Jury System is First Step in Checking Power of Judges
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 1, 2011
The Judicial Yuan has approved a "Jury System" pilot program. The system will allow the public limited participation in the trial process. But no sooner were the plans were announced, then critics from all walks of life weighed in. Future passage and implementation of the system may be difficult.
A government can have a tripartite or quinpartite power structure. But judicial power is unique. Only judges may exercise this power, free from any and all interference. Past judicial reform efforts strove for judicial independence. They abolished the "by the book system." They established a system in which judges determined personnel assignments. This prevented "higher ups" and "still higher ups" from interfering with court judgments. Today, we have an independent justice system that conforms to the Rule of Law.
When a trial judge's power is free from any and all interference, the practical result is trial judge absolutism. Judges are virtually gods in their courtrooms. Judges have the final say on everything. As a result, the success or failure of the trial process will hinge on the individual character of judges. An individual judge may have a particular bias or moral defect. He may be clearly incompetent. But his judicial authority will be immune to any checks or balances. This may lead to wrongful convictions and ridiculous sentences. It may lead to controversial, erroneous, and absurd rulings that cast doubt on the credibility of the justice system. Recently, so-called "dinosaur judges" were the target of ridicule. Other judges with strong political colors have handed down highly controversial rulings. Some judges have even practiced corruption, inviting massive criticism. This shows that our pursuit of judicial independence has gone too far. Today the problem is not insufficient judicial independence. Today the problem is a surfeit of judicial tyranny.
In our effort to arrive at a workable system, we have gone from seeking balance to avoiding tyranny. Our efforts were worthwhile. But before we introduce a new system, we must first consider social reality. We must not be Quixotic. When the Judicial Yuan introduced its "Jury System," some compared it to the Anglo-American jury system, or the German assessor/lay judges system. They said that "Such a jury system is absurd. The public cannot be trusted." Leave aside the issue of whether the system is constitutional. Any attempt to introduce such an idealized system in the near term, would be extremely difficult.
First consider the Anglo-American jury system. The jury has the power to rule on the facts of the case. It shares power with the trial judge, consistent with the applicable laws. Jurors may be selected by an elaborate selection procedure. They may be strictly sequestered. They may be receive strict instructions from judges. But a jury consisting of ordinary citizens remains vulnerable to undue influences. They may arrive at unexpected verdicts. This has often occurred in the UK and the US. If the jury system is adopted here, given our social realities, a jury would be unlikely to match Anglo-American standards. The jury system does not always work in the UK and the US. How well would it work on Taiwan? This is not a question of whether we trust the people. This is a question of whether we can afford to gamble with an individual's rights.
Now consider the German assessor/lay judges system. Assessors, along with judges, function as decision-makers during trials. But not all cases use assessors. Only misdemeanors and lower court cases use assessors. Felony cases may include assessors, but fewer assessors than judges. Nor do they take part in the Final Appeal stage. Assessor selection is stricter than jury selection. Given the situation on Taiwan, it would probably be even more difficult to establish a trustworthy selection assessor selection process.
We must consider social reality. The "jury system" is the first step in checking and balancing the power of trial judges. Once we implement such a system, we must see how well it works. We can then choose either the jury system, the assessor system, or some other system. This is the way to arrive at a reliable solution.
We approve of the Judicial Yuan's move to shatter the conservative mindset of the justice system. It has taken an important first step. But such a pilot program must be strengthened. For example, according to the published data, once jurors have been selected, no mechanism prevents undue influence. The jurors have only the right to make recommendations. But while the new system is being tested, jury comments may still exert considerable pressure on judges. We must guard against undue influence. It must be punished. Citizens with a senior high education or better. who are at least 23 years old, qualify as jurors. Given current social realities, this is probably much too lenient. Suppose the judge is 26, and the juror is 23? How reassuring would such a combination be? The devil is in the details. The proposed system must be carefully evaluated.
觀審制是平衡法官權力的第一步
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.01
司法院通過「人民觀審制」試行方案，將推動有限度的民眾參與審判的新制度。計劃一宣布，各界批評聲浪即如翻江倒海而來，未來立法及執行要闖的關卡恐怕不少。
不論三權還是五權，司法權的主要特色當然是法官獨立審判，不受任何干涉。過去司法改革長期的努力是追求審判獨立，所以廢止「書類送閱制度」，也建立起法官參與的人事制度，阻斷了「上級、上上級」干預判決的各種管道；至今，我國法官審判獨立，已可謂達到法治國家的標準。
當法官的審判權力不受任何干涉時，在審理實務上其實就是法官極權，法官等於是「法庭裡的上帝」，一切法官說了算。這樣一來，審判的成敗，法官個人因素即成了關鍵。倘若法官個人有特定偏見，或有道德瑕疵，甚至明顯能力不足，其手中的審判權力又無任何制衡機制，即可能作出引發嚴重爭議的錯判、謬判，終致打擊司法信譽。近來所謂「恐龍法官」之譏，或部分政治色彩濃烈法官爭議極大的舉措，甚至法官貪污案引起巨大的批評等等現象，都說明了我們追求司法獨立已經進入物極必反的情境，如今是「不患司法不獨立，而患其太獨裁」。
因此，從平衡過於極權的審判權力而言，試著找出任何可行制度的努力，都值得支持；亦因如此，我們在引進或創設任何新的制度時，都必須先考慮社會實況，不可過於理想化。司法院的「人民觀審制」推出之後，有人以英美採用的「陪審制」或德國採行的「參審制」加以比較，指「人民觀審制莫名其妙、對人民不信任」云云。撇開違憲爭議不談，那些「理想制度」若立即引進，恐怕真的有些困難。
先看英美的「陪審制」。因為陪審團有決定案件事實成立與否的權力，與主持審判和適用法律的法官可謂做到了分權；但平民組成的陪審團，儘管有種種挑選過程、嚴加隔離、法官的指導等等防範機制，仍確實容易受到各種訴訟花招的左右，而作出意外的決定，在英美也有很多檢討。倘若現在就將陪審制搬來我國，大概沒有人敢相信以我們的社會實況，陪審團的運作能夠達到英美的標準。英美的實踐都不理想了，能想像我們若採陪審團會是什麼模樣嗎？這不是「信任人民與否」的問題，而是不能拿案件和個人權益來賭博。
再說德國「參審制」。參審員像法官一樣參與審判和判決的作成，但並不是所有案件都有參審員，而是在刑度較輕的案件，下級法院有參審員；重罪案件即使有參審員，人數亦低於法官，且終審不採參審員。由於參審員的要求比陪審員更高，在我國現況，恐怕更難安排值得信任的選派機制。
我們認為，考量社會實況之後，以「人民觀審制」作為踏出平衡法官審判權力的第一步，再觀察實施成果，作為更進一步選擇「陪審制」或「參審制」，或任何其他可行制度的基礎，應該算是從無到有的相對穩健的方案。
我們贊成司法院打破司法界的保守習慣，踏出這重要的第一步，但認為該試行方案還是有許多地方必須加強。例如，依公布資料，觀審員選定之後，似無防範不當影響的機制；雖然觀審員只有建議權，但新制試行，觀審員的意見，對法官還是有很大壓力的。不當影響必須防範，甚至給予處罰。再如，一般而言，高中程度以上國民、滿二十三歲即有擔任資格；以現況何言，恐怕過於寬泛。倘若法官二十六歲、觀審員二十三歲，這樣的組合能讓人放心嗎？細節影響成敗，尚待仔細研議。
Sunday, July 31, 2011
Thursday, July 28, 2011
James Soong, Why Not Run For President?
James Soong, Why Not Run For President?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2011
James Soong recently made a bold move. To understand his motives, we must consider the impact of his move on the January 2012 two-in-one election and on the future of the Republic of China.
James Soong said his goal was to win three seats for the People First Party in the Legislative Yuan, and to form a three man PFP party caucus. Does the PFP have the ability to form a three man PFP party caucus? This is not necessarily the key to the political future of the ROC. The question being asked of voters in the current election is, should they remain loyal to the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution? Should the government maintain its current cross-Strait policy? Or should it adopt an entirely different strategic policy path? Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen represent two vastly different policy paths. Therefore this election has enormous significance for the future of the ROC, The issues are, should the ROC change its strategic path? Should the ROC change its president? Should the president elect change the strategic path of the ROC, via the Legislative Yuan? The issue is not whether the PFP can form a three man PFP party caucus.
If James Soong runs for president, in the hope of influencing the strategic direction of the ROC, he is well within his rights. How well he can do in the election is not the issue, But suppose he is unable to offer a strategic direction that transcends those offered by Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen? Suppose his goal is merely to stir up the pot, or to establish a three man PFP party caucus? Never mind whether he has the ability. If that is his goal, he is not justified in doing so. Because the question of whether to adopt a new strategic direction transcends the question of whether the PFP is able to form a three man PFP party caucus. Is James Soong's real goal to alter the strategic direction of the ROC? If it is not, then stirring the pot and forming a three man PFP party caucus hardly justifies what he is doing.
What is the purpose of forming a three man PFP party caucus? Is it to enable the DPP's Chou Po-ya to become Deputy Speaker of the Taipei City Council? Is it to enable the Legislative Yuan to make Chen Tsung-ming Prosecutor General? Is it to pave the way for a "Tsai/Soong Meeting," as a follow up to the "Bian/Soong Meeting?" Is it to enable a three man PFP party caucus to play the role of a decisive minority in the legislature? What will the strategic impact on the nation and society be? Suppose Soong's move subverts the strategic picture? Suppose it changes our strategtic direction? Is that James Soong's real goal?
Soong obviously opposes Ma and hates Ma. But he is unwilling to be honest about his motives. This is why James Soong keeps advancing reasons for what he is doing. James Soong can run for president. All he needs to do is launch a petition drive. Green Camp voters will automatically, spontaneously support his candidacy. His candidacy will be assured. No matter what the outcome of the election is, no matter whether Soong wins or Tsai wins, Soong will have fulfilled his goal. He will have exacted revenge on Ma Ying-jeou. James Soong is not running for president. But he is still splitting Blue Camp votes. If he runs for president with the express intention of stirring the pot, Soong will become Blue Camp Public Enemy Number One, He can forget about any three man PFP party caucus. If the People First Party fields candidates for the legislature left and right, it will be publicly admitting that it is merely stirring the pot, that it is not running for office, but merely acting as a spoiler.
James Soong is opposed to Ma and angry at Ma. But he cannot deny the success of Ma Ying-jeou's strategic path. If the PFP considers Ma Ying-jeou's strategic path to be generally correct, why must it set up a three man PFP party caucus? Why must it deliberately create chaos and wreak havoc? What justification does it have? What reasons can it offer? James Soong may be unhappy with King Pu-tsung, But that is no reason to create chaos and subvert the strategic picture.
James Soong's actions are destructive rather than constructive. He hopes merely to foil Ma Ying-jeou's bid for a second term, or to hurt him in the legislative elections, all for the sake of his three man PFP party caucus. His approach is to split the Blue Camp, to wrap his fingers around Ma Ying-jeou's neck. The inevitable result would be a windfall for Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP, Tsai could topple Ma as president. The DPP could gain control of the Legislative Yuan. The election could change the nation's helmsman, and the nation's strategic direction. No one is suggesting that James Soong cannot support Tsai Ing-wen. No one can forbid James Soong to meet with Ah-Bian. But Soong must explain his reasons for bringing down Ma Ying-jeou and helping up Tsai Ing-wen. Does he really think that a three man PFP party caucus, in exchange for subverting the strategic direction of the ROC, constitutes a reasonable political trade off?
James Soong may wish to distinguish between his path and Ma Ying-jeou's, He may wish to advance his own strategic vision. Ma Ying-jeou advocates "no [immediate] reunification." The PFP may choose to advocate "reunification," in the hope of attracting votes from elderly veterans. But can James Soong really champion reunification merely by forming a three man PFP party caucus? And if the final result is that Ma steps down and Tsai steps up, will Tsai's positions on national identity, constitutional allegiance, and cross-Strait policy more closely approximate those held by elderly veterans? Is this not a fraud perpetrated upon elderly veterans?
Besides, consider the worst case scenario. The KMT loses its legislative majority, Ma Ying-jeou loses his bid for reelection. The PFP fails in its attempt to form a three man PFP party caucus.
Ma Ying-jeou's record is far from satisfactory. Tsai Ing-wen's record is not without its achievements. The biggest difference between the two has nothing to do with their public images, but with their strategic paths. If James Soong runs for president, and defeats both Ma and Tsai, he may be able to influence the ROC's strategic direction. But if Soong cannot defeat Ma and Tsai, he must choose between two strategic paths, the KMT's and the DPP's. He must choose between Ma and Tsai. This is a choice each and every voter must make in the general election of January next year. James Soong is no exception. Any three man PFP party caucus must also have a strategic direction.
During next year's elections, the strategic direction of the ROC is more important than any personal grudges. It is more important than 2.4 billion NT, It is more important than any three man PFP party caucus. No one is saying that James Soong cannot subvert the strategic picture, and bring down Ma Ying-jeou. But Soong must make clear whether this is what he really wants. Is James Soong really concerned about three seats in the Legislative Yuan? Or is he merely attempting to subvert the strategic picture? If he is really concerned about three seats in the Legislative Yuan, he does not need to create so much chaos. He should be able to achieve his purpose some other way.
Is James Soong not running for president, but merely attempting to bring down Ma Ying-jeou? Or is James Soong running for president, in order to bring down Ma Ying-jeou? Either way, the results will be exactly the same. In which case, James Soong might as well run for president. Because if Soong runs for president and brings down Ma, Soong might just win. This might make a meaningful difference to the strategic path taken by the ROC.
James Soong opposes Ma and hates Ma. But he must not allow his feelings to overwhelm his concern for the future of the ROC.
宋楚瑜何不選總統
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.29
欲解釋宋楚瑜這些日子裡的大動作，應先看明年一月的二合一選舉對台灣未來有何意義。
宋楚瑜說，將以親民黨當選三席立委在立院組成黨團為目標。但親民黨之能否成立三人黨團，未必是這次選舉能否影響台灣未來的政治槓桿。這次選舉的主要意義是在：現行「國憲認同／兩岸政策」的「全局路線」是否仍要繼續，或者改變為另一套截然不同的「全局路線」，而馬英九及蔡英文是這兩套迥然而異的政策路線的代表人。因而，這次選舉對台灣未來的最大意義，在於是否要改變「全局路線」，亦即是否要換總統，並使當選的總統能透過立法院執行其「全局路線」，而不在親民黨能否在立院成立三人黨團。
基於此一看法，宋楚瑜若是參選總統，欲對「全局路線」發生影響，則他無論怎麼做，皆有正當性。但他若不能對「全局路線」提出超越馬蔡二人的主張，卻作出要攪動「全局」的姿態，或以成立「三人黨團」（不論後來能否成立）為目標，最後則因而產生了顛覆全局的效果，那即未必具有正當性。因為，「全局」存廢的問題，大於親民黨能否成立「三人黨團」的問題。除非「顛覆全局」就是宋楚瑜的真正目標，否則，若以「顛覆全局」交換「親民黨三人黨團」，這豈符合比例原則？
親民黨成立「三人黨團」有何作用？是要如在台北市議會選民進黨周柏雅為副議長？或是要如在立院護航陳聰明出任檢察總長？還是要繼「扁宋會」後再演出「蔡宋會」？倘若親民黨的「三人黨團」仍然演出此類的「關鍵少數」，將對國家社會的「全局路線」有何意義？且倘因此而「顛覆全局」，改變了「全局路線」，是否亦是宋楚瑜的真正追求？
明明是反馬仇馬，卻又不老實說反馬仇馬，這是宋楚瑜左支右絀的原因。宋楚瑜可以選總統，只要他發動連署，綠營選民就會自動自發地成全他，將他送上壘，輕而易舉；而選舉的結果，不論蔡上或宋上，皆可實現反馬仇馬的目的。但宋楚瑜卻不會選總統，因為他要拉的仍是泛藍的票，若參選總統表明志在「顛覆全局」，則宋將成泛藍公敵，恐連「三人黨團」也不必選了。何況，親民黨「遍地烽火」式地提名區域立委，已經公開言明只是「破壞組」，不在當選，而在攪局。
宋此時的情緒是反馬仇馬，他卻不可能否定馬英九在「全局路線」的大體成就；然而，倘若親民黨也認為馬英九的「全局路線」大體正確，則為了成立「三人黨團」，擺出這種不惜掀桌鬧場、玉石俱焚的架式，正當性何在？合理性何在？宋楚瑜可以不悅金溥聰，但那與應否掀桌鬧場、顛覆全局是兩回事。
宋楚瑜擺出的姿態是「成事不足，敗事有餘」，也就是欲在總統大選或立院選舉「拖垮馬英九」，來換取他的「三人黨團」。他的手法是分裂泛藍、掐住馬英九的脖子；其必然的效應則是有利於蔡英文及民進黨，因此就可能造成蔡上馬下或立院易手的結果，亦即改變了大選後台灣「全局路線」的掌舵者。絕不是說宋楚瑜不能支持蔡英文，正如無人可以反對「扁宋會」；但宋楚瑜必須說明，在全局思考上，為何他認為應當「拖下馬英九」及「拱上蔡英文」？難道他認為以「親民黨三人黨團」換來顛覆台灣「全局路線」的後果，也是正當合理的政治買賣？
當然，宋楚瑜也可能進一步與馬英九作路線區隔，提出他的「全局論述」；日前已放話稱馬英九「不統」，親民黨可主張「統一」，欲藉此吸引老兵票。然而，宋楚瑜難道只憑「三人黨團」就想主張「統一」？而倘若最後造成馬下蔡上的結果，則蔡的「國憲認同／兩岸政策」難道比馬更接近「老兵」的思考？這豈不是自欺又欺老兵？
何況，最極端的情況將是：國民黨失去了立院多數，也拖垮了馬英九，但親民黨的「三人黨團」也未選上。
馬英九的表現當然未盡如人意，蔡英文的表現亦有可以肯定處；二人的差異或許不在形象，而是在「全局路線」。宋楚瑜若是競選總統，勝過馬蔡，即可掌握台灣未來的「全局路線」；但若不能，他即應在國民黨及民進黨兩條「全局路線」中作出判斷，亦即必須在馬蔡之間作出選擇。這是每一選民在明年一月大選皆須面對的抉擇，宋楚瑜不可能自外於此，「三人黨團」也不能沒有「全局路線」。
明年的選舉，全局路線大於個人恩怨，大於二點四億，大於三人黨團。絕非說宋楚瑜不可有顛覆全局、拖垮馬英九的想法，而只是說宋楚瑜必須想清楚他是否真要追求這種後果。如果宋楚瑜要的只是三席立委，而不是要顛覆全局，其實不必如此翻天覆地，而應有其他軟著陸的途徑。
宋楚瑜不選總統而想要拖垮馬英九，它的效應其實與宋楚瑜若參選總統而拖垮馬英九是完全一樣的。那麼，宋楚瑜何不選總統？因為，宋不選而拖垮馬就是蔡當選，但宋參選而拖垮馬卻也有可能是宋自己當選；此就台灣未來的「全局路線」言，看來還是有差別的。
宋楚瑜反馬仇馬的情緒，不可淹溺了他慎擇台灣未來「全局路線」的理智。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2011
James Soong recently made a bold move. To understand his motives, we must consider the impact of his move on the January 2012 two-in-one election and on the future of the Republic of China.
James Soong said his goal was to win three seats for the People First Party in the Legislative Yuan, and to form a three man PFP party caucus. Does the PFP have the ability to form a three man PFP party caucus? This is not necessarily the key to the political future of the ROC. The question being asked of voters in the current election is, should they remain loyal to the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution? Should the government maintain its current cross-Strait policy? Or should it adopt an entirely different strategic policy path? Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen represent two vastly different policy paths. Therefore this election has enormous significance for the future of the ROC, The issues are, should the ROC change its strategic path? Should the ROC change its president? Should the president elect change the strategic path of the ROC, via the Legislative Yuan? The issue is not whether the PFP can form a three man PFP party caucus.
If James Soong runs for president, in the hope of influencing the strategic direction of the ROC, he is well within his rights. How well he can do in the election is not the issue, But suppose he is unable to offer a strategic direction that transcends those offered by Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen? Suppose his goal is merely to stir up the pot, or to establish a three man PFP party caucus? Never mind whether he has the ability. If that is his goal, he is not justified in doing so. Because the question of whether to adopt a new strategic direction transcends the question of whether the PFP is able to form a three man PFP party caucus. Is James Soong's real goal to alter the strategic direction of the ROC? If it is not, then stirring the pot and forming a three man PFP party caucus hardly justifies what he is doing.
What is the purpose of forming a three man PFP party caucus? Is it to enable the DPP's Chou Po-ya to become Deputy Speaker of the Taipei City Council? Is it to enable the Legislative Yuan to make Chen Tsung-ming Prosecutor General? Is it to pave the way for a "Tsai/Soong Meeting," as a follow up to the "Bian/Soong Meeting?" Is it to enable a three man PFP party caucus to play the role of a decisive minority in the legislature? What will the strategic impact on the nation and society be? Suppose Soong's move subverts the strategic picture? Suppose it changes our strategtic direction? Is that James Soong's real goal?
Soong obviously opposes Ma and hates Ma. But he is unwilling to be honest about his motives. This is why James Soong keeps advancing reasons for what he is doing. James Soong can run for president. All he needs to do is launch a petition drive. Green Camp voters will automatically, spontaneously support his candidacy. His candidacy will be assured. No matter what the outcome of the election is, no matter whether Soong wins or Tsai wins, Soong will have fulfilled his goal. He will have exacted revenge on Ma Ying-jeou. James Soong is not running for president. But he is still splitting Blue Camp votes. If he runs for president with the express intention of stirring the pot, Soong will become Blue Camp Public Enemy Number One, He can forget about any three man PFP party caucus. If the People First Party fields candidates for the legislature left and right, it will be publicly admitting that it is merely stirring the pot, that it is not running for office, but merely acting as a spoiler.
James Soong is opposed to Ma and angry at Ma. But he cannot deny the success of Ma Ying-jeou's strategic path. If the PFP considers Ma Ying-jeou's strategic path to be generally correct, why must it set up a three man PFP party caucus? Why must it deliberately create chaos and wreak havoc? What justification does it have? What reasons can it offer? James Soong may be unhappy with King Pu-tsung, But that is no reason to create chaos and subvert the strategic picture.
James Soong's actions are destructive rather than constructive. He hopes merely to foil Ma Ying-jeou's bid for a second term, or to hurt him in the legislative elections, all for the sake of his three man PFP party caucus. His approach is to split the Blue Camp, to wrap his fingers around Ma Ying-jeou's neck. The inevitable result would be a windfall for Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP, Tsai could topple Ma as president. The DPP could gain control of the Legislative Yuan. The election could change the nation's helmsman, and the nation's strategic direction. No one is suggesting that James Soong cannot support Tsai Ing-wen. No one can forbid James Soong to meet with Ah-Bian. But Soong must explain his reasons for bringing down Ma Ying-jeou and helping up Tsai Ing-wen. Does he really think that a three man PFP party caucus, in exchange for subverting the strategic direction of the ROC, constitutes a reasonable political trade off?
James Soong may wish to distinguish between his path and Ma Ying-jeou's, He may wish to advance his own strategic vision. Ma Ying-jeou advocates "no [immediate] reunification." The PFP may choose to advocate "reunification," in the hope of attracting votes from elderly veterans. But can James Soong really champion reunification merely by forming a three man PFP party caucus? And if the final result is that Ma steps down and Tsai steps up, will Tsai's positions on national identity, constitutional allegiance, and cross-Strait policy more closely approximate those held by elderly veterans? Is this not a fraud perpetrated upon elderly veterans?
Besides, consider the worst case scenario. The KMT loses its legislative majority, Ma Ying-jeou loses his bid for reelection. The PFP fails in its attempt to form a three man PFP party caucus.
Ma Ying-jeou's record is far from satisfactory. Tsai Ing-wen's record is not without its achievements. The biggest difference between the two has nothing to do with their public images, but with their strategic paths. If James Soong runs for president, and defeats both Ma and Tsai, he may be able to influence the ROC's strategic direction. But if Soong cannot defeat Ma and Tsai, he must choose between two strategic paths, the KMT's and the DPP's. He must choose between Ma and Tsai. This is a choice each and every voter must make in the general election of January next year. James Soong is no exception. Any three man PFP party caucus must also have a strategic direction.
During next year's elections, the strategic direction of the ROC is more important than any personal grudges. It is more important than 2.4 billion NT, It is more important than any three man PFP party caucus. No one is saying that James Soong cannot subvert the strategic picture, and bring down Ma Ying-jeou. But Soong must make clear whether this is what he really wants. Is James Soong really concerned about three seats in the Legislative Yuan? Or is he merely attempting to subvert the strategic picture? If he is really concerned about three seats in the Legislative Yuan, he does not need to create so much chaos. He should be able to achieve his purpose some other way.
Is James Soong not running for president, but merely attempting to bring down Ma Ying-jeou? Or is James Soong running for president, in order to bring down Ma Ying-jeou? Either way, the results will be exactly the same. In which case, James Soong might as well run for president. Because if Soong runs for president and brings down Ma, Soong might just win. This might make a meaningful difference to the strategic path taken by the ROC.
James Soong opposes Ma and hates Ma. But he must not allow his feelings to overwhelm his concern for the future of the ROC.
宋楚瑜何不選總統
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.29
欲解釋宋楚瑜這些日子裡的大動作，應先看明年一月的二合一選舉對台灣未來有何意義。
宋楚瑜說，將以親民黨當選三席立委在立院組成黨團為目標。但親民黨之能否成立三人黨團，未必是這次選舉能否影響台灣未來的政治槓桿。這次選舉的主要意義是在：現行「國憲認同／兩岸政策」的「全局路線」是否仍要繼續，或者改變為另一套截然不同的「全局路線」，而馬英九及蔡英文是這兩套迥然而異的政策路線的代表人。因而，這次選舉對台灣未來的最大意義，在於是否要改變「全局路線」，亦即是否要換總統，並使當選的總統能透過立法院執行其「全局路線」，而不在親民黨能否在立院成立三人黨團。
基於此一看法，宋楚瑜若是參選總統，欲對「全局路線」發生影響，則他無論怎麼做，皆有正當性。但他若不能對「全局路線」提出超越馬蔡二人的主張，卻作出要攪動「全局」的姿態，或以成立「三人黨團」（不論後來能否成立）為目標，最後則因而產生了顛覆全局的效果，那即未必具有正當性。因為，「全局」存廢的問題，大於親民黨能否成立「三人黨團」的問題。除非「顛覆全局」就是宋楚瑜的真正目標，否則，若以「顛覆全局」交換「親民黨三人黨團」，這豈符合比例原則？
親民黨成立「三人黨團」有何作用？是要如在台北市議會選民進黨周柏雅為副議長？或是要如在立院護航陳聰明出任檢察總長？還是要繼「扁宋會」後再演出「蔡宋會」？倘若親民黨的「三人黨團」仍然演出此類的「關鍵少數」，將對國家社會的「全局路線」有何意義？且倘因此而「顛覆全局」，改變了「全局路線」，是否亦是宋楚瑜的真正追求？
明明是反馬仇馬，卻又不老實說反馬仇馬，這是宋楚瑜左支右絀的原因。宋楚瑜可以選總統，只要他發動連署，綠營選民就會自動自發地成全他，將他送上壘，輕而易舉；而選舉的結果，不論蔡上或宋上，皆可實現反馬仇馬的目的。但宋楚瑜卻不會選總統，因為他要拉的仍是泛藍的票，若參選總統表明志在「顛覆全局」，則宋將成泛藍公敵，恐連「三人黨團」也不必選了。何況，親民黨「遍地烽火」式地提名區域立委，已經公開言明只是「破壞組」，不在當選，而在攪局。
宋此時的情緒是反馬仇馬，他卻不可能否定馬英九在「全局路線」的大體成就；然而，倘若親民黨也認為馬英九的「全局路線」大體正確，則為了成立「三人黨團」，擺出這種不惜掀桌鬧場、玉石俱焚的架式，正當性何在？合理性何在？宋楚瑜可以不悅金溥聰，但那與應否掀桌鬧場、顛覆全局是兩回事。
宋楚瑜擺出的姿態是「成事不足，敗事有餘」，也就是欲在總統大選或立院選舉「拖垮馬英九」，來換取他的「三人黨團」。他的手法是分裂泛藍、掐住馬英九的脖子；其必然的效應則是有利於蔡英文及民進黨，因此就可能造成蔡上馬下或立院易手的結果，亦即改變了大選後台灣「全局路線」的掌舵者。絕不是說宋楚瑜不能支持蔡英文，正如無人可以反對「扁宋會」；但宋楚瑜必須說明，在全局思考上，為何他認為應當「拖下馬英九」及「拱上蔡英文」？難道他認為以「親民黨三人黨團」換來顛覆台灣「全局路線」的後果，也是正當合理的政治買賣？
當然，宋楚瑜也可能進一步與馬英九作路線區隔，提出他的「全局論述」；日前已放話稱馬英九「不統」，親民黨可主張「統一」，欲藉此吸引老兵票。然而，宋楚瑜難道只憑「三人黨團」就想主張「統一」？而倘若最後造成馬下蔡上的結果，則蔡的「國憲認同／兩岸政策」難道比馬更接近「老兵」的思考？這豈不是自欺又欺老兵？
何況，最極端的情況將是：國民黨失去了立院多數，也拖垮了馬英九，但親民黨的「三人黨團」也未選上。
馬英九的表現當然未盡如人意，蔡英文的表現亦有可以肯定處；二人的差異或許不在形象，而是在「全局路線」。宋楚瑜若是競選總統，勝過馬蔡，即可掌握台灣未來的「全局路線」；但若不能，他即應在國民黨及民進黨兩條「全局路線」中作出判斷，亦即必須在馬蔡之間作出選擇。這是每一選民在明年一月大選皆須面對的抉擇，宋楚瑜不可能自外於此，「三人黨團」也不能沒有「全局路線」。
明年的選舉，全局路線大於個人恩怨，大於二點四億，大於三人黨團。絕非說宋楚瑜不可有顛覆全局、拖垮馬英九的想法，而只是說宋楚瑜必須想清楚他是否真要追求這種後果。如果宋楚瑜要的只是三席立委，而不是要顛覆全局，其實不必如此翻天覆地，而應有其他軟著陸的途徑。
宋楚瑜不選總統而想要拖垮馬英九，它的效應其實與宋楚瑜若參選總統而拖垮馬英九是完全一樣的。那麼，宋楚瑜何不選總統？因為，宋不選而拖垮馬就是蔡當選，但宋參選而拖垮馬卻也有可能是宋自己當選；此就台灣未來的「全局路線」言，看來還是有差別的。
宋楚瑜反馬仇馬的情緒，不可淹溺了他慎擇台灣未來「全局路線」的理智。
Wednesday, July 27, 2011
Different Time, Different Place: But One Still Needs a Platform
Different Time, Different Place: But One Still Needs a Platform
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 28, 2011
Summary: An expression has become all the rage: "Different time, different place." This expression has practically become DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's mantra. Apparently she finds it pretty handy. The political scene on Taiwan has undergone significant change. It has experienced two changes in ruling parties. Both the ruling Blues and the opposition Greens have been in office before. Neither can eradicate the record of the road they once traveled. Government and opposition leaders may try to rationalize their past policies by saying, "different time, different place." But we must subject them to harsh scrutiny. We must ask them, are the time and place really so different?
Full Text below:
An expression has become all the rage: "Different time, different place." This expression has practically become DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's mantra, Apparently she finds it pretty handy. The political scene on Taiwan has undergone significant change. It has experienced two changes in ruling parties. Both the ruling Blues and the opposition Greens have been in office before. Neither can eradicate the record of the road they once traveled. Government and opposition leaders may attempt to rationalize their past policies by saying, "different time, different place." But we must subject them to harsh scrutiny. We must ask them, are the time and place really so different?
Consider the subsidies for elderly farmers. The DPP approved an increase from 6000 NT to 7000 NT. The Ma administration followed suit. It refused to let this become and election season trump card for the DPP. But this plank in the DPP campaign platform is an elephant in the living room. When the DPP was in office, Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen firmly opposed this subsidy increase.
The Chen administration cited any number of reasons for opposing the subsidy increase. One was that the government was in fiscal straits. The DPP was placing emphasis on the National Pension System. Under the National Pension System, additional allowances would be incorporated into the system as a whole. Unfortunately, neither the Democratic Progressive Party administration, nor the Ma administration made proper plans. Both failed to fully implement the program. Now that the general election is around the corner, both are attempting to curry favor with voters by offering cash bribes.
The Ma administration's problem is that after three years in office, it has yet to fully implement the policy. The DPP continues to force the KMT to up the ante. Tsai Ing-wen's problem is that she opposed the increase then, but favors it now. Her excuse is, "different time, different place." But are conditions really that different from three to five years ago? The government is still in dire fiscal straits. The National Pension Plan has been implemented. Why is it necessary to increase subsidies for elderly farmers, when they should have been incorporated into the National Pension Plan long ago? Consider agricultural policy. During its eight years in office, the Chen administration opened the market to Mainland agricultural products. It attempted to abolish the Agricultural Cooperative Credit Department. Farmers protested in front of the presidential palace, on a scale far larger than today. Yet Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to shirk responsibility for the Chen administration's policy, with an airy "different time, different place." She even had the chutzpah to visit the grassroots and gladhand the protesting farmers.
This is hardly the first time Tsai Ing-wen has fallen back on a "different time, different place." Last year the DPP lambasted the Ma administration for providing government subsidies to Mainland students. But it soon became clear that this policy was a legacy from the Lee Teng-hui era. The subsidies provided by the Chen administration during a single year, far exceeded the subsidies provided by the Ma administration over two years. Tsai Ing-wen's excuse was, yet again, "different time, different place." This was even more incomprehensible. During the Ma era cross-Strait exchanges were more frequent than during the Lee era and Chen era. How can the Ma administration be criticized for tightening controls?
Consider another example, Tsai Ing-wen blasted the Ma administration over rice wine price cuts. She said "A lot of people do not see this as a major achievement." This is even more bizarre. During the Chen era, Taipei was trying to join the WTO. Tsai Ing-wen's chief negotiator argued, "Our government began negotiations on rice wine prices only after the dispute settlement panel arrived at its decision on Japanese shochu prices. Negotiations took place after the WTO emphasized legal discipline. Legally, we had very little room to maneuver." She even argued that given high living standards on Taiwan, we could afford to buy slightly more expensive wine, that we had no need to dwell on rice wine prices. Given her desertion in the face of fire at the front, was it really necessary to hold the line at the rear?
Tsai Ing-wen could not bring down rice wine prices. The Ma administration could. Taipei was a WTO Member State. Yet the Ma administration could do something the DPP administration could not. It could get different tax rates for cooking wine and drinking wine. If this is not a major political achievement, what is? Such incidents are not confined to rice wine. Let us not forget how the DPP administration agreed to open the market to US beef imports. It even agreed to forsake Taiwan standards for Ractopamine and Clenbuterol in meat inspections. This matter was never satisfactorily resolved. The repercussions are still being felt in Taipei/Washington relations. But the Ma administration has refused to make concessions or to give up. It fights on.
Tsai Ing-wen is DPP chairman. She is competing for the highest office in the land. Before Tsai Ing-wen trots out specific policy proposals, she would do well to review the road she has already traveled. She was a member of the National Security Commission under Lee Teng-hui. She was MAC Chairman and Vice Premier under Chen Shui-bian, Many of her policies remain in force, even today. Many policies still bear her imprint. They are not something a simple "different time, different place" can erase from our collective memory.
She opposes the 18% preferential interest rate for retired civil servants. But upon leaving office, she continued to collect her 18% preferential interest rate payments, and to deposit them in her personal bank account. That is one of the more striking examples. When she was vice premier she pressured EIA officials to approve the Taichung Science Park Project during Phase Three environmental impact assessment. That is another striking example. Tsai Ing-wen may have erased these incidents from her memory. But during the election process, they will inevitably resurface, again and again. There is nothing unfair about this. Just the opposite. This is precisely how candidates must be evaluated. They must undergo rigorous examination. Anything less is an injustice to ROC voters.
Politics may be characterized as clever rhetoric, able to deceive people in the near term. But politics can never erase words uttered in the past. In the process of winning votes, politicians must speak the truth. They must grant voters a modicum of respect. They must not assume that everyone has a short memory, and can easily be fooled. They must be responsible for their words and deeds. They must be responsible to the people. Anyone aspiring to the office of the president must meet these conditions. Why else is the opposition DPP reminding voters that President Ma reneged on his "6/3/3" campaign pledge? Why can't Ma simply say "different time, different place?"
「時空背景不同」 還是要提政見
2011-07-28 中國時報
最近政壇流行一句話，「時空背景不同。」這句話幾乎成了民進黨主席蔡英文的口頭禪，但似乎真的很管用，因為台灣政壇變化確實很大，台灣經歷過兩次政黨輪替；但是，正因為朝野藍綠都執政過，沒有政黨可以忘記自己走過的路，當朝野領袖要把自己的主張歸咎於時空變換，企圖昨是今非的時候，就必須受到檢驗：時空背景真的差這麼多嗎？
以老農津貼調漲案為例，民進黨拍板決定加碼從六千到七千元，馬政府同樣定調跟進，不讓這個選舉利多成為民進黨的專利。尷尬的是，民進黨執政過程中，就在蔡英文擔任行政院副院長的時候，她堅定反對調漲！
當年扁政府反對調漲老農津貼的原因很多，一是國家財政考量，二是民進黨政策主軸是國民年金，在國民年金的規畫下，所有額外津貼照常理都該配套吸納。遺憾的是，民進黨政府到馬政府，所有的配套顯然都沒妥善規畫和落實，鬧到大選在即，還是得用現金加碼的方式討好選民。
馬政府的問題是，執政三年沒做好配套，還是被民進黨逼著跟進加碼；蔡英文的問題是：為何當年反對如今贊成？她的說法是「時空背景不同」，三、五年能有這麼大差別嗎？國家財政依舊緊迫，國民年金已經實施，為什麼還得加碼早該整體納入國民年金的老農津貼？從老農津貼看農業政策，扁政府八年開放大陸農產品、企圖廢止農會信用部，讓農民走上凱道抗議，其規模遠比今日農民上凱道要大得多。蔡英文一句話，完全推卸了扁政府的政策責任，還理直氣壯地在基層與農民搏感情。
蔡英文的「時空背景」變了不只這一次。去年，民進黨嚴厲批判馬政府補助大陸學生，結果發現，這個政策早在李登輝執政末期就開始實施，扁政府時代每年補助的大陸學生數目，比馬政府執政二年還要多得多。蔡英文的解釋同樣是「時空背景不同」，這就更讓人無法理解，馬政府時代的兩岸交流遠比李、扁時代更頻密，李、扁的政策，馬政府強化管理繼續實施誰曰不可？
再舉一例，蔡英文對馬政府調降米酒價格一事批評，「很多人不會把這當成重大政績」，這就更奇怪了，蔡英文當年還是台灣加入ＷＴＯ的第一線談判人員，她的說法是，「我國的米酒談判時刻是在爭端解決小組對日本燒酒已作成決定之後，而且是在強調法律紀律的世貿組織成立之後，故我們在法律上及談判上纏鬥的空間並不大」。她甚至認為，台灣的生活水準有資格買貴一點的酒，不必再屈就米酒。第一線棄守，後方如何堅持？
蔡英文談不下來的價格，馬政府做到了，台灣還是ＷＴＯ會員國，卻做到民進黨政府做不到的事：將料理用酒與飲用酒分離課稅，這不是政績是什麼？類似事件不只米酒，別忘了同樣是在民進黨政府執政時期同意美國牛肉開放進口，還可以不在台灣標準查驗瘦肉精，此事仍未善了，後遺症仍在台美外交關係中發酵，但是，馬政府可沒退讓放手，依舊堅持。
身為民進黨主席，準備競逐大位，蔡英文要提出具體主張前，最好從頭回溯自己走過的路，不論是在李登輝時代充任國安會幕僚，或者陳水扁時代出任陸委會主委、行政院副院長，每一樁此刻仍在執行的政策，都有可能仍存在她自己的身影與痕跡，不是一句「時空背景不同」就可以抹煞。
她反對公務員退休金十八趴政策，自己卸任後卻依舊領了十八趴優惠存款利率，是最鮮明的例子；她擔任副院長時親電環評委員關切中科三期環評案又是一例，這些發生過的案例，蔡英文可能遺忘，但在大選過程中，會一而再、再而三被提出來檢驗，這不是對蔡英文不公平，相反的，只有公平且嚴格地檢驗候選人，才是對台灣選民最公平的做法。
政治，可能是高明的修辭術，但蒙混得了一時，終究抹不了過往說過的話語，在爭取選票的過程中，做為政治領袖至少要表達起碼的誠意，對選民要有起碼的尊重，不要以為每個人的記憶力都很差，可以輕易糊弄過關，唯有對自己言行負責的人，才能對人民負責，這是所有要競逐總統大位者應具備的基本條件。否則，在野黨何必還要動輒就質疑馬總統的六三三跳票，馬是不是也可以拿「時空背景不同」來回應？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 28, 2011
Summary: An expression has become all the rage: "Different time, different place." This expression has practically become DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's mantra. Apparently she finds it pretty handy. The political scene on Taiwan has undergone significant change. It has experienced two changes in ruling parties. Both the ruling Blues and the opposition Greens have been in office before. Neither can eradicate the record of the road they once traveled. Government and opposition leaders may try to rationalize their past policies by saying, "different time, different place." But we must subject them to harsh scrutiny. We must ask them, are the time and place really so different?
Full Text below:
An expression has become all the rage: "Different time, different place." This expression has practically become DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's mantra, Apparently she finds it pretty handy. The political scene on Taiwan has undergone significant change. It has experienced two changes in ruling parties. Both the ruling Blues and the opposition Greens have been in office before. Neither can eradicate the record of the road they once traveled. Government and opposition leaders may attempt to rationalize their past policies by saying, "different time, different place." But we must subject them to harsh scrutiny. We must ask them, are the time and place really so different?
Consider the subsidies for elderly farmers. The DPP approved an increase from 6000 NT to 7000 NT. The Ma administration followed suit. It refused to let this become and election season trump card for the DPP. But this plank in the DPP campaign platform is an elephant in the living room. When the DPP was in office, Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen firmly opposed this subsidy increase.
The Chen administration cited any number of reasons for opposing the subsidy increase. One was that the government was in fiscal straits. The DPP was placing emphasis on the National Pension System. Under the National Pension System, additional allowances would be incorporated into the system as a whole. Unfortunately, neither the Democratic Progressive Party administration, nor the Ma administration made proper plans. Both failed to fully implement the program. Now that the general election is around the corner, both are attempting to curry favor with voters by offering cash bribes.
The Ma administration's problem is that after three years in office, it has yet to fully implement the policy. The DPP continues to force the KMT to up the ante. Tsai Ing-wen's problem is that she opposed the increase then, but favors it now. Her excuse is, "different time, different place." But are conditions really that different from three to five years ago? The government is still in dire fiscal straits. The National Pension Plan has been implemented. Why is it necessary to increase subsidies for elderly farmers, when they should have been incorporated into the National Pension Plan long ago? Consider agricultural policy. During its eight years in office, the Chen administration opened the market to Mainland agricultural products. It attempted to abolish the Agricultural Cooperative Credit Department. Farmers protested in front of the presidential palace, on a scale far larger than today. Yet Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to shirk responsibility for the Chen administration's policy, with an airy "different time, different place." She even had the chutzpah to visit the grassroots and gladhand the protesting farmers.
This is hardly the first time Tsai Ing-wen has fallen back on a "different time, different place." Last year the DPP lambasted the Ma administration for providing government subsidies to Mainland students. But it soon became clear that this policy was a legacy from the Lee Teng-hui era. The subsidies provided by the Chen administration during a single year, far exceeded the subsidies provided by the Ma administration over two years. Tsai Ing-wen's excuse was, yet again, "different time, different place." This was even more incomprehensible. During the Ma era cross-Strait exchanges were more frequent than during the Lee era and Chen era. How can the Ma administration be criticized for tightening controls?
Consider another example, Tsai Ing-wen blasted the Ma administration over rice wine price cuts. She said "A lot of people do not see this as a major achievement." This is even more bizarre. During the Chen era, Taipei was trying to join the WTO. Tsai Ing-wen's chief negotiator argued, "Our government began negotiations on rice wine prices only after the dispute settlement panel arrived at its decision on Japanese shochu prices. Negotiations took place after the WTO emphasized legal discipline. Legally, we had very little room to maneuver." She even argued that given high living standards on Taiwan, we could afford to buy slightly more expensive wine, that we had no need to dwell on rice wine prices. Given her desertion in the face of fire at the front, was it really necessary to hold the line at the rear?
Tsai Ing-wen could not bring down rice wine prices. The Ma administration could. Taipei was a WTO Member State. Yet the Ma administration could do something the DPP administration could not. It could get different tax rates for cooking wine and drinking wine. If this is not a major political achievement, what is? Such incidents are not confined to rice wine. Let us not forget how the DPP administration agreed to open the market to US beef imports. It even agreed to forsake Taiwan standards for Ractopamine and Clenbuterol in meat inspections. This matter was never satisfactorily resolved. The repercussions are still being felt in Taipei/Washington relations. But the Ma administration has refused to make concessions or to give up. It fights on.
Tsai Ing-wen is DPP chairman. She is competing for the highest office in the land. Before Tsai Ing-wen trots out specific policy proposals, she would do well to review the road she has already traveled. She was a member of the National Security Commission under Lee Teng-hui. She was MAC Chairman and Vice Premier under Chen Shui-bian, Many of her policies remain in force, even today. Many policies still bear her imprint. They are not something a simple "different time, different place" can erase from our collective memory.
She opposes the 18% preferential interest rate for retired civil servants. But upon leaving office, she continued to collect her 18% preferential interest rate payments, and to deposit them in her personal bank account. That is one of the more striking examples. When she was vice premier she pressured EIA officials to approve the Taichung Science Park Project during Phase Three environmental impact assessment. That is another striking example. Tsai Ing-wen may have erased these incidents from her memory. But during the election process, they will inevitably resurface, again and again. There is nothing unfair about this. Just the opposite. This is precisely how candidates must be evaluated. They must undergo rigorous examination. Anything less is an injustice to ROC voters.
Politics may be characterized as clever rhetoric, able to deceive people in the near term. But politics can never erase words uttered in the past. In the process of winning votes, politicians must speak the truth. They must grant voters a modicum of respect. They must not assume that everyone has a short memory, and can easily be fooled. They must be responsible for their words and deeds. They must be responsible to the people. Anyone aspiring to the office of the president must meet these conditions. Why else is the opposition DPP reminding voters that President Ma reneged on his "6/3/3" campaign pledge? Why can't Ma simply say "different time, different place?"
「時空背景不同」 還是要提政見
2011-07-28 中國時報
最近政壇流行一句話，「時空背景不同。」這句話幾乎成了民進黨主席蔡英文的口頭禪，但似乎真的很管用，因為台灣政壇變化確實很大，台灣經歷過兩次政黨輪替；但是，正因為朝野藍綠都執政過，沒有政黨可以忘記自己走過的路，當朝野領袖要把自己的主張歸咎於時空變換，企圖昨是今非的時候，就必須受到檢驗：時空背景真的差這麼多嗎？
以老農津貼調漲案為例，民進黨拍板決定加碼從六千到七千元，馬政府同樣定調跟進，不讓這個選舉利多成為民進黨的專利。尷尬的是，民進黨執政過程中，就在蔡英文擔任行政院副院長的時候，她堅定反對調漲！
當年扁政府反對調漲老農津貼的原因很多，一是國家財政考量，二是民進黨政策主軸是國民年金，在國民年金的規畫下，所有額外津貼照常理都該配套吸納。遺憾的是，民進黨政府到馬政府，所有的配套顯然都沒妥善規畫和落實，鬧到大選在即，還是得用現金加碼的方式討好選民。
馬政府的問題是，執政三年沒做好配套，還是被民進黨逼著跟進加碼；蔡英文的問題是：為何當年反對如今贊成？她的說法是「時空背景不同」，三、五年能有這麼大差別嗎？國家財政依舊緊迫，國民年金已經實施，為什麼還得加碼早該整體納入國民年金的老農津貼？從老農津貼看農業政策，扁政府八年開放大陸農產品、企圖廢止農會信用部，讓農民走上凱道抗議，其規模遠比今日農民上凱道要大得多。蔡英文一句話，完全推卸了扁政府的政策責任，還理直氣壯地在基層與農民搏感情。
蔡英文的「時空背景」變了不只這一次。去年，民進黨嚴厲批判馬政府補助大陸學生，結果發現，這個政策早在李登輝執政末期就開始實施，扁政府時代每年補助的大陸學生數目，比馬政府執政二年還要多得多。蔡英文的解釋同樣是「時空背景不同」，這就更讓人無法理解，馬政府時代的兩岸交流遠比李、扁時代更頻密，李、扁的政策，馬政府強化管理繼續實施誰曰不可？
再舉一例，蔡英文對馬政府調降米酒價格一事批評，「很多人不會把這當成重大政績」，這就更奇怪了，蔡英文當年還是台灣加入ＷＴＯ的第一線談判人員，她的說法是，「我國的米酒談判時刻是在爭端解決小組對日本燒酒已作成決定之後，而且是在強調法律紀律的世貿組織成立之後，故我們在法律上及談判上纏鬥的空間並不大」。她甚至認為，台灣的生活水準有資格買貴一點的酒，不必再屈就米酒。第一線棄守，後方如何堅持？
蔡英文談不下來的價格，馬政府做到了，台灣還是ＷＴＯ會員國，卻做到民進黨政府做不到的事：將料理用酒與飲用酒分離課稅，這不是政績是什麼？類似事件不只米酒，別忘了同樣是在民進黨政府執政時期同意美國牛肉開放進口，還可以不在台灣標準查驗瘦肉精，此事仍未善了，後遺症仍在台美外交關係中發酵，但是，馬政府可沒退讓放手，依舊堅持。
身為民進黨主席，準備競逐大位，蔡英文要提出具體主張前，最好從頭回溯自己走過的路，不論是在李登輝時代充任國安會幕僚，或者陳水扁時代出任陸委會主委、行政院副院長，每一樁此刻仍在執行的政策，都有可能仍存在她自己的身影與痕跡，不是一句「時空背景不同」就可以抹煞。
她反對公務員退休金十八趴政策，自己卸任後卻依舊領了十八趴優惠存款利率，是最鮮明的例子；她擔任副院長時親電環評委員關切中科三期環評案又是一例，這些發生過的案例，蔡英文可能遺忘，但在大選過程中，會一而再、再而三被提出來檢驗，這不是對蔡英文不公平，相反的，只有公平且嚴格地檢驗候選人，才是對台灣選民最公平的做法。
政治，可能是高明的修辭術，但蒙混得了一時，終究抹不了過往說過的話語，在爭取選票的過程中，做為政治領袖至少要表達起碼的誠意，對選民要有起碼的尊重，不要以為每個人的記憶力都很差，可以輕易糊弄過關，唯有對自己言行負責的人，才能對人民負責，這是所有要競逐總統大位者應具備的基本條件。否則，在野黨何必還要動輒就質疑馬總統的六三三跳票，馬是不是也可以拿「時空背景不同」來回應？
Monday, July 25, 2011
Will Intraparty Dissent Fall on Deaf Ears?
Will Intraparty Dissent Fall on Deaf Ears?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 26, 2011
Summary: The Blues and Greens are now meeting on the battlefield. On the KMT side, Ma Ying-jeou is waging a one man war. He comes across as frail and weak. Meanwhile, the DPP is wracked by dissent, which the party leadership completely ignores. President Ma appears exhausted. He appears to be running scared. But the DPP is totally ignoring internal dissent. From the perspective of partisan politics, that is the more chilling proposition.
Full Text Below:
The Blues and Greens are now meeting on the battlefield. On the KMT side, Ma Ying-jeou is waging a one man war. He comes across as frail and weak. Meanwhile, the DPP is wracked by dissent, which the party leadership completely ignores. President Ma appears exhausted. He appears to be running scared. But the DPP is totally ignoring internal dissent. From the perspective of partisan politics, that is the more chilling proposition.
The Green Camp has been wracked by dissent. It began with the controversy over nominations for legislators without portfolio, and continued over recent increases in elderly farmers' subsidies, The party leadership has given dissenters the cold shoulder. This is baffling. Wang Hsing-nan, Ker Chien-ming, and Trong Chai, have ripped away each others' scabs. Are their grudges and differences merely personal? Wang Jung-chang and former political commissar Lin Wan-yi are members of the "fair tax reform alliance." On increased subsidies for elderly farmers, they held one position yesterday, and another position today. They spoke of "safeguarding Taiwan's democracy." They criticized the nominees for legislator without portfolio, saying they reflected "a failure of democratic imagination." Tsai Yu-chuang accused nominees for legislator without portfolio of "questionable personal morals." These are important matters of political ethics and political ideals. Why is the party leadership silent? Is the DPP unable to look at itself in the mirror? Does it lack the courage to accept different opinions?
The DPP is wracked by dissent, The reason is clear. One. the DPP leadership has lost its sense of direction. It has become preoccupied with short term advantage. Two. Tsai Ing-wen's leadership remains in doubt. Three. Personal and factional scores remain unresolved. Four. DPP leaders are torn between idealism and opportunism. Among these reasons, the fourth is the most critical. Alas, for the party leadership, opportunism has clearly already won out.
In terms of political evolution, this is hardly a welcome development. The DPP boasts of its dedication to democracy and reform. The myth of Chen Shui-bian as the "Son of Taiwan" has been shattered. Now however, Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to reconstruct this myth. The constant stream of internal dissent merely exposes the hollowness of this myth. Needless to say, the DPP cannot face the truth. The DPP is a political party that flip-flops endlessly, that says one thing but does another, that pursues short term advantage over long term principles, and that cannot remember what it stands for. How can voters possible trust such a party?
Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly been forced to eat crow. She has flip-flopped on the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant project, on nuclear power generation, on the 18% preferential interest rate, on ECFA, and on subsidies for elderly farmers. What are her principles for governing the nation? Does she even have hard and fast principles? Just how shrewd is Tsai Ing-wen? Voters have yet to see. But if she ignores the views of her own comrades today, can we really expect her to listen to the people following the election? Isn't that a pipe dream?
These problems are not confined to Tsai Ing-wen alone. They reflect the DPP's lack of openness and lack of self-introspection. When Chen Shui-bian and his family busied themselves with rampant corruption, the DPP mobilized its forces, crushing anyone in the party who dared to oppose corruption. It portrayed them as "brigands," and subjected them to "struggle sessions." Today Tsai Ing-wen and her retinue of supporters know they lack legitimacy. Therefore they turn a deaf ear to dissent. They think if they can suppress dissent, they can convey the illusion of intraparty harmony. But an illusion it all it is. The DPP has foolishly sacrificed its fundamental values, merely to gain an advantage over its enemies in the short term.
The DPP's fickle behavior reveals its lack of consistent principles. Even worse, it reveals its utter selfishness. The DPP is willing to sacrifice the nation, but unwilling to sacrifice the party. Take subsidies for farmers. Concern for the nation's fiscal health, for the systematization of annuities, for the fairness of the welfare system, and for larger scale agricultural problems, mean now is not the time to talk about increases. But the DPP is unwilling to let go of the pork in its mouth, It knows if it takes even one bite, it will revert to form. Nevertheless it cannot resist its own impulses. In fact, four years ago many Pan Greens opposed subsidies for elderly farmers, not just Wang Jung-chang and Lin Wan-yi. But Tsai Ing-wen is surrounded by people preoccupied with seizing power. They do not give a damn how they look.
What's the difference between this election and other elections over the past decade? This election lacks boasting about "reform" and "progress." This is not because political reforms on Taiwan are complete, This is because so many promises of reform and progress turned out to be empty. Reminding voters about them today would merely antagonize them. Hence the appeals to innocent first time voters, begging them to "Save Taiwan!" But no matter how eloquent politicians are, they cannot erase the footprints on the road they have traveled. No matter what rosy promises they might make about the future, they cannot escape the verdict of history. President Ma has been subjected to three years of political inquisition. The DPP's eight years in office was a total wash, marked by endless waffling on issues too numerous to mention. No matter how inexperienced voters may be, they should have no trouble learning the truth. They need only listen to the voices of dissent emerging from the Green Camp.
如果黨內異見全變成狗吠火車
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.26
藍綠大選交鋒，國民黨只見馬英九唱獨角戲，形象顯得單薄；相對的，民進黨內部則異聲連連，黨中央卻一概不予理會。從政黨政治的觀點看，民進黨的「狗吠火車」現象，比起馬總統的疲於奔命，景象恐怕更加荒涼。
從不分區提名的爭議，到最近老農津貼的加碼，綠營內部一再傳出不同的聲音；黨中央卻一律以「冷處理」對付，令人費解。其中，王幸男、蔡同榮和柯建銘的互揭瘡疤，若只看作是個人恩怨或路線差異；那麼「公平稅改聯盟」王榮璋及前政委林萬億歷數老農津貼加碼的「昨是今非」，和「守護台灣民主平台」批評不分區立委名單「失去民主想像力」，乃至蔡有全檢舉不分區被提名人「私德不檢」，都是事關政治倫理與從政理想的大是大非，為何黨中央也均不作聲？是民進黨無法面對真實的自己？還是沒有接受不同意見的勇氣？
民進黨內部雜音頻傳，原因不難想像：其一，黨中央決策因利害算計過甚而失去準頭；其二，蔡英文的領導威信仍未能全面建立；其三，個人或派系恩怨無法擺平；其四，「理想路線」與「投機路線」的拉鋸和角力。其中第四點尤為關鍵因素，但從黨中央的作法看，投機路線明顯占了上風。
從台灣政治的發展看，這當然不是一個樂觀的訊息。民進黨一直以民主改革政黨自居，在陳水扁的「台灣之子」傳說破滅後，蔡英文仍企圖重構這個神話；此時內部不斷傳出雜音，難免暴露了綠色神話的虛假，民進黨當然無法面對。而一個反覆善變、言行不一、追逐近利的政黨，連自己的出發點都不記得，又怎值得選民託付？
從國光石化及核電政策的反覆、十八趴的明反暗取、到ＥＣＦＡ的搖擺不定、到老農津貼從「抗稅」到「加碼」的變臉，蔡英文一次又一次吞掉自己過去的大話，她的治國原則是什麼？她有什麼一貫的理念？蔡英文究竟有多英明，選民還未真正見識；但她今天若連同志的不同意見都置之不理，大家要期待她當選後聆聽人民的聲音，豈非癡人說夢？
問題其實不只在蔡英文，而在整個民進黨的開放性及自省能力。當年陳水扁家族傳出貪腐弊案時，民進黨是動員全黨力量來圍剿主張「反貪腐」的人，把他們當成「寇」痛打；今天蔡英文和圍繞在她四周的擁戴者，自知正當性不足，因此以「裝聾」來對付雜音。以為摀住異議，就能塑造黨內和諧美好形象，其實只是幻想。而為了短期的制敵戰略，卻把自己立足的道德大本營拿去抵押，才是愚不可及。
民進黨的善變，除顯示其缺乏一貫原則，更嚴重的是暴露了它「可以輸國家、不能輸政黨」的自私本質。以老農津貼為例，不論從國家財政、年金制度化、福利公平性、乃至解決農業問題等「大我」的角度看，都不應在此刻伺機談加碼。但民進黨就是不甘放棄嘴邊的肥肉，即使明明知道咬一口會讓自己現出原形，還是壓抑不住貪吃的衝動。事實上，四年前反對過老農津貼的綠營人士何止王榮璋、林萬億，但那些一心只想著簇擁蔡英文奪取執政大權的人，已根本不在乎自己的吃相了。
要說這次大選和過去十年有什麼不同，那就是少了「改革」和「向上提升」之類的政治大話。這並非台灣的改革已經完成，而是許多改革口號均已宣告落空，再提只會讓選民反感，所以只能轉向天真的首投族訴求未來的台灣。然而，政治人物再怎麼善辯，終抹不掉自己行過道路的足印；再怎麼訴求未來，也不能擺脫歷史的檢驗。要說馬總統深受三年多的政績糾纏，民進黨空虛及反覆的八年更是罄竹難書；就算再沒有經驗的選民，從綠營內那些此起彼落的異音中，也能捕捉到足夠的真相了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 26, 2011
Summary: The Blues and Greens are now meeting on the battlefield. On the KMT side, Ma Ying-jeou is waging a one man war. He comes across as frail and weak. Meanwhile, the DPP is wracked by dissent, which the party leadership completely ignores. President Ma appears exhausted. He appears to be running scared. But the DPP is totally ignoring internal dissent. From the perspective of partisan politics, that is the more chilling proposition.
Full Text Below:
The Blues and Greens are now meeting on the battlefield. On the KMT side, Ma Ying-jeou is waging a one man war. He comes across as frail and weak. Meanwhile, the DPP is wracked by dissent, which the party leadership completely ignores. President Ma appears exhausted. He appears to be running scared. But the DPP is totally ignoring internal dissent. From the perspective of partisan politics, that is the more chilling proposition.
The Green Camp has been wracked by dissent. It began with the controversy over nominations for legislators without portfolio, and continued over recent increases in elderly farmers' subsidies, The party leadership has given dissenters the cold shoulder. This is baffling. Wang Hsing-nan, Ker Chien-ming, and Trong Chai, have ripped away each others' scabs. Are their grudges and differences merely personal? Wang Jung-chang and former political commissar Lin Wan-yi are members of the "fair tax reform alliance." On increased subsidies for elderly farmers, they held one position yesterday, and another position today. They spoke of "safeguarding Taiwan's democracy." They criticized the nominees for legislator without portfolio, saying they reflected "a failure of democratic imagination." Tsai Yu-chuang accused nominees for legislator without portfolio of "questionable personal morals." These are important matters of political ethics and political ideals. Why is the party leadership silent? Is the DPP unable to look at itself in the mirror? Does it lack the courage to accept different opinions?
The DPP is wracked by dissent, The reason is clear. One. the DPP leadership has lost its sense of direction. It has become preoccupied with short term advantage. Two. Tsai Ing-wen's leadership remains in doubt. Three. Personal and factional scores remain unresolved. Four. DPP leaders are torn between idealism and opportunism. Among these reasons, the fourth is the most critical. Alas, for the party leadership, opportunism has clearly already won out.
In terms of political evolution, this is hardly a welcome development. The DPP boasts of its dedication to democracy and reform. The myth of Chen Shui-bian as the "Son of Taiwan" has been shattered. Now however, Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to reconstruct this myth. The constant stream of internal dissent merely exposes the hollowness of this myth. Needless to say, the DPP cannot face the truth. The DPP is a political party that flip-flops endlessly, that says one thing but does another, that pursues short term advantage over long term principles, and that cannot remember what it stands for. How can voters possible trust such a party?
Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly been forced to eat crow. She has flip-flopped on the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant project, on nuclear power generation, on the 18% preferential interest rate, on ECFA, and on subsidies for elderly farmers. What are her principles for governing the nation? Does she even have hard and fast principles? Just how shrewd is Tsai Ing-wen? Voters have yet to see. But if she ignores the views of her own comrades today, can we really expect her to listen to the people following the election? Isn't that a pipe dream?
These problems are not confined to Tsai Ing-wen alone. They reflect the DPP's lack of openness and lack of self-introspection. When Chen Shui-bian and his family busied themselves with rampant corruption, the DPP mobilized its forces, crushing anyone in the party who dared to oppose corruption. It portrayed them as "brigands," and subjected them to "struggle sessions." Today Tsai Ing-wen and her retinue of supporters know they lack legitimacy. Therefore they turn a deaf ear to dissent. They think if they can suppress dissent, they can convey the illusion of intraparty harmony. But an illusion it all it is. The DPP has foolishly sacrificed its fundamental values, merely to gain an advantage over its enemies in the short term.
The DPP's fickle behavior reveals its lack of consistent principles. Even worse, it reveals its utter selfishness. The DPP is willing to sacrifice the nation, but unwilling to sacrifice the party. Take subsidies for farmers. Concern for the nation's fiscal health, for the systematization of annuities, for the fairness of the welfare system, and for larger scale agricultural problems, mean now is not the time to talk about increases. But the DPP is unwilling to let go of the pork in its mouth, It knows if it takes even one bite, it will revert to form. Nevertheless it cannot resist its own impulses. In fact, four years ago many Pan Greens opposed subsidies for elderly farmers, not just Wang Jung-chang and Lin Wan-yi. But Tsai Ing-wen is surrounded by people preoccupied with seizing power. They do not give a damn how they look.
What's the difference between this election and other elections over the past decade? This election lacks boasting about "reform" and "progress." This is not because political reforms on Taiwan are complete, This is because so many promises of reform and progress turned out to be empty. Reminding voters about them today would merely antagonize them. Hence the appeals to innocent first time voters, begging them to "Save Taiwan!" But no matter how eloquent politicians are, they cannot erase the footprints on the road they have traveled. No matter what rosy promises they might make about the future, they cannot escape the verdict of history. President Ma has been subjected to three years of political inquisition. The DPP's eight years in office was a total wash, marked by endless waffling on issues too numerous to mention. No matter how inexperienced voters may be, they should have no trouble learning the truth. They need only listen to the voices of dissent emerging from the Green Camp.
如果黨內異見全變成狗吠火車
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.26
藍綠大選交鋒，國民黨只見馬英九唱獨角戲，形象顯得單薄；相對的，民進黨內部則異聲連連，黨中央卻一概不予理會。從政黨政治的觀點看，民進黨的「狗吠火車」現象，比起馬總統的疲於奔命，景象恐怕更加荒涼。
從不分區提名的爭議，到最近老農津貼的加碼，綠營內部一再傳出不同的聲音；黨中央卻一律以「冷處理」對付，令人費解。其中，王幸男、蔡同榮和柯建銘的互揭瘡疤，若只看作是個人恩怨或路線差異；那麼「公平稅改聯盟」王榮璋及前政委林萬億歷數老農津貼加碼的「昨是今非」，和「守護台灣民主平台」批評不分區立委名單「失去民主想像力」，乃至蔡有全檢舉不分區被提名人「私德不檢」，都是事關政治倫理與從政理想的大是大非，為何黨中央也均不作聲？是民進黨無法面對真實的自己？還是沒有接受不同意見的勇氣？
民進黨內部雜音頻傳，原因不難想像：其一，黨中央決策因利害算計過甚而失去準頭；其二，蔡英文的領導威信仍未能全面建立；其三，個人或派系恩怨無法擺平；其四，「理想路線」與「投機路線」的拉鋸和角力。其中第四點尤為關鍵因素，但從黨中央的作法看，投機路線明顯占了上風。
從台灣政治的發展看，這當然不是一個樂觀的訊息。民進黨一直以民主改革政黨自居，在陳水扁的「台灣之子」傳說破滅後，蔡英文仍企圖重構這個神話；此時內部不斷傳出雜音，難免暴露了綠色神話的虛假，民進黨當然無法面對。而一個反覆善變、言行不一、追逐近利的政黨，連自己的出發點都不記得，又怎值得選民託付？
從國光石化及核電政策的反覆、十八趴的明反暗取、到ＥＣＦＡ的搖擺不定、到老農津貼從「抗稅」到「加碼」的變臉，蔡英文一次又一次吞掉自己過去的大話，她的治國原則是什麼？她有什麼一貫的理念？蔡英文究竟有多英明，選民還未真正見識；但她今天若連同志的不同意見都置之不理，大家要期待她當選後聆聽人民的聲音，豈非癡人說夢？
問題其實不只在蔡英文，而在整個民進黨的開放性及自省能力。當年陳水扁家族傳出貪腐弊案時，民進黨是動員全黨力量來圍剿主張「反貪腐」的人，把他們當成「寇」痛打；今天蔡英文和圍繞在她四周的擁戴者，自知正當性不足，因此以「裝聾」來對付雜音。以為摀住異議，就能塑造黨內和諧美好形象，其實只是幻想。而為了短期的制敵戰略，卻把自己立足的道德大本營拿去抵押，才是愚不可及。
民進黨的善變，除顯示其缺乏一貫原則，更嚴重的是暴露了它「可以輸國家、不能輸政黨」的自私本質。以老農津貼為例，不論從國家財政、年金制度化、福利公平性、乃至解決農業問題等「大我」的角度看，都不應在此刻伺機談加碼。但民進黨就是不甘放棄嘴邊的肥肉，即使明明知道咬一口會讓自己現出原形，還是壓抑不住貪吃的衝動。事實上，四年前反對過老農津貼的綠營人士何止王榮璋、林萬億，但那些一心只想著簇擁蔡英文奪取執政大權的人，已根本不在乎自己的吃相了。
要說這次大選和過去十年有什麼不同，那就是少了「改革」和「向上提升」之類的政治大話。這並非台灣的改革已經完成，而是許多改革口號均已宣告落空，再提只會讓選民反感，所以只能轉向天真的首投族訴求未來的台灣。然而，政治人物再怎麼善辯，終抹不掉自己行過道路的足印；再怎麼訴求未來，也不能擺脫歷史的檢驗。要說馬總統深受三年多的政績糾纏，民進黨空虛及反覆的八年更是罄竹難書；就算再沒有經驗的選民，從綠營內那些此起彼落的異音中，也能捕捉到足夠的真相了。
Sunday, July 24, 2011
Can Taiwan Shrug Off the Lee Teng-hui Complex?
Can Taiwan Shrug Off the Lee Teng-hui Complex?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 25, 2011
Two ruling party changes have taken place on Taiwan. But over the past ten years, democracy on Taiwan has remained mired in web of contradictions. On the one hand, both the ruling and opposition parties praise the passing of the baton. On the other hand, the replacement rate for politicians is surprisingly low. Over the past decade, this has resulted in a "Lee Teng-hui Complex," and even an inability to escape the influence of the "Lee Teng-hui Era." Althought he has retired, this nonagenarian continues attempting to play the role of kingmaker.
Lee was the first president of the Republic of China born on Taiwan. No one can ignore Lee Teng-hui's contribution to democracy. Before leaving office, he said his greatest wish was to be a missionary. Who knew that within six months, he would found the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)? In the beginning, the purpose of the TSU was to induce the Nativist faction to defect from the KMT. When this attempt failed, the TSU became an independent bastion for the Taiwan independence camp. Within a year, it shattered successor Chen Shui-bian's "new centrist path."
Ah-bian was in power for eight years. On the surface, he and Lee were got along swimmingly. In fact, relations were strained to the breaking point. Ah-Bian both solicited his opinion, and intimidated him. He dared not confront Lee outright of course, The TSU virtually became the DPP's policy maker. In order to crank up election sentiment and bolster support for Taiwan independence, the DPP was forced to follow the TSU's lead on such issues as joining the United Nations or making referenda part of the election process. This remains true even today. The TSU no longer has a single seat in the legislature. But because it unites the Taiwan independence movement, it continues to exert a powerful attraction on the DPP. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen can subtly snub Chen Shui-bian. But she must cling to Lee Teng-hui for dear life.
Even stranger is the effect Lee Teng-hui has on the KMT. It is similar to the effect James Soong has on the KMT. Both have an influence that cannot be ignored. One reason is that Lee is too adept at political intrigue. Either that, or the middle-aged elites within the Blue and Green camps are far too inept. Over the past decade, they have allowed Lee Teng-hui to political developments by dropping rhetorical bombshells and by staging media events.
James Soong was once powerful because of Lee Teng-hui. He fell from grace, also because of Lee Teng-hui. The key issue was not that Lee froze the Taiwan Provincial Government. The key issue was that during the 2000 Republic of China Presidential Election. Lee either acquiesced or conspired in leaking information about the Chung Hsing Bills case and US real estate registered in the name of James Soong's son. Lee and Sung have many scores to settle. Thirteen years after their battle over the freezing of the Taiwan Provincial Government, James Soong attended Lee Teng-hui's birthday party. He even felt compelled to thank Lee Teng-hui for making him "the one and only governor." Had he known this is how things would turn out, James Soong need not have turned against Lee Teng-hui so many years ago. He could have obediently allowed Lee Teng-hui to plan his political future, and the political arena on Taiwan would look very different today.
Lee Teng-hui made good use of James Soong. But he also pulled the rug out from under him, Lee refused to allow Soong to run for president, because Soong was a "Mainlander." "At most he can be Premier." But neither did Lee appoint Soong to his cabinet. Instead he allowed Vincent Siew, Soong's good friend, to assume that role. From that moment on, Siew and Soong were strangers. Today Lee praises Soong as "the best administrator ever," It is even rumored that Lee Teng-hui urged Tsai Ing-wen to make James Soong a member of her cabinet. This has left both the Blue and Green camps dumbfounded. James Soong has ironically become best pawn in Lee Teng-hui's effort to divide the Blue Camp.
The Ma administration assumed office three years ago. Lee Teng-hui has repeatedly criticized the Ma administration for "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." As a result, democracy on Taiwan has undergone regression. Lee seems to have forgotten that of all the Presidents of the ROC who served on Taiwan, he was the only one who ever joined the Communist Party. He seems to have forgotten that he was the one who dispatched a "cross-Strait emissary" to Beijing during his term. He was the one who wanted the Uni-President Corporation to grow tomatoes on the Mainland. He was the one who suggested that Chi Mei set up factories on the Mainland. He accused the Ma administration of "forfeiting the nation's sovereignty." But he seems to have forgotten his own years in power. How many nations offered the ROC visa-free entry back then? He seems to have forgotten that his state visits to allies were made possible only by means of spendthrift checkbook diplomacy, and that he left behind the foul stench of secret national security accounts.
Lee Teng-hui's intense power lust undermined his policy expertise. Consider another example. Lee Teng-hui is an expert in agricultural economy. He contributed to Taiwan's economic development. But during his term the largest peasant movement in history took place. In 2004 Lee blasted Lien and Soong, accusing them of not understanding agriculture. He also blasted Beijing for "dumping" agricultural products on Taiwan. But he seems to have forgotten it was the Chen administration that permitted the importation of Mainland produce to Taiwan, not Lien and Soong.
Today he is blasting the Ma administration, saying that its "small landlord, big tenant farmer" policy was bungled. He trumpets the "80,000 strong army of peasants" during his term as Taiwan Provincial Governor. He argues that there are now 300,000 jia worth of fallow land, calling it such a pity. He seems to have forgotten that he first served as governor, then as vice president, then as president. He was in power for twelve years, Why was the "scale up in order to reduce costs" policy he advocated unsustainable? We have not even mentioned how the scale of agriculture on Taiwan began shrinking during his term of office.
Lee lived through colonial rule and the white terror, Lee has a strong sense of political mission. He has strong feelings about the direction the nation should take. During his term, he advocated "terminating the alien regime," remaking the KMT as a "Nativist" political party, and underscoring "Taiwan's sovereignty." Whether one agrees with his rhetorical style and content, no one can challenge his "Taiwanese values." Lee has already written an unforgettable page in Taiwan's history. Why does he feel compelled to add a footnote that provokes so much unnecessary controversy?
Blue and Green politicians who consider themselves new generation political leaders, may defer to this elder, who once commanded the forces of nature. But they need no longer dance to his tune, Otherwise, what future is there for politics on Taiwan?
社論－台灣走不出「李登輝情結」？
2011-07-25
中國時報
【本報訊】
台灣已經過兩次政黨輪替，但台灣的民主政治這十幾年來，始終陷在一個矛盾糾結的情境：一方面朝野政黨都喊著世代交替，另方面政治領袖的汰換率卻驚人的低，導致十幾年來還走不出「李登輝情結」，甚至跨不過「李登輝時代」，自他卸任以來，這個已經九十歲的老人家還企圖扮演權力指導者的角色。
身為第一位台灣人總統，沒有人能忽略李登輝對台灣民主之功。他在卸任前最大的心願就是要當傳教士，沒想到，不過半年，他就風風火火搞起台聯，剛開始是要裂解國民黨的本土派，裂解不成反倒成了獨派的外圍根據地，讓宣示「中間路線」的繼任者陳水扁一年不到就破功。
扁執政八年，與李登輝貌似情投意合，實則緊張萬分，扁對他既請益又恐嚇，但恐嚇卻又不敢當真，為了繃緊選情，鞏固獨派選票，不論是入聯護台或公投綁大選，台聯扮演的角色都形同民進黨的指揮者；綁到如今，台聯甚至一席立委都無，卻因為結合獨派，對民進黨仍有強大磁吸效應，民進黨主席蔡英文可以軟切割的方式不理陳水扁，卻不敢不緊緊靠著李登輝。
更奇特的是，李登輝對國民黨、甚至自國民黨脫出的宋楚瑜同樣還有無法忽視的影響力，其中原因不知是李登輝太懂政治權謀？還是這群藍綠中生代們本事太差，讓李登輝在這十年內，發言即引人側目，出手就震動政壇？
宋楚瑜因為李登輝而權傾一時，也因為李登輝而從高峰重重墜落，其關鍵原因不只是李登輝凍省，而是因為二千年總統大選，李登輝默許或授意讓興票案和宋楚瑜兒子在美房產資料全曝光；李宋恩怨糾葛，凍省纏鬥十三年後，宋楚瑜親赴李登輝壽宴，還得感謝李登輝讓他成為「唯一的省長」。早知如此，宋楚瑜當年還須要與李登輝翻臉嗎？乖乖聽任李登輝安排出路，台灣政壇豈非又是另一番面貌？
李登輝重用宋楚瑜，卻也執意拔掉他，李不讓宋選總統，因為他是外省人，「最多只能當行政院長。」但李也沒任命宋組閣，讓與宋交好的蕭萬長後來居上，從此宋蕭形同陌路。如今李盛讚宋楚瑜是「最好的行政人才」，政壇甚至傳出李登輝建議蔡英文當選後邀宋組閣，讓藍綠都傻眼，宋楚瑜竟成了李登輝離間藍營國民黨的最佳棋子。
馬政府執政三年多以來，李登輝數度痛批馬政府傾中賣台，使台灣民主出現倒退危機，但他忘了，台灣歷任總統只有他真正加入過共產黨，他也忘了當年是誰在他任內派出「兩岸密使」，是誰要統一集團赴大陸種番茄？是誰暗示奇美赴大陸設廠？他批評馬政府淪喪主權，卻忘了自己掌權十二年，做到哪一國免簽證？他更忘了，他只能靠著金援外交出訪友邦，卻搞出一本烏煙瘴氣的國安密帳。
李登輝對政治權力的強烈渴望，讓他的政策專業逐漸模糊。再舉一例，李登輝是農經專家，台灣經濟發展過程中他是出力也有功之人，然而，在他任內發生過史上最大的農民運動；二○○四年他痛批連宋不懂農業，更痛批中國農產品低價傾銷台灣，他卻忘了開放大陸農產品來台的是扁政府，而非連宋。
如今他又批馬政府「小地主大佃農」的政策沒有做好，並以自己擔任省主席時代的「八萬農業大軍」自豪，批評現在卻有卅萬甲休耕地，非常可惜。他又忘了，在他出任省主席之後，一路從副總統到總統，掌權十二年，為什麼他所主張「擴大規模降低成本」的政策方向無法持續？遑論台灣的農業規模還是在他任內開始縮小的。
走過殖民統治、白色恐怖的歲月，李登輝擁有強烈的政治使命，對國家發展方向與願景有強烈的主張，在他任內鼓吹「終結外來政權」，讓「國民黨老店新開」，強化「台灣主體性」，不論其論述方式或內涵是否引起仁智之見，「台灣價值」卻已無人可以挑戰，李登輝已為自己、為台灣寫下一頁足堪後人懷念的歷史，何須再在史頁之後，留下諸多無謂爭議的註腳？
當然，號稱要世代交替的藍綠政治領袖，對這位曾經呼風喚雨的老人家尊之敬之即可，卻不必更不該再受他擺佈，否則，台灣政治還有什麼未來性可言。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 25, 2011
Two ruling party changes have taken place on Taiwan. But over the past ten years, democracy on Taiwan has remained mired in web of contradictions. On the one hand, both the ruling and opposition parties praise the passing of the baton. On the other hand, the replacement rate for politicians is surprisingly low. Over the past decade, this has resulted in a "Lee Teng-hui Complex," and even an inability to escape the influence of the "Lee Teng-hui Era." Althought he has retired, this nonagenarian continues attempting to play the role of kingmaker.
Lee was the first president of the Republic of China born on Taiwan. No one can ignore Lee Teng-hui's contribution to democracy. Before leaving office, he said his greatest wish was to be a missionary. Who knew that within six months, he would found the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)? In the beginning, the purpose of the TSU was to induce the Nativist faction to defect from the KMT. When this attempt failed, the TSU became an independent bastion for the Taiwan independence camp. Within a year, it shattered successor Chen Shui-bian's "new centrist path."
Ah-bian was in power for eight years. On the surface, he and Lee were got along swimmingly. In fact, relations were strained to the breaking point. Ah-Bian both solicited his opinion, and intimidated him. He dared not confront Lee outright of course, The TSU virtually became the DPP's policy maker. In order to crank up election sentiment and bolster support for Taiwan independence, the DPP was forced to follow the TSU's lead on such issues as joining the United Nations or making referenda part of the election process. This remains true even today. The TSU no longer has a single seat in the legislature. But because it unites the Taiwan independence movement, it continues to exert a powerful attraction on the DPP. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen can subtly snub Chen Shui-bian. But she must cling to Lee Teng-hui for dear life.
Even stranger is the effect Lee Teng-hui has on the KMT. It is similar to the effect James Soong has on the KMT. Both have an influence that cannot be ignored. One reason is that Lee is too adept at political intrigue. Either that, or the middle-aged elites within the Blue and Green camps are far too inept. Over the past decade, they have allowed Lee Teng-hui to political developments by dropping rhetorical bombshells and by staging media events.
James Soong was once powerful because of Lee Teng-hui. He fell from grace, also because of Lee Teng-hui. The key issue was not that Lee froze the Taiwan Provincial Government. The key issue was that during the 2000 Republic of China Presidential Election. Lee either acquiesced or conspired in leaking information about the Chung Hsing Bills case and US real estate registered in the name of James Soong's son. Lee and Sung have many scores to settle. Thirteen years after their battle over the freezing of the Taiwan Provincial Government, James Soong attended Lee Teng-hui's birthday party. He even felt compelled to thank Lee Teng-hui for making him "the one and only governor." Had he known this is how things would turn out, James Soong need not have turned against Lee Teng-hui so many years ago. He could have obediently allowed Lee Teng-hui to plan his political future, and the political arena on Taiwan would look very different today.
Lee Teng-hui made good use of James Soong. But he also pulled the rug out from under him, Lee refused to allow Soong to run for president, because Soong was a "Mainlander." "At most he can be Premier." But neither did Lee appoint Soong to his cabinet. Instead he allowed Vincent Siew, Soong's good friend, to assume that role. From that moment on, Siew and Soong were strangers. Today Lee praises Soong as "the best administrator ever," It is even rumored that Lee Teng-hui urged Tsai Ing-wen to make James Soong a member of her cabinet. This has left both the Blue and Green camps dumbfounded. James Soong has ironically become best pawn in Lee Teng-hui's effort to divide the Blue Camp.
The Ma administration assumed office three years ago. Lee Teng-hui has repeatedly criticized the Ma administration for "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." As a result, democracy on Taiwan has undergone regression. Lee seems to have forgotten that of all the Presidents of the ROC who served on Taiwan, he was the only one who ever joined the Communist Party. He seems to have forgotten that he was the one who dispatched a "cross-Strait emissary" to Beijing during his term. He was the one who wanted the Uni-President Corporation to grow tomatoes on the Mainland. He was the one who suggested that Chi Mei set up factories on the Mainland. He accused the Ma administration of "forfeiting the nation's sovereignty." But he seems to have forgotten his own years in power. How many nations offered the ROC visa-free entry back then? He seems to have forgotten that his state visits to allies were made possible only by means of spendthrift checkbook diplomacy, and that he left behind the foul stench of secret national security accounts.
Lee Teng-hui's intense power lust undermined his policy expertise. Consider another example. Lee Teng-hui is an expert in agricultural economy. He contributed to Taiwan's economic development. But during his term the largest peasant movement in history took place. In 2004 Lee blasted Lien and Soong, accusing them of not understanding agriculture. He also blasted Beijing for "dumping" agricultural products on Taiwan. But he seems to have forgotten it was the Chen administration that permitted the importation of Mainland produce to Taiwan, not Lien and Soong.
Today he is blasting the Ma administration, saying that its "small landlord, big tenant farmer" policy was bungled. He trumpets the "80,000 strong army of peasants" during his term as Taiwan Provincial Governor. He argues that there are now 300,000 jia worth of fallow land, calling it such a pity. He seems to have forgotten that he first served as governor, then as vice president, then as president. He was in power for twelve years, Why was the "scale up in order to reduce costs" policy he advocated unsustainable? We have not even mentioned how the scale of agriculture on Taiwan began shrinking during his term of office.
Lee lived through colonial rule and the white terror, Lee has a strong sense of political mission. He has strong feelings about the direction the nation should take. During his term, he advocated "terminating the alien regime," remaking the KMT as a "Nativist" political party, and underscoring "Taiwan's sovereignty." Whether one agrees with his rhetorical style and content, no one can challenge his "Taiwanese values." Lee has already written an unforgettable page in Taiwan's history. Why does he feel compelled to add a footnote that provokes so much unnecessary controversy?
Blue and Green politicians who consider themselves new generation political leaders, may defer to this elder, who once commanded the forces of nature. But they need no longer dance to his tune, Otherwise, what future is there for politics on Taiwan?
社論－台灣走不出「李登輝情結」？
2011-07-25
中國時報
【本報訊】
台灣已經過兩次政黨輪替，但台灣的民主政治這十幾年來，始終陷在一個矛盾糾結的情境：一方面朝野政黨都喊著世代交替，另方面政治領袖的汰換率卻驚人的低，導致十幾年來還走不出「李登輝情結」，甚至跨不過「李登輝時代」，自他卸任以來，這個已經九十歲的老人家還企圖扮演權力指導者的角色。
身為第一位台灣人總統，沒有人能忽略李登輝對台灣民主之功。他在卸任前最大的心願就是要當傳教士，沒想到，不過半年，他就風風火火搞起台聯，剛開始是要裂解國民黨的本土派，裂解不成反倒成了獨派的外圍根據地，讓宣示「中間路線」的繼任者陳水扁一年不到就破功。
扁執政八年，與李登輝貌似情投意合，實則緊張萬分，扁對他既請益又恐嚇，但恐嚇卻又不敢當真，為了繃緊選情，鞏固獨派選票，不論是入聯護台或公投綁大選，台聯扮演的角色都形同民進黨的指揮者；綁到如今，台聯甚至一席立委都無，卻因為結合獨派，對民進黨仍有強大磁吸效應，民進黨主席蔡英文可以軟切割的方式不理陳水扁，卻不敢不緊緊靠著李登輝。
更奇特的是，李登輝對國民黨、甚至自國民黨脫出的宋楚瑜同樣還有無法忽視的影響力，其中原因不知是李登輝太懂政治權謀？還是這群藍綠中生代們本事太差，讓李登輝在這十年內，發言即引人側目，出手就震動政壇？
宋楚瑜因為李登輝而權傾一時，也因為李登輝而從高峰重重墜落，其關鍵原因不只是李登輝凍省，而是因為二千年總統大選，李登輝默許或授意讓興票案和宋楚瑜兒子在美房產資料全曝光；李宋恩怨糾葛，凍省纏鬥十三年後，宋楚瑜親赴李登輝壽宴，還得感謝李登輝讓他成為「唯一的省長」。早知如此，宋楚瑜當年還須要與李登輝翻臉嗎？乖乖聽任李登輝安排出路，台灣政壇豈非又是另一番面貌？
李登輝重用宋楚瑜，卻也執意拔掉他，李不讓宋選總統，因為他是外省人，「最多只能當行政院長。」但李也沒任命宋組閣，讓與宋交好的蕭萬長後來居上，從此宋蕭形同陌路。如今李盛讚宋楚瑜是「最好的行政人才」，政壇甚至傳出李登輝建議蔡英文當選後邀宋組閣，讓藍綠都傻眼，宋楚瑜竟成了李登輝離間藍營國民黨的最佳棋子。
馬政府執政三年多以來，李登輝數度痛批馬政府傾中賣台，使台灣民主出現倒退危機，但他忘了，台灣歷任總統只有他真正加入過共產黨，他也忘了當年是誰在他任內派出「兩岸密使」，是誰要統一集團赴大陸種番茄？是誰暗示奇美赴大陸設廠？他批評馬政府淪喪主權，卻忘了自己掌權十二年，做到哪一國免簽證？他更忘了，他只能靠著金援外交出訪友邦，卻搞出一本烏煙瘴氣的國安密帳。
李登輝對政治權力的強烈渴望，讓他的政策專業逐漸模糊。再舉一例，李登輝是農經專家，台灣經濟發展過程中他是出力也有功之人，然而，在他任內發生過史上最大的農民運動；二○○四年他痛批連宋不懂農業，更痛批中國農產品低價傾銷台灣，他卻忘了開放大陸農產品來台的是扁政府，而非連宋。
如今他又批馬政府「小地主大佃農」的政策沒有做好，並以自己擔任省主席時代的「八萬農業大軍」自豪，批評現在卻有卅萬甲休耕地，非常可惜。他又忘了，在他出任省主席之後，一路從副總統到總統，掌權十二年，為什麼他所主張「擴大規模降低成本」的政策方向無法持續？遑論台灣的農業規模還是在他任內開始縮小的。
走過殖民統治、白色恐怖的歲月，李登輝擁有強烈的政治使命，對國家發展方向與願景有強烈的主張，在他任內鼓吹「終結外來政權」，讓「國民黨老店新開」，強化「台灣主體性」，不論其論述方式或內涵是否引起仁智之見，「台灣價值」卻已無人可以挑戰，李登輝已為自己、為台灣寫下一頁足堪後人懷念的歷史，何須再在史頁之後，留下諸多無謂爭議的註腳？
當然，號稱要世代交替的藍綠政治領袖，對這位曾經呼風喚雨的老人家尊之敬之即可，卻不必更不該再受他擺佈，否則，台灣政治還有什麼未來性可言。
Friday, July 22, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen Must Answer Chen Shui-bian
Tsai Ing-wen Must Answer Chen Shui-bian
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 27, 2011
Chen Shui-bian has publicly asked two questions, and is now awaiting Tsai Ing-wen's answer.
The first question is: Tsai Ing-wen, if you are elected president, will you grant me amnesty? Chen Shui-bian recently penned an article entitled "Yingluck Shinawatra Wins on Her Brother's Behalf." He said former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was forced into exile when charges of corruption were leveled against him. His sister Yingluck ran for parliament in his place. She did not distance herself from Thaksin. She acknowledged and affirmed Taksin's achievements. She openly advocated "amnesty for convicted political prisoners." As a result, she won the election and became prime minister. Chen Shui-bian said this is why Tsai Ing-wen should not distance herself from him. He said "distancing herself from me will only lead to defeat." Chen Shui-bian said Yingluck never denied she was "Thaksin's clone." Therefore Tsai Ing-wen should "replicate Yingluck's experience." Chen went on and on. But Chen Shui-bian's real question was "Tsai Ing-wen, do you intend to pardon me, Chen Shui-bian?"
The second question is, "Tsai Ing-wen, why not promise that if elected, you will abolish ECFA?" Chen Shui-bian said the issue of "Taiwan's primacy and national identity," and even the termination of ECFA, are questions that cannot be avoided. These remarks were of course directed at Tsai Ing-wen, who has been studiously avoiding them. Chen Shui-bian feels they must be "confronted directly." He feels she must "dominate the issue and seize the initiative." Chen Shui-bian and Chen Chih-chung have both expressed their views on the matter. Once Tsai Ing-wen is elected, asssuming Beijing does not preempt by terminating ECFA first, then "President Tsai" should do so. Chen said that provisions for the termination of ECFA by either Beijing or the Democratic Progressive Party, is a question that cannot be avoided. Chen went on and on. But Chen's real question was, "Tsai Ing-wen, why not promise that if elected you will abolish ECFA?"
Will Tsai pardon Chen Shui-bian? Will Tsai abolish ECFA? These are questions most people would like to ask Tsai Ing-wen. Today, these questions have been asked by Chen Shui-bian. Naturally she is under increased pressure to respond. These are questions that Tsai Ing-wen must not evade and cannot evade.
For Chen Shui-bian, this was an audacious move that took everyone by surprise. Tsai Ing-wen is under the gun, both inside and outside her party. Logically speaking, Chen Shui-bian should be easing any pressure on Tsai Ing-wen. He should not become the straw that breaks the camel's back. He should wait until after Tsai Ing-wen is elected to bring up such matters. Yet Chen Shui-bian has deliberately chosen this chaotic moment to raise two issues that could impact Tsai Ing-wen's election prospects. What is he doing, but intentionally making life difficult for Tsai?
He has two possible motives for doing this. One. Chen Shui-bian may think that people within the Green Camp have strong feelings about ECFA and a presidential pardon. If Tsai fails to respond to these people, she may find it dfficult to generate any political momentum. Two. Chen Tsai Ing-wen may feel a need to force Tsai Ing-wen to take a stand before the election. On the one hand this would force Tsai to keep her campaign promises. On the other hand this would give him an opportunity to endorse Tsai's candidacy. That way, if Tsai is elected, she will be obliged to fulfill her campaign promises. The act of pardoning Chen will also be given greater legitimacy.
But when confronted with the two questions, Tsai Ing-wen remains hesitant. Will she pardon Chen Shui-bian? Her answers are, "This is a serious matter" and "This is something everyone on Taiwan must contemplate." What sort of answer is that? In response to questions about terminating ECFA, she first said that ECFA "pandered to [Mainland] China and sold out Taiwan." Later she said it "forfeited our sovereignty and humiliated our nation." She said, "one option would be to hold a referendum." She said she "would not rule out having the Legislative Yuan take another look at the law." Finally she said she "would continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." Again, what sort of answer is that?
Is Tsai Ing-wen like Yingluck Shinawatra? Consider the current situation. Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, Koo Kwan-min, and the Taiwan independence movement have taken Tsai Ing-wen hostage. Tsai Ing-wen has even declared that "people in southern Taiwan feel that a president who represents the Taiwanese people has been hunted relentlessly and persecuted politically." Is this not an expression of support? Does she not resemble Yingluck Shinawatra? Not really. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to fully endorse the Chen regime's eight years in office. Instead, she continues to stress "Taiwan Next," and "taking responsibility for the future." She has not publicly promised to pardon Chen Shui-bian. She merely speaks of "solemnly confronting the issue." Also, Chen Shui-bian opposes ECFA. Tsai Ing-wen however, has refused to take a clear stand on ECFA. In response to such questions, she is nowhere as consistent in her words and deeds as Yingluck Shinawatra. Therefore she bears scant resemblance to Yingluck Shinawatra.
Chen Shui-bian posed two major questions. He was of course, making a calculated, Machiavellian political move. But these are two questions Tsai Ing-wen must face. On terminating ECFA, Tsai has no desire to alarm Chen Shui-bian. According to Chen Shui-bian, if Tsai is elected, Beijing may well invoke the ECFA termination clause. If it does, will Tsai still support ECFA? Or will she preempt by terminating ECFA first? Tsai Ing-wen has no answer. Regarding a presidential pardon, Chen Shui-bian is even less likely to back off. He thinks Tsai Ing-wen should make a clear yes or no declaration before the election. She should ask voters to act as witnesses and support her decision. If Tsai does not answer these two questions before the election, but is elected, these two issues will become a nightmare for everyone on Taiwan.
Tsai Ing-wen finds herself on the horns of a dilemma. Her situation is a little like Yingluck Shinawatra's, but not entirely. For Tsai, "Is she or isn't she like Yingluck Shinawatra?" is an embarrassing question. Yingluck Shinawatra won because she talked the talk, and walked the walk. Voters backed her all the way. But if an ersatz Yingluck Shinawatra says one thing but does another, if she tries to pull the wool over the voters' eyes and muddle through, the result may be very different. Can Tsai Ing-wen become another Yingluck Shinawatra? That depends on whether Taiwan is another Thailand. That depends on whether voters on Taiwan are like voters in Thailand.
Chen Shui-bian wants Tsai Ing-wen to confront the issues, to force her to tell him where she stands. This is what most voters want as well.
蔡英文必須回答陳水扁
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.23
陳水扁公開提出兩個問題，等待蔡英文回答。
第一個問題是：蔡英文若當選總統，會不會對陳水扁特赦？陳水扁在名為〈代兄出征的盈拉贏了〉的文章中指出，泰國前總理塔信因案出亡國外，其妹盈拉在國會選舉代兄出征，未與塔信切割，且肯定並宣揚塔信的政績，又公開主張「特赦被定罪的政治犯」，因此贏得大選而出任總理。陳水扁以此諷勸蔡英文不要與他切割，「切割的結果只有落選」。陳水扁說，盈拉從來不否認自己是「塔信的複製品」，因此蔡英文也應以「複製盈拉經驗」自期。說了這一大套，陳水扁的問題其實是：蔡英文要不要特赦陳水扁？
第二個問題是：蔡英文為何不直接宣示若當選將廢止ＥＣＦＡ？陳水扁說，台灣主體意識及國家認同、甚至ＥＣＦＡ終止條款都是迴避不了的問題；此話當然是指蔡英文正在迴避這些問題，陳水扁則認為必須「正面迎戰」、「主導議題、主動出擊」。依陳水扁及陳致中先後發表的看法，蔡英文如當選後，若不是由北京主動啟動ＥＣＦＡ終止條款，即應由「蔡總統」主動啟動。所以，陳水扁說，ＥＣＦＡ終止條款，不論在北京或在民進黨，皆是迴避不了的問題。說了這一大套，陳水扁的問題無非是：蔡英文為何不直接宣告若當選將廢止ＥＣＦＡ？
是否特赦陳水扁？是否廢止ＥＣＦＡ？這正是多數國人想對蔡英文提出的問題，如今由陳水扁發問，自是更具張力；對這兩個問題，蔡英文不應再迴避，恐也不容她迴避。
陳水扁的這個大動作，出人意表。照理說，正當蔡英文在內外肆應上已陷焦頭爛額的境況，陳水扁為減輕蔡英文的負擔，自應少向駱駝背上堆稻草，一切待蔡英文若順利當選後再說。然而，陳水扁卻偏偏在這兵荒馬亂之際，提出這兩個對蔡英文的選情有重大影響的問題，豈非哪壺不開提哪壺？
可能有兩種原因：一、陳水扁估計綠營群眾在ＥＣＦＡ及特赦問題上，均有強烈主張，蔡若不回應這些群眾，炒不起熱情。二、陳水扁必須在選前逼蔡英文表態，一方面以選舉見證蔡的承諾，另一方面也可藉選舉為蔡的承諾背書，如此則蔡在若當選後即有履踐諾言的必然性與正當性。
然而，蔡英文對這兩個問題，仍是支支吾吾。特不特赦陳水扁？答案仍是「這是一個嚴肅的問題」，「這是一個整個台灣都得共同思考的問題」，這算是什麼答案？至於ＥＣＦＡ終止條款，一下子說「傾中賣台、喪權辱國」，一下子說「公投是一個選項」，一下子說「不排除立院重審」，一下子說「若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」，這又算是什麼答案？
蔡英文是不是「盈拉」？以現狀看來，「扁李謝辜獨」都挾持了蔡英文，而蔡英文連「南部認為政治追殺兩位台灣人的總統」都說出來了，難道還不算挺？難道還不是「盈拉」？但是蔡英文畢竟沒有大力宣揚扁政府八年政績，反而口口聲聲「Taiwan Next」，「把未來扛起來」；亦未公開主張特赦陳水扁，只說「嚴肅面對」。再者，陳水扁反ＥＣＦＡ，蔡英文則拒不表態。這些都不如「盈拉」那般心口如一，因此不太像「盈拉」。
陳水扁的兩個大哉問，當然有其政治操作的權謀，但也呈現了兩個蔡英文必須正視的課題。關於ＥＣＦＡ終止條款的問題，當非陳水扁危言聳聽；依陳水扁的看法，蔡若當選，北京即可能啟動終止條款，屆時蔡要不要延續ＥＣＦＡ，或先發制人主動終止，蔡英文當然不能不給個答案。至於特赦的問題，陳水扁更不可能鬆手；蔡英文也應在選季作出是或否的宣示，請選民見證及背書。蔡若不在選前回答這兩個問題，她若當選，這兩個問題將成整個台灣的噩夢。
有一點「盈拉」，但又不全是「盈拉」；這種「真假盈拉」的尷尬，正是蔡英文的困境。真盈拉的勝出，勝在心口如一，選民為她背書；假盈拉若欲用心口不一來欺世媚俗，矇混過關，可能有完全相反的結局。因為，蔡英文能不能當盈拉，要看台灣是不是泰國，台灣的選民是不是泰國的選民？
陳水扁要蔡英文勿迴避，把話說清楚，這也正是多數選民的期望。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 27, 2011
Chen Shui-bian has publicly asked two questions, and is now awaiting Tsai Ing-wen's answer.
The first question is: Tsai Ing-wen, if you are elected president, will you grant me amnesty? Chen Shui-bian recently penned an article entitled "Yingluck Shinawatra Wins on Her Brother's Behalf." He said former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was forced into exile when charges of corruption were leveled against him. His sister Yingluck ran for parliament in his place. She did not distance herself from Thaksin. She acknowledged and affirmed Taksin's achievements. She openly advocated "amnesty for convicted political prisoners." As a result, she won the election and became prime minister. Chen Shui-bian said this is why Tsai Ing-wen should not distance herself from him. He said "distancing herself from me will only lead to defeat." Chen Shui-bian said Yingluck never denied she was "Thaksin's clone." Therefore Tsai Ing-wen should "replicate Yingluck's experience." Chen went on and on. But Chen Shui-bian's real question was "Tsai Ing-wen, do you intend to pardon me, Chen Shui-bian?"
The second question is, "Tsai Ing-wen, why not promise that if elected, you will abolish ECFA?" Chen Shui-bian said the issue of "Taiwan's primacy and national identity," and even the termination of ECFA, are questions that cannot be avoided. These remarks were of course directed at Tsai Ing-wen, who has been studiously avoiding them. Chen Shui-bian feels they must be "confronted directly." He feels she must "dominate the issue and seize the initiative." Chen Shui-bian and Chen Chih-chung have both expressed their views on the matter. Once Tsai Ing-wen is elected, asssuming Beijing does not preempt by terminating ECFA first, then "President Tsai" should do so. Chen said that provisions for the termination of ECFA by either Beijing or the Democratic Progressive Party, is a question that cannot be avoided. Chen went on and on. But Chen's real question was, "Tsai Ing-wen, why not promise that if elected you will abolish ECFA?"
Will Tsai pardon Chen Shui-bian? Will Tsai abolish ECFA? These are questions most people would like to ask Tsai Ing-wen. Today, these questions have been asked by Chen Shui-bian. Naturally she is under increased pressure to respond. These are questions that Tsai Ing-wen must not evade and cannot evade.
For Chen Shui-bian, this was an audacious move that took everyone by surprise. Tsai Ing-wen is under the gun, both inside and outside her party. Logically speaking, Chen Shui-bian should be easing any pressure on Tsai Ing-wen. He should not become the straw that breaks the camel's back. He should wait until after Tsai Ing-wen is elected to bring up such matters. Yet Chen Shui-bian has deliberately chosen this chaotic moment to raise two issues that could impact Tsai Ing-wen's election prospects. What is he doing, but intentionally making life difficult for Tsai?
He has two possible motives for doing this. One. Chen Shui-bian may think that people within the Green Camp have strong feelings about ECFA and a presidential pardon. If Tsai fails to respond to these people, she may find it dfficult to generate any political momentum. Two. Chen Tsai Ing-wen may feel a need to force Tsai Ing-wen to take a stand before the election. On the one hand this would force Tsai to keep her campaign promises. On the other hand this would give him an opportunity to endorse Tsai's candidacy. That way, if Tsai is elected, she will be obliged to fulfill her campaign promises. The act of pardoning Chen will also be given greater legitimacy.
But when confronted with the two questions, Tsai Ing-wen remains hesitant. Will she pardon Chen Shui-bian? Her answers are, "This is a serious matter" and "This is something everyone on Taiwan must contemplate." What sort of answer is that? In response to questions about terminating ECFA, she first said that ECFA "pandered to [Mainland] China and sold out Taiwan." Later she said it "forfeited our sovereignty and humiliated our nation." She said, "one option would be to hold a referendum." She said she "would not rule out having the Legislative Yuan take another look at the law." Finally she said she "would continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." Again, what sort of answer is that?
Is Tsai Ing-wen like Yingluck Shinawatra? Consider the current situation. Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, Koo Kwan-min, and the Taiwan independence movement have taken Tsai Ing-wen hostage. Tsai Ing-wen has even declared that "people in southern Taiwan feel that a president who represents the Taiwanese people has been hunted relentlessly and persecuted politically." Is this not an expression of support? Does she not resemble Yingluck Shinawatra? Not really. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to fully endorse the Chen regime's eight years in office. Instead, she continues to stress "Taiwan Next," and "taking responsibility for the future." She has not publicly promised to pardon Chen Shui-bian. She merely speaks of "solemnly confronting the issue." Also, Chen Shui-bian opposes ECFA. Tsai Ing-wen however, has refused to take a clear stand on ECFA. In response to such questions, she is nowhere as consistent in her words and deeds as Yingluck Shinawatra. Therefore she bears scant resemblance to Yingluck Shinawatra.
Chen Shui-bian posed two major questions. He was of course, making a calculated, Machiavellian political move. But these are two questions Tsai Ing-wen must face. On terminating ECFA, Tsai has no desire to alarm Chen Shui-bian. According to Chen Shui-bian, if Tsai is elected, Beijing may well invoke the ECFA termination clause. If it does, will Tsai still support ECFA? Or will she preempt by terminating ECFA first? Tsai Ing-wen has no answer. Regarding a presidential pardon, Chen Shui-bian is even less likely to back off. He thinks Tsai Ing-wen should make a clear yes or no declaration before the election. She should ask voters to act as witnesses and support her decision. If Tsai does not answer these two questions before the election, but is elected, these two issues will become a nightmare for everyone on Taiwan.
Tsai Ing-wen finds herself on the horns of a dilemma. Her situation is a little like Yingluck Shinawatra's, but not entirely. For Tsai, "Is she or isn't she like Yingluck Shinawatra?" is an embarrassing question. Yingluck Shinawatra won because she talked the talk, and walked the walk. Voters backed her all the way. But if an ersatz Yingluck Shinawatra says one thing but does another, if she tries to pull the wool over the voters' eyes and muddle through, the result may be very different. Can Tsai Ing-wen become another Yingluck Shinawatra? That depends on whether Taiwan is another Thailand. That depends on whether voters on Taiwan are like voters in Thailand.
Chen Shui-bian wants Tsai Ing-wen to confront the issues, to force her to tell him where she stands. This is what most voters want as well.
蔡英文必須回答陳水扁
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.23
陳水扁公開提出兩個問題，等待蔡英文回答。
第一個問題是：蔡英文若當選總統，會不會對陳水扁特赦？陳水扁在名為〈代兄出征的盈拉贏了〉的文章中指出，泰國前總理塔信因案出亡國外，其妹盈拉在國會選舉代兄出征，未與塔信切割，且肯定並宣揚塔信的政績，又公開主張「特赦被定罪的政治犯」，因此贏得大選而出任總理。陳水扁以此諷勸蔡英文不要與他切割，「切割的結果只有落選」。陳水扁說，盈拉從來不否認自己是「塔信的複製品」，因此蔡英文也應以「複製盈拉經驗」自期。說了這一大套，陳水扁的問題其實是：蔡英文要不要特赦陳水扁？
第二個問題是：蔡英文為何不直接宣示若當選將廢止ＥＣＦＡ？陳水扁說，台灣主體意識及國家認同、甚至ＥＣＦＡ終止條款都是迴避不了的問題；此話當然是指蔡英文正在迴避這些問題，陳水扁則認為必須「正面迎戰」、「主導議題、主動出擊」。依陳水扁及陳致中先後發表的看法，蔡英文如當選後，若不是由北京主動啟動ＥＣＦＡ終止條款，即應由「蔡總統」主動啟動。所以，陳水扁說，ＥＣＦＡ終止條款，不論在北京或在民進黨，皆是迴避不了的問題。說了這一大套，陳水扁的問題無非是：蔡英文為何不直接宣告若當選將廢止ＥＣＦＡ？
是否特赦陳水扁？是否廢止ＥＣＦＡ？這正是多數國人想對蔡英文提出的問題，如今由陳水扁發問，自是更具張力；對這兩個問題，蔡英文不應再迴避，恐也不容她迴避。
陳水扁的這個大動作，出人意表。照理說，正當蔡英文在內外肆應上已陷焦頭爛額的境況，陳水扁為減輕蔡英文的負擔，自應少向駱駝背上堆稻草，一切待蔡英文若順利當選後再說。然而，陳水扁卻偏偏在這兵荒馬亂之際，提出這兩個對蔡英文的選情有重大影響的問題，豈非哪壺不開提哪壺？
可能有兩種原因：一、陳水扁估計綠營群眾在ＥＣＦＡ及特赦問題上，均有強烈主張，蔡若不回應這些群眾，炒不起熱情。二、陳水扁必須在選前逼蔡英文表態，一方面以選舉見證蔡的承諾，另一方面也可藉選舉為蔡的承諾背書，如此則蔡在若當選後即有履踐諾言的必然性與正當性。
然而，蔡英文對這兩個問題，仍是支支吾吾。特不特赦陳水扁？答案仍是「這是一個嚴肅的問題」，「這是一個整個台灣都得共同思考的問題」，這算是什麼答案？至於ＥＣＦＡ終止條款，一下子說「傾中賣台、喪權辱國」，一下子說「公投是一個選項」，一下子說「不排除立院重審」，一下子說「若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」，這又算是什麼答案？
蔡英文是不是「盈拉」？以現狀看來，「扁李謝辜獨」都挾持了蔡英文，而蔡英文連「南部認為政治追殺兩位台灣人的總統」都說出來了，難道還不算挺？難道還不是「盈拉」？但是蔡英文畢竟沒有大力宣揚扁政府八年政績，反而口口聲聲「Taiwan Next」，「把未來扛起來」；亦未公開主張特赦陳水扁，只說「嚴肅面對」。再者，陳水扁反ＥＣＦＡ，蔡英文則拒不表態。這些都不如「盈拉」那般心口如一，因此不太像「盈拉」。
陳水扁的兩個大哉問，當然有其政治操作的權謀，但也呈現了兩個蔡英文必須正視的課題。關於ＥＣＦＡ終止條款的問題，當非陳水扁危言聳聽；依陳水扁的看法，蔡若當選，北京即可能啟動終止條款，屆時蔡要不要延續ＥＣＦＡ，或先發制人主動終止，蔡英文當然不能不給個答案。至於特赦的問題，陳水扁更不可能鬆手；蔡英文也應在選季作出是或否的宣示，請選民見證及背書。蔡若不在選前回答這兩個問題，她若當選，這兩個問題將成整個台灣的噩夢。
有一點「盈拉」，但又不全是「盈拉」；這種「真假盈拉」的尷尬，正是蔡英文的困境。真盈拉的勝出，勝在心口如一，選民為她背書；假盈拉若欲用心口不一來欺世媚俗，矇混過關，可能有完全相反的結局。因為，蔡英文能不能當盈拉，要看台灣是不是泰國，台灣的選民是不是泰國的選民？
陳水扁要蔡英文勿迴避，把話說清楚，這也正是多數選民的期望。
Thursday, July 21, 2011
A Healthy and Diverse Media
A Healthy and Diverse Media
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 22, 2011
Following a two year delay, the National Communications Commission (NCC) has approved NEXT TV News Channel's application for an operating license. Jimmy Lai, President of Next Media, established the Media Ethics Commission, and offered it seven major assurances. Sex, violence, and nudity would not be part of its programming. NEXT TV will be available only to Chunghwa Telecom MOD users for the time being. The impact on the existing electronic media marketplace will be limited. But Next Media has made its Taiwan debut. Given its substantial resources and its approach to news coverage, it is certain to have an impact on Taiwan's media market. This is merely the beginning.
Next Media made its world debut ten years ago. It took the standard road for tabloids: sex, violence, and crime. Its pages were crammed with paparazzi photos. It totally subverted Taiwan's traditional media. Its also recorded amazing sales figures in short order. Its revenues were extraordinary, In the process however, it generated considerable controversy. For example, Next Magazine covers showed nude photos of sexual intercourse. Womens groups and parents groups protested, The Taipei City Government demanded that copies be removed from news racks. The Apple Daily showed detailed images of a mother abusing and murdering her four year old daughter on the Internet. The public reacted violently, This however, did not affect advertising revenues. Nor did it reduce readership.
The NCC approved NEXT TV's application for a license a few days ago, in mid-July. Only then did the Media Watch Foundation criticize the Apple Daily's news coverage. A story entitled "Mental Patient Crashes Airport," reported on weak spots in the security at Taoyuan Airport. The report contained no nudity or gore. Yet it was charged with violating reporting requirements for the Mental Health Act. On the same day that NEXT TV received approval, the Apple Daily website ran articles entitled "Night Club Beauty Cheats, Sugar Daddy Bites Nipple, Asserts Ownership" and "Kinky Womanizer Deceives Wife." The stench of scandal and Jimmy Lai's assurances regarding NEXT TV were not entirely consistent with each other.
Next Media's reporting style has had an impact on Taiwan's media that cannot be ignored. Its reporting relies not on text, but on images. Its pages are filled with candid photos. Recently, it has gone even further. In the absence of photos, it has resorted to diagrams. These diagrams show everything, relevant and irrelevant. They satisfy the reader's need for visual titillation. They also make some readers uncomfortable. The Ministry of the Interior wants to amend the "Children and Youth Act." It hopes to tighten standards for the print media. Next Media has forced High Court Judges to convene Constitutional Court sessions to deal with paparazzi photographs. This has increased pressure on the media as a whole.
Two years ago, the NCC refused to approve NEXT TV's application for a broadcasting license. One reason was the launch of its online platform, which mapped out a criminal offender's behavior. For victims, this was insult added to injury. It was an assault on their dignity. Its "dramatized" news coverage techniques simulated news events. But this is not how real news should be covered by professional journalists. The content was also in breach of the program ratings system. Two years later, the NCC eased off. Jimmy Lai made clear assurances to NCC commissioners. NEXT TV would put a three percent cap on sensationalistic news coverage. Commissioners decided that NEXT TV was genuine in its effort to impose internal controls.
The media must attempt to satisfy its readers. But it must not transgress moral and social boundaries. A balance must be struck between self-interest and the public interest. The media must retain some sense of proportion in its news coverage. The watchword for the media must always be "self-discipline." The mass media being what it is, this may be difficult to define. But the rule must apply to the print media, the electronic media, and the Internet alike.
To persuade NCC commissioners, Jimmy Lai established the Media Ethics Committee. This enabled his application, which had been delayed for two years, to finally be approved wtihout objection. Among the Media Ethics Committee members hired by Next Media, are independent scholars and experts deeply concerned about media content and media format. This suggests that NEXT Media is demonstrating sincerity and self-discipline. This is the nation's first such ethics committee. In the aftermath of the News of the World wiretapping scandal, the British Government has been thinking about how to rebuild media ethics and oversight mechanisms. The Media Ethics Committe could offer a self-regulation guideline for all media. Media organizations other than NEXT Media may have closely adhered to moral and social standards. But they too must make the necessary preparations.
Jimmy Lai personally attended the NCC review session. He told commissioners that the News of the World wiretapping scandal "hit home, and taught him a lesson." When Media tycoon Rupert Murdoch appeared before the British Parliament, he was choked with emotion, "This is the most humble day of my career." A day later, Jimmy Lai appeared before the NCC. His demeanor came across as sincere. Apparently it was the most humble day for him as well since becaming a media mogul. In any case, we hope the future will unfold as Lai assured us: AS he put it, "Having made my position clear, I must do what I said. I have no reason not to comply." We too are part of the media industry. We are pleased to see NEXT Media become a part of Taiwan's media market. We look forward to healthy competition, Together we hope to establish a healthier and more diverse media market.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.07.22
社論－樂見傳媒打造健康多樣文化
本報訊
延宕兩年，國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）通過壹電視新聞台申請經營案，壹傳媒總裁黎智英並做出成立跨媒體倫理委員會，性、暴力、裸露情節不做動新聞等七大承諾，儘管壹電視初期只能在用戶有限的中華電信ＭＯＤ上架，對現有電子媒體生態影響有限，但以壹傳媒登台的手筆和報導新聞的手法，可預期其對台灣媒體生態的衝擊才開始而已。
壹傳媒登台十年，走的是典型的性、暴力、犯罪的小報風格，狗仔新聞橫行，完全顛覆過去台灣對媒體報導的認知，也在極短的時間內創造驚人的銷量，營收一枝獨秀，但過程中也曾造成不少爭議。例如《壹週刊》曾因封面圖片刊登全裸露的性交畫面，遭到婦女和家長團體抗議，並遭台北市政府要求下架；《蘋果日報》也因為在網路上播出母親虐殺四歲女童細節的動新聞，遭到社會嚴厲撻伐，儘管如此卻無礙廣告主的青睬，亦無損於讀者的偏好。
甚至就在ＮＣＣ通過其申請案前幾天的七月中旬，台灣媒體觀察教育基金會才批判《蘋果日報》的動新聞，以「精神病患闖機場」為主題，報導桃園機場安檢漏洞。這則報導沒有任何裸露血腥的畫面，卻違反《精神衛生法》所規範的報導原則。同樣的，就在壹電視新聞台過關的同一天，《蘋果日報》網站的動新聞還有〈酒國名花劈腿，金主咬奶示威〉及〈淫狼誆妻〉等動新聞，其羶色程度與黎智英對壹電視開播所做的附帶承諾顯然未盡相符。
壹傳媒旗下媒體的報導風格，對台灣傳媒確實造成不可忽視的影響。不以文字報導而以圖像呈現為優先的表現方式，使得偷拍照片充斥其版面，晚近更進一步，沒有照片就改用圖示，圖示則鉅細靡遺，滿足了讀者的視覺需求，但也造成部分讀者不舒適的感受。不論是內政部擬修正《兒少法》，企圖對平面媒體加重規範；或者大法官為狗仔跟拍召開憲法法庭，均因壹傳媒而來，也對所有媒體都造成壓力。
兩年前，ＮＣＣ不讓壹電視過關的原因就是因為其網路平台開播時，揣摩犯罪者的犯罪行為，讓被害人二度傷害，造成人性尊嚴遭到踐踏；同時，動新聞以戲劇演繹手法，擬真方式呈現新聞，不符新聞內容應真實呈現的專業，且相關內容已違反節目分級制。兩年後，ＮＣＣ放行，因為黎智英明確回答ＮＣＣ委員，動新聞在壹電視新聞比例不到百分之三，委員們認為壹電視己經用心做到內控。
畢竟，媒體報導如何既滿足讀者偏好，又不逾越道德或社會觀感的界限，又如何在私利與公益間求取平衡，端賴媒體對報導分寸的拿捏，「自律」應是媒體心目中永遠不可或缺的一把尺。既為大眾傳播媒體，只要無法做到分級，這把尺就同樣適用於平面、電子或網路的平台。
或許，黎智英承諾率先組成「跨媒體倫理委員會」說服了ＮＣＣ的委員們，讓拖延兩年的申請案，最終能在無異議的情況下通過。從形式看來，已曝光的若干壹傳媒聘請的「跨媒體倫理委員會」成員，包括對媒體報導內容和形式相當關切的外聘學者專家，展現其自律誠意，這個國內首創的倫理委員會，尤其在《世界新聞報》竊聽風暴發生後，英國政府也積極思考如何重建媒體倫理與監督機制，可能也會成為所有媒體的自律準則之一，對壹傳媒之外其他原本就謹守社會道德界限的媒體而言，同樣也要做好積極面對的準備。
黎智英親赴ＮＣＣ審查會，對委員詢及最近英國《世界新聞報》的竊聽風暴表示「很有感觸，將引以為戒。」傳媒大亨梅鐸赴英國國會聽證時感慨，「這是我有生以來最感卑微的一天。」相隔一天，親赴ＮＣＣ審查會的黎智英姿態之誠懇，似乎也是他成為媒體鉅子以來最謙卑的一天。不論如何，希望未來的發展能如他所言，對他所有的承諾，「現在講清楚，就要做出來，沒有必要不遵守。」。無論如何，站在同業的立場，我們樂見壹電視加入台灣媒體市場，也期盼能在未來的良性競爭中，共同打造一個更健康、更多樣的台灣傳媒文化。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 22, 2011
Following a two year delay, the National Communications Commission (NCC) has approved NEXT TV News Channel's application for an operating license. Jimmy Lai, President of Next Media, established the Media Ethics Commission, and offered it seven major assurances. Sex, violence, and nudity would not be part of its programming. NEXT TV will be available only to Chunghwa Telecom MOD users for the time being. The impact on the existing electronic media marketplace will be limited. But Next Media has made its Taiwan debut. Given its substantial resources and its approach to news coverage, it is certain to have an impact on Taiwan's media market. This is merely the beginning.
Next Media made its world debut ten years ago. It took the standard road for tabloids: sex, violence, and crime. Its pages were crammed with paparazzi photos. It totally subverted Taiwan's traditional media. Its also recorded amazing sales figures in short order. Its revenues were extraordinary, In the process however, it generated considerable controversy. For example, Next Magazine covers showed nude photos of sexual intercourse. Womens groups and parents groups protested, The Taipei City Government demanded that copies be removed from news racks. The Apple Daily showed detailed images of a mother abusing and murdering her four year old daughter on the Internet. The public reacted violently, This however, did not affect advertising revenues. Nor did it reduce readership.
The NCC approved NEXT TV's application for a license a few days ago, in mid-July. Only then did the Media Watch Foundation criticize the Apple Daily's news coverage. A story entitled "Mental Patient Crashes Airport," reported on weak spots in the security at Taoyuan Airport. The report contained no nudity or gore. Yet it was charged with violating reporting requirements for the Mental Health Act. On the same day that NEXT TV received approval, the Apple Daily website ran articles entitled "Night Club Beauty Cheats, Sugar Daddy Bites Nipple, Asserts Ownership" and "Kinky Womanizer Deceives Wife." The stench of scandal and Jimmy Lai's assurances regarding NEXT TV were not entirely consistent with each other.
Next Media's reporting style has had an impact on Taiwan's media that cannot be ignored. Its reporting relies not on text, but on images. Its pages are filled with candid photos. Recently, it has gone even further. In the absence of photos, it has resorted to diagrams. These diagrams show everything, relevant and irrelevant. They satisfy the reader's need for visual titillation. They also make some readers uncomfortable. The Ministry of the Interior wants to amend the "Children and Youth Act." It hopes to tighten standards for the print media. Next Media has forced High Court Judges to convene Constitutional Court sessions to deal with paparazzi photographs. This has increased pressure on the media as a whole.
Two years ago, the NCC refused to approve NEXT TV's application for a broadcasting license. One reason was the launch of its online platform, which mapped out a criminal offender's behavior. For victims, this was insult added to injury. It was an assault on their dignity. Its "dramatized" news coverage techniques simulated news events. But this is not how real news should be covered by professional journalists. The content was also in breach of the program ratings system. Two years later, the NCC eased off. Jimmy Lai made clear assurances to NCC commissioners. NEXT TV would put a three percent cap on sensationalistic news coverage. Commissioners decided that NEXT TV was genuine in its effort to impose internal controls.
The media must attempt to satisfy its readers. But it must not transgress moral and social boundaries. A balance must be struck between self-interest and the public interest. The media must retain some sense of proportion in its news coverage. The watchword for the media must always be "self-discipline." The mass media being what it is, this may be difficult to define. But the rule must apply to the print media, the electronic media, and the Internet alike.
To persuade NCC commissioners, Jimmy Lai established the Media Ethics Committee. This enabled his application, which had been delayed for two years, to finally be approved wtihout objection. Among the Media Ethics Committee members hired by Next Media, are independent scholars and experts deeply concerned about media content and media format. This suggests that NEXT Media is demonstrating sincerity and self-discipline. This is the nation's first such ethics committee. In the aftermath of the News of the World wiretapping scandal, the British Government has been thinking about how to rebuild media ethics and oversight mechanisms. The Media Ethics Committe could offer a self-regulation guideline for all media. Media organizations other than NEXT Media may have closely adhered to moral and social standards. But they too must make the necessary preparations.
Jimmy Lai personally attended the NCC review session. He told commissioners that the News of the World wiretapping scandal "hit home, and taught him a lesson." When Media tycoon Rupert Murdoch appeared before the British Parliament, he was choked with emotion, "This is the most humble day of my career." A day later, Jimmy Lai appeared before the NCC. His demeanor came across as sincere. Apparently it was the most humble day for him as well since becaming a media mogul. In any case, we hope the future will unfold as Lai assured us: AS he put it, "Having made my position clear, I must do what I said. I have no reason not to comply." We too are part of the media industry. We are pleased to see NEXT Media become a part of Taiwan's media market. We look forward to healthy competition, Together we hope to establish a healthier and more diverse media market.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.07.22
社論－樂見傳媒打造健康多樣文化
本報訊
延宕兩年，國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）通過壹電視新聞台申請經營案，壹傳媒總裁黎智英並做出成立跨媒體倫理委員會，性、暴力、裸露情節不做動新聞等七大承諾，儘管壹電視初期只能在用戶有限的中華電信ＭＯＤ上架，對現有電子媒體生態影響有限，但以壹傳媒登台的手筆和報導新聞的手法，可預期其對台灣媒體生態的衝擊才開始而已。
壹傳媒登台十年，走的是典型的性、暴力、犯罪的小報風格，狗仔新聞橫行，完全顛覆過去台灣對媒體報導的認知，也在極短的時間內創造驚人的銷量，營收一枝獨秀，但過程中也曾造成不少爭議。例如《壹週刊》曾因封面圖片刊登全裸露的性交畫面，遭到婦女和家長團體抗議，並遭台北市政府要求下架；《蘋果日報》也因為在網路上播出母親虐殺四歲女童細節的動新聞，遭到社會嚴厲撻伐，儘管如此卻無礙廣告主的青睬，亦無損於讀者的偏好。
甚至就在ＮＣＣ通過其申請案前幾天的七月中旬，台灣媒體觀察教育基金會才批判《蘋果日報》的動新聞，以「精神病患闖機場」為主題，報導桃園機場安檢漏洞。這則報導沒有任何裸露血腥的畫面，卻違反《精神衛生法》所規範的報導原則。同樣的，就在壹電視新聞台過關的同一天，《蘋果日報》網站的動新聞還有〈酒國名花劈腿，金主咬奶示威〉及〈淫狼誆妻〉等動新聞，其羶色程度與黎智英對壹電視開播所做的附帶承諾顯然未盡相符。
壹傳媒旗下媒體的報導風格，對台灣傳媒確實造成不可忽視的影響。不以文字報導而以圖像呈現為優先的表現方式，使得偷拍照片充斥其版面，晚近更進一步，沒有照片就改用圖示，圖示則鉅細靡遺，滿足了讀者的視覺需求，但也造成部分讀者不舒適的感受。不論是內政部擬修正《兒少法》，企圖對平面媒體加重規範；或者大法官為狗仔跟拍召開憲法法庭，均因壹傳媒而來，也對所有媒體都造成壓力。
兩年前，ＮＣＣ不讓壹電視過關的原因就是因為其網路平台開播時，揣摩犯罪者的犯罪行為，讓被害人二度傷害，造成人性尊嚴遭到踐踏；同時，動新聞以戲劇演繹手法，擬真方式呈現新聞，不符新聞內容應真實呈現的專業，且相關內容已違反節目分級制。兩年後，ＮＣＣ放行，因為黎智英明確回答ＮＣＣ委員，動新聞在壹電視新聞比例不到百分之三，委員們認為壹電視己經用心做到內控。
畢竟，媒體報導如何既滿足讀者偏好，又不逾越道德或社會觀感的界限，又如何在私利與公益間求取平衡，端賴媒體對報導分寸的拿捏，「自律」應是媒體心目中永遠不可或缺的一把尺。既為大眾傳播媒體，只要無法做到分級，這把尺就同樣適用於平面、電子或網路的平台。
或許，黎智英承諾率先組成「跨媒體倫理委員會」說服了ＮＣＣ的委員們，讓拖延兩年的申請案，最終能在無異議的情況下通過。從形式看來，已曝光的若干壹傳媒聘請的「跨媒體倫理委員會」成員，包括對媒體報導內容和形式相當關切的外聘學者專家，展現其自律誠意，這個國內首創的倫理委員會，尤其在《世界新聞報》竊聽風暴發生後，英國政府也積極思考如何重建媒體倫理與監督機制，可能也會成為所有媒體的自律準則之一，對壹傳媒之外其他原本就謹守社會道德界限的媒體而言，同樣也要做好積極面對的準備。
黎智英親赴ＮＣＣ審查會，對委員詢及最近英國《世界新聞報》的竊聽風暴表示「很有感觸，將引以為戒。」傳媒大亨梅鐸赴英國國會聽證時感慨，「這是我有生以來最感卑微的一天。」相隔一天，親赴ＮＣＣ審查會的黎智英姿態之誠懇，似乎也是他成為媒體鉅子以來最謙卑的一天。不論如何，希望未來的發展能如他所言，對他所有的承諾，「現在講清楚，就要做出來，沒有必要不遵守。」。無論如何，站在同業的立場，我們樂見壹電視加入台灣媒體市場，也期盼能在未來的良性競爭中，共同打造一個更健康、更多樣的台灣傳媒文化。
Wednesday, July 20, 2011
Decoding Tsai Ing-wen's "I am Taiwanese."
Decoding Tsai Ing-wen's "I am Taiwanese."
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 21, 2011
"I am Taiwanese, I am Tsai Ing-wen," This declaration means that "Ma Ying-jeou is not Taiwanese." It means also that "They are not Taiwanese." That is, those who support Ma are "not Taiwanese." Tsai's declaration does not just divide Ma from Tsai. It divides society as well.
Just exactly what is Ma Ying-jeou? According to Green Camp political logic, Ma Ying-jeou is a "mainlander." By implication, Ma Ying-jeou is "Chinese." By further implication, he is a "Chi-Com fellow traveler." Context reveals meaning. Ma Ying-jeou, by implication, is "not Taiwanese." In fact, Tsai's declaration is merely a sanitized version of "Chinese pigs, get the hell back to China." According to Green Camp logic, Ma Ying-jeou stands for a "foreign regime," for "eventual reunification," and for "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." Therefore Ma Ying-jeou is "not Taiwanese," By implication he is "Chinese," just like "those people" on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Therefore Green Camp political rhetoric often equates the China Nationalist Party with the Chinese Communist Party. Lashing out at the Kuomintang means lashing out at the Chinese Communists. Sometimes it even equates the Republic of China with the Peoples Republic of China. Opposition to the ROC is hence equated with opposition to the PRC.
The Republic of China government has scant wherewithal currently to represent China as a whole. This is primarily the fault of Beijing. Few people on Taiwan identify themselves as "Chinese." This too is primarily the fault of Beijing. Therefore when Taiwan independence advocates incite "ethnic struggles," they spin them as showdowns between "Taiwanese" on the one side, and "Chinese" on the other. On Taiwan, being labeled "Chinese" is now the equivalent of being a "Chinese" person from the other side of the Taiwan Strait. The term "Taiwanese" is no longer merely an antonym for "Mainlander." That merely invokes the issue of "ethnicity," or more accurately, provincial origin. Today the term "Taiwanese" has been transformed into an antonym for "Chinese." That invokes the issue of "national identity." According to the self-styled "Taiwanese" in today's Democratic Progressive Party, the Republic of China is a "foreign regime." Ma Ying-jeou is a "Territorial Governor," and supporters of the Republic of China are "Chinese." By implication, opposition to Taiwan independence is opposition to Taiwan. Opposition to Taiwan independence is "lack of love for Taiwan." Opposition to Taiwan independence is proof positive that one is "not Taiwanese." This is the clear and unambiguous subtext behind Tsai Ing-wen's declaration, "I am Taiwanese,"
But champions of this rhetorical framework must prove that Taiwan independence is the only way to save Taiwan, and the only way to demonstrate one's love for Taiwan. Unfortunately for them, Taiwan independence is a movement whose time has come and gone. Since martial law was lifted, Taiwan has been subjected to over 20 years of internal and external shocks. These shocks swept Taiwan independence into the dustbin of history. With their ringing declarations that "I am Taiwanese," Tsai Ing-wen and DPP officials are encouraging Taiwan independence supporters to cling to their delusions. They are inciting social divisions. In fact, Tsai and the DPP no longer have the chutzpah to openly champion Taiwan independence. Otherwise, Tsai Ing-wen would have come right out and declared, "I am a champion of Taiwan independence. I am Tsai Ing-wen!"
This is the pathetic reality behind this political farce. Chinese from the other side of the Taiwan Strait have become "Mainland tourists." They have become Taiwan's "sixth ethnic group," second only to foreign spouses. Tsai Ing-wen was encouraging delusions of Taiwan independence. Why else would she revive the long dead Taiwan independence mantra, "I am Taiwanese?" Since she insists on reviving the "I am Taiwanese" mantra, why not use the more common phrase, "My Nation of Taiwan compatriots?" Why not come right out and champion Taiwan independence?
This has long been the plight of the Democratic Progressive Party. It flirts with Taiwan independence, but does not dare openly champion Taiwan independence. Unfortunately, Tsai Ing-wen remains trapped within this dilemma of self-delusion. Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 consensus. She opposes ECFA. She opposes "politically motivated procurements." All her positions are based on Taiwan independence political and economic logic. But when all is said and done, she cannot publicly champion Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen remains trapped. She can flirt with Taiwan independence, but she cannot openly promote Taiwan independence. In which case, what are we to make of her "Taiwan Next" gimmick?
Three years ago, Tsai Ing-wen became Democratic Progressive Party Chairman. She clearly hoped to shrug off this albatrosss around her neck. In March 2009, she issued a manifesto entitled, "Defend Taiwan with a New Concept of Nativism." She said "Some people have unintentionally [sic] defined Nativism far too narrowly. They have invested it with a specific meaning. Their narrow definition of Nativism is at odds with our need to unite for our collective survival." What does Tsai Ing-wen plan to do with her "I am Taiwanese" TV spot, which intentionally defines Nativism ar too narrowly.
DPP officials can no longer talk through their hats. They can no longer treat the term "Taiwanese" as their private property. Taiwan independence advocates can not longer treat the term "Taiwanese" as their private property, And finally, Tsai Ing-wen has no right to treat the term "Taiwanese" as her private property. Taiwan independence is an ideology that can only create chaos on Taiwan. It cannot save Taiwan. Therefore, it is not a means by which one can demonstrate "love for Taiwan." Taiwan independence advocates must cease using the terms "Republic of China" and "Nation of Taiwan" to divide the nation, They must cease using the declaration that "I am Taiwanese (whereas you are not)" to divide Taiwan.
Some people may persist in using such terms as "love for Taiwan" and "Save Taiwan" to define who is "Taiwanese." Perhaps we should compare Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. Which of the two has demonstrated greater allegiance to the nation's Constitution? Which of the two has crafted a cross-Strait policy that has benefitted the public on Taiwan? Which of the two deserves the honorific "Taiwanese" more? Perhaps we should let the public decide.
Tsai Ing-wen did not say "I am a champion of Taiwan independence, I am Tsai Ing-wen." She was afraid even to whisper it. Why do DPP officials insist on flirting with Taiwan independence, when they are afraid to champion it?
解讀蔡英文的「我是台灣人」
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.07.21 02:32 am
「我是台灣人，我是蔡英文」這句話不但意謂「馬英九不是台灣人」，而且意謂「他們不是台灣人」；亦即，支持馬就不是「台灣人」。一手區隔馬蔡，一手撕裂社會。
那麼，馬英九是什麼人呢？依綠營的政治邏輯，由馬英九是外省人，進一步將馬英九推向他是中國人，再進一步更將他推往根本就是中共的同路人。從語境的營造言，將馬英九隱指為不是台灣人，其實只是「中國豬滾回去」的化妝版；在這樣的邏輯下，馬英九是「外來政權」、「終極統一」、「傾中賣台」，所以馬英九不是台灣人，進而將他打成與對岸一樣的「中國人」。因而，在綠營的某些政治操作中，中國國民黨與中國共產黨可以相互代換，所以打國民黨就等於打中共；甚至中華民國與中華人民共和國也可相互代換，所以反中華民國就等於反中華人民共和國。
由於中華民國的「中國代表性」已經幾乎不存在（這主要是北京造成的），所以「中國人」在台灣的身分認同也站不住腳（這也主要是北京造成的）；因而，當台獨將台灣的族群鬥爭建構在「台灣人／中國人」的對立之上，在台灣若被指為「中國人」，就成了與對岸一樣的「中國人」。而「台灣人」亦不再只是與「外省人」對稱（這只是族群議題），而是與「中國人」對稱（這就升高為國家認同問題）。所以，在民進黨今日的語境中，所謂的「台灣人」，就是將中華民國視為「外來政權」，將馬英九視為「區長」，將中華民國的支持者視為「中國人」；因此，反台獨就是反台灣，反台獨就是不愛台灣，反台獨就不是台灣人……，這些，皆是蔡英文那句「我是台灣人」的潛台詞。
然而，此一論述若要成立，須先確立「台獨是救台灣與愛台灣的方案」；但經歷解嚴後二十餘年來的內外衝擊激盪，台獨已成歷史泡沫。民進黨及蔡英文現在只是想用「我是台灣人」來煽動台獨的幻覺，與撕裂社會，但已再無能力明目張膽地鼓動台獨；否則，蔡英文就應當直截了當地說：「我是台獨，我是蔡英文！」
這正是這齣政治鬧劇的可悲可痛處。在對岸中國人的「陸客」漸將成為台灣「第六大族群」的今日（次於外配），如果蔡英文不是在操作台獨的幻覺，何必回頭玩弄「我是台灣人」的台獨老梗？而既然要回頭玩弄「我是台灣人」的老梗，更何不乾脆使用民進黨常聞的開場白「咱台灣國的鄉親父老」，而旗幟鮮明地主張台獨？
這是民進黨的一貫困境，玩弄台獨，卻又不敢明白主張台獨；不幸的是，蔡英文今日仍陷此種自欺欺人的困境之中。蔡英文反對九二共識、反對ＥＣＦＡ、反對「政治性採購」，皆是建立在台獨的政經邏輯之上，但她畢竟絕無可能公開聲言主張台獨。所以，蔡英文仍未走出「玩弄台獨，不敢台獨」的宿命，既如此，她所謂的Taiwan Next怎堪設想？
蔡英文三年前剛接民進黨主席時，很明顯地曾想奮力擺脫此一噩運。她在二○○九年三月發表〈以新本土觀捍衛台灣〉專文指出：「有些人無意的（我相信是無意的）把『本土』窄化成一種排他性的觀念；這種窄化的本土詮釋……跟我們團結成生命共同體的需要是矛盾的。」現在，蔡英文要如何面對這支「我是台灣人」的廣告，竟然是如此「有意地」玩弄此種窄化又排他的觀念。
民進黨不可再自說自話地將「台灣人」據為私用，台獨亦無可能將「台灣人」據為私用，蔡英文更何德何能將「台灣人」據為私用。台獨已是「只能亂台、不能救台」的方案，因此亦絕非「愛台灣」的方案；所以，不要再用「中華民國／台灣國」來分裂國家，也不要再用「我是台灣人／你不是台灣人」來撕裂台灣。
如果真要用「愛台灣」「救台灣」來區別誰才是「台灣人」的話，其實，若以馬英九的國憲認同及兩岸政策，與蔡英文的相比較，何者更配稱作「台灣人」，誠可付諸公評。
蔡英文未說出「我是台獨，我是蔡英文」的潛台詞，連偷偷小聲說出也沒有。民進黨，何必還要搬弄「鬧台獨，卻不敢台獨」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 21, 2011
"I am Taiwanese, I am Tsai Ing-wen," This declaration means that "Ma Ying-jeou is not Taiwanese." It means also that "They are not Taiwanese." That is, those who support Ma are "not Taiwanese." Tsai's declaration does not just divide Ma from Tsai. It divides society as well.
Just exactly what is Ma Ying-jeou? According to Green Camp political logic, Ma Ying-jeou is a "mainlander." By implication, Ma Ying-jeou is "Chinese." By further implication, he is a "Chi-Com fellow traveler." Context reveals meaning. Ma Ying-jeou, by implication, is "not Taiwanese." In fact, Tsai's declaration is merely a sanitized version of "Chinese pigs, get the hell back to China." According to Green Camp logic, Ma Ying-jeou stands for a "foreign regime," for "eventual reunification," and for "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." Therefore Ma Ying-jeou is "not Taiwanese," By implication he is "Chinese," just like "those people" on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Therefore Green Camp political rhetoric often equates the China Nationalist Party with the Chinese Communist Party. Lashing out at the Kuomintang means lashing out at the Chinese Communists. Sometimes it even equates the Republic of China with the Peoples Republic of China. Opposition to the ROC is hence equated with opposition to the PRC.
The Republic of China government has scant wherewithal currently to represent China as a whole. This is primarily the fault of Beijing. Few people on Taiwan identify themselves as "Chinese." This too is primarily the fault of Beijing. Therefore when Taiwan independence advocates incite "ethnic struggles," they spin them as showdowns between "Taiwanese" on the one side, and "Chinese" on the other. On Taiwan, being labeled "Chinese" is now the equivalent of being a "Chinese" person from the other side of the Taiwan Strait. The term "Taiwanese" is no longer merely an antonym for "Mainlander." That merely invokes the issue of "ethnicity," or more accurately, provincial origin. Today the term "Taiwanese" has been transformed into an antonym for "Chinese." That invokes the issue of "national identity." According to the self-styled "Taiwanese" in today's Democratic Progressive Party, the Republic of China is a "foreign regime." Ma Ying-jeou is a "Territorial Governor," and supporters of the Republic of China are "Chinese." By implication, opposition to Taiwan independence is opposition to Taiwan. Opposition to Taiwan independence is "lack of love for Taiwan." Opposition to Taiwan independence is proof positive that one is "not Taiwanese." This is the clear and unambiguous subtext behind Tsai Ing-wen's declaration, "I am Taiwanese,"
But champions of this rhetorical framework must prove that Taiwan independence is the only way to save Taiwan, and the only way to demonstrate one's love for Taiwan. Unfortunately for them, Taiwan independence is a movement whose time has come and gone. Since martial law was lifted, Taiwan has been subjected to over 20 years of internal and external shocks. These shocks swept Taiwan independence into the dustbin of history. With their ringing declarations that "I am Taiwanese," Tsai Ing-wen and DPP officials are encouraging Taiwan independence supporters to cling to their delusions. They are inciting social divisions. In fact, Tsai and the DPP no longer have the chutzpah to openly champion Taiwan independence. Otherwise, Tsai Ing-wen would have come right out and declared, "I am a champion of Taiwan independence. I am Tsai Ing-wen!"
This is the pathetic reality behind this political farce. Chinese from the other side of the Taiwan Strait have become "Mainland tourists." They have become Taiwan's "sixth ethnic group," second only to foreign spouses. Tsai Ing-wen was encouraging delusions of Taiwan independence. Why else would she revive the long dead Taiwan independence mantra, "I am Taiwanese?" Since she insists on reviving the "I am Taiwanese" mantra, why not use the more common phrase, "My Nation of Taiwan compatriots?" Why not come right out and champion Taiwan independence?
This has long been the plight of the Democratic Progressive Party. It flirts with Taiwan independence, but does not dare openly champion Taiwan independence. Unfortunately, Tsai Ing-wen remains trapped within this dilemma of self-delusion. Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 consensus. She opposes ECFA. She opposes "politically motivated procurements." All her positions are based on Taiwan independence political and economic logic. But when all is said and done, she cannot publicly champion Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen remains trapped. She can flirt with Taiwan independence, but she cannot openly promote Taiwan independence. In which case, what are we to make of her "Taiwan Next" gimmick?
Three years ago, Tsai Ing-wen became Democratic Progressive Party Chairman. She clearly hoped to shrug off this albatrosss around her neck. In March 2009, she issued a manifesto entitled, "Defend Taiwan with a New Concept of Nativism." She said "Some people have unintentionally [sic] defined Nativism far too narrowly. They have invested it with a specific meaning. Their narrow definition of Nativism is at odds with our need to unite for our collective survival." What does Tsai Ing-wen plan to do with her "I am Taiwanese" TV spot, which intentionally defines Nativism ar too narrowly.
DPP officials can no longer talk through their hats. They can no longer treat the term "Taiwanese" as their private property. Taiwan independence advocates can not longer treat the term "Taiwanese" as their private property, And finally, Tsai Ing-wen has no right to treat the term "Taiwanese" as her private property. Taiwan independence is an ideology that can only create chaos on Taiwan. It cannot save Taiwan. Therefore, it is not a means by which one can demonstrate "love for Taiwan." Taiwan independence advocates must cease using the terms "Republic of China" and "Nation of Taiwan" to divide the nation, They must cease using the declaration that "I am Taiwanese (whereas you are not)" to divide Taiwan.
Some people may persist in using such terms as "love for Taiwan" and "Save Taiwan" to define who is "Taiwanese." Perhaps we should compare Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. Which of the two has demonstrated greater allegiance to the nation's Constitution? Which of the two has crafted a cross-Strait policy that has benefitted the public on Taiwan? Which of the two deserves the honorific "Taiwanese" more? Perhaps we should let the public decide.
Tsai Ing-wen did not say "I am a champion of Taiwan independence, I am Tsai Ing-wen." She was afraid even to whisper it. Why do DPP officials insist on flirting with Taiwan independence, when they are afraid to champion it?
解讀蔡英文的「我是台灣人」
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.07.21 02:32 am
「我是台灣人，我是蔡英文」這句話不但意謂「馬英九不是台灣人」，而且意謂「他們不是台灣人」；亦即，支持馬就不是「台灣人」。一手區隔馬蔡，一手撕裂社會。
那麼，馬英九是什麼人呢？依綠營的政治邏輯，由馬英九是外省人，進一步將馬英九推向他是中國人，再進一步更將他推往根本就是中共的同路人。從語境的營造言，將馬英九隱指為不是台灣人，其實只是「中國豬滾回去」的化妝版；在這樣的邏輯下，馬英九是「外來政權」、「終極統一」、「傾中賣台」，所以馬英九不是台灣人，進而將他打成與對岸一樣的「中國人」。因而，在綠營的某些政治操作中，中國國民黨與中國共產黨可以相互代換，所以打國民黨就等於打中共；甚至中華民國與中華人民共和國也可相互代換，所以反中華民國就等於反中華人民共和國。
由於中華民國的「中國代表性」已經幾乎不存在（這主要是北京造成的），所以「中國人」在台灣的身分認同也站不住腳（這也主要是北京造成的）；因而，當台獨將台灣的族群鬥爭建構在「台灣人／中國人」的對立之上，在台灣若被指為「中國人」，就成了與對岸一樣的「中國人」。而「台灣人」亦不再只是與「外省人」對稱（這只是族群議題），而是與「中國人」對稱（這就升高為國家認同問題）。所以，在民進黨今日的語境中，所謂的「台灣人」，就是將中華民國視為「外來政權」，將馬英九視為「區長」，將中華民國的支持者視為「中國人」；因此，反台獨就是反台灣，反台獨就是不愛台灣，反台獨就不是台灣人……，這些，皆是蔡英文那句「我是台灣人」的潛台詞。
然而，此一論述若要成立，須先確立「台獨是救台灣與愛台灣的方案」；但經歷解嚴後二十餘年來的內外衝擊激盪，台獨已成歷史泡沫。民進黨及蔡英文現在只是想用「我是台灣人」來煽動台獨的幻覺，與撕裂社會，但已再無能力明目張膽地鼓動台獨；否則，蔡英文就應當直截了當地說：「我是台獨，我是蔡英文！」
這正是這齣政治鬧劇的可悲可痛處。在對岸中國人的「陸客」漸將成為台灣「第六大族群」的今日（次於外配），如果蔡英文不是在操作台獨的幻覺，何必回頭玩弄「我是台灣人」的台獨老梗？而既然要回頭玩弄「我是台灣人」的老梗，更何不乾脆使用民進黨常聞的開場白「咱台灣國的鄉親父老」，而旗幟鮮明地主張台獨？
這是民進黨的一貫困境，玩弄台獨，卻又不敢明白主張台獨；不幸的是，蔡英文今日仍陷此種自欺欺人的困境之中。蔡英文反對九二共識、反對ＥＣＦＡ、反對「政治性採購」，皆是建立在台獨的政經邏輯之上，但她畢竟絕無可能公開聲言主張台獨。所以，蔡英文仍未走出「玩弄台獨，不敢台獨」的宿命，既如此，她所謂的Taiwan Next怎堪設想？
蔡英文三年前剛接民進黨主席時，很明顯地曾想奮力擺脫此一噩運。她在二○○九年三月發表〈以新本土觀捍衛台灣〉專文指出：「有些人無意的（我相信是無意的）把『本土』窄化成一種排他性的觀念；這種窄化的本土詮釋……跟我們團結成生命共同體的需要是矛盾的。」現在，蔡英文要如何面對這支「我是台灣人」的廣告，竟然是如此「有意地」玩弄此種窄化又排他的觀念。
民進黨不可再自說自話地將「台灣人」據為私用，台獨亦無可能將「台灣人」據為私用，蔡英文更何德何能將「台灣人」據為私用。台獨已是「只能亂台、不能救台」的方案，因此亦絕非「愛台灣」的方案；所以，不要再用「中華民國／台灣國」來分裂國家，也不要再用「我是台灣人／你不是台灣人」來撕裂台灣。
如果真要用「愛台灣」「救台灣」來區別誰才是「台灣人」的話，其實，若以馬英九的國憲認同及兩岸政策，與蔡英文的相比較，何者更配稱作「台灣人」，誠可付諸公評。
蔡英文未說出「我是台獨，我是蔡英文」的潛台詞，連偷偷小聲說出也沒有。民進黨，何必還要搬弄「鬧台獨，卻不敢台獨」？
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
James Soong: Between Illusion and Reality
James Soong: Between Illusion and Reality
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 20, 2011
Grass-roots supporters of the Orange Camp are petitioning to make James Soong a candidate for President of the Republic of China, The leadership of the People First Party reportedly wants him to run for legislator from Hualien. Running for president and running for legislator from Hualien are miles apart. This suggests that despite any brave face James Soong might put on, in his heart of hearts he remains a realist.
By threatening to run for president, James Soong is putting on a magic show. This magic show conceals his bitterness with his loss of power and status, He is alienated from and angry with the Ma camp, It is hard for him to forget the era when everyone greeted him as "the honorable Governor Soong." Even now friends crowd around him, and urge him to run for office, The result has been bittersweet. On the Internet, he boasts a "million man petition." At the grassroots level however, he commands only a few tens of thousands of supporters. How many real world votes will this support translate into on election day? James Soong, a seasoned veteran, knows only too well.
By contrast, his plan to run for legislator from Hualien, is Soong's ultimate reality. Since 2000, he has suffered one defeat after another. He made failed bids for the presidency, the vice presidency, and the mayorship of Taipei City. In the end, he received barely more than 50,000 votes. He may still harbor political ambitions. But can he still fight the good fight? Fu Kun-chi has sunk deep roots in the region. James Soong probably intends to hitch a ride on Fu Kun-chi's coat tails. If Soong runs for legislator from Hualien, he may be able to return to the political stage. But even if Song is elected legislator from Hualien, the only impact he will have on the election, on cross-Strait relations, and on the strategic situation, is likely to be negative. Is this really the legacy Soong seeks? Even Lee Teng-hui is urging him to run for president. Running for legislator could be regarded as self-degradation, as looking tough on the outside, but being weak on the inside.
Just exactly what role does James Soong hope to play on Taiwan's political stage, and in cross-Strait relations? Why run for legislator from Hualien? Just because nothing better is available? He may be able to make trouble for the KMT. But what of it? He may be able to give the DPP a boost, and create chaos. But is that really James Soong's mission in life?
Also, must James Soong be synonymous with the People First Party? Is that something that might change? Years ago, the People First Party rode to glory on James Soong's coat tails. But times have changed. The halo over James Soong's head, has become a dark cloud over the PFP. The PFP is a political party founded on a single person's charisma. It may have difficulty maintaining voter support in Taiwan's highly competitive political arena. For proof, look at Lee Teng-hui's Taiwan Solidarity Union.
James Soong never considered the long term survival of the People First Party. He put himself above the party. His leadership of the party was emotional, even violent. He ignored others' advice. He alienated his original supporters. He drove away the party elite. This, rather than any KMT dominance. led to the decline of the People First Party. The real cause of the PFP's decline was the party chairman's egotism. The public still recalls his conduct during the "Chen/Soong Meeting." James Soong could refuse to remain under the Pan Blue banner. He could argue that "three parties without a majority ensures people power." But his political moves did not reassure the public. The public doubted his power play would improve the situation for Taiwan. They feared it would only make it worse.
Soong's problems began with the 240 million NT Chung Hsing Bills case. Soong insisted that the 240 million belonged to the KMT. Now however, he says the money was the balance from his own campaign funds. The KMT cannot compromise on this matter. The issue concerns more than justice. It concerns Soong's reputation. Soong originally insisted that the money belonged to the KMT. If he and the KMT were to donate it to charity, Soong could erase the stigma from the Chung Hsing Bills case, He could rehabilitate his image. But if the 240 million NT becomes his reason to run for legislator from Hualien, his reputation will soon be in shambles.
James Soong has repeatedly gone on the offensive, and attacked the KMT. But he has offered no national policies superior to the KMT's. The public sees no overarching reason for him to return to politics. Why is he joining the DPP's attack on the KMT? On the issue of black gold, he has even joined in the chorus with Lee Teng-hui. He is saying the money had nothing to do with Lee Teng-hui. Lee Teng-hui has returned the favor, praising Soong as "the best administor on Taiwan." Years ago, the two confronted each other with drawn swords. Yet today they acted out this perverse charade. By the look of things, Lee Teng-hui ought to visit Hualien and stump for James Soong.
This is Soong's greatest tragedy. The express train of time has hurtled ten years into the future, But James Soong remains seated at the same station, waxing nostalgic over the past. Filled with grief and sorrow, he rails against fate, and longs to revisit happier times. But who are his real enemies? Are they his erstwhile comrades, who once fought at his side? Are they Taiwan's voters, whose moods are as changeable as the wind? Or are they the demons in his own heart, who long for revenge?
People Soong once touched may recall the hard working Governor Soong of years gone by. But such memories are being squeezed out by today's images of a sour faced Chairman Soong. Five years ago, when James Soong ran for Taipei mayor, he said it would be his last hurrah. Today James Soong can still be received on the mainland with some dignity, People on both sides of the Strait still recall happier times. Is James Soong determined to sink so low? Is he determined to eradicate these final traces of his legacy, by glad handing and shouting slogans?
宋楚瑜：在魔幻與現實之間
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.20
正當橘營基層為宋楚瑜發動連署競選總統之際，親民黨中央也傳出他可能到花蓮參選立委的消息。從「選總統」到「選花蓮立委」的天壤之別，顯示宋楚瑜不管把手上的大刀舞得多花稍，他心中對現實的估計終究有幾分保留。
揚言要選總統，是宋楚瑜的魔幻。這個魔幻中，包含了他權位失落的苦澀、他對馬陣營疏離的憤怒、他難以忘情的「省長好」時代的甜美，乃至今天周遭親朋勸進的湧動，匯成了酸甜苦辣痛的錯綜情結。但無論是網路上虛擬的「百萬人連署」，或者基層實體誇稱的幾十萬人，最後能在選舉中化為多少張真實的選票，久經歷練如宋楚瑜，自是心裡有數。
相形之下，盤算到花蓮選立委，則是宋楚瑜最後的現實。從兩千年以來，他屢戰屢敗，一路從總統、副總統、選到台北市長，最後得票不過五萬多；廉頗老矣，尚能戰否？宋楚瑜的盤算應是：藉著傅?萁既有的耕耘，宋自己若在花蓮參選區域立委，或許有重返江湖的機會。然而，即使宋在花蓮當選立委，對此次選舉及台灣政治全局及兩岸關係恐也只是「成事不足，敗事有餘」而已，這難道就是宋所追求的歷史角色？連李登輝都建議他選總統，選立委可能被視為自貶身價、色厲內荏。
宋楚瑜究竟想在台灣政治全局及兩岸關係中扮演何種角色？花蓮選立委，只因無魚蝦也好？扯國民黨後腿，扯斷了又如何？抬捧了民進黨，攪亂了全局，難道這是宋楚瑜的歷史使命？
再者，「宋楚瑜」和「親民黨」之間的等號關係究竟要不要調整？當年親民黨因宋楚瑜的光環而成立，曾風光一時；但時過境遷，宋楚瑜的「光環」幾已變成親民黨的「陰影」。這麼一個高度「個人化」的政黨，要在競爭激烈的政黨政治中維持台灣多元選民的認同，並非易事；只要一睹李登輝的台聯，已可一目了然。
然而，宋楚瑜對親民黨的經營不僅缺乏長期布局，他也始終把自己看得比黨還大，甚至以情緒性的暴衝來領導政黨。他的一意孤行，不僅讓他流失原有的支持者，也使黨內菁英不斷出走。亦即，親民黨的沒落，其實未必是由於國民黨的凌越，而是黨主席過度自我中心所致，眾人應仍記得宋在「扁宋會」的表現。宋楚瑜當然可以拒絕屈就在泛藍的旗幟底下，他要喊「三黨不過半，人民才有伴」也是他的自由；但從他的手段看，人們看不到這個口號有打造台灣新局面的可能，反而恐將使台灣更向下沉淪。
一切都是那二‧四億在作怪。興票案爆發時，宋說這二‧四億是國民黨的；如今卻稱這筆錢是他自己的選舉節餘款。國民黨不能在這方面退讓，非但事關是非公義，其實也在愛護宋的名節；倘若宋能將這筆他原稱是國民黨的錢，與國民黨一起捐作公益，他即可洗刷興票案的汙名，亦是人格風範的重生與再造。但若這二‧四億成了赴花蓮參選立委的動機，其高下軒輊即是判若天壤了。
宋楚瑜頻頻出手，刀刀都指向國民黨；但在國家大政方針上卻完全不見能超越國民黨的主張，外界很難看出他誓言重返政壇的超然訴求何在，又為何要與民進黨分進合擊？在黑金問題上，他甚至與李登輝唱和，說黑金和李無關，還因此換來李給他「行政能力全台最優秀」的讚揚。當年兩人刀槍相向，今天竟演出如此倒錯的場面，看來，李登輝可赴花蓮為宋楚瑜站台了。
這正是宋楚瑜最大的悲情。時代的列車已經往前開了十幾年，宋楚瑜卻還停留在他最不能忘情的那個車站，抱著滿腔的悲憤和酸楚向天呼嘯，希望時鐘能夠倒撥。但他真正的敵人是誰呢？是曾和他並肩作戰過的戰友，是台灣如流水的民意，還是他自己心裡的復仇惡魔？
曾被「天道酬勤」感動過的人，記憶中那位宋省長的勤謹模樣或許還沒全然消退，但與今天這位宋主席的酸辣影像已經漸漸無法重疊。五年前選台北市長，宋楚瑜曾誓言那是「人生最後一役」；宋楚瑜今日尚可帶著幾分虛榮到大陸行走，在兩岸全局中讓人存有幾分想像，難道要自甘淪落到由傅?萁拉手喊凍蒜的地步？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 20, 2011
Grass-roots supporters of the Orange Camp are petitioning to make James Soong a candidate for President of the Republic of China, The leadership of the People First Party reportedly wants him to run for legislator from Hualien. Running for president and running for legislator from Hualien are miles apart. This suggests that despite any brave face James Soong might put on, in his heart of hearts he remains a realist.
By threatening to run for president, James Soong is putting on a magic show. This magic show conceals his bitterness with his loss of power and status, He is alienated from and angry with the Ma camp, It is hard for him to forget the era when everyone greeted him as "the honorable Governor Soong." Even now friends crowd around him, and urge him to run for office, The result has been bittersweet. On the Internet, he boasts a "million man petition." At the grassroots level however, he commands only a few tens of thousands of supporters. How many real world votes will this support translate into on election day? James Soong, a seasoned veteran, knows only too well.
By contrast, his plan to run for legislator from Hualien, is Soong's ultimate reality. Since 2000, he has suffered one defeat after another. He made failed bids for the presidency, the vice presidency, and the mayorship of Taipei City. In the end, he received barely more than 50,000 votes. He may still harbor political ambitions. But can he still fight the good fight? Fu Kun-chi has sunk deep roots in the region. James Soong probably intends to hitch a ride on Fu Kun-chi's coat tails. If Soong runs for legislator from Hualien, he may be able to return to the political stage. But even if Song is elected legislator from Hualien, the only impact he will have on the election, on cross-Strait relations, and on the strategic situation, is likely to be negative. Is this really the legacy Soong seeks? Even Lee Teng-hui is urging him to run for president. Running for legislator could be regarded as self-degradation, as looking tough on the outside, but being weak on the inside.
Just exactly what role does James Soong hope to play on Taiwan's political stage, and in cross-Strait relations? Why run for legislator from Hualien? Just because nothing better is available? He may be able to make trouble for the KMT. But what of it? He may be able to give the DPP a boost, and create chaos. But is that really James Soong's mission in life?
Also, must James Soong be synonymous with the People First Party? Is that something that might change? Years ago, the People First Party rode to glory on James Soong's coat tails. But times have changed. The halo over James Soong's head, has become a dark cloud over the PFP. The PFP is a political party founded on a single person's charisma. It may have difficulty maintaining voter support in Taiwan's highly competitive political arena. For proof, look at Lee Teng-hui's Taiwan Solidarity Union.
James Soong never considered the long term survival of the People First Party. He put himself above the party. His leadership of the party was emotional, even violent. He ignored others' advice. He alienated his original supporters. He drove away the party elite. This, rather than any KMT dominance. led to the decline of the People First Party. The real cause of the PFP's decline was the party chairman's egotism. The public still recalls his conduct during the "Chen/Soong Meeting." James Soong could refuse to remain under the Pan Blue banner. He could argue that "three parties without a majority ensures people power." But his political moves did not reassure the public. The public doubted his power play would improve the situation for Taiwan. They feared it would only make it worse.
Soong's problems began with the 240 million NT Chung Hsing Bills case. Soong insisted that the 240 million belonged to the KMT. Now however, he says the money was the balance from his own campaign funds. The KMT cannot compromise on this matter. The issue concerns more than justice. It concerns Soong's reputation. Soong originally insisted that the money belonged to the KMT. If he and the KMT were to donate it to charity, Soong could erase the stigma from the Chung Hsing Bills case, He could rehabilitate his image. But if the 240 million NT becomes his reason to run for legislator from Hualien, his reputation will soon be in shambles.
James Soong has repeatedly gone on the offensive, and attacked the KMT. But he has offered no national policies superior to the KMT's. The public sees no overarching reason for him to return to politics. Why is he joining the DPP's attack on the KMT? On the issue of black gold, he has even joined in the chorus with Lee Teng-hui. He is saying the money had nothing to do with Lee Teng-hui. Lee Teng-hui has returned the favor, praising Soong as "the best administor on Taiwan." Years ago, the two confronted each other with drawn swords. Yet today they acted out this perverse charade. By the look of things, Lee Teng-hui ought to visit Hualien and stump for James Soong.
This is Soong's greatest tragedy. The express train of time has hurtled ten years into the future, But James Soong remains seated at the same station, waxing nostalgic over the past. Filled with grief and sorrow, he rails against fate, and longs to revisit happier times. But who are his real enemies? Are they his erstwhile comrades, who once fought at his side? Are they Taiwan's voters, whose moods are as changeable as the wind? Or are they the demons in his own heart, who long for revenge?
People Soong once touched may recall the hard working Governor Soong of years gone by. But such memories are being squeezed out by today's images of a sour faced Chairman Soong. Five years ago, when James Soong ran for Taipei mayor, he said it would be his last hurrah. Today James Soong can still be received on the mainland with some dignity, People on both sides of the Strait still recall happier times. Is James Soong determined to sink so low? Is he determined to eradicate these final traces of his legacy, by glad handing and shouting slogans?
宋楚瑜：在魔幻與現實之間
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.20
正當橘營基層為宋楚瑜發動連署競選總統之際，親民黨中央也傳出他可能到花蓮參選立委的消息。從「選總統」到「選花蓮立委」的天壤之別，顯示宋楚瑜不管把手上的大刀舞得多花稍，他心中對現實的估計終究有幾分保留。
揚言要選總統，是宋楚瑜的魔幻。這個魔幻中，包含了他權位失落的苦澀、他對馬陣營疏離的憤怒、他難以忘情的「省長好」時代的甜美，乃至今天周遭親朋勸進的湧動，匯成了酸甜苦辣痛的錯綜情結。但無論是網路上虛擬的「百萬人連署」，或者基層實體誇稱的幾十萬人，最後能在選舉中化為多少張真實的選票，久經歷練如宋楚瑜，自是心裡有數。
相形之下，盤算到花蓮選立委，則是宋楚瑜最後的現實。從兩千年以來，他屢戰屢敗，一路從總統、副總統、選到台北市長，最後得票不過五萬多；廉頗老矣，尚能戰否？宋楚瑜的盤算應是：藉著傅?萁既有的耕耘，宋自己若在花蓮參選區域立委，或許有重返江湖的機會。然而，即使宋在花蓮當選立委，對此次選舉及台灣政治全局及兩岸關係恐也只是「成事不足，敗事有餘」而已，這難道就是宋所追求的歷史角色？連李登輝都建議他選總統，選立委可能被視為自貶身價、色厲內荏。
宋楚瑜究竟想在台灣政治全局及兩岸關係中扮演何種角色？花蓮選立委，只因無魚蝦也好？扯國民黨後腿，扯斷了又如何？抬捧了民進黨，攪亂了全局，難道這是宋楚瑜的歷史使命？
再者，「宋楚瑜」和「親民黨」之間的等號關係究竟要不要調整？當年親民黨因宋楚瑜的光環而成立，曾風光一時；但時過境遷，宋楚瑜的「光環」幾已變成親民黨的「陰影」。這麼一個高度「個人化」的政黨，要在競爭激烈的政黨政治中維持台灣多元選民的認同，並非易事；只要一睹李登輝的台聯，已可一目了然。
然而，宋楚瑜對親民黨的經營不僅缺乏長期布局，他也始終把自己看得比黨還大，甚至以情緒性的暴衝來領導政黨。他的一意孤行，不僅讓他流失原有的支持者，也使黨內菁英不斷出走。亦即，親民黨的沒落，其實未必是由於國民黨的凌越，而是黨主席過度自我中心所致，眾人應仍記得宋在「扁宋會」的表現。宋楚瑜當然可以拒絕屈就在泛藍的旗幟底下，他要喊「三黨不過半，人民才有伴」也是他的自由；但從他的手段看，人們看不到這個口號有打造台灣新局面的可能，反而恐將使台灣更向下沉淪。
一切都是那二‧四億在作怪。興票案爆發時，宋說這二‧四億是國民黨的；如今卻稱這筆錢是他自己的選舉節餘款。國民黨不能在這方面退讓，非但事關是非公義，其實也在愛護宋的名節；倘若宋能將這筆他原稱是國民黨的錢，與國民黨一起捐作公益，他即可洗刷興票案的汙名，亦是人格風範的重生與再造。但若這二‧四億成了赴花蓮參選立委的動機，其高下軒輊即是判若天壤了。
宋楚瑜頻頻出手，刀刀都指向國民黨；但在國家大政方針上卻完全不見能超越國民黨的主張，外界很難看出他誓言重返政壇的超然訴求何在，又為何要與民進黨分進合擊？在黑金問題上，他甚至與李登輝唱和，說黑金和李無關，還因此換來李給他「行政能力全台最優秀」的讚揚。當年兩人刀槍相向，今天竟演出如此倒錯的場面，看來，李登輝可赴花蓮為宋楚瑜站台了。
這正是宋楚瑜最大的悲情。時代的列車已經往前開了十幾年，宋楚瑜卻還停留在他最不能忘情的那個車站，抱著滿腔的悲憤和酸楚向天呼嘯，希望時鐘能夠倒撥。但他真正的敵人是誰呢？是曾和他並肩作戰過的戰友，是台灣如流水的民意，還是他自己心裡的復仇惡魔？
曾被「天道酬勤」感動過的人，記憶中那位宋省長的勤謹模樣或許還沒全然消退，但與今天這位宋主席的酸辣影像已經漸漸無法重疊。五年前選台北市長，宋楚瑜曾誓言那是「人生最後一役」；宋楚瑜今日尚可帶著幾分虛榮到大陸行走，在兩岸全局中讓人存有幾分想像，難道要自甘淪落到由傅?萁拉手喊凍蒜的地步？
Monday, July 18, 2011
Bail and Custody: Prosecutors and Judges have a Responsibility
Bail and Custody: Prosecutors and Judges have a Responsibility
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 19, 2011
The White Rose Movement has been reborn. This time the impetus came from Banqiao District Court Judge Judge Lu Chun-chieh. Lu allowed a taxi driver named Hsieh to go free on 50,000 NT bail. Hsieh is suspected of sexually assaulting a female university student from Japan. Netizens are demanding that Lu step down. Controversy over incompetent "dinosaur judges," out of touch with the expectations of society, is once again shaking up the judicial system.
People are angry. They pity the Japanese woman who came to Taiwan, only to be sexually assaulted. They are outraged by cavalier oversights within the judicial process. The result has been a rapidly accelerating, unstoppable snowball. Public anger is intense and warranted. But detention procedures, the conditions of detention, judgments about their purpose, must be subjected to rational review. Public sentiments must be directed at the problem. Only then can we prevent their recurrence.
The driver, whose surname is Hsieh, was arrested for sexual assault then released on bail. First of all, the prosecutor failed to provide sufficient proof of his guilt. Before prosecutors can detain a suspect, they must present sufficient evidence. When required, this evidence must appear on their reports. They must convince a judge that the defendant must be detained. This is necessary to ensure both the public welfare and the victim's rights.
Detaining a suspect does not imply that he is either guilty or not guilty. Its purpose is to enable an investigation or trial to proceed. It temporarily restricts a defendant's personal freedom. When a crime takes place, one must begin with the presumption of innocence. Judges must be cautious about detaining a defendant. The seriousness of the crime cannot be the sole justification for detaining a defendant. Other considerations, such as flight risk, the possibility that perpetrators might coordinate their testimony, or that perpetrators might repeat their offenses, must all be taken into consideration, to protect the rights of the defendant.
In the Hsieh case, the only reason the prosecutor cited for detaining Hsieh was the seriousness of the crime. No one from the prosecutor's office appeared in court. No one suggested that Hsieh might be a flight risk. No one suggested that the police adopt "preventive detention" measures. Still less did anyone suggest that Hsieh was a repeat offender, with a record for sexual assault. Should such a sexual assault suspect be detained?
Prosecutors failed to provide evidence of guilt. The judge rejected demands that he be detained. Even if prosecutors refile motions to have the defendant detained, they are unlikely to escape blame. Still less can they argue that judges have the authority and obligation to investigate, and use that as a defense. Otherwise, what is the point of having prosecutors? One may as well turn all cases over to the judges, and have them investigate. This last line of defense was incorporated into the Code of Criminal Procedures to ensure justice and fairness. It was never intended as a pretext for prosecutorial indolence. Prosecutors who have not laid the proper groundwork to detain a suspect have only themselves to blame. Meanwhile, the decision whether to detain a suspect, remains the responsibility of the gatekeepers -- the judges. Public safety and human rights are in a constant tug of war. We must not rush to judgment. We must defend to the death the provisions of the law. We must approach every case based on the facts.
In the Hsieh case, the prosecutor cited only the seriousness of the crime as a reason to detain the suspect. This was in violation of the requirements of justice. The prosecutors were negligent. But Hsieh is a taxi driver. He has many opportunities to come in contact with women. If he repeats his offense, that is no trivial matter. Given these questions, the judge failed to ask the prosecutor to provide additional information. He too was negligent. The victims of sexual assault may or may not be Japanese women. Regardless, judges should show greater empathy.
This process reveals how prosecutors and judges routinely handle such cases. The word "detain" on the whiteboard in the bailiffs' room means that someone has lost his freedom and his reputation. If prosecutors want to take someone into custody and hold him at a detention center, they need to do more than check a few boxes on an indictment form. But prosecutors rarely argue their case in court. They are often slapdash in their case preparation. They desperately need oversight. The judge has little time in which to decide whether a defendant should be detained. He must understand the requirements for detention. He must be experienced in his interactions with prosecutors. He must be seasoned and tough. But unless the case is a major case or a media case, in practice judges invariably "allow the cattle to graze." They allow the first instance judges to take on cases alone. Are these judges sufficiently well trained? That remains to be seen.
Another issue warrants concern. That is the impact of public indignation on court cases. Justice requires avoiding human influences. human biases. It requires listening to statements by different parties, and arriving at a judgment based on the evidence. But in the Hsieh case, the media has spoken on behalf of the victim alone. It has painted Hsieh as a demon. It has already convicted him. Netizens meanwhile, immediately painted the judges as "dinosaur judges," without bothering to first understand the problems with custody. The White Rose Movement has used this opportunity to rise again. It is unhappy about the sexual assault bill proposed by the administration. It is also exterting enormous pressure on the judges to detain Hsieh.
Therefore if Hsieh is eventually detained, it will be impossible to tell whether it was due to "public opinion," or to judges exercising their judicial autonomy. Public outrage may result in pressure. But it may not lead to the truth. If the judicial system is negligent in its handling of cases, it will lead to a public backlash. It will invite public contempt.
The public is disappointed with the justice system. Prosecutors and the courts must not blindly succumb to public pressure. They must not pass the buck in order to relieve the pressure on themselves. They must work together to improve the system as a whole. Only by this can they address public concerns. They must take advantage of public discontent to improve the system. The public may vent its anger because it is dissatisfied with the justice system. But it should return to the issue of how to change the system. Only this will prevent populist sentiment from influencing the administration of justice. Only this will allow the public to feel secure in the administration of justice.
交保又收押 檢察官與法官都有責任
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.19
白玫瑰運動風雲再起，這回的動力，來自板橋地方法院法官盧軍傑讓涉嫌性侵日本女大學生的謝姓司機以五萬元交保，網民串連要盧下台，恐龍法官風暴再度襲擊司法界。
民眾之憤，來自對隻身來台日本女子疑受性侵際遇的憐憫，以及司法處理過程輕率疏漏的不滿，因而在短時間內匯集成巨大的能量，銳不可擋。民憤之銳，其來有自，不過，事涉羈押程序進行責任的歸屬，羈押條件、目的的判斷，仍應理性討論，激憤的群情才能對準問題發威，避免事件重演。
謝姓司機涉嫌性侵交保案中，首先被忽略的是檢察官的舉證角色。檢察官發動羈押的聲請，應提出證據資料，必要時還應出庭論告，以說服法官，為什麼要羈押被告，這是基於公益，也在保護被害人的權益。
羈押不在決定被告有罪、無罪，而是為了偵查、審判順利進行或將來執行的必要，而暫時限制被告的人身自由。刑案才剛發生，基於無罪推定原則，法官羈押被告必須十分審慎，大法官也才作出第六六五號解釋，要求不能以被告涉犯重罪，作為羈押的唯一理由，必須另搭配逃亡、串證或再犯的可能性，以保護被告的權益。
謝案中，檢察官僅勾選謝涉重罪的聲押事由，人未到庭論告，亦未提出謝可能逃亡的其他說明，且未採警方以「預防性羈押」聲押謝的建議，更別說提供謝有無其他性侵、性騷擾前科的事證，難道性侵疑犯就應予羈押？
檢察官未盡舉證之責，遭法官駁回羈押聲請，縱再提抗告，也難辭其咎，更不能以法官有職權調查義務作為抗辯，否則設檢察官何用，全部交給法官去查好了。刑事訴訟法的公平正義防線，不是為檢察官偷懶怠職而定，未能做好羈押聲請準備的檢察官，首先應該負責。然而，決定羈押與否，負責守門的法官，於公共安全與人權的拉鋸戰中，也不能馬虎判斷，死守法條文義，仍須結合每一件個案事實去判定。
謝案中，檢察官僅以重罪一由聲請羈押，違反大法官的要求，雖有疏漏；但謝是計程車司機，有許多與女性接觸的機會，若再犯，情況非同小可；有這些疑問，法官卻未請檢察官補正資料，也太掉以輕心了。不管性侵被害人是否為日本女子，法官都應多一點同理心。
這些過程，顯露檢察官、法官制式化辦案的一面。法院法警室白板上「羈押」兩字，代表一個人自由名譽的淪喪，檢察官要把一個人押進看守所，可不是打幾個勾的簡單事，但檢察官很少到法庭上力辯，資料準備容易流於草率，極需檢討。至於法官必須在短時間內決定是否羈押被告，對羈押要件的掌握，與檢察官的互動和經驗，更需要相當的歷練與火候。然而，除非是社會特別矚目或重大案件，實務上都「放牛吃草」，讓一審法官獨自面對案件，法官的訓練是否足夠，亦應檢討。
另一值得注意的是，民氣義憤對司法個案的影響。司法的可貴，本在於避免人云亦云，失之偏頗，聽取各方陳述，以證據資料作判斷。但在謝案中，媒體站在被害人立場發聲，以色魔運將稱謝，已然將之定罪；而網民直衝法官恐龍，亦未必全然理解羈押問題的所在；白玫瑰運動借勢再起，雖是對政府提出性侵法案的不滿，同樣對法官重新決定羈押謝，產生了巨大壓力。
因而，謝姓司機最後遭羈押，已分不清是「民意所向」或是司法自主重新判斷的結果。民氣義憤雖會產生力量，卻也可能看不見真相；但司法若輕忽審酌，引來民意反撲，亦可謂是自取其辱。
民意對司法失望，檢院不是一味屈服於民意，彼此推卸責任，釋放自我壓力就好，而應共同從制度面改善，化解民意的憂慮，借民意為改進的力量；至於民氣因對司法個案不滿出發，也應回歸制度面督促改變，才能避免民粹因素扭曲司法，俾讓國人皆能安心在司法制度運作中找到正義。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 19, 2011
The White Rose Movement has been reborn. This time the impetus came from Banqiao District Court Judge Judge Lu Chun-chieh. Lu allowed a taxi driver named Hsieh to go free on 50,000 NT bail. Hsieh is suspected of sexually assaulting a female university student from Japan. Netizens are demanding that Lu step down. Controversy over incompetent "dinosaur judges," out of touch with the expectations of society, is once again shaking up the judicial system.
People are angry. They pity the Japanese woman who came to Taiwan, only to be sexually assaulted. They are outraged by cavalier oversights within the judicial process. The result has been a rapidly accelerating, unstoppable snowball. Public anger is intense and warranted. But detention procedures, the conditions of detention, judgments about their purpose, must be subjected to rational review. Public sentiments must be directed at the problem. Only then can we prevent their recurrence.
The driver, whose surname is Hsieh, was arrested for sexual assault then released on bail. First of all, the prosecutor failed to provide sufficient proof of his guilt. Before prosecutors can detain a suspect, they must present sufficient evidence. When required, this evidence must appear on their reports. They must convince a judge that the defendant must be detained. This is necessary to ensure both the public welfare and the victim's rights.
Detaining a suspect does not imply that he is either guilty or not guilty. Its purpose is to enable an investigation or trial to proceed. It temporarily restricts a defendant's personal freedom. When a crime takes place, one must begin with the presumption of innocence. Judges must be cautious about detaining a defendant. The seriousness of the crime cannot be the sole justification for detaining a defendant. Other considerations, such as flight risk, the possibility that perpetrators might coordinate their testimony, or that perpetrators might repeat their offenses, must all be taken into consideration, to protect the rights of the defendant.
In the Hsieh case, the only reason the prosecutor cited for detaining Hsieh was the seriousness of the crime. No one from the prosecutor's office appeared in court. No one suggested that Hsieh might be a flight risk. No one suggested that the police adopt "preventive detention" measures. Still less did anyone suggest that Hsieh was a repeat offender, with a record for sexual assault. Should such a sexual assault suspect be detained?
Prosecutors failed to provide evidence of guilt. The judge rejected demands that he be detained. Even if prosecutors refile motions to have the defendant detained, they are unlikely to escape blame. Still less can they argue that judges have the authority and obligation to investigate, and use that as a defense. Otherwise, what is the point of having prosecutors? One may as well turn all cases over to the judges, and have them investigate. This last line of defense was incorporated into the Code of Criminal Procedures to ensure justice and fairness. It was never intended as a pretext for prosecutorial indolence. Prosecutors who have not laid the proper groundwork to detain a suspect have only themselves to blame. Meanwhile, the decision whether to detain a suspect, remains the responsibility of the gatekeepers -- the judges. Public safety and human rights are in a constant tug of war. We must not rush to judgment. We must defend to the death the provisions of the law. We must approach every case based on the facts.
In the Hsieh case, the prosecutor cited only the seriousness of the crime as a reason to detain the suspect. This was in violation of the requirements of justice. The prosecutors were negligent. But Hsieh is a taxi driver. He has many opportunities to come in contact with women. If he repeats his offense, that is no trivial matter. Given these questions, the judge failed to ask the prosecutor to provide additional information. He too was negligent. The victims of sexual assault may or may not be Japanese women. Regardless, judges should show greater empathy.
This process reveals how prosecutors and judges routinely handle such cases. The word "detain" on the whiteboard in the bailiffs' room means that someone has lost his freedom and his reputation. If prosecutors want to take someone into custody and hold him at a detention center, they need to do more than check a few boxes on an indictment form. But prosecutors rarely argue their case in court. They are often slapdash in their case preparation. They desperately need oversight. The judge has little time in which to decide whether a defendant should be detained. He must understand the requirements for detention. He must be experienced in his interactions with prosecutors. He must be seasoned and tough. But unless the case is a major case or a media case, in practice judges invariably "allow the cattle to graze." They allow the first instance judges to take on cases alone. Are these judges sufficiently well trained? That remains to be seen.
Another issue warrants concern. That is the impact of public indignation on court cases. Justice requires avoiding human influences. human biases. It requires listening to statements by different parties, and arriving at a judgment based on the evidence. But in the Hsieh case, the media has spoken on behalf of the victim alone. It has painted Hsieh as a demon. It has already convicted him. Netizens meanwhile, immediately painted the judges as "dinosaur judges," without bothering to first understand the problems with custody. The White Rose Movement has used this opportunity to rise again. It is unhappy about the sexual assault bill proposed by the administration. It is also exterting enormous pressure on the judges to detain Hsieh.
Therefore if Hsieh is eventually detained, it will be impossible to tell whether it was due to "public opinion," or to judges exercising their judicial autonomy. Public outrage may result in pressure. But it may not lead to the truth. If the judicial system is negligent in its handling of cases, it will lead to a public backlash. It will invite public contempt.
The public is disappointed with the justice system. Prosecutors and the courts must not blindly succumb to public pressure. They must not pass the buck in order to relieve the pressure on themselves. They must work together to improve the system as a whole. Only by this can they address public concerns. They must take advantage of public discontent to improve the system. The public may vent its anger because it is dissatisfied with the justice system. But it should return to the issue of how to change the system. Only this will prevent populist sentiment from influencing the administration of justice. Only this will allow the public to feel secure in the administration of justice.
交保又收押 檢察官與法官都有責任
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.19
白玫瑰運動風雲再起，這回的動力，來自板橋地方法院法官盧軍傑讓涉嫌性侵日本女大學生的謝姓司機以五萬元交保，網民串連要盧下台，恐龍法官風暴再度襲擊司法界。
民眾之憤，來自對隻身來台日本女子疑受性侵際遇的憐憫，以及司法處理過程輕率疏漏的不滿，因而在短時間內匯集成巨大的能量，銳不可擋。民憤之銳，其來有自，不過，事涉羈押程序進行責任的歸屬，羈押條件、目的的判斷，仍應理性討論，激憤的群情才能對準問題發威，避免事件重演。
謝姓司機涉嫌性侵交保案中，首先被忽略的是檢察官的舉證角色。檢察官發動羈押的聲請，應提出證據資料，必要時還應出庭論告，以說服法官，為什麼要羈押被告，這是基於公益，也在保護被害人的權益。
羈押不在決定被告有罪、無罪，而是為了偵查、審判順利進行或將來執行的必要，而暫時限制被告的人身自由。刑案才剛發生，基於無罪推定原則，法官羈押被告必須十分審慎，大法官也才作出第六六五號解釋，要求不能以被告涉犯重罪，作為羈押的唯一理由，必須另搭配逃亡、串證或再犯的可能性，以保護被告的權益。
謝案中，檢察官僅勾選謝涉重罪的聲押事由，人未到庭論告，亦未提出謝可能逃亡的其他說明，且未採警方以「預防性羈押」聲押謝的建議，更別說提供謝有無其他性侵、性騷擾前科的事證，難道性侵疑犯就應予羈押？
檢察官未盡舉證之責，遭法官駁回羈押聲請，縱再提抗告，也難辭其咎，更不能以法官有職權調查義務作為抗辯，否則設檢察官何用，全部交給法官去查好了。刑事訴訟法的公平正義防線，不是為檢察官偷懶怠職而定，未能做好羈押聲請準備的檢察官，首先應該負責。然而，決定羈押與否，負責守門的法官，於公共安全與人權的拉鋸戰中，也不能馬虎判斷，死守法條文義，仍須結合每一件個案事實去判定。
謝案中，檢察官僅以重罪一由聲請羈押，違反大法官的要求，雖有疏漏；但謝是計程車司機，有許多與女性接觸的機會，若再犯，情況非同小可；有這些疑問，法官卻未請檢察官補正資料，也太掉以輕心了。不管性侵被害人是否為日本女子，法官都應多一點同理心。
這些過程，顯露檢察官、法官制式化辦案的一面。法院法警室白板上「羈押」兩字，代表一個人自由名譽的淪喪，檢察官要把一個人押進看守所，可不是打幾個勾的簡單事，但檢察官很少到法庭上力辯，資料準備容易流於草率，極需檢討。至於法官必須在短時間內決定是否羈押被告，對羈押要件的掌握，與檢察官的互動和經驗，更需要相當的歷練與火候。然而，除非是社會特別矚目或重大案件，實務上都「放牛吃草」，讓一審法官獨自面對案件，法官的訓練是否足夠，亦應檢討。
另一值得注意的是，民氣義憤對司法個案的影響。司法的可貴，本在於避免人云亦云，失之偏頗，聽取各方陳述，以證據資料作判斷。但在謝案中，媒體站在被害人立場發聲，以色魔運將稱謝，已然將之定罪；而網民直衝法官恐龍，亦未必全然理解羈押問題的所在；白玫瑰運動借勢再起，雖是對政府提出性侵法案的不滿，同樣對法官重新決定羈押謝，產生了巨大壓力。
因而，謝姓司機最後遭羈押，已分不清是「民意所向」或是司法自主重新判斷的結果。民氣義憤雖會產生力量，卻也可能看不見真相；但司法若輕忽審酌，引來民意反撲，亦可謂是自取其辱。
民意對司法失望，檢院不是一味屈服於民意，彼此推卸責任，釋放自我壓力就好，而應共同從制度面改善，化解民意的憂慮，借民意為改進的力量；至於民氣因對司法個案不滿出發，也應回歸制度面督促改變，才能避免民粹因素扭曲司法，俾讓國人皆能安心在司法制度運作中找到正義。
Sunday, July 17, 2011
Only Narrowing the Wealth Gap Can Increase Happiness
Only Narrowing the Wealth Gap Can Increase Happiness
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 18, 2011
Last year, economic growth on Taiwan exceeded 10%. International competitiveness greatly exceeded that of South Korea. The chief editor of South Korea's Dong-a Ilbo heaped praise on President Ma Ying-jeou, saying he far outperformed South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. But on the happiness index, South Korea brought up the rear, and Taiwan trailed even South Korea. For both economies, their well-being indices lagged far behind their economic growth indices. Most people within the two economies are not experiencing the benefits of economic growth. That is why the two presidents are trailing in the polls.
Consider last year's data. In terms of economic growth. Taiwan far outperformed South Korea. Consider the past decade, South Korea enjoyed an average growth rate of 4.17%, higher than Taiwan's 3.93%. During the financial crisis, Taiwan's economic growth rate was -1.9%. South Korea by contrast, was one of the few members of the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to maintain a positive growth rate. Since 2004, Korea has surpassed Taiwan in per capita income, This year, for the first time, per capita income on Taiwan surpassed 20,000 USD. It now has a chance to surpass South Korea.
Consider the unemployment rate. Over the past decade the unemployment rate for South Korea has remained at 4% or less. During the financial crisis it never exceeded 4%. During the financial tsunami, the unemployment rate on Taiwan soared past 5%. It fell to 4.27% in May of this year. But it still ranks first among the Four Asian Dragons. It is worth noting that South Korea's atypical employment rate (temporary workers, employment agencies) has increased significantly, in recent years. Taiwan has also experienced the same trend.
Taiwan and South Korea's are economic rivals. But behind the bright economic growth, both economies face a widening gap between rich and poor. According to South Korean government figures, per capita income for the 20% of people at the top of the economic pyramid rose 55% over the past decade. Per capita income for the 20% of people at the bottom of the economic pyramid decreased 35%. As the local media put it, the wealth gap is clear from where people live. The "royalty" live in the the exclusive Gangnam District. There, one ping goes for 30 million won (about 1 million NT). In other parts of of the city one ping goes for 14 million won (about 400,000 NT) Below that is where one finds ordinary people or servants.
Unfortunately, in recent years, the wealth gap on Taiwan has become worse than in Korea. The "Gini coefficient" is an international indicator of the wealth gap. The higher the coefficient, the greater the gap between rich and poor. South Korea's Gini coefficient is 0.314. Taiwan's is 0.345. In recent years, the biggest public grievance has been soaring housing prices. In June the government introduced a luxury tax. But housing prices in the greater Taipei area remain virtually unaffected. In June existing-home prices soared another 10%, setting new highs. In Taipei luxury housing goes for two to three million NT per ping. People without homes can look but not touch.
Consider the manufacturing industry. Revenues earned by former South Korean tycoons account for 70% of the nation's GDP. The South Korean government fully backs its large enterprises. During the financial crisis the Korean Won depreciated nearly 50%. Yet large export-oriented enterprises such as Samsung and Hyundai showed record profits. Ironically, real purchasing power for locals fell due to currency devaluation and higher prices, Life became even more difficult for them. A clear example occurred in June, when South Korean students protested excessively high tuition fees. Many parents could not afford tuition fees approaching 20 million Won (about 300,000 NT). Some students even committed suicide because they could not pay their tuition. To solve the problem, President Lee Myung-bak has pledged to cut tuition at the end of June.
Lee Myung-bak has been called the CEO President. His top priority has been to boost the economy. He introduced a number of policies favorable to conglomerates. According to statistics, the number of subsidiaries controlled by South Korea's thirty largest chaebols has doubled since the financial turmoil. Even small businesses making pizza and tofu have not been spared, Many small and medium enterprises have been swallowed up. Outside criticism and the upcoming election, persuaded President Lee Myung-bak to order a "large and small enterprises shared development committee" review at the end of June. Over 200 types of businesses, including tofu manufacturing, will be reserved for SMEs. Will the "bean curd campaign" work? It will depend on Lee Myung-bak's political will.
Economic growth is up. But are people happier? South Korea's local media wonders. Over the past decade, South Korea's per capita income rose from 10,000 US to 20,000 US. But the South Korean people's happiness index has declined. South Korea's well-being index in the OECD is at the bottom of the heap. Consider the Gallup "global happiness" survey. Among the 124 economies evaluated, Denmark had the highest happiness index. As many as 72% of the population was optimistic about the coming five years. In South Korea, that number was 35%. On Taiwan it was a mere 32%. Both economies were in the bottom half of the class.
Consider the economic growth rate, the wealth gap, and the happiness index. South Korea and Taiwan have many similarities. But a wise leader must realize that economic growth is not necessarily shared by all. It does not make all people happier. Only specific policies that narrow the gap between rich and poor can enhance happiness for most people.
縮小貧富差距 才能增加幸福感
2011-07-18 中國時報
台灣去年經濟成長率逾十％，國際競爭力評比大幅超越韓國，因而韓國東亞日報主筆撰文盛讚馬英九總統政績遠勝韓國總統李明博。不過，如果從幸福指數來看，韓國屬於後段班，台灣排名更落後韓國。這段經濟成長與幸福指數的落差，正好說明了為何兩國總統民調均低迷不振，因為兩國多數民眾對經濟成長「無感」。
從經濟成長率分析，如果只看去年一年的數據，台灣的表現遠勝韓國；若拉長十年來看，過去十年來韓國平均經濟成長率達四．一七％，高於台灣的三．九三％。金融海嘯期間，台灣經濟成長率曾為負一．九三％，韓國則是經濟合作發展組織（ＯＥＣＤ）中少數維持正成長的。在人均所得方面，韓國自二○○四年起超越台灣，台灣則是在今年首次突破二萬美元，並有機會超越韓國。
再看失業率，最近十年來韓國失業率均維持在四％以下，金融海嘯期間也未超過四％；台灣在金融海嘯期間飆破五％，今年五月下降至四．二七％，仍高居四小龍之首。值得注意的是，近年來韓國非典型就業比率（臨時工、人力派遣）大幅增加，台灣也有相同的趨勢。
台灣與韓國在經濟上互相較勁，但亮麗的經濟成長背後，兩國均面臨貧富差距擴大的隱憂。韓國官方統計，近十年來金字塔頂端二十％的人均收入增加了五十五％，而最底層二十％的人均收入卻減少了卅五％。當地媒體形容，從居住地區可以看出貧富差距，住首爾江南精華區的是「皇族」，該區每坪逾三千萬韓元（約新台幣一百萬元），而住在其他地區每坪一千四百萬韓元（約新台幣四十六萬元）以下的則是平民或傭人。
遺憾的是，近年來台灣貧富差距惡化的程度遠勝於韓國。以國際上觀察貧富差距的指標「吉尼系數」（系數越高表示貧富差距越大）來看，韓國為○．三一四，台灣為○．三四五。近年來房價飆漲問題成為民怨之首，政府自六月起開徵奢侈稅，不過，大台北地區房價幾乎不受影響，六月的成屋成交價依然向上飆升一成，再創歷史新高，台北市豪宅動輒每坪二、三百萬元，無殼蝸牛只有望屋興嘆。
從產業面來看，韓國前卅大財閥營收占ＧＤＰ的七十％。韓國政府傾全力扶持大企業，在金融海嘯期間韓元大幅貶值逾五成，以出口為主的大企業如三星、現代集團的獲利反而創歷史新高；諷刺的是，當地老百姓卻因貨幣貶值、物價高漲，實質購買力降低，生活變得更苦。六月間，韓國大學生串聯示威抗議學費太高即是明顯例證。每年近千萬韓元（約新台幣卅萬元）的學費讓許多家長負擔不起，有些學生甚至因付不出學費而跳樓自殺。為解決高學費問題，李明博總統在六月底已承諾調降學費。
被喻為ＣＥＯ總統的李明博上任後，以拚經濟為首要任務，推出許多對財團有利的政策。據統計，韓國前卅大財閥掌控的子公司較金融風暴前倍增，他們連披薩和豆腐這種小生意都不放過，使得許多中小企業不支倒地。針對外界的批評與即將到來的大選，李明博總統六月底下令由「大小企業共享成長委員會」檢討包括豆腐在內的兩百多個營業項目，將保留給中小企業。這項「豆腐戰爭」究竟能否發揮功能，就看李明博的魄力了。
經濟成長率上揚，人民是否更幸福？韓國當地媒體質疑，過去十多年來，韓國的人均所得從一萬美元跨越二萬美元，但韓國民眾的幸福感卻下降，韓國的幸福指數在ＯＥＣＤ中更是墊底。再看蓋洛普公布的「全球幸福」大調查，在一二四個受評國家中，幸福指數最高的是丹麥，高達七二％對目前與未來五年生活感到樂觀，而韓國為卅五％，台灣只有卅二％，兩國均屬後段班。
從經濟成長率、貧富差距到幸福指數，韓國與台灣的確有許多相似之處，不過，聰明的領導人應該心知肚明，亮麗的經濟成長率如果不能讓全民共享，那是無法讓全民變得更幸福的。唯有拿出具體政策縮小貧富差距，才能提升大多數人的幸福感。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 18, 2011
Last year, economic growth on Taiwan exceeded 10%. International competitiveness greatly exceeded that of South Korea. The chief editor of South Korea's Dong-a Ilbo heaped praise on President Ma Ying-jeou, saying he far outperformed South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. But on the happiness index, South Korea brought up the rear, and Taiwan trailed even South Korea. For both economies, their well-being indices lagged far behind their economic growth indices. Most people within the two economies are not experiencing the benefits of economic growth. That is why the two presidents are trailing in the polls.
Consider last year's data. In terms of economic growth. Taiwan far outperformed South Korea. Consider the past decade, South Korea enjoyed an average growth rate of 4.17%, higher than Taiwan's 3.93%. During the financial crisis, Taiwan's economic growth rate was -1.9%. South Korea by contrast, was one of the few members of the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to maintain a positive growth rate. Since 2004, Korea has surpassed Taiwan in per capita income, This year, for the first time, per capita income on Taiwan surpassed 20,000 USD. It now has a chance to surpass South Korea.
Consider the unemployment rate. Over the past decade the unemployment rate for South Korea has remained at 4% or less. During the financial crisis it never exceeded 4%. During the financial tsunami, the unemployment rate on Taiwan soared past 5%. It fell to 4.27% in May of this year. But it still ranks first among the Four Asian Dragons. It is worth noting that South Korea's atypical employment rate (temporary workers, employment agencies) has increased significantly, in recent years. Taiwan has also experienced the same trend.
Taiwan and South Korea's are economic rivals. But behind the bright economic growth, both economies face a widening gap between rich and poor. According to South Korean government figures, per capita income for the 20% of people at the top of the economic pyramid rose 55% over the past decade. Per capita income for the 20% of people at the bottom of the economic pyramid decreased 35%. As the local media put it, the wealth gap is clear from where people live. The "royalty" live in the the exclusive Gangnam District. There, one ping goes for 30 million won (about 1 million NT). In other parts of of the city one ping goes for 14 million won (about 400,000 NT) Below that is where one finds ordinary people or servants.
Unfortunately, in recent years, the wealth gap on Taiwan has become worse than in Korea. The "Gini coefficient" is an international indicator of the wealth gap. The higher the coefficient, the greater the gap between rich and poor. South Korea's Gini coefficient is 0.314. Taiwan's is 0.345. In recent years, the biggest public grievance has been soaring housing prices. In June the government introduced a luxury tax. But housing prices in the greater Taipei area remain virtually unaffected. In June existing-home prices soared another 10%, setting new highs. In Taipei luxury housing goes for two to three million NT per ping. People without homes can look but not touch.
Consider the manufacturing industry. Revenues earned by former South Korean tycoons account for 70% of the nation's GDP. The South Korean government fully backs its large enterprises. During the financial crisis the Korean Won depreciated nearly 50%. Yet large export-oriented enterprises such as Samsung and Hyundai showed record profits. Ironically, real purchasing power for locals fell due to currency devaluation and higher prices, Life became even more difficult for them. A clear example occurred in June, when South Korean students protested excessively high tuition fees. Many parents could not afford tuition fees approaching 20 million Won (about 300,000 NT). Some students even committed suicide because they could not pay their tuition. To solve the problem, President Lee Myung-bak has pledged to cut tuition at the end of June.
Lee Myung-bak has been called the CEO President. His top priority has been to boost the economy. He introduced a number of policies favorable to conglomerates. According to statistics, the number of subsidiaries controlled by South Korea's thirty largest chaebols has doubled since the financial turmoil. Even small businesses making pizza and tofu have not been spared, Many small and medium enterprises have been swallowed up. Outside criticism and the upcoming election, persuaded President Lee Myung-bak to order a "large and small enterprises shared development committee" review at the end of June. Over 200 types of businesses, including tofu manufacturing, will be reserved for SMEs. Will the "bean curd campaign" work? It will depend on Lee Myung-bak's political will.
Economic growth is up. But are people happier? South Korea's local media wonders. Over the past decade, South Korea's per capita income rose from 10,000 US to 20,000 US. But the South Korean people's happiness index has declined. South Korea's well-being index in the OECD is at the bottom of the heap. Consider the Gallup "global happiness" survey. Among the 124 economies evaluated, Denmark had the highest happiness index. As many as 72% of the population was optimistic about the coming five years. In South Korea, that number was 35%. On Taiwan it was a mere 32%. Both economies were in the bottom half of the class.
Consider the economic growth rate, the wealth gap, and the happiness index. South Korea and Taiwan have many similarities. But a wise leader must realize that economic growth is not necessarily shared by all. It does not make all people happier. Only specific policies that narrow the gap between rich and poor can enhance happiness for most people.
縮小貧富差距 才能增加幸福感
2011-07-18 中國時報
台灣去年經濟成長率逾十％，國際競爭力評比大幅超越韓國，因而韓國東亞日報主筆撰文盛讚馬英九總統政績遠勝韓國總統李明博。不過，如果從幸福指數來看，韓國屬於後段班，台灣排名更落後韓國。這段經濟成長與幸福指數的落差，正好說明了為何兩國總統民調均低迷不振，因為兩國多數民眾對經濟成長「無感」。
從經濟成長率分析，如果只看去年一年的數據，台灣的表現遠勝韓國；若拉長十年來看，過去十年來韓國平均經濟成長率達四．一七％，高於台灣的三．九三％。金融海嘯期間，台灣經濟成長率曾為負一．九三％，韓國則是經濟合作發展組織（ＯＥＣＤ）中少數維持正成長的。在人均所得方面，韓國自二○○四年起超越台灣，台灣則是在今年首次突破二萬美元，並有機會超越韓國。
再看失業率，最近十年來韓國失業率均維持在四％以下，金融海嘯期間也未超過四％；台灣在金融海嘯期間飆破五％，今年五月下降至四．二七％，仍高居四小龍之首。值得注意的是，近年來韓國非典型就業比率（臨時工、人力派遣）大幅增加，台灣也有相同的趨勢。
台灣與韓國在經濟上互相較勁，但亮麗的經濟成長背後，兩國均面臨貧富差距擴大的隱憂。韓國官方統計，近十年來金字塔頂端二十％的人均收入增加了五十五％，而最底層二十％的人均收入卻減少了卅五％。當地媒體形容，從居住地區可以看出貧富差距，住首爾江南精華區的是「皇族」，該區每坪逾三千萬韓元（約新台幣一百萬元），而住在其他地區每坪一千四百萬韓元（約新台幣四十六萬元）以下的則是平民或傭人。
遺憾的是，近年來台灣貧富差距惡化的程度遠勝於韓國。以國際上觀察貧富差距的指標「吉尼系數」（系數越高表示貧富差距越大）來看，韓國為○．三一四，台灣為○．三四五。近年來房價飆漲問題成為民怨之首，政府自六月起開徵奢侈稅，不過，大台北地區房價幾乎不受影響，六月的成屋成交價依然向上飆升一成，再創歷史新高，台北市豪宅動輒每坪二、三百萬元，無殼蝸牛只有望屋興嘆。
從產業面來看，韓國前卅大財閥營收占ＧＤＰ的七十％。韓國政府傾全力扶持大企業，在金融海嘯期間韓元大幅貶值逾五成，以出口為主的大企業如三星、現代集團的獲利反而創歷史新高；諷刺的是，當地老百姓卻因貨幣貶值、物價高漲，實質購買力降低，生活變得更苦。六月間，韓國大學生串聯示威抗議學費太高即是明顯例證。每年近千萬韓元（約新台幣卅萬元）的學費讓許多家長負擔不起，有些學生甚至因付不出學費而跳樓自殺。為解決高學費問題，李明博總統在六月底已承諾調降學費。
被喻為ＣＥＯ總統的李明博上任後，以拚經濟為首要任務，推出許多對財團有利的政策。據統計，韓國前卅大財閥掌控的子公司較金融風暴前倍增，他們連披薩和豆腐這種小生意都不放過，使得許多中小企業不支倒地。針對外界的批評與即將到來的大選，李明博總統六月底下令由「大小企業共享成長委員會」檢討包括豆腐在內的兩百多個營業項目，將保留給中小企業。這項「豆腐戰爭」究竟能否發揮功能，就看李明博的魄力了。
經濟成長率上揚，人民是否更幸福？韓國當地媒體質疑，過去十多年來，韓國的人均所得從一萬美元跨越二萬美元，但韓國民眾的幸福感卻下降，韓國的幸福指數在ＯＥＣＤ中更是墊底。再看蓋洛普公布的「全球幸福」大調查，在一二四個受評國家中，幸福指數最高的是丹麥，高達七二％對目前與未來五年生活感到樂觀，而韓國為卅五％，台灣只有卅二％，兩國均屬後段班。
從經濟成長率、貧富差距到幸福指數，韓國與台灣的確有許多相似之處，不過，聰明的領導人應該心知肚明，亮麗的經濟成長率如果不能讓全民共享，那是無法讓全民變得更幸福的。唯有拿出具體政策縮小貧富差距，才能提升大多數人的幸福感。
Thursday, July 14, 2011
Do Not Experiment with Our Educational System
Do Not Experiment with Our Educational System
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 15, 2011
The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination has been held for the first time. The "high scores, low achievement" phenomenon, and the "second round admissions" process have provoked ongoing discontent. Some parents are demanding that the government compensate them for applicants' second round admissions, The Control Yuan will investigate, Some people even think the exam might influence the outcome of the 2012 election. How should one solve this problem? Should Taipei, Xinbei, and Keelung increase the number of applicants admitted? For the answer, we must await the results of the second round admissions process on the 15th of this month.
The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination has provoked a major uproar. One reason is that the threshold for admission to certain schools are inappropriate. Another is that Taipei City educational institutions are technically deficient. But the core problem is widespread preconceptions about the ranking of high schools on Taiwan. The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination may help promote 12 year national compulsory education. If the 12 year national compulsory education reforms are to succeed, one of the keys will be the attitude of parents, applicants, high schools, and particularly elite high schools.
The motives behind the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination were good. The exam reduces applicant anxiety. Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung County launched a '“one guideline, one textbook, joint examination." This differed from the “one guideline, multiple textbooks” national examination. The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination offers examination-free admissions. On the basis of Basic Competency Test results, applicants may apply for admission, select their school, and register. But the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination this year was more difficult. Applicants' average scores fell. Senior high schools based admissions on past performance. Either that, or they hoped to attract better students through higher scores. As a result, this year some Taipei Xinbei Keelung high schools set higher thresholds for admission. This led to the so-called "high scores, low achievement" problem.
Once the admissions process was over, schools proceeded with second phase registration and enrollment. Some candidates learned that because their admission scores were higher than their previous grades, the same score, would not have enabled them to enter a school during first round admissions, but would have during second round admissions. First round applicants and parents were extremely unhappy, They chose schools with lower scores. Had they applied using the applicant's previous grades, they might have gotten into a higher ranking school.
The Taipei Xinbei Keelung "high scores, low achievement" phenomenon has been a source of constant controversy. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin decided to solve the problem by means of a "second round admissions" process. Taipei, Xinbei, and Keelung have allocated over 2000 places to applicants who consider themselves victims of the "high score, low achievement" phenomenon. By doing so, Taipei, Xinbei, and Keelung have pleased one party only to displease another. Applicants with "high scores, low achievements" hope to get into a higher ranking school. But the results of second round admissions could impact students retaking the Basic Competency Tests. The places remaining after the Taipei Xinbei Keelung admissions process, would have gone to students retaking the Basic Competency Tests. The Taipei Xinbei Keelung second round of admissions may use up some of those places. They may reduce opportunities for students retaking the Basic Competency Tests. Some students retaking the Basic Competency Tests and their parents are extremely angry. They feel the system must not sacrifice them in order to look after the Taipei Xinbei Keelung students victimized by the "high scores, low achievement" phenomenon. .
Students interested in participating in the second round admissions process must apply today. How serious is the problem? How will it impact students retaking the Basic Competency Tests? We will know soon enough. Should we use the so-called "additional places, extra students" approach? We will know only after second round admissions are complete. Perhaps the matter will not be as serious as some students and their parents anticipate.
Nevertheless, the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination has already angered many. If handled improperly, it could indeed lead to political confronation. Will the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination be continued next year? That is not Hau Lung-bin's decision. Education has long been a difficult problem. Education impacts those directly involved. It also impacts human resources and national development. Political parties may replace one another. But education must endure. The fact is that when those in charge of education are replaced, policies are often changed along with them. As a result, children on Taiwan have become white mice. This has caused students and parents no end of suffering.
In 2014 the government will implement 12-year national compulsory education. It hopes to implement high school and rural community-based studies. it hopes to distribute educational resources more evenly, and to reduce the burden on students. But given the problems caused by the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination, one cannot help worrying. Won't 12 year national compulsory education and examination-free admissions collide head on with everyone's desire to get into elite schools with high admissions scores? The elite high school magnet effect must be reduced. This will take longer than education officials imagine. Do those in charge understand this? Education is not something one can experiment with. It is not something that can be attained in a single bound, The consequences of experimentation may have no end. No matter how good one's intentions, poor execution will have a negative impact. Let the firestorm over the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination serve as a warning.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.07.15
社論－別拿教育當實驗 北北基是殷鑑
本報訊
從「高分低就」到「二次分發」，首次登場的北北基聯測（北北基高中職聯合入學測驗；北北基聯測或聯測）引發民怨連連。部分二次基測的考生家長擬申請國賠、監察院要介入調查，甚至有人認為會牽動二○一二年大選的選情。這個問題究竟要如何解決、北北基是否要增額錄取，都還要看今天（十五日）「申請入學改分發」作業開始後，實際情況如何而定。
北北基聯測之所以會造成如此大的風暴，除了相關學校申請入學的分數門檻不當、北市教育單位的技術不周之外，核心議題其實是台灣普遍存在的高中學校排名的情結。這次北北基事件或許正好也可以做為推行十二年國教的首部曲，因為十二年國教這項台灣教育史上的重大變革，如果要能成功，關鍵之一就在於如何與家長、考生以及高中、尤其是所謂的明星高中，主事者的心態取得平衡。
北北基聯測的出發點本為善意。為減輕考生的學習壓力，台北市、新北市（台北縣）、基隆縣合作推行「一綱一本，共辦基測」，有別於教學採一綱多本的全國基測。北北基聯測除了免試入學以外，考生憑基測成績，經由申請入學、甄選入學和登記分發方式進入高中。不過，由於今年北北基聯測考題較難，拉低考生平均成績，再加上各高中職或是依據以往成績，或是想要以較高的申請分數吸引成績較好的學生，因此今年一些北北基高中職訂出了較高的申請入學門檻，也因此發生了所謂的「高分低就」問題。
申請入學結束後，學校進行第二階段的登記分發入學。一些考生發現，因為申請入學的分數較登記分發入學高一截，因此同一個分數，第一階段申請進不了的學校，第二階段登記卻可以進得去，有部分在第一階段申請入學的考生及家長對此感到非常不滿，因為他們當時選擇的是分數較低的學校，如果他們選擇的是登記分發，可能可以進入分數比較前面的學校就讀。
「北北基」考生高分低就現象，連日來爭議不斷，主事者台北市長郝龍斌決定以「二次分發」的方式解決。北北基開放了兩千多個名額給自認為是高分低就的考生重新申請，這樣一來，「順了姑情失嫂意」，高分低就的考生重燃希望，因為如此或許就有機會能分發到分數比較前面的學校；然而，北北基二次分發的決定卻可能影響參加二次基測考生的權益，因為北北基在分發、登記後的剩餘名額，本來會流向二次基測的考生，北北基允許二次分發，也許會使用掉一些名額，因此衍生壓縮二次基測考生錄取名額問題，部分二測考生與家長氣憤難平，認為不可以為了照顧北北基高分低就的考生，就犧牲他們。
有意參加改分發的學生，今天起開始進行申請作業，問題到底有多嚴重、會對二測考生形成多大的衝擊，也很快就可以分曉。是否要採取所謂「外加名額、增額錄取」的方式作為彌補，也必須等申請入學改分發作業完成後才能確定；或許最後事情也並不會如某些憂心忡忡的考生和家長所擔憂的那麼嚴重。
但無論如何，這次北北基已搞得天怒人怨，如果處理不當，的確很可能發酵為政治鬥爭，屆時，明年北北基聯測要不要繼續，甚至也不是郝龍斌就能拍板定案的。教育的問題向來非常棘手，因為教育不但事關各相關當事人的權益，也關係到總體人力資源與國家發展的規畫，政黨可以輪替，但教育必須延續，然而，事實卻是，教育主事者一更換，往往政策就會發生變動，以致於每隔一時間，就有台灣的孩子要當教育的白老鼠，簡直讓學子與家長無所適從、痛苦萬分。
政府在一○三年就要正式實施十二年國教，期望藉留鄉升學落實高中職社區化，讓教育資源更平均，也減輕學生負擔。不過，看到北北基引發的問題，不禁讓人十分擔心，十二年國教免試入學真的能夠與「大家都想擠進明星高中、想讀分數高的學校」這種潮流相抗衡嗎？要化解明星高中的磁吸效應，可能得花上比教育主管當局所想像的更長的時間。這點，主事者想清楚了嗎。教育是很難做實驗的，不能一次到位，後患無窮。立意再好，執行不周就會帶來負面效應。北北基的風波可為殷鑑。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 15, 2011
The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination has been held for the first time. The "high scores, low achievement" phenomenon, and the "second round admissions" process have provoked ongoing discontent. Some parents are demanding that the government compensate them for applicants' second round admissions, The Control Yuan will investigate, Some people even think the exam might influence the outcome of the 2012 election. How should one solve this problem? Should Taipei, Xinbei, and Keelung increase the number of applicants admitted? For the answer, we must await the results of the second round admissions process on the 15th of this month.
The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination has provoked a major uproar. One reason is that the threshold for admission to certain schools are inappropriate. Another is that Taipei City educational institutions are technically deficient. But the core problem is widespread preconceptions about the ranking of high schools on Taiwan. The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination may help promote 12 year national compulsory education. If the 12 year national compulsory education reforms are to succeed, one of the keys will be the attitude of parents, applicants, high schools, and particularly elite high schools.
The motives behind the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination were good. The exam reduces applicant anxiety. Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung County launched a '“one guideline, one textbook, joint examination." This differed from the “one guideline, multiple textbooks” national examination. The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination offers examination-free admissions. On the basis of Basic Competency Test results, applicants may apply for admission, select their school, and register. But the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination this year was more difficult. Applicants' average scores fell. Senior high schools based admissions on past performance. Either that, or they hoped to attract better students through higher scores. As a result, this year some Taipei Xinbei Keelung high schools set higher thresholds for admission. This led to the so-called "high scores, low achievement" problem.
Once the admissions process was over, schools proceeded with second phase registration and enrollment. Some candidates learned that because their admission scores were higher than their previous grades, the same score, would not have enabled them to enter a school during first round admissions, but would have during second round admissions. First round applicants and parents were extremely unhappy, They chose schools with lower scores. Had they applied using the applicant's previous grades, they might have gotten into a higher ranking school.
The Taipei Xinbei Keelung "high scores, low achievement" phenomenon has been a source of constant controversy. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin decided to solve the problem by means of a "second round admissions" process. Taipei, Xinbei, and Keelung have allocated over 2000 places to applicants who consider themselves victims of the "high score, low achievement" phenomenon. By doing so, Taipei, Xinbei, and Keelung have pleased one party only to displease another. Applicants with "high scores, low achievements" hope to get into a higher ranking school. But the results of second round admissions could impact students retaking the Basic Competency Tests. The places remaining after the Taipei Xinbei Keelung admissions process, would have gone to students retaking the Basic Competency Tests. The Taipei Xinbei Keelung second round of admissions may use up some of those places. They may reduce opportunities for students retaking the Basic Competency Tests. Some students retaking the Basic Competency Tests and their parents are extremely angry. They feel the system must not sacrifice them in order to look after the Taipei Xinbei Keelung students victimized by the "high scores, low achievement" phenomenon. .
Students interested in participating in the second round admissions process must apply today. How serious is the problem? How will it impact students retaking the Basic Competency Tests? We will know soon enough. Should we use the so-called "additional places, extra students" approach? We will know only after second round admissions are complete. Perhaps the matter will not be as serious as some students and their parents anticipate.
Nevertheless, the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination has already angered many. If handled improperly, it could indeed lead to political confronation. Will the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination be continued next year? That is not Hau Lung-bin's decision. Education has long been a difficult problem. Education impacts those directly involved. It also impacts human resources and national development. Political parties may replace one another. But education must endure. The fact is that when those in charge of education are replaced, policies are often changed along with them. As a result, children on Taiwan have become white mice. This has caused students and parents no end of suffering.
In 2014 the government will implement 12-year national compulsory education. It hopes to implement high school and rural community-based studies. it hopes to distribute educational resources more evenly, and to reduce the burden on students. But given the problems caused by the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination, one cannot help worrying. Won't 12 year national compulsory education and examination-free admissions collide head on with everyone's desire to get into elite schools with high admissions scores? The elite high school magnet effect must be reduced. This will take longer than education officials imagine. Do those in charge understand this? Education is not something one can experiment with. It is not something that can be attained in a single bound, The consequences of experimentation may have no end. No matter how good one's intentions, poor execution will have a negative impact. Let the firestorm over the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination serve as a warning.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.07.15
社論－別拿教育當實驗 北北基是殷鑑
本報訊
從「高分低就」到「二次分發」，首次登場的北北基聯測（北北基高中職聯合入學測驗；北北基聯測或聯測）引發民怨連連。部分二次基測的考生家長擬申請國賠、監察院要介入調查，甚至有人認為會牽動二○一二年大選的選情。這個問題究竟要如何解決、北北基是否要增額錄取，都還要看今天（十五日）「申請入學改分發」作業開始後，實際情況如何而定。
北北基聯測之所以會造成如此大的風暴，除了相關學校申請入學的分數門檻不當、北市教育單位的技術不周之外，核心議題其實是台灣普遍存在的高中學校排名的情結。這次北北基事件或許正好也可以做為推行十二年國教的首部曲，因為十二年國教這項台灣教育史上的重大變革，如果要能成功，關鍵之一就在於如何與家長、考生以及高中、尤其是所謂的明星高中，主事者的心態取得平衡。
北北基聯測的出發點本為善意。為減輕考生的學習壓力，台北市、新北市（台北縣）、基隆縣合作推行「一綱一本，共辦基測」，有別於教學採一綱多本的全國基測。北北基聯測除了免試入學以外，考生憑基測成績，經由申請入學、甄選入學和登記分發方式進入高中。不過，由於今年北北基聯測考題較難，拉低考生平均成績，再加上各高中職或是依據以往成績，或是想要以較高的申請分數吸引成績較好的學生，因此今年一些北北基高中職訂出了較高的申請入學門檻，也因此發生了所謂的「高分低就」問題。
申請入學結束後，學校進行第二階段的登記分發入學。一些考生發現，因為申請入學的分數較登記分發入學高一截，因此同一個分數，第一階段申請進不了的學校，第二階段登記卻可以進得去，有部分在第一階段申請入學的考生及家長對此感到非常不滿，因為他們當時選擇的是分數較低的學校，如果他們選擇的是登記分發，可能可以進入分數比較前面的學校就讀。
「北北基」考生高分低就現象，連日來爭議不斷，主事者台北市長郝龍斌決定以「二次分發」的方式解決。北北基開放了兩千多個名額給自認為是高分低就的考生重新申請，這樣一來，「順了姑情失嫂意」，高分低就的考生重燃希望，因為如此或許就有機會能分發到分數比較前面的學校；然而，北北基二次分發的決定卻可能影響參加二次基測考生的權益，因為北北基在分發、登記後的剩餘名額，本來會流向二次基測的考生，北北基允許二次分發，也許會使用掉一些名額，因此衍生壓縮二次基測考生錄取名額問題，部分二測考生與家長氣憤難平，認為不可以為了照顧北北基高分低就的考生，就犧牲他們。
有意參加改分發的學生，今天起開始進行申請作業，問題到底有多嚴重、會對二測考生形成多大的衝擊，也很快就可以分曉。是否要採取所謂「外加名額、增額錄取」的方式作為彌補，也必須等申請入學改分發作業完成後才能確定；或許最後事情也並不會如某些憂心忡忡的考生和家長所擔憂的那麼嚴重。
但無論如何，這次北北基已搞得天怒人怨，如果處理不當，的確很可能發酵為政治鬥爭，屆時，明年北北基聯測要不要繼續，甚至也不是郝龍斌就能拍板定案的。教育的問題向來非常棘手，因為教育不但事關各相關當事人的權益，也關係到總體人力資源與國家發展的規畫，政黨可以輪替，但教育必須延續，然而，事實卻是，教育主事者一更換，往往政策就會發生變動，以致於每隔一時間，就有台灣的孩子要當教育的白老鼠，簡直讓學子與家長無所適從、痛苦萬分。
政府在一○三年就要正式實施十二年國教，期望藉留鄉升學落實高中職社區化，讓教育資源更平均，也減輕學生負擔。不過，看到北北基引發的問題，不禁讓人十分擔心，十二年國教免試入學真的能夠與「大家都想擠進明星高中、想讀分數高的學校」這種潮流相抗衡嗎？要化解明星高中的磁吸效應，可能得花上比教育主管當局所想像的更長的時間。這點，主事者想清楚了嗎。教育是很難做實驗的，不能一次到位，後患無窮。立意再好，執行不周就會帶來負面效應。北北基的風波可為殷鑑。
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