Is the Republic of China rooted in the 1911 Revolution or the 2/28 Incident?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 31, 2009
The Republic of China, on its Ninety-ninth New Years Day. 1 of 6
Tomorrow is New Years Day. It will be the 99th New Years Day since the founding of the Republic of China, We are now headed toward the Republic of China's centennial year.
The Republic of China is unique among nations, ancient and modern, east and west. Following its defeat during the Sino-Japanese War, the Qing Court ceded Taiwan to Japan. Following the Republic of China's pyrrhic victory in World War II, Japan returned Taiwan to China. Alas, the romantic dreams of retrocession were shattered by the 2/28 Incident. In the blink of an eye, the central government was routed during the Chinese Civil War and retreated to Taiwan. During the 60 years since, neither Kuningtou nor the August 23 Artillery Battle were able to defeat the Republic of China government on Taiwan. It survived attempts to strangle it diplomatically. Its economy evolved from an economy reliant on rice and camphor exports, to the developed economy it is today. The political system evolved from martial law and the white terror, to a democracy with direct presidential elections and changes in ruling parties. Most importantly, despite the disparity in size between the two sides, divided rule across the Taiwan Strait evolved from Beijing's calls for the "liberation of Taiwan" and Taipei's calls to "counterattack the mainland," to today's calls to "maintain the status quo," and "peaceful development." The Republic of China is entering its ninety-ninth year. The Republic of China government on Taiwan is a paradigm for economic development and democratic politics among emerging nations. The People's Republic of China government on the Mainland emerged from thirty years of blood-soaked hell, to become the envy of the world for its "peaceful rise." As we can see, the Republic of China is unique in all the world, ancient and modern, east and west. The People's Republic of China is similar. Such is the nature of bilateral rivalry in the Taiwan Strait.
The Republic of China is moving towards its centennial. Yet its national consciousness is still that of a weak and divided nation. States need not fear because they are small. States need not fear because they face hardship. As long as they consolidate their national consciousness, they will experience a sense of solidarity, a sense of mission, and a sense of honor. But today the collective feeling is one of internal division and hostility far more harmful to the nation than foreign invasions. The Republic of China was founded ninety-nine years ago. It has been on Taiwan for one "jia zi" (60 year cycle in the Chinese calendar). Must we remain a nation with divided intentity?
As we see it, the great divide in the Republic of China's national identity is rooted in the divide between the "1911 Revolution premise" and the "2/28 premise." The 1911 Revolution premise sees the Republic of China as China's historical legacy. Its Three People's Principles sees "national solidarity, human rights, and social welfare" as China's political and economic vision. Taiwan's destiny is to guide the development of China as a whole. Put simply, it hopes to use Taiwan as a lever to move the rest of China. Taiwan as a lever can help maintain cross-Strait peace. The 2/28 premise on the other hand, sees the Republic of China as a political liability. The thirty years of catastrophe precipitated by the People's Republic of China government on the Mainland, has turned "China" into a synonym for political disaster. Taiwan does not want the Republic of China. It wants the People's Republic of China even less. Put simply, this is the Taiwan independence movement's "Taiwan on one side, China on the other" framework.
Over the past 60 years, the 1911 Revolution premise has been impacted by the 2/28 premise. The 1911 Revolution premise has taken what can only be described as an "N-turn." During the early years, due to internal and external crises, coupled with martial law, the 1911 Revolution premise maintained an ideological monopoly on Taiwan. This was the left side of the letter N, moving from bottom to top. Later on, the Republic of China government was forced to withdraw from the United Nations. Washington broke off diplomatic relations with Taipei. The Republic of China could no longer hold the line on the diplomatic front, leading to a Domino Effect. Internal challenges mounted, beginning with the Chungli Incident, leading to a Broken Window Effect. Add to this the evils perpetrated by the Gang of Four, exposed in the wake of Mao Zedong's death. The public on Taiwan was shocked, leading to a Bad Neighbor Effect. This enabled the 2/28 premise to become the guiding premise for the Taiwan independence movement. The Republic of China premise suffered a setback. This was the downward, diagonal stroke in the letter N. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian spent the next decade inciting Taiwan independence, only to see Taiwan independence thoroughly discredited, both in theory and in practice. The Republic of China premise and the 1911 Revolution premise began to show signs of recovery. Over the past year and a half, the "1992 Consensus" and "One China, Different Interpretations" have become the basis of cross-Strait interaction. This is the right side of the letter N, moving from bottom to top.
The 2/28 premise addresses two issues. One, it attempts to "nativize" democracy on Taiwan. This goal has been reached. Two, it attempts to resolve cross-Strait issues by promoting Taiwan independence and severing links with Mainland China. But this is something the 2/28 premise cannot possibly achieve. Despite decades of agitation, the Republic of China premise has already co-opted the 2/28 premise of "nativized" democracy. Meanwhile, the 2/28 premise is unable to negate the role and status of the Republic of China in cross-Strait negotiations.
Consider current trends. As we move toward the future, the Taiwan independence premise and 2/28 premise will command less and less influence on Taiwan. The Republic of China premise will become more and more dominant. The importance of the Republic of China in bilateral rivalry is rooted in the 1911 Revolution premise. This sort of statement may sound foolish at this point in time. But sooner or later, the public on Taiwan will realize that this is its trump card in cross-Strait relations. We are already into the right hand side of the aforementioned "N-turn," and there is simply no going back.
The 1911 Revolution was one of the most heroic revolutions in human history. The American Revolution, or Revolutionary War, was a revolution against the mother country by one of its colonies. The French Revolution was a revolution against monarchy and aristocracy. The 1911 Revolution by contrast, was primarily a revolution against foreign powers attempting to gobble up China. It was a tragic, heroic and forthright cause. It established Asia's first democratic republic. Symbols such as the Mayflower or the Bastille simply do not compare. Alas, in 1949, the People's Republic of China usurped the 1911 Revolution. The Republic of China retreated to Taiwan. As a result, the glory of the 1911 Revolution was tarnished by the Republic of China government defeat in the Chinese Civil War.
Today however, we are traveling upwards along the right hand side of the letter N. Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution have become the nexus of political thinking in the Taiwan Strait. Both Beijing and Taipei are moving upward along the right hand side of the letter N. Giant statues of Sun Yat-sen were inspirational symbols for the People's Republic of China during its sixtieth anniversary National Day ceremonies. It was the theme of its National Day documentary, "The Founding of a Republic." Mao Zedong's opening line is, "Chiang Kai-shek and I are both disciples of Sun Yat-sen." Beijing has already announced that it will expand its commemoration of the centennial of the 1911 Revolution. It is clearly invoking the 1911 Revolution to enhance the legitimacy of its rule. Today, as both sides of the Taiwan Strait recall the humiliations endured since the Opium War, and reflect on six decades of divided rule, and their successes and failures, they still think of Sun Yat-sen. They still think of the 1911 Revolution and the Wuchang Uprising. In fact, Beijing appears to take Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution even more seriously than Taipei. On Taiwan, confrontations between the 1911 Revolution premise and the 2/28 premise have led to a divided sense of national identity. Isn't it time to begin the healing?
When the 1911 Revolution premise was on the left hand side of the letter N, the Republic of China was a monopoly maintained by means of martial law. The People's Republic of China meanwhile, denied the legitimacy of the Republic of China altogether. But now the 1911 Revolution premise is on the right hand side of the letter N. The two sides have already found common ground regarding "full democracy" and "reform and opening." Tiananmen Square boasts an important symbol, a giant statue of Sun Yat-sen. The Republic of China will soon celebrate its centennial. If the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can find more points of agreement in the spirit of the 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen, they can increase mutual goodwill. They can develop a shared vision in which both sides can win.
Allow us to wish the Republic of China a happy centennial, in advance. As the public debates the merits and demerits of the 2/28 premise and the 1911 Revolution premise, let us establish a nation founded on wisdom and strength. Let us share the sense of purpose, the same sense of pride, and the same sense of mission.
中華民國主論述：辛亥革命或二二八
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.31 03:08 am
《中華民國九十九年感思》六之一
明天是中華民國九十九年元旦，就此邁向中華民國一百年。
中華民國這樣的國家，是古今中外絕無僅有的一例。甲午戰敗後大清割讓給日本的台灣，在二戰後回歸「慘勝」的中華民國；光復的浪漫幻夢剛因二二八而破滅，轉眼中央政府又因內戰「慘敗」而播遷台灣。六十年來，古寧頭、八二三的砲火沒有擊敗台灣，外交的窒息也辛苦熬過，經濟則從靠米糖樟腦出口到今天名列已開發國家，政治更從戒嚴白色恐怖臻至總統直選、政黨輪替的自由民主體制；尤其重要的是，縱然兩岸大小強弱懸殊，但兩岸分治也從「解放台灣／反攻大陸」，轉變到「維持現狀」、「和平發展」。時至今日，中華民國已然進入九十九年，在台灣的中華民國是新興國家經濟發展與民主政治的範例，在大陸的中華人民共和國也從卅年浩劫的血淵骨嶽中轉變為舉世議論的「和平崛起」的話題。準此以觀，中華民國之例是古今中外絕無僅有，中華人民共和國之例亦然，台灣海峽雙邊的競合關係之例亦是。
中華民國已經邁向一百年，卻在國家意識上仍是一個羸弱與分裂的國家。國家不怕小，國勢不怕艱難，只要國家意識鞏固，就會有認同感、使命感與光榮感。然而，現今國人共同的感受卻是，內部的撕裂敵對，遠比外部的侵凌更傷害國家。中華民國立國已經九十九年，在台灣也已逾一甲子，我們還要繼續作一個認同分裂的國家嗎？
若依本文的題旨而言，我們認為，中華民國國家認同的分裂，是緣自「辛亥革命論述」與「二二八論述」的分裂。辛亥革命論述認為：中華民國是中國的傳承，三民主義所主張的「民族／民權／民生」是中國政治經濟的願景與策略，台灣的命運及使命是在導正中國的發展方向。化約而言，就是欲以台灣為槓桿來導正中國，而台灣亦以槓桿的功能來維持兩岸和平。二二八論述則認為：中華民國是台灣的政治負債，中華人民共和國的卅年浩劫更使得「中國」成為政治災難的同義詞，台灣不要中華民國，更不要中華人民共和國。化約而言，就這是台獨主張的「台灣中國／一邊一國」。
在中華民國，六十年來的歷史動線顯示，辛亥革命論述因二二八論述的影響，而儼然呈現一個Ｎ型的轉折。早年，由於內外情勢危殆，再加上戒嚴統治，辛亥革命論述在台灣久居壟斷地位（這是Ｎ的的向上左線）；後來，因退出聯合國及台美斷交，中華民國在外交上撐持不住（骨牌效應）、內部的挑戰自中壢事件引爆（破窗效應），再加上大陸四人幫的惡行因毛澤東死而公開，震撼了台灣民心（惡鄰效應），以致藉二二八論述為主體的台獨訴求急遽上升（中華民國論述因而轉入Ｎ的下斜線）；此後，再經李登輝與陳水扁十餘年的台獨操作，台獨在理論與實踐上皆告失敗，中華民國與辛亥革命的論述又有回升的跡象，一年半來，以「九二共識／一中各表」為主軸的兩岸互動，即可視為Ｎ的上升右線。
二二八論述是要處理兩個課題：一、欲使台灣實現本土化的民主政治；如今此一目標已經達成。二、欲藉此鼓吹台灣獨立，與中國切割，以解決兩岸問題；這卻是二二八論述不可能做到的。經歷數十年的激盪，目前的情勢是：中華民國論述已經包羅涵蘊了二二八論述的本土民主化主張，但二二八論述不可能取代或否定中華民國在處理兩岸課題上的角色及地位。
就當前趨勢來看，時空架構愈往未來發展，台獨二二八論述對台灣的支配力將愈弱，而中華民國的主導性將愈大；中華民國在兩岸角力間的重要憑藉，則正是辛亥革命論述。這樣的說法，現在也許聽起來覺得迂闊，但台灣早晚將體會其在兩岸間最大的優勢正在此點。前述那條Ｎ型的動線，進入右側上升後，不可能再返折。
辛亥革命其實是人類歷史上最壯烈的民主革命。美國革命（獨立戰爭）是殖民地對宗主國的革命，法國革命是對王權與貴族階級的革命；辛亥革命則主要是因列強魚肉中國而激發的革命；其悲壯、英烈、正大，開創了亞洲第一個民主共和國，絕非五月花號或巴士底獄等象徵所能匹比。但是，一九四九年，中華人民共和國襲奪了辛亥革命，中華民國被驅逐到台灣；辛亥革命遂在國共內戰中，被貶抑甚至被塗抹掉了。
然而，今日在前述的Ｎ型動線中，孫中山及辛亥革命這類的政治理念儼然可能成為海峽兩岸主要的交集點，而共同走向Ｎ型右側的上升動線之中。孫中山巨像仍是中華人民共和國六十周年國慶典禮上的政治號召；代表其國慶主旋律的「建國大業」影片中，毛澤東開場的台詞是：「我與蔣（中正）先生，皆是中山先生的門徒。」尤其，北京當局已經宣布，將擴大紀念辛亥革命一百年，明顯地欲以辛亥革命來修正、補充其統治的正當性。當海峽兩岸今日共同回顧鴉片戰爭以來的民族屈辱，並反省這六十年分裂分治後各自的是非對錯，現在還能一同想到孫中山，還能一同想到辛亥革命及武昌起義，而且看起來北京比台北對孫中山及辛亥革命更在意，則台灣內部因辛亥革命論述與二二八論述而造成的國家認同分裂，如今是否已到了療傷止痛的時刻？
辛亥革命論述在Ｎ型左側動線時，中華民國是以戒嚴體制建立其壟斷地位，中華人民共和國則對其幾乎完全否定；但如今辛亥革命論述走到Ｎ型右側動線時，兩岸在「完全民主」與「改革開放」中已經多有交集，天安門廣場的孫中山巨像即是重要象徵。面對中華民國一百年，海峽兩岸若能在辛亥革命精神與孫中山志業中找到更多交集點，兩岸未來應當會有更多的相互善意，並有可能發展出雙贏共生的共同憧憬。
預祝中華民國百歲生日快樂。但願國人能在辛亥革命論述與二二八論述的糾纏中，找到立國的智慧與力量，使我們能夠成為一個有理想、有尊嚴、有使命感的快樂國家。
Thursday, December 31, 2009
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
The Hidden Crisis Revealed by One Opinion Poll
The Hidden Crisis Revealed by One Opinion Poll
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 30, 2009
Who has one man above him, and tens of thousands of men beneath him? In ancient times it was the "first minister." In modern times it is the premier. Who has two men above him, and tens of thousands of men beneath him? In modern times it is a ministry head. But according to the latest poll conducted by Wang Wang and the China Times, the name recognition of ministry heads with tens of thousands of men beneath them, is quite low. Without prompting, 82% of all respondents could not name a single minister. Even with prompting, 52% of all respondents still couldn't name a single minister. These ministry heads are important and powerful. They are responsibile for policies that impact our lives. Why is the public so unfamiliar with them? This is not merely a question of how well individual ministry heads can explain or defend their policies.
Polls are merely for reference. Phone surveys cannot tackle issues that are too complex. They can only ask the most rudimentary questions about the respondent's objective and subjective impressions. According to the Wang Wang China Times poll, the three most visible cabinet members, the ones with the highest name recognition and policy making ability, were Central Bank President Peng Hui-nan, Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng, and Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Lai Hsing-yuan. The Peng cabinet members have tenure, hence job security. Not surprisingly, the Ma administration official who has served the longest, who has the greatest ability, and who has the approval of both the Green Camp and the Blue Camp, is Wang Ching-feng. For years, Wang Ching-feng was a champion of the downtrodden. Recently, campaigning for the three in one local elections and anti-corruption campaigns have given her even more exposure. Lai Hsing-yuan has primary responsibility for the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies. Recently the fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting has received the greatest media coverage, giving Lai more name recognition. But how is one to explain the low name recognition factor for so many other ministry heads?
Perhaps the ministry head lacks charisma and the ability to defend his ministry's policy. But individual ministry heads have any number of ways to make themselves seen and heard. First, the agency may be too anachronistic. Former legislator Kao Shi-po, is the son of former Speaker of the Provincial Assembly Kao Yu-ren, and Deputy Prime Minister Chu Li-lun's brother in law. His name recognition factor is hardly low. But for the public, the function of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Committeee is a mystery. The general population cannot connect him with his job.
Secondly, the work of certain agencies has little immediate relevancy for the public. For example, the CEPD is responsible for national land planning. Normally the vice premier would be in charge, because most of its business is inter-ministerial in nature. But because its activities have little immediate impact on the public, the pollsters did not even mention him. No wonder the head of the CEPD is so forgettable.
Thirdly, officials have a hard time surviving. Ministry heads are replaced with frightening alacrity. One hardly has time to note what they do before they are replaced. In the past school tests sometimes asked, "Who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs? Who is the Minister of the Interior? Who is the Minister of Education?" More recently, these have not been included among the test questions. The reason is simple. Before the test is administered, the ministers may already have been replaced. Or they may be replaced immediately after the test is given. We can force students to remember the names of key ministry heads, but what would be the point?
But leave aside these structural factors. Ministry heads themselves cannot escape blame. The function of any particular agency may not be obvious to the public. But these agencies are nevertheless answerable to the Legislative Yuan. In other words, as long they are required to present their case to the legislature, they have no shortage of opportunities for media exposure. The less exposure ministry heads have, the lower the public name recognition. The views ministry heads hold may not meet with the approval of legislators. They may lead to noisy debate. But the public does not forget noisy debates. How can anyone unwilling to defend his policies be remembered as a ministry head willing to assume responsibility? Take Director of Health Yaung Chih-liang for example. He wants to raise fees for health insurance. He supports the administration's policy on US beef imports. His views may not coincide with those of his superiors. But he courageously stated his professional opinion. The public affirmed his courage. By contrast, when ministry heads assume only that "no news is good news," and run for cover at the first sign of controversy, they are going to have a hard time enhancing their name recognition.
Apart from these structural factors and individual factors, the most worrisome problem is public indifference to public affairs. This is no trivial matter. This is a problem common to all democratic societies. The situation in the United States is similar. When pollsters ask students in high school and above, the names of national leaders, most of them draw a blank. Why? Is it really because "politics is so awful?" Politics may indeed be awful. But politics impacts everyone. One may ignore politics. But politics is not going to ignore you. That being the case, why do so many people refuse to touch it? Is the political culture on Taiwan so far gone that no one even wants to think about it? Does no one even want to discuss such matters as political policy?
A society without public discussion of political policy, will find it difficult to elevate the standard of its political culture. This is the most frightening problem on Taiwan. Some people may blame these ministry heads' lack of name recognition on President Ma. They may demand to know why the president chose these people in the first place? But is the problem really that simple? When the public doesn't know the names of ministry heads, should we rush to blame the president? That is not how a healthy democratic society functions. When most ministry heads go unrecognized by 40% of the public, then that is a problem society truly needs to ponder.
一項民調數據背後所透露的危機
2009-12-30
中國時報
一人之下，萬人之上，是誰？古代是宰相，現代是行政院長。兩人之下，萬人之上，是誰，在現代講就是各部會首長，不過，根據旺旺中時最新民調，這些萬人之上的部會首長們，知名度甚低，在不提示的狀況下，高達八成二的受訪民眾，講不出任何一位部長的名字，即使提示，還是有高達五成二的民眾講不出任何一位部長的名字！為什麼位高權重，業務、政策與民眾息息相關的部會首長不為人熟悉？這已經不只是首長個人政策說明或辯護能力的問題。
持平而言，民調只是參考數據，因為電話民調不可能做太複雜的問題，只能就主客觀印象做最基本的詢問。在旺旺中時民調結果中，知名度與政策能力排行前三名的內閣閣員：央行總裁彭淮南、法務部長王清峰、陸委會主委賴幸媛。彭係內閣中受任期保障，馬政府就任迄今任期最長的閣員，專業能力歷綠、藍而皆受肯定，這個結果並不令人意外；王清峰多年投身保護弱勢的社會運動，最近也因為基層三合一選舉宣導反賄而有相當曝光率；賴幸媛則身負馬政府兩岸主軸政策之所繫，最近又有媒體曝光率最高的四次江陳會。但是，其他部會知名度如此之低又該做何解釋？
從首長個人魅力、政策辯護能力到作秀能力，都可能是理由，但還是有若干結構因素非首長個人可以主控，諸如：第一，機關存在與時代和社會需求落差太大，前立委高思博、係前省議會議長高育仁之子，是行政院副院長朱立倫的連襟，他的知名度絕對不低，但是他和蒙藏委員業務差距太大，一般民眾很難把他和機關串聯在一起。
第二，機關業務和民眾直接關聯性沒這麼高。比方說，經建會負責國土規畫與國家願景，過去常態性是由副院長兼任，因為該機關業務多數事涉跨部會，但是，偏偏和一般民眾距離沒這麼近，在民調中甚至連提示都沒提示，經建會首長的名字當然很容易就這麼被疏忽掉。
第三，官不僚生，首長更迭太快，連記得他做什麼事的時間都還不夠之前，就被替換掉了。過去學校考試，偶爾時事都還問問外交部長是誰？內政部長是誰？教育部長是誰？晚近這幾年，這些題目都不在基測、學測考量之列，原因很簡單，出題的時候，部長可能就換了，或者，才考完部長就換了，即使以考試強求學子去記得重要部會首長都不再有意義。
但是，在這些結構因素之外，部會首長也有難辭其咎之處。因為機關業務可能與民眾未必直接相關，但是，行政部門必須向立法院負責，換言之，只要在國會鼎力辯護，就有曝光機會，首長曝光機會少，自然民眾指名度低，知名度就不可能高。首長意見很可能未必符合立委之意，大吵其架者所在多有，吵了架就不大可能讓民眾不記得，不肯為政策辯護吵架者，又如何讓民眾記得這位部長很有肩膀呢？以衛生署長楊志良為例，他要漲健保、還要為美牛政策辯護，辯護之餘還未必與高層意見相合，但他堂堂正正為自己的專業辯護，民眾就肯定他。相反來看，當部會首長腦袋裡只想到「沒新聞就是好新聞」避禍原則，遇事就躲，想有知名度都難。
除了上述結構因素與首長個人因素外，最讓人憂心的則是：民眾根本不關心公眾事務！不要小看這個問題，這是民主社會的通病，美國情況非常類似，以民調詢問高中以上學生，該國部會首長的名字，同樣有高比例是答不出來的。為什麼？真的是「政治太可怕」嗎？政治即使真的很可怕，但因為政治是管理眾人之事，你不關心，它都可能影響到每一個人的生活，即便這樣為何民眾還是避之唯恐不及？難道，台灣的政治環境和文化已經惡化到沒有人願意去思考、去討論政治或政策這些事了嗎？
一個沒有公眾討論政治或政策的社會，很難強求政治文化得到提升，這是台灣潛藏的最可怕的問題，有人直接把部會首長知名度低怪罪於馬總統，直斥為什麼總統要用這些人？問題能這樣簡單化思考嗎？當民眾不識部會首長的時候，動輒就要總統負起責任，這絕對不是一個健康的民主社會的正常現象，當多數部會首長竟都有超過四成的民眾不識，這問題真的值得台灣社會一起思考。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 30, 2009
Who has one man above him, and tens of thousands of men beneath him? In ancient times it was the "first minister." In modern times it is the premier. Who has two men above him, and tens of thousands of men beneath him? In modern times it is a ministry head. But according to the latest poll conducted by Wang Wang and the China Times, the name recognition of ministry heads with tens of thousands of men beneath them, is quite low. Without prompting, 82% of all respondents could not name a single minister. Even with prompting, 52% of all respondents still couldn't name a single minister. These ministry heads are important and powerful. They are responsibile for policies that impact our lives. Why is the public so unfamiliar with them? This is not merely a question of how well individual ministry heads can explain or defend their policies.
Polls are merely for reference. Phone surveys cannot tackle issues that are too complex. They can only ask the most rudimentary questions about the respondent's objective and subjective impressions. According to the Wang Wang China Times poll, the three most visible cabinet members, the ones with the highest name recognition and policy making ability, were Central Bank President Peng Hui-nan, Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng, and Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Lai Hsing-yuan. The Peng cabinet members have tenure, hence job security. Not surprisingly, the Ma administration official who has served the longest, who has the greatest ability, and who has the approval of both the Green Camp and the Blue Camp, is Wang Ching-feng. For years, Wang Ching-feng was a champion of the downtrodden. Recently, campaigning for the three in one local elections and anti-corruption campaigns have given her even more exposure. Lai Hsing-yuan has primary responsibility for the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies. Recently the fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting has received the greatest media coverage, giving Lai more name recognition. But how is one to explain the low name recognition factor for so many other ministry heads?
Perhaps the ministry head lacks charisma and the ability to defend his ministry's policy. But individual ministry heads have any number of ways to make themselves seen and heard. First, the agency may be too anachronistic. Former legislator Kao Shi-po, is the son of former Speaker of the Provincial Assembly Kao Yu-ren, and Deputy Prime Minister Chu Li-lun's brother in law. His name recognition factor is hardly low. But for the public, the function of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Committeee is a mystery. The general population cannot connect him with his job.
Secondly, the work of certain agencies has little immediate relevancy for the public. For example, the CEPD is responsible for national land planning. Normally the vice premier would be in charge, because most of its business is inter-ministerial in nature. But because its activities have little immediate impact on the public, the pollsters did not even mention him. No wonder the head of the CEPD is so forgettable.
Thirdly, officials have a hard time surviving. Ministry heads are replaced with frightening alacrity. One hardly has time to note what they do before they are replaced. In the past school tests sometimes asked, "Who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs? Who is the Minister of the Interior? Who is the Minister of Education?" More recently, these have not been included among the test questions. The reason is simple. Before the test is administered, the ministers may already have been replaced. Or they may be replaced immediately after the test is given. We can force students to remember the names of key ministry heads, but what would be the point?
But leave aside these structural factors. Ministry heads themselves cannot escape blame. The function of any particular agency may not be obvious to the public. But these agencies are nevertheless answerable to the Legislative Yuan. In other words, as long they are required to present their case to the legislature, they have no shortage of opportunities for media exposure. The less exposure ministry heads have, the lower the public name recognition. The views ministry heads hold may not meet with the approval of legislators. They may lead to noisy debate. But the public does not forget noisy debates. How can anyone unwilling to defend his policies be remembered as a ministry head willing to assume responsibility? Take Director of Health Yaung Chih-liang for example. He wants to raise fees for health insurance. He supports the administration's policy on US beef imports. His views may not coincide with those of his superiors. But he courageously stated his professional opinion. The public affirmed his courage. By contrast, when ministry heads assume only that "no news is good news," and run for cover at the first sign of controversy, they are going to have a hard time enhancing their name recognition.
Apart from these structural factors and individual factors, the most worrisome problem is public indifference to public affairs. This is no trivial matter. This is a problem common to all democratic societies. The situation in the United States is similar. When pollsters ask students in high school and above, the names of national leaders, most of them draw a blank. Why? Is it really because "politics is so awful?" Politics may indeed be awful. But politics impacts everyone. One may ignore politics. But politics is not going to ignore you. That being the case, why do so many people refuse to touch it? Is the political culture on Taiwan so far gone that no one even wants to think about it? Does no one even want to discuss such matters as political policy?
A society without public discussion of political policy, will find it difficult to elevate the standard of its political culture. This is the most frightening problem on Taiwan. Some people may blame these ministry heads' lack of name recognition on President Ma. They may demand to know why the president chose these people in the first place? But is the problem really that simple? When the public doesn't know the names of ministry heads, should we rush to blame the president? That is not how a healthy democratic society functions. When most ministry heads go unrecognized by 40% of the public, then that is a problem society truly needs to ponder.
一項民調數據背後所透露的危機
2009-12-30
中國時報
一人之下，萬人之上，是誰？古代是宰相，現代是行政院長。兩人之下，萬人之上，是誰，在現代講就是各部會首長，不過，根據旺旺中時最新民調，這些萬人之上的部會首長們，知名度甚低，在不提示的狀況下，高達八成二的受訪民眾，講不出任何一位部長的名字，即使提示，還是有高達五成二的民眾講不出任何一位部長的名字！為什麼位高權重，業務、政策與民眾息息相關的部會首長不為人熟悉？這已經不只是首長個人政策說明或辯護能力的問題。
持平而言，民調只是參考數據，因為電話民調不可能做太複雜的問題，只能就主客觀印象做最基本的詢問。在旺旺中時民調結果中，知名度與政策能力排行前三名的內閣閣員：央行總裁彭淮南、法務部長王清峰、陸委會主委賴幸媛。彭係內閣中受任期保障，馬政府就任迄今任期最長的閣員，專業能力歷綠、藍而皆受肯定，這個結果並不令人意外；王清峰多年投身保護弱勢的社會運動，最近也因為基層三合一選舉宣導反賄而有相當曝光率；賴幸媛則身負馬政府兩岸主軸政策之所繫，最近又有媒體曝光率最高的四次江陳會。但是，其他部會知名度如此之低又該做何解釋？
從首長個人魅力、政策辯護能力到作秀能力，都可能是理由，但還是有若干結構因素非首長個人可以主控，諸如：第一，機關存在與時代和社會需求落差太大，前立委高思博、係前省議會議長高育仁之子，是行政院副院長朱立倫的連襟，他的知名度絕對不低，但是他和蒙藏委員業務差距太大，一般民眾很難把他和機關串聯在一起。
第二，機關業務和民眾直接關聯性沒這麼高。比方說，經建會負責國土規畫與國家願景，過去常態性是由副院長兼任，因為該機關業務多數事涉跨部會，但是，偏偏和一般民眾距離沒這麼近，在民調中甚至連提示都沒提示，經建會首長的名字當然很容易就這麼被疏忽掉。
第三，官不僚生，首長更迭太快，連記得他做什麼事的時間都還不夠之前，就被替換掉了。過去學校考試，偶爾時事都還問問外交部長是誰？內政部長是誰？教育部長是誰？晚近這幾年，這些題目都不在基測、學測考量之列，原因很簡單，出題的時候，部長可能就換了，或者，才考完部長就換了，即使以考試強求學子去記得重要部會首長都不再有意義。
但是，在這些結構因素之外，部會首長也有難辭其咎之處。因為機關業務可能與民眾未必直接相關，但是，行政部門必須向立法院負責，換言之，只要在國會鼎力辯護，就有曝光機會，首長曝光機會少，自然民眾指名度低，知名度就不可能高。首長意見很可能未必符合立委之意，大吵其架者所在多有，吵了架就不大可能讓民眾不記得，不肯為政策辯護吵架者，又如何讓民眾記得這位部長很有肩膀呢？以衛生署長楊志良為例，他要漲健保、還要為美牛政策辯護，辯護之餘還未必與高層意見相合，但他堂堂正正為自己的專業辯護，民眾就肯定他。相反來看，當部會首長腦袋裡只想到「沒新聞就是好新聞」避禍原則，遇事就躲，想有知名度都難。
除了上述結構因素與首長個人因素外，最讓人憂心的則是：民眾根本不關心公眾事務！不要小看這個問題，這是民主社會的通病，美國情況非常類似，以民調詢問高中以上學生，該國部會首長的名字，同樣有高比例是答不出來的。為什麼？真的是「政治太可怕」嗎？政治即使真的很可怕，但因為政治是管理眾人之事，你不關心，它都可能影響到每一個人的生活，即便這樣為何民眾還是避之唯恐不及？難道，台灣的政治環境和文化已經惡化到沒有人願意去思考、去討論政治或政策這些事了嗎？
一個沒有公眾討論政治或政策的社會，很難強求政治文化得到提升，這是台灣潛藏的最可怕的問題，有人直接把部會首長知名度低怪罪於馬總統，直斥為什麼總統要用這些人？問題能這樣簡單化思考嗎？當民眾不識部會首長的時候，動輒就要總統負起責任，這絕對不是一個健康的民主社會的正常現象，當多數部會首長竟都有超過四成的民眾不識，這問題真的值得台灣社會一起思考。
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
How Chen Shui-bian Helped the Yuanta Ma Family Acquire KMT Party Assets
How Chen Shui-bian Helped the Yuanta Ma Family Acquire KMT Party Assets
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 29, 2009
The Special Investigation Unit has handed down indictments in the Chen family's "Second Financial Reform Program" scandal. This wave of prosecutions is noteworthy in two respects. First, Chen Shui-bian waved the banner of reform. He demanded that the KMT divest itself of its party assets. But at the same time he covered up the Yuanta Ma family's acquisition of KMT party assets. Secondly, Chen Shui-bian began his crusade against corruption during his first term as president. The famous expression, "power corrupts," must be amended. As the Chen Shui-bian corruption case shows, "power corrupts immediately."
Toward the end of 2003, Chen Shui-bian was running for re-election. Chen Shui-bian and the DPP targeted KMT party assets. The Executive Yuan set up an "ad hoc group for the return of illicit party assets [to the government]." They used the power of the executive to apply pressure on the Kuomintang. The KMT, in an attempt to escape from its political predicament, secretly attempted to divest itself of its party assets. The Yuanta Ma family was interested in acquiring China Investments. China Investments held the rights to Fuhua Holdings. Its acquisition would allow the Yuanta Ma family to expand its operations. Party assets had become the target of public criticism. The transaction was extremely complex. And yet Chen Shui-bian was able to pull if off.
The Yuanta Ma family first contacted Chen Hui-Yu, a Chen Shui-bian relative and trusted go-between. During Chen's re-election campaign, the Yuanta Ma family gave 20 million NT in "campaign contributions," just to test the waters. Once Chen Shui-bian was "reelected," the Yuanta Ma family paid a visit to Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng. The pretext was to congratulate them for their election victory. They used the occasion to ask whether they could acquire China Investments. At the time, Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng replied that acquiring a controlling interest in China Investments on the open market was perfectly okay. But to buy it directly would be considered "an illegal party assets transaction." This was hardly what the Yuanta Ma family hoped to hear. If the Yuanta Ma family attempted to acquire a controlling interest of China Investments on the open market, the price of shares would skyrocket. The Yuanta Ma family's capital costs would increase substantially. Therefore the Yuanta Ma family attempted to bribe Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng. It would acquire China Investments directly, and hope to pick it up for a bargain.
The Yuanta Ma family strategy involved two approaches. On the one hand, it would use DPP legislators. It would secretly install Wu Jie, an "industrial spy." He would run for the board of directors of Fuhua Holdings, demanding that the KMT divest itself of its party assets. Wu Jie would then be firmly in control of divestiture proceedings for China Investments. Angelo Koo of Development Holdings also hoped to acquire China Investments. Koo was in secret talks with the KMT, and appeared to have reached an accord. But in the end he failed, because Wu Jie leaked information to the Yuanta Ma family. The Yuanta Ma family immediately used Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's authority to intervene. Wu Jie was of course rewarded once the deal was struck. By the time the scandal was exposed, he had already fled overseas.
The Yuanta Ma family was aware of the progress of secret talks between Development Holding's Angelo Koo and the KMT. It knew if it did not act immediately, Development Holdings would snatch China Holdings from under its nose. Therefore it dispatched Tu Li-ping to the president's official residence, and asked Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng for their support. Wu Shu-chen then revealed her asking price. Their support was available, for 200 million NT. By this time it was clear that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's rhetoric about how "acquiring a controlling interest on the open market was perfectly okay" was nothing more than a smokescreen. What Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng really wanted was money. Whoever gave them money, could buy any damned party assets they cared to. The crusade against KMT party assets was nothing more than election rhetoric. The DPP and the public were kept in the dark.
On the morning of November 30, 2004, the Yuanta Ma family delivered 200 million NT in cash to the president's official residence. Wu Shu-chen immediately "sealed the deal." She personally telephoned Angelo Koo. She said she had evidence Angelo Koo was dealing with the Kuomintang, that he was helping the KMT, and that therefore she would punish him. She then hung up. But Wu Shu-chen's "lightning bolt" failed to deter Development Holdings. Chen Shui-bian told Ma Yung-cheng to threaten the Koo family. He told him to tell the Koo family that their private attempts to acquire KMT party assets were illegal, and that if they didn't give up their attempt to acquire China Holdings, then even Development Holdings would encounter problems. At this point, the Koo family had no choice but to back down. Ah-Cheng and Ah-Bian had successfully helped the Yuanta Ma family privately acquire KMT party assets by means of illegal transactions.
This is the true face of Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng helping the Yuanta Ma family acquire China Holdings. This is what prosecutors have now exposed. Chen's so-called crusade against illicit KMT party assets was nothing but pretexts for the First Family to rake in money. Is this not shameful? Is this not despicable? Is this not frightening?
Did Chen Shui-bian's corruption become as flagrant as it did only after his first term expired and he began campaigning for a second term? The answer is no. Chen Shui-bian was first elected president in 2000. Just one year after taking office, he began extorting money from Tsai Hong-tu of Cathay Financial Holdings. Tsai Hong-tu and Fubon Financial Holdings were attempting to acquire the rights to the United World Chinese Commercial Bank. That year Tsai Hong-tu paid Chen Shui-bian 100 million NT. For the next three years he paid the same amount. All in all he paid Chen 400 million in bribes. He squeezed out the once dominant Fubon Financial Holdings Corporation, and gained control of the United World Chinese Commercial Bank.
When we say "power corrupts" we usually mean that once people have been in power a while and begin to understand how to abuse their power, they are no longer able to resist its temptation. In other words, "Power corrupts gradually." But Chen Shui-bian was different. Chen Shui-bian was a case of "Power corrupts immediately." No sooner had Chen Shui-bian assumed office than he began engaging in wholesale corruption. Chen Shui-bian was different from most people. He was already on this path, long before he became president.
看陳水扁如何助元大馬家買國民黨黨產
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.29 03:47 am
扁家與二次金改有關的弊案，特偵組已提起公訴。這一波起訴有兩個值得注意的地方：第一，陳水扁打著反國民黨黨產的大旗，卻收賄掩護元大馬家買黨產；第二，陳水扁的腐化是打從首屆出任總統就開始的，「權力使人腐化」這句名言，在扁案應修正為「權力立即使人腐化」。
二 ○○三年底，陳水扁競選連任，當時陳水扁和民進黨鎖定國民黨黨產的議題猛打，行政院還成立了「政黨不當黨產歸還政府專案小組」，藉行政力量對國民黨施壓。而國民黨為了擺脫政治困境，正極機密地謀求出脫黨產。元大馬家有意買黨產中投公司，是看上了中投握有復華金控的經營權，買下即可迅速擴大事業版圖。在黨產成為眾矢之的的情勢下，這麼複雜的一筆交易，陳水扁卻仍然有本事促成。
元大馬家先是經由陳水扁親信陳慧遊穿針引線，在大選期間先送了二千萬元「政治獻金」以投石問路。大選後，陳水扁連任了，馬家再以道賀為名，拜訪扁珍，順便問明可否買中投。當時扁珍的答覆是：公開市場去買股票進而控制中投無妨，直接買則會被認定是「違法的黨產交易」云云。然而，這並不符合元大馬家的如意算盤，因為馬家若這樣做，只會造成中投股價大漲，元大馬家的投資成本會大幅增加。因此，馬家打算買通扁珍路線，直接購買，以期撿便宜買黨產。
元大馬家的布局分兩大方向：一方面，利用民進黨立委的管道，安插了一名「商業間諜」吳杰，以打擊黨產為名，出任復華金控官股董事的代表，進而由吳杰牢牢掌握了國民黨出售中投的動向。因此，也有意買中投的開發金辜仲與國民黨秘密談判雖幾乎達陣，卻功敗垂成，最終破局；就是敗在吳杰走漏消息給元大馬家，使元大馬家立即動用扁珍的力量橫加干涉所致。吳杰在事成之後當頗有報酬，但在本案爆發之際，早已逃往海外。
另一方面，元大馬家掌握開發金辜仲與國民黨秘密談判的進度，知道若再不出手，就要眼看著復華金控由開發金取得，乃直接派由杜麗萍前往玉山官邸，要求扁珍的支持；吳淑珍這時遂亮出了底牌，支持可以，但要價兩億元。至此，原先扁珍所謂「公開市場買股無妨」的說法，證明只是幌子；扁珍真正要的是錢，給了錢，誰愛買黨產就買黨產。打擊黨產云云，不過是選舉語言罷了；整個民進黨及全體國人皆被扁珍蒙在鼓裡。
二 ○○四年十一月三十日上午，元大馬家兩億元現鈔送進總統官邸，吳淑珍隨即「履行交易」。她親自致電辜仲，聲稱「有證據顯示辜仲和國民黨交易，辜仲是在幫國民黨，她會修理辜仲」云云，然後就掛了電話。但吳淑珍的「雷擊」還沒嚇退開發金；陳水扁乃透過馬永成，向辜家威脅，謂私「買」國民黨黨產「違法」，若不放棄中投，那連開發金控也會有問題。至此，辜家不得不撤退了；而扁珍也助成了元大馬家「私買黨產的違法交易」。
以上是檢察官揭發出來的扁珍夫婦助元大馬家買黨產中投公司的政治真面目。所謂打擊黨產云云的政治口號，在陳水扁夫婦而言，只不過是他們斂財牟利的題材而已。可不可恥？可不可恨？可不可怕？
再者，陳水扁的腐化，是到了第一任將屆滿、競選第二任時才達到如此腐臭的地步嗎？答案是否定的。因為，在陳水扁二千年首次當選總統，上任剛滿一年之際，就直接了當地向國泰金控的蔡宏圖索賄。索賄的由頭，是蔡宏圖正和富邦金控爭奪世華銀行經營權。蔡宏圖在當年付了一億元，之後又連付三年，共付四億賄款，因而排擠掉了原占優勢的富邦金控，拿下了世華銀行。
所謂「權力使人腐化」，一般的情況是掌權者手握大權一段時間之後，瞭解了權力運用的「巧門」，加上無法抵抗誘惑，才會逐步沉淪。陳水扁的情況卻是「權力立即使人腐化」，一上任就開始大貪特貪；若非陳水扁異於常人，就是其實在出任總統的更早之前，陳水扁早已深諳此道了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 29, 2009
The Special Investigation Unit has handed down indictments in the Chen family's "Second Financial Reform Program" scandal. This wave of prosecutions is noteworthy in two respects. First, Chen Shui-bian waved the banner of reform. He demanded that the KMT divest itself of its party assets. But at the same time he covered up the Yuanta Ma family's acquisition of KMT party assets. Secondly, Chen Shui-bian began his crusade against corruption during his first term as president. The famous expression, "power corrupts," must be amended. As the Chen Shui-bian corruption case shows, "power corrupts immediately."
Toward the end of 2003, Chen Shui-bian was running for re-election. Chen Shui-bian and the DPP targeted KMT party assets. The Executive Yuan set up an "ad hoc group for the return of illicit party assets [to the government]." They used the power of the executive to apply pressure on the Kuomintang. The KMT, in an attempt to escape from its political predicament, secretly attempted to divest itself of its party assets. The Yuanta Ma family was interested in acquiring China Investments. China Investments held the rights to Fuhua Holdings. Its acquisition would allow the Yuanta Ma family to expand its operations. Party assets had become the target of public criticism. The transaction was extremely complex. And yet Chen Shui-bian was able to pull if off.
The Yuanta Ma family first contacted Chen Hui-Yu, a Chen Shui-bian relative and trusted go-between. During Chen's re-election campaign, the Yuanta Ma family gave 20 million NT in "campaign contributions," just to test the waters. Once Chen Shui-bian was "reelected," the Yuanta Ma family paid a visit to Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng. The pretext was to congratulate them for their election victory. They used the occasion to ask whether they could acquire China Investments. At the time, Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng replied that acquiring a controlling interest in China Investments on the open market was perfectly okay. But to buy it directly would be considered "an illegal party assets transaction." This was hardly what the Yuanta Ma family hoped to hear. If the Yuanta Ma family attempted to acquire a controlling interest of China Investments on the open market, the price of shares would skyrocket. The Yuanta Ma family's capital costs would increase substantially. Therefore the Yuanta Ma family attempted to bribe Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng. It would acquire China Investments directly, and hope to pick it up for a bargain.
The Yuanta Ma family strategy involved two approaches. On the one hand, it would use DPP legislators. It would secretly install Wu Jie, an "industrial spy." He would run for the board of directors of Fuhua Holdings, demanding that the KMT divest itself of its party assets. Wu Jie would then be firmly in control of divestiture proceedings for China Investments. Angelo Koo of Development Holdings also hoped to acquire China Investments. Koo was in secret talks with the KMT, and appeared to have reached an accord. But in the end he failed, because Wu Jie leaked information to the Yuanta Ma family. The Yuanta Ma family immediately used Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's authority to intervene. Wu Jie was of course rewarded once the deal was struck. By the time the scandal was exposed, he had already fled overseas.
The Yuanta Ma family was aware of the progress of secret talks between Development Holding's Angelo Koo and the KMT. It knew if it did not act immediately, Development Holdings would snatch China Holdings from under its nose. Therefore it dispatched Tu Li-ping to the president's official residence, and asked Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng for their support. Wu Shu-chen then revealed her asking price. Their support was available, for 200 million NT. By this time it was clear that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's rhetoric about how "acquiring a controlling interest on the open market was perfectly okay" was nothing more than a smokescreen. What Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng really wanted was money. Whoever gave them money, could buy any damned party assets they cared to. The crusade against KMT party assets was nothing more than election rhetoric. The DPP and the public were kept in the dark.
On the morning of November 30, 2004, the Yuanta Ma family delivered 200 million NT in cash to the president's official residence. Wu Shu-chen immediately "sealed the deal." She personally telephoned Angelo Koo. She said she had evidence Angelo Koo was dealing with the Kuomintang, that he was helping the KMT, and that therefore she would punish him. She then hung up. But Wu Shu-chen's "lightning bolt" failed to deter Development Holdings. Chen Shui-bian told Ma Yung-cheng to threaten the Koo family. He told him to tell the Koo family that their private attempts to acquire KMT party assets were illegal, and that if they didn't give up their attempt to acquire China Holdings, then even Development Holdings would encounter problems. At this point, the Koo family had no choice but to back down. Ah-Cheng and Ah-Bian had successfully helped the Yuanta Ma family privately acquire KMT party assets by means of illegal transactions.
This is the true face of Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng helping the Yuanta Ma family acquire China Holdings. This is what prosecutors have now exposed. Chen's so-called crusade against illicit KMT party assets was nothing but pretexts for the First Family to rake in money. Is this not shameful? Is this not despicable? Is this not frightening?
Did Chen Shui-bian's corruption become as flagrant as it did only after his first term expired and he began campaigning for a second term? The answer is no. Chen Shui-bian was first elected president in 2000. Just one year after taking office, he began extorting money from Tsai Hong-tu of Cathay Financial Holdings. Tsai Hong-tu and Fubon Financial Holdings were attempting to acquire the rights to the United World Chinese Commercial Bank. That year Tsai Hong-tu paid Chen Shui-bian 100 million NT. For the next three years he paid the same amount. All in all he paid Chen 400 million in bribes. He squeezed out the once dominant Fubon Financial Holdings Corporation, and gained control of the United World Chinese Commercial Bank.
When we say "power corrupts" we usually mean that once people have been in power a while and begin to understand how to abuse their power, they are no longer able to resist its temptation. In other words, "Power corrupts gradually." But Chen Shui-bian was different. Chen Shui-bian was a case of "Power corrupts immediately." No sooner had Chen Shui-bian assumed office than he began engaging in wholesale corruption. Chen Shui-bian was different from most people. He was already on this path, long before he became president.
看陳水扁如何助元大馬家買國民黨黨產
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.29 03:47 am
扁家與二次金改有關的弊案，特偵組已提起公訴。這一波起訴有兩個值得注意的地方：第一，陳水扁打著反國民黨黨產的大旗，卻收賄掩護元大馬家買黨產；第二，陳水扁的腐化是打從首屆出任總統就開始的，「權力使人腐化」這句名言，在扁案應修正為「權力立即使人腐化」。
二 ○○三年底，陳水扁競選連任，當時陳水扁和民進黨鎖定國民黨黨產的議題猛打，行政院還成立了「政黨不當黨產歸還政府專案小組」，藉行政力量對國民黨施壓。而國民黨為了擺脫政治困境，正極機密地謀求出脫黨產。元大馬家有意買黨產中投公司，是看上了中投握有復華金控的經營權，買下即可迅速擴大事業版圖。在黨產成為眾矢之的的情勢下，這麼複雜的一筆交易，陳水扁卻仍然有本事促成。
元大馬家先是經由陳水扁親信陳慧遊穿針引線，在大選期間先送了二千萬元「政治獻金」以投石問路。大選後，陳水扁連任了，馬家再以道賀為名，拜訪扁珍，順便問明可否買中投。當時扁珍的答覆是：公開市場去買股票進而控制中投無妨，直接買則會被認定是「違法的黨產交易」云云。然而，這並不符合元大馬家的如意算盤，因為馬家若這樣做，只會造成中投股價大漲，元大馬家的投資成本會大幅增加。因此，馬家打算買通扁珍路線，直接購買，以期撿便宜買黨產。
元大馬家的布局分兩大方向：一方面，利用民進黨立委的管道，安插了一名「商業間諜」吳杰，以打擊黨產為名，出任復華金控官股董事的代表，進而由吳杰牢牢掌握了國民黨出售中投的動向。因此，也有意買中投的開發金辜仲與國民黨秘密談判雖幾乎達陣，卻功敗垂成，最終破局；就是敗在吳杰走漏消息給元大馬家，使元大馬家立即動用扁珍的力量橫加干涉所致。吳杰在事成之後當頗有報酬，但在本案爆發之際，早已逃往海外。
另一方面，元大馬家掌握開發金辜仲與國民黨秘密談判的進度，知道若再不出手，就要眼看著復華金控由開發金取得，乃直接派由杜麗萍前往玉山官邸，要求扁珍的支持；吳淑珍這時遂亮出了底牌，支持可以，但要價兩億元。至此，原先扁珍所謂「公開市場買股無妨」的說法，證明只是幌子；扁珍真正要的是錢，給了錢，誰愛買黨產就買黨產。打擊黨產云云，不過是選舉語言罷了；整個民進黨及全體國人皆被扁珍蒙在鼓裡。
二 ○○四年十一月三十日上午，元大馬家兩億元現鈔送進總統官邸，吳淑珍隨即「履行交易」。她親自致電辜仲，聲稱「有證據顯示辜仲和國民黨交易，辜仲是在幫國民黨，她會修理辜仲」云云，然後就掛了電話。但吳淑珍的「雷擊」還沒嚇退開發金；陳水扁乃透過馬永成，向辜家威脅，謂私「買」國民黨黨產「違法」，若不放棄中投，那連開發金控也會有問題。至此，辜家不得不撤退了；而扁珍也助成了元大馬家「私買黨產的違法交易」。
以上是檢察官揭發出來的扁珍夫婦助元大馬家買黨產中投公司的政治真面目。所謂打擊黨產云云的政治口號，在陳水扁夫婦而言，只不過是他們斂財牟利的題材而已。可不可恥？可不可恨？可不可怕？
再者，陳水扁的腐化，是到了第一任將屆滿、競選第二任時才達到如此腐臭的地步嗎？答案是否定的。因為，在陳水扁二千年首次當選總統，上任剛滿一年之際，就直接了當地向國泰金控的蔡宏圖索賄。索賄的由頭，是蔡宏圖正和富邦金控爭奪世華銀行經營權。蔡宏圖在當年付了一億元，之後又連付三年，共付四億賄款，因而排擠掉了原占優勢的富邦金控，拿下了世華銀行。
所謂「權力使人腐化」，一般的情況是掌權者手握大權一段時間之後，瞭解了權力運用的「巧門」，加上無法抵抗誘惑，才會逐步沉淪。陳水扁的情況卻是「權力立即使人腐化」，一上任就開始大貪特貪；若非陳水扁異於常人，就是其實在出任總統的更早之前，陳水扁早已深諳此道了。
Monday, December 28, 2009
The Ministry of Justice Must Rectify Its Interpretation of "Bribery Not Inconsistent with the Performance of One's Official Duties"
The Ministry of Justice Must Rectify Its Interpretation of "Bribery Not Inconsistent with the Performance of One's Official Duties"
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 28, 2009
Yesterday the Special Investigation Unit handed down indictments in the Second Financial Reform mergers and acquisitions scandal. But it sharply narrowed the range of those targeted for indictment, provoking a storm of public outrage. The most heavily criticized aspect was the Special Investigation Unit's interpretation of the clause, "bribery not inconsistent with the performance of one's official duties." According to its interpretation of this clause, government officials who accept bribes have have no criminal liability under current law, as long as accepting the bribe did not affect the official's performance of his duties. This newspaper has recently attempted to clarify the issue. Unfortunately we have been unable to persuade the legal hacks involved to change their definition. The Special Investigation Unit has even rationalized Chen Shui-bian's euphemistically-named "Second Financial Reform Program," a transparently obvious sweetheart deal. All we can do is explain the issues, yet again, not only to the Special Investigation Unit, but to every prosecutor within the Ministry of Justice. All we can do is enlighten them about the meaning of "mergers and acquisitions" and "dereliction of duty."
Publicly owned banks are the nation's cash cows. Even though their operational efficiency cannot match that of private banks, they receive a fixed annual income from the national treasury. The central government has only one reason to privatize these banks and sells off shares, and that is to maximize the wealth of the treasury. Other considerations include protecting the rights of employees, but these are invariably of secondary importance. They are the most important reason for selling off shares.
When the Ministry of Finance sells shares of say, Bank A, it must of course sell to the highest bidder, or at least to the most appropriate bidder based on other considerations. Say for example, that Bidder A and Bidder B are both interested in acquiring Bank A. Bidder A bids 100 billion. Bidder B bids a mere 30 billion. Yet the Ministry of Finance sells the bank to Bidder B. The National Treasury loses 70 billion, for no good reason. If this is does not constitute dereliction of one's duties as a civil servant, what does? Is this does not constitute a violation of government procurement laws, what does? All of the government's laws pertaining to the procurement process, including the Administrative Procedure Act, stipulate open bidding and transparent evaluations, in order to protect the national interest. Only under special circumstances, when the national interest is not involved, are officials free to choose between Bidder A and Bidder B. In other words, when the government sells off shares of public banks, there is definitely a "right price." If offiicals ignore the higher bid, and hapharzardly award contracts without proper authorization, they are impoverishing the national treasury, in order to benefit special interests. This is clearly a dereliction of their duty as civil service employees. They may be prosecuted for such conduct. The person offering bribes may also be subject to criminal prosecution for "bribery inconsistent with the performance of one's official duties."
Let's examine bribery from another point of view. Say Bidder A, Bidder B, and Bidder C all want to bid on Bank A. The government must award the bid to the highest bidder. If the highest bidder is awarded the bid, then there is no need to pay bribes. Only when someone who is not the highest bidder wants to be awarded the bid, that is it necessary for him to pay a bribe. Therefore, the act of bribing an official is prima facie evidence of an attempt to induce an official to violate correct procedure. It is prima facie evidence that the bidder wants an official to grant them a franchise inconsistent with the national interest. Those attempting to bribe officials are clearly guilty of attempting to induce them to engage in "bribery inconsistent with the performance of one's official duties."
Conceptually, only one situation can be classified as "bribery not inconsistent with the performance of one's official duties." That is when the person offering the bribe is merely seeking to ensure rights he was already entitled to. For example, if a person has passed a driving test, he is entitled to a driver's license. But officials may make him jump through hoops. In such a case, he may attempt to bribe them, merely to ensure the rights he was already entitled to. To absolve such a person of a crime is publicly acceptable. A holding company's acquisitions, on the other hand, are another matter entirely. The Tsai family, which owns the Cathay Corporation, has no god-given right to acquire the United Bank. The Koo family or Wu family have no god-given right to acquire the Changhua Bank. These are not matters of rights. Therefore if officials illicitly transfer tens of billions from the state treasury into the private accounts of these wealthy families, they are course derelict in their duty. Officials transfer tens of billions in government assets into the pockets of private individuals. And yet prosecutors maintain that these officials were not derelict in their duty, and that these were not sweetheart deals for the sake of special interests. This is not merely an inability to reason. This is willfull, head in the sand blindness.
Former University of Chicago president Robert Hutchins once commented on the shortcomings of today's legal education. He said that if those who enforce the law know only how to apply the law mechanically, but know nothing about the philosophy of law and the concept of justice, then they are a menace to society. Unfortunately the legal hacks in the Special Investigation Unit and the Ministry of Justice Prosecutors Office have an understanding of bribery and official responsibility that deviates from society's. Worse, it is not even consistent with the most basic principles of justice. They must indict those guilty of bribery in the Second Financial Reforms Program scandal. They must insist that the bribery involved dereliction of duty. If they refuse to do so, then they are declaring that those who have stolen hundreds of billions in national assets may get off scot-free. They are demonstrating that those who enforce the law live in a decadent, self-imposed isolation.
We offer the prosecutors of the Special Investigation Unit and the Ministry of Justice a refresher course in jurisprudence. We call upon Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng to address the serious problem of ignorance among those who interpret the law, and who indiscriminately expand the definition of the clause, "bribery not inconsistent with the performance of one's official duties." To the vast majority of the public on Taiwan, this is unacceptable. It rationalizes official discretion in the accepting of bribes. It is a major scandal that has shaken the foundations of the nation. Addressing the problem does not require amending the law. All that is necessary is for prosecutors to clarify the various legal concepts. The good name of government administrators and private entrepreneurs must not be destroyed by this group of legal hacks with a flawed understanding of the law!
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.28
社論－法務部應導正「不違背職務行賄」詮釋
本報訊
特偵組日前對泛二次金改的金融併購案件偵結起訴，但因追究對象極為限縮，招致外界排山倒海的批評，而其中最受詬病的，就是特偵組對諸多案件以「不違背職務」行賄偵結，以致行賄者依現行法律皆無刑責。對於不違背職務的認定，本報社論日前已嘗試釐清，可惜未能撼動法匠的狹窄認知。現在，竟然連二次金改這麼大規模的賤售國產案件都能被特偵組輾平，我們只好再做論述，不只是對特偵組，而要對所有法務部檢察官補上一堂課，教教他們什麼是金融併購、什麼叫違背職務。
公股銀行是國家的金雞母，即使經營效率可能不若民營銀行，但畢竟每年有定期的國庫收入。國家若因民營化等政策目的而要將公股銀行出售，則只有一個主要出售目的，就是要極大化釋股國庫收入。其他考量或許包括現有員工權益保障等，但無論如何皆屬次要，絕不會置最重要的釋股收入於不顧。
既然如此，那麼當財政部要把公股銀行A的經營權釋出時，當然就該把銀行賣給出價較高、或其他綜合考量最恰當的投標者。如果甲、乙二人對於 A銀行皆有意併購，甲出價一千億、乙只出價三百億，但財政部卻將銀行低價賣給乙，使國庫平白無故損失了七百億，這不是違背公務員職務，是什麼？所有的政府採購法、行政程序法等規範，就是要以公開的程序、透明的審理，去確保國家權益的極大。只有在無涉國家利益的特殊情形，公務員才有在甲、乙之間的自由採擇空間。簡言之，國家出售公股銀行，絕對是有「對價」的。公務員捨棄出價高者、或是根本不理會對價而擅予亂點鴛鴦譜，就是減損國庫、圖利他人的行為，是百分之百的違背公務員職務。這種行為不但該予追究，而行賄者也當受「違背職務行賄」之刑責。
換個角度來看行賄者。如果甲、乙、丙三人皆想標購 A銀行，而國家也理應以出價最高者標售之，則甲、乙、丙中出價最高者本來就會得標，不必行賄。事實上，也只有原本不該得標的人想要破例得標，才有行賄的必要。因此，商家行賄官員之行為本身，就是表示其意圖使公務員破格給標，也就表示他們想要公務員不合國家利益地給予經營權，其行賄自然應依「違背職務行賄」予以追究。
在概念上，我們認為只有一種情況可以列為不違背職務行賄，即行賄者所企求的標的，本為其所應得的權利（entitled rights）。例如，某人已通過駕照考試，應有取得駕照的權利，卻因行政官員刁難而拿不到手。在這種情況下，行賄只是為求保障應得權利之不得已，免其行賄刑責人民自能接受。就金控併購而言，併入世華銀行當然不是國泰蔡家權利、買下開發金或彰銀也不是辜家或吳家權利。既然不是權利，卻任憑官員上下其手、私相授受，且影響國庫收入動輒數百億，當然是違背職務的行為。如將國家財產數百億給予私人，檢察官竟然還說這不算圖利、沒有違背職務，這不僅是推理短路，簡直是晉惠帝般愚癡。
芝加哥大學前校長哈金斯（Robert Hutchins）曾經對當今法學教育的弊病提出針砭。哈氏指出，司法者若只嫻熟法律規則的形式推理，卻對於法理正義的哲學一無所知，那就是社會的危害。令人遺憾的是，特偵組與法務部法匠檢察官對不違背職務行賄的認知，既悖離社會感情，亦不符合最基本的法理正義。如果對於二次金改的行賄者不起訴，硬說他們是不違職務行賄，那不僅宣示五鬼搬運國家千億財產者可以逍遙法外，也是司法者自我封閉於形式邏輯實證法的墮落。
在此，我們不但要對特偵組檢察官與法務部補上一堂法理學的課，也要籲請王清峰部長正視法匠愚癡詮釋的嚴重性。濫行擴大不違背職務行賄的範圍，不但絕大多數台灣人民難接受，也合理化所有政府裁量的賄賂，幾乎是動搖國本的重大事件。此事的解決並不需要修法，只要釐清諸檢察官的觀念即可。無論如何，台灣的吏治前途與政商清明，不能毀在這一群認知有瑕疵的法匠之手！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 28, 2009
Yesterday the Special Investigation Unit handed down indictments in the Second Financial Reform mergers and acquisitions scandal. But it sharply narrowed the range of those targeted for indictment, provoking a storm of public outrage. The most heavily criticized aspect was the Special Investigation Unit's interpretation of the clause, "bribery not inconsistent with the performance of one's official duties." According to its interpretation of this clause, government officials who accept bribes have have no criminal liability under current law, as long as accepting the bribe did not affect the official's performance of his duties. This newspaper has recently attempted to clarify the issue. Unfortunately we have been unable to persuade the legal hacks involved to change their definition. The Special Investigation Unit has even rationalized Chen Shui-bian's euphemistically-named "Second Financial Reform Program," a transparently obvious sweetheart deal. All we can do is explain the issues, yet again, not only to the Special Investigation Unit, but to every prosecutor within the Ministry of Justice. All we can do is enlighten them about the meaning of "mergers and acquisitions" and "dereliction of duty."
Publicly owned banks are the nation's cash cows. Even though their operational efficiency cannot match that of private banks, they receive a fixed annual income from the national treasury. The central government has only one reason to privatize these banks and sells off shares, and that is to maximize the wealth of the treasury. Other considerations include protecting the rights of employees, but these are invariably of secondary importance. They are the most important reason for selling off shares.
When the Ministry of Finance sells shares of say, Bank A, it must of course sell to the highest bidder, or at least to the most appropriate bidder based on other considerations. Say for example, that Bidder A and Bidder B are both interested in acquiring Bank A. Bidder A bids 100 billion. Bidder B bids a mere 30 billion. Yet the Ministry of Finance sells the bank to Bidder B. The National Treasury loses 70 billion, for no good reason. If this is does not constitute dereliction of one's duties as a civil servant, what does? Is this does not constitute a violation of government procurement laws, what does? All of the government's laws pertaining to the procurement process, including the Administrative Procedure Act, stipulate open bidding and transparent evaluations, in order to protect the national interest. Only under special circumstances, when the national interest is not involved, are officials free to choose between Bidder A and Bidder B. In other words, when the government sells off shares of public banks, there is definitely a "right price." If offiicals ignore the higher bid, and hapharzardly award contracts without proper authorization, they are impoverishing the national treasury, in order to benefit special interests. This is clearly a dereliction of their duty as civil service employees. They may be prosecuted for such conduct. The person offering bribes may also be subject to criminal prosecution for "bribery inconsistent with the performance of one's official duties."
Let's examine bribery from another point of view. Say Bidder A, Bidder B, and Bidder C all want to bid on Bank A. The government must award the bid to the highest bidder. If the highest bidder is awarded the bid, then there is no need to pay bribes. Only when someone who is not the highest bidder wants to be awarded the bid, that is it necessary for him to pay a bribe. Therefore, the act of bribing an official is prima facie evidence of an attempt to induce an official to violate correct procedure. It is prima facie evidence that the bidder wants an official to grant them a franchise inconsistent with the national interest. Those attempting to bribe officials are clearly guilty of attempting to induce them to engage in "bribery inconsistent with the performance of one's official duties."
Conceptually, only one situation can be classified as "bribery not inconsistent with the performance of one's official duties." That is when the person offering the bribe is merely seeking to ensure rights he was already entitled to. For example, if a person has passed a driving test, he is entitled to a driver's license. But officials may make him jump through hoops. In such a case, he may attempt to bribe them, merely to ensure the rights he was already entitled to. To absolve such a person of a crime is publicly acceptable. A holding company's acquisitions, on the other hand, are another matter entirely. The Tsai family, which owns the Cathay Corporation, has no god-given right to acquire the United Bank. The Koo family or Wu family have no god-given right to acquire the Changhua Bank. These are not matters of rights. Therefore if officials illicitly transfer tens of billions from the state treasury into the private accounts of these wealthy families, they are course derelict in their duty. Officials transfer tens of billions in government assets into the pockets of private individuals. And yet prosecutors maintain that these officials were not derelict in their duty, and that these were not sweetheart deals for the sake of special interests. This is not merely an inability to reason. This is willfull, head in the sand blindness.
Former University of Chicago president Robert Hutchins once commented on the shortcomings of today's legal education. He said that if those who enforce the law know only how to apply the law mechanically, but know nothing about the philosophy of law and the concept of justice, then they are a menace to society. Unfortunately the legal hacks in the Special Investigation Unit and the Ministry of Justice Prosecutors Office have an understanding of bribery and official responsibility that deviates from society's. Worse, it is not even consistent with the most basic principles of justice. They must indict those guilty of bribery in the Second Financial Reforms Program scandal. They must insist that the bribery involved dereliction of duty. If they refuse to do so, then they are declaring that those who have stolen hundreds of billions in national assets may get off scot-free. They are demonstrating that those who enforce the law live in a decadent, self-imposed isolation.
We offer the prosecutors of the Special Investigation Unit and the Ministry of Justice a refresher course in jurisprudence. We call upon Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng to address the serious problem of ignorance among those who interpret the law, and who indiscriminately expand the definition of the clause, "bribery not inconsistent with the performance of one's official duties." To the vast majority of the public on Taiwan, this is unacceptable. It rationalizes official discretion in the accepting of bribes. It is a major scandal that has shaken the foundations of the nation. Addressing the problem does not require amending the law. All that is necessary is for prosecutors to clarify the various legal concepts. The good name of government administrators and private entrepreneurs must not be destroyed by this group of legal hacks with a flawed understanding of the law!
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.28
社論－法務部應導正「不違背職務行賄」詮釋
本報訊
特偵組日前對泛二次金改的金融併購案件偵結起訴，但因追究對象極為限縮，招致外界排山倒海的批評，而其中最受詬病的，就是特偵組對諸多案件以「不違背職務」行賄偵結，以致行賄者依現行法律皆無刑責。對於不違背職務的認定，本報社論日前已嘗試釐清，可惜未能撼動法匠的狹窄認知。現在，竟然連二次金改這麼大規模的賤售國產案件都能被特偵組輾平，我們只好再做論述，不只是對特偵組，而要對所有法務部檢察官補上一堂課，教教他們什麼是金融併購、什麼叫違背職務。
公股銀行是國家的金雞母，即使經營效率可能不若民營銀行，但畢竟每年有定期的國庫收入。國家若因民營化等政策目的而要將公股銀行出售，則只有一個主要出售目的，就是要極大化釋股國庫收入。其他考量或許包括現有員工權益保障等，但無論如何皆屬次要，絕不會置最重要的釋股收入於不顧。
既然如此，那麼當財政部要把公股銀行A的經營權釋出時，當然就該把銀行賣給出價較高、或其他綜合考量最恰當的投標者。如果甲、乙二人對於 A銀行皆有意併購，甲出價一千億、乙只出價三百億，但財政部卻將銀行低價賣給乙，使國庫平白無故損失了七百億，這不是違背公務員職務，是什麼？所有的政府採購法、行政程序法等規範，就是要以公開的程序、透明的審理，去確保國家權益的極大。只有在無涉國家利益的特殊情形，公務員才有在甲、乙之間的自由採擇空間。簡言之，國家出售公股銀行，絕對是有「對價」的。公務員捨棄出價高者、或是根本不理會對價而擅予亂點鴛鴦譜，就是減損國庫、圖利他人的行為，是百分之百的違背公務員職務。這種行為不但該予追究，而行賄者也當受「違背職務行賄」之刑責。
換個角度來看行賄者。如果甲、乙、丙三人皆想標購 A銀行，而國家也理應以出價最高者標售之，則甲、乙、丙中出價最高者本來就會得標，不必行賄。事實上，也只有原本不該得標的人想要破例得標，才有行賄的必要。因此，商家行賄官員之行為本身，就是表示其意圖使公務員破格給標，也就表示他們想要公務員不合國家利益地給予經營權，其行賄自然應依「違背職務行賄」予以追究。
在概念上，我們認為只有一種情況可以列為不違背職務行賄，即行賄者所企求的標的，本為其所應得的權利（entitled rights）。例如，某人已通過駕照考試，應有取得駕照的權利，卻因行政官員刁難而拿不到手。在這種情況下，行賄只是為求保障應得權利之不得已，免其行賄刑責人民自能接受。就金控併購而言，併入世華銀行當然不是國泰蔡家權利、買下開發金或彰銀也不是辜家或吳家權利。既然不是權利，卻任憑官員上下其手、私相授受，且影響國庫收入動輒數百億，當然是違背職務的行為。如將國家財產數百億給予私人，檢察官竟然還說這不算圖利、沒有違背職務，這不僅是推理短路，簡直是晉惠帝般愚癡。
芝加哥大學前校長哈金斯（Robert Hutchins）曾經對當今法學教育的弊病提出針砭。哈氏指出，司法者若只嫻熟法律規則的形式推理，卻對於法理正義的哲學一無所知，那就是社會的危害。令人遺憾的是，特偵組與法務部法匠檢察官對不違背職務行賄的認知，既悖離社會感情，亦不符合最基本的法理正義。如果對於二次金改的行賄者不起訴，硬說他們是不違職務行賄，那不僅宣示五鬼搬運國家千億財產者可以逍遙法外，也是司法者自我封閉於形式邏輯實證法的墮落。
在此，我們不但要對特偵組檢察官與法務部補上一堂法理學的課，也要籲請王清峰部長正視法匠愚癡詮釋的嚴重性。濫行擴大不違背職務行賄的範圍，不但絕大多數台灣人民難接受，也合理化所有政府裁量的賄賂，幾乎是動搖國本的重大事件。此事的解決並不需要修法，只要釐清諸檢察官的觀念即可。無論如何，台灣的吏治前途與政商清明，不能毀在這一群認知有瑕疵的法匠之手！
Thursday, December 24, 2009
The DPP's Challenge: To Transform Its Supporters
The DPP's Challenge: To Transform Its Supporters
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 24, 2009
Only four days after the DPP's protest march ended peacefully, Taiwan independence movement protests led to violence. A police officer was forcibly shoved off the back of a truck. His head struck the pavement and began bleeding profusely. The DPP leadership promptly expressed concern over the incident. It stressed repeatedly that the instigators of the violence were not DPP members, but that the DPP was willing to assume responsible for their conduct all the same. The DPP made a point of reminding the general public that one must not negate or obscure the protest movement's underlying demands due to an isolated case.
We solemnly urge the DPP to face a harsh reality. The Taiwan independence movement and the Democratic Progressive Party are inseparable. Nobody is ignoring the underlying demands of the DPP or the Taiwan independence movement. But is it really necessary to incite violence in order to arouse public concern? The instigators of the incident were members of "tai wan guo" (The Nation of Taiwan). After posting bail, they said they if they were wrong, they would acknowledge wrongdoing, but they weren't in the wrong. The Republic of China is a nation that protects freedom of expression. Advocacy of reunification and independence both fall under freedom of expression. But one may not express one's political position by inflicting bodily injury upon others. Advocating one's political position, advocating Taiwan independence is a right. Advocating Taiwan independence by inflicting bodily injury upon others is not.
One incident of violence after another have seriously undercut the image of the Taiwan independence movement. When the vast majority of peaceful and rational middle class voters and even DPP members speak of "Deep Green elements," they characterize them as "political extremists" who have trouble controlling what they say and how they behave. Because of this awareness, DPP members are afraid to antagonize them. They want to avoid provoking them, and making the situation even more worse.
Are all Taiwan independence advocates like this? Ever since Fei Hsi-ping and Lin Cheng-chieh left the Democratic Progressive Party, anyone who does not advocate Taiwan independence has found it hard to make a home in the DPP. Which DPP members call for violence? Even those who have left the DPP, such as Shen Fu-hsiung or Shih Ming-teh, are essentially advocates of Taiwan independence. But look at how polite they are in the political arena. Shih Ming-teh is an expert at urging the masses to take to the streets. He led masses against the KMT. He led masses against Chen Shui-bian. But during the month-long "Depose Ah-Bian" protests, there was not a single incident of mobs beating up dissenters, let alone clashing with the police. The fact is that whenever crowds gather, and time drags on, both crowds and police become physically fatigued, emotionally irritable, and incidents can easily erupt. If protests keep popping up everywhere, or follow one around like a shadow, a tiny spark can easily lead to disaster. This is basic knowledge for every leader of a social movement.
The DPP intiated its Sunday protest march. Observers repeatedly warned the DPP to establish a response center and have the maturity to invite the police to participate and maintain order, stressing that this would be a good way to avoid incidents. Who knew that even after the Chiang/Chen Meeting concluded, an incident would occur? The Chiang/Chen Meeting lasted only two days, from preparatory consultations to official signing. On the third day, Chen Yunlin began touring Taiwan and attending banquets. By then, what was there to protest? Yet protesters followed him around all day like a shadow, heckling him. After nightfall, they set off skyrockets, saying that were "bombarding Chen Yunlin." The skyrockets fired high into the air could not reach Chen Yunlin. They could not reach the Yue Yuen Hotel where he was staying. They could only hurt innocent bystanders. Was this really necessary?
Particularly appalling was the attitude of the protesters afterwards. "The policeman was an idiot. I've never seen such a stupid policeman, using his own body to block our vehicles. He fell off the truck, all by himself, and now he wants to blame us?" Why did the policeman block the vehicle with his own body? Because the Ma administration wanted to avoid bloodshed. It wanted to avoid any incidents of excessive force. It ordered police to exercise restraint, and not allow any of the protesters to be harmed. Just two days before the incident, a policeman used pepper spray on protesters who had grabbed him and were pulling him back and forth. He was disciplined and reassigned. The metropolitan police captain who was shoved off the truck and injured was attempting to prevent protesters from firing skyrockets from the back of their truck. He wasn't even carrying a baton. When he fell to the ground and began bleeding, protesters screamed, "The police are beating us!" Fortunately the police were meticulous about collecting forensic evidence. Otherwise the incident would have turned into a case of one policeman's word against the word of a hundred protesters.
The entire country watched television images of a police officer lying on the ground after being forcibly pushed off the back of a vehicle by a mob. They are no longer willing to tolerate acts of violence spun as "freedom of expression." Taichung City Mayor Jason Hu spoke of "over the line." This was considerably more than "over the line." This was simply intolerable. Taichung citizens may tolerate four or five days of sound trucks blaring "Long live the Nation of Taiwan!" But no one can tolerate disregard for law and order. No one can tolerate utter disregard for the lives and well-being of others.
If Deep Green mobs refuse to express their political positions rationally, if they refuse to deal with others peacefully, if they refuse to respect people with different views, the image of the Taiwan independence movement and the DPP can never improve.
The DPP is no longer a guerrilla-like political party clashing with the government in the streets. The DPP is a mature political party. It ruled the nation for eight years. So-called "Deep Green" mobs are the main reason the DPP has been unable to grow since its founding. If the Democratic Progressive Party wants to return to power, it must confront this problem. It must become a responsible political party. It must transform both itself and its supporters.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.25
社論－民進黨的習題：帶領支持群眾轉型
本報訊
大遊行才和平落幕四天，獨派嗆陳活動就出事了！一名執勤員警遭抗議群眾推下車，撞得頭破血流。民進黨中央第一時間就表達關切，儘管再次說明肇事民眾非民進黨員，但民進黨願意負責面對。當然，民進黨沒忘記提醒社會大眾：不要因為單一個案，抹殺或模糊民間抗議活動的主題和訴求。
我們必須沉痛的呼籲民進黨，正視獨派與民進黨無法切割的事實。社會大眾沒有人忽略民進黨或獨派抗議的主題與訴求，問題是：有必要一次又一次用製造衝突的方式引起關注嗎？肇事的台灣國成員交保後強調，有錯他會認，但他沒有錯。台灣是言論自由的國家，要統要獨，都屬言論自由，但是，不能以傷害他人的方式，主張自己的政治立場，主張台獨沒有錯，主張台獨卻以行動傷人就是錯。
一次又一次的暴力事件，已經深深傷害獨派形象，對絕大多數和平理性的中間選民、甚至對民進黨人而言，談起他們口中的「深綠群眾」，某種程度就帶著一種「他們是極端政治主張者」，他們的言行舉止難以控制，因為這樣的認知，讓民進黨人都不敢輕易觸其鋒，避免激化他們的情緒，讓事態更失序。
獨派，真的是這樣嗎？自從當年費希平、林正杰等人離開民進黨之後，非獨派就無法自安於民進黨，放眼民進黨人，有哪一個人遇事就喊打喊衝？即使脫離民進黨，沈富雄或施明德，基本上都還是獨派，他們在政治場域裡，多麼有禮貌。施明德從反國民黨到倒扁，帶群眾上街是他的專長，倒扁抗議一個月，沒聽說哪個群眾打人，遑論打警察。但是，群眾聚集，時間拖久了，民眾與警察體能疲憊、情緒焦躁，就容易出事，抗爭活動若搞成遍地開花，或如影隨形，因為小火花而釀成巨禍的機率就必然升高，這是所有帶領社會運動者的基本常識。
這一次，民進黨發動周日大遊行，輿論反覆提醒、警告，民進黨也慎重其事地組成應變中心，並且相當成熟地邀請維持秩序的警方參與，這是避免衝突事端好的開始。沒想到，在江陳正式會談都結束了，還是出事。江陳會從預備磋商到正式簽署，只有兩天，第三天就是陳雲林的遊台與酬酢，有什麼好嗆的呢？就算白天行程要如影隨形跟著嗆，入夜之後有需要施放沖天炮，意淫式地「砲打陳雲林」嗎？一枚枚升空的高空煙火，打不到陳雲林，也打不到陳入住的裕元飯店，只會傷及無辜路人，有必要嗎？
非常可惡的是，群眾肇事後的反應竟是：「那個警察是白痴，我沒看過這麼笨的警察，想以肉身擋車，自已摔下來還想賴給我們…」警察為什麼肉身擋車？因為馬政府避免流血，避免警察「執勤過當」，要求員警注意執勤手段，不能讓民眾受傷！就在出事前兩天，一位員警因為帶了辣椒噴霧器，噴了拉扯他的嗆聲民眾，遭到處分並調離維安勤務。遭民眾推下車而受傷的市刑大小隊長，攔阻施放沖天炮的車子，手上連警棍都沒有，他倒在地上頭破血流的同時，抗議群眾竟還鼓噪著，「警察打人。」若不是這次警察蒐證格外細密謹慎，這次事件，很可能又要讓警方陷入百口莫辯的困境之中。
當全國民眾看到執勤員警遭到民眾用力推下車而倒地的連續畫面，沒有人能再忍受以暴力行為包裝言論自由，這已經不是台中市長胡志強說的「超過邊緣」，而是太超過了；台中市民可以忍受四、五天穿梭街頭的宣傳車，大肆播放的「台灣國萬歲」狂躁音量，卻沒有人可以忍受無視法紀、目無他人的衝突暴力。
如果深綠群眾始終學不會理性表達政治立場，學不會和平對待、並尊重與其意見不同的人士，獨派的形象、民進黨的形象就永遠沒有再提升的可能。
民進黨不是當年衝撞街頭的草莽政黨，民進黨是已經執政過八年的成熟政黨，所謂的深綠群眾從當年到現在，都是讓民進黨成長、讓民進黨受傷的主要因素。民進黨若還想重回執政之路，非得嚴肅面對問題：做一個負責任的政黨，帶領支持群眾和黨一起轉型。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 24, 2009
Only four days after the DPP's protest march ended peacefully, Taiwan independence movement protests led to violence. A police officer was forcibly shoved off the back of a truck. His head struck the pavement and began bleeding profusely. The DPP leadership promptly expressed concern over the incident. It stressed repeatedly that the instigators of the violence were not DPP members, but that the DPP was willing to assume responsible for their conduct all the same. The DPP made a point of reminding the general public that one must not negate or obscure the protest movement's underlying demands due to an isolated case.
We solemnly urge the DPP to face a harsh reality. The Taiwan independence movement and the Democratic Progressive Party are inseparable. Nobody is ignoring the underlying demands of the DPP or the Taiwan independence movement. But is it really necessary to incite violence in order to arouse public concern? The instigators of the incident were members of "tai wan guo" (The Nation of Taiwan). After posting bail, they said they if they were wrong, they would acknowledge wrongdoing, but they weren't in the wrong. The Republic of China is a nation that protects freedom of expression. Advocacy of reunification and independence both fall under freedom of expression. But one may not express one's political position by inflicting bodily injury upon others. Advocating one's political position, advocating Taiwan independence is a right. Advocating Taiwan independence by inflicting bodily injury upon others is not.
One incident of violence after another have seriously undercut the image of the Taiwan independence movement. When the vast majority of peaceful and rational middle class voters and even DPP members speak of "Deep Green elements," they characterize them as "political extremists" who have trouble controlling what they say and how they behave. Because of this awareness, DPP members are afraid to antagonize them. They want to avoid provoking them, and making the situation even more worse.
Are all Taiwan independence advocates like this? Ever since Fei Hsi-ping and Lin Cheng-chieh left the Democratic Progressive Party, anyone who does not advocate Taiwan independence has found it hard to make a home in the DPP. Which DPP members call for violence? Even those who have left the DPP, such as Shen Fu-hsiung or Shih Ming-teh, are essentially advocates of Taiwan independence. But look at how polite they are in the political arena. Shih Ming-teh is an expert at urging the masses to take to the streets. He led masses against the KMT. He led masses against Chen Shui-bian. But during the month-long "Depose Ah-Bian" protests, there was not a single incident of mobs beating up dissenters, let alone clashing with the police. The fact is that whenever crowds gather, and time drags on, both crowds and police become physically fatigued, emotionally irritable, and incidents can easily erupt. If protests keep popping up everywhere, or follow one around like a shadow, a tiny spark can easily lead to disaster. This is basic knowledge for every leader of a social movement.
The DPP intiated its Sunday protest march. Observers repeatedly warned the DPP to establish a response center and have the maturity to invite the police to participate and maintain order, stressing that this would be a good way to avoid incidents. Who knew that even after the Chiang/Chen Meeting concluded, an incident would occur? The Chiang/Chen Meeting lasted only two days, from preparatory consultations to official signing. On the third day, Chen Yunlin began touring Taiwan and attending banquets. By then, what was there to protest? Yet protesters followed him around all day like a shadow, heckling him. After nightfall, they set off skyrockets, saying that were "bombarding Chen Yunlin." The skyrockets fired high into the air could not reach Chen Yunlin. They could not reach the Yue Yuen Hotel where he was staying. They could only hurt innocent bystanders. Was this really necessary?
Particularly appalling was the attitude of the protesters afterwards. "The policeman was an idiot. I've never seen such a stupid policeman, using his own body to block our vehicles. He fell off the truck, all by himself, and now he wants to blame us?" Why did the policeman block the vehicle with his own body? Because the Ma administration wanted to avoid bloodshed. It wanted to avoid any incidents of excessive force. It ordered police to exercise restraint, and not allow any of the protesters to be harmed. Just two days before the incident, a policeman used pepper spray on protesters who had grabbed him and were pulling him back and forth. He was disciplined and reassigned. The metropolitan police captain who was shoved off the truck and injured was attempting to prevent protesters from firing skyrockets from the back of their truck. He wasn't even carrying a baton. When he fell to the ground and began bleeding, protesters screamed, "The police are beating us!" Fortunately the police were meticulous about collecting forensic evidence. Otherwise the incident would have turned into a case of one policeman's word against the word of a hundred protesters.
The entire country watched television images of a police officer lying on the ground after being forcibly pushed off the back of a vehicle by a mob. They are no longer willing to tolerate acts of violence spun as "freedom of expression." Taichung City Mayor Jason Hu spoke of "over the line." This was considerably more than "over the line." This was simply intolerable. Taichung citizens may tolerate four or five days of sound trucks blaring "Long live the Nation of Taiwan!" But no one can tolerate disregard for law and order. No one can tolerate utter disregard for the lives and well-being of others.
If Deep Green mobs refuse to express their political positions rationally, if they refuse to deal with others peacefully, if they refuse to respect people with different views, the image of the Taiwan independence movement and the DPP can never improve.
The DPP is no longer a guerrilla-like political party clashing with the government in the streets. The DPP is a mature political party. It ruled the nation for eight years. So-called "Deep Green" mobs are the main reason the DPP has been unable to grow since its founding. If the Democratic Progressive Party wants to return to power, it must confront this problem. It must become a responsible political party. It must transform both itself and its supporters.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.25
社論－民進黨的習題：帶領支持群眾轉型
本報訊
大遊行才和平落幕四天，獨派嗆陳活動就出事了！一名執勤員警遭抗議群眾推下車，撞得頭破血流。民進黨中央第一時間就表達關切，儘管再次說明肇事民眾非民進黨員，但民進黨願意負責面對。當然，民進黨沒忘記提醒社會大眾：不要因為單一個案，抹殺或模糊民間抗議活動的主題和訴求。
我們必須沉痛的呼籲民進黨，正視獨派與民進黨無法切割的事實。社會大眾沒有人忽略民進黨或獨派抗議的主題與訴求，問題是：有必要一次又一次用製造衝突的方式引起關注嗎？肇事的台灣國成員交保後強調，有錯他會認，但他沒有錯。台灣是言論自由的國家，要統要獨，都屬言論自由，但是，不能以傷害他人的方式，主張自己的政治立場，主張台獨沒有錯，主張台獨卻以行動傷人就是錯。
一次又一次的暴力事件，已經深深傷害獨派形象，對絕大多數和平理性的中間選民、甚至對民進黨人而言，談起他們口中的「深綠群眾」，某種程度就帶著一種「他們是極端政治主張者」，他們的言行舉止難以控制，因為這樣的認知，讓民進黨人都不敢輕易觸其鋒，避免激化他們的情緒，讓事態更失序。
獨派，真的是這樣嗎？自從當年費希平、林正杰等人離開民進黨之後，非獨派就無法自安於民進黨，放眼民進黨人，有哪一個人遇事就喊打喊衝？即使脫離民進黨，沈富雄或施明德，基本上都還是獨派，他們在政治場域裡，多麼有禮貌。施明德從反國民黨到倒扁，帶群眾上街是他的專長，倒扁抗議一個月，沒聽說哪個群眾打人，遑論打警察。但是，群眾聚集，時間拖久了，民眾與警察體能疲憊、情緒焦躁，就容易出事，抗爭活動若搞成遍地開花，或如影隨形，因為小火花而釀成巨禍的機率就必然升高，這是所有帶領社會運動者的基本常識。
這一次，民進黨發動周日大遊行，輿論反覆提醒、警告，民進黨也慎重其事地組成應變中心，並且相當成熟地邀請維持秩序的警方參與，這是避免衝突事端好的開始。沒想到，在江陳正式會談都結束了，還是出事。江陳會從預備磋商到正式簽署，只有兩天，第三天就是陳雲林的遊台與酬酢，有什麼好嗆的呢？就算白天行程要如影隨形跟著嗆，入夜之後有需要施放沖天炮，意淫式地「砲打陳雲林」嗎？一枚枚升空的高空煙火，打不到陳雲林，也打不到陳入住的裕元飯店，只會傷及無辜路人，有必要嗎？
非常可惡的是，群眾肇事後的反應竟是：「那個警察是白痴，我沒看過這麼笨的警察，想以肉身擋車，自已摔下來還想賴給我們…」警察為什麼肉身擋車？因為馬政府避免流血，避免警察「執勤過當」，要求員警注意執勤手段，不能讓民眾受傷！就在出事前兩天，一位員警因為帶了辣椒噴霧器，噴了拉扯他的嗆聲民眾，遭到處分並調離維安勤務。遭民眾推下車而受傷的市刑大小隊長，攔阻施放沖天炮的車子，手上連警棍都沒有，他倒在地上頭破血流的同時，抗議群眾竟還鼓噪著，「警察打人。」若不是這次警察蒐證格外細密謹慎，這次事件，很可能又要讓警方陷入百口莫辯的困境之中。
當全國民眾看到執勤員警遭到民眾用力推下車而倒地的連續畫面，沒有人能再忍受以暴力行為包裝言論自由，這已經不是台中市長胡志強說的「超過邊緣」，而是太超過了；台中市民可以忍受四、五天穿梭街頭的宣傳車，大肆播放的「台灣國萬歲」狂躁音量，卻沒有人可以忍受無視法紀、目無他人的衝突暴力。
如果深綠群眾始終學不會理性表達政治立場，學不會和平對待、並尊重與其意見不同的人士，獨派的形象、民進黨的形象就永遠沒有再提升的可能。
民進黨不是當年衝撞街頭的草莽政黨，民進黨是已經執政過八年的成熟政黨，所謂的深綠群眾從當年到現在，都是讓民進黨成長、讓民進黨受傷的主要因素。民進黨若還想重回執政之路，非得嚴肅面對問題：做一個負責任的政黨，帶領支持群眾和黨一起轉型。
To the DPP: End Your Anti-Intellectual Demagoguery
To the DPP: End Your Anti-Intellectual Demagoguery
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 24, 2009
As one watches the Democratic Progressive Party's protests against the Chiang/Chen Meeting and ECFA, one gradually realizes how hollow, how anti-intellectual, and how demagogic the DPP's mainland policy really is.
The Democratic Progressive Party has never opposed Mainland China spending tens of billions or even hundreds of billions procuring goods and services from Taiwan. It merely resents the images of Mainland procurement teams being given the red carpet treatment by "native Taiwanese" industrialists. What kind of head in the sand attitude is this? Does the DPP expect Mainland Chinese businesses to procure goods and services from Taiwan anonymously? DPP Secretary-General Su Chia-chuan said he did not object to Chen Yunlin coming to Taiwan for a meeting. But Chen shouldn't "flit back and forth, acting like an overlord." Does that mean if Chen Yunlin doesn't "flit back and forth, acting like an overlord," the Democratic Progressive Party will not oppose the Chiang/Chen Meeting?
Everyone is wondering just exactly what is it the Democratic Progressive Party opposes? The four Chiang/Chen Meetings have led to the signing of 12 agreements. They include direct flights, Mainland tourists coming to Taiwan, mutual legal assistance, food safety, agricultural quarantines, cooperation in labor affairs for the fishing industry, and cooperation in standards certification. One seldom hears the Democratic Progressive Party say no to these. Is the DPP not opposed to the 12 agreements reached during the Chiang/Chen Meetings? Is it opposed merely to Chen Yunlin fltting back and forth, acting like an overlord? Just exactly what is it the Democratic Progressive Party opposes?
ECFA is no different. For example, ECFA immediately benefits Taiwan businesses on the Mainland by providing them with a 6-9% reduction in tariffs. This puts them on an equal footing with the ASEAN plus Three countries. Has the DPP ever said one word against this? Besides, the Ma administration has repeatedly stressed that it will not increase imports of agricultural products or introduce mainland laborers. How has the DPP responded? On the one hand it insists it has no idea what sort of animal ECFA is, that it doesn't know whether it is round or flat. On the other hand, it is inciting farmers to oppose ECFA. But if the DPP doesn't know whether ECFA is round or flat, why is it demanding a referendum? Believe it or not, the DPP replied, We demand a referendum on ECFA precisely because we don't know whether it is round or flat! Just exactly what is it the Democratic Progressive Party opposes?
The general public may not know the content of the Chiang/Chen Meeting or ECFA. That is to be expected. But to suggest that Tsai Ing-wen and decision-makers within the DPP do not know which 12 agreements reached by the Chiang/Chen Meeting, or the pros and cons of ECFA, is simply disingenuous. It is nothing more than anti-intellectual demagoguery. Tsai Ing-wen and her fellow strategists within the DPP know perfectly well what the Chiang/Chen Meeting and ECFA were about. They have merely chosen to turn them into their political footballs. They have characterized Chen Yunlin as an "overlord." They have characterized support for ECFA as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." This is simply disingenuous. This is nothing more than anti-intellectual demagoguery.
Why have cross-Strait relations come to this? For two reasons. First, the Taiwan independence movement has reached an impasse. It has nowhere else to go. If the Taiwan region can stand tall as the "Republic of China," then cross-Strait relations will move toward a win-win symbiosis. Secondly, globalization and regional economic organizations such as ASEAN plus Three have established a macro-level trend. Taiwan's competitiveness has been seriously tested. It faces a deadly political and economic crisis. Yet the DPP's political and economic strategy flies in the face of these factors.
First, The DPP continues to trumpet "one country on each side" and "de jure Taiwan independence." Therefore its political leaders' thinking, and its supporters' feelings, require that they reject the Republic of China. This "repudiate the Republic of China to prove one's love of Taiwan" mentality dominates the DPP's mainland policy discourse. That is why the DPP opposes the Chiang/Chen Meeting and ECFA, and is indifferent to whether they are round or flat. Secondly, cross-Strait relations are severely constrained by globalization. As the Ma administration said, the Chiang/Chen Meeting and ECFA are the first building block for Taiwan's globalization. But the DPP's strategy to advocate "ASEAN plus Four" and to sign FTAs with the United States and other countries, while refusing to sign an ECFA with Mainland China. Either that, or to demand that ECFA must be preceded by the signing of an FTA. As a result, the Democratic Progressive Party has found itself caught on the horns of a major dilemma. For the record, such an expectation is reasonable.
Signing ECFA is a way to confront the challenge of globalization. But the DPP considers ECFA a scourge. It may sign FTAs with other countries. But it refuses to sign an ECFA with Mainland China. Moreover, if the Taiwan region becomes part of ASEAN plus Four, it may find it impossible to resist the importation of Southeast Asian agricultural products and laborers. So why isn't the DPP opposed to ASEAN plus Four? Clearly the DPP's actions are actually directed at the Republic of China. That is why it opposes the Chiang/Chen Meeting and ECFA. If the DPP were to view globalization from the perspective of the Republic of China, it would not act the way it has. If the Democratic Progressive Party's cross-Strait policy superstructure is erected on a "Nation of Taiwan" political foundation and an "anti-globalization" political foundation, can it really stand?
Just what is it the Democratic Progressive Party opposes? If it wants to repudiate the Republic of China and champion a "Nation of Taiwan," it should not oppose direct flights and astronomical amounts of Mainland trade and economic procurement. If it is concerned about the plight of disadvantaged economic groups, why doesn't it oppose globalization? Why doesn't it oppose ASEAN plus Four? Just what is it the Democratic Progressive Party opposes?
The Democratic Progressive Party should immediately cease its disingenuous, anti-intellectual demagoguery.
民進黨必須終止反智愚民的政治操作
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.24 03:05 am
觀察民進黨對江陳會及ＥＣＦＡ的抗議活動，益發察覺民進黨大陸政策的空洞虛無與反智愚民。
民進黨從未反對中國對台灣動輒數百億甚至數千億的經貿採購，卻只是反對中國採購團那些「上國代表」在台灣受本土廠商前呼後擁的場景；這是何等莫名其妙的鴕鳥政策，難道是要中國用「無名氏」的名義向台灣採購？民進黨秘書長蘇嘉全又說，陳雲林來台灣開會則罷，但不要「搞得像太上皇一樣四處趴趴走」；那麼，是否不趴趴走，民進黨就認為陳雲林不是「太上皇」了，也就不反對江陳會了？
大家都在問：民進黨究竟在反對什麼？四次江陳會已簽訂的十二項協議，包括直航、陸客來台、司法互助、食品安全、農產品檢疫、漁業勞務合作、標準認證合作等，幾乎從未聽到民進黨說過一句「反對」；難道民進黨真是完全不反對江陳會的十二項協議，而只是反對陳雲林趴趴走？民進黨究竟在反對什麼？
ＥＣＦＡ亦然。例如，ＥＣＦＡ的立即利益是可使台商在大陸減免六％至九％的關稅，以取得與「東協加三」國家的平等競爭地位；對此，民進黨何嘗有過一句反對？再者，馬政府已屢稱不會增加農產品進口項目，亦不會引入大陸勞工；但民進黨卻一方面自稱不知ＥＣＦＡ是圓是扁，另一方面又煽動農民反ＥＣＦＡ。有人問：既不知ＥＣＦＡ是圓是扁，為何主張公投？民進黨竟說：正因不知是圓是扁，所以要公投！請問：民進黨在反對什麼？
一般民眾未必知道江陳會及ＥＣＦＡ的內容，這或許是正常現象；但若說蔡英文及民進黨決策階層亦不知江陳會十二項協議及ＥＣＦＡ的得失利害如何，則必是自欺欺人、反智愚民的政治操作。蔡英文及民進黨操盤者，明知江陳會及ＥＣＦＡ是圓是扁，卻偏偏要將之捏成符合他們自己政治操作的形狀；將陳雲林捏成「太上皇」，將ＥＣＦＡ捏成「傾中賣台」。這是自欺欺人，這是反智愚民。
兩岸關係何以走到今日地步？主要因素有二：一、台獨在兩岸關係中已無路可走；台灣若要以「中華民國」的地位走下去，兩岸關係只有朝雙贏共生努力。二、全球化及區域經濟組織（如東協加三）所形成的大局大勢，使台灣的競爭力受到嚴重考驗，面臨了致命的政經危機。然而，民進黨的政經戰略，卻刻意與這兩大因素背道而馳。
一、民進黨迄仍主張「一邊一國」的「法理台獨」；因而其政治領袖的操作概念及其支持者的情感傾向皆在否定中華民國。這種「以否定中華民國來愛台灣」的心態，主導著民進黨的大陸政策；所以，民進黨才會不管是圓是扁也要反對江陳會與ＥＣＦＡ。二、兩岸關係受到全球化的高度制約；如馬政府所言，江陳會及ＥＣＦＡ是台灣建構全球化布建的「第一塊積木」。但民進黨的操作卻是，一方面主張成為「東協加四」，並與美國等國家簽訂ＦＴＡ；卻又另一方面反對與中國簽定ＥＣＦＡ，或主張簽訂ＥＣＦＡ須以可與他國簽訂ＦＴＡ為前提（這種期待是對的）。由此可見，民進黨已陷於嚴重的自相矛盾之中。
簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，是為了面對全球化。但民進黨若認為ＥＣＦＡ真是洪水猛獸，則即使可與他國簽訂ＦＴＡ，亦不可與中國簽ＥＣＦＡ；何況，台灣若成為「東協加四」，則恐無可能阻擋東南亞的農產品及勞工輸入，那麼民進黨何不亦反對成為「東協加四」？可見，民進黨的操作，在骨子裡仍是因為反對中華民國，所以才反對江陳會與ＥＣＦＡ；倘若民進黨是站在中華民國及全球化的立場上思考，即不致如此操作。試問：民進黨倘將其兩岸政策架設在政治上的「台灣國」與經濟上的「反全球化」上，如何立足？
民進黨究竟在反對什麼？若是因否定中華民國而主張台灣國，則應根本反對直航及大陸天文數字的經貿採購；若是因顧慮弱勢經濟族群的處境，則應根本反對全球化，更應反對成為「東協加四」。請問：民進黨究竟在反對什麼？
民進黨應當立即終止自欺欺人、反智愚民的政治操作。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 24, 2009
As one watches the Democratic Progressive Party's protests against the Chiang/Chen Meeting and ECFA, one gradually realizes how hollow, how anti-intellectual, and how demagogic the DPP's mainland policy really is.
The Democratic Progressive Party has never opposed Mainland China spending tens of billions or even hundreds of billions procuring goods and services from Taiwan. It merely resents the images of Mainland procurement teams being given the red carpet treatment by "native Taiwanese" industrialists. What kind of head in the sand attitude is this? Does the DPP expect Mainland Chinese businesses to procure goods and services from Taiwan anonymously? DPP Secretary-General Su Chia-chuan said he did not object to Chen Yunlin coming to Taiwan for a meeting. But Chen shouldn't "flit back and forth, acting like an overlord." Does that mean if Chen Yunlin doesn't "flit back and forth, acting like an overlord," the Democratic Progressive Party will not oppose the Chiang/Chen Meeting?
Everyone is wondering just exactly what is it the Democratic Progressive Party opposes? The four Chiang/Chen Meetings have led to the signing of 12 agreements. They include direct flights, Mainland tourists coming to Taiwan, mutual legal assistance, food safety, agricultural quarantines, cooperation in labor affairs for the fishing industry, and cooperation in standards certification. One seldom hears the Democratic Progressive Party say no to these. Is the DPP not opposed to the 12 agreements reached during the Chiang/Chen Meetings? Is it opposed merely to Chen Yunlin fltting back and forth, acting like an overlord? Just exactly what is it the Democratic Progressive Party opposes?
ECFA is no different. For example, ECFA immediately benefits Taiwan businesses on the Mainland by providing them with a 6-9% reduction in tariffs. This puts them on an equal footing with the ASEAN plus Three countries. Has the DPP ever said one word against this? Besides, the Ma administration has repeatedly stressed that it will not increase imports of agricultural products or introduce mainland laborers. How has the DPP responded? On the one hand it insists it has no idea what sort of animal ECFA is, that it doesn't know whether it is round or flat. On the other hand, it is inciting farmers to oppose ECFA. But if the DPP doesn't know whether ECFA is round or flat, why is it demanding a referendum? Believe it or not, the DPP replied, We demand a referendum on ECFA precisely because we don't know whether it is round or flat! Just exactly what is it the Democratic Progressive Party opposes?
The general public may not know the content of the Chiang/Chen Meeting or ECFA. That is to be expected. But to suggest that Tsai Ing-wen and decision-makers within the DPP do not know which 12 agreements reached by the Chiang/Chen Meeting, or the pros and cons of ECFA, is simply disingenuous. It is nothing more than anti-intellectual demagoguery. Tsai Ing-wen and her fellow strategists within the DPP know perfectly well what the Chiang/Chen Meeting and ECFA were about. They have merely chosen to turn them into their political footballs. They have characterized Chen Yunlin as an "overlord." They have characterized support for ECFA as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." This is simply disingenuous. This is nothing more than anti-intellectual demagoguery.
Why have cross-Strait relations come to this? For two reasons. First, the Taiwan independence movement has reached an impasse. It has nowhere else to go. If the Taiwan region can stand tall as the "Republic of China," then cross-Strait relations will move toward a win-win symbiosis. Secondly, globalization and regional economic organizations such as ASEAN plus Three have established a macro-level trend. Taiwan's competitiveness has been seriously tested. It faces a deadly political and economic crisis. Yet the DPP's political and economic strategy flies in the face of these factors.
First, The DPP continues to trumpet "one country on each side" and "de jure Taiwan independence." Therefore its political leaders' thinking, and its supporters' feelings, require that they reject the Republic of China. This "repudiate the Republic of China to prove one's love of Taiwan" mentality dominates the DPP's mainland policy discourse. That is why the DPP opposes the Chiang/Chen Meeting and ECFA, and is indifferent to whether they are round or flat. Secondly, cross-Strait relations are severely constrained by globalization. As the Ma administration said, the Chiang/Chen Meeting and ECFA are the first building block for Taiwan's globalization. But the DPP's strategy to advocate "ASEAN plus Four" and to sign FTAs with the United States and other countries, while refusing to sign an ECFA with Mainland China. Either that, or to demand that ECFA must be preceded by the signing of an FTA. As a result, the Democratic Progressive Party has found itself caught on the horns of a major dilemma. For the record, such an expectation is reasonable.
Signing ECFA is a way to confront the challenge of globalization. But the DPP considers ECFA a scourge. It may sign FTAs with other countries. But it refuses to sign an ECFA with Mainland China. Moreover, if the Taiwan region becomes part of ASEAN plus Four, it may find it impossible to resist the importation of Southeast Asian agricultural products and laborers. So why isn't the DPP opposed to ASEAN plus Four? Clearly the DPP's actions are actually directed at the Republic of China. That is why it opposes the Chiang/Chen Meeting and ECFA. If the DPP were to view globalization from the perspective of the Republic of China, it would not act the way it has. If the Democratic Progressive Party's cross-Strait policy superstructure is erected on a "Nation of Taiwan" political foundation and an "anti-globalization" political foundation, can it really stand?
Just what is it the Democratic Progressive Party opposes? If it wants to repudiate the Republic of China and champion a "Nation of Taiwan," it should not oppose direct flights and astronomical amounts of Mainland trade and economic procurement. If it is concerned about the plight of disadvantaged economic groups, why doesn't it oppose globalization? Why doesn't it oppose ASEAN plus Four? Just what is it the Democratic Progressive Party opposes?
The Democratic Progressive Party should immediately cease its disingenuous, anti-intellectual demagoguery.
民進黨必須終止反智愚民的政治操作
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.24 03:05 am
觀察民進黨對江陳會及ＥＣＦＡ的抗議活動，益發察覺民進黨大陸政策的空洞虛無與反智愚民。
民進黨從未反對中國對台灣動輒數百億甚至數千億的經貿採購，卻只是反對中國採購團那些「上國代表」在台灣受本土廠商前呼後擁的場景；這是何等莫名其妙的鴕鳥政策，難道是要中國用「無名氏」的名義向台灣採購？民進黨秘書長蘇嘉全又說，陳雲林來台灣開會則罷，但不要「搞得像太上皇一樣四處趴趴走」；那麼，是否不趴趴走，民進黨就認為陳雲林不是「太上皇」了，也就不反對江陳會了？
大家都在問：民進黨究竟在反對什麼？四次江陳會已簽訂的十二項協議，包括直航、陸客來台、司法互助、食品安全、農產品檢疫、漁業勞務合作、標準認證合作等，幾乎從未聽到民進黨說過一句「反對」；難道民進黨真是完全不反對江陳會的十二項協議，而只是反對陳雲林趴趴走？民進黨究竟在反對什麼？
ＥＣＦＡ亦然。例如，ＥＣＦＡ的立即利益是可使台商在大陸減免六％至九％的關稅，以取得與「東協加三」國家的平等競爭地位；對此，民進黨何嘗有過一句反對？再者，馬政府已屢稱不會增加農產品進口項目，亦不會引入大陸勞工；但民進黨卻一方面自稱不知ＥＣＦＡ是圓是扁，另一方面又煽動農民反ＥＣＦＡ。有人問：既不知ＥＣＦＡ是圓是扁，為何主張公投？民進黨竟說：正因不知是圓是扁，所以要公投！請問：民進黨在反對什麼？
一般民眾未必知道江陳會及ＥＣＦＡ的內容，這或許是正常現象；但若說蔡英文及民進黨決策階層亦不知江陳會十二項協議及ＥＣＦＡ的得失利害如何，則必是自欺欺人、反智愚民的政治操作。蔡英文及民進黨操盤者，明知江陳會及ＥＣＦＡ是圓是扁，卻偏偏要將之捏成符合他們自己政治操作的形狀；將陳雲林捏成「太上皇」，將ＥＣＦＡ捏成「傾中賣台」。這是自欺欺人，這是反智愚民。
兩岸關係何以走到今日地步？主要因素有二：一、台獨在兩岸關係中已無路可走；台灣若要以「中華民國」的地位走下去，兩岸關係只有朝雙贏共生努力。二、全球化及區域經濟組織（如東協加三）所形成的大局大勢，使台灣的競爭力受到嚴重考驗，面臨了致命的政經危機。然而，民進黨的政經戰略，卻刻意與這兩大因素背道而馳。
一、民進黨迄仍主張「一邊一國」的「法理台獨」；因而其政治領袖的操作概念及其支持者的情感傾向皆在否定中華民國。這種「以否定中華民國來愛台灣」的心態，主導著民進黨的大陸政策；所以，民進黨才會不管是圓是扁也要反對江陳會與ＥＣＦＡ。二、兩岸關係受到全球化的高度制約；如馬政府所言，江陳會及ＥＣＦＡ是台灣建構全球化布建的「第一塊積木」。但民進黨的操作卻是，一方面主張成為「東協加四」，並與美國等國家簽訂ＦＴＡ；卻又另一方面反對與中國簽定ＥＣＦＡ，或主張簽訂ＥＣＦＡ須以可與他國簽訂ＦＴＡ為前提（這種期待是對的）。由此可見，民進黨已陷於嚴重的自相矛盾之中。
簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，是為了面對全球化。但民進黨若認為ＥＣＦＡ真是洪水猛獸，則即使可與他國簽訂ＦＴＡ，亦不可與中國簽ＥＣＦＡ；何況，台灣若成為「東協加四」，則恐無可能阻擋東南亞的農產品及勞工輸入，那麼民進黨何不亦反對成為「東協加四」？可見，民進黨的操作，在骨子裡仍是因為反對中華民國，所以才反對江陳會與ＥＣＦＡ；倘若民進黨是站在中華民國及全球化的立場上思考，即不致如此操作。試問：民進黨倘將其兩岸政策架設在政治上的「台灣國」與經濟上的「反全球化」上，如何立足？
民進黨究竟在反對什麼？若是因否定中華民國而主張台灣國，則應根本反對直航及大陸天文數字的經貿採購；若是因顧慮弱勢經濟族群的處境，則應根本反對全球化，更應反對成為「東協加四」。請問：民進黨究竟在反對什麼？
民進黨應當立即終止自欺欺人、反智愚民的政治操作。
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Flowers and Thorns: Positive Implications of the Tax Agreement
Flowers and Thorns: Positive Implications of the Tax Agreement
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 23, 2009
The fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting concluded yesterday. The tax agreement previously signed was temporarily withdrawn. To quote Premier Wu Den-yih, optimists see the flowers, pessimists see the thorns. This is the first time a signed document has been withdrawn. Cross-Strait interaction involves thorns as well as flowers. Withdrawing the agreement means the signatories are in no hurry to pick the flowers, for fear of being pricked by the thorns. Both sides are being judicious. That has positive implications.
They may have had a day to let doubts settle. But many people are still confused about why the two sides called time out on the tax agreement. They are wondering what sort of problems arose.
Recent discussions addressed cooperation over agricultural inspections, quarantine procedures, labor affairs for the fishing industry, standards and measures, inspection certification, and cross-Strait tax agreements. They were all very specialized and technical in nature. The opposition DPP was unable to make any political hay out of them. That is why they deliberately turned their attention to ECFA. The two sides have spent years discussing the institutionalization of labor affairs for the fishing industry. Cross-Strait agricultural trade volume has expanded. Cooperation over quarantine and inspection procedures, the avoidance of double taxation, and certification standards require further agreements. These will dramatically change cross-Strait economic interaction. Once the pros and cons have been balanced, they will greatly increase Taiwan's efficiency vis a vis the outside world. This is something the opposition DPP should make every effort to monitor. It should make an effort to sharpen the focus of the debate, instead of hurling wild accusations.
Take the recent extension to the tax agreement for example. Taipei has signed 17 similar agreements with other nations. The main purpose was to avoid double taxation, to define taxation powers, and to reduce the tax burden on businesses and individuals who shuttle back and forth between Taiwan and the Mainland. It will help determine tax overhead, and promote mutual investments and development. This agreement applies only to direct investments. It will help businesses change their investment models. It will make cross-Strait investments more transparent. More importantly, it will induce multinational companies who wish to break into the Mainland market to use Taiwan as their operational base. It will be the key to restarting our plans for an Asia-Pacific operations center.
This agreement incorporates existing international rules. But it must also take into account the special historical ties between the two sides. Various forms of income tax directly affect the two governments' tax revenues, corporate tax planning, and any number of business activities. Therefore lop-sided tax provisions inconsistent with our interests must be avoided. If these issues are not made clear in advance, the government will find it difficult to bring them up later. They also highlight the difficulty of applying international statutes to cross-Strait economic and trade consultations. They involve disputes over sovereignty that the government may find difficult to talk about. Cross-Straits tax agreements are sensitive and complex. ECFA is even more so. With ECFA the uncertainties for both sides will be even greater. These are the thorns that bedevil cross-Strait relations. The fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting has inadvertently highlighted this fact, yet again.
That cross-Strait tax agreements have been halted during the final stages of negotiations may take us aback. It may lead to doubts about the pace of cross-Strait economic and trade normalization, It may even provoke concern that we have reached a critical impasse regarding sovereignty. But it also allows the public to see whether the Democratic Progressive Party is making an effort to oversee the government's policies, or merely shouting populist slogans. Is the DPP adopting a professional and rational approach to policy discourse? Is it promoting transparency in cross-Strait consultations in order to protect the public interest? The DPP has said nothing about the substance of the agreement. The Ma administration withdrew its support for the tax agreement on its own. This shows that the DPP prefers to whoop it up rather than act responsibly. It is derelict in its responsibility as an opposition party.
For the Ma Ying-jeou government, the extension of the cross-Strait tax agreement has been spun as a serendipitous result of the Chiang/Chen Meeting. It will be the focus of public attention. Two consultations have already taken place, in two locations. The participants' rank and numbers have accorded with formal reciprocity. The issues raised have accorded with substantive reciprocity. The withdrawal of the tax agreement has allowed the public to see cross-Strait negotiations very differently. Cross-Strait negotiations have turned out to be real negotiations, with the real possibility of failure. They have turned out to be more than pro forma rituals. The public now realizes that the government is in earnest about cross-Strait consultations, and that it has something to show for its efforts. The government knows that "all that glitters is not gold." The withdrawal of the tax agreement has inadvertently reminded the government that the institutionalization of cross-Strait consultations has advanced from the easy stage to the difficult stage. They have advanced from the mutually beneficial initial stage, to a quid pro quo, zero sum later stage. They may adversely affect the interests of certain groups. Some policies may provoke controversy. Public sensitivities are sure to increase. The way to defuse such sensitivities is to make policy debate more transparent. The government must have confidence in civil society.
The tax agreement has been withdrawn over terminology relating to sovereignty, or to technicalities. The Chiang/Chen Meeting has suffered a setback. But this setback will allow each side to better understand the others's position during future cross-Strait negotiations. It will allow them to pick the flowers without being pricked by the thorns.
花與刺：租稅協議撤簽的正面意義
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.23 03:11 am
第四次江陳會昨天閉幕，原訂簽署的兩岸租稅協議臨時撤簽。借用行政院長吳敦義的名言，樂觀的人看到花，悲觀的人看到刺；這個首次出現的撤簽動作顯示，兩岸互動確是有花也有刺。撤簽意謂不急於摘花，免得被刺螫傷；雙方的臨事慎重，具有正面意義。
即使經過一天的沉澱，很多民眾仍對兩岸租稅協議何以臨陣叫停一頭霧水，不知其間究竟出了什麼問題。
就議題本質而言，這次討論的農產品檢疫檢驗合作、漁業勞務合作及標準計量檢驗認證合作及兩岸租稅協議等，是非常專業且技術性的，以致在野黨抓不到攻擊的主靶，才會故意轉移焦點到ＥＣＦＡ；但在實質面，除漁業勞務合作是把兩岸討論多年的漁工問題制度化、農產品檢疫檢驗合作是兩岸農產貿易量擴大後的必要配套外，避免雙重課稅及標準認證合作等兩協議，都會大幅改變兩岸經貿互動的模式，利弊相抵後，更將為台灣帶來高度外部效益，這其實才是在野黨應盡力監督、加大社會討論力度的焦點，而不是亂打一通。
以這次延簽的兩岸租稅協議為例，我國已與十七個國家簽署類似協定，主要目的是避免雙重課稅、劃分課稅權，以降低往來兩地企業、個人的租稅負擔，有利確定租稅成本，並促進彼此的投資發展。此外，這項協議因僅適用於直接投資，亦將引導企業改變投資模式，有助兩岸投資監理的透明化；更重要的是，這可吸引有意進軍大陸市場的跨國企業，評估以台灣為營運基地，亦是台灣重啟亞太營運中心大計的關鍵。
不過，儘管這項協議已有國際規約可供參酌、比較及運用，但兩岸間的特殊歷史關係必須納入考慮；尤其是在各類所得課稅權的劃分上，直接攸關雙邊課稅利益、企業租稅規劃及由此延伸的各種經營行為等，自應避免因租稅傾斜而誘導不符我方利益的行為。然而，這些事前沒說清楚的，政府事後也諱莫如深，顯有難言之隱；亦凸顯兩岸經貿協商在准用於國際通用的規約上，仍有其一定的難度，而其難度或正是政府啟不了口的主權爭議。由兩岸租稅協議的轉折看敏感、複雜度更高的ＥＣＦＡ，兩岸簽署的不確定性顯然就更高了，這正是兩岸關係發展過程中的刺，江陳四會的意外再次凸顯了這一點。
然而，兩岸租稅協議在最後階段踩下煞車，固然一時令人錯愕，也難免引發兩岸經貿關係正常化政策節奏是否改變的疑慮，甚而擔心是否已走到難以跨越主權爭議這道鴻溝的臨界點；但於此同時，也讓社會看到了民進黨若能把對政府的監督放在實質的政策而非民粹式的口號，用專業、合理的政策論述推動兩岸協商的透明化，如此才能真正保護台灣利益。如今，民進黨對協議內容未置一辭，反而是由馬政府主動撤簽；這顯示民進黨只想「熱鬧」而不問「門道」，實在有虧於反對黨的職守。
對執政的馬英九政府而言，兩岸租稅協議的延簽，更是已被定型化、制式化的江陳會一個「美麗的意外」；它將社會的視聽焦點，從兩會協商在地點、與會人士層級、人數等「形式對等」，轉移至議題折衝的「實質對等」；也讓社會對兩岸協商可以有不同的觀感，原來它是真正的談判，有破局的可能，而非只是定期舉行的儀式；更讓民眾知道，原來政府在兩岸協商中亦可有守有為，而非撿到籃裡都是菜。這個意外更提醒政府，兩岸制度化協商「由易而難」的階段，難度已從雙方有利無害的初階，進階到雙方利益互換、甚而相爭的中階，因為有部分族群的利益可能受影響，其政策爭議性、社會敏感度勢必更大，而其化解之道正是加大政策論述的透明度，政府應對台灣的公民社會有信心。
租稅協議不論是因「主權用語」或「技術因素」而撤簽，雖是此次江陳會的挫折；但對未來的兩岸談判而言，應會使雙方更懂得準確拿捏分寸，摘花而不被刺所傷。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 23, 2009
The fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting concluded yesterday. The tax agreement previously signed was temporarily withdrawn. To quote Premier Wu Den-yih, optimists see the flowers, pessimists see the thorns. This is the first time a signed document has been withdrawn. Cross-Strait interaction involves thorns as well as flowers. Withdrawing the agreement means the signatories are in no hurry to pick the flowers, for fear of being pricked by the thorns. Both sides are being judicious. That has positive implications.
They may have had a day to let doubts settle. But many people are still confused about why the two sides called time out on the tax agreement. They are wondering what sort of problems arose.
Recent discussions addressed cooperation over agricultural inspections, quarantine procedures, labor affairs for the fishing industry, standards and measures, inspection certification, and cross-Strait tax agreements. They were all very specialized and technical in nature. The opposition DPP was unable to make any political hay out of them. That is why they deliberately turned their attention to ECFA. The two sides have spent years discussing the institutionalization of labor affairs for the fishing industry. Cross-Strait agricultural trade volume has expanded. Cooperation over quarantine and inspection procedures, the avoidance of double taxation, and certification standards require further agreements. These will dramatically change cross-Strait economic interaction. Once the pros and cons have been balanced, they will greatly increase Taiwan's efficiency vis a vis the outside world. This is something the opposition DPP should make every effort to monitor. It should make an effort to sharpen the focus of the debate, instead of hurling wild accusations.
Take the recent extension to the tax agreement for example. Taipei has signed 17 similar agreements with other nations. The main purpose was to avoid double taxation, to define taxation powers, and to reduce the tax burden on businesses and individuals who shuttle back and forth between Taiwan and the Mainland. It will help determine tax overhead, and promote mutual investments and development. This agreement applies only to direct investments. It will help businesses change their investment models. It will make cross-Strait investments more transparent. More importantly, it will induce multinational companies who wish to break into the Mainland market to use Taiwan as their operational base. It will be the key to restarting our plans for an Asia-Pacific operations center.
This agreement incorporates existing international rules. But it must also take into account the special historical ties between the two sides. Various forms of income tax directly affect the two governments' tax revenues, corporate tax planning, and any number of business activities. Therefore lop-sided tax provisions inconsistent with our interests must be avoided. If these issues are not made clear in advance, the government will find it difficult to bring them up later. They also highlight the difficulty of applying international statutes to cross-Strait economic and trade consultations. They involve disputes over sovereignty that the government may find difficult to talk about. Cross-Straits tax agreements are sensitive and complex. ECFA is even more so. With ECFA the uncertainties for both sides will be even greater. These are the thorns that bedevil cross-Strait relations. The fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting has inadvertently highlighted this fact, yet again.
That cross-Strait tax agreements have been halted during the final stages of negotiations may take us aback. It may lead to doubts about the pace of cross-Strait economic and trade normalization, It may even provoke concern that we have reached a critical impasse regarding sovereignty. But it also allows the public to see whether the Democratic Progressive Party is making an effort to oversee the government's policies, or merely shouting populist slogans. Is the DPP adopting a professional and rational approach to policy discourse? Is it promoting transparency in cross-Strait consultations in order to protect the public interest? The DPP has said nothing about the substance of the agreement. The Ma administration withdrew its support for the tax agreement on its own. This shows that the DPP prefers to whoop it up rather than act responsibly. It is derelict in its responsibility as an opposition party.
For the Ma Ying-jeou government, the extension of the cross-Strait tax agreement has been spun as a serendipitous result of the Chiang/Chen Meeting. It will be the focus of public attention. Two consultations have already taken place, in two locations. The participants' rank and numbers have accorded with formal reciprocity. The issues raised have accorded with substantive reciprocity. The withdrawal of the tax agreement has allowed the public to see cross-Strait negotiations very differently. Cross-Strait negotiations have turned out to be real negotiations, with the real possibility of failure. They have turned out to be more than pro forma rituals. The public now realizes that the government is in earnest about cross-Strait consultations, and that it has something to show for its efforts. The government knows that "all that glitters is not gold." The withdrawal of the tax agreement has inadvertently reminded the government that the institutionalization of cross-Strait consultations has advanced from the easy stage to the difficult stage. They have advanced from the mutually beneficial initial stage, to a quid pro quo, zero sum later stage. They may adversely affect the interests of certain groups. Some policies may provoke controversy. Public sensitivities are sure to increase. The way to defuse such sensitivities is to make policy debate more transparent. The government must have confidence in civil society.
The tax agreement has been withdrawn over terminology relating to sovereignty, or to technicalities. The Chiang/Chen Meeting has suffered a setback. But this setback will allow each side to better understand the others's position during future cross-Strait negotiations. It will allow them to pick the flowers without being pricked by the thorns.
花與刺：租稅協議撤簽的正面意義
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.23 03:11 am
第四次江陳會昨天閉幕，原訂簽署的兩岸租稅協議臨時撤簽。借用行政院長吳敦義的名言，樂觀的人看到花，悲觀的人看到刺；這個首次出現的撤簽動作顯示，兩岸互動確是有花也有刺。撤簽意謂不急於摘花，免得被刺螫傷；雙方的臨事慎重，具有正面意義。
即使經過一天的沉澱，很多民眾仍對兩岸租稅協議何以臨陣叫停一頭霧水，不知其間究竟出了什麼問題。
就議題本質而言，這次討論的農產品檢疫檢驗合作、漁業勞務合作及標準計量檢驗認證合作及兩岸租稅協議等，是非常專業且技術性的，以致在野黨抓不到攻擊的主靶，才會故意轉移焦點到ＥＣＦＡ；但在實質面，除漁業勞務合作是把兩岸討論多年的漁工問題制度化、農產品檢疫檢驗合作是兩岸農產貿易量擴大後的必要配套外，避免雙重課稅及標準認證合作等兩協議，都會大幅改變兩岸經貿互動的模式，利弊相抵後，更將為台灣帶來高度外部效益，這其實才是在野黨應盡力監督、加大社會討論力度的焦點，而不是亂打一通。
以這次延簽的兩岸租稅協議為例，我國已與十七個國家簽署類似協定，主要目的是避免雙重課稅、劃分課稅權，以降低往來兩地企業、個人的租稅負擔，有利確定租稅成本，並促進彼此的投資發展。此外，這項協議因僅適用於直接投資，亦將引導企業改變投資模式，有助兩岸投資監理的透明化；更重要的是，這可吸引有意進軍大陸市場的跨國企業，評估以台灣為營運基地，亦是台灣重啟亞太營運中心大計的關鍵。
不過，儘管這項協議已有國際規約可供參酌、比較及運用，但兩岸間的特殊歷史關係必須納入考慮；尤其是在各類所得課稅權的劃分上，直接攸關雙邊課稅利益、企業租稅規劃及由此延伸的各種經營行為等，自應避免因租稅傾斜而誘導不符我方利益的行為。然而，這些事前沒說清楚的，政府事後也諱莫如深，顯有難言之隱；亦凸顯兩岸經貿協商在准用於國際通用的規約上，仍有其一定的難度，而其難度或正是政府啟不了口的主權爭議。由兩岸租稅協議的轉折看敏感、複雜度更高的ＥＣＦＡ，兩岸簽署的不確定性顯然就更高了，這正是兩岸關係發展過程中的刺，江陳四會的意外再次凸顯了這一點。
然而，兩岸租稅協議在最後階段踩下煞車，固然一時令人錯愕，也難免引發兩岸經貿關係正常化政策節奏是否改變的疑慮，甚而擔心是否已走到難以跨越主權爭議這道鴻溝的臨界點；但於此同時，也讓社會看到了民進黨若能把對政府的監督放在實質的政策而非民粹式的口號，用專業、合理的政策論述推動兩岸協商的透明化，如此才能真正保護台灣利益。如今，民進黨對協議內容未置一辭，反而是由馬政府主動撤簽；這顯示民進黨只想「熱鬧」而不問「門道」，實在有虧於反對黨的職守。
對執政的馬英九政府而言，兩岸租稅協議的延簽，更是已被定型化、制式化的江陳會一個「美麗的意外」；它將社會的視聽焦點，從兩會協商在地點、與會人士層級、人數等「形式對等」，轉移至議題折衝的「實質對等」；也讓社會對兩岸協商可以有不同的觀感，原來它是真正的談判，有破局的可能，而非只是定期舉行的儀式；更讓民眾知道，原來政府在兩岸協商中亦可有守有為，而非撿到籃裡都是菜。這個意外更提醒政府，兩岸制度化協商「由易而難」的階段，難度已從雙方有利無害的初階，進階到雙方利益互換、甚而相爭的中階，因為有部分族群的利益可能受影響，其政策爭議性、社會敏感度勢必更大，而其化解之道正是加大政策論述的透明度，政府應對台灣的公民社會有信心。
租稅協議不論是因「主權用語」或「技術因素」而撤簽，雖是此次江陳會的挫折；但對未來的兩岸談判而言，應會使雙方更懂得準確拿捏分寸，摘花而不被刺所傷。
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Making Room for the Rational Discussion of Cross-Strait Issues
Making Room for the Rational Discussion of Cross-Strait Issues
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 22, 2009
Yesterday, on the eve of the fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting, Robert Tsao, Honorary Chairman of the UMC Corporation, took out two half-page ads on the front pages of three different newpapers. He called on President Ma Ying-jeou to extricate himself from his "no unification, no independence, no use of force" framework. He called on him to make a courageous decision by actively promoting a law ensuring peaceful cross-Strait relations. Whether Robert Tsao's suggestion is sound is debatable. How the Ma administration will respond is also unclear. But we think such positive and proactive approaches to cross-Strait interaction and cross-Strait policy deserve recognition.
Cross-Strait debate has long been deadlocked, mired in a simplistic dualism. The leaders of the ruling and opposition camps have devoted most of their intellect and energy challenging their opponent's positions. Public debate is dominated by simplistic slogans and emotional rhetoric. This vicious cycle has gone on for at least a dozen years. It has led to escalating confrontation between the government and the opposition. Neither camp has been able to convert the other. This was true in the past, and will remain true in the future. Who is in office makes no difference. Whoever is in office will find himself mired in the same quagmire, spinning his wheels, and unable to extricate himself.
What is the point of ruling party change on Taiwan, if the only change is that a different camp will take to the streets to protest? How will enhance our competitiveness? Robert Tsao's main point was that we must attempt to find a way out of our deadlock when discussing cross-Strait relations. We must find a new way to debate these issues. A new way of debating such issues would offer many benefits. One would no longer be mired in disputes for which there will never be any final conclusion. In short, one must not engage in debates which can only bring disaster upon Taiwan. Instead, one must consider options that may provide Taiwan with benefits and opportunities. The issue would no longer be "reunification vs. independence." The issue would be how to build cross-Strait trust under conditions of peace and democracy. Robert Tsao's "cross-Strait peaceful coexistence Law" is one possibility. Such discussions would of course give priority to the interests of the public on Taiwan. They would involve the democratic process. They would involve a rational calculation of the interests of a majority of the public on Taiwan. They would prevent anyone from hurling accusations about "Who is selling out Taiwan." That is why Robert Tsao said that if the DPP figures this out, the KMT could soon be out of power.
We certainly agree that given the current political atmosphere on Taiwan, even if one could initiate such a debate, it would soon descend into name-calling. Name-calling involves a very simple logic. Anyone who offers any constructive suggestions for cross-Straits interaction, regardless of what their substance might be, will be labeled "a traitor selling out Taiwan," who is "pandering to [Mainland] China," and who is "pro-reunification." He will be reduced to a straw man, to be blasted to smithereens with every weapon in one's arsenal. Any debate that descends to such depths will never lead anywhere. The debate will essentially be over. In recent years it has been impossible to openly and rationally discuss cross-Strait issues. This is the result of ad hominem name-calling. Put bluntly, the DPP has yet to hold a real debate on [Mainland] China policy. DPP leaders are too afraid of being labeled "traitors selling out Taiwan." The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy since assuming office has been timid and fearful, largely because it too is terrified of such accusations.
So the question is, is there nothing one can do, merely because one is afraid of being labeled? When it comes to [Mainland] China, the Democratic Progressive Party has its sacred cows. It is also the political opposition. Its inability to offer new policies and proposals is understandable. But this is not true of the KMT. A majority of the public on Taiwan voted for the KMT. They gave it a nearly three-quarters supermajority in the Legislative Yuan. They gave President Ma Ying-jeou an absolute majority. Why? So President Ma and the KMT could wallow in their current indecisiveness, constantly looking over their shoulder and second-guessing themselves? So President Ma and the KMT could spin their wheels and mark time? What we see today is a KMT legislative caucus with an absolute majority, able to do nothing, paralyzed by an opposition DPP with an absolute minority. Faced with opposition DPP criticism, the only thing President Ma knows how to do is apologize repeatedly. He has nothing positive to offer. Robert Tsao offered a criticism worth pondering. He thinks that since President Ma assumed office, he has adopted an "avoid controversy" style of decision-making. But to avoid controversy is tantamount to forsaking one's responsibility to govern. When national leaders are unwilling to stick to their guns, when they fail to set goals, their subordinates will find themselves adrift. The result will be "a plate of loose sand."
Everyone knows that amidst the current wave of globalization, our future is not bright. To escape our predicament, we must adopt a more aggressive attitude when it comes to cross-Strait relations. We can be proud of our baptism in democracy. We are able to accommodate a diversity of opinions. We have adopted such an attitude regarding Green Camp supporters when they protest against the Chiang/Chen Meeting. We must adopt the same attitude regarding all cross-Strait discussions and proposals.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.22
社論－為兩岸議題的討論打開更多理性的空間
本報訊
選在第四次江陳會登場前夕，聯電榮譽董事長曹興誠於昨日在三家報紙頭版，刊登了兩個半版的文字廣告，呼籲總統馬英九能走出「不統不獨不武」的框架，做出有膽識的決策，積極推動制定兩岸和平共處法。曹興誠的建言是否允當容或有討論的空間，馬政府將會如何回應目前也不清楚，但我們以為，類似這種以正面、積極的態度為兩岸未來互動提供思維方向與政策方案的做法，是值得肯定的。
長久以來，台灣內部對兩岸議題的討論，一直都沉溺在二元對立的僵局中打轉。朝野陣營的領導精英，持續將其大部分的智慧與心力，耗費在質疑對手的觀點與立場上，公共討論空間則充斥著鮮明的口號與情緒的修辭。這種惡性循環，十幾年下來除了持續升高朝野對立，誰也沒能把誰說服。長此以往，台灣未來不論換那個政黨執政，恐怕都一樣陷在無窮的內耗中無法自拔。
嘗試想想，如果政黨輪替在台灣的意義，就只是更換不同的群眾上街頭抗爭，那還何必奢談什麼提升競爭力？曹興誠在其建言中所訴求的最主要論點，就是嘗試將所有有關兩岸關係的討論，從爭論終局選項的死胡同中跳出來，置換成程序與手段的討論。這種置換的好處是：不必再沉溺於那些永遠沒結論，也不可能有共識的「終局」爭執上。換言之，不要再去爭執哪個選項會為台灣帶來災難，而是去討論哪個方案會給台灣提供好處與機會，「統/獨」不再是論爭焦點，而是轉換到兩岸在「和平」與「民主」的前提下，循何種方案或模式可以建立彼此的互信與互助？曹興誠所提示的「兩岸和平共處法」或許是其中的模式之一。這種討論當然永遠是以台灣的利益為優先，以民主的程序為首要，它著重的是對最大多數台灣人利益的理性計算，而不復再是「誰在賣台」的情緒質疑。這也就是為什麼曹興誠會說如果民進黨真的想通了這一點，國民黨可能很快就會失去政權。
我們當然同意，在當前台灣的政治氛圍中，即便是啟動這種形式的討論，也很快就會掉入標籤化指控的陷阱中。這種指控的邏輯很簡單：即只要對兩岸未來的互動模式提出任何積極的主張，不論你實質的主張究竟是什麼，都一律先扣上「賣台」、「傾中」、「統派」…等大帽子，然後再卯盡全力轟擊這個被塑造出來的稻草人，任何議題的討論只要陷入到這種境地，其實也就等於討論不下去了。台灣這幾年有關兩岸議題的討論，一直沒法打開理性的公共空間，就是這種標籤化指控支配一切的結果。講再直接一點，民進黨內部迄今為止有關中國政策的辯論一直打不開格局，就是任何一方都怕被貼標籤；同樣的，馬政府執政以來在兩岸政策開放上一再瞻前顧後，很大一部分也是畏懼被貼標籤的結果。
問題是：難道因為畏懼被貼標籤，所以就可以無所作為嗎？民進黨在中國政策上有它「神主牌」的信仰堅持，再加上角色是在野黨，在政策主張上打不開格局還情有可原；但國民黨就不一樣了，至少當初台灣多數民意透過選票讓國民黨在立法院取得近四分之三的席次優勢，讓馬英九以絕對過半多數的優勢進入總統府，並不是期待其以今天這種瞻前顧後，甚至原地踏步的表現來執政的。而我們今天所看到的實況是：擁有席次絕對多數的國民黨黨團，在立法院面對少數在野黨的杯葛與癱瘓，表現的卻是一籌莫展！馬總統面對在野人士的批判，除了一再道歉，也不曾表現出更多積極的作為。曹興誠在他建言中有句批評頗值得深思，他認為馬總統就任以來在決策治理上處處都呈現「避免爭議」的風格，然而避免爭議的結果卻等於是「放棄管理」，亦就是等於「放棄承擔」。當國家領導人吝於堅持立場、不訂目標，底下就無所適從，最後必然是一片散沙！
誰都知道，在全球化的浪潮中，台灣的角色與處境並不樂觀，要打開這種困局不能不以更積極的態度去面對兩岸關係。同樣的，台灣最值得驕傲的地方，正在於它已經歷過民主的洗禮，能夠容納多元的聲音。我們用這樣的態度看待綠營民眾對江陳會的嗆聲，當然也該用同樣的態度對待所有對兩岸未來前景的討論與主張。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 22, 2009
Yesterday, on the eve of the fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting, Robert Tsao, Honorary Chairman of the UMC Corporation, took out two half-page ads on the front pages of three different newpapers. He called on President Ma Ying-jeou to extricate himself from his "no unification, no independence, no use of force" framework. He called on him to make a courageous decision by actively promoting a law ensuring peaceful cross-Strait relations. Whether Robert Tsao's suggestion is sound is debatable. How the Ma administration will respond is also unclear. But we think such positive and proactive approaches to cross-Strait interaction and cross-Strait policy deserve recognition.
Cross-Strait debate has long been deadlocked, mired in a simplistic dualism. The leaders of the ruling and opposition camps have devoted most of their intellect and energy challenging their opponent's positions. Public debate is dominated by simplistic slogans and emotional rhetoric. This vicious cycle has gone on for at least a dozen years. It has led to escalating confrontation between the government and the opposition. Neither camp has been able to convert the other. This was true in the past, and will remain true in the future. Who is in office makes no difference. Whoever is in office will find himself mired in the same quagmire, spinning his wheels, and unable to extricate himself.
What is the point of ruling party change on Taiwan, if the only change is that a different camp will take to the streets to protest? How will enhance our competitiveness? Robert Tsao's main point was that we must attempt to find a way out of our deadlock when discussing cross-Strait relations. We must find a new way to debate these issues. A new way of debating such issues would offer many benefits. One would no longer be mired in disputes for which there will never be any final conclusion. In short, one must not engage in debates which can only bring disaster upon Taiwan. Instead, one must consider options that may provide Taiwan with benefits and opportunities. The issue would no longer be "reunification vs. independence." The issue would be how to build cross-Strait trust under conditions of peace and democracy. Robert Tsao's "cross-Strait peaceful coexistence Law" is one possibility. Such discussions would of course give priority to the interests of the public on Taiwan. They would involve the democratic process. They would involve a rational calculation of the interests of a majority of the public on Taiwan. They would prevent anyone from hurling accusations about "Who is selling out Taiwan." That is why Robert Tsao said that if the DPP figures this out, the KMT could soon be out of power.
We certainly agree that given the current political atmosphere on Taiwan, even if one could initiate such a debate, it would soon descend into name-calling. Name-calling involves a very simple logic. Anyone who offers any constructive suggestions for cross-Straits interaction, regardless of what their substance might be, will be labeled "a traitor selling out Taiwan," who is "pandering to [Mainland] China," and who is "pro-reunification." He will be reduced to a straw man, to be blasted to smithereens with every weapon in one's arsenal. Any debate that descends to such depths will never lead anywhere. The debate will essentially be over. In recent years it has been impossible to openly and rationally discuss cross-Strait issues. This is the result of ad hominem name-calling. Put bluntly, the DPP has yet to hold a real debate on [Mainland] China policy. DPP leaders are too afraid of being labeled "traitors selling out Taiwan." The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy since assuming office has been timid and fearful, largely because it too is terrified of such accusations.
So the question is, is there nothing one can do, merely because one is afraid of being labeled? When it comes to [Mainland] China, the Democratic Progressive Party has its sacred cows. It is also the political opposition. Its inability to offer new policies and proposals is understandable. But this is not true of the KMT. A majority of the public on Taiwan voted for the KMT. They gave it a nearly three-quarters supermajority in the Legislative Yuan. They gave President Ma Ying-jeou an absolute majority. Why? So President Ma and the KMT could wallow in their current indecisiveness, constantly looking over their shoulder and second-guessing themselves? So President Ma and the KMT could spin their wheels and mark time? What we see today is a KMT legislative caucus with an absolute majority, able to do nothing, paralyzed by an opposition DPP with an absolute minority. Faced with opposition DPP criticism, the only thing President Ma knows how to do is apologize repeatedly. He has nothing positive to offer. Robert Tsao offered a criticism worth pondering. He thinks that since President Ma assumed office, he has adopted an "avoid controversy" style of decision-making. But to avoid controversy is tantamount to forsaking one's responsibility to govern. When national leaders are unwilling to stick to their guns, when they fail to set goals, their subordinates will find themselves adrift. The result will be "a plate of loose sand."
Everyone knows that amidst the current wave of globalization, our future is not bright. To escape our predicament, we must adopt a more aggressive attitude when it comes to cross-Strait relations. We can be proud of our baptism in democracy. We are able to accommodate a diversity of opinions. We have adopted such an attitude regarding Green Camp supporters when they protest against the Chiang/Chen Meeting. We must adopt the same attitude regarding all cross-Strait discussions and proposals.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.22
社論－為兩岸議題的討論打開更多理性的空間
本報訊
選在第四次江陳會登場前夕，聯電榮譽董事長曹興誠於昨日在三家報紙頭版，刊登了兩個半版的文字廣告，呼籲總統馬英九能走出「不統不獨不武」的框架，做出有膽識的決策，積極推動制定兩岸和平共處法。曹興誠的建言是否允當容或有討論的空間，馬政府將會如何回應目前也不清楚，但我們以為，類似這種以正面、積極的態度為兩岸未來互動提供思維方向與政策方案的做法，是值得肯定的。
長久以來，台灣內部對兩岸議題的討論，一直都沉溺在二元對立的僵局中打轉。朝野陣營的領導精英，持續將其大部分的智慧與心力，耗費在質疑對手的觀點與立場上，公共討論空間則充斥著鮮明的口號與情緒的修辭。這種惡性循環，十幾年下來除了持續升高朝野對立，誰也沒能把誰說服。長此以往，台灣未來不論換那個政黨執政，恐怕都一樣陷在無窮的內耗中無法自拔。
嘗試想想，如果政黨輪替在台灣的意義，就只是更換不同的群眾上街頭抗爭，那還何必奢談什麼提升競爭力？曹興誠在其建言中所訴求的最主要論點，就是嘗試將所有有關兩岸關係的討論，從爭論終局選項的死胡同中跳出來，置換成程序與手段的討論。這種置換的好處是：不必再沉溺於那些永遠沒結論，也不可能有共識的「終局」爭執上。換言之，不要再去爭執哪個選項會為台灣帶來災難，而是去討論哪個方案會給台灣提供好處與機會，「統/獨」不再是論爭焦點，而是轉換到兩岸在「和平」與「民主」的前提下，循何種方案或模式可以建立彼此的互信與互助？曹興誠所提示的「兩岸和平共處法」或許是其中的模式之一。這種討論當然永遠是以台灣的利益為優先，以民主的程序為首要，它著重的是對最大多數台灣人利益的理性計算，而不復再是「誰在賣台」的情緒質疑。這也就是為什麼曹興誠會說如果民進黨真的想通了這一點，國民黨可能很快就會失去政權。
我們當然同意，在當前台灣的政治氛圍中，即便是啟動這種形式的討論，也很快就會掉入標籤化指控的陷阱中。這種指控的邏輯很簡單：即只要對兩岸未來的互動模式提出任何積極的主張，不論你實質的主張究竟是什麼，都一律先扣上「賣台」、「傾中」、「統派」…等大帽子，然後再卯盡全力轟擊這個被塑造出來的稻草人，任何議題的討論只要陷入到這種境地，其實也就等於討論不下去了。台灣這幾年有關兩岸議題的討論，一直沒法打開理性的公共空間，就是這種標籤化指控支配一切的結果。講再直接一點，民進黨內部迄今為止有關中國政策的辯論一直打不開格局，就是任何一方都怕被貼標籤；同樣的，馬政府執政以來在兩岸政策開放上一再瞻前顧後，很大一部分也是畏懼被貼標籤的結果。
問題是：難道因為畏懼被貼標籤，所以就可以無所作為嗎？民進黨在中國政策上有它「神主牌」的信仰堅持，再加上角色是在野黨，在政策主張上打不開格局還情有可原；但國民黨就不一樣了，至少當初台灣多數民意透過選票讓國民黨在立法院取得近四分之三的席次優勢，讓馬英九以絕對過半多數的優勢進入總統府，並不是期待其以今天這種瞻前顧後，甚至原地踏步的表現來執政的。而我們今天所看到的實況是：擁有席次絕對多數的國民黨黨團，在立法院面對少數在野黨的杯葛與癱瘓，表現的卻是一籌莫展！馬總統面對在野人士的批判，除了一再道歉，也不曾表現出更多積極的作為。曹興誠在他建言中有句批評頗值得深思，他認為馬總統就任以來在決策治理上處處都呈現「避免爭議」的風格，然而避免爭議的結果卻等於是「放棄管理」，亦就是等於「放棄承擔」。當國家領導人吝於堅持立場、不訂目標，底下就無所適從，最後必然是一片散沙！
誰都知道，在全球化的浪潮中，台灣的角色與處境並不樂觀，要打開這種困局不能不以更積極的態度去面對兩岸關係。同樣的，台灣最值得驕傲的地方，正在於它已經歷過民主的洗禮，能夠容納多元的聲音。我們用這樣的態度看待綠營民眾對江陳會的嗆聲，當然也該用同樣的態度對待所有對兩岸未來前景的討論與主張。
Monday, December 21, 2009
The Chiang/Chen Meeting: Do Not Create a Lose-Lose Situation
The Chiang/Chen Meeting: Do Not Create a Lose-Lose Situation
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 21, 2009
Tens of thousands of people took to the streets in bitterly cold winds. But the crowd held contradictory goals. On the one hand, the Democratic Progressive Party has relentlessly incited mob sentiment. Green Camp pundits even coined such incendiary slogans as "Capture Chen Yunlin Alive!" On the other hand, DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly urged protestors to be "peaceful, rational and non-violent," and assured the public that they would be. Unfortunately in November 2008, the situation got out of hand. Bloody clashes took place between protestors and police. Memories are still fresh, and make many uneasy. Is the DPP serious about wanting their supporters to "gather peacefully and scatter peacefully?"
In this same wintry weather, thousands of police officers have been assigned to the streets. They too labor under an "Impossible Mission." On the one hand, they represent the authority of the state, and have a duty to maintain public safety. They must act swiftly, resolving any problems that might lead to social unrest. They also have an albatross around their neck. If they are cursed at, they may not curse back. If they are struck, they many not strike back. This is true for central and local governments alike. The government has assured the public that police will not use excessive force. Taichung Mayor Jason Hu even bet on his own job on it. But during 2008, police in Taipei enforced the law in a Draconian manner. Many people remain skeptical of the attitude of the police, and their ability to deal with problems that arise. Have they actually considered the many possible scenarios? Will police on the front lines lose control when push comes to shove?
The same thing happened last year. The Chiang/Chen Meeting became a ritual for the airing of public sentiment. On the surface it appeared to be a confrontation between rival political parties. In fact it was an expression of collective anxiety. The Chiang/Chen Meeting is not really about differences between Blue and Green, or differences between social groups (erroneously referred to as "ethnic groups") , or differences between northern Taiwan and southern Taiwan. It is about a feeling of gradually being marginalized as a country. Under the impact of globalization, the Republic of China has lost its sense of direction. It is afraid it may cease to exist. Its industrial competitiveness and the livelihood of its farmers and fishermen are at risk. This is not a question of political ideology. This is a question of economic pressures on domestic industries. This is question of winners and losers. Whoever is in office must answer the same questions. Should we integrate our economy with the rest of eastern Asia? How can we protect farmers, fishermen, and traditional industries from the impact of globalization?
The problems must be dealt with. On the one hand how they are dealt with will reflect the competence and wisdom of those in office. On the other hand, it will affect how voters cast their ballots. Under democracy every vote is equal. But the votes of industry sectors whose survival is at risk are a little more equal than others. The middle class is complacent. Industry sectors whose survival is at stake value their votes more than the middle class, which remains secure amidst globalization. This is one of the few things that may change their lives. They are taking to the streets because they believe otherwise they will remain invisible. They have protested violently. They have not hesitated to make trouble. They believe that only then will they be included in decisions affecting their futures. They believe that only then can they avoid being sacrificed as part of some package deal. The most direct and often most effective way of making themselves heard is through the ballot box. The recent three in one elections are in part a showdown between the economic winners and the economic losers. Such showdowns have taken place in many countries. But cross-Strait relations are unique. Add to this an extremely high degree of economic dependence, and the problem is compounded.
Such confrontation and internal conflict has motivated too many to spend too much time and energy rejecting ECFA. They forget that ECFA may enable us to sign more FTAs. They forget that the best and often most effective way to resist pressure from Beijing is to enter the Mainland. Taiwan businesses on the Mainland can reach out and touch the outside world from the Mainland. The same is true of the Republic of China government in Taipei. Too much confrontation has blinded the public to ECFA's upside.
The Republic of China feels as if it is being suffocated, both economically and politically. The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. But the only thing it knew how to do was to withdraw from the world. The Ma administration has little to offer apart from its Mainland policy. It too has contributed to widespread anxiety. Beijing has excluded Taipei from the international arena, and made the public on Taiwan feel deprived, dominated, and undermined. For the public on Taiwan, the Chiang/Chen Meeting has become a means by which they can vent their frustrations. What we see is a zero-sum game between DPP Chairman Tsai Ying-wen and KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou. Their supporters hurl accusations of "bao li xiao ying" (a violence prone Tsai Ying-wen) and "mai tai xiao ma" (a Ma Ying-jeou who is selling out Taiwan) at each other. This is truly unfortunate. The Chiang/Chen Meeting must not be reduced to this. The opposition DPP is able to persuade hundreds of thousands of people to take to the streets. Yet it is unable to tell them just exactly what sort of cross-Strait policy it would have instead. The ruling KMT is able to order overwhelming police force to prevent blood in the streets. Yet it is unable to persuade the public that any agreement signed with the Mainland will not reduce Taiwan to tears.
The conduct of both the ruling and opposition parties during the previous Chiang/Chen Meeting was disappointing. Intelligent and conscientious political leaders should be able to win their supporters' hearts and their opponents' respect. We hope the leaders of both parties will see the Chiang/Chen Meeting as an opportunity for the public to better understand our situation. We hope they will find a better way to survive in a globalized environment. Ensuring the Republic of China's survival requires hard-headed realism, not emotionalism and enmity.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.21
社論－反江陳會 別讓朝野雙輸憾事重演
本報訊
颼颼冷風中，數萬人走上街頭，這群人被賦予了矛盾的期望：一方面，遊行的主事者，民進黨不斷升高對立的情緒，甚至有綠營名嘴用了「活捉陳雲林」這樣煽情的口號；另一方面，在這樣的氛圍下，民進黨主席蔡英文卻又不斷呼籲並且保證遊行會「和平、理性與非暴力」。只是，二○○八年十一月江陳會警民流血衝突的失控場面，記憶猶新，讓許多人仍免不了感到不安──民進黨真的能夠、真的打從心裡是想要讓民眾「好好的來，平平安安的去」嗎？
同樣的寒冬天氣裡，數千警力也在街頭上，這群人，同樣揹負著某種不可能的任務：一方面，他們代表公權力維護公共安全，必須當機立斷化解任何造成社會不安與危險的場面和舉動；另一方面，他們有著不能說的秘密，就是罵不還口，加上打不還手。從中央到地方，政府再三保證警察絕對不會執法過當，台中市長胡志強甚至賭上自己的官位；然而，同樣的，二○○八年警察在台北的激動執法，讓很多人對警方的心理素質與現場處理問題的能力，感到憂心──執政黨真的有辦法、真的周延地沙盤推演過，讓第一線在與抗議民眾短兵相接的警方人員不會亂了方寸、不會壞了分寸？
與去年完全一樣，江陳會彷彿成了社會情緒大操演的某種儀式：表面看來是不同政黨的政治對立，骨子裡其實是台灣集體的焦慮；江陳會所涉及的核心議題，其實不是藍綠，不是族群，當然更不是南北差異，而是做為一個逐漸被邊緣化的國家、台灣，在全球化衝擊下失去方向，甚至於逐漸失去存在感的恐懼 ──從產業競爭到農漁民生計，都不是政治立場問題，而是國內生產部門此消彼漲的壓力，不論誰執政，都一樣要面對一個殘酷的挑戰：那就是要不要因應東亞區域整合？以及如何保護無力因應全球化而遭到生存威脅的農漁業或傳統產業部門？
問題非要好好因應不可，因為這一方面反映出執政者的能力與智慧，另一方面，當然也關係著選票。民主政治不但票票等值，生存遭到威脅的產業部門，他們的票有時還更值錢些，因為他們可能比安逸的中產階級、在全球化浪朝中較有機會安身立命的那些人，更重視手上的選票，畢竟這可能是他們改變生命的少數依恃；他們走上街頭，是因為他們認為，不這樣，他們永遠不會被看見；他們激烈抗爭、不惜鬧事，是因為，他們相信這是能夠阻止在某些他們無力參與的決策裡，被包裹交易以及被犧牲的悲慘命運；當然，最直接也往往最有效的是用選票表達意見。最近三合一選舉的結果，部分也反應了受惠多者與受惠少者之間的對決；這種對決，其實很多國家都在上演，只是，由於兩岸特殊的關係，再加上經濟上的超高度依存度，使得問題變得更複雜。
這種對抗與內耗，使得不少人花了過多的心思去排斥ＥＣＦＡ，卻忘了如何透過ＥＣＦＡ去爭取更多ＦＴＡ的可能性；忘了要抗拒中國，最好也最有效的辦法，其實是走進中國，台商從中國走向世界，台灣也是如此。太多的對立，使台灣看不到機會。
台灣今天在經濟和政治上有窒息之感，八年執政只知不斷內縮的民進黨固然難辭其咎，自從上任後除了中國政策之外，幾乎看不到其他太多主張的馬政府，也是造成許多民眾疑慮叢生的原因。再加上，在各種國際舞台緊緊勒住台灣的對岸，讓台灣人不斷複習著被剝奪、被宰制、被架空的痛苦。江陳會因此被走不出去的台灣，窄化成了一個發洩情緒的管道，我們看到的是暴力小英與賣台小馬間的互控與零合遊戲，這實在是非常可惜的事，畢竟江陳會不該只是如此──為什麼，在野黨可發動十萬人上街，卻說不清楚他們究竟要什麼樣的兩岸政策；為什麼，執政黨可以用優勢警力保證街頭不流血，卻始終無法說服人民與大陸簽訂的任何協議，絕對不會讓某些台灣人流淚。
朝野兩黨在上次江陳會的表現，都是讓人失望的。有智慧有良心的政黨與政治人物，不但應該要讓支持者安心，也要讓反對者願意尊重。期許兩黨領導人，把這次江陳會當做一個好機會，讓更多台灣人清楚地認識台灣處境、理性地尋找在全球化架構下，台灣的生存發展之路；這是個現實問題，不是情緒、好惡問題。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 21, 2009
Tens of thousands of people took to the streets in bitterly cold winds. But the crowd held contradictory goals. On the one hand, the Democratic Progressive Party has relentlessly incited mob sentiment. Green Camp pundits even coined such incendiary slogans as "Capture Chen Yunlin Alive!" On the other hand, DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly urged protestors to be "peaceful, rational and non-violent," and assured the public that they would be. Unfortunately in November 2008, the situation got out of hand. Bloody clashes took place between protestors and police. Memories are still fresh, and make many uneasy. Is the DPP serious about wanting their supporters to "gather peacefully and scatter peacefully?"
In this same wintry weather, thousands of police officers have been assigned to the streets. They too labor under an "Impossible Mission." On the one hand, they represent the authority of the state, and have a duty to maintain public safety. They must act swiftly, resolving any problems that might lead to social unrest. They also have an albatross around their neck. If they are cursed at, they may not curse back. If they are struck, they many not strike back. This is true for central and local governments alike. The government has assured the public that police will not use excessive force. Taichung Mayor Jason Hu even bet on his own job on it. But during 2008, police in Taipei enforced the law in a Draconian manner. Many people remain skeptical of the attitude of the police, and their ability to deal with problems that arise. Have they actually considered the many possible scenarios? Will police on the front lines lose control when push comes to shove?
The same thing happened last year. The Chiang/Chen Meeting became a ritual for the airing of public sentiment. On the surface it appeared to be a confrontation between rival political parties. In fact it was an expression of collective anxiety. The Chiang/Chen Meeting is not really about differences between Blue and Green, or differences between social groups (erroneously referred to as "ethnic groups") , or differences between northern Taiwan and southern Taiwan. It is about a feeling of gradually being marginalized as a country. Under the impact of globalization, the Republic of China has lost its sense of direction. It is afraid it may cease to exist. Its industrial competitiveness and the livelihood of its farmers and fishermen are at risk. This is not a question of political ideology. This is a question of economic pressures on domestic industries. This is question of winners and losers. Whoever is in office must answer the same questions. Should we integrate our economy with the rest of eastern Asia? How can we protect farmers, fishermen, and traditional industries from the impact of globalization?
The problems must be dealt with. On the one hand how they are dealt with will reflect the competence and wisdom of those in office. On the other hand, it will affect how voters cast their ballots. Under democracy every vote is equal. But the votes of industry sectors whose survival is at risk are a little more equal than others. The middle class is complacent. Industry sectors whose survival is at stake value their votes more than the middle class, which remains secure amidst globalization. This is one of the few things that may change their lives. They are taking to the streets because they believe otherwise they will remain invisible. They have protested violently. They have not hesitated to make trouble. They believe that only then will they be included in decisions affecting their futures. They believe that only then can they avoid being sacrificed as part of some package deal. The most direct and often most effective way of making themselves heard is through the ballot box. The recent three in one elections are in part a showdown between the economic winners and the economic losers. Such showdowns have taken place in many countries. But cross-Strait relations are unique. Add to this an extremely high degree of economic dependence, and the problem is compounded.
Such confrontation and internal conflict has motivated too many to spend too much time and energy rejecting ECFA. They forget that ECFA may enable us to sign more FTAs. They forget that the best and often most effective way to resist pressure from Beijing is to enter the Mainland. Taiwan businesses on the Mainland can reach out and touch the outside world from the Mainland. The same is true of the Republic of China government in Taipei. Too much confrontation has blinded the public to ECFA's upside.
The Republic of China feels as if it is being suffocated, both economically and politically. The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. But the only thing it knew how to do was to withdraw from the world. The Ma administration has little to offer apart from its Mainland policy. It too has contributed to widespread anxiety. Beijing has excluded Taipei from the international arena, and made the public on Taiwan feel deprived, dominated, and undermined. For the public on Taiwan, the Chiang/Chen Meeting has become a means by which they can vent their frustrations. What we see is a zero-sum game between DPP Chairman Tsai Ying-wen and KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou. Their supporters hurl accusations of "bao li xiao ying" (a violence prone Tsai Ying-wen) and "mai tai xiao ma" (a Ma Ying-jeou who is selling out Taiwan) at each other. This is truly unfortunate. The Chiang/Chen Meeting must not be reduced to this. The opposition DPP is able to persuade hundreds of thousands of people to take to the streets. Yet it is unable to tell them just exactly what sort of cross-Strait policy it would have instead. The ruling KMT is able to order overwhelming police force to prevent blood in the streets. Yet it is unable to persuade the public that any agreement signed with the Mainland will not reduce Taiwan to tears.
The conduct of both the ruling and opposition parties during the previous Chiang/Chen Meeting was disappointing. Intelligent and conscientious political leaders should be able to win their supporters' hearts and their opponents' respect. We hope the leaders of both parties will see the Chiang/Chen Meeting as an opportunity for the public to better understand our situation. We hope they will find a better way to survive in a globalized environment. Ensuring the Republic of China's survival requires hard-headed realism, not emotionalism and enmity.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.21
社論－反江陳會 別讓朝野雙輸憾事重演
本報訊
颼颼冷風中，數萬人走上街頭，這群人被賦予了矛盾的期望：一方面，遊行的主事者，民進黨不斷升高對立的情緒，甚至有綠營名嘴用了「活捉陳雲林」這樣煽情的口號；另一方面，在這樣的氛圍下，民進黨主席蔡英文卻又不斷呼籲並且保證遊行會「和平、理性與非暴力」。只是，二○○八年十一月江陳會警民流血衝突的失控場面，記憶猶新，讓許多人仍免不了感到不安──民進黨真的能夠、真的打從心裡是想要讓民眾「好好的來，平平安安的去」嗎？
同樣的寒冬天氣裡，數千警力也在街頭上，這群人，同樣揹負著某種不可能的任務：一方面，他們代表公權力維護公共安全，必須當機立斷化解任何造成社會不安與危險的場面和舉動；另一方面，他們有著不能說的秘密，就是罵不還口，加上打不還手。從中央到地方，政府再三保證警察絕對不會執法過當，台中市長胡志強甚至賭上自己的官位；然而，同樣的，二○○八年警察在台北的激動執法，讓很多人對警方的心理素質與現場處理問題的能力，感到憂心──執政黨真的有辦法、真的周延地沙盤推演過，讓第一線在與抗議民眾短兵相接的警方人員不會亂了方寸、不會壞了分寸？
與去年完全一樣，江陳會彷彿成了社會情緒大操演的某種儀式：表面看來是不同政黨的政治對立，骨子裡其實是台灣集體的焦慮；江陳會所涉及的核心議題，其實不是藍綠，不是族群，當然更不是南北差異，而是做為一個逐漸被邊緣化的國家、台灣，在全球化衝擊下失去方向，甚至於逐漸失去存在感的恐懼 ──從產業競爭到農漁民生計，都不是政治立場問題，而是國內生產部門此消彼漲的壓力，不論誰執政，都一樣要面對一個殘酷的挑戰：那就是要不要因應東亞區域整合？以及如何保護無力因應全球化而遭到生存威脅的農漁業或傳統產業部門？
問題非要好好因應不可，因為這一方面反映出執政者的能力與智慧，另一方面，當然也關係著選票。民主政治不但票票等值，生存遭到威脅的產業部門，他們的票有時還更值錢些，因為他們可能比安逸的中產階級、在全球化浪朝中較有機會安身立命的那些人，更重視手上的選票，畢竟這可能是他們改變生命的少數依恃；他們走上街頭，是因為他們認為，不這樣，他們永遠不會被看見；他們激烈抗爭、不惜鬧事，是因為，他們相信這是能夠阻止在某些他們無力參與的決策裡，被包裹交易以及被犧牲的悲慘命運；當然，最直接也往往最有效的是用選票表達意見。最近三合一選舉的結果，部分也反應了受惠多者與受惠少者之間的對決；這種對決，其實很多國家都在上演，只是，由於兩岸特殊的關係，再加上經濟上的超高度依存度，使得問題變得更複雜。
這種對抗與內耗，使得不少人花了過多的心思去排斥ＥＣＦＡ，卻忘了如何透過ＥＣＦＡ去爭取更多ＦＴＡ的可能性；忘了要抗拒中國，最好也最有效的辦法，其實是走進中國，台商從中國走向世界，台灣也是如此。太多的對立，使台灣看不到機會。
台灣今天在經濟和政治上有窒息之感，八年執政只知不斷內縮的民進黨固然難辭其咎，自從上任後除了中國政策之外，幾乎看不到其他太多主張的馬政府，也是造成許多民眾疑慮叢生的原因。再加上，在各種國際舞台緊緊勒住台灣的對岸，讓台灣人不斷複習著被剝奪、被宰制、被架空的痛苦。江陳會因此被走不出去的台灣，窄化成了一個發洩情緒的管道，我們看到的是暴力小英與賣台小馬間的互控與零合遊戲，這實在是非常可惜的事，畢竟江陳會不該只是如此──為什麼，在野黨可發動十萬人上街，卻說不清楚他們究竟要什麼樣的兩岸政策；為什麼，執政黨可以用優勢警力保證街頭不流血，卻始終無法說服人民與大陸簽訂的任何協議，絕對不會讓某些台灣人流淚。
朝野兩黨在上次江陳會的表現，都是讓人失望的。有智慧有良心的政黨與政治人物，不但應該要讓支持者安心，也要讓反對者願意尊重。期許兩黨領導人，把這次江陳會當做一個好機會，讓更多台灣人清楚地認識台灣處境、理性地尋找在全球化架構下，台灣的生存發展之路；這是個現實問題，不是情緒、好惡問題。
Friday, December 18, 2009
Ma Administration: Don't Let Mere Technicalities Undermine the Big Picture
Ma Administration: Don't Let Mere Technicalities Undermine the Big Picture
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 18, 2009
The Ma administration has been in office for a year and a half. Mere technicalities have repeatedly undermined many of its major policies. They have clouded the essential issues, and even ignited heated controversy. President Ma Ying-jeou was recently interviewed by the Wall Street Journal. He spoke in an earnest and measured manner about his views on cross-Strait developments. And yet a simple "s" at the end of the word "decade“ generated pointless controversy. Unfortunately this example is all too typical.
Cross-Strait disputes are complex. They involve pain and sorrow dating back four hundred years. Taiwan's political climate is unique. Reunification and independence stand at loggerheads with each other, generating voluminous rhetoric over cross-Strait issues. Any political leader aspiring to high office must trot out his own set of arguments, and use them to rally public support. Blue Camp advocates of reunification and Green Camp advocates of independence are unable to sway each other. Under the circumstances, maintaining the status quo has become the common denominator. Reunification is something for the distant future. Independence, on the other hand, is a pipe dream. Most people think independence is not even worth discussing, because the Republic of China's national sovereignty is well-established. Reunification is an issue because many people have powerful apprehensions about reunification.
During President Ma's interview, he earnestly addressed the question of why the public on Taiwan doesn't want [immediate] reunification?" He spoke to the American media, but in fact he was speaking to Beijing. He wanted Beijing to hear and understand the true feelings of the public on Taiwan. As far as Mainland China is concerned, reunification is the most important national goal. Its timing can be postponed. But the goal is non-negotiable. In the past, the public on Taiwan considered the Mainland too impoverished and too restrictive. Now Mainland reforms and liberalization have transformed it into an economic powerhouse. Yet many people on Taiwan still refuse to reunify. Why? Ma Ying-jeou said "We (people on Taiwan and people on the Mainland) don't even know each other that well." As he explained, opening cross-Strait exchanges will help promote Mainland China's economic freedom, and even political freedom. This is an historic opportunity. "I want to create a situation where the two sides could. . . see which system is better for the Chinese culture, for the Chinese people."
Put plainly, Ma Ying-jeou said that what the public on Taiwan wants before it considers reunification, is democracy. Mainland China may be close to having a free market economic system. But it is still a long way from having a democratic political system. Local elections were instituted during the "Two Chiangs Era." Direct presidential elections were instituted during the Lee Teng-hui era. Two changes in ruling parties have taken place. The Republic of China is no longer a party-dominated authoritarian nation. Legislators may blast administration officials. Ordinary citizens may protest. Amidst the chaos, there is ordered freedom. Democracy has become synonymous with sunshine, air, and water. It is indispensable.
Such an informative interview, and yet the Presidential Office failed to issue a press release. The domestic media had to quote the Wall Street Journal. Note Ma Ying-jeou's key statement, "Whether there will be reunification as expected by the mainland side depends very much on what is going to unfold in the next decades. Note how carefully the President stressed reunification "as expected by the mainland side," and not "as expected by the Taiwan side." And yet, the opposition DPP blasted him. They accused Ma Ying-jeou of embracing "ultimate unification." They mocked the President's "poor English grammar." Ma Ying-jeou agreed to an interview with the foreign media, out of the best of motives. But he was drowned out by wave upon wave of criticism and ridicule over mere technicalities.
The President agreed to an interview with the foreign media. It was hardly the first time a news report differed with the facts. So the question is, why does the same problem keep happening, again and again? Ma Ying-jeou likes to speak English, and his English is not bad. But critics have suggested that need not use English from beginning to end. The President agreed to an interview with the foreign media, in his capacity as the President of the Republic of China. The interview was conducted within the Republic of China. For him to conduct the interview in Mandarin would hardly be impolite. If anything, it would underscore his status as the head of state. It would underscore a head of state's respect for and belief in his own nation. Most importantly, it would avoid misunderstandings when the foreign media transcribes such interviews.
Furthermore, when the President agrees to an interview with the international media, he is speaking as a representative of the nation. He is speaking as the President of the Republic of China, rather than as an individual. As part of his Presidential duties, he should issue a press release. It is his duty to his countrymen. Each time the President makes a statement, he has an obligation and responsibility to the people. Otherwise, how can the people monitor his performance? How can they know whether his words are consistent with the national interest? This was so during the Two Chiangs era. This was so during the Lee Teng-hui era. This was so even during the Chen Shui-bian era. Only Ma Ying-jeou, out of whatever special considerations, or austerity measures, or baffling personality quirks, has thinned out the ranks of the Presidential Office so drastically. No matter how austere one might want to be, one surely needs at least one or two interpreters. President Ma Ying-jeou himself was a translator. Surely he knows how important this work is. If the Presidential Office has no one to perform translations or write press releases, surely the Government Information Office can assume responsibility for international PR, or assign this task to the Central News Agency.
Ma Ying-jeou got his start at Chiang Ching-kuo's side. He should have learned a little something from him. Yet he doesn't conduct interviews in Mandarin. He doesn't issue press releases. These are a technical problems. But they reflect a more important problem. Does Ma Ying-jeou really understand the importance of interviews with the international media? Does the Presidential Office understand that not issuing a press release for presidential interviews, may result in the president's words being misunderstood? Does it understand that this is a dereliction of duty? The Presidential Office needs to realize that press releases of the President's interviews are official documents, and that one day they will become part of the historical record.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.18
社論－馬政府別再讓枝節問題 壞了大事
本報訊
就任一年半多，馬政府許多重大政策，總是因為技術問題，干擾了議題本質，不但模糊焦點，甚至造成爭議。馬英九總統接受《華爾街日報》專訪，言辭懇切、情理俱足地談他對兩岸發展的見解，卻因為一個「Ｓ」，釀出一堆無聊的爭議，就是最典型的例證。
兩岸關係糾葛複雜，恩怨情仇上溯四百年；台灣政治生態特殊，統獨兩端各持立論，反而讓「兩岸論述」汗牛充棟，凡有志競逐大位的政治領袖，無不得提出一套說法，並藉此做為號召群眾的核心。在藍綠統獨彼此無法說服的情況下，維持現狀反而成為最大公約數，要談統也是在遙遠不可測的未來，要談獨同樣寄託於不知能否實現的希望或夢想；有更多人認為，獨不必談，因為台灣的國家主權明確，統會是一個問題，因為還有太多人對統一這件事，心懷強烈憂懼。
馬總統這篇專訪，誠懇面對「台灣為什麼不想統一」這件事，他既是對美國媒體說，更重要是說給對岸聽：希望對岸必須理解、體會台灣人民真實的心聲。對中國大陸而言，統一是最重要的國家目標，時間可以放遠，目標絕對不能放棄。過去，台灣嫌中國不夠富裕、不夠開放；現在，中國改革開放還成為經濟崛起的大國，台灣還不肯統一，為什麼？馬英九含蓄的說，「我們（兩岸）還不夠了解彼此。」緊接著，他繼續詮釋，推動開放有助於促進中國經濟自由、乃至政治自由，現在是個歷史契機，「我想要塑造一種情況，讓雙方能夠…看看哪個制度對中國文化、對中國人民更好。」
馬英九這番話等於講白了，台灣需要的是民主政治！而中國大陸不論如何貼近市場經濟，終究距離民主政治還遠，從兩蔣時代就習慣基層選舉，李登輝時代更開放總統民選的台灣，已經經過兩次政黨輪替，再也不是過去那個以黨領政的威權國家，儘管立委能罵官、小民能嗆聲，吵吵鬧鬧，卻有著亂中有序的自由。民主在台灣，已經等同陽光、空氣與水，不可或缺。
這麼漂亮的專訪，很奇特的，總統府未發任何新聞稿。國內媒體引據的是《華爾街日報》出刊後的報導，馬英九的關鍵用語，「兩岸能否如大陸期待的統一，得看未來十年的情勢發展。」總統多麼謹慎地強調了是「大陸期待」而非「台灣期待」的統一，結果，卻被在野黨痛批，指責馬英九心目中就是「終極統一」，更嘲諷總統英文文法有點差。馬英九接受國際媒體訪問的一番用心，全部被淹沒在這些枝節的批評與嘲諷之中。
總統接受外媒訪問，出現報導與原意有落差，早不是第一次了。問題是：為什麼相同的狀況一而再、再而三的出現？過去輿論即曾建議，喜歡講英文、英文其實很不差的馬英九，以總統身分接受國際媒體訪問時，實在沒必要全程使用英文，做為中華民國總統，又在國內接受訪問，使用本國語言，既不失禮，更顯元首之尊，這是元首對自己代表國家的最大敬重和信仰，最重要的，避免外媒在採訪到寫譯過程中可能發生的誤讀。
其次，總統接受國際媒體訪問，是代表國家對外發言，談話代表的是中華民國而非總統個人，總統府職責上應該發出新聞稿，這是對國家人民負責。總統每一次對外發言，都有義務和責任對人民公開，否則人民如何監督？如何知道總統之言是否符合國家人民利益？不要說兩蔣時代如此，李登輝時代、陳水扁時代都是如此，獨獨馬英九，不曉得是什麼特殊考量或儉樸到莫名其妙的個性，讓總統府人事精簡到一個程度，問題是，再精簡總得用一、二個翻譯官吧？馬英九自己是總統翻譯官出身，總該知道這個工作有多重要吧？總統府沒人譯寫新聞稿，新聞局職司國際宣傳，也可交待新聞局辦理啊。
馬英九跟在蔣經國身邊起家，學也該學到一點皮毛，不用國語受訪、不發新聞稿，是技術問題，卻也反映出更重要的問題：馬英九到底知不知道國際媒體專訪的重要性？總統府知不知道不為總統訪談發出新聞稿，致令總統之言遭到誤解，已經有虧職守？總統府必須認知，總統訪談的新聞稿，既是官定文本，也將是歷史紀錄。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 18, 2009
The Ma administration has been in office for a year and a half. Mere technicalities have repeatedly undermined many of its major policies. They have clouded the essential issues, and even ignited heated controversy. President Ma Ying-jeou was recently interviewed by the Wall Street Journal. He spoke in an earnest and measured manner about his views on cross-Strait developments. And yet a simple "s" at the end of the word "decade“ generated pointless controversy. Unfortunately this example is all too typical.
Cross-Strait disputes are complex. They involve pain and sorrow dating back four hundred years. Taiwan's political climate is unique. Reunification and independence stand at loggerheads with each other, generating voluminous rhetoric over cross-Strait issues. Any political leader aspiring to high office must trot out his own set of arguments, and use them to rally public support. Blue Camp advocates of reunification and Green Camp advocates of independence are unable to sway each other. Under the circumstances, maintaining the status quo has become the common denominator. Reunification is something for the distant future. Independence, on the other hand, is a pipe dream. Most people think independence is not even worth discussing, because the Republic of China's national sovereignty is well-established. Reunification is an issue because many people have powerful apprehensions about reunification.
During President Ma's interview, he earnestly addressed the question of why the public on Taiwan doesn't want [immediate] reunification?" He spoke to the American media, but in fact he was speaking to Beijing. He wanted Beijing to hear and understand the true feelings of the public on Taiwan. As far as Mainland China is concerned, reunification is the most important national goal. Its timing can be postponed. But the goal is non-negotiable. In the past, the public on Taiwan considered the Mainland too impoverished and too restrictive. Now Mainland reforms and liberalization have transformed it into an economic powerhouse. Yet many people on Taiwan still refuse to reunify. Why? Ma Ying-jeou said "We (people on Taiwan and people on the Mainland) don't even know each other that well." As he explained, opening cross-Strait exchanges will help promote Mainland China's economic freedom, and even political freedom. This is an historic opportunity. "I want to create a situation where the two sides could. . . see which system is better for the Chinese culture, for the Chinese people."
Put plainly, Ma Ying-jeou said that what the public on Taiwan wants before it considers reunification, is democracy. Mainland China may be close to having a free market economic system. But it is still a long way from having a democratic political system. Local elections were instituted during the "Two Chiangs Era." Direct presidential elections were instituted during the Lee Teng-hui era. Two changes in ruling parties have taken place. The Republic of China is no longer a party-dominated authoritarian nation. Legislators may blast administration officials. Ordinary citizens may protest. Amidst the chaos, there is ordered freedom. Democracy has become synonymous with sunshine, air, and water. It is indispensable.
Such an informative interview, and yet the Presidential Office failed to issue a press release. The domestic media had to quote the Wall Street Journal. Note Ma Ying-jeou's key statement, "Whether there will be reunification as expected by the mainland side depends very much on what is going to unfold in the next decades. Note how carefully the President stressed reunification "as expected by the mainland side," and not "as expected by the Taiwan side." And yet, the opposition DPP blasted him. They accused Ma Ying-jeou of embracing "ultimate unification." They mocked the President's "poor English grammar." Ma Ying-jeou agreed to an interview with the foreign media, out of the best of motives. But he was drowned out by wave upon wave of criticism and ridicule over mere technicalities.
The President agreed to an interview with the foreign media. It was hardly the first time a news report differed with the facts. So the question is, why does the same problem keep happening, again and again? Ma Ying-jeou likes to speak English, and his English is not bad. But critics have suggested that need not use English from beginning to end. The President agreed to an interview with the foreign media, in his capacity as the President of the Republic of China. The interview was conducted within the Republic of China. For him to conduct the interview in Mandarin would hardly be impolite. If anything, it would underscore his status as the head of state. It would underscore a head of state's respect for and belief in his own nation. Most importantly, it would avoid misunderstandings when the foreign media transcribes such interviews.
Furthermore, when the President agrees to an interview with the international media, he is speaking as a representative of the nation. He is speaking as the President of the Republic of China, rather than as an individual. As part of his Presidential duties, he should issue a press release. It is his duty to his countrymen. Each time the President makes a statement, he has an obligation and responsibility to the people. Otherwise, how can the people monitor his performance? How can they know whether his words are consistent with the national interest? This was so during the Two Chiangs era. This was so during the Lee Teng-hui era. This was so even during the Chen Shui-bian era. Only Ma Ying-jeou, out of whatever special considerations, or austerity measures, or baffling personality quirks, has thinned out the ranks of the Presidential Office so drastically. No matter how austere one might want to be, one surely needs at least one or two interpreters. President Ma Ying-jeou himself was a translator. Surely he knows how important this work is. If the Presidential Office has no one to perform translations or write press releases, surely the Government Information Office can assume responsibility for international PR, or assign this task to the Central News Agency.
Ma Ying-jeou got his start at Chiang Ching-kuo's side. He should have learned a little something from him. Yet he doesn't conduct interviews in Mandarin. He doesn't issue press releases. These are a technical problems. But they reflect a more important problem. Does Ma Ying-jeou really understand the importance of interviews with the international media? Does the Presidential Office understand that not issuing a press release for presidential interviews, may result in the president's words being misunderstood? Does it understand that this is a dereliction of duty? The Presidential Office needs to realize that press releases of the President's interviews are official documents, and that one day they will become part of the historical record.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.18
社論－馬政府別再讓枝節問題 壞了大事
本報訊
就任一年半多，馬政府許多重大政策，總是因為技術問題，干擾了議題本質，不但模糊焦點，甚至造成爭議。馬英九總統接受《華爾街日報》專訪，言辭懇切、情理俱足地談他對兩岸發展的見解，卻因為一個「Ｓ」，釀出一堆無聊的爭議，就是最典型的例證。
兩岸關係糾葛複雜，恩怨情仇上溯四百年；台灣政治生態特殊，統獨兩端各持立論，反而讓「兩岸論述」汗牛充棟，凡有志競逐大位的政治領袖，無不得提出一套說法，並藉此做為號召群眾的核心。在藍綠統獨彼此無法說服的情況下，維持現狀反而成為最大公約數，要談統也是在遙遠不可測的未來，要談獨同樣寄託於不知能否實現的希望或夢想；有更多人認為，獨不必談，因為台灣的國家主權明確，統會是一個問題，因為還有太多人對統一這件事，心懷強烈憂懼。
馬總統這篇專訪，誠懇面對「台灣為什麼不想統一」這件事，他既是對美國媒體說，更重要是說給對岸聽：希望對岸必須理解、體會台灣人民真實的心聲。對中國大陸而言，統一是最重要的國家目標，時間可以放遠，目標絕對不能放棄。過去，台灣嫌中國不夠富裕、不夠開放；現在，中國改革開放還成為經濟崛起的大國，台灣還不肯統一，為什麼？馬英九含蓄的說，「我們（兩岸）還不夠了解彼此。」緊接著，他繼續詮釋，推動開放有助於促進中國經濟自由、乃至政治自由，現在是個歷史契機，「我想要塑造一種情況，讓雙方能夠…看看哪個制度對中國文化、對中國人民更好。」
馬英九這番話等於講白了，台灣需要的是民主政治！而中國大陸不論如何貼近市場經濟，終究距離民主政治還遠，從兩蔣時代就習慣基層選舉，李登輝時代更開放總統民選的台灣，已經經過兩次政黨輪替，再也不是過去那個以黨領政的威權國家，儘管立委能罵官、小民能嗆聲，吵吵鬧鬧，卻有著亂中有序的自由。民主在台灣，已經等同陽光、空氣與水，不可或缺。
這麼漂亮的專訪，很奇特的，總統府未發任何新聞稿。國內媒體引據的是《華爾街日報》出刊後的報導，馬英九的關鍵用語，「兩岸能否如大陸期待的統一，得看未來十年的情勢發展。」總統多麼謹慎地強調了是「大陸期待」而非「台灣期待」的統一，結果，卻被在野黨痛批，指責馬英九心目中就是「終極統一」，更嘲諷總統英文文法有點差。馬英九接受國際媒體訪問的一番用心，全部被淹沒在這些枝節的批評與嘲諷之中。
總統接受外媒訪問，出現報導與原意有落差，早不是第一次了。問題是：為什麼相同的狀況一而再、再而三的出現？過去輿論即曾建議，喜歡講英文、英文其實很不差的馬英九，以總統身分接受國際媒體訪問時，實在沒必要全程使用英文，做為中華民國總統，又在國內接受訪問，使用本國語言，既不失禮，更顯元首之尊，這是元首對自己代表國家的最大敬重和信仰，最重要的，避免外媒在採訪到寫譯過程中可能發生的誤讀。
其次，總統接受國際媒體訪問，是代表國家對外發言，談話代表的是中華民國而非總統個人，總統府職責上應該發出新聞稿，這是對國家人民負責。總統每一次對外發言，都有義務和責任對人民公開，否則人民如何監督？如何知道總統之言是否符合國家人民利益？不要說兩蔣時代如此，李登輝時代、陳水扁時代都是如此，獨獨馬英九，不曉得是什麼特殊考量或儉樸到莫名其妙的個性，讓總統府人事精簡到一個程度，問題是，再精簡總得用一、二個翻譯官吧？馬英九自己是總統翻譯官出身，總該知道這個工作有多重要吧？總統府沒人譯寫新聞稿，新聞局職司國際宣傳，也可交待新聞局辦理啊。
馬英九跟在蔣經國身邊起家，學也該學到一點皮毛，不用國語受訪、不發新聞稿，是技術問題，卻也反映出更重要的問題：馬英九到底知不知道國際媒體專訪的重要性？總統府知不知道不為總統訪談發出新聞稿，致令總統之言遭到誤解，已經有虧職守？總統府必須認知，總統訪談的新聞稿，既是官定文本，也將是歷史紀錄。
Thursday, December 17, 2009
From Chaos to Hope: Public Expectations
From Chaos to Hope: Public Expectations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 17, 2009
The United Daily News and the Far Eastern Group recently sponsored a Word of the Year Contest. We asked the public which words best symbolized the year 2009. The word "pan," (hope) took first place. Last year the word was "luan," (chaos). This year's word, "hope," reflects a shift in public sentiment. It also represents the public's expectations for the new political regime.
Given the current political climate, the emergence of the word "hope" was rather unexpected. Public morale is low. The list of candidates included 30 words. Over two-thirds of them carried negative connotations. They included words such as "ma" (verbal abuse), "hun" (muddling through), "jing" (panic), "ku" (bitterness), "men" (suffocation), and "can" (tragedy). That the word "hope" would come to the fore shows that after years of unrest and suffering, people are finally calming down. They are finally able to look to the new year with relative equanimity. They may be dissatisfied, but they are full of expectations.
The Word of the Year Contest has three functions. First, it encapsulates the collective mood of society. Second, it enables the public to both review the past and anticipate the future. Third, it reflects public sentiment and encourages the government to engage in self-examination. The contest was co-sponsored by the United Daily News and the Far Eastern Group. This is merely the second year it has been held, but it has already become the focus of public attention. It also reflects to a considerable degree the collective mood on Taiwan. This year's word "hope," was suggested by Mr. Kuo Yao-hua. That a retiree's feelings would resonant so intensely with the public, makes it even more meaningful.
Recall last year. The beginning of the new year saw a second change in ruling parties, and a restructuring of the legislature. And yet the word of the year was not "new," but "chaos." This suggests that the new administration failed to find its way. It was unable to put Taiwan back on track. The public felt as if it had been cast adrift, and surrounded by chaos. Add to this the twists and turns of the Chen corruption case, the impact of the global financial crisis, and the sudden rise in the unemployment rate. No wonder the public felt trapped, both politically and economically. No wonder the word "chaos" came to peoples' minds.
This year the situation on Taiwan is slightly different. A first instance verdict has been delivered in the Chen corruption case. Most of the dark clouds have dissipated. Chen Shui-bian is not being released. Any statements he hopes to make, will have to be made from his jail cell. His ability to incite political unrest and meddle with the political process has been significantly diminished. The wounds inflicted by the financial tsunami have yet to heal, but the economy is showing signs of heating up. Signs of prosperity are returning. Although one cannot say that all our worries have been swept away, the public feels some relief. It looks forward with "hope" for political stability and economic rejuvenation. It no longer feels it is at the bottom of an abyss.
Now compare the top ten words for this year with last year's. Except for the winning candidate, the changes in the words suggested reveal an interesting trend. For example, this years' finalists include fewer negative words such as "can" (tragic) and "men" (suffocating). They include more positive words such as "bian" (change), and "ai" (love). These show that public sentiment has reversed itself and has taken on a sunnier outlook. Especially worth pondering are the words associated with Chen Shui-bian, such as "pian" (deception), "tan" (greed), and "bian" (flattened out). These words have all disappeared from the top 10 list. This does not mean the public is satisfied with the government's handling of the Chen corruption case. But it does show that the public has emerged from under the shadow of the Chen Shui-bian kleptocracy.
What is noteworthy is that although the number one word for the year was "hope," the second, third, and fourth words were negative words such as "false, bitter, tragic, stifling." This reminds us that as the society as a whole adapts and recovers, many individuals remain incapable of surmounting the bitterness in their lives. They are unable to share the majority's calm optimism. Naturally their feelings must not be overlooked. This year, for example, what people remember the most clearly is the landslides that buried entire villages alive during the 8/8 Floods. Because it was a regional disaster, it lacked universal impact. Therefore symbolic words do not always reflect the pathos experienced. The sponsors of the Word of the Year Contest invited aboriginal children from disaster stricken regions to write the word "hope." They wanted to give them a chance to express their hopes that their homes might be rebuilt. They wanted to remind people not to forget the suffering of the disaster victims.
For two consecutive years, over two-thirds of the words on the annual word for the year list have been negative. The public on Taiwan has been inculcated with the notion that tragedies, disasters, scandals, and other negative developments are the norm. This makes it more suceptible to negative suggestions. Year after year of voting for their favored candidates may allow us to better understand our society's psychological bottom line, and adopt a more proactive, less victim-oriented posture.
The word "hope" emerged in late 2009. It summarized the past year. It also expressed our collective hopes for the coming year. Some people hope for a rejuvenated economy. Some people hope for a brighter future. Some people hope for national unity. Some people hope for cross-Strait peace. Some people hope for social progress. Some people hope for relief from suffering and disaster. We too hope that the new year will go our way, and that our compatriots can enjoy peace and prosperity.
由「亂」到「盼」 台灣期待更大的提升
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.17 03:12 am
台灣選出二○○九年的代表字，「盼」字拔得頭籌。從去年的代表字「亂」，走到今年的「盼」，反映民眾心境上的轉折，也顯示人們對新局的期待之殷切。
以當前的政治氣氛而言，這個「盼」字的出線，其實讓人有點意外。國家社會情勢低迷，在候選名單上的卅個字，超過三分之二都是負面感受的字眼，如罵、混、驚、苦、悶、慘等；「盼」字能在其間脫穎而出，顯示人們在歷經多年的不安與煎熬後，心情上似已更加沉澱，因而能用比較平靜的態度看待這一年：不能說滿意，但懷抱期待。
年度代表字的選拔，意義有三：一則在總結社會的集體感受，二則提供民眾自身回顧與前瞻的參考，三則反映民情促主政者反省。這項由聯合報及遠東集團共同舉辦的活動，雖然今年才第二屆，但不僅成功凝聚了社會焦點，也相當真切地反射了台灣社會的集體心理。今年這個「盼」字，是由郭耀華先生所提出，一位退休人士的感受能獲得那麼廣大的共鳴，似乎更具深意！
回顧去年，從年初歷經政黨再輪替及國會結構重整的嶄新政局，但最後年度代表字選出的不是「新」，而是「亂」。這顯示，新政府執政未能及時掌握方向，無法將台灣政局帶上新的軌道，讓民眾產生茫然、失序之感。此外，扁案偵辦的波波折折、枝節橫生，以及全球金融風暴的突襲，造成失業率驟升，政治和民生雙陷困頓。在那種情況下，人民的感受豈是一個「亂」字了得？
今年台灣的情勢略有不同。扁案經過一審判決，漫天疑雲大致底定，陳水扁只能在獄中發聲，對政治的騷動和干擾作用大為降低。此外，金融海嘯帶來的重創雖未全部復元，但經濟有回溫跡象，景氣信號已出現綠燈。雖不能說一掃愁鬱，一般民眾的苦悶多少有所紓解，社會心境轉為「盼」，期待政治安定、經濟回春，可見谷底心情已經過去。
再以今年選出的前十大代表字與去年相比，除了榜首字，若干些微的移動也透露出有趣的趨勢。比如說，接連兩年皆上榜的字中，負面的代表字「慘」和「悶」排名都下降，而正面代表字「變」與「愛」排名都前進，顯示人們情緒的黑白反差正朝著陽光面調整。更值得玩味的是，與陳水扁有關的代表字，如「騙」、「貪」、「扁」，今年全部從前十名單上消失。這雖無法說明民眾大致滿意扁案的偵辦，卻可反映出人們在心情上已擺脫了陳水扁窳政和貪瀆的陰影。
值得注意的是，今年名列前五名的代表字，除了「盼」外，第二到第四名皆為負面字：假、苦、慘、悶。這也提醒我們：在社會集體調適和復元的過程中，仍有極高比率的人無法克服生活中的種種愁苦，無法分享多數人的平靜和樂觀；當然，他們的感受也不應受到忽略。以今年為例，人們記憶最深刻的，應該是八八水災崩山、滅村的悲劇；但因為那是一場區域性的災難，未造成全面性衝擊，所以代表字中未必能反映其間悲情。這次主辦單位特別邀請災區原住民學童用毛筆寫下「盼」字，讓他們說出期盼重建家園的願望，目的也在提醒人們不要忘了災民的苦難。
連續兩年，台灣的年度字名單，負面字都佔了三分之二以上。究其原因，或者是台灣人被灌輸了太多悲情，或者災難、醜聞等負面事件本來就比較容易造成心理衝擊。透過年復一年的票選，也許可以幫我們看清其間的社會心理底蘊，從而向更積極的面向轉化。
「盼」字出現在二○○九年尾，既是對過去一年的總結，也是對未來一年的期許。有人期盼景氣回春，有人期盼前途光明，有人期盼國家團結，有人期盼兩岸和平，有人期盼社會向上提升，有人期盼人民免於痛苦和災難。我們亦願與國人一同期盼：新的一年風調雨順，國泰民安。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 17, 2009
The United Daily News and the Far Eastern Group recently sponsored a Word of the Year Contest. We asked the public which words best symbolized the year 2009. The word "pan," (hope) took first place. Last year the word was "luan," (chaos). This year's word, "hope," reflects a shift in public sentiment. It also represents the public's expectations for the new political regime.
Given the current political climate, the emergence of the word "hope" was rather unexpected. Public morale is low. The list of candidates included 30 words. Over two-thirds of them carried negative connotations. They included words such as "ma" (verbal abuse), "hun" (muddling through), "jing" (panic), "ku" (bitterness), "men" (suffocation), and "can" (tragedy). That the word "hope" would come to the fore shows that after years of unrest and suffering, people are finally calming down. They are finally able to look to the new year with relative equanimity. They may be dissatisfied, but they are full of expectations.
The Word of the Year Contest has three functions. First, it encapsulates the collective mood of society. Second, it enables the public to both review the past and anticipate the future. Third, it reflects public sentiment and encourages the government to engage in self-examination. The contest was co-sponsored by the United Daily News and the Far Eastern Group. This is merely the second year it has been held, but it has already become the focus of public attention. It also reflects to a considerable degree the collective mood on Taiwan. This year's word "hope," was suggested by Mr. Kuo Yao-hua. That a retiree's feelings would resonant so intensely with the public, makes it even more meaningful.
Recall last year. The beginning of the new year saw a second change in ruling parties, and a restructuring of the legislature. And yet the word of the year was not "new," but "chaos." This suggests that the new administration failed to find its way. It was unable to put Taiwan back on track. The public felt as if it had been cast adrift, and surrounded by chaos. Add to this the twists and turns of the Chen corruption case, the impact of the global financial crisis, and the sudden rise in the unemployment rate. No wonder the public felt trapped, both politically and economically. No wonder the word "chaos" came to peoples' minds.
This year the situation on Taiwan is slightly different. A first instance verdict has been delivered in the Chen corruption case. Most of the dark clouds have dissipated. Chen Shui-bian is not being released. Any statements he hopes to make, will have to be made from his jail cell. His ability to incite political unrest and meddle with the political process has been significantly diminished. The wounds inflicted by the financial tsunami have yet to heal, but the economy is showing signs of heating up. Signs of prosperity are returning. Although one cannot say that all our worries have been swept away, the public feels some relief. It looks forward with "hope" for political stability and economic rejuvenation. It no longer feels it is at the bottom of an abyss.
Now compare the top ten words for this year with last year's. Except for the winning candidate, the changes in the words suggested reveal an interesting trend. For example, this years' finalists include fewer negative words such as "can" (tragic) and "men" (suffocating). They include more positive words such as "bian" (change), and "ai" (love). These show that public sentiment has reversed itself and has taken on a sunnier outlook. Especially worth pondering are the words associated with Chen Shui-bian, such as "pian" (deception), "tan" (greed), and "bian" (flattened out). These words have all disappeared from the top 10 list. This does not mean the public is satisfied with the government's handling of the Chen corruption case. But it does show that the public has emerged from under the shadow of the Chen Shui-bian kleptocracy.
What is noteworthy is that although the number one word for the year was "hope," the second, third, and fourth words were negative words such as "false, bitter, tragic, stifling." This reminds us that as the society as a whole adapts and recovers, many individuals remain incapable of surmounting the bitterness in their lives. They are unable to share the majority's calm optimism. Naturally their feelings must not be overlooked. This year, for example, what people remember the most clearly is the landslides that buried entire villages alive during the 8/8 Floods. Because it was a regional disaster, it lacked universal impact. Therefore symbolic words do not always reflect the pathos experienced. The sponsors of the Word of the Year Contest invited aboriginal children from disaster stricken regions to write the word "hope." They wanted to give them a chance to express their hopes that their homes might be rebuilt. They wanted to remind people not to forget the suffering of the disaster victims.
For two consecutive years, over two-thirds of the words on the annual word for the year list have been negative. The public on Taiwan has been inculcated with the notion that tragedies, disasters, scandals, and other negative developments are the norm. This makes it more suceptible to negative suggestions. Year after year of voting for their favored candidates may allow us to better understand our society's psychological bottom line, and adopt a more proactive, less victim-oriented posture.
The word "hope" emerged in late 2009. It summarized the past year. It also expressed our collective hopes for the coming year. Some people hope for a rejuvenated economy. Some people hope for a brighter future. Some people hope for national unity. Some people hope for cross-Strait peace. Some people hope for social progress. Some people hope for relief from suffering and disaster. We too hope that the new year will go our way, and that our compatriots can enjoy peace and prosperity.
由「亂」到「盼」 台灣期待更大的提升
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.17 03:12 am
台灣選出二○○九年的代表字，「盼」字拔得頭籌。從去年的代表字「亂」，走到今年的「盼」，反映民眾心境上的轉折，也顯示人們對新局的期待之殷切。
以當前的政治氣氛而言，這個「盼」字的出線，其實讓人有點意外。國家社會情勢低迷，在候選名單上的卅個字，超過三分之二都是負面感受的字眼，如罵、混、驚、苦、悶、慘等；「盼」字能在其間脫穎而出，顯示人們在歷經多年的不安與煎熬後，心情上似已更加沉澱，因而能用比較平靜的態度看待這一年：不能說滿意，但懷抱期待。
年度代表字的選拔，意義有三：一則在總結社會的集體感受，二則提供民眾自身回顧與前瞻的參考，三則反映民情促主政者反省。這項由聯合報及遠東集團共同舉辦的活動，雖然今年才第二屆，但不僅成功凝聚了社會焦點，也相當真切地反射了台灣社會的集體心理。今年這個「盼」字，是由郭耀華先生所提出，一位退休人士的感受能獲得那麼廣大的共鳴，似乎更具深意！
回顧去年，從年初歷經政黨再輪替及國會結構重整的嶄新政局，但最後年度代表字選出的不是「新」，而是「亂」。這顯示，新政府執政未能及時掌握方向，無法將台灣政局帶上新的軌道，讓民眾產生茫然、失序之感。此外，扁案偵辦的波波折折、枝節橫生，以及全球金融風暴的突襲，造成失業率驟升，政治和民生雙陷困頓。在那種情況下，人民的感受豈是一個「亂」字了得？
今年台灣的情勢略有不同。扁案經過一審判決，漫天疑雲大致底定，陳水扁只能在獄中發聲，對政治的騷動和干擾作用大為降低。此外，金融海嘯帶來的重創雖未全部復元，但經濟有回溫跡象，景氣信號已出現綠燈。雖不能說一掃愁鬱，一般民眾的苦悶多少有所紓解，社會心境轉為「盼」，期待政治安定、經濟回春，可見谷底心情已經過去。
再以今年選出的前十大代表字與去年相比，除了榜首字，若干些微的移動也透露出有趣的趨勢。比如說，接連兩年皆上榜的字中，負面的代表字「慘」和「悶」排名都下降，而正面代表字「變」與「愛」排名都前進，顯示人們情緒的黑白反差正朝著陽光面調整。更值得玩味的是，與陳水扁有關的代表字，如「騙」、「貪」、「扁」，今年全部從前十名單上消失。這雖無法說明民眾大致滿意扁案的偵辦，卻可反映出人們在心情上已擺脫了陳水扁窳政和貪瀆的陰影。
值得注意的是，今年名列前五名的代表字，除了「盼」外，第二到第四名皆為負面字：假、苦、慘、悶。這也提醒我們：在社會集體調適和復元的過程中，仍有極高比率的人無法克服生活中的種種愁苦，無法分享多數人的平靜和樂觀；當然，他們的感受也不應受到忽略。以今年為例，人們記憶最深刻的，應該是八八水災崩山、滅村的悲劇；但因為那是一場區域性的災難，未造成全面性衝擊，所以代表字中未必能反映其間悲情。這次主辦單位特別邀請災區原住民學童用毛筆寫下「盼」字，讓他們說出期盼重建家園的願望，目的也在提醒人們不要忘了災民的苦難。
連續兩年，台灣的年度字名單，負面字都佔了三分之二以上。究其原因，或者是台灣人被灌輸了太多悲情，或者災難、醜聞等負面事件本來就比較容易造成心理衝擊。透過年復一年的票選，也許可以幫我們看清其間的社會心理底蘊，從而向更積極的面向轉化。
「盼」字出現在二○○九年尾，既是對過去一年的總結，也是對未來一年的期許。有人期盼景氣回春，有人期盼前途光明，有人期盼國家團結，有人期盼兩岸和平，有人期盼社會向上提升，有人期盼人民免於痛苦和災難。我們亦願與國人一同期盼：新的一年風調雨順，國泰民安。
Wednesday, December 16, 2009
Hsu Hsin-liang Rains on the DPP's Parade
Hsu Hsin-liang Rains on the DPP's Parade
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 16, 2009
Former DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang called on all the Green Camp "princes" to enter the mayoral races for the five major cities late next year. This would increase political momentum leading up to the presidential election. His reasoning was that the Democratic Progressive Party never broke through the basic pattern of "60% Blue, 40% Green" voter support during the recent local elections. "The DPP really has no reason to rejoice."
Some people in the Green Camp may agree with Hsu's first statement. The Green Camp "princes" are probably already making plans. But the Democratic Progressive Party may be unhappy about Hsu's second statement, namely that the Green Camp didn't really win a victory. It may feel Hsu is raining on their parade, merely out of spite. But unflattering advice is often what one needs to hear the most, and with a cool head.
As Hsu sees it, the Green Camp's increased support was primarily a result of Blue Camp voters staying home. In fact, the total number of votes the DPP received fell, by tens of thousands votes. In his view, a victory may boost morale. But without a change in the basic pattern of Blue vs. Green voter support, the DPP cannot hope to win back the presidency. Therefore he urged the "princes" to formulate a strategy to win all five municipal elections. Only then can the DPP build sufficient momentum. Only then can it change the basic pattern of Blue vs. Green voter support. Only then can it hope to win back the presidency in 2012.
Hsu Hsin-liang is hardly alone in this view. Cooler heads on Taiwan have all arrived at the same conclusion. They have all concluded that there has been no major change in Blue vs. Green voter support. On the surface, Green Camp support has increased. The KMT now commands a mere two and a half percentage point lead over the DPP. But if one merges support for Fu Kun-chi and others into the Blue Camp, the gap between the two camps still exceeds eight percentage points. Numbers talk. The Green Camp has a right to be happy about its victory. But it should not get carried away.
Besides, before the election the Green Camp boasted that it would win six to ten county seats. It won only four. This suggests that although people may be dissatisfied with the ruling KMT, in a one on one election, many people still have misgivings about Democratic Progressive Party rule. Conversely, Ma Ying-jeou refuses to admit defeat. He maintains that the Blue Camp still holds a substantial lead in the number of county and municipal executive seats, and that the gap in support between the two camps still holds.
The "basic pattern" of Blue vs. Green voter support has persisted for years, through one election after another. The Kuomintang has undergone two consecutive schisms. Internecine warfare led to a string of Blue Camp debacles. Blue Camp supporters now understand the dangers of "split-tickets." Over the past two years, the single-member district two-vote system for legislative elections has established a KMT/DPP two party system. Smaller parties have evaporated. The basic pattern of "60% Blue, 40% Green" voter support is largely set.
The Green Camp has a clear ideology. Therefore its core support is relatively solid. No matter how poorly the Democratic Progressive Party performs, Green Camp voters persist in giving it their support. By contrast, Blue Camp supporters support the KMT for many different reasons. Blue Camp core support is not as solid, not as unquestioningly loyal as the Green Camp's. Because of this, whenever the KMT governs badly, Blue Camp voters either stay away from the polls, or cast protest votes for independent or third party candidates. But during major one on one elections, they remain united in their "opposition to Taiwan independence." In other words, if the DPP refuses to make reasonable alterations to its stance on reunification vs. independence, it will continue "running into a brick wall" during general elections.
Hsu Hsin-liang is urging Green Camp "princes" to build political momentum. He has a point. If done properly, it might have a powerful psychological effect. But it is also a tactic of desperation, one full of risk. After all, such a move would thwart the rise of younger generation political stars. If the "princes" lose, the younger generation political stars will have to wait four years for their next opportunity. Hsu Hsin-liang believes that if the "princes" win their bids for mayor, then run for president, their supporters will forgive them, providing they are up front about their agenda. In fact, the practice of using public offices as springboards, and using public elections to increase one's political capital, may lead to a voter backlash. Most importantly, if the Democratic Progressive Party misjudges the significance of their recent election "victory," and adopts a radical platform, a "pendulum effect" will kick in. Voters will revert to their basic pattern of "60% Blue, 40% Green" voter support. The key to Hsu Hsin-liang's thinking is that he expects the DPP to break through the basic pattern of "60% Blue, 40% Green" voter support.
Hsu Hsin-liang has admonished the Democratic Progressive Party not to celebrate too soon. He rained on their parade. But he spoke the truth. He helped the Green Camp keep a cool head. The Green Camp may have built up some momentum during the local elections. But the basic pattern of voter support remains unchanged. In order to win the five upcoming mayoral elections, not to mention the presidential election, it must win the trust of over half the voters. It must behave in a manner that will win that trust. Electioneering gimmicks alone will not be enough. The Democratic Progressive Party must not misinterpret the meaning of its recent election "victory." It must not react inappropriately, and thereby forfeit the opportunity to undergo a rebirth.
許信良的冷水：民進黨真的大勝了嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.16 03:38 am
民進黨前主席許信良呼籲，明年底的五都選舉，綠營天王天后都應該全部參戰，以衝高未來拚總統大選的氣勢。他的理由是，這次地方選舉，民進黨基本上仍未突破「藍六綠四」的基本盤，「民進黨實在沒有高興的本錢」。
前半段談話，綠營也許有人贊同，天王們或許也正在盤算自己的戰略；但後一段話說綠營並沒有大勝，民進黨聽了可能甚為不悅，認為許信良是故意潑他們冷水。然而，刺耳的話，反倒該平心靜氣聽聽。
許信良的分析是：綠營這次得票率成長，主要是泛藍支持者未投票所致，民進黨的總得票數其實下降了數萬票。他認為，勝選雖有助鼓舞士氣，但若不突破藍綠基本盤，對奪回中央執政權毫無幫助。也因此，他提出天王天后盡出的戰略，認為全力攻取五都選舉，才能拉高氣勢、突破基本盤，進而攻奪二○一二總統大位。
許信良的看法，其實不算十分獨特；對台灣政治比較冷靜的人，也都觀察到了這次選舉藍綠基本盤沒有大變動的現象。表面上，綠營得票率雖然提高，將國民黨逼成只剩兩個半百分點的差距；但若將傅?萁等違紀者的得票納入泛藍，兩營的差距仍在百分之八以上。數字會說話，綠營勝選固然值得高興，但不宜得意忘形。
何況，選前綠營有人誇口要拿下六到十席，結果只奪下四縣。這顯示，民意雖不滿意執政黨，但在一對一對決的選舉，許多人對民進黨執政仍充滿顧忌。反過來看，馬英九遲不承認敗選，除了藍軍縣市長當選席次仍大幅領先，或也是認定兩營得票基本差距還在。
所謂藍綠「基本盤」，是多年透過選舉往復實際探測出來的結構。先前國民黨歷經兩度分裂，因「近親相殺」造成泛藍幾次失利後，藍營支持者已徹底認清「分裂投票」的風險。近兩年，透過立院單一選區兩票制的變革，更確立了國、民兩黨兩強對立的政黨政治；小黨泡沫化的結果，「藍六綠四」之比大致底定。
綠營因為意識形態鮮明，核心基本盤較堅實，無論民進黨表現如何，支持者都願意出動投票。相形之下，藍營支持者的投票動機較為多元，結構相對鬆散，不如綠軍死忠。也因此，每當國民黨表現欠佳，藍營就會出現賭爛票；但在大型一對一選舉時，仍會出現團結的「防獨」的意識。亦即，如果民進黨不在統獨論述上作合理修正，在大選中仍不免「撞牆」。
許信良主張天王天后傾巢而出衝高選情，誠然有其觀點；若經營得當，可以造成強烈的社會心理效應。然而，這也是孤注一擲的戰法，充滿風險；畢竟，此舉將對中壯代造成嚴重壓抑，天王萬一失利，新人也平白賠掉四年機會。何況，許信良認為，天王們若當選市長後再要參選總統，只要把話說清楚，選民應可理解；事實上，這種把公職當跳板、拿公共選舉煉自己的政治黃金的作法，可能引起選民強烈反感。最重要的是，民進黨若誤判此次選舉「勝利」的意義，轉而採行激進路線，恐將觸動選民的「鐘擺效應」，又將逼出「藍六綠四」的基本盤。然而，許信良談話的核心觀點卻在：期望民進黨能突破這個「六四障礙」。
許信良提醒民進黨別高興太早，雖是一盆傾頭冷水，說的卻是事實，有助綠營保持清醒。綠軍在地方選舉雖呈現上漲態勢，但就全盤結構而言，並未突破基本盤。未來要爭取五都市長的勝選，乃至在未來總統大選爭取過半選民支持，需得提出足以取信於民的作為，而不可能光憑選舉的技術操作即能如願。民進黨不可錯誤解讀此次選舉的「勝利」，以免作出錯誤的回應，而失去新生再造的契機。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 16, 2009
Former DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang called on all the Green Camp "princes" to enter the mayoral races for the five major cities late next year. This would increase political momentum leading up to the presidential election. His reasoning was that the Democratic Progressive Party never broke through the basic pattern of "60% Blue, 40% Green" voter support during the recent local elections. "The DPP really has no reason to rejoice."
Some people in the Green Camp may agree with Hsu's first statement. The Green Camp "princes" are probably already making plans. But the Democratic Progressive Party may be unhappy about Hsu's second statement, namely that the Green Camp didn't really win a victory. It may feel Hsu is raining on their parade, merely out of spite. But unflattering advice is often what one needs to hear the most, and with a cool head.
As Hsu sees it, the Green Camp's increased support was primarily a result of Blue Camp voters staying home. In fact, the total number of votes the DPP received fell, by tens of thousands votes. In his view, a victory may boost morale. But without a change in the basic pattern of Blue vs. Green voter support, the DPP cannot hope to win back the presidency. Therefore he urged the "princes" to formulate a strategy to win all five municipal elections. Only then can the DPP build sufficient momentum. Only then can it change the basic pattern of Blue vs. Green voter support. Only then can it hope to win back the presidency in 2012.
Hsu Hsin-liang is hardly alone in this view. Cooler heads on Taiwan have all arrived at the same conclusion. They have all concluded that there has been no major change in Blue vs. Green voter support. On the surface, Green Camp support has increased. The KMT now commands a mere two and a half percentage point lead over the DPP. But if one merges support for Fu Kun-chi and others into the Blue Camp, the gap between the two camps still exceeds eight percentage points. Numbers talk. The Green Camp has a right to be happy about its victory. But it should not get carried away.
Besides, before the election the Green Camp boasted that it would win six to ten county seats. It won only four. This suggests that although people may be dissatisfied with the ruling KMT, in a one on one election, many people still have misgivings about Democratic Progressive Party rule. Conversely, Ma Ying-jeou refuses to admit defeat. He maintains that the Blue Camp still holds a substantial lead in the number of county and municipal executive seats, and that the gap in support between the two camps still holds.
The "basic pattern" of Blue vs. Green voter support has persisted for years, through one election after another. The Kuomintang has undergone two consecutive schisms. Internecine warfare led to a string of Blue Camp debacles. Blue Camp supporters now understand the dangers of "split-tickets." Over the past two years, the single-member district two-vote system for legislative elections has established a KMT/DPP two party system. Smaller parties have evaporated. The basic pattern of "60% Blue, 40% Green" voter support is largely set.
The Green Camp has a clear ideology. Therefore its core support is relatively solid. No matter how poorly the Democratic Progressive Party performs, Green Camp voters persist in giving it their support. By contrast, Blue Camp supporters support the KMT for many different reasons. Blue Camp core support is not as solid, not as unquestioningly loyal as the Green Camp's. Because of this, whenever the KMT governs badly, Blue Camp voters either stay away from the polls, or cast protest votes for independent or third party candidates. But during major one on one elections, they remain united in their "opposition to Taiwan independence." In other words, if the DPP refuses to make reasonable alterations to its stance on reunification vs. independence, it will continue "running into a brick wall" during general elections.
Hsu Hsin-liang is urging Green Camp "princes" to build political momentum. He has a point. If done properly, it might have a powerful psychological effect. But it is also a tactic of desperation, one full of risk. After all, such a move would thwart the rise of younger generation political stars. If the "princes" lose, the younger generation political stars will have to wait four years for their next opportunity. Hsu Hsin-liang believes that if the "princes" win their bids for mayor, then run for president, their supporters will forgive them, providing they are up front about their agenda. In fact, the practice of using public offices as springboards, and using public elections to increase one's political capital, may lead to a voter backlash. Most importantly, if the Democratic Progressive Party misjudges the significance of their recent election "victory," and adopts a radical platform, a "pendulum effect" will kick in. Voters will revert to their basic pattern of "60% Blue, 40% Green" voter support. The key to Hsu Hsin-liang's thinking is that he expects the DPP to break through the basic pattern of "60% Blue, 40% Green" voter support.
Hsu Hsin-liang has admonished the Democratic Progressive Party not to celebrate too soon. He rained on their parade. But he spoke the truth. He helped the Green Camp keep a cool head. The Green Camp may have built up some momentum during the local elections. But the basic pattern of voter support remains unchanged. In order to win the five upcoming mayoral elections, not to mention the presidential election, it must win the trust of over half the voters. It must behave in a manner that will win that trust. Electioneering gimmicks alone will not be enough. The Democratic Progressive Party must not misinterpret the meaning of its recent election "victory." It must not react inappropriately, and thereby forfeit the opportunity to undergo a rebirth.
許信良的冷水：民進黨真的大勝了嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.16 03:38 am
民進黨前主席許信良呼籲，明年底的五都選舉，綠營天王天后都應該全部參戰，以衝高未來拚總統大選的氣勢。他的理由是，這次地方選舉，民進黨基本上仍未突破「藍六綠四」的基本盤，「民進黨實在沒有高興的本錢」。
前半段談話，綠營也許有人贊同，天王們或許也正在盤算自己的戰略；但後一段話說綠營並沒有大勝，民進黨聽了可能甚為不悅，認為許信良是故意潑他們冷水。然而，刺耳的話，反倒該平心靜氣聽聽。
許信良的分析是：綠營這次得票率成長，主要是泛藍支持者未投票所致，民進黨的總得票數其實下降了數萬票。他認為，勝選雖有助鼓舞士氣，但若不突破藍綠基本盤，對奪回中央執政權毫無幫助。也因此，他提出天王天后盡出的戰略，認為全力攻取五都選舉，才能拉高氣勢、突破基本盤，進而攻奪二○一二總統大位。
許信良的看法，其實不算十分獨特；對台灣政治比較冷靜的人，也都觀察到了這次選舉藍綠基本盤沒有大變動的現象。表面上，綠營得票率雖然提高，將國民黨逼成只剩兩個半百分點的差距；但若將傅?萁等違紀者的得票納入泛藍，兩營的差距仍在百分之八以上。數字會說話，綠營勝選固然值得高興，但不宜得意忘形。
何況，選前綠營有人誇口要拿下六到十席，結果只奪下四縣。這顯示，民意雖不滿意執政黨，但在一對一對決的選舉，許多人對民進黨執政仍充滿顧忌。反過來看，馬英九遲不承認敗選，除了藍軍縣市長當選席次仍大幅領先，或也是認定兩營得票基本差距還在。
所謂藍綠「基本盤」，是多年透過選舉往復實際探測出來的結構。先前國民黨歷經兩度分裂，因「近親相殺」造成泛藍幾次失利後，藍營支持者已徹底認清「分裂投票」的風險。近兩年，透過立院單一選區兩票制的變革，更確立了國、民兩黨兩強對立的政黨政治；小黨泡沫化的結果，「藍六綠四」之比大致底定。
綠營因為意識形態鮮明，核心基本盤較堅實，無論民進黨表現如何，支持者都願意出動投票。相形之下，藍營支持者的投票動機較為多元，結構相對鬆散，不如綠軍死忠。也因此，每當國民黨表現欠佳，藍營就會出現賭爛票；但在大型一對一選舉時，仍會出現團結的「防獨」的意識。亦即，如果民進黨不在統獨論述上作合理修正，在大選中仍不免「撞牆」。
許信良主張天王天后傾巢而出衝高選情，誠然有其觀點；若經營得當，可以造成強烈的社會心理效應。然而，這也是孤注一擲的戰法，充滿風險；畢竟，此舉將對中壯代造成嚴重壓抑，天王萬一失利，新人也平白賠掉四年機會。何況，許信良認為，天王們若當選市長後再要參選總統，只要把話說清楚，選民應可理解；事實上，這種把公職當跳板、拿公共選舉煉自己的政治黃金的作法，可能引起選民強烈反感。最重要的是，民進黨若誤判此次選舉「勝利」的意義，轉而採行激進路線，恐將觸動選民的「鐘擺效應」，又將逼出「藍六綠四」的基本盤。然而，許信良談話的核心觀點卻在：期望民進黨能突破這個「六四障礙」。
許信良提醒民進黨別高興太早，雖是一盆傾頭冷水，說的卻是事實，有助綠營保持清醒。綠軍在地方選舉雖呈現上漲態勢，但就全盤結構而言，並未突破基本盤。未來要爭取五都市長的勝選，乃至在未來總統大選爭取過半選民支持，需得提出足以取信於民的作為，而不可能光憑選舉的技術操作即能如願。民進黨不可錯誤解讀此次選舉的「勝利」，以免作出錯誤的回應，而失去新生再造的契機。
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