Can There Be Such a Thing as "Accepting Bribes, but without Betraying One's Official Responsibilities?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 30, 2009
Former Chairman of the Taipei 101 Building Diana Chen has retracted her testimony. She says the 10 million NT she gave then First Lady Ah-Cheng was not a "campaign contribution." Rather it was a bribe given to the chairman of Grand Cathay Securities. Diana Chen's testimony has established that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng accepted bribes. Is Diana Chen herself guilty or innocent of bribery? Her testimony has touched off considerable controversy. Many people think that given this precedent, Ah-Bian's "Second Financial Reform" can no longer be successfully prosecuted. Below is our view of the "not in violation of official responsibilities" provision in the Civil Servants Service Act.
On September 24 the Executive Yuan pushed through draft amendments to certain provisions of the Anti-Corruption Law. They added a clause pertaining to "accepting bribes not in violation of one's official responsibilities." The law originally stipulated that civil servants who accepted bribes were guilty regardless of whether they were in violation of their official responsibilities. The law originally stipulated that those who offer bribes are only guilty if they ask the civil servant to violate his official responsibilities. If what they ask the civil servant to do is not a violation of his official responsibilities, then those who offered the bribe are not guilty.
When most people think of the "not in violation of official responsibilities" clause, they think of delays in the issuance of construction permits. They are forced to provide additional documentation, repeatedly. Their applications are rejected, repeatedly. Applicants have the right to have their projects approved. But civil servants deliberately make every effort to deny them the permits they have every right to expect. When the applicant offers money and gifts, he is in fact a victim who has been forced to protect himself. It is understandable that the old anti-corruption law did not punish the victims of such official abuse. In order to clarify official responsiblities and reduce the incentive of officials to demand bribes, the amended provisions will increase punishments. That too is understandable.
But other clauses apart from the aforementioned "rights which should have been protected" are another matter altogether. Being appointed chairman of the Taipei 101 Building was not Diana Chen's right. But some people are actually arguing that Diana Chen's appointment as chairman of the Taipei 101 Building should not be considered a violation of official responsibility. As the Ministry of Justice puts it, a "violation of official responsibility" refers to illegal conduct by civil servants. Conversely, "no violation of official responsibility" refers to lack of illegal conduct by civil servants. But this distinction is far too crude. It strikes one as some sort of ivory tower distinction cobbled up by a legal hack. It is utterly at odds with public expectations regarding fairness and justice.
Members of the public are usually forced to bribe an official because the official wields discretionary authority. Examples include the selection of sites for the construction of public buildings, land use classification in urban planning, whether to tax a particular activity, whether to assign a certain case to a certain individual. These decisions are often made by civil servants. They are often in a position to pick winners and losers from a large number of competitors. For them to pick any particular Tom, Dick, or Harry is in itself legal or illegal. But if one reduces "violation of official responsibility" to what is illegal, if one equates "legal" with "not a violation of official responsibility," then one is being deliberately obtuse.
Take re-zoning or closed bids for example. It is a civil servant's responsibility to act conscientiously, in the best interests of the nation and society. According to Civil Servants Services Act, civil servants may not use their authority "to benefit special interests." Therefore when they are involved in public policy decisions that grant them a high degree of discretion, the Administrative Procedure Act mandates a public hearing and public review. A fair assessment must be made before a decision is made. Special interests may not benefit unfairly. Only then can one say that "no violation of official responsibility" has occurred.
Now let us return to the Diana Chen bribery case. Obviously officials in charge of government-owned shares have considerable discretion regarding personnel appointments for various holding companies and securities firms. That is the only reason candidates feel compelled to offer bribes. Often officials abuse their power to extort bribes, or blindly follow orders handed down from above. They do so to benefit special interests at the expense of the nation. They bypass formal assessment processes. They neglect the welfare of the nation. This is of course a clear violation of the Civil Servants Services Act. In short, official misconduct must not be defined narrowly, on the basis of whether civil servants' conduct is or is not "legal." It must be defined broadly, on the basis of whether civil servants' conduct accords with their larger duty to the nation and society. The justice system must recognize this fact. Only then can those who lobby on behalf of re-zoning be made accountable. Only this accords with public expectations regarding social justice.
The Diana Chen case is actually quite simple. She became chairman of the Taipei 101 Building through bribery. But over the past several years, during the so-called "Second Financial Reform Program," many parasites extracted hundreds of billions of dollars in wealth from the nation's coffers. They did so with the help of civil servants who abused their authority and "violated their official responsibility." These parasites are still sitting pretty and living high off the hog. If the legal system does nothing to bring them to justice, if it allows them to continue enjoying the vast fortunes they extracted from the nations coffers by means of huge bribes, public anger will erupt during future elections. Our Ministry of Justice must re-think its definition of "not in violation of official responsibilities." It must bring it in line with the understanding of the man in the street. It must stop thinking like a legal hack.
「不違背職務行賄」豈可如此詮釋！
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.30 02:43 am
前一○一董事長陳敏薰在法庭翻供，指其給扁珍之一千萬元並非先前供稱之政治獻金，而是牟求大華證券董事長職位的行賄款。陳敏薰的供詞坐實了扁珍收受賄賂的罪行；不過，對於陳敏薰行賄之事是否有罪，則引發社會討論，許多人認為此例一開，將使得所有二次金改相關案件辦不下去。對此，我們要對公務員「不違背職務」的內涵做些剖析，也要提出我們的看法。
今年九月廿四日，行政院院會通過了貪汙治罪條例部分條文修正草案，增加了「不違背職務行賄罪」。原本的法律規範是：公務員受賄者不論其有無違背職務均為有罪，但對行賄之一方，則只有要求公務員「違背職務」而行賄的人才有罪；若是所要求的行為沒有違背公務人員職務，則行賄者無罪。
在一般人的直觀概念裡，所謂公務員不違背職務，應該是指申請建照被拖延、補件退件反覆要求等刁難情事。當事人原本即有權利該得到公務機關之核准，卻因公務人員千方百計以技術性阻擋而無法獲得其權利；這個時候，當事人送錢送禮行賄，其實是被壓迫下的自保行為。舊的貪汙治罪條例對此行為不罰人民，可以理解；而為澄清吏治減少行賄意願，新的修正條文要加以處罰，我們也可以接受。
但除了前述當事人「原本即應享權利」之情形外，其餘狀況則有不少灰色空間。一○一董座當然不是陳敏薰應得的權利，故類似指派陳敏薰為一○一董座的行為究竟該歸類為有違職務或不違職務，我們則有以下的詮釋。依法務部說帖的解說，所謂違背職務即指公務員之違法行為，而所謂不違背職務即指其不違法之行為。但這樣的定義區分太過粗疏，像是不食人間煙火的法匠論述，更與人民對公平正義之期待有相當大的出入。
其實，絕大多數需要行賄的事件，都是公務人員的裁量行為。例如，興建公共建築之場地選擇、都市計畫土地用途之劃分、某種行為要不要課稅、某一個限制性標案要委託給誰；這些都是公務員的裁量權，他們要在眾多競逐選項中挑一個，選到某甲或不選某甲無所謂合法或不合法。但是，若要依此而把「違背職務」限縮為「非法」，復將「合法」等同於「不違背職務」，那就幾近是白目詮釋了。
以土地重劃或限制性標案為例，公務人員的職務，就是盡心努力、謀求國家社會的最大福祉。此外，依公務人員服務法，公務員不可藉權力「圖他人之利益」。因此，若是牽涉到多重選擇的公共政策或裁量，總是要經過行政程序法所要求的公聽會、審查會等程序，做好了公正評估再作出選擇，沒有使特定他人獲利，才能算是不違背職務。
再回到陳敏薰行賄求官的個案。官股顯然對於許多金控、證券等事業人事有主導裁量權，當事人才有行賄之必要。如果對於有裁量取擇的案件，主管機關因為賄款、高層指示或其他誘惑，就任意將國家財產給予特定個人，完全沒有評估分析，也不見謀求國家福祉的努力，這當然就是違背公務人員服務法所明定之職務。簡言之，貪汙治罪條例中行賄者是否有責的認定，絕不應該是公務人員行為本身是否狹義「合法」，而應包含所有廣義的公務員職務。司法上一定要如此認定，才能將關說遊說土地重劃者納入追究的範圍，也才符合社會正義的期待。
陳敏薰個案討論起來還算單純，因為她現已卸任行賄所取得的一○一董事長。但在過去數年的諸多二次金改案件中，有許多靠著官方「違背職務」的行政裁量，而取得千億百億國家金控資產的社會蠹蟲，他們不但用賄賂騙得了千億財產，至今還安安穩穩地吃香喝辣。如果司法對他們也不用追究，聽任他們一輩子享受以賄賂換來的巨額國產，人民這口怨氣恐怕會在以後的大選中翻湧而出。我們的法務部實在該重新思考「不違背職務」的庶民定義，不能再沉溺在法匠思考的框架中了。
Monday, November 30, 2009
Friday, November 27, 2009
No Hit Parade for Public Grievances, No Fast Track for Political Accomplishments
No Hit Parade for Public Grievances, No Fast Track for Political Accomplishments
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 27, 2009
From his "Meat and Potatoes Economics" inititiative, to his live vote on "Ten Major Public Grievances," Premier Wu Den-yih has shown that he is indeed a "man of the people." But his call for a live vote on public grievances, and his promise to budget 500 billion NT for a "flagship project" to eliminate public grievances, is dubious, to say the least.
When a ruling administration is genuinely determined to address public grievances, it should be applauded. At least this is not a phony issue. Compared to the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution," or the "referendum to join the UN," it is far more concrete, far more real, and far more relevant to our daily lives. Getting get past empty political disputes, and getting back to fundamental issues of public welfare would be a positive development. But if government officials have no clue what the public is unhappy about, and need a live vote to determine which grievances ought to be given the highest priority, then it is unconsciously engaging in another form populist pandering.
How did this notion of a live vote on public grievances come about? After Wu Den-yih announced his "Meat and Potatoes Economics" initiative, the CEPD responded by cooking up over 200 action programs and sub-programs. To Wu Den-yih, these programs were overkill. They tried to be all things to all people. They tried to do too much. In the end nothing would get done. He asked the ministries to pick out those programs that would "impress" the public the most. This would maximize their impact. In other words, Premier Wu wanted to make a major gesture that would put a shine on his halo, that he could introduce with a great deal of fanfare. But here's the rub. Is ruling a nation really so simple? Can one really pull a few rabbits out of one's hat and leave the public gasping in astonishment?
In today's society, information is readily available. Every day the government is the target of countless petitions, street protests, and criticisms and suggestions from bloggers on the Internet. Doe the government really not know what people are unhappy about? In fact, as long as the various ministries compile statistics, and elected officials at all levels exchange a few views, or even search the Internet with Google, they will have all the information they ever need. Whatever made them consider resorting to a live vote?
The Wu cabinet may say that government policies require prioritization. A top ten list of public grievances would help prioritize these grievances. This sort of thinking is not wrong per se. But one must not allow oneself to be misled. First of all, the government must have something to show in the way of improved cross-Strait relations, increased public confidence and civic pride, and more effective managment of the economy. If instead it turns administrative routine into a political football that requires the resolution of public grievances, it has gotten its priorities reversed. Secondly, if one looks at the "potential grievances" list, one sees "salaries have not risen" and "gasoline prices continue to rise." How will the Wu Cabinet deal with these? Thirdly, the voting technique itself may result in deviations from the norm, and bias the results. They may ignore or filter out the voices of many disadvantaged elements within society. Fourthly, when the government asks various departments to resolve items on this "hit parade of public grievances," it may well crowd out many routine administrative activities. It may well create new grievances.
If one examines the public grievances that have received the most media attention lately, most of them are minor matters. They include being towed for temporarily parking next to a yellow line, government agencies passing the buck, double standards for law enforcement, and overly strict urban planning standards. These are all a far cry from the 500 billion NT flagship program Premier Wu wants to address public grievances. Clearly public discontent focuses upon bureaucratic inconveniences and systemic injustices. Day after day, these grievances accumulate. Elimination of these grievances does not require spending a lot of money. All that is required is slight adjustments in attitude, or minor improvements in procedure. A closer look reveals that what angers the public the most is governmental injustice, aggravated by bureacratic indifference. Officials turn a deaf ear and a blind eye to problems right under their noses. These problems include a lackluster economy, low public morale, a failure to recover one penny from the Ah-Bian corruption case, years of police inaction in response to rampant telephone fraud, and an inability to catch the culprits responsible for long term damage to the environment. These grievances may not be on the top ten list. But who can say that they are not angry knots in everyone's gut?
Governance must put the public first. The administration's intentions are good. But addressing public grievances does not require spending a lot of money. It does not require making top ten lists. It merely requires addressing the attitudes of officials at all levels of government. Civil servants must be the first to demonstrate a spirit of service, and a willingness to address people's problems. That is the ultimate solution for the elimination of grievances . A record of political accomplishments cannot be created overnight. Grievances require measured solutions. Otherwise, the Wu Cabinet's 500 billion NT budget to address public grievances, could give rise to a public firestorm that merely provokes new grievances.
民怨沒有排行榜，政績豈有速成班？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.27 03:04 am
從倡議「庶民經濟」到票選「十大民怨」，閣揆吳敦義展現了他接近民意、體貼庶民的一面。但他要求以「票選」方式來排列民怨，並聲稱將編列五千億元「旗艦計畫」來消除民怨，卻有商榷餘地。
主政者有心消除民怨，值得給予肯定，至少這不是一個假議題；比起「正名制憲」、「入聯公投」等，都是更具體、真切、攸關民生的事。台灣能擺脫空泛的政治爭議，回歸民生基本面，這是正向的發展。問題在，如果政府官員竟似不知民眾有何怨怒，而要用「票選」來決定優先次序，恐怕也不知不覺落入了另一種民粹的窠臼。
票選民怨的源起是，吳敦義提出「庶民經濟」概念後，經建會相應制定了兩百多項的行動方案及子計畫；吳揆認為其內容鋪天蓋地、包山包海，「面面俱到，等於面面不到」，因而要求各部會擬訂最讓民眾感到「驚艷」的方案，才能收到耳目一新的效果。亦即，吳揆需要的，是一個能夠即時打響、擦亮內閣招牌的大動作。但弔詭之處也在這裡：治國若想要用三招兩式就讓民眾一新耳目，天下有這麼簡單的事嗎？
現代社會資訊如此發達，政府每日收到的陳情、街上進行的示威抗議、網路部落格上各式的批評和建議，皆已多到難以勝數，政府能說不知道民怨在哪裡嗎？事實上，只要各部會做個統計，與各級民代稍微交換意見，乃至上網用谷歌搜尋，都有足夠資料可資參佐，怎麼會用到「票選」這種手法呢？
吳內閣也許會說，施政有先後，列出十大民怨，執行上更能分出輕重緩急的優先次序。這種想法，不能說錯，卻必須注意其誤導效果。第一，倘若在兩岸關係、人民的信心與光榮感，及經濟治理等大格局上沒有成績，反而將原本在日常行政中應當解決的民怨變成政治主題，恐將捨本逐末。第二，看「候選民怨」項目中，「薪水不漲」及「汽油漲價」也是選項，吳內閣如何救治此類民怨？第三，票選的形式，本身即可能產生偏離及過濾效果，主動隔離掉許多更弱勢民眾的聲音。第四，當政府要求各部門傾力解決排行榜上的民怨，極可能對其他例常行政業務造成排擠，反而在新的空窗地帶滋生新民怨。
檢視近日見諸媒體的民意，各界反映最多的民怨，許多其實都是小事。諸如，黃線臨時停車被拖吊、行政機關踢皮球、警察執法兩套標準，以及都市計畫太過苛擾等；這些，和吳揆準備以五千億元旗艦計畫消民怨的構想，似乎大相逕庭。很顯然，民眾的不滿主要集中在政府的不便民和執法不公，日復一日便形成了積怨；要消除這部分的民怨，並不需要花大錢，只要制度稍作調整或執行態度稍加改善即可。深一層看，人民更大的怨懟其實是，明明大家都看見的問題或不公不義的現象，政府卻裝聾作啞，諸如：經濟不見起色、社會士氣低沉、扁案贓款至今追不回分文、詐騙電話擾民多年警方卻束手無策、台灣環境土地長期遭到汙染卻抓不到元兇……。這些問題，也許未必會登上十大民怨排行榜，但誰能說它不是纏繞在每個人心頭的頑固怨結？
政府治理軌道能回歸以人民為先，出發點值得肯定。但要治民怨，其實不必花大錢，更不能只看排行榜，而是該先「治心」：各級政府官員、所有公務人員都該先拿出服務的精神，認真面對人民的問題，那才是消除民怨的終極法門。政績很難速成，民怨需等量對待；否則，吳內閣若真的列出一個五千億的「治民怨預算」，那麼這個動作掀起的爭議恐將引發另一個新的民怨。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 27, 2009
From his "Meat and Potatoes Economics" inititiative, to his live vote on "Ten Major Public Grievances," Premier Wu Den-yih has shown that he is indeed a "man of the people." But his call for a live vote on public grievances, and his promise to budget 500 billion NT for a "flagship project" to eliminate public grievances, is dubious, to say the least.
When a ruling administration is genuinely determined to address public grievances, it should be applauded. At least this is not a phony issue. Compared to the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution," or the "referendum to join the UN," it is far more concrete, far more real, and far more relevant to our daily lives. Getting get past empty political disputes, and getting back to fundamental issues of public welfare would be a positive development. But if government officials have no clue what the public is unhappy about, and need a live vote to determine which grievances ought to be given the highest priority, then it is unconsciously engaging in another form populist pandering.
How did this notion of a live vote on public grievances come about? After Wu Den-yih announced his "Meat and Potatoes Economics" initiative, the CEPD responded by cooking up over 200 action programs and sub-programs. To Wu Den-yih, these programs were overkill. They tried to be all things to all people. They tried to do too much. In the end nothing would get done. He asked the ministries to pick out those programs that would "impress" the public the most. This would maximize their impact. In other words, Premier Wu wanted to make a major gesture that would put a shine on his halo, that he could introduce with a great deal of fanfare. But here's the rub. Is ruling a nation really so simple? Can one really pull a few rabbits out of one's hat and leave the public gasping in astonishment?
In today's society, information is readily available. Every day the government is the target of countless petitions, street protests, and criticisms and suggestions from bloggers on the Internet. Doe the government really not know what people are unhappy about? In fact, as long as the various ministries compile statistics, and elected officials at all levels exchange a few views, or even search the Internet with Google, they will have all the information they ever need. Whatever made them consider resorting to a live vote?
The Wu cabinet may say that government policies require prioritization. A top ten list of public grievances would help prioritize these grievances. This sort of thinking is not wrong per se. But one must not allow oneself to be misled. First of all, the government must have something to show in the way of improved cross-Strait relations, increased public confidence and civic pride, and more effective managment of the economy. If instead it turns administrative routine into a political football that requires the resolution of public grievances, it has gotten its priorities reversed. Secondly, if one looks at the "potential grievances" list, one sees "salaries have not risen" and "gasoline prices continue to rise." How will the Wu Cabinet deal with these? Thirdly, the voting technique itself may result in deviations from the norm, and bias the results. They may ignore or filter out the voices of many disadvantaged elements within society. Fourthly, when the government asks various departments to resolve items on this "hit parade of public grievances," it may well crowd out many routine administrative activities. It may well create new grievances.
If one examines the public grievances that have received the most media attention lately, most of them are minor matters. They include being towed for temporarily parking next to a yellow line, government agencies passing the buck, double standards for law enforcement, and overly strict urban planning standards. These are all a far cry from the 500 billion NT flagship program Premier Wu wants to address public grievances. Clearly public discontent focuses upon bureaucratic inconveniences and systemic injustices. Day after day, these grievances accumulate. Elimination of these grievances does not require spending a lot of money. All that is required is slight adjustments in attitude, or minor improvements in procedure. A closer look reveals that what angers the public the most is governmental injustice, aggravated by bureacratic indifference. Officials turn a deaf ear and a blind eye to problems right under their noses. These problems include a lackluster economy, low public morale, a failure to recover one penny from the Ah-Bian corruption case, years of police inaction in response to rampant telephone fraud, and an inability to catch the culprits responsible for long term damage to the environment. These grievances may not be on the top ten list. But who can say that they are not angry knots in everyone's gut?
Governance must put the public first. The administration's intentions are good. But addressing public grievances does not require spending a lot of money. It does not require making top ten lists. It merely requires addressing the attitudes of officials at all levels of government. Civil servants must be the first to demonstrate a spirit of service, and a willingness to address people's problems. That is the ultimate solution for the elimination of grievances . A record of political accomplishments cannot be created overnight. Grievances require measured solutions. Otherwise, the Wu Cabinet's 500 billion NT budget to address public grievances, could give rise to a public firestorm that merely provokes new grievances.
民怨沒有排行榜，政績豈有速成班？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.27 03:04 am
從倡議「庶民經濟」到票選「十大民怨」，閣揆吳敦義展現了他接近民意、體貼庶民的一面。但他要求以「票選」方式來排列民怨，並聲稱將編列五千億元「旗艦計畫」來消除民怨，卻有商榷餘地。
主政者有心消除民怨，值得給予肯定，至少這不是一個假議題；比起「正名制憲」、「入聯公投」等，都是更具體、真切、攸關民生的事。台灣能擺脫空泛的政治爭議，回歸民生基本面，這是正向的發展。問題在，如果政府官員竟似不知民眾有何怨怒，而要用「票選」來決定優先次序，恐怕也不知不覺落入了另一種民粹的窠臼。
票選民怨的源起是，吳敦義提出「庶民經濟」概念後，經建會相應制定了兩百多項的行動方案及子計畫；吳揆認為其內容鋪天蓋地、包山包海，「面面俱到，等於面面不到」，因而要求各部會擬訂最讓民眾感到「驚艷」的方案，才能收到耳目一新的效果。亦即，吳揆需要的，是一個能夠即時打響、擦亮內閣招牌的大動作。但弔詭之處也在這裡：治國若想要用三招兩式就讓民眾一新耳目，天下有這麼簡單的事嗎？
現代社會資訊如此發達，政府每日收到的陳情、街上進行的示威抗議、網路部落格上各式的批評和建議，皆已多到難以勝數，政府能說不知道民怨在哪裡嗎？事實上，只要各部會做個統計，與各級民代稍微交換意見，乃至上網用谷歌搜尋，都有足夠資料可資參佐，怎麼會用到「票選」這種手法呢？
吳內閣也許會說，施政有先後，列出十大民怨，執行上更能分出輕重緩急的優先次序。這種想法，不能說錯，卻必須注意其誤導效果。第一，倘若在兩岸關係、人民的信心與光榮感，及經濟治理等大格局上沒有成績，反而將原本在日常行政中應當解決的民怨變成政治主題，恐將捨本逐末。第二，看「候選民怨」項目中，「薪水不漲」及「汽油漲價」也是選項，吳內閣如何救治此類民怨？第三，票選的形式，本身即可能產生偏離及過濾效果，主動隔離掉許多更弱勢民眾的聲音。第四，當政府要求各部門傾力解決排行榜上的民怨，極可能對其他例常行政業務造成排擠，反而在新的空窗地帶滋生新民怨。
檢視近日見諸媒體的民意，各界反映最多的民怨，許多其實都是小事。諸如，黃線臨時停車被拖吊、行政機關踢皮球、警察執法兩套標準，以及都市計畫太過苛擾等；這些，和吳揆準備以五千億元旗艦計畫消民怨的構想，似乎大相逕庭。很顯然，民眾的不滿主要集中在政府的不便民和執法不公，日復一日便形成了積怨；要消除這部分的民怨，並不需要花大錢，只要制度稍作調整或執行態度稍加改善即可。深一層看，人民更大的怨懟其實是，明明大家都看見的問題或不公不義的現象，政府卻裝聾作啞，諸如：經濟不見起色、社會士氣低沉、扁案贓款至今追不回分文、詐騙電話擾民多年警方卻束手無策、台灣環境土地長期遭到汙染卻抓不到元兇……。這些問題，也許未必會登上十大民怨排行榜，但誰能說它不是纏繞在每個人心頭的頑固怨結？
政府治理軌道能回歸以人民為先，出發點值得肯定。但要治民怨，其實不必花大錢，更不能只看排行榜，而是該先「治心」：各級政府官員、所有公務人員都該先拿出服務的精神，認真面對人民的問題，那才是消除民怨的終極法門。政績很難速成，民怨需等量對待；否則，吳內閣若真的列出一個五千億的「治民怨預算」，那麼這個動作掀起的爭議恐將引發另一個新的民怨。
Thursday, November 26, 2009
Maintaining the Status Quo: The Happy Medium for Taipei and Beijing
Maintaining the Status Quo: The Happy Medium for Taipei and Beijing
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 26, 2009
As Beijing interacts with Taipei, two factions have emerged, "reunification hawks" and "reunification doves."
Recent examples of doves include Zhang Nianchi, head of the Shanghai East Asia Research Institute. In an article in the "China Review" Zhang said, "Peaceful development ... will take a long time ... the mainland must not think in terms of quick fixes. It must not oversimplify matters or become impatient. It must not perform a few good deeds and expect an immediate reward. That would be a failure to understand the meaning of peaceful development." Zhang Nianchi said, "We must ... alter certain attitudes formed over the past six decades or even the past century." This is a "dove" speaking. Recent examples of hawks include PLA Major General Luo Yuan. Luo publicly stated that upon election Ma Ying-jeou has "sacrificed reunification for the sake of gradual secession." Luo said Ma's "no unification / no independence / no use of force" is in fact "peaceful secession." This is a "hawk" speaking. This shows that the other side has indeed held "certain attitudes" for the past sixty years.
The two may have their differences. But they appear to share the same opinion of President Ma Ying-jeou. As noted above, Luo Yuan interprets President Ma's "three no's" as "peaceful secession." His remarks expressed dissatisfaction. Actually, dove spokesman Zhang Nianchi was even more explicit. Zhang referred to Ma Ying-jeou as "Chiang Ching-kuo Redux." He concluded therefore that Ma would neither "sell out Taiwan" nor "achieve reunification."
Zhang and Luo shared the same assessment of public sentiment on Taiwan. Luo Yuan pointed out that the KMT may be in power, but that the DPP still has about 40% public support. The mainland has demonstrated a great deal of goodwill towards Taiwan. But support for reunification has not increased, and support for independence has not decreased. He said "Permanently maintaining the status quo amounts to peaceful secession." Zhang Nian-chi's view of public sentiment on Taiwan was that "Although rapid changes (in cross-Strait relations) is an historical necessity, it is perceived as happening too fast ... therefore those hoping to achieve independence feel despair, and those hoping to preserve the status quo feel panic."
Zhang and Luo have similar assessments of public sentiment on Taiwan. So why have two schools of thought emerged, the "hawks" and the "doves?" To borrow a phrase from Zhang Nianchi, it is because the hawks remain trapped in the "crisis management" mentality of the past. For them non-reunification constitutes a crisis. The doves on the other hand, have adopted an "opportunity management" mentality. For them peaceful development constitutes an opportunity.
Zhang says President Ma will not "achieve reunification." Luo says President Ma's "three noes" amounts to "peaceful secession." These are their assessments of President Ma. Based on their assessments of public sentiment on Taiwan, we know they understand President Ma's policies and thinking. In fact, given the system of democracy on Taiwan at this stage, such a position is unavoidable. No Republic of China leader can possibly ignore public opinion. Public sentiment makes the reappearance of another Taiwan independence demagogue such as Lee Teng-hui or Chen Shui-bian in the ROC impossible. Crisis Management has seen to that. On the other hand, the appearance of a president who advocates immediate reunification is also impossible. Opportunity Management on Taiwan has seen to that. Therefore, Beijing must realize that whether one is talking about "crisis management" or "opportunity management," the final arbiter of cross-Strait policy on Taiwan is mainstream public opinion. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian lost power when they lost popular support. Ma Ying-jeou too must march in lockstep with public opinion. If Beijing is able to realize that the final say rests in the hands of the public on Taiwan, it will arrive at its own conclusions about whether it should support the hawks or the doves.
Zhang Nianchi's statement reminds one of former ARATS chairman Wang Daohan. Twelve years ago, in 1997, Wang proclaimed that "we are now moving towards One China." He said "One China does not mean the People's Republic of China. Nor does it mean the Republic of China. It means a One China created by compatriots on both sides of the Strait." He pointed out that "This so-called one China, is a yet to be reunified China, but one which both sides are moving toward." Wang's reasoning was published the year after the missile crisis and presidential election. Today his "crisis management" would be referred to as "opportunity management." Today his so-called "China that has yet to be reunified, but which is still One China," or his "1992 Consensus / One China, Different Interpretations," or "maintaining the status quo," also represent different ways of transforming "crises" into "opportunities." That is why the United Daily News has long advocated "replacing goal orientation with process orientation." Doves want to change crises into opportunities. Hawks on the other hand, want to change opportunities into crises.
Cross-Strait relations have traveled a bumpy road with many detours. There have been gains and setbacks. Maintaining the status quo means maintaining opportunities and avoiding crises. As Zhang Nianchi noted, Taipei and Beijing must not oversimplify matters or act impetuously. They must not retreat in the face of setbacks. They must have the wisdom to "know when to hold," and the vigilance to "know when to fold."
維持現狀是兩岸最佳停利停損點
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.26 03:49 am
大陸方面對兩岸政治互動的進程，似乎出現了「主急派」與「主緩派」的分歧。
最近的事例是：一、上海東亞研究所所長章念馳在《中國評論》發表專文指出：「和平發展……這是很長的階段……大陸不可有急功好利的思想，不可簡單化和急躁化，做了幾天善事就要回報，那就是對和平發展的膚淺認識。」章念馳說：「要……改變過去六十年乃至一百年形成的某種意識。」這是「主緩派」。二、解放軍少將羅援公開演講則表示，馬英九當選後，「以犧牲統一為代價／以細微分裂為目的」，所提「不統／不獨／不武」，其實是「和平分裂」。這是「主急派」，言下所顯露的可謂正是對岸六十年來一直存在的「某種意識」。
二人雖有歧見，但對馬英九總統的評論似有交集。正如前述，主急派羅援將馬總統的「三不」解釋為「和平分裂」，而語透不耐；其實，主緩派章念馳在文中對馬總統的相關評論，則較羅援更露骨。章說：馬英九是「蔣經國第二」，因此注定不會「出賣台灣」，也注定不會「成就統一」。
除此，章羅二人對台灣的社會民情亦有相似的評估。羅援指出：國民黨主政，但民進黨仍有四成左右的支持率。大陸雖然釋放許多善意，但支持統一的未上升，支持獨立的也沒有下降。他又說：「永久維持現狀就是和平分裂。」章念馳對台灣社會民情的觀察則是：「（兩岸關係）迅速的改變雖是歷史的必然，但似乎來得太快……讓嚮往台獨者感到絕望，讓要求維持現狀者感到慌張。」
章羅二人對台灣的主政者及社會民情既有相似的評量，卻何以會出現「主急／主緩」的不同主張？借用章念馳的語彙來說，這是因為主急派仍自陷於過去那種「危機管理」（不統一就是危機）的心態，而主緩派則已將心態調整為「機遇管理」（和平發展就是機遇）。
章指馬總統不可能「成就統一」，羅指馬總統的「三不」是「和平分裂」。這是他們對馬總統的評量；但由前述他們對台灣社會民情的見解，可知他們也明白馬總統的政策與思維，其實是在台灣民主體制中現階段的必然立場，任何中華民國的主政者皆沒有脫離民意的可能性。由於民意的彰顯與影響，中華民國已不可能反覆到再出現如李登輝、陳水扁那般操作台獨的總統（「危機管理」已經做到），但也不可能在現階段出現一個主張立即統一的總統（台灣也有台灣的「機遇管理」）。所以，北京方面應當知道，不論是「危機管理」或「機遇管理」，在台灣主導兩岸關係的主體始終是主流民意；李登輝、陳水扁因失去民意支持而失勢，馬英九也必須與民意並肩而行。倘若北京能認清最後的話語權是掌握在台灣人民手中，自會對主急派或主緩派作出高下軒輊的評量。
章念馳的發言，令人想到前海協會長汪道涵。汪在十二年前（一九九七年）就發表「現在進行式的一個中國」。他說：「一個中國並不等於中華人民共和國，也不等於中華民國，而是兩岸同胞共同締造的一個中國。」並指出：「所謂一個中國，應是一個尚未統一的中國，共同邁向統一的中國。」汪道涵的此一論述，發表在總統大選飛彈危機的次一年，從今天的角度看，可謂當年已將「危機管理」調整為「機遇管理」；而如今所謂「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」、「九二共識／一中各表」，或「維持現狀」，皆亦可說是將「危機」轉化成「機遇」的不同途徑。這也就是本報歷來主張的「以過程論取代目的論」。準此以論，主緩派是主張化危機為機遇，而主急派則不啻是反其道而行，欲化機遇為危機了！
兩岸關係確實是曲折反覆，損益互見。維持現狀，就是維持機遇、避免危機。再借用章念馳的話：兩岸皆不要簡單化躁進化，要有「停利」的理智；亦不要一遇矛盾就埋怨後退，須有「停損」的警覺。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 26, 2009
As Beijing interacts with Taipei, two factions have emerged, "reunification hawks" and "reunification doves."
Recent examples of doves include Zhang Nianchi, head of the Shanghai East Asia Research Institute. In an article in the "China Review" Zhang said, "Peaceful development ... will take a long time ... the mainland must not think in terms of quick fixes. It must not oversimplify matters or become impatient. It must not perform a few good deeds and expect an immediate reward. That would be a failure to understand the meaning of peaceful development." Zhang Nianchi said, "We must ... alter certain attitudes formed over the past six decades or even the past century." This is a "dove" speaking. Recent examples of hawks include PLA Major General Luo Yuan. Luo publicly stated that upon election Ma Ying-jeou has "sacrificed reunification for the sake of gradual secession." Luo said Ma's "no unification / no independence / no use of force" is in fact "peaceful secession." This is a "hawk" speaking. This shows that the other side has indeed held "certain attitudes" for the past sixty years.
The two may have their differences. But they appear to share the same opinion of President Ma Ying-jeou. As noted above, Luo Yuan interprets President Ma's "three no's" as "peaceful secession." His remarks expressed dissatisfaction. Actually, dove spokesman Zhang Nianchi was even more explicit. Zhang referred to Ma Ying-jeou as "Chiang Ching-kuo Redux." He concluded therefore that Ma would neither "sell out Taiwan" nor "achieve reunification."
Zhang and Luo shared the same assessment of public sentiment on Taiwan. Luo Yuan pointed out that the KMT may be in power, but that the DPP still has about 40% public support. The mainland has demonstrated a great deal of goodwill towards Taiwan. But support for reunification has not increased, and support for independence has not decreased. He said "Permanently maintaining the status quo amounts to peaceful secession." Zhang Nian-chi's view of public sentiment on Taiwan was that "Although rapid changes (in cross-Strait relations) is an historical necessity, it is perceived as happening too fast ... therefore those hoping to achieve independence feel despair, and those hoping to preserve the status quo feel panic."
Zhang and Luo have similar assessments of public sentiment on Taiwan. So why have two schools of thought emerged, the "hawks" and the "doves?" To borrow a phrase from Zhang Nianchi, it is because the hawks remain trapped in the "crisis management" mentality of the past. For them non-reunification constitutes a crisis. The doves on the other hand, have adopted an "opportunity management" mentality. For them peaceful development constitutes an opportunity.
Zhang says President Ma will not "achieve reunification." Luo says President Ma's "three noes" amounts to "peaceful secession." These are their assessments of President Ma. Based on their assessments of public sentiment on Taiwan, we know they understand President Ma's policies and thinking. In fact, given the system of democracy on Taiwan at this stage, such a position is unavoidable. No Republic of China leader can possibly ignore public opinion. Public sentiment makes the reappearance of another Taiwan independence demagogue such as Lee Teng-hui or Chen Shui-bian in the ROC impossible. Crisis Management has seen to that. On the other hand, the appearance of a president who advocates immediate reunification is also impossible. Opportunity Management on Taiwan has seen to that. Therefore, Beijing must realize that whether one is talking about "crisis management" or "opportunity management," the final arbiter of cross-Strait policy on Taiwan is mainstream public opinion. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian lost power when they lost popular support. Ma Ying-jeou too must march in lockstep with public opinion. If Beijing is able to realize that the final say rests in the hands of the public on Taiwan, it will arrive at its own conclusions about whether it should support the hawks or the doves.
Zhang Nianchi's statement reminds one of former ARATS chairman Wang Daohan. Twelve years ago, in 1997, Wang proclaimed that "we are now moving towards One China." He said "One China does not mean the People's Republic of China. Nor does it mean the Republic of China. It means a One China created by compatriots on both sides of the Strait." He pointed out that "This so-called one China, is a yet to be reunified China, but one which both sides are moving toward." Wang's reasoning was published the year after the missile crisis and presidential election. Today his "crisis management" would be referred to as "opportunity management." Today his so-called "China that has yet to be reunified, but which is still One China," or his "1992 Consensus / One China, Different Interpretations," or "maintaining the status quo," also represent different ways of transforming "crises" into "opportunities." That is why the United Daily News has long advocated "replacing goal orientation with process orientation." Doves want to change crises into opportunities. Hawks on the other hand, want to change opportunities into crises.
Cross-Strait relations have traveled a bumpy road with many detours. There have been gains and setbacks. Maintaining the status quo means maintaining opportunities and avoiding crises. As Zhang Nianchi noted, Taipei and Beijing must not oversimplify matters or act impetuously. They must not retreat in the face of setbacks. They must have the wisdom to "know when to hold," and the vigilance to "know when to fold."
維持現狀是兩岸最佳停利停損點
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.26 03:49 am
大陸方面對兩岸政治互動的進程，似乎出現了「主急派」與「主緩派」的分歧。
最近的事例是：一、上海東亞研究所所長章念馳在《中國評論》發表專文指出：「和平發展……這是很長的階段……大陸不可有急功好利的思想，不可簡單化和急躁化，做了幾天善事就要回報，那就是對和平發展的膚淺認識。」章念馳說：「要……改變過去六十年乃至一百年形成的某種意識。」這是「主緩派」。二、解放軍少將羅援公開演講則表示，馬英九當選後，「以犧牲統一為代價／以細微分裂為目的」，所提「不統／不獨／不武」，其實是「和平分裂」。這是「主急派」，言下所顯露的可謂正是對岸六十年來一直存在的「某種意識」。
二人雖有歧見，但對馬英九總統的評論似有交集。正如前述，主急派羅援將馬總統的「三不」解釋為「和平分裂」，而語透不耐；其實，主緩派章念馳在文中對馬總統的相關評論，則較羅援更露骨。章說：馬英九是「蔣經國第二」，因此注定不會「出賣台灣」，也注定不會「成就統一」。
除此，章羅二人對台灣的社會民情亦有相似的評估。羅援指出：國民黨主政，但民進黨仍有四成左右的支持率。大陸雖然釋放許多善意，但支持統一的未上升，支持獨立的也沒有下降。他又說：「永久維持現狀就是和平分裂。」章念馳對台灣社會民情的觀察則是：「（兩岸關係）迅速的改變雖是歷史的必然，但似乎來得太快……讓嚮往台獨者感到絕望，讓要求維持現狀者感到慌張。」
章羅二人對台灣的主政者及社會民情既有相似的評量，卻何以會出現「主急／主緩」的不同主張？借用章念馳的語彙來說，這是因為主急派仍自陷於過去那種「危機管理」（不統一就是危機）的心態，而主緩派則已將心態調整為「機遇管理」（和平發展就是機遇）。
章指馬總統不可能「成就統一」，羅指馬總統的「三不」是「和平分裂」。這是他們對馬總統的評量；但由前述他們對台灣社會民情的見解，可知他們也明白馬總統的政策與思維，其實是在台灣民主體制中現階段的必然立場，任何中華民國的主政者皆沒有脫離民意的可能性。由於民意的彰顯與影響，中華民國已不可能反覆到再出現如李登輝、陳水扁那般操作台獨的總統（「危機管理」已經做到），但也不可能在現階段出現一個主張立即統一的總統（台灣也有台灣的「機遇管理」）。所以，北京方面應當知道，不論是「危機管理」或「機遇管理」，在台灣主導兩岸關係的主體始終是主流民意；李登輝、陳水扁因失去民意支持而失勢，馬英九也必須與民意並肩而行。倘若北京能認清最後的話語權是掌握在台灣人民手中，自會對主急派或主緩派作出高下軒輊的評量。
章念馳的發言，令人想到前海協會長汪道涵。汪在十二年前（一九九七年）就發表「現在進行式的一個中國」。他說：「一個中國並不等於中華人民共和國，也不等於中華民國，而是兩岸同胞共同締造的一個中國。」並指出：「所謂一個中國，應是一個尚未統一的中國，共同邁向統一的中國。」汪道涵的此一論述，發表在總統大選飛彈危機的次一年，從今天的角度看，可謂當年已將「危機管理」調整為「機遇管理」；而如今所謂「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」、「九二共識／一中各表」，或「維持現狀」，皆亦可說是將「危機」轉化成「機遇」的不同途徑。這也就是本報歷來主張的「以過程論取代目的論」。準此以論，主緩派是主張化危機為機遇，而主急派則不啻是反其道而行，欲化機遇為危機了！
兩岸關係確實是曲折反覆，損益互見。維持現狀，就是維持機遇、避免危機。再借用章念馳的話：兩岸皆不要簡單化躁進化，要有「停利」的理智；亦不要一遇矛盾就埋怨後退，須有「停損」的警覺。
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Beware the Signs of Long-Term Unemployment
Beware the Signs of Long-Term Unemployment
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 25, 2009
The unemployment rate has fallen for two months in a row. In October it dropped below 6%. Government heads at all levels breathed a huge sigh of relief. But officials must not get too excited. Because the overall unemployment figures conceal a deteriorating long-term unemployment picture. Various short term government employment measures must be modified as soon as possible to avoid a rapid increase in long-term unemployment. This constitutes a major challenge to continued economic development.
According to the latest government figures, 653,000 people were unemployed in October. That is 20,000 less than were unemployed at the peak. Whatever the reasons for the fall in unemployment, this is good news indeed. Unfortunately the average duration of unemployment has not fallen accordingly. On the contrary, it increased last month to 28.3 weeks, the highest since 2004. This far exceeds the 27 weeks that most economists consider "long-term unemployment." The number of unemployed has decreased, but those unemployed are taking even longer to find work.
Another figure is even more interesting. Long term unemployment, i.e., being unemployed for over six months, already accounts for 40% of total unemployment. This is even higher than in the US, which faces double-digit unemployment. In the US, 15 million people are currently unemployed. About one-third of them are long-term unemployed, the highest since World War II. For the past five months, over 10,000 have been unemployed for over one year. Long-term unemployment on Taiwan is already taking shape, and may well increase.
Let us examine the October data for these long-term unemployed. In terms of age, they are mainly 30 to 34 years old, and in the prime of their life. Over half of this group has been unemployed for over six months. Young people in the prime of their life are normally the backbone of the job market. Long-term unemployment is a major human resources warning sign. In terms of educational level, long term unemployment among vocational school graduates and specialists is much higher than average. This means technical and vocational skills are no longer a guarantee of employment. In terms of cause of unemployment, the main reason is downsizing in the workplace, or the company going out of business. This means that the economic recovery is M-shaped. The fittest may have survived the financial tsunami. But those with their heads below water have perished. These employees are unable to return to the workplace.
Long-term unemployment has different causes than the weak global economy, plant closures caused by cyclical tightening, and frictional unemployment. It reflects a growing gap between labor supply and market demand. This is the structural unemployment that scholars and experts have urged the government to address. This type of unemployment does not improve during an economic recovery, but deteriorates during an economic recession. The current Great Depression has made long-term unemployment manifest. The previous century sowed the seeds for today's long-term unemployment. But the government always responds short-term. This leads time and again to economic cycles, and our current plight.
Failure to solve the problem of long-term unemployment will result in a long chain of consequences. First, the unemployment cycle will lengthen. The job skills of the long-term unemployed may degenerate. They may become demoralized, and become permanently unemployed. The work experience they accumulated will evaporate. In some fields it may create a human resources faultline. Increased long-term unemployment will increase the cost of unemployment benefits. The unemployed may turn to other forms of social relief. The result will be a heavier burden on the nation's finances, or reduced benefits for other needy parties. Neither is desirable. Long-term unemployment may weaken peoples' willingness to work and their motivation to learn. Over time, Taiwan's highly-trained manpower, which gave it a global economic advantage, may also evaporate.
Therefore, the government must not underestimate the problem of long-term unemployment. It must not naively assume that once the economy recovers, all will be well. It may moderate. But if no long-term countermeasures are initiated, it will not be eradicated. Look at the government's measures for combatting unemployment. Consider its "immediate work start plan" which provides subsidies to employers. Consider its "short-term employment plan," which provides public sector jobs. They do indeed have a short-term impact. But should limited resources be expended on such efforts? The government must do its homework before deciding, and not just focus on short-term decreases in unemployment. The government expects to spend over 30 billion yuan over the next four years on a combination of short-term and long-term "employment promotion" measures. It hopes to lower the unemployment rate to 3 percent in 2012. This hodgepodge of programs includes university-industry cooperation, vocational training, enhancing the success rate for employment "matchmaking," wage subsidies, and assistance to new businesses. The results may well turn out to be "Everything is included, but nothing works," and may well do nothing to solve the problem of structural unemployment. President Ma's promise to reduce the unemployment rate to three per cent, is sheer fantasy.
就業路迢迢：注意失業期延長的警訊
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.25 03:22 am
失業率連續兩個月下降，十月更降到百分之六以下，著實令政府各級首長大大鬆一口氣。然而，政府官員小小高興一下就好，因為在總體失業統計之下，隱而未現的長期失業問題正在惡化，政府各項救急救短的促進就業政策必須儘速調整重心，以免快速集結的長期失業大軍，形成經濟發展的大難題。
根據主計處最新資料，十月有六十五萬三千人失業，已較最高峰時期少了近二萬人，不管失業減少的原因如何，這確是喜訊一樁。不過，平均失業周數並未同步縮短，上月反而拉長為廿八點三周，是民國九十三年以來最長，遠超過一般經濟學家定義「長期失業」所用的廿七周，代表失業人數雖下降，但待業找工作的期間更長了。
另一數據更值得注意，目前失業期間超過半年的長期失業者，已占總失業人口的四成，比正面臨二位數失業率危機的美國還高（美國有一千五百萬人失業，約三分之一屬長期失業者，是二次大戰以來最高），而失業逾一年者更已連續五個月突破十萬人，台灣的長期失業大軍已然成形，甚至可能繼續擴大。
用十月的資料描述這群長期失業大軍，依年齡看，主要集中在卅到卅四歲的青壯族群，這一年齡層的失業者近半數已失業逾半年，青壯人口原是就業市場的主力，卻深陷長期失業困境，實是人力資源一大警訊；依教育程度，高職及專科的長期失業者比率也遠高於平均水準，顯示以「一技之長」為號召的技職教育，似乎不再是就業的保證；依失業原因，還是以工作場所業務緊縮或歇業為最多，這代表景氣復甦也出現Ｍ型化，體質強健者挺過金融海嘯後更強，但滅頂者再無重生之機，員工也無法重返職場。
長期失業的成因，與景氣衰退、工廠歇業緊縮導致的循環性、摩擦性失業不同，反映的是人力供給與職場需求之間的落差擴大，也就是學者專家不斷提醒政府要下苦功因應的結構性失業；此型失業的特色是無法隨著景氣復甦而快速好轉，卻會因為經濟衰退而惡化，一如這波大衰退，就讓長期失業現象顯露無遺。只是，現今的長期失業問題早在上一世紀末就已種下結構性失業的惡因，但因政府總是著眼於短期對策，以致經過一次又一次的經濟循環，終致今天的局面。
長期失業的問題不解，將會帶來環環相扣的後遺症。首先，失業周期拉長，長期失業者的技能可能退化、意志消沉，並可能墮入永久性失業，其原累積的工作經驗也跟著退場，而在某些領域形成人力斷層；另方面，長期失業的惡化，不只將增加既有失業給付支出，淡出職場者還可能轉而尋求其他社會救濟，其結果不是財政負擔惡化，就是排擠到其他弱勢族群的資源，而兩者都非吾人所願；再者，長期失業現象的持續，還可能降低勞動意願、學習動機，久而久之，台灣向以優質人力資源傲稱於世的經濟優勢，也可能跟著流失了。
因此，政府不能小看長期失業的問題，更別天真地以為景氣回春，一切就能迎刃而解；或許，它可能會稍稍緩和，但若沒有長期抗戰的對策，就不可能根除。檢視政府現有各項搶救失業對策，例如補助雇主僱用的「立即上工」計畫、釋出公部門職缺的「短期就業措施」等，確實發揮了短期救急的效果，但是否還要再將有限的資源續用於此，政府應做好研究再決定，而非僅著眼於短期失業率的下降；至於結合短中長期措施的「促進就業方案」，政府預計四年動用三百多億元，讓失業率在民國一○一年降到百分之三，但這個大雜燴的方案，從產學合作、強化職業訓練、提升就業媒合成功率、提供工資補貼、協助創業等無所不包，但成果也可能是「樣樣有，樣樣鬆」，還是沒有解決結構性失業問題；失業率要降到馬總統承諾的百分之三，更是天方夜譚。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 25, 2009
Summary: The unemployment rate has fallen for two months in a row. In October it dropped below 6%. Government heads at all levels breathed a huge sigh of relief. But officials must not get too excited. Because the overall unemployment figures conceal a deteriorating long-term unemployment picture. Various short term government employment measures must be modified as soon as possible to avoid a rapid increase in long-term unemployment. This constitutes a major challenge to continued economic development.
Full Text below:
The unemployment rate has fallen for two months in a row. In October it dropped below 6%. Government heads at all levels breathed a huge sigh of relief. But officials must not get too excited. Because the overall unemployment figures conceal a deteriorating long-term unemployment picture. Various short term government employment measures must be modified as soon as possible to avoid a rapid increase in long-term unemployment. This constitutes a major challenge to continued economic development.
According to the latest government figures, 653,000 people were unemployed in October. That is 20,000 less than were unemployed at the peak. Whatever the reasons for the fall in unemployment, this is good news indeed. Unfortunately the average duration of unemployment has not fallen accordingly. On the contrary, it increased last month to 28.3 weeks, the highest since 2004. This far exceeds the 27 weeks that most economists consider "long-term unemployment." The number of unemployed has decreased, but those unemployed are taking even longer to find work.
Another figure is even more interesting. Long term unemployment, i.e., being unemployed for over six months, already accounts for 40% of total unemployment. This is even higher than in the US, which faces double-digit unemployment. In the US, 15 million people are currently unemployed. About one-third of them are long-term unemployed, the highest since World War II. For the past five months, over 10,000 have been unemployed for over one year. Long-term unemployment on Taiwan is already taking shape, and may well increase.
Let us examine the October data for these long-term unemployed. In terms of age, they are mainly 30 to 34 years old, and in the prime of their life. Over half of this group has been unemployed for over six months. Young people in the prime of their life are normally the backbone of the job market. Long-term unemployment is a major human resources warning sign. In terms of educational level, long term unemployment among vocational school graduates and specialists is much higher than average. This means technical and vocational skills are no longer a guarantee of employment. In terms of cause of unemployment, the main reason is downsizing in the workplace, or the company going out of business. This means that the economic recovery is M-shaped. The fittest may have survived the financial tsunami. But those with their heads below water have perished. These employees are unable to return to the workplace.
Long-term unemployment has different causes than the weak global economy, plant closures caused by cyclical tightening, and frictional unemployment. It reflects a growing gap between labor supply and market demand. This is the structural unemployment that scholars and experts have urged the government to address. This type of unemployment does not improve during an economic recovery, but deteriorates during an economic recession. The current Great Depression has made long-term unemployment manifest. The previous century sowed the seeds for today's long-term unemployment. But the government always responds short-term. This leads time and again to economic cycles, and our current plight.
Failure to solve the problem of long-term unemployment will result in a long chain of consequences. First, the unemployment cycle will lengthen. The job skills of the long-term unemployed may degenerate. They may become demoralized, and become permanently unemployed. The work experience they accumulated will evaporate. In some fields it may create a human resources faultline. Increased long-term unemployment will increase the cost of unemployment benefits. The unemployed may turn to other forms of social relief. The result will be a heavier burden on the nation's finances, or reduced benefits for other needy parties. Neither is desirable. Long-term unemployment may weaken peoples' willingness to work and their motivation to learn. Over time, Taiwan's highly-trained manpower, which gave it a global economic advantage, may also evaporate.
Therefore, the government must not underestimate the problem of long-term unemployment. It must not naively assume that once the economy recovers, all will be well. It may moderate. But if no long-term countermeasures are initiated, it will not be eradicated. Look at the government's measures for combatting unemployment. Consider its "immediate work start plan" which provides subsidies to employers. Consider its "short-term employment plan," which provides public sector jobs. They do indeed have a short-term impact. But should limited resources be expended on such efforts? The government must do its homework before deciding, and not just focus on short-term decreases in unemployment. The government expects to spend over 30 billion yuan over the next four years on a combination of short-term and long-term "employment promotion" measures. It hopes to lower the unemployment rate to 3 percent in 2012. This hodgepodge of programs includes university-industry cooperation, vocational training, enhancing the success rate for employment "matchmaking," wage subsidies, and assistance to new businesses. The results may well turn out to be "Everything is included, but nothing works," and may well do nothing to solve the problem of structural unemployment. President Ma's promise to reduce the unemployment rate to three per cent, is sheer fantasy.
就業路迢迢：注意失業期延長的警訊
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.25 03:22 am
失業率連續兩個月下降，十月更降到百分之六以下，著實令政府各級首長大大鬆一口氣。然而，政府官員小小高興一下就好，因為在總體失業統計之下，隱而未現的長期失業問題正在惡化，政府各項救急救短的促進就業政策必須儘速調整重心，以免快速集結的長期失業大軍，形成經濟發展的大難題。
根據主計處最新資料，十月有六十五萬三千人失業，已較最高峰時期少了近二萬人，不管失業減少的原因如何，這確是喜訊一樁。不過，平均失業周數並未同步縮短，上月反而拉長為廿八點三周，是民國九十三年以來最長，遠超過一般經濟學家定義「長期失業」所用的廿七周，代表失業人數雖下降，但待業找工作的期間更長了。
另一數據更值得注意，目前失業期間超過半年的長期失業者，已占總失業人口的四成，比正面臨二位數失業率危機的美國還高（美國有一千五百萬人失業，約三分之一屬長期失業者，是二次大戰以來最高），而失業逾一年者更已連續五個月突破十萬人，台灣的長期失業大軍已然成形，甚至可能繼續擴大。
用十月的資料描述這群長期失業大軍，依年齡看，主要集中在卅到卅四歲的青壯族群，這一年齡層的失業者近半數已失業逾半年，青壯人口原是就業市場的主力，卻深陷長期失業困境，實是人力資源一大警訊；依教育程度，高職及專科的長期失業者比率也遠高於平均水準，顯示以「一技之長」為號召的技職教育，似乎不再是就業的保證；依失業原因，還是以工作場所業務緊縮或歇業為最多，這代表景氣復甦也出現Ｍ型化，體質強健者挺過金融海嘯後更強，但滅頂者再無重生之機，員工也無法重返職場。
長期失業的成因，與景氣衰退、工廠歇業緊縮導致的循環性、摩擦性失業不同，反映的是人力供給與職場需求之間的落差擴大，也就是學者專家不斷提醒政府要下苦功因應的結構性失業；此型失業的特色是無法隨著景氣復甦而快速好轉，卻會因為經濟衰退而惡化，一如這波大衰退，就讓長期失業現象顯露無遺。只是，現今的長期失業問題早在上一世紀末就已種下結構性失業的惡因，但因政府總是著眼於短期對策，以致經過一次又一次的經濟循環，終致今天的局面。
長期失業的問題不解，將會帶來環環相扣的後遺症。首先，失業周期拉長，長期失業者的技能可能退化、意志消沉，並可能墮入永久性失業，其原累積的工作經驗也跟著退場，而在某些領域形成人力斷層；另方面，長期失業的惡化，不只將增加既有失業給付支出，淡出職場者還可能轉而尋求其他社會救濟，其結果不是財政負擔惡化，就是排擠到其他弱勢族群的資源，而兩者都非吾人所願；再者，長期失業現象的持續，還可能降低勞動意願、學習動機，久而久之，台灣向以優質人力資源傲稱於世的經濟優勢，也可能跟著流失了。
因此，政府不能小看長期失業的問題，更別天真地以為景氣回春，一切就能迎刃而解；或許，它可能會稍稍緩和，但若沒有長期抗戰的對策，就不可能根除。檢視政府現有各項搶救失業對策，例如補助雇主僱用的「立即上工」計畫、釋出公部門職缺的「短期就業措施」等，確實發揮了短期救急的效果，但是否還要再將有限的資源續用於此，政府應做好研究再決定，而非僅著眼於短期失業率的下降；至於結合短中長期措施的「促進就業方案」，政府預計四年動用三百多億元，讓失業率在民國一○一年降到百分之三，但這個大雜燴的方案，從產學合作、強化職業訓練、提升就業媒合成功率、提供工資補貼、協助創業等無所不包，但成果也可能是「樣樣有，樣樣鬆」，還是沒有解決結構性失業問題；失業率要降到馬總統承諾的百分之三，更是天方夜譚。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 25, 2009
The unemployment rate has fallen for two months in a row. In October it dropped below 6%. Government heads at all levels breathed a huge sigh of relief. But officials must not get too excited. Because the overall unemployment figures conceal a deteriorating long-term unemployment picture. Various short term government employment measures must be modified as soon as possible to avoid a rapid increase in long-term unemployment. This constitutes a major challenge to continued economic development.
According to the latest government figures, 653,000 people were unemployed in October. That is 20,000 less than were unemployed at the peak. Whatever the reasons for the fall in unemployment, this is good news indeed. Unfortunately the average duration of unemployment has not fallen accordingly. On the contrary, it increased last month to 28.3 weeks, the highest since 2004. This far exceeds the 27 weeks that most economists consider "long-term unemployment." The number of unemployed has decreased, but those unemployed are taking even longer to find work.
Another figure is even more interesting. Long term unemployment, i.e., being unemployed for over six months, already accounts for 40% of total unemployment. This is even higher than in the US, which faces double-digit unemployment. In the US, 15 million people are currently unemployed. About one-third of them are long-term unemployed, the highest since World War II. For the past five months, over 10,000 have been unemployed for over one year. Long-term unemployment on Taiwan is already taking shape, and may well increase.
Let us examine the October data for these long-term unemployed. In terms of age, they are mainly 30 to 34 years old, and in the prime of their life. Over half of this group has been unemployed for over six months. Young people in the prime of their life are normally the backbone of the job market. Long-term unemployment is a major human resources warning sign. In terms of educational level, long term unemployment among vocational school graduates and specialists is much higher than average. This means technical and vocational skills are no longer a guarantee of employment. In terms of cause of unemployment, the main reason is downsizing in the workplace, or the company going out of business. This means that the economic recovery is M-shaped. The fittest may have survived the financial tsunami. But those with their heads below water have perished. These employees are unable to return to the workplace.
Long-term unemployment has different causes than the weak global economy, plant closures caused by cyclical tightening, and frictional unemployment. It reflects a growing gap between labor supply and market demand. This is the structural unemployment that scholars and experts have urged the government to address. This type of unemployment does not improve during an economic recovery, but deteriorates during an economic recession. The current Great Depression has made long-term unemployment manifest. The previous century sowed the seeds for today's long-term unemployment. But the government always responds short-term. This leads time and again to economic cycles, and our current plight.
Failure to solve the problem of long-term unemployment will result in a long chain of consequences. First, the unemployment cycle will lengthen. The job skills of the long-term unemployed may degenerate. They may become demoralized, and become permanently unemployed. The work experience they accumulated will evaporate. In some fields it may create a human resources faultline. Increased long-term unemployment will increase the cost of unemployment benefits. The unemployed may turn to other forms of social relief. The result will be a heavier burden on the nation's finances, or reduced benefits for other needy parties. Neither is desirable. Long-term unemployment may weaken peoples' willingness to work and their motivation to learn. Over time, Taiwan's highly-trained manpower, which gave it a global economic advantage, may also evaporate.
Therefore, the government must not underestimate the problem of long-term unemployment. It must not naively assume that once the economy recovers, all will be well. It may moderate. But if no long-term countermeasures are initiated, it will not be eradicated. Look at the government's measures for combatting unemployment. Consider its "immediate work start plan" which provides subsidies to employers. Consider its "short-term employment plan," which provides public sector jobs. They do indeed have a short-term impact. But should limited resources be expended on such efforts? The government must do its homework before deciding, and not just focus on short-term decreases in unemployment. The government expects to spend over 30 billion yuan over the next four years on a combination of short-term and long-term "employment promotion" measures. It hopes to lower the unemployment rate to 3 percent in 2012. This hodgepodge of programs includes university-industry cooperation, vocational training, enhancing the success rate for employment "matchmaking," wage subsidies, and assistance to new businesses. The results may well turn out to be "Everything is included, but nothing works," and may well do nothing to solve the problem of structural unemployment. President Ma's promise to reduce the unemployment rate to three per cent, is sheer fantasy.
就業路迢迢：注意失業期延長的警訊
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.25 03:22 am
失業率連續兩個月下降，十月更降到百分之六以下，著實令政府各級首長大大鬆一口氣。然而，政府官員小小高興一下就好，因為在總體失業統計之下，隱而未現的長期失業問題正在惡化，政府各項救急救短的促進就業政策必須儘速調整重心，以免快速集結的長期失業大軍，形成經濟發展的大難題。
根據主計處最新資料，十月有六十五萬三千人失業，已較最高峰時期少了近二萬人，不管失業減少的原因如何，這確是喜訊一樁。不過，平均失業周數並未同步縮短，上月反而拉長為廿八點三周，是民國九十三年以來最長，遠超過一般經濟學家定義「長期失業」所用的廿七周，代表失業人數雖下降，但待業找工作的期間更長了。
另一數據更值得注意，目前失業期間超過半年的長期失業者，已占總失業人口的四成，比正面臨二位數失業率危機的美國還高（美國有一千五百萬人失業，約三分之一屬長期失業者，是二次大戰以來最高），而失業逾一年者更已連續五個月突破十萬人，台灣的長期失業大軍已然成形，甚至可能繼續擴大。
用十月的資料描述這群長期失業大軍，依年齡看，主要集中在卅到卅四歲的青壯族群，這一年齡層的失業者近半數已失業逾半年，青壯人口原是就業市場的主力，卻深陷長期失業困境，實是人力資源一大警訊；依教育程度，高職及專科的長期失業者比率也遠高於平均水準，顯示以「一技之長」為號召的技職教育，似乎不再是就業的保證；依失業原因，還是以工作場所業務緊縮或歇業為最多，這代表景氣復甦也出現Ｍ型化，體質強健者挺過金融海嘯後更強，但滅頂者再無重生之機，員工也無法重返職場。
長期失業的成因，與景氣衰退、工廠歇業緊縮導致的循環性、摩擦性失業不同，反映的是人力供給與職場需求之間的落差擴大，也就是學者專家不斷提醒政府要下苦功因應的結構性失業；此型失業的特色是無法隨著景氣復甦而快速好轉，卻會因為經濟衰退而惡化，一如這波大衰退，就讓長期失業現象顯露無遺。只是，現今的長期失業問題早在上一世紀末就已種下結構性失業的惡因，但因政府總是著眼於短期對策，以致經過一次又一次的經濟循環，終致今天的局面。
長期失業的問題不解，將會帶來環環相扣的後遺症。首先，失業周期拉長，長期失業者的技能可能退化、意志消沉，並可能墮入永久性失業，其原累積的工作經驗也跟著退場，而在某些領域形成人力斷層；另方面，長期失業的惡化，不只將增加既有失業給付支出，淡出職場者還可能轉而尋求其他社會救濟，其結果不是財政負擔惡化，就是排擠到其他弱勢族群的資源，而兩者都非吾人所願；再者，長期失業現象的持續，還可能降低勞動意願、學習動機，久而久之，台灣向以優質人力資源傲稱於世的經濟優勢，也可能跟著流失了。
因此，政府不能小看長期失業的問題，更別天真地以為景氣回春，一切就能迎刃而解；或許，它可能會稍稍緩和，但若沒有長期抗戰的對策，就不可能根除。檢視政府現有各項搶救失業對策，例如補助雇主僱用的「立即上工」計畫、釋出公部門職缺的「短期就業措施」等，確實發揮了短期救急的效果，但是否還要再將有限的資源續用於此，政府應做好研究再決定，而非僅著眼於短期失業率的下降；至於結合短中長期措施的「促進就業方案」，政府預計四年動用三百多億元，讓失業率在民國一○一年降到百分之三，但這個大雜燴的方案，從產學合作、強化職業訓練、提升就業媒合成功率、提供工資補貼、協助創業等無所不包，但成果也可能是「樣樣有，樣樣鬆」，還是沒有解決結構性失業問題；失業率要降到馬總統承諾的百分之三，更是天方夜譚。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 25, 2009
Summary: The unemployment rate has fallen for two months in a row. In October it dropped below 6%. Government heads at all levels breathed a huge sigh of relief. But officials must not get too excited. Because the overall unemployment figures conceal a deteriorating long-term unemployment picture. Various short term government employment measures must be modified as soon as possible to avoid a rapid increase in long-term unemployment. This constitutes a major challenge to continued economic development.
Full Text below:
The unemployment rate has fallen for two months in a row. In October it dropped below 6%. Government heads at all levels breathed a huge sigh of relief. But officials must not get too excited. Because the overall unemployment figures conceal a deteriorating long-term unemployment picture. Various short term government employment measures must be modified as soon as possible to avoid a rapid increase in long-term unemployment. This constitutes a major challenge to continued economic development.
According to the latest government figures, 653,000 people were unemployed in October. That is 20,000 less than were unemployed at the peak. Whatever the reasons for the fall in unemployment, this is good news indeed. Unfortunately the average duration of unemployment has not fallen accordingly. On the contrary, it increased last month to 28.3 weeks, the highest since 2004. This far exceeds the 27 weeks that most economists consider "long-term unemployment." The number of unemployed has decreased, but those unemployed are taking even longer to find work.
Another figure is even more interesting. Long term unemployment, i.e., being unemployed for over six months, already accounts for 40% of total unemployment. This is even higher than in the US, which faces double-digit unemployment. In the US, 15 million people are currently unemployed. About one-third of them are long-term unemployed, the highest since World War II. For the past five months, over 10,000 have been unemployed for over one year. Long-term unemployment on Taiwan is already taking shape, and may well increase.
Let us examine the October data for these long-term unemployed. In terms of age, they are mainly 30 to 34 years old, and in the prime of their life. Over half of this group has been unemployed for over six months. Young people in the prime of their life are normally the backbone of the job market. Long-term unemployment is a major human resources warning sign. In terms of educational level, long term unemployment among vocational school graduates and specialists is much higher than average. This means technical and vocational skills are no longer a guarantee of employment. In terms of cause of unemployment, the main reason is downsizing in the workplace, or the company going out of business. This means that the economic recovery is M-shaped. The fittest may have survived the financial tsunami. But those with their heads below water have perished. These employees are unable to return to the workplace.
Long-term unemployment has different causes than the weak global economy, plant closures caused by cyclical tightening, and frictional unemployment. It reflects a growing gap between labor supply and market demand. This is the structural unemployment that scholars and experts have urged the government to address. This type of unemployment does not improve during an economic recovery, but deteriorates during an economic recession. The current Great Depression has made long-term unemployment manifest. The previous century sowed the seeds for today's long-term unemployment. But the government always responds short-term. This leads time and again to economic cycles, and our current plight.
Failure to solve the problem of long-term unemployment will result in a long chain of consequences. First, the unemployment cycle will lengthen. The job skills of the long-term unemployed may degenerate. They may become demoralized, and become permanently unemployed. The work experience they accumulated will evaporate. In some fields it may create a human resources faultline. Increased long-term unemployment will increase the cost of unemployment benefits. The unemployed may turn to other forms of social relief. The result will be a heavier burden on the nation's finances, or reduced benefits for other needy parties. Neither is desirable. Long-term unemployment may weaken peoples' willingness to work and their motivation to learn. Over time, Taiwan's highly-trained manpower, which gave it a global economic advantage, may also evaporate.
Therefore, the government must not underestimate the problem of long-term unemployment. It must not naively assume that once the economy recovers, all will be well. It may moderate. But if no long-term countermeasures are initiated, it will not be eradicated. Look at the government's measures for combatting unemployment. Consider its "immediate work start plan" which provides subsidies to employers. Consider its "short-term employment plan," which provides public sector jobs. They do indeed have a short-term impact. But should limited resources be expended on such efforts? The government must do its homework before deciding, and not just focus on short-term decreases in unemployment. The government expects to spend over 30 billion yuan over the next four years on a combination of short-term and long-term "employment promotion" measures. It hopes to lower the unemployment rate to 3 percent in 2012. This hodgepodge of programs includes university-industry cooperation, vocational training, enhancing the success rate for employment "matchmaking," wage subsidies, and assistance to new businesses. The results may well turn out to be "Everything is included, but nothing works," and may well do nothing to solve the problem of structural unemployment. President Ma's promise to reduce the unemployment rate to three per cent, is sheer fantasy.
就業路迢迢：注意失業期延長的警訊
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.25 03:22 am
失業率連續兩個月下降，十月更降到百分之六以下，著實令政府各級首長大大鬆一口氣。然而，政府官員小小高興一下就好，因為在總體失業統計之下，隱而未現的長期失業問題正在惡化，政府各項救急救短的促進就業政策必須儘速調整重心，以免快速集結的長期失業大軍，形成經濟發展的大難題。
根據主計處最新資料，十月有六十五萬三千人失業，已較最高峰時期少了近二萬人，不管失業減少的原因如何，這確是喜訊一樁。不過，平均失業周數並未同步縮短，上月反而拉長為廿八點三周，是民國九十三年以來最長，遠超過一般經濟學家定義「長期失業」所用的廿七周，代表失業人數雖下降，但待業找工作的期間更長了。
另一數據更值得注意，目前失業期間超過半年的長期失業者，已占總失業人口的四成，比正面臨二位數失業率危機的美國還高（美國有一千五百萬人失業，約三分之一屬長期失業者，是二次大戰以來最高），而失業逾一年者更已連續五個月突破十萬人，台灣的長期失業大軍已然成形，甚至可能繼續擴大。
用十月的資料描述這群長期失業大軍，依年齡看，主要集中在卅到卅四歲的青壯族群，這一年齡層的失業者近半數已失業逾半年，青壯人口原是就業市場的主力，卻深陷長期失業困境，實是人力資源一大警訊；依教育程度，高職及專科的長期失業者比率也遠高於平均水準，顯示以「一技之長」為號召的技職教育，似乎不再是就業的保證；依失業原因，還是以工作場所業務緊縮或歇業為最多，這代表景氣復甦也出現Ｍ型化，體質強健者挺過金融海嘯後更強，但滅頂者再無重生之機，員工也無法重返職場。
長期失業的成因，與景氣衰退、工廠歇業緊縮導致的循環性、摩擦性失業不同，反映的是人力供給與職場需求之間的落差擴大，也就是學者專家不斷提醒政府要下苦功因應的結構性失業；此型失業的特色是無法隨著景氣復甦而快速好轉，卻會因為經濟衰退而惡化，一如這波大衰退，就讓長期失業現象顯露無遺。只是，現今的長期失業問題早在上一世紀末就已種下結構性失業的惡因，但因政府總是著眼於短期對策，以致經過一次又一次的經濟循環，終致今天的局面。
長期失業的問題不解，將會帶來環環相扣的後遺症。首先，失業周期拉長，長期失業者的技能可能退化、意志消沉，並可能墮入永久性失業，其原累積的工作經驗也跟著退場，而在某些領域形成人力斷層；另方面，長期失業的惡化，不只將增加既有失業給付支出，淡出職場者還可能轉而尋求其他社會救濟，其結果不是財政負擔惡化，就是排擠到其他弱勢族群的資源，而兩者都非吾人所願；再者，長期失業現象的持續，還可能降低勞動意願、學習動機，久而久之，台灣向以優質人力資源傲稱於世的經濟優勢，也可能跟著流失了。
因此，政府不能小看長期失業的問題，更別天真地以為景氣回春，一切就能迎刃而解；或許，它可能會稍稍緩和，但若沒有長期抗戰的對策，就不可能根除。檢視政府現有各項搶救失業對策，例如補助雇主僱用的「立即上工」計畫、釋出公部門職缺的「短期就業措施」等，確實發揮了短期救急的效果，但是否還要再將有限的資源續用於此，政府應做好研究再決定，而非僅著眼於短期失業率的下降；至於結合短中長期措施的「促進就業方案」，政府預計四年動用三百多億元，讓失業率在民國一○一年降到百分之三，但這個大雜燴的方案，從產學合作、強化職業訓練、提升就業媒合成功率、提供工資補貼、協助創業等無所不包，但成果也可能是「樣樣有，樣樣鬆」，還是沒有解決結構性失業問題；失業率要降到馬總統承諾的百分之三，更是天方夜譚。
Monday, November 23, 2009
The Legislature: A Coliseum in which Political Appointees are Fed to the Lions
The Legislature: A Coliseum in which Political Appointees are Fed to the Lions
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 23, 2009
Last week, two very different scenes played themselve out in the legislature. In the first scene, Foreign Minister Shen Lu-hsun was questioned by legislators. Like a praying mantis, he held forth with eloquence, heedless of personal danger. Without batting an eyelash, he parried every attack launched against him. In the second scene, Liu Tsui-rong, Vice President of the Academia Sinica, was blasted by legislators to where she could no longer lift her head and look them in the eyes. When she returned to the podium and spoke of submitting her resignation in April for health reasons, she burst into tears.
Neither scene was that unusual. When first entering the political arena, political appointees unfamiliar with the culture of the legislature may react like either Shen Lu-hsiung or Liu Tsui-rong. They may decide to go head to head with the legislators, or they may allow themselves to be humiliated in silence. These two scenes account for the bulk of our recent media reports. The public as a whole hasn't reacted strongly to such reports. Few realize that Republic of China political appointees have long risen and fallen, or even perished as a result of such unprofessional treatment within the legislature. Both ruling and opposition party legislators accuse Executive Yuan of having contempt for the legislature. But they themselves trample over the dignity of others during their questioning. Their vicious conduct is part of a preemptive effort to enhance the "status" of members of the legislature.
Legislators who engage in such vicious conduct during questioning demonstrate a lack respect for others. As a result, they are going to find it difficult to get respect from others. They are in the habit of blaming others. But they forget that collectively they are a group of people with very low public credibility. When the legislature reviews legislation, such as US beef imports, what the public sees is two weeks of wheelspinning. Ruling and opposition party legislators, in their effort to oversee the government's loosening of limits on the importation of bone-in beef and organ meats, have proposed a Food Safety Law. The result however, has been legislative gridlock. The public has no way of knowing just which ruling and opposition legislators proposed which bill, not to mention which bill is more desirable.
A Food Safety Law involving US beef is highly controversial. The "Academia Sinica Council Abolition Ordinance" should have been passed twenty years ago. There ought to be no controversy over this. And yet Liu Tsui-rong was blasted by the legislative committees responsible for reviewing the abolition of the ordinance, and forced to silently step down from the podium. Even more astonishingly, the issue the legislators blasted her over had nothing to do with the Academia Sinica Council. The legislators were clearly ignorant of the function of the Academia Sinica Council. Nor did their questioning have anything to do with Academia Sinica administrative matters. On the contrary, their questions were over U.S. beef imports. Legislators were asking the Academia Sinica to provide research on U.S. beef and the possible impacts they might have on public health. For some reason, Liu Tsiu-rong's response "I will take the suggestion under advisement" sent the legislator into a rage. It was hard to understand why he was so angry. When Liu Tsui-rong, an expert on the history of Taiwan, spoke of her unsuccessful attempt to resign half a year ago, she was moved to tears. All those who saw her then are surely asking themselves, "Why must an esteemed Vice President of the Academia Sinica have to put up with such insulting treatment by an ignorant legislator?"
Each year, the executive branch reviews and catalogs outdated laws, and recommends their abolition. Usually there is little controversy, and their recommendations clear the Legislative Yuan without resistance. The Academia Sinica Council Abolition Ordinance was last submitted to the Legislative Yuan eight years ago. But because the session was interrupted, the bill was returned. Why did such a non-controversial bill fail to clear the third reading? Time has passed, and what happened is now uncertain. But it may have been because the issue was unglamorous. Legislators couldn't be bothered to review it. It may have been that the bill was too controversial. Legislators may have batted it back and forth a few times, then conveniently forgotten all about it. In any case, regardless of which committees legislators sit on, regardless of whether they are reviewing the budget or a bill, they always chase after the trendiest issues, to protect themselves and their bills. Nonsense irrelevant to the budget makes headlines. As a result, over the past two or three weeks, U.S. beef imports and the Sun Chung-yu scandal have dominated the Legislative Yuan.
It is said that Director of Health Yang Chi-liang efforts on behalf of U.S. beef were not worth it. Yang, who fought with legislators, was never driven to tears. But he probably never imagined that the Vice President of the Academia Sinica would end up as the legislature's whipping boy. Shen Lu-hsiung was unaware of how vicious legislators could be. Yang Chi-liang, on the other hand, was fully aware. Having entered the bullring, he could only lower his head and charge. He mocked himself, saying he should have brought along a white paper spelling out every policy measure, that he should have carried a briefcase filled with them at all times. As a political appointee, he had been long prepared to resign at any time, but only after speaking his peace.
When did Taiwan, specifically the ROC Legislature, become a place where one is not allowed to speak one's peace? Years ago University of Hong Kong President Chu Ching-wu, wary of the reunification vs. independence controversy on Taiwan, and how it placed undue emphasis on being born into the "right" group, declined an invitation to come to Taiwan, but instead went to Hong Kong. Over the past six months, the Academia Sinica has been urging Harvard scholar David Wang to return to Taiwan. David Wang has refused. Given the images of Liu Tsui-rong driven to tears in the legislature, no wonder David Wang refused to return. Any scholar with a backbone would probably resign. Do not underestimate the tears of political appointees. When the Legislative Yuan becomes a haven for the ignorant, who amuse themselves by trampling over the dignity of political appointees, the legislature will become the primary cause of a political disaster. The government will be unable to recruit people of talent. What sort of future will Taiwan have then?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.23
社論－國會已淪為踐踏政務官尊嚴的鬥場
本報訊
上周，堂堂國會出現兩幕落差極大的場景：第一幕，外交部次長沈呂巡備詢，猶如一隻奮不顧身的螳螂，張開雙臂，口才便給，神色毫不退讓地擋住立委的砲火；第二幕，中研院副院長劉翠溶被立委罵到抬不起頭來，重新被請回備詢台，談到自己今年四月即因健康因素請辭，就忍不住悲從中來，淚灑國會。
這兩幕場景一點都不特殊，初入政壇，對粗糙的國會議事文化不熟悉或太熟悉的政務官，都可能像沈呂巡或劉翠溶，不是和立委硬槓，就是委屈往自己肚子裡吞。這兩幕場景，在媒體報導中，佔了相當大的版面，舉國民眾卻沒有太多迴響，沒有人意識到：中華民國政務官長久以來，就是在這麼粗魯無文、毫無專業可言的國會議事波濤中，載浮載沉，起起落落，甚或滅頂。當朝野立委動輒指責行政機關不尊重國會的同時，他們以踩著他人尊嚴的問政言行，窮兇惡極的嘴臉，企圖抬高所謂國會議員的「地位」，先聲奪人。
憑藉惡聲問政的立委，既不懂得尊重他人，就難獲得他人的尊敬，只是他們習慣性地指責別人，忘記自己才是民意信賴度相對低的一群人。談到審查法案，民眾看到的是立法院為了美國牛，院會已經癱瘓兩周，毫無進展，朝野立委當初為監督政府開放帶骨美國牛和內臟等提出的食品衛生管理法，卡著動彈不得，全國民眾當然無從得知朝野立委到底提出了什麼版本？遑論哪一個版本比較合乎需要。
食品衛生管理法，涉及美國牛肉，算是爭議性大的法案，中研院一個早在廿年前就該廢止的「中研院評議會條例」，總該沒爭議了吧？莫名其妙的是，劉翠溶就在立法院相關委員會審查該條例廢止案時被罵到黯然步下備詢台；更誇張的是，立委罵她的議題既非中研院評議會（立委肯定不知道中研院評議會是什麼玩意兒），亦非任何與中研院行政管理相關事項，相反的，竟還是為了美國牛！立委要求中研院要做美國牛與國人健康的研究，劉翠溶一句，「會將建議帶回去。」竟讓質詢的立委惱羞成怒，很難理解這位立委到底生什麼氣？但以研究台灣史為專業的劉翠溶，講到自己辭職半年還不能離開時哽咽掉淚，所有看到這一幕的人都想問一句話，「堂堂中研院副院長，為什麼要受這種無知立委的氣！」
每年，行政機關都會匯整過時不合用之法律，提出法律廢止案，因為無爭議，通常都能順利在立法院通關，上次中研院評議會條例廢止案提送立法院是八年前的事，卻因為立院屆期不連續而撤回，當年，這個無爭議法案為什麼沒順利三讀？時間久遠不可考，想來因為沒什麼話題性，立委連排定審查的意願都無，或者，其他爭議法案太熱，足堪立委大打出手好幾場，順理成章的就把這個案子給遺忘了。不論如何，立委不論出席什麼會議，不論審查的是預算還是法案，永遠追著熱門話題跑，以確保自己與法案、預算風馬牛不相及的廢話能夠在媒體曝光。於是乎，美國牛與孫仲瑜在過去二、三周裡，佔據立法院每一個角落。
曾經說為美國牛鞠躬盡瘁並不值得的衛生署長楊志良，大概想都想不到，他力戰國會群雄，沒被罵哭，反倒是讓中研院副院長代為受氣。如果說沈呂巡是不知立委有多兇狠的螳螂，楊志良就是深知立委很兇狠的蠻牛，既進了鬥牛場，就只能悶著頭衝。他調侃自己要隨身攜帶一份萬言書，把各種政策說得清清楚楚，以備隨時提起公事包就走人，身為政務官，他早做好隨時可以辭職下台的準備─但是，話一定要講清楚。
台灣，尤其是國會，不知什麼時候竟變成話都不能講清楚的競技場！香港大學校長朱經武，當年因為畏於分統分獨還要講究出身血緣的台灣政治文化，而婉拒邀請，轉赴香港；最近半年，中研院力邀哈佛學者王德威返台，王德威一直不肯點頭。看到劉翠溶淚灑國會這一幕，不要說王德威不肯回來，所有還有點讀書人骨氣的學者，大概都要掛冠求去。不要小看政務官之淚，當立法院成為無知者的天堂，放言高論以踐踏政務官尊嚴為樂，國會將成為政治最大的災難之源，政府留不住也延攬不了人才，台灣的政治又有何前景可言！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 23, 2009
Last week, two very different scenes played themselve out in the legislature. In the first scene, Foreign Minister Shen Lu-hsun was questioned by legislators. Like a praying mantis, he held forth with eloquence, heedless of personal danger. Without batting an eyelash, he parried every attack launched against him. In the second scene, Liu Tsui-rong, Vice President of the Academia Sinica, was blasted by legislators to where she could no longer lift her head and look them in the eyes. When she returned to the podium and spoke of submitting her resignation in April for health reasons, she burst into tears.
Neither scene was that unusual. When first entering the political arena, political appointees unfamiliar with the culture of the legislature may react like either Shen Lu-hsiung or Liu Tsui-rong. They may decide to go head to head with the legislators, or they may allow themselves to be humiliated in silence. These two scenes account for the bulk of our recent media reports. The public as a whole hasn't reacted strongly to such reports. Few realize that Republic of China political appointees have long risen and fallen, or even perished as a result of such unprofessional treatment within the legislature. Both ruling and opposition party legislators accuse Executive Yuan of having contempt for the legislature. But they themselves trample over the dignity of others during their questioning. Their vicious conduct is part of a preemptive effort to enhance the "status" of members of the legislature.
Legislators who engage in such vicious conduct during questioning demonstrate a lack respect for others. As a result, they are going to find it difficult to get respect from others. They are in the habit of blaming others. But they forget that collectively they are a group of people with very low public credibility. When the legislature reviews legislation, such as US beef imports, what the public sees is two weeks of wheelspinning. Ruling and opposition party legislators, in their effort to oversee the government's loosening of limits on the importation of bone-in beef and organ meats, have proposed a Food Safety Law. The result however, has been legislative gridlock. The public has no way of knowing just which ruling and opposition legislators proposed which bill, not to mention which bill is more desirable.
A Food Safety Law involving US beef is highly controversial. The "Academia Sinica Council Abolition Ordinance" should have been passed twenty years ago. There ought to be no controversy over this. And yet Liu Tsui-rong was blasted by the legislative committees responsible for reviewing the abolition of the ordinance, and forced to silently step down from the podium. Even more astonishingly, the issue the legislators blasted her over had nothing to do with the Academia Sinica Council. The legislators were clearly ignorant of the function of the Academia Sinica Council. Nor did their questioning have anything to do with Academia Sinica administrative matters. On the contrary, their questions were over U.S. beef imports. Legislators were asking the Academia Sinica to provide research on U.S. beef and the possible impacts they might have on public health. For some reason, Liu Tsiu-rong's response "I will take the suggestion under advisement" sent the legislator into a rage. It was hard to understand why he was so angry. When Liu Tsui-rong, an expert on the history of Taiwan, spoke of her unsuccessful attempt to resign half a year ago, she was moved to tears. All those who saw her then are surely asking themselves, "Why must an esteemed Vice President of the Academia Sinica have to put up with such insulting treatment by an ignorant legislator?"
Each year, the executive branch reviews and catalogs outdated laws, and recommends their abolition. Usually there is little controversy, and their recommendations clear the Legislative Yuan without resistance. The Academia Sinica Council Abolition Ordinance was last submitted to the Legislative Yuan eight years ago. But because the session was interrupted, the bill was returned. Why did such a non-controversial bill fail to clear the third reading? Time has passed, and what happened is now uncertain. But it may have been because the issue was unglamorous. Legislators couldn't be bothered to review it. It may have been that the bill was too controversial. Legislators may have batted it back and forth a few times, then conveniently forgotten all about it. In any case, regardless of which committees legislators sit on, regardless of whether they are reviewing the budget or a bill, they always chase after the trendiest issues, to protect themselves and their bills. Nonsense irrelevant to the budget makes headlines. As a result, over the past two or three weeks, U.S. beef imports and the Sun Chung-yu scandal have dominated the Legislative Yuan.
It is said that Director of Health Yang Chi-liang efforts on behalf of U.S. beef were not worth it. Yang, who fought with legislators, was never driven to tears. But he probably never imagined that the Vice President of the Academia Sinica would end up as the legislature's whipping boy. Shen Lu-hsiung was unaware of how vicious legislators could be. Yang Chi-liang, on the other hand, was fully aware. Having entered the bullring, he could only lower his head and charge. He mocked himself, saying he should have brought along a white paper spelling out every policy measure, that he should have carried a briefcase filled with them at all times. As a political appointee, he had been long prepared to resign at any time, but only after speaking his peace.
When did Taiwan, specifically the ROC Legislature, become a place where one is not allowed to speak one's peace? Years ago University of Hong Kong President Chu Ching-wu, wary of the reunification vs. independence controversy on Taiwan, and how it placed undue emphasis on being born into the "right" group, declined an invitation to come to Taiwan, but instead went to Hong Kong. Over the past six months, the Academia Sinica has been urging Harvard scholar David Wang to return to Taiwan. David Wang has refused. Given the images of Liu Tsui-rong driven to tears in the legislature, no wonder David Wang refused to return. Any scholar with a backbone would probably resign. Do not underestimate the tears of political appointees. When the Legislative Yuan becomes a haven for the ignorant, who amuse themselves by trampling over the dignity of political appointees, the legislature will become the primary cause of a political disaster. The government will be unable to recruit people of talent. What sort of future will Taiwan have then?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.23
社論－國會已淪為踐踏政務官尊嚴的鬥場
本報訊
上周，堂堂國會出現兩幕落差極大的場景：第一幕，外交部次長沈呂巡備詢，猶如一隻奮不顧身的螳螂，張開雙臂，口才便給，神色毫不退讓地擋住立委的砲火；第二幕，中研院副院長劉翠溶被立委罵到抬不起頭來，重新被請回備詢台，談到自己今年四月即因健康因素請辭，就忍不住悲從中來，淚灑國會。
這兩幕場景一點都不特殊，初入政壇，對粗糙的國會議事文化不熟悉或太熟悉的政務官，都可能像沈呂巡或劉翠溶，不是和立委硬槓，就是委屈往自己肚子裡吞。這兩幕場景，在媒體報導中，佔了相當大的版面，舉國民眾卻沒有太多迴響，沒有人意識到：中華民國政務官長久以來，就是在這麼粗魯無文、毫無專業可言的國會議事波濤中，載浮載沉，起起落落，甚或滅頂。當朝野立委動輒指責行政機關不尊重國會的同時，他們以踩著他人尊嚴的問政言行，窮兇惡極的嘴臉，企圖抬高所謂國會議員的「地位」，先聲奪人。
憑藉惡聲問政的立委，既不懂得尊重他人，就難獲得他人的尊敬，只是他們習慣性地指責別人，忘記自己才是民意信賴度相對低的一群人。談到審查法案，民眾看到的是立法院為了美國牛，院會已經癱瘓兩周，毫無進展，朝野立委當初為監督政府開放帶骨美國牛和內臟等提出的食品衛生管理法，卡著動彈不得，全國民眾當然無從得知朝野立委到底提出了什麼版本？遑論哪一個版本比較合乎需要。
食品衛生管理法，涉及美國牛肉，算是爭議性大的法案，中研院一個早在廿年前就該廢止的「中研院評議會條例」，總該沒爭議了吧？莫名其妙的是，劉翠溶就在立法院相關委員會審查該條例廢止案時被罵到黯然步下備詢台；更誇張的是，立委罵她的議題既非中研院評議會（立委肯定不知道中研院評議會是什麼玩意兒），亦非任何與中研院行政管理相關事項，相反的，竟還是為了美國牛！立委要求中研院要做美國牛與國人健康的研究，劉翠溶一句，「會將建議帶回去。」竟讓質詢的立委惱羞成怒，很難理解這位立委到底生什麼氣？但以研究台灣史為專業的劉翠溶，講到自己辭職半年還不能離開時哽咽掉淚，所有看到這一幕的人都想問一句話，「堂堂中研院副院長，為什麼要受這種無知立委的氣！」
每年，行政機關都會匯整過時不合用之法律，提出法律廢止案，因為無爭議，通常都能順利在立法院通關，上次中研院評議會條例廢止案提送立法院是八年前的事，卻因為立院屆期不連續而撤回，當年，這個無爭議法案為什麼沒順利三讀？時間久遠不可考，想來因為沒什麼話題性，立委連排定審查的意願都無，或者，其他爭議法案太熱，足堪立委大打出手好幾場，順理成章的就把這個案子給遺忘了。不論如何，立委不論出席什麼會議，不論審查的是預算還是法案，永遠追著熱門話題跑，以確保自己與法案、預算風馬牛不相及的廢話能夠在媒體曝光。於是乎，美國牛與孫仲瑜在過去二、三周裡，佔據立法院每一個角落。
曾經說為美國牛鞠躬盡瘁並不值得的衛生署長楊志良，大概想都想不到，他力戰國會群雄，沒被罵哭，反倒是讓中研院副院長代為受氣。如果說沈呂巡是不知立委有多兇狠的螳螂，楊志良就是深知立委很兇狠的蠻牛，既進了鬥牛場，就只能悶著頭衝。他調侃自己要隨身攜帶一份萬言書，把各種政策說得清清楚楚，以備隨時提起公事包就走人，身為政務官，他早做好隨時可以辭職下台的準備─但是，話一定要講清楚。
台灣，尤其是國會，不知什麼時候竟變成話都不能講清楚的競技場！香港大學校長朱經武，當年因為畏於分統分獨還要講究出身血緣的台灣政治文化，而婉拒邀請，轉赴香港；最近半年，中研院力邀哈佛學者王德威返台，王德威一直不肯點頭。看到劉翠溶淚灑國會這一幕，不要說王德威不肯回來，所有還有點讀書人骨氣的學者，大概都要掛冠求去。不要小看政務官之淚，當立法院成為無知者的天堂，放言高論以踐踏政務官尊嚴為樂，國會將成為政治最大的災難之源，政府留不住也延攬不了人才，台灣的政治又有何前景可言！
Saturday, November 21, 2009
ECFA Negotiations Should Accord with an Industry-Based Strategic Blueprint
ECFA Negotiations Should Accord with an Industry-Based Strategic Blueprint
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 21, 2009
Taipei and Beijing have recently signed and exchanged memoranda of understanding regarding financial supervision. This of course is beneficial to the financial industry on Taiwan. But as FSC chairman Sean Chen said, the MOU merely gets us into the ball park. Our seats may not be in the best spot. We may not get the best view of the game. Mainland China imposes tight restrictions the services local branches of foreign financial institutions may offer. In earlier years, the government on Taiwan maintained a "San Guan Wu Ka" policy. As a result we got a late start on the Mainland. Getting tickets this late means we only get to see half the game. No wonder Sean Chen characterized our situation the way he did.
Industry insiders say the financial MOU is merely an appetizer. The main course is ECFA. Media reports indicate that ECFA will be signed no later than next spring. An early harvest can take effect immediately. Only the outlines for dispute resolution, investment protection, and industry cooperation have been signed. The starting time for negotiations, the table of contents, and even the detailed contents remain unclear. The two sides are still bargaining over the early harvest items. The situation is complete chaotic. Will the projects expected by the financial sector be included in the early harvest list? Even that is uncertain.
Here we must remind the ruling administration that ECFA negotiations must look to the future. They must not remain obsessed with the present. Financial sector businesses able to establish themselves on the Mainland are businesses already in existence. Many of them are family-owned consortiums. When the government on Taiwan uses its authority to help private financial industry consortiums expand their operations, the other side is bound to demand concessions from other industries. Other industries will either be forced to take less, or to give more. When the FSC negotiates an MOU and ECFA on behalf of our industries, it should offer the public a financial sector blueprint for Taiwan's future. This blueprint should include hostile takeovers and acquisitions, corporate governance goals, and company management objectives. It should practice goal management, and incorporate the requisite negotiating strategy. Only that qualifies as a future-oriented strategy.
In corporate governance, for example, if family-owned consortiums drag their feet in establishing audit committees, if their operations remain opaque, it makes no sense for the government help them expand their operations into regions where supervision would be difficult. Therefore, while the government expands future operations for the financial sector, it should simultaneously establish a healthier financial order on Taiwan. Take cross-Strait cooperation in the energy industry for example. Taiwan's crystalline silicon solar cell producers account for much of the world's output. But they may not have any advantage in thin film production techniques, or modules and systems development. The Mainland has a huge market for solar power generation. It is subject to international market pressure regarding carbon dioxide emissions. These are bound to provide considerable opportunities for cross-Strait cooperation. How should businesses on Taiwan cooperate with businesses on the Mainland? First, they should make use of each other's market advantages. Secondly, they should expand their scientific and technological leads. They should create a "smiling curve" in the energy industry. Only then will they have a future worth looking forward to. Based on such projections, it is easy to see what Taiwan's energy industry must fight for during ECFA negotiations.
Take the complex biotechnology industry, for example. The R&D capabilities of biotech companies on Taiwan are still superior to those of companies on Mainland China. Companies on Taiwan are still in a dominant position in the research and development of new medicines and medical supplies and capital market support for follow-up promotion. But Mainland China has a huge population and vast territory. Its clinical trials costs are relatively low. In the medical materials field, ICT industries on Taiwan have the advantage of a long-established foundation conducive to R&D breakthroughs. Can the two sides cooperate to develop new medicines and medical materials with the potential to dominate the world market? This is what the biomedical industry urgently needs to consider. Such projections allow one to get a handle on requisite negotiating strategy for talks in the field of biotechnology.
In sum, from a public welfare perspective, ECFA is a cross-Strait agreement that should be signed for the sake of Taiwan's industries. That being the case, one must envision all sorts of scenarios as the basis for the formulation of strategy. Therefore, the government's ECFA strategy team must have a view of industry extending decades into the future. It must not think in terms of past eras, past frameworks, past industries, past industrialists, and past conflicts of interests. The other side is still fundamentally authoritarian. It is exempt from existing fetters. It is able to meet the terms of its agreements. Society on Taiwan is pluralistic. Traditional influences abound. Given such an environment, the administration faces real challenges during negotiations over ECFA. First, it must seek a niche within tradition. Next, it must not confine itself to the traditional mold. It must rely on negotiations to open up new horizons.
ＥＣＦＡ談判該以產業策略藍圖為依據
2009-11-21
中國時報
兩岸金融監理備忘錄日前換文簽訂，這對於台灣金融產業發展，當然是有助益的。但誠如金管會主委陳?所言，這份備忘錄只是看球賽入場券，且座位角度不佳，看起比賽也不會有多精彩。如所周知，中國大陸對外國金融機構在當地分行設立、業務內容等有極為嚴格限制，而台灣在早年政府「三管五卡」管制之下，赴對岸布局起步甚晚，如今即使拿到球賽入場券，都只能看下半場比賽，也難怪陳?有此描述了。
業界人士都說，金融ＭＯＵ只是餐前小菜，真正的主食還是要靠ＥＣＦＡ的簽署。媒體報導顯示，ＥＣＦＡ至遲將於明年春天簽定，除了早期收穫可以立即生效之外，其餘關於爭端解決、投資保障、產業合作等等，都只是簽下各章的目錄、啟動談判時間、與內容摘要；至於內容細目皆仍不明朗。即使是早期收穫項目，雙方似亦仍在討價還價階段，情勢混沌一片。即使以金融界所期待的項目而言，究竟能不能列入早期收穫清單，也未可知。
在此要再一次提醒府院當局：ＥＣＦＡ的談判一定要著眼未來，而不要執著於現在。台灣金融業現在能夠去中國大陸布局的，都是現有的業者，其中不乏許多財團家族。在台灣當局以公權力努力為私人金融業財團擴張地盤時，其實必然要在其他產業的談判條件上有所退讓：或則少要些對方條件，或則多給些對方要求。當金管會為我們的業者以ＭＯＵ與ＥＣＦＡ等談判開展一個願景時，也該向國人提出一個台灣未來的金融業藍圖，包括產業結構、敵意併購、公司治理等目標，再以目標管理的精神反推應有的談判策略；這才是未來取向的應有策略舖陳。
以公司治理為例，財團家族如遲遲不設立審計委員會、公司極不透明，政府實沒有道理為他們在監理不易的地區再開疆闢土。因此，在拓展金融業明日地盤同時，也該同時建立更健康的台灣金融秩序。再以能源產業兩岸合作為例，台灣在矽晶電池單位產製上已占全世界相當規模，但在薄膜生產技術、及模組與系統開發上，則未必有其優勢。由於中國大陸太陽能發電系統市場極大，且其受國際市場二氧化碳排放壓力，必然會有相當的兩岸合作契機。台灣要如何與對岸產業合作，一則善用對方市場優勢、二則拓展我方科技先機，串連起能源產業的微笑曲線，那才是值得期待的前景。由這樣的前景回推，就不難得知我們該在ＥＣＦＡ談判中為台灣能源產業爭取些什麼。
復以生技產業為例，台灣的生技研發實力約略還在中國大陸之上，不論從事新藥與醫材研發的科研實力，或是支援後續推動的資本市場，台灣應該都處於優勢。但是中國大陸由於人口多、幅員廣，其執行臨床實驗的成本也比較低。在醫材領域，台灣ＩＣＴ產業的累積基礎與優勢，也有利於我們的研發突破。兩岸該如何在新藥與醫材上密切合作，發展出具有潛力的產品，雄霸部分世界市場，是生醫產業亟待思考的課題。由這樣的預期反推回當下，就可以掌握在生技領域的談判策略。
總之，從民生福祉的角度觀之，ＥＣＦＡ應為台灣產業未來而簽署的兩岸協定。既然如此，就要設想種種未來情境，做為當下策略的擬定出發點。因此，政府研擬ＥＣＦＡ策略的團隊，必須要有產業視野與數十年的前瞻預期，而不能以舊時代、舊框架、舊產業、舊業者、舊利益瓜葛去構思。對岸基本上還是威權體制，他們可以不受既有的羈絆，執行他們的談判任務。台灣卻是個多元社會，傳統勢力的影響無所不在。如何在這個環境下，一則從傳統中尋找利基、再則又不自限於傳統窠臼，進而靠談判而開創新局，是當局ＥＣＦＡ談判面對的真正挑戰。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 21, 2009
Taipei and Beijing have recently signed and exchanged memoranda of understanding regarding financial supervision. This of course is beneficial to the financial industry on Taiwan. But as FSC chairman Sean Chen said, the MOU merely gets us into the ball park. Our seats may not be in the best spot. We may not get the best view of the game. Mainland China imposes tight restrictions the services local branches of foreign financial institutions may offer. In earlier years, the government on Taiwan maintained a "San Guan Wu Ka" policy. As a result we got a late start on the Mainland. Getting tickets this late means we only get to see half the game. No wonder Sean Chen characterized our situation the way he did.
Industry insiders say the financial MOU is merely an appetizer. The main course is ECFA. Media reports indicate that ECFA will be signed no later than next spring. An early harvest can take effect immediately. Only the outlines for dispute resolution, investment protection, and industry cooperation have been signed. The starting time for negotiations, the table of contents, and even the detailed contents remain unclear. The two sides are still bargaining over the early harvest items. The situation is complete chaotic. Will the projects expected by the financial sector be included in the early harvest list? Even that is uncertain.
Here we must remind the ruling administration that ECFA negotiations must look to the future. They must not remain obsessed with the present. Financial sector businesses able to establish themselves on the Mainland are businesses already in existence. Many of them are family-owned consortiums. When the government on Taiwan uses its authority to help private financial industry consortiums expand their operations, the other side is bound to demand concessions from other industries. Other industries will either be forced to take less, or to give more. When the FSC negotiates an MOU and ECFA on behalf of our industries, it should offer the public a financial sector blueprint for Taiwan's future. This blueprint should include hostile takeovers and acquisitions, corporate governance goals, and company management objectives. It should practice goal management, and incorporate the requisite negotiating strategy. Only that qualifies as a future-oriented strategy.
In corporate governance, for example, if family-owned consortiums drag their feet in establishing audit committees, if their operations remain opaque, it makes no sense for the government help them expand their operations into regions where supervision would be difficult. Therefore, while the government expands future operations for the financial sector, it should simultaneously establish a healthier financial order on Taiwan. Take cross-Strait cooperation in the energy industry for example. Taiwan's crystalline silicon solar cell producers account for much of the world's output. But they may not have any advantage in thin film production techniques, or modules and systems development. The Mainland has a huge market for solar power generation. It is subject to international market pressure regarding carbon dioxide emissions. These are bound to provide considerable opportunities for cross-Strait cooperation. How should businesses on Taiwan cooperate with businesses on the Mainland? First, they should make use of each other's market advantages. Secondly, they should expand their scientific and technological leads. They should create a "smiling curve" in the energy industry. Only then will they have a future worth looking forward to. Based on such projections, it is easy to see what Taiwan's energy industry must fight for during ECFA negotiations.
Take the complex biotechnology industry, for example. The R&D capabilities of biotech companies on Taiwan are still superior to those of companies on Mainland China. Companies on Taiwan are still in a dominant position in the research and development of new medicines and medical supplies and capital market support for follow-up promotion. But Mainland China has a huge population and vast territory. Its clinical trials costs are relatively low. In the medical materials field, ICT industries on Taiwan have the advantage of a long-established foundation conducive to R&D breakthroughs. Can the two sides cooperate to develop new medicines and medical materials with the potential to dominate the world market? This is what the biomedical industry urgently needs to consider. Such projections allow one to get a handle on requisite negotiating strategy for talks in the field of biotechnology.
In sum, from a public welfare perspective, ECFA is a cross-Strait agreement that should be signed for the sake of Taiwan's industries. That being the case, one must envision all sorts of scenarios as the basis for the formulation of strategy. Therefore, the government's ECFA strategy team must have a view of industry extending decades into the future. It must not think in terms of past eras, past frameworks, past industries, past industrialists, and past conflicts of interests. The other side is still fundamentally authoritarian. It is exempt from existing fetters. It is able to meet the terms of its agreements. Society on Taiwan is pluralistic. Traditional influences abound. Given such an environment, the administration faces real challenges during negotiations over ECFA. First, it must seek a niche within tradition. Next, it must not confine itself to the traditional mold. It must rely on negotiations to open up new horizons.
ＥＣＦＡ談判該以產業策略藍圖為依據
2009-11-21
中國時報
兩岸金融監理備忘錄日前換文簽訂，這對於台灣金融產業發展，當然是有助益的。但誠如金管會主委陳?所言，這份備忘錄只是看球賽入場券，且座位角度不佳，看起比賽也不會有多精彩。如所周知，中國大陸對外國金融機構在當地分行設立、業務內容等有極為嚴格限制，而台灣在早年政府「三管五卡」管制之下，赴對岸布局起步甚晚，如今即使拿到球賽入場券，都只能看下半場比賽，也難怪陳?有此描述了。
業界人士都說，金融ＭＯＵ只是餐前小菜，真正的主食還是要靠ＥＣＦＡ的簽署。媒體報導顯示，ＥＣＦＡ至遲將於明年春天簽定，除了早期收穫可以立即生效之外，其餘關於爭端解決、投資保障、產業合作等等，都只是簽下各章的目錄、啟動談判時間、與內容摘要；至於內容細目皆仍不明朗。即使是早期收穫項目，雙方似亦仍在討價還價階段，情勢混沌一片。即使以金融界所期待的項目而言，究竟能不能列入早期收穫清單，也未可知。
在此要再一次提醒府院當局：ＥＣＦＡ的談判一定要著眼未來，而不要執著於現在。台灣金融業現在能夠去中國大陸布局的，都是現有的業者，其中不乏許多財團家族。在台灣當局以公權力努力為私人金融業財團擴張地盤時，其實必然要在其他產業的談判條件上有所退讓：或則少要些對方條件，或則多給些對方要求。當金管會為我們的業者以ＭＯＵ與ＥＣＦＡ等談判開展一個願景時，也該向國人提出一個台灣未來的金融業藍圖，包括產業結構、敵意併購、公司治理等目標，再以目標管理的精神反推應有的談判策略；這才是未來取向的應有策略舖陳。
以公司治理為例，財團家族如遲遲不設立審計委員會、公司極不透明，政府實沒有道理為他們在監理不易的地區再開疆闢土。因此，在拓展金融業明日地盤同時，也該同時建立更健康的台灣金融秩序。再以能源產業兩岸合作為例，台灣在矽晶電池單位產製上已占全世界相當規模，但在薄膜生產技術、及模組與系統開發上，則未必有其優勢。由於中國大陸太陽能發電系統市場極大，且其受國際市場二氧化碳排放壓力，必然會有相當的兩岸合作契機。台灣要如何與對岸產業合作，一則善用對方市場優勢、二則拓展我方科技先機，串連起能源產業的微笑曲線，那才是值得期待的前景。由這樣的前景回推，就不難得知我們該在ＥＣＦＡ談判中為台灣能源產業爭取些什麼。
復以生技產業為例，台灣的生技研發實力約略還在中國大陸之上，不論從事新藥與醫材研發的科研實力，或是支援後續推動的資本市場，台灣應該都處於優勢。但是中國大陸由於人口多、幅員廣，其執行臨床實驗的成本也比較低。在醫材領域，台灣ＩＣＴ產業的累積基礎與優勢，也有利於我們的研發突破。兩岸該如何在新藥與醫材上密切合作，發展出具有潛力的產品，雄霸部分世界市場，是生醫產業亟待思考的課題。由這樣的預期反推回當下，就可以掌握在生技領域的談判策略。
總之，從民生福祉的角度觀之，ＥＣＦＡ應為台灣產業未來而簽署的兩岸協定。既然如此，就要設想種種未來情境，做為當下策略的擬定出發點。因此，政府研擬ＥＣＦＡ策略的團隊，必須要有產業視野與數十年的前瞻預期，而不能以舊時代、舊框架、舊產業、舊業者、舊利益瓜葛去構思。對岸基本上還是威權體制，他們可以不受既有的羈絆，執行他們的談判任務。台灣卻是個多元社會，傳統勢力的影響無所不在。如何在這個環境下，一則從傳統中尋找利基、再則又不自限於傳統窠臼，進而靠談判而開創新局，是當局ＥＣＦＡ談判面對的真正挑戰。
Friday, November 20, 2009
Re-investigate the 3/19 Shooting Incident: Swiftly Establish the Truth
Re-investigate the 3/19 Shooting Incident: Swiftly Establish the Truth
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 20, 2009
The Control Yuan's report on the Tainan District Prosecutor's Office's handling of the 3/19 Shooting Incident was made public yesterday. The Control Yuan's finding was that prosecutors did not have enough evidence to conclude Chen Yi-hsiung was the sole perpetrator. Four aspects of the case remain in doubt. Prosecutors were clearly negligent in their handling of the case. The Control Yuan's findings were sent to the Ministry of Justice Supreme Prosecutor's Office, in the hope that the Special Investigation Unit will reopen the case, and carry out a thorough investigation.
The circumstances surrounding the 319 Shooting Incident are strange. The truth remains hidden. Prosecutors concluded that Chen Yi-hsiung was the perpetrator, then hastily closed the books on the case. The public remains deeply skeptical. Two reports issued by the Truth Investigation Committee have listed a number of doubts. Former Vice President Annette Lu was one of the victims of the shooting. Her own research has been published in her book, "Focus on 3/19." She has asked that the case be reopened. Rumors are that a just completed Control Yuan investigation headed by Control Yuan member Wu Feng-shan has arrived at the same conclusion. The truth of the incident remains hidden. Prosecutors must reopen the case. The Attorney-General recently revealed in the Legislative Yuan that the Supreme Prosecutor's Office Special Investigation Unit has obtained new facts and evidence and has reopened the investigation. The Control Yuan has merely released its report. It has not exercised its right of impeachment. It has not exercised its right of redress. It has investigated the prosecutors who handled the case for dereliction of duty. It merely wants to uncover the truth and uphold justice. The Special Investigation Unit has a responsibility to make amends. We would like to remind the Special Investigation Unit of these three points.
First, when the Special Investigation Unit reopens the case, it must explain why it is reopening the case. There is only one reason to reopen the case, and that is to unmask the real perpetrators, to discover why they committed these crimes, and how they committed these crimes. The previous investigation concluded that there was only one perpetrator, Chen Yi-hsiung. He allegedly committed the crime because he was unhappy with the Chen administration. He allegedly fired two rounds from a single gun. These and other conclusions have been called into question by two consecutive Truth Investigation Committee Reports, by Annette Lu's book "Focus on 3/19," and by the Control Yuan's report. Obviously the conclusions of the previous investigation have little credibility. Therefore a Special Investigation Unit must return to square one, and start all over again. It must ask who were the perpetrators? How many were there? It can no longer stonewall by stubbornly sticking to discredited and overturned conclusions. It can no longer defend the indefensible. It can no longer engage in self-deception. It can no longer neglect its duty by pointing the finger Chen Yi-hsiung without evidence.
Secondly, when the Special Investigation Unit reopens the case, it must uphold the strictest standards for professionalism and neutrality. It may not harbor any preconceived opinions. It may not rule out any possibilities. For example, it may not assume there was only one perpetrator. It may not assume that two rounds were fired from one gun, or that two rounds were fired from two guns. It may not assume that the conclusions of the Tainan Prosecutor's Office were flawless. It may not assume that no political conspiracy was involved. Above all, it may not assume that Chen Yi-hsiung was the sole perpetrator. The previous investigation concluded that the perpetrator was Chen Yi-hsiuing, and that the first shot was fired at Annette Lu and not at Chen Shui-bian. As the Control Yuan's report has already pointed out, these conclusions are difficult to reconcile with the facts, including the condition of Chen Yi-hsiung's body and the time of his death. Last time the prosecution closed the case because Chen Yi-hsiung was already dead. But it lacked sufficient evidence that he committed any crime. It also concluded that Chen was the sole perpetrator of the crime. Prosecutors violated proper procedure when handling the case. They caused serious injury to Chen Yi-hsiung's reputation and to the rights of his family. The Special Investigation Unit must not cover up the defects in their case. It must frankly admit that the original investigation was seriously flawed. Only then can it cast off its burden, rekindle the flames, and uncover the full truth.
Thirdly, when the Special Investigation Unit reopens the case, it must take into account serious public skepticism. It must seek a reasonable answer and a reasonable explanation. Frankly, given the conduct of Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming's Special Investigation Unit over the past two years, its credibility is limited, and its competence is in question. The prosecution originally concluded that Chen was the sole perpetrator. It lacked direct evidence for its conclusion. Even the evidence that Chen was "a perpetrator" rather than "the sole perpetrator" was unpersuasive. There were no eye witnesses. There was no plausible motive, let alone evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. There is probably more evidence that Chen Yi-hsiung's role was something else entirely, than that he was the perpetrator. When the Special Investigation Unit seeks new facts and evidence, it need not remain fixated on the idea that Chen Yi-hsiung was the perpetrator. It should be prepared to admit that Chen is not necessarily the perpetrator. It may be difficult to reconstruct the scene of the crime. The movements, itineraries, duty stations, and liaison arrangements of those involved that day, including one thousand bodyguards and members of the motorcade, must be reestablished. Only then can we even begin to approach the truth. Only then can we learn the full story. Only then can we learn who, why, and how the perpetrators committed their crime.
The uncovering of the real perpetrator of the 319 Shooting Incident has a bearing on criminal justice and the fundamental human rights of Chen Yi-hsiung and his family. It has a bearing on the use and abuse of official power on Taiwan. It has a bearing on the character and credibility of the president, his subordinates, his security detail, prosecutors, and police in the hearts of the public. The Control Yuan report calls for the truth. The Special Investigation Unit must overcome all difficulties, and uncover the truth!
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.20
社論－再查319槍擊案 速還原真相
本報訊
監察院調查台南地檢署偵辦三一九槍擊案的調查報告日前出爐，認定檢方辦案欠缺直接證物；判定陳義雄是唯一凶手明顯不當；全案還有四項重大疑點，偵辦過程顯有疏失。監察院決議通過調查報告，送法務部轉最高檢察署，期待特偵組重啟調查，並詳為調查。
三一九槍擊事件發生迄今，不僅情節詭異，真相也一直不明。當年檢方認定已死的陳義雄為凶手，草草結案，輿論已經普遍質疑。前後兩屆真調會均曾提出調查報告，列舉許多疑點；槍擊案件主要被害人前副總統呂秀蓮根據自己的調查研究曾經出版了《透視三一九》一書，要求重啟調查。現在監察院由吳豐山委員主持完成的調查報告也傳出了相同的結論，就是事件真相未明，檢方必須再為偵查。檢察總長不久前在立法院亦已透露最高檢察署特偵組現在從新的事證入手重為調查。監察院只公布調查報告，未動用彈劾權，未動用糾正權，追究當年辦案檢方人員的疏失責任，只是要求本案再發現真相伸張正義，特偵組就有責任代為將功補過。我們想在此提出三點做為特偵組辦案的提醒。
第一，特偵組重啟調查，必須確立調查的目的，只有一個，就是找出真凶，發現真凶為何犯案，如何犯案的真相。前次的偵查結論是真凶只有一個，就是陳義雄，因為不滿扁政而犯案，犯案方法是一槍兩彈。此等結論均遭兩屆真調會調查報告、呂秀蓮的《透視三一九》及監察院調查報告所提出的反駁與質疑，顯示其難以成立。因而特偵組的調查工作，應該要回到原點，重新來過，重問誰是凶手？參與者究竟有些什麼人，不能再拘泥於業已遭到質疑而推翻的結論，抱殘守缺，自欺欺人地以陳義雄死無對證搪塞其事。
第二，特偵組重啟調查，必須秉持專業而中立的態度辦案，不能有預設立場，也不能排除各種可能性。例如不能預設凶手只有一人，不能預設一槍兩彈或是兩槍兩彈，不能預設南檢的偵查結論並無錯誤，也不能預設此中全無任何政治操作斧鑿的陰謀，更不能預設陳義雄就是犯案凶手。監察院的調查報告已然指出，檢方前次的偵查認定陳義雄為凶手，從第一槍射向呂秀蓮而非陳水扁，到其屍體的狀態與死亡時間，都與檢方做出的結論難以吻合。檢方前次以陳義雄已死而結案，卻擅以不足以證明犯罪的證據，結論式地指控陳義雄為僅有的犯案凶手，不但違背檢方辦案的常軌，也對陳義雄的名譽，還有其家人的權利，造成嚴重的傷害。特偵組絕對不能懷著包庇護短的心態續辦此案，而應該坦率地承認原來的偵查犯下嚴重的錯誤，才有拋開既有包袱，重啟爐灶，發現完整真相的可能。
第三，特偵組重啟調查，必須將外界業已提出的重大疑點，列入考慮，也自我要求都能提出合理的回答與說明，容我們坦率直言，過去兩年有餘的表現，陳聰明檢察總長指揮領導的特偵組，公信力有限，能力印象也屬不足。原有檢方的偵查結論，判定陳義雄是唯一的凶手，欠缺直接證物，連陳義雄是凶手，也不具有說服力，既無現場目擊證人，也無合理的犯案動機，莫說是超越合理懷疑的證據並不存在，認定陳義雄是凶手的證據恐怕比起陳義雄不是凶手而有其他可能的情況證據，還來得不足。特偵組尋找新的事證，不必只以必須再度認定陳義雄是凶手為方向，也該有承認陳義雄並不足以認定為本案凶手的思想準備。涉案當時的現場重建雖有困難，但是案發當日當事人及一干隨扈人等的行蹤行程與遊行車隊出發前的布置與聯絡實情，都有必要予以還原，才能真正拼出接近事實真相，找到真凶是誰與犯案原委為何的答案。
三一九槍擊案真凶的發現，關係到陳義雄及其家屬的基本人權與社會正義的實現，也關係到台灣公權力體系，上至總統及其所屬，包括維安人員，下至檢警辦案人員的品格與信用，在台灣人民心中的評價與定位，監察院的調查報告要求知道真相，特偵組必須排除萬難，找出真相！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 20, 2009
The Control Yuan's report on the Tainan District Prosecutor's Office's handling of the 3/19 Shooting Incident was made public yesterday. The Control Yuan's finding was that prosecutors did not have enough evidence to conclude Chen Yi-hsiung was the sole perpetrator. Four aspects of the case remain in doubt. Prosecutors were clearly negligent in their handling of the case. The Control Yuan's findings were sent to the Ministry of Justice Supreme Prosecutor's Office, in the hope that the Special Investigation Unit will reopen the case, and carry out a thorough investigation.
The circumstances surrounding the 319 Shooting Incident are strange. The truth remains hidden. Prosecutors concluded that Chen Yi-hsiung was the perpetrator, then hastily closed the books on the case. The public remains deeply skeptical. Two reports issued by the Truth Investigation Committee have listed a number of doubts. Former Vice President Annette Lu was one of the victims of the shooting. Her own research has been published in her book, "Focus on 3/19." She has asked that the case be reopened. Rumors are that a just completed Control Yuan investigation headed by Control Yuan member Wu Feng-shan has arrived at the same conclusion. The truth of the incident remains hidden. Prosecutors must reopen the case. The Attorney-General recently revealed in the Legislative Yuan that the Supreme Prosecutor's Office Special Investigation Unit has obtained new facts and evidence and has reopened the investigation. The Control Yuan has merely released its report. It has not exercised its right of impeachment. It has not exercised its right of redress. It has investigated the prosecutors who handled the case for dereliction of duty. It merely wants to uncover the truth and uphold justice. The Special Investigation Unit has a responsibility to make amends. We would like to remind the Special Investigation Unit of these three points.
First, when the Special Investigation Unit reopens the case, it must explain why it is reopening the case. There is only one reason to reopen the case, and that is to unmask the real perpetrators, to discover why they committed these crimes, and how they committed these crimes. The previous investigation concluded that there was only one perpetrator, Chen Yi-hsiung. He allegedly committed the crime because he was unhappy with the Chen administration. He allegedly fired two rounds from a single gun. These and other conclusions have been called into question by two consecutive Truth Investigation Committee Reports, by Annette Lu's book "Focus on 3/19," and by the Control Yuan's report. Obviously the conclusions of the previous investigation have little credibility. Therefore a Special Investigation Unit must return to square one, and start all over again. It must ask who were the perpetrators? How many were there? It can no longer stonewall by stubbornly sticking to discredited and overturned conclusions. It can no longer defend the indefensible. It can no longer engage in self-deception. It can no longer neglect its duty by pointing the finger Chen Yi-hsiung without evidence.
Secondly, when the Special Investigation Unit reopens the case, it must uphold the strictest standards for professionalism and neutrality. It may not harbor any preconceived opinions. It may not rule out any possibilities. For example, it may not assume there was only one perpetrator. It may not assume that two rounds were fired from one gun, or that two rounds were fired from two guns. It may not assume that the conclusions of the Tainan Prosecutor's Office were flawless. It may not assume that no political conspiracy was involved. Above all, it may not assume that Chen Yi-hsiung was the sole perpetrator. The previous investigation concluded that the perpetrator was Chen Yi-hsiuing, and that the first shot was fired at Annette Lu and not at Chen Shui-bian. As the Control Yuan's report has already pointed out, these conclusions are difficult to reconcile with the facts, including the condition of Chen Yi-hsiung's body and the time of his death. Last time the prosecution closed the case because Chen Yi-hsiung was already dead. But it lacked sufficient evidence that he committed any crime. It also concluded that Chen was the sole perpetrator of the crime. Prosecutors violated proper procedure when handling the case. They caused serious injury to Chen Yi-hsiung's reputation and to the rights of his family. The Special Investigation Unit must not cover up the defects in their case. It must frankly admit that the original investigation was seriously flawed. Only then can it cast off its burden, rekindle the flames, and uncover the full truth.
Thirdly, when the Special Investigation Unit reopens the case, it must take into account serious public skepticism. It must seek a reasonable answer and a reasonable explanation. Frankly, given the conduct of Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming's Special Investigation Unit over the past two years, its credibility is limited, and its competence is in question. The prosecution originally concluded that Chen was the sole perpetrator. It lacked direct evidence for its conclusion. Even the evidence that Chen was "a perpetrator" rather than "the sole perpetrator" was unpersuasive. There were no eye witnesses. There was no plausible motive, let alone evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. There is probably more evidence that Chen Yi-hsiung's role was something else entirely, than that he was the perpetrator. When the Special Investigation Unit seeks new facts and evidence, it need not remain fixated on the idea that Chen Yi-hsiung was the perpetrator. It should be prepared to admit that Chen is not necessarily the perpetrator. It may be difficult to reconstruct the scene of the crime. The movements, itineraries, duty stations, and liaison arrangements of those involved that day, including one thousand bodyguards and members of the motorcade, must be reestablished. Only then can we even begin to approach the truth. Only then can we learn the full story. Only then can we learn who, why, and how the perpetrators committed their crime.
The uncovering of the real perpetrator of the 319 Shooting Incident has a bearing on criminal justice and the fundamental human rights of Chen Yi-hsiung and his family. It has a bearing on the use and abuse of official power on Taiwan. It has a bearing on the character and credibility of the president, his subordinates, his security detail, prosecutors, and police in the hearts of the public. The Control Yuan report calls for the truth. The Special Investigation Unit must overcome all difficulties, and uncover the truth!
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.20
社論－再查319槍擊案 速還原真相
本報訊
監察院調查台南地檢署偵辦三一九槍擊案的調查報告日前出爐，認定檢方辦案欠缺直接證物；判定陳義雄是唯一凶手明顯不當；全案還有四項重大疑點，偵辦過程顯有疏失。監察院決議通過調查報告，送法務部轉最高檢察署，期待特偵組重啟調查，並詳為調查。
三一九槍擊事件發生迄今，不僅情節詭異，真相也一直不明。當年檢方認定已死的陳義雄為凶手，草草結案，輿論已經普遍質疑。前後兩屆真調會均曾提出調查報告，列舉許多疑點；槍擊案件主要被害人前副總統呂秀蓮根據自己的調查研究曾經出版了《透視三一九》一書，要求重啟調查。現在監察院由吳豐山委員主持完成的調查報告也傳出了相同的結論，就是事件真相未明，檢方必須再為偵查。檢察總長不久前在立法院亦已透露最高檢察署特偵組現在從新的事證入手重為調查。監察院只公布調查報告，未動用彈劾權，未動用糾正權，追究當年辦案檢方人員的疏失責任，只是要求本案再發現真相伸張正義，特偵組就有責任代為將功補過。我們想在此提出三點做為特偵組辦案的提醒。
第一，特偵組重啟調查，必須確立調查的目的，只有一個，就是找出真凶，發現真凶為何犯案，如何犯案的真相。前次的偵查結論是真凶只有一個，就是陳義雄，因為不滿扁政而犯案，犯案方法是一槍兩彈。此等結論均遭兩屆真調會調查報告、呂秀蓮的《透視三一九》及監察院調查報告所提出的反駁與質疑，顯示其難以成立。因而特偵組的調查工作，應該要回到原點，重新來過，重問誰是凶手？參與者究竟有些什麼人，不能再拘泥於業已遭到質疑而推翻的結論，抱殘守缺，自欺欺人地以陳義雄死無對證搪塞其事。
第二，特偵組重啟調查，必須秉持專業而中立的態度辦案，不能有預設立場，也不能排除各種可能性。例如不能預設凶手只有一人，不能預設一槍兩彈或是兩槍兩彈，不能預設南檢的偵查結論並無錯誤，也不能預設此中全無任何政治操作斧鑿的陰謀，更不能預設陳義雄就是犯案凶手。監察院的調查報告已然指出，檢方前次的偵查認定陳義雄為凶手，從第一槍射向呂秀蓮而非陳水扁，到其屍體的狀態與死亡時間，都與檢方做出的結論難以吻合。檢方前次以陳義雄已死而結案，卻擅以不足以證明犯罪的證據，結論式地指控陳義雄為僅有的犯案凶手，不但違背檢方辦案的常軌，也對陳義雄的名譽，還有其家人的權利，造成嚴重的傷害。特偵組絕對不能懷著包庇護短的心態續辦此案，而應該坦率地承認原來的偵查犯下嚴重的錯誤，才有拋開既有包袱，重啟爐灶，發現完整真相的可能。
第三，特偵組重啟調查，必須將外界業已提出的重大疑點，列入考慮，也自我要求都能提出合理的回答與說明，容我們坦率直言，過去兩年有餘的表現，陳聰明檢察總長指揮領導的特偵組，公信力有限，能力印象也屬不足。原有檢方的偵查結論，判定陳義雄是唯一的凶手，欠缺直接證物，連陳義雄是凶手，也不具有說服力，既無現場目擊證人，也無合理的犯案動機，莫說是超越合理懷疑的證據並不存在，認定陳義雄是凶手的證據恐怕比起陳義雄不是凶手而有其他可能的情況證據，還來得不足。特偵組尋找新的事證，不必只以必須再度認定陳義雄是凶手為方向，也該有承認陳義雄並不足以認定為本案凶手的思想準備。涉案當時的現場重建雖有困難，但是案發當日當事人及一干隨扈人等的行蹤行程與遊行車隊出發前的布置與聯絡實情，都有必要予以還原，才能真正拼出接近事實真相，找到真凶是誰與犯案原委為何的答案。
三一九槍擊案真凶的發現，關係到陳義雄及其家屬的基本人權與社會正義的實現，也關係到台灣公權力體系，上至總統及其所屬，包括維安人員，下至檢警辦案人員的品格與信用，在台灣人民心中的評價與定位，監察院的調查報告要求知道真相，特偵組必須排除萬難，找出真相！
Thursday, November 19, 2009
A Careful Reading of the Joint Declaration
A Careful Reading of the Joint Declaration
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 19, 2009
U.S. President Barack Obama may have left Beijing. But the Joint Declaration he and Mainland Chinese President Hu Jintao signed has shaken Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. The aftershocks are still being felt. This Joint Declaration may be the most important document in Sino-US relations since the Three Communiques. To refer to it as the Fourth Communique may be an overstatement. But the Joint Declaration will surely guide Beijing-Washington relations during the Barack Obama administration.
Beijing and Washington have signed communiques and agreements in the past. But the Joint Declaration issued by Obama and Hu differs from previous documents. The portion pertaining to Taiwan contains several clear differences.
First of all, it specified and emphasized core interests. In particular, it emphasized that the key to healthy bilateral relations is for Beijing and Washington to respect each other's core interests. Leave aside for the moment the core interests of Washington, and concentrate on the core interests of Beijing. Consider their relation to China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Whatever the reasons might be for not making these core interests explicit, President Hu Jintao made clear at a press conference that "on the issue of Taiwan, the US must respect China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity." Obama said he respected the fact that "Tibet is a part of China." These made Beijing's core interests explicit. The United States must respect the fact that it is not entitled to intervene in matters concerning Taiwan and Tibet.
Secondly, there was no mention of Taiwan's security. Whenever the United States issued any statement or conducted any conversation concerning cross-Strait issues in the past, it always mentioned the Taiwan Relations Act, or its "security commitment to Taiwan." It mentioned them in the same breath as the Three Communiques. Yet it was not mentioned at all in this current, official document. The United States may mention them later. But the overall impact will be less than the impact of the Joint Declaration by the two heads of state.
The day before yesterday Barack Obama met with students in Shanghai. He did not mention the Taiwan Relations Act. That was a warning sign. After the Joint Declaration was signed, Obama mentioned it belatedly at a press conference. He seemed to be attempting to strike a balance. But Mainland Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei immediately rebutted Obama's statement. He said the Joint Declaration is the document that supplies the guiding principles for bilateral relations. Beijing firmly opposes the Taiwan Relations Act and arms sales to Taipei. "On this point, there is no ambiguity."
Third, Washington's expectations in political negotiations are gradually converging with Beijing's. In the past, Washington would merely say that it looked forward to cross-Strait dialogue and a reduction in tensions. By contrast, the Joint Declaration clearly states that Washington and Beijing "look forward to increased bilateral (Taipei and Beijing) dialogue and interaction in economic, political, and other areas," consistent wtih Beijing's latest policies vis a vis Taipei.
Recently President Hu Jintao met with Lien Chan in Singapore. Zheng Bijian lead a mission to Taiwan. Both times Beijing raised the issue of political dialogue or negotiations. But the Ma administration has always insisted upon "economics first, politics last." Scholars with close ties to agencies responsible for national security have suggested three conditions for the initiation of political dialogue. One of these conditions is that "they must be acceptable to the international community." But now that Washington's attitude is consistent with Beijing's, it may violate its past six assurances not to pressure Taipei to negotiate with Beijing.
That Obama has tilted this far is part of a larger pattern. The Financial Times invoked a metaphor. When a debtor visits a creditor, he cannot possibly adopt a tough attitude. Mainland China holds 600 billion in U.S. government debt. Besides, Washington needs Beijing's cooperation on issues such as climate change, the economic crisis, and even global security. It must acknowledge China's rise, and accept the reality of shared global leadership.
The United States can no longer dominate the world. But it is unwilling to allow Mainland China to eject it from the Western Pacific. On the contrary, it wants even more active participation. During a speech in Tokyo, Barack Obama openly declared that "The United States is a Pacific nation." U.S. forces will stay in Okinawa. The United States will become an ASEAN partner. It will not be absent from any new Asia-Pacific free trade bodies.
Under the influence of these factors, Washington has made concessions regarding Beijing's core interests, in exchange for Beijing's agreement not to oppose a continued U.S. presence in the Western Pacific, and for active cooperation with Washington in global affairs. This is regarded as a cost-effective transaction. Washington is satisfied, Beijing is happy, and Asia-Pacific nations are at ease. The only ones sacrificed have been Taiwan and Tibet.
The Joint Declaration amounts to a major change in Washington-Beijing-Taipei relations. Although international power arrangements are a factor, the Ma administration's national security team has a responsibility to understand the circumstances surrounding this development. First of all, if Washington informed the Ma administration in advance, but the agencies responsible for national security failed to react prudently, solemnly, then they were derelict in their duty. If on the other hand, Washington did not even bother to give us a heads-up, or if our side failed to catch wind of these developments, that is cause for even greater concern.
According to reports Washington will send someone to Taipei next week to explain the situation. Our side should take the opportunity to let Washington know we do not agree with its position. We would like high-ranking U.S. officials to make a public statement, or reaffirm its commitment to Taiwan's security through concrete actions such as arms sales, gradually amending the gist of the Joint Declaration. Following the Joint Declaration Beijing soon began demanding peace talks. Beijing, as one can imagine, will surely link ECFA with peace negotiations. Handled improperly, ECFA could run aground. Or it could trigger a confrontation between the government and the opposition. At the very least it could influence the elections. At worst it could divide the country. Those in authority must respond prudently.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.19
審慎解讀歐胡聯合聲明的訊息
本報訊
美國總統歐巴馬雖已離開北京，但是他與中共國家主席胡錦濤所簽署的聯合聲明，在美中台三地所引發的動盪，依舊餘波未息。這項聯合聲明或許是繼美中三個公報之後，規範中美關係最重要的文件，稱它為第四公報，也許有人認為言過其實，但這項聯合聲明絕對會是歐巴馬執政期間，中美關係的指導綱領。
中美兩國過去也曾簽署過公報與協議，但歐胡聯合聲明中的台灣部分，卻與過去所有文件，有幾點明顯不同：
首先，是核心利益的提出與確認。聲明中特別強調，中美尊重彼此的核心利益是確保兩國關係健康發展的關鍵所在；在此，美國的核心利益並不是重點，重點在確立中國的核心利益是主權與領土完整原則。儘管所指為何沒有明講，但胡錦濤在記者會上進一步表示，「在台灣等問題上尊重中國的主權和領土完整」，而歐巴馬表示尊重「西藏是中國的一部分」，都明確化了核心利益，指的就是台灣與西藏事務，而美國必須尊重，無權干預。
其次是，沒有提台灣安全。過去任何關於兩岸的聲明或談話中，美國向來把《台灣關係法》、或「對台灣的安全承諾」，與美中三公報並提，可是竟然在這個正式文件中沒有，雖然也許美方會在稍後重申，但是效力總不及兩國元首的聯合聲明。
前一天歐巴馬與上海學生見面時，未提《台灣關係法》，已經是個警訊，聯合聲明簽署後，歐巴馬在記者會上補提，似想求得平衡，但馬上被中國外交部副部長何亞非駁斥，他表示「聯合聲明」才是指導兩國關係發展的原則文件，中國堅決反對《台灣關係法》，以及反對售台軍備，「這一點沒什麼好含糊的」。
其三是，美國對政治談判的期待，與中國的態度逐步趨同。過去美方期待兩岸對話云云，只是希望降低緊張，但在聯合聲明中，明確提出「期待兩岸加強經濟、政治及其他領域的對話與互動」，正符合大陸對台的最新政策。
近日，無論是連戰在新加坡與胡錦濤見面，或是鄭必堅所率領的來台訪問團，大陸都提出政治對話或談判，但是馬政府向來堅持先經後政，與國安單位有密切關係的學者提出啟動政治對話三條件說，其中之一就有「國際社會接受」的前提，可是現在美國態度如果與大陸一致，將有違華盛頓過去六項對台保證中「不會促談」的承諾。
歐巴馬會傾斜到這個程度，其實有跡可循；《金融時報》比喻此行有如負債人上債主家拜訪，態度不可能硬得起來，除了中國手中持有六千億美國政府公債之外，從氣候變化、經濟危機、甚至全球安全等等議題，美國都必須與中國合作，承認中國的崛起，接受共治全球的事實。
另一方面，雖然美國獨霸已不可能，但不甘被中國推出亞太，相反的，更想要積極參與，歐巴馬在東京演講時公開宣示：「美國是太平洋國家」，駐日美軍堅持要留在沖繩，美國開始成為東協對話夥伴，亞太自由貿易新機制更不會缺席。
在這些因素交錯之下，美國以退讓出中國核心利益，來交換中國不反對美國繼續留在亞太，在全球事務上與美國積極配合，這算是個合算的交易，美國滿意、大陸高興、亞太各國安心，唯一被犧牲的，恐怕就只有台灣與西藏了。
聯合聲明是美中台關係的重大變化，雖然有國際結構的因素，但馬政府的國安團隊有責任了解造成此情勢的前因後果，首先，如果美國事先通報內容，而國安決策單位沒有慎重以對、嚴正反應，顯有失職之嫌，如果美國事先連招呼都沒有打，或是我方沒有聽到風聲，那就更令人擔心了。
據說下周美國要派人來台說明，我方應該藉機向美國表達不同意的立場，讓美方經由高層公開發言，或如軍售等實際行動，確認對台灣的安全承諾，以逐步修正聯合聲明的方向。同時在聯合聲明之後，大陸要求和平談判的壓力將接踵而來，可以想見北京一定會把ＥＣＦＡ與談判掛勾，處理的不好，不是讓ＥＣＦＡ觸礁，就是將會引發朝野對立，小則影響選情，大則造成國內分裂，當政者不可不審慎因應。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 19, 2009
U.S. President Barack Obama may have left Beijing. But the Joint Declaration he and Mainland Chinese President Hu Jintao signed has shaken Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. The aftershocks are still being felt. This Joint Declaration may be the most important document in Sino-US relations since the Three Communiques. To refer to it as the Fourth Communique may be an overstatement. But the Joint Declaration will surely guide Beijing-Washington relations during the Barack Obama administration.
Beijing and Washington have signed communiques and agreements in the past. But the Joint Declaration issued by Obama and Hu differs from previous documents. The portion pertaining to Taiwan contains several clear differences.
First of all, it specified and emphasized core interests. In particular, it emphasized that the key to healthy bilateral relations is for Beijing and Washington to respect each other's core interests. Leave aside for the moment the core interests of Washington, and concentrate on the core interests of Beijing. Consider their relation to China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Whatever the reasons might be for not making these core interests explicit, President Hu Jintao made clear at a press conference that "on the issue of Taiwan, the US must respect China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity." Obama said he respected the fact that "Tibet is a part of China." These made Beijing's core interests explicit. The United States must respect the fact that it is not entitled to intervene in matters concerning Taiwan and Tibet.
Secondly, there was no mention of Taiwan's security. Whenever the United States issued any statement or conducted any conversation concerning cross-Strait issues in the past, it always mentioned the Taiwan Relations Act, or its "security commitment to Taiwan." It mentioned them in the same breath as the Three Communiques. Yet it was not mentioned at all in this current, official document. The United States may mention them later. But the overall impact will be less than the impact of the Joint Declaration by the two heads of state.
The day before yesterday Barack Obama met with students in Shanghai. He did not mention the Taiwan Relations Act. That was a warning sign. After the Joint Declaration was signed, Obama mentioned it belatedly at a press conference. He seemed to be attempting to strike a balance. But Mainland Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei immediately rebutted Obama's statement. He said the Joint Declaration is the document that supplies the guiding principles for bilateral relations. Beijing firmly opposes the Taiwan Relations Act and arms sales to Taipei. "On this point, there is no ambiguity."
Third, Washington's expectations in political negotiations are gradually converging with Beijing's. In the past, Washington would merely say that it looked forward to cross-Strait dialogue and a reduction in tensions. By contrast, the Joint Declaration clearly states that Washington and Beijing "look forward to increased bilateral (Taipei and Beijing) dialogue and interaction in economic, political, and other areas," consistent wtih Beijing's latest policies vis a vis Taipei.
Recently President Hu Jintao met with Lien Chan in Singapore. Zheng Bijian lead a mission to Taiwan. Both times Beijing raised the issue of political dialogue or negotiations. But the Ma administration has always insisted upon "economics first, politics last." Scholars with close ties to agencies responsible for national security have suggested three conditions for the initiation of political dialogue. One of these conditions is that "they must be acceptable to the international community." But now that Washington's attitude is consistent with Beijing's, it may violate its past six assurances not to pressure Taipei to negotiate with Beijing.
That Obama has tilted this far is part of a larger pattern. The Financial Times invoked a metaphor. When a debtor visits a creditor, he cannot possibly adopt a tough attitude. Mainland China holds 600 billion in U.S. government debt. Besides, Washington needs Beijing's cooperation on issues such as climate change, the economic crisis, and even global security. It must acknowledge China's rise, and accept the reality of shared global leadership.
The United States can no longer dominate the world. But it is unwilling to allow Mainland China to eject it from the Western Pacific. On the contrary, it wants even more active participation. During a speech in Tokyo, Barack Obama openly declared that "The United States is a Pacific nation." U.S. forces will stay in Okinawa. The United States will become an ASEAN partner. It will not be absent from any new Asia-Pacific free trade bodies.
Under the influence of these factors, Washington has made concessions regarding Beijing's core interests, in exchange for Beijing's agreement not to oppose a continued U.S. presence in the Western Pacific, and for active cooperation with Washington in global affairs. This is regarded as a cost-effective transaction. Washington is satisfied, Beijing is happy, and Asia-Pacific nations are at ease. The only ones sacrificed have been Taiwan and Tibet.
The Joint Declaration amounts to a major change in Washington-Beijing-Taipei relations. Although international power arrangements are a factor, the Ma administration's national security team has a responsibility to understand the circumstances surrounding this development. First of all, if Washington informed the Ma administration in advance, but the agencies responsible for national security failed to react prudently, solemnly, then they were derelict in their duty. If on the other hand, Washington did not even bother to give us a heads-up, or if our side failed to catch wind of these developments, that is cause for even greater concern.
According to reports Washington will send someone to Taipei next week to explain the situation. Our side should take the opportunity to let Washington know we do not agree with its position. We would like high-ranking U.S. officials to make a public statement, or reaffirm its commitment to Taiwan's security through concrete actions such as arms sales, gradually amending the gist of the Joint Declaration. Following the Joint Declaration Beijing soon began demanding peace talks. Beijing, as one can imagine, will surely link ECFA with peace negotiations. Handled improperly, ECFA could run aground. Or it could trigger a confrontation between the government and the opposition. At the very least it could influence the elections. At worst it could divide the country. Those in authority must respond prudently.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.19
審慎解讀歐胡聯合聲明的訊息
本報訊
美國總統歐巴馬雖已離開北京，但是他與中共國家主席胡錦濤所簽署的聯合聲明，在美中台三地所引發的動盪，依舊餘波未息。這項聯合聲明或許是繼美中三個公報之後，規範中美關係最重要的文件，稱它為第四公報，也許有人認為言過其實，但這項聯合聲明絕對會是歐巴馬執政期間，中美關係的指導綱領。
中美兩國過去也曾簽署過公報與協議，但歐胡聯合聲明中的台灣部分，卻與過去所有文件，有幾點明顯不同：
首先，是核心利益的提出與確認。聲明中特別強調，中美尊重彼此的核心利益是確保兩國關係健康發展的關鍵所在；在此，美國的核心利益並不是重點，重點在確立中國的核心利益是主權與領土完整原則。儘管所指為何沒有明講，但胡錦濤在記者會上進一步表示，「在台灣等問題上尊重中國的主權和領土完整」，而歐巴馬表示尊重「西藏是中國的一部分」，都明確化了核心利益，指的就是台灣與西藏事務，而美國必須尊重，無權干預。
其次是，沒有提台灣安全。過去任何關於兩岸的聲明或談話中，美國向來把《台灣關係法》、或「對台灣的安全承諾」，與美中三公報並提，可是竟然在這個正式文件中沒有，雖然也許美方會在稍後重申，但是效力總不及兩國元首的聯合聲明。
前一天歐巴馬與上海學生見面時，未提《台灣關係法》，已經是個警訊，聯合聲明簽署後，歐巴馬在記者會上補提，似想求得平衡，但馬上被中國外交部副部長何亞非駁斥，他表示「聯合聲明」才是指導兩國關係發展的原則文件，中國堅決反對《台灣關係法》，以及反對售台軍備，「這一點沒什麼好含糊的」。
其三是，美國對政治談判的期待，與中國的態度逐步趨同。過去美方期待兩岸對話云云，只是希望降低緊張，但在聯合聲明中，明確提出「期待兩岸加強經濟、政治及其他領域的對話與互動」，正符合大陸對台的最新政策。
近日，無論是連戰在新加坡與胡錦濤見面，或是鄭必堅所率領的來台訪問團，大陸都提出政治對話或談判，但是馬政府向來堅持先經後政，與國安單位有密切關係的學者提出啟動政治對話三條件說，其中之一就有「國際社會接受」的前提，可是現在美國態度如果與大陸一致，將有違華盛頓過去六項對台保證中「不會促談」的承諾。
歐巴馬會傾斜到這個程度，其實有跡可循；《金融時報》比喻此行有如負債人上債主家拜訪，態度不可能硬得起來，除了中國手中持有六千億美國政府公債之外，從氣候變化、經濟危機、甚至全球安全等等議題，美國都必須與中國合作，承認中國的崛起，接受共治全球的事實。
另一方面，雖然美國獨霸已不可能，但不甘被中國推出亞太，相反的，更想要積極參與，歐巴馬在東京演講時公開宣示：「美國是太平洋國家」，駐日美軍堅持要留在沖繩，美國開始成為東協對話夥伴，亞太自由貿易新機制更不會缺席。
在這些因素交錯之下，美國以退讓出中國核心利益，來交換中國不反對美國繼續留在亞太，在全球事務上與美國積極配合，這算是個合算的交易，美國滿意、大陸高興、亞太各國安心，唯一被犧牲的，恐怕就只有台灣與西藏了。
聯合聲明是美中台關係的重大變化，雖然有國際結構的因素，但馬政府的國安團隊有責任了解造成此情勢的前因後果，首先，如果美國事先通報內容，而國安決策單位沒有慎重以對、嚴正反應，顯有失職之嫌，如果美國事先連招呼都沒有打，或是我方沒有聽到風聲，那就更令人擔心了。
據說下周美國要派人來台說明，我方應該藉機向美國表達不同意的立場，讓美方經由高層公開發言，或如軍售等實際行動，確認對台灣的安全承諾，以逐步修正聯合聲明的方向。同時在聯合聲明之後，大陸要求和平談判的壓力將接踵而來，可以想見北京一定會把ＥＣＦＡ與談判掛勾，處理的不好，不是讓ＥＣＦＡ觸礁，就是將會引發朝野對立，小則影響選情，大則造成國內分裂，當政者不可不審慎因應。
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Going Our Own Way: Taipei and Beijing Sign MOU during Barack Obama's Mainland Visit
Going Our Own Way: Taipei and Beijing Sign MOU during Barack Obama's Mainland Visit
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 18, 2009
United States President Barack Obama arrived in Beijing on Air Force One, at the same time that Taipei and Beijing were signing a MOU (memorandum of understanding) on cooperation regarding cross-Strait financial supervision.
This coincidence shows that in recent years both the global climate and the cross-Strait micro-climate have changed. Washington and Beijing are on a very different path than in the past. Taipei and Beijing are also going their own way.
Over the past several decades, especially during the Cold War, Taipei took its cue from Washington. When Washington attempted to contain Beijing, Taipei and remained Beijing's Cold War rival. Today however, given Washington-Beijing relations under Barack Obama and Hu Jintao, Taipei can no longer follow Washington's lead on cross-Strait relations. Instead, it must go its own way, and must think about how to go its own way.
The situation can be seen from many different angles. A detailed interpretation of Barack Obama's visit to Beijing and its implications for Washington-Beijing and Taipei-Beijing relations may be a matter of interpretation. But few disagree about its core significance. First, the larger trend reveals a clear tilt toward Beijing. Beijing holds close to a trillion dollars in U.S. debt. Secondly, during the Clinton and Bush administrations, Washington's tune was, "Do not contain Mainland China, instead welcome its participation in the international community." Today Obama's tune is, "There are very few global challenges that can be solved unless the United States and China agree." Thirdly, Obama is leading the U.S. out of Bush's era of "unilateralism." The United States' experience in Iraq and the impact of the financial tsunami have forced it to reexamine its role in the world. Together, these massive changes have impacted Washington-Beijing and Taipei-Beijing relations. Washington-Beijing relations are becoming friendler and more co-operative, and Beijing speaks with greater and greater authority. By the same token, given the new relationship between Washington and Beijing, Taipei must find its own way.
This tilt was hardly an overnight phenomenon. It is a steady trend that has prevailed for over ten years. In 1996, the Republic of China Presidential Election led to a U.S. aircraft carrier intervening in a missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The following year, United States President Bill Clinton spoke of a One-China Policy beneficial to Taiwan. The year after that, in 1998, Bill Clinton visited Mainland China, and in Shanghai issued the "Three Noes" policy. The Three Noes meant the United States did not support Taiwan independence, did not support One China, One Taiwan, and did not support Taiwan's membership in international organizations requiring national sovereignty. At the time, a reporter asked White House national security adviser Samuel Berger "If the democratically elected government on Taiwan were to choose Taiwan independence, or if a plebiscite on Taiwan independence won by a landslide, would the United States still refuse to support it?" Berger's reply at the time was "We would not." Newspaper editorials referred to this framework as "Five Noes." In 2005 Chen Shui-bian proclaimed his support for "democracy without conditions," and the holding of a "Referendum on UN membership." U.S. officials sternly referred to Chen Shui-bian as an advocate of Taiwan independence, who was betraying Taipei's interests. They pointed out that Ah-Bian's attempt to challenge Washington's One-China Policy was akin to driving headlong into a wall. These were the first two times Clinton's "Five Noes" were put into practice. This occurred during the most hawkish, most pro-Taipei Bush administration. Washington-Beijing relations are much closer under Obama and Hu Jintao. Taipei is bound to be more and more marginalized. The trend in cross-Strait relations over the past ten years is even more predictable, given the lack of disagreement between the two sides.
In fact, Chiang Ching-kuo's lifting of martial law, his implementation of a fully democratic system, and his opening of cross-Strait exchanges, could be considered a preview of the huge changes that were to occur. Chiang Ching-kuo was attempting to free Taipei from dependence upon the United States, and to allow Taipei to find its own way. But Lee Teng-hui took a wrong turn in the road. Chen Shui-bian marched farther down that road into a dead end. Chen Shui-bian eventually filed suit with a U.S. military tribunal, and proposed "ceding Taiwan to the United States." He attempted to turn the clock back to a time when Taipei was dependent upon the United States. He succeeded only in acting out an ugly farce.
After 9/11, the quagmire in Iraq, and the financial tsunami, Washington faced massive changes in the state of the world and the state of the nation. It had to reexamine its global strategy. Its relationship with Beijing was among the first it needed to reexamine and change. Any changes were bound to affect Taipei-Washington relations and Taipei-Beijing relations. Although Washington is still concerned about Taipei, it is no longer as powerful as it once was. Taipei must guard against its increasing marginalization in cross-Strait relations, given improving Washington-Beijing relations. It must go its own way.
Since the Ma administration took office, it has improved cross-Strait relations. The U.S. government, including the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, have all sung their praises, with nary a dissenting voice. Some people consider this a sign of close agreement between Taipei and Washington on cross-Strait policy. But others hear overtones of something else entirely. Perhaps this is Washington's way of telling Taipei that it is time for Taipei to go its own way, that it is now on its own.
The MOU the two sides have signed use the terms, "the Taiwan side" and "the Mainland side." This is Taipei going its own way. It is also the two sides finding their own way. Beijing has made a point of reminding Washington that the MOU means Taipei and Beijing have already begun going their own way. The role of the United States will rapidly diminish. A new era of cross-Strait relations has truly arrived!
走自己的路：兩岸在歐巴馬訪陸日簽署MOU
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.18 04:14 am
大概就在美國總統歐巴馬搭乘空軍一號抵達北京的那一刻，台灣和大陸正在進行ＭＯＵ（兩岸金融監理合作瞭解備忘錄）的簽署換文。
此一巧合顯示：在近年世界大氣候及兩岸小氣候的巨變中，美國與中國大陸的關係已經走上了一條與往昔相當不同的道路，而台灣在兩岸關係上也走上了自己的道路。
過去幾十年，在冷戰時代，台灣在兩岸關係上，可以說是走在由美國主導及扶持的道路上。美國以圍堵政策操作冷戰，台灣則藉冷戰與大陸分庭抗禮。但是，如今在歐巴馬與胡錦濤所標舉的美中關係下，台灣不再能走在由美國主導及扶持的路上，而是要走自己的路，且要思考如何以自己的方式走下去。
橫看成嶺側成峰。歐巴馬訪中在美中關係及兩岸關係上應作如何解讀的細節，或許仍有見仁見智之處，但其核心意義卻沒有爭議：一、大勢向中國傾斜，北京掌握約近一兆美元的美國債權只是其中一項。二、柯林頓、布希時代的口吻是：「不要遏堵中國，應歡迎他參加國際社會。」如今歐巴馬的措詞卻是：「除非美中一致聯手，否則許多全球挑戰無以解決。」三、歐巴馬以帶領美國走出布希的「片面主義」自期，而美國經過伊拉克困局及金融海嘯的衝擊，也已開始深切反省其世界角色。這些巨變加總起來，對美中及兩岸關係的影響是：美中關係已經走向一條較往昔友善及合作的道路，且中國的話語權只升不降；相對而言，台灣在新的美中關係下，也必須嘗試走出一條自己的路。
值得注意的是，這種傾斜的大勢，不是一夕造成，而是十餘年來一貫的不變趨勢。一九九六年，總統大選引發美國航空母艦介入台海飛彈危機以後，翌年美國總統柯林頓即發表「一個中國政策對台灣有利」的評論；又次年，一九九八年柯林頓訪問中國，更在上海發表「三不支持」，亦即美國不支持台獨，不支持一中一台，也不支持台灣以國家身分加入國際組織。當場有記者問白宮國家安全顧問柏格：「是否縱使台灣民選政府選擇了（台獨）那條路，或（經由）公民投票而有壓倒性的傾向支持（台獨）時，美國也不支持？」柏格的答覆是：「也不支持。」當時，本報社論曾將此一架構指為「五不支持」。直到二○○八年陳水扁揚言「民主無紅線」，舉行「入聯公投」；美國官方疾言厲色指陳水扁是台獨分子，背叛了台灣的利益，並指：「（扁）欲挑戰『美國的一個中國政策』，是在推車撞壁（hitting into a wall）。」這可視為柯林頓「五不支持」後面兩項的首度實踐，當時卻是一度最挺台灣、最鷹派的布希主政時代。如今，歐巴馬胡錦濤之間更加親密的美中關係，與在美中關係中勢將更加邊緣化、也更不具歧見的兩岸關係，可謂只是順著十餘年來此一大勢巨變的必趨必至而已。
其實，蔣經國的解嚴實施全面民主與開放兩岸交流，可謂正是出於對大勢巨變的預知預感；就本文題旨而言，蔣經國正是嘗試要走出依賴美國的路，而要走上台灣自己的路。但是，後來李登輝把路走岔了，陳水扁更是把路走死了。陳水扁控告美國軍事法庭，主張「割台獻美」；這其實就是想要倒撥時鐘走回由美國扶持的路，卻是徒然演出了一場醜聞鬧劇。
美國在九一一、伊拉克困局及金融海嘯後，面對巨變的世局與國情，當然必須重新設定其全球政略，而美中關係正是美國必須首先調整的樞紐，因而亦必然影響到台美關係與兩岸關係。美國雖然仍會關注台灣，但其性質與力道已非昔比；台灣必須警覺兩岸關係在美中關係中日漸邊緣化的一貫趨勢，而應當及早在兩岸關係上開闢出自己的路，自己走下去。
馬政府就任以來，美國政府對台灣改善兩岸關係的表現，自白宮、國務院、五角大廈，皆一概吐露稱許讚譽之聲，幾乎未聞一語批駁。有人認為，這是台美在兩岸政策上更加契合的象徵；但是，也有人聽出了弦外之音，這或許正是美國要告訴台灣：台灣該走自己的路，該自己走下去了！
ＭＯＵ在此時換文，雙邊各用「台灣方面」及「大陸方面」的名義簽署；這是台灣自己開的路，也是兩岸自己開的路（北京不無以ＭＯＵ向美表示兩岸已有「自己的路」之意），美國的角色將快速淡出，兩岸的新時代已真正來臨了！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 18, 2009
United States President Barack Obama arrived in Beijing on Air Force One, at the same time that Taipei and Beijing were signing a MOU (memorandum of understanding) on cooperation regarding cross-Strait financial supervision.
This coincidence shows that in recent years both the global climate and the cross-Strait micro-climate have changed. Washington and Beijing are on a very different path than in the past. Taipei and Beijing are also going their own way.
Over the past several decades, especially during the Cold War, Taipei took its cue from Washington. When Washington attempted to contain Beijing, Taipei and remained Beijing's Cold War rival. Today however, given Washington-Beijing relations under Barack Obama and Hu Jintao, Taipei can no longer follow Washington's lead on cross-Strait relations. Instead, it must go its own way, and must think about how to go its own way.
The situation can be seen from many different angles. A detailed interpretation of Barack Obama's visit to Beijing and its implications for Washington-Beijing and Taipei-Beijing relations may be a matter of interpretation. But few disagree about its core significance. First, the larger trend reveals a clear tilt toward Beijing. Beijing holds close to a trillion dollars in U.S. debt. Secondly, during the Clinton and Bush administrations, Washington's tune was, "Do not contain Mainland China, instead welcome its participation in the international community." Today Obama's tune is, "There are very few global challenges that can be solved unless the United States and China agree." Thirdly, Obama is leading the U.S. out of Bush's era of "unilateralism." The United States' experience in Iraq and the impact of the financial tsunami have forced it to reexamine its role in the world. Together, these massive changes have impacted Washington-Beijing and Taipei-Beijing relations. Washington-Beijing relations are becoming friendler and more co-operative, and Beijing speaks with greater and greater authority. By the same token, given the new relationship between Washington and Beijing, Taipei must find its own way.
This tilt was hardly an overnight phenomenon. It is a steady trend that has prevailed for over ten years. In 1996, the Republic of China Presidential Election led to a U.S. aircraft carrier intervening in a missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The following year, United States President Bill Clinton spoke of a One-China Policy beneficial to Taiwan. The year after that, in 1998, Bill Clinton visited Mainland China, and in Shanghai issued the "Three Noes" policy. The Three Noes meant the United States did not support Taiwan independence, did not support One China, One Taiwan, and did not support Taiwan's membership in international organizations requiring national sovereignty. At the time, a reporter asked White House national security adviser Samuel Berger "If the democratically elected government on Taiwan were to choose Taiwan independence, or if a plebiscite on Taiwan independence won by a landslide, would the United States still refuse to support it?" Berger's reply at the time was "We would not." Newspaper editorials referred to this framework as "Five Noes." In 2005 Chen Shui-bian proclaimed his support for "democracy without conditions," and the holding of a "Referendum on UN membership." U.S. officials sternly referred to Chen Shui-bian as an advocate of Taiwan independence, who was betraying Taipei's interests. They pointed out that Ah-Bian's attempt to challenge Washington's One-China Policy was akin to driving headlong into a wall. These were the first two times Clinton's "Five Noes" were put into practice. This occurred during the most hawkish, most pro-Taipei Bush administration. Washington-Beijing relations are much closer under Obama and Hu Jintao. Taipei is bound to be more and more marginalized. The trend in cross-Strait relations over the past ten years is even more predictable, given the lack of disagreement between the two sides.
In fact, Chiang Ching-kuo's lifting of martial law, his implementation of a fully democratic system, and his opening of cross-Strait exchanges, could be considered a preview of the huge changes that were to occur. Chiang Ching-kuo was attempting to free Taipei from dependence upon the United States, and to allow Taipei to find its own way. But Lee Teng-hui took a wrong turn in the road. Chen Shui-bian marched farther down that road into a dead end. Chen Shui-bian eventually filed suit with a U.S. military tribunal, and proposed "ceding Taiwan to the United States." He attempted to turn the clock back to a time when Taipei was dependent upon the United States. He succeeded only in acting out an ugly farce.
After 9/11, the quagmire in Iraq, and the financial tsunami, Washington faced massive changes in the state of the world and the state of the nation. It had to reexamine its global strategy. Its relationship with Beijing was among the first it needed to reexamine and change. Any changes were bound to affect Taipei-Washington relations and Taipei-Beijing relations. Although Washington is still concerned about Taipei, it is no longer as powerful as it once was. Taipei must guard against its increasing marginalization in cross-Strait relations, given improving Washington-Beijing relations. It must go its own way.
Since the Ma administration took office, it has improved cross-Strait relations. The U.S. government, including the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, have all sung their praises, with nary a dissenting voice. Some people consider this a sign of close agreement between Taipei and Washington on cross-Strait policy. But others hear overtones of something else entirely. Perhaps this is Washington's way of telling Taipei that it is time for Taipei to go its own way, that it is now on its own.
The MOU the two sides have signed use the terms, "the Taiwan side" and "the Mainland side." This is Taipei going its own way. It is also the two sides finding their own way. Beijing has made a point of reminding Washington that the MOU means Taipei and Beijing have already begun going their own way. The role of the United States will rapidly diminish. A new era of cross-Strait relations has truly arrived!
走自己的路：兩岸在歐巴馬訪陸日簽署MOU
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.18 04:14 am
大概就在美國總統歐巴馬搭乘空軍一號抵達北京的那一刻，台灣和大陸正在進行ＭＯＵ（兩岸金融監理合作瞭解備忘錄）的簽署換文。
此一巧合顯示：在近年世界大氣候及兩岸小氣候的巨變中，美國與中國大陸的關係已經走上了一條與往昔相當不同的道路，而台灣在兩岸關係上也走上了自己的道路。
過去幾十年，在冷戰時代，台灣在兩岸關係上，可以說是走在由美國主導及扶持的道路上。美國以圍堵政策操作冷戰，台灣則藉冷戰與大陸分庭抗禮。但是，如今在歐巴馬與胡錦濤所標舉的美中關係下，台灣不再能走在由美國主導及扶持的路上，而是要走自己的路，且要思考如何以自己的方式走下去。
橫看成嶺側成峰。歐巴馬訪中在美中關係及兩岸關係上應作如何解讀的細節，或許仍有見仁見智之處，但其核心意義卻沒有爭議：一、大勢向中國傾斜，北京掌握約近一兆美元的美國債權只是其中一項。二、柯林頓、布希時代的口吻是：「不要遏堵中國，應歡迎他參加國際社會。」如今歐巴馬的措詞卻是：「除非美中一致聯手，否則許多全球挑戰無以解決。」三、歐巴馬以帶領美國走出布希的「片面主義」自期，而美國經過伊拉克困局及金融海嘯的衝擊，也已開始深切反省其世界角色。這些巨變加總起來，對美中及兩岸關係的影響是：美中關係已經走向一條較往昔友善及合作的道路，且中國的話語權只升不降；相對而言，台灣在新的美中關係下，也必須嘗試走出一條自己的路。
值得注意的是，這種傾斜的大勢，不是一夕造成，而是十餘年來一貫的不變趨勢。一九九六年，總統大選引發美國航空母艦介入台海飛彈危機以後，翌年美國總統柯林頓即發表「一個中國政策對台灣有利」的評論；又次年，一九九八年柯林頓訪問中國，更在上海發表「三不支持」，亦即美國不支持台獨，不支持一中一台，也不支持台灣以國家身分加入國際組織。當場有記者問白宮國家安全顧問柏格：「是否縱使台灣民選政府選擇了（台獨）那條路，或（經由）公民投票而有壓倒性的傾向支持（台獨）時，美國也不支持？」柏格的答覆是：「也不支持。」當時，本報社論曾將此一架構指為「五不支持」。直到二○○八年陳水扁揚言「民主無紅線」，舉行「入聯公投」；美國官方疾言厲色指陳水扁是台獨分子，背叛了台灣的利益，並指：「（扁）欲挑戰『美國的一個中國政策』，是在推車撞壁（hitting into a wall）。」這可視為柯林頓「五不支持」後面兩項的首度實踐，當時卻是一度最挺台灣、最鷹派的布希主政時代。如今，歐巴馬胡錦濤之間更加親密的美中關係，與在美中關係中勢將更加邊緣化、也更不具歧見的兩岸關係，可謂只是順著十餘年來此一大勢巨變的必趨必至而已。
其實，蔣經國的解嚴實施全面民主與開放兩岸交流，可謂正是出於對大勢巨變的預知預感；就本文題旨而言，蔣經國正是嘗試要走出依賴美國的路，而要走上台灣自己的路。但是，後來李登輝把路走岔了，陳水扁更是把路走死了。陳水扁控告美國軍事法庭，主張「割台獻美」；這其實就是想要倒撥時鐘走回由美國扶持的路，卻是徒然演出了一場醜聞鬧劇。
美國在九一一、伊拉克困局及金融海嘯後，面對巨變的世局與國情，當然必須重新設定其全球政略，而美中關係正是美國必須首先調整的樞紐，因而亦必然影響到台美關係與兩岸關係。美國雖然仍會關注台灣，但其性質與力道已非昔比；台灣必須警覺兩岸關係在美中關係中日漸邊緣化的一貫趨勢，而應當及早在兩岸關係上開闢出自己的路，自己走下去。
馬政府就任以來，美國政府對台灣改善兩岸關係的表現，自白宮、國務院、五角大廈，皆一概吐露稱許讚譽之聲，幾乎未聞一語批駁。有人認為，這是台美在兩岸政策上更加契合的象徵；但是，也有人聽出了弦外之音，這或許正是美國要告訴台灣：台灣該走自己的路，該自己走下去了！
ＭＯＵ在此時換文，雙邊各用「台灣方面」及「大陸方面」的名義簽署；這是台灣自己開的路，也是兩岸自己開的路（北京不無以ＭＯＵ向美表示兩岸已有「自己的路」之意），美國的角色將快速淡出，兩岸的新時代已真正來臨了！
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
From Cross-Strait Negotiations to Regional and International Economic and Trade Negotiations
From Cross-Strait Negotiations to Regional and International Economic and Trade Negotiations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 17, 2009
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit (APEC), which opened on the 15th in Singapore, has reached a successful conclusion. In the wake of the global financial tsunami, many nations are struggling to get back on the road to recovery. The theme of the summit was "sustainable growth, regional linkage." It clearly conveyed the inevitable trend toward regional economic integration. In order to to safeguard the nation's development, and to avoid being isolated, the Republic of China must pick up the pace by actively seeking opportunities to participate.
APEC is often regarded as nothing more than a political shindig. The main attraction has long been the impromptu "fashion show" put on by the leaders of the summit, who appear before the media in traditional clothing from the host nation. But this year discussions resulted in a clear consensus. Asia-Pacific regional reconstruction and trade and economic integration increased. And Mainland China has been acknowledgeds as the locomotive that will lead the Asia-Pacific region out of its economic plight.
Even the United States was afraid of being shut out. President Barack Obama announced that the United States would join the "Pan-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement," and conduct exchanges with TPP Member States. He believes it will provide jobs and economic prosperity for the American people. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also pointed out that the TPP can be a model for regional free trade agreements. Following Obama's unambiguous declaration, the desire of Asia-Pacific nations to join was even greater. The TPP may develop to the point where it includes the twenty-one Member States of the APEC free trade region.
In fact, the pace of Asia-Pacific trade and economic integration has accelerated in recent years. Mainland China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are already principal members of "ASEAN plus One." This has had an immediate impact on Taiwan. We may soon face "ASEAN plus Three" and other such free trade blocs. Taiwan is dependent on foreign trade. Being excluded from such free-trade groups, means the loss of important opportunities for development. The impact will be incalculable.
Last year's financial tsunami flooded the world. It also led to an unprecedented global fight to save the economy. It highlighted the importance of regional trade groups. As the economies of Europe and the United States gasp for air, emerging nations have seized the opportunity to establish themselves. The light of the G8 has faded. The G20 has become a forum for the discussion and establishment of new financial standards. Many feel that only the G2 ─ the United States and Mainland China, are able to lead the world. An economic catastrophe has changed the world's political and economic ecology. Their thinking is now very different. The Asia-Pacific region's evaluation of Mainland China is much higher. Nations around the world now pay much more attention to Mainland China's influence.
Amidst such an atmosphere, many regions have formed free trade blocs. The Asia-Pacific countries in particular see Beijing as a candidate for free trade links. In the past Taipei was subject to political constraints. Establishing free trade agreements was very difficult. Suppose the twenty one countries of APEC establish a free trade zone. This once loose organization will become a free-trade group that includes over 200 million people. At the very least it will increase APEC's trade and economic integration. If Taipei can not join, the situation will become critical. Especially this time, APEC nations held a climate conference outside the conference. Taipei alone was left out in the cold. This underscored even more the importance of joining more international groups as soon as possible.
In the past, the one blocking Taipei was Beijing. This pressure has now diminished. Taipei now has more opportunities to participate. This demonstrates the importance of signing the agreement on cross-Strait economic cooperation (ECFA). ECFA is not merely a channel by which Taipei can expand cross-Strait business opportunities. It is also a basis by which it can talk and establish free trade agreements with other nations. During an era in which economic and trade exchanges are increasingly conducted through groupings, If Taipei fails to find a way in, will find itself with less and less room to maneuver.
This of course, is no easy task. Cross-Strait consultations on ECFA were a complex and difficult process, filled with surprises. The atmosphere was uncertain. Even though it was finally signed, will follow-up co-operation proceed smoothly? Will it break the impasse over negotiations with other countries regarding FTAs? Just what are the limits of Beijing's goodwill? Can Taipei establish a new model of international cooperation in the space opened up? Taipei continues to face many challenges.
Former Vice President Lien Chan attended the APEC summit as President Ma Ying-jeou's representative. Fortunately he and Mainland Chinese President Hu Jintao made clear that the launching of ECFA this year established a new starting point. The MOU concerning further cross-Strait financial cooperation was signed on the 16th. We hope its provisions can be implemented smoothly, creating additional opportunities for Taiwan's economic development.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.17
社論－經由兩岸協商 連結區域與國際經貿
本報訊
本屆亞太經合會議（ＡＰＥＣ）十五日在新加坡圓滿落幕，在全球金融海嘯後，各國正努力走出低迷邁向復甦，這次會議以「永續成長，連結區域」為主題，鮮明傳達出區域經貿整合已是必然趨勢。為了維護國家發展避免受到孤立，台灣必須加緊腳步，積極尋求參與的機會。
雖然ＡＰＥＣ過去常被視為一場政治大拜拜，最熱鬧的主秀是參與峰會的領袖穿上當地傳統服裝亮相，但綜觀今年的研討與結論，亞太地區攜手重建、加強經貿整合的氣氛比以往更濃，共識相當一致，而無疑地，中國則已被公認是帶領亞太走出經濟險灘的火車頭。
這樣的大趨勢，美國也不敢置身於外。美國總統歐巴馬因此宣布，美國將加入「泛太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協定」（the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement），與ＴＰＰ會員國交往，相信將帶給美國人民就業機會和經濟繁榮。新加坡總理李顯龍也指出，ＴＰＰ可以成為一個區域自由貿易協定的模範。在歐巴馬明確表態之後，亞太地區國家加入的意願更高，未來ＴＰＰ可能發展成涵蓋ＡＰＥＣ廿一個會員國的自由貿易區。
事實上，亞太經貿整合的腳步近年來不斷加速，以中國與東南亞國協為主軸的「東協加一」即將上路，勢必對台灣造成立即的衝擊，而接下來我們還可能面對的「東協加三」等不同的自貿板塊。對於依賴外貿甚深的台灣，被排除在這些自由貿易集團之外，將意味著失去許多重要的發展機會，影響將難以估計。
去年底金融海嘯淹沒全球，也因此促成史上前所未見的全球聯手挽救經濟大作戰。集團的重要性因此受到彰顯，而在歐美經濟奄奄一息的同時，新興國家趁勢取得更重要的地位；Ｇ８光芒褪色，Ｇ20成為討論及設定金融新規範的論壇，而最能主導世局的，咸認唯有Ｇ２─美國與中國。一場經濟浩劫，讓全球政經生態為之丕變，思維觀念也大為不同；亞太地區對中國的評價與寄望更高，世界各國也更加重視中國的影響力。
在這種氣氛下，許多地區紛紛形成自由貿易區塊，亞太國家更是以中國為連結標的。台灣過去受限於政治問題，自由貿易協定的談判很不順利。如果未來ＡＰＥＣ廿一個國家進一步形成自由貿易區，讓這個原本鬆散的組織變成涵蓋廿多億人口的自貿集團，或至少讓ＡＰＥＣ國家的經貿整合更加緊密，那麼台灣能不能加入，就至關緊要了。尤其這次ＡＰＥＣ國家又針對氣候問題舉行會外會，獨獨台灣無緣參加，更凸顯出儘早加入更多國際運作的重要性。
過去卡住台灣的是中共的阻擋，當這個壓力減輕時，台灣可能會有機會爭取更多的參與。由此可知，兩岸簽署經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）的重要性，因為它不僅是台灣擴展兩岸商機的管道，更是進一步與其他國家商談自由貿易協議的基礎。在這個經貿交流日趨集團化的時代，台灣不找到入門的路，生存空間恐怕會愈來愈窄。
當然，這不是一項容易的工程，光是兩岸協商ＥＣＦＡ，就已經需要一番複雜困難的過程，其間變數百出，氣氛晴雨不定，而即使終能簽定，後續的合作能否順利推動，是不是能因此打破與其他國家洽談自貿協定的僵局，而中共善意的上限又在哪裡，台灣能不能在新的空間裡開創新的國際合作模式，也面臨著諸多考驗。
所幸這次代表馬英九總統出席ＡＰＥＣ峰會的前副總統連戰與中國國家主席胡錦濤會晤時，胡錦濤明確表示兩岸ＥＣＦＡ協商在今年內啟動，算是明確設定了一個起跑點，而攸關兩岸進一步金融合作的ＭＯＵ也於十六日完成換文簽署，希望各項協商能自此順利推動，為台灣的未來發展開創更多契機。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 17, 2009
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit (APEC), which opened on the 15th in Singapore, has reached a successful conclusion. In the wake of the global financial tsunami, many nations are struggling to get back on the road to recovery. The theme of the summit was "sustainable growth, regional linkage." It clearly conveyed the inevitable trend toward regional economic integration. In order to to safeguard the nation's development, and to avoid being isolated, the Republic of China must pick up the pace by actively seeking opportunities to participate.
APEC is often regarded as nothing more than a political shindig. The main attraction has long been the impromptu "fashion show" put on by the leaders of the summit, who appear before the media in traditional clothing from the host nation. But this year discussions resulted in a clear consensus. Asia-Pacific regional reconstruction and trade and economic integration increased. And Mainland China has been acknowledgeds as the locomotive that will lead the Asia-Pacific region out of its economic plight.
Even the United States was afraid of being shut out. President Barack Obama announced that the United States would join the "Pan-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement," and conduct exchanges with TPP Member States. He believes it will provide jobs and economic prosperity for the American people. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also pointed out that the TPP can be a model for regional free trade agreements. Following Obama's unambiguous declaration, the desire of Asia-Pacific nations to join was even greater. The TPP may develop to the point where it includes the twenty-one Member States of the APEC free trade region.
In fact, the pace of Asia-Pacific trade and economic integration has accelerated in recent years. Mainland China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are already principal members of "ASEAN plus One." This has had an immediate impact on Taiwan. We may soon face "ASEAN plus Three" and other such free trade blocs. Taiwan is dependent on foreign trade. Being excluded from such free-trade groups, means the loss of important opportunities for development. The impact will be incalculable.
Last year's financial tsunami flooded the world. It also led to an unprecedented global fight to save the economy. It highlighted the importance of regional trade groups. As the economies of Europe and the United States gasp for air, emerging nations have seized the opportunity to establish themselves. The light of the G8 has faded. The G20 has become a forum for the discussion and establishment of new financial standards. Many feel that only the G2 ─ the United States and Mainland China, are able to lead the world. An economic catastrophe has changed the world's political and economic ecology. Their thinking is now very different. The Asia-Pacific region's evaluation of Mainland China is much higher. Nations around the world now pay much more attention to Mainland China's influence.
Amidst such an atmosphere, many regions have formed free trade blocs. The Asia-Pacific countries in particular see Beijing as a candidate for free trade links. In the past Taipei was subject to political constraints. Establishing free trade agreements was very difficult. Suppose the twenty one countries of APEC establish a free trade zone. This once loose organization will become a free-trade group that includes over 200 million people. At the very least it will increase APEC's trade and economic integration. If Taipei can not join, the situation will become critical. Especially this time, APEC nations held a climate conference outside the conference. Taipei alone was left out in the cold. This underscored even more the importance of joining more international groups as soon as possible.
In the past, the one blocking Taipei was Beijing. This pressure has now diminished. Taipei now has more opportunities to participate. This demonstrates the importance of signing the agreement on cross-Strait economic cooperation (ECFA). ECFA is not merely a channel by which Taipei can expand cross-Strait business opportunities. It is also a basis by which it can talk and establish free trade agreements with other nations. During an era in which economic and trade exchanges are increasingly conducted through groupings, If Taipei fails to find a way in, will find itself with less and less room to maneuver.
This of course, is no easy task. Cross-Strait consultations on ECFA were a complex and difficult process, filled with surprises. The atmosphere was uncertain. Even though it was finally signed, will follow-up co-operation proceed smoothly? Will it break the impasse over negotiations with other countries regarding FTAs? Just what are the limits of Beijing's goodwill? Can Taipei establish a new model of international cooperation in the space opened up? Taipei continues to face many challenges.
Former Vice President Lien Chan attended the APEC summit as President Ma Ying-jeou's representative. Fortunately he and Mainland Chinese President Hu Jintao made clear that the launching of ECFA this year established a new starting point. The MOU concerning further cross-Strait financial cooperation was signed on the 16th. We hope its provisions can be implemented smoothly, creating additional opportunities for Taiwan's economic development.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.17
社論－經由兩岸協商 連結區域與國際經貿
本報訊
本屆亞太經合會議（ＡＰＥＣ）十五日在新加坡圓滿落幕，在全球金融海嘯後，各國正努力走出低迷邁向復甦，這次會議以「永續成長，連結區域」為主題，鮮明傳達出區域經貿整合已是必然趨勢。為了維護國家發展避免受到孤立，台灣必須加緊腳步，積極尋求參與的機會。
雖然ＡＰＥＣ過去常被視為一場政治大拜拜，最熱鬧的主秀是參與峰會的領袖穿上當地傳統服裝亮相，但綜觀今年的研討與結論，亞太地區攜手重建、加強經貿整合的氣氛比以往更濃，共識相當一致，而無疑地，中國則已被公認是帶領亞太走出經濟險灘的火車頭。
這樣的大趨勢，美國也不敢置身於外。美國總統歐巴馬因此宣布，美國將加入「泛太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協定」（the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement），與ＴＰＰ會員國交往，相信將帶給美國人民就業機會和經濟繁榮。新加坡總理李顯龍也指出，ＴＰＰ可以成為一個區域自由貿易協定的模範。在歐巴馬明確表態之後，亞太地區國家加入的意願更高，未來ＴＰＰ可能發展成涵蓋ＡＰＥＣ廿一個會員國的自由貿易區。
事實上，亞太經貿整合的腳步近年來不斷加速，以中國與東南亞國協為主軸的「東協加一」即將上路，勢必對台灣造成立即的衝擊，而接下來我們還可能面對的「東協加三」等不同的自貿板塊。對於依賴外貿甚深的台灣，被排除在這些自由貿易集團之外，將意味著失去許多重要的發展機會，影響將難以估計。
去年底金融海嘯淹沒全球，也因此促成史上前所未見的全球聯手挽救經濟大作戰。集團的重要性因此受到彰顯，而在歐美經濟奄奄一息的同時，新興國家趁勢取得更重要的地位；Ｇ８光芒褪色，Ｇ20成為討論及設定金融新規範的論壇，而最能主導世局的，咸認唯有Ｇ２─美國與中國。一場經濟浩劫，讓全球政經生態為之丕變，思維觀念也大為不同；亞太地區對中國的評價與寄望更高，世界各國也更加重視中國的影響力。
在這種氣氛下，許多地區紛紛形成自由貿易區塊，亞太國家更是以中國為連結標的。台灣過去受限於政治問題，自由貿易協定的談判很不順利。如果未來ＡＰＥＣ廿一個國家進一步形成自由貿易區，讓這個原本鬆散的組織變成涵蓋廿多億人口的自貿集團，或至少讓ＡＰＥＣ國家的經貿整合更加緊密，那麼台灣能不能加入，就至關緊要了。尤其這次ＡＰＥＣ國家又針對氣候問題舉行會外會，獨獨台灣無緣參加，更凸顯出儘早加入更多國際運作的重要性。
過去卡住台灣的是中共的阻擋，當這個壓力減輕時，台灣可能會有機會爭取更多的參與。由此可知，兩岸簽署經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）的重要性，因為它不僅是台灣擴展兩岸商機的管道，更是進一步與其他國家商談自由貿易協議的基礎。在這個經貿交流日趨集團化的時代，台灣不找到入門的路，生存空間恐怕會愈來愈窄。
當然，這不是一項容易的工程，光是兩岸協商ＥＣＦＡ，就已經需要一番複雜困難的過程，其間變數百出，氣氛晴雨不定，而即使終能簽定，後續的合作能否順利推動，是不是能因此打破與其他國家洽談自貿協定的僵局，而中共善意的上限又在哪裡，台灣能不能在新的空間裡開創新的國際合作模式，也面臨著諸多考驗。
所幸這次代表馬英九總統出席ＡＰＥＣ峰會的前副總統連戰與中國國家主席胡錦濤會晤時，胡錦濤明確表示兩岸ＥＣＦＡ協商在今年內啟動，算是明確設定了一個起跑點，而攸關兩岸進一步金融合作的ＭＯＵ也於十六日完成換文簽署，希望各項協商能自此順利推動，為台灣的未來發展開創更多契機。
Monday, November 16, 2009
The Next 60 Years of Cross-Strait Relations: A Broader Path, A More Elevated Perspective
The Next 60 Years of Cross-Strait Relations: A Broader Path, A More Elevated Perspective
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 16, 2009
The current "Two Sides, One Jiazi (traditional Chinese 60 year cycle) Seminar" is perceived as a second channel for communications between Taipei and Beijing. Speaking from a packed hall, Zheng Bijian, head of the Mainland delegation, made two remarks that left a deep impression. She said "Our vision will determine our prospects. Our thinking will offer us solutions."
The function of the seminar is to test the waters. Each side will of course express its views. Differences may arise during the seminar, whether from 60 years ago or a mere five years ago. There may be significant differences of opinion. But our vision and thinking are considerably more sophisticated than they once were, and cannot be thought of in the same terms. Consider the mainland delegation's remark that 30 years ago, Mainland China spoke of "assuming responsibility for world revolution," of "liberating Taiwan," and of "class struggle as the key." Today Zheng Bijian speaks of "Three Harmonies," specifically, international peace (he ping), domestic tranquility (he xie), and cross-strait reconciliation (he jie). Compare the present and the past. Our vision is bolder, and our thinking is freer. Twenty years ago, Beijing was saying that "The Republic of China has been destroyed." But today Liu Guosheng, President of Xiamen University, spoke of "national spheres vs. international spheres." He openly proclaimed that "China is a national sphere. It is comprised of two political authorities: the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. They sit back to back, each representing China like the two sides of the same coin." This represents an elevation of vision, and a broadening of thinking.
Zheng Bijian's interpretation allows us to borrow and fine-tune our vision and our thinking. The two sides have come a long way. Our vision does indeed determine our prospects. Our thinking does indeed offer solutions. But perhaps we should invert Zheng's formulation, and instead allow our prospects to determine our vision, and our solutions to determine out thinking.
What is vision? The main component of vision is knowledge. Mao Zedong foisted the Cultural Revolution and people's communes upon the public. He created a lethal cocktail of "Marxi/Engels/Lenin/Stalin/Mao" thinking. He did so primarily because he was intellectually ignorant. Song Jiang and Zhang Xienzhong could not control 20th century China. When Deng Xiaoping launched the "Bianshi (flog Mao's corpse) Revolution," he was forced to do so by circumstances. When he embarked on "reform and liberalization," he really wasn't sure where he was headed. Hence the metaphor of "crossing the river by feeling the stones" that has guided Beijing for the past twenty years. All of this was originally a result of intellectual uncertainty. But today, thirty years of reform and liberalization have been a huge success. Right and wrong are now clear-cut. Scientific data has replaced "satellite launches" (the exaggerated reporting of production figures). The profit motive has replaced the waving of red flags. Politics was once in command. Now knowledge rules the roost. Today the problem is no longer a lack of knowledge or a lack of vision. From this day forward, the limiting factor will be our prospects, our willingness to apply our knowledge and consult our consciences, and our determination to remain true to our ideals. Yesterday political ideology prevented us from finding a solution to our dilemma. Today we have found a solution, because our thinking is no longer constrained by political ideology. The main theme of cross-Strait relations in the future must be: "Our prospects determine our vision, our solution determines our thinking."
Given such an understanding, we were surprised by Zheng's conclusion: "peaceful reunification / one country, two systems." Actually "peaceful reunification / one country, two systems" should be considered obsolete pre-2008 thinking. Why? Because such a prospect prevents us from finding any solution. That is why the 2005 Lien/Hu Summit set forth the theory of "peaceful development." Our prospects were suddenly better. Our solution was suddenly obvious. Today we live in a post-2008 era. The "1992 Consensus" remains the overarching framework for cross-Strait policy, followed logically by "One China, Different Interpretations." This, in terms of our vision, our prospects, our thinking, and our solutions, has transcended the rhetoric of "peaceful reunification / one country, two systems." Were Zheng's remarks a case of backpedalling regarding prospects and solutions?
During the seminar the Beijing delegation said it recognized only the "1992 Consensus." It did not recognize "One China, Different Interpretations." But if even "One China, Different Interpretations" is seen as contrary to the "One China Principle," then "unification" means "I intend to swallow you up." Does such a prospect really offer any solution?
Beijing has said that "Anything is up for discussion." In fact, what the two sides need to discuss most is prospects and solutions. For example, what is "China," but a question of prospects? Must one side swallow up the other in cross-Strait politics? That is an issue pertaining to solutions.
Despite our differences, we vigorously affirm the vision and thinking of the current cross-Straits seminar. We expect that the coming 60 year cycle will offer an even broader vision, even brighter prospects, even more liberated thinking, and even more solutions for cross-Strait relations.
兩岸下一甲子：出路要寬，境界要高
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.16 03:37 am
這次「兩岸一甲子研討會」，被視為雙方的「二軌對話」。發言盈庭之中，大陸團長鄭必堅的兩句話令人印象深刻；他說：「眼界決定境界，思路決定出路。」
此會的功能既是投石問路，各抒己見亦是理所當然。然而，會中出現的歧見若與一甲子前、甚或五年前的歧見相較，歧見雖仍有歧見，但「眼界」與「思路」皆已有大幅的精進，不可同日而語。即以大陸方面的發言而論，三十年前，中國大陸對外主張「以世界革命為己任」，對台灣主張「解放台灣」，對內主張「以階級鬥爭為綱」；如今則出現了鄭必堅的「三和理論」（對外和平，對內和諧，兩岸和解）。今昔對照，眼界提高，思路亦開。又如，二十年前，北京的主旋律是「中華民國已經滅亡」，但如今則有廈門大學劉國深院長的「國家球體／國際星系」論，明白標舉：「中國這個『國家球體』的球面，是由中華人民共和國與中華民國兩個競爭中的政權構成，她們分別在背對背的空間和場合代表著中國，雙方形成了事實上『一體兩面』的關係。」這裡也看到了眼界與思路的提高和放大。
鄭必堅的說法，容我們借用並調整一下。我們認為，兩岸能從過去走到今天，確實是「眼界決定境界／思路決定出路」；但欲從今天走向未來，也許應當調整成「境界決定眼界／出路決定思路」。
什麼是眼界？眼界的主要成分是知識。毛澤東之所以用人民公社及文化大革命，來實踐其「馬／恩／列／史／毛」的「雞尾酒式的共產主義」，主要是因他的知識貧弱；宋江加張獻忠不能治理二十世紀的中國。到了鄧小平等發動對毛澤東的鞭屍革命，則主要仍是迫於形勢不得不然；至於提出「改革開放」的主張，其實當時一切都還說不準，所以「摸著石頭過河」這句話用了二十餘年，原因亦在知識上的不確定性。但是，到了今天，改革開放三十年已見巨大成效，是非黑白已是一清二楚，科學統計數字已代替了「放衛星」，利潤誘因則代替了「搖紅旗」；一切已從政治掛帥變成知識掛帥。所以，就知識與眼界而論，如今皆已不是問題；從現在走向未來，決定因素是在境界，也就是決定在使用知識的良知、理想與胸襟。相對而言，過去以政治意識形態的「思路」，侷限了「出路」；如今若看見了「出路」，則不能再被政治意識形態的「思路」所綑綁。同樣的道理，這也應當是未來兩岸關係的主軸思維：「境界決定眼界，出路決定思路。」
出於這樣的見解，我們對鄭必堅的談話仍以「和平統一／一國兩制」為歸結，頗感意外。其實，「和平統一／一國兩制」應當是「前二○○八」的語彙；正因此一論述的「境界」與「出路」皆有侷限，所以才有二○○五年「連胡會」提出了「和平發展論」，是「境界」的提升，也是「出路」的放大。到了「後二○○ 八」的今天，「九二共識」已是兩岸的政策主軸，「一中各表」則是其必然存在的潛台詞；這無論在眼界、境界、及思路、出路上，皆已超越了「和平統一／一國兩制」的論述。鄭必堅的談話，會不會是境界與出路上的倒退？
北京方面有人在會中說，只承認「九二共識」，不承認「一中各表」。但是，倘若連「一中各表」也被視為違背「一個中國的原則」，且所謂的「統一」也就是「我吃掉你」；試問，這個方案的「境界」如何？又難道會是「出路」？
北京一直說「什麼都能談」；其實，兩岸要談的就是「境界」與「出路」。例如，什麼是「中國」，其實是一個「境界」的問題；又如，兩岸的政治方案是否只有「我吃掉你」一個版本，則是「出路」問題。
我們對這次充滿「歧見」、但眼界與思路皆已見相對開闊的兩岸研討會表示高度肯定，亦對下一甲子的兩岸關係可望有更加開闊的眼界、境界、思路、出路，寄以高度的期待。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 16, 2009
The current "Two Sides, One Jiazi (traditional Chinese 60 year cycle) Seminar" is perceived as a second channel for communications between Taipei and Beijing. Speaking from a packed hall, Zheng Bijian, head of the Mainland delegation, made two remarks that left a deep impression. She said "Our vision will determine our prospects. Our thinking will offer us solutions."
The function of the seminar is to test the waters. Each side will of course express its views. Differences may arise during the seminar, whether from 60 years ago or a mere five years ago. There may be significant differences of opinion. But our vision and thinking are considerably more sophisticated than they once were, and cannot be thought of in the same terms. Consider the mainland delegation's remark that 30 years ago, Mainland China spoke of "assuming responsibility for world revolution," of "liberating Taiwan," and of "class struggle as the key." Today Zheng Bijian speaks of "Three Harmonies," specifically, international peace (he ping), domestic tranquility (he xie), and cross-strait reconciliation (he jie). Compare the present and the past. Our vision is bolder, and our thinking is freer. Twenty years ago, Beijing was saying that "The Republic of China has been destroyed." But today Liu Guosheng, President of Xiamen University, spoke of "national spheres vs. international spheres." He openly proclaimed that "China is a national sphere. It is comprised of two political authorities: the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. They sit back to back, each representing China like the two sides of the same coin." This represents an elevation of vision, and a broadening of thinking.
Zheng Bijian's interpretation allows us to borrow and fine-tune our vision and our thinking. The two sides have come a long way. Our vision does indeed determine our prospects. Our thinking does indeed offer solutions. But perhaps we should invert Zheng's formulation, and instead allow our prospects to determine our vision, and our solutions to determine out thinking.
What is vision? The main component of vision is knowledge. Mao Zedong foisted the Cultural Revolution and people's communes upon the public. He created a lethal cocktail of "Marxi/Engels/Lenin/Stalin/Mao" thinking. He did so primarily because he was intellectually ignorant. Song Jiang and Zhang Xienzhong could not control 20th century China. When Deng Xiaoping launched the "Bianshi (flog Mao's corpse) Revolution," he was forced to do so by circumstances. When he embarked on "reform and liberalization," he really wasn't sure where he was headed. Hence the metaphor of "crossing the river by feeling the stones" that has guided Beijing for the past twenty years. All of this was originally a result of intellectual uncertainty. But today, thirty years of reform and liberalization have been a huge success. Right and wrong are now clear-cut. Scientific data has replaced "satellite launches" (the exaggerated reporting of production figures). The profit motive has replaced the waving of red flags. Politics was once in command. Now knowledge rules the roost. Today the problem is no longer a lack of knowledge or a lack of vision. From this day forward, the limiting factor will be our prospects, our willingness to apply our knowledge and consult our consciences, and our determination to remain true to our ideals. Yesterday political ideology prevented us from finding a solution to our dilemma. Today we have found a solution, because our thinking is no longer constrained by political ideology. The main theme of cross-Strait relations in the future must be: "Our prospects determine our vision, our solution determines our thinking."
Given such an understanding, we were surprised by Zheng's conclusion: "peaceful reunification / one country, two systems." Actually "peaceful reunification / one country, two systems" should be considered obsolete pre-2008 thinking. Why? Because such a prospect prevents us from finding any solution. That is why the 2005 Lien/Hu Summit set forth the theory of "peaceful development." Our prospects were suddenly better. Our solution was suddenly obvious. Today we live in a post-2008 era. The "1992 Consensus" remains the overarching framework for cross-Strait policy, followed logically by "One China, Different Interpretations." This, in terms of our vision, our prospects, our thinking, and our solutions, has transcended the rhetoric of "peaceful reunification / one country, two systems." Were Zheng's remarks a case of backpedalling regarding prospects and solutions?
During the seminar the Beijing delegation said it recognized only the "1992 Consensus." It did not recognize "One China, Different Interpretations." But if even "One China, Different Interpretations" is seen as contrary to the "One China Principle," then "unification" means "I intend to swallow you up." Does such a prospect really offer any solution?
Beijing has said that "Anything is up for discussion." In fact, what the two sides need to discuss most is prospects and solutions. For example, what is "China," but a question of prospects? Must one side swallow up the other in cross-Strait politics? That is an issue pertaining to solutions.
Despite our differences, we vigorously affirm the vision and thinking of the current cross-Straits seminar. We expect that the coming 60 year cycle will offer an even broader vision, even brighter prospects, even more liberated thinking, and even more solutions for cross-Strait relations.
兩岸下一甲子：出路要寬，境界要高
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.16 03:37 am
這次「兩岸一甲子研討會」，被視為雙方的「二軌對話」。發言盈庭之中，大陸團長鄭必堅的兩句話令人印象深刻；他說：「眼界決定境界，思路決定出路。」
此會的功能既是投石問路，各抒己見亦是理所當然。然而，會中出現的歧見若與一甲子前、甚或五年前的歧見相較，歧見雖仍有歧見，但「眼界」與「思路」皆已有大幅的精進，不可同日而語。即以大陸方面的發言而論，三十年前，中國大陸對外主張「以世界革命為己任」，對台灣主張「解放台灣」，對內主張「以階級鬥爭為綱」；如今則出現了鄭必堅的「三和理論」（對外和平，對內和諧，兩岸和解）。今昔對照，眼界提高，思路亦開。又如，二十年前，北京的主旋律是「中華民國已經滅亡」，但如今則有廈門大學劉國深院長的「國家球體／國際星系」論，明白標舉：「中國這個『國家球體』的球面，是由中華人民共和國與中華民國兩個競爭中的政權構成，她們分別在背對背的空間和場合代表著中國，雙方形成了事實上『一體兩面』的關係。」這裡也看到了眼界與思路的提高和放大。
鄭必堅的說法，容我們借用並調整一下。我們認為，兩岸能從過去走到今天，確實是「眼界決定境界／思路決定出路」；但欲從今天走向未來，也許應當調整成「境界決定眼界／出路決定思路」。
什麼是眼界？眼界的主要成分是知識。毛澤東之所以用人民公社及文化大革命，來實踐其「馬／恩／列／史／毛」的「雞尾酒式的共產主義」，主要是因他的知識貧弱；宋江加張獻忠不能治理二十世紀的中國。到了鄧小平等發動對毛澤東的鞭屍革命，則主要仍是迫於形勢不得不然；至於提出「改革開放」的主張，其實當時一切都還說不準，所以「摸著石頭過河」這句話用了二十餘年，原因亦在知識上的不確定性。但是，到了今天，改革開放三十年已見巨大成效，是非黑白已是一清二楚，科學統計數字已代替了「放衛星」，利潤誘因則代替了「搖紅旗」；一切已從政治掛帥變成知識掛帥。所以，就知識與眼界而論，如今皆已不是問題；從現在走向未來，決定因素是在境界，也就是決定在使用知識的良知、理想與胸襟。相對而言，過去以政治意識形態的「思路」，侷限了「出路」；如今若看見了「出路」，則不能再被政治意識形態的「思路」所綑綁。同樣的道理，這也應當是未來兩岸關係的主軸思維：「境界決定眼界，出路決定思路。」
出於這樣的見解，我們對鄭必堅的談話仍以「和平統一／一國兩制」為歸結，頗感意外。其實，「和平統一／一國兩制」應當是「前二○○八」的語彙；正因此一論述的「境界」與「出路」皆有侷限，所以才有二○○五年「連胡會」提出了「和平發展論」，是「境界」的提升，也是「出路」的放大。到了「後二○○ 八」的今天，「九二共識」已是兩岸的政策主軸，「一中各表」則是其必然存在的潛台詞；這無論在眼界、境界、及思路、出路上，皆已超越了「和平統一／一國兩制」的論述。鄭必堅的談話，會不會是境界與出路上的倒退？
北京方面有人在會中說，只承認「九二共識」，不承認「一中各表」。但是，倘若連「一中各表」也被視為違背「一個中國的原則」，且所謂的「統一」也就是「我吃掉你」；試問，這個方案的「境界」如何？又難道會是「出路」？
北京一直說「什麼都能談」；其實，兩岸要談的就是「境界」與「出路」。例如，什麼是「中國」，其實是一個「境界」的問題；又如，兩岸的政治方案是否只有「我吃掉你」一個版本，則是「出路」問題。
我們對這次充滿「歧見」、但眼界與思路皆已見相對開闊的兩岸研討會表示高度肯定，亦對下一甲子的兩岸關係可望有更加開闊的眼界、境界、思路、出路，寄以高度的期待。
Friday, November 13, 2009
The Science and Technology Advisory Group Must Do Its Job
The Science and Technology Advisory Group Must Do Its Job
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 13, 2009
The Executive Yuan Science and Technology Advisory Group was established 30 years ago. Last week the group held its annual meeting. It made a point of screening a documentary short commemorating the Godfather of Taiwan's Technology, Li Kuo-ting. Thinking back, we cherish the memory of this incomparably courageous visionary, who laid the foundation for Taiwan's information and communications industry. On the other hand, we bemoan the fact that the future of Taiwan's industries remains in question. As we examine the political landscape, no one emerges as a worthy helmsman to guide the future development of emerging industries and science and technology.
The public naturally understands that Taiwan's political environment is not what it once was. Chief executives are no longer the authoritative figures they once were. The legislature would not tolerate such dictatorial strongmen. If Li Kuo-ting were alive today, he would probably be harangued by the the Legislative Yuan and the media to the point of humiliation. Even if he was spared, he would not be able to summon the wind and rain the way he did. That said, the changed political climate is no excuse for inaction and incompetence. Nor can it be used to rationalize absurd and mistaken arrangements and practices. Compare the accomplishments of the current Executive Yuan Science and Technology Advisory Group meeting with the accomplishments of Li Kuo-ting back then. Clearly there is room for improvement.
The theme of the current Science and Technology Advisory Group Conference is Taiwan's six emerging industries. The Executive Yuan is asking its science and technology consultants to discuss, one by one, the industrial policies it is promoting. One wonders what Li Kuo-ting would think of such an arrangement if he were alive today. The Executive Yuan Science and Technology Advisory has about 20 members, including 10 from abroad. Among them are internationally renowned scientists and Nobel Prize winners. National consultants include the presidents of Academia Sinica, National Taiwan University, National Tsing Hua University, the Vice-Chancellor of National Cheng Kung University, and other elders of academia. Their research has been impressive, but most of them have no business experience. They may be familiar with upstream technology R&D, but are unlikely to understand the downstream realm of industrial production. Isn't inviting these elders from academia to discuss Taiwan's industrial policy irrelevant?
Some members of the Executive Yuan Science and Technology Advisory Group may understand certain industry practices. But what is asking ten foreign scientists to offer advice for Chinese cultural and creative industries, but an embarrassing imposition? The cultural and creative industries involve many issue that have nothing to do with science or technology, but rather wisdom from the humanities. Why should we hand these issues over to a group of technology experts for discussion? Many foreign IT consultants may never have purchased a butterfly orchid, or eaten a grouper. How can they contribute anything to a discussion on quality agriculture? They might ad lib by saying that "scientific research must not be divorced from industry." But of how much significance would this be in a meeting dedicated to the in-depth examination of difficult, substantive, industry-related issues?
What worries us the most is not the waste of three days of valuable time for these scientists. But to promote industrial reform in such a heavy-handed manner, really makes makes us break out in a cold sweat. To promote an unprecedented new industry or previously unsuccessful industry requires clear vision and a development strategy. Such a strategy is the result of examining the overall situation, studying industry feasibility, making critical breakthroughs, and creating new markets. To use the vernacular of the popular media, industrial strategy requires key breakthroughs in Blue Ocean Strategy. What is not required is minor tweaks to various revenue producing items within the framework of the existing Red Ocean Strategy. Unfortunately the information provided by the Science and Technology Advisory Group shows that although they are working very hard, they have no clear strategic direction.
Six months ago, the Executive Yuan was apparently under pressure from President Ma. It hastily promoted a new solution every week or two for Taiwan's six emerging industries. At the time outsiders were concerned that some programs were merely administrative staffers wracking their brains competing in an essay contest. Sure enough, the information provided by various sectors to the Science and Technology Advisory Group was almost identical to the programs promoted by the Executive Yuan six months ago. As we can see, the organizer's implementation of the programs over the past six months has been slow. The authorities responsible are unclear on their strategic direction, and are having difficulty making any progress to speak of. They must consider better means of implementation, rather than discussing old programs that have led nowhere.
Politicians make no bones about labelling someone a hero on the basis of his success or failure. Li Kuo-ting is widely respected by the public because he "created " Taiwan's ICT industry. It was not because he presided over so many conferences, made the front page so many times, or spent so many dollars on advertising. Li Kuo-ting planned the financing for Taiwan's Science Parks. But he did not meddle in cultural creative industries he was unfamiliar with, such as the cultivation of butterfly orchids or groupers, That was why he was successful. The achievements of the Science and Technology Advisory Group back then are legendary the world over. Credit is always given to the Science and Technology Advisory Group. But take one look at last week's science and technology advisors meeting, and one can't help longing for the "Good Old Days."
請科技顧問組認真做份內的事
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.13 03:46 am
今年是行政院科技顧問組成立三十周年；該會上周在舉辦一年一度的科技顧問會議時，特地播放了一段紀念台灣科技教父李國鼎先生的短片。撫今追昔，我們一則緬懷昔日教父開創台灣資通產業基礎的前瞻視野與無比魄力，另一方面也要感傷今日台灣的產業前景不明；放眼政壇，已沒有任何人堪稱是新興產業與未來科技發展的掌舵者。
國人當然了解，台灣的政治生態今非昔比，行政首長不再有一言九鼎的威望人物，國會殿堂也容不下乾綱獨斷的強人。李國鼎先生如果處於今日，恐怕也會被立法院與媒體整得灰頭土臉，就算不致鎩羽而歸，也絕不可能有呼風喚雨的威勢。但是，政治形勢的改變終究不是無為無能的藉口，更不能用來合理化荒謬錯誤的安排與做法。如果拿這一次行政院科顧會議的內容與李國鼎先生當年的事蹟做對比，則有待改進的空間就格外清楚了。
這一次科技顧問會議的主題是台灣的六大新興產業，把行政院所推的產業政策端出來請科技顧問逐一討論。李國鼎先生如果在世，對於這樣的議程安排真不知道有何感想。行政院科技顧問約有二十人，其中有十位來自國外，都是國際知名的科學家，也有諾貝爾獎得主。國內顧問則包括中研院院長、台大、清大、成大校長等學界大老。他們的學術研究成績斐然，但是絕大多數都沒有企業經驗。他們或許熟悉科技研發的上游運作，卻不太可能了解中下游的產業世界。請這些學界大老對台灣的產業政策開會討論，是不是有些文不對題？
縱使部分行政院科技顧問也懂得他們那一行的若干產業實務，但是叫十位外國科學家對華人的文化創意產業發表高見，這不是強人所難是什麼？文化創意產業所涉面向有諸多既非科學、亦非技術，而屬人文智慧，為什麼要交給一群科技專家去討論呢？國外科技顧問可能有許多位沒有買過蝴蝶蘭、也沒有吃過石斑魚，他們又要如何對精緻農業案發表意見呢？就算能應景地說些「科研不能與產業脫節」的場面話，卻對產業推動的實質問題難做深入評論，開這個會又有多少意義？
令我們最擔心的，不是開三天會浪費了多少科學家的寶貴時間，而是以這種粗率方式推動產業改革，真的教國人捏把冷汗！推動一個前所未有或先前不成功的新產業，最需要的就是釐清視野、擬定策略。這樣的策略擬定，來自於盱衡全局、審酌利基、重點突破、開創新局的能力。用坊間出版品的通俗語言來說，產業策略必須要是具有重點突破的藍海策略，而不是在現行框架下，把各個現存營收項目都努力上修些微的紅海策略。令人遺憾的是，科顧會議中各主管部會所準備的資料，或許已呈現出他們的賣命付出，卻幾乎沒有清楚的策略方向。
半年前，行政院似乎是在馬總統的指示壓力下，才匆匆忙忙以每一周或兩周推一件的方式提出六大產業行動方案。當時，外界就擔心部分方案只是行政人員絞盡腦汁的作文比賽。果不其然，這次科顧會議多項產業所呈現的資料，有些根本與六個月前行政院的推動方案相差無幾，可見過去半年主辦單位推動執行的進度緩慢。當主管機關因為策略方向不明而難有進度可言時，就應該要努力構思更好的執行方式，而不是把一事無成的舊方案沒頭沒腦地提到一個不相干會議上去討論。
政治人物的功勳評價，誠然是以成敗論英雄。李國鼎先生之所以廣受國人崇敬，是因為他「做成」了台灣的ＩＣＴ產業，而不在於他主持開了幾次會、上了幾次媒體版面、花了多少錢買置入性廣告。李國鼎規劃科學園區與財政金融，但不曾旁涉他不熟悉的文化建設與石斑、蘭花，如此才能事竟功圓。當年的科顧組認真地做科技的事，不求聞達於天下，但做成之後功勞總是科顧組的。看看上周召開的科顧會議，真令人有「今不如昔」的感慨。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 13, 2009
The Executive Yuan Science and Technology Advisory Group was established 30 years ago. Last week the group held its annual meeting. It made a point of screening a documentary short commemorating the Godfather of Taiwan's Technology, Li Kuo-ting. Thinking back, we cherish the memory of this incomparably courageous visionary, who laid the foundation for Taiwan's information and communications industry. On the other hand, we bemoan the fact that the future of Taiwan's industries remains in question. As we examine the political landscape, no one emerges as a worthy helmsman to guide the future development of emerging industries and science and technology.
The public naturally understands that Taiwan's political environment is not what it once was. Chief executives are no longer the authoritative figures they once were. The legislature would not tolerate such dictatorial strongmen. If Li Kuo-ting were alive today, he would probably be harangued by the the Legislative Yuan and the media to the point of humiliation. Even if he was spared, he would not be able to summon the wind and rain the way he did. That said, the changed political climate is no excuse for inaction and incompetence. Nor can it be used to rationalize absurd and mistaken arrangements and practices. Compare the accomplishments of the current Executive Yuan Science and Technology Advisory Group meeting with the accomplishments of Li Kuo-ting back then. Clearly there is room for improvement.
The theme of the current Science and Technology Advisory Group Conference is Taiwan's six emerging industries. The Executive Yuan is asking its science and technology consultants to discuss, one by one, the industrial policies it is promoting. One wonders what Li Kuo-ting would think of such an arrangement if he were alive today. The Executive Yuan Science and Technology Advisory has about 20 members, including 10 from abroad. Among them are internationally renowned scientists and Nobel Prize winners. National consultants include the presidents of Academia Sinica, National Taiwan University, National Tsing Hua University, the Vice-Chancellor of National Cheng Kung University, and other elders of academia. Their research has been impressive, but most of them have no business experience. They may be familiar with upstream technology R&D, but are unlikely to understand the downstream realm of industrial production. Isn't inviting these elders from academia to discuss Taiwan's industrial policy irrelevant?
Some members of the Executive Yuan Science and Technology Advisory Group may understand certain industry practices. But what is asking ten foreign scientists to offer advice for Chinese cultural and creative industries, but an embarrassing imposition? The cultural and creative industries involve many issue that have nothing to do with science or technology, but rather wisdom from the humanities. Why should we hand these issues over to a group of technology experts for discussion? Many foreign IT consultants may never have purchased a butterfly orchid, or eaten a grouper. How can they contribute anything to a discussion on quality agriculture? They might ad lib by saying that "scientific research must not be divorced from industry." But of how much significance would this be in a meeting dedicated to the in-depth examination of difficult, substantive, industry-related issues?
What worries us the most is not the waste of three days of valuable time for these scientists. But to promote industrial reform in such a heavy-handed manner, really makes makes us break out in a cold sweat. To promote an unprecedented new industry or previously unsuccessful industry requires clear vision and a development strategy. Such a strategy is the result of examining the overall situation, studying industry feasibility, making critical breakthroughs, and creating new markets. To use the vernacular of the popular media, industrial strategy requires key breakthroughs in Blue Ocean Strategy. What is not required is minor tweaks to various revenue producing items within the framework of the existing Red Ocean Strategy. Unfortunately the information provided by the Science and Technology Advisory Group shows that although they are working very hard, they have no clear strategic direction.
Six months ago, the Executive Yuan was apparently under pressure from President Ma. It hastily promoted a new solution every week or two for Taiwan's six emerging industries. At the time outsiders were concerned that some programs were merely administrative staffers wracking their brains competing in an essay contest. Sure enough, the information provided by various sectors to the Science and Technology Advisory Group was almost identical to the programs promoted by the Executive Yuan six months ago. As we can see, the organizer's implementation of the programs over the past six months has been slow. The authorities responsible are unclear on their strategic direction, and are having difficulty making any progress to speak of. They must consider better means of implementation, rather than discussing old programs that have led nowhere.
Politicians make no bones about labelling someone a hero on the basis of his success or failure. Li Kuo-ting is widely respected by the public because he "created " Taiwan's ICT industry. It was not because he presided over so many conferences, made the front page so many times, or spent so many dollars on advertising. Li Kuo-ting planned the financing for Taiwan's Science Parks. But he did not meddle in cultural creative industries he was unfamiliar with, such as the cultivation of butterfly orchids or groupers, That was why he was successful. The achievements of the Science and Technology Advisory Group back then are legendary the world over. Credit is always given to the Science and Technology Advisory Group. But take one look at last week's science and technology advisors meeting, and one can't help longing for the "Good Old Days."
請科技顧問組認真做份內的事
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.13 03:46 am
今年是行政院科技顧問組成立三十周年；該會上周在舉辦一年一度的科技顧問會議時，特地播放了一段紀念台灣科技教父李國鼎先生的短片。撫今追昔，我們一則緬懷昔日教父開創台灣資通產業基礎的前瞻視野與無比魄力，另一方面也要感傷今日台灣的產業前景不明；放眼政壇，已沒有任何人堪稱是新興產業與未來科技發展的掌舵者。
國人當然了解，台灣的政治生態今非昔比，行政首長不再有一言九鼎的威望人物，國會殿堂也容不下乾綱獨斷的強人。李國鼎先生如果處於今日，恐怕也會被立法院與媒體整得灰頭土臉，就算不致鎩羽而歸，也絕不可能有呼風喚雨的威勢。但是，政治形勢的改變終究不是無為無能的藉口，更不能用來合理化荒謬錯誤的安排與做法。如果拿這一次行政院科顧會議的內容與李國鼎先生當年的事蹟做對比，則有待改進的空間就格外清楚了。
這一次科技顧問會議的主題是台灣的六大新興產業，把行政院所推的產業政策端出來請科技顧問逐一討論。李國鼎先生如果在世，對於這樣的議程安排真不知道有何感想。行政院科技顧問約有二十人，其中有十位來自國外，都是國際知名的科學家，也有諾貝爾獎得主。國內顧問則包括中研院院長、台大、清大、成大校長等學界大老。他們的學術研究成績斐然，但是絕大多數都沒有企業經驗。他們或許熟悉科技研發的上游運作，卻不太可能了解中下游的產業世界。請這些學界大老對台灣的產業政策開會討論，是不是有些文不對題？
縱使部分行政院科技顧問也懂得他們那一行的若干產業實務，但是叫十位外國科學家對華人的文化創意產業發表高見，這不是強人所難是什麼？文化創意產業所涉面向有諸多既非科學、亦非技術，而屬人文智慧，為什麼要交給一群科技專家去討論呢？國外科技顧問可能有許多位沒有買過蝴蝶蘭、也沒有吃過石斑魚，他們又要如何對精緻農業案發表意見呢？就算能應景地說些「科研不能與產業脫節」的場面話，卻對產業推動的實質問題難做深入評論，開這個會又有多少意義？
令我們最擔心的，不是開三天會浪費了多少科學家的寶貴時間，而是以這種粗率方式推動產業改革，真的教國人捏把冷汗！推動一個前所未有或先前不成功的新產業，最需要的就是釐清視野、擬定策略。這樣的策略擬定，來自於盱衡全局、審酌利基、重點突破、開創新局的能力。用坊間出版品的通俗語言來說，產業策略必須要是具有重點突破的藍海策略，而不是在現行框架下，把各個現存營收項目都努力上修些微的紅海策略。令人遺憾的是，科顧會議中各主管部會所準備的資料，或許已呈現出他們的賣命付出，卻幾乎沒有清楚的策略方向。
半年前，行政院似乎是在馬總統的指示壓力下，才匆匆忙忙以每一周或兩周推一件的方式提出六大產業行動方案。當時，外界就擔心部分方案只是行政人員絞盡腦汁的作文比賽。果不其然，這次科顧會議多項產業所呈現的資料，有些根本與六個月前行政院的推動方案相差無幾，可見過去半年主辦單位推動執行的進度緩慢。當主管機關因為策略方向不明而難有進度可言時，就應該要努力構思更好的執行方式，而不是把一事無成的舊方案沒頭沒腦地提到一個不相干會議上去討論。
政治人物的功勳評價，誠然是以成敗論英雄。李國鼎先生之所以廣受國人崇敬，是因為他「做成」了台灣的ＩＣＴ產業，而不在於他主持開了幾次會、上了幾次媒體版面、花了多少錢買置入性廣告。李國鼎規劃科學園區與財政金融，但不曾旁涉他不熟悉的文化建設與石斑、蘭花，如此才能事竟功圓。當年的科顧組認真地做科技的事，不求聞達於天下，但做成之後功勞總是科顧組的。看看上周召開的科顧會議，真令人有「今不如昔」的感慨。
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