Solution to Mainland Dilemma is Political Reform
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 25, 2011
A butterfly fluttering its wings in Beijing, could touch off a storm in New York, This is the famous "Butterfly Effect" outlined in Chaos Theory. On the other hand, could a butterfly fluttering its wings from afar, touch off a storm on Mainland China?
Tunisia has undergone a "Jasmine Revolution." It has driven out Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the strongman who ruled the country for 23 years. This was followed by a similar revolution in Egypt. Hosni Mubarak, who ruled the country for 30 years, was forced to step down. The butcher who ruled Sudan for 30 years, has also announced that he will not seek another term. Muammar al-Gaddafi, who ruled Libya for 40 years, has imposed a bloody crackdown on democratic protesters. Sparks from these flames in North Africa and the Middle East are now drifting toward Mainland China.
A second wave of "Jasmine Revolution" protests may occur on Sunday. Pro government media outlets dismissed the previous wave of protests as a "walk in the park," as "nothing more than a few people engaged in performance art." But if this was "performance art," then the endless stream of petitioners in Beijing are also enaged in "performance art." Those protesting the illegal demolition of their homes, those who hanged themselves in the ruins of their homes, are also practioners of "performance art." Urban squatters who cannot afford even a tiny room, are also "ants" engaged in "performance art." Those who gather and block streets, creating "mass incidents" are also enaged in "performance art." These people may indeed be a "minority." But the Jasmin Revolution in Tunisia was touched off by an unemployed college graduate who immolated himself. Who could have predicted that collective anger suppressed for decades would find an outlet in his act of "performance art?"
In fact, the Beijing authorities are acutely aware of the people's dissatisfaction. Even the People's Daily has acknowledged that Mainland China "faces more and more painful problems." Jasmine blossoms have yet to appear in the streets. Nevertheless the CCP leadership gathered last week at the CCP Central Party School to discuss appropriate responses. Hu Jintao stressed the need for three "maximizations." Maximize those factors inspiring social vitality. Maximize those factors encouraging social harmony. Maximize those factors preventing social disharmony. Alas, these three "maximizations" contradict each other. If one wishes to "maximize those factors inspiring social vitality," how can one possibly "maximize those factors preventing social disharmony?" Hu Jintao's answer was, "Further strengthen and improve information network management. Improve the management of virtual society," In short, "under the unified leadership of party committees, the government will strictly regulate the Internet."
The word "Jasmine" has been blocked, Even the word "tomorrow" has been blocked. Beijing is keeping close tabs on the Internet. But its approach harks back to the thousand year old Great Wall. Back then the Great Wall created a closed regime. It closed off the people. It closed off the nation. In the end the enemy arrived wave upon wave from the sea. China, under attack from advanced warships and their powerful guns, was nearly partitioned and wiped out. Today, the Great Wall lies in ruins. Officials are doing everything possible to erect a Great Wall on the Internet. But their efforts will be futile. Instead, they will merely encourage the people to undermine the wall out of spite. If the government blocks the word "Jasmine," Internet users will simply use "Rose" or "Peony." Is the CCP really prepared to block the words for every flower known to man?
In fact, the Beijing authorities and the people sporting jasmine blossoms, are all thinking the same thing. They are all yearning for freedom and democracy. Beijing considers them a scourge. But evading problems instead of facing them merely intensifies one's fears. For example, the Tiananmen Indicent occurred 22 years ago. Yet the CCP is still unable to confront the pain.
The science of economics tells us that "whatever is unsustainable, will be sustained for long." Mainland China has long faced "growing pains." Even Premier Wen Jiabao has warned that without political reform, the fruits of economic reform cannot be sustained. Zhongnanhai is deeply anxious. It senses the urgency. It realizes the importance. Otherwise, why would Premier Wen Jiabao say such a thing?
The CCP authorities ought to have more confidence in themselves. The CCP's achievements in economic reform over the past 30 years are clear for the world to see. But now it must reform itself politically as well. Otherwise it will be building a tower on quicksand. Spontaneous change is called reform. Forced change is called revolution. Look at the fate of collapsed authoritarian regimes. Reform or revolution. The CCP must take the initiative. The reason why should be clear.
Mainland China is not the Middle East, The current wave of "pollen" may make the Beijing authorities cough and wheeze. A few anti-histamines and it will pass. But the CCP authorities will be the only ones experiencing hay fever. The public on the Mainland loves flowers. None of them are about to chop down trees to eliminate the cause of hay fever.
A turbulent Chinese Mainland will make world peace impossible. Taiwan will also remain vulnerable. The Chinese Mainland endured the bloody Cultural Revolution. Those in the know on Mainland China have issued a "farewell to revolution" declaration. They have done so out of bitter experience. But some social contradictions can only be alleviated by a democratic revolution. This is a classic dilemma. How can Mainland China implement democracy with "Chinese characteristics?" This is not merely a problem for the Chinese people. It is a problem for mankind as a whole.
中國大陸的難局須以政治改革紓解
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.02.25 03:29 am
北京一隻蝴蝶振翅，可能掀起紐約一場風暴，這是混沌理論知名的「蝴蝶效應」；現在，遠方的蝴蝶振翅，會不會在中國掀起風暴？
突尼西亞的「茉莉花革命」，逼走執政二十三年的強人阿里，埃及緊接著轟下在位三十年的總統穆巴拉克，蘇丹執政三十年的屠夫也宣布不再連任，統治利比亞四十年的格達費則正用血腥鎮壓民主浪潮。這把火繼續在北非、中東怒燒，火星也飄到中國大陸。
大陸「茉莉花活動」周日可能有第二波，傾政府的媒體評論人民上回的「散步」，「只是少數人搞的行為藝術」。若這是「行為藝術」，每天絡繹於途「上訪」北京的，也是「行為藝術」；抗議不法拆遷，在家園廢墟上吊的，也是「行為藝術」；寄身都會、買不起一間小房的，當然也是「蟻族」的「行為藝術」；聚集堵路圍街的「群體事件」，更是「行為藝術」。這些人或許確是「少數人」，但引爆茉莉花革命的也只是突尼西亞一個失業的大學畢業生自焚，誰料到社會壓抑幾十年的集體憤怒就在這一件「行為藝術」上找到突破口？
中共對人民的不滿其實高度敏感，連人民日報也承認中國「面臨越來越多痛苦問題」。在茉莉花還沒出現街頭前，中共領導上周已齊聚中央黨校會商因應之道，胡錦濤特別標舉三個「最大限度」要牢牢把握：最大限度激發社會活力、最大限度增加和諧因素、最大限度減少不和諧因素。只是這三個「最大限度」不免相互矛盾，既要「最大限度激發社會活力」，又如何能「最大限度減少不和諧因素」？胡錦濤給的答案是：「進一步加強和完善資訊網路管理，提高對虛擬社會的管理水準」；簡言之，就是對網路要「黨委統一領導，政府嚴格管理」。
網路「茉莉花」被封鎖了，甚至連「明天」兩字也封殺了。北京嚴管網路的手法，完全是幾千年前的「長城」思維；長城當年只是造就了封閉的政權、封閉的人民、封閉的國家，最後敵人卻是從海上一波波湧來，中國面對列強的船堅砲利，差點瓜分亡國。如今長城只剩廢墟了，官方千方百計還妄想在網路築牆，恐怕亦只是徒勞，反而更激起人民以「翻牆」為樂；官方封鎖「茉莉花」，已有網民建議換「玫瑰花」、「牡丹花」，中共能把網路上面的花全數封掉嗎？
北京和手拿茉莉花的人民，其實想的都是同一件事，即「自由」和「民主」；只是人民求之若渴，北京懼之如洪水猛獸。但是，逃避問題的恐懼比面對問題的恐懼更讓自己恐懼。像六四，二十二年了，仍是中共不能碰的痛處。
經濟學有一句話：「撐不住的東西撐不久。」中國面對「成長痛」已很久了，連溫家寶都預警若再不政治改革，經濟改革的果實將不能保；中南海若對這問題沒有焦慮感、急迫性及重大歧異，溫家寶何出此言？
中共當局其實可以更有自信些，三十年來，中共在經濟面改革開放的成果舉世共睹；但政治面的改革開放若不到位，一切終究如浮沙建塔。自發的改變，叫改革；被逼的改變，叫革命。看看那些垮台的獨裁政權下場，中共要主動改革或被革命，道理甚明。
中國不是中東，這波「花粉熱」或許只是讓北京當局難受一下，用一點抗組織胺即能過去；但畢竟患花粉熱的只是中共政權，大陸人民卻喜歡花團錦簇，沒有人用砍花斫木來消滅花粉熱的。
一個動亂的中國，必無和平的世界，台灣更是首當其衝。經過血淵骨嶽的文革浩劫，中國有識之士在痛定思痛之餘發出「告別革命」的思考，但諸多社會矛盾的確亟須以民主改革來紓解。千古難局，中國究竟如何寫出具有「中國特色」的民主篇章？這不僅是中國人的大事，也是人類的大事。
Friday, February 25, 2011
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Deciphering Tsai Ing-wen's Gobbledygook
Deciphering Tsai Ing-wen's Gobbledygook
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2011
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen presided over the opening ceremony of a think tank. Many people were eager to hear her views on cross-Strait policy. But what she said left them in an impenetrable fog.
Tsai Ing-wen said that the KMT is moving toward "peace and reunification," and toward "peace and inevitable reunification." She said the DPP advocates "peace and differentiation," and "peace while seeking differentiation." Tsai Ing-wen was setting herself in opposition to the KMT. Logically speaking therefore, she should have said that she advocated "peace without reunification." She said others advocated "peace and reunification." But she lacked the guts to say that she advocated "peace without reunification." Instead, she said that she advocated "peace and differentiation." What is she doing, other than playing evasive word games?
Ma Ying-jeou has never advocated "peace and reunification," and "peace and inevitable reunification." These are charges leveled against him by Tsai Ing-wen. Ma Ying-jeou advocates "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." He loudly proclaimed "no reunification." Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, indulged in tongue twisting word games, and spoke of "peace and differentiation." She was afraid to say "peace without reunification." Tsai Ing-wen may find it difficult to say "no independence," the way Ma Ying-jeou did. But why was she afraid to say "no reunification?" What is she evading? What is she hiding?
Tsai Ing-wen has often played the "strategic vision" card. In April of 2010, during the "Two Ying's Debate," she played the "strategic vision" card. She argued that ECFA would cost the United States its strategic regional advantage. Instead, the US praised ECFA to the skies. She claimed that Taipei/Washington relations and cross-Strait relations were the best they have ever been. Professor Tsai appears oblivious about her own limitations. Once again, she has played her "strategic vision" card. She said "Taiwan must be positioned within the international framework. Only by giving political consideration to future relationships can we ensure the necessary strategic depth."
What is this, if not incomprehensible gobbledygook? How can such arguments unseat Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy? Does the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy not position the Republic of China within the international framework? Globalization and the rise of Mainland China have heavily skewed the two sides' economic status, Under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the Taiwan independence movement rushed headlong into a brick wall. Attitudes regarding the two sides have changed on Taiwan. Otherwise, how could the two sides have reached a consensus on "peaceful development?" How could they have signed ECFA? What is all this, if not "positioning Taiwan within the international framework?" What is all this, if not the ensuring of "strategic depth?" In fact, Tsai Ing-wen's pretensions of "strategic vision" were discredited during the Two Ying's Debate. Now all we see, is the emptiness of her rhetoric.
Tsai Ing-wen criticized Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy. She said the Ma administration had fallen into "a trap set by [Mainland] China." But she did not say that Beijing had also fallen into a "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" trap set by Ma Ying-jeou. Tsai Ing-wen condemned the Ma administration for its "Chinese identity and Chinese core values." But she did not say that the Ma administration's 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations reaffirm the Republic of China and the core values of the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen is the one who is trapped within a fallacy. She mistakenly equates opposition to the Peoples Republic of China wtih opposition to the Republic of China. That is both sad and ridiculous.
Frank Hsieh advocates an "Overlapping Consensus on the Constitution" and "One Constitution, Different Interpretations." His proposals may be considered esoteric. But it is one way of looking at things. Su Tseng-chang advocates "survival as the highest value," and "democracy as the foundation." It too, is empty rhetoric, But at least he knows enough to conceal the fact. He does not attempt to spin it as evidence of "strategic vision." By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen, who has been playing word games for years, could offer only an incomprehensible "peace and differentiation," and "peace while seeking differentiation." As a result, those who expected the most from her, are the ones most deeply disappointed.
Tsai Ing-wen should let the public know what she favors and opposes vis a vis cross-Strait relations. She once advocated the two states theory. What about now? She once objected to the 1992 Consensus and ECFA. What about now? Beijing says that opposition to Taiwan independence and adherence to the 1992 Consensus are prerequisites for cross-Strait exchanges and interaction. What about Tsai Ing-wen? The Ma administration advocates "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It upholds the 1992 Consensus, and One China, Different Interpretations. What about Tsai Ing-wen? Or, as a recent editorial asked, Tsai Ing-wen once led bloody street protests against Chen Yunlin. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, will it agree to let him visit?
National identity, constitutional interpretation, and cross-Strait policy are major issues. The Democratic Progressive Party must provide the public with a thorough accounting of its positions on these issues, before the 2012 presidential election. Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to muddle through by playing word games with "peace with differentiation" and "peace while seeking differentiation." This is irresponsible, dishonest, incompetent, or all three.
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen announced this incomprehensible policy. She failed even to mention her promise to "continue the cross-Strait policy of the previous administration in the event she is elected." That is how irresponsible she has been. She has become a great disappointment to many voters. We feel compelled to ask Tsai Ing-wen, "Are even you satisfied with your own performance?"
且聽蔡英文的不知所云
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.24
蔡英文昨日主持智庫揭牌儀式，許多人都準備洗耳恭聽她發表兩岸政策觀點，結果卻是雲山霧罩，不知所云。
蔡英文說，國民黨走的是「和而要統」、「和而必統」；又稱民進黨主張的是「和而不同」、「和而求同」。照理說，蔡英文既說國民黨是「和而要統」，則蔡英文站在對立面，至少就該主張「和而不統」。然而，反對別人「和而要統」，卻又不敢主張「和而不統」，轉個彎竟說是「和而不同」。這豈不擺明了是避重就輕的文字遊戲？
馬英九從未主張過「和而要統」、「和而必統」，這些都是蔡英文栽贓的罪名。馬英九主張的是「不統／不獨／不武」，可以大聲地說「不統」；但蔡英文竟玩繞口令的諧音遊戲說成「和而不同」，連一句「和而不統」都不敢說。蔡英文若不便如馬英九說「不獨」，卻為何連「不統」也不敢說；妳在躲什麼？妳又在瞞什麼？
蔡英文動輒玩弄「國際戰略觀」的花腔。二○一○年四月的「雙英辯」上，她就搬出一套「國際戰略觀」；謂ＥＣＦＡ將使美國失去區域優勢；結果美方迄今數度高調稱許ＥＣＦＡ，並謂此際是台美關係及兩岸關係最佳時刻。現在，蔡教授不揣譾陋，再次端出她的「國際戰略觀」。她說：「必須把台灣放在國際的結構當中，把政策思考著眼於未來關係的建構，才能拉出必要的戰略縱深。」
這不是不知所云是什麼？況且，這套說法又豈能扳倒馬英九的兩岸政策。難道馬政府的兩岸政策不是「把台灣放在國際的結構當中」？倘若不是全球化、中國崛起、兩岸經濟地位嚴重傾斜、台獨在李扁任內已經推車撞壁，且台灣內部的兩岸認知已經移變，則兩岸豈會出現「和平發展」的共識，又豈能簽訂ＥＣＦＡ？這一切難道不是「把台灣放在國際的結構當中」所建立的「戰略縱深」？其實，蔡英文的「國際戰略觀」在「雙英辯」後已經無處立足，現則益見其言之無物。
蔡英文批評馬英九的兩岸政策。說馬政府陷入「中國設定的框框裡」；她卻為何不說，其實北京也陷於馬英九「不統／不獨／不武」的「框框」裡。蔡英文又指馬政府一切皆以「中國認同、中國價值為核心」；卻為何不說，馬政府的「九二共識／一中各表」，其實是「一切以中華民國認同及中華民國價值為核心」。蔡英文竟至今日仍陷於「把反中華民國當成反中華人民共和國」的謬誤中，豈不可悲亦復可笑？
謝長廷提出「憲法重疊共識」及「憲法各表」，雖屬玄妙，但畢竟也是一家之言；蘇貞昌謂「生存是王道、民主是基石」，縱然也是虛晃一招，卻懂得藏拙，未曾用「國際戰略」來濃妝艷抹。相對而言，蔡英文煮字經年，竟然只是熬出不知所云的「和而不同／和而求同」八個字；由於眾人對她的寄望最深，不免亦失望最大。
蔡英文至少要讓大家知道，在兩岸關係上，她贊成什麼？反對什麼？她曾主張兩國論，現在呢？她曾反對九二共識、反對ＥＣＦＡ，現在呢？北京說「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」是兩岸互動交流的前提與基礎，蔡英文是同意或反對？馬政府主張「不統／不獨／不武」、「九二共識／一中各表」，蔡英文又是同意或反對？或者，如日前社論所問：曾以街頭喋血反對陳雲林來訪的蔡英文，在民進黨若再執政後是否同意他繼續來訪？
國家認同、憲法認知及兩岸政策，這是民進黨在二○一二總統大選前，必須徹底明白交代的重大議題。蔡英文欲以「和而不同／和而求同」八個字矇混過關，這若不是不負責，就是不誠實，要不就是無能，或三者兼之。
蔡英文昨天的這場不知所云的政策宣示，居然連「若執政後將延續前朝兩岸政策」這一句話都不見了。敷衍至此地步，恐怕令許多中間選民大失所望。且問蔡英文：妳自己滿意自己的表現嗎？？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2011
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen presided over the opening ceremony of a think tank. Many people were eager to hear her views on cross-Strait policy. But what she said left them in an impenetrable fog.
Tsai Ing-wen said that the KMT is moving toward "peace and reunification," and toward "peace and inevitable reunification." She said the DPP advocates "peace and differentiation," and "peace while seeking differentiation." Tsai Ing-wen was setting herself in opposition to the KMT. Logically speaking therefore, she should have said that she advocated "peace without reunification." She said others advocated "peace and reunification." But she lacked the guts to say that she advocated "peace without reunification." Instead, she said that she advocated "peace and differentiation." What is she doing, other than playing evasive word games?
Ma Ying-jeou has never advocated "peace and reunification," and "peace and inevitable reunification." These are charges leveled against him by Tsai Ing-wen. Ma Ying-jeou advocates "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." He loudly proclaimed "no reunification." Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, indulged in tongue twisting word games, and spoke of "peace and differentiation." She was afraid to say "peace without reunification." Tsai Ing-wen may find it difficult to say "no independence," the way Ma Ying-jeou did. But why was she afraid to say "no reunification?" What is she evading? What is she hiding?
Tsai Ing-wen has often played the "strategic vision" card. In April of 2010, during the "Two Ying's Debate," she played the "strategic vision" card. She argued that ECFA would cost the United States its strategic regional advantage. Instead, the US praised ECFA to the skies. She claimed that Taipei/Washington relations and cross-Strait relations were the best they have ever been. Professor Tsai appears oblivious about her own limitations. Once again, she has played her "strategic vision" card. She said "Taiwan must be positioned within the international framework. Only by giving political consideration to future relationships can we ensure the necessary strategic depth."
What is this, if not incomprehensible gobbledygook? How can such arguments unseat Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy? Does the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy not position the Republic of China within the international framework? Globalization and the rise of Mainland China have heavily skewed the two sides' economic status, Under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the Taiwan independence movement rushed headlong into a brick wall. Attitudes regarding the two sides have changed on Taiwan. Otherwise, how could the two sides have reached a consensus on "peaceful development?" How could they have signed ECFA? What is all this, if not "positioning Taiwan within the international framework?" What is all this, if not the ensuring of "strategic depth?" In fact, Tsai Ing-wen's pretensions of "strategic vision" were discredited during the Two Ying's Debate. Now all we see, is the emptiness of her rhetoric.
Tsai Ing-wen criticized Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy. She said the Ma administration had fallen into "a trap set by [Mainland] China." But she did not say that Beijing had also fallen into a "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" trap set by Ma Ying-jeou. Tsai Ing-wen condemned the Ma administration for its "Chinese identity and Chinese core values." But she did not say that the Ma administration's 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations reaffirm the Republic of China and the core values of the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen is the one who is trapped within a fallacy. She mistakenly equates opposition to the Peoples Republic of China wtih opposition to the Republic of China. That is both sad and ridiculous.
Frank Hsieh advocates an "Overlapping Consensus on the Constitution" and "One Constitution, Different Interpretations." His proposals may be considered esoteric. But it is one way of looking at things. Su Tseng-chang advocates "survival as the highest value," and "democracy as the foundation." It too, is empty rhetoric, But at least he knows enough to conceal the fact. He does not attempt to spin it as evidence of "strategic vision." By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen, who has been playing word games for years, could offer only an incomprehensible "peace and differentiation," and "peace while seeking differentiation." As a result, those who expected the most from her, are the ones most deeply disappointed.
Tsai Ing-wen should let the public know what she favors and opposes vis a vis cross-Strait relations. She once advocated the two states theory. What about now? She once objected to the 1992 Consensus and ECFA. What about now? Beijing says that opposition to Taiwan independence and adherence to the 1992 Consensus are prerequisites for cross-Strait exchanges and interaction. What about Tsai Ing-wen? The Ma administration advocates "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It upholds the 1992 Consensus, and One China, Different Interpretations. What about Tsai Ing-wen? Or, as a recent editorial asked, Tsai Ing-wen once led bloody street protests against Chen Yunlin. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, will it agree to let him visit?
National identity, constitutional interpretation, and cross-Strait policy are major issues. The Democratic Progressive Party must provide the public with a thorough accounting of its positions on these issues, before the 2012 presidential election. Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to muddle through by playing word games with "peace with differentiation" and "peace while seeking differentiation." This is irresponsible, dishonest, incompetent, or all three.
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen announced this incomprehensible policy. She failed even to mention her promise to "continue the cross-Strait policy of the previous administration in the event she is elected." That is how irresponsible she has been. She has become a great disappointment to many voters. We feel compelled to ask Tsai Ing-wen, "Are even you satisfied with your own performance?"
且聽蔡英文的不知所云
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.24
蔡英文昨日主持智庫揭牌儀式，許多人都準備洗耳恭聽她發表兩岸政策觀點，結果卻是雲山霧罩，不知所云。
蔡英文說，國民黨走的是「和而要統」、「和而必統」；又稱民進黨主張的是「和而不同」、「和而求同」。照理說，蔡英文既說國民黨是「和而要統」，則蔡英文站在對立面，至少就該主張「和而不統」。然而，反對別人「和而要統」，卻又不敢主張「和而不統」，轉個彎竟說是「和而不同」。這豈不擺明了是避重就輕的文字遊戲？
馬英九從未主張過「和而要統」、「和而必統」，這些都是蔡英文栽贓的罪名。馬英九主張的是「不統／不獨／不武」，可以大聲地說「不統」；但蔡英文竟玩繞口令的諧音遊戲說成「和而不同」，連一句「和而不統」都不敢說。蔡英文若不便如馬英九說「不獨」，卻為何連「不統」也不敢說；妳在躲什麼？妳又在瞞什麼？
蔡英文動輒玩弄「國際戰略觀」的花腔。二○一○年四月的「雙英辯」上，她就搬出一套「國際戰略觀」；謂ＥＣＦＡ將使美國失去區域優勢；結果美方迄今數度高調稱許ＥＣＦＡ，並謂此際是台美關係及兩岸關係最佳時刻。現在，蔡教授不揣譾陋，再次端出她的「國際戰略觀」。她說：「必須把台灣放在國際的結構當中，把政策思考著眼於未來關係的建構，才能拉出必要的戰略縱深。」
這不是不知所云是什麼？況且，這套說法又豈能扳倒馬英九的兩岸政策。難道馬政府的兩岸政策不是「把台灣放在國際的結構當中」？倘若不是全球化、中國崛起、兩岸經濟地位嚴重傾斜、台獨在李扁任內已經推車撞壁，且台灣內部的兩岸認知已經移變，則兩岸豈會出現「和平發展」的共識，又豈能簽訂ＥＣＦＡ？這一切難道不是「把台灣放在國際的結構當中」所建立的「戰略縱深」？其實，蔡英文的「國際戰略觀」在「雙英辯」後已經無處立足，現則益見其言之無物。
蔡英文批評馬英九的兩岸政策。說馬政府陷入「中國設定的框框裡」；她卻為何不說，其實北京也陷於馬英九「不統／不獨／不武」的「框框」裡。蔡英文又指馬政府一切皆以「中國認同、中國價值為核心」；卻為何不說，馬政府的「九二共識／一中各表」，其實是「一切以中華民國認同及中華民國價值為核心」。蔡英文竟至今日仍陷於「把反中華民國當成反中華人民共和國」的謬誤中，豈不可悲亦復可笑？
謝長廷提出「憲法重疊共識」及「憲法各表」，雖屬玄妙，但畢竟也是一家之言；蘇貞昌謂「生存是王道、民主是基石」，縱然也是虛晃一招，卻懂得藏拙，未曾用「國際戰略」來濃妝艷抹。相對而言，蔡英文煮字經年，竟然只是熬出不知所云的「和而不同／和而求同」八個字；由於眾人對她的寄望最深，不免亦失望最大。
蔡英文至少要讓大家知道，在兩岸關係上，她贊成什麼？反對什麼？她曾主張兩國論，現在呢？她曾反對九二共識、反對ＥＣＦＡ，現在呢？北京說「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」是兩岸互動交流的前提與基礎，蔡英文是同意或反對？馬政府主張「不統／不獨／不武」、「九二共識／一中各表」，蔡英文又是同意或反對？或者，如日前社論所問：曾以街頭喋血反對陳雲林來訪的蔡英文，在民進黨若再執政後是否同意他繼續來訪？
國家認同、憲法認知及兩岸政策，這是民進黨在二○一二總統大選前，必須徹底明白交代的重大議題。蔡英文欲以「和而不同／和而求同」八個字矇混過關，這若不是不負責，就是不誠實，要不就是無能，或三者兼之。
蔡英文昨天的這場不知所云的政策宣示，居然連「若執政後將延續前朝兩岸政策」這一句話都不見了。敷衍至此地步，恐怕令許多中間選民大失所望。且問蔡英文：妳自己滿意自己的表現嗎？？
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Defend Taipei's Interests, Demand Respect from Manila
Defend Taipei's Interests, Demand Respect from Manila
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2011
The Philippines recently deported a number of Republic of China citizens suspected of fraud to Mainland China. Taipei has retaliated by such measures as putting a freeze on Filipino laborers. Yesterday, President Ma met with Special Envoy Manuel Roxas. He sternly criticized the Philippines, using language unprecedented in its harshness. This move by the upper levels of government told the international community that Taipei was determined to defend the ROC's sovereignty and dignity.
President Ma has long been soft spoken and gentle in his demeanor. But when he met with Special Presidential Envoy Roxas from the Philippines, and pointed out the three mistakes Manila had made, his manner was stern. Fourteen ROC suspects were expelled from the Philippines. Philippine officials said they were extradited. They were expelled, but they were not repatriated to the Republic of China. This constitutes a violation of international law and international practice. The suspects held Republic of China passports. The Philippines claimed that they failed to cooperate, that they failed to submit their travel documents. The suspects' attorney obtained a court order from the Philippine court. But the Philippine government ignored its own laws, and illegally deported the suspects to Mainland China.
President Ma demanded that the Philippine government assume responsibility for is mistakes, and apologize. He said "My country will watch to see how your country deals with the incident. This will indicate how bilateral relations should develop." Seldom in Republic of China history has a president spoken so sternly to a foreign guest. Seldom has our government retaliated against a foreign government so harshly.
Roxas was dispatched to Taipei by President Benigno Aquino III. The purpose was to appease Taipei, by communicating directly, in order to turn things around. But Manila still refuses to admit that sending the suspects to the Mainland was a mistake, Manila reasons that the case was investigated by public security officials from the Mainland. The information came from public security officials on the Mainland. The victims were from the the Mainland. Beijing's desire that the Mainland judicial system investigate and prosecute the case struck Manila as reasonable. In truth, many mistakes were made in handling the case. Manila has also begun legal proceedings, congressional hearings, and congressional investigations. Similar cases have occurred before. ROC suspects were never prosecuted after being sent back to Taiwan. Manila feels these suspects will be dealt with more effectively if they are turned over to Beijing, which Manila considers better at fighting crime.
The Philippine Special Envoy held a ten hour long marathon session with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but still refused to apologize. This is why. Frankly, if Manila knew it had made a serious mistake, it should have apologized right then and there. Now it has sent Rojas. It is hoping that if he puts a nice spin on the matter, and allows Taipei to blow off some steam, the storm will quickly blow over. Sending a special envoy is of course a gesture of goodwill and a sign of respect. But mere lip service suggests that Manila has underestimated Taipei's anger.
During these diplomatic representations, Taipei must have a clear objective, namely, to safeguard the national interest. Manila's motives may have been well intentioned. But its actions treated Beijing as the guardian of Taipei's international affairs. This our government considers absolutely unacceptable. In order to teach Manila a lesson, and to prevent the international community from getting the wrong impression, Taipei is demanding that Manila apologize. The government is taking a tough stand. It is responding to a public backlash. It is also keeping an eye on future developments. It must make a grand gesture, as preventive medicine.
Manila may or may not be willing to eat crow and apologize. But Taipei must adopt stern measures, in the hope that similar cases will be handled the correct way. Manila must commit to international law and international practices. In the common fight against crime, it must fully respect Taipei's rights and interests. It must ensure that this incident remains an isolated one that is never repeated.
According to the "consensus reality" negotiated by Minister of Foreign Affairs Timothy Yang and Roxas, Philippine officials have agreed to take discipline the officials for dereliction of duty. This is something it should have done in the first place, in accorandance with the rule of law. The Philippines is willing to discuss the establishment of mutual legal assistance mechanisms for combatting transnational crime. Taipei and Manila should actively promote such measures. They must not allow the matter to drop. Manila hopes to sign an "economic partnership agreement" with Taipei. Taipei may not need such an agreement. Obviously there is no reason to "reward" Manila at this moment.
Diplomatic negotiations require clear objectives and bargaining chips. Taipei's objective is clear, It must play its chips wisely. Taipei has put a freeze on Filipino workers. Those impacted are admittedly the economically disadvantaged, and the businesses on Taiwan who employ them. Such a freeze may not directly impact the decision-making officials. But the Philippines is a nation that relies on the export of labor. Therefore the impact of such an action must not be underestimated. President Aquino III in particular, is under attack at home. He too hopes the storm will blow over, as soon as possible. Therefore, Taipei must continue its hard bargaining. It must be firm but rational. It must ensure that its national interests are not hurt again.
Internationally, Taipei is in a tough spot. But that is exactly why it must not lose hope. That is why it must demand respect. Others treat you the way you tell them to treat you. Taipei must take concrete action to ensure that the international community understands its aspirations.
捍衛台灣利益 向菲律賓爭尊嚴
2011-02-23 中國時報
台灣為了菲律賓「台嫌遣陸」事件強烈反彈並祭出凍結菲勞等報復措施，馬總統昨天在接見菲律賓特使羅哈斯時，以前所未見的疾言厲色指責菲國的錯誤。政府高層的大動作，也明確向國際社會傳達出台灣捍衛主權尊嚴的決心。
一向溫文儒雅的馬總統，在接見菲律賓總統特使羅哈斯時，罕見地板著臉指責菲律賓的三大錯誤，包括十四名台灣嫌犯是遭到菲國驅逐出境，菲國官員卻聲稱是引渡；驅逐出境卻又不是遣返本國中華民國，違反了國際法與國際慣例。這些嫌犯都持有中華民國護照，菲國卻聲稱他們沒有合作旅行文件。而律師已向菲國法院申請到保護令，菲國政府卻罔顧菲國自己的法律，違法將台灣嫌犯遣送到中國大陸。
馬總統同時要求，菲國政府必須為錯誤負起責任，並且表示歉意，而「我國會以貴國對於此事件後續的處理結果，作為評量兩國關係發展的重要指標。」在我國對外關係史上，總統對外賓如此嚴厲，政府對外國祭出強硬報復反擊，可謂極為罕見。
羅哈斯銜總統艾奎諾三世之命來台，目的是希望能藉由直接的安撫溝通，讓報復之事有所轉圜。然而，菲律賓仍然不認為把台籍嫌犯遣送大陸是非常嚴重的錯誤，因為此案的追查、情報都來自中國公安，受害者也都是中國人，大陸方面希望交由中國司法單位偵訊審判似乎合理。在處理程序上，確實有許多缺失，菲方也已展開司法程序與國會聽證會調查。加上之前另一樁類似案件，台籍嫌犯回台後並未受到司法追究，菲方自認將嫌犯交給大陸比較能收打擊犯罪之效。
這也是為什麼，菲國特使和我國外交部馬拉松談判十小時，卻仍然堅持不道歉。坦白說，菲律賓如果真的認識到自己犯了大錯，在事件當時就該道歉。如今派羅哈斯來，看樣子只是來說兩句好話，認為讓台灣消消氣，事情就過去了。當然，派遣特使前來溝通，本身也是一種善意與尊重的表達，但口惠而實不至，還是低估了台灣的憤怒。
台灣在這場外交交涉中，應該要有明確的目標，也就是維護國家利益。不管菲律賓的出發點為何，但在行動上，把中國大陸當成處理台灣國際事務的代理人，這是我國絕對不能接受的謬誤。為了讓菲律賓記取教訓，也為了不讓國際社會得到錯誤印象，因此台灣強烈要求菲律賓認錯道歉。政府之所以如此強硬，除了是在回應民意的反彈之外，也是著眼於未來可能的效應，而必須以大動作進行防堵。
因此，無論菲律賓最後是不是肯拉下臉來道歉，台灣都應該積極交涉，希望能對類似案件的處理達成一個協議，讓菲國承諾依循國際法與國際慣例，在共同打擊犯罪及司法合作時，能充分尊重台灣的權益。務必讓這次事件，成為下不為例的唯一個案。
依據外交部長楊進添和羅哈斯談判達成的「事實共識」，菲國同意對失職官員採取相應措施，這是原本依法就必須追查懲處的。菲律賓也願意討論建立打擊跨國犯罪的司法互助機制，未來台菲雙方應該在這部分積極推動，不可以不了了之。至於菲國政府期盼和我國簽署「經濟伙伴協議」，目前台灣未必有此需要，而且此時顯然也沒有理由「獎勵」菲律賓。
外交談判需要明確的目標與籌碼，台灣的目標很清楚，籌碼卻要用得精準。台灣決定凍結菲勞，雖然受衝擊的是弱勢菲勞與台灣使用菲勞的企業，未必直接影響決策官員，但畢竟對於一個依靠勞工輸出的國家，這樣的動作仍然不能小覷。尤其艾奎諾三世在內政上飽受批判，也希望這次的風波能儘快落幕。因此，台灣的後續協商必須保持力度，以理性而堅定的態度，確保國家利益不至再受傷害。
在國際間，台灣處境確實比較困難，但也因此更加不能失了志氣與自尊。別人怎麼對待你，是你教的。台灣必須以具體行動，讓國際社會理解台灣的訴求。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2011
The Philippines recently deported a number of Republic of China citizens suspected of fraud to Mainland China. Taipei has retaliated by such measures as putting a freeze on Filipino laborers. Yesterday, President Ma met with Special Envoy Manuel Roxas. He sternly criticized the Philippines, using language unprecedented in its harshness. This move by the upper levels of government told the international community that Taipei was determined to defend the ROC's sovereignty and dignity.
President Ma has long been soft spoken and gentle in his demeanor. But when he met with Special Presidential Envoy Roxas from the Philippines, and pointed out the three mistakes Manila had made, his manner was stern. Fourteen ROC suspects were expelled from the Philippines. Philippine officials said they were extradited. They were expelled, but they were not repatriated to the Republic of China. This constitutes a violation of international law and international practice. The suspects held Republic of China passports. The Philippines claimed that they failed to cooperate, that they failed to submit their travel documents. The suspects' attorney obtained a court order from the Philippine court. But the Philippine government ignored its own laws, and illegally deported the suspects to Mainland China.
President Ma demanded that the Philippine government assume responsibility for is mistakes, and apologize. He said "My country will watch to see how your country deals with the incident. This will indicate how bilateral relations should develop." Seldom in Republic of China history has a president spoken so sternly to a foreign guest. Seldom has our government retaliated against a foreign government so harshly.
Roxas was dispatched to Taipei by President Benigno Aquino III. The purpose was to appease Taipei, by communicating directly, in order to turn things around. But Manila still refuses to admit that sending the suspects to the Mainland was a mistake, Manila reasons that the case was investigated by public security officials from the Mainland. The information came from public security officials on the Mainland. The victims were from the the Mainland. Beijing's desire that the Mainland judicial system investigate and prosecute the case struck Manila as reasonable. In truth, many mistakes were made in handling the case. Manila has also begun legal proceedings, congressional hearings, and congressional investigations. Similar cases have occurred before. ROC suspects were never prosecuted after being sent back to Taiwan. Manila feels these suspects will be dealt with more effectively if they are turned over to Beijing, which Manila considers better at fighting crime.
The Philippine Special Envoy held a ten hour long marathon session with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but still refused to apologize. This is why. Frankly, if Manila knew it had made a serious mistake, it should have apologized right then and there. Now it has sent Rojas. It is hoping that if he puts a nice spin on the matter, and allows Taipei to blow off some steam, the storm will quickly blow over. Sending a special envoy is of course a gesture of goodwill and a sign of respect. But mere lip service suggests that Manila has underestimated Taipei's anger.
During these diplomatic representations, Taipei must have a clear objective, namely, to safeguard the national interest. Manila's motives may have been well intentioned. But its actions treated Beijing as the guardian of Taipei's international affairs. This our government considers absolutely unacceptable. In order to teach Manila a lesson, and to prevent the international community from getting the wrong impression, Taipei is demanding that Manila apologize. The government is taking a tough stand. It is responding to a public backlash. It is also keeping an eye on future developments. It must make a grand gesture, as preventive medicine.
Manila may or may not be willing to eat crow and apologize. But Taipei must adopt stern measures, in the hope that similar cases will be handled the correct way. Manila must commit to international law and international practices. In the common fight against crime, it must fully respect Taipei's rights and interests. It must ensure that this incident remains an isolated one that is never repeated.
According to the "consensus reality" negotiated by Minister of Foreign Affairs Timothy Yang and Roxas, Philippine officials have agreed to take discipline the officials for dereliction of duty. This is something it should have done in the first place, in accorandance with the rule of law. The Philippines is willing to discuss the establishment of mutual legal assistance mechanisms for combatting transnational crime. Taipei and Manila should actively promote such measures. They must not allow the matter to drop. Manila hopes to sign an "economic partnership agreement" with Taipei. Taipei may not need such an agreement. Obviously there is no reason to "reward" Manila at this moment.
Diplomatic negotiations require clear objectives and bargaining chips. Taipei's objective is clear, It must play its chips wisely. Taipei has put a freeze on Filipino workers. Those impacted are admittedly the economically disadvantaged, and the businesses on Taiwan who employ them. Such a freeze may not directly impact the decision-making officials. But the Philippines is a nation that relies on the export of labor. Therefore the impact of such an action must not be underestimated. President Aquino III in particular, is under attack at home. He too hopes the storm will blow over, as soon as possible. Therefore, Taipei must continue its hard bargaining. It must be firm but rational. It must ensure that its national interests are not hurt again.
Internationally, Taipei is in a tough spot. But that is exactly why it must not lose hope. That is why it must demand respect. Others treat you the way you tell them to treat you. Taipei must take concrete action to ensure that the international community understands its aspirations.
捍衛台灣利益 向菲律賓爭尊嚴
2011-02-23 中國時報
台灣為了菲律賓「台嫌遣陸」事件強烈反彈並祭出凍結菲勞等報復措施，馬總統昨天在接見菲律賓特使羅哈斯時，以前所未見的疾言厲色指責菲國的錯誤。政府高層的大動作，也明確向國際社會傳達出台灣捍衛主權尊嚴的決心。
一向溫文儒雅的馬總統，在接見菲律賓總統特使羅哈斯時，罕見地板著臉指責菲律賓的三大錯誤，包括十四名台灣嫌犯是遭到菲國驅逐出境，菲國官員卻聲稱是引渡；驅逐出境卻又不是遣返本國中華民國，違反了國際法與國際慣例。這些嫌犯都持有中華民國護照，菲國卻聲稱他們沒有合作旅行文件。而律師已向菲國法院申請到保護令，菲國政府卻罔顧菲國自己的法律，違法將台灣嫌犯遣送到中國大陸。
馬總統同時要求，菲國政府必須為錯誤負起責任，並且表示歉意，而「我國會以貴國對於此事件後續的處理結果，作為評量兩國關係發展的重要指標。」在我國對外關係史上，總統對外賓如此嚴厲，政府對外國祭出強硬報復反擊，可謂極為罕見。
羅哈斯銜總統艾奎諾三世之命來台，目的是希望能藉由直接的安撫溝通，讓報復之事有所轉圜。然而，菲律賓仍然不認為把台籍嫌犯遣送大陸是非常嚴重的錯誤，因為此案的追查、情報都來自中國公安，受害者也都是中國人，大陸方面希望交由中國司法單位偵訊審判似乎合理。在處理程序上，確實有許多缺失，菲方也已展開司法程序與國會聽證會調查。加上之前另一樁類似案件，台籍嫌犯回台後並未受到司法追究，菲方自認將嫌犯交給大陸比較能收打擊犯罪之效。
這也是為什麼，菲國特使和我國外交部馬拉松談判十小時，卻仍然堅持不道歉。坦白說，菲律賓如果真的認識到自己犯了大錯，在事件當時就該道歉。如今派羅哈斯來，看樣子只是來說兩句好話，認為讓台灣消消氣，事情就過去了。當然，派遣特使前來溝通，本身也是一種善意與尊重的表達，但口惠而實不至，還是低估了台灣的憤怒。
台灣在這場外交交涉中，應該要有明確的目標，也就是維護國家利益。不管菲律賓的出發點為何，但在行動上，把中國大陸當成處理台灣國際事務的代理人，這是我國絕對不能接受的謬誤。為了讓菲律賓記取教訓，也為了不讓國際社會得到錯誤印象，因此台灣強烈要求菲律賓認錯道歉。政府之所以如此強硬，除了是在回應民意的反彈之外，也是著眼於未來可能的效應，而必須以大動作進行防堵。
因此，無論菲律賓最後是不是肯拉下臉來道歉，台灣都應該積極交涉，希望能對類似案件的處理達成一個協議，讓菲國承諾依循國際法與國際慣例，在共同打擊犯罪及司法合作時，能充分尊重台灣的權益。務必讓這次事件，成為下不為例的唯一個案。
依據外交部長楊進添和羅哈斯談判達成的「事實共識」，菲國同意對失職官員採取相應措施，這是原本依法就必須追查懲處的。菲律賓也願意討論建立打擊跨國犯罪的司法互助機制，未來台菲雙方應該在這部分積極推動，不可以不了了之。至於菲國政府期盼和我國簽署「經濟伙伴協議」，目前台灣未必有此需要，而且此時顯然也沒有理由「獎勵」菲律賓。
外交談判需要明確的目標與籌碼，台灣的目標很清楚，籌碼卻要用得精準。台灣決定凍結菲勞，雖然受衝擊的是弱勢菲勞與台灣使用菲勞的企業，未必直接影響決策官員，但畢竟對於一個依靠勞工輸出的國家，這樣的動作仍然不能小覷。尤其艾奎諾三世在內政上飽受批判，也希望這次的風波能儘快落幕。因此，台灣的後續協商必須保持力度，以理性而堅定的態度，確保國家利益不至再受傷害。
在國際間，台灣處境確實比較困難，但也因此更加不能失了志氣與自尊。別人怎麼對待你，是你教的。台灣必須以具體行動，讓國際社會理解台灣的訴求。
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
Would Chen Yunlin Still Be Able to Visit with the DPP in Power?
Would Chen Yunlin Still Be Able to Visit with the DPP in Power?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 22, 2011
Chen Yunlin is not being allowed to visit Tainan City. Lai Ching-teh made this unfortunate declaration. But that is hardly the full extent of the problem. The problem goes far beyond this. If the DPP returns to power, will Chen Yunlin even be able to visit Taiwan? Will the SEF and ARATS still be able to conduct annual exchanges?
The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Forum debuted today at a spa in Chungli. Tomorrow Chen Yunlin will bring a group of Mainland entrepreneurs to Taiwan. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Forum is the official mechanism for Vice Ministerial-level economic consultation and dialogue. Chen Yunlin's visit is a symbol of continuing cross-Strait economic coopetition. These two phenomenon represent a watershed in cross-Strait relations. They represent continued progress toward multifront, full range interaction. They represent the consolidation of cross-Strait "peaceful development."
These interactions are taking place on many fronts. Cross-Strait economic exchanges were originally driven by a random search for profits. Now governments on both sides are overseeing mutually advantageous integration. But this scenario may not have a chance to gel. Because next year's presidential election may lead to a third change in ruling parties. Cross-Strait relations will inevitably be put to the test. Today, the cross-Strait situation is one of peaceful development. It is a banquet in progress. But if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, will that mean the party is over? This is a serious question. It is not one that a Democratic Progressive Party administration can dismiss by promising to "continue the cross-Strait policies of the previous administration."
Suppose Chen Yunlin can no longer visit Taiwan. Suppose the OECD can no longer be held. The results will be unmistakable. In the language of the common people, "Who is going to buy grandma's hard boiled eggs?" "If we can't sell our groupers to the Mainland, to whom are we going to sell them?" In the language of politics and economics, "If cross-Strait economic and trade relations undergo a sea change, does Taiwan have an alternate plan?"
This is not scare-mongering. It may well be a case of history repeating itself. In July 1999, Lee Teng-hui trotted out his "special state to state relations" thesis. ARATS President Wang Daohan was scheduled to visit Taiwan in three to four months. Instead he announced that the SEF and ARATS no longer had any basis on which they could conduct dialogue and exchanges, and canceled his plans to come to Taiwan. Soon afterwards, cross-Strait relations underwent swift deterioration. After Chen Shui-bian took office, he repudiated the 1992 Consensus. Relations between the two organizations went from bad to worse. Today, the two organizations are mending fences. This represents cross-Strait peace, win/win, and consensus. But what about next year?
If the Democratic Progressive Party regains power, will Chen Yunlin still be able to come? On the one hand, it depends upon whether a DPP regime would allow him to come. On the other hand, it depends upon whether he would want to come. First, consider whether the DPP would allow him to come. Chen Yunlin first visited Taiwan in 2009. Tsai Ing-wen led a mob and laid siege to the hotel, closing off all access. The streets ran with blood. Last year she provoked disturbances in Taichung. Recently, he was in danger of running into into Green Camp local officials. Under the circumstances, in the event the Democratic Progressive Party regains power, and Tsai Ing-wen becomes president, what could they possibly say that would induce Chen Yunlin to come?
Now let us consider whether he would want to come. Chen Yunlin said the Mainland's economic policy vis a vis Taiwan is predicated upon certain political conditions. "If one day opposition to Taiwan independence vanishes, if the 1992 Consensus evaporates, everything may be subject to reconsideration." Back then, Wang Daohan did not come. Will Chen Yunlin refuse to come next year?
Lai Ching-teh, under pressure from Taiwan independence elements, canceled Chen Yunlin's visit, One can imagine the dilemma the Democratic Progressive Party would face in the event it returned to power. The DPP cannot simply say "If we return to office we will continue the cross-Strait policy of the previous administration." It cannot simply sweep its dilemma under the rug. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, will Chen be able to come? Internally, it depends upon whether Deep Green hardliners take to the streets and make trouble. Externally, it depends upon whether a DPP regime would oppose Taiwan independence and uphold the 1992 Consensus. How would the DPP deal with these questions?
Should the DPP receive Chen Yunlin or not? That is the problem Lai Ching-teh faces. It is also the problem the Democratic Progressive Party would face in the event it returned to power. The DPP has harassed Chen Yunlin over the past several days. It may wait until the presidential election before it comes up with some plausible sounding rhetoric. If it returns to power and continues the previous administration's cross-Strait policy, will it continue to exchanges between the two organizations? Will it roll out the red carpet for Chen Yunlin, or will it attempt to humiliate him in the streets?
民進黨若執政 陳雲林還能來嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.22
陳雲林不能造訪台南市，但這不是賴清德一句遺憾即能交代。因此引申的問題是：民進黨若再執政，陳雲林會否再到台灣？海基會與海協會的每年互訪能否繼續下去？
兩岸經合會今天在中壢一家溫泉莊園登場，陳雲林明天帶著大陸一群大企業家訪台；經合會是兩岸次長級官員的經濟對話與協商機制，陳雲林訪台則象徵兩岸競合關係的繼續開展。這兩件事都代表兩岸關係又再翻過一個山頭，繼續走上多維度、全方位的交流互動，亦是兩岸「和平發展」的優化與固化。
進一步論，這個多維度的互動階段，表現於經濟上的特徵就是，兩岸經濟交流已由企業自主的隨機逐利、任意遇合，進入由兩岸政府共同政策主導的優勢整合。但是，這圖像卻可能無法進入恆定狀態，因為明年總統大選或許會出現第三次政黨輪替，兩岸關係勢將面臨新的考驗。兩岸如今締造的和平發展局面，就像一場進行中的筵席，但民進黨再次執政，有無可能出現鬧場翻桌的場面？這是嚴肅的問題，恐怕不是一句「民進黨若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」即可交代。
陳雲林若不能訪台，經合會若不能續開，只是平鋪直敘，換成庶民語言則是：阿婆的茶葉蛋咁有人買？石斑魚嘸賣大陸要賣去叼位？若翻成政經語彙即是：兩岸經貿關係若生變化，台灣有何「替代方案」？
這個場景應非黑色預言，而可能會是一個歷史的複製品。1999年七月初李登輝提出「特殊國與國」關係論，原應在三、四個月後首度訪台的海協會長汪道涵宣布，海基海協兩會對話交流基礎已不復存在，取消來台計畫，自此兩岸關係即急轉直下；至陳水扁就任後否認「九二共識」，兩會關係更是每下愈況。如今，兩會之恢復運作，象徵著兩岸和平雙贏的共識，但會不會到了明年陳雲林就來不成了？
民進黨若執政，陳雲林來不來，一則要看民進黨政府要不要他來？一則要看他要不要來？先說要不要他來。陳雲林2009年首次來台，蔡英文以封鎖酒店、血濺街頭伺候，去年赴台中也鬧得風聲鶴唳，這次到南部連能不能與綠色地方首長「不期而遇」都搞不定。既是如此，倘民進黨執政，若蔡英文當了總統，將用什麼說詞讓陳雲林來或不來？
再說他要不要來。陳雲林說，大陸對台灣採取的經濟政策有一個政治前提，「如果有一天，反對台獨沒有了，九二共識沒有了，可能一切都要重新考慮。」當年，汪道涵不來；明年陳雲林來不來？
從賴清德受台獨選民的牽制而取消陳雲林往訪，可以想像民進黨若重掌執政權後進退兩難的場景。民進黨不可能只憑一句「若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」，就想將必會面對的困局掩飾過去。民進黨若執政，陳雲林來不來，對內言，要看鐵桿深綠是否仍然「一路嗆聲／如影隨形」？對外言，要看民進黨政府對「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」這兩項「前提與基礎」作何說法？
接不接待陳雲林？賴清德今日的難題，當然也必是民進黨若執政後的困局。民進黨這幾天可以儘管騷擾陳雲林的行程，待在總統大選時再想出一套說詞告訴國人：若執政是否延續前朝政策，是否繼續兩會互訪，並是否將在豪華會場而非以街頭羞辱來接待陳雲林的到訪？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 22, 2011
Chen Yunlin is not being allowed to visit Tainan City. Lai Ching-teh made this unfortunate declaration. But that is hardly the full extent of the problem. The problem goes far beyond this. If the DPP returns to power, will Chen Yunlin even be able to visit Taiwan? Will the SEF and ARATS still be able to conduct annual exchanges?
The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Forum debuted today at a spa in Chungli. Tomorrow Chen Yunlin will bring a group of Mainland entrepreneurs to Taiwan. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Forum is the official mechanism for Vice Ministerial-level economic consultation and dialogue. Chen Yunlin's visit is a symbol of continuing cross-Strait economic coopetition. These two phenomenon represent a watershed in cross-Strait relations. They represent continued progress toward multifront, full range interaction. They represent the consolidation of cross-Strait "peaceful development."
These interactions are taking place on many fronts. Cross-Strait economic exchanges were originally driven by a random search for profits. Now governments on both sides are overseeing mutually advantageous integration. But this scenario may not have a chance to gel. Because next year's presidential election may lead to a third change in ruling parties. Cross-Strait relations will inevitably be put to the test. Today, the cross-Strait situation is one of peaceful development. It is a banquet in progress. But if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, will that mean the party is over? This is a serious question. It is not one that a Democratic Progressive Party administration can dismiss by promising to "continue the cross-Strait policies of the previous administration."
Suppose Chen Yunlin can no longer visit Taiwan. Suppose the OECD can no longer be held. The results will be unmistakable. In the language of the common people, "Who is going to buy grandma's hard boiled eggs?" "If we can't sell our groupers to the Mainland, to whom are we going to sell them?" In the language of politics and economics, "If cross-Strait economic and trade relations undergo a sea change, does Taiwan have an alternate plan?"
This is not scare-mongering. It may well be a case of history repeating itself. In July 1999, Lee Teng-hui trotted out his "special state to state relations" thesis. ARATS President Wang Daohan was scheduled to visit Taiwan in three to four months. Instead he announced that the SEF and ARATS no longer had any basis on which they could conduct dialogue and exchanges, and canceled his plans to come to Taiwan. Soon afterwards, cross-Strait relations underwent swift deterioration. After Chen Shui-bian took office, he repudiated the 1992 Consensus. Relations between the two organizations went from bad to worse. Today, the two organizations are mending fences. This represents cross-Strait peace, win/win, and consensus. But what about next year?
If the Democratic Progressive Party regains power, will Chen Yunlin still be able to come? On the one hand, it depends upon whether a DPP regime would allow him to come. On the other hand, it depends upon whether he would want to come. First, consider whether the DPP would allow him to come. Chen Yunlin first visited Taiwan in 2009. Tsai Ing-wen led a mob and laid siege to the hotel, closing off all access. The streets ran with blood. Last year she provoked disturbances in Taichung. Recently, he was in danger of running into into Green Camp local officials. Under the circumstances, in the event the Democratic Progressive Party regains power, and Tsai Ing-wen becomes president, what could they possibly say that would induce Chen Yunlin to come?
Now let us consider whether he would want to come. Chen Yunlin said the Mainland's economic policy vis a vis Taiwan is predicated upon certain political conditions. "If one day opposition to Taiwan independence vanishes, if the 1992 Consensus evaporates, everything may be subject to reconsideration." Back then, Wang Daohan did not come. Will Chen Yunlin refuse to come next year?
Lai Ching-teh, under pressure from Taiwan independence elements, canceled Chen Yunlin's visit, One can imagine the dilemma the Democratic Progressive Party would face in the event it returned to power. The DPP cannot simply say "If we return to office we will continue the cross-Strait policy of the previous administration." It cannot simply sweep its dilemma under the rug. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, will Chen be able to come? Internally, it depends upon whether Deep Green hardliners take to the streets and make trouble. Externally, it depends upon whether a DPP regime would oppose Taiwan independence and uphold the 1992 Consensus. How would the DPP deal with these questions?
Should the DPP receive Chen Yunlin or not? That is the problem Lai Ching-teh faces. It is also the problem the Democratic Progressive Party would face in the event it returned to power. The DPP has harassed Chen Yunlin over the past several days. It may wait until the presidential election before it comes up with some plausible sounding rhetoric. If it returns to power and continues the previous administration's cross-Strait policy, will it continue to exchanges between the two organizations? Will it roll out the red carpet for Chen Yunlin, or will it attempt to humiliate him in the streets?
民進黨若執政 陳雲林還能來嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.22
陳雲林不能造訪台南市，但這不是賴清德一句遺憾即能交代。因此引申的問題是：民進黨若再執政，陳雲林會否再到台灣？海基會與海協會的每年互訪能否繼續下去？
兩岸經合會今天在中壢一家溫泉莊園登場，陳雲林明天帶著大陸一群大企業家訪台；經合會是兩岸次長級官員的經濟對話與協商機制，陳雲林訪台則象徵兩岸競合關係的繼續開展。這兩件事都代表兩岸關係又再翻過一個山頭，繼續走上多維度、全方位的交流互動，亦是兩岸「和平發展」的優化與固化。
進一步論，這個多維度的互動階段，表現於經濟上的特徵就是，兩岸經濟交流已由企業自主的隨機逐利、任意遇合，進入由兩岸政府共同政策主導的優勢整合。但是，這圖像卻可能無法進入恆定狀態，因為明年總統大選或許會出現第三次政黨輪替，兩岸關係勢將面臨新的考驗。兩岸如今締造的和平發展局面，就像一場進行中的筵席，但民進黨再次執政，有無可能出現鬧場翻桌的場面？這是嚴肅的問題，恐怕不是一句「民進黨若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」即可交代。
陳雲林若不能訪台，經合會若不能續開，只是平鋪直敘，換成庶民語言則是：阿婆的茶葉蛋咁有人買？石斑魚嘸賣大陸要賣去叼位？若翻成政經語彙即是：兩岸經貿關係若生變化，台灣有何「替代方案」？
這個場景應非黑色預言，而可能會是一個歷史的複製品。1999年七月初李登輝提出「特殊國與國」關係論，原應在三、四個月後首度訪台的海協會長汪道涵宣布，海基海協兩會對話交流基礎已不復存在，取消來台計畫，自此兩岸關係即急轉直下；至陳水扁就任後否認「九二共識」，兩會關係更是每下愈況。如今，兩會之恢復運作，象徵著兩岸和平雙贏的共識，但會不會到了明年陳雲林就來不成了？
民進黨若執政，陳雲林來不來，一則要看民進黨政府要不要他來？一則要看他要不要來？先說要不要他來。陳雲林2009年首次來台，蔡英文以封鎖酒店、血濺街頭伺候，去年赴台中也鬧得風聲鶴唳，這次到南部連能不能與綠色地方首長「不期而遇」都搞不定。既是如此，倘民進黨執政，若蔡英文當了總統，將用什麼說詞讓陳雲林來或不來？
再說他要不要來。陳雲林說，大陸對台灣採取的經濟政策有一個政治前提，「如果有一天，反對台獨沒有了，九二共識沒有了，可能一切都要重新考慮。」當年，汪道涵不來；明年陳雲林來不來？
從賴清德受台獨選民的牽制而取消陳雲林往訪，可以想像民進黨若重掌執政權後進退兩難的場景。民進黨不可能只憑一句「若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」，就想將必會面對的困局掩飾過去。民進黨若執政，陳雲林來不來，對內言，要看鐵桿深綠是否仍然「一路嗆聲／如影隨形」？對外言，要看民進黨政府對「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」這兩項「前提與基礎」作何說法？
接不接待陳雲林？賴清德今日的難題，當然也必是民進黨若執政後的困局。民進黨這幾天可以儘管騷擾陳雲林的行程，待在總統大選時再想出一套說詞告訴國人：若執政是否延續前朝政策，是否繼續兩會互訪，並是否將在豪華會場而非以街頭羞辱來接待陳雲林的到訪？
Monday, February 21, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen Take Note: Players May Not Double As Referees
Tsai Ing-wen Take Note: Players May Not Double As Referees
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 21, 2011
Two controversies arose during the DPP presidential primaries. The first was over whether to nominate the candidates on the basis of a "nationwide poll," or whether to nominate the candidates on the basis of a "party member ballot." Those who advocated a nationwide poll prevailed. The other was over whether to hold a "traveling townhall debate," or whether "the less debate, the better." So far, the two sides are at loggerheads. Neither side has gained the upper hand.
Those who advocate "the less debate, the better," feel that political debate will inevitably result in fratricide. In 2008, Su Tseng-chang and Frank Hsieh went at each other, no holds barred. Even arguments such as "changing the subject cannot change the perpetrators' guilt" were trotted out. Those who advocate more debates, feel the party cannot talk only about the candidates, and not about policy. They feel that because party chairman Tsai Ing-wen has election momentum, and holds the upper hand, she is both a player and a referee. They think she avoiding debate to maintain her advantage. They think this is unfair to the other candidates. Annette Lu has accused Tsai Ing-wen of making empty promises. Her rivals imply that Tsai's momentum has not been tested during political debate.
After evaluating the situation, the DPP decided it was better to hold additional, in-depth political debates. One. Tsai Ing-wen is herself a candidate. She cannot be an impartial referee. She has the power to manipulate the rules to counter the moves of rival candidates. Two. The decision has been made to hold a nationwide poll. Therefore even more public debate should be held. This would allow the public to evaluate each candidate's political views, and to make decisions accordingly. This is particularly true because the current presidential election involves major political controversies that cannot and should not be avoided.
During past presidential elections, voters were regaled with such slogans as "new centrist path," "believe in Taiwan," or "consistent from beginning to end." Such slogans were mere soap bubbles. They sparkled on the outside, but werem empty on the inside. The current presidential election however, involves matters of flesh and blood. They include such matters as the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, One Naition on Each Side, ECFA, Three Links and Direct Flights, the Economic Cooperation Committee, and whether to continue the cross-Strait policy of the previous administration. Soap bubbles such as "believe in Taiwan" may help a candidate dodge the issues. But the candidates really must take a stand on issues such as the 1992 Consensus.
Frank Hsieh advocates an "overlapping constitutional consensus" as a replacement for the 1992 Consensus, and "One Constitution, Different Interpretations" as a replacement for "One China, Different Interpretations." But some within the party have denounced his proposals as an absurd mess. Taiwan independence elements say that it follows the the same internal logic as the One China Constitution. Su Tseng-chang meanwhile, advocates a "Taiwanese Consensus." He advocates the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. He maintains that "survival is paramount, democracy is the foundation." That of course, is merely another soap bubble. Frank Hsieh has confronted Su Tseng-chang. "How can you oppose One China, Different Interpretations?" "Do you accept the Constitution of the Republic of China in its entirety?" Chen Shui-bian also had his two cents worth. From inside prison, he blasted both Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus," and Annette Lu's, "1996 Consensus," as "sophistry." He said they were not as good as his own "One Nation, each Side." Tsai Ing-wen meanwhile, remains mired in opposition to ECFA, repudiation of the 1992 Consensus, claims that the Republic of China is an exiled alien regime, and assurances that if the DPP wins, it will continue the previous administation's cross-Strait policy. Tsai's position is a self-contradictory mess. Her "Political Platform for the Coming Decade" is all thunder and no rain. How can the Democratic Progressive Party wage a presidential campaign based on this mess? How can it govern the nation assuming it is elected? How can we avoid debating such matters? How can we not hold a series of in-depth debates?
Those who say "the less debate. the better," say they are concerned about preserving unity. But under the circumstances, any such "unity" would constitute complicity in fraud. It would evade debate in order to deceive the Green Camp party faithful. It would use the nationwide poll to provide false hope. It would blow yet another soap bubble to deceive swing voters. This trick was used during the five cities elections. What were "Happiness" and "Glory," but more soap bubbles? Does the DPP really think it can win the presidency merely by donning a pink T shirt?
Chen Shui-bian ran for president in 2000. To enable him to win, the DPP published its Resolution on Taiwan's Future. But then the DPP ruled for eight years. It attempted to ram through the "rectification of names," the "Referendum to Join the UN," "One Country Each Side," and the "Resolution for a Normal Nation." It has already shredded the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. How should the DPP presidential candidate sort out this mess before entering the debate? One. The candidate must help the party regroup, internally. Two. The candidate must explain the party's position to the public, Three. The candidate must declare the party's position to Beijing and the international community.
Tsai Ing-wen is both a player and a referee. Years ago, when she was MAC chairman, she prevented Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus and from restoring the National Unification Council. Today, she is vying for the presidency. When she stands for election, she must make clear her position on the constitution and cross-Strait policy. She must explain her position to the Green Camp and voters in public debate. Or does she intend to correct her "Five Noes" only after she becomes president, through her newly appointed Mainland Affairs Council Chairman?
蔡英文應注意球員兼裁判的操作
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.21
民進黨總統候選人初選辦法有兩項爭議。一是「全民調」與「黨員投票」，如今「全民調」定案；另一是「巡迴政見辯論」或「愈少政見辯論愈好」，爾今仍相持不下。
主張愈少政見辯論愈好者認為，辯論起來不免刀刀見骨，二○○八年蘇謝殺到「轉移焦點不能改變涉案事實」的地步，可謂殷鑑不遠。至於主張多辦辯論者，則認為不能「只談人選，不談政策」；再者，亦認為如今在民氣上好像較佔優勢的黨主席蔡英文，似有「球員兼裁判」以迴避辯論來維持優勢之嫌，對有意競逐者有失公平。呂秀蓮指蔡英文「每天光鮮亮麗給人希望」，即暗指蔡的聲勢未經政見辯論的考驗。
盱衡情勢，民進黨仍以多辦幾場深入的政見辯論為宜。一方面，蔡英文自己是「球員」，不能恃「裁判」地位以操控比賽規則來抵制其他參賽的「球員」；二方面，既是「全民調」，則更應透過多場公開辯論使社會公眾評比各參選人的政見，憑以選擇；尤其重要的是，本屆總統選舉是一明顯存有重大政見爭議的選舉，不可逃避，不應逃避。
在往昔總統大選中，聽到的口號是「新中間路線」、「相信台灣」，或「一路走來，始終如一」，其實皆像是肥皂泡，在亮晶晶的外膜裡頭空無一物；但是，本屆總統大選所涉卻皆是有血有肉的真實題材，比如「九二共識」、「一中各表」、「一邊一國」、「ＥＣＦＡ」、「三通直航」、「經合會」、「執政後將延續前朝兩岸政策」等等。「相信台灣」之類的肥皂泡，也許吹一口氣就能躲過別人的針鋒；但「九二共識」之類的事實擺在眼前，總該有個說法。
謝長廷主張以「憲法重疊共識」取代「九二共識」，以「憲法各表」取代「一中各表」；但黨內有人斥其荒唐、胡搞，而獨派則指其「含有憲法一中的內在邏輯」。蘇貞昌則提「台灣共識」，主張以《台灣前途決議文》為主，守住「生存是王道，民主是基石」兩大原則（又是肥皂泡）；自顧不暇的謝長廷質問蘇貞昌：「你要怎麼反對一中各表？」「中華民國憲法你全盤接受嗎？」陳水扁亦不甘寂寞，在獄中批謝長廷的「憲法共識」與呂秀蓮的「九六共識」皆是「硬掰」，不如他主張的「一邊一國」。至於蔡英文，如今仍陷於「反對ＥＣＦＡ」、「否認九二共識」、「中華民國是外來流亡政府」及「民進黨若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」的亂七八糟之中，其「十年政綱」也久雷不雨。如此亂象，民進黨如何選總統？若選上更如何治國？因而，如何可以不辯論？又如何可以不多辦幾場深入的辯論？
主張少辦辯論者說是為了「團結」，但在現今情勢下，這種「團結」卻不啻只是勾串共謀一個「騙局」而已。亦即以迴避辯論來欺騙綠營內部及「忠貞黨員」，待稀裡糊塗地憑「光鮮亮麗給人希望」的直覺印象經全民調推出候選人後，再即興吹一個肥皂泡去欺騙「中間選民」；這一套已經用在五都選舉的「幸福／光榮」（不是肥皂泡嗎？），難道又想以一件粉紅Ｔ恤去騙取一個總統大位？
二○○○年陳水扁競選總統，民進黨尚為他發表《台灣前途決議文》；然而，民進黨八年執政，經「正名制憲」、「入聯公投」、「一邊一國」、《正常國家決議文》，已將《台灣前途決議文》撕成碎紙。因此，在民進黨總統參選人之間，當然應對如何整理此一亂局進行辯論，一以整合內部，二以向國人交代，三以向對岸及國際宣示其政策立場。
如今球員兼裁判的蔡英文，當年在陸委會主委任內曾隻身力阻陳水扁承認「九二共識」及回復國統會。如今她自己將競逐總統大位，更豈可不在參選時就其憲法認同及兩岸政策，經由辯論向綠營及國人交代清楚；難道要待若就任總統後，卻由她的陸委會主委來糾正她的「四不一沒有」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 21, 2011
Two controversies arose during the DPP presidential primaries. The first was over whether to nominate the candidates on the basis of a "nationwide poll," or whether to nominate the candidates on the basis of a "party member ballot." Those who advocated a nationwide poll prevailed. The other was over whether to hold a "traveling townhall debate," or whether "the less debate, the better." So far, the two sides are at loggerheads. Neither side has gained the upper hand.
Those who advocate "the less debate, the better," feel that political debate will inevitably result in fratricide. In 2008, Su Tseng-chang and Frank Hsieh went at each other, no holds barred. Even arguments such as "changing the subject cannot change the perpetrators' guilt" were trotted out. Those who advocate more debates, feel the party cannot talk only about the candidates, and not about policy. They feel that because party chairman Tsai Ing-wen has election momentum, and holds the upper hand, she is both a player and a referee. They think she avoiding debate to maintain her advantage. They think this is unfair to the other candidates. Annette Lu has accused Tsai Ing-wen of making empty promises. Her rivals imply that Tsai's momentum has not been tested during political debate.
After evaluating the situation, the DPP decided it was better to hold additional, in-depth political debates. One. Tsai Ing-wen is herself a candidate. She cannot be an impartial referee. She has the power to manipulate the rules to counter the moves of rival candidates. Two. The decision has been made to hold a nationwide poll. Therefore even more public debate should be held. This would allow the public to evaluate each candidate's political views, and to make decisions accordingly. This is particularly true because the current presidential election involves major political controversies that cannot and should not be avoided.
During past presidential elections, voters were regaled with such slogans as "new centrist path," "believe in Taiwan," or "consistent from beginning to end." Such slogans were mere soap bubbles. They sparkled on the outside, but werem empty on the inside. The current presidential election however, involves matters of flesh and blood. They include such matters as the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, One Naition on Each Side, ECFA, Three Links and Direct Flights, the Economic Cooperation Committee, and whether to continue the cross-Strait policy of the previous administration. Soap bubbles such as "believe in Taiwan" may help a candidate dodge the issues. But the candidates really must take a stand on issues such as the 1992 Consensus.
Frank Hsieh advocates an "overlapping constitutional consensus" as a replacement for the 1992 Consensus, and "One Constitution, Different Interpretations" as a replacement for "One China, Different Interpretations." But some within the party have denounced his proposals as an absurd mess. Taiwan independence elements say that it follows the the same internal logic as the One China Constitution. Su Tseng-chang meanwhile, advocates a "Taiwanese Consensus." He advocates the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. He maintains that "survival is paramount, democracy is the foundation." That of course, is merely another soap bubble. Frank Hsieh has confronted Su Tseng-chang. "How can you oppose One China, Different Interpretations?" "Do you accept the Constitution of the Republic of China in its entirety?" Chen Shui-bian also had his two cents worth. From inside prison, he blasted both Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus," and Annette Lu's, "1996 Consensus," as "sophistry." He said they were not as good as his own "One Nation, each Side." Tsai Ing-wen meanwhile, remains mired in opposition to ECFA, repudiation of the 1992 Consensus, claims that the Republic of China is an exiled alien regime, and assurances that if the DPP wins, it will continue the previous administation's cross-Strait policy. Tsai's position is a self-contradictory mess. Her "Political Platform for the Coming Decade" is all thunder and no rain. How can the Democratic Progressive Party wage a presidential campaign based on this mess? How can it govern the nation assuming it is elected? How can we avoid debating such matters? How can we not hold a series of in-depth debates?
Those who say "the less debate. the better," say they are concerned about preserving unity. But under the circumstances, any such "unity" would constitute complicity in fraud. It would evade debate in order to deceive the Green Camp party faithful. It would use the nationwide poll to provide false hope. It would blow yet another soap bubble to deceive swing voters. This trick was used during the five cities elections. What were "Happiness" and "Glory," but more soap bubbles? Does the DPP really think it can win the presidency merely by donning a pink T shirt?
Chen Shui-bian ran for president in 2000. To enable him to win, the DPP published its Resolution on Taiwan's Future. But then the DPP ruled for eight years. It attempted to ram through the "rectification of names," the "Referendum to Join the UN," "One Country Each Side," and the "Resolution for a Normal Nation." It has already shredded the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. How should the DPP presidential candidate sort out this mess before entering the debate? One. The candidate must help the party regroup, internally. Two. The candidate must explain the party's position to the public, Three. The candidate must declare the party's position to Beijing and the international community.
Tsai Ing-wen is both a player and a referee. Years ago, when she was MAC chairman, she prevented Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus and from restoring the National Unification Council. Today, she is vying for the presidency. When she stands for election, she must make clear her position on the constitution and cross-Strait policy. She must explain her position to the Green Camp and voters in public debate. Or does she intend to correct her "Five Noes" only after she becomes president, through her newly appointed Mainland Affairs Council Chairman?
蔡英文應注意球員兼裁判的操作
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.21
民進黨總統候選人初選辦法有兩項爭議。一是「全民調」與「黨員投票」，如今「全民調」定案；另一是「巡迴政見辯論」或「愈少政見辯論愈好」，爾今仍相持不下。
主張愈少政見辯論愈好者認為，辯論起來不免刀刀見骨，二○○八年蘇謝殺到「轉移焦點不能改變涉案事實」的地步，可謂殷鑑不遠。至於主張多辦辯論者，則認為不能「只談人選，不談政策」；再者，亦認為如今在民氣上好像較佔優勢的黨主席蔡英文，似有「球員兼裁判」以迴避辯論來維持優勢之嫌，對有意競逐者有失公平。呂秀蓮指蔡英文「每天光鮮亮麗給人希望」，即暗指蔡的聲勢未經政見辯論的考驗。
盱衡情勢，民進黨仍以多辦幾場深入的政見辯論為宜。一方面，蔡英文自己是「球員」，不能恃「裁判」地位以操控比賽規則來抵制其他參賽的「球員」；二方面，既是「全民調」，則更應透過多場公開辯論使社會公眾評比各參選人的政見，憑以選擇；尤其重要的是，本屆總統選舉是一明顯存有重大政見爭議的選舉，不可逃避，不應逃避。
在往昔總統大選中，聽到的口號是「新中間路線」、「相信台灣」，或「一路走來，始終如一」，其實皆像是肥皂泡，在亮晶晶的外膜裡頭空無一物；但是，本屆總統大選所涉卻皆是有血有肉的真實題材，比如「九二共識」、「一中各表」、「一邊一國」、「ＥＣＦＡ」、「三通直航」、「經合會」、「執政後將延續前朝兩岸政策」等等。「相信台灣」之類的肥皂泡，也許吹一口氣就能躲過別人的針鋒；但「九二共識」之類的事實擺在眼前，總該有個說法。
謝長廷主張以「憲法重疊共識」取代「九二共識」，以「憲法各表」取代「一中各表」；但黨內有人斥其荒唐、胡搞，而獨派則指其「含有憲法一中的內在邏輯」。蘇貞昌則提「台灣共識」，主張以《台灣前途決議文》為主，守住「生存是王道，民主是基石」兩大原則（又是肥皂泡）；自顧不暇的謝長廷質問蘇貞昌：「你要怎麼反對一中各表？」「中華民國憲法你全盤接受嗎？」陳水扁亦不甘寂寞，在獄中批謝長廷的「憲法共識」與呂秀蓮的「九六共識」皆是「硬掰」，不如他主張的「一邊一國」。至於蔡英文，如今仍陷於「反對ＥＣＦＡ」、「否認九二共識」、「中華民國是外來流亡政府」及「民進黨若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」的亂七八糟之中，其「十年政綱」也久雷不雨。如此亂象，民進黨如何選總統？若選上更如何治國？因而，如何可以不辯論？又如何可以不多辦幾場深入的辯論？
主張少辦辯論者說是為了「團結」，但在現今情勢下，這種「團結」卻不啻只是勾串共謀一個「騙局」而已。亦即以迴避辯論來欺騙綠營內部及「忠貞黨員」，待稀裡糊塗地憑「光鮮亮麗給人希望」的直覺印象經全民調推出候選人後，再即興吹一個肥皂泡去欺騙「中間選民」；這一套已經用在五都選舉的「幸福／光榮」（不是肥皂泡嗎？），難道又想以一件粉紅Ｔ恤去騙取一個總統大位？
二○○○年陳水扁競選總統，民進黨尚為他發表《台灣前途決議文》；然而，民進黨八年執政，經「正名制憲」、「入聯公投」、「一邊一國」、《正常國家決議文》，已將《台灣前途決議文》撕成碎紙。因此，在民進黨總統參選人之間，當然應對如何整理此一亂局進行辯論，一以整合內部，二以向國人交代，三以向對岸及國際宣示其政策立場。
如今球員兼裁判的蔡英文，當年在陸委會主委任內曾隻身力阻陳水扁承認「九二共識」及回復國統會。如今她自己將競逐總統大位，更豈可不在參選時就其憲法認同及兩岸政策，經由辯論向綠營及國人交代清楚；難道要待若就任總統後，卻由她的陸委會主委來糾正她的「四不一沒有」？
Friday, February 18, 2011
Wu Shu-chen's Prison Term Should Balance Justice and Humanitarianism
Wu Shu-chen's Prison Term Should Balance Justice and Humanitarianism
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 18, 2011
Today, Wu Shu-chen will report to the Kaohsiung District Prosecutors Office. She will then be sent to the Taichung Prison Annex Hospital for testing and evaluation. The results will determine whether she will be put behind bars. Minister of Justice Tseng Yung-fu said every step along the way would accord with the professional judgment of physicians. The DPP has argued that Wu Shu-cheng is unable to care for herself. Therefore they oppose having her serve. Green Camp elected representatives and local community leaders plan to stage protests.
Compared to Chen Shui-bian, Wu Shu-cheng's physical disability does make her prison term a more prickly issue. Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's sentences were handed down at the same time, last November. Chen Shui-bian has already been in prison two and half months. Wu Shu-cheng spent New Years, Chinese New Years, and the Lantern Festival at home. Only now has she been referred to the hospital for evaluation. As we can see, the Ministry of Justice has given her special treatment due to humanitarian considerations. Yet the Green Camp persists in its attacks. They have accused the Ma administration of "using the system to kill people." On the other hand, many others are waiting to see whether the Ma government will buckle under pressure, and whether it will use Wu Shu-chen's health as an excuse to let her escape justice.
Justice, humanitarianism, and politics are engaged in a three way tug of war. In fact, the problem is not confined to the Ma administration. It also reflects the DPP's inability to examine its own conscience when confronted by Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's corruption. Democracy on Taiwan has a malignant tumor. Normally speaking, anyone who commited the same offense as Wu Shu-chen, would be forced to serve a prison sentence. The prison system has long established evaluation criteria. The system has been in existence for many years. It has never run into any real problems. Now, in order to pander to Wu Shu-chen, the DPP is demanding that the system change its standards, It is demanding that the government custom tailor her prison sentence, in accorance with her individual requirements. This is hardly consistent with the concept of equal justice under the law.
Medical and humanitarian factors must be considered. Whether Wu Shu-chen is fit to serve time, requires careful medical evaluation. It also requires adequate prison facilities. If anything untoward were to happen in prison, the Ma administration would bear the brunt of any responsibility. Meanwhile, the DPP refuses to wait for the hospital assessment. It repeatedly asserts that Wu Shu-chen is "unfit to serve a prison term." It repeatedly accuses the Ma government of "politics before the law." In fact, the purpose of the DPP's moves are precisely that -- "politics before the law." In fact, the purpose of the DPP's moves is to exert political pressure on the administration of justice.
The political atmosphere is grave. The Ministry of Justice may stick to its self-proclaimed "non-intervention, non-interference, non-guidance" and "three noes." But PTC hospital physicians must conduct an assessment. Can they truly not be affected, psychologically and emotionally? Mobs outside the hospital raged. Can the physicians truly maintain their professionalism and objectivity? Can their assessment truly remain free from political influence? Suppose they make a clearly worded assessment? Regardless of whether Wu Shu-chen may or may not be required to serve time behind bars, can they truly avoid harassment by either Blue or Green camp supporters?
According to records, last year the PTC ruled that four convicts need not serve time. The Ministry of Justice has had over 500 such cases over the years. DPP legislators "reason" that so many "ordinary people" have not be required to serve time. Therefore why should Wu Shu-cheng? Their "reasoning" contains three fallacies. One. It reveals imperial arrogance. If the prince and the pauper commit the same crime, they must be treated the same under the law, Wu Shu-cheng must undergo the same testing and treatment as other prisoners. She cannot claim exemption on the basis of her status as "former first lady." Two. It inverts cause and effect. The other prisoners were assessed by physicians. Only then were they exempted, on medical grounds. They were not exempted before hand, before medical assessment. Many of them merely received temporary reprieves. Once their physical condition improved, they were forced to serve out their sentences. Three. It makes hypocritical appeals to "humanitarianism." Today's prisons are filled with sick people. Many convicts enter prison while sick. The DPP has never cared a whit for any of them. It blindly supports Wu Shu-cheng alone. What is the DPP's selective humanitarianism, except flagrant hypocrisy?
Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's corruption scandals came to light. Political turmoil followed. The Red Shirts took to the streets and demanded justice. Now, Chen Shui-bian has finally entered prison. Democracy and justice on Taiwan have take a giant leap forward. But many more of Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's corruption cases have yet to be tried. Whether Wu Shu-cheng must serve out her sentence, how the money she and Ah-Bian stole will be recovered, are all pieces of this unfinished puzzle. We hope that the Blue and Green camps will both take a step back. We hope they will give the physicians a chance to assess Wu Shu-Cheng's physical condition according to professional medical standards. These physicians must ignore Wu Shu-chen's status as "former first lady." They must treat her as an ordinary person. Ultimately, they must explain their decision to the public on the basis of scientific data. Their decision must reflect the demands of justice and humanitarianism, and not political pressure. Only such an approach can win the public trust.
In short, the assessment of Wu Shu-chen's health must be based on justice and humanitarianism. If political pressures are involved, the result will be a lie. Something untoward could happen to Wu Shu-chen while she serves out her prison sentence. She could then use her medical assessment as a shield, as an excuse to refuse to appear in court, or to do whatever she wants. This is not something the public would like to see. The physicians performing the assessment must exercise extreme caution.
政治迴避：以司法及人道權衡吳淑珍服刑
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.02.18 03:07 am
吳淑珍今天將到高雄地檢署報到，再送至台中監獄附設培德醫院檢驗評估，決定她是否入監服刑。法務部長曾勇夫說，一切尊重醫師的專業判斷；民進黨則以吳淑珍不能自理生活，反對她入監服刑，綠營民代和本土社團皆發動抗議。
比起陳水扁，吳淑珍因身體病殘，其服刑問題確實棘手許多。扁珍在去年十一月間同時判刑確定，陳水扁已經入獄兩個半月，吳淑珍卻在家度過了新年、春節和元宵，至今才要交由醫院進行評估。可見，法務部對她的情況已作了特殊的人情考量。但綠營仍然撻伐，指控馬政府利用「制度殺人」；在另一方面，也有許多民眾在等著看馬政府是否會承受不住壓力，讓吳淑珍以病體當藉口逍遙法外。
陷入這種司法、人道和政治的三角拔河，其實不只是馬政府的難題，也說明民進黨無能反省扁珍貪腐案的困境，儼然成為台灣民主政治的一個惡性腫瘤。依正常的程序，任何人犯了吳淑珍的罪行，是否需入監服刑，獄政體系原有一套既定的評估標準；這套系統行之有年，並未出現什麼適用上的困難。如今，為了吳淑珍，民進黨卻要求系統改變標準，要求政府為個人量身打造服刑條件，恐不符合司法正義的平等精神。
從醫療及人道的立場看，吳淑珍的身體狀況是否適宜入監服刑，除需要在醫學上作仔細評估，也需要考慮獄中的照護條件。若在獄中有任何三長兩短，那將是馬政府難以承受的責任。然而，民進黨不待醫院的評估，即再三宣稱吳淑珍的身體「不適合服刑」，指控馬政府的處理「政治性大過法律性」。這種操作，其實才是政治目的大過司法目的，是政治對司法行政的侵壓。
在如此嚴峻的政治氛圍中，就算法務部能保持其自稱的「不介入、不干預、不指導」的「三不」原則，但被指派進行這次評估的培德醫院醫師，其心理和情緒能不受影響嗎？當院外傳來聲援者的叫罵，他們如何保持專業與平常心，使評估不受政治牽引？甚至，一旦他們作出明確評估，不管吳淑珍入監或不必入監，他們能免於被藍綠陣營支持者窮追猛打嗎？
根據紀錄，去年培德曾裁定四人不必入監服刑，而法務部歷年來這類案件共有五百多例。民進黨立委因此質疑：那麼多「平民百姓」都不必服刑，為何偏偏不放過吳淑珍？這項指控犯了三項謬誤：一是「身分論」的傲慢：王子犯法與庶民同罪，吳淑珍需接受和其他犯人相同的檢驗待遇，不能以「前總統夫人」身分豁免；二是「倒果為因」：這些人都經醫師評估，而非事前要求免刑，且許多人只是暫時免服，近七成在身體狀況改善後仍服完刑期；三是虛假的「人道關懷」：如今病監人滿為患，多少人抱病入獄，民進黨從未過問，獨對吳淑珍一味力挺，這種因人而異的人道關懷豈不虛偽？
從扁珍爆發貪瀆，歷經政治風暴、紅衫軍示威和司法纏鬥，走到今天陳水扁入獄服刑，台灣的民主和司法都往前邁進了一大步。然而，扁珍貪瀆仍有許多相關案件尚未審完，包括吳淑珍服刑與否、贓款如何追回，都是這個滔天弊案未完成的拼圖。我們希望，藍綠陣營今天都能後退一步，讓培德醫院醫師有足夠的空間，根據專業完成吳淑珍的健康評估；醫師們則必須忘卻吳淑珍「前第一夫人」的身分，將她當成一個普通人處理，最後並用科學數據向國人清楚說明評估的理由。人道自在司法體制中，而非在政治壓力下；如此才是可昭公信的作法。
簡言之，對吳淑珍的評估，是要在司法的天平上添加人道的籌碼來衡量，若加上政治之手操作，就會失真。不論是吳淑珍因服刑發生意外，或是她日後拿此評估當護身符拒不出庭或為所欲為，都是社會不樂見的景象，醫師們請謹慎以對！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 18, 2011
Today, Wu Shu-chen will report to the Kaohsiung District Prosecutors Office. She will then be sent to the Taichung Prison Annex Hospital for testing and evaluation. The results will determine whether she will be put behind bars. Minister of Justice Tseng Yung-fu said every step along the way would accord with the professional judgment of physicians. The DPP has argued that Wu Shu-cheng is unable to care for herself. Therefore they oppose having her serve. Green Camp elected representatives and local community leaders plan to stage protests.
Compared to Chen Shui-bian, Wu Shu-cheng's physical disability does make her prison term a more prickly issue. Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's sentences were handed down at the same time, last November. Chen Shui-bian has already been in prison two and half months. Wu Shu-cheng spent New Years, Chinese New Years, and the Lantern Festival at home. Only now has she been referred to the hospital for evaluation. As we can see, the Ministry of Justice has given her special treatment due to humanitarian considerations. Yet the Green Camp persists in its attacks. They have accused the Ma administration of "using the system to kill people." On the other hand, many others are waiting to see whether the Ma government will buckle under pressure, and whether it will use Wu Shu-chen's health as an excuse to let her escape justice.
Justice, humanitarianism, and politics are engaged in a three way tug of war. In fact, the problem is not confined to the Ma administration. It also reflects the DPP's inability to examine its own conscience when confronted by Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's corruption. Democracy on Taiwan has a malignant tumor. Normally speaking, anyone who commited the same offense as Wu Shu-chen, would be forced to serve a prison sentence. The prison system has long established evaluation criteria. The system has been in existence for many years. It has never run into any real problems. Now, in order to pander to Wu Shu-chen, the DPP is demanding that the system change its standards, It is demanding that the government custom tailor her prison sentence, in accorance with her individual requirements. This is hardly consistent with the concept of equal justice under the law.
Medical and humanitarian factors must be considered. Whether Wu Shu-chen is fit to serve time, requires careful medical evaluation. It also requires adequate prison facilities. If anything untoward were to happen in prison, the Ma administration would bear the brunt of any responsibility. Meanwhile, the DPP refuses to wait for the hospital assessment. It repeatedly asserts that Wu Shu-chen is "unfit to serve a prison term." It repeatedly accuses the Ma government of "politics before the law." In fact, the purpose of the DPP's moves are precisely that -- "politics before the law." In fact, the purpose of the DPP's moves is to exert political pressure on the administration of justice.
The political atmosphere is grave. The Ministry of Justice may stick to its self-proclaimed "non-intervention, non-interference, non-guidance" and "three noes." But PTC hospital physicians must conduct an assessment. Can they truly not be affected, psychologically and emotionally? Mobs outside the hospital raged. Can the physicians truly maintain their professionalism and objectivity? Can their assessment truly remain free from political influence? Suppose they make a clearly worded assessment? Regardless of whether Wu Shu-chen may or may not be required to serve time behind bars, can they truly avoid harassment by either Blue or Green camp supporters?
According to records, last year the PTC ruled that four convicts need not serve time. The Ministry of Justice has had over 500 such cases over the years. DPP legislators "reason" that so many "ordinary people" have not be required to serve time. Therefore why should Wu Shu-cheng? Their "reasoning" contains three fallacies. One. It reveals imperial arrogance. If the prince and the pauper commit the same crime, they must be treated the same under the law, Wu Shu-cheng must undergo the same testing and treatment as other prisoners. She cannot claim exemption on the basis of her status as "former first lady." Two. It inverts cause and effect. The other prisoners were assessed by physicians. Only then were they exempted, on medical grounds. They were not exempted before hand, before medical assessment. Many of them merely received temporary reprieves. Once their physical condition improved, they were forced to serve out their sentences. Three. It makes hypocritical appeals to "humanitarianism." Today's prisons are filled with sick people. Many convicts enter prison while sick. The DPP has never cared a whit for any of them. It blindly supports Wu Shu-cheng alone. What is the DPP's selective humanitarianism, except flagrant hypocrisy?
Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's corruption scandals came to light. Political turmoil followed. The Red Shirts took to the streets and demanded justice. Now, Chen Shui-bian has finally entered prison. Democracy and justice on Taiwan have take a giant leap forward. But many more of Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's corruption cases have yet to be tried. Whether Wu Shu-cheng must serve out her sentence, how the money she and Ah-Bian stole will be recovered, are all pieces of this unfinished puzzle. We hope that the Blue and Green camps will both take a step back. We hope they will give the physicians a chance to assess Wu Shu-Cheng's physical condition according to professional medical standards. These physicians must ignore Wu Shu-chen's status as "former first lady." They must treat her as an ordinary person. Ultimately, they must explain their decision to the public on the basis of scientific data. Their decision must reflect the demands of justice and humanitarianism, and not political pressure. Only such an approach can win the public trust.
In short, the assessment of Wu Shu-chen's health must be based on justice and humanitarianism. If political pressures are involved, the result will be a lie. Something untoward could happen to Wu Shu-chen while she serves out her prison sentence. She could then use her medical assessment as a shield, as an excuse to refuse to appear in court, or to do whatever she wants. This is not something the public would like to see. The physicians performing the assessment must exercise extreme caution.
政治迴避：以司法及人道權衡吳淑珍服刑
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.02.18 03:07 am
吳淑珍今天將到高雄地檢署報到，再送至台中監獄附設培德醫院檢驗評估，決定她是否入監服刑。法務部長曾勇夫說，一切尊重醫師的專業判斷；民進黨則以吳淑珍不能自理生活，反對她入監服刑，綠營民代和本土社團皆發動抗議。
比起陳水扁，吳淑珍因身體病殘，其服刑問題確實棘手許多。扁珍在去年十一月間同時判刑確定，陳水扁已經入獄兩個半月，吳淑珍卻在家度過了新年、春節和元宵，至今才要交由醫院進行評估。可見，法務部對她的情況已作了特殊的人情考量。但綠營仍然撻伐，指控馬政府利用「制度殺人」；在另一方面，也有許多民眾在等著看馬政府是否會承受不住壓力，讓吳淑珍以病體當藉口逍遙法外。
陷入這種司法、人道和政治的三角拔河，其實不只是馬政府的難題，也說明民進黨無能反省扁珍貪腐案的困境，儼然成為台灣民主政治的一個惡性腫瘤。依正常的程序，任何人犯了吳淑珍的罪行，是否需入監服刑，獄政體系原有一套既定的評估標準；這套系統行之有年，並未出現什麼適用上的困難。如今，為了吳淑珍，民進黨卻要求系統改變標準，要求政府為個人量身打造服刑條件，恐不符合司法正義的平等精神。
從醫療及人道的立場看，吳淑珍的身體狀況是否適宜入監服刑，除需要在醫學上作仔細評估，也需要考慮獄中的照護條件。若在獄中有任何三長兩短，那將是馬政府難以承受的責任。然而，民進黨不待醫院的評估，即再三宣稱吳淑珍的身體「不適合服刑」，指控馬政府的處理「政治性大過法律性」。這種操作，其實才是政治目的大過司法目的，是政治對司法行政的侵壓。
在如此嚴峻的政治氛圍中，就算法務部能保持其自稱的「不介入、不干預、不指導」的「三不」原則，但被指派進行這次評估的培德醫院醫師，其心理和情緒能不受影響嗎？當院外傳來聲援者的叫罵，他們如何保持專業與平常心，使評估不受政治牽引？甚至，一旦他們作出明確評估，不管吳淑珍入監或不必入監，他們能免於被藍綠陣營支持者窮追猛打嗎？
根據紀錄，去年培德曾裁定四人不必入監服刑，而法務部歷年來這類案件共有五百多例。民進黨立委因此質疑：那麼多「平民百姓」都不必服刑，為何偏偏不放過吳淑珍？這項指控犯了三項謬誤：一是「身分論」的傲慢：王子犯法與庶民同罪，吳淑珍需接受和其他犯人相同的檢驗待遇，不能以「前總統夫人」身分豁免；二是「倒果為因」：這些人都經醫師評估，而非事前要求免刑，且許多人只是暫時免服，近七成在身體狀況改善後仍服完刑期；三是虛假的「人道關懷」：如今病監人滿為患，多少人抱病入獄，民進黨從未過問，獨對吳淑珍一味力挺，這種因人而異的人道關懷豈不虛偽？
從扁珍爆發貪瀆，歷經政治風暴、紅衫軍示威和司法纏鬥，走到今天陳水扁入獄服刑，台灣的民主和司法都往前邁進了一大步。然而，扁珍貪瀆仍有許多相關案件尚未審完，包括吳淑珍服刑與否、贓款如何追回，都是這個滔天弊案未完成的拼圖。我們希望，藍綠陣營今天都能後退一步，讓培德醫院醫師有足夠的空間，根據專業完成吳淑珍的健康評估；醫師們則必須忘卻吳淑珍「前第一夫人」的身分，將她當成一個普通人處理，最後並用科學數據向國人清楚說明評估的理由。人道自在司法體制中，而非在政治壓力下；如此才是可昭公信的作法。
簡言之，對吳淑珍的評估，是要在司法的天平上添加人道的籌碼來衡量，若加上政治之手操作，就會失真。不論是吳淑珍因服刑發生意外，或是她日後拿此評估當護身符拒不出庭或為所欲為，都是社會不樂見的景象，醫師們請謹慎以對！
Thursday, February 17, 2011
One China: Undivided But Separately Administered
One China: Undivided But Separately Administered
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 17, 2011
President Ma spoke out recently at a Chinese New Years tea party. He said that in order to comply with the 1992 Consensus and "One China, Different Interpretations," from this day forward the government would refer to Beijing as "the other side" or "the Mainland," and not "China."
Ma's comments can be interpreted two ways. One. The "One China" in "One China, Different Interpretations," refers to the Republic of China. Therefore the other side must not be referred to as "China." Two. The "One China" in "One China, Different Interpretations," refers to a third concept of China, one that transcends both the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China. Both the ROC and the PRC are part of this Third Concept of China. Therefore the other side must not be referred to as "China."
Beijing has also moved toward this Third Concept of One China in recent years. The media on Taiwan is already in the habit of referring to the other side as "China." This has alarmed and worried the Beijing authorities. Such usage smacks of "Taiwan and China, One Nation on Each Side." In cross-Strait relations, when the public on Taiwan refers to the Mainland as "China," it reflects a sense of alienation and differentiation.
In the past Beijing proclaimed that "The PRC Government is the sole government of all China," and that "One China means the People's Republic of China." As a result, the Republic of China found it difficult to persuade other nations that it still represented China. Besides, Beijing was determined to "annihilate the Republic of China." As a result, Beijing "de-Sinized" the name "Republic of China," both internationally, and on Taiwan. This frustrated the public on Taiwan. They gave up all hope of being "China" or being "Chinese." They had been humiliated. They were fearful. Their political identity as "China" and "Chinese" was steadily diluted. It was gradually replaced by a sense of being "Taiwanese." In other words, Beijing's past insistence that "One China means the Peoples Republic of China" was the the root cause of the de-Sinicization of the Republic of China and the de-Sinicization of the public on Taiwan. In recent years, Beijing has begun to realize this. This is the main reason it has begun leaning toward a "Third Concept of One China."
Beijing has made several attempts to do so. For example, the so-called "Three New Phrases" argued that "There is only one China in the world. Both the Mainland and Taiwan are part of this one China." This definition of China connotes and denotes the "roof theory" and the "Third Concept." In another example, Beijing argued that "the cross-Strait status quo is defined in existing regulations and documents on Taiwan." Beijing was referring to the Republic of China's "One China Constitution." In yet another example, Hu Jintao reiterated that "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they nevertheless belong to one China." The status quo is perceived a "continued political confrontation -- a legacy of the Chinese Civil War of the late 1940s." The status quo is perceived as "an undivided but separately administered China." One might say that after 2008, new opportunities have been present to both sides. Beijing's cross-Strait policy has changed from the "annihilation of the Republic of China," to the "preservation of the Republic of China."
Compare President Ma's recent declaration to Beijing's. Both sides have have subtly altered their definitions of "One China." They no longer insist that either the Republic of China or the Peoples Republic of China is the sole government of China. Instead, they are attempting to establish a new way of thinking, in which Taiwan and the Mainland, or the ROC and the PRC, are both part of one China. They both view "One China" as a "Third Concept" or as the "Roof Theory."
The Ma administration speaks of "One China, Different Interpretations." Hu Jintao speaks of a China which "has yet to be reunified, but nevertheless remains a single China." Both are describing an "undivided but separately administered China," that is a "Third Concept of China." Do the two sides want "peaceful development?" Do they want to uphold "One China, Different Interpretations," or a China which "has yet to be reunified, but nevertheless remains a single China?" If so, then the public on Taiwan must feel that the Republic of China is part of China. Only then will they feel that they are part of China and that they are Chinese. If on the other hand, Beijing de-Sinicizes the Republic of China, it will de-Sinicize Taiwan. It will de-Sinicize the public on Taiwan. Consider cross-Strait affairs. A recent editorial argued that if we wish to sign a "peace agreement," we cannot refuse to recognize that the ROC government was one of the two warring parties, and must be one of the two peacemaking parties. This newspaper spoke of the "Glass Theory," in which Taiwan is the water, and the ROC is the glass. As long as the glass remains, so does the water. Once the glass is broken, the water spills out.
Neither side rules out cross-Strait reunification. But reunification will not be easy. We have been presented with a rare and fleeting opportunity. The two sides' "interim goal" should be to institutionalize and concretize "One China, Different Interpretations," or "One China which has yet to be reunified, but nevertheless remains a single China." This newspaper spoke of "connectedness," and how it was better than "unity." This is what it meant. "One China" must be promoted to the level of "roof theory," to the level of a "Third Concept." Actually this is merely an extension of President Ma's demand that the other side be referred to as "the Mainland," rather than "China." It is merely an extension of Beijing's statement that "the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China," It is what this newspaper meant by "Three New Phrases." "There is only one China in the world. Both the ROC and the PRC are part of that one China, China's sovereignty and territory must not be divided."
A New Concept has presented itself: an undivided but separately administered China. We urge both the ruling administration and opposition parties to consider this new direction.
一中新解：一個分治而不分裂的第三概念中國
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.17
馬總統在新春茶會中指出，為符合「九二共識」、「一個中國／各自表述」，今後政府機關用語，一律稱「對岸」或「大陸」，不稱「中國」。
此語可能作兩種解讀。一、「一中各表」中的「一個中國」，是指中華民國，因此不可稱對岸為「中國」；二、「一中各表」中的「一個中國」，是指超越「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」的「第三概念」的「中國」，中華民國與中華人民共和國皆是這個「第三概念」的「中國」的一部分，因此不可稱對岸為「中國」。
將「一個中國」朝向「第三概念化」，也是北京近年來持續探討的方向。台灣的媒體用語已經習以「中國」指稱對岸，這使北京當局頗生警覺與憂慮；因為，這種用語儼然已成「台灣中國／一邊一國」的洗腦藥水；在兩岸關係上，台灣人民將大陸稱為「中國」，其實反映出一種疏離與區隔的意識。
北京過去稱「中華人民共和國政府是代表中國的唯一政府」，「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」。中華民國因在國際上難與對岸競爭代表「中國」的地位，而北京又以「消滅中華民國」為主軸政策，致「中華民國」在國際上及台灣內部皆被北京「去中國化」；因而使台灣人民對成為「中國」或「中國人」非但絕望，且亦感到恐懼及被羞辱，遂在政治認同上與「中國」及「中國人」漸行漸遠，而台灣的主體意識則愈來愈高。也就是說，北京過去的「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」的政策，正是使中華民國及台灣人民「去中國化」的根本原因；而這也正是北京方面近年持續探究，欲將「一個中國」朝向「第三概念化」的主要原因。
北京方面做過多種嘗試。例如，所謂的「新三句」即稱「世界上只有一個中國，大陸和台灣同屬一個中國」；此處所指的「中國」，即有「屋頂理論」及「第三概念」的內涵及外延。又如，謂「（兩岸）現狀就是見之於台灣現行規定及文件的現狀」；此處是指中華民國的「一中憲法」。再如，胡錦濤多次提及「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」；這是視現狀為「上個世紀四十年代中後期中國內戰遺留並延續的政治對立」，亦即視現狀為「分治而不分裂的中國」。可以這麼說：在二○○八後的兩岸新機遇中，北京的兩岸政策已從「消滅中華民國」轉移至「維持中華民國」。
比較馬總統的此次宣示與北京近年所做嘗試，可見雙方都在對「一個中國」的涵義進行調整；主要的方向皆在不再強調「中華民國（或中華人民共和國）是代表中國的唯一政府」，而欲創造一個「台灣（中華民國）及大陸（中華人民共和國）皆是一部分的中國」的新思維；此即將「一個中國」視為「第三概念」或「屋頂理論」。
其實，無論馬政府的「一中各表」，或胡錦濤的「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」，用意皆在描繪「一個分治而不分裂的第三概念中國」。兩岸若欲「和平發展」，並維持「一中各表」或「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」；至少必須讓台灣人民覺得「中華民國是一部分的中國」，始能讓台灣人民有「中國」及「中國人」的認同；反之，北京若欲將中華民國「去中國化」，也就是將台灣「去中國化」及將台灣人民「去中國人化」。至於在兩岸實務上，如日前社論所言，即使欲簽定《和平協議》，亦不可否認中華民國政府為交戰主體及議和主體。此即本報主張的「杯子理論」：台灣是水，中華民國是杯；杯在水在，杯破水覆。
兩岸不必排除統一，但統一不易達成。在這個亙古一遇、稍縱即逝的機遇期中，兩岸的「中程目標」，應在設法使「一中各表」或「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」達到法制化及固定化。此即本報所指「連結論」先於並優於「統一論」的道理。欲臻此境，「一個中國」即須昇華為「屋頂理論」的「第三概念」；這其實只是馬總統所說「稱大陸，不稱中國」，及北京所說「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國」的引伸；亦是本報所提「新新三句」的意旨：「世界上只有一個中國，中華民國與中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國，中國的主權和領土不容分割。」
一中新解：一個分治而不分裂的中國。建議兩岸朝野皆朝此方向想想看吧！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 17, 2011
President Ma spoke out recently at a Chinese New Years tea party. He said that in order to comply with the 1992 Consensus and "One China, Different Interpretations," from this day forward the government would refer to Beijing as "the other side" or "the Mainland," and not "China."
Ma's comments can be interpreted two ways. One. The "One China" in "One China, Different Interpretations," refers to the Republic of China. Therefore the other side must not be referred to as "China." Two. The "One China" in "One China, Different Interpretations," refers to a third concept of China, one that transcends both the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China. Both the ROC and the PRC are part of this Third Concept of China. Therefore the other side must not be referred to as "China."
Beijing has also moved toward this Third Concept of One China in recent years. The media on Taiwan is already in the habit of referring to the other side as "China." This has alarmed and worried the Beijing authorities. Such usage smacks of "Taiwan and China, One Nation on Each Side." In cross-Strait relations, when the public on Taiwan refers to the Mainland as "China," it reflects a sense of alienation and differentiation.
In the past Beijing proclaimed that "The PRC Government is the sole government of all China," and that "One China means the People's Republic of China." As a result, the Republic of China found it difficult to persuade other nations that it still represented China. Besides, Beijing was determined to "annihilate the Republic of China." As a result, Beijing "de-Sinized" the name "Republic of China," both internationally, and on Taiwan. This frustrated the public on Taiwan. They gave up all hope of being "China" or being "Chinese." They had been humiliated. They were fearful. Their political identity as "China" and "Chinese" was steadily diluted. It was gradually replaced by a sense of being "Taiwanese." In other words, Beijing's past insistence that "One China means the Peoples Republic of China" was the the root cause of the de-Sinicization of the Republic of China and the de-Sinicization of the public on Taiwan. In recent years, Beijing has begun to realize this. This is the main reason it has begun leaning toward a "Third Concept of One China."
Beijing has made several attempts to do so. For example, the so-called "Three New Phrases" argued that "There is only one China in the world. Both the Mainland and Taiwan are part of this one China." This definition of China connotes and denotes the "roof theory" and the "Third Concept." In another example, Beijing argued that "the cross-Strait status quo is defined in existing regulations and documents on Taiwan." Beijing was referring to the Republic of China's "One China Constitution." In yet another example, Hu Jintao reiterated that "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they nevertheless belong to one China." The status quo is perceived a "continued political confrontation -- a legacy of the Chinese Civil War of the late 1940s." The status quo is perceived as "an undivided but separately administered China." One might say that after 2008, new opportunities have been present to both sides. Beijing's cross-Strait policy has changed from the "annihilation of the Republic of China," to the "preservation of the Republic of China."
Compare President Ma's recent declaration to Beijing's. Both sides have have subtly altered their definitions of "One China." They no longer insist that either the Republic of China or the Peoples Republic of China is the sole government of China. Instead, they are attempting to establish a new way of thinking, in which Taiwan and the Mainland, or the ROC and the PRC, are both part of one China. They both view "One China" as a "Third Concept" or as the "Roof Theory."
The Ma administration speaks of "One China, Different Interpretations." Hu Jintao speaks of a China which "has yet to be reunified, but nevertheless remains a single China." Both are describing an "undivided but separately administered China," that is a "Third Concept of China." Do the two sides want "peaceful development?" Do they want to uphold "One China, Different Interpretations," or a China which "has yet to be reunified, but nevertheless remains a single China?" If so, then the public on Taiwan must feel that the Republic of China is part of China. Only then will they feel that they are part of China and that they are Chinese. If on the other hand, Beijing de-Sinicizes the Republic of China, it will de-Sinicize Taiwan. It will de-Sinicize the public on Taiwan. Consider cross-Strait affairs. A recent editorial argued that if we wish to sign a "peace agreement," we cannot refuse to recognize that the ROC government was one of the two warring parties, and must be one of the two peacemaking parties. This newspaper spoke of the "Glass Theory," in which Taiwan is the water, and the ROC is the glass. As long as the glass remains, so does the water. Once the glass is broken, the water spills out.
Neither side rules out cross-Strait reunification. But reunification will not be easy. We have been presented with a rare and fleeting opportunity. The two sides' "interim goal" should be to institutionalize and concretize "One China, Different Interpretations," or "One China which has yet to be reunified, but nevertheless remains a single China." This newspaper spoke of "connectedness," and how it was better than "unity." This is what it meant. "One China" must be promoted to the level of "roof theory," to the level of a "Third Concept." Actually this is merely an extension of President Ma's demand that the other side be referred to as "the Mainland," rather than "China." It is merely an extension of Beijing's statement that "the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China," It is what this newspaper meant by "Three New Phrases." "There is only one China in the world. Both the ROC and the PRC are part of that one China, China's sovereignty and territory must not be divided."
A New Concept has presented itself: an undivided but separately administered China. We urge both the ruling administration and opposition parties to consider this new direction.
一中新解：一個分治而不分裂的第三概念中國
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.17
馬總統在新春茶會中指出，為符合「九二共識」、「一個中國／各自表述」，今後政府機關用語，一律稱「對岸」或「大陸」，不稱「中國」。
此語可能作兩種解讀。一、「一中各表」中的「一個中國」，是指中華民國，因此不可稱對岸為「中國」；二、「一中各表」中的「一個中國」，是指超越「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」的「第三概念」的「中國」，中華民國與中華人民共和國皆是這個「第三概念」的「中國」的一部分，因此不可稱對岸為「中國」。
將「一個中國」朝向「第三概念化」，也是北京近年來持續探討的方向。台灣的媒體用語已經習以「中國」指稱對岸，這使北京當局頗生警覺與憂慮；因為，這種用語儼然已成「台灣中國／一邊一國」的洗腦藥水；在兩岸關係上，台灣人民將大陸稱為「中國」，其實反映出一種疏離與區隔的意識。
北京過去稱「中華人民共和國政府是代表中國的唯一政府」，「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」。中華民國因在國際上難與對岸競爭代表「中國」的地位，而北京又以「消滅中華民國」為主軸政策，致「中華民國」在國際上及台灣內部皆被北京「去中國化」；因而使台灣人民對成為「中國」或「中國人」非但絕望，且亦感到恐懼及被羞辱，遂在政治認同上與「中國」及「中國人」漸行漸遠，而台灣的主體意識則愈來愈高。也就是說，北京過去的「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」的政策，正是使中華民國及台灣人民「去中國化」的根本原因；而這也正是北京方面近年持續探究，欲將「一個中國」朝向「第三概念化」的主要原因。
北京方面做過多種嘗試。例如，所謂的「新三句」即稱「世界上只有一個中國，大陸和台灣同屬一個中國」；此處所指的「中國」，即有「屋頂理論」及「第三概念」的內涵及外延。又如，謂「（兩岸）現狀就是見之於台灣現行規定及文件的現狀」；此處是指中華民國的「一中憲法」。再如，胡錦濤多次提及「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」；這是視現狀為「上個世紀四十年代中後期中國內戰遺留並延續的政治對立」，亦即視現狀為「分治而不分裂的中國」。可以這麼說：在二○○八後的兩岸新機遇中，北京的兩岸政策已從「消滅中華民國」轉移至「維持中華民國」。
比較馬總統的此次宣示與北京近年所做嘗試，可見雙方都在對「一個中國」的涵義進行調整；主要的方向皆在不再強調「中華民國（或中華人民共和國）是代表中國的唯一政府」，而欲創造一個「台灣（中華民國）及大陸（中華人民共和國）皆是一部分的中國」的新思維；此即將「一個中國」視為「第三概念」或「屋頂理論」。
其實，無論馬政府的「一中各表」，或胡錦濤的「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」，用意皆在描繪「一個分治而不分裂的第三概念中國」。兩岸若欲「和平發展」，並維持「一中各表」或「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」；至少必須讓台灣人民覺得「中華民國是一部分的中國」，始能讓台灣人民有「中國」及「中國人」的認同；反之，北京若欲將中華民國「去中國化」，也就是將台灣「去中國化」及將台灣人民「去中國人化」。至於在兩岸實務上，如日前社論所言，即使欲簽定《和平協議》，亦不可否認中華民國政府為交戰主體及議和主體。此即本報主張的「杯子理論」：台灣是水，中華民國是杯；杯在水在，杯破水覆。
兩岸不必排除統一，但統一不易達成。在這個亙古一遇、稍縱即逝的機遇期中，兩岸的「中程目標」，應在設法使「一中各表」或「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」達到法制化及固定化。此即本報所指「連結論」先於並優於「統一論」的道理。欲臻此境，「一個中國」即須昇華為「屋頂理論」的「第三概念」；這其實只是馬總統所說「稱大陸，不稱中國」，及北京所說「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國」的引伸；亦是本報所提「新新三句」的意旨：「世界上只有一個中國，中華民國與中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國，中國的主權和領土不容分割。」
一中新解：一個分治而不分裂的中國。建議兩岸朝野皆朝此方向想想看吧！
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
New Year's Economic Prospects Call for Cautious Optimism
New Year's Economic Prospects Call for Cautious Optimism
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 16, 2011
Tomorrow is the Lantern Festival. The New Year has begun, and is bringing people warmer weather and renewed hope.
Last year's economic growth was double-digit. The black clouds of the financial tsunami dissipated. ECFA, which dragged on forever, finally went from paper to reality. The early harvest list of 579 exports will gradually reduce tariffs, beginning this year. More long-awaited benefits are still to come. So much good news, all at the same time. We should be able to look forward to a good year.
But despite these positive omens, we must not take economic prosperity for granted. But must take things one step at a time. Long term indicators could turn negative. If that happens, not just Taiwan, but the entire world will feel the impact. When might it take effect? It could happen this year. It could happen in the first half.
In September 2008, the financial tsunami struck. With the US at the helm, governments the world over attempted to minimize its impact and to ensure an early recovery. They adopted all sorts of unorthodox monetary and fiscal policies. But they went too far. They severely distorted the global economy. For two years imbalances worsened. Bubbles appeared in developing countries. Their economies overheated. Developed countries experienced capital loss. They hoped to revive their economies, but lacked the ability. The result was one half of the world bloomed, while the other half withered. Fire and ice coexisted, side by side, in an abnormal structure. More and more urgent measures became necessary to turn things around, and set the global economy back on the road to normality.
Here lies one of the keys. the U.S. Federal Reserve was the first to suddenly drop interest rates to zero. This was a serious offense against the laws of the marketplace. When will the Fed stop engaging in such heavy-handed interventions, and allow interest rates to return to normal? The U.S. Government is selfish. It obstinately adheres to a ridiculous interest rate policy and refuses to make concessions. With quantitative easing in the second quarter, it added fuel to the fire. As a result, developing countries fear that interest rates rises will encourage carry trades. Hot money will become even more rampant. Bubbles will burst, currencies will be revalued, and export competitiveness will be lost, They have no choice but to follow suit, to sit back and watch as real interest rates plummet, or even turn negative. How long can such distortions be maintained?
In the second half of last year, the United States began bleeding capital. The economy is still recovering. Apart from unemployment, the indicators have significantly improved. If this trend continues, the Federal Reserve's zero interest rate policy will become less and less justifiable. The Fed is likely to suddenly declare an interest rate increase during the first half. Once the United States lets go, developing countries will be relieved. They will rally in response. Disaster looms. The global interest rate structure will return to normal. It may even increase due to inflationary pressure. By then, much of the hot money will rapidly return to the United States. Fire and ice will suddenly collide. Fueled by U.S. funds, they will be unleashed. Hot money in developing countries will unexpectedly depart. Interest rates will increase. This will lead to the bursting of one bubble after another. Taiwan has been the target of hot money over the past two years. The central bank has wracked its brains attempting to block hot money. But it has been powerless. When the hot money leaves and the bubble bursts, the negative impact will not be far behind. If the bubble bursts too hard and too fast, it will lead to the worrisome "double dip." That is not something to be taken lightly.
Another important factor is Mainland China. Mainland policy, combined with a sudden jump in salaries, could close the doors of the world's factory. In recent years, Taiwan's economic growth has been dependent upon the surplus from Mainland processing zones. If this situation changes, the impact on Taiwan's economy would be great indeed.
If the world's factory closes, the initial brunt would be borne by the Mainland economy. The impact would be massive. The outlook for the Mainland economy would not be optimistic. Not only would it lose exports. Imports would be unsustainable too. This year Taiwan anticipates a huge increase in the number of Mainland tourists. Strong domestic demand and expansion on the Mainland would lead to exports to Taiwan. If these expectations come up short, if they decrease instead of increase, they will deal a nasty blow to Taiwan. Unfulfilled expectations are particularly hard to bear.
Such developments are likely this year. We must face the facts. We must prepare for a rainy day. We must begin as soon as possible. These growth engines, these pillars of the economy, may be suddenly shaken. We must ensure that Taiwan's economy does not collapse. After all, if the world's factory closes its doors, Southeast Asia will surely replace it. The global economy will emerge from the twisted wreckage. Prosperity will return. ECFA, in particular, has thrown open the doors to freedom and liberalization. Taiwan now faces a new era, undreamed of in six decades. But only as long as we are not attached to appearances, only as long as we are willing to confront the future, The Republic of China Centennial will be an important beginning. It will be the starting point for a new era of prosperity.
新年經濟新局 要樂觀也應審慎
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.02.16 02:56 am
明天是元宵，新年的序幕拉開，為人們帶來新的氣象與新的憧憬。
去年的經濟成長率在兩位數上下，將金融海嘯的陰霾一掃而光，而擾攘甚久的ＥＣＦＡ終於從紙面走上現實，早收清單的五七九項出口品今年開始逐步降低關稅，更將帶來期盼已久的實質利益。這麼多好消息一時並至，應可期盼醞釀出一個好年頭。
然而，儘管有這些好兆頭加持，今年的經濟情勢卻不容掉以輕心，反而必須步步為營，因為若干影響深遠的重要因素顯得撲朔迷離，一旦發作，不止台灣，整個世界經濟都難免顛簸震盪；而發威的時間，很可能不出今年，甚至上半年即見分曉。
二○○八年九月金融海嘯爆發以來，以美國為首的全球各國政府為求減輕災難，早日復甦，紛紛採取各種非典型的貨幣與財政政策以應變；結果過猶不及，全球經濟結構受到嚴重扭曲。因而兩年於茲，失衡狀況愈演愈烈，新興國家泡沫滋長、景氣過熱，先進國家則資金流失，欲振乏力，形成一個半榮半枯、冰炭共存的畸形結構，愈來愈迫切需要以霹靂手段扭轉乾坤，重置全球經濟於正常穩健的大道之上。
此中關鍵之一，就是率先將利率遽降至零的美國聯準會，何時可停止此嚴重違反市場規律的強力干預，讓利率水準逐漸回歸正常。由於美國政府為一己之私，膠柱鼓瑟，堅守此一荒謬利率政策而毫不讓步，甚至以二次量化寬鬆政策（ＱＥ２）火上加油；於是，新興國家唯恐單獨升息將助長利差交易，使熱錢更猖獗，鼓脹泡沫並推升幣值損及出口競爭力，只好勉力跟隨，坐視本國實質利率向下沉淪，乃至成為負值。但如此扭曲的狀態，豈能持久？
從去年下半年開始，美國在資金流失的情況下，經濟依然走向復甦之路，除失業率外，各項指標皆明顯改善；若此趨勢繼續發展，則聯準會堅守零利率的政策即逐步失去說服力，極可能在今年上半年毅然宣布升息。一旦美國放手，新興國家將如釋重負，群起響應，則不旋踵之間，全球利率結構將幡然歸正，甚至在逐漸加深的通膨壓力之下，逐步走高；屆時，無數追求利差的熱錢會加速向美國回流，冰炭兩個半球會猛然碰撞，美國在資金的助長下，如虎添翼，而新興國家則因為熱錢驟去、利率走揚，而使棘手的泡沫接踵破滅。台灣正是熱錢兩年來攻擊的重點，央行近來殫精竭慮勉力阻擋，仍力不從心；因而屆時熱錢之流失與泡沫之破滅，其衝擊恐怕也不落人後。而泡沫過大又破滅過快，正是常為人憂心的所謂「二次衰退」，豈可掉以輕心？
另一項重要因素，則是中國大陸在政策引導與薪資驟升的夾擊之下，世界工廠正拉下大門；最近幾年，台灣經濟成長率基本上靠在對岸這些加工基地的出超支撐，倘若情勢丕變，其對台灣經濟的衝擊將無比巨大。
不過，世界工廠如果關門，首當其衝的乃是大陸經濟；在其巨大衝擊之下，大陸景氣恐難樂觀，不但失去出口支撐，進口也難以為繼。然而，今年台灣最期待的正是陸客大量增加、大陸內需擴張大力向台灣進口；如果這兩項期待落空，甚至不增反減，則當前面兩項因素重擊台灣時，落空的期望會格外沉重。
面對這幾項極有可能在今年發生的衝擊，我們必須認清真相，未雨綢繆；不但要預先做好可能的防備，而且儘速籌謀對策，俾在這些成長引擎、景氣支柱忽然動搖時，可以有力地支撐台灣經濟不墜。畢竟，對岸的世界工廠拉下大門，必定會在東南亞一帶重新開張；而全球經濟結構自扭曲畸形的陷阱脫出，自會重新走上繁榮興盛的大道，尤其ＥＣＦＡ猛然打開自由開放的大門，台灣正面對六十年來不敢奢想的新紀元；只要我們不耽迷於表相，而能眾志成城迎向未來，民國一百年會是一個重要的開端，亦應是昂揚向上的起點。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 16, 2011
Tomorrow is the Lantern Festival. The New Year has begun, and is bringing people warmer weather and renewed hope.
Last year's economic growth was double-digit. The black clouds of the financial tsunami dissipated. ECFA, which dragged on forever, finally went from paper to reality. The early harvest list of 579 exports will gradually reduce tariffs, beginning this year. More long-awaited benefits are still to come. So much good news, all at the same time. We should be able to look forward to a good year.
But despite these positive omens, we must not take economic prosperity for granted. But must take things one step at a time. Long term indicators could turn negative. If that happens, not just Taiwan, but the entire world will feel the impact. When might it take effect? It could happen this year. It could happen in the first half.
In September 2008, the financial tsunami struck. With the US at the helm, governments the world over attempted to minimize its impact and to ensure an early recovery. They adopted all sorts of unorthodox monetary and fiscal policies. But they went too far. They severely distorted the global economy. For two years imbalances worsened. Bubbles appeared in developing countries. Their economies overheated. Developed countries experienced capital loss. They hoped to revive their economies, but lacked the ability. The result was one half of the world bloomed, while the other half withered. Fire and ice coexisted, side by side, in an abnormal structure. More and more urgent measures became necessary to turn things around, and set the global economy back on the road to normality.
Here lies one of the keys. the U.S. Federal Reserve was the first to suddenly drop interest rates to zero. This was a serious offense against the laws of the marketplace. When will the Fed stop engaging in such heavy-handed interventions, and allow interest rates to return to normal? The U.S. Government is selfish. It obstinately adheres to a ridiculous interest rate policy and refuses to make concessions. With quantitative easing in the second quarter, it added fuel to the fire. As a result, developing countries fear that interest rates rises will encourage carry trades. Hot money will become even more rampant. Bubbles will burst, currencies will be revalued, and export competitiveness will be lost, They have no choice but to follow suit, to sit back and watch as real interest rates plummet, or even turn negative. How long can such distortions be maintained?
In the second half of last year, the United States began bleeding capital. The economy is still recovering. Apart from unemployment, the indicators have significantly improved. If this trend continues, the Federal Reserve's zero interest rate policy will become less and less justifiable. The Fed is likely to suddenly declare an interest rate increase during the first half. Once the United States lets go, developing countries will be relieved. They will rally in response. Disaster looms. The global interest rate structure will return to normal. It may even increase due to inflationary pressure. By then, much of the hot money will rapidly return to the United States. Fire and ice will suddenly collide. Fueled by U.S. funds, they will be unleashed. Hot money in developing countries will unexpectedly depart. Interest rates will increase. This will lead to the bursting of one bubble after another. Taiwan has been the target of hot money over the past two years. The central bank has wracked its brains attempting to block hot money. But it has been powerless. When the hot money leaves and the bubble bursts, the negative impact will not be far behind. If the bubble bursts too hard and too fast, it will lead to the worrisome "double dip." That is not something to be taken lightly.
Another important factor is Mainland China. Mainland policy, combined with a sudden jump in salaries, could close the doors of the world's factory. In recent years, Taiwan's economic growth has been dependent upon the surplus from Mainland processing zones. If this situation changes, the impact on Taiwan's economy would be great indeed.
If the world's factory closes, the initial brunt would be borne by the Mainland economy. The impact would be massive. The outlook for the Mainland economy would not be optimistic. Not only would it lose exports. Imports would be unsustainable too. This year Taiwan anticipates a huge increase in the number of Mainland tourists. Strong domestic demand and expansion on the Mainland would lead to exports to Taiwan. If these expectations come up short, if they decrease instead of increase, they will deal a nasty blow to Taiwan. Unfulfilled expectations are particularly hard to bear.
Such developments are likely this year. We must face the facts. We must prepare for a rainy day. We must begin as soon as possible. These growth engines, these pillars of the economy, may be suddenly shaken. We must ensure that Taiwan's economy does not collapse. After all, if the world's factory closes its doors, Southeast Asia will surely replace it. The global economy will emerge from the twisted wreckage. Prosperity will return. ECFA, in particular, has thrown open the doors to freedom and liberalization. Taiwan now faces a new era, undreamed of in six decades. But only as long as we are not attached to appearances, only as long as we are willing to confront the future, The Republic of China Centennial will be an important beginning. It will be the starting point for a new era of prosperity.
新年經濟新局 要樂觀也應審慎
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.02.16 02:56 am
明天是元宵，新年的序幕拉開，為人們帶來新的氣象與新的憧憬。
去年的經濟成長率在兩位數上下，將金融海嘯的陰霾一掃而光，而擾攘甚久的ＥＣＦＡ終於從紙面走上現實，早收清單的五七九項出口品今年開始逐步降低關稅，更將帶來期盼已久的實質利益。這麼多好消息一時並至，應可期盼醞釀出一個好年頭。
然而，儘管有這些好兆頭加持，今年的經濟情勢卻不容掉以輕心，反而必須步步為營，因為若干影響深遠的重要因素顯得撲朔迷離，一旦發作，不止台灣，整個世界經濟都難免顛簸震盪；而發威的時間，很可能不出今年，甚至上半年即見分曉。
二○○八年九月金融海嘯爆發以來，以美國為首的全球各國政府為求減輕災難，早日復甦，紛紛採取各種非典型的貨幣與財政政策以應變；結果過猶不及，全球經濟結構受到嚴重扭曲。因而兩年於茲，失衡狀況愈演愈烈，新興國家泡沫滋長、景氣過熱，先進國家則資金流失，欲振乏力，形成一個半榮半枯、冰炭共存的畸形結構，愈來愈迫切需要以霹靂手段扭轉乾坤，重置全球經濟於正常穩健的大道之上。
此中關鍵之一，就是率先將利率遽降至零的美國聯準會，何時可停止此嚴重違反市場規律的強力干預，讓利率水準逐漸回歸正常。由於美國政府為一己之私，膠柱鼓瑟，堅守此一荒謬利率政策而毫不讓步，甚至以二次量化寬鬆政策（ＱＥ２）火上加油；於是，新興國家唯恐單獨升息將助長利差交易，使熱錢更猖獗，鼓脹泡沫並推升幣值損及出口競爭力，只好勉力跟隨，坐視本國實質利率向下沉淪，乃至成為負值。但如此扭曲的狀態，豈能持久？
從去年下半年開始，美國在資金流失的情況下，經濟依然走向復甦之路，除失業率外，各項指標皆明顯改善；若此趨勢繼續發展，則聯準會堅守零利率的政策即逐步失去說服力，極可能在今年上半年毅然宣布升息。一旦美國放手，新興國家將如釋重負，群起響應，則不旋踵之間，全球利率結構將幡然歸正，甚至在逐漸加深的通膨壓力之下，逐步走高；屆時，無數追求利差的熱錢會加速向美國回流，冰炭兩個半球會猛然碰撞，美國在資金的助長下，如虎添翼，而新興國家則因為熱錢驟去、利率走揚，而使棘手的泡沫接踵破滅。台灣正是熱錢兩年來攻擊的重點，央行近來殫精竭慮勉力阻擋，仍力不從心；因而屆時熱錢之流失與泡沫之破滅，其衝擊恐怕也不落人後。而泡沫過大又破滅過快，正是常為人憂心的所謂「二次衰退」，豈可掉以輕心？
另一項重要因素，則是中國大陸在政策引導與薪資驟升的夾擊之下，世界工廠正拉下大門；最近幾年，台灣經濟成長率基本上靠在對岸這些加工基地的出超支撐，倘若情勢丕變，其對台灣經濟的衝擊將無比巨大。
不過，世界工廠如果關門，首當其衝的乃是大陸經濟；在其巨大衝擊之下，大陸景氣恐難樂觀，不但失去出口支撐，進口也難以為繼。然而，今年台灣最期待的正是陸客大量增加、大陸內需擴張大力向台灣進口；如果這兩項期待落空，甚至不增反減，則當前面兩項因素重擊台灣時，落空的期望會格外沉重。
面對這幾項極有可能在今年發生的衝擊，我們必須認清真相，未雨綢繆；不但要預先做好可能的防備，而且儘速籌謀對策，俾在這些成長引擎、景氣支柱忽然動搖時，可以有力地支撐台灣經濟不墜。畢竟，對岸的世界工廠拉下大門，必定會在東南亞一帶重新開張；而全球經濟結構自扭曲畸形的陷阱脫出，自會重新走上繁榮興盛的大道，尤其ＥＣＦＡ猛然打開自由開放的大門，台灣正面對六十年來不敢奢想的新紀元；只要我們不耽迷於表相，而能眾志成城迎向未來，民國一百年會是一個重要的開端，亦應是昂揚向上的起點。
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
Before Signing Any Peace Agreement, First Identify the Signatories
Before Signing Any Peace Agreement, First Identify the Signatories
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 15, 2011
Every now and again officials will talk about how they "look forward to strengthening cross-Strait political dialogue." The recent Obama/Hu Summit was no exception. Taipei's response was the same. "First economics, then politics. First the easy, then the hard." Everyone on both sides of the Strait knows that political dialogue cannot be avoided in the long run. The problem is that no one on either side knows where to begin. This newspaper suggests that the two sides should begin by concluding a "peace agreement," ending the civil war.
The concept of a cross-Strait peace agreement is an old one. Even Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian have suggested it. Lee sent secret emissary Su Chih-cheng to Beijing to propose the signing of a peace agreement. Beijing refused because Lee insisted that the agreement be on a nation to nation basis. Subsequently, American scholar Kenneth Lieberthal proposed an interim agreement, in which Taipei would not declare independence, and Beijing would refrain from using force. This provoked many lively discussions. In 2005, Lien Chan met with Hu Jintao. They cited a peace agreement as one of their five main hopes for the future. Ma Ying-jeou made a peace agreement part of his presidential campaign platform. During his 2009 Chinese New Year's speech, Hu Jintao spoke at length of an "end to hostilities, and the reaching of a peace agreement."
Hu Jintao said "Since 1949, the Mainland and Taiwan have yet to be reunified, but this does not mean that China's territory and sovereignty have been divided. It merely means that since the late 1940s, the Chinese Civil War has resulted in continued political confrontation." Based on such an understanding, Hu Jintao called for "an end to hostilities, and the reaching of a peace agreement."
His reasoning accords with historical fact as well as with logic. In other words, the cross-Strait status quo is the legacy and continuation of the Chinese Civil War. Therefore it is necessary to sign a peace agreement, The Chinese Civil War of the previous century lasted from 1927 to 1949. It continued in fits and starts for 22 years. During the eight year long War of Resistance Against Japan, the Civil War was officially on hold, but in practice it went on regardless. The warring parties were the National Revolutionary Army of the Central Government, and the People's Liberation Army of the Chinese Communist Party. This evolved into cross-Strait confrontation between the Republic of China government on one side, and the People's Republic of China government on the other. As a result of the Civil War, the two sides refused to recognize each other. They sought to destroy each other. A peace agreement would end the Civil War. The two sides would agree not to destroy each other. They would recognize each other, both as belligerents, and as peacemakers. In other words, if one wishes to sign a peace agreement one must first affirm the status of the two warring governments. Without first doing so, how can one possibly sign a peace agreement?
Such thinking inspired Hu's Chinese New Year's Eve speech. Hu mentioned "China" twice during his speech. But the China he mentioned was the China of 1949, prior to internal division by the Chinese Civil War. A peace agreement would address the "legacy and continuation" of this internal division. It would reconstruct a future China, a Third Concept of Chjina, and provide a framework for mutual interaction.
Talking about a peace agreement today, "post 2008," is especially meaningful. Talk of a peace agreement often provokes conflict between the two sides. But the cross-Strait situation is already peaceful. Civil War hostilities have already ended. Talk of a peace agreement now can only help consolidate the peace.
In recent years, Beijing has made a genuine effort to promote "mutual non-denial." For this, it deserves recognition. It should now pick up the pace, and move toward "mutual recognition." Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said, "Peaceful reunification is not the Mainland annexing Taiwan. Nor is it Taiwan annexing the Mainland." This is a concrete expression of Deng Xiaoping's "It is not about you gobbling me up, or me gobbling you up." What exactly does "ending the Civil War, and reaching a peace agreement" mean? What it means is that the Republic of China will not annex the Peoples Republic of China, and the Peoples Republic of China will not annex the Republic of China. This is the only way to correctly identify the participants in the conflict, as well as the participants in any peace agreement.
Actually, the KMT and the CCP once signed a peace agreement, back in April 1949. At the time, the CCP had a military advantage. The CCP's proposed agreement called for the "abolition of the [ROC's] ersatz constitution and legal system." Talks broke down. Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River the very next day. The peace agreement was all about eliminating one's opponent. It was different from today's peace agreement.
Today, the two sides are "already peaceful." This is mainly because the two sides "do not repudiate each other, and are not annexing each other." The main reason for a peace agreement in an already peaceful environment, is to further consolidate the peace. It is to make that agreement explicit. It is to "put it in writing." Therefore we must acknowledge that we are dealing with the "legacy and continuation of the Civil War." We must identify the warring parties, and by extension, the parties that would be making peace. That is why we need a consensus on the "cessation of Civil War hostilities, and the reaching of a peace agreement." Only then can we establish a phased framework for a peace agreement. Only then can we make the proposition that "although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are nevertheless still part of one China," a matter of established law.
Most people on Taiwan consider the Civil War a political cross they must bear, But we believe that citing the Civil War in order to promote a peace agreement can be a clever way to break the deadlock.
Beijing is aware of course that it cannot sign a peace agreement while simultaneously denying that the ROC government was one of the warring parties, and therefore one of the signatories of any peace agreement. Therefore, Beijing must overcome its resistance to "mutual recognition." It must see the peace agreement as a way to cut the Gordian Knot. This accords with historical fact. It also accords with logic.
欲談和平協議‧先談議和主體
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.02.15 03:15 am
每隔一陣子就傳出「期待兩岸加強政治領域對話」的說法，日前的歐胡會亦然；台北的反應仍是千篇一律：「先經後政，先易後難。」雖任人皆知兩岸的「政治對話」終究無可迴避，問題在於雙方皆找不到一個入手處。本文建議：可以考慮從結束內戰的《和平協議》著手。
《和平協議》是兩岸之間存在已久的解決方案構想，連李登輝、陳水扁都倡議過；李且遣密使蘇志誠向北京方面提議簽訂《和平協議》，為對方以事涉「國與國的條約行為」而拒絕；嗣後，美國學者李侃如以「台灣不獨／中國不武」為張本的《中程協議》，一度引起熱烈討論；至二○○五年連胡會，將《和平協議》列入了「五大願景」，馬英九又納入總統大選政見，而以胡錦濤二○○九年的除夕談話，對「結束敵對狀態，達成和平協議」的著墨最深。
胡錦濤說：「一九四九年以來大陸和台灣儘管尚未統一，但不是中國領土和主權的分裂，而是上個世紀四十年代中後期中國內戰遺留並延續的政治對立。」胡錦濤是站在此一認知上，主張兩岸「結束敵對狀態，達成和平協議」。
這樣的論述，是符合史實的，也是符合邏輯的。也就是說：由於兩岸現狀仍是內戰的遺留及延續，所以始有議簽《和平協議》的必要。上世紀中國的國共內戰，自一九二七年至一九四九年，打打停停了二十二年（八年抗戰期間，「內戰」在形式上停止，實質上仍在進行）；交戰雙方，由中央政府的國民革命軍對中共的人民解放軍的當面廝殺，轉變至中華民國對中華人民共和國的隔海對抗。由於內戰之故，雙方互不承認，而欲毀滅對方；而《和平協議》則是要終止內戰，不再毀滅對方，因而必須先以承認對方的交戰地位及議和地位為前提。也就是說：若欲議簽《和平協議》，即須首先確認兩個交戰政府的地位；沒有這個基礎，如何簽《和平協議》？
倘朝這個方向思考，前引胡錦濤的除夕談話，其中兩次談到的「中國」，其實皆是一九四九年以前因內戰而分裂的「中國」；《和平協議》即是欲在這個分裂中國的「遺留及延續」上，重建兩岸在未來中國（第三概念）的互動架構。
在「二○○八年後」的今日談《和平協議》，尤其別具深意。因為，《和平協議》常是在雙方熾戰中啟動；但兩岸如今卻是在「已經如此和平」的態勢下提議，戰爭已經終止，只是要鞏固和平。
北京方面近年在「互不否認」上所做的努力值得肯定，應可再向「相互承認」移動腳步。國台辦主任王毅日前說：「和平統一，不是大陸併吞台灣，也不是台灣併吞大陸。」此說已較鄧小平說「不是你吃掉我，也不是我吃掉你」具象化。唯若以「終止內戰／和平協議」的意旨而言，其實應當說成：不是中華民國併吞中華人民共和國，也不是中華人民共和國併吞中華民國。這樣才能正確表述交戰主體與議和主體。
其實，國共在一九四九年四月也議簽過一次《和平協定》。當時，中共取得軍事優勢，在《協定》中主張「廢除偽憲法／廢除偽法統」；雙方破裂，隔日共軍即南渡長江。當年的《和平協定》是在消滅對方，如今談《和平協議》自應有不同的思考。
兩岸今日「已經如此和平」，主要是因雙方「互不否認／互不併吞」；而在「已經如此和平」的今日談《和平協議》，主要是因認為「和平」不夠鞏固，須有一明文的「協議」加以支撐。因而，承認現狀是「內戰的遺留及延續」，亦即承認雙方為交戰主體及議和主體，這是「終止敵對內戰／達成和平協議」的必要共識；亦唯如此，始有可能在《和平協議》的階段性體制下，達成「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」的法制化及固定化。
台灣多數人認為國共內戰是一個政治負債，但我們卻認為，「由內戰論述轉到和平協議論述」，有可能成為化解兩岸僵局的「巧門」。
北京當然也應知道，不可能要簽《和平協議》，卻否定中華民國政府是交戰主體及議和主體。因而，北京若欲破解「相互承認」的難題，從《和平協議》著手亦不失為一「巧門」。因為，這是符合史實的，也是符合邏輯的。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 15, 2011
Every now and again officials will talk about how they "look forward to strengthening cross-Strait political dialogue." The recent Obama/Hu Summit was no exception. Taipei's response was the same. "First economics, then politics. First the easy, then the hard." Everyone on both sides of the Strait knows that political dialogue cannot be avoided in the long run. The problem is that no one on either side knows where to begin. This newspaper suggests that the two sides should begin by concluding a "peace agreement," ending the civil war.
The concept of a cross-Strait peace agreement is an old one. Even Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian have suggested it. Lee sent secret emissary Su Chih-cheng to Beijing to propose the signing of a peace agreement. Beijing refused because Lee insisted that the agreement be on a nation to nation basis. Subsequently, American scholar Kenneth Lieberthal proposed an interim agreement, in which Taipei would not declare independence, and Beijing would refrain from using force. This provoked many lively discussions. In 2005, Lien Chan met with Hu Jintao. They cited a peace agreement as one of their five main hopes for the future. Ma Ying-jeou made a peace agreement part of his presidential campaign platform. During his 2009 Chinese New Year's speech, Hu Jintao spoke at length of an "end to hostilities, and the reaching of a peace agreement."
Hu Jintao said "Since 1949, the Mainland and Taiwan have yet to be reunified, but this does not mean that China's territory and sovereignty have been divided. It merely means that since the late 1940s, the Chinese Civil War has resulted in continued political confrontation." Based on such an understanding, Hu Jintao called for "an end to hostilities, and the reaching of a peace agreement."
His reasoning accords with historical fact as well as with logic. In other words, the cross-Strait status quo is the legacy and continuation of the Chinese Civil War. Therefore it is necessary to sign a peace agreement, The Chinese Civil War of the previous century lasted from 1927 to 1949. It continued in fits and starts for 22 years. During the eight year long War of Resistance Against Japan, the Civil War was officially on hold, but in practice it went on regardless. The warring parties were the National Revolutionary Army of the Central Government, and the People's Liberation Army of the Chinese Communist Party. This evolved into cross-Strait confrontation between the Republic of China government on one side, and the People's Republic of China government on the other. As a result of the Civil War, the two sides refused to recognize each other. They sought to destroy each other. A peace agreement would end the Civil War. The two sides would agree not to destroy each other. They would recognize each other, both as belligerents, and as peacemakers. In other words, if one wishes to sign a peace agreement one must first affirm the status of the two warring governments. Without first doing so, how can one possibly sign a peace agreement?
Such thinking inspired Hu's Chinese New Year's Eve speech. Hu mentioned "China" twice during his speech. But the China he mentioned was the China of 1949, prior to internal division by the Chinese Civil War. A peace agreement would address the "legacy and continuation" of this internal division. It would reconstruct a future China, a Third Concept of Chjina, and provide a framework for mutual interaction.
Talking about a peace agreement today, "post 2008," is especially meaningful. Talk of a peace agreement often provokes conflict between the two sides. But the cross-Strait situation is already peaceful. Civil War hostilities have already ended. Talk of a peace agreement now can only help consolidate the peace.
In recent years, Beijing has made a genuine effort to promote "mutual non-denial." For this, it deserves recognition. It should now pick up the pace, and move toward "mutual recognition." Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said, "Peaceful reunification is not the Mainland annexing Taiwan. Nor is it Taiwan annexing the Mainland." This is a concrete expression of Deng Xiaoping's "It is not about you gobbling me up, or me gobbling you up." What exactly does "ending the Civil War, and reaching a peace agreement" mean? What it means is that the Republic of China will not annex the Peoples Republic of China, and the Peoples Republic of China will not annex the Republic of China. This is the only way to correctly identify the participants in the conflict, as well as the participants in any peace agreement.
Actually, the KMT and the CCP once signed a peace agreement, back in April 1949. At the time, the CCP had a military advantage. The CCP's proposed agreement called for the "abolition of the [ROC's] ersatz constitution and legal system." Talks broke down. Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River the very next day. The peace agreement was all about eliminating one's opponent. It was different from today's peace agreement.
Today, the two sides are "already peaceful." This is mainly because the two sides "do not repudiate each other, and are not annexing each other." The main reason for a peace agreement in an already peaceful environment, is to further consolidate the peace. It is to make that agreement explicit. It is to "put it in writing." Therefore we must acknowledge that we are dealing with the "legacy and continuation of the Civil War." We must identify the warring parties, and by extension, the parties that would be making peace. That is why we need a consensus on the "cessation of Civil War hostilities, and the reaching of a peace agreement." Only then can we establish a phased framework for a peace agreement. Only then can we make the proposition that "although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are nevertheless still part of one China," a matter of established law.
Most people on Taiwan consider the Civil War a political cross they must bear, But we believe that citing the Civil War in order to promote a peace agreement can be a clever way to break the deadlock.
Beijing is aware of course that it cannot sign a peace agreement while simultaneously denying that the ROC government was one of the warring parties, and therefore one of the signatories of any peace agreement. Therefore, Beijing must overcome its resistance to "mutual recognition." It must see the peace agreement as a way to cut the Gordian Knot. This accords with historical fact. It also accords with logic.
欲談和平協議‧先談議和主體
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.02.15 03:15 am
每隔一陣子就傳出「期待兩岸加強政治領域對話」的說法，日前的歐胡會亦然；台北的反應仍是千篇一律：「先經後政，先易後難。」雖任人皆知兩岸的「政治對話」終究無可迴避，問題在於雙方皆找不到一個入手處。本文建議：可以考慮從結束內戰的《和平協議》著手。
《和平協議》是兩岸之間存在已久的解決方案構想，連李登輝、陳水扁都倡議過；李且遣密使蘇志誠向北京方面提議簽訂《和平協議》，為對方以事涉「國與國的條約行為」而拒絕；嗣後，美國學者李侃如以「台灣不獨／中國不武」為張本的《中程協議》，一度引起熱烈討論；至二○○五年連胡會，將《和平協議》列入了「五大願景」，馬英九又納入總統大選政見，而以胡錦濤二○○九年的除夕談話，對「結束敵對狀態，達成和平協議」的著墨最深。
胡錦濤說：「一九四九年以來大陸和台灣儘管尚未統一，但不是中國領土和主權的分裂，而是上個世紀四十年代中後期中國內戰遺留並延續的政治對立。」胡錦濤是站在此一認知上，主張兩岸「結束敵對狀態，達成和平協議」。
這樣的論述，是符合史實的，也是符合邏輯的。也就是說：由於兩岸現狀仍是內戰的遺留及延續，所以始有議簽《和平協議》的必要。上世紀中國的國共內戰，自一九二七年至一九四九年，打打停停了二十二年（八年抗戰期間，「內戰」在形式上停止，實質上仍在進行）；交戰雙方，由中央政府的國民革命軍對中共的人民解放軍的當面廝殺，轉變至中華民國對中華人民共和國的隔海對抗。由於內戰之故，雙方互不承認，而欲毀滅對方；而《和平協議》則是要終止內戰，不再毀滅對方，因而必須先以承認對方的交戰地位及議和地位為前提。也就是說：若欲議簽《和平協議》，即須首先確認兩個交戰政府的地位；沒有這個基礎，如何簽《和平協議》？
倘朝這個方向思考，前引胡錦濤的除夕談話，其中兩次談到的「中國」，其實皆是一九四九年以前因內戰而分裂的「中國」；《和平協議》即是欲在這個分裂中國的「遺留及延續」上，重建兩岸在未來中國（第三概念）的互動架構。
在「二○○八年後」的今日談《和平協議》，尤其別具深意。因為，《和平協議》常是在雙方熾戰中啟動；但兩岸如今卻是在「已經如此和平」的態勢下提議，戰爭已經終止，只是要鞏固和平。
北京方面近年在「互不否認」上所做的努力值得肯定，應可再向「相互承認」移動腳步。國台辦主任王毅日前說：「和平統一，不是大陸併吞台灣，也不是台灣併吞大陸。」此說已較鄧小平說「不是你吃掉我，也不是我吃掉你」具象化。唯若以「終止內戰／和平協議」的意旨而言，其實應當說成：不是中華民國併吞中華人民共和國，也不是中華人民共和國併吞中華民國。這樣才能正確表述交戰主體與議和主體。
其實，國共在一九四九年四月也議簽過一次《和平協定》。當時，中共取得軍事優勢，在《協定》中主張「廢除偽憲法／廢除偽法統」；雙方破裂，隔日共軍即南渡長江。當年的《和平協定》是在消滅對方，如今談《和平協議》自應有不同的思考。
兩岸今日「已經如此和平」，主要是因雙方「互不否認／互不併吞」；而在「已經如此和平」的今日談《和平協議》，主要是因認為「和平」不夠鞏固，須有一明文的「協議」加以支撐。因而，承認現狀是「內戰的遺留及延續」，亦即承認雙方為交戰主體及議和主體，這是「終止敵對內戰／達成和平協議」的必要共識；亦唯如此，始有可能在《和平協議》的階段性體制下，達成「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」的法制化及固定化。
台灣多數人認為國共內戰是一個政治負債，但我們卻認為，「由內戰論述轉到和平協議論述」，有可能成為化解兩岸僵局的「巧門」。
北京當然也應知道，不可能要簽《和平協議》，卻否定中華民國政府是交戰主體及議和主體。因而，北京若欲破解「相互承認」的難題，從《和平協議》著手亦不失為一「巧門」。因為，這是符合史實的，也是符合邏輯的。
Monday, February 14, 2011
Tseng Ya-ni, Taiwan's Queen of Golf
Tseng Ya-ni, Taiwan's Queen of Golf
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 14, 2011
Who knew? She still has a baby face. Just last month, she celebrated her 22nd birthday. But yesterday she won the Australian Women's Masters Championship. Overnight, she became the queen of golf. Tseng Ya-ni became the number one ranked woman golfer in the world. It was too spectacular for words.
Yesterday, even before the final hole, the media swarmed around her. TV anchor persons talked about "Yani's outstanding performance." They expressed amazement at how much she had matured over the past two years. The audience spontaneously lined up on the green to applaud Tseng, and to pay tribute to this newest queen of golf. Tseng nodded to the crowd. She flashed her signature smile. She betrayed no special joy or pride. For Tseng, this day was long coming, and she took it calmly.
In recent years, athletes from Taiwan have shone in a number of sports. Wang Chien-ming and Kuo Hong-chi in baseball. Lu Yan-hsun and Chan Yung-chan have performed brilliantly in tennis, bringing glory to Taiwan. Tseng turned professional only four years ago, She has shone In international competitions since then. She has become a star who has caught the public eye. At age 22, she has been crowned the queen of tennis. That may strike some as incredible. But for Tseng Ya-ni, the title was hard won. Her biggest challenge now, is to hold on to the title.
She began training when she was only five. She was barely taller than the club. Yet she took on adults. Tseng is more experienced than other young golfers. When she was still in elementary school, she watched the U.S. Open for the first time. She boldly declared, "I want to compete in this game." As a result, her parents turned this 12 year old over to the airlines. They "air shipped" her to golfing venues the world over. Flight attendants even stuck "special attention" stickers on her. Tseng Ya-ni, with her unique style, has made a place for herself in the golfing world.
Tseng's success is no secret. It is her self awareness and indomitable will. During junior high, she became junior women's amateur champion. She had no competition. As a result, she found herself in a predicament -- lack of motivation. Her mother demanded that she make a choice between academics and sports. Many athletes on Taiwan have faced this same dilemma before. In the end, most chose to quit sports. But Tseng Ya-ni told her mother, "I have no intention of giving up on either." She decided then to discipline herself. Seven years later, this queen of golf, brimming with self confidence, emerged into the spotlight.
Tseng Ya-ni once revealed how she would secretly watch golf champions and learn from them. The champions she learned from included Australian champion Mark Webber and Swedish legend Annika Suolunsitan. She learned how to maintain her golf rhythm, how to overcome psychological pressure, and how to correct the weaknesses in her putting. She had ambition. But more importantly, she was willing to confront her own weaknesses, and to practice tirelessly. She even used her spare time to practice English. She wanted to be able to express herself more accurately and fluently. She the inevitable day was coming closer and closer. She knew she had to make advance preparations, Interestingly enough, when Tseng rose to the number 2 position last year, she suddenly experienced a sense of unreality. Her ranking showed that she had already surpassed her childhood idols.
At the tender age of 12, Tseng Ya-ni resolved to become "number one in the world." Yesterday she fulfilled her dream. This dream was achieved through a strength of will difficult for outsiders to imagine. But her dreams of glory came true. They are something everyone on Taiwan can share in. Last year, a company on Mainland China offered her a one billion dollar signing bonus, if only she would compete for the Mainland. But Tseng Ya-ni, who was born in Kueishan in Taoyuan County, was unmoved. Her halo shines increasingly bright. But she has chosen to use her fame for the common good. She became a spokesman for children with cancer. She chose to share her light and warmth with underprivileged children. This outspoken young girl is a ray of sunshine.
At age 22, Tseng Ya-ni has scaled the heights of the golfing world. She has achieved her "Impossible Mission." She has become a Taiwan golfing legend. But competition in sports never ends. She must now attempt to retain her title. Other young people look up to her. They are inspired by her. They follow in her footsteps. How should they go about doing so? The answer is in Tseng Ya-ni's confident smile.
全台說讚：陽光雅妮登上世界球后
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.14
誰能想像，這個仍一臉稚氣的女孩，上個月剛度過她的廿二歲生日，昨天不僅以傑出而穩健的球技摘下澳洲女子高球名人賽的冠軍寶座，更一夕登上了世界球后的頂峰。曾雅妮奪得這個世界第一，太精采，太令人驚喜了！
昨天尚未打完最後一洞，轉播鏡頭便一再環繞著曾雅妮，主播談到「Yani」的出色表現，直說她這兩年的「成熟、再成熟」令人驚艷。現場觀眾主動列隊為正走向果嶺的曾雅妮鼓掌，向這位準新球后致意；曾雅妮則帶著她慣有的招牌微笑向大家點頭，沒有露出特別的喜悅或驕傲。曾雅妮心中其實早就為這一天做好了準備，她顯得一派從容。
近幾年台灣選手在國際各類球賽中新人輩出，美國職棒的王建民、郭弘志，網球的盧彥勳、詹詠然都大放異采，為台灣爭光。曾雅妮由業餘選手轉為職業不過短短四年，在國際大賽中一路過關斬將，成為深受注目的新星。以廿二歲之齡戴上「世界球后」的桂冠，或許有人覺得不可思議；但對曾雅妮來說，這項殊榮不算早到，未來更大的挑戰是：能保住這個榮銜多久。
五歲開始學球，從個子不比球桿高出多少的時代，就膽敢越齡和大人交手，曾雅妮的高爾夫球之路，並不像其年齡顯示的那麼淺短。小學未畢業，首度在美國觀賞了巡迴公開賽之後，就發下「我也要參加這比賽」的豪語。於是，十二歲起，父母將她交由航空公司「託運」到世界各地參賽，空服人員還在她身上貼著「需要特別照顧」的標籤；就在這一場場東征西討的賽事中，曾雅妮培養出獨立的性格，也走出無限寬闊的高球天地。
曾雅妮的成功沒有秘訣，關鍵在於她敏銳的自覺與不屈的意志。國中時代就成為台灣業餘女子高球界的高手，缺乏足以匹敵的對手，一度使她陷入缺乏動力的困境，母親要求她必須在「學業」和「打球」中作出抉擇。這是許多台灣球員都有過的瓶頸，多數人最後選擇退出；但曾雅妮給母親的答覆斬釘截鐵，她說「兩樣我都不放棄」。就這樣下定決心自我鞭策，七年後，台灣誕生了一個充滿自信與陽光的世界球后。
曾雅妮曾透露，自己在球場上如何向高球前輩「偷偷學習」，包括澳洲名將韋柏、瑞典傳奇球星索倫絲坦等，學習如何保持擊球節奏，如何克服心理壓力，如何強化自己的推桿弱勢。她不僅具有企圖心，更願意面對自己的弱點，不辭辛勞地練習改進。她還利用練球的餘暇勤練英文，目的是希望面對國際媒體時能更準確、流暢地表達自己的想法。她知道，自己愈來愈接近那個不容忽視的位置，必須預先作好完美的準備。有趣的是，去年曾雅妮排名晉升到世界第二時，她突然有一種不真實感，因為排名顯示她的球技已超越了自己少年時代的諸位偶像。
十二歲便立志要成為「世界第一」的曾雅妮，昨天實現了她的夢想。這個夢想，是她用外人難以想像的意志打造的；但她夢想成真的榮耀，卻是所有台灣人都能和她共同分享的。去年大陸一家企業曾提供十億元的簽約金，要求曾雅妮轉而為大陸效力，但這位出身桃園龜山的女孩絲毫不為所動。在身上光環日漸耀眼之際，曾雅妮選擇的是為公益發聲、為癌童代言，把自己的光彩與溫暖和弱勢分享。這個明朗的女孩像個小太陽。
廿二歲登上世界球后的頂峰，曾雅妮完成了不可能的任務，也為台灣寫下一頁燦爛的傳奇。但球場的挑戰永無休止，接下來，要如何保住這頂桂冠，如何讓仰望她的青少年新手踏著其步伐前進，在曾雅妮自信的笑容裡應該備有答案吧！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 14, 2011
Who knew? She still has a baby face. Just last month, she celebrated her 22nd birthday. But yesterday she won the Australian Women's Masters Championship. Overnight, she became the queen of golf. Tseng Ya-ni became the number one ranked woman golfer in the world. It was too spectacular for words.
Yesterday, even before the final hole, the media swarmed around her. TV anchor persons talked about "Yani's outstanding performance." They expressed amazement at how much she had matured over the past two years. The audience spontaneously lined up on the green to applaud Tseng, and to pay tribute to this newest queen of golf. Tseng nodded to the crowd. She flashed her signature smile. She betrayed no special joy or pride. For Tseng, this day was long coming, and she took it calmly.
In recent years, athletes from Taiwan have shone in a number of sports. Wang Chien-ming and Kuo Hong-chi in baseball. Lu Yan-hsun and Chan Yung-chan have performed brilliantly in tennis, bringing glory to Taiwan. Tseng turned professional only four years ago, She has shone In international competitions since then. She has become a star who has caught the public eye. At age 22, she has been crowned the queen of tennis. That may strike some as incredible. But for Tseng Ya-ni, the title was hard won. Her biggest challenge now, is to hold on to the title.
She began training when she was only five. She was barely taller than the club. Yet she took on adults. Tseng is more experienced than other young golfers. When she was still in elementary school, she watched the U.S. Open for the first time. She boldly declared, "I want to compete in this game." As a result, her parents turned this 12 year old over to the airlines. They "air shipped" her to golfing venues the world over. Flight attendants even stuck "special attention" stickers on her. Tseng Ya-ni, with her unique style, has made a place for herself in the golfing world.
Tseng's success is no secret. It is her self awareness and indomitable will. During junior high, she became junior women's amateur champion. She had no competition. As a result, she found herself in a predicament -- lack of motivation. Her mother demanded that she make a choice between academics and sports. Many athletes on Taiwan have faced this same dilemma before. In the end, most chose to quit sports. But Tseng Ya-ni told her mother, "I have no intention of giving up on either." She decided then to discipline herself. Seven years later, this queen of golf, brimming with self confidence, emerged into the spotlight.
Tseng Ya-ni once revealed how she would secretly watch golf champions and learn from them. The champions she learned from included Australian champion Mark Webber and Swedish legend Annika Suolunsitan. She learned how to maintain her golf rhythm, how to overcome psychological pressure, and how to correct the weaknesses in her putting. She had ambition. But more importantly, she was willing to confront her own weaknesses, and to practice tirelessly. She even used her spare time to practice English. She wanted to be able to express herself more accurately and fluently. She the inevitable day was coming closer and closer. She knew she had to make advance preparations, Interestingly enough, when Tseng rose to the number 2 position last year, she suddenly experienced a sense of unreality. Her ranking showed that she had already surpassed her childhood idols.
At the tender age of 12, Tseng Ya-ni resolved to become "number one in the world." Yesterday she fulfilled her dream. This dream was achieved through a strength of will difficult for outsiders to imagine. But her dreams of glory came true. They are something everyone on Taiwan can share in. Last year, a company on Mainland China offered her a one billion dollar signing bonus, if only she would compete for the Mainland. But Tseng Ya-ni, who was born in Kueishan in Taoyuan County, was unmoved. Her halo shines increasingly bright. But she has chosen to use her fame for the common good. She became a spokesman for children with cancer. She chose to share her light and warmth with underprivileged children. This outspoken young girl is a ray of sunshine.
At age 22, Tseng Ya-ni has scaled the heights of the golfing world. She has achieved her "Impossible Mission." She has become a Taiwan golfing legend. But competition in sports never ends. She must now attempt to retain her title. Other young people look up to her. They are inspired by her. They follow in her footsteps. How should they go about doing so? The answer is in Tseng Ya-ni's confident smile.
全台說讚：陽光雅妮登上世界球后
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.14
誰能想像，這個仍一臉稚氣的女孩，上個月剛度過她的廿二歲生日，昨天不僅以傑出而穩健的球技摘下澳洲女子高球名人賽的冠軍寶座，更一夕登上了世界球后的頂峰。曾雅妮奪得這個世界第一，太精采，太令人驚喜了！
昨天尚未打完最後一洞，轉播鏡頭便一再環繞著曾雅妮，主播談到「Yani」的出色表現，直說她這兩年的「成熟、再成熟」令人驚艷。現場觀眾主動列隊為正走向果嶺的曾雅妮鼓掌，向這位準新球后致意；曾雅妮則帶著她慣有的招牌微笑向大家點頭，沒有露出特別的喜悅或驕傲。曾雅妮心中其實早就為這一天做好了準備，她顯得一派從容。
近幾年台灣選手在國際各類球賽中新人輩出，美國職棒的王建民、郭弘志，網球的盧彥勳、詹詠然都大放異采，為台灣爭光。曾雅妮由業餘選手轉為職業不過短短四年，在國際大賽中一路過關斬將，成為深受注目的新星。以廿二歲之齡戴上「世界球后」的桂冠，或許有人覺得不可思議；但對曾雅妮來說，這項殊榮不算早到，未來更大的挑戰是：能保住這個榮銜多久。
五歲開始學球，從個子不比球桿高出多少的時代，就膽敢越齡和大人交手，曾雅妮的高爾夫球之路，並不像其年齡顯示的那麼淺短。小學未畢業，首度在美國觀賞了巡迴公開賽之後，就發下「我也要參加這比賽」的豪語。於是，十二歲起，父母將她交由航空公司「託運」到世界各地參賽，空服人員還在她身上貼著「需要特別照顧」的標籤；就在這一場場東征西討的賽事中，曾雅妮培養出獨立的性格，也走出無限寬闊的高球天地。
曾雅妮的成功沒有秘訣，關鍵在於她敏銳的自覺與不屈的意志。國中時代就成為台灣業餘女子高球界的高手，缺乏足以匹敵的對手，一度使她陷入缺乏動力的困境，母親要求她必須在「學業」和「打球」中作出抉擇。這是許多台灣球員都有過的瓶頸，多數人最後選擇退出；但曾雅妮給母親的答覆斬釘截鐵，她說「兩樣我都不放棄」。就這樣下定決心自我鞭策，七年後，台灣誕生了一個充滿自信與陽光的世界球后。
曾雅妮曾透露，自己在球場上如何向高球前輩「偷偷學習」，包括澳洲名將韋柏、瑞典傳奇球星索倫絲坦等，學習如何保持擊球節奏，如何克服心理壓力，如何強化自己的推桿弱勢。她不僅具有企圖心，更願意面對自己的弱點，不辭辛勞地練習改進。她還利用練球的餘暇勤練英文，目的是希望面對國際媒體時能更準確、流暢地表達自己的想法。她知道，自己愈來愈接近那個不容忽視的位置，必須預先作好完美的準備。有趣的是，去年曾雅妮排名晉升到世界第二時，她突然有一種不真實感，因為排名顯示她的球技已超越了自己少年時代的諸位偶像。
十二歲便立志要成為「世界第一」的曾雅妮，昨天實現了她的夢想。這個夢想，是她用外人難以想像的意志打造的；但她夢想成真的榮耀，卻是所有台灣人都能和她共同分享的。去年大陸一家企業曾提供十億元的簽約金，要求曾雅妮轉而為大陸效力，但這位出身桃園龜山的女孩絲毫不為所動。在身上光環日漸耀眼之際，曾雅妮選擇的是為公益發聲、為癌童代言，把自己的光彩與溫暖和弱勢分享。這個明朗的女孩像個小太陽。
廿二歲登上世界球后的頂峰，曾雅妮完成了不可能的任務，也為台灣寫下一頁燦爛的傳奇。但球場的挑戰永無休止，接下來，要如何保住這頂桂冠，如何讓仰望她的青少年新手踏著其步伐前進，在曾雅妮自信的笑容裡應該備有答案吧！
Friday, February 11, 2011
Put an End to the Liberty Times' McCarthyism
Put an End to the Liberty Times' McCarthyism
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 11, 2011
Cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges are finally on track. Cross-strait financial exchanges, investments, official exchanges have all experienced considerable growth. These developments have been a shot in the arm for Taiwan's economy. But amidst this progress, a wave of reaction has struck Taiwan. This reactionary force demonizes anyone connected with cross-Strait trade and investment. It characterizes this progress as the "Invasion of Chinese capital." It calls everyone involved a "Communist." This new wave of McCarthyism is spearheaded by the Liberty Times.
Over the past twenty years, the world has undergone rapid globalization, A nation's economy can no longer remain hermetically sealed. A nation can no longer restrict its dealings to only a handful of other countries. Instead, it must expand its markets. It must invest in plants. It must engage in international cooperation. It must have global distribution and logistics. Otherwise it cannot compete globally. Taiwan businesses are attempting to position themselves globally. The Mainland boasts vast productive resources. Income growth has created a vast market. We enjoy cultural and linquistic advantages. Why on earth should we give them up?
Many Taiwan based enterprises have investments on the Mainland. This has helped them maintain their competitiveness. It has kept them close to their markets. Many OEM oriented industries have set up factories on the Mainland at the behest of their clients. Otherwise their orders would have dried up. They would have found it difficult to survive. If these businesses vanish from the increasingly competitive global arena, Taiwan's economy will decline. The plain fact is that flat panels, OEM chips, and other key industries and enterprises on Taiwan have invested heavily on the Mainland. Only by doing so have they been able to remain competitive in the global marketplace. ECFA has been signed. Mainland tourists have been allowed to visit. This has brought new prosperity to Taiwan. An increasing proportion of the revenues of many listed companies come from the Mainland. For many of them, the proportion exceeds one half. Many investors hold China themed stocks. They are aware of the benefits of setting up plants on the Mainland. They are aware of the profits to be made from Mainland sales. They are aware of the positive impact for Taiwan's economy.
But the Liberty Times holds a different world view. The Liberty Times longs to seal off Taiwan, to put a padlock on Taiwan. In 2002 and 2003, a public debate was held over the construction of chip fabs on the Mainland. The Liberty Times opposed the move. It alleged that allowing the move would result in a loss of competitiveness. Two years ago, negotiations over ECFA began. The Liberty Times opposed ECFA as well. It alleged that signing ECFA would result in the collapse of our economy. People would find themselves out on the street. Over the past two years, successful Taiwan businesses have returned to Taiwan, to list on the stock market, and to invest in the island. Yet the Liberty Times persists in its ravings. It persists in calling others "Communists." It persists in accusing others of "having Chinese coloration." It persists in accusing others of "using proxies to gobble up Taiwan businesses."
These businesses left their hometowns. They struggled to succeed on the Mainland. They established themselves commercially. They struck it rich. Now, they have returned to invest in Taiwan, to set up factories, or purchase businesses. The bottom line is they have created more job opportunities on Taiwan. They have created greater economic value. Yet they must endure baseless attacks from the Liberty Times. According to the Liberty Times, OEM chip plants and other industries should never have been built on the Mainland. ECFA should never have been signed. Taiwan businesses should never have been permitted to return to Taiwan to invest. The fact is, the Liberty Times deluded economic policies would have killed off Taiwan's economy long ago.
The Liberty Times belongs to the Federal Group. The Federal Group got its start in real estate. Its boss Lin Jung-san, is a former legislator, former Control Yuan member, and former Control Yuan President. During authoritarian rule, he obediently carried out political directives. The KMT routinely gained the support and obedience of "nativist" businessmen through land deals. These land deals delivered vast wealth into the hands of these "nativist" businessmen. When former Taipei County Chief You Ching recalled the Xinzhuang Satellite City case, he revealed that all landlords were required to donate land in accordance with regulations. Only Lin Jung-san failed to do so. When the KMT lost Taipei County to the DPP, he swiftly obtained construction permits. You Ching said "Lin Jung-san owes Taipei County."
The public on Taiwan has a high opinion of traditional industries. Those businesses able to export their products, to make money in foreign lands, or to earn foreign exchange, have been applauded by the public. But businesses which have engaged in land speculation, which have colluded with corrupt officials, which have abused land zoning to their private advantage, which have raked in billions in windfall profits, which have deprived ordinary people of housing due to rising prices, have been roundly condemned by the public.
Today, a company which amassed its wealth through real estate profiteering, uses its media mouthpiece to trumpet its "love for Taiwan." Meanwhile, other companies, which struggled far from home, which returned to Taiwan to invest in Taiwan, have been denounced as "Communists." How and when did such glaring double standards become the norm? The Liberty Times amassed a fortune from illicit real estate deals, at the expense of the Taiwan public. The Liberty Times then turned around and denounced companies which made an honest profit on the Mainland as "Communists." Such is the Liberty Times' "love for Taiwan." The 1950s McCarthy era sundered American society, and impacted many of society's elites. The Liberty Times must cease its McCarthyite demagoguery. Otherwise Taiwan will be similarly impacted as well.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.02.11
社論－讓紅色麥卡鍚主義化為灰燼
本報訊
兩岸經貿往來步入正軌日趨熱絡後，兩岸資金往來、投資、人員參訪等都較過去長足的成長，此發展對台灣經濟也注入更多活水。但在此過程中，我們卻發現台灣持續存在著一股逆流，這股逆流對任何涉及兩岸經貿與投資事項，一概給予負面解讀，全視為所謂「中資入侵」，甚至到處給人戴紅帽子。這種紅色麥卡鍚主義又以《自由時報》為代表。
近廿年堪稱全球化進展最快速的時期，一個國家、一個經濟體的運作，早已不再是封閉對內，或面對少數幾個國家即可運作，而是必須在市場拓銷、投資設廠、國際合作上，都要有全球布局與運籌，否則難以在全球競爭中站穩腳步。台灣企業在布局過程中，面對大陸這個擁有龐大生產資源的基地，及在所得增長後釋出的龐大市場，藉由本身在文化、語言上所擁有的相對優勢，怎麼可能會選擇放棄布局？
對許多國內企業而言，赴大陸投資，除了維繫其競爭力外，也有貼近市場的目的。不少以代工為主的業者，則更是應業主要求而必須赴大陸設廠，否則訂單可能流失，企業更難生存；如果這些企業在全球競技場上競爭力日益流失，台灣經濟必然下滑。擺在眼前的事實是，不論是面板、晶圓代工、及各種台灣重要的產業與企業，透過投資大陸，才更能在全球競爭版圖中立穩腳步。ＥＣＦＡ的簽訂、開放陸客觀光，更是為台灣帶來新榮景。看看不少上市櫃企業，來自大陸的出貨、營收比重不斷上升，不少已超過五成，投資人爭捧這些中概股，即知道來自大陸投資設廠與市場銷售的利益，對台灣企業的挹注，及對國內經濟的正面效益。
但是看看《自由時報》的主張，卻一貫是封閉、鎖國。在九十一、九十二年各界討論開放晶圓代工赴大陸投資時，《自由時報》一再主張不能開放，認為開放會導致台灣競爭力流失。在兩年前討論與大陸簽訂ＥＣＦＡ時，《自由時報》亦大力反對，儼然簽訂後台灣經濟要崩盤、台灣人都要失業。而對近兩年在大陸經營有成的台商紛紛回台掛牌與投資，《自由時報》也不改其恐共、戴紅帽的習慣作為，動輒冠以「中資色彩」、「中資找替身買台灣企業」等帽子。
當這些離鄉背井、到大陸奮鬥有成的企業，站穩腳步，存得一桶金後，要回台灣投資，他們或是設廠投資、或是購買企業，無論那種形式，都為台灣創造更多的就業機會、更多的經濟產值，但他們卻要面對《自由時報》這種不分青紅皂白的紅色麥卡鍚主義的質疑與攻擊。如真依《自由時報》主張，等於不要開放晶圓代工等產業赴大陸投資、不要簽ＥＣＦＡ、不要讓台商回台投資，這種封閉、死水式的經濟，早置台灣經濟於死地了。
《自由時報》為聯邦集團擁有，集團以房地產起家，老闆林榮三擔任過立委、監委及監察院副院長。在那個國民威權統治時代的「侍從政治」中，國民黨慣常以土地利益交換本土商界的支持與服從。許多土地變更利益也這樣輸送到個別企業手中。前台北縣長尤清談到新莊副都心案時，就提到當所有地主都依規定捐出抵費地，只有林榮三不捐，而且台北縣長由國民黨變成民進黨籍時，快速取得建照，因此他說「林榮三欠台北縣民一個公道」。
台灣傳統社會對生產事業給予相當高的評價，能外銷出口、或在他鄉創業成功賺錢創匯的企業，都能得到社會普遍的肯定。但對炒作地皮、以官商勾結手法，塗畫變更都市計畫，獲取動輒數十甚至上百億土地暴利，讓房價高漲到庶民幾無立錐之地者，則給予負面評價。
今日一個在房地產獲取高利的企業，透過旗下媒體，口口聲聲愛台灣，卻為那些異地打拚有成，回台投資的企業大戴紅帽，瓦釜雷鳴，何至於斯？一手從島內民眾身上大賺房地產利益，一手為賺大陸錢的企業大戴紅帽，難道，這就是「愛台灣」嗎？上世紀五○年代美國的麥卡鍚主義，讓美國社會分裂，不少社會菁英受創；《自由時報》搞的這套紅色麥卡鍚主義，此一惡質手法如果不能終止，台灣社會也終將承受其負面影響。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 11, 2011
Cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges are finally on track. Cross-strait financial exchanges, investments, official exchanges have all experienced considerable growth. These developments have been a shot in the arm for Taiwan's economy. But amidst this progress, a wave of reaction has struck Taiwan. This reactionary force demonizes anyone connected with cross-Strait trade and investment. It characterizes this progress as the "Invasion of Chinese capital." It calls everyone involved a "Communist." This new wave of McCarthyism is spearheaded by the Liberty Times.
Over the past twenty years, the world has undergone rapid globalization, A nation's economy can no longer remain hermetically sealed. A nation can no longer restrict its dealings to only a handful of other countries. Instead, it must expand its markets. It must invest in plants. It must engage in international cooperation. It must have global distribution and logistics. Otherwise it cannot compete globally. Taiwan businesses are attempting to position themselves globally. The Mainland boasts vast productive resources. Income growth has created a vast market. We enjoy cultural and linquistic advantages. Why on earth should we give them up?
Many Taiwan based enterprises have investments on the Mainland. This has helped them maintain their competitiveness. It has kept them close to their markets. Many OEM oriented industries have set up factories on the Mainland at the behest of their clients. Otherwise their orders would have dried up. They would have found it difficult to survive. If these businesses vanish from the increasingly competitive global arena, Taiwan's economy will decline. The plain fact is that flat panels, OEM chips, and other key industries and enterprises on Taiwan have invested heavily on the Mainland. Only by doing so have they been able to remain competitive in the global marketplace. ECFA has been signed. Mainland tourists have been allowed to visit. This has brought new prosperity to Taiwan. An increasing proportion of the revenues of many listed companies come from the Mainland. For many of them, the proportion exceeds one half. Many investors hold China themed stocks. They are aware of the benefits of setting up plants on the Mainland. They are aware of the profits to be made from Mainland sales. They are aware of the positive impact for Taiwan's economy.
But the Liberty Times holds a different world view. The Liberty Times longs to seal off Taiwan, to put a padlock on Taiwan. In 2002 and 2003, a public debate was held over the construction of chip fabs on the Mainland. The Liberty Times opposed the move. It alleged that allowing the move would result in a loss of competitiveness. Two years ago, negotiations over ECFA began. The Liberty Times opposed ECFA as well. It alleged that signing ECFA would result in the collapse of our economy. People would find themselves out on the street. Over the past two years, successful Taiwan businesses have returned to Taiwan, to list on the stock market, and to invest in the island. Yet the Liberty Times persists in its ravings. It persists in calling others "Communists." It persists in accusing others of "having Chinese coloration." It persists in accusing others of "using proxies to gobble up Taiwan businesses."
These businesses left their hometowns. They struggled to succeed on the Mainland. They established themselves commercially. They struck it rich. Now, they have returned to invest in Taiwan, to set up factories, or purchase businesses. The bottom line is they have created more job opportunities on Taiwan. They have created greater economic value. Yet they must endure baseless attacks from the Liberty Times. According to the Liberty Times, OEM chip plants and other industries should never have been built on the Mainland. ECFA should never have been signed. Taiwan businesses should never have been permitted to return to Taiwan to invest. The fact is, the Liberty Times deluded economic policies would have killed off Taiwan's economy long ago.
The Liberty Times belongs to the Federal Group. The Federal Group got its start in real estate. Its boss Lin Jung-san, is a former legislator, former Control Yuan member, and former Control Yuan President. During authoritarian rule, he obediently carried out political directives. The KMT routinely gained the support and obedience of "nativist" businessmen through land deals. These land deals delivered vast wealth into the hands of these "nativist" businessmen. When former Taipei County Chief You Ching recalled the Xinzhuang Satellite City case, he revealed that all landlords were required to donate land in accordance with regulations. Only Lin Jung-san failed to do so. When the KMT lost Taipei County to the DPP, he swiftly obtained construction permits. You Ching said "Lin Jung-san owes Taipei County."
The public on Taiwan has a high opinion of traditional industries. Those businesses able to export their products, to make money in foreign lands, or to earn foreign exchange, have been applauded by the public. But businesses which have engaged in land speculation, which have colluded with corrupt officials, which have abused land zoning to their private advantage, which have raked in billions in windfall profits, which have deprived ordinary people of housing due to rising prices, have been roundly condemned by the public.
Today, a company which amassed its wealth through real estate profiteering, uses its media mouthpiece to trumpet its "love for Taiwan." Meanwhile, other companies, which struggled far from home, which returned to Taiwan to invest in Taiwan, have been denounced as "Communists." How and when did such glaring double standards become the norm? The Liberty Times amassed a fortune from illicit real estate deals, at the expense of the Taiwan public. The Liberty Times then turned around and denounced companies which made an honest profit on the Mainland as "Communists." Such is the Liberty Times' "love for Taiwan." The 1950s McCarthy era sundered American society, and impacted many of society's elites. The Liberty Times must cease its McCarthyite demagoguery. Otherwise Taiwan will be similarly impacted as well.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.02.11
社論－讓紅色麥卡鍚主義化為灰燼
本報訊
兩岸經貿往來步入正軌日趨熱絡後，兩岸資金往來、投資、人員參訪等都較過去長足的成長，此發展對台灣經濟也注入更多活水。但在此過程中，我們卻發現台灣持續存在著一股逆流，這股逆流對任何涉及兩岸經貿與投資事項，一概給予負面解讀，全視為所謂「中資入侵」，甚至到處給人戴紅帽子。這種紅色麥卡鍚主義又以《自由時報》為代表。
近廿年堪稱全球化進展最快速的時期，一個國家、一個經濟體的運作，早已不再是封閉對內，或面對少數幾個國家即可運作，而是必須在市場拓銷、投資設廠、國際合作上，都要有全球布局與運籌，否則難以在全球競爭中站穩腳步。台灣企業在布局過程中，面對大陸這個擁有龐大生產資源的基地，及在所得增長後釋出的龐大市場，藉由本身在文化、語言上所擁有的相對優勢，怎麼可能會選擇放棄布局？
對許多國內企業而言，赴大陸投資，除了維繫其競爭力外，也有貼近市場的目的。不少以代工為主的業者，則更是應業主要求而必須赴大陸設廠，否則訂單可能流失，企業更難生存；如果這些企業在全球競技場上競爭力日益流失，台灣經濟必然下滑。擺在眼前的事實是，不論是面板、晶圓代工、及各種台灣重要的產業與企業，透過投資大陸，才更能在全球競爭版圖中立穩腳步。ＥＣＦＡ的簽訂、開放陸客觀光，更是為台灣帶來新榮景。看看不少上市櫃企業，來自大陸的出貨、營收比重不斷上升，不少已超過五成，投資人爭捧這些中概股，即知道來自大陸投資設廠與市場銷售的利益，對台灣企業的挹注，及對國內經濟的正面效益。
但是看看《自由時報》的主張，卻一貫是封閉、鎖國。在九十一、九十二年各界討論開放晶圓代工赴大陸投資時，《自由時報》一再主張不能開放，認為開放會導致台灣競爭力流失。在兩年前討論與大陸簽訂ＥＣＦＡ時，《自由時報》亦大力反對，儼然簽訂後台灣經濟要崩盤、台灣人都要失業。而對近兩年在大陸經營有成的台商紛紛回台掛牌與投資，《自由時報》也不改其恐共、戴紅帽的習慣作為，動輒冠以「中資色彩」、「中資找替身買台灣企業」等帽子。
當這些離鄉背井、到大陸奮鬥有成的企業，站穩腳步，存得一桶金後，要回台灣投資，他們或是設廠投資、或是購買企業，無論那種形式，都為台灣創造更多的就業機會、更多的經濟產值，但他們卻要面對《自由時報》這種不分青紅皂白的紅色麥卡鍚主義的質疑與攻擊。如真依《自由時報》主張，等於不要開放晶圓代工等產業赴大陸投資、不要簽ＥＣＦＡ、不要讓台商回台投資，這種封閉、死水式的經濟，早置台灣經濟於死地了。
《自由時報》為聯邦集團擁有，集團以房地產起家，老闆林榮三擔任過立委、監委及監察院副院長。在那個國民威權統治時代的「侍從政治」中，國民黨慣常以土地利益交換本土商界的支持與服從。許多土地變更利益也這樣輸送到個別企業手中。前台北縣長尤清談到新莊副都心案時，就提到當所有地主都依規定捐出抵費地，只有林榮三不捐，而且台北縣長由國民黨變成民進黨籍時，快速取得建照，因此他說「林榮三欠台北縣民一個公道」。
台灣傳統社會對生產事業給予相當高的評價，能外銷出口、或在他鄉創業成功賺錢創匯的企業，都能得到社會普遍的肯定。但對炒作地皮、以官商勾結手法，塗畫變更都市計畫，獲取動輒數十甚至上百億土地暴利，讓房價高漲到庶民幾無立錐之地者，則給予負面評價。
今日一個在房地產獲取高利的企業，透過旗下媒體，口口聲聲愛台灣，卻為那些異地打拚有成，回台投資的企業大戴紅帽，瓦釜雷鳴，何至於斯？一手從島內民眾身上大賺房地產利益，一手為賺大陸錢的企業大戴紅帽，難道，這就是「愛台灣」嗎？上世紀五○年代美國的麥卡鍚主義，讓美國社會分裂，不少社會菁英受創；《自由時報》搞的這套紅色麥卡鍚主義，此一惡質手法如果不能終止，台灣社會也終將承受其負面影響。
Thursday, February 10, 2011
Wild Accusations of "Chinese Capital" and "Red Enterprises"
Wild Accusations of "Chinese Capital" and "Red Enterprises"
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 10, 2011
Recently the Liberty Times published a series of news reports. It referred to the head of the Want Want Group as "a Taiwan businessman named Tsai, heavily reliant on Chinese capital." The Liberty Times has repeatedly leveled wild accusations of "Chinese capital" and "Red enterprises." It has given the public a grossly misleading impression. Its conduct is reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution or the White Terror. We feel compelled to clarify the matter for the public, and to refute the distortions created by the Liberty Times.
Strictly speaking, so-called "Chinese capital" refers to strictly controlled Mainland government funds. The most obvious source of "Chinese capital" is of course, Mainland government funds. The next most obvious source is funds from state-owned enterprises. Other sources are less obvious. Most of the funding for some family enterprises may come from the private sector. But some funding may come from the government or state-owned enterprises. Other businesses derive no capital whatsoever from the Mainland government or state-owned enterprises. They merely sell their products on the Mainland. Yet the Liberty Times classifies even their profits as "Chinese capital." This is unheard of. The Liberty Times is the only entity in the world that defines "Chinese capital" in such an absurd manner.
According to the Liberty Times' novel definition, all Taiwan is under the shadow of "Chinese capital." Over 1600 companies are listed on Taiwan, Nearly 1000 have been plants on Mainland China. Technology companies account for nearly 90%. In the past, most Taiwan businessmen investing on Mainland China merely took advantage of the Mainland's cheap land, cheap labor, and other production factors. They manufactured export-oriented products, and turned the Mainland into the "world's factory." But in recent years the Mainland has undergone a transformation, to the global market. Private sector consumption has skyrocketed. All Taiwan-funded businesses have substantially increased their presence in the Mainland domestic market. These companies make money from the Mainland market. According to the Liberty Times' absurd definition, they have all become "businesses heavily reliant on Chinese capital."
These companies earn money selling products on the mainland. Back on Taiwan, they pay dividends to the investing public. Members of the public pay taxes on their dividends. The salaries of everyone in the government, from President Ma at the top, to civil servants at the bottom, come from government revenues. Therefore, according to the Liberty Times unique definition of "Chinese capital," President Ma and every civil servant on Taiwan is funded by "Chinese capital."
Taiwan-funded enterprises have grown strong on the Mainland. They have won a large market share. The public on Taiwan approves. Initially such success stories applied only to Taiwan's small and medium enterprises. The Chicken King grew strong on the Mainland. The Ting Hsing Group had a small food factory in Changhua. It became the largest instant noodle brand on the Mainland. Taiwan's RT-Mart invested heavily in Mainland China for ten years. It has now surpassed French retail giant Carrefour, and become the number one discount store on the Mainland. Others include Taiwan funded service sector industries, Daphne shoes, Natural Beauty, Les Enphants, Ou Difen Kelisiting lingerie, Christine bakeries, 85 Degree Centigrade coffee shop, Yonghe Soybean Milk. These and other large and small enterprises built their own brands on Mainland China. They created new business empires. After establishing themselves on the Mainland, these businesses returned to Taiwan to invest, or list on the Taiwan stock market, allowing investors on Taiwan to share in the profits.
Take global computer brand Acer, "the pride of Taiwan." Acer made a concerted effort to develop new markets on the Mainland. By the end of last year, it was number two in personal computer sales on the Mainland. One can hardly say that Acer made little money on the Mainland. According to the Liberty Times definition of "Chinese capital," Acer is also funded by "Chinese capital." Acer's sales pitch is highly flexible. On the Mainland, Acer stresses that it is "the pride of the Chinese people." It stresses that it is an "international brand, with local values." According to the Liberty Times' closed minded, inward looking definition of "local values," Acer's sales pitch amounts to "selling out Taiwan." But since cross-Strait financial liberalization, the [連合庫] and other public financial institutions have established branches on the Mainland. They are beginning to earn Mainland dollars. According to the Liberty Times' definition of "Chinese capital," aren't these state-owned banks under the influence of "Chinese capital?" Is the Liberty Times' view of the world reasonable and convincing?
The main business of the Want Want Group's Ilan Food Division is rice crackers. It is a 100% Taiwan owned enterprise. During the 90s it began investing in the Mainland, After 20 years of hard work, it successfully captured the hearts of Mainland consumers. After establishing a firm foothold on the Mainland, it returned to Taiwan to invest in the media. It issued TDRs. During 20 years of development, it never received a penny from the Mainland authorities or state-owned enterprises. All of its income was derived from the sale of products in the Mainland market. It returned to Taiwan to invest in the media. Its sources of funding have been closely scrutinized by the government. No "Chinese capital" is involved.
The Liberty Times however, has turned a blind eye to these facts. It persists in leveling risible allegations of "Chinese capital" against the Want Want Group and other businesses that have achieved success in the Mainland market. It persists in painting them as "Reds." It persists in misleading the general public. We are puzzled. These companies work hard. They develop new markets. They earn money from the locals. They send the profits back to Taiwan, to invest in new businesses, Do they really not "love Taiwan?" Do their actions really represent "domination by Chinese capital?" Others shut themselves up on the island of Taiwan. The engage in land speculation. They inflate real estate prices. They profit from local Taiwanese. They make it impossible for ordinary office workers to afford their own homes. Do they really "love Taiwan?" What right do such businesses have to accuse others of being "Reds?" What rigth to they have to accuse others of "domination by Chinese capital?"
胡亂界定中資 惡扣企業紅帽子
2011-02-10 中國時報
日前《自由時報》在新聞報導中，再以「中資色彩濃厚的蔡姓台商」影射旺旺中時集團負責人；對《自由時報》一再以其自行胡亂界定的中資定義，隨意惡扣企業紅帽子，我們認為已嚴重誤導社會視聽，並成為另外一種文革式的白色恐怖。我們在此做一說明並就教社會大眾與《自由時報》。
所謂的中資，嚴格的定義是指大陸官方掌控的資金，最直接者當然是大陸官方的資金，再來則是其國營企業的資金；至於間接一點者，則是指某家企業中，雖然大部分資金來自民間，但仍有部分資金來自官方或國企。至於，把所有資金都毫無來自大陸官方或國企，只是在大陸賣產品，掙得的錢，也列入「中資」行列，則是聞所未聞─全世界只有《自由時報》是如此定義中資。
依照《自由時報》這個新定義，全台都籠照在中資陰影中。全台一千六百多家上市櫃公司中，近千家已在大陸投資設廠，科技業者更達近九成；過去，大部分台商赴大陸投資是利用大陸廉價土地、勞動力等生產要素，產品以出口為主，大陸成為「世界工廠」。但近年大陸轉型為「全球市場」，民間消費力快速成長，所有台資企業、台商全部都轉而大幅增加在大陸的內銷比重。這些賺大陸市場錢的企業，在《自由時報》的定義中，可全都變成「中資色彩濃厚的企業」了。
這些企業在大陸賣產品掙得錢，回台發股息、股利給投資大眾，民眾拿到股利也要繳稅，上至馬總統、下至基層公務員的薪資，都來自政府稅收。所以，依照《自由時報》這種獨樹一幟、特殊的中資定義，豈不成馬總統與台灣公務員領取的薪資，都有中資了？
對在大陸成長、茁壯，搶攻市場成功的台資企業，台灣社會一向不吝給予掌聲喝采。大成長城原本只是台灣的中小企業，在大陸發展成雞肉大王；頂新集團以彰化的小食品廠，成為大陸最大方便麵品牌。來自台灣的大潤發深耕大陸十年，已快超越全球零售業巨擘法國的家樂福，成為大陸第一大量販店。其它如台商投資的服務業中還有如達芙妮女鞋、自然美、麗嬰房、歐迪芬內衣及賣麵包的克莉絲汀、餐飲的八五度Ｃ、永和豆漿等各種大大小小企業，都在大陸以自有品牌闖出一片天，在大陸立穩腳步後，這些企業也陸續回台投資或掛牌上市，與台灣投資人分享大陸投資利得。
我們再以台灣人的驕傲、全球性電腦品牌宏碁為例。宏碁在大陸努力開拓市場，去年底在大陸的個人電腦銷售市占率站上第二名，宏碁賺的大陸錢不可謂少吧？依《自由時報》的定義，宏碁也是中資。宏碁在大陸的銷售非常靈活，強調宏碁是「中國人的驕傲」，強調「國際名牌，本土價值」，依《自由時報》那種封閉、「內視」的本土價值，豈不是「賣台」？而在兩岸金融開放後，連合庫等公營金融機構也赴大陸設點，開始要賺大陸錢，依《自由時報》定義這豈非連國營行庫都己滲入中資了？這種觀點，豈有道理與說服力？
旺旺集團的宜蘭食品，以販賣米果為本業，是百分之百的台灣企業；在九○年代開始赴大陸投資，經過廿年的耕耘，以自有品牌成功擄獲大陸消費者的心；在大陸立穩腳步後，回台投資媒體及發行台灣存託憑證（ＴＤＲ）。在廿年的發展過程中，從來沒有一分一毫的資金來自大陸官方、國企，完全是在大陸市場銷售產品之所得。回台投資媒體時，也經政府嚴格審核資金來源，其中完全沒有所謂的中資。
不過，《自由時報》對這一切卻視而不見，不斷以其滑天下之大稽的「中資定義」，為包括旺旺集團在內所有在大陸市場成功的企業，大玩戴紅帽子的把戲，錯誤引導社會視聽。我們很疑惑，難道去海外─包括大陸在內打拚，開拓市場、賺當地人錢，再把所得盈餘匯回台灣投資的企業，是不愛台灣、是「中資色彩濃厚」；那些關在台灣島內，惡炒地皮、拉升房價、大賺台灣人錢、讓上班族望屋興嘆的企業，才是愛台灣嗎？這種企業，憑什麼、而且有什麼臉到處為人家戴帽子，亂扣中資帽子？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 10, 2011
Recently the Liberty Times published a series of news reports. It referred to the head of the Want Want Group as "a Taiwan businessman named Tsai, heavily reliant on Chinese capital." The Liberty Times has repeatedly leveled wild accusations of "Chinese capital" and "Red enterprises." It has given the public a grossly misleading impression. Its conduct is reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution or the White Terror. We feel compelled to clarify the matter for the public, and to refute the distortions created by the Liberty Times.
Strictly speaking, so-called "Chinese capital" refers to strictly controlled Mainland government funds. The most obvious source of "Chinese capital" is of course, Mainland government funds. The next most obvious source is funds from state-owned enterprises. Other sources are less obvious. Most of the funding for some family enterprises may come from the private sector. But some funding may come from the government or state-owned enterprises. Other businesses derive no capital whatsoever from the Mainland government or state-owned enterprises. They merely sell their products on the Mainland. Yet the Liberty Times classifies even their profits as "Chinese capital." This is unheard of. The Liberty Times is the only entity in the world that defines "Chinese capital" in such an absurd manner.
According to the Liberty Times' novel definition, all Taiwan is under the shadow of "Chinese capital." Over 1600 companies are listed on Taiwan, Nearly 1000 have been plants on Mainland China. Technology companies account for nearly 90%. In the past, most Taiwan businessmen investing on Mainland China merely took advantage of the Mainland's cheap land, cheap labor, and other production factors. They manufactured export-oriented products, and turned the Mainland into the "world's factory." But in recent years the Mainland has undergone a transformation, to the global market. Private sector consumption has skyrocketed. All Taiwan-funded businesses have substantially increased their presence in the Mainland domestic market. These companies make money from the Mainland market. According to the Liberty Times' absurd definition, they have all become "businesses heavily reliant on Chinese capital."
These companies earn money selling products on the mainland. Back on Taiwan, they pay dividends to the investing public. Members of the public pay taxes on their dividends. The salaries of everyone in the government, from President Ma at the top, to civil servants at the bottom, come from government revenues. Therefore, according to the Liberty Times unique definition of "Chinese capital," President Ma and every civil servant on Taiwan is funded by "Chinese capital."
Taiwan-funded enterprises have grown strong on the Mainland. They have won a large market share. The public on Taiwan approves. Initially such success stories applied only to Taiwan's small and medium enterprises. The Chicken King grew strong on the Mainland. The Ting Hsing Group had a small food factory in Changhua. It became the largest instant noodle brand on the Mainland. Taiwan's RT-Mart invested heavily in Mainland China for ten years. It has now surpassed French retail giant Carrefour, and become the number one discount store on the Mainland. Others include Taiwan funded service sector industries, Daphne shoes, Natural Beauty, Les Enphants, Ou Difen Kelisiting lingerie, Christine bakeries, 85 Degree Centigrade coffee shop, Yonghe Soybean Milk. These and other large and small enterprises built their own brands on Mainland China. They created new business empires. After establishing themselves on the Mainland, these businesses returned to Taiwan to invest, or list on the Taiwan stock market, allowing investors on Taiwan to share in the profits.
Take global computer brand Acer, "the pride of Taiwan." Acer made a concerted effort to develop new markets on the Mainland. By the end of last year, it was number two in personal computer sales on the Mainland. One can hardly say that Acer made little money on the Mainland. According to the Liberty Times definition of "Chinese capital," Acer is also funded by "Chinese capital." Acer's sales pitch is highly flexible. On the Mainland, Acer stresses that it is "the pride of the Chinese people." It stresses that it is an "international brand, with local values." According to the Liberty Times' closed minded, inward looking definition of "local values," Acer's sales pitch amounts to "selling out Taiwan." But since cross-Strait financial liberalization, the [連合庫] and other public financial institutions have established branches on the Mainland. They are beginning to earn Mainland dollars. According to the Liberty Times' definition of "Chinese capital," aren't these state-owned banks under the influence of "Chinese capital?" Is the Liberty Times' view of the world reasonable and convincing?
The main business of the Want Want Group's Ilan Food Division is rice crackers. It is a 100% Taiwan owned enterprise. During the 90s it began investing in the Mainland, After 20 years of hard work, it successfully captured the hearts of Mainland consumers. After establishing a firm foothold on the Mainland, it returned to Taiwan to invest in the media. It issued TDRs. During 20 years of development, it never received a penny from the Mainland authorities or state-owned enterprises. All of its income was derived from the sale of products in the Mainland market. It returned to Taiwan to invest in the media. Its sources of funding have been closely scrutinized by the government. No "Chinese capital" is involved.
The Liberty Times however, has turned a blind eye to these facts. It persists in leveling risible allegations of "Chinese capital" against the Want Want Group and other businesses that have achieved success in the Mainland market. It persists in painting them as "Reds." It persists in misleading the general public. We are puzzled. These companies work hard. They develop new markets. They earn money from the locals. They send the profits back to Taiwan, to invest in new businesses, Do they really not "love Taiwan?" Do their actions really represent "domination by Chinese capital?" Others shut themselves up on the island of Taiwan. The engage in land speculation. They inflate real estate prices. They profit from local Taiwanese. They make it impossible for ordinary office workers to afford their own homes. Do they really "love Taiwan?" What right do such businesses have to accuse others of being "Reds?" What rigth to they have to accuse others of "domination by Chinese capital?"
胡亂界定中資 惡扣企業紅帽子
2011-02-10 中國時報
日前《自由時報》在新聞報導中，再以「中資色彩濃厚的蔡姓台商」影射旺旺中時集團負責人；對《自由時報》一再以其自行胡亂界定的中資定義，隨意惡扣企業紅帽子，我們認為已嚴重誤導社會視聽，並成為另外一種文革式的白色恐怖。我們在此做一說明並就教社會大眾與《自由時報》。
所謂的中資，嚴格的定義是指大陸官方掌控的資金，最直接者當然是大陸官方的資金，再來則是其國營企業的資金；至於間接一點者，則是指某家企業中，雖然大部分資金來自民間，但仍有部分資金來自官方或國企。至於，把所有資金都毫無來自大陸官方或國企，只是在大陸賣產品，掙得的錢，也列入「中資」行列，則是聞所未聞─全世界只有《自由時報》是如此定義中資。
依照《自由時報》這個新定義，全台都籠照在中資陰影中。全台一千六百多家上市櫃公司中，近千家已在大陸投資設廠，科技業者更達近九成；過去，大部分台商赴大陸投資是利用大陸廉價土地、勞動力等生產要素，產品以出口為主，大陸成為「世界工廠」。但近年大陸轉型為「全球市場」，民間消費力快速成長，所有台資企業、台商全部都轉而大幅增加在大陸的內銷比重。這些賺大陸市場錢的企業，在《自由時報》的定義中，可全都變成「中資色彩濃厚的企業」了。
這些企業在大陸賣產品掙得錢，回台發股息、股利給投資大眾，民眾拿到股利也要繳稅，上至馬總統、下至基層公務員的薪資，都來自政府稅收。所以，依照《自由時報》這種獨樹一幟、特殊的中資定義，豈不成馬總統與台灣公務員領取的薪資，都有中資了？
對在大陸成長、茁壯，搶攻市場成功的台資企業，台灣社會一向不吝給予掌聲喝采。大成長城原本只是台灣的中小企業，在大陸發展成雞肉大王；頂新集團以彰化的小食品廠，成為大陸最大方便麵品牌。來自台灣的大潤發深耕大陸十年，已快超越全球零售業巨擘法國的家樂福，成為大陸第一大量販店。其它如台商投資的服務業中還有如達芙妮女鞋、自然美、麗嬰房、歐迪芬內衣及賣麵包的克莉絲汀、餐飲的八五度Ｃ、永和豆漿等各種大大小小企業，都在大陸以自有品牌闖出一片天，在大陸立穩腳步後，這些企業也陸續回台投資或掛牌上市，與台灣投資人分享大陸投資利得。
我們再以台灣人的驕傲、全球性電腦品牌宏碁為例。宏碁在大陸努力開拓市場，去年底在大陸的個人電腦銷售市占率站上第二名，宏碁賺的大陸錢不可謂少吧？依《自由時報》的定義，宏碁也是中資。宏碁在大陸的銷售非常靈活，強調宏碁是「中國人的驕傲」，強調「國際名牌，本土價值」，依《自由時報》那種封閉、「內視」的本土價值，豈不是「賣台」？而在兩岸金融開放後，連合庫等公營金融機構也赴大陸設點，開始要賺大陸錢，依《自由時報》定義這豈非連國營行庫都己滲入中資了？這種觀點，豈有道理與說服力？
旺旺集團的宜蘭食品，以販賣米果為本業，是百分之百的台灣企業；在九○年代開始赴大陸投資，經過廿年的耕耘，以自有品牌成功擄獲大陸消費者的心；在大陸立穩腳步後，回台投資媒體及發行台灣存託憑證（ＴＤＲ）。在廿年的發展過程中，從來沒有一分一毫的資金來自大陸官方、國企，完全是在大陸市場銷售產品之所得。回台投資媒體時，也經政府嚴格審核資金來源，其中完全沒有所謂的中資。
不過，《自由時報》對這一切卻視而不見，不斷以其滑天下之大稽的「中資定義」，為包括旺旺集團在內所有在大陸市場成功的企業，大玩戴紅帽子的把戲，錯誤引導社會視聽。我們很疑惑，難道去海外─包括大陸在內打拚，開拓市場、賺當地人錢，再把所得盈餘匯回台灣投資的企業，是不愛台灣、是「中資色彩濃厚」；那些關在台灣島內，惡炒地皮、拉升房價、大賺台灣人錢、讓上班族望屋興嘆的企業，才是愛台灣嗎？這種企業，憑什麼、而且有什麼臉到處為人家戴帽子，亂扣中資帽子？
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
Proper Nomenclature Beneficial to Cross-Strait Relations
Proper Nomenclature Beneficial to Cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 9, 2011
In his Chinese New Year speech, President Ma Ying-jeou gave government officials specific instructions. In all future documents, they must refer to the other side of the Taiwan Strait as "the Mainland," or as "Mainland China." They must not refer to it as "China." This would avoid confusion over the issue of sovereignty and "two Chinas." It would ensure that cross-Strait relations are based on the constitution. His remarks elicited different reactions from the Blue and Green camps. But in fact this was a simple matter of law, and fundamental to cross-Strait relations. It was what the government should have been doing all along.
Under the provisions of the ROC Constitution, the current cross-Strait situation is one in which "the nation has yet to be reunified." Therefore the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been classified as the "Free Region" and the "Mainland Region." Article One of the "Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region" states that "This article has been specially crafted to ensure the safety and welfare of people in the Taiwan Region prior to national reunification, to regulate exchanges between the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region, and to deal with such legal matters as may arise," The article explicitly defines the Taiwan Region as Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and any other areas under the jurisdiction of the government. The Mainland Region is defined as "sovereign territory outside the Taiwan Region belonging to the Republic of China." The competent authority in charge of cross-Strait affairs shall be the "Mainland Affairs Council."
Everything, from the constitution, to the law, to government entities, explicitly refer to the other side as "the Mainland." Logically speaking, official documents are the same as the law. Naturally they must accord with the law. They can hardly use concocted names. President Ma reiterated the government's position. He stressed that this was a description of the status quo. This status quo was derived from amendments to the constitution, and from the "Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region." It has not changed since the establishment of the MAC, despite two changes in the ruling party.
DPP legislators have alleged that President Ma Ying-jeou's declaration demeaned our sovereignty. Their allegations are groundless. When the DPP was in power, then Premier Yu Shyi-kun was questioned in the Legislative Yuan. Yu ordered the various government agencies to refer to the other side as "Mainland China" or "the Chinese Communists." Yu Shyi-kun had no choice. As the chief executive of the Republic of China, he was duty bound by its constitution and laws. Besides, the other side refers to us as "Taiwan." We refer to it as "the Mainland." Who can complain? We have not repudiated the Beijing authorities' jurisdiction. But neither have we recognized their sovereignty. How exactly have we "demeaned" ourselves?
Following the five cities elections, the DPP held lively debates, in which they discussed new cross-Strait policies. Former DPP chairman and premier Frank Hsieh proposed "One Constitution, Different Interpretations." He proposed a return to his long held "One China Constitution." The DPP may refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus. But it can not avoid the spirit of "One China, Different Interpretations" when dealing with cross-Strait affairs. The ROC Constitution, after all, implies "One China." On Taiwan, the term "China" means the Republic of China. On Taiwan, this is the lowest common denominator regarding cross-Strait policy.
Scholars have commented on President Ma Ying-jeou's declaration. They consider it a gesture of goodwill toward the mainland. They also think it may appeal to swing voters. The two may go hand in hand. Official documents are law. They represent the government's position, When government officials prepare official documents, or are questioned by legislators, they must do so in accordance with the law. They must refer to the other side as "the Mainland" or "Mainland China." Basically they must reaffirm the Republic of China. They must not repudiate the policies of the Republic of China "prior to reunification." The Mainland fears that Taipei's attempts to assert its sovereignty may pave the way for Taiwan independence. The government must dispel any such concerns. On the other hand, the government must firmly uphold the Republic of China's sovereignty. This is its public responsibility. The government must not neglect national sovereignty, merely because it is attempting to strengthen cross-Strait relations.
For the public on Taiwan, the constitution should be treated like air and water, essential to our national survival. It is not necessary to pay it constant lip service. But cross-Strait relations are increasingly intimate. Historical disputes over the two sides' sovereignty have yet to be resolved, If repeated declarations reduce controversy, why not? Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan spoke of Taiwan's seven major interests. But she failed to stipulate "under the framework of the ROC Constitution." As a result, scholars wondered whether her proposal was "unconstitutional." People were incredulous. Beijing characterized this as a "minor matter." Just to make sure, Ma Ying-jeou reiterated the government's position, He gave Lai Shin-yuan support. Cross-Strait exchanges are currently in full swing. The various ministries may be forced to deal with cross-Strait matters. The Lai Shin-yuan incident may become a problem for all government officials.
Cross-Strait exchanges have been going on for 24 years. People to people exchanges are warmer than ever. People refer to the other side using all sorts of names. These include China, the Peoples Republic of China, the Beijing authorities, the Mainland, Mainland China, even the Chinese Communists. The man in the street may not understand the distinction between "jurisdiction" and "sovereignty." The government is not about to tell private citizens what terms they should use when referring to the other side. Take the calendar for example. The private sector has long used the Western calendar for publication dates. But the government is not the private sector. All official documents must use "Year of the Republic" dates. When dealing with cross-Strait affairs and policy, the government must abide by the same laws. Only then can it avoid misusing words and generating controversy within a complex political environment.
對等稱呼 有利兩岸關係平順發展
2011-02-09 中國時報
馬英九總統新春講話，特別要求各部會未來的公文書，一律要稱對岸為「大陸」或「中國大陸」，不能簡稱其為「中國」，避免產生「兩個中國」的主權混淆，也讓兩岸關係回歸憲法架構。這番談話，引起藍綠不同解讀，但這其實是兩岸關係最簡單的法律基礎，符合政府一貫政策應有的作為。
根據中華民國憲法增修條文，兩岸處境仍屬「國家未統一前」，因此分別以「自由地區」與「大陸地區」定位兩岸。而根據《台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例》，第一條開宗明義就是「國家統一前，為確保臺灣地區安全與民眾福祉，規範臺灣地區與大陸地區人民之往來，並處理衍生之法律事件，特制定本條例。」條例並明確定義台灣地區是指臺灣、澎湖、金門、馬祖及政府統治權所及之其他地區，而大陸地區則是指「臺灣地區以外之中華民國領土」。至於處理兩岸事務的主管機關名稱則是「行政院大陸委員會」。
從憲法到法律，從法律到機關，都非常明確的定位對岸為「大陸」，照常理，機關公文書形同法令，當然得依法而行，豈能自創名稱？馬總統重申政府立場，強調這是對現狀的描述，這個現狀從憲法增修條文、《兩岸人民關係條例》制定、陸委會設置以來，即使歷經兩次政黨輪替，都沒改變。
民進黨立委指責馬英九總統的宣示是矮化主權之舉，完全沒有道理。因為民進黨執政時期，當年的行政院長游錫?就在立法院總質詢時表明，要求各部會稱對岸為「中國大陸」或者「中共」，游錫?沒有其他選擇，既身為中華民國最高行政首長，恪遵憲法和法律，就是他的職責。何況對岸稱我為「台灣」，我稱對岸為「大陸」，誰曰不宜？我們不否認北京當局的「治權」，但沒承認其「主權」，又何來矮化自己的問題？
五都選舉之後，民進黨也熱烈討論新的兩岸論述。前民進黨主席、行政院長謝長廷提出「憲法各表」，回歸他過去一貫主張「憲法一中」。盡管民進黨不承認「九二共識」，但也無法迴避以「一個中國，各自表述」的精神，處理兩岸事務。畢竟中華民國憲法就是「一個中國」，這個「中國」在台灣就是中華民國，這是台灣內部對兩岸政策紛歧中的最大公約數。
學者評論馬英九總統的宣示，認為是對大陸表達善意的做法，也有爭取中間選民的政治意涵，這兩種作用完全可以並行不悖。公文書是法律，是政府立場，官員在公文書，甚至國會備詢時，依法而行，稱呼對岸為大陸或中國大陸，基本上是重申了中華民國的立場，不否定中華民國「統一前」的各種政策作為，緩解大陸對台灣爭取主權作為可能導致獨立的疑慮；另一方面，政府堅守主權立場，也是對國人最負責任的做法，政府不會因為強化兩岸交流，而輕忽國家主權定位。
對台灣而言，憲法理應如空氣與水，是國家存在的必需品，不必每天掛在嘴上宣示。但兩岸關係愈趨頻密，兩岸主權的歷史糾葛卻猶未解決，如果多一次宣示，多減少一些爭議，有何不可？就像陸委會主委賴幸媛提出台灣七大利益論，只因為少說了一句「在中華民國憲法架構下」，竟引發學者質疑「違憲」，令人不可思議，馬英九以確定對岸稱謂這件其實非常簡單的「小事」，重申政府立場，也為賴幸媛緩頰。而賴幸媛事件，在目前兩岸交流全面開展，各部會都有機會觸及兩岸事務的情況下，可能會成為政府官員的共同問題。
兩岸開放交流廿四年，民間往來愈趨熱絡，對於對岸的稱呼，從中國、中華人民共和國、北京當局、大陸、中國大陸、乃至中共，林林種種。民間並不會嚴格區分「治權」與「主權」的差異，政府也很難約束民間到底要用什麼名詞稱呼對岸，就像談到紀年，民間出版品早已常用西元紀年。但政府不同於民間，所有的公文書紀年還是得用「民國」，在處理兩岸事務與政策時，政府同樣得須依循法律基礎，才能在複雜的政治論述中，避免因為言詞誤用造成的爭議和困擾。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 9, 2011
In his Chinese New Year speech, President Ma Ying-jeou gave government officials specific instructions. In all future documents, they must refer to the other side of the Taiwan Strait as "the Mainland," or as "Mainland China." They must not refer to it as "China." This would avoid confusion over the issue of sovereignty and "two Chinas." It would ensure that cross-Strait relations are based on the constitution. His remarks elicited different reactions from the Blue and Green camps. But in fact this was a simple matter of law, and fundamental to cross-Strait relations. It was what the government should have been doing all along.
Under the provisions of the ROC Constitution, the current cross-Strait situation is one in which "the nation has yet to be reunified." Therefore the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been classified as the "Free Region" and the "Mainland Region." Article One of the "Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region" states that "This article has been specially crafted to ensure the safety and welfare of people in the Taiwan Region prior to national reunification, to regulate exchanges between the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region, and to deal with such legal matters as may arise," The article explicitly defines the Taiwan Region as Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and any other areas under the jurisdiction of the government. The Mainland Region is defined as "sovereign territory outside the Taiwan Region belonging to the Republic of China." The competent authority in charge of cross-Strait affairs shall be the "Mainland Affairs Council."
Everything, from the constitution, to the law, to government entities, explicitly refer to the other side as "the Mainland." Logically speaking, official documents are the same as the law. Naturally they must accord with the law. They can hardly use concocted names. President Ma reiterated the government's position. He stressed that this was a description of the status quo. This status quo was derived from amendments to the constitution, and from the "Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region." It has not changed since the establishment of the MAC, despite two changes in the ruling party.
DPP legislators have alleged that President Ma Ying-jeou's declaration demeaned our sovereignty. Their allegations are groundless. When the DPP was in power, then Premier Yu Shyi-kun was questioned in the Legislative Yuan. Yu ordered the various government agencies to refer to the other side as "Mainland China" or "the Chinese Communists." Yu Shyi-kun had no choice. As the chief executive of the Republic of China, he was duty bound by its constitution and laws. Besides, the other side refers to us as "Taiwan." We refer to it as "the Mainland." Who can complain? We have not repudiated the Beijing authorities' jurisdiction. But neither have we recognized their sovereignty. How exactly have we "demeaned" ourselves?
Following the five cities elections, the DPP held lively debates, in which they discussed new cross-Strait policies. Former DPP chairman and premier Frank Hsieh proposed "One Constitution, Different Interpretations." He proposed a return to his long held "One China Constitution." The DPP may refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus. But it can not avoid the spirit of "One China, Different Interpretations" when dealing with cross-Strait affairs. The ROC Constitution, after all, implies "One China." On Taiwan, the term "China" means the Republic of China. On Taiwan, this is the lowest common denominator regarding cross-Strait policy.
Scholars have commented on President Ma Ying-jeou's declaration. They consider it a gesture of goodwill toward the mainland. They also think it may appeal to swing voters. The two may go hand in hand. Official documents are law. They represent the government's position, When government officials prepare official documents, or are questioned by legislators, they must do so in accordance with the law. They must refer to the other side as "the Mainland" or "Mainland China." Basically they must reaffirm the Republic of China. They must not repudiate the policies of the Republic of China "prior to reunification." The Mainland fears that Taipei's attempts to assert its sovereignty may pave the way for Taiwan independence. The government must dispel any such concerns. On the other hand, the government must firmly uphold the Republic of China's sovereignty. This is its public responsibility. The government must not neglect national sovereignty, merely because it is attempting to strengthen cross-Strait relations.
For the public on Taiwan, the constitution should be treated like air and water, essential to our national survival. It is not necessary to pay it constant lip service. But cross-Strait relations are increasingly intimate. Historical disputes over the two sides' sovereignty have yet to be resolved, If repeated declarations reduce controversy, why not? Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan spoke of Taiwan's seven major interests. But she failed to stipulate "under the framework of the ROC Constitution." As a result, scholars wondered whether her proposal was "unconstitutional." People were incredulous. Beijing characterized this as a "minor matter." Just to make sure, Ma Ying-jeou reiterated the government's position, He gave Lai Shin-yuan support. Cross-Strait exchanges are currently in full swing. The various ministries may be forced to deal with cross-Strait matters. The Lai Shin-yuan incident may become a problem for all government officials.
Cross-Strait exchanges have been going on for 24 years. People to people exchanges are warmer than ever. People refer to the other side using all sorts of names. These include China, the Peoples Republic of China, the Beijing authorities, the Mainland, Mainland China, even the Chinese Communists. The man in the street may not understand the distinction between "jurisdiction" and "sovereignty." The government is not about to tell private citizens what terms they should use when referring to the other side. Take the calendar for example. The private sector has long used the Western calendar for publication dates. But the government is not the private sector. All official documents must use "Year of the Republic" dates. When dealing with cross-Strait affairs and policy, the government must abide by the same laws. Only then can it avoid misusing words and generating controversy within a complex political environment.
對等稱呼 有利兩岸關係平順發展
2011-02-09 中國時報
馬英九總統新春講話，特別要求各部會未來的公文書，一律要稱對岸為「大陸」或「中國大陸」，不能簡稱其為「中國」，避免產生「兩個中國」的主權混淆，也讓兩岸關係回歸憲法架構。這番談話，引起藍綠不同解讀，但這其實是兩岸關係最簡單的法律基礎，符合政府一貫政策應有的作為。
根據中華民國憲法增修條文，兩岸處境仍屬「國家未統一前」，因此分別以「自由地區」與「大陸地區」定位兩岸。而根據《台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例》，第一條開宗明義就是「國家統一前，為確保臺灣地區安全與民眾福祉，規範臺灣地區與大陸地區人民之往來，並處理衍生之法律事件，特制定本條例。」條例並明確定義台灣地區是指臺灣、澎湖、金門、馬祖及政府統治權所及之其他地區，而大陸地區則是指「臺灣地區以外之中華民國領土」。至於處理兩岸事務的主管機關名稱則是「行政院大陸委員會」。
從憲法到法律，從法律到機關，都非常明確的定位對岸為「大陸」，照常理，機關公文書形同法令，當然得依法而行，豈能自創名稱？馬總統重申政府立場，強調這是對現狀的描述，這個現狀從憲法增修條文、《兩岸人民關係條例》制定、陸委會設置以來，即使歷經兩次政黨輪替，都沒改變。
民進黨立委指責馬英九總統的宣示是矮化主權之舉，完全沒有道理。因為民進黨執政時期，當年的行政院長游錫?就在立法院總質詢時表明，要求各部會稱對岸為「中國大陸」或者「中共」，游錫?沒有其他選擇，既身為中華民國最高行政首長，恪遵憲法和法律，就是他的職責。何況對岸稱我為「台灣」，我稱對岸為「大陸」，誰曰不宜？我們不否認北京當局的「治權」，但沒承認其「主權」，又何來矮化自己的問題？
五都選舉之後，民進黨也熱烈討論新的兩岸論述。前民進黨主席、行政院長謝長廷提出「憲法各表」，回歸他過去一貫主張「憲法一中」。盡管民進黨不承認「九二共識」，但也無法迴避以「一個中國，各自表述」的精神，處理兩岸事務。畢竟中華民國憲法就是「一個中國」，這個「中國」在台灣就是中華民國，這是台灣內部對兩岸政策紛歧中的最大公約數。
學者評論馬英九總統的宣示，認為是對大陸表達善意的做法，也有爭取中間選民的政治意涵，這兩種作用完全可以並行不悖。公文書是法律，是政府立場，官員在公文書，甚至國會備詢時，依法而行，稱呼對岸為大陸或中國大陸，基本上是重申了中華民國的立場，不否定中華民國「統一前」的各種政策作為，緩解大陸對台灣爭取主權作為可能導致獨立的疑慮；另一方面，政府堅守主權立場，也是對國人最負責任的做法，政府不會因為強化兩岸交流，而輕忽國家主權定位。
對台灣而言，憲法理應如空氣與水，是國家存在的必需品，不必每天掛在嘴上宣示。但兩岸關係愈趨頻密，兩岸主權的歷史糾葛卻猶未解決，如果多一次宣示，多減少一些爭議，有何不可？就像陸委會主委賴幸媛提出台灣七大利益論，只因為少說了一句「在中華民國憲法架構下」，竟引發學者質疑「違憲」，令人不可思議，馬英九以確定對岸稱謂這件其實非常簡單的「小事」，重申政府立場，也為賴幸媛緩頰。而賴幸媛事件，在目前兩岸交流全面開展，各部會都有機會觸及兩岸事務的情況下，可能會成為政府官員的共同問題。
兩岸開放交流廿四年，民間往來愈趨熱絡，對於對岸的稱呼，從中國、中華人民共和國、北京當局、大陸、中國大陸、乃至中共，林林種種。民間並不會嚴格區分「治權」與「主權」的差異，政府也很難約束民間到底要用什麼名詞稱呼對岸，就像談到紀年，民間出版品早已常用西元紀年。但政府不同於民間，所有的公文書紀年還是得用「民國」，在處理兩岸事務與政策時，政府同樣得須依循法律基礎，才能在複雜的政治論述中，避免因為言詞誤用造成的爭議和困擾。
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