Obama's Anxiety: Another Sputnik Moment
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 29, 2011
President Obama has just delivered his 2011 State of the Union Address. It was the first time in history that a US president openly expressed so much anxiety. He said that a half century ago, when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite in history, it shocked America. Eventually America put a man on the moon, surpassing the Soviet Union. Obama said that America is now experiencing yet another "Sputnik moment."
When Obama speaks of America's current Sputnik moment, he is referring to the emergence of Mainland China and India. They have changed the rules of the global economic game. Mainland China and India present a challenge to the US. According to Obama, America can meet this challenge only if political parties set aside their differences and work together. His declaration has an underlying theme, namely, how can America, which is proud of its multiparty democracy, emerge victorious over Mainland China and India?
America is in decline. This is the subtext of Obama's State of the Union address. In his address, Obama mentioned Mainland China four times. He spoke of its rapid progress in education, technology, and infrastructure. He reminded the American people that they must not fall behind. He said South Korean households have more convenient Internet access than those in the United States. Europe and Russia have surpassed the US in terms of investment in roads and railways. Mainland China is building faster trains and upgrading its airports. Even the world's fastest computers are made in Mainland China. To Obama, the fact that South Korea's educational system had surpassed that of America's. To Obama, this constitutes today's Sputnik moment.
Never before has an American president's State of the Union Address betrayed such intense anxiety. Members of the U.S. House of Representatives responded to the Sputnik moment. For the first time in history, they seated themselves in Congress without regard for party affiliation. Together, they listened to Obama's State of the Union Address. In the past, Democrats and Republicans invariably sat on opposite sides of the aisle, according to party affiliation. When the president delivered his address, the ruling party would give him a standing ovation. The opposition party would remain silent and seated. But after the shooting in Tucson, champions of a centrist "third way" suggested that the two parties sit together without regard for party affiliation during State of the Union Addresses, in response to public expectations for bipartisan cooperation. This was a first. No one knows whether there will be second.
America's national power is in decline. The tea party has escalated the politics of hate, increasing public anxiety. To Obama and some Americans, this has already undermined America's chances of "winning the future."
Obama said that the ruling and opposition parties should compete on the basis of mutual respect. But governing the nation is the shared responsibility of all parties. When Obama referred to China for the fifth time, he did not do so by name. He said some countries don't need to hold political debates. If the central government wants a railroad, they build a railroad, no matter how many homes get bulldozed. If they don't want a bad story in the newspaper, it doesn't get written.
Obama compared the two systems, revealing mixed feelings. On the one hand, he said "As contentious and frustrating and messy as our democracy can sometimes be, I know there isn't a person here who would trade places with any other nation on Earth."
Barak Obama's anxieties echo Francis Fukuyama's. Francis Fukuyama's famous "End of History" thesis argues that liberal democracy is the final form of human government. It will never be surpassed because it is the end of history as such. More recently however, he expressed concern over the state of democracy in America. The United States is mired in partisan power struggles, No one knows how to respond to the "Sputnik moment." Mainland China meanwhile, relies on Hu Jintao's "socialism with special characteristics" to launch its own Sputniks.
This is America's problem. This is the problem faced by human civilization. Years ago, the Soviets launched Sputnik. But Sputnik failed to save the Soviet Union's doomed political and economic system. As Obama noted, no one in a liberal democracy "would trade places with any other nation on Earth." They are unwilling to do so, even in the face of another Sputnik. But is a liberal democracy doomed? Must it remain mired in Republican vs. Democrat partisan political struggles, or be subjected to tea party style politics? Is it doomed to lose against "socialism with special characteristics?"
Members of congress may have sat together for an evening without regard for party affiliation. But how will America's democracy confront the current Sputnik moment? Americans are watching, The rest of the world is watching as well. Because America's democracy is a grand experiment, and human civilization is an even grander experiment.
歐巴馬的焦慮：現在的史潑尼克時刻
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.29
美國總統歐巴馬的二○一一年國情咨文，可謂是一篇歷來首次露骨地顯示美國強烈焦慮感的總統咨文。他說，半世紀前，蘇聯發射史上首枚「史潑尼克」人造衛星（Sputnik），震驚了美國，最後美國以首先登陸月球超越了蘇聯。歐巴馬說：現在正是美國這個時代的「史潑尼克時刻」。
歐巴馬口中的「現在的史潑尼克」，指的是正在崛起的中國與印度，以及「已經改變的世界經濟規則」；至於因應這「中國印度尼克」的方法，歐巴馬指出，美國面對的問題與挑戰，只有在所有政黨撇開政爭戰火，群策群力，才能解決。這篇咨文隱約有一主軸，那就是：如何以美國引以為榮的政黨民主制度，去勝過中國、印度這些新興強權。
美國正在衰退，這是此篇國情咨文取名「贏向未來」的潛台詞。歐巴馬在演說中四次提到中國在教育、科技、基礎設施等方面的快速發展，提醒美國人民不能落後。他又說，南韓家庭上網比美國更方便，歐洲及俄羅斯在公路和鐵路方面的投資超越美國，中國正在建造更快的火車和更新的機場，連全球最快的電腦也落在中國。在歐巴馬眼中，南韓的教育體制也優於美國。這就是歐巴馬描繪的「現在的史潑尼克時刻」。
未曾有過一篇美國總統咨文，流露出如此強烈的焦慮感。相對於此種「現在的史潑尼克震撼」，美國眾議院首次以兩黨議員在議場混坐，共同聽取歐巴馬總統的新年國情咨文。一向以來，民主共和兩黨各據議場一邊，象驢分明；總統宣讀咨文，執政黨的一半起立鼓掌，反對黨的一半面無表情地坐著不動。但在土桑槍擊事件後，中間團體「第三條路」建議在國情咨文之夜兩黨混坐，以回應美國社會對政黨合作的期待。這是第一次，但不知有否下一次。
美國國勢衰退，與茶黨掀高的仇恨政爭同為引起焦慮的嚴肅問題；在歐巴馬及有些美國人眼中，這已威脅到美國能否「贏得未來」。
歐巴馬說，朝野政黨應當相互尊重據理力爭，但治國則是各政黨的共同責任。在咨文中，歐巴馬第五次提及中國，卻未點名，他說：「有些國家沒有這個問題（政黨爭論），中央政府要開一條鐵路就能開成，不管要剷平多少住家；如果不希望壞消息見報，就不會有人寫。」
接著，歐巴馬似乎說出了他對兩種制度對比的兩種矛盾感受：一方面，他有些憂心而指出「雖然美國民主有時可能讓人感到混亂與挫折」；另一方面，他也表達了自信與堅持而說：「但沒有人會想和其他國家交換制度。」
歐巴馬的焦慮與福山的焦慮可以相互印證。福山以「歷史終結論」知名，謂民主自由是人類文明的最高境界，此後不可能有超越者，故而歷史至此已告終結；近年他卻對美國民主體制的表現深以為憂。在美國陷於黨爭，而不知能否正確有效回應「現在的史潑尼克」的時候；中國卻恃其「社會主義體制的特點與優勢」（胡錦濤語），大放其「史潑尼克」。
這是美國的難題，甚至也反映了整個人類文明的難題。蘇聯當年領先發射「史潑尼克」，但「史潑尼克」的紀錄卻不能改變後來蘇聯整體政經體制的傾覆。正如歐巴馬所說，在自由民主體制下的人民，「沒有人願與其他國家交換制度」；即使面對「現在的史潑尼克」，也不願意。但是，難道民主自由體制，就一定要走上「象驢分明」或「茶黨模式」，而注定就不能勝過「社會主義體制的特點與優勢」嗎？
經過一夜混坐的美國民主體制，如何面對這個「現在的史潑尼克時刻」；不但美國人在看，全世界也在看。因為，這不僅是美國民主體制的大試煉，也是人類歷史文明的大試煉！
Saturday, January 29, 2011
Friday, January 28, 2011
Mainland Affairs Council: Two Decades of Change
Mainland Affairs Council: Two Decades of Change
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 28, 2011
The Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) is about to celebrate its 20th birthday. The past two decades have been filled with intrigue, and wracked by vicissitudes. Twenty years is not that long. But the changes are too numerous to count. During that time, clashes have brought us to the brink of war. Cross-Strait relations have gone from indeterminate to inseparable. We should review our journey, reflect on the errors in our thinking, in order to formulate a better cross-Strait policy for the future.
The MAC did not appear out of nowhere. It was Taipei's reaction to the end of the Cold War. The Cold War officially ended when the Soviet Union imploded. The year was 1991. The Mainland Affairs Council was established early that year. The MAC was born amidst the Tiananmen Incident, the collapse of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The ice which had covered nearly half the earth melted, almost instantaneously.
The period was about democratization and reconciliation. The original mission of the Mainland Affairs Council was promoting reconciliation. But when Beijing cracked down on the pro-democracy movement in Tiananmen Square, promoting democratization in the Mainland Region became the MAC's added responsibility.
The MAC was part of Chiang Ching-kuo's strategy for opening up the Mainland Region during his own lifetime. It was born after his death. It was his posthumous child. In 1987 Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and the ban on family visits. Thus began the resumption of cross-Strait interaction. He died early the following year. But seven months later, the predecessor of the Mainland Affairs Council was established. This was the Executive Yuan Mainland Working Committee (?). It was crammed into the annex of the Executive Yuan on Peking East Road, on the second floor. Executive Secretary Ma Ying-jeou, along with several coworkers, reported to the Executive Yuan Mainland Working Committee for work, half a day each week. Two years later, the MAC was born.
Consider when and where the Mainland Affairs Council was born, and that will tell you much about its original nature. The goal of the MAC, established under Lee Teng-hui, was to promote cross-Strait reconciliation, and to pursue cross-Strait unification under democracy. One month after the MAC was established, the National Unification Guidelines were approved by the National Unification Council, with the participation of DPP members. The National Unification Guidelines outlined the path for China's reunification. It established certain institutional preconditions as its highest priority, including democracy, freedom, and the equitable distribution of wealth. It transcended nationalist stereotypes. It championed universal values. It did not posit reunification as an unconditional goal. It gave priority to the pursuit of happiness. It was a national guideline that addressed the problems of the nation, both root and branch. We traveled down the path toward democracy and unity, in step with the rest of the world, for three to five years. But the Taiwan Region suddenly found itself inundated by a wave of reaction, and began marching in the opposite direction.
That opposite direction was Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence exploited the Republic of China's democratization. It turned democracy into its hostage. Its political moves reached extremes under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. During this period, the MAC abandoned its original goal of reconciliation, and instead incited hatred and hostility. It contravened the spirit of the council. Over much of the following two decades, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian viewed cross-Strait relations as playthings of authority. They incited divisions on Taiwan, and antipathy toward the Mainland. They clung to power by exploiting populism. Lee Teng-hui trotted out his "be patient, avoid haste policy" and his "two-states theory." Chen Shui-bian trotted out his "one country on each side theory," and demanded the repeal of the National Unification Guidelines. He called for the "rectification of names" and the "authoring of a new constitution." He led the nation to the brink of disaster. He turned the nation upside down. That said, the CCP bears the heaviest responsibility for the wave of Taiwan independence sentiment that swept over the island. Its dogmatic One China rhetoric loudly proclaimed that the "Republic of China has been destroyed." It relentlessly threatened the use of force. It imposed authoritarian rule in the Mainland Region. These provided fertile soil for Taiwan independence agitation. Taiwan independence frenzy originated with Lee and Chen demagoguery. But Beijing bears the greatest responsibility for public skepticism towards reunification.
Cross-strait relations have been thoroughly undermined. Like a crumpled piece of paper, it will be difficult to restore to its original condition. Ma Ying-jeou gave birth to the MAC. He is now in office. Nevertheless the MAC cannot be restored to its original condition. The National Unification Guidelines have been replaced by the "1992 Consensus," "One China, Different Interpretations," and "no reunification, no independence, no use of force." Romantic aspirations and lofty sentiments may have been dampened. But realistic cross-Strait exchanges are proceeding by leaps and bounds.
The past two decades were a process of trial and error. These two decades saw the Taiwan independence movement take the Taiwan Region on a drunken joy ride, only to crash it into a wall. The past two decades tell us that Taiwan must not adopt a negative, shrinking attitude. It must adopt a positive, forward looking attitude. The National Unification Guidelines have been moved to the back burner. But bilateral political and economic links have already progressed passed the point of no return. Authorities on the Taiwan side have provided inspiration over the past two decades. Without this inspiration, Beijing would not have adopted its current "symbiotic win-win" thinking.
Twenty years ago, we had the Mainland Affairs Council and the National Unification Council. Today we have the "1992 Consensus," "One China, Different Interpretations," and "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." This may look like regression. But at this stage, "no [immediate] reunification, and no independence" is the pragmatic path that both sides must take. It is the path that will lead the two sides onto the high road of "peaceful development."
陸委會20載：從國統綱領到不統不獨不武
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.28
二十載忽焉而過，行政院大陸委員會就要度過二十歲生日。這二十年風詭雲譎、滄桑多變，雖是短短二十年，卻堆疊了目不暇給的流變，其間衝撞跌宕，且曾瀕臨戰爭邊緣，而兩岸關係如今畢竟已從懵然走向深炙。我們或應檢視這段走過的路程，濾清思維上的誤區，俾能走出兩岸關係更正確的未來。
陸委會不是憑空而生，它其實是台灣對世界冷戰結束的領先反應。東西冷戰在蘇聯解體後正式告終，這一年是一九九一年，陸委會就在這年的年初成立。陸委會誕生時的背景拼貼是：六四天安門事件、東歐劇變、柏林圍牆倒塌與蘇聯解體，覆蓋半個世界長達近半世紀的嚴冰瞬間消融。
民主化與和解，是這段歷史時期的顯著主題。和解自然是陸委會的原始性格，而在見證六四民運遭到鎮壓的狀況下，促使大陸民主化更是當年陸委會的擔當。
陸委會亦是蔣經國生前開放戰略的遺腹子，一九八七年蔣經國宣布解嚴並開放老兵返鄉探親，成為兩岸重新互動的濫觴，隔年年初他卻與世長辭；但七個月後陸委會的前身行政院大陸工作會報成立，擠在北平東路邊上的行政院後棟二樓，擔任會報執行秘書的馬英九帶著幾位夥伴每周工作半天，二年多後陸委會呱呱墜地。
將陸委會成立時空稍作剪影，即可替陸委會找到最初的面容。李登輝設置的陸委會是為兩岸和解而生，以追尋兩岸的民主統一為目標。陸委會成立一個月內，《國家統一綱領》即由民進黨人亦參加其中的國統會通過。國統綱領繪出中國統一的路徑，以民主、自由、均富的制度前提為最終關懷，它超越了民族主義的窠臼，標舉了普世的價值，亦即不以統一為不附條件的追求，而以人民生活的幸福美好做為統一的上位方針；持平而論，此不能不算得上是一部可攻可守、標本兼治的國家綱領。然而，沿著民主統一路徑，跟著世界脈搏共同湧動了大約僅僅三、五年，台灣卻突地由一股逆潮引領，而走向了反面。
這個反面即是台獨，它以台灣自身的民主化為推力，將台獨扣緊民主，而在李登輝及陳水扁的政治操作下達到了最高潮；這一段歷史過程，陸委會不單離棄了和解的初衷，反倒走上仇視與敵對，竟與立會之精神背道而馳。二十年的大半歲月，是李登輝與陳水扁皆將兩岸關係當成權力的玩物，以祭起反中、分裂的大纛操作民粹而攫取權力；李登輝拋出戒急用忍、兩國論，陳水扁提一邊一國、廢除《國統綱領》、操作正名制憲，率全民在危境之中往復衝撞，陷國家於傾覆邊緣。然而，台獨反潮的發生，中共更應承擔最重的責任，它那僵化的一個中國論述、口口聲聲「中華民國已經滅亡」、毫不鬆動的武力威脅，以及內部專制統治，都成了這股逆潮的論述土壤。台獨的狂飆，出自李扁操作的因素較大；而統一的不入人心及擱淺，則北京要負更大的責任。
兩岸關係被蹂躪至此，已如揉皺的紙，難以復平。如今一手催生陸委會的馬英九執政，陸委會卻已不能回到最初的面目。《國統綱領》已由「九二共識／一中各表」及「不統／不獨／不武」取代；雖似失去了幾分浪漫及豪情壯志，卻使得在現實上兩岸的交流磨合突飛猛進。
二十年或是一趟試誤的歷程。這二十年正映現了台獨的飆車與撞壁；而二十年經驗亦告訴我們，台灣與其消極逃避退縮，不如正面進取，《國統綱領》雖束諸高閣，但兩岸的政經連結已然跨過了不可折返點。至於若無這廿年對彼岸當局的啟示，北京亦不會有「共生雙贏」的思考。
因而，「九二共識／一中各表」及「不統／不獨／不武」看似已從廿年前的陸委會及國統會倒退，但在這個階段看來，「不統／不獨」對兩岸卻皆是一個實事求是的路徑，將兩岸帶上了「和平發展」的大道。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 28, 2011
The Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) is about to celebrate its 20th birthday. The past two decades have been filled with intrigue, and wracked by vicissitudes. Twenty years is not that long. But the changes are too numerous to count. During that time, clashes have brought us to the brink of war. Cross-Strait relations have gone from indeterminate to inseparable. We should review our journey, reflect on the errors in our thinking, in order to formulate a better cross-Strait policy for the future.
The MAC did not appear out of nowhere. It was Taipei's reaction to the end of the Cold War. The Cold War officially ended when the Soviet Union imploded. The year was 1991. The Mainland Affairs Council was established early that year. The MAC was born amidst the Tiananmen Incident, the collapse of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The ice which had covered nearly half the earth melted, almost instantaneously.
The period was about democratization and reconciliation. The original mission of the Mainland Affairs Council was promoting reconciliation. But when Beijing cracked down on the pro-democracy movement in Tiananmen Square, promoting democratization in the Mainland Region became the MAC's added responsibility.
The MAC was part of Chiang Ching-kuo's strategy for opening up the Mainland Region during his own lifetime. It was born after his death. It was his posthumous child. In 1987 Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and the ban on family visits. Thus began the resumption of cross-Strait interaction. He died early the following year. But seven months later, the predecessor of the Mainland Affairs Council was established. This was the Executive Yuan Mainland Working Committee (?). It was crammed into the annex of the Executive Yuan on Peking East Road, on the second floor. Executive Secretary Ma Ying-jeou, along with several coworkers, reported to the Executive Yuan Mainland Working Committee for work, half a day each week. Two years later, the MAC was born.
Consider when and where the Mainland Affairs Council was born, and that will tell you much about its original nature. The goal of the MAC, established under Lee Teng-hui, was to promote cross-Strait reconciliation, and to pursue cross-Strait unification under democracy. One month after the MAC was established, the National Unification Guidelines were approved by the National Unification Council, with the participation of DPP members. The National Unification Guidelines outlined the path for China's reunification. It established certain institutional preconditions as its highest priority, including democracy, freedom, and the equitable distribution of wealth. It transcended nationalist stereotypes. It championed universal values. It did not posit reunification as an unconditional goal. It gave priority to the pursuit of happiness. It was a national guideline that addressed the problems of the nation, both root and branch. We traveled down the path toward democracy and unity, in step with the rest of the world, for three to five years. But the Taiwan Region suddenly found itself inundated by a wave of reaction, and began marching in the opposite direction.
That opposite direction was Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence exploited the Republic of China's democratization. It turned democracy into its hostage. Its political moves reached extremes under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. During this period, the MAC abandoned its original goal of reconciliation, and instead incited hatred and hostility. It contravened the spirit of the council. Over much of the following two decades, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian viewed cross-Strait relations as playthings of authority. They incited divisions on Taiwan, and antipathy toward the Mainland. They clung to power by exploiting populism. Lee Teng-hui trotted out his "be patient, avoid haste policy" and his "two-states theory." Chen Shui-bian trotted out his "one country on each side theory," and demanded the repeal of the National Unification Guidelines. He called for the "rectification of names" and the "authoring of a new constitution." He led the nation to the brink of disaster. He turned the nation upside down. That said, the CCP bears the heaviest responsibility for the wave of Taiwan independence sentiment that swept over the island. Its dogmatic One China rhetoric loudly proclaimed that the "Republic of China has been destroyed." It relentlessly threatened the use of force. It imposed authoritarian rule in the Mainland Region. These provided fertile soil for Taiwan independence agitation. Taiwan independence frenzy originated with Lee and Chen demagoguery. But Beijing bears the greatest responsibility for public skepticism towards reunification.
Cross-strait relations have been thoroughly undermined. Like a crumpled piece of paper, it will be difficult to restore to its original condition. Ma Ying-jeou gave birth to the MAC. He is now in office. Nevertheless the MAC cannot be restored to its original condition. The National Unification Guidelines have been replaced by the "1992 Consensus," "One China, Different Interpretations," and "no reunification, no independence, no use of force." Romantic aspirations and lofty sentiments may have been dampened. But realistic cross-Strait exchanges are proceeding by leaps and bounds.
The past two decades were a process of trial and error. These two decades saw the Taiwan independence movement take the Taiwan Region on a drunken joy ride, only to crash it into a wall. The past two decades tell us that Taiwan must not adopt a negative, shrinking attitude. It must adopt a positive, forward looking attitude. The National Unification Guidelines have been moved to the back burner. But bilateral political and economic links have already progressed passed the point of no return. Authorities on the Taiwan side have provided inspiration over the past two decades. Without this inspiration, Beijing would not have adopted its current "symbiotic win-win" thinking.
Twenty years ago, we had the Mainland Affairs Council and the National Unification Council. Today we have the "1992 Consensus," "One China, Different Interpretations," and "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." This may look like regression. But at this stage, "no [immediate] reunification, and no independence" is the pragmatic path that both sides must take. It is the path that will lead the two sides onto the high road of "peaceful development."
陸委會20載：從國統綱領到不統不獨不武
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.28
二十載忽焉而過，行政院大陸委員會就要度過二十歲生日。這二十年風詭雲譎、滄桑多變，雖是短短二十年，卻堆疊了目不暇給的流變，其間衝撞跌宕，且曾瀕臨戰爭邊緣，而兩岸關係如今畢竟已從懵然走向深炙。我們或應檢視這段走過的路程，濾清思維上的誤區，俾能走出兩岸關係更正確的未來。
陸委會不是憑空而生，它其實是台灣對世界冷戰結束的領先反應。東西冷戰在蘇聯解體後正式告終，這一年是一九九一年，陸委會就在這年的年初成立。陸委會誕生時的背景拼貼是：六四天安門事件、東歐劇變、柏林圍牆倒塌與蘇聯解體，覆蓋半個世界長達近半世紀的嚴冰瞬間消融。
民主化與和解，是這段歷史時期的顯著主題。和解自然是陸委會的原始性格，而在見證六四民運遭到鎮壓的狀況下，促使大陸民主化更是當年陸委會的擔當。
陸委會亦是蔣經國生前開放戰略的遺腹子，一九八七年蔣經國宣布解嚴並開放老兵返鄉探親，成為兩岸重新互動的濫觴，隔年年初他卻與世長辭；但七個月後陸委會的前身行政院大陸工作會報成立，擠在北平東路邊上的行政院後棟二樓，擔任會報執行秘書的馬英九帶著幾位夥伴每周工作半天，二年多後陸委會呱呱墜地。
將陸委會成立時空稍作剪影，即可替陸委會找到最初的面容。李登輝設置的陸委會是為兩岸和解而生，以追尋兩岸的民主統一為目標。陸委會成立一個月內，《國家統一綱領》即由民進黨人亦參加其中的國統會通過。國統綱領繪出中國統一的路徑，以民主、自由、均富的制度前提為最終關懷，它超越了民族主義的窠臼，標舉了普世的價值，亦即不以統一為不附條件的追求，而以人民生活的幸福美好做為統一的上位方針；持平而論，此不能不算得上是一部可攻可守、標本兼治的國家綱領。然而，沿著民主統一路徑，跟著世界脈搏共同湧動了大約僅僅三、五年，台灣卻突地由一股逆潮引領，而走向了反面。
這個反面即是台獨，它以台灣自身的民主化為推力，將台獨扣緊民主，而在李登輝及陳水扁的政治操作下達到了最高潮；這一段歷史過程，陸委會不單離棄了和解的初衷，反倒走上仇視與敵對，竟與立會之精神背道而馳。二十年的大半歲月，是李登輝與陳水扁皆將兩岸關係當成權力的玩物，以祭起反中、分裂的大纛操作民粹而攫取權力；李登輝拋出戒急用忍、兩國論，陳水扁提一邊一國、廢除《國統綱領》、操作正名制憲，率全民在危境之中往復衝撞，陷國家於傾覆邊緣。然而，台獨反潮的發生，中共更應承擔最重的責任，它那僵化的一個中國論述、口口聲聲「中華民國已經滅亡」、毫不鬆動的武力威脅，以及內部專制統治，都成了這股逆潮的論述土壤。台獨的狂飆，出自李扁操作的因素較大；而統一的不入人心及擱淺，則北京要負更大的責任。
兩岸關係被蹂躪至此，已如揉皺的紙，難以復平。如今一手催生陸委會的馬英九執政，陸委會卻已不能回到最初的面目。《國統綱領》已由「九二共識／一中各表」及「不統／不獨／不武」取代；雖似失去了幾分浪漫及豪情壯志，卻使得在現實上兩岸的交流磨合突飛猛進。
二十年或是一趟試誤的歷程。這二十年正映現了台獨的飆車與撞壁；而二十年經驗亦告訴我們，台灣與其消極逃避退縮，不如正面進取，《國統綱領》雖束諸高閣，但兩岸的政經連結已然跨過了不可折返點。至於若無這廿年對彼岸當局的啟示，北京亦不會有「共生雙贏」的思考。
因而，「九二共識／一中各表」及「不統／不獨／不武」看似已從廿年前的陸委會及國統會倒退，但在這個階段看來，「不統／不獨」對兩岸卻皆是一個實事求是的路徑，將兩岸帶上了「和平發展」的大道。
Thursday, January 27, 2011
Will a Nationwide Poll Really Help the DPP Move Toward the Center?
Will a Nationwide Poll Really Help the DPP Move Toward the Center?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 27, 2011
The curtain has just rung down on the Democratic Progressive Party's Plenary Session. It approved the use of a nationwide poll to determine the party's candidates for president and regional legislators. This highlights once again the DPP's distinctive brand of "democratic centralism." The real decision-making power remains in the hands of factional heads and the party nomenklatura. This sort of "joint factional rule" can control how the party goes about reforming its primary process. But can it help the DPP set forth a compelling cross-Strait policy platform? Can it help it to move toward the center? That is the really big question.
Party members who supported a nationwide poll, fought party members who wanted nominees to be chosen by party members exclusively. The result during the DPP's plenary session was a tempest in a teapot. The so-called "party members only faction" was eventually defeated. This was not surprising. Change within the DPP has never been from the bottom up. When Chen Shui-bian ran for president, he adopted his "new centrist path." Later, the party adopted its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." All these changes were initiated from the top down. The recent intraparty elections made major changes to the party's primary process. These too were the result of joint factional rule. Annette Lu found herself isolated within the party. She waved the banner of democracy within the party. But in the end she was unable to overcome a consensus reached by the factions.
People have joked that the DPP was founded 20 years ago, but has since adopted at least 20 methods for candidate nomination during its party primaries. The method is changed every time an election rolls around, During its early years, party cadres would conduct candidate evaluations. These candidate evaluations would be used in conjuction with party member balloting. Later, party member votes and opinion polls would be weighted equally. At one time they were weighted 30/70. At another time Deep Green votes were weighted more heavily. That was the case when the "Blue Excluded Opinion Polls" were used. Today, it is using a nationwide poll. The methods for candidate selection keep changing. But in fact there is only one problem that must be solved, and that is the problem with "phantom party members."
Major players and factions within the DPP have long maintained hordes of phantom party members. These phantom party members infested the 2008 legislative elections. Many candidates adopted a centrist path. First they had to get past the major players. They then had to get past the "Blues excluded opinion poll." After negotiating these two gauntlets, most centrist oriented candidates were either dead or hanging by a thread. The result was an election debacle. It almost destroyed the younger generation of Democratic Progressive Party officials. They had to rebuild amidst the ruins.
Given this history, the Democratic Progressive Party leadership long ago rejected the possibility of a primary process in which candidates are determined exclusively by party member ballots. But a final factor persuaded the various factions within the party to accept a nationwide poll. Party leaders issued repeated warnings. If prosecutors were to take advantage of the party primaries to launch an investigation into phantom party members, the DPP would lose the election, even before it was held.
Concern over this issue is the greatest in the DPP's legislators without portfolio nominations. Legislators without portfolio represent a political party. They cannot be nominated in the same way as a party's presidential or regional legislative candidates, by relying on nationwide polls. But if party member balloting plays any part in their selection, phantom voters may appear out of the woodwork, or vote buying may rear its ugly head. The DPP Central Executive Committee eventually reached a majority decision. All legislators without portfolio would be nominated by a nominating committee. On the surface the party chairman expanded his or her power. In fact future candidatesfor legislator without portfolio will require the support of two-thirds of the members of the Central Executive Committee. This means that any nominations will be the result of a compromise between various factions. They will be the product of joint factional rule. Even the party chairman will not be able to control this process.
Phantom party members remain a concern. But the nationwide poll approach for primary nominations is a major change. Why did the factions and party members agree to relinquish power? Because everyone in the Democratic Progressive Party, from top to bottom, is determined to win. That is why they are willing to incorporate a nationwide poll that includes the opinions of swing voters. This raises another question. The entire Democratic Progressive Party is pinning its hopes on the so-called nationwide poll. Can the nationwide poll really persuade the DPP to adopt a more centrist path?
The actual situation suggests otherwise. The nationwide poll approach for the primary nomination processs has just been passed. Ker Chien-min is the Chairman of the DPP legislative caucus. He said that the most important thing during the 2012 election is to "avoid infighting." Therefore all nominations should avoid the primaries. Based on this logic, although the presidential candidate is supposed to be determined by a nationwide poll, the party "must nevertheless avoid a nationwide poll!"
On the surface, this addresses the issue of residual infighting from 2008. But at a deeper level, it addresses the issue of how to incorporate the Republic of China into the system. The DPP is still unclear about how to create a stable framework for cross-Strait relations. Therefore it cannot withstand intraparty debates during the party primaries. The party leadership even lacks confidence in the nationwide poll. It cannot believe that debating the facts could help the truth come to light.
The changes to the primary nomination process are important. But consider the experience of the British Labour Party. The system must be changed. Political leaders must offer a viable political platform. They must offer thoughful policies. Only then can win voter confidence. Therefore, if the DPP wishes to return to power, a nationwide poll is merely the first step. Everyone is still waiting for Tsai Ing-wen's Platform for the Coming Decade.
「全民調」真能帶領民進黨往中間走？
2011-01-27 中國時報
甫於日前落幕的民進黨全代會，通過以全民調的方式來選出總統及區域立委候選人，再次凸顯民進黨「民主集中制」的特質，真正掌握決策權的是派系頭頭及黨內精英；只是，這樣的「派系共治」方式，即使能夠主導初選制度的改革，但是否能讓民進黨提出一套穩健可行的兩岸論述、進一步往中間走，才是令人關注的。
全民調派大戰黨員派，這是民進黨全代會前的茶壺風暴。但所謂的黨員派最後敗下陣來，並不令人意外，因為，主導民進黨改變的，從來不是黨員由下而上的力量，相反的，從陳水扁參選時的新中間路線、到通過《台灣前途決議文》，大多是由上而下的改變。而這次的黨內選舉辦法大調整，同樣是派系共治下的結果，在黨內落單的呂秀蓮，即使援引黨內民主大旗，最後還是打不過派系共識。
有人戲稱，自民進黨創黨二十幾年來，實行過的黨內初選辦法，至少也有二十幾種。每逢選舉就要改一次，從早期的幹部評鑑併行黨員投票、黨員及民調投票各半、有時是三七比，或是加重深綠支持者的排藍民調，再到現在的全民調。黨內初選辦法一變再變，要解決的問題只有一個：就是人頭黨員問題。
長期以來，民進黨內就有大戶或派系豢養人頭黨員，為患最烈的應該是二○○八年立委選舉，許多採取中間路線的候選人，要先過人頭大戶這一關，接下來再面對排藍民調，經過這兩關嚴酷的篩選，中間傾向的候選人非死即傷，不但直接造成選舉大敗，更讓民進黨青壯派差點毀於一旦，必須在廢墟中重建。
在這樣的背景下，民進黨領導精英早就排除初選黨員投票的可能性，但說服各派系接受全民調的最後一根稻草，就是黨內精英一再警告：檢調一旦趁初選時、發動調查人頭黨員，民進黨形同是未選先敗。
其中，以民進黨不分區立委提名辦法，最能凸顯此一疑慮。不分區立委代表政黨，不能如總統或區域立委一般，全部以民調方式產生，但即使只是部分採用黨員投票，都可能爆發人頭黨員集體投票、或買票弊案，民進黨中執會最後以絕對多數通過，不分區提名全部交由提名委員會決定，表面上是黨主席擴權，事實上將來的不分區名單必須有三分之二的中執委支持才會通過，預告這必然是各派系妥協之後的名單，同樣是派系共治的產物，即使黨主席也不可能主導。
當然，即使有人頭黨員的疑慮，全民調的初選方式還是劇烈的調整。各派系及黨員為何同意放棄權力，最大的關鍵在於：民進黨舉黨上下都充滿著「贏的意志」，因此他們願意採取可以納入中間民意的全民調。接下來的問題是，當整個民進黨都對所謂的全民調寄以厚望時，全民調真的能帶領民進黨往中間走嗎？
實際的狀況似乎並非如此，全民調初選辦法才剛通過，民進黨立院黨團總召柯建銘即表示，二○一二的選舉，最重要的就是要「避免內鬥」，所以一切提名都應該避免初選，在這樣的前提之下，即使總統候選人已通過由全民調產生，「還是要避免去全民調！」
表面上，這是對二○○八年黨內惡鬥餘悸猶存，但更深層的背景則是，對於如何納入中華民國體制、如何建立一套穩定的兩岸關係架構，民進黨目前仍然混沌不明，也因此禁不起黨內初選的論辯，即使是在全民調這樣一個全民的舞台上，民進黨精英仍然沒有信心，不敢相信真理有可能愈辯愈明。
可以說，初選制度的調整當然很重要，但是觀諸英國工黨的經驗，制度調整之外，政黨領導人還必須擘畫可行的政黨綱領，及提出周延的政策、政見，才可能得到選民的信賴；因此，民進黨要重返執政，全民調只是第一步而已，大家仍然在期待她的十年政綱。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 27, 2011
The curtain has just rung down on the Democratic Progressive Party's Plenary Session. It approved the use of a nationwide poll to determine the party's candidates for president and regional legislators. This highlights once again the DPP's distinctive brand of "democratic centralism." The real decision-making power remains in the hands of factional heads and the party nomenklatura. This sort of "joint factional rule" can control how the party goes about reforming its primary process. But can it help the DPP set forth a compelling cross-Strait policy platform? Can it help it to move toward the center? That is the really big question.
Party members who supported a nationwide poll, fought party members who wanted nominees to be chosen by party members exclusively. The result during the DPP's plenary session was a tempest in a teapot. The so-called "party members only faction" was eventually defeated. This was not surprising. Change within the DPP has never been from the bottom up. When Chen Shui-bian ran for president, he adopted his "new centrist path." Later, the party adopted its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." All these changes were initiated from the top down. The recent intraparty elections made major changes to the party's primary process. These too were the result of joint factional rule. Annette Lu found herself isolated within the party. She waved the banner of democracy within the party. But in the end she was unable to overcome a consensus reached by the factions.
People have joked that the DPP was founded 20 years ago, but has since adopted at least 20 methods for candidate nomination during its party primaries. The method is changed every time an election rolls around, During its early years, party cadres would conduct candidate evaluations. These candidate evaluations would be used in conjuction with party member balloting. Later, party member votes and opinion polls would be weighted equally. At one time they were weighted 30/70. At another time Deep Green votes were weighted more heavily. That was the case when the "Blue Excluded Opinion Polls" were used. Today, it is using a nationwide poll. The methods for candidate selection keep changing. But in fact there is only one problem that must be solved, and that is the problem with "phantom party members."
Major players and factions within the DPP have long maintained hordes of phantom party members. These phantom party members infested the 2008 legislative elections. Many candidates adopted a centrist path. First they had to get past the major players. They then had to get past the "Blues excluded opinion poll." After negotiating these two gauntlets, most centrist oriented candidates were either dead or hanging by a thread. The result was an election debacle. It almost destroyed the younger generation of Democratic Progressive Party officials. They had to rebuild amidst the ruins.
Given this history, the Democratic Progressive Party leadership long ago rejected the possibility of a primary process in which candidates are determined exclusively by party member ballots. But a final factor persuaded the various factions within the party to accept a nationwide poll. Party leaders issued repeated warnings. If prosecutors were to take advantage of the party primaries to launch an investigation into phantom party members, the DPP would lose the election, even before it was held.
Concern over this issue is the greatest in the DPP's legislators without portfolio nominations. Legislators without portfolio represent a political party. They cannot be nominated in the same way as a party's presidential or regional legislative candidates, by relying on nationwide polls. But if party member balloting plays any part in their selection, phantom voters may appear out of the woodwork, or vote buying may rear its ugly head. The DPP Central Executive Committee eventually reached a majority decision. All legislators without portfolio would be nominated by a nominating committee. On the surface the party chairman expanded his or her power. In fact future candidatesfor legislator without portfolio will require the support of two-thirds of the members of the Central Executive Committee. This means that any nominations will be the result of a compromise between various factions. They will be the product of joint factional rule. Even the party chairman will not be able to control this process.
Phantom party members remain a concern. But the nationwide poll approach for primary nominations is a major change. Why did the factions and party members agree to relinquish power? Because everyone in the Democratic Progressive Party, from top to bottom, is determined to win. That is why they are willing to incorporate a nationwide poll that includes the opinions of swing voters. This raises another question. The entire Democratic Progressive Party is pinning its hopes on the so-called nationwide poll. Can the nationwide poll really persuade the DPP to adopt a more centrist path?
The actual situation suggests otherwise. The nationwide poll approach for the primary nomination processs has just been passed. Ker Chien-min is the Chairman of the DPP legislative caucus. He said that the most important thing during the 2012 election is to "avoid infighting." Therefore all nominations should avoid the primaries. Based on this logic, although the presidential candidate is supposed to be determined by a nationwide poll, the party "must nevertheless avoid a nationwide poll!"
On the surface, this addresses the issue of residual infighting from 2008. But at a deeper level, it addresses the issue of how to incorporate the Republic of China into the system. The DPP is still unclear about how to create a stable framework for cross-Strait relations. Therefore it cannot withstand intraparty debates during the party primaries. The party leadership even lacks confidence in the nationwide poll. It cannot believe that debating the facts could help the truth come to light.
The changes to the primary nomination process are important. But consider the experience of the British Labour Party. The system must be changed. Political leaders must offer a viable political platform. They must offer thoughful policies. Only then can win voter confidence. Therefore, if the DPP wishes to return to power, a nationwide poll is merely the first step. Everyone is still waiting for Tsai Ing-wen's Platform for the Coming Decade.
「全民調」真能帶領民進黨往中間走？
2011-01-27 中國時報
甫於日前落幕的民進黨全代會，通過以全民調的方式來選出總統及區域立委候選人，再次凸顯民進黨「民主集中制」的特質，真正掌握決策權的是派系頭頭及黨內精英；只是，這樣的「派系共治」方式，即使能夠主導初選制度的改革，但是否能讓民進黨提出一套穩健可行的兩岸論述、進一步往中間走，才是令人關注的。
全民調派大戰黨員派，這是民進黨全代會前的茶壺風暴。但所謂的黨員派最後敗下陣來，並不令人意外，因為，主導民進黨改變的，從來不是黨員由下而上的力量，相反的，從陳水扁參選時的新中間路線、到通過《台灣前途決議文》，大多是由上而下的改變。而這次的黨內選舉辦法大調整，同樣是派系共治下的結果，在黨內落單的呂秀蓮，即使援引黨內民主大旗，最後還是打不過派系共識。
有人戲稱，自民進黨創黨二十幾年來，實行過的黨內初選辦法，至少也有二十幾種。每逢選舉就要改一次，從早期的幹部評鑑併行黨員投票、黨員及民調投票各半、有時是三七比，或是加重深綠支持者的排藍民調，再到現在的全民調。黨內初選辦法一變再變，要解決的問題只有一個：就是人頭黨員問題。
長期以來，民進黨內就有大戶或派系豢養人頭黨員，為患最烈的應該是二○○八年立委選舉，許多採取中間路線的候選人，要先過人頭大戶這一關，接下來再面對排藍民調，經過這兩關嚴酷的篩選，中間傾向的候選人非死即傷，不但直接造成選舉大敗，更讓民進黨青壯派差點毀於一旦，必須在廢墟中重建。
在這樣的背景下，民進黨領導精英早就排除初選黨員投票的可能性，但說服各派系接受全民調的最後一根稻草，就是黨內精英一再警告：檢調一旦趁初選時、發動調查人頭黨員，民進黨形同是未選先敗。
其中，以民進黨不分區立委提名辦法，最能凸顯此一疑慮。不分區立委代表政黨，不能如總統或區域立委一般，全部以民調方式產生，但即使只是部分採用黨員投票，都可能爆發人頭黨員集體投票、或買票弊案，民進黨中執會最後以絕對多數通過，不分區提名全部交由提名委員會決定，表面上是黨主席擴權，事實上將來的不分區名單必須有三分之二的中執委支持才會通過，預告這必然是各派系妥協之後的名單，同樣是派系共治的產物，即使黨主席也不可能主導。
當然，即使有人頭黨員的疑慮，全民調的初選方式還是劇烈的調整。各派系及黨員為何同意放棄權力，最大的關鍵在於：民進黨舉黨上下都充滿著「贏的意志」，因此他們願意採取可以納入中間民意的全民調。接下來的問題是，當整個民進黨都對所謂的全民調寄以厚望時，全民調真的能帶領民進黨往中間走嗎？
實際的狀況似乎並非如此，全民調初選辦法才剛通過，民進黨立院黨團總召柯建銘即表示，二○一二的選舉，最重要的就是要「避免內鬥」，所以一切提名都應該避免初選，在這樣的前提之下，即使總統候選人已通過由全民調產生，「還是要避免去全民調！」
表面上，這是對二○○八年黨內惡鬥餘悸猶存，但更深層的背景則是，對於如何納入中華民國體制、如何建立一套穩定的兩岸關係架構，民進黨目前仍然混沌不明，也因此禁不起黨內初選的論辯，即使是在全民調這樣一個全民的舞台上，民進黨精英仍然沒有信心，不敢相信真理有可能愈辯愈明。
可以說，初選制度的調整當然很重要，但是觀諸英國工黨的經驗，制度調整之外，政黨領導人還必須擘畫可行的政黨綱領，及提出周延的政策、政見，才可能得到選民的信賴；因此，民進黨要重返執政，全民調只是第一步而已，大家仍然在期待她的十年政綱。
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Su/Tsai Unity vs. Su/Tsai Rivalry
Su/Tsai Unity vs. Su/Tsai Rivalry
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 26, 2011
The DPP reached an agreement on the conduct of its presidential primaries. Immediately afterwards, speculation about "Su/Tsai unity" vs. "Su/Tsai rivalry" emerged. The DPP will decide who will be its presidential candidate, and who will be his or her running mate. The public however, is more concerned about the process, about how the presidential and vice presidential candidates will be determined. It is more concerned about whether the DPP will fully debate the party's policy path, and subject it to internal and external scrutiny.
Those calling for Su/Tsai unity are attempting to avoid such debate. They think Su and Tsai should not be subject to either a nationwide poll or participate in county and municipal level policy debates. They think the two should "engage in dialog, and nominate the candidates jointly." Doing so may allow them to sidestep "internecine warfare" and "Su/Tsai rivalry." But doing so will also undermine the DPP's campaign platform and policy path. The primary process enables a party to refine its campaign platform and policy path. Eliminating the process deprives a party of this opportunity. When the time comes, the presidential and vice presidential candidates will mouth a few platitudes. This will determine the party's campaign platform and even the nation's policy path. But such a policy path would have no support within the DPP. Nor is it likely to meet with approval of the larger society.
Annette Lu proposed a "three part primary." She wanted a thorough policy debate and full participation by party members. Frank Hsieh floated his "One Constitution, Two Interpretations." He too wanted the party primaries to include a debate over policy direction. The decision was made to hold a nationwide poll. Annette Lu lost her leverage. She may withdraw from the primaries. The shrewd but ill-fated Frank Hsieh trapped himself with his comment about "withdrawing from the public forum." Su and Tsai suggested "engaging in dialog, and nominating the candidates jointly." But the party has been deprived of the opportunity to refine its campaign platform and policy path.
Su Tseng-chang acted very differently recently than he did in 2008. In 2007, word spread that Su Tseng-chang opposed any Su/Hsieh ticket arranged by Chen Shui-bian. Su then declared he would turn down the vice presidential spot. He denounced Frank Hsieh, calling him "devious." He asked, "Who really betrayed the core values of the Democratic Progressive Party?" He said "Changing the subject will not change the facts." He blasted Frank Hsieh mercilessly. Su lost the primaries and retreated to the United States to lick his wounds. Then he said he would "campaign full force, but seek no office." He said he would "wait for the next tropical storm, and ride its currents." As we all know, Su expressed "respect for the big picture" and accepted the "Hsieh/Su ticket." Frank Hsieh became his "tropical storm."
Su Tseng-chang's situation today is very different from what it was in 2008. Rumors are the Su camp is not ruling out either a "Tsai/Su ticket" or a "Su/Tsai ticket." Su Tseng-chang said "The DPP must unite in order to nominate the strongest candidate," leading to speculation about what he really meant. Several opinion polls show Su Tseng-chang slightly ahead of Tsai Ing-wen. Given Su Tseng-chang's current situation, he could win a nationwide poll. But a deal could also put him in the position of running mate. In 2008 he immediately tried to deal Frank Hsieh a knockout punch. He left himself no room for retreat, and said he would refuse to be anyone's running mate. Today he behaved very differently. Su Tseng-chang has effectively put the ball in Tsai Ing-wen's court.
Some in the DPP are not optimistic about either a "Su/Tsai ticket" or a "Tsai/Su ticket." They consider such a "shotgun marriage" unlikely. Tsai Ing-wen's supporters believe that "Even a Chen Shui-bian/Annette Lu ticket could win." What they mean is that Tsai Ing-wen could choose anyone as her running mate and win. Why bother choosing Su Tseng-chang?
Consider the current situation. Su and Tsai are running neck and neck in the polls. This makes it difficult for either to eliminate the other. Tsai Ing-wen wants to dump Su Tseng-chang. But Su Tseng-chang is stuck to her like a tar baby. If Su Tseng-chang wins the nationwide poll, he could become Tsai Ing-wen's running mate. If Su Tseng-chang loses the nationwide poll, a victorious Tsai will still be subject to pressure from within the party. She may still be stuck with Su. That is, unless she can offer a more attractive candidate for the vice presidential spot.
We once pointed out that Tsai Ing-wen faces a "three part challenge." She faces "generational change, the presidential election, and a change in policy path. Among them, generational change is fundamental to the other two. Over the past two and and a half years, Tsai Ing-wen has negotiated several major hurdles. These include Chen Shui-bian, Annette Lu, and Frank Hsieh. She defeated Taiwan independence elements during the recent debate over the primary process. Now however, she is stuck with Su Tseng-chang. Will she be forced to compromise with Su on her "Platform for the Coming Decade?"
Will Su and Tsai reach an agreement prior to any nationwide poll? Or will they await the results of a nationwide poll before making separate plans? This question concerns who will be the presidential candidate, and who will be the running mate. It also concerns whether Su and Tsai can conduct a primary debate within the party and the larger community. Can they arrive at a new policy path with the participation of the larger public?
蘇蔡合體或蘇蔡角力
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.26
民進黨總統候選人初選辦法議定，立即傳出「蘇蔡合體」或「蘇蔡角力」的二種說法。其實，民進黨最後總會決定由何人出線及如何搭檔，但國人較關注的是在正副總統候選人的產生過程中，民進黨能否經充分辯論以淬煉出真正經歷內外激盪積澱的政策路線。
「蘇蔡合體」的主張，就是要迴避這樣的淬煉及激盪；甚至認為，蘇蔡二人不應經歷「全民調」及「一縣一市的廝殺」（政見辯論會），而應「對談／共推」；然而，此種主張雖可避免「對殺／互殘」的「蘇蔡角力」，但也將使民進黨的競選綱領與治國路線，失去了藉初選機制淬煉及積澱的過程。屆時，只消正副總統候選人嘴皮子翻兩下，就算是決定了大選及治國的政策路線；但這樣的政策路線在民進黨內沒有根，也不可能期望它在國家社會結出果來。
呂秀蓮主張「初選三部曲」，重點即在進行深刻的政策辯論及引入黨員參與；而謝長廷拋出「憲法各表」，也在欲將初選主題導向政策辯論。如今決定「全民調」，呂秀蓮已失槓桿，可能退出初選，而智多命舛的謝長廷又被「退出論壇」套住；倘若蘇蔡再經「協調／共推」而形成「蘇蔡合體」，則此次初選即失去經內外淬煉激盪而形成政策路線的機能。
蘇貞昌此時的動作與二○○八年大相逕庭。二○○七年，很早就傳出蘇拒絕陳水扁「蘇謝配」的撮合，接下來蘇公開宣布「不任副手」，並以「奸巧」、「誰真正背叛民進黨核心價值」，及「轉移焦點不能改變涉案事實」狂轟猛批謝長廷；至蘇初選落敗赴美療傷，又說「全力輔選／不要位子」，「等待下一個熱帶氣旋，乘風而起」；最後的結果則已眾人皆知，蘇以「顧全大局」，接受了「謝蘇配」，謝長廷成了他的「熱帶氣旋」。
然而，此時的蘇貞昌卻與二○○八大不相同。蘇陣營傳出「蘇蔡配」、「蔡蘇配」皆不排除的說法；蘇貞昌更說「民進黨要團結推出最強的候選人」，引人遐想。何況，最近發表的幾次民意調查，蘇貞昌尚微幅領先蔡英文。以蘇貞昌如今的態勢，既可在「全民調」中求勝，亦可在協調後屈居副手；這與二○○八年他一出手就非要把謝長廷打趴、且不給自己留退路的手法（不任副手）已不可同日而語。蘇貞昌形同把球拍到了蔡英文的球場裡。
然而，民進黨內有人不看好「蘇蔡配」或「蔡蘇配」，認為二人連當「怨偶」都很難；且支持蔡英文者認為，「連陳水扁配呂秀蓮都能當選」，意謂蔡英文找誰搭檔都行，何須蘇貞昌來配？
但就當下情勢言，蘇蔡兩人民調差距不大，將使兩人皆不易完全甩掉對方。蔡英文即使有意甩掉蘇貞昌，但蘇貞昌卻已黏上了蔡英文。蘇若在「全民調」勝出，他極可能找蔡英文為副手；而蘇若在「全民調」敗，勝出的蔡在黨內壓力下也未必能甩掉蘇，除非她能舉出比蘇更具說服力的副手。
我們曾經指出，蔡英文面對的是「世代交替／總統大選／路線轉型」的「三合一工程」；其中，世代交替更是其他二者的根本。二年半來，蔡英文繞過了扁呂謝等重大關卡，此次初選制度的議決又打敗了獨派，現在她卻似乎卡在蘇貞昌的手上，難道要與蘇共擬《十年政綱》？
蘇蔡將在「全民調」之前合體？或經「全民調」分出軒輊後再作打算？這不僅關係到誰出線及如何搭檔的問題，更關係到蘇蔡二人能否在黨內及社會上進行初選辯論，淬煉出一個經全民激盪積澱的新政策路線。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 26, 2011
The DPP reached an agreement on the conduct of its presidential primaries. Immediately afterwards, speculation about "Su/Tsai unity" vs. "Su/Tsai rivalry" emerged. The DPP will decide who will be its presidential candidate, and who will be his or her running mate. The public however, is more concerned about the process, about how the presidential and vice presidential candidates will be determined. It is more concerned about whether the DPP will fully debate the party's policy path, and subject it to internal and external scrutiny.
Those calling for Su/Tsai unity are attempting to avoid such debate. They think Su and Tsai should not be subject to either a nationwide poll or participate in county and municipal level policy debates. They think the two should "engage in dialog, and nominate the candidates jointly." Doing so may allow them to sidestep "internecine warfare" and "Su/Tsai rivalry." But doing so will also undermine the DPP's campaign platform and policy path. The primary process enables a party to refine its campaign platform and policy path. Eliminating the process deprives a party of this opportunity. When the time comes, the presidential and vice presidential candidates will mouth a few platitudes. This will determine the party's campaign platform and even the nation's policy path. But such a policy path would have no support within the DPP. Nor is it likely to meet with approval of the larger society.
Annette Lu proposed a "three part primary." She wanted a thorough policy debate and full participation by party members. Frank Hsieh floated his "One Constitution, Two Interpretations." He too wanted the party primaries to include a debate over policy direction. The decision was made to hold a nationwide poll. Annette Lu lost her leverage. She may withdraw from the primaries. The shrewd but ill-fated Frank Hsieh trapped himself with his comment about "withdrawing from the public forum." Su and Tsai suggested "engaging in dialog, and nominating the candidates jointly." But the party has been deprived of the opportunity to refine its campaign platform and policy path.
Su Tseng-chang acted very differently recently than he did in 2008. In 2007, word spread that Su Tseng-chang opposed any Su/Hsieh ticket arranged by Chen Shui-bian. Su then declared he would turn down the vice presidential spot. He denounced Frank Hsieh, calling him "devious." He asked, "Who really betrayed the core values of the Democratic Progressive Party?" He said "Changing the subject will not change the facts." He blasted Frank Hsieh mercilessly. Su lost the primaries and retreated to the United States to lick his wounds. Then he said he would "campaign full force, but seek no office." He said he would "wait for the next tropical storm, and ride its currents." As we all know, Su expressed "respect for the big picture" and accepted the "Hsieh/Su ticket." Frank Hsieh became his "tropical storm."
Su Tseng-chang's situation today is very different from what it was in 2008. Rumors are the Su camp is not ruling out either a "Tsai/Su ticket" or a "Su/Tsai ticket." Su Tseng-chang said "The DPP must unite in order to nominate the strongest candidate," leading to speculation about what he really meant. Several opinion polls show Su Tseng-chang slightly ahead of Tsai Ing-wen. Given Su Tseng-chang's current situation, he could win a nationwide poll. But a deal could also put him in the position of running mate. In 2008 he immediately tried to deal Frank Hsieh a knockout punch. He left himself no room for retreat, and said he would refuse to be anyone's running mate. Today he behaved very differently. Su Tseng-chang has effectively put the ball in Tsai Ing-wen's court.
Some in the DPP are not optimistic about either a "Su/Tsai ticket" or a "Tsai/Su ticket." They consider such a "shotgun marriage" unlikely. Tsai Ing-wen's supporters believe that "Even a Chen Shui-bian/Annette Lu ticket could win." What they mean is that Tsai Ing-wen could choose anyone as her running mate and win. Why bother choosing Su Tseng-chang?
Consider the current situation. Su and Tsai are running neck and neck in the polls. This makes it difficult for either to eliminate the other. Tsai Ing-wen wants to dump Su Tseng-chang. But Su Tseng-chang is stuck to her like a tar baby. If Su Tseng-chang wins the nationwide poll, he could become Tsai Ing-wen's running mate. If Su Tseng-chang loses the nationwide poll, a victorious Tsai will still be subject to pressure from within the party. She may still be stuck with Su. That is, unless she can offer a more attractive candidate for the vice presidential spot.
We once pointed out that Tsai Ing-wen faces a "three part challenge." She faces "generational change, the presidential election, and a change in policy path. Among them, generational change is fundamental to the other two. Over the past two and and a half years, Tsai Ing-wen has negotiated several major hurdles. These include Chen Shui-bian, Annette Lu, and Frank Hsieh. She defeated Taiwan independence elements during the recent debate over the primary process. Now however, she is stuck with Su Tseng-chang. Will she be forced to compromise with Su on her "Platform for the Coming Decade?"
Will Su and Tsai reach an agreement prior to any nationwide poll? Or will they await the results of a nationwide poll before making separate plans? This question concerns who will be the presidential candidate, and who will be the running mate. It also concerns whether Su and Tsai can conduct a primary debate within the party and the larger community. Can they arrive at a new policy path with the participation of the larger public?
蘇蔡合體或蘇蔡角力
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.26
民進黨總統候選人初選辦法議定，立即傳出「蘇蔡合體」或「蘇蔡角力」的二種說法。其實，民進黨最後總會決定由何人出線及如何搭檔，但國人較關注的是在正副總統候選人的產生過程中，民進黨能否經充分辯論以淬煉出真正經歷內外激盪積澱的政策路線。
「蘇蔡合體」的主張，就是要迴避這樣的淬煉及激盪；甚至認為，蘇蔡二人不應經歷「全民調」及「一縣一市的廝殺」（政見辯論會），而應「對談／共推」；然而，此種主張雖可避免「對殺／互殘」的「蘇蔡角力」，但也將使民進黨的競選綱領與治國路線，失去了藉初選機制淬煉及積澱的過程。屆時，只消正副總統候選人嘴皮子翻兩下，就算是決定了大選及治國的政策路線；但這樣的政策路線在民進黨內沒有根，也不可能期望它在國家社會結出果來。
呂秀蓮主張「初選三部曲」，重點即在進行深刻的政策辯論及引入黨員參與；而謝長廷拋出「憲法各表」，也在欲將初選主題導向政策辯論。如今決定「全民調」，呂秀蓮已失槓桿，可能退出初選，而智多命舛的謝長廷又被「退出論壇」套住；倘若蘇蔡再經「協調／共推」而形成「蘇蔡合體」，則此次初選即失去經內外淬煉激盪而形成政策路線的機能。
蘇貞昌此時的動作與二○○八年大相逕庭。二○○七年，很早就傳出蘇拒絕陳水扁「蘇謝配」的撮合，接下來蘇公開宣布「不任副手」，並以「奸巧」、「誰真正背叛民進黨核心價值」，及「轉移焦點不能改變涉案事實」狂轟猛批謝長廷；至蘇初選落敗赴美療傷，又說「全力輔選／不要位子」，「等待下一個熱帶氣旋，乘風而起」；最後的結果則已眾人皆知，蘇以「顧全大局」，接受了「謝蘇配」，謝長廷成了他的「熱帶氣旋」。
然而，此時的蘇貞昌卻與二○○八大不相同。蘇陣營傳出「蘇蔡配」、「蔡蘇配」皆不排除的說法；蘇貞昌更說「民進黨要團結推出最強的候選人」，引人遐想。何況，最近發表的幾次民意調查，蘇貞昌尚微幅領先蔡英文。以蘇貞昌如今的態勢，既可在「全民調」中求勝，亦可在協調後屈居副手；這與二○○八年他一出手就非要把謝長廷打趴、且不給自己留退路的手法（不任副手）已不可同日而語。蘇貞昌形同把球拍到了蔡英文的球場裡。
然而，民進黨內有人不看好「蘇蔡配」或「蔡蘇配」，認為二人連當「怨偶」都很難；且支持蔡英文者認為，「連陳水扁配呂秀蓮都能當選」，意謂蔡英文找誰搭檔都行，何須蘇貞昌來配？
但就當下情勢言，蘇蔡兩人民調差距不大，將使兩人皆不易完全甩掉對方。蔡英文即使有意甩掉蘇貞昌，但蘇貞昌卻已黏上了蔡英文。蘇若在「全民調」勝出，他極可能找蔡英文為副手；而蘇若在「全民調」敗，勝出的蔡在黨內壓力下也未必能甩掉蘇，除非她能舉出比蘇更具說服力的副手。
我們曾經指出，蔡英文面對的是「世代交替／總統大選／路線轉型」的「三合一工程」；其中，世代交替更是其他二者的根本。二年半來，蔡英文繞過了扁呂謝等重大關卡，此次初選制度的議決又打敗了獨派，現在她卻似乎卡在蘇貞昌的手上，難道要與蘇共擬《十年政綱》？
蘇蔡將在「全民調」之前合體？或經「全民調」分出軒輊後再作打算？這不僅關係到誰出線及如何搭檔的問題，更關係到蘇蔡二人能否在黨內及社會上進行初選辯論，淬煉出一個經全民激盪積澱的新政策路線。
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
No More Joyless Cabinet Reshuffles
No More Joyless Cabinet Reshuffles
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 25, 2011
The Democratic Progressive Party, amidst a war of words, approved new procedures for its presidential and legislative nominations. They have already begun beating the drum for these two elections. The KMT meanwhile, continues to argue whether Wang Jing-pyng qualifies for "without portfolio" status. Nor has any solution has been found to the problem of party leaders who refuse to step up to the firing line. Premier Wu must reshuffle the cabinet. Under the circumstances, can he come up with an inspired arrangement?
We see little reason for optimism. Premier Wu Den-yih has mentioned reshuffling several times recently. Each time he conveyed a sense of pessimism. He displayed no signs of courage or ambition. When he spoke of the Ministry of Finance, he indicated that he was completely satisfied, and said the minister was doing a good job. "Wouldn't it be a contradiction to make changes?" When he spoke of civil service salary increases, he enigmatically said that would be the responsibility of "the next premier." Was that a declaration that any cabinet reshuffle would be minor? Was he himself awaiting a new appointment? Were his thoughts already elsewhere?
The Ma administration's approach to cabinet reshuffles over the past two years has been "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." For the most part, it has been passive, and engaged merely in fine-tuning. On the surface, one could say it was attempting to maintain administrative "stability" and "consistency." But the public has been dissatisfied with its policies. The ruling party has lost ground during recent elections. Cabinet appointments have placed too much emphasis on not making waves. The administration's response to public expectations has been slow and weak. Take the current reshuffling for example. Yang Chi-liang and Wang Yu-ting resigned. Kao Shi-po chose to run for the legislature. This leaves openings that must be filled. Premier Wu may not want to stir up the waters. He may be satisfied with the performance of his cabinet members. But 40% of the public is not. Has he thought about how to mollify them?
Last year the economy grew ten percent. Unemployment fell to five percent. The Ma administration has done well indeed. The results show. But the gap between rich and poor has also increased. Most people feel no joy from the economic recovery. The current wave of growth has been referred to as a "joyless recovery." The lack of joy is tricky. The government can say it is working hard. The numbers may look good. But most people do not feel good. So what are you going to believe? The numbers? Or your gut feeling?
The worst kind of cabinet reshuffle is this absent-minded sort of cabinet reshuffle. The government solemnly announces a reshuffle. But the vast majority of people see nothing happening of any significance. Two weeks ago, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan initiated a cabinet reshuffle. Public support increased, slightly. But 70% of all respondents still said they expected nothing worthwhile from the new cabinet. This shows the Japanese people are burned out on politics. If Premier Wu insists on clinging to an "I'm alright, Jack!" attitude, the new cabinet reshuffle is bound to become another round of "joyless reshuffling." It will merely invite public antipathy. The ruling party will miss a golden opportunity to boost the party's morale and improve its public image.
Frankly, those in power are often reluctant to reshuffle the cabinet, change its personnel, and eliminating the inferior. Why? Because they see members of the government as fellow team members. They do not see the machinery of government as a tool to serve the people. That is why they allow the unfit to hide among them. For example, the Minister of Finance has repeatedly been criticized by the public. Yet he continues to cling to his position. And thanks to the current economic recovery, he has even become a "fiscal genius." Another example is the GIO Chief, who was purportedly an expert on ECFA. But he seldom spoke out, and the time for him to explain ECFA is long over. Another example is the array of government officials who have no practical value. Is there really no need to reassign them? Are there really no better qualified candidates among the public?
When Chen Shui-bian was in power, the premier and his cabinet members were pawns on his chessboard. They could be sacrificed at any moment. This reflected the selfish behavior of a political manipulator. By contrast, President Ma has arrayed an army of appointees out on the chessboard, and not moved them for an eternity. The public has blasted them, but Ma refuses to budge, even an inch. He has been too hesitant. A leader must know when to hold, and know when to fold. He has lost the initiative a leader requires. Consider the recent reorganization of the Kuomintang. It resulted in a new formation, and resolved tensions within the party. The new team may not hit the ground running. But at least its immediate response is appropriate. The legislative and presidential elections will be tough battles. The nation needs innovative social initiatives. More importantly, Ma Ying-jeou's main strategy should be to reorganize his administration. He must aggressively reshuffle his cabinet. He must raise morale within the government. Only then can he win the hearts and minds of the people.
It is the custom to clean house every New Year. Premier Wu must clean house as well. He must clean up the mess in his cabinet. He must not tell us that good people are hard to find. He wields great power. It is his job to help the public find the right people, and not just fill seats. The 2012 showdown is imminent. Do not initiate another "joyless reshuffling." Do not go through the motions.
內閣不能再作「無感改組」
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.25
民進黨在舌戰中通過新的總統和立委提名辦法，兩場大選的戰鼓已然擂動。反觀國民黨，不僅仍卡在王金平不分區資格的障礙中，且黨內菁英怯戰的問題依然無解。在此之際，吳揆即將對內閣人事作出調整，他能拿出什麼樣振奮人心的安排？
目前看來，似嗅不出樂觀的跡象。行政院長吳敦義近日幾度談到改組，言談間都傳達出消極的訊息，看不出一展雄心的企圖。談到財經部會，他露出對現狀相當滿意的神情，說財經表現很好，「要換首長不是很矛盾」？談到公務員加薪問題時，他莫測高深地說，那是「下任院長」的事。這難道是在宣告：內閣僅會進行微幅改組？或者他自己也在等待新的角色召喚，已經心不在焉？
馬政府兩年多來內閣異動，多半在這類「多一事不如少一事」的心態下進行，多屬被動或微調。表面上，這可說是意在維持行政決策的「穩定」和「一貫」；但相對於民眾對施政的不滿，乃致執政黨幾次選舉的節節敗退，內閣人事過度「偏安」，不能不說是對民意期待的反應遲鈍與疲弱。以這次改組為例，若非楊志良、王昱婷掛冠，高思博將轉戰立委，留下遺缺待補，吳揆或許還未必想攪動這池春水。問題是，就算他對所有閣員表現都感到滿意，他是否想過如何從民眾四成多的不滿意度中再多挽回一些人心？
去年經濟成長達百分之十，失業率降到百分之五以下，這確實是馬政府執政的績效逐漸顯現。但由於所得差距的擴大，廣大的民眾感受不到復甦的喜悅，這波成長也被稱為「無感復甦」。「無感」是一個棘手的東西：政府可以說有在做事，統計數字看起來也很亮麗，但多數民眾就是感覺不到好在哪裡；那麼，你要選擇相信數字，還是相信感覺？
最糟的內閣改組，便是這種心不在焉的類型：政府鄭重宣布改組人事，而絕大多數民眾看不出這有何意義。兩周前，日本首相菅直人改組內閣，支持度雖微幅上升，但仍有七成多的受訪者表示對新內閣「沒有期待」，反映出日本民眾對政治深沉的倦怠感。如果吳揆持續保持「自我感覺良好」的心情，這波改組勢將掉入這種「無感改組」的泥淖，徒增民眾厭煩，從而錯失提振執政黨士氣和形象的良機。
不客氣地說，執政者對內閣人事之所以如此怠於更迭汰劣，主要癥結在把政府成員當成自家班底，而不是把政府機器當成為民服務的工具，所以就會縱容不適任者藏身其間。舉例而言，屢遭外界點名的財政部長，卻始終安居其位，現在還拜經濟復甦之賜成為「財經功臣」；又如當初以ＥＣＦＡ專家之名獲得拔擢的新聞局長，始終罕見其發言，而其解說ＥＣＦＡ之任務似乎也已過期；再如若干政務委員一直未見其實際作用，其角色都沒有調整必要嗎？民間都沒有良才比他們更勝任嗎？
陳水扁執政時，閣揆和閣員都只是他棋盤上的卒子，隨時可以拋棄；那是一個政治郎中的自私駕御術。相形之下，馬總統把一盤棋子擺在那裡長久不動，任憑民眾說破嘴還寸步不移，恐怕也是過猶不及，失卻領軍揮兵布局攻守的主動。且看日前國民黨的黨務改組，斷然呈現新的隊形，並化解原來內部的緊張；新團隊未必能旗開得勝，至少眼前因應得宜。然而，若要論迎接立委和總統大選兩場硬仗，並為國家社會再創新猷，馬英九更重要的戰略應該放在政務布局，策動內閣的積極作為，激勵整個政府的服務士氣，才是爭取民心的不二法門。
新年要大掃除，吳揆也請好好清理內閣那些個不太漂亮的角落吧。不要告訴我們說什麼人才很難找，手握大權，就是要幫民眾找出國之重才來做大事，不要只想著把位子填滿就好。二○一二的決戰已迫在眉睫，不要再用「無感改組」來虛應故事了！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 25, 2011
The Democratic Progressive Party, amidst a war of words, approved new procedures for its presidential and legislative nominations. They have already begun beating the drum for these two elections. The KMT meanwhile, continues to argue whether Wang Jing-pyng qualifies for "without portfolio" status. Nor has any solution has been found to the problem of party leaders who refuse to step up to the firing line. Premier Wu must reshuffle the cabinet. Under the circumstances, can he come up with an inspired arrangement?
We see little reason for optimism. Premier Wu Den-yih has mentioned reshuffling several times recently. Each time he conveyed a sense of pessimism. He displayed no signs of courage or ambition. When he spoke of the Ministry of Finance, he indicated that he was completely satisfied, and said the minister was doing a good job. "Wouldn't it be a contradiction to make changes?" When he spoke of civil service salary increases, he enigmatically said that would be the responsibility of "the next premier." Was that a declaration that any cabinet reshuffle would be minor? Was he himself awaiting a new appointment? Were his thoughts already elsewhere?
The Ma administration's approach to cabinet reshuffles over the past two years has been "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." For the most part, it has been passive, and engaged merely in fine-tuning. On the surface, one could say it was attempting to maintain administrative "stability" and "consistency." But the public has been dissatisfied with its policies. The ruling party has lost ground during recent elections. Cabinet appointments have placed too much emphasis on not making waves. The administration's response to public expectations has been slow and weak. Take the current reshuffling for example. Yang Chi-liang and Wang Yu-ting resigned. Kao Shi-po chose to run for the legislature. This leaves openings that must be filled. Premier Wu may not want to stir up the waters. He may be satisfied with the performance of his cabinet members. But 40% of the public is not. Has he thought about how to mollify them?
Last year the economy grew ten percent. Unemployment fell to five percent. The Ma administration has done well indeed. The results show. But the gap between rich and poor has also increased. Most people feel no joy from the economic recovery. The current wave of growth has been referred to as a "joyless recovery." The lack of joy is tricky. The government can say it is working hard. The numbers may look good. But most people do not feel good. So what are you going to believe? The numbers? Or your gut feeling?
The worst kind of cabinet reshuffle is this absent-minded sort of cabinet reshuffle. The government solemnly announces a reshuffle. But the vast majority of people see nothing happening of any significance. Two weeks ago, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan initiated a cabinet reshuffle. Public support increased, slightly. But 70% of all respondents still said they expected nothing worthwhile from the new cabinet. This shows the Japanese people are burned out on politics. If Premier Wu insists on clinging to an "I'm alright, Jack!" attitude, the new cabinet reshuffle is bound to become another round of "joyless reshuffling." It will merely invite public antipathy. The ruling party will miss a golden opportunity to boost the party's morale and improve its public image.
Frankly, those in power are often reluctant to reshuffle the cabinet, change its personnel, and eliminating the inferior. Why? Because they see members of the government as fellow team members. They do not see the machinery of government as a tool to serve the people. That is why they allow the unfit to hide among them. For example, the Minister of Finance has repeatedly been criticized by the public. Yet he continues to cling to his position. And thanks to the current economic recovery, he has even become a "fiscal genius." Another example is the GIO Chief, who was purportedly an expert on ECFA. But he seldom spoke out, and the time for him to explain ECFA is long over. Another example is the array of government officials who have no practical value. Is there really no need to reassign them? Are there really no better qualified candidates among the public?
When Chen Shui-bian was in power, the premier and his cabinet members were pawns on his chessboard. They could be sacrificed at any moment. This reflected the selfish behavior of a political manipulator. By contrast, President Ma has arrayed an army of appointees out on the chessboard, and not moved them for an eternity. The public has blasted them, but Ma refuses to budge, even an inch. He has been too hesitant. A leader must know when to hold, and know when to fold. He has lost the initiative a leader requires. Consider the recent reorganization of the Kuomintang. It resulted in a new formation, and resolved tensions within the party. The new team may not hit the ground running. But at least its immediate response is appropriate. The legislative and presidential elections will be tough battles. The nation needs innovative social initiatives. More importantly, Ma Ying-jeou's main strategy should be to reorganize his administration. He must aggressively reshuffle his cabinet. He must raise morale within the government. Only then can he win the hearts and minds of the people.
It is the custom to clean house every New Year. Premier Wu must clean house as well. He must clean up the mess in his cabinet. He must not tell us that good people are hard to find. He wields great power. It is his job to help the public find the right people, and not just fill seats. The 2012 showdown is imminent. Do not initiate another "joyless reshuffling." Do not go through the motions.
內閣不能再作「無感改組」
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.25
民進黨在舌戰中通過新的總統和立委提名辦法，兩場大選的戰鼓已然擂動。反觀國民黨，不僅仍卡在王金平不分區資格的障礙中，且黨內菁英怯戰的問題依然無解。在此之際，吳揆即將對內閣人事作出調整，他能拿出什麼樣振奮人心的安排？
目前看來，似嗅不出樂觀的跡象。行政院長吳敦義近日幾度談到改組，言談間都傳達出消極的訊息，看不出一展雄心的企圖。談到財經部會，他露出對現狀相當滿意的神情，說財經表現很好，「要換首長不是很矛盾」？談到公務員加薪問題時，他莫測高深地說，那是「下任院長」的事。這難道是在宣告：內閣僅會進行微幅改組？或者他自己也在等待新的角色召喚，已經心不在焉？
馬政府兩年多來內閣異動，多半在這類「多一事不如少一事」的心態下進行，多屬被動或微調。表面上，這可說是意在維持行政決策的「穩定」和「一貫」；但相對於民眾對施政的不滿，乃致執政黨幾次選舉的節節敗退，內閣人事過度「偏安」，不能不說是對民意期待的反應遲鈍與疲弱。以這次改組為例，若非楊志良、王昱婷掛冠，高思博將轉戰立委，留下遺缺待補，吳揆或許還未必想攪動這池春水。問題是，就算他對所有閣員表現都感到滿意，他是否想過如何從民眾四成多的不滿意度中再多挽回一些人心？
去年經濟成長達百分之十，失業率降到百分之五以下，這確實是馬政府執政的績效逐漸顯現。但由於所得差距的擴大，廣大的民眾感受不到復甦的喜悅，這波成長也被稱為「無感復甦」。「無感」是一個棘手的東西：政府可以說有在做事，統計數字看起來也很亮麗，但多數民眾就是感覺不到好在哪裡；那麼，你要選擇相信數字，還是相信感覺？
最糟的內閣改組，便是這種心不在焉的類型：政府鄭重宣布改組人事，而絕大多數民眾看不出這有何意義。兩周前，日本首相菅直人改組內閣，支持度雖微幅上升，但仍有七成多的受訪者表示對新內閣「沒有期待」，反映出日本民眾對政治深沉的倦怠感。如果吳揆持續保持「自我感覺良好」的心情，這波改組勢將掉入這種「無感改組」的泥淖，徒增民眾厭煩，從而錯失提振執政黨士氣和形象的良機。
不客氣地說，執政者對內閣人事之所以如此怠於更迭汰劣，主要癥結在把政府成員當成自家班底，而不是把政府機器當成為民服務的工具，所以就會縱容不適任者藏身其間。舉例而言，屢遭外界點名的財政部長，卻始終安居其位，現在還拜經濟復甦之賜成為「財經功臣」；又如當初以ＥＣＦＡ專家之名獲得拔擢的新聞局長，始終罕見其發言，而其解說ＥＣＦＡ之任務似乎也已過期；再如若干政務委員一直未見其實際作用，其角色都沒有調整必要嗎？民間都沒有良才比他們更勝任嗎？
陳水扁執政時，閣揆和閣員都只是他棋盤上的卒子，隨時可以拋棄；那是一個政治郎中的自私駕御術。相形之下，馬總統把一盤棋子擺在那裡長久不動，任憑民眾說破嘴還寸步不移，恐怕也是過猶不及，失卻領軍揮兵布局攻守的主動。且看日前國民黨的黨務改組，斷然呈現新的隊形，並化解原來內部的緊張；新團隊未必能旗開得勝，至少眼前因應得宜。然而，若要論迎接立委和總統大選兩場硬仗，並為國家社會再創新猷，馬英九更重要的戰略應該放在政務布局，策動內閣的積極作為，激勵整個政府的服務士氣，才是爭取民心的不二法門。
新年要大掃除，吳揆也請好好清理內閣那些個不太漂亮的角落吧。不要告訴我們說什麼人才很難找，手握大權，就是要幫民眾找出國之重才來做大事，不要只想著把位子填滿就好。二○一二的決戰已迫在眉睫，不要再用「無感改組」來虛應故事了！
Saturday, January 22, 2011
Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin's "Tsai Ing-wen Consensus"
Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin's "Tsai Ing-wen Consensus"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 22, 2011
The DPP held a plenary meeting today. It will arrive at a resolution on the nomination of presidential candidates and the conduct of the party primaries. It may adopt any number of nomination procedures. But Tsai Ing-wen will probably be the party's nominee. The key will be how to implement her cross-Strait policy proposals.
Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy position includes two major points. One. It opposes the 1992 Consensus. Two. It declares that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy. But these two points have already been refuted by Chen Shui-bian and ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin. Tsai Ing-wen finds herself attacked both front and rear.
Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin both made the same point. One the one hand Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus. On the other hand she has declared that she intends to continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy. This is self-contradictory, and makes no sense. As Chen Yunlin put it, "if" one opposes the 1992 Consensus, one cannot continue conducting cross-Strait economic exchanges. As Chen Shui-bian put it, "since" one opposes the 1992 Consensus, one cannot continue conducting cross-Strait economic exchanges. Comparing the two shines a spotlight on Tsai Ing-wen's logical contradiction. One might say that Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin have reached a "Tsai Ing-wen Consensus."
Frank Hsieh proposed "One Constitution, Two Interpretations." He was blasted by others in his party. The main reason the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus is that the Taiwan independence movement cannot bring itself to recognize the Republic of China and the Constitution of the Republic of China. If they recognize the Republic of China, they must recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China. If they recognize the ROC Constitution, they must recognize the One China Constitution. If they recognize the One China Constitution, they must recognize One China, Different Interpretations. If they recognize One China, Different Interpretations, they must recognize the 1992 Consensus. Therefore if one wants to ascertain whether the DPP really recognizes the Republic of China, and is not merely engaging in "backdoor listing," merely ask whether they recognize the 1992 Consensus, and One China, Different Interpretations.
The logic of Taiwan independence is incompatible with the Republic of China. Frank Hsieh was blasted by Taiwan independence elements. "The DPP demands the rectification of names. How can it support One Constitution, Different Interpretations?" Frank Hsieh inadvertently touched the Taiwan independence movement's third rail. Refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus and refusing to recognize the Republic of China, suddenly became two sides of the same coin. This suddenly made the 1992 Consensus an even more insoluble dilemma within the Democratic Progressive Party.
When Frank Hsieh made his proposal, he tested the Taiwan independence movement's bottom line. Not only does the movement oppose the 1992 Consensus, it also opposes One China, Different Interpretations. It categorically opposes the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. Of course, that does not mean it will become the DPP's campaign platform for the coming 2012 presidential election. Interestingly enough, the political climate in the DPP is more Taiwan independence oriented than it has ever been during past presidential campaigns.
Compare the plight of Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen. The DPP, in support of Chen Shui-bian's first campaign in 2000, issued its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." They supported his advocacy of the "New Centrist Path." They allowed him to declare "Five Noes." They made every effort to soften the "Taiwan independence party platform." Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen stopped Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus and restarting the National Unification Council. Only then did Ah-Bian apply the brakes. By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen has yet to take her first step. But Taiwan independence elements have already forbidden her to recognize the 1992 Consensus. They have reminded her that she herself refused to recognize it. To intimidate her, they have made an example of Frank Hsieh. They forbade her from playing word games or engaging in "backdoor listing." They even forbade her from explicitly recognizing the Republic of China. They reminded her that she herself referred to the ROC as an "alien regime."
If this is the case, Tsai Ing-wen faces two problems. One. Whether to continue publicly expressing opposition to the 1992 Consensus. If she wants to change course, how can she continue playing word games? Two. If she wishes to express her views on the Republic of China, and return to the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," that still does not solve the problem. The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" states that "according to the Constitution, [Taiwan] shall be known as the "Republic of China." But if one recognizes the "ROC Constitution" and the "Republic of China," how can one refuse to accept the "One China Constitution," "One China, Different Interpretations" and the "1992 Consensus?" Frank Hsieh learned a lesson. Do not play word games with "One Constitution, Different Interpretations."
As Taiwan independence elements recapitulate the vicissitudes of the past eight years, they have clearly concluded that Chen Shui-bian's "Five Noes" were a form of self incarceration, and a betrayal of Taiwan independence. They also consider the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" and "backdoor listing" opportunistic behavior. Hence the massive backlash against Frank Hsieh's "One Constitution, Different Interpretations" and "word games." As for Chen Shui-bian, he has become the spiritual leader of "One nation on each side." He is doing his utmost to ensure his historical legacy. He is giving himself a makeover, from "corrupt president" to "Taiwan independence standard-bearer." Years ago, Tsai Ing-wen forbade Chen from recognizing the 1992 Consensus. Years later, Chen is not about to let Tsai Ing-wen off the hook.
If Tsai Ing-wen fails to clarify her stand on the 1992 Consensus, how can she respond to Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin? If Tsai Ing-wen fails to clarify her stand on the "Republic of China," how can she respond to Frank Hsieh, who asked, "Without it, [the ROC] how can we even hold a presidential election?"
Tsai Ing-wen was originally considered the Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate most able to reconcile cross-Strait relations with national identity. But the situation has evolved. She may be the person in the greatest peril, with the least room to maneuver. That is because she once forced Chen Shui-bian to say "I oppose the 1992 Consensus!" and because she herself says it today.
陳水扁與陳雲林的「蔡英文共識」
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.22
民進黨今日舉行臨全會，將議決總統候選人初選提名辦法。但不論以何種辦法提名，蔡英文出線的機率皆高，關鍵問題仍在她的兩岸論述將如何呈現。
蔡英文迄今的兩岸論述可歸納作兩點。一、反對九二共識；二、民進黨若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策。但這兩點卻被陳水扁及大陸海協會長陳雲林相繼批駁。蔡英文儼然腹背受敵。
陳水扁與陳雲林皆指出了一個共同點，那就是：蔡英文一方面要「反對九二共識」，一方面又要「延續前朝兩岸政策」，這是矛盾不通的。簡略而言，陳雲林的說法是：「如果」反對九二共識，那就「不能」延續兩岸經濟交流現狀。陳水扁的說法則是：「既然」反對九二共識，那就「不可」延續兩岸經濟交流現狀。兩相對照，皆聚焦於蔡英文的邏輯矛盾，這可謂是陳水扁與陳雲林的「蔡英文共識」。
謝長廷發表「憲法各表」而遭黨內狂轟猛批，揭示了一個事實，那就是：民進黨不能承認「九二共識」的主要原因，是在台獨的邏輯上根本不能承認「中華民國」與「中華民國憲法」。因為，若承認中華民國，即應承認中華民國憲法；若承認中華民國憲法，即應承認憲法一中；若承認憲法一中，即應承認一中各表；若承認一中各表，即可承認九二共識。所以，若欲檢視民進黨是否真正承認中華民國（而非「借殼上市」），就看是否承認「九二共識／一中各表」。
但是，台獨的邏輯基礎卻是根本不承認中華民國，正如謝長廷所受來自獨派的批評：「民進黨要正名制憲，豈能憲法各表？」謝長廷貿然撕開了台獨邏輯的底蘊，使得「不承認九二共識」與「不承認中華民國」頓時成為一體的兩面，遂使「九二共識」在民進黨內的不可解決性陡然升高。
謝長廷的提法測出了獨派的底線，那就是：不但反對九二共識，反對一中各表，而且根本反對中華民國與中華民國憲法。當然，這未必即成為民進黨未來在2012大選中的論述體系；但值得玩味的是，這樣的政治氛圍卻是民進黨在歷屆總統大選中最「獨」的一次。
以陳水扁與蔡英文的處境相比。2000年，陳水扁首次參選，民進黨為他發表《台灣前途決議文》，支撐他主張「新中間路線」，又維護他宣示「四不一沒有」，一切努力皆指向架空及軟化《台獨黨綱》；一直到陸委會主委蔡英文阻擋陳水扁承認「九二共識」及重啟「國統會」，扁才被迫煞車轉向。相較而言，蔡英文如今尚未起步，獨派就禁止她承認「九二共識」（當年妳自己不也不承認嗎？），甚至以謝長廷對她殺雞嚇猴，將她逼到不可再玩「文字遊戲」，不可「借殼上市」，甚至不可正面承認中華民國（妳不說是「外來政權」嗎？）的地步。
勢若趨此，蔡英文至少面臨了兩個難題：一、是否繼續公開表示「反對九二共識」？若要轉彎，又如何玩「文字遊戲」？二、如何表達其「中華民國論述」？若仍回到《台灣前途決議文》，恐仍解決不了問題；因為《決議文》稱「依憲法稱為中華民國」，則若承認了「憲法」與「中華民國」，又如何不接受「憲法一中」、「一中各表」及「九二共識」？謝長廷得到的教訓是不可玩「憲法各表」之類的「文字遊戲」。
此時的獨派回憶起過去八年執政的滄桑，他們顯然認為陳水扁的「四不一沒有」是作繭自縛，且背叛了台獨，也認為《台灣前途決議文》的「借殼上市」是投機行為，因此才會對謝長廷「憲法各表」的「文字遊戲」大反彈。至於陳水扁，現在成了「一邊一國」的精神領袖，他全力要將自己的歷史定位，從「貪汙總統」的形象轉成「台獨旗手」角色，當然也不會輕易放過當年阻禁他承認「九二共識」的蔡英文。
蔡英文若對「九二共識」說不清楚，如何回應陳水扁及陳雲林？而若對「中華民國」說不清楚，又如何回應謝長廷所問：「不然我們怎麼選總統？」
蔡英文原被認為是最能化解兩岸關係及國家認同爭議的民進黨總統候選人，如今情勢的演化則顯示，她卻可能是一個最無轉圜迴旋餘地的危險人物。因為她曾教陳水扁說且現在自己仍說：「我反對九二共識！」
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 22, 2011
The DPP held a plenary meeting today. It will arrive at a resolution on the nomination of presidential candidates and the conduct of the party primaries. It may adopt any number of nomination procedures. But Tsai Ing-wen will probably be the party's nominee. The key will be how to implement her cross-Strait policy proposals.
Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy position includes two major points. One. It opposes the 1992 Consensus. Two. It declares that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy. But these two points have already been refuted by Chen Shui-bian and ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin. Tsai Ing-wen finds herself attacked both front and rear.
Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin both made the same point. One the one hand Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus. On the other hand she has declared that she intends to continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy. This is self-contradictory, and makes no sense. As Chen Yunlin put it, "if" one opposes the 1992 Consensus, one cannot continue conducting cross-Strait economic exchanges. As Chen Shui-bian put it, "since" one opposes the 1992 Consensus, one cannot continue conducting cross-Strait economic exchanges. Comparing the two shines a spotlight on Tsai Ing-wen's logical contradiction. One might say that Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin have reached a "Tsai Ing-wen Consensus."
Frank Hsieh proposed "One Constitution, Two Interpretations." He was blasted by others in his party. The main reason the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus is that the Taiwan independence movement cannot bring itself to recognize the Republic of China and the Constitution of the Republic of China. If they recognize the Republic of China, they must recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China. If they recognize the ROC Constitution, they must recognize the One China Constitution. If they recognize the One China Constitution, they must recognize One China, Different Interpretations. If they recognize One China, Different Interpretations, they must recognize the 1992 Consensus. Therefore if one wants to ascertain whether the DPP really recognizes the Republic of China, and is not merely engaging in "backdoor listing," merely ask whether they recognize the 1992 Consensus, and One China, Different Interpretations.
The logic of Taiwan independence is incompatible with the Republic of China. Frank Hsieh was blasted by Taiwan independence elements. "The DPP demands the rectification of names. How can it support One Constitution, Different Interpretations?" Frank Hsieh inadvertently touched the Taiwan independence movement's third rail. Refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus and refusing to recognize the Republic of China, suddenly became two sides of the same coin. This suddenly made the 1992 Consensus an even more insoluble dilemma within the Democratic Progressive Party.
When Frank Hsieh made his proposal, he tested the Taiwan independence movement's bottom line. Not only does the movement oppose the 1992 Consensus, it also opposes One China, Different Interpretations. It categorically opposes the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. Of course, that does not mean it will become the DPP's campaign platform for the coming 2012 presidential election. Interestingly enough, the political climate in the DPP is more Taiwan independence oriented than it has ever been during past presidential campaigns.
Compare the plight of Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen. The DPP, in support of Chen Shui-bian's first campaign in 2000, issued its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." They supported his advocacy of the "New Centrist Path." They allowed him to declare "Five Noes." They made every effort to soften the "Taiwan independence party platform." Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen stopped Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus and restarting the National Unification Council. Only then did Ah-Bian apply the brakes. By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen has yet to take her first step. But Taiwan independence elements have already forbidden her to recognize the 1992 Consensus. They have reminded her that she herself refused to recognize it. To intimidate her, they have made an example of Frank Hsieh. They forbade her from playing word games or engaging in "backdoor listing." They even forbade her from explicitly recognizing the Republic of China. They reminded her that she herself referred to the ROC as an "alien regime."
If this is the case, Tsai Ing-wen faces two problems. One. Whether to continue publicly expressing opposition to the 1992 Consensus. If she wants to change course, how can she continue playing word games? Two. If she wishes to express her views on the Republic of China, and return to the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," that still does not solve the problem. The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" states that "according to the Constitution, [Taiwan] shall be known as the "Republic of China." But if one recognizes the "ROC Constitution" and the "Republic of China," how can one refuse to accept the "One China Constitution," "One China, Different Interpretations" and the "1992 Consensus?" Frank Hsieh learned a lesson. Do not play word games with "One Constitution, Different Interpretations."
As Taiwan independence elements recapitulate the vicissitudes of the past eight years, they have clearly concluded that Chen Shui-bian's "Five Noes" were a form of self incarceration, and a betrayal of Taiwan independence. They also consider the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" and "backdoor listing" opportunistic behavior. Hence the massive backlash against Frank Hsieh's "One Constitution, Different Interpretations" and "word games." As for Chen Shui-bian, he has become the spiritual leader of "One nation on each side." He is doing his utmost to ensure his historical legacy. He is giving himself a makeover, from "corrupt president" to "Taiwan independence standard-bearer." Years ago, Tsai Ing-wen forbade Chen from recognizing the 1992 Consensus. Years later, Chen is not about to let Tsai Ing-wen off the hook.
If Tsai Ing-wen fails to clarify her stand on the 1992 Consensus, how can she respond to Chen Shui-bian and Chen Yunlin? If Tsai Ing-wen fails to clarify her stand on the "Republic of China," how can she respond to Frank Hsieh, who asked, "Without it, [the ROC] how can we even hold a presidential election?"
Tsai Ing-wen was originally considered the Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate most able to reconcile cross-Strait relations with national identity. But the situation has evolved. She may be the person in the greatest peril, with the least room to maneuver. That is because she once forced Chen Shui-bian to say "I oppose the 1992 Consensus!" and because she herself says it today.
陳水扁與陳雲林的「蔡英文共識」
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.22
民進黨今日舉行臨全會，將議決總統候選人初選提名辦法。但不論以何種辦法提名，蔡英文出線的機率皆高，關鍵問題仍在她的兩岸論述將如何呈現。
蔡英文迄今的兩岸論述可歸納作兩點。一、反對九二共識；二、民進黨若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策。但這兩點卻被陳水扁及大陸海協會長陳雲林相繼批駁。蔡英文儼然腹背受敵。
陳水扁與陳雲林皆指出了一個共同點，那就是：蔡英文一方面要「反對九二共識」，一方面又要「延續前朝兩岸政策」，這是矛盾不通的。簡略而言，陳雲林的說法是：「如果」反對九二共識，那就「不能」延續兩岸經濟交流現狀。陳水扁的說法則是：「既然」反對九二共識，那就「不可」延續兩岸經濟交流現狀。兩相對照，皆聚焦於蔡英文的邏輯矛盾，這可謂是陳水扁與陳雲林的「蔡英文共識」。
謝長廷發表「憲法各表」而遭黨內狂轟猛批，揭示了一個事實，那就是：民進黨不能承認「九二共識」的主要原因，是在台獨的邏輯上根本不能承認「中華民國」與「中華民國憲法」。因為，若承認中華民國，即應承認中華民國憲法；若承認中華民國憲法，即應承認憲法一中；若承認憲法一中，即應承認一中各表；若承認一中各表，即可承認九二共識。所以，若欲檢視民進黨是否真正承認中華民國（而非「借殼上市」），就看是否承認「九二共識／一中各表」。
但是，台獨的邏輯基礎卻是根本不承認中華民國，正如謝長廷所受來自獨派的批評：「民進黨要正名制憲，豈能憲法各表？」謝長廷貿然撕開了台獨邏輯的底蘊，使得「不承認九二共識」與「不承認中華民國」頓時成為一體的兩面，遂使「九二共識」在民進黨內的不可解決性陡然升高。
謝長廷的提法測出了獨派的底線，那就是：不但反對九二共識，反對一中各表，而且根本反對中華民國與中華民國憲法。當然，這未必即成為民進黨未來在2012大選中的論述體系；但值得玩味的是，這樣的政治氛圍卻是民進黨在歷屆總統大選中最「獨」的一次。
以陳水扁與蔡英文的處境相比。2000年，陳水扁首次參選，民進黨為他發表《台灣前途決議文》，支撐他主張「新中間路線」，又維護他宣示「四不一沒有」，一切努力皆指向架空及軟化《台獨黨綱》；一直到陸委會主委蔡英文阻擋陳水扁承認「九二共識」及重啟「國統會」，扁才被迫煞車轉向。相較而言，蔡英文如今尚未起步，獨派就禁止她承認「九二共識」（當年妳自己不也不承認嗎？），甚至以謝長廷對她殺雞嚇猴，將她逼到不可再玩「文字遊戲」，不可「借殼上市」，甚至不可正面承認中華民國（妳不說是「外來政權」嗎？）的地步。
勢若趨此，蔡英文至少面臨了兩個難題：一、是否繼續公開表示「反對九二共識」？若要轉彎，又如何玩「文字遊戲」？二、如何表達其「中華民國論述」？若仍回到《台灣前途決議文》，恐仍解決不了問題；因為《決議文》稱「依憲法稱為中華民國」，則若承認了「憲法」與「中華民國」，又如何不接受「憲法一中」、「一中各表」及「九二共識」？謝長廷得到的教訓是不可玩「憲法各表」之類的「文字遊戲」。
此時的獨派回憶起過去八年執政的滄桑，他們顯然認為陳水扁的「四不一沒有」是作繭自縛，且背叛了台獨，也認為《台灣前途決議文》的「借殼上市」是投機行為，因此才會對謝長廷「憲法各表」的「文字遊戲」大反彈。至於陳水扁，現在成了「一邊一國」的精神領袖，他全力要將自己的歷史定位，從「貪汙總統」的形象轉成「台獨旗手」角色，當然也不會輕易放過當年阻禁他承認「九二共識」的蔡英文。
蔡英文若對「九二共識」說不清楚，如何回應陳水扁及陳雲林？而若對「中華民國」說不清楚，又如何回應謝長廷所問：「不然我們怎麼選總統？」
蔡英文原被認為是最能化解兩岸關係及國家認同爭議的民進黨總統候選人，如今情勢的演化則顯示，她卻可能是一個最無轉圜迴旋餘地的危險人物。因為她曾教陳水扁說且現在自己仍說：「我反對九二共識！」
Thursday, January 20, 2011
Obama/Hu Secret Talks: Highly Unusual
Obama/Hu Secret Talks: Highly Unusual
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 20, 2011
On the 18th of this month, Mainland Chinese President Hu Jintao embarked on a state visit to the United States. It was the highest profile visit Hu Jintao has made during his term of office. It is also critical to the development of Beijing/Washington relations. Obama is currently besieged, both at home and abroad. Mainland leaders meanwhile, will soon undergo a changing of the guard. As a result, the spotlight is on Hu Jintao.
Before such visits commentators often make distinctions between appearance and substance. At Beijing's insistence, the visit has be classified as a state visit. Vice President Joe Biden and his wife will personally greet Hu at the airport. A string of high-profile meetings have been arranged. Washington apparently hopes to give Hu Jintao lots of face, in exchange for real concessions. It hopes to receive something substantive in return.
But Washington may be engaging in wishful thinking. After all, Mainland China has already risen. It can easily play the same game. Washington must adopt a mature attitude when considering Beijing's opinions and views. It cannot wave candy in front of Beijing, as if it were a mere child.
For example, prior to Hu Jintao's departure, he was interviewed by the U.S. media. He questioned the Fed's loose money policy. He spoke not merely on behalf of Mainland China. He spoke on behalf of the entire world. He criticized the U.S. for its vicious behavior at the expense of others. If Obama fails to offer a positive response, he will underscore the irrationality of an international trading system based on the US dollar.
Over the next few days, several points will be worth noting. First, President Hu Jintao will be in Washington for three days. He will attend a number of meetings and parties. Most of them are purely symbolic. But the most important one will be held on the evening of the 18th, upon his arrival. President Obama will hold a working dinner with President Hu in the White House. Only six people will attend. On the Washington side, they will include the president, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon. On the Beijing side, they will include Mainland Chinese President Hu Jintao, State Councilor Dai Chenguo, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi.
According to the U.S. the arrangement is highly unusual, and provides a less formal environment in which Beijing and Washington can conduct a frank exchange. Before this, in order to ensure the success of the state visit, a series of high-level meetings were held between the two governments. But in view of the complex problems dogging the two governments, they may find themselves at loggerheads. If that happens, top leaders from both sides will have to reach a consensus at the last minute.
Next, during the meeting, the two sides will dispense with formalities. They will address each other directly on the issues that most concern them. For example, Washington has been pressuring Beijing on the yuan and the trade deficit. Barack Obama suffered a setback during the midterm elections. He is under enormous domestic pressure, Beijing is concerned about the change in leadership next year. Will it be able to maintain stable Sino-US relations over the next decade? These questions must be properly resolved. Otherwise they will undermine these leaders' political base.
In bilateral summits the world over, the watchword is "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." They must understand each others' plight. They must address each others' most pressing political problems. Only then can they achieve mutual trust. Only then can they this expanded trust be applied to other problems. During the working dinner on the night of the 18th, only six people will be present. This will maximize the chances of keeping the meeting confidential. This will allow them to make highly specific requests for assistance.
Another possibility of course, is that a quarrel may erupt behind closed doors. The two sides can lay their cards on the table, and avoid making their differences too explicit. If harsh words are exchanged during such bilateral meetings, they must often be made public. People can then see that their leaders refused to make concessions. Therefore the atmosphere during a private meeting is often more congenial than during a public meeting.
Finally, in Taipei, we frequently worry that Beijing/Washington summits will sacrifice our interests and security. This time Taipei is probably not the focus of the Beijing/Washington meeting. But whenever tensions arise between Beijing and Washington, Taipei is invariably a factor.
Some in the US have voiced criticisms. But fundamentally speaking, the U.S. government approves of current developments in cross-Strait relations. The most obvious indication was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's January 14th speech on Sino-US relations. She publicly affirmed the historic economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) reached between Taipei and Beijing. Beijing also believes that cross-Strait relations are peaceful, and will not become a sticking point in Beijing/Washington relations.
The Taiwan issue is gradually becoming an East Asian issue. This year Beijing experienced tensions and frictions in its relations with neighboring countries. South Korea, Japan, and even Southeast Asian countries are worried about the rise of mainland Chinese military power. They hope the United States will again intervene in Southeast Asia. Under the circumstances, it will be difficult for Taipei to remain aloof. In other words, the importance of the Taiwan issue has diminished. Nevertheless Beijing/Washington relations, the Korean Peninsula issue, the Diaoyutai issue the South China Sea issue, have all made their appearance on the strategic radar.
The Obama/Hu summit has reached a consensus. Beijing hopes to put in in writing. It hopes to hold the United States to its word. The China-US Joint Statement will be made public. Washington has reluctantly signed off on it. It hopes to leave each side room for interpretation. The final text is still being scrutinized with a fine toothed comb. But the real bilateral agreement is not in the surface text. It is in the face to face secret talks held that night.
歐胡會三對三密談 十分不尋常
2011-01-20 中國時報
中國國家主席胡錦濤已在十八日展開對美國國是訪問，這將是胡錦濤任內最高規格的訪問，此也正值中美關係的發展關鍵，歐巴馬此刻內外交逼，而大陸領導人換屆在即，都讓胡錦濤此行備受矚目。
訪問前，許多人評論時，往往傾向以「面子」、「裡子」來區分，在中國的堅持下，定位為國是訪問，從副總統拜登夫婦親往接機開始，安排一連串的高規格待遇，美方似乎希望給足胡錦濤面子，來換取中方實際讓步，賺得裡子。
但這某種程度上所反應的是美方的一廂情願；大陸畢竟已經崛起，足以與美國分庭抗禮，美國必須要以成熟的態度，來面對中國提出的意見與看法，不是以拿糖哄小孩的心態來處理。
胡錦濤行前接受美國媒體訪問時，質疑聯準會的寬鬆貨幣政策，就是很好的例子。他不僅代表中國，而且是代表世界各國發言，批評美國以鄰為壑的惡性手段，歐巴馬如果沒有積極回應，只會凸顯美元主導國際經貿體系的不合理。
在未來幾天當中，有幾方面是值得注意的：首先，胡錦濤在華府的三天，安排了幾場會談與宴會，大部分都是象徵性儀式，但是最重要的是十八日剛抵達的晚間，歐巴馬總統將在白宮的總統私人住宅，與胡主席舉行工作晚餐，參加的人員只有六位，美國是總統本人、希拉蕊國務卿、以及國安顧問唐尼倫，中方除了胡錦濤之外，還有國務委員戴秉國與外交部長楊潔篪。
據美方表示，這個安排「十分不尋常」，提供一個在「不那麼正式」的中美會談環境下，進行坦承的對話。在此之前，為了要讓國是訪問順利成功，兩國高層已經來回會晤好幾次。但是有鑑於兩國間問題之複雜，在某些癥結雙方肯定相持不下，需要最後一刻，由雙方最高領導人拍板，才能達成共識。
其次，特別要指出在這場會議中，雙方將破除客套，直接就彼此最關切的議題進行對話。像美國一再施壓的人民幣與貿易逆差，因為歐巴馬期中選舉挫敗後，承受莫大的國內壓力，而中國所關心的，是明年領導人換屆後，未來十年中美關係能否維持穩定，這些議題沒有妥善解決，會動搖兩國領導人各自的政治基礎。
換句話說，全世界這類的雙邊高峰會，都是「你搔我的背、我搔你的背」，了解對方的困境，替對方解決最困擾的政治問題，才能達到相互的信任，擴散到解決別的問題。在十八日晚間的工作晚餐，只有六個人與會，最能夠保密，彼此也最能提出具體協助要求。
當然另一個可能是關起門吵架，雙方把醜話講在前面，避免分歧表面化；可是在雙邊會晤中，講硬話狠話，往往必須公開，好讓老百姓看到自己的領袖是不妥協的，所以私下見面的氣氛，往往要比公開會面氣氛要好。
最後，對於台灣的我們，往昔每每會擔心在中美高峰會上，台灣的利益與安全會被犧牲；但我們認為這回台灣問題不會再是中美之間的焦點，但是中美之間的緊張，台灣問題仍然是其中的一部分。
雖然部分美方人士有雜音，但是美國官方基本上是肯定目前兩岸關係的發展，最明確的跡證就是，國務卿希拉蕊十四日發表美中關係演說時，公開肯定兩岸達成歷史性的「經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）」，大陸方面也認為兩岸平靜，不會成為中美關係中的焦點問題。
但現在台灣問題卻出現與其他東亞問題結合起來的趨勢。這一年來，大陸與周邊國家的關係出現緊張與摩擦，無論是南韓、日本乃至東南亞國家，都擔心大陸軍力崛起，希望美國能夠重新介入東亞局勢，在這種背景之下，台灣很難完全置身事外。換句話說，台灣問題的重要性雖然降低，但是在中美關係裡，卻與朝鮮半島問題、釣魚台問題、南中國海問題，一起浮現在戰略雷達之上。
歐胡高峰會所達成的共識，中方希望形諸文字，好牽制美方行為，目前將會以《中美聯合聲明》的文件形式表現出來，美方雖然勉為同意，但希望保留各說各話的空間，最後的文字，仍在逐字逐句推敲，但是真正雙方的約定，不會在表面文字，而在那個晚上的促膝密談。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 20, 2011
On the 18th of this month, Mainland Chinese President Hu Jintao embarked on a state visit to the United States. It was the highest profile visit Hu Jintao has made during his term of office. It is also critical to the development of Beijing/Washington relations. Obama is currently besieged, both at home and abroad. Mainland leaders meanwhile, will soon undergo a changing of the guard. As a result, the spotlight is on Hu Jintao.
Before such visits commentators often make distinctions between appearance and substance. At Beijing's insistence, the visit has be classified as a state visit. Vice President Joe Biden and his wife will personally greet Hu at the airport. A string of high-profile meetings have been arranged. Washington apparently hopes to give Hu Jintao lots of face, in exchange for real concessions. It hopes to receive something substantive in return.
But Washington may be engaging in wishful thinking. After all, Mainland China has already risen. It can easily play the same game. Washington must adopt a mature attitude when considering Beijing's opinions and views. It cannot wave candy in front of Beijing, as if it were a mere child.
For example, prior to Hu Jintao's departure, he was interviewed by the U.S. media. He questioned the Fed's loose money policy. He spoke not merely on behalf of Mainland China. He spoke on behalf of the entire world. He criticized the U.S. for its vicious behavior at the expense of others. If Obama fails to offer a positive response, he will underscore the irrationality of an international trading system based on the US dollar.
Over the next few days, several points will be worth noting. First, President Hu Jintao will be in Washington for three days. He will attend a number of meetings and parties. Most of them are purely symbolic. But the most important one will be held on the evening of the 18th, upon his arrival. President Obama will hold a working dinner with President Hu in the White House. Only six people will attend. On the Washington side, they will include the president, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon. On the Beijing side, they will include Mainland Chinese President Hu Jintao, State Councilor Dai Chenguo, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi.
According to the U.S. the arrangement is highly unusual, and provides a less formal environment in which Beijing and Washington can conduct a frank exchange. Before this, in order to ensure the success of the state visit, a series of high-level meetings were held between the two governments. But in view of the complex problems dogging the two governments, they may find themselves at loggerheads. If that happens, top leaders from both sides will have to reach a consensus at the last minute.
Next, during the meeting, the two sides will dispense with formalities. They will address each other directly on the issues that most concern them. For example, Washington has been pressuring Beijing on the yuan and the trade deficit. Barack Obama suffered a setback during the midterm elections. He is under enormous domestic pressure, Beijing is concerned about the change in leadership next year. Will it be able to maintain stable Sino-US relations over the next decade? These questions must be properly resolved. Otherwise they will undermine these leaders' political base.
In bilateral summits the world over, the watchword is "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." They must understand each others' plight. They must address each others' most pressing political problems. Only then can they achieve mutual trust. Only then can they this expanded trust be applied to other problems. During the working dinner on the night of the 18th, only six people will be present. This will maximize the chances of keeping the meeting confidential. This will allow them to make highly specific requests for assistance.
Another possibility of course, is that a quarrel may erupt behind closed doors. The two sides can lay their cards on the table, and avoid making their differences too explicit. If harsh words are exchanged during such bilateral meetings, they must often be made public. People can then see that their leaders refused to make concessions. Therefore the atmosphere during a private meeting is often more congenial than during a public meeting.
Finally, in Taipei, we frequently worry that Beijing/Washington summits will sacrifice our interests and security. This time Taipei is probably not the focus of the Beijing/Washington meeting. But whenever tensions arise between Beijing and Washington, Taipei is invariably a factor.
Some in the US have voiced criticisms. But fundamentally speaking, the U.S. government approves of current developments in cross-Strait relations. The most obvious indication was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's January 14th speech on Sino-US relations. She publicly affirmed the historic economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) reached between Taipei and Beijing. Beijing also believes that cross-Strait relations are peaceful, and will not become a sticking point in Beijing/Washington relations.
The Taiwan issue is gradually becoming an East Asian issue. This year Beijing experienced tensions and frictions in its relations with neighboring countries. South Korea, Japan, and even Southeast Asian countries are worried about the rise of mainland Chinese military power. They hope the United States will again intervene in Southeast Asia. Under the circumstances, it will be difficult for Taipei to remain aloof. In other words, the importance of the Taiwan issue has diminished. Nevertheless Beijing/Washington relations, the Korean Peninsula issue, the Diaoyutai issue the South China Sea issue, have all made their appearance on the strategic radar.
The Obama/Hu summit has reached a consensus. Beijing hopes to put in in writing. It hopes to hold the United States to its word. The China-US Joint Statement will be made public. Washington has reluctantly signed off on it. It hopes to leave each side room for interpretation. The final text is still being scrutinized with a fine toothed comb. But the real bilateral agreement is not in the surface text. It is in the face to face secret talks held that night.
歐胡會三對三密談 十分不尋常
2011-01-20 中國時報
中國國家主席胡錦濤已在十八日展開對美國國是訪問，這將是胡錦濤任內最高規格的訪問，此也正值中美關係的發展關鍵，歐巴馬此刻內外交逼，而大陸領導人換屆在即，都讓胡錦濤此行備受矚目。
訪問前，許多人評論時，往往傾向以「面子」、「裡子」來區分，在中國的堅持下，定位為國是訪問，從副總統拜登夫婦親往接機開始，安排一連串的高規格待遇，美方似乎希望給足胡錦濤面子，來換取中方實際讓步，賺得裡子。
但這某種程度上所反應的是美方的一廂情願；大陸畢竟已經崛起，足以與美國分庭抗禮，美國必須要以成熟的態度，來面對中國提出的意見與看法，不是以拿糖哄小孩的心態來處理。
胡錦濤行前接受美國媒體訪問時，質疑聯準會的寬鬆貨幣政策，就是很好的例子。他不僅代表中國，而且是代表世界各國發言，批評美國以鄰為壑的惡性手段，歐巴馬如果沒有積極回應，只會凸顯美元主導國際經貿體系的不合理。
在未來幾天當中，有幾方面是值得注意的：首先，胡錦濤在華府的三天，安排了幾場會談與宴會，大部分都是象徵性儀式，但是最重要的是十八日剛抵達的晚間，歐巴馬總統將在白宮的總統私人住宅，與胡主席舉行工作晚餐，參加的人員只有六位，美國是總統本人、希拉蕊國務卿、以及國安顧問唐尼倫，中方除了胡錦濤之外，還有國務委員戴秉國與外交部長楊潔篪。
據美方表示，這個安排「十分不尋常」，提供一個在「不那麼正式」的中美會談環境下，進行坦承的對話。在此之前，為了要讓國是訪問順利成功，兩國高層已經來回會晤好幾次。但是有鑑於兩國間問題之複雜，在某些癥結雙方肯定相持不下，需要最後一刻，由雙方最高領導人拍板，才能達成共識。
其次，特別要指出在這場會議中，雙方將破除客套，直接就彼此最關切的議題進行對話。像美國一再施壓的人民幣與貿易逆差，因為歐巴馬期中選舉挫敗後，承受莫大的國內壓力，而中國所關心的，是明年領導人換屆後，未來十年中美關係能否維持穩定，這些議題沒有妥善解決，會動搖兩國領導人各自的政治基礎。
換句話說，全世界這類的雙邊高峰會，都是「你搔我的背、我搔你的背」，了解對方的困境，替對方解決最困擾的政治問題，才能達到相互的信任，擴散到解決別的問題。在十八日晚間的工作晚餐，只有六個人與會，最能夠保密，彼此也最能提出具體協助要求。
當然另一個可能是關起門吵架，雙方把醜話講在前面，避免分歧表面化；可是在雙邊會晤中，講硬話狠話，往往必須公開，好讓老百姓看到自己的領袖是不妥協的，所以私下見面的氣氛，往往要比公開會面氣氛要好。
最後，對於台灣的我們，往昔每每會擔心在中美高峰會上，台灣的利益與安全會被犧牲；但我們認為這回台灣問題不會再是中美之間的焦點，但是中美之間的緊張，台灣問題仍然是其中的一部分。
雖然部分美方人士有雜音，但是美國官方基本上是肯定目前兩岸關係的發展，最明確的跡證就是，國務卿希拉蕊十四日發表美中關係演說時，公開肯定兩岸達成歷史性的「經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）」，大陸方面也認為兩岸平靜，不會成為中美關係中的焦點問題。
但現在台灣問題卻出現與其他東亞問題結合起來的趨勢。這一年來，大陸與周邊國家的關係出現緊張與摩擦，無論是南韓、日本乃至東南亞國家，都擔心大陸軍力崛起，希望美國能夠重新介入東亞局勢，在這種背景之下，台灣很難完全置身事外。換句話說，台灣問題的重要性雖然降低，但是在中美關係裡，卻與朝鮮半島問題、釣魚台問題、南中國海問題，一起浮現在戰略雷達之上。
歐胡高峰會所達成的共識，中方希望形諸文字，好牽制美方行為，目前將會以《中美聯合聲明》的文件形式表現出來，美方雖然勉為同意，但希望保留各說各話的空間，最後的文字，仍在逐字逐句推敲，但是真正雙方的約定，不會在表面文字，而在那個晚上的促膝密談。
Wednesday, January 19, 2011
The KMT Needs a Trowel as well as a Machete
The KMT Needs a Trowel as well as a Machete
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 19, 2011
Wang Yu-ting's resignation from the Youth Commission chairmanship has yet to be finalized. But King Pu-tsung has already resigned as KMT Secretary-General. King Pu-tsung's nickname is "little gold knife." But basically a secretary general should be a "trowel" rather than a "knife." He should make repairs, working slowly and deliberately. King Pu-tsung was more like a machete. He longed to slash away at the clutter. Instead he may have damaged the roots.
Wang Yu-ting turned down the job. This reflects Blue Camp defeatism. It also reflects an unwillingness to accept an offhand recruitment. To King Pu-tsung, the party was in dire straits. How could Wang Yu-ting think only of herself? But Wang Yu-ting felt that for her to become cannon fodder was pointless, and would benefit neither the party nor herself. Considered calmly, neither King nor Wang were wrong. They merely had different priorities. Wang Yu Ting's rejection, and King Pu-tsung's resignation amounted to the same thing. As matters stood, no one could have managed. This was true for Wang Yu-ting. This was true for King Pu-tsung as well.
King Pu-tsung and Wang Yu-ting faced the same problems as the KMT as a whole. They face problems at two levels. The first is the level of high-ranking party and government officials. The other is the level of grass-roots society. Consider the level of hig-ranking party and government officials. Cross-Strait policy appears to be the only policy that is working. Even this is subject to accusations of "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." Other policies often raise controversies. Take Kuan Chung's self-righteous handling of the 18% interest rate, and his handling of King Pu-tsung and Wang Yu-ting. He was completely out of touch with the public. Poor coordination between the party and the administration also created problems. The handling of the 18% interest rate left military personnel, civil servants, and teachers deeply hurt. Ordinary citizens felt cheated. The handling of health care insurance angered the middle class. The handling of the five cities elections angered local factions, As a result, support at the grassroots level was shaken. Problems with misgovernance dogged them at higher levels. The prospect of electoral defeat loomed at the grassroots level. Wang Yu-ting turned down the post. But didn't King Pu-tsung do the same?
During the Kaohsiung legislative by election, KMT Secretary-General King Pu-tsung actually nominated Hsu Ching-huang. But in Tainan, he was unable to persuade Wang Yu-ting and Kao Shi-po to run. His frustration can only be imagined. But anger is no solution. The public agrees with King Pu-tsung's attempt to recruit Wang Yu-ting. But it felt he handled the matter too clumsily. A way must be found to improve governing ability at the upper level, and campaigning ability at the grassroots level. .
King Pu-tsung is likely to rejoin Ma Ying-jeou's campaign committee. He may well be the right man for the right job. As a member of his campaign committee, he can intercept people and matters Ma wants to ignore. Ma can then deal only with a few consultants and public relations experts. During the past one year and one month, he should have been a "can do" secretary general. Instead, he turned himself a public target. He got what he wanted. But how can he face Ma Ying-jeou, who had such high hopes for him?
Ma's vision is sound. His heart is in the right place. His conduct is upright. Cross-Strait relations are improving. The economy is taking a turn for the better. Logically everything ought to be hunky dory. But his party and his adminstration remain victims of failures in communication. Take two examples. Kuan Chung still does not realize that his big mouth got him into trouble. King Pu-tsung still clings to his pride, and refuses to bow to custom. Both have problems communicating and connecting with the public. It may be unfair to characterize their attitude as "smugness." But at the very least it suggests a serious case of political tone-deafness.
King Pu-tsung may be an extreme case within the KMT, someone who resorts to both the carrot and the stick, to both orthodox and heterodox methods. But the "little gold knife" seems to lean only one way. He seems to think that as long as he is in the right, he can ignore how the system operates and the need to communicate with the public. The secretary general's job is to ensure that the party chairman has no other worries. Instead, he has left the party chairman with this mess to clean up. The secretary general should have no arguments with the world. Instead, he has created a rift within the party. This is hardly what Ma Ying-jeou and King Pu-tsung wanted to see. All one can say about his appointment as secretary general, is that they two came together due to a misunderstanding, and the two are parting ways now because they finally understand each other.
King Pu-tsung's style was prickly and unorthodox. If truth be told, it was consistent with public expectations that he transform KMT's "muddle through" mentality. He did not muddle through. But he was failed to reform the party's "muddle through" mentality. As we can see, politics sometimes requires drastic action. It sometimes call for someone to swing the machete. But it also requires a trowel. It also requires someone able to work slowly and deliberately.
Liao Liao-yi has been presented with a tough situation. Wang Yu-ting can refuse to rise to the challenge. King Pu-tsung can throw in the towel. But Liao Liao-yi must deal with the matter. The Ma Ying-jeou administration must do better. Party and adminstration officials must demonstrate greater governing ability at the top, and greater communication ability at the grassroots. Otherwise its burden can only grow heavier and heavier.
國民黨需要開山刀也要鏝刀
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.19
王昱婷請辭青輔會主委尚待定案，金溥聰卻先辭去了黨秘書長。金溥聰號稱金小刀，而黨秘書長基本上應是一把「鏝刀」，堆砌修葺，慢工出細活；但金溥聰卻像一把「開山刀」，想的是披荊斬棘，實際上卻可能折幹傷根。
王昱婷拒戰，一方面是藍軍失敗主義的反映，另一方面也是不能接受這種臨場拉伕式的徵召；金溥聰心裡想的是黨面臨如此困境，王昱婷豈能打自己的算盤？但王昱婷心裡想的卻是，作這種無謂的砲灰，對黨對個人有何意義？冷靜思考，金王二人的想法皆沒有錯，只因角色不同而已。王昱婷拒戰，與金溥聰辭職不幹秘書長，其實是同一回事。當大局到此地步，任何人都有撐不住的可能性；王昱婷如此，金溥聰又何嘗不是？
金溥聰與王昱婷的困境，其實反映了整個國民黨的困境。大致可分兩個層面：一在黨政高層，一在社會基層。就黨政高層言，當前顯得較具成效者似乎只有兩岸政策一項，但也有「傾中賣台」的批評；至於其他政務，則時生爭議，如關中之處理十八％，及金溥聰之處理王昱婷，率皆自以為是，卻與社會觀感完全脫節；又由於黨政的操作能力的問題，十八％使軍公教深覺委屈，亦增添了平民百姓的相對剝奪感，健保又惹毛了中產階級，選舉則搞火了地方派系，因而社會基層也告鬆動。這樣的態勢，在上層有治理失能的問題，在下有選舉失利的問題；王昱婷因此拒戰，金溥聰豈不也告「拒戰」？
試想，黨秘書長金溥聰在高雄立委補選竟到了提名徐慶煌的地步，而在台南又叫不動王昱婷及高思博，其心中的「悲憤」可想而知。但是，惱羞成怒卻不是辦法；輿論並不認為金溥聰不應徵召王昱婷，而是認為他的善後太離譜。問題是：必須找到改善上層治理能力及基層選舉紐帶的方案。
金溥聰可能回到馬英九的選舉團隊，這也許始是適才適所的歸宿。在選舉團隊中，他可以屏擋一切他不想理會的人與事，只消專心與幾名智囊與廣告才子周旋即可；這一年一個月以來，他原應是「調和鼎鼐」的秘書長，竟把自己變成了眾矢之的。他走得似乎求仁得仁，但如何對得起曾對他寄以厚望的馬英九。
馬英九的願景正確，心地相對良善，操守廉潔；且如今兩岸局勢打開，經濟已見好轉，照理說應是蔗境彌甘；但他的黨政團隊主要卻是害在溝通與連結的失敗。仍以眼前兩件事為例：關中竟不自知他的「大嘴巴」闖了什麼禍，金溥聰恐亦以自己不甘流俗的傲骨俠情為榮。二人之病，皆在溝通與連結的問題。也許這不能說是「自我感覺良好」，但至少是對政治氛圍及政治效果的感應大有問題。
金溥聰也許反映了國民黨現在的一個極端的典型。政治操作講究剛柔並濟、軟硬兼施、奇正互用；但金小刀的風格卻似乎是向一端傾斜，好像只要覺得自己站得住腳，卻沒想到體制運作及社會溝通是另一回事。且秘書長原應使黨主席無後顧之憂為職責，如今卻丟下了這個難以收拾的攤子；秘書長亦原應以和光同塵為能事，現在卻似乎搞得黨內界際分明。這應不是馬英九和金溥聰想要見到的場景，只能說在黨秘書長這個任命上，二人因誤會而結合，因了解而分手。
其實，以金溥聰的犀利及異質，確曾使社會期盼他能改造過去國民黨「和稀泥」的文化；卻未料，他不和稀泥，但也找不到取代稀泥的磚石。可見，政治操作固然須有大刀闊斧、披荊斬棘的「開山刀」，也應有堆砌修葺、慢工出細活的「鏝刀」。
難為廖了以了。王昱婷可以拒戰，金溥聰可以撂挑子，但廖了以卻必須臨危受命。然而，馬英九黨政團隊在上層的治理能力及在下層的社會紐帶若不改善，這副擔子恐怕只會愈挑愈重。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 19, 2011
Wang Yu-ting's resignation from the Youth Commission chairmanship has yet to be finalized. But King Pu-tsung has already resigned as KMT Secretary-General. King Pu-tsung's nickname is "little gold knife." But basically a secretary general should be a "trowel" rather than a "knife." He should make repairs, working slowly and deliberately. King Pu-tsung was more like a machete. He longed to slash away at the clutter. Instead he may have damaged the roots.
Wang Yu-ting turned down the job. This reflects Blue Camp defeatism. It also reflects an unwillingness to accept an offhand recruitment. To King Pu-tsung, the party was in dire straits. How could Wang Yu-ting think only of herself? But Wang Yu-ting felt that for her to become cannon fodder was pointless, and would benefit neither the party nor herself. Considered calmly, neither King nor Wang were wrong. They merely had different priorities. Wang Yu Ting's rejection, and King Pu-tsung's resignation amounted to the same thing. As matters stood, no one could have managed. This was true for Wang Yu-ting. This was true for King Pu-tsung as well.
King Pu-tsung and Wang Yu-ting faced the same problems as the KMT as a whole. They face problems at two levels. The first is the level of high-ranking party and government officials. The other is the level of grass-roots society. Consider the level of hig-ranking party and government officials. Cross-Strait policy appears to be the only policy that is working. Even this is subject to accusations of "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." Other policies often raise controversies. Take Kuan Chung's self-righteous handling of the 18% interest rate, and his handling of King Pu-tsung and Wang Yu-ting. He was completely out of touch with the public. Poor coordination between the party and the administration also created problems. The handling of the 18% interest rate left military personnel, civil servants, and teachers deeply hurt. Ordinary citizens felt cheated. The handling of health care insurance angered the middle class. The handling of the five cities elections angered local factions, As a result, support at the grassroots level was shaken. Problems with misgovernance dogged them at higher levels. The prospect of electoral defeat loomed at the grassroots level. Wang Yu-ting turned down the post. But didn't King Pu-tsung do the same?
During the Kaohsiung legislative by election, KMT Secretary-General King Pu-tsung actually nominated Hsu Ching-huang. But in Tainan, he was unable to persuade Wang Yu-ting and Kao Shi-po to run. His frustration can only be imagined. But anger is no solution. The public agrees with King Pu-tsung's attempt to recruit Wang Yu-ting. But it felt he handled the matter too clumsily. A way must be found to improve governing ability at the upper level, and campaigning ability at the grassroots level. .
King Pu-tsung is likely to rejoin Ma Ying-jeou's campaign committee. He may well be the right man for the right job. As a member of his campaign committee, he can intercept people and matters Ma wants to ignore. Ma can then deal only with a few consultants and public relations experts. During the past one year and one month, he should have been a "can do" secretary general. Instead, he turned himself a public target. He got what he wanted. But how can he face Ma Ying-jeou, who had such high hopes for him?
Ma's vision is sound. His heart is in the right place. His conduct is upright. Cross-Strait relations are improving. The economy is taking a turn for the better. Logically everything ought to be hunky dory. But his party and his adminstration remain victims of failures in communication. Take two examples. Kuan Chung still does not realize that his big mouth got him into trouble. King Pu-tsung still clings to his pride, and refuses to bow to custom. Both have problems communicating and connecting with the public. It may be unfair to characterize their attitude as "smugness." But at the very least it suggests a serious case of political tone-deafness.
King Pu-tsung may be an extreme case within the KMT, someone who resorts to both the carrot and the stick, to both orthodox and heterodox methods. But the "little gold knife" seems to lean only one way. He seems to think that as long as he is in the right, he can ignore how the system operates and the need to communicate with the public. The secretary general's job is to ensure that the party chairman has no other worries. Instead, he has left the party chairman with this mess to clean up. The secretary general should have no arguments with the world. Instead, he has created a rift within the party. This is hardly what Ma Ying-jeou and King Pu-tsung wanted to see. All one can say about his appointment as secretary general, is that they two came together due to a misunderstanding, and the two are parting ways now because they finally understand each other.
King Pu-tsung's style was prickly and unorthodox. If truth be told, it was consistent with public expectations that he transform KMT's "muddle through" mentality. He did not muddle through. But he was failed to reform the party's "muddle through" mentality. As we can see, politics sometimes requires drastic action. It sometimes call for someone to swing the machete. But it also requires a trowel. It also requires someone able to work slowly and deliberately.
Liao Liao-yi has been presented with a tough situation. Wang Yu-ting can refuse to rise to the challenge. King Pu-tsung can throw in the towel. But Liao Liao-yi must deal with the matter. The Ma Ying-jeou administration must do better. Party and adminstration officials must demonstrate greater governing ability at the top, and greater communication ability at the grassroots. Otherwise its burden can only grow heavier and heavier.
國民黨需要開山刀也要鏝刀
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.19
王昱婷請辭青輔會主委尚待定案，金溥聰卻先辭去了黨秘書長。金溥聰號稱金小刀，而黨秘書長基本上應是一把「鏝刀」，堆砌修葺，慢工出細活；但金溥聰卻像一把「開山刀」，想的是披荊斬棘，實際上卻可能折幹傷根。
王昱婷拒戰，一方面是藍軍失敗主義的反映，另一方面也是不能接受這種臨場拉伕式的徵召；金溥聰心裡想的是黨面臨如此困境，王昱婷豈能打自己的算盤？但王昱婷心裡想的卻是，作這種無謂的砲灰，對黨對個人有何意義？冷靜思考，金王二人的想法皆沒有錯，只因角色不同而已。王昱婷拒戰，與金溥聰辭職不幹秘書長，其實是同一回事。當大局到此地步，任何人都有撐不住的可能性；王昱婷如此，金溥聰又何嘗不是？
金溥聰與王昱婷的困境，其實反映了整個國民黨的困境。大致可分兩個層面：一在黨政高層，一在社會基層。就黨政高層言，當前顯得較具成效者似乎只有兩岸政策一項，但也有「傾中賣台」的批評；至於其他政務，則時生爭議，如關中之處理十八％，及金溥聰之處理王昱婷，率皆自以為是，卻與社會觀感完全脫節；又由於黨政的操作能力的問題，十八％使軍公教深覺委屈，亦增添了平民百姓的相對剝奪感，健保又惹毛了中產階級，選舉則搞火了地方派系，因而社會基層也告鬆動。這樣的態勢，在上層有治理失能的問題，在下有選舉失利的問題；王昱婷因此拒戰，金溥聰豈不也告「拒戰」？
試想，黨秘書長金溥聰在高雄立委補選竟到了提名徐慶煌的地步，而在台南又叫不動王昱婷及高思博，其心中的「悲憤」可想而知。但是，惱羞成怒卻不是辦法；輿論並不認為金溥聰不應徵召王昱婷，而是認為他的善後太離譜。問題是：必須找到改善上層治理能力及基層選舉紐帶的方案。
金溥聰可能回到馬英九的選舉團隊，這也許始是適才適所的歸宿。在選舉團隊中，他可以屏擋一切他不想理會的人與事，只消專心與幾名智囊與廣告才子周旋即可；這一年一個月以來，他原應是「調和鼎鼐」的秘書長，竟把自己變成了眾矢之的。他走得似乎求仁得仁，但如何對得起曾對他寄以厚望的馬英九。
馬英九的願景正確，心地相對良善，操守廉潔；且如今兩岸局勢打開，經濟已見好轉，照理說應是蔗境彌甘；但他的黨政團隊主要卻是害在溝通與連結的失敗。仍以眼前兩件事為例：關中竟不自知他的「大嘴巴」闖了什麼禍，金溥聰恐亦以自己不甘流俗的傲骨俠情為榮。二人之病，皆在溝通與連結的問題。也許這不能說是「自我感覺良好」，但至少是對政治氛圍及政治效果的感應大有問題。
金溥聰也許反映了國民黨現在的一個極端的典型。政治操作講究剛柔並濟、軟硬兼施、奇正互用；但金小刀的風格卻似乎是向一端傾斜，好像只要覺得自己站得住腳，卻沒想到體制運作及社會溝通是另一回事。且秘書長原應使黨主席無後顧之憂為職責，如今卻丟下了這個難以收拾的攤子；秘書長亦原應以和光同塵為能事，現在卻似乎搞得黨內界際分明。這應不是馬英九和金溥聰想要見到的場景，只能說在黨秘書長這個任命上，二人因誤會而結合，因了解而分手。
其實，以金溥聰的犀利及異質，確曾使社會期盼他能改造過去國民黨「和稀泥」的文化；卻未料，他不和稀泥，但也找不到取代稀泥的磚石。可見，政治操作固然須有大刀闊斧、披荊斬棘的「開山刀」，也應有堆砌修葺、慢工出細活的「鏝刀」。
難為廖了以了。王昱婷可以拒戰，金溥聰可以撂挑子，但廖了以卻必須臨危受命。然而，馬英九黨政團隊在上層的治理能力及在下層的社會紐帶若不改善，這副擔子恐怕只會愈挑愈重。
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
From Water Spinach to the 18% Interest Rate
From Water Spinach to the 18% Interest Rate
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 18, 2011
The DPP touched off a conflagration over the 18% interest rate issue. But the winds changed direction, and they wound up accidentally burning Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. The Green Camp accused the Ma administration of attempting to undermine Tsai Ing-wen's presidential bid. But its conspiracy theory is patently ridiculous. It is truly regrettable that the underlying issue has been lost amidst the 18% interest rate controversy, and increased social confrontation for no good reason. The DPP passed up a golden opportunity to win a debate through appeals to reason.
The underlying issue has been derailed because amidst the melee, the ruling and opposition parties lost their heads. They lost the ability to contemplate the problem and solve the problem. When the DPP was in power, it knew perfectly well the 18% interest rate problem could be solved. DPP legislators were among those who amended the new law last July. But they suddenly did an about face and fanned the flames of controversy. They deliberately lied. They demonized military personnel, civil servants, and teachers. They indiscriminately blasted away. As a result, Tsai Ing-wen and a number of Green Camp elders caught stray bullets. The free for all artillery barrage resulted in friendly fire casualties.
The Democratic Progressive Party blasted the 18% interest rate. Their own party chairman became collateral damage. This is reminiscent of the Green Camp's previous campaign against the Flora Expo. It undermined Su Tseng-chang's election prospects in Taipei City. It too was the result of a loss of focus. It too was the result of a lack of proportionality. Green Camp city council members demagogued the Xinsheng Avenue Overpass scandal. They tried to characterize the Flora Expo as rife with corruption. They attempted to smear the entire Flora Expo over 500 NT bunches of water spinach. They got the public all worked up, over nothing. Now, looking back, we can see that the allegations were completely groundless. They merely revealed the DPP's viciousness. They object was not really to expose corruption. In the end, apart from benefitting a small number of extremist city council members, what did it do for the public?
The 18% interest rate controversy involves a number of related issues, with far deeper social implications than water spinach. They deserve to be explored in greater detail. But the DPP persists in raking muck, rattling its sabers, and demonizing military personnel, civil servants, and teachers, It has no intention of introducing more clarity to the problem. It is making no effort to seek a more socially acceptable solution. In fact, the 18% interest rate provision has undergone repeated revisions over the past 20 years. It no longer bears any resemblance to its original form. Besides, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party was once faced with the same problem. It chose to leave the problem untouched and intact. Today, when the DPP engages in the same old finger-pointing, their efforts merely boomerang. People naturally ask, "So why didn't you take care of it while you were in office?"
Does the DPP wishe to be rational? If so, it should focus on reforming the "income replacement rate." It should underscore the gap between the income replacement rate for labor on the one hand, and civil servants and teachers on the other. It should highlight the need to review retirement benefits for civil servants and teachers. That is more likely to resonate with the public. But the DPP is incapable of jettisoning its outdated mindset. It finds it easier to demonize the 18% interest rate. It is incapable of adopting new modes of thought. It persists in playing the same old 18% interest rate card. As a result, whenever it encounters an underprivileged, low income bracket civil servant, their rhetoric falls on deaf ears. Also, the DPP persists in wallowing in its own moral righteousness. It equates opposition to the 18% interest rate with being on the side of truth and justice. Who knew that once the curtain was pulled back, the person sitting in the hot seat would be their own party chairman.
The problem with the DPP is its addiction to demagoguery. The problem with the KMT is its unresponsiveness, procrastination, and passivity. The new law has addressed the problem of "fat cat high officials, thin cat low officials." But it has saved only 100 million in expenditures. Meanwhile, it has muddied the waters, for no good reason. This was the trade-off. Such "reform" is a misnomer. During the debate, the Examination Yuan and the Executive Yuan were unable to explain the issues. Instead they shot their mouths off, adding fuel to the fire, provoking public outrage. Any benefits were outweighed by the losses. Suppose the original version proposed by the Examination Yuan had taken public perception and social justice into account? Suppose it had incorporated the "exclusion of the wealthy" clause into its design? Wouldn't it have been met by far greater public approval? Suppose the Ma administration had considered the times we live in and changes in the financial burden? Suppose it had calculated the income replacement rate in advance? Would it have provided its opponents with so many pretexts for criticism? Would it have turned so many military personnel, civil servants, and teachers into live targets?
One melee has followed another. The ruling and opposition parties must learn from the experience. They must change the way they debate the issues. Only then can they lead democracy on Taiwan out of its cycle of hatred, and its abyss of confrontation. The opposition DPP must forsake its practice of smears, mockery, and epithets. It must adopt a clearer, more purposeful, more specific, and more constructive manner of debate. Only then can it win for itself greater public approval. The ruling KMT must abandon its bureaucratic status quo mentality. It must become more sensitive to public sentiment, more responsive to change, and more open to criticism. Only then can it rid itself of its reputation of being indifferent to injustice.
President Ma called for "excluding the wealthy" from the 18% interest rate program. The Green Camp blasted him. This unwittingly conferred upon Ma Ying-jeou the image of a "reformer." Their words showed they were in a funk. Their logic showed that the problem was in their heads. If the opposition DPP had been the ones to point out the problem, they would have boasted, "We did it all for Taiwan." But when the ruling KMT implements the very same policy, why can't the DPP simply say it was the result of a joint effort? Why worry about who came out ahead? The crown of victory should adorn the heads of the people. Only that makes sense. Preoccupation with winning or losing, is merely the way politicians think. .
空心菜到十八趴：論戰的比例和原則
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.18
民進黨點燃十八趴的戰火，結果風勢逆轉，意外延燒到主席蔡英文。綠營指控，此一發展是馬政府為破壞蔡英文總統選情而發，這種「陰謀論」未免無稽。真正令人惋惜的是，十八趴之爭在辯論中失焦，平白升高了社會對立，民進黨則錯失了勝之以理的機會。
此事之所以演成脫軌，主要是朝野均在混戰中失去就事論事的理性，也就失去解決問題的積極思考。尤其民進黨，執政時即知十八趴是有待時日始可解決的問題，其立委去年七月也參與了新法的修正，此時卻煽風點火，蓄意妖魔化十八趴及軍公教。正因為毫無節制地裝填炮火亂轟，反而讓蔡英文和一批綠營大老意外受傷；大砲打鳥的結果，是炸傷了自己。
民進黨猛攻十八趴，回火灼傷黨主席；這和綠營先前以空心菜追打花博，卻壞了蘇貞昌的北市選情一樣，都出在論戰失去焦點，攻擊違反比例原則。當時綠營議員擴大渲染新生高弊案，將花博說得弊影幢幢，企圖以五百元的空心菜一舉否定整個花博，弄得人心沸騰。如今回看，那些指控完全是捕風捉影，只反射了民進黨的嗜血本性，目的並不在揭弊打假。最後，除便宜了少數極端議員，對社會公眾有何助益？
十八趴的相關問題，其實有比空心菜更深刻的社會意涵，值得更細緻地探討。但民進黨卻依舊流於敲鑼打鼓式的「驅魔法」，刀劍棍棒齊上，對軍公教一陣亂打，卻無意將問題呈現得更清晰，也未提出更能贏得社會認同的解決主張。事實上，十八趴之爭經過廿年來幾度修正，已非其初始形貌；何況，民進黨執政八年也曾面對同一問題，卻把攤子幾乎原封不動地保留了下來。如今，民進黨卻還在延續早年的招式死纏爛打，勢必產生「迴力棒效應」，民眾當然會反問：「你執政時為何不做？」
如果理性的話，民進黨應把論戰焦點改放在「所得替代率」，藉由勞工及公教所得替代率的反差，來凸顯公教退休給付的必須檢討，那樣更容易引起社會共鳴。然而，民進黨一方面無法擺脫自己的思維窠臼，覺得妖魔化的十八趴打起來順手，即不再開闢新思緒，只把自己反鎖在十八趴的論述老套中。結果，一遇到弱勢的底層公教人員，這套說法就破功了。另一方面，民進黨也耽溺於自己的道德幻想，以為反十八趴就代表著真理和正義；誰料，簾幕拉開，才發現「妖魔」的溫床上正躺著自己的黨主席。
若說民進黨的問題在只追求煽風點火的快感，國民黨的問題則是遲鈍、因循、不點不亮。新法雖是在修正前朝「肥大官、瘦小吏」的缺失，但僅節約一億支出，卻無端又攪動了一池渾水，且是顧此失彼。這樣的「改革」，名不副實。而在論戰過程，考試、行政兩院說不清楚緣由，反而信口開河，火上加油，挑起眾怒，得不償失。試想，當初的考試院版本若能顧及社會公平及民眾觀感，主動作出「排富」設計，不是更能贏得掌聲嗎？而如果馬政府思量時代環境變遷及財政負擔，早一步精算調整所得替代率，又豈會提供對手這麼多攻擊口實，讓軍公教變成箭靶？
經過一次次的混戰之後，朝野政黨都應該記取教訓，學習調整政策辯論方式，才能把台灣的民主政治帶出仇恨的循環及對峙的深淵。在野黨應把純粹抹黑、譏嘲、叫罵式的指控，轉化為目標更清晰、指向更具體、主張更具建設性的論述；那樣，才能為自己爭取到更廣大群眾的認同。而執政黨則須拋棄安於現狀的官僚心態，敏於因應變化，虛心接受批評，才能甩掉不公不義的陳年包袱。
馬總統指示十八趴設排富條款，綠營批評，這讓馬英九平白得了「改革者」形象，言下心中頗有不甘。此一邏輯，仍是心態的問題。如果在野黨拋出問題，是為了台灣更好，而執政者採納，那就是朝野的共同成就，豈能說誰占了便宜？勝利的光環，要戴在人民頭上，才有意義；斤斤計較政黨的輸贏，那只是政客的算盤。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 18, 2011
The DPP touched off a conflagration over the 18% interest rate issue. But the winds changed direction, and they wound up accidentally burning Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. The Green Camp accused the Ma administration of attempting to undermine Tsai Ing-wen's presidential bid. But its conspiracy theory is patently ridiculous. It is truly regrettable that the underlying issue has been lost amidst the 18% interest rate controversy, and increased social confrontation for no good reason. The DPP passed up a golden opportunity to win a debate through appeals to reason.
The underlying issue has been derailed because amidst the melee, the ruling and opposition parties lost their heads. They lost the ability to contemplate the problem and solve the problem. When the DPP was in power, it knew perfectly well the 18% interest rate problem could be solved. DPP legislators were among those who amended the new law last July. But they suddenly did an about face and fanned the flames of controversy. They deliberately lied. They demonized military personnel, civil servants, and teachers. They indiscriminately blasted away. As a result, Tsai Ing-wen and a number of Green Camp elders caught stray bullets. The free for all artillery barrage resulted in friendly fire casualties.
The Democratic Progressive Party blasted the 18% interest rate. Their own party chairman became collateral damage. This is reminiscent of the Green Camp's previous campaign against the Flora Expo. It undermined Su Tseng-chang's election prospects in Taipei City. It too was the result of a loss of focus. It too was the result of a lack of proportionality. Green Camp city council members demagogued the Xinsheng Avenue Overpass scandal. They tried to characterize the Flora Expo as rife with corruption. They attempted to smear the entire Flora Expo over 500 NT bunches of water spinach. They got the public all worked up, over nothing. Now, looking back, we can see that the allegations were completely groundless. They merely revealed the DPP's viciousness. They object was not really to expose corruption. In the end, apart from benefitting a small number of extremist city council members, what did it do for the public?
The 18% interest rate controversy involves a number of related issues, with far deeper social implications than water spinach. They deserve to be explored in greater detail. But the DPP persists in raking muck, rattling its sabers, and demonizing military personnel, civil servants, and teachers, It has no intention of introducing more clarity to the problem. It is making no effort to seek a more socially acceptable solution. In fact, the 18% interest rate provision has undergone repeated revisions over the past 20 years. It no longer bears any resemblance to its original form. Besides, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party was once faced with the same problem. It chose to leave the problem untouched and intact. Today, when the DPP engages in the same old finger-pointing, their efforts merely boomerang. People naturally ask, "So why didn't you take care of it while you were in office?"
Does the DPP wishe to be rational? If so, it should focus on reforming the "income replacement rate." It should underscore the gap between the income replacement rate for labor on the one hand, and civil servants and teachers on the other. It should highlight the need to review retirement benefits for civil servants and teachers. That is more likely to resonate with the public. But the DPP is incapable of jettisoning its outdated mindset. It finds it easier to demonize the 18% interest rate. It is incapable of adopting new modes of thought. It persists in playing the same old 18% interest rate card. As a result, whenever it encounters an underprivileged, low income bracket civil servant, their rhetoric falls on deaf ears. Also, the DPP persists in wallowing in its own moral righteousness. It equates opposition to the 18% interest rate with being on the side of truth and justice. Who knew that once the curtain was pulled back, the person sitting in the hot seat would be their own party chairman.
The problem with the DPP is its addiction to demagoguery. The problem with the KMT is its unresponsiveness, procrastination, and passivity. The new law has addressed the problem of "fat cat high officials, thin cat low officials." But it has saved only 100 million in expenditures. Meanwhile, it has muddied the waters, for no good reason. This was the trade-off. Such "reform" is a misnomer. During the debate, the Examination Yuan and the Executive Yuan were unable to explain the issues. Instead they shot their mouths off, adding fuel to the fire, provoking public outrage. Any benefits were outweighed by the losses. Suppose the original version proposed by the Examination Yuan had taken public perception and social justice into account? Suppose it had incorporated the "exclusion of the wealthy" clause into its design? Wouldn't it have been met by far greater public approval? Suppose the Ma administration had considered the times we live in and changes in the financial burden? Suppose it had calculated the income replacement rate in advance? Would it have provided its opponents with so many pretexts for criticism? Would it have turned so many military personnel, civil servants, and teachers into live targets?
One melee has followed another. The ruling and opposition parties must learn from the experience. They must change the way they debate the issues. Only then can they lead democracy on Taiwan out of its cycle of hatred, and its abyss of confrontation. The opposition DPP must forsake its practice of smears, mockery, and epithets. It must adopt a clearer, more purposeful, more specific, and more constructive manner of debate. Only then can it win for itself greater public approval. The ruling KMT must abandon its bureaucratic status quo mentality. It must become more sensitive to public sentiment, more responsive to change, and more open to criticism. Only then can it rid itself of its reputation of being indifferent to injustice.
President Ma called for "excluding the wealthy" from the 18% interest rate program. The Green Camp blasted him. This unwittingly conferred upon Ma Ying-jeou the image of a "reformer." Their words showed they were in a funk. Their logic showed that the problem was in their heads. If the opposition DPP had been the ones to point out the problem, they would have boasted, "We did it all for Taiwan." But when the ruling KMT implements the very same policy, why can't the DPP simply say it was the result of a joint effort? Why worry about who came out ahead? The crown of victory should adorn the heads of the people. Only that makes sense. Preoccupation with winning or losing, is merely the way politicians think. .
空心菜到十八趴：論戰的比例和原則
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.18
民進黨點燃十八趴的戰火，結果風勢逆轉，意外延燒到主席蔡英文。綠營指控，此一發展是馬政府為破壞蔡英文總統選情而發，這種「陰謀論」未免無稽。真正令人惋惜的是，十八趴之爭在辯論中失焦，平白升高了社會對立，民進黨則錯失了勝之以理的機會。
此事之所以演成脫軌，主要是朝野均在混戰中失去就事論事的理性，也就失去解決問題的積極思考。尤其民進黨，執政時即知十八趴是有待時日始可解決的問題，其立委去年七月也參與了新法的修正，此時卻煽風點火，蓄意妖魔化十八趴及軍公教。正因為毫無節制地裝填炮火亂轟，反而讓蔡英文和一批綠營大老意外受傷；大砲打鳥的結果，是炸傷了自己。
民進黨猛攻十八趴，回火灼傷黨主席；這和綠營先前以空心菜追打花博，卻壞了蘇貞昌的北市選情一樣，都出在論戰失去焦點，攻擊違反比例原則。當時綠營議員擴大渲染新生高弊案，將花博說得弊影幢幢，企圖以五百元的空心菜一舉否定整個花博，弄得人心沸騰。如今回看，那些指控完全是捕風捉影，只反射了民進黨的嗜血本性，目的並不在揭弊打假。最後，除便宜了少數極端議員，對社會公眾有何助益？
十八趴的相關問題，其實有比空心菜更深刻的社會意涵，值得更細緻地探討。但民進黨卻依舊流於敲鑼打鼓式的「驅魔法」，刀劍棍棒齊上，對軍公教一陣亂打，卻無意將問題呈現得更清晰，也未提出更能贏得社會認同的解決主張。事實上，十八趴之爭經過廿年來幾度修正，已非其初始形貌；何況，民進黨執政八年也曾面對同一問題，卻把攤子幾乎原封不動地保留了下來。如今，民進黨卻還在延續早年的招式死纏爛打，勢必產生「迴力棒效應」，民眾當然會反問：「你執政時為何不做？」
如果理性的話，民進黨應把論戰焦點改放在「所得替代率」，藉由勞工及公教所得替代率的反差，來凸顯公教退休給付的必須檢討，那樣更容易引起社會共鳴。然而，民進黨一方面無法擺脫自己的思維窠臼，覺得妖魔化的十八趴打起來順手，即不再開闢新思緒，只把自己反鎖在十八趴的論述老套中。結果，一遇到弱勢的底層公教人員，這套說法就破功了。另一方面，民進黨也耽溺於自己的道德幻想，以為反十八趴就代表著真理和正義；誰料，簾幕拉開，才發現「妖魔」的溫床上正躺著自己的黨主席。
若說民進黨的問題在只追求煽風點火的快感，國民黨的問題則是遲鈍、因循、不點不亮。新法雖是在修正前朝「肥大官、瘦小吏」的缺失，但僅節約一億支出，卻無端又攪動了一池渾水，且是顧此失彼。這樣的「改革」，名不副實。而在論戰過程，考試、行政兩院說不清楚緣由，反而信口開河，火上加油，挑起眾怒，得不償失。試想，當初的考試院版本若能顧及社會公平及民眾觀感，主動作出「排富」設計，不是更能贏得掌聲嗎？而如果馬政府思量時代環境變遷及財政負擔，早一步精算調整所得替代率，又豈會提供對手這麼多攻擊口實，讓軍公教變成箭靶？
經過一次次的混戰之後，朝野政黨都應該記取教訓，學習調整政策辯論方式，才能把台灣的民主政治帶出仇恨的循環及對峙的深淵。在野黨應把純粹抹黑、譏嘲、叫罵式的指控，轉化為目標更清晰、指向更具體、主張更具建設性的論述；那樣，才能為自己爭取到更廣大群眾的認同。而執政黨則須拋棄安於現狀的官僚心態，敏於因應變化，虛心接受批評，才能甩掉不公不義的陳年包袱。
馬總統指示十八趴設排富條款，綠營批評，這讓馬英九平白得了「改革者」形象，言下心中頗有不甘。此一邏輯，仍是心態的問題。如果在野黨拋出問題，是為了台灣更好，而執政者採納，那就是朝野的共同成就，豈能說誰占了便宜？勝利的光環，要戴在人民頭上，才有意義；斤斤計較政黨的輸贏，那只是政客的算盤。
Monday, January 17, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen: A Gopher Yet to Stick Her Head Out of the Hole
Tsai Ing-wen: A Gopher Yet to Stick Her Head Out of the Hole
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 17, 2011
Taiwan independence elements have blasted Frank Hsieh's "One Constitution, Different Interpretations." They have hammered Frank Hsieh over the head. In doing so, they have simultaneously issued Tsai Ing-wen a warning. This intense reaction from Taiwan independence elements means they have drawn a line in the sand regarding the DPP's 2012 presidential campaign cross-Strait policy platform.
Party elders have dismissed Frank Hsieh's "One Constitution, Different Interpretations" as "word games." In fact, Frank Hsieh's rhetoric is merely a restatement of the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." For example, it recognizes the ROC Constitution. It affirms that changing the status quo requires a referendum and must accord with the constitution.. These cover essentially the same ground as the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. As for Frank Hsieh's opposition to the "One-China Principle," that is merely an extension of the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. The resolution states, "According to the current constitution, the name of the nation is the Republic of China." This means that in the future the name might not be the Republic of China, and that the DPP might found an independent "Nation of Taiwan." In other words, Frank Hsieh's merely made another argument for "backdoor listing," not so different from the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. The Resolution on Taiwan's Future was already a word game. Frank Hsieh's One Constitution, Different Interpretations is merely a "word game within a word game." The DPP supports the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. So why are Taiwan independence elements reacting so strongly to Frank Hsieh's One Constitution, Different Interpreations?
Frank Hsieh is chopping the constitution into two halves, Internally, he recognizes the ROC Constitution. Externally, he calls for One Constitution, Different Interpretations. Taiwan independence elements are reacting only against One China, Different Interpretations. They consider One China, Different Interpretations word games. They also oppose Frank Hsieh explicitly recognizing the ROC Constitution. Taiwan independence elements feel that recognizing the Republic of China makes it difficult to repudiate the One China Constitution. This shows us that Taiwan independence elements have always opposed the backdoor listing strategy adopted in the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Taiwan independence elements advocate the "Rectification of Names." Therefore how can they possibly advocate recognition of the Republic of China Constitution? Frank Hsieh was merely the first gopher to stick his head out of the hole. That's why he got hammered. The treatment he received of course sent Tsai Ing-wen a stern warning.
The prospects for Tsai Ing-wen are bullish. Taiwan independence elements are simultaneously hopeful and wary. They are taking a number of measures. The first is to resolutely oppose the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. That is why they oppose the One China Constitution and the Constitution of the Republic of China. Next, they oppose choosing a presidential candidate by polling the entire population. These are all measures intended to restrain Tsai Ing-wen, whom they consider "very un-DPP like." What happened to Frank Hsieh today was intended as an object lesson for Tsai Ing-wen.
Taiwan independence elements support Annette Lu. They of course have no illusions about Annette Lu's election prospects. They are doing so merely to contain Tsai Ing-wen, They want Tsai to pay attention to the views of "party members." Annette Lu is chummy with Taiwan independence elements. But she doesn't really think Tsai Ing-wen can get away with repudiating the August 1, 1992 resolution of the National Unification Council. The resolution stipulates that both sides adhere to the One China Principle, but each side interprets One China differently. This reveals the chaos within the DPP regarding its power arrangements and ideological direction. Annette Lu sees it, Tsai Ing-wen sees it too. Tsai Ing-wen finds herself squarely on the horns of a dilemma.
Taiwan independence elements hammered Frank Hsieh over the head. Their bottom line is opposition to the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. They oppose explicit recognition of the Republic of China and the Constitution of the Republic of China. They, unlike Frank Hsieh, are unwilling to play wordgames with the Republic of China and the One China Constitution. Cross-Strait policy will be an issue during the 2012 presidential election. The DPP is likely to fulfill Chen Shui-bian's prophecy. He warned Tsai Ing-wen that if she "opposed the 1992 Consensus, then she cannot perpetuate the policies of the previous adminstration after she is elected." In other words, if Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus, she has no reason to support or maintain the 1992 Consensus, since it is the foundation and prerequisite for all cross-Strait relations, including ECFA. What will Tsai Ing-wen do? Will she accept the demands laid down by Taiwan independence elements when she enters the presidential race? Or will she proclaim "Five Noes" after she is elected president?
Frank Hsieh hoped to generate a climate of opposition to the 1992 Consensus within the party. He thought he could use ambiguous word games to lead the party out of its dilemma. Who knew Taiwan independence elements did not appreciate his slippery rhetoric. They hammered him over the head. He is now seeing stars. Tsai Ing-wen witnessed the results of Frank Hsieh's unsucessful trial balloon. Will she be able to play any wordgames with her "Platform for the Coming Decade?"
蔡英文是尚未伸出頭來的另一隻地鼠
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.17
獨派對謝長廷所提「憲法各表」大反彈，不但使謝長廷滿頭包，更是殺雞嚇猴給蔡英文看。獨派的強烈反應，形同給民進黨二○一二總統大選的兩岸論述劃下了一條底線。
謝長廷的「憲法各表」被黨內大老說成「文字遊戲」。其實，從某種角度來說，這套論述只是用另一種語言來表達《台灣前途決議文》；比如說，承認中華民國憲法，並稱，若要改變現狀，須經公民投票及修憲決定。這些皆大致不出《台灣前途決議文》的範圍。至於謝長廷稱反對「一中原則」，其實也是《台灣前途決議文》之引伸；因為，決議文說，「依目前憲法稱為中華民國」，其意即指「未來」未必仍是「中華民國」，而可以另建台灣國。換句話說，謝長廷的論述主軸仍是「借殼上市」，與《台灣前途決議文》並無太大出入；而《台灣前途決議文》已是「文字遊戲」，謝長廷的「憲法各表」則是「遊戲中的遊戲」。民進黨既曾支持《台灣前途決議文》，為何獨派竟會對謝長廷的「憲法各表」如此大反彈？
謝長廷將憲法切成兩半，對內承認中華民國憲法，對外「憲法各表」。而獨派此次的反應，卻是不但反對「憲法各表」（認為那只是「一中各表」的「文字遊戲」）；更反對謝長廷以正面論述承認中華民國憲法；因為，獨派認為只要承認中華民國，就難以否棄「憲法一中」。此一立場證實了獨派一向反對《台灣前途決議文》所採「借殼上市」的投機策略；獨派主張「正名制憲」，豈能承認「中華民國憲法」？只因謝長廷是第一隻伸出頭來的地鼠而被大槌轟擊，這對蔡英文當然是一個嚴重的警告。
蔡英文的聲勢看好，獨派對其既期待又警戒。獨派採取的對策，首先是堅決反對「九二共識／一中各表」（因此亦反對憲法一中，反對中華民國憲法），其次是反對總統候選人以「全民調」產生；這些皆是為了對「很不像民進黨」的蔡英文有所節制。如今謝長廷這隻地鼠的下場，足為蔡英文的殷鑒。
獨派拱呂秀蓮，當然不是看好呂秀蓮；而是欲用呂秀蓮來牽制蔡英文，要蔡重視「黨員」的意見。而呂秀蓮一方面拉攏獨派，另一方面卻又認為蔡英文不能否認一九九二年八月一日國統會的決議（海峽兩岸均堅持「一個中國」之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵義有所不同），尤其顯得民進黨內權力及路線鬥爭之錯亂。呂秀蓮有此見地，難道蔡英文會沒有？事到如今，蔡英文的處境，已是進退維谷。
獨派借謝長廷這隻地鼠祭旗，其劃出的底線是：反對「九二共識／一中各表」，亦反對正面承認中華民國及中華民國憲法；也不可如謝長廷那般玩弄「中華民國」與「憲法一中」分離的「文字遊戲」。在這樣的前提下，民進黨二○一二總統大選的兩岸論述，就很可能步上陳水扁的預言，他警告蔡英文：「反對九二共識，就不能在執政後延續前朝兩岸政策。」也就是說，蔡英文若「反對九二共識」，她也就沒有理由贊成或維持以「九二共識」為基礎及前提所建立的所有兩岸關係（包括ＥＣＦＡ等等）。蔡英文將接受獨派這樣的訓令而參加總統大選，或在若選上總統後再來「四不一沒有」？
謝長廷欲掙脫「反對九二共識」的黨內氛圍，自以為可用模稜兩可的「文字遊戲」帶領全黨脫困，不料獨派對他的自作聰明並不領情，且一槌子打得他眼冒金星。蔡英文目睹謝長廷「拋磚引玉」的下場，她將在《十年政綱》中玩出怎樣的「文字遊戲」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 17, 2011
Taiwan independence elements have blasted Frank Hsieh's "One Constitution, Different Interpretations." They have hammered Frank Hsieh over the head. In doing so, they have simultaneously issued Tsai Ing-wen a warning. This intense reaction from Taiwan independence elements means they have drawn a line in the sand regarding the DPP's 2012 presidential campaign cross-Strait policy platform.
Party elders have dismissed Frank Hsieh's "One Constitution, Different Interpretations" as "word games." In fact, Frank Hsieh's rhetoric is merely a restatement of the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." For example, it recognizes the ROC Constitution. It affirms that changing the status quo requires a referendum and must accord with the constitution.. These cover essentially the same ground as the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. As for Frank Hsieh's opposition to the "One-China Principle," that is merely an extension of the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. The resolution states, "According to the current constitution, the name of the nation is the Republic of China." This means that in the future the name might not be the Republic of China, and that the DPP might found an independent "Nation of Taiwan." In other words, Frank Hsieh's merely made another argument for "backdoor listing," not so different from the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. The Resolution on Taiwan's Future was already a word game. Frank Hsieh's One Constitution, Different Interpretations is merely a "word game within a word game." The DPP supports the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. So why are Taiwan independence elements reacting so strongly to Frank Hsieh's One Constitution, Different Interpreations?
Frank Hsieh is chopping the constitution into two halves, Internally, he recognizes the ROC Constitution. Externally, he calls for One Constitution, Different Interpretations. Taiwan independence elements are reacting only against One China, Different Interpretations. They consider One China, Different Interpretations word games. They also oppose Frank Hsieh explicitly recognizing the ROC Constitution. Taiwan independence elements feel that recognizing the Republic of China makes it difficult to repudiate the One China Constitution. This shows us that Taiwan independence elements have always opposed the backdoor listing strategy adopted in the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Taiwan independence elements advocate the "Rectification of Names." Therefore how can they possibly advocate recognition of the Republic of China Constitution? Frank Hsieh was merely the first gopher to stick his head out of the hole. That's why he got hammered. The treatment he received of course sent Tsai Ing-wen a stern warning.
The prospects for Tsai Ing-wen are bullish. Taiwan independence elements are simultaneously hopeful and wary. They are taking a number of measures. The first is to resolutely oppose the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. That is why they oppose the One China Constitution and the Constitution of the Republic of China. Next, they oppose choosing a presidential candidate by polling the entire population. These are all measures intended to restrain Tsai Ing-wen, whom they consider "very un-DPP like." What happened to Frank Hsieh today was intended as an object lesson for Tsai Ing-wen.
Taiwan independence elements support Annette Lu. They of course have no illusions about Annette Lu's election prospects. They are doing so merely to contain Tsai Ing-wen, They want Tsai to pay attention to the views of "party members." Annette Lu is chummy with Taiwan independence elements. But she doesn't really think Tsai Ing-wen can get away with repudiating the August 1, 1992 resolution of the National Unification Council. The resolution stipulates that both sides adhere to the One China Principle, but each side interprets One China differently. This reveals the chaos within the DPP regarding its power arrangements and ideological direction. Annette Lu sees it, Tsai Ing-wen sees it too. Tsai Ing-wen finds herself squarely on the horns of a dilemma.
Taiwan independence elements hammered Frank Hsieh over the head. Their bottom line is opposition to the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. They oppose explicit recognition of the Republic of China and the Constitution of the Republic of China. They, unlike Frank Hsieh, are unwilling to play wordgames with the Republic of China and the One China Constitution. Cross-Strait policy will be an issue during the 2012 presidential election. The DPP is likely to fulfill Chen Shui-bian's prophecy. He warned Tsai Ing-wen that if she "opposed the 1992 Consensus, then she cannot perpetuate the policies of the previous adminstration after she is elected." In other words, if Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus, she has no reason to support or maintain the 1992 Consensus, since it is the foundation and prerequisite for all cross-Strait relations, including ECFA. What will Tsai Ing-wen do? Will she accept the demands laid down by Taiwan independence elements when she enters the presidential race? Or will she proclaim "Five Noes" after she is elected president?
Frank Hsieh hoped to generate a climate of opposition to the 1992 Consensus within the party. He thought he could use ambiguous word games to lead the party out of its dilemma. Who knew Taiwan independence elements did not appreciate his slippery rhetoric. They hammered him over the head. He is now seeing stars. Tsai Ing-wen witnessed the results of Frank Hsieh's unsucessful trial balloon. Will she be able to play any wordgames with her "Platform for the Coming Decade?"
蔡英文是尚未伸出頭來的另一隻地鼠
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.01.17
獨派對謝長廷所提「憲法各表」大反彈，不但使謝長廷滿頭包，更是殺雞嚇猴給蔡英文看。獨派的強烈反應，形同給民進黨二○一二總統大選的兩岸論述劃下了一條底線。
謝長廷的「憲法各表」被黨內大老說成「文字遊戲」。其實，從某種角度來說，這套論述只是用另一種語言來表達《台灣前途決議文》；比如說，承認中華民國憲法，並稱，若要改變現狀，須經公民投票及修憲決定。這些皆大致不出《台灣前途決議文》的範圍。至於謝長廷稱反對「一中原則」，其實也是《台灣前途決議文》之引伸；因為，決議文說，「依目前憲法稱為中華民國」，其意即指「未來」未必仍是「中華民國」，而可以另建台灣國。換句話說，謝長廷的論述主軸仍是「借殼上市」，與《台灣前途決議文》並無太大出入；而《台灣前途決議文》已是「文字遊戲」，謝長廷的「憲法各表」則是「遊戲中的遊戲」。民進黨既曾支持《台灣前途決議文》，為何獨派竟會對謝長廷的「憲法各表」如此大反彈？
謝長廷將憲法切成兩半，對內承認中華民國憲法，對外「憲法各表」。而獨派此次的反應，卻是不但反對「憲法各表」（認為那只是「一中各表」的「文字遊戲」）；更反對謝長廷以正面論述承認中華民國憲法；因為，獨派認為只要承認中華民國，就難以否棄「憲法一中」。此一立場證實了獨派一向反對《台灣前途決議文》所採「借殼上市」的投機策略；獨派主張「正名制憲」，豈能承認「中華民國憲法」？只因謝長廷是第一隻伸出頭來的地鼠而被大槌轟擊，這對蔡英文當然是一個嚴重的警告。
蔡英文的聲勢看好，獨派對其既期待又警戒。獨派採取的對策，首先是堅決反對「九二共識／一中各表」（因此亦反對憲法一中，反對中華民國憲法），其次是反對總統候選人以「全民調」產生；這些皆是為了對「很不像民進黨」的蔡英文有所節制。如今謝長廷這隻地鼠的下場，足為蔡英文的殷鑒。
獨派拱呂秀蓮，當然不是看好呂秀蓮；而是欲用呂秀蓮來牽制蔡英文，要蔡重視「黨員」的意見。而呂秀蓮一方面拉攏獨派，另一方面卻又認為蔡英文不能否認一九九二年八月一日國統會的決議（海峽兩岸均堅持「一個中國」之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵義有所不同），尤其顯得民進黨內權力及路線鬥爭之錯亂。呂秀蓮有此見地，難道蔡英文會沒有？事到如今，蔡英文的處境，已是進退維谷。
獨派借謝長廷這隻地鼠祭旗，其劃出的底線是：反對「九二共識／一中各表」，亦反對正面承認中華民國及中華民國憲法；也不可如謝長廷那般玩弄「中華民國」與「憲法一中」分離的「文字遊戲」。在這樣的前提下，民進黨二○一二總統大選的兩岸論述，就很可能步上陳水扁的預言，他警告蔡英文：「反對九二共識，就不能在執政後延續前朝兩岸政策。」也就是說，蔡英文若「反對九二共識」，她也就沒有理由贊成或維持以「九二共識」為基礎及前提所建立的所有兩岸關係（包括ＥＣＦＡ等等）。蔡英文將接受獨派這樣的訓令而參加總統大選，或在若選上總統後再來「四不一沒有」？
謝長廷欲掙脫「反對九二共識」的黨內氛圍，自以為可用模稜兩可的「文字遊戲」帶領全黨脫困，不料獨派對他的自作聰明並不領情，且一槌子打得他眼冒金星。蔡英文目睹謝長廷「拋磚引玉」的下場，她將在《十年政綱》中玩出怎樣的「文字遊戲」？
Friday, January 14, 2011
The 18% Interest Rate Controversy: Get Back to Basics
The 18% Interest Rate Controversy: Get Back to Basics
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 14, 2011
Civil service health and retirement benefits include preferential interest rates on bank deposits. Following attacks on the system from various segments of the public, President Ma responded. He said he would conduct an overall review and urge amending the relevant laws. This would ensure fairness, justice, and meet public expectations. We agree with President Ma. We too look forward to a final outcome consistent with the requirements of social justice.
The 18% interest issue has a long history. In 1960, the prevailing interest rate was over 10%. The preferential interest rate on bank deposits for civil servants was set at 1.5 times the standard bank deposit interest rate. In 1979, interest rates fell to 8%. Therefore the preferential interest rate was set at 14.25%. In 1983, after several revisions, both up and down, it was set at the 18% minimum we have today. At the time the bank interest rate was 12%.
The system has been around for some time. So why has it become a source of political and social turmoil? The main reason is that the overall economic and social environment has changed dramatically. The 10% bank interest rate back then has become today's 1%. The government, i.e., the taxpayer, provides this interest to retired civil servants. This interest has surged from seven or eight percentage points, to sixteen or seventeen percentage points. Annual spending has grown from 10 or 20 billion NT to 70 or 80 billion NT. Next year it will grow to a high of 140 billion NT.
But what about the general public? DGBAS statistics tell us that millions of employees across the country earn less than 20,000 NT a month, and 360,000 earn less than 30,000 NT a month. These employees work hard all their lives. Labor pensions are annuitized. But their monthly retirement annuities will be a paltry 10,000 to 20,000 NT. Civil servants however, will receive an average monthly civil service pension of 40,000 to 50,000 NT. Blue collar workers will receive less than 30% of what civil servants receive. If we add additional benefits such as preferential deposit rates, the gap is even greater. This is the source of social discontent.
According to the Bank of Taiwan, over 400,000 depositors have preferential interest rate savings accounts. Twenty percent of them have a balance over 2,000,000 NT. Every month they receive 30,000 NT in preferential interest. Millions of employees earn less than 30,000 NT a month. They must pay taxes to support these pensioners. They must also subsidize them by providing them with interest rates 17 times the market rate. Such a system is naturally going to come under fire.
Consider also the fiscal burden of government. The 18% interest rate is increasingly unsustainable. Those who advocate maintaining the original system point out that workers who entered the civil service after 1996 did not qualify for such treatment. Therefore, the burden on the government will become lighter, and the problem will eventually disappear. But according to estimates if interest rates fail to rise, future 18% interest expenditures will increase. In four or five years it may reach 140 billion NT per year. By the time the system is sunsetted in Year 134 of the Republic of China, the government will have to pay out 2.5 trillion.
Second generation health care has been rammed through, in the hope that the national health insurance system will remain solvent for another five years. It receives little more than 20 billion NT in income. Leave aside middle and low income workers, lunches for impoverished students, and other social welfare spending for the disadvantaged, costing the public billions. When the government starts counting beans, every year taxpayers will have to pay out hundreds of billions in civil service pensions. They will also have to provide interest subsidies to the tune of 70 billion NT. The public will rebel, and the system will find it unsustainable monetarily.
So how should the system be reformed? President Ma has proposed excluding the wealthy, and signing a substitute rate into law, We agree. Moreover, we believe that reform should be based on the concept of an income replacement rate. In many countries the world over, retirees receive a reasonable pension, commensurate with the income they once earned, i.e., the income replacement rate. This rate ranges from 60 to 70%. It is based on the human life span. Peak spending is concentrated at one's prime of life. Work, child-rearing, home purchases, and other large expenditures all occur during this period. Expenses following retirement occur after the peak. An income replacement rate of 60 to 70% can maintain one's quality of life. Therefore, if one receives monthly retirement pensions that exceed a certain percentage, say, 50 to 70%, the preferential savings interest rates should not apply.
As for excluding the wealthy, this might be considered a codicile to the income replacement rate. For example, the statutory income replacement rate might be lower than 60 or 70%. But if one's income exceeds a certain amount, such as 80,000 or 100,000 NT, or a specified multiple of the minimum cost of living, one will no longer qualify for the preferential interest on bank deposits. In addition to the income replacement rate, and provisions to exclude the wealthy, there should be "provisions for the poor." The number of early retirees and low level civil servants on small pensions may be small. But they should not be neglected. They should be given special consideration.
The current system sets the minimum preferential interest rate at 18%. We believe this should be changed, and linked to the market interest rate. One way is to follow the original example, and set the prefeerential interest rate at 1.5 times the market interest rate. But the interest rate today is only 1%. Vested interests will inevitably precipitate a powerful backlash. Therefore a fixed percentage in subsidies will allow the government to control spending.
Reforming the 18% interest rate is bound to provoke a backlash, But the issue has already provoked widespread discontent. The government must proceed. It must get back to basics, rather than sit idly by while the issue is politicized.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.01.14
回歸制度面 談十八趴改革
本報訊
在社會各界對公務員公保養老退休給付的優惠存款利率提出抨擊後，馬總統也有所反應，並表示要通盤檢討與修正相關法令，以符合社會期望公平正義的要求。對馬總統的宣示，我們深表贊同與肯定，更期望看到一個符合社會公平正義要求的結果定案實施。
十八趴可以說是「源遠流長」，從民國四十九年就開始，當時利率約十％以上，給予公務員的優惠存款利率訂為銀行定存利率的一．五倍；到六十八年時，因利率降到八％，才訂出十四．二五的優惠存款利率下限。在經過幾次升降後，到七十二年訂十八％為下限，並沿用至今；當時的銀行利率是十二％。
既然實施已久，為何竟成政壇與社會的風暴所源？主因是整體經濟社會環境大變，當年十％的銀行利率，今日剩下一％，政府─其實就是納稅人要貼補給退休公務員的利息，由七、八個百分點驟增為十六、七個百分點；每年支出由一、二百億增為七、八百億元，未來仍將逐年增加到一千四百億元的高峰。
但一般民眾的情況又如何呢？行政院主計處的統計數字告訴我們，全國有上百萬的受雇員工月薪不到二萬，有三六○萬人月薪在三萬元以下。而這些受雇勞工辛苦一輩子，即使勞工退休金已年金化，但其未來平均每個月能領取的退休年金，只有區區的一．二萬元；但公務員退撫平均月退則達四．五萬元。勞工所領不到公務員的三成。如果加上額外附加的優惠存款利率，差距更大，社會不平之議油然而生。
根據台銀資料，目前開立優惠存款戶者超過四十萬戶，其中存款超過二百萬元以上者有二成，每個月領取優惠利息三萬元。試問，讓那些月薪不到三萬元的數百萬受雇員工，除了繳稅供養退休公務員領月退俸外，還額外再補貼供養其領取遠高於市場十七倍的利息，這個制度當然會受到非議。
此外，就政府財政負擔而言，十八趴也將日益成為不可承受之重。雖然主張維持原制者表示公務員八十五年後的資歷已取消十八趴了，所以政府負擔會日益減少，此問題終會消失。但根據推估，如利率不升，未來十八趴支出會逐年增加，四、五年後可能到每年一千四百億元；到民國一三四年十八趴「落日」時，政府要支出近二．五兆。
特別是，當社會拚死拚活把二代健保通過，以求健保能再撐五年時，也不過多二百多億元的收入；更別提為了中低收入、清寒學生營養午餐…等弱勢支出的幾十億社福支出，政府都要錙銖必較時；每年納稅人卻除了負擔數千億元公務員月退俸支出外，還要補貼七百多億優惠利息；不僅在社會上無法得到諒解支持，在財政上更難以為繼。
那要如何改革呢？對馬總統提出的排富條款、替代率等納入修法的構想，我們深表贊同，而且，我們認為應以所得替代率為改革主軸。以世界各國而言，退休者領取的合理月退金，相較工作期間的所得（即所得替代率），大概在六到七成間。主要是一個人生命周期中，支出的高峰幾乎都集中在工作時期的壯年期，養育兒女、購屋等大筆支出多在此時期發生。退休後則已過了支出高峰期，所得替代率有六到七成，即可維持原有的生活品質。因此，對領取月退俸已超過某一比例（如五到七成之間），優惠存款應全數取消。
至於排富條款，則可考慮作為所得替代率的輔佐條件。例如所得替代率雖然低於法定的六或七成，但領取的絕對金額高於某一數值（如八萬、或十萬，或最低生活費用的某一倍數），則取消優惠存款利息。除了所得替代率、排富條款外，我們也認為該有「濟貧條款」；如果有部分早期退休、領取的退休金低的基層公務員，雖然為數可能非常少，仍不應忽視，應另有考量。
此外，對現制把優惠利率下限訂在十八％的作法，我們也認為該修改，與市場利率作連動。一種方式是仿效最早給予市場利率一．五倍補貼，不過，在利率只有一％的今日，必然引起既得利益者強烈反彈。那麼，就給予固定百分點的補貼，如此才能讓政府支出有所控管。
可以理解，十八趴改革過程中勢必面臨的反彈與壓力，但這項議題確實已引起社會普遍的不平，政府該做的，就是趕緊回到問題基本面去解決，而不是坐視這個議題被政治化。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 14, 2011
Civil service health and retirement benefits include preferential interest rates on bank deposits. Following attacks on the system from various segments of the public, President Ma responded. He said he would conduct an overall review and urge amending the relevant laws. This would ensure fairness, justice, and meet public expectations. We agree with President Ma. We too look forward to a final outcome consistent with the requirements of social justice.
The 18% interest issue has a long history. In 1960, the prevailing interest rate was over 10%. The preferential interest rate on bank deposits for civil servants was set at 1.5 times the standard bank deposit interest rate. In 1979, interest rates fell to 8%. Therefore the preferential interest rate was set at 14.25%. In 1983, after several revisions, both up and down, it was set at the 18% minimum we have today. At the time the bank interest rate was 12%.
The system has been around for some time. So why has it become a source of political and social turmoil? The main reason is that the overall economic and social environment has changed dramatically. The 10% bank interest rate back then has become today's 1%. The government, i.e., the taxpayer, provides this interest to retired civil servants. This interest has surged from seven or eight percentage points, to sixteen or seventeen percentage points. Annual spending has grown from 10 or 20 billion NT to 70 or 80 billion NT. Next year it will grow to a high of 140 billion NT.
But what about the general public? DGBAS statistics tell us that millions of employees across the country earn less than 20,000 NT a month, and 360,000 earn less than 30,000 NT a month. These employees work hard all their lives. Labor pensions are annuitized. But their monthly retirement annuities will be a paltry 10,000 to 20,000 NT. Civil servants however, will receive an average monthly civil service pension of 40,000 to 50,000 NT. Blue collar workers will receive less than 30% of what civil servants receive. If we add additional benefits such as preferential deposit rates, the gap is even greater. This is the source of social discontent.
According to the Bank of Taiwan, over 400,000 depositors have preferential interest rate savings accounts. Twenty percent of them have a balance over 2,000,000 NT. Every month they receive 30,000 NT in preferential interest. Millions of employees earn less than 30,000 NT a month. They must pay taxes to support these pensioners. They must also subsidize them by providing them with interest rates 17 times the market rate. Such a system is naturally going to come under fire.
Consider also the fiscal burden of government. The 18% interest rate is increasingly unsustainable. Those who advocate maintaining the original system point out that workers who entered the civil service after 1996 did not qualify for such treatment. Therefore, the burden on the government will become lighter, and the problem will eventually disappear. But according to estimates if interest rates fail to rise, future 18% interest expenditures will increase. In four or five years it may reach 140 billion NT per year. By the time the system is sunsetted in Year 134 of the Republic of China, the government will have to pay out 2.5 trillion.
Second generation health care has been rammed through, in the hope that the national health insurance system will remain solvent for another five years. It receives little more than 20 billion NT in income. Leave aside middle and low income workers, lunches for impoverished students, and other social welfare spending for the disadvantaged, costing the public billions. When the government starts counting beans, every year taxpayers will have to pay out hundreds of billions in civil service pensions. They will also have to provide interest subsidies to the tune of 70 billion NT. The public will rebel, and the system will find it unsustainable monetarily.
So how should the system be reformed? President Ma has proposed excluding the wealthy, and signing a substitute rate into law, We agree. Moreover, we believe that reform should be based on the concept of an income replacement rate. In many countries the world over, retirees receive a reasonable pension, commensurate with the income they once earned, i.e., the income replacement rate. This rate ranges from 60 to 70%. It is based on the human life span. Peak spending is concentrated at one's prime of life. Work, child-rearing, home purchases, and other large expenditures all occur during this period. Expenses following retirement occur after the peak. An income replacement rate of 60 to 70% can maintain one's quality of life. Therefore, if one receives monthly retirement pensions that exceed a certain percentage, say, 50 to 70%, the preferential savings interest rates should not apply.
As for excluding the wealthy, this might be considered a codicile to the income replacement rate. For example, the statutory income replacement rate might be lower than 60 or 70%. But if one's income exceeds a certain amount, such as 80,000 or 100,000 NT, or a specified multiple of the minimum cost of living, one will no longer qualify for the preferential interest on bank deposits. In addition to the income replacement rate, and provisions to exclude the wealthy, there should be "provisions for the poor." The number of early retirees and low level civil servants on small pensions may be small. But they should not be neglected. They should be given special consideration.
The current system sets the minimum preferential interest rate at 18%. We believe this should be changed, and linked to the market interest rate. One way is to follow the original example, and set the prefeerential interest rate at 1.5 times the market interest rate. But the interest rate today is only 1%. Vested interests will inevitably precipitate a powerful backlash. Therefore a fixed percentage in subsidies will allow the government to control spending.
Reforming the 18% interest rate is bound to provoke a backlash, But the issue has already provoked widespread discontent. The government must proceed. It must get back to basics, rather than sit idly by while the issue is politicized.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.01.14
回歸制度面 談十八趴改革
本報訊
在社會各界對公務員公保養老退休給付的優惠存款利率提出抨擊後，馬總統也有所反應，並表示要通盤檢討與修正相關法令，以符合社會期望公平正義的要求。對馬總統的宣示，我們深表贊同與肯定，更期望看到一個符合社會公平正義要求的結果定案實施。
十八趴可以說是「源遠流長」，從民國四十九年就開始，當時利率約十％以上，給予公務員的優惠存款利率訂為銀行定存利率的一．五倍；到六十八年時，因利率降到八％，才訂出十四．二五的優惠存款利率下限。在經過幾次升降後，到七十二年訂十八％為下限，並沿用至今；當時的銀行利率是十二％。
既然實施已久，為何竟成政壇與社會的風暴所源？主因是整體經濟社會環境大變，當年十％的銀行利率，今日剩下一％，政府─其實就是納稅人要貼補給退休公務員的利息，由七、八個百分點驟增為十六、七個百分點；每年支出由一、二百億增為七、八百億元，未來仍將逐年增加到一千四百億元的高峰。
但一般民眾的情況又如何呢？行政院主計處的統計數字告訴我們，全國有上百萬的受雇員工月薪不到二萬，有三六○萬人月薪在三萬元以下。而這些受雇勞工辛苦一輩子，即使勞工退休金已年金化，但其未來平均每個月能領取的退休年金，只有區區的一．二萬元；但公務員退撫平均月退則達四．五萬元。勞工所領不到公務員的三成。如果加上額外附加的優惠存款利率，差距更大，社會不平之議油然而生。
根據台銀資料，目前開立優惠存款戶者超過四十萬戶，其中存款超過二百萬元以上者有二成，每個月領取優惠利息三萬元。試問，讓那些月薪不到三萬元的數百萬受雇員工，除了繳稅供養退休公務員領月退俸外，還額外再補貼供養其領取遠高於市場十七倍的利息，這個制度當然會受到非議。
此外，就政府財政負擔而言，十八趴也將日益成為不可承受之重。雖然主張維持原制者表示公務員八十五年後的資歷已取消十八趴了，所以政府負擔會日益減少，此問題終會消失。但根據推估，如利率不升，未來十八趴支出會逐年增加，四、五年後可能到每年一千四百億元；到民國一三四年十八趴「落日」時，政府要支出近二．五兆。
特別是，當社會拚死拚活把二代健保通過，以求健保能再撐五年時，也不過多二百多億元的收入；更別提為了中低收入、清寒學生營養午餐…等弱勢支出的幾十億社福支出，政府都要錙銖必較時；每年納稅人卻除了負擔數千億元公務員月退俸支出外，還要補貼七百多億優惠利息；不僅在社會上無法得到諒解支持，在財政上更難以為繼。
那要如何改革呢？對馬總統提出的排富條款、替代率等納入修法的構想，我們深表贊同，而且，我們認為應以所得替代率為改革主軸。以世界各國而言，退休者領取的合理月退金，相較工作期間的所得（即所得替代率），大概在六到七成間。主要是一個人生命周期中，支出的高峰幾乎都集中在工作時期的壯年期，養育兒女、購屋等大筆支出多在此時期發生。退休後則已過了支出高峰期，所得替代率有六到七成，即可維持原有的生活品質。因此，對領取月退俸已超過某一比例（如五到七成之間），優惠存款應全數取消。
至於排富條款，則可考慮作為所得替代率的輔佐條件。例如所得替代率雖然低於法定的六或七成，但領取的絕對金額高於某一數值（如八萬、或十萬，或最低生活費用的某一倍數），則取消優惠存款利息。除了所得替代率、排富條款外，我們也認為該有「濟貧條款」；如果有部分早期退休、領取的退休金低的基層公務員，雖然為數可能非常少，仍不應忽視，應另有考量。
此外，對現制把優惠利率下限訂在十八％的作法，我們也認為該修改，與市場利率作連動。一種方式是仿效最早給予市場利率一．五倍補貼，不過，在利率只有一％的今日，必然引起既得利益者強烈反彈。那麼，就給予固定百分點的補貼，如此才能讓政府支出有所控管。
可以理解，十八趴改革過程中勢必面臨的反彈與壓力，但這項議題確實已引起社會普遍的不平，政府該做的，就是趕緊回到問題基本面去解決，而不是坐視這個議題被政治化。
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen's Ordeal Has Just Begun
Tsai Ing-wen's Ordeal Has Just Begun
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 12, 2011
A dispute has arisen within the DPP presidential primary, between the "all peoples faction" and the "party members faction." On the surface, this represents a surprise attack by "Old Fogie fundamentalists" against the party leadership, which is consolidating its hold on the party. The power struggle has impacted the DPP's policy toward Mainland China. Yesterday the "all peoples faction" enjoyed a breakthrough in the Central Executive Committee. But Deep Green elements have also made their move. They have clearly indicated they will not allow Tsai Ing-wen to adopt a more centrist cross-Strait policy.
The DPP is unlike the KMT. The DPP rose through hard struggle. Every DPP elected official is adept with both the pen and the sword. Annette Lu is highly eloquent. But even the office manager for Taiwan independence elder Koo Kuan-min, blasted Tsai Ing-wen as "very un-DPP like," "elitist," and "dictatorial." This is the way it has been ever since the Democratic Progressive Party was founded. But Tsai Ing-wen, who has been praised both inside and outside the DPP, may not be accustomed to such merciless public attacks. .
Two years ago, during the party chairman election, Koo Kuan-min and Tsai Ing-wen fought each other tooth and nail. This was followed by rule changes within the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen had never encountered so much resistance. Last year, by adopting Tsai Ing-wen's campaign strategy during the five cities elections, the DPP scored victories in Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Taichung City. Winning was everything. Theoretically the party leadership would hold small group discussions, nominate candidates, and begin recruitment.
Following the five cities elections, Tsai Ing-wen found herself riding high. Now however she faces an uphill battle for the presidential nomination. The media has mocked Annette Lu and Trong Chai as "Old Fogey fundamentalists." Neither compares with Tsai Ing-wen in intraparty authority or support. Next to Tsai Ing-wen, they lag far behind. Therefore, regardless of whether party members vote in the party primaries, Tsai Ing-wen is likely to lead by a wide margin. Nevertheless the "Old Fogey fundamentalists" have made their move. This means infighting will soon begin.
Annette Lu's call for party members to vote in the party primaries was defeated in the Central Executive Committee. But she is certain to shift the battleground to the January 22 meeting of the National Party Congress. By then, public polls will be conducted. Twenty-one sessions will be held, during which policy positions will be set forth. They will include proposals to postpone the presidential primaries until July. All these matters will be debated. The current party leadership wants to confirm the party's nominee by March. But the DPP includes presidential hopefuls such as Su Tseng-chang, Annette Lu, Trong Chai, and Koo Kwan-min, all of whom hope to postpone the presidential primaries until July. They want to drag the process out, in the hope that Tsai Ing-wen's lead can be diminished. If the DPP leadership digs in its heels, the party may find itself divided even before the election.
Suppose the nomination process is postponed, from March to July. Can the DPP trade time for space? Can the DPP reach an accord? Or will it merely prolong the struggle within the party? The presidential election may involve problems other than election procedure. The DPP has been in the opposition for four years, It must offer a new cross-Strait policy platform. But the "Old Fogey fundamentalists" have joined forces with Taiwan independence hardliners. The power struggle over the DPP primary process, may turn into a fierce battle over ideology.
If Tsai Ing-wen is determined to run, her every word and deed will be subject to Deep Green scrutiny. The "very un-DPP like" charge leveled against her suggests that the Deep Greens have already begun to question Tsai Ing-wen's "background." Given this atmosphere, will Tsai Ing-wen be able to set forth a pragmatic cross-Strait policy? She certainly will be put to the test.
In fact, the atmosphere of moderation the DPP generated during the five cities elections has already evaporated. Frank Hsieh has proposed "One Constitution, Different Interpretations." He wants specifically to eliminate the "One China Constitution" he once advocated. Taiwan independence elements and the party elite are joining forces. They are reluctant even to recognize the ROC Constitution. Under the circumstances, how can the DPP possibly offer a workable framework for cross-Strait exchanges during the presidential election?
This reminds one of the U.S. presidential elections. During the primaries, the DPP must appease Deep Green elements. But during the presidential election, it must move toward the center. The DPP leadership is consulting opinion polls, in the hope of avoiding this dilemma. Tsai Ing-wen faces a dilemma. Taiwan independence elements are menacing her. Polls may serve as a shield. But every DPP candidate must be approved by the Deep Greens, or solemnly affirm his or her commitment to Taiwan independence. After imposing such political purity tests, how much latitude does the DPP have to move toward the center? But if it fails to move toward the center, how can the DPP possibly return to power in 2012?
How will the DPP reach an accord on the party's nomination process? How will it arrive at a viable cross-Strait policy in the face of such a dilemma? Can Tsai Ing-wen reassure the public? These questions have no easy answers, One might say that Chairman Tsai's ordeal has just begun!
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.01.13
蔡英文的嚴酷挑戰 才剛要開始
本報訊
民進黨總統初選的「全民調」與「黨員派」之爭，表面上這是由已經式微的公媽派，向鞏固領導核心的掌權派發動突襲，但是這場權力鬥爭卻牽動了民進黨內的中國政策路線走向，即使全民調昨日順利在中執會闖關，但是深綠陣營已經出手，擺明不可能讓蔡英文主導調整民進黨兩岸政策、朝中間路線邁進。
不同於國民黨，打天下起家的民進黨，個個都具文攻武略之才，不要說口才一流的呂秀蓮，即使是獨派大老辜寬敏辦公室執行長，都可以隨口批評蔡英文「很不民進黨」，玩「菁英獨裁」，這是自民進黨創黨以來司空見慣的場景，但是這一年來備受民進黨內外肯定的蔡英文，面對這些毫不留情的公開叫陣，可能還不見得很習慣。
畢竟，除了兩年前黨主席選舉，辜寬敏和蔡英文戰到最後一刻外，接下來的民進黨內規調整，蔡英文並未遇到太大的阻力，甚至去年的五都選舉，台北市、新北市、台中市三都，都依據蔡英文的原則，以勝選為最高目標，原則上由中央提名小組討論後，就逕行徵召。
五都選後，蔡英文聲勢高漲，但立即上場的卻是總統提名方式之爭。表面上，被媒體譏為公媽派的呂秀蓮、蔡同榮，無論是黨內實力、或受支持程度，和蔡英文比起來，絕對是瞠乎其後；因此，不論初選是否納入黨員投票，蔡英文都可能遙遙領先，但是，公媽派的出手，仍然預告著民進黨將進入內鬥階段。
呂秀蓮的黨員投票提案雖然在中執會敗下陣來，但她勢必轉移陣地到一月二十二日舉行的全國黨員代表大會提案。屆時除了全民調外，其他包括二十一場巡迴政見發表會、延後到七月再決定總統提名人等主張，也都要經過黨代表的討論，目前黨中央的掌權派傾向三月提名確定，但是民進黨內有意角逐總統大位的蘇貞昌、呂秀蓮、蔡同榮、辜寬敏等人，都傾向將時程挪後到七月再決定人選，藉著時間的拉長，看看如此能否暫挫蔡英文領先的聲勢。因而黨中央若是在這些議程上堅持己見，民進黨可能未選就先鬧分裂。
只是，時程從三月延後到七月，能否以時間換取空間，讓民進黨順利協調整合，還是民進黨黨內鬥爭的延長賽？尤其是，總統大選牽涉的可不只選舉辦法這些程序問題，已經在野四年的民進黨，必然要重新提出一套兩岸論述；但是，當公媽派與民進黨內的極獨勢力已經合流之際，民進黨初選過程中的權力之爭，卻有可能轉化成激烈的立場之爭。
蔡英文如果確定參選，她的一言一行都將受到深綠檢驗，從「很不民進黨」這樣的批評看來，深綠陣營已經發動開始檢討蔡英文的「血統」，這樣的氣氛中，蔡英文能不能提出一套務實的兩岸政策，看來是一場極大的考驗。
事實上，民進黨在五都選舉時擺出來的中間氣氛，近來已消失殆盡，謝長廷提出的「憲法各表」，即使刻意去掉過去主張的「憲法一中」，但獨派及黨內菁英群起攻之，如果連承認中華民國憲法都如此困難，民進黨有可能在總統大選時，提出未來兩岸交流的可行架構嗎？
和美國總統選舉一樣，民進黨即使初選時要討好深綠，但大選時必然要往中間走；民進黨中央會採取全民調，應該就是不想面臨這樣的矛盾處境。蔡英文的兩難是，獨派來勢洶洶，即使有全民調護身，民進黨候選人仍都要經過深綠驗明正身，或者對台獨立場做出承諾，歷經這樣的路線檢驗，民進黨還有多大的餘力往中間走？但不往中間走，民進黨二○一二有可能重返執政嗎？
如何協調黨內提名的遊戲規則，如何在兩難之局找出可行的兩岸政策，蔡英文的協調能力能否服眾，這些問題都沒有簡單的答案，可以說，蔡主席的考驗才剛要開始！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 12, 2011
A dispute has arisen within the DPP presidential primary, between the "all peoples faction" and the "party members faction." On the surface, this represents a surprise attack by "Old Fogie fundamentalists" against the party leadership, which is consolidating its hold on the party. The power struggle has impacted the DPP's policy toward Mainland China. Yesterday the "all peoples faction" enjoyed a breakthrough in the Central Executive Committee. But Deep Green elements have also made their move. They have clearly indicated they will not allow Tsai Ing-wen to adopt a more centrist cross-Strait policy.
The DPP is unlike the KMT. The DPP rose through hard struggle. Every DPP elected official is adept with both the pen and the sword. Annette Lu is highly eloquent. But even the office manager for Taiwan independence elder Koo Kuan-min, blasted Tsai Ing-wen as "very un-DPP like," "elitist," and "dictatorial." This is the way it has been ever since the Democratic Progressive Party was founded. But Tsai Ing-wen, who has been praised both inside and outside the DPP, may not be accustomed to such merciless public attacks. .
Two years ago, during the party chairman election, Koo Kuan-min and Tsai Ing-wen fought each other tooth and nail. This was followed by rule changes within the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen had never encountered so much resistance. Last year, by adopting Tsai Ing-wen's campaign strategy during the five cities elections, the DPP scored victories in Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Taichung City. Winning was everything. Theoretically the party leadership would hold small group discussions, nominate candidates, and begin recruitment.
Following the five cities elections, Tsai Ing-wen found herself riding high. Now however she faces an uphill battle for the presidential nomination. The media has mocked Annette Lu and Trong Chai as "Old Fogey fundamentalists." Neither compares with Tsai Ing-wen in intraparty authority or support. Next to Tsai Ing-wen, they lag far behind. Therefore, regardless of whether party members vote in the party primaries, Tsai Ing-wen is likely to lead by a wide margin. Nevertheless the "Old Fogey fundamentalists" have made their move. This means infighting will soon begin.
Annette Lu's call for party members to vote in the party primaries was defeated in the Central Executive Committee. But she is certain to shift the battleground to the January 22 meeting of the National Party Congress. By then, public polls will be conducted. Twenty-one sessions will be held, during which policy positions will be set forth. They will include proposals to postpone the presidential primaries until July. All these matters will be debated. The current party leadership wants to confirm the party's nominee by March. But the DPP includes presidential hopefuls such as Su Tseng-chang, Annette Lu, Trong Chai, and Koo Kwan-min, all of whom hope to postpone the presidential primaries until July. They want to drag the process out, in the hope that Tsai Ing-wen's lead can be diminished. If the DPP leadership digs in its heels, the party may find itself divided even before the election.
Suppose the nomination process is postponed, from March to July. Can the DPP trade time for space? Can the DPP reach an accord? Or will it merely prolong the struggle within the party? The presidential election may involve problems other than election procedure. The DPP has been in the opposition for four years, It must offer a new cross-Strait policy platform. But the "Old Fogey fundamentalists" have joined forces with Taiwan independence hardliners. The power struggle over the DPP primary process, may turn into a fierce battle over ideology.
If Tsai Ing-wen is determined to run, her every word and deed will be subject to Deep Green scrutiny. The "very un-DPP like" charge leveled against her suggests that the Deep Greens have already begun to question Tsai Ing-wen's "background." Given this atmosphere, will Tsai Ing-wen be able to set forth a pragmatic cross-Strait policy? She certainly will be put to the test.
In fact, the atmosphere of moderation the DPP generated during the five cities elections has already evaporated. Frank Hsieh has proposed "One Constitution, Different Interpretations." He wants specifically to eliminate the "One China Constitution" he once advocated. Taiwan independence elements and the party elite are joining forces. They are reluctant even to recognize the ROC Constitution. Under the circumstances, how can the DPP possibly offer a workable framework for cross-Strait exchanges during the presidential election?
This reminds one of the U.S. presidential elections. During the primaries, the DPP must appease Deep Green elements. But during the presidential election, it must move toward the center. The DPP leadership is consulting opinion polls, in the hope of avoiding this dilemma. Tsai Ing-wen faces a dilemma. Taiwan independence elements are menacing her. Polls may serve as a shield. But every DPP candidate must be approved by the Deep Greens, or solemnly affirm his or her commitment to Taiwan independence. After imposing such political purity tests, how much latitude does the DPP have to move toward the center? But if it fails to move toward the center, how can the DPP possibly return to power in 2012?
How will the DPP reach an accord on the party's nomination process? How will it arrive at a viable cross-Strait policy in the face of such a dilemma? Can Tsai Ing-wen reassure the public? These questions have no easy answers, One might say that Chairman Tsai's ordeal has just begun!
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.01.13
蔡英文的嚴酷挑戰 才剛要開始
本報訊
民進黨總統初選的「全民調」與「黨員派」之爭，表面上這是由已經式微的公媽派，向鞏固領導核心的掌權派發動突襲，但是這場權力鬥爭卻牽動了民進黨內的中國政策路線走向，即使全民調昨日順利在中執會闖關，但是深綠陣營已經出手，擺明不可能讓蔡英文主導調整民進黨兩岸政策、朝中間路線邁進。
不同於國民黨，打天下起家的民進黨，個個都具文攻武略之才，不要說口才一流的呂秀蓮，即使是獨派大老辜寬敏辦公室執行長，都可以隨口批評蔡英文「很不民進黨」，玩「菁英獨裁」，這是自民進黨創黨以來司空見慣的場景，但是這一年來備受民進黨內外肯定的蔡英文，面對這些毫不留情的公開叫陣，可能還不見得很習慣。
畢竟，除了兩年前黨主席選舉，辜寬敏和蔡英文戰到最後一刻外，接下來的民進黨內規調整，蔡英文並未遇到太大的阻力，甚至去年的五都選舉，台北市、新北市、台中市三都，都依據蔡英文的原則，以勝選為最高目標，原則上由中央提名小組討論後，就逕行徵召。
五都選後，蔡英文聲勢高漲，但立即上場的卻是總統提名方式之爭。表面上，被媒體譏為公媽派的呂秀蓮、蔡同榮，無論是黨內實力、或受支持程度，和蔡英文比起來，絕對是瞠乎其後；因此，不論初選是否納入黨員投票，蔡英文都可能遙遙領先，但是，公媽派的出手，仍然預告著民進黨將進入內鬥階段。
呂秀蓮的黨員投票提案雖然在中執會敗下陣來，但她勢必轉移陣地到一月二十二日舉行的全國黨員代表大會提案。屆時除了全民調外，其他包括二十一場巡迴政見發表會、延後到七月再決定總統提名人等主張，也都要經過黨代表的討論，目前黨中央的掌權派傾向三月提名確定，但是民進黨內有意角逐總統大位的蘇貞昌、呂秀蓮、蔡同榮、辜寬敏等人，都傾向將時程挪後到七月再決定人選，藉著時間的拉長，看看如此能否暫挫蔡英文領先的聲勢。因而黨中央若是在這些議程上堅持己見，民進黨可能未選就先鬧分裂。
只是，時程從三月延後到七月，能否以時間換取空間，讓民進黨順利協調整合，還是民進黨黨內鬥爭的延長賽？尤其是，總統大選牽涉的可不只選舉辦法這些程序問題，已經在野四年的民進黨，必然要重新提出一套兩岸論述；但是，當公媽派與民進黨內的極獨勢力已經合流之際，民進黨初選過程中的權力之爭，卻有可能轉化成激烈的立場之爭。
蔡英文如果確定參選，她的一言一行都將受到深綠檢驗，從「很不民進黨」這樣的批評看來，深綠陣營已經發動開始檢討蔡英文的「血統」，這樣的氣氛中，蔡英文能不能提出一套務實的兩岸政策，看來是一場極大的考驗。
事實上，民進黨在五都選舉時擺出來的中間氣氛，近來已消失殆盡，謝長廷提出的「憲法各表」，即使刻意去掉過去主張的「憲法一中」，但獨派及黨內菁英群起攻之，如果連承認中華民國憲法都如此困難，民進黨有可能在總統大選時，提出未來兩岸交流的可行架構嗎？
和美國總統選舉一樣，民進黨即使初選時要討好深綠，但大選時必然要往中間走；民進黨中央會採取全民調，應該就是不想面臨這樣的矛盾處境。蔡英文的兩難是，獨派來勢洶洶，即使有全民調護身，民進黨候選人仍都要經過深綠驗明正身，或者對台獨立場做出承諾，歷經這樣的路線檢驗，民進黨還有多大的餘力往中間走？但不往中間走，民進黨二○一二有可能重返執政嗎？
如何協調黨內提名的遊戲規則，如何在兩難之局找出可行的兩岸政策，蔡英文的協調能力能否服眾，這些問題都沒有簡單的答案，可以說，蔡主席的考驗才剛要開始！
Cross-Strait Policy Must Comply with the ROC Constitution
Cross-Strait Policy Must Comply with the ROC Constitution
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 12, 2011
When the Ma administration enunciated its cross-Strait policy, it stressed that "Taiwan's future must be determined by 23 million people." This sounds eerily reminiscent of the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It could be considered plagiarism, and may well be unconstitutional.
Green Camp rhetoric has undergone a four stage evolution. Stage One. During the 1950s, it championed "democratic self-determination," demanded a "public referendum," and proclaimed that "Taiwan's future should be decided collectively by the Taiwanese people." Stage Two. The 1991 "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" demanded "an independent nation and the authoring of a new constitution." Stage Three. The 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" argued that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. According to the current constitution, it is referred to as the Republic of China." It argued that "any changes to the status quo regarding independence, must be determined by the Taiwanese people via referendum." Stage Four. In 2007, it trotted out its "Resolution for a Normal Nation" and called for the "swift rectification of names."
Amidst these four stages, "democratic self-determination" has remained a consistent theme. The "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" called for the founding of a "Republic of Taiwan." The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" adopted a "backdoor listing" strategy. It called for a "unified referendum." The Resolution on Taiwan's Future stipulated that any declaration of "independent status" would require a referendum. The "Resolution for a Normal Nation" again called for the "rectification of names." These four different stages of Green Camp rhetoric have been merged into DPP policy positions. This has resulted in a strange phenomenon, namely "four simultaneous stages, with chickens and rabbits in the same cage." What's more, a Fifth Stage will be soon be added -- the "Platform for the Coming Decade." But "democratic determinism" has remained its consistent theme, namely, "Taiwan's future must be determined collectively by the Taiwanese people."
The Ma administration appears to be copying the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." But if we look closely. we realize the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" is moving closer to "Republic of China" reasoning. In 1999, for the sake of Chen Shui-bian's presidential campaign, the DPP is began promoting its "New Centrist Path." Hence the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." In 1998 this newspaper proposed a "referendum on unification." We departed from the notion that only a declaration of independence required a referendum. The DPP meanwhile, is still calling for "four simultaneous stages, with chickens and rabbits in the same cage." Therefore, its main thrust remains "Taiwan independence" and "backdoor listing."
When the Ma administration and the DPP simultaneously proclaim that "Taiwan's future must be decided by 23 million people," people will naturally demand that certain distinctions be made. For the Democratic Progressive Party, 23 million people is all it takes to overthrow the Republic of China and found a separate "Nation of Taiwan." But for the KMT and the Ma administration, this is not the case. Freedom of expression is protected by the constitution. Therefore private individuals may advocate independence. But the Ma administration clearly does not consider Taiwan independence an option. If it did, the KMT and the Ma administration would be no different from the DPP on such issues as "Taiwan independence," an "independent Taiwan," the "two-states theory," "one country on each side," and "backdoor listing." The negative press the KMT received recently was clearly self-generated.
When the Ma administration addresses cross-Strait policy, it often proclaims its allegiance to the "framework of the ROC Constitution." But can one proclaim that "Taiwan's future must be determined collectively by 23 million people," while simultaneously proclaiming that "cross-Strait policy must comply with the ROC Constitution?" The KMT and the Ma administration must reaffirm their allegiance to the "Republic of China." They must also uphold the spirit of "democratic self-determination." They must distinguish themselves from the DPP. They must go beyond the DPP. Only then can they avoid charges that they are "violatiing the constitution."
As mentioned earlier, Green Camp assertions that "Taiwan's future must be determined by 23 million people" has its origins in the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," in Taiwan independence ideology, and "backdoor listing." By contrast, "the future of cross-Strait relations must comply with the ROC Constitution," is predicated upon the Republic of China and "One China, Different Interpretations." The emphasis is on "future cross-Strait relations," complying with "the Republic of China Constitution, democratic processes, and the rule of law."
The term "complying with the Republic of China Constitution" has two meanings. One. The cross-Strait status quo. All processes must of course comply with the ROC Constitution. Whoever is in office must rise to office in accordance with constitutional processes. Opposition parties must provide checks and balances, in accordance with constitutional processes. In other words, cross-Strait policy is the result of constitutional processes, including elections, majority rule, ruling party changes, democracy, and the rule of law. In 2000, the DPP won the right to rule by just such means. So did the KMT In 2008. Two. Amendments in the preamble of the Constitution stipulate that "in order to meet the needs of the nation prior to reunification," the constitution will allows for "one China, different interpretations" and "divided rule." If one day this "prior to reunification" constitution is amended, it must of course be amended in accordance with constitutional processes.
The argument that "cross-Strait policy must comply with ROC constitutional processes," is more compelling than the argument that "Taiwan's future must be determined collectively by 23 million people." The "One China Constitution," the "1992 Consensus," "One China, Different Interpretations," "No [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force," "Putting Taiwan first, and benefitting the people," are all mutually reinforcing policies. These are the basis for Taipei's cross-Strait policy. They are guidelines for cross-Strait relations that Beijing should accept and cannot refuse to accept.
The direction and content of existing cross-Strait policy for the 23 million people on Taiwan, was formulated in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, democracy, and the rule of law. The same rules must of course apply to future cross-Strait policy.
兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法程序決定
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.01.12 02:49 am
馬政府在宣示兩岸政策時，屢屢表達「台灣的前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」之類的論述；此說被認為是抄襲民進黨的《台灣前途決議文》，且有違憲之虞。
綠營相關論述的演化，略可分作四個階段。一、五○年代起即倡議「民主自決論」及「公民投票論」，主張「台灣的前途應由台灣全體住民共同決定」。二、一九九一年的《台獨黨綱》，主張「獨立建國，制定新憲」。三、至一九九九年《台灣前途決議文》則主張「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家……依目前憲法稱為中華民國」，「任何有關獨立現狀的更動，必須經由台灣全體住民以公民投票方式決定」。四、二○○七年《正常國家決議文》，又回頭主張「及早正名制憲」。
在這四階段中，「民主自決論」是始終一貫的理論主軸。《台獨黨綱》主張另建台灣共和國；至《台灣前途決議文》，則見「借殼上市」的策略，甚至透露出「統一公投」的思維（決議文稱，若改變「獨立現狀」，必須公投）；到了《正常國家決議文》，又回到「正名制憲」。這雖是綠營四階段的不同論述，如今卻同時存在於民進黨的政策論述中，形成「四個階段／雞兔共籠」的奇異現象（不久後更將加入《十年政綱》的第五階段）；然而，「民主決定論」則是貫通其間的主軸訴求，亦即：「台灣的前途應由台灣全體住民共同決定。」
由前述析論可知，如今似乎是馬政府抄襲了《台灣前途決議文》，但究其根源，則是民進黨的《台灣前途決議文》先向「中華民國論述」靠攏。一九九九年，民進黨為推倡「新中間路線」的陳水扁參選總統進行部署，遂有《台灣前途決議文》的宣示；在其中略可見到本報在一九九八年所提「統一公投」的概念（改變「獨立現狀」才要公投）。不過，由於民進黨的相關論述迄今仍是「四個階段／雞兔共籠」，所以整個論述的主軸仍是「台獨取向」、「借殼上市」。
因而，當馬政府與民進黨皆宣示「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」之類的論述時，自然有人認為應當有所區隔。因為，民進黨持此說法時，是指只要兩千三百萬人決定，便可推翻中華民國，也可另建台灣國；但就國民黨與馬政府的立場言，基於憲法所保障的言論自由，雖不可禁止民間存有台獨論述，但馬政府顯然不能以「台獨選項」作為中華民國的國家政策。否則，國民黨及馬政府如何與台獨、獨台、兩國論、一邊一國或借殼上市有所區隔？有了這一層的思考，即可知最近引發的相關爭議可謂其來有自，不無道理。
其實，馬政府在宣示兩岸政策時，經常標舉「在中華民國憲法架構下」這個前提；若能將「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人共同決定」，置於此一前提之下，而稱「兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法的程序決定」，即可一方面鞏固了「中華民國」的立場，兼也維持了「民主自決」的精神。可與民進黨區隔，並超越民進黨，也不會再有「違憲」的爭議。
如前所述，「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」，源自綠營對「台灣前途」的思維，係台獨取向，是借殼上市；但「兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法程序決定」，則是以中華民國及一中各表為前提，而強調將「兩岸關係的未來」置於「中華民國憲法民主法治程序」的節制之下。
所謂「中華民國憲法的程序」，有兩層意義。一、就兩岸現狀的運作言，當然應當遵照中華民國憲法的程序；執政者應經憲法程序取得執政地位，在野黨應依憲法程序進行監督制衡。亦即，兩岸政策是在憲法程序中，經選舉、多數決及政黨輪替的民主法治之憲法規制所產生並據以運作。民進黨在二○○○年如此取得執政權，二 ○○八年國民黨亦是如此。二、現行憲法增修條文的前言標示「為因應國家統一前的需要」，所以這部憲法可以稱作「一中各表」的「分治憲法」；若他日要改變「統一前」的憲法狀態時，自然也應經由憲法程序來處理。
「兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法程序決定」，可以成為大於並高於「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」的論述架構；而與「憲法一中」、「九二共識／一中各表」、「不統／不獨／不武」、「以台灣為主／對人民有利」等政策概念相輔相成。這應是台灣人民對兩岸政策的最大公約數，也是北京當局應當接納及不能不接納的兩岸互動準則。
因為，台灣兩千三百萬人對兩岸關係的方向及內容，過去及現在皆是通過中華民國憲法的民主法治之程序在加以節制，未來當然亦將如此。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 12, 2011
When the Ma administration enunciated its cross-Strait policy, it stressed that "Taiwan's future must be determined by 23 million people." This sounds eerily reminiscent of the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It could be considered plagiarism, and may well be unconstitutional.
Green Camp rhetoric has undergone a four stage evolution. Stage One. During the 1950s, it championed "democratic self-determination," demanded a "public referendum," and proclaimed that "Taiwan's future should be decided collectively by the Taiwanese people." Stage Two. The 1991 "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" demanded "an independent nation and the authoring of a new constitution." Stage Three. The 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" argued that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. According to the current constitution, it is referred to as the Republic of China." It argued that "any changes to the status quo regarding independence, must be determined by the Taiwanese people via referendum." Stage Four. In 2007, it trotted out its "Resolution for a Normal Nation" and called for the "swift rectification of names."
Amidst these four stages, "democratic self-determination" has remained a consistent theme. The "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" called for the founding of a "Republic of Taiwan." The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" adopted a "backdoor listing" strategy. It called for a "unified referendum." The Resolution on Taiwan's Future stipulated that any declaration of "independent status" would require a referendum. The "Resolution for a Normal Nation" again called for the "rectification of names." These four different stages of Green Camp rhetoric have been merged into DPP policy positions. This has resulted in a strange phenomenon, namely "four simultaneous stages, with chickens and rabbits in the same cage." What's more, a Fifth Stage will be soon be added -- the "Platform for the Coming Decade." But "democratic determinism" has remained its consistent theme, namely, "Taiwan's future must be determined collectively by the Taiwanese people."
The Ma administration appears to be copying the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." But if we look closely. we realize the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" is moving closer to "Republic of China" reasoning. In 1999, for the sake of Chen Shui-bian's presidential campaign, the DPP is began promoting its "New Centrist Path." Hence the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." In 1998 this newspaper proposed a "referendum on unification." We departed from the notion that only a declaration of independence required a referendum. The DPP meanwhile, is still calling for "four simultaneous stages, with chickens and rabbits in the same cage." Therefore, its main thrust remains "Taiwan independence" and "backdoor listing."
When the Ma administration and the DPP simultaneously proclaim that "Taiwan's future must be decided by 23 million people," people will naturally demand that certain distinctions be made. For the Democratic Progressive Party, 23 million people is all it takes to overthrow the Republic of China and found a separate "Nation of Taiwan." But for the KMT and the Ma administration, this is not the case. Freedom of expression is protected by the constitution. Therefore private individuals may advocate independence. But the Ma administration clearly does not consider Taiwan independence an option. If it did, the KMT and the Ma administration would be no different from the DPP on such issues as "Taiwan independence," an "independent Taiwan," the "two-states theory," "one country on each side," and "backdoor listing." The negative press the KMT received recently was clearly self-generated.
When the Ma administration addresses cross-Strait policy, it often proclaims its allegiance to the "framework of the ROC Constitution." But can one proclaim that "Taiwan's future must be determined collectively by 23 million people," while simultaneously proclaiming that "cross-Strait policy must comply with the ROC Constitution?" The KMT and the Ma administration must reaffirm their allegiance to the "Republic of China." They must also uphold the spirit of "democratic self-determination." They must distinguish themselves from the DPP. They must go beyond the DPP. Only then can they avoid charges that they are "violatiing the constitution."
As mentioned earlier, Green Camp assertions that "Taiwan's future must be determined by 23 million people" has its origins in the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," in Taiwan independence ideology, and "backdoor listing." By contrast, "the future of cross-Strait relations must comply with the ROC Constitution," is predicated upon the Republic of China and "One China, Different Interpretations." The emphasis is on "future cross-Strait relations," complying with "the Republic of China Constitution, democratic processes, and the rule of law."
The term "complying with the Republic of China Constitution" has two meanings. One. The cross-Strait status quo. All processes must of course comply with the ROC Constitution. Whoever is in office must rise to office in accordance with constitutional processes. Opposition parties must provide checks and balances, in accordance with constitutional processes. In other words, cross-Strait policy is the result of constitutional processes, including elections, majority rule, ruling party changes, democracy, and the rule of law. In 2000, the DPP won the right to rule by just such means. So did the KMT In 2008. Two. Amendments in the preamble of the Constitution stipulate that "in order to meet the needs of the nation prior to reunification," the constitution will allows for "one China, different interpretations" and "divided rule." If one day this "prior to reunification" constitution is amended, it must of course be amended in accordance with constitutional processes.
The argument that "cross-Strait policy must comply with ROC constitutional processes," is more compelling than the argument that "Taiwan's future must be determined collectively by 23 million people." The "One China Constitution," the "1992 Consensus," "One China, Different Interpretations," "No [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force," "Putting Taiwan first, and benefitting the people," are all mutually reinforcing policies. These are the basis for Taipei's cross-Strait policy. They are guidelines for cross-Strait relations that Beijing should accept and cannot refuse to accept.
The direction and content of existing cross-Strait policy for the 23 million people on Taiwan, was formulated in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, democracy, and the rule of law. The same rules must of course apply to future cross-Strait policy.
兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法程序決定
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.01.12 02:49 am
馬政府在宣示兩岸政策時，屢屢表達「台灣的前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」之類的論述；此說被認為是抄襲民進黨的《台灣前途決議文》，且有違憲之虞。
綠營相關論述的演化，略可分作四個階段。一、五○年代起即倡議「民主自決論」及「公民投票論」，主張「台灣的前途應由台灣全體住民共同決定」。二、一九九一年的《台獨黨綱》，主張「獨立建國，制定新憲」。三、至一九九九年《台灣前途決議文》則主張「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家……依目前憲法稱為中華民國」，「任何有關獨立現狀的更動，必須經由台灣全體住民以公民投票方式決定」。四、二○○七年《正常國家決議文》，又回頭主張「及早正名制憲」。
在這四階段中，「民主自決論」是始終一貫的理論主軸。《台獨黨綱》主張另建台灣共和國；至《台灣前途決議文》，則見「借殼上市」的策略，甚至透露出「統一公投」的思維（決議文稱，若改變「獨立現狀」，必須公投）；到了《正常國家決議文》，又回到「正名制憲」。這雖是綠營四階段的不同論述，如今卻同時存在於民進黨的政策論述中，形成「四個階段／雞兔共籠」的奇異現象（不久後更將加入《十年政綱》的第五階段）；然而，「民主決定論」則是貫通其間的主軸訴求，亦即：「台灣的前途應由台灣全體住民共同決定。」
由前述析論可知，如今似乎是馬政府抄襲了《台灣前途決議文》，但究其根源，則是民進黨的《台灣前途決議文》先向「中華民國論述」靠攏。一九九九年，民進黨為推倡「新中間路線」的陳水扁參選總統進行部署，遂有《台灣前途決議文》的宣示；在其中略可見到本報在一九九八年所提「統一公投」的概念（改變「獨立現狀」才要公投）。不過，由於民進黨的相關論述迄今仍是「四個階段／雞兔共籠」，所以整個論述的主軸仍是「台獨取向」、「借殼上市」。
因而，當馬政府與民進黨皆宣示「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」之類的論述時，自然有人認為應當有所區隔。因為，民進黨持此說法時，是指只要兩千三百萬人決定，便可推翻中華民國，也可另建台灣國；但就國民黨與馬政府的立場言，基於憲法所保障的言論自由，雖不可禁止民間存有台獨論述，但馬政府顯然不能以「台獨選項」作為中華民國的國家政策。否則，國民黨及馬政府如何與台獨、獨台、兩國論、一邊一國或借殼上市有所區隔？有了這一層的思考，即可知最近引發的相關爭議可謂其來有自，不無道理。
其實，馬政府在宣示兩岸政策時，經常標舉「在中華民國憲法架構下」這個前提；若能將「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人共同決定」，置於此一前提之下，而稱「兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法的程序決定」，即可一方面鞏固了「中華民國」的立場，兼也維持了「民主自決」的精神。可與民進黨區隔，並超越民進黨，也不會再有「違憲」的爭議。
如前所述，「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」，源自綠營對「台灣前途」的思維，係台獨取向，是借殼上市；但「兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法程序決定」，則是以中華民國及一中各表為前提，而強調將「兩岸關係的未來」置於「中華民國憲法民主法治程序」的節制之下。
所謂「中華民國憲法的程序」，有兩層意義。一、就兩岸現狀的運作言，當然應當遵照中華民國憲法的程序；執政者應經憲法程序取得執政地位，在野黨應依憲法程序進行監督制衡。亦即，兩岸政策是在憲法程序中，經選舉、多數決及政黨輪替的民主法治之憲法規制所產生並據以運作。民進黨在二○○○年如此取得執政權，二 ○○八年國民黨亦是如此。二、現行憲法增修條文的前言標示「為因應國家統一前的需要」，所以這部憲法可以稱作「一中各表」的「分治憲法」；若他日要改變「統一前」的憲法狀態時，自然也應經由憲法程序來處理。
「兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法程序決定」，可以成為大於並高於「台灣前途應由兩千三百萬人決定」的論述架構；而與「憲法一中」、「九二共識／一中各表」、「不統／不獨／不武」、「以台灣為主／對人民有利」等政策概念相輔相成。這應是台灣人民對兩岸政策的最大公約數，也是北京當局應當接納及不能不接納的兩岸互動準則。
因為，台灣兩千三百萬人對兩岸關係的方向及內容，過去及現在皆是通過中華民國憲法的民主法治之程序在加以節制，未來當然亦將如此。
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