Remembering Year 99, Welcoming Year 100
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 31, 2010
Today is the last day of the 99th year of the Republic of China. Tomorrow is first day of the Republic of China centennial.
This newspaper is holding a "2101 Poll." Readers are invited to phone in and vote on "A Record of Major Events," or 13 major events that occurred this year,
This newspaper invited four experts to suggest five major events each. Among these events, "ECFA is signed" and "Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng are imprisoned for corruption" received votes from all four. The signing of ECFA ranked number one. It received three votes for first place, and one vote for second place. Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng Jane being imprisoned ranked second place. It received one vote for first place, one vote for second place, and two votes for fifth place. One might say that the theme for the 99th Year of the Republic of China was the reestablishment of cross-Strait relations and the restoration of justice.
ECFA has been signed. It was undoubtedly one of the most important events of the year. On January 26, representatives from Taipei and Beijing met in Beijing and held their first formal consultation on the "cross-strait economic cooperation agreement" (ECFA). On June 29, the agreement was formally signed in Chongqing. By the end of the year, the "cross-strait economic cooperation committee" had been formed. This was the biggest breakthrough in six decades of cross-Strait economic and trade relations. It was also an experiment in cross-Strait political relations. ECFA will officially go into effect tomorrow, on New Year's Day. Meanwhile the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan remain deadlocked over "whether there is a 1992 consensus" and "whether the 1992 consensus should be recognized."
The 13 "major events" include events that directly or indirectly affect cross-Strait relations. For example, Liu Xiaopo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. This underscored freedom and democracy -- the main difference between the two sides. Another was the Shanghai World Expo. It underscored "the rise of [Mainland] China" and of course affected attitudes toward cross-Strait relations. The North and South Korean Tianan ship incident closely mirrored cross-Strait relations. The debt crisis in Europe was a continuation of the 2008 financial crisis. It forced the public on Taiwan to contemplate the opportunities and risks involved in cross-Strait relations and globalization. The Taipei Flora Exposition invited comparision with the Shanghai World Expo, and symbolized the rivalry between the two sides.
We look forward to tomorrow, and welcome the Republic of China centennial. The 1992 consensus and ECFA have made cross-Strait economic and trade relations and symbiotic win/win "peaceful development" possible. Yet cross-Strait relations remain mired in political controversy over whether they should be recognized.
Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng have been imprisoned for corruption. Chen Shui-bian was imprisoned on December 2. This was an important step in the judicial process. During the trial however, the issue of "presidential authority" came up. This underscored the failure of seven constitutional amendments. During the year end five cities elections, Chen Shui-bian's "one country each side connection" scored a remarkable victory. This underscored the struggle between justice and populist politics.
In 2008, the ROC underwent a second change in ruling parties. The Chen corruption trial went on. The public had high expectations. They wanted an independent judiciary and social justice. Huang Shi-ming was included in the 13 major events. As Prosecutor General he carried out the death penalty, executing four convicts in one night, by firing squad. This also involved attitudes regarding justice system reform and social justice. Huang Shi-ming stood out because Chen Tsung-ming, Morley Shih, Lu Jen-fa, Yeh Sheng-mao, Cheng Chung-mo and their ilk shattered public faith in the justice system. Minister of Justice Tseng Yung-fu carried out four death sentences in a single night. He did so because his predecessor Wang Ching-feng opposed the death penalty, postponed the executions, and was forced to resign.
Chen family corruption inflicted untold damage on public morals and on the nation's justice system. On Taiwan, the justice system remains riddled with defects. These defects are not confined to disputes over the Chen family corruption case. The 99th year of the Republic of China is drawing to a close. The public has heightened expectations about housing. The fairness of health care reform has become a point of controversy. School bullying incidents have shocked the nation. One elderly Mr. Wang crucified one elderly Mrs. Wang. A doctoral candidate stood in the way of an ambulance and flipped people the bird, Eight men and women used "ten torture methods" to torture a friend, and were sentenced to 12 years in prison. These major and minor news events were not included in the 13 major events. They happened during the final days of of the year. They suggest that an increasingly M-shaped society brims over with injustice and hostility. These injustices must be corrected by a robust educational system.
We look forward to the Republic of China centennial. People on Taiwan seek a better tomorrow. They are taking two main directions. One. They are reestablishing cross-Strait relations. Politically, they are upholding the 1992 consensus, and "one China, different interpretations." Economically, they are upholding ECFA, which ensures a mutually beneficial, win-win situation for both sides. This is how it must be. Otherwise Taiwan cannot compete in a globalized marketplace. It cannot enjoy the peace and stability required for survival and development. Two. They are restoring social justice. The Chen family corruption case still has the potential to divide society. Politicians, particularly the Democratic Progressive Party, must heal society's wounds. Our society is filled with injustice and hostility. Society's values have been grossly distorted. The ruling and opposition parties must work together. They must reform the justice system and repair the many gaps in the social system.
回憶九九 迎向一百
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.12.31 02:41 am
今天是中華民國九十九年除夕，明天是中華民國一百年元旦。
本報正在舉辦「票選二○一○年」的活動，請讀者對本報今年「記錄大事件／典藏優質報」所選出的十三則大事件進行電話排序投票。
活動開跑前，本報邀請了四位專家學者選出他們認知上的「五大事件」。其中，「簽署ＥＣＦＡ」與「扁珍貪汙定讞入獄」皆獲全額四票；而又以簽署ＥＣＦＡ居首（三票第一、一票第二），扁珍定讞居次（一票第一、一票第四、兩票第五）。或許可說，中華民國九十九年的歷史主軸動線正是：重建兩岸關係，修補社會正義。
ＥＣＦＡ完成簽署，無疑是今年最重大的事件。一月二十六日兩岸代表在北京進行《兩岸經濟合作協議》（ＥＣＦＡ）第一次正式協商，至六月二十九日在重慶正式簽署，到了年底「兩岸經濟合作委員會」已呼之欲出。此一發展，非但是六十年來兩岸經貿關係的大突破，實際上亦是兩岸政治關係的新試驗；而正當ＥＣＦＡ將在明日元旦正式上路實施之際，朝野兩黨卻仍為「有無九二共識」、「是否承認九二共識」相持不下。
在十三則「典藏事件」中，另有多則也直接或間接與兩岸有關。例如，劉曉波獲諾貝爾和平獎；顯示兩岸的主要歧異是在自由民主上的分野。又如，上海世博開幕，顯示「中國崛起」，當然也牽動兩岸思維。再如，南北韓天安艦事件，正是兩岸關係的對照。至於歐債風暴，則是延續○八年的金融海嘯，使台灣思考兩岸關係在全球化的機會與風險。台北花博開幕，亦有與上海世博對比而具兩岸形象角力的象徵意義。
瞻望明天，迎向民國一百年，兩岸關係仍將在「承不承認九二共識」的政治爭議，及以ＥＣＦＡ為主軸的兩岸經貿現實中，追求兩岸雙贏共生的「和平發展」。
扁珍夫婦貪汙定讞，且陳水扁已於十二月二日入監服刑，這是重大無比的司法進程。然而，在審判中出現的「總統權限」的爭議，反映了七次修憲的失敗；而在年底的五都選舉中，陳水扁的「一邊一國連線」獲得了顯著的勝利，則顯示了司法正義與民粹政治的角力。
自二○○八政黨輪替以來，隨著扁案審判的發展，民間對司法獨立及社會正義的期望甚高。另在十三則「典藏事件」中，黃世銘獲提名出任檢察總長及執行死刑一夜槍決四人，亦與民間對司法改革及社會正義的思考有關。黃世銘出線，是因陳聰明、施茂林、盧仁發、葉盛茂、城仲模等司法首長大傷民心；而法務部長曾勇夫一夜執行四個死刑，則是因前任王清峰反對死刑且延宕執行而被迫辭職所致。
扁案對社會道德及國家正義的傷害無與倫比，而台灣在社會正義上的缺陷則不止是扁案及司法爭議而已。在民國九十九年即將結尾之際，對社會住宅的期待升高、健保改革的公平性成為輿論焦點、校園霸凌事件令人怵目驚心、王老先生釘死了王老太太、博士生阻擋救護車比中指、八名男女用「十大酷刑」凌虐友人被求刑十二年……。這些大大小小的新聞，皆不在十三則「典藏事件」中，卻密集地發生在歲末年終之際，在在顯示這個愈來愈Ｍ型的社會似乎充滿了不平與戾氣，必須從體制上及教育上大力修補社會正義。
迎向民國一百年，台灣為了追求更美好的明天，主要的努力方向，仍然是這兩大主軸。一、重建兩岸關係：在政治上維持「九二共識／一中各表」，在經濟上循ＥＣＦＡ的思維促進兩岸互利雙贏；非如此，台灣不能在全球化的競爭中獲得一個和平穩定的生存發展基礎；二、修補社會正義：扁案仍是撕裂社會的潛在因素，尚須政治人物（尤其是民進黨）來療傷止痛；至於對這個充滿不平與戾氣且價值觀念扭曲的社會，除了司法改革，仍有許多在社會公平正義上的缺口，亟待朝野同心協力修補。
Friday, December 31, 2010
Thursday, December 30, 2010
KMT Chops Heads, Boldly Moves Forward
KMT Chops Heads, Boldly Moves Forward
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 30, 2010
"Voting for rival candidates is tantamount to betraying the party!" The KMT Disciplinary Committee has established an historic precedent. All ten KMT city council members who voted for rival candidates during the Tainan City Government Speaker and Deputy Speaker elections will have their party membership revoked. Party Secretary-General King Pu-tsung delivered a solemn speech. The KMT chopped heads even though it was left with only three seats. It was virtually starting from scratch. But the KMT showed its determination, and administered discipline. It changed the image of the party. For this it has earned our respect.
Local politics on Taiwan is complex. Unless one resorts to extraordinary, virtually revolutionary measures, the problems that dog local politics cannot be corrected. During the Chiang Ching-kuo era, when the government encountered deeply entrenched local interests, its attitude was "out of sight, out of mind." But after all, it was an authoritarian era. The central government could impose draconian punishments. Local factions dared not engage in official/triad collusion. During Lee Teng-hui's reign, he wooed local factions. This enabled him to retain power for 12 years. He left behind him a legacy of Black Gold, and contributed to the KMT's loss of power.
Pandering to local factions is the most expedient means of clinging to power. But it is also the costliest means of clinging to power. During the 20 years since martial law was lifted, local politics has undergone rapid degeneration. City and county council members carry illegal firearms, engage in illicit sexual conduct, and control local gambling. Those who shield the local sex industry from prosecution are given carte blanche. Prosecutors and police are all on the same page. Violators can neither be apprehended nor prosecuted.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. Chen Shui-bian paid lip service to higher standards of conduct. But in practice he played the same old game as Lee Teng-hui. If anything, he was worse. Every time an election rolled around, Chen Shui-bian made a personal appearance. He paid secret visits to local triad leaders and party bosses. When the president himself is busy glad-handing triad bosses, who is going to have the guts to prosecute these people?
Each time a city or county council election rolled around, bribery was rampant. Votes sold for several million NT. Candidates paid huge bribes for city or county council speaker positions. What did the winners do upon being elected? Collect their salaries and go on vacation? Hardly. Council members sell their votes. As they move about the council chambers, they can hardly defy orders handed down by Black Gold council speakers. City and county councils have become the biggest gangs of all. They can exert pressure on officials through both the government and through triads. Can any local official hoping to avoid trouble defy them? Eventually city and county governments, overtly or covertly, will be compelled to award local elective officials infrastructure contracts, and even lobbying commissions.
When political parties surrender to local factions for the sake of votes, local politics is plunged into darkness. Even more frightening, once these local factions grow in strength, they swiftly infiltrate the central government. Standards for legislators have declined precipitously over the past 20 years. Democracy on Taiwan has become mired in a vicious cycle, unable to extricate itself.
For these local elected officials, selfish interest trumps all. In their eyes, political parties do not exist. To them, "party discipline" is a joke. Never mind party spirit and party ethics. Under democracy, the concept of "draconian party discipline" may come across as something out of ancient history. But respect for discipline is a fundamental truth. Today, an individual might sell his vote for selfish gain. Tomorrow he might sell out the dignity of his party for even larger gains. Personal integrity for such individuals is a foreign concept.
In Tainan, the KMT has been in the opposition for some time. This time, it has sharpened its axes. It has, in one fell swoop, revoked the party membership of over 10 city council members. This has left the KMT even weaker in Tainan than before. But as the saying goes, "three's a crowd." As long as the three remaining KMT members are sufficiently professional, and have enough heart, they can still play a role in the municipal government. At least when factional disputes arise in the future, they will have nothing to with the KMT. The DPP has implemented "total government" in Tainan. Whether the DPP can rid itself of its negative image depends on its determination.
The KMT has severely punished 10 city council members. King Pu-tsung explained. Tainan City clearly stipulates that when city council members cast their votes, "their political allegiances must be clear, if their party has disciplinary measures, they must be imposed." Among the 10 KMT city council members, seven voted for independents. Only three voted for the DPP. But it was impossible to determine which three voted for the DPP. Although the other seven did not betray the party to the same degree, they had to be treated equally. Those who voted for the DPP betrayed the party. Those who voted for a controversial independent, may have done so for personal financial motives. Did vote-buying figure in the recent five cities elections? Why have prosecutors remained silent?
The KMT is the most inclusive political party on Taiwan. But being inclusive does not mean condoning betrayal. In particular, one cannot condone displaying the party colors even while engaging in illicit quid pro quo. Some city council members also voted for political opponents in the Taipei City Government Deputy Speaker election. But because the KMT failed to take action in advance, verifying the facts afterward was difficult. Strict party discipline must not lead to miscarriages of justice. King Pu-tsung asked the KMT leadership, the KMT council caucus, and the party, to "engage in soul searching." In fact, the KMT leadership, the KMT council caucus, and even the party, know perfectly well which council members voted for rival candidates. If the guilty parties remain unrepentant, and fail to engage in soul-searching, such rotten apples should not remain in the barrel.
A nation has its national laws. A party has its party discipline. The purpose of political parties is not merely to win elections. It is to serve the public after winning elections. How can those who seek selfish advantage or engage in wrongdoing represent the people? During the five cities elections, the KMT received fewer votes than the DPP. For the KMT, there is no turning back. It has taken a bold step. It has gotten a fresh start and seized the initiative. It has taken the first step in partisan competition, not just during election season, but in the day to day performance of its duties. Only by emancipating itself from election pressures, can it stand tall, and win respect. Otherwise, even if it wins elections, and attains high office, it will still be ashamed to face the nation.
國民黨大刀出鍘 勇敢邁出一大步
2010-12-30 中國時報
「跑票形同叛黨！」國民黨中央考紀會對台南市議會正副議長選舉跑票事件，史無前例地，將十位黨籍議員全部開除之後，黨秘書長金溥聰發表嚴正談話。盡管自此一鍘，國民黨在大台南議員僅餘三席，形同「歸零」，但完全展現國民黨整飭紀律、端正黨形象的決心和魄力，值得喝采。
台灣地方政治生態與利益糾葛的複雜，不以革命之非常手段，不足以導正。蔣經國時代，對盤根錯節的地方利益，眼不見為淨；然終究是威權時代，整肅流氓手段嚴厲，地方派系不敢膽大妄為到黑白掛勾的地步。李登輝時代，對地方派系曲意拉攏，維護了十二年執政政權，卻留下黑金罵名，並因此讓國民黨失去政權。
拉攏派系是最簡單的方法，卻也是代價最大的方法。解嚴廿多年，地方議會生態愈益惡化，地方議員身擁黑槍，聲色犬馬，把持地方賭盤，為地方色情行業圍事者，所在多有；嚴重者甚至檢警調都同聲出氣，抓不到，更辦不了。
民進黨執政八年，陳水扁即使以向上提昇為號召，但玩的是和李登輝一模一樣的老把戲，甚至猶有過之；每到大選，陳水扁御駕親征，密訪的就是地方組頭大樁腳，以總統之尊與組頭老大攜手言歡，誰還敢辦人？
每到議會改選，必傳賄選之聲，每票以數百萬起跳，撒重金以當選的議長，當選後能憑議長薪資度日嗎？拿錢投票的議員，進出議會，能不以黑金議長之命是從嗎？議會成為最大幫派，挾黑白勢力以施壓，哪個縣市首長能不虛與委蛇，以求施政順暢？最後各縣市政府明的暗的，只能給與地方民代各種地方建設、乃至人事關說的配額。
政黨為選票故，妥協於地方惡勢力的結果，就是讓地方生態永無見天日之時；更可怕的是這樣的地方勢力，坐大之後，就直上中央，國會素質因此在這廿年之間，急遽下滑，台灣民主政治陷入難以自拔的惡性循環。
對這些利益至上的地方民代而言，眼中根本就無政黨，「黨紀」像個笑話，遑論黨魂、黨德。民主時代，「嚴肅黨紀」彷彿是上古史，但講究紀律是做人的最基本道理，既身為團體的一份子，今日為利益賣掉一張票，明日就能為更大的利益賣掉政黨的尊嚴；因為他們不懂什麼是做人的格調。
國民黨在大台南在野已久，這次大刀出鍘，一舉開除十席議員，讓國民黨在台南更處弱勢。但是，三人成眾，只要三席議員夠專業、夠用心，還是可以發揮監督市政之力。至少未來在大台南凡與利益糾葛之事，俱與國民黨無涉。在大台南完全執政的民進黨，能不能擺脫形象爭議，就得看民進黨的決心了。
國民黨嚴厲處分台南十位議員，金溥聰說明，當初台南市已白紙寫黑字要求議員票投自己，「政治上要清清楚楚，有黨紀就一定要執行。」雖然十位議員中，七位投給無黨籍，只有三票投給民進黨，但無法查明到底是哪三人，盡管「叛黨」程度有別，只能一視同仁。投給民進黨是叛黨，投給極具形象爭議的無黨籍，則不只是政黨壁壘的問題，背後恐怕還有利益問題。這次五都選舉到底有沒有金錢介入選舉？司法檢調機關豈能悶聲不吭？
國民黨是最具包容性的政黨，但包容不表示縱容，尤其不能縱容端著政黨招牌，卻搞利益輸送的勾當。台北市議員同樣在副議長選舉中跑票，但因為事前沒有採取動作，事後查證不易，嚴飭黨紀也不能冤枉任何人，金溥聰只能要求黨中央、市黨部和黨團「反省檢討」。事實上，黨中央、市黨部乃至黨團，理應心知肚明是誰跑票，如果當事人還心存僥倖，不知檢討，這樣的爛蘋果，真的不必再硬撿到籃子裡來。
國有國法，黨有黨紀，政黨的目的不只在勝選，重點是勝選後服務人民；貪圖利益或畏怯惡勢力者，如何堂堂正正為民喉舌？五都選後，選票數落後於民進黨的國民黨，能義無反顧，勇敢地走出這一步，已經在起跑點上搶得先機，贏了第一步。政黨競爭，不只在選舉期間，而在每天、每件事的表現；唯有擺脫選票壓力，挺起腰桿，才能贏得尊敬，否則即使贏得選舉，爭得大位，還是有愧於國家社會。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 30, 2010
"Voting for rival candidates is tantamount to betraying the party!" The KMT Disciplinary Committee has established an historic precedent. All ten KMT city council members who voted for rival candidates during the Tainan City Government Speaker and Deputy Speaker elections will have their party membership revoked. Party Secretary-General King Pu-tsung delivered a solemn speech. The KMT chopped heads even though it was left with only three seats. It was virtually starting from scratch. But the KMT showed its determination, and administered discipline. It changed the image of the party. For this it has earned our respect.
Local politics on Taiwan is complex. Unless one resorts to extraordinary, virtually revolutionary measures, the problems that dog local politics cannot be corrected. During the Chiang Ching-kuo era, when the government encountered deeply entrenched local interests, its attitude was "out of sight, out of mind." But after all, it was an authoritarian era. The central government could impose draconian punishments. Local factions dared not engage in official/triad collusion. During Lee Teng-hui's reign, he wooed local factions. This enabled him to retain power for 12 years. He left behind him a legacy of Black Gold, and contributed to the KMT's loss of power.
Pandering to local factions is the most expedient means of clinging to power. But it is also the costliest means of clinging to power. During the 20 years since martial law was lifted, local politics has undergone rapid degeneration. City and county council members carry illegal firearms, engage in illicit sexual conduct, and control local gambling. Those who shield the local sex industry from prosecution are given carte blanche. Prosecutors and police are all on the same page. Violators can neither be apprehended nor prosecuted.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. Chen Shui-bian paid lip service to higher standards of conduct. But in practice he played the same old game as Lee Teng-hui. If anything, he was worse. Every time an election rolled around, Chen Shui-bian made a personal appearance. He paid secret visits to local triad leaders and party bosses. When the president himself is busy glad-handing triad bosses, who is going to have the guts to prosecute these people?
Each time a city or county council election rolled around, bribery was rampant. Votes sold for several million NT. Candidates paid huge bribes for city or county council speaker positions. What did the winners do upon being elected? Collect their salaries and go on vacation? Hardly. Council members sell their votes. As they move about the council chambers, they can hardly defy orders handed down by Black Gold council speakers. City and county councils have become the biggest gangs of all. They can exert pressure on officials through both the government and through triads. Can any local official hoping to avoid trouble defy them? Eventually city and county governments, overtly or covertly, will be compelled to award local elective officials infrastructure contracts, and even lobbying commissions.
When political parties surrender to local factions for the sake of votes, local politics is plunged into darkness. Even more frightening, once these local factions grow in strength, they swiftly infiltrate the central government. Standards for legislators have declined precipitously over the past 20 years. Democracy on Taiwan has become mired in a vicious cycle, unable to extricate itself.
For these local elected officials, selfish interest trumps all. In their eyes, political parties do not exist. To them, "party discipline" is a joke. Never mind party spirit and party ethics. Under democracy, the concept of "draconian party discipline" may come across as something out of ancient history. But respect for discipline is a fundamental truth. Today, an individual might sell his vote for selfish gain. Tomorrow he might sell out the dignity of his party for even larger gains. Personal integrity for such individuals is a foreign concept.
In Tainan, the KMT has been in the opposition for some time. This time, it has sharpened its axes. It has, in one fell swoop, revoked the party membership of over 10 city council members. This has left the KMT even weaker in Tainan than before. But as the saying goes, "three's a crowd." As long as the three remaining KMT members are sufficiently professional, and have enough heart, they can still play a role in the municipal government. At least when factional disputes arise in the future, they will have nothing to with the KMT. The DPP has implemented "total government" in Tainan. Whether the DPP can rid itself of its negative image depends on its determination.
The KMT has severely punished 10 city council members. King Pu-tsung explained. Tainan City clearly stipulates that when city council members cast their votes, "their political allegiances must be clear, if their party has disciplinary measures, they must be imposed." Among the 10 KMT city council members, seven voted for independents. Only three voted for the DPP. But it was impossible to determine which three voted for the DPP. Although the other seven did not betray the party to the same degree, they had to be treated equally. Those who voted for the DPP betrayed the party. Those who voted for a controversial independent, may have done so for personal financial motives. Did vote-buying figure in the recent five cities elections? Why have prosecutors remained silent?
The KMT is the most inclusive political party on Taiwan. But being inclusive does not mean condoning betrayal. In particular, one cannot condone displaying the party colors even while engaging in illicit quid pro quo. Some city council members also voted for political opponents in the Taipei City Government Deputy Speaker election. But because the KMT failed to take action in advance, verifying the facts afterward was difficult. Strict party discipline must not lead to miscarriages of justice. King Pu-tsung asked the KMT leadership, the KMT council caucus, and the party, to "engage in soul searching." In fact, the KMT leadership, the KMT council caucus, and even the party, know perfectly well which council members voted for rival candidates. If the guilty parties remain unrepentant, and fail to engage in soul-searching, such rotten apples should not remain in the barrel.
A nation has its national laws. A party has its party discipline. The purpose of political parties is not merely to win elections. It is to serve the public after winning elections. How can those who seek selfish advantage or engage in wrongdoing represent the people? During the five cities elections, the KMT received fewer votes than the DPP. For the KMT, there is no turning back. It has taken a bold step. It has gotten a fresh start and seized the initiative. It has taken the first step in partisan competition, not just during election season, but in the day to day performance of its duties. Only by emancipating itself from election pressures, can it stand tall, and win respect. Otherwise, even if it wins elections, and attains high office, it will still be ashamed to face the nation.
國民黨大刀出鍘 勇敢邁出一大步
2010-12-30 中國時報
「跑票形同叛黨！」國民黨中央考紀會對台南市議會正副議長選舉跑票事件，史無前例地，將十位黨籍議員全部開除之後，黨秘書長金溥聰發表嚴正談話。盡管自此一鍘，國民黨在大台南議員僅餘三席，形同「歸零」，但完全展現國民黨整飭紀律、端正黨形象的決心和魄力，值得喝采。
台灣地方政治生態與利益糾葛的複雜，不以革命之非常手段，不足以導正。蔣經國時代，對盤根錯節的地方利益，眼不見為淨；然終究是威權時代，整肅流氓手段嚴厲，地方派系不敢膽大妄為到黑白掛勾的地步。李登輝時代，對地方派系曲意拉攏，維護了十二年執政政權，卻留下黑金罵名，並因此讓國民黨失去政權。
拉攏派系是最簡單的方法，卻也是代價最大的方法。解嚴廿多年，地方議會生態愈益惡化，地方議員身擁黑槍，聲色犬馬，把持地方賭盤，為地方色情行業圍事者，所在多有；嚴重者甚至檢警調都同聲出氣，抓不到，更辦不了。
民進黨執政八年，陳水扁即使以向上提昇為號召，但玩的是和李登輝一模一樣的老把戲，甚至猶有過之；每到大選，陳水扁御駕親征，密訪的就是地方組頭大樁腳，以總統之尊與組頭老大攜手言歡，誰還敢辦人？
每到議會改選，必傳賄選之聲，每票以數百萬起跳，撒重金以當選的議長，當選後能憑議長薪資度日嗎？拿錢投票的議員，進出議會，能不以黑金議長之命是從嗎？議會成為最大幫派，挾黑白勢力以施壓，哪個縣市首長能不虛與委蛇，以求施政順暢？最後各縣市政府明的暗的，只能給與地方民代各種地方建設、乃至人事關說的配額。
政黨為選票故，妥協於地方惡勢力的結果，就是讓地方生態永無見天日之時；更可怕的是這樣的地方勢力，坐大之後，就直上中央，國會素質因此在這廿年之間，急遽下滑，台灣民主政治陷入難以自拔的惡性循環。
對這些利益至上的地方民代而言，眼中根本就無政黨，「黨紀」像個笑話，遑論黨魂、黨德。民主時代，「嚴肅黨紀」彷彿是上古史，但講究紀律是做人的最基本道理，既身為團體的一份子，今日為利益賣掉一張票，明日就能為更大的利益賣掉政黨的尊嚴；因為他們不懂什麼是做人的格調。
國民黨在大台南在野已久，這次大刀出鍘，一舉開除十席議員，讓國民黨在台南更處弱勢。但是，三人成眾，只要三席議員夠專業、夠用心，還是可以發揮監督市政之力。至少未來在大台南凡與利益糾葛之事，俱與國民黨無涉。在大台南完全執政的民進黨，能不能擺脫形象爭議，就得看民進黨的決心了。
國民黨嚴厲處分台南十位議員，金溥聰說明，當初台南市已白紙寫黑字要求議員票投自己，「政治上要清清楚楚，有黨紀就一定要執行。」雖然十位議員中，七位投給無黨籍，只有三票投給民進黨，但無法查明到底是哪三人，盡管「叛黨」程度有別，只能一視同仁。投給民進黨是叛黨，投給極具形象爭議的無黨籍，則不只是政黨壁壘的問題，背後恐怕還有利益問題。這次五都選舉到底有沒有金錢介入選舉？司法檢調機關豈能悶聲不吭？
國民黨是最具包容性的政黨，但包容不表示縱容，尤其不能縱容端著政黨招牌，卻搞利益輸送的勾當。台北市議員同樣在副議長選舉中跑票，但因為事前沒有採取動作，事後查證不易，嚴飭黨紀也不能冤枉任何人，金溥聰只能要求黨中央、市黨部和黨團「反省檢討」。事實上，黨中央、市黨部乃至黨團，理應心知肚明是誰跑票，如果當事人還心存僥倖，不知檢討，這樣的爛蘋果，真的不必再硬撿到籃子裡來。
國有國法，黨有黨紀，政黨的目的不只在勝選，重點是勝選後服務人民；貪圖利益或畏怯惡勢力者，如何堂堂正正為民喉舌？五都選後，選票數落後於民進黨的國民黨，能義無反顧，勇敢地走出這一步，已經在起跑點上搶得先機，贏了第一步。政黨競爭，不只在選舉期間，而在每天、每件事的表現；唯有擺脫選票壓力，挺起腰桿，才能贏得尊敬，否則即使贏得選舉，爭得大位，還是有愧於國家社會。
Wednesday, December 29, 2010
Tsai Ing-wen Has Painted Herself into a Corner
Tsai Ing-wen Has Painted Herself into a Corner
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 29, 2010
During an interview with the media, President Ma Ying-jeou demanded that DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen come clean. "Does she recognize the 1992 Consensus or not?" The DPP's response was swift. "The DPP has never recognized the 1992 Consensus."
We urge the DPP to think twice before speaking, The DPP should refrain from making such a sweeping statement. Because without the 1992 Consensus, there can be no "peaceful development" between Taipei and Beijing.
Without the 1992 Consensus, the two sides cannot possibly enjoy "peaceful development." Everyone knows this. The DPP cannot possibly be unaware of this. Nor can Tsai Ing-wen. The main reason the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus, is intra-party power struggles.
The political situation on Taiwan has undergone changes since the five cities elections. In particular, power relations within the DPP have undergone massive changes. Two major trends have appeared. One. Tsai Ing-wen has gained political momentum. She may relegate Su Tseng-chang's generation to the dustbin of history -- in one fell swoop. Two. Chen Shui-bian scored an election victory on the shoulders of the "one country on each side connection." As a result, he may become a "party within the party." These two trends, including Tsai Ing-wen eliminating Su Tseng-chang as a player, will only benefit Chen Shui-bian. They leave the impression that Tsai Ing-wen is at loggerheads with Chen Shui-bian over his advocacy of "one country each side." Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. One reason is her fear of Chen Shui-bian.
Let us begin at the beginning. In May 2000, President Chen Shui-bian began his first term as president. In June, he met with officials from the US. He accepted "One China, Different Interpretations," and the 1992 Consensus. The next day, as a result of intervention by then Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council Tsai Ing-wen, Chen Shui-bian repudiated his previous statement. Not only that, Chen Shui-bian even contemplated abolishing the National Unification Council. He followed the example set by Lee Teng-hui. He personally assumed the chairmanship of the National Unification Council. He failed to follow through as a result of Tsai Ing-wen's opposition. In other words, the demise of Chen Shui-bian's "new centrist path" was primarily Tsai Ing-wen's responsibility. Tsai has a history of opposition to the 1992 Consensus. How can she possibly fail to oppose it now? Suppose Tsai endorses the 1992 Consensus? Won't Chen Shui-bian, who is leading the charge on "one country each side" insist on settling an old score with Tsai Ing-wen?
This is a paradox of history. To the general public and DPP reformers, Tsai Ing-wen is the person most likely to lead the DPP toward a new era. The key to the DPP's transformation is recognizing the ROC Constitution and changing the DPP's cross-Strait policy accordingly. The 1992 Consensus is the key within the key. Besides, the 1992 Consensus was a key first turned by the KMT. The DPP can simply say it is "continuing the cross-Strait policies of the previous administration." It can merely go with the flow, and stabilize the situation. But who knew that Tsai Ing-wen, the person most likely to lead the DPP into a new era, would find herself stuck? She is stuck over "reality vs. development," "attack vs. defense," and the "1992 Consensus, and one China, different interpretations." Years ago Tsai Ing-wen prevented Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus. Now, years later, she must suffer the consequences of her own actions. Karmic payback has resulted in a tragic absurdity.
We have repeatedly stressed the importance of the 1992 Consensus. Therefore this article will not harp on the matter now. In sum, the "peaceful development" enjoyed by the two sides today is rooted entirely in the above mentioned 1992 Consensus. Repudiating the 1992 Consensus means repudiating "peaceful development." For example, if one repudiates the 1992 Consensus, how can one possibly uphold ECFA? Is this really what the DPP advocates? Is this really Tsai Ing-wen's proposal? Is this really how the DPP intends to rule the nation in the event it returns to power in 2012?
Besides, why has Tsai Ing-wen repudiated the 1992 Consensus? Has she done so out of concern for the nation's current and future survival? Or did she do so merely out of concern for her personal political survival? Did she do so merely because Chen Shui-bian made it known that she once blocked the 1992 Consensus? Did she do so merely because she now finds it impossible to change her tune? On this, the DPP must be clear. Tsai Ing-wen herself must be even clearer. Therefore, we urge the DPP to think twice before speaking, and to refrain from making such a sweeping statement. After all, if it repudiates the 1992 Consensus, what sort of "Political Platform for the Coming Decade" can it possibly offer?
In June 2000, Tsai Ing-wen first prevented Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus. As a result, the DPP spun its wheels over "one country each side," for the next eight years. Now Tsai Ing-wen is the Democratic Progressive Party's 2012 presidential candidate. Does she really intend to repudiate the 1992 Consensus a second time? Does she really intend to launch a coordinated attack against the 1992 Consensus in lockstep with Chen Shui-bian?
Tsai Ing-wen finds herself caught on the horns of a dilemma. If she recognizes the 1992 Consensus, how can she answer to Chen Shui-bian and her Deep Green supporters? If she repudiates the 1992 Consensus, how can she answer to the majority of the public? How should she approach the 2012 presidential election? Will the DPP move toward a scenario in which Tsai Ing-wen eliminates Su Tseng-chang, while Chen Shui-bian coopts Tsai Ing-wen?
Who would have guessed that the paint Tsai Ing-wen laid down in June 2000, would paint her into a corner years later?
蔡英文被自己十年前的油漆刷到牆角
【聯合報╱聯合報】 2010.12.29
馬英九總統透過媒體專訪，要民進黨主席蔡英文說清楚：「承認九二共識嗎？」民進黨方面立刻回應：「民進黨從來就不承認九二共識。」
我們建議民進黨：不要把話說得太早，也不要把話說得太死。因為，沒有「九二共識」，兩岸就沒有「和平發展」。
沒有「九二共識」，兩岸就沒有「和平發展」；這其實是任人皆知之事，民進黨不會不知，蔡英文更不會不知；但民進黨及蔡英文否認「九二共識」，主要是出自黨內鬥爭的因素，不得不然。
五都選舉後，台灣整個政情發生變化，而民進黨內的權力關係尤生巨變。其主要發展動線呈現兩大走向：一、蔡英文聲勢看漲，可能將蘇貞昌等老一輩人物一次洗乾淨；二、相對而言，陳水扁因「一邊一國連線」選舉獲勝，可能成為「黨中之黨」。在兩大走向中，蔡英文洗掉了蘇貞昌等，其實也對陳水扁有利；因此形成了蔡英文已然在黨內與陳水扁的「一邊一國」直接針鋒相對的情勢。蔡英文若反對「九二共識」，主要原因之一即在對陳水扁有顧慮。
話說從頭。二○○○年五月，陳水扁首任總統；六月，在接見美賓時表示，可接受「一個中國／各自表述」的「九二共識」；隔日，即因時任陸委會主委的蔡英文介入，陳水扁又否認此說。不僅如此，陳水扁當時並擬開啟「國統會」的運作，且循李登輝例，由總統自兼國統會主任委員；亦因蔡英文的反對而告吹。也就是說，陳水扁的「新中間路線」，可謂主要是毀於蔡英文之手；蔡既有此紀錄，她現在能不反對「九二共識」嗎？而蔡若贊同「九二共識」，領導「一邊一國」的陳水扁會不與蔡英文算這筆舊帳嗎？
這真是一個歷史大弔詭。在一般國人及民進黨內改革派的想像中，蔡英文是最有可能帶領民進黨轉型的人物；至於轉型的關鍵，則在國家憲政認同與兩岸政策，而「九二共識」更是關鍵中的關鍵；何況，「九二共識」是國民黨打開的鎖鑰，民進黨只要「若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」，即可順水推舟，穩住大局。然而，誰會想到：最有可能帶領民進黨轉型的蔡英文，竟會卡在最具創意，且「現實／發展」、「攻擊／防禦」兼具的「九二共識／一中各表」上面；而卡住的原因，竟是在當年她曾阻擋陳水扁承認「九二共識」，如今遂不能不自食其果。如此昭彰的「因果循環」，在慘烈中透露著無比的荒謬。
我們曾反覆申論「九二共識」的重要，本文略而不贅。總而言之，兩岸今日的「和平發展」，全是建立在「九二共識」上面的；否認「九二共識」，就是要否認這一切「和平發展」。例如：若反對「九二共識」，還能維持ＥＣＦＡ嗎？這難道就是民進黨的主張？就是蔡英文的主張？就是民進黨若在二○一二執政後的治國政策？
何況，蔡英文否認九二共識，究竟是出自對國家當前及未來生存發展的可行方案之考慮？或只是緣於她曾阻擋陳水扁承認「九二共識」致如今已不便改口的「個人因素」？這一點，民進黨要搞清楚，蔡英文自己更要搞清楚。因此，我們建議民進黨，不要把話說得太快，說得太死。問題在於：若否認「九二共識」，將寫出怎樣一部「十年政綱」？
二○○○年六月，蔡英文第一次阻擋陳水扁承認「九二共識」，使民進黨在「一邊一國」的操作中內耗空轉了八年；如今，蔡英文儼然將是民進黨二○一二的總統候選人，難道她又將第二次否認「九二共識」，而與陳水扁的「一邊一國」「分進合擊」？
蔡英文進退兩難。她若承認「九二共識」，如何向陳水扁及深綠交代？若反對，則又如何向多數國人交代？更如何迎對二○一二總統大選？民進黨會不會就此走向「蔡英文洗掉蘇貞昌／陳水扁收拾蔡英文」的下場？
誰會料到：蔡英文在二○○○年六月刷的油漆，在十年後將她自己刷到牆角。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 29, 2010
During an interview with the media, President Ma Ying-jeou demanded that DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen come clean. "Does she recognize the 1992 Consensus or not?" The DPP's response was swift. "The DPP has never recognized the 1992 Consensus."
We urge the DPP to think twice before speaking, The DPP should refrain from making such a sweeping statement. Because without the 1992 Consensus, there can be no "peaceful development" between Taipei and Beijing.
Without the 1992 Consensus, the two sides cannot possibly enjoy "peaceful development." Everyone knows this. The DPP cannot possibly be unaware of this. Nor can Tsai Ing-wen. The main reason the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus, is intra-party power struggles.
The political situation on Taiwan has undergone changes since the five cities elections. In particular, power relations within the DPP have undergone massive changes. Two major trends have appeared. One. Tsai Ing-wen has gained political momentum. She may relegate Su Tseng-chang's generation to the dustbin of history -- in one fell swoop. Two. Chen Shui-bian scored an election victory on the shoulders of the "one country on each side connection." As a result, he may become a "party within the party." These two trends, including Tsai Ing-wen eliminating Su Tseng-chang as a player, will only benefit Chen Shui-bian. They leave the impression that Tsai Ing-wen is at loggerheads with Chen Shui-bian over his advocacy of "one country each side." Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. One reason is her fear of Chen Shui-bian.
Let us begin at the beginning. In May 2000, President Chen Shui-bian began his first term as president. In June, he met with officials from the US. He accepted "One China, Different Interpretations," and the 1992 Consensus. The next day, as a result of intervention by then Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council Tsai Ing-wen, Chen Shui-bian repudiated his previous statement. Not only that, Chen Shui-bian even contemplated abolishing the National Unification Council. He followed the example set by Lee Teng-hui. He personally assumed the chairmanship of the National Unification Council. He failed to follow through as a result of Tsai Ing-wen's opposition. In other words, the demise of Chen Shui-bian's "new centrist path" was primarily Tsai Ing-wen's responsibility. Tsai has a history of opposition to the 1992 Consensus. How can she possibly fail to oppose it now? Suppose Tsai endorses the 1992 Consensus? Won't Chen Shui-bian, who is leading the charge on "one country each side" insist on settling an old score with Tsai Ing-wen?
This is a paradox of history. To the general public and DPP reformers, Tsai Ing-wen is the person most likely to lead the DPP toward a new era. The key to the DPP's transformation is recognizing the ROC Constitution and changing the DPP's cross-Strait policy accordingly. The 1992 Consensus is the key within the key. Besides, the 1992 Consensus was a key first turned by the KMT. The DPP can simply say it is "continuing the cross-Strait policies of the previous administration." It can merely go with the flow, and stabilize the situation. But who knew that Tsai Ing-wen, the person most likely to lead the DPP into a new era, would find herself stuck? She is stuck over "reality vs. development," "attack vs. defense," and the "1992 Consensus, and one China, different interpretations." Years ago Tsai Ing-wen prevented Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus. Now, years later, she must suffer the consequences of her own actions. Karmic payback has resulted in a tragic absurdity.
We have repeatedly stressed the importance of the 1992 Consensus. Therefore this article will not harp on the matter now. In sum, the "peaceful development" enjoyed by the two sides today is rooted entirely in the above mentioned 1992 Consensus. Repudiating the 1992 Consensus means repudiating "peaceful development." For example, if one repudiates the 1992 Consensus, how can one possibly uphold ECFA? Is this really what the DPP advocates? Is this really Tsai Ing-wen's proposal? Is this really how the DPP intends to rule the nation in the event it returns to power in 2012?
Besides, why has Tsai Ing-wen repudiated the 1992 Consensus? Has she done so out of concern for the nation's current and future survival? Or did she do so merely out of concern for her personal political survival? Did she do so merely because Chen Shui-bian made it known that she once blocked the 1992 Consensus? Did she do so merely because she now finds it impossible to change her tune? On this, the DPP must be clear. Tsai Ing-wen herself must be even clearer. Therefore, we urge the DPP to think twice before speaking, and to refrain from making such a sweeping statement. After all, if it repudiates the 1992 Consensus, what sort of "Political Platform for the Coming Decade" can it possibly offer?
In June 2000, Tsai Ing-wen first prevented Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus. As a result, the DPP spun its wheels over "one country each side," for the next eight years. Now Tsai Ing-wen is the Democratic Progressive Party's 2012 presidential candidate. Does she really intend to repudiate the 1992 Consensus a second time? Does she really intend to launch a coordinated attack against the 1992 Consensus in lockstep with Chen Shui-bian?
Tsai Ing-wen finds herself caught on the horns of a dilemma. If she recognizes the 1992 Consensus, how can she answer to Chen Shui-bian and her Deep Green supporters? If she repudiates the 1992 Consensus, how can she answer to the majority of the public? How should she approach the 2012 presidential election? Will the DPP move toward a scenario in which Tsai Ing-wen eliminates Su Tseng-chang, while Chen Shui-bian coopts Tsai Ing-wen?
Who would have guessed that the paint Tsai Ing-wen laid down in June 2000, would paint her into a corner years later?
蔡英文被自己十年前的油漆刷到牆角
【聯合報╱聯合報】 2010.12.29
馬英九總統透過媒體專訪，要民進黨主席蔡英文說清楚：「承認九二共識嗎？」民進黨方面立刻回應：「民進黨從來就不承認九二共識。」
我們建議民進黨：不要把話說得太早，也不要把話說得太死。因為，沒有「九二共識」，兩岸就沒有「和平發展」。
沒有「九二共識」，兩岸就沒有「和平發展」；這其實是任人皆知之事，民進黨不會不知，蔡英文更不會不知；但民進黨及蔡英文否認「九二共識」，主要是出自黨內鬥爭的因素，不得不然。
五都選舉後，台灣整個政情發生變化，而民進黨內的權力關係尤生巨變。其主要發展動線呈現兩大走向：一、蔡英文聲勢看漲，可能將蘇貞昌等老一輩人物一次洗乾淨；二、相對而言，陳水扁因「一邊一國連線」選舉獲勝，可能成為「黨中之黨」。在兩大走向中，蔡英文洗掉了蘇貞昌等，其實也對陳水扁有利；因此形成了蔡英文已然在黨內與陳水扁的「一邊一國」直接針鋒相對的情勢。蔡英文若反對「九二共識」，主要原因之一即在對陳水扁有顧慮。
話說從頭。二○○○年五月，陳水扁首任總統；六月，在接見美賓時表示，可接受「一個中國／各自表述」的「九二共識」；隔日，即因時任陸委會主委的蔡英文介入，陳水扁又否認此說。不僅如此，陳水扁當時並擬開啟「國統會」的運作，且循李登輝例，由總統自兼國統會主任委員；亦因蔡英文的反對而告吹。也就是說，陳水扁的「新中間路線」，可謂主要是毀於蔡英文之手；蔡既有此紀錄，她現在能不反對「九二共識」嗎？而蔡若贊同「九二共識」，領導「一邊一國」的陳水扁會不與蔡英文算這筆舊帳嗎？
這真是一個歷史大弔詭。在一般國人及民進黨內改革派的想像中，蔡英文是最有可能帶領民進黨轉型的人物；至於轉型的關鍵，則在國家憲政認同與兩岸政策，而「九二共識」更是關鍵中的關鍵；何況，「九二共識」是國民黨打開的鎖鑰，民進黨只要「若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」，即可順水推舟，穩住大局。然而，誰會想到：最有可能帶領民進黨轉型的蔡英文，竟會卡在最具創意，且「現實／發展」、「攻擊／防禦」兼具的「九二共識／一中各表」上面；而卡住的原因，竟是在當年她曾阻擋陳水扁承認「九二共識」，如今遂不能不自食其果。如此昭彰的「因果循環」，在慘烈中透露著無比的荒謬。
我們曾反覆申論「九二共識」的重要，本文略而不贅。總而言之，兩岸今日的「和平發展」，全是建立在「九二共識」上面的；否認「九二共識」，就是要否認這一切「和平發展」。例如：若反對「九二共識」，還能維持ＥＣＦＡ嗎？這難道就是民進黨的主張？就是蔡英文的主張？就是民進黨若在二○一二執政後的治國政策？
何況，蔡英文否認九二共識，究竟是出自對國家當前及未來生存發展的可行方案之考慮？或只是緣於她曾阻擋陳水扁承認「九二共識」致如今已不便改口的「個人因素」？這一點，民進黨要搞清楚，蔡英文自己更要搞清楚。因此，我們建議民進黨，不要把話說得太快，說得太死。問題在於：若否認「九二共識」，將寫出怎樣一部「十年政綱」？
二○○○年六月，蔡英文第一次阻擋陳水扁承認「九二共識」，使民進黨在「一邊一國」的操作中內耗空轉了八年；如今，蔡英文儼然將是民進黨二○一二的總統候選人，難道她又將第二次否認「九二共識」，而與陳水扁的「一邊一國」「分進合擊」？
蔡英文進退兩難。她若承認「九二共識」，如何向陳水扁及深綠交代？若反對，則又如何向多數國人交代？更如何迎對二○一二總統大選？民進黨會不會就此走向「蔡英文洗掉蘇貞昌／陳水扁收拾蔡英文」的下場？
誰會料到：蔡英文在二○○○年六月刷的油漆，在十年後將她自己刷到牆角。
Tuesday, December 28, 2010
Reform Bullies and Protect Their Victims
Reform Bullies and Protect Their Victims
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 28, 2010
School bullying has become a matter of public attention. Everyone considers the problem serious. Everyone agrees on the need for increased prevention. Given such a widespread consensus, the government agencies responsible should immediately look into the matter, and establish mechanisms to prevent bullying. After all, our childrens' development is not something that can wait.
In fact, bullying reflects the dark side of human nature. Education is part of a child's socialization process. Education inculcates self-restraint, respect for others, and the need to abide by certain norms. Anyone who has read the novel, "The Lord of the Flies," knows how children left to run amok, can degenerate into cruelty and barbarism. The campus is a place where children must be educated. It must correct deviant behavior. It must not become a place in which children are subjected to the law of the jungle. It must not become a killing field in which some children are destroyed.
Campuses will always have bullies. Students will always have conflicts. Students will always be subject to ostracism. Recent examples of campus bullying however, suggest some worrying trends.
One. The level of violence has escalated. Many incidents of abuse are quite violent and cruel. They resemble incidents from movies. They have already reached the level of indictable criminal offenses.
Two. Incidents of sexual assault have increased. Many bullying incidents, particularly those with female victims, involve sexual violence. Victims are stripped of their clothing and photographed naked in obscene poses. They are subjected to sexual assault using bottles, and photographs of them are distributed.
Three. Incidents of teenage girls engaging in bullying behavior have increased. Incidents of bullying by girls were once rare. Incidents were mostly verbal attacks or social ostracism. Recently however, the incidence of bullying by female students has increased, and so has the level of violence.
Four. Gangs and illegal drugs have cast a shadow over schools, complicating matters. Many bullies, on and off campus, are gang members. They engage in displays of machismo to impress their peers. Even teachers are intimidated.
Five. Bullying has entered the age of the Internet. The younger generation is intimately familiar with the Internet. Some bullies launch their attacks on the Internet. They spread rumors, isolating the victim. The harm inflicted upon their victims is every bit as great as direct physical harm. Their traumatic impact is increased by the effect of the Internet.
In particular, some bullies see the Internet as a means of showing off. They triumphantly post their videos on the Internet. This amplifies the impact. Such videos wind up circulating on the Internet forever, making the victim's trauma even worse.
Such trends underscore the need for a strong response to campus bullying. In fact, the bullies, their victims, and bystanders, are all affected to a greater or lesser degree. The bullies need isolation and counseling. Their victims need counseling and protection. Bystanders may experience feelings of panic and impotence. They may be afraid they will become the next target. They too may have psychological scars. A bullying environment acclimate members to violence and bullying. They will lose their sense of right and wrong, of fundamental respect for human rights, and of the right to self-defense. All of these problems need to be addressed.
Most people focus on protecting the victims. They want to punish or even ostracize the bully. They want to make campuses safe again. But the source of bullying, the bully himself, is often himself the victim of simplistic labeling and stigmatization. He may have been depicted as a heinous criminal. His background, character, and motivation may be ignored.
But bullies are also children who must be educated. Their problems must also be addressed. They may include family dysfunction, inadequate parenting, and individual or peer group influences. If these children can be reformed, society may be spared future crimes. Give up on them prematurely, refuse to give them another chance, treat them as public enemies, consider only punishment or ostracism, and we will only push more people into the abyss. Our campuses and community will not necessarily be more secure.
As we focus on counseling students who engage in bullying, we must of course ensure that the campus is a safe environment for learning. Students and teachers must be protected by the law. They all have a right to a safe environment. Therefore we must establish an effective communication mechanism to deal with bullying. We already have mechanisms for the prevention of domestic violence, We have anti-fraud hotlines. We should have similar mechanisms to control bullying. Basically schools would be responsible. When the need arises, such agencies would provide assistance.
Most importantly, if schools are concerned about airing their dirty laundry, if they tolerate it or cover up bullying, children will lose their faith in adults and our social institutions. If the bullying reaches the level of an actionable criminal offense, then the police must be notified, and the matter dealt with according to the law. The law protects peoples' basic rights and interests. This line of defense must not be broken merely because the violations occured on campus.
One of the most urgent tasks is to establish a safe environment for children. We must protect children from bullying. We must not give up on children who engage in bullying. Protecting and educating the next generation is the responsibility of adults. On campus or off, we must not let our children down.
保護遭欺學生 也不放棄施霸的孩子
2010-12-28 中國時報
最近校園霸凌的問題成為各方議論的焦點，大家都覺得問題嚴重，也都認為必須加強防制，面對這樣強烈而一致的社會共識，政府相關部門應該迅速協調研究，盡早建立一個防止校園霸凌的機制，畢竟孩子的成長，是不能等待的。
其實校園霸凌只是人性黑暗面的自然反映，孩子在接受教育的社會化過程中，學習約束自我、尊重他人並服從規範。看過名著《蒼蠅王》的都知道，如果放任不管，小孩子也可能變得殘忍野蠻。但是我們也必須了解，校園是培育教化每個孩子的地方，也是矯正偏差行為的重要機會，既不是個任孩子弱肉強食的叢林，也不是要殲滅某些孩子的殺戮戰場。
雖說校園裡總會有些小霸王，或者同學之間會發生衝突或排擠事件，但檢視近來校園霸凌的情節，可以發現一些令人憂心的新趨勢：
第一、暴力程度加劇。許多事件中的凌虐行為相當暴力殘忍，宛如電影情節的翻版，已經達到觸犯刑法的程度。
第二、性侵行為增加。若干霸凌事件，尤其對象是女性時，往往伴隨著帶有強烈性侵犯意味的動作，例如脫衣、拍裸照、猥褻、以酒瓶性侵乃至散播不雅照片等。
第三、少女霸凌事件增加。過去少女較少出現霸凌行為，即使有，型態也多為言語攻擊或社交排擠，但近來女學生的霸凌行為不但增加，暴力程度也加劇。
第四、黑幫與禁藥的陰影進入校園，讓問題益發複雜。不少霸凌者是校園內外黑幫組織的成員，以叫囂鬥狠向同夥展威風，也讓老師心生畏懼。
第五、霸凌網路化。年輕世代的生活和網路密切結合，有些霸凌者是在網路上攻擊、造謠、孤立受害者，對當事人的傷害不亞於直接的肢體傷害，效果還因為網路效應而更加擴大。
尤其，若干霸凌者更把霸凌當成在網上出鋒頭的工具，因此還把影片洋洋得意地ＰＯ上網，傳閱者則推波助瀾，影片在網上全球永流傳，讓受害者的創傷雪上加霜。
上述趨勢，益發凸顯因應校園霸凌問題之迫切性。其實，施霸者、受害者、旁觀者，都受到了不同程度的影響。施霸者需要進行隔離與輔導，受害者需要諮商與保護。而週邊學生感受的恐慌、無力，害怕自己成為下一個目標，同樣會留下心理陰影。而在一個霸凌的環境裡，成員會逐漸習慣暴力欺凌的行為，對何謂不當侵犯、人的基本權益及自我保護的底線、觀念都可能出現偏差，凡此種種，都需要開導指引。
現在各方的討論，大多站在保護受害者的立場，希望懲罰甚至排除霸凌者，還校園一個安全乾淨的空間。但是，霸凌事件的源頭─霸凌者，卻往往被簡單地標籤化與汙名化，彷彿成了十惡不赦的罪犯，他們的成長背景、性格特質、行為動機，反而沒有得到關注。
但這些霸凌者，一樣是需要教育的孩子，他們的問題需要得到正視，原因也許包括家庭失能、教養不足、個性或同儕影響，如果能夠導正這些孩子的偏差，將來社會可能就少了幾椿犯罪事件。如果過早放棄最後拉他們一把的機會，直接把他們當成全民公敵，討之伐之懲處之驅逐之，可能只是把更多人推到墮落黑界，校園與社會都未必能更安全。
在關注於輔導施霸學生的同時，我們當然也必須確保校園是一個安全的學習環境。無論是學生還是老師，在法律保護下，都有權利在一個安全平靜的環境裡生活。因此，一定要建立起有效的霸凌通報處理機制。現在我們已經有防治家暴專線、反詐騙專線，對於校園霸凌，也應該有這樣一個防治機制。基本上由校方負責，必須時再請相關單位協助。
最重要的是，如果校方擔心家醜外揚，予以姑息或掩蓋，孩子會失去對大人、社會體制與價值的信任。如果霸凌行為已經嚴重到了違法的程度，當然必須報警，依照法律程序來處理。法律是保障人民基本權益的防線，這道防線不能一碰到校園就斷了線。
現在的當務之急，是還給孩子一個安全的環境。除保護孩子不受欺凌，也不能放棄施霸的孩子。保護與教育下一代，是我們大人的責任，無論在校園內還是校園外都不該辜負了孩子。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 28, 2010
School bullying has become a matter of public attention. Everyone considers the problem serious. Everyone agrees on the need for increased prevention. Given such a widespread consensus, the government agencies responsible should immediately look into the matter, and establish mechanisms to prevent bullying. After all, our childrens' development is not something that can wait.
In fact, bullying reflects the dark side of human nature. Education is part of a child's socialization process. Education inculcates self-restraint, respect for others, and the need to abide by certain norms. Anyone who has read the novel, "The Lord of the Flies," knows how children left to run amok, can degenerate into cruelty and barbarism. The campus is a place where children must be educated. It must correct deviant behavior. It must not become a place in which children are subjected to the law of the jungle. It must not become a killing field in which some children are destroyed.
Campuses will always have bullies. Students will always have conflicts. Students will always be subject to ostracism. Recent examples of campus bullying however, suggest some worrying trends.
One. The level of violence has escalated. Many incidents of abuse are quite violent and cruel. They resemble incidents from movies. They have already reached the level of indictable criminal offenses.
Two. Incidents of sexual assault have increased. Many bullying incidents, particularly those with female victims, involve sexual violence. Victims are stripped of their clothing and photographed naked in obscene poses. They are subjected to sexual assault using bottles, and photographs of them are distributed.
Three. Incidents of teenage girls engaging in bullying behavior have increased. Incidents of bullying by girls were once rare. Incidents were mostly verbal attacks or social ostracism. Recently however, the incidence of bullying by female students has increased, and so has the level of violence.
Four. Gangs and illegal drugs have cast a shadow over schools, complicating matters. Many bullies, on and off campus, are gang members. They engage in displays of machismo to impress their peers. Even teachers are intimidated.
Five. Bullying has entered the age of the Internet. The younger generation is intimately familiar with the Internet. Some bullies launch their attacks on the Internet. They spread rumors, isolating the victim. The harm inflicted upon their victims is every bit as great as direct physical harm. Their traumatic impact is increased by the effect of the Internet.
In particular, some bullies see the Internet as a means of showing off. They triumphantly post their videos on the Internet. This amplifies the impact. Such videos wind up circulating on the Internet forever, making the victim's trauma even worse.
Such trends underscore the need for a strong response to campus bullying. In fact, the bullies, their victims, and bystanders, are all affected to a greater or lesser degree. The bullies need isolation and counseling. Their victims need counseling and protection. Bystanders may experience feelings of panic and impotence. They may be afraid they will become the next target. They too may have psychological scars. A bullying environment acclimate members to violence and bullying. They will lose their sense of right and wrong, of fundamental respect for human rights, and of the right to self-defense. All of these problems need to be addressed.
Most people focus on protecting the victims. They want to punish or even ostracize the bully. They want to make campuses safe again. But the source of bullying, the bully himself, is often himself the victim of simplistic labeling and stigmatization. He may have been depicted as a heinous criminal. His background, character, and motivation may be ignored.
But bullies are also children who must be educated. Their problems must also be addressed. They may include family dysfunction, inadequate parenting, and individual or peer group influences. If these children can be reformed, society may be spared future crimes. Give up on them prematurely, refuse to give them another chance, treat them as public enemies, consider only punishment or ostracism, and we will only push more people into the abyss. Our campuses and community will not necessarily be more secure.
As we focus on counseling students who engage in bullying, we must of course ensure that the campus is a safe environment for learning. Students and teachers must be protected by the law. They all have a right to a safe environment. Therefore we must establish an effective communication mechanism to deal with bullying. We already have mechanisms for the prevention of domestic violence, We have anti-fraud hotlines. We should have similar mechanisms to control bullying. Basically schools would be responsible. When the need arises, such agencies would provide assistance.
Most importantly, if schools are concerned about airing their dirty laundry, if they tolerate it or cover up bullying, children will lose their faith in adults and our social institutions. If the bullying reaches the level of an actionable criminal offense, then the police must be notified, and the matter dealt with according to the law. The law protects peoples' basic rights and interests. This line of defense must not be broken merely because the violations occured on campus.
One of the most urgent tasks is to establish a safe environment for children. We must protect children from bullying. We must not give up on children who engage in bullying. Protecting and educating the next generation is the responsibility of adults. On campus or off, we must not let our children down.
保護遭欺學生 也不放棄施霸的孩子
2010-12-28 中國時報
最近校園霸凌的問題成為各方議論的焦點，大家都覺得問題嚴重，也都認為必須加強防制，面對這樣強烈而一致的社會共識，政府相關部門應該迅速協調研究，盡早建立一個防止校園霸凌的機制，畢竟孩子的成長，是不能等待的。
其實校園霸凌只是人性黑暗面的自然反映，孩子在接受教育的社會化過程中，學習約束自我、尊重他人並服從規範。看過名著《蒼蠅王》的都知道，如果放任不管，小孩子也可能變得殘忍野蠻。但是我們也必須了解，校園是培育教化每個孩子的地方，也是矯正偏差行為的重要機會，既不是個任孩子弱肉強食的叢林，也不是要殲滅某些孩子的殺戮戰場。
雖說校園裡總會有些小霸王，或者同學之間會發生衝突或排擠事件，但檢視近來校園霸凌的情節，可以發現一些令人憂心的新趨勢：
第一、暴力程度加劇。許多事件中的凌虐行為相當暴力殘忍，宛如電影情節的翻版，已經達到觸犯刑法的程度。
第二、性侵行為增加。若干霸凌事件，尤其對象是女性時，往往伴隨著帶有強烈性侵犯意味的動作，例如脫衣、拍裸照、猥褻、以酒瓶性侵乃至散播不雅照片等。
第三、少女霸凌事件增加。過去少女較少出現霸凌行為，即使有，型態也多為言語攻擊或社交排擠，但近來女學生的霸凌行為不但增加，暴力程度也加劇。
第四、黑幫與禁藥的陰影進入校園，讓問題益發複雜。不少霸凌者是校園內外黑幫組織的成員，以叫囂鬥狠向同夥展威風，也讓老師心生畏懼。
第五、霸凌網路化。年輕世代的生活和網路密切結合，有些霸凌者是在網路上攻擊、造謠、孤立受害者，對當事人的傷害不亞於直接的肢體傷害，效果還因為網路效應而更加擴大。
尤其，若干霸凌者更把霸凌當成在網上出鋒頭的工具，因此還把影片洋洋得意地ＰＯ上網，傳閱者則推波助瀾，影片在網上全球永流傳，讓受害者的創傷雪上加霜。
上述趨勢，益發凸顯因應校園霸凌問題之迫切性。其實，施霸者、受害者、旁觀者，都受到了不同程度的影響。施霸者需要進行隔離與輔導，受害者需要諮商與保護。而週邊學生感受的恐慌、無力，害怕自己成為下一個目標，同樣會留下心理陰影。而在一個霸凌的環境裡，成員會逐漸習慣暴力欺凌的行為，對何謂不當侵犯、人的基本權益及自我保護的底線、觀念都可能出現偏差，凡此種種，都需要開導指引。
現在各方的討論，大多站在保護受害者的立場，希望懲罰甚至排除霸凌者，還校園一個安全乾淨的空間。但是，霸凌事件的源頭─霸凌者，卻往往被簡單地標籤化與汙名化，彷彿成了十惡不赦的罪犯，他們的成長背景、性格特質、行為動機，反而沒有得到關注。
但這些霸凌者，一樣是需要教育的孩子，他們的問題需要得到正視，原因也許包括家庭失能、教養不足、個性或同儕影響，如果能夠導正這些孩子的偏差，將來社會可能就少了幾椿犯罪事件。如果過早放棄最後拉他們一把的機會，直接把他們當成全民公敵，討之伐之懲處之驅逐之，可能只是把更多人推到墮落黑界，校園與社會都未必能更安全。
在關注於輔導施霸學生的同時，我們當然也必須確保校園是一個安全的學習環境。無論是學生還是老師，在法律保護下，都有權利在一個安全平靜的環境裡生活。因此，一定要建立起有效的霸凌通報處理機制。現在我們已經有防治家暴專線、反詐騙專線，對於校園霸凌，也應該有這樣一個防治機制。基本上由校方負責，必須時再請相關單位協助。
最重要的是，如果校方擔心家醜外揚，予以姑息或掩蓋，孩子會失去對大人、社會體制與價值的信任。如果霸凌行為已經嚴重到了違法的程度，當然必須報警，依照法律程序來處理。法律是保障人民基本權益的防線，這道防線不能一碰到校園就斷了線。
現在的當務之急，是還給孩子一個安全的環境。除保護孩子不受欺凌，也不能放棄施霸的孩子。保護與教育下一代，是我們大人的責任，無論在校園內還是校園外都不該辜負了孩子。
Monday, December 27, 2010
DPP Must Adopt a Pragmatic Cross-Strait Policy
DPP Must Adopt a Pragmatic Cross-Strait Policy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 27, 2010
When the Democratic Progressive Party kicks off its 2012 presidential campaign, it must change its cross-Strait policy.
Ideally, the DPP would: One. Abandon its goal of Taiwan independence. Two. Recognize the Republic of China Constitution, without reservation. Three. From this day forward, hold high the red, white, and blue Republic of China flag at all DPP rallies. Such a radical transformation however, is a pipe dream. Everyone knows the DPP cannot possibly implement such changes. Consider the problems, in ascending order. If ROC national flags still cannot be seen within the ranks of the DPP, how can one possibly expect the DPP to recognize the Republic of China -- without reservation? How can one possibly expect the DPP to forsake its goal of Taiwan independence? Conversely, suppose the DPP continues using the "Republic of China" as a fig leaf, even as it refuses to abandon Taiwan independence? Suppose "Nation of Taiwan" flags continue fluttering within the ranks of the DPP? How can the DPP possibly transform its cross-Strait policy?
The Chen regime ruled for eight years, and this was its cross-Strait policy. The ROC flag flew over the Presidential Palace. But at DPP rallies, one saw only a sea of green. The DPP was not a "loyal opposition party" when it was out of power. It was not even a "loyal ruling party" when it was in power. Therefore, when the DPP runs for election in 2012, it must jettison the Chen regime's cross-Strait policy. Chen Shui-bian once affirmed the "five noes." He even paid homage to his Mainland forebears. But later he clamored for the Rectification of Names, and made peace impossible. Therefore if the DPP hopes to return to power in 2012, it needs to undergo just such a radical transformation. Otherwise it will never be able to achieve cross-Strait mutual trust.
However, as we noted above, such an expectation is a pipe dream. Signs suggest that DPP cross-Strait policy is what it has always been. One. To the DPP, "One China" is the PRC. Two. The DPP rejects the "1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations." Three. The DPP expects Beijing to "make concessions" to its Taiwan compatriots, but simultaneously promotes Taiwan independence. Four. The DPP trumpets reform and transformation each time an election rolls around, but "Nation of Taiwan" flags continue to flutter above the heads of supporters. This approach may allow the DPP to win elections. But it will not allow it to govern. The DPP cannot simultaneously maintain economic exchanges while championing Taiwan independence. Cross-Strait relations involve a bottom line. Beijing opposes Taiwan independence. The ruling administration of the Republic of China cannot adopt a policy of Taiwan independence. But it can uphold the right of Taiwan independence advocates to exercise their freedom of speech. The ROC must support the 1992 consensus. Beijing can stress the One China Principle. Taipei can stress One China, Different Interpretations.
If the DPP returns to power because Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, it must abruptly alter its cross-Strait policy. Otherwise upon taking office, it will be hijacked by Beijing. One. Tsai champions the Two States Theory, rejects the 1992 Consensus, and opposes ECFA. If Tsai takes office, Beijing will naturally want to hear the president-elect's views on the 1992 Consensus. If Tsai fails to change her tune before the election, can she really change it after the election? If she does not change her tune, can she really pass muster? Two. Cross-strait economic and social exchanges have passed the point of no return. If the DPP fails to change its cross-Strait policy before the election, it will be forced to rethink it after it assumes power. It cannot repeat the mistake of the Chen regime. It cannot "win the election but lose its direction." Besides, the Chen regime merely had to obstruct the progress of cross-Strait relations. In 2012, a DPP administration must confront a fait accompli. That will be a different matter altogether.
In sum, the DPP's cross-Strait policy for 2012 must get past "backdoor listing." It must abandon its "Taiwan independence party platform." The existence of the "Taiwan independence party platform" has transformed the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" into a template for "backdoor listing." It has also provided a basis for the "Resolution for a Normal Nation" and the "Rectification of Names." If DPP cross-Strait rhetoric cannot get past this framework, how can the DPP achieve bilateral trust?
Suppose the DPP retains its "Taiwan independence party platform?" Suppose Tsai Ing-wen is elected president in 2012? She will immediately become a female counterpart of Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian could avoid being hijacked by Beijing. But Tsai Ing-wen will not be able to escape such a fate.
The DPPs fundamental problem remains its refusal to recognize the national flag. It is willing only to recognize the flag of the "Nation of Taiwan." This is how it feels, even as it attempts to seize power under the ROC Constitution. Its behavior involves an irreconcilable contradiction. The two sides experienced the consequences of this contradiction between 2000 and 2008. That experience is not something they will soon forget.
The DPP must jettison its existing cross-Strait policy. The DPP must think hard about what must be done. But myriad obstacles stand in the way. The DPP must think hard about how it can be done.
民進黨兩岸政策轉型的應然與實然
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.12.27
民進黨為迎對二○一二總統大選，必須調整其兩岸政策。
想像中，最極致的境界是：一、否棄台獨主張；二、不折不扣地回歸中華民國的國家憲政認同；三、從此，民進黨的集會中高舉中華民國青天白日滿地紅的國旗。
不過，這種「一步到位」的想像，是癡人說夢，任誰皆知是民進黨辦不到的。問題其實要從後面說起：如果民進黨的隊伍中仍然看不到國旗，則如何做到不折不扣的中華民國認同？又怎能、怎敢否棄台獨主張？倒過來說，如果仍只是用「中華民國」借殼上市，仍不否棄台獨，隊伍中仍是台灣國的旌旗迎風獵獵，則民進黨的兩岸政策豈有什麼調整轉型的空間？
其實，扁政府八年執政，操持的就是這一套兩岸政策：總統府上懸掛中華民國國旗，但民進黨的集會中仍是一片台獨綠色海洋；證明民進黨非但在野時不是「忠誠的反對黨」，主政時甚至也不是「忠誠的執政黨」。所以，民進黨若要迎對二○一二，即必須要有超越扁政府時代的兩岸政策。陳水扁說過「四不一沒有」，甚至還遙祭黃陵表態認祖歸宗，但後來卻將正名制憲鬧得國無寧日；因而，民進黨若要在二○一二重返執政，恐非做到前述的「最極致的境界」，不足以取信於兩岸之間。
但是，前面已經說過，這是癡人說夢。於是，就目前所見民進黨透露的零星訊息，其未來兩岸政策的輪廓仍是：一、「一個中國」即是中華人民共和國；二、反對「九二共識／一中各表」；三、要北京「讓利」，但也要「台獨」；四、只在選舉口號上求變化，但在群眾隊伍中台灣國的旗幟招展依舊……。這樣的手法，也許可以贏得選舉，但可斷言絕無可能藉以執政；因為，民進黨不可能維持一種既要維持經濟交流又要主張台獨的兩岸關係。兩岸的底線是：北京反對台獨，中華民國主政者則不採台獨政策，但保障台獨的政治言論自由；兩岸共同支持九二共識，大陸強調一中原則，台灣強調一中各表。
倘民進黨以蔡英文當選總統而執政，若不及早調整兩岸政策，在主政後必將受北京的挾制。一、蔡英文主張兩國論，反對九二共識、反對ＥＣＦＡ；蔡若主政後，北京自然想聽到新總統對九二共識的看法。蔡若在選前不改口，難道要在當選後才改口？不改口又豈能過關？二、兩岸經貿及社會各領域的交流已經通過了不可折返點，民進黨若不在選前調整其政治論述，執政後必將重創兩岸關係的運作，從而重蹈扁政府「贏了選舉／輸了路線」之覆轍。何況，扁政府時只是要阻擋兩岸關係的進展而已，但二○一二民進黨若執政則將面臨兩岸已經建立的關係是否切斷的問題，兩者自不可同日而語。
總之，面對二○一二，民進黨的兩岸政策必須超越「借殼上市」的思考，而關鍵則在於《台獨黨綱》的存廢。由於《台獨黨綱》仍在，《台灣前途決議文》即成了「借殼上市」的張本；亦由於《台獨黨綱》仍在，即成了《正常國家決議文》主張「正名制憲」的依據。如果民進黨二○一二的兩岸論述不能跳脫超越這個架構，如何取信於兩岸之間？
倘《台獨黨綱》仍保留，則蔡英文若選上二○一二總統，即成女版的陳水扁；而陳水扁當年尚可不受北京挾制，但蔡英文則無可逃避。
民進黨的根本問題仍在其隊伍中不見國旗、只見台灣國的旗幟；以這樣的體質而欲爭奪中華民國的主政權，其中存有不可克服的矛盾，何況兩岸在二○○○至二○○八已經刻骨銘心地領教過一次。
民進黨應當調整其兩岸政策，這是「應然」的思考；但民進黨的轉型亦存有許多自設的重大障礙，這則是「實然」的難題。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 27, 2010
When the Democratic Progressive Party kicks off its 2012 presidential campaign, it must change its cross-Strait policy.
Ideally, the DPP would: One. Abandon its goal of Taiwan independence. Two. Recognize the Republic of China Constitution, without reservation. Three. From this day forward, hold high the red, white, and blue Republic of China flag at all DPP rallies. Such a radical transformation however, is a pipe dream. Everyone knows the DPP cannot possibly implement such changes. Consider the problems, in ascending order. If ROC national flags still cannot be seen within the ranks of the DPP, how can one possibly expect the DPP to recognize the Republic of China -- without reservation? How can one possibly expect the DPP to forsake its goal of Taiwan independence? Conversely, suppose the DPP continues using the "Republic of China" as a fig leaf, even as it refuses to abandon Taiwan independence? Suppose "Nation of Taiwan" flags continue fluttering within the ranks of the DPP? How can the DPP possibly transform its cross-Strait policy?
The Chen regime ruled for eight years, and this was its cross-Strait policy. The ROC flag flew over the Presidential Palace. But at DPP rallies, one saw only a sea of green. The DPP was not a "loyal opposition party" when it was out of power. It was not even a "loyal ruling party" when it was in power. Therefore, when the DPP runs for election in 2012, it must jettison the Chen regime's cross-Strait policy. Chen Shui-bian once affirmed the "five noes." He even paid homage to his Mainland forebears. But later he clamored for the Rectification of Names, and made peace impossible. Therefore if the DPP hopes to return to power in 2012, it needs to undergo just such a radical transformation. Otherwise it will never be able to achieve cross-Strait mutual trust.
However, as we noted above, such an expectation is a pipe dream. Signs suggest that DPP cross-Strait policy is what it has always been. One. To the DPP, "One China" is the PRC. Two. The DPP rejects the "1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations." Three. The DPP expects Beijing to "make concessions" to its Taiwan compatriots, but simultaneously promotes Taiwan independence. Four. The DPP trumpets reform and transformation each time an election rolls around, but "Nation of Taiwan" flags continue to flutter above the heads of supporters. This approach may allow the DPP to win elections. But it will not allow it to govern. The DPP cannot simultaneously maintain economic exchanges while championing Taiwan independence. Cross-Strait relations involve a bottom line. Beijing opposes Taiwan independence. The ruling administration of the Republic of China cannot adopt a policy of Taiwan independence. But it can uphold the right of Taiwan independence advocates to exercise their freedom of speech. The ROC must support the 1992 consensus. Beijing can stress the One China Principle. Taipei can stress One China, Different Interpretations.
If the DPP returns to power because Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, it must abruptly alter its cross-Strait policy. Otherwise upon taking office, it will be hijacked by Beijing. One. Tsai champions the Two States Theory, rejects the 1992 Consensus, and opposes ECFA. If Tsai takes office, Beijing will naturally want to hear the president-elect's views on the 1992 Consensus. If Tsai fails to change her tune before the election, can she really change it after the election? If she does not change her tune, can she really pass muster? Two. Cross-strait economic and social exchanges have passed the point of no return. If the DPP fails to change its cross-Strait policy before the election, it will be forced to rethink it after it assumes power. It cannot repeat the mistake of the Chen regime. It cannot "win the election but lose its direction." Besides, the Chen regime merely had to obstruct the progress of cross-Strait relations. In 2012, a DPP administration must confront a fait accompli. That will be a different matter altogether.
In sum, the DPP's cross-Strait policy for 2012 must get past "backdoor listing." It must abandon its "Taiwan independence party platform." The existence of the "Taiwan independence party platform" has transformed the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" into a template for "backdoor listing." It has also provided a basis for the "Resolution for a Normal Nation" and the "Rectification of Names." If DPP cross-Strait rhetoric cannot get past this framework, how can the DPP achieve bilateral trust?
Suppose the DPP retains its "Taiwan independence party platform?" Suppose Tsai Ing-wen is elected president in 2012? She will immediately become a female counterpart of Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian could avoid being hijacked by Beijing. But Tsai Ing-wen will not be able to escape such a fate.
The DPPs fundamental problem remains its refusal to recognize the national flag. It is willing only to recognize the flag of the "Nation of Taiwan." This is how it feels, even as it attempts to seize power under the ROC Constitution. Its behavior involves an irreconcilable contradiction. The two sides experienced the consequences of this contradiction between 2000 and 2008. That experience is not something they will soon forget.
The DPP must jettison its existing cross-Strait policy. The DPP must think hard about what must be done. But myriad obstacles stand in the way. The DPP must think hard about how it can be done.
民進黨兩岸政策轉型的應然與實然
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.12.27
民進黨為迎對二○一二總統大選，必須調整其兩岸政策。
想像中，最極致的境界是：一、否棄台獨主張；二、不折不扣地回歸中華民國的國家憲政認同；三、從此，民進黨的集會中高舉中華民國青天白日滿地紅的國旗。
不過，這種「一步到位」的想像，是癡人說夢，任誰皆知是民進黨辦不到的。問題其實要從後面說起：如果民進黨的隊伍中仍然看不到國旗，則如何做到不折不扣的中華民國認同？又怎能、怎敢否棄台獨主張？倒過來說，如果仍只是用「中華民國」借殼上市，仍不否棄台獨，隊伍中仍是台灣國的旌旗迎風獵獵，則民進黨的兩岸政策豈有什麼調整轉型的空間？
其實，扁政府八年執政，操持的就是這一套兩岸政策：總統府上懸掛中華民國國旗，但民進黨的集會中仍是一片台獨綠色海洋；證明民進黨非但在野時不是「忠誠的反對黨」，主政時甚至也不是「忠誠的執政黨」。所以，民進黨若要迎對二○一二，即必須要有超越扁政府時代的兩岸政策。陳水扁說過「四不一沒有」，甚至還遙祭黃陵表態認祖歸宗，但後來卻將正名制憲鬧得國無寧日；因而，民進黨若要在二○一二重返執政，恐非做到前述的「最極致的境界」，不足以取信於兩岸之間。
但是，前面已經說過，這是癡人說夢。於是，就目前所見民進黨透露的零星訊息，其未來兩岸政策的輪廓仍是：一、「一個中國」即是中華人民共和國；二、反對「九二共識／一中各表」；三、要北京「讓利」，但也要「台獨」；四、只在選舉口號上求變化，但在群眾隊伍中台灣國的旗幟招展依舊……。這樣的手法，也許可以贏得選舉，但可斷言絕無可能藉以執政；因為，民進黨不可能維持一種既要維持經濟交流又要主張台獨的兩岸關係。兩岸的底線是：北京反對台獨，中華民國主政者則不採台獨政策，但保障台獨的政治言論自由；兩岸共同支持九二共識，大陸強調一中原則，台灣強調一中各表。
倘民進黨以蔡英文當選總統而執政，若不及早調整兩岸政策，在主政後必將受北京的挾制。一、蔡英文主張兩國論，反對九二共識、反對ＥＣＦＡ；蔡若主政後，北京自然想聽到新總統對九二共識的看法。蔡若在選前不改口，難道要在當選後才改口？不改口又豈能過關？二、兩岸經貿及社會各領域的交流已經通過了不可折返點，民進黨若不在選前調整其政治論述，執政後必將重創兩岸關係的運作，從而重蹈扁政府「贏了選舉／輸了路線」之覆轍。何況，扁政府時只是要阻擋兩岸關係的進展而已，但二○一二民進黨若執政則將面臨兩岸已經建立的關係是否切斷的問題，兩者自不可同日而語。
總之，面對二○一二，民進黨的兩岸政策必須超越「借殼上市」的思考，而關鍵則在於《台獨黨綱》的存廢。由於《台獨黨綱》仍在，《台灣前途決議文》即成了「借殼上市」的張本；亦由於《台獨黨綱》仍在，即成了《正常國家決議文》主張「正名制憲」的依據。如果民進黨二○一二的兩岸論述不能跳脫超越這個架構，如何取信於兩岸之間？
倘《台獨黨綱》仍保留，則蔡英文若選上二○一二總統，即成女版的陳水扁；而陳水扁當年尚可不受北京挾制，但蔡英文則無可逃避。
民進黨的根本問題仍在其隊伍中不見國旗、只見台灣國的旗幟；以這樣的體質而欲爭奪中華民國的主政權，其中存有不可克服的矛盾，何況兩岸在二○○○至二○○八已經刻骨銘心地領教過一次。
民進黨應當調整其兩岸政策，這是「應然」的思考；但民進黨的轉型亦存有許多自設的重大障礙，這則是「實然」的難題。
Friday, December 24, 2010
Exercises from the Sixth Jiang/Chen Meeting
Exercises from the Sixth Jiang/Chen Meeting
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 24, 2010
The sixth Chiang/Chen meeting has drawn to a close. The two sides have successfully reached an agreement on "cross-Strait medical and health cooperation." But the meeting has also provoked a string of questions. These questions are even more intriguing than the results of the sixth Chiang/Chen meeting.
The first question concerns the consultation mechanism adopted by the two organizations, and the status of the two organizations. An agreement on investment insurance has yet to be reached. The establishment of a Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee (CSECC) has been postponed. This has raised questions about what the Chiang/Chen meeting accomplished. It has also induced the two sides to issue comments testing the waters. SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung said if the two sides fail to sign an agreement, they need not convene another Chiang/Chen meeting. PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi responded. He said the purpose of the meetings was not merely to sign agreements. It was also to establish a system for future consultations. Indeed, if one recalls the history of previous consultations, not all of them led to the signing of agreements. The Chiang/Chen meetings established an institutionalized consultation mechanism. The MAC considers this one of its major policy achievements.
Chiang's statement however, did make a valid point. Look at the 15 cross-Strait agreements that have been reached. Nearly all of them led to articles establishing direct cross-Strait links, to information exchanges, and to problem-solving between competent authorities. Suppose the status of agreements reached by the two organizations remains unchanged. More cross-Strait agreements will be signed. Fewer and fewer agreements will require the two organizations to act as buffers. But without the two organizations acting as buffers, simmering cross-Strait political issues will be laid bare, and lead to confrontations. That is hardly an answer. Therefore the sixth Chiang/Chen meeting has made another contribution. It has underscored a need to rethink the status of the two organizations.
The second question concerns the postponement of the establishment of a CSECC. The government has never fully explained the nature of the CSECC. Everyone is confused. They misinterpret its significance. This leads to widespread misunderstandings. In fact, the function of the CSECC is quite simple. It is to clarify the position of the ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs to the PRC Commerce Department. It does not change the status quo. This includes other systems, including those under the aegis of the Legislative Yuan. The opposition DPP has caricatured it as some sort of superauthority. In fact the CSECC will merely coordinate and integrate Taipei's negotiation resources in a synergistic manner. This will be highly beneficial to Taipei, When the DPP government negotiated a free trade agreement (FTA) in the past, it established similar institutions. The government erred when it negotiated ECFA. It failed to specify its function and the benefits it would bring. It failed to promptly rebut the opposition DPP's false allegations, It allowed a non-issue to spread and become an issue.
The third and final question concerns the cross-Strait investment protection agreement. Investment insurance agreements reduce the risk of overseas investment. They serve as incentives to increase mutual investment. They are mechanisms that have been adopted by the international community, not just Taipei and Beijing. Beijing has insurance agreements with over one hundred other governments. Taipei has concluded agreements for investment promotion and protection with 26 governments, Among these, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and India do not have diplomatic relations with Taipei, but would nevertheless like to conclude FTAs. Insurance agreements are not nearly as politically sensitive as FTAs or ECFA. But even cross-Strait negotiations over insurance agreement are beset with difficulties. According to Zheng Lizhong, vice chairman of ARATS, the two sides have yet to reach a consensus on the definition of cross-Strait investment, investment benefits, investment facilitation, expropriation compensation, and dispute settlement. This covers almost all issues of disagreement. This means that not one word has been written on cross-Strait insurance agreements!
Insurance agreements involve a broad range of complex legal issues. Negotiations will consume both time and energy. That is understandable. But in the final analysis, both sides must take a step back so they can see the big picture. Beijing should not be such a stickler over the institutional arrangements. Taipei should open itself up more to Mainland capital. It should adopt a more flexible attitude toward the formal aspects of mainland investment arbitration. Investment on the Mainland has reached record highs. Increasing the amount of protection afforded to Taiwan businessmen and their personal property, will benefit everyone. Businessman abroad have always placed a high priority on harmonious relations. Few are likely to sue the government. In fact, virtually no arbitration cases have arisen among the nations with which Beijing has signed insurance agreements. Even assuming grievances requiring lawsuits arise, Beijing already has a wide range of mediation channels.
As for Taiwan, insurance agreements are merely a means. The end is the promotion of investments. A multitude of restrictions continue to limit Mainland investments on Taiwan. If Mainland capital cannot come to Taiwan, what good is an an agreement providing investment insurance? The five cities elections have drawn to a close. The legislative elections have yet to begin, Now is the time to promote the next wave of Mainland investments, to issue an active expression of goodwill. Allowing Mainland capital to enter will facilitate an investment insurance agreement. But that is hardly its main purpose. Its main purpose is to lay a foundation for even larger scale cross-Strait interaction.
江陳六會留下的習題
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.12.24
第六次江陳會落幕，並順利完成「兩岸醫藥衛生合作協議」的洽簽。但這次會議所挑起的一連串問題與答案，反而比江陳六會的成果還值得關注。
首先是兩會協商機制的功能與定位問題。由於投保協議未及完成與經合會延後宣布成立，引發外界質疑江陳會的成果，也使得兩岸分別對兩會協商的功能與定位，拋出試水溫的言論。海基會江丙坤董事長表示，兩岸未來若無協議可簽，江陳會可不召開；中共國台辦主任王毅則回應，兩會功能不僅是簽協議，仍應保持制度化的協商。確實，回顧兩會協商的歷史，並非都以簽署協議為目的，而且陸委會也把透過江陳會建立的兩岸制度性協商機制，列為重大政策之一。
然而，江丙坤的說法，好像也不是無的放矢。仔細看看兩岸目前完成的十五項協議，幾乎都有建立兩岸主管機關直接聯繫、資訊交換及解決問題的條款。換言之，若兩會事務性協商的定位不調整，兩岸協議簽得愈多，需要藉由兩會這個白手套協商的議題就愈少；但若沒有兩會機制作為緩衝，兩岸間許多隱而未發的政治問題，就須赤裸裸地攤開碰撞，其實並非良策。因此，江陳六會的另一個貢獻，就是彰顯出重新思考兩會協商定位的急迫性。
第二個關注的焦點，是延後宣布成立兩岸經合會。政府對經合會的性質一直沒有說清楚，大家在霧裡看花下以辭害義，頗多誤解。其實，經合會的功能很單純，就是把ＥＣＦＡ談判時，台灣經濟部對大陸商務部的協商平台明文化而已，並未改變現狀下包含立法院審議在內的其他制度，遑論成為反對黨所謂的太上組織。以經合會協調、整合談判資源所發揮的綜效，對台灣特別有利，而且過去民進黨政府時代洽簽的自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）中，也有成立類似機構。但是，政府又犯了洽簽ＥＣＦＡ時的錯誤，非但沒有具體說明其功能與利益，更未在第一時間有效導正這些錯謬的指控，使得這個不應是議題的議題擴散蔓延。
最後是兩岸投資保護協議的問題。透過投保協議降低海外投資風險，作為增加相互投資的誘因，是國際乃至於兩岸普遍採行的機制。中國大陸與其他國家的投保協定已經超過一百個，台灣也已締結了廿六個投資促進及保護協定，其中包括印尼、菲律賓、馬來西亞、越南與印度等我國想締結ＦＴＡ的非邦交國，可見投保協議的政治敏感度，遠不如ＦＴＡ或ＥＣＦＡ，但兩岸談起投保協議卻是困難重重。依據大陸海協會副會長鄭立中的說明，兩岸對於投資定義、投資待遇、投資便利、徵收補償、爭端解決等事項，都尚未形成共識。這些幾乎涵蓋了整部協議主要內容的分歧議題，其實代表著兩岸投保協議八字還沒一撇！
投保協議涉及高度法律問題，涵蓋面也很廣，談起來費時費神，可以理解；但追根究柢，其關鍵是兩岸都需要退一步、看大局的胸襟；除了大陸方面不應拘泥於機制安排的形式外，台灣也要有進一步開放陸資的體認與決心。對於大陸對投資仲裁等形式上的憂慮，其實可以更彈性的思維面對；畢竟台商在大陸投資金額屢創新高，提升對台商財產與人身的保護，正是利人利己之事；何況商人在外一向以和為貴，走上告政府一途者恐怕有限。事實上，大陸政府與他國所簽的投保協議中，幾乎沒有發生過仲裁案件。即使真有非告不可的冤屈，大陸當局原本就應利用各種調解協助化解。
至於台灣，畢竟投保協議只是一種手段，其目的在於促進相互投資。在陸資來台限制仍然很高的情形下，大陸投資既無法入場，又何來利用投保協議促進的意義。因此，在五都已選完、立委選舉未到的此刻，正是推動下一波陸資開放、主動釋放善意的時機。當然，開放陸資並非單純為了促成投保協議，而是一種在更大的格局下，創造未來兩岸互動新局的基礎。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 24, 2010
The sixth Chiang/Chen meeting has drawn to a close. The two sides have successfully reached an agreement on "cross-Strait medical and health cooperation." But the meeting has also provoked a string of questions. These questions are even more intriguing than the results of the sixth Chiang/Chen meeting.
The first question concerns the consultation mechanism adopted by the two organizations, and the status of the two organizations. An agreement on investment insurance has yet to be reached. The establishment of a Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee (CSECC) has been postponed. This has raised questions about what the Chiang/Chen meeting accomplished. It has also induced the two sides to issue comments testing the waters. SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung said if the two sides fail to sign an agreement, they need not convene another Chiang/Chen meeting. PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi responded. He said the purpose of the meetings was not merely to sign agreements. It was also to establish a system for future consultations. Indeed, if one recalls the history of previous consultations, not all of them led to the signing of agreements. The Chiang/Chen meetings established an institutionalized consultation mechanism. The MAC considers this one of its major policy achievements.
Chiang's statement however, did make a valid point. Look at the 15 cross-Strait agreements that have been reached. Nearly all of them led to articles establishing direct cross-Strait links, to information exchanges, and to problem-solving between competent authorities. Suppose the status of agreements reached by the two organizations remains unchanged. More cross-Strait agreements will be signed. Fewer and fewer agreements will require the two organizations to act as buffers. But without the two organizations acting as buffers, simmering cross-Strait political issues will be laid bare, and lead to confrontations. That is hardly an answer. Therefore the sixth Chiang/Chen meeting has made another contribution. It has underscored a need to rethink the status of the two organizations.
The second question concerns the postponement of the establishment of a CSECC. The government has never fully explained the nature of the CSECC. Everyone is confused. They misinterpret its significance. This leads to widespread misunderstandings. In fact, the function of the CSECC is quite simple. It is to clarify the position of the ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs to the PRC Commerce Department. It does not change the status quo. This includes other systems, including those under the aegis of the Legislative Yuan. The opposition DPP has caricatured it as some sort of superauthority. In fact the CSECC will merely coordinate and integrate Taipei's negotiation resources in a synergistic manner. This will be highly beneficial to Taipei, When the DPP government negotiated a free trade agreement (FTA) in the past, it established similar institutions. The government erred when it negotiated ECFA. It failed to specify its function and the benefits it would bring. It failed to promptly rebut the opposition DPP's false allegations, It allowed a non-issue to spread and become an issue.
The third and final question concerns the cross-Strait investment protection agreement. Investment insurance agreements reduce the risk of overseas investment. They serve as incentives to increase mutual investment. They are mechanisms that have been adopted by the international community, not just Taipei and Beijing. Beijing has insurance agreements with over one hundred other governments. Taipei has concluded agreements for investment promotion and protection with 26 governments, Among these, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and India do not have diplomatic relations with Taipei, but would nevertheless like to conclude FTAs. Insurance agreements are not nearly as politically sensitive as FTAs or ECFA. But even cross-Strait negotiations over insurance agreement are beset with difficulties. According to Zheng Lizhong, vice chairman of ARATS, the two sides have yet to reach a consensus on the definition of cross-Strait investment, investment benefits, investment facilitation, expropriation compensation, and dispute settlement. This covers almost all issues of disagreement. This means that not one word has been written on cross-Strait insurance agreements!
Insurance agreements involve a broad range of complex legal issues. Negotiations will consume both time and energy. That is understandable. But in the final analysis, both sides must take a step back so they can see the big picture. Beijing should not be such a stickler over the institutional arrangements. Taipei should open itself up more to Mainland capital. It should adopt a more flexible attitude toward the formal aspects of mainland investment arbitration. Investment on the Mainland has reached record highs. Increasing the amount of protection afforded to Taiwan businessmen and their personal property, will benefit everyone. Businessman abroad have always placed a high priority on harmonious relations. Few are likely to sue the government. In fact, virtually no arbitration cases have arisen among the nations with which Beijing has signed insurance agreements. Even assuming grievances requiring lawsuits arise, Beijing already has a wide range of mediation channels.
As for Taiwan, insurance agreements are merely a means. The end is the promotion of investments. A multitude of restrictions continue to limit Mainland investments on Taiwan. If Mainland capital cannot come to Taiwan, what good is an an agreement providing investment insurance? The five cities elections have drawn to a close. The legislative elections have yet to begin, Now is the time to promote the next wave of Mainland investments, to issue an active expression of goodwill. Allowing Mainland capital to enter will facilitate an investment insurance agreement. But that is hardly its main purpose. Its main purpose is to lay a foundation for even larger scale cross-Strait interaction.
江陳六會留下的習題
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.12.24
第六次江陳會落幕，並順利完成「兩岸醫藥衛生合作協議」的洽簽。但這次會議所挑起的一連串問題與答案，反而比江陳六會的成果還值得關注。
首先是兩會協商機制的功能與定位問題。由於投保協議未及完成與經合會延後宣布成立，引發外界質疑江陳會的成果，也使得兩岸分別對兩會協商的功能與定位，拋出試水溫的言論。海基會江丙坤董事長表示，兩岸未來若無協議可簽，江陳會可不召開；中共國台辦主任王毅則回應，兩會功能不僅是簽協議，仍應保持制度化的協商。確實，回顧兩會協商的歷史，並非都以簽署協議為目的，而且陸委會也把透過江陳會建立的兩岸制度性協商機制，列為重大政策之一。
然而，江丙坤的說法，好像也不是無的放矢。仔細看看兩岸目前完成的十五項協議，幾乎都有建立兩岸主管機關直接聯繫、資訊交換及解決問題的條款。換言之，若兩會事務性協商的定位不調整，兩岸協議簽得愈多，需要藉由兩會這個白手套協商的議題就愈少；但若沒有兩會機制作為緩衝，兩岸間許多隱而未發的政治問題，就須赤裸裸地攤開碰撞，其實並非良策。因此，江陳六會的另一個貢獻，就是彰顯出重新思考兩會協商定位的急迫性。
第二個關注的焦點，是延後宣布成立兩岸經合會。政府對經合會的性質一直沒有說清楚，大家在霧裡看花下以辭害義，頗多誤解。其實，經合會的功能很單純，就是把ＥＣＦＡ談判時，台灣經濟部對大陸商務部的協商平台明文化而已，並未改變現狀下包含立法院審議在內的其他制度，遑論成為反對黨所謂的太上組織。以經合會協調、整合談判資源所發揮的綜效，對台灣特別有利，而且過去民進黨政府時代洽簽的自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）中，也有成立類似機構。但是，政府又犯了洽簽ＥＣＦＡ時的錯誤，非但沒有具體說明其功能與利益，更未在第一時間有效導正這些錯謬的指控，使得這個不應是議題的議題擴散蔓延。
最後是兩岸投資保護協議的問題。透過投保協議降低海外投資風險，作為增加相互投資的誘因，是國際乃至於兩岸普遍採行的機制。中國大陸與其他國家的投保協定已經超過一百個，台灣也已締結了廿六個投資促進及保護協定，其中包括印尼、菲律賓、馬來西亞、越南與印度等我國想締結ＦＴＡ的非邦交國，可見投保協議的政治敏感度，遠不如ＦＴＡ或ＥＣＦＡ，但兩岸談起投保協議卻是困難重重。依據大陸海協會副會長鄭立中的說明，兩岸對於投資定義、投資待遇、投資便利、徵收補償、爭端解決等事項，都尚未形成共識。這些幾乎涵蓋了整部協議主要內容的分歧議題，其實代表著兩岸投保協議八字還沒一撇！
投保協議涉及高度法律問題，涵蓋面也很廣，談起來費時費神，可以理解；但追根究柢，其關鍵是兩岸都需要退一步、看大局的胸襟；除了大陸方面不應拘泥於機制安排的形式外，台灣也要有進一步開放陸資的體認與決心。對於大陸對投資仲裁等形式上的憂慮，其實可以更彈性的思維面對；畢竟台商在大陸投資金額屢創新高，提升對台商財產與人身的保護，正是利人利己之事；何況商人在外一向以和為貴，走上告政府一途者恐怕有限。事實上，大陸政府與他國所簽的投保協議中，幾乎沒有發生過仲裁案件。即使真有非告不可的冤屈，大陸當局原本就應利用各種調解協助化解。
至於台灣，畢竟投保協議只是一種手段，其目的在於促進相互投資。在陸資來台限制仍然很高的情形下，大陸投資既無法入場，又何來利用投保協議促進的意義。因此，在五都已選完、立委選舉未到的此刻，正是推動下一波陸資開放、主動釋放善意的時機。當然，開放陸資並非單純為了促成投保協議，而是一種在更大的格局下，創造未來兩岸互動新局的基礎。
Thursday, December 23, 2010
Moment of Truth for DPP Cross-Strait Policy
Moment of Truth for DPP Cross-Strait Policy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 23, 2010
The sixth Chiang/Chen summit will be held this week at the Grand Hotel in Taipei. ARATS President Chen Yunlin felt compelled to comment. He said, "History sometimes brings surprising coincidences." Two years ago, Chiang and Chen met for the first time, at the same time of year, a the same location. At that time however, the DPP staged violent protests. The ruling administration placed tens of thousands of police on full alert. The enemy was at the gates. Given intense political and social polarization on Taiwan, a conflagration could have broken out at any moment.
Two years later however, things are moving along with ease. The two sides have signed ECFA, the most historic agreement since the two sides instituted separate rule. Five hundred and fifty-seven items on the early harvest list will enjoy tax breaks starting on New Year's Day next year. Industry tariffs will be cut by over one billion NT in the first year. More importantly, DPP legislators might continue protesting in the Legislative Yuan. But DPP party chairman Tsai Ing-wen has already assured the media that if she is elected president in 2012, she "will continue the previous administration's policies." During the recent five cities elections, not a single Green Camp candidate challenged ECFA. This was true even in the Deep Green bastions of Tainan and Kaohsiung. Why? Because according to the DPP's own polls, over half the public on Taiwan supports ECFA. The DPP is nothing if not adept at electioneering. It is not about to shoot itself in the foot at election time.
Chiang and Chen have already met six times. Cross-Strait economic exchanges are now closer than ever. Some industries are even further along in their integration. They have passed the point of no return. The two sides might not engage in political talks for the time being. But attempts to promote a referendum to author a new constitution failed during the Chen Shui-bian era. De jure independence is no longer a possibility. That is a reality the DPP cannot ignore. This political and economic situation is consistent with the wishes of most of the public, which prefers to maintain the status quo, No political party or politician can ignore this reality.
The DPP may attempt to spin the five cities elections as a contest over "governing ability." It may attempt to deliberately avoid the issue of cross-Strait policy. But during the upcoming presidential election, it cannot fall back on the catechism, "we will continue the former administration's policies." The sixth Chiang/Chen summit is now discussing matters of practical policy. Officials from the two sides are negotiating ECFA and financial sector MOUs. The two sides are even signing mutual legal assistance agreements, expressing respect for each others' jurisdiction. Meanwhile, all the DPP can talk about is Taiwan independence ideology, rather than concrete, pragmatic cross-Strait policy. How can the DPP possibly persuade the public it has "governing ability?"
Following the five cities elections, "China policy" has reportedly become a hot topic within the DPP. Green Camp think tanks are experiencing a wave of "China fever." As a matter of fact, "DPP fever," a complementary phenomenon on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, is also in full swing. Both sides appear to be taking a closer look at each other. From the perspective of cross-Strait peace and development, we of course welcome this new atmosphere of closer communication. Communication of course does not equate with policy change. In fact, exchanges between private sector think tanks on the Mainland and the DPP have been going on for years. But DPP cross-Strait policy strategy has yet to catch up with the times. If the DPP wants to adopt a pragmatic cross-Strait policy, the key will be its leaders' will power.
This is surely Tsai Ing-wen's most difficult challenge. Ever since Chen Shui-bian overturned his own "five noes" during his last days in office, the DPP has avoided the topic of cross-Strait policy. As a result, extreme Sinophobia has been the DPP's guiding concept. The presidential election is just around the corner. The DPP is an eleventh hour convert. But how will it breach the topic of cross-Strait policy, without touching off internecine warfare? That will be something of a feat.
This is especially true because Taiwan independence extremism has already taken hold within the DPP. Members of the "one nation on each side connection" carried signs expressing support for Chen Shui-bian. During the recent five cities elections, they comprised nearly 9% of the vote. This means they have already crossed the 5% legal threshold for recognition as a political party. Even if they withdrew from the DPP, they could still make their strength felt. Therefore they have enough strength to threaten Tsai Ing-wen. Taiwan independence extremists within the DPP have considerable organzational ability. This makes compromise within the DPP extremely difficult.
Compromise may be urgent and difficult. But the 2012 presidential election looms. The DPP cannot avoid the issue of cross-Strait policy. It desperately wants to win this office. Over the past year, the DPP has managed to hold its ground. The public may not support the party's cross-Strait policy. But it is dissatisfied with the worsening gap between rich and poor. Therefore it demanded that the KMT pay the price.
"It's the inequality, stupid!" This is the lesson of the five cities elections. The DPP has nearly enough strength to achieve a simple majority. If it can cash in on this resentment, and propose relevant economic and fiscal policies, it may even win over Pale Blue voters. On the other hand, if the DPP reverts to its old hatreds, it will probably lose the swing voters who supported it during the past year. Can the DPP's Platform for the Coming Decade set a new tone for 2012? The moment of truth has arrived.
民進黨兩岸路線 已到關鍵時刻
2010-12-23 中國時報
六次江陳會本周在台北圓山飯店舉行，大陸海協會會長陳雲林有感而發的說，「歷史有時會出現令人驚奇的巧合」，和兩年前首次江陳會同樣的季節、同樣的地點，但是當時民進黨帶頭烽火抗爭，執政黨派出上萬員警嚴陣以待、如臨大敵，台灣政治、社會在這樣的激烈對決中，衝突可能一觸即發。
兩年後的今天，卻是輕舟已過萬重山，兩岸簽下分治以來最具歷史性的ＥＣＦＡ經貿協定，有五百五十七項早收清單將自明年元旦起降稅，第一年的產業降稅利益達百億以上，更重要的是，民進黨立委雖在立院強烈抗爭，但民進黨黨主席蔡英文之後接受媒體專訪時卻表達「將延續前朝政策」。這次五都選舉時沒有任何綠營選將質疑ＥＣＦＡ，即使在深綠大本營的台南、高雄亦然，因為，根據民進黨內部民調，台灣民眾超過五成支持兩岸簽ＥＣＦＡ，擅長選舉的民進黨，當然不會在選舉時攖其鋒。
可以說，六次江陳會下來，現階段兩岸經濟上的密切交流、甚至部分產業的進一步整合，已是無法回頭的趨勢；另一個民進黨無法忽視的現實是，即使兩岸短期內不會進行政治談判，但經過陳水扁時代的公投制憲暴衝實驗失敗，法理台獨的可能性也完全斷絕。這樣的政治經濟情勢，頗符合目前維持現狀的多數民意，也是任何政黨或政治人物無法忽視的政治現實。
民進黨可以將五都選舉定調為治理能力之爭，刻意迴避兩岸政策，但接下來的總統大選，卻不能只靠「延續前朝政策」就一語帶過，當六次江陳會已走到實際政策層面，不但兩岸官員參與ＥＣＦＡ及金融ＭＯＵ談判，兩岸甚至簽下司法互助協定、尊重對岸的司法管轄權時，民進黨若只能空談極獨意識形態，而不能提出具體務實的兩岸政策，如何讓人民相信民進黨有治理能力？
五都選後，據傳中國政策已成民進黨新顯學，綠營智庫興起中國熱。其實，和這個現象互補的則是對岸的民進黨熱，雙方似乎重新正視對方，站在兩岸和平發展的角度，我們對這樣的交流氣氛當然樂觀其成，但是，交流不代表政策調整，事實上對岸智庫與民進黨人士私下交流，這幾年從未斷過，但民進黨的兩岸方向卻還是無法與時俱進，可以說，民進黨要提出務實的兩岸政策，最重要的關鍵還是領導人的意志力。
對蔡英文來說，這確實是艱困的挑戰，畢竟自從陳水扁在任期末推翻自己提出的「四不一沒有」後，民進黨內一直迴避討論兩岸政策，因此極端反中、仇中才是民進黨內的主導意見，現在，總統大選在即，民進黨臨陣抱佛腳，但如何討論兩岸政策的同時，不跟著引爆民進黨內鬨，這是相當高難度的挑戰。
尤其，民進黨內極獨勢力已經卓然成形，扛著扁招牌的一邊一國連線，這次初試啼聲就拿下將近百分之九的選票，這個數字的意涵是，他們已跨過政黨得票百分之五的門檻，即使離開民進黨也有進軍國會的實力，因此也就具足以要脅蔡英文的實力，民進黨內極獨勢力的組織化，其實就預告了民進黨內部協調的難度。
只是，時間再急迫，協調再困難，面對二○一二總統大選，民進黨終究不可能跳過兩岸政策，就想要直攻大位。畢竟，這一年來，民進黨之所以能在歷次選舉中保持佳績，並非人民支持該黨的兩岸政策，最主要的原因在於人民不滿日漸惡化的貧富差距，因此要求執政的國民黨付出代價。
問題在分配！這是五都大選給政治人物的教訓，若能以這股民怨做為選戰主軸，提出相關經濟、財稅措施，已接近過半實力的民進黨，還可能再爭取到淺藍選票；相反的，民進黨若又走回仇中的老路，只怕這一年來爭取到的中間選票，也會流失。民進黨的十年政綱，如何為二○一二定調，現在真的已到關鍵時刻。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 23, 2010
The sixth Chiang/Chen summit will be held this week at the Grand Hotel in Taipei. ARATS President Chen Yunlin felt compelled to comment. He said, "History sometimes brings surprising coincidences." Two years ago, Chiang and Chen met for the first time, at the same time of year, a the same location. At that time however, the DPP staged violent protests. The ruling administration placed tens of thousands of police on full alert. The enemy was at the gates. Given intense political and social polarization on Taiwan, a conflagration could have broken out at any moment.
Two years later however, things are moving along with ease. The two sides have signed ECFA, the most historic agreement since the two sides instituted separate rule. Five hundred and fifty-seven items on the early harvest list will enjoy tax breaks starting on New Year's Day next year. Industry tariffs will be cut by over one billion NT in the first year. More importantly, DPP legislators might continue protesting in the Legislative Yuan. But DPP party chairman Tsai Ing-wen has already assured the media that if she is elected president in 2012, she "will continue the previous administration's policies." During the recent five cities elections, not a single Green Camp candidate challenged ECFA. This was true even in the Deep Green bastions of Tainan and Kaohsiung. Why? Because according to the DPP's own polls, over half the public on Taiwan supports ECFA. The DPP is nothing if not adept at electioneering. It is not about to shoot itself in the foot at election time.
Chiang and Chen have already met six times. Cross-Strait economic exchanges are now closer than ever. Some industries are even further along in their integration. They have passed the point of no return. The two sides might not engage in political talks for the time being. But attempts to promote a referendum to author a new constitution failed during the Chen Shui-bian era. De jure independence is no longer a possibility. That is a reality the DPP cannot ignore. This political and economic situation is consistent with the wishes of most of the public, which prefers to maintain the status quo, No political party or politician can ignore this reality.
The DPP may attempt to spin the five cities elections as a contest over "governing ability." It may attempt to deliberately avoid the issue of cross-Strait policy. But during the upcoming presidential election, it cannot fall back on the catechism, "we will continue the former administration's policies." The sixth Chiang/Chen summit is now discussing matters of practical policy. Officials from the two sides are negotiating ECFA and financial sector MOUs. The two sides are even signing mutual legal assistance agreements, expressing respect for each others' jurisdiction. Meanwhile, all the DPP can talk about is Taiwan independence ideology, rather than concrete, pragmatic cross-Strait policy. How can the DPP possibly persuade the public it has "governing ability?"
Following the five cities elections, "China policy" has reportedly become a hot topic within the DPP. Green Camp think tanks are experiencing a wave of "China fever." As a matter of fact, "DPP fever," a complementary phenomenon on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, is also in full swing. Both sides appear to be taking a closer look at each other. From the perspective of cross-Strait peace and development, we of course welcome this new atmosphere of closer communication. Communication of course does not equate with policy change. In fact, exchanges between private sector think tanks on the Mainland and the DPP have been going on for years. But DPP cross-Strait policy strategy has yet to catch up with the times. If the DPP wants to adopt a pragmatic cross-Strait policy, the key will be its leaders' will power.
This is surely Tsai Ing-wen's most difficult challenge. Ever since Chen Shui-bian overturned his own "five noes" during his last days in office, the DPP has avoided the topic of cross-Strait policy. As a result, extreme Sinophobia has been the DPP's guiding concept. The presidential election is just around the corner. The DPP is an eleventh hour convert. But how will it breach the topic of cross-Strait policy, without touching off internecine warfare? That will be something of a feat.
This is especially true because Taiwan independence extremism has already taken hold within the DPP. Members of the "one nation on each side connection" carried signs expressing support for Chen Shui-bian. During the recent five cities elections, they comprised nearly 9% of the vote. This means they have already crossed the 5% legal threshold for recognition as a political party. Even if they withdrew from the DPP, they could still make their strength felt. Therefore they have enough strength to threaten Tsai Ing-wen. Taiwan independence extremists within the DPP have considerable organzational ability. This makes compromise within the DPP extremely difficult.
Compromise may be urgent and difficult. But the 2012 presidential election looms. The DPP cannot avoid the issue of cross-Strait policy. It desperately wants to win this office. Over the past year, the DPP has managed to hold its ground. The public may not support the party's cross-Strait policy. But it is dissatisfied with the worsening gap between rich and poor. Therefore it demanded that the KMT pay the price.
"It's the inequality, stupid!" This is the lesson of the five cities elections. The DPP has nearly enough strength to achieve a simple majority. If it can cash in on this resentment, and propose relevant economic and fiscal policies, it may even win over Pale Blue voters. On the other hand, if the DPP reverts to its old hatreds, it will probably lose the swing voters who supported it during the past year. Can the DPP's Platform for the Coming Decade set a new tone for 2012? The moment of truth has arrived.
民進黨兩岸路線 已到關鍵時刻
2010-12-23 中國時報
六次江陳會本周在台北圓山飯店舉行，大陸海協會會長陳雲林有感而發的說，「歷史有時會出現令人驚奇的巧合」，和兩年前首次江陳會同樣的季節、同樣的地點，但是當時民進黨帶頭烽火抗爭，執政黨派出上萬員警嚴陣以待、如臨大敵，台灣政治、社會在這樣的激烈對決中，衝突可能一觸即發。
兩年後的今天，卻是輕舟已過萬重山，兩岸簽下分治以來最具歷史性的ＥＣＦＡ經貿協定，有五百五十七項早收清單將自明年元旦起降稅，第一年的產業降稅利益達百億以上，更重要的是，民進黨立委雖在立院強烈抗爭，但民進黨黨主席蔡英文之後接受媒體專訪時卻表達「將延續前朝政策」。這次五都選舉時沒有任何綠營選將質疑ＥＣＦＡ，即使在深綠大本營的台南、高雄亦然，因為，根據民進黨內部民調，台灣民眾超過五成支持兩岸簽ＥＣＦＡ，擅長選舉的民進黨，當然不會在選舉時攖其鋒。
可以說，六次江陳會下來，現階段兩岸經濟上的密切交流、甚至部分產業的進一步整合，已是無法回頭的趨勢；另一個民進黨無法忽視的現實是，即使兩岸短期內不會進行政治談判，但經過陳水扁時代的公投制憲暴衝實驗失敗，法理台獨的可能性也完全斷絕。這樣的政治經濟情勢，頗符合目前維持現狀的多數民意，也是任何政黨或政治人物無法忽視的政治現實。
民進黨可以將五都選舉定調為治理能力之爭，刻意迴避兩岸政策，但接下來的總統大選，卻不能只靠「延續前朝政策」就一語帶過，當六次江陳會已走到實際政策層面，不但兩岸官員參與ＥＣＦＡ及金融ＭＯＵ談判，兩岸甚至簽下司法互助協定、尊重對岸的司法管轄權時，民進黨若只能空談極獨意識形態，而不能提出具體務實的兩岸政策，如何讓人民相信民進黨有治理能力？
五都選後，據傳中國政策已成民進黨新顯學，綠營智庫興起中國熱。其實，和這個現象互補的則是對岸的民進黨熱，雙方似乎重新正視對方，站在兩岸和平發展的角度，我們對這樣的交流氣氛當然樂觀其成，但是，交流不代表政策調整，事實上對岸智庫與民進黨人士私下交流，這幾年從未斷過，但民進黨的兩岸方向卻還是無法與時俱進，可以說，民進黨要提出務實的兩岸政策，最重要的關鍵還是領導人的意志力。
對蔡英文來說，這確實是艱困的挑戰，畢竟自從陳水扁在任期末推翻自己提出的「四不一沒有」後，民進黨內一直迴避討論兩岸政策，因此極端反中、仇中才是民進黨內的主導意見，現在，總統大選在即，民進黨臨陣抱佛腳，但如何討論兩岸政策的同時，不跟著引爆民進黨內鬨，這是相當高難度的挑戰。
尤其，民進黨內極獨勢力已經卓然成形，扛著扁招牌的一邊一國連線，這次初試啼聲就拿下將近百分之九的選票，這個數字的意涵是，他們已跨過政黨得票百分之五的門檻，即使離開民進黨也有進軍國會的實力，因此也就具足以要脅蔡英文的實力，民進黨內極獨勢力的組織化，其實就預告了民進黨內部協調的難度。
只是，時間再急迫，協調再困難，面對二○一二總統大選，民進黨終究不可能跳過兩岸政策，就想要直攻大位。畢竟，這一年來，民進黨之所以能在歷次選舉中保持佳績，並非人民支持該黨的兩岸政策，最主要的原因在於人民不滿日漸惡化的貧富差距，因此要求執政的國民黨付出代價。
問題在分配！這是五都大選給政治人物的教訓，若能以這股民怨做為選戰主軸，提出相關經濟、財稅措施，已接近過半實力的民進黨，還可能再爭取到淺藍選票；相反的，民進黨若又走回仇中的老路，只怕這一年來爭取到的中間選票，也會流失。民進黨的十年政綱，如何為二○一二定調，現在真的已到關鍵時刻。
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
Reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula?
Reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 22, 2010
The South Korean military recently announced a postponement of its Yeonpyeong Island live fire exercises. North Korea then announced that in order to defend its territorial waters from attack, its shelling was more intense and covered greater territory than in the past.
All of a sudden, the atmosphere had changed. Moscow and Beijing met with ambassadors from Seoul and Washington. They called for an emergency session of the Security Council. They urged all parties to exercise restraint, and to dispatch special envoys to intervene in peninsula affairs. Although the Security Council convened a two-day weekend meeting, it failed to reach a consensus.
At noon on the 20th, South Korea began 90 minutes of shelling. Nearly 2000 rounds were fired. North Korea's response was a surprise, The Supreme Commander of the North Korean People's Army issued a statement: "We consider it unnecessary to retaliate against such despicable military provocations." In other words, it was not merely postponing retaliation, it was refusing to respond at all.
The crisis has passed. The world has breathed a sigh of relief. The incident shows Washington and Seoul's tough stance. North Korea's response will have a long term impact on the future on the peninsula.
First of all, South Korea was the party that deliberately conducted military exercises. To characterize Seoul's action as a provocation would be an overstatement. But South Korea was unquestionably the one that acted first.
Routine artillery exercises have been held on Yeonpyeong Island for decades. But this was a sensitive time. South Korea insisted on holding them anyway, motivated by domestic politics.
South Korea suffered greater losses than North Korea during the Cheonan ship sinking incident and shelling incident. This provoked public anger and forced the government to replace its MInister of Defense. If the government failed to take a harder line, or to retaliate, the public would have lost all confidence. South Korea's ruling party noted pragmatically that "If we knuckle under, North Korea will hold Korea in contempt, and will force us to make further concessions." That is why President Lee Myung-bak said "In response to North Korean provocations, it is essential to make them pay a price. Only if we have the courage to hold our ground and refuse to make concessions, can we enjoy a lasting peace."
In response to the exercise, North Korea mobilized more warships, early warning aircraft, and surface to surface missiles. South Korea ordered F-15K fighters, equipped with JDAMs with a 278 km range, on standby alert. If North Korea shelled in retaliation, South Korea would not have hesitated. It would have immediately blown up the other side's artillery positions.
Furthermore, this time Washington was informed about the situation and supported Seoul's response. Washington must firmly support Seoul. Obama must not provoke another war of course. But if allows Pyongyang to succeed once again, the US will lose all credibility in the Asia-Pacific region. Never mind South Korea. Even Japan and Southeast Asia will no longer be able to trust US security assurances.
Two weeks ago, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen suddenly flew to the front-lines to conduct an inspection. Soon afterwards, Vice Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright said that if North Korea engages in an aggressive response to an exercise conducted by South Korea, it could trigger a "chain reaction." The implication was the US military would not sit idly by. The US deployed over 20 officers on Yeonpyeong Island during the recent exercises. They provided communications, intelligence analysis, and medical facilities, But the real significance of their presence was political. They were there to act as "trip wires." If these soldiers became casualties, the US would be handed a pretext for intervention. The soldiers also served as human shields to contain North Korea.
Seoul and Washington have finally gotten what they wanted. Will this open a door to future peace on the Korean Peninsula? That will depend upon North Korea's response.
North Korea's reaction was a surprise. The world must now re-evaluate the rationality of the Kim dynasty, father and son. Of course, some think Pyongyang merely responded to intense pressure from the Washington/Seoul alliance, and finally saw the light. If a similar incident occurs in the future, some say, one must respond in an equally hard line manner. Tolerance and concessions have already been shown to be the wrong way.
But from another perspective, one might simply conclude that Pyongyang's military tactics have reached a point of diminishing returns. While the two sides harangued each other, former US Secretary of Energy and current New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson was invited to North Korea. He was accompanied by reporters from the New York Times and CNN. Pyongyang was sending a message. It wanted direct talks with Washington.
According to reports, Richardson met with senior officials under Kim Jong-il. Last year, International Atomic Energy Agency personnel were expelled from the country. North Korea has agreed to allow them back in. It has also agreed to sell 12,000 fuel rods, reassuring the West that they will not be transferred to Iran. It has even agreed to set up a military hot line with the tripartite mission. Such concessions are substantial. They show that North Korea is undergoing transition. It is paving the way for future contacts and reconciliation.
North Korea was wrong to engage in provocation. But whether a such a strong response was necessary is debatable. Moscow and Beijing proposed an emergency sesson of the UN Security Council, not without reason. If North Korea retaliated violently, and war suddenly erupted, the entire world could be caught in the crossfire. Washington and Seoul engaged in a high stakes gamble. In order to have a war, both sides must be determined to fight. Fortunately, both North and South Korea knew they were ill-prepared to fight a war. North Korea is small. It has long relied on bluster to get what it wants. But do the US and South Korea, who are more powerful, really want to play the same game? This is a question worth considering.
朝鮮半島和解出現契機
2010-12-22 中國時報
南韓軍方日前宣布要在延坪島實施射擊演習，北韓隨即宣稱：為了保衛領海將進行自衛性攻擊，火力強度與範圍都要比前次炮擊更為嚴重。
一時之間，山雨欲來；俄羅斯與中國除了約見韓國與美國大使外，還要求緊急召開安理會特別會議，呼籲各方節制，要聯合國派遣特使介入半島事務。但安理會周末開了兩天會，無法達成共識。
廿日中午，南韓開始了九十分鐘的砲擊，發射近兩千發炮彈。但北韓的反應卻出人意料，北韓人民軍最高司令發布聲明，「不認為有必要對每次可鄙軍事挑釁都採取報復行動」。換句話說，不是延遲報復，而是根本不採取相對回應了。
危機時刻已過，全世界都鬆了一口氣。但我們認為，這次事件中展現出美韓的強硬態度、北韓的決策，對於日後半島局勢都有長遠的影響。
首先，這是南韓刻意而為的演習。說挑釁也許太過，但南韓主動卻是無庸置疑。當然延坪島上幾十年來都做例行火炮演習，但是在這個敏感時刻，南韓堅持要做，卻與國內政治情勢有關。
南韓在天安號沉沒事件和炮擊事件中都吃了虧，民憤高漲，逼得國防部長被撤換，如不進一步採取強烈回應或報復，政府會完全失信於民。南韓執政黨很實際的指出：「如果我們屈服，北韓會藐視韓國，會要求我們做出更大的讓步。」所以總統李明博才表示：「對於北韓的挑釁，一定要讓他們付出相應的代價。只有我們拿出堅決不讓步的勇氣，才能永享和平。」
對於北韓針對這次演習的威脅，除了動員多艘艦艇、海上預警機、地對地導彈，南韓還戰備待命了F-15K戰機，掛載射程長達二七八公里的聯合制導攻擊武器（JDAM），如果北韓反炮擊，就毫不遲疑的，立即精確炸掉對方的炮陣地。
其次，這是美國知情並且支持下的行為。美國必須要堅決支持南韓，歐巴馬現在當然不能引發另一場戰爭，但是如果任憑北韓再一次得逞，美國在亞太地區將毫無信用可言；南韓自不用說，日本與東南亞各國也不會依賴美國的安全保障。
美國參謀首長聯席會議主席穆倫，兩周前突然飛到前線視察，稍後並由副主席卡特萊特表示，如果北韓就南韓演習採取攻擊性的應對措施，有可能引發「連鎖反應」，這就表示美軍不會坐視；美軍這次在演習的延坪島上也部署了廿多名人員，提供通訊、情報分析與醫療等設施的操作，但他們的政治意義在於「拉拌線」（trip wire），意即如果這些士兵傷亡，美軍即可正式介入，也以這些士兵做為牽制北韓行為的人肉盾牌。
南韓與美國終於得到他們要的，但是能不能替後來朝鮮半島的和平開一扇門，還要看北韓的反應與考量。
北韓的反應，出人意料，令世界要重新估算金氏父子的理性。當然有人會認為，這是美韓聯盟強力施壓的結果，平壤是不見棺材不掉淚，未來如有類似情況發生，只能以更強硬的方式回應，姑息退讓的方式已證明是錯的。
但是從另一個層面看，我們可以窺知平壤方面的軍事手段已經走到了極限。在雙方叫陣的同時，美國前能源部長、現任新墨西哥州州長李察遜應邀在北韓訪問，同行的還有紐約時報與ＣＮＮ的記者，這是北韓送出的訊息，他們希望與美國直接對話。
根據報導，李察遜見到了金正日以下的高官，北韓同意讓去年被趕出境的國際原子能總署人員，重返檢查；也同意出售一萬兩千根燃料棒，讓西方放心不會轉讓給伊朗，甚至還同意設置熱線電話與三方軍事視察團，協議成果不可謂不大，也因此顯示出北韓正在轉向，替後來的接觸和解開啟了契機。
我們認為，北韓挑釁在先，固然有錯，但要不要這麼強烈回應，卻有待商榷。俄羅斯與中國緊急在聯合國安理會提案，不是沒有道理；如果北韓強力報復，戰爭瞬間爆發，全世界都會被捲入，美國與南韓的行為，是在豪賭。戰爭要打得起來，必須雙方都有不惜一戰的決心，幸好北韓、南韓雙方都理解沒有戰爭的條件。北韓國小，過去向來採行唬人的邊緣策略，以獲取外交利益，但美韓勢大，是否也要玩相同把戲，值得深思。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 22, 2010
The South Korean military recently announced a postponement of its Yeonpyeong Island live fire exercises. North Korea then announced that in order to defend its territorial waters from attack, its shelling was more intense and covered greater territory than in the past.
All of a sudden, the atmosphere had changed. Moscow and Beijing met with ambassadors from Seoul and Washington. They called for an emergency session of the Security Council. They urged all parties to exercise restraint, and to dispatch special envoys to intervene in peninsula affairs. Although the Security Council convened a two-day weekend meeting, it failed to reach a consensus.
At noon on the 20th, South Korea began 90 minutes of shelling. Nearly 2000 rounds were fired. North Korea's response was a surprise, The Supreme Commander of the North Korean People's Army issued a statement: "We consider it unnecessary to retaliate against such despicable military provocations." In other words, it was not merely postponing retaliation, it was refusing to respond at all.
The crisis has passed. The world has breathed a sigh of relief. The incident shows Washington and Seoul's tough stance. North Korea's response will have a long term impact on the future on the peninsula.
First of all, South Korea was the party that deliberately conducted military exercises. To characterize Seoul's action as a provocation would be an overstatement. But South Korea was unquestionably the one that acted first.
Routine artillery exercises have been held on Yeonpyeong Island for decades. But this was a sensitive time. South Korea insisted on holding them anyway, motivated by domestic politics.
South Korea suffered greater losses than North Korea during the Cheonan ship sinking incident and shelling incident. This provoked public anger and forced the government to replace its MInister of Defense. If the government failed to take a harder line, or to retaliate, the public would have lost all confidence. South Korea's ruling party noted pragmatically that "If we knuckle under, North Korea will hold Korea in contempt, and will force us to make further concessions." That is why President Lee Myung-bak said "In response to North Korean provocations, it is essential to make them pay a price. Only if we have the courage to hold our ground and refuse to make concessions, can we enjoy a lasting peace."
In response to the exercise, North Korea mobilized more warships, early warning aircraft, and surface to surface missiles. South Korea ordered F-15K fighters, equipped with JDAMs with a 278 km range, on standby alert. If North Korea shelled in retaliation, South Korea would not have hesitated. It would have immediately blown up the other side's artillery positions.
Furthermore, this time Washington was informed about the situation and supported Seoul's response. Washington must firmly support Seoul. Obama must not provoke another war of course. But if allows Pyongyang to succeed once again, the US will lose all credibility in the Asia-Pacific region. Never mind South Korea. Even Japan and Southeast Asia will no longer be able to trust US security assurances.
Two weeks ago, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen suddenly flew to the front-lines to conduct an inspection. Soon afterwards, Vice Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright said that if North Korea engages in an aggressive response to an exercise conducted by South Korea, it could trigger a "chain reaction." The implication was the US military would not sit idly by. The US deployed over 20 officers on Yeonpyeong Island during the recent exercises. They provided communications, intelligence analysis, and medical facilities, But the real significance of their presence was political. They were there to act as "trip wires." If these soldiers became casualties, the US would be handed a pretext for intervention. The soldiers also served as human shields to contain North Korea.
Seoul and Washington have finally gotten what they wanted. Will this open a door to future peace on the Korean Peninsula? That will depend upon North Korea's response.
North Korea's reaction was a surprise. The world must now re-evaluate the rationality of the Kim dynasty, father and son. Of course, some think Pyongyang merely responded to intense pressure from the Washington/Seoul alliance, and finally saw the light. If a similar incident occurs in the future, some say, one must respond in an equally hard line manner. Tolerance and concessions have already been shown to be the wrong way.
But from another perspective, one might simply conclude that Pyongyang's military tactics have reached a point of diminishing returns. While the two sides harangued each other, former US Secretary of Energy and current New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson was invited to North Korea. He was accompanied by reporters from the New York Times and CNN. Pyongyang was sending a message. It wanted direct talks with Washington.
According to reports, Richardson met with senior officials under Kim Jong-il. Last year, International Atomic Energy Agency personnel were expelled from the country. North Korea has agreed to allow them back in. It has also agreed to sell 12,000 fuel rods, reassuring the West that they will not be transferred to Iran. It has even agreed to set up a military hot line with the tripartite mission. Such concessions are substantial. They show that North Korea is undergoing transition. It is paving the way for future contacts and reconciliation.
North Korea was wrong to engage in provocation. But whether a such a strong response was necessary is debatable. Moscow and Beijing proposed an emergency sesson of the UN Security Council, not without reason. If North Korea retaliated violently, and war suddenly erupted, the entire world could be caught in the crossfire. Washington and Seoul engaged in a high stakes gamble. In order to have a war, both sides must be determined to fight. Fortunately, both North and South Korea knew they were ill-prepared to fight a war. North Korea is small. It has long relied on bluster to get what it wants. But do the US and South Korea, who are more powerful, really want to play the same game? This is a question worth considering.
朝鮮半島和解出現契機
2010-12-22 中國時報
南韓軍方日前宣布要在延坪島實施射擊演習，北韓隨即宣稱：為了保衛領海將進行自衛性攻擊，火力強度與範圍都要比前次炮擊更為嚴重。
一時之間，山雨欲來；俄羅斯與中國除了約見韓國與美國大使外，還要求緊急召開安理會特別會議，呼籲各方節制，要聯合國派遣特使介入半島事務。但安理會周末開了兩天會，無法達成共識。
廿日中午，南韓開始了九十分鐘的砲擊，發射近兩千發炮彈。但北韓的反應卻出人意料，北韓人民軍最高司令發布聲明，「不認為有必要對每次可鄙軍事挑釁都採取報復行動」。換句話說，不是延遲報復，而是根本不採取相對回應了。
危機時刻已過，全世界都鬆了一口氣。但我們認為，這次事件中展現出美韓的強硬態度、北韓的決策，對於日後半島局勢都有長遠的影響。
首先，這是南韓刻意而為的演習。說挑釁也許太過，但南韓主動卻是無庸置疑。當然延坪島上幾十年來都做例行火炮演習，但是在這個敏感時刻，南韓堅持要做，卻與國內政治情勢有關。
南韓在天安號沉沒事件和炮擊事件中都吃了虧，民憤高漲，逼得國防部長被撤換，如不進一步採取強烈回應或報復，政府會完全失信於民。南韓執政黨很實際的指出：「如果我們屈服，北韓會藐視韓國，會要求我們做出更大的讓步。」所以總統李明博才表示：「對於北韓的挑釁，一定要讓他們付出相應的代價。只有我們拿出堅決不讓步的勇氣，才能永享和平。」
對於北韓針對這次演習的威脅，除了動員多艘艦艇、海上預警機、地對地導彈，南韓還戰備待命了F-15K戰機，掛載射程長達二七八公里的聯合制導攻擊武器（JDAM），如果北韓反炮擊，就毫不遲疑的，立即精確炸掉對方的炮陣地。
其次，這是美國知情並且支持下的行為。美國必須要堅決支持南韓，歐巴馬現在當然不能引發另一場戰爭，但是如果任憑北韓再一次得逞，美國在亞太地區將毫無信用可言；南韓自不用說，日本與東南亞各國也不會依賴美國的安全保障。
美國參謀首長聯席會議主席穆倫，兩周前突然飛到前線視察，稍後並由副主席卡特萊特表示，如果北韓就南韓演習採取攻擊性的應對措施，有可能引發「連鎖反應」，這就表示美軍不會坐視；美軍這次在演習的延坪島上也部署了廿多名人員，提供通訊、情報分析與醫療等設施的操作，但他們的政治意義在於「拉拌線」（trip wire），意即如果這些士兵傷亡，美軍即可正式介入，也以這些士兵做為牽制北韓行為的人肉盾牌。
南韓與美國終於得到他們要的，但是能不能替後來朝鮮半島的和平開一扇門，還要看北韓的反應與考量。
北韓的反應，出人意料，令世界要重新估算金氏父子的理性。當然有人會認為，這是美韓聯盟強力施壓的結果，平壤是不見棺材不掉淚，未來如有類似情況發生，只能以更強硬的方式回應，姑息退讓的方式已證明是錯的。
但是從另一個層面看，我們可以窺知平壤方面的軍事手段已經走到了極限。在雙方叫陣的同時，美國前能源部長、現任新墨西哥州州長李察遜應邀在北韓訪問，同行的還有紐約時報與ＣＮＮ的記者，這是北韓送出的訊息，他們希望與美國直接對話。
根據報導，李察遜見到了金正日以下的高官，北韓同意讓去年被趕出境的國際原子能總署人員，重返檢查；也同意出售一萬兩千根燃料棒，讓西方放心不會轉讓給伊朗，甚至還同意設置熱線電話與三方軍事視察團，協議成果不可謂不大，也因此顯示出北韓正在轉向，替後來的接觸和解開啟了契機。
我們認為，北韓挑釁在先，固然有錯，但要不要這麼強烈回應，卻有待商榷。俄羅斯與中國緊急在聯合國安理會提案，不是沒有道理；如果北韓強力報復，戰爭瞬間爆發，全世界都會被捲入，美國與南韓的行為，是在豪賭。戰爭要打得起來，必須雙方都有不惜一戰的決心，幸好北韓、南韓雙方都理解沒有戰爭的條件。北韓國小，過去向來採行唬人的邊緣策略，以獲取外交利益，但美韓勢大，是否也要玩相同把戲，值得深思。
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
A Tsai/Su Ticket? Or Su/Tsai Ticket?
A Tsai/Su Ticket? Or Su/Tsai Ticket?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 21, 2010
Tsai Ing-wen will represent the DPP in the 2012 presidential election. That is becoming clearer day by day. Su Tseng-chang's desire to "continue transcending" his current status is all too clear. As we examine at the overall situation, a Su/Tsai ticket is unlikely.
Why? First, a Su/Tsai ticket is impossible. Tsai Ing-wen would never agree to such a ticket. Secondly, a Tsai/Su ticket would probably embarrass Su. Su has already been Frank Hsieh's running mate. Also, Tsai would never agree to such a ticket.
Su and Tsai served in the Executive Yuan as Premier and Vice Premier, Tsai finds Su's political style distasteful. Will Tsai toss her hat in the ring? If she does, she will seek the presidency. She will hardly settle for being Su's vice presidential running mate. Besides, Tsai Ing-wen has been trumpeting her "Platform for the Coming Decade." She has obviously been setting her self up as presidential candidate in 2012. Today the political climate is right, She will hardly allow Su to usurp her "Platform for the Coming Decade." Su would not look the part in any event.
Suppose Tsai Ing-wen runs in 2012. Ma Ying-jeou will be seeking a second term. The ECFA debate in April already covered most of the major issues likely to come up in the 2012 presidential election. It has also covered the qualifications of the candidates. Ma is apparently still the favorite. The Democratic Progressive Party nomination process will begin in May next year, less than six months from now. Tsai Ing-wen may not have time to resolve the differences between rival factions within the party. Will Su Tseng-chang acknowledge the difficulties he faces in seeking the party nomination, and simply step aside? Will the "Platform for the Coming Decade" be an asset or a deficit? Haste could well make waste. But Tsai Ing-wen's candidacy is a foregone conclusion. Chen Shui-bian, Koo Kuan-min, and others have already endorsed her candidacy, and are pessimistic about Su Tseng-chang's chances. The situation is urgent. Tsai will be forced to yield to the prevailing winds, just as she was forced to run for Xinbei City mayor. If Tsai is elected president in 2012, certain consequences will ensue. But what if her election bid is unsuccessful? What will the consequences for the DPP be then?
Suppose Tsai Ing-wen runs for president. That will be tantamount to a proclamation that the time for Su Tseng-chang and other Kaohsiung Incident figures has passed. But if Tsai Ing-wen runs and loses, advocates of reform may become targets inside the party. The chances of Tsai Ing-wen becoming the Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate in 2016 will be greatly reduced. By the same token, the chances that the DPP might return to power in 2016 will also evaporate. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen has two choices. One. She can choose to remain out of the 2012 presidential race. Two. She can make a risky move by acquiescing to a Su/Tsai ticket. If the ticket loses, she will have all the more justification to make a run for the presidency in 2016. These choices are attractive for Tsai Ing-wen, because they enable her to avoid butting heads with Ma Ying-jeou in 2012. They allow her time to transform the DPP. But as mentioned above, the choice is no longer up to Tsai Ing-wen. She will almost certainly declare her candidacy for the 2012 presidential race. She cannot wait until 2012.
Will Tsai Ing-wen's candidacy be a plus or a minus? That depends on whether she can facilitate the transformation of the DPP. One. Beijing has reiterated its cross-Strait bottom line, namely, "Oppose Taiwan independence, uphold the 1992 Consensus." Two. Tsai Ing-wen advocated the two states theory, opposed the 1992 Consensus, and opposed ECFA. Three. The "Platform for the Coming Decade" is not a DPP party platform. It is not even a DPP party resolution. It is merely Tsai Ing-wen's personal political platform. Can it transcend, replace, or abrogate the Taiwan independence party platform, the Resolution on Taiwan's future, and the Resolution for a Normal Nation? Four. Chen Shui-bian has already made "one nation on each side" synonymous with Taiwan independence. The "one nation on each side connection" has become the first unabashedly Taiwan independence faction within the DPP. Five. On the one hand Tsai accuses Ma Ying-jeou of "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." On the other hand, she assures voters that "upon assuming power, she would perpetuate the previous administration's cross-Strait policies," How can she possibly reconcile these contradictions? Six. During the five cities elections, the DPP trumpeted its "ability to govern." Perhaps it was referring to local governance. But what are we to make of the DPP's alleged "ability to govern" at the central government level, between 2000 and 2008? These are just a few examples of the problems the DPP faces as it undergoes tranformation. They are hardly exhaustive. What sort of campaign does Tsai Ing-wen intend to run in 2012? Does she really intend to run merely by donning jeans and a pink T-shirt? Suppose she fails to get to the root of these problems? Can she really be elected? That will be a problem. Suppose she is elected and assumes power? Tragedy will surely ensue. That will be a far more serious problem.
The Democratic Progressive Party will hold its presidential primaries in May of next year. Before then, Tsai Ing-wen must resolve two major crises. One. The crisis that will ensue if the DPP loses in 2012. Two. The even greater crisis that will ensue if the DPP wins in 2012. The key is whether Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP can take its "China policy" and change it back into what it is supposed to be, "cross-Strait policy." The DPP's so-called "China policy" implies "one nation on each side." It casts "China" as the enemy and as "the other." By contrast, "cross-Strait policy" implies "one China, different interpetations." It stresses a symbiotic win-win situation.
Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP opposed direct flights, opposed allowing Mainland tourists onto Taiwan, opposed the Chiang/Chen summits, and opposed ECFA. They opposed every measure, every step along the way. Today we have direct flights across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, summits between Chiang and Chen, and ECFA. Every one of these measures has been successfully implemented. Each has come to pass, naturally, in swift succession. In short, can Tsai Ing-wen really win the presidency merely by wearing a pink T-shirt, even as she demands that Taiwan turn the clock back to the Cold War?
蘇蔡配或蔡蘇配？
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.12.21
蔡英文代表民進黨競選二○一二總統的態勢日趨明朗，而蘇貞昌仍有「繼續超越」的意願亦昭然若揭。但是，盱衡大局，已不太可能出現「蘇蔡」搭檔。
因為：一、蘇正蔡副的「蘇蔡配」不可能，因蔡英文不會接受；二、至於蔡正蘇副的「蔡蘇配」，蘇大概也難為情（已經「配」過謝長廷），何況蔡也不會接受。
蘇蔡二人在行政院正副院長共事期間，蔡即對蘇的作風頗不以為然；爾今除非蔡不下水，如果要?下去，自然就直接選總統，而無可能作蘇的副手。何況，蔡英文自倡議「十年政綱」以來，已顯露在二○一二「自導自演」的企圖，如今氣候已成，難道會讓蘇來演「十年政綱」？蘇演了恐怕也不像。
然而，蔡英文若在二○一二角逐總統，將面對競選連任的馬英九；四月間的ＥＣＦＡ大辯論，已大致反映了二○一二大選的議題輪廓及馬蔡二人的主觀條件，馬似仍佔優勢。再者，如今至明年五月民進黨提名，只剩不到半年光景，蔡英文未必有充裕的時間來解決黨內權力傾軋及路線鬥爭（蘇貞昌會「知難而退」嗎？），何況「十年政綱」的得失亦難確定；如此倉卒出戰，陣腳即可能不夠堅實。不過，如今蔡英文出馬的形勢幾已確定，連陳水扁、辜寬敏等皆為她背書，而看衰蘇貞昌；形勢逼人，蔡恐怕必須順風扯帆，正如她不得不參選新北市長一般。然而，蔡若順利當選二○一二總統則罷，倘若落選，對民進黨又將有何種後果？
對民進黨而言，蔡英文若出馬競選，即宣告蘇貞昌等美麗島世代的人物皆已被徹底洗掉；但若蔡英文競選失敗，屆時其轉型路線可能成為黨內箭靶，則蔡英文再次代表民進黨轉戰二○一六總統選舉的機率就會大幅降低，相對地甚至亦使民進黨連在二○一六重返執政的可能性也告幻滅。因而，蔡英文現今的另兩個選擇是：一、不參加二○一二總統選舉；二、下險棋，接受「蘇蔡配」，若敗，即取得二○一六競選總統的較大正當性。對蔡英文來說，這兩個選擇的主要著眼是：避開二○一二與馬英九對決，爭取引導民進黨轉型的時間。然而，已如前述，現今的情勢恐已由不得蔡英文，她二○一二出馬的機率極大，拖不到二○一六。
蔡英文出馬的得失關鍵，仍在能否引導民進黨轉型。一、北京一再重申，兩岸底線是「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」。二、蔡英文曾主張兩國論、反對九二共識、反對ＥＣＦＡ。三、「十年政綱」不是「黨綱」，又不是「決議文」，只是高度「蔡英文個人化」的「政綱」；能否超越、取代或廢止台獨黨綱、台灣前途決議文，及正常國家決議文？四、「一邊一國」已被陳水扁據為台獨標籤，且「一邊一國連線」已成為民進黨內首見的旗幟鮮明的台獨派系。五、一方面指馬英九「傾中賣台」，另一方面又稱「執政後將延續前朝兩岸政策」，如何自圓其說？六、五都選舉標榜「治理能力」，那也許是指地方事務，但將如何解釋民進黨二○○○至二○○八年之間在中央執政的「國家治理」？這些只是略舉數例，而民進黨轉型面對的難題，尚絕不止這些。蔡英文難道仍想只憑一件粉紅Ｔ恤及一襲牛仔褲就殺進二○一二？如若不從根本處解決這些難題，會不會當選是一問題，倘使當選而執政則必是更大的悲劇。
蔡英文必須在明年五月民進黨總統候選人提名前，化解兩大危機。一、二○一二敗選的危機；二、若當選後執政而發生的更大危機。關鍵在於蔡英文與民進黨能否將其「中國政策」還原成「兩岸政策」。所謂「中國政策」，即有「一邊一國」的意涵，視「中國」為敵體及他者；而「兩岸政策」，即有「一中各表」的意涵，強調共生雙贏。
蔡英文及民進黨，自反直航、反陸客來台、反江陳會、反ＥＣＦＡ，一路反到底；如今卻是直航、陸客來台、江陳會、ＥＣＦＡ，一路通關，猶如堂堂溪水出前村。總結的問題是：蔡英文有可能穿著粉紅Ｔ恤以主張台灣倒撥時鐘就將自己送上總統大位嗎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 21, 2010
Tsai Ing-wen will represent the DPP in the 2012 presidential election. That is becoming clearer day by day. Su Tseng-chang's desire to "continue transcending" his current status is all too clear. As we examine at the overall situation, a Su/Tsai ticket is unlikely.
Why? First, a Su/Tsai ticket is impossible. Tsai Ing-wen would never agree to such a ticket. Secondly, a Tsai/Su ticket would probably embarrass Su. Su has already been Frank Hsieh's running mate. Also, Tsai would never agree to such a ticket.
Su and Tsai served in the Executive Yuan as Premier and Vice Premier, Tsai finds Su's political style distasteful. Will Tsai toss her hat in the ring? If she does, she will seek the presidency. She will hardly settle for being Su's vice presidential running mate. Besides, Tsai Ing-wen has been trumpeting her "Platform for the Coming Decade." She has obviously been setting her self up as presidential candidate in 2012. Today the political climate is right, She will hardly allow Su to usurp her "Platform for the Coming Decade." Su would not look the part in any event.
Suppose Tsai Ing-wen runs in 2012. Ma Ying-jeou will be seeking a second term. The ECFA debate in April already covered most of the major issues likely to come up in the 2012 presidential election. It has also covered the qualifications of the candidates. Ma is apparently still the favorite. The Democratic Progressive Party nomination process will begin in May next year, less than six months from now. Tsai Ing-wen may not have time to resolve the differences between rival factions within the party. Will Su Tseng-chang acknowledge the difficulties he faces in seeking the party nomination, and simply step aside? Will the "Platform for the Coming Decade" be an asset or a deficit? Haste could well make waste. But Tsai Ing-wen's candidacy is a foregone conclusion. Chen Shui-bian, Koo Kuan-min, and others have already endorsed her candidacy, and are pessimistic about Su Tseng-chang's chances. The situation is urgent. Tsai will be forced to yield to the prevailing winds, just as she was forced to run for Xinbei City mayor. If Tsai is elected president in 2012, certain consequences will ensue. But what if her election bid is unsuccessful? What will the consequences for the DPP be then?
Suppose Tsai Ing-wen runs for president. That will be tantamount to a proclamation that the time for Su Tseng-chang and other Kaohsiung Incident figures has passed. But if Tsai Ing-wen runs and loses, advocates of reform may become targets inside the party. The chances of Tsai Ing-wen becoming the Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate in 2016 will be greatly reduced. By the same token, the chances that the DPP might return to power in 2016 will also evaporate. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen has two choices. One. She can choose to remain out of the 2012 presidential race. Two. She can make a risky move by acquiescing to a Su/Tsai ticket. If the ticket loses, she will have all the more justification to make a run for the presidency in 2016. These choices are attractive for Tsai Ing-wen, because they enable her to avoid butting heads with Ma Ying-jeou in 2012. They allow her time to transform the DPP. But as mentioned above, the choice is no longer up to Tsai Ing-wen. She will almost certainly declare her candidacy for the 2012 presidential race. She cannot wait until 2012.
Will Tsai Ing-wen's candidacy be a plus or a minus? That depends on whether she can facilitate the transformation of the DPP. One. Beijing has reiterated its cross-Strait bottom line, namely, "Oppose Taiwan independence, uphold the 1992 Consensus." Two. Tsai Ing-wen advocated the two states theory, opposed the 1992 Consensus, and opposed ECFA. Three. The "Platform for the Coming Decade" is not a DPP party platform. It is not even a DPP party resolution. It is merely Tsai Ing-wen's personal political platform. Can it transcend, replace, or abrogate the Taiwan independence party platform, the Resolution on Taiwan's future, and the Resolution for a Normal Nation? Four. Chen Shui-bian has already made "one nation on each side" synonymous with Taiwan independence. The "one nation on each side connection" has become the first unabashedly Taiwan independence faction within the DPP. Five. On the one hand Tsai accuses Ma Ying-jeou of "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." On the other hand, she assures voters that "upon assuming power, she would perpetuate the previous administration's cross-Strait policies," How can she possibly reconcile these contradictions? Six. During the five cities elections, the DPP trumpeted its "ability to govern." Perhaps it was referring to local governance. But what are we to make of the DPP's alleged "ability to govern" at the central government level, between 2000 and 2008? These are just a few examples of the problems the DPP faces as it undergoes tranformation. They are hardly exhaustive. What sort of campaign does Tsai Ing-wen intend to run in 2012? Does she really intend to run merely by donning jeans and a pink T-shirt? Suppose she fails to get to the root of these problems? Can she really be elected? That will be a problem. Suppose she is elected and assumes power? Tragedy will surely ensue. That will be a far more serious problem.
The Democratic Progressive Party will hold its presidential primaries in May of next year. Before then, Tsai Ing-wen must resolve two major crises. One. The crisis that will ensue if the DPP loses in 2012. Two. The even greater crisis that will ensue if the DPP wins in 2012. The key is whether Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP can take its "China policy" and change it back into what it is supposed to be, "cross-Strait policy." The DPP's so-called "China policy" implies "one nation on each side." It casts "China" as the enemy and as "the other." By contrast, "cross-Strait policy" implies "one China, different interpetations." It stresses a symbiotic win-win situation.
Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP opposed direct flights, opposed allowing Mainland tourists onto Taiwan, opposed the Chiang/Chen summits, and opposed ECFA. They opposed every measure, every step along the way. Today we have direct flights across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, summits between Chiang and Chen, and ECFA. Every one of these measures has been successfully implemented. Each has come to pass, naturally, in swift succession. In short, can Tsai Ing-wen really win the presidency merely by wearing a pink T-shirt, even as she demands that Taiwan turn the clock back to the Cold War?
蘇蔡配或蔡蘇配？
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.12.21
蔡英文代表民進黨競選二○一二總統的態勢日趨明朗，而蘇貞昌仍有「繼續超越」的意願亦昭然若揭。但是，盱衡大局，已不太可能出現「蘇蔡」搭檔。
因為：一、蘇正蔡副的「蘇蔡配」不可能，因蔡英文不會接受；二、至於蔡正蘇副的「蔡蘇配」，蘇大概也難為情（已經「配」過謝長廷），何況蔡也不會接受。
蘇蔡二人在行政院正副院長共事期間，蔡即對蘇的作風頗不以為然；爾今除非蔡不下水，如果要?下去，自然就直接選總統，而無可能作蘇的副手。何況，蔡英文自倡議「十年政綱」以來，已顯露在二○一二「自導自演」的企圖，如今氣候已成，難道會讓蘇來演「十年政綱」？蘇演了恐怕也不像。
然而，蔡英文若在二○一二角逐總統，將面對競選連任的馬英九；四月間的ＥＣＦＡ大辯論，已大致反映了二○一二大選的議題輪廓及馬蔡二人的主觀條件，馬似仍佔優勢。再者，如今至明年五月民進黨提名，只剩不到半年光景，蔡英文未必有充裕的時間來解決黨內權力傾軋及路線鬥爭（蘇貞昌會「知難而退」嗎？），何況「十年政綱」的得失亦難確定；如此倉卒出戰，陣腳即可能不夠堅實。不過，如今蔡英文出馬的形勢幾已確定，連陳水扁、辜寬敏等皆為她背書，而看衰蘇貞昌；形勢逼人，蔡恐怕必須順風扯帆，正如她不得不參選新北市長一般。然而，蔡若順利當選二○一二總統則罷，倘若落選，對民進黨又將有何種後果？
對民進黨而言，蔡英文若出馬競選，即宣告蘇貞昌等美麗島世代的人物皆已被徹底洗掉；但若蔡英文競選失敗，屆時其轉型路線可能成為黨內箭靶，則蔡英文再次代表民進黨轉戰二○一六總統選舉的機率就會大幅降低，相對地甚至亦使民進黨連在二○一六重返執政的可能性也告幻滅。因而，蔡英文現今的另兩個選擇是：一、不參加二○一二總統選舉；二、下險棋，接受「蘇蔡配」，若敗，即取得二○一六競選總統的較大正當性。對蔡英文來說，這兩個選擇的主要著眼是：避開二○一二與馬英九對決，爭取引導民進黨轉型的時間。然而，已如前述，現今的情勢恐已由不得蔡英文，她二○一二出馬的機率極大，拖不到二○一六。
蔡英文出馬的得失關鍵，仍在能否引導民進黨轉型。一、北京一再重申，兩岸底線是「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」。二、蔡英文曾主張兩國論、反對九二共識、反對ＥＣＦＡ。三、「十年政綱」不是「黨綱」，又不是「決議文」，只是高度「蔡英文個人化」的「政綱」；能否超越、取代或廢止台獨黨綱、台灣前途決議文，及正常國家決議文？四、「一邊一國」已被陳水扁據為台獨標籤，且「一邊一國連線」已成為民進黨內首見的旗幟鮮明的台獨派系。五、一方面指馬英九「傾中賣台」，另一方面又稱「執政後將延續前朝兩岸政策」，如何自圓其說？六、五都選舉標榜「治理能力」，那也許是指地方事務，但將如何解釋民進黨二○○○至二○○八年之間在中央執政的「國家治理」？這些只是略舉數例，而民進黨轉型面對的難題，尚絕不止這些。蔡英文難道仍想只憑一件粉紅Ｔ恤及一襲牛仔褲就殺進二○一二？如若不從根本處解決這些難題，會不會當選是一問題，倘使當選而執政則必是更大的悲劇。
蔡英文必須在明年五月民進黨總統候選人提名前，化解兩大危機。一、二○一二敗選的危機；二、若當選後執政而發生的更大危機。關鍵在於蔡英文與民進黨能否將其「中國政策」還原成「兩岸政策」。所謂「中國政策」，即有「一邊一國」的意涵，視「中國」為敵體及他者；而「兩岸政策」，即有「一中各表」的意涵，強調共生雙贏。
蔡英文及民進黨，自反直航、反陸客來台、反江陳會、反ＥＣＦＡ，一路反到底；如今卻是直航、陸客來台、江陳會、ＥＣＦＡ，一路通關，猶如堂堂溪水出前村。總結的問題是：蔡英文有可能穿著粉紅Ｔ恤以主張台灣倒撥時鐘就將自己送上總統大位嗎？
Monday, December 20, 2010
Inefficient Government Practices Have Caused Economic Cancer
Inefficient Management Practices Have Caused Economic Cancer
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 20, 2010
In classical economics, the government's role is to establish a system, enforce the law, build an infrastructure, and create a favorable environment for business and investment. Everything else is left to the market. It is now the twenty-first century, The government has been granted more authority. But its economic role has not changed that much. During the past year however, several major investment projects show that the government has exceeded its proper role. It has imposed unwarranted restrictions before the fact. It has imposed inefficient management after the fact. It has become a cancer afflicting the economy and industry.
Take the Kuokuang Petrochemical project, i.e., the Eighth Naphtha Cracking Plant, which is facing a life for death situation. The project was first proposed in 2005.
It was approved by the CEPD the following year. It then underwent environmental assessment. Construction was supposed to begin in 2008. But as of 2010, it is still being reviewed. If the Kuokuang Petrochemical project ought not to be approved at all, that is one thing. But frightening government in efficiency is another thing altogether. Such inefficiency dramatically increases business risks and investment costs. If government efficiency was increased, and ensured the survival of the Kuokuang Petrochemical project, a company such as Kuokuang would find it easier to survive. It would not be mired in a hopelessness morass, like everyone else.
The government has only just arrived at a decision. If it approves the investment,
the manufacturer will still face substantial cost increases. Its capital outlay will increase from 400 billion to 600 billion. It will also be battered by other petrochemical companies. If rejected, it will be forced to migrate to the Mainland.
Because the project has been subject to delays, other major petrochemical plants have made advance arrangements. Therefore it faces a dilemma, and is unsure whether to advance or retreat. The government may say that the EIA process is protracted because it requires approval by so many different government agencies, experts, and environmental groups. Therefore it "simply cannot be rushed." But let us examine several straightforward investment projects that required approval by only a few government agencies. Let us see how government delays undermined these companies.
Consider AIG, a US-owned company, and its sale of the Nan Shan Life Insurance Group. Bidding was opened in mid-2009. The bid was awarded in October of that year. China Strategic Holdings, a Hong Kong-owned company, and the Primus Group won the bid. The sale was then submitted to the government for review. The result? The review took nearly one full year. The review dragged on until August of this year. Only then did the government announce that the deal had been disapproved. We have no objections to the government rejecting a sale because a major shareholder was ineligible and fears that the insurance industry might be destabilized. But was such a long delay really necessary? During a long delay, a company's future could hang in the balance. A long delay could amount to a death sentence for Nan Shan Life Insurance.
Nan Shan was once an outstanding, blue chip, Taiwan-based insurance company.
But after AIG announced its sale, Nan Shan endured a period of uncertainty. The company's management and operations were virtually in limbo. Employees fretted over their futures. Old policyholders worried about their coverage. Potential policyholders became more difficult to sell. In 2007, before it was sold, Nan Shan Life Insurance's market share of First Year Premiums (FYP) was 9,6%. By 2009 it had plummeted to 3.7%. This year it could drop below 3%. It has already fallen out of the ranks of the top ten. The devastating impact of inefficient government management on business should be evident.
Taiwan Mobile is a subsidiary of the Fubon Group. Last September Taiwan Mobile bought kbro from the Carlyle Group. The total transaction involved 32.8 billion NT.
The Carlyle Group took on 24 billion in debt. The total investment amounted to nearly 57 billion. The investment project underwent "detailed review" by the National Communications Commission (NCC) for nearly one year. At the end of that year, it was rejected. It was rejected because the NCC completely misunderstood the clause prohibiting "political party, government, and military ownership of the media." Fubon was forced to purchase kbro in a private capacity. Less than a year later, the total cost of the M&A ballooned to 64 billion. Under NCC mismanagement
a Taiwan-based company was forced to pay an extra 20 billion NT. The NCC certainly handed a foreign corporation a windfall profit. Meanwhile, the FSC's "three financial laws" have bound the financial industry hand and foot. They have exacted unreasonable penalties from industry. All one sees is clueless bureaucrats imposing crippling restrictions and engaging in rampant mismanagement.
Recently Hon Hai chairman Terry Gou attracted considerable attention when he blasted the government for undermining the flat panel industry. This was yet another case of inappropriate and inefficient government management. In March of this year, AUO applied for permission to construct Generation 7.5 plants on the Mainland. It is now December. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is still "reviewing the application one line at a time." Fortunately Terry Gou raised a stink. Otherwise who knows how long the review process would have dragged on. Guo's attack forced Premier Wu to respond on behalf of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Wu announced that "The application has already been approved. All that remains is the paperwork." The Ministry of Economic Affairs will grant its official approval as soon as possible. Because of the year long delay, vendor opportunities were lost. Local panel manufacturers on the Mainland have already begun constructing Generation 8.5 plants. Earlier this month, the South Korean government spoke out on behalf of South Korea's Samsung and LG. They too received official approval from the Mainland authorities. Only Taiwan's vendors have the misfortune of finding themselves trapped in the slow lane, behind the Ministry of Economic Affairs. All they can do is wring their hands as they run in place.
Frankly, the way the Ministry of Economic Affairs has handled Taiwan-based investments on the Mainland is unprofessional and unreasonable. The only plants it permits manufacturers to construct on the Mainland are those producing third-rate technology. The Ministry of Economic Affairs treats twelve-inch wafer fabs
and 90 nanometer technology as if they were national treasures. It prohibits their construction on the mainland. The Mainland, by contrast, treats them as if they were any other local or foreign enterprise. The Mainland has already constructed over a dozen twelve-inch wafer fabs. It has already adopted 90 nanometer manufacturing procedures. Mainland Chinese and South Korean panel makers have already adopted Generation 8.5 plants. AUO however, is only permitted to build Generation 7.5 plants. As a result its competitiveness suffers. Time delays make matters worse. AUO originally seized the initiative. Now it has been reduced to playing catch up. The Mainland has already transformed its global factory into a global market. Our own Ministry of Economic Affairs, on the other hand, still binds our own industries hand and foot. How can they possibly compete with major global companies on the Mainland market?
Such is our government. From the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to the FSC and the NCC. Every ministry is rife with inappropriate, unreasonable, inefficient management practices and restrictions. They have all negatively impacted industrial development, business investments, and Taiwan's competitiveness. We expect the government to improve its management efficiency, and avoid delays while reviewing investment projects. It must expedite these investments projects and help them succeed. If the projects should not be approved, they must be reviewed promptly,
We can no longer tolerate unprofessional and politically motivated restrictions and management practices.
無效管理與限制已成經濟之癌
2010-12-20 中國時報
古典經濟學中，對政府的定位是建立制度、執行法律、推動基礎建設，創造良好的經商與投資環境即可；其餘，就交給市場吧！到了廿一世紀，雖然政府已被賦予更多責任，但在經濟上扮演的角色，仍未改變太多。不過，由近一年的幾個重大投資案看出，政府己逾越該有的角色，不當限制在先，無效率管理在後，已成為經濟與產業之癌。
以最近即將「定生死」的國光石化（八輕）為例，二○○五年就提出計畫，隔年經建會審核通過，接著進入環評等程序，原訂二○○八年動工，但至今仍在審查中。國光石化該不該推動是一回事，但政府的效率實在低落得可怕，也讓企業投資風險與成本都大幅增高。如果政府效率提高，早點替國光石化「斷生死」，企業也容易另尋出路，不會大家一起耗在這看似有望又像無望的計畫中。
事實上，現在政府才作出決策，如果准許投資，廠商仍面臨成本大幅提高，投資經費由四千億增為六千億，同時錯失石化多頭的打擊；如果否決，則要移轉到大陸，也因時程延誤，大陸早被各大石化廠卡位，而面臨進退維谷的窘境。
如果，政府說這是因為環評程序冗長，且涉及許多不同單位、學者專家、環保團體，因此一定「快不起來」，那麼，我們看看幾個單純政府單位就能決定的投資案，政府是如何拖延、作賤企業。
美國ＡＩＧ集團出售南山人壽案，在二○○九年中宣布後開始競標，十月決標，由港商中策集團與博智共組的團隊得標，接著就進入政府審查階段。結果政府一審查又是搞了快一年，一直到今年八月，才宣布駁回此案。我們對政府基於大股東適格性、保險經營穩定性等考量駁回此案沒意見，但需要拖這麼久嗎？拖延時間、懸而未決的結果，是坑死南山人壽。
這家過去台灣績優的保險公司，在ＡＩＧ宣布出售後就陷入動盪不安中，公司管理與經營幾乎陷入空窗期，員工難以安心工作，舊保戶提心吊膽，新保戶更難進來。出售前的二○○七年，南山人壽的初年度保費（ＦＹＰ）市佔率有九．六％，二○○九年跌到三．七％，今年則可能跌破三％，排名跌出十名之外。政府的低效率管理，對企業能造成的殺傷力，由此可見一斑。
富邦集團旗下的台哥大，去年九月從外資凱雷手上買下凱擘，總交易金額三二八億台幣，加上承接凱雷二四○億元的負債，總投資金額近五七○億元。這個投資案在國家通訊委員會（ＮＣＣ）「詳實審查」快一年後，也被打回票，原因是ＮＣＣ不當的拘泥於「黨政軍條款」。富邦只好以家族個人身分再買凱擘，不到一年時間，總併購金額暴漲到六四○億元。在ＮＣＣ的管理下，企業因此多出資一、二百億元，外資倒是受惠哩！其它如金管會以金融三法綁住業者腳步、以不合理的處罰對待業者，都是只見限制與不當管理的官僚作風。
近來因鴻海董事長郭台銘炮轟而引發社會關注的面板登陸投資案亦復如此，同樣是一個政府不當兼無效率管理的案例。友達今年三月遞件申請赴大陸投資面板七．五代廠，到十二月了，經濟部還在「逐條審查」。要不是郭台銘放炮，讓吳院長趕忙代經濟部宣布「已經核准，只差程序」，經濟部才儘快在日前正式通過，否則還不知會拖多久。年頭拖到年尾的結果，是廠商先機盡失。大陸幾個本地面板廠的八．五代廠已動工，本月初韓國三星與樂金，在韓國政府代為出面爭取下，也拿到大陸官方的批文。只有台灣廠商，碰上慢郎中的經濟部，只能原地踏步乾焦急。
不諱言，經濟部的大陸投資管制可說缺乏專業到無理的地步，只懂得掐住廠商拿三流技術去大陸投資設廠。事實上，當經濟部把十二吋晶圓廠、九○奈米技術當寶，不准赴大陸投資時，大陸當地的企業、或國外其它企業，早已在大陸設多座十二吋晶圓廠、製程也早已到九○奈米。當大陸及韓國面板廠都設八．五代廠時，友達只能拿七．五代廠去，競爭力就差一截；加上延誤時機，現在就算核准，友達已由掌握先機變為「在後苦追」。當大陸已由全球工廠轉為全球市場時，經濟部還是擺明綁住企業手腳，企業要如何在大陸市場與全球各大企業競爭？
這就是我們的政府，從經濟部、金管會到ＮＣＣ…，每個部會都充斥著不當、無理又無效率的管理與限制，嚴重影響著產業發展、企業投資，對台灣競爭力造成相當大的負面影響。對需要審查通過的各種投資案，我們期望政府能提升管理效率，避免拖延，就早點幫這些投資案「斷生死」吧。要不，就趕緊檢討那些不必要，只見政治考量，不見專業的限制與管制吧！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 20, 2010
In classical economics, the government's role is to establish a system, enforce the law, build an infrastructure, and create a favorable environment for business and investment. Everything else is left to the market. It is now the twenty-first century, The government has been granted more authority. But its economic role has not changed that much. During the past year however, several major investment projects show that the government has exceeded its proper role. It has imposed unwarranted restrictions before the fact. It has imposed inefficient management after the fact. It has become a cancer afflicting the economy and industry.
Take the Kuokuang Petrochemical project, i.e., the Eighth Naphtha Cracking Plant, which is facing a life for death situation. The project was first proposed in 2005.
It was approved by the CEPD the following year. It then underwent environmental assessment. Construction was supposed to begin in 2008. But as of 2010, it is still being reviewed. If the Kuokuang Petrochemical project ought not to be approved at all, that is one thing. But frightening government in efficiency is another thing altogether. Such inefficiency dramatically increases business risks and investment costs. If government efficiency was increased, and ensured the survival of the Kuokuang Petrochemical project, a company such as Kuokuang would find it easier to survive. It would not be mired in a hopelessness morass, like everyone else.
The government has only just arrived at a decision. If it approves the investment,
the manufacturer will still face substantial cost increases. Its capital outlay will increase from 400 billion to 600 billion. It will also be battered by other petrochemical companies. If rejected, it will be forced to migrate to the Mainland.
Because the project has been subject to delays, other major petrochemical plants have made advance arrangements. Therefore it faces a dilemma, and is unsure whether to advance or retreat. The government may say that the EIA process is protracted because it requires approval by so many different government agencies, experts, and environmental groups. Therefore it "simply cannot be rushed." But let us examine several straightforward investment projects that required approval by only a few government agencies. Let us see how government delays undermined these companies.
Consider AIG, a US-owned company, and its sale of the Nan Shan Life Insurance Group. Bidding was opened in mid-2009. The bid was awarded in October of that year. China Strategic Holdings, a Hong Kong-owned company, and the Primus Group won the bid. The sale was then submitted to the government for review. The result? The review took nearly one full year. The review dragged on until August of this year. Only then did the government announce that the deal had been disapproved. We have no objections to the government rejecting a sale because a major shareholder was ineligible and fears that the insurance industry might be destabilized. But was such a long delay really necessary? During a long delay, a company's future could hang in the balance. A long delay could amount to a death sentence for Nan Shan Life Insurance.
Nan Shan was once an outstanding, blue chip, Taiwan-based insurance company.
But after AIG announced its sale, Nan Shan endured a period of uncertainty. The company's management and operations were virtually in limbo. Employees fretted over their futures. Old policyholders worried about their coverage. Potential policyholders became more difficult to sell. In 2007, before it was sold, Nan Shan Life Insurance's market share of First Year Premiums (FYP) was 9,6%. By 2009 it had plummeted to 3.7%. This year it could drop below 3%. It has already fallen out of the ranks of the top ten. The devastating impact of inefficient government management on business should be evident.
Taiwan Mobile is a subsidiary of the Fubon Group. Last September Taiwan Mobile bought kbro from the Carlyle Group. The total transaction involved 32.8 billion NT.
The Carlyle Group took on 24 billion in debt. The total investment amounted to nearly 57 billion. The investment project underwent "detailed review" by the National Communications Commission (NCC) for nearly one year. At the end of that year, it was rejected. It was rejected because the NCC completely misunderstood the clause prohibiting "political party, government, and military ownership of the media." Fubon was forced to purchase kbro in a private capacity. Less than a year later, the total cost of the M&A ballooned to 64 billion. Under NCC mismanagement
a Taiwan-based company was forced to pay an extra 20 billion NT. The NCC certainly handed a foreign corporation a windfall profit. Meanwhile, the FSC's "three financial laws" have bound the financial industry hand and foot. They have exacted unreasonable penalties from industry. All one sees is clueless bureaucrats imposing crippling restrictions and engaging in rampant mismanagement.
Recently Hon Hai chairman Terry Gou attracted considerable attention when he blasted the government for undermining the flat panel industry. This was yet another case of inappropriate and inefficient government management. In March of this year, AUO applied for permission to construct Generation 7.5 plants on the Mainland. It is now December. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is still "reviewing the application one line at a time." Fortunately Terry Gou raised a stink. Otherwise who knows how long the review process would have dragged on. Guo's attack forced Premier Wu to respond on behalf of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Wu announced that "The application has already been approved. All that remains is the paperwork." The Ministry of Economic Affairs will grant its official approval as soon as possible. Because of the year long delay, vendor opportunities were lost. Local panel manufacturers on the Mainland have already begun constructing Generation 8.5 plants. Earlier this month, the South Korean government spoke out on behalf of South Korea's Samsung and LG. They too received official approval from the Mainland authorities. Only Taiwan's vendors have the misfortune of finding themselves trapped in the slow lane, behind the Ministry of Economic Affairs. All they can do is wring their hands as they run in place.
Frankly, the way the Ministry of Economic Affairs has handled Taiwan-based investments on the Mainland is unprofessional and unreasonable. The only plants it permits manufacturers to construct on the Mainland are those producing third-rate technology. The Ministry of Economic Affairs treats twelve-inch wafer fabs
and 90 nanometer technology as if they were national treasures. It prohibits their construction on the mainland. The Mainland, by contrast, treats them as if they were any other local or foreign enterprise. The Mainland has already constructed over a dozen twelve-inch wafer fabs. It has already adopted 90 nanometer manufacturing procedures. Mainland Chinese and South Korean panel makers have already adopted Generation 8.5 plants. AUO however, is only permitted to build Generation 7.5 plants. As a result its competitiveness suffers. Time delays make matters worse. AUO originally seized the initiative. Now it has been reduced to playing catch up. The Mainland has already transformed its global factory into a global market. Our own Ministry of Economic Affairs, on the other hand, still binds our own industries hand and foot. How can they possibly compete with major global companies on the Mainland market?
Such is our government. From the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to the FSC and the NCC. Every ministry is rife with inappropriate, unreasonable, inefficient management practices and restrictions. They have all negatively impacted industrial development, business investments, and Taiwan's competitiveness. We expect the government to improve its management efficiency, and avoid delays while reviewing investment projects. It must expedite these investments projects and help them succeed. If the projects should not be approved, they must be reviewed promptly,
We can no longer tolerate unprofessional and politically motivated restrictions and management practices.
無效管理與限制已成經濟之癌
2010-12-20 中國時報
古典經濟學中，對政府的定位是建立制度、執行法律、推動基礎建設，創造良好的經商與投資環境即可；其餘，就交給市場吧！到了廿一世紀，雖然政府已被賦予更多責任，但在經濟上扮演的角色，仍未改變太多。不過，由近一年的幾個重大投資案看出，政府己逾越該有的角色，不當限制在先，無效率管理在後，已成為經濟與產業之癌。
以最近即將「定生死」的國光石化（八輕）為例，二○○五年就提出計畫，隔年經建會審核通過，接著進入環評等程序，原訂二○○八年動工，但至今仍在審查中。國光石化該不該推動是一回事，但政府的效率實在低落得可怕，也讓企業投資風險與成本都大幅增高。如果政府效率提高，早點替國光石化「斷生死」，企業也容易另尋出路，不會大家一起耗在這看似有望又像無望的計畫中。
事實上，現在政府才作出決策，如果准許投資，廠商仍面臨成本大幅提高，投資經費由四千億增為六千億，同時錯失石化多頭的打擊；如果否決，則要移轉到大陸，也因時程延誤，大陸早被各大石化廠卡位，而面臨進退維谷的窘境。
如果，政府說這是因為環評程序冗長，且涉及許多不同單位、學者專家、環保團體，因此一定「快不起來」，那麼，我們看看幾個單純政府單位就能決定的投資案，政府是如何拖延、作賤企業。
美國ＡＩＧ集團出售南山人壽案，在二○○九年中宣布後開始競標，十月決標，由港商中策集團與博智共組的團隊得標，接著就進入政府審查階段。結果政府一審查又是搞了快一年，一直到今年八月，才宣布駁回此案。我們對政府基於大股東適格性、保險經營穩定性等考量駁回此案沒意見，但需要拖這麼久嗎？拖延時間、懸而未決的結果，是坑死南山人壽。
這家過去台灣績優的保險公司，在ＡＩＧ宣布出售後就陷入動盪不安中，公司管理與經營幾乎陷入空窗期，員工難以安心工作，舊保戶提心吊膽，新保戶更難進來。出售前的二○○七年，南山人壽的初年度保費（ＦＹＰ）市佔率有九．六％，二○○九年跌到三．七％，今年則可能跌破三％，排名跌出十名之外。政府的低效率管理，對企業能造成的殺傷力，由此可見一斑。
富邦集團旗下的台哥大，去年九月從外資凱雷手上買下凱擘，總交易金額三二八億台幣，加上承接凱雷二四○億元的負債，總投資金額近五七○億元。這個投資案在國家通訊委員會（ＮＣＣ）「詳實審查」快一年後，也被打回票，原因是ＮＣＣ不當的拘泥於「黨政軍條款」。富邦只好以家族個人身分再買凱擘，不到一年時間，總併購金額暴漲到六四○億元。在ＮＣＣ的管理下，企業因此多出資一、二百億元，外資倒是受惠哩！其它如金管會以金融三法綁住業者腳步、以不合理的處罰對待業者，都是只見限制與不當管理的官僚作風。
近來因鴻海董事長郭台銘炮轟而引發社會關注的面板登陸投資案亦復如此，同樣是一個政府不當兼無效率管理的案例。友達今年三月遞件申請赴大陸投資面板七．五代廠，到十二月了，經濟部還在「逐條審查」。要不是郭台銘放炮，讓吳院長趕忙代經濟部宣布「已經核准，只差程序」，經濟部才儘快在日前正式通過，否則還不知會拖多久。年頭拖到年尾的結果，是廠商先機盡失。大陸幾個本地面板廠的八．五代廠已動工，本月初韓國三星與樂金，在韓國政府代為出面爭取下，也拿到大陸官方的批文。只有台灣廠商，碰上慢郎中的經濟部，只能原地踏步乾焦急。
不諱言，經濟部的大陸投資管制可說缺乏專業到無理的地步，只懂得掐住廠商拿三流技術去大陸投資設廠。事實上，當經濟部把十二吋晶圓廠、九○奈米技術當寶，不准赴大陸投資時，大陸當地的企業、或國外其它企業，早已在大陸設多座十二吋晶圓廠、製程也早已到九○奈米。當大陸及韓國面板廠都設八．五代廠時，友達只能拿七．五代廠去，競爭力就差一截；加上延誤時機，現在就算核准，友達已由掌握先機變為「在後苦追」。當大陸已由全球工廠轉為全球市場時，經濟部還是擺明綁住企業手腳，企業要如何在大陸市場與全球各大企業競爭？
這就是我們的政府，從經濟部、金管會到ＮＣＣ…，每個部會都充斥著不當、無理又無效率的管理與限制，嚴重影響著產業發展、企業投資，對台灣競爭力造成相當大的負面影響。對需要審查通過的各種投資案，我們期望政府能提升管理效率，避免拖延，就早點幫這些投資案「斷生死」吧。要不，就趕緊檢討那些不必要，只見政治考量，不見專業的限制與管制吧！
Friday, December 17, 2010
Reaching a Consensus on Our Nation's History
Reaching a Consensus on Our Nation's History
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 17, 2010
Lin Man-hung was until recently, Curator of the Academia Historica. She suddenly resigned over an online voting controversy at the museum's official website. By resigning, she proudly displayed an historian's true colors. Lin Man-hung probably still doesn't understand what she did wrong. But apparently an historian who is unwilling to tell a lie, cannot remain on as Curator of the Academia Historica, Her resignation has brought the controversy to a close. Perhaps the incident will help ensure a correct understanding of the history of the Republic of China. Perhaps it will help establish a more meaningful national consensus.
The facts are irrefutable. The Republic of China has been in existence for a hundred years. Over a third of that the time its activities centered on the mainland. During the remaining 62 years, they centered on Taiwan. They changed with the political winds. Amidst controversy over reunification vs. independence, and conflict between Blue and Green, the "Republic of China on Taiwan" has become a rare point of agreement for the public on Taiwan. But from an historical perspective, the first 38 years of the Republic of China cannot be eradicated with the stroke of a pen. As historians record the events of the past one hundred years, can they ignore Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek? Can they ignore Mao Zedong, who nearly caused the Republic of China's downfall? Can they ignore Wang Jingwei, who established a pro-Japanese puppet government? For that matter, can they ignore Yuan Shi-kai, who crowned himself emperor? Can they ignore the warlords, Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-hsiang of the "八方風雨會中州?" They cannot, any more than German historians can ignore Adolf Hitler.
The Republic of China has endured for 100 years. As the authority entrusted with compiling the nation's history, the importance of the Academia Historica is self-evident. It could take on any number of tasks. It could write a history of Mao Zedong, warts and all. But the Academia Historica is not Wikipedia, It need not draw premature conclusions. It need not lay down the law. In the past, those in power wrote their predecessors' histories. They defined their predecessors' historical legacy. They also defined their own historical legacy, A century later, the history of the Qing Dynasty is still incomplete. Online voting is not what the Academia Historica should be doing.
The recent online poll provoked controversy because under "military affairs," Deng Xiaoping was ranked number one. Professionally speaking, this was not quite accurate. Deng is indeed a major historical figure. He was twice named Time Magazine's Person of the Year. But his legacy concerned the liberalization and reform of the People's Republic of China. It did not concern the Republic of China. He may have played a role in the famous Battle of the Dabie Mountains. But he was not yet one of the top ten marshals of the Red Army.
Lin Man-hung's original field was Taiwan's economic history. When former Vice President Annette Lu declared that Taiwan's status remained undetermined, Lin Man-hung forcefully articulated a comprehensive view of history. She made clear that the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty had clearly determined Taiwan's status. Her work was appreciated by President Ma Ying-jeou, and she assumed the curatorship of the Academia Historica. But apparently the "民國百人" online voting feature was handled a little too carelessly.
When she was questioned in the Legislative Yuan, she frankly declared that she "had no prior knowledge." Legislators unexpectedly pulled out official documents she had personally signed. They denounced her as a liar, and threatened to have the Control Yuan impeach her. Those who know Lin Man-hung know how difficult is for her to tell a lie. Lin Man-hung said she heard the personnel in charge of the online voting activity say that among the key figures listed were Teresa Teng and others. As a result, she approved it. This is probably the truth. Back in the days when the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were at loggerheads with each other, Teresa Teng's songs were the first to break through the Bamboo Curtain. That process is still ongoing. Who could possibly disagree?
History is a serious matter. It may be commemorated by the government or by private citizens. Either way, it can quietly see us through difficult times. The Republic of China is Asia's first democracy. Its glorious past includes all too much pain. Political interference on Taiwan remains rampant. Political leaders have paid scant attention to the significance of the Republic of China's centennial. Less than a year remains. Government agencies have promoted all sorts of activities. The Academia Historica came up with the idea of an online voting feature, perhaps out of expediency. It never realized it had taken on a burden weightier than any other governmental or private entity.
But expedient solutions require expedient techniques. Take for example the commemoration of historic dates and historic individuals. Choose an historic figure for each year. Ask 100 historians to compile a "民國百人" chronicle. For example, in the first year of the Republic of China, the historic figure would be Sun Yat-sen. In the 11th year of the Republic, it would be Hu Shi, who promoted the use of vernacular Chinese. In the 38th year of the Republic, it would be Mao Zedong, who ended Republic of China rule on the Mainland. In the 46th year of the Repubic, it would be Yang Cheng-ning and Lee Tseng-dao, the first ethnic Chinese to win the Nobel Prize, In the 62nd year of the Republic, it would be Lin Hwai-min, who founded the Cloud Gate dance theater. In the 68th year of the Republic, it would be Shih Ming-teh, who provoked the Formosa Incident. In the 77th year of the Republic, it would be Lee Teng-hui, who was the Republic of China's first directly elected president. In the 80th year of the Republic, it would be Master Cheng Yen, who received the Maigesesai Award for global disaster relief. In the 99th year of the Republic, it would be Chen Shui-bian, who became the first president of the Republic of China sentenced to prison. What need is there for online voting?
Lin Man-hung has resigned and returned to the study of history. She continues to tell the truth. Her efforts deserve recognition. Her successor should keep in mind the lessons of this incident. Chinese dynasties that have lasted longer than a century are rare. The public will vote according to its whims. But the Academia Historica is a guardian of history. When it promotes its "民國百人" activity, it must be clear about what it is doing. It must not be merely a fireworks display. It must carefully trace the path of history. It must draw lessons from history. It must spur future developments. It must concentrate a nation's will for the coming century.
正確史觀才能鞏固國家共識
2010-12-17 中國時報
國史館館長林滿紅為「民國百人」網路票選爭議，閃電請辭下台，展現歷史學者的本色，林滿紅或許還是不能理解她到底做錯了什麼？說錯了什麼？但顯然認知到做為一個不能說謊的歷史學者，她確實不適合再留任國史館長，她的請辭為爭議事件劃下句點。更重要的，這個事件如果能為中華民國建立一個正確的史觀，並以此為基礎，鞏固全民的國家共識，或許更有意義。
不必諱言，中華民國一百年，超過三分之一的時間重點都在大陸，其餘六十二年在台灣，隨著政治形勢變遷，「中華民國在台灣」已經成為全民於統獨藍綠歧見中，少有的重大共識。但從歷史角度，中華民國是不可能將曾經發生過的卅八年一筆抹消，寫史者回顧這一百年，看到了孫中山、蔣介石，又豈能忽略讓中華民國差點亡國的毛澤東、或媚日建立偽政權的汪精衛？甚至復辟當皇帝的袁世凱、乃至軍閥割據，八方風雨會中州的吳佩孚、馮玉祥等人？就像德國寫史者再痛恨都不可能忘記希特勒一樣。
民國一百年，作為國家史料的編纂機關，國史館重要性不言可喻，在林林種種可為之事中，國史館要為毛澤東寫下正負面的歷史評價都可以，但國史館不是維基百科，出手就要拍板定案，以為是非定論，過去執政者為前朝寫史，既為前朝定位，也為自己定位，一部清史稿，一百年都還沒編纂完成，網路票選實非國史館應為之正事。
這次網路票選惹出爭議的是軍事類首選竟是鄧小平，在專業認知上也有落差，鄧小平的確是號人物，還曾兩度入選美國《時代》雜誌的年度風雲人物，但他的歷史地位在於對中華人民共和國改革開放之功，非關中華民國，儘管當年他打過赫赫有名的大別山戰役，但仍未列紅軍的十大元帥。
林滿紅本人治史專才從台灣經濟史出發，後及於台灣地位，前副總統呂秀蓮夸夸其談台灣地位未定論時，林滿紅鏗鏘有力地提出完整的史料史觀，以中日和約就是台灣地位確定的依據，得到馬英九總統的賞識，從而出任國史館長，但在「民國百人」網路票選活動的細節處理上，顯然太過粗疏。
她在立法院答詢時，直言她「事前不知情」，未料立委拿出她親簽公文，痛斥她說謊，並揚言要將她移送監察院彈劾。認識林滿紅的人都知道，要林滿紅說謊是難上加難，林滿紅指她聽承辦人員指票選名單中有鄧麗君等人就直接批可了，應該不假，當年兩岸隔絕勢同水火的年代，鄧麗君的歌聲率先衝破鐵幕，且迄今歷久未歇，誰曰不宜。
歷史是嚴肅莊嚴的事，不論政府或民間在歡欣中，都應該更沉靜肅穆地看待我們走過的坎坷路。中華民國是亞洲第一個民主國家，在輝煌歲月的背後，有太多辛酸，台灣政治干擾又多，政治領袖沒人深刻思考民國一百年的意義，倉卒地在一年不到的時間中，要求各機關用盡各種角度舉辦共襄盛舉的活動，國史館或為方便故，搞出網路票選，卻沒想到己身扛的責任迥然不同於其他政府或民間單位。
然而，便宜行事有便宜行事的辦法，隨便舉例，以紀年為經，人物為緯，一年選出一個年度人物，請一百位歷史學者為民國百人寫傳，比方說，民國元年必然是孫中山，民國十一年有推動白話文運動的胡適，民國卅八年就是終結大陸時期國民政府的毛澤東，民國四十六年還有華人首得諾貝爾獎的楊振寧和李政道，民國六十二年就是創辦雲門的林懷民，民國六十八年則是美麗島事件的施明德，民國七十七年當然是第一位民選總統李登輝，民國八十年還有全球救災濟世，獲得麥格塞塞獎的證嚴上人，民國九十九年更有第一位判刑入監的總統陳水扁…，何須網路票選？
林滿紅請辭回歸歷史研究，繼續講真話，值得肯定，後繼者則須記取此一事件的教訓。中國歷朝歷代，國祚延續百年以上者，均屬不易，民間喜歡怎麼票選都成，但作為官史重鎮，國史館要辦「民國百人」活動時，起心動念就要非常清楚，其意義絕對不能只是一場熱鬧花俏的煙花秀，而是審慎爬梳歷史的跡痕，從而以史為鑑、策勵未來，積蓄下一個百年的動能和國民意志。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 17, 2010
Lin Man-hung was until recently, Curator of the Academia Historica. She suddenly resigned over an online voting controversy at the museum's official website. By resigning, she proudly displayed an historian's true colors. Lin Man-hung probably still doesn't understand what she did wrong. But apparently an historian who is unwilling to tell a lie, cannot remain on as Curator of the Academia Historica, Her resignation has brought the controversy to a close. Perhaps the incident will help ensure a correct understanding of the history of the Republic of China. Perhaps it will help establish a more meaningful national consensus.
The facts are irrefutable. The Republic of China has been in existence for a hundred years. Over a third of that the time its activities centered on the mainland. During the remaining 62 years, they centered on Taiwan. They changed with the political winds. Amidst controversy over reunification vs. independence, and conflict between Blue and Green, the "Republic of China on Taiwan" has become a rare point of agreement for the public on Taiwan. But from an historical perspective, the first 38 years of the Republic of China cannot be eradicated with the stroke of a pen. As historians record the events of the past one hundred years, can they ignore Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek? Can they ignore Mao Zedong, who nearly caused the Republic of China's downfall? Can they ignore Wang Jingwei, who established a pro-Japanese puppet government? For that matter, can they ignore Yuan Shi-kai, who crowned himself emperor? Can they ignore the warlords, Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-hsiang of the "八方風雨會中州?" They cannot, any more than German historians can ignore Adolf Hitler.
The Republic of China has endured for 100 years. As the authority entrusted with compiling the nation's history, the importance of the Academia Historica is self-evident. It could take on any number of tasks. It could write a history of Mao Zedong, warts and all. But the Academia Historica is not Wikipedia, It need not draw premature conclusions. It need not lay down the law. In the past, those in power wrote their predecessors' histories. They defined their predecessors' historical legacy. They also defined their own historical legacy, A century later, the history of the Qing Dynasty is still incomplete. Online voting is not what the Academia Historica should be doing.
The recent online poll provoked controversy because under "military affairs," Deng Xiaoping was ranked number one. Professionally speaking, this was not quite accurate. Deng is indeed a major historical figure. He was twice named Time Magazine's Person of the Year. But his legacy concerned the liberalization and reform of the People's Republic of China. It did not concern the Republic of China. He may have played a role in the famous Battle of the Dabie Mountains. But he was not yet one of the top ten marshals of the Red Army.
Lin Man-hung's original field was Taiwan's economic history. When former Vice President Annette Lu declared that Taiwan's status remained undetermined, Lin Man-hung forcefully articulated a comprehensive view of history. She made clear that the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty had clearly determined Taiwan's status. Her work was appreciated by President Ma Ying-jeou, and she assumed the curatorship of the Academia Historica. But apparently the "民國百人" online voting feature was handled a little too carelessly.
When she was questioned in the Legislative Yuan, she frankly declared that she "had no prior knowledge." Legislators unexpectedly pulled out official documents she had personally signed. They denounced her as a liar, and threatened to have the Control Yuan impeach her. Those who know Lin Man-hung know how difficult is for her to tell a lie. Lin Man-hung said she heard the personnel in charge of the online voting activity say that among the key figures listed were Teresa Teng and others. As a result, she approved it. This is probably the truth. Back in the days when the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were at loggerheads with each other, Teresa Teng's songs were the first to break through the Bamboo Curtain. That process is still ongoing. Who could possibly disagree?
History is a serious matter. It may be commemorated by the government or by private citizens. Either way, it can quietly see us through difficult times. The Republic of China is Asia's first democracy. Its glorious past includes all too much pain. Political interference on Taiwan remains rampant. Political leaders have paid scant attention to the significance of the Republic of China's centennial. Less than a year remains. Government agencies have promoted all sorts of activities. The Academia Historica came up with the idea of an online voting feature, perhaps out of expediency. It never realized it had taken on a burden weightier than any other governmental or private entity.
But expedient solutions require expedient techniques. Take for example the commemoration of historic dates and historic individuals. Choose an historic figure for each year. Ask 100 historians to compile a "民國百人" chronicle. For example, in the first year of the Republic of China, the historic figure would be Sun Yat-sen. In the 11th year of the Republic, it would be Hu Shi, who promoted the use of vernacular Chinese. In the 38th year of the Republic, it would be Mao Zedong, who ended Republic of China rule on the Mainland. In the 46th year of the Repubic, it would be Yang Cheng-ning and Lee Tseng-dao, the first ethnic Chinese to win the Nobel Prize, In the 62nd year of the Republic, it would be Lin Hwai-min, who founded the Cloud Gate dance theater. In the 68th year of the Republic, it would be Shih Ming-teh, who provoked the Formosa Incident. In the 77th year of the Republic, it would be Lee Teng-hui, who was the Republic of China's first directly elected president. In the 80th year of the Republic, it would be Master Cheng Yen, who received the Maigesesai Award for global disaster relief. In the 99th year of the Republic, it would be Chen Shui-bian, who became the first president of the Republic of China sentenced to prison. What need is there for online voting?
Lin Man-hung has resigned and returned to the study of history. She continues to tell the truth. Her efforts deserve recognition. Her successor should keep in mind the lessons of this incident. Chinese dynasties that have lasted longer than a century are rare. The public will vote according to its whims. But the Academia Historica is a guardian of history. When it promotes its "民國百人" activity, it must be clear about what it is doing. It must not be merely a fireworks display. It must carefully trace the path of history. It must draw lessons from history. It must spur future developments. It must concentrate a nation's will for the coming century.
正確史觀才能鞏固國家共識
2010-12-17 中國時報
國史館館長林滿紅為「民國百人」網路票選爭議，閃電請辭下台，展現歷史學者的本色，林滿紅或許還是不能理解她到底做錯了什麼？說錯了什麼？但顯然認知到做為一個不能說謊的歷史學者，她確實不適合再留任國史館長，她的請辭為爭議事件劃下句點。更重要的，這個事件如果能為中華民國建立一個正確的史觀，並以此為基礎，鞏固全民的國家共識，或許更有意義。
不必諱言，中華民國一百年，超過三分之一的時間重點都在大陸，其餘六十二年在台灣，隨著政治形勢變遷，「中華民國在台灣」已經成為全民於統獨藍綠歧見中，少有的重大共識。但從歷史角度，中華民國是不可能將曾經發生過的卅八年一筆抹消，寫史者回顧這一百年，看到了孫中山、蔣介石，又豈能忽略讓中華民國差點亡國的毛澤東、或媚日建立偽政權的汪精衛？甚至復辟當皇帝的袁世凱、乃至軍閥割據，八方風雨會中州的吳佩孚、馮玉祥等人？就像德國寫史者再痛恨都不可能忘記希特勒一樣。
民國一百年，作為國家史料的編纂機關，國史館重要性不言可喻，在林林種種可為之事中，國史館要為毛澤東寫下正負面的歷史評價都可以，但國史館不是維基百科，出手就要拍板定案，以為是非定論，過去執政者為前朝寫史，既為前朝定位，也為自己定位，一部清史稿，一百年都還沒編纂完成，網路票選實非國史館應為之正事。
這次網路票選惹出爭議的是軍事類首選竟是鄧小平，在專業認知上也有落差，鄧小平的確是號人物，還曾兩度入選美國《時代》雜誌的年度風雲人物，但他的歷史地位在於對中華人民共和國改革開放之功，非關中華民國，儘管當年他打過赫赫有名的大別山戰役，但仍未列紅軍的十大元帥。
林滿紅本人治史專才從台灣經濟史出發，後及於台灣地位，前副總統呂秀蓮夸夸其談台灣地位未定論時，林滿紅鏗鏘有力地提出完整的史料史觀，以中日和約就是台灣地位確定的依據，得到馬英九總統的賞識，從而出任國史館長，但在「民國百人」網路票選活動的細節處理上，顯然太過粗疏。
她在立法院答詢時，直言她「事前不知情」，未料立委拿出她親簽公文，痛斥她說謊，並揚言要將她移送監察院彈劾。認識林滿紅的人都知道，要林滿紅說謊是難上加難，林滿紅指她聽承辦人員指票選名單中有鄧麗君等人就直接批可了，應該不假，當年兩岸隔絕勢同水火的年代，鄧麗君的歌聲率先衝破鐵幕，且迄今歷久未歇，誰曰不宜。
歷史是嚴肅莊嚴的事，不論政府或民間在歡欣中，都應該更沉靜肅穆地看待我們走過的坎坷路。中華民國是亞洲第一個民主國家，在輝煌歲月的背後，有太多辛酸，台灣政治干擾又多，政治領袖沒人深刻思考民國一百年的意義，倉卒地在一年不到的時間中，要求各機關用盡各種角度舉辦共襄盛舉的活動，國史館或為方便故，搞出網路票選，卻沒想到己身扛的責任迥然不同於其他政府或民間單位。
然而，便宜行事有便宜行事的辦法，隨便舉例，以紀年為經，人物為緯，一年選出一個年度人物，請一百位歷史學者為民國百人寫傳，比方說，民國元年必然是孫中山，民國十一年有推動白話文運動的胡適，民國卅八年就是終結大陸時期國民政府的毛澤東，民國四十六年還有華人首得諾貝爾獎的楊振寧和李政道，民國六十二年就是創辦雲門的林懷民，民國六十八年則是美麗島事件的施明德，民國七十七年當然是第一位民選總統李登輝，民國八十年還有全球救災濟世，獲得麥格塞塞獎的證嚴上人，民國九十九年更有第一位判刑入監的總統陳水扁…，何須網路票選？
林滿紅請辭回歸歷史研究，繼續講真話，值得肯定，後繼者則須記取此一事件的教訓。中國歷朝歷代，國祚延續百年以上者，均屬不易，民間喜歡怎麼票選都成，但作為官史重鎮，國史館要辦「民國百人」活動時，起心動念就要非常清楚，其意義絕對不能只是一場熱鬧花俏的煙花秀，而是審慎爬梳歷史的跡痕，從而以史為鑑、策勵未來，積蓄下一個百年的動能和國民意志。
Thursday, December 16, 2010
Will the Big Mouth Clause Shut Political Appointees' Mouths?
Will the Big Mouth Clause Shut Political Appointees' Mouths?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 16, 2010
The Legislative Yuan has completed its first reading of the "Big Mouth Clause," a draft law regulating the conduct of political appointees.
The law would require political appointees to step down if their verbal indiscretions adversely affect the government's policy decisions or public image. If the bill becomes law, the quiet voice inside political appointees' heads will be replaced by the stentorian voice of John Law. The inevitable result will be endless controversy.
Suppose the "Big Mouth Clause" becomes law. On the one hand, the public will expect political appointees to comport themselves with greater decorum. On the other hand, it will underscore the extent to which political appointees' words and deeds provoke criticism. The reality is that
political appointees' speaking skills could stand improvement. But the problem is, who decides whose mouth is "too big?" And suppose someone has to step down because he had a big mouth? Will we really be better off if political appointees have "no mouths?" Will we really be better off if they never express an opinion? Is such a provision really necessary? Or will it merely create more problems than it solves? This is a question worth considering.
So-called political appointees are government officials who have been appointed for political reasons, and therefore bear political responsibility. They are different from civil service administrators. Anyone qualified to be a political appointee, is in principle forward-looking and politically sensitive. If he commits a major slip of the tongue, if he is guilty of misconduct, or if he fails to accomplish his appointed task, he should resign without being asked, as an expression of political responsibility. For political appointees that is taken for granted. In fact, we have no need to await legal guidelines. Under our current system,
whenever a ruling administration feels its own political appointees have been guilty of misconduct or incompetence, it can replace them at its discretion. Suppose a political appointee trips over his own tongue and touches off a firestorm. If his superior fails to take action, or attempts to shield him, he is likely to get into trouble himself.
Officials may step down on their own initiative. Or they may be replaced by their superiors. Political appointees may be forced to step down due to a slip of the tongue. None of these eventualities pose a problem. The point is that slips of the tongue are a political matter. They can be dealt with flexibly, as a political matter. But if political matters are turned into legal matters, then they must be dealt with rigidly, as a legal matter. Those who must deal with the matter are likely to come across as rigid sticklers. For example, when Premier Wu spoke about health care he mentioned Lin Yi-shi. Because he failed to pause "one tenth of a second," between phrases, he was misunderstood. Many days passed before the matter was finally cleared up. Sports Commission Vice Chairman Chen Hsien-chung was forced to resign over the Yang Shu-chun incident.
He got himself into hot water when he said the athletes "would have to lump it." But in retrospect, why did he say what he did? If he said it in order to safeguard the rights of the Chinese Taipei team, can he really be blamed?
Besides, haven't we been touting the lifting of martial law, and the right of free speech? If the government suddenly begins controlling the speech of political appointees, people may get the impression the government is attempting to turn the clock back. No wonder some people are saying that the law is akin to the ancient practice of executing those who criticize the emperor, and signals the advent of a "white terror for political appointees." More ominously, many current political appointees were once members of the bureaucracy. They are often verbally challenged and afraid to face the public. Their ineptitude and fear often lead to poor communication and bad decision-making. If legal penalties are imposed on them for speaking out, such officials will surely shrink even deeper into their shells. They will perceive speaking to the public as negotiating a minefield. They may even become irresolute fence-sitters who go along to get along. For a liberal democracy, such a chilling effect on political appointees is not something anyone wants to see.
To control what political appointees say, they must bear primary responsibility for their speech. They must be adept at communicating and dialoguing with the public, but also avoid glibness. If they utter something inappropriate, they must apologize. If their apology fails to remedy the situation, they must resign without being asked. This is to be expected.
Japan's Minister of Legal Affairs Yanagida touched off a firestorm with "two words" and betrayed his contempt for the Diet. Having blundered,
he had little choice but to apologize and step down. Of course, different political parties have different norms. KMT officials are often inept at public speaking. They often fail to communicate effectively during the decision-making process. When it comes to cabinet reshuffles, they are often a day late and a dollar short. DPP officials often have the gift of gab.
Sometimes officials such as Tu Cheng-sheng or Chuang Kuo-jung deliberately incite controversy. The ruling DPP administration may feel they did nothing wrong or cover for them. Even if we had a "Big Mouth Clause," would that really compel them to step down?
The Examination Yuan has proposed a "political appointees law." Apparently it has lost its understanding of the distinction between the party and the government. For example, the proposed law stipulates that political appointees shall not use government resources for partisan political activities. It stipulates that when political appointees leave office, they must be accountable. It stipulates that they may not conceal or damage documents or data. It stipulates that during working hours they may not participate in partisan political activities. Two changes in ruling parties have already taken place. Yet the no man's land between the party and the state has apparently grown. This law will redefine and clarify the powers and responsibilities of political appointees. It will encourage both the ruling and opposition parties to engage in reflection. But adding the "Big Mouth Clause" to the law is not necessarily an improvement. It is not necessarily beneficial. The existence of the provisions may encourage the arbitrary invocation of the law merely to harass political appointees. It may invite unnecessary conflict and turbulence.
Given political developments on Taiwan, stuffed shirt political appointees no longer meet the requirement of the times. If they lack communication skills, they may find it difficult to be effective political appointees. In that case, officials who commit verbal gaffes should resign before being asked.
We hardly need laws to force them out. Until then, we may wish to leave more room for discretion. We hardly need to sew their mouths shut with the law.
大嘴巴條款會使政務官沒嘴巴？
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.12.16
立法院審查政務人員法草案，一審通過「大嘴巴條款」，規定未來政務官員因多言、失言惹禍，影響施政決策或政府形象，都應辭職下台。倘若就此完成立法，政務官發言的「心中一把尺」，將變成「法上一把尺」，不免引發見仁見智的議論。
「大嘴巴條款」入法，一方面顯示外界對政務官才德的要求更高，另方面也反映了政務官言行常常招致非議的問題。就現實看，我國政務官的發言能力確有加強之必要，問題是誰來決定什麼樣的嘴巴算太「大」？再者，若大嘴巴該下台，那麼「沒嘴巴」的政務官是否會更好？此一條款有否必要、會不會治絲益棼，值得探討。
所謂政務官，是指受政治任命、負政治責任的官員，與一般行政體系公務員不同。既能出任政務官，理當更具瞻矚及政治敏感，若本身發生重大失言、失德，或無法達成託付，自應主動掛冠求去以示負責；這是現代政務官的基本素養，其實已無待立法規範。以我國現行體制，主政者只要認為自己團隊裡的政務官員失格或不夠稱職，也可隨時調動撤換。若有政務官失言，導致輿論沸騰，而其首長竟無動於衷或曲意迴護，恐怕還會引火上身。
亦即，不論是官員自行引咎請退，或遭首長主動撤換，政務官因失言下台，目前並無處理上的困難。問題是，失言原為政治問題，以政治處理可有較寬裕的拿捏；若變成法條，要用刻板的法律來處理政治進退，反而恐顯拘泥。例如，吳揆談健保提到林益世時，因語句少了「十分之一秒的停頓」，主詞遭到誤解，多日始獲釐清。包括因楊淑君事件掛冠的體委會副主委陳顯宗，他那句「吞下去」的禍言，時過境遷後回頭看，若說此話是為維護整個中華隊的比賽權而發，不也有其理性思考的一面？
再說，台灣多年來推動人民言論「解禁」，若政府反要提高對政務官發言的管制，恐怕將予人開倒車的印象。難怪有人說，此法儼如「偶語棄市」、「政務官的白色恐怖」。更不利的是，目前一些出身官僚系統的政務官，往往拙於說明、怯於面對社會大眾，造成許多決策溝通不良；若是再設下對於發言的懲罰，勢必讓這類型官員更形退縮，視與社會對話為畏途，甚至變成唯唯諾諾、只知附和的人。就一個民主開放社會而言，政務官之間若出現這種寒蟬效應，絕非人們樂見的發展。
要管理政務官嘴巴，首要責任在他們自己：既要勤於溝通對話，又要避免輕率油滑；一旦說出什麼不得體的話，觸犯了社會大忌，若道歉仍無法收拾，即應考慮主動求去，這是基本修養。日本法務大臣柳田的「兩句話」風波，透露了他對國會的敷衍與輕蔑；這種錯誤，除了道歉下台，沒有第二條路可走。但大家別忘了不同政黨之間的文化差異。例如，國民黨政務官多半拙於表達，決策上通常是溝通不足的問題更為嚴重，內閣處理人事異動也往往慢三拍。民進黨官員則巧言善辯，有時甚至像杜正勝、莊國榮那樣故意說出無理挑釁的話；如果主政者不認為不妥或刻意袒護，就算增訂了大嘴巴條款，又能叫他們下台嗎？
考試院所提的「政務人員法」草案，試圖對漸形混淆的黨、政分際，找到一個界線，諸如：政務官不得動用行政資源辦理政黨活動，政務官離職時應辦理交代，不得隱匿或毀損文書、資料，上班時間不得參加政黨活動等。兩度政黨輪替後，黨政之間的不明地帶似有擴大之勢，透過此法的訂定，對政務官的權責重新清理定位，有助於朝野政黨的反思。然而，將「大嘴巴條款」納入其中，卻未必是進步、有益的作法，反而可能因此條文的存在，造成各界動不動就「依法」對政務官言行作無關宏旨的品頭論足，徒增施政上的無謂衝突與紛擾。
以台灣的政治發展，木訥寡言的政務官已不再符合時代要求，若沒有一點言語應對能力，將難成為勝任的政務官。在那種情況下，失言官員應自知去從，不必等法律來趕他走；而在此之前，我們也許不妨多留些空間，不必硬用法律來縫住他們的嘴巴吧？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 16, 2010
The Legislative Yuan has completed its first reading of the "Big Mouth Clause," a draft law regulating the conduct of political appointees.
The law would require political appointees to step down if their verbal indiscretions adversely affect the government's policy decisions or public image. If the bill becomes law, the quiet voice inside political appointees' heads will be replaced by the stentorian voice of John Law. The inevitable result will be endless controversy.
Suppose the "Big Mouth Clause" becomes law. On the one hand, the public will expect political appointees to comport themselves with greater decorum. On the other hand, it will underscore the extent to which political appointees' words and deeds provoke criticism. The reality is that
political appointees' speaking skills could stand improvement. But the problem is, who decides whose mouth is "too big?" And suppose someone has to step down because he had a big mouth? Will we really be better off if political appointees have "no mouths?" Will we really be better off if they never express an opinion? Is such a provision really necessary? Or will it merely create more problems than it solves? This is a question worth considering.
So-called political appointees are government officials who have been appointed for political reasons, and therefore bear political responsibility. They are different from civil service administrators. Anyone qualified to be a political appointee, is in principle forward-looking and politically sensitive. If he commits a major slip of the tongue, if he is guilty of misconduct, or if he fails to accomplish his appointed task, he should resign without being asked, as an expression of political responsibility. For political appointees that is taken for granted. In fact, we have no need to await legal guidelines. Under our current system,
whenever a ruling administration feels its own political appointees have been guilty of misconduct or incompetence, it can replace them at its discretion. Suppose a political appointee trips over his own tongue and touches off a firestorm. If his superior fails to take action, or attempts to shield him, he is likely to get into trouble himself.
Officials may step down on their own initiative. Or they may be replaced by their superiors. Political appointees may be forced to step down due to a slip of the tongue. None of these eventualities pose a problem. The point is that slips of the tongue are a political matter. They can be dealt with flexibly, as a political matter. But if political matters are turned into legal matters, then they must be dealt with rigidly, as a legal matter. Those who must deal with the matter are likely to come across as rigid sticklers. For example, when Premier Wu spoke about health care he mentioned Lin Yi-shi. Because he failed to pause "one tenth of a second," between phrases, he was misunderstood. Many days passed before the matter was finally cleared up. Sports Commission Vice Chairman Chen Hsien-chung was forced to resign over the Yang Shu-chun incident.
He got himself into hot water when he said the athletes "would have to lump it." But in retrospect, why did he say what he did? If he said it in order to safeguard the rights of the Chinese Taipei team, can he really be blamed?
Besides, haven't we been touting the lifting of martial law, and the right of free speech? If the government suddenly begins controlling the speech of political appointees, people may get the impression the government is attempting to turn the clock back. No wonder some people are saying that the law is akin to the ancient practice of executing those who criticize the emperor, and signals the advent of a "white terror for political appointees." More ominously, many current political appointees were once members of the bureaucracy. They are often verbally challenged and afraid to face the public. Their ineptitude and fear often lead to poor communication and bad decision-making. If legal penalties are imposed on them for speaking out, such officials will surely shrink even deeper into their shells. They will perceive speaking to the public as negotiating a minefield. They may even become irresolute fence-sitters who go along to get along. For a liberal democracy, such a chilling effect on political appointees is not something anyone wants to see.
To control what political appointees say, they must bear primary responsibility for their speech. They must be adept at communicating and dialoguing with the public, but also avoid glibness. If they utter something inappropriate, they must apologize. If their apology fails to remedy the situation, they must resign without being asked. This is to be expected.
Japan's Minister of Legal Affairs Yanagida touched off a firestorm with "two words" and betrayed his contempt for the Diet. Having blundered,
he had little choice but to apologize and step down. Of course, different political parties have different norms. KMT officials are often inept at public speaking. They often fail to communicate effectively during the decision-making process. When it comes to cabinet reshuffles, they are often a day late and a dollar short. DPP officials often have the gift of gab.
Sometimes officials such as Tu Cheng-sheng or Chuang Kuo-jung deliberately incite controversy. The ruling DPP administration may feel they did nothing wrong or cover for them. Even if we had a "Big Mouth Clause," would that really compel them to step down?
The Examination Yuan has proposed a "political appointees law." Apparently it has lost its understanding of the distinction between the party and the government. For example, the proposed law stipulates that political appointees shall not use government resources for partisan political activities. It stipulates that when political appointees leave office, they must be accountable. It stipulates that they may not conceal or damage documents or data. It stipulates that during working hours they may not participate in partisan political activities. Two changes in ruling parties have already taken place. Yet the no man's land between the party and the state has apparently grown. This law will redefine and clarify the powers and responsibilities of political appointees. It will encourage both the ruling and opposition parties to engage in reflection. But adding the "Big Mouth Clause" to the law is not necessarily an improvement. It is not necessarily beneficial. The existence of the provisions may encourage the arbitrary invocation of the law merely to harass political appointees. It may invite unnecessary conflict and turbulence.
Given political developments on Taiwan, stuffed shirt political appointees no longer meet the requirement of the times. If they lack communication skills, they may find it difficult to be effective political appointees. In that case, officials who commit verbal gaffes should resign before being asked.
We hardly need laws to force them out. Until then, we may wish to leave more room for discretion. We hardly need to sew their mouths shut with the law.
大嘴巴條款會使政務官沒嘴巴？
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.12.16
立法院審查政務人員法草案，一審通過「大嘴巴條款」，規定未來政務官員因多言、失言惹禍，影響施政決策或政府形象，都應辭職下台。倘若就此完成立法，政務官發言的「心中一把尺」，將變成「法上一把尺」，不免引發見仁見智的議論。
「大嘴巴條款」入法，一方面顯示外界對政務官才德的要求更高，另方面也反映了政務官言行常常招致非議的問題。就現實看，我國政務官的發言能力確有加強之必要，問題是誰來決定什麼樣的嘴巴算太「大」？再者，若大嘴巴該下台，那麼「沒嘴巴」的政務官是否會更好？此一條款有否必要、會不會治絲益棼，值得探討。
所謂政務官，是指受政治任命、負政治責任的官員，與一般行政體系公務員不同。既能出任政務官，理當更具瞻矚及政治敏感，若本身發生重大失言、失德，或無法達成託付，自應主動掛冠求去以示負責；這是現代政務官的基本素養，其實已無待立法規範。以我國現行體制，主政者只要認為自己團隊裡的政務官員失格或不夠稱職，也可隨時調動撤換。若有政務官失言，導致輿論沸騰，而其首長竟無動於衷或曲意迴護，恐怕還會引火上身。
亦即，不論是官員自行引咎請退，或遭首長主動撤換，政務官因失言下台，目前並無處理上的困難。問題是，失言原為政治問題，以政治處理可有較寬裕的拿捏；若變成法條，要用刻板的法律來處理政治進退，反而恐顯拘泥。例如，吳揆談健保提到林益世時，因語句少了「十分之一秒的停頓」，主詞遭到誤解，多日始獲釐清。包括因楊淑君事件掛冠的體委會副主委陳顯宗，他那句「吞下去」的禍言，時過境遷後回頭看，若說此話是為維護整個中華隊的比賽權而發，不也有其理性思考的一面？
再說，台灣多年來推動人民言論「解禁」，若政府反要提高對政務官發言的管制，恐怕將予人開倒車的印象。難怪有人說，此法儼如「偶語棄市」、「政務官的白色恐怖」。更不利的是，目前一些出身官僚系統的政務官，往往拙於說明、怯於面對社會大眾，造成許多決策溝通不良；若是再設下對於發言的懲罰，勢必讓這類型官員更形退縮，視與社會對話為畏途，甚至變成唯唯諾諾、只知附和的人。就一個民主開放社會而言，政務官之間若出現這種寒蟬效應，絕非人們樂見的發展。
要管理政務官嘴巴，首要責任在他們自己：既要勤於溝通對話，又要避免輕率油滑；一旦說出什麼不得體的話，觸犯了社會大忌，若道歉仍無法收拾，即應考慮主動求去，這是基本修養。日本法務大臣柳田的「兩句話」風波，透露了他對國會的敷衍與輕蔑；這種錯誤，除了道歉下台，沒有第二條路可走。但大家別忘了不同政黨之間的文化差異。例如，國民黨政務官多半拙於表達，決策上通常是溝通不足的問題更為嚴重，內閣處理人事異動也往往慢三拍。民進黨官員則巧言善辯，有時甚至像杜正勝、莊國榮那樣故意說出無理挑釁的話；如果主政者不認為不妥或刻意袒護，就算增訂了大嘴巴條款，又能叫他們下台嗎？
考試院所提的「政務人員法」草案，試圖對漸形混淆的黨、政分際，找到一個界線，諸如：政務官不得動用行政資源辦理政黨活動，政務官離職時應辦理交代，不得隱匿或毀損文書、資料，上班時間不得參加政黨活動等。兩度政黨輪替後，黨政之間的不明地帶似有擴大之勢，透過此法的訂定，對政務官的權責重新清理定位，有助於朝野政黨的反思。然而，將「大嘴巴條款」納入其中，卻未必是進步、有益的作法，反而可能因此條文的存在，造成各界動不動就「依法」對政務官言行作無關宏旨的品頭論足，徒增施政上的無謂衝突與紛擾。
以台灣的政治發展，木訥寡言的政務官已不再符合時代要求，若沒有一點言語應對能力，將難成為勝任的政務官。在那種情況下，失言官員應自知去從，不必等法律來趕他走；而在此之前，我們也許不妨多留些空間，不必硬用法律來縫住他們的嘴巴吧？
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