Sovereign Territory and Rare Earth: Diaoyutai and the DPP
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 30, 2010
Global events are unpredictable. Who would have guessed that the Cheonan corvette sinking incident would trigger an international tug of war, and even become a footnote in the September Dioayutai incident?
Following the Cheonan incident, the US and the ROK held naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. These were followed by joint US/Vietnamese naval exercises. People cried that "The United States is returning to Asia," and is engaged in renewed efforts to contain Mainland China. Under the circumstances, Japan's detention of people at Diaoyutai, and Wen Jiabao's demand that Japan release them without conditions, was tantamount to a global game of chicken, a contest to see who would be the first to blink. In the end, the Japanese released the detainees. At this point, it is hard to say who won and who lost. But clearly Beijing has both the will and the way to defy the dictates of the United States and Japan.
Diaoyutai has long been a raw nerve on Taiwan's political scene. This time was no different. The Ma Administration's speech was nothing new. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's remarks however, were food for thought. Tsai Ing-wen said "Diaoyutai belongs to Taiwan." Although this quoted old Executive Yuan cases, coming from the mouth of Tsai Ing-wen, it was tantamount to a declaration of "quasi-Taiwan independence."
A full-fledged declaration of Taiwan independence would have quoted Lee Teng-hui, who said "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan." "Of course it belongs to Japan." When Lee Teng-hui said this, he had already stepped down. When President Chen Shui-bian took a boat to Pengjia Island, he declared that "Diaoyutai belongs to the Republic of China." This was another statement of position by a Green Camp leader regarding Diaoyutai.
Tsai Ing-wen's statement reveals her dilemma. On the one hand, she cannot echo Lee Teng-hui's declaration that "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan." If she were to make such a statement, the DPP would not have a leg to stand on. It would also find it difficult to mend relations with Beijing. On the other hand, she did not want to repeat Chen Shui-bian's declaration that "Diaoyutai belongs to the Republic of China." First, she had to mollify Taiwan independence elements. Secondly, invoking the Republic of China involves Diaoyutai in a "Greater China" struggle. But after all, there is no "Nation of Taiwan." Tsai's "Nation of Taiwan" is a fiction. If one hopes to assert sovereignty over Diaoyutai, what way is there but to assert that "Diaoyutai belongs to the Republic of China?"
The Taiwan independence movement would like to rid itself of Diaoyutai. It wants to rid itself of Diaoyutai in order to rid itself of Beijing. But Tsai Ying-wen dares not get rid of Diaoyutai. Clearly she is concerned about a backlash from Beijing. But if she cannot get rid of Diaoyutai, she cannot get rid of Beijing, even though she may have repudiated the "Republic of China." As we can see, she is trapped on the horns of a dilemma.
For Beijing the Diaoyutai incident involves two strategic elements: "sovereign territory" and "rare earth." This is where advocates of Taiwan independence within the DPP should focus their attention. The territorial issue is an issue of sovereignty. Beijing's tough stance on sovereignty needs no further comment. The issue of "rare earth" Beijing is tackling using economic means. Mainland China is already "the world's factory" and "the global marketplace." Japan cannot hold out in the long term. This is the main reason Japan felt compelled to release the detainees and swallow its pride. It effectively backed down under Beijing's economic threats. This should serve as a warning for the DPP.
Taipei is in coopetition with Beijing over two issues, "sovereignty" and "economics." On the issue of sovereignty, the DPP repudiates the "1992 Consensus" and "One China, Different Interpretations." It asserts that "the Republic of China is an alien regime." It attempts to promote "Taiwan independence" in a power struggle with Beijing." Is this a workable policy? On the issue of economics, the economy on Taiwan and the economy on Mainland China are inseparable. If the DPP returns to power and resumes its Taiwan independence path, Beijing may well nullify ECFA. How will the DPP cope with such a threat? This is a strategic possibility the DPP must anticipate. Actually, Beijing need only declare a "suspension of dealings between the two organizations." Any DPP-ruled central government would buckle under the impact. The 1992 Consensus allows the two sides to coexist. Taiwan's economy is inseparable from the Mainland's. If the DPP returns to power, but insists on repudiating the 1992 Consensus, the consequences will be unimagineable.
The political situation on Taiwan is changing. Some on the Mainland are even "pinning their hopes on the DPP." This tells us that if one day the DPP returns to power, but refuses to make a declaration even more explicit than the "five noes," Beijing will punish the DPP for promoting Taiwan independence. By applying economic pressure, it can exert complete control over Taiwan's political and economic systems. The DPP regime will become a fragile government, highly susceptible to extortion. Therefore in the eyes of the Beijing authorities, a DPP return to power may constitute a windfall opportunity to resolve the cross-Strait dilemma. Why shouldn't it look forward to a DPP return to power?
In recent years, the global situation and cross-Strait situation have undergone dramatic changes. The Diaoyutai issue has also undergone changes, both internationally and across the Strait. The Diaoyutai issue involves both "sovereign territory" and "rare earth." Cross-Strait issues will as well. Tsai Ing-wen has attempted to get rid of Diaoyutai. Instead she has repudiated the Republic of China. Her attempt has merely exposed the shortcomings of her strategy.
Beijing's "sovereignty/economics" strategy has been applied not just to Diaoyutai, but to the Taiwan Strait. This is precisely why Beijing is pinning its hopes on a DPP return to power.
領土與稀土 釣魚台與民進黨
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.30 03:15 am
世局變化莫測，誰曾料到三月天安艦事件觸發的一連串國際角力，竟然會在九月由釣魚台事件作了註腳？
天安艦事件後，美韓黃海演習，接著美越南海演習，「美國重返亞洲」之說甚囂塵上，一種針對中國的「新圍堵」儼然上演；在這種情勢下，日本在釣魚台扣船押人，及溫家寶要求日本無條件放人，不啻是在世人面前進行「懦夫博弈」（chicken game），看誰先撐不住而跳車，最後以日本放人收場。事態發展至此，雖然難謂勝負輸贏，但北京有意志及有力量拒絕接受美日等國所定義的局勢，則為有目共睹。
釣魚台早已成為牽動台灣政治神經的鋼絲，此次亦然。馬政府這次的發言並無新意，反而是民進黨主席蔡英文的談話頗可推敲。蔡英文說：「釣魚台列嶼的主權屬於台灣。」這雖是引據行政院的舊案，但此際出自蔡英文之口，卻儼然可謂是「半個台獨」的論述。
真正的台獨立場，應如李登輝所說：「釣魚台的主權屬於日本。」「當然是日本的。」說此話時，李登輝已經卸任總統。另一種綠營領袖的表述形式是陳水扁任總統時，乘船至彭佳嶼海域，宣示「釣魚台的主權屬於中華民國」。
蔡英文的說法顯示她陷於兩難之境。一方面，她不可能如李登輝那樣說「釣魚台是日本的」；她若這樣說，民進黨非但在台灣難以立足，此後也難與北京修復關係。另一方面，她又不願像陳水扁那樣說「釣魚台是中華民國的」，一者是要照顧獨派的感情，二者是因思及中華民國使釣島問題捲入「大中國」的糾纏中。但是，畢竟「台灣國」仍是子虛烏有，台灣若要主張釣島的「主權」，除了說「釣魚台的主權是中華民國的」，難道還有其他方法？
台獨想要甩掉釣魚台，主要是想以甩掉釣魚台來甩掉北京。但蔡英文不敢甩掉釣魚台，顯然是顧忌北京的反彈；然她未甩掉釣魚台，也甩不掉北京，卻竟否定了「中華民國」，可見已陷兩難的矛盾中。
北京在此次釣魚台事件中的兩大戰略要素是：領土與稀土。這是民進黨主張台獨路線者宜應觀察的重點。領土問題就是主權問題，北京立場之強硬不待贅論。稀土問題則泛指北京以經濟手段作為折衝主力，而日本對於已成「世界工廠」及「世界市場」的中國，不能不寄以久遠，這應是日本這次唾面自乾、放人息事的主因，可謂是在北京的經濟威脅下讓步。此一情勢，對民進黨應當有所啟示。
台灣與北京政權的競合關係，其實也在「主權」與「經濟」兩大項目。就主權論，民進黨否定「九二共識」、「一中各表」，認為「中華民國是外來政權」，而欲以「台獨建國」與北京進行「主權」角力，這是否可行的政策？再就經濟論，台灣經濟絕無可能與中國隔離，民進黨若再執政而仍採台獨路線，將如何面對北京可能停廢ＥＣＦＡ等威脅，這也是不能不有所預防的戰略思考。其實，屆時恐怕只消北京宣布暫停「兩會來往」，主持中央政府的民進黨就必承受不起。民進黨若在主權上仍否認猶可與北京分庭抗禮的「九二共識」，且台灣在經濟上又擺脫不了中國，則民進黨再執政將是何等不堪想像的危境？
隨著台灣內部政治情勢變化，大陸方面甚至已出現了「寄希望於民進黨」的思考。此說認為，如果另日民進黨主政，不作出比「四不一沒有」更明確的宣示，北京即以民進黨主張台獨進行政治施壓，又以經濟利害相脅迫，就能完全操控台灣的政經神經，而民進黨政府將成為極易受挾持及極脆弱的政府。因而，在北京當局眼中，民進黨若再執政，儼然即是解決兩岸問題的另一個更佳的「機遇期」，何不寄希望於民進黨再執政？
近年來，世界局勢與兩岸競合關係皆有了巨大變化，釣魚台問題的性質在國際及兩岸間亦告變化。釣魚台問題未來仍將循「領土／稀土」的路徑發展，兩岸關係亦然；蔡英文這種甩不掉釣魚台卻反而否定了中華民國的手法，其實只是自暴其短。
北京「主權／經濟」的戰略，不僅施於釣魚台，也施於台灣海峽；這也正是北京有人寄希望於民進黨再執政的原因所在。
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Our Vision, the Government's Implementation
Our Vision, the Government's Implementation
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 29, 2010
Last Thursday this newspaper began publishing its 2030 series of news reports. We imagined how Taiwan might be 20 years into the future. We explored economic development, educational policy, land planning international relations, civil society, covering most important domestic and foreign issues. We invited scholars and experts to provide insights and focus regarding key issues. The 2030 series of special reports explored the issues in greater depth than other fora. It outlined a highly specific future for Taiwan. Of course we hope the current administration and future political leaders will carefully read our analyses, then implement our recommendations. After all, a better future cannot be achieved by individual members of the public on a piecemeal basis. It will require governmental authority and policy coordination.
The above reports showed that such positive visions reflect the subjective views of scholars and experts. They also reveal the shortfall between ideals and reality. Indeed, when people who care about education compare the enthusiasm of the 4/10 Educational Reform March of 16 years ago, to chaotic reform measures in recent years, how can they not feel depressed? We have been consuming our seed corn for the past decade, relentlessly squandering the information industry capital Li Kuo-ting and Sun Yun-suan bequeathed us. When people who care about the economy see how utterly incapable we are at establishing new industries with comparative advantages, how can they not be worried? The gap between the future scholars and experts depict, and the reality of today's Taiwan is too great. This raises concerns about the government's ability to realize our dreams for the future.
Pessimistically speaking, the rosy future depicted 20 years from today is a "pie in the sky." Everyone makes it sound so inevitable. But to realize the vision depicted, those in power, specifically the president and the premier, must carefully read what these experts have to say. They must internalize their recommendations, and treat them as genuine expectations. Those in office must think like executives. They must divide the work into manageable units, and after discussion and communication, instruct their ministers to carry them out. Assigning tasks is merely the first step in realizing the vision. The president and premier must carefully monitor any progress. Such persistence, perseverance, and close supervision was the key to Li Kuo-ting's successful promotion of the Hsinchu Science Park, and to Sun Yun-suan's successful promotion of the IC industry. Fail to follow up on the details, or to ensure close supervision, and the vision will remain a pie in the sky.
The issues covered in these newspaper reports were all major issues. Each issue includes many secondary issues. These also require the same perseverance to be successful. Take environmental protection, a big issue, as a way to address a smaller issue, "carbon reduction." Readers should have no trouble understanding that the key is follow through. In 2009, President Ma announced his vision for carbon reduction on Taiwan. This vision included reducing carbon emissions in 2020 to their 2008 level, and in 2025 to their 2000 level. But such carbon reduction goals are unreal fantasies. Achieving such goals would require the reduction of motor vehicle emissions, the introduction of alternative power generation, the reduction of industrial emissions, industrial restructuring, and the promotion of smart metering. To achieve these goals, the president or premier would have to rally the heads of the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Environmental Protection Bureau. They would have to establish emission reduction timetables, and supervise their implementation, without relaxation.
This is hardly the situation on Taiwan. The president may have announced carbon reduction goals. The "Renewable Energy Development Bill" may have been passed. But over the past year at least, environmentalists have seen no concrete improvements in power generation, vehicle emissions, or industrial restructuring. Has the Ministry of Economic Affairs encouraged the public to make use of alternative energy sources? Is the public aware it can sell electrical power to government? Has the Ministry of Transportation adopted progressive vehicle emissions taxes like the European Union? The petrochemical industry has recently been a hotbed of controversy. What exactly is its position on carbon reduction? Shouldn't it make its 10 year carbon reduction targets known to the public?
A quick look at energy conservation and carbon emissions alone, and it is obvious the Ma administration lacks the ability to follow through on implementation. As a member of the media, all we can do is offer a vision, rally the public, and create a consensus. But any vision requires governmental implementation to work. This newspaper's series of reports is merely the first stage in a relay race. The next two or three stages will depend upon the government's administrative ability and strength of will.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.09.29
願景我們描繪 執行要靠政府
本報訊
本報自上周四起開始推出二○三○系列報導，分別從不同面向透視廿年後的台灣前景。就切入角度而言，我們探討經濟發展、教育政策、國土規畫、國際關係、公民社會等，幾乎涵蓋所有重要的內政與外交議題。就分析的視野觀點而言，本報所邀請析論的學者專家也都能洞見癥結，銳利地釐清問題。就深度而言，這一系列二○三○的專題報導，相較於最近其他類似議題的討論都更為深入，也為台灣的未來描繪了相當具體的輪廓。當然，我們希望現在的主政者與未來有志於政治領導的人都能認真地閱讀、體會這一系列的分析，進而推動落實。畢竟，打造美好台灣不能單靠人民分散切割的投入，也需要政府公權力及政策的配合與努力。
由前述系列報導我們發現，民間的學者專家在議題論述中均呈現出深切的期待。這種正面的願景期待一方面反映學者專家的主觀理念，但另一方面也對比出理想與現實之間的落差。的確，當關心台灣教育的人比較十六年前四一○教改遊行的熱情期盼與這些年來教改措施的紛亂雜沓，他們的心情焉能不沉重？當關心台灣經濟的人看到十數年來台灣以「吃老本」的態勢逐漸消耗李國鼎與孫運璿為我們累積的資訊產業資產，卻完全無法開創新一波的產業相對優勢，他們豈能不焦急？整體而言，學者專家為我們描繪的願景，與當前台灣的環境差距甚大，這也使我們對政府實踐願景的執行力感到憂心。
從消極面來看，廿年後的遠景有如「畫大餅」，人人都能說得頭頭是道。若要真正讓願景描繪發揮功能，就需要主政者（總統與行政院長）認真的、仔細的讀通這些專家的意見，進而將這些意見「內化」為真心期待的看法。然後，主政者就該進入執行面的思考，將達成願景所須做的工作切割為若干區塊，經過討論溝通，責成相關的部會首長去貫徹。對首長交辦任務只是推動願景的起步；接下來，總統與行政院長就該仔細地、定期地檢視進度。這種執著的目標方向感與鍥而不捨的緊盯態度，是李國鼎當年成功推動竹科、孫運璿成功開創ＩＣ產業的關鍵。這些後續細節若是做不好、盯不緊，則願景就必然只是大餅，全無實質意義。
本報所報導的系列專題探討的都是大題目，而每一個大主題底下都還有細項子題，也都需要類似前述的貫徹緊盯態度，才可能有成。我們就以環境保育大議題中「減碳」一個小項來談，讀者當能理解後續執行的關鍵。馬總統在二○○九年就已經宣示了台灣減碳的願景，包括在二○二○年降至○八年的排放水準、二○二五年降至二○○○年的水準等。但這樣的減碳目標只是虛幻的期待，必須要靠汽機車減排、發電替代、工業排放減少、產業重組、智慧電表推廣等手段方能達成。為了達成這些目標，總統或院長就該召集交通部、經濟部、環保署等首長，定下各個部會、各個分項的減排期程，然後督促其執行，絲毫不放鬆。
台灣的情形卻不是如此：雖然總統減碳的目標已經宣示了，《再生能源發展條例》也已經通過了，但至少在過去這一年，環保人士都看不到台灣在發電、汽車排放、產業重組等方面有什麼具體的改善。經濟部有大力宣導促使民間加入替代能源的行列嗎？民間有「發電可賣給政府」的認知嗎？汽車排放的稅費，交通部有像歐盟那樣分期漸進的規畫嗎？最近吵翻天的石化產業，究竟在減碳拼圖上處於什麼地位？十年後減碳目標的百分比究竟是如何分配，難道不該向民眾宣導嗎？
見微知著，我們由節能減碳單一向度的觀察，就能想像馬政府頗為欠缺追蹤貫徹政策的執行力。作為媒體，我們只能在願景上盡言責，匯集民間力量，凝聚共同期待。但是所有的願景期待，都要靠踏實的政府執行方克竟功。本報的系列報導只是願景接力賽的第一棒；接下來的二、三棒要怎麼跑，就要看府院的能力與魄力了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 29, 2010
Last Thursday this newspaper began publishing its 2030 series of news reports. We imagined how Taiwan might be 20 years into the future. We explored economic development, educational policy, land planning international relations, civil society, covering most important domestic and foreign issues. We invited scholars and experts to provide insights and focus regarding key issues. The 2030 series of special reports explored the issues in greater depth than other fora. It outlined a highly specific future for Taiwan. Of course we hope the current administration and future political leaders will carefully read our analyses, then implement our recommendations. After all, a better future cannot be achieved by individual members of the public on a piecemeal basis. It will require governmental authority and policy coordination.
The above reports showed that such positive visions reflect the subjective views of scholars and experts. They also reveal the shortfall between ideals and reality. Indeed, when people who care about education compare the enthusiasm of the 4/10 Educational Reform March of 16 years ago, to chaotic reform measures in recent years, how can they not feel depressed? We have been consuming our seed corn for the past decade, relentlessly squandering the information industry capital Li Kuo-ting and Sun Yun-suan bequeathed us. When people who care about the economy see how utterly incapable we are at establishing new industries with comparative advantages, how can they not be worried? The gap between the future scholars and experts depict, and the reality of today's Taiwan is too great. This raises concerns about the government's ability to realize our dreams for the future.
Pessimistically speaking, the rosy future depicted 20 years from today is a "pie in the sky." Everyone makes it sound so inevitable. But to realize the vision depicted, those in power, specifically the president and the premier, must carefully read what these experts have to say. They must internalize their recommendations, and treat them as genuine expectations. Those in office must think like executives. They must divide the work into manageable units, and after discussion and communication, instruct their ministers to carry them out. Assigning tasks is merely the first step in realizing the vision. The president and premier must carefully monitor any progress. Such persistence, perseverance, and close supervision was the key to Li Kuo-ting's successful promotion of the Hsinchu Science Park, and to Sun Yun-suan's successful promotion of the IC industry. Fail to follow up on the details, or to ensure close supervision, and the vision will remain a pie in the sky.
The issues covered in these newspaper reports were all major issues. Each issue includes many secondary issues. These also require the same perseverance to be successful. Take environmental protection, a big issue, as a way to address a smaller issue, "carbon reduction." Readers should have no trouble understanding that the key is follow through. In 2009, President Ma announced his vision for carbon reduction on Taiwan. This vision included reducing carbon emissions in 2020 to their 2008 level, and in 2025 to their 2000 level. But such carbon reduction goals are unreal fantasies. Achieving such goals would require the reduction of motor vehicle emissions, the introduction of alternative power generation, the reduction of industrial emissions, industrial restructuring, and the promotion of smart metering. To achieve these goals, the president or premier would have to rally the heads of the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Environmental Protection Bureau. They would have to establish emission reduction timetables, and supervise their implementation, without relaxation.
This is hardly the situation on Taiwan. The president may have announced carbon reduction goals. The "Renewable Energy Development Bill" may have been passed. But over the past year at least, environmentalists have seen no concrete improvements in power generation, vehicle emissions, or industrial restructuring. Has the Ministry of Economic Affairs encouraged the public to make use of alternative energy sources? Is the public aware it can sell electrical power to government? Has the Ministry of Transportation adopted progressive vehicle emissions taxes like the European Union? The petrochemical industry has recently been a hotbed of controversy. What exactly is its position on carbon reduction? Shouldn't it make its 10 year carbon reduction targets known to the public?
A quick look at energy conservation and carbon emissions alone, and it is obvious the Ma administration lacks the ability to follow through on implementation. As a member of the media, all we can do is offer a vision, rally the public, and create a consensus. But any vision requires governmental implementation to work. This newspaper's series of reports is merely the first stage in a relay race. The next two or three stages will depend upon the government's administrative ability and strength of will.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.09.29
願景我們描繪 執行要靠政府
本報訊
本報自上周四起開始推出二○三○系列報導，分別從不同面向透視廿年後的台灣前景。就切入角度而言，我們探討經濟發展、教育政策、國土規畫、國際關係、公民社會等，幾乎涵蓋所有重要的內政與外交議題。就分析的視野觀點而言，本報所邀請析論的學者專家也都能洞見癥結，銳利地釐清問題。就深度而言，這一系列二○三○的專題報導，相較於最近其他類似議題的討論都更為深入，也為台灣的未來描繪了相當具體的輪廓。當然，我們希望現在的主政者與未來有志於政治領導的人都能認真地閱讀、體會這一系列的分析，進而推動落實。畢竟，打造美好台灣不能單靠人民分散切割的投入，也需要政府公權力及政策的配合與努力。
由前述系列報導我們發現，民間的學者專家在議題論述中均呈現出深切的期待。這種正面的願景期待一方面反映學者專家的主觀理念，但另一方面也對比出理想與現實之間的落差。的確，當關心台灣教育的人比較十六年前四一○教改遊行的熱情期盼與這些年來教改措施的紛亂雜沓，他們的心情焉能不沉重？當關心台灣經濟的人看到十數年來台灣以「吃老本」的態勢逐漸消耗李國鼎與孫運璿為我們累積的資訊產業資產，卻完全無法開創新一波的產業相對優勢，他們豈能不焦急？整體而言，學者專家為我們描繪的願景，與當前台灣的環境差距甚大，這也使我們對政府實踐願景的執行力感到憂心。
從消極面來看，廿年後的遠景有如「畫大餅」，人人都能說得頭頭是道。若要真正讓願景描繪發揮功能，就需要主政者（總統與行政院長）認真的、仔細的讀通這些專家的意見，進而將這些意見「內化」為真心期待的看法。然後，主政者就該進入執行面的思考，將達成願景所須做的工作切割為若干區塊，經過討論溝通，責成相關的部會首長去貫徹。對首長交辦任務只是推動願景的起步；接下來，總統與行政院長就該仔細地、定期地檢視進度。這種執著的目標方向感與鍥而不捨的緊盯態度，是李國鼎當年成功推動竹科、孫運璿成功開創ＩＣ產業的關鍵。這些後續細節若是做不好、盯不緊，則願景就必然只是大餅，全無實質意義。
本報所報導的系列專題探討的都是大題目，而每一個大主題底下都還有細項子題，也都需要類似前述的貫徹緊盯態度，才可能有成。我們就以環境保育大議題中「減碳」一個小項來談，讀者當能理解後續執行的關鍵。馬總統在二○○九年就已經宣示了台灣減碳的願景，包括在二○二○年降至○八年的排放水準、二○二五年降至二○○○年的水準等。但這樣的減碳目標只是虛幻的期待，必須要靠汽機車減排、發電替代、工業排放減少、產業重組、智慧電表推廣等手段方能達成。為了達成這些目標，總統或院長就該召集交通部、經濟部、環保署等首長，定下各個部會、各個分項的減排期程，然後督促其執行，絲毫不放鬆。
台灣的情形卻不是如此：雖然總統減碳的目標已經宣示了，《再生能源發展條例》也已經通過了，但至少在過去這一年，環保人士都看不到台灣在發電、汽車排放、產業重組等方面有什麼具體的改善。經濟部有大力宣導促使民間加入替代能源的行列嗎？民間有「發電可賣給政府」的認知嗎？汽車排放的稅費，交通部有像歐盟那樣分期漸進的規畫嗎？最近吵翻天的石化產業，究竟在減碳拼圖上處於什麼地位？十年後減碳目標的百分比究竟是如何分配，難道不該向民眾宣導嗎？
見微知著，我們由節能減碳單一向度的觀察，就能想像馬政府頗為欠缺追蹤貫徹政策的執行力。作為媒體，我們只能在願景上盡言責，匯集民間力量，凝聚共同期待。但是所有的願景期待，都要靠踏實的政府執行方克竟功。本報的系列報導只是願景接力賽的第一棒；接下來的二、三棒要怎麼跑，就要看府院的能力與魄力了。
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
To "Open Taipei," First Open Yourself
To "Open Taipei," First Open Yourself
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 28, 2010
Su Tseng-chang is the Democratic Progressive Party's candidate for Taipei City Mayor. Su is running on an "Open Taipei" platform. He says he wants to use music to awaken a Taipei burdened by "boredom, helplessness, and anxiety." Past political campaigns have often used music. Su however, invited 33 musicians and 20 music groups to write and perform 11 Mandarin, Hoklo, Hakka, English, and Vietnamese songs. They include everything from love songs to hip-hop, everything from R&B to New Age. Su commissioned Hsiao Ching-yang, Taiwan's only three time Grammy finalist, to design a trendy CD cover. This sort of extravagance and boldness is a first for the Taiwan political stage.
Actually, whether Taipei is burdened by "boredom, helplessness, and anxiety," as Su Tseng-chang insists, depends largely upon one's political orientation. What's interesting is that the album claims it is using "entirely apolitical" means to attract moderate voters. Li Hou-ching, the chief publicist for the Su Tseng-chang campaign committee, insists that the album is entirely apolitical, Based on content alone, it may do little for Su's election prospects. But the production and marketing of the album involved many political considerations. Of the 20 musical groups that participated, most insisted on anonymity. Their main concern was "fear that others would see political connections."
The producer of the album was well-known rock band lead singer Wu Yong-ji. Wu was willing to make his own participation known. He said others were unable to make their identities public due to concern on the part of their agents. They wanted to avoid political coloration. Therefore the artists signed confidentiality agreements. The musicians would participate, on condition of anonymity. Wu Yong-ji said that for musicians to create and perform music, but not be able to reveal their identities, constituted a tragedy for Taiwan. He said he hoped Taiwan would allow the creators of the music to reveal their identities under a genuine system of "democratic freedom."
The Republic of China has undergone two ruling party changes. The DPP served as the ruling party. Its candidate served as president. The Taipei mayoral race Su Tseng-change has entered is a local election. Is the political climate really so fraught with peril that even musicians participating in the "Open Taipei" production, must engage in cloak and dagger intrigue? Do Su Tseng-chang and these musicians really believe they are living in the "dang wai" era, and that they risk being put on some sort of terrifying "blacklist?" To borrow Chen Shui-bian's famous remark: "Is it really that serious?"
The "Open Taipei" musicians' reason for wanting anonymity, according to the Su camp's own spin, is to avoid political overtones. Outsiders speculate that some of the music groups may not wish to be labeled politically because this might affect their marketability on the Mainland. Assume for the moment that their desire for anonymity is not a gimmick or marketing ploy, but reflects genuine concerns. If so, these musicians and the Su Tseng-chang campaign committee are making a mountain out of a molehill. Becoming politically colored ceased being an issue on Taiwan long ago. The fact is most people don't care that much about an artist's political colors.
Any social tensions resulting from clashes between Blue and Green Camp performing artists during Su Tseng-chang's Taipei mayoral campaign are unlikely to compare to social tensions during the 2008 presidential election. Some artists with intense political colors got into shouting matches with each other. After the election however, everyone returned to business as usual. Whether they were Blue or Green was no big deal. Besides, according to the album notes, the bands who participated in "Open Taipei" were indie bands. During the authoritarian era indie bands were unafraid to voice their political views. Have they really become fearful of showing their faces now that democracy prevails? The "Open Taipei" album centers on Taipei. Its content is heart-warming and inspirational. It encourages people to love and respect Taipei. Such content, as the Su camp asserted, is "entirely apolitical." Not only that, it is pleasant and uplifting. What reason do any of the music groups involved have to be terrified that people will find out?
Wu Yong-chi claims that the reason these musicians wish to remain anonymous is they do not want to diminish their marketability on the Mainland. But Chen Chao-jung, a Formosa TV prime time and Sanlih E TV "nativist" TV star has successfully performed on the Mainland. Several other "stunning artists" have also perfromed on the Mainland. Why would the "Open Taipei" musicans have so many misgivings and concerns? Why would they go so far as to make an album but hide their identities? These indie bands are being "cautious" beyond comprehension. Has time really run backwards? Are we really revisiting history? Besides, when did indie groups become so petty and timid? If the Su camp's intention is to protect these musicians by keeping them anonymous, it may be "killing them with love." It may be neutering them by depriving them of their spirit of rebellion.
If on the other hand, the Su camp's intention was to posture as a victim of authoritarian tyranny, to invoke memories of the spectre of authoritarianism, to create a sense of solidarity, then its tactics are immoral. They will also be ineffective. One hopes this is not the motivation behind the strategy of anonymity adopted by "Open Taipei." The Su camp has long proclaimed its desire to jettison stereotypical Green Camp propaganda methods. One hopes the Su camp is not backsliding. We would like to remind the Su camp and the "Open Taipei" musicians to believe in the Republic of China's democracy, Before they "Open Taipei" they should "open themselves." They should look at Taiwan's political past and present, and realize they need not frighten themselves to death.
想開放台北 何妨先打開自己
2010-09-28
中國時報
民進黨台北市市長候選人蘇貞昌推出競選專輯《Open Taipei》，希望能用音樂叫醒他認為呈現「無趣、無力、讓人覺得焦慮」的台北；選舉中有競選歌曲很常見，不過，像蘇貞昌這樣一口氣邀集了卅三個音樂人，廿組獨立音樂團隊參與創作，製作出橫跨國、台、客、英及越南語，從抒情到嘻哈、R&B到New Age的十一首歌，並邀請到台灣唯一三次入圍葛萊美獎的蕭青陽製作「潮牌風」ＣＤ封面，這等手筆與氣魄，在台灣政壇還屬首見。
台北是不是已經成了蘇貞昌所觀察與感受到的這般無力無趣，可能見仁見智。有趣的倒是，這張專輯標榜要用「很不政治的」曲風來吸引中間選民，蘇貞昌競選辦公室文宣部主任李厚慶就說，整張專輯很不政治，單以內容來講或許難以達到競選功能。不過，專輯在製作與行銷的過程中，倒是有不少政治考量，廿組樂團絕大多數都是匿名參與，主要的顧慮是「怕外界有政治聯想。」
專輯的音樂製作人是願意曝光的知名搖滾樂團「董事長」主唱吳永吉，他說，有部分音樂人礙於經紀公司考量，無法以真實身分曝光，免得沾染了政治色彩，所以與藝人簽了保密協定，音樂人以匿名出現；吳永吉並且表示，音樂人參與創作、演出，卻不能公開身分，這是台灣的悲哀；他期望台灣能給音樂創作者公開身分的真正的「民主自由」。
台灣已經政黨輪替兩次，民進黨也執政做過總統了，蘇貞昌參選的這個台北市市長又是地方選舉，到底是有多肅殺、多危險，以至於連音樂創作人投入這張《Open Taipei》的製作時，還必須偷偷摸摸地搞神祕，蘇貞昌以及這些音樂人覺得自己還在「黨外時期」、還在「黑名單」的年代嗎？套一句陳水扁總統的名言：「有這麼嚴重嗎？」
《Open Taipei》音樂人匿名的理由，根據蘇陣營自己的講法是為了避免沾上政治色彩，外界則猜測可能與部分音樂團體不想因此被貼上標籤，影響在對岸市場的發展。如果匿名演出不是一個噱頭、不是為了行銷，而是真的有上述的擔心，那這些音樂人、蘇貞昌總部，都可能是多慮了。不要說台灣現在的政治現實早就對所謂的「沾惹政治色彩」這件事沒有限制，就是一般人對藝人的政治色彩到底是什麼的這件事情，其實也沒有那麼在意。
論到台灣藝人藍綠之別所引發的某種社會情緒，蘇貞昌參與的台北市市長選舉，再怎麼樣也不會如同二○○八年總統大選般強烈，當時部分政治立場較為鮮明的藝人彼此對陣叫罵，選完後，大家還不是如常過日子；是藍是綠，有什麼大不了的！更何況，根據專輯介紹，參與《Open Taipei》的都是獨立樂團，獨立樂團在政治威權時代都敢為當年的黨外發聲，怎麼到了民主時代，反而不敢露臉了？《Open Taipei》整張專輯以「台北」為創作核心，內容溫暖勵志，為的是喚醒人們對台北的愛與尊敬，這樣的內容，不但照蘇陣營的說法是「很不政治」，而且還很討人喜歡、可以給人正面的感受，參與的音樂團體有什麼怕人知道的呢？
吳永吉公開這些音樂創作人之所以要匿名的理由是不想影響他們在大陸的演藝之路，在民視八點檔、三立本土一哥陳昭榮陸續成功登陸，以及許多傳說中的「絕色藝人」也在大陸演出後，《Open Taipei》的音樂人為什麼還會有這麼多顧忌與擔憂，甚至到了連作一張音樂都要隱藏真實身分的程度，這些獨立樂團「小心翼翼」的程度實在令人費解，難道時光倒流了、歷史又走回頭路了？更何況，獨立樂團的風格向來不是這樣小裡小氣的藏首藏尾。如果是想要藉匿名保護這些音樂人，那蘇陣營可能愛之適足以害之，把獨立樂團的叛逆guts給消滅掉了。
如果刻意要以某種受壓迫與專制的姿態，召喚出記憶中的威權魅影，以集結認同，那麼，這樣的操作是不道德的，而且也是無效的。相信這不是走明亮、希望路線的《Open Taipei》採匿名策略的動機，也不會是參選以來一直有意擺脫綠色文宣刻板印象的蘇貞昌陣營的競選手法。那麼，或許在此可以提醒蘇陣營與《Open Taipei》的音樂人：要對台灣的民主、開放有信心──在「Open Taipei」之前，請先想辦法「打開自己」，看看台灣的政治現在已經走到哪裡了，不需要自己嚇自己。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 28, 2010
Su Tseng-chang is the Democratic Progressive Party's candidate for Taipei City Mayor. Su is running on an "Open Taipei" platform. He says he wants to use music to awaken a Taipei burdened by "boredom, helplessness, and anxiety." Past political campaigns have often used music. Su however, invited 33 musicians and 20 music groups to write and perform 11 Mandarin, Hoklo, Hakka, English, and Vietnamese songs. They include everything from love songs to hip-hop, everything from R&B to New Age. Su commissioned Hsiao Ching-yang, Taiwan's only three time Grammy finalist, to design a trendy CD cover. This sort of extravagance and boldness is a first for the Taiwan political stage.
Actually, whether Taipei is burdened by "boredom, helplessness, and anxiety," as Su Tseng-chang insists, depends largely upon one's political orientation. What's interesting is that the album claims it is using "entirely apolitical" means to attract moderate voters. Li Hou-ching, the chief publicist for the Su Tseng-chang campaign committee, insists that the album is entirely apolitical, Based on content alone, it may do little for Su's election prospects. But the production and marketing of the album involved many political considerations. Of the 20 musical groups that participated, most insisted on anonymity. Their main concern was "fear that others would see political connections."
The producer of the album was well-known rock band lead singer Wu Yong-ji. Wu was willing to make his own participation known. He said others were unable to make their identities public due to concern on the part of their agents. They wanted to avoid political coloration. Therefore the artists signed confidentiality agreements. The musicians would participate, on condition of anonymity. Wu Yong-ji said that for musicians to create and perform music, but not be able to reveal their identities, constituted a tragedy for Taiwan. He said he hoped Taiwan would allow the creators of the music to reveal their identities under a genuine system of "democratic freedom."
The Republic of China has undergone two ruling party changes. The DPP served as the ruling party. Its candidate served as president. The Taipei mayoral race Su Tseng-change has entered is a local election. Is the political climate really so fraught with peril that even musicians participating in the "Open Taipei" production, must engage in cloak and dagger intrigue? Do Su Tseng-chang and these musicians really believe they are living in the "dang wai" era, and that they risk being put on some sort of terrifying "blacklist?" To borrow Chen Shui-bian's famous remark: "Is it really that serious?"
The "Open Taipei" musicians' reason for wanting anonymity, according to the Su camp's own spin, is to avoid political overtones. Outsiders speculate that some of the music groups may not wish to be labeled politically because this might affect their marketability on the Mainland. Assume for the moment that their desire for anonymity is not a gimmick or marketing ploy, but reflects genuine concerns. If so, these musicians and the Su Tseng-chang campaign committee are making a mountain out of a molehill. Becoming politically colored ceased being an issue on Taiwan long ago. The fact is most people don't care that much about an artist's political colors.
Any social tensions resulting from clashes between Blue and Green Camp performing artists during Su Tseng-chang's Taipei mayoral campaign are unlikely to compare to social tensions during the 2008 presidential election. Some artists with intense political colors got into shouting matches with each other. After the election however, everyone returned to business as usual. Whether they were Blue or Green was no big deal. Besides, according to the album notes, the bands who participated in "Open Taipei" were indie bands. During the authoritarian era indie bands were unafraid to voice their political views. Have they really become fearful of showing their faces now that democracy prevails? The "Open Taipei" album centers on Taipei. Its content is heart-warming and inspirational. It encourages people to love and respect Taipei. Such content, as the Su camp asserted, is "entirely apolitical." Not only that, it is pleasant and uplifting. What reason do any of the music groups involved have to be terrified that people will find out?
Wu Yong-chi claims that the reason these musicians wish to remain anonymous is they do not want to diminish their marketability on the Mainland. But Chen Chao-jung, a Formosa TV prime time and Sanlih E TV "nativist" TV star has successfully performed on the Mainland. Several other "stunning artists" have also perfromed on the Mainland. Why would the "Open Taipei" musicans have so many misgivings and concerns? Why would they go so far as to make an album but hide their identities? These indie bands are being "cautious" beyond comprehension. Has time really run backwards? Are we really revisiting history? Besides, when did indie groups become so petty and timid? If the Su camp's intention is to protect these musicians by keeping them anonymous, it may be "killing them with love." It may be neutering them by depriving them of their spirit of rebellion.
If on the other hand, the Su camp's intention was to posture as a victim of authoritarian tyranny, to invoke memories of the spectre of authoritarianism, to create a sense of solidarity, then its tactics are immoral. They will also be ineffective. One hopes this is not the motivation behind the strategy of anonymity adopted by "Open Taipei." The Su camp has long proclaimed its desire to jettison stereotypical Green Camp propaganda methods. One hopes the Su camp is not backsliding. We would like to remind the Su camp and the "Open Taipei" musicians to believe in the Republic of China's democracy, Before they "Open Taipei" they should "open themselves." They should look at Taiwan's political past and present, and realize they need not frighten themselves to death.
想開放台北 何妨先打開自己
2010-09-28
中國時報
民進黨台北市市長候選人蘇貞昌推出競選專輯《Open Taipei》，希望能用音樂叫醒他認為呈現「無趣、無力、讓人覺得焦慮」的台北；選舉中有競選歌曲很常見，不過，像蘇貞昌這樣一口氣邀集了卅三個音樂人，廿組獨立音樂團隊參與創作，製作出橫跨國、台、客、英及越南語，從抒情到嘻哈、R&B到New Age的十一首歌，並邀請到台灣唯一三次入圍葛萊美獎的蕭青陽製作「潮牌風」ＣＤ封面，這等手筆與氣魄，在台灣政壇還屬首見。
台北是不是已經成了蘇貞昌所觀察與感受到的這般無力無趣，可能見仁見智。有趣的倒是，這張專輯標榜要用「很不政治的」曲風來吸引中間選民，蘇貞昌競選辦公室文宣部主任李厚慶就說，整張專輯很不政治，單以內容來講或許難以達到競選功能。不過，專輯在製作與行銷的過程中，倒是有不少政治考量，廿組樂團絕大多數都是匿名參與，主要的顧慮是「怕外界有政治聯想。」
專輯的音樂製作人是願意曝光的知名搖滾樂團「董事長」主唱吳永吉，他說，有部分音樂人礙於經紀公司考量，無法以真實身分曝光，免得沾染了政治色彩，所以與藝人簽了保密協定，音樂人以匿名出現；吳永吉並且表示，音樂人參與創作、演出，卻不能公開身分，這是台灣的悲哀；他期望台灣能給音樂創作者公開身分的真正的「民主自由」。
台灣已經政黨輪替兩次，民進黨也執政做過總統了，蘇貞昌參選的這個台北市市長又是地方選舉，到底是有多肅殺、多危險，以至於連音樂創作人投入這張《Open Taipei》的製作時，還必須偷偷摸摸地搞神祕，蘇貞昌以及這些音樂人覺得自己還在「黨外時期」、還在「黑名單」的年代嗎？套一句陳水扁總統的名言：「有這麼嚴重嗎？」
《Open Taipei》音樂人匿名的理由，根據蘇陣營自己的講法是為了避免沾上政治色彩，外界則猜測可能與部分音樂團體不想因此被貼上標籤，影響在對岸市場的發展。如果匿名演出不是一個噱頭、不是為了行銷，而是真的有上述的擔心，那這些音樂人、蘇貞昌總部，都可能是多慮了。不要說台灣現在的政治現實早就對所謂的「沾惹政治色彩」這件事沒有限制，就是一般人對藝人的政治色彩到底是什麼的這件事情，其實也沒有那麼在意。
論到台灣藝人藍綠之別所引發的某種社會情緒，蘇貞昌參與的台北市市長選舉，再怎麼樣也不會如同二○○八年總統大選般強烈，當時部分政治立場較為鮮明的藝人彼此對陣叫罵，選完後，大家還不是如常過日子；是藍是綠，有什麼大不了的！更何況，根據專輯介紹，參與《Open Taipei》的都是獨立樂團，獨立樂團在政治威權時代都敢為當年的黨外發聲，怎麼到了民主時代，反而不敢露臉了？《Open Taipei》整張專輯以「台北」為創作核心，內容溫暖勵志，為的是喚醒人們對台北的愛與尊敬，這樣的內容，不但照蘇陣營的說法是「很不政治」，而且還很討人喜歡、可以給人正面的感受，參與的音樂團體有什麼怕人知道的呢？
吳永吉公開這些音樂創作人之所以要匿名的理由是不想影響他們在大陸的演藝之路，在民視八點檔、三立本土一哥陳昭榮陸續成功登陸，以及許多傳說中的「絕色藝人」也在大陸演出後，《Open Taipei》的音樂人為什麼還會有這麼多顧忌與擔憂，甚至到了連作一張音樂都要隱藏真實身分的程度，這些獨立樂團「小心翼翼」的程度實在令人費解，難道時光倒流了、歷史又走回頭路了？更何況，獨立樂團的風格向來不是這樣小裡小氣的藏首藏尾。如果是想要藉匿名保護這些音樂人，那蘇陣營可能愛之適足以害之，把獨立樂團的叛逆guts給消滅掉了。
如果刻意要以某種受壓迫與專制的姿態，召喚出記憶中的威權魅影，以集結認同，那麼，這樣的操作是不道德的，而且也是無效的。相信這不是走明亮、希望路線的《Open Taipei》採匿名策略的動機，也不會是參選以來一直有意擺脫綠色文宣刻板印象的蘇貞昌陣營的競選手法。那麼，或許在此可以提醒蘇陣營與《Open Taipei》的音樂人：要對台灣的民主、開放有信心──在「Open Taipei」之前，請先想辦法「打開自己」，看看台灣的政治現在已經走到哪裡了，不需要自己嚇自己。
Monday, September 27, 2010
Cross-Strait Policy: Determined by Helmsmen, or Public Opinion?
Cross-Strait Policy: Determined by Helmsmen, or Public Opinion?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 27, 2010
This newspaper published a series of "Six New Year's Editorials," as well as an editorial entitled, "Cross-Strait Antidote: From Reunification to Reconnection." We raised a number of cross-Strait issues, and received a number of responses from both sides. One of the responses from the Taiwan side compared Taiwan to a ship at sea. It argued that the captain of the ship must fulfill his duty as helmsman. He can hardly allow the ship to drift with the current.
"Navigating the seas requires a helmsman" was a slogan from the Cultural Revolution. It was also a symbol of authoritarianism. It likens the relationship between those in power and the general public, to the relationship between a ship's helmsman and the ship's passengers. It represents a feudal rather than democratic mindset.
The Helmsman Theory argues that "the Ma administration follows public opinion, rather than leads public opinion." The Helmsman Theory argues therefore that Ma Ying-jeou is "a helmsman without direction." The Helmsman Theory opposes the idea that "Taiwan's future should be decided by 23,000 million people." It argues that in cross-Strait policy, the Ma administration should "lead public opinion." that it should be a helmsman with a direction.
In fact however, under a democracy "the views of those in power" and "public opinion" are one and the same. They are not in opposition to each other. Those in power derive public policy from public opinion. The public is in turn inspired by those in power. The two interact with each other. This is how democracy normally functions. The Chen regime incited eight years of unrest. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy calls for "no reunification, no independence, no use of force." It has established three direct links and signed ECFA. One cannot claim that the Ma administration "lacks direction." One cannot claim that the Ma administration is "drifting with the current." One cannot claim that Ma Ying-jeou has defaulted on the role of "helmsman." We believe the Ma administration's cross-strait policy , reflects both views of those in power, and mainstream public opinion.
If one wishes to talk about the Helmsman Theory, then Chen Shui-bian is the perfect example. He had a "firm direction." He advocated Taiwan independence. He obstinately refused to respond to the aspirations of the public for cross-Strait reconciliation. Instead he insisted on promoting Taiwan independence. His attempt to "lead public opinion" was a perfect expression of the premise that "navigating the seas requires a helmsman." But in the end, Chen Shui-bian as helmsman failed to establish Taiwan's direction. Instead, as American analysts put it, "public opinion led Taiwan out of the Chen Shui-bian Nightmare." As we can see, viewing the helmsman and public opinion as separate and opposed to each other, leads to serious mistakes. Even Beijing says it is "pinning its hopes on the Taiwan public." Why is public policy formulated in accordance with public opinion characterized as "drifting with the current?" Why assume that the direction taken by the public is not the right direction?
In cross-Strait policy, even the opinion of isolated members of the public must be carefully considered. The common people on both sides are suffering. Why assume that the views of any helmsman will not conform to public opinion? Why assume that they must override public opinion?
On Taiwan, when it comes to political views or political values, democracy trumps cross-Strait matters. If one wishes to oppose Taiwan independence, one must resort to democratic means. One must have faith that democracy is capable of dealing with the issue. Otherwise, one may well end up like Chen Shui-bian. If one advocates reunification, reintegration, or reconnecting, on the other hand, one must also resort to democratic means. Consider the rapid progress made over the past two years. Democracy is something Taiwan demands. It is also something Beijing is pursuing. How can cross-Strait issues be decided by a helmsman whose views are diametrically opposed to public opinion? It matters not whether the helmsman is in Taipei or Beijing. Otherwise, why speak of "pinning one's hopes on the Taiwan public?"
As for the Helmsman Theory, why link that to this newspaper editorial? Advocates of the Helmsman Theory believe that Ma Ying-jeou's advocacy of the "1992 Consensus," "One China, Different Interpretations," "Republic of China", and "no reunification, no independence, no use of force," is phony, fraudulent, lacking in direction, and ineffective. They consider it the equivalent of Chen Shui-bian's advocacy of Taiwan independence or an independent Taiwan. These people assert or insinuate that this newspaper's editorial pages are a mouthpiece for the Ma administration. They accuse this newspaper editorials of advocating Taiwan independence, an independent Taiwan, the two-states theory, a Republic of China in name only, as lacking direction, and drifting with the current. What do such absurd and bizarre charges represent, but a 21st century version of the Inquisition?
Long ago we declared that our editorials have nothing to do with the Ma administration. Once again we solemnly declare that our editorials have "zero" connection with the Ma administration. Such smear tactics have actually appeared in the writings of self-proclaimed scholars. This is truly astonishing. If in order to establish their own doctrine, these critics wish to characterize Ma Ying-jeou as an advocate of "Taiwan independence," We would take strong exception. But we would point out that we do not speak for Ma Ying-jeou. These are merely matters of opinion, subjective evaluations by third parties. But to claim that the United Daily News advocates Taiwan independence, an independent Taiwan, the two-states theory, or a Republic of China in name only, is absurd. Such vicious attacks merely make one wonder whether such individuals have any cognitive ability.
Cross-Strait issues have been the subject of much discussion. Even a fool can occasionally have a good idea. Even a wise man can make a mistake. The defects of democracy cannot obscure its virtues. We could have engaged in a constructive dialogue. We could have addressed each others' shortcomings. But if one arbitrarily accuses others of advocating "Taiwan independence." or of "lacking direction," merely to flatter oneself, then isn't one setting oneself up as a "helmsman?"
蒼生尋岸：大海航行靠舵手或民意？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.27 03:15 am
本報《元旦六論》及《兩岸解藥：從統一論到連結論》系列社論，討論兩岸議題，在兩岸皆見回響。其中有一種來自台灣內部的說法是：在兩岸局勢中，台灣像是一條船在大海中航行，船長須當舵手，豈可隨波逐流？
「大海航行靠舵手」是文革口號，也是專政圖騰。將主政者與人民的關係，比喻成舵手與乘客的關係；這是封建政治文學，但未必是民主政治的生理。
「舵手論」認為，在兩岸政策上，「由於馬政府的思維是跟著民意走，而非引導民意」，因而認定馬英九是「一個沒有方向的舵手」。「舵手論」者也反對「台灣前途應由二千三百萬人決定」的說法，認為馬政府在兩岸政策上應有「引導民意」的作為，當一個主導方向的「舵手」。
其實，在民主政治中，「主政者的意念」與「民意」，二者並非分割與對立的概念。主政者從民意中提煉政策，及民眾受到主政者情操的感召，二者相激相盪，皆是民主政治的正常生理。據此以論馬政府的兩岸政策，在扁政府八年的動亂之後，標舉「不統／不獨／不武」，完成了三通直航、簽訂了ECFA；這恐怕不能說馬政府「沒有方向」，亦好像不能說馬政府「隨波逐流」，也似乎不能說馬英九有虧於「舵手」的角色。我們認為，現階段馬政府的兩岸政策，大致反映出主政者意念與主流民意在此階段的最佳交集。
說到「舵手論」，陳水扁應是最鮮明的例證。他有最堅定的「方向」，硬是主張台獨；他也絕不回應民意希望兩岸和解的願望，非要主張台獨。這種「引導民意」的意志，正是「大海航行靠舵手」的典範。然而，最後陳水扁這位「舵手」並未能宰制台灣的「方向」，反而是「民意」帶領了台灣走出「陳水扁的夢魘」（美國的評論）。可見，在民主政治中，將「舵手」與「民意」視為分割與對立的概念，極易出錯。何況，連北京也說，「寄希望於台灣人民」，則為何說在台灣民意中提煉政策即是「隨波逐流」？更為何認為民意的「方向」就一定不是正確的「方向」？
在這個連一家釘子戶的「民意」都要仔細斟酌的兩岸情境中，為何會在兩岸蒼生怒海尋岸的苦難中，假定「舵手」的意志縱然不符「民意」，卻仍應凌越民意？
在台灣，不論就政治觀點或政治價值言，民主問題都超越兩岸問題；若是反對台獨，要用民主方式達成，並要相信民主體制有能力處理這個問題（否則陳水扁為何有此下場？）；倘是主張兩岸「統一」、「統合」或「連結」，也要以民主方式進行（看看這兩年進度神速）。民主是台灣的堅持，也是北京的追求。兩岸問題豈可由一名假設與「民意」背離的「舵手」決定？不論這名「舵手」是在台北或北京。否則，何必談什麼「寄希望於台灣人民」？
至於「舵手論」為何扯上本報社論？「舵手論」者認為，馬英九的「九二共識」、「一中各表」、「中華民國」、「不統／不獨／不武」，不是假的、騙人的，就是沒有方向、沒有效用；且不啻就等同於「與陳水扁一樣」的台獨或獨台。接下來，這些人就不斷明示或暗示，本報系列社論是在為馬政府放話，於是就將本報社論，也說成是台獨、獨台、兩國論、假中華民國、沒有方向、隨波逐流。這種荒謬離奇的場景，豈不是廿一世紀的文字獄與火刑柱？
我們早已聲明，系列社論與馬政府「完全無關」；現在可以再鄭重說一次，系列社論與馬政府的關係是「零」。這種扣帽子的手段，竟然出現在自命為學者之輩，實在令人駭異。若為了樹立自己的「學說」，將馬英九說成「台獨」，我們頗不以為然，但爾我皆「子非馬英九也」，這畢竟只是雙方對第三者見仁見智的評價；不過，若說聯合報社論是主張台獨、獨台、兩國論，是假中華民國，這種誅心之論則恐怕會令人有「此人究竟有無認知能力」的質疑。
兩岸議題，議論紛紜；一得之愚固可貴，千慮一失亦瑕不掩瑜，原可相激相盪，截長補短。但若恣意將他人誣為「台獨」或「沒有方向」，以自我抬舉，豈是自立為「理論舵手」的正途？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 27, 2010
This newspaper published a series of "Six New Year's Editorials," as well as an editorial entitled, "Cross-Strait Antidote: From Reunification to Reconnection." We raised a number of cross-Strait issues, and received a number of responses from both sides. One of the responses from the Taiwan side compared Taiwan to a ship at sea. It argued that the captain of the ship must fulfill his duty as helmsman. He can hardly allow the ship to drift with the current.
"Navigating the seas requires a helmsman" was a slogan from the Cultural Revolution. It was also a symbol of authoritarianism. It likens the relationship between those in power and the general public, to the relationship between a ship's helmsman and the ship's passengers. It represents a feudal rather than democratic mindset.
The Helmsman Theory argues that "the Ma administration follows public opinion, rather than leads public opinion." The Helmsman Theory argues therefore that Ma Ying-jeou is "a helmsman without direction." The Helmsman Theory opposes the idea that "Taiwan's future should be decided by 23,000 million people." It argues that in cross-Strait policy, the Ma administration should "lead public opinion." that it should be a helmsman with a direction.
In fact however, under a democracy "the views of those in power" and "public opinion" are one and the same. They are not in opposition to each other. Those in power derive public policy from public opinion. The public is in turn inspired by those in power. The two interact with each other. This is how democracy normally functions. The Chen regime incited eight years of unrest. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy calls for "no reunification, no independence, no use of force." It has established three direct links and signed ECFA. One cannot claim that the Ma administration "lacks direction." One cannot claim that the Ma administration is "drifting with the current." One cannot claim that Ma Ying-jeou has defaulted on the role of "helmsman." We believe the Ma administration's cross-strait policy , reflects both views of those in power, and mainstream public opinion.
If one wishes to talk about the Helmsman Theory, then Chen Shui-bian is the perfect example. He had a "firm direction." He advocated Taiwan independence. He obstinately refused to respond to the aspirations of the public for cross-Strait reconciliation. Instead he insisted on promoting Taiwan independence. His attempt to "lead public opinion" was a perfect expression of the premise that "navigating the seas requires a helmsman." But in the end, Chen Shui-bian as helmsman failed to establish Taiwan's direction. Instead, as American analysts put it, "public opinion led Taiwan out of the Chen Shui-bian Nightmare." As we can see, viewing the helmsman and public opinion as separate and opposed to each other, leads to serious mistakes. Even Beijing says it is "pinning its hopes on the Taiwan public." Why is public policy formulated in accordance with public opinion characterized as "drifting with the current?" Why assume that the direction taken by the public is not the right direction?
In cross-Strait policy, even the opinion of isolated members of the public must be carefully considered. The common people on both sides are suffering. Why assume that the views of any helmsman will not conform to public opinion? Why assume that they must override public opinion?
On Taiwan, when it comes to political views or political values, democracy trumps cross-Strait matters. If one wishes to oppose Taiwan independence, one must resort to democratic means. One must have faith that democracy is capable of dealing with the issue. Otherwise, one may well end up like Chen Shui-bian. If one advocates reunification, reintegration, or reconnecting, on the other hand, one must also resort to democratic means. Consider the rapid progress made over the past two years. Democracy is something Taiwan demands. It is also something Beijing is pursuing. How can cross-Strait issues be decided by a helmsman whose views are diametrically opposed to public opinion? It matters not whether the helmsman is in Taipei or Beijing. Otherwise, why speak of "pinning one's hopes on the Taiwan public?"
As for the Helmsman Theory, why link that to this newspaper editorial? Advocates of the Helmsman Theory believe that Ma Ying-jeou's advocacy of the "1992 Consensus," "One China, Different Interpretations," "Republic of China", and "no reunification, no independence, no use of force," is phony, fraudulent, lacking in direction, and ineffective. They consider it the equivalent of Chen Shui-bian's advocacy of Taiwan independence or an independent Taiwan. These people assert or insinuate that this newspaper's editorial pages are a mouthpiece for the Ma administration. They accuse this newspaper editorials of advocating Taiwan independence, an independent Taiwan, the two-states theory, a Republic of China in name only, as lacking direction, and drifting with the current. What do such absurd and bizarre charges represent, but a 21st century version of the Inquisition?
Long ago we declared that our editorials have nothing to do with the Ma administration. Once again we solemnly declare that our editorials have "zero" connection with the Ma administration. Such smear tactics have actually appeared in the writings of self-proclaimed scholars. This is truly astonishing. If in order to establish their own doctrine, these critics wish to characterize Ma Ying-jeou as an advocate of "Taiwan independence," We would take strong exception. But we would point out that we do not speak for Ma Ying-jeou. These are merely matters of opinion, subjective evaluations by third parties. But to claim that the United Daily News advocates Taiwan independence, an independent Taiwan, the two-states theory, or a Republic of China in name only, is absurd. Such vicious attacks merely make one wonder whether such individuals have any cognitive ability.
Cross-Strait issues have been the subject of much discussion. Even a fool can occasionally have a good idea. Even a wise man can make a mistake. The defects of democracy cannot obscure its virtues. We could have engaged in a constructive dialogue. We could have addressed each others' shortcomings. But if one arbitrarily accuses others of advocating "Taiwan independence." or of "lacking direction," merely to flatter oneself, then isn't one setting oneself up as a "helmsman?"
蒼生尋岸：大海航行靠舵手或民意？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.27 03:15 am
本報《元旦六論》及《兩岸解藥：從統一論到連結論》系列社論，討論兩岸議題，在兩岸皆見回響。其中有一種來自台灣內部的說法是：在兩岸局勢中，台灣像是一條船在大海中航行，船長須當舵手，豈可隨波逐流？
「大海航行靠舵手」是文革口號，也是專政圖騰。將主政者與人民的關係，比喻成舵手與乘客的關係；這是封建政治文學，但未必是民主政治的生理。
「舵手論」認為，在兩岸政策上，「由於馬政府的思維是跟著民意走，而非引導民意」，因而認定馬英九是「一個沒有方向的舵手」。「舵手論」者也反對「台灣前途應由二千三百萬人決定」的說法，認為馬政府在兩岸政策上應有「引導民意」的作為，當一個主導方向的「舵手」。
其實，在民主政治中，「主政者的意念」與「民意」，二者並非分割與對立的概念。主政者從民意中提煉政策，及民眾受到主政者情操的感召，二者相激相盪，皆是民主政治的正常生理。據此以論馬政府的兩岸政策，在扁政府八年的動亂之後，標舉「不統／不獨／不武」，完成了三通直航、簽訂了ECFA；這恐怕不能說馬政府「沒有方向」，亦好像不能說馬政府「隨波逐流」，也似乎不能說馬英九有虧於「舵手」的角色。我們認為，現階段馬政府的兩岸政策，大致反映出主政者意念與主流民意在此階段的最佳交集。
說到「舵手論」，陳水扁應是最鮮明的例證。他有最堅定的「方向」，硬是主張台獨；他也絕不回應民意希望兩岸和解的願望，非要主張台獨。這種「引導民意」的意志，正是「大海航行靠舵手」的典範。然而，最後陳水扁這位「舵手」並未能宰制台灣的「方向」，反而是「民意」帶領了台灣走出「陳水扁的夢魘」（美國的評論）。可見，在民主政治中，將「舵手」與「民意」視為分割與對立的概念，極易出錯。何況，連北京也說，「寄希望於台灣人民」，則為何說在台灣民意中提煉政策即是「隨波逐流」？更為何認為民意的「方向」就一定不是正確的「方向」？
在這個連一家釘子戶的「民意」都要仔細斟酌的兩岸情境中，為何會在兩岸蒼生怒海尋岸的苦難中，假定「舵手」的意志縱然不符「民意」，卻仍應凌越民意？
在台灣，不論就政治觀點或政治價值言，民主問題都超越兩岸問題；若是反對台獨，要用民主方式達成，並要相信民主體制有能力處理這個問題（否則陳水扁為何有此下場？）；倘是主張兩岸「統一」、「統合」或「連結」，也要以民主方式進行（看看這兩年進度神速）。民主是台灣的堅持，也是北京的追求。兩岸問題豈可由一名假設與「民意」背離的「舵手」決定？不論這名「舵手」是在台北或北京。否則，何必談什麼「寄希望於台灣人民」？
至於「舵手論」為何扯上本報社論？「舵手論」者認為，馬英九的「九二共識」、「一中各表」、「中華民國」、「不統／不獨／不武」，不是假的、騙人的，就是沒有方向、沒有效用；且不啻就等同於「與陳水扁一樣」的台獨或獨台。接下來，這些人就不斷明示或暗示，本報系列社論是在為馬政府放話，於是就將本報社論，也說成是台獨、獨台、兩國論、假中華民國、沒有方向、隨波逐流。這種荒謬離奇的場景，豈不是廿一世紀的文字獄與火刑柱？
我們早已聲明，系列社論與馬政府「完全無關」；現在可以再鄭重說一次，系列社論與馬政府的關係是「零」。這種扣帽子的手段，竟然出現在自命為學者之輩，實在令人駭異。若為了樹立自己的「學說」，將馬英九說成「台獨」，我們頗不以為然，但爾我皆「子非馬英九也」，這畢竟只是雙方對第三者見仁見智的評價；不過，若說聯合報社論是主張台獨、獨台、兩國論，是假中華民國，這種誅心之論則恐怕會令人有「此人究竟有無認知能力」的質疑。
兩岸議題，議論紛紜；一得之愚固可貴，千慮一失亦瑕不掩瑜，原可相激相盪，截長補短。但若恣意將他人誣為「台獨」或「沒有方向」，以自我抬舉，豈是自立為「理論舵手」的正途？
Thursday, September 23, 2010
Overdevelopment and Industrial Zone Bubbles
Overdevelopment and Industrial Zone Bubbles
China Times
A Translation
September 23, 2010
Phases III and IV of the Taichung Science Park and the acquisition of land in Dapu, Miaoli County have provoked protests by farmers. Problems with excessive industrial park development and with "too many chefs spoiling the broth" have resurfaced. Bureau of Audit statistics indicate that industrial parks island-wide include over 2000 hectares of idle land. Several years ago the Bureau of industry halted the development of new industrial zones. But local officials were eager to pad their resumes. They relentlessly acquired agricultural land and developed new industrial zones. The absence of overall management and control has led to an industrial zone bubble on Taiwan. This bubble will lead to inestimable waste and destruction.
Have industrial zones been overdeveloped? A walk through the zones tells all. Most northern industrial zones are full. Central and southern industrial zones are idle. Their plight is worse than the official statistics suggest. The main reason is that some manufacturers purchase the land during the early stages of development, but do not actually build any plants. Some vendors rent the land. Because the rents are ultra low, the plants are left idle. Plant construction never even began.
Take the Changhua Coastal Industrial Park for example, the largest in the nation. It has been in development for 30 years, but most of the land remains idle. Much of it is overgrown with weeds and crumbling structures. The underlying cause is insufficient planning. Some people harbored unrealistic dreams of a Yunlin Offshore Industrial Zone. Three industrial zones in addition to Formosa Plastics in Mailiao have been forced to shut down. Over 1000 hectares of new industrial zones involved the investment of tens of billions in land reclamation. All have been forced to suspend development.
In 1996, the Bureau of Industrial Development developed the Tainan Technology Industrial Park. Later, the National Science Council developed the Tainan Science-Based Industrial Park. The two entities worked against each other. The result was below expectation industry investment. This was a perfect example of how central government ministries each go their own way. What was even more absurd, land in Tainan was much cheaper than land in Taipei. But a less than ideal long-term financing and unit sales situation inflated development costs. Land at the Tainan Technology Industrial Park went for seven million NT per ping, making it the island's most expensive industrial zone. Even after the price was lowered to four million NT per ping, it remained higher than for any other industrial zone.
For years, everyone from the central government level to the local level, from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to the National Science Council, from the Council of Agriculture to the Environmental Protection Agency, rushed to develop industrial zones. Together, they created the industrial zone bubble. In addition, local governments in financial distress became ever more aggressive in acquiring and developing land.
Closer examination reveals that behind county and municipal government development of industrial zones, was wholesale collusion between political and business interests. Superficially, industrial zones promote economic development and create jobs. But even more importantly, eminent domain rezones agricultural land for industrial, residential, or commercial use. This brings with it immense development advantages. Conglomerates with advance information can jockey for position. Builders can often maximize their profits. Local governments can rezone the land, sell it, and inject the profits into the local economy. So many birds, all killed with a single stone. So why not?
But not everyone benefits from the land acquisition and development game. In 1986, the Chiayi County Government set up the "Chung Yang Chi Industrial Zone." At the time martial law was still in effect. Many farmers who protested were charged with obstruction of official business. Eight landlords insisted on recovery of ancestral lands and refused government compensation. The case dragged on for over a decade, and the courts ruled their compensation forfeited. This tragedy underscores the many problems behind the use of eminent domain to acquire land for industrial zones.
First of all, was the land acquisition legitimate? Was it consistent with the public interest? The farmers lived off the land for over a century. If the government ends up with large tracts of idle land, was it really justified driving farmers off the land in the name of new industrial zones?
Secondly, the publicly announced acquistion price is often far lower than the current market price. This is unfair to those forced to sell. The government invokes eminent domain to acquire agricultural land on the cheap. It rezones the land for industrial, commercial, or residential use. After which the price of the land skyrockets, often increasing by several hundred percent. The farmers may be allotted a tiny plot of land, but only enough to build a toilet or a bedroom. Is such a system of eminent domain reasonable?
Third, the industrial zone development system has too many chefs. They have already created industrial zone bubbles all over the island, leading to idle land and wasted resources. Science park operating funds have accumulated a liability amounting to 120 billion NT. In the end, this will be borne by the taxpayers. The Bureau of Industrial Development has put its foot on the brake. It has imposed a moratorium on the development of new industrial zones. But it continues to allow county and municipal governments to develop new industrial zones. Is this responsible?
The development of industrial zones began in the 1960s. Rapid industrial development enabled Taiwan's economy to take-off. But the public as a whole has paid a heavy price. In recent years, total industrial output as percentage of GDP has fallen below 30 percent. Industrial zone development policy has reached the stage where it requires comprehensive review and adjustment. Land and water resources on Taiwan are limited, The world is moving toward a knowledge economy. Does the government really intend to continue developing industrial zones without end? Who will assume responsibility for the waste and destruction caused by over-exploitation?
浮濫開發 各地工業區逐漸泡沫化
2010-09-23 中國時報
中科三、四期開發以及苗栗大埔徵地引發農民抗爭事件，讓工業區開發浮濫、多頭馬車的問題再次浮上檯面。審計部統計，全國各類工業園區閒置土地逾二千公頃，近年工業局已停止開發新工業區，但地方政府為了政績，還不斷徵收農地競相開發新的工業區。在缺乏整體管控之下，導致台灣的工業區逐漸泡沫化，將造成難以估計的浪費與破壞。
工業區有沒有浮濫開發，實際到各區走走就可以一目了然，北部的工業區多數滿載，中南部工業區閒置狀況則比官方統計數字嚴重。主要原因是，有些廠商在開發之初買下土地，並未真正投資設廠；有些廠商租下土地，由於租金超低廉，廠房放著養蚊子，根本沒有真正開工營運。
以全國最大的彰濱工業區為例，開發迄今卅年，大半土地仍閒置，許多長滿雜草的空地與廢墟般的廠房，背後隱藏某些人謀不臧的故事。懷抱人定勝天夢想而打造的雲林離島工業區，除了台塑麥寮之外，其餘三區均停擺，而一千多公頃的新興區已投下百億元經費填海造陸，目前被迫暫停開發。
民國八十五年，工業局在台南開發科技工業區，後來國科會也在台南開發科學工業園區，兩個單位打對台，結果招商成果不如預期，這正是中央部會各行其是的最佳寫照。更荒謬的是，台南地價比台北便宜許多，由於開發單位長期融資且出售情形不佳，墊高開發成本，台南科技工業區每坪高達七萬元，成為全國最貴工業區，即使今年降價後每坪四萬元，還是高於其他工業區。
這些年來，從中央到地方，從經濟部工業局到國科會、農委會、環保署，一窩蜂投入工業區的開發，共同吹起工業區的泡沫；此外，各縣市政府在財政困窘下，圈地開發的動作越來越積極。
進一步分析，各縣市政府爭相投入工業區的開發，背後牽涉龐大政商利益。表面上，工業區可以促進經濟發展、創造就業機會，但更重要的是透過區段徵收手段，將農地變工業區、住宅區或商業區，帶來龐大開發利益；消息靈通事先卡位的財團、建商往往獲取最大利潤，地方政府取得重劃土地出售後又可挹注地方財政，如此一石多鳥的政策，何樂不為？
不過，並非每個人都從這個圈地開發的遊戲中獲利。民國七十五年，嘉義縣政府規畫設置「中洋子工業區」，當時還在戒嚴時期，多位抗爭的農民被依妨害公務罪移送法辦，有八位地主堅持要討回祖先土地而未領取補償費，後來因提存法院超過十年而被沒收。這樣的悲慘故事，凸顯出政府徵地開發工業區的過程，有許多值得檢討的地方。
首先，徵收土地的正當性，在於是否完全符合公共利益。如果仍有大批閒置土地，政府還能以開發新的工業區為名義徵收農地，要求農民遠離百年來賴以為生的家園嗎？
其次，徵收價格以公告現值計，遠低於市價，對於被徵收者相對不公平。政府辦理區段徵收，以公告現值徵收便宜農地，變更為工業區、商業區或住宅區之後，土地價格可能暴漲數倍，但農民即使換回建地，可能只夠蓋一間廁所或小套房，這樣的徵收制度合理嗎？
第三，多頭馬車的工業區開發體系，已在全國各地吹起工業區泡沫，造成許多閒置與浪費，其中，科學園區作業基金累積負債高達一千二百億元，最後勢必由全民埋單。身為工業區主管機關的工業局自己踩煞車，暫停新工業區的開發，卻放任各縣市政府不斷開發新工業區，這是負責任的做法嗎？
自一九六○年代開始設立第一個工業區以來，工業發展迅速帶動了台灣的經濟起飛，不過，全民也相對付出沉重代價。近年來工業產值占整體ＧＤＰ的比重已降至百分之三十以下，工業區的開發政策也到了必須全面檢討與調整的階段。尤其，台灣的土地與水資源非常有限，在全球邁向知識經濟的時代，台灣還要如此無限制地開發工業區嗎？誰該為這些開發過度而造成的浪費與破壞負起責任呢？-
China Times
A Translation
September 23, 2010
Phases III and IV of the Taichung Science Park and the acquisition of land in Dapu, Miaoli County have provoked protests by farmers. Problems with excessive industrial park development and with "too many chefs spoiling the broth" have resurfaced. Bureau of Audit statistics indicate that industrial parks island-wide include over 2000 hectares of idle land. Several years ago the Bureau of industry halted the development of new industrial zones. But local officials were eager to pad their resumes. They relentlessly acquired agricultural land and developed new industrial zones. The absence of overall management and control has led to an industrial zone bubble on Taiwan. This bubble will lead to inestimable waste and destruction.
Have industrial zones been overdeveloped? A walk through the zones tells all. Most northern industrial zones are full. Central and southern industrial zones are idle. Their plight is worse than the official statistics suggest. The main reason is that some manufacturers purchase the land during the early stages of development, but do not actually build any plants. Some vendors rent the land. Because the rents are ultra low, the plants are left idle. Plant construction never even began.
Take the Changhua Coastal Industrial Park for example, the largest in the nation. It has been in development for 30 years, but most of the land remains idle. Much of it is overgrown with weeds and crumbling structures. The underlying cause is insufficient planning. Some people harbored unrealistic dreams of a Yunlin Offshore Industrial Zone. Three industrial zones in addition to Formosa Plastics in Mailiao have been forced to shut down. Over 1000 hectares of new industrial zones involved the investment of tens of billions in land reclamation. All have been forced to suspend development.
In 1996, the Bureau of Industrial Development developed the Tainan Technology Industrial Park. Later, the National Science Council developed the Tainan Science-Based Industrial Park. The two entities worked against each other. The result was below expectation industry investment. This was a perfect example of how central government ministries each go their own way. What was even more absurd, land in Tainan was much cheaper than land in Taipei. But a less than ideal long-term financing and unit sales situation inflated development costs. Land at the Tainan Technology Industrial Park went for seven million NT per ping, making it the island's most expensive industrial zone. Even after the price was lowered to four million NT per ping, it remained higher than for any other industrial zone.
For years, everyone from the central government level to the local level, from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to the National Science Council, from the Council of Agriculture to the Environmental Protection Agency, rushed to develop industrial zones. Together, they created the industrial zone bubble. In addition, local governments in financial distress became ever more aggressive in acquiring and developing land.
Closer examination reveals that behind county and municipal government development of industrial zones, was wholesale collusion between political and business interests. Superficially, industrial zones promote economic development and create jobs. But even more importantly, eminent domain rezones agricultural land for industrial, residential, or commercial use. This brings with it immense development advantages. Conglomerates with advance information can jockey for position. Builders can often maximize their profits. Local governments can rezone the land, sell it, and inject the profits into the local economy. So many birds, all killed with a single stone. So why not?
But not everyone benefits from the land acquisition and development game. In 1986, the Chiayi County Government set up the "Chung Yang Chi Industrial Zone." At the time martial law was still in effect. Many farmers who protested were charged with obstruction of official business. Eight landlords insisted on recovery of ancestral lands and refused government compensation. The case dragged on for over a decade, and the courts ruled their compensation forfeited. This tragedy underscores the many problems behind the use of eminent domain to acquire land for industrial zones.
First of all, was the land acquisition legitimate? Was it consistent with the public interest? The farmers lived off the land for over a century. If the government ends up with large tracts of idle land, was it really justified driving farmers off the land in the name of new industrial zones?
Secondly, the publicly announced acquistion price is often far lower than the current market price. This is unfair to those forced to sell. The government invokes eminent domain to acquire agricultural land on the cheap. It rezones the land for industrial, commercial, or residential use. After which the price of the land skyrockets, often increasing by several hundred percent. The farmers may be allotted a tiny plot of land, but only enough to build a toilet or a bedroom. Is such a system of eminent domain reasonable?
Third, the industrial zone development system has too many chefs. They have already created industrial zone bubbles all over the island, leading to idle land and wasted resources. Science park operating funds have accumulated a liability amounting to 120 billion NT. In the end, this will be borne by the taxpayers. The Bureau of Industrial Development has put its foot on the brake. It has imposed a moratorium on the development of new industrial zones. But it continues to allow county and municipal governments to develop new industrial zones. Is this responsible?
The development of industrial zones began in the 1960s. Rapid industrial development enabled Taiwan's economy to take-off. But the public as a whole has paid a heavy price. In recent years, total industrial output as percentage of GDP has fallen below 30 percent. Industrial zone development policy has reached the stage where it requires comprehensive review and adjustment. Land and water resources on Taiwan are limited, The world is moving toward a knowledge economy. Does the government really intend to continue developing industrial zones without end? Who will assume responsibility for the waste and destruction caused by over-exploitation?
浮濫開發 各地工業區逐漸泡沫化
2010-09-23 中國時報
中科三、四期開發以及苗栗大埔徵地引發農民抗爭事件，讓工業區開發浮濫、多頭馬車的問題再次浮上檯面。審計部統計，全國各類工業園區閒置土地逾二千公頃，近年工業局已停止開發新工業區，但地方政府為了政績，還不斷徵收農地競相開發新的工業區。在缺乏整體管控之下，導致台灣的工業區逐漸泡沫化，將造成難以估計的浪費與破壞。
工業區有沒有浮濫開發，實際到各區走走就可以一目了然，北部的工業區多數滿載，中南部工業區閒置狀況則比官方統計數字嚴重。主要原因是，有些廠商在開發之初買下土地，並未真正投資設廠；有些廠商租下土地，由於租金超低廉，廠房放著養蚊子，根本沒有真正開工營運。
以全國最大的彰濱工業區為例，開發迄今卅年，大半土地仍閒置，許多長滿雜草的空地與廢墟般的廠房，背後隱藏某些人謀不臧的故事。懷抱人定勝天夢想而打造的雲林離島工業區，除了台塑麥寮之外，其餘三區均停擺，而一千多公頃的新興區已投下百億元經費填海造陸，目前被迫暫停開發。
民國八十五年，工業局在台南開發科技工業區，後來國科會也在台南開發科學工業園區，兩個單位打對台，結果招商成果不如預期，這正是中央部會各行其是的最佳寫照。更荒謬的是，台南地價比台北便宜許多，由於開發單位長期融資且出售情形不佳，墊高開發成本，台南科技工業區每坪高達七萬元，成為全國最貴工業區，即使今年降價後每坪四萬元，還是高於其他工業區。
這些年來，從中央到地方，從經濟部工業局到國科會、農委會、環保署，一窩蜂投入工業區的開發，共同吹起工業區的泡沫；此外，各縣市政府在財政困窘下，圈地開發的動作越來越積極。
進一步分析，各縣市政府爭相投入工業區的開發，背後牽涉龐大政商利益。表面上，工業區可以促進經濟發展、創造就業機會，但更重要的是透過區段徵收手段，將農地變工業區、住宅區或商業區，帶來龐大開發利益；消息靈通事先卡位的財團、建商往往獲取最大利潤，地方政府取得重劃土地出售後又可挹注地方財政，如此一石多鳥的政策，何樂不為？
不過，並非每個人都從這個圈地開發的遊戲中獲利。民國七十五年，嘉義縣政府規畫設置「中洋子工業區」，當時還在戒嚴時期，多位抗爭的農民被依妨害公務罪移送法辦，有八位地主堅持要討回祖先土地而未領取補償費，後來因提存法院超過十年而被沒收。這樣的悲慘故事，凸顯出政府徵地開發工業區的過程，有許多值得檢討的地方。
首先，徵收土地的正當性，在於是否完全符合公共利益。如果仍有大批閒置土地，政府還能以開發新的工業區為名義徵收農地，要求農民遠離百年來賴以為生的家園嗎？
其次，徵收價格以公告現值計，遠低於市價，對於被徵收者相對不公平。政府辦理區段徵收，以公告現值徵收便宜農地，變更為工業區、商業區或住宅區之後，土地價格可能暴漲數倍，但農民即使換回建地，可能只夠蓋一間廁所或小套房，這樣的徵收制度合理嗎？
第三，多頭馬車的工業區開發體系，已在全國各地吹起工業區泡沫，造成許多閒置與浪費，其中，科學園區作業基金累積負債高達一千二百億元，最後勢必由全民埋單。身為工業區主管機關的工業局自己踩煞車，暫停新工業區的開發，卻放任各縣市政府不斷開發新工業區，這是負責任的做法嗎？
自一九六○年代開始設立第一個工業區以來，工業發展迅速帶動了台灣的經濟起飛，不過，全民也相對付出沉重代價。近年來工業產值占整體ＧＤＰ的比重已降至百分之三十以下，工業區的開發政策也到了必須全面檢討與調整的階段。尤其，台灣的土地與水資源非常有限，在全球邁向知識經濟的時代，台灣還要如此無限制地開發工業區嗎？誰該為這些開發過度而造成的浪費與破壞負起責任呢？-
Direct Government to Government Links: Accelerate the "Fourth Link"
Direct Government to Government Links: Accelerate the "Fourth Link"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 23, 2010
Central government officials have appeared at cross-Strait events with increasing frequency. Mainland Culture Minister Cai Wu met with our own Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) Minister Emile Sheng. Our own Government Information Office (GIO) Chief Chiang Chi-chen met with Mainland Deputy Director of Press and Publication Administration Wu Shulin. Our own Minister of Education (MOE) Wu Ching-chi attended the same ribbon-cutting ceremony as Shaanxi Provincial Governor Chao Zhengtong. Our own APEC Affairs Council Chairperson Wang Ju-hsuan attended the Beijing Conference on Human Development, and was photographed next to Mainland President Hu Jintao.
These phenomena remind one of cross-Strait shipping and its transition from "indirect" to "direct." Over the years, the two sides have used Hong Kong and Ishigaki Island as shipping "buffers." This led to "changing the voyage number without changing the ship" and other gimmicks. These gimmicks however, backfired, especially after Hong Kong's retrocession in 1997. Voyages and flights between Taiwan and Hong Kong were already "direct." Never mind that we engaged in self-deception by pretending they were still "indirect." In December 2008, following the implementation of direct flights, we finally stopped using Hong Kong as a "buffer."
Current cross-Strait exchanges also rely on "buffers." The Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), are just such "buffers." Therefore the aforementioned phenomenon of central government officials meeting directly has already gone from "indirect" exchanges, to "direct government to government" exchanges. This should be considered a valuable "fourth link" in the wake of the "three links."
The two sides are currently negotiating a cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Commission. This would help promote "direct government to government" links. Negotiations are nominally under the aegis of the SEF and ARATS. But the delegations will be led on both sides by vice ministerial level officials. The buffers have already been set aside, and are now merely for show.
This is a positive and welcome trend. Representatives from the two sides were often faced with a dilemma. They were required to tap dance around whether they were "not in disagreement" or "in agreement." Direct contact by central government officials would enable them to sidestep such theoretical or rhetorical obstacles. In other words, the theoretical and rhetorical justifications for cross-Strait exchanges have fallen behind real world practice and action. Therefore it makes sense to allow practice to guide theory.
In the past, contacts between Mainland and Taiwan officials were limited to the local government level. The authorities in Beijing and central government officials on Taiwan were leery of higher level contacts. The most obvious example was ARATS President Chen Yunlin's meeting with Ma Ying-jeou. For one, Chen Yunlin was not an official but merely a "buffer." Furthermore, Chen Yunlin addressed President Ma as "you." The reason for this was difficulties over "mutual recognition." Now however, central government officials from both sides have made direct contact. It is now possible to modify the theoretical justifications for "mutual non-denial" or "mutual recognition."
The two sides "recognize each other," or at least "do not repudiate each other." This may have developed out of Lien Chan's 2005 visit to the Mainland. Beijing recognized Lien Chan as Chairman of the KMT. In effect, it recognized his status as the chairman of the opposition party of the Republic of China. Next, Beijing recognized Wu Po-hsiung as chairman of the KMT. In effect, it recognized his status as the chairman of the ruling party of the Republic of China. Furthermore, Beijing was originally willing to recognize officials from Taiwan only at the county and municipal level. But without a Republic of China central government, where did its county and municipal governments come from? Today, central government officials from the two sides are meeting directly. The two sides' ministerial level officials must of course answer to "heads of state" above them. How can anyone deny this? As we can see, practice has outstripped theory. Theory has lagged behind action. In fact, recognizing county chiefs and city mayors, or recognizing ministerial level officials, all implicitly require recognizing the existence of the central governments. The logic is above reproach. It was merely that our political practices deviated from it in the past.
Now officials on both sides look forward to a meeting between President Ma Ying-jeou and President Hu Jintao. This also poses "theoretical" obstacles. But if the two sides can refer to each other by their official titles, the possibility of a meeting is great. If the two sides wish to see a Ma/Hu meeting, they need to create a mutually acceptable "theoretical basis" for any such meeting.
In the past, Beijing associated "repudiating the Republic of China" with "reunification." But in fact these are two entirely separate issues. If Beijing recognizes the Republic of China, does that really mean we cannot reunify? East and West Germany recognized each other as "nations," but not as "foreign nations." Were they not reunified in the end? The cross-Strait status quo is merely the legacy of a civil war. What is this, if not the theoretical basis for two governments, either warring or negotiating a peace treaty, under the premise of "One China?" What is the alternative? Taipei can hardly sign a peace agreement with Beijing under the name of the "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu Separate Customs Territory." Besides, the two sides are undergoing "peaceful development." "Reconnecting" should take precedence over "reunification." "Direct government to government links" would be a powerful connection extremely difficult to reverse, hence something both worthwhile and welcome.
We are delighted to see central government officials from the two sides accelerate the "fourth link." This will allow the public on the two sides to become accustomed to "direct government to government links." This will allow the two sides to gain a better understanding of cross-Strait relations from "direct government to government links." This will allow "practical innovation" to lead "theoretical innovation" and "policy innovation." Perhaps this precious historical opportunity will enable the heads of the MAC and the Taiwan Affairs Office visit each other, premiers on the two sides each other, and even Ma and Hu meet each other in an official, earth-shaking, world class summit.
政府直通：加速發展「第四通」
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.09.23
中央政府官員出現在兩岸場合的鏡頭頻密公開。大陸文化部長蔡武會見我文建會主委盛治仁，我新聞局長江啟臣接見大陸新聞出版總署副署長鄔書林，我教育部長吳清基與陝西省長趙正永同場剪綵，勞委會主委王如玄出席北京ＡＰＥＣ人力發展會議，與中國國家主席胡錦濤「合影」……。
這些現象令人想起兩岸航運由「中轉」變「直航」的過程。多年來兩岸一直透過香港、石垣島為「白手套」進行通航，因此發展出「換班次不換載具」等模式；但這些模式只是自作自受，尤其在九七香港回歸大陸後，台港其實已經是「直航」，卻仍要藉它「中轉」，更是自欺欺人。二○○八年十二月實施直航後，終於脫掉了香港這副白手套。
現在，兩岸政府的往來，也靠「中轉」，海基、海協兩會就是「白手套」；因而，前述中央官員直接會面的現象，已由「中轉」漸變為「政府直通」，可以視為「三通」之後，值得期待的「第四通」。
兩岸正在議商的經濟合作委員會，應是促進「政府直通」的關鍵作為；雖仍掛名在兩會之下，但雙邊皆將以次長級官員領軍，白手套已擺在桌邊作樣子。
這是一個值得肯定與期待的發展趨勢。而且，當兩岸正在「互不否認」，或「相互承認」的困局中左右為難之際，中央政府官員的直接接觸，可謂是超越了理論或論述的領先作為；也就是說，在這個時候，兩岸交往的理論及論述，已見落後於實踐與行動的發展。然而，「以實踐帶動理論發展」，也許正是一個好辦法。
過去，大陸與台灣官員接觸，只停留在地方政府層級，北京當局對與台灣中央政府官員會面有所避忌。最明顯的例子是海協會長陳雲林見馬英九總統，一者陳雲林不是官員而是白手套，再者陳雲林以「您」稱呼馬總統；此中皆涉及了是否「相互承認」的爭議。現在，兩岸中央政府官員直接接觸，「互不否認」或「相互承認」的理論，似有可待發展的空間。
兩岸的相互承認或不否認，也許可由二○○五年連戰訪問大陸談起。北京承認了連戰為中國國民黨主席的身分，其實也就是承認其為中華民國反對黨主席的身分；接著，北京承認了吳伯雄為中國國民黨主席的身分，其實也就是承認其為中華民國執政黨主席的身分。再者，北京起初只承認台灣縣市長的身分，但若沒有中華民國的中央政府，何來這些縣市長？如今，又見兩岸中央政府官員「直通」，但不能否認兩岸這些部長的上面都有一位「國家元首」。可見，實踐已超越理論，理論已落後於行動。其實，接受了縣市長，或接受了部長，便皆不能否認中央政府，其邏輯「一以貫之」，只是一直被政治操作切斷罷了。
如今存在於兩岸的最大想像之一，是馬英九總統與胡錦濤主席有無可能見面；這也牽涉到「理論」的問題。倘若雙方能以正式職銜互相稱呼，會面的機會就很大。兩岸若對馬胡會皆有憧憬，即必須共創一套彼此皆可接納的「理論」。
北京過去將「否認中華民國」與「統一」綁在一起；但這其實可以是兩回事。若承認了中華民國，難道就一定不能「統一」？如東西德相互承認為「非外國的國家」，最後還不是「統一」了？既稱兩岸現狀就是內戰的遺留，這豈不正是相互為「一個中國」下的兩個交戰或議和政府的現成「理論」？否則，難道要用「ＴＰＫＭ個別關稅領域」來簽訂「和平協議」？何況，兩岸在「和平發展期」中，「連結」比「統一」優先；而「政府直通」則是相當強固且難以逆轉的「連結」，因此應可寄以肯定及期待。
我們樂見兩岸中央政府官員加速加強「第四通」，俾使兩岸人民習於「政府直通」的運作，亦可從「政府直通」中重新理解兩岸關係，並以「實踐創新」來帶動「理論創新」及「政策創新」。倘能如此，或許在這珍貴的歷史機遇期中，兩岸人民將可見到陸委會與國台辦首長的互訪，行政院長與國務院總理的會面，以及馬胡二人以正式職稱舉行轟動世界的高峰會。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 23, 2010
Central government officials have appeared at cross-Strait events with increasing frequency. Mainland Culture Minister Cai Wu met with our own Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) Minister Emile Sheng. Our own Government Information Office (GIO) Chief Chiang Chi-chen met with Mainland Deputy Director of Press and Publication Administration Wu Shulin. Our own Minister of Education (MOE) Wu Ching-chi attended the same ribbon-cutting ceremony as Shaanxi Provincial Governor Chao Zhengtong. Our own APEC Affairs Council Chairperson Wang Ju-hsuan attended the Beijing Conference on Human Development, and was photographed next to Mainland President Hu Jintao.
These phenomena remind one of cross-Strait shipping and its transition from "indirect" to "direct." Over the years, the two sides have used Hong Kong and Ishigaki Island as shipping "buffers." This led to "changing the voyage number without changing the ship" and other gimmicks. These gimmicks however, backfired, especially after Hong Kong's retrocession in 1997. Voyages and flights between Taiwan and Hong Kong were already "direct." Never mind that we engaged in self-deception by pretending they were still "indirect." In December 2008, following the implementation of direct flights, we finally stopped using Hong Kong as a "buffer."
Current cross-Strait exchanges also rely on "buffers." The Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), are just such "buffers." Therefore the aforementioned phenomenon of central government officials meeting directly has already gone from "indirect" exchanges, to "direct government to government" exchanges. This should be considered a valuable "fourth link" in the wake of the "three links."
The two sides are currently negotiating a cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Commission. This would help promote "direct government to government" links. Negotiations are nominally under the aegis of the SEF and ARATS. But the delegations will be led on both sides by vice ministerial level officials. The buffers have already been set aside, and are now merely for show.
This is a positive and welcome trend. Representatives from the two sides were often faced with a dilemma. They were required to tap dance around whether they were "not in disagreement" or "in agreement." Direct contact by central government officials would enable them to sidestep such theoretical or rhetorical obstacles. In other words, the theoretical and rhetorical justifications for cross-Strait exchanges have fallen behind real world practice and action. Therefore it makes sense to allow practice to guide theory.
In the past, contacts between Mainland and Taiwan officials were limited to the local government level. The authorities in Beijing and central government officials on Taiwan were leery of higher level contacts. The most obvious example was ARATS President Chen Yunlin's meeting with Ma Ying-jeou. For one, Chen Yunlin was not an official but merely a "buffer." Furthermore, Chen Yunlin addressed President Ma as "you." The reason for this was difficulties over "mutual recognition." Now however, central government officials from both sides have made direct contact. It is now possible to modify the theoretical justifications for "mutual non-denial" or "mutual recognition."
The two sides "recognize each other," or at least "do not repudiate each other." This may have developed out of Lien Chan's 2005 visit to the Mainland. Beijing recognized Lien Chan as Chairman of the KMT. In effect, it recognized his status as the chairman of the opposition party of the Republic of China. Next, Beijing recognized Wu Po-hsiung as chairman of the KMT. In effect, it recognized his status as the chairman of the ruling party of the Republic of China. Furthermore, Beijing was originally willing to recognize officials from Taiwan only at the county and municipal level. But without a Republic of China central government, where did its county and municipal governments come from? Today, central government officials from the two sides are meeting directly. The two sides' ministerial level officials must of course answer to "heads of state" above them. How can anyone deny this? As we can see, practice has outstripped theory. Theory has lagged behind action. In fact, recognizing county chiefs and city mayors, or recognizing ministerial level officials, all implicitly require recognizing the existence of the central governments. The logic is above reproach. It was merely that our political practices deviated from it in the past.
Now officials on both sides look forward to a meeting between President Ma Ying-jeou and President Hu Jintao. This also poses "theoretical" obstacles. But if the two sides can refer to each other by their official titles, the possibility of a meeting is great. If the two sides wish to see a Ma/Hu meeting, they need to create a mutually acceptable "theoretical basis" for any such meeting.
In the past, Beijing associated "repudiating the Republic of China" with "reunification." But in fact these are two entirely separate issues. If Beijing recognizes the Republic of China, does that really mean we cannot reunify? East and West Germany recognized each other as "nations," but not as "foreign nations." Were they not reunified in the end? The cross-Strait status quo is merely the legacy of a civil war. What is this, if not the theoretical basis for two governments, either warring or negotiating a peace treaty, under the premise of "One China?" What is the alternative? Taipei can hardly sign a peace agreement with Beijing under the name of the "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu Separate Customs Territory." Besides, the two sides are undergoing "peaceful development." "Reconnecting" should take precedence over "reunification." "Direct government to government links" would be a powerful connection extremely difficult to reverse, hence something both worthwhile and welcome.
We are delighted to see central government officials from the two sides accelerate the "fourth link." This will allow the public on the two sides to become accustomed to "direct government to government links." This will allow the two sides to gain a better understanding of cross-Strait relations from "direct government to government links." This will allow "practical innovation" to lead "theoretical innovation" and "policy innovation." Perhaps this precious historical opportunity will enable the heads of the MAC and the Taiwan Affairs Office visit each other, premiers on the two sides each other, and even Ma and Hu meet each other in an official, earth-shaking, world class summit.
政府直通：加速發展「第四通」
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.09.23
中央政府官員出現在兩岸場合的鏡頭頻密公開。大陸文化部長蔡武會見我文建會主委盛治仁，我新聞局長江啟臣接見大陸新聞出版總署副署長鄔書林，我教育部長吳清基與陝西省長趙正永同場剪綵，勞委會主委王如玄出席北京ＡＰＥＣ人力發展會議，與中國國家主席胡錦濤「合影」……。
這些現象令人想起兩岸航運由「中轉」變「直航」的過程。多年來兩岸一直透過香港、石垣島為「白手套」進行通航，因此發展出「換班次不換載具」等模式；但這些模式只是自作自受，尤其在九七香港回歸大陸後，台港其實已經是「直航」，卻仍要藉它「中轉」，更是自欺欺人。二○○八年十二月實施直航後，終於脫掉了香港這副白手套。
現在，兩岸政府的往來，也靠「中轉」，海基、海協兩會就是「白手套」；因而，前述中央官員直接會面的現象，已由「中轉」漸變為「政府直通」，可以視為「三通」之後，值得期待的「第四通」。
兩岸正在議商的經濟合作委員會，應是促進「政府直通」的關鍵作為；雖仍掛名在兩會之下，但雙邊皆將以次長級官員領軍，白手套已擺在桌邊作樣子。
這是一個值得肯定與期待的發展趨勢。而且，當兩岸正在「互不否認」，或「相互承認」的困局中左右為難之際，中央政府官員的直接接觸，可謂是超越了理論或論述的領先作為；也就是說，在這個時候，兩岸交往的理論及論述，已見落後於實踐與行動的發展。然而，「以實踐帶動理論發展」，也許正是一個好辦法。
過去，大陸與台灣官員接觸，只停留在地方政府層級，北京當局對與台灣中央政府官員會面有所避忌。最明顯的例子是海協會長陳雲林見馬英九總統，一者陳雲林不是官員而是白手套，再者陳雲林以「您」稱呼馬總統；此中皆涉及了是否「相互承認」的爭議。現在，兩岸中央政府官員直接接觸，「互不否認」或「相互承認」的理論，似有可待發展的空間。
兩岸的相互承認或不否認，也許可由二○○五年連戰訪問大陸談起。北京承認了連戰為中國國民黨主席的身分，其實也就是承認其為中華民國反對黨主席的身分；接著，北京承認了吳伯雄為中國國民黨主席的身分，其實也就是承認其為中華民國執政黨主席的身分。再者，北京起初只承認台灣縣市長的身分，但若沒有中華民國的中央政府，何來這些縣市長？如今，又見兩岸中央政府官員「直通」，但不能否認兩岸這些部長的上面都有一位「國家元首」。可見，實踐已超越理論，理論已落後於行動。其實，接受了縣市長，或接受了部長，便皆不能否認中央政府，其邏輯「一以貫之」，只是一直被政治操作切斷罷了。
如今存在於兩岸的最大想像之一，是馬英九總統與胡錦濤主席有無可能見面；這也牽涉到「理論」的問題。倘若雙方能以正式職銜互相稱呼，會面的機會就很大。兩岸若對馬胡會皆有憧憬，即必須共創一套彼此皆可接納的「理論」。
北京過去將「否認中華民國」與「統一」綁在一起；但這其實可以是兩回事。若承認了中華民國，難道就一定不能「統一」？如東西德相互承認為「非外國的國家」，最後還不是「統一」了？既稱兩岸現狀就是內戰的遺留，這豈不正是相互為「一個中國」下的兩個交戰或議和政府的現成「理論」？否則，難道要用「ＴＰＫＭ個別關稅領域」來簽訂「和平協議」？何況，兩岸在「和平發展期」中，「連結」比「統一」優先；而「政府直通」則是相當強固且難以逆轉的「連結」，因此應可寄以肯定及期待。
我們樂見兩岸中央政府官員加速加強「第四通」，俾使兩岸人民習於「政府直通」的運作，亦可從「政府直通」中重新理解兩岸關係，並以「實踐創新」來帶動「理論創新」及「政策創新」。倘能如此，或許在這珍貴的歷史機遇期中，兩岸人民將可見到陸委會與國台辦首長的互訪，行政院長與國務院總理的會面，以及馬胡二人以正式職稱舉行轟動世界的高峰會。
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
Heartless Politics and the Rape of Flowers
Heartless Politics and the Rape of Flowers
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 21, 2010
On the 19th of this month, this newspaper's "Issues in Black and White" column published an editorial entitled, "Naivete is not a Virtue." It criticized the Hau Lung-ping administration's tardy response to the Flora Expo controversy, which needlessly allowed the Flora Expo's image to be slandered. But the real guilt belongs to DPP councilmembers, who hurled false, out-of-context accusations. The Flora Expo has yet to open, but it is has already been viciously maligned as one huge pork barrel. The DPP perpetrated this "rape of the flowers." It is the real culprit. The DPP hypocritically proclaimed that it was "providing checks and balances" for the Taipei City Government. Can political parties consider only partisan advantage, and ignore the harm they inflict upon the nation and society?
Opposition parties must oversee the party in power. A democracy requires anti-corruption measures. No one objects to this. Oversight must protect the public interest. It must prevent those in office from abusing their power by engaging in corruption. Oversight however, is not a license to engage in irrational demagoguery. Oversight must be reasonable. It must help the public discern the truth. Oversight is not a license to turn facts on their head in an effort to bamboozle the public. DPP councilmembers tried to fabricate a Flora Expo scandal by demagoguing water spinach, basil, and bamboo pavilions. Examine the DPP councilmembers' ends and means, and one finds that the DPP councilmembers' actions were neither in the public interest nor consistent with reason.
Consider the rule of reason. The Flora Expo will display nearly 3000 varieties of fruits and vegetables. Over 30 million transplants will be on display. Out of this entire range, only four plants were priced above the norm. In other words, 99.9 percent of the plants were problem free. When an exhibit of such complexity conforms this closely to specifications, it is evidence of extraordinary administrative efficiency. If anything, it deserves public affirmation and warrants public pride. The average family probably overpays by a larger percentage in its domestic budget than the Hau administration.
The DPP is milking the 0.1 percent for all it is worth. It has locked its jaws around the issue and refuses to let go. One has to hand it to them. The DPP is playing the role of opposition party to the hilt. The only problem is that when Green Camp councilmembers level accusations of excessively high flower prices, they insinuate and embellish. They relentlessly attempt to mislead the public into believing that the procurement process was rife with pork. They characterize the entire Flora Expo as a hotbed of corruption, manipulated by Hau Lung-ping and the Taipei City Government. Do they care that their smear campaign has nothing to do with the truth? Hardly. For them the Flora Expo controversy is nothing more than an election strategy for the five cities elections. The Flora Expo controversy may well sabotage Hau Lung-bin's re-election efforts. But it hardly qualifies as "oversight." Such "whistleblowing" hardly conforms to the "principle of proportionality." It hardly meets the criteria of rationality, and still less morality.
The Green Camp has attempted to make a major issue out of water spinach. Green Camp councilmembers displayed a bunch of water spinach purchased from the local supermarket. They compared it with what they asserted was a sickly, withered specimen of water spinach, and asserted that the 20 NT per pot water spinach must have involved major pork. But they concealed certain facts. One. Out of the entire Flora Expo water spinach zone, they picked out the single ugliest specimen of water spinach. Two. A live plant is hardly the same as a harvested item from the supermarket. Three. Flora Expo water spinach specimens must be 20 centimeters wide by 20 centimeters high. Any given water spinach plant may have five or more stems. Therefore such comparisons are incorrect. Four. The overhead for flower growers include freight costs, display costs, and six months of guaranteed live maintenance costs. The DPP councilmembers were fully aware of the situation. Yet they deliberately distorted the facts in order to mislead the public. Clearly Green Camp claims that they were merely engaged in oversight on behalf of the public, were an inversion of the truth. In fact they were up to their usual dirty tricks.
Consider the public interest. If the construction of the Flower Expo venues and the procurement of plants involved inflated prices, fraud, or the squandering of public funds, of course any wrongdoing would have to be exposed. But the Flora Expo is not merely a venue for domestic flower growers and the domestic horticultural industry. It is an international event. It is a rare opportunity for landscape architects, technology and creative cultural industry entrepreneurs to showcase their masterpieces. This combined floral exhibit, tourism exhibit, and cultural exhibit, is exactly the world stage we need to showcase Taiwan's soft power. Naturally everyone involved must take extra care to maximize its chance of success. The Flora Expo has opened some of its venues to the public. Based on these, the Flora Expo has nothing to apologize for. The DPP hopes to use water spinach to destroy the Flora Expo. Are they really so heartless?
Consider the bamboo pavilion. Architects attempted to provide Taiwan's bamboo craft industry with a green stage at the Flora Expo. They extended a special invitation to elderly bamboo craft masters. They invited architecture students to participate in a hands-on student project. This thoughtful attempt to encourage creativity, created an elegant pavilion, and a valuable attraction within the Flora Expo. How did DPP councilmembers spin this success story? They characterized it as the "exploitation of students by their professors." In one fell swoop, they smeared the designer's heartfelt intentions, and the participants' laborious efforts. They indiscriminately hurled wild accusation, all under the mantle of "oversight." What difference is there between the DPP's "oversight" and outright sabotage?
The Republic of China government implemented democracy in the Taiwan Region for several decades ago. But "oversight" continues to be a synonym for sabotage. That is sad indeed. A prosperous Taiwan requires collective concern for the public good. it requires a collective appreciation for things of value. We urge the ruling and opposition parties to collectively consider how they can make the Flora Expo a success.
空心政治 辣手摧花
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.21 11:22 am
本報19日黑白集「憨慢不是美德」，批評郝市府對花風暴因應遲緩，使花博形象受到不必要的汙蔑。但追根究柢，民進黨議員以偏頗的取樣和不實的指控，把尚未開展的花博打成黑幕重重的公共工程，才是辣手摧花的罪魁禍首。在野黨假制衡之名監督市政，可以只問政黨收益而不計國家社會的損失嗎？
在野黨監督執政者，是民主政治必要的防腐機制，沒有人會反對這點。關鍵在，監督的目的是在維護公眾利益，防止掌權者濫權貪腐，而非無端興風作浪；監督的手段亦應符合理性原則，協助民眾辨識事實，而非一味顛倒黑白、混淆視聽。從目的和手段兩項標準看，民進黨議員藉空心菜、九層塔、竹涼亭等議題，猛烈炒作出一場「花風暴」，恐怕禁不起「公共利益」及「理性原則」的檢驗。
先談理性原則。這次花博展出的花卉、果蔬等園藝作物近三千多種，計三千萬株植栽；在這麼浩大的工程中，僅發現四種植物價格明顯偏高，應是意味百分之九十九點九的作物是沒有問題的。如此繁複的展覽而有這麼高的妥適比率，若從積極的角度看，其實也很是值得市民肯定與驕傲的治理能力，不是嗎？一般家庭採購的誤失率恐怕尚高於此。
當然，民進黨擴大指控那百分之零點一的問題，其絲毫不肯放過的精神，確實值得敬佩，亦是反對黨的角色所在。問題在，綠營議員指控花價偏高時，卻不斷含沙射影、加油添醋，企圖誘導民眾誤信以為各種花卉採購都弊端重重，進而渲染整個花博就是郝市府團隊上下其手、藏汙納垢的淵藪。作為五都的選戰策略，花風暴或許成功地打壓了郝龍斌的選情；但就在野的「監督」角色而言，這樣的「揭弊」手法不僅完全不符合「比例原則」，當然更不符合理性原則，甚至是根本不道德的。
以製造出最強烈話題的空心菜為例，綠營議員拿出一把市場買來的空心菜，與其聲稱從現場拍攝的一株病態蔫蔫的空心菜對比，即斷言廿元一盆的花博空心菜必有大弊端。但他隱而未言的事實卻是：一，在花博空心菜區，他只選最醜的一盆拍攝；二，活生生的植栽和採下的葉菜不能等量齊觀；三，花博的空心菜要符合廿公分乘廿公分的寬高，一「棵」空心菜可能有五「株」以上的莖，這是單位不對等的錯誤類比。四，花卉業者的成本，還包括了運費、布置費及六個月「保活期」的養護等費用；這些狀況，皆是議員所明知，卻故意扭曲誤導。由此可見，綠營民代表面上聲稱在監督市政，其實卻在混淆社會大眾視聽，使出慣用的烏賊戰術來打選戰。
再談「公眾利益原則」。花博的場館工程和園藝作物採購，若有浮報作假或浪費公帑情事，當然必須揭發；但花博本身不僅是國內花農、園藝業者衝上國際浪頭的舞台，更是建築景觀乃至科技、文創業者一顯身手的好機會。這樣兼具花卉、觀光、文化功能的展覽，也正是我們向世界展現台灣軟實力的舞台，當然需要各界更加細心呵護，以取得最大的成功。以花博近日公開的部分場館看，確實較世博任何頂級場館亦不遜色；想用一株空心菜的「空心政治」來毀了眾人心血營造的花博，真是於心何忍？
再以這次遭到波及的竹編涼亭為例，建築師為了讓台灣固有的竹編工藝能在花博的綠色舞台揚眉吐氣，特別請來竹編老師傅出馬，並邀建築科系學生一同動手見習建造。如此用心的創意，也成功打造出雅致的古典涼亭，成為花博珍貴的一景，結果竟被形容為「教授剝削學生」，一筆抹煞了設計者的用心及參與者的汗水。不分青紅皂白的粗暴指控，若都能美其名為「監督」，那在野黨跟體制內的絆腳石有何兩樣？
台灣實施民主政治數十年，「監督」若仍然只是「扯後腿」的同義詞，那就太可悲了。美好的台灣，需要大家懷有共同成全之心；美好的事物，也需要大家共同珍惜。現在，請朝野共同想想如何能把花博辦得更好吧！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 21, 2010
On the 19th of this month, this newspaper's "Issues in Black and White" column published an editorial entitled, "Naivete is not a Virtue." It criticized the Hau Lung-ping administration's tardy response to the Flora Expo controversy, which needlessly allowed the Flora Expo's image to be slandered. But the real guilt belongs to DPP councilmembers, who hurled false, out-of-context accusations. The Flora Expo has yet to open, but it is has already been viciously maligned as one huge pork barrel. The DPP perpetrated this "rape of the flowers." It is the real culprit. The DPP hypocritically proclaimed that it was "providing checks and balances" for the Taipei City Government. Can political parties consider only partisan advantage, and ignore the harm they inflict upon the nation and society?
Opposition parties must oversee the party in power. A democracy requires anti-corruption measures. No one objects to this. Oversight must protect the public interest. It must prevent those in office from abusing their power by engaging in corruption. Oversight however, is not a license to engage in irrational demagoguery. Oversight must be reasonable. It must help the public discern the truth. Oversight is not a license to turn facts on their head in an effort to bamboozle the public. DPP councilmembers tried to fabricate a Flora Expo scandal by demagoguing water spinach, basil, and bamboo pavilions. Examine the DPP councilmembers' ends and means, and one finds that the DPP councilmembers' actions were neither in the public interest nor consistent with reason.
Consider the rule of reason. The Flora Expo will display nearly 3000 varieties of fruits and vegetables. Over 30 million transplants will be on display. Out of this entire range, only four plants were priced above the norm. In other words, 99.9 percent of the plants were problem free. When an exhibit of such complexity conforms this closely to specifications, it is evidence of extraordinary administrative efficiency. If anything, it deserves public affirmation and warrants public pride. The average family probably overpays by a larger percentage in its domestic budget than the Hau administration.
The DPP is milking the 0.1 percent for all it is worth. It has locked its jaws around the issue and refuses to let go. One has to hand it to them. The DPP is playing the role of opposition party to the hilt. The only problem is that when Green Camp councilmembers level accusations of excessively high flower prices, they insinuate and embellish. They relentlessly attempt to mislead the public into believing that the procurement process was rife with pork. They characterize the entire Flora Expo as a hotbed of corruption, manipulated by Hau Lung-ping and the Taipei City Government. Do they care that their smear campaign has nothing to do with the truth? Hardly. For them the Flora Expo controversy is nothing more than an election strategy for the five cities elections. The Flora Expo controversy may well sabotage Hau Lung-bin's re-election efforts. But it hardly qualifies as "oversight." Such "whistleblowing" hardly conforms to the "principle of proportionality." It hardly meets the criteria of rationality, and still less morality.
The Green Camp has attempted to make a major issue out of water spinach. Green Camp councilmembers displayed a bunch of water spinach purchased from the local supermarket. They compared it with what they asserted was a sickly, withered specimen of water spinach, and asserted that the 20 NT per pot water spinach must have involved major pork. But they concealed certain facts. One. Out of the entire Flora Expo water spinach zone, they picked out the single ugliest specimen of water spinach. Two. A live plant is hardly the same as a harvested item from the supermarket. Three. Flora Expo water spinach specimens must be 20 centimeters wide by 20 centimeters high. Any given water spinach plant may have five or more stems. Therefore such comparisons are incorrect. Four. The overhead for flower growers include freight costs, display costs, and six months of guaranteed live maintenance costs. The DPP councilmembers were fully aware of the situation. Yet they deliberately distorted the facts in order to mislead the public. Clearly Green Camp claims that they were merely engaged in oversight on behalf of the public, were an inversion of the truth. In fact they were up to their usual dirty tricks.
Consider the public interest. If the construction of the Flower Expo venues and the procurement of plants involved inflated prices, fraud, or the squandering of public funds, of course any wrongdoing would have to be exposed. But the Flora Expo is not merely a venue for domestic flower growers and the domestic horticultural industry. It is an international event. It is a rare opportunity for landscape architects, technology and creative cultural industry entrepreneurs to showcase their masterpieces. This combined floral exhibit, tourism exhibit, and cultural exhibit, is exactly the world stage we need to showcase Taiwan's soft power. Naturally everyone involved must take extra care to maximize its chance of success. The Flora Expo has opened some of its venues to the public. Based on these, the Flora Expo has nothing to apologize for. The DPP hopes to use water spinach to destroy the Flora Expo. Are they really so heartless?
Consider the bamboo pavilion. Architects attempted to provide Taiwan's bamboo craft industry with a green stage at the Flora Expo. They extended a special invitation to elderly bamboo craft masters. They invited architecture students to participate in a hands-on student project. This thoughtful attempt to encourage creativity, created an elegant pavilion, and a valuable attraction within the Flora Expo. How did DPP councilmembers spin this success story? They characterized it as the "exploitation of students by their professors." In one fell swoop, they smeared the designer's heartfelt intentions, and the participants' laborious efforts. They indiscriminately hurled wild accusation, all under the mantle of "oversight." What difference is there between the DPP's "oversight" and outright sabotage?
The Republic of China government implemented democracy in the Taiwan Region for several decades ago. But "oversight" continues to be a synonym for sabotage. That is sad indeed. A prosperous Taiwan requires collective concern for the public good. it requires a collective appreciation for things of value. We urge the ruling and opposition parties to collectively consider how they can make the Flora Expo a success.
空心政治 辣手摧花
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.21 11:22 am
本報19日黑白集「憨慢不是美德」，批評郝市府對花風暴因應遲緩，使花博形象受到不必要的汙蔑。但追根究柢，民進黨議員以偏頗的取樣和不實的指控，把尚未開展的花博打成黑幕重重的公共工程，才是辣手摧花的罪魁禍首。在野黨假制衡之名監督市政，可以只問政黨收益而不計國家社會的損失嗎？
在野黨監督執政者，是民主政治必要的防腐機制，沒有人會反對這點。關鍵在，監督的目的是在維護公眾利益，防止掌權者濫權貪腐，而非無端興風作浪；監督的手段亦應符合理性原則，協助民眾辨識事實，而非一味顛倒黑白、混淆視聽。從目的和手段兩項標準看，民進黨議員藉空心菜、九層塔、竹涼亭等議題，猛烈炒作出一場「花風暴」，恐怕禁不起「公共利益」及「理性原則」的檢驗。
先談理性原則。這次花博展出的花卉、果蔬等園藝作物近三千多種，計三千萬株植栽；在這麼浩大的工程中，僅發現四種植物價格明顯偏高，應是意味百分之九十九點九的作物是沒有問題的。如此繁複的展覽而有這麼高的妥適比率，若從積極的角度看，其實也很是值得市民肯定與驕傲的治理能力，不是嗎？一般家庭採購的誤失率恐怕尚高於此。
當然，民進黨擴大指控那百分之零點一的問題，其絲毫不肯放過的精神，確實值得敬佩，亦是反對黨的角色所在。問題在，綠營議員指控花價偏高時，卻不斷含沙射影、加油添醋，企圖誘導民眾誤信以為各種花卉採購都弊端重重，進而渲染整個花博就是郝市府團隊上下其手、藏汙納垢的淵藪。作為五都的選戰策略，花風暴或許成功地打壓了郝龍斌的選情；但就在野的「監督」角色而言，這樣的「揭弊」手法不僅完全不符合「比例原則」，當然更不符合理性原則，甚至是根本不道德的。
以製造出最強烈話題的空心菜為例，綠營議員拿出一把市場買來的空心菜，與其聲稱從現場拍攝的一株病態蔫蔫的空心菜對比，即斷言廿元一盆的花博空心菜必有大弊端。但他隱而未言的事實卻是：一，在花博空心菜區，他只選最醜的一盆拍攝；二，活生生的植栽和採下的葉菜不能等量齊觀；三，花博的空心菜要符合廿公分乘廿公分的寬高，一「棵」空心菜可能有五「株」以上的莖，這是單位不對等的錯誤類比。四，花卉業者的成本，還包括了運費、布置費及六個月「保活期」的養護等費用；這些狀況，皆是議員所明知，卻故意扭曲誤導。由此可見，綠營民代表面上聲稱在監督市政，其實卻在混淆社會大眾視聽，使出慣用的烏賊戰術來打選戰。
再談「公眾利益原則」。花博的場館工程和園藝作物採購，若有浮報作假或浪費公帑情事，當然必須揭發；但花博本身不僅是國內花農、園藝業者衝上國際浪頭的舞台，更是建築景觀乃至科技、文創業者一顯身手的好機會。這樣兼具花卉、觀光、文化功能的展覽，也正是我們向世界展現台灣軟實力的舞台，當然需要各界更加細心呵護，以取得最大的成功。以花博近日公開的部分場館看，確實較世博任何頂級場館亦不遜色；想用一株空心菜的「空心政治」來毀了眾人心血營造的花博，真是於心何忍？
再以這次遭到波及的竹編涼亭為例，建築師為了讓台灣固有的竹編工藝能在花博的綠色舞台揚眉吐氣，特別請來竹編老師傅出馬，並邀建築科系學生一同動手見習建造。如此用心的創意，也成功打造出雅致的古典涼亭，成為花博珍貴的一景，結果竟被形容為「教授剝削學生」，一筆抹煞了設計者的用心及參與者的汗水。不分青紅皂白的粗暴指控，若都能美其名為「監督」，那在野黨跟體制內的絆腳石有何兩樣？
台灣實施民主政治數十年，「監督」若仍然只是「扯後腿」的同義詞，那就太可悲了。美好的台灣，需要大家懷有共同成全之心；美好的事物，也需要大家共同珍惜。現在，請朝野共同想想如何能把花博辦得更好吧！
Monday, September 20, 2010
Reconnection: Cross-Strait Face-Saver and Road to Prosperity
Reconnection: Cross-Strait Face-Saver and Road to Prosperity
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 20, 2010
This article concludes the editorial series, "From Reunification to Reconnection." It argues that "Reconnection" is a face saving measure that could break the cross-Strait impasse. It is also the cross-Strait road to prosperity.
As pointed out in our previous editorial, reunification is the toughest and riskiest alternative. Demanding "reunification" may mire Beijing in a "commitment trap." Beijing might find itself unable to retreat because it has overcommitted itself. Cross-Strait relations is a paradox. Demanding "reunification" effectively prolongs "separation." From the ruling CCP's perspective, leaving reunification unresolved sets hawks and doves at each others' throats, and creates a ticking time bomb. It makes it difficult for Beijing to answer to a public which has been led to expect "reunification no matter what."
The implosion of the Soviet Union had many causes, both remote and proximate. But a major cause was Moscow's "overcommitment" to the three Baltic states, which mired it in a "commitment trap." Suppose earlier that year Moscow had relaxed its commitment to the three Baltic states? Suppose it had engaged in timely "policy innovation," and chosen to deal with the three Baltic states differently than the other republics? Had it done so, these tiny states might not have been the dominoes that led to the Soviet Union's collapse. Cross-Strait relations are of course very different from the relationship between the Soviet Union and the three Baltic states. But this example illustrates the consequences of improper goals. Therefore, we must avoid becoming mired in a "commitment trap" when establishing new goals.
In fact, the Beijing authorities have been aware of the problem for some time. Its "yet to be reunified, but still part of one China" phraseology attempts to resolve this impasse and stabilize cross-Strait relations "prior to reunification." This is why we must seek goals besides "reunification." We must think instead about "reconnecting," in order to establish an "in progress form of One China."
From Taipei's perspective, consider this newspaper's "2010 Cross-Strait Relations Survey." If we simplify the results of the survey on "Taiwan's Future," we get three results. Advocates of immediate or eventual independence total 31%. Advocates of maintaining the statusq quo in perpetuity total 51%. Advocates of immediate or eventual reunification total 14%. As we can see, for some time into the future, "reunification" will not constitute "the will of the people." The same survey shows that the public hopes that cross-Strait relations can be improved and stabilized. The public wants to "reconnect" with the other side, without "substantially changing the status quo." The thinking behind "reconnecting" was proposed by this newspaper in its "glass theory." According to the glass theory, Taiwan is the water, the Republic of China is the glass. As long as the glass remains, the water remains. Once the glass is shattered however, the water is lost. By contrast, the goal of "reunification" [from Beijing's perspective] is to shatter the glass.
Cross-Strait relations require process-oriented "peaceful development." They require goal-oriented "peaceful resolutions." This newspaper's "Six New Year's Day Editorials" proposed "setting new goals, predicated upon rational processes." Process-orientation and goal-orientation are mutually complementary alternatives. Here are the four conclusions previously cited.
Since reunification is difficult, why not reconnect first? If reconnection is successful, reunification may be unnecessary. If reconnection is successful, , the result may be better than reunification. Once reconnection is successful, reunification is also a possibility.
These four conclusions are the theme of this article. In other words, reconnection is a face saving measure that could break the cross-Strait impasse. It is also the road to cross-Strait prosperity.
After World War II, four divided countries emerged. North and South Vietnam fought a bitter civil war, underwent regime change, but has yet to resolve its national difficulties. North and South Korea have arranged meetings between their heads of state. But bureaucratic obstacles still stand in the way of talks. East and West Germany were once separated by a wall. But their abruptly reunification left everyone unprepared. By comparison, Taiwan and the Mainland are blessed. We can take incremental steps to improve and stabilize relations. We may be able to find an "historic solution" that will serve as a model for divided countries around the world. China, which has also been divided into two parts, is different from the three other divided countries. The biggest difference is that we can use "reconnection" as a face saving measure and the road to prosperity.
Taipei and Beijing have a responsibility to make good use this face saving measure and road to prosperity. Especially Beijing. Taiwan has adopted democracy. Any high-level "connection," such as a peace agreement or a confederation, will require Beijing's initiative. Otherwise, allegations of "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan" will fly. But if Beijing were to promote a gradual scheme for "reconnecting," it could bypass partisan political struggles on Taiwan. It could appeal directly to the public on Taiwan. It could offer a proposal, similar to ECFA, that would immediately appeal the public on Taiwan. Taipei and Beijing would have a fait accompli on their hands. Of course, for Beijing to move from "reunification" to "reconnection," is easier said than done. After all, it has already found itself mired in a "commitment trap" for some time.
Both sides of the Taiwan Strait know perfectly well that the past few years constitute a fleeting historical opportunity. If the overall situation undergoes further change, perhaps even "reconnection" will no longer be an option. This would once again plunge the two sides into a "commitment trap." Therefore, we propose that Mainland authorities encourage free discussion of "reconnection" by Mainland think-tanks. This will reduce the impasse. After all, one's ideas determine one's behavior. One's vision determines one's horizons.
「連結論」是兩岸的下台階與青雲路
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.20 04:10 am
本文是《從統一論到連結論》系列社論的收尾，想要強調：「連結論」是兩岸難題的下台階，但同時也是兩岸發展的青雲路。
前文指出，統一是難度最高、風險最大的解決方案。主張「統一」，可能使北京墜入「承諾的陷阱」；亦即可能被這個「過度的承諾」弄得無法下台。因為，就兩岸關係的弔詭與辯證情境而言，主張「統一」不啻就是延長「分裂」；就中共統治當局而言，則統一問題久懸未決，在內部就永遠是一顆鷹鴿反目的炸彈，且將如何向已被「非統一不可」洗腦的大陸人民交代？
舉例來說，蘇聯解體有諸多遠因近因，但當年莫斯科對波羅的海三小國的「過度政策」，使自己墜落「承諾的陷阱」，亦是重大原因；莫斯科當年若能及早降低放鬆對「三小國」的「政策承諾」，並及時「政策創新」，以與其他共和國切割處理，也許三小國不致成為蘇聯瓦解的第一張骨牌。兩岸關係當然大不同於蘇聯與三小國的關係，但由此可見，雙邊關係的「目標定位」是否準確，應當是政策風險的必要考量；因此，必須在陷入「承諾的陷阱」之時有所警覺，考慮「目標創新」。
其實，北京當局早有此種警覺，所謂「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」之類的論述，皆是想要在「統一前」或「未統一」的情勢中，找到化解僵局、穩定兩岸關係的辦法。這就必須在「統一論」之外嘗試「目標創新」，朝往「連結論」的方向去思考，設法創造「現在進行式的一個中國」。
再就台灣方面言，從本報11日發表的「2010兩岸關係年度大調查」顯示，若將這次民調對「台灣前途」的主張簡化為三項，則急獨加緩獨佔31％，永遠維持現狀佔51％，急統加緩統為14％。可見，在未來相當時間內，「統一」並非「民之所欲」；而在同一民調所顯示的民眾對改善及穩定兩岸關係的期待卻顯示，若欲在兩岸之間建立各種「不大幅改變現狀」的「連結」，則相當符合民意。而「連結論」的基本思考即在本報所提出的「杯子理論」（台灣是水，中華民國是杯子；杯在水在，杯破水覆）；相對而言，「統一論」則是以砸破杯子為目標，豈堪想像？
兩岸關係必須「和平發展」（過程論），亦必須「和平解決」（目的論），此即本報《元旦六論》所主張的「從合理的過程到改善之目的」。關於「過程論」與「目的論」之間的互補及替代關係，前文曾舉出四個對子，茲再抄錄如下：
既然很難統一，何妨作好連結／如果作好連結，也就不必統一／只要作好連結，其實好過統一／連結通過考驗，統一也有可能。
這四個對子，即能反映出本文的題旨，那就是：連結論是兩岸難題的下台階，同時也是兩岸發展的青雲路。
二戰後，出現四個分裂國家。南北越打了一場慘烈的內戰，政權更替，但國家困境迄未解決；南北韓即使已進入元首會面的層次，但仍陷劍拔弩張的不可開交之局；東西德則昨天還是隔牆分治，第二天竟已實現統一，來個措手不及。相較而言，兩岸可謂何其幸運，如今能以漸層漸進的步驟改善並穩定關係，因而極可能在四個分裂國家中創造一個足稱「人類歷史典範」的解決方案；而兩岸與其他三個分裂國家的最大不同所在，正是因為我們可以用「連結論」作為下台階及青雲路。
如何善用這個下台階與青雲路，北京的責任應大於台北。因為，台灣的民主體制，對任何高層次的「連結」（如和平協議或邦聯），除非先由北京提出正面的方案，否則必然會因「傾中賣台」吵得不可開交；但如果北京能對漸層漸進的「連結」方案，跳過台灣的政黨鬥爭，直接面對台灣民眾，端出一出手就能說服台灣主流民意的提案（如ECFA），那兩岸就可能有一拍即合的效應。當然，大陸內部若要從「統一論」朝向「連結論」，恐怕也是一個不小的難題，畢竟已陷「承諾的陷阱」久矣。
兩岸皆知，這幾年是稍縱即逝的珍貴歷史機遇期。倘若大局再變，恐怕連「連結論」提出的空間都沒有了，兩岸就又再墜入「承諾的陷阱」之中。所以，我們特別建議，大陸當局應鼓勵內部智囊公開討論「連結論」，為困局鬆綁。畢竟，思路決定出路，眼界決定境界。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 20, 2010
This article concludes the editorial series, "From Reunification to Reconnection." It argues that "Reconnection" is a face saving measure that could break the cross-Strait impasse. It is also the cross-Strait road to prosperity.
As pointed out in our previous editorial, reunification is the toughest and riskiest alternative. Demanding "reunification" may mire Beijing in a "commitment trap." Beijing might find itself unable to retreat because it has overcommitted itself. Cross-Strait relations is a paradox. Demanding "reunification" effectively prolongs "separation." From the ruling CCP's perspective, leaving reunification unresolved sets hawks and doves at each others' throats, and creates a ticking time bomb. It makes it difficult for Beijing to answer to a public which has been led to expect "reunification no matter what."
The implosion of the Soviet Union had many causes, both remote and proximate. But a major cause was Moscow's "overcommitment" to the three Baltic states, which mired it in a "commitment trap." Suppose earlier that year Moscow had relaxed its commitment to the three Baltic states? Suppose it had engaged in timely "policy innovation," and chosen to deal with the three Baltic states differently than the other republics? Had it done so, these tiny states might not have been the dominoes that led to the Soviet Union's collapse. Cross-Strait relations are of course very different from the relationship between the Soviet Union and the three Baltic states. But this example illustrates the consequences of improper goals. Therefore, we must avoid becoming mired in a "commitment trap" when establishing new goals.
In fact, the Beijing authorities have been aware of the problem for some time. Its "yet to be reunified, but still part of one China" phraseology attempts to resolve this impasse and stabilize cross-Strait relations "prior to reunification." This is why we must seek goals besides "reunification." We must think instead about "reconnecting," in order to establish an "in progress form of One China."
From Taipei's perspective, consider this newspaper's "2010 Cross-Strait Relations Survey." If we simplify the results of the survey on "Taiwan's Future," we get three results. Advocates of immediate or eventual independence total 31%. Advocates of maintaining the statusq quo in perpetuity total 51%. Advocates of immediate or eventual reunification total 14%. As we can see, for some time into the future, "reunification" will not constitute "the will of the people." The same survey shows that the public hopes that cross-Strait relations can be improved and stabilized. The public wants to "reconnect" with the other side, without "substantially changing the status quo." The thinking behind "reconnecting" was proposed by this newspaper in its "glass theory." According to the glass theory, Taiwan is the water, the Republic of China is the glass. As long as the glass remains, the water remains. Once the glass is shattered however, the water is lost. By contrast, the goal of "reunification" [from Beijing's perspective] is to shatter the glass.
Cross-Strait relations require process-oriented "peaceful development." They require goal-oriented "peaceful resolutions." This newspaper's "Six New Year's Day Editorials" proposed "setting new goals, predicated upon rational processes." Process-orientation and goal-orientation are mutually complementary alternatives. Here are the four conclusions previously cited.
Since reunification is difficult, why not reconnect first? If reconnection is successful, reunification may be unnecessary. If reconnection is successful, , the result may be better than reunification. Once reconnection is successful, reunification is also a possibility.
These four conclusions are the theme of this article. In other words, reconnection is a face saving measure that could break the cross-Strait impasse. It is also the road to cross-Strait prosperity.
After World War II, four divided countries emerged. North and South Vietnam fought a bitter civil war, underwent regime change, but has yet to resolve its national difficulties. North and South Korea have arranged meetings between their heads of state. But bureaucratic obstacles still stand in the way of talks. East and West Germany were once separated by a wall. But their abruptly reunification left everyone unprepared. By comparison, Taiwan and the Mainland are blessed. We can take incremental steps to improve and stabilize relations. We may be able to find an "historic solution" that will serve as a model for divided countries around the world. China, which has also been divided into two parts, is different from the three other divided countries. The biggest difference is that we can use "reconnection" as a face saving measure and the road to prosperity.
Taipei and Beijing have a responsibility to make good use this face saving measure and road to prosperity. Especially Beijing. Taiwan has adopted democracy. Any high-level "connection," such as a peace agreement or a confederation, will require Beijing's initiative. Otherwise, allegations of "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan" will fly. But if Beijing were to promote a gradual scheme for "reconnecting," it could bypass partisan political struggles on Taiwan. It could appeal directly to the public on Taiwan. It could offer a proposal, similar to ECFA, that would immediately appeal the public on Taiwan. Taipei and Beijing would have a fait accompli on their hands. Of course, for Beijing to move from "reunification" to "reconnection," is easier said than done. After all, it has already found itself mired in a "commitment trap" for some time.
Both sides of the Taiwan Strait know perfectly well that the past few years constitute a fleeting historical opportunity. If the overall situation undergoes further change, perhaps even "reconnection" will no longer be an option. This would once again plunge the two sides into a "commitment trap." Therefore, we propose that Mainland authorities encourage free discussion of "reconnection" by Mainland think-tanks. This will reduce the impasse. After all, one's ideas determine one's behavior. One's vision determines one's horizons.
「連結論」是兩岸的下台階與青雲路
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.20 04:10 am
本文是《從統一論到連結論》系列社論的收尾，想要強調：「連結論」是兩岸難題的下台階，但同時也是兩岸發展的青雲路。
前文指出，統一是難度最高、風險最大的解決方案。主張「統一」，可能使北京墜入「承諾的陷阱」；亦即可能被這個「過度的承諾」弄得無法下台。因為，就兩岸關係的弔詭與辯證情境而言，主張「統一」不啻就是延長「分裂」；就中共統治當局而言，則統一問題久懸未決，在內部就永遠是一顆鷹鴿反目的炸彈，且將如何向已被「非統一不可」洗腦的大陸人民交代？
舉例來說，蘇聯解體有諸多遠因近因，但當年莫斯科對波羅的海三小國的「過度政策」，使自己墜落「承諾的陷阱」，亦是重大原因；莫斯科當年若能及早降低放鬆對「三小國」的「政策承諾」，並及時「政策創新」，以與其他共和國切割處理，也許三小國不致成為蘇聯瓦解的第一張骨牌。兩岸關係當然大不同於蘇聯與三小國的關係，但由此可見，雙邊關係的「目標定位」是否準確，應當是政策風險的必要考量；因此，必須在陷入「承諾的陷阱」之時有所警覺，考慮「目標創新」。
其實，北京當局早有此種警覺，所謂「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」之類的論述，皆是想要在「統一前」或「未統一」的情勢中，找到化解僵局、穩定兩岸關係的辦法。這就必須在「統一論」之外嘗試「目標創新」，朝往「連結論」的方向去思考，設法創造「現在進行式的一個中國」。
再就台灣方面言，從本報11日發表的「2010兩岸關係年度大調查」顯示，若將這次民調對「台灣前途」的主張簡化為三項，則急獨加緩獨佔31％，永遠維持現狀佔51％，急統加緩統為14％。可見，在未來相當時間內，「統一」並非「民之所欲」；而在同一民調所顯示的民眾對改善及穩定兩岸關係的期待卻顯示，若欲在兩岸之間建立各種「不大幅改變現狀」的「連結」，則相當符合民意。而「連結論」的基本思考即在本報所提出的「杯子理論」（台灣是水，中華民國是杯子；杯在水在，杯破水覆）；相對而言，「統一論」則是以砸破杯子為目標，豈堪想像？
兩岸關係必須「和平發展」（過程論），亦必須「和平解決」（目的論），此即本報《元旦六論》所主張的「從合理的過程到改善之目的」。關於「過程論」與「目的論」之間的互補及替代關係，前文曾舉出四個對子，茲再抄錄如下：
既然很難統一，何妨作好連結／如果作好連結，也就不必統一／只要作好連結，其實好過統一／連結通過考驗，統一也有可能。
這四個對子，即能反映出本文的題旨，那就是：連結論是兩岸難題的下台階，同時也是兩岸發展的青雲路。
二戰後，出現四個分裂國家。南北越打了一場慘烈的內戰，政權更替，但國家困境迄未解決；南北韓即使已進入元首會面的層次，但仍陷劍拔弩張的不可開交之局；東西德則昨天還是隔牆分治，第二天竟已實現統一，來個措手不及。相較而言，兩岸可謂何其幸運，如今能以漸層漸進的步驟改善並穩定關係，因而極可能在四個分裂國家中創造一個足稱「人類歷史典範」的解決方案；而兩岸與其他三個分裂國家的最大不同所在，正是因為我們可以用「連結論」作為下台階及青雲路。
如何善用這個下台階與青雲路，北京的責任應大於台北。因為，台灣的民主體制，對任何高層次的「連結」（如和平協議或邦聯），除非先由北京提出正面的方案，否則必然會因「傾中賣台」吵得不可開交；但如果北京能對漸層漸進的「連結」方案，跳過台灣的政黨鬥爭，直接面對台灣民眾，端出一出手就能說服台灣主流民意的提案（如ECFA），那兩岸就可能有一拍即合的效應。當然，大陸內部若要從「統一論」朝向「連結論」，恐怕也是一個不小的難題，畢竟已陷「承諾的陷阱」久矣。
兩岸皆知，這幾年是稍縱即逝的珍貴歷史機遇期。倘若大局再變，恐怕連「連結論」提出的空間都沒有了，兩岸就又再墜入「承諾的陷阱」之中。所以，我們特別建議，大陸當局應鼓勵內部智囊公開討論「連結論」，為困局鬆綁。畢竟，思路決定出路，眼界決定境界。
Friday, September 17, 2010
Taipei and Beijing: Is "Reconnection" Preferable to "Reunification?"
Taipei and Beijing: Is "Reconnection" Preferable to "Reunification?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 17, 2010
Summary: This newspaper's editorial page compared "reconnection" to "reunification." Our feeling is that the "roof theory," which entails reconnection, is preferable to "reunification." As we pointed out previously, "reunification" is the hardest and riskiest option. Reunification means one side swallowing up the other under a single national title. Is "reunification" really the best solution? Is there a better alternative to "reunification?" Might "reconnection" be preferable to "reunification?" Might the "roof theory" be preferable to "reunification?"
Full Text below:
On the 2nd, the 4th, the 12th of this month, this newspaper's editorial page compared "reconnection" to "reunification." Our feeling is that the "roof theory," which entails reconnection, is preferable to "reunification."
As we pointed out previously, "reunification" is the hardest and riskiest option. Reunification means one side swallowing up the other under a single national title. This raises three questions.
One. How should one reunify? If one wants to reunfy democratically, how long will that take? If one wishes to reunify forcibly, what will be the aftermath? Two. What governance issues will arise post-reunification? After all, the President and the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China are democratically elected under a system of universal suffrage. Even if one succeeds in implementing "one country, two systems," it is unlikely one can turn the clock back. Consider one example. After "reunification" will Taiwan still permit the existence of a pro-independence political party? Allowing their existence is a governance issue. Not allowing their existence is also a governance issue. Three. Reunification is a goal that has remained long unresolved. If one equates "failure to reunify" with not being "one China," then until "one side swallows up the other," "reunification" will paradoxically divide the two sides. Cross-Strait relations will remain strained merely because the two sides have "yet to be reunified." Conversely, if one considers the "roof theory" consistent with the "one China principle," then the two sides can gradual implement an "in progress form of One China," under a "soft roof," "flexible roof," or "hard roof."
Therefore "reunification" is in fact destabilizing the "One China principle." The "roof theory," on the other hand, may be best way to gradually put past controversy to rest and resolve the problem. The distinction between "reunification" and "reconnection" has major relevance for internal politics, both on Taiwan and on the Mainland. If the "roof theory" and an "in progress form of One China" can be adopted, disputes between mainland hawks and doves can be moderated. Beijing will not be forced to deal with government policy wild cards merely because they have yet to achieve "reunification." Taipei meanwhile, may be able to substantially reduce the social divisions created by struggles over reunification vs. independence. Why must one single-mindedly pursue the target of "reunification?" Why not consider the "roof theory" as one's "new target?"
Is there a better alternative to "reunfication?" This is a question both the ruling and opposition parties should seriously contemplate. Taipei and Beijing should not stand in the way of such private sector discussions. They should encourage them. Beijing in particular should do so, and give itself and the Mainland public a break. The Beijing authorities have chained themselves and the Mainland public to a giant post named "reunification." They have made a difficult to fulfill commitment to the Mainland public. They are effectively sitting on a time bomb that may go off at any moment. Prevailing policy is both impractical and dangerous. That is why Beijing ought to consider "new targets."
The management field speaks of "commitment traps." These involve being trapped by one's own "over-commitments." One can neither fulfill one's commitments, nor clean up after reneging on those commitments. One is trapped. For example, a person vows to eat 500 dumplings in a single sitting. Ony two results are possible. One is to eat oneslef into the hospital. The other is knowing one cannot possible fulfill one's promises, and instead "eating one's words." This is a "commitment trap." Setting "new targets" means resetting the number of dumplings at a more reasonable number. Doing so enables one to escape the "commitment trap," instead of either rolling oneself up in a cocoon, or being forced to face public embarrassment.
A majority on Taiwan is "afraid of reunification." The Beijing authorities on the other hand are "afraid reunification might not happen." It is not hard to understand why a majority on Taiwan is "afraid of reunification." But the main reason the Beijing authorities are "afraid reunification may not happen," is their "commitment trap." Therefore if the two sides want "peaceful development," Taipei must allay public "fears of reunification." Beijing meanwhile, must not mire those in power and the Mainland public deeper in a commitment trap of "reunification at all cost." A feasible compromise would be for Taipei and Beijing to realize that the "roof theory" may be preferable to "reunjfication." Why not consider a "new target?"
Speaking of "new targets," just precisely what targets are realistic cross-Strait targets? The two sides should pursue a number of targets. One. They must not deviate from the "One China principle." Two. The Taiwan Region must not become a foreign country and a proxy for foreign powers. Three. The authorities on the two sides must not view each other with hostility. Four. The public on the two sides should look upon each other with goodwill and friendship. Five. The two sides should establish a mutually beneficial win-win relationship. Can such "targets" promote "reunification?" Or, conversely, will a single-minded commitment to "reunification" become a barrier to the pursuit of "real targets?" Will it mire us in a "commitment trap?" Are the two sides pursuing "reunification" as a "pro forma target?" Or are we pursuing the above mentioned "real target?"
Is "reunification" really the best solution? Is there a better alternative to "reunification?" Might "reconnection" be preferable to "reunification?" Might the "roof theory" be preferable to "reunification?"
兩岸解藥：「連結論」好過「統一論」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.17 02:35 am
本報二日、四日、十二日社論探討「連結論」與「統一論」之比較，認為「屋頂理論」（連結）是較「統一」為佳的選擇。
前文指出，「統一」是難度最高及風險最大的選項。「統一」就是「誰吃掉誰」，併吞在一個國號之下；這關係到三個方面的問題：
一、如何統一的問題。若要民主統一，河清何日？若是武力統一，如何善後？二、統一後的治理問題。畢竟中華民國已是直選總統及普選國會的民主政體，即使實施「一國兩制」，恐怕也不應開倒車；在此僅舉一例，「統一」後的台灣還容許存在一個主張台獨的政黨嗎？容許存在是一個治理問題，不容許存在也是一個治理問題。三、統一目標久懸未決的問題。如果認定「不統一」就不是「一個中國」，則在「誰吃掉誰」之前，「統一」就反而成了兩岸分裂的因素，兩岸關係亦因「未統一」而長久陷於緊張；反過來說，倘若認為「屋頂理論」也符合「一個中國原則」，則兩岸在軟屋頂、巧屋頂或硬屋頂（見前文）之下，即可漸層漸進地體現「現在進行式的一個中國」。準此以論，「統一」其實是使得「一個中國原則」不能安頓的因素，而「屋頂理論」則可將之漸層漸進地提早止息爭議，解決問題。此一差異對兩岸各自的內部政治亦有重大關聯，如果能確認「屋頂理論」及「現在進行式的一個中國」，大陸方面的鷹鴿之爭即可緩和，北京當局將不致因長久無法兌現「統一」的政策目標而使政權存有難測因素，而台灣方面亦可望大幅降低統獨鬥爭的社會傷害。然則，為何非要偏執「統一」的目標，又為何不能思考以「屋頂理論」為「目標創新」？
有沒有比「統一」更好的辦法？這是兩岸朝野皆應嚴肅思考的問題，至少兩岸當局不應阻止而應鼓勵這類的民間討論；北京當局尤應如此，給自己鬆綁，也給大陸民間鬆綁。北京政權如今將自己及整個大陸社會綁在「統一」的大柱上，一方面永遠欠大陸人民一個「很難實現／即使實現了也很難收拾」的承諾，另一方面也在統治圈內部永遠埋著一個鷹鴿反目的炸彈，這種政策未免太不實際也相當危險。所以，應當考慮「政策創新」。
管理學上有一種說法叫做「承諾的陷阱」（commitment trap），意思是說一個人被自己的「過度承諾」所陷害；用一個無法實現或實現後無法收拾的承諾，使自己陷於危境。例如，一個人若發誓要一口氣吃五百顆水餃，只會有兩種結果：一種是吃到送醫院；另一種是明知後果而根本不能兌現承諾，只能「食言」。這即是「承諾的陷阱」，所謂「目標創新」，可說就是要將水餃的數量重訂在一個合情合理的標準；使發出承諾者不致墜落「承諾的陷阱」，而作繭自縛或下不了台。
當下的「統一」問題，在台灣民意是「怕統一」，在北京當局則是「怕不統一」。台灣民意「怕統一」，不難理解；而北京當局「怕不統一」，主要原因之一就是已陷「承諾的陷阱」之中。因而，兩岸若要「和平發展」，在台灣須化解「怕統一」的民意憂慮，在北京當局則是不宜使主政者及大陸人民在「非要統一」的「承諾陷阱」中愈陷愈深。折衷之道是：兩岸若認為「屋頂理論」可有優於「統一」之處，何不共策「目標創新」？
談到「目標創新」，應先認定「兩岸目標」的「實質追求」究竟是什麼？兩岸追求的實質目標應當是：一、不要偏離「一個中國原則」。二、台灣不要成為他國對抗中國的外國代理人。三、兩岸政權不相仇視敵對。四、兩岸人民相互親善友愛。五、兩岸互利雙贏。這樣的「目標追求」是否唯有「統一」後始能實現？或者，反過來說，太過偏執於「統一」的「承諾」，有無可能反而成為追求這些「實質目標」的阻障，而陷於「承諾的陷阱」中？我們必須想清楚：兩岸追求的究竟是「統一」的「形式目標」？或是前述的「實質目標」？
「統一」真是最佳方案嗎？有沒有比「統一」更好的辦法？「連結論」會不會較「統一論」更佳？「屋頂理論」會不會比「統一」更好？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 17, 2010
Summary: This newspaper's editorial page compared "reconnection" to "reunification." Our feeling is that the "roof theory," which entails reconnection, is preferable to "reunification." As we pointed out previously, "reunification" is the hardest and riskiest option. Reunification means one side swallowing up the other under a single national title. Is "reunification" really the best solution? Is there a better alternative to "reunification?" Might "reconnection" be preferable to "reunification?" Might the "roof theory" be preferable to "reunification?"
Full Text below:
On the 2nd, the 4th, the 12th of this month, this newspaper's editorial page compared "reconnection" to "reunification." Our feeling is that the "roof theory," which entails reconnection, is preferable to "reunification."
As we pointed out previously, "reunification" is the hardest and riskiest option. Reunification means one side swallowing up the other under a single national title. This raises three questions.
One. How should one reunify? If one wants to reunfy democratically, how long will that take? If one wishes to reunify forcibly, what will be the aftermath? Two. What governance issues will arise post-reunification? After all, the President and the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China are democratically elected under a system of universal suffrage. Even if one succeeds in implementing "one country, two systems," it is unlikely one can turn the clock back. Consider one example. After "reunification" will Taiwan still permit the existence of a pro-independence political party? Allowing their existence is a governance issue. Not allowing their existence is also a governance issue. Three. Reunification is a goal that has remained long unresolved. If one equates "failure to reunify" with not being "one China," then until "one side swallows up the other," "reunification" will paradoxically divide the two sides. Cross-Strait relations will remain strained merely because the two sides have "yet to be reunified." Conversely, if one considers the "roof theory" consistent with the "one China principle," then the two sides can gradual implement an "in progress form of One China," under a "soft roof," "flexible roof," or "hard roof."
Therefore "reunification" is in fact destabilizing the "One China principle." The "roof theory," on the other hand, may be best way to gradually put past controversy to rest and resolve the problem. The distinction between "reunification" and "reconnection" has major relevance for internal politics, both on Taiwan and on the Mainland. If the "roof theory" and an "in progress form of One China" can be adopted, disputes between mainland hawks and doves can be moderated. Beijing will not be forced to deal with government policy wild cards merely because they have yet to achieve "reunification." Taipei meanwhile, may be able to substantially reduce the social divisions created by struggles over reunification vs. independence. Why must one single-mindedly pursue the target of "reunification?" Why not consider the "roof theory" as one's "new target?"
Is there a better alternative to "reunfication?" This is a question both the ruling and opposition parties should seriously contemplate. Taipei and Beijing should not stand in the way of such private sector discussions. They should encourage them. Beijing in particular should do so, and give itself and the Mainland public a break. The Beijing authorities have chained themselves and the Mainland public to a giant post named "reunification." They have made a difficult to fulfill commitment to the Mainland public. They are effectively sitting on a time bomb that may go off at any moment. Prevailing policy is both impractical and dangerous. That is why Beijing ought to consider "new targets."
The management field speaks of "commitment traps." These involve being trapped by one's own "over-commitments." One can neither fulfill one's commitments, nor clean up after reneging on those commitments. One is trapped. For example, a person vows to eat 500 dumplings in a single sitting. Ony two results are possible. One is to eat oneslef into the hospital. The other is knowing one cannot possible fulfill one's promises, and instead "eating one's words." This is a "commitment trap." Setting "new targets" means resetting the number of dumplings at a more reasonable number. Doing so enables one to escape the "commitment trap," instead of either rolling oneself up in a cocoon, or being forced to face public embarrassment.
A majority on Taiwan is "afraid of reunification." The Beijing authorities on the other hand are "afraid reunification might not happen." It is not hard to understand why a majority on Taiwan is "afraid of reunification." But the main reason the Beijing authorities are "afraid reunification may not happen," is their "commitment trap." Therefore if the two sides want "peaceful development," Taipei must allay public "fears of reunification." Beijing meanwhile, must not mire those in power and the Mainland public deeper in a commitment trap of "reunification at all cost." A feasible compromise would be for Taipei and Beijing to realize that the "roof theory" may be preferable to "reunjfication." Why not consider a "new target?"
Speaking of "new targets," just precisely what targets are realistic cross-Strait targets? The two sides should pursue a number of targets. One. They must not deviate from the "One China principle." Two. The Taiwan Region must not become a foreign country and a proxy for foreign powers. Three. The authorities on the two sides must not view each other with hostility. Four. The public on the two sides should look upon each other with goodwill and friendship. Five. The two sides should establish a mutually beneficial win-win relationship. Can such "targets" promote "reunification?" Or, conversely, will a single-minded commitment to "reunification" become a barrier to the pursuit of "real targets?" Will it mire us in a "commitment trap?" Are the two sides pursuing "reunification" as a "pro forma target?" Or are we pursuing the above mentioned "real target?"
Is "reunification" really the best solution? Is there a better alternative to "reunification?" Might "reconnection" be preferable to "reunification?" Might the "roof theory" be preferable to "reunification?"
兩岸解藥：「連結論」好過「統一論」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.17 02:35 am
本報二日、四日、十二日社論探討「連結論」與「統一論」之比較，認為「屋頂理論」（連結）是較「統一」為佳的選擇。
前文指出，「統一」是難度最高及風險最大的選項。「統一」就是「誰吃掉誰」，併吞在一個國號之下；這關係到三個方面的問題：
一、如何統一的問題。若要民主統一，河清何日？若是武力統一，如何善後？二、統一後的治理問題。畢竟中華民國已是直選總統及普選國會的民主政體，即使實施「一國兩制」，恐怕也不應開倒車；在此僅舉一例，「統一」後的台灣還容許存在一個主張台獨的政黨嗎？容許存在是一個治理問題，不容許存在也是一個治理問題。三、統一目標久懸未決的問題。如果認定「不統一」就不是「一個中國」，則在「誰吃掉誰」之前，「統一」就反而成了兩岸分裂的因素，兩岸關係亦因「未統一」而長久陷於緊張；反過來說，倘若認為「屋頂理論」也符合「一個中國原則」，則兩岸在軟屋頂、巧屋頂或硬屋頂（見前文）之下，即可漸層漸進地體現「現在進行式的一個中國」。準此以論，「統一」其實是使得「一個中國原則」不能安頓的因素，而「屋頂理論」則可將之漸層漸進地提早止息爭議，解決問題。此一差異對兩岸各自的內部政治亦有重大關聯，如果能確認「屋頂理論」及「現在進行式的一個中國」，大陸方面的鷹鴿之爭即可緩和，北京當局將不致因長久無法兌現「統一」的政策目標而使政權存有難測因素，而台灣方面亦可望大幅降低統獨鬥爭的社會傷害。然則，為何非要偏執「統一」的目標，又為何不能思考以「屋頂理論」為「目標創新」？
有沒有比「統一」更好的辦法？這是兩岸朝野皆應嚴肅思考的問題，至少兩岸當局不應阻止而應鼓勵這類的民間討論；北京當局尤應如此，給自己鬆綁，也給大陸民間鬆綁。北京政權如今將自己及整個大陸社會綁在「統一」的大柱上，一方面永遠欠大陸人民一個「很難實現／即使實現了也很難收拾」的承諾，另一方面也在統治圈內部永遠埋著一個鷹鴿反目的炸彈，這種政策未免太不實際也相當危險。所以，應當考慮「政策創新」。
管理學上有一種說法叫做「承諾的陷阱」（commitment trap），意思是說一個人被自己的「過度承諾」所陷害；用一個無法實現或實現後無法收拾的承諾，使自己陷於危境。例如，一個人若發誓要一口氣吃五百顆水餃，只會有兩種結果：一種是吃到送醫院；另一種是明知後果而根本不能兌現承諾，只能「食言」。這即是「承諾的陷阱」，所謂「目標創新」，可說就是要將水餃的數量重訂在一個合情合理的標準；使發出承諾者不致墜落「承諾的陷阱」，而作繭自縛或下不了台。
當下的「統一」問題，在台灣民意是「怕統一」，在北京當局則是「怕不統一」。台灣民意「怕統一」，不難理解；而北京當局「怕不統一」，主要原因之一就是已陷「承諾的陷阱」之中。因而，兩岸若要「和平發展」，在台灣須化解「怕統一」的民意憂慮，在北京當局則是不宜使主政者及大陸人民在「非要統一」的「承諾陷阱」中愈陷愈深。折衷之道是：兩岸若認為「屋頂理論」可有優於「統一」之處，何不共策「目標創新」？
談到「目標創新」，應先認定「兩岸目標」的「實質追求」究竟是什麼？兩岸追求的實質目標應當是：一、不要偏離「一個中國原則」。二、台灣不要成為他國對抗中國的外國代理人。三、兩岸政權不相仇視敵對。四、兩岸人民相互親善友愛。五、兩岸互利雙贏。這樣的「目標追求」是否唯有「統一」後始能實現？或者，反過來說，太過偏執於「統一」的「承諾」，有無可能反而成為追求這些「實質目標」的阻障，而陷於「承諾的陷阱」中？我們必須想清楚：兩岸追求的究竟是「統一」的「形式目標」？或是前述的「實質目標」？
「統一」真是最佳方案嗎？有沒有比「統一」更好的辦法？「連結論」會不會較「統一論」更佳？「屋頂理論」會不會比「統一」更好？
Thursday, September 16, 2010
Industrial Policy Favoritism toward the Electronics Industry
Industrial Policy Favoritism toward the Electronics Industry
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 16, 2010
Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey is a wooden academic, a man of few words. During a September 11 meeting with business representatives however, he loudly criticized the government's industrial policy. Wong Chi-huey pointed out that the ROC government's industrial policy too heavily favors electronics. Many companies within the electronics industry are low-margin OEM firms that require precise control over mass production techiques. Therefore the government's one-sided policy is probably detrimental to Taiwan's overall economic development.
For the past thirty years, the electronics industry has been Taiwan's most important economic asset, the goose that laid the golden egg. But this electronic goose is showing its age. It no longer lays as many eggs as it once did. Recently the heads of Foxconn and Compal spoke guardedly about the future of their companies. The electronics industry faces a bottleneck, just as Wong Chi-huey noted.
Government officials are not unaware of the electronic industry's plight. But although the problem is obvious, little has been done to seek a solution. Over the past two years, we have seen few industries adjust their policies.
As early as one year and five months ago, then Premier Liu was making much of the "six new industries." These include biotechnology, green energy, creative culture, tourism, international health care, and high-quality agriculture. After taking over last September, Wu Den-yih added digital convergence and cloud computing. The arguments these two premiers have offered on behalf of these seven or eight industries sound plausible enough. Each of them has long-range plans. Each of them has inter-disciplinary plans. Each plan includes page after page of slide presentations submitted to the Executive Yuan. But plans are plans, and briefings are briefings. For the past year or so little progress has been made. If the old electronics industry reaches a bottleneck, but new industries are merely plans on paper, what happens to Taiwan's economic future? How can anyone who cares about Taiwan's economic development not be concerned?
On economic issues, the Democratic Progressive Party has a clear but relatively straightforward problem. Apart from sporadic cases as the Number Four Nuclear Plant, or the DuPont Plant for Lukang, the DPP is not anti-business as such. The DPP's real Achilles Heel has always been cross-Strait relations. For the past eight years, it was consistently unwilling to confront the Mainland's economic strength and avail itself of the Mainland's economic opportunities. Instead, it excluded Taiwan from the Mainland's economic circle. It forsook the Mainland market, it squandered precious opportunities, it lost the chance to gain an early advantage. But apart from this cross-Strait Achilles Heel, the Democratic Progressive Party, is a fierce and youthful political party. It has fewer systemic shackles than the KMT. Unfortunately this Democratic Progressive Party Achilles Heel is an incurable disease. For years the DPP has remained captive to a tiny contingent of die hard fundamentalists, unable to break free. Even two and a half years in the opposition has not inspired the DPP to reexamine its cross-Strait policies. Beijing is not the only one who sees the DPP as trouble. Most businesses on Taiwan see DPP rule as unconducive to their Mainland operations.
Ma Ying-jeou's Kuomintang of course harbors no hostility toward the Mainland. It feels no obligation to avoid contact with Beijing. But the KMT is one hundred years old. It has accumulated problems and scars far more complex than the DPP's. The KMT is plagued by covert internecine struggle, by complex crony factionalism. It traditionally squelches the ambitions of younger party members. It must mediate between the interests of an Honorary Chairman and an Honorary Vice Chairman. It is plagued by a wide range of illnesses. The causes of these illnesses are difficult to diagnose. Consider some of the new industries. Frankly, the department heads who made many of the original proposals did so under the pressure of deadlines set by the premier. Their content was often mere slogans and abstractions. They contained everything under the sun, but lacked any and all focus. The touched all the necessary bases, but failed to see forest for the trees.
People who understand politics know that to successfully promote a policy, one must have a capable leader who understands what is important and what is not. He must be able to get to the core of the matter. He must be able to follow through, keeping his eye on the ball every step of the way. Allow us to be blunt. Neither of the last two premiers have ever understood the core issues behind the new industries they promoted. Because they never grasped the core issues, they never knew what to keep their eye on, or what direction to take. The aforementioned leaders lacked the ability to implement the policies they promoted. The Presidential Office Financial Advisory Group has been pointing the finger at everyone else. Recently a former premier launched a technology forum. Nominally it will consult with the current Executive Yuan and offer it guidance. Add to this complex, century-old, chronic illnesses and complex entanglements inherent in one party rule, and it is little wonder Wong Chi-huey is concerned about industrial development.
The road ahead for Taiwan industries is going to be rough. In 2008, fears of a heart attack were allayed. But if new policies cannot be implemented, kidney failure looms. Wong Chi-huey said he saw "neither vision nor content" in the government's industrial policy. This is a revealing characterization from the leader of a leading academic institution. Shouldn't the ruling administration wake up? Shouldn't it address the problem?
太偏電子 產業政策困境待解
2010-09-16
中國時報
中央研究院院長翁啟惠在九月十一日與工商代表的一次會議中，一反以往木訥寡言的學者作風，發聲批評當前的產業政策。翁院長指出，台灣的產業政策太偏向電子業，但電子業的許多領域卻又將重心放在利潤微薄的代工，著重量產管理與精密度掌握；這樣的單面向執著恐怕是不利於台灣經濟發展的。
如所周知，過去卅年電子業是台灣經濟發展最重要的金雞母，已經為我們下了許許多多的金蛋。如今，電子雞母年歲已高，下蛋孵蛋的能耐大不如前。由日前鴻海與仁寶負責人對未來前景的保守發言，我們也大致觀察到電子產業所面臨的瓶頸，與翁院長所述情境大致相合。
這樣的產業困境政府官員不是沒有看到，但令人感慨的是，問題雖然明顯呈現，但解決問題的努力卻完全不能劍及履及；至少在過去兩年多，我們實在看不到多少產業布局的進程。
早在一年五個月之前，當時的行政院長劉兆玄就大張旗鼓地提出六大新興產業的口號，包括生技、綠能、文創、觀光、國際醫療、精緻農業。去年九月吳敦義接任之後，又新添了數位匯流與雲端運算等方向。前後兩任行政院長所提七、八種產業方向每一項都言之成理，每一個產業也都提出了願景規畫，跨部會支援方向等計畫，每個計畫也都有數十頁精美投影片提報行政院通過。但規畫歸規畫、簡報歸簡報，一年多下來就是沒什麼進展。如果舊有的電子業瓶頸已現，但新興產業卻又遙不可及，那麼台灣的經濟前景究竟在哪裡呢？關心台灣經濟發展的人，又怎麼能不憂心呢？
就經濟議題而言，民進黨的毛病非常清楚，但也相對單純。除了核四與杜邦等零星個案之外，民進黨未必有什麼嚴重的反商情節，其真正病入膏肓的罩門，就是「兩岸」。民進黨八年來始終不敢面對、正視中國大陸的經濟實力與機會，將台灣的經濟布局自外於中國板塊之外，拋棄了市場、浪費了機會、也流失了布局的契機。除了兩岸罩門之外，民進黨畢竟是生猛年輕，比較沒有來自體制內的其他羈絆與束縛。但遺憾的是，這兩岸罩門的宿疾民進黨就是無力根治，數年來始終在少數基本盤意識形態的裹脅下難以掙脫。即使下野兩年半了，該黨的兩岸論述依然不見起色，不但對岸視民進黨為麻煩，恐怕絕大多數的台灣企業也視該黨執政不利於企業在對岸的布局。
馬英九先生所領導的國民黨當然沒有敵視中國、迴避與對岸接觸的包袱，但百年國民黨所累積的問題與病兆，卻比民進黨要複雜得多。國民黨裡有陰柔的鬥爭文化、有繁複的裙帶派系、有壓抑年輕人出頭的傳統、更有榮譽主席、副主席等一大掛需要「平衡」考量的利益，病兆千絲百結、病因難以清解。就幾大新興產業而言，坦白說，當初提案的部會有不少都是在閣揆壓力下限期提出，其內容有不少是現有部會作為的口號化與抽象化，包山包海卻少有聚焦重點，涵蓋周全卻欠缺直觀視野。
了解政治運作的人都知道，任何一項政策要推動成功，一定要有一位能幹的首長真正的掌握重點、抓到核心，然後一以貫之的「盯」住進度，一步一步地把事情做成。容我們不客氣地指出，兩任閣揆幾大新興產業中有若干項，根本就沒有一位部會首長堪稱抓到產業的核心。既然能力不足抓不到重心，當然就不知道要盯住什麼方向重點。除了前述頗受詬病的部會執行力，總統府裡有財經諮詢小組指東指西，最近又由前任行政院長成立個科技論壇另起爐灶，以諮詢為名對現任行政院下指導棋。再加上種種複雜百年黨政文化的宿疾糾纏，也難怪關心產業發展的翁院長要心急如焚了。
台灣產業前景真是坎坷，二○○八驅走了一個兩岸驚恐心臟病，卻又來了新政策執行無力的腎衰竭。翁院長說，他看不出台灣產業政策的「前瞻性與具體內容」。這樣露骨的描述出自國家最高學術機關首長之口，主政者難道還不該警惕，力求改變局勢嗎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 16, 2010
Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey is a wooden academic, a man of few words. During a September 11 meeting with business representatives however, he loudly criticized the government's industrial policy. Wong Chi-huey pointed out that the ROC government's industrial policy too heavily favors electronics. Many companies within the electronics industry are low-margin OEM firms that require precise control over mass production techiques. Therefore the government's one-sided policy is probably detrimental to Taiwan's overall economic development.
For the past thirty years, the electronics industry has been Taiwan's most important economic asset, the goose that laid the golden egg. But this electronic goose is showing its age. It no longer lays as many eggs as it once did. Recently the heads of Foxconn and Compal spoke guardedly about the future of their companies. The electronics industry faces a bottleneck, just as Wong Chi-huey noted.
Government officials are not unaware of the electronic industry's plight. But although the problem is obvious, little has been done to seek a solution. Over the past two years, we have seen few industries adjust their policies.
As early as one year and five months ago, then Premier Liu was making much of the "six new industries." These include biotechnology, green energy, creative culture, tourism, international health care, and high-quality agriculture. After taking over last September, Wu Den-yih added digital convergence and cloud computing. The arguments these two premiers have offered on behalf of these seven or eight industries sound plausible enough. Each of them has long-range plans. Each of them has inter-disciplinary plans. Each plan includes page after page of slide presentations submitted to the Executive Yuan. But plans are plans, and briefings are briefings. For the past year or so little progress has been made. If the old electronics industry reaches a bottleneck, but new industries are merely plans on paper, what happens to Taiwan's economic future? How can anyone who cares about Taiwan's economic development not be concerned?
On economic issues, the Democratic Progressive Party has a clear but relatively straightforward problem. Apart from sporadic cases as the Number Four Nuclear Plant, or the DuPont Plant for Lukang, the DPP is not anti-business as such. The DPP's real Achilles Heel has always been cross-Strait relations. For the past eight years, it was consistently unwilling to confront the Mainland's economic strength and avail itself of the Mainland's economic opportunities. Instead, it excluded Taiwan from the Mainland's economic circle. It forsook the Mainland market, it squandered precious opportunities, it lost the chance to gain an early advantage. But apart from this cross-Strait Achilles Heel, the Democratic Progressive Party, is a fierce and youthful political party. It has fewer systemic shackles than the KMT. Unfortunately this Democratic Progressive Party Achilles Heel is an incurable disease. For years the DPP has remained captive to a tiny contingent of die hard fundamentalists, unable to break free. Even two and a half years in the opposition has not inspired the DPP to reexamine its cross-Strait policies. Beijing is not the only one who sees the DPP as trouble. Most businesses on Taiwan see DPP rule as unconducive to their Mainland operations.
Ma Ying-jeou's Kuomintang of course harbors no hostility toward the Mainland. It feels no obligation to avoid contact with Beijing. But the KMT is one hundred years old. It has accumulated problems and scars far more complex than the DPP's. The KMT is plagued by covert internecine struggle, by complex crony factionalism. It traditionally squelches the ambitions of younger party members. It must mediate between the interests of an Honorary Chairman and an Honorary Vice Chairman. It is plagued by a wide range of illnesses. The causes of these illnesses are difficult to diagnose. Consider some of the new industries. Frankly, the department heads who made many of the original proposals did so under the pressure of deadlines set by the premier. Their content was often mere slogans and abstractions. They contained everything under the sun, but lacked any and all focus. The touched all the necessary bases, but failed to see forest for the trees.
People who understand politics know that to successfully promote a policy, one must have a capable leader who understands what is important and what is not. He must be able to get to the core of the matter. He must be able to follow through, keeping his eye on the ball every step of the way. Allow us to be blunt. Neither of the last two premiers have ever understood the core issues behind the new industries they promoted. Because they never grasped the core issues, they never knew what to keep their eye on, or what direction to take. The aforementioned leaders lacked the ability to implement the policies they promoted. The Presidential Office Financial Advisory Group has been pointing the finger at everyone else. Recently a former premier launched a technology forum. Nominally it will consult with the current Executive Yuan and offer it guidance. Add to this complex, century-old, chronic illnesses and complex entanglements inherent in one party rule, and it is little wonder Wong Chi-huey is concerned about industrial development.
The road ahead for Taiwan industries is going to be rough. In 2008, fears of a heart attack were allayed. But if new policies cannot be implemented, kidney failure looms. Wong Chi-huey said he saw "neither vision nor content" in the government's industrial policy. This is a revealing characterization from the leader of a leading academic institution. Shouldn't the ruling administration wake up? Shouldn't it address the problem?
太偏電子 產業政策困境待解
2010-09-16
中國時報
中央研究院院長翁啟惠在九月十一日與工商代表的一次會議中，一反以往木訥寡言的學者作風，發聲批評當前的產業政策。翁院長指出，台灣的產業政策太偏向電子業，但電子業的許多領域卻又將重心放在利潤微薄的代工，著重量產管理與精密度掌握；這樣的單面向執著恐怕是不利於台灣經濟發展的。
如所周知，過去卅年電子業是台灣經濟發展最重要的金雞母，已經為我們下了許許多多的金蛋。如今，電子雞母年歲已高，下蛋孵蛋的能耐大不如前。由日前鴻海與仁寶負責人對未來前景的保守發言，我們也大致觀察到電子產業所面臨的瓶頸，與翁院長所述情境大致相合。
這樣的產業困境政府官員不是沒有看到，但令人感慨的是，問題雖然明顯呈現，但解決問題的努力卻完全不能劍及履及；至少在過去兩年多，我們實在看不到多少產業布局的進程。
早在一年五個月之前，當時的行政院長劉兆玄就大張旗鼓地提出六大新興產業的口號，包括生技、綠能、文創、觀光、國際醫療、精緻農業。去年九月吳敦義接任之後，又新添了數位匯流與雲端運算等方向。前後兩任行政院長所提七、八種產業方向每一項都言之成理，每一個產業也都提出了願景規畫，跨部會支援方向等計畫，每個計畫也都有數十頁精美投影片提報行政院通過。但規畫歸規畫、簡報歸簡報，一年多下來就是沒什麼進展。如果舊有的電子業瓶頸已現，但新興產業卻又遙不可及，那麼台灣的經濟前景究竟在哪裡呢？關心台灣經濟發展的人，又怎麼能不憂心呢？
就經濟議題而言，民進黨的毛病非常清楚，但也相對單純。除了核四與杜邦等零星個案之外，民進黨未必有什麼嚴重的反商情節，其真正病入膏肓的罩門，就是「兩岸」。民進黨八年來始終不敢面對、正視中國大陸的經濟實力與機會，將台灣的經濟布局自外於中國板塊之外，拋棄了市場、浪費了機會、也流失了布局的契機。除了兩岸罩門之外，民進黨畢竟是生猛年輕，比較沒有來自體制內的其他羈絆與束縛。但遺憾的是，這兩岸罩門的宿疾民進黨就是無力根治，數年來始終在少數基本盤意識形態的裹脅下難以掙脫。即使下野兩年半了，該黨的兩岸論述依然不見起色，不但對岸視民進黨為麻煩，恐怕絕大多數的台灣企業也視該黨執政不利於企業在對岸的布局。
馬英九先生所領導的國民黨當然沒有敵視中國、迴避與對岸接觸的包袱，但百年國民黨所累積的問題與病兆，卻比民進黨要複雜得多。國民黨裡有陰柔的鬥爭文化、有繁複的裙帶派系、有壓抑年輕人出頭的傳統、更有榮譽主席、副主席等一大掛需要「平衡」考量的利益，病兆千絲百結、病因難以清解。就幾大新興產業而言，坦白說，當初提案的部會有不少都是在閣揆壓力下限期提出，其內容有不少是現有部會作為的口號化與抽象化，包山包海卻少有聚焦重點，涵蓋周全卻欠缺直觀視野。
了解政治運作的人都知道，任何一項政策要推動成功，一定要有一位能幹的首長真正的掌握重點、抓到核心，然後一以貫之的「盯」住進度，一步一步地把事情做成。容我們不客氣地指出，兩任閣揆幾大新興產業中有若干項，根本就沒有一位部會首長堪稱抓到產業的核心。既然能力不足抓不到重心，當然就不知道要盯住什麼方向重點。除了前述頗受詬病的部會執行力，總統府裡有財經諮詢小組指東指西，最近又由前任行政院長成立個科技論壇另起爐灶，以諮詢為名對現任行政院下指導棋。再加上種種複雜百年黨政文化的宿疾糾纏，也難怪關心產業發展的翁院長要心急如焚了。
台灣產業前景真是坎坷，二○○八驅走了一個兩岸驚恐心臟病，卻又來了新政策執行無力的腎衰竭。翁院長說，他看不出台灣產業政策的「前瞻性與具體內容」。這樣露骨的描述出自國家最高學術機關首長之口，主政者難道還不該警惕，力求改變局勢嗎？
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Chopsticks Theory: Interpreting Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations
Chopsticks Theory: Interpreting Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 15, 2010
Last Saturday this newspaper published a public opinion survey on cross-Strait relations in 2010. It found that when asked whether the two sides are friends or foes, most people feel the two sides are warming up to each other. When asked about their position on reunification vs. independence, most want to maintain the status quo (51%), most have a negative impression of the Mainland government (54%), and a minority have a negative impression of Mainlanders in general (47%). A third however, would like to work on the Mainland. Nearly 30% want their children to study on the Mainland. And 63% do not think the Mainland's growing strength constitutes a threat to Taiwan, and are happy to see the Mainland continue growing.
Our survey reached the following conclusions. One. The public is largely content with the cross-Strait status quo. In three out of five major areas, social, political, and economic relations, the public feels cross-Strait relations are "warming." Even in areas such as military relations and diplomatic relations, cross-Strait relations are merely considered slightly "tense or competitive." Military relations were rated at 6.1, only 0.1 above "warming." Diplomatic relations were rated at 6.3, only 0.3 above "warming." Most people consider this the payoff of two years of cross-Strait reconciliation.
Two. The public on Taiwan has clear reservations about cross-Strait political integration. Fifty-one percent proposed "maintaining the status quo in perpetuity." They constitute a majority. Immediate independence plus gradual independence advocates (maintain the status quo for now, declare independence later) constitute 31%. Immediate reunification plus gradual reunification advocates (maintain the status quo for now, reunify later) constitute 14%. Again, pro independence advocates outnumber pro reunification advocates.
These two poll results show that the public on Taiwan approves of cross-Strait reconciliation, but does not advocate "reunification." This however must not be misinterpreted. It does not mean that advocates of Taiwan independence outnumber advocates of reunification. Because in such questionnaires the definition of "Taiwan independence" varies with the respondent. If "Taiwan independence" is defined more precisely, it could change how the respondent answers. Besides, advocates of Taiwan independence may number roughly 30%. But they are unlikely to increase to where they constitute mainstream public opinion and weild mainstream political clout. The 2007 legislative elections and 2008 presidential elections proved that.
These attitudes can be explained by the "chopsticks theory." A majority of the public wants Taiwan and the Mainland to act like a pair of chopsticks, joined at certain spots, but separated at others. This way the two can pick up food. They do not feel the two chopsticks should be either bound together (reunified) or separated (independent). Either way would defeat the purpose of chopsticks.
Twenty years ago, the chief editor of this newspaper met with then AIT Director Nat Bellochi, and mentioned the "chopsticks theory." He suggested that the two sides could be like a pair of chopsticks, neither completely bound together, nor completely kept apart. They should be joined at certain points, but separated at others. During recent political debates on Taiwan, political rhetoric reminscent of the chopsticks theory has emerged. In 1997, the DPP suggested that Taiwan is neither at the center, nor at the periphery. Instead, it is a dynamic, thoughtful, and creative bridge between the land and the sea It is a "bridge between the East and West," and an "interface between sea and land." It is neither at the center, nor at the periphery. This is reminiscent of the "chopsticks model." One might say that "great minds think alike." The current poll reveals that the "chopsticks model," which "wants exchanges but not to be tied down" did not arise yesterday. It has been a long time coming. It will also represent the majority view for the forseeable future.
A majority on Taiwan wants "no [immediate] reunification and no independence, both reunification and independence" and the "chopsticks model." It advocates maintaining the status quo, and proceeding from there. This ought to provide inspiration for all three political parties on both sides of the Strait. For the KMT, the current poll results mean the Ma administration's policy of "no reunification, no independence, and no war" has paid off. But as cross-Strait relations become even closer, some may wish to moderate the pace of reconciliation. This is also a characteristic of the "chopsticks phenomenon," which involves alternately coming together and separating. This may explain why the success of cross-Strait policy may not help the Blue Camp in the five cities elections.
The DPP claims that the 31% "Taiwan independence elements" constitute the Democratic Progressive Party's core support. Perhaps it does. But it is also the DPP's biggest stumbling block. The Democratic Progressive Party can use hard-core pro-independence elements to inflame political passions during election season. But it cannot transform Taiwan independence into the majority perspective on Taiwan. Still less can it maintain stable relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, on a Taiwan independence premise. Taiwan independence is not a viable option for Taiwan's future. The only solution is a return to the "chopsticks theory" and the theory of "a bridge between East and West, an interface between sea and land."
For the CCP, such attitudes on Taiwan are insufficient to justify talk of reunification. But by the same token, such attitudes hardly represent support for Taiwan independence. Therefore when the Beijing authorities attempt to interpret this poll, they should give the last two years of cross-Strait policy a positive evaluation. The public on Taiwan has a somewhat negative opinion of the Mainland, due in part to stereotypes, in part to a lack of understanding, and due in part to a need for improvement by the Mainland. The survey showed that the main factor determining whether cross-Strait relations become friendlier or more hostile is not merely physical issues such as military or political pressure, but psychological issues such as democracy, culture, society, and civilization.
As "peaceful development" proceeds, the "chopsticks theory" is perhaps the one that best conforms to public expectations.
筷子理論：解讀兩岸關係民意大調查
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.15 01:39 am
本報在上周六發表2010兩岸關係年度民意大調查，主要的發現是：在兩岸敵友量表上，大致認為兩岸關係傾向和緩；在民意統獨取向上，以維持現狀為主流（51％）；對大陸政府的印象不好（54％），也對大陸人民的印象不好（47％）；但有三分之一願赴大陸工作，近三成想讓子女赴大陸念書；且六成三不認為大陸國力強盛會危及台灣，並樂見大陸持續發展。
此項大調查所顯示的民意樣態可以解讀為：一、民意對兩岸關係現狀大致滿意。五大領域中，對社會、政治及經貿，皆認為「和緩」；甚至對軍事及外交領域，也認為只是低度的「緊張或競爭」。其中，軍事領域的量表分數是6.1，只差0.1就可降至「和緩」的刻度內；外交則是6.3，若降0.3就成「和緩」。一般認為，這是兩年來兩岸和解政策所反映的正面成果。
二、但是，台灣民意對兩岸若進一步進行政治整合，卻持明顯的保留態度。51％主張「永遠維持現狀」，這應是主流民意。此外，急獨與緩獨（先維持現狀再獨立）相加為31％，急統與緩統（先維持現狀再統一）相加為14％，又可見獨大於統。
以上兩項解讀顯示：台灣民意贊同兩岸和解、和緩，卻不主張「統一」。但是，這也不能過度推論為主張獨立者壓過主張統一者；因為，在此類問卷中，「台獨」一詞只憑受訪者的直覺來定義，若將台獨的準確涵義及因果加入考量，就有可能改變受訪者的看法；再者，縱使仍有三成左右主張台獨者，也難超越主流社會的民意比重及政治勢位。2007立委選舉及2008的總統大選即是顯證。
這樣的民意樣態，可用「筷子理論」來解釋。主流民意所期待的兩岸關係，似乎是希望台灣與大陸像一雙操作中的筷子一樣，有些地方接合，有些地方分開，這樣才能挾菜扒飯；而不認為兩隻筷子應綁在一起（統一），或將兩隻筷子遙分兩處（獨立），畢竟，這樣就都不再有筷子的功能了。
本報主筆於20年前晤見當時的AIT理事主席白樂崎時，提出「筷子理論」；認為兩岸可如一雙筷子一樣，不應完全綁在一起，也不能完全切割，有分有合，始能靈動自如。在台灣的政治辯論中，最近似筷子理論的政治論述，應是民進黨在1997年所提出的：台灣不是中心，也不是邊陲；而是一個有活力、有反省力及有創造力的海陸介面與東西橋樑。所謂「東西橋樑」、「海陸介面」，不是中心、不是邊陲，儼然就是「筷子理論」的圖象；可謂是英雄所見略同。而此次民意調查呈現出「希望交流／不願綁住」的「筷子圖象」，其實亦並非形成於今日，而是長久以來，也將是長久以後的主流民意樣態。
台灣主流民意可視為一種「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」的「筷子圖象」，也就是主張兩岸維持現狀及在現狀上發展。這對兩岸三黨皆應有所啟發。對國民黨言，此次民意調查的結果，可以視為馬政府「不統／不獨／不武」政策已見成效。但是，在兩岸關係愈加緊密時，民間希望放慢放緩的心情可能升高；這也是一種分合輪動的「筷子現象」，或許可以解釋為何兩岸政策成功卻未必有益藍軍的五都選情。
對民進黨言，31％的「獨派」，是民進黨的基本盤；卻也是民進黨轉型蛻變的絆腳石。民進黨可以利用鐵桿獨派來激盪選舉熱情，但不可能使台獨成為台灣的主流民意，更不可能用台獨來處理美中台三邊關係，亦即不可能將台獨當作台灣的生路。回到「東西橋樑／海陸介面」的「筷子理論」，或許才是出路。
對中共而言，這樣的台灣民意，不足與言統一；但這樣的台灣民意也不會贊同台獨。所以北京當局在解讀此項民調時，應當對近兩年來的兩岸政策給予正面評價。至於台灣民意對大陸印象稍差，一部分緣於刻板印象，一部分出於缺乏瞭解，另一部分則大陸確有改善空間。這樣調查也顯示：牽動兩岸關係敵友變化的主要因素，絕不只是一個物理問題（軍事、政治的壓力），而更是一個心理的問題（民主、文化、社會、文明）。
其實，在兩岸的「和平發展期」中，「筷子理論」可能正是最合宜的民意期待。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 15, 2010
Last Saturday this newspaper published a public opinion survey on cross-Strait relations in 2010. It found that when asked whether the two sides are friends or foes, most people feel the two sides are warming up to each other. When asked about their position on reunification vs. independence, most want to maintain the status quo (51%), most have a negative impression of the Mainland government (54%), and a minority have a negative impression of Mainlanders in general (47%). A third however, would like to work on the Mainland. Nearly 30% want their children to study on the Mainland. And 63% do not think the Mainland's growing strength constitutes a threat to Taiwan, and are happy to see the Mainland continue growing.
Our survey reached the following conclusions. One. The public is largely content with the cross-Strait status quo. In three out of five major areas, social, political, and economic relations, the public feels cross-Strait relations are "warming." Even in areas such as military relations and diplomatic relations, cross-Strait relations are merely considered slightly "tense or competitive." Military relations were rated at 6.1, only 0.1 above "warming." Diplomatic relations were rated at 6.3, only 0.3 above "warming." Most people consider this the payoff of two years of cross-Strait reconciliation.
Two. The public on Taiwan has clear reservations about cross-Strait political integration. Fifty-one percent proposed "maintaining the status quo in perpetuity." They constitute a majority. Immediate independence plus gradual independence advocates (maintain the status quo for now, declare independence later) constitute 31%. Immediate reunification plus gradual reunification advocates (maintain the status quo for now, reunify later) constitute 14%. Again, pro independence advocates outnumber pro reunification advocates.
These two poll results show that the public on Taiwan approves of cross-Strait reconciliation, but does not advocate "reunification." This however must not be misinterpreted. It does not mean that advocates of Taiwan independence outnumber advocates of reunification. Because in such questionnaires the definition of "Taiwan independence" varies with the respondent. If "Taiwan independence" is defined more precisely, it could change how the respondent answers. Besides, advocates of Taiwan independence may number roughly 30%. But they are unlikely to increase to where they constitute mainstream public opinion and weild mainstream political clout. The 2007 legislative elections and 2008 presidential elections proved that.
These attitudes can be explained by the "chopsticks theory." A majority of the public wants Taiwan and the Mainland to act like a pair of chopsticks, joined at certain spots, but separated at others. This way the two can pick up food. They do not feel the two chopsticks should be either bound together (reunified) or separated (independent). Either way would defeat the purpose of chopsticks.
Twenty years ago, the chief editor of this newspaper met with then AIT Director Nat Bellochi, and mentioned the "chopsticks theory." He suggested that the two sides could be like a pair of chopsticks, neither completely bound together, nor completely kept apart. They should be joined at certain points, but separated at others. During recent political debates on Taiwan, political rhetoric reminscent of the chopsticks theory has emerged. In 1997, the DPP suggested that Taiwan is neither at the center, nor at the periphery. Instead, it is a dynamic, thoughtful, and creative bridge between the land and the sea It is a "bridge between the East and West," and an "interface between sea and land." It is neither at the center, nor at the periphery. This is reminiscent of the "chopsticks model." One might say that "great minds think alike." The current poll reveals that the "chopsticks model," which "wants exchanges but not to be tied down" did not arise yesterday. It has been a long time coming. It will also represent the majority view for the forseeable future.
A majority on Taiwan wants "no [immediate] reunification and no independence, both reunification and independence" and the "chopsticks model." It advocates maintaining the status quo, and proceeding from there. This ought to provide inspiration for all three political parties on both sides of the Strait. For the KMT, the current poll results mean the Ma administration's policy of "no reunification, no independence, and no war" has paid off. But as cross-Strait relations become even closer, some may wish to moderate the pace of reconciliation. This is also a characteristic of the "chopsticks phenomenon," which involves alternately coming together and separating. This may explain why the success of cross-Strait policy may not help the Blue Camp in the five cities elections.
The DPP claims that the 31% "Taiwan independence elements" constitute the Democratic Progressive Party's core support. Perhaps it does. But it is also the DPP's biggest stumbling block. The Democratic Progressive Party can use hard-core pro-independence elements to inflame political passions during election season. But it cannot transform Taiwan independence into the majority perspective on Taiwan. Still less can it maintain stable relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, on a Taiwan independence premise. Taiwan independence is not a viable option for Taiwan's future. The only solution is a return to the "chopsticks theory" and the theory of "a bridge between East and West, an interface between sea and land."
For the CCP, such attitudes on Taiwan are insufficient to justify talk of reunification. But by the same token, such attitudes hardly represent support for Taiwan independence. Therefore when the Beijing authorities attempt to interpret this poll, they should give the last two years of cross-Strait policy a positive evaluation. The public on Taiwan has a somewhat negative opinion of the Mainland, due in part to stereotypes, in part to a lack of understanding, and due in part to a need for improvement by the Mainland. The survey showed that the main factor determining whether cross-Strait relations become friendlier or more hostile is not merely physical issues such as military or political pressure, but psychological issues such as democracy, culture, society, and civilization.
As "peaceful development" proceeds, the "chopsticks theory" is perhaps the one that best conforms to public expectations.
筷子理論：解讀兩岸關係民意大調查
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.15 01:39 am
本報在上周六發表2010兩岸關係年度民意大調查，主要的發現是：在兩岸敵友量表上，大致認為兩岸關係傾向和緩；在民意統獨取向上，以維持現狀為主流（51％）；對大陸政府的印象不好（54％），也對大陸人民的印象不好（47％）；但有三分之一願赴大陸工作，近三成想讓子女赴大陸念書；且六成三不認為大陸國力強盛會危及台灣，並樂見大陸持續發展。
此項大調查所顯示的民意樣態可以解讀為：一、民意對兩岸關係現狀大致滿意。五大領域中，對社會、政治及經貿，皆認為「和緩」；甚至對軍事及外交領域，也認為只是低度的「緊張或競爭」。其中，軍事領域的量表分數是6.1，只差0.1就可降至「和緩」的刻度內；外交則是6.3，若降0.3就成「和緩」。一般認為，這是兩年來兩岸和解政策所反映的正面成果。
二、但是，台灣民意對兩岸若進一步進行政治整合，卻持明顯的保留態度。51％主張「永遠維持現狀」，這應是主流民意。此外，急獨與緩獨（先維持現狀再獨立）相加為31％，急統與緩統（先維持現狀再統一）相加為14％，又可見獨大於統。
以上兩項解讀顯示：台灣民意贊同兩岸和解、和緩，卻不主張「統一」。但是，這也不能過度推論為主張獨立者壓過主張統一者；因為，在此類問卷中，「台獨」一詞只憑受訪者的直覺來定義，若將台獨的準確涵義及因果加入考量，就有可能改變受訪者的看法；再者，縱使仍有三成左右主張台獨者，也難超越主流社會的民意比重及政治勢位。2007立委選舉及2008的總統大選即是顯證。
這樣的民意樣態，可用「筷子理論」來解釋。主流民意所期待的兩岸關係，似乎是希望台灣與大陸像一雙操作中的筷子一樣，有些地方接合，有些地方分開，這樣才能挾菜扒飯；而不認為兩隻筷子應綁在一起（統一），或將兩隻筷子遙分兩處（獨立），畢竟，這樣就都不再有筷子的功能了。
本報主筆於20年前晤見當時的AIT理事主席白樂崎時，提出「筷子理論」；認為兩岸可如一雙筷子一樣，不應完全綁在一起，也不能完全切割，有分有合，始能靈動自如。在台灣的政治辯論中，最近似筷子理論的政治論述，應是民進黨在1997年所提出的：台灣不是中心，也不是邊陲；而是一個有活力、有反省力及有創造力的海陸介面與東西橋樑。所謂「東西橋樑」、「海陸介面」，不是中心、不是邊陲，儼然就是「筷子理論」的圖象；可謂是英雄所見略同。而此次民意調查呈現出「希望交流／不願綁住」的「筷子圖象」，其實亦並非形成於今日，而是長久以來，也將是長久以後的主流民意樣態。
台灣主流民意可視為一種「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」的「筷子圖象」，也就是主張兩岸維持現狀及在現狀上發展。這對兩岸三黨皆應有所啟發。對國民黨言，此次民意調查的結果，可以視為馬政府「不統／不獨／不武」政策已見成效。但是，在兩岸關係愈加緊密時，民間希望放慢放緩的心情可能升高；這也是一種分合輪動的「筷子現象」，或許可以解釋為何兩岸政策成功卻未必有益藍軍的五都選情。
對民進黨言，31％的「獨派」，是民進黨的基本盤；卻也是民進黨轉型蛻變的絆腳石。民進黨可以利用鐵桿獨派來激盪選舉熱情，但不可能使台獨成為台灣的主流民意，更不可能用台獨來處理美中台三邊關係，亦即不可能將台獨當作台灣的生路。回到「東西橋樑／海陸介面」的「筷子理論」，或許才是出路。
對中共而言，這樣的台灣民意，不足與言統一；但這樣的台灣民意也不會贊同台獨。所以北京當局在解讀此項民調時，應當對近兩年來的兩岸政策給予正面評價。至於台灣民意對大陸印象稍差，一部分緣於刻板印象，一部分出於缺乏瞭解，另一部分則大陸確有改善空間。這樣調查也顯示：牽動兩岸關係敵友變化的主要因素，絕不只是一個物理問題（軍事、政治的壓力），而更是一個心理的問題（民主、文化、社會、文明）。
其實，在兩岸的「和平發展期」中，「筷子理論」可能正是最合宜的民意期待。
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Liu Shih-chung's Revelations and Evasions
Liu Shih-chung's Revelations and Evasions
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 14, 2010
In his new book, American scholar Jeremy J. Stone has revealed that when Chen Shui-bian became president in 2000, he initially hoped to hold talks with Beijing on the basis of the 1992 Consensus and the One China Principle. As Stone put it, former Chen Shui-bian presidential aide Liu Shih-chung's new book, "History's Knots," has proven correct. Liu Shih-chung said that Stone hoped Chen Shui-bian would reach out to Mainland China, that he would become "Taiwan's Nixon," and that Chen Shui-bian did indeed entertain such a notion.
Liu's book describes the situation in 2000, when Chen Shui-bian was first elected president. Chen Shui-bian aspired to be "Taiwan's Nixon." Not only did he announce his "Four Noes Policy," he considered negotiating a "future One China" with Beijing. He echoed the concept of "under one roof" advanced by many people on both sides of the Strait. He expressed a commitment to the possibility of "political integration." But the book concludes that two years after Chen left office, Washington remains haunted by the "Chen Shui-bian nightmare." It is terrified that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, "another Chen Shui-bian" will appear.
Joseph Wu, former Chen administration Mainland Affairs Council Chief and Representative to the United States, wrote a preface to Liu's book. He said that when Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000, Liu Shih-chung became an Ah-Bian disciple and eventually a key staffer and a member of his brain trust. Therefore he was among the very few with a full understanding of Chen Shui-bian's policies and objectives. As a result of his role in the Chen administration, Joseph Wu participated in the pre-publication editing of Liu's book. That is why Liu Shih-chung's revelations and evaluations display an admirable frankness.
Liu's book describes Chen Shui-bian's policy background and evaluates his political moves, including "one country on each side," the "authoring of a new constitution," his "defensive referendum," his response to the "Anti-Secession Law," his "termination of the reunification process" and the "Referendum to join the UN." The book suggests that Chen made it impossible to initiate cross-Strait exchanges. Even worse, Washington viewed Chen Shui-bian with "hostility and mistrust," with "deep anger and resentment," and "lost all confidence in Chen Shui-bian." The result was the Democratic Progressive Party's election debacle in 2008.
Liu's book assesses Chen Shui-bian's policies outside the context of cross-Strait relations. It assesses them on the basis of their impact on Taipei/Washington relations. One might say that Liu's book is the diametric opposite of Chen Shui-bian's policies, which manipulated cross-Strait and Taipei/Washington relations entirely out of domestic election considerations. The blurb includes the following passages. "(Washington) took exception to (Chen Shui-bian's) habit of engaging only in domestic election moves, utterly ignoring their impact on cross-Strait relations." "The leader (Chen Shui-bian) ignored the need for consistency between election rhetoric and official statements. This made it difficult for Washington to trust Chen Shui-bian." The final result was that Stone's dreams of a "Taiwan's Nixon" was tranformed into a "Chen Shui-bian nightmare."
The book leaves the impression that Taiwan independence is just another election ploy incompatible with national survival and three-way coopetition between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. This is the unintended implication of Liu's book. Liu's book states that the main reason the Chen Shui-bian regime failed was Chen Shui-bian's obstinate, hermetic, decision-making process, or his penchant for exploiting internal contradictions within the US bureaucracy. But these were merely tactical level problems. The real problem was at the strategic level. Eight agonizing years under the Chen Shui-bian regime confirmed that a Taiwan independence strategy is incompatible with a stable three-way Washington, Beijing, Taipei relationship. Chen Shui-bian knew this. As Liu's book notes, Ah-Bian clearly knew such a strategy was infeasible. He merely hoped to use Taiwan independence to divide the public for election advantage. He was utterly indifferent to the international repercussions on the three-way Washington, Beijing, Taipei relationship. He was only too happy to provoke the three parties for political gain. This is the most important revelation in Liu's book. It is also the point Liu Shih-chung has struggled hardest to conceal. The so-called "Chen Shui-bian nightmare" is really the "Taiwan independence nightmare."
According to Liu Shih-chung, when Chen Shui-bian is being good, he submits his inaugural speech to Washington for advance review. He consults personally with Washington on how to hold a referendum. But when he being bad, he responds to Washington's "punishment and retaliation" by embarking on a "Voyage to Nowhere" and "virtually becomes an enemy of the United States." When Chen Shui-bian is clear-headed, he favors "political integration." But when he goes off on a tangent, he announces "Four Demands and One No," (we demand independence, we demand the rectification of names, we demand a new constitution, we demand development, we have no left vs. right conflict, only reunification vs. independence conflict.) Does Chen bear the slightest resemblance to a president? To the leader of a nation? Or does he more closely resemble a drunk driver?
Liu Shih-chung helped Chen Shui-bian hide the truth. For example, when Chen Shui-bian announced his "Four Demands and One No," and "Referendum for UN membership," Liu Shih-chung spun it as Chen's aspirations for a political legacy after leaving office. He distorted the truth to protect Ah-Bian. The simple fact is that when Chen's corruption was exposed, he swiftly racheted up his Taiwan independence rhetoric. His goal was to lay claim to spiritual leadership of the Taiwan independence movement, thereby evading criminal prosecution once he stepped down from office. The March 19 Shooting Incident further undermined the legitimacy of the Chen regime. This led to Chen's subsequent desperation and brinksmanship. Liu's book glosses over this as well.
Liu's book aspires to be a reference source for future Democratic Progressive Party rulers. But it treats a national tragedy as if it were Chen Shui-bian's personal failure. It covers up the real reason for Chen's failure, the fact that Taiwan independence is utterly infeasible. For example, Liu's book implies that Chen Shui-bian's "Five Noes" left himself bound hand and foot. But given cross-Strait developments, even assuming the Democratic Progressive Party returned to power, what else could it do but reaffirm the "Five Noes?" What policy other than the "Five Noes" could allow the three way relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei to continue?
Chen Shui-bian was mistaken. Liu's book makes this crystal clear. The Taiwan independence movement was even more mistaken. Liu's book attempts to tap dance around this fact. But as long as the Taiwan independence movement exists, as long as the Democratic Progressive Party rules, they will produce another desperado in the pattern of Chen Shui-bian.
劉世忠的坦率與隱諱
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.14
美國學者史東（Jeremy J. Stone）在新書揭露，陳水扁在2000年就任總統之初，曾同意在「九二共識」的基礎上，以「一個中國」的原則與北京進行會談。這段敘述，在扁政府前總統府幕僚劉世忠的新著《歷史的糾結》（以下稱《劉著》）中獲得證實。劉世忠說：史東當時期許陳水扁打開中國大門，成為「台灣的尼克森」，而陳水扁確懷此一夢想。
《劉著》描寫2000年陳水扁首次當選總統時的情況：心懷成為「台灣的尼克森」的阿扁，不但宣示「四不一沒有」，且又不排除與對岸共同討論「未來一個中國」的問題，再又呼應兩岸「同處一個屋簷下」的說法，承諾「政治統合」的可能性。然而，到了此書收尾時的評論則是：（陳水扁）下台兩年多，華府卻普遍仍對「陳水扁夢魘」有揮之不去的恐慌，深怕民進黨重新執政會出現「第二個陳水扁」。
在扁政府曾任陸委會主委及駐美代表的吳釗燮為《劉著》作序稱：劉世忠自2000年陳水扁當選總統之後，就跟隨阿扁，後來成為「重要幕僚與文膽」，因此對阿扁的政策談話內容與目標，是極少數能有全盤掌握者……。再由於以吳釗燮的角色身分，曾在《劉著》付梓前參與校訂；因此，劉世忠這本書所揭露的史實與對這些史實所作的評價，其心態之坦率令人敬佩。
《劉著》的內容，主要在敘述及評價陳水扁對「一邊一國」、「催生新憲」、「防禦性公投」、「反分裂國家法」、「終統」及「入聯公投」等的決策背景及操作手法。全書給人的印象是：非但最後鬧到兩岸關係不可開交，美國對陳水扁也「敵視與不信任」、「深感憤怒與不滿」、「對陳水扁的信任蕩然無存」，在國內則以民進黨2008年大敗收場。
《劉著》是從台灣外部的兩岸關係及台美關係效應，來評價陳水扁的政策；此於陳水扁完全從國內選舉的考量來操作兩岸及台美關係，堪謂完全背道而馳。簡錄幾段內文：「（華府）對其（陳水扁）只顧國內選舉操作而罔顧兩岸可能風險的作法不予苟同。」「領導者（陳水扁）忽略其『競選語言』與『官方語言』的一致性，……讓美方對陳水扁略為恢復的信任再度受到損失。」最後的結果是：史東所期許的「台灣的尼克森」，變成了「陳水扁夢魘」。
全書給人的印象是：台獨只是操作選舉的題材，卻不是能夠用在美中台三邊競合關係的國家生存戰略。這也是《劉著》在坦率之中的最大隱諱。《劉著》認為，陳水扁失政的主因，在於陳水扁的剛愎、決策環境封閉，或不當利用美國官僚的內部矛盾等。但是，這些尚皆只是「戰術」或「戰鬥」層次的問題，真正的要害是在「戰略」層面。經歷扁政府的八年折騰，已經證實「台獨戰略」絕無可能維持美中台三邊關係的平衡；其實，陳水扁不是不知這個道理（《劉著》稱：扁很清楚其可行性微乎其微），但他只是要用台獨來撕裂社會、操作選舉而已，完全不問美中台三邊關係的國際效應，甚至是以挑釁三邊關係來挑激選情。這其實才是《劉著》最重要的揭露，卻竟也成了劉世忠筆下最大的隱諱。所謂「陳水扁夢魘」，其實就是「台獨夢魘」。
劉世忠筆下的陳水扁，馴順時，把就職演說稿呈美國御覽，更與美國來使面商公投方案；叛逆時，面對美國的「懲罰與報復」，演出迷航，與美國「幾近反目成仇」。清醒時，主張「政治統合」；偏激時，宣示「四要一沒有」（台灣要獨立／要正名／要新憲／要發展／沒有左右問題，只有統獨問題）。這豈是一個為國家掌舵的總統？實儼如一個酒駕的醉漢！
劉世忠亦為陳水扁隱。例如，陳水扁到宣布「四要一沒有」及「入聯公投」的階段，劉世忠仍指他是為了在卸任後留下政治遺產（Legacy），這是曲筆護扁；然事實卻是，當時陳水扁貪案大爆，他升高台獨操作，其實是要佔據台獨教主的地位，作為他卸任後對抗司法的資本。其次，三一九槍擊案對陳水扁執政正當性的衝擊，導致他後來的走投無路、鋌而走險，在《劉著》也是一筆帶過而已。
《劉著》自期能作為民進黨未來再執政時的參考。但此書似將整場國家悲劇視為陳水扁一人的失敗，卻隱諱了真正的敗因是在台獨戰略的絕對不可採行。例如：《劉著》暗示，陳水扁誤用「四不一沒有」綁住了自己；但是，以目前兩岸發展趨勢觀，民進黨倘再執政，若不說出比「四不一沒有」更確切的美中台三邊保證，台灣能走得下去嗎？
陳水扁錯了，這是《劉著》的坦率；台獨更是大錯，這卻是《劉著》的隱諱。只要台獨還在，民進黨若執政，就還一定會有另一個走投無路的「陳水扁」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 14, 2010
In his new book, American scholar Jeremy J. Stone has revealed that when Chen Shui-bian became president in 2000, he initially hoped to hold talks with Beijing on the basis of the 1992 Consensus and the One China Principle. As Stone put it, former Chen Shui-bian presidential aide Liu Shih-chung's new book, "History's Knots," has proven correct. Liu Shih-chung said that Stone hoped Chen Shui-bian would reach out to Mainland China, that he would become "Taiwan's Nixon," and that Chen Shui-bian did indeed entertain such a notion.
Liu's book describes the situation in 2000, when Chen Shui-bian was first elected president. Chen Shui-bian aspired to be "Taiwan's Nixon." Not only did he announce his "Four Noes Policy," he considered negotiating a "future One China" with Beijing. He echoed the concept of "under one roof" advanced by many people on both sides of the Strait. He expressed a commitment to the possibility of "political integration." But the book concludes that two years after Chen left office, Washington remains haunted by the "Chen Shui-bian nightmare." It is terrified that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, "another Chen Shui-bian" will appear.
Joseph Wu, former Chen administration Mainland Affairs Council Chief and Representative to the United States, wrote a preface to Liu's book. He said that when Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000, Liu Shih-chung became an Ah-Bian disciple and eventually a key staffer and a member of his brain trust. Therefore he was among the very few with a full understanding of Chen Shui-bian's policies and objectives. As a result of his role in the Chen administration, Joseph Wu participated in the pre-publication editing of Liu's book. That is why Liu Shih-chung's revelations and evaluations display an admirable frankness.
Liu's book describes Chen Shui-bian's policy background and evaluates his political moves, including "one country on each side," the "authoring of a new constitution," his "defensive referendum," his response to the "Anti-Secession Law," his "termination of the reunification process" and the "Referendum to join the UN." The book suggests that Chen made it impossible to initiate cross-Strait exchanges. Even worse, Washington viewed Chen Shui-bian with "hostility and mistrust," with "deep anger and resentment," and "lost all confidence in Chen Shui-bian." The result was the Democratic Progressive Party's election debacle in 2008.
Liu's book assesses Chen Shui-bian's policies outside the context of cross-Strait relations. It assesses them on the basis of their impact on Taipei/Washington relations. One might say that Liu's book is the diametric opposite of Chen Shui-bian's policies, which manipulated cross-Strait and Taipei/Washington relations entirely out of domestic election considerations. The blurb includes the following passages. "(Washington) took exception to (Chen Shui-bian's) habit of engaging only in domestic election moves, utterly ignoring their impact on cross-Strait relations." "The leader (Chen Shui-bian) ignored the need for consistency between election rhetoric and official statements. This made it difficult for Washington to trust Chen Shui-bian." The final result was that Stone's dreams of a "Taiwan's Nixon" was tranformed into a "Chen Shui-bian nightmare."
The book leaves the impression that Taiwan independence is just another election ploy incompatible with national survival and three-way coopetition between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. This is the unintended implication of Liu's book. Liu's book states that the main reason the Chen Shui-bian regime failed was Chen Shui-bian's obstinate, hermetic, decision-making process, or his penchant for exploiting internal contradictions within the US bureaucracy. But these were merely tactical level problems. The real problem was at the strategic level. Eight agonizing years under the Chen Shui-bian regime confirmed that a Taiwan independence strategy is incompatible with a stable three-way Washington, Beijing, Taipei relationship. Chen Shui-bian knew this. As Liu's book notes, Ah-Bian clearly knew such a strategy was infeasible. He merely hoped to use Taiwan independence to divide the public for election advantage. He was utterly indifferent to the international repercussions on the three-way Washington, Beijing, Taipei relationship. He was only too happy to provoke the three parties for political gain. This is the most important revelation in Liu's book. It is also the point Liu Shih-chung has struggled hardest to conceal. The so-called "Chen Shui-bian nightmare" is really the "Taiwan independence nightmare."
According to Liu Shih-chung, when Chen Shui-bian is being good, he submits his inaugural speech to Washington for advance review. He consults personally with Washington on how to hold a referendum. But when he being bad, he responds to Washington's "punishment and retaliation" by embarking on a "Voyage to Nowhere" and "virtually becomes an enemy of the United States." When Chen Shui-bian is clear-headed, he favors "political integration." But when he goes off on a tangent, he announces "Four Demands and One No," (we demand independence, we demand the rectification of names, we demand a new constitution, we demand development, we have no left vs. right conflict, only reunification vs. independence conflict.) Does Chen bear the slightest resemblance to a president? To the leader of a nation? Or does he more closely resemble a drunk driver?
Liu Shih-chung helped Chen Shui-bian hide the truth. For example, when Chen Shui-bian announced his "Four Demands and One No," and "Referendum for UN membership," Liu Shih-chung spun it as Chen's aspirations for a political legacy after leaving office. He distorted the truth to protect Ah-Bian. The simple fact is that when Chen's corruption was exposed, he swiftly racheted up his Taiwan independence rhetoric. His goal was to lay claim to spiritual leadership of the Taiwan independence movement, thereby evading criminal prosecution once he stepped down from office. The March 19 Shooting Incident further undermined the legitimacy of the Chen regime. This led to Chen's subsequent desperation and brinksmanship. Liu's book glosses over this as well.
Liu's book aspires to be a reference source for future Democratic Progressive Party rulers. But it treats a national tragedy as if it were Chen Shui-bian's personal failure. It covers up the real reason for Chen's failure, the fact that Taiwan independence is utterly infeasible. For example, Liu's book implies that Chen Shui-bian's "Five Noes" left himself bound hand and foot. But given cross-Strait developments, even assuming the Democratic Progressive Party returned to power, what else could it do but reaffirm the "Five Noes?" What policy other than the "Five Noes" could allow the three way relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei to continue?
Chen Shui-bian was mistaken. Liu's book makes this crystal clear. The Taiwan independence movement was even more mistaken. Liu's book attempts to tap dance around this fact. But as long as the Taiwan independence movement exists, as long as the Democratic Progressive Party rules, they will produce another desperado in the pattern of Chen Shui-bian.
劉世忠的坦率與隱諱
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.14
美國學者史東（Jeremy J. Stone）在新書揭露，陳水扁在2000年就任總統之初，曾同意在「九二共識」的基礎上，以「一個中國」的原則與北京進行會談。這段敘述，在扁政府前總統府幕僚劉世忠的新著《歷史的糾結》（以下稱《劉著》）中獲得證實。劉世忠說：史東當時期許陳水扁打開中國大門，成為「台灣的尼克森」，而陳水扁確懷此一夢想。
《劉著》描寫2000年陳水扁首次當選總統時的情況：心懷成為「台灣的尼克森」的阿扁，不但宣示「四不一沒有」，且又不排除與對岸共同討論「未來一個中國」的問題，再又呼應兩岸「同處一個屋簷下」的說法，承諾「政治統合」的可能性。然而，到了此書收尾時的評論則是：（陳水扁）下台兩年多，華府卻普遍仍對「陳水扁夢魘」有揮之不去的恐慌，深怕民進黨重新執政會出現「第二個陳水扁」。
在扁政府曾任陸委會主委及駐美代表的吳釗燮為《劉著》作序稱：劉世忠自2000年陳水扁當選總統之後，就跟隨阿扁，後來成為「重要幕僚與文膽」，因此對阿扁的政策談話內容與目標，是極少數能有全盤掌握者……。再由於以吳釗燮的角色身分，曾在《劉著》付梓前參與校訂；因此，劉世忠這本書所揭露的史實與對這些史實所作的評價，其心態之坦率令人敬佩。
《劉著》的內容，主要在敘述及評價陳水扁對「一邊一國」、「催生新憲」、「防禦性公投」、「反分裂國家法」、「終統」及「入聯公投」等的決策背景及操作手法。全書給人的印象是：非但最後鬧到兩岸關係不可開交，美國對陳水扁也「敵視與不信任」、「深感憤怒與不滿」、「對陳水扁的信任蕩然無存」，在國內則以民進黨2008年大敗收場。
《劉著》是從台灣外部的兩岸關係及台美關係效應，來評價陳水扁的政策；此於陳水扁完全從國內選舉的考量來操作兩岸及台美關係，堪謂完全背道而馳。簡錄幾段內文：「（華府）對其（陳水扁）只顧國內選舉操作而罔顧兩岸可能風險的作法不予苟同。」「領導者（陳水扁）忽略其『競選語言』與『官方語言』的一致性，……讓美方對陳水扁略為恢復的信任再度受到損失。」最後的結果是：史東所期許的「台灣的尼克森」，變成了「陳水扁夢魘」。
全書給人的印象是：台獨只是操作選舉的題材，卻不是能夠用在美中台三邊競合關係的國家生存戰略。這也是《劉著》在坦率之中的最大隱諱。《劉著》認為，陳水扁失政的主因，在於陳水扁的剛愎、決策環境封閉，或不當利用美國官僚的內部矛盾等。但是，這些尚皆只是「戰術」或「戰鬥」層次的問題，真正的要害是在「戰略」層面。經歷扁政府的八年折騰，已經證實「台獨戰略」絕無可能維持美中台三邊關係的平衡；其實，陳水扁不是不知這個道理（《劉著》稱：扁很清楚其可行性微乎其微），但他只是要用台獨來撕裂社會、操作選舉而已，完全不問美中台三邊關係的國際效應，甚至是以挑釁三邊關係來挑激選情。這其實才是《劉著》最重要的揭露，卻竟也成了劉世忠筆下最大的隱諱。所謂「陳水扁夢魘」，其實就是「台獨夢魘」。
劉世忠筆下的陳水扁，馴順時，把就職演說稿呈美國御覽，更與美國來使面商公投方案；叛逆時，面對美國的「懲罰與報復」，演出迷航，與美國「幾近反目成仇」。清醒時，主張「政治統合」；偏激時，宣示「四要一沒有」（台灣要獨立／要正名／要新憲／要發展／沒有左右問題，只有統獨問題）。這豈是一個為國家掌舵的總統？實儼如一個酒駕的醉漢！
劉世忠亦為陳水扁隱。例如，陳水扁到宣布「四要一沒有」及「入聯公投」的階段，劉世忠仍指他是為了在卸任後留下政治遺產（Legacy），這是曲筆護扁；然事實卻是，當時陳水扁貪案大爆，他升高台獨操作，其實是要佔據台獨教主的地位，作為他卸任後對抗司法的資本。其次，三一九槍擊案對陳水扁執政正當性的衝擊，導致他後來的走投無路、鋌而走險，在《劉著》也是一筆帶過而已。
《劉著》自期能作為民進黨未來再執政時的參考。但此書似將整場國家悲劇視為陳水扁一人的失敗，卻隱諱了真正的敗因是在台獨戰略的絕對不可採行。例如：《劉著》暗示，陳水扁誤用「四不一沒有」綁住了自己；但是，以目前兩岸發展趨勢觀，民進黨倘再執政，若不說出比「四不一沒有」更確切的美中台三邊保證，台灣能走得下去嗎？
陳水扁錯了，這是《劉著》的坦率；台獨更是大錯，這卻是《劉著》的隱諱。只要台獨還在，民進黨若執政，就還一定會有另一個走投無路的「陳水扁」。
Monday, September 13, 2010
Singapore is Small and Beautiful. Taiwan Can Be Too
Singapore is Small and Beautiful. Taiwan Can Be Too
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 13, 2010
This newspaper recently addressed the issue of Singapore, and interviewed Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. We reported on the economic cooperation agreement between Taipei and Singapore. We also published an in-depth investigation of Singapore's path to economic success. Singapore and Taiwan are quite similar in terms of innate advantages. But Singapore has been more courageous in confronting real world difficulties and international challenges. It has aggressively transformed deficits into assets. In many ways, Taiwan would do well to emulate Singapore.
Singapore is a small country, which like the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China, lacks natural resources. Yet it has been an amazing success story, one that nations with far larger populations and far greater resources look on with envy. In terms of national competitiveness and cleanliness, it is invariably ranked near the top. The World Economic Forum released its Global Competitiveness report on the 9th of this month. Singapore came in third. Singapore's success is due to outstanding leadership, but also because it has the courage to confront challenges, to seize opportunities, to make judgements, to act decisively, to follow through, and to look to the future.
Singapore is a tiny island nation. Drive 20 minutes northward, and one finds oneself in Malaysia. Indonesia is visible with the naked eye to the south. Singapore is virtually defenseless and without natural barriers. Singapore is highly exposed. Yet it is utterly fearless and has not the slightest desire to close itself off. Instead, it courageously welcomes the challenges posed by the outside world. It makes superb use of its location as a geographic hub. It has turned itself into a zero-tariff free port. As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said, "To develop, we must develop outward. We must make use of the economics of scale. We must transcend the limits imposed on our nation by its size." Singapore may be small, but it is courageous. Its positive and pragmatic strategies have transformed it into "the world's Singapore." So far the results have been outstanding.
And so it is with Mainland China's rapid rise in recent years. Singapore also took the initiative to hitch its wagon to Mainland China's star. It has established close economic and trade relations with Mainland China. It is also taking advantage of its experience with economic development to cooperate with Mainland China in developing such projects as the Suzhou Industrial Park and Tianjin Eco-city. Taipei and Singapore are about to sign an economic cooperation agreement. This will further contribute to trilateral trade between Singapore, Taipei, and Beijing. It will open yet another channel for Singapore's economic growth.
In recent years, Singapore has been plagued by a shrinking and aging population, It has substantially increased the number of foreign workers, permanent residents and immigrants. It must make up for insufficient human resources and human labor. in order to maintain its economic vitality and competitiveness. Singapore's current population of 4.8 million includes over one million foreign workers and permanent residents. The ratio of locals to outsiders is nearly three to one.
Taiwan confronts a far less numerous foreign labor and immigrant population. Yet we often hear shrill demands for their exclusion. Singaporeans may complain about overpopulation, skyrocketing real estate prices, and about being elbowed out of jobs and educational opportunities. But their acceptance of immigrants as the driving force behind their economic policy remains unchanged. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has urged people to accept immigrants with open hearts, and to learn how to cope with international competition even earlier, in school. Actually, despite fierce international competition, Singapore has never pullled back merely to protect itself. Instead, it has bravely charged into battle. It has forced itself to grow and to leapfrog the competition. For example, it adopted an open skies policy. Singapore Airlines was required to complete on the basis of its own strength, Singapore Airlines is now one of the best airlines in the world. Singapore's basic philosophy is that government should take care of the people, but not over-protect them. Otherwise, the people and the country will lose their competitiveness. People on Taiwan ought to think long and hard about Lee's insight.
Another example is the use of water resources. Singapore has long been short of water. It must purchase it from Malaysia. This puts the lifeblood of its economic system in someone else's hands. But Singapore overcame all difficulties to develop advanced water harvesting and waste water recycling and purification technology. This, along with desalination technology, has made it self-sufficient in water use. It has even made Singapore an exporter of water resources technology. Singapore confronted its disadvantages and overcame them. It transformed weaknesses into strengths. Singapore's success story teaches us that any country that makes the right choices and has an unyielding will, can create its own growth.
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in an interview with this newspaper, also offered some views on Singapore/Taipei economic cooperation and cross-Strait relations. He pointed out that economic cooperation and free trade are advantageous for many countries. Singapore has a large network of partners. If one cooperates with Singapore, other Asian countries may well consider following suit. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said he also looked forward to Taipei and Beijing signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). He said that although it is an economic agreement, the long-term narrowing of the cross-Strait gap is part of a larger historical current. It is the right thing to do. ECFA will have a postive impact on the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's comments were pertinent and pragmatic. They were further evidence that the international community looks forward to improved cross-Strait relations.
Taiwan and Singapore have similarities and differences. Conditions for Taiwan and Singapore are also different. But Singapore's experience of successfully confronting its challenges, its ability to make forward-looking and pragmatic decisions, and its ability to effectively execute those decisions, are precisely what Taiwan needs to learn.
新加坡小而美 台灣不鎖國也做得到
2010-09-13
中國時報
本報最近推出新加坡專題，並專訪新加坡總理李顯龍，除了對台星經濟合作協議進行報導之外，也對新加坡發展成功之道深入探討。新加坡的先天條件與處境和台灣相當類似，但在現實困境與國際挑戰下，新加坡卻更加勇於面對，積極化逆勢為優勢，在許多方面都值得台灣學習。
和台灣一樣，新加坡也是個缺乏天然資源的小國，卻能打造出驚人成就，令世界許多人口、資源遠超過新加坡的國家望塵莫及，在國家競爭力與清廉排行上總是名列前茅，世界經濟論壇九日發布的全球競爭力報告裡，新加坡更是蟬聯第三。綜觀新加坡的成功之道，除了優秀的領導階層外，更因為勇於面對挑戰、精準掌握時機、周詳決策、明快行動、認真貫徹，以及能以前瞻眼光長遠布局。
新加坡這個迷你島國，往北開車廿分鐘就到馬來西亞，朝南可以看見印尼，可以說毫無屏障保護。但如此極度暴露的新加坡，卻沒有絲毫畏縮閉鎖，反而勇敢迎向外在世界的挑戰，善用地理樞紐位置，把自己經營成一個零關稅的自由港。誠如李顯龍總理所說的，「要發展，就必須向外發展；要有經濟規模，就要超越我們國家局限。」新加坡雖然小，卻以勇敢、積極且務實的策略，把自己經營成「世界的新加坡」，至今成果斐然。
同樣的，面對中國近年來迅速崛起，新加坡也主動向前，全力抓住中國成長的勢頭。除了更緊密的經貿交流外，新加坡也以本身卓越的發展經驗，與中國進行蘇州工業園區、天津生態城等合作案。如今台星即將洽簽經濟合作協議，將進一步促成星、台、中貿易三角的成形，為新加坡的經貿發展又開通了一個管道。
近年來新加坡面臨人口萎縮及老化問題，開始大幅增加外來工作者、永久居民（ＰＲ）及移民，以彌補人才與勞動力之不足，維持經濟活力與競爭力。現在新加坡的四百八十餘萬人口裡，外來工作者及永久居民就佔了一百多萬，幾乎三個本地人就要面對一個外來人。
台灣面對的外勞與移民的人口比例遠低於此，卻常有反彈排斥之聲，相較之下，新加坡雖然也出現對人口擁擠、房市飆漲、排擠工作與教育機會的怨言，但接納移民以為經濟注入動力的政策方向並沒有改變。新加坡總理李顯龍更呼籲人民要以包容之心接納移民，並且更早從學校裡就學習去面對國際競爭。事實上，面對激烈的國際競爭，新加坡從來不會畏縮只求自保，而是勇敢迎上前去投入搏鬥，逼自己成長、超越對手。例如採取開放天空政策，要求新航必須靠自己的實力在競爭中脫穎而出，如今新航果然是舉世數一數二的航空公司。新加坡的基本理念是，政府要照顧人民，但不能過度保護人民，否則人民和國家都會失去競爭力，這點很值得台灣深思。
另一個例子是水資源的利用，新加坡原本缺水，必須向馬來西亞購買，以致於民生命脈制於他手。但新加坡努力克服困境，發展出完善先進的集水及回收廢水淨化技術，加上海水淡化技術，不但已經能在用水上自給自足，還成為水資源技術的輸出國。面對缺點、努力克服、化弱項為強項，新加坡的成功經驗，說明一個國家如果有正確決策及不服輸的意志，可以如何創造出自己的成長。
新加坡總理李顯龍在接受本報專訪時，對台星經濟合作協議及兩岸關係也有所分析。他指出，經濟合作、自由貿易對許多國家都有很多好處，新加坡是個體系性的合作對象，如果與新加坡有合作，其他亞洲國家也會慎重考慮是不是應該跟進。李顯龍總理並表示樂見兩岸簽署《經濟合作架構協議》（ＥＣＦＡ），他認為雖然它是經濟協議，但長期會把兩岸關係拉近，這是大勢所趨，也是應該做的事情，而ＥＣＦＡ將會對整個亞太區域產生正面的影響。李顯龍總理的評論中肯而務實，說明了國際社會對兩岸關係的期待。
台星之間有同有異，台灣有些狀況也和新加坡不同，但觀察新加坡的成功經驗，可以發現它勇敢面對挑戰、前瞻務實的決策、貫徹有效的執行力，應該正是台灣最需要學習的。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 13, 2010
This newspaper recently addressed the issue of Singapore, and interviewed Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. We reported on the economic cooperation agreement between Taipei and Singapore. We also published an in-depth investigation of Singapore's path to economic success. Singapore and Taiwan are quite similar in terms of innate advantages. But Singapore has been more courageous in confronting real world difficulties and international challenges. It has aggressively transformed deficits into assets. In many ways, Taiwan would do well to emulate Singapore.
Singapore is a small country, which like the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China, lacks natural resources. Yet it has been an amazing success story, one that nations with far larger populations and far greater resources look on with envy. In terms of national competitiveness and cleanliness, it is invariably ranked near the top. The World Economic Forum released its Global Competitiveness report on the 9th of this month. Singapore came in third. Singapore's success is due to outstanding leadership, but also because it has the courage to confront challenges, to seize opportunities, to make judgements, to act decisively, to follow through, and to look to the future.
Singapore is a tiny island nation. Drive 20 minutes northward, and one finds oneself in Malaysia. Indonesia is visible with the naked eye to the south. Singapore is virtually defenseless and without natural barriers. Singapore is highly exposed. Yet it is utterly fearless and has not the slightest desire to close itself off. Instead, it courageously welcomes the challenges posed by the outside world. It makes superb use of its location as a geographic hub. It has turned itself into a zero-tariff free port. As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said, "To develop, we must develop outward. We must make use of the economics of scale. We must transcend the limits imposed on our nation by its size." Singapore may be small, but it is courageous. Its positive and pragmatic strategies have transformed it into "the world's Singapore." So far the results have been outstanding.
And so it is with Mainland China's rapid rise in recent years. Singapore also took the initiative to hitch its wagon to Mainland China's star. It has established close economic and trade relations with Mainland China. It is also taking advantage of its experience with economic development to cooperate with Mainland China in developing such projects as the Suzhou Industrial Park and Tianjin Eco-city. Taipei and Singapore are about to sign an economic cooperation agreement. This will further contribute to trilateral trade between Singapore, Taipei, and Beijing. It will open yet another channel for Singapore's economic growth.
In recent years, Singapore has been plagued by a shrinking and aging population, It has substantially increased the number of foreign workers, permanent residents and immigrants. It must make up for insufficient human resources and human labor. in order to maintain its economic vitality and competitiveness. Singapore's current population of 4.8 million includes over one million foreign workers and permanent residents. The ratio of locals to outsiders is nearly three to one.
Taiwan confronts a far less numerous foreign labor and immigrant population. Yet we often hear shrill demands for their exclusion. Singaporeans may complain about overpopulation, skyrocketing real estate prices, and about being elbowed out of jobs and educational opportunities. But their acceptance of immigrants as the driving force behind their economic policy remains unchanged. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has urged people to accept immigrants with open hearts, and to learn how to cope with international competition even earlier, in school. Actually, despite fierce international competition, Singapore has never pullled back merely to protect itself. Instead, it has bravely charged into battle. It has forced itself to grow and to leapfrog the competition. For example, it adopted an open skies policy. Singapore Airlines was required to complete on the basis of its own strength, Singapore Airlines is now one of the best airlines in the world. Singapore's basic philosophy is that government should take care of the people, but not over-protect them. Otherwise, the people and the country will lose their competitiveness. People on Taiwan ought to think long and hard about Lee's insight.
Another example is the use of water resources. Singapore has long been short of water. It must purchase it from Malaysia. This puts the lifeblood of its economic system in someone else's hands. But Singapore overcame all difficulties to develop advanced water harvesting and waste water recycling and purification technology. This, along with desalination technology, has made it self-sufficient in water use. It has even made Singapore an exporter of water resources technology. Singapore confronted its disadvantages and overcame them. It transformed weaknesses into strengths. Singapore's success story teaches us that any country that makes the right choices and has an unyielding will, can create its own growth.
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in an interview with this newspaper, also offered some views on Singapore/Taipei economic cooperation and cross-Strait relations. He pointed out that economic cooperation and free trade are advantageous for many countries. Singapore has a large network of partners. If one cooperates with Singapore, other Asian countries may well consider following suit. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said he also looked forward to Taipei and Beijing signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). He said that although it is an economic agreement, the long-term narrowing of the cross-Strait gap is part of a larger historical current. It is the right thing to do. ECFA will have a postive impact on the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's comments were pertinent and pragmatic. They were further evidence that the international community looks forward to improved cross-Strait relations.
Taiwan and Singapore have similarities and differences. Conditions for Taiwan and Singapore are also different. But Singapore's experience of successfully confronting its challenges, its ability to make forward-looking and pragmatic decisions, and its ability to effectively execute those decisions, are precisely what Taiwan needs to learn.
新加坡小而美 台灣不鎖國也做得到
2010-09-13
中國時報
本報最近推出新加坡專題，並專訪新加坡總理李顯龍，除了對台星經濟合作協議進行報導之外，也對新加坡發展成功之道深入探討。新加坡的先天條件與處境和台灣相當類似，但在現實困境與國際挑戰下，新加坡卻更加勇於面對，積極化逆勢為優勢，在許多方面都值得台灣學習。
和台灣一樣，新加坡也是個缺乏天然資源的小國，卻能打造出驚人成就，令世界許多人口、資源遠超過新加坡的國家望塵莫及，在國家競爭力與清廉排行上總是名列前茅，世界經濟論壇九日發布的全球競爭力報告裡，新加坡更是蟬聯第三。綜觀新加坡的成功之道，除了優秀的領導階層外，更因為勇於面對挑戰、精準掌握時機、周詳決策、明快行動、認真貫徹，以及能以前瞻眼光長遠布局。
新加坡這個迷你島國，往北開車廿分鐘就到馬來西亞，朝南可以看見印尼，可以說毫無屏障保護。但如此極度暴露的新加坡，卻沒有絲毫畏縮閉鎖，反而勇敢迎向外在世界的挑戰，善用地理樞紐位置，把自己經營成一個零關稅的自由港。誠如李顯龍總理所說的，「要發展，就必須向外發展；要有經濟規模，就要超越我們國家局限。」新加坡雖然小，卻以勇敢、積極且務實的策略，把自己經營成「世界的新加坡」，至今成果斐然。
同樣的，面對中國近年來迅速崛起，新加坡也主動向前，全力抓住中國成長的勢頭。除了更緊密的經貿交流外，新加坡也以本身卓越的發展經驗，與中國進行蘇州工業園區、天津生態城等合作案。如今台星即將洽簽經濟合作協議，將進一步促成星、台、中貿易三角的成形，為新加坡的經貿發展又開通了一個管道。
近年來新加坡面臨人口萎縮及老化問題，開始大幅增加外來工作者、永久居民（ＰＲ）及移民，以彌補人才與勞動力之不足，維持經濟活力與競爭力。現在新加坡的四百八十餘萬人口裡，外來工作者及永久居民就佔了一百多萬，幾乎三個本地人就要面對一個外來人。
台灣面對的外勞與移民的人口比例遠低於此，卻常有反彈排斥之聲，相較之下，新加坡雖然也出現對人口擁擠、房市飆漲、排擠工作與教育機會的怨言，但接納移民以為經濟注入動力的政策方向並沒有改變。新加坡總理李顯龍更呼籲人民要以包容之心接納移民，並且更早從學校裡就學習去面對國際競爭。事實上，面對激烈的國際競爭，新加坡從來不會畏縮只求自保，而是勇敢迎上前去投入搏鬥，逼自己成長、超越對手。例如採取開放天空政策，要求新航必須靠自己的實力在競爭中脫穎而出，如今新航果然是舉世數一數二的航空公司。新加坡的基本理念是，政府要照顧人民，但不能過度保護人民，否則人民和國家都會失去競爭力，這點很值得台灣深思。
另一個例子是水資源的利用，新加坡原本缺水，必須向馬來西亞購買，以致於民生命脈制於他手。但新加坡努力克服困境，發展出完善先進的集水及回收廢水淨化技術，加上海水淡化技術，不但已經能在用水上自給自足，還成為水資源技術的輸出國。面對缺點、努力克服、化弱項為強項，新加坡的成功經驗，說明一個國家如果有正確決策及不服輸的意志，可以如何創造出自己的成長。
新加坡總理李顯龍在接受本報專訪時，對台星經濟合作協議及兩岸關係也有所分析。他指出，經濟合作、自由貿易對許多國家都有很多好處，新加坡是個體系性的合作對象，如果與新加坡有合作，其他亞洲國家也會慎重考慮是不是應該跟進。李顯龍總理並表示樂見兩岸簽署《經濟合作架構協議》（ＥＣＦＡ），他認為雖然它是經濟協議，但長期會把兩岸關係拉近，這是大勢所趨，也是應該做的事情，而ＥＣＦＡ將會對整個亞太區域產生正面的影響。李顯龍總理的評論中肯而務實，說明了國際社會對兩岸關係的期待。
台星之間有同有異，台灣有些狀況也和新加坡不同，但觀察新加坡的成功經驗，可以發現它勇敢面對挑戰、前瞻務實的決策、貫徹有效的執行力，應該正是台灣最需要學習的。
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