The Nation's Justice System Must Not Be Undermined
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 30, 2010
The Taipei District Court has handed down its decision in the Lafayette Frigate case. Lei Hsueh-ming and several other naval officers have been found not guilty. The judge explained his decision, saying that prosecutors offered no evidence of illegal profiteering. These particular defendants had nothing to do with the kickbacks. The court decision vindicates Taipei District Prosecutor Huang Shi-ming, who refused to prosecute the defendants even though it cost him his job.
President Chen Shui-bian once vowed to prosecute this case "even if it shook the nation to its foundations." It has now been shown that prosecutors perverted the law by persisting in a wrongful prosecution. They undermined the authority of the justice system, and shook the foundations of the justice system.
Nine years ago, under pressure from Chen Shui-bian, Prosecutor-General Lu Jen-fa spoke to Huang Shi-ming for nine straight hours, deep into the night. But he could not persuade Huang Shi-ming to prosecute the Lafayette Frigate case. Huang Shi-ming, who had been Prosecutor General for only ten months, was immediately fired. As soon his replacement was found, the Lafayette Frigate case went ahead, in accordance with the wishes of higher ups. Today, after nine years of wrangling in the courts, this politically-motivated fiasco has been exposed for what it is -- wrongful prosecution.
The prosecutorial system is said to be "a unified system." Higher level prosecutors exercise considerable authority over lower level prosecutors. But in order to maintain the credibility of the prosecutorial system, they must resist political pressure, and ensure that prosecutors are able to prosecute cases immune from political interference. This of course is the Chief Prosecutor's job. But what if the Chief Prosecutor himself tolerates political interference, or even invites it from those in positions of power? What if prosecutors have no qualms about abusing their authority, and force subordinates to serve the needs of powerful politicians? Then they have debased themselves, turned the prosecutorial system into a political tool, and undermined the credibility of the prosecutorial system, When people lose respect for the nation's legal system, the consequences are serious indeed. Prosecutor General Huang Shi-ming has blown the lid off this case of intervention by the Chief Prosecutor. If the prosecutorial system fails to deal with this case in earnest, it cannot allay the nation's doubts.
The review and reform of the prosecutorial system must address at least two issues. First, it must seek accountability. If a prosecutor betrays his professional responsibility and enages in indiscriminate prosecutions, he has violated Article 25 of the Criminal Code, and is guilty of "abuse of prosecutorial authority." Some may say that the charges listed in this section exist in name only. Many cases have been handled outrageously. One never sees justice system officials prosecuting their own family members. Hou Kuan-jen falsified court records in an effort to railroad Ma Ying-jeou, but he was never punished for it. This is precisely why unscrupulous prosecutors who engage in arbitrary prosecutions for ulterior motives have nothing to fear. This is why whether the defendants are found guilty in this case or not, prosecutors must nevertheless clean house. They must be thorough. Even they find that no crimes were been committed, these cases must be investigated for dereliction of duty, as a warning to future offenders.
Secondly, the unified prosecutorial system must establish a monitoring system to limit the power of the chief prosecutor. Take the Lafayette Frigate case. When the prosecutor in charge disagreed with the original prosecutor, the chief prosecutor abused his authority by reassigning him and replacing him with someone more obedient. A unified prosecutorial system that repaces prosecutors with those more obedient hardly meets the requirements of justice. Therefore prosecutors must establish ground rules for chief prosecutors who reassign subordinates. Judges are assigned to one case and not another according to certain criteria. Once they have been assigned, they may not be arbitrarily reassigned. Prosectors are similar. They too must handle cases on a professional basis. The rules for by which they are assigned need not be as strict. But criteria must nevertheless be established. Otherwise the same problems will recur. When judges encounter conflicts of interest, they can be reassigned by a conference of presiding judges. The prosecutorial system must establish a similar mechanism for the prosecutors. This will allow subordinates to speak up on their own behalf.
The prosecutorial system must engage in self-examination. Prosecutors owe the defendants in the Lafayette Frigate case an explanation. Had the prosecutor in charge not been changed, Lei Hsueh-ming and the other naval officers might have been spared a ten year legal ordeal. They may have been acquitted, but have they really received justice? The case files have been examined under a microscope for the past ten years. The warship procurement process has been reviewed from beginning to end. Does the prosecution really intend to appeal?
The facts behind the Chen Shui-bian corruption case continue to emerge. One of the most shocking revelations is how the Chen regime undermined the independence of the judiciary. Bureau of Investigation Chief Yeh Sheng-mao served as President Chen's hatchetman. Justice Minister Shi Mao-lin, and Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming dined at the home of Chen Shui-bian crony Huang Fang-yan. Public Prosecutor General Lu Jen-fa pressured Taipei City Chief Prosecutor Huang Shi-ming to prosecute the Lafayette Frigate case. These scandals have shaken the foundations of the nation's justice system. It is now time to heal these wounds.
不可動搖司法國本
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.30 01:48 am
拉法葉艦案台北地方法院日前宣判，雷學明等海軍軍官均無罪。法官在判決理由中指出，檢方所控「浮報價額圖利法方」並無證據，佣金亦與被告等無關；這個判決，間接證明了當年的台北地檢署檢察長黃世銘的決定是正確的，他寧可丟官亦不同意起訴。
本案是在陳水扁任總統時「即使動搖國本也要辦到底」的政治宣示下，進行司法偵查並起訴；如今證明檢方有枉法濫訴情事，不啻傷害了司法威信，險些動搖了司法的「國本」。
九年多前，檢察總長盧仁發受到陳水扁的政治壓力，與黃世銘徹夜長談九個小時，惟仍無法說服黃世銘同意起訴拉法葉艦案。黃世銘旋即丟了任期僅僅十個月的北檢檢察長的職位；換人之後，拉案即如檢方上級的意志起訴了。如今，這樁當年被政治運作的案件，經過法院九年多審理，卻被證明為一大錯案。
檢察系統既稱「檢察一體」，上級檢察首長對下級有實質的指揮權力，則如何維護檢方的公信力，抗拒一切政治壓力，以確保檢察官依法辦案，不受干預，當然就是檢察首長的重責大任。反之，若檢察首長自己就先接受了政治干預，或為迎合當權者的意向，竟不惜動用檢察一體的權力，來迫使下屬就範，服務於政治高層，那就是自甘墮落，且使檢察系統淪為政治工具，破壞檢方的公信力。檢方的公信力受到破壞，將使國人對國家法律秩序失去信仰和尊重，其後果是非常嚴重的。黃世銘檢察總長既然揭露了當年這段最高檢察首長干預案件的內幕和真相，若檢察系統對本案沒有一個認真的檢討處理，恐怕是難以面對國人的質疑。
我們認為，檢察系統的檢討和處理，至少應包括兩個方向：第一，應當追究責任。倘若檢察官違背專業良知，濫行起訴，那是涉犯刑法第一百二十五條的「濫權追訴罪」。固然，許多人批評，刑法本條罪名形同虛設，諸多處理得荒唐離譜的案件，從未見到司法界追究過自家人，即使是檢察官侯寬仁筆錄造假起訴馬英九，亦未受處分；但正因如此，縱然有不肖檢察官以特定目的濫行偵辦起訴，亦有恃無恐。所以，本案不論是否成罪，檢方都必須自清，認真調查；縱然調查結果不構成犯罪，亦當追究辦案草率的行政責任，以茲警惕。
第二，應當重新設定檢察一體的首長權力界限，建立監督機制。以拉案為例，當承辦檢察署的檢察長和原檢察官都不同意起訴時，最高首長竟有權力立即調動其職位，換上聽話的檢察長，再換上聽話的檢察官，這種檢察一體的權力行使，毫無疑問是不符正義，不正確的。因此，檢察首長在什麼條件下有權調動正偵辦案件的下屬，檢方實應制定一套行事準則。因為，法官分案有一定準則，分案之後不能任意改動；檢察官既然仍有司法官的性質，並依循專業辦案，雖不能像法官分案後不得更動那樣硬性規定，但一定的分際是應當制定出來的，否則弊病難防。同時，就像法官分案後若有疑義，有庭長會議來處理；檢察系統亦當建立案件換人的爭議處理機制，俾給下屬申辯的機會。
除了檢察系統自我檢討之外，檢方實應給拉案當事人一個合理的交代。回到當年，倘若本案沒有換人承辦，雷學明等軍官就未必會步上纏訟十年的噩運；如今，雖然法院判決無罪，這種公道又該如何還？難道在法院十年審理，看遍當年購艦的全部檔案文卷，仔細檢視了全部購艦過程之後，檢方還要上訴嗎？
扁案真相不斷揭露，其中最駭人聽聞者，是扁政府對司法獨立地位的嚴重戕害。調查局長葉盛茂當總統的「爪耙子」，法務部長施茂林、檢察總長陳聰明在總統親信黃芳彥家吃春酒，加上檢察總長盧仁發壓迫北檢檢察長黃世銘起訴拉法葉艦案……。這些，皆是「動搖司法國本」的天大醜聞，現在已到了療傷止痛的時候了。
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
ECFA: Economic Interests and a Race Against Time
ECFA: Economic Interests and a Race Against Time
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 29, 2010
Today in Chongqing, Taipei and Beijing signed a Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). This is undoubtedly the most important step the two sides have taken to promote economic and trade relations since normalization, and constitutes a landmark event. ECFA is rooted in economics and trade. It helps cross-Strait economic interaction take a certain path. It helps Taiwan integrate itself into the regional economy. But the benefits ECFA provides will not appear magically merely because the agreement has been signed. Taiwan is running a race against itself, against the world, and against time. We do not have a moment to waste.
ECFA includes an early harvest list of 539 goods and 11 services. The mainland will allow these to be implemented first. The window of opportunity will be opened further in the mid to long term, and allow other governments to sign free trade agreements (FTAs) with Taipei. This will enable Taiwan to integrate itself into the regional economy and avoid marginalization. From a larger perspective, ECFA will kickstart Taipei's accession to the WTO, begun nine years ago. The importance of this large-scale economic reform cannot be overstated.
Before the benefits of the early harvest list materialize, many things can happen. The immediate benefits of the early harvest list are time-sensitive and fleeting. Our chances of signing FTAs with other governments has been improved. But whether any FTAs will actually be signed is not entirely up to us, and remains far from certain. Can Taiwan survive the pain of economic reforms? That will depend on the determination and ability of those in power. These three factors, interacting with each other, will enable Taiwan's economic metamorphosis.
Take the early harvest list. This is a special arrangement that allows the two sides to enjoy the benefits of liberalization even before negotiations over trade liberalization have begun. This allows industries on the early harvest list to enter the mainland market in advance, and be more competitive. This is why the government is promoting ECFA so vigorously. What the government is not saying however, is that these early harvest items are time sensitive. These goods and services must be liberalized within six months after ECFA goes into effect. This means that the sooner the two sides complete their negotiations, the sooner they will liberalize, and the shorter the early harvest period. The two sides however did not clearly define the length of the consultation phase. Therefore the consultation phase has a beginning, but no end. This makes the definition of the early harvest phase uncertain. Businesses naturally want the early harvest phase to last as long as possible. But that is neither consistent with Beijing's interests nor with international norms. It could also encourage corporate complacency. The best response is to take advantage of the early harvest provisions as soon as possible, and establish a competitive position in the mainland market.
Now take FTAs. ECFA is a essentially the phased implementation of an FTA, but it is not an FTA as such. Politically, a high degree of mistrust lingers between Taipei and Beijing. Economically however, the two sides have a special relationship, and a high degree of economic interdependence. This makes ECFA very different from normal international trade agreements. For example, the early harvest list accounts for fully 16.5% of all trade. This far exceeds normal FTA standards, and makes ECFA very different from other FTAs. The explicit timetables for the start of negotiations are all special cases. But these special cases may become the model other governments use when signing FTAs with Taipei and Beijing. They may provoke challenges from the opposition. They may become obstacles when Taipei attempts to sign agreements with foreign governments. The government must anticipate such problems.
Also, Taipei hopes that through ECFA, and Beijing, it can participate in the process of world-wide regional integration. This is increasingly likely, given improved cross-Strait relations, but it remains a unilateral expectation. Taipei must offer incentives sufficient to induce foreign governments to sign FTAs. This is a practical matter that the government must consider during the post-ECFA era. Now that the two sides have signed ECFA, this may accelerate the pace at which the South Korean and other governments sign FTAs with Beijing. This will affect Taipei's interests vis a vis ECFA. The world continues to turn. Taipei must not assume that just because it has signed ECFA, it can sit back and rake in all manner of benefits. If so, it has signed ECFA in vain.
As Japanese strategist Kenichi Ohmae astutely noted, ECFA is a multivitamin formula tailored for Taiwan. Vitamins can help one stay fit. But they cannot ensure one's survival. Therefore, in order to maintain our competitive advantage and economic development, it is not enough merely to take a multivitamin. One must also have a strategy for keeping fit. The key is whether the government can use the leverage provided by ECFA to promote economic reform. That is why President Ma intends to announce a post-ECFA global economic strategy. We for one, are eager to hear what he has to say.
ECFA的經濟利益與時間賽跑
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.29 03:13 am
就在今天，兩岸在重慶正式簽署兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）；這無疑是兩岸推動經貿關係正常化以來最重要的一步，更是劃時代的關鍵歷史事件。由ＥＣＦＡ架構而起的經貿機制，讓兩岸的經濟互動有了具體的方向及可循的軌跡，並將開啟台灣進入區域經濟整合的道路。然而，ＥＣＦＡ的一切預期效益不是簽署即現，這是一場台灣與自己、與世界、更與時間的競賽，絲毫虛耗不得。
從預期效益而言，ＥＣＦＡ將快速顯現的，自是內含五百卅九項貨品及十一項服務業的早收清單，將可享受彼岸先開放市場的好處；中長期來說，則是為台灣與他國洽簽自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），以融入區域整合及避免邊緣化，開啟了更多機會之窗；更宏觀的是，ＥＣＦＡ將啟動台灣繼九年前加入世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）以來最大規模的經濟改革工程，對台灣經濟發展的意義不言可喻。
但是，這一切預期效益的收割結果，仍存有很多的變數；因為立即受惠的早期收穫，是有時效性的，非永久的；與他國洽簽ＦＴＡ，機會雖然變大了，卻非可完全操之在我，仍存有高度不確定性；至於台灣能否順利通過經濟改革工程的調整之痛，那更與執政者的決心及執行力密不可分了；而這三者間又彼此交互影響，交織而成台灣經濟的蛻變期。
即以早收為例，這是兩岸在進入貿易自由化協商前，互予提前享受開放利益的特別安排，確可讓列入早收產業在進軍大陸市場時，擁有更強的競爭力，這也是政府強力促銷ＥＣＦＡ的焦點所在。但是，政府沒有說出口的是，既是「早期」收穫，就有一定時效性，而其時效與須在ＥＣＦＡ生效後六個月內展開的貨品及服務貿易自由化協商息息相關，意即雙方談得愈快、開放愈快，早收期就愈短；但因雙方沒有明訂完成協商的期限，顯示這是「有起點沒有終點」的協商，也讓早收期變得不確定。對企業而言，自然希望早收期愈長愈好，但其不僅不符大陸利益及國際規範，也會讓企業更怠惰，最好的對應還是儘速運用早收優勢，在大陸市場建立競爭利基。
再看ＦＴＡ，ＥＣＦＡ是分段到位的ＦＴＡ，但畢竟還不是ＦＴＡ；尤其，兩岸在政治上的相互不信任、但經濟上高度依存的特殊關係，讓ＥＣＦＡ與國際間通用模式非常不同，例如早收項目的貿易占比達百分之十六點五，遠高於所有ＦＴＡ的標準，也未比照其他ＦＴＡ，明訂啟動自由化協商的時間表等，都是特例；但這個特例既有可能成為他國與兩岸洽簽ＦＴＡ時比照參照的模式，也可能面臨異議的挑戰，甚至可能成為台灣對外洽簽的障礙，政府須預為綢繆。
另方面，台灣期望透過ＥＣＦＡ，借道中國，進入全球區域整合的網絡，雖是兩岸關係日趨和緩下的可能結果，但畢竟仍以官方的主觀期待居多，台灣要拿出多少吸引各國與我洽簽ＦＴＡ的誘因，將是後ＥＣＦＡ時期政府須務實思考的事。更值得注意的是，兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，反而可能加速南韓等其他國家與大陸洽簽ＦＴＡ的進度，這自然牽動台灣的ＥＣＦＡ利益。這說明的是，世界是轉動的，台灣不要以為簽了ＥＣＦＡ，所有好處就手到擒來，遂以不變應萬變。果如此，ＥＣＦＡ就白簽了。
日本策略大師大前研一說得好，ＥＣＦＡ是顆為台灣精心調製的維他命，但維他命可用以強身，卻無法保命；因此，要保住台灣經濟發展的競爭優勢，吃了ＥＣＦＡ這顆維他命是不夠的，還須有相應的強身健體之策，其關鍵在於政府能否借力使力，運用ＥＣＦＡ的兩岸經貿自由化開放壓力，推進台灣的經濟改革工程。因此，馬總統本周要提出的後ＥＣＦＡ全球經濟戰略至關重要，我們拭目以待。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 29, 2010
Today in Chongqing, Taipei and Beijing signed a Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). This is undoubtedly the most important step the two sides have taken to promote economic and trade relations since normalization, and constitutes a landmark event. ECFA is rooted in economics and trade. It helps cross-Strait economic interaction take a certain path. It helps Taiwan integrate itself into the regional economy. But the benefits ECFA provides will not appear magically merely because the agreement has been signed. Taiwan is running a race against itself, against the world, and against time. We do not have a moment to waste.
ECFA includes an early harvest list of 539 goods and 11 services. The mainland will allow these to be implemented first. The window of opportunity will be opened further in the mid to long term, and allow other governments to sign free trade agreements (FTAs) with Taipei. This will enable Taiwan to integrate itself into the regional economy and avoid marginalization. From a larger perspective, ECFA will kickstart Taipei's accession to the WTO, begun nine years ago. The importance of this large-scale economic reform cannot be overstated.
Before the benefits of the early harvest list materialize, many things can happen. The immediate benefits of the early harvest list are time-sensitive and fleeting. Our chances of signing FTAs with other governments has been improved. But whether any FTAs will actually be signed is not entirely up to us, and remains far from certain. Can Taiwan survive the pain of economic reforms? That will depend on the determination and ability of those in power. These three factors, interacting with each other, will enable Taiwan's economic metamorphosis.
Take the early harvest list. This is a special arrangement that allows the two sides to enjoy the benefits of liberalization even before negotiations over trade liberalization have begun. This allows industries on the early harvest list to enter the mainland market in advance, and be more competitive. This is why the government is promoting ECFA so vigorously. What the government is not saying however, is that these early harvest items are time sensitive. These goods and services must be liberalized within six months after ECFA goes into effect. This means that the sooner the two sides complete their negotiations, the sooner they will liberalize, and the shorter the early harvest period. The two sides however did not clearly define the length of the consultation phase. Therefore the consultation phase has a beginning, but no end. This makes the definition of the early harvest phase uncertain. Businesses naturally want the early harvest phase to last as long as possible. But that is neither consistent with Beijing's interests nor with international norms. It could also encourage corporate complacency. The best response is to take advantage of the early harvest provisions as soon as possible, and establish a competitive position in the mainland market.
Now take FTAs. ECFA is a essentially the phased implementation of an FTA, but it is not an FTA as such. Politically, a high degree of mistrust lingers between Taipei and Beijing. Economically however, the two sides have a special relationship, and a high degree of economic interdependence. This makes ECFA very different from normal international trade agreements. For example, the early harvest list accounts for fully 16.5% of all trade. This far exceeds normal FTA standards, and makes ECFA very different from other FTAs. The explicit timetables for the start of negotiations are all special cases. But these special cases may become the model other governments use when signing FTAs with Taipei and Beijing. They may provoke challenges from the opposition. They may become obstacles when Taipei attempts to sign agreements with foreign governments. The government must anticipate such problems.
Also, Taipei hopes that through ECFA, and Beijing, it can participate in the process of world-wide regional integration. This is increasingly likely, given improved cross-Strait relations, but it remains a unilateral expectation. Taipei must offer incentives sufficient to induce foreign governments to sign FTAs. This is a practical matter that the government must consider during the post-ECFA era. Now that the two sides have signed ECFA, this may accelerate the pace at which the South Korean and other governments sign FTAs with Beijing. This will affect Taipei's interests vis a vis ECFA. The world continues to turn. Taipei must not assume that just because it has signed ECFA, it can sit back and rake in all manner of benefits. If so, it has signed ECFA in vain.
As Japanese strategist Kenichi Ohmae astutely noted, ECFA is a multivitamin formula tailored for Taiwan. Vitamins can help one stay fit. But they cannot ensure one's survival. Therefore, in order to maintain our competitive advantage and economic development, it is not enough merely to take a multivitamin. One must also have a strategy for keeping fit. The key is whether the government can use the leverage provided by ECFA to promote economic reform. That is why President Ma intends to announce a post-ECFA global economic strategy. We for one, are eager to hear what he has to say.
ECFA的經濟利益與時間賽跑
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.29 03:13 am
就在今天，兩岸在重慶正式簽署兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）；這無疑是兩岸推動經貿關係正常化以來最重要的一步，更是劃時代的關鍵歷史事件。由ＥＣＦＡ架構而起的經貿機制，讓兩岸的經濟互動有了具體的方向及可循的軌跡，並將開啟台灣進入區域經濟整合的道路。然而，ＥＣＦＡ的一切預期效益不是簽署即現，這是一場台灣與自己、與世界、更與時間的競賽，絲毫虛耗不得。
從預期效益而言，ＥＣＦＡ將快速顯現的，自是內含五百卅九項貨品及十一項服務業的早收清單，將可享受彼岸先開放市場的好處；中長期來說，則是為台灣與他國洽簽自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），以融入區域整合及避免邊緣化，開啟了更多機會之窗；更宏觀的是，ＥＣＦＡ將啟動台灣繼九年前加入世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）以來最大規模的經濟改革工程，對台灣經濟發展的意義不言可喻。
但是，這一切預期效益的收割結果，仍存有很多的變數；因為立即受惠的早期收穫，是有時效性的，非永久的；與他國洽簽ＦＴＡ，機會雖然變大了，卻非可完全操之在我，仍存有高度不確定性；至於台灣能否順利通過經濟改革工程的調整之痛，那更與執政者的決心及執行力密不可分了；而這三者間又彼此交互影響，交織而成台灣經濟的蛻變期。
即以早收為例，這是兩岸在進入貿易自由化協商前，互予提前享受開放利益的特別安排，確可讓列入早收產業在進軍大陸市場時，擁有更強的競爭力，這也是政府強力促銷ＥＣＦＡ的焦點所在。但是，政府沒有說出口的是，既是「早期」收穫，就有一定時效性，而其時效與須在ＥＣＦＡ生效後六個月內展開的貨品及服務貿易自由化協商息息相關，意即雙方談得愈快、開放愈快，早收期就愈短；但因雙方沒有明訂完成協商的期限，顯示這是「有起點沒有終點」的協商，也讓早收期變得不確定。對企業而言，自然希望早收期愈長愈好，但其不僅不符大陸利益及國際規範，也會讓企業更怠惰，最好的對應還是儘速運用早收優勢，在大陸市場建立競爭利基。
再看ＦＴＡ，ＥＣＦＡ是分段到位的ＦＴＡ，但畢竟還不是ＦＴＡ；尤其，兩岸在政治上的相互不信任、但經濟上高度依存的特殊關係，讓ＥＣＦＡ與國際間通用模式非常不同，例如早收項目的貿易占比達百分之十六點五，遠高於所有ＦＴＡ的標準，也未比照其他ＦＴＡ，明訂啟動自由化協商的時間表等，都是特例；但這個特例既有可能成為他國與兩岸洽簽ＦＴＡ時比照參照的模式，也可能面臨異議的挑戰，甚至可能成為台灣對外洽簽的障礙，政府須預為綢繆。
另方面，台灣期望透過ＥＣＦＡ，借道中國，進入全球區域整合的網絡，雖是兩岸關係日趨和緩下的可能結果，但畢竟仍以官方的主觀期待居多，台灣要拿出多少吸引各國與我洽簽ＦＴＡ的誘因，將是後ＥＣＦＡ時期政府須務實思考的事。更值得注意的是，兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，反而可能加速南韓等其他國家與大陸洽簽ＦＴＡ的進度，這自然牽動台灣的ＥＣＦＡ利益。這說明的是，世界是轉動的，台灣不要以為簽了ＥＣＦＡ，所有好處就手到擒來，遂以不變應萬變。果如此，ＥＣＦＡ就白簽了。
日本策略大師大前研一說得好，ＥＣＦＡ是顆為台灣精心調製的維他命，但維他命可用以強身，卻無法保命；因此，要保住台灣經濟發展的競爭優勢，吃了ＥＣＦＡ這顆維他命是不夠的，還須有相應的強身健體之策，其關鍵在於政府能否借力使力，運用ＥＣＦＡ的兩岸經貿自由化開放壓力，推進台灣的經濟改革工程。因此，馬總統本周要提出的後ＥＣＦＡ全球經濟戰略至關重要，我們拭目以待。
Monday, June 28, 2010
DPP Must Dialogue, Not Merely Shout Slogans
DPP Must Dialogue, Not Merely Shout Slogans
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 28, 2010
The Democratic Progressive Party held an anti-ECFA protest march this weekend. It made clear that some on Taiwan hold different views of ECFA. This is perfectly normal in a democracy. But if the DPP hopes to assume greater responsibility for the nation's future, it must be able to engage in responsible dialogue, and not merely shout empty slogans.
Some people have long been opposed to ECFA. In part this has to do with Green Camp electioneering. But this also has to do with some peoples' fears about cross-Strait economic integration. Agriculture and other traditional industries in particular are sensitive to competitive pressures. They lack confidence in the government's willingness to protect vulnerable segments of the economy. Therefore they are resistant. Their feelings are understandable, and should be dealt with sympathetically. But the reality is that Taiwan faces intense international competition. The Democratic Progressive Party has led its supporters onto the streets. It must now face the difficult challenges confronting Taiwan.
First, the DPP must be able to dialogue with the public on Taiwan, not just its core supporters. ECFA is a new beginning for cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation. Cooperation and exchanges are taking place with a depth, breadth, and pace that are unprecedented. Positive cross-Strait interactions have gained public support. The Green Camp may attempt to incite fear and loathing. It may engage in rhetoric utterly divorced from reality. Some may be frightened to death. Others may scoff. Neither is conducive to a rational discussion of the issues. This also diminishes the DPP's capacity to debate cross-Strait policy. It enables the KMT to monopolize the discussion of cross-Strait issues.
ECFA or any other government policy must be subject to public oversight. Other options may be discussed. After all, the highest priority is to seek opportunities for economic development. The Green Camp's rallying cries depict ECFA as the scourge of god. Once it's signed, they warn, Taiwan is finished. Yet local DPP leaders are only too happy to use the opportunity to sell more fruit and produce to the mainland. On the one hand they insist on shouting slogans. On the other hand they insist on reaping profits. What is this, if not a clear case of hypocrisy?
Whether in office or out, political parties have their ideals. But they must also respond to real world problems. The foremost concerns of the public on Taiwan are physical survival, economic prosperity, personal dignity, and individual well-being. How these should be achieved may be debated. The DPP should be able to engage the general public in dialogue. The DPP says it doesn't want ECFA. So how does it intend to promote prosperity and prevent marginalization? How does it intend to look after the interests of all people? Blind opposition and sloganeering is not an option.
Secondly, the DPP should also be able to dialogue with Beijing. Mainland China is the most significant factor in Taiwan's development, diplomatically, economically, and militarily. In particular, the mainland's rapid increase in economic power has made it the most important player in the world, and diminished Taiwan's value as a counterforce. Upholding the sovereignty and dignity of the Republic of China means refusing to yield to threats or inducements from Beijing. But it doees not mean provoking cross-Strait confrontations, squandering precious resources, and even denying oneself breathing room.
A responsible political party must offer a practicable cross-Strait policy. Deep Green elements may not trust Beijing. But cross-Strait civil exchanges are close, and involve a wide range of interests. The DPP must also consider how it wishes to handle relations with Beijing, how to dialogue with Beijing, how to find common ground, or at least establish channels of communication. Only then can it negotiate on behalf of the public on Taiwan. How the DPP can develop a theoretical framework by which it can dialogue with Beijing will be a major challenge. But a political party without a practicable cross-Strait policy cannot meet Taiwan's needs.
The DPP must also be able to dialogue with the world. It must learn to accurately grasp the international situation, to conduct multilateral exchanges, to participate in exchanges concerning economics, trade, science and technology, investments, culture, academia, and NGOs. It must learn to promote the Republic of China's diplomatic relations. The Republic of China's international status is unique. The DPP must learn how to communicate this to the international community.
For example, the Ma administration's "cross-Strait reconciliation" and "diplomatic truce" moves enabled Taipei to attend the WHA. The DPP insists that such policies harm Taipei's interests. The DPP may suggest different options. But it must not depart from reality, and it must be able to persuade the international community. Some DPP leaders point to other countries. They say these countries have signed FTAs with the EU, the U.S., and ASEAN. They conveniently fail to mention that the Republic of China has only 20 or so allies. Its situation is very different from other countries.
Finally, and most importantly, the DPP must learn to dialogue with the future. If it continues hiding insides its shell, it will eventually lose its courage and fritter away its dreams. It will forsake a valuable but fleeting opportunity. A political party capable only of living in the past, and capable only of looking inward, can never meet the needs of a public that hopes for a better future.
The Republic of China is a reality. It encompasses a commitment to a common past, it confronts a common reality, and it shares a common responsibility to create a better tomorrow. Any political party, Blue or Green, pro-reunification or pro-independence, must have the capacity to respond to public opinion, to reality, and to the future. While it opposes ECFA, the Democratic Progressive Party ought to contemplate what it can do for the people, besides shouting slogans.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.06.28
民進黨不要只喊話也要能對話
本報訊
民進黨發起的反ＥＣＦＡ遊行在街頭發出了反對之聲，清楚表達出台灣內部不同的意見。在一個民主社會，這本是常態，但民進黨如果要對台灣的未來承擔起更多責任，除了喊話，也要能夠對話。
台灣內部始終有反對ＥＣＦＡ的聲浪，這固然與綠營選舉炒作有關，但也反映出部分民眾對兩岸經濟更加緊密結合的疑懼。尤其是農業等傳統產業，對競爭壓力十分敏感，對政府保護弱勢的信心也不足，因此心存抗拒。這樣的心情可以理解，也應該得到理解。但是，台灣的現實環境與國際競爭擺在眼前，民進黨在帶領群眾上街之後，仍然必須正視台灣所面對的艱難挑戰。
首先，民進黨要能夠與整個台灣社會對話。ＥＣＦＡ是兩岸開展經貿合作的一個新開始，各項合作交流將邁入前所未有的深度、廣度與速度，而良好的兩岸互動，受到大多數民眾支持。綠營如果一味以聳動甚至驚悚的言詞煽動恐懼感，或者作出完全脫離現實的論述，一部分民眾被嚇得要死，其他民眾則嗤之以鼻。這無助於議題的理性討論，也削減自己論辯兩岸政策的空間與能力，讓兩岸問題成了國民黨的獨門生意。
ＥＣＦＡ和政府任何施政一樣，必須接受民意的檢驗和監督，是不是還有其他選項，可以討論看看，畢竟最重要的是替台灣尋找發展機會。綠營如果在振臂疾呼時把ＥＣＦＡ講得像洪水猛獸，一簽下去台灣就完蛋了，但地方首長卻又願意搭順風車多銷些農產水果到大陸，口號要喊好處也要拿，就顯得言行不一了。
無論執政或在野，政黨固然有其理想，卻仍然必須回答現實所提出的問題。對於台灣老百姓而言，最重要的是生存、繁榮、尊嚴與幸福，用什麼方法做到，大家可以一起來討論。而民進黨要能夠和一般民眾對話，如果不要ＥＣＦＡ，那要怎樣促進繁榮避免台灣被邊緣化？各層面民眾的利益能不能盡量得到照顧？一味反對的喊話不足以成為選項。
其次，民進黨也要能夠與中國對話。無論在外交、經濟、軍事方面，中國都是影響台灣發展的最大因素。尤其大陸經濟力量迅速崛起，如今已成為全球舉足輕重的要角，讓台灣過去的抗衡籌碼更加萎縮。堅持主權尊嚴的台灣民眾，不會因威脅利誘而向中共屈膝，但是不是非要激烈衝撞兩岸關係，甚至投擲寶貴資源折損活路空間也在所不惜？
一個負責任的政黨，必須要對兩岸關係有一套可行的政策，即使深綠不信任中國，但以目前兩岸民間往來之密切、牽涉利益之廣泛，民進黨也必須思考如何處理與中國的關係，如何與中國對話，如何試圖尋找共同的交集，或至少建立起基本的溝通模式，才能在需要時為台灣民眾的利益交涉。如何開發出一套能據以和中國對話的理論架構與策略進程，對民進黨是一大挑戰，但一個沒有可行兩岸政策的政黨，已經無法滿足台灣的需要了。
此外，民進黨也需要有與國際對話的能力。這包括精準掌握國際情勢、開展多方接觸交流、尋求參與機會，從經貿、科技、投資、文化、學術乃至ＮＧＯ活動，全方位推動台灣的對外關係。然而，台灣的國際地位與處境都非常特殊，民進黨的主張必須讓國際社會聽得進去。
例如馬政府的「兩岸和解」與「外交休兵」促成了台灣能夠出席世衛大會，民進黨如果認為這樣的政策傷害台灣利益，大可提出不同的方案，但如果想法脫離現實，卻是無法向國際行銷的。就像有人聲稱別的國家都是先和歐盟、美國、東協簽自由貿易協定，卻不提只有廿幾個邦交國的台灣，情況和其他國家完全不同。
最後，也是最重要的，民進黨還要能夠與未來對話。繼續讓台灣束手無策地瑟縮在殼裡，會剝奪掉自己的勇氣與夢想，也將流失稍縱即逝的寶貴機會。一個只會往回看、往內看的政黨，不符合希望開創更好未來的民意需求。
台灣是一個整體，承擔著共同的過去，面對著共同的現實，也有責任一起開創美好明天。不管藍綠、無論統獨，任何政黨都必須能回應民意、現實與未來。在反對ＥＣＦＡ的同時，民進黨必須思考，除了喊話之外，自己還能給人民什麼。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 28, 2010
The Democratic Progressive Party held an anti-ECFA protest march this weekend. It made clear that some on Taiwan hold different views of ECFA. This is perfectly normal in a democracy. But if the DPP hopes to assume greater responsibility for the nation's future, it must be able to engage in responsible dialogue, and not merely shout empty slogans.
Some people have long been opposed to ECFA. In part this has to do with Green Camp electioneering. But this also has to do with some peoples' fears about cross-Strait economic integration. Agriculture and other traditional industries in particular are sensitive to competitive pressures. They lack confidence in the government's willingness to protect vulnerable segments of the economy. Therefore they are resistant. Their feelings are understandable, and should be dealt with sympathetically. But the reality is that Taiwan faces intense international competition. The Democratic Progressive Party has led its supporters onto the streets. It must now face the difficult challenges confronting Taiwan.
First, the DPP must be able to dialogue with the public on Taiwan, not just its core supporters. ECFA is a new beginning for cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation. Cooperation and exchanges are taking place with a depth, breadth, and pace that are unprecedented. Positive cross-Strait interactions have gained public support. The Green Camp may attempt to incite fear and loathing. It may engage in rhetoric utterly divorced from reality. Some may be frightened to death. Others may scoff. Neither is conducive to a rational discussion of the issues. This also diminishes the DPP's capacity to debate cross-Strait policy. It enables the KMT to monopolize the discussion of cross-Strait issues.
ECFA or any other government policy must be subject to public oversight. Other options may be discussed. After all, the highest priority is to seek opportunities for economic development. The Green Camp's rallying cries depict ECFA as the scourge of god. Once it's signed, they warn, Taiwan is finished. Yet local DPP leaders are only too happy to use the opportunity to sell more fruit and produce to the mainland. On the one hand they insist on shouting slogans. On the other hand they insist on reaping profits. What is this, if not a clear case of hypocrisy?
Whether in office or out, political parties have their ideals. But they must also respond to real world problems. The foremost concerns of the public on Taiwan are physical survival, economic prosperity, personal dignity, and individual well-being. How these should be achieved may be debated. The DPP should be able to engage the general public in dialogue. The DPP says it doesn't want ECFA. So how does it intend to promote prosperity and prevent marginalization? How does it intend to look after the interests of all people? Blind opposition and sloganeering is not an option.
Secondly, the DPP should also be able to dialogue with Beijing. Mainland China is the most significant factor in Taiwan's development, diplomatically, economically, and militarily. In particular, the mainland's rapid increase in economic power has made it the most important player in the world, and diminished Taiwan's value as a counterforce. Upholding the sovereignty and dignity of the Republic of China means refusing to yield to threats or inducements from Beijing. But it doees not mean provoking cross-Strait confrontations, squandering precious resources, and even denying oneself breathing room.
A responsible political party must offer a practicable cross-Strait policy. Deep Green elements may not trust Beijing. But cross-Strait civil exchanges are close, and involve a wide range of interests. The DPP must also consider how it wishes to handle relations with Beijing, how to dialogue with Beijing, how to find common ground, or at least establish channels of communication. Only then can it negotiate on behalf of the public on Taiwan. How the DPP can develop a theoretical framework by which it can dialogue with Beijing will be a major challenge. But a political party without a practicable cross-Strait policy cannot meet Taiwan's needs.
The DPP must also be able to dialogue with the world. It must learn to accurately grasp the international situation, to conduct multilateral exchanges, to participate in exchanges concerning economics, trade, science and technology, investments, culture, academia, and NGOs. It must learn to promote the Republic of China's diplomatic relations. The Republic of China's international status is unique. The DPP must learn how to communicate this to the international community.
For example, the Ma administration's "cross-Strait reconciliation" and "diplomatic truce" moves enabled Taipei to attend the WHA. The DPP insists that such policies harm Taipei's interests. The DPP may suggest different options. But it must not depart from reality, and it must be able to persuade the international community. Some DPP leaders point to other countries. They say these countries have signed FTAs with the EU, the U.S., and ASEAN. They conveniently fail to mention that the Republic of China has only 20 or so allies. Its situation is very different from other countries.
Finally, and most importantly, the DPP must learn to dialogue with the future. If it continues hiding insides its shell, it will eventually lose its courage and fritter away its dreams. It will forsake a valuable but fleeting opportunity. A political party capable only of living in the past, and capable only of looking inward, can never meet the needs of a public that hopes for a better future.
The Republic of China is a reality. It encompasses a commitment to a common past, it confronts a common reality, and it shares a common responsibility to create a better tomorrow. Any political party, Blue or Green, pro-reunification or pro-independence, must have the capacity to respond to public opinion, to reality, and to the future. While it opposes ECFA, the Democratic Progressive Party ought to contemplate what it can do for the people, besides shouting slogans.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.06.28
民進黨不要只喊話也要能對話
本報訊
民進黨發起的反ＥＣＦＡ遊行在街頭發出了反對之聲，清楚表達出台灣內部不同的意見。在一個民主社會，這本是常態，但民進黨如果要對台灣的未來承擔起更多責任，除了喊話，也要能夠對話。
台灣內部始終有反對ＥＣＦＡ的聲浪，這固然與綠營選舉炒作有關，但也反映出部分民眾對兩岸經濟更加緊密結合的疑懼。尤其是農業等傳統產業，對競爭壓力十分敏感，對政府保護弱勢的信心也不足，因此心存抗拒。這樣的心情可以理解，也應該得到理解。但是，台灣的現實環境與國際競爭擺在眼前，民進黨在帶領群眾上街之後，仍然必須正視台灣所面對的艱難挑戰。
首先，民進黨要能夠與整個台灣社會對話。ＥＣＦＡ是兩岸開展經貿合作的一個新開始，各項合作交流將邁入前所未有的深度、廣度與速度，而良好的兩岸互動，受到大多數民眾支持。綠營如果一味以聳動甚至驚悚的言詞煽動恐懼感，或者作出完全脫離現實的論述，一部分民眾被嚇得要死，其他民眾則嗤之以鼻。這無助於議題的理性討論，也削減自己論辯兩岸政策的空間與能力，讓兩岸問題成了國民黨的獨門生意。
ＥＣＦＡ和政府任何施政一樣，必須接受民意的檢驗和監督，是不是還有其他選項，可以討論看看，畢竟最重要的是替台灣尋找發展機會。綠營如果在振臂疾呼時把ＥＣＦＡ講得像洪水猛獸，一簽下去台灣就完蛋了，但地方首長卻又願意搭順風車多銷些農產水果到大陸，口號要喊好處也要拿，就顯得言行不一了。
無論執政或在野，政黨固然有其理想，卻仍然必須回答現實所提出的問題。對於台灣老百姓而言，最重要的是生存、繁榮、尊嚴與幸福，用什麼方法做到，大家可以一起來討論。而民進黨要能夠和一般民眾對話，如果不要ＥＣＦＡ，那要怎樣促進繁榮避免台灣被邊緣化？各層面民眾的利益能不能盡量得到照顧？一味反對的喊話不足以成為選項。
其次，民進黨也要能夠與中國對話。無論在外交、經濟、軍事方面，中國都是影響台灣發展的最大因素。尤其大陸經濟力量迅速崛起，如今已成為全球舉足輕重的要角，讓台灣過去的抗衡籌碼更加萎縮。堅持主權尊嚴的台灣民眾，不會因威脅利誘而向中共屈膝，但是不是非要激烈衝撞兩岸關係，甚至投擲寶貴資源折損活路空間也在所不惜？
一個負責任的政黨，必須要對兩岸關係有一套可行的政策，即使深綠不信任中國，但以目前兩岸民間往來之密切、牽涉利益之廣泛，民進黨也必須思考如何處理與中國的關係，如何與中國對話，如何試圖尋找共同的交集，或至少建立起基本的溝通模式，才能在需要時為台灣民眾的利益交涉。如何開發出一套能據以和中國對話的理論架構與策略進程，對民進黨是一大挑戰，但一個沒有可行兩岸政策的政黨，已經無法滿足台灣的需要了。
此外，民進黨也需要有與國際對話的能力。這包括精準掌握國際情勢、開展多方接觸交流、尋求參與機會，從經貿、科技、投資、文化、學術乃至ＮＧＯ活動，全方位推動台灣的對外關係。然而，台灣的國際地位與處境都非常特殊，民進黨的主張必須讓國際社會聽得進去。
例如馬政府的「兩岸和解」與「外交休兵」促成了台灣能夠出席世衛大會，民進黨如果認為這樣的政策傷害台灣利益，大可提出不同的方案，但如果想法脫離現實，卻是無法向國際行銷的。就像有人聲稱別的國家都是先和歐盟、美國、東協簽自由貿易協定，卻不提只有廿幾個邦交國的台灣，情況和其他國家完全不同。
最後，也是最重要的，民進黨還要能夠與未來對話。繼續讓台灣束手無策地瑟縮在殼裡，會剝奪掉自己的勇氣與夢想，也將流失稍縱即逝的寶貴機會。一個只會往回看、往內看的政黨，不符合希望開創更好未來的民意需求。
台灣是一個整體，承擔著共同的過去，面對著共同的現實，也有責任一起開創美好明天。不管藍綠、無論統獨，任何政黨都必須能回應民意、現實與未來。在反對ＥＣＦＡ的同時，民進黨必須思考，除了喊話之外，自己還能給人民什麼。
Friday, June 25, 2010
ECFA and the Destiny of the DPP
ECFA and the Destiny of the DPP
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 25, 2010
The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) will be signed in Chongqing on the 29th of this month. The Democratic Progressive Party will initiate a new round of anti-ECFA political moves.
Once the agreement is signed, it will be a done deal. Even if a referendum is held, the wording of the referendum will have to be changed to read, "Should the already signed ECFA agreement be repealed?" If the DPP demands a referendum, it will be compelled to unambiguously declare, "We oppose ECFA." It will no longer be able to bob and weave, and claim it is calling for a referendum merely as a matter of "democratic procedure." If during Legislative Yuan deliberations the Democratic Progressive Party demands an "item by item review," it will mean it has changed its tune, and is asking merely for "partial revisions" rather than a "total repudiation." Will that mean the DPP is prepared to accept the results of a legislative review and vote? Conversely, if the DPP still wants "total repudiation," why bother with an "item by item review?" Moreover, if the Legislative Yuan submits ECFA to an "item by item review," how can a referendum "totally repudiate" it?
The DPP must make a choice. Is it demanding a "total repudiation of ECFA," or is it merely "in partial disagreement with ECFA?" It must decide. One or the other. Otherwise, it will merely be contradicting itself.
During this round of ECFA negotiations, the DPP has indeed contributed by playing the role of bad cop. The Democratic Progressive Party has taken advantage of ECFA to incite Blue vs. Green conflict. This may be one reason Beijing made major concessions. But now that Beijing has made major concessions, it has left the DPP in a quandary. The DPP may be scratching its head, wondering, "Just why did Beijing make so many major concessions?"
ECFA has become a hot button issue on Taiwan. This is why the content of ECFA has taken on an obvious political coloration. Objectively speaking, based on the content made public so far, ECFA is an astonishingly lop-sided trade agreement seldom seen in the world. Taiwan's early harvest list includes 539 items, worth a whopping 13.83 billion USD. Mainland China's early harvest list includes 267 items, worth a mere 600 million USD. Seventeen of Taiwan's weaker industries were included on the early harvest list. Eighteen of Taiwan's agricultural and fishing products were included on the early harvest list. Mainland agricultural products will not be sold on Taiwan. Mainland workers will not enter Taiwan. Taipei hopes to sign an FTA with Washington. But American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt said that even beef and rice would have to be negotiated. By contrast, look at the ECFA early harvest list. If it weren't for our unique political status, would Beijing have made so many major concessions?
But the most significant aspect of ECFA is that given the threat ASEAN plus N poses for Taiwan, it has achieved an equal footing with the mainland. ECFA will also improve Taiwan's chances of becoming an international platform. ECFA will help Taiwan confront the challenges of globalization and international coopetition. This is why the benefits of ECFA outweigh the deficits, and the gains outweigh the losses. This is why it is not easy for the DPP to flatly repudiate ECFA.
Furthermore, any trade agreement is inevitably going to be a "potluck dinner." If I want to eat the dishes you brought, I can hardly tell you not to eat mine. Hence, the tug of war between liberalization and protection. The Democratic Progressive Party is not about to oppose the benefits Taiwan has received is it? Or does it intend to oppose the inclusion of 100 petrochemical industry items on the early harvest list? Does it intend to oppose the inclusion of orchids and groupers? The DPP has no basis for its allegation that "The government failed to demand what it should have demanded." From the very beginning, the Democratic Progressive Party opposed seeking any relief on tariffs. Tsai Ing-wen even favored "building plants on the mainland for high tariff industries." That being the case, all the Democratic Progressive Party can do is demagogue the 267 items on the mainland's early harvest list. But if the DPP compares the pluses and minuses on the two sides' early harvest lists, it will be forced to conclude that Taiwan's benefits outweighed its deficits, and its gains outweighed its losses.
This round of negotiations over ECFA once again underscored the DPP's destiny. During cross-Strait negotiations, when the DPP plays bad cop, it does indeed provide an assist. But that's it. The DPP's role is limited to playing bad cop, nothing more. It is incapable of taking the lead in cross-Strait relations amidst increasing globalization. This is the DPP's political destiny. ECFA does indeed offer both advantages and disadvantages for Taiwan. It does indeed involve both gains and losses. But it unquestionably offers more advantages than disadvantages, and more gains than losses. After all, the DPP did not totally repudiate ECFA. It could only point to a few of the deficits and losses, in an effort to incite conflict and divide society. On the one hand, the DPP is unable to offer any alternatives. On the other hand, it is unable to deny that ECFA's advantages outweigh its disadvantages, and its gains outweigh its losses. All it can do is tear society apart as it engages in internal struggles over the party's future. Such is the DPP's political destiny.
ECFA has effectively been signed. The Democratic Progressive Party sees this as more grist for its political mill. The prospect of another issue to demagogue fills it with glee. But ECFA has again revealed the DPP's increasing marginalization and negation in the mainstream of cross-Strait affairs and globalizaton. In cross-Strait affairs it invariably plays bad cop. On Taiwan it invariably incites social divisions. Can the DPP escape its sorry destiny?
從ECFA看民進黨的角色與宿命
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.25 03:38 am
兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）可望於廿九日在重慶簽署，民進黨的「反ＥＣＦＡ」操作，亦將進入新階段。
完成簽署，木已成舟。就公投言，題旨就必須改變成「是否同意廢止已經簽署完成的ＥＣＦＡ」；亦即，民進黨若主張「公投」，就勢須正面表態「反對ＥＣＦＡ」，已無閃避的空間，而說只是主張「公投」的「民主程序」而已。另就立院的審議言，則民進黨若主張「逐條審議」，即表示改採「局部修正」的路線，而非「全盤否定」的路線；然則，民進黨是否即應接受審議表決的結果？反之，若主張「全盤否定」，則又何必進行「逐條審議」？再者，倘若在立院「逐條審議」，則在公投又如何「全盤否定」？
也就是說，民進黨在「全盤否定ＥＣＦＡ」及「局部不同意ＥＣＦＡ」之間，必須作出抉擇。否則便是自相矛盾。
這場ＥＣＦＡ談判，民進黨的黑臉確實扮演了「側翼」的助攻角色。民進黨藉ＥＣＦＡ升高了藍綠鬥爭，應是北京方面考慮大幅「讓利」的因素之一。然而，北京如今既已大幅讓利，卻使民進黨陷於難以著力的困境。或許，民進黨現在真正的難題是：「北京為何讓利那麼多？」
由於ＥＣＦＡ在台灣成為尖銳的「政治性」議題，所以使ＥＣＦＡ的內容也呈現了明顯的「政治性」元素。就迄今公開的內容看，客觀而言，ＥＣＦＡ應是舉世罕見的「利益不對稱」的經貿協定。台灣早收五三九項，金額一百卅八億點三美元；大陸二六七項，廿八點六億美元。十七個台灣弱勢產業納入早收清單，十八項台灣農漁產品也上了榜。大陸農產品不銷台，大陸勞工不入台……。台灣若要與美國談ＦＴＡ，美國在台協會理事主席薄瑞光還說，牛肉及稻米都要談；如今看兩岸ＥＣＦＡ的早收內容，倘非緣於特殊的政治情勢，北京方面豈可能「讓利那麼多」？
然而，ＥＣＦＡ最重要的意義，是台灣在東協加Ｎ的威脅中，對大陸市場取得了平等的立足點；再者，ＥＣＦＡ亦使台灣成為國際平台的條件獲得加分與改善，有利於台灣面對全球化的競合挑戰。這也是使ＥＣＦＡ可以獲得「利大於弊／得大於失」評價的主要理由，遂使民進黨不易「全盤否定」ＥＣＦＡ。
再者，任何貿易協定皆是「攜菜派對」。我要吃你的菜，就不能不讓你也吃我的菜；於是發生了「開放」與「保護」的角力。民進黨如今恐怕不至於反對台灣在ＥＣＦＡ獲利的部分；難道會反對石化一百項列入早收？難道會反對文心蘭、石斑魚列入清單？甚至似乎也沒有立場攻擊「該要的要不到」的部分，因為民進黨自始即反對爭取任何減免關稅，蔡英文甚至主張「高關稅產業赴大陸設廠」。倘係如此，民進黨勢必只能在大陸二六七項早收清單中找尋政治鬥爭的題材；但即使就雙方早收清單的對比利害而論，民進黨恐亦必須接受對台灣「利大於弊／得大於失」的宏觀評價。
這場ＥＣＦＡ談判，再次呈現出民進黨在台灣政治上的角色及宿命。就兩岸關係言，民進黨的政治黑臉，確實對兩岸角力具有「側翼助攻」的效應；但民進黨在兩岸的角色，仍也僅止於扮黑臉而已，然在全球化的兩岸互動中不可能扮演主導的角色，這是民進黨的政治宿命。再就台灣內部言，ＥＣＦＡ誠然有利有弊、有得有失；卻無疑是利大於弊、得大於失。民進黨終究沒有全盤否定ＥＣＦＡ的正當性，而只能凸顯其中的弊與失，來鼓動政爭，撕裂社會；也就是說，民進黨一方面拿不出「替代方案」，另一方面又不可能全盤否定利大於弊、得大於失的ＥＣＦＡ，而只能在黨內路線分歧下，繼續扮演鼓動政爭、撕裂社會的負面角色，這豈不也是民進黨的政治宿命？
ＥＣＦＡ簽定，民進黨視為政爭題材，似有見獵心喜之情。但若從另一角度看，ＥＣＦＡ簽定，卻也再度呈現了民進黨在全球及兩岸主流趨勢中的邊緣化與負面化。在兩岸始終扮黑臉，在台灣始終搞撕裂，民進黨如何走出這等噩運？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 25, 2010
The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) will be signed in Chongqing on the 29th of this month. The Democratic Progressive Party will initiate a new round of anti-ECFA political moves.
Once the agreement is signed, it will be a done deal. Even if a referendum is held, the wording of the referendum will have to be changed to read, "Should the already signed ECFA agreement be repealed?" If the DPP demands a referendum, it will be compelled to unambiguously declare, "We oppose ECFA." It will no longer be able to bob and weave, and claim it is calling for a referendum merely as a matter of "democratic procedure." If during Legislative Yuan deliberations the Democratic Progressive Party demands an "item by item review," it will mean it has changed its tune, and is asking merely for "partial revisions" rather than a "total repudiation." Will that mean the DPP is prepared to accept the results of a legislative review and vote? Conversely, if the DPP still wants "total repudiation," why bother with an "item by item review?" Moreover, if the Legislative Yuan submits ECFA to an "item by item review," how can a referendum "totally repudiate" it?
The DPP must make a choice. Is it demanding a "total repudiation of ECFA," or is it merely "in partial disagreement with ECFA?" It must decide. One or the other. Otherwise, it will merely be contradicting itself.
During this round of ECFA negotiations, the DPP has indeed contributed by playing the role of bad cop. The Democratic Progressive Party has taken advantage of ECFA to incite Blue vs. Green conflict. This may be one reason Beijing made major concessions. But now that Beijing has made major concessions, it has left the DPP in a quandary. The DPP may be scratching its head, wondering, "Just why did Beijing make so many major concessions?"
ECFA has become a hot button issue on Taiwan. This is why the content of ECFA has taken on an obvious political coloration. Objectively speaking, based on the content made public so far, ECFA is an astonishingly lop-sided trade agreement seldom seen in the world. Taiwan's early harvest list includes 539 items, worth a whopping 13.83 billion USD. Mainland China's early harvest list includes 267 items, worth a mere 600 million USD. Seventeen of Taiwan's weaker industries were included on the early harvest list. Eighteen of Taiwan's agricultural and fishing products were included on the early harvest list. Mainland agricultural products will not be sold on Taiwan. Mainland workers will not enter Taiwan. Taipei hopes to sign an FTA with Washington. But American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt said that even beef and rice would have to be negotiated. By contrast, look at the ECFA early harvest list. If it weren't for our unique political status, would Beijing have made so many major concessions?
But the most significant aspect of ECFA is that given the threat ASEAN plus N poses for Taiwan, it has achieved an equal footing with the mainland. ECFA will also improve Taiwan's chances of becoming an international platform. ECFA will help Taiwan confront the challenges of globalization and international coopetition. This is why the benefits of ECFA outweigh the deficits, and the gains outweigh the losses. This is why it is not easy for the DPP to flatly repudiate ECFA.
Furthermore, any trade agreement is inevitably going to be a "potluck dinner." If I want to eat the dishes you brought, I can hardly tell you not to eat mine. Hence, the tug of war between liberalization and protection. The Democratic Progressive Party is not about to oppose the benefits Taiwan has received is it? Or does it intend to oppose the inclusion of 100 petrochemical industry items on the early harvest list? Does it intend to oppose the inclusion of orchids and groupers? The DPP has no basis for its allegation that "The government failed to demand what it should have demanded." From the very beginning, the Democratic Progressive Party opposed seeking any relief on tariffs. Tsai Ing-wen even favored "building plants on the mainland for high tariff industries." That being the case, all the Democratic Progressive Party can do is demagogue the 267 items on the mainland's early harvest list. But if the DPP compares the pluses and minuses on the two sides' early harvest lists, it will be forced to conclude that Taiwan's benefits outweighed its deficits, and its gains outweighed its losses.
This round of negotiations over ECFA once again underscored the DPP's destiny. During cross-Strait negotiations, when the DPP plays bad cop, it does indeed provide an assist. But that's it. The DPP's role is limited to playing bad cop, nothing more. It is incapable of taking the lead in cross-Strait relations amidst increasing globalization. This is the DPP's political destiny. ECFA does indeed offer both advantages and disadvantages for Taiwan. It does indeed involve both gains and losses. But it unquestionably offers more advantages than disadvantages, and more gains than losses. After all, the DPP did not totally repudiate ECFA. It could only point to a few of the deficits and losses, in an effort to incite conflict and divide society. On the one hand, the DPP is unable to offer any alternatives. On the other hand, it is unable to deny that ECFA's advantages outweigh its disadvantages, and its gains outweigh its losses. All it can do is tear society apart as it engages in internal struggles over the party's future. Such is the DPP's political destiny.
ECFA has effectively been signed. The Democratic Progressive Party sees this as more grist for its political mill. The prospect of another issue to demagogue fills it with glee. But ECFA has again revealed the DPP's increasing marginalization and negation in the mainstream of cross-Strait affairs and globalizaton. In cross-Strait affairs it invariably plays bad cop. On Taiwan it invariably incites social divisions. Can the DPP escape its sorry destiny?
從ECFA看民進黨的角色與宿命
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.25 03:38 am
兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）可望於廿九日在重慶簽署，民進黨的「反ＥＣＦＡ」操作，亦將進入新階段。
完成簽署，木已成舟。就公投言，題旨就必須改變成「是否同意廢止已經簽署完成的ＥＣＦＡ」；亦即，民進黨若主張「公投」，就勢須正面表態「反對ＥＣＦＡ」，已無閃避的空間，而說只是主張「公投」的「民主程序」而已。另就立院的審議言，則民進黨若主張「逐條審議」，即表示改採「局部修正」的路線，而非「全盤否定」的路線；然則，民進黨是否即應接受審議表決的結果？反之，若主張「全盤否定」，則又何必進行「逐條審議」？再者，倘若在立院「逐條審議」，則在公投又如何「全盤否定」？
也就是說，民進黨在「全盤否定ＥＣＦＡ」及「局部不同意ＥＣＦＡ」之間，必須作出抉擇。否則便是自相矛盾。
這場ＥＣＦＡ談判，民進黨的黑臉確實扮演了「側翼」的助攻角色。民進黨藉ＥＣＦＡ升高了藍綠鬥爭，應是北京方面考慮大幅「讓利」的因素之一。然而，北京如今既已大幅讓利，卻使民進黨陷於難以著力的困境。或許，民進黨現在真正的難題是：「北京為何讓利那麼多？」
由於ＥＣＦＡ在台灣成為尖銳的「政治性」議題，所以使ＥＣＦＡ的內容也呈現了明顯的「政治性」元素。就迄今公開的內容看，客觀而言，ＥＣＦＡ應是舉世罕見的「利益不對稱」的經貿協定。台灣早收五三九項，金額一百卅八億點三美元；大陸二六七項，廿八點六億美元。十七個台灣弱勢產業納入早收清單，十八項台灣農漁產品也上了榜。大陸農產品不銷台，大陸勞工不入台……。台灣若要與美國談ＦＴＡ，美國在台協會理事主席薄瑞光還說，牛肉及稻米都要談；如今看兩岸ＥＣＦＡ的早收內容，倘非緣於特殊的政治情勢，北京方面豈可能「讓利那麼多」？
然而，ＥＣＦＡ最重要的意義，是台灣在東協加Ｎ的威脅中，對大陸市場取得了平等的立足點；再者，ＥＣＦＡ亦使台灣成為國際平台的條件獲得加分與改善，有利於台灣面對全球化的競合挑戰。這也是使ＥＣＦＡ可以獲得「利大於弊／得大於失」評價的主要理由，遂使民進黨不易「全盤否定」ＥＣＦＡ。
再者，任何貿易協定皆是「攜菜派對」。我要吃你的菜，就不能不讓你也吃我的菜；於是發生了「開放」與「保護」的角力。民進黨如今恐怕不至於反對台灣在ＥＣＦＡ獲利的部分；難道會反對石化一百項列入早收？難道會反對文心蘭、石斑魚列入清單？甚至似乎也沒有立場攻擊「該要的要不到」的部分，因為民進黨自始即反對爭取任何減免關稅，蔡英文甚至主張「高關稅產業赴大陸設廠」。倘係如此，民進黨勢必只能在大陸二六七項早收清單中找尋政治鬥爭的題材；但即使就雙方早收清單的對比利害而論，民進黨恐亦必須接受對台灣「利大於弊／得大於失」的宏觀評價。
這場ＥＣＦＡ談判，再次呈現出民進黨在台灣政治上的角色及宿命。就兩岸關係言，民進黨的政治黑臉，確實對兩岸角力具有「側翼助攻」的效應；但民進黨在兩岸的角色，仍也僅止於扮黑臉而已，然在全球化的兩岸互動中不可能扮演主導的角色，這是民進黨的政治宿命。再就台灣內部言，ＥＣＦＡ誠然有利有弊、有得有失；卻無疑是利大於弊、得大於失。民進黨終究沒有全盤否定ＥＣＦＡ的正當性，而只能凸顯其中的弊與失，來鼓動政爭，撕裂社會；也就是說，民進黨一方面拿不出「替代方案」，另一方面又不可能全盤否定利大於弊、得大於失的ＥＣＦＡ，而只能在黨內路線分歧下，繼續扮演鼓動政爭、撕裂社會的負面角色，這豈不也是民進黨的政治宿命？
ＥＣＦＡ簽定，民進黨視為政爭題材，似有見獵心喜之情。但若從另一角度看，ＥＣＦＡ簽定，卻也再度呈現了民進黨在全球及兩岸主流趨勢中的邊緣化與負面化。在兩岸始終扮黑臉，在台灣始終搞撕裂，民進黨如何走出這等噩運？
Thursday, June 24, 2010
The DPP Protest March and Its Ersatz Leftist Rhetoric
The DPP Protest March and Its Ersatz Leftist Rhetoric
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 24, 2010
On Saturday the DPP will kick off its "Great Anti-ECFA Protest March." The theme of its protest march will be "The KMT and CCP are singing a duet. The rich and the poor are locked in a class struggle." Of the two, the charge that "The KMT and CCP are singing a duet" is old hat. But the allegation that "The rich and the poor are locked in a class struggle" is new for the DPP.
The DPP alleges that "The rich and the poor and locked in a class struggle." It would have the public believe that ECFA is beneficial to huge conglomerates, but not to "weaker industries," to agriculture, or to the lumpen proletariat.
Actually this line of argument is nothing new. Direct flights between Songshan Airport and Hongqiao Airport are transforming Songshan Airport into a business airport. The DPP has alleged that business airports are beneficial only to the wealthy, but not to ordinary members of the public. Thirty years ago it was the highway system. At the time the "dang wai" movement alleged that the highway system was beneficial only to the wealthy, not the ordinary citizen.
ECFA will have different impacts on different industries. Some favorable, some unfavorable. At the macro level, one must weigh the benefits against the deficits. At the micro level, impacted industries must be protected. In other words, one must simultaneously liberalize and protect. One must not focus solely on one's political agenda, demagoguing the issue by inciting rich vs. poor class struggle. Unfortunately the "dang wai" movement and the DPP have relentlessly turned the highway system, commercial airports, and ECFA into grist for the political mill.
In fact, the DPP is not a class-based political party. Nor is it a left-wing political party. Its rich vs. poor rhetoric is merely a tool in its political struggle. The clearest example is the year 2000. Before the Chen administration assumed power, various social movements within the DPP were highly active. But soon after the DPP assumed power, these social movements withered on the vine. Collusion between the Chen regime and Big Business created a major stink. Now that the DPP has been forced out of office, these fringe groups have gradually been revived. As we can see, the DPP's proletarian and leftist coloration is mere opportunistic posturing, devoid of substance or meaning.
In fact, the DPP is one of the few political parties among the world's emerging democracies without any trace of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist political coloration. The reason is the Democratic Progressive Party and the "dang wai" movement have their roots among wealthy "huang min" (Subjects of the Japanese Emperor), land owners, and foreign missionaries. That is why the DPP lacks an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist mindset. That is why the DPP's "proletariat" and "leftist" posturing does not come naturally, but is mere political posturing.
ECFA must simultaneously liberalize and protect. It must seek liberalization for key industries. It must seek protection for weaker industries. Tsai Ing-wen was once involved in WTO negotiations. She knows this perfectly well. So does the Democratic Progressive Party, which oversaw its signing. Yet in order to demagogue the ECFA controversy, the DPP is shouting slogans such as "The KMT and the CCP are singing a duet" and "The rich and the poor are locked in a class struggle." It is linking "opposition to [mainland] China" with "opposition to the rich." This is no different from allegations that commercial airports and the highway system are beneficial only to the rich. It has merely raised the ante.
The ECFA early harvest list has yet to be made public. Yet the DPP is already screaming "The government failed to demand what it should have demanded. It failed to defend what it should have defended." It is clearly shooting first and asking questions later. No matter what the issue, it is determined to apply this same rote formula. The DPP is not interested in a rational policy debate. It is waging a political war.
In the past, the DPP demagogued the issue of "old age allowances" and "elderly farmers allowances." But these were merely local issues. Now the DPP is turning ECFA into a class struggle between conglomerates and the underprivileged. It is equating the interests of conglomerates with "pandering to [mainland] China." It is equating "opposition to the rich" with "opposition to [mainland] China." It is equating "hatred of the rich" with "hatred of [mainland] China." Isn't such political demagoguery just a wee bit excessive? Every time the DPP wants a baby, it advocates taking a knife and cutting the baby out of the mother's womb.
The DPP is not a left-wing political party. It is merely an "ersatz leftist" or "pseudo-leftist" political party. The ECFA controversy is the first time the DPP has linked "opposition to the rich" with "opposition to [mainland] China" and "hatred of the rich" with "hatred of [mainland] China." It is playing upon the resentment felt by weaker industries and the insecurity felt by disadvantaged groups. The DPP's demagoguery is not helping the public balance liberalization with protection. It is merely enabling the DPP to use ECFA to divide the rich and the poor, the cities from the countryside, and the nation as a whole.
Tsai Ing-wen comes from a wealthy family. Yet she has now become the most "leftist" chairman ever of the Democratic Progressive Party. Confronted with the impact of ECFA, she advocates "forsaking our economics first priorities" and "repudiating our export-oriented model." Is this "genuine leftism" or "ersatz leftism?" Is it a "alternative policy" for national governance? Or it is merely an agenda for partisan political struggle?
民進黨遊行與「假左」路線
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.24 02:47 am
民進黨周六發動「反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行」，主調是「國共唱和，貧富鬥爭」。其中，「國共唱和」已是老調，「貧富鬥爭」的操作則有後來居上之勢。
「貧富鬥爭」的主論述是：ＥＣＦＡ（兩岸經濟協議）只是對財團有利，卻對「弱勢產業」不利，對農業不利，對基層勞工不利。
其實，這種論述模式並無新義。日前「松山 ／虹橋」對飛，松山機場將朝「商務機場」轉型；民進黨也說，商務機場只是對有錢人有利，對社會大眾不利。更早的事例是三十多年前高速公路通車，當時的「黨外」也說，高速公路只利於「有錢人」，但對庶民不利。
ＥＣＦＡ對各種產業有不同影響，有利有不利。從宏觀角度看，應當考量是否「利大於弊」；從微觀角度看，對受到衝擊的產業，則應設法保護。也就是說，應當注重「開放」與「保護」的政策比例，而不宜只著眼於政治算計，動輒將之操作成貧富對立的階級鬥爭。但是，黨外及民進黨卻將高速公路、商務機場及ＥＣＦＡ，一律操作成貧富階級鬥爭。
民進黨其實不是一個階級政黨，也不是一個左翼政黨；它的貧富鬥爭論，只是政治鬥爭的補充。最顯著的例證是，在二○○○年陳水扁政府執政以前，民進黨種種社運組織的外圍團體皆十分活躍；及至二○○○年民進黨執政，這些社運團體竟紛告萎縮，扁政府的政商勾結卻反而臭不可聞；如今，民進黨又下野，這些外圍團體又漸活躍起來。可見，民進黨的階級色彩或「左」的表現，只是政治操作的工具，而非其內涵或本質。
其實，民進黨是世界新興民主國家中，極少數自始不具反帝及反資色彩的新興政黨之一。因為，民進黨及黨外的社會根源，是來自皇民、地主及外來教會的資產階級；所以在精神思維上不致反帝及反資。因而，民進黨的階級性及「左」的表現，不是出自內在，而只是政治操作的權謀而已。
ＥＣＦＡ必須注意「開放」與「保護」的政策比例，為關鍵產業爭「開放」，為弱勢產業爭「保護」。這一點，曾經參與ＷＴＯ談判的蔡英文，及主導簽署的民進黨皆深知熟悉。但是，民進黨如今卻以「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」來操作ＥＣＦＡ的爭議，將「反中」與「反富」聯結，這與指商務機場與高速公路只利於「有錢人」並無不同，且是變本加厲。
ＥＣＦＡ的早收清單猶未公布，但民進黨已經宣示，將以「該要的要不到／該守的守不住」進行抗爭。這擺明的是「先射箭，再畫靶」，不論三七二十一，只要往這個「公式」裡頭套即可；這不是理性的政策辯論，而是政治鬥爭。
過去，民進黨亦曾運用「老人津貼」、「老農津貼」等題材，但皆只是「局部」的議題。如今民進黨將ＥＣＦＡ炒作成一個「財團vs.弱勢」的階級議題，又將財團利益與傾中聯結，於是把「反富」與「反中」、「仇富」與「仇中」混在一起；這樣的政治操作，會不會太超過？每到爭取嬰兒之時，民進黨皆是主張用刀分嬰的母親。
民進黨不是一個左翼政黨，而始終只是一個「假左」或「偽左」的政黨。ＥＣＦＡ的爭議，則是民進黨首次將「反富／反中」、「仇富／仇中」作為聯結操作；玩弄弱勢產業的相對剝奪感，煽動弱勢族群的不安全感；其效應不是協助國人共同面對ＥＣＦＡ「開放／保護」的兼籌並顧，而只是要利用ＥＣＦＡ來撕裂貧富，撕裂城鄉，撕裂國家。
蔡英文是富豪之女，如今她竟然成了民進黨有史以來最「左」的黨主席。面對ＥＣＦＡ的衝擊，她居然主張「放棄經濟掛帥／否定出口導向」。試問：這是「真左」，還是「假左」？是國家的「替代方案」，還是政黨的「鬥爭方案」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 24, 2010
On Saturday the DPP will kick off its "Great Anti-ECFA Protest March." The theme of its protest march will be "The KMT and CCP are singing a duet. The rich and the poor are locked in a class struggle." Of the two, the charge that "The KMT and CCP are singing a duet" is old hat. But the allegation that "The rich and the poor are locked in a class struggle" is new for the DPP.
The DPP alleges that "The rich and the poor and locked in a class struggle." It would have the public believe that ECFA is beneficial to huge conglomerates, but not to "weaker industries," to agriculture, or to the lumpen proletariat.
Actually this line of argument is nothing new. Direct flights between Songshan Airport and Hongqiao Airport are transforming Songshan Airport into a business airport. The DPP has alleged that business airports are beneficial only to the wealthy, but not to ordinary members of the public. Thirty years ago it was the highway system. At the time the "dang wai" movement alleged that the highway system was beneficial only to the wealthy, not the ordinary citizen.
ECFA will have different impacts on different industries. Some favorable, some unfavorable. At the macro level, one must weigh the benefits against the deficits. At the micro level, impacted industries must be protected. In other words, one must simultaneously liberalize and protect. One must not focus solely on one's political agenda, demagoguing the issue by inciting rich vs. poor class struggle. Unfortunately the "dang wai" movement and the DPP have relentlessly turned the highway system, commercial airports, and ECFA into grist for the political mill.
In fact, the DPP is not a class-based political party. Nor is it a left-wing political party. Its rich vs. poor rhetoric is merely a tool in its political struggle. The clearest example is the year 2000. Before the Chen administration assumed power, various social movements within the DPP were highly active. But soon after the DPP assumed power, these social movements withered on the vine. Collusion between the Chen regime and Big Business created a major stink. Now that the DPP has been forced out of office, these fringe groups have gradually been revived. As we can see, the DPP's proletarian and leftist coloration is mere opportunistic posturing, devoid of substance or meaning.
In fact, the DPP is one of the few political parties among the world's emerging democracies without any trace of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist political coloration. The reason is the Democratic Progressive Party and the "dang wai" movement have their roots among wealthy "huang min" (Subjects of the Japanese Emperor), land owners, and foreign missionaries. That is why the DPP lacks an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist mindset. That is why the DPP's "proletariat" and "leftist" posturing does not come naturally, but is mere political posturing.
ECFA must simultaneously liberalize and protect. It must seek liberalization for key industries. It must seek protection for weaker industries. Tsai Ing-wen was once involved in WTO negotiations. She knows this perfectly well. So does the Democratic Progressive Party, which oversaw its signing. Yet in order to demagogue the ECFA controversy, the DPP is shouting slogans such as "The KMT and the CCP are singing a duet" and "The rich and the poor are locked in a class struggle." It is linking "opposition to [mainland] China" with "opposition to the rich." This is no different from allegations that commercial airports and the highway system are beneficial only to the rich. It has merely raised the ante.
The ECFA early harvest list has yet to be made public. Yet the DPP is already screaming "The government failed to demand what it should have demanded. It failed to defend what it should have defended." It is clearly shooting first and asking questions later. No matter what the issue, it is determined to apply this same rote formula. The DPP is not interested in a rational policy debate. It is waging a political war.
In the past, the DPP demagogued the issue of "old age allowances" and "elderly farmers allowances." But these were merely local issues. Now the DPP is turning ECFA into a class struggle between conglomerates and the underprivileged. It is equating the interests of conglomerates with "pandering to [mainland] China." It is equating "opposition to the rich" with "opposition to [mainland] China." It is equating "hatred of the rich" with "hatred of [mainland] China." Isn't such political demagoguery just a wee bit excessive? Every time the DPP wants a baby, it advocates taking a knife and cutting the baby out of the mother's womb.
The DPP is not a left-wing political party. It is merely an "ersatz leftist" or "pseudo-leftist" political party. The ECFA controversy is the first time the DPP has linked "opposition to the rich" with "opposition to [mainland] China" and "hatred of the rich" with "hatred of [mainland] China." It is playing upon the resentment felt by weaker industries and the insecurity felt by disadvantaged groups. The DPP's demagoguery is not helping the public balance liberalization with protection. It is merely enabling the DPP to use ECFA to divide the rich and the poor, the cities from the countryside, and the nation as a whole.
Tsai Ing-wen comes from a wealthy family. Yet she has now become the most "leftist" chairman ever of the Democratic Progressive Party. Confronted with the impact of ECFA, she advocates "forsaking our economics first priorities" and "repudiating our export-oriented model." Is this "genuine leftism" or "ersatz leftism?" Is it a "alternative policy" for national governance? Or it is merely an agenda for partisan political struggle?
民進黨遊行與「假左」路線
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.24 02:47 am
民進黨周六發動「反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行」，主調是「國共唱和，貧富鬥爭」。其中，「國共唱和」已是老調，「貧富鬥爭」的操作則有後來居上之勢。
「貧富鬥爭」的主論述是：ＥＣＦＡ（兩岸經濟協議）只是對財團有利，卻對「弱勢產業」不利，對農業不利，對基層勞工不利。
其實，這種論述模式並無新義。日前「松山 ／虹橋」對飛，松山機場將朝「商務機場」轉型；民進黨也說，商務機場只是對有錢人有利，對社會大眾不利。更早的事例是三十多年前高速公路通車，當時的「黨外」也說，高速公路只利於「有錢人」，但對庶民不利。
ＥＣＦＡ對各種產業有不同影響，有利有不利。從宏觀角度看，應當考量是否「利大於弊」；從微觀角度看，對受到衝擊的產業，則應設法保護。也就是說，應當注重「開放」與「保護」的政策比例，而不宜只著眼於政治算計，動輒將之操作成貧富對立的階級鬥爭。但是，黨外及民進黨卻將高速公路、商務機場及ＥＣＦＡ，一律操作成貧富階級鬥爭。
民進黨其實不是一個階級政黨，也不是一個左翼政黨；它的貧富鬥爭論，只是政治鬥爭的補充。最顯著的例證是，在二○○○年陳水扁政府執政以前，民進黨種種社運組織的外圍團體皆十分活躍；及至二○○○年民進黨執政，這些社運團體竟紛告萎縮，扁政府的政商勾結卻反而臭不可聞；如今，民進黨又下野，這些外圍團體又漸活躍起來。可見，民進黨的階級色彩或「左」的表現，只是政治操作的工具，而非其內涵或本質。
其實，民進黨是世界新興民主國家中，極少數自始不具反帝及反資色彩的新興政黨之一。因為，民進黨及黨外的社會根源，是來自皇民、地主及外來教會的資產階級；所以在精神思維上不致反帝及反資。因而，民進黨的階級性及「左」的表現，不是出自內在，而只是政治操作的權謀而已。
ＥＣＦＡ必須注意「開放」與「保護」的政策比例，為關鍵產業爭「開放」，為弱勢產業爭「保護」。這一點，曾經參與ＷＴＯ談判的蔡英文，及主導簽署的民進黨皆深知熟悉。但是，民進黨如今卻以「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」來操作ＥＣＦＡ的爭議，將「反中」與「反富」聯結，這與指商務機場與高速公路只利於「有錢人」並無不同，且是變本加厲。
ＥＣＦＡ的早收清單猶未公布，但民進黨已經宣示，將以「該要的要不到／該守的守不住」進行抗爭。這擺明的是「先射箭，再畫靶」，不論三七二十一，只要往這個「公式」裡頭套即可；這不是理性的政策辯論，而是政治鬥爭。
過去，民進黨亦曾運用「老人津貼」、「老農津貼」等題材，但皆只是「局部」的議題。如今民進黨將ＥＣＦＡ炒作成一個「財團vs.弱勢」的階級議題，又將財團利益與傾中聯結，於是把「反富」與「反中」、「仇富」與「仇中」混在一起；這樣的政治操作，會不會太超過？每到爭取嬰兒之時，民進黨皆是主張用刀分嬰的母親。
民進黨不是一個左翼政黨，而始終只是一個「假左」或「偽左」的政黨。ＥＣＦＡ的爭議，則是民進黨首次將「反富／反中」、「仇富／仇中」作為聯結操作；玩弄弱勢產業的相對剝奪感，煽動弱勢族群的不安全感；其效應不是協助國人共同面對ＥＣＦＡ「開放／保護」的兼籌並顧，而只是要利用ＥＣＦＡ來撕裂貧富，撕裂城鄉，撕裂國家。
蔡英文是富豪之女，如今她竟然成了民進黨有史以來最「左」的黨主席。面對ＥＣＦＡ的衝擊，她居然主張「放棄經濟掛帥／否定出口導向」。試問：這是「真左」，還是「假左」？是國家的「替代方案」，還是政黨的「鬥爭方案」？
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
ECFA: Multivitamin Formula for Taiwan's Economy
ECFA: Multivitamin Formula for Taiwan's Economy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 23, 2010
Negotiations over the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) have begun. The contents of the "early harvest" list have gradually emerged. As one can imagine, some items were not included. Or else they were included, but the items were not manufactured by that many companies. This led to much dissatisfaction. Take the petrochemical industry. Wang Wen-yuan, CEO of the industry leading Formosa Plastics Group said "It's so sad, I'm almost in tears." Don't even mention "Boss Lai," whom President Ma Ying-jeou cited during the Two Yings Debate. If his company fails to benefit from ECFA, he won't be sad. He'll commit suicide by smashing his head into a wall.
During the Two Yings Debate, the most impressive aspect of President Ma's performance was his reference to living, breathing industry heads. When President Ma visited Boss Lai's factory in Taichung, Lai told him that if machine tool exports are good, our workers' jobs will be secure. If exports are poor, our workers' will be negatively impacted. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen asserted that not signing ECFA would lead to a less than 1% difference in tariffs. President Ma made a point of refuting her. He said Boss Lai told him the difference in tariffs for the machine tool industry would be a whopping 8%! Invoking Boss Lai allowed the president to gain quite a few debating points. But because he was the only concrete example cited during the entire debate, Boss Lai in effect became the star of the Two Yings Debate. It was widely assumed that Boss Lai's machine tools would be included on the ECFA early harvest list, and become one of the major players.
To everyones' surprise automotive, petrochemical, and machine tools did not appear on the early harvest list during the third round of cross-strait negotiations as expected. The automotive parts section did not include "assembled vehicles." The industry is disappointed. But at this stage measures relating to liberalization are extremely complex. They include quota allocations, the coordination of regulations, the determination of local content rates. None of these can be determined in such a short period of time. Take the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), for example. Parts and assemblies must include 62.5% local content before they may be sold. Taiwan clearly cannot achieve this standard. The scale and capacity of the mainland's automobile production far exceeds that of Taiwan. Full liberalization would leave Taiwan companies unable to compete. For Taiwan the WTO model of quota management and gradual opening is actually more favorable and less stressful. Therefore industry heads can probably accept the removal of the automotive industry from the first phase list. Can Taiwan's automotive industry achieve international competitiveness? Can it emerge from its limited and weak situation in Taiwan's market? ECFA provides an important opportunity. We can proceed slowly, but not too slowly.
One week remains between now and the siging of ECFA, scheduled for the end of June. Both sides are preparing for begin the fourth round of consultations. In response to industry disappointment, Premier Wu Den-yih explained. The petrochemical industry originally proposed 111 items. Agreements have already been reached on 94 of them. Items not included constitute a small part of the whole. Over a dozen machine tool items are already included on the early harvest list. According to senior party and government sources, our side has already proposed a 38 item early harvest list. Among them, eight machine tool industry items and one petrochemical industry item may be included. Petrochemicals and machine tools are Taiwan's strengths. Of course the mainland will object. The best thing to do is to wait for the final outcome.
In any bilateral economic and trade negotiations, each side always fights for its own interests and attempts to minimize any potential losses or negative impacts. For industry heads, these are commercial interests that must be fought for. For the Republic of China government, they include undeniable political as well as economic interests. This is especially true during election season, when ECFA has become a political football. The DPP, the Taiwan Solidarity Union and "nativist" pressure groups are preparing an anti-ECFA protest march this weekend. If the early harvest list is not as favorable as expected, "nativist" pressure groups will feel even more justified in their opposition. Former supporters may wonder, if the government failed to obtain the best terms possible, what was it all for?
Famed management guru Kenichi Ohmae spoke at the presidential palace last month. He said ECFA is a multivitamin formula that can strengthen Taiwan's economy. Even Japan is concerned. ECFA and FTAs allow businesses on Taiwan to compete on a level playing field. Next year is critical, and will decide whether businesses on Taiwan can ascend to the world stage. The matter is urgent and requires immediate action. Originally Ohmae did not think consultations between Taiwan and the mainland would come to much. But mainland China has demonstrated considerable patience. Therefore ECFA offers many incentives for Taiwan. Taiwan can become a hub for Greater China. Even if it does not become an airline hub, it can become a business hub. According to Ohmae Taiwan need not worry about excessive reliance on the mainland. All Asian countries are in the same boat. One could even say that Taiwan is using its advantages to take the lead.
Taiwan's advantages are geographical, economic, and to some extent political. In the face of strong international competition and irreversible cross-Strait developments, one must seize the moment. One must seek a satisfactory result for a majority of the people. If the results are not as expected, then one of the greatest achievements of the Ma administration may instead become one of its worst liabilities, and negatively impact the year end five cities mayoral elections. The negotiating team must remain vigilant and put out its best effort.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.06.23
社論－ECFA是精心調製維他命 可補台灣經濟
本報訊
隨著兩岸磋商經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）展開，列入早收清單的項目陸續出爐。可想而知，部分沒納入、或納入但品項並不太多的業者，大為跳腳；以石化業為例，龍頭台塑集團總裁王文淵都表示，「很傷心，快要哭出來」；更甭提曾經被馬英九總統在雙英辯論援引為例子的工具機業者「賴老闆」，萬一沒能因為ＥＣＦＡ獲利，大概不只傷心，還會想撞牆了。
雙英辯論中，馬總統表現最讓人印象深刻的就是舉出他實際拜訪業者的例子。馬總統拜訪的就是工廠位在台中的賴老闆，賴老闆告訴總統，工具機出口好，員工生計就好，出口差就受影響；馬總統還特別反駁民進黨主席蔡英文所稱簽不簽ＥＣＦＡ差別只在平均零點幾的關稅，同樣以賴老闆告訴他的工具機關稅一差就是百分之八！因為賴老闆，讓總統辯論生色不少，也因為全場辯論會只有這麼一個具體案例，讓「賴老闆」幾乎成為雙英辯論會的最佳男主角。一般預期，賴老闆所屬的工具機，也會成為兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ的早收清單中，必然會出現的主角之一。
沒想到，兩岸第三次磋商早收清單，汽車、石化、工具機都不如預期。汽車部分，未將「整車」納入清單，業者雖然失望，但由於現階段有關開放的相關配套措施，非常複雜，從配額的調配，法規的融合，到自製率的認定等，都不是短時間能完成。以北美自由貿易區為例，產品零組件必須達到區域內採購佔百分之六十二點五，才能上場，台灣顯然還達不到這個標準。同時，大陸市場規模和車廠的產能都遠遠在台灣之上，萬一全面開放，台灣業者難有立足之地，對台灣而言，採用ＷＴＯ模式，配額管理、逐年開放，反而是降低衝擊比較有利的做法；因此，業者大抵能接受汽車與第一階段開放清單脫勾。但是，台灣車輛工業能否建立國際競爭力，擺脫台灣小而弱的市場現況，ＥＣＦＡ是重要的契機，就算慢，也不能拖太久。
距離六月底簽署ＥＣＦＡ的既定時程，還有一星期，兩岸也準備展開第四次磋商。對業者的失望，行政院長吳敦義說明，石化業原本提出一百一十一項，已經同意納入的有九十四項，沒納入的其實是產量較小的部分；至於工具機則已有十幾項納入早收清單。據黨政高層人士透露，在上述已納入部分，台灣已經再提出卅八項早收清單，其中有八項工具機和一項石化業有機會納入，由於石化和工具機都是台灣的強項，大陸方面難免還有意見，還是得看最後關頭的磋商結果而定。
任何雙邊經貿談判，都免不了為自己爭取最大利益，減少最多可能的損失和衝擊。對業者而言，牽涉到行業利益，非爭不可；對台灣整體而言，除了經濟，無可諱言，還有政治上的利害。尤其是ＥＣＦＡ議題已成為選舉焦點話題之一，包括民進黨、台聯及本土社團準備在周未舉行反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行，如果早收清單不如業界預期，則更讓本土社團認為反對有理，原本支持者也容易懷疑，如果沒能爭取到最大利益，那麼所為何來？
誠如日本知名策略大師大前研一在總統府月會演講所言，ＥＣＦＡ是精心調製的維他命，可為台灣補經濟，包括日本都非常關切。從ＥＣＦＡ到ＦＴＡ，讓台灣能在公平競爭場域競爭，明年就是關鍵期，台灣能否攀升到世界舞台，刻不容緩，應立刻採取行動。過去，他從不預期台灣和大陸的磋商會有太好的成果，但是中國大陸卻表現相當的耐心，因此未來台灣有很多誘因可以成為大中華區的樞紐，即使不是航空的樞紐，卻肯定可以成為企業的樞紐，台灣也不必擔心過度依賴中國大陸，因為所有的亞洲國家都是如此，事實上，「台灣是利用優勢打前鋒。」
台灣的優勢有地理上的、經濟上的、某種程度還有政治上的。面對強勁的國際競爭，以及不可逆轉的兩岸關係，關鍵時刻只能全力拚搏，非爭到一個相對讓多數民眾滿意的結果不可；如果未如預期，這個馬政府引以為傲最大政績之一，反而可能成為年底五都選舉的最大地雷。談判隊伍不可不慎，不可不勉力為之！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 23, 2010
Negotiations over the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) have begun. The contents of the "early harvest" list have gradually emerged. As one can imagine, some items were not included. Or else they were included, but the items were not manufactured by that many companies. This led to much dissatisfaction. Take the petrochemical industry. Wang Wen-yuan, CEO of the industry leading Formosa Plastics Group said "It's so sad, I'm almost in tears." Don't even mention "Boss Lai," whom President Ma Ying-jeou cited during the Two Yings Debate. If his company fails to benefit from ECFA, he won't be sad. He'll commit suicide by smashing his head into a wall.
During the Two Yings Debate, the most impressive aspect of President Ma's performance was his reference to living, breathing industry heads. When President Ma visited Boss Lai's factory in Taichung, Lai told him that if machine tool exports are good, our workers' jobs will be secure. If exports are poor, our workers' will be negatively impacted. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen asserted that not signing ECFA would lead to a less than 1% difference in tariffs. President Ma made a point of refuting her. He said Boss Lai told him the difference in tariffs for the machine tool industry would be a whopping 8%! Invoking Boss Lai allowed the president to gain quite a few debating points. But because he was the only concrete example cited during the entire debate, Boss Lai in effect became the star of the Two Yings Debate. It was widely assumed that Boss Lai's machine tools would be included on the ECFA early harvest list, and become one of the major players.
To everyones' surprise automotive, petrochemical, and machine tools did not appear on the early harvest list during the third round of cross-strait negotiations as expected. The automotive parts section did not include "assembled vehicles." The industry is disappointed. But at this stage measures relating to liberalization are extremely complex. They include quota allocations, the coordination of regulations, the determination of local content rates. None of these can be determined in such a short period of time. Take the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), for example. Parts and assemblies must include 62.5% local content before they may be sold. Taiwan clearly cannot achieve this standard. The scale and capacity of the mainland's automobile production far exceeds that of Taiwan. Full liberalization would leave Taiwan companies unable to compete. For Taiwan the WTO model of quota management and gradual opening is actually more favorable and less stressful. Therefore industry heads can probably accept the removal of the automotive industry from the first phase list. Can Taiwan's automotive industry achieve international competitiveness? Can it emerge from its limited and weak situation in Taiwan's market? ECFA provides an important opportunity. We can proceed slowly, but not too slowly.
One week remains between now and the siging of ECFA, scheduled for the end of June. Both sides are preparing for begin the fourth round of consultations. In response to industry disappointment, Premier Wu Den-yih explained. The petrochemical industry originally proposed 111 items. Agreements have already been reached on 94 of them. Items not included constitute a small part of the whole. Over a dozen machine tool items are already included on the early harvest list. According to senior party and government sources, our side has already proposed a 38 item early harvest list. Among them, eight machine tool industry items and one petrochemical industry item may be included. Petrochemicals and machine tools are Taiwan's strengths. Of course the mainland will object. The best thing to do is to wait for the final outcome.
In any bilateral economic and trade negotiations, each side always fights for its own interests and attempts to minimize any potential losses or negative impacts. For industry heads, these are commercial interests that must be fought for. For the Republic of China government, they include undeniable political as well as economic interests. This is especially true during election season, when ECFA has become a political football. The DPP, the Taiwan Solidarity Union and "nativist" pressure groups are preparing an anti-ECFA protest march this weekend. If the early harvest list is not as favorable as expected, "nativist" pressure groups will feel even more justified in their opposition. Former supporters may wonder, if the government failed to obtain the best terms possible, what was it all for?
Famed management guru Kenichi Ohmae spoke at the presidential palace last month. He said ECFA is a multivitamin formula that can strengthen Taiwan's economy. Even Japan is concerned. ECFA and FTAs allow businesses on Taiwan to compete on a level playing field. Next year is critical, and will decide whether businesses on Taiwan can ascend to the world stage. The matter is urgent and requires immediate action. Originally Ohmae did not think consultations between Taiwan and the mainland would come to much. But mainland China has demonstrated considerable patience. Therefore ECFA offers many incentives for Taiwan. Taiwan can become a hub for Greater China. Even if it does not become an airline hub, it can become a business hub. According to Ohmae Taiwan need not worry about excessive reliance on the mainland. All Asian countries are in the same boat. One could even say that Taiwan is using its advantages to take the lead.
Taiwan's advantages are geographical, economic, and to some extent political. In the face of strong international competition and irreversible cross-Strait developments, one must seize the moment. One must seek a satisfactory result for a majority of the people. If the results are not as expected, then one of the greatest achievements of the Ma administration may instead become one of its worst liabilities, and negatively impact the year end five cities mayoral elections. The negotiating team must remain vigilant and put out its best effort.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.06.23
社論－ECFA是精心調製維他命 可補台灣經濟
本報訊
隨著兩岸磋商經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）展開，列入早收清單的項目陸續出爐。可想而知，部分沒納入、或納入但品項並不太多的業者，大為跳腳；以石化業為例，龍頭台塑集團總裁王文淵都表示，「很傷心，快要哭出來」；更甭提曾經被馬英九總統在雙英辯論援引為例子的工具機業者「賴老闆」，萬一沒能因為ＥＣＦＡ獲利，大概不只傷心，還會想撞牆了。
雙英辯論中，馬總統表現最讓人印象深刻的就是舉出他實際拜訪業者的例子。馬總統拜訪的就是工廠位在台中的賴老闆，賴老闆告訴總統，工具機出口好，員工生計就好，出口差就受影響；馬總統還特別反駁民進黨主席蔡英文所稱簽不簽ＥＣＦＡ差別只在平均零點幾的關稅，同樣以賴老闆告訴他的工具機關稅一差就是百分之八！因為賴老闆，讓總統辯論生色不少，也因為全場辯論會只有這麼一個具體案例，讓「賴老闆」幾乎成為雙英辯論會的最佳男主角。一般預期，賴老闆所屬的工具機，也會成為兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ的早收清單中，必然會出現的主角之一。
沒想到，兩岸第三次磋商早收清單，汽車、石化、工具機都不如預期。汽車部分，未將「整車」納入清單，業者雖然失望，但由於現階段有關開放的相關配套措施，非常複雜，從配額的調配，法規的融合，到自製率的認定等，都不是短時間能完成。以北美自由貿易區為例，產品零組件必須達到區域內採購佔百分之六十二點五，才能上場，台灣顯然還達不到這個標準。同時，大陸市場規模和車廠的產能都遠遠在台灣之上，萬一全面開放，台灣業者難有立足之地，對台灣而言，採用ＷＴＯ模式，配額管理、逐年開放，反而是降低衝擊比較有利的做法；因此，業者大抵能接受汽車與第一階段開放清單脫勾。但是，台灣車輛工業能否建立國際競爭力，擺脫台灣小而弱的市場現況，ＥＣＦＡ是重要的契機，就算慢，也不能拖太久。
距離六月底簽署ＥＣＦＡ的既定時程，還有一星期，兩岸也準備展開第四次磋商。對業者的失望，行政院長吳敦義說明，石化業原本提出一百一十一項，已經同意納入的有九十四項，沒納入的其實是產量較小的部分；至於工具機則已有十幾項納入早收清單。據黨政高層人士透露，在上述已納入部分，台灣已經再提出卅八項早收清單，其中有八項工具機和一項石化業有機會納入，由於石化和工具機都是台灣的強項，大陸方面難免還有意見，還是得看最後關頭的磋商結果而定。
任何雙邊經貿談判，都免不了為自己爭取最大利益，減少最多可能的損失和衝擊。對業者而言，牽涉到行業利益，非爭不可；對台灣整體而言，除了經濟，無可諱言，還有政治上的利害。尤其是ＥＣＦＡ議題已成為選舉焦點話題之一，包括民進黨、台聯及本土社團準備在周未舉行反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行，如果早收清單不如業界預期，則更讓本土社團認為反對有理，原本支持者也容易懷疑，如果沒能爭取到最大利益，那麼所為何來？
誠如日本知名策略大師大前研一在總統府月會演講所言，ＥＣＦＡ是精心調製的維他命，可為台灣補經濟，包括日本都非常關切。從ＥＣＦＡ到ＦＴＡ，讓台灣能在公平競爭場域競爭，明年就是關鍵期，台灣能否攀升到世界舞台，刻不容緩，應立刻採取行動。過去，他從不預期台灣和大陸的磋商會有太好的成果，但是中國大陸卻表現相當的耐心，因此未來台灣有很多誘因可以成為大中華區的樞紐，即使不是航空的樞紐，卻肯定可以成為企業的樞紐，台灣也不必擔心過度依賴中國大陸，因為所有的亞洲國家都是如此，事實上，「台灣是利用優勢打前鋒。」
台灣的優勢有地理上的、經濟上的、某種程度還有政治上的。面對強勁的國際競爭，以及不可逆轉的兩岸關係，關鍵時刻只能全力拚搏，非爭到一個相對讓多數民眾滿意的結果不可；如果未如預期，這個馬政府引以為傲最大政績之一，反而可能成為年底五都選舉的最大地雷。談判隊伍不可不慎，不可不勉力為之！
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
RMB Revaluation Will Test Taiwan Exports
RMB Revaluation Will Test Taiwan Exports
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 22, 2010
This weekend the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit will be held in Toronto, Canada. On the 19th, the Bank of China (PBOC) announced that it would take another step toward the formation of a RMB exchange rate mechanism. The RMB would no longer be pegged to the U.S. Dollar. This policy statement was interpreted as a positive response to international calls for the upward revaluation of the RMB. It may help resolve Sino-US trade tensions. On Monday the RMB rose sharply against the dollar. It closed on a new high, the highest since July 2005. Asian currencies and stock markets rose in tandem. The US and the EU are certain to return to a floating exchange rate mechanism.
The PBOC stressed that the RMB will be pegged to a basket of currencies, rather than the USD. The RMB would not be revalued upward in a single move. The RMB is currently not subject to sharp fluctuations. This statement clearly shows that the RMB will not be revalued abruptly in a single move, and will not be subjected to floating range trading practices.
During the September 2008 financial crisis Asian currencies plummeted one after the other. The Bank of China pegged the RMB to the dollar, and played a key role in ensuring stability. Since the beginning of this year, international pressures for the upward revaluation of the RMB have increased. News reports note that in early April the Beijing authorities undertook exchange rate reform. They intend to allow the RMB to float periodically. A second earthquake and the European debt crisis forced the postponement of these reform measures until the end of June.
The Beijing authorities have always adopted a hardline attitude in response to international calls for RMB revaluation. They have always said that the yuan is a Chinese currency, and must not be the target of irresponsible remarks by the international community. The current PBOC statement stressed that RMB exchange rate reform would help fluctuations remain within a controllable range, consistent with mainland China's economic fundamentals and macro-control needs, and that it would adopt a gradual approach. The current change will help mainland China's balance of payments, and is not directed at bilateral trade issues with any particular country.
The market believes the new wave of RMB revaluations will not be too large. This year the RMB rose 16.5% against the Euro. This has seriously eroded the profitability of mainland China's exports to Europe. New York University economics professor Nouriel Roubin thinks if the Euro continues to weaken after the RMB adopts floating range practices, that it may need to be devalued. According to a Bloomberg News survey, RMB Exchange Bank personnel expect it to appreciate about 1.9% before the end of the year
It is generally believed that the return to a floating range RMB exchange rate mechanism demonstrates mainland China's confidence in an economic recovery. For the mainland, it will help contain inflation and promote economic restructuring. The appreciation of the RMB will be conducive to industries keyed to domestic demand. Airline and metal stocks in particular have soared, and people's purchasing power has increased. Upward revaluation will also improve the standard of living. Internationally, RMB revaluation will reduce the imbalance in global trade, in particular under-consumption in the United States and Europe. The United States hopes the mainland Chinese domestic market will play a balancing role.
Observers have long expected a revaluation of the RMB. But Foxconn is being battered by waves of wage increases. The revaluation will have a considerable impact on mainland China's export-oriented businesses, as well as Taiwan businesses on the mainland. The PBOC statement stressed that reform will promote industrial upgrading, reorient the economic development model towards domestic demand, and shift export industries from simple processing to advanced processing and finishing. Reform will help employees shift from manufacturing jobs to service jobs. This statement clearly shows that Taiwan businesses can no longer rely on export-oriented exchange rate advantages to earn a modest profit. They must make a full commitment to transformation and upgrading.
Consider the upward revaluations of the NTD between 1986 and 1989. Shoes, umbrellas, sunglasses, household appliances, textiles, and other industries gradually moved to the mainland in search of low cost labor and land, and established a whole new realm on the mainland. Between 2005 and 2008, the RMB rose 21% against the USD. Mainland wages rose, and environmental conditions improved. Taiwan businesses moved once again, this time to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia. Over the years, Taiwan businesses have used mainland China's vast low-wage labor resources and favorable exchange rates to create numerous OEM miracles.
Now, a new wave of RMB revaluation, however modest, means that mainland China has begun changing its industrial structure. An increased emphasis on domestic demand will test export-oriented Taiwan businesses. They will face pressure to move upmarket. Only by adding value can Taiwan businesses prevail. OEM industries must make the transition to branding. The road may be hard, but computer industry success stories include Acer and ASUS. Only by developing one's brand, can one integrate one's resources in the production chain. Otherwise one will be forced to offshore once again in search of lower wages.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.06.22
社論－人民幣升值趨勢考驗出口台商
本報訊
本周末二十國集團(Ｇ20)將在加拿大多倫多召開高峰會，中國人民銀行（人行）十九日宣布進一步推進人民幣匯率形成機制改革，不再緊盯美元，各界解讀這項政策宣示有助於轉移國際間對人民幣升值的壓力，並化解中美之間貿易緊張關係。周一人民幣兌美元匯率勁揚，收盤升至二○○五年七月以來新高，亞洲貨幣、股市亦同步上漲，美國與歐盟均肯定人民幣匯率回歸浮動機制的作法。
人行強調，人民幣將依一籃子貨幣進行調節，不會緊盯美元，更不會一次重估人民幣價值；當前人民幣不存在大幅波動和變化的基礎。這項說法明白顯示，人民幣不會採取一次性大幅升值以及放寬浮動區間的作法。
二○○八年九月金融海嘯期間，亞洲貨幣紛紛貶值之際，中國人民銀行將人民幣匯率盯住美元，扮演了穩定的關鍵性角色。今年初以來，國際間對於人民幣匯率升值的預期越來越高，媒體報導指出，其實中國官方原本打算四月初就採取匯率改革，讓人民幣回歸區間浮動機制。後來接連爆發地震與歐債危機，才使得這項匯改措施延後到六月底。
對於國際間要求人民幣升值的聲浪，北京當局向來態度強硬，並表示人民幣是中國貨幣，不容國際說三道四。這次人行在聲明中特別強調，人民幣匯率改革是在確保匯率波動幅度可控範圍內，符合中國經濟基本面和宏觀調控的需要，並且採取漸進方式。這次的匯改有助於中國的收支平衡，不是針對與特定國家的雙邊貿易問題。
市場普遍認為新一波人民幣升值幅度不至於太大，此外，今年以來人民幣兌歐元升值了十六．五％，已嚴重侵蝕中國對歐洲出口的獲利。紐約大學經濟系教授盧比尼甚至預期，如果歐元繼續走貶，人民幣改採區間浮動之後，可能貶值。據據彭博社調查，匯銀人士預期人民幣今年底以前升值幅度約一．九％。
一般認為，這次人民幣匯率回歸區間浮動機制是中國對經濟的復甦展現了信心，對大陸內部而言，有助於抑制通貨膨脹，並且促進經濟結構的轉型。人民幣的升值有利於內需產業，特別是航空與金屬類股均大漲，人們的購買力提高了，也有助於提升生活水平。在國際上，人民幣的升值有助於改善失衡的全球經貿，尤其美、歐的消費低迷之際，美國一直希望中國內需市場可以發揮平衡的作用。
儘管外界對人民幣匯率的升值早有預期，不過，此時在富士康掀起的加薪風潮下，這項升值仍對中國出口型企業與大陸台商造成相當的衝擊。人行在聲明中強調，改革有助於推動產業升級，調正經濟發展模式，朝向內需型發展，並將促使出口產業從簡單加工，轉向深加工與精加工，有助於就業人口從製造業向服務業移轉。這項說法明白顯示，出口型台商不能再依賴匯率優勢賺取微薄利潤了，必須要有全力轉型與升級的決心。
回顧一九八六年至八九年那一波新台幣升值風潮期間，國內包括鞋、傘、太陽眼鏡、家電、紡織等產業紛紛外移到大陸尋求低廉的工資與土地，在大陸開創另一片天；二○○五年至 ○八年間，人民幣兌美元升值了廿一％，大陸工資與環保條件也普遍提升，台商則進一步往越南、印度與東南亞發展。這些年來，台商利用大陸龐大而低廉的工資與匯率，創造了多項代工王國的奇蹟。
如今，新一波人民幣升值趨勢啟動，儘管幅度不大，卻意味著大陸正展開產業結構的調整，逐步重視內需產業，對出口型台商更是一大考驗。面對升值的壓力，台商唯有提高附加價值才能勝出，在發展代工產業之餘，也必須朝向品牌之路，這條路雖然艱辛，但電腦業如宏碁、華碩都是成功的案例。唯有發展品牌，才能在產業鍊中掌握整合資源的能力，否則只有被迫再轉移他地尋找更低廉的工資了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 22, 2010
This weekend the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit will be held in Toronto, Canada. On the 19th, the Bank of China (PBOC) announced that it would take another step toward the formation of a RMB exchange rate mechanism. The RMB would no longer be pegged to the U.S. Dollar. This policy statement was interpreted as a positive response to international calls for the upward revaluation of the RMB. It may help resolve Sino-US trade tensions. On Monday the RMB rose sharply against the dollar. It closed on a new high, the highest since July 2005. Asian currencies and stock markets rose in tandem. The US and the EU are certain to return to a floating exchange rate mechanism.
The PBOC stressed that the RMB will be pegged to a basket of currencies, rather than the USD. The RMB would not be revalued upward in a single move. The RMB is currently not subject to sharp fluctuations. This statement clearly shows that the RMB will not be revalued abruptly in a single move, and will not be subjected to floating range trading practices.
During the September 2008 financial crisis Asian currencies plummeted one after the other. The Bank of China pegged the RMB to the dollar, and played a key role in ensuring stability. Since the beginning of this year, international pressures for the upward revaluation of the RMB have increased. News reports note that in early April the Beijing authorities undertook exchange rate reform. They intend to allow the RMB to float periodically. A second earthquake and the European debt crisis forced the postponement of these reform measures until the end of June.
The Beijing authorities have always adopted a hardline attitude in response to international calls for RMB revaluation. They have always said that the yuan is a Chinese currency, and must not be the target of irresponsible remarks by the international community. The current PBOC statement stressed that RMB exchange rate reform would help fluctuations remain within a controllable range, consistent with mainland China's economic fundamentals and macro-control needs, and that it would adopt a gradual approach. The current change will help mainland China's balance of payments, and is not directed at bilateral trade issues with any particular country.
The market believes the new wave of RMB revaluations will not be too large. This year the RMB rose 16.5% against the Euro. This has seriously eroded the profitability of mainland China's exports to Europe. New York University economics professor Nouriel Roubin thinks if the Euro continues to weaken after the RMB adopts floating range practices, that it may need to be devalued. According to a Bloomberg News survey, RMB Exchange Bank personnel expect it to appreciate about 1.9% before the end of the year
It is generally believed that the return to a floating range RMB exchange rate mechanism demonstrates mainland China's confidence in an economic recovery. For the mainland, it will help contain inflation and promote economic restructuring. The appreciation of the RMB will be conducive to industries keyed to domestic demand. Airline and metal stocks in particular have soared, and people's purchasing power has increased. Upward revaluation will also improve the standard of living. Internationally, RMB revaluation will reduce the imbalance in global trade, in particular under-consumption in the United States and Europe. The United States hopes the mainland Chinese domestic market will play a balancing role.
Observers have long expected a revaluation of the RMB. But Foxconn is being battered by waves of wage increases. The revaluation will have a considerable impact on mainland China's export-oriented businesses, as well as Taiwan businesses on the mainland. The PBOC statement stressed that reform will promote industrial upgrading, reorient the economic development model towards domestic demand, and shift export industries from simple processing to advanced processing and finishing. Reform will help employees shift from manufacturing jobs to service jobs. This statement clearly shows that Taiwan businesses can no longer rely on export-oriented exchange rate advantages to earn a modest profit. They must make a full commitment to transformation and upgrading.
Consider the upward revaluations of the NTD between 1986 and 1989. Shoes, umbrellas, sunglasses, household appliances, textiles, and other industries gradually moved to the mainland in search of low cost labor and land, and established a whole new realm on the mainland. Between 2005 and 2008, the RMB rose 21% against the USD. Mainland wages rose, and environmental conditions improved. Taiwan businesses moved once again, this time to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia. Over the years, Taiwan businesses have used mainland China's vast low-wage labor resources and favorable exchange rates to create numerous OEM miracles.
Now, a new wave of RMB revaluation, however modest, means that mainland China has begun changing its industrial structure. An increased emphasis on domestic demand will test export-oriented Taiwan businesses. They will face pressure to move upmarket. Only by adding value can Taiwan businesses prevail. OEM industries must make the transition to branding. The road may be hard, but computer industry success stories include Acer and ASUS. Only by developing one's brand, can one integrate one's resources in the production chain. Otherwise one will be forced to offshore once again in search of lower wages.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.06.22
社論－人民幣升值趨勢考驗出口台商
本報訊
本周末二十國集團(Ｇ20)將在加拿大多倫多召開高峰會，中國人民銀行（人行）十九日宣布進一步推進人民幣匯率形成機制改革，不再緊盯美元，各界解讀這項政策宣示有助於轉移國際間對人民幣升值的壓力，並化解中美之間貿易緊張關係。周一人民幣兌美元匯率勁揚，收盤升至二○○五年七月以來新高，亞洲貨幣、股市亦同步上漲，美國與歐盟均肯定人民幣匯率回歸浮動機制的作法。
人行強調，人民幣將依一籃子貨幣進行調節，不會緊盯美元，更不會一次重估人民幣價值；當前人民幣不存在大幅波動和變化的基礎。這項說法明白顯示，人民幣不會採取一次性大幅升值以及放寬浮動區間的作法。
二○○八年九月金融海嘯期間，亞洲貨幣紛紛貶值之際，中國人民銀行將人民幣匯率盯住美元，扮演了穩定的關鍵性角色。今年初以來，國際間對於人民幣匯率升值的預期越來越高，媒體報導指出，其實中國官方原本打算四月初就採取匯率改革，讓人民幣回歸區間浮動機制。後來接連爆發地震與歐債危機，才使得這項匯改措施延後到六月底。
對於國際間要求人民幣升值的聲浪，北京當局向來態度強硬，並表示人民幣是中國貨幣，不容國際說三道四。這次人行在聲明中特別強調，人民幣匯率改革是在確保匯率波動幅度可控範圍內，符合中國經濟基本面和宏觀調控的需要，並且採取漸進方式。這次的匯改有助於中國的收支平衡，不是針對與特定國家的雙邊貿易問題。
市場普遍認為新一波人民幣升值幅度不至於太大，此外，今年以來人民幣兌歐元升值了十六．五％，已嚴重侵蝕中國對歐洲出口的獲利。紐約大學經濟系教授盧比尼甚至預期，如果歐元繼續走貶，人民幣改採區間浮動之後，可能貶值。據據彭博社調查，匯銀人士預期人民幣今年底以前升值幅度約一．九％。
一般認為，這次人民幣匯率回歸區間浮動機制是中國對經濟的復甦展現了信心，對大陸內部而言，有助於抑制通貨膨脹，並且促進經濟結構的轉型。人民幣的升值有利於內需產業，特別是航空與金屬類股均大漲，人們的購買力提高了，也有助於提升生活水平。在國際上，人民幣的升值有助於改善失衡的全球經貿，尤其美、歐的消費低迷之際，美國一直希望中國內需市場可以發揮平衡的作用。
儘管外界對人民幣匯率的升值早有預期，不過，此時在富士康掀起的加薪風潮下，這項升值仍對中國出口型企業與大陸台商造成相當的衝擊。人行在聲明中強調，改革有助於推動產業升級，調正經濟發展模式，朝向內需型發展，並將促使出口產業從簡單加工，轉向深加工與精加工，有助於就業人口從製造業向服務業移轉。這項說法明白顯示，出口型台商不能再依賴匯率優勢賺取微薄利潤了，必須要有全力轉型與升級的決心。
回顧一九八六年至八九年那一波新台幣升值風潮期間，國內包括鞋、傘、太陽眼鏡、家電、紡織等產業紛紛外移到大陸尋求低廉的工資與土地，在大陸開創另一片天；二○○五年至 ○八年間，人民幣兌美元升值了廿一％，大陸工資與環保條件也普遍提升，台商則進一步往越南、印度與東南亞發展。這些年來，台商利用大陸龐大而低廉的工資與匯率，創造了多項代工王國的奇蹟。
如今，新一波人民幣升值趨勢啟動，儘管幅度不大，卻意味著大陸正展開產業結構的調整，逐步重視內需產業，對出口型台商更是一大考驗。面對升值的壓力，台商唯有提高附加價值才能勝出，在發展代工產業之餘，也必須朝向品牌之路，這條路雖然艱辛，但電腦業如宏碁、華碩都是成功的案例。唯有發展品牌，才能在產業鍊中掌握整合資源的能力，否則只有被迫再轉移他地尋找更低廉的工資了。
Monday, June 21, 2010
Soft Power: Theme for a Golden Decade
Soft Power: Theme for a Golden Decade
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 21, 2010
Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-ping led a delegation to Shanghai to discuss direct flights between Songshan Airport and Hongqiao Airport. He spoke of using soft power to move the world. What exactly is Taiwan's "soft power?" How can it move the world?
The theme song of the Taiwan Pavilion at the Shanghai World Expo is "Taiwan's Heartbeat." The lyrics proclaim: "I piously light the incense stick. My hand holds a column of hope; A little less hate, a little more us; A little less chill, a little more gentleness; Use freehand to render Cloud Gate, use fireworks to build a city; Matsu abides, generation upon generation of the pious; Sky lanterns ascend, carrying aloft our wishes, no need to delay." The lyrics mention Taroko Gorge and the Lungshan Temple. They mention Mei Nung paper umbrellas and Sanyi woodcarvings. They mention Pingtung Bluefin Tuna and the neon lights of the night market. Visitors from Taiwan were moved to tears.
Make no mistake. This is the Taiwan we grew up with. This is the Taiwan we know and love. This is the Taiwan clear in our memories, the one we are eager to promote to the world. But this Taiwan reflects only Taiwan's inner cohesion. To move the world, we must bolster Taiwan's connections to the outside world. We must make Taiwan's connections to the outside world as strong as its internal cohesion. Only then can Taiwan's "soft power" flex its muscles.
The film "Cape No. 7" set box office records on Taiwan. It reduced many to tears. It made many laugh. But it left audiences in Hong Kong, mainland China, and even Japan cold. The reason was its local color, which included a mixture of Mandarin, Hoklo, Japanese, and English jokes. It was a uniquely "Taiwanese" experience. By the same token, if the Taiwan Pavilion theme song were to emphasize the Ba Jia Jiang and Yunghe Soybean Milk, many visitors would be left scratching their heads. That is why the song includes rap, and the lead singer is Jolin Tsai. That is why the Taipei Pavilion hired Wong Lee Hom as Goodwill Ambassador. They were popular in Chinese cities everywhere. These icons of pop culture in Southeast Asia attracted popular attention.
In recent years, Taiwan has gradually developed another kind of introspective self-confidence, rooted in "native" values, different from reckless "Taiwan is knee-deep in money" self-confidence. Today Taiwan needs more than just the ability to "connect with the outside world." It needs a more universal vision. It needs to connect with a more international aesthetic. The Cloud Gate Dance Theatre and Franz Porcelain are no longer the only cultural creative achievements capable of showcasing Taiwan's achievements. Other bits and pieces of culture and cultural artifacts are also worth introducing to the world.
For example, Luo Chi-cheng, newly appointed Chairman of the Kuanghua Cultural Centre, recently organized a series of exchanges between Hong Kong and Taiwan. He invited 20 cultural leaders from Taiwan to attend a forum in Hong Kong. Included were works by famed crossover Hong Kong author Wang Wenhua, "knowledge as value" illusionist Chan Hong-chi, and "First Witch of Taipei" Han Liang-lu. These people are all champions of high culture. They also command local market appeal on Taiwan. What matters today is not quasi-official efforts on behalf of "cultural exports." The marketing of art in the modern market place has helped MIT products rid themselves of the OEM label. It has given Sun Chui-feng and Yen Chang-shou the opportunity to represent Taiwan culture.
Today's Taiwan is no longer the OEM Taiwan that sells cheap umbrellas and plastic shoes. Today's Taiwan is not just Acer and Giant. Giant promoted local "bike culture" on Taiwan. It used cycling to encourage the "discovery of a new Taiwan." The Eslite brand has created an elevated "bookstore culture" on Taiwan, the mainland, and Hong Kong. Such achievements are truly remarkable. Proud people on Taiwan how have the courage to promote Taiwan. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-ping personally presented high school students in Shanghai with tickets to Taipei's Flower Expo. Tainan County Magistrate Su Huan-chih treated people to Taiwan mangoes in a Beijing supermarket. Their efforts were similarly motivated. They expressed the beauty of both content and form. They elevated Taiwan's soft power to new heights.
As Taiwan connects with the rest of the world, it has proclaimed a desire for peace. "Fewer scars, more applause. Fewer conflicts, more simplicity." The bottom line is that as Taiwan connects with the outside world, it must eventually return to person to person, lifestyle to lifestyle relationships. The best way to enhance the quality of life on Taiwan is summed up in lyrics of the song, "Taiwan's Hearbeat." "This is a land of many, many choices." This was a hard-won achievement. But this soft power is the best way to create a Golden Decade.
在軟實力的主軸上打造黃金十年
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.21 02:16 am
松山機場對飛虹橋，台北市長郝龍斌率團訪上海，說要用軟實力感動世界。台灣的「軟實力」是什麼？要如何能讓世界感動？
正在上海世博展出的台灣館，主題曲「台灣心跳聲」，是這麼唱的：「我虔誠點著香，手拿一炷希望；少一點仇恨，多一點的我們；少一點寒冷，多一點的溫存；用狂草寫雲門，用蜂炮築一座城；媽祖永恆，世世代代的虔誠；天燈冉冉在上升，可以許下願望，就別等……」歌詞裡還講到太魯閣和龍山寺，講到美濃紙傘和三義木雕，講到屏東黑鮪魚和夜市霓虹燈，讓很多台灣人聽來熱淚盈眶。
沒錯，這就是我們生長於斯的台灣，是我們熟知且熱愛的台灣，是我們記憶鮮明、樂意向世人推銷的台灣。不過，這些台灣之美，只是台灣內在的強項；要以這樣的力量去感動世人，還需要加強一下台灣和世界的「連結」。把台灣內部的力量和外部的連結搭配起來，才是完整的台灣「軟實力」，也才能彰顯台灣的優勢。
曾經在台灣創下票房紀錄，讓多少人哭、多少人笑的「海角七號」，在香港、大陸、甚至日本上演，並未能引起那麼大的共鳴，因為其中獨特的本土味，包括混雜了國、台、日、英語的對白笑點，可能只有具「台灣經驗」的觀眾群能心領神會。同樣地，世博台灣館的主題曲如果儘在強調八家將和永和豆漿，也未必能讓參觀者全然理解欣賞。於是，這首歌裡有ＲＡＰ，又由蔡依林主唱，就像台北館找來了王力宏當親善大使，這些紅遍華人城市、甚至整個東南亞的流行文化偶像，果然吸引了人氣鼎盛。
這些年，台灣漸漸發展出一種不同於「台灣錢淹腳目」的狂飆年代的自信心，比較能回頭省視、怡然自得於台灣本土之美。現在，台灣需要的不只是「走出去」的動力，更要經由一種比較普世化的途徑，來和國際的美學眼光接軌。可作為文創內涵或示範的已不只是例如雲門舞集或法藍瓷這種「台灣之光」的成績，點點滴滴還有各種精緻文化的代表性人和物，值得向世界推出。
舉例而言，新往香港上任的光華文化中心主任羅智成，最近設計一連串港台交流活動，邀請二十位台灣文化人赴港座談，包括作品已為港人熟知的「跨界修道的蛋白作家」王文華、「用知識創造價值的魔法師」詹宏志、「台北首席女巫」韓良露等人。這些人都是台灣精微文化生活的推手，名單拿出來，在台灣本地也足有市場吸引力。現在重點不僅是台灣的半官方代表努力於「文化外銷」的工作，而且加上了現代市場機制中的行銷藝術，使得行走世界的ＭＩＴ標籤不再只貼在代工商品上面，而是讓從孫翠鳳到嚴長壽，都有了為台灣文化代言的機會。
今天的台灣，已經不是賣廉價雨傘和塑膠鞋的「加工廠」台灣，甚至不只是賣宏碁和捷安特的「品牌」台灣。捷安特在台灣本地帶動了「自行車文化」，擴散而至單車環島的「發現新台灣」風氣；而誠品的品牌，甚至為兩岸三地創造了「書店文化」的高標竿。這樣的成績真是不簡單！自豪的台灣人，如今勇於向外行銷台灣，台北市長郝龍斌親自向上海中學生致贈花博門票，台南縣長蘇煥智在北京超市裡笑顏請人試吃芒果，出於同樣的心意加上努力，結合了台灣之美的內容和手段，把台灣的軟實力推上高峰。
台灣走向世界，不但宣示「少一點傷痕，多一點掌聲；少一點戰爭，多一點單純」這樣的和平心願；說到底，台灣和世界的接觸，最終要回復到人對人、生活對生活的層面。台灣在營造生活品質方面的最強項，正是「台灣心跳聲」歌裡所說的，「這塊土地上有很多很多的選擇」。這是得來不易的成績，要以這種軟實力作為打造黃金十年的主軸。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 21, 2010
Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-ping led a delegation to Shanghai to discuss direct flights between Songshan Airport and Hongqiao Airport. He spoke of using soft power to move the world. What exactly is Taiwan's "soft power?" How can it move the world?
The theme song of the Taiwan Pavilion at the Shanghai World Expo is "Taiwan's Heartbeat." The lyrics proclaim: "I piously light the incense stick. My hand holds a column of hope; A little less hate, a little more us; A little less chill, a little more gentleness; Use freehand to render Cloud Gate, use fireworks to build a city; Matsu abides, generation upon generation of the pious; Sky lanterns ascend, carrying aloft our wishes, no need to delay." The lyrics mention Taroko Gorge and the Lungshan Temple. They mention Mei Nung paper umbrellas and Sanyi woodcarvings. They mention Pingtung Bluefin Tuna and the neon lights of the night market. Visitors from Taiwan were moved to tears.
Make no mistake. This is the Taiwan we grew up with. This is the Taiwan we know and love. This is the Taiwan clear in our memories, the one we are eager to promote to the world. But this Taiwan reflects only Taiwan's inner cohesion. To move the world, we must bolster Taiwan's connections to the outside world. We must make Taiwan's connections to the outside world as strong as its internal cohesion. Only then can Taiwan's "soft power" flex its muscles.
The film "Cape No. 7" set box office records on Taiwan. It reduced many to tears. It made many laugh. But it left audiences in Hong Kong, mainland China, and even Japan cold. The reason was its local color, which included a mixture of Mandarin, Hoklo, Japanese, and English jokes. It was a uniquely "Taiwanese" experience. By the same token, if the Taiwan Pavilion theme song were to emphasize the Ba Jia Jiang and Yunghe Soybean Milk, many visitors would be left scratching their heads. That is why the song includes rap, and the lead singer is Jolin Tsai. That is why the Taipei Pavilion hired Wong Lee Hom as Goodwill Ambassador. They were popular in Chinese cities everywhere. These icons of pop culture in Southeast Asia attracted popular attention.
In recent years, Taiwan has gradually developed another kind of introspective self-confidence, rooted in "native" values, different from reckless "Taiwan is knee-deep in money" self-confidence. Today Taiwan needs more than just the ability to "connect with the outside world." It needs a more universal vision. It needs to connect with a more international aesthetic. The Cloud Gate Dance Theatre and Franz Porcelain are no longer the only cultural creative achievements capable of showcasing Taiwan's achievements. Other bits and pieces of culture and cultural artifacts are also worth introducing to the world.
For example, Luo Chi-cheng, newly appointed Chairman of the Kuanghua Cultural Centre, recently organized a series of exchanges between Hong Kong and Taiwan. He invited 20 cultural leaders from Taiwan to attend a forum in Hong Kong. Included were works by famed crossover Hong Kong author Wang Wenhua, "knowledge as value" illusionist Chan Hong-chi, and "First Witch of Taipei" Han Liang-lu. These people are all champions of high culture. They also command local market appeal on Taiwan. What matters today is not quasi-official efforts on behalf of "cultural exports." The marketing of art in the modern market place has helped MIT products rid themselves of the OEM label. It has given Sun Chui-feng and Yen Chang-shou the opportunity to represent Taiwan culture.
Today's Taiwan is no longer the OEM Taiwan that sells cheap umbrellas and plastic shoes. Today's Taiwan is not just Acer and Giant. Giant promoted local "bike culture" on Taiwan. It used cycling to encourage the "discovery of a new Taiwan." The Eslite brand has created an elevated "bookstore culture" on Taiwan, the mainland, and Hong Kong. Such achievements are truly remarkable. Proud people on Taiwan how have the courage to promote Taiwan. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-ping personally presented high school students in Shanghai with tickets to Taipei's Flower Expo. Tainan County Magistrate Su Huan-chih treated people to Taiwan mangoes in a Beijing supermarket. Their efforts were similarly motivated. They expressed the beauty of both content and form. They elevated Taiwan's soft power to new heights.
As Taiwan connects with the rest of the world, it has proclaimed a desire for peace. "Fewer scars, more applause. Fewer conflicts, more simplicity." The bottom line is that as Taiwan connects with the outside world, it must eventually return to person to person, lifestyle to lifestyle relationships. The best way to enhance the quality of life on Taiwan is summed up in lyrics of the song, "Taiwan's Hearbeat." "This is a land of many, many choices." This was a hard-won achievement. But this soft power is the best way to create a Golden Decade.
在軟實力的主軸上打造黃金十年
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.21 02:16 am
松山機場對飛虹橋，台北市長郝龍斌率團訪上海，說要用軟實力感動世界。台灣的「軟實力」是什麼？要如何能讓世界感動？
正在上海世博展出的台灣館，主題曲「台灣心跳聲」，是這麼唱的：「我虔誠點著香，手拿一炷希望；少一點仇恨，多一點的我們；少一點寒冷，多一點的溫存；用狂草寫雲門，用蜂炮築一座城；媽祖永恆，世世代代的虔誠；天燈冉冉在上升，可以許下願望，就別等……」歌詞裡還講到太魯閣和龍山寺，講到美濃紙傘和三義木雕，講到屏東黑鮪魚和夜市霓虹燈，讓很多台灣人聽來熱淚盈眶。
沒錯，這就是我們生長於斯的台灣，是我們熟知且熱愛的台灣，是我們記憶鮮明、樂意向世人推銷的台灣。不過，這些台灣之美，只是台灣內在的強項；要以這樣的力量去感動世人，還需要加強一下台灣和世界的「連結」。把台灣內部的力量和外部的連結搭配起來，才是完整的台灣「軟實力」，也才能彰顯台灣的優勢。
曾經在台灣創下票房紀錄，讓多少人哭、多少人笑的「海角七號」，在香港、大陸、甚至日本上演，並未能引起那麼大的共鳴，因為其中獨特的本土味，包括混雜了國、台、日、英語的對白笑點，可能只有具「台灣經驗」的觀眾群能心領神會。同樣地，世博台灣館的主題曲如果儘在強調八家將和永和豆漿，也未必能讓參觀者全然理解欣賞。於是，這首歌裡有ＲＡＰ，又由蔡依林主唱，就像台北館找來了王力宏當親善大使，這些紅遍華人城市、甚至整個東南亞的流行文化偶像，果然吸引了人氣鼎盛。
這些年，台灣漸漸發展出一種不同於「台灣錢淹腳目」的狂飆年代的自信心，比較能回頭省視、怡然自得於台灣本土之美。現在，台灣需要的不只是「走出去」的動力，更要經由一種比較普世化的途徑，來和國際的美學眼光接軌。可作為文創內涵或示範的已不只是例如雲門舞集或法藍瓷這種「台灣之光」的成績，點點滴滴還有各種精緻文化的代表性人和物，值得向世界推出。
舉例而言，新往香港上任的光華文化中心主任羅智成，最近設計一連串港台交流活動，邀請二十位台灣文化人赴港座談，包括作品已為港人熟知的「跨界修道的蛋白作家」王文華、「用知識創造價值的魔法師」詹宏志、「台北首席女巫」韓良露等人。這些人都是台灣精微文化生活的推手，名單拿出來，在台灣本地也足有市場吸引力。現在重點不僅是台灣的半官方代表努力於「文化外銷」的工作，而且加上了現代市場機制中的行銷藝術，使得行走世界的ＭＩＴ標籤不再只貼在代工商品上面，而是讓從孫翠鳳到嚴長壽，都有了為台灣文化代言的機會。
今天的台灣，已經不是賣廉價雨傘和塑膠鞋的「加工廠」台灣，甚至不只是賣宏碁和捷安特的「品牌」台灣。捷安特在台灣本地帶動了「自行車文化」，擴散而至單車環島的「發現新台灣」風氣；而誠品的品牌，甚至為兩岸三地創造了「書店文化」的高標竿。這樣的成績真是不簡單！自豪的台灣人，如今勇於向外行銷台灣，台北市長郝龍斌親自向上海中學生致贈花博門票，台南縣長蘇煥智在北京超市裡笑顏請人試吃芒果，出於同樣的心意加上努力，結合了台灣之美的內容和手段，把台灣的軟實力推上高峰。
台灣走向世界，不但宣示「少一點傷痕，多一點掌聲；少一點戰爭，多一點單純」這樣的和平心願；說到底，台灣和世界的接觸，最終要回復到人對人、生活對生活的層面。台灣在營造生活品質方面的最強項，正是「台灣心跳聲」歌裡所說的，「這塊土地上有很多很多的選擇」。這是得來不易的成績，要以這種軟實力作為打造黃金十年的主軸。
Friday, June 18, 2010
Su Tseng-chang's "Early Green" Loses to Lee Teng-hui's "Late Green"
Su Tseng-chang's "Early Green" Loses to Lee Teng-hui's "Late Green"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 18, 2010
Su Tseng-chang has yet to take a stand against ECFA. Some Taiwan independence advocates are saying, "If any of the five mayoral candidates fails to express opposition to ECFA, we will not support him."
One of the characteristics of Green Camp politicians is endless flip-flopping regarding their political path. For example, yesterday's "Five Noes" has become today's "one country on each side." Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang's flip-flopping on ECFA is even more flagrant than Lee Teng-hui's. Endless flip-flopping is not merely a characteristic of Green Camp politicians. It is also the main reason the Green Camp political path is unlikely to become the nation's political path.
Compare Lee Teng-hui, Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang. Su Tseng-chang has the deepest connections with the Green Camp. He was a Formosa Incident defense attorney. He is considered a first generation Green Camp elder. By contrast, Lee Teng-hui served as Republic of China president under the Nationalists for 12 years. He changed his political colors only after stepping down. Tsai Ing-wen got her start as a staffer in Lee Teng-hui's KMT. Only later did she defect to Ah-Bian's DPP. She was elected chairman of the DPP only four years after her defection. Su Chen-chang's political coloration was Green all the way. Lee Teng-hui and Tsai Ing-wen changed their political colors from Blue to Green. By comparison, their flip-flopping is far more obvious.
Now however, all three must confront ECFA. On today's Green Camp ideological spectrum, Lee Teng-hui and Tsai Ing-wen are paradoxically coming across as "greener" than Su Tseng-chang. Lee and Tsai were "Late Greens." Su was an "Early Green." Yet Lee and Tsai are coming across as greener than Su. The reasons behind this are intriguing.
Lee Teng-hui was the founder of the National Unification Council and the author of the Guidelines for National Unification. He was expelled from the KMT after serving out his term as president. Only then did he join the Green Camp. Even then he urged successor Chen Shui-bian not to dismantle the "two pillars," aka the National Unification Council and the National Unification Guidelines. After Ma Ying-jeou was elected president in 2008, Lee Teng-hui clearly hoped to cozy up to him. But the public response was negative, so Lee beat a hasty retreat. Lee was the standard-bearer for the National Unification Guidelines. Today, he has become the standard bearer for opposition to ECFA. Is such endless flip-flopping motivated by rational considerations, or merely by political opportunism?
Now take Tsai Ing-wen. During the Two Yings Debate, she had yet to express opposition to ECFA. She merely hoped to "delay signing" and demanded "conditions." But once the debate was lost, she had to position herself for re-election as party chairman. She had to respond to "Tsai/Su coopetition." That was when she began to characterize ECFA as a "duet sung by the KMT and CCP" and a "struggle between the rich and the poor." Consider the issue of national identity. That was when she went from referring to herself as the "former Vice Premier of the Republic of China," to referring to the Republic of China as a "government in exile." Such flip-flopping reflects internecine struggles within the Green Camp over both personal power and the nation's political future.
Su Tseng-chang was one of the DPP's founding fathers. Lee and Tsai were not. Su was a pioneer of the DPP's "Taiwan independence party platform." But Su's political path has never been all that clear. Su Tseng-chang's hollow political image is summed up by his equally hollow "charge, charge, charge" political mantra. In fact, the reason Su's political path has never been all that clear, is his major flip-flops. He once refused to back Ah-Bian. But now he has compromised. He once insisted he "would not accept the vice-presidential slot." But eventually he acquiesced to a "Hsieh/Su ticket." Today he is campaigning for Taipei Mayor. He has been forced to take a position on Songshan Airport and ECFA. If Su Tseng-chang were running for Mayor of Greater Kaohsiung, he probably would not hesitate to oppose ECFA. But he is running for Mayor of Taipei. He must use the moderate rhetoric of "Taipei and Beyond."
Compare Lee, Tsai, and Su. The defining character trait of Green Camp politicians is endless flip-flopping. Green Camp politicians flip-flop endlessly on their vision for the nation's future as well. Chen Shui-bian could go from "Five Noes" to "one country each side." Lee Teng-hui could go from proposing "National Unification Guidelines" to asserting that "the Republic of China no longer exists." Su Tseng-chang is running for Taipei Mayor. He feels compelled to adopt a moderate stance on ECFA. The other four DPP candidates however have all have expressed sharp opposition to ECFA. Even on such a major national issue, they are each going by their own playbook. They flip-flop personally. They flip-flop ideologically. The precedents set by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian provide us with a lesson. In response to threats to their personal power, Green Camp politicians flip-flop endlessly. But their endless flip-flopping paradoxically, generates to new threats to their personal power. Endless flip-flopping and endless threats to their personal power become two sides of a vicious cycle.
This vicious cycle makes it impossible for Green Camp leaders to extricate themselves from power crises. It make it impossible for the Green Camp to rise above endless flip-flopping regarding the nation's future. Should they advocate Taiwan independence? They flip-flop endlessly. They hem and haw. Should they back Ah-Bian? They flip-flop endlessly. They hem and haw. When in power, they say one thing. When out of power, they say something else altogether. They have one political platform for Taipei. They have an entirely different platform for the four other four cities.
While Su was drafting the "Taiwan Independence party platform," Lee was President of the Republic of China. He was holding high the "National Unification Guidelines." Tsai Ing-wen was still a nobody. Today however, Lee and Tsai are perceived as even greener and even more independence-minded than Su. If Su Tseng-chang were running for Mayor of Kaohsiung, would he allow Lee and Tsai to posture as "greener than thou?" As "more independence-minded than thou?"
Green Camp leaders flip-flop endlessly, both personally and ideologically. What possible justification can they offer in their own defense?
蘇貞昌「早綠」不如李登輝「晚綠」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.18 02:34 am
蘇貞昌未表態反對ＥＣＦＡ，獨派有人放話：「五都候選人，不反ＥＣＦＡ就不支持。」
綠營政治人物共同的一大人格特徵就是在政治路線上搖擺變化。例如，昨天還是「四不一沒有」，今天卻變成「一邊一國」。若比較李登輝、蔡英文與蘇貞昌三人對ＥＣＦＡ的態度，亦可見其搖擺變化；其實，搖擺變化非僅是綠營人物的人格特徵，也是綠營路線難以成為國家生存路線的根本原因。
以李登輝、蔡英文與蘇貞昌三人比較，蘇貞昌與綠營的淵源最深，他是美麗島大審律師，可謂是第一代的綠營先驅人物。相對而言，李登輝卻是當了國民黨政府的中華民國總統十二年後，才改持綠旗；而蔡英文則出身國民黨李政府的幕僚，後來才轉入民進黨扁政府，她在當選民進黨主席時黨齡只有四年。由藍變綠的李登輝、蔡英文，較諸一路綠到底的蘇貞昌，其人格之搖擺變化顯而易見。
然而，面對ＥＣＦＡ，如今在綠營意識形態的光譜上，李登輝與蔡英文二人，儼然都比蘇貞昌「綠」。「晚綠」的李蔡二人，卻比「早綠」的蘇貞昌更「綠」，其中道理頗堪玩味。
李登輝是國家統一委員會及國家統一綱領的創制者；甚至在其卸任總統被逐出國民黨、投入綠營後，還告訴接任的陳水扁，不要拆除國統會及國統綱領這「兩大支柱」。及至二○○八馬英九當選總統，李登輝顯有「靠攏」之意；但因馬的民意回應不佳，李遂又抽腿。如今，李由國統綱領的旗手，搖身一變成為反ＥＣＦＡ的轎夫；此種一路走來的搖擺變化，是出自政治理性，或只是投機操作而已？
至於蔡英文，在雙英辯論時尚未「反對」ＥＣＦＡ，僅持「緩簽／配套」立場；及至辯論失敗，再加上布局連任黨主席及因應「蔡蘇競合」，遂將反ＥＣＦＡ拉至「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」的高度。在國家認同上，亦從「曾任中華民國行政院副院長」，變成將中華民國說成「流亡政府」。這樣的搖擺變化，主要亦是反映了綠營內部的權力及路線鬥爭。
與李蔡相較，蘇貞昌畢竟是民進黨的創黨元勳，也是經歷《台獨黨綱》的先驅人物。但是，蘇的政治路線始終較不凸顯；「衝衝衝」三字訣，成了蘇貞昌空泛的政治品牌。其實，蘇的政治路線之所以不凸顯，原因亦在其高度搖擺變化的人格；他曾抗拒挺扁，卻終告妥協；亦曾堅持「不任副手」，最後接受了「謝蘇配」。然而，如今他參選台北市長，松山機場已迫其表態，ＥＣＦＡ也要他交出答案；倘若蘇貞昌參選的是大高雄市長，他應會毫不猶豫地反ＥＣＦＡ，但他選的卻是台北市長，他就必須考慮「台北超越台北」的溫和說詞。
從李蔡蘇三人的表現來看，綠營人物的人格是搖擺不定的，綠營人物的國家路線也是搖擺不定的。陳水扁可由「四不一沒有」，變成「一邊一國」；李登輝可由倡議「國家統一綱領」，變成「中華民國已經不存在」。蘇貞昌選台北市長，對ＥＣＦＡ持溫和立場，但其他四都卻採尖銳反對立場；連如此重大的國家路線問題，也可各吹各的號。人格是搖擺變化的，路線也是搖擺變化的；從李登輝及陳水扁的前車之鑑可以看出：綠營人物為了因應自己的權力危機而搖擺路線，路線搖擺又形成新的權力危機。往復搖擺，往復變化，遂成惡性循環。
這種惡性循環，是使綠營領導人物不能免除權力危機的原因，亦是使綠營不能免除路線搖擺的原因。台不台獨，擺來擺去，躲來躲去；挺不挺扁，搖來搖去，躲來躲去。執政時是一套，下野時又是另一套；台北市是一套，其他四都又是另一套。
當蘇貞昌經歷《台獨黨綱》之時，李登輝是高舉「國統綱領」的中華民國總統，蔡英文尚名不見經傳；然而，如今李蔡在反ＥＣＦＡ上，卻比蘇貞昌更綠更獨。但若蘇貞昌今天選的是大高雄市長，他會讓李蔡「專綠於前」、「專獨於前」嗎？
綠營的人格搖擺，路線變化，有何道理可言？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 18, 2010
Su Tseng-chang has yet to take a stand against ECFA. Some Taiwan independence advocates are saying, "If any of the five mayoral candidates fails to express opposition to ECFA, we will not support him."
One of the characteristics of Green Camp politicians is endless flip-flopping regarding their political path. For example, yesterday's "Five Noes" has become today's "one country on each side." Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang's flip-flopping on ECFA is even more flagrant than Lee Teng-hui's. Endless flip-flopping is not merely a characteristic of Green Camp politicians. It is also the main reason the Green Camp political path is unlikely to become the nation's political path.
Compare Lee Teng-hui, Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang. Su Tseng-chang has the deepest connections with the Green Camp. He was a Formosa Incident defense attorney. He is considered a first generation Green Camp elder. By contrast, Lee Teng-hui served as Republic of China president under the Nationalists for 12 years. He changed his political colors only after stepping down. Tsai Ing-wen got her start as a staffer in Lee Teng-hui's KMT. Only later did she defect to Ah-Bian's DPP. She was elected chairman of the DPP only four years after her defection. Su Chen-chang's political coloration was Green all the way. Lee Teng-hui and Tsai Ing-wen changed their political colors from Blue to Green. By comparison, their flip-flopping is far more obvious.
Now however, all three must confront ECFA. On today's Green Camp ideological spectrum, Lee Teng-hui and Tsai Ing-wen are paradoxically coming across as "greener" than Su Tseng-chang. Lee and Tsai were "Late Greens." Su was an "Early Green." Yet Lee and Tsai are coming across as greener than Su. The reasons behind this are intriguing.
Lee Teng-hui was the founder of the National Unification Council and the author of the Guidelines for National Unification. He was expelled from the KMT after serving out his term as president. Only then did he join the Green Camp. Even then he urged successor Chen Shui-bian not to dismantle the "two pillars," aka the National Unification Council and the National Unification Guidelines. After Ma Ying-jeou was elected president in 2008, Lee Teng-hui clearly hoped to cozy up to him. But the public response was negative, so Lee beat a hasty retreat. Lee was the standard-bearer for the National Unification Guidelines. Today, he has become the standard bearer for opposition to ECFA. Is such endless flip-flopping motivated by rational considerations, or merely by political opportunism?
Now take Tsai Ing-wen. During the Two Yings Debate, she had yet to express opposition to ECFA. She merely hoped to "delay signing" and demanded "conditions." But once the debate was lost, she had to position herself for re-election as party chairman. She had to respond to "Tsai/Su coopetition." That was when she began to characterize ECFA as a "duet sung by the KMT and CCP" and a "struggle between the rich and the poor." Consider the issue of national identity. That was when she went from referring to herself as the "former Vice Premier of the Republic of China," to referring to the Republic of China as a "government in exile." Such flip-flopping reflects internecine struggles within the Green Camp over both personal power and the nation's political future.
Su Tseng-chang was one of the DPP's founding fathers. Lee and Tsai were not. Su was a pioneer of the DPP's "Taiwan independence party platform." But Su's political path has never been all that clear. Su Tseng-chang's hollow political image is summed up by his equally hollow "charge, charge, charge" political mantra. In fact, the reason Su's political path has never been all that clear, is his major flip-flops. He once refused to back Ah-Bian. But now he has compromised. He once insisted he "would not accept the vice-presidential slot." But eventually he acquiesced to a "Hsieh/Su ticket." Today he is campaigning for Taipei Mayor. He has been forced to take a position on Songshan Airport and ECFA. If Su Tseng-chang were running for Mayor of Greater Kaohsiung, he probably would not hesitate to oppose ECFA. But he is running for Mayor of Taipei. He must use the moderate rhetoric of "Taipei and Beyond."
Compare Lee, Tsai, and Su. The defining character trait of Green Camp politicians is endless flip-flopping. Green Camp politicians flip-flop endlessly on their vision for the nation's future as well. Chen Shui-bian could go from "Five Noes" to "one country each side." Lee Teng-hui could go from proposing "National Unification Guidelines" to asserting that "the Republic of China no longer exists." Su Tseng-chang is running for Taipei Mayor. He feels compelled to adopt a moderate stance on ECFA. The other four DPP candidates however have all have expressed sharp opposition to ECFA. Even on such a major national issue, they are each going by their own playbook. They flip-flop personally. They flip-flop ideologically. The precedents set by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian provide us with a lesson. In response to threats to their personal power, Green Camp politicians flip-flop endlessly. But their endless flip-flopping paradoxically, generates to new threats to their personal power. Endless flip-flopping and endless threats to their personal power become two sides of a vicious cycle.
This vicious cycle makes it impossible for Green Camp leaders to extricate themselves from power crises. It make it impossible for the Green Camp to rise above endless flip-flopping regarding the nation's future. Should they advocate Taiwan independence? They flip-flop endlessly. They hem and haw. Should they back Ah-Bian? They flip-flop endlessly. They hem and haw. When in power, they say one thing. When out of power, they say something else altogether. They have one political platform for Taipei. They have an entirely different platform for the four other four cities.
While Su was drafting the "Taiwan Independence party platform," Lee was President of the Republic of China. He was holding high the "National Unification Guidelines." Tsai Ing-wen was still a nobody. Today however, Lee and Tsai are perceived as even greener and even more independence-minded than Su. If Su Tseng-chang were running for Mayor of Kaohsiung, would he allow Lee and Tsai to posture as "greener than thou?" As "more independence-minded than thou?"
Green Camp leaders flip-flop endlessly, both personally and ideologically. What possible justification can they offer in their own defense?
蘇貞昌「早綠」不如李登輝「晚綠」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.18 02:34 am
蘇貞昌未表態反對ＥＣＦＡ，獨派有人放話：「五都候選人，不反ＥＣＦＡ就不支持。」
綠營政治人物共同的一大人格特徵就是在政治路線上搖擺變化。例如，昨天還是「四不一沒有」，今天卻變成「一邊一國」。若比較李登輝、蔡英文與蘇貞昌三人對ＥＣＦＡ的態度，亦可見其搖擺變化；其實，搖擺變化非僅是綠營人物的人格特徵，也是綠營路線難以成為國家生存路線的根本原因。
以李登輝、蔡英文與蘇貞昌三人比較，蘇貞昌與綠營的淵源最深，他是美麗島大審律師，可謂是第一代的綠營先驅人物。相對而言，李登輝卻是當了國民黨政府的中華民國總統十二年後，才改持綠旗；而蔡英文則出身國民黨李政府的幕僚，後來才轉入民進黨扁政府，她在當選民進黨主席時黨齡只有四年。由藍變綠的李登輝、蔡英文，較諸一路綠到底的蘇貞昌，其人格之搖擺變化顯而易見。
然而，面對ＥＣＦＡ，如今在綠營意識形態的光譜上，李登輝與蔡英文二人，儼然都比蘇貞昌「綠」。「晚綠」的李蔡二人，卻比「早綠」的蘇貞昌更「綠」，其中道理頗堪玩味。
李登輝是國家統一委員會及國家統一綱領的創制者；甚至在其卸任總統被逐出國民黨、投入綠營後，還告訴接任的陳水扁，不要拆除國統會及國統綱領這「兩大支柱」。及至二○○八馬英九當選總統，李登輝顯有「靠攏」之意；但因馬的民意回應不佳，李遂又抽腿。如今，李由國統綱領的旗手，搖身一變成為反ＥＣＦＡ的轎夫；此種一路走來的搖擺變化，是出自政治理性，或只是投機操作而已？
至於蔡英文，在雙英辯論時尚未「反對」ＥＣＦＡ，僅持「緩簽／配套」立場；及至辯論失敗，再加上布局連任黨主席及因應「蔡蘇競合」，遂將反ＥＣＦＡ拉至「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」的高度。在國家認同上，亦從「曾任中華民國行政院副院長」，變成將中華民國說成「流亡政府」。這樣的搖擺變化，主要亦是反映了綠營內部的權力及路線鬥爭。
與李蔡相較，蘇貞昌畢竟是民進黨的創黨元勳，也是經歷《台獨黨綱》的先驅人物。但是，蘇的政治路線始終較不凸顯；「衝衝衝」三字訣，成了蘇貞昌空泛的政治品牌。其實，蘇的政治路線之所以不凸顯，原因亦在其高度搖擺變化的人格；他曾抗拒挺扁，卻終告妥協；亦曾堅持「不任副手」，最後接受了「謝蘇配」。然而，如今他參選台北市長，松山機場已迫其表態，ＥＣＦＡ也要他交出答案；倘若蘇貞昌參選的是大高雄市長，他應會毫不猶豫地反ＥＣＦＡ，但他選的卻是台北市長，他就必須考慮「台北超越台北」的溫和說詞。
從李蔡蘇三人的表現來看，綠營人物的人格是搖擺不定的，綠營人物的國家路線也是搖擺不定的。陳水扁可由「四不一沒有」，變成「一邊一國」；李登輝可由倡議「國家統一綱領」，變成「中華民國已經不存在」。蘇貞昌選台北市長，對ＥＣＦＡ持溫和立場，但其他四都卻採尖銳反對立場；連如此重大的國家路線問題，也可各吹各的號。人格是搖擺變化的，路線也是搖擺變化的；從李登輝及陳水扁的前車之鑑可以看出：綠營人物為了因應自己的權力危機而搖擺路線，路線搖擺又形成新的權力危機。往復搖擺，往復變化，遂成惡性循環。
這種惡性循環，是使綠營領導人物不能免除權力危機的原因，亦是使綠營不能免除路線搖擺的原因。台不台獨，擺來擺去，躲來躲去；挺不挺扁，搖來搖去，躲來躲去。執政時是一套，下野時又是另一套；台北市是一套，其他四都又是另一套。
當蘇貞昌經歷《台獨黨綱》之時，李登輝是高舉「國統綱領」的中華民國總統，蔡英文尚名不見經傳；然而，如今李蔡在反ＥＣＦＡ上，卻比蘇貞昌更綠更獨。但若蘇貞昌今天選的是大高雄市長，他會讓李蔡「專綠於前」、「專獨於前」嗎？
綠營的人格搖擺，路線變化，有何道理可言？
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
Welcome with Open Arms the Return of the Salmon
Welcome with Open Arms the Return of the Salmon
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 16, 2010
Labor is on strike all over the mainland. Wages are skyrocketing. What is to become of Taiwan businesses on the mainland? This is a matter of urgent concern.
Mainland China is the "world's factory." Taiwan is its primary upstream supplier. Recently Taiwan's economy has slumped. One of the main reasons behind Taiwan's economic growth is exports by Taiwan-based businesses on the mainland. The industrial environment on the mainland has changed. This has affected not just Taiwan businesses, but Taiwan's economy as a whole. Naturally the government cannot turn a blind eye to this development.
Officials are now enthusiastically beckoning Taiwan businesses, "Why not return? We welcome you with open arms!" In fact these arms have been open for who knows how many years, for over a decade, but nobody ever noticed. Open arms are nothing new. Why should anyone expect a sudden increase in enthusiasm now?
This scenario cannot help but leave one feeling sad and helpless. Taiwan businesses are like ants on a hot stove. They don't know where to run to keep from being burned. Some observers assume that since our government has done nothing, these businesses have no choice but to return to Taiwan. Officials could then pad their resumes. But this is wishful thinking, and unlikely to pan out. Taiwan businessmen are fending for themselves. They are engaging in land speculation, switching to domestic sales, and changing track. Even assuming we wish to preserve these industries, plenty of backward countries have wages lower than the mainland, including Vietnam, Indonesia, and Cambodia. Unless Taiwan makes itself more attractive, will the salmon really be forced to return?
Officials have endlessly stressed Taiwan's outstanding talent, proud technological standards, comprehensive infrastructure, superior location, and therefore Taiwan's great appeal. But none of this is new. These conditions have prevailed for over ten years. Yet an endless stream of businesses have fled Taiwan.
Believers return stress the need for a 17% cut in business taxes. They stress the need for additional concessions and subsidies substantial enough to encourage the salmon to return. But difficulties abound. The government's finances are already in dire straits. How can it offer more concessions and subsidies? If Taiwan businesses on the mainland are given special dispensations, is that fair to Taiwan businesses on Taiwan?
In fact, if we merely change our thinking, all these problems can be solved. Imagine endless, barren stretches of land in Yunlin and Chiayi. If only we could replicate the essence of Singapore there. Imagine a clean and beautiful countryside, comprehensive and convenient facilities, orderly planning, decisive and effective management. Add across the board liberalization, low taxes, a simplified tax system, ready access to transportation, including access to the Port of Mailiao in under one hour by car, and from there to other major ports. Imagine a new town in which every worker has his own house, and all his living needs have been met. Imagine the same labor policies as Singapore.
This oasis amidst a wasteland would need no officials with open arms. Overseas companies would fall over each other to locate there. It would not be Singapore. It would be better than Singapore. It would have the whole of Taiwan's economy as backup. It would be close to the favored Chinese mainland. It would be a thousand miles ahead of Singapore. After businesses elbow each other aside to relocate there, it would attract limitless capital and business opportunities. It would not even require public subsidies for infrastructure construction. Domestic investment would surge, creating millions of jobs.
In this "economic and trade zone," would we still cling to base salaries of 500 USD? To contracts that bind employees hand and foot and provoke unnecessary labor conflicts and administrative burdens? If employees prosper, would such negative and meaningless regulations be necessary? Therefore, in these particular locations, the minimum wage may no longer be necessary.
These competing vendors will of course include Taiwan businesses. Such a superior environment, combined with low cost labor similar to Singapore's, is something they have long dreamed about. Some worry this may attract sweatshops unable to survive on mainland coastal regions. Tens of thousands, even millions of foreign workers would be confined within these plants, replicating Foxconn's painful experience. "Is this really what Taiwan wants?" they ask.
Those who project such dire scenarios clearly not believe Singapore is a hotbed of sweatshops, with countless oppressed workers struggling to survive in conditions worse than death. Would Singapore's situation, replicated on Taiwan, really be as awful as described?
Of course not! When businesses elbow each other aside for resources in this "special economic zone," the most capable will come to the fore. They will be the most competitive companies with the most efficient supply chains, the ones most able to complement Taiwan's peripheral industries, create jobs, develop Taiwan's advantages, and upgrade Taiwan's overall competitiveness. Sweatshops will find it hard to find a footing. Instead, this free and open "special economic zone" will enable Taiwan to shine, and to create a new future for the people.
Those who advocate an "economic zone" today are pursuing just such a goal. The logic is so clear. Who can dispute it?
張開雙臂歡迎鮭魚回流
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.17 01:38 am
大陸工潮四起，工資猛漲。台商何去何從，令人關切。
台灣是大陸「世界工廠」的主要上游供應者；事實上，近年來台灣百業蕭條，維繫經濟成長率的主力之一，就是前往對岸的台商加工出口業。如今，大陸產業環境生變，受影響的不止是台商，亦是整個台灣經濟生態，政府自不能視若無睹。
就在這個時候，我們的政府官員熱情地向台商高呼：回來吧！我們張開雙臂歡迎你們！不過，說老實話，這雙臂已張開了不知多少歲月，從來乏人聞問；倘若今天的雙臂也一如十餘年來的雙臂，沒有新意，則何以見得就會有熱烈的響應？
這樣的場景，不禁令人感到辛酸與無奈。或許有人認為，那一群如熱鍋上螞蟻不知投向何方的台商，即使我們的政府一無所為，但他們別無選擇，也只好返回台灣，官員們即可平白增添許多「業績」。不過，這個如意算盤恐怕要落空。且不說有本事的台商會設法在大陸炒地皮、轉內銷、換跑道自謀生路，即使要維持本業，仍大有薪資遠低於大陸的越南、印尼、柬埔寨等落後國家可以落腳。除非台灣有更大的吸引力，鮭魚一定會回流嗎？
官員們不斷強調，台灣有優秀的人才、傲人的科技水準、完善的基礎設施、優越的地理位置，因而台灣有強大的吸引力。然而，這都不自今日始，十餘年來這些條件一無所缺，但棄此而去者絡繹於途。
因此，論者乃強調，除了營所稅降到17％，台灣還需要提供更多的優惠、補貼，才足以吸引鮭魚回流。但這當然困難重重，財政已如此困窘，如何再事優惠、補貼？如果針對台商單獨給此好處，又對在地企業何其不公？
其實，只要轉換一個思維角度，或許一切都可迎刃而解。我們可以想像，如果在雲嘉一望無際但一片荒蕪的土地上，將新加坡的精華地段在此處複製：景觀整潔美麗、設施完整便利、規劃井然有序、管理明快有效，再加上全面自由開放、稅賦輕簡合度，配合四通八達的交通網，順利聯接車程不到一小時的麥寮港可自由往來各大港埠，同時，完善的new-town使工作者人人有其屋，一切生活機能都高度健全，此外，外勞政策也完全比照新加坡。
這一片在荒地中的綠洲，無需任何官員張開雙臂，海外企業必爭先恐後搶入其中，因為它不是新加坡，卻勝過新加坡，它不但有整個台灣經濟為其後盾，而且距離今天最被看好的中國大陸，至少較新加坡近逾千里。在企業攘臂爭入之後，會帶來不可勝計的資金與商機，甚至公共建設都未必要動用公帑，不僅國內投資會暴增，而且勢將創造數以百萬計的工作機會。
在這個「經貿特區」裡，我們還要用折合五百美元的基本工資綁死受雇者的待遇、造成無謂的勞資衝突、行政負擔嗎？如果受雇者可以安居樂業，還需要用如此消極而無意義的法規庸人自擾嗎？因此，在這個特殊的所在，基本工資或許根本沒有存在的必要。
在爭相進駐的廠商中，當然包括大陸台商，因為以如此優異的環境，配合與新加坡一樣低廉的外勞，正是他們夢寐以求的樂園。然而，亦有人擔心，將大陸沿海無法生存的「血汗工廠」搬回台灣，雇用十萬、百萬外勞將他們困鎖廠中，複製富士康的慘痛經驗，難道是今天台灣之所求？
持此論者顯然不會相信新加坡竟是一個「血汗工廠」的淵藪，無數被壓迫的勞工在那裡生不如死地掙扎求生；則何以一旦複製於台灣，就會如此不堪？
當然不會。因為當企業攘臂競逐「經貿特區」內的資源，最後必定是競爭力最強、連鎖效果最大，與台灣周邊產業最能互補、創造就業效果最明顯、對開發台灣優勢、提升台灣整體競爭力最有貢獻者始能脫穎而出。血汗工廠自難立足；但這個全面自由開放的「經貿特區」，就會讓台灣發光發亮，為台灣開創一個新紀元。
今天鼓吹「經貿特區」者，所追求的正在於此，其理至明，誰曰不然？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 16, 2010
Labor is on strike all over the mainland. Wages are skyrocketing. What is to become of Taiwan businesses on the mainland? This is a matter of urgent concern.
Mainland China is the "world's factory." Taiwan is its primary upstream supplier. Recently Taiwan's economy has slumped. One of the main reasons behind Taiwan's economic growth is exports by Taiwan-based businesses on the mainland. The industrial environment on the mainland has changed. This has affected not just Taiwan businesses, but Taiwan's economy as a whole. Naturally the government cannot turn a blind eye to this development.
Officials are now enthusiastically beckoning Taiwan businesses, "Why not return? We welcome you with open arms!" In fact these arms have been open for who knows how many years, for over a decade, but nobody ever noticed. Open arms are nothing new. Why should anyone expect a sudden increase in enthusiasm now?
This scenario cannot help but leave one feeling sad and helpless. Taiwan businesses are like ants on a hot stove. They don't know where to run to keep from being burned. Some observers assume that since our government has done nothing, these businesses have no choice but to return to Taiwan. Officials could then pad their resumes. But this is wishful thinking, and unlikely to pan out. Taiwan businessmen are fending for themselves. They are engaging in land speculation, switching to domestic sales, and changing track. Even assuming we wish to preserve these industries, plenty of backward countries have wages lower than the mainland, including Vietnam, Indonesia, and Cambodia. Unless Taiwan makes itself more attractive, will the salmon really be forced to return?
Officials have endlessly stressed Taiwan's outstanding talent, proud technological standards, comprehensive infrastructure, superior location, and therefore Taiwan's great appeal. But none of this is new. These conditions have prevailed for over ten years. Yet an endless stream of businesses have fled Taiwan.
Believers return stress the need for a 17% cut in business taxes. They stress the need for additional concessions and subsidies substantial enough to encourage the salmon to return. But difficulties abound. The government's finances are already in dire straits. How can it offer more concessions and subsidies? If Taiwan businesses on the mainland are given special dispensations, is that fair to Taiwan businesses on Taiwan?
In fact, if we merely change our thinking, all these problems can be solved. Imagine endless, barren stretches of land in Yunlin and Chiayi. If only we could replicate the essence of Singapore there. Imagine a clean and beautiful countryside, comprehensive and convenient facilities, orderly planning, decisive and effective management. Add across the board liberalization, low taxes, a simplified tax system, ready access to transportation, including access to the Port of Mailiao in under one hour by car, and from there to other major ports. Imagine a new town in which every worker has his own house, and all his living needs have been met. Imagine the same labor policies as Singapore.
This oasis amidst a wasteland would need no officials with open arms. Overseas companies would fall over each other to locate there. It would not be Singapore. It would be better than Singapore. It would have the whole of Taiwan's economy as backup. It would be close to the favored Chinese mainland. It would be a thousand miles ahead of Singapore. After businesses elbow each other aside to relocate there, it would attract limitless capital and business opportunities. It would not even require public subsidies for infrastructure construction. Domestic investment would surge, creating millions of jobs.
In this "economic and trade zone," would we still cling to base salaries of 500 USD? To contracts that bind employees hand and foot and provoke unnecessary labor conflicts and administrative burdens? If employees prosper, would such negative and meaningless regulations be necessary? Therefore, in these particular locations, the minimum wage may no longer be necessary.
These competing vendors will of course include Taiwan businesses. Such a superior environment, combined with low cost labor similar to Singapore's, is something they have long dreamed about. Some worry this may attract sweatshops unable to survive on mainland coastal regions. Tens of thousands, even millions of foreign workers would be confined within these plants, replicating Foxconn's painful experience. "Is this really what Taiwan wants?" they ask.
Those who project such dire scenarios clearly not believe Singapore is a hotbed of sweatshops, with countless oppressed workers struggling to survive in conditions worse than death. Would Singapore's situation, replicated on Taiwan, really be as awful as described?
Of course not! When businesses elbow each other aside for resources in this "special economic zone," the most capable will come to the fore. They will be the most competitive companies with the most efficient supply chains, the ones most able to complement Taiwan's peripheral industries, create jobs, develop Taiwan's advantages, and upgrade Taiwan's overall competitiveness. Sweatshops will find it hard to find a footing. Instead, this free and open "special economic zone" will enable Taiwan to shine, and to create a new future for the people.
Those who advocate an "economic zone" today are pursuing just such a goal. The logic is so clear. Who can dispute it?
張開雙臂歡迎鮭魚回流
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.17 01:38 am
大陸工潮四起，工資猛漲。台商何去何從，令人關切。
台灣是大陸「世界工廠」的主要上游供應者；事實上，近年來台灣百業蕭條，維繫經濟成長率的主力之一，就是前往對岸的台商加工出口業。如今，大陸產業環境生變，受影響的不止是台商，亦是整個台灣經濟生態，政府自不能視若無睹。
就在這個時候，我們的政府官員熱情地向台商高呼：回來吧！我們張開雙臂歡迎你們！不過，說老實話，這雙臂已張開了不知多少歲月，從來乏人聞問；倘若今天的雙臂也一如十餘年來的雙臂，沒有新意，則何以見得就會有熱烈的響應？
這樣的場景，不禁令人感到辛酸與無奈。或許有人認為，那一群如熱鍋上螞蟻不知投向何方的台商，即使我們的政府一無所為，但他們別無選擇，也只好返回台灣，官員們即可平白增添許多「業績」。不過，這個如意算盤恐怕要落空。且不說有本事的台商會設法在大陸炒地皮、轉內銷、換跑道自謀生路，即使要維持本業，仍大有薪資遠低於大陸的越南、印尼、柬埔寨等落後國家可以落腳。除非台灣有更大的吸引力，鮭魚一定會回流嗎？
官員們不斷強調，台灣有優秀的人才、傲人的科技水準、完善的基礎設施、優越的地理位置，因而台灣有強大的吸引力。然而，這都不自今日始，十餘年來這些條件一無所缺，但棄此而去者絡繹於途。
因此，論者乃強調，除了營所稅降到17％，台灣還需要提供更多的優惠、補貼，才足以吸引鮭魚回流。但這當然困難重重，財政已如此困窘，如何再事優惠、補貼？如果針對台商單獨給此好處，又對在地企業何其不公？
其實，只要轉換一個思維角度，或許一切都可迎刃而解。我們可以想像，如果在雲嘉一望無際但一片荒蕪的土地上，將新加坡的精華地段在此處複製：景觀整潔美麗、設施完整便利、規劃井然有序、管理明快有效，再加上全面自由開放、稅賦輕簡合度，配合四通八達的交通網，順利聯接車程不到一小時的麥寮港可自由往來各大港埠，同時，完善的new-town使工作者人人有其屋，一切生活機能都高度健全，此外，外勞政策也完全比照新加坡。
這一片在荒地中的綠洲，無需任何官員張開雙臂，海外企業必爭先恐後搶入其中，因為它不是新加坡，卻勝過新加坡，它不但有整個台灣經濟為其後盾，而且距離今天最被看好的中國大陸，至少較新加坡近逾千里。在企業攘臂爭入之後，會帶來不可勝計的資金與商機，甚至公共建設都未必要動用公帑，不僅國內投資會暴增，而且勢將創造數以百萬計的工作機會。
在這個「經貿特區」裡，我們還要用折合五百美元的基本工資綁死受雇者的待遇、造成無謂的勞資衝突、行政負擔嗎？如果受雇者可以安居樂業，還需要用如此消極而無意義的法規庸人自擾嗎？因此，在這個特殊的所在，基本工資或許根本沒有存在的必要。
在爭相進駐的廠商中，當然包括大陸台商，因為以如此優異的環境，配合與新加坡一樣低廉的外勞，正是他們夢寐以求的樂園。然而，亦有人擔心，將大陸沿海無法生存的「血汗工廠」搬回台灣，雇用十萬、百萬外勞將他們困鎖廠中，複製富士康的慘痛經驗，難道是今天台灣之所求？
持此論者顯然不會相信新加坡竟是一個「血汗工廠」的淵藪，無數被壓迫的勞工在那裡生不如死地掙扎求生；則何以一旦複製於台灣，就會如此不堪？
當然不會。因為當企業攘臂競逐「經貿特區」內的資源，最後必定是競爭力最強、連鎖效果最大，與台灣周邊產業最能互補、創造就業效果最明顯、對開發台灣優勢、提升台灣整體競爭力最有貢獻者始能脫穎而出。血汗工廠自難立足；但這個全面自由開放的「經貿特區」，就會讓台灣發光發亮，為台灣開創一個新紀元。
今天鼓吹「經貿特區」者，所追求的正在於此，其理至明，誰曰不然？
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
Ten Year War of Resistance? Is It Really that Serious?
Ten Year War of Resistance? Is It Really that Serious?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 15, 2010
Taipei and Beijng reached a consensus during the third working session of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Meanwhile an ECFA referendum proposal submitted to the Referendum Commission was shot down. Its sponsors, the DPP, TSU, and nativist pressure groups vowed to wage a "ten year war of resistance" against the agreement. They declared their intent to closely oversee the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy. Government policies have always needed close oversight. In the event of a third change in ruling parties, the target of the nativist pressure groups' ten year war of resistance may well change. These pressure groups may demand that the DPP abolish ECFA. The KMT's position on cross-Strait policy is clear and firm. The KMT believes expanded exchanges are essential. Ironically, the DPP is the party that must justify its position. It can no longer sow dissension between North and South in an effort to cloud the issue or fool the voters.
The DPP is the largest opposition party. It is the one nativist pressure groups have pinned their hopes on. The DPP must bear in mind that it was once in power for eight years. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party enforced the "avoid haste, be patient" cross-Strait edict handed down by Lee Teng-hui late in his administration. The Ah-Bian administration's "active management" imposed limits on direct cross-Strait transportation links and the influx of mainland capital, But it was never able to extricate itself from its dilemma. This was one of the main reasons for the second change in ruling parties.
The Ma administration has been in office two years. Regardless of how effective its other policies may be, its cross-Strait policy is a significant improvement. Direct cross-Strait flights have continuously increased. The number of flights between Songshang Airport and Hongqiao Airport has increased by multiples. Songshan Airport had fallen into a state of semi-stagnation during the eight years of the Chen administration. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy has brought Songshan Airport back to life. Li Ying-yuan and Frank Hsieh, two DPP candidates for Taipei Mayor, both advocated moving Songshan Airport and converting it into a Central Park for the nation's capital. From an urban development and environmental perspective, this is a tempting option. Especially if Songshan Airport had no potential for development. But the situation has changed dramatically. Songshan Airport has become the most popular airport for direct cross-Strait flights. Su Tseng-chang is the Democratic Progressive Party candidate for Taipei Mayor. This change has embarrassed him in particular. The vast majority of air travelers are accustomed to flying directly to the mainland from Songshan Airport. They prefer it. Moving Songshan Airport is not a policy that would curry favor with them. For political candidates, policy proposals must change as the situation demands. But for the DPP Songshan Airport is no ordinary direct flight airport. It involves subtle issues of cross-Strait relations and national development. The DPP's biggest problem is how to frame an argument that will satisfy its fundamentalist supporters but also the far more numerous moderate voters who will determine whether the DPP returns to power.
Songshan Airport is a simple issue. Yet it constitutes a complex dilemma for the DPP. From this we can see why the Cross-Strait Economic Framework Agreement is such an intractable problem for the DPP. The Democratic Progressive Party opposes ECFA. But it is impotent to prevent closer cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. It opposes a cross-Strait agreement. But the greatest harm the DPP's obstructionism has done, is to Taiwan businesses and Taiwan's vast economic interests. No bilateral agreement is going to have only an upside and no downside. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen accuses the Ma administration of wishful thinking, of seeing only the benefits and ignoring the risks. But the Democratic Progressive Party has fallen prey to the other extreme. It sees only the risks and ignores the benefits. The DPP has exaggerated the cross-Strait policy risk for eight years. The majority of the public does not buy its arguments. The Ma administration has expanded exchanges, conveyed goodwill, and sought victory amidst danger. Over the past two years, it has achieved impressive results. The public has witnessed the Ma administration's policy achievements. It sees results. Hypothetical, virtual risks are merely a Procrustean Bed into which the DPP continues to force fit its cross-Strait policy.
For example, while the Democratic Progressive Party was shrilly voicing its opposition to ECFA, local DPP county and municipal chiefs were visiting the mainland. They were visiting the Shanghai World Expo, or promoting their cities. Democratic Progressive Party officials on the mainland were afraid to voice opposition to ECFA. DPP legislators even heaped abuse on a contestant who participated in a beauty pageant on the mainland, blasting her for "demeaning the nation's dignity." To their dismay, the contestant turned out to be the girl friend of a DPP legislator's son. They were forced to offer an abject apology. In the end, their knee-jerk political response hurt only themselves. Similar incidents have occurred. Attorney Chen Chang-wen wrote an open letter to the Referendum Commission. He found himself denounced as the "KMT's hatchetman" by the Democratic Progressive Party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, and the Liberty Times. Some critics even drew parallels between the Chen family's shortcomings and Chen's political stance. But according to their logic, wouldn't that make any academic who stood up and publicly criticized the Referendum Commission a "hatchetman for the DPP, TSU, Deep Green, and Taiwan independence elements?" Under a democratic political system, no act of oversight or opposition should subject a person to personal attacks or artificial political labeling.
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party governed for eight years. The spiritual leader of the Taiwan Solidarity Union and other nativist pressure groups served as Republic of China President for 12 years. Both have enjoyed the fruits of our democracy. They should be capable of discussing policy rationally. They can begin with the mayoral elections for the five directly administered municipalities. The DPP and KMT must have the courage to declare their stand on ECFA, and allow voters to vote their consciences. Their ballots will impact not just the year end five municipalities election. They will impact the 2012 presidential election. Most importantly, they will impact the coming decade.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.06.15
社論－十年抗戰？有這麼嚴重嗎！
本報訊
兩岸經濟合作架構協議「ＥＣＦＡ」第三次工作會商漸次取得共識，在此同時，包括民進黨、台聯在內的本土社團在ＥＣＦＡ公投遭公投審議委員會否決後，宣示將展開十年長期運動，強力監督馬政府的兩岸政策。政府政策本來就需全民監督，如果政黨三輪替，本土社團的「十年抗戰」，標靶可能就得轉向，衝著民進黨會不會廢ＥＣＦＡ而來。國民黨秉持兩岸政策必須開放的立場明確而堅定，反倒是民進黨必須負責任地說明政黨立場，不可再用南北切割的方式，企圖模糊焦點，甚至唬弄選民。
做為本土社團寄望最殷的最大在野黨，民進黨必須謹記自己曾經執政八年的事實，而民進黨執政八年的兩岸政策，從延續李登輝執政後期的戒急用忍，到扁政府的積極管理，包括兩岸三通直航、開放赴大陸投資上限等重大政策，都受限於此而陷入形式開放，卻無法有效開展窘境，因此也成為政黨再輪替的重大原因之一。
馬政府執政兩年，不論其他政策效能如何，就兩岸政策而言，卻是明顯改善。顯而易見的，兩岸直航班機不斷增加，最近松山?虹橋對飛班次亦倍數成長，讓扁政府八年幾乎陷入半停滯狀態的松山機場復生，事實上，從李應元到謝長廷，民進黨兩任台北市長候選人都主張松山機場遷建，將松山機場原址改建為首都中央公園。從都市發展環境的角度，此一政見不可謂不吸引人，特別是如果松山機場再無發展性，但如今形勢丕變，松山機場已經成為兩岸直航點中最熱門的機場，這個轉變，讓今年民進黨台北市長候選人蘇貞昌格外尷尬。對絕大多數習慣、甚至歡迎松山機場直飛大陸的民眾而言，遷廢松山機場顯然不會是個討好的政見；對候選人而言，政見當然要隨著形勢改變而更易，但是，對民進黨而言，松山機場畢竟不只是普通直航機場的問題，還牽涉到兩岸關係和國家發展的幽微立場，民進黨該如何找出一套說詞滿足基本支持群眾，還有更多數且關係能否再執政的中間選民，才是最大難題。
松山機場這麼簡單的問題，都能如此尷尬，可以想見，兩岸經濟架構協議是民進黨更難處理的困境。民進黨反對ＥＣＦＡ，卻無法阻止兩岸愈來愈密的經貿交流，反對兩岸簽署類似協議，耽誤的其實是台商和台灣更巨大的經貿利益。無可諱言，任何雙邊協議都不可能只取利而無弊，民進黨主席蔡英文質疑馬政府太過一廂情願，只看到利益卻忽略風險；民進黨卻陷入兩極的另一端，只看到風險卻忽視利益。民進黨擴大風險論述的兩岸政策已經八年實驗，不為多數民眾接受，馬政府擴大交流、傳達善意、險中求勝的兩岸政策，在這兩年已取得相當成果。民意監督或檢驗政府政策績效，看得就是成果，虛擬的風險前提，只會成為框架民進黨兩岸政策論述的束縛。
隨便舉例，當民進黨反ＥＣＦＡ的同時，民進黨部分縣市首長登陸，或參觀上海世博、或進行城市行銷，人在大陸的民進黨人，不敢聲言反對兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ；甚至民進黨立委惡言批判出國參加選美比賽的小姐矮化國格，結果一棒打到立委同僚兒子的女友，竟前倨而後恭地道歉；類似膝射式反應的政治語言，最終傷害的還是自己。同樣狀況也發生在最近，陳長文律師因為撰文給公投審議委員會的公開信，竟遭民進黨、台聯、《自由時報》等惡意批評為「國民黨的打手」，甚至還有人以陳家人的缺憾，對照陳的政治立場；照此邏輯，站出來公開批判公審會否決ＥＣＦＡ公投的學者，難不成都成了「民進黨或台聯或深綠或獨派的打手」？在民主政治有機運轉的制度下，任何監督或反對政策之舉，都沒有必要用近乎人身攻擊或扣帽子式的政治語言，徒逞一時之快。
曾經執政八年的民進黨，或精神領袖曾經擔任過十二年中華民國總統的台聯等本土社團，都享受過台灣民主的果實，理性討論政策應該是再簡單不過的道理，就從五都選舉開始，請民進黨和國民黨勇敢且負責任地拿出對ＥＣＦＡ的政黨立場，讓選民慎重地面對手中一票。這一票，不只攸關年底五都、未來的二 ○一二、最重要的，還有台灣未來十年！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 15, 2010
Taipei and Beijng reached a consensus during the third working session of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Meanwhile an ECFA referendum proposal submitted to the Referendum Commission was shot down. Its sponsors, the DPP, TSU, and nativist pressure groups vowed to wage a "ten year war of resistance" against the agreement. They declared their intent to closely oversee the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy. Government policies have always needed close oversight. In the event of a third change in ruling parties, the target of the nativist pressure groups' ten year war of resistance may well change. These pressure groups may demand that the DPP abolish ECFA. The KMT's position on cross-Strait policy is clear and firm. The KMT believes expanded exchanges are essential. Ironically, the DPP is the party that must justify its position. It can no longer sow dissension between North and South in an effort to cloud the issue or fool the voters.
The DPP is the largest opposition party. It is the one nativist pressure groups have pinned their hopes on. The DPP must bear in mind that it was once in power for eight years. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party enforced the "avoid haste, be patient" cross-Strait edict handed down by Lee Teng-hui late in his administration. The Ah-Bian administration's "active management" imposed limits on direct cross-Strait transportation links and the influx of mainland capital, But it was never able to extricate itself from its dilemma. This was one of the main reasons for the second change in ruling parties.
The Ma administration has been in office two years. Regardless of how effective its other policies may be, its cross-Strait policy is a significant improvement. Direct cross-Strait flights have continuously increased. The number of flights between Songshang Airport and Hongqiao Airport has increased by multiples. Songshan Airport had fallen into a state of semi-stagnation during the eight years of the Chen administration. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy has brought Songshan Airport back to life. Li Ying-yuan and Frank Hsieh, two DPP candidates for Taipei Mayor, both advocated moving Songshan Airport and converting it into a Central Park for the nation's capital. From an urban development and environmental perspective, this is a tempting option. Especially if Songshan Airport had no potential for development. But the situation has changed dramatically. Songshan Airport has become the most popular airport for direct cross-Strait flights. Su Tseng-chang is the Democratic Progressive Party candidate for Taipei Mayor. This change has embarrassed him in particular. The vast majority of air travelers are accustomed to flying directly to the mainland from Songshan Airport. They prefer it. Moving Songshan Airport is not a policy that would curry favor with them. For political candidates, policy proposals must change as the situation demands. But for the DPP Songshan Airport is no ordinary direct flight airport. It involves subtle issues of cross-Strait relations and national development. The DPP's biggest problem is how to frame an argument that will satisfy its fundamentalist supporters but also the far more numerous moderate voters who will determine whether the DPP returns to power.
Songshan Airport is a simple issue. Yet it constitutes a complex dilemma for the DPP. From this we can see why the Cross-Strait Economic Framework Agreement is such an intractable problem for the DPP. The Democratic Progressive Party opposes ECFA. But it is impotent to prevent closer cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. It opposes a cross-Strait agreement. But the greatest harm the DPP's obstructionism has done, is to Taiwan businesses and Taiwan's vast economic interests. No bilateral agreement is going to have only an upside and no downside. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen accuses the Ma administration of wishful thinking, of seeing only the benefits and ignoring the risks. But the Democratic Progressive Party has fallen prey to the other extreme. It sees only the risks and ignores the benefits. The DPP has exaggerated the cross-Strait policy risk for eight years. The majority of the public does not buy its arguments. The Ma administration has expanded exchanges, conveyed goodwill, and sought victory amidst danger. Over the past two years, it has achieved impressive results. The public has witnessed the Ma administration's policy achievements. It sees results. Hypothetical, virtual risks are merely a Procrustean Bed into which the DPP continues to force fit its cross-Strait policy.
For example, while the Democratic Progressive Party was shrilly voicing its opposition to ECFA, local DPP county and municipal chiefs were visiting the mainland. They were visiting the Shanghai World Expo, or promoting their cities. Democratic Progressive Party officials on the mainland were afraid to voice opposition to ECFA. DPP legislators even heaped abuse on a contestant who participated in a beauty pageant on the mainland, blasting her for "demeaning the nation's dignity." To their dismay, the contestant turned out to be the girl friend of a DPP legislator's son. They were forced to offer an abject apology. In the end, their knee-jerk political response hurt only themselves. Similar incidents have occurred. Attorney Chen Chang-wen wrote an open letter to the Referendum Commission. He found himself denounced as the "KMT's hatchetman" by the Democratic Progressive Party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, and the Liberty Times. Some critics even drew parallels between the Chen family's shortcomings and Chen's political stance. But according to their logic, wouldn't that make any academic who stood up and publicly criticized the Referendum Commission a "hatchetman for the DPP, TSU, Deep Green, and Taiwan independence elements?" Under a democratic political system, no act of oversight or opposition should subject a person to personal attacks or artificial political labeling.
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party governed for eight years. The spiritual leader of the Taiwan Solidarity Union and other nativist pressure groups served as Republic of China President for 12 years. Both have enjoyed the fruits of our democracy. They should be capable of discussing policy rationally. They can begin with the mayoral elections for the five directly administered municipalities. The DPP and KMT must have the courage to declare their stand on ECFA, and allow voters to vote their consciences. Their ballots will impact not just the year end five municipalities election. They will impact the 2012 presidential election. Most importantly, they will impact the coming decade.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.06.15
社論－十年抗戰？有這麼嚴重嗎！
本報訊
兩岸經濟合作架構協議「ＥＣＦＡ」第三次工作會商漸次取得共識，在此同時，包括民進黨、台聯在內的本土社團在ＥＣＦＡ公投遭公投審議委員會否決後，宣示將展開十年長期運動，強力監督馬政府的兩岸政策。政府政策本來就需全民監督，如果政黨三輪替，本土社團的「十年抗戰」，標靶可能就得轉向，衝著民進黨會不會廢ＥＣＦＡ而來。國民黨秉持兩岸政策必須開放的立場明確而堅定，反倒是民進黨必須負責任地說明政黨立場，不可再用南北切割的方式，企圖模糊焦點，甚至唬弄選民。
做為本土社團寄望最殷的最大在野黨，民進黨必須謹記自己曾經執政八年的事實，而民進黨執政八年的兩岸政策，從延續李登輝執政後期的戒急用忍，到扁政府的積極管理，包括兩岸三通直航、開放赴大陸投資上限等重大政策，都受限於此而陷入形式開放，卻無法有效開展窘境，因此也成為政黨再輪替的重大原因之一。
馬政府執政兩年，不論其他政策效能如何，就兩岸政策而言，卻是明顯改善。顯而易見的，兩岸直航班機不斷增加，最近松山?虹橋對飛班次亦倍數成長，讓扁政府八年幾乎陷入半停滯狀態的松山機場復生，事實上，從李應元到謝長廷，民進黨兩任台北市長候選人都主張松山機場遷建，將松山機場原址改建為首都中央公園。從都市發展環境的角度，此一政見不可謂不吸引人，特別是如果松山機場再無發展性，但如今形勢丕變，松山機場已經成為兩岸直航點中最熱門的機場，這個轉變，讓今年民進黨台北市長候選人蘇貞昌格外尷尬。對絕大多數習慣、甚至歡迎松山機場直飛大陸的民眾而言，遷廢松山機場顯然不會是個討好的政見；對候選人而言，政見當然要隨著形勢改變而更易，但是，對民進黨而言，松山機場畢竟不只是普通直航機場的問題，還牽涉到兩岸關係和國家發展的幽微立場，民進黨該如何找出一套說詞滿足基本支持群眾，還有更多數且關係能否再執政的中間選民，才是最大難題。
松山機場這麼簡單的問題，都能如此尷尬，可以想見，兩岸經濟架構協議是民進黨更難處理的困境。民進黨反對ＥＣＦＡ，卻無法阻止兩岸愈來愈密的經貿交流，反對兩岸簽署類似協議，耽誤的其實是台商和台灣更巨大的經貿利益。無可諱言，任何雙邊協議都不可能只取利而無弊，民進黨主席蔡英文質疑馬政府太過一廂情願，只看到利益卻忽略風險；民進黨卻陷入兩極的另一端，只看到風險卻忽視利益。民進黨擴大風險論述的兩岸政策已經八年實驗，不為多數民眾接受，馬政府擴大交流、傳達善意、險中求勝的兩岸政策，在這兩年已取得相當成果。民意監督或檢驗政府政策績效，看得就是成果，虛擬的風險前提，只會成為框架民進黨兩岸政策論述的束縛。
隨便舉例，當民進黨反ＥＣＦＡ的同時，民進黨部分縣市首長登陸，或參觀上海世博、或進行城市行銷，人在大陸的民進黨人，不敢聲言反對兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ；甚至民進黨立委惡言批判出國參加選美比賽的小姐矮化國格，結果一棒打到立委同僚兒子的女友，竟前倨而後恭地道歉；類似膝射式反應的政治語言，最終傷害的還是自己。同樣狀況也發生在最近，陳長文律師因為撰文給公投審議委員會的公開信，竟遭民進黨、台聯、《自由時報》等惡意批評為「國民黨的打手」，甚至還有人以陳家人的缺憾，對照陳的政治立場；照此邏輯，站出來公開批判公審會否決ＥＣＦＡ公投的學者，難不成都成了「民進黨或台聯或深綠或獨派的打手」？在民主政治有機運轉的制度下，任何監督或反對政策之舉，都沒有必要用近乎人身攻擊或扣帽子式的政治語言，徒逞一時之快。
曾經執政八年的民進黨，或精神領袖曾經擔任過十二年中華民國總統的台聯等本土社團，都享受過台灣民主的果實，理性討論政策應該是再簡單不過的道理，就從五都選舉開始，請民進黨和國民黨勇敢且負責任地拿出對ＥＣＦＡ的政黨立場，讓選民慎重地面對手中一票。這一票，不只攸關年底五都、未來的二 ○一二、最重要的，還有台灣未來十年！
Sunday, June 13, 2010
Chen Corruption Case: What Conceivable Justification for the Second Instance Ruling?
Chen Corruption Case: What Conceivable Justification for the Second Instance Ruling?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 13, 2010
The High Court has announced its ruling in the Chen Family Corruption Case. It has found the Chen family guilty as charged in the State Affairs Fund scandal, the Longtan Industrial District scandal, the Nangang Exhibition Hall scandal, and the Diana Chen bribery and money laundering scandals. In his ruling, the trial judge sternly rebuked Ah-Bian, Ah-Cheng, and others for crimes for which they cannot evade reponsibility. But he simultaneously reduced the lengths of their sentences and the amounts of their fines, sharply. This flagrant contradiction between his stern rebuke and his lenient sentence is utterly incomprehensible.
Consider the charges against Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-cheng, and the sentences they received. Consider the State Affairs Fund. Before the criminal code was amended in 2006, each subsequent offense called for a sentence 1.5 times as long as the initial offense. The High Court sentenced Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng each to 14 years imprisonment. After the criminal code was amended, each offense was punished separately. The court found Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng guilty of 10 offenses. They were each sentenced to six years for each offense. Their sentences for each offense were reduced to three years. The total sentence was 30 years. The State Affairs Fund scandal is punishable under Article IV of the Corruption Act. It involves the "usurpation of public property," and is punishable by a sentence of 10 to life. In other words, the High Court did not impose the maximum sentence, but instead reduced their sentences to only three years for each offense.
Consider the Longtan Industrial Zone scandal. According to Article V of the Corruption Act, Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng were each subject to at least seven years imprisonment for "accepting bribes in one's capacity as an official." The High Court originally sentenced Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng each to 12 years. Consider the Diana Chen bribery scandal. Pursuant to Article V of the Corruption Act, they were each sentenced to eight years for "accepting bribes in one's capacity as an official." Consider the Nangang Exhibition Hall scandal, in which only Wu Shu-chen was charged. Pursuant to Article IV of the Corruption Act, she was found guilty of "accepting bribes in breach of official duties" and sentenced to 16 years. On the basis of corruption charges alone, the High Court sentenced Chen Shui-bian to 64 years imprisonment, and Wu Shu-cheng to 80 years imprisonment. Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng were found guilty of falsifying official documents and money laundering, and sentenced for these crimes as well.
So many crimes. Such long sentences. Yet the High Court abruptly reduced the court's ruling of life imprisonment in the first instance, to "20 years imprisonment." Individuals convicted under the Republic of China criminal code often do not receive life sentences. Short of a life sentence, the longest sentence the courts are permitted to impose is 30 years, not 20 years. The upper limit of 20 years applies only to isolated offenses. Suppose the court does not wish to give Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng life sentences. Altogether they were sentenced to 70 to 80 years. Shouldn't their sentences have been reduced to 30 years, and not merely 20? Also, apart from their terms of their imprisonment, the 200 million NT fine imposed upon Chen Shui-bian by the court of the first instance has been reduced to 170 million NT. The 300 million NT fine imposed upon Wu Shu-cheng has been reduced to 200 million NT. What justification can the high court offer for that?
The High Court has sharply reduced Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's sentences. But it has offered no justifications whatsover for pulling its punches. Instead, all we see is harsh language.
For example, the judge rebuked Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng, saying that "high officials must be clean. They must not abuse their power for the benefit of their cronies and family members. Abusing public power for private gain shames the government, undermines society's values, and encourages lawlessness." The judge went to say that [Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng] allowed family members to misappropriate public funds for private use. In the name of national economic development, they conducted illegal transactions that lined their own pockets. Heads of public agencies squandered public public funds, providing financial relief for favored private companies. Out of fear, the Minister of Finance arranged public jobs for private individuals. Through family members, Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng used convoluted methods to launder illicit funds abroad. To disguise the criminal nature of their financial gains, and to avoid criminal prosecution, they knowing broke the law and betrayed the public trust.
What is one to make of such a stern rebuke, in conjunction with such a sharply reduced sentence? Most culpable and abhorrent of all is Ah-Cheng. She abused her power to satisfy her greed. Instead of forcing her to return her ill-gotten gains to the national treasury, the High Court has reduced her fines. What possible justification can the High Court have for its action? As president, Chen Shui-bian engaged in all manner of evil-doing. He should not be punished above and beyond the limits of the law. But what possible justification can the judges have to abet his criminal conduct by deliberately lightening his sentence? When the rebuke issued by the judge is diametrically opposed to the sentence handed down, the public is naturally going to feel conflicted. In short, the decision of the High Court is sharply at odds with ordinary citizens' understanding of the law.
Now consider characters other than Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng. Take family members such as Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching. Take Ah-Bian confidants such as Ma Yung-cheng and Lin Teh-hsung. They too have had their sentences sharply reduced, also for no conceivable reason. For example, the High Court ruled that Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching knew perfectly well that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's vast fortune was illicit gains, but nevertheless decided to act as accomplices in their complex money laundering schemes. The media even reported on the two of them, living it up abroad. In the eyes of society, Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching bear a heavy responsibility. Yet Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching received sharp reductions in their fines. Huang Jui-ching received probation. The 200 million NT they were required to pay in the first instance was reduced to a mere 10 million NT. Are the the judges truly unaware of the Chen family's financial clout? The reasons behind this slap on the wrist remain shrouded in mystery. The rebuke issued by the High Court was so harsh. Yet its sentence was so light. That is what the public finds utterly incomprehensible.
扁案二審量刑標準有何道理？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.13
台灣高等法院就扁家弊案宣判，審判所及的國務機要費、龍潭工業區、南港展館、陳敏薰賄賂以及相關洗錢行為等各部分案情，二審仍然認定有罪。但承審法官雖在判決中嚴詞譴責扁珍等人的犯行罪無可逭，卻在量刑上大幅降低刑期和罰金，這種「判詞與量刑相矛盾」的情況，令人不解。
先看陳水扁和吳淑珍在判決中認定的各罪與所量刑度：國務機要費部分，九十五年刑法修正前，亦即有連續犯加重二分之一的期間，高院判扁珍各十四年有期徒刑；刑法修正後，一罪一罰，法院認定扁珍共犯十罪，每罪判六年，減為三年，總共是三十年。國務機要費弊案是構成貪污治罪條例第四條「侵占公有財物罪」，可處無期徒刑或十年以上有期徒刑。亦即，高院就本罪並未量處最重刑度，且在一罪一罰部分，還減至三年。
再者，龍潭工業區部分，高院以構成貪污治罪條例第五條，本刑七年以上有期徒刑的「職務上行為受賄罪」，判處扁珍各十二年。在陳敏薰賄賂案，高院同樣以貪污治罪條例第五條「職務上行為受賄罪」，判處扁珍各八年。在南港展館案，僅吳淑珍涉案，高院依貪污治罪條例第四條「共同違背職務受賄罪」，判處她十六年。加總起來，僅以上開貪污罪名，高院總共判處了陳水扁六十四年有期徒刑，吳淑珍八十年有期徒刑；除此之外，扁珍還有偽造文書、洗錢等，亦分別判處有期徒刑。
這麼多罪名，這麼長的刑期，高院卻由第一審所判的無期徒刑，一下子降為扁珍均為「應執行有期徒刑二十年」。事實上，我國刑法在多項罪名均成立，判處多數有期徒刑時，容許法院定的最高有期徒刑，是三十年而非二十年，二十年僅是單一罪名有期徒刑的最高上限。若不處無期徒刑，則扁珍合計七、八十年的刑期，為何不是合併執行三十年，而是二十年？更有甚者，除了刑期，在罰金方面，陳水扁也由一審的二億元降為一億七千萬元，吳淑珍則由三億元降為二億元。這又是什麼道理？
然而，高院對扁珍的懲罰銳減，但在量刑的判詞中，非但看不到這般大放水的理由，反而是聲色俱厲的嚴詞譴責。
例如，法官指責扁珍「位高權重，本應廉潔自持，並應敦促家人親信避免以權牟利，以私害公，辱壞官箴，導致社會價值觀及行為觀紊亂」；但是，竟放任家人將國務機要費公款私用；藉國家經濟科技發展，以金錢交易牟利私囊，致主管機關浪費公款解決私人廠商財務問題；財政部長戒慎恐懼安排私人職位；將不法所得由家人以繁複手段洗至國外，以切斷資金來源及犯罪所得性質，逃避司法追訴；知法犯法，背棄人民付託……。
如此嚴厲的指摘，卻又如何能夠大幅度減低刑期至此？尤其可怪者，扁珍最為可惡的就是恃權貪錢，如今不以罰金迫其交予國庫，卻反而減少金額，這又是什麼道理？陳水扁身為總統而作惡多端，固然不可給予超逾法律的刑罰，但若是擅以法官裁量權而故意輕刑寬縱，似乎亦無道理。法官的譴責和刑度相反，社會大眾當然感到矛盾；也就是說，高院判決的結果，恐怕是背離了一般國民的法律感情。
除了扁珍這兩名主角，其餘如陳致中、黃睿靚等扁家成員，以及其他馬永成、林德訓等扁的親信，也均獲得大幅降低刑度的待遇。但這些部分的減輕，也看不出理由。例如，高院也認定陳致中、黃睿靚都是明知扁珍取得大量不法所得，還參與了繁複的洗錢犯行；事實上，媒體也報導了許多兩人在國外的享受行為。那麼，陳致中、黃睿靚就這部分應承擔較重的責任，方符合一般社會的正義觀念。結果，陳致中、黃睿靚的量刑、罰金大幅降低之外，連黃睿靚的緩刑條件，也由一審向公庫繳納二億元，大降為一千萬元。難道法官不知道，扁家財力的真相，迄今仍是一團謎霧，這樣做不啻輕縱了犯罪？高院的判詞罵得那麼兇，判刑卻這麼輕，這是讓人無法理解的地方。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 13, 2010
The High Court has announced its ruling in the Chen Family Corruption Case. It has found the Chen family guilty as charged in the State Affairs Fund scandal, the Longtan Industrial District scandal, the Nangang Exhibition Hall scandal, and the Diana Chen bribery and money laundering scandals. In his ruling, the trial judge sternly rebuked Ah-Bian, Ah-Cheng, and others for crimes for which they cannot evade reponsibility. But he simultaneously reduced the lengths of their sentences and the amounts of their fines, sharply. This flagrant contradiction between his stern rebuke and his lenient sentence is utterly incomprehensible.
Consider the charges against Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-cheng, and the sentences they received. Consider the State Affairs Fund. Before the criminal code was amended in 2006, each subsequent offense called for a sentence 1.5 times as long as the initial offense. The High Court sentenced Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng each to 14 years imprisonment. After the criminal code was amended, each offense was punished separately. The court found Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng guilty of 10 offenses. They were each sentenced to six years for each offense. Their sentences for each offense were reduced to three years. The total sentence was 30 years. The State Affairs Fund scandal is punishable under Article IV of the Corruption Act. It involves the "usurpation of public property," and is punishable by a sentence of 10 to life. In other words, the High Court did not impose the maximum sentence, but instead reduced their sentences to only three years for each offense.
Consider the Longtan Industrial Zone scandal. According to Article V of the Corruption Act, Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng were each subject to at least seven years imprisonment for "accepting bribes in one's capacity as an official." The High Court originally sentenced Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng each to 12 years. Consider the Diana Chen bribery scandal. Pursuant to Article V of the Corruption Act, they were each sentenced to eight years for "accepting bribes in one's capacity as an official." Consider the Nangang Exhibition Hall scandal, in which only Wu Shu-chen was charged. Pursuant to Article IV of the Corruption Act, she was found guilty of "accepting bribes in breach of official duties" and sentenced to 16 years. On the basis of corruption charges alone, the High Court sentenced Chen Shui-bian to 64 years imprisonment, and Wu Shu-cheng to 80 years imprisonment. Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng were found guilty of falsifying official documents and money laundering, and sentenced for these crimes as well.
So many crimes. Such long sentences. Yet the High Court abruptly reduced the court's ruling of life imprisonment in the first instance, to "20 years imprisonment." Individuals convicted under the Republic of China criminal code often do not receive life sentences. Short of a life sentence, the longest sentence the courts are permitted to impose is 30 years, not 20 years. The upper limit of 20 years applies only to isolated offenses. Suppose the court does not wish to give Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng life sentences. Altogether they were sentenced to 70 to 80 years. Shouldn't their sentences have been reduced to 30 years, and not merely 20? Also, apart from their terms of their imprisonment, the 200 million NT fine imposed upon Chen Shui-bian by the court of the first instance has been reduced to 170 million NT. The 300 million NT fine imposed upon Wu Shu-cheng has been reduced to 200 million NT. What justification can the high court offer for that?
The High Court has sharply reduced Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's sentences. But it has offered no justifications whatsover for pulling its punches. Instead, all we see is harsh language.
For example, the judge rebuked Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng, saying that "high officials must be clean. They must not abuse their power for the benefit of their cronies and family members. Abusing public power for private gain shames the government, undermines society's values, and encourages lawlessness." The judge went to say that [Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng] allowed family members to misappropriate public funds for private use. In the name of national economic development, they conducted illegal transactions that lined their own pockets. Heads of public agencies squandered public public funds, providing financial relief for favored private companies. Out of fear, the Minister of Finance arranged public jobs for private individuals. Through family members, Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng used convoluted methods to launder illicit funds abroad. To disguise the criminal nature of their financial gains, and to avoid criminal prosecution, they knowing broke the law and betrayed the public trust.
What is one to make of such a stern rebuke, in conjunction with such a sharply reduced sentence? Most culpable and abhorrent of all is Ah-Cheng. She abused her power to satisfy her greed. Instead of forcing her to return her ill-gotten gains to the national treasury, the High Court has reduced her fines. What possible justification can the High Court have for its action? As president, Chen Shui-bian engaged in all manner of evil-doing. He should not be punished above and beyond the limits of the law. But what possible justification can the judges have to abet his criminal conduct by deliberately lightening his sentence? When the rebuke issued by the judge is diametrically opposed to the sentence handed down, the public is naturally going to feel conflicted. In short, the decision of the High Court is sharply at odds with ordinary citizens' understanding of the law.
Now consider characters other than Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng. Take family members such as Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching. Take Ah-Bian confidants such as Ma Yung-cheng and Lin Teh-hsung. They too have had their sentences sharply reduced, also for no conceivable reason. For example, the High Court ruled that Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching knew perfectly well that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's vast fortune was illicit gains, but nevertheless decided to act as accomplices in their complex money laundering schemes. The media even reported on the two of them, living it up abroad. In the eyes of society, Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching bear a heavy responsibility. Yet Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching received sharp reductions in their fines. Huang Jui-ching received probation. The 200 million NT they were required to pay in the first instance was reduced to a mere 10 million NT. Are the the judges truly unaware of the Chen family's financial clout? The reasons behind this slap on the wrist remain shrouded in mystery. The rebuke issued by the High Court was so harsh. Yet its sentence was so light. That is what the public finds utterly incomprehensible.
扁案二審量刑標準有何道理？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.13
台灣高等法院就扁家弊案宣判，審判所及的國務機要費、龍潭工業區、南港展館、陳敏薰賄賂以及相關洗錢行為等各部分案情，二審仍然認定有罪。但承審法官雖在判決中嚴詞譴責扁珍等人的犯行罪無可逭，卻在量刑上大幅降低刑期和罰金，這種「判詞與量刑相矛盾」的情況，令人不解。
先看陳水扁和吳淑珍在判決中認定的各罪與所量刑度：國務機要費部分，九十五年刑法修正前，亦即有連續犯加重二分之一的期間，高院判扁珍各十四年有期徒刑；刑法修正後，一罪一罰，法院認定扁珍共犯十罪，每罪判六年，減為三年，總共是三十年。國務機要費弊案是構成貪污治罪條例第四條「侵占公有財物罪」，可處無期徒刑或十年以上有期徒刑。亦即，高院就本罪並未量處最重刑度，且在一罪一罰部分，還減至三年。
再者，龍潭工業區部分，高院以構成貪污治罪條例第五條，本刑七年以上有期徒刑的「職務上行為受賄罪」，判處扁珍各十二年。在陳敏薰賄賂案，高院同樣以貪污治罪條例第五條「職務上行為受賄罪」，判處扁珍各八年。在南港展館案，僅吳淑珍涉案，高院依貪污治罪條例第四條「共同違背職務受賄罪」，判處她十六年。加總起來，僅以上開貪污罪名，高院總共判處了陳水扁六十四年有期徒刑，吳淑珍八十年有期徒刑；除此之外，扁珍還有偽造文書、洗錢等，亦分別判處有期徒刑。
這麼多罪名，這麼長的刑期，高院卻由第一審所判的無期徒刑，一下子降為扁珍均為「應執行有期徒刑二十年」。事實上，我國刑法在多項罪名均成立，判處多數有期徒刑時，容許法院定的最高有期徒刑，是三十年而非二十年，二十年僅是單一罪名有期徒刑的最高上限。若不處無期徒刑，則扁珍合計七、八十年的刑期，為何不是合併執行三十年，而是二十年？更有甚者，除了刑期，在罰金方面，陳水扁也由一審的二億元降為一億七千萬元，吳淑珍則由三億元降為二億元。這又是什麼道理？
然而，高院對扁珍的懲罰銳減，但在量刑的判詞中，非但看不到這般大放水的理由，反而是聲色俱厲的嚴詞譴責。
例如，法官指責扁珍「位高權重，本應廉潔自持，並應敦促家人親信避免以權牟利，以私害公，辱壞官箴，導致社會價值觀及行為觀紊亂」；但是，竟放任家人將國務機要費公款私用；藉國家經濟科技發展，以金錢交易牟利私囊，致主管機關浪費公款解決私人廠商財務問題；財政部長戒慎恐懼安排私人職位；將不法所得由家人以繁複手段洗至國外，以切斷資金來源及犯罪所得性質，逃避司法追訴；知法犯法，背棄人民付託……。
如此嚴厲的指摘，卻又如何能夠大幅度減低刑期至此？尤其可怪者，扁珍最為可惡的就是恃權貪錢，如今不以罰金迫其交予國庫，卻反而減少金額，這又是什麼道理？陳水扁身為總統而作惡多端，固然不可給予超逾法律的刑罰，但若是擅以法官裁量權而故意輕刑寬縱，似乎亦無道理。法官的譴責和刑度相反，社會大眾當然感到矛盾；也就是說，高院判決的結果，恐怕是背離了一般國民的法律感情。
除了扁珍這兩名主角，其餘如陳致中、黃睿靚等扁家成員，以及其他馬永成、林德訓等扁的親信，也均獲得大幅降低刑度的待遇。但這些部分的減輕，也看不出理由。例如，高院也認定陳致中、黃睿靚都是明知扁珍取得大量不法所得，還參與了繁複的洗錢犯行；事實上，媒體也報導了許多兩人在國外的享受行為。那麼，陳致中、黃睿靚就這部分應承擔較重的責任，方符合一般社會的正義觀念。結果，陳致中、黃睿靚的量刑、罰金大幅降低之外，連黃睿靚的緩刑條件，也由一審向公庫繳納二億元，大降為一千萬元。難道法官不知道，扁家財力的真相，迄今仍是一團謎霧，這樣做不啻輕縱了犯罪？高院的判詞罵得那麼兇，判刑卻這麼輕，這是讓人無法理解的地方。
Friday, June 11, 2010
DPP Infighting over the Five City Elections
DPP Infighting over the Five City Elections
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 11, 2010
During the 2008 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian and Frank Hsieh engaged in an internal DPP power struggle. They fought over personal power and the party's future. Eventually this internal struggle hijacked the DPP's presidential campaign.
Chen Shui-bian hoped to manipulate the presidential election. He hoped to maintain his status as the standard bearer for the Taiwan independence movement. He hoped to use that status to evade prosecution for corruption after leaving office. Presidential candidate Frank Hsieh was initially reluctant to express solidarity with Chen and reluctant to endorse the demand for a referendum on UN membership. But he lost to Chen Shui-bian. He also lost his bid for the presidency.
The upcoming mayoral elections for the five directly administered municipalities mirror internal struggles within the DPP for personal power and over the party's future. Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang are in coopetition over personal power and the party's future. Tsai and Su are the only two candidates for the 2012 presidential election. Su Tseng-chang, who is running for Taipei mayor, has vowed that if elected, he will serve out his term in full. Tsai Ing-wen, who is running for Xinbei City mayor, has said only that if elected, "we will be responsible to the end." Even this tiny difference leaves a lot to the imagination. Also, now that ECFA has become a plank in the DPP election platform, it will only intensify the Tsai vs. Su power struggle.
The DPP has demagogued the issue of ECFA so long it can no longer stop. Opposition to ECFA has become the clarion call in four out five DPP mayoral campaigns, including Tsai Ing-wen's campaign for Xinbei City mayor. Only Su Tseng-chang, in his campaign for Taipei mayor, has expressed reservations about opposing ECFA. So far he has made only two remarks about ECFA. He said "Entering (mainland) China means getting locked in (mainland) China" and "I favor opening, but with conditions." Given public sentiments in Taipei City, Su Tseng-chang may be wise to go easy on ECFA. On the other hand, Tsai Ing-wen, along with the three other DPP mayoral candidates, have been demagoguing the issue of ECFA. She has even threatened to raise such a ruckus that no one will have any peace. This is clearly inconsistent with the interests of Su Tseng-chang's election campaign.
Up until the Two Yings Debate, Tsai Ing-wen had yet to express any opposition to ECFA. She merely adopted a "go slow, add conditions" position. After losing the debate however, her rhetoric changed. She spoke of "abolishing ECFA once we assume power," and of "holding a referendum to abolish ECFA." She referred to the ROC as a "government in exile." She expressed opposition to our "economics above all attitude" and doubts about our "export-orientation." After Tsai Ing-wen announced her candidacy for Xinbei City mayor, and the TSU proposal for a referendum on ECFA was shot down, she adopted an even harder line on ECFA. She denounced ECFA as a "duet sung by the KMT and the CCP." She adopted the rhetoric of class struggle, claiming that "the conglomerates will benefit, but the poor will be victimized." Tsai Ing-wen has used the occasion to move closer to the Deep Greens. She is attempting to seize the party leadership, and shrink Su Tseng-chang's manuevering room. Su Tseng-chang initially proposed a "Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers" scenario. But Tsai Ing-wen wants a "Five Cities Network." Su Tseng-chang's marginalization is clear to see. Coopetition between Tsai and Su in the five mayoral elections has become a two way power struggle over who will call the shots in the five mayoral campaigns, and a prelude to the 2012 presidential election.
Internal DPP struggles over the five mayoral elections are more than a power struggle between Tsai and Su. Other demands have been made, including calls to "share party power" and demands that "the princes of the party must become standing committee members." Chen Chih-chung has announced his candidacy. DPP city council candidates have formed a "Chen Shui-bian Alliance." This represents another sort of inner-party struggle. This scenario confirms Taiwan's political destiny. Internecine power struggles within the DPP are an insoluble problem. They will go on forever. Then will be played up during elections. The larger interests of Republic of China citizens on Taiwan will never be addressed.
Tsai Ing-wen has already been thoroughly "DPP-ized." She has already embarked upon a one way path, politically and socially. She has already passed the point of no return. To consolidate her status within the party, and to gain an advantage over Su Tseng-chang, she has encouraged the DPP to adopt an anti-ECFA stance. She has spouted such extremist rhetoric as "a duet sung by the KMT and the CCP," and "the conglomerates will benefit, but the poor will be victimized." This is remarkably similar to how Chen Shui-bian encouraged the DPP to adopt such extremist rhetoric as the "rectification of names" and "one country on each side." The only difference is the issue at hand. Chen Shui-bian's thinking was "as long as the head gets through, the body can get through." But if Tsai Ing-wen categorically repudiates ECFA, and incites rich vs. poor class struggles, neither the head nor the body will get through. One can safely predict the outcome of both the five mayoral elections and the 2012 presidential election. Does Tsai Ing-wen really wish to incite class struggle on Taiwan? With the 2012 elections looming, does she really wish to turn the clock back to the era prior to cross-Strait flights and ECFA? If she does, then even if the head gets through, the body will not get through.
Taiwan is afflicted by a lethal defect. That defect is not the consensus formed by mainstream society. That defect was created by the DPP. Due to internal power struggles, the DPP is incapable of ever reaching a final consensus. Internal differences over the party line may provide leverage for political struggles within the party and on the island of Taiwan. But they are useless in cross-Strait relations and in the global arena. They cannot offer Taiwan any kind of future. Coopetition between Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang has once again left us with an insoluble dilemma.
伴隨五都選舉的民進黨內鬥
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.11 03:09 am
二○○八年總統大選，伴隨著發生民進黨內陳水扁與謝長廷的權力與路線鬥爭。最後，黨內鬥爭甚至凌駕了總統大選。
當時，陳水扁欲藉主導操作總統大選，以保全其台獨旗手的地位，做為卸任後因貪腐弊案對司法抗爭的本錢；競選總統的謝長廷原本對挺扁及入聯公投等操作均有保留，但皆不敵陳水扁，最後輸掉了總統大選。
如今的五都選舉，其實也與民進黨內的權力與路線鬥爭正在平行發展。蔡英文與蘇貞昌之間的競合關係，是這場權力與路線鬥爭的主軸。蔡蘇是民進黨問鼎二○一二總統大選的「唯二人選」，蘇貞昌選台北市長，有「當選任滿」的承諾；蔡英文選新北市長，卻只說「若當選，我們負責到底」。僅是此一差異，已有極大想像空間；何況，如今ＥＣＦＡ儼然已成民進黨五都選戰的主題，更將深化蔡蘇鬥爭。
民進黨將ＥＣＦＡ爭議炒作到今日地步，已是欲罷不能；看現今情勢，包括蔡英文在內的四都皆將持反ＥＣＦＡ的明銳立場，唯獨在台北市的蘇貞昌似仍有保留。蘇對ＥＣＦＡ，目前大約只有「前進中國／鎖進中國」，及「贊成開放／必須配套」這兩句口訣。以台北市的民情而言，蘇貞昌對ＥＣＦＡ輕描淡寫或許才是上策；蔡英文卻帶著其他四都大炒反ＥＣＦＡ，甚至揚言要鬧到「永無寧日」，這顯然未必符合蘇貞昌的選情利益。
蔡英文一直到四月雙英辯論時，猶未明白宣示「反對ＥＣＦＡ」；當時，她尚持「緩簽／配套」的立場。辯論失利後，她的言論明顯改變，包括：「執政後，公投廢ＥＣＦＡ」、「流亡政府論」、「否定經濟掛帥／質疑出口導向」等等。及至蔡英文宣布參選新北市後，又值台聯ＥＣＦＡ公投案被駁回，她的立場更趨尖銳，逕指ＥＣＦＡ是「國共唱和」，並緊咬「財團受益／窮人受害」的階級鬥爭論述。蔡英文藉此向深綠靠攏、佔奪黨內領導地位的同時，卻也壓縮了蘇貞昌的政治空間。蘇貞昌原本提供的劇本是「雙城奇謀」，但蔡英文要唱的是「五都連線」；如今，蘇貞昌的邊緣化已是有目共睹。蔡蘇在五都選舉中的競合關係，其實是二人在五都的龍頭地位之爭，亦是二○一二總統大選的前哨戰。
與五都選舉平行發展的黨內鬥爭，尚不止是蔡蘇角力而已。「釋出黨權」與「天王入中常會」則是另一齣。陳致中宣布參選，及市議員參選人出現「陳水扁連線」，也呈現了另一層面的黨內鬥爭。此一場景，再次印證了台灣政治上的一種宿命，那就是：民進黨的內鬥是一個不可能有解答的題目，而民進黨的內鬥既是沒完沒了，再透過選戰等戲碼的放大操作，台灣的大局也就不可能找到出路。
蔡英文已徹底「民進黨化」了；此去她在政治路線上及社會信任上已走上不歸路，皆已過了折返點。她為了自己的黨內地位，並對蘇貞昌取得優勢，將民進黨反ＥＣＦＡ的論述，引向「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」的極端；這與陳水扁將民進黨引向「正名制憲／一邊一國」其實是異曲同工，只是換了一個題目。陳水扁的想法是「頭過身就過」；但蔡英文若全面否定ＥＣＦＡ，以炒作貧富鬥爭為能事，姑不論在五都選舉中，「頭」能不能過；但可預言，此一路線的「身」，恐怕絕無可能在二○一二過得了關。蔡英文難道想煽動一個階級對立的台灣，在二○一二回到前直航及前ＥＣＦＡ的時代嗎？恐怕即使是頭過，身也不會過。
台灣的致命問題，其實不在主流社會沒有形成最大公約數的共識，而是民進黨的內鬥找不到終局解答所致。黨內路線的搖擺與鬥爭，做為在黨內及島內政爭的槓桿則有餘；卻不能在兩岸關係及全球化平台上，為台灣找到生路。蔡英文與蘇貞昌的競合關係，再次呈現了此一無解的內鬥課題。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 11, 2010
During the 2008 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian and Frank Hsieh engaged in an internal DPP power struggle. They fought over personal power and the party's future. Eventually this internal struggle hijacked the DPP's presidential campaign.
Chen Shui-bian hoped to manipulate the presidential election. He hoped to maintain his status as the standard bearer for the Taiwan independence movement. He hoped to use that status to evade prosecution for corruption after leaving office. Presidential candidate Frank Hsieh was initially reluctant to express solidarity with Chen and reluctant to endorse the demand for a referendum on UN membership. But he lost to Chen Shui-bian. He also lost his bid for the presidency.
The upcoming mayoral elections for the five directly administered municipalities mirror internal struggles within the DPP for personal power and over the party's future. Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang are in coopetition over personal power and the party's future. Tsai and Su are the only two candidates for the 2012 presidential election. Su Tseng-chang, who is running for Taipei mayor, has vowed that if elected, he will serve out his term in full. Tsai Ing-wen, who is running for Xinbei City mayor, has said only that if elected, "we will be responsible to the end." Even this tiny difference leaves a lot to the imagination. Also, now that ECFA has become a plank in the DPP election platform, it will only intensify the Tsai vs. Su power struggle.
The DPP has demagogued the issue of ECFA so long it can no longer stop. Opposition to ECFA has become the clarion call in four out five DPP mayoral campaigns, including Tsai Ing-wen's campaign for Xinbei City mayor. Only Su Tseng-chang, in his campaign for Taipei mayor, has expressed reservations about opposing ECFA. So far he has made only two remarks about ECFA. He said "Entering (mainland) China means getting locked in (mainland) China" and "I favor opening, but with conditions." Given public sentiments in Taipei City, Su Tseng-chang may be wise to go easy on ECFA. On the other hand, Tsai Ing-wen, along with the three other DPP mayoral candidates, have been demagoguing the issue of ECFA. She has even threatened to raise such a ruckus that no one will have any peace. This is clearly inconsistent with the interests of Su Tseng-chang's election campaign.
Up until the Two Yings Debate, Tsai Ing-wen had yet to express any opposition to ECFA. She merely adopted a "go slow, add conditions" position. After losing the debate however, her rhetoric changed. She spoke of "abolishing ECFA once we assume power," and of "holding a referendum to abolish ECFA." She referred to the ROC as a "government in exile." She expressed opposition to our "economics above all attitude" and doubts about our "export-orientation." After Tsai Ing-wen announced her candidacy for Xinbei City mayor, and the TSU proposal for a referendum on ECFA was shot down, she adopted an even harder line on ECFA. She denounced ECFA as a "duet sung by the KMT and the CCP." She adopted the rhetoric of class struggle, claiming that "the conglomerates will benefit, but the poor will be victimized." Tsai Ing-wen has used the occasion to move closer to the Deep Greens. She is attempting to seize the party leadership, and shrink Su Tseng-chang's manuevering room. Su Tseng-chang initially proposed a "Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers" scenario. But Tsai Ing-wen wants a "Five Cities Network." Su Tseng-chang's marginalization is clear to see. Coopetition between Tsai and Su in the five mayoral elections has become a two way power struggle over who will call the shots in the five mayoral campaigns, and a prelude to the 2012 presidential election.
Internal DPP struggles over the five mayoral elections are more than a power struggle between Tsai and Su. Other demands have been made, including calls to "share party power" and demands that "the princes of the party must become standing committee members." Chen Chih-chung has announced his candidacy. DPP city council candidates have formed a "Chen Shui-bian Alliance." This represents another sort of inner-party struggle. This scenario confirms Taiwan's political destiny. Internecine power struggles within the DPP are an insoluble problem. They will go on forever. Then will be played up during elections. The larger interests of Republic of China citizens on Taiwan will never be addressed.
Tsai Ing-wen has already been thoroughly "DPP-ized." She has already embarked upon a one way path, politically and socially. She has already passed the point of no return. To consolidate her status within the party, and to gain an advantage over Su Tseng-chang, she has encouraged the DPP to adopt an anti-ECFA stance. She has spouted such extremist rhetoric as "a duet sung by the KMT and the CCP," and "the conglomerates will benefit, but the poor will be victimized." This is remarkably similar to how Chen Shui-bian encouraged the DPP to adopt such extremist rhetoric as the "rectification of names" and "one country on each side." The only difference is the issue at hand. Chen Shui-bian's thinking was "as long as the head gets through, the body can get through." But if Tsai Ing-wen categorically repudiates ECFA, and incites rich vs. poor class struggles, neither the head nor the body will get through. One can safely predict the outcome of both the five mayoral elections and the 2012 presidential election. Does Tsai Ing-wen really wish to incite class struggle on Taiwan? With the 2012 elections looming, does she really wish to turn the clock back to the era prior to cross-Strait flights and ECFA? If she does, then even if the head gets through, the body will not get through.
Taiwan is afflicted by a lethal defect. That defect is not the consensus formed by mainstream society. That defect was created by the DPP. Due to internal power struggles, the DPP is incapable of ever reaching a final consensus. Internal differences over the party line may provide leverage for political struggles within the party and on the island of Taiwan. But they are useless in cross-Strait relations and in the global arena. They cannot offer Taiwan any kind of future. Coopetition between Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang has once again left us with an insoluble dilemma.
伴隨五都選舉的民進黨內鬥
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.11 03:09 am
二○○八年總統大選，伴隨著發生民進黨內陳水扁與謝長廷的權力與路線鬥爭。最後，黨內鬥爭甚至凌駕了總統大選。
當時，陳水扁欲藉主導操作總統大選，以保全其台獨旗手的地位，做為卸任後因貪腐弊案對司法抗爭的本錢；競選總統的謝長廷原本對挺扁及入聯公投等操作均有保留，但皆不敵陳水扁，最後輸掉了總統大選。
如今的五都選舉，其實也與民進黨內的權力與路線鬥爭正在平行發展。蔡英文與蘇貞昌之間的競合關係，是這場權力與路線鬥爭的主軸。蔡蘇是民進黨問鼎二○一二總統大選的「唯二人選」，蘇貞昌選台北市長，有「當選任滿」的承諾；蔡英文選新北市長，卻只說「若當選，我們負責到底」。僅是此一差異，已有極大想像空間；何況，如今ＥＣＦＡ儼然已成民進黨五都選戰的主題，更將深化蔡蘇鬥爭。
民進黨將ＥＣＦＡ爭議炒作到今日地步，已是欲罷不能；看現今情勢，包括蔡英文在內的四都皆將持反ＥＣＦＡ的明銳立場，唯獨在台北市的蘇貞昌似仍有保留。蘇對ＥＣＦＡ，目前大約只有「前進中國／鎖進中國」，及「贊成開放／必須配套」這兩句口訣。以台北市的民情而言，蘇貞昌對ＥＣＦＡ輕描淡寫或許才是上策；蔡英文卻帶著其他四都大炒反ＥＣＦＡ，甚至揚言要鬧到「永無寧日」，這顯然未必符合蘇貞昌的選情利益。
蔡英文一直到四月雙英辯論時，猶未明白宣示「反對ＥＣＦＡ」；當時，她尚持「緩簽／配套」的立場。辯論失利後，她的言論明顯改變，包括：「執政後，公投廢ＥＣＦＡ」、「流亡政府論」、「否定經濟掛帥／質疑出口導向」等等。及至蔡英文宣布參選新北市後，又值台聯ＥＣＦＡ公投案被駁回，她的立場更趨尖銳，逕指ＥＣＦＡ是「國共唱和」，並緊咬「財團受益／窮人受害」的階級鬥爭論述。蔡英文藉此向深綠靠攏、佔奪黨內領導地位的同時，卻也壓縮了蘇貞昌的政治空間。蘇貞昌原本提供的劇本是「雙城奇謀」，但蔡英文要唱的是「五都連線」；如今，蘇貞昌的邊緣化已是有目共睹。蔡蘇在五都選舉中的競合關係，其實是二人在五都的龍頭地位之爭，亦是二○一二總統大選的前哨戰。
與五都選舉平行發展的黨內鬥爭，尚不止是蔡蘇角力而已。「釋出黨權」與「天王入中常會」則是另一齣。陳致中宣布參選，及市議員參選人出現「陳水扁連線」，也呈現了另一層面的黨內鬥爭。此一場景，再次印證了台灣政治上的一種宿命，那就是：民進黨的內鬥是一個不可能有解答的題目，而民進黨的內鬥既是沒完沒了，再透過選戰等戲碼的放大操作，台灣的大局也就不可能找到出路。
蔡英文已徹底「民進黨化」了；此去她在政治路線上及社會信任上已走上不歸路，皆已過了折返點。她為了自己的黨內地位，並對蘇貞昌取得優勢，將民進黨反ＥＣＦＡ的論述，引向「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」的極端；這與陳水扁將民進黨引向「正名制憲／一邊一國」其實是異曲同工，只是換了一個題目。陳水扁的想法是「頭過身就過」；但蔡英文若全面否定ＥＣＦＡ，以炒作貧富鬥爭為能事，姑不論在五都選舉中，「頭」能不能過；但可預言，此一路線的「身」，恐怕絕無可能在二○一二過得了關。蔡英文難道想煽動一個階級對立的台灣，在二○一二回到前直航及前ＥＣＦＡ的時代嗎？恐怕即使是頭過，身也不會過。
台灣的致命問題，其實不在主流社會沒有形成最大公約數的共識，而是民進黨的內鬥找不到終局解答所致。黨內路線的搖擺與鬥爭，做為在黨內及島內政爭的槓桿則有餘；卻不能在兩岸關係及全球化平台上，為台灣找到生路。蔡英文與蘇貞昌的競合關係，再次呈現了此一無解的內鬥課題。
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