The Legislative Yuan should be the Primary Mechanism for National Policy Debate
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
March 29, 2010
Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen may debate ECFA. But this is not the normal way to conduct a national policy debate. This process occurred outside the system. The "Two Yings Debate" has highlighted the failure of national policy debate within the constitutional framework. In particular, it has highlighted the Legislative Yuan's failure to do its duty.
The controversy over ECFA has continued for a year and a half. The executive branch has failed to allay public anxieties. The main reason is the Blue camp majority in the legislature did not treat the problem seriously and failed to take aggressive action. That is not all. Health insurance fees have been raised. The civil service job performance evaluation system has turned into a major controversy. Most legislators watch idly. They have no intention of holding a debate to establish a community-wide consensus. As a result, the public has heaped all the responsibility on the shoulders of the executive branch. Meanwhile, the legislature sits to one side enjoying the breeze. Does such an entity truly merit the honorific, "The Legislature?"
What role should the legislature play in the formulation of national policy? A look at recent U.S. health-care reforms, which underwent a long and grueling process, should give us an answer. On the surface, reforms were single-handedly launched by President Barack Obama. But a deeper look reveals that once the decision was made, the ruling and opposition parties, as well as the public, debated its pros and cons. Both houses of congress, as well as federal and state governments, repeatedly scrutinized and revised its provisions. The impact of the new system on trade unions, hospitals, drug manufacturers and the insurance industry, has been made known to the upper echelons of government. One by one, the executive branch communicated and consulted with industry, and reached compromises.
Obama did not promote U.S. health care reform merely by virtue of his noble ideals and strength of will. He made use of the nation's democratic institutions. The various parties repeatedly clashed, but eventually reached a compromise. Members of the public still have many differences of opinion regarding the program. After ten months of debate, the house and the senate each proposed their own version. They debated the issue repeatedly before finally taking a vote. The version approved by the House of Representatives includes more than 2000 pages. It established hundreds of complicated rules for different kinds of insurees. The representatives debated all of them, one by one. In short, this ambitious blueprint for reform was not made possible by rumor mongering, fisticuffs, or physically occupying the podium.
Health insurance reform in the US was no less controversial than ECFA in the ROC. The Republican Party boycotted it. Even many Democrats found their hands tied by local interests and were unable to cast affirmative votes. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi shuttled back and forth. The Obama administration amended the abortion provisions, prohibiting federal funds for abortions. Only then was the Democratic Party able to secure enough votes for passage. Pelosi has her own ideology, but she is also pragmatic about political strategy. She was concerned more about party unity than about seeking a government-opposition alliance. This is the main reason the White House bill was able to pass its reforms. Reform cannot be realized through ideals alone. One must also take into account reality and feasibility. The more times a policy has been forged under intense heat, the stronger it becomes.
But the Legislative Yuan of the ROC seems to have forsaken its responsibility to reflect public opinion and to establish a public consensus. The Legislative Yuan could have been more aggressive about promoting ECFA. It could have encouraged the executive to offer a better sales pitch. It could have played a role as communicator, allowing different industries holding different opinions the opportunity to dialogue. The Legislative Yuan is the nation's highest representative body. If it had been doing its job, why would Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen need to hold a debate outside the government framework? The process of dispelling public doubts could have been conducted by the legislature via public hearings or other means. Any exchange of views would have been more extensive and diverse. But ruling and opposition party legislators were indifferent. Some attempted to incite even greater conflict. The legislature's indifference and negativity reveal just how alienating politics on Taiwan can be.
Our current political predicament is not the result of Blue vs. Green confrontation. It is the result of no means to bridge the great divide. That is why the two sides can only resort to populist demagoguery. That is why they can only shout propaganda at each other, and spread rumors about each other. But decisions are often not made at the extremes of the spectrum, between black and white. Rather, they are often made between zero and one. Finding a balance, where the winner does not take all, and the loser does not lose all, is a political art.
The legislature can transform itself into a forum for the debate of political and policy issues. Government and opposition legislators can introduce different opinions from different regions and constituencies. Such turmoil helps the executive branch understand the problem. It enables it to find the best solution for policy dilemmas. KMT legislators hold far more seats in the legislature. Yet it is unable to shepherd the ruling party's decisions through the legislature. What a shame. If DPP legislators engage in indiscriminate obstructionism out of ideological bias, then they are selfish and contemptible. Lest we forget, the legislature has had its seats reduced by half. But its ability to oversee the nation's affairs must not be reduced by half.
立法院應當成為國策辯論的主要機制
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.29 02:34 am
馬英九與蔡英文可能捉對辯論ＥＣＦＡ，這其實不是國策辯論的正常機制，而是體制外的非常之舉；雙英辯論，凸顯了體制內國策辯論憲政機制的失敗，其中尤以立法院的失職最屬可議。
ＥＣＦＡ問題已爭論一年半之久，行政部門未能將疑問解釋清楚固是主因，但藍軍占絕對優勢的國會並未曾認真看待此一問題，亦迄未採取任何積極作為。不僅如此，諸如健保費調漲、考績法等重大政策爭議，多數立委都袖手旁觀，無意透過國會的辯論來促成社會共識的凝聚及政策的調整。正因為如此，社會壓力幾乎全落在行政部門，但在一旁納涼的立法院，又豈對得起「國會」的角色？
國會該在國家大政中扮演什麼角色，觀察最近美國通過健保改革方案的漫長而激烈的過程，即可得知端倪。表面上看，這項改革是歐巴馬總統一手發動；但深一層觀察，在決策發動後，朝野的激辯和社會的正反意見，是沿著國會參、眾兩院的機制，從聯邦到各州反覆地磋商、推敲與修正。其間，新制對於工會、醫院、藥商和保險業的不同衝擊，也都透過民代的管道向上反映，再由行政部門逐一和業者溝通協商，取得妥協。
亦即，美國健保改革的推動，不只是靠著歐巴馬的高尚理想及堅決意志，而是要依循民主體制的運作，在各方意見之中反覆折衝，以期找到最佳平衡。且不論美國社會對此方案仍有眾多歧見，但在長達十個月的討論中，參眾兩院都曾提出各自的版本，再經反覆表決討論；最後眾院通過的方案長達兩千多頁，針對不同投保人訂出數百種繁複的規則，議員們必須逐條辯論。簡單地說，這項龐大改革工程的藍圖，絕不是靠著放話、打架、罷台或強勢表決即可完成。
美國健保方案爭議之大，其實不亞於台灣的ＥＣＦＡ；不僅遭共和黨全面杯葛，連民主黨議員也有不少人因受制地方利益，無法投下贊成票。最後，在眾院議長裴洛西的穿梭下，歐巴馬政府修改關於墮胎條款，禁止以聯邦資金補助墮胎手術，才爭取到足夠的民主黨關鍵票數。裴洛西有清晰的意識形態，但她也有務實的政治戰略，她關切黨內的團結勝過追求朝野同盟，這也是白宮的法案在眾院都能過關的主因。亦即，改革不能徒懸理想，也要顧及現實的可行性；政策愈經錘鍊，愈是扎實。
但在台灣，立法院卻似乎放棄了其反映民意、凝聚共識的角色。ＥＣＦＡ的問題，如果立院足夠積極，不僅可以督促行政部門拿出更佳說明方案，也可以扮演溝通角色，讓不同產業、不同面向的民意能夠有對話、交鋒的機會。試想，作為最高民意機構的立法院如果表現稱職，何需馬英九與蔡英文在那裡舉行什麼體制外的辯論？如果這個思辯、釋疑的過程，是在國會主導下以公聽會或其他方式進行，意見的交換應能更廣泛、也更多元；然而，朝野立委對此一分歧都漠然以對，甚至有人只是企圖挑激煽動更大的分歧。國會的冷漠消極，對照台灣政治的躁鬱，實在太顯疏離了。
台灣目前的政治困境，其實不在於藍綠對峙，而在於找不到路徑跨越意見的鴻溝，因此只能以喊話、放話等民粹手段彼此叫囂。然而，決策的選擇往往不是在「黑」與「白」兩端作取捨，而是要在「零與一」之間往返移動修正，找到一個最佳地帶，做到既不是贏者全拿，也不是輸者全丟，那才是政治的藝術。
立法院可以做的，是把自己變成政治和政策議題的論壇，朝野立委可以帶進不同地方或團體的意見，在此激盪，幫助行政部門了解問題所在，也讓政策能在折衝下找到最佳出口。對國民黨立委而言，佔有絕佳的席次優勢卻無法讓執政黨的決策過關，是可恥的事；對民進黨立委而言，若為了意識形態而不分青紅皂白阻撓決策，是自私而可鄙。別忘了，這是席次減半的首屆國會，不能讓問政能力跟著減半了。
Monday, March 29, 2010
Friday, March 26, 2010
Is ECFA a Phony Issue?
Is ECFA a Phony Issue?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 26, 2010
President Ma Ying-jeou and Premier Wu Den-yih have expressed their willingness to debate ECFA with DPP chairman Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen has finally relented, saying that "The leaders of the two parties will have to debate ECFA eventually." But she then demanded that the ruling and opposition party caucuses in the legislature first conduct an investigation and submit a report. The consensus is that Tsai Ing-wen has responded tactically, but deliberately thrown up obstacles strategically.
ASEAN plus One is already a reality. ECFA is now a matter of urgency. Its signing is scheduled for June. For Tsai Ing-wen to lay down the condition that "The Legislative Yuan must conduct an independent investigation" at such a late date, is merely a ploy to delay the process by two months, then shrug off any debate, alleging that the "The Ma administration is not serious." This will allow it to shift the responsibility onto Ma Ying-jeou, and leave the debate hanging in the air.
Quibbling over the "Two Yings Meeting" has gone on for some time. The "Two Yings" are of course Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen has constantly evaded the issue. The debate has now been demoted to the level of a "Two Yings Debate over ECFA." Only then was Tsai Ing-wen willing to respond tactically. Even then, she still laid down strategic obstacles. Actually, what the current political scenario needs is a "Two Yings Macro Level Political Debate" over the nation's overarching political and economy strategy, not a "Two Yings Special Topics Debate" over ECFA. ECFA is not intrinsically a phony issue. But the bipartisan debate over ECFA has turned it into a phony issue.
The DPP says it "is unclear about what ECFA is," and keeps demanding that the Ma administration "make clear what it means." But others wonder, if the DPP is really unclear about what ECFA is, then why is it so vehement in its opposition? Tsai Ing-wen has even demanded that the Legislative Yuan conduct an independent investigation and submit a report, providing a basis for the debate. But the DPP has been opposed to ECFA all along, regardless of the facts. Does it really need an "independent investigation" to justify its opposition?
As noted earlier, what is needed currently is a "Two Yings Macro Level Political Debate" over the nation's overall strategic political and economic path, not merely a debate over ECFA alone. The Ma administration's political framework is contained within the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and No Reunification, No Independence, and No Military Conflict. The Ma administration's trade and economic framework is contained within ECFA. The DPP's political strategy since it stepped down in 2008 meanwhile, remains undetermined. One could say that it simply has no benchmark against which it can evaluate ECFA. In other words, If the Democratic Progressive Party advocates Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation, it will have one opinion of ECFA. If the Democratic Progressive Party were to change its Taiwan independence path, it would have a different opinion of ECFA. Since the DPP's positions on national identity and the constitution remain indeterminate. how can it even talk about cross-Strait relations? How can it even talk about ECFA? No wonder some are wondering, can Tsai Ing-wen really "represent" the Democratic Progressive Party at all?
The Republic of China's constitutional strategy and cross-Strait trade and economic strategy must be consistent. A constitutional and political strategy that leads to an economic and trade dead end is impracticable. A cross-Strait strategy that leads to an economic and trade dead end is also impracticable. The DPP has yet to clarify its constitutional strategy. It has yet to tell us whether it still advocates Taiwan independence. It has yet to clarify its cross-Strait strategy. It has yet to tell us whether it still opposes exchanges. Until it does so, how can we know what benchmarks is it using to evaluate ECFA?
Some members of the public may not be aware of ECFA is. But are DPP party leaders really unclear about the main thrust of ECFA? For example, the purpose of ECFA is to cope with globalization and regional economic entities. It is a necessary defensive measure in response to ASEAN plus N, It does not increase imports of agricultural items. It does not introduce mainland workers. It stipulates relief for impacted industries. It stipulates a beneficial "early harvest list." It even includes a "termination clause." Besides, apart from ECFA, what alternatives do we have? Is the Democratic Progressive Party leadership really unclear about all this? Tsai Ing-wen has been involved in WTO and cross-Strait affairs for years. Is she really unclear about all this? Or is she merely using the pretext "I'm unclear" to demagogue the issue? ECFA is not a phony issue per se. But the bipartisan debate over ECFA has turned it into a phony issue.
The Ma administration has a political and economic framework for the Republic of China. From the top down that framework is: a constitutional strategy based on national identity, leading to cross-Strait strategy, leading to economic and trade strategy. In practice, from the bottom up, that framework is: to use economic and trade strategy to stabilize the cross-Strait strategic situation. To use cross-Strait strategy to safeguard the Republic of China and its constitutional framework of "One China, Different Interpretations." Therefore in order to evaluate ECFA, one must take into account this three-tiered strategy. If one fails to talk about constitutional strategy and cross-Strait strategy, and talks only about economic and trade strategy, one may as well follow the prescriptions offered by Green oriented think tanks, and urge industries to set up factories in any of the ASEAN countries. Therefore, if any debate between the Two Yings addresses the issue of ECFA in isolation, it will not solve the problem. What is needed is a Two Yings Debate over the nation's macro level political and economic path. Only that will allow the Republic of China to find a way out of its problems.
Interestingly enough, Tsai Ing-wen's "Platform for the Decade," will soon be made public. Rumor has it the first issue it raises is, surprise surprise, "A Vision for Taiwan's Prosperity," rather than "An Affirmation of Taiwan's Primacy and Its Constitution." How can one assess ECFA by turning a blind eye to the issues and talking only about constitutional strategy? Unless the DPP first makes clear its position on Taiwan independence, how can it offer an extravagant vision for Taiwan's prosperity?
ECFA是不是假議題？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.26 02:33 am
馬英九總統及吳敦義院長，相繼表示願意與民進黨主席蔡英文辯論ＥＣＦＡ。蔡英文終於鬆口說，關於ＥＣＦＡ議題，「兩黨領導人終須一辯」，但又開出了應先由立院朝野黨團完成調查報告的條件。一般認為，這是蔡英文在「戰術上」接招，卻在「戰略上」設下障礙。
東協加一已經上路，ＥＣＦＡ有時間上的緊迫性，預定在六月許簽定；蔡英文此時開出「立院獨立調查」的條件，想的是只要拖過這兩個月，屆時民進黨只消一句「馬政府沒有誠意」，即可把責任推給馬英九，辯論亦可不了了之。
「雙英會」吵了很久，蔡英文總是推三阻四；如今降低規格變成「雙英辯論ＥＣＦＡ」，蔡英文才在「戰術上」接招，但仍設下戰略障礙。其實，當前政局所需要的，是一場關於國家政經總戰略大辯論的「雙英宏觀論政」；而未必是一場關於ＥＣＦＡ的「雙英專題辯論」。因為，ＥＣＦＡ本身不是假議題，但「兩黨辯論ＥＣＦＡ」卻是政爭炒作出來的假議題。
民進黨一直說「不清楚ＥＣＦＡ是什麼」，要馬政府「說清楚」；但有人質疑：民進黨既不清楚ＥＣＦＡ是什麼，那民進黨究竟是在反對什麼？如今蔡英文甚至主張應由立院提出獨立調查報告，供為辯論基礎，但民進黨一向以來如此不分青紅皂白地反對ＥＣＦＡ，卻何嘗是基於什麼「獨立調查報告」？
前文說，現在需要的是一場「雙英宏觀論政」，就國家政經總路線作一通盤議論，而不是只對ＥＣＦＡ作專題辯論。因為，馬政府是在「九二共識／一中各表」，及「不統／不獨／不武」的政治戰略下，提出了ＥＣＦＡ的兩岸經貿框架；但民進黨自二○○八下野後對兩岸政治戰略尚未確立，可以說根本沒有評價ＥＣＦＡ的基準。也就是說，民進黨若主張台獨建國，對ＥＣＦＡ將是一種評價；民進黨若修正其台獨路線，對ＥＣＦＡ則可能是另一種評價。民進黨如今連國家認同、憲法立場都尚未確定，如何談兩岸關係？又如何談ＥＣＦＡ？難怪有人說，蔡英文真能「代表」民進黨嗎？
台灣的憲政戰略、兩岸戰略與經貿戰略必須一致。在經貿上沒有出路的憲政戰略，行不通；在經貿上沒有出路的兩岸戰略，也不可行。民進黨若不將其憲政戰略說清楚（是否台獨），不將其兩岸戰略說清楚（是否反對開放交流）；他要用什麼基準來評價ＥＣＦＡ？
有些民眾可能不清楚ＥＣＦＡ為何物，但民進黨內菁英階層豈會不清楚ＥＣＦＡ的主要思慮？例如：ＥＣＦＡ是為了因應全球化及區域經濟組織，是為了因應東協加Ｎ，必須注意防衛機制（農產品不增加進口項目，不引進大陸勞工），必須對受衝擊產業給予救濟，必須爭取有利的「早收清單」，甚至訂定「終止條款」，尤其，除ＥＣＦＡ外，是否尚有其他的替代方案？種種切切，難道民進黨菁英不清楚？難道長期涉獵ＷＴＯ及兩岸政務的蔡英文不清楚？或者，只是要用「不清楚」來炒作政爭而已？因而，ＥＣＦＡ本身不是假議題，但「兩黨辯論ＥＣＦＡ」卻是政爭炒作出來的假議題。
馬政府的台灣政經總路線的架構，由上而下是：國家認同的憲政戰略→兩岸戰略→經貿戰略；然後，在實際操作時，再由下而上，以經貿戰略穩定兩岸戰略，以兩岸戰略維護中華民國「一中各表」的憲政架構。因而，要評價ＥＣＦＡ，必須思慮這三層戰略的關聯性；倘若不談憲政戰略、兩岸戰略，只談經貿戰略，就會如綠色智囊的建議，主張廠商外移至任何東協國家設廠即可。所以，雙英之間倘若只安排一場ＥＣＦＡ的專題辯論，尚不能解決問題；必須要有一場對全盤宏觀的國家政經總路線進行大辯論的「雙英會」，才有可能為台灣的難題找出答案。
令人玩味的是：蔡英文的「十年政綱」即將出爐，據聞首波推出的竟然是「台灣社會福利的願景」之類的議題，而不是「台灣的主體性與憲法定位」。避重就輕、捨本逐末。諱談憲法戰略，如何評價ＥＣＦＡ？不先說清楚台獨不台獨，奢論什麼台灣社會福利的願景？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 26, 2010
President Ma Ying-jeou and Premier Wu Den-yih have expressed their willingness to debate ECFA with DPP chairman Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen has finally relented, saying that "The leaders of the two parties will have to debate ECFA eventually." But she then demanded that the ruling and opposition party caucuses in the legislature first conduct an investigation and submit a report. The consensus is that Tsai Ing-wen has responded tactically, but deliberately thrown up obstacles strategically.
ASEAN plus One is already a reality. ECFA is now a matter of urgency. Its signing is scheduled for June. For Tsai Ing-wen to lay down the condition that "The Legislative Yuan must conduct an independent investigation" at such a late date, is merely a ploy to delay the process by two months, then shrug off any debate, alleging that the "The Ma administration is not serious." This will allow it to shift the responsibility onto Ma Ying-jeou, and leave the debate hanging in the air.
Quibbling over the "Two Yings Meeting" has gone on for some time. The "Two Yings" are of course Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen has constantly evaded the issue. The debate has now been demoted to the level of a "Two Yings Debate over ECFA." Only then was Tsai Ing-wen willing to respond tactically. Even then, she still laid down strategic obstacles. Actually, what the current political scenario needs is a "Two Yings Macro Level Political Debate" over the nation's overarching political and economy strategy, not a "Two Yings Special Topics Debate" over ECFA. ECFA is not intrinsically a phony issue. But the bipartisan debate over ECFA has turned it into a phony issue.
The DPP says it "is unclear about what ECFA is," and keeps demanding that the Ma administration "make clear what it means." But others wonder, if the DPP is really unclear about what ECFA is, then why is it so vehement in its opposition? Tsai Ing-wen has even demanded that the Legislative Yuan conduct an independent investigation and submit a report, providing a basis for the debate. But the DPP has been opposed to ECFA all along, regardless of the facts. Does it really need an "independent investigation" to justify its opposition?
As noted earlier, what is needed currently is a "Two Yings Macro Level Political Debate" over the nation's overall strategic political and economic path, not merely a debate over ECFA alone. The Ma administration's political framework is contained within the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and No Reunification, No Independence, and No Military Conflict. The Ma administration's trade and economic framework is contained within ECFA. The DPP's political strategy since it stepped down in 2008 meanwhile, remains undetermined. One could say that it simply has no benchmark against which it can evaluate ECFA. In other words, If the Democratic Progressive Party advocates Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation, it will have one opinion of ECFA. If the Democratic Progressive Party were to change its Taiwan independence path, it would have a different opinion of ECFA. Since the DPP's positions on national identity and the constitution remain indeterminate. how can it even talk about cross-Strait relations? How can it even talk about ECFA? No wonder some are wondering, can Tsai Ing-wen really "represent" the Democratic Progressive Party at all?
The Republic of China's constitutional strategy and cross-Strait trade and economic strategy must be consistent. A constitutional and political strategy that leads to an economic and trade dead end is impracticable. A cross-Strait strategy that leads to an economic and trade dead end is also impracticable. The DPP has yet to clarify its constitutional strategy. It has yet to tell us whether it still advocates Taiwan independence. It has yet to clarify its cross-Strait strategy. It has yet to tell us whether it still opposes exchanges. Until it does so, how can we know what benchmarks is it using to evaluate ECFA?
Some members of the public may not be aware of ECFA is. But are DPP party leaders really unclear about the main thrust of ECFA? For example, the purpose of ECFA is to cope with globalization and regional economic entities. It is a necessary defensive measure in response to ASEAN plus N, It does not increase imports of agricultural items. It does not introduce mainland workers. It stipulates relief for impacted industries. It stipulates a beneficial "early harvest list." It even includes a "termination clause." Besides, apart from ECFA, what alternatives do we have? Is the Democratic Progressive Party leadership really unclear about all this? Tsai Ing-wen has been involved in WTO and cross-Strait affairs for years. Is she really unclear about all this? Or is she merely using the pretext "I'm unclear" to demagogue the issue? ECFA is not a phony issue per se. But the bipartisan debate over ECFA has turned it into a phony issue.
The Ma administration has a political and economic framework for the Republic of China. From the top down that framework is: a constitutional strategy based on national identity, leading to cross-Strait strategy, leading to economic and trade strategy. In practice, from the bottom up, that framework is: to use economic and trade strategy to stabilize the cross-Strait strategic situation. To use cross-Strait strategy to safeguard the Republic of China and its constitutional framework of "One China, Different Interpretations." Therefore in order to evaluate ECFA, one must take into account this three-tiered strategy. If one fails to talk about constitutional strategy and cross-Strait strategy, and talks only about economic and trade strategy, one may as well follow the prescriptions offered by Green oriented think tanks, and urge industries to set up factories in any of the ASEAN countries. Therefore, if any debate between the Two Yings addresses the issue of ECFA in isolation, it will not solve the problem. What is needed is a Two Yings Debate over the nation's macro level political and economic path. Only that will allow the Republic of China to find a way out of its problems.
Interestingly enough, Tsai Ing-wen's "Platform for the Decade," will soon be made public. Rumor has it the first issue it raises is, surprise surprise, "A Vision for Taiwan's Prosperity," rather than "An Affirmation of Taiwan's Primacy and Its Constitution." How can one assess ECFA by turning a blind eye to the issues and talking only about constitutional strategy? Unless the DPP first makes clear its position on Taiwan independence, how can it offer an extravagant vision for Taiwan's prosperity?
ECFA是不是假議題？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.26 02:33 am
馬英九總統及吳敦義院長，相繼表示願意與民進黨主席蔡英文辯論ＥＣＦＡ。蔡英文終於鬆口說，關於ＥＣＦＡ議題，「兩黨領導人終須一辯」，但又開出了應先由立院朝野黨團完成調查報告的條件。一般認為，這是蔡英文在「戰術上」接招，卻在「戰略上」設下障礙。
東協加一已經上路，ＥＣＦＡ有時間上的緊迫性，預定在六月許簽定；蔡英文此時開出「立院獨立調查」的條件，想的是只要拖過這兩個月，屆時民進黨只消一句「馬政府沒有誠意」，即可把責任推給馬英九，辯論亦可不了了之。
「雙英會」吵了很久，蔡英文總是推三阻四；如今降低規格變成「雙英辯論ＥＣＦＡ」，蔡英文才在「戰術上」接招，但仍設下戰略障礙。其實，當前政局所需要的，是一場關於國家政經總戰略大辯論的「雙英宏觀論政」；而未必是一場關於ＥＣＦＡ的「雙英專題辯論」。因為，ＥＣＦＡ本身不是假議題，但「兩黨辯論ＥＣＦＡ」卻是政爭炒作出來的假議題。
民進黨一直說「不清楚ＥＣＦＡ是什麼」，要馬政府「說清楚」；但有人質疑：民進黨既不清楚ＥＣＦＡ是什麼，那民進黨究竟是在反對什麼？如今蔡英文甚至主張應由立院提出獨立調查報告，供為辯論基礎，但民進黨一向以來如此不分青紅皂白地反對ＥＣＦＡ，卻何嘗是基於什麼「獨立調查報告」？
前文說，現在需要的是一場「雙英宏觀論政」，就國家政經總路線作一通盤議論，而不是只對ＥＣＦＡ作專題辯論。因為，馬政府是在「九二共識／一中各表」，及「不統／不獨／不武」的政治戰略下，提出了ＥＣＦＡ的兩岸經貿框架；但民進黨自二○○八下野後對兩岸政治戰略尚未確立，可以說根本沒有評價ＥＣＦＡ的基準。也就是說，民進黨若主張台獨建國，對ＥＣＦＡ將是一種評價；民進黨若修正其台獨路線，對ＥＣＦＡ則可能是另一種評價。民進黨如今連國家認同、憲法立場都尚未確定，如何談兩岸關係？又如何談ＥＣＦＡ？難怪有人說，蔡英文真能「代表」民進黨嗎？
台灣的憲政戰略、兩岸戰略與經貿戰略必須一致。在經貿上沒有出路的憲政戰略，行不通；在經貿上沒有出路的兩岸戰略，也不可行。民進黨若不將其憲政戰略說清楚（是否台獨），不將其兩岸戰略說清楚（是否反對開放交流）；他要用什麼基準來評價ＥＣＦＡ？
有些民眾可能不清楚ＥＣＦＡ為何物，但民進黨內菁英階層豈會不清楚ＥＣＦＡ的主要思慮？例如：ＥＣＦＡ是為了因應全球化及區域經濟組織，是為了因應東協加Ｎ，必須注意防衛機制（農產品不增加進口項目，不引進大陸勞工），必須對受衝擊產業給予救濟，必須爭取有利的「早收清單」，甚至訂定「終止條款」，尤其，除ＥＣＦＡ外，是否尚有其他的替代方案？種種切切，難道民進黨菁英不清楚？難道長期涉獵ＷＴＯ及兩岸政務的蔡英文不清楚？或者，只是要用「不清楚」來炒作政爭而已？因而，ＥＣＦＡ本身不是假議題，但「兩黨辯論ＥＣＦＡ」卻是政爭炒作出來的假議題。
馬政府的台灣政經總路線的架構，由上而下是：國家認同的憲政戰略→兩岸戰略→經貿戰略；然後，在實際操作時，再由下而上，以經貿戰略穩定兩岸戰略，以兩岸戰略維護中華民國「一中各表」的憲政架構。因而，要評價ＥＣＦＡ，必須思慮這三層戰略的關聯性；倘若不談憲政戰略、兩岸戰略，只談經貿戰略，就會如綠色智囊的建議，主張廠商外移至任何東協國家設廠即可。所以，雙英之間倘若只安排一場ＥＣＦＡ的專題辯論，尚不能解決問題；必須要有一場對全盤宏觀的國家政經總路線進行大辯論的「雙英會」，才有可能為台灣的難題找出答案。
令人玩味的是：蔡英文的「十年政綱」即將出爐，據聞首波推出的竟然是「台灣社會福利的願景」之類的議題，而不是「台灣的主體性與憲法定位」。避重就輕、捨本逐末。諱談憲法戰略，如何評價ＥＣＦＡ？不先說清楚台獨不台獨，奢論什麼台灣社會福利的願景？
Thursday, March 25, 2010
Does the DPP Really Want to Debate, or is It Deliberately Sabotaging Debate?
Does the DPP Really Want to Debate, or is It Deliberately Sabotaging Debate?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 25, 2010
The cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) will be signed in June. Yesterday President Ma Ying-jeou declared that he was willing to debate this important issue with DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. Seldom does a ruling party make such an offer to the political opposition on its own initiative. The DPP no long has any excuse to evade debate. According to the latest opinion polls, 92% of the Green Camp's supporters favor a debate between the government and the opposition DPP. This number is even higher than the number for Blue Camp supporters. Tsai Ing-wen has responded to internal party pressure. Unfortunately, she has deliberately laid down all sorts of of preconditions. She appears intent on sabotaging any possible debate.
Tsai Ing-wen has trotted out any number of excuses for her reluctance to debate. One excuse is that before the nations of the world enter major trade negotiations, they invariably call for independent studies. Any such studies would be used during future oversight and review, and ensure that oversight and review of ECFA would be substantive and meaningful. But the ECFA about to be signed by the two sides is merely a framework. It does not merit the appellation, "trade negotiations." Some people still fear the impact ECFA may have on certain industries once it is signed. There is no reason why an in-depth report cannot be ordered. But the Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research and other think tanks already conducted in-depth investigations long ago. Think tanks close to the Democratic Progressive Party have also conducted independent studies. ECFA, after all, is not the 3/19 Shooting Incident. The Legislative Yuan is the highest representative body of the nation. Should it conduct such a study? Is it competent to conduct such a study? Many doubt it.
Tsai Ing-wen wants the Legislative Yuan to conduct a study of ECFA. DPP spokesman Tsai Chi-chang also proposed the establishment of an effective negotiating mechanism. Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng agrees there should be a cross-Strait affairs oversight committee. Wang Jin-pyng favors systematic organization of the Legislative Yuan's tasks. He favors comprehensive monitoring of the government's cross-Strait policies, rather than the establishment of ad hoc oversight committees, saying the two can not be compared. What does the DPP want? An ECFA oversight committee? Or a cross-Strait affairs oversight committee? No matter what it wants, the Legislative Yuan has the authority to oversee all government policies, bills, and budgets, including ECFA. Debates between the government and the political opposition need not be linked to the Legislative Yuan's authority. If the two must be linked, then the debate between the ruling and opposition parties can be held in the Legislative Yuan, between party cadres. Why must the chairman be called into action?
Tsai Ing-wen also stressed the need to promote a second ECFA referendum. In fact the DPP began an ECFA referendum signature drive last year. But the referendum was rejected by the Referendum Committee. Who knew that although little has changed, the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union's second signature drive would succeed? The Referendum Committee may reverse its previous ruling, and suddenly approve a referendum on ECFA. ECFA is merely an agreement about the framework of future talks. Only after it is signed, can the two sides begin negotiations and consultations within the framework. What is the point of holding a referendum on an agreement that merely contains a table of contents, but no actual content?
Tsai Ing-wen has criticized the Ma administration, saying not only does it seem determined to sign ECFA, it has established a timetable, and is moving along faster and faster, creating cause for concern. Actually, the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement has been in the works for a year and a half. Everthing from its name to its signing date have been repeatedly postponed. The reason it must be signed this year has nothing to do with Ma administration's wishes. It has to do with the ASEAN Free Trade Area, which was launched earlier this year. From the perspective of national competitiveness, signing ECFA in June is already late.
The atmosphere on Taiwan is full of divisive rhetoric. People habitually turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to rhetoric different from their own. Over the past year, volumes of information on ECFA have been made available by the Council of Agriculture, the Council of Labor Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Mainland Affairs Council. Each of these agencies has offered talking points. Leave aside the question of quality, and look only at the quantity. The volume has far exceeded the volume for other major economic policies. Most people cab remain indifferent to ECFA, which is merely an agreement over the framework of future negotiations. But the DPP must act responsibly. It is an opposition party that was in power for eight years. The DPP has no excuse for engaging in irrational obstructionism. The Democratic Progressive Party need not accept the government's official spin. But it must offer concrete justifications for its opposition.
Since the second change in ruling parties in 2008, leaders of the government and the political opposition have remained at loggerheads. Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly expressed a willingness to debate Tsai Ing-wen, but has never received a response. Based on this alone, Tsai Ing-wen does not compare with former KMT Chairman Lien Chan, who handed over power in 2000. The Ma/Tsai debate remains a non-starter. Therefore it will not generate any political sparks. Tsai Ing-wen might as well come out of hiding. The Republic of China is a mature democracy. Party politics have persisted for twenty years. People may have their own political preferences. But they will not say no to their party chairmen meeting face to face. In fact, they welcome a debate between the two chairmen. Elections are about winning and losing. Post election debates on the other hand, are about healthy political exchanges. Blue reunificationist vs. Green independence rhetoric on Taiwan has corrupted political discourse far too long. Government and opposition leaders must lead by example. They must reestablish a normal and healthy political culture. A debate over ECFA would be a good first step.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.25
民進黨真要辯論 還是故意要破局
本報訊
兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）即將在六月簽署，馬英九總統日前已明快宣示，願意與民進黨主席蔡英文就此一重大議題進行辯論。執政黨難得主動出擊，民進黨沒道理再迴避了。畢竟根據最新民調，泛綠支持者有高達九成二贊成朝野辯論，比泛藍支持者還高，面對黨內力主迎戰聲浪，蔡英文儘管做出了回應，令人相當遺憾的是，又刻意設下了種種前提條件，彷彿故意就是要讓這場辯論陷入破局之勢。
蔡英文搬出的理由之一是，世界各國重大貿易談判前，一定要由獨立機構進行完整的調查報告，因此宣稱將透過立院黨團提案由國會主導進行並完成一份獨立調查報告，做為未來監督審查ＥＣＦＡ簽訂過程的依據，使審查更具實質意涵。然而，兩岸簽署的ＥＣＦＡ只是架構協議，稱不上貿易談判，但由於部分國人對簽署ＥＣＦＡ後對相關產業的衝擊，還存有疑慮，有一份深入的調查報告並無不可。只不過針對ＥＣＦＡ議題包括中華經濟研究院等智庫機構早有研究，民進黨外圍智庫也有大量研究報告。ＥＣＦＡ畢竟不是三一九槍擊案，立院即使是最高民意機關，適不適合、有沒有能力進行類似調查，其實是有疑問的。
蔡英文要求立法院主導ＥＣＦＡ調查報告，民進黨發言人蔡其昌則提出要建立有效的談判機制，例如立法院長王金平也同意的兩岸事務監督小組。王金平主張建置的兩岸事務監督小組是編制外、制度化的立法院任務編組，廣泛監督政府所有的兩岸政策，並非專案式的調查委員會，兩者不能相提並論。那麼，民進黨到底是要ＥＣＦＡ調查委員會？還是兩岸事務監督小組？而不論何者，立法院職權就在監督政府所有政策、法案與預算，當然包括ＥＣＦＡ，朝野辯論與立法院職權可以脫勾，如果兩者非掛勾不可，朝野辯論由立法院兩黨幹部在立法院進行即可，何必主席出馬？
蔡英文同時又強調要全力推動第二次ＥＣＦＡ公投。事實上，民進黨去年已經進行過一次ＥＣＦＡ的公投連署案，但遭公投審議委員會否決。很難想像，在沒有太多變化的情況下，即使民進黨與台聯再次連署完成，公審會可能推翻前議，突然通過了ＥＣＦＡ公投案。ＥＣＦＡ只是架構協議，簽署之後，兩岸才能在這個架構下，進行談判和磋商，沒有內容只有綱要的協議，要公投什麼呢？
蔡英文批評，馬政府執意簽定ＥＣＦＡ，不僅先訂定時間表、而且發展速度越來越快，令人憂慮。事實上，兩岸經濟合作架構協議已醞釀一年半，從名稱到簽署時程，都幾經調整，今年非簽不可的原因，並非馬政府執意施為，而是東協自由貿易區今年已經啟動，如果從國家競爭力的角度來看，六月間兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，時程上已經慢了。
台灣社會充斥情緒性的對立言詞，對不同於己方的論述，習慣性的視而不見、聽而不聞。這一年多來，ＥＣＦＡ的資訊汗牛充棟，從農委會、勞委會、經濟部、陸委會，各部門都有政策說帖，先不說質，僅從量上評估，也遠遠超過政府其他重大政策。對一般民眾而言，對一個只是「架構協議」的ＥＣＦＡ可以淡漠以對，但做為負責任的、特別是已經有執政八年經驗的在野黨，民進黨沒有為反對而反對的藉口，民進黨可以不接受政府部門的「官方說法」，但也要拿得出反對的具體理由和論點。
二○○八政黨再輪替迄今，朝野領袖始終緣慳一面，馬英九多次釋出雙英會的善意，卻一直得不到回應。就這一點而言，蔡英文還不如二千年交出政權後的國民黨主席連戰，雙英會不成，雙英辯論既已造成氣氛，就不必再拖延閃躲。台灣是一個成熟的民主社會，政黨政治好歹也走了廿多年，民眾或許有自己的政黨偏好，卻不至於堅拒兩黨主席會面，甚至會歡迎兩黨主席辯論。選舉拚輸贏，選後辯政策，這才是健康的政黨互動。台灣，已經被唯藍綠統獨的政治語言扭曲太久了，朝野領袖必須以身作則，重建一個正常而健康的政治文化，ＥＣＦＡ辯論就是第一步。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 25, 2010
The cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) will be signed in June. Yesterday President Ma Ying-jeou declared that he was willing to debate this important issue with DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. Seldom does a ruling party make such an offer to the political opposition on its own initiative. The DPP no long has any excuse to evade debate. According to the latest opinion polls, 92% of the Green Camp's supporters favor a debate between the government and the opposition DPP. This number is even higher than the number for Blue Camp supporters. Tsai Ing-wen has responded to internal party pressure. Unfortunately, she has deliberately laid down all sorts of of preconditions. She appears intent on sabotaging any possible debate.
Tsai Ing-wen has trotted out any number of excuses for her reluctance to debate. One excuse is that before the nations of the world enter major trade negotiations, they invariably call for independent studies. Any such studies would be used during future oversight and review, and ensure that oversight and review of ECFA would be substantive and meaningful. But the ECFA about to be signed by the two sides is merely a framework. It does not merit the appellation, "trade negotiations." Some people still fear the impact ECFA may have on certain industries once it is signed. There is no reason why an in-depth report cannot be ordered. But the Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research and other think tanks already conducted in-depth investigations long ago. Think tanks close to the Democratic Progressive Party have also conducted independent studies. ECFA, after all, is not the 3/19 Shooting Incident. The Legislative Yuan is the highest representative body of the nation. Should it conduct such a study? Is it competent to conduct such a study? Many doubt it.
Tsai Ing-wen wants the Legislative Yuan to conduct a study of ECFA. DPP spokesman Tsai Chi-chang also proposed the establishment of an effective negotiating mechanism. Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng agrees there should be a cross-Strait affairs oversight committee. Wang Jin-pyng favors systematic organization of the Legislative Yuan's tasks. He favors comprehensive monitoring of the government's cross-Strait policies, rather than the establishment of ad hoc oversight committees, saying the two can not be compared. What does the DPP want? An ECFA oversight committee? Or a cross-Strait affairs oversight committee? No matter what it wants, the Legislative Yuan has the authority to oversee all government policies, bills, and budgets, including ECFA. Debates between the government and the political opposition need not be linked to the Legislative Yuan's authority. If the two must be linked, then the debate between the ruling and opposition parties can be held in the Legislative Yuan, between party cadres. Why must the chairman be called into action?
Tsai Ing-wen also stressed the need to promote a second ECFA referendum. In fact the DPP began an ECFA referendum signature drive last year. But the referendum was rejected by the Referendum Committee. Who knew that although little has changed, the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union's second signature drive would succeed? The Referendum Committee may reverse its previous ruling, and suddenly approve a referendum on ECFA. ECFA is merely an agreement about the framework of future talks. Only after it is signed, can the two sides begin negotiations and consultations within the framework. What is the point of holding a referendum on an agreement that merely contains a table of contents, but no actual content?
Tsai Ing-wen has criticized the Ma administration, saying not only does it seem determined to sign ECFA, it has established a timetable, and is moving along faster and faster, creating cause for concern. Actually, the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement has been in the works for a year and a half. Everthing from its name to its signing date have been repeatedly postponed. The reason it must be signed this year has nothing to do with Ma administration's wishes. It has to do with the ASEAN Free Trade Area, which was launched earlier this year. From the perspective of national competitiveness, signing ECFA in June is already late.
The atmosphere on Taiwan is full of divisive rhetoric. People habitually turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to rhetoric different from their own. Over the past year, volumes of information on ECFA have been made available by the Council of Agriculture, the Council of Labor Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Mainland Affairs Council. Each of these agencies has offered talking points. Leave aside the question of quality, and look only at the quantity. The volume has far exceeded the volume for other major economic policies. Most people cab remain indifferent to ECFA, which is merely an agreement over the framework of future negotiations. But the DPP must act responsibly. It is an opposition party that was in power for eight years. The DPP has no excuse for engaging in irrational obstructionism. The Democratic Progressive Party need not accept the government's official spin. But it must offer concrete justifications for its opposition.
Since the second change in ruling parties in 2008, leaders of the government and the political opposition have remained at loggerheads. Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly expressed a willingness to debate Tsai Ing-wen, but has never received a response. Based on this alone, Tsai Ing-wen does not compare with former KMT Chairman Lien Chan, who handed over power in 2000. The Ma/Tsai debate remains a non-starter. Therefore it will not generate any political sparks. Tsai Ing-wen might as well come out of hiding. The Republic of China is a mature democracy. Party politics have persisted for twenty years. People may have their own political preferences. But they will not say no to their party chairmen meeting face to face. In fact, they welcome a debate between the two chairmen. Elections are about winning and losing. Post election debates on the other hand, are about healthy political exchanges. Blue reunificationist vs. Green independence rhetoric on Taiwan has corrupted political discourse far too long. Government and opposition leaders must lead by example. They must reestablish a normal and healthy political culture. A debate over ECFA would be a good first step.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.25
民進黨真要辯論 還是故意要破局
本報訊
兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）即將在六月簽署，馬英九總統日前已明快宣示，願意與民進黨主席蔡英文就此一重大議題進行辯論。執政黨難得主動出擊，民進黨沒道理再迴避了。畢竟根據最新民調，泛綠支持者有高達九成二贊成朝野辯論，比泛藍支持者還高，面對黨內力主迎戰聲浪，蔡英文儘管做出了回應，令人相當遺憾的是，又刻意設下了種種前提條件，彷彿故意就是要讓這場辯論陷入破局之勢。
蔡英文搬出的理由之一是，世界各國重大貿易談判前，一定要由獨立機構進行完整的調查報告，因此宣稱將透過立院黨團提案由國會主導進行並完成一份獨立調查報告，做為未來監督審查ＥＣＦＡ簽訂過程的依據，使審查更具實質意涵。然而，兩岸簽署的ＥＣＦＡ只是架構協議，稱不上貿易談判，但由於部分國人對簽署ＥＣＦＡ後對相關產業的衝擊，還存有疑慮，有一份深入的調查報告並無不可。只不過針對ＥＣＦＡ議題包括中華經濟研究院等智庫機構早有研究，民進黨外圍智庫也有大量研究報告。ＥＣＦＡ畢竟不是三一九槍擊案，立院即使是最高民意機關，適不適合、有沒有能力進行類似調查，其實是有疑問的。
蔡英文要求立法院主導ＥＣＦＡ調查報告，民進黨發言人蔡其昌則提出要建立有效的談判機制，例如立法院長王金平也同意的兩岸事務監督小組。王金平主張建置的兩岸事務監督小組是編制外、制度化的立法院任務編組，廣泛監督政府所有的兩岸政策，並非專案式的調查委員會，兩者不能相提並論。那麼，民進黨到底是要ＥＣＦＡ調查委員會？還是兩岸事務監督小組？而不論何者，立法院職權就在監督政府所有政策、法案與預算，當然包括ＥＣＦＡ，朝野辯論與立法院職權可以脫勾，如果兩者非掛勾不可，朝野辯論由立法院兩黨幹部在立法院進行即可，何必主席出馬？
蔡英文同時又強調要全力推動第二次ＥＣＦＡ公投。事實上，民進黨去年已經進行過一次ＥＣＦＡ的公投連署案，但遭公投審議委員會否決。很難想像，在沒有太多變化的情況下，即使民進黨與台聯再次連署完成，公審會可能推翻前議，突然通過了ＥＣＦＡ公投案。ＥＣＦＡ只是架構協議，簽署之後，兩岸才能在這個架構下，進行談判和磋商，沒有內容只有綱要的協議，要公投什麼呢？
蔡英文批評，馬政府執意簽定ＥＣＦＡ，不僅先訂定時間表、而且發展速度越來越快，令人憂慮。事實上，兩岸經濟合作架構協議已醞釀一年半，從名稱到簽署時程，都幾經調整，今年非簽不可的原因，並非馬政府執意施為，而是東協自由貿易區今年已經啟動，如果從國家競爭力的角度來看，六月間兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，時程上已經慢了。
台灣社會充斥情緒性的對立言詞，對不同於己方的論述，習慣性的視而不見、聽而不聞。這一年多來，ＥＣＦＡ的資訊汗牛充棟，從農委會、勞委會、經濟部、陸委會，各部門都有政策說帖，先不說質，僅從量上評估，也遠遠超過政府其他重大政策。對一般民眾而言，對一個只是「架構協議」的ＥＣＦＡ可以淡漠以對，但做為負責任的、特別是已經有執政八年經驗的在野黨，民進黨沒有為反對而反對的藉口，民進黨可以不接受政府部門的「官方說法」，但也要拿得出反對的具體理由和論點。
二○○八政黨再輪替迄今，朝野領袖始終緣慳一面，馬英九多次釋出雙英會的善意，卻一直得不到回應。就這一點而言，蔡英文還不如二千年交出政權後的國民黨主席連戰，雙英會不成，雙英辯論既已造成氣氛，就不必再拖延閃躲。台灣是一個成熟的民主社會，政黨政治好歹也走了廿多年，民眾或許有自己的政黨偏好，卻不至於堅拒兩黨主席會面，甚至會歡迎兩黨主席辯論。選舉拚輸贏，選後辯政策，這才是健康的政黨互動。台灣，已經被唯藍綠統獨的政治語言扭曲太久了，朝野領袖必須以身作則，重建一個正常而健康的政治文化，ＥＣＦＡ辯論就是第一步。
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
Neither the Government nor the Opposition Should Be Afraid To Debate ECFA
Neither the Government nor the Opposition Should Be Afraid To Debate ECFA
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 24, 2010
This time last year, President Ma specifically asked his administration to step up communications over the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The government issued its first statement on the matter. A year has passed. Just exactly what is ECFA? Most people still don't know. They listen, but still don't understand. According to the Wang Wang Media Group's latest poll, among the 70% who know Taipei and Beijing are about to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement, only 33% feel they understand the substance of the agreement. Two months later, according to the Ma administration's timetable, a majority of the public still does not understand it. This has led to serious Blue vs. Green confrontations over whether to sign. Both the government and the opposition refuse to publicly debate the issue. Instead, they have treated it as a political or campaign tool. This has not helped the nation's economic development. Nor has it helped to establish a national consensus.
The two sides began permitting exchanges over 20 years ago. Private sector exchanges have been akin to the river flowing into the sea -- difficult to stop. Politics has progressed from hostility to reconciliation. Economics has progressed from isolation to interdependence. Unfortunately the 60 year long cross-Strait confrontation has created a unique historical situation. It has created a peculiar atmosphere on Taiwan, one in which reunification and independence are unable to coexist. The atmosphere has become increasingly strained with increasing political openness. If reunification vs. independence disputes were merely election rhetoric, the problem would not be so serious. But reunification vs. independence issues dictate cross-Strait policy. Both government and opposition political leaders must realize that their reunification vs. independence political positions have created an insoluble dilemma for Taiwan.
The latest Wang Wang China Times poll numbers underscore the above-mentioned difficulties. According to the Wang Wang China Times poll, and a poll conducted by Commonwealth magazine and Global Views magazine, as many as 73% of the public on Taiwan feel that if the Republic of China fails to sign trade agreements with nearby countries, the failure will seriously affect Taiwan's economic development. Nevertheless 36% of the public still does not support ECFA. However, in the overall interests of the the Republic of China, over half, or 51% of the public supports ECFA. More supporters live in the North than the South. More opponents live in the South than the North. This underscores the regional differences.
Does the public really not understand that ECFA is an economic agreement? Does the public really not appreciate the international pickle the Republic of China is in? If the two sides fail to sign this agreement, the Republic of China will find it impossible to sign economic and trade agreements with neighboring countries. Does the public really not understand that the ASEAN Free Trade Area has already been launched, and that if the Republic of China falls further behind, it will be irreversibly marginalized?
There is no denying that if the two sides sign ECFA, some industries will profit and others will suffer. The government and the public must make decisions that will maximize the benefits and minimize the deficits. Who will tell us what is to our benefit? Who will tell us what is to our deficit? Besides the pros and cons, what other programs and measures are involved? The government repeatedly issues statements. It frequently introduces new talking points. The opposition party was in power for eight years. Besides accusing others of "selling out Taiwan," it has never offered any concrete reasons for its opposition. The Ma administration has repeatedly declared that it will absolutely not allow workers and agricultural products to enter from the Chinese Mainland. And yet the DPP still cites this as a reason for its criticism and opposition. It is unwilling even to do a little homework. It is unwilling to ensure that industries on Taiwan receive more benefits from the "early harvest" list to be announced in April.
Now for the vulnerable industries. Let us cite just one example. The Chen regime accused Mainland China of "dumping" cloth towels on the market. At the time, current Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council Lai Hsing-yuan was a legislator. She led the charge. She forced the Ministry of Economic Affairs to invoke WTO standards. She demanded arbitration. Meanwhile the towel industry on Taiwan was undergoing radical upgrading. It is now producing high-quality towels. The Mainland Affairs Council has protected industries on Taiwan far better than the DPP government. The accusation of "selling out Taiwan" simply will not stick to the Ma administration. If the DPP still wants to oppose ECFA, then why not have the courage to debate it? It is time to clear the air, once and for all. Stop using simplistic McCarthyite tactics to paint Taiwan's economy into a corner.
Premier Wu Den-yih has agreed to a debate between the government and the opposition DPP. According to polls, the DPP figure the public most hopes will participate in the debate is Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen was a national security aide under Lee Teng-hui. She served as Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council and as Vice Premier in the Executive Yuan under the Chen regime. Her thinking was clear. Her tongue was sharp. She was also familiar with the ins and outs of cross-Strait policy. She is indeed a most suitable candidate for the debate. Unfortunately Tsai Ing-wen has been dodging the debate. Late last year President Ma Ying-jeou openly declared his willingness to debate with Tsai Ying-wen, even about ECFA. Chairman Tsai demurred, and asked how can we hold a debate on issues that have not been clarified? Today, faced with intense public demand for a debate, Tsai Ing-wen's staffers are saying that if Tsai agrees to a debate, her opponent must be Ma Ying-jeou. They said that Ko Chien-min, executive director of the DPP Policy Committee, was highly qualified and would debate Premier Wu. Ko Chien-min undoubtedly has plentiful experience with the DPP's party affairs. But the public also knows that Ko Chien-min lacks eloquence. The Democratic Progressive Party is not merely terrified of a debate. It is throwing obstacles in the way of a debate.
Cross-Strait policy is an important subject that the Republic of China government can not avoid. If it is not resolved today, it will continue to confront us tomorrow. The public wants a policy debate, not verbal abuse. That is a rather modest expectation. The leaders of the ruling Blue and opposition Green political parties must take this matter seriously. They must not treat it as merely another political campaign. It concerns Taiwan's economic prosperity, and even its future.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.24
社論－論辯ＥＣＦＡ 朝野都不容怯戰
本報訊
去年此時，馬總統特別要求政府團隊加強兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）的溝通，首份政府說帖出爐。一年過去了，ＥＣＦＡ到底是什麼？多數民眾還是一頭霧水，有聽沒有懂。根據旺旺中時媒體集團所做的最新民調，在知道兩岸要簽經濟合作架構協議的七成多民眾中，只有三成三自認了解其內容，照馬政府的既定時程，二個多月後，這項多數人尚不明所以、卻已造成藍綠嚴重對立的協議就要簽定。然而，朝野對政策辯論卻你閃我躲，將政策做為政治或選戰工具，既無益於國家發展，遑論凝聚國人共識。
兩岸開放廿多年，民間交流如江海難擋，政治從敵對到和解，經濟從隔絕到相互依存，偏偏兩岸對峙一甲子造成特殊的歷史情境，並形塑台灣內部統獨難容的奇特氛圍，這個氛圍隨著政治開放卻愈見緊繃。如果統、獨論調僅止是選舉或政治語言，問題還沒這麼大，但是當統獨思考可能左右所有的兩岸政策時，朝野政治領袖必須意識到：他們的唯統獨論的政治立場，已經替台灣套上一個難解的困境。
旺旺中時最新民調透露數據，正完全反映上述困境。搭配另一項由天下遠見所做的民調，高達七成三的民眾認知台灣若未與附近國家簽署經貿協定，將嚴重影響台灣未來經濟發展，但還是有三成六民眾不支持兩岸簽定ＥＣＦＡ，但是若對台灣整體利益有好處，就有過半五成一的民眾支持應該簽定，而支持者北多於南，反對者則是南多於北，呈現出區域的差異性。
難道民眾不知道ＥＣＦＡ就是經濟協定嗎？難道民眾不知道在台灣困難的國際處境下，兩岸若不簽署此一架構協議，台灣和周邊國家的經貿協議很難進一步簽定嗎？難道民眾不知道東協自由貿易區自今年起已經啟動，台灣如果再慢一步，就將落入難以逆轉的邊緣化處境嗎？
無可諱言，兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，有產業得利，也有產業難免受到衝擊，政府、乃至全體國民都要面對趨利避凶的政策抉擇，誰來告訴我們，利到底在哪？弊到底有多大？在利與弊之外，還有什麼配套方案與措施？當政府反覆溝通，頻頻推出新說帖的同時，曾經執政八年的在野政黨，除了「賣台」兩個字，也講不出反對的具體理由，從大陸勞工到仍在限制之列的大陸農產品，馬政府公開宣示多次，絕不開放，民進黨人照樣以此做為批評與反對的理由，甚至不肯用心做一點功課，在四月即將公布的早期收穫清單中，為產業力爭更多籌碼。
至於其他弱勢產業，舉一個最簡單的例子，扁政府時期，大陸毛巾傾銷，時任立委的陸委會主委賴幸媛，帶頭衝撞，硬是逼到經濟部援引ＷＴＯ國際規範，進行仲裁，而台灣的毛巾業者也全力轉型，現在成為高品質毛巾的代表。有比民進黨政府更保護台灣產業的陸委會把關，「賣台」兩個字無論如何套不上馬政府的頭上，民進黨還要反對，那就辯論吧，把事理一次說清楚，不要用簡單化的紅帽子策略，將台灣發展逼到死角。
行政院長吳敦義點頭應允朝野辯論，根據民調顯示，民眾最期待民進黨出馬辯論者就是黨主席蔡英文。蔡英文從李登輝執政時期就是國安幕僚，扁政府八年又歷任陸委會主委與行政院副院長，思路清晰，口才便給，又熟悉兩岸政策的來龍去脈，確實是最適合的辯論人選，遺憾的是，蔡英文對辯論始終閃躲。去年底馬英九總統接受訪問時即直接表明，願意與蔡辯論，辯論ＥＣＦＡ也可以；蔡主席的反應卻是，內涵都搞不清楚的東西怎麼辯論？如今，面對強烈要求辯論的民調，蔡英文的幕僚又拋出，蔡辯論的對象是馬，至於吳揆要辯論，派民進黨政策會執行長柯建銘出馬即可，柯建銘在民進黨內資歷豐富，毋庸置疑，但柯建銘不擅於論述，卻也眾所皆知，民進黨此舉已經不只是怯戰，而是搗蛋了。
兩岸政策是台灣不能迴避的重要課題，今日不解決，明日還是要面對，政策辯論，而非口水謾罵，只是民眾對朝野政黨最低限度的要求，朝野兩黨藍綠領袖，都必須嚴肅看待，不能只視為選戰策略操作，因為這攸關台灣的發展、台灣的未來、甚至台灣的生存。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 24, 2010
This time last year, President Ma specifically asked his administration to step up communications over the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The government issued its first statement on the matter. A year has passed. Just exactly what is ECFA? Most people still don't know. They listen, but still don't understand. According to the Wang Wang Media Group's latest poll, among the 70% who know Taipei and Beijing are about to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement, only 33% feel they understand the substance of the agreement. Two months later, according to the Ma administration's timetable, a majority of the public still does not understand it. This has led to serious Blue vs. Green confrontations over whether to sign. Both the government and the opposition refuse to publicly debate the issue. Instead, they have treated it as a political or campaign tool. This has not helped the nation's economic development. Nor has it helped to establish a national consensus.
The two sides began permitting exchanges over 20 years ago. Private sector exchanges have been akin to the river flowing into the sea -- difficult to stop. Politics has progressed from hostility to reconciliation. Economics has progressed from isolation to interdependence. Unfortunately the 60 year long cross-Strait confrontation has created a unique historical situation. It has created a peculiar atmosphere on Taiwan, one in which reunification and independence are unable to coexist. The atmosphere has become increasingly strained with increasing political openness. If reunification vs. independence disputes were merely election rhetoric, the problem would not be so serious. But reunification vs. independence issues dictate cross-Strait policy. Both government and opposition political leaders must realize that their reunification vs. independence political positions have created an insoluble dilemma for Taiwan.
The latest Wang Wang China Times poll numbers underscore the above-mentioned difficulties. According to the Wang Wang China Times poll, and a poll conducted by Commonwealth magazine and Global Views magazine, as many as 73% of the public on Taiwan feel that if the Republic of China fails to sign trade agreements with nearby countries, the failure will seriously affect Taiwan's economic development. Nevertheless 36% of the public still does not support ECFA. However, in the overall interests of the the Republic of China, over half, or 51% of the public supports ECFA. More supporters live in the North than the South. More opponents live in the South than the North. This underscores the regional differences.
Does the public really not understand that ECFA is an economic agreement? Does the public really not appreciate the international pickle the Republic of China is in? If the two sides fail to sign this agreement, the Republic of China will find it impossible to sign economic and trade agreements with neighboring countries. Does the public really not understand that the ASEAN Free Trade Area has already been launched, and that if the Republic of China falls further behind, it will be irreversibly marginalized?
There is no denying that if the two sides sign ECFA, some industries will profit and others will suffer. The government and the public must make decisions that will maximize the benefits and minimize the deficits. Who will tell us what is to our benefit? Who will tell us what is to our deficit? Besides the pros and cons, what other programs and measures are involved? The government repeatedly issues statements. It frequently introduces new talking points. The opposition party was in power for eight years. Besides accusing others of "selling out Taiwan," it has never offered any concrete reasons for its opposition. The Ma administration has repeatedly declared that it will absolutely not allow workers and agricultural products to enter from the Chinese Mainland. And yet the DPP still cites this as a reason for its criticism and opposition. It is unwilling even to do a little homework. It is unwilling to ensure that industries on Taiwan receive more benefits from the "early harvest" list to be announced in April.
Now for the vulnerable industries. Let us cite just one example. The Chen regime accused Mainland China of "dumping" cloth towels on the market. At the time, current Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council Lai Hsing-yuan was a legislator. She led the charge. She forced the Ministry of Economic Affairs to invoke WTO standards. She demanded arbitration. Meanwhile the towel industry on Taiwan was undergoing radical upgrading. It is now producing high-quality towels. The Mainland Affairs Council has protected industries on Taiwan far better than the DPP government. The accusation of "selling out Taiwan" simply will not stick to the Ma administration. If the DPP still wants to oppose ECFA, then why not have the courage to debate it? It is time to clear the air, once and for all. Stop using simplistic McCarthyite tactics to paint Taiwan's economy into a corner.
Premier Wu Den-yih has agreed to a debate between the government and the opposition DPP. According to polls, the DPP figure the public most hopes will participate in the debate is Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen was a national security aide under Lee Teng-hui. She served as Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council and as Vice Premier in the Executive Yuan under the Chen regime. Her thinking was clear. Her tongue was sharp. She was also familiar with the ins and outs of cross-Strait policy. She is indeed a most suitable candidate for the debate. Unfortunately Tsai Ing-wen has been dodging the debate. Late last year President Ma Ying-jeou openly declared his willingness to debate with Tsai Ying-wen, even about ECFA. Chairman Tsai demurred, and asked how can we hold a debate on issues that have not been clarified? Today, faced with intense public demand for a debate, Tsai Ing-wen's staffers are saying that if Tsai agrees to a debate, her opponent must be Ma Ying-jeou. They said that Ko Chien-min, executive director of the DPP Policy Committee, was highly qualified and would debate Premier Wu. Ko Chien-min undoubtedly has plentiful experience with the DPP's party affairs. But the public also knows that Ko Chien-min lacks eloquence. The Democratic Progressive Party is not merely terrified of a debate. It is throwing obstacles in the way of a debate.
Cross-Strait policy is an important subject that the Republic of China government can not avoid. If it is not resolved today, it will continue to confront us tomorrow. The public wants a policy debate, not verbal abuse. That is a rather modest expectation. The leaders of the ruling Blue and opposition Green political parties must take this matter seriously. They must not treat it as merely another political campaign. It concerns Taiwan's economic prosperity, and even its future.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.24
社論－論辯ＥＣＦＡ 朝野都不容怯戰
本報訊
去年此時，馬總統特別要求政府團隊加強兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）的溝通，首份政府說帖出爐。一年過去了，ＥＣＦＡ到底是什麼？多數民眾還是一頭霧水，有聽沒有懂。根據旺旺中時媒體集團所做的最新民調，在知道兩岸要簽經濟合作架構協議的七成多民眾中，只有三成三自認了解其內容，照馬政府的既定時程，二個多月後，這項多數人尚不明所以、卻已造成藍綠嚴重對立的協議就要簽定。然而，朝野對政策辯論卻你閃我躲，將政策做為政治或選戰工具，既無益於國家發展，遑論凝聚國人共識。
兩岸開放廿多年，民間交流如江海難擋，政治從敵對到和解，經濟從隔絕到相互依存，偏偏兩岸對峙一甲子造成特殊的歷史情境，並形塑台灣內部統獨難容的奇特氛圍，這個氛圍隨著政治開放卻愈見緊繃。如果統、獨論調僅止是選舉或政治語言，問題還沒這麼大，但是當統獨思考可能左右所有的兩岸政策時，朝野政治領袖必須意識到：他們的唯統獨論的政治立場，已經替台灣套上一個難解的困境。
旺旺中時最新民調透露數據，正完全反映上述困境。搭配另一項由天下遠見所做的民調，高達七成三的民眾認知台灣若未與附近國家簽署經貿協定，將嚴重影響台灣未來經濟發展，但還是有三成六民眾不支持兩岸簽定ＥＣＦＡ，但是若對台灣整體利益有好處，就有過半五成一的民眾支持應該簽定，而支持者北多於南，反對者則是南多於北，呈現出區域的差異性。
難道民眾不知道ＥＣＦＡ就是經濟協定嗎？難道民眾不知道在台灣困難的國際處境下，兩岸若不簽署此一架構協議，台灣和周邊國家的經貿協議很難進一步簽定嗎？難道民眾不知道東協自由貿易區自今年起已經啟動，台灣如果再慢一步，就將落入難以逆轉的邊緣化處境嗎？
無可諱言，兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，有產業得利，也有產業難免受到衝擊，政府、乃至全體國民都要面對趨利避凶的政策抉擇，誰來告訴我們，利到底在哪？弊到底有多大？在利與弊之外，還有什麼配套方案與措施？當政府反覆溝通，頻頻推出新說帖的同時，曾經執政八年的在野政黨，除了「賣台」兩個字，也講不出反對的具體理由，從大陸勞工到仍在限制之列的大陸農產品，馬政府公開宣示多次，絕不開放，民進黨人照樣以此做為批評與反對的理由，甚至不肯用心做一點功課，在四月即將公布的早期收穫清單中，為產業力爭更多籌碼。
至於其他弱勢產業，舉一個最簡單的例子，扁政府時期，大陸毛巾傾銷，時任立委的陸委會主委賴幸媛，帶頭衝撞，硬是逼到經濟部援引ＷＴＯ國際規範，進行仲裁，而台灣的毛巾業者也全力轉型，現在成為高品質毛巾的代表。有比民進黨政府更保護台灣產業的陸委會把關，「賣台」兩個字無論如何套不上馬政府的頭上，民進黨還要反對，那就辯論吧，把事理一次說清楚，不要用簡單化的紅帽子策略，將台灣發展逼到死角。
行政院長吳敦義點頭應允朝野辯論，根據民調顯示，民眾最期待民進黨出馬辯論者就是黨主席蔡英文。蔡英文從李登輝執政時期就是國安幕僚，扁政府八年又歷任陸委會主委與行政院副院長，思路清晰，口才便給，又熟悉兩岸政策的來龍去脈，確實是最適合的辯論人選，遺憾的是，蔡英文對辯論始終閃躲。去年底馬英九總統接受訪問時即直接表明，願意與蔡辯論，辯論ＥＣＦＡ也可以；蔡主席的反應卻是，內涵都搞不清楚的東西怎麼辯論？如今，面對強烈要求辯論的民調，蔡英文的幕僚又拋出，蔡辯論的對象是馬，至於吳揆要辯論，派民進黨政策會執行長柯建銘出馬即可，柯建銘在民進黨內資歷豐富，毋庸置疑，但柯建銘不擅於論述，卻也眾所皆知，民進黨此舉已經不只是怯戰，而是搗蛋了。
兩岸政策是台灣不能迴避的重要課題，今日不解決，明日還是要面對，政策辯論，而非口水謾罵，只是民眾對朝野政黨最低限度的要求，朝野兩黨藍綠領袖，都必須嚴肅看待，不能只視為選戰策略操作，因為這攸關台灣的發展、台灣的未來、甚至台灣的生存。
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
Civil Service Evaluation System Reform: Jihad or Terrorism?
Civil Service Evaluation System Reform: Jihad or Terrorism?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 23, 2010
Reform of the civil service evaluation system will necessarily provoke intense conflict. This is hardly surprising. What is surprising is how government heads have taken the lead in badmouthing such reforms.
Two issues are involved in the dispute over civil service evaluation system reform. One concerns principles. The other concerns technical obstacles. Each has provoked both positive and negative reactions. During debates, Wu Den-yih, Li Yong-ping, and other government heads left the public with the impression they were sacrificing their principles merely because they had encountered some technical obstacles. What these government heads should have done, was to approach technical obstacles from the perspective of principle, and aspired to create a system the public could respect.
First, we should make clear just how much slack the new system has. Kuan Chung said "If one gets a C rating this year, no problem. Just work hard and get an A next year." This remark exposed the new system as a "toothless tiger." Under new regulations, 3% of all personnel will be given a C rating. Anyone who receives three consecutive C ratings will be forced to retire or laid off. But nobody is likely to receive three consecutive Cs under the existing system, unless there is absolutely no alternative. What Kuan Chung said in effect was, "So what if one gets two consecutive Cs? Just get a B next year!" In other words, in actual practice, the new system's mechanism for "punishing poor performance and eliminating poor performers" is virtually non-existent. The mandatory C ratings for 3% of all personnel will have nothing more than a warning effect, or "catfish effect."
The "catfish effect" is what happens when a catfish is introduced into a tank full of sardines. The catfish alarms the sardines, forcing them to remain active. The catfish does not actually eat the sardines. If such a softball evaluation system were implemented in Singapore or South Korea, the number of C ratings handed out would be set at 10% or more. In fact, even 10% is too lenient. This is why the public thinks the new system is weak. From a management perspective, we agree. If government heads fail to point civil servants in the right direction, if they fail to acknowledge the legitimacy of civil service reform, but instead speak of "technical obstacles" or even demonize reform efforts and encourage civil servants to take to the streets, we consider it incomprehensible.
Wu Den-yih, Li Yong-ping, and others have raised concerns about the new system. Their concerns are not unreasonable. For example, if every agency, good or bad, big or small, is forced to give 3% of its personnel C ratings, that may be unfair. But if one compares public schools against other public schools, and private schools against other private schools, then one public school must be in last place. One cannot refuse to rate other public schools merely because one does not wish to give a particular public school a C rating. Giving 3% of all agencies, good or bad, big or small, C ratings may involve technical obstacles. But government heads have heavy responsibilities. They cannot refuse to see the forest for the trees.
Even stranger reasons have been trotted out. Some have actually said that "a government head handing out ratings is like someone wielding a knife. Good people get cut, bad people purge their opponents." But this is a problem every office in the world must cope with. Even without C ratings for 3% of all employees, concerns over who gets an A and who gets a B remain, even under our current system. Government heads have heavy responsibilities. Is it not shocking that they would invoke the standards of the "man in the street" when evaluating civil service reform?
Reform is like war. Those who direct the war, must define the war. The Examination Yuan has referred to reform as a "jihad." It has apparently become what Wu Den-yih and Li Yong-ping have described as "terrorist activities." Government reform efforts have been incorrectly spun as a civil war between civil servants. A government ought to act in unison. This war has been misnamed, making it difficult to prosecute. It has become a case of "I do not know what I'm fighting for, and I do not know whom I'm fighting for."
How an issue is perceived, depends upon how it is defined. Reform of the civil service evaluation system can improve civil servants' self-esteem and sense of honor. It can also incite discontent within the ranks of the civil service. Wu Den-yih and other government heads are not being unreasonable when they cite "technical obstacles." But if inflammatory speech succeeds in demonizing such a moderate, even slack new system in the minds of civil servants, then thes government heads have acted irresponsibly, and their political response must be considered a debacle.
This debate over civil service evaluation reform has mired the Ma administration in "civil strife," in a "damned if you do, and damned if you don't" dilemma. The government has defined its reform efforts as a "jihad." Some may oppose a jihad, but at least those who support it will give it their seal of approval. But if even some in the government consider the government's reform efforts "terrorist activities," those who oppose it will continue to oppose it. And even those who support it will be disillusioned by the government's "civil strife." Voter support will evaporate as a consequence of one such fiasco after another.
Reform is like war. Those who direct the war, must first define the war.
考績改革究竟是聖戰或恐怖活動
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.23 02:19 am
考績制度改革必是利害衝突劇烈，本不足怪；奇怪的是行政首長帶頭以負面評價來唱衰考績改革。
此次《考績法》改制的爭議，可分作兩類。一類是對「原則問題」的爭議，一類是對「技術問題」的爭議；而每一類問題又可引出正面及負面兩種評價。吳敦義及李永萍等行政首長在辯論新制時給人留下的印象是：因技術問題而否定了原則，致對整個改革新制給予負面評價。然而，面對此次爭議，較符行政首長角色的立場或許應當是：強調原則正當而修正技術問題，將新制改革導向正面印象的社會視聽。
首先必須弄清楚，新制的鬆緊程度究竟如何。關中說：「今年打丙，明年努力拿甲就好了嘛！」一句話，已經道盡新制其實是「無牙老虎」。新制規定，三％打丙；且三年連續打丙者，始得令其退休或資遣。在當前這種行政文化中，除非已是無可如何，「三年連續打丙」的情況其實極不易發生；關中的話屆時就變成：「兩年打丙，第三年打乙就好了嘛！」也就是說，實際運作起來，新制的「懲劣／汰劣」的「退場機制」幾乎並不存在；其實只是「鯰魚效應」，寄望三％打丙能發生一些「警惕／激勵」的作用而已。
所謂「鯰魚效應」，就是在沙丁魚的池裡放一條鯰魚，目的在刺激沙丁魚活動起來，而不在吃掉沙丁魚。如此「溫和」的考績制度，若與星韓等國最低階考績規定十％相較，其實已是寬縱得多。正因如此，民間甚至認為，新制的力道太弱；站在人事管理的觀點，我們亦持此見。在此種情勢下，身為行政首長，若非僅未能引導公務員以正面態度認知改革的正當性，反而強調諸種「技術障礙」，甚至將改革妖魔化，挑激公務員的抗議情緒，這就令人不解了。
吳敦義與李永萍等對新制提出的有些質疑，或許不無道理。例如各機關不論大小良莠均三 ％打丙，有失公平。但建國中學的成績與建中比，私立補校與私立補校比；不能說建中就不可有最後一名。更何況，尤其不能因建中不「打丙」，就讓全國的中學也打不成。機關不論大小良莠皆三％打丙，容或真有技術障礙，但站在行政首長的高度，卻不可見樹不見林。
更奇異的理由是，有人居然說：「打考績的首長就像擁有一把刀，良善的人披荊斬棘，惡質的人誅除異己。」其實，這是舉世辦公室皆可能存在的問題，即使沒有三％打丙，現今考績制度誰打甲誰打乙，難道就無此種顧慮。站在行政首長的高度，竟以此種「庶人之見」來評論考績改革，豈不是駭人聽聞。
改革很像是一場戰爭。主導戰爭者，首應掌握戰爭的「定義權」。然而，如今考試院口中的這場「聖戰」，似乎變成了吳敦義與李永萍等人口中的「恐怖活動」。這場國家體制的改革，也被扭曲成了公務員之間的「內戰」。以「政府一體」的觀點來看，這場戰爭已是「名不正／言不順」，更已是「不知為何而戰／不知為誰而戰」。
橫看成嶺側成峰。考績改革可以朝提升公務員自尊心、榮譽感的方向疏導，也可朝挑激公務員不滿情緒的方向操作。吳敦義等行政首長提出的「技術障礙」並非全無道理，但若因為此類言論，使得如此溫和、甚至仍嫌流於寬縱的新制，在公務員間留下妖魔化的形象；我們認為，這樣的行政首長有失立場，這樣的政治對應亦屬敗筆。
這場考績論戰，使馬政府陷入「內亂」，且已又落入父子騎驢的境地。如果「政府一體」將此改革定義為「聖戰」，則反對者固然反對，至少或許尚能贏得贊成者的聲援；然而，倘若連政府內部都有人將之視為「恐怖活動」，則反對者固然反對，連贊成者也會對政府的「內亂」感到失望。所謂「選票跑光光」，也許就是一次又一次複製此類情事而形成的。
改革有如戰爭。主導戰爭者，首應掌握「定義權」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 23, 2010
Reform of the civil service evaluation system will necessarily provoke intense conflict. This is hardly surprising. What is surprising is how government heads have taken the lead in badmouthing such reforms.
Two issues are involved in the dispute over civil service evaluation system reform. One concerns principles. The other concerns technical obstacles. Each has provoked both positive and negative reactions. During debates, Wu Den-yih, Li Yong-ping, and other government heads left the public with the impression they were sacrificing their principles merely because they had encountered some technical obstacles. What these government heads should have done, was to approach technical obstacles from the perspective of principle, and aspired to create a system the public could respect.
First, we should make clear just how much slack the new system has. Kuan Chung said "If one gets a C rating this year, no problem. Just work hard and get an A next year." This remark exposed the new system as a "toothless tiger." Under new regulations, 3% of all personnel will be given a C rating. Anyone who receives three consecutive C ratings will be forced to retire or laid off. But nobody is likely to receive three consecutive Cs under the existing system, unless there is absolutely no alternative. What Kuan Chung said in effect was, "So what if one gets two consecutive Cs? Just get a B next year!" In other words, in actual practice, the new system's mechanism for "punishing poor performance and eliminating poor performers" is virtually non-existent. The mandatory C ratings for 3% of all personnel will have nothing more than a warning effect, or "catfish effect."
The "catfish effect" is what happens when a catfish is introduced into a tank full of sardines. The catfish alarms the sardines, forcing them to remain active. The catfish does not actually eat the sardines. If such a softball evaluation system were implemented in Singapore or South Korea, the number of C ratings handed out would be set at 10% or more. In fact, even 10% is too lenient. This is why the public thinks the new system is weak. From a management perspective, we agree. If government heads fail to point civil servants in the right direction, if they fail to acknowledge the legitimacy of civil service reform, but instead speak of "technical obstacles" or even demonize reform efforts and encourage civil servants to take to the streets, we consider it incomprehensible.
Wu Den-yih, Li Yong-ping, and others have raised concerns about the new system. Their concerns are not unreasonable. For example, if every agency, good or bad, big or small, is forced to give 3% of its personnel C ratings, that may be unfair. But if one compares public schools against other public schools, and private schools against other private schools, then one public school must be in last place. One cannot refuse to rate other public schools merely because one does not wish to give a particular public school a C rating. Giving 3% of all agencies, good or bad, big or small, C ratings may involve technical obstacles. But government heads have heavy responsibilities. They cannot refuse to see the forest for the trees.
Even stranger reasons have been trotted out. Some have actually said that "a government head handing out ratings is like someone wielding a knife. Good people get cut, bad people purge their opponents." But this is a problem every office in the world must cope with. Even without C ratings for 3% of all employees, concerns over who gets an A and who gets a B remain, even under our current system. Government heads have heavy responsibilities. Is it not shocking that they would invoke the standards of the "man in the street" when evaluating civil service reform?
Reform is like war. Those who direct the war, must define the war. The Examination Yuan has referred to reform as a "jihad." It has apparently become what Wu Den-yih and Li Yong-ping have described as "terrorist activities." Government reform efforts have been incorrectly spun as a civil war between civil servants. A government ought to act in unison. This war has been misnamed, making it difficult to prosecute. It has become a case of "I do not know what I'm fighting for, and I do not know whom I'm fighting for."
How an issue is perceived, depends upon how it is defined. Reform of the civil service evaluation system can improve civil servants' self-esteem and sense of honor. It can also incite discontent within the ranks of the civil service. Wu Den-yih and other government heads are not being unreasonable when they cite "technical obstacles." But if inflammatory speech succeeds in demonizing such a moderate, even slack new system in the minds of civil servants, then thes government heads have acted irresponsibly, and their political response must be considered a debacle.
This debate over civil service evaluation reform has mired the Ma administration in "civil strife," in a "damned if you do, and damned if you don't" dilemma. The government has defined its reform efforts as a "jihad." Some may oppose a jihad, but at least those who support it will give it their seal of approval. But if even some in the government consider the government's reform efforts "terrorist activities," those who oppose it will continue to oppose it. And even those who support it will be disillusioned by the government's "civil strife." Voter support will evaporate as a consequence of one such fiasco after another.
Reform is like war. Those who direct the war, must first define the war.
考績改革究竟是聖戰或恐怖活動
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.23 02:19 am
考績制度改革必是利害衝突劇烈，本不足怪；奇怪的是行政首長帶頭以負面評價來唱衰考績改革。
此次《考績法》改制的爭議，可分作兩類。一類是對「原則問題」的爭議，一類是對「技術問題」的爭議；而每一類問題又可引出正面及負面兩種評價。吳敦義及李永萍等行政首長在辯論新制時給人留下的印象是：因技術問題而否定了原則，致對整個改革新制給予負面評價。然而，面對此次爭議，較符行政首長角色的立場或許應當是：強調原則正當而修正技術問題，將新制改革導向正面印象的社會視聽。
首先必須弄清楚，新制的鬆緊程度究竟如何。關中說：「今年打丙，明年努力拿甲就好了嘛！」一句話，已經道盡新制其實是「無牙老虎」。新制規定，三％打丙；且三年連續打丙者，始得令其退休或資遣。在當前這種行政文化中，除非已是無可如何，「三年連續打丙」的情況其實極不易發生；關中的話屆時就變成：「兩年打丙，第三年打乙就好了嘛！」也就是說，實際運作起來，新制的「懲劣／汰劣」的「退場機制」幾乎並不存在；其實只是「鯰魚效應」，寄望三％打丙能發生一些「警惕／激勵」的作用而已。
所謂「鯰魚效應」，就是在沙丁魚的池裡放一條鯰魚，目的在刺激沙丁魚活動起來，而不在吃掉沙丁魚。如此「溫和」的考績制度，若與星韓等國最低階考績規定十％相較，其實已是寬縱得多。正因如此，民間甚至認為，新制的力道太弱；站在人事管理的觀點，我們亦持此見。在此種情勢下，身為行政首長，若非僅未能引導公務員以正面態度認知改革的正當性，反而強調諸種「技術障礙」，甚至將改革妖魔化，挑激公務員的抗議情緒，這就令人不解了。
吳敦義與李永萍等對新制提出的有些質疑，或許不無道理。例如各機關不論大小良莠均三 ％打丙，有失公平。但建國中學的成績與建中比，私立補校與私立補校比；不能說建中就不可有最後一名。更何況，尤其不能因建中不「打丙」，就讓全國的中學也打不成。機關不論大小良莠皆三％打丙，容或真有技術障礙，但站在行政首長的高度，卻不可見樹不見林。
更奇異的理由是，有人居然說：「打考績的首長就像擁有一把刀，良善的人披荊斬棘，惡質的人誅除異己。」其實，這是舉世辦公室皆可能存在的問題，即使沒有三％打丙，現今考績制度誰打甲誰打乙，難道就無此種顧慮。站在行政首長的高度，竟以此種「庶人之見」來評論考績改革，豈不是駭人聽聞。
改革很像是一場戰爭。主導戰爭者，首應掌握戰爭的「定義權」。然而，如今考試院口中的這場「聖戰」，似乎變成了吳敦義與李永萍等人口中的「恐怖活動」。這場國家體制的改革，也被扭曲成了公務員之間的「內戰」。以「政府一體」的觀點來看，這場戰爭已是「名不正／言不順」，更已是「不知為何而戰／不知為誰而戰」。
橫看成嶺側成峰。考績改革可以朝提升公務員自尊心、榮譽感的方向疏導，也可朝挑激公務員不滿情緒的方向操作。吳敦義等行政首長提出的「技術障礙」並非全無道理，但若因為此類言論，使得如此溫和、甚至仍嫌流於寬縱的新制，在公務員間留下妖魔化的形象；我們認為，這樣的行政首長有失立場，這樣的政治對應亦屬敗筆。
這場考績論戰，使馬政府陷入「內亂」，且已又落入父子騎驢的境地。如果「政府一體」將此改革定義為「聖戰」，則反對者固然反對，至少或許尚能贏得贊成者的聲援；然而，倘若連政府內部都有人將之視為「恐怖活動」，則反對者固然反對，連贊成者也會對政府的「內亂」感到失望。所謂「選票跑光光」，也許就是一次又一次複製此類情事而形成的。
改革有如戰爭。主導戰爭者，首應掌握「定義權」。
Sunday, March 21, 2010
Profit Sharing: In the Long Term Interest of Both Sides
Profit Sharing: In the Long Term Interest of Both Sides
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 21, 2010
Taipei and Beijing underwent a crisis when Washington sold Taipei arms. Nevertheless consultations over the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) remained unaffected. Recently, while speaking before the National People's Congress, Mainland Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao even announced a policy of "profit sharing" with Taipei. If this pragmatic policy can be implement in good faith at all levels, we can expect positive and far-reaching impacts.
Mainland Chinese leaders consider cross-Strait differences a fraternal quarrel. They may have differences of opinion with Taipei. Their positions may differ. But blood remains thicker than water. In negotiations over the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, Beijing is willing to "share profits" as an expression of sincerity and goodwill. If we read between the lines, Beijing seems to be implying that it is willing to make even more concessions during future negotiations, or to allow Taipei to receive even more benefits.
In fact this responds to the concerns of many on Taiwan. A clear disparity exists between Mainland China and Taiwan in size, population, markets, economies of scale, and international status. Some on Taiwan are afraid of being swallowed up or inundated. They feel insecure as they face an uncertain future. After decades of cross-Strait confrontation, exchanges and cooperation have only just begun. They have yet to take effect. The public remains unable to lower its guard. Long-term hostilities cannot be dissolved overnight. That is why even though the government has talked until it is blue in the face, many people on Taiwan remain dubious. They worry that once the door is opened, the local economy will wither and die. Beijing has now explicitly declared a willingness to engage in "profit sharing" with Taipei. Whether this will be translated into concrete moves remains to be seen. The public on Taiwan is adopting a wait and see attitude. It will arrive at its own conclusions about Beijing's goodwill based on the evidence.
Cross-Strait consultations have never been purely consultative. Even ECFA, ostensibly only about trade and investment matters, is not confined to economic relations and trade agreements. The key of course is which items will be allowed in. Based on negotiations and the final agreement, each side will make political declarations to each other and their own constituents. More importantly, they will lay out their plans for the future. The two sides are still being integrated. What is covered on the Early Harvest list remains uncertain. If we want negotiations to be completed on schedule in May, and the agreement signed at the Chiang-Chen meeting in June, we clearly need to step up consultations. We also need to seek internal consensus on Taiwan. The agreement is merely an expression of bilateral attitudes. For Beijing the most important issue is what kind of message it wants to send Taipei. When it comes time for negotiations, it will naturally incorporate its concerns into its political considerations.
Why should the two sides turn swords into plowshares? Because any conflict will directly impact both sides. It will also undermine the next generation's chances of living together in peace and prosperity. Why do we need to sign ECFA? Because it is the basis for wide-ranging economic and trade cooperation. It will provide increased opportunities for Taiwan's prosperity. It will allow cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation to enter a new and more intensive stage.
Of course certain industries may be affected. The same was true when Taipei was admitted to the WTO. Because Mainland China is such an important global economic power, Taipei has an opportunity to establish more favorable relations with others. It has no reason not to seize the opportunity. Some people are worried that Taiwan may be swallowed up. But in a globalized world, as long as one is able to find one's own niche, one can establish one's own little piece of heaven. The real fear is that one will shrink and retreat. We must not do nothing merely because we are afraid of the risk. Doing nothing may cost us even more.
The specifics of the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement will be decided over the next two months. They may require something of a tug of war. Beijing may need to show what "profit sharing" means in more concrete terms. That might ease public concerns, and enable this vital framework for cross-Strait relations succeed. That might contribute to a peaceful and friendly interactive environment, helping the two sides put past grievances behind them, promote mutual understanding and tolerance, and find better ways of dealing with differences.
We are promoting cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation for our own sake, to ensure our future and to seize opportunities. If Beijing were to make certain concessions, they might be perceived in the short term as "profit sharing." But in the long term they would benefit both sides. Beijing would not be granting concessions to Taipei. Beijing would be demonstrating an even greater commitment to the future.
「讓利」長遠來看對兩岸都有利
2010-03-21
中國時報
儘管之前經過了美國軍售台灣的波折，兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）協商並未受到影響；日前，中國國務院總理溫家寶更在人大宣示對台灣「讓利」的基本立場。這樣務實善意政策路線如果能落實到兩岸交流的各個層面，可望帶來良性而深遠的影響。
中國領導人認為兩岸的分歧，乃是一種兄弟之爭，即使意見不同、立場互異，仍然斷絕不了血緣之繫、家族之情。而在兩岸經濟合作架構協議談判過程中，中國願意以「讓利」來表達善意與誠意；言辭之間，似乎暗示著未來在談判時有些項目願意作更多讓步，或讓台灣獲取較多利益。
其實這也正回應了許多台灣民眾的疑慮，因為把中國和台灣比一比，無論就幅員、人口、市場、經濟規模、國際地位等各方面，雙方大小懸殊、強弱分明，台灣難免會擔心將被併吞淹沒，對不明確的未來也有不安全感。尤其兩岸對立數十年，才剛剛重新啟動的交流合作，效應還沒有足夠的時間發酵擴大，因此無法讓台灣民眾對中國完全放心，長久的心結不可能一朝一夕就能打開。這也是為什麼，政府說破了嘴，還是有不少基層民眾對兩岸經濟合作架構協議感到疑懼，憂心國門一開，本土經濟命脈將悉數凋萎。現在中國領導人既已明確表達願意對台「讓利」，到底會落實成哪些具體動作，將是台灣民眾拭目以待，並據以評價中國善意的指標。
兩岸的協商，從來就不是單純的協商；即使是只涉及經貿投資事務的「ＥＣＦＡ」，也不僅僅是為經貿而經貿的協議，開放哪些項目、內容如何固然是重點，藉著談判與簽署協議，彼此向對方及各自內部作出政治宣示，並替未來進一步的發展作舖陳則更是重要。現在兩岸的意見仍在整合中，早期收穫清單到底涵蓋哪些也還不定，如果希望依規畫進度在五月完成協商，六月江陳會進行簽署，顯然需要加緊協商，台灣內部也必須努力溝通獲致共識。然而，協議只是雙方態度的代言者，因此對中國來說，最重要的課題，是到底要藉著兩岸經濟合作架構協議向台灣傳達什麼樣的訊息，談判時自然必須納入政治考量。
兩岸為什麼應該化干戈為玉帛？因為衝突不僅會直接重創雙方，也將損害下一代和平相處攜手共榮的機會。為什麼需要簽署「ＥＣＦＡ」？因為它是一個廣泛經貿合作的基礎，有希望為台灣帶來更多繁榮機會，也讓兩岸進入一個更密集交流合作的新階段。
當然，有些產業可能受到衝擊，就像台灣加入世貿組織一樣；但中國既然已是全球一個如此重要的經濟力量，台灣有機會建立比別人更優惠的合作關係，沒有理由不去抓住這個機會。有人擔心台灣被實質吸納，但在一個全球化的世界裡，只要找到利基與獨特位置，就能為自己開創一片天，怕的反而是自己萎縮退步。台灣不能永遠因為擔心風險而什麼都不做，因為那可能失去更多。
兩岸經濟合作架構協議的具體內涵，將在未來兩個月內逐漸成形，其間可能少不了也需一番折衝拉鋸。如中國能具體展現「讓利」動作，有效消解台灣民眾的疑慮，讓這項攸關兩岸關係發展的合作架構成功運作，將能大大有助於打造一個和平友好的互動環境，讓雙方逐漸走出猜忌仇視的過去，慢慢促進對彼此的了解與包容，並且學習以更好的方式處理歧見。
我們推動兩岸更進一步的合作交流，是在為自己、以及未來爭取機會。就此觀之，如果中國對若干談判項目作出讓步，短期而言或許自覺是在對台「讓利」，但長遠來看，這將是對雙方都有利的作法，並不是中國施惠於台灣，而是在展現對一個更美好未來的堅定承諾。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 21, 2010
Taipei and Beijing underwent a crisis when Washington sold Taipei arms. Nevertheless consultations over the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) remained unaffected. Recently, while speaking before the National People's Congress, Mainland Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao even announced a policy of "profit sharing" with Taipei. If this pragmatic policy can be implement in good faith at all levels, we can expect positive and far-reaching impacts.
Mainland Chinese leaders consider cross-Strait differences a fraternal quarrel. They may have differences of opinion with Taipei. Their positions may differ. But blood remains thicker than water. In negotiations over the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, Beijing is willing to "share profits" as an expression of sincerity and goodwill. If we read between the lines, Beijing seems to be implying that it is willing to make even more concessions during future negotiations, or to allow Taipei to receive even more benefits.
In fact this responds to the concerns of many on Taiwan. A clear disparity exists between Mainland China and Taiwan in size, population, markets, economies of scale, and international status. Some on Taiwan are afraid of being swallowed up or inundated. They feel insecure as they face an uncertain future. After decades of cross-Strait confrontation, exchanges and cooperation have only just begun. They have yet to take effect. The public remains unable to lower its guard. Long-term hostilities cannot be dissolved overnight. That is why even though the government has talked until it is blue in the face, many people on Taiwan remain dubious. They worry that once the door is opened, the local economy will wither and die. Beijing has now explicitly declared a willingness to engage in "profit sharing" with Taipei. Whether this will be translated into concrete moves remains to be seen. The public on Taiwan is adopting a wait and see attitude. It will arrive at its own conclusions about Beijing's goodwill based on the evidence.
Cross-Strait consultations have never been purely consultative. Even ECFA, ostensibly only about trade and investment matters, is not confined to economic relations and trade agreements. The key of course is which items will be allowed in. Based on negotiations and the final agreement, each side will make political declarations to each other and their own constituents. More importantly, they will lay out their plans for the future. The two sides are still being integrated. What is covered on the Early Harvest list remains uncertain. If we want negotiations to be completed on schedule in May, and the agreement signed at the Chiang-Chen meeting in June, we clearly need to step up consultations. We also need to seek internal consensus on Taiwan. The agreement is merely an expression of bilateral attitudes. For Beijing the most important issue is what kind of message it wants to send Taipei. When it comes time for negotiations, it will naturally incorporate its concerns into its political considerations.
Why should the two sides turn swords into plowshares? Because any conflict will directly impact both sides. It will also undermine the next generation's chances of living together in peace and prosperity. Why do we need to sign ECFA? Because it is the basis for wide-ranging economic and trade cooperation. It will provide increased opportunities for Taiwan's prosperity. It will allow cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation to enter a new and more intensive stage.
Of course certain industries may be affected. The same was true when Taipei was admitted to the WTO. Because Mainland China is such an important global economic power, Taipei has an opportunity to establish more favorable relations with others. It has no reason not to seize the opportunity. Some people are worried that Taiwan may be swallowed up. But in a globalized world, as long as one is able to find one's own niche, one can establish one's own little piece of heaven. The real fear is that one will shrink and retreat. We must not do nothing merely because we are afraid of the risk. Doing nothing may cost us even more.
The specifics of the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement will be decided over the next two months. They may require something of a tug of war. Beijing may need to show what "profit sharing" means in more concrete terms. That might ease public concerns, and enable this vital framework for cross-Strait relations succeed. That might contribute to a peaceful and friendly interactive environment, helping the two sides put past grievances behind them, promote mutual understanding and tolerance, and find better ways of dealing with differences.
We are promoting cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation for our own sake, to ensure our future and to seize opportunities. If Beijing were to make certain concessions, they might be perceived in the short term as "profit sharing." But in the long term they would benefit both sides. Beijing would not be granting concessions to Taipei. Beijing would be demonstrating an even greater commitment to the future.
「讓利」長遠來看對兩岸都有利
2010-03-21
中國時報
儘管之前經過了美國軍售台灣的波折，兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）協商並未受到影響；日前，中國國務院總理溫家寶更在人大宣示對台灣「讓利」的基本立場。這樣務實善意政策路線如果能落實到兩岸交流的各個層面，可望帶來良性而深遠的影響。
中國領導人認為兩岸的分歧，乃是一種兄弟之爭，即使意見不同、立場互異，仍然斷絕不了血緣之繫、家族之情。而在兩岸經濟合作架構協議談判過程中，中國願意以「讓利」來表達善意與誠意；言辭之間，似乎暗示著未來在談判時有些項目願意作更多讓步，或讓台灣獲取較多利益。
其實這也正回應了許多台灣民眾的疑慮，因為把中國和台灣比一比，無論就幅員、人口、市場、經濟規模、國際地位等各方面，雙方大小懸殊、強弱分明，台灣難免會擔心將被併吞淹沒，對不明確的未來也有不安全感。尤其兩岸對立數十年，才剛剛重新啟動的交流合作，效應還沒有足夠的時間發酵擴大，因此無法讓台灣民眾對中國完全放心，長久的心結不可能一朝一夕就能打開。這也是為什麼，政府說破了嘴，還是有不少基層民眾對兩岸經濟合作架構協議感到疑懼，憂心國門一開，本土經濟命脈將悉數凋萎。現在中國領導人既已明確表達願意對台「讓利」，到底會落實成哪些具體動作，將是台灣民眾拭目以待，並據以評價中國善意的指標。
兩岸的協商，從來就不是單純的協商；即使是只涉及經貿投資事務的「ＥＣＦＡ」，也不僅僅是為經貿而經貿的協議，開放哪些項目、內容如何固然是重點，藉著談判與簽署協議，彼此向對方及各自內部作出政治宣示，並替未來進一步的發展作舖陳則更是重要。現在兩岸的意見仍在整合中，早期收穫清單到底涵蓋哪些也還不定，如果希望依規畫進度在五月完成協商，六月江陳會進行簽署，顯然需要加緊協商，台灣內部也必須努力溝通獲致共識。然而，協議只是雙方態度的代言者，因此對中國來說，最重要的課題，是到底要藉著兩岸經濟合作架構協議向台灣傳達什麼樣的訊息，談判時自然必須納入政治考量。
兩岸為什麼應該化干戈為玉帛？因為衝突不僅會直接重創雙方，也將損害下一代和平相處攜手共榮的機會。為什麼需要簽署「ＥＣＦＡ」？因為它是一個廣泛經貿合作的基礎，有希望為台灣帶來更多繁榮機會，也讓兩岸進入一個更密集交流合作的新階段。
當然，有些產業可能受到衝擊，就像台灣加入世貿組織一樣；但中國既然已是全球一個如此重要的經濟力量，台灣有機會建立比別人更優惠的合作關係，沒有理由不去抓住這個機會。有人擔心台灣被實質吸納，但在一個全球化的世界裡，只要找到利基與獨特位置，就能為自己開創一片天，怕的反而是自己萎縮退步。台灣不能永遠因為擔心風險而什麼都不做，因為那可能失去更多。
兩岸經濟合作架構協議的具體內涵，將在未來兩個月內逐漸成形，其間可能少不了也需一番折衝拉鋸。如中國能具體展現「讓利」動作，有效消解台灣民眾的疑慮，讓這項攸關兩岸關係發展的合作架構成功運作，將能大大有助於打造一個和平友好的互動環境，讓雙方逐漸走出猜忌仇視的過去，慢慢促進對彼此的了解與包容，並且學習以更好的方式處理歧見。
我們推動兩岸更進一步的合作交流，是在為自己、以及未來爭取機會。就此觀之，如果中國對若干談判項目作出讓步，短期而言或許自覺是在對台「讓利」，但長遠來看，這將是對雙方都有利的作法，並不是中國施惠於台灣，而是在展現對一個更美好未來的堅定承諾。
Friday, March 19, 2010
Taiwan Does Not Have Fat Cat Syndrome. It Has Red-Eye Syndrome
Taiwan Does Not Have Fat Cat Syndrome. It Has Red-Eye Syndrome
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 19, 2010
The CEO of the Taiwan Asset Management Corporation (TAMCO) lined his own pockets at company expense. The Legislative Yuan Finance Committee took advantage of the resulting wave of populist sentiment. It swiftly passed a resolution capping salaries for the chairmen and general managers of public or quasi-public utilities at 32,000 a month. According to information collected by the legislators, the current annual salaries are: Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) 7.63 million, the Gre Tai Securities Market (GTSM) 8.28 million, the Taiwan Depository & Clearing Corporation (TDCC) 5.62 million, the Taiwan Futures Exchange (Taifex) 634 million. Their average monthly salary exceeds 50 million, nearly three times that of ministry heads. Naturally everyone is jealous.
Who are the people occupying the aforementioned positions? They are none other than people such as former Financial Supervisory Commission chairman Sean Chen and former CEPD vice chairman Schive Chi. Besides the FSC chief, those in charge include the president of the Industrial Technology Research Institute under the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the chairman of the External Trade Development Council. These positions are considered sinecures. The Ministry of Finance also controls a large number of public shares, hence cushy jobs. If these sinecures were monopolized by a tiny coterie of retired officials, outside suspicions would be understandable. When they were in office, they may not have made any extraordinary contributions. Their placement in these sinecures was the result of sponsorship by former superiors, rather than a shining record in the marketplace. Their extravagant salaries would provoke envy, and it would be hard to avoid characterizing their positions as patronage.
The vice-premier has reportedly discussed the issue of salaries for heads of public enterprises. The Executive Yuan raised a number of questions. It asked about the contributions made by those occupying these sinecures. "Were their contributions greater than those of Central Bank CEO Peng Hui-nan?" When challenged using such a high standard, these fat cats would find it hard to declare "My contribution is no less than his." But such comparisons involve a number of blind spots.
First of all, the Stock Exchange and the Gre Tai Securities Market are headed by former cabinet ministers. That is why the Executive Yuan cites Peng Hui-nan in comparison. If the CEO of trhe Taiwan Stock Exchange was not a retired official, but the manager of a private sector securities firm, or a well known foreign business manager, how would his contribution stack up against Peng Hui-nan's? We are used to seeing these job openings as the exclusive domain of retired political appointees. That is why we compare their salaries against those of cabinet ministers. We provide them a salary of 320,000 NTD, twice what a political appointee receives, and consider ourselves generous. But such a perspective assumes that the position is only about patronage. Admittedly, the issue can be demagogued to good effect. But that would be a very narrow view of the matter.
Logically speaking, public enterprises need to be well managed. They are not retirement communities. Morris Chang once served as president and chairman of the Industrial Technology Research Institute. This laid the foundation for TSMC's future. If legislators were to check out "President Chang's" salary back then, they would realize that today's "fat cats" are emaciated by comparison. They don't even rate. If one is determined to manage a public enterprise well, one needs to bring someone of Morris Chang's caliber back to Taiwan. One must offer him an appropriate salary. If we had another chance to create a wafer miracle, the government ought to pay such pioneers salaries over ten times that of cabinet ministers, not two times that of cabinet ministers. Talent has a market value. A manager has a manager's market value. Therefore, when one is seeking out talent, the salaries depend upon the invidual. They should not be set artificially. When one is seeking to put an end to patronage on the other hand, even twice the salary of a cabinet minister is too much. It all depends on one's perspective. It all depends upon how the legislature views the matter.
We favor salary caps for retired political appointees. In fact, we feel their salaries should not exceed those for cabinet ministers. But we do not favor salary caps for the heads of the Taiwan Stock Exchange, the Gre Tai Securities Market, and the Industrial Technology Research Institute. The same job can be filled by different people. Only if one is providing patronage for retired cabinet ministers, will one make comparisons with cabinet minister. If one is recruiting outside talent, one will not think in such terms. Salary caps would of course be irrelevant. Also, if these posts are filled by retired cabinet ministers changing track, the government need only stipulate that a particular individual should have his salary capped. The difference can be deposited in the government's coffers. There is no need whatsoever to limit the salary for the position as such.
The Legislative Yuan views the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Gre Tai Securities Market as sinecures for retired cabinet ministers. This is a shallow and narrow perspective. Consider Chiu Cheng-hsiung. He retired as Minister of Finance. He then became the CEO of Grand Cathay Securities and the Aetna Commercial Bank. The former vice president of the Executive Yuan is now the CEO of the Yongfeng Holding Company. How do his contributions stack up against those of Peng Hui-nan? Such comparisons are difficult to make. Is his salary capped? Probably not. Is he a fat cat? Probably not. His income is determined by the marketplace. In short, from the perspective of elected representatives, retired officials are all fat cats. But from the perspective of civil society and the marketplace, our elected representatives are all unreasonable. This is the sad reality on Taiwan.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.19
台灣有紅眼症 沒有肥貓症
本報訊
在台灣金聯董座自肥案出包之後，立法院財政委員會日前又趁著這股民粹順風，一舉決議要自四月一日起，將所有公股派任的公營或準公營事業，其董事長與總經理等每月待遇上限一律限為卅二萬。據立委所蒐集的資料，證交所董座每年七百六十三萬、櫃買中心八百廿八萬、集保中心五百六十二萬、期交所六百卅四萬。這些薪資平均算一算，每個月都有五十餘萬，幾乎是部會首長的三倍，當然令眾人眼紅。
前述這幾個職位現在由哪些人在擔綱呢？不外是前金管會主委陳?、前經建會副主委薛琦等。除了金管會主管事業外，經濟部轄下也有工研院院長、外貿協會董事長等肥缺，而財政部公股掌控的油滋滋職位也不少。這些肥缺若是由少數卸任政府官員所盤據，外界質疑就在所難免。他們在就任之前也不曾有過什麼豐功偉業，而其進駐肥缺靠 的是老長官的提攜拉拔，不是市場上的輝煌戰績。若是如此，那麼其高薪惹人嫌惡，恐怕就與「酬庸」兩個字難脫關係了。
據了解，行政院副院長曾經對公股事業負責人的薪給召開會議做過討論。行政院所提的問題是：這些肥缺負責人的貢獻，「有大過央行總裁彭淮南嗎」？用這樣的標準質疑當前的肥貓群，貓兒們大概都很難挺身說出「我貢獻不比他小」的答案。但這比較方法背後隱藏著若干盲點，值得提出來檢視。
首先，正因為證交所、櫃買中心的負責人是部會首長出身，所以行政院才會用「彭淮南」來相比。如果證交所董座不是卸任官員，而是民間某證券公司的經理、或國外知名的管理人才，那麼他的貢獻要如何與彭總裁比？也因為我們習慣性地將這些職缺視為卸任政務官的禁臠，才會動輒將他們的薪水與部會首長相比，認為給他們卅二萬，兩倍於政次的薪水，就是給了多大的恩給一般。但這樣的觀點打從心底就難脫酬庸卸任首長的心態，雖有民粹討好之效，視野卻相當的封閉。
照理說，公股事業是要好好經營的，不是要安息養老的。當年，張忠謀也做過工研院的院長與董事長，為日後的台積電公司奠基。立委們如果去查一查當年「張院長」的薪水，就知道今日所謂肥貓相較之下乾癟瘦小，根本端不上檯面。但如果真要辦好事業，真要請張忠謀這樣的大和尚回台唸經，就一定要搭配個像樣的待遇。假設今日還有機會再創造一次晶圓奇蹟，國家對開創者所該付的薪水，不僅不止是部長的兩倍，甚至高上十幾倍也是應該的。人才有人才的行情，經理人有經理人的市場，故從找人才的角度觀之，薪水是因人而異的，根本不該設限。但若從防堵酬庸的角度觀之，則部長兩倍的薪資恐怕都嫌多。正看成嶺側成峰，端視立法院看問題的角度而定。
挑明了說，我們贊成對卸任政務官轉任公股職務的待遇設上限，甚至規定不得超過部長薪水都可以。但是我們不贊成對證交所、櫃買董座、工研院院長等「職務」的薪資設定上限。同一個職務可以找不同的人來做；酬庸卸任首長才有待遇配合首長的思惟，延攬外界人才則根本就不受類似思考的羈絆，當然就沒有薪給上限的問題。此外，如果其職位是由卸任首長轉接，政府只要規定此人「所領」薪資上限即可，其餘差額皆可繳庫，根本無需觸及該職位本身的薪資額度。
立法院常將證交所、櫃買中心視為金融首長卸任後的肥缺，那實在是粗淺狹隘的見解。看看邱正雄吧，當年卸任財政部長，就坐上大華證券董座、安泰商業銀行董座。如今卸任政院副院長，又有永豐金控董座等著。他的貢獻有大過彭淮南嗎？這很難比。他的薪水有上限嗎？大概沒有。他算是肥貓嗎？應該不算，因為那是市場決定的。總之，從民代的角度看，卸任官員人人都肥胖臃腫；但從民間與市場角度看，現任民代人人皆不可理喻。這正是台灣的悲哀。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 19, 2010
The CEO of the Taiwan Asset Management Corporation (TAMCO) lined his own pockets at company expense. The Legislative Yuan Finance Committee took advantage of the resulting wave of populist sentiment. It swiftly passed a resolution capping salaries for the chairmen and general managers of public or quasi-public utilities at 32,000 a month. According to information collected by the legislators, the current annual salaries are: Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) 7.63 million, the Gre Tai Securities Market (GTSM) 8.28 million, the Taiwan Depository & Clearing Corporation (TDCC) 5.62 million, the Taiwan Futures Exchange (Taifex) 634 million. Their average monthly salary exceeds 50 million, nearly three times that of ministry heads. Naturally everyone is jealous.
Who are the people occupying the aforementioned positions? They are none other than people such as former Financial Supervisory Commission chairman Sean Chen and former CEPD vice chairman Schive Chi. Besides the FSC chief, those in charge include the president of the Industrial Technology Research Institute under the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the chairman of the External Trade Development Council. These positions are considered sinecures. The Ministry of Finance also controls a large number of public shares, hence cushy jobs. If these sinecures were monopolized by a tiny coterie of retired officials, outside suspicions would be understandable. When they were in office, they may not have made any extraordinary contributions. Their placement in these sinecures was the result of sponsorship by former superiors, rather than a shining record in the marketplace. Their extravagant salaries would provoke envy, and it would be hard to avoid characterizing their positions as patronage.
The vice-premier has reportedly discussed the issue of salaries for heads of public enterprises. The Executive Yuan raised a number of questions. It asked about the contributions made by those occupying these sinecures. "Were their contributions greater than those of Central Bank CEO Peng Hui-nan?" When challenged using such a high standard, these fat cats would find it hard to declare "My contribution is no less than his." But such comparisons involve a number of blind spots.
First of all, the Stock Exchange and the Gre Tai Securities Market are headed by former cabinet ministers. That is why the Executive Yuan cites Peng Hui-nan in comparison. If the CEO of trhe Taiwan Stock Exchange was not a retired official, but the manager of a private sector securities firm, or a well known foreign business manager, how would his contribution stack up against Peng Hui-nan's? We are used to seeing these job openings as the exclusive domain of retired political appointees. That is why we compare their salaries against those of cabinet ministers. We provide them a salary of 320,000 NTD, twice what a political appointee receives, and consider ourselves generous. But such a perspective assumes that the position is only about patronage. Admittedly, the issue can be demagogued to good effect. But that would be a very narrow view of the matter.
Logically speaking, public enterprises need to be well managed. They are not retirement communities. Morris Chang once served as president and chairman of the Industrial Technology Research Institute. This laid the foundation for TSMC's future. If legislators were to check out "President Chang's" salary back then, they would realize that today's "fat cats" are emaciated by comparison. They don't even rate. If one is determined to manage a public enterprise well, one needs to bring someone of Morris Chang's caliber back to Taiwan. One must offer him an appropriate salary. If we had another chance to create a wafer miracle, the government ought to pay such pioneers salaries over ten times that of cabinet ministers, not two times that of cabinet ministers. Talent has a market value. A manager has a manager's market value. Therefore, when one is seeking out talent, the salaries depend upon the invidual. They should not be set artificially. When one is seeking to put an end to patronage on the other hand, even twice the salary of a cabinet minister is too much. It all depends on one's perspective. It all depends upon how the legislature views the matter.
We favor salary caps for retired political appointees. In fact, we feel their salaries should not exceed those for cabinet ministers. But we do not favor salary caps for the heads of the Taiwan Stock Exchange, the Gre Tai Securities Market, and the Industrial Technology Research Institute. The same job can be filled by different people. Only if one is providing patronage for retired cabinet ministers, will one make comparisons with cabinet minister. If one is recruiting outside talent, one will not think in such terms. Salary caps would of course be irrelevant. Also, if these posts are filled by retired cabinet ministers changing track, the government need only stipulate that a particular individual should have his salary capped. The difference can be deposited in the government's coffers. There is no need whatsoever to limit the salary for the position as such.
The Legislative Yuan views the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Gre Tai Securities Market as sinecures for retired cabinet ministers. This is a shallow and narrow perspective. Consider Chiu Cheng-hsiung. He retired as Minister of Finance. He then became the CEO of Grand Cathay Securities and the Aetna Commercial Bank. The former vice president of the Executive Yuan is now the CEO of the Yongfeng Holding Company. How do his contributions stack up against those of Peng Hui-nan? Such comparisons are difficult to make. Is his salary capped? Probably not. Is he a fat cat? Probably not. His income is determined by the marketplace. In short, from the perspective of elected representatives, retired officials are all fat cats. But from the perspective of civil society and the marketplace, our elected representatives are all unreasonable. This is the sad reality on Taiwan.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.19
台灣有紅眼症 沒有肥貓症
本報訊
在台灣金聯董座自肥案出包之後，立法院財政委員會日前又趁著這股民粹順風，一舉決議要自四月一日起，將所有公股派任的公營或準公營事業，其董事長與總經理等每月待遇上限一律限為卅二萬。據立委所蒐集的資料，證交所董座每年七百六十三萬、櫃買中心八百廿八萬、集保中心五百六十二萬、期交所六百卅四萬。這些薪資平均算一算，每個月都有五十餘萬，幾乎是部會首長的三倍，當然令眾人眼紅。
前述這幾個職位現在由哪些人在擔綱呢？不外是前金管會主委陳?、前經建會副主委薛琦等。除了金管會主管事業外，經濟部轄下也有工研院院長、外貿協會董事長等肥缺，而財政部公股掌控的油滋滋職位也不少。這些肥缺若是由少數卸任政府官員所盤據，外界質疑就在所難免。他們在就任之前也不曾有過什麼豐功偉業，而其進駐肥缺靠 的是老長官的提攜拉拔，不是市場上的輝煌戰績。若是如此，那麼其高薪惹人嫌惡，恐怕就與「酬庸」兩個字難脫關係了。
據了解，行政院副院長曾經對公股事業負責人的薪給召開會議做過討論。行政院所提的問題是：這些肥缺負責人的貢獻，「有大過央行總裁彭淮南嗎」？用這樣的標準質疑當前的肥貓群，貓兒們大概都很難挺身說出「我貢獻不比他小」的答案。但這比較方法背後隱藏著若干盲點，值得提出來檢視。
首先，正因為證交所、櫃買中心的負責人是部會首長出身，所以行政院才會用「彭淮南」來相比。如果證交所董座不是卸任官員，而是民間某證券公司的經理、或國外知名的管理人才，那麼他的貢獻要如何與彭總裁比？也因為我們習慣性地將這些職缺視為卸任政務官的禁臠，才會動輒將他們的薪水與部會首長相比，認為給他們卅二萬，兩倍於政次的薪水，就是給了多大的恩給一般。但這樣的觀點打從心底就難脫酬庸卸任首長的心態，雖有民粹討好之效，視野卻相當的封閉。
照理說，公股事業是要好好經營的，不是要安息養老的。當年，張忠謀也做過工研院的院長與董事長，為日後的台積電公司奠基。立委們如果去查一查當年「張院長」的薪水，就知道今日所謂肥貓相較之下乾癟瘦小，根本端不上檯面。但如果真要辦好事業，真要請張忠謀這樣的大和尚回台唸經，就一定要搭配個像樣的待遇。假設今日還有機會再創造一次晶圓奇蹟，國家對開創者所該付的薪水，不僅不止是部長的兩倍，甚至高上十幾倍也是應該的。人才有人才的行情，經理人有經理人的市場，故從找人才的角度觀之，薪水是因人而異的，根本不該設限。但若從防堵酬庸的角度觀之，則部長兩倍的薪資恐怕都嫌多。正看成嶺側成峰，端視立法院看問題的角度而定。
挑明了說，我們贊成對卸任政務官轉任公股職務的待遇設上限，甚至規定不得超過部長薪水都可以。但是我們不贊成對證交所、櫃買董座、工研院院長等「職務」的薪資設定上限。同一個職務可以找不同的人來做；酬庸卸任首長才有待遇配合首長的思惟，延攬外界人才則根本就不受類似思考的羈絆，當然就沒有薪給上限的問題。此外，如果其職位是由卸任首長轉接，政府只要規定此人「所領」薪資上限即可，其餘差額皆可繳庫，根本無需觸及該職位本身的薪資額度。
立法院常將證交所、櫃買中心視為金融首長卸任後的肥缺，那實在是粗淺狹隘的見解。看看邱正雄吧，當年卸任財政部長，就坐上大華證券董座、安泰商業銀行董座。如今卸任政院副院長，又有永豐金控董座等著。他的貢獻有大過彭淮南嗎？這很難比。他的薪水有上限嗎？大概沒有。他算是肥貓嗎？應該不算，因為那是市場決定的。總之，從民代的角度看，卸任官員人人都肥胖臃腫；但從民間與市場角度看，現任民代人人皆不可理喻。這正是台灣的悲哀。
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Health Insurance Problems Will Persist Even If Yang Chih-liang Stays
Health Insurance Problems Will Persist Even If Yang Chih-liang Stays
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 18, 2010
Director of Health Yang Chih-liang has decided to "temporarily remain in office." Yang resigned over the health insurance premiums controversy. President Ma and Premier Wu have persuaded him to stay on. This has granted the Ma administration a reprieve. But the underlying problems remain. One. An increase in health insurance premiums and a change in the way government subsidies are provided. A compromise has been reached between programs offered by different agencies. But the problems underlying the health insurance system remain. Two. The presidential office and the executive yuan have approved a second generation health insurance program to be implemented within two years. But one can only keep one's fingers crossed. Three. Whether Yang Chih-liang will stay on or leave remains unknown. When the current Legislative Yuan session ends, the president and the premier may face another round of resignations.
Over the past ten days, Yang Chih-liang was ostensibly on leave. But he was hardly idle. If anything, he was busier than usual. He had to report to the presidential office twice in three days. Even the KMT party leadership joined in, begging him to stay. He was forced to respond to appeals from the presidential office, the executive yuan and the party urging him to stay. He had to promote a variety of schemes for health insurance premium increases, and report on them to the presidential office. President Ma has yet to approve an increase in health insurance premiums. But he already knows the score. A high-level five-member team will approve a compromise solution. It will draw from the Department of Health's version. It will allow 59% of the public to remain unaffected by the premiums increase. It will meet the standards established by Premier Wu in his "Meat and Potatoes Economics" program. It will allow 75% of the public to remain unaffected. The 16% shortfall will be covered by government subsidies, allowing the proposal to temporarily pass muster.
On the surface, Yang Chih-liang's resignation risked bureaucratic condemnation. He sang a different tune than his boss, both conceptually and even procedurally. Put nicely, taxpayers will foot the bill for the health insurance deficit. Put less nicely, taxpayers will foot the bill for Premier Wu and Yang Chih-liang's "dignity." Substantively, neither Premier Wu nor Yang Chih-liang benefitted. Premier Wu is the chief executive. His subordinates will find it difficult to implement his orders. Yang used his official position to silence his boss. Yang Chih-liang's resignation forced the president to personally mediate between various agencies. Even a program that did not require an amendment to the law, needed presidential intervention to break the impasse, to determine policy, and to convince the director of health to stay on. Yang Chih-liang's resignation rehabilitated the president's image as a man of wisdom and courage. Premier Wu on the other hand, came out looking like a populist panderer who lacked the courage to stand behind his policies.
Do not assume that Yang Chih-liang will benefit because he helped the president. Quite the contrary. As a cabinet member, he must answer to Premier Wu. Yang has agreed to stay on. Will communications between Yang Chih-liang and Premier Wu be tough or tactful? Blunt or diplomatic? Yang Chih-liang said he would "stay on temporarily." He knows he cannot continue defying his superiors, who include the premier and the president. How much trouble will the issue of "face" bring him? All we can do is wait and see. He must exchange time for space. He must pave the way for his retreat on amicable terms.
Yang Chih-liang has agreed to stay on. But before that, he privately confided that "What I want is a system, not a solution." The compromise solution worked out by the presidential office and the executive yuan is not what he wanted. But all he could do was bite the bullet and soldier on. Besides, President Ma agreed to his own prescription: a second generation health insurance system. He does not realize that the program must still undergo legislative review. Whether the legislature will pass it before the current session runs out is uncertain.
Is health insurance medical insurance, or is it a medical benefit? According to the compromise solution, the Republic of China's national health insurance system is the envy of the world. It is virtually a social welfare benefit. Premier Wu understands public sentiment better than anyone. No price increase is ever a good price increase. And so it is with gasoline price increases, electricity price increases, water price increases, and tax increases. Government subsidies may only be increased. They may never be decreased, let alone eliminated. The same is true for pensions. The subsidy to the health insurance system will ostensibly be phased out in two years. The second generation health insurance system will then take over. But whether the second generation health insurance system will be able to take over as planned remains uncertain. If it takes over, but second generation health insurance premiums must also be increased, the public will find it unacceptable. The government is using subsidies to reduce the impact of health insurance premium increases, and to make up the deficit in the health care system. But it has yet to find its way to fiscal solvency.
The cabinet is undergoing a decision making crisis. Health insurance premium increases are merely the tip of the iceberg. Premier Wu has no shortage of political solutions. He has more than enough campaign staffers. But as premier, he must ensure the nation's long term prosperity. He cannot rely exclusively on political tactics. The more sensitive the policy, the greater the need for both boldness and caution. He cannot count on the president to settle every crisis that arises. Yang Chih-liang's resignation exposed hidden concerns, especially for department heads who value professionalism. Does the premier respect professionalism? The answer will determine whether they are willing to stay on and serve their country. There is nothing wrong with Premier Wu's "Meat and Potatoes Economics." But if every issue is decided on the basis of public sentiment, if every deficit is made up by state subsidies, if every problem encountered is fobbed off on those ministries responsible for economics and finance, given the nation's current financial difficulties, the next official hoping to resign will surface, sooner rather than later.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.18
社論－留住楊志良 健保難題還是沒解決
本報訊
轉了一圈，為健保調漲請辭的衛生署長楊志良，在馬總統與行政院長吳敦義強力慰留下，決定「暫時留任」。這固然解除了馬政府的燃眉之急，不過，真正的問題還是未解決，包括：一、健保調漲以及政府補助的方式，在院署不同方案中取得妥協，卻沒處理健保制度的終極問題；第二，府院雖拍板二代健保要在二年內施行，但這個拍板只能是「希望」；第三，楊志良個人去留還是埋了伏筆，立法院這個會期結束，總統與閣揆可能還得面對相同的辭官戲碼。
這十天，楊志良儘管請假，卻沒一天閒著，反而比平常更忙。三天兩頭進府報告，連黨中央都加入勸留行列，他前腳要應付府院黨的留人攻勢，後腳卻必須馬不停蹄地敦促健保局反覆試算各種調漲方案，以備入府報告。在馬總統對健保調漲方案拍板前，他已經心理有數，高層五人小組會通過折衷方案：既要採用衛生署的版本，讓百分之五十九的人不受保費調漲影響，還要滿足吳揆的庶民經濟理念，讓百分之七十五的人不受影響；這中間落差百分之十六，則靠政府補助方式，暫時過關。
表面上看，楊志良辭官冒了官場之大不韙，以烏紗帽硬槓上長官的理念、甚至決策。講好聽一點，健保虧空全民埋單，講難聽一點，吳揆與楊志良的面子，也是全民埋單。至於裡子，吳揆和楊志良都沒撈到好處。吳揆做為最高行政首長，他的指示，部屬不但難以執行，還硬生生用官位堵住長官的嘴。楊志良這一辭，逼著總統親自出馬，與院署協調，連法都不必修的調漲方案，還得靠總統才能快刀斬亂麻，既決定了方案還留下了署長，楊志良辭官難得地重建了總統英明有能的形象，吳揆卻落得趨從民粹、無政策擔當的批評。
不要以為楊志良捧了總統就有了方便，剛好相反，做為內閣閣員，面對的還是吳揆，從點頭答應留任開始，這以後楊志良與吳揆溝通，該硬該軟？該直該曲？楊志良「暫留一會期」的伏筆，多少也清楚自己不能再不給長官面子，長官包括了院長和總統，只是這面子會給自己帶來多少困擾，只能忍一時以靜觀其變，以時間換取空間，為自己將來好聚好散，留個退路。
楊志良接受慰留前，曾私下感慨，「我要的是制度，不是方案。」府院通過的妥協方案，並不是他真心想要的，但也只能硬著頭皮推下去。更何況，馬總統還同意了他自己提出的藥方：二代健保，雖然他完全不知道，這個方案還要提到立法院去審議，立法院能不能在會期內通過，尚在未定之天。
健保到底是醫療保險？還是醫療福利？從折衷方案看來，台灣傲視全球的全民健保，差不多已經成為社會福利了。吳揆最了解民間情緒，但凡涉及漲價者，最好都不漲，就像油電水價與稅；但凡涉及政府補助者，只可增加不可減少，遑論取消，就像老人年金。換言之，健保調漲的差額補助，雖說以二年為期，迄二代健保接手後終止，但是，二代健保到底能不能如願在二年內接軌，還是未知數，即使接手，二代健保的保費若較現制又要再漲，多數民眾亦未必接受。政府用補助方式壓縮健保調漲的社會衝擊，並彌填健保財務虧空的大洞，但還是沒找到健全健保財務的根本之道。
健保調漲只是吳內閣決策危機的冰山一角，吳揆不缺政治手段，選戰參謀綽綽有餘，但身為行政院長，肩負舉國興廢，終究不能只靠政治手腕，愈是敏感棘手的政策，愈得膽大心細，不能事事靠總統擺平。楊志良辭官引爆了內閣閣員潛藏在心底的隱憂，特別對講究專業的部會首長們，一個是否尊重政策專業的閣揆，會是決定未來他們願不願意留在官場為國效力的關鍵。庶民經濟沒什麼錯，但若全照著民眾情緒走，萬事俱由國家補助扛下，把各部會的難題全推到了財主單位，以目前國家財政之困窘，下一個想辭官的首長就快浮上檯面了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 18, 2010
Director of Health Yang Chih-liang has decided to "temporarily remain in office." Yang resigned over the health insurance premiums controversy. President Ma and Premier Wu have persuaded him to stay on. This has granted the Ma administration a reprieve. But the underlying problems remain. One. An increase in health insurance premiums and a change in the way government subsidies are provided. A compromise has been reached between programs offered by different agencies. But the problems underlying the health insurance system remain. Two. The presidential office and the executive yuan have approved a second generation health insurance program to be implemented within two years. But one can only keep one's fingers crossed. Three. Whether Yang Chih-liang will stay on or leave remains unknown. When the current Legislative Yuan session ends, the president and the premier may face another round of resignations.
Over the past ten days, Yang Chih-liang was ostensibly on leave. But he was hardly idle. If anything, he was busier than usual. He had to report to the presidential office twice in three days. Even the KMT party leadership joined in, begging him to stay. He was forced to respond to appeals from the presidential office, the executive yuan and the party urging him to stay. He had to promote a variety of schemes for health insurance premium increases, and report on them to the presidential office. President Ma has yet to approve an increase in health insurance premiums. But he already knows the score. A high-level five-member team will approve a compromise solution. It will draw from the Department of Health's version. It will allow 59% of the public to remain unaffected by the premiums increase. It will meet the standards established by Premier Wu in his "Meat and Potatoes Economics" program. It will allow 75% of the public to remain unaffected. The 16% shortfall will be covered by government subsidies, allowing the proposal to temporarily pass muster.
On the surface, Yang Chih-liang's resignation risked bureaucratic condemnation. He sang a different tune than his boss, both conceptually and even procedurally. Put nicely, taxpayers will foot the bill for the health insurance deficit. Put less nicely, taxpayers will foot the bill for Premier Wu and Yang Chih-liang's "dignity." Substantively, neither Premier Wu nor Yang Chih-liang benefitted. Premier Wu is the chief executive. His subordinates will find it difficult to implement his orders. Yang used his official position to silence his boss. Yang Chih-liang's resignation forced the president to personally mediate between various agencies. Even a program that did not require an amendment to the law, needed presidential intervention to break the impasse, to determine policy, and to convince the director of health to stay on. Yang Chih-liang's resignation rehabilitated the president's image as a man of wisdom and courage. Premier Wu on the other hand, came out looking like a populist panderer who lacked the courage to stand behind his policies.
Do not assume that Yang Chih-liang will benefit because he helped the president. Quite the contrary. As a cabinet member, he must answer to Premier Wu. Yang has agreed to stay on. Will communications between Yang Chih-liang and Premier Wu be tough or tactful? Blunt or diplomatic? Yang Chih-liang said he would "stay on temporarily." He knows he cannot continue defying his superiors, who include the premier and the president. How much trouble will the issue of "face" bring him? All we can do is wait and see. He must exchange time for space. He must pave the way for his retreat on amicable terms.
Yang Chih-liang has agreed to stay on. But before that, he privately confided that "What I want is a system, not a solution." The compromise solution worked out by the presidential office and the executive yuan is not what he wanted. But all he could do was bite the bullet and soldier on. Besides, President Ma agreed to his own prescription: a second generation health insurance system. He does not realize that the program must still undergo legislative review. Whether the legislature will pass it before the current session runs out is uncertain.
Is health insurance medical insurance, or is it a medical benefit? According to the compromise solution, the Republic of China's national health insurance system is the envy of the world. It is virtually a social welfare benefit. Premier Wu understands public sentiment better than anyone. No price increase is ever a good price increase. And so it is with gasoline price increases, electricity price increases, water price increases, and tax increases. Government subsidies may only be increased. They may never be decreased, let alone eliminated. The same is true for pensions. The subsidy to the health insurance system will ostensibly be phased out in two years. The second generation health insurance system will then take over. But whether the second generation health insurance system will be able to take over as planned remains uncertain. If it takes over, but second generation health insurance premiums must also be increased, the public will find it unacceptable. The government is using subsidies to reduce the impact of health insurance premium increases, and to make up the deficit in the health care system. But it has yet to find its way to fiscal solvency.
The cabinet is undergoing a decision making crisis. Health insurance premium increases are merely the tip of the iceberg. Premier Wu has no shortage of political solutions. He has more than enough campaign staffers. But as premier, he must ensure the nation's long term prosperity. He cannot rely exclusively on political tactics. The more sensitive the policy, the greater the need for both boldness and caution. He cannot count on the president to settle every crisis that arises. Yang Chih-liang's resignation exposed hidden concerns, especially for department heads who value professionalism. Does the premier respect professionalism? The answer will determine whether they are willing to stay on and serve their country. There is nothing wrong with Premier Wu's "Meat and Potatoes Economics." But if every issue is decided on the basis of public sentiment, if every deficit is made up by state subsidies, if every problem encountered is fobbed off on those ministries responsible for economics and finance, given the nation's current financial difficulties, the next official hoping to resign will surface, sooner rather than later.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.18
社論－留住楊志良 健保難題還是沒解決
本報訊
轉了一圈，為健保調漲請辭的衛生署長楊志良，在馬總統與行政院長吳敦義強力慰留下，決定「暫時留任」。這固然解除了馬政府的燃眉之急，不過，真正的問題還是未解決，包括：一、健保調漲以及政府補助的方式，在院署不同方案中取得妥協，卻沒處理健保制度的終極問題；第二，府院雖拍板二代健保要在二年內施行，但這個拍板只能是「希望」；第三，楊志良個人去留還是埋了伏筆，立法院這個會期結束，總統與閣揆可能還得面對相同的辭官戲碼。
這十天，楊志良儘管請假，卻沒一天閒著，反而比平常更忙。三天兩頭進府報告，連黨中央都加入勸留行列，他前腳要應付府院黨的留人攻勢，後腳卻必須馬不停蹄地敦促健保局反覆試算各種調漲方案，以備入府報告。在馬總統對健保調漲方案拍板前，他已經心理有數，高層五人小組會通過折衷方案：既要採用衛生署的版本，讓百分之五十九的人不受保費調漲影響，還要滿足吳揆的庶民經濟理念，讓百分之七十五的人不受影響；這中間落差百分之十六，則靠政府補助方式，暫時過關。
表面上看，楊志良辭官冒了官場之大不韙，以烏紗帽硬槓上長官的理念、甚至決策。講好聽一點，健保虧空全民埋單，講難聽一點，吳揆與楊志良的面子，也是全民埋單。至於裡子，吳揆和楊志良都沒撈到好處。吳揆做為最高行政首長，他的指示，部屬不但難以執行，還硬生生用官位堵住長官的嘴。楊志良這一辭，逼著總統親自出馬，與院署協調，連法都不必修的調漲方案，還得靠總統才能快刀斬亂麻，既決定了方案還留下了署長，楊志良辭官難得地重建了總統英明有能的形象，吳揆卻落得趨從民粹、無政策擔當的批評。
不要以為楊志良捧了總統就有了方便，剛好相反，做為內閣閣員，面對的還是吳揆，從點頭答應留任開始，這以後楊志良與吳揆溝通，該硬該軟？該直該曲？楊志良「暫留一會期」的伏筆，多少也清楚自己不能再不給長官面子，長官包括了院長和總統，只是這面子會給自己帶來多少困擾，只能忍一時以靜觀其變，以時間換取空間，為自己將來好聚好散，留個退路。
楊志良接受慰留前，曾私下感慨，「我要的是制度，不是方案。」府院通過的妥協方案，並不是他真心想要的，但也只能硬著頭皮推下去。更何況，馬總統還同意了他自己提出的藥方：二代健保，雖然他完全不知道，這個方案還要提到立法院去審議，立法院能不能在會期內通過，尚在未定之天。
健保到底是醫療保險？還是醫療福利？從折衷方案看來，台灣傲視全球的全民健保，差不多已經成為社會福利了。吳揆最了解民間情緒，但凡涉及漲價者，最好都不漲，就像油電水價與稅；但凡涉及政府補助者，只可增加不可減少，遑論取消，就像老人年金。換言之，健保調漲的差額補助，雖說以二年為期，迄二代健保接手後終止，但是，二代健保到底能不能如願在二年內接軌，還是未知數，即使接手，二代健保的保費若較現制又要再漲，多數民眾亦未必接受。政府用補助方式壓縮健保調漲的社會衝擊，並彌填健保財務虧空的大洞，但還是沒找到健全健保財務的根本之道。
健保調漲只是吳內閣決策危機的冰山一角，吳揆不缺政治手段，選戰參謀綽綽有餘，但身為行政院長，肩負舉國興廢，終究不能只靠政治手腕，愈是敏感棘手的政策，愈得膽大心細，不能事事靠總統擺平。楊志良辭官引爆了內閣閣員潛藏在心底的隱憂，特別對講究專業的部會首長們，一個是否尊重政策專業的閣揆，會是決定未來他們願不願意留在官場為國效力的關鍵。庶民經濟沒什麼錯，但若全照著民眾情緒走，萬事俱由國家補助扛下，把各部會的難題全推到了財主單位，以目前國家財政之困窘，下一個想辭官的首長就快浮上檯面了。
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Don't Just Say No: The DPP Must Offer a Vision for the Future
Don't Just Say No: The DPP Must Offer a Vision for the Future
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 17, 2010
Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has reiterated her commitment to a "Platform for the Decade." Following several victories at the polls, the beleaguered DPP's reaction is now substantially different. Vice President Annette Lu criticized Tsai's platform as "biting off more than one can chew." Elections are held only once every four years, Lu said. To be realistic, the DPP should offer a political platform with a two or four year timeframe.
DPP party elders are not bothering to conceal their belief that "It's all for the sake of elections." Apparently they believe such an attitude will actually help them at the polls. The Democratic Progressive Party has long trumpeted its concern for Taiwan's long term development. Now apparently even a ten year timeframe is too long!
Political competition is never absolute. Between two bad apples, all voters can do is choose the less rotten one. Since last year's three in one elections, the Democratic Progressive Party has won three elections in a row. This can only be explained by the dismal performance of the KMT. But to suggest that the DPP has engaged in soul-searching or that it has offered constructive proposals for the future, will probably be met with raised eyebrows, even from DPP officials.
Take the fiercely debated death penalty issue. Wang Ching-feng refused to implement the death penalty. Cabinet members have adopted different attitudes. Her resignation was no surprise. But consider the underlying structural factors. Voters who support the KMT usually hold more conservative attitudes regarding the death penalty and other social issues. Wang Ching-feng's firm commitment to the abolition of the death penalty was out of step with most KMT supporters. Her resignation was a forgone conclusion.
By contrast, during the "dang wai" era the DPP collaborated with human rights groups. Some Democratic Progressive Party elders were former death-row inmates. The DPP has long trumpeted its intention of "founding a nation on human rights." But when confronted with the Wang Ching-feng incident, all it could do was heap abuse and ridicule upon her. Whether to abolish the death penalty has sparked controversy in many democratic nations. If the DPP were in power today, would it handle the matter more circumspectly?
The "Platform for the Decade" lit a fuse. Last Wednesday the DPP Central Standing Committee discussed "Global Warming and Climate Change: What the Government Should Do regarding Land Restoration." This was supposed to officially launch its Platform for the Decade. But the meeting been barely been convened when DPP officials poured cold water on the proposal. This is truly regrettable. Global climate change will precipitate natural disasters. Taiwan was a victim of the 8/8 Floods. Leaders of the United Nations, the USA, the Chinese Mainland, and the EU are all busy combatting global warming, reducing carbon, and conserving energy. The Democratic Progressive Party however, has no solutions whatsoever. They may say this is not something an opposition party need worry about. But when the DPP was in power, it insisted on scrapping the nuclear energy program. It opposes nuclear power generation. But fossil fuel generating plants may be needed to compensate for the shortfall in nuclear power generation. If the DPP returns to office, does it intend to continue such an energy policy? The world now emphasizes energy efficiency. Does the DPP have a response? Does it have any idea how to deal with such a contingency?
The Republic of China faces another long term problem. Taipei and Beijing are about to sign an ECFA (Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement). The Ma administration is eager to sign, primarily because ASEAN and Beijing have launched a free trade region this year. Exports from the ten ASEAN nations to the Chinese mainland will be tariff free. Similar exports from Taiwan to the Chinese mainland will remain subject to high tariffs. The Ma administration hopes to close the deal on ECFA in order to overcome this problem. The DPP accuses the KMT of looking out only for the interests of big business. But it never offers any alternatives. Even more importantly, what sort of relationship would the DPP establish with Beijing? The Democratic Progressive Party may become the ruling party. It cannot refuse to address this matter merely because it considers it taboo.
DPP officials may say that discussing these issues does not require a Platform for the Decade. An election platform can achieve the same goal. But such an approach would turn every issue into an election issue. Every issue would be evaluated and demagogued for short term political advantage. The DPP would do well to examine the KMT's current plight. The government has flip-flopped on every issue, from taxes for members of the military, the civil service, and public school teachers, to health insurance premium increases. This is a textbook case of being bound hand and foot by election concerns.
And so it is with the DPP. The Republican Party in the United States has enjoyed smooth sailing recently. But it is still willing to talk with Obama about health care reform. It even allowed the Democrats' work bill to pass in the Senate. It knows that a party that only says "No!" will never win the public trust.
The Democratic Progressive Party has also won victory after victory. But its victories have been followed by internecine power struggles. Several electoral districts in the five cities even resorted to character assassination. Perhaps it is unrealistic to talk about the DPP's "Platform for the Decade" given such vicious life or death power struggles. But a new generation of middle-aged Democratic Progressive Party leaders is committed to sustainable development. They really ought to join Tsai Ing-wen and give careful thought to the DPP's plans for Taiwan over the next decade!
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.17
社論－別只會說NO 民進黨應提未來執政願景
本報訊
民進黨黨主席蔡英文日前重提研擬「十年政綱」。經過幾次勝選、驚魂甫定的民進黨，這次反應大為不同，副總統呂秀蓮批評這是「好高鶩遠」，因為一次選舉才四年，民進黨應該提二或四年政綱才切合實際。
看來，民進黨大老一點都不掩飾該黨「萬事莫如選舉忙」的態度，只是，「一切為選舉」，真的就對選舉有利；更別說，民進黨口口聲聲都是台灣的永續發展，現在卻連十年都嫌太久！
政治競爭從來不是絕對的，如果只有兩個爛蘋果，選民只能選比較不爛的那一個。因此去年三合一以來、民進黨連勝三次，只能用國民黨執政表現不佳來解釋，但要說民進黨有所反省、甚而已對未來執政提出建設性的主張，恐怕多數民進黨要員自己都不以為然。
就以近日來炒得最凶的死刑話題為例，王清峰堅持不肯執行死刑，和內閣態度迥異，下台並不令人意外，但背後的結構性因素是，支持國民黨的選民，通常在死刑等社會議題上，是持比較保守的態度，王清峰對於廢除死刑的堅決態度，和多數國民黨支持者格格不入，她下台是必然的。
相對的，民進黨在黨外時期就有和人權團體攜手合作的經驗，民進黨大老中，更有人過去是為死刑犯奔走求情的，但是，面對王清峰事件，過去標榜「人權立國」的民進黨，卻也只能攻訐、嘲笑，是否廢死，近來已在不少民主國家引發爭議，如果今天換成是民進黨執政，有可能處理得比較周延嗎？
這次「十年政綱」的引爆點在於，民進黨上周三中常會討論「面對全球暖化與氣候變遷，政府應有之國土復育作為」，以做為啟動十年政綱的正式會議，但第一次會議就被潑冷水，這是相當令人遺憾的，氣候變遷不但在全球釀成巨大天災，台灣也成為八八風災的受災戶，但是，當聯合國、美國、中國、歐盟領袖都已將抗暖化、節能減碳視為是首要措施時，民進黨卻並未提出對策；也許，他們可以說這不是在野黨該憂心的，問題是，民進黨執政時期，因為堅持廢核、反核，面臨不得不以蓋火力發電廠來彌補核能發電的選擇，將來若重返執政，還要持續這樣的耗能措施嗎？面對將來強調節能的全球環境，民進黨能否擘畫、或想像台灣該如何應變。
另一個台灣長期要面對的問題，就與兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ（經濟合作架構協議）有關，馬政府急著與對岸簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，最根本的原因在於，東協與中國大陸自由貿易區今年正式啟動，東協十國相關產品銷往大陸，將是零關稅；台灣同類產品出口到大陸，仍須負擔高額關稅。馬政府希望以ＥＣＦＡ的早收清單來克服這個問題，民進黨可以攻擊國民黨只顧大企業的利益，但卻從不提出替代方案，更關鍵的是，民進黨究竟要和中國維持怎樣的關係，有可能執政的民進黨，不該還將討論視為是一種禁忌！
當然，民進黨人士可以說，要討論這些問題，不一定要十年政綱，選舉政綱也可達到同樣的目標，問題是，如此一來，事事以選舉為導向，卻也注定會短視近利、或是民粹化；民進黨不妨看看國民黨現在的處境，無論是軍公教課稅、健保費調漲，政府都左支右絀，這是典型被選舉綁住、作繭自縛的例子。
和民進黨一樣，美國的共和黨近來打選戰，也是無往不利，但他們仍然願意和歐巴馬面對面談健保改革，甚至在參院讓民主黨的工作法案過關，因為他們知道，一個只會說「不」的政黨，最後還是無法得到人民的信任。
同樣的，民進黨近來也是連戰皆捷，但是跟著上演的戲碼，則是黨內戰將互相攻伐，部分五都選區更發展到人身攻擊、打到你死我活的地步，也許，現在和這些殺到見骨的民進黨大老談「十年政綱」，真的非常不切實際，但是，有心要讓民進黨永續發展的新生代、中生代們，真的應該跟著蔡英文，好好思考民進黨及台灣的未來十年！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 17, 2010
Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has reiterated her commitment to a "Platform for the Decade." Following several victories at the polls, the beleaguered DPP's reaction is now substantially different. Vice President Annette Lu criticized Tsai's platform as "biting off more than one can chew." Elections are held only once every four years, Lu said. To be realistic, the DPP should offer a political platform with a two or four year timeframe.
DPP party elders are not bothering to conceal their belief that "It's all for the sake of elections." Apparently they believe such an attitude will actually help them at the polls. The Democratic Progressive Party has long trumpeted its concern for Taiwan's long term development. Now apparently even a ten year timeframe is too long!
Political competition is never absolute. Between two bad apples, all voters can do is choose the less rotten one. Since last year's three in one elections, the Democratic Progressive Party has won three elections in a row. This can only be explained by the dismal performance of the KMT. But to suggest that the DPP has engaged in soul-searching or that it has offered constructive proposals for the future, will probably be met with raised eyebrows, even from DPP officials.
Take the fiercely debated death penalty issue. Wang Ching-feng refused to implement the death penalty. Cabinet members have adopted different attitudes. Her resignation was no surprise. But consider the underlying structural factors. Voters who support the KMT usually hold more conservative attitudes regarding the death penalty and other social issues. Wang Ching-feng's firm commitment to the abolition of the death penalty was out of step with most KMT supporters. Her resignation was a forgone conclusion.
By contrast, during the "dang wai" era the DPP collaborated with human rights groups. Some Democratic Progressive Party elders were former death-row inmates. The DPP has long trumpeted its intention of "founding a nation on human rights." But when confronted with the Wang Ching-feng incident, all it could do was heap abuse and ridicule upon her. Whether to abolish the death penalty has sparked controversy in many democratic nations. If the DPP were in power today, would it handle the matter more circumspectly?
The "Platform for the Decade" lit a fuse. Last Wednesday the DPP Central Standing Committee discussed "Global Warming and Climate Change: What the Government Should Do regarding Land Restoration." This was supposed to officially launch its Platform for the Decade. But the meeting been barely been convened when DPP officials poured cold water on the proposal. This is truly regrettable. Global climate change will precipitate natural disasters. Taiwan was a victim of the 8/8 Floods. Leaders of the United Nations, the USA, the Chinese Mainland, and the EU are all busy combatting global warming, reducing carbon, and conserving energy. The Democratic Progressive Party however, has no solutions whatsoever. They may say this is not something an opposition party need worry about. But when the DPP was in power, it insisted on scrapping the nuclear energy program. It opposes nuclear power generation. But fossil fuel generating plants may be needed to compensate for the shortfall in nuclear power generation. If the DPP returns to office, does it intend to continue such an energy policy? The world now emphasizes energy efficiency. Does the DPP have a response? Does it have any idea how to deal with such a contingency?
The Republic of China faces another long term problem. Taipei and Beijing are about to sign an ECFA (Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement). The Ma administration is eager to sign, primarily because ASEAN and Beijing have launched a free trade region this year. Exports from the ten ASEAN nations to the Chinese mainland will be tariff free. Similar exports from Taiwan to the Chinese mainland will remain subject to high tariffs. The Ma administration hopes to close the deal on ECFA in order to overcome this problem. The DPP accuses the KMT of looking out only for the interests of big business. But it never offers any alternatives. Even more importantly, what sort of relationship would the DPP establish with Beijing? The Democratic Progressive Party may become the ruling party. It cannot refuse to address this matter merely because it considers it taboo.
DPP officials may say that discussing these issues does not require a Platform for the Decade. An election platform can achieve the same goal. But such an approach would turn every issue into an election issue. Every issue would be evaluated and demagogued for short term political advantage. The DPP would do well to examine the KMT's current plight. The government has flip-flopped on every issue, from taxes for members of the military, the civil service, and public school teachers, to health insurance premium increases. This is a textbook case of being bound hand and foot by election concerns.
And so it is with the DPP. The Republican Party in the United States has enjoyed smooth sailing recently. But it is still willing to talk with Obama about health care reform. It even allowed the Democrats' work bill to pass in the Senate. It knows that a party that only says "No!" will never win the public trust.
The Democratic Progressive Party has also won victory after victory. But its victories have been followed by internecine power struggles. Several electoral districts in the five cities even resorted to character assassination. Perhaps it is unrealistic to talk about the DPP's "Platform for the Decade" given such vicious life or death power struggles. But a new generation of middle-aged Democratic Progressive Party leaders is committed to sustainable development. They really ought to join Tsai Ing-wen and give careful thought to the DPP's plans for Taiwan over the next decade!
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.17
社論－別只會說NO 民進黨應提未來執政願景
本報訊
民進黨黨主席蔡英文日前重提研擬「十年政綱」。經過幾次勝選、驚魂甫定的民進黨，這次反應大為不同，副總統呂秀蓮批評這是「好高鶩遠」，因為一次選舉才四年，民進黨應該提二或四年政綱才切合實際。
看來，民進黨大老一點都不掩飾該黨「萬事莫如選舉忙」的態度，只是，「一切為選舉」，真的就對選舉有利；更別說，民進黨口口聲聲都是台灣的永續發展，現在卻連十年都嫌太久！
政治競爭從來不是絕對的，如果只有兩個爛蘋果，選民只能選比較不爛的那一個。因此去年三合一以來、民進黨連勝三次，只能用國民黨執政表現不佳來解釋，但要說民進黨有所反省、甚而已對未來執政提出建設性的主張，恐怕多數民進黨要員自己都不以為然。
就以近日來炒得最凶的死刑話題為例，王清峰堅持不肯執行死刑，和內閣態度迥異，下台並不令人意外，但背後的結構性因素是，支持國民黨的選民，通常在死刑等社會議題上，是持比較保守的態度，王清峰對於廢除死刑的堅決態度，和多數國民黨支持者格格不入，她下台是必然的。
相對的，民進黨在黨外時期就有和人權團體攜手合作的經驗，民進黨大老中，更有人過去是為死刑犯奔走求情的，但是，面對王清峰事件，過去標榜「人權立國」的民進黨，卻也只能攻訐、嘲笑，是否廢死，近來已在不少民主國家引發爭議，如果今天換成是民進黨執政，有可能處理得比較周延嗎？
這次「十年政綱」的引爆點在於，民進黨上周三中常會討論「面對全球暖化與氣候變遷，政府應有之國土復育作為」，以做為啟動十年政綱的正式會議，但第一次會議就被潑冷水，這是相當令人遺憾的，氣候變遷不但在全球釀成巨大天災，台灣也成為八八風災的受災戶，但是，當聯合國、美國、中國、歐盟領袖都已將抗暖化、節能減碳視為是首要措施時，民進黨卻並未提出對策；也許，他們可以說這不是在野黨該憂心的，問題是，民進黨執政時期，因為堅持廢核、反核，面臨不得不以蓋火力發電廠來彌補核能發電的選擇，將來若重返執政，還要持續這樣的耗能措施嗎？面對將來強調節能的全球環境，民進黨能否擘畫、或想像台灣該如何應變。
另一個台灣長期要面對的問題，就與兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ（經濟合作架構協議）有關，馬政府急著與對岸簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，最根本的原因在於，東協與中國大陸自由貿易區今年正式啟動，東協十國相關產品銷往大陸，將是零關稅；台灣同類產品出口到大陸，仍須負擔高額關稅。馬政府希望以ＥＣＦＡ的早收清單來克服這個問題，民進黨可以攻擊國民黨只顧大企業的利益，但卻從不提出替代方案，更關鍵的是，民進黨究竟要和中國維持怎樣的關係，有可能執政的民進黨，不該還將討論視為是一種禁忌！
當然，民進黨人士可以說，要討論這些問題，不一定要十年政綱，選舉政綱也可達到同樣的目標，問題是，如此一來，事事以選舉為導向，卻也注定會短視近利、或是民粹化；民進黨不妨看看國民黨現在的處境，無論是軍公教課稅、健保費調漲，政府都左支右絀，這是典型被選舉綁住、作繭自縛的例子。
和民進黨一樣，美國的共和黨近來打選戰，也是無往不利，但他們仍然願意和歐巴馬面對面談健保改革，甚至在參院讓民主黨的工作法案過關，因為他們知道，一個只會說「不」的政黨，最後還是無法得到人民的信任。
同樣的，民進黨近來也是連戰皆捷，但是跟著上演的戲碼，則是黨內戰將互相攻伐，部分五都選區更發展到人身攻擊、打到你死我活的地步，也許，現在和這些殺到見骨的民進黨大老談「十年政綱」，真的非常不切實際，但是，有心要讓民進黨永續發展的新生代、中生代們，真的應該跟著蔡英文，好好思考民進黨及台灣的未來十年！
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
The New Minister of Justice Should Tell Us Whether He Intends to Abolish the Death Penalty
The New Minister of Justice Should Tell Us Whether He Intends to Abolish the Death Penalty
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 16, 2010
Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng has resigned in response to the controversies over the death penalty and the prison break at the Taipei Detention Center. What position will the next Minister of Justice adopt regarding prison policy? Here are some major issues her successor must consider.
First of all, will he or she adopt a different position regarding the abolition of the death penalty? Yesterday President Ma noted that abolishing the death penalty and carrying out executions are two entirely different issues. On the surface, Minister Wang erred because she refused to carry out the death penalty, even though the law has yet to be amended. At a deeper level however, people favor harsh penalties during troubled times. They like the idea of an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. They simply do not understand why the death penalty should be abolished. That is the real reason Wang Ching-feng was forced to resign.
Why do so many countries the world over hope to abolish the death penalty? Do they care only about the rights of bad people and not the good? The Republic of China has undergone two changes in ruling parties. Abolishing the death penalty would surely meet with international approval. But the public on Taiwan is convinced the death penalty helps keep their community safe. Will newly appointed ministers reverse the policy of abolishing the death penalty? Or will they explain why the government should abolish the death penalty, and communicate their reasoning to the public?
Will the new ministers immediately sign 44 execution orders? Will they carry out all the executions at one time? Will they carry them out in batches? Or will they exercise their discretionary powers in deciding how to act? President Ma says he intends to govern in accordance with the law. Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng immediately stepped down. In fact however, she failed to make her position clear. She left people with the impression she was reluctant to govern in accordance with the law. Of course she should resign. As we all know, the law authorizes the minister to order executions. If something is a law, it must be carried out. If something is not a law, it must not be carried out. Only then is one governing in accordance with the rule of law. Carrying out something that is not a law, is not governing in accordance with the rule of law.
The Republic of China will incorporate two human rights conventions into its domestic legal system. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that those sentenced to death have the right to request commutation of their sentences. Death row inmaters hae already submitted applications. Carrying out the law at this moment would violate the protocol for the reduction of sentences. If the minister hastily orders these executions, does that still constitute governing in accordance with the rule of law? The Grand Justices have offered two constitutional interpretations of the death penalty. One of them was during the martial law era. The legal reasoning was so backward as to be shameful. In fact, one execution being ruled constitutional does not make all executions constitutional. The Republic of China has already incorporated human rights conventions into its domestic law. Death-row inmates have already petitioned for a constitutional review of the death penalty, in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution in the 21st Century. According to existing regulations, inmates awaiting retrial or who have filed appeals may not be executed. If the minister fails to wait for the constitutional interpretation before carrying out executions, then he has failed to "govern in accordance with the rule of law." How can a minister committed to the abolition of capital punishment, hastily impose the death penalty?
Minister Wang's resignation shows that the Ministry of Justice failed to communicate with the public. It failed to convince the public that the abolition of the death penalty has nothing to do with the preservation of law and order. It also failed to care for and protect crime victims. When the government brings a criminal to justice, that is a form of condemnation. But mere condemnation is not enough. It must also help victims to escape victimhood and get on with their lives. No one has the right to demand that victims forgive their victimizers. But the government can help victims forsake the notion of revenge. This is one way to help victims of crime. Has the Ministry of Justice done enough in this respect?
Some say that if criminals commit crimes, why must the government rehabilitate them? Actually this is open to debate. The government need not compensate the victim on behalf of the victimizer. But it can help the victims to obtain restitution from victimizers. We are not advocating debt collection by means of physical coercion. But prosecuting criminals is a far cry from helping crime victims receive restitution. This should be considered a form of protection for crime victims. Government assistance to victims no longer able to support themselves as a result of crime, must not be considered restitution by those who committed the crime. That would mean valuing money more than the crime victim's distress. The government should also provide psychological counseling to help crime victims survive their ordeal, to put their suffering behind them, and begin life anew. Only then can crime victims forsake the notion of revenge. Most worrisome of all are government officials who would rally support for the government's crime fighting efforts by encouraging victims to hate their victimizers. These officials refuse crime victims resources that would enable them to put their suffering behind them.
Resource allocation has much to do with the penal system as a whole. Yesterday's escapee was a convicted inmate. The person left in the Detention Center was merely a suspect who had yet to be tried. Why was a convict placed in the same facility as a suspect? Why was the detention center being used as a prison? Failing to distinguish between detention and imprisonment is also a violation of of the provisions of the Human Rights Convention. Inadequate resources is no excuse to violate the basic principles of prison administration. This is the harsh reality the new Minister of Justice must confront and address.
If the new Minister of Justice has the courage to face up to his policy problems, if he does what he should, and refrains from doing what he shouldn't, the price we paid as a result of Minister of Justice Wang's resignation may be worth it.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.16
社論－死刑廢不廢 新法務部長應先講清楚
本報訊
法務部部長王清峰因是否執行死刑風波閃電去職，台北看守所即發生人犯掉包脫逃事件。下一位法務部部長將會採取什麼樣的刑事政策呢？以下是繼任人選必須嚴肅思考的重大議題。
首先，廢除死刑的政策難道要改弦易轍嗎？馬總統昨天指出，廢除死刑與執行死刑是兩碼事。表面上看，王部長錯在尚未修法廢除死刑就拒絕執行死刑；骨子裡面，其實社會根深蒂固治亂世用重典，以命償命的應報刑思想，根本不知道為什麼要廢除死刑，才是王清峰去職的真正原因。
仔細想想，為什麼世界上那麼多國家都要廢除死刑？他們都只重壞人的人權不重好人的人權嗎？台灣兩次政黨輪替，確立廢死政策，其實在國際間備受讚譽，可是台灣的社會大眾卻仍然深信死刑可保社會平安。新的部長會開廢除死刑政策的倒車嗎？還是要認真說明政府為何要廢除死刑，徹底進行社會溝通呢？
其次，新的部長要立即簽署四十四張執行死刑令嗎？是一次執行全部，或分批執行？還是要依法行使裁量權決定如何行事？馬總統說要依法行政，王清峰部長隨即下台，其實話沒說清楚，給人一種不肯依法行政的印象，當然應該去職。殊不知，法律賦予部長簽署死刑執行命令之權，該執行的執行，不該執行的不執行，才是依法行政。不該執行的付諸執行，就不是依法行政。
台灣甫將兩部人權公約納入國內法律體系，其中公民與政治權利國際公約賦予受死刑宣告者請求減刑之權利；死刑犯都已提出申請，現行法令卻無斟酌減刑的程序，部長貿然執行死刑，算是依法行政嗎？大法官雖曾二次釋憲談論死刑，有的是在戒嚴時代，有的說理觀念落伍令人汗顏。其實，一項死刑曾被認定合憲不能使得所有死刑一概合憲；何況台灣已將人權公約納入國內法，死刑犯已經聲請大法官釋憲檢討死刑在廿一世紀台灣的憲法環境，依照現行規定，聲請釋憲或再審或非常上訴期間不能執行死刑，部長不待釋憲就貿然執行，也對不起「依法行政」口號。繼續推動廢除死刑政策的部長，任何執行死刑的決定，怎可操之過急？
王部長去職事件，顯示了法務部除了與社會溝通不足，不能讓社會安心瞭解死刑存廢與治安良窳無關之外，也忽略了犯罪被害人的照顧與保護。國家將罪犯繩之以法，是施以譴責，但只做到譴責並不足夠，還要幫助被害人走出受害的困境，離開受害的時點繼續邁向人生。無人有權利奢求被害人饒恕加害人，但國家可以幫助被害人放棄報復的念頭，這正是犯罪被害人保護該為之事。多年以來，法務部在這方面做的夠不夠呢？
有人會說，罪犯造孽，為何要國家善後？這其實有待商榷。國家不必代罪犯賠償受害人，但可以積極協助受害人向加害人求償。我們並不鼓勵以刑逼民的討債手法，但是真正的犯罪，在完成追訴之後，協助被害人從犯罪利得中受償的途徑很多，應該是犯罪被害人保護事務的範疇。另外，國家對於因犯罪受害而生活無依者施以生活救助，不能認為是代加害人賠償，否則就是將金錢的價值看得比被害人的窘迫還重要。國家也該提供真正的心理輔導協助被害人走出困境，這樣才能讓被害人遠離受害時的情境，真正面對新的人生；唯有如此，才能讓被害人放棄報復。最令人擔心的，則是主政者寧讓受害人心懷恨意支持國家打擊犯罪，也不肯提供資源照顧受害人讓他們脫離受害當時的情境。
其實，說到資源配置，還與整體獄政有關。昨日掉包脫逃的是已定讞的受刑人，留在看守所中的則是未定罪的被告。受刑人與受押被告怎會同舍？看守所怎可當做監獄使用？看守所與監獄不分，其實也是違反人權公約規定的安排，資源配置不足並不能成為違反基本獄政原則的理由，卻正是台灣現在面對的現實，新的法務部長有責任改善這種惡劣的現實環境。
新的法務部長若能勇敢面對政策環境，有所為也有所不為，王部長去職而付出代價，就算值得了！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 16, 2010
Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng has resigned in response to the controversies over the death penalty and the prison break at the Taipei Detention Center. What position will the next Minister of Justice adopt regarding prison policy? Here are some major issues her successor must consider.
First of all, will he or she adopt a different position regarding the abolition of the death penalty? Yesterday President Ma noted that abolishing the death penalty and carrying out executions are two entirely different issues. On the surface, Minister Wang erred because she refused to carry out the death penalty, even though the law has yet to be amended. At a deeper level however, people favor harsh penalties during troubled times. They like the idea of an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. They simply do not understand why the death penalty should be abolished. That is the real reason Wang Ching-feng was forced to resign.
Why do so many countries the world over hope to abolish the death penalty? Do they care only about the rights of bad people and not the good? The Republic of China has undergone two changes in ruling parties. Abolishing the death penalty would surely meet with international approval. But the public on Taiwan is convinced the death penalty helps keep their community safe. Will newly appointed ministers reverse the policy of abolishing the death penalty? Or will they explain why the government should abolish the death penalty, and communicate their reasoning to the public?
Will the new ministers immediately sign 44 execution orders? Will they carry out all the executions at one time? Will they carry them out in batches? Or will they exercise their discretionary powers in deciding how to act? President Ma says he intends to govern in accordance with the law. Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng immediately stepped down. In fact however, she failed to make her position clear. She left people with the impression she was reluctant to govern in accordance with the law. Of course she should resign. As we all know, the law authorizes the minister to order executions. If something is a law, it must be carried out. If something is not a law, it must not be carried out. Only then is one governing in accordance with the rule of law. Carrying out something that is not a law, is not governing in accordance with the rule of law.
The Republic of China will incorporate two human rights conventions into its domestic legal system. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that those sentenced to death have the right to request commutation of their sentences. Death row inmaters hae already submitted applications. Carrying out the law at this moment would violate the protocol for the reduction of sentences. If the minister hastily orders these executions, does that still constitute governing in accordance with the rule of law? The Grand Justices have offered two constitutional interpretations of the death penalty. One of them was during the martial law era. The legal reasoning was so backward as to be shameful. In fact, one execution being ruled constitutional does not make all executions constitutional. The Republic of China has already incorporated human rights conventions into its domestic law. Death-row inmates have already petitioned for a constitutional review of the death penalty, in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution in the 21st Century. According to existing regulations, inmates awaiting retrial or who have filed appeals may not be executed. If the minister fails to wait for the constitutional interpretation before carrying out executions, then he has failed to "govern in accordance with the rule of law." How can a minister committed to the abolition of capital punishment, hastily impose the death penalty?
Minister Wang's resignation shows that the Ministry of Justice failed to communicate with the public. It failed to convince the public that the abolition of the death penalty has nothing to do with the preservation of law and order. It also failed to care for and protect crime victims. When the government brings a criminal to justice, that is a form of condemnation. But mere condemnation is not enough. It must also help victims to escape victimhood and get on with their lives. No one has the right to demand that victims forgive their victimizers. But the government can help victims forsake the notion of revenge. This is one way to help victims of crime. Has the Ministry of Justice done enough in this respect?
Some say that if criminals commit crimes, why must the government rehabilitate them? Actually this is open to debate. The government need not compensate the victim on behalf of the victimizer. But it can help the victims to obtain restitution from victimizers. We are not advocating debt collection by means of physical coercion. But prosecuting criminals is a far cry from helping crime victims receive restitution. This should be considered a form of protection for crime victims. Government assistance to victims no longer able to support themselves as a result of crime, must not be considered restitution by those who committed the crime. That would mean valuing money more than the crime victim's distress. The government should also provide psychological counseling to help crime victims survive their ordeal, to put their suffering behind them, and begin life anew. Only then can crime victims forsake the notion of revenge. Most worrisome of all are government officials who would rally support for the government's crime fighting efforts by encouraging victims to hate their victimizers. These officials refuse crime victims resources that would enable them to put their suffering behind them.
Resource allocation has much to do with the penal system as a whole. Yesterday's escapee was a convicted inmate. The person left in the Detention Center was merely a suspect who had yet to be tried. Why was a convict placed in the same facility as a suspect? Why was the detention center being used as a prison? Failing to distinguish between detention and imprisonment is also a violation of of the provisions of the Human Rights Convention. Inadequate resources is no excuse to violate the basic principles of prison administration. This is the harsh reality the new Minister of Justice must confront and address.
If the new Minister of Justice has the courage to face up to his policy problems, if he does what he should, and refrains from doing what he shouldn't, the price we paid as a result of Minister of Justice Wang's resignation may be worth it.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.16
社論－死刑廢不廢 新法務部長應先講清楚
本報訊
法務部部長王清峰因是否執行死刑風波閃電去職，台北看守所即發生人犯掉包脫逃事件。下一位法務部部長將會採取什麼樣的刑事政策呢？以下是繼任人選必須嚴肅思考的重大議題。
首先，廢除死刑的政策難道要改弦易轍嗎？馬總統昨天指出，廢除死刑與執行死刑是兩碼事。表面上看，王部長錯在尚未修法廢除死刑就拒絕執行死刑；骨子裡面，其實社會根深蒂固治亂世用重典，以命償命的應報刑思想，根本不知道為什麼要廢除死刑，才是王清峰去職的真正原因。
仔細想想，為什麼世界上那麼多國家都要廢除死刑？他們都只重壞人的人權不重好人的人權嗎？台灣兩次政黨輪替，確立廢死政策，其實在國際間備受讚譽，可是台灣的社會大眾卻仍然深信死刑可保社會平安。新的部長會開廢除死刑政策的倒車嗎？還是要認真說明政府為何要廢除死刑，徹底進行社會溝通呢？
其次，新的部長要立即簽署四十四張執行死刑令嗎？是一次執行全部，或分批執行？還是要依法行使裁量權決定如何行事？馬總統說要依法行政，王清峰部長隨即下台，其實話沒說清楚，給人一種不肯依法行政的印象，當然應該去職。殊不知，法律賦予部長簽署死刑執行命令之權，該執行的執行，不該執行的不執行，才是依法行政。不該執行的付諸執行，就不是依法行政。
台灣甫將兩部人權公約納入國內法律體系，其中公民與政治權利國際公約賦予受死刑宣告者請求減刑之權利；死刑犯都已提出申請，現行法令卻無斟酌減刑的程序，部長貿然執行死刑，算是依法行政嗎？大法官雖曾二次釋憲談論死刑，有的是在戒嚴時代，有的說理觀念落伍令人汗顏。其實，一項死刑曾被認定合憲不能使得所有死刑一概合憲；何況台灣已將人權公約納入國內法，死刑犯已經聲請大法官釋憲檢討死刑在廿一世紀台灣的憲法環境，依照現行規定，聲請釋憲或再審或非常上訴期間不能執行死刑，部長不待釋憲就貿然執行，也對不起「依法行政」口號。繼續推動廢除死刑政策的部長，任何執行死刑的決定，怎可操之過急？
王部長去職事件，顯示了法務部除了與社會溝通不足，不能讓社會安心瞭解死刑存廢與治安良窳無關之外，也忽略了犯罪被害人的照顧與保護。國家將罪犯繩之以法，是施以譴責，但只做到譴責並不足夠，還要幫助被害人走出受害的困境，離開受害的時點繼續邁向人生。無人有權利奢求被害人饒恕加害人，但國家可以幫助被害人放棄報復的念頭，這正是犯罪被害人保護該為之事。多年以來，法務部在這方面做的夠不夠呢？
有人會說，罪犯造孽，為何要國家善後？這其實有待商榷。國家不必代罪犯賠償受害人，但可以積極協助受害人向加害人求償。我們並不鼓勵以刑逼民的討債手法，但是真正的犯罪，在完成追訴之後，協助被害人從犯罪利得中受償的途徑很多，應該是犯罪被害人保護事務的範疇。另外，國家對於因犯罪受害而生活無依者施以生活救助，不能認為是代加害人賠償，否則就是將金錢的價值看得比被害人的窘迫還重要。國家也該提供真正的心理輔導協助被害人走出困境，這樣才能讓被害人遠離受害時的情境，真正面對新的人生；唯有如此，才能讓被害人放棄報復。最令人擔心的，則是主政者寧讓受害人心懷恨意支持國家打擊犯罪，也不肯提供資源照顧受害人讓他們脫離受害當時的情境。
其實，說到資源配置，還與整體獄政有關。昨日掉包脫逃的是已定讞的受刑人，留在看守所中的則是未定罪的被告。受刑人與受押被告怎會同舍？看守所怎可當做監獄使用？看守所與監獄不分，其實也是違反人權公約規定的安排，資源配置不足並不能成為違反基本獄政原則的理由，卻正是台灣現在面對的現實，新的法務部長有責任改善這種惡劣的現實環境。
新的法務部長若能勇敢面對政策環境，有所為也有所不為，王部長去職而付出代價，就算值得了！
Monday, March 15, 2010
Political Appointees: Reconciling Convictions with Responsibilities
Political Appointees: Reconciling Convictions with Responsibilities
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 15, 2010
In just one short week, two cabinet ministers resigned in the midst of policy turmoil. The two cabinet ministers differ in that Yang Chih-liang stuck to his guns regarding health insurance premium increases. Much of the public has affirmed his professionalism. He also cleared away numerous obstacles in the way of a premium increase. Wang Ching-feng on the other hand, refused to implement the death penalty due to ethical concerns. She stirred up considerable controversy, and debased the level of public discourse. She allowed the administration to become caught on the horns of a dilemma.
Yang Chih-liang Yuang and Wang Ching-feng have resigned over policy disagreements. This is better than officials resigning over personal corruption. This is better than betraying one's convictions in order to cling to one's job. The two have at least left their mark on government. It is difficult to denigrate the way they did their jobs. Wu Deng-yi attempted to dissuade Yang Chih-liang. Considering how two well-respected political appointees have resigned in such a controversial manner, the issue of right and wrong surely merits our attention.
Yang Chih-liang is an academic. Wang Ching-feng is a human rights lawyer. Both have professional images. This is why they were recruited in the first place. The two entered politics. The two should have been able to carry out their jobs in a professional manner. The two should have been able to benefit society and the public. Who knew they would resign over personal beliefs? If we compare the two, Yang Chih-liang's resignation was more rational. He wanted to ensure the fiscal integrity of the health insurance system. Wang Ching-feng's insistence on abolishing the death penalty was merely about clinging to her personal beliefs, while ignoring the social realities and the duties of her position.
Most surprising of all is Wang Ching-feng's value system. She cares deeply about 44 death-row inmates' right to life. She boasts she is willing to "descend into hell" for them. But she has little concern for public anxieties at the other end of the spectrum. She has few if any words of comfort for family members of victims of violent crime. The abolition of the death penalty may be an "international trend." But how can a justice minister turn a blind eye to the concerns of her own compatriots? Wang Ching-has failed to reconcile her personal beliefs with social reality. The bias is so severe, it could be considered obsessive. She has in fact put the cart before the horse.
A political appointee's personal beliefs are one thing. But in order to impose one's personal beliefs on the public, one must first go through legal and institutional channels. Wang Ching-feng has obsessed on the need to abolish the death penalty. But she has made no effort to undergo due process. Not only that, she has constantly resorted to extreme measures when dealing with problems. As a result, she has made matters worse rather than better. For example, she characterized the signing of an execution order as "homicide." She in effect demonized the ministerial system. She left her successor holding the bag, as she cavalierly resigned and departed. She protected her public image of "respect for life," even as she shifted the burden of "homicide" onto the administration and society as a whole. Her posture is extremely dubious.
In her capacity as Minister of Justice, Wang Ching-feng had many opportunities and channels by which she could have persuaded the public to respect human life. She had many ways by which she could have gradually promoted her goal of abolishing the death penalty. But she chose to ignore them. Instead, she resorted to rhetorical shock tactics to promote her beliefs. As a result, she has debased public discourse of the issue, and regressed it to a more conservative extreme. If in the wake of this incident the public on Taiwan is less willing to abolish the death penalty, and if the international community's human rights index for Taiwan declines, Wang Ching-feng will have a hard time escaping blame. Her impetuous resignation can only be described as "cavalier in the extreme."
Besides abolishing the death penalty, Wang Ching-feng taught us another lesson, namely, how should politicians go about realizing their "personal beliefs." Wang Ching-feng resigned over her personal beliefs. She declared that she "did the right thing." But her declaration involves a huge paradox. First of all, "doing the right thing" is not necessarily the same as "doing things the right way." Secondly, Wang Ching-feng may have done the right thing for herself as an individual, but she may not have done the right thing for society as a whole.
German sociologist Max Weber spoke of the distinction between the "ethic of responsibility" and the "ethic of conviction." Irresponsible politicians seek only personal peace of mind and moral purity. They ignore their social responsibility as public figures. They ignore their responsibilities as wielders of public authority. Such "politicians of conviction" often care only about expressing their own their moral sentiments. They are not prepared to debate with others. They are not prepared to convince others. They are heedless of the consequences of their words and deeds. Perhaps these saints should never enter the political arena, because their moral superiority does not allow them to deal wtih other people as equals.
Wang Ching-feng, in emphasizing the right to life, may have been oblivious to her own moral posturing. But if political appointees' only response in the face of public controversy is to retreat into their personal beliefs, that is tantamount to abandoning the public domain. The truly regrettable aspect of Wang Ching-feng's resignation is that to the bitter end, she experienced no "ethic of responsibility" whatsoever.
政務官在信念與責任之間的平衡
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.15 03:40 am
短短一周，兩名內閣閣員在政策風波中掛冠請辭。所不同的是，楊志良對漲保費的專業堅持得到不少民眾肯定，同時也為保費調整排除了若干障礙；而王清峰拒執行死刑的道德訴求，攪翻社會一池春水，卻讓問題的思辯走向倒退，更讓政府陷入進退兩難之境。
楊志良和王清峰為理念不合而求去，較之官員因貪贓枉法而去職，或為戀棧而不惜出賣公權力，至少留下了獨特的身影，其品操難以一筆抹煞。雖然吳揆還在極力慰留楊志良，但兩位平素風評不惡的政務官以如此爭議的姿態求去，其間輕重是非，確值得我們進一步探討。
楊志良是學者出身，王清峰原為人權律師，均素有不錯的專業形象，這也應是他們獲邀入閣的主因。兩人既投身政治，即應以專業能力服務新的角色，以求有利於社會和人民，未料兩人最後都卡在個人的信念求去。兩相比較，楊志良的堅持是基於決策理性，以維持健保制度的健全為出發；而王清峰的廢死堅持，則只顧維護個人信仰，卻忽略了社會現實與職務角色。
最令人驚訝的是，在王清峰的價值天平上，她心心念念四十四名死刑犯的生命權，聲稱願意為他們「下地獄」；但對另一端對治安存疑義的廣大民眾卻冷眼以對，亦對曾因暴行受難的家屬也幾無一語寬慰。即使廢除死刑是「國際潮流」，但一位法務部長面對本國人民的疑慮，能視若無睹嗎？王清峰在理念與實務之間的失衡竟嚴重到這種地步，不僅偏執，也倒置了本末。
政務官的個人信念是一回事，要將這個信念灌注到施政上，仍須透過合法及制度化手段來達成；但王清峰一再強調廢除死刑的必要，卻不設法尋求程序的完備。不僅如此，她在處理問題時連續作出過激表現，反讓事情愈發棘手。例如，她形容簽核執刑令為「殺人」，不啻妖魔化了部長的制度角色，也把這個原罪強加到繼任者身上。而她輕鬆下台而去，維持了自己「尊重生命」的形象和信念，遺下的「殺人」問題卻拋給政府和台灣社會去承擔。這種態度，確實頗有可議。
以法務部長之角色，王清峰原本有許多機會和管道向民眾宣導尊重生命的意義，以目的及手段兼顧的方式，徐徐向廢死的法制道路推進。但她捨此而不為，卻以驚世駭俗的言論推銷自己的信念；如此一來，反而把社會輿意的討論推向更保守的極端。經過此一事件，如果台灣社會對廢除死刑的抗拒更大，國際對台灣人權指標的評價下降，王清峰恐怕難辭其咎。她暴衝式的去職，可謂「輕於鴻毛」。
除了廢死，王清峰留下來的一課，還有政治人物如何實現「個人信念」的問題。王清峰為個人理念而去職，她稱自己是「做對的事」，這句話存在著莫大的弔詭。第一，做對的事，未必「做對事」。第二，對王清峰個人而言是對的事，對社會未必是對的事。
德國社會學家韋伯當年曾區分「責任倫理」與「信念倫理」，認為只講「信念」的政治家，是不負責的政治家；因為他們只追求個人的心安與道德的純潔，卻忽略了公眾人物對社會的責任，怠忽了公權力的職責。「信念政治家」往往只是任性地發洩道德情緒，既不準備與他人辯論，也不準備說服別人，更不在意自己言行會帶來什麼後果。這種道德聖人，或許原本即不應該進入實際政治操作的領域，因為在他們的道德優越感之下，不容許別人與他們平等。
王清峰在強調生命權時，未必意識到自己在誇示道德優越感；但政務官面對沸騰的民意，若只能退回到個人信念的堡壘，那等於宣告棄守公共領域。王清峰下台，真正令人惋惜的是，她到最後一刻對己身所負的責任倫理仍一無感應。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 15, 2010
In just one short week, two cabinet ministers resigned in the midst of policy turmoil. The two cabinet ministers differ in that Yang Chih-liang stuck to his guns regarding health insurance premium increases. Much of the public has affirmed his professionalism. He also cleared away numerous obstacles in the way of a premium increase. Wang Ching-feng on the other hand, refused to implement the death penalty due to ethical concerns. She stirred up considerable controversy, and debased the level of public discourse. She allowed the administration to become caught on the horns of a dilemma.
Yang Chih-liang Yuang and Wang Ching-feng have resigned over policy disagreements. This is better than officials resigning over personal corruption. This is better than betraying one's convictions in order to cling to one's job. The two have at least left their mark on government. It is difficult to denigrate the way they did their jobs. Wu Deng-yi attempted to dissuade Yang Chih-liang. Considering how two well-respected political appointees have resigned in such a controversial manner, the issue of right and wrong surely merits our attention.
Yang Chih-liang is an academic. Wang Ching-feng is a human rights lawyer. Both have professional images. This is why they were recruited in the first place. The two entered politics. The two should have been able to carry out their jobs in a professional manner. The two should have been able to benefit society and the public. Who knew they would resign over personal beliefs? If we compare the two, Yang Chih-liang's resignation was more rational. He wanted to ensure the fiscal integrity of the health insurance system. Wang Ching-feng's insistence on abolishing the death penalty was merely about clinging to her personal beliefs, while ignoring the social realities and the duties of her position.
Most surprising of all is Wang Ching-feng's value system. She cares deeply about 44 death-row inmates' right to life. She boasts she is willing to "descend into hell" for them. But she has little concern for public anxieties at the other end of the spectrum. She has few if any words of comfort for family members of victims of violent crime. The abolition of the death penalty may be an "international trend." But how can a justice minister turn a blind eye to the concerns of her own compatriots? Wang Ching-has failed to reconcile her personal beliefs with social reality. The bias is so severe, it could be considered obsessive. She has in fact put the cart before the horse.
A political appointee's personal beliefs are one thing. But in order to impose one's personal beliefs on the public, one must first go through legal and institutional channels. Wang Ching-feng has obsessed on the need to abolish the death penalty. But she has made no effort to undergo due process. Not only that, she has constantly resorted to extreme measures when dealing with problems. As a result, she has made matters worse rather than better. For example, she characterized the signing of an execution order as "homicide." She in effect demonized the ministerial system. She left her successor holding the bag, as she cavalierly resigned and departed. She protected her public image of "respect for life," even as she shifted the burden of "homicide" onto the administration and society as a whole. Her posture is extremely dubious.
In her capacity as Minister of Justice, Wang Ching-feng had many opportunities and channels by which she could have persuaded the public to respect human life. She had many ways by which she could have gradually promoted her goal of abolishing the death penalty. But she chose to ignore them. Instead, she resorted to rhetorical shock tactics to promote her beliefs. As a result, she has debased public discourse of the issue, and regressed it to a more conservative extreme. If in the wake of this incident the public on Taiwan is less willing to abolish the death penalty, and if the international community's human rights index for Taiwan declines, Wang Ching-feng will have a hard time escaping blame. Her impetuous resignation can only be described as "cavalier in the extreme."
Besides abolishing the death penalty, Wang Ching-feng taught us another lesson, namely, how should politicians go about realizing their "personal beliefs." Wang Ching-feng resigned over her personal beliefs. She declared that she "did the right thing." But her declaration involves a huge paradox. First of all, "doing the right thing" is not necessarily the same as "doing things the right way." Secondly, Wang Ching-feng may have done the right thing for herself as an individual, but she may not have done the right thing for society as a whole.
German sociologist Max Weber spoke of the distinction between the "ethic of responsibility" and the "ethic of conviction." Irresponsible politicians seek only personal peace of mind and moral purity. They ignore their social responsibility as public figures. They ignore their responsibilities as wielders of public authority. Such "politicians of conviction" often care only about expressing their own their moral sentiments. They are not prepared to debate with others. They are not prepared to convince others. They are heedless of the consequences of their words and deeds. Perhaps these saints should never enter the political arena, because their moral superiority does not allow them to deal wtih other people as equals.
Wang Ching-feng, in emphasizing the right to life, may have been oblivious to her own moral posturing. But if political appointees' only response in the face of public controversy is to retreat into their personal beliefs, that is tantamount to abandoning the public domain. The truly regrettable aspect of Wang Ching-feng's resignation is that to the bitter end, she experienced no "ethic of responsibility" whatsoever.
政務官在信念與責任之間的平衡
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.15 03:40 am
短短一周，兩名內閣閣員在政策風波中掛冠請辭。所不同的是，楊志良對漲保費的專業堅持得到不少民眾肯定，同時也為保費調整排除了若干障礙；而王清峰拒執行死刑的道德訴求，攪翻社會一池春水，卻讓問題的思辯走向倒退，更讓政府陷入進退兩難之境。
楊志良和王清峰為理念不合而求去，較之官員因貪贓枉法而去職，或為戀棧而不惜出賣公權力，至少留下了獨特的身影，其品操難以一筆抹煞。雖然吳揆還在極力慰留楊志良，但兩位平素風評不惡的政務官以如此爭議的姿態求去，其間輕重是非，確值得我們進一步探討。
楊志良是學者出身，王清峰原為人權律師，均素有不錯的專業形象，這也應是他們獲邀入閣的主因。兩人既投身政治，即應以專業能力服務新的角色，以求有利於社會和人民，未料兩人最後都卡在個人的信念求去。兩相比較，楊志良的堅持是基於決策理性，以維持健保制度的健全為出發；而王清峰的廢死堅持，則只顧維護個人信仰，卻忽略了社會現實與職務角色。
最令人驚訝的是，在王清峰的價值天平上，她心心念念四十四名死刑犯的生命權，聲稱願意為他們「下地獄」；但對另一端對治安存疑義的廣大民眾卻冷眼以對，亦對曾因暴行受難的家屬也幾無一語寬慰。即使廢除死刑是「國際潮流」，但一位法務部長面對本國人民的疑慮，能視若無睹嗎？王清峰在理念與實務之間的失衡竟嚴重到這種地步，不僅偏執，也倒置了本末。
政務官的個人信念是一回事，要將這個信念灌注到施政上，仍須透過合法及制度化手段來達成；但王清峰一再強調廢除死刑的必要，卻不設法尋求程序的完備。不僅如此，她在處理問題時連續作出過激表現，反讓事情愈發棘手。例如，她形容簽核執刑令為「殺人」，不啻妖魔化了部長的制度角色，也把這個原罪強加到繼任者身上。而她輕鬆下台而去，維持了自己「尊重生命」的形象和信念，遺下的「殺人」問題卻拋給政府和台灣社會去承擔。這種態度，確實頗有可議。
以法務部長之角色，王清峰原本有許多機會和管道向民眾宣導尊重生命的意義，以目的及手段兼顧的方式，徐徐向廢死的法制道路推進。但她捨此而不為，卻以驚世駭俗的言論推銷自己的信念；如此一來，反而把社會輿意的討論推向更保守的極端。經過此一事件，如果台灣社會對廢除死刑的抗拒更大，國際對台灣人權指標的評價下降，王清峰恐怕難辭其咎。她暴衝式的去職，可謂「輕於鴻毛」。
除了廢死，王清峰留下來的一課，還有政治人物如何實現「個人信念」的問題。王清峰為個人理念而去職，她稱自己是「做對的事」，這句話存在著莫大的弔詭。第一，做對的事，未必「做對事」。第二，對王清峰個人而言是對的事，對社會未必是對的事。
德國社會學家韋伯當年曾區分「責任倫理」與「信念倫理」，認為只講「信念」的政治家，是不負責的政治家；因為他們只追求個人的心安與道德的純潔，卻忽略了公眾人物對社會的責任，怠忽了公權力的職責。「信念政治家」往往只是任性地發洩道德情緒，既不準備與他人辯論，也不準備說服別人，更不在意自己言行會帶來什麼後果。這種道德聖人，或許原本即不應該進入實際政治操作的領域，因為在他們的道德優越感之下，不容許別人與他們平等。
王清峰在強調生命權時，未必意識到自己在誇示道德優越感；但政務官面對沸騰的民意，若只能退回到個人信念的堡壘，那等於宣告棄守公共領域。王清峰下台，真正令人惋惜的是，她到最後一刻對己身所負的責任倫理仍一無感應。
Friday, March 12, 2010
Why Talk of Reform if One Cannot Tolerate Appointees with Ideas?
Why Talk of Reform if One Cannot Tolerate Appointees with Ideas?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 12, 2010
Department of Health Director Yang Chi-liang tendered his resignation over the health-care fee increase controversy. After several rounds of dispute, the issue of his resignation remains unsettled. Superficially the dispute is over the cost of health insurance. But if one digs deeper, one discovers it is actually over political appointees' vision and principles. This is a problem that deserves close attention.
A political appointee is someone who must assume responsibility for the failure of his policies. Therefore the most important requirement for a political appointee is a comprehensive policy blueprint and vision. Think of the government as a vast machine. Civil service officials are large or small cogs in this machine. They are important. But they seldom direct the operation of the machine. Political appointees are the engineers whose responsibility it is to oversee the operation of the machine. They design and review the blueprints for the machine. They also direct the operation of the machine.
Of course, sub engineers who oversee individual machines cannot oversee the plant as a whole. From time to time, they must communicate with the chief engineer. They may even need to submit progress reports to the director. The sub engineers and the chief engineer each have their own areas of expertise. They also have their own blind spots. They must communicate with each other frequently. They must coordinate and compromise as they oversee the operations of the plant's machines. If the sub engineer and the chief engineer have major differences over the blueprints and operational strategy for the plant, the sub-engineer is the one who must resign. This describes most peoples' understanding of the government. Cabinet officials are the sub engineers. The premier is the chief engineer. The president is the director.
Allow us to be so bold as to ask the president and the premier how many officials in the current cabinet have any policy concepts, any policy blueprints, any sense of direction, and any vision for the future? Yang Chih-liang is in charge of health-care financing. He vision may be too narrow. He has proposed increasing the price of health care for high-income individuals. Some are critical of his proposal. But Yang is one of the few cabinet officials over the past two years who have any ideas or insights of their own. Most political appointees are good only at crisis management or coping with the media. They good only at obeying the chief engineer or director's commands, and have no opinions of their own. They are good only at self-preservation, at hiding behind bureaucratic smoke and mirrors. They are incapable of offering any views, policies, or reforms of their own. They are unable to lead the public into the future. Our question is simple. How many Republic of China cabinet officials have any policy blueprints of their own? How many of them understand the distinction between a political appointee and a civil service official?
Yang's health-care reforms may not be perfect. UDN editorials have been critical of him. But we prefer controversial political appointees with flawed policy prescriptions to namby-pamby, mealy-mouthed political appointees unwilling to express themselves, unable to offer any policy visions of their own. Society has no shortage of capable individuals with policy prescriptions to offer. Yuan Presidents and the public may attempt to draft them. But secretary-generals may be fearful of public opinion. The legislature may subject them to humiliation. One election follows another, year after year. Everyone knows it is difficult to get anything done in such a political atmosphere. A handful of idealistic individuals may try, only to find themselves being swept away by the raging political currents. Exerting any significant influence under such circumstances is nearly impossible.
Yang Chi-liang's resignation is a mere microcosm of the peverse "elimination of the fittest" in today's political environment. Ma and Wu will of course have little trouble finding a replacement. Health care reform may continue, business as usual. But the resignation has dealt a severe blow to morale in the cabinet. This must not be taken lightly. How can current and future cabinet heads retain their commitment to reform? Lonely policy prescriptions may lack the support of cabinet heads. How can they be sold to a public under the sway of populist sentiment? If future ministry heads reflect upon this sorry record, how committed will they remain to reform? Where exactly is the Ma administration looking for talent?
Over the next two or three years, the Republic of China will face three major challenges. ECFA will soon be signed. Domestic confrontation between the Blue and Green camps will remain serious. Industrial upgrading will remain urgent. The fiscal deficit is worsening. Public and private sector investments are on the wane. By contrast, raising health insurance rates is a relatively simple matter. If such a simple policy issue cannot be handled properly, if political appointees are not permitted to express their own views, how can the public hold out any hope for other more complex policies?
Yang feels that the setbacks to his policies are related to endless annual elections. But we think it has to do with our political ecology and our culture. Leaders with ideals and aspirations will evince no fear of the election culture. They will shield political appointees from such pressures. Reform is possible only when talented people are able to contribute. But the current political environment is just the opposite. Those in the know are concerned. Will Yang's resignation serve as a wake up call to the president and the premier? This may be the key to the Republic of China's future.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.12
容不下有見解的政務官 奢談改革
本報訊
衛生署長楊志良因健保費調漲爭議請辭，在幾經折衝之後仍難轉寰。表面上看這件事情的爭議，在於健保費調漲門檻的高低，但若深入檢視，則會發現這是一個牽涉政務官視野與原則的大問題，值得仔細剖析。
如所周知，政務官的定義就是要為政策成敗負責的官員。因此，當政務官最基本、最重要的條件，就是坐在這個位子的人必須要有一套整體的政策藍圖與願景。如果將政府部會比喻為一台大機器，則事務官就是這機器上的大小零件，雖然重要、卻較少有運作方向的主觀意志。但政務官則是負責督導操作機器運行的工程師，他們一方面設計並檢視藍圖，另一方面則引領指揮機器運轉。
當然，分項工作的機器工程師並不能觀察工廠運作的全貌，他不時需要與廠房的總工程師溝通討論，甚至也要向廠長報告進度。機器工程師與總工程師各有熟悉的場域與觀察的盲點，往往需要彼此溝通、協調、妥協，然後才能完成一套機器操作的指揮流程。如果分項工程師與總工程師對於藍圖與運作策略有重大的意見歧異，則分項工程師就得走人。以上的描述，應該相當符合一般人對於閣員（分項工程師）、閣揆（總工程師）與總統（廠長）的互動邏輯。
但容我們冒昧地請問府院首長：現在的內閣成員中，堪稱有政策理念、有施政藍圖、有方向視野的，究竟有幾人？楊志良署長在萬千業務中獨沽健保財務一味，眼界或嫌狹窄；他所提健保改革案著重對高薪資所得者調高費率，外界亦有批評。但無論如何，楊署長幾乎是過去兩年來內閣首長中極少數幾位講得出一套理念與見解的閣員。其他絕大多數的政務官，或則擅長處理危機應付媒體，或則服膺總工程師或廠長的一切指揮而全無己見，或則明哲保身於官場煙幕之中而苟且度日，但就是不曾、不能提出一套見解、一套政策、一組改革方案、一場能感動人民引領未來的論述。我們的問題很簡單：台灣的內閣成員中有政策理念藍圖者幾希？真正能分辨政務官與事務官區別者，又有幾人？
楊署長的健保改革案也許不理想，本報社論對此也有些評論；但是，我們寧願政務官的政見有瑕疵、有爭議，也不願見唯唯諾諾、庸庸祿祿、完全沒有政策願景與論述能力的所謂政務官。社會上不乏有政策論述能力的人才，但是在院長庶民召喚、秘書長畏懼輿情、國會凌遲羞辱、年年選舉壓力之下，任何人才都知道這是一個難以發揮的大環境。即使少數有理想抱負者仍願執意力拚，也只是逆向洪流中載沉載浮的浮羽扁舟，要能發揮重要影響，幾乎是全無可能。
楊志良署長堅辭案，只是當今政壇逆向淘汰的殘酷縮影。馬、吳二人當然不愁找不到接替人選，健保改革案也有可能照常推動，但內閣士氣因此件請辭案所受到的打擊，絕對不能等閒視之。試問所有現任首長與未來可能的閣員人才，要如何說服自己保持改革的熱情？孤獨的政策論述要如何在首長不支持的情況下，與廣大的民粹意識溝通？如果以後的部會首長都「鑑往知來」，台灣究竟還有多少的改革動力？馬政府究竟還能去哪裡尋覓人才？
台灣在未來兩、三年面臨的挑戰極大：ＥＣＦＡ簽署在即，國內藍綠對抗嚴重，產業升級刻不容緩，財政赤字惡化，公私部門投資活動消極；相對而言，健保費調整議題還算是單純的。這樣一個單純的政策都處理不好，都容不下有自己見解的政務官，其他更複雜的政策又焉能讓人民樂觀期待？
楊署長認為其政策挫敗可能與台灣年年選舉的情境有關，但我們卻認為這是一個政治生態與文化的制度性問題。有理想、有抱負的領導人不會畏懼在選舉文化中保護優秀的政務官；一個改革的環境，應該是要期待優秀人才能盡情地為台灣奉獻付出才是，但目前的環境卻恰恰相反，令有識之士心憂。楊署長辭官究竟能不能激發出府院高層的的覺醒認知，恐怕是台灣未來發展的關鍵。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 12, 2010
Department of Health Director Yang Chi-liang tendered his resignation over the health-care fee increase controversy. After several rounds of dispute, the issue of his resignation remains unsettled. Superficially the dispute is over the cost of health insurance. But if one digs deeper, one discovers it is actually over political appointees' vision and principles. This is a problem that deserves close attention.
A political appointee is someone who must assume responsibility for the failure of his policies. Therefore the most important requirement for a political appointee is a comprehensive policy blueprint and vision. Think of the government as a vast machine. Civil service officials are large or small cogs in this machine. They are important. But they seldom direct the operation of the machine. Political appointees are the engineers whose responsibility it is to oversee the operation of the machine. They design and review the blueprints for the machine. They also direct the operation of the machine.
Of course, sub engineers who oversee individual machines cannot oversee the plant as a whole. From time to time, they must communicate with the chief engineer. They may even need to submit progress reports to the director. The sub engineers and the chief engineer each have their own areas of expertise. They also have their own blind spots. They must communicate with each other frequently. They must coordinate and compromise as they oversee the operations of the plant's machines. If the sub engineer and the chief engineer have major differences over the blueprints and operational strategy for the plant, the sub-engineer is the one who must resign. This describes most peoples' understanding of the government. Cabinet officials are the sub engineers. The premier is the chief engineer. The president is the director.
Allow us to be so bold as to ask the president and the premier how many officials in the current cabinet have any policy concepts, any policy blueprints, any sense of direction, and any vision for the future? Yang Chih-liang is in charge of health-care financing. He vision may be too narrow. He has proposed increasing the price of health care for high-income individuals. Some are critical of his proposal. But Yang is one of the few cabinet officials over the past two years who have any ideas or insights of their own. Most political appointees are good only at crisis management or coping with the media. They good only at obeying the chief engineer or director's commands, and have no opinions of their own. They are good only at self-preservation, at hiding behind bureaucratic smoke and mirrors. They are incapable of offering any views, policies, or reforms of their own. They are unable to lead the public into the future. Our question is simple. How many Republic of China cabinet officials have any policy blueprints of their own? How many of them understand the distinction between a political appointee and a civil service official?
Yang's health-care reforms may not be perfect. UDN editorials have been critical of him. But we prefer controversial political appointees with flawed policy prescriptions to namby-pamby, mealy-mouthed political appointees unwilling to express themselves, unable to offer any policy visions of their own. Society has no shortage of capable individuals with policy prescriptions to offer. Yuan Presidents and the public may attempt to draft them. But secretary-generals may be fearful of public opinion. The legislature may subject them to humiliation. One election follows another, year after year. Everyone knows it is difficult to get anything done in such a political atmosphere. A handful of idealistic individuals may try, only to find themselves being swept away by the raging political currents. Exerting any significant influence under such circumstances is nearly impossible.
Yang Chi-liang's resignation is a mere microcosm of the peverse "elimination of the fittest" in today's political environment. Ma and Wu will of course have little trouble finding a replacement. Health care reform may continue, business as usual. But the resignation has dealt a severe blow to morale in the cabinet. This must not be taken lightly. How can current and future cabinet heads retain their commitment to reform? Lonely policy prescriptions may lack the support of cabinet heads. How can they be sold to a public under the sway of populist sentiment? If future ministry heads reflect upon this sorry record, how committed will they remain to reform? Where exactly is the Ma administration looking for talent?
Over the next two or three years, the Republic of China will face three major challenges. ECFA will soon be signed. Domestic confrontation between the Blue and Green camps will remain serious. Industrial upgrading will remain urgent. The fiscal deficit is worsening. Public and private sector investments are on the wane. By contrast, raising health insurance rates is a relatively simple matter. If such a simple policy issue cannot be handled properly, if political appointees are not permitted to express their own views, how can the public hold out any hope for other more complex policies?
Yang feels that the setbacks to his policies are related to endless annual elections. But we think it has to do with our political ecology and our culture. Leaders with ideals and aspirations will evince no fear of the election culture. They will shield political appointees from such pressures. Reform is possible only when talented people are able to contribute. But the current political environment is just the opposite. Those in the know are concerned. Will Yang's resignation serve as a wake up call to the president and the premier? This may be the key to the Republic of China's future.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.12
容不下有見解的政務官 奢談改革
本報訊
衛生署長楊志良因健保費調漲爭議請辭，在幾經折衝之後仍難轉寰。表面上看這件事情的爭議，在於健保費調漲門檻的高低，但若深入檢視，則會發現這是一個牽涉政務官視野與原則的大問題，值得仔細剖析。
如所周知，政務官的定義就是要為政策成敗負責的官員。因此，當政務官最基本、最重要的條件，就是坐在這個位子的人必須要有一套整體的政策藍圖與願景。如果將政府部會比喻為一台大機器，則事務官就是這機器上的大小零件，雖然重要、卻較少有運作方向的主觀意志。但政務官則是負責督導操作機器運行的工程師，他們一方面設計並檢視藍圖，另一方面則引領指揮機器運轉。
當然，分項工作的機器工程師並不能觀察工廠運作的全貌，他不時需要與廠房的總工程師溝通討論，甚至也要向廠長報告進度。機器工程師與總工程師各有熟悉的場域與觀察的盲點，往往需要彼此溝通、協調、妥協，然後才能完成一套機器操作的指揮流程。如果分項工程師與總工程師對於藍圖與運作策略有重大的意見歧異，則分項工程師就得走人。以上的描述，應該相當符合一般人對於閣員（分項工程師）、閣揆（總工程師）與總統（廠長）的互動邏輯。
但容我們冒昧地請問府院首長：現在的內閣成員中，堪稱有政策理念、有施政藍圖、有方向視野的，究竟有幾人？楊志良署長在萬千業務中獨沽健保財務一味，眼界或嫌狹窄；他所提健保改革案著重對高薪資所得者調高費率，外界亦有批評。但無論如何，楊署長幾乎是過去兩年來內閣首長中極少數幾位講得出一套理念與見解的閣員。其他絕大多數的政務官，或則擅長處理危機應付媒體，或則服膺總工程師或廠長的一切指揮而全無己見，或則明哲保身於官場煙幕之中而苟且度日，但就是不曾、不能提出一套見解、一套政策、一組改革方案、一場能感動人民引領未來的論述。我們的問題很簡單：台灣的內閣成員中有政策理念藍圖者幾希？真正能分辨政務官與事務官區別者，又有幾人？
楊署長的健保改革案也許不理想，本報社論對此也有些評論；但是，我們寧願政務官的政見有瑕疵、有爭議，也不願見唯唯諾諾、庸庸祿祿、完全沒有政策願景與論述能力的所謂政務官。社會上不乏有政策論述能力的人才，但是在院長庶民召喚、秘書長畏懼輿情、國會凌遲羞辱、年年選舉壓力之下，任何人才都知道這是一個難以發揮的大環境。即使少數有理想抱負者仍願執意力拚，也只是逆向洪流中載沉載浮的浮羽扁舟，要能發揮重要影響，幾乎是全無可能。
楊志良署長堅辭案，只是當今政壇逆向淘汰的殘酷縮影。馬、吳二人當然不愁找不到接替人選，健保改革案也有可能照常推動，但內閣士氣因此件請辭案所受到的打擊，絕對不能等閒視之。試問所有現任首長與未來可能的閣員人才，要如何說服自己保持改革的熱情？孤獨的政策論述要如何在首長不支持的情況下，與廣大的民粹意識溝通？如果以後的部會首長都「鑑往知來」，台灣究竟還有多少的改革動力？馬政府究竟還能去哪裡尋覓人才？
台灣在未來兩、三年面臨的挑戰極大：ＥＣＦＡ簽署在即，國內藍綠對抗嚴重，產業升級刻不容緩，財政赤字惡化，公私部門投資活動消極；相對而言，健保費調整議題還算是單純的。這樣一個單純的政策都處理不好，都容不下有自己見解的政務官，其他更複雜的政策又焉能讓人民樂觀期待？
楊署長認為其政策挫敗可能與台灣年年選舉的情境有關，但我們卻認為這是一個政治生態與文化的制度性問題。有理想、有抱負的領導人不會畏懼在選舉文化中保護優秀的政務官；一個改革的環境，應該是要期待優秀人才能盡情地為台灣奉獻付出才是，但目前的環境卻恰恰相反，令有識之士心憂。楊署長辭官究竟能不能激發出府院高層的的覺醒認知，恐怕是台灣未來發展的關鍵。
Thursday, March 11, 2010
The Death Penalty: Other Considerations
The Death Penalty: Other Considerations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 11, 2010
Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng invoked the concept of "reason and tolerance" while publicly calling for a moratorium on executions. Minister Wang has long advocated abolishing the death penalty. Following her appointment, the Ministry of Justice has continued to push for the gradual abolition of the death penalty. Current Vice Minister of Justice Huang Shi-ming was recently nominated for the position of Prosecutor General. When questioned by the Legislative Yuan, he said he advocates the abolition of the death penalty, but feels that until the death penalty is abolished, those already sentenced should be executed. This is why Wang Ching-feng felt compelled to express her solemn opinion on the matter.
The gradual abolition of the death penalty has been going on for the past decade. The policy has not been any easier to implement merely because any particular political party was in office. The legal code still includes the death penalty. Over the past several years the courts have sentenced over 40 persons to death. Whether the Minister of Justice should sign death penalty orders has become a issue. Huang Shi-ming, in his capacity as Vice Minister of Justice, has openly expressed views at odds with the Minister's. That is not not unusual. Minister Wang Ching-feng says she understands the Vice Minister's position, and that his views do not diminish her respect for him. Hers was a concrete expression of reason and tolerance. The Minister of Justice is boldly making policy trade-offs. As a result, the death penalty issue has once again come to the fore.
The death penalty raises issues pertaining to democracy and the rule of law. Those who favor the death penalty believe that the public demands it. Those who advocate the abolition of the death penalty and a moratorium on executions, believe the public opposes it. Opponents of the death penalty believe that once the death penalty has been abolished, alternatives will be found. Opinion polls that resort to simplistic dichotomies are unreliable. The death penalty is too final. The risk of mistakes is too high. This is not an issue that the public can decide. Controversy over the death penalty is hardly confined to the Republic of China. Such debates have been going on throughout the world for some time. They continue to buzz around one's ear. During the 21st century however, calls for the abolition of the death penalty have become the global norm. Last year the Republic of China Legislative Yuan passed two human rights bills. Two provisions of the Charter of Universal Human Rights will be incorporated into our legal system. Existing laws and regulations must be amended and fully implemented before December 10, 2011. The abolition of the death penalty has become the Republic of China's urgent homework assignment.
Advocates of the death penalty say the court has ruled that the Ministry of Justice may not refuse to carry out executions. Those with reservations about the death penalty say the authority to carry out the death penalty belongs to the courts. When and how it is implemented should be considered discretionary, comparable to an executive power. The Convention on Human Rights includes two provisions on the death penalty. They make the carrying out of the death penalty on Taiwan seem hasty. One provision states that the condemned has the "right" to request commutation of his sentence. But the Republic of China still lacks a protocol for such cases. To carry out death sentences prior to the enactment of remedial legislation is a violation of the convention and the law. Another provision in the convention states that although the Convention on Human Rights has yet to explicitly repudiate the death penalty, national governments must not obstruct or delay efforts to abolish the death penalty. Although the convention has yet to explicitly repudiate the death penalty, the Ministry of Justice may not use this as an excuse to not grant a moratorium on executions. Minister Wang's legal reasoning may be subtle. But it has a solid legal foundation.
Minister Wang's article mentions the recent killing of a police officer. This case demonstrates the danger of the death penalty. Ten years ago, police officer Lin An-shun died during a gun battle with drug dealers. Two defendants were charged with homicide. One of the defendants was named Li. One of the officers on the scene failed to identify him as one of the shooters. As a result Li was found not guilty of homicide. He was sentenced to five years for illegal possession of firearms. Because the prosecutor failed to appeal, Li was released after serving out the full term of his sentence. The other defendant was named Chan. He was tried fived times. During his last two trials, the court discovered that the man who killed the policeman was not Chen, but Li. Chen was convicted of attempted murder for wounding another police officer, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Put simply, the High Court's rulings have been inconsistent. Lin An-shun died in the line of duty. But his murderer has escaped justice.
The case underscores a problem. The problem is not who should or should not have been sentenced to death. The problem is that during the administration of justice it is difficult to avoid mistakes in identifying those guilty of murder. The reason the suspect in the Lin murder case escaped justice, is that prosecutors and police lacked forensic evidence. They must reduce reliance on eyewitness testimony and even defendants' confessions. They must collect crime scene evidence, including abandoned guns, fingerprints, bullets extracted from the slain police officers, and obtain convictions by means of scientific evidence. Had this been done, this miscarriage of justice would never have happened. The prosecution chose not to appeal. The courts tried the case five times in ten years, on the basis of limited evidence. The result was this strange ruling.
Think about it. If evidence gathering is as sloppy as this when a police officer has been murdered, what can we expect in other homicide cases? The families of the deceased police officers have nowhere to turn to. From this we can see how poorly crime victims are protected. None of these are problems that can be solved by means of the death penalty. The legal system remains error prone. Under these circumstances, the risks the death penalty imposes exceed those permissible under the rule of law.
Minister Wang has the courage to call for an end the death penalty. Her responsible approach deserves affirmation. Prosecutors must improve their forensic evidence gathering techniques. Only then can they avoid weakening their criminal prosecution efforts. They must actively assist crime victims and their families. These are issues the Ministry of Justice must address as they deal with the death penalty. Only this can solve the problem, and eliminate the rationale for the death penalty.
爭辯廢除死刑之外該思考的課題
2010-03-11
中國時報
法務部長王清峰部長以〈理性與寬恕〉為題公開撰文呼籲暫停執行死刑。王部長一向主張廢除死刑，她上任之後，法務部也持續推動她上任之後即已確立「逐步廢除死刑」的政策。日前現任法務部政務次長黃世銘因被提名擔任檢察總長在立法院與立委對話，說到他贊成廢除死刑，但認為在死刑廢除前，已定讞者應予執行。王清峰鄭重撰文表達立場，緣由在此。
逐步廢除死刑，是近十年來，未因執政黨更易而由政府持續採取的政策。由於法典中仍有死刑存在，法院也於數年之間，累積判決了四十餘起死刑確定，法務部長應否簽署執行死刑命令，遂成一項議題。黃世銘身為次長，公開說出與部長理念並不一致的想法，並不尋常；王清峰部長則表示可以理解，不會稍減她對次長的尊重，這是具體展現理性與寬容；法務部長面對政策是非勇於取捨，於是又一次將台灣在死刑問題上何去何從的嚴肅考驗，端上檯面。
死刑，同時涉及了民主與法治的辯論。贊成死刑的人士經常以為死刑是民意的要求，主張廢除死刑與停止執行死刑違反民意。死刑的反對者，則傾向認為廢除死刑之後的替代途徑很多，簡單二分法的民意測驗並不可恃；而且死刑過於絕對，犯錯的危險又高，不是單純交由民意可以決定的問題。此類辯論，不但在台灣，而且在全世界長期進行，不絕於耳；然而進入廿一世紀之後，全面廢除死刑，似乎已是地球村裡的共同發展趨勢。在台灣去年由立法院制定兩項人格公約施行法，將被目為普世人權憲章之兩項人格公約引入我國法制，而且要求應於民國一百年十二月十日之前全面修改現行法令規章以求配合之後，死刑的執行，也已成台灣必須改弦易轍的功課。
主張執行死刑的論者以為法院判決確定，法務部沒有不執行的權力；採取保留態度的人則認為判處死刑是司法審判權，何時及如何慎重執行則為行政權的裁量。人權公約對於死刑的兩項規定，都已使得台灣當下執行死刑顯得操切。其中一項規定是賦予死刑犯請求減刑的「權利」，但台灣至今仍缺乏考量個案減刑的法律程序，在未立法彌補之前執行死刑，勢將違反公約及施行法的要求。公約的另一項規定，則不許國家主張人權公約並未明文否定死刑而阻止或延緩廢除死刑的努力，法務部也就不能以公約並未否定死刑為由而拒絕延緩死刑。王部長的文章，說理委婉，其實文章背後的法理基礎確有所本。
王部長的文章裡，談到最近定讞的殺警案，足可顯示死刑的危險性。十餘年前警察林安順在緝毒槍戰中殉職，被控殺警者為兩個被告之中的一人。其中李姓被告因為槍戰在場的刑警事後並未指認其開槍殺警，殺人部分無罪，只依非法持槍判刑五年，又因檢察官並未上訴，已經定讞而且服刑期滿出獄。另一位陳姓被告則於更審五次之後，日前經最後兩次更審法院認定殺警者為李姓被告而非陳姓被告，依殺人未遂（殺傷其他警察）而判處無期徒刑定讞。簡單地說，最高法院先後判決歧異，以致林安順殉職，兇手卻未得到應得的刑罰。
此案顯示的問題，其實不在誰該不判處死刑，而在於司法審判認定誰是殺人兇手的過程很難避免發生錯誤。林案凶嫌逍遙法外的真正原因，在於檢警的蒐證舉證不足，如能減少倚賴目擊證人甚或被告的口供，而是依照現場蒐集棄槍的指紋以及殉職警察身中的子彈做為定罪的科學證據，本案當不致發生檢方放棄上訴而法院歷經五次更審卻在有限的證據之間徘徊十餘年後做成歧異判決。
試想，連殺警案的警察蒐證工作尚且如此，一般的刑案調查證據水準，豈非可見一斑？本案中殉職警員家屬求助無門，尤可知犯罪被害人保護工作鬆散不足的程度。凡此，不但不是實施死刑可以解決的問題；更顯示了死刑免於錯誤的司法環境距離理想甚為遙遠時，動用死刑的風險就已超出法治國家可以容許的範圍。
王部長勇於呼籲停止執行死刑，為政策負責的態度值得肯定。然而檢方強化科學蒐證工作要求以免追訴犯罪不力，積極針對犯罪被害人及家屬施以援手慰助，都是法務部處理死刑問題應同時著力的重要環節。這也才能真正解決問題，去除培養死刑的溫床。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 11, 2010
Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng invoked the concept of "reason and tolerance" while publicly calling for a moratorium on executions. Minister Wang has long advocated abolishing the death penalty. Following her appointment, the Ministry of Justice has continued to push for the gradual abolition of the death penalty. Current Vice Minister of Justice Huang Shi-ming was recently nominated for the position of Prosecutor General. When questioned by the Legislative Yuan, he said he advocates the abolition of the death penalty, but feels that until the death penalty is abolished, those already sentenced should be executed. This is why Wang Ching-feng felt compelled to express her solemn opinion on the matter.
The gradual abolition of the death penalty has been going on for the past decade. The policy has not been any easier to implement merely because any particular political party was in office. The legal code still includes the death penalty. Over the past several years the courts have sentenced over 40 persons to death. Whether the Minister of Justice should sign death penalty orders has become a issue. Huang Shi-ming, in his capacity as Vice Minister of Justice, has openly expressed views at odds with the Minister's. That is not not unusual. Minister Wang Ching-feng says she understands the Vice Minister's position, and that his views do not diminish her respect for him. Hers was a concrete expression of reason and tolerance. The Minister of Justice is boldly making policy trade-offs. As a result, the death penalty issue has once again come to the fore.
The death penalty raises issues pertaining to democracy and the rule of law. Those who favor the death penalty believe that the public demands it. Those who advocate the abolition of the death penalty and a moratorium on executions, believe the public opposes it. Opponents of the death penalty believe that once the death penalty has been abolished, alternatives will be found. Opinion polls that resort to simplistic dichotomies are unreliable. The death penalty is too final. The risk of mistakes is too high. This is not an issue that the public can decide. Controversy over the death penalty is hardly confined to the Republic of China. Such debates have been going on throughout the world for some time. They continue to buzz around one's ear. During the 21st century however, calls for the abolition of the death penalty have become the global norm. Last year the Republic of China Legislative Yuan passed two human rights bills. Two provisions of the Charter of Universal Human Rights will be incorporated into our legal system. Existing laws and regulations must be amended and fully implemented before December 10, 2011. The abolition of the death penalty has become the Republic of China's urgent homework assignment.
Advocates of the death penalty say the court has ruled that the Ministry of Justice may not refuse to carry out executions. Those with reservations about the death penalty say the authority to carry out the death penalty belongs to the courts. When and how it is implemented should be considered discretionary, comparable to an executive power. The Convention on Human Rights includes two provisions on the death penalty. They make the carrying out of the death penalty on Taiwan seem hasty. One provision states that the condemned has the "right" to request commutation of his sentence. But the Republic of China still lacks a protocol for such cases. To carry out death sentences prior to the enactment of remedial legislation is a violation of the convention and the law. Another provision in the convention states that although the Convention on Human Rights has yet to explicitly repudiate the death penalty, national governments must not obstruct or delay efforts to abolish the death penalty. Although the convention has yet to explicitly repudiate the death penalty, the Ministry of Justice may not use this as an excuse to not grant a moratorium on executions. Minister Wang's legal reasoning may be subtle. But it has a solid legal foundation.
Minister Wang's article mentions the recent killing of a police officer. This case demonstrates the danger of the death penalty. Ten years ago, police officer Lin An-shun died during a gun battle with drug dealers. Two defendants were charged with homicide. One of the defendants was named Li. One of the officers on the scene failed to identify him as one of the shooters. As a result Li was found not guilty of homicide. He was sentenced to five years for illegal possession of firearms. Because the prosecutor failed to appeal, Li was released after serving out the full term of his sentence. The other defendant was named Chan. He was tried fived times. During his last two trials, the court discovered that the man who killed the policeman was not Chen, but Li. Chen was convicted of attempted murder for wounding another police officer, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Put simply, the High Court's rulings have been inconsistent. Lin An-shun died in the line of duty. But his murderer has escaped justice.
The case underscores a problem. The problem is not who should or should not have been sentenced to death. The problem is that during the administration of justice it is difficult to avoid mistakes in identifying those guilty of murder. The reason the suspect in the Lin murder case escaped justice, is that prosecutors and police lacked forensic evidence. They must reduce reliance on eyewitness testimony and even defendants' confessions. They must collect crime scene evidence, including abandoned guns, fingerprints, bullets extracted from the slain police officers, and obtain convictions by means of scientific evidence. Had this been done, this miscarriage of justice would never have happened. The prosecution chose not to appeal. The courts tried the case five times in ten years, on the basis of limited evidence. The result was this strange ruling.
Think about it. If evidence gathering is as sloppy as this when a police officer has been murdered, what can we expect in other homicide cases? The families of the deceased police officers have nowhere to turn to. From this we can see how poorly crime victims are protected. None of these are problems that can be solved by means of the death penalty. The legal system remains error prone. Under these circumstances, the risks the death penalty imposes exceed those permissible under the rule of law.
Minister Wang has the courage to call for an end the death penalty. Her responsible approach deserves affirmation. Prosecutors must improve their forensic evidence gathering techniques. Only then can they avoid weakening their criminal prosecution efforts. They must actively assist crime victims and their families. These are issues the Ministry of Justice must address as they deal with the death penalty. Only this can solve the problem, and eliminate the rationale for the death penalty.
爭辯廢除死刑之外該思考的課題
2010-03-11
中國時報
法務部長王清峰部長以〈理性與寬恕〉為題公開撰文呼籲暫停執行死刑。王部長一向主張廢除死刑，她上任之後，法務部也持續推動她上任之後即已確立「逐步廢除死刑」的政策。日前現任法務部政務次長黃世銘因被提名擔任檢察總長在立法院與立委對話，說到他贊成廢除死刑，但認為在死刑廢除前，已定讞者應予執行。王清峰鄭重撰文表達立場，緣由在此。
逐步廢除死刑，是近十年來，未因執政黨更易而由政府持續採取的政策。由於法典中仍有死刑存在，法院也於數年之間，累積判決了四十餘起死刑確定，法務部長應否簽署執行死刑命令，遂成一項議題。黃世銘身為次長，公開說出與部長理念並不一致的想法，並不尋常；王清峰部長則表示可以理解，不會稍減她對次長的尊重，這是具體展現理性與寬容；法務部長面對政策是非勇於取捨，於是又一次將台灣在死刑問題上何去何從的嚴肅考驗，端上檯面。
死刑，同時涉及了民主與法治的辯論。贊成死刑的人士經常以為死刑是民意的要求，主張廢除死刑與停止執行死刑違反民意。死刑的反對者，則傾向認為廢除死刑之後的替代途徑很多，簡單二分法的民意測驗並不可恃；而且死刑過於絕對，犯錯的危險又高，不是單純交由民意可以決定的問題。此類辯論，不但在台灣，而且在全世界長期進行，不絕於耳；然而進入廿一世紀之後，全面廢除死刑，似乎已是地球村裡的共同發展趨勢。在台灣去年由立法院制定兩項人格公約施行法，將被目為普世人權憲章之兩項人格公約引入我國法制，而且要求應於民國一百年十二月十日之前全面修改現行法令規章以求配合之後，死刑的執行，也已成台灣必須改弦易轍的功課。
主張執行死刑的論者以為法院判決確定，法務部沒有不執行的權力；採取保留態度的人則認為判處死刑是司法審判權，何時及如何慎重執行則為行政權的裁量。人權公約對於死刑的兩項規定，都已使得台灣當下執行死刑顯得操切。其中一項規定是賦予死刑犯請求減刑的「權利」，但台灣至今仍缺乏考量個案減刑的法律程序，在未立法彌補之前執行死刑，勢將違反公約及施行法的要求。公約的另一項規定，則不許國家主張人權公約並未明文否定死刑而阻止或延緩廢除死刑的努力，法務部也就不能以公約並未否定死刑為由而拒絕延緩死刑。王部長的文章，說理委婉，其實文章背後的法理基礎確有所本。
王部長的文章裡，談到最近定讞的殺警案，足可顯示死刑的危險性。十餘年前警察林安順在緝毒槍戰中殉職，被控殺警者為兩個被告之中的一人。其中李姓被告因為槍戰在場的刑警事後並未指認其開槍殺警，殺人部分無罪，只依非法持槍判刑五年，又因檢察官並未上訴，已經定讞而且服刑期滿出獄。另一位陳姓被告則於更審五次之後，日前經最後兩次更審法院認定殺警者為李姓被告而非陳姓被告，依殺人未遂（殺傷其他警察）而判處無期徒刑定讞。簡單地說，最高法院先後判決歧異，以致林安順殉職，兇手卻未得到應得的刑罰。
此案顯示的問題，其實不在誰該不判處死刑，而在於司法審判認定誰是殺人兇手的過程很難避免發生錯誤。林案凶嫌逍遙法外的真正原因，在於檢警的蒐證舉證不足，如能減少倚賴目擊證人甚或被告的口供，而是依照現場蒐集棄槍的指紋以及殉職警察身中的子彈做為定罪的科學證據，本案當不致發生檢方放棄上訴而法院歷經五次更審卻在有限的證據之間徘徊十餘年後做成歧異判決。
試想，連殺警案的警察蒐證工作尚且如此，一般的刑案調查證據水準，豈非可見一斑？本案中殉職警員家屬求助無門，尤可知犯罪被害人保護工作鬆散不足的程度。凡此，不但不是實施死刑可以解決的問題；更顯示了死刑免於錯誤的司法環境距離理想甚為遙遠時，動用死刑的風險就已超出法治國家可以容許的範圍。
王部長勇於呼籲停止執行死刑，為政策負責的態度值得肯定。然而檢方強化科學蒐證工作要求以免追訴犯罪不力，積極針對犯罪被害人及家屬施以援手慰助，都是法務部處理死刑問題應同時著力的重要環節。這也才能真正解決問題，去除培養死刑的溫床。
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