and betray the party's principles, yet they always seem to have elaborate rationalizations for what they have done.
Fixing baseball games is not the same thing as political defections. But what difference is there between a politician defecting from his own party in the heat of battle, and a ball player ignoring his coach's instructions but instead taking orders from a triad boss on the sidelines?
Eight years ago, Chen Ming-wen took off his Blue KMT robe and raised the Green DPP banner. He helped Chiayi County become a Green domain for the first time. The DPP boasted that "party politics had put an end to local factional politics." But eight years have passed. Has Chiayi County put an end to local factions? Hardly. If anything, the political ecology has become even more complex. Green camp officials in Chiayi are accusing Chen Ming-wen and others of being "Pseudo-DPP" members. Not only do their ideologies clash, other more complex factors are involved. These self-styled "Veterans of the Democratic Progressive Party" are throwing their support behind Hsiao Teng-piao, who just removed his Blue KMT robe. This proves that in Chiayi County, "party politics" is nothing more than a rumor in the wind, with no basis in reality.
The current campaign has seen widespread rebellion within the KMT. This shows that even after twenty years of hard work, party politics is merely skin deep. Internal strife within the Green Camp further illustrates this phenomenon of "in the same business, but working toward different objectives." This is not just the KMT's problem. For the KMT, long-term entanglement with local factions eventually left it at the mercy of local factions. This is the thorniest issue Ma Ying-jeou must face. The DPP meanwhile, has spread itself too thin. It was unwilling to cultivate new talent. Instead it adopted a strategy of recruiting Blue Camp defectors. It is perishing because its ideology and its methods are incompatible. This will eventually lead to a schism.
Consider the internal strife within the Green Camp in Chiayi County. Is Chen Ming-wen a "pseudo-DPP" member? Or are those denouncing him "pseudo-DPP" members? In all likelihood, even the DPP leadership doesn't know. Never mind that while the Democratic Progressive Party was in power it used every trick in the book to incite Blue Camp defections. Chen Ming-wen's original reason for defecting to the Green Camp was that he sensed the emotional fervor behind the support for Chen Shui-bian, and jumped on the bandwagon. But that was then. The Ah-Bian craze has died down. What the public wants now is soul-searching. The public wants the mess Ah-Bian left behind cleaned up. But the Democratic Progressive Party has absolutely no response to such public expectations. In particular, toward the end of Ah-Bian's term of office, countless loyal and upright members of the Democratic Progressive Party were forced to leave. Today, the DPP leadership can no longer speak of the "Democratic Progressive Party spirit." Party members are still arguing over who is the "real" DPP candidate in Chiayi County. One really has to laugh.
Ironically, while the Green camp is condemning "pseudo-DPP" members, so many Blue camp officials are "ersatz-KMT" members, no one even cares. Cheng Yung-chin is a local leader of the ruling KMT. Yet he threw his support behind a candidate who refused to participate in the party primaries. As a result, his party membership was revoked. That was hardly an injustice. If Hsieh Shen-shan falls into the "Green Hsieh Alliance" trap, isn't that a confession he was merely pretending to be a KMT member for the past several decades?
A number of years ago, martial law was lifted, democracy was rampant, politicians ran wild, alliances were forged, then dissolved. One still enaged in ideological disputes. Such disputes promoted democracy. But today, political apostasy is motivated by power lust and self-interest. It undermines party politics and the system of democracy. Those who have trouble understanding cause and effect need only look at the fixing of professional baseball games. A few bad apples can ruin the entire game of professional baseball and shatter public faith in sportsmanship. The same applies to politics.
「假民進黨」與「偽國民黨」
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.30 04:36 am
以民進黨前立委何金松為首的一批嘉義綠營人士，日前公開抨擊縣長陳明文及縣長候選人張花冠是「假民進黨」，靠著轉換黨派色彩來攫取政治利益。值得玩味的是，他們當天現身的檯子，卻是退出國民黨參選的蕭登標總部。
無獨有偶，在藍營三雄相爭的花蓮，傳出了「綠謝合」的風聲；即民進黨將和退黨參選的張志明結盟，被謝深山視為「接班人」的張志明，可能為民進黨花蓮市長候選人站台，以換取蔡英文的表態支持。張志明的實力到底如何，外界看不出來；但民進黨看中的，應是謝深山以他半生做為國民黨員所經營的殘餘價值吧。
比起棒壇正鬧得沸沸揚揚的「假球風波」，政壇的變臉、易幟乃至陣前倒戈叛降的事件，更是歷史悠久得多。不同的是，球員打假球有刑事責任，一被查出，不僅遭球迷唾棄，在棒壇也將永無立錐之地；而政治變臉卻似乎可隨心所欲而為，不論拋棄黨紀黨德的姿態多難看，變節者總有一套自圓其說的道理。
將「打假球」與「政治變臉」相提並論，雖不盡對稱；但試想：同志臨陣造自己政黨的反，這跟球員在球場上不看教練指揮、卻聽候場邊黑幫小弟的指令，有何兩樣？
八年前，陳明文脫下藍袍改掛綠旗，幫綠營締造嘉義縣的首度變天，民進黨曾大誇海口，說這具有「政黨政治終結地方派系」的意義。但八年過去，嘉義的地方派系終結了嗎？不僅沒有，而且利益生態變得更形複雜。這次，嘉義綠營人士指控陳明文等是「假民進黨」，除了理念不合，也許有更複雜的背景；但這批自稱「民進黨老兵」的人，卻跑去為剛脫下藍袍的蕭登標站台，正證明嘉義的「政黨政治」只不過是風中的傳說，一點根也沒有。
這次選舉，國民黨內叛聲四起，顯示台灣耕耘廿多年的政黨政治只是虛有其表；而綠營的內訌，更說明這種「同營異心」的現象，亦不只是國民黨一黨的問題。在國民黨而言，長期與地方派系合縱連橫的結果，最後卻遭派系牽制、反噬，這是馬英九如今必須惶恐面對的棘手問題。在民進黨而言，則是在擴張過程裡不願務實培養人才，卻大肆招降納叛策略吸納藍軍叛將，卒至理念和作法均難契合，而終歸要分道揚鑣。
以嘉義綠營的內訌為例，到底陳明文是「假民進黨」，或者指控他的那一方才是「假民進黨」，恐怕連民進黨中央也沒有辦法說得分明。且不說民進黨在執政過程中使用過多少招降納叛伎倆，陳明文當初之所以投效綠營，主要是看到群眾對陳水扁瘋狂追隨的熱力，而意識到自己必須跟上這股「潮流」。曾幾何時，「瘋扁」的狂潮早已退燒，取而代之的，是社會大眾要求反省、清理阿扁餘緒的聲音，民進黨對此卻毫無招架之力。尤其，在扁任內末期的紛爭中，多少民進黨忠貞、正直之士被迫退黨；如今，黨中央連什麼是「民進黨精神」都已經說不出口，同志還在爭誰是嘉義「正統」，委實令人啞然失笑。
諷刺的是，當綠營在聲討「假民進黨」時，藍營裡的「偽國民黨」卻已經多到讓人懶得追問了。鄭永金身為執政黨首長，卻去支持不參加黨內初選的違紀參選者，因此而遭撤銷黨籍，有什麼冤可喊？而若謝深山最後投入「綠謝合」的陷阱，不也是形同自承戴了數十年國民黨假面具？
早些年，在解嚴前後的民主狂飆期，政治人物跳來跳去、分分合合，尚有理念之爭，可謂是民主的推進器；但時至今日，這類變臉變節者，已大多出於權力傾軋及私利算計，只是蹧蹋政黨政治和台灣民主而已。不明白其間因果的人，請看看職棒假球事件吧：幾個害群之馬就能毀掉整個職棒和人們相信的運動精神，道理是一樣的！
Thursday, October 29, 2009
Is Washington Profiteering from Taipei's Plight?
Is Washington Profiteering from Taipei's Plight?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 29, 2009
The U.S. beef controversy has heated up over the past several days, making the situation increasingly difficult to resolve. At the local level, the Taipei Municipal Government took the lead. It imposed controls blocking the inflow of questionable U.S. beef into Taipei. It forbade primary and secondary schools within the city from using it as lunch ingredients. Many cities and counties are considering following suit. This amounts to a trend among local governments. If everyone on Taiwan boycotts U.S. beef, the impact will be significant.
Politically speaking, lawmakers in the Legislative Yuan, both Blue and Green, are firmly opposed to allowing these imports. Former Director of Health Yeh Chin-chuan promised legislators that before the administration allowed in any U.S. beef imports, it would seek prior approval from the Legislative Yuan. But it clearly failed to do so before signing an agreement with Washington. It even allowed bone-in meats and organ meats. How could it not precipitate a controversy?
The current U.S. beef controversy admittedly involves domestic demagoguery, deliberate obfuscation, and insufficient clarity from the ruling administration. But the real culprit behind the scenes is Washington. Everyone wants the National Security Council and the Council of Agriculture to tell us what we received in return for allowing in U.S. beef organ meats. These two agencies have hemmed and hawed, and not explained matters clearly. Although we do not know what deal they made, it is not difficult to understand why the government agencies involved are so tight-lipped.
Take rumors of a TIFA or arms sales between Taipei and Washington for example. Taipei is caught between Beijing and Washington. It finds itself between a rock and a hard place. Taipei has finally, with great difficulty, brought stability to cross-Strait relations. It has been aggressively negotiating ECFA, only to have a monkey wrench thrown into the works. Theoretically Taipei can negotiate FTAs with other countries even as it negotiates ECFA with Beijing. But the reality is that FTAs with other nations cannot be made public until ECFA has been signed. The revelation of any tacit understanding or agreement between Taipei and Washington could set back bilateral progress over ECFA. That is not a setback Taipei can withstand. The outside world must realize that although Taipei might have an understanding with Washington over a TIFA or FTA, it cannot say so openly.
Besides United States beef imports, another news item concerns Taipei and Washington, namely, huge increases in the price of U.S. arms. According to newspaper reports Washington recently asked Taipei to install "anti-leak intelligence software," ruthlessly forcing Taipei to fork out as much as 1.8 billion dollars. Add to this radar and radar peripherals costing billions of dollars. Washington is clearly exploiting Taipei's dependence upon the US for its defense. Washington is profiteering from Taipei's plight. Taipei is in dire financial straits. The national budget is only a trillion dollars or so. But the defense budget alone accounts for over 300 billion. Much of this is arms purchases. Under the circumstances, what is pressuring Taipei to pay through the nose for arms purchases, if not blackmail?
In fact, Washington sees Taipei's plight quite clearly. Washington's calculations are made in America's own national interest. We understand that. But Washington sees Taipei's plight, then coerces it into buying its unmarketable beef organ meats, its bone-in meats, or overpriced military equipment. It is profiteering from Taipei's plight. That is intolerable. Whether Taipei can establish mutually beneficial economic and trade relations with other countries outside of ECFA, depends upon both Beijing and Washington. During President Chen Shui-bian's term, relations between Taipei and Beijing were non-existent. Relations between Taipei and Washington were extremely tense. The triangular relationship between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington was essentially tranformed into a bilateral relationship between Taipei and Washington. Once President Ma Ying-jeou took office, he began rebuilding the connection between Taipei and Beijing. This is beneficial to Taipei's international space. It is also beneficial to stability in the Western Pacific Rim, and indirectly beneficial to Washington.
Washington wants Taipei to sign an ECFA with Beijing. But it does not want cross-Strait relations to become too chummy, to the point where they undermine Taipei's relations with Washington. That sort of development could lead to another sort of imbalance between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. But if Washington alienates the public on Taiwan by linking beef imports with military procurements, it may drive Taipei and Beijing closer together. Would that be consistent with Washington's interests?
In sum, we call upon Washington to see clearly the macro level Big Picture between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, and not take advantage of Taipei's plight to make a profit from our hardship. United States President Barack Obama has just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He should conduct himself in a manner befitting the president of a great nation and the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. To pressure the Ma administration and the ruling KMT into signing a "Makuan Treaty" on beef organ meats and beef brains, one month before the County and Municipal Elections, is surely a myopic and obtuse strategy. Taking advantage of Taipei's plight to raise prices on weapons for national defense hardly qualifies as proper long-term diplomatic policy. To force Taipei to sign a treaty under duress, provoking an anti-American backlash among the public, betrays a lack of strategic vision. The United States President has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Are US government agencies determined to generate friction between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington at a time like this? Is profiteering from Taipei's plight the Barack Obama administration's idea of how to promote peace?
美國難道在發台灣的國難財？
2009-10-29
中國時報
美 國牛肉事件這幾天越演越烈，也使局面難以收拾。就地方政府而言，台北市率先發難，要以行政程序阻擋有疑慮的美國牛肉流入北市，也不准市內國中小學營養午餐 用做食材；隨後全台許多縣市亦考慮跟進，頗有地方政府大串聯之勢。萬一台灣四處形成抵制美國牛的風潮，風起雲湧之下，恐怕造成極大的衝擊。
就政治環境而言，立法院不分藍綠，立委都大力反對。至少，前任衛生署長葉金川答應立委，在開放美國牛肉進口之前，要先報請立法院同意。如今分明還沒有報備，就與美國簽署協定，而且開放內容又是帶骨、帶內臟，怎麼可能沒有風波？
坦 白說，這次美國牛肉的風波，固然有國內操作不當、解釋不明、行政交接不清等疏失，但事後真正的罪魁禍首卻是老美。大家都問國安會與農委會開放美牛內臟究竟 換到什麼利益，但這兩個單位都支吾其辭，難以交代明白。我們雖然不了解真正的交換利益內容，卻不難理解政府相關單位難以啟齒的原因。
以 外傳台美之間的ＴＩＦＡ或軍售為例，台灣夾在老共與老美之間，真是好生為難。台灣好不容易把兩岸關係弄穩當了，也與對岸積極洽談ＥＣＦＡ，但最後結果還是 有一些變數。台灣固然可以同時與中共及其他國家平行談判ＦＴＡ，但是現實情況卻是：其他的ＦＴＡ一定要等ＥＣＦＡ簽定之後才能曝光。萬一台美之間任何默契 或協議曝光，進而影響到兩岸ＥＣＦＡ的簽署進度，那對台灣可是不可承受之痛。明乎此，外界就不難理解：就算台美真有什麼ＴＩＦＡ或ＦＴＡ的共識，卻也不便 挑明了講。
在 美國牛肉之外，另一則與台美關係有關的新聞，則是美對台軍售的大漲價。報載最近美國要求台灣加裝「防情資洩密軟體」，狠狠敲台灣竹槓達十八億，外加雷達本 體及周邊設備十億美元，是吃定了台灣國防對美國的依賴，而獅子大開口，也是在發台灣的國難財。台灣的財政情況惡劣，整個國家預算也不過一兆數千億，單單國 防預算就有三千多億，其中又有一大塊是軍購支出。在這樣的壓力環境下逼台灣政府埋單大筆軍購預算，這不是敲詐是什麼呢？
台 灣艱困處境，其實老美是很清楚的。美國為自己國家利益打算，我們當然理解。但美國若是看準了台灣的困難，而趁機向台灣壓迫出口其國內根本沒有行情的牛內臟 與牛骨或是大漲武器售價，那就是趁台灣的「國難」發財，非常要不得。台灣在ＥＣＦＡ之外究竟能與多少國家建立經貿互惠關係，一則看老共，二則看老美。在陳 水扁總統時代，兩岸不僅斷線，中美之間也極為緊張；台、中、美之間的三角關係幾乎已經質變為台美之間的雙向關係。馬英九總統上任之後努力想重建兩岸之間的 連線，一方面固然對台灣的國際空間有利，另一方面也有助於太平洋西岸的穩定，間接也有利於美國。
換個角度來看，美國希望中台之間簽署ＥＣＦＡ，但也不希望兩岸關係太緊密，進而疏遠了台美關係；那樣的發展又會使台、中、美之間產生另一種不平衡。美國如果因為牛肉與軍購事件與台灣人民產生距離，那麼就逼得兩岸走得更近，這難道符合美國的利益？
整 體而言，我們要呼籲美國看清楚台、中、美之間的大環境與大形勢，而不要趁機在台灣的困難處境之中發我們的國難財。美國總統歐巴馬剛剛才獲頒諾貝爾和平獎， 總該有點大國大總統的受獎高度。逼台灣馬政府與執政黨的談判代表在年底縣市長選舉前一個多月簽下牛雜牛腦的「馬關」條約，絕對是短多長空的笨策略。利用台 灣的艱困處境拚命將國防武器漲價，也絕對不是長期外交的妥善做法。逼台灣簽城下之盟，激起民間一股反美的非官方運動，更是缺乏戰略視野與思惟。難道，在美 國總統領諾貝爾和平獎之際，美國的行政部門卻努力在製造台、中、美之間的摩擦？難道，發台灣的國難財竟是歐巴馬手下官員推動和平的策略之一？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 29, 2009
The U.S. beef controversy has heated up over the past several days, making the situation increasingly difficult to resolve. At the local level, the Taipei Municipal Government took the lead. It imposed controls blocking the inflow of questionable U.S. beef into Taipei. It forbade primary and secondary schools within the city from using it as lunch ingredients. Many cities and counties are considering following suit. This amounts to a trend among local governments. If everyone on Taiwan boycotts U.S. beef, the impact will be significant.
Politically speaking, lawmakers in the Legislative Yuan, both Blue and Green, are firmly opposed to allowing these imports. Former Director of Health Yeh Chin-chuan promised legislators that before the administration allowed in any U.S. beef imports, it would seek prior approval from the Legislative Yuan. But it clearly failed to do so before signing an agreement with Washington. It even allowed bone-in meats and organ meats. How could it not precipitate a controversy?
The current U.S. beef controversy admittedly involves domestic demagoguery, deliberate obfuscation, and insufficient clarity from the ruling administration. But the real culprit behind the scenes is Washington. Everyone wants the National Security Council and the Council of Agriculture to tell us what we received in return for allowing in U.S. beef organ meats. These two agencies have hemmed and hawed, and not explained matters clearly. Although we do not know what deal they made, it is not difficult to understand why the government agencies involved are so tight-lipped.
Take rumors of a TIFA or arms sales between Taipei and Washington for example. Taipei is caught between Beijing and Washington. It finds itself between a rock and a hard place. Taipei has finally, with great difficulty, brought stability to cross-Strait relations. It has been aggressively negotiating ECFA, only to have a monkey wrench thrown into the works. Theoretically Taipei can negotiate FTAs with other countries even as it negotiates ECFA with Beijing. But the reality is that FTAs with other nations cannot be made public until ECFA has been signed. The revelation of any tacit understanding or agreement between Taipei and Washington could set back bilateral progress over ECFA. That is not a setback Taipei can withstand. The outside world must realize that although Taipei might have an understanding with Washington over a TIFA or FTA, it cannot say so openly.
Besides United States beef imports, another news item concerns Taipei and Washington, namely, huge increases in the price of U.S. arms. According to newspaper reports Washington recently asked Taipei to install "anti-leak intelligence software," ruthlessly forcing Taipei to fork out as much as 1.8 billion dollars. Add to this radar and radar peripherals costing billions of dollars. Washington is clearly exploiting Taipei's dependence upon the US for its defense. Washington is profiteering from Taipei's plight. Taipei is in dire financial straits. The national budget is only a trillion dollars or so. But the defense budget alone accounts for over 300 billion. Much of this is arms purchases. Under the circumstances, what is pressuring Taipei to pay through the nose for arms purchases, if not blackmail?
In fact, Washington sees Taipei's plight quite clearly. Washington's calculations are made in America's own national interest. We understand that. But Washington sees Taipei's plight, then coerces it into buying its unmarketable beef organ meats, its bone-in meats, or overpriced military equipment. It is profiteering from Taipei's plight. That is intolerable. Whether Taipei can establish mutually beneficial economic and trade relations with other countries outside of ECFA, depends upon both Beijing and Washington. During President Chen Shui-bian's term, relations between Taipei and Beijing were non-existent. Relations between Taipei and Washington were extremely tense. The triangular relationship between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington was essentially tranformed into a bilateral relationship between Taipei and Washington. Once President Ma Ying-jeou took office, he began rebuilding the connection between Taipei and Beijing. This is beneficial to Taipei's international space. It is also beneficial to stability in the Western Pacific Rim, and indirectly beneficial to Washington.
Washington wants Taipei to sign an ECFA with Beijing. But it does not want cross-Strait relations to become too chummy, to the point where they undermine Taipei's relations with Washington. That sort of development could lead to another sort of imbalance between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. But if Washington alienates the public on Taiwan by linking beef imports with military procurements, it may drive Taipei and Beijing closer together. Would that be consistent with Washington's interests?
In sum, we call upon Washington to see clearly the macro level Big Picture between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, and not take advantage of Taipei's plight to make a profit from our hardship. United States President Barack Obama has just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He should conduct himself in a manner befitting the president of a great nation and the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. To pressure the Ma administration and the ruling KMT into signing a "Makuan Treaty" on beef organ meats and beef brains, one month before the County and Municipal Elections, is surely a myopic and obtuse strategy. Taking advantage of Taipei's plight to raise prices on weapons for national defense hardly qualifies as proper long-term diplomatic policy. To force Taipei to sign a treaty under duress, provoking an anti-American backlash among the public, betrays a lack of strategic vision. The United States President has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Are US government agencies determined to generate friction between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington at a time like this? Is profiteering from Taipei's plight the Barack Obama administration's idea of how to promote peace?
美國難道在發台灣的國難財？
2009-10-29
中國時報
美 國牛肉事件這幾天越演越烈，也使局面難以收拾。就地方政府而言，台北市率先發難，要以行政程序阻擋有疑慮的美國牛肉流入北市，也不准市內國中小學營養午餐 用做食材；隨後全台許多縣市亦考慮跟進，頗有地方政府大串聯之勢。萬一台灣四處形成抵制美國牛的風潮，風起雲湧之下，恐怕造成極大的衝擊。
就政治環境而言，立法院不分藍綠，立委都大力反對。至少，前任衛生署長葉金川答應立委，在開放美國牛肉進口之前，要先報請立法院同意。如今分明還沒有報備，就與美國簽署協定，而且開放內容又是帶骨、帶內臟，怎麼可能沒有風波？
坦 白說，這次美國牛肉的風波，固然有國內操作不當、解釋不明、行政交接不清等疏失，但事後真正的罪魁禍首卻是老美。大家都問國安會與農委會開放美牛內臟究竟 換到什麼利益，但這兩個單位都支吾其辭，難以交代明白。我們雖然不了解真正的交換利益內容，卻不難理解政府相關單位難以啟齒的原因。
以 外傳台美之間的ＴＩＦＡ或軍售為例，台灣夾在老共與老美之間，真是好生為難。台灣好不容易把兩岸關係弄穩當了，也與對岸積極洽談ＥＣＦＡ，但最後結果還是 有一些變數。台灣固然可以同時與中共及其他國家平行談判ＦＴＡ，但是現實情況卻是：其他的ＦＴＡ一定要等ＥＣＦＡ簽定之後才能曝光。萬一台美之間任何默契 或協議曝光，進而影響到兩岸ＥＣＦＡ的簽署進度，那對台灣可是不可承受之痛。明乎此，外界就不難理解：就算台美真有什麼ＴＩＦＡ或ＦＴＡ的共識，卻也不便 挑明了講。
在 美國牛肉之外，另一則與台美關係有關的新聞，則是美對台軍售的大漲價。報載最近美國要求台灣加裝「防情資洩密軟體」，狠狠敲台灣竹槓達十八億，外加雷達本 體及周邊設備十億美元，是吃定了台灣國防對美國的依賴，而獅子大開口，也是在發台灣的國難財。台灣的財政情況惡劣，整個國家預算也不過一兆數千億，單單國 防預算就有三千多億，其中又有一大塊是軍購支出。在這樣的壓力環境下逼台灣政府埋單大筆軍購預算，這不是敲詐是什麼呢？
台 灣艱困處境，其實老美是很清楚的。美國為自己國家利益打算，我們當然理解。但美國若是看準了台灣的困難，而趁機向台灣壓迫出口其國內根本沒有行情的牛內臟 與牛骨或是大漲武器售價，那就是趁台灣的「國難」發財，非常要不得。台灣在ＥＣＦＡ之外究竟能與多少國家建立經貿互惠關係，一則看老共，二則看老美。在陳 水扁總統時代，兩岸不僅斷線，中美之間也極為緊張；台、中、美之間的三角關係幾乎已經質變為台美之間的雙向關係。馬英九總統上任之後努力想重建兩岸之間的 連線，一方面固然對台灣的國際空間有利，另一方面也有助於太平洋西岸的穩定，間接也有利於美國。
換個角度來看，美國希望中台之間簽署ＥＣＦＡ，但也不希望兩岸關係太緊密，進而疏遠了台美關係；那樣的發展又會使台、中、美之間產生另一種不平衡。美國如果因為牛肉與軍購事件與台灣人民產生距離，那麼就逼得兩岸走得更近，這難道符合美國的利益？
整 體而言，我們要呼籲美國看清楚台、中、美之間的大環境與大形勢，而不要趁機在台灣的困難處境之中發我們的國難財。美國總統歐巴馬剛剛才獲頒諾貝爾和平獎， 總該有點大國大總統的受獎高度。逼台灣馬政府與執政黨的談判代表在年底縣市長選舉前一個多月簽下牛雜牛腦的「馬關」條約，絕對是短多長空的笨策略。利用台 灣的艱困處境拚命將國防武器漲價，也絕對不是長期外交的妥善做法。逼台灣簽城下之盟，激起民間一股反美的非官方運動，更是缺乏戰略視野與思惟。難道，在美 國總統領諾貝爾和平獎之際，美國的行政部門卻努力在製造台、中、美之間的摩擦？難道，發台灣的國難財竟是歐巴馬手下官員推動和平的策略之一？
Wednesday, October 28, 2009
Viewing ECFA from the Macro Level, in terms of Economics
Viewing ECFA from the Macro Level, in terms of Economics
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 28, 2009
The Council of Labor Affairs has announced the signing of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, or ECFA. The job market impact report and the Mainland Commerce Department's assessments revealed Mainland earning figures larger than Taiwan's. All sorts of doubts and opposition to ECFA emerged. But ECFA must be viewed from the macro level, in terms of economics.
Government and industry desperately hope that ECFA can be signed. The main reason is that next year "ASEAN plus One," i.e., ASEAN plus Mainland China, touted as the world's largest free trade zone, will take effect. Tariffs within the zone will be for the most part reduced to zero. Taiwan will be left in the cold. Products exported to this region, including petrochemicals, machinery, textiles, and electronics, will all face higher tariffs.
Amidst fierce global competition, profits from exports are generally in the single-digit range. Other countries will impose tariffs ranging from 5% to 10%. In the short term, we will lose our competitiveness, and profits will decline. In the long term, many manufacturers will be unable to cope. They will have no choice but to pull up their roots in Taiwan and set up factories in the region in order to enjoy zero tariffs. Domestic investment and employment opportunities will be reduced. Mainland China signed ECFA in order to avoid being marginalized, to avoid higher tariffs on its exports. It had no other choice.
Some may ask, why don't other countries in the region sign FTAs, i.e., Free Trade Agreements? Why are they able to prevent themselves from being shut out? The international reality is that at this stage Taipei is unable to successfully sign FTAs with other countries in Southeast Asia. No matter how many FTAs Taipei signs with Latin American allies, that will not help it from being shut out of the East Asia Free Trade Area. Instead, countries in the region are keeping an eye on Beijing and Taipei. If the two sides sign ECFA, they may be willing to sign FTAs with Taipei. From the macro level, Taipei no longer has any option but to sign ECFA, as soon as possible.
As for opponents of ECFA, according to Mainland China Ministry of Commerce estimates, once the two sides sign ECFA, Mainland China's gross domestic product (GDP) will increase by 27 billion U.S. dollars, more than Taiwan's GDP increase of 6.9 billion U.S. dollars. Those opposed to signing claim that "The advantages are not enjoyed by Taiwan alone," or even that "Taiwan will lose more than it gains." Their allegations are absurd. Clearly the ROC benefits from the agreement. Without such an agreement, the ROC's GDP will decline, and unemployment will rise. Besides, when we look at the numbers, we must consider the relative sizes of the two economies. Based on these criteria, ECFA will increase the ROC's GDP 1.72%, and the PRC's 0.63%. Taiwan will benefit more than the Mainland.
Also, from another point of view, both sides will benefit from ECFA. ECFA is not an act of charity by the Mainland towards Taiwan. Rather, it is a normal, mutually profitable economic agreement. Opponents are unwilling to address the economic issues. Instead, they blindly fuss over the political issues, leaving Taiwan's economy mired in a crisis.
The Council of Labor Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs have different assessments of the impact of ECFA on the job market. Some industries oppose ECFA because it may have a negative impact on them. They fail to see the forest for the trees. Different economic models use different parameters in their estimates. Of course their estimates differ. Besides, these are merely estimates. Economies make organic adjustments. No one can accurately forecast the final results with 100% accuracy. And because individual industries in other countries have different comparative advantages, some industries will benefit while others suffer. What matters is whether the overall economic benefits are worth it. The government's responsibility is to provide policy support for industry and labor, including relief for unemployed workers and guidance for manufacturers engaged in industrial upgrading. Opponents oppose signing because of potential harm to certain industries. But in the end, when more industries have been harmed, the overall economy will be harmed even more.
Domestically, we are engaged in a war of words over whether to sign ECFA. Meanwhile our main competitor South Korea has been signing agreements all over the globe. In October South Korea signed an FTA with one of the largest economies in the European Union. Within three years, 99% of the EU's exports to South Korea will have zero tariffs or reduced tariffs. Bilateral trade will increase an estimated 32 billion euros. Before this, in August, South Korea signed an FTA with India, the third largest economy in Asia, one roughly equivalent to the "Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement" or CEPA. Two years ago, South Korea signed an FTA with the United States. Currently the two countries are awaiting approval from their legislatures. Even earlier, South Korea signed an FTA with Singapore and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. This allowed South Korea's exports to the region to grow at a double-digit rate.
Take a look at others. Think about oneself. How much capital and time does Taiwan have to squander?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.28
社論－大處著眼、回歸經濟面看ECFA
本報訊
在勞委會公布我國簽署ＥＣＦＡ（兩岸經濟合作架構協議）後，就業市場的影響報告，加上之前大陸商務部公布的評估，顯示其經濟獲利數字高於台灣之後，各種質疑與反對聲浪又起。在此，我們必須指出，談ＥＣＦＡ必須從大處著眼，回歸經濟面看待。
政府與產業界迫切希望與對岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，最主要的原因是明年「東協加一」（東協加上大陸）、號稱全球最大的自由貿易區的東亞自由貿易區將上路，屆時區內的關稅，大部分都將降到零。被排除在外的台灣，出口到此地區的產品─從石化、機械、到紡織、電子…，所有產品都就將面對高於區內各國的產品關稅。
在全球激烈競爭下，目前產業界出口普遍只有個位數字的獲利，一旦被課徵高於他國五％到十％不等的關稅，短期而言，競爭力頓失、獲利下降；長期而言，許多無法調適因應的廠商，別無選擇的要「根離台灣」、進入該區內投資設廠以享受零關稅，國內的投資與就業機會必然減少。因此，與大陸簽署ＥＣＦＡ以突破「邊緣化」、避免出口產品被課徵較高關稅，是唯一的選擇。
有人問：為什麼不與區內其它國家簽署ＦＴＡ（自由貿易協定），一樣可達突破被排除在區外的目的？這就是國際現實，現階段，台灣就是無法與區內其它國家完成簽署ＦＴＡ，台灣與中南美友邦簽再多的ＦＴＡ，都無助於突破被排除在東亞自由貿易區外的現況。反而是各國在觀察，如兩岸順利簽署ＥＣＦＡ後，才可能與台灣簽ＦＴＡ。從大勢著眼，台灣已沒有不儘快簽署ＥＣＦＡ的條件了。
至於反對者根據中國商務部估計，兩岸簽ＥＣＦＡ後對大陸國內生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）可增加二七○億美元，高於台灣ＧＤＰ增加的六九億美元，「好處不是台灣盡得」，甚至認為台灣「得不償失」，因而反對簽署，則更是不可取的謬論。因為明顯的是台灣在此協定中也有得利，如無此協定，台灣的ＧＤＰ卻會因此減少、失業增加。更何況看此數字必須把經濟體規模加入考量，以此估計，簽ＥＣＦＡ台灣ＧＤＰ是增加一．七二％，大陸是○．六三％，台灣受益還比大陸高。
而且，換個角度看，兩岸都能從ＥＣＦＡ獲利，才顯示簽署ＥＣＦＡ不是大陸片面對台灣的「示惠」，而是正常、雙方都能獲利的經濟協定。反對者不回歸經濟面著眼，一味在政治面作文章，只是陷台灣經濟於危機。
至於部分人士以勞委會與經濟部有關ＥＣＦＡ對就業市場影響的評估不一樣，及會對部分產業有負面影響而反對，則更是見樹不見林的說法。不同的經濟模型、模型的參數估計不同，結果當然不一樣，而且，坦白說，這些都只是一個預估值，經濟體是有機的調整，最後的數字一定沒有人能百分之百預測正確。而由於各經濟體內個別產業與他國同樣產業的比較利益不同，因此一定有產業受惠、有產業受損，只要整體經濟體受益即值得作。政府的責任是對受損的產業與勞工，在政策上給予支持─如對失業勞工的救濟、輔導，對廠商給予產業升級協助等。反對者以某些產業受損而主張不簽，最後是更多產業受損，整體經濟更將因此受創。
當國內還在為ＥＣＦＡ是否該簽署流於口水戰時，我們的主要競爭對手國南韓，已「全球簽透透」；十月南韓再與全球最大的經濟體之一歐盟，簽署了ＦＴＡ，三年內，歐盟銷往南韓的九九％商品將取消或逐步降低關稅，預估雙邊貿易額可增加三二○億歐元。在此之前的八月，南韓也才與亞洲第三大經濟體印度簽署相當於廣義ＦＴＡ的「更緊密經貿關係安排」（ＣＥＰＡ）。兩年前，南韓也已與美國簽署ＦＴＡ，目前正待兩國國會批准。至於更早前，南韓已與新加坡、東南亞國協簽署ＦＴＡ，讓南韓對該地區的出口金額呈二位數成長。
看看別人，想想自己。台灣，還有多少本錢與時間去爭執、去蹉跎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 28, 2009
The Council of Labor Affairs has announced the signing of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, or ECFA. The job market impact report and the Mainland Commerce Department's assessments revealed Mainland earning figures larger than Taiwan's. All sorts of doubts and opposition to ECFA emerged. But ECFA must be viewed from the macro level, in terms of economics.
Government and industry desperately hope that ECFA can be signed. The main reason is that next year "ASEAN plus One," i.e., ASEAN plus Mainland China, touted as the world's largest free trade zone, will take effect. Tariffs within the zone will be for the most part reduced to zero. Taiwan will be left in the cold. Products exported to this region, including petrochemicals, machinery, textiles, and electronics, will all face higher tariffs.
Amidst fierce global competition, profits from exports are generally in the single-digit range. Other countries will impose tariffs ranging from 5% to 10%. In the short term, we will lose our competitiveness, and profits will decline. In the long term, many manufacturers will be unable to cope. They will have no choice but to pull up their roots in Taiwan and set up factories in the region in order to enjoy zero tariffs. Domestic investment and employment opportunities will be reduced. Mainland China signed ECFA in order to avoid being marginalized, to avoid higher tariffs on its exports. It had no other choice.
Some may ask, why don't other countries in the region sign FTAs, i.e., Free Trade Agreements? Why are they able to prevent themselves from being shut out? The international reality is that at this stage Taipei is unable to successfully sign FTAs with other countries in Southeast Asia. No matter how many FTAs Taipei signs with Latin American allies, that will not help it from being shut out of the East Asia Free Trade Area. Instead, countries in the region are keeping an eye on Beijing and Taipei. If the two sides sign ECFA, they may be willing to sign FTAs with Taipei. From the macro level, Taipei no longer has any option but to sign ECFA, as soon as possible.
As for opponents of ECFA, according to Mainland China Ministry of Commerce estimates, once the two sides sign ECFA, Mainland China's gross domestic product (GDP) will increase by 27 billion U.S. dollars, more than Taiwan's GDP increase of 6.9 billion U.S. dollars. Those opposed to signing claim that "The advantages are not enjoyed by Taiwan alone," or even that "Taiwan will lose more than it gains." Their allegations are absurd. Clearly the ROC benefits from the agreement. Without such an agreement, the ROC's GDP will decline, and unemployment will rise. Besides, when we look at the numbers, we must consider the relative sizes of the two economies. Based on these criteria, ECFA will increase the ROC's GDP 1.72%, and the PRC's 0.63%. Taiwan will benefit more than the Mainland.
Also, from another point of view, both sides will benefit from ECFA. ECFA is not an act of charity by the Mainland towards Taiwan. Rather, it is a normal, mutually profitable economic agreement. Opponents are unwilling to address the economic issues. Instead, they blindly fuss over the political issues, leaving Taiwan's economy mired in a crisis.
The Council of Labor Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs have different assessments of the impact of ECFA on the job market. Some industries oppose ECFA because it may have a negative impact on them. They fail to see the forest for the trees. Different economic models use different parameters in their estimates. Of course their estimates differ. Besides, these are merely estimates. Economies make organic adjustments. No one can accurately forecast the final results with 100% accuracy. And because individual industries in other countries have different comparative advantages, some industries will benefit while others suffer. What matters is whether the overall economic benefits are worth it. The government's responsibility is to provide policy support for industry and labor, including relief for unemployed workers and guidance for manufacturers engaged in industrial upgrading. Opponents oppose signing because of potential harm to certain industries. But in the end, when more industries have been harmed, the overall economy will be harmed even more.
Domestically, we are engaged in a war of words over whether to sign ECFA. Meanwhile our main competitor South Korea has been signing agreements all over the globe. In October South Korea signed an FTA with one of the largest economies in the European Union. Within three years, 99% of the EU's exports to South Korea will have zero tariffs or reduced tariffs. Bilateral trade will increase an estimated 32 billion euros. Before this, in August, South Korea signed an FTA with India, the third largest economy in Asia, one roughly equivalent to the "Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement" or CEPA. Two years ago, South Korea signed an FTA with the United States. Currently the two countries are awaiting approval from their legislatures. Even earlier, South Korea signed an FTA with Singapore and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. This allowed South Korea's exports to the region to grow at a double-digit rate.
Take a look at others. Think about oneself. How much capital and time does Taiwan have to squander?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.28
社論－大處著眼、回歸經濟面看ECFA
本報訊
在勞委會公布我國簽署ＥＣＦＡ（兩岸經濟合作架構協議）後，就業市場的影響報告，加上之前大陸商務部公布的評估，顯示其經濟獲利數字高於台灣之後，各種質疑與反對聲浪又起。在此，我們必須指出，談ＥＣＦＡ必須從大處著眼，回歸經濟面看待。
政府與產業界迫切希望與對岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，最主要的原因是明年「東協加一」（東協加上大陸）、號稱全球最大的自由貿易區的東亞自由貿易區將上路，屆時區內的關稅，大部分都將降到零。被排除在外的台灣，出口到此地區的產品─從石化、機械、到紡織、電子…，所有產品都就將面對高於區內各國的產品關稅。
在全球激烈競爭下，目前產業界出口普遍只有個位數字的獲利，一旦被課徵高於他國五％到十％不等的關稅，短期而言，競爭力頓失、獲利下降；長期而言，許多無法調適因應的廠商，別無選擇的要「根離台灣」、進入該區內投資設廠以享受零關稅，國內的投資與就業機會必然減少。因此，與大陸簽署ＥＣＦＡ以突破「邊緣化」、避免出口產品被課徵較高關稅，是唯一的選擇。
有人問：為什麼不與區內其它國家簽署ＦＴＡ（自由貿易協定），一樣可達突破被排除在區外的目的？這就是國際現實，現階段，台灣就是無法與區內其它國家完成簽署ＦＴＡ，台灣與中南美友邦簽再多的ＦＴＡ，都無助於突破被排除在東亞自由貿易區外的現況。反而是各國在觀察，如兩岸順利簽署ＥＣＦＡ後，才可能與台灣簽ＦＴＡ。從大勢著眼，台灣已沒有不儘快簽署ＥＣＦＡ的條件了。
至於反對者根據中國商務部估計，兩岸簽ＥＣＦＡ後對大陸國內生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）可增加二七○億美元，高於台灣ＧＤＰ增加的六九億美元，「好處不是台灣盡得」，甚至認為台灣「得不償失」，因而反對簽署，則更是不可取的謬論。因為明顯的是台灣在此協定中也有得利，如無此協定，台灣的ＧＤＰ卻會因此減少、失業增加。更何況看此數字必須把經濟體規模加入考量，以此估計，簽ＥＣＦＡ台灣ＧＤＰ是增加一．七二％，大陸是○．六三％，台灣受益還比大陸高。
而且，換個角度看，兩岸都能從ＥＣＦＡ獲利，才顯示簽署ＥＣＦＡ不是大陸片面對台灣的「示惠」，而是正常、雙方都能獲利的經濟協定。反對者不回歸經濟面著眼，一味在政治面作文章，只是陷台灣經濟於危機。
至於部分人士以勞委會與經濟部有關ＥＣＦＡ對就業市場影響的評估不一樣，及會對部分產業有負面影響而反對，則更是見樹不見林的說法。不同的經濟模型、模型的參數估計不同，結果當然不一樣，而且，坦白說，這些都只是一個預估值，經濟體是有機的調整，最後的數字一定沒有人能百分之百預測正確。而由於各經濟體內個別產業與他國同樣產業的比較利益不同，因此一定有產業受惠、有產業受損，只要整體經濟體受益即值得作。政府的責任是對受損的產業與勞工，在政策上給予支持─如對失業勞工的救濟、輔導，對廠商給予產業升級協助等。反對者以某些產業受損而主張不簽，最後是更多產業受損，整體經濟更將因此受創。
當國內還在為ＥＣＦＡ是否該簽署流於口水戰時，我們的主要競爭對手國南韓，已「全球簽透透」；十月南韓再與全球最大的經濟體之一歐盟，簽署了ＦＴＡ，三年內，歐盟銷往南韓的九九％商品將取消或逐步降低關稅，預估雙邊貿易額可增加三二○億歐元。在此之前的八月，南韓也才與亞洲第三大經濟體印度簽署相當於廣義ＦＴＡ的「更緊密經貿關係安排」（ＣＥＰＡ）。兩年前，南韓也已與美國簽署ＦＴＡ，目前正待兩國國會批准。至於更早前，南韓已與新加坡、東南亞國協簽署ＦＴＡ，讓南韓對該地區的出口金額呈二位數成長。
看看別人，想想自己。台灣，還有多少本錢與時間去爭執、去蹉跎？
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Party Transformation Has Yet to Succeed, the President Must Continue His Struggle
Party Transformation Has Yet to Succeed, the President Must Continue His Struggle
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 27, 2009
The KMT Central Standing Committee has finally made its decision. Every Central Standing Committee Member must run for re-election. The curtain has risen on a "quiet intraparty coup."
Why this quiet intraparty coup? The Central Standing Committee is the highest authority within the KMT. Its status is comparable to the Central Political Bureau in Soviet-style political parties. If every Politburo Member was replaced overnight, that would constitute an intraparty coup. Now that the Central Standing Committee has ordered its members to submit their joint resignation, that too constitutes an intraparty coup.
The Central Standing Committee is elected by party representatives. It makes no difference why they were elected. The Central Standing Committee unquestionably represents the will of the party. But some members of the Central Standing Committee enaged in vote-buying. A few rotten apples spoiled the entire barrel. The decision to dump the entire barrel and start over from scratch means that the will of certain individuals or the Central Standing Committee has nullified a decision reached through a democratic election. This also constitutes an intraparty coup.
This intraparty coup was instigated by Party Chairman Ma Ying-jeou. It was promoted by Ma Ying-jeou. Whatever its motives, the current party leadership refused to recognize the legitimacy of the former Central Standing Committee, and proceeded to overthrow it. This also constitutes an intraparty coup seldom seen in political history.
The intraparty coup is already a partial success. Central Standing Committee by-elections have already been announced. Candidates involved in vote-buying will not be permitted to participate. Can we look forward to a high caliber Central Standing Committee that meets the expectations of Ma Ying-jeou? We can, but it won't be easy.
Why not? Suppose no vote-buying had occurred, and the 32 former Central Standing Committee Members served out their one year terms? Would this Central Standing Committee befit an outstanding political party, adept at governance? Would it be able to help the ruling adminstration govern the nation? Would it be a locomotive for a "party of action?" Probably not.
Why not? Because even after those guilty of vote-buying are removed, the 32 former Central Standing Committee Members still bore scant resemblance to a supreme political authority. They included neither central government level political appointees and local political leaders, nor experienced professionals with reputations for integrity. They lacked leaders with charisma, and leaders with experience. They were second and even third string players. How could they possibly fulfill the role of supreme decision-makers within the halls of power? What virtues did they embody, if any? Did they have either the professionalism or the aptitude to help the administration govern the nation, let alone lead a party of action in its time of need? Such a Central Standing Committee was nothing more than an empty shell. It could not have contributed anything to the KMT's larger mission. It failed to meet with Ma Ying-jeou's expectations. Never mind whether Ma Ying-jeou was "centralizating power in the name of reform." The intraparty coup has begun. A galloping horse is hard to capture. Ma Ying-jeou urgently needs to do two things.
First, he must decide what sort of Central Standing Committee he wants. Central government political appointees resigned en masse from the previous Central Standing Committee. Ma Camp candidates withdrew their candidacies, en masse. Some outsiders concluded that Ma wanted to diminish the power of the party, and "virtualize" the role of the Central Standing Committee. If Ma Ying-jeou was actually thinking in such terms, and was attempting to transform the KMT into a "soft power" political party, the public would have been delighted. If Ma Ying-jeou is actually thinking in such terms, he should stop repeating the slogan, "A better party for a better government." He should avoid any discrepancy between words and deeds, to prevent the KMT from being branded a party whose substance fails to match its form.
Secondly, if Ma is not attempting to diminish the power of the Central Standing Committee, if he genuinely wants "a better party for a better government," he must strengthen the Central Standing Committee. This will help underscore his intentions. The only way to strengthen the Central Standing Committee is to recruit personnel of the highest caliber. In order to overthrow an inadequate Central Standing Committee, Ma Ying-jeou was able to persuade Central Standing Committee Members to resign, en masse. In order to establish a superior Central Standing Committee, Ma should also be able to persuade better qualified Central Standing Committee candidates to throw their hats in the ring. Otherwise the same candidates will run in the wake of the intraparty coup. The same second and third stringers will be elected. The intraparty coup will be a charade, making the KMT a laughing stock.
Over a century ago Qing dynasty scholar Tan Sitong declared, "China has never known political reformers willing to shed their own blood. Let me be the first." Tan wanted to affirm his commitment to political reform. Ma Ying-jeou should display the same courage. Ma should declare, "The Kuomintang has never known party reformers willing to shed their own blood. Let me be the first." Without such courage, the intraparty coup may well end in failure, and become the target of ridicule.
黨變尚未成功，主席仍須努力
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.27 04:35 am
國民黨臨時中常會終於作出決定：全額補選中常委，一場黨史上僅見的「寧靜黨變」也宣告揭開序幕。
何以是「黨變」？中常會是國民黨的最上層權力結構，地位猶如蘇維埃式政黨的中央政治局，政治局委員若在一夜之間全遭撤換，自是「黨變」；如今，中常會全體常委在黨中央指揮操盤下集體被動請辭，當然亦可謂「黨變」。
另外，中常委是由黨代表票選產生，不論其當選原因為何，中常委具有票選的黨意基礎卻殆無疑義；但黨中央卻因部分人士賄選，幾粒老鼠屎壞了一鍋粥，而決定將整鍋粥倒棄重起爐灶，不啻是以個人意志或黨中央意志推翻了民主票選的結論，也難謂非為「黨變」。
而且這場「黨變」是由黨主席馬英九主導發動，也是「馬英九意志」的貫徹，不論基於何種動機，現任黨領導人不承認並進而推翻前任所主導產生的中常會，在世界政黨史上也是罕見的「黨變」。
如今「黨變」既已初階段成功，中常委全額補選的選舉新制也已公告，曾經涉賄者的參選資格亦將被剝奪，一個優質並符合「馬英九意志」的中常會，因此便可樂觀期待會在十一月十四日投票後產生嗎？我們的看法是：非也，難也！
何以故？先假設這樣的情況：如果並無賄選情事的發生，上次當選的三十二名中常委如期任事一年，但試問：這樣的中常會能符合「黨優政強」的條件？能具備「以黨輔政」的能力？能扮演「行動政黨」火車頭的角色嗎？任何人的答案大概都是否定的。
為什麼？因為那三十二位中常委組成的權力結構，即使剔除部分賄選者，也「望之不似最高權力機制」，其中既無有政治實力的中央政務官與地方首長，亦無有社會形象的專業人士，代表性與功能性兩者俱缺，以如此二軍甚至三軍的陣容，要如何負起最高權力機制的決策角色？又有何優質可言？憑什麼專業與能力去輔助比他們更強數倍的政府？更遑論要當聞聲救苦的行動政黨領頭羊。
這樣一個天殘地缺的「空殼中常會」，對國民黨的執政大業毫無裨益，相信也不符合「馬英九意志」的期待；因此姑且不論馬英九是否如外界所言「以集權之實行改革之名」，「黨變」既已啟動，駟馬難追，馬英九目前最迫切要做的祇有兩件事：
其一，他必須確定他要的到底是一個什麼樣的中常會。上次中常委選舉，中央政務官集體退出，馬系人馬全面棄選，外界的普遍解讀是：他要弱化黨的功能，虛擬化中常會的角色。如果馬英九確作此想，有志於把國民黨逐步改造成柔性政黨，社會大眾自應樂觀其成，但他卻應從此閉口不談「黨優政強」這類口號，免得造成社會認知的落差，並讓國民黨遭受「名實不符」、「表裡不一」的譏評。
其二，如果他並無弱化中常會的意圖，「以黨輔政」也確是他的目標，他就必須以強化中常會作為手段，來彰顯意圖並實踐目標。而強化中常會的方法唯有一途：延攬優質人才參選中常委。馬英九既然可以「勸辭」全體中常委，推翻一個「劣質中常會」，當然也應該「勸選」中常委，重建一個「優質中常會」；否則，「黨變」之後，參選中常委的仍是原來那批人，當選中常委的也仍是那些二、三軍者流，這樣的「黨變」祇不過是兒戲一場，徒留社會笑柄。
一百多年前，譚嗣同曾誓言：「中國未聞有因變法而流血者，有之，請自嗣同始」，以示變法決心；馬英九也應有這樣的氣魄：「國民黨未聞有因改革而黨變者，有之，請自英九始」，少了這樣的氣魄，這場「黨變」恐怕將以失敗甚至笑話收場。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 27, 2009
The KMT Central Standing Committee has finally made its decision. Every Central Standing Committee Member must run for re-election. The curtain has risen on a "quiet intraparty coup."
Why this quiet intraparty coup? The Central Standing Committee is the highest authority within the KMT. Its status is comparable to the Central Political Bureau in Soviet-style political parties. If every Politburo Member was replaced overnight, that would constitute an intraparty coup. Now that the Central Standing Committee has ordered its members to submit their joint resignation, that too constitutes an intraparty coup.
The Central Standing Committee is elected by party representatives. It makes no difference why they were elected. The Central Standing Committee unquestionably represents the will of the party. But some members of the Central Standing Committee enaged in vote-buying. A few rotten apples spoiled the entire barrel. The decision to dump the entire barrel and start over from scratch means that the will of certain individuals or the Central Standing Committee has nullified a decision reached through a democratic election. This also constitutes an intraparty coup.
This intraparty coup was instigated by Party Chairman Ma Ying-jeou. It was promoted by Ma Ying-jeou. Whatever its motives, the current party leadership refused to recognize the legitimacy of the former Central Standing Committee, and proceeded to overthrow it. This also constitutes an intraparty coup seldom seen in political history.
The intraparty coup is already a partial success. Central Standing Committee by-elections have already been announced. Candidates involved in vote-buying will not be permitted to participate. Can we look forward to a high caliber Central Standing Committee that meets the expectations of Ma Ying-jeou? We can, but it won't be easy.
Why not? Suppose no vote-buying had occurred, and the 32 former Central Standing Committee Members served out their one year terms? Would this Central Standing Committee befit an outstanding political party, adept at governance? Would it be able to help the ruling adminstration govern the nation? Would it be a locomotive for a "party of action?" Probably not.
Why not? Because even after those guilty of vote-buying are removed, the 32 former Central Standing Committee Members still bore scant resemblance to a supreme political authority. They included neither central government level political appointees and local political leaders, nor experienced professionals with reputations for integrity. They lacked leaders with charisma, and leaders with experience. They were second and even third string players. How could they possibly fulfill the role of supreme decision-makers within the halls of power? What virtues did they embody, if any? Did they have either the professionalism or the aptitude to help the administration govern the nation, let alone lead a party of action in its time of need? Such a Central Standing Committee was nothing more than an empty shell. It could not have contributed anything to the KMT's larger mission. It failed to meet with Ma Ying-jeou's expectations. Never mind whether Ma Ying-jeou was "centralizating power in the name of reform." The intraparty coup has begun. A galloping horse is hard to capture. Ma Ying-jeou urgently needs to do two things.
First, he must decide what sort of Central Standing Committee he wants. Central government political appointees resigned en masse from the previous Central Standing Committee. Ma Camp candidates withdrew their candidacies, en masse. Some outsiders concluded that Ma wanted to diminish the power of the party, and "virtualize" the role of the Central Standing Committee. If Ma Ying-jeou was actually thinking in such terms, and was attempting to transform the KMT into a "soft power" political party, the public would have been delighted. If Ma Ying-jeou is actually thinking in such terms, he should stop repeating the slogan, "A better party for a better government." He should avoid any discrepancy between words and deeds, to prevent the KMT from being branded a party whose substance fails to match its form.
Secondly, if Ma is not attempting to diminish the power of the Central Standing Committee, if he genuinely wants "a better party for a better government," he must strengthen the Central Standing Committee. This will help underscore his intentions. The only way to strengthen the Central Standing Committee is to recruit personnel of the highest caliber. In order to overthrow an inadequate Central Standing Committee, Ma Ying-jeou was able to persuade Central Standing Committee Members to resign, en masse. In order to establish a superior Central Standing Committee, Ma should also be able to persuade better qualified Central Standing Committee candidates to throw their hats in the ring. Otherwise the same candidates will run in the wake of the intraparty coup. The same second and third stringers will be elected. The intraparty coup will be a charade, making the KMT a laughing stock.
Over a century ago Qing dynasty scholar Tan Sitong declared, "China has never known political reformers willing to shed their own blood. Let me be the first." Tan wanted to affirm his commitment to political reform. Ma Ying-jeou should display the same courage. Ma should declare, "The Kuomintang has never known party reformers willing to shed their own blood. Let me be the first." Without such courage, the intraparty coup may well end in failure, and become the target of ridicule.
黨變尚未成功，主席仍須努力
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.27 04:35 am
國民黨臨時中常會終於作出決定：全額補選中常委，一場黨史上僅見的「寧靜黨變」也宣告揭開序幕。
何以是「黨變」？中常會是國民黨的最上層權力結構，地位猶如蘇維埃式政黨的中央政治局，政治局委員若在一夜之間全遭撤換，自是「黨變」；如今，中常會全體常委在黨中央指揮操盤下集體被動請辭，當然亦可謂「黨變」。
另外，中常委是由黨代表票選產生，不論其當選原因為何，中常委具有票選的黨意基礎卻殆無疑義；但黨中央卻因部分人士賄選，幾粒老鼠屎壞了一鍋粥，而決定將整鍋粥倒棄重起爐灶，不啻是以個人意志或黨中央意志推翻了民主票選的結論，也難謂非為「黨變」。
而且這場「黨變」是由黨主席馬英九主導發動，也是「馬英九意志」的貫徹，不論基於何種動機，現任黨領導人不承認並進而推翻前任所主導產生的中常會，在世界政黨史上也是罕見的「黨變」。
如今「黨變」既已初階段成功，中常委全額補選的選舉新制也已公告，曾經涉賄者的參選資格亦將被剝奪，一個優質並符合「馬英九意志」的中常會，因此便可樂觀期待會在十一月十四日投票後產生嗎？我們的看法是：非也，難也！
何以故？先假設這樣的情況：如果並無賄選情事的發生，上次當選的三十二名中常委如期任事一年，但試問：這樣的中常會能符合「黨優政強」的條件？能具備「以黨輔政」的能力？能扮演「行動政黨」火車頭的角色嗎？任何人的答案大概都是否定的。
為什麼？因為那三十二位中常委組成的權力結構，即使剔除部分賄選者，也「望之不似最高權力機制」，其中既無有政治實力的中央政務官與地方首長，亦無有社會形象的專業人士，代表性與功能性兩者俱缺，以如此二軍甚至三軍的陣容，要如何負起最高權力機制的決策角色？又有何優質可言？憑什麼專業與能力去輔助比他們更強數倍的政府？更遑論要當聞聲救苦的行動政黨領頭羊。
這樣一個天殘地缺的「空殼中常會」，對國民黨的執政大業毫無裨益，相信也不符合「馬英九意志」的期待；因此姑且不論馬英九是否如外界所言「以集權之實行改革之名」，「黨變」既已啟動，駟馬難追，馬英九目前最迫切要做的祇有兩件事：
其一，他必須確定他要的到底是一個什麼樣的中常會。上次中常委選舉，中央政務官集體退出，馬系人馬全面棄選，外界的普遍解讀是：他要弱化黨的功能，虛擬化中常會的角色。如果馬英九確作此想，有志於把國民黨逐步改造成柔性政黨，社會大眾自應樂觀其成，但他卻應從此閉口不談「黨優政強」這類口號，免得造成社會認知的落差，並讓國民黨遭受「名實不符」、「表裡不一」的譏評。
其二，如果他並無弱化中常會的意圖，「以黨輔政」也確是他的目標，他就必須以強化中常會作為手段，來彰顯意圖並實踐目標。而強化中常會的方法唯有一途：延攬優質人才參選中常委。馬英九既然可以「勸辭」全體中常委，推翻一個「劣質中常會」，當然也應該「勸選」中常委，重建一個「優質中常會」；否則，「黨變」之後，參選中常委的仍是原來那批人，當選中常委的也仍是那些二、三軍者流，這樣的「黨變」祇不過是兒戲一場，徒留社會笑柄。
一百多年前，譚嗣同曾誓言：「中國未聞有因變法而流血者，有之，請自嗣同始」，以示變法決心；馬英九也應有這樣的氣魄：「國民黨未聞有因改革而黨變者，有之，請自英九始」，少了這樣的氣魄，這場「黨變」恐怕將以失敗甚至笑話收場。
Monday, October 26, 2009
Public Health and US Beef
Public Health and US Beef
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 26, 2009
The government has lifted its ban on U.S. beef, provoking a public outcry. Amidst accusations that he was "outside the loop," Director of Health Yang Chih-liang even expressed a willingness to step down. But if all the policy decisions were made by the National Security Council, why must Yang Chih-liang bear responsibility? In this tug of war between public health and diplomatic advantage, what exactly was our moral and political calculus?
Most regrettable of all is that during recent negotiations our side failed to stick to its guns. As Yang Chih-liang blurted out, "What can we do? That's the way things are for us." His lament induced a "national malaise." It is true that in negotiations with the United States, we are usually at a disadvantage. That is why Chen administration National Security Council Secretary General Chiou I-jen asked rhetorically, "Whose apron strings are we going to cling to, if not Uncle Sam's?" But the question is: Were the recent negotiations one-sided? Was the United States really too rough with us? Or were we simply too soft? Ma Ying-jeou and Su Chi are on good terms with the United States. But if their administration leaves the impression that Washington is bullying Taipei, isn't it squandering its friendship with the United States? The U.S. executive branch has maintained a consistent negotiating posture. But when Obama replaced Bush, Taipei lost some of its bargaining chips. Has Washington decided it can get away with bullying Taipei? Or have we merely failed to assert ourselves?
Department of Health officials said that some provisions which appear overly generous, are merely instances in which we "allowed the United States to save face." That is ridiculous. What about saving our own face? Washington's representative to Taipei has never denied that his responsibility is to safeguard U.S. interests. Even after leaving office, Stephen M. Young is still attempting to sell the idea of "Let in the beef in the Year of the Ox." If we don't look after Taipei's rights and dignity, who will?
The current tempest over US beef involves three bones of contention. First, too many items been allowed in. In addition to bone-in steaks, many organ meats have been allowed in. These pose a risk to our health. Secondly, the decision-making process is too opaque. In particular, the views of health authorities have not been sufficiently heeded. Decision-making has been dominated by the National Security Council, which is not required to answer to public opinion. Thirdly, the government hasn't made a sincere effort to communicate with the public. It has repeatedly said that "in principle, no imports are allowed," but that "both sides have a private understanding," and used other vague terms to mislead the public.
After a full day of public backlash, Premier Wu Den-yih amended his US beef import policy. He stressed that beef brains, marrow, eyes, skulls, and other high-risk parts would not be allowed in. He revised the Department of Health's previous statement that "in principle, no imports are allowed." He said "If Americans won't eat it, neither will we." This bottom line is probably more acceptable to the public.
The Executive Yuan is locking the barn door after the horse was been stolen. Its current priority is to act as gatekeeper, to prevent unscrupulous businesses from taking advantage of the situation, or using the black hole of customs to smuggle in high-risk foodstuffs. It must establish a more effective management mechanism. It must provide the public with more detailed explanations. For example, it should ensure that all U.S. beef and organ meat imports are consistently labeled. It should ensure that downstream retail and restaurant industry are in compliance, enabling consumers to see clearly what they are buying. It must enable the public to decide for itself whether it wishes to consume U.S. beef and organ meats. It must control the damage caused by its foreign policy blunders, and safeguard against future policy errors.
Government agencies can also set up dedicated web pages. They can track Taiwan import data, including what was imported, how much was imported, and when it was imported. They can track mid-stream and down-stream sales volume and sales destinations. Organ meats used in processed foods are often hard to identify. This way they can be subjected to periodic checks by Consumer Protection Officers, or consumers actively participating in the supervision process. This will reduce the possibility of administrative black holes. Premier Wu wants the Department of Health to establish a "compulsory insurance" system for importers. Actually making the process more transparent, and the information more readily available to the public, will be more helpful than some makeshift insurance policy.
To be fair, much of the public wants U.S. beef imports. Many think the probability of a renewed outbreak of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease infections is minuscule. After long deprivation, many gourmets are hungry for US T-bone steaks. This does not mean they are indifferent to their own health. This does not mean the government can disregard public health, or lower its guard. It is rumored we made significant concessions for the sake of the "Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement," and to enable ministerial-level officials from the US to visit Taiwan. But using public health as a bargaining chip is unthinkable. The administration has failed to stand behind its policies. If it continues to default on its responsibility, the government's image may take a big hit.
The Ma administration has linked beef imports to foreign policy. But in the end it must respond to the economic concerns of the man in the street. It need not advance any elaborate theories. It merely needs to assure the public that the beef it is eating is safe.
美國的牛肉與台灣的民生
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.26 03:32 am
政府宣布美國牛肉大舉解禁，輿論大譁，被轟「狀況外」的衛生署長楊志良甚至表示願意下台負責。但如果整起決策是由國安會主導，楊志良能負什麼責任？在民生安全與外交利益之間，這個算盤究竟是怎麼打的？
最令人不愉快的是，這次談判，我方該堅持的未堅持，連楊志良都脫口說出「沒辦法，國家的狀況就是這樣」，使整個社會籠罩在一種深沈的「無力感」之中。的確，對美談判，優勢通常不操之在我，所以扁政府時代的國安會祕書長邱義仁才會說：「不抱美國大腿，抱誰？」問題是，這次談判的一面倒，真是「美國太鴨霸」嗎？還是我們自己的腿太軟？馬英九和蘇起都有不錯的美國關係，他們當政，如果反而升高這種美國「欺壓」的印象，豈非枉費了他們與美國的交誼？美國行政部門固有一貫的談判原則，但在歐巴馬政府取代了布希政府後，台灣在談判線上反而倒退，真的是美國吃定台灣，還是我們未能據理力爭？
衛生署官員又說，談判條文看來很寬，是我們「給美國面子」，這真是荒唐的想法；請問，我們自己的面子又在哪裡？美國駐台代表從來不諱言自己的職責在維護美國利益，楊甦棣離職前都還在推銷「牛年開放牛肉」的想法；台灣的權益和尊嚴若不靠我們自己維護，要指望誰？
這起「美牛風波」最受爭議之處有三：其一，開放幅度超過合理範圍，除了帶骨牛排外，大量內臟的進口，為國民健康帶來風險。其二，決策太不透明，尤其衛生主管機關的意見未獲充分尊重，主導決策的國安會卻不必面對民意。其三，政府向社會溝通的誠意不足，一再使用「原則上不進口」、「雙方私下諒解」等含糊字眼誤導民眾，留下許多曖昧空間。
經過一天民意反彈，閣揆吳敦義立即對開放範圍作了修正，強調牛腦、脊髓、牛眼、頭骨等高風險部位都在禁止之列，更正了衛生署先前所謂的「原則上不進口」。他說，「美國人不吃的，我們也不吃」；這點，應是一般民眾較能接受的底線。
亡羊補牢，行政院現今的要務是必須在執行上把關，防止不肖商人趁隙上下其手，或利用海關黑洞偷偷夾帶高風險食材進口，應當設計出更有效的管理機制，並向民眾作更明確的說明。比如說，應將所有進口美國牛肉及內臟產品，一律加貼統一的識別標誌，並規定下游零售及餐飲業遵行，使消費者能夠一望即知，至少要讓民眾有吃不吃美國牛肉與牛雜的自主選擇權。總之，必須做到「外交失利／內政善後」及「政策失守／行政把關」。
政府部門亦可設置專門網頁，將台灣進口商的資訊公開處理，包括其進口項目、時間、數量及中下游銷售去向等。如此，對於內臟或因輾轉加工而不易辨識來源的產品，也可由各地消保官定時稽查，或透過消費大眾主動參與監督，以降低行政管理的黑洞風險。吳揆要求衛生署建立進口商「強制保險」制度，事實上，如果各項資訊能夠充分透明，要比聊備一格的保險對民眾更有實益。
平情而論，這次開放美國牛肉進口，或亦有不少民眾支持；有人認為感染新型庫賈氏症的機率極低，有些老饕對久違的美國丁骨牛排更是躍躍欲試。儘管如此，這並不表示他們不在乎健康，也不表示政府可以把民眾的安危置之度外，更不意味政府可以降低自己的把關標準。外傳，我方之所以大幅讓步，是為換取「台美貿易暨投資架構協定」的談判，以及美開放部長級官員來台訪問；無論如何，把國民健康拿到談判桌上去作政治交易，都是難以想像的事。政策失守，行政若再不把關，政府的形象聲望恐將受到重創。
無論馬政府把牛肉開放跟什麼外交政策綁在一起，終要從「庶民經濟」的觀點來答覆民眾的疑慮。在此，不必談太多大道理，必須告訴大家如何確保吃得安心才行。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 26, 2009
The government has lifted its ban on U.S. beef, provoking a public outcry. Amidst accusations that he was "outside the loop," Director of Health Yang Chih-liang even expressed a willingness to step down. But if all the policy decisions were made by the National Security Council, why must Yang Chih-liang bear responsibility? In this tug of war between public health and diplomatic advantage, what exactly was our moral and political calculus?
Most regrettable of all is that during recent negotiations our side failed to stick to its guns. As Yang Chih-liang blurted out, "What can we do? That's the way things are for us." His lament induced a "national malaise." It is true that in negotiations with the United States, we are usually at a disadvantage. That is why Chen administration National Security Council Secretary General Chiou I-jen asked rhetorically, "Whose apron strings are we going to cling to, if not Uncle Sam's?" But the question is: Were the recent negotiations one-sided? Was the United States really too rough with us? Or were we simply too soft? Ma Ying-jeou and Su Chi are on good terms with the United States. But if their administration leaves the impression that Washington is bullying Taipei, isn't it squandering its friendship with the United States? The U.S. executive branch has maintained a consistent negotiating posture. But when Obama replaced Bush, Taipei lost some of its bargaining chips. Has Washington decided it can get away with bullying Taipei? Or have we merely failed to assert ourselves?
Department of Health officials said that some provisions which appear overly generous, are merely instances in which we "allowed the United States to save face." That is ridiculous. What about saving our own face? Washington's representative to Taipei has never denied that his responsibility is to safeguard U.S. interests. Even after leaving office, Stephen M. Young is still attempting to sell the idea of "Let in the beef in the Year of the Ox." If we don't look after Taipei's rights and dignity, who will?
The current tempest over US beef involves three bones of contention. First, too many items been allowed in. In addition to bone-in steaks, many organ meats have been allowed in. These pose a risk to our health. Secondly, the decision-making process is too opaque. In particular, the views of health authorities have not been sufficiently heeded. Decision-making has been dominated by the National Security Council, which is not required to answer to public opinion. Thirdly, the government hasn't made a sincere effort to communicate with the public. It has repeatedly said that "in principle, no imports are allowed," but that "both sides have a private understanding," and used other vague terms to mislead the public.
After a full day of public backlash, Premier Wu Den-yih amended his US beef import policy. He stressed that beef brains, marrow, eyes, skulls, and other high-risk parts would not be allowed in. He revised the Department of Health's previous statement that "in principle, no imports are allowed." He said "If Americans won't eat it, neither will we." This bottom line is probably more acceptable to the public.
The Executive Yuan is locking the barn door after the horse was been stolen. Its current priority is to act as gatekeeper, to prevent unscrupulous businesses from taking advantage of the situation, or using the black hole of customs to smuggle in high-risk foodstuffs. It must establish a more effective management mechanism. It must provide the public with more detailed explanations. For example, it should ensure that all U.S. beef and organ meat imports are consistently labeled. It should ensure that downstream retail and restaurant industry are in compliance, enabling consumers to see clearly what they are buying. It must enable the public to decide for itself whether it wishes to consume U.S. beef and organ meats. It must control the damage caused by its foreign policy blunders, and safeguard against future policy errors.
Government agencies can also set up dedicated web pages. They can track Taiwan import data, including what was imported, how much was imported, and when it was imported. They can track mid-stream and down-stream sales volume and sales destinations. Organ meats used in processed foods are often hard to identify. This way they can be subjected to periodic checks by Consumer Protection Officers, or consumers actively participating in the supervision process. This will reduce the possibility of administrative black holes. Premier Wu wants the Department of Health to establish a "compulsory insurance" system for importers. Actually making the process more transparent, and the information more readily available to the public, will be more helpful than some makeshift insurance policy.
To be fair, much of the public wants U.S. beef imports. Many think the probability of a renewed outbreak of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease infections is minuscule. After long deprivation, many gourmets are hungry for US T-bone steaks. This does not mean they are indifferent to their own health. This does not mean the government can disregard public health, or lower its guard. It is rumored we made significant concessions for the sake of the "Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement," and to enable ministerial-level officials from the US to visit Taiwan. But using public health as a bargaining chip is unthinkable. The administration has failed to stand behind its policies. If it continues to default on its responsibility, the government's image may take a big hit.
The Ma administration has linked beef imports to foreign policy. But in the end it must respond to the economic concerns of the man in the street. It need not advance any elaborate theories. It merely needs to assure the public that the beef it is eating is safe.
美國的牛肉與台灣的民生
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.26 03:32 am
政府宣布美國牛肉大舉解禁，輿論大譁，被轟「狀況外」的衛生署長楊志良甚至表示願意下台負責。但如果整起決策是由國安會主導，楊志良能負什麼責任？在民生安全與外交利益之間，這個算盤究竟是怎麼打的？
最令人不愉快的是，這次談判，我方該堅持的未堅持，連楊志良都脫口說出「沒辦法，國家的狀況就是這樣」，使整個社會籠罩在一種深沈的「無力感」之中。的確，對美談判，優勢通常不操之在我，所以扁政府時代的國安會祕書長邱義仁才會說：「不抱美國大腿，抱誰？」問題是，這次談判的一面倒，真是「美國太鴨霸」嗎？還是我們自己的腿太軟？馬英九和蘇起都有不錯的美國關係，他們當政，如果反而升高這種美國「欺壓」的印象，豈非枉費了他們與美國的交誼？美國行政部門固有一貫的談判原則，但在歐巴馬政府取代了布希政府後，台灣在談判線上反而倒退，真的是美國吃定台灣，還是我們未能據理力爭？
衛生署官員又說，談判條文看來很寬，是我們「給美國面子」，這真是荒唐的想法；請問，我們自己的面子又在哪裡？美國駐台代表從來不諱言自己的職責在維護美國利益，楊甦棣離職前都還在推銷「牛年開放牛肉」的想法；台灣的權益和尊嚴若不靠我們自己維護，要指望誰？
這起「美牛風波」最受爭議之處有三：其一，開放幅度超過合理範圍，除了帶骨牛排外，大量內臟的進口，為國民健康帶來風險。其二，決策太不透明，尤其衛生主管機關的意見未獲充分尊重，主導決策的國安會卻不必面對民意。其三，政府向社會溝通的誠意不足，一再使用「原則上不進口」、「雙方私下諒解」等含糊字眼誤導民眾，留下許多曖昧空間。
經過一天民意反彈，閣揆吳敦義立即對開放範圍作了修正，強調牛腦、脊髓、牛眼、頭骨等高風險部位都在禁止之列，更正了衛生署先前所謂的「原則上不進口」。他說，「美國人不吃的，我們也不吃」；這點，應是一般民眾較能接受的底線。
亡羊補牢，行政院現今的要務是必須在執行上把關，防止不肖商人趁隙上下其手，或利用海關黑洞偷偷夾帶高風險食材進口，應當設計出更有效的管理機制，並向民眾作更明確的說明。比如說，應將所有進口美國牛肉及內臟產品，一律加貼統一的識別標誌，並規定下游零售及餐飲業遵行，使消費者能夠一望即知，至少要讓民眾有吃不吃美國牛肉與牛雜的自主選擇權。總之，必須做到「外交失利／內政善後」及「政策失守／行政把關」。
政府部門亦可設置專門網頁，將台灣進口商的資訊公開處理，包括其進口項目、時間、數量及中下游銷售去向等。如此，對於內臟或因輾轉加工而不易辨識來源的產品，也可由各地消保官定時稽查，或透過消費大眾主動參與監督，以降低行政管理的黑洞風險。吳揆要求衛生署建立進口商「強制保險」制度，事實上，如果各項資訊能夠充分透明，要比聊備一格的保險對民眾更有實益。
平情而論，這次開放美國牛肉進口，或亦有不少民眾支持；有人認為感染新型庫賈氏症的機率極低，有些老饕對久違的美國丁骨牛排更是躍躍欲試。儘管如此，這並不表示他們不在乎健康，也不表示政府可以把民眾的安危置之度外，更不意味政府可以降低自己的把關標準。外傳，我方之所以大幅讓步，是為換取「台美貿易暨投資架構協定」的談判，以及美開放部長級官員來台訪問；無論如何，把國民健康拿到談判桌上去作政治交易，都是難以想像的事。政策失守，行政若再不把關，政府的形象聲望恐將受到重創。
無論馬政府把牛肉開放跟什麼外交政策綁在一起，終要從「庶民經濟」的觀點來答覆民眾的疑慮。在此，不必談太多大道理，必須告訴大家如何確保吃得安心才行。
Friday, October 23, 2009
Killing a Second Chicken won't Intimidate the Monkey
Killing a Second Chicken won't Intimidate the Monkey
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 23, 2009
Three KMT legislators have had their electoral victories nullified as a result of vote-buying. Two KMT Central Standing Committee Members have had their status as Central Standing Committee Members nullified as a result of vote-buying. The legal system and the party disciplinary system show that the practice of vote-buying within the KMT has yet to be eradicated.
The KMT Central Standing Committee was a "special occupation." It was special because once one was made a Central Standing Committee Member, one occupied a position at the center of power. Being granted the title was the equivalent of being handed the keys to power. It was a guarantee of official advancement. Now however, it is "special" in an entirely different sense. Although being elected to the Central Standing Committee nominally places one at the center of power, one has in fact merely been placed at the fringes of power. One is unable to participate in decision-making on any policies whatsoever. People with real power have gradually abandoned their quest to become Central Standing Committee Members. Central Standing Committee membership is a mere figurehead position.
Central Standing Committee Members no longer wield real power. But some within the KMT are still falling over each other in their quest to become members. More than a few retired veteran politicians, as well as ordinary civilians who have never tasted real political power, have enthusiastically plunged into this power game in which no real power is to be had. They have won election to a Central Standing Committee that represents nothing and wields no power. It is nothing more than a public mockery, a blot on the history of the KMT. But because so many of its members were elected by hook or by crook, this particular Central Standing Committee election is especially controversial.
The KMT culture of vote-buying is of course nothing new. During past Central Standing Committee elections candidates began giving out campaign gifts from Day One. These gifts included everything from vintage wines to gold pens and gold watches. This time the two candidates whose elections were nullified merely gave out a few salted fish and a few bottles of red wine. Compared to previous candidates they were pikers. Also, candidates who gave out smaller gifts were subjected to harsher party discipline than those who gave out more extravagant gifts. Candidates who bought votes for a few hundred dollars lost their seats on the Central Standing Committee. This led to a backlash by those disciplined. They demanded to know why those who gave out salted fish were being disciplined, while those who gave out more expensive gifts such as orchids were spared. Besides, they said, giving gifts is normal human behavior. It is an historical custom. One gives gifts on holidays, and every time the party holds a party congress, it holds an election. Since one is holding an election, one must campaign. Since one must campaign, how can one not give gifts?
But the candidates who are lashing back have forgotten something. Why must one give gifts if one is campaigning for the Central Standing Committee? If one doesn't give gifts, does that mean one cannot get elected? If one cannot get elected, so what? Central Standing Committee Members are elected annually. Each week they hold only one meeting. They cannot participate in government decision-making. Nor can they intervene in the legislative or budgetary processes. How many political chips is a name card reading "KMT Central Standing Committee Member" worth? Will executive branch agencies put any stock in it? Will it enhance one's prestige as one shuttles back and forth between Taiwan and the Mainland? Perhaps one has some really great suggestions on how to govern the nation. Perhaps one must meet with the President in his capacity as party chairman every week so that one can save the party and the nation. Otherwise, these candidates who argue that "giving gifts is not a crime," must ask themselves why must candidates give gifts? Moreover, if one feels compelled to give gifts during party elections, can one say no to vote-buying when running for public office? Aren't the three candidates whose elections were nullified a perfect example?
If the party is crooked, then the government will be crooked. The first step in correcting the political atmosphere in the ruling administration, is to correct the political atmosphere in the ruling party. The ruling party controls the nation's resources. If ruling party members become accustomed to giving gifts, what won't they become accustomed to doing? Ma Ying-jeou has long abhorred vote-buying. He was sacked when he was Minister of Justice precisely because he was too diligent about investigating vote-buying. When he first became Kuomintang chairman, he warned party members that must not accept even souvenir mugs. Today, Central Standing Committee vote-buying offers proof positive that initial efforts at imposing party discipline have yet to improve the situtation. In order to change the party's political character and reverse the political winds, this is the right first step for Ma to take as party chairman.
Some have criticized Ma's handling of the affair as "overkill," "making a mountain out of a molehill," or even "punishing minor offenders but not major offenders." But the culture of vote-buying is deep-rooted. One has to make a mountain out of a molehill. One has to engage in overkill. Besides, during past attempts to intimidate potential offenders, killing one chicken successfully intimidated 100 monkeys. But today's monkeys are bolder. Killing one or two chickens is no longer enough to deter even one monkey, let alone hundreds of such monkeys. Today one must continue killing chickens until the monkeys are eventually intimidated.
If the KMT cannot rid itself of the monkey on its back known as vote-buying, then reformers will never rally behind the KMT. The KMT will remain forever trapped in the vicious cycle of its "historic role." If Ma Ying-jeou truly wants reform, he must act boldly. However many engage in vote-buying, then however many must be punished. Even if it means the overthrow of the Central Standing Committee. Only this way can the KMT transform itself. We look forward to seeing Ma Ying-jeou lob the heads off more evil monkeys.
殺二雞尚不足以儆眾猴
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.23 03:38 am
三位國民黨立委因賄選而被判決當選無效，兩位國民黨中常委因賄選而被取消中常委資格；司法與黨紀都證明國民黨內的賄選文化仍未根除。
國民黨中常委是個「特殊職務」，早年之所以「特殊」是因為當了中常委，就可以躋身權力核心，有了這個頭銜就等於拿到了權力的身分證，也取得了宦途晉升的保證書。而晚近之所以「特殊」則是因為進入中常會後，形式上雖儼然身處權力核心，但實質上卻被擺在權力邊陲地帶，什麼決策都參與也影響不了。真正有實力的人紛紛棄選這屆中常委，就可見中常委這個職位其實已如雞肋。
但即使中常委的權力角色已質變至此，國民黨內卻仍有人不惜擠破頭也要當個「空頭中常委」。不少資深早已退休的政治人物，以及與政治事務根本沾不上邊的社會人士，這次興沖沖參與這場拿不到權力的權力遊戲，並且在最後列名當選名單內，不但讓外界嘲諷這是國民黨黨史上「最沒權力」也「最沒代表性」的中常會；又因為其中甚多不惜一切手段也要當選的人物，更使這次中常委選舉的選風頗滋物議。
當然，國民黨內的賄選文化並非始於今日。過去別說競選中常委，從競選中央委員開始就得送禮，禮品從高價洋酒到金筆金錶不一而足。這次被開鍘的兩位中常委送的祇是幾條鹹魚與幾瓶紅酒，跟過去相比其實祇能算是小兒科。也因為「禮輕而黨紀重」，幾百元賄選卻付出喪失中常委的代價，而引起當事人的反彈。他們抱怨說：送鹹魚都要處分，送更貴蘭花的人為何不被處分？而且，送禮是人情之常，也是歷史共業，年節都要送禮，黨舉辦一次黨代表大會，又要辦選舉，既要選舉，總要拜票，既要拜票，豈能不送個伴手禮？
但這些反彈的人卻忘了想想：為什麼競選中常委就非要送禮？不送禮就選不上嗎？選不上很嚴重嗎？中常委每年改選一次，每周祇開一次會，既參與不了政府決策，也無法介入國會立法或預算刪審，一張印有「國民黨中常委」頭銜的名片，能為自己增加多少籌碼？是行政機關更買帳？還是行走兩岸更拉風？或是自己真有什麼了不起的治國建言，非得每周當著總統兼主席的面，進言獻策以救黨救國？如果以上皆非，這些主張「送禮無罪」的人就不得不問問自己：為什麼參選非要送禮？而且，黨內選舉都得送禮，真要參選公職，豈能不賄選？三位被判決當選無效的同黨立委，不就正是血淋淋的例子？
黨不正則政不正，端正政風的第一步，就得端正黨風，尤其執政黨掌控國家資源，黨員若對送禮酬謝習以為常，那就沒有任何事做不出來。馬英九對賄選一向深惡痛絕，當年他的法務部長職位就是因為查賄太嚴而被查掉；他初任國民黨主席時，也曾警告黨員連一個馬克杯都不能收，如今因中常委賄選罪證確鑿而開鍘辦人，可見他未改初衷，並且想從扭轉黨風開始，企圖扭轉政風，這是他兼任黨主席後正確的第一步。
雖然有人批評他的處理是「矯枉過正」、「小題大作」，而且「辦小不辦大」，但對於根深柢固的賄選文化，小題不但要大作，矯枉也才能過正；更何況，過去殺雞儆猴，可以殺一而儆百，但現在猴子早已成精，殺一雞二雞已不足以儆一猴，更無法儆眾猴，非得多殺幾隻雞才能收到儆嚇的效果。
國民黨如果清不掉這些靠送禮打點關係的惡猴，改革人士就不可能真心向國民黨靠攏，國民黨就永遠得陷入所謂「歷史共業」的惡性循環當中。馬英九真要改革，就得大膽施為，有幾個賄選就辦幾個，即使辦到中常委翻盤重選都不足惜，唯有如此，國民黨才有脫胎換骨的可能；我們期待馬英九再開虎頭鍘，多斬幾隻惡猴。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 23, 2009
Three KMT legislators have had their electoral victories nullified as a result of vote-buying. Two KMT Central Standing Committee Members have had their status as Central Standing Committee Members nullified as a result of vote-buying. The legal system and the party disciplinary system show that the practice of vote-buying within the KMT has yet to be eradicated.
The KMT Central Standing Committee was a "special occupation." It was special because once one was made a Central Standing Committee Member, one occupied a position at the center of power. Being granted the title was the equivalent of being handed the keys to power. It was a guarantee of official advancement. Now however, it is "special" in an entirely different sense. Although being elected to the Central Standing Committee nominally places one at the center of power, one has in fact merely been placed at the fringes of power. One is unable to participate in decision-making on any policies whatsoever. People with real power have gradually abandoned their quest to become Central Standing Committee Members. Central Standing Committee membership is a mere figurehead position.
Central Standing Committee Members no longer wield real power. But some within the KMT are still falling over each other in their quest to become members. More than a few retired veteran politicians, as well as ordinary civilians who have never tasted real political power, have enthusiastically plunged into this power game in which no real power is to be had. They have won election to a Central Standing Committee that represents nothing and wields no power. It is nothing more than a public mockery, a blot on the history of the KMT. But because so many of its members were elected by hook or by crook, this particular Central Standing Committee election is especially controversial.
The KMT culture of vote-buying is of course nothing new. During past Central Standing Committee elections candidates began giving out campaign gifts from Day One. These gifts included everything from vintage wines to gold pens and gold watches. This time the two candidates whose elections were nullified merely gave out a few salted fish and a few bottles of red wine. Compared to previous candidates they were pikers. Also, candidates who gave out smaller gifts were subjected to harsher party discipline than those who gave out more extravagant gifts. Candidates who bought votes for a few hundred dollars lost their seats on the Central Standing Committee. This led to a backlash by those disciplined. They demanded to know why those who gave out salted fish were being disciplined, while those who gave out more expensive gifts such as orchids were spared. Besides, they said, giving gifts is normal human behavior. It is an historical custom. One gives gifts on holidays, and every time the party holds a party congress, it holds an election. Since one is holding an election, one must campaign. Since one must campaign, how can one not give gifts?
But the candidates who are lashing back have forgotten something. Why must one give gifts if one is campaigning for the Central Standing Committee? If one doesn't give gifts, does that mean one cannot get elected? If one cannot get elected, so what? Central Standing Committee Members are elected annually. Each week they hold only one meeting. They cannot participate in government decision-making. Nor can they intervene in the legislative or budgetary processes. How many political chips is a name card reading "KMT Central Standing Committee Member" worth? Will executive branch agencies put any stock in it? Will it enhance one's prestige as one shuttles back and forth between Taiwan and the Mainland? Perhaps one has some really great suggestions on how to govern the nation. Perhaps one must meet with the President in his capacity as party chairman every week so that one can save the party and the nation. Otherwise, these candidates who argue that "giving gifts is not a crime," must ask themselves why must candidates give gifts? Moreover, if one feels compelled to give gifts during party elections, can one say no to vote-buying when running for public office? Aren't the three candidates whose elections were nullified a perfect example?
If the party is crooked, then the government will be crooked. The first step in correcting the political atmosphere in the ruling administration, is to correct the political atmosphere in the ruling party. The ruling party controls the nation's resources. If ruling party members become accustomed to giving gifts, what won't they become accustomed to doing? Ma Ying-jeou has long abhorred vote-buying. He was sacked when he was Minister of Justice precisely because he was too diligent about investigating vote-buying. When he first became Kuomintang chairman, he warned party members that must not accept even souvenir mugs. Today, Central Standing Committee vote-buying offers proof positive that initial efforts at imposing party discipline have yet to improve the situtation. In order to change the party's political character and reverse the political winds, this is the right first step for Ma to take as party chairman.
Some have criticized Ma's handling of the affair as "overkill," "making a mountain out of a molehill," or even "punishing minor offenders but not major offenders." But the culture of vote-buying is deep-rooted. One has to make a mountain out of a molehill. One has to engage in overkill. Besides, during past attempts to intimidate potential offenders, killing one chicken successfully intimidated 100 monkeys. But today's monkeys are bolder. Killing one or two chickens is no longer enough to deter even one monkey, let alone hundreds of such monkeys. Today one must continue killing chickens until the monkeys are eventually intimidated.
If the KMT cannot rid itself of the monkey on its back known as vote-buying, then reformers will never rally behind the KMT. The KMT will remain forever trapped in the vicious cycle of its "historic role." If Ma Ying-jeou truly wants reform, he must act boldly. However many engage in vote-buying, then however many must be punished. Even if it means the overthrow of the Central Standing Committee. Only this way can the KMT transform itself. We look forward to seeing Ma Ying-jeou lob the heads off more evil monkeys.
殺二雞尚不足以儆眾猴
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.23 03:38 am
三位國民黨立委因賄選而被判決當選無效，兩位國民黨中常委因賄選而被取消中常委資格；司法與黨紀都證明國民黨內的賄選文化仍未根除。
國民黨中常委是個「特殊職務」，早年之所以「特殊」是因為當了中常委，就可以躋身權力核心，有了這個頭銜就等於拿到了權力的身分證，也取得了宦途晉升的保證書。而晚近之所以「特殊」則是因為進入中常會後，形式上雖儼然身處權力核心，但實質上卻被擺在權力邊陲地帶，什麼決策都參與也影響不了。真正有實力的人紛紛棄選這屆中常委，就可見中常委這個職位其實已如雞肋。
但即使中常委的權力角色已質變至此，國民黨內卻仍有人不惜擠破頭也要當個「空頭中常委」。不少資深早已退休的政治人物，以及與政治事務根本沾不上邊的社會人士，這次興沖沖參與這場拿不到權力的權力遊戲，並且在最後列名當選名單內，不但讓外界嘲諷這是國民黨黨史上「最沒權力」也「最沒代表性」的中常會；又因為其中甚多不惜一切手段也要當選的人物，更使這次中常委選舉的選風頗滋物議。
當然，國民黨內的賄選文化並非始於今日。過去別說競選中常委，從競選中央委員開始就得送禮，禮品從高價洋酒到金筆金錶不一而足。這次被開鍘的兩位中常委送的祇是幾條鹹魚與幾瓶紅酒，跟過去相比其實祇能算是小兒科。也因為「禮輕而黨紀重」，幾百元賄選卻付出喪失中常委的代價，而引起當事人的反彈。他們抱怨說：送鹹魚都要處分，送更貴蘭花的人為何不被處分？而且，送禮是人情之常，也是歷史共業，年節都要送禮，黨舉辦一次黨代表大會，又要辦選舉，既要選舉，總要拜票，既要拜票，豈能不送個伴手禮？
但這些反彈的人卻忘了想想：為什麼競選中常委就非要送禮？不送禮就選不上嗎？選不上很嚴重嗎？中常委每年改選一次，每周祇開一次會，既參與不了政府決策，也無法介入國會立法或預算刪審，一張印有「國民黨中常委」頭銜的名片，能為自己增加多少籌碼？是行政機關更買帳？還是行走兩岸更拉風？或是自己真有什麼了不起的治國建言，非得每周當著總統兼主席的面，進言獻策以救黨救國？如果以上皆非，這些主張「送禮無罪」的人就不得不問問自己：為什麼參選非要送禮？而且，黨內選舉都得送禮，真要參選公職，豈能不賄選？三位被判決當選無效的同黨立委，不就正是血淋淋的例子？
黨不正則政不正，端正政風的第一步，就得端正黨風，尤其執政黨掌控國家資源，黨員若對送禮酬謝習以為常，那就沒有任何事做不出來。馬英九對賄選一向深惡痛絕，當年他的法務部長職位就是因為查賄太嚴而被查掉；他初任國民黨主席時，也曾警告黨員連一個馬克杯都不能收，如今因中常委賄選罪證確鑿而開鍘辦人，可見他未改初衷，並且想從扭轉黨風開始，企圖扭轉政風，這是他兼任黨主席後正確的第一步。
雖然有人批評他的處理是「矯枉過正」、「小題大作」，而且「辦小不辦大」，但對於根深柢固的賄選文化，小題不但要大作，矯枉也才能過正；更何況，過去殺雞儆猴，可以殺一而儆百，但現在猴子早已成精，殺一雞二雞已不足以儆一猴，更無法儆眾猴，非得多殺幾隻雞才能收到儆嚇的效果。
國民黨如果清不掉這些靠送禮打點關係的惡猴，改革人士就不可能真心向國民黨靠攏，國民黨就永遠得陷入所謂「歷史共業」的惡性循環當中。馬英九真要改革，就得大膽施為，有幾個賄選就辦幾個，即使辦到中常委翻盤重選都不足惜，唯有如此，國民黨才有脫胎換骨的可能；我們期待馬英九再開虎頭鍘，多斬幾隻惡猴。
Thursday, October 22, 2009
The Impact of Interpretation 665 on Felony Offenses
The Impact of Interpretation 665 on Felony Offenses
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 22, 2009
Chen Shui-bian petitioned for a constitutional interpretation. The Grand Justices responded with Constitutional Interpretation 665. Its most controversial aspect is the "felony detention" provision. A majority of the Grand Justices ruled that "legislating from the bench" was constitutional, but they added a separate clause. The logic of the opinion was flawed, but at the practical level, the public let out a collective sigh of relief.
The provisions of Article 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure outlines the conditions for the detention of suspects. The law is quite clear. It can be divided into several parts. One: The defendant is questioned by a judge, who decides whether sufficient suspicion exists. Two: The judge asks whether failure to detain the person will make prosecution or trial impossible, therefore whether detention is required. Three: The judge asks whether the suspect is a flight risk, whether there reason to believe the suspect is a flight risk, whether there is reason to believe the suspect will destroy evidence, or engage in a conspiracy to commit perjury, and whether the crime is punishable by death, a life sentence, or a five year minimum sentence.
According to these provisions if a person is "under a high degree of suspicion, or requires detention, or there is reason to believe the suspect may destroy evidence or engage in a conspiracy to commit perjury," the judge may order the person detained. If the person is "under a high degree of suspicion, requires detention, is charged with a crime punishable by death, a life sentence, or a five year minimum sentence," the judge may order the person detained. This is the origin of the term "felony detention."
Clearly the term "felony detention" is likely to lead to misunderstandings. It is likely to be misundertood. People are likely to conclude that once one is suspected of a felony, one may then be detained, without considering other factors. But under current legal provisions, this is clearly not the case. As mentioned earlier, judges must also ask whether the supect is "under a high degree of suspicion," or "requires detention." Moreover, the law requires the judge to personally question the defendant before arriving at a decision. The judge must personally examine the case, listen to the suspect's words, observe the suspect's behavior, examine the prosecution's evidence, and only then arrive at a judgment. The judge's ruling must reflect the strength of the prosecution's evidence. What qualifies as "high degree of suspicion" or "requires detention?" That depends on whether the defendant might repeat the crime or threaten witnesses.
News reports over the past tell of many judges mistakenly releasing murderers, serial rapists, and armed robbers. This was the result of judge's faulty judgment while considering these conditions. Judges are human beings. Human beings will invariably be deceived or blinded by their experience, their knowledge, or the defendant's guile. When such mistakes occur, everyone denounces the judges for releasing suspects willy nilly. No one asks whether felony detention is constitutional.
Chen Shui-bian and those riding to his rescue have made an issue of felony detention. They have cleverly focused attention on the easily misunderstood term "felony custody." They have forced the Grand Justices to waste time repeatedly explaining the meaning of the term, and explaining how different judges hold different opinions on the matter. The Grand Justices ruled that the so-called "felony detention" law was constitutional. but added a separate clause, namely the aforementioned "high degree of suspicion, requires detention, death penalty, life sentence, or minimum five year sentence" clause. They also required "reason to believe the suspect was a flight risk, that the suspect is under a high degree of suspicion, requires detention, or has committed a crime punishable by death, a life sentence, or a minimum five year sentence." By doing what they did, the Grand Justices were of course "legislating from the bench." But their intention was to reduce controversy over whether the felony detention law should be eliminated. Their decision was a compromise to ensure that the law would be enforced with greater care.
The product of such compromises in legal logic can never be perfect. One dissenting judge said the law links different concepts such as "felony," "flight risk," and "conspiracy to commit perjury." Today's interpretation includes such language as "reason to believe the suspect is a flight risk" in a law pertaining to felonies. Doesn't this amount to conceptual confusion? Doesn't this suggest that the felony detention law has no basis in law, and shouldn't exist? Otherwise, why the need to add flight risk and conspiracy to commit perjury as justifications? Furthermore, the new clause requires "reason to believe the suspect is a flight risk and may conspire to commit perjury." Compare this to the clause, "evidence of a flight risk and conspiracy to commit perjury." Doesn't this amount to regression on human rights? Logically the dissenters' arguments hold water. But the Grand Justices' conclusion was that the "felony" clause was a compromise closer to society's expectations. The system has worked for so many years. Just because Chen Shui-bian is challenging it, why must his challenge be suddenly touted as a major human rights case?
Dissenters also raised the issue of foreign felony detention laws that cited case law. By contrast our own laws throw in the kitchen sink, citing the death penalty, life sentences, and minimum five year sentences. We can of course change the law. But asking the Grand Justices to amend the law is going too far. The Grand Justices' answer can be summarized in one sentence: The felony detention law must not be eliminated!
六六五號解釋對重罪羈押的見解
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.22 04:18 am
陳水扁聲請釋憲，大法官所作第六六五號解釋，爭議最大者就是所謂「重罪羈押」規定。大法官多數意見通過的是「大法官造法」式的結論：認定合憲，但加上了現行法律所無的條件。解釋邏輯並不完美，不過在實務認知上卻使各界鬆了一口氣。
刑事訴訟法第一百零一條規定羈押被告的條件，法律條文的構造本來就很清楚，可概分為幾部分：第一，被告經法官訊問後，認為其犯罪嫌疑重大。第二，不羈押顯難進行追訴審判或執行（即有羈押之必要）。第三，有以下三種情形之一：逃亡或有事實足認有逃亡之虞；有事實足認有滅證串證之虞；所犯為死刑、無期徒刑或最輕本刑為五年以上有期徒刑者。
依此規定，則若某人「犯嫌重大、有羈押之必要、有事實足認有滅證串證之虞」，固可由法官決定羈押；而某人「犯嫌重大、有羈押之必要、所犯為死刑、無期徒刑或最輕本刑為五年以上有期徒刑者」，亦可由法官決定羈押。這就是所謂「重罪羈押」一詞的由來。
「重罪羈押」一詞顯然容易造成誤解，被錯認是只要涉犯重罪，就可以羈押，不必計慮其他。然而，現行法律的規定卻明明不是這樣。如前所述，在重罪以外，法官還要考慮「犯嫌重大」、「有羈押之必要」這兩個條件才行。而且，這兩個條件，法律都要求法官必須在親自訊問被告後，才能作決定；亦即須由法官以直接審理，察言觀色，並審視檢方證據之後，再作出判斷。什麼是「犯嫌重大」？「有羈押之必要」？前者當與檢方證據在形式上判斷是否犯罪之強弱有關，後者則如被告可能再度犯案或威脅證人等等。
過去新聞報導不少法官誤放了殺人嫌犯、性侵慣犯、擁槍搶嫌等等案件，其實都是由於法官在考慮這兩個條件時，判斷失誤所致。然而，法官是人，是人就會受到經驗、知識、被告狡飾等限制或蒙蔽，因而發生失誤；但當發生此類事件時，大家都會罵法官亂放人，卻無人指責什麼「重罪羈押」違憲。
如今陳水扁和聲援者製造這個話題，很技巧地把焦點置於易生誤解的「重罪羈押」一詞上，結果勞動大法官費盡唇舌來解釋，還有許多不同意見。大法官雖然認定所謂「重罪羈押」合憲，卻加上了現行法律之外的條件；也就是在前述「犯嫌重大、有羈押之必要、所犯為死刑、無期徒刑或最輕本刑為五年以上有期徒刑者」之外，還要求加上「有相當理由認為有逃亡滅證串證之虞」。如此一來，大法官當然是在「造法」；但究其本意，大法官是在考慮重罪羈押不可廢的前提下，為降低批評，提高實務運作上的謹慎程度，而作出的妥協決定。
然而，這種妥協產物在法律邏輯上是不可能完美的。本釋憲案中有一位持反對意見的大法官說，該法律條文明明「重罪」和「虞逃」、「串證」等是並列的規定、不同的概念；如今的解釋文卻在「重罪」條款上，創造出「有相當理由認為有逃亡滅證串證之虞」的新條件，豈不是概念混淆？豈不是更足以證明重罪羈押本身不能成立、不該存在，否則豈須加上虞逃、串證來護航？再者，重罪羈押的新條件所需的「有相當理由認為有逃亡滅證串證之虞」，比起「有事實足認虞逃串證」來得寬鬆，豈不是人權倒退？從邏輯上講，反對者言之成理；但大法官結論以「重罪」加上新條件作為妥協，應該是更貼近社會實情的辦法。否則，這項制度運作了這麼多年，何以要待陳水扁抗爭，才忽而被說成了人權大弊端？
反對者另外提出國外重罪羈押，採取列舉規定，不像我國採死刑、無期徒刑或最低本刑五年以上有期徒刑的概括規定，過於寬泛云云。這當然可以考慮改變，但涉及修法的問題；若要大法官來解決，那造法的腳步就未免走太遠了。總之，大法官給的答案可濃縮為一句話：重罪羈押原則上不可廢！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 22, 2009
Chen Shui-bian petitioned for a constitutional interpretation. The Grand Justices responded with Constitutional Interpretation 665. Its most controversial aspect is the "felony detention" provision. A majority of the Grand Justices ruled that "legislating from the bench" was constitutional, but they added a separate clause. The logic of the opinion was flawed, but at the practical level, the public let out a collective sigh of relief.
The provisions of Article 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure outlines the conditions for the detention of suspects. The law is quite clear. It can be divided into several parts. One: The defendant is questioned by a judge, who decides whether sufficient suspicion exists. Two: The judge asks whether failure to detain the person will make prosecution or trial impossible, therefore whether detention is required. Three: The judge asks whether the suspect is a flight risk, whether there reason to believe the suspect is a flight risk, whether there is reason to believe the suspect will destroy evidence, or engage in a conspiracy to commit perjury, and whether the crime is punishable by death, a life sentence, or a five year minimum sentence.
According to these provisions if a person is "under a high degree of suspicion, or requires detention, or there is reason to believe the suspect may destroy evidence or engage in a conspiracy to commit perjury," the judge may order the person detained. If the person is "under a high degree of suspicion, requires detention, is charged with a crime punishable by death, a life sentence, or a five year minimum sentence," the judge may order the person detained. This is the origin of the term "felony detention."
Clearly the term "felony detention" is likely to lead to misunderstandings. It is likely to be misundertood. People are likely to conclude that once one is suspected of a felony, one may then be detained, without considering other factors. But under current legal provisions, this is clearly not the case. As mentioned earlier, judges must also ask whether the supect is "under a high degree of suspicion," or "requires detention." Moreover, the law requires the judge to personally question the defendant before arriving at a decision. The judge must personally examine the case, listen to the suspect's words, observe the suspect's behavior, examine the prosecution's evidence, and only then arrive at a judgment. The judge's ruling must reflect the strength of the prosecution's evidence. What qualifies as "high degree of suspicion" or "requires detention?" That depends on whether the defendant might repeat the crime or threaten witnesses.
News reports over the past tell of many judges mistakenly releasing murderers, serial rapists, and armed robbers. This was the result of judge's faulty judgment while considering these conditions. Judges are human beings. Human beings will invariably be deceived or blinded by their experience, their knowledge, or the defendant's guile. When such mistakes occur, everyone denounces the judges for releasing suspects willy nilly. No one asks whether felony detention is constitutional.
Chen Shui-bian and those riding to his rescue have made an issue of felony detention. They have cleverly focused attention on the easily misunderstood term "felony custody." They have forced the Grand Justices to waste time repeatedly explaining the meaning of the term, and explaining how different judges hold different opinions on the matter. The Grand Justices ruled that the so-called "felony detention" law was constitutional. but added a separate clause, namely the aforementioned "high degree of suspicion, requires detention, death penalty, life sentence, or minimum five year sentence" clause. They also required "reason to believe the suspect was a flight risk, that the suspect is under a high degree of suspicion, requires detention, or has committed a crime punishable by death, a life sentence, or a minimum five year sentence." By doing what they did, the Grand Justices were of course "legislating from the bench." But their intention was to reduce controversy over whether the felony detention law should be eliminated. Their decision was a compromise to ensure that the law would be enforced with greater care.
The product of such compromises in legal logic can never be perfect. One dissenting judge said the law links different concepts such as "felony," "flight risk," and "conspiracy to commit perjury." Today's interpretation includes such language as "reason to believe the suspect is a flight risk" in a law pertaining to felonies. Doesn't this amount to conceptual confusion? Doesn't this suggest that the felony detention law has no basis in law, and shouldn't exist? Otherwise, why the need to add flight risk and conspiracy to commit perjury as justifications? Furthermore, the new clause requires "reason to believe the suspect is a flight risk and may conspire to commit perjury." Compare this to the clause, "evidence of a flight risk and conspiracy to commit perjury." Doesn't this amount to regression on human rights? Logically the dissenters' arguments hold water. But the Grand Justices' conclusion was that the "felony" clause was a compromise closer to society's expectations. The system has worked for so many years. Just because Chen Shui-bian is challenging it, why must his challenge be suddenly touted as a major human rights case?
Dissenters also raised the issue of foreign felony detention laws that cited case law. By contrast our own laws throw in the kitchen sink, citing the death penalty, life sentences, and minimum five year sentences. We can of course change the law. But asking the Grand Justices to amend the law is going too far. The Grand Justices' answer can be summarized in one sentence: The felony detention law must not be eliminated!
六六五號解釋對重罪羈押的見解
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.22 04:18 am
陳水扁聲請釋憲，大法官所作第六六五號解釋，爭議最大者就是所謂「重罪羈押」規定。大法官多數意見通過的是「大法官造法」式的結論：認定合憲，但加上了現行法律所無的條件。解釋邏輯並不完美，不過在實務認知上卻使各界鬆了一口氣。
刑事訴訟法第一百零一條規定羈押被告的條件，法律條文的構造本來就很清楚，可概分為幾部分：第一，被告經法官訊問後，認為其犯罪嫌疑重大。第二，不羈押顯難進行追訴審判或執行（即有羈押之必要）。第三，有以下三種情形之一：逃亡或有事實足認有逃亡之虞；有事實足認有滅證串證之虞；所犯為死刑、無期徒刑或最輕本刑為五年以上有期徒刑者。
依此規定，則若某人「犯嫌重大、有羈押之必要、有事實足認有滅證串證之虞」，固可由法官決定羈押；而某人「犯嫌重大、有羈押之必要、所犯為死刑、無期徒刑或最輕本刑為五年以上有期徒刑者」，亦可由法官決定羈押。這就是所謂「重罪羈押」一詞的由來。
「重罪羈押」一詞顯然容易造成誤解，被錯認是只要涉犯重罪，就可以羈押，不必計慮其他。然而，現行法律的規定卻明明不是這樣。如前所述，在重罪以外，法官還要考慮「犯嫌重大」、「有羈押之必要」這兩個條件才行。而且，這兩個條件，法律都要求法官必須在親自訊問被告後，才能作決定；亦即須由法官以直接審理，察言觀色，並審視檢方證據之後，再作出判斷。什麼是「犯嫌重大」？「有羈押之必要」？前者當與檢方證據在形式上判斷是否犯罪之強弱有關，後者則如被告可能再度犯案或威脅證人等等。
過去新聞報導不少法官誤放了殺人嫌犯、性侵慣犯、擁槍搶嫌等等案件，其實都是由於法官在考慮這兩個條件時，判斷失誤所致。然而，法官是人，是人就會受到經驗、知識、被告狡飾等限制或蒙蔽，因而發生失誤；但當發生此類事件時，大家都會罵法官亂放人，卻無人指責什麼「重罪羈押」違憲。
如今陳水扁和聲援者製造這個話題，很技巧地把焦點置於易生誤解的「重罪羈押」一詞上，結果勞動大法官費盡唇舌來解釋，還有許多不同意見。大法官雖然認定所謂「重罪羈押」合憲，卻加上了現行法律之外的條件；也就是在前述「犯嫌重大、有羈押之必要、所犯為死刑、無期徒刑或最輕本刑為五年以上有期徒刑者」之外，還要求加上「有相當理由認為有逃亡滅證串證之虞」。如此一來，大法官當然是在「造法」；但究其本意，大法官是在考慮重罪羈押不可廢的前提下，為降低批評，提高實務運作上的謹慎程度，而作出的妥協決定。
然而，這種妥協產物在法律邏輯上是不可能完美的。本釋憲案中有一位持反對意見的大法官說，該法律條文明明「重罪」和「虞逃」、「串證」等是並列的規定、不同的概念；如今的解釋文卻在「重罪」條款上，創造出「有相當理由認為有逃亡滅證串證之虞」的新條件，豈不是概念混淆？豈不是更足以證明重罪羈押本身不能成立、不該存在，否則豈須加上虞逃、串證來護航？再者，重罪羈押的新條件所需的「有相當理由認為有逃亡滅證串證之虞」，比起「有事實足認虞逃串證」來得寬鬆，豈不是人權倒退？從邏輯上講，反對者言之成理；但大法官結論以「重罪」加上新條件作為妥協，應該是更貼近社會實情的辦法。否則，這項制度運作了這麼多年，何以要待陳水扁抗爭，才忽而被說成了人權大弊端？
反對者另外提出國外重罪羈押，採取列舉規定，不像我國採死刑、無期徒刑或最低本刑五年以上有期徒刑的概括規定，過於寬泛云云。這當然可以考慮改變，但涉及修法的問題；若要大法官來解決，那造法的腳步就未免走太遠了。總之，大法官給的答案可濃縮為一句話：重罪羈押原則上不可廢！
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Does the DPP Dare to Say It Doesn't Need the Swing Vote?
Does the DPP Dare to Say It Doesn't Need the Swing Vote?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 21, 2009
From his prison cell, Chen Shui-bian issued the following challenge: "Who in the DPP dares to say it doesn't need 'Ah-Bian Men' (Ah-Bian Crowd) votes in 2012? " Actually the DPP ought to be asking itself, "Who in the DPP dares to say it doesn't need the swing vote in 2012?"
The "Ah-Bian Crowd" consists of hardline Deep Green Taiwan independence politicians and supporters. Even though Chen Shui-bian publicly "ceded Taiwan to the United States," the Ah-Bian Crowd stills back him. They have concluded that Ah-Bian is a Taiwan independence icon who must not fall, no matter what. As for his corruption, they have defined it as a mere "social and cultural crime." Besides, many in the DPP and the Green Camp have made abundant use of Ah-Bian's dirty money. These Ah-Bian Crowd members may not constitute a majority within the Green Camp, but they have long been the prime mover within the Green Camp. The Ah-Bian Crowd is a tail with the ability to wag the dog. No wonder Chen Shui-bian said: "Who dares to say he doesn't need Ah-Bian Crowd votes?"
But if the DPP is bound hand and foot by the Ah-Bian Crowd, how can it attract swing voters during the 2012 Presidential Election? In addition to the above mentioned "Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd," there is also a "Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd," consisting of Ma Yung-cheng, Chen Che-nan, and other Ah-Bian cronies. Swing voters cannot tolerate the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd's corruption. They disagree with the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd's increasingly perverse Taiwan independence agenda. Wang Hsing-nan and Huang Ching-lin are right when they say Chen Shui-bian "ceded Taiwan to the United States." But they waited too long to say it. Swing voters have yet to see the DPP engage in thorough soul-searching or criticism of the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd's corruption. The DPP has failed to criticize or reflect upon the increasingly dubious rationales for Taiwan independence. Swing voters have deep misgivings about the DPP's inability or unwillingness to re-educate the Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd. The question the DPP should be asking itself is, "Who in the DPP can say it doesn't need the support of swing voters?"
The key is, as always, Taiwan independence. Chen Shui-bian once held that "Taiwan is an independent country. Its current name is the Republic of China." When the DPP first failed to distance itself from Ah-Bian, it still had room to maneuver. But Chen Shui-bian's pro-independence rhetoric has degenerated to the point where he has effectively ceded Taiwan to the United States. He has clearly underscored his opposition to the "backdoor listing" of "Taiwan" under the name "Republic of China." He now says that unless the Republic of China is terminated, Taiwan cannot become a new and independent country. He has now proclaimed himself the standard bearer for "de jure Taiwan independence." Some in the DPP and the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd support him on this. Some in the Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd support him on this. Chen Shui-bian hopes to take advantage of opposition to backdoor listing and insistence upon the "rectification of names and the founding of a new nation." He hopes to link the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd to the Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd, and thereby hijack the DPP. If the DPP cannot clarify its position in relation to this degenerate version of Taiwan independence, can it really win the trust of swing voters?
As 2012 approaches, the DPP must rethink its position on Taiwan independence. Over the next two years two themes will emerge. First, once ECFA is signed, cross-Strait relations will become even closer. Second, the Republic of China will celebrate its Centennial. These two themes will force the Democratic Progressive Party to show its hand regarding Taiwan independence. By 2012, direct airline flights will have been in place for four years. ECFA will have been in force for two years. Does the DPP still intend to overturn these policies in the name of Taiwan independence? By 2012, the Republic of China will be one hundred years young. Twenty-three years will have passed since the lifting of martial law and the implementation of full democracy. Does the DPP still intend to demand the establishment of a "Nation of Taiwan?"
The DPP originally demanded the founding of a new and independent nation, in accordance with its "Taiwan Independence Party Constitution." But later, in order to allow Chen Shui-bian to run for Republic of China president in 2000, it resorted to backdoor listing, in accordance with its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." Later, when the political situation changed in 2008, the DPP reversed itself yet again, and demanded the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution," in accordance with its "Resolution for a Normal Nation." Now the international, cross-Strait and domestic scenario is forcing the DPP to choose between backdoor listing or becoming a committed shareholder in the "Republic of China, Inc."
Chen Shui-bian opposes backdoor listing. But what is the DPP's position? Moreover, given international, cross-Strait, and domestic developments, is backdoor listing even an option for the Democratic Progressive Party anymore? The DPP's only realistic option is to come home to the Republic of China. Buy into the business. Stop engaging in the self-contradictory and fraudulent game of backdoor listing. After all, Chen Shui-bian has already made it impossible for the DPP to continue engaging in its hypocritical and self-deluding practice of backdoor listing.
The relationship between the DPP and Chen Shui-bian is the relationship between the DPP and Taiwan independence. The relationship between the DPP and Taiwan independence will determine the relationship between the DPP and swing voters. The DPP has failed to clarify its relationship to Taiwan independence. That is why it remains a political hostage of both the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd and Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd. If in 2012 the DPP wants the Ah-Bian Crowd's votes, it will find it impossible to retain the swing vote.
The Democratic Progressive Party should become committed shareholders in the Republic of China, Inc. It should stop entertaining any fantasies about any would-be "Nation of Taiwan."
兩岸關係：杯子理論與屋頂理論
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.20 03:59 am
兩岸關係「以和平取代戰爭」的大勢應當已告確立；現在的互動準則是「先經後政／先急後緩／先易後難」。但是，「政治」雖被置於「後／緩／難」的部位，卻是遲早必須面對及處理的問題。如今雖非處理的時機，但不妨預作思考。
我們曾指出，兩岸關係不可能將「政」與「經」分割成兩個截然區隔的領域；因為，在重大的經濟互動中，必然已經蘊涵了重大的政治效應。例如，三通直航或ＥＣＦＡ，皆不只是經濟事件，同時也是重大的政治事件。雖然如此，兩岸畢竟仍有高層次的政治關係必須處理。
本文嘗試提出的思考是：從杯子理論到屋頂理論。先談杯子理論。中華民國是杯子，台灣是杯子裡面的水。過去北京的思維是，只想取水，而不要杯子。想像中，此法除非訴諸流血戰爭，不可能達成；但若訴諸武力，砸破杯子，恐將面對一灘覆水。
就歷史淵源看，中華民國這一只杯子，曾以辛亥革命締造共和，並主持北伐及抗日戰爭，且台灣亦由中華民國所光復；再就現實看，今天的台灣，在中華民國的杯子裡，是一個自里長至總統皆直選的民主政體。也就是說，「中華民國」這只杯子，是「中國論述」與「民主實踐」的結晶體；無論中共或台獨，誰要砸破這只杯子，誰便須面對一灘覆水。
北京近年來的「思想解放」是值得肯定的。從「中華民國已經滅亡」，改版到「一個中國就是台灣法典中的一個中國」，再到「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」；不啻已默認中華民國的地位。至於所謂「反對法理台獨」及「主張維持現狀」，也就是承認「中華民國體制不是台獨」的意思。
在北京眼中，顯然亦已認知，沒有「中華民國」這只杯子，就沒有水。若沒有中華民國這只杯子，台灣對北京會比西藏及新疆更為棘手萬倍。所以，在可以想像的時空中，「杯水合體」是未來兩岸關係的重要準則之一。
更進一步的思考是「屋頂理論」。兩岸關係可能發展至建立某種政治聯結，如今或許言之過早，但想像中的那種政治聯結，自應建立在一個超越「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」的「第三概念」或「上位概念」之下。北京近年不再稱「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，並謂「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」；這些論述都含有「九二共識」的意味，其潛台詞則是「一中各表」。顯易可見，這類論述皆有將「一個中國」逐漸「第三概念化」的跡象。
倘若「一個中國」是「第三概念」，兩岸關係未來即不無可能在「屋頂理論」下討論如何聯結。或許有兩種可能：一、組成邦聯，在邦聯憲法或邦聯基本法下聯結。二、經由「和平協議」的特定條款，作成「維持現狀」的法制架構。這兩種想法，可能仍是過渡方案，但亦可視為終極處理。
以上看法，或許兩岸皆有人會認為不合時宜或異想天開。但是，若想砸破杯子，如何處理覆水？若想留住水，則豈能砸破杯子？
杯子理論也許聽來不順耳，但其實這不啻已然是兩岸當局的現行政策。北京希望以杯保水，台灣當局則是藉水保杯（以台灣的民主體制來維護中華民國）。理由很簡單：兩岸關係唯有賴「和平發展」始能漸進處理；既然和平是主旋律，北京與台北皆不可能砸破杯子。
杯子理論與屋頂理論，其實是一體的兩面。但「杯子理論」著眼於維持「和平發展」的過程；而「屋頂理論」則是對進行政治聯結的可能思考。唯不論未來是否走上「屋頂理論」，但如今已可證實：「杯子理論」是「兩岸關係和平發展」的中心準則，殆無疑義。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 21, 2009
From his prison cell, Chen Shui-bian issued the following challenge: "Who in the DPP dares to say it doesn't need 'Ah-Bian Men' (Ah-Bian Crowd) votes in 2012? " Actually the DPP ought to be asking itself, "Who in the DPP dares to say it doesn't need the swing vote in 2012?"
The "Ah-Bian Crowd" consists of hardline Deep Green Taiwan independence politicians and supporters. Even though Chen Shui-bian publicly "ceded Taiwan to the United States," the Ah-Bian Crowd stills back him. They have concluded that Ah-Bian is a Taiwan independence icon who must not fall, no matter what. As for his corruption, they have defined it as a mere "social and cultural crime." Besides, many in the DPP and the Green Camp have made abundant use of Ah-Bian's dirty money. These Ah-Bian Crowd members may not constitute a majority within the Green Camp, but they have long been the prime mover within the Green Camp. The Ah-Bian Crowd is a tail with the ability to wag the dog. No wonder Chen Shui-bian said: "Who dares to say he doesn't need Ah-Bian Crowd votes?"
But if the DPP is bound hand and foot by the Ah-Bian Crowd, how can it attract swing voters during the 2012 Presidential Election? In addition to the above mentioned "Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd," there is also a "Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd," consisting of Ma Yung-cheng, Chen Che-nan, and other Ah-Bian cronies. Swing voters cannot tolerate the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd's corruption. They disagree with the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd's increasingly perverse Taiwan independence agenda. Wang Hsing-nan and Huang Ching-lin are right when they say Chen Shui-bian "ceded Taiwan to the United States." But they waited too long to say it. Swing voters have yet to see the DPP engage in thorough soul-searching or criticism of the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd's corruption. The DPP has failed to criticize or reflect upon the increasingly dubious rationales for Taiwan independence. Swing voters have deep misgivings about the DPP's inability or unwillingness to re-educate the Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd. The question the DPP should be asking itself is, "Who in the DPP can say it doesn't need the support of swing voters?"
The key is, as always, Taiwan independence. Chen Shui-bian once held that "Taiwan is an independent country. Its current name is the Republic of China." When the DPP first failed to distance itself from Ah-Bian, it still had room to maneuver. But Chen Shui-bian's pro-independence rhetoric has degenerated to the point where he has effectively ceded Taiwan to the United States. He has clearly underscored his opposition to the "backdoor listing" of "Taiwan" under the name "Republic of China." He now says that unless the Republic of China is terminated, Taiwan cannot become a new and independent country. He has now proclaimed himself the standard bearer for "de jure Taiwan independence." Some in the DPP and the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd support him on this. Some in the Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd support him on this. Chen Shui-bian hopes to take advantage of opposition to backdoor listing and insistence upon the "rectification of names and the founding of a new nation." He hopes to link the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd to the Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd, and thereby hijack the DPP. If the DPP cannot clarify its position in relation to this degenerate version of Taiwan independence, can it really win the trust of swing voters?
As 2012 approaches, the DPP must rethink its position on Taiwan independence. Over the next two years two themes will emerge. First, once ECFA is signed, cross-Strait relations will become even closer. Second, the Republic of China will celebrate its Centennial. These two themes will force the Democratic Progressive Party to show its hand regarding Taiwan independence. By 2012, direct airline flights will have been in place for four years. ECFA will have been in force for two years. Does the DPP still intend to overturn these policies in the name of Taiwan independence? By 2012, the Republic of China will be one hundred years young. Twenty-three years will have passed since the lifting of martial law and the implementation of full democracy. Does the DPP still intend to demand the establishment of a "Nation of Taiwan?"
The DPP originally demanded the founding of a new and independent nation, in accordance with its "Taiwan Independence Party Constitution." But later, in order to allow Chen Shui-bian to run for Republic of China president in 2000, it resorted to backdoor listing, in accordance with its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." Later, when the political situation changed in 2008, the DPP reversed itself yet again, and demanded the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution," in accordance with its "Resolution for a Normal Nation." Now the international, cross-Strait and domestic scenario is forcing the DPP to choose between backdoor listing or becoming a committed shareholder in the "Republic of China, Inc."
Chen Shui-bian opposes backdoor listing. But what is the DPP's position? Moreover, given international, cross-Strait, and domestic developments, is backdoor listing even an option for the Democratic Progressive Party anymore? The DPP's only realistic option is to come home to the Republic of China. Buy into the business. Stop engaging in the self-contradictory and fraudulent game of backdoor listing. After all, Chen Shui-bian has already made it impossible for the DPP to continue engaging in its hypocritical and self-deluding practice of backdoor listing.
The relationship between the DPP and Chen Shui-bian is the relationship between the DPP and Taiwan independence. The relationship between the DPP and Taiwan independence will determine the relationship between the DPP and swing voters. The DPP has failed to clarify its relationship to Taiwan independence. That is why it remains a political hostage of both the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd and Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd. If in 2012 the DPP wants the Ah-Bian Crowd's votes, it will find it impossible to retain the swing vote.
The Democratic Progressive Party should become committed shareholders in the Republic of China, Inc. It should stop entertaining any fantasies about any would-be "Nation of Taiwan."
兩岸關係：杯子理論與屋頂理論
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.20 03:59 am
兩岸關係「以和平取代戰爭」的大勢應當已告確立；現在的互動準則是「先經後政／先急後緩／先易後難」。但是，「政治」雖被置於「後／緩／難」的部位，卻是遲早必須面對及處理的問題。如今雖非處理的時機，但不妨預作思考。
我們曾指出，兩岸關係不可能將「政」與「經」分割成兩個截然區隔的領域；因為，在重大的經濟互動中，必然已經蘊涵了重大的政治效應。例如，三通直航或ＥＣＦＡ，皆不只是經濟事件，同時也是重大的政治事件。雖然如此，兩岸畢竟仍有高層次的政治關係必須處理。
本文嘗試提出的思考是：從杯子理論到屋頂理論。先談杯子理論。中華民國是杯子，台灣是杯子裡面的水。過去北京的思維是，只想取水，而不要杯子。想像中，此法除非訴諸流血戰爭，不可能達成；但若訴諸武力，砸破杯子，恐將面對一灘覆水。
就歷史淵源看，中華民國這一只杯子，曾以辛亥革命締造共和，並主持北伐及抗日戰爭，且台灣亦由中華民國所光復；再就現實看，今天的台灣，在中華民國的杯子裡，是一個自里長至總統皆直選的民主政體。也就是說，「中華民國」這只杯子，是「中國論述」與「民主實踐」的結晶體；無論中共或台獨，誰要砸破這只杯子，誰便須面對一灘覆水。
北京近年來的「思想解放」是值得肯定的。從「中華民國已經滅亡」，改版到「一個中國就是台灣法典中的一個中國」，再到「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」；不啻已默認中華民國的地位。至於所謂「反對法理台獨」及「主張維持現狀」，也就是承認「中華民國體制不是台獨」的意思。
在北京眼中，顯然亦已認知，沒有「中華民國」這只杯子，就沒有水。若沒有中華民國這只杯子，台灣對北京會比西藏及新疆更為棘手萬倍。所以，在可以想像的時空中，「杯水合體」是未來兩岸關係的重要準則之一。
更進一步的思考是「屋頂理論」。兩岸關係可能發展至建立某種政治聯結，如今或許言之過早，但想像中的那種政治聯結，自應建立在一個超越「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」的「第三概念」或「上位概念」之下。北京近年不再稱「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，並謂「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」；這些論述都含有「九二共識」的意味，其潛台詞則是「一中各表」。顯易可見，這類論述皆有將「一個中國」逐漸「第三概念化」的跡象。
倘若「一個中國」是「第三概念」，兩岸關係未來即不無可能在「屋頂理論」下討論如何聯結。或許有兩種可能：一、組成邦聯，在邦聯憲法或邦聯基本法下聯結。二、經由「和平協議」的特定條款，作成「維持現狀」的法制架構。這兩種想法，可能仍是過渡方案，但亦可視為終極處理。
以上看法，或許兩岸皆有人會認為不合時宜或異想天開。但是，若想砸破杯子，如何處理覆水？若想留住水，則豈能砸破杯子？
杯子理論也許聽來不順耳，但其實這不啻已然是兩岸當局的現行政策。北京希望以杯保水，台灣當局則是藉水保杯（以台灣的民主體制來維護中華民國）。理由很簡單：兩岸關係唯有賴「和平發展」始能漸進處理；既然和平是主旋律，北京與台北皆不可能砸破杯子。
杯子理論與屋頂理論，其實是一體的兩面。但「杯子理論」著眼於維持「和平發展」的過程；而「屋頂理論」則是對進行政治聯結的可能思考。唯不論未來是否走上「屋頂理論」，但如今已可證實：「杯子理論」是「兩岸關係和平發展」的中心準則，殆無疑義。
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
Cross-Strait Relations: The Cup and the Roof
Cross-Strait Relations: The Cup and the Roof
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 20, 2009
In cross-Strait relations, peace has replaced war. Now the basis for interaction is "First economics, then politics. First the urgent, then the gradual. First the easy, then the difficult." Politics has been lumped with "the later, the gradual, and the difficult," but sooner or later we will have to face these problems and deal with them. It may be too early to solve them, but it is not too early to think about them.
As we have pointed out, cross-Strait relations cannot actually be divided into discrete realms labeled "political" and "economic." Major economic interactions invariably have major political implications. For example, the establishment of Direct Links or ECFA are not merely economic events, but also major political events. The two sides still have high-level political issues that must be addressed.
We would like to set forth two theories: the Cup Theory, and the Roof Theory. First, the Cup Theory. The Republic of China is the Cup. Taiwan is part of the water in the cup. Beijing has long wanted the water, but not the Cup. As one can imagine, attempting to take the water without the Cup, can only precipitate a bloody war. It is impossible. If one resorts to force, and breaks the Cup, one will merely wind up with a puddle of water.
From an historical perspective, the Republic of China is a Cup. It established a republic during the Xinhai Revolution. It waged the Northern Expedition, fought the Sino-Japanese War, and recovered Taiwan. The reality is that today's Taiwan is contained within the Republic of China Cup. The Republic of China is a democratic entity whose borough chiefs and president are directly elected. In other words, the "Republic of China" Cup is the crystalization of both Chinese principles and democratic practices. Neither the Chinese Communist Party nor Taiwan independence elements may break this Cup. Anyone who does, will merely wind up with a puddle of water.
Beijing's recent "liberation of thought" deserves affirmation. It has gone from "The Republic of China has already been destroyed" to "One China is the One China referred to in Taiwan's laws," to "Although China has yet to be reunified, it remains One China." It has in effect tacitly acknowledged the position held by the Republic of China. As for the "Rejection of de jure Taiwan independence" and "Maintenance of the status quo," these affirm that "The Republic of China political framework is not Taiwan independence."
Beijing clearly realizes that without the Cup known as the "Republic of China," there is no water. Without this Cup called the Republic of China, Taiwan will be ten thousand times more difficult to deal with than Tibet and Xinjiang. Therefore, we can imagine a time and a place when "The Cup and the water are one" becomes the key to cross-Strait relations.
The next step is the "Roof Theory." Will cross-Strait relations lead to the establishment of some sort of political affiliation? That may be too early to say. One can imagine all sorts of political affiliations. But any affiliation should be based on something that transcends both the "Republic of China" and the "People's Republic of China." It should be based on a "Third Concept" or "Higher Concept." In recent years, Beijing no longer refers to One China as the PRC. It says instead that "The mainland and Taiwan are both part of China." Such arguments smack of the 1992 Consensus, whose subtext is "One China, Different Interpretations." As we can see, such arguments are gradually subsuming "One China" under a "Third Concept" framework.
If "One China" is a "Third Concept," then the two sides may be able to consider a cross-Strait political affiliation based on the "Roof Theory." There are two possibilities. One. Form a confederation. Affiliate the two sides politically under the Basic Law of the confederation or federation. Two. Sign a peace agreement. Have they peace agreement's provisions "maintain the status quo." These two ways of thinking may still be in the developmental stages. But they may also constitute eventual solutions.
Some on either side of the Taiwan Strait will consider such views out-dated or whimsical. But if one wishes to shatter the Cup, how will one deal with leftover water? If one wishes to retain the water, how can one shatter the Cup?
The Cup Theory may grate on some people's ears. But in fact it is nothing more than the policy currently maintained by authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing wants the Cup to preserve the water. Taipei wants the water to preserve the Cup. Taipei wants to use Taiwan's democratic institutions to preserve the Republic of China. The reason is simple. Only "peaceful development" will allow cross-Strait relations to be resolved gradually. Since peace is the main theme, neither Beijing nor Taipei may shatter the Cup.
The Cup Theory and the Roof Theory are in fact two sides of the same coin. The Cup Theory ensures peaceful development. The Roof Theory is a way of establishing some sort of political affiliation. The future may or may not hold a Roof Theory. But evidence shows that the Cup Theory is the key to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Of that there is no doubt.
兩岸關係：杯子理論與屋頂理論
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.20 03:59 am
兩岸關係「以和平取代戰爭」的大勢應當已告確立；現在的互動準則是「先經後政／先急後緩／先易後難」。但是，「政治」雖被置於「後／緩／難」的部位，卻是遲早必須面對及處理的問題。如今雖非處理的時機，但不妨預作思考。
我們曾指出，兩岸關係不可能將「政」與「經」分割成兩個截然區隔的領域；因為，在重大的經濟互動中，必然已經蘊涵了重大的政治效應。例如，三通直航或ＥＣＦＡ，皆不只是經濟事件，同時也是重大的政治事件。雖然如此，兩岸畢竟仍有高層次的政治關係必須處理。
本文嘗試提出的思考是：從杯子理論到屋頂理論。先談杯子理論。中華民國是杯子，台灣是杯子裡面的水。過去北京的思維是，只想取水，而不要杯子。想像中，此法除非訴諸流血戰爭，不可能達成；但若訴諸武力，砸破杯子，恐將面對一灘覆水。
就歷史淵源看，中華民國這一只杯子，曾以辛亥革命締造共和，並主持北伐及抗日戰爭，且台灣亦由中華民國所光復；再就現實看，今天的台灣，在中華民國的杯子裡，是一個自里長至總統皆直選的民主政體。也就是說，「中華民國」這只杯子，是「中國論述」與「民主實踐」的結晶體；無論中共或台獨，誰要砸破這只杯子，誰便須面對一灘覆水。
北京近年來的「思想解放」是值得肯定的。從「中華民國已經滅亡」，改版到「一個中國就是台灣法典中的一個中國」，再到「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」；不啻已默認中華民國的地位。至於所謂「反對法理台獨」及「主張維持現狀」，也就是承認「中華民國體制不是台獨」的意思。
在北京眼中，顯然亦已認知，沒有「中華民國」這只杯子，就沒有水。若沒有中華民國這只杯子，台灣對北京會比西藏及新疆更為棘手萬倍。所以，在可以想像的時空中，「杯水合體」是未來兩岸關係的重要準則之一。
更進一步的思考是「屋頂理論」。兩岸關係可能發展至建立某種政治聯結，如今或許言之過早，但想像中的那種政治聯結，自應建立在一個超越「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」的「第三概念」或「上位概念」之下。北京近年不再稱「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，並謂「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」；這些論述都含有「九二共識」的意味，其潛台詞則是「一中各表」。顯易可見，這類論述皆有將「一個中國」逐漸「第三概念化」的跡象。
倘若「一個中國」是「第三概念」，兩岸關係未來即不無可能在「屋頂理論」下討論如何聯結。或許有兩種可能：一、組成邦聯，在邦聯憲法或邦聯基本法下聯結。二、經由「和平協議」的特定條款，作成「維持現狀」的法制架構。這兩種想法，可能仍是過渡方案，但亦可視為終極處理。
以上看法，或許兩岸皆有人會認為不合時宜或異想天開。但是，若想砸破杯子，如何處理覆水？若想留住水，則豈能砸破杯子？
杯子理論也許聽來不順耳，但其實這不啻已然是兩岸當局的現行政策。北京希望以杯保水，台灣當局則是藉水保杯（以台灣的民主體制來維護中華民國）。理由很簡單：兩岸關係唯有賴「和平發展」始能漸進處理；既然和平是主旋律，北京與台北皆不可能砸破杯子。
杯子理論與屋頂理論，其實是一體的兩面。但「杯子理論」著眼於維持「和平發展」的過程；而「屋頂理論」則是對進行政治聯結的可能思考。唯不論未來是否走上「屋頂理論」，但如今已可證實：「杯子理論」是「兩岸關係和平發展」的中心準則，殆無疑義。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 20, 2009
In cross-Strait relations, peace has replaced war. Now the basis for interaction is "First economics, then politics. First the urgent, then the gradual. First the easy, then the difficult." Politics has been lumped with "the later, the gradual, and the difficult," but sooner or later we will have to face these problems and deal with them. It may be too early to solve them, but it is not too early to think about them.
As we have pointed out, cross-Strait relations cannot actually be divided into discrete realms labeled "political" and "economic." Major economic interactions invariably have major political implications. For example, the establishment of Direct Links or ECFA are not merely economic events, but also major political events. The two sides still have high-level political issues that must be addressed.
We would like to set forth two theories: the Cup Theory, and the Roof Theory. First, the Cup Theory. The Republic of China is the Cup. Taiwan is part of the water in the cup. Beijing has long wanted the water, but not the Cup. As one can imagine, attempting to take the water without the Cup, can only precipitate a bloody war. It is impossible. If one resorts to force, and breaks the Cup, one will merely wind up with a puddle of water.
From an historical perspective, the Republic of China is a Cup. It established a republic during the Xinhai Revolution. It waged the Northern Expedition, fought the Sino-Japanese War, and recovered Taiwan. The reality is that today's Taiwan is contained within the Republic of China Cup. The Republic of China is a democratic entity whose borough chiefs and president are directly elected. In other words, the "Republic of China" Cup is the crystalization of both Chinese principles and democratic practices. Neither the Chinese Communist Party nor Taiwan independence elements may break this Cup. Anyone who does, will merely wind up with a puddle of water.
Beijing's recent "liberation of thought" deserves affirmation. It has gone from "The Republic of China has already been destroyed" to "One China is the One China referred to in Taiwan's laws," to "Although China has yet to be reunified, it remains One China." It has in effect tacitly acknowledged the position held by the Republic of China. As for the "Rejection of de jure Taiwan independence" and "Maintenance of the status quo," these affirm that "The Republic of China political framework is not Taiwan independence."
Beijing clearly realizes that without the Cup known as the "Republic of China," there is no water. Without this Cup called the Republic of China, Taiwan will be ten thousand times more difficult to deal with than Tibet and Xinjiang. Therefore, we can imagine a time and a place when "The Cup and the water are one" becomes the key to cross-Strait relations.
The next step is the "Roof Theory." Will cross-Strait relations lead to the establishment of some sort of political affiliation? That may be too early to say. One can imagine all sorts of political affiliations. But any affiliation should be based on something that transcends both the "Republic of China" and the "People's Republic of China." It should be based on a "Third Concept" or "Higher Concept." In recent years, Beijing no longer refers to One China as the PRC. It says instead that "The mainland and Taiwan are both part of China." Such arguments smack of the 1992 Consensus, whose subtext is "One China, Different Interpretations." As we can see, such arguments are gradually subsuming "One China" under a "Third Concept" framework.
If "One China" is a "Third Concept," then the two sides may be able to consider a cross-Strait political affiliation based on the "Roof Theory." There are two possibilities. One. Form a confederation. Affiliate the two sides politically under the Basic Law of the confederation or federation. Two. Sign a peace agreement. Have they peace agreement's provisions "maintain the status quo." These two ways of thinking may still be in the developmental stages. But they may also constitute eventual solutions.
Some on either side of the Taiwan Strait will consider such views out-dated or whimsical. But if one wishes to shatter the Cup, how will one deal with leftover water? If one wishes to retain the water, how can one shatter the Cup?
The Cup Theory may grate on some people's ears. But in fact it is nothing more than the policy currently maintained by authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing wants the Cup to preserve the water. Taipei wants the water to preserve the Cup. Taipei wants to use Taiwan's democratic institutions to preserve the Republic of China. The reason is simple. Only "peaceful development" will allow cross-Strait relations to be resolved gradually. Since peace is the main theme, neither Beijing nor Taipei may shatter the Cup.
The Cup Theory and the Roof Theory are in fact two sides of the same coin. The Cup Theory ensures peaceful development. The Roof Theory is a way of establishing some sort of political affiliation. The future may or may not hold a Roof Theory. But evidence shows that the Cup Theory is the key to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Of that there is no doubt.
兩岸關係：杯子理論與屋頂理論
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.20 03:59 am
兩岸關係「以和平取代戰爭」的大勢應當已告確立；現在的互動準則是「先經後政／先急後緩／先易後難」。但是，「政治」雖被置於「後／緩／難」的部位，卻是遲早必須面對及處理的問題。如今雖非處理的時機，但不妨預作思考。
我們曾指出，兩岸關係不可能將「政」與「經」分割成兩個截然區隔的領域；因為，在重大的經濟互動中，必然已經蘊涵了重大的政治效應。例如，三通直航或ＥＣＦＡ，皆不只是經濟事件，同時也是重大的政治事件。雖然如此，兩岸畢竟仍有高層次的政治關係必須處理。
本文嘗試提出的思考是：從杯子理論到屋頂理論。先談杯子理論。中華民國是杯子，台灣是杯子裡面的水。過去北京的思維是，只想取水，而不要杯子。想像中，此法除非訴諸流血戰爭，不可能達成；但若訴諸武力，砸破杯子，恐將面對一灘覆水。
就歷史淵源看，中華民國這一只杯子，曾以辛亥革命締造共和，並主持北伐及抗日戰爭，且台灣亦由中華民國所光復；再就現實看，今天的台灣，在中華民國的杯子裡，是一個自里長至總統皆直選的民主政體。也就是說，「中華民國」這只杯子，是「中國論述」與「民主實踐」的結晶體；無論中共或台獨，誰要砸破這只杯子，誰便須面對一灘覆水。
北京近年來的「思想解放」是值得肯定的。從「中華民國已經滅亡」，改版到「一個中國就是台灣法典中的一個中國」，再到「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」；不啻已默認中華民國的地位。至於所謂「反對法理台獨」及「主張維持現狀」，也就是承認「中華民國體制不是台獨」的意思。
在北京眼中，顯然亦已認知，沒有「中華民國」這只杯子，就沒有水。若沒有中華民國這只杯子，台灣對北京會比西藏及新疆更為棘手萬倍。所以，在可以想像的時空中，「杯水合體」是未來兩岸關係的重要準則之一。
更進一步的思考是「屋頂理論」。兩岸關係可能發展至建立某種政治聯結，如今或許言之過早，但想像中的那種政治聯結，自應建立在一個超越「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」的「第三概念」或「上位概念」之下。北京近年不再稱「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，並謂「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」；這些論述都含有「九二共識」的意味，其潛台詞則是「一中各表」。顯易可見，這類論述皆有將「一個中國」逐漸「第三概念化」的跡象。
倘若「一個中國」是「第三概念」，兩岸關係未來即不無可能在「屋頂理論」下討論如何聯結。或許有兩種可能：一、組成邦聯，在邦聯憲法或邦聯基本法下聯結。二、經由「和平協議」的特定條款，作成「維持現狀」的法制架構。這兩種想法，可能仍是過渡方案，但亦可視為終極處理。
以上看法，或許兩岸皆有人會認為不合時宜或異想天開。但是，若想砸破杯子，如何處理覆水？若想留住水，則豈能砸破杯子？
杯子理論也許聽來不順耳，但其實這不啻已然是兩岸當局的現行政策。北京希望以杯保水，台灣當局則是藉水保杯（以台灣的民主體制來維護中華民國）。理由很簡單：兩岸關係唯有賴「和平發展」始能漸進處理；既然和平是主旋律，北京與台北皆不可能砸破杯子。
杯子理論與屋頂理論，其實是一體的兩面。但「杯子理論」著眼於維持「和平發展」的過程；而「屋頂理論」則是對進行政治聯結的可能思考。唯不論未來是否走上「屋頂理論」，但如今已可證實：「杯子理論」是「兩岸關係和平發展」的中心準則，殆無疑義。
Monday, October 19, 2009
The Revolution has yet to Succeed, Ma Ying-jeou must Continue his Struggle
The Revolution has yet to Succeed, Ma Ying-jeou must Continue his Struggle
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 19, 2009
The 18th Kuomintang Party Congress ended a few days ago. Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected party chairman. He reaffirmed the KMT's commitment to political reform, clean government, and hard work. Ma was elected party chairman for the first time four years ago. Since then Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou has become the head of state. Both times he issued solemn declarations regarding the direction of the nation, using almost the same language. This is not surprising. After all, as Sun Yat-sen once said, "The revolution has yet to succeed, comrades must continue their struggle." Ma Ying-jeou has twice been elected party chairman. He must carry out his promised reforms. He must also carry out a revolution inside the party, enabling the administration to govern more effectively and ensure a second term in 2012.
Four years ago, the Kuomintang had been in the opposition for five years. The once divided KMT and People First Party joined forces. Lien Chan and James Soong waged a hard fought election campaign. But as a result of the 3/19 Shooting Incident, they failed to unseat the long-discredited Chen Shui-bian. Demands for a recount by protesters camped on Ketegelan Boulevard came to naught. Ever since Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou proposed that the party chairman be directly elected, he has been the standard bearer for Blue Camp political rejuvention. In August 2005, Ma Ying-jeou was elected party chairman. The first thing he did was to announce that he would tie up the controversial issue of party assets before 2008. That check has bounced. The first time Ma Ying-jeou assumed the party chairmanship, during the Central Standing Committee session in February 2007, he made it clear that the party must become an election machine. Party assets must not be used on election campaigns. All elections must be financed by means of fund raising. This check has also bounced.
The first time Ma Ying-jeou assumed the party chairmanship, he failed to fulfill any major campaign promises. The reason is simple. In September 2007, Ma Ying-jeou was indicted in the Discretionary Fund case. He promptly resigned as party chairman. Wu Poh-hsiung, who had been planning to retire, held down the fort in Ma's absence. Ma Ying-jeou, who was no longer in charge of party affairs, focused on his presidential campaign. He was no longer able to oversee the divestiture of KMT party assets. He was no longer able to oversee the reform of KMT party finances. Given the prevailing mood within society and the party, no one blamed Ma Ying-jeou for this bounced check. Quite the contrary, it underscored society's feeling that justice had to be done.
Today Ma Ying-jeou is again in charge of the party. He has proudly waved the party flag on behalf of candidates for the year end elections. When Ma Ying-jeou declared his commitment to clean government and political reform, people were inspired. Political momentum accumulated. But he has now declared his intention to enforce strict party discipline. Candidates for political office are lashing out at the party leadership. They doubt Ma will hold up if they give him the cold-shoulder treatment. Ma Ying-jeou has been in charge of the affairs of state for a year and a half. He is being pulled in several directions at the same time. He has not demonstrated sufficient courage and determination. As a result, his leadership has been subjected to constant challenges. Candidates for City Mayor and County Executive offices have thrown their hats in the ring without consulting him. Even incumbents who were elected on the basis of Ma's endorsement are ignoring the party leadership, and bent on rebellion. During the party chairmanship election, the turnout in many constituencies was low. The percentage of invalid ballots was high. Quite a few former "Team Ma" legislators with reputations for integrity became Central Standing Committee members. These and other outspoken and forceful County Executives and City Mayors have gradually withdraw their candidacies. When asked why, they reply without enthusiasm, and sighed, "Let him (Ma) find out what it's like to not to have a Central Standing Committee consisting of his people!"
In the year and a half since Ma Ying-jeou became president, this group of party officials, who once stood shoulder to shoulder with him in the trenches, have met with and talked with him less than a handful of times, perhaps only twice. Even party members close to Ma are saying such things. One can imagine what people not so close to Ma are saying. They simply cannot find any way to interact with the party chairman. People everywhere are asking, "Is he (Ma) actually willing to listen to other people's advice?" Actually some people really don't care whether Chairman Ma is willing to listen to other people's advice. They care only about their status as Central Standing Committee members, whether that status will profit them personally. More importantly, the Central Standing Committee lacks career officials and local leaders who can explain what they fighting for. How can such a party leadership help the administration govern efficiently? Ma Ying-jeou wants to tranform the party into an election machine. He wants to turn it into a platform for communications and policy coordination. Based on the current structure of the Central Standing Committee, one can expect a weakening of the party's policy-making functions. Whether it will be of any help during election campaigns, is hard to say. Ma Ying-jeou will inevitably encounter trouble implementing his personal ideals.
Ma Ying-jeou sees the problem. He has called upon the KMT not to buy votes during election campaigns, not to enage in corruption while in office, and not to abuse its political power. In fact, this is a problem common to both Blue Camp and Green Camp parties. But seeing the problem and talking about the problem is not enough. Now that the president is also the party chairman, he must walk the walk, not just talk the talk.
Four years ago, Ma Ying-jeou was denied the opportunity to make good on his promises. He has now returned as party chairman. He must now accomplish his mission. Only with such an understanding can he avoid future regrets. Voters may have the wisdom, but they may lack the patience to give the KMT another chance.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.19
社論－改革尚未成功 英九仍須努力
本報訊
國民黨第十八屆黨代表大會日前落幕，馬英九再度回鍋兼任黨主席，同時也宣示國民黨改革、清廉、勤政路線。對比四年前第一次就任黨主席，馬英九的正職從台北市長一躍而為國家元首；前後兩次就任講話所嚴正宣示的方向，幾近是相同的語言，這一點並不讓人意外，因為「改革尚未完成，同志仍須努力」。馬英九兩度兼任黨主席，一方面要繼續未完成的黨務改革，再方面也要透過黨的改革，強化「輔政」的功能，進一步確保二○一二年的連任順遂。
回顧四年前，國民黨已經在野五年，分裂的國民黨和親民黨在連戰、宋楚瑜攜手合作下，拚搏大選，卻在三一九槍擊案的衝擊下，未能擊敗聲望早已潰跌的陳水扁，凱道驗票抗爭未果，身為台北市長的馬英九，從推動黨主席直選開始，始終背負藍營復興政權大業的深切期待。二○○五年八月任黨主席的馬英九，第一件大事就是宣示：二○○八年以前要將備受爭議的黨產問題處理完畢；這張支票，並未兌現。馬英九第一次就任黨主席時，在二○○七年二月上旬的中常會上，也明確表示，黨要成為選舉機器，黨產不得用於輔選，所有選舉相關財務都要以募款為之；這張支票，也沒兌現。
馬英九首次就任黨主席，沒兌現任何一樁重大政治承諾，原因無它，二○○七年九月，馬英九就因為特別費案遭起訴，毅然辭卸黨主席職務，由原來規畫退休的吳伯雄頂住大局。卸下黨職務的馬英九，專心投入大選，既管不了黨產進度，也無心聞問包括黨財務在內的改革方案。但當時的社會和黨的大氣候，沒有人怪責馬英九支票兌現不了，相反的，卻瀰漫著要討回公道的悲壯氣氛。
如今重回黨中央的馬英九，授旗給年底要參選的公職提名人，揮舞黨旗志得意滿，但是，當年宣示清廉改革的馬英九，令人振奮，有風行景從的氣勢；如今宣示強化黨紀，違紀參選者從嚴議處的馬英九，面對的則是黨內反彈四起，看你能奈我何的冷漠。已經執掌國家大政一年半的馬英九，在多方力量的拉鋸下，未能展現足夠的魄力和決斷，使他的領導威信不斷遭到挑戰。縣市長提名，各路人馬各顯神通，連曾經依靠馬光環才得以當選的多位現任縣市長，都不理黨中央的態度，執意造反。黨主席選舉，許多選區投票率偏低不說，廢票率還格外高；中常委選舉，許多當年以廁身「馬團隊」的形象牌立委、以及在黨內始終敢於直言力諫的縣市長，紛紛退出選局，問到何以致此？他們連熱情都沒有的、只能嘆口氣，「讓他（馬）嘗嘗沒有自己人的中常會是個什麼滋味！」
這群曾經與馬英九一起打天下的黨公職，在馬英九就任總統之後，一年半時間來，面見談話進言次數不必用一個手掌數，三個手指頭數大概都嫌多。與馬關係還算近的黨內人士都這麼說，和馬關係遠的人可以想見，根本找不出與主席互動之道，有人到處問，「他（馬）聽得進建言嗎？」也有人其實並不在乎馬主席聽不聽得下建言，只在乎端著中常委的招牌，能不能有利於自己的企業營生。更重要的，一個缺乏政務官、地方首長、講得出道理的中央民代參與的中常會，能提供黨主席多少「輔政」功能？馬英九要求黨要轉型為選舉機器，並成為政策協調溝通的平台，以眼下中常會的結構，黨決策功能的弱化幾乎可以預期，輔選作用的強化難講能否達到，馬英九難免再次陷入個人理想如何落實的困境。
馬英九不是看不到問題的人，他要求國民黨要做到：選舉不買票、執政不貪汙、問政不腐化，其實已看盡藍綠政黨的通病。然而，看到、說到還不夠，既已總統兼任黨主席，話說出口就要執行到位，否則所有的政治宣示都將是空談。
四年前的支票，馬英九來不及兌現，此番回鍋黨務，就得使命必達，有所警覺，不要留下遺憾，因為選民縱有足夠的智慧，卻可能沒太多耐性再給國民黨太多機會了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 19, 2009
The 18th Kuomintang Party Congress ended a few days ago. Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected party chairman. He reaffirmed the KMT's commitment to political reform, clean government, and hard work. Ma was elected party chairman for the first time four years ago. Since then Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou has become the head of state. Both times he issued solemn declarations regarding the direction of the nation, using almost the same language. This is not surprising. After all, as Sun Yat-sen once said, "The revolution has yet to succeed, comrades must continue their struggle." Ma Ying-jeou has twice been elected party chairman. He must carry out his promised reforms. He must also carry out a revolution inside the party, enabling the administration to govern more effectively and ensure a second term in 2012.
Four years ago, the Kuomintang had been in the opposition for five years. The once divided KMT and People First Party joined forces. Lien Chan and James Soong waged a hard fought election campaign. But as a result of the 3/19 Shooting Incident, they failed to unseat the long-discredited Chen Shui-bian. Demands for a recount by protesters camped on Ketegelan Boulevard came to naught. Ever since Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou proposed that the party chairman be directly elected, he has been the standard bearer for Blue Camp political rejuvention. In August 2005, Ma Ying-jeou was elected party chairman. The first thing he did was to announce that he would tie up the controversial issue of party assets before 2008. That check has bounced. The first time Ma Ying-jeou assumed the party chairmanship, during the Central Standing Committee session in February 2007, he made it clear that the party must become an election machine. Party assets must not be used on election campaigns. All elections must be financed by means of fund raising. This check has also bounced.
The first time Ma Ying-jeou assumed the party chairmanship, he failed to fulfill any major campaign promises. The reason is simple. In September 2007, Ma Ying-jeou was indicted in the Discretionary Fund case. He promptly resigned as party chairman. Wu Poh-hsiung, who had been planning to retire, held down the fort in Ma's absence. Ma Ying-jeou, who was no longer in charge of party affairs, focused on his presidential campaign. He was no longer able to oversee the divestiture of KMT party assets. He was no longer able to oversee the reform of KMT party finances. Given the prevailing mood within society and the party, no one blamed Ma Ying-jeou for this bounced check. Quite the contrary, it underscored society's feeling that justice had to be done.
Today Ma Ying-jeou is again in charge of the party. He has proudly waved the party flag on behalf of candidates for the year end elections. When Ma Ying-jeou declared his commitment to clean government and political reform, people were inspired. Political momentum accumulated. But he has now declared his intention to enforce strict party discipline. Candidates for political office are lashing out at the party leadership. They doubt Ma will hold up if they give him the cold-shoulder treatment. Ma Ying-jeou has been in charge of the affairs of state for a year and a half. He is being pulled in several directions at the same time. He has not demonstrated sufficient courage and determination. As a result, his leadership has been subjected to constant challenges. Candidates for City Mayor and County Executive offices have thrown their hats in the ring without consulting him. Even incumbents who were elected on the basis of Ma's endorsement are ignoring the party leadership, and bent on rebellion. During the party chairmanship election, the turnout in many constituencies was low. The percentage of invalid ballots was high. Quite a few former "Team Ma" legislators with reputations for integrity became Central Standing Committee members. These and other outspoken and forceful County Executives and City Mayors have gradually withdraw their candidacies. When asked why, they reply without enthusiasm, and sighed, "Let him (Ma) find out what it's like to not to have a Central Standing Committee consisting of his people!"
In the year and a half since Ma Ying-jeou became president, this group of party officials, who once stood shoulder to shoulder with him in the trenches, have met with and talked with him less than a handful of times, perhaps only twice. Even party members close to Ma are saying such things. One can imagine what people not so close to Ma are saying. They simply cannot find any way to interact with the party chairman. People everywhere are asking, "Is he (Ma) actually willing to listen to other people's advice?" Actually some people really don't care whether Chairman Ma is willing to listen to other people's advice. They care only about their status as Central Standing Committee members, whether that status will profit them personally. More importantly, the Central Standing Committee lacks career officials and local leaders who can explain what they fighting for. How can such a party leadership help the administration govern efficiently? Ma Ying-jeou wants to tranform the party into an election machine. He wants to turn it into a platform for communications and policy coordination. Based on the current structure of the Central Standing Committee, one can expect a weakening of the party's policy-making functions. Whether it will be of any help during election campaigns, is hard to say. Ma Ying-jeou will inevitably encounter trouble implementing his personal ideals.
Ma Ying-jeou sees the problem. He has called upon the KMT not to buy votes during election campaigns, not to enage in corruption while in office, and not to abuse its political power. In fact, this is a problem common to both Blue Camp and Green Camp parties. But seeing the problem and talking about the problem is not enough. Now that the president is also the party chairman, he must walk the walk, not just talk the talk.
Four years ago, Ma Ying-jeou was denied the opportunity to make good on his promises. He has now returned as party chairman. He must now accomplish his mission. Only with such an understanding can he avoid future regrets. Voters may have the wisdom, but they may lack the patience to give the KMT another chance.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.19
社論－改革尚未成功 英九仍須努力
本報訊
國民黨第十八屆黨代表大會日前落幕，馬英九再度回鍋兼任黨主席，同時也宣示國民黨改革、清廉、勤政路線。對比四年前第一次就任黨主席，馬英九的正職從台北市長一躍而為國家元首；前後兩次就任講話所嚴正宣示的方向，幾近是相同的語言，這一點並不讓人意外，因為「改革尚未完成，同志仍須努力」。馬英九兩度兼任黨主席，一方面要繼續未完成的黨務改革，再方面也要透過黨的改革，強化「輔政」的功能，進一步確保二○一二年的連任順遂。
回顧四年前，國民黨已經在野五年，分裂的國民黨和親民黨在連戰、宋楚瑜攜手合作下，拚搏大選，卻在三一九槍擊案的衝擊下，未能擊敗聲望早已潰跌的陳水扁，凱道驗票抗爭未果，身為台北市長的馬英九，從推動黨主席直選開始，始終背負藍營復興政權大業的深切期待。二○○五年八月任黨主席的馬英九，第一件大事就是宣示：二○○八年以前要將備受爭議的黨產問題處理完畢；這張支票，並未兌現。馬英九第一次就任黨主席時，在二○○七年二月上旬的中常會上，也明確表示，黨要成為選舉機器，黨產不得用於輔選，所有選舉相關財務都要以募款為之；這張支票，也沒兌現。
馬英九首次就任黨主席，沒兌現任何一樁重大政治承諾，原因無它，二○○七年九月，馬英九就因為特別費案遭起訴，毅然辭卸黨主席職務，由原來規畫退休的吳伯雄頂住大局。卸下黨職務的馬英九，專心投入大選，既管不了黨產進度，也無心聞問包括黨財務在內的改革方案。但當時的社會和黨的大氣候，沒有人怪責馬英九支票兌現不了，相反的，卻瀰漫著要討回公道的悲壯氣氛。
如今重回黨中央的馬英九，授旗給年底要參選的公職提名人，揮舞黨旗志得意滿，但是，當年宣示清廉改革的馬英九，令人振奮，有風行景從的氣勢；如今宣示強化黨紀，違紀參選者從嚴議處的馬英九，面對的則是黨內反彈四起，看你能奈我何的冷漠。已經執掌國家大政一年半的馬英九，在多方力量的拉鋸下，未能展現足夠的魄力和決斷，使他的領導威信不斷遭到挑戰。縣市長提名，各路人馬各顯神通，連曾經依靠馬光環才得以當選的多位現任縣市長，都不理黨中央的態度，執意造反。黨主席選舉，許多選區投票率偏低不說，廢票率還格外高；中常委選舉，許多當年以廁身「馬團隊」的形象牌立委、以及在黨內始終敢於直言力諫的縣市長，紛紛退出選局，問到何以致此？他們連熱情都沒有的、只能嘆口氣，「讓他（馬）嘗嘗沒有自己人的中常會是個什麼滋味！」
這群曾經與馬英九一起打天下的黨公職，在馬英九就任總統之後，一年半時間來，面見談話進言次數不必用一個手掌數，三個手指頭數大概都嫌多。與馬關係還算近的黨內人士都這麼說，和馬關係遠的人可以想見，根本找不出與主席互動之道，有人到處問，「他（馬）聽得進建言嗎？」也有人其實並不在乎馬主席聽不聽得下建言，只在乎端著中常委的招牌，能不能有利於自己的企業營生。更重要的，一個缺乏政務官、地方首長、講得出道理的中央民代參與的中常會，能提供黨主席多少「輔政」功能？馬英九要求黨要轉型為選舉機器，並成為政策協調溝通的平台，以眼下中常會的結構，黨決策功能的弱化幾乎可以預期，輔選作用的強化難講能否達到，馬英九難免再次陷入個人理想如何落實的困境。
馬英九不是看不到問題的人，他要求國民黨要做到：選舉不買票、執政不貪汙、問政不腐化，其實已看盡藍綠政黨的通病。然而，看到、說到還不夠，既已總統兼任黨主席，話說出口就要執行到位，否則所有的政治宣示都將是空談。
四年前的支票，馬英九來不及兌現，此番回鍋黨務，就得使命必達，有所警覺，不要留下遺憾，因為選民縱有足夠的智慧，卻可能沒太多耐性再給國民黨太多機會了。
Friday, October 16, 2009
Beijing's Green Warning Labels at the Frankfurt Book Fair
Beijing's Green Warning Labels at the Frankfurt Book Fair
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 16, 2009
The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are both participants at the Frankfurt Book Fair. Mainland China has among the books on display at its pavilion volumes published on Taiwan. To these it has attached "Green Warning Labels" reading "We do not endorse any content that violates the One China Principle." This gesture mirrors the disclaimers shown at the end of many political talk shows on Taiwan declaring that "The above comments do not represent the views of our station." It is hard not to chuckle at them.
The primary purpose of these Green Warning Labels is to protect the book fair host from potential political fallout. This system is more progressive than checking each book page by page, or worse, blotting out the actual text with black markers. Actually, since the two sides already have a "You can write what you like, but I don't intend to recognize it" understanding, such Green Warning Labels are superfluous.
Beijing has just displayed its military capabilities at its 60th National Day celebration. As this year's featured nation, Beijing sees the book fair as an important showcase for its soft power. But beginning last month, Beijing began pressuring dissident authors to withdraw from the book fair. Recently the Taiwan Pavilion was forced to change its name to "Taiwan Publishers." The Mainland pavilion pasted political warning labels on books published on Taiwan. These are evidence of too much bluster and too little tolerance.
The ice is melting in the Taiwan Strait. The Mainland China Pavilion is displaying books published on Taiwan. This is a praiseworthy move. But the books have been carefully preselected. Mostly they are books on art and decorating. Yet even they require "One China Principle" preventive measures. Isn't this just a wee bit one-sided? Isn't this making a mountain out of a molehill? This international book fair has a 600 year history. To handle cultural creations in such a heavy handed manner is markedly at odds with the air of civilization and refinement Beijing wishes to demonstrate.
The Frankfurt Book Fair is not the 10/1 National Day celebration. Beijing cannot force the host nation or participating nations to adopt the framework it applies at home. This is an international activity, with internationally accepted rules of the game. Beijing is a participant. It can participate fully. It can work toward its own goals. But it cannot coerce other participants to play by its rules. That would be contrary to the rules of international competition. Moreover, a book fair is a free market for peaceful and pluralistic cultural exchange. There is no need for hegemonic "rule the roost" attitudes.
The book fair includes over 600 China themed activities, more than enough to allow the West to understand the "New China." But some of Beijing's political gestures will merely make unnecessary trouble for the organizers. The world media will focus on these negative developments. This runs counter to the international image Beijing hopes to create.
The main reason for this gap is that political thinking within the Chinese Communist Party has not caught up with the Mainland's newfound economic prosperity. Those within the bureaucracy still think in terms of Cold War era confrontation and containment. Top officials on both sides have reached a reconciliation. The ice is melting. A consensus is forming. But administrators have yet to change their thinking and standard operating procedures. They have yet to stand down from their diplomatic wars and military preparations. In recent years, The CCP Central Committee has indeed shown signs of "emancipating its thought." But lower echelon officials have yet to adjust their thinking and behavior accordingly. That is because the safest response is the standard response. Going strictly by the book is least likely to get one into trouble. But a great nation is confident of its own status. If Mainland officials respond confidently and rationality, there is no reason why they can't change the outside world's image of an authoritarian power that suppresses freedom of expression?
As a rising power Mainland China's hard power has indeed attracted the world's attention. But its soft power remains in doubt. When it comes to recognizing the universal values of human rights, democracy, and freedom, Beijing is still a long way off. It still has much room for improvement. Last year Taipei joined WHA as an observer. This created a win-win scenario. Beijing's openness won international acclaim. That was a perfect example. During this year's World Games in Kaohsiung and Deaflympics in Taipei, Beijing respected the right of audience members to wave flags of their own choosing. This was also a highly positive development. By contrast, the Green Warning Labels at the Frankfurt Book Fair run counter to this trend.
The Mainland pavilion at the Frankfurt Book Fair should to remove the little Green Warning Labels on books published on Taiwan. Allowing a diversity of opinions would be an enlightened move, Pasting labels on books merely leave one disillusioned. Removing such labels means removing an old bandage covering China's self-doubts.
法蘭克福書展 中國館的綠色標籤
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.16 04:56 am
兩岸同時參加法蘭克福書展，中國大陸在其展區陳列的台灣圖書上，加貼「違反一中原則的內容一律不予承認」的綠色警語標籤。這個動作像是台灣的叩應節目，在片尾加註「以上言論不代表本台立場」，令人看了不禁莞爾。
這枚綠色標籤的主要作用，是使主持書展者免去萬一發生的政治責任；此制較全書逐頁檢查甚至局部塗黑的舊制自較進步，但既然已有「你寫你的／我不承認」的空間，這張綠色標籤誠屬多此一舉。
剛剛舉辦過軍容壯盛的建國一甲子國慶，身為此次書展的主題國，中國也將這次書展視為重要的文化國力展示場。然而，從上月中共官員因杯葛異議作家與會而集體退席，至近日台灣館被迫更名「台灣出版人」，乃至中國館陳列台灣書籍卻加貼政治宣示標籤，卻都顯得「霸氣」逼人，而「大氣」不足。
從兩岸融冰的角度看，中國館要展出台灣圖書，原本值得積極看待；但展出的書類其實皆經過挑選，大多是藝術、裝潢類書刊，卻也要加註「一中原則」的防範，未免極不對稱，小題大作。在一個有六百年歷史的國際書展，用這麼粗糙的手法對待文化創作產品，實在與北京亟欲誇示的文明和氣質大相逕庭。
與十一國慶不同，在法蘭克福書展，中國不能拿國內那套硬梆梆的手法來框架主辦單位或其他參展組織，因為這是一個國際活動，有國際通行的遊戲規則。中國作為一個參與者，可以在場上全力演出，爭取自己的成功；卻不能以杯葛或壓制其他參與者的方式，來抬高自己，因為那有違國際競賽的規則。何況，書展是文化交流的場域及和平多元的自由市場，實在不必有稱雄、稱霸的居心。
這次書展，計有六百多場以中國為主題的活動，足可吸引許多西方人士認識「新中國」。但中共的一些政治性的小動作，不僅使主辦單位增添了許多不必要的麻煩，也使全球媒體反而聚焦在這些負面報導，這對中國想要營造的國際形象其實是有害無益。
之所以有這樣的落差，主要原因是中共內部尚未形成一套足與經濟崛起相符應的新政治思維；因此，官僚體系所熟悉者仍是那一套冷戰時代的對抗和圍堵思維。雖然兩岸高層對和解、融冰的共識已然形成，但在中共行政體系思維與操作中，外交戰的武裝卻仍未卸除。這幾年來，中共中央令人確有「解放思想」的跡象，但基層人員的思想行為似未隨之調整；因為，最安全的一定是「制式反應」，照著「標準模式」演出最不可能犯錯。但作為一個自許的大國，官員若能秉著自信與理性應對，何致無法改變外界對其「打壓言論自由」的專制印象？
作為一個崛起的大國，中國的「硬實力」確已受到全球矚目，但它的「軟實力」卻仍有爭議；尤其在人權、民主和自由等面向，與普世認可的價值仍有相當距離。在這個廣大的空間中，北京實有極大的進取餘地。去年台北以觀察員身分參加ＷＨＡ，不僅締造了兩岸雙贏，北京的開放作風更贏得國際好評，即是最好的例子。今年的高雄世運及台北聽奧，中共對觀眾的持旗權利亦予尊重，這也頗具正面意義的表徵。兩相對照，法蘭克福書展上的綠色標籤，就顯得似與這個大趨勢背道而馳。
法蘭克福中國館台灣書籍上的那張綠色小標籤其實可以撕掉。容許書中可能存在的多元意見是一開明進步，但貼上一張標籤卻使這種正面的想像幻滅。撕掉這枚標籤，也是撕掉貼在中國自信心創傷上的陳年膏藥。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 16, 2009
The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are both participants at the Frankfurt Book Fair. Mainland China has among the books on display at its pavilion volumes published on Taiwan. To these it has attached "Green Warning Labels" reading "We do not endorse any content that violates the One China Principle." This gesture mirrors the disclaimers shown at the end of many political talk shows on Taiwan declaring that "The above comments do not represent the views of our station." It is hard not to chuckle at them.
The primary purpose of these Green Warning Labels is to protect the book fair host from potential political fallout. This system is more progressive than checking each book page by page, or worse, blotting out the actual text with black markers. Actually, since the two sides already have a "You can write what you like, but I don't intend to recognize it" understanding, such Green Warning Labels are superfluous.
Beijing has just displayed its military capabilities at its 60th National Day celebration. As this year's featured nation, Beijing sees the book fair as an important showcase for its soft power. But beginning last month, Beijing began pressuring dissident authors to withdraw from the book fair. Recently the Taiwan Pavilion was forced to change its name to "Taiwan Publishers." The Mainland pavilion pasted political warning labels on books published on Taiwan. These are evidence of too much bluster and too little tolerance.
The ice is melting in the Taiwan Strait. The Mainland China Pavilion is displaying books published on Taiwan. This is a praiseworthy move. But the books have been carefully preselected. Mostly they are books on art and decorating. Yet even they require "One China Principle" preventive measures. Isn't this just a wee bit one-sided? Isn't this making a mountain out of a molehill? This international book fair has a 600 year history. To handle cultural creations in such a heavy handed manner is markedly at odds with the air of civilization and refinement Beijing wishes to demonstrate.
The Frankfurt Book Fair is not the 10/1 National Day celebration. Beijing cannot force the host nation or participating nations to adopt the framework it applies at home. This is an international activity, with internationally accepted rules of the game. Beijing is a participant. It can participate fully. It can work toward its own goals. But it cannot coerce other participants to play by its rules. That would be contrary to the rules of international competition. Moreover, a book fair is a free market for peaceful and pluralistic cultural exchange. There is no need for hegemonic "rule the roost" attitudes.
The book fair includes over 600 China themed activities, more than enough to allow the West to understand the "New China." But some of Beijing's political gestures will merely make unnecessary trouble for the organizers. The world media will focus on these negative developments. This runs counter to the international image Beijing hopes to create.
The main reason for this gap is that political thinking within the Chinese Communist Party has not caught up with the Mainland's newfound economic prosperity. Those within the bureaucracy still think in terms of Cold War era confrontation and containment. Top officials on both sides have reached a reconciliation. The ice is melting. A consensus is forming. But administrators have yet to change their thinking and standard operating procedures. They have yet to stand down from their diplomatic wars and military preparations. In recent years, The CCP Central Committee has indeed shown signs of "emancipating its thought." But lower echelon officials have yet to adjust their thinking and behavior accordingly. That is because the safest response is the standard response. Going strictly by the book is least likely to get one into trouble. But a great nation is confident of its own status. If Mainland officials respond confidently and rationality, there is no reason why they can't change the outside world's image of an authoritarian power that suppresses freedom of expression?
As a rising power Mainland China's hard power has indeed attracted the world's attention. But its soft power remains in doubt. When it comes to recognizing the universal values of human rights, democracy, and freedom, Beijing is still a long way off. It still has much room for improvement. Last year Taipei joined WHA as an observer. This created a win-win scenario. Beijing's openness won international acclaim. That was a perfect example. During this year's World Games in Kaohsiung and Deaflympics in Taipei, Beijing respected the right of audience members to wave flags of their own choosing. This was also a highly positive development. By contrast, the Green Warning Labels at the Frankfurt Book Fair run counter to this trend.
The Mainland pavilion at the Frankfurt Book Fair should to remove the little Green Warning Labels on books published on Taiwan. Allowing a diversity of opinions would be an enlightened move, Pasting labels on books merely leave one disillusioned. Removing such labels means removing an old bandage covering China's self-doubts.
法蘭克福書展 中國館的綠色標籤
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.16 04:56 am
兩岸同時參加法蘭克福書展，中國大陸在其展區陳列的台灣圖書上，加貼「違反一中原則的內容一律不予承認」的綠色警語標籤。這個動作像是台灣的叩應節目，在片尾加註「以上言論不代表本台立場」，令人看了不禁莞爾。
這枚綠色標籤的主要作用，是使主持書展者免去萬一發生的政治責任；此制較全書逐頁檢查甚至局部塗黑的舊制自較進步，但既然已有「你寫你的／我不承認」的空間，這張綠色標籤誠屬多此一舉。
剛剛舉辦過軍容壯盛的建國一甲子國慶，身為此次書展的主題國，中國也將這次書展視為重要的文化國力展示場。然而，從上月中共官員因杯葛異議作家與會而集體退席，至近日台灣館被迫更名「台灣出版人」，乃至中國館陳列台灣書籍卻加貼政治宣示標籤，卻都顯得「霸氣」逼人，而「大氣」不足。
從兩岸融冰的角度看，中國館要展出台灣圖書，原本值得積極看待；但展出的書類其實皆經過挑選，大多是藝術、裝潢類書刊，卻也要加註「一中原則」的防範，未免極不對稱，小題大作。在一個有六百年歷史的國際書展，用這麼粗糙的手法對待文化創作產品，實在與北京亟欲誇示的文明和氣質大相逕庭。
與十一國慶不同，在法蘭克福書展，中國不能拿國內那套硬梆梆的手法來框架主辦單位或其他參展組織，因為這是一個國際活動，有國際通行的遊戲規則。中國作為一個參與者，可以在場上全力演出，爭取自己的成功；卻不能以杯葛或壓制其他參與者的方式，來抬高自己，因為那有違國際競賽的規則。何況，書展是文化交流的場域及和平多元的自由市場，實在不必有稱雄、稱霸的居心。
這次書展，計有六百多場以中國為主題的活動，足可吸引許多西方人士認識「新中國」。但中共的一些政治性的小動作，不僅使主辦單位增添了許多不必要的麻煩，也使全球媒體反而聚焦在這些負面報導，這對中國想要營造的國際形象其實是有害無益。
之所以有這樣的落差，主要原因是中共內部尚未形成一套足與經濟崛起相符應的新政治思維；因此，官僚體系所熟悉者仍是那一套冷戰時代的對抗和圍堵思維。雖然兩岸高層對和解、融冰的共識已然形成，但在中共行政體系思維與操作中，外交戰的武裝卻仍未卸除。這幾年來，中共中央令人確有「解放思想」的跡象，但基層人員的思想行為似未隨之調整；因為，最安全的一定是「制式反應」，照著「標準模式」演出最不可能犯錯。但作為一個自許的大國，官員若能秉著自信與理性應對，何致無法改變外界對其「打壓言論自由」的專制印象？
作為一個崛起的大國，中國的「硬實力」確已受到全球矚目，但它的「軟實力」卻仍有爭議；尤其在人權、民主和自由等面向，與普世認可的價值仍有相當距離。在這個廣大的空間中，北京實有極大的進取餘地。去年台北以觀察員身分參加ＷＨＡ，不僅締造了兩岸雙贏，北京的開放作風更贏得國際好評，即是最好的例子。今年的高雄世運及台北聽奧，中共對觀眾的持旗權利亦予尊重，這也頗具正面意義的表徵。兩相對照，法蘭克福書展上的綠色標籤，就顯得似與這個大趨勢背道而馳。
法蘭克福中國館台灣書籍上的那張綠色小標籤其實可以撕掉。容許書中可能存在的多元意見是一開明進步，但貼上一張標籤卻使這種正面的想像幻滅。撕掉這枚標籤，也是撕掉貼在中國自信心創傷上的陳年膏藥。
Thursday, October 15, 2009
What the Supreme Court Must Do
What the Supreme Court Must Do
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 15, 2009
The Supreme Court has reversed the High Court's detention of Chen Shui-bian. By doing so, it has turned the law on its head. Its job is to rule on the constitutionality of the law. Instead, it ruled on whether Chen Shui-bian was a flight risk. By ruling on the facts of the case, instead of on the constitutionality of the law as such, the Supreme Court exceeded its authority. Since the High Court is responsible for ruling on the facts of the case, it has rightly and properly continued to detain Chen Shui-bian.
Successful Supreme Court appeals by defendants charged with felonies are as rare as hen's teeth. The Chen corruption case is a high profile media case. It is the focus of public attention. The Supreme Court has done the public a disservice. Not only has it failed to assert its authority, it has disgraced itself.
The Supreme Court failed to assert its authority for institutional reasons. Its judges lacked of a sense of mission. They failed to render their best legal opinion. They tarnished the "Supreme" in "Supreme Court."
Consider the institutional factors. To assert authority, one must speak with one voice. But our Supreme Court has many Chambers, 13 Criminal Courts, and seven Civil Courts. Each is the king of its own hill. Each interprets the law its own way. No one pays any attention to anyone else. Only when serious discrepancies appear, do they convene a criminal court or civil court conference to hammer out a consensus.
Current practice admittedly highlights the existence of judicial independence. Divergent legal opinions have the opportunity to emerge and be heard. But if the process fails to work as expected, if the various courts each go their own way, if they view themselves as discrete entities, they may lose sight of their responsibilty as final arbiters, leaving the public increasing adrift.
For example, the full court sent the case back to the lower courts, rescinding Ah-Bian's detention, forcing the system to repeat the process a second time. It appeared to be upholding human rights. It appeared to be acting responsibly by re-trying the case. But it failed to offer a convincing legal basis for its opinion. Instead, it merely left people with the impression that it was making light of its duties. It obfuscated the duty of the court, namely, to rule according to the law.
The Supreme Court is responsible for ruling on the constitutionality of the law. It should respect the lower court's legal decisions. In practice however, it seldom does. The High Court often complains that the Supreme Court exceeds its authority, fussing over individual cases, picking over minor details. The Supreme Court often has objections. But instead of making clear how lower courts ought to rule, it often uses weasel words such as "is apparently," or "would benefit from further study." Since the Supreme Court has no confidence in in its own rulings, and is unwilling to assume responsibility, how are lower courts supposed to follow their lead? Over time, this has resulted in a Supreme Court that evades its responsibility instead of asserting its authority.
Therefore, do not blame the full court for rescinding the order to detain Ah-Bian. The judges responsible are the product of long immersion in the unique culture of the Supreme Court. They failed to realize that their legal reasoning would be subjected to close public scrutiny, and that the distinction between the facts of the case, and the letter of the law would suddenly became so clear. They failed to realize that their ruling would be the object of such intense public suspicion.
This legal culture has a long history. It has killed public confidence in the trial process. The aforementioned institutional factors are part of the problem. But judges can make changes. It all depends on how judges see their duty. Judges have no rank. But they do have different responsibilities. Judges in courts of final appeal are authorized to rule on the basis of the law. They must expect much of themselves. They must display boldness and erudition. Only then can they establish a credible justice system.
If judges in courts of final appeal have any self-respect, they will find ways to minimize differences of opinion. They will stop acting like petty despots, and provide lower court concrete legal guidelines worthy of respect. They will consider the views of those making appeals. They will not evade responsibility by automatically sending cases back to lower courts. They will not ignore the suffering endured by people trapped in the legal process. They will look further ahead. They will leave their private offices, their piles of legal documents, and ask themselves how they can render legal judgments that will inspire future generations.
All this will take time. But as long as judges are willing to dive in, the legal culture will gradually change. A virtuous cycle will lead to improvements. An individual case such as this can lead to the establishment of new values. Judges in courts of the third instance must be the cream of the crop. They are the key to the administration of justice. Starting over with such standards, judges in courts of the third instance must not to allow the trial process become an object of public ridicule or worse, public indifference.
The Supreme Court should value its "Supreme" label. It should ensure the quality of the trial process. This is what the Supreme Court must do. Nothing more, and nothing less.
最高法院該做的事
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.15 04:17 am
最高法院撤銷高院羈押陳水扁的裁定，栽了一個大筋斗。明明是法律審，卻論及陳水扁可不可能逃亡的事實判斷；既是事實爭議，身為事實審的高院當然不客氣，理直氣壯地繼續羈押陳水扁。
重罪羈押能向最高法院抗告成功的案例鳳毛麟角，扁案又是眾所矚目的大案，最高法院無法令出眾服，不但立威不成，且顏面無光。
最高法院無法建立權威，固有制度上的原因，而法官欠缺承擔責任的使命感，沒有展現「最優」法律見解的的企圖心，益使「最高」的招牌蒙塵。
從制度上的原因探究，要建立權威，就不能一門多調；但我們的最高法院有多個分庭，刑庭十三庭，民庭有七庭，各擁一座山頭，各持法律見解，誰也管不了誰，只有當發現重大歧見，召開刑事庭或民事庭會議討論後，才會形成一致的看法。
現行做法固然彰顯審判獨立的可貴，使各種法律意見有頭角崢嶸的機會，但如運作失靈，各庭各自為政，把自己看成法院的一小部分，容易失去擔起最後把關責任的使命感，而人民則益發無所適從。
正如作成扁撤押裁定的合議庭，發回案件，讓羈押程序重走一遭，好像就盡到了維護人權、重新審查的責任；但因沒有提出擲地有聲的法律見解，反而給人輕忽職能的感覺，也混淆了法院就法論法的功能。
最高法院既是法律審，本應在法律見解上引領下級法院，但在實務運作上卻天差地遠，二審常抱怨最高法院撈過界管太多，老在案件事實上作文章，甚至在枝節上計較。何況，即使表示意見，最高法院法官並不直接挑明該怎麼做，發回的理由書裡常可見到「似乎」、「不無研求餘地」等用語。倘若最高法院自己都沒信心，沒把握，也不想負責任，則下級審如何依循？久而久之，就形成我們最高法院獨有的「求免責多於立威信」的審判文化。
因此，不必苛責作出扁撤押案的合議庭，這些法官早就浸潤在最高法院獨有的文化中多時。他們只是沒有料到：裁定理由會受到社會各界的嚴格檢視，事實和法律的分際會突然被劃得這麼清楚；他們也沒有料到，要為一次發回的裁定面對這麼多的檢視和質疑。
這種審判文化的形成其來有自，成為扼殺審判信度的可怕殺手。前述提及的制度因素雖有影響，法官卻非毫無改變的著力空間，改變的最大動力在於法官怎麼看待自己的審判使命。法官雖無大小之別，然職有分工，終審法官握有案件定讞、法律適用當否的權限，應當自我期許以相當的氣魄和學養，開創出有見解之審判系統。
終審法官如果看重自己，就會想辦法減少見解的歧異，像個老大哥的樣子，給下級審具體而值得敬佩的指引；更會站在訴訟民眾的立場去思考，不要僅為躲避責任而發回案件，無視當事人陷於纏訟的苦痛；進而會把眼光放遠，離開獨居的辦公室、成堆的文書卷證，為如何作出啟發後世的一篇篇經典判決而努力。
這些都需要時間經營，但只要法官們願意投注心力於此，審判文化就會慢慢改變，產生良性的循環，帶動審判的精緻化，由一件件個案重新建立起審判的新價值。三審法官應是法官中的精選，是影響司法審判風氣的重心；由此標準再出發，三審法官著實責無旁貸，不能任由審判笑罵由人，還無動於衷。
最高法院應當看重自己的「最高」品牌，細心呵護審判的品質；最高法院該做的事，莫過於此。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 15, 2009
The Supreme Court has reversed the High Court's detention of Chen Shui-bian. By doing so, it has turned the law on its head. Its job is to rule on the constitutionality of the law. Instead, it ruled on whether Chen Shui-bian was a flight risk. By ruling on the facts of the case, instead of on the constitutionality of the law as such, the Supreme Court exceeded its authority. Since the High Court is responsible for ruling on the facts of the case, it has rightly and properly continued to detain Chen Shui-bian.
Successful Supreme Court appeals by defendants charged with felonies are as rare as hen's teeth. The Chen corruption case is a high profile media case. It is the focus of public attention. The Supreme Court has done the public a disservice. Not only has it failed to assert its authority, it has disgraced itself.
The Supreme Court failed to assert its authority for institutional reasons. Its judges lacked of a sense of mission. They failed to render their best legal opinion. They tarnished the "Supreme" in "Supreme Court."
Consider the institutional factors. To assert authority, one must speak with one voice. But our Supreme Court has many Chambers, 13 Criminal Courts, and seven Civil Courts. Each is the king of its own hill. Each interprets the law its own way. No one pays any attention to anyone else. Only when serious discrepancies appear, do they convene a criminal court or civil court conference to hammer out a consensus.
Current practice admittedly highlights the existence of judicial independence. Divergent legal opinions have the opportunity to emerge and be heard. But if the process fails to work as expected, if the various courts each go their own way, if they view themselves as discrete entities, they may lose sight of their responsibilty as final arbiters, leaving the public increasing adrift.
For example, the full court sent the case back to the lower courts, rescinding Ah-Bian's detention, forcing the system to repeat the process a second time. It appeared to be upholding human rights. It appeared to be acting responsibly by re-trying the case. But it failed to offer a convincing legal basis for its opinion. Instead, it merely left people with the impression that it was making light of its duties. It obfuscated the duty of the court, namely, to rule according to the law.
The Supreme Court is responsible for ruling on the constitutionality of the law. It should respect the lower court's legal decisions. In practice however, it seldom does. The High Court often complains that the Supreme Court exceeds its authority, fussing over individual cases, picking over minor details. The Supreme Court often has objections. But instead of making clear how lower courts ought to rule, it often uses weasel words such as "is apparently," or "would benefit from further study." Since the Supreme Court has no confidence in in its own rulings, and is unwilling to assume responsibility, how are lower courts supposed to follow their lead? Over time, this has resulted in a Supreme Court that evades its responsibility instead of asserting its authority.
Therefore, do not blame the full court for rescinding the order to detain Ah-Bian. The judges responsible are the product of long immersion in the unique culture of the Supreme Court. They failed to realize that their legal reasoning would be subjected to close public scrutiny, and that the distinction between the facts of the case, and the letter of the law would suddenly became so clear. They failed to realize that their ruling would be the object of such intense public suspicion.
This legal culture has a long history. It has killed public confidence in the trial process. The aforementioned institutional factors are part of the problem. But judges can make changes. It all depends on how judges see their duty. Judges have no rank. But they do have different responsibilities. Judges in courts of final appeal are authorized to rule on the basis of the law. They must expect much of themselves. They must display boldness and erudition. Only then can they establish a credible justice system.
If judges in courts of final appeal have any self-respect, they will find ways to minimize differences of opinion. They will stop acting like petty despots, and provide lower court concrete legal guidelines worthy of respect. They will consider the views of those making appeals. They will not evade responsibility by automatically sending cases back to lower courts. They will not ignore the suffering endured by people trapped in the legal process. They will look further ahead. They will leave their private offices, their piles of legal documents, and ask themselves how they can render legal judgments that will inspire future generations.
All this will take time. But as long as judges are willing to dive in, the legal culture will gradually change. A virtuous cycle will lead to improvements. An individual case such as this can lead to the establishment of new values. Judges in courts of the third instance must be the cream of the crop. They are the key to the administration of justice. Starting over with such standards, judges in courts of the third instance must not to allow the trial process become an object of public ridicule or worse, public indifference.
The Supreme Court should value its "Supreme" label. It should ensure the quality of the trial process. This is what the Supreme Court must do. Nothing more, and nothing less.
最高法院該做的事
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.15 04:17 am
最高法院撤銷高院羈押陳水扁的裁定，栽了一個大筋斗。明明是法律審，卻論及陳水扁可不可能逃亡的事實判斷；既是事實爭議，身為事實審的高院當然不客氣，理直氣壯地繼續羈押陳水扁。
重罪羈押能向最高法院抗告成功的案例鳳毛麟角，扁案又是眾所矚目的大案，最高法院無法令出眾服，不但立威不成，且顏面無光。
最高法院無法建立權威，固有制度上的原因，而法官欠缺承擔責任的使命感，沒有展現「最優」法律見解的的企圖心，益使「最高」的招牌蒙塵。
從制度上的原因探究，要建立權威，就不能一門多調；但我們的最高法院有多個分庭，刑庭十三庭，民庭有七庭，各擁一座山頭，各持法律見解，誰也管不了誰，只有當發現重大歧見，召開刑事庭或民事庭會議討論後，才會形成一致的看法。
現行做法固然彰顯審判獨立的可貴，使各種法律意見有頭角崢嶸的機會，但如運作失靈，各庭各自為政，把自己看成法院的一小部分，容易失去擔起最後把關責任的使命感，而人民則益發無所適從。
正如作成扁撤押裁定的合議庭，發回案件，讓羈押程序重走一遭，好像就盡到了維護人權、重新審查的責任；但因沒有提出擲地有聲的法律見解，反而給人輕忽職能的感覺，也混淆了法院就法論法的功能。
最高法院既是法律審，本應在法律見解上引領下級法院，但在實務運作上卻天差地遠，二審常抱怨最高法院撈過界管太多，老在案件事實上作文章，甚至在枝節上計較。何況，即使表示意見，最高法院法官並不直接挑明該怎麼做，發回的理由書裡常可見到「似乎」、「不無研求餘地」等用語。倘若最高法院自己都沒信心，沒把握，也不想負責任，則下級審如何依循？久而久之，就形成我們最高法院獨有的「求免責多於立威信」的審判文化。
因此，不必苛責作出扁撤押案的合議庭，這些法官早就浸潤在最高法院獨有的文化中多時。他們只是沒有料到：裁定理由會受到社會各界的嚴格檢視，事實和法律的分際會突然被劃得這麼清楚；他們也沒有料到，要為一次發回的裁定面對這麼多的檢視和質疑。
這種審判文化的形成其來有自，成為扼殺審判信度的可怕殺手。前述提及的制度因素雖有影響，法官卻非毫無改變的著力空間，改變的最大動力在於法官怎麼看待自己的審判使命。法官雖無大小之別，然職有分工，終審法官握有案件定讞、法律適用當否的權限，應當自我期許以相當的氣魄和學養，開創出有見解之審判系統。
終審法官如果看重自己，就會想辦法減少見解的歧異，像個老大哥的樣子，給下級審具體而值得敬佩的指引；更會站在訴訟民眾的立場去思考，不要僅為躲避責任而發回案件，無視當事人陷於纏訟的苦痛；進而會把眼光放遠，離開獨居的辦公室、成堆的文書卷證，為如何作出啟發後世的一篇篇經典判決而努力。
這些都需要時間經營，但只要法官們願意投注心力於此，審判文化就會慢慢改變，產生良性的循環，帶動審判的精緻化，由一件件個案重新建立起審判的新價值。三審法官應是法官中的精選，是影響司法審判風氣的重心；由此標準再出發，三審法官著實責無旁貸，不能任由審判笑罵由人，還無動於衷。
最高法院應當看重自己的「最高」品牌，細心呵護審判的品質；最高法院該做的事，莫過於此。
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
Barack Obama and Wei Jingsheng
Barack Obama and Wei Jingsheng
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 14, 2009
Barack Obama's awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize was met with a global outcry. Even he did not feel he deserved it. Meanwhile rumors that mainland democratic activist Wei Jingsheng and human rights activist Hu Jia might be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize have receded from public memory.
If one wishes to give one of these the award, Wei Jingsheng is probably more deserving than Hu Jia. Hu Jia's record is impressive. He is a high school graduate who made his appearance after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. When Wei Jingsheng first appeared he was an electrician at the Beijing Zoo. Mao Zedong had just died. The ten year long disaster known as the Cultural Revolution had transformed mainland China into a closed society. During the "Beijing Spring" Wei Jingsheng unquestionably issued the most resonant grass roots "hu sheng" (outcry). Wei Jingsheng was born 30 years before Hu Jia. He is more representative of society than Hu Jia.
Wei Jingsheng often uses the term "outcry." In 1978, on the Xidan democracy wall, he posted a "Fifth Modernization: Democracy etc." He said that Deng Xiaoping, who resurfaced following the "Smash the Gang of Four" movement "should be grateful for the outcry that restored him to the political arena."
By outcry, he meant the voice of the people. Those who smashed the Gang of Four, who staged the coup d'etat, and who denounced the late Mao Zedong in 1976, were of course Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping. Theirs was an internecine struggle. But according to Wei Jingsheng, the real impetus originated with the people, with their outcry. They were the ones who gave this anti-Maoist coup legitimacy in the eyes of heaven and earth.
To this day, leftists on the mainland insist that the three decade long drama that began with the Smash the Gang of Four movement, and led up to the Reform and Liberalization movement, was all part of "socialism's superior self-correcting mechanisms." But the anti-Maoist coup was clearly not part of any "self-correcting mechanism." Deng Xiaoping and others responded to the people's outcry. They were compelled by the people's outcry to smash the Gang of Five (including Mao Tse-tung). That is why Wei Jingsheng said Deng Xiaoping "should be grateful for the outcries that restored him to the political arena."
Thirty years later, as one reads Wei Jingsheng's words, such as his "Fifth Modernization: Democracy etc," and his "Democracy, or a new dictatorship?" one cannot help being moved. Even today, Wei Jingsheng's personal controversies should not detract from his Beijing Spring era achievements. Wei was a 28 year old electrician and a high school graduate. He had just emerged from the closed society of the Cultural Revolution. Yet he spoke of Rousseau and Locke. He foreshadowed the developments of the next three decades. If a young electrician could hold such views, that meant there was no shortage of people among the vast population of China who held the same views. The only difference was that most of them dared not express their views quite so openly. Thirty years later, grass-roots attitudes in China are probably the same. They dare not speak, but in their hearts they know what they believe. The outcry continues to reverberate.
Today's China is not the exclusive achievement of the Deng Xiaoping/Hu Jintao "palace coup." Is is also the achievement of Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and millions of other middle and upper level political figures. It was paid for by the tens of millions who died of hunger for the "Three Red Banners," and the hundreds of millions who were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution as "feudalists, capitalists, and revisionists." It was paid for by the victims of the 1978 Beijing Spring and the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. The result was an outcry inspired by the people's suffering. Today's China is not the result of any "socialist self-correcting mechanisms." It is the result of the CCP regime's lack of alternatives. The CCP was forced to forsake class struggle and instead champion a harmonious society.
Today, the sentiments and reasoning behind Wei Jingsheng's outcry three decades ago may sound somewhat anachronistic. But in fact the buzzword "reform and liberalization" goes back to his "Fifth Modernization." Today Beijing is taking the path of reform and liberalization. But it still characterizes the reform and liberalization advocated by pro-democracy and human rights activists as heresy. If it is merely indulging in power games, that is understandable. But Beijing's leaders surely realize that it was precisely such outcries that enabled them to remain in power in order to promote reform and liberalization. The CCP has rehabilitated Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi. The latter died a nameless corpse. The CCP can hardly ignore the outcries from the grass roots during the Beijing Spring and 1989 pro-democracy movement. Without such strong and sustained outcries today's China would not exist. Peng Dehuai was in fact an insider version of Wei Jingsheng. Wei Jingsheng was conversely, a grass-roots version of Peng Dehuai.
President Ma Ying-jeou's National Day speech noted that today's Taiwan must affirm the decades long fight for democracy and human rights waged by Lei Chen with his "Free China" movement and by "party outsiders" during their "Kaohsiung Incident" movement. Hu Jintao and other leaders in Beijing may not be able to openly affirm the views of Wei Jingsheng and Hu Jia. But they must allow their outcries to echo in their hearts.
從歐巴馬想到魏京生
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.14 04:32 am
歐巴馬獲得諾貝爾和平獎，舉世譁然，連他自己都覺得受之有愧。於此同時，多年來大陸民運人士魏京生，與維權人士胡佳可能獲獎的傳說，則再次消失在人們的想像中。
若要給獎，魏京生可能較胡佳更有資格。胡佳的表現確屬不易，他是高校畢業生，是八九天安門事件後的人物；魏京生初露面時，則是北京動物園的電工，當時正值毛澤東死，中國大陸仍是文革十年浩劫造成的封閉社會，魏京生的「呼聲」，無疑是當年「北京之春」裡最令人震懾的草根吶喊。魏京生出道比胡佳早三十年，他的社會代表性也比胡佳土，比胡佳深。
「呼聲」是魏京生的用語。他在一九七八年西單民主牆上貼出的《第五個現代化：民主及其他》裡指出：當年在「粉碎四人幫」後復出的鄧小平，「應當感謝那個把他推上台的呼聲」。
呼聲，是指人民的聲音。若依魏京生的看法，一九七六年「粉碎四人幫」對毛澤東的鞭屍政變，固然是葉劍英、鄧小平等發動的黨內鬥爭；然其底層的真正動力，卻是來自人民的「呼聲」，使這場鞭屍政變取得了順天應人的正當性。
一直到今天，大陸的左派仍在說，三十年來從「粉碎四人幫」至「改革開放」的巨劇，是出於「社會主義」內在的「優異的自我糾錯機制」。然而，顯然那是「鞭屍政變」，而不是什麼「糾錯機制」。鄧小平等人是回應了人民的「呼聲」，或迫於人民的「呼聲」，而粉碎了「五人幫」（包括毛澤東）；因而，魏京生說：鄧小平等「應當感謝那個把他推上台的呼聲」。
即使在三十年後展閱魏京生的文字，如《第五個現代化：民主及其他》、《要民主還是要新的獨裁》，仍令人心靈震動。即使今日對魏京生的私行有些議論，但應當無損於他在「北京之春」的表現。當年魏是二十八歲的電工，高中畢業，剛經過文革的封閉社會；但他的吐屬，居然有盧梭、洛克的況味，不啻也預告了嗣後至今三十年的歷史走向。我們可以想像，當年一名青年電工有這種政治見解，其實在中國廣大基層民眾間亦不乏有此見解，只是他們不會或不敢像魏京生這般地表達。我們也相信，三十年後今天的中國草根基層仍是如此；不會說，不敢說，但心知肚明，也就是「呼聲」仍在迴盪。
就此以論，中國有今日，不全緣於自鄧小平至胡錦濤的「宮廷政變」；也是因彭德懷、劉少奇、林彪、胡耀邦、趙紫陽等萬千中上層人物的罹禍；更是因「三面紅旗」數千萬餓殍，及文革數億「封／資／修」被鬥者，以至一九七八「北京之春」，到一九八九天安門事件，所付出的民生苦難及因苦難而發出的「呼聲」。鐵一般的事實是：中國有今日，並非因為「社會主義」的「自我糾錯機制」，而是中共政權已經再也沒有不改弦更張的餘地，必須從「階級鬥爭」走到「和諧社會」。
回顧魏京生在三十年前的「呼聲」，其中的情緒與邏輯雖不免略有時空的落差，但其實不妨逕將「第五個現代化」一詞改作「改革開放」的今日流行語。但是，今日的北京政權，走的是「改革開放」路線，卻仍將主張「改革開放」的民運或維權人士視為異端。這若是緣於統治權謀，尚可理解；但北京主政者卻不可不知，正是這種民間「呼聲」，使當局得以繼續挺住及推動「改革開放」。中共既然漸次平反了犯顏直諫的彭德懷，和死時成為無名屍的劉少奇等；當然也不能抹煞「北京之春」至「八九民運」的民間「呼聲」。沒有這股強大而持續的「呼聲」，中國不會有今日。彭德懷其實是朝廷裡的魏京生，而魏京生則是草根的彭德懷。
馬英九總統在國慶談話中指出，台灣有今日，必須肯定從（雷震）「自由中國」，到（黨外運動）「美麗島」數十年來爭取民主人權的志士。北京當局胡錦濤等領導人，也許一時做不到在口中認同魏京生、胡佳等的見解，但應當常使這類「呼聲」在自己的心中迴盪。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 14, 2009
Barack Obama's awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize was met with a global outcry. Even he did not feel he deserved it. Meanwhile rumors that mainland democratic activist Wei Jingsheng and human rights activist Hu Jia might be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize have receded from public memory.
If one wishes to give one of these the award, Wei Jingsheng is probably more deserving than Hu Jia. Hu Jia's record is impressive. He is a high school graduate who made his appearance after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. When Wei Jingsheng first appeared he was an electrician at the Beijing Zoo. Mao Zedong had just died. The ten year long disaster known as the Cultural Revolution had transformed mainland China into a closed society. During the "Beijing Spring" Wei Jingsheng unquestionably issued the most resonant grass roots "hu sheng" (outcry). Wei Jingsheng was born 30 years before Hu Jia. He is more representative of society than Hu Jia.
Wei Jingsheng often uses the term "outcry." In 1978, on the Xidan democracy wall, he posted a "Fifth Modernization: Democracy etc." He said that Deng Xiaoping, who resurfaced following the "Smash the Gang of Four" movement "should be grateful for the outcry that restored him to the political arena."
By outcry, he meant the voice of the people. Those who smashed the Gang of Four, who staged the coup d'etat, and who denounced the late Mao Zedong in 1976, were of course Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping. Theirs was an internecine struggle. But according to Wei Jingsheng, the real impetus originated with the people, with their outcry. They were the ones who gave this anti-Maoist coup legitimacy in the eyes of heaven and earth.
To this day, leftists on the mainland insist that the three decade long drama that began with the Smash the Gang of Four movement, and led up to the Reform and Liberalization movement, was all part of "socialism's superior self-correcting mechanisms." But the anti-Maoist coup was clearly not part of any "self-correcting mechanism." Deng Xiaoping and others responded to the people's outcry. They were compelled by the people's outcry to smash the Gang of Five (including Mao Tse-tung). That is why Wei Jingsheng said Deng Xiaoping "should be grateful for the outcries that restored him to the political arena."
Thirty years later, as one reads Wei Jingsheng's words, such as his "Fifth Modernization: Democracy etc," and his "Democracy, or a new dictatorship?" one cannot help being moved. Even today, Wei Jingsheng's personal controversies should not detract from his Beijing Spring era achievements. Wei was a 28 year old electrician and a high school graduate. He had just emerged from the closed society of the Cultural Revolution. Yet he spoke of Rousseau and Locke. He foreshadowed the developments of the next three decades. If a young electrician could hold such views, that meant there was no shortage of people among the vast population of China who held the same views. The only difference was that most of them dared not express their views quite so openly. Thirty years later, grass-roots attitudes in China are probably the same. They dare not speak, but in their hearts they know what they believe. The outcry continues to reverberate.
Today's China is not the exclusive achievement of the Deng Xiaoping/Hu Jintao "palace coup." Is is also the achievement of Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and millions of other middle and upper level political figures. It was paid for by the tens of millions who died of hunger for the "Three Red Banners," and the hundreds of millions who were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution as "feudalists, capitalists, and revisionists." It was paid for by the victims of the 1978 Beijing Spring and the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. The result was an outcry inspired by the people's suffering. Today's China is not the result of any "socialist self-correcting mechanisms." It is the result of the CCP regime's lack of alternatives. The CCP was forced to forsake class struggle and instead champion a harmonious society.
Today, the sentiments and reasoning behind Wei Jingsheng's outcry three decades ago may sound somewhat anachronistic. But in fact the buzzword "reform and liberalization" goes back to his "Fifth Modernization." Today Beijing is taking the path of reform and liberalization. But it still characterizes the reform and liberalization advocated by pro-democracy and human rights activists as heresy. If it is merely indulging in power games, that is understandable. But Beijing's leaders surely realize that it was precisely such outcries that enabled them to remain in power in order to promote reform and liberalization. The CCP has rehabilitated Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi. The latter died a nameless corpse. The CCP can hardly ignore the outcries from the grass roots during the Beijing Spring and 1989 pro-democracy movement. Without such strong and sustained outcries today's China would not exist. Peng Dehuai was in fact an insider version of Wei Jingsheng. Wei Jingsheng was conversely, a grass-roots version of Peng Dehuai.
President Ma Ying-jeou's National Day speech noted that today's Taiwan must affirm the decades long fight for democracy and human rights waged by Lei Chen with his "Free China" movement and by "party outsiders" during their "Kaohsiung Incident" movement. Hu Jintao and other leaders in Beijing may not be able to openly affirm the views of Wei Jingsheng and Hu Jia. But they must allow their outcries to echo in their hearts.
從歐巴馬想到魏京生
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.14 04:32 am
歐巴馬獲得諾貝爾和平獎，舉世譁然，連他自己都覺得受之有愧。於此同時，多年來大陸民運人士魏京生，與維權人士胡佳可能獲獎的傳說，則再次消失在人們的想像中。
若要給獎，魏京生可能較胡佳更有資格。胡佳的表現確屬不易，他是高校畢業生，是八九天安門事件後的人物；魏京生初露面時，則是北京動物園的電工，當時正值毛澤東死，中國大陸仍是文革十年浩劫造成的封閉社會，魏京生的「呼聲」，無疑是當年「北京之春」裡最令人震懾的草根吶喊。魏京生出道比胡佳早三十年，他的社會代表性也比胡佳土，比胡佳深。
「呼聲」是魏京生的用語。他在一九七八年西單民主牆上貼出的《第五個現代化：民主及其他》裡指出：當年在「粉碎四人幫」後復出的鄧小平，「應當感謝那個把他推上台的呼聲」。
呼聲，是指人民的聲音。若依魏京生的看法，一九七六年「粉碎四人幫」對毛澤東的鞭屍政變，固然是葉劍英、鄧小平等發動的黨內鬥爭；然其底層的真正動力，卻是來自人民的「呼聲」，使這場鞭屍政變取得了順天應人的正當性。
一直到今天，大陸的左派仍在說，三十年來從「粉碎四人幫」至「改革開放」的巨劇，是出於「社會主義」內在的「優異的自我糾錯機制」。然而，顯然那是「鞭屍政變」，而不是什麼「糾錯機制」。鄧小平等人是回應了人民的「呼聲」，或迫於人民的「呼聲」，而粉碎了「五人幫」（包括毛澤東）；因而，魏京生說：鄧小平等「應當感謝那個把他推上台的呼聲」。
即使在三十年後展閱魏京生的文字，如《第五個現代化：民主及其他》、《要民主還是要新的獨裁》，仍令人心靈震動。即使今日對魏京生的私行有些議論，但應當無損於他在「北京之春」的表現。當年魏是二十八歲的電工，高中畢業，剛經過文革的封閉社會；但他的吐屬，居然有盧梭、洛克的況味，不啻也預告了嗣後至今三十年的歷史走向。我們可以想像，當年一名青年電工有這種政治見解，其實在中國廣大基層民眾間亦不乏有此見解，只是他們不會或不敢像魏京生這般地表達。我們也相信，三十年後今天的中國草根基層仍是如此；不會說，不敢說，但心知肚明，也就是「呼聲」仍在迴盪。
就此以論，中國有今日，不全緣於自鄧小平至胡錦濤的「宮廷政變」；也是因彭德懷、劉少奇、林彪、胡耀邦、趙紫陽等萬千中上層人物的罹禍；更是因「三面紅旗」數千萬餓殍，及文革數億「封／資／修」被鬥者，以至一九七八「北京之春」，到一九八九天安門事件，所付出的民生苦難及因苦難而發出的「呼聲」。鐵一般的事實是：中國有今日，並非因為「社會主義」的「自我糾錯機制」，而是中共政權已經再也沒有不改弦更張的餘地，必須從「階級鬥爭」走到「和諧社會」。
回顧魏京生在三十年前的「呼聲」，其中的情緒與邏輯雖不免略有時空的落差，但其實不妨逕將「第五個現代化」一詞改作「改革開放」的今日流行語。但是，今日的北京政權，走的是「改革開放」路線，卻仍將主張「改革開放」的民運或維權人士視為異端。這若是緣於統治權謀，尚可理解；但北京主政者卻不可不知，正是這種民間「呼聲」，使當局得以繼續挺住及推動「改革開放」。中共既然漸次平反了犯顏直諫的彭德懷，和死時成為無名屍的劉少奇等；當然也不能抹煞「北京之春」至「八九民運」的民間「呼聲」。沒有這股強大而持續的「呼聲」，中國不會有今日。彭德懷其實是朝廷裡的魏京生，而魏京生則是草根的彭德懷。
馬英九總統在國慶談話中指出，台灣有今日，必須肯定從（雷震）「自由中國」，到（黨外運動）「美麗島」數十年來爭取民主人權的志士。北京當局胡錦濤等領導人，也許一時做不到在口中認同魏京生、胡佳等的見解，但應當常使這類「呼聲」在自己的心中迴盪。
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