Do Not Allow Taxpayers to Remain Hostages of Big Banking
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 29, 2010
Unemployment in the US has reached 15 million since the financial tsunami, or nearly 10%. The Obama administration has provided hundreds of billions in government relief for major banks. The banking industry meanwhile, has been doling out huge dividends with complete impunity. The result has been intense public antipathy. Yesterday Barack Obama announced the largest scale financial reform bill since the 1930s. The bill will impose limits on the size of big banks and on their range of services. Obama vowed that he would no longer allow taxpayers to remain hostages to Big Banking. His proposal sent shockwaves through the financial sector and sent financial stocks tumbling on Wall Street for several days in a row.
This is the third time in one week that Obama has targeted Wall Street's big banks. First, on the 14th of this month, he announced the imposition of a "Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee" on the nation's 50 biggest banks. He plans to levy a tax of 90 billion USD on them over the next decade. He intends to get back every dime the taxpayers lost. Next, he ordered the establishment of an independent consumer finance protection agency, responsible for the protection of consumers of financial services. On the 21st of this month he introduced the "Volcker Rule." This financial reform was proposed by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. It will prohibit commercial banks from engaging in dealer transactions. They will not be allowed to own or invest in hedge funds or private equity funds. In addition, any single bank's deposit insurance may not exceed 10% of the US total. This rule will apply to non-insurance deposits as well. These reforms will have a major impact on mergers and acquisitions within the financial sector.
In 1929 the US stock market crashed, sending the economy into the Great Depression. At the time the securities industry was regarded as the culprit. In 1933 the US Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act, imposing severe restrictions on commercial banks and investment banking sub-sector operations. The bill was not repealed until 1999. Obama has now introduced the "Volcker Rule." It is considered a new version of the Glass-Steagall Act, one that will lead to massive changes in the financial industry's business model. It is widely believed that tanking public support, coupled with the Democratic Party's election defeat in Massachusetts, forced Obama to reposition himself relative to the fat cats on Wall Street, in order to salvage his tarnished image.
The announcement of the "Volcker Rule" was greeted with widespread international approval. The President of the Bank of England, the President of the Swiss National Bank, and the French Finance Minister have all expressed their support. Mario Draghi, Chairman of the International Financial Stability Committee (FSB), said Obama's financial reform will help promote international financial reform. This week the World Economic Forum (WEF) will convene in Switzerland. Early next month the G7 finance ministers will meet. In May the Group20 will meet. All of them will focus on strengthening financial supervision.
But Wall Street firms strongly object to Obama's financial reform bills. Many bankers who deliberately stayed away from the World Economic Forum last year have decided to become personally involved. They intend to use the forum to make their wishes known to national policy-makers and the media.
Wall Street analysts are skeptical. They doubt that Obama's financial reforms will prevent future financial crises, or change the "too big to fail" status of big banks. Suppose a large financial group sells private equity funds and hedge funds. In the event of a financial crisis, will the government really do nothing? Analysts expressed doubts. The root cause of the financial tsunami was toxic securities invented by Wall Street and sold to investors. The process lacked clear supervision. The Volcker Rule does not touch upon this thorny issue. But not all financial industry leaders are opposed to Obama's proposals. For example, former Citigroup chairman John Reed has expressed his support.
Obama's financial reforms face two major challenges. First, the bill must be passed by Congress. The Democratic Party lost a crucial battle in Massachusetts. Its support in the Senate remains in doubt. Secondly, in an era of globalization, Obama's financial reforms need support from other governments. Will the international financial supervisors meeting at the World Economic Forum really reach a consensus? It is difficult to be optimistic.
From an international perspective, unemployment is rising, governments are spending vast sums on relief for Big Banking. Meanwhile these big banks remain utterly indifferent to public perceptions. They continue to hand out huge bonuses, provoking taxpayer wrath. Obama is taking advantage of this sentiment to aggressively promote financial reform. He is clearly speaking to the taxpayer. He has declared his commitment to reform. He hopes to win the hearts of the public. The financial tsunami has not impacted the financial sector on Taiwan as badly. But no matter which party comes to power they firmly support the interests of the big banks and financial groups. They have never been willing to allow banks to fall. Taxpayers have always been held hostage by the big banks. This phenomenon must be reversed. Otherwise bad money will drive out good, becoming the biggest obstacle to progress in the financial sector.
On the first anniversary of his administration, Barack Obama's prestige has taken a beating. But he has demonstrated a resolve to promote a new wave of financial reforms, and a determination to turn the tide. As he approaches the second anniversary of his administration, President Ma's prestige has also taken a beating. Does he have the resolve to protect the interests of taxpayers and promote a new wave of reform?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.29
別再讓納稅人淪為銀行人質
本報訊
金融海嘯以來，美國失業人口高達一千五百多萬，失業率逾十％，歐巴馬政府砸下數千億元資金紓困大銀行，業者卻肆無忌憚發放高額紅利，讓民怨沸騰到了極點。歐巴馬日前宣布了一項一九三○年代以來最大規模的金融改革法案，將限制大銀行經營規模與業務範疇，誓言不再讓納稅人淪為大銀行的人質。這項改革為金融業投下了震撼彈，也使得華爾街金融股連日大跌。
這是歐巴馬在短短一周內第三次對華爾街的大銀行開刀，他首先在十四日宣布對全美前五十大銀行開徵「金融危機責任費」，計畫在未來十年內徵收九百億美元，把納稅人紓困的每一毛錢要回來；其次，指示成立一個獨立的消費者金融保護局，專責保護金融消費者。廿一日則祭出「伏爾克法則」，這項由前聯準會主席伏爾克所主導的金融改革，將限制吸收存款的商業銀行進行自營商交易，也不得擁有或投資對沖基金、私募基金。此外，擬將單一銀行保險存款占全美比例不得超過十％的規定，擴大到非保險存款，此舉將對金融業的併購活動造成衝擊。
美國在一九二九年股市大崩盤，經濟陷入大蕭條，當時銀行兼營證券業務被視為禍首，國會在一九三三年通過葛拉斯｜史帝格法案，嚴格限制商業銀行與投資銀行分業經營，這項法案直到一九九九年才廢止。這次歐巴馬推出「伏爾克法則」，被認為是新版的葛拉斯｜史帝格法案，將使金融業的經營模式產生極大變化。一般認為，歐巴馬由於民意支持度跌落谷底，再加上民主黨在麻州選舉失利，迫使他對華爾街肥貓祭出鐵腕，以挽救低迷的聲望。
「伏爾克法則」宣布後，普遍獲得國際間的肯定，英格蘭銀行總裁、瑞士央行總裁、法國財長都表示支持。國際金融穩定委員會（ＦＳＢ）主席德拉吉表示，歐巴馬的金融改革，增強國際間推動金改的動力。本周將在瑞士舉行的世界經濟論壇（ＷＥＦ）、下月初七大工業國財長會議、五月的二十國集團會議，都將以加強金融監理為重點。
不過，對於歐巴馬的金改法案，華爾街業者非常不以為然。去年刻意避開世界經濟論壇的銀行家們，許多人今年決定親自出馬並將利用這個論壇對各國決策官員與媒體們提出他們的訴求。
華爾街分析師質疑，歐巴馬的金改無助於防範新的金融危機，也無法改變銀行「大到不能倒」的現況，假設某大型金融集團出售旗下私募基金與對沖基金，將來若發生金融危機，政府真的見死不救？分析師質疑，金融海嘯的根源是華爾街發明了一系列有毒證券，然後銷售給投資人，這個過程缺乏明確的監理，而伏爾克法則完全未觸及這個棘手問題。不過，並非所有金融業者都反對這項方案，例如，前花旗集團董事長瑞德（John Reed）就表示支持。
歐巴馬的金融改革，未來必須面臨兩大挑戰，首先，法案必須獲得國會通過，民主黨輸掉麻州關鍵性一役，未來能否在參議院取得支持，仍是一大問號。其次，在全球化時代，歐巴馬的金改要達到效果，必須取得各國政府的支持。各界對於這次參與世界經濟論壇的領袖們是否能就國際金融監理，達成一致的共識，也不敢太樂觀。
從國際趨勢來看，在失業率高漲之際，各國政府花大錢紓困大銀行而這些大銀行不顧社會觀感大發紅利的做法，已令納稅人怒不可遏。雄心勃勃的歐巴馬則趁勢推動金改，明確向納稅人喊話，宣示改革決心，希望挽回民心。反觀台灣，金融海嘯雖未直接對金融業造成太大的衝擊，不過，無論哪一黨執政，均堅定擁護大銀行與財團的利益，也從來不敢讓銀行倒，納稅人一直是銀行永遠的人質，這個現象如果無法扭轉，金融市場劣幣逐良幣惡性循環，成為台灣金融業進步的最大阻力。
執政滿周年的歐巴馬在聲望下挫之際，有魄力推動新一波金融改革，以力挽狂瀾；執政即將滿二周年的馬總統，民意也跌落谷底，是否也有魄力從保障納稅人權益的立場出發，推動新一波金改？
Friday, January 29, 2010
Thursday, January 28, 2010
Hoping for a Rational Debate on Cross-Strait Peace
Hoping for a Rational Debate on Cross-Strait Peace
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 28, 2010
The Wang Wang Group and the China Times Media Group sponsored a "We demand peace! We demand a Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law." Yesterday the multimedia debate took place without incident. The participants included honorary UMC chairman Robert Tsao, Chinese Integration Association Director Chang Ya-chung, and former DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui. The debate explored the feasibility of a "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law." The participants presented their positions, took part in a Question and Answer period, and debated the issues. Sparks flew. Sensitive issues were dealt with by means of constructive dialogue. The participants did not reach any consensus. But their differences were not as great as imagined. Most importantly the debate established a model for rational discussion of this sensitive topic.
The debate originated with UMC Chairman Robert Tsao several months ago, when he purchased newspaper ads promoting a "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law." Tsao thinks that such a law could defuse internal disputes over reunification and independence, and might enable long term peaceful cross-Strait coexistence. But as his proposal immediately triggered a wide range of reactions, pro and con. Some consider his proposal highly creative. Others disagree. For example, Chinese Integration Association director Chang Ya-chung expressed skepticism about Tsao's proposal five times. The Green Camp argued that Tsao's version of a "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law" excluded any referendum on independence, making it unacceptable to them. This suggests that considerable differences remain over the advantages and disadvantages and feasibility of the "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law." Will we continue to sit back and watch as both sides talk past each other? Or will we try to allow parties holding different views to engage in dialogue? The answer shjuld be clear. The Republic of China has undergone two changes in ruling parties. It should be mature enough to permit the rational discussion of sensitive issues. It should not remain permantly trapped in feeble-minded name-calling.
During yesterday's debate the participants disagreed. It was inevitable that they would challenge each other and engage in a war of words. But both the live audience and readers who pored over the transcript of the debate afterwards, would probably agree. All three parties were pursuing the best interests of the public on Taiwan and attempting to maintain cross-Strait peace. The only real disagreements between the three parties were over the feasibility and consequences of Tsao's initiative.
For example, Robert Tsao's "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law" emphasizes "procedural justice." It allows the public on Taiwan to decide whether to reunify. It allows the public on Taiwan to decide whether it wants reunification or independence, instead of allowing Blue and Green camp politicians to demagogue the issue. Chang Ya-chung however, thought that if the two sides failed to reach a certain degree of mutual trust, the "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law" would probably be subject to political manipulation. It would ultimately become a "Cross-Strait Peaceful Secession Law." The so-called "Referendum on Reunification" might well turn into a "Referendum against Reunification." Lin Cho-shui considered the "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law" well intentioned but infeasible. It might well turn into another "Defensive Referendum," originally intended to diminish acute identity issues on Taiwan, but actually counter-productive.
Regardless which of the three parties' views was most persuasive, we can at least agree that sensitive cross-Strait issues should be discussed in just such a manner. Honorary UMC Chairman Robert Tsao is attempting to engage in rational thinking about cross-Strait disputes. He put forth his "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law." He believes it can resolve internal disputes on Taiwan and cross-Strait disputes between Taipei and Beijing. But both Chinese Integration Society Director Chang Ya-chung and former DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui opposed his initiative, albeit from different perspectives. They felt his intitiative was not particularly feasible. Just how feasible is the "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law?" Which of the three parties' take on this controversial initiative is the most reasonable? The best way to clarify controversial issues is to debate them, and see whose ideas are the most feasible. We may not arrive at a final consensus. But at least the initiative has undergone rational debate. At least we have had an opportunity to point out the advantages and disadvantages,s as well as the blind spots. Any cross-strait initiative can be subjected to the same such dialogue. Blue and Green camp politicians will no longer hold a monopoly on the discussion of cross-Strait issues. Everyone will be able to participate in the discussion of public issues.
More importantly, this debate can ensure a rational atmosphere for future discussions. No one used harsh language to defame others during this debate. No one resorted to name-calling or conspiracy theories. We have long looked forward to the advent of rational dialogue. This debate was a real life example of rational dialogue.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.28
社論－理性辯論 樂見兩岸和平成公共議題
本報訊
由旺旺中時媒體集團所主辦的「一定要和平！兩岸和平共處法」跨媒體辯論會，已於昨天下午順利舉行。出席這場辯論的主角，分別為聯電榮譽董事長曹興誠、兩岸統合學會理事長張亞中以及前民進黨立委林濁水，主要是針對「兩岸和平共處法」的可行性等問題公開辯論。三方透過陳述與詢答程序的各抒已見，辯論過程雖有些許火花，但在許多敏感的焦點上也進行了建設性的對話，儘管最終並未達成太多共識，但其實三方的分歧亦無想像中那麼大。而我們以為這其中最值得珍視的，還是促成此一敏感議題終於可以在台灣循理性對話的模式來進行。
此一辯論會的緣起，主要係聯電榮譽董事長曹興誠月前在報端登廣告積極倡議制定「兩岸和平共處法」，認為此舉不但可化解台灣內部的統獨爭端，也能為兩岸關係找到可長可久的和平共處方法。然而此一構想經提出後，隨後也立即引發正反不同的反應。有人認為很有創意，但也有不少論者表達不同的見解，例如統合會會長張亞中即五度為文提出質疑；綠營方面也有論者認為曹版「兩岸和平共處法」排除獨立公投，令他們無法接受。這意味「兩岸和平共處法」的利弊得失與可行性究竟如何，確實存有頗大的討論空間，我們是該持續坐視各方毫無交集的各說各話？還是努力促成讓不同意見的各方進行對話？這個問題的答案其實很清楚，畢竟台灣已經經歷過兩次政黨輪替，應該已經成熟到可以理性的討論任何敏感的議題，而非永遠還停留在那個「扣帽子」的弱智年代。
昨天這場辯論中，儘管因為參與辯論的三方立場互異，難免因為相互質疑而彼此脣槍舌劍，但相信不論是在現場聆聽的聽眾，或是在事後細心閱讀辯論全文的讀者，都會同意參與這場辯論會中，三方在「追求台灣人民的最大利益」上根本沒有歧見，在「維持兩岸和平」的立場上更是未見對立，三方真正的分歧，主要還是在可行性與後果評估上。
例如，曹興誠認為他所倡議的「兩岸和平共處法」，主旨在強調「程序正義」，讓「統一」交由台灣民意來把關，他認為這樣可以讓台灣百姓自己來決定未來統獨與否，而非任由藍綠政客來操弄這個議題。但張亞中卻認為兩岸若是未能達成一定程度的互信，則「兩岸和平共處法」很可能會遭到政客玩弄，最終導致其變成「兩岸和平分裂法」，甚至所謂「統一公投」也很可能變成了「不統一公投」。而林濁水認為「兩岸和平共處法」雖然立意良善，但可行性卻不高，很可能變成另類的防禦性公投，原本旨在降低台灣內部尖銳的認同問題，但結果卻很可能適得其反。
姑不論證辯三方的論點究竟是誰比誰更有理，至少我們都會承認，兩岸間的所有敏感議題，不就是應該這樣談嗎？聯電榮譽董事長曹興誠理性的思索兩岸爭議，提出了「兩岸和平共處法」的公開倡議，他認為此舉可以有效解決台灣內部與兩岸間的爭議，但兩岸統合學會理事長張亞中以及前民進黨立委林濁水，各自從不同的立場反對這種倡議，且都認為可行性不高，那麼究竟「兩岸和平共處法」有沒有可行性呢？究竟這爭議三方誰的倡議更合理呢？讓問題爭議澄清最好的方式，不就是讓他們一同來辯論，看看誰的倡議最有可行性？或許最終我們還是不能獲致最後結論，但至少此一倡議方案，經過理性辯論後，所有的優缺點乃至可能的盲點，都有機會被指出來。如果任何有關兩岸的倡議，都可能循這樣的方式進行對話，那麼兩岸議題就不復再是藍綠政客壟斷的議題，而是全民都可以參與討論的公共議題。
更重要的是，這場辯論也證明，類似這種討論可以保證是在理性的氛圍下進行討論，我們不曾看到有任何人以情緒的字眼抹黑對方，更未見任何「扣帽子」、「陰謀論」的語言出現，我們長期以來一直期待台灣能出現所謂「理性的對話空間」，這場辯論，不正就是一場「理性對話」具體實現！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 28, 2010
The Wang Wang Group and the China Times Media Group sponsored a "We demand peace! We demand a Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law." Yesterday the multimedia debate took place without incident. The participants included honorary UMC chairman Robert Tsao, Chinese Integration Association Director Chang Ya-chung, and former DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui. The debate explored the feasibility of a "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law." The participants presented their positions, took part in a Question and Answer period, and debated the issues. Sparks flew. Sensitive issues were dealt with by means of constructive dialogue. The participants did not reach any consensus. But their differences were not as great as imagined. Most importantly the debate established a model for rational discussion of this sensitive topic.
The debate originated with UMC Chairman Robert Tsao several months ago, when he purchased newspaper ads promoting a "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law." Tsao thinks that such a law could defuse internal disputes over reunification and independence, and might enable long term peaceful cross-Strait coexistence. But as his proposal immediately triggered a wide range of reactions, pro and con. Some consider his proposal highly creative. Others disagree. For example, Chinese Integration Association director Chang Ya-chung expressed skepticism about Tsao's proposal five times. The Green Camp argued that Tsao's version of a "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law" excluded any referendum on independence, making it unacceptable to them. This suggests that considerable differences remain over the advantages and disadvantages and feasibility of the "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law." Will we continue to sit back and watch as both sides talk past each other? Or will we try to allow parties holding different views to engage in dialogue? The answer shjuld be clear. The Republic of China has undergone two changes in ruling parties. It should be mature enough to permit the rational discussion of sensitive issues. It should not remain permantly trapped in feeble-minded name-calling.
During yesterday's debate the participants disagreed. It was inevitable that they would challenge each other and engage in a war of words. But both the live audience and readers who pored over the transcript of the debate afterwards, would probably agree. All three parties were pursuing the best interests of the public on Taiwan and attempting to maintain cross-Strait peace. The only real disagreements between the three parties were over the feasibility and consequences of Tsao's initiative.
For example, Robert Tsao's "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law" emphasizes "procedural justice." It allows the public on Taiwan to decide whether to reunify. It allows the public on Taiwan to decide whether it wants reunification or independence, instead of allowing Blue and Green camp politicians to demagogue the issue. Chang Ya-chung however, thought that if the two sides failed to reach a certain degree of mutual trust, the "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law" would probably be subject to political manipulation. It would ultimately become a "Cross-Strait Peaceful Secession Law." The so-called "Referendum on Reunification" might well turn into a "Referendum against Reunification." Lin Cho-shui considered the "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law" well intentioned but infeasible. It might well turn into another "Defensive Referendum," originally intended to diminish acute identity issues on Taiwan, but actually counter-productive.
Regardless which of the three parties' views was most persuasive, we can at least agree that sensitive cross-Strait issues should be discussed in just such a manner. Honorary UMC Chairman Robert Tsao is attempting to engage in rational thinking about cross-Strait disputes. He put forth his "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law." He believes it can resolve internal disputes on Taiwan and cross-Strait disputes between Taipei and Beijing. But both Chinese Integration Society Director Chang Ya-chung and former DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui opposed his initiative, albeit from different perspectives. They felt his intitiative was not particularly feasible. Just how feasible is the "Cross-Strait Peaceful Coexistence Law?" Which of the three parties' take on this controversial initiative is the most reasonable? The best way to clarify controversial issues is to debate them, and see whose ideas are the most feasible. We may not arrive at a final consensus. But at least the initiative has undergone rational debate. At least we have had an opportunity to point out the advantages and disadvantages,s as well as the blind spots. Any cross-strait initiative can be subjected to the same such dialogue. Blue and Green camp politicians will no longer hold a monopoly on the discussion of cross-Strait issues. Everyone will be able to participate in the discussion of public issues.
More importantly, this debate can ensure a rational atmosphere for future discussions. No one used harsh language to defame others during this debate. No one resorted to name-calling or conspiracy theories. We have long looked forward to the advent of rational dialogue. This debate was a real life example of rational dialogue.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.28
社論－理性辯論 樂見兩岸和平成公共議題
本報訊
由旺旺中時媒體集團所主辦的「一定要和平！兩岸和平共處法」跨媒體辯論會，已於昨天下午順利舉行。出席這場辯論的主角，分別為聯電榮譽董事長曹興誠、兩岸統合學會理事長張亞中以及前民進黨立委林濁水，主要是針對「兩岸和平共處法」的可行性等問題公開辯論。三方透過陳述與詢答程序的各抒已見，辯論過程雖有些許火花，但在許多敏感的焦點上也進行了建設性的對話，儘管最終並未達成太多共識，但其實三方的分歧亦無想像中那麼大。而我們以為這其中最值得珍視的，還是促成此一敏感議題終於可以在台灣循理性對話的模式來進行。
此一辯論會的緣起，主要係聯電榮譽董事長曹興誠月前在報端登廣告積極倡議制定「兩岸和平共處法」，認為此舉不但可化解台灣內部的統獨爭端，也能為兩岸關係找到可長可久的和平共處方法。然而此一構想經提出後，隨後也立即引發正反不同的反應。有人認為很有創意，但也有不少論者表達不同的見解，例如統合會會長張亞中即五度為文提出質疑；綠營方面也有論者認為曹版「兩岸和平共處法」排除獨立公投，令他們無法接受。這意味「兩岸和平共處法」的利弊得失與可行性究竟如何，確實存有頗大的討論空間，我們是該持續坐視各方毫無交集的各說各話？還是努力促成讓不同意見的各方進行對話？這個問題的答案其實很清楚，畢竟台灣已經經歷過兩次政黨輪替，應該已經成熟到可以理性的討論任何敏感的議題，而非永遠還停留在那個「扣帽子」的弱智年代。
昨天這場辯論中，儘管因為參與辯論的三方立場互異，難免因為相互質疑而彼此脣槍舌劍，但相信不論是在現場聆聽的聽眾，或是在事後細心閱讀辯論全文的讀者，都會同意參與這場辯論會中，三方在「追求台灣人民的最大利益」上根本沒有歧見，在「維持兩岸和平」的立場上更是未見對立，三方真正的分歧，主要還是在可行性與後果評估上。
例如，曹興誠認為他所倡議的「兩岸和平共處法」，主旨在強調「程序正義」，讓「統一」交由台灣民意來把關，他認為這樣可以讓台灣百姓自己來決定未來統獨與否，而非任由藍綠政客來操弄這個議題。但張亞中卻認為兩岸若是未能達成一定程度的互信，則「兩岸和平共處法」很可能會遭到政客玩弄，最終導致其變成「兩岸和平分裂法」，甚至所謂「統一公投」也很可能變成了「不統一公投」。而林濁水認為「兩岸和平共處法」雖然立意良善，但可行性卻不高，很可能變成另類的防禦性公投，原本旨在降低台灣內部尖銳的認同問題，但結果卻很可能適得其反。
姑不論證辯三方的論點究竟是誰比誰更有理，至少我們都會承認，兩岸間的所有敏感議題，不就是應該這樣談嗎？聯電榮譽董事長曹興誠理性的思索兩岸爭議，提出了「兩岸和平共處法」的公開倡議，他認為此舉可以有效解決台灣內部與兩岸間的爭議，但兩岸統合學會理事長張亞中以及前民進黨立委林濁水，各自從不同的立場反對這種倡議，且都認為可行性不高，那麼究竟「兩岸和平共處法」有沒有可行性呢？究竟這爭議三方誰的倡議更合理呢？讓問題爭議澄清最好的方式，不就是讓他們一同來辯論，看看誰的倡議最有可行性？或許最終我們還是不能獲致最後結論，但至少此一倡議方案，經過理性辯論後，所有的優缺點乃至可能的盲點，都有機會被指出來。如果任何有關兩岸的倡議，都可能循這樣的方式進行對話，那麼兩岸議題就不復再是藍綠政客壟斷的議題，而是全民都可以參與討論的公共議題。
更重要的是，這場辯論也證明，類似這種討論可以保證是在理性的氛圍下進行討論，我們不曾看到有任何人以情緒的字眼抹黑對方，更未見任何「扣帽子」、「陰謀論」的語言出現，我們長期以來一直期待台灣能出現所謂「理性的對話空間」，這場辯論，不正就是一場「理性對話」具體實現！
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Four Years Later: Nominating Huang Shi-ming
Four Years Later: Nominating Huang Shi-ming
amidst Applause and Hisses
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 27, 2010
President Ma Ying-jeou has nominated Huang Shi-ming Prosecutor General. Inspection Commission spokesman Chen Chi-ming termed it a "belated appointment."
In March 2006, Chen Shui-bian nominated Hsieh Wen-ting Prosecutor General. In January 2007 he nominated Chen Tsung-ming. At the time everyone wondered "Why didn't he nominate Huang Shi-ming?" Four years later, Ma Ying-jeou has replaced Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian has been convicted in the first instance for corruption. Chen Tsung-ming, the first Prosecutor General under the new system, has been impeached by the Control Yuan and forced to resign. Huang Shi-ming has finally been nominated. During the past four years, Chen Shui-bian has been convicted, and Chen Tsung-ming has been impeached. The cost to society has been high. The political system and justice system have experienced severe shocks. Huang Shi-ming's nomination now, may be even more appropriate than his nomination four years ago, because the lessons learned may keep us from repeating them in the future. We hope this "belated appointment" for which we have paid a heavy price, will yield a belated return, and have a belated impact.
Over the past four years, the nomination process for the Prosecutor General has repeatedly provoked controversy. Chen Tsung-ming, the new Prosecutor General, is an individual who provokes controversy. In the eyes of the public, Huang Shi-ming has long been the ideal nominee. He is even regarded as the only solution to an institutional impasse. Given the social climate, President Ma had no alternative but to nominate Huang Shi-ming. The public would not have accepted any other candidate. Yesterday people were asking "Why wasn't Huang Shi-ming nominated?" Today people are saying "Huang Shi-ming has belatedly been nominated." Such public expectations, viewed optimistically, are the key that can break the deadlock. Such public expectations, viewed pessimistically, are the seeds of an even greater crisis. Suppose Huang Shi-ming lets us down? How will the public react? This constitutes a potential judicial and political crisis. It is also a test of Huang Shi-ming's personal reputation.
We believe the judiciary has many people like Huang Shi-ming. But four years of political chaos have turned Huang Shi-ming into a moral paragon. This is a cross Huang Shi-ming may have to bear upon assuming office. Consider the superlatives the public has heaped upon him: judicial iron man, never bows to power, a paragon of moral rectitude, meticulous, utterly without favoritism, untouchable. In today's world, such a person amounts to a fictional hero. No wonder some say his appointment invited "hisses amongst the applause." Some say he is impervious to reason, that his appointment was overkill, that he is too strict, too straightlaced, too extreme, too inflexible, does not communicate with legislators, and is therefore unsuitable as Prosecutor General. Before Huang Shi-ming was nominated, he was regarded as The One. Now that he has been nominated, some fear he will enforce the law with Draconian harshness. Huang Shi-ming will soon be appointed Prosecutor General in the midst of such contradictory public sentiment. One can say that the road is long and the load is heavy.
Frankly, like the public, we expect a great deal from Huang Shi-ming. But will his severe character make him unsuitable for the job? We are unsure. We are sure only that the public does not want a slick Prosecutor General. It does not want a smooth Prosecutor General. Huang Shi-ming has been described as a "nerdy style judge," reticent about making friends, austere in his dining habits, not inclined to socialize. " He is self-disciplined, dislikes the limelight, enjoys solitude, and socializes as little as possible. If he were to appear at the same social gathering as Chen Tsung-ming, Shih Mao-lin, and Huang Fang-yen, his taciturn style would be the most practical and effective means of dealing with the hydra-headed judicial reform program,
The judicial process is corrupt mainly because justice system officials have been corrupted by improper personal relationships between the justice system and the political system, or the justice system and business interests. Given the proliferation of such relationships, deals have surely been made. The ruling administration is in a position to grant official posts. Businessmen are in a position to offer banquets or gifts. Administrative chiefs have discretionary powers, and for businessmen, banquets and gifts are a drop in the bucket. But when administration officials or businessmen offer justice system officials a quid pro quo, they are buying and selling justice, they are twisting and distorting justice. Yeh Sheng-mao leaked the contents of the Egmont Group report to Chen Shui-bian. Shi Mao-ling and Chen Tsung-ming visited Huang Fang-yen at his private residence. Chen Tsung-ming attended banquets thrown by businessmen under indictment. They were reproached for buying and selling justice, something the public cannot tolerate.
For one hand to wash the other, both hands must understand each other. The public is confident that President Ma would never strike a political deal with justice system officials. Wang Ching-feng and Huang Shi-ming belong to a generation of justice system officials whose personal dealings are open and above board. We must treasure this opportunity to clarify the relationship between politics and the law. We must establish a new tradition, based on the principle that "the ruling authorities will not buy justice, and justice system officials will not sell justice." Only with such a foundation, can we talk about judicial reform in other areas.
Huang Shi-ming says he does not seek fame. Today, because he does not seek fame, he has found fame. Huang Shi-ming's reputation was given to him by the public, not by the ruling authorities. Quite the contrary. The ruling authorities are often reluctant to praise justice system officials. Praise from them often hurts the reputations of justic system officials. The Ma administration should consider this a warning. Huang Shi-ming should consider this an encouragement. If they do so, this appointment just might not disappoint the public. It just might establish a new model for reform, and new traditions for the justice system as a whole, and Huang Shi-ming as an individual.
四年後在掌聲與雜音中提名黃世銘
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.27 01:38 pm
馬總統提名黃世銘出任檢察總長，檢改會發言人陳鋕銘稱，這是「遲來的任命」。
二○○六年三月陳水扁提名謝文定出任檢察總長，二○○七年一月提名陳聰明，當時皆聞「為何不提黃世銘」的聲音；四年後的今天，總統由陳水扁換成了馬英九，而陳水扁已因涉貪汙案初審被判刑，首任新制檢察總長陳聰明則因遭監院彈劾請辭，黃世銘也終於獲得提名。這四年之間，陳水扁被判刑，陳聰明被彈劾；雖然是付出了重大的社會代價，但在整個政治與司法體系經歷如此慘痛的衝擊之後，黃世銘於此際出任，卻可能較若在四年前即出任更為適宜。因為，前車可鑑，就可避免再蹈覆轍。我們期待，這個「遲來的任命」，遲有遲的代價，遲有遲的收穫，遲有遲的意義！
四年來，由於新制檢察總長的提名屢掀波瀾，而首任新制總長陳聰明又滋物議；使得黃世銘一直成為社會大眾心目中的一個想像，甚至認為他可能是體制困局的唯一救贖。在這樣的社會氛圍中，馬總統其實已無不提名黃世銘的空間，社會也沒有接受其他人選的可能。然而，從「為何不提黃世銘」，到如今的「終於提了黃世銘」；這種社會的期待與想像，從樂觀面看也許是打開困局的鑰匙，但從悲觀面看也可能是更大的危機。這個危機是：萬一黃世銘也出問題的話，國人將如何面對？這是司法及政治上的潛在危機，更是黃世銘個人聲譽評價的重大考驗。
我們相信在司法界有不少像黃世銘這種類型的人物，但黃世銘卻是因四年政治亂局而被過度凸顯的典型，亦屬事實。這是黃世銘上任的資產，但也可能是他的負荷。且看輿論對他的評價：司法鐵漢、從未彎過腰、剛正不阿、一絲不苟、六親不認，及鐵面無私等等；這樣的人物處於今日紅塵，簡直有如小說傳奇中的角色。難怪有人說他的任命是「掌聲中有雜音」，說他的不近人情、矯枉過正、太硬、太直、太偏執、不會轉彎、不跟立委溝通，皆是不適合擔任檢察總長的因素。黃世銘未被提名，國人視他為不二人選；如今被提名，又有人怕他成為法匠酷吏。在這種宛如「葉公好龍」矛盾交雜的社會情愫中，黃世銘即將出任檢察總長，堪謂任重道遠。
說實話，我們雖與國人一樣對黃世銘的出任抱持期待，但對他明銳的性格究竟是否適任也無把握。唯一可以確定的是，國家寧可有人際互動單純的檢察總長，而不宜有八面玲瓏的檢察總長。黃世銘被形容成一個慎交遊、吃便當、不應酬的「宅男型司法官」；他的自律要求，亦是不愛出名、不愛出風頭、要耐得住寂寞，不必要的應酬愈少愈好。若與陳聰明、施茂林出現在黃芳彥私宅相較，黃世銘惜遊慎交的作風，也許正是頭緒紛繁的司法改革方案中，最實際且最具宏效的基本功。
因為，司法不清明，主要的原因即在司法人員被法政或法商的不當「人際關係」汙染所致。在這類關係中，難謂沒有發生「交易」的可能。行政當局的籌碼是給你官位，商人則是請你吃飯或送禮。官位授予在行政首長有裁量權，吃飯送禮對商人更是九牛一毛；但是，當行政當局或商人要求司法人員相對進行「交易」時，他們要求的卻是出賣司法正義、扭曲社會公理。當葉盛茂向陳水扁報告艾格蒙情資，施茂林與陳聰明赴黃芳彥私宅，及陳聰明與有案在身的商人飲宴；他們所受非議，即是這種「出賣司法正義」的想像，已令社會忍無可忍。
要銅板不響，須兩個銅板皆知分寸。國人似乎對馬總統不至於與司法人員做政治交易有信心，而王清峰與黃世銘這一輩司法行政官員的人際關係亦較單純。倘若能珍惜這樣的機遇，從澄清政法關係著手，自此建立「政治當局不收買司法、司法人員不出賣司法」的新傳統，有了這個基礎，始有可能再談司法改革的其他領域。
黃世銘自稱不求出名，如今他卻因不求出名而出了名。黃世銘的名聲是社會給他的，而不是行政當局給他的；相反的，行政當局往往不會給司法人員名聲，只會傷害他們的人格名譽。馬政府若能以此為戒，黃世銘倘能以此自持；那麼，這次人事任命或許不致會再令社會失望，而能為司法體制及黃世銘個人，建立一個具有改革意義的新典範與新傳統。
amidst Applause and Hisses
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 27, 2010
President Ma Ying-jeou has nominated Huang Shi-ming Prosecutor General. Inspection Commission spokesman Chen Chi-ming termed it a "belated appointment."
In March 2006, Chen Shui-bian nominated Hsieh Wen-ting Prosecutor General. In January 2007 he nominated Chen Tsung-ming. At the time everyone wondered "Why didn't he nominate Huang Shi-ming?" Four years later, Ma Ying-jeou has replaced Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian has been convicted in the first instance for corruption. Chen Tsung-ming, the first Prosecutor General under the new system, has been impeached by the Control Yuan and forced to resign. Huang Shi-ming has finally been nominated. During the past four years, Chen Shui-bian has been convicted, and Chen Tsung-ming has been impeached. The cost to society has been high. The political system and justice system have experienced severe shocks. Huang Shi-ming's nomination now, may be even more appropriate than his nomination four years ago, because the lessons learned may keep us from repeating them in the future. We hope this "belated appointment" for which we have paid a heavy price, will yield a belated return, and have a belated impact.
Over the past four years, the nomination process for the Prosecutor General has repeatedly provoked controversy. Chen Tsung-ming, the new Prosecutor General, is an individual who provokes controversy. In the eyes of the public, Huang Shi-ming has long been the ideal nominee. He is even regarded as the only solution to an institutional impasse. Given the social climate, President Ma had no alternative but to nominate Huang Shi-ming. The public would not have accepted any other candidate. Yesterday people were asking "Why wasn't Huang Shi-ming nominated?" Today people are saying "Huang Shi-ming has belatedly been nominated." Such public expectations, viewed optimistically, are the key that can break the deadlock. Such public expectations, viewed pessimistically, are the seeds of an even greater crisis. Suppose Huang Shi-ming lets us down? How will the public react? This constitutes a potential judicial and political crisis. It is also a test of Huang Shi-ming's personal reputation.
We believe the judiciary has many people like Huang Shi-ming. But four years of political chaos have turned Huang Shi-ming into a moral paragon. This is a cross Huang Shi-ming may have to bear upon assuming office. Consider the superlatives the public has heaped upon him: judicial iron man, never bows to power, a paragon of moral rectitude, meticulous, utterly without favoritism, untouchable. In today's world, such a person amounts to a fictional hero. No wonder some say his appointment invited "hisses amongst the applause." Some say he is impervious to reason, that his appointment was overkill, that he is too strict, too straightlaced, too extreme, too inflexible, does not communicate with legislators, and is therefore unsuitable as Prosecutor General. Before Huang Shi-ming was nominated, he was regarded as The One. Now that he has been nominated, some fear he will enforce the law with Draconian harshness. Huang Shi-ming will soon be appointed Prosecutor General in the midst of such contradictory public sentiment. One can say that the road is long and the load is heavy.
Frankly, like the public, we expect a great deal from Huang Shi-ming. But will his severe character make him unsuitable for the job? We are unsure. We are sure only that the public does not want a slick Prosecutor General. It does not want a smooth Prosecutor General. Huang Shi-ming has been described as a "nerdy style judge," reticent about making friends, austere in his dining habits, not inclined to socialize. " He is self-disciplined, dislikes the limelight, enjoys solitude, and socializes as little as possible. If he were to appear at the same social gathering as Chen Tsung-ming, Shih Mao-lin, and Huang Fang-yen, his taciturn style would be the most practical and effective means of dealing with the hydra-headed judicial reform program,
The judicial process is corrupt mainly because justice system officials have been corrupted by improper personal relationships between the justice system and the political system, or the justice system and business interests. Given the proliferation of such relationships, deals have surely been made. The ruling administration is in a position to grant official posts. Businessmen are in a position to offer banquets or gifts. Administrative chiefs have discretionary powers, and for businessmen, banquets and gifts are a drop in the bucket. But when administration officials or businessmen offer justice system officials a quid pro quo, they are buying and selling justice, they are twisting and distorting justice. Yeh Sheng-mao leaked the contents of the Egmont Group report to Chen Shui-bian. Shi Mao-ling and Chen Tsung-ming visited Huang Fang-yen at his private residence. Chen Tsung-ming attended banquets thrown by businessmen under indictment. They were reproached for buying and selling justice, something the public cannot tolerate.
For one hand to wash the other, both hands must understand each other. The public is confident that President Ma would never strike a political deal with justice system officials. Wang Ching-feng and Huang Shi-ming belong to a generation of justice system officials whose personal dealings are open and above board. We must treasure this opportunity to clarify the relationship between politics and the law. We must establish a new tradition, based on the principle that "the ruling authorities will not buy justice, and justice system officials will not sell justice." Only with such a foundation, can we talk about judicial reform in other areas.
Huang Shi-ming says he does not seek fame. Today, because he does not seek fame, he has found fame. Huang Shi-ming's reputation was given to him by the public, not by the ruling authorities. Quite the contrary. The ruling authorities are often reluctant to praise justice system officials. Praise from them often hurts the reputations of justic system officials. The Ma administration should consider this a warning. Huang Shi-ming should consider this an encouragement. If they do so, this appointment just might not disappoint the public. It just might establish a new model for reform, and new traditions for the justice system as a whole, and Huang Shi-ming as an individual.
四年後在掌聲與雜音中提名黃世銘
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.27 01:38 pm
馬總統提名黃世銘出任檢察總長，檢改會發言人陳鋕銘稱，這是「遲來的任命」。
二○○六年三月陳水扁提名謝文定出任檢察總長，二○○七年一月提名陳聰明，當時皆聞「為何不提黃世銘」的聲音；四年後的今天，總統由陳水扁換成了馬英九，而陳水扁已因涉貪汙案初審被判刑，首任新制檢察總長陳聰明則因遭監院彈劾請辭，黃世銘也終於獲得提名。這四年之間，陳水扁被判刑，陳聰明被彈劾；雖然是付出了重大的社會代價，但在整個政治與司法體系經歷如此慘痛的衝擊之後，黃世銘於此際出任，卻可能較若在四年前即出任更為適宜。因為，前車可鑑，就可避免再蹈覆轍。我們期待，這個「遲來的任命」，遲有遲的代價，遲有遲的收穫，遲有遲的意義！
四年來，由於新制檢察總長的提名屢掀波瀾，而首任新制總長陳聰明又滋物議；使得黃世銘一直成為社會大眾心目中的一個想像，甚至認為他可能是體制困局的唯一救贖。在這樣的社會氛圍中，馬總統其實已無不提名黃世銘的空間，社會也沒有接受其他人選的可能。然而，從「為何不提黃世銘」，到如今的「終於提了黃世銘」；這種社會的期待與想像，從樂觀面看也許是打開困局的鑰匙，但從悲觀面看也可能是更大的危機。這個危機是：萬一黃世銘也出問題的話，國人將如何面對？這是司法及政治上的潛在危機，更是黃世銘個人聲譽評價的重大考驗。
我們相信在司法界有不少像黃世銘這種類型的人物，但黃世銘卻是因四年政治亂局而被過度凸顯的典型，亦屬事實。這是黃世銘上任的資產，但也可能是他的負荷。且看輿論對他的評價：司法鐵漢、從未彎過腰、剛正不阿、一絲不苟、六親不認，及鐵面無私等等；這樣的人物處於今日紅塵，簡直有如小說傳奇中的角色。難怪有人說他的任命是「掌聲中有雜音」，說他的不近人情、矯枉過正、太硬、太直、太偏執、不會轉彎、不跟立委溝通，皆是不適合擔任檢察總長的因素。黃世銘未被提名，國人視他為不二人選；如今被提名，又有人怕他成為法匠酷吏。在這種宛如「葉公好龍」矛盾交雜的社會情愫中，黃世銘即將出任檢察總長，堪謂任重道遠。
說實話，我們雖與國人一樣對黃世銘的出任抱持期待，但對他明銳的性格究竟是否適任也無把握。唯一可以確定的是，國家寧可有人際互動單純的檢察總長，而不宜有八面玲瓏的檢察總長。黃世銘被形容成一個慎交遊、吃便當、不應酬的「宅男型司法官」；他的自律要求，亦是不愛出名、不愛出風頭、要耐得住寂寞，不必要的應酬愈少愈好。若與陳聰明、施茂林出現在黃芳彥私宅相較，黃世銘惜遊慎交的作風，也許正是頭緒紛繁的司法改革方案中，最實際且最具宏效的基本功。
因為，司法不清明，主要的原因即在司法人員被法政或法商的不當「人際關係」汙染所致。在這類關係中，難謂沒有發生「交易」的可能。行政當局的籌碼是給你官位，商人則是請你吃飯或送禮。官位授予在行政首長有裁量權，吃飯送禮對商人更是九牛一毛；但是，當行政當局或商人要求司法人員相對進行「交易」時，他們要求的卻是出賣司法正義、扭曲社會公理。當葉盛茂向陳水扁報告艾格蒙情資，施茂林與陳聰明赴黃芳彥私宅，及陳聰明與有案在身的商人飲宴；他們所受非議，即是這種「出賣司法正義」的想像，已令社會忍無可忍。
要銅板不響，須兩個銅板皆知分寸。國人似乎對馬總統不至於與司法人員做政治交易有信心，而王清峰與黃世銘這一輩司法行政官員的人際關係亦較單純。倘若能珍惜這樣的機遇，從澄清政法關係著手，自此建立「政治當局不收買司法、司法人員不出賣司法」的新傳統，有了這個基礎，始有可能再談司法改革的其他領域。
黃世銘自稱不求出名，如今他卻因不求出名而出了名。黃世銘的名聲是社會給他的，而不是行政當局給他的；相反的，行政當局往往不會給司法人員名聲，只會傷害他們的人格名譽。馬政府若能以此為戒，黃世銘倘能以此自持；那麼，這次人事任命或許不致會再令社會失望，而能為司法體制及黃世銘個人，建立一個具有改革意義的新典範與新傳統。
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
Force Manufacturers to Relocate rather than Sign ECFA?
Force Manufacturers to Relocate rather than Sign ECFA?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 26, 2010
The first round of negotiations over ECFA begin in Beijing today.
Three main reasons have been cited for opposing ECFA. Reason 1. ECFA is not merely an economic issue. It is also a political issue. Signing ECFA means that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will be more closely bound together. Reason 2. Beijing should publicly agree to Taipei signing FTAs with other countries. Otherwise, Taipei should refuse to sign an ECFA with Beijing. Reason 3. We have alternatives to signing ECFA. For example, we need only build factories in any one of the ASEAN plus One or ASEAN plus Three nations. Once we do so, we automatically gain access to them all.
Let's begin with Reason 1. Signing ECFA will give us a 5-10 percent Mainland tariff reduction. But this applies only pertains to exports. Even more important is total exemption from tariffs. That would allow manufacturers to keep their factories on Taiwan, increasing employment opportunities on Taiwan. If we do not sign ECFA, the manufacturers may be forced to move their plants to Southeast Asia or Mainland China. If that happens, the unemployment problem on Taiwan will surely deteriorate. Therefore, one of the reasons for signing ECFA is to encourage manufacturers to keep their roots on Taiwan. Those who oppose signing ECFA may ask "What's wrong with relocating?" This may solve the manufacturers' problems, but exports will become less competitive. Worse, it will exacerbate unemployment on Taiwan. If manufacturers are able to set up factories on Taiwan, why should they be forced to move to Southeast Asia?
When it comes to signing FTAs with other countries, there appears to be no difference between the pros and the cons. But even if we can't sign FTAs with other countries at the moment, we must sign an ECFA with Mainland China. Globalization and regional economic organizations are a macro level trend. Taipei must seek the same tariff treatment as other countries on Mainland China. It must provide incentives for companies to build plants on Taiwan. Therefore it must sign ECFA. Taiwan's exports constitute 70% of its GDP. Taiwan's exports to Mainland China constitute 40% of its total exports. We now face ASEAN plus One (Mainland China), ASEAN plus Three (Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea), ASEAN plus Six (add India, New Zealand, and Australia), and ASEAN plus Seven (Russia). Do people really want manufacturers on Taiwan to relocate, rather than sign ECFA? Those who oppose ECFA do not object to products from Taiwan being sold on the Mainland. Do they object to products from Taiwan being tariff-free? Do they object to manufacturers on Taiwan remaining on Taiwan? Of course it would be best if Taipei could also sign FTAs with other countries. But for the time being it can't. Therefore it must sign an ECFA with Beijing.
If Taipei can some day become part of "ASEAN plus Four," it might be able to use its membership to protect its political interests. But the threat to the livelihood of lower level agricultural and industrial workers is more serious than any threat posed by ECFA. It is precisely because cross-Strait politics is such an important factor, that ECFA will reduce the negative effects on agriculture and industry. Taipei must stand tall. It must face the test of globalization. ECFA is a globalization issue. But it has been deliberately spin-doctored and turned into an issue of cross-Strait politics. It has become a blind spot in the dispute over ECFA. In order to meet the challenges of globalization and regional economic organizations, we must sign ECFA. We must factor in any political risk. As long as the Republic of China, from the president down to neighborhood chiefs, maintains its system of democratic elections, it will have all the support it needs. It will be able to maintain political security in the form of the "status quo and peaceful development"
The most fundamental concern is that after signing ECFA, Taipei must not be subject to Beijing's control. ECFA is of course not limited to only economic matters. It also has political implications. Therefore the choice to sign or not sign ECFA, is actually a choice between two political strategies. Naturally advocates Taiwan independence oppose ECFA. But if the proposal advocates "neither reunification nor independence," they should agree to sign ECFA.
If we wish to usher in globalization, we have no reason to oppose ECFA. ECFA will solve cross-strait economic and trade problems. But more importantly, ECFA will solve "ASEAN plus X" regional economic problems. We must be able to survive in a globalized world. Only then can we find solutions to our political problems. If our economy cannot survive, how can we find solutions to our political problems? One might say that signing ECFA will bind Taipei. But it would be more accurate to say that not signing ECFA will bind Taipei to the wrong political strategy.
Taipei's economic path has been affected by its political situation. Conversely, Taipei's political path has been affected by its economic situation. The advent of globalization and regional economic organizations are Taipei's greatest economic challenges, and also its greatest political threat. In cross-Strait relations, the challenges of bilateral economic and trade relations have already exceeded those of direct political or military threats. The controversy over ECFA boils down to a simple reality. Taipei must adopt certain political and economic strategies for its survival. But Taipei cannot ignore globalization and regionalization, and the "ASEAN plus X" tidal wave. It cannot ignore the urgency and necessity of signing ECFA. That is, unless we really want manufacturers to relocate.
寧可廠商外移也不簽ECFA？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.26 02:59 am
ＥＣＦＡ首場協商今日在北京登場。
反對簽ＥＣＦＡ的主要理由，可以歸納為三點：一、ＥＣＦＡ不只是經濟事務，也是政治事務；簽了ＥＣＦＡ，兩岸關係就不易解套。二、北京應公開同意台灣與其他國家簽ＦＴＡ，否則台灣即不應與北京簽ＥＣＦＡ。三、不簽ＥＣＦＡ，仍有其他解決之道；例如，面對東協加一或東協加三，只要能進入其中任何一國設廠投資，即可「打遍全部」。
先從最後一點談起。簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，可在中國減免五％至十％的關稅，這只是從出口貿易的利益來看；但更重要的則是，由於可以免除關稅，即可維持廠商在台投資設廠的利基，以增加台灣的就業機會。倘若不簽ＥＣＦＡ，相關廠商必須外移至東南亞或中國，可能即是唯一選擇；但如此一來，台灣的失業問題亦必趨嚴重。因此，主張簽訂ＥＣＦＡ的理由之一，正是要留住廠商，有「根留台灣」的作用；反對簽約者建議「何不外移」，也許可解決廠商的問題，卻必會使台灣的就業問題更形惡化，而不僅是外銷產品失去競爭力而已。但若能在台灣設廠，何必移往東南亞？
關於與其他國家簽ＦＴＡ，正反雙方似無歧見。但即使暫不能與其他國家簽ＦＴＡ，也必須與中國簽ＥＣＦＡ。因為，全球化及區域經濟組織的運作已是大勢所趨，如前所述，台灣為能與其他國家取得在中國免關稅的平等立足點，及為求維持吸引廠商在台投資設廠的誘因，皆不能不簽ＥＣＦＡ；台灣出口貿易可占ＧＤＰ總值的七成，而台灣將對中國的出口又占總出口總值的四成，面對東協加一（加中國）、東協加三（加中、日、韓）、東協加六（再加印、紐、澳），及東協加七（再加俄羅斯）這個迎面而來的情勢，台灣難道真的寧可廠商外移，也不簽ＥＣＦＡ？反對簽ＥＣＦＡ者，並不反對台灣產品銷往中國市場；難道卻反對在中國免關稅，及反對廠商留在台灣？台灣當然最好也能與其他國家簽ＦＴＡ；但即使暫時不能，也必須與中國簽ＥＣＦＡ。
其實，倘若台灣有朝一日能成為「東協加四」，雖可能取得政治平衡的利益，但對台灣農業及基層勞工的生計威脅，必較ＥＣＦＡ更嚴重。（正因兩岸的政治因素，使ＥＣＦＡ有可能在農業等方面減少衝擊）。然而，即使如此，台灣也必須挺起胸膛、面對全球化的考驗；如今將ＥＣＦＡ這個因應全球化的經貿議題扭曲成只是兩岸的政治議題，可謂正是ＥＣＦＡ爭議中的主要盲點。為了迎對全球化及區域經濟組織的挑戰，所以必須簽訂ＥＣＦＡ；至於其中必須考量的政治風險，只要中華民國維持自總統至里長的民主直選制度，就有充分的支撐，能夠維持「維持現狀／和平發展」的政治安全。
最根本的顧慮是在，簽訂ＥＣＦＡ後台灣會不會被北京套住。ＥＣＦＡ當然不只是經濟事務，也有其政治意涵；因而，簽不簽ＥＣＦＡ，其實是兩種政治戰略的選擇。若主張台獨，自然反對簽ＥＣＦＡ；但若主張「不統／不獨」，即會傾向贊成簽ＥＣＦＡ。
關鍵在於：若要迎對全球化，即無理由反對ＥＣＦＡ。與其說ＥＣＦＡ是在解決兩岸經貿問題，不如說是台灣須藉ＥＣＦＡ以處理與「東協加Ｎ」的區域經濟難題。台灣必須先有在全球化中求生的能力，始有可能在政治上找到出路；否則，經濟上若無生路，在政治上亦不可能有出路。若謂簽ＥＣＦＡ會套住台灣；不如說，若不簽ＥＣＦＡ，反而會使台灣被錯誤的政治戰略套住。
台灣的經濟路線受到政治情勢的影響；同樣的，台灣的政治路線也受制約於經濟情勢。全球化及區域經濟組織是對台灣最大的經濟挑戰，也是最大的政治威脅；甚至就兩岸關係言，雙方經貿關係的挑戰，也已超越了政治或軍事的直接威脅。關於ＥＣＦＡ的種種爭議，歸結而言，其實只是對於台灣應當採取何種「政經戰略」以維生存發展持不同看法。但除非台灣能否定全球化及區域化的發展，及改變「東協加Ｎ」的大勢，即不能不考慮簽訂ＥＣＦＡ的急迫性與必要性。否則，難道真的要主張廠商統統外移？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 26, 2010
The first round of negotiations over ECFA begin in Beijing today.
Three main reasons have been cited for opposing ECFA. Reason 1. ECFA is not merely an economic issue. It is also a political issue. Signing ECFA means that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will be more closely bound together. Reason 2. Beijing should publicly agree to Taipei signing FTAs with other countries. Otherwise, Taipei should refuse to sign an ECFA with Beijing. Reason 3. We have alternatives to signing ECFA. For example, we need only build factories in any one of the ASEAN plus One or ASEAN plus Three nations. Once we do so, we automatically gain access to them all.
Let's begin with Reason 1. Signing ECFA will give us a 5-10 percent Mainland tariff reduction. But this applies only pertains to exports. Even more important is total exemption from tariffs. That would allow manufacturers to keep their factories on Taiwan, increasing employment opportunities on Taiwan. If we do not sign ECFA, the manufacturers may be forced to move their plants to Southeast Asia or Mainland China. If that happens, the unemployment problem on Taiwan will surely deteriorate. Therefore, one of the reasons for signing ECFA is to encourage manufacturers to keep their roots on Taiwan. Those who oppose signing ECFA may ask "What's wrong with relocating?" This may solve the manufacturers' problems, but exports will become less competitive. Worse, it will exacerbate unemployment on Taiwan. If manufacturers are able to set up factories on Taiwan, why should they be forced to move to Southeast Asia?
When it comes to signing FTAs with other countries, there appears to be no difference between the pros and the cons. But even if we can't sign FTAs with other countries at the moment, we must sign an ECFA with Mainland China. Globalization and regional economic organizations are a macro level trend. Taipei must seek the same tariff treatment as other countries on Mainland China. It must provide incentives for companies to build plants on Taiwan. Therefore it must sign ECFA. Taiwan's exports constitute 70% of its GDP. Taiwan's exports to Mainland China constitute 40% of its total exports. We now face ASEAN plus One (Mainland China), ASEAN plus Three (Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea), ASEAN plus Six (add India, New Zealand, and Australia), and ASEAN plus Seven (Russia). Do people really want manufacturers on Taiwan to relocate, rather than sign ECFA? Those who oppose ECFA do not object to products from Taiwan being sold on the Mainland. Do they object to products from Taiwan being tariff-free? Do they object to manufacturers on Taiwan remaining on Taiwan? Of course it would be best if Taipei could also sign FTAs with other countries. But for the time being it can't. Therefore it must sign an ECFA with Beijing.
If Taipei can some day become part of "ASEAN plus Four," it might be able to use its membership to protect its political interests. But the threat to the livelihood of lower level agricultural and industrial workers is more serious than any threat posed by ECFA. It is precisely because cross-Strait politics is such an important factor, that ECFA will reduce the negative effects on agriculture and industry. Taipei must stand tall. It must face the test of globalization. ECFA is a globalization issue. But it has been deliberately spin-doctored and turned into an issue of cross-Strait politics. It has become a blind spot in the dispute over ECFA. In order to meet the challenges of globalization and regional economic organizations, we must sign ECFA. We must factor in any political risk. As long as the Republic of China, from the president down to neighborhood chiefs, maintains its system of democratic elections, it will have all the support it needs. It will be able to maintain political security in the form of the "status quo and peaceful development"
The most fundamental concern is that after signing ECFA, Taipei must not be subject to Beijing's control. ECFA is of course not limited to only economic matters. It also has political implications. Therefore the choice to sign or not sign ECFA, is actually a choice between two political strategies. Naturally advocates Taiwan independence oppose ECFA. But if the proposal advocates "neither reunification nor independence," they should agree to sign ECFA.
If we wish to usher in globalization, we have no reason to oppose ECFA. ECFA will solve cross-strait economic and trade problems. But more importantly, ECFA will solve "ASEAN plus X" regional economic problems. We must be able to survive in a globalized world. Only then can we find solutions to our political problems. If our economy cannot survive, how can we find solutions to our political problems? One might say that signing ECFA will bind Taipei. But it would be more accurate to say that not signing ECFA will bind Taipei to the wrong political strategy.
Taipei's economic path has been affected by its political situation. Conversely, Taipei's political path has been affected by its economic situation. The advent of globalization and regional economic organizations are Taipei's greatest economic challenges, and also its greatest political threat. In cross-Strait relations, the challenges of bilateral economic and trade relations have already exceeded those of direct political or military threats. The controversy over ECFA boils down to a simple reality. Taipei must adopt certain political and economic strategies for its survival. But Taipei cannot ignore globalization and regionalization, and the "ASEAN plus X" tidal wave. It cannot ignore the urgency and necessity of signing ECFA. That is, unless we really want manufacturers to relocate.
寧可廠商外移也不簽ECFA？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.26 02:59 am
ＥＣＦＡ首場協商今日在北京登場。
反對簽ＥＣＦＡ的主要理由，可以歸納為三點：一、ＥＣＦＡ不只是經濟事務，也是政治事務；簽了ＥＣＦＡ，兩岸關係就不易解套。二、北京應公開同意台灣與其他國家簽ＦＴＡ，否則台灣即不應與北京簽ＥＣＦＡ。三、不簽ＥＣＦＡ，仍有其他解決之道；例如，面對東協加一或東協加三，只要能進入其中任何一國設廠投資，即可「打遍全部」。
先從最後一點談起。簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，可在中國減免五％至十％的關稅，這只是從出口貿易的利益來看；但更重要的則是，由於可以免除關稅，即可維持廠商在台投資設廠的利基，以增加台灣的就業機會。倘若不簽ＥＣＦＡ，相關廠商必須外移至東南亞或中國，可能即是唯一選擇；但如此一來，台灣的失業問題亦必趨嚴重。因此，主張簽訂ＥＣＦＡ的理由之一，正是要留住廠商，有「根留台灣」的作用；反對簽約者建議「何不外移」，也許可解決廠商的問題，卻必會使台灣的就業問題更形惡化，而不僅是外銷產品失去競爭力而已。但若能在台灣設廠，何必移往東南亞？
關於與其他國家簽ＦＴＡ，正反雙方似無歧見。但即使暫不能與其他國家簽ＦＴＡ，也必須與中國簽ＥＣＦＡ。因為，全球化及區域經濟組織的運作已是大勢所趨，如前所述，台灣為能與其他國家取得在中國免關稅的平等立足點，及為求維持吸引廠商在台投資設廠的誘因，皆不能不簽ＥＣＦＡ；台灣出口貿易可占ＧＤＰ總值的七成，而台灣將對中國的出口又占總出口總值的四成，面對東協加一（加中國）、東協加三（加中、日、韓）、東協加六（再加印、紐、澳），及東協加七（再加俄羅斯）這個迎面而來的情勢，台灣難道真的寧可廠商外移，也不簽ＥＣＦＡ？反對簽ＥＣＦＡ者，並不反對台灣產品銷往中國市場；難道卻反對在中國免關稅，及反對廠商留在台灣？台灣當然最好也能與其他國家簽ＦＴＡ；但即使暫時不能，也必須與中國簽ＥＣＦＡ。
其實，倘若台灣有朝一日能成為「東協加四」，雖可能取得政治平衡的利益，但對台灣農業及基層勞工的生計威脅，必較ＥＣＦＡ更嚴重。（正因兩岸的政治因素，使ＥＣＦＡ有可能在農業等方面減少衝擊）。然而，即使如此，台灣也必須挺起胸膛、面對全球化的考驗；如今將ＥＣＦＡ這個因應全球化的經貿議題扭曲成只是兩岸的政治議題，可謂正是ＥＣＦＡ爭議中的主要盲點。為了迎對全球化及區域經濟組織的挑戰，所以必須簽訂ＥＣＦＡ；至於其中必須考量的政治風險，只要中華民國維持自總統至里長的民主直選制度，就有充分的支撐，能夠維持「維持現狀／和平發展」的政治安全。
最根本的顧慮是在，簽訂ＥＣＦＡ後台灣會不會被北京套住。ＥＣＦＡ當然不只是經濟事務，也有其政治意涵；因而，簽不簽ＥＣＦＡ，其實是兩種政治戰略的選擇。若主張台獨，自然反對簽ＥＣＦＡ；但若主張「不統／不獨」，即會傾向贊成簽ＥＣＦＡ。
關鍵在於：若要迎對全球化，即無理由反對ＥＣＦＡ。與其說ＥＣＦＡ是在解決兩岸經貿問題，不如說是台灣須藉ＥＣＦＡ以處理與「東協加Ｎ」的區域經濟難題。台灣必須先有在全球化中求生的能力，始有可能在政治上找到出路；否則，經濟上若無生路，在政治上亦不可能有出路。若謂簽ＥＣＦＡ會套住台灣；不如說，若不簽ＥＣＦＡ，反而會使台灣被錯誤的政治戰略套住。
台灣的經濟路線受到政治情勢的影響；同樣的，台灣的政治路線也受制約於經濟情勢。全球化及區域經濟組織是對台灣最大的經濟挑戰，也是最大的政治威脅；甚至就兩岸關係言，雙方經貿關係的挑戰，也已超越了政治或軍事的直接威脅。關於ＥＣＦＡ的種種爭議，歸結而言，其實只是對於台灣應當採取何種「政經戰略」以維生存發展持不同看法。但除非台灣能否定全球化及區域化的發展，及改變「東協加Ｎ」的大勢，即不能不考慮簽訂ＥＣＦＡ的急迫性與必要性。否則，難道真的要主張廠商統統外移？
Monday, January 25, 2010
One China, Different Interpretations: A Breeding Ground for Taiwan Independence?
One China, Different Interpretations: A Breeding Ground for Taiwan Independence?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 25, 2010
Toward the end of last year the United Daily News published a series of six editorials entitled, "Thoughts on the 99th Year of the Founding of the Republic of China." They received considerable attention from people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. We do not necessarily believe the arguments presented in our editorial series are unassailable. We wrote them merely to stimulate discussion and encourage brainstorming.
Cross-Strait issues are troublesome. They provoke intense disagreement. We are gratified that many people agree with our "Six New Years Day Editorials." But we also respect those who disagree. But if our editorials have been misunderstood or misinterpreted, we would like to clarify our position, to avoid conveying any misleading impressions.
Chang Ya-chung, Hsieh Ta-ning, and Huang Kuang-kuo are three scholars. They have published an article entitled "Six Questions for the United Daily News." They maintain that the "One China, Different Interpretations" argument advanced in our Six New Years Day Editorials is equivalent to Taiwan independence, that it provides a breeding ground for Taiwan independence. This is a misunderstanding. This is also a distortion. [Translator's note: unable to ascertain the proper translation for "我們有不能已於言者"]
These three scholars have long been concerned about cross-Strait issues. They have made a number of in-depth investigations. They have offered many creative suggestions. They have inspired widespread admiration. But their recently published Six Questions touts their own theory of "One China, Same Interpretation," "One China, Three Constitutions," and "Cross-Strait Reunification," which they characterize as the "Strategic Cornerstone for Cross-Strait Peaceful Development." It refers to "One China, Different Interpretations" as illogical, infeasible, and inconsistent with the interests of the concerned parties. It even equates "One China, Different Interpretations" with hardline Taiwan independence, with creeping Taiwan independence, with a breeding ground for Taiwan independence, with shielding Taiwan independence, and with an independent Taiwan. To say that "One China, Different Interpretations" is infeasible is to express an opinion. But to suggest that "One China, Different interpretations" is the equivalent of Taiwan independence, or a breeding ground for Taiwan independence, is neither here nor there.
In fact, we see no clear-cut difference between their Six Questions and our Six Editorials. A detailed discussion will take time. But our two positions have at least two things in common.
First. Both advocate a Big Roof Theory. Our Six Editorials stress a process oriented theory for peaceful development. We hope to moderate, soften, transform, and improve upon the goal oriented theories for reunification and independence. Because we emphasize process orientation, we advocate a Chopsticks Theory involving neither reunification nor independence, and a Cup Theory which preserves the Constitution of the Republic of China and the status quo. Stressing process orientation does not mean evading the issue of goals. Therefore we also advocate a Big Roof Theory to deal with the issue of long term objectives. For example, the two sides could set up a confederation. The Six Questions seem to imply that "One China, Different Interpretations" fails to explain the meaning of "One China." But our Six Editorials make it clear that the "One China" in "One China, Different Interpretations" is a Big Roof, a Third Concept, a higher level concept. For example, setting up a confederation would involve a Third Constitution. It would be no different from their Six Questions. When it comes to "Different Interpretations," their Six Questions and our Six Editorials both champion a One China Constitution. We differ even less on this issue. Their Six Questions assert that accepting One China does not mean we must accept Beijing as the central government, and Taipei as a local government. But isn't that a kind of "Different Interpretation?" After all, their Six Questions do not accept the premise that "One China means the PRC." How different is that from our assertion that "One China" ought to refer to a Third Concept or Third Constitution? In fact, their Six Questions say that a peace agreement should be the first document to establish cross-Strait political mutual trust. That was also our proposal. So what's the difference?
Their Six Questions equates "One China, Different Interpretations" with Taiwan independence and a breeding ground for Taiwan independence. They even say it poses an embryonic threat. This distorts the facts. What champion of Taiwan independence would advocate a One China Constitution? What person attempting to establish a breeding ground for Taiwan independence would urge the two sides to return to the starting point, to Sun Yat-sen's 1911 Revolution? What person attempting to establish a breeding ground for Taiwan independence would advocate a rational process to clarify long term objectives?" The three scholars may have ambitious goals for a Greater China. But is it necessary to characterize others as having a waif mentality?
In fact, our Six Editorials proposes breaking cross-Straits relations into many parts. Their Six Questions proposes combining many parts into one. But without the parts how can one have the whole? Without the whole, how can the parts have any order? Processes and goals are mutually complementary. They need not be mutually contradictory.
Secondly, Beijing is the main variable. Their Six Questions characterize our Six Editorials as wishful thinking. They may have a point. But their Six Questions also unwittingly engage in wishful thinking. Their Six Questions point out that substantive power in cross-Strait relations is asymmetrical. But their Six Questions and our Six Editorials face the same problem. Their Six Questions pose a powerful challenge to our Six Editorials. They ask why Beijing would accept "One China, Different Interpretations." Their six lengthy articles point out that Beijing's repeated rejection of "One China, Different Interpretations" amounts to opposition. But aren't they afraid that people will say the same thing about their Six Questions? Why would Beijing accept "One China, Three Constitutions?"
Beijing's opposition is not cast in stone. We do not oppose "One China, Three Constitutions." We think that "One China, Different Interpretations" and "One China, Three Constitutions" are essentially the same thing. If Beijing can accept "One China, Three Constitutions," it has no reason not to accept "One China, Different Interpretations." Since both of them advocate the Big Cup Theory and Big Roof Theory. But it makes no sense to badmouth "One China, Different Interpretations" in order to advance "One China, Three Constitutions."
In order to resolve the cross-Strait impasse, political and civic leaders on both sides have proposed innumerable policy prescriptions. All of them have encountered the same problem -- rejection by Beijing, or rejection by Taipei. This is the same problem faced by "One China, Three Constitutions" and the "One China, Different Interpretations." Nevertheless, debates rage on both sides, because what is unacceptable isn't cast in stone. Creativity requires the breaking of molds. As their Six Questions noted, the Grundlagenvertragbasic, or Basic Treaty between East and West Germany and the European Union's Helsinki Final Act were repeatedly rejected before they were finally adopted. By the same token, the two sides have moved away from the rhetoric of "Liberate Taiwan!" and "Counterattack the mainland!" They have arrived at today's theme: peaceful development. Did they not succeed in breaking through the unacceptable? We hope the two sides can accept "One China, Different Interpretations." We hope the two sides can accept "One China, Three Constitutions." We do not care whose theories become the official basis for cross-Strait negotiations. We are concerned only about adopting a rational process for the formulation of cross-Strait objectives.
Because we stress process, we do not think that our assertion that Taiwan's future should be decided by 23 million people is a deviant position. We believe the ultimate resolution of cross-Strait issues must resolve the issue of Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence can only be transformed. It cannot be eradicated. In particular, "One China, Different Interpretations," Lee Teng-hui's "Two States," and the DPP's Taiwan independence are not one and the same. Why the accusation that we are birds of a feather? Are the three scholars merely seeking targets for their arrows?
Finally, we solemnly declare that our Six New Years Day Editorials have nothing to do with the Ma administration. Nothing whatsoever. In fact, "One China, Different Interpretations" is a concept still in development. During the Lee Teng-hui era we advocated "One China, Different Interpretations." We are not worried about whether the Ma administration's "One China, Different Interpretations" differs. We merely wish to make some small effort on behalf of "One China, Different Interpretations." We welcome the creative thinking behind "One China, Three Constitutions." But we hope "One China, Different Interpretations" will not be misunderstood and misinterpreted. Soliciting a wide range of opinions cannot be a bad thing.
「一中各表」等於台獨偏安？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.25 04:09 am
本報在歲末新正發表的《中華民國九十九年感思》系列社論六篇，受到兩岸有心人士的重視與討論；我們並不認為系列社論所言即是顛撲不破，而拋磚引玉、集思廣益，才是我們動念寫作的初衷。
兩岸問題是一個見仁見智的大難題。對於贊同《元旦六論》見解者，我們固然欣慰；對於不贊同者，我們也表尊重。但若有嚴重誤解或曲解，我們仍應試作說明，以免以訛傳訛。
張亞中、謝大寧、黃光國三位學者，發表《六問聯合報》，指《六論》所主張的「一中各表」，等於台獨，等於偏安；這是誤解，也是曲解，我們有不能已於言者。
三學者長期關注兩岸議題，鑽研甚深，創見亦多，令人欽敬。但此次發表《六問》，一方面標榜他門創製的「一中同表／一中三憲／兩岸統合」，喻為「兩岸和平發展的戰略基石」；另一方面，又指「一中各表」不合邏輯、不可行、不符合相關各造的利益，筆鋒一轉，甚至指「一中各表」與剛性台獨、柔性台獨、偏安台獨、偏安自保，及獨台是同一類屬的政治主張。若說「一中各表」不可行，當然可以見仁見智；但若說「一中各表」等於台獨、等於偏安，那就不知所云了。
其實，我們完全看不出《六問》與《六論》有甚麼斬釘截鐵的歧異。暫難細論，僅舉二者的最大共同點有二：
一、都是「泛屋頂理論」。《六論》的主軸，是強調和平發展的「過程論」，而欲以緩化、軟化、轉化，來改善統獨的「目的論」。因為強調「過程論」，所以主張「筷子理論」（不統／不獨），與「杯子理論」（維持「中華民國一中憲法」的「現狀」）；但強調「過程論」，亦並未迴避「目的論」，因此也主張可考慮以「屋頂理論」來處理「目的議題」，例如兩岸成立「邦聯」。《六問》似乎指稱：「一中各表」對「一中」的意涵交代不清，但《六論》卻說得很清楚：「一中各表」所說的「一中」，說的是「屋頂」，是「第三概念」、「上位概念」；比如，若成立「邦聯」就會出現「第三憲」，與《六問》無異；至於「各表」，《六問》與《六論》皆主張「一中憲法」，更無差別；《六問》又稱，「接受一中，不表示我們必然接受大陸為中央，台灣為地方」，這豈非也是一種「各表」？《六問》畢竟並不贊成「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，而認為「一個中國」應是「第三概念」（第三憲），這又與《六論》有何不同？甚至，《六問》主張，可經「和平協議」做為建立兩岸政治互信的「第一份文件」，這也是本報早有的提議，差別何在？
至於《六問》將「一中各表」說成與台獨與偏安無異，甚至說成皆是「螟蛉子之焦慮」，更不啻已是指鹿為馬。台獨會主張「一中憲法」嗎？偏安者會主張「兩岸共同回歸辛亥革命及孫中山的起點」嗎？會主張由「合理的過程」達到「改善之目的」嗎？三學者大可自詡有「經略大中華」的雄心壯志，但何必將他人說成「孤兒心態」？
其實，《六論》主張兩岸關係應「化整為零」，《六問》則是主張應當「化零為整」。然而，無零豈有整，無整則零亦亂；「過程」與「目的」應是首尾呼應、相輔相成，沒有非要相互對立的道理。
二、北京是主要的變數。《六問》稱，《六論》的觀點有一點一廂情願，我們承認；但《六問》的問題，則是在不知自己也有一點一廂情願。《六問》指出，「兩岸的物質權力處於不對稱狀態」，這也是《六問》與《六論》必須面對的相同處境。《六問》對《六論》的質疑，最具說服力者，應是「北京『憑甚麼』接受一中各表」這類的口吻，六篇長文不斷抬出「北京不答應」，據此反對一中各表；難道不怕有人也會用同一語氣請教《六問》，北京又「憑甚麼」接受「一中三憲」？
然而，北京不接受，未必是絕對不可變的事情。必須聲明，我們不反對「一中三憲」，且認為「一中各表」與「一中三憲」只是名異實同；而北京若能接受「一中三憲」，就沒有道理不接受「一中各表」，因為兩者皆是「泛杯子理論」與「泛屋頂理論」。令人遺憾的是，若為了主張「一中三憲」，卻要以北京「憑甚麼接受」來否定「一中各表」，那就是莫名所以了。
其實，為了解決兩岸僵局，在兩岸主政者與社會菁英間，出計獻策者不可勝數；其中有一共同困境，即皆須面對「北京不答應」或「台灣不接受」的難題，這也是「一中三憲」與「一中各表」的共同處境。雖然如此，兩岸卻仍然是議論滔滔，正是因為「不接受／不答應」未必是鐵板一塊。所有的「理念的創製」，皆須首先打破「墨守成規」的侷限。正如《六問》所說，東西德的《基礎條約》，與歐盟的《赫爾辛基最終議定書》，皆是穿透了許多「不答應／不接受」才破繭而出；同樣的，兩岸自「解放台灣」「反攻大陸」，能走到今日以「和平發展」為主軸基調，又何嘗不是穿透了許多「不答應／不接受」而形成？我們希望兩岸皆能接受「一中各表」，同時也歡迎兩岸能接受「一中三憲」；我們不在意誰的理論學說能成為兩岸的正式論述或旗幟，我們只關切如何經由「合理的過程」以實現兩岸「改善之目的」。
由於我們更強調過程論，所以不認為「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」是甚麼離經叛道的論述；我們也認為兩岸問題的終極解決，必須同時化解確實存在的台獨因素，所以只能轉化台獨，而不可想像把台獨一筆勾銷；尤其，「一中各表」與李登輝的「兩國論」，及民進黨的台獨，根本不是一回事，何能將之指為一丘之貉？三學者難道不是在「為箭畫靶」？
最後，我們要鄭重聲明，《元旦六論》與馬政府完全無關，連一點點關聯都沒有。其實，「一中各表」是一個仍在發展中的概念，我們在李登輝時代即主張「一中各表」，也不在意與馬政府「一中各表」的思考有何出入。我們的用心，只在嘗試為「一中各表」思考體系的建構略盡棉薄而已。我們歡迎「一中三憲」的創見，但也希望我們對「一中各表」的思考，勿被誤解及曲解。集思廣益，豈不甚好？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 25, 2010
Toward the end of last year the United Daily News published a series of six editorials entitled, "Thoughts on the 99th Year of the Founding of the Republic of China." They received considerable attention from people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. We do not necessarily believe the arguments presented in our editorial series are unassailable. We wrote them merely to stimulate discussion and encourage brainstorming.
Cross-Strait issues are troublesome. They provoke intense disagreement. We are gratified that many people agree with our "Six New Years Day Editorials." But we also respect those who disagree. But if our editorials have been misunderstood or misinterpreted, we would like to clarify our position, to avoid conveying any misleading impressions.
Chang Ya-chung, Hsieh Ta-ning, and Huang Kuang-kuo are three scholars. They have published an article entitled "Six Questions for the United Daily News." They maintain that the "One China, Different Interpretations" argument advanced in our Six New Years Day Editorials is equivalent to Taiwan independence, that it provides a breeding ground for Taiwan independence. This is a misunderstanding. This is also a distortion. [Translator's note: unable to ascertain the proper translation for "我們有不能已於言者"]
These three scholars have long been concerned about cross-Strait issues. They have made a number of in-depth investigations. They have offered many creative suggestions. They have inspired widespread admiration. But their recently published Six Questions touts their own theory of "One China, Same Interpretation," "One China, Three Constitutions," and "Cross-Strait Reunification," which they characterize as the "Strategic Cornerstone for Cross-Strait Peaceful Development." It refers to "One China, Different Interpretations" as illogical, infeasible, and inconsistent with the interests of the concerned parties. It even equates "One China, Different Interpretations" with hardline Taiwan independence, with creeping Taiwan independence, with a breeding ground for Taiwan independence, with shielding Taiwan independence, and with an independent Taiwan. To say that "One China, Different Interpretations" is infeasible is to express an opinion. But to suggest that "One China, Different interpretations" is the equivalent of Taiwan independence, or a breeding ground for Taiwan independence, is neither here nor there.
In fact, we see no clear-cut difference between their Six Questions and our Six Editorials. A detailed discussion will take time. But our two positions have at least two things in common.
First. Both advocate a Big Roof Theory. Our Six Editorials stress a process oriented theory for peaceful development. We hope to moderate, soften, transform, and improve upon the goal oriented theories for reunification and independence. Because we emphasize process orientation, we advocate a Chopsticks Theory involving neither reunification nor independence, and a Cup Theory which preserves the Constitution of the Republic of China and the status quo. Stressing process orientation does not mean evading the issue of goals. Therefore we also advocate a Big Roof Theory to deal with the issue of long term objectives. For example, the two sides could set up a confederation. The Six Questions seem to imply that "One China, Different Interpretations" fails to explain the meaning of "One China." But our Six Editorials make it clear that the "One China" in "One China, Different Interpretations" is a Big Roof, a Third Concept, a higher level concept. For example, setting up a confederation would involve a Third Constitution. It would be no different from their Six Questions. When it comes to "Different Interpretations," their Six Questions and our Six Editorials both champion a One China Constitution. We differ even less on this issue. Their Six Questions assert that accepting One China does not mean we must accept Beijing as the central government, and Taipei as a local government. But isn't that a kind of "Different Interpretation?" After all, their Six Questions do not accept the premise that "One China means the PRC." How different is that from our assertion that "One China" ought to refer to a Third Concept or Third Constitution? In fact, their Six Questions say that a peace agreement should be the first document to establish cross-Strait political mutual trust. That was also our proposal. So what's the difference?
Their Six Questions equates "One China, Different Interpretations" with Taiwan independence and a breeding ground for Taiwan independence. They even say it poses an embryonic threat. This distorts the facts. What champion of Taiwan independence would advocate a One China Constitution? What person attempting to establish a breeding ground for Taiwan independence would urge the two sides to return to the starting point, to Sun Yat-sen's 1911 Revolution? What person attempting to establish a breeding ground for Taiwan independence would advocate a rational process to clarify long term objectives?" The three scholars may have ambitious goals for a Greater China. But is it necessary to characterize others as having a waif mentality?
In fact, our Six Editorials proposes breaking cross-Straits relations into many parts. Their Six Questions proposes combining many parts into one. But without the parts how can one have the whole? Without the whole, how can the parts have any order? Processes and goals are mutually complementary. They need not be mutually contradictory.
Secondly, Beijing is the main variable. Their Six Questions characterize our Six Editorials as wishful thinking. They may have a point. But their Six Questions also unwittingly engage in wishful thinking. Their Six Questions point out that substantive power in cross-Strait relations is asymmetrical. But their Six Questions and our Six Editorials face the same problem. Their Six Questions pose a powerful challenge to our Six Editorials. They ask why Beijing would accept "One China, Different Interpretations." Their six lengthy articles point out that Beijing's repeated rejection of "One China, Different Interpretations" amounts to opposition. But aren't they afraid that people will say the same thing about their Six Questions? Why would Beijing accept "One China, Three Constitutions?"
Beijing's opposition is not cast in stone. We do not oppose "One China, Three Constitutions." We think that "One China, Different Interpretations" and "One China, Three Constitutions" are essentially the same thing. If Beijing can accept "One China, Three Constitutions," it has no reason not to accept "One China, Different Interpretations." Since both of them advocate the Big Cup Theory and Big Roof Theory. But it makes no sense to badmouth "One China, Different Interpretations" in order to advance "One China, Three Constitutions."
In order to resolve the cross-Strait impasse, political and civic leaders on both sides have proposed innumerable policy prescriptions. All of them have encountered the same problem -- rejection by Beijing, or rejection by Taipei. This is the same problem faced by "One China, Three Constitutions" and the "One China, Different Interpretations." Nevertheless, debates rage on both sides, because what is unacceptable isn't cast in stone. Creativity requires the breaking of molds. As their Six Questions noted, the Grundlagenvertragbasic, or Basic Treaty between East and West Germany and the European Union's Helsinki Final Act were repeatedly rejected before they were finally adopted. By the same token, the two sides have moved away from the rhetoric of "Liberate Taiwan!" and "Counterattack the mainland!" They have arrived at today's theme: peaceful development. Did they not succeed in breaking through the unacceptable? We hope the two sides can accept "One China, Different Interpretations." We hope the two sides can accept "One China, Three Constitutions." We do not care whose theories become the official basis for cross-Strait negotiations. We are concerned only about adopting a rational process for the formulation of cross-Strait objectives.
Because we stress process, we do not think that our assertion that Taiwan's future should be decided by 23 million people is a deviant position. We believe the ultimate resolution of cross-Strait issues must resolve the issue of Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence can only be transformed. It cannot be eradicated. In particular, "One China, Different Interpretations," Lee Teng-hui's "Two States," and the DPP's Taiwan independence are not one and the same. Why the accusation that we are birds of a feather? Are the three scholars merely seeking targets for their arrows?
Finally, we solemnly declare that our Six New Years Day Editorials have nothing to do with the Ma administration. Nothing whatsoever. In fact, "One China, Different Interpretations" is a concept still in development. During the Lee Teng-hui era we advocated "One China, Different Interpretations." We are not worried about whether the Ma administration's "One China, Different Interpretations" differs. We merely wish to make some small effort on behalf of "One China, Different Interpretations." We welcome the creative thinking behind "One China, Three Constitutions." But we hope "One China, Different Interpretations" will not be misunderstood and misinterpreted. Soliciting a wide range of opinions cannot be a bad thing.
「一中各表」等於台獨偏安？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.25 04:09 am
本報在歲末新正發表的《中華民國九十九年感思》系列社論六篇，受到兩岸有心人士的重視與討論；我們並不認為系列社論所言即是顛撲不破，而拋磚引玉、集思廣益，才是我們動念寫作的初衷。
兩岸問題是一個見仁見智的大難題。對於贊同《元旦六論》見解者，我們固然欣慰；對於不贊同者，我們也表尊重。但若有嚴重誤解或曲解，我們仍應試作說明，以免以訛傳訛。
張亞中、謝大寧、黃光國三位學者，發表《六問聯合報》，指《六論》所主張的「一中各表」，等於台獨，等於偏安；這是誤解，也是曲解，我們有不能已於言者。
三學者長期關注兩岸議題，鑽研甚深，創見亦多，令人欽敬。但此次發表《六問》，一方面標榜他門創製的「一中同表／一中三憲／兩岸統合」，喻為「兩岸和平發展的戰略基石」；另一方面，又指「一中各表」不合邏輯、不可行、不符合相關各造的利益，筆鋒一轉，甚至指「一中各表」與剛性台獨、柔性台獨、偏安台獨、偏安自保，及獨台是同一類屬的政治主張。若說「一中各表」不可行，當然可以見仁見智；但若說「一中各表」等於台獨、等於偏安，那就不知所云了。
其實，我們完全看不出《六問》與《六論》有甚麼斬釘截鐵的歧異。暫難細論，僅舉二者的最大共同點有二：
一、都是「泛屋頂理論」。《六論》的主軸，是強調和平發展的「過程論」，而欲以緩化、軟化、轉化，來改善統獨的「目的論」。因為強調「過程論」，所以主張「筷子理論」（不統／不獨），與「杯子理論」（維持「中華民國一中憲法」的「現狀」）；但強調「過程論」，亦並未迴避「目的論」，因此也主張可考慮以「屋頂理論」來處理「目的議題」，例如兩岸成立「邦聯」。《六問》似乎指稱：「一中各表」對「一中」的意涵交代不清，但《六論》卻說得很清楚：「一中各表」所說的「一中」，說的是「屋頂」，是「第三概念」、「上位概念」；比如，若成立「邦聯」就會出現「第三憲」，與《六問》無異；至於「各表」，《六問》與《六論》皆主張「一中憲法」，更無差別；《六問》又稱，「接受一中，不表示我們必然接受大陸為中央，台灣為地方」，這豈非也是一種「各表」？《六問》畢竟並不贊成「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，而認為「一個中國」應是「第三概念」（第三憲），這又與《六論》有何不同？甚至，《六問》主張，可經「和平協議」做為建立兩岸政治互信的「第一份文件」，這也是本報早有的提議，差別何在？
至於《六問》將「一中各表」說成與台獨與偏安無異，甚至說成皆是「螟蛉子之焦慮」，更不啻已是指鹿為馬。台獨會主張「一中憲法」嗎？偏安者會主張「兩岸共同回歸辛亥革命及孫中山的起點」嗎？會主張由「合理的過程」達到「改善之目的」嗎？三學者大可自詡有「經略大中華」的雄心壯志，但何必將他人說成「孤兒心態」？
其實，《六論》主張兩岸關係應「化整為零」，《六問》則是主張應當「化零為整」。然而，無零豈有整，無整則零亦亂；「過程」與「目的」應是首尾呼應、相輔相成，沒有非要相互對立的道理。
二、北京是主要的變數。《六問》稱，《六論》的觀點有一點一廂情願，我們承認；但《六問》的問題，則是在不知自己也有一點一廂情願。《六問》指出，「兩岸的物質權力處於不對稱狀態」，這也是《六問》與《六論》必須面對的相同處境。《六問》對《六論》的質疑，最具說服力者，應是「北京『憑甚麼』接受一中各表」這類的口吻，六篇長文不斷抬出「北京不答應」，據此反對一中各表；難道不怕有人也會用同一語氣請教《六問》，北京又「憑甚麼」接受「一中三憲」？
然而，北京不接受，未必是絕對不可變的事情。必須聲明，我們不反對「一中三憲」，且認為「一中各表」與「一中三憲」只是名異實同；而北京若能接受「一中三憲」，就沒有道理不接受「一中各表」，因為兩者皆是「泛杯子理論」與「泛屋頂理論」。令人遺憾的是，若為了主張「一中三憲」，卻要以北京「憑甚麼接受」來否定「一中各表」，那就是莫名所以了。
其實，為了解決兩岸僵局，在兩岸主政者與社會菁英間，出計獻策者不可勝數；其中有一共同困境，即皆須面對「北京不答應」或「台灣不接受」的難題，這也是「一中三憲」與「一中各表」的共同處境。雖然如此，兩岸卻仍然是議論滔滔，正是因為「不接受／不答應」未必是鐵板一塊。所有的「理念的創製」，皆須首先打破「墨守成規」的侷限。正如《六問》所說，東西德的《基礎條約》，與歐盟的《赫爾辛基最終議定書》，皆是穿透了許多「不答應／不接受」才破繭而出；同樣的，兩岸自「解放台灣」「反攻大陸」，能走到今日以「和平發展」為主軸基調，又何嘗不是穿透了許多「不答應／不接受」而形成？我們希望兩岸皆能接受「一中各表」，同時也歡迎兩岸能接受「一中三憲」；我們不在意誰的理論學說能成為兩岸的正式論述或旗幟，我們只關切如何經由「合理的過程」以實現兩岸「改善之目的」。
由於我們更強調過程論，所以不認為「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」是甚麼離經叛道的論述；我們也認為兩岸問題的終極解決，必須同時化解確實存在的台獨因素，所以只能轉化台獨，而不可想像把台獨一筆勾銷；尤其，「一中各表」與李登輝的「兩國論」，及民進黨的台獨，根本不是一回事，何能將之指為一丘之貉？三學者難道不是在「為箭畫靶」？
最後，我們要鄭重聲明，《元旦六論》與馬政府完全無關，連一點點關聯都沒有。其實，「一中各表」是一個仍在發展中的概念，我們在李登輝時代即主張「一中各表」，也不在意與馬政府「一中各表」的思考有何出入。我們的用心，只在嘗試為「一中各表」思考體系的建構略盡棉薄而已。我們歡迎「一中三憲」的創見，但也希望我們對「一中各表」的思考，勿被誤解及曲解。集思廣益，豈不甚好？
Friday, January 22, 2010
Su Huan-chih and Hsu Tien-tsai: Why Not Forcibly Occupy the Podium in the Legislature?
Su Huan-chih and Hsu Tien-tsai: Why Not Forcibly Occupy the Podium in the Legislature?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 22, 2010
The ruling and opposition parties were stalemated in the Legislature over the Law of Local Institutions. But eventually after several bouts of scuffling, they successfully held a vote. Such scenes have become commonplace. What leaves the public most angry and confused is that the Legislative Yuan has already undergone a number of structural reforms. It has an internal consultation system. It has a voting system. Yet every time it votes, physical confrontations erupt because the DPP "occupies the podium" by means of brute force. Must the Republic of China legislature remain trapped outside the evolutionary path of democracy?
We're not sure when physically occupying the podium using brute physical force became the DPP's political trademark. Years ago the DPP accused the KMT of one party rule. Their sentiments were shared by society. This led to the reform of the "10,000 Year Legislature." But when the DPP became the ruling party, it continued to throw shoes at its political opponents in the legislature. It continued to use superglue to disable locks to the doors of the legislature, in order to block the passage of bills that did not meet with its approval. The current legislature is the seventh. Its composition is based on the single member district, two ballot system the Green Camp demanded and got. Yet the Democratic Progressive Party continues its practice of physically occupying the podium by means of brute force, It offers all sorts of elaborate rationalizatons for its brawling. But the Blue Camp commands a huge majority in the legislature. It represents the clearly expressed will of a democratic majority. Can the DPP truly ignore this simple reality?
The way the Law of Local Institutions was amended was indeed rushed. The process was indeed too hasty. It was indeed less than entirely rational. But the amended law is an improvement over the original one. The most controversial items have been revised. Additional provisions have been made for the reassignment of township and city mayors to district chiefs. Township and city representatives may not be reassigned to the District Advisory Committee. They may not receive 45,000 NT in research fees. The ruling and opposition parties had already reached a consensus in the morning. But by the afternoon Tsai Ing-wen and Ko Chien-min suddenly reneged. Under the circumstances, the public cannot help wondering whether the Democratic Progressive Party's stonewalling was motivated purely by the desire for a violent confrontation, and by the desire to occupy the podium purely for the sake of occupying the podium.
The Democratic Progressive Party stonewalls on every issue. It practices a "scorched-earth policy." This shows that its actions are utterly unprincipled, and that the DPP is utterly insincere concerning the rational evaluation of public policy. When the DPP was in power it proposed amendments to the Law of Local Institutions. It proposed abolishing township and municipal self-government elections, township and mayor appointments, and the township people's congress. It attempted to abolish grass-roots elections on a scale far greater than today's restructuring of the five major metropolitan areas. Predictably, now that the DPP's role has changed, it is turning around and denouncing the KMT, accusing it of amending the law in order to disrupt local self-government and undermine constitutional order. Apparently the Democratic Progressive Party's stand on the Law of Local Institutions changes according to whether it is in or out of office.
Worse still, the Executive Yuan's original version originally stipulated that township and municipal representatives reassigned to the District Advisory Committee could receive a 45,000 NT monthly salary. This stipulation was advanced by DPP Tainan Mayor Su Huan-chi and DPP Tainan County Executive Hsu Tien-tsai. During consultations between the central and local governments, other participants agreed with the DPP city mayors and county executives. It was only when the legislature began its third reading that the Green Camp suddenly sounded the alarm and accused the KMT of attempting to "install its own people." It even proclaimed that it would defend constitutional government "to the death." But doesn't the Democratic Progressive Party leadership's heroic posturing directly contradict its city mayors' and county executives' opportunism? Doesn't it reveal the DPP's internal contradictions. Doesn't it reveal how it says one thing, but does another thing? The Ma administration's decision-making process may be obtuse. But the chronic and habitual hypocrisy of the Democratic Progressive Party makes it impossible for the public to find any emotional relief.
As far as the KMT is concerned, it won a victory during the melee over the Law of Local Institutions. The Ma adminstration bears scars from the process. An initial lack of communication and evaluation, along with blind obedience of DPP city mayors and county executives led to wrong decisions and widespread discontent. Eventually a brawl within an extraordinary session resolved the differences, and blocked the DPP's attempt to interfere with the review procedure. Actually, it was merely technical victory. But Blue Camp legislators have felt considerable excitement over the past two days. Wang Jin-pyng declared that "This is more like it. This is the way political party must conduct itself." In the end the KMT broke the senseless deadlock the Democratic Progressive Party created when it physically occupied the podium using brute force. This could be considered progress. The important thing is that the Blue Camp legislators, who constitute a three quarters supermajority, have finally become a team. Even more significantly, the will of the people, expressed two years ago during the legislative elections, has finally broken through psychological and strategic barriers in the Legislative Yuan. It is finally enabling the machinery of government to function.
In today's open political environment, the ruling party has little room for clandestine operations. Many deficiencies in administrative decision-making can be overseen by the media and improved by elected representatives. That is why the DPP must forsake its strategy of "perpetual protests." It must adopt more rational means of checks and balances. Only then can it avoid sacrificing the interests of the nation and the public with day after day of scorched-earth warfare.
Why don't Su Huan-chih and Hsu Tien-tsai come to the Legislative Yuan and physically occupy the podium by means of brute force? The Democratic Progressive Party has long been more adept at rhetoric than the KMT. But its dismal record of governance has given the public an insight into chaotic policy. The DPP must find a more civilized strategy for ensuring checks and balances. It must establish a comprehensive policy. It must overcome its own contradictions and hypocrisy. Only then can the DPP restructure itself and raise its political stature.
為何蘇煥智、許添財不到立法院「霸台」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.22 03:22 am
朝野為地制法在立法院僵持鎮日，最後在幾波扭打中完成表決。這類景象固已司空見慣，但最使民眾感到憤怒與困惑的是：立法院結構歷經多少次改革，內部有協商機制、有表決機制，但每次都要鬧到「霸佔主席台」的肢體衝突收場，台灣國會真要自陷於民主發展「進化論」的正軌之外嗎？
罷台阻撓議事，不知何時已變成民進黨的政治專利。民進黨當年指控國民黨一黨獨大，掀起社會共鳴，促成了萬年國會的改革；但輪到它變成了執政黨，卻依舊在立法院使用扔鞋、強力膠封門的伎倆強力阻擋法案。現今的第七屆國會，是根據綠營主張的單一選區兩票制而產生，民進黨卻仍把罷台、群毆說得振振有詞；但立院藍大綠小所代表的民意，對民進黨一點都不算數嗎？
這次地制法修正，過程確嫌倉促草率，也未盡合理。但新的修正案已就原先版本中的重大爭議作了改進，除對鄉鎮市長轉任區長增設門檻，也排除鄉鎮市民代表轉任區諮委可月領四萬五千元研究費的規定。更何況，朝野上午原已就此達成協商共識，下午隨即又傳出蔡英文及柯建銘反對而推翻；在這種情況下，不得不讓人懷疑：民進黨的杯葛只是「為戰而戰」、「為霸台而霸台」而已。
民進黨這種凡事杯葛的「焦土策略」，其實更暴露它出爾反爾、毫無原則的問政心態。民進黨執政時期，即曾提出過地制法修正案，擬議全面取消鄉鎮市自治選舉，鄉鎮市長改為派任，裁撤鄉鎮市民代表大會；當時企圖廢除基層選舉的規模，要比今天因應五都改制的調整大上許多。孰料，如今角色一變，民進黨卻反咬國民黨修法是打亂自治體系、重創憲政秩序。民進黨對地方制度改革的原則，是因時因人而異嗎？
尤有甚者，當初政院版規定鄉鎮市民代表轉任區諮委可月領四萬五，本是民進黨台南縣市長蘇煥智及許添財提出來的主張，在中央與地方協商時，其他與會民進黨縣市長亦皆贊同。直到立法院進入三讀，綠營才突然大喊狼來了，指控國民黨此舉是意圖「綁樁」，還宣稱要「誓死」捍衛憲政。民進黨中央如此故作英勇正義狀，不正是反襯了其縣市首長的投機，也暴露了自己說一套、做一套的矛盾嗎？馬政府的決策固愚不可及，但民進黨的偽善、反覆，只怕更難令人民寬心。
對國民黨而言，地制法之役雖然在混亂中勝出，馬政府其實也傷痕累累。當初溝通不足、思慮不周，甚至盲從民進黨縣市長的提議作出錯誤的決策，肇下異聲四起的後果。最後，召開臨時會打群架解決歧見，並用復議堵死民進黨的程序干擾，其實也只能稱為「技術性」的勝利。但從藍軍立委這兩日的興奮之情看來，包括王金平宣稱「這才像個政黨」，畢竟，能夠突破民進黨無謂霸台的僵局，也算是一次頗具意義的進展。重要的，不是占四分之三藍軍立委總算變成了一支有意志的隊伍，更具實質意義的是，兩年前國會大選所凝聚的選民意志，終於讓立法院能突破它的心理障礙和戰略障礙，至少讓國家機器能夠運作。
在今天開放的政治環境下，執政黨其實已沒有太多黑箱運作的空間，許多行政決策缺失，都可以透過輿論辨正或民意代表的監督而獲得調整與改善。也因此，民進黨必須放棄「無限抗爭」路線，改採比較理性的制衡，才不會在日復一日的焦土作戰中，把國家和人民的利益一起犧牲掉。
為何蘇煥智和許添財不到立法院霸台？民進黨一直有「長於論述」的優勢，但它的執政紀錄，讓人民見識到其「政策」的錯亂。找到更文明的制衡戰略，建立完整的政策體系，克服自己的矛盾與偽善，也許民進黨就能找到轉型升級之鑰。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 22, 2010
The ruling and opposition parties were stalemated in the Legislature over the Law of Local Institutions. But eventually after several bouts of scuffling, they successfully held a vote. Such scenes have become commonplace. What leaves the public most angry and confused is that the Legislative Yuan has already undergone a number of structural reforms. It has an internal consultation system. It has a voting system. Yet every time it votes, physical confrontations erupt because the DPP "occupies the podium" by means of brute force. Must the Republic of China legislature remain trapped outside the evolutionary path of democracy?
We're not sure when physically occupying the podium using brute physical force became the DPP's political trademark. Years ago the DPP accused the KMT of one party rule. Their sentiments were shared by society. This led to the reform of the "10,000 Year Legislature." But when the DPP became the ruling party, it continued to throw shoes at its political opponents in the legislature. It continued to use superglue to disable locks to the doors of the legislature, in order to block the passage of bills that did not meet with its approval. The current legislature is the seventh. Its composition is based on the single member district, two ballot system the Green Camp demanded and got. Yet the Democratic Progressive Party continues its practice of physically occupying the podium by means of brute force, It offers all sorts of elaborate rationalizatons for its brawling. But the Blue Camp commands a huge majority in the legislature. It represents the clearly expressed will of a democratic majority. Can the DPP truly ignore this simple reality?
The way the Law of Local Institutions was amended was indeed rushed. The process was indeed too hasty. It was indeed less than entirely rational. But the amended law is an improvement over the original one. The most controversial items have been revised. Additional provisions have been made for the reassignment of township and city mayors to district chiefs. Township and city representatives may not be reassigned to the District Advisory Committee. They may not receive 45,000 NT in research fees. The ruling and opposition parties had already reached a consensus in the morning. But by the afternoon Tsai Ing-wen and Ko Chien-min suddenly reneged. Under the circumstances, the public cannot help wondering whether the Democratic Progressive Party's stonewalling was motivated purely by the desire for a violent confrontation, and by the desire to occupy the podium purely for the sake of occupying the podium.
The Democratic Progressive Party stonewalls on every issue. It practices a "scorched-earth policy." This shows that its actions are utterly unprincipled, and that the DPP is utterly insincere concerning the rational evaluation of public policy. When the DPP was in power it proposed amendments to the Law of Local Institutions. It proposed abolishing township and municipal self-government elections, township and mayor appointments, and the township people's congress. It attempted to abolish grass-roots elections on a scale far greater than today's restructuring of the five major metropolitan areas. Predictably, now that the DPP's role has changed, it is turning around and denouncing the KMT, accusing it of amending the law in order to disrupt local self-government and undermine constitutional order. Apparently the Democratic Progressive Party's stand on the Law of Local Institutions changes according to whether it is in or out of office.
Worse still, the Executive Yuan's original version originally stipulated that township and municipal representatives reassigned to the District Advisory Committee could receive a 45,000 NT monthly salary. This stipulation was advanced by DPP Tainan Mayor Su Huan-chi and DPP Tainan County Executive Hsu Tien-tsai. During consultations between the central and local governments, other participants agreed with the DPP city mayors and county executives. It was only when the legislature began its third reading that the Green Camp suddenly sounded the alarm and accused the KMT of attempting to "install its own people." It even proclaimed that it would defend constitutional government "to the death." But doesn't the Democratic Progressive Party leadership's heroic posturing directly contradict its city mayors' and county executives' opportunism? Doesn't it reveal the DPP's internal contradictions. Doesn't it reveal how it says one thing, but does another thing? The Ma administration's decision-making process may be obtuse. But the chronic and habitual hypocrisy of the Democratic Progressive Party makes it impossible for the public to find any emotional relief.
As far as the KMT is concerned, it won a victory during the melee over the Law of Local Institutions. The Ma adminstration bears scars from the process. An initial lack of communication and evaluation, along with blind obedience of DPP city mayors and county executives led to wrong decisions and widespread discontent. Eventually a brawl within an extraordinary session resolved the differences, and blocked the DPP's attempt to interfere with the review procedure. Actually, it was merely technical victory. But Blue Camp legislators have felt considerable excitement over the past two days. Wang Jin-pyng declared that "This is more like it. This is the way political party must conduct itself." In the end the KMT broke the senseless deadlock the Democratic Progressive Party created when it physically occupied the podium using brute force. This could be considered progress. The important thing is that the Blue Camp legislators, who constitute a three quarters supermajority, have finally become a team. Even more significantly, the will of the people, expressed two years ago during the legislative elections, has finally broken through psychological and strategic barriers in the Legislative Yuan. It is finally enabling the machinery of government to function.
In today's open political environment, the ruling party has little room for clandestine operations. Many deficiencies in administrative decision-making can be overseen by the media and improved by elected representatives. That is why the DPP must forsake its strategy of "perpetual protests." It must adopt more rational means of checks and balances. Only then can it avoid sacrificing the interests of the nation and the public with day after day of scorched-earth warfare.
Why don't Su Huan-chih and Hsu Tien-tsai come to the Legislative Yuan and physically occupy the podium by means of brute force? The Democratic Progressive Party has long been more adept at rhetoric than the KMT. But its dismal record of governance has given the public an insight into chaotic policy. The DPP must find a more civilized strategy for ensuring checks and balances. It must establish a comprehensive policy. It must overcome its own contradictions and hypocrisy. Only then can the DPP restructure itself and raise its political stature.
為何蘇煥智、許添財不到立法院「霸台」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.22 03:22 am
朝野為地制法在立法院僵持鎮日，最後在幾波扭打中完成表決。這類景象固已司空見慣，但最使民眾感到憤怒與困惑的是：立法院結構歷經多少次改革，內部有協商機制、有表決機制，但每次都要鬧到「霸佔主席台」的肢體衝突收場，台灣國會真要自陷於民主發展「進化論」的正軌之外嗎？
罷台阻撓議事，不知何時已變成民進黨的政治專利。民進黨當年指控國民黨一黨獨大，掀起社會共鳴，促成了萬年國會的改革；但輪到它變成了執政黨，卻依舊在立法院使用扔鞋、強力膠封門的伎倆強力阻擋法案。現今的第七屆國會，是根據綠營主張的單一選區兩票制而產生，民進黨卻仍把罷台、群毆說得振振有詞；但立院藍大綠小所代表的民意，對民進黨一點都不算數嗎？
這次地制法修正，過程確嫌倉促草率，也未盡合理。但新的修正案已就原先版本中的重大爭議作了改進，除對鄉鎮市長轉任區長增設門檻，也排除鄉鎮市民代表轉任區諮委可月領四萬五千元研究費的規定。更何況，朝野上午原已就此達成協商共識，下午隨即又傳出蔡英文及柯建銘反對而推翻；在這種情況下，不得不讓人懷疑：民進黨的杯葛只是「為戰而戰」、「為霸台而霸台」而已。
民進黨這種凡事杯葛的「焦土策略」，其實更暴露它出爾反爾、毫無原則的問政心態。民進黨執政時期，即曾提出過地制法修正案，擬議全面取消鄉鎮市自治選舉，鄉鎮市長改為派任，裁撤鄉鎮市民代表大會；當時企圖廢除基層選舉的規模，要比今天因應五都改制的調整大上許多。孰料，如今角色一變，民進黨卻反咬國民黨修法是打亂自治體系、重創憲政秩序。民進黨對地方制度改革的原則，是因時因人而異嗎？
尤有甚者，當初政院版規定鄉鎮市民代表轉任區諮委可月領四萬五，本是民進黨台南縣市長蘇煥智及許添財提出來的主張，在中央與地方協商時，其他與會民進黨縣市長亦皆贊同。直到立法院進入三讀，綠營才突然大喊狼來了，指控國民黨此舉是意圖「綁樁」，還宣稱要「誓死」捍衛憲政。民進黨中央如此故作英勇正義狀，不正是反襯了其縣市首長的投機，也暴露了自己說一套、做一套的矛盾嗎？馬政府的決策固愚不可及，但民進黨的偽善、反覆，只怕更難令人民寬心。
對國民黨而言，地制法之役雖然在混亂中勝出，馬政府其實也傷痕累累。當初溝通不足、思慮不周，甚至盲從民進黨縣市長的提議作出錯誤的決策，肇下異聲四起的後果。最後，召開臨時會打群架解決歧見，並用復議堵死民進黨的程序干擾，其實也只能稱為「技術性」的勝利。但從藍軍立委這兩日的興奮之情看來，包括王金平宣稱「這才像個政黨」，畢竟，能夠突破民進黨無謂霸台的僵局，也算是一次頗具意義的進展。重要的，不是占四分之三藍軍立委總算變成了一支有意志的隊伍，更具實質意義的是，兩年前國會大選所凝聚的選民意志，終於讓立法院能突破它的心理障礙和戰略障礙，至少讓國家機器能夠運作。
在今天開放的政治環境下，執政黨其實已沒有太多黑箱運作的空間，許多行政決策缺失，都可以透過輿論辨正或民意代表的監督而獲得調整與改善。也因此，民進黨必須放棄「無限抗爭」路線，改採比較理性的制衡，才不會在日復一日的焦土作戰中，把國家和人民的利益一起犧牲掉。
為何蘇煥智和許添財不到立法院霸台？民進黨一直有「長於論述」的優勢，但它的執政紀錄，讓人民見識到其「政策」的錯亂。找到更文明的制衡戰略，建立完整的政策體系，克服自己的矛盾與偽善，也許民進黨就能找到轉型升級之鑰。
Thursday, January 21, 2010
When Chen Tsung-ming and Shih Mao-lin Turn Up in Huang Fang-yen's Living Room
When Chen Tsung-ming and Shih Mao-lin Turn Up in Huang Fang-yen's Living Room
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 21, 2010
The public does not know whether Chen Tsung-ming leaked case information to Huang Fang-yen. But the Control Yuan had good reason to conclude that Chen Tsung-ming was happy to see Huang Fang-yen flee the country and go into hiding. After all, if Huang Fang-yen was investigated, he just might reveal the details of his association with Chen Tsung-ming, to the serious detriment of Chen Tsung-ming.
The articles of impeachment describe the February 26, 2007 Chinese New Years banquet at Huang Fang-yen's house in great detail. Control Yuan Member Li Fu-dian, a co-sponsor, said that Minister of Justice Shih Mao-lin and Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming attended the banquet. Together they appeared at the private residence of Huang Fang-yen, a suspect in the Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-cheng corruption cases. This was not merely questionable, it raised "suspicions of criminal conduct." Li Fu-dian concluded that there were clear grounds for suspicion.
Chen Tsung-ming's rebuttal was hardly convincing. He said "According to this logic, nobody is permitted to have contacts with those in power." But Chen Tsung-ming is the Prosecutor General. He is not just anybody. At the time Huang Fang-yen was a key figure in the Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-cheng corruption case. How could he be considered "just another person close to the ruling government?" Yet both the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General showed up in Huang Fang-yen's home, the same time that the Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-cheng corruption cases were making the headlines. How can this be possibly be classified as routine contacts with those in power?
Control Yuan member Chien Lin Hui-chung, another co-sponsor, said that "anyone who bothered to read a paper" at the time knew that Huang Fang-yen and Chen Shui-bian had a special relationship. They had special roles in Chen Shui-bian's corruption case. Chen Tsung-ming and Shih Mao-lin were even more familiar with the facts of the case than the average citizen. How could they not know who Huang Fang-yen was? The Chinese New Years banquet Chen Tsung-ming and Huang Fang-yen attended had already raised "suspicions of criminal conduct." Yet Chen Tsung-ming had the temerity to argue that "According to this logic, nobody is permitted to have contacts with those in power." He had the gall to feign innocence. This is both self-deception and deception of others. This is especially unforgivable.
That Chinese New Years banquet was perhaps the single most sordid political scenario in recent memory. It was perhaps the most shameful judicial scenario in recent memory. Add to this Bureau of Investigation Chief Yeh Sheng-mao's leaking of case information collected by the Egmont Group to Chen Shui-bian during the same period. The public can imagine how far the nation's justice system degenerated under DPP rule. The justice system had already lost its transcendent status. Even the "Three Heads" had been reduced to hatchetmen. The public believes the "Three Heads" covered up Chen Shui-bian's corruption. It suspects even the relationship between the justice system and the ruling government. It wonders why the High Speed Rail System scandal was prosecuted so haphazardly and why the focus was deliberately shifted to peripheral instead of central issues.
The "Three Heads" are responsible for the administration of justice. But by then they had become the president's accomplices -- tools for political domination and political infighting. Ironically, reports of Chen Tsung-ming's Chinese New Years banquet at Huang Fang-yen's house originated with then Minister of Justice Shih Mao-lin. Shih Mao-lin's report emulated Chen Tsung-ming's legal response. Shih Mao-lin's report naturally failed to mention his own presence on the premises. Chen Tsung-ming naturally failed to mention Shih Mao-lin's presence. The Control Yuan's impeachment notes that both of them were present. Leave aside the question of whether they are criminal suspects. Their reports alone are prima facie evidence of perjury. Are they qualified to continue serving as Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General?
It is rumored that the Control Yuan's impeachment of Chen Tsung-ming has provoked a "reaction from prosecuters at the grassroots level." Do prosecutors truly believe Chen Tsung-ming and Shih Mao-lin did nothing wrong when they visited Huang Fang-yen, just as the Chen Shui-bian corruption case was reaching full boil? Is it unreasonable to suspect criminal conduct in the Chinese New Years banquet incident? Is it unreasonable to suspect a connection between "imperial witness" Huang Fang-yen's flight abroad and Chen Tsung-ming's concern that Huang might turn around and implicate him? Is it unreasonable to conclude that Chen Tsung-ming's characterization of Huang Fang-yen as "an ordinary acquaintance" was unmitigated nonsense? The Control Yuan's impeachment was initiated only after the Chen corruption case reached a certain point. Did so-called "prosecutors at the grassroots level" really consider the impeachment interference with the judicial process? In fact the Control Yuan's impeachment helped rid the ranks of prosecutors of rotten apples. Yet so-called "prosecutors at the grassroots level" characterized the Control Yuan's actions as persecution of the virtuous. Is their characterization not just a wee bit dubious?
These self-styled "prosecutors at the grassroots level" are clearly a minority. Their perception is at dramatic odds with that of the public. Why don't these self-styled "prosecutors at the grassroots level" host a Chinese New Years banquet and invite all the key people in the cases they are prosecuting? They can assure the public they are engaging in "nothing more than routine contacts with ordinary people."
Chen Tsung-ming's attitude is no different from those of the typical criminal suspect. "You think I committed a crime? Prove it!" He is arguing that if there is no evidence that he committed a crime, then he cannot be impeached for attending a Chinese New Years banquet with Huang Fang-yen. Real prosecutors at the grass-roots level have encountered many suspects who talk tough but who have no leg to stand on. Does Chen Tsung-ming really consider his attitude following the commission of a crime something the public ought to emulate?
If the judicial system wishes to redeem itself, it must set an example for the nation. Shih Mao-lin, Chen Tsung-ming, and Yeh Sheng-mao are the "Three Heads" responsible for the administration of justice. Their conduct as individuals was questionable. Worse, they and the president were accomplices who undermined the nation's system of justice. Add to this triumvirate a fourth, Grand Justice Cheng Chung-mo, who helped the president lobby legislators. This is the worst example of an independent judiciary being undermined since the lifting of martial law. It is an example of the irreparable damage the DPP inflicted upon our nation and society during its rule. We still do not know whether members of the judiciary feel shame. They appear intent on inflicting material injury upon others. This is no longer a question of Chen, Shih, Yeh and their personal reputations. This is an indication that judicial reform has undergone catastrophic failure.
當陳聰明與施茂林出現在黃芳彥的客廳
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.21 03:22 am
國人不知陳聰明是否洩密縱放黃芳彥，但從監察院的彈劾文看來，若謂陳聰明應有樂見黃芳彥畏罪潛逃的理由，似屬合理的懷疑。因為，黃芳彥倘若進入偵審，一旦供出他與陳聰明的過從細節，恐對陳聰明極為不利。
彈劾文對二○○七年二月廿六日夜黃芳彥家的那場春酒，描述甚詳。提案監委李復甸認為，這場春酒，法務部長施茂林及檢察總長陳聰明，一同出現在扁案及珍案重大關係人黃芳彥私宅，非僅可議，更有「犯罪嫌疑」。李復甸的判斷，自是建立在合理的懷疑之上。
陳聰明事後的辯駁不足採信。他說：「若按照這個邏輯，豈不是任何人都不能與執政者身邊的人交往？」但是，陳聰明身為檢察總長，豈是「任何人」？而黃芳彥在當時已明確是扁案與珍案的重大關係人，又豈僅是「執政者身邊的一般人」？而法務部長及檢察總長二人，居然在扁案珍案大爆期間，雙雙出現在黃芳彥的家中，這又豈是「一般的交往」而已？
如提案委員錢林慧君所說，當時「只要看報」即知黃芳彥與扁家的非常關係與在扁案中的非常角色；而陳聰明及施茂林對案情內幕尤較一般國人清楚，豈能不知黃芳彥是何等人物？何況，陳聰明參與黃芳彥的那場春酒，已有「犯罪嫌疑」；如今居然又辯稱「豈不是任何人都不能與執政者身邊的人交往」，故作天真無辜狀，更是自欺欺人，尤是罪無可恕。
那場春酒，可謂是最骯髒的政治場景，也是最可恥的司法醜相。若再加上在同一時期調查局長葉盛茂將艾格蒙情資洩露給陳水扁；國人應可想像，國家司法行政這一塊在民進黨主政階段，已然墮落、沉淪、解構至何等地步？司法行政的超然地位蕩然，連「三長」都淪為政治僕役鷹犬；國人此刻已不僅對當時「三長」如何包庇扁案產生重大懷疑，甚至亦對當年整個「法政關係」也疑竇叢生。比如說：高捷案何以辦得如此雞零狗碎、避重就輕？
司法行政的三長，當時顯已成為總統藉司法為統治及政爭工具的共犯結構。可笑的是，陳聰明在黃芳彥家的春酒宴，調查報告居然是出自當時的法務部長施茂林之手；而施茂林的報告當然是照抄陳聰明的答辯書。施茂林在報告中不說當日自己也在場，陳聰明當然也不說施茂林在場。現在，監察院的彈劾文指出二人同時在場，姑且不論「犯罪嫌疑」，僅以二人在報告中說謊偽證，他們還有資格擔任法務部長及檢察總長嗎？
據說，監院彈劾陳聰明，引發「檢方基層」的「反彈」。國人要問：難道檢察官認為陳聰明與施茂林在扁案沸騰時應當赴黃芳彥私宅之約？難道謂這場春酒中有「犯罪嫌疑」，不是合理的懷疑？難道不懷疑「帝王證人」黃芳彥的逃亡，與陳聰明怕他在進入偵審後將他咬出有關？難道認為陳聰明事後故作天真無辜地將黃芳彥說成「一般交往」不是胡說八道？監察院的彈劾，是在扁案告一段落後才發動，然而，所謂的「檢方基層」卻認為干涉司法；再者，監察院的彈劾，其實是在為檢方清除害群之馬，所謂的「檢方基層」竟認為是殘害忠良。如此解讀，寧非怪事？
這些顯然是少數的「檢方基層」，若與社會認知出現如此嚴重的落差，何不相率與各位承辦案件中的重大關係人們，在即將到臨的春節舉行一場擴大聯歡春酒，並昭告國人：這只是「任何人與一般人的平常交往」而已！
陳聰明如今的態度其實與一般嫌犯無異，不外就是一句：「拿出我犯罪的證據來！」；若無犯罪的證據，豈能彈劾我與黃芳彥喝春酒？「檢方基層」看多了這類理不直卻氣壯的嫌犯，難道會認為陳聰明這種「犯後態度」，可以作為國人的示範？
司法界若要自救，必須建立正確的人物典型。施茂林、陳聰明及葉盛茂三長，非但其個人的言行可議，甚且已然與當時的總統一體成為重創司法正義的共犯結構（還有幫總統向立委拉票的大法官城仲模）；這是解嚴以後力倡司法公正獨立的大沉淪及大解構，也是民進黨政府對國家社會造成的難以彌償的傷害。倘若司法界尚不知引以為恥，反而竟有物傷其類的味道；那就不只是陳、施、葉三長身敗名裂的問題，而將是整個司法改革的解構與破滅。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 21, 2010
The public does not know whether Chen Tsung-ming leaked case information to Huang Fang-yen. But the Control Yuan had good reason to conclude that Chen Tsung-ming was happy to see Huang Fang-yen flee the country and go into hiding. After all, if Huang Fang-yen was investigated, he just might reveal the details of his association with Chen Tsung-ming, to the serious detriment of Chen Tsung-ming.
The articles of impeachment describe the February 26, 2007 Chinese New Years banquet at Huang Fang-yen's house in great detail. Control Yuan Member Li Fu-dian, a co-sponsor, said that Minister of Justice Shih Mao-lin and Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming attended the banquet. Together they appeared at the private residence of Huang Fang-yen, a suspect in the Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-cheng corruption cases. This was not merely questionable, it raised "suspicions of criminal conduct." Li Fu-dian concluded that there were clear grounds for suspicion.
Chen Tsung-ming's rebuttal was hardly convincing. He said "According to this logic, nobody is permitted to have contacts with those in power." But Chen Tsung-ming is the Prosecutor General. He is not just anybody. At the time Huang Fang-yen was a key figure in the Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-cheng corruption case. How could he be considered "just another person close to the ruling government?" Yet both the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General showed up in Huang Fang-yen's home, the same time that the Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-cheng corruption cases were making the headlines. How can this be possibly be classified as routine contacts with those in power?
Control Yuan member Chien Lin Hui-chung, another co-sponsor, said that "anyone who bothered to read a paper" at the time knew that Huang Fang-yen and Chen Shui-bian had a special relationship. They had special roles in Chen Shui-bian's corruption case. Chen Tsung-ming and Shih Mao-lin were even more familiar with the facts of the case than the average citizen. How could they not know who Huang Fang-yen was? The Chinese New Years banquet Chen Tsung-ming and Huang Fang-yen attended had already raised "suspicions of criminal conduct." Yet Chen Tsung-ming had the temerity to argue that "According to this logic, nobody is permitted to have contacts with those in power." He had the gall to feign innocence. This is both self-deception and deception of others. This is especially unforgivable.
That Chinese New Years banquet was perhaps the single most sordid political scenario in recent memory. It was perhaps the most shameful judicial scenario in recent memory. Add to this Bureau of Investigation Chief Yeh Sheng-mao's leaking of case information collected by the Egmont Group to Chen Shui-bian during the same period. The public can imagine how far the nation's justice system degenerated under DPP rule. The justice system had already lost its transcendent status. Even the "Three Heads" had been reduced to hatchetmen. The public believes the "Three Heads" covered up Chen Shui-bian's corruption. It suspects even the relationship between the justice system and the ruling government. It wonders why the High Speed Rail System scandal was prosecuted so haphazardly and why the focus was deliberately shifted to peripheral instead of central issues.
The "Three Heads" are responsible for the administration of justice. But by then they had become the president's accomplices -- tools for political domination and political infighting. Ironically, reports of Chen Tsung-ming's Chinese New Years banquet at Huang Fang-yen's house originated with then Minister of Justice Shih Mao-lin. Shih Mao-lin's report emulated Chen Tsung-ming's legal response. Shih Mao-lin's report naturally failed to mention his own presence on the premises. Chen Tsung-ming naturally failed to mention Shih Mao-lin's presence. The Control Yuan's impeachment notes that both of them were present. Leave aside the question of whether they are criminal suspects. Their reports alone are prima facie evidence of perjury. Are they qualified to continue serving as Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General?
It is rumored that the Control Yuan's impeachment of Chen Tsung-ming has provoked a "reaction from prosecuters at the grassroots level." Do prosecutors truly believe Chen Tsung-ming and Shih Mao-lin did nothing wrong when they visited Huang Fang-yen, just as the Chen Shui-bian corruption case was reaching full boil? Is it unreasonable to suspect criminal conduct in the Chinese New Years banquet incident? Is it unreasonable to suspect a connection between "imperial witness" Huang Fang-yen's flight abroad and Chen Tsung-ming's concern that Huang might turn around and implicate him? Is it unreasonable to conclude that Chen Tsung-ming's characterization of Huang Fang-yen as "an ordinary acquaintance" was unmitigated nonsense? The Control Yuan's impeachment was initiated only after the Chen corruption case reached a certain point. Did so-called "prosecutors at the grassroots level" really consider the impeachment interference with the judicial process? In fact the Control Yuan's impeachment helped rid the ranks of prosecutors of rotten apples. Yet so-called "prosecutors at the grassroots level" characterized the Control Yuan's actions as persecution of the virtuous. Is their characterization not just a wee bit dubious?
These self-styled "prosecutors at the grassroots level" are clearly a minority. Their perception is at dramatic odds with that of the public. Why don't these self-styled "prosecutors at the grassroots level" host a Chinese New Years banquet and invite all the key people in the cases they are prosecuting? They can assure the public they are engaging in "nothing more than routine contacts with ordinary people."
Chen Tsung-ming's attitude is no different from those of the typical criminal suspect. "You think I committed a crime? Prove it!" He is arguing that if there is no evidence that he committed a crime, then he cannot be impeached for attending a Chinese New Years banquet with Huang Fang-yen. Real prosecutors at the grass-roots level have encountered many suspects who talk tough but who have no leg to stand on. Does Chen Tsung-ming really consider his attitude following the commission of a crime something the public ought to emulate?
If the judicial system wishes to redeem itself, it must set an example for the nation. Shih Mao-lin, Chen Tsung-ming, and Yeh Sheng-mao are the "Three Heads" responsible for the administration of justice. Their conduct as individuals was questionable. Worse, they and the president were accomplices who undermined the nation's system of justice. Add to this triumvirate a fourth, Grand Justice Cheng Chung-mo, who helped the president lobby legislators. This is the worst example of an independent judiciary being undermined since the lifting of martial law. It is an example of the irreparable damage the DPP inflicted upon our nation and society during its rule. We still do not know whether members of the judiciary feel shame. They appear intent on inflicting material injury upon others. This is no longer a question of Chen, Shih, Yeh and their personal reputations. This is an indication that judicial reform has undergone catastrophic failure.
當陳聰明與施茂林出現在黃芳彥的客廳
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.21 03:22 am
國人不知陳聰明是否洩密縱放黃芳彥，但從監察院的彈劾文看來，若謂陳聰明應有樂見黃芳彥畏罪潛逃的理由，似屬合理的懷疑。因為，黃芳彥倘若進入偵審，一旦供出他與陳聰明的過從細節，恐對陳聰明極為不利。
彈劾文對二○○七年二月廿六日夜黃芳彥家的那場春酒，描述甚詳。提案監委李復甸認為，這場春酒，法務部長施茂林及檢察總長陳聰明，一同出現在扁案及珍案重大關係人黃芳彥私宅，非僅可議，更有「犯罪嫌疑」。李復甸的判斷，自是建立在合理的懷疑之上。
陳聰明事後的辯駁不足採信。他說：「若按照這個邏輯，豈不是任何人都不能與執政者身邊的人交往？」但是，陳聰明身為檢察總長，豈是「任何人」？而黃芳彥在當時已明確是扁案與珍案的重大關係人，又豈僅是「執政者身邊的一般人」？而法務部長及檢察總長二人，居然在扁案珍案大爆期間，雙雙出現在黃芳彥的家中，這又豈是「一般的交往」而已？
如提案委員錢林慧君所說，當時「只要看報」即知黃芳彥與扁家的非常關係與在扁案中的非常角色；而陳聰明及施茂林對案情內幕尤較一般國人清楚，豈能不知黃芳彥是何等人物？何況，陳聰明參與黃芳彥的那場春酒，已有「犯罪嫌疑」；如今居然又辯稱「豈不是任何人都不能與執政者身邊的人交往」，故作天真無辜狀，更是自欺欺人，尤是罪無可恕。
那場春酒，可謂是最骯髒的政治場景，也是最可恥的司法醜相。若再加上在同一時期調查局長葉盛茂將艾格蒙情資洩露給陳水扁；國人應可想像，國家司法行政這一塊在民進黨主政階段，已然墮落、沉淪、解構至何等地步？司法行政的超然地位蕩然，連「三長」都淪為政治僕役鷹犬；國人此刻已不僅對當時「三長」如何包庇扁案產生重大懷疑，甚至亦對當年整個「法政關係」也疑竇叢生。比如說：高捷案何以辦得如此雞零狗碎、避重就輕？
司法行政的三長，當時顯已成為總統藉司法為統治及政爭工具的共犯結構。可笑的是，陳聰明在黃芳彥家的春酒宴，調查報告居然是出自當時的法務部長施茂林之手；而施茂林的報告當然是照抄陳聰明的答辯書。施茂林在報告中不說當日自己也在場，陳聰明當然也不說施茂林在場。現在，監察院的彈劾文指出二人同時在場，姑且不論「犯罪嫌疑」，僅以二人在報告中說謊偽證，他們還有資格擔任法務部長及檢察總長嗎？
據說，監院彈劾陳聰明，引發「檢方基層」的「反彈」。國人要問：難道檢察官認為陳聰明與施茂林在扁案沸騰時應當赴黃芳彥私宅之約？難道謂這場春酒中有「犯罪嫌疑」，不是合理的懷疑？難道不懷疑「帝王證人」黃芳彥的逃亡，與陳聰明怕他在進入偵審後將他咬出有關？難道認為陳聰明事後故作天真無辜地將黃芳彥說成「一般交往」不是胡說八道？監察院的彈劾，是在扁案告一段落後才發動，然而，所謂的「檢方基層」卻認為干涉司法；再者，監察院的彈劾，其實是在為檢方清除害群之馬，所謂的「檢方基層」竟認為是殘害忠良。如此解讀，寧非怪事？
這些顯然是少數的「檢方基層」，若與社會認知出現如此嚴重的落差，何不相率與各位承辦案件中的重大關係人們，在即將到臨的春節舉行一場擴大聯歡春酒，並昭告國人：這只是「任何人與一般人的平常交往」而已！
陳聰明如今的態度其實與一般嫌犯無異，不外就是一句：「拿出我犯罪的證據來！」；若無犯罪的證據，豈能彈劾我與黃芳彥喝春酒？「檢方基層」看多了這類理不直卻氣壯的嫌犯，難道會認為陳聰明這種「犯後態度」，可以作為國人的示範？
司法界若要自救，必須建立正確的人物典型。施茂林、陳聰明及葉盛茂三長，非但其個人的言行可議，甚且已然與當時的總統一體成為重創司法正義的共犯結構（還有幫總統向立委拉票的大法官城仲模）；這是解嚴以後力倡司法公正獨立的大沉淪及大解構，也是民進黨政府對國家社會造成的難以彌償的傷害。倘若司法界尚不知引以為恥，反而竟有物傷其類的味道；那就不只是陳、施、葉三長身敗名裂的問題，而將是整個司法改革的解構與破滅。
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Chen Tsung-ming's Wounds: Not Impeachment, But Loss of Public Trust
Chen Tsung-ming's Wounds: Not Impeachment, But Loss of Public Trust
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 20, 2010
The Control Yuan has impeached Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming by a vote of eight to three. It has also demanded by a vote of seven to three that the Ministry of Justice bring the matter to a swift resolution. The Control Yuan has gotten tough. Chen Tsung-ming has responded by tendering his resignation.
The first Prosecutor General under the new system has been impeached. This is deeply regrettable, not just for Chen Tsung-ming personally, but for the entire judicial system. Ever since Chen Tsung-ming's role and behavior became the subject of a major scandal, we have urged him to be smart and consider resigning. Given his protestations of innocence, his words and deeds clearly run counter to public expectations. He may feel personally aggrieved. But as the highest ranking official within the prosecutorial system, he must boldly resign. He must do so to uphold justice and to maintain respect and trust in the administration of justice. Only by doing so, can he maintain his own reputation and minimize the damage done to the judicial system. Instead Chen Tsung-ming dragged his feet so long he forced the Control Yuan to impeach him. On the one hand, Chen Tsung-ming set a negative example for judicial ethics. On the other hand, he left huge scars on the nation's system of justice.
Chen Tsung-ming has provoked a great deal of controversy. He may not have left traces of illegal conduct. That is why the Control Yuan's reasons for impeachment did not include references to illegal conduct, but rather to negligence. For example, the impeachment points to Chen Tsung-ming and Shih Mao-ling's frequent meetings at Huang Fang-yen's private residence, and to his self-contradictory testimony when questioned by the Legislative Yuan. He even personally visited a building contractor named Tsai, a witness in the Chen Shui-bian corruption case, at Tsai's office. The Control Yuan concluded that his conduct was suspicious, but difficult to prove illegal. Therefore they characterized his conduct merely as "dereliction of duty." In fact, Chen provoked all manner of controversy. For example, during the Discretionary Fund controversy, he failed to preside over a unified opinion. He sat idly by as conflicting standards of justice prevailed in different jurisdictions. The political tides turned. But this inconsistency remained under the purview of an independent prosecution. Control Yuan members were unhappy with the situation. But getting to the bottom of the matter proved difficult. Chen Tsung-ming and Huang Fang-yen were suspected of leaking information. Suspicions linger. But this is not something the Control Yuan can comment on. It lacked proof that Chen Tsung-ming engaged in illegal conduct. But characterizing Chen's words and deeds as "dereliction of duty" was fully consistent with public perceptions. Chen Tsung-ming should not have met in Huang Fang-yen's private residence, just as another man's underwear must not show up in the Queen's chambers. It is not necessary to talk about whether there is evidence of illegal conduct. The fact is Chen Tsung-ming must take full responsibility for his unethical conduct.
Chen Tsung-ming Chan has tendered his resignation. This was a wise decision. He must not be so oblivious as to continue stonewalling, to the point where he is impeached. His allegation that the Control Yuan "fabricated facts and maliciously defamed him" will only provoke even greater public disappointment. It can only exacerbate the damage done to his personal reputation. The job of Prosecutor General involves important duties and responsibilities. A Prosecutor General must maintain public respect and public trust in the administration of justice. Chen Tsung-ming has already lost the public trust. That much is abundantly clear. Chen Tsung-ming landed himself in his current plight. He would do well to ask himself whether as Prosecutor General, he still commands the people's respect and trust.
The Prosecutor General is a unique cabinet position. No one within the administrative system can force him to resign. Therefore, anyone who assumes this position must measure himself against the highest standards for professional conduct. Chen Tsung-ming's given name means "smart." But Chen Tsung-ming lacked the smarts to know when to fold. Instead, he has landed himself in his current pickle. He severely damaged the image of the justice system. Chen Tsung-ming could have minimized the damage to himself and to the nation by making a moral choice. Instead he forced the Control Yuan to impeach him. This harmed Chen Tsung-ming. It also left a massive scar on "the first Prosecutor General" under the new system.
Chen Tsung-ming's words and deeds have provoked intense public indignation. As mentioned earlier, Chen Tsung-ming has lost the public trust. The public has even concluded that if it could not rid itself of Chen Tsung-ming, then the entire government would remain riddled with problems. Chen Tsung-ming did not know enough to resign. He forced the Control Yuan to impeach him. Chen Tsung-ming apparently failed to realize that if he was unable to maintain his status as a moral paragon, he would have no leg to stand on. In fact, Chen Tsung-ming's real wound was not inflicted by the Control Yuan when it impeached him. His real wound was inflicted upon him by himself, when he lost the public's respect and trust.
The Chen Tsung-ming case is a major blow to the justice system. The lesson is that for administrators of justice, public respect and trust are the ne plus ultra. The loss of that respect and trust renders the administration of justice meaningless.
陳聰明的重傷不在彈劾 而在失去社會信任
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.20 03:13 am
監察院以八比三通過彈劾檢察總長陳聰明，又以七比四通過要求法務部須為「急速救濟」的附帶決議。監察院出重手，陳聰明以主動辭職回應。
首位新制檢察總長竟然走到被彈劾的地步，這不只是陳聰明個人的遺憾，更是司法體制的不幸。自陳聰明的角色表現成為社會重大爭議以來，我們一向主張，他應當明智處理自己的進退問題；即使自認無辜，但畢竟種種言行明顯已違社會期待，他作為檢察體系最高首長，為維護司法清譽及國人對司法的尊敬與信任，縱然百般委屈，亦當果斷辭職。倘係如此，一則自己可以保有識大體的社會評價，另則亦使司法威信減低損害。然而，陳聰明卻將形勢拖到被彈劾的下場，一方面陳聰明使自己在司法倫理上成為惡例，另一方面亦在國家司法史上留下重創的傷痕。
陳聰明引發議論的言行甚多，但未必留下什麼違法的跡證；因此，監察院的彈劾理由，並未朝「違法」部分發展，而是往「失職」方面追究。比如說，彈劾理由指陳聰明與施茂林出入黃芳彥私宅聚會，又在立法院答詢時言詞反覆，甚至親自到已具證人身分的蔡姓建商辦公室；在這些情節中，監院調查即使認為有「犯罪嫌疑」，但都不易朝「違法」發展，而僅認定皆屬「失職」。其實，陳聰明引發的種種議論，並非僅此而已。譬如，在特別費風潮期間，未能主持統一見解，坐視司法標準不一，政潮翻騰；唯此間出入，畢竟屬於檢察部門的獨立權責，監察委員縱覺不妥，亦未便深究。再如，陳聰明與黃芳彥過從如此，有否洩密及縱放的嫌疑；這雖是一個問號，但也非監察院所能論斷。總之，或許未曾掌握陳聰明「違法」的證據，但若謂其言行已屬「失職」，應當是符合社會公議的評價。陳聰明不應出現在黃芳彥的私宅聚會，有如在皇后的寢宮裡不應出現其他男子的底衫。不必談有否「違法」的證據，陳聰明皆必須在職位倫理上負起完全的責任。
陳聰明主動提出辭呈，應是明智之舉。唯若走到被彈劾的地步，不知自省，而謂監察院「捏造事實，惡意攻訐」，恐將更使國人失望，而形同又對自己在人格名譽的傷口上撒鹽；畢竟，檢察總長這個職位最重要的職守及責任，就是維持社會對司法的尊敬與信任，而陳聰明之已失社會信任，則是一個明顯而強固的社會共識。陳聰明處今日情勢，不妨自問：作為檢察總長，我還能維持國人對我的尊敬與信任嗎？
檢察總長是一個非常特別的特任官，在行政體系內無人能使之去職；所以，擔任此一職位者，在專業倫理表現上更應有高標準的自我要求。但是，陳聰明卻常涉瓜田李下，引發蜚短流長；而陳聰明未有急流勇退的「聰明」，非但使自己深陷泥淖，也重傷了司法的清譽與形象。這場風潮，原本可因陳聰明個人將之視作「倫理抉擇」，以辭退來減低自己及國家的損傷；如今卻是動用了彈劾，傷了陳聰明，也為「首任檢察總長」的新制留下一個大傷疤。
陳聰明可議的言行，激發了等比例的強烈民憤。如前所述，陳聰明已失社會信任；民怨甚至認為，若不能處分陳聰明，整個國家體制都有問題；但陳聰明卻不知以辭退自處，而必欲將情勢逼到監院彈劾的田地。陳聰明似乎不知，檢察總長若不能維持其倫理角色，即已再無立足的餘地。其實，陳聰明的真正重傷，不在監院彈劾，而是在他失去了社會的尊敬與信任。
陳聰明案是司法界的重大傷痛。若欲從中記取教訓，即應知社會的尊敬與信任，是司法人所以頂天立地的憑藉。倘若失去了尊敬與信任，司法即失去意義。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 20, 2010
The Control Yuan has impeached Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming by a vote of eight to three. It has also demanded by a vote of seven to three that the Ministry of Justice bring the matter to a swift resolution. The Control Yuan has gotten tough. Chen Tsung-ming has responded by tendering his resignation.
The first Prosecutor General under the new system has been impeached. This is deeply regrettable, not just for Chen Tsung-ming personally, but for the entire judicial system. Ever since Chen Tsung-ming's role and behavior became the subject of a major scandal, we have urged him to be smart and consider resigning. Given his protestations of innocence, his words and deeds clearly run counter to public expectations. He may feel personally aggrieved. But as the highest ranking official within the prosecutorial system, he must boldly resign. He must do so to uphold justice and to maintain respect and trust in the administration of justice. Only by doing so, can he maintain his own reputation and minimize the damage done to the judicial system. Instead Chen Tsung-ming dragged his feet so long he forced the Control Yuan to impeach him. On the one hand, Chen Tsung-ming set a negative example for judicial ethics. On the other hand, he left huge scars on the nation's system of justice.
Chen Tsung-ming has provoked a great deal of controversy. He may not have left traces of illegal conduct. That is why the Control Yuan's reasons for impeachment did not include references to illegal conduct, but rather to negligence. For example, the impeachment points to Chen Tsung-ming and Shih Mao-ling's frequent meetings at Huang Fang-yen's private residence, and to his self-contradictory testimony when questioned by the Legislative Yuan. He even personally visited a building contractor named Tsai, a witness in the Chen Shui-bian corruption case, at Tsai's office. The Control Yuan concluded that his conduct was suspicious, but difficult to prove illegal. Therefore they characterized his conduct merely as "dereliction of duty." In fact, Chen provoked all manner of controversy. For example, during the Discretionary Fund controversy, he failed to preside over a unified opinion. He sat idly by as conflicting standards of justice prevailed in different jurisdictions. The political tides turned. But this inconsistency remained under the purview of an independent prosecution. Control Yuan members were unhappy with the situation. But getting to the bottom of the matter proved difficult. Chen Tsung-ming and Huang Fang-yen were suspected of leaking information. Suspicions linger. But this is not something the Control Yuan can comment on. It lacked proof that Chen Tsung-ming engaged in illegal conduct. But characterizing Chen's words and deeds as "dereliction of duty" was fully consistent with public perceptions. Chen Tsung-ming should not have met in Huang Fang-yen's private residence, just as another man's underwear must not show up in the Queen's chambers. It is not necessary to talk about whether there is evidence of illegal conduct. The fact is Chen Tsung-ming must take full responsibility for his unethical conduct.
Chen Tsung-ming Chan has tendered his resignation. This was a wise decision. He must not be so oblivious as to continue stonewalling, to the point where he is impeached. His allegation that the Control Yuan "fabricated facts and maliciously defamed him" will only provoke even greater public disappointment. It can only exacerbate the damage done to his personal reputation. The job of Prosecutor General involves important duties and responsibilities. A Prosecutor General must maintain public respect and public trust in the administration of justice. Chen Tsung-ming has already lost the public trust. That much is abundantly clear. Chen Tsung-ming landed himself in his current plight. He would do well to ask himself whether as Prosecutor General, he still commands the people's respect and trust.
The Prosecutor General is a unique cabinet position. No one within the administrative system can force him to resign. Therefore, anyone who assumes this position must measure himself against the highest standards for professional conduct. Chen Tsung-ming's given name means "smart." But Chen Tsung-ming lacked the smarts to know when to fold. Instead, he has landed himself in his current pickle. He severely damaged the image of the justice system. Chen Tsung-ming could have minimized the damage to himself and to the nation by making a moral choice. Instead he forced the Control Yuan to impeach him. This harmed Chen Tsung-ming. It also left a massive scar on "the first Prosecutor General" under the new system.
Chen Tsung-ming's words and deeds have provoked intense public indignation. As mentioned earlier, Chen Tsung-ming has lost the public trust. The public has even concluded that if it could not rid itself of Chen Tsung-ming, then the entire government would remain riddled with problems. Chen Tsung-ming did not know enough to resign. He forced the Control Yuan to impeach him. Chen Tsung-ming apparently failed to realize that if he was unable to maintain his status as a moral paragon, he would have no leg to stand on. In fact, Chen Tsung-ming's real wound was not inflicted by the Control Yuan when it impeached him. His real wound was inflicted upon him by himself, when he lost the public's respect and trust.
The Chen Tsung-ming case is a major blow to the justice system. The lesson is that for administrators of justice, public respect and trust are the ne plus ultra. The loss of that respect and trust renders the administration of justice meaningless.
陳聰明的重傷不在彈劾 而在失去社會信任
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.20 03:13 am
監察院以八比三通過彈劾檢察總長陳聰明，又以七比四通過要求法務部須為「急速救濟」的附帶決議。監察院出重手，陳聰明以主動辭職回應。
首位新制檢察總長竟然走到被彈劾的地步，這不只是陳聰明個人的遺憾，更是司法體制的不幸。自陳聰明的角色表現成為社會重大爭議以來，我們一向主張，他應當明智處理自己的進退問題；即使自認無辜，但畢竟種種言行明顯已違社會期待，他作為檢察體系最高首長，為維護司法清譽及國人對司法的尊敬與信任，縱然百般委屈，亦當果斷辭職。倘係如此，一則自己可以保有識大體的社會評價，另則亦使司法威信減低損害。然而，陳聰明卻將形勢拖到被彈劾的下場，一方面陳聰明使自己在司法倫理上成為惡例，另一方面亦在國家司法史上留下重創的傷痕。
陳聰明引發議論的言行甚多，但未必留下什麼違法的跡證；因此，監察院的彈劾理由，並未朝「違法」部分發展，而是往「失職」方面追究。比如說，彈劾理由指陳聰明與施茂林出入黃芳彥私宅聚會，又在立法院答詢時言詞反覆，甚至親自到已具證人身分的蔡姓建商辦公室；在這些情節中，監院調查即使認為有「犯罪嫌疑」，但都不易朝「違法」發展，而僅認定皆屬「失職」。其實，陳聰明引發的種種議論，並非僅此而已。譬如，在特別費風潮期間，未能主持統一見解，坐視司法標準不一，政潮翻騰；唯此間出入，畢竟屬於檢察部門的獨立權責，監察委員縱覺不妥，亦未便深究。再如，陳聰明與黃芳彥過從如此，有否洩密及縱放的嫌疑；這雖是一個問號，但也非監察院所能論斷。總之，或許未曾掌握陳聰明「違法」的證據，但若謂其言行已屬「失職」，應當是符合社會公議的評價。陳聰明不應出現在黃芳彥的私宅聚會，有如在皇后的寢宮裡不應出現其他男子的底衫。不必談有否「違法」的證據，陳聰明皆必須在職位倫理上負起完全的責任。
陳聰明主動提出辭呈，應是明智之舉。唯若走到被彈劾的地步，不知自省，而謂監察院「捏造事實，惡意攻訐」，恐將更使國人失望，而形同又對自己在人格名譽的傷口上撒鹽；畢竟，檢察總長這個職位最重要的職守及責任，就是維持社會對司法的尊敬與信任，而陳聰明之已失社會信任，則是一個明顯而強固的社會共識。陳聰明處今日情勢，不妨自問：作為檢察總長，我還能維持國人對我的尊敬與信任嗎？
檢察總長是一個非常特別的特任官，在行政體系內無人能使之去職；所以，擔任此一職位者，在專業倫理表現上更應有高標準的自我要求。但是，陳聰明卻常涉瓜田李下，引發蜚短流長；而陳聰明未有急流勇退的「聰明」，非但使自己深陷泥淖，也重傷了司法的清譽與形象。這場風潮，原本可因陳聰明個人將之視作「倫理抉擇」，以辭退來減低自己及國家的損傷；如今卻是動用了彈劾，傷了陳聰明，也為「首任檢察總長」的新制留下一個大傷疤。
陳聰明可議的言行，激發了等比例的強烈民憤。如前所述，陳聰明已失社會信任；民怨甚至認為，若不能處分陳聰明，整個國家體制都有問題；但陳聰明卻不知以辭退自處，而必欲將情勢逼到監院彈劾的田地。陳聰明似乎不知，檢察總長若不能維持其倫理角色，即已再無立足的餘地。其實，陳聰明的真正重傷，不在監院彈劾，而是在他失去了社會的尊敬與信任。
陳聰明案是司法界的重大傷痛。若欲從中記取教訓，即應知社會的尊敬與信任，是司法人所以頂天立地的憑藉。倘若失去了尊敬與信任，司法即失去意義。
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
From Li Chia-tung to Lin Yi-hsiung
From Li Chia-tung to Lin Yi-hsiung
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 19, 2010
On the 17th of this month, Professor Li Chia-tung published an article in this newspaper's "Hall of Fame," entitled "South Korea Can Export Nuclear Power Plants. Can Taiwan?" It was reminiscent of Lin Yi-hsiung's frequent appearances during street protests.
Lee Chia-tung and Lin Yi-hsiung appear to have similar temperaments. Both may be bleeding heart humanitarians. But the two have fundamental differences. Li is an intellectual. Lin is a politician.
The differences between Li and Lin on nuclear power generation are intriguing. Lin Yi-hsiung opposes nuclear power generation. He quotes scientific sources to prove that nuclear power generation is a danger to society. He has linked "anti-nuke" with "referendum." He has turned it into an issue of human rights and political justice. The "referendum on nuclear plant no. 4" has become a synonym for "Lin Yi-hsiung." Lee Chia-tung is a scientist. He is familiar with the arguments against nuclear power generation. But in a article entitled "South Korea Can," he characterized South Korea's 40 billion dollar nuclear power plant in the United Arab Emirates, after winning a competition against the United States, Japan, and France, as a world shaking industrial and technological achievement. Actually, the Republic of China and South Korea began using nuclear power at the same time, about thirty years ago. The ROC was once even in the lead. Today, Lee Chia-tung is demanding to know why we aren't ashamed for lagging so far behind South Korea?
Lee Chia-tung is one of a small number of prestigious "self-made" intellectuals. He has never attached himself to any pressure group or political party. By writing about the issue, one article at a time, he has made a name for himself within the community. At first, his concern was humanitarian. It was the borderless humanitarianism of Mother Theresa and of Shusaku Endo's "Deep River." Later, he became a vigorous advocate of education. He personally taught poor students English. He considers giving people the gift of knowledge an act of humanitarianism. It prevents them from being exploited as a result of their ignorance. More recently, Lee Chia-tung has turned his attention to technology and industry. His article "South Korea's Nuclear Power Plant" is a must-read.
Lin Yi-hsiung is an emotionally intense humanitarian. The difference between Lin and Lee Chia-tung is that Lin's humanitarianism comes packaged with political arguments. Lin Yi-hsiung has three proposals. First, his "Basic Draft Law for the Republic of Taiwan." Lin wants to establish a "Taiwanese national identity" and considers this a humanistic solution. Secondly, his single-member district two-vote system. It was intended to reduce the probability of "Mainlanders" getting elected, thereby reducing "ethnic conflict" (more accurately termed "communal strife") and social friction. This too had a humanitarian aspect. Thirdly, the fourth nuclear power plant referendum. This was also a humanitarian ideal.
As previously mentioned, the biggest difference between Lin and Li is that Lin is a politician, while Li is an intellectual. Lin Yi-hsiung's three propositions, his "Basic Law for the Republic of Taiwan," his single-member district two-vote system, may have humanitarian implications. But his humanitarianism is part of a political package deal. As for his opposition to Nuclear Power Plant No. 4, he finally persuaded President Chen Shui-bian to halt construction in October 2000. Halting construction of the plant however created a political and economic crisis for Chen Shui-bian. Furthermore, construction on the project was halted without resort to the referendum process, i.e,, without public consent. In terms of justice, Lin Yi-hsiung's position on Nuclear Power Plant No. 4 was self-contradictory. Chen Shui-bian never initiated a referendum on the plant. If the decision whether to hold a referendum is made on the basis of political power, then is the decision whether to halt Nuclear Power Plant No. 4 also to be made on the basis of brute political power?
Li and Lin both have ideals and passion. But if one wishes to save the nation, one needs to be realistic as well as idealistic. Besides passion, one needs knowledge. Lin Yi-hsiung dropped his demands for a referendum as soon as Chen Shui-bian acquired the power to halt the project. Those with differing views on nuclear power generation could only bow to the dictates of political power. Is nuclear power generation a question of political power? Or is it a question of scientific knowledge? Lin Yi-hsiung mobilized crowds to oppose nuclear power generation. Lee Chia-tung stayed in bed, reading reader comments posted in the newspapers. Whom should the public listen to? Where do we go from here?
In fact, both Li and Lin play indispensable roles within society. Lin alerts us to the risks of nuclear power generation. Lee offers us a choice based on reality and factual knowledge. Today there is a resurgence of support for nuclear power generation. This will not diminish people's concerns about nuclear power generation. But it shows that knowledge of the anti-nuke position will not necessarily make the anti-nuke position the only policy choice. France's total generating capacity is over 80% nuclear. Belgium's is 60%, Japan's is 34%, and Switzerland's is 42%. Even the United States' total generating capacity is over 20% nuclear. The Republic of China's is only 17% nuclear. Are there no Lin Yi-hsiungs in those countries? Are there no Chen Shui-bians in those countries to halt construction of nuclear power plants on behalf of their own Lin Yi-hsiungs?
South Korea is building more than nuclear power plants for the United Arab Emirates. The Samsung Group has just completed construction on the Burj Dubai, the tallest tower in the world. Does the public on Taiwan wish to continue linking humanitarianism and "love for Taiwan" with ideology? Or should we promote the humanitarian sentiments expressed by Mother Theresa and by Shusaku Endo in "Deep River?" Should we revitalize our educational system, our technology, and our industry to demonstrate our "love of the land?"
Lee Chia-tung puts pen to paper. Lin Yi-hsiung takes to the streets. Both are passionate humanitarians. Both are respected by the community. But idealism must also take into account reality. Passion must also be accompanied by knowledge. In particular, attention should be paid to the hijacking and corruption of humanitarianism by political power. Ideological zealotry plus nativist sentiment will inevitably spell disaster.
從李家同想到林義雄
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.19 04:17 am
李家同教授十七日在本報「名人堂」發表專文《南韓能輸出核電廠，台灣呢？》，令人想起林義雄十餘年來為「核四公投」經常在街頭出現的苦行身影。
李家同與林義雄二人的氣質似有相近之處，皆是痌瘝在抱、悲天憫人的人道主義者；但二人也有根本的差異，李是公共知識分子，林則是政治人物。
比較李林在核能發電觀點上的差異，足堪發人深省。林義雄對核能發電持否定及反對立場，引據許多科學論證來證明核能的危險與可能造成的社會負債；且又將「反核」與「公投」聯結，形成一個人權與人道的政治公義論述。「核四公投」與「林義雄」已是同位語，也幾是同義語。李家同則是科學家，對核能的負面論證應亦通曉，但在專文《南韓能》中，將南韓與美、日、法等國競爭下，能取得為阿拉伯聯合大公國總額四百億美元的核電廠建造合約，視為震動世界的工業與科技成就。其實，台灣與韓國在核能發電上同於三十年前起步，且台灣一度曾超前領先；如今，李家同卻問：我們落後南韓如此之多，能不羞愧嗎？
李家同是少數「白手起家」且極具聲望的公共知識分子，他從未依附在社團或政黨之下，憑著伏案一個字一個字地書寫，在社會上建立了自己的旗幟與品牌。起初，他關懷的主題是人道主義，而且是德蕾莎修女及遠藤周作的《深河》中那種無國界無族界的人道主義。接著，他大力鼓吹教育，親自為貧窮學生教授英文；給人知識，使人不受蒙昧之害，即是人道。最近幾年，李家同的話題又轉往科技及產業；若尚未看過《南韓輸出核電廠》一文者，應當一讀。
林義雄的特質亦在強烈的人道主義，他與李家同不同之處則在其人道議論皆與政治綑綁在一起。林義雄有三大主張：一、《台灣共和國基本法草案》，可謂是從人道觀點為台灣的國家定位找出路；二、單一選區兩票制，據稱著眼點之一是為了使「外省籍候選人」減低當選機會，以平緩族群衝突的社會痛苦，亦有其人道觀點；三、核四公投，這當然也是出於人道主義的主張。
前文曾說，林與李的最大差別是，林為政治人物，李是公共知識分子。林義雄的三大主張，《台灣共和國基本法》、單一選區兩票制，雖皆有人道蘊涵，卻是被政治意識綑綁的人道主義。至於反核四，終於在二○○○年十月，挾持總統陳水扁作出停建的主張；但核四停建竟成為陳水扁日後政經危機的肇端，且停建核四又根本未經「公投」同意，更是與林義雄反核的公義訴求自相矛盾（陳水扁執政，從未發動核四公投）。若「公投或不公投」是由政治權力決定，那麼，「反核或不反核」及「停建核四或不停建」，如何可由赤裸裸的政治權力決定？
李林二人皆有理想，有熱情。但救國濟民，除了高擎理想，也須顧及現實；除了懷抱熱情，也須具備知識。當林義雄擱置了「公投」，經陳水扁的權力之手即停建核四；那些對核能發電有相對看法者，只能無言地接受政治權力的專擅。然而，核能發電究竟是一個權力的議題？還是一個知識的議題？在林義雄率眾反核苦行，及李家同向坐在床頭看報的讀者溝通之間，國人該聽誰的？何去何從？
其實，李林皆是社會中不可或缺的角色。林告訴我們對核能的警戒，李告訴大家在現實與知識上的相對選擇。核能發電如今又有回潮的趨勢，這雖不能稍減人們對核能的顧慮，卻也顯示了反核在知識上並未成為政治或政策的必然選擇。法國的核能發電已逾總發電量的八十％，比利時六十％，日本三十四％，瑞士四十二％，連美國也逾二十％，而台灣僅占十七％。試問：那些國家有沒有林義雄？有沒有為林義雄停建核四的陳水扁？
韓國不只將為阿拉伯聯合大公國興建核能電廠，三星集團也已承建完成世界第一高塔杜拜哈里發塔。台灣究竟是否繼續要將人道主義及愛台灣的熱情，與政治的意識形態綑綁在一起？還是應當闡發德蕾莎與《深河》那種無分別心的人道情懷，從振興教育、科技及產業，來愛這塊土地？
伏案振筆的李家同，街頭苦行的林義雄，皆是熱情的人道主義者，都受社會尊敬。但是，有理想，也須顧及現實；有熱情，也須具備知識。尤其應當注意：挾持政治權力的人道主義，極易變質；包藏意識形態的愛鄉土熱情，必定扭曲。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 19, 2010
On the 17th of this month, Professor Li Chia-tung published an article in this newspaper's "Hall of Fame," entitled "South Korea Can Export Nuclear Power Plants. Can Taiwan?" It was reminiscent of Lin Yi-hsiung's frequent appearances during street protests.
Lee Chia-tung and Lin Yi-hsiung appear to have similar temperaments. Both may be bleeding heart humanitarians. But the two have fundamental differences. Li is an intellectual. Lin is a politician.
The differences between Li and Lin on nuclear power generation are intriguing. Lin Yi-hsiung opposes nuclear power generation. He quotes scientific sources to prove that nuclear power generation is a danger to society. He has linked "anti-nuke" with "referendum." He has turned it into an issue of human rights and political justice. The "referendum on nuclear plant no. 4" has become a synonym for "Lin Yi-hsiung." Lee Chia-tung is a scientist. He is familiar with the arguments against nuclear power generation. But in a article entitled "South Korea Can," he characterized South Korea's 40 billion dollar nuclear power plant in the United Arab Emirates, after winning a competition against the United States, Japan, and France, as a world shaking industrial and technological achievement. Actually, the Republic of China and South Korea began using nuclear power at the same time, about thirty years ago. The ROC was once even in the lead. Today, Lee Chia-tung is demanding to know why we aren't ashamed for lagging so far behind South Korea?
Lee Chia-tung is one of a small number of prestigious "self-made" intellectuals. He has never attached himself to any pressure group or political party. By writing about the issue, one article at a time, he has made a name for himself within the community. At first, his concern was humanitarian. It was the borderless humanitarianism of Mother Theresa and of Shusaku Endo's "Deep River." Later, he became a vigorous advocate of education. He personally taught poor students English. He considers giving people the gift of knowledge an act of humanitarianism. It prevents them from being exploited as a result of their ignorance. More recently, Lee Chia-tung has turned his attention to technology and industry. His article "South Korea's Nuclear Power Plant" is a must-read.
Lin Yi-hsiung is an emotionally intense humanitarian. The difference between Lin and Lee Chia-tung is that Lin's humanitarianism comes packaged with political arguments. Lin Yi-hsiung has three proposals. First, his "Basic Draft Law for the Republic of Taiwan." Lin wants to establish a "Taiwanese national identity" and considers this a humanistic solution. Secondly, his single-member district two-vote system. It was intended to reduce the probability of "Mainlanders" getting elected, thereby reducing "ethnic conflict" (more accurately termed "communal strife") and social friction. This too had a humanitarian aspect. Thirdly, the fourth nuclear power plant referendum. This was also a humanitarian ideal.
As previously mentioned, the biggest difference between Lin and Li is that Lin is a politician, while Li is an intellectual. Lin Yi-hsiung's three propositions, his "Basic Law for the Republic of Taiwan," his single-member district two-vote system, may have humanitarian implications. But his humanitarianism is part of a political package deal. As for his opposition to Nuclear Power Plant No. 4, he finally persuaded President Chen Shui-bian to halt construction in October 2000. Halting construction of the plant however created a political and economic crisis for Chen Shui-bian. Furthermore, construction on the project was halted without resort to the referendum process, i.e,, without public consent. In terms of justice, Lin Yi-hsiung's position on Nuclear Power Plant No. 4 was self-contradictory. Chen Shui-bian never initiated a referendum on the plant. If the decision whether to hold a referendum is made on the basis of political power, then is the decision whether to halt Nuclear Power Plant No. 4 also to be made on the basis of brute political power?
Li and Lin both have ideals and passion. But if one wishes to save the nation, one needs to be realistic as well as idealistic. Besides passion, one needs knowledge. Lin Yi-hsiung dropped his demands for a referendum as soon as Chen Shui-bian acquired the power to halt the project. Those with differing views on nuclear power generation could only bow to the dictates of political power. Is nuclear power generation a question of political power? Or is it a question of scientific knowledge? Lin Yi-hsiung mobilized crowds to oppose nuclear power generation. Lee Chia-tung stayed in bed, reading reader comments posted in the newspapers. Whom should the public listen to? Where do we go from here?
In fact, both Li and Lin play indispensable roles within society. Lin alerts us to the risks of nuclear power generation. Lee offers us a choice based on reality and factual knowledge. Today there is a resurgence of support for nuclear power generation. This will not diminish people's concerns about nuclear power generation. But it shows that knowledge of the anti-nuke position will not necessarily make the anti-nuke position the only policy choice. France's total generating capacity is over 80% nuclear. Belgium's is 60%, Japan's is 34%, and Switzerland's is 42%. Even the United States' total generating capacity is over 20% nuclear. The Republic of China's is only 17% nuclear. Are there no Lin Yi-hsiungs in those countries? Are there no Chen Shui-bians in those countries to halt construction of nuclear power plants on behalf of their own Lin Yi-hsiungs?
South Korea is building more than nuclear power plants for the United Arab Emirates. The Samsung Group has just completed construction on the Burj Dubai, the tallest tower in the world. Does the public on Taiwan wish to continue linking humanitarianism and "love for Taiwan" with ideology? Or should we promote the humanitarian sentiments expressed by Mother Theresa and by Shusaku Endo in "Deep River?" Should we revitalize our educational system, our technology, and our industry to demonstrate our "love of the land?"
Lee Chia-tung puts pen to paper. Lin Yi-hsiung takes to the streets. Both are passionate humanitarians. Both are respected by the community. But idealism must also take into account reality. Passion must also be accompanied by knowledge. In particular, attention should be paid to the hijacking and corruption of humanitarianism by political power. Ideological zealotry plus nativist sentiment will inevitably spell disaster.
從李家同想到林義雄
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.19 04:17 am
李家同教授十七日在本報「名人堂」發表專文《南韓能輸出核電廠，台灣呢？》，令人想起林義雄十餘年來為「核四公投」經常在街頭出現的苦行身影。
李家同與林義雄二人的氣質似有相近之處，皆是痌瘝在抱、悲天憫人的人道主義者；但二人也有根本的差異，李是公共知識分子，林則是政治人物。
比較李林在核能發電觀點上的差異，足堪發人深省。林義雄對核能發電持否定及反對立場，引據許多科學論證來證明核能的危險與可能造成的社會負債；且又將「反核」與「公投」聯結，形成一個人權與人道的政治公義論述。「核四公投」與「林義雄」已是同位語，也幾是同義語。李家同則是科學家，對核能的負面論證應亦通曉，但在專文《南韓能》中，將南韓與美、日、法等國競爭下，能取得為阿拉伯聯合大公國總額四百億美元的核電廠建造合約，視為震動世界的工業與科技成就。其實，台灣與韓國在核能發電上同於三十年前起步，且台灣一度曾超前領先；如今，李家同卻問：我們落後南韓如此之多，能不羞愧嗎？
李家同是少數「白手起家」且極具聲望的公共知識分子，他從未依附在社團或政黨之下，憑著伏案一個字一個字地書寫，在社會上建立了自己的旗幟與品牌。起初，他關懷的主題是人道主義，而且是德蕾莎修女及遠藤周作的《深河》中那種無國界無族界的人道主義。接著，他大力鼓吹教育，親自為貧窮學生教授英文；給人知識，使人不受蒙昧之害，即是人道。最近幾年，李家同的話題又轉往科技及產業；若尚未看過《南韓輸出核電廠》一文者，應當一讀。
林義雄的特質亦在強烈的人道主義，他與李家同不同之處則在其人道議論皆與政治綑綁在一起。林義雄有三大主張：一、《台灣共和國基本法草案》，可謂是從人道觀點為台灣的國家定位找出路；二、單一選區兩票制，據稱著眼點之一是為了使「外省籍候選人」減低當選機會，以平緩族群衝突的社會痛苦，亦有其人道觀點；三、核四公投，這當然也是出於人道主義的主張。
前文曾說，林與李的最大差別是，林為政治人物，李是公共知識分子。林義雄的三大主張，《台灣共和國基本法》、單一選區兩票制，雖皆有人道蘊涵，卻是被政治意識綑綁的人道主義。至於反核四，終於在二○○○年十月，挾持總統陳水扁作出停建的主張；但核四停建竟成為陳水扁日後政經危機的肇端，且停建核四又根本未經「公投」同意，更是與林義雄反核的公義訴求自相矛盾（陳水扁執政，從未發動核四公投）。若「公投或不公投」是由政治權力決定，那麼，「反核或不反核」及「停建核四或不停建」，如何可由赤裸裸的政治權力決定？
李林二人皆有理想，有熱情。但救國濟民，除了高擎理想，也須顧及現實；除了懷抱熱情，也須具備知識。當林義雄擱置了「公投」，經陳水扁的權力之手即停建核四；那些對核能發電有相對看法者，只能無言地接受政治權力的專擅。然而，核能發電究竟是一個權力的議題？還是一個知識的議題？在林義雄率眾反核苦行，及李家同向坐在床頭看報的讀者溝通之間，國人該聽誰的？何去何從？
其實，李林皆是社會中不可或缺的角色。林告訴我們對核能的警戒，李告訴大家在現實與知識上的相對選擇。核能發電如今又有回潮的趨勢，這雖不能稍減人們對核能的顧慮，卻也顯示了反核在知識上並未成為政治或政策的必然選擇。法國的核能發電已逾總發電量的八十％，比利時六十％，日本三十四％，瑞士四十二％，連美國也逾二十％，而台灣僅占十七％。試問：那些國家有沒有林義雄？有沒有為林義雄停建核四的陳水扁？
韓國不只將為阿拉伯聯合大公國興建核能電廠，三星集團也已承建完成世界第一高塔杜拜哈里發塔。台灣究竟是否繼續要將人道主義及愛台灣的熱情，與政治的意識形態綑綁在一起？還是應當闡發德蕾莎與《深河》那種無分別心的人道情懷，從振興教育、科技及產業，來愛這塊土地？
伏案振筆的李家同，街頭苦行的林義雄，皆是熱情的人道主義者，都受社會尊敬。但是，有理想，也須顧及現實；有熱情，也須具備知識。尤其應當注意：挾持政治權力的人道主義，極易變質；包藏意識形態的愛鄉土熱情，必定扭曲。
Monday, January 18, 2010
The Su Family of Yunlin: The Ideological Spark that Transforms the DPP?
The Su Family of Yunlin: The Ideological Spark that Transforms the DPP?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 18, 2010
Su Chih-hao is the executive director of the Su Tung-chi Foundation. On the 12th of this month he published a newspaper article entitled, "Liberation from the Insular Mentality." He appealed to the Democratic Progressive Party to forsake its self-imposed isolation and seek peaceful contacts with the Mainland, in order to create a win-win situation. Su Tung-chi is Su Chih-hao's father. Su Chih-hao is Su Chih-fen's brother. When a family with a long history of Green Camp political activism makes such an appeal, it is definitely an attention getter.
Su Tung-chi's son in law, i.e., Su Chih-fen's husband, is a mathematics professor Huang Wu-hsiung. By coincidence, about the same time last year, Huang published a proposal entitled, "Seeking Fifty Years of (Cross-Strait) Peace," and initiated an online signature drive. He proposed "maintaining the status quo for fifty years, no reunification, no independence, and Republic of China demilitarization written into the Constitution." Huang Wu-hsiung's cross-Strait views overlap with President Ma Ying-jeou's "no reunification, no independence, no use of force." If anything, they are more radical than Ma's. calling as they do for a constitutional amendment.
The cross-Strait situation is changing. On Taiwan the Blue and Green camps are locked in a fierce struggle. Could the son in law of the Su Family be the spark that transforms the DPP's thinking about cross-Strait relations?
The Su Family in Yunlin was among the few families on Taiwan active in the resistance movement during the Japanese occupation. During the Japanese occupation Su Tung-chi went to Mainland China to participate in the Sino-Japanese War. Following retrocession he joined the Youth League. He ran for County Councilor and County Executive. He helped Lei Chen organize the "China Democratic Party." He was also involved in the Taiwan independence related "3/9 Incident" and sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He was only 39 years old when he entered prison. He was granted amnesty due to the passing of President Chiang Kai-shek and released from prison. Su Tung-chi's entire life reflects the best traditions of the democratic and opposition movement on Taiwan. Meanwhile Yunlin, Taiwan's most "native" agricultural county, best reflects Taiwan's grass-roots character. The son in law of the Su Family has made a cross-Strait proposal quite different from that of the Green Camp and the DPP. The Su Family's influence may not be fully realized, but the Su Family has a long history in the opposition movement. One seldom encounters such a capacity for transcendence. The Green Camp and the DPP should settle down and carefully consider the views expressed by the Su Family's son in law. His views may become the basis for future cross-Strait policy.
The United Daily News analyzed Huang Wu-hsiung's "Proposal for Fifty Years of Peace" in a newspaper editorial published on February 10, 2009. Su Chih-hao's article was not as specific as Huang Wu-hsiung's. But in terms of reasoning and emotion, it was equally moving.
Su Chih-hao wrote that for the DPP, cross-Strait relations, reunification, and independence were blind spots. The times are changing. The tide is changing. Mainland China is changing, The world situation is changing. The Democratic Progressive Party must adapt to a changing world. It must remain responsive to public opinion. It must move closer to the center.
Su Chih-hao has offered some sobering thoughts about democracy on Taiwan. He said that the era of democratic reform and liberalization may be mere illusion. Winning elections, expediency, and short-term advantage are everything. An insular mentality is bedeviled by amnesia. The economy may be first rate, but politics are third rate. Internal bickering is eroding the island's foundations. But the KMT and DPP can offer no solutions.
Su Chih-hao has a rather positive evaluation of Deng Xiaoping. He has high praise for Deng's "wisdom, foresight, self-confidence, perseverance in the face of overwhelming opposition." He also had positive things to say about Chiang Ching-kuo. "(Chiang Ching-kuo's) one small step for a man sounded the bell for cross-Strait peace. It created an opportunity for peaceful cross-Strait interaction." Remarks such as Su Chih-hao's are rare within the Green Camp.
Su Chih-hao exhorted the Democratic Progressive Party. He said the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have the same culture and belong to the same race. They are connected by an umbilical cord. They are brothers, and ought not to be hostile nations. The DPP need only set aside disputes and seek common ground in its referendum on self-determination. "Great wisdom," it is said, "often appears foolish." The DPP can be reborn. It can engage with the Mainland. It can demonstrate greater goodwill. Lien Chan and James Soong broke the ice during their Journey of Peace. The DPP can follow suit.
Su Chih-hao exposed the hollowness of democratic politics on Taiwan. He said, "democratic reform and liberalization may be merely an illusion." Politics on Taiwan is "third rate politics that offers no solutions." He noted that cross-Strait relations are at a critical juncture. The so-called "bottom line referendum on self-determination, " overlaps with the "referendum on reunification" promoted by Tsao Hsing-cheng and others, including this paper. In sum, Su Chih-hao's proposals have much in common with mainstream thought on Taiwan. Democracy on Taiwan should be used to protect the Republic of China in cross-strait interactions. It should not be used to divide Taiwan. It should not blindly oppose globalization and insist on hostility toward the Mainland.
Su Chih-Hao wrote that the times are changing, the tide is changing, Mainland China is changing, and the world situation is also changing. Chiang Ching-kuo saw this 20 years ago. Twenty years later, apart from the blind, and liars committed to self-deception, everyone sees it. Are the Su Family of Yunlin really the only people in the DPP and Green Camp able to see it? Are Su Chih-hao and Huang Wu-hsiung the only ones able to see it? Are these people blind, or merely engaging in self-deception?
Are cross-Strait issues and democratic politics on Taiwan merely "third-rate politics that offers no solutions?" What sayeth the DPP?
雲林蘇家是民進黨思想轉型的火種？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.18 04:11 am
蘇東啟文教基金會執行長蘇治灝，十二日在本報發表《擺脫島國根性症候群》專文，呼籲民進黨勿再自我封閉，應尋求與大陸和平接觸、共創雙贏。蘇東啟是蘇治灝的父親，蘇治灝是蘇治芬的哥哥；綠營政治世家中人有此呼籲，殊值正視。
無獨有偶。去年約莫亦在此際，蘇東啟的女婿，即蘇治芬的丈夫，數學教授黃武雄也發表《尋找太平歲月酖酖（兩岸）五十年維和方案》，在網路上徵求連署；他主張，將「五十年維持現狀，不統不獨，台灣非軍事化」入憲。黃武雄的兩岸論述體系，其實與馬英九總統的「不統／不獨／不武」有許多交集；且較馬更激進，主張入憲。
在兩岸情勢丕變，而國內藍綠惡鬥難分難解之際，雲林蘇家婿子相繼發出的呼籲，有否可能成為民進黨兩岸思考轉型的火種？
雲林蘇家是台灣少數幾個自日據時代至今仍活躍的反對運動的政治世家。蘇東啟在日據時代曾赴中國參加抗日戰爭，光復後參加青年黨，積極參與縣議員及縣長選舉，並聲援雷震組織「中國民主黨」，又捲入「三九事件」的台獨案，一度被判死刑，覆判為無期徒刑，入監時僅三十九歲，嗣因蔣中正總統逝世特赦而出獄。蘇東啟的一生，可謂即是台灣民主運動及反對運動的一脈傳統，而雲林亦是最能反映台灣草根特性的地區，迄今仍是最「本土」的農業縣。現在，蘇家婿子相繼對兩岸論述提出相當不同於綠營及民進黨的見解，若就蘇家的影響力而言，或許尚有未逮，但以蘇家在台灣反對運動上的代表性而言，卻可謂已罕有能超越者；綠營及民進黨應當沉澱下來，好好細思蘇家婿子的觀點，做為未來重新架構兩岸政策的重要參照。
對於黃武雄的《五十年維和方案》，本報社論曾經作過析論（二○○九年二月十日）；此次蘇治灝的專文，雖然未見如黃武雄一般的具體方案，但在論理及抒情上，同樣有感人動人之處。
蘇治灝說：兩岸問題、統獨辯論……一直是民進黨的盲點。時代在變、潮流在變、大陸在變，世界局勢也瞬息萬變，民進黨要能順應變局，以民意為依歸，向中間選民靠攏……。
蘇治灝對台灣民主政治的思考確是發人深省。他說：民主改革開放年代可能只是假象。選舉掛帥、操短線、急功近利、健忘的島國根性症候群，一流的經濟、三流的政治，內耗，侵蝕台灣的根基。……但國民兩黨只會虛耗內鬥，開不出藥方。
蘇治灝對鄧小平頗有正面評價，讚為「睿智、遠見、自信，雖千萬人吾往矣」；對蔣經國亦有佳評，「（蔣經國）個人的一小步，敲響了兩岸和平的鐘聲，開啟了兩岸和平互動的新契機」。蘇治灝這樣的言論，在綠營的紀錄中可謂是絕無僅有。
接著，蘇治灝期勉民進黨。他說：兩岸同文同種、臍帶相連，是兄弟之邦，不應是敵對的國家。……民進黨當下只要能在公投自決的底線下，擱置爭議，求同存異，「大巧若拙」就可脫胎換骨，與大陸展開全面接觸，釋放更大的誠意善意，不讓連宋破冰之旅專美於前。
從兩岸關係的角度言，蘇治灝點破了台灣民主政治的虛假空無。他說，「民主改革開放年代，可能只是假象」，台灣的政治是「拿不出藥方的三流政治」；他也指出了兩岸關係的肯綮，所謂「守住公投自決的底線」，其實與本報一向倡議而有曹興誠等人推動的「統一公投」，亦有交集之處。歸結而言，蘇治灝的主張，與台灣主流社會的思想實有極大的共同點，那就是：台灣的民主政治，應當用來在兩岸積極互動中守護台灣；而不是用來撕裂台灣，一味在違反全球化的舉世潮流下與大陸敵對鬥爭。
蘇治灝說：時代在變、潮流在變、大陸在變，世界局勢也瞬息萬變……。蔣經國在二十幾年前就看出此點；在二十多年後的今天，除了瞎子，及自欺欺人的騙子，恐亦無人看不出此點。民進黨及綠營中，難道只有雲林蘇家看得見？難道只有黃武雄及蘇治灝看得見？那些看不見的人，究竟是瞎子，還是自欺欺人？
就兩岸問題而言，台灣的民主政治，是不是「拿不出藥方的三流政治」？民進黨有無答案？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 18, 2010
Su Chih-hao is the executive director of the Su Tung-chi Foundation. On the 12th of this month he published a newspaper article entitled, "Liberation from the Insular Mentality." He appealed to the Democratic Progressive Party to forsake its self-imposed isolation and seek peaceful contacts with the Mainland, in order to create a win-win situation. Su Tung-chi is Su Chih-hao's father. Su Chih-hao is Su Chih-fen's brother. When a family with a long history of Green Camp political activism makes such an appeal, it is definitely an attention getter.
Su Tung-chi's son in law, i.e., Su Chih-fen's husband, is a mathematics professor Huang Wu-hsiung. By coincidence, about the same time last year, Huang published a proposal entitled, "Seeking Fifty Years of (Cross-Strait) Peace," and initiated an online signature drive. He proposed "maintaining the status quo for fifty years, no reunification, no independence, and Republic of China demilitarization written into the Constitution." Huang Wu-hsiung's cross-Strait views overlap with President Ma Ying-jeou's "no reunification, no independence, no use of force." If anything, they are more radical than Ma's. calling as they do for a constitutional amendment.
The cross-Strait situation is changing. On Taiwan the Blue and Green camps are locked in a fierce struggle. Could the son in law of the Su Family be the spark that transforms the DPP's thinking about cross-Strait relations?
The Su Family in Yunlin was among the few families on Taiwan active in the resistance movement during the Japanese occupation. During the Japanese occupation Su Tung-chi went to Mainland China to participate in the Sino-Japanese War. Following retrocession he joined the Youth League. He ran for County Councilor and County Executive. He helped Lei Chen organize the "China Democratic Party." He was also involved in the Taiwan independence related "3/9 Incident" and sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He was only 39 years old when he entered prison. He was granted amnesty due to the passing of President Chiang Kai-shek and released from prison. Su Tung-chi's entire life reflects the best traditions of the democratic and opposition movement on Taiwan. Meanwhile Yunlin, Taiwan's most "native" agricultural county, best reflects Taiwan's grass-roots character. The son in law of the Su Family has made a cross-Strait proposal quite different from that of the Green Camp and the DPP. The Su Family's influence may not be fully realized, but the Su Family has a long history in the opposition movement. One seldom encounters such a capacity for transcendence. The Green Camp and the DPP should settle down and carefully consider the views expressed by the Su Family's son in law. His views may become the basis for future cross-Strait policy.
The United Daily News analyzed Huang Wu-hsiung's "Proposal for Fifty Years of Peace" in a newspaper editorial published on February 10, 2009. Su Chih-hao's article was not as specific as Huang Wu-hsiung's. But in terms of reasoning and emotion, it was equally moving.
Su Chih-hao wrote that for the DPP, cross-Strait relations, reunification, and independence were blind spots. The times are changing. The tide is changing. Mainland China is changing, The world situation is changing. The Democratic Progressive Party must adapt to a changing world. It must remain responsive to public opinion. It must move closer to the center.
Su Chih-hao has offered some sobering thoughts about democracy on Taiwan. He said that the era of democratic reform and liberalization may be mere illusion. Winning elections, expediency, and short-term advantage are everything. An insular mentality is bedeviled by amnesia. The economy may be first rate, but politics are third rate. Internal bickering is eroding the island's foundations. But the KMT and DPP can offer no solutions.
Su Chih-hao has a rather positive evaluation of Deng Xiaoping. He has high praise for Deng's "wisdom, foresight, self-confidence, perseverance in the face of overwhelming opposition." He also had positive things to say about Chiang Ching-kuo. "(Chiang Ching-kuo's) one small step for a man sounded the bell for cross-Strait peace. It created an opportunity for peaceful cross-Strait interaction." Remarks such as Su Chih-hao's are rare within the Green Camp.
Su Chih-hao exhorted the Democratic Progressive Party. He said the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have the same culture and belong to the same race. They are connected by an umbilical cord. They are brothers, and ought not to be hostile nations. The DPP need only set aside disputes and seek common ground in its referendum on self-determination. "Great wisdom," it is said, "often appears foolish." The DPP can be reborn. It can engage with the Mainland. It can demonstrate greater goodwill. Lien Chan and James Soong broke the ice during their Journey of Peace. The DPP can follow suit.
Su Chih-hao exposed the hollowness of democratic politics on Taiwan. He said, "democratic reform and liberalization may be merely an illusion." Politics on Taiwan is "third rate politics that offers no solutions." He noted that cross-Strait relations are at a critical juncture. The so-called "bottom line referendum on self-determination, " overlaps with the "referendum on reunification" promoted by Tsao Hsing-cheng and others, including this paper. In sum, Su Chih-hao's proposals have much in common with mainstream thought on Taiwan. Democracy on Taiwan should be used to protect the Republic of China in cross-strait interactions. It should not be used to divide Taiwan. It should not blindly oppose globalization and insist on hostility toward the Mainland.
Su Chih-Hao wrote that the times are changing, the tide is changing, Mainland China is changing, and the world situation is also changing. Chiang Ching-kuo saw this 20 years ago. Twenty years later, apart from the blind, and liars committed to self-deception, everyone sees it. Are the Su Family of Yunlin really the only people in the DPP and Green Camp able to see it? Are Su Chih-hao and Huang Wu-hsiung the only ones able to see it? Are these people blind, or merely engaging in self-deception?
Are cross-Strait issues and democratic politics on Taiwan merely "third-rate politics that offers no solutions?" What sayeth the DPP?
雲林蘇家是民進黨思想轉型的火種？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.18 04:11 am
蘇東啟文教基金會執行長蘇治灝，十二日在本報發表《擺脫島國根性症候群》專文，呼籲民進黨勿再自我封閉，應尋求與大陸和平接觸、共創雙贏。蘇東啟是蘇治灝的父親，蘇治灝是蘇治芬的哥哥；綠營政治世家中人有此呼籲，殊值正視。
無獨有偶。去年約莫亦在此際，蘇東啟的女婿，即蘇治芬的丈夫，數學教授黃武雄也發表《尋找太平歲月酖酖（兩岸）五十年維和方案》，在網路上徵求連署；他主張，將「五十年維持現狀，不統不獨，台灣非軍事化」入憲。黃武雄的兩岸論述體系，其實與馬英九總統的「不統／不獨／不武」有許多交集；且較馬更激進，主張入憲。
在兩岸情勢丕變，而國內藍綠惡鬥難分難解之際，雲林蘇家婿子相繼發出的呼籲，有否可能成為民進黨兩岸思考轉型的火種？
雲林蘇家是台灣少數幾個自日據時代至今仍活躍的反對運動的政治世家。蘇東啟在日據時代曾赴中國參加抗日戰爭，光復後參加青年黨，積極參與縣議員及縣長選舉，並聲援雷震組織「中國民主黨」，又捲入「三九事件」的台獨案，一度被判死刑，覆判為無期徒刑，入監時僅三十九歲，嗣因蔣中正總統逝世特赦而出獄。蘇東啟的一生，可謂即是台灣民主運動及反對運動的一脈傳統，而雲林亦是最能反映台灣草根特性的地區，迄今仍是最「本土」的農業縣。現在，蘇家婿子相繼對兩岸論述提出相當不同於綠營及民進黨的見解，若就蘇家的影響力而言，或許尚有未逮，但以蘇家在台灣反對運動上的代表性而言，卻可謂已罕有能超越者；綠營及民進黨應當沉澱下來，好好細思蘇家婿子的觀點，做為未來重新架構兩岸政策的重要參照。
對於黃武雄的《五十年維和方案》，本報社論曾經作過析論（二○○九年二月十日）；此次蘇治灝的專文，雖然未見如黃武雄一般的具體方案，但在論理及抒情上，同樣有感人動人之處。
蘇治灝說：兩岸問題、統獨辯論……一直是民進黨的盲點。時代在變、潮流在變、大陸在變，世界局勢也瞬息萬變，民進黨要能順應變局，以民意為依歸，向中間選民靠攏……。
蘇治灝對台灣民主政治的思考確是發人深省。他說：民主改革開放年代可能只是假象。選舉掛帥、操短線、急功近利、健忘的島國根性症候群，一流的經濟、三流的政治，內耗，侵蝕台灣的根基。……但國民兩黨只會虛耗內鬥，開不出藥方。
蘇治灝對鄧小平頗有正面評價，讚為「睿智、遠見、自信，雖千萬人吾往矣」；對蔣經國亦有佳評，「（蔣經國）個人的一小步，敲響了兩岸和平的鐘聲，開啟了兩岸和平互動的新契機」。蘇治灝這樣的言論，在綠營的紀錄中可謂是絕無僅有。
接著，蘇治灝期勉民進黨。他說：兩岸同文同種、臍帶相連，是兄弟之邦，不應是敵對的國家。……民進黨當下只要能在公投自決的底線下，擱置爭議，求同存異，「大巧若拙」就可脫胎換骨，與大陸展開全面接觸，釋放更大的誠意善意，不讓連宋破冰之旅專美於前。
從兩岸關係的角度言，蘇治灝點破了台灣民主政治的虛假空無。他說，「民主改革開放年代，可能只是假象」，台灣的政治是「拿不出藥方的三流政治」；他也指出了兩岸關係的肯綮，所謂「守住公投自決的底線」，其實與本報一向倡議而有曹興誠等人推動的「統一公投」，亦有交集之處。歸結而言，蘇治灝的主張，與台灣主流社會的思想實有極大的共同點，那就是：台灣的民主政治，應當用來在兩岸積極互動中守護台灣；而不是用來撕裂台灣，一味在違反全球化的舉世潮流下與大陸敵對鬥爭。
蘇治灝說：時代在變、潮流在變、大陸在變，世界局勢也瞬息萬變……。蔣經國在二十幾年前就看出此點；在二十多年後的今天，除了瞎子，及自欺欺人的騙子，恐亦無人看不出此點。民進黨及綠營中，難道只有雲林蘇家看得見？難道只有黃武雄及蘇治灝看得見？那些看不見的人，究竟是瞎子，還是自欺欺人？
就兩岸問題而言，台灣的民主政治，是不是「拿不出藥方的三流政治」？民進黨有無答案？
Friday, January 15, 2010
A Jerry-Rigged Economic Policy: No Direction, No Future
A Jerry-Rigged Economic Policy: No Direction, No Future
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 15, 2010
The financial news on the 12th of this month focused on two points. Both have considerable influence on our economic development. First, the Council of Labor Affairs adopted a draft amendment to the Labor Standards Law. It hopes to adopt German legal reasoning, which stipulates that "mergers and acquisitions may not result in employee changes." It wants to forbid un-incorporated companies and financial holding companies from dismissing employees following mergers and acquisitions. Secondly, it wants to replace regulations pertaining to the promotion of innovation in sunset industries. It wants grants to promote research and innovation, along with business tax cuts, in order to attract foreign capital.
These two bills are merely the beginning. Other bills have already entered their second or third reading in the Legislative Yuan. All are equally controversial. If the Labor Standards Act is amended in accordance with the Council of Labor's demands, financial holding companies will be petrified. It will also take Taiwan farther away from the free market. Businesses undergo mergers and acquisitions in order to achieve synergy. Changes in the work force are essential for improved company performance. If financial holding companies are not allowed to lay off personnel following mergers, it is certain to discourage companies attempting to expand their financial reach. What's worse, the new bill may even be retroactive. The stipulation that "mergers and acquisitions may not lead to employee changes" may express the spirit of German law. But German laborers enjoy close-knit legal protections based on a venerable philosophical foundation. Taiwan must not selectively imitiate Germany's labor laws. This haphazard transplanting of another nation's laws may not be appropriate for our society, and will inevitably inspire skepticism.
The new industrial innovation law is also controversial. This law can be boiled down to two words: "tax cut." It cuts the general business income tax to 20%. Even more controversial is Article 30. It cuts taxes for operational headquarters to 15%. The logic of the ruling party has always been to bring tax rates down to those of Singapore and Hong Kong. It has long applied this logic to both business regulations and the income tax. Early last year, a substantial cut in the inheritance tax rate reflected this very thinking. But Singapore and Hong Kong are small. Neither has a manufacturing base, and no broad based work force. Their economic and social structures are very different from Taiwan's. We are obviously different from Singapore and Hong Kong. Yet we insist on emulating their low tax regime to attract cross-border business. This is another example of our haphazard transplantation of other peoples' tax systems. This has long been a target of criticism by economic and financial experts.
In addition to the aforementioned two bills, we have the national health insurance system, labor pension system and social welfare system. All three were adopted in the past few years. These were inspired to a considerable extent by the Scandinavian countries. The Republic of China's health insurance program has been praised by Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman. But Krugman failed to notice that our Director of Health has demanded a health insurance premium increase upon threat of resignation. The increase remains far off. On the one hand the public on Taiwan enjoys the level of health care and social welfare enjoyed in Scandinavia. On the other hand our tax burden is merely one-third that of the Northern European nations. We get more. We pay less. No one in the government cares that the health insurance program and pension program cannot possibly continue in this manner forever. Put simply, we want only to transplant the Scandinavian system of welfare benefits. The rest of the system we refuse to look at.
Politicians on Taiwan love jerry-rigging. Public infrastructure uses mass rapid transit systems and trains from Canada and France. It uses high-speed rail transport components from Japan and Europe. They are all cobbled together haphazardly, depending upon our politicians' whims. On the policy front, we imitate Germany's labor laws, Hong Kong and Singapore's tax cut regimes, the Scandinavian countries' social welfare system, America's university system, and the Communist Party's party organizational structure. Our constitution is a major work of jerry-rigging. It components can euphemistically be described as "the best of all worlds." But in fact it is rife with incompatibilities. Mutually-exclusive organs have been transplanted into a single body. The final outcome is certain disaster.
If a country wants to adopt the Scandinavian welfare system, it must impose high taxes to cover its expenses. It cannot possibly maintain a low tax rate. If it insists on a low-tax rates to attract cross-border business, it will not have enough funds to take cover social welfare. Also, since 2001 our government has been promoting a knowledge economy. But it fails to understand that rapid changes within a knowledge-based economy necessitate frequent labor force disruptions. Therefore promoting a knowledge-based economy will inevitably affect labor policy and social welfare policy. Unfortunately, Taiwan's populist political climate, short-sighted politicians, and the mindset of the man in the street have never fully meshed. A jerry-rigged machine is usually riddled with defects. It can seldom continue operating over time.
No one knows where our government is taking us with its public policy. Is it towards Scandinavia's Nanny State? Singapore and Hong Kong's low tax, small government regime? Germany's state capitalism? America's free market? The United Kingdom's privatization model? South Korea's consortium led government? Indonesia's crony capitalism? Where exactly is it taking us? The public on Taiwan no longer dares to hope for enlighted leaders with shining visions. All it wants is a clear direction. Nothing more.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.15
社論－拼裝車式經濟政策 沒方向也沒前途
本報訊
本月十二日媒體的財經新聞有兩個重點，都相當程度會影響未來台灣的經濟發展。其一，是勞委會通過了勞基法修正草案，希望套用德國「併購不得改變僱傭」的法律邏輯，要求將來非股份有限公司及金控公司於併購時，不得解僱員工。其二，是關於取代促產條例落日的產業創新條例，其主軸就是要對於各行各業的研發創新予以補助，並以降營所稅率等方式，吸引外資外商來台。
前述這兩項法案一個只是主管機關的修法初步意見，另一個則已將進入立法院二讀、三讀，但兩者爭議卻不相上下。勞基法如果依勞委會規劃修正，許多金控公司都心驚膽跳，也使台灣離自由市場更遠。企業合併就是要取得綜效，而員工調整當然是必要的改善績效手段。倘若金控公司併購後不准裁員，甚至新的法案還可能溯及既往，則必然會使意圖擴張金融版圖者卻步。「併購不變僱傭」是德國法律的精神，但德國勞工有綿密的證照保護、有淵遠流長的哲學背景；台灣別的都不學德國，卻只有勞工制度抄襲人家。這種半調子的制度移植，是否與社會情境格格不入，難免讓外界質疑。
再以產業創新條例的立法爭議為例：這部法律的重點就只有「降稅」兩個字，除了一般營利事業所得稅降到廿％，更在爭議性極大的第卅條，要將營運總部的各種賦稅再做降低，營所稅率甚至要降至十五％。執政黨一貫的邏輯，就是要把各種稅率設法與新加坡、香港拉平，不但在產創條例、所得稅法中如此，去年初大幅調降的遺贈稅率也是同樣的構思。但是新加坡與香港都只是彈丸之地，既無製造業基礎，當然也沒有廣大的基層勞工，經社結構與台灣截然不同。我們明明與星、港不同，但卻偏偏要學他們以低稅吸引過境商務的模式。這又是片面移植稅制的突兀思維，財經學者對此早有強烈批評。
除了前述兩個待審法案之外，台灣過去幾年通過的全民健保、勞保年金等社福制度，卻又有相當程度的北歐色彩。台灣的健保方案頗受諾貝爾經濟學家克魯曼好評，但克氏卻沒注意到，我們的衛生署長把烏紗帽提在手上要求漲健保費，卻仍然遙不可及。台灣人民一方面享受北歐級的健保社福，一方面租稅負擔率卻只有北歐的三分之一。這樣拿得多、付得少，政府上下沒有一個人在乎健保與年金難永續營運的現象。簡單地說，台灣只想移植北歐的社福給付，其他的制度卻不肯、不願學習。
台灣的政治人物就是愛做拼裝車。在公共建設方面，捷運系統與車廂有加拿大有法國、高鐵運輸組件有日本有歐洲，一切的拼裝取擇，都看政治人物的臉色決定。在政策制度方面，我們似乎是要勞工學德國、降稅仿星港、社福學北歐、大學抄美制、黨務效老共、憲法則是集拼裝之大成，好不熱鬧。拼裝的好處美其名是能「取各家之長」，但實質上卻極可能是左支右絀，各種移植器官在體內互不相容，最後極可能悲劇收場。
舉個例子來看，一個國家如果社福制度要學北歐，就一定需要大筆稅金因應其開支，故勢必不可能採取低稅率。相反的，如果堅持要採低稅率吸引過境商務，那就不可能有餘裕預算來照顧社會福利。再者，台灣自二○○一年以來就不斷推知識經濟，但似乎卻渾然不了解知識經濟時代由於產業更迭迅速，必然牽涉頻繁的勞工異動，故推動知識經濟就難免有勞工社福的配套思慮。但可惜的是，台灣的民粹政治、短視政客、庶民思考，就從來不曾綿密周詳。拼裝車不是少了輪胎就是熄了大燈，只要過一段時間，就必然是難以為繼了。
以過去數年的重大公共政策操作來看，坦白說，沒有人知道我們的政府要把台灣經濟帶向何方？是北歐的大政府？是星港的輕稅簡政？是德國的國家資本？是美國的自由市場？是英國的民營化？是韓國的財團主導？是印尼的家族裙帶資本主義？究竟是什麼？台灣人民已經不敢奢求聖君明相，只期待有個方向，如此而已。
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 15, 2010
The financial news on the 12th of this month focused on two points. Both have considerable influence on our economic development. First, the Council of Labor Affairs adopted a draft amendment to the Labor Standards Law. It hopes to adopt German legal reasoning, which stipulates that "mergers and acquisitions may not result in employee changes." It wants to forbid un-incorporated companies and financial holding companies from dismissing employees following mergers and acquisitions. Secondly, it wants to replace regulations pertaining to the promotion of innovation in sunset industries. It wants grants to promote research and innovation, along with business tax cuts, in order to attract foreign capital.
These two bills are merely the beginning. Other bills have already entered their second or third reading in the Legislative Yuan. All are equally controversial. If the Labor Standards Act is amended in accordance with the Council of Labor's demands, financial holding companies will be petrified. It will also take Taiwan farther away from the free market. Businesses undergo mergers and acquisitions in order to achieve synergy. Changes in the work force are essential for improved company performance. If financial holding companies are not allowed to lay off personnel following mergers, it is certain to discourage companies attempting to expand their financial reach. What's worse, the new bill may even be retroactive. The stipulation that "mergers and acquisitions may not lead to employee changes" may express the spirit of German law. But German laborers enjoy close-knit legal protections based on a venerable philosophical foundation. Taiwan must not selectively imitiate Germany's labor laws. This haphazard transplanting of another nation's laws may not be appropriate for our society, and will inevitably inspire skepticism.
The new industrial innovation law is also controversial. This law can be boiled down to two words: "tax cut." It cuts the general business income tax to 20%. Even more controversial is Article 30. It cuts taxes for operational headquarters to 15%. The logic of the ruling party has always been to bring tax rates down to those of Singapore and Hong Kong. It has long applied this logic to both business regulations and the income tax. Early last year, a substantial cut in the inheritance tax rate reflected this very thinking. But Singapore and Hong Kong are small. Neither has a manufacturing base, and no broad based work force. Their economic and social structures are very different from Taiwan's. We are obviously different from Singapore and Hong Kong. Yet we insist on emulating their low tax regime to attract cross-border business. This is another example of our haphazard transplantation of other peoples' tax systems. This has long been a target of criticism by economic and financial experts.
In addition to the aforementioned two bills, we have the national health insurance system, labor pension system and social welfare system. All three were adopted in the past few years. These were inspired to a considerable extent by the Scandinavian countries. The Republic of China's health insurance program has been praised by Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman. But Krugman failed to notice that our Director of Health has demanded a health insurance premium increase upon threat of resignation. The increase remains far off. On the one hand the public on Taiwan enjoys the level of health care and social welfare enjoyed in Scandinavia. On the other hand our tax burden is merely one-third that of the Northern European nations. We get more. We pay less. No one in the government cares that the health insurance program and pension program cannot possibly continue in this manner forever. Put simply, we want only to transplant the Scandinavian system of welfare benefits. The rest of the system we refuse to look at.
Politicians on Taiwan love jerry-rigging. Public infrastructure uses mass rapid transit systems and trains from Canada and France. It uses high-speed rail transport components from Japan and Europe. They are all cobbled together haphazardly, depending upon our politicians' whims. On the policy front, we imitate Germany's labor laws, Hong Kong and Singapore's tax cut regimes, the Scandinavian countries' social welfare system, America's university system, and the Communist Party's party organizational structure. Our constitution is a major work of jerry-rigging. It components can euphemistically be described as "the best of all worlds." But in fact it is rife with incompatibilities. Mutually-exclusive organs have been transplanted into a single body. The final outcome is certain disaster.
If a country wants to adopt the Scandinavian welfare system, it must impose high taxes to cover its expenses. It cannot possibly maintain a low tax rate. If it insists on a low-tax rates to attract cross-border business, it will not have enough funds to take cover social welfare. Also, since 2001 our government has been promoting a knowledge economy. But it fails to understand that rapid changes within a knowledge-based economy necessitate frequent labor force disruptions. Therefore promoting a knowledge-based economy will inevitably affect labor policy and social welfare policy. Unfortunately, Taiwan's populist political climate, short-sighted politicians, and the mindset of the man in the street have never fully meshed. A jerry-rigged machine is usually riddled with defects. It can seldom continue operating over time.
No one knows where our government is taking us with its public policy. Is it towards Scandinavia's Nanny State? Singapore and Hong Kong's low tax, small government regime? Germany's state capitalism? America's free market? The United Kingdom's privatization model? South Korea's consortium led government? Indonesia's crony capitalism? Where exactly is it taking us? The public on Taiwan no longer dares to hope for enlighted leaders with shining visions. All it wants is a clear direction. Nothing more.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.15
社論－拼裝車式經濟政策 沒方向也沒前途
本報訊
本月十二日媒體的財經新聞有兩個重點，都相當程度會影響未來台灣的經濟發展。其一，是勞委會通過了勞基法修正草案，希望套用德國「併購不得改變僱傭」的法律邏輯，要求將來非股份有限公司及金控公司於併購時，不得解僱員工。其二，是關於取代促產條例落日的產業創新條例，其主軸就是要對於各行各業的研發創新予以補助，並以降營所稅率等方式，吸引外資外商來台。
前述這兩項法案一個只是主管機關的修法初步意見，另一個則已將進入立法院二讀、三讀，但兩者爭議卻不相上下。勞基法如果依勞委會規劃修正，許多金控公司都心驚膽跳，也使台灣離自由市場更遠。企業合併就是要取得綜效，而員工調整當然是必要的改善績效手段。倘若金控公司併購後不准裁員，甚至新的法案還可能溯及既往，則必然會使意圖擴張金融版圖者卻步。「併購不變僱傭」是德國法律的精神，但德國勞工有綿密的證照保護、有淵遠流長的哲學背景；台灣別的都不學德國，卻只有勞工制度抄襲人家。這種半調子的制度移植，是否與社會情境格格不入，難免讓外界質疑。
再以產業創新條例的立法爭議為例：這部法律的重點就只有「降稅」兩個字，除了一般營利事業所得稅降到廿％，更在爭議性極大的第卅條，要將營運總部的各種賦稅再做降低，營所稅率甚至要降至十五％。執政黨一貫的邏輯，就是要把各種稅率設法與新加坡、香港拉平，不但在產創條例、所得稅法中如此，去年初大幅調降的遺贈稅率也是同樣的構思。但是新加坡與香港都只是彈丸之地，既無製造業基礎，當然也沒有廣大的基層勞工，經社結構與台灣截然不同。我們明明與星、港不同，但卻偏偏要學他們以低稅吸引過境商務的模式。這又是片面移植稅制的突兀思維，財經學者對此早有強烈批評。
除了前述兩個待審法案之外，台灣過去幾年通過的全民健保、勞保年金等社福制度，卻又有相當程度的北歐色彩。台灣的健保方案頗受諾貝爾經濟學家克魯曼好評，但克氏卻沒注意到，我們的衛生署長把烏紗帽提在手上要求漲健保費，卻仍然遙不可及。台灣人民一方面享受北歐級的健保社福，一方面租稅負擔率卻只有北歐的三分之一。這樣拿得多、付得少，政府上下沒有一個人在乎健保與年金難永續營運的現象。簡單地說，台灣只想移植北歐的社福給付，其他的制度卻不肯、不願學習。
台灣的政治人物就是愛做拼裝車。在公共建設方面，捷運系統與車廂有加拿大有法國、高鐵運輸組件有日本有歐洲，一切的拼裝取擇，都看政治人物的臉色決定。在政策制度方面，我們似乎是要勞工學德國、降稅仿星港、社福學北歐、大學抄美制、黨務效老共、憲法則是集拼裝之大成，好不熱鬧。拼裝的好處美其名是能「取各家之長」，但實質上卻極可能是左支右絀，各種移植器官在體內互不相容，最後極可能悲劇收場。
舉個例子來看，一個國家如果社福制度要學北歐，就一定需要大筆稅金因應其開支，故勢必不可能採取低稅率。相反的，如果堅持要採低稅率吸引過境商務，那就不可能有餘裕預算來照顧社會福利。再者，台灣自二○○一年以來就不斷推知識經濟，但似乎卻渾然不了解知識經濟時代由於產業更迭迅速，必然牽涉頻繁的勞工異動，故推動知識經濟就難免有勞工社福的配套思慮。但可惜的是，台灣的民粹政治、短視政客、庶民思考，就從來不曾綿密周詳。拼裝車不是少了輪胎就是熄了大燈，只要過一段時間，就必然是難以為繼了。
以過去數年的重大公共政策操作來看，坦白說，沒有人知道我們的政府要把台灣經濟帶向何方？是北歐的大政府？是星港的輕稅簡政？是德國的國家資本？是美國的自由市場？是英國的民營化？是韓國的財團主導？是印尼的家族裙帶資本主義？究竟是什麼？台灣人民已經不敢奢求聖君明相，只期待有個方向，如此而已。
Thursday, January 14, 2010
The Government must Reorganize in order to Increase Its Effectiveness
The Government must Reorganize in order to Increase Its Effectiveness
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 14, 2010
Take a close look at the Republic of China's laws. The "Executive Yuan Organic Law," which has been in force for 60 years, is perhaps a rare bird. Times have changed. The executive branch has been subjected to repeated changes in its organization. Yet amending the law has proven impossible. Recently the Legislative Yuan allowed four laws to enter their third reading. In doing so, it turned a page in the history of governmental reform. One cannot help but cheer the Ma administration's persistence. But the reorganization of the executive branch is an unprecedented and Herculean task. It entails streamlining the civil service -- another huge task. Care must be taken during the follow-up. The each step must be closely monitored to minimize the negative impact of reforms.
The "Executive Yuan Organic Law" was promulgated in 1947. After the government moved the capital to Taiwan, it was amended for the fourth time, in 1949. Fifteen ministries and three commissions were streamlined, reduced to eight ministries and two commissions. Since then this arrangement has remained largely unchanged. The last amendment was 30 years ago, in 1980. The "Administration of Justice Department" was renamed the "Ministry of Justice." During the final years of the Chiang Ching-kuo administration, the Lee Teng-hui administration, and even the eight year long Chen Shui-bian administration, the Executive Yuan Organic Law was the subject of repeated discussion. The Chen administration even established "representatives for the reinvention of government." In 2002 and 2004 it proposed two draft amendments, but failed to win the support of the legislature. Meanwhile, the 60 year old organizational structure has expanded. It now has eight ministries and over twenty commissions. It has too many agencies, making coordination and intregration of operations difficult.
The current amendment process will merge ministries and commissions. A single overhaul will result in 14 ministries, eight commissions, three independent agencies, and two bureaus. The Central Bank and National Palace Museum will be preserved. The raison d'etre for many government agencies will be evaluated. For example, the National Science Council and Atomic Energy Commission will be merged into the Ministry of Science and Technology. The Public Works Commission will be merged into the Ministry of Transportation and renamed the Ministry of Transportation and Construction. The National Youth Commission will be broken up and its functions assigned to the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Labor. Many years ago the Sports Commission was moved out of the Ministry of Education. It will now be moved back. The functions of the Coast Guard will be assigned to the newly established Ministry of Defense Oceanographic Commission, The functions of the Council of Agriculture and the Ministry of Economic Affairs Water Resources Agency will be incorporated into the upgraded Ministry of Environmental Resources. The Council for Economic Planning will be merged into the Ministry of National Development. The largely symbolic Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission will become a thing of the past, to be merged into the Mainland Affairs Commission.
The reorganization and merger involves the reallocation of both operations and personnel. Their decades long standard operating procedures will be disrupted. Therefore the run-in period for these government agencies may be much longer than expected. And we haven't even mentioned the impact on the Sports Commission, which is being restored to its former status. The Sports Commission was set up many years ago. It has always been a small agency handicapped by a small budget. It lacks the resources to take nurture professional athletes. It is unable to cultivate new talent. Past calls to upgrade the Sports Commission to the level of a Sports Ministry have led nowhere. Instead of being upgraded, it has been downgraded to its former status. Sports promotion may not depend upon the status of the agency doing the promoting. But the downgrading of the Sports Commission raises concerns over its future budgets. The government must take concrete actions to demonstrate that it values sports. Only then can it rally athletes and fans.
Besides the Sports Commission, the Aviation Safety Commission and the Consumer Protection Council have also been demoted. They have become third tier agencies within the executive branch. The Executive Yuan needs to explain itself better. But in the eyes of consumer organizations, it has not. During the third reading of the "Executive Yuan Organic Law," the Consumers' Foundation and other private groups gathered outside the Legislative Yuan to protest. Over the years, the Consumers' Foundation's efforts have raised consumer consciousness. Government agencies are following in the footsteps of the private sector, establishing the Consumer Protection Commission. Consumer Protection officials have gradually solidified their authority and credibility. They are now able to influence the public. The government must stand on the front lines, watching out for consumers. This will be a major challenge.
Integrating the National Development Council with the Economic Planning Council and the Research Council is a good idea. The CEPD is responsible for national land planning and economic and trade planning. Following up on the progress of the Research Council should make this integration more successful. The CEPD had an inter-ministerial coordination role for major projects. When necessary, the Vice President of the Executive Yuan often served as part-time chairman of the Council. But the time for this kind of CEPD is long past. Many people probably have no ideal what the Council for Economic Planning does. So what if it is renamed and restructured? What will that do? The Oceanographic Commission is even more so. The Marine Ministry is a Chen administration program consistent with DPP policy, but utterly irrelevant in terms of KMT policy. The Coast Guard has its role of course. But otherwise, what purpose does this agency serve?
The purpose of governmental reform is to enhance administrative efficiency. Ten years ago, the provincial government was frozen, by invoking this very reason. Ten years later, the after-effects of freezing or abolishing the provincial government are still being felt. The central government is still finding it difficult to reach the grassroots. The government must be reformed. But no matter how much one streamlines and restructures, the government must provide efficient and attentive service. If one cannot achieve this, any government downsizing project will be considered a failure. The Ma administration insists on reform. It must address these problems. Only then will the fruits of reform not wither on the vine.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.14
社論－政府必須再造 後續配套尤重效能
本報訊
細數中華民國各項法令，大概很少像《行政院組織法》這樣的大案，歷六十年施行，時空背景全部轉變，組織本身多次調整擴編，卻始終修改不成、動彈不得。這一 次，立法院在會期結束前，讓政府再造四法完成三讀，寫下政府組織變革的新頁，不能不為馬政府的堅持喝采。不過，由於相關組織調整空前巨大，又牽涉公務員精 簡移撥的大工程，後續配套尤須審慎，每一個環節都必須盯緊進度，俾使改革的負面效應降到最低。
《行政院組織法》在民國卅六年頒布，政府遷台後於卅八年第四次修正，將大陸時期的十五部三會，精簡成八部二會，從此這個架構基本不變，最近一次的條文修正 已是卅年前、民國六十九年的事了，唯一的修改是將「司法行政部」更名為現行之「法務部」。蔣經國總統執政末期、李登輝執政時期、乃至扁政府八年，行政院組 織法反覆被提出討論，扁政府甚至特別成立「政府再造委員」，並在民國九十一年、九十三年兩次提出修正草案，卻始終無法得到國會的支持。然而，原有的組織架 構歷六十年，已經擴大到八部廿多個委員會，不但組織數量過多，業務協調、整合更加困難。
這次修法，部會經歸併調整後，一次大修為十四部八會、三個獨立機關、二處，還有維持現制的央行與故宮。許多部會重新檢討業務功能，比方說：國科會與原能會 合併成為科技部，公共工程委員會併入交通部並更名為交通暨建設部，青輔會業務打散分別納入教育部和勞動部，多年前從教育部移出的體委會恢復舊制，回到教育 部，海巡署也將業務分別納入國防部與新成立的海洋委員會，還有調整包括農委會與經濟部水利署在內的業務，併入升級後的環境資源部、研考會與經建會則合併為 國家發展部，至於僅餘象徵意義的蒙藏委員會也終於走入歷史，納入陸委會。
這些整併不僅只是業務與人員的調撥，因為數十年習慣的機關運轉模式，都將因此受到衝擊，機關間的磨合期可能比預期還要長，更不要說類似體委會恢復舊制對體 育圈的打擊有多大。體委會成立這麼多年來，一直處於小單位微預算的困境，既無法擁有龐大的資源照顧職業選手，也無法有計畫的培育新秀，過去一直有呼聲希望 能將體委會提升為體育部，這次不但升格未成，甚至再被打回原形，固然推廣運動不靠機關層級有多高，但是降級改敘的體育署還能爭取到多少預算，實在令人憂 心，政府必須展現實際的行動，拿出具體作法，證明對運動的重視，才能凝聚體育圈的心。
體委會之外，這次還有飛安會與消保會，同樣降級改敘，成為院本部下設三級單位，行政院的說法是可以更有效能，看在消費者運動團體眼裡，卻完全不是這麼回 事。《行政院組織法》三讀通過的同時，消基會等民間團體就在立法院外抗議，這麼多年來，在消基會的努力下，台灣消費者意識抬頭，政府部門腳步在民間之後成 立消保會，消保官也逐步建立起權威和公信力，如何說服社會大眾，政府還是會站在第一線為消費者把關，勢必成為重大挑戰。
再比方說，國家發展委員會整合經建會與研考會，想法不錯，經建會本來就要負責國土與經貿願景之規畫，加上研考會的管考追蹤，理應讓這個工作更落實，過去經 建會還有跨部會協調財經重大方案之功，重要的時候還經常由行政院副院長兼任主委，問題是，這樣的經建會似乎早成過去，很多人可能懷疑，現在的經建會到底做 些什麼都不清楚了，即使更名改制，又能做什麼？海洋委員會的情況更是如此，海洋部是扁政府提出的方案，符合民進黨的政綱政策，然而，這個政策概念一直不在 國民黨政府腦袋裡，除了海巡署原有業務外，這個新設機關能做什麼？
政府組織改造的目的是要提升行政效能，就像十年前凍廢省政府也用了相同的理由，十年來凍廢省的後遺症還在持續中，中央政府事權管理依舊很難快速有效地下達 基層，政府必須改造，但是，不論如何精簡再造，對民眾而言，最重要的還是這個政府能提供有效率、且貼心的服務，如果做不到，任何政府瘦身工程都是失敗的， 堅持改革的馬政府必須非常嚴肅面對、並處理後續問題，才不會讓改革的果實未成熟就凋零。
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 14, 2010
Take a close look at the Republic of China's laws. The "Executive Yuan Organic Law," which has been in force for 60 years, is perhaps a rare bird. Times have changed. The executive branch has been subjected to repeated changes in its organization. Yet amending the law has proven impossible. Recently the Legislative Yuan allowed four laws to enter their third reading. In doing so, it turned a page in the history of governmental reform. One cannot help but cheer the Ma administration's persistence. But the reorganization of the executive branch is an unprecedented and Herculean task. It entails streamlining the civil service -- another huge task. Care must be taken during the follow-up. The each step must be closely monitored to minimize the negative impact of reforms.
The "Executive Yuan Organic Law" was promulgated in 1947. After the government moved the capital to Taiwan, it was amended for the fourth time, in 1949. Fifteen ministries and three commissions were streamlined, reduced to eight ministries and two commissions. Since then this arrangement has remained largely unchanged. The last amendment was 30 years ago, in 1980. The "Administration of Justice Department" was renamed the "Ministry of Justice." During the final years of the Chiang Ching-kuo administration, the Lee Teng-hui administration, and even the eight year long Chen Shui-bian administration, the Executive Yuan Organic Law was the subject of repeated discussion. The Chen administration even established "representatives for the reinvention of government." In 2002 and 2004 it proposed two draft amendments, but failed to win the support of the legislature. Meanwhile, the 60 year old organizational structure has expanded. It now has eight ministries and over twenty commissions. It has too many agencies, making coordination and intregration of operations difficult.
The current amendment process will merge ministries and commissions. A single overhaul will result in 14 ministries, eight commissions, three independent agencies, and two bureaus. The Central Bank and National Palace Museum will be preserved. The raison d'etre for many government agencies will be evaluated. For example, the National Science Council and Atomic Energy Commission will be merged into the Ministry of Science and Technology. The Public Works Commission will be merged into the Ministry of Transportation and renamed the Ministry of Transportation and Construction. The National Youth Commission will be broken up and its functions assigned to the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Labor. Many years ago the Sports Commission was moved out of the Ministry of Education. It will now be moved back. The functions of the Coast Guard will be assigned to the newly established Ministry of Defense Oceanographic Commission, The functions of the Council of Agriculture and the Ministry of Economic Affairs Water Resources Agency will be incorporated into the upgraded Ministry of Environmental Resources. The Council for Economic Planning will be merged into the Ministry of National Development. The largely symbolic Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission will become a thing of the past, to be merged into the Mainland Affairs Commission.
The reorganization and merger involves the reallocation of both operations and personnel. Their decades long standard operating procedures will be disrupted. Therefore the run-in period for these government agencies may be much longer than expected. And we haven't even mentioned the impact on the Sports Commission, which is being restored to its former status. The Sports Commission was set up many years ago. It has always been a small agency handicapped by a small budget. It lacks the resources to take nurture professional athletes. It is unable to cultivate new talent. Past calls to upgrade the Sports Commission to the level of a Sports Ministry have led nowhere. Instead of being upgraded, it has been downgraded to its former status. Sports promotion may not depend upon the status of the agency doing the promoting. But the downgrading of the Sports Commission raises concerns over its future budgets. The government must take concrete actions to demonstrate that it values sports. Only then can it rally athletes and fans.
Besides the Sports Commission, the Aviation Safety Commission and the Consumer Protection Council have also been demoted. They have become third tier agencies within the executive branch. The Executive Yuan needs to explain itself better. But in the eyes of consumer organizations, it has not. During the third reading of the "Executive Yuan Organic Law," the Consumers' Foundation and other private groups gathered outside the Legislative Yuan to protest. Over the years, the Consumers' Foundation's efforts have raised consumer consciousness. Government agencies are following in the footsteps of the private sector, establishing the Consumer Protection Commission. Consumer Protection officials have gradually solidified their authority and credibility. They are now able to influence the public. The government must stand on the front lines, watching out for consumers. This will be a major challenge.
Integrating the National Development Council with the Economic Planning Council and the Research Council is a good idea. The CEPD is responsible for national land planning and economic and trade planning. Following up on the progress of the Research Council should make this integration more successful. The CEPD had an inter-ministerial coordination role for major projects. When necessary, the Vice President of the Executive Yuan often served as part-time chairman of the Council. But the time for this kind of CEPD is long past. Many people probably have no ideal what the Council for Economic Planning does. So what if it is renamed and restructured? What will that do? The Oceanographic Commission is even more so. The Marine Ministry is a Chen administration program consistent with DPP policy, but utterly irrelevant in terms of KMT policy. The Coast Guard has its role of course. But otherwise, what purpose does this agency serve?
The purpose of governmental reform is to enhance administrative efficiency. Ten years ago, the provincial government was frozen, by invoking this very reason. Ten years later, the after-effects of freezing or abolishing the provincial government are still being felt. The central government is still finding it difficult to reach the grassroots. The government must be reformed. But no matter how much one streamlines and restructures, the government must provide efficient and attentive service. If one cannot achieve this, any government downsizing project will be considered a failure. The Ma administration insists on reform. It must address these problems. Only then will the fruits of reform not wither on the vine.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.14
社論－政府必須再造 後續配套尤重效能
本報訊
細數中華民國各項法令，大概很少像《行政院組織法》這樣的大案，歷六十年施行，時空背景全部轉變，組織本身多次調整擴編，卻始終修改不成、動彈不得。這一 次，立法院在會期結束前，讓政府再造四法完成三讀，寫下政府組織變革的新頁，不能不為馬政府的堅持喝采。不過，由於相關組織調整空前巨大，又牽涉公務員精 簡移撥的大工程，後續配套尤須審慎，每一個環節都必須盯緊進度，俾使改革的負面效應降到最低。
《行政院組織法》在民國卅六年頒布，政府遷台後於卅八年第四次修正，將大陸時期的十五部三會，精簡成八部二會，從此這個架構基本不變，最近一次的條文修正 已是卅年前、民國六十九年的事了，唯一的修改是將「司法行政部」更名為現行之「法務部」。蔣經國總統執政末期、李登輝執政時期、乃至扁政府八年，行政院組 織法反覆被提出討論，扁政府甚至特別成立「政府再造委員」，並在民國九十一年、九十三年兩次提出修正草案，卻始終無法得到國會的支持。然而，原有的組織架 構歷六十年，已經擴大到八部廿多個委員會，不但組織數量過多，業務協調、整合更加困難。
這次修法，部會經歸併調整後，一次大修為十四部八會、三個獨立機關、二處，還有維持現制的央行與故宮。許多部會重新檢討業務功能，比方說：國科會與原能會 合併成為科技部，公共工程委員會併入交通部並更名為交通暨建設部，青輔會業務打散分別納入教育部和勞動部，多年前從教育部移出的體委會恢復舊制，回到教育 部，海巡署也將業務分別納入國防部與新成立的海洋委員會，還有調整包括農委會與經濟部水利署在內的業務，併入升級後的環境資源部、研考會與經建會則合併為 國家發展部，至於僅餘象徵意義的蒙藏委員會也終於走入歷史，納入陸委會。
這些整併不僅只是業務與人員的調撥，因為數十年習慣的機關運轉模式，都將因此受到衝擊，機關間的磨合期可能比預期還要長，更不要說類似體委會恢復舊制對體 育圈的打擊有多大。體委會成立這麼多年來，一直處於小單位微預算的困境，既無法擁有龐大的資源照顧職業選手，也無法有計畫的培育新秀，過去一直有呼聲希望 能將體委會提升為體育部，這次不但升格未成，甚至再被打回原形，固然推廣運動不靠機關層級有多高，但是降級改敘的體育署還能爭取到多少預算，實在令人憂 心，政府必須展現實際的行動，拿出具體作法，證明對運動的重視，才能凝聚體育圈的心。
體委會之外，這次還有飛安會與消保會，同樣降級改敘，成為院本部下設三級單位，行政院的說法是可以更有效能，看在消費者運動團體眼裡，卻完全不是這麼回 事。《行政院組織法》三讀通過的同時，消基會等民間團體就在立法院外抗議，這麼多年來，在消基會的努力下，台灣消費者意識抬頭，政府部門腳步在民間之後成 立消保會，消保官也逐步建立起權威和公信力，如何說服社會大眾，政府還是會站在第一線為消費者把關，勢必成為重大挑戰。
再比方說，國家發展委員會整合經建會與研考會，想法不錯，經建會本來就要負責國土與經貿願景之規畫，加上研考會的管考追蹤，理應讓這個工作更落實，過去經 建會還有跨部會協調財經重大方案之功，重要的時候還經常由行政院副院長兼任主委，問題是，這樣的經建會似乎早成過去，很多人可能懷疑，現在的經建會到底做 些什麼都不清楚了，即使更名改制，又能做什麼？海洋委員會的情況更是如此，海洋部是扁政府提出的方案，符合民進黨的政綱政策，然而，這個政策概念一直不在 國民黨政府腦袋裡，除了海巡署原有業務外，這個新設機關能做什麼？
政府組織改造的目的是要提升行政效能，就像十年前凍廢省政府也用了相同的理由，十年來凍廢省的後遺症還在持續中，中央政府事權管理依舊很難快速有效地下達 基層，政府必須改造，但是，不論如何精簡再造，對民眾而言，最重要的還是這個政府能提供有效率、且貼心的服務，如果做不到，任何政府瘦身工程都是失敗的， 堅持改革的馬政府必須非常嚴肅面對、並處理後續問題，才不會讓改革的果實未成熟就凋零。
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