Taiwan's Dilemma in Governance
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 31, 2011
Summary: Seoul, South Korea, recently held a public referendum. The issue was whether to provide free lunches to all elementary, junior high, and senior high students. But the voter turnout was too low. The numbers were below the required legal threshold. Therefore the referendum was declared null and void. Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon wanted to exclude students from wealthy families from the free lunch programs. He swore that if the referendum failed to pass, he would resign as mayor. The failed referendum was tantamount to a vote of no confidence in his administration. Will he carry out his threat by actually resigning? The question has provoked considerable concern and debate In South Korea.
Full Text below:
Seoul, South Korea, recently held a public referendum. The issue was whether to provide free lunches to all elementary, junior high, and senior high students. But the voter turnout was too low. The numbers were below the required legal threshold. Therefore the referendum was declared null and void. Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon wanted to exclude students from wealthy families from the free lunch programs. He swore that if the referendum failed to pass, he would resign as mayor. The failed referendum was tantamount to a vote of no confidence in his administration. Will he carry out his threat by actually resigning? The question has provoked considerable concern and debate In South Korea.
According to the foreign press, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon's political achievements are remarkable. He is highly popular. He was seen as a possible contender in next year's presidential election. He was seen as a successor to the highly popular Lee Myung Bak. According to reports, he demanded a public referendum to exclude students from wealthy families from the free lunch programs. The public however, was unmoved. As a result, he found himself in a dilemma.
Imagine this happening on Taiwan. Matters would have been completely different. Initially the Seoul City Council wanted to include students from wealthy families in the free lunch programs. Had the same situation occurred on Taiwan, the ruling administration would have considered the matter briefly, then increased spending. It would have ignored fairness and justice. At most it would have issued a few talking points, weighing some of the pros and cons. But as soon as the City Council reached a decision, the mayor would most likely go along to get along. The mayor would be unlikely to demand a public referendum. In the event a referendum was held, he would be unlikely to bet his future on the outcome. He would avoid creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Officials on Taiwan are afraid to take responsible for their policies. They refuse to do so. Suppose opposition city council members advocated making students from wealthy families eligible for the free lunch programs? The ruling administration would immediately jump on the populist bandwagon. It would try to prevent the opposition from claiming all the credit. It might even engage in a bidding war with the opposition. Every time a general election rolls around, the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan try to outbid each other. Subsidies for elderly farmers are a perfect example. Ruling and opposition politicians on Taiwan watched as Oh Se-hoon openly advocated excluding students from wealthy families from the free lunch programs. He even demanded a public referendum, and put his political future on the line. They must have assumed he was foolish beyond belief, or harbored suicidal tendencies.
Consider another political entity -- Singapore. Singapore recently held its first presidential election in 18 years, Political veteran Tony Tan Keng Yam ran on the ruling People's Action Party ticket. He was widely considered a shoo-in, Who knew a recount would be required? In the end he won, but only by a narrow 0.34% margin. Ever since Singapore's founding and independence, the People's Action Party's political record has been outstanding. During past general elections, it invariably won a clear majority in parliament. Singapore has yet to undergo a ruling party change. By virtue of its brilliant record of accomplishments, the ruling PAP has maintained a firm grip on power. But during this May's parliamentary elections, the People's Action Party's share of the vote fell below 60%. Singaporean citizens are experiencing a change of heart. The president may be merely a figurehead. But Tony Tan was the ruling party's candidate. He held important government positions. He is a former Deputy Prime Minister. Yet he nearly met his Waterloo. Singaporean citizens want change. The pressure for change has been building for some time.
Over the years, Singapore has weathered all manner of international crises. It has survived. It has flourished. It has won international acclaim. It has even become a model emulated by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. But look closer. Behind Singapore's brilliant record, Singaporean citizens feel like sacrificial martyrs. The cost of living and the cost of housing are sky high. In recent years, Singapore has vigorously recruited high-end international talent. This has created a brain drain from Taiwan. Taiwan has been dwarfed, unable to compete. But these immigrants from Taiwan have taken jobs from Singaporeans. The resentment was palpable during the recent election.
Singapore's manner of governance is highly patriarchal. Its policies and its governance are closely scrutinized. Japanese-American scholar Frances Fukuyama is the author of "The End of History." Recently he delivered a speech on Taiwan. He said that democratic development in East Asia lacks the rule of law and societal constraints on governmental power. Nevertheless policies have been implemented with rapidity. By contrast, societal constraints on governmental power in Europe and the United States are excessive. This is detrimental to the implementation of policy, and undermines government efficiency.
Fukuyama considers both the Chinese mainland and Singapore performance-oriented governments. But they lack societal constraints on governmental power. Governmental complacency on the Chinese mainland has led to deep rooted problems. These problems, such as problems with the high-speed rail system, have surfaced one by one. Societal constraints on governmental power have gradually surfaced in Singapore. Two general elections have revealed grievances underlying the government's brilliant record. What about on Taiwan? The government on Taiwan is not as efficient as the government on the Chinese mainland or the government on Singapore. Political appointees on Taiwan take less political responsibility for their policies than their counterparts in South Korea. In his speech, Professor Fukuyama said some democratic nations hold free and democratic elections. But their elected officials ignore the interests of the people. Instead, they cause problems. Was he talking about the government on Taiwan? Is Taiwan so wanting that all we can take pride in is our free elections?
他山之石看台灣的治理困境
2011-08-31 中國時報
南韓首都首爾不久前舉辦「應否全面向小中高學生供應免費營養午餐」的市民公投，由於投票率過低，未達可以開票的門檻，宣告公投無效，從而首爾市議會先前通過取消免費營養午餐的排富條款決議正式生效。而強烈反對取消排富條款的首爾市長吳世勳，在啟動公投之前聲稱一旦公投失敗，將辭去市長職務，於今公投失敗形同被市民投下不信任票，未來是否履行承諾辭職，在南韓引起關注和廣泛議論。
根據外電報導，吳世勳擔任首爾市長政績卓著、民望極高，原被看好可望於明年底的南韓總統選舉時，成為接替李明博的熱門人選。詎料因為執意就學生營養午餐是否應取消排富條款，率爾發動市民公投，結果市民不領情，也讓自己陷入進退失據的窘境。
檢視此一新聞事件，如果發生在台灣，顯然將會出現完全不同的景況。首先，在首爾市議會倡議要取消排富條款時，如果換做在台灣，主政者即使考量因而將增加財政支出，以及有違公平正義原則，但充其量只是發表說帖剖析其利弊後遺。而一旦市議會做成決議，通常則是表示尊重，並不至於進一步啟動市民公投。而萬一真的訴諸公投，也絕不敢以個人的去留為訴求，以免弄假成真自陷絕境。
台灣的官場除了不敢與不願公開表態為政策負責之外，以這個案例來看，最可能的場景應該是當市議會的在野議員倡議取消排富時，執政者面對此一民粹訴求立即應和，以免功勞丰采被在野黨獨佔。更甚者還可能出現競相比價的現象，台灣朝野政黨每逢大選就競相喊價加碼老農年金正是此一寫照。因此，台灣的朝野政客看到吳世勳竟然公開反對取消排富條款，還為此啟動市民公投，以及和個人的去留綁在一起，一定認為是愚不可及的自殺行為。
把焦點移轉到另一個景場，新加坡日前舉行18年來的首次總統投票選舉，代表執政黨人民行動黨的政壇長青樹陳慶炎，在廣被看好穩穩當選的情況下，沒想到最後必須經過重新計票，才以0.34％的微小得票差距僥倖勝選。如所周知，新加坡從獨立建國以來，人民行動黨以優異的政績表現，在歷次的大選中無不囊括國會絕大多數席位，而從來不曾出現過政黨輪替。然而這種靠亮麗政績表現穩穩掌握執政優勢的榮景，在今年5月間國會選舉人民行動黨得票率跌破60％時，已經呈現星國國民人心思變的徵兆。而這次的總統改選，雖然總統只是虛位元首，但執政黨所推出的候選人，且是歷任政府重要職位的前副總理陳慶炎，竟然差點就慘遭滑鐵盧，顯示星國社會人心思變的能量已經蓄積到相當可觀的水位。
從表象來看，星國這些年來在面對國際情勢一波波的危機衝擊下，都能安然度過且表現亮眼，不只贏得國際讚賞，並且也成為海峽兩岸政府競相學習、取經的對象。然而深入分析，星國這種亮麗的表現，星國人民卻有成為犧牲者的感受，包括對物價、房價上漲的怨言滿天，又如星國近年大力延攬國際高端人才，使台灣出現人才外流現象並在人才的爭取上相形見絀，然而這些外來移民形同搶走星國人民的工作機會，這股民怨也在此次選舉中表露無遺。
新加坡的國家治理，由於具有相當程度的父權領導特質，政策推動和治理效能備受矚目。曾發表「歷史的終結」理論的日裔美籍學者法蘭西斯.福山，最近來台公開演講即指出東亞民主發展的過程雖欠缺法治與社會制衡力，但政策推動與落實快速，相形之下歐美國家的社會制衡力過大，反而不利政策推動，影響政府效能。
儘管包括大陸新加坡都可歸類為福山口中的效能型政府，但社會制衡力的不足，在大陸使得自我感覺良好的高鐵系統深層問題逐一浮現，在新加坡甦醒的社會制衡力也透過兩次大選宣洩亮麗政績表現下的深層民怨。而台灣的情況又是怎樣呢？論治理效能比不上大陸與新加坡、論政務官為政策負責的責任政治又不如南韓。福山教授在演講中點出某些民主國家，僅把自由民主選舉當成程序，選出的政治人物也不考量人民利益，反而會造成問題。他說的是否就是台灣的寫照？台灣真是窮的只剩下選舉了嗎？
Wednesday, August 31, 2011
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Demand Realistic Property Tax Reporting
Demand Realistic Property Tax Reporting
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 30, 2011
Summary: Rich folk living in 100 million yuan mansions cannot understand what it is like to be broke and live in a tent. Banquet guests riding elevators to the top of luxury high rises pay scant attention to what life is like for those at the bottom of the economic ladder. To learn what it was like to be poor, Ph.D and former New York Times columnist Barbara Ehrenreich worked as a waitress and a cleaning woman. She related her experience in her book, "Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America." As she noted, when the economy is good, housing prices soar. As a result the poor are afflicted not by poverty, but by prosperity.
Full Text below:
Rich folk living in 100 million yuan mansions cannot understand what it is like to be broke and live in a tent. Banquet guests riding elevators to the top of luxury high rises pay scant attention to what life is like for those at the bottom of the economic ladder. To learn what it was like to be poor, Ph.D and former New York Times columnist Barbara Ehrenreich worked as a waitress and a cleaning woman. She related her experience in her book, "Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America." As she noted, when the economy is good, housing prices soar. As a result the poor are afflicted not by poverty, but by prosperity.
The United States is the world's economic leader. When the real estate bubble burst, millions of houses were repossessed. Tent cities sprung up everywhere. During the Asian financial crisis, tent cities sprung up in public parks all over Japan. In recent years this has led to concern about young people becoming "Internet cafe refugees." A Japanese Ministry of Health survey found that 60% of those who squat in Internet cafes are day laborers. They are classic examples of poor but overworked families.
On Taiwan, a new generation of young homeless people squat in Internet cafes. According to a survey by the Homeless of Taiwan Association, those aged 26 to 35 account for 10% of the homeless near the Taipei Railway Station. Homeless persons born in the 1980s are on the rise. They are less educated, low-skilled workers. Some may find work this month, only to get laid off the next. Such instability means they have no steady income. They cannot afford to rent a house. All they can do is squat in Internet cafes.
Globalization, advances in technology, inequities in the social structure and tax system, have all widened the gap between rich and poor. When the economy is strong, those at the top of the economic pyramid and export-related industries benefit the most. But when the stock market rises, housing costs soar. People at the bottom of the economic pyramid can no longer keep up with soaring housing costs. They experience a greater sense of deprivation. Even worse, when the economy takes a downturn, they are the ones hardest hit.
The DGBAS has announced the results of its latest Household Income and Expenditure Survey. Household income is divided into five brackets. Last year, the wealthiest households had disposable income 6.19 times as high as the poorest. This is a slight improvement over the previous year. It is the third highest in history. The historical data shows that the gap increased from 4.97 times in 1991, to 6.19 times today. This is the largest increase in two decades, and shows that the government must work harder to narrow the gap between rich and poor.
Consider the effect of government transfer payments on families. According to DGBAS statistics, social welfare payments and tax transfers last year reduced the income gap 1.5 times. Social welfare had the largest impact, at 1.4 times. The impact of taxation was only 0.11 times, a record low. These numbers show that over the years government efforts to narrow the income gap have steadily increased the role of social welfare, while steadily decreasing the role of taxation. This calls for soul-searching. The original function of taxation was income redistribution. Now its impact is diminishing, mainly because the tax system is unfair, but also because repeated tax cuts have been made over the years.
As we all know, stocks and real estate are the main source of income for the rich. Transactions on the stock exchange are tax-free. Real estate taxes have little to do with actual sale prices. These phenomenon have long been targets of criticism, Such a tax system contributes to soaring housing prices. It also widens the gap between rich and poor.
To curb housing speculation, and to narrow the gap between rich and poor, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has proposed a real estate tax on residential properties not occupied by the owner. A tax system based on actual selling prices will be gradually phased in. Tsai however, offered no specifics on how it would be implemented. President Ma Ying-jeou subsequently announced five measures to ensure more equitable land and housing ownership. In a report to the Executive Yuan, Finance Minister Li Shu-teh said the current value of land and the assessed value of real estate would be gradually adjusted in the coming years, bringing them closer to market prices. This would eventually enable taxation based on actual prices. Observers are skeptical. Increasing the real estate tax will increase the powers and responsibilities of local government. This would have to be assessed by county council committees. This would not be up to the central government. This is the main reason property taxes have been based on numbers far below actual market prices.
From the perspective of tax fairness, a realistic property tax would certainly help narrow the wealth gap. But the real estate industry would react violently, making such a reform impossible for many decades. Twenty years ago, when Wang Chien-hsuan was Treasury Minister, he tried to promote taxation based on actual selling prices. He learned a painful lesson. His successors avoided the problem altogether. The KMT and DPP are now proposing property taxes based on actual selling prices. This is a rare opportunity for property tax reform. But how can this objective be achieved? Neither party has offered any specifics.
One hundred million yuan mansions and tattered tents are as far from each other as night and day. An unfair tax system has widened the gap even more. The presidential election however, has inspired candidates from both parties to propose property taxes based on actual selling prices. For this, they deserve praise. Accurate reporting of selling prices is a precondition for taxation based on actual selling prices. But how can tax rates based on actual selling prices be implemented? Both parties must offer concrete and feasible approaches. Only this can win public support, Goals and slogans alone will not do the trick.
不動產實價課稅 勿淪為選舉口號
2011-08-30 中國時報
住在億元豪宅裡的富人，很難體會窮人住在帳篷裡的滋味；登上摩天大樓吃奢華大餐的人，很少會注意底層民眾的日子怎麼過。擁有博士學位、前《紐約時報》專欄作家芭芭拉．艾倫瑞克為了體驗貧窮，化身為女服務生、清潔工寫成《我在底層的生活》一書，她深刻感受到，景氣好、房價飆的榮景下，「窮人其實不是受貧窮之苦，而是繁榮之害。」
美國身為全球經濟龍頭，在房地產泡沫破滅後，數百萬人的房子被查封，各地出現了許多帳篷族。亞洲金融風暴後，日本各地公園裡也曾出現大量帳篷族，近年來引發各界關注的是年輕人淪為「網咖難民」。日本厚生省調查發現，留宿網咖者有六成是領取日薪的臨時工，他們是典型的窮忙族。
在台灣，有批年輕新世代遊民隱身網咖裡。據當代漂泊協會調查，台北車站附近遊民介於廿六至卅五歲間占一成，七年級遊民有增加趨勢，他們屬低學歷、低技術的派遣工，有人這個月找到工作，下個月就被通知不必來了，由於工作不穩定，收入不固定，又租不起房子，最後只好淪落至網咖。
全球化效應下，科技的進步、社會結構與租稅制度的不公平，擴大了貧富差距。經濟表現強勁時，金字塔頂端與出口相關產業受惠最大；不過，股市漲、房價飆，底層民眾的所得跟不上房價飆漲的速度，相對剝奪感也越大；更糟的是，景氣反轉時，他們受到的衝擊最大。
主計處日前公布最新家庭收支調查，去年家戶可支配所得五等分位差距倍數為六點一九倍，較前一年微幅縮小，為史上第三高。從歷史資料看，這項差距從一九九一年的四點九七倍增加至六點一九倍，二十年來呈現明顯增加的趨勢，也顯示政府在縮小貧富差距方面必須再加把勁。
再看政府對家庭移轉收支的效果，依主計處統計，去年政府透過社福與租稅移轉收支縮減所得差距達一點五三倍，其中，社福效果占了大部分，為一點四二倍，而租稅效果僅達○點一一倍，創下歷年新低。這項統計顯示，歷年來政府努力縮小所得差距，社福的比重越來越高，租稅的效果越來越低。值得檢討的是，原本應發揮所得重分配功能的租稅制度，如今效果卻是越來越萎縮，主要是稅制的不公，同時也與歷年來不斷的減稅政策有關。
眾所周知，股票與房地產是富人的主要所得來源，我國除了證券交易所得免稅之外，不動產稅負與實際交易價格脫鉤，長期以來為人詬病，這樣的租稅制度不僅助長房價飆漲，更進一步擴大了貧富差距。
為了抑制房價的人為炒作，縮小貧富差距，民進黨總統參選人蔡英文日前提出非自用住宅依實價課稅的原則，將分階段建立實價課稅制度，不過並未提出具體做法。馬英九總統隨後宣布五大措施，以落實土地、居住正義，財長李述德在行政院院會中報告，將逐年調整土地公告現值及房屋評定現值，使其更接近市場價格，逐步達成實價課稅的效果。外界也質疑，調高不動產課稅稅基屬地方政府權責，必須由各縣市評議委員會來評定，並非中央說了算，這也是歷年來不動產課稅稅基遠低於市價的主因。
從租稅公平的觀點，不動產實價課稅當然有助於縮小貧富差距。然而，不動產業者的強烈反彈，使得這項改革數十年來始終無法推動；二十年前王建?在財長任內推動實價課稅的慘痛經驗，也使得後繼者避之唯恐不及。這回兩黨均提出不動產依實價課稅的大方針，為不動產稅制改革帶來了一個難得的契機。不過，究竟如何落實這個目標，兩黨尚未提出具體做法。
億元豪宅與破爛帳篷間的距離有如天壤之別，不公平的稅制更擴大了其間的差距。總統大選前，兩黨候選人不約而同提出不動產實價課稅的主張，值得肯定；實價登錄是實價課稅的基礎，但如何落實在實價課稅上，兩黨都必須進一步提出具體可行的做法，才能真正獲得民眾的認同，畢竟，空有目標與口號難以成事。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 30, 2011
Summary: Rich folk living in 100 million yuan mansions cannot understand what it is like to be broke and live in a tent. Banquet guests riding elevators to the top of luxury high rises pay scant attention to what life is like for those at the bottom of the economic ladder. To learn what it was like to be poor, Ph.D and former New York Times columnist Barbara Ehrenreich worked as a waitress and a cleaning woman. She related her experience in her book, "Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America." As she noted, when the economy is good, housing prices soar. As a result the poor are afflicted not by poverty, but by prosperity.
Full Text below:
Rich folk living in 100 million yuan mansions cannot understand what it is like to be broke and live in a tent. Banquet guests riding elevators to the top of luxury high rises pay scant attention to what life is like for those at the bottom of the economic ladder. To learn what it was like to be poor, Ph.D and former New York Times columnist Barbara Ehrenreich worked as a waitress and a cleaning woman. She related her experience in her book, "Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America." As she noted, when the economy is good, housing prices soar. As a result the poor are afflicted not by poverty, but by prosperity.
The United States is the world's economic leader. When the real estate bubble burst, millions of houses were repossessed. Tent cities sprung up everywhere. During the Asian financial crisis, tent cities sprung up in public parks all over Japan. In recent years this has led to concern about young people becoming "Internet cafe refugees." A Japanese Ministry of Health survey found that 60% of those who squat in Internet cafes are day laborers. They are classic examples of poor but overworked families.
On Taiwan, a new generation of young homeless people squat in Internet cafes. According to a survey by the Homeless of Taiwan Association, those aged 26 to 35 account for 10% of the homeless near the Taipei Railway Station. Homeless persons born in the 1980s are on the rise. They are less educated, low-skilled workers. Some may find work this month, only to get laid off the next. Such instability means they have no steady income. They cannot afford to rent a house. All they can do is squat in Internet cafes.
Globalization, advances in technology, inequities in the social structure and tax system, have all widened the gap between rich and poor. When the economy is strong, those at the top of the economic pyramid and export-related industries benefit the most. But when the stock market rises, housing costs soar. People at the bottom of the economic pyramid can no longer keep up with soaring housing costs. They experience a greater sense of deprivation. Even worse, when the economy takes a downturn, they are the ones hardest hit.
The DGBAS has announced the results of its latest Household Income and Expenditure Survey. Household income is divided into five brackets. Last year, the wealthiest households had disposable income 6.19 times as high as the poorest. This is a slight improvement over the previous year. It is the third highest in history. The historical data shows that the gap increased from 4.97 times in 1991, to 6.19 times today. This is the largest increase in two decades, and shows that the government must work harder to narrow the gap between rich and poor.
Consider the effect of government transfer payments on families. According to DGBAS statistics, social welfare payments and tax transfers last year reduced the income gap 1.5 times. Social welfare had the largest impact, at 1.4 times. The impact of taxation was only 0.11 times, a record low. These numbers show that over the years government efforts to narrow the income gap have steadily increased the role of social welfare, while steadily decreasing the role of taxation. This calls for soul-searching. The original function of taxation was income redistribution. Now its impact is diminishing, mainly because the tax system is unfair, but also because repeated tax cuts have been made over the years.
As we all know, stocks and real estate are the main source of income for the rich. Transactions on the stock exchange are tax-free. Real estate taxes have little to do with actual sale prices. These phenomenon have long been targets of criticism, Such a tax system contributes to soaring housing prices. It also widens the gap between rich and poor.
To curb housing speculation, and to narrow the gap between rich and poor, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has proposed a real estate tax on residential properties not occupied by the owner. A tax system based on actual selling prices will be gradually phased in. Tsai however, offered no specifics on how it would be implemented. President Ma Ying-jeou subsequently announced five measures to ensure more equitable land and housing ownership. In a report to the Executive Yuan, Finance Minister Li Shu-teh said the current value of land and the assessed value of real estate would be gradually adjusted in the coming years, bringing them closer to market prices. This would eventually enable taxation based on actual prices. Observers are skeptical. Increasing the real estate tax will increase the powers and responsibilities of local government. This would have to be assessed by county council committees. This would not be up to the central government. This is the main reason property taxes have been based on numbers far below actual market prices.
From the perspective of tax fairness, a realistic property tax would certainly help narrow the wealth gap. But the real estate industry would react violently, making such a reform impossible for many decades. Twenty years ago, when Wang Chien-hsuan was Treasury Minister, he tried to promote taxation based on actual selling prices. He learned a painful lesson. His successors avoided the problem altogether. The KMT and DPP are now proposing property taxes based on actual selling prices. This is a rare opportunity for property tax reform. But how can this objective be achieved? Neither party has offered any specifics.
One hundred million yuan mansions and tattered tents are as far from each other as night and day. An unfair tax system has widened the gap even more. The presidential election however, has inspired candidates from both parties to propose property taxes based on actual selling prices. For this, they deserve praise. Accurate reporting of selling prices is a precondition for taxation based on actual selling prices. But how can tax rates based on actual selling prices be implemented? Both parties must offer concrete and feasible approaches. Only this can win public support, Goals and slogans alone will not do the trick.
不動產實價課稅 勿淪為選舉口號
2011-08-30 中國時報
住在億元豪宅裡的富人，很難體會窮人住在帳篷裡的滋味；登上摩天大樓吃奢華大餐的人，很少會注意底層民眾的日子怎麼過。擁有博士學位、前《紐約時報》專欄作家芭芭拉．艾倫瑞克為了體驗貧窮，化身為女服務生、清潔工寫成《我在底層的生活》一書，她深刻感受到，景氣好、房價飆的榮景下，「窮人其實不是受貧窮之苦，而是繁榮之害。」
美國身為全球經濟龍頭，在房地產泡沫破滅後，數百萬人的房子被查封，各地出現了許多帳篷族。亞洲金融風暴後，日本各地公園裡也曾出現大量帳篷族，近年來引發各界關注的是年輕人淪為「網咖難民」。日本厚生省調查發現，留宿網咖者有六成是領取日薪的臨時工，他們是典型的窮忙族。
在台灣，有批年輕新世代遊民隱身網咖裡。據當代漂泊協會調查，台北車站附近遊民介於廿六至卅五歲間占一成，七年級遊民有增加趨勢，他們屬低學歷、低技術的派遣工，有人這個月找到工作，下個月就被通知不必來了，由於工作不穩定，收入不固定，又租不起房子，最後只好淪落至網咖。
全球化效應下，科技的進步、社會結構與租稅制度的不公平，擴大了貧富差距。經濟表現強勁時，金字塔頂端與出口相關產業受惠最大；不過，股市漲、房價飆，底層民眾的所得跟不上房價飆漲的速度，相對剝奪感也越大；更糟的是，景氣反轉時，他們受到的衝擊最大。
主計處日前公布最新家庭收支調查，去年家戶可支配所得五等分位差距倍數為六點一九倍，較前一年微幅縮小，為史上第三高。從歷史資料看，這項差距從一九九一年的四點九七倍增加至六點一九倍，二十年來呈現明顯增加的趨勢，也顯示政府在縮小貧富差距方面必須再加把勁。
再看政府對家庭移轉收支的效果，依主計處統計，去年政府透過社福與租稅移轉收支縮減所得差距達一點五三倍，其中，社福效果占了大部分，為一點四二倍，而租稅效果僅達○點一一倍，創下歷年新低。這項統計顯示，歷年來政府努力縮小所得差距，社福的比重越來越高，租稅的效果越來越低。值得檢討的是，原本應發揮所得重分配功能的租稅制度，如今效果卻是越來越萎縮，主要是稅制的不公，同時也與歷年來不斷的減稅政策有關。
眾所周知，股票與房地產是富人的主要所得來源，我國除了證券交易所得免稅之外，不動產稅負與實際交易價格脫鉤，長期以來為人詬病，這樣的租稅制度不僅助長房價飆漲，更進一步擴大了貧富差距。
為了抑制房價的人為炒作，縮小貧富差距，民進黨總統參選人蔡英文日前提出非自用住宅依實價課稅的原則，將分階段建立實價課稅制度，不過並未提出具體做法。馬英九總統隨後宣布五大措施，以落實土地、居住正義，財長李述德在行政院院會中報告，將逐年調整土地公告現值及房屋評定現值，使其更接近市場價格，逐步達成實價課稅的效果。外界也質疑，調高不動產課稅稅基屬地方政府權責，必須由各縣市評議委員會來評定，並非中央說了算，這也是歷年來不動產課稅稅基遠低於市價的主因。
從租稅公平的觀點，不動產實價課稅當然有助於縮小貧富差距。然而，不動產業者的強烈反彈，使得這項改革數十年來始終無法推動；二十年前王建?在財長任內推動實價課稅的慘痛經驗，也使得後繼者避之唯恐不及。這回兩黨均提出不動產依實價課稅的大方針，為不動產稅制改革帶來了一個難得的契機。不過，究竟如何落實這個目標，兩黨尚未提出具體做法。
億元豪宅與破爛帳篷間的距離有如天壤之別，不公平的稅制更擴大了其間的差距。總統大選前，兩黨候選人不約而同提出不動產實價課稅的主張，值得肯定；實價登錄是實價課稅的基礎，但如何落實在實價課稅上，兩黨都必須進一步提出具體可行的做法，才能真正獲得民眾的認同，畢竟，空有目標與口號難以成事。
Monday, August 29, 2011
Fraudulent Expense Reports Ruled Legal
Fraudulent Expense Reports Ruled Legal
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 27, 2011
Summary: The Chen family corruption case has undergone appellate review. The High Court verdict surprised everyone. Most surprised were Ah-Bian, Ah-Cheng, and others who abused the power of their office, fraudulently applied for State Affairs Fund reimbursements, yet got off scot-free. If judges are permitted to abuse their power to this degree, trials will be reckless gambles. Defendants will be betting their lives on whether the presiding judge distinguishes between charitable donations and stolen money.
Full Text below:
The Chen family corruption case has undergone appellate review. The High Court verdict surprised everyone. Most surprised were Ah-Bian, Ah-Cheng, and others who abused the power of their office, fraudulently applied for State Affairs Fund reimbursements, yet got off scot-free.
According to the limited information released by the High Court, the first instance verdict was overturned for a simple reason. Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng were guilty of falsifying records, forging invoices, and even of embezzling cash resources in their custody. The amount embezzled exceeded 104 million NT. During Chen's term of office, kickbacks, secret diplomacy, gifts, and other expenditures exceeded 130 million NT. The expenditures exceeded the amount embezzled. The High Court judges ruled therefore that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng "objectively amassed no illegal wealth, and subjectively evinced no criminal intent." Therefore, they found the defendants "not guilty."
The reasoning behind their verdict is dubious. The Full Court concluded that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng falsified records, forged invoices, and embezzled public funds, but that their conduct was not illegal, and did not constitute corruption. But if their "subjective intent was not to subvert the law," why did they falsify records? Why did they forge invoices? Why did the Full Court argue that falsifying records, forging invoices, and resorting to criminal means to obtain public funds was not motivated by a desire to amass illegal wealth?
Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng ordered their subordinates to fraudulently apply for State Affairs Funds reimbursements. The Court of First Instance found them guilty and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The judge explained the court's decision for each embezzled sum in great detail. The judge ruled that Chen's argument in his own defense was not credible. Chen's "secret diplomacy" expenditures were either false, or simply a case of using public funds from sources other than the State Affairs Fund. Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng fraudulently obtained huge sums from the State Affairs Fund to cover private Chen family expenses. The judge ruled that Chen Shui-bian's argument in his own defense was not credible, and sentenced Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng to life imprisonment.
The judge in the Court of Second Instance upheld the findings of the Court of First Instance. He confirmed that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng were guilty of embezzling public funds. He merely reduced the amount that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng were guilty of embezzling in the first instance verdict. He ruled that the considerable sums spent on dog food, dog grooming, mosquito swatters, disposable contact lenses, and hair styling, qualified as presidential living expenses. He defined them very liberally as "public expenses." As a result, the Chen family, initially found guilty of embezzling over 100 million NT from the State Affairs Fund, was now liable for embezzling only 10 million NT. Their sentences were reduced from life imprisonment to 20 years.
The Supreme Court questioned this verdict, It ordered an appellate review. The appellate review overturned both the first instance and second instance verdicts. This was indeed unexpected.
A judge can of course overturn a verdict, if he offers a convincing argument. But the High Court argued merely that expenditures exceeded income. From this it concluded that the defendants "objectively amassed no illegal wealth, and subjectively evinced no criminal intent." This was a high-handed dictate by an autocrat, not a reasoned legal opinion by judge. Prosecutors painstakingly uncovered the paper trail left in the State Affairs Fund case. Chen Shui-bian's arguments in his own defense were thoroughly investigated, one by one. They were ruled not credible. The presiding judges in both instances found the president's arguments in his own defense lacking in credibility. They differed only in how strictly public expenditures ought to be defined. The Supreme Court did not overturn these first and second instance findings. Yet the Supreme Court ordered an appellate review. The appellate judge did not question the credibility of Chen Shui-bian's arguments in his own defense. He did not question the authenticity of Chen Shui-bian's "secret diplomacy." He did not question the source of the funds. He merely asserted that expenditures exceeded income. On this flimsiest of pretexts, he found Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng not guilty, on the basis of mens rea, because "objectively no crime had been committed." Where in the world does one find judges such as this?
Now consider the presiding judge's verdict in the Nangang Exhibition Hall case. He did not overturn the guilty verdict. Wu Shu-chen abused her power. She pressured Yu Cheng-hsien into revealing the list of review board members, so she could bribe them. The first and second instance courts found Wu Shu-cheng guilty of complicity in corruption. The appellate court however found her guilty only of patronage and leaking information. The appellate court argued that "the facts of the case remain the same, but the law is different." As a result Wu Shu-cheng's sentence was drastically reduced. Now consider the money laundering charges. By definition, money laundering includes the intent to conceal criminal gains. But the appellate judge handed down a not guilty ruling in the State Affairs Fund case. Therefore only the proceeds of the Nangang Exhibition Hall case are still considered criminal gains. This drastically reduces her sentence.
Clearly, the retrial judge was determined to let Chen Shui-bian off scot-free. Therefore he turned a blind eye to the State Affairs Fund case, for which Chen Shui-bian could offer no convincing argument in his defense. He did not overturn the verdict in the Nangang Exhibition Hall case. Instead, he reinterpreted the law. He dramatically reduced the scope of the money laundering charges, to ensure the lightest sentence possible.
The ruling was shocking. The Court of First Instance found the defendants guilty of falsifying records, forging invoices, and other fraudulent conduct. Yet the appellate court ruled that resorting to such illegal means to embezzle public funds did not constitute corruption. According to the appellate court, an embezzler whose expenditures exceed his income, is not guilty of corruption. By the appellate court's logic, a robber need only donate more of his loot to charity than he took in to be immune from prosecution. Shouldn't charitable donations count as charitable donations? Shouldn't stolen money count as stolen money? Besides, the money donated was not stolen money.
If judges are permitted to abuse their power to this degree, trials will be reckless gambles. Defendants will be betting their lives on whether the presiding judge distinguishes between charitable donations and stolen money.
豈有此理 認定非法取錢 竟說貪汙無罪！
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.27
扁家弊案發回更審的部分，高等法院宣判結果令各界最感意外者，就是扁珍等人共同利用職務詐取國務機要費部分改判無罪。
依據目前高院公布的有限資料看來，更一審判決的理由極為簡單，亦即：扁珍以不實犒賞清冊、不實發票報支，甚或直接侵占下屬保管的現金等，金額是一億四百餘萬元；而扁任內的犒賞、秘密外交、餽贈等支出金額則為一億三千餘萬元；支出大於取得的款項，因此「客觀上未取得不法財物、主觀上無不法意圖」，所以無罪。
判決之推理邏輯最重大的疑點在於：合議庭認定扁珍以犒賞清冊，及不實發票侵占公帑；卻認定此一行為並不違法，不是貪汙。然而，倘「主觀上無不法意圖」，何必偽造犒賞清冊？何必用不實發票？而用偽造清冊及不實發票等犯罪手段取得了公帑，卻何以稱「客觀上未取得不法財物」？
扁珍指使下屬詐取國務機要費的部分，第一審判處無期徒刑。當時法官在判決中詳細交代了各筆款項的追查結果，認為陳水扁的辯解都不可信；所謂秘密外交的支出，或屬虛假，或者根本用的是國務機要費以外的公帑來源，而且詐取得來的國務機要費大量用於扁家私人支出，所以不能採信陳水扁的辯解，重判扁珍無期徒刑。
第二審法官並沒有改變第一審的基本認定，亦即也確認扁珍以非法手段侵吞公帑的罪行，只是將一審所認定的扁家私人支出部分大幅縮減，把大量支出如狗飼料、狗美容、電蚊拍、可拋式隱形眼鏡、理髮費之類，只要與總統生活用度沾得上一點邊的，一律從寬認定為「因公支出」；這樣一來，扁家詐取的國務機要費金額即從一億多元降低至一千多萬元，故而改判二十年有期徒刑。由於最高法院對此認定有疑問，遂發回更審；如今，更審結果竟然將先前一二審的認定全部推翻，確實令人大出意外。
法官要更改認定，若能拿得出足以說服人的理由，自無不可。但以高院公布這種簡單的邏輯：只用「支出大於取得」六個字，就推論出「客觀上未取得不法財物、主觀上無不法意圖」的結論，這根本就是霸道而非法律推理了。先前檢察官追查國務機要費時，就陳水扁的辯解，已逐一查證，認定所供均不實在；而兩次審判的法官也認為陳水扁的辯解不足採信，差別只在對於是否因公支出的範圍認定寬嚴不同；至最高法院也沒有否定一二審的這些認定。但是最高法院發回更一審，更審法官竟完全沒有交代陳水扁的辯解是否可信，也不問秘密外交的真偽，或者另有款項來源，只憑一句「支出大於取得」，就認定扁珍在主觀上無犯意、客觀上無犯行，天下哪有這種法官？
更審法官在南港展覽館的部分，則對於犯罪事實並沒有任何更動，亦即吳淑珍利用其地位，向余政憲要求洩露審評委員名單，依此而收賄；但先前均認定這是吳淑珍共犯貪汙受賄罪，更審竟稱這只是圖利罪及洩密罪，進而稱「事實同一、變更法條」，遂使吳淑珍的刑度大為降低。在洗錢的部分，因洗錢罪以隱匿「犯罪所得」為前提，現因國務機要費既被更審法官認定為「無罪」，所以也只論「洗」南港展覽館部分的「犯罪所得」的錢，刑度因而降低。
顯然，更審法官是有意識地要為陳水扁脫罪，所以對國務機要費陳水扁辯解不實的問題避而不談；對南港展覽館的事實認定雖無變動，卻竟然變更法條；而洗錢的範圍也隨之大幅減少，以達輕判目的。
此一判決令人驚駭處在於：更一審合議庭其實也認定了偽造犒賞清冊及使用不實發票等詐騙手段，卻認為使用這些非法手段侵吞公帑不是貪汙。但是，如果只是「支出大於所得」就不算貪汙，則盜匪只要捐出的善款大於贓款，也就不能治以盜匪罪了。法律難道不該善款歸善款，贓款歸贓款；何況，已經證實捐出的善款並非出自贓款。
如果法官竟能濫權專斷至此地步，審判豈不是成了一場因法官人選不同而致善款贓款莫辨的賭博？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 27, 2011
Summary: The Chen family corruption case has undergone appellate review. The High Court verdict surprised everyone. Most surprised were Ah-Bian, Ah-Cheng, and others who abused the power of their office, fraudulently applied for State Affairs Fund reimbursements, yet got off scot-free. If judges are permitted to abuse their power to this degree, trials will be reckless gambles. Defendants will be betting their lives on whether the presiding judge distinguishes between charitable donations and stolen money.
Full Text below:
The Chen family corruption case has undergone appellate review. The High Court verdict surprised everyone. Most surprised were Ah-Bian, Ah-Cheng, and others who abused the power of their office, fraudulently applied for State Affairs Fund reimbursements, yet got off scot-free.
According to the limited information released by the High Court, the first instance verdict was overturned for a simple reason. Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng were guilty of falsifying records, forging invoices, and even of embezzling cash resources in their custody. The amount embezzled exceeded 104 million NT. During Chen's term of office, kickbacks, secret diplomacy, gifts, and other expenditures exceeded 130 million NT. The expenditures exceeded the amount embezzled. The High Court judges ruled therefore that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng "objectively amassed no illegal wealth, and subjectively evinced no criminal intent." Therefore, they found the defendants "not guilty."
The reasoning behind their verdict is dubious. The Full Court concluded that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng falsified records, forged invoices, and embezzled public funds, but that their conduct was not illegal, and did not constitute corruption. But if their "subjective intent was not to subvert the law," why did they falsify records? Why did they forge invoices? Why did the Full Court argue that falsifying records, forging invoices, and resorting to criminal means to obtain public funds was not motivated by a desire to amass illegal wealth?
Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng ordered their subordinates to fraudulently apply for State Affairs Funds reimbursements. The Court of First Instance found them guilty and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The judge explained the court's decision for each embezzled sum in great detail. The judge ruled that Chen's argument in his own defense was not credible. Chen's "secret diplomacy" expenditures were either false, or simply a case of using public funds from sources other than the State Affairs Fund. Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng fraudulently obtained huge sums from the State Affairs Fund to cover private Chen family expenses. The judge ruled that Chen Shui-bian's argument in his own defense was not credible, and sentenced Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng to life imprisonment.
The judge in the Court of Second Instance upheld the findings of the Court of First Instance. He confirmed that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng were guilty of embezzling public funds. He merely reduced the amount that Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng were guilty of embezzling in the first instance verdict. He ruled that the considerable sums spent on dog food, dog grooming, mosquito swatters, disposable contact lenses, and hair styling, qualified as presidential living expenses. He defined them very liberally as "public expenses." As a result, the Chen family, initially found guilty of embezzling over 100 million NT from the State Affairs Fund, was now liable for embezzling only 10 million NT. Their sentences were reduced from life imprisonment to 20 years.
The Supreme Court questioned this verdict, It ordered an appellate review. The appellate review overturned both the first instance and second instance verdicts. This was indeed unexpected.
A judge can of course overturn a verdict, if he offers a convincing argument. But the High Court argued merely that expenditures exceeded income. From this it concluded that the defendants "objectively amassed no illegal wealth, and subjectively evinced no criminal intent." This was a high-handed dictate by an autocrat, not a reasoned legal opinion by judge. Prosecutors painstakingly uncovered the paper trail left in the State Affairs Fund case. Chen Shui-bian's arguments in his own defense were thoroughly investigated, one by one. They were ruled not credible. The presiding judges in both instances found the president's arguments in his own defense lacking in credibility. They differed only in how strictly public expenditures ought to be defined. The Supreme Court did not overturn these first and second instance findings. Yet the Supreme Court ordered an appellate review. The appellate judge did not question the credibility of Chen Shui-bian's arguments in his own defense. He did not question the authenticity of Chen Shui-bian's "secret diplomacy." He did not question the source of the funds. He merely asserted that expenditures exceeded income. On this flimsiest of pretexts, he found Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng not guilty, on the basis of mens rea, because "objectively no crime had been committed." Where in the world does one find judges such as this?
Now consider the presiding judge's verdict in the Nangang Exhibition Hall case. He did not overturn the guilty verdict. Wu Shu-chen abused her power. She pressured Yu Cheng-hsien into revealing the list of review board members, so she could bribe them. The first and second instance courts found Wu Shu-cheng guilty of complicity in corruption. The appellate court however found her guilty only of patronage and leaking information. The appellate court argued that "the facts of the case remain the same, but the law is different." As a result Wu Shu-cheng's sentence was drastically reduced. Now consider the money laundering charges. By definition, money laundering includes the intent to conceal criminal gains. But the appellate judge handed down a not guilty ruling in the State Affairs Fund case. Therefore only the proceeds of the Nangang Exhibition Hall case are still considered criminal gains. This drastically reduces her sentence.
Clearly, the retrial judge was determined to let Chen Shui-bian off scot-free. Therefore he turned a blind eye to the State Affairs Fund case, for which Chen Shui-bian could offer no convincing argument in his defense. He did not overturn the verdict in the Nangang Exhibition Hall case. Instead, he reinterpreted the law. He dramatically reduced the scope of the money laundering charges, to ensure the lightest sentence possible.
The ruling was shocking. The Court of First Instance found the defendants guilty of falsifying records, forging invoices, and other fraudulent conduct. Yet the appellate court ruled that resorting to such illegal means to embezzle public funds did not constitute corruption. According to the appellate court, an embezzler whose expenditures exceed his income, is not guilty of corruption. By the appellate court's logic, a robber need only donate more of his loot to charity than he took in to be immune from prosecution. Shouldn't charitable donations count as charitable donations? Shouldn't stolen money count as stolen money? Besides, the money donated was not stolen money.
If judges are permitted to abuse their power to this degree, trials will be reckless gambles. Defendants will be betting their lives on whether the presiding judge distinguishes between charitable donations and stolen money.
豈有此理 認定非法取錢 竟說貪汙無罪！
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.27
扁家弊案發回更審的部分，高等法院宣判結果令各界最感意外者，就是扁珍等人共同利用職務詐取國務機要費部分改判無罪。
依據目前高院公布的有限資料看來，更一審判決的理由極為簡單，亦即：扁珍以不實犒賞清冊、不實發票報支，甚或直接侵占下屬保管的現金等，金額是一億四百餘萬元；而扁任內的犒賞、秘密外交、餽贈等支出金額則為一億三千餘萬元；支出大於取得的款項，因此「客觀上未取得不法財物、主觀上無不法意圖」，所以無罪。
判決之推理邏輯最重大的疑點在於：合議庭認定扁珍以犒賞清冊，及不實發票侵占公帑；卻認定此一行為並不違法，不是貪汙。然而，倘「主觀上無不法意圖」，何必偽造犒賞清冊？何必用不實發票？而用偽造清冊及不實發票等犯罪手段取得了公帑，卻何以稱「客觀上未取得不法財物」？
扁珍指使下屬詐取國務機要費的部分，第一審判處無期徒刑。當時法官在判決中詳細交代了各筆款項的追查結果，認為陳水扁的辯解都不可信；所謂秘密外交的支出，或屬虛假，或者根本用的是國務機要費以外的公帑來源，而且詐取得來的國務機要費大量用於扁家私人支出，所以不能採信陳水扁的辯解，重判扁珍無期徒刑。
第二審法官並沒有改變第一審的基本認定，亦即也確認扁珍以非法手段侵吞公帑的罪行，只是將一審所認定的扁家私人支出部分大幅縮減，把大量支出如狗飼料、狗美容、電蚊拍、可拋式隱形眼鏡、理髮費之類，只要與總統生活用度沾得上一點邊的，一律從寬認定為「因公支出」；這樣一來，扁家詐取的國務機要費金額即從一億多元降低至一千多萬元，故而改判二十年有期徒刑。由於最高法院對此認定有疑問，遂發回更審；如今，更審結果竟然將先前一二審的認定全部推翻，確實令人大出意外。
法官要更改認定，若能拿得出足以說服人的理由，自無不可。但以高院公布這種簡單的邏輯：只用「支出大於取得」六個字，就推論出「客觀上未取得不法財物、主觀上無不法意圖」的結論，這根本就是霸道而非法律推理了。先前檢察官追查國務機要費時，就陳水扁的辯解，已逐一查證，認定所供均不實在；而兩次審判的法官也認為陳水扁的辯解不足採信，差別只在對於是否因公支出的範圍認定寬嚴不同；至最高法院也沒有否定一二審的這些認定。但是最高法院發回更一審，更審法官竟完全沒有交代陳水扁的辯解是否可信，也不問秘密外交的真偽，或者另有款項來源，只憑一句「支出大於取得」，就認定扁珍在主觀上無犯意、客觀上無犯行，天下哪有這種法官？
更審法官在南港展覽館的部分，則對於犯罪事實並沒有任何更動，亦即吳淑珍利用其地位，向余政憲要求洩露審評委員名單，依此而收賄；但先前均認定這是吳淑珍共犯貪汙受賄罪，更審竟稱這只是圖利罪及洩密罪，進而稱「事實同一、變更法條」，遂使吳淑珍的刑度大為降低。在洗錢的部分，因洗錢罪以隱匿「犯罪所得」為前提，現因國務機要費既被更審法官認定為「無罪」，所以也只論「洗」南港展覽館部分的「犯罪所得」的錢，刑度因而降低。
顯然，更審法官是有意識地要為陳水扁脫罪，所以對國務機要費陳水扁辯解不實的問題避而不談；對南港展覽館的事實認定雖無變動，卻竟然變更法條；而洗錢的範圍也隨之大幅減少，以達輕判目的。
此一判決令人驚駭處在於：更一審合議庭其實也認定了偽造犒賞清冊及使用不實發票等詐騙手段，卻認為使用這些非法手段侵吞公帑不是貪汙。但是，如果只是「支出大於所得」就不算貪汙，則盜匪只要捐出的善款大於贓款，也就不能治以盜匪罪了。法律難道不該善款歸善款，贓款歸贓款；何況，已經證實捐出的善款並非出自贓款。
如果法官竟能濫權專斷至此地步，審判豈不是成了一場因法官人選不同而致善款贓款莫辨的賭博？
Thursday, August 25, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen's Word Games with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future
Tsai Ing-wen's Word Games with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 26, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen is once again paying lip service to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Once again, the DPP has returned to its old tricks. It is playing word games with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, henceforth referred to as The Resolution. If the DPP is sincere about the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, then Tsai Ing-wen cannot repudiate the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force."
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen is once again paying lip service to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Once again, the DPP has returned to its old tricks. It is playing word games with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, henceforth referred to as The Resolution.
The Resolution was first announced in May 1999. Chen Shui-bian used it to pave the way for his 2000 presidential campaign. It was a key element of his "New Centrist Path." The Resolution states that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. According to its current constitution it is known as the Republic of China, But it has no connection with the Peoples Republic of China. Any changes to its current independent status, must be approved by all inhabitants of Taiwan, via popular referendum."
The Resolution makes two major points. One. It recognizes the Republic of China and the ROC Constitution. Two. It repudiates the Taiwan independence Party Platform, which calls for the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan, the authoring of a new constitution, and the holding of a Taiwan Independence Referendum. It advanced the notion that in order to change the Republic of China's independent status, a referendum must first be held. It replaced the Taiwan Independence Referendum with a Reunification Referendum.
But the DPP usually plays two tricks when it invokes The Resolution. One. It simplifies its statement to read, "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. It is currently referred to as the Republic of China." It then adds the superfluous clause, "Taiwan's future must be decided by 23 million people." But this is not what The Resolution actually said. Instead, this is taken from the "inhabitants self-determination" slogan of the 60s. It nullifies the clause stipulating that "any change in the independent status of the Republic of China requires a public referendum" and a "reunification referendum." About these it is dead silent. The phrase "it is currently referred to as the Republic of China," together with "Taiwan's future must be decided by 23 million people," implies "inhabitants self-determination." It implies that "in the future it may become a Nation of Taiwan, simply by holding a Taiwan Independence Referendum.
Two, When the DPP invokes The Resolution, it often quotes it out of context. It often quotes it selectively. In order to facilitate Chen Shui-bian's 2000 presidential campaign, The Resolution replaced the Taiwan Independence Party Platform. But when the Chen Shui-bian regime found itself in hot water, it came back to the Taiwan Independence Constitution and Taiwan Independence Referendum. Eventually the Resolution for a Normal Nation, which called for the "rectification of names" and the "authoring of a new constitution" as soon as possible, replaced the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Today Tsai Ing-wen has entered the 2012 presidential race. Therefore the DPP has reintroduced the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. But the Taiwan Independence Party Platform and the Resolution for a Normal Nation are still on the books. Which is valid and which is not? Who knows?
In fact, Chen Shui-bian's "Five Noes" is fully consistent with the spirit of The Resolution. The Five Noes state that, no, the DPP will not declare Taiwan independence, it will not change the name of the country, it will not promote the Two States Theory, it will not call for a public referendum to change the status quo, and it will not abolish the National Unification Guidelines and the National Unification Council, Each of these is an expression of the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. But once Chen Shui-bian left office, he returned to his "Four Demands and One Denial," which demanded Taiwan independence, demanded the rectification of names, demanded a new constitution, demanded economic development, and denied any divide between left and right, but only a divide between reunification and independence. This, needless to say, utterly shredded The Resolution. .
Tsai Ing-wen claims she has returned to The Resolution. But she has yet to invoke any "Five Noes" type arguments to support her claim. On the contrary, she has explicitly refused to recognize One China, Different Interpretations. She has therefore negated the spirit of The Resolution. The Resolution affirms the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. One China, Different Interpretations affirms the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. It seeks common ground with the People's Republic of China. Tsai's rejection of One China, Different Interpretations is nothing less than a rejection of the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. It clearly contradicts the spirit of The Resolution. Worse still, Tsai Ing-wen alleges that the Republic of China is a "government in exile." This is clearly inconsistent with the spirit of The Resolution.
Are Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP sincere about returning to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future? If they are, they should nullify the Taiwan Independence Party Platform and the Resolution for a Normal Nation. They should stop talking out of both sides of their mouth. They should stop contradicting themselves. Furthermore, they should recognize the ROC and the ROC Constitution. They should replace their call for a public referendum on independence, with a call for a public referendum on reunification. That would be consistent with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future.
The Resolution on Taiwan's Future has several logical defects. One. The Taiwan Independence Party Platform and Resolution for a Normal Nation co-exist alongside the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Which are valid? Which is null and void? Which applies? Which does not? Two. DPP political leaders have zero credibility. Chen Shui-bian went from Five Noes to Four Demands and One Denial in the blink of an eye. Clearly DPP reassurances regarding The Resolution guarantee nothing. Three. The Resolution is self-deception and deception of others. It was not advanced in good faith. It is a grab bag of truths, half truths, and lies. Tsai Ing-wen's intentions are clear from The Resolution. She is merely using The Resolution as a means of "backdoor listing." The Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution are nowhere to be found. The spirit of the reunification referendum is nowhere to be found.
If the DPP is sincere about the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, then Tsai Ing-wen cannot repudiate the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force."
看蔡英文如何玩弄台灣前途決議文
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.26
蔡英文在兩岸論述上回到《台灣前途決議文》，再度顯現了民進黨玩弄《台灣前途決議文》（下稱《決議文》）的一貫伎倆。
《決議文》發表於一九九九年五月，在為陳水扁競選二○○○年總統預設鋪墊，作為所謂「新中間路線」的支撐。《決議文》的關鍵語句為：台灣是一個主權獨立的國家……台灣固然依目前憲法稱為中華民國，但與中華人民共和國互不隸屬，任何有關獨立現狀的更動，都必須經台灣全體住民以公民投票方式決定。
其主要意義是：一、承認中華民國，也承認中華民國憲法。二、否定《台獨黨綱》的「建立台灣共和國及制定新憲法」及「台獨公投」，而主張在「更動（中華民國）獨立現狀」之時，始應進行公投；亦即由「台獨公投」轉為「統一公投」。
然而，民進黨在操作《決議文》時，卻常玩弄兩個花樣：一、將其簡化為「台灣是一主權獨立的國家，現在叫做中華民國」；然後畫蛇添足，加上「台灣的前途由兩千三百萬人民決定」一語，但此語並非出自《決議文》的主文，而是摘自六○年代「住民自決」的口號。然而，如此一來，《決議文》中「任何有關（中華民國）獨立現狀的更動必須公投」的「統一公投」即告消失，絕口不提；反而使「現在叫做中華民國」一語，因附加了「台灣前途由兩千三百萬人民決定」的「住民自決」之隱喻，而又成為「未來可以變成台灣國」的「台獨公投」潛台詞。
二、民進黨在操作《決議文》時，不但常常「斷章取義」，且根本是「選擇性地運用」。為了陳水扁競選二○○○年總統，以《決議文》壓過《台獨黨綱》；待陳水扁陷入執政危機，又轉回「正名制憲」、「入聯公投」；最後又以《正常國家決議文》（主張及早正名制憲），壓過了《台灣前途決議文》；如今蔡英文要參選二○一二總統，再又拾回《台灣前途決議文》，但《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》迄今亦仍是有效文件，蛇鼠一窩孰作主？
其實，陳水扁的「四不一沒有」，才是完全符合《決議文》精神的；不宣布台獨，不更動國號，不推動兩國論入憲，不推動改變現狀的統獨公投，沒有廢除國統綱領與國統會的問題，每一項可謂皆是《台灣前途決議文》的引伸及落實。但是，在陳水扁卸任前，卻又走向「四要一沒有」；要獨立、要正名、要新憲、要發展，沒有左右路線問題、只有統獨問題。至此，《決議文》已被撕得粉碎。
蔡英文宣稱回到《決議文》，卻未採取「四不一沒有」之類的論述來支撐《決議文》，反而不啻以拒認「一中各表」來否定了《決議文》的精神。因為，《決議文》是承認中華民國及中華民國憲法的，而「一中各表」的主軸即是支持中華民國與中華民國憲法，並與中華人民共和國「求同存異」；而蔡英文否定了「一中各表」，就不啻是自我否定了中華民國及中華民國憲法的地位，這顯已違悖了《決議文》的精神。何況，蔡英文指「中華民國是流亡政府」，這當然也逾越了《決議文》的分寸。
蔡英文及民進黨若真要回到《台灣前途決議文》，首應終止《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》的效力，不能蛇鼠一窩，自相矛盾；再者，更必須回復「承認中華民國與中華民國憲法」及「以統一公投取代台獨公投」的主張，這應才是《台灣前途決議文》的本來面目。
《台灣前途決議文》有幾大罩門：一、與《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》並存，且皆有效（或皆無效），如何確定其效力？二、民進黨政治領袖的人格可信度極低，如陳水扁竟從「四不一沒有」翻覆至「四要一沒有」，當然不能確保《決議文》的效力。三、民進黨以《決議文》自欺欺人，不具忠誠，任意切割拼裝；以蔡英文如今所為，證諸《決議文》，只見她把《決議文》用為「借殼上市」的工具，將中華民國及中華民國憲法置於何地？又將「統一公投」的精神置於何地？
如果忠誠履行《台灣前途決議文》，蔡英文豈有否定「九二共識，一中各表」及「不統，不獨，不武」的餘地？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 26, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen is once again paying lip service to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Once again, the DPP has returned to its old tricks. It is playing word games with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, henceforth referred to as The Resolution. If the DPP is sincere about the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, then Tsai Ing-wen cannot repudiate the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force."
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen is once again paying lip service to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Once again, the DPP has returned to its old tricks. It is playing word games with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, henceforth referred to as The Resolution.
The Resolution was first announced in May 1999. Chen Shui-bian used it to pave the way for his 2000 presidential campaign. It was a key element of his "New Centrist Path." The Resolution states that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. According to its current constitution it is known as the Republic of China, But it has no connection with the Peoples Republic of China. Any changes to its current independent status, must be approved by all inhabitants of Taiwan, via popular referendum."
The Resolution makes two major points. One. It recognizes the Republic of China and the ROC Constitution. Two. It repudiates the Taiwan independence Party Platform, which calls for the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan, the authoring of a new constitution, and the holding of a Taiwan Independence Referendum. It advanced the notion that in order to change the Republic of China's independent status, a referendum must first be held. It replaced the Taiwan Independence Referendum with a Reunification Referendum.
But the DPP usually plays two tricks when it invokes The Resolution. One. It simplifies its statement to read, "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. It is currently referred to as the Republic of China." It then adds the superfluous clause, "Taiwan's future must be decided by 23 million people." But this is not what The Resolution actually said. Instead, this is taken from the "inhabitants self-determination" slogan of the 60s. It nullifies the clause stipulating that "any change in the independent status of the Republic of China requires a public referendum" and a "reunification referendum." About these it is dead silent. The phrase "it is currently referred to as the Republic of China," together with "Taiwan's future must be decided by 23 million people," implies "inhabitants self-determination." It implies that "in the future it may become a Nation of Taiwan, simply by holding a Taiwan Independence Referendum.
Two, When the DPP invokes The Resolution, it often quotes it out of context. It often quotes it selectively. In order to facilitate Chen Shui-bian's 2000 presidential campaign, The Resolution replaced the Taiwan Independence Party Platform. But when the Chen Shui-bian regime found itself in hot water, it came back to the Taiwan Independence Constitution and Taiwan Independence Referendum. Eventually the Resolution for a Normal Nation, which called for the "rectification of names" and the "authoring of a new constitution" as soon as possible, replaced the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Today Tsai Ing-wen has entered the 2012 presidential race. Therefore the DPP has reintroduced the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. But the Taiwan Independence Party Platform and the Resolution for a Normal Nation are still on the books. Which is valid and which is not? Who knows?
In fact, Chen Shui-bian's "Five Noes" is fully consistent with the spirit of The Resolution. The Five Noes state that, no, the DPP will not declare Taiwan independence, it will not change the name of the country, it will not promote the Two States Theory, it will not call for a public referendum to change the status quo, and it will not abolish the National Unification Guidelines and the National Unification Council, Each of these is an expression of the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. But once Chen Shui-bian left office, he returned to his "Four Demands and One Denial," which demanded Taiwan independence, demanded the rectification of names, demanded a new constitution, demanded economic development, and denied any divide between left and right, but only a divide between reunification and independence. This, needless to say, utterly shredded The Resolution. .
Tsai Ing-wen claims she has returned to The Resolution. But she has yet to invoke any "Five Noes" type arguments to support her claim. On the contrary, she has explicitly refused to recognize One China, Different Interpretations. She has therefore negated the spirit of The Resolution. The Resolution affirms the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. One China, Different Interpretations affirms the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. It seeks common ground with the People's Republic of China. Tsai's rejection of One China, Different Interpretations is nothing less than a rejection of the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. It clearly contradicts the spirit of The Resolution. Worse still, Tsai Ing-wen alleges that the Republic of China is a "government in exile." This is clearly inconsistent with the spirit of The Resolution.
Are Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP sincere about returning to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future? If they are, they should nullify the Taiwan Independence Party Platform and the Resolution for a Normal Nation. They should stop talking out of both sides of their mouth. They should stop contradicting themselves. Furthermore, they should recognize the ROC and the ROC Constitution. They should replace their call for a public referendum on independence, with a call for a public referendum on reunification. That would be consistent with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future.
The Resolution on Taiwan's Future has several logical defects. One. The Taiwan Independence Party Platform and Resolution for a Normal Nation co-exist alongside the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Which are valid? Which is null and void? Which applies? Which does not? Two. DPP political leaders have zero credibility. Chen Shui-bian went from Five Noes to Four Demands and One Denial in the blink of an eye. Clearly DPP reassurances regarding The Resolution guarantee nothing. Three. The Resolution is self-deception and deception of others. It was not advanced in good faith. It is a grab bag of truths, half truths, and lies. Tsai Ing-wen's intentions are clear from The Resolution. She is merely using The Resolution as a means of "backdoor listing." The Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution are nowhere to be found. The spirit of the reunification referendum is nowhere to be found.
If the DPP is sincere about the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, then Tsai Ing-wen cannot repudiate the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force."
看蔡英文如何玩弄台灣前途決議文
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.26
蔡英文在兩岸論述上回到《台灣前途決議文》，再度顯現了民進黨玩弄《台灣前途決議文》（下稱《決議文》）的一貫伎倆。
《決議文》發表於一九九九年五月，在為陳水扁競選二○○○年總統預設鋪墊，作為所謂「新中間路線」的支撐。《決議文》的關鍵語句為：台灣是一個主權獨立的國家……台灣固然依目前憲法稱為中華民國，但與中華人民共和國互不隸屬，任何有關獨立現狀的更動，都必須經台灣全體住民以公民投票方式決定。
其主要意義是：一、承認中華民國，也承認中華民國憲法。二、否定《台獨黨綱》的「建立台灣共和國及制定新憲法」及「台獨公投」，而主張在「更動（中華民國）獨立現狀」之時，始應進行公投；亦即由「台獨公投」轉為「統一公投」。
然而，民進黨在操作《決議文》時，卻常玩弄兩個花樣：一、將其簡化為「台灣是一主權獨立的國家，現在叫做中華民國」；然後畫蛇添足，加上「台灣的前途由兩千三百萬人民決定」一語，但此語並非出自《決議文》的主文，而是摘自六○年代「住民自決」的口號。然而，如此一來，《決議文》中「任何有關（中華民國）獨立現狀的更動必須公投」的「統一公投」即告消失，絕口不提；反而使「現在叫做中華民國」一語，因附加了「台灣前途由兩千三百萬人民決定」的「住民自決」之隱喻，而又成為「未來可以變成台灣國」的「台獨公投」潛台詞。
二、民進黨在操作《決議文》時，不但常常「斷章取義」，且根本是「選擇性地運用」。為了陳水扁競選二○○○年總統，以《決議文》壓過《台獨黨綱》；待陳水扁陷入執政危機，又轉回「正名制憲」、「入聯公投」；最後又以《正常國家決議文》（主張及早正名制憲），壓過了《台灣前途決議文》；如今蔡英文要參選二○一二總統，再又拾回《台灣前途決議文》，但《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》迄今亦仍是有效文件，蛇鼠一窩孰作主？
其實，陳水扁的「四不一沒有」，才是完全符合《決議文》精神的；不宣布台獨，不更動國號，不推動兩國論入憲，不推動改變現狀的統獨公投，沒有廢除國統綱領與國統會的問題，每一項可謂皆是《台灣前途決議文》的引伸及落實。但是，在陳水扁卸任前，卻又走向「四要一沒有」；要獨立、要正名、要新憲、要發展，沒有左右路線問題、只有統獨問題。至此，《決議文》已被撕得粉碎。
蔡英文宣稱回到《決議文》，卻未採取「四不一沒有」之類的論述來支撐《決議文》，反而不啻以拒認「一中各表」來否定了《決議文》的精神。因為，《決議文》是承認中華民國及中華民國憲法的，而「一中各表」的主軸即是支持中華民國與中華民國憲法，並與中華人民共和國「求同存異」；而蔡英文否定了「一中各表」，就不啻是自我否定了中華民國及中華民國憲法的地位，這顯已違悖了《決議文》的精神。何況，蔡英文指「中華民國是流亡政府」，這當然也逾越了《決議文》的分寸。
蔡英文及民進黨若真要回到《台灣前途決議文》，首應終止《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》的效力，不能蛇鼠一窩，自相矛盾；再者，更必須回復「承認中華民國與中華民國憲法」及「以統一公投取代台獨公投」的主張，這應才是《台灣前途決議文》的本來面目。
《台灣前途決議文》有幾大罩門：一、與《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》並存，且皆有效（或皆無效），如何確定其效力？二、民進黨政治領袖的人格可信度極低，如陳水扁竟從「四不一沒有」翻覆至「四要一沒有」，當然不能確保《決議文》的效力。三、民進黨以《決議文》自欺欺人，不具忠誠，任意切割拼裝；以蔡英文如今所為，證諸《決議文》，只見她把《決議文》用為「借殼上市」的工具，將中華民國及中華民國憲法置於何地？又將「統一公投」的精神置於何地？
如果忠誠履行《台灣前途決議文》，蔡英文豈有否定「九二共識，一中各表」及「不統，不獨，不武」的餘地？
Tsai Ing-wen Nukes Cross-Strait Trade and Economic Relations
Tsai Ing-wen Nukes Cross-Strait Trade and Economic Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 25, 2011
Summary: DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen refers to her presidential campaign platform as the "Platform for the Coming Decade." In the section on cross-Strait relations, Tsai denies the existence of a 1992 Consensus. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, her denial will become an atomic bomb dropped on cross-Strait economic and trade relations. The peaceful and mutually beneficial economic and trade exchanges that the governments and people on both sides of the Strait have enjoyed over the past three years will be destroyed overnight. To no one's surprise, Mainland officials have already responded. They have said that repudiation of the 1992 Consensus is "unacceptable to the Mainland side." They have said that if such a policy is implemented, "cross-Strait negotiations will be impossible."
Full Text below:
DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen refers to her presidential campaign platform as the "Platform for the Coming Decade." In the section on cross-Strait relations, Tsai denies the existence of the 1992 Consensus. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, her denial will become an atomic bomb dropped on cross-Strait economic and trade relations. The peaceful and mutually beneficial economic and trade exchanges that the governments and people on both sides of the Strait have enjoyed over the past three years will be destroyed overnight. To no one's surprise, Mainland officials have already responded. They have said that repudiation of the 1992 Consensus is "unacceptable to the Mainland side." They have said that if such a policy is implemented, "cross-Strait negotiations will be impossible."
The Ma administration has been in office three years. During that time, cross-Strait economic exchanges reached yet another milestone. They went from direct links, Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, liberalization of the financial industry, and Mainland purchasing groups coming to Taiwan, to the signing of ECFA. Cross-Strait economic exchanges were finally normalized. This process, and these results, benefited both sides. The Mainland has undeniably made many concessions to improve relations with Taiwan. Overall, therefore, Taiwan has benefited more.
For example, when the financial tsunami struck, the technology industry on Taiwan stalled. Capacity utilization fell to 30%. Unpaid leaves were widespread. The Mainland launched a four trillion RMB Home Appliances for Rural Families Program. Provincial and municipal governments on the Mainland dispatched swarms of purchasing groups to Taiwan. In a single year they purchased 20 billion USD in home appliances. This was a shot in the arm for ailing industries and enterprises. Allowing Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan led to a tripling in their numbers. Last year the number increased to 1.5 million. The growth rate reached 5%. This enabled last year's tourism foreign exchange earnings to increase 30%. The signing of ECFA has yielded even more far-reaching benefits. Taiwan benefited from the tariff reduction early harvest list more than the Mainland. The side effects are even more impressive. All in all, the benefits of this wave of deepening cross-Strait trade, amount to an entirely different class of benefits that benefit the common people.
Maintaining good cross-Strait relations and further expanding economic and trade interests is essential to our economic future. It affects the economic interests and lives of everyone. The Mainland's economic strength is growing. It is now the second largest after the United States. According to forecast by international think tanks, the Mainland may overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy as early as 2020, or as late as 2030. People on the Mainland and Taiwan are the same people. We speak the same language. We have the same culture. Given the economic prospects before our noses, how can we not take advantage of them? If we refuse to have any dealings with the Mainland, our economy will fall into an abyss.
Secondly, in recent years the Mainland has become the world's factory. Seizing "Mainland opportunities" is no longer limited to mastering production factors and plant problems. Seizing Mainland opportunities means opening up one's markets, building one's brand, and enhancing one's businesses and industries. For example, the local Taiwan market has remained small. The financial sector has too many banks. These businesses would have a vastly larger market on the Mainland, enabling them to survive and to thrive.
Thirdly, exports account for about 70% of our gross domestic product (GDP). The Mainland accounts for 40% of all "exports" from Taiwan. Last year, Taiwan enjoyed a 80 billion USD cross-Strait trade surplus. Most companies listed on Taiwan have built factories on the Mainland. For many technology industries, shipments from the Mainland, already exceed 50% to 80%. People say one should not put all one's eggs in the same basket. But the reality is all our eggs are in one basket. The most important thing is to take good care of that one basket. Tsai Ing-wen's repudiation of 1992 Consensus runs the risk of destroying this basket.
Finally, the reason Taiwan and the Mainland had to rush the signing of ECFA, was the imminent launch of the ASEAN plus One (ASEAN plus the Mainland) East Asian free trade zone. Had Taiwan been excluded from the world's largest free trade zone, over half our exports would be affected. Lest we forget, ASEAN plus One was followed by ASEAN plus Three (ASEAN plus Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea). South Korea is Taiwan's toughest competitor. If cross-Strait relations change, and ECFA cannot integrate Taiwan into the ECFA regional trade zone, exports from Taiwan and the Taiwan economy will be in trouble.
Tsai Ing-wen says ECFA is a fait accompli, and that is why it will be submitted to the people for "democratic approval." But Tsai Ing-wen does not seem to realize that three years of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, and other interests and achievements, are all based on good faith and consensus. Take away this good faith and consensus, and ECFA will be an empty shell. The most important cornerstone of cross-Strait good faith is the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen seems to think she can repudiate the 1992 Consensus, but the other side will continue to respond in good faith. She seems to imagine that the other side will do everything according to her play book, and handle cross-Strait economic and trade relations according to her whims. Tsai is either naive and ignorant beyond belief, or is knowingly deceiving the public.
By repudiating the 1992 Consensus, Tsai Ing-wen is gambling with her political future. Motivated by personal beliefs, ideals, ideology, or merely by a desire to consolidate her support among the Green Camp, she is "betting the farm" on cross-Strait relations. But the economy, people's livelihood, and people's hopes for cross-Strait harmony, are not chips to be gambled away on the whims of politicians.
蔡英文給兩岸經貿投下原子彈
2011-08-25 中國時報
民進黨主席、總統參選人蔡英文公布的十年政綱兩岸篇中，否認「九二共識」的存在。如果蔡英文當選，這一否認實際上是為兩岸經貿投下一顆原子彈。過去三年，兩岸政府與人民共同努力，營造出的和平前景、經貿往來、利益共享，將全部毀於一旦。不出外界所料的，大陸官方已正式發表回應，除了說不承認九二共識是「大陸方面不能接受的」外，更強調此政策一旦實施，「將導致兩岸協商無法進行」。
馬政府上台後，過去三年，兩岸經貿往來跨入了另一個新里程；從兩岸三通、陸客來台觀光、開放金融產業、大陸採購團來台、到ＥＣＦＡ簽署，兩岸經貿往來可說終於「正常化」。這個過程、這個結果，兩岸互蒙其利，一起受惠；而不能否認的是，大陸官方為了拉近與台灣的關係，而有「讓利」想法，因此整體而言，台灣受益程度又更高。
例如，在金融海嘯狂捲全球時，台灣科技產業陷入停擺困境，產能利用率降到一到三成，無薪假遍及各公司。大陸除了推出四兆人民幣的家電下鄉外，各省市也派出龐大的採購團來台採購，一年的採購金額就逾二百億美元，對國內產業與企業無異雪中送炭。此外，開放陸客來台觀光後，大陸觀光客數字也呈三級跳，去年成長到一五○萬人，成長率高達五成，這也讓我國去年的觀光外匯收入增加了近三成。至於ＥＣＦＡ的簽訂，影響更深遠；除了台灣得到的降稅早收清單多於大陸外，後續帶來的其它效應，更是可觀。綜觀而言，這一波兩岸經貿深化的利益，幾乎可說不同階級者皆有獲利，惠及庶民。
我們要強調的是：維持兩岸良好的關係，進而拓展經貿利益，絕對是台灣未來經濟大戰略上最重點的課題；這也關係著全民的經濟利益與生活。一來，大陸經濟實力與時日增，現在已是僅次於美國的第二大經濟體；依照各國智庫的預測，早則在二○二○年，晚則到二○三○年，大陸就可能超越美國成為全球第一大經濟體。對一個近在咫尺、又同文同種，語言、文化相通，前景看好的經濟體，台灣豈能不好好掌握這個契機？揚棄與其往來，台灣經濟必陷深淵。
二來，大陸近年已由全球工廠轉型為全球市場；掌握「大陸機會」，已不僅是掌握生產要素與工廠的問題，而是開拓市場、建立品牌、提升企業與產業的問題了。例如，國內長久受困於市場小、銀行過多的金融業，就能在大陸找到更大市場，延續拓展企業命脈。
三來，現實上，台灣的出口占國內生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）的七成左右，而台灣出口地區中，大陸就占了四成。台灣去年從兩岸貿易中取得的順差就超過八百億美元，國內上市櫃企業大部分都已在大陸有投資設廠，許多科技產業大陸的出貨量，已超過五成到八成。雖然，許多人都說「雞蛋不能放在同一個籃子裡」，但當現實上我們的雞蛋是高度集中在這個籃子中時，最要緊的就是「好好的顧好這個籃子」。蔡英文的否認九二共識，其實就有「打壞這個籃子」的風險。
最後，我們也要指出，當初台灣急於與大陸簽署ＥＣＦＡ的原因，主要是因應「東協加一」（東協加上大陸）的東亞自由貿易區上路，台灣如果被排拒在此全球最大的自由貿易區之外，則超過五成的出口都受影響。但別忘了，東協加一後接著是「東協加三」（東協加上大陸、日本、南韓）的上路。在台灣最重要的競爭對手南韓加入後，如果兩岸關係生變，台灣無法藉著ＥＣＦＡ融入此區域貿易中，則台灣出口與經濟皆危矣。
蔡英文雖然表示ＥＣＦＡ是既成事實，所以會「循民主程序處理」。但蔡英文似乎不了解，這三年來兩岸經貿的交流往來、及其產生的諸多利益及成果，有許多是基於彼此的善意與共識才取得。如果把這個善意與共識拿掉，ＥＣＦＡ也可以成為一個空殼子。蔡英文在否認兩岸善意產生的最重要基石─「九二共識」後，還期望對岸有善意，且依循她個人的主觀期望，來處理兩岸經貿關係，不是太天真、無知，就是存心欺騙社會大眾。
不論蔡英文是基於個人信念、理想、意識型態，或甚至只是為了鞏固綠營基本盤選票，而提出否認九二共識，都可以說是拿政治前途、兩岸關係去「豪賭一把」；但，台灣的經濟、民眾的生活、兩岸關係前景，都不能被政客當籌碼，放在賭桌上「豪賭一把」！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 25, 2011
Summary: DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen refers to her presidential campaign platform as the "Platform for the Coming Decade." In the section on cross-Strait relations, Tsai denies the existence of a 1992 Consensus. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, her denial will become an atomic bomb dropped on cross-Strait economic and trade relations. The peaceful and mutually beneficial economic and trade exchanges that the governments and people on both sides of the Strait have enjoyed over the past three years will be destroyed overnight. To no one's surprise, Mainland officials have already responded. They have said that repudiation of the 1992 Consensus is "unacceptable to the Mainland side." They have said that if such a policy is implemented, "cross-Strait negotiations will be impossible."
Full Text below:
DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen refers to her presidential campaign platform as the "Platform for the Coming Decade." In the section on cross-Strait relations, Tsai denies the existence of the 1992 Consensus. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, her denial will become an atomic bomb dropped on cross-Strait economic and trade relations. The peaceful and mutually beneficial economic and trade exchanges that the governments and people on both sides of the Strait have enjoyed over the past three years will be destroyed overnight. To no one's surprise, Mainland officials have already responded. They have said that repudiation of the 1992 Consensus is "unacceptable to the Mainland side." They have said that if such a policy is implemented, "cross-Strait negotiations will be impossible."
The Ma administration has been in office three years. During that time, cross-Strait economic exchanges reached yet another milestone. They went from direct links, Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, liberalization of the financial industry, and Mainland purchasing groups coming to Taiwan, to the signing of ECFA. Cross-Strait economic exchanges were finally normalized. This process, and these results, benefited both sides. The Mainland has undeniably made many concessions to improve relations with Taiwan. Overall, therefore, Taiwan has benefited more.
For example, when the financial tsunami struck, the technology industry on Taiwan stalled. Capacity utilization fell to 30%. Unpaid leaves were widespread. The Mainland launched a four trillion RMB Home Appliances for Rural Families Program. Provincial and municipal governments on the Mainland dispatched swarms of purchasing groups to Taiwan. In a single year they purchased 20 billion USD in home appliances. This was a shot in the arm for ailing industries and enterprises. Allowing Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan led to a tripling in their numbers. Last year the number increased to 1.5 million. The growth rate reached 5%. This enabled last year's tourism foreign exchange earnings to increase 30%. The signing of ECFA has yielded even more far-reaching benefits. Taiwan benefited from the tariff reduction early harvest list more than the Mainland. The side effects are even more impressive. All in all, the benefits of this wave of deepening cross-Strait trade, amount to an entirely different class of benefits that benefit the common people.
Maintaining good cross-Strait relations and further expanding economic and trade interests is essential to our economic future. It affects the economic interests and lives of everyone. The Mainland's economic strength is growing. It is now the second largest after the United States. According to forecast by international think tanks, the Mainland may overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy as early as 2020, or as late as 2030. People on the Mainland and Taiwan are the same people. We speak the same language. We have the same culture. Given the economic prospects before our noses, how can we not take advantage of them? If we refuse to have any dealings with the Mainland, our economy will fall into an abyss.
Secondly, in recent years the Mainland has become the world's factory. Seizing "Mainland opportunities" is no longer limited to mastering production factors and plant problems. Seizing Mainland opportunities means opening up one's markets, building one's brand, and enhancing one's businesses and industries. For example, the local Taiwan market has remained small. The financial sector has too many banks. These businesses would have a vastly larger market on the Mainland, enabling them to survive and to thrive.
Thirdly, exports account for about 70% of our gross domestic product (GDP). The Mainland accounts for 40% of all "exports" from Taiwan. Last year, Taiwan enjoyed a 80 billion USD cross-Strait trade surplus. Most companies listed on Taiwan have built factories on the Mainland. For many technology industries, shipments from the Mainland, already exceed 50% to 80%. People say one should not put all one's eggs in the same basket. But the reality is all our eggs are in one basket. The most important thing is to take good care of that one basket. Tsai Ing-wen's repudiation of 1992 Consensus runs the risk of destroying this basket.
Finally, the reason Taiwan and the Mainland had to rush the signing of ECFA, was the imminent launch of the ASEAN plus One (ASEAN plus the Mainland) East Asian free trade zone. Had Taiwan been excluded from the world's largest free trade zone, over half our exports would be affected. Lest we forget, ASEAN plus One was followed by ASEAN plus Three (ASEAN plus Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea). South Korea is Taiwan's toughest competitor. If cross-Strait relations change, and ECFA cannot integrate Taiwan into the ECFA regional trade zone, exports from Taiwan and the Taiwan economy will be in trouble.
Tsai Ing-wen says ECFA is a fait accompli, and that is why it will be submitted to the people for "democratic approval." But Tsai Ing-wen does not seem to realize that three years of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, and other interests and achievements, are all based on good faith and consensus. Take away this good faith and consensus, and ECFA will be an empty shell. The most important cornerstone of cross-Strait good faith is the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen seems to think she can repudiate the 1992 Consensus, but the other side will continue to respond in good faith. She seems to imagine that the other side will do everything according to her play book, and handle cross-Strait economic and trade relations according to her whims. Tsai is either naive and ignorant beyond belief, or is knowingly deceiving the public.
By repudiating the 1992 Consensus, Tsai Ing-wen is gambling with her political future. Motivated by personal beliefs, ideals, ideology, or merely by a desire to consolidate her support among the Green Camp, she is "betting the farm" on cross-Strait relations. But the economy, people's livelihood, and people's hopes for cross-Strait harmony, are not chips to be gambled away on the whims of politicians.
蔡英文給兩岸經貿投下原子彈
2011-08-25 中國時報
民進黨主席、總統參選人蔡英文公布的十年政綱兩岸篇中，否認「九二共識」的存在。如果蔡英文當選，這一否認實際上是為兩岸經貿投下一顆原子彈。過去三年，兩岸政府與人民共同努力，營造出的和平前景、經貿往來、利益共享，將全部毀於一旦。不出外界所料的，大陸官方已正式發表回應，除了說不承認九二共識是「大陸方面不能接受的」外，更強調此政策一旦實施，「將導致兩岸協商無法進行」。
馬政府上台後，過去三年，兩岸經貿往來跨入了另一個新里程；從兩岸三通、陸客來台觀光、開放金融產業、大陸採購團來台、到ＥＣＦＡ簽署，兩岸經貿往來可說終於「正常化」。這個過程、這個結果，兩岸互蒙其利，一起受惠；而不能否認的是，大陸官方為了拉近與台灣的關係，而有「讓利」想法，因此整體而言，台灣受益程度又更高。
例如，在金融海嘯狂捲全球時，台灣科技產業陷入停擺困境，產能利用率降到一到三成，無薪假遍及各公司。大陸除了推出四兆人民幣的家電下鄉外，各省市也派出龐大的採購團來台採購，一年的採購金額就逾二百億美元，對國內產業與企業無異雪中送炭。此外，開放陸客來台觀光後，大陸觀光客數字也呈三級跳，去年成長到一五○萬人，成長率高達五成，這也讓我國去年的觀光外匯收入增加了近三成。至於ＥＣＦＡ的簽訂，影響更深遠；除了台灣得到的降稅早收清單多於大陸外，後續帶來的其它效應，更是可觀。綜觀而言，這一波兩岸經貿深化的利益，幾乎可說不同階級者皆有獲利，惠及庶民。
我們要強調的是：維持兩岸良好的關係，進而拓展經貿利益，絕對是台灣未來經濟大戰略上最重點的課題；這也關係著全民的經濟利益與生活。一來，大陸經濟實力與時日增，現在已是僅次於美國的第二大經濟體；依照各國智庫的預測，早則在二○二○年，晚則到二○三○年，大陸就可能超越美國成為全球第一大經濟體。對一個近在咫尺、又同文同種，語言、文化相通，前景看好的經濟體，台灣豈能不好好掌握這個契機？揚棄與其往來，台灣經濟必陷深淵。
二來，大陸近年已由全球工廠轉型為全球市場；掌握「大陸機會」，已不僅是掌握生產要素與工廠的問題，而是開拓市場、建立品牌、提升企業與產業的問題了。例如，國內長久受困於市場小、銀行過多的金融業，就能在大陸找到更大市場，延續拓展企業命脈。
三來，現實上，台灣的出口占國內生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）的七成左右，而台灣出口地區中，大陸就占了四成。台灣去年從兩岸貿易中取得的順差就超過八百億美元，國內上市櫃企業大部分都已在大陸有投資設廠，許多科技產業大陸的出貨量，已超過五成到八成。雖然，許多人都說「雞蛋不能放在同一個籃子裡」，但當現實上我們的雞蛋是高度集中在這個籃子中時，最要緊的就是「好好的顧好這個籃子」。蔡英文的否認九二共識，其實就有「打壞這個籃子」的風險。
最後，我們也要指出，當初台灣急於與大陸簽署ＥＣＦＡ的原因，主要是因應「東協加一」（東協加上大陸）的東亞自由貿易區上路，台灣如果被排拒在此全球最大的自由貿易區之外，則超過五成的出口都受影響。但別忘了，東協加一後接著是「東協加三」（東協加上大陸、日本、南韓）的上路。在台灣最重要的競爭對手南韓加入後，如果兩岸關係生變，台灣無法藉著ＥＣＦＡ融入此區域貿易中，則台灣出口與經濟皆危矣。
蔡英文雖然表示ＥＣＦＡ是既成事實，所以會「循民主程序處理」。但蔡英文似乎不了解，這三年來兩岸經貿的交流往來、及其產生的諸多利益及成果，有許多是基於彼此的善意與共識才取得。如果把這個善意與共識拿掉，ＥＣＦＡ也可以成為一個空殼子。蔡英文在否認兩岸善意產生的最重要基石─「九二共識」後，還期望對岸有善意，且依循她個人的主觀期望，來處理兩岸經貿關係，不是太天真、無知，就是存心欺騙社會大眾。
不論蔡英文是基於個人信念、理想、意識型態，或甚至只是為了鞏固綠營基本盤選票，而提出否認九二共識，都可以說是拿政治前途、兩岸關係去「豪賭一把」；但，台灣的經濟、民眾的生活、兩岸關係前景，都不能被政客當籌碼，放在賭桌上「豪賭一把」！
Wednesday, August 24, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen's Cross-Strait Sophistry
Tsai Ing-wen's Cross-Strait Sophistry
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 24, 2011
Summary: DPP Chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her Political Platform for the Coming Decade. It includes a chapter on "national security and cross-Strait economic exchanges." In it she resorts to all manner of sophistries to justify her stance on cross-Strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP cling to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Do they acknowledge whether the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation? Must Taiwan labor under the curse of independence and nation building? Must politicians on Taiwan repeatedly incite unnecessary political controversy? Must they repeatedly undermine cross-Strait peace and prosperity?
Full Text below:
DPP Chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her Political Platform for the Coming Decade. It includes a chapter on "national security and cross-Strait economic exchanges." In it she resorts to all manner of sophistries to justify her stance on cross-Strait policy. Key points include: The DPP will accept the already signed cross-Strait trade and economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA). If the DPP returns to power, it will deal with any related issue in accordance with democratic processes and international norms. But the "1992 Consensus" does not exist. Therefore the DPP has no need to either accept it or reject it. Superficially Tsai Ing-wen's argument may seem sound. But in fact it is self-contradictory and cannot withstand close scrutiny.
Take ECFA for example, The two sides signed a framework agreement in accordance with democratic processes and international norms. First, the agreement was approved by the Legislative Yuan, Second, the agreement between the two sides accorded with World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, and was even submitted to the WTO after signing. Tsai Ing-wen proposes to redo everything the Ma administration already did. She then intends to make it part of her campaign platform. She even intends to make it part of the DPP's political principles.
Tsai Ing-wen has accused the Ma administration of turning a blind eye to the long term effects of ECFA on Taiwan's development. She accuses the Ma administration of ignoring the "China Factor." She says doing so could make it impossible for Taiwan to sign free trade agreements with other important trading partners. But the truth is just the reverse. The Chen regime ruled for eight years. Apart from a handful of diplomatic allies, no other nations signed FTAs with Taipei. By contrast, the Ma administration successfully signed FTAs with many non-allies, all in three short years. Taipei has yet to sign an FTA with Washington. But the sticking point is not any alleged "China Factor." It is the still unresolved dispute between Taipei and Washington over US beef imports and Clenbuterol.
Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP blasted ECFA, both before and after it was signed. They said it seriously harmed industries on Taiwan. During an interview with the SET channels's "Taiwan Yes" talk show, Tsai publicly proclaimed that the DPP would launch a referendum drive and allow the people to decide whether they still wanted ECFA. The facts have shown that ECFA has benefitted industries on Taiwan. Beneficiaries include counties headed by the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen must reconcile her current position with past statements. Unfortunately for her, she cannot erase what she said before.
The 1992 Consensus is of supreme importance to cross-Strait relations. But Tsai Ing-wen considers the 1992 Consensus "non-existent." To her, the 1992 Consensus does not exist. But the 1991 National Unification Guidelines and the 1992 Consensus made the 1993 Koo-Wang Summit possible. This is historical fact. The two sides have set aside their differences, and each side adheres to its own definition of "One China." Because the two sides had this consensus, peaceful cross-Strait exchanges prevail today.
In fact, the two sides have already held six Chiang-Chen Summits, and signed 15 agreements, including the most important agreement of all, ECFA. Every one of these agreements are predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. To repudiate the 1992 Consensus is to repudiate the very basis of these cross-Strait agreements. Repudiation would threaten existing agreements. Repudiation would also threaten future cross-strait consultations, Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus would repudiate everything that went before. What kind of leader indulges in such myopic thinking?
Tsai Ing-wen told interviewers that "[Mainland] China must consider what kind of relationship it wants to maintain with Taiwan. If [Mainland] China insists that its principles trump all else, it will collide head on with mainstream thinking on Taiwan. Would this be a good thing for [Mainland] China? " But the reverse is equally true, Tsai Ing-wen should ask herself, "Taiwan must consider what kind of relationship it wants to maintain with Mainland China. If Taiwan insists that its principles trump all else, it will collide head on with mainstream thinking on Mainland China. Would this be a good thing for Taiwan?"
Cross-Strait relations affect both sides. Neither side can expect the other to acquiesce totally to its demands. The 1992 Consensus is the balance point between these two interests. Both sides adhere to their own positions, while setting aside their differences. The DPP insists on rejecting the 1992 Consensus, and butting heads with the Mainland, What good will this do Taiwan? What good will this do peaceful cross-strait exchanges?
Tsai Ing-wen rejects the 1992 Consensus. She says that once she is elected president, she will use the democratic process to establish a new "Taiwanese Consensus" as a basis for cross-Strait talks. She said that creating a domestic consensus is the responsibility of the president. "The president cannot consider only his own party's interests, nor can he cling to a predetermined position. Quite true. A presidential election is the important democratic institution of all. In 2008, the people elected Ma Ying-jeou president. By doing so, they voted in favor of across the board, peaceful, pragmatic cross-Strait relations, predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. How can Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP consider only her own party's interests? How can she cling to a predetermined position? How can she presume that the DPP alone represents "mainstream thinking" on Taiwan?
If Tsai Ing-wen is merely confused, then she should refer to former DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh's statement. "After half a century of living together, we already have a consensus!" [As Shih Ming-teh sees it] the Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP cling to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Do they acknowledge whether the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation? Must Taiwan labor under the curse of independence and nation building? Must politicians on Taiwan repeatedly incite unnecessary political controversy? Must they repeatedly undermine cross-Strait peace and prosperity?
闡釋兩岸政策 蔡英文近乎詭辯
2011-08-24 中國時報
民進黨主席、總統參選人蔡英文發表十年政綱「國家安全、兩岸經貿篇」，以一貫近乎詭辯的言詞闡釋她的兩岸政策立場；其重點包括：對已簽署的兩岸經貿合作框架協議（ＥＣＦＡ）概括承受，若執政後將會遵循民主程序及國際規範來處理相關事宜；至於「九二共識」，既不存在，即無接受或否認的問題。表面上看，蔡英文的說法彷彿言之成理，實際上卻前後矛盾，根本無法自圓其說。
以ＥＣＦＡ為例，兩岸簽署此一合作框架協議，是遵循民主程序與國際規範辦理；首先，協議係經立法院認可，其次兩岸依世界貿易組織（ＷＴＯ）原則簽定，且簽定後也已經ＷＴＯ報備。蔡英文重複馬政府已經做完的事，能成為競選政見、乃至民進黨的政綱嗎？
蔡英文又說，馬政府不願面對兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ對台灣發展的深遠影響，忽視中國因素可能導致台灣無法與其他重要貿易伙伴洽簽自由貿易協定的事實。但，恰恰相反，扁政府執政八年，除了少數邦交國，同樣簽不成任何ＦＴＡ；反而馬政府三年多來與多個非邦交國的友邦開始協商簽署ＦＴＡ事宜，與美國之間尚未談攏，不是中國因素，而是美國牛與瘦肉精爭議。
兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ前後，蔡英文與民進黨舉黨批判，強調對台灣產業危害至深，並在接受三立《大話新聞》訪問時，公開宣示民進黨執政後要發動公投，讓全民決定是否還要ＥＣＦＡ。事實證明，ＥＣＦＡ確實讓台灣產業受惠，受惠者還包括民進黨執政縣市，蔡英文此刻含糊面對她曾經表達過的立場，卻無法抹去她曾經說過的話。
更重要的，對於維繫兩岸關係最重要的「九二共識」，蔡英文認定是「不存在的」。在她的認知中或許沒有「九二共識」這個名詞，但是因為一九九一年的國統綱領和一九九二年的共識，才促成了一九九三的「辜汪會談」，這是「歷史事實」。就內涵上而言，這是兩岸擱置爭議，各自表述「一個中國」；因為有這樣的「共識」，兩岸才能建構出目前和平交流的關係。
事實上，兩岸迄今舉辦六次江陳會談，簽署了十五項協議，包括最重要的ＥＣＦＡ，都是以「九二共識」為基礎、為前提。否認「九二共識」，就是否定了兩岸協議的基礎和前提，不但對現有協議如何繼續執行產生困擾，就未來兩岸可能的協商，形同一筆勾銷，這算什麼領導者的戰略思考？
蔡英文接受媒體訪問時，進一步強調「中國必須思考要跟台灣維持什麼關係？如果中國堅持自己的原則最重要，不惜與台灣人民的主流思想與意志衝突，對中國是不是一件好事」？這個說法反過來同樣成立，蔡英文必須思考，「什麼是對台灣最有利的事，如果堅持自己的想法最重要，不惜與台灣主流思考與利益衝突，對台灣、對民進黨是不是一件好事？」
兩岸關係繫乎兩端，對任何一方來說，都不可能要求對方全面退讓；「九二共識」就是在這樣的互利思考中得到的平衡點，各執立場但放下爭端。拒絕九二共識，堅持爭端，對台灣有什麼好處？對兩岸後後續的和平交流有什麼利基？
否定九二共識的蔡英文要宣示，當選總統後要透過民主機制凝聚的新的「台灣共識」，做為兩岸對談的基礎；她還說，國內共識是總統的責任，「總統不能宥於自己政黨的利益與思考，也不能預設立場。」有道理，總統選舉就是最重要的民主機制，當二○○八年馬英九當選總統的那一刻開始，全民已經用實際行動要求兩岸務實地在九二共識的基礎下全面開展和平關係。蔡英文和民進黨豈能宥於自己政黨的利益和思考，預設立場地認為只有民進黨的主張才是台灣的「主流思想」？
如果蔡英文還是想不清楚，或許應該參考民進黨前主席施明德的論述：「歷經半世紀的共同生活，我們早已磨合出共識了！」中華民國就是台灣，台灣就是中華民國。執著於台灣前途決議文的蔡英文和民進黨，到底承不承認中華民國一直是主權獨立的國家？台灣還需要困在獨立建國的魔咒中，反覆陷入無謂的政治爭議，破壞兩岸已經和平交流的繁榮局面嗎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 24, 2011
Summary: DPP Chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her Political Platform for the Coming Decade. It includes a chapter on "national security and cross-Strait economic exchanges." In it she resorts to all manner of sophistries to justify her stance on cross-Strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP cling to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Do they acknowledge whether the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation? Must Taiwan labor under the curse of independence and nation building? Must politicians on Taiwan repeatedly incite unnecessary political controversy? Must they repeatedly undermine cross-Strait peace and prosperity?
Full Text below:
DPP Chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her Political Platform for the Coming Decade. It includes a chapter on "national security and cross-Strait economic exchanges." In it she resorts to all manner of sophistries to justify her stance on cross-Strait policy. Key points include: The DPP will accept the already signed cross-Strait trade and economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA). If the DPP returns to power, it will deal with any related issue in accordance with democratic processes and international norms. But the "1992 Consensus" does not exist. Therefore the DPP has no need to either accept it or reject it. Superficially Tsai Ing-wen's argument may seem sound. But in fact it is self-contradictory and cannot withstand close scrutiny.
Take ECFA for example, The two sides signed a framework agreement in accordance with democratic processes and international norms. First, the agreement was approved by the Legislative Yuan, Second, the agreement between the two sides accorded with World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, and was even submitted to the WTO after signing. Tsai Ing-wen proposes to redo everything the Ma administration already did. She then intends to make it part of her campaign platform. She even intends to make it part of the DPP's political principles.
Tsai Ing-wen has accused the Ma administration of turning a blind eye to the long term effects of ECFA on Taiwan's development. She accuses the Ma administration of ignoring the "China Factor." She says doing so could make it impossible for Taiwan to sign free trade agreements with other important trading partners. But the truth is just the reverse. The Chen regime ruled for eight years. Apart from a handful of diplomatic allies, no other nations signed FTAs with Taipei. By contrast, the Ma administration successfully signed FTAs with many non-allies, all in three short years. Taipei has yet to sign an FTA with Washington. But the sticking point is not any alleged "China Factor." It is the still unresolved dispute between Taipei and Washington over US beef imports and Clenbuterol.
Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP blasted ECFA, both before and after it was signed. They said it seriously harmed industries on Taiwan. During an interview with the SET channels's "Taiwan Yes" talk show, Tsai publicly proclaimed that the DPP would launch a referendum drive and allow the people to decide whether they still wanted ECFA. The facts have shown that ECFA has benefitted industries on Taiwan. Beneficiaries include counties headed by the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen must reconcile her current position with past statements. Unfortunately for her, she cannot erase what she said before.
The 1992 Consensus is of supreme importance to cross-Strait relations. But Tsai Ing-wen considers the 1992 Consensus "non-existent." To her, the 1992 Consensus does not exist. But the 1991 National Unification Guidelines and the 1992 Consensus made the 1993 Koo-Wang Summit possible. This is historical fact. The two sides have set aside their differences, and each side adheres to its own definition of "One China." Because the two sides had this consensus, peaceful cross-Strait exchanges prevail today.
In fact, the two sides have already held six Chiang-Chen Summits, and signed 15 agreements, including the most important agreement of all, ECFA. Every one of these agreements are predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. To repudiate the 1992 Consensus is to repudiate the very basis of these cross-Strait agreements. Repudiation would threaten existing agreements. Repudiation would also threaten future cross-strait consultations, Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus would repudiate everything that went before. What kind of leader indulges in such myopic thinking?
Tsai Ing-wen told interviewers that "[Mainland] China must consider what kind of relationship it wants to maintain with Taiwan. If [Mainland] China insists that its principles trump all else, it will collide head on with mainstream thinking on Taiwan. Would this be a good thing for [Mainland] China? " But the reverse is equally true, Tsai Ing-wen should ask herself, "Taiwan must consider what kind of relationship it wants to maintain with Mainland China. If Taiwan insists that its principles trump all else, it will collide head on with mainstream thinking on Mainland China. Would this be a good thing for Taiwan?"
Cross-Strait relations affect both sides. Neither side can expect the other to acquiesce totally to its demands. The 1992 Consensus is the balance point between these two interests. Both sides adhere to their own positions, while setting aside their differences. The DPP insists on rejecting the 1992 Consensus, and butting heads with the Mainland, What good will this do Taiwan? What good will this do peaceful cross-strait exchanges?
Tsai Ing-wen rejects the 1992 Consensus. She says that once she is elected president, she will use the democratic process to establish a new "Taiwanese Consensus" as a basis for cross-Strait talks. She said that creating a domestic consensus is the responsibility of the president. "The president cannot consider only his own party's interests, nor can he cling to a predetermined position. Quite true. A presidential election is the important democratic institution of all. In 2008, the people elected Ma Ying-jeou president. By doing so, they voted in favor of across the board, peaceful, pragmatic cross-Strait relations, predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. How can Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP consider only her own party's interests? How can she cling to a predetermined position? How can she presume that the DPP alone represents "mainstream thinking" on Taiwan?
If Tsai Ing-wen is merely confused, then she should refer to former DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh's statement. "After half a century of living together, we already have a consensus!" [As Shih Ming-teh sees it] the Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP cling to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Do they acknowledge whether the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation? Must Taiwan labor under the curse of independence and nation building? Must politicians on Taiwan repeatedly incite unnecessary political controversy? Must they repeatedly undermine cross-Strait peace and prosperity?
闡釋兩岸政策 蔡英文近乎詭辯
2011-08-24 中國時報
民進黨主席、總統參選人蔡英文發表十年政綱「國家安全、兩岸經貿篇」，以一貫近乎詭辯的言詞闡釋她的兩岸政策立場；其重點包括：對已簽署的兩岸經貿合作框架協議（ＥＣＦＡ）概括承受，若執政後將會遵循民主程序及國際規範來處理相關事宜；至於「九二共識」，既不存在，即無接受或否認的問題。表面上看，蔡英文的說法彷彿言之成理，實際上卻前後矛盾，根本無法自圓其說。
以ＥＣＦＡ為例，兩岸簽署此一合作框架協議，是遵循民主程序與國際規範辦理；首先，協議係經立法院認可，其次兩岸依世界貿易組織（ＷＴＯ）原則簽定，且簽定後也已經ＷＴＯ報備。蔡英文重複馬政府已經做完的事，能成為競選政見、乃至民進黨的政綱嗎？
蔡英文又說，馬政府不願面對兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ對台灣發展的深遠影響，忽視中國因素可能導致台灣無法與其他重要貿易伙伴洽簽自由貿易協定的事實。但，恰恰相反，扁政府執政八年，除了少數邦交國，同樣簽不成任何ＦＴＡ；反而馬政府三年多來與多個非邦交國的友邦開始協商簽署ＦＴＡ事宜，與美國之間尚未談攏，不是中國因素，而是美國牛與瘦肉精爭議。
兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ前後，蔡英文與民進黨舉黨批判，強調對台灣產業危害至深，並在接受三立《大話新聞》訪問時，公開宣示民進黨執政後要發動公投，讓全民決定是否還要ＥＣＦＡ。事實證明，ＥＣＦＡ確實讓台灣產業受惠，受惠者還包括民進黨執政縣市，蔡英文此刻含糊面對她曾經表達過的立場，卻無法抹去她曾經說過的話。
更重要的，對於維繫兩岸關係最重要的「九二共識」，蔡英文認定是「不存在的」。在她的認知中或許沒有「九二共識」這個名詞，但是因為一九九一年的國統綱領和一九九二年的共識，才促成了一九九三的「辜汪會談」，這是「歷史事實」。就內涵上而言，這是兩岸擱置爭議，各自表述「一個中國」；因為有這樣的「共識」，兩岸才能建構出目前和平交流的關係。
事實上，兩岸迄今舉辦六次江陳會談，簽署了十五項協議，包括最重要的ＥＣＦＡ，都是以「九二共識」為基礎、為前提。否認「九二共識」，就是否定了兩岸協議的基礎和前提，不但對現有協議如何繼續執行產生困擾，就未來兩岸可能的協商，形同一筆勾銷，這算什麼領導者的戰略思考？
蔡英文接受媒體訪問時，進一步強調「中國必須思考要跟台灣維持什麼關係？如果中國堅持自己的原則最重要，不惜與台灣人民的主流思想與意志衝突，對中國是不是一件好事」？這個說法反過來同樣成立，蔡英文必須思考，「什麼是對台灣最有利的事，如果堅持自己的想法最重要，不惜與台灣主流思考與利益衝突，對台灣、對民進黨是不是一件好事？」
兩岸關係繫乎兩端，對任何一方來說，都不可能要求對方全面退讓；「九二共識」就是在這樣的互利思考中得到的平衡點，各執立場但放下爭端。拒絕九二共識，堅持爭端，對台灣有什麼好處？對兩岸後後續的和平交流有什麼利基？
否定九二共識的蔡英文要宣示，當選總統後要透過民主機制凝聚的新的「台灣共識」，做為兩岸對談的基礎；她還說，國內共識是總統的責任，「總統不能宥於自己政黨的利益與思考，也不能預設立場。」有道理，總統選舉就是最重要的民主機制，當二○○八年馬英九當選總統的那一刻開始，全民已經用實際行動要求兩岸務實地在九二共識的基礎下全面開展和平關係。蔡英文和民進黨豈能宥於自己政黨的利益和思考，預設立場地認為只有民進黨的主張才是台灣的「主流思想」？
如果蔡英文還是想不清楚，或許應該參考民進黨前主席施明德的論述：「歷經半世紀的共同生活，我們早已磨合出共識了！」中華民國就是台灣，台灣就是中華民國。執著於台灣前途決議文的蔡英文和民進黨，到底承不承認中華民國一直是主權獨立的國家？台灣還需要困在獨立建國的魔咒中，反覆陷入無謂的政治爭議，破壞兩岸已經和平交流的繁榮局面嗎？
Tuesday, August 23, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen's Bizarre Proposal
Tsai Ing-wen's Bizarre Proposal
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 23, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her public education platform. She advocates fast tracking 12-year national education. She advocates a comprehensive community-based system of vocational high schools within eight years. She advocates increasing the percentage of students admitted to public universities by more than half. She advocates minimum quotas and special concessions for local students. If Tsai Ing-wen has her way, universities may soon be community-based. Such an educational platform is worse than devoid of content. It is downright bizarre. How did Tsai Ing-wen arrive at such a bizarre proposal?
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her public education platform. She advocates fast tracking 12-year national education. She advocates a comprehensive community-based system of vocational high schools within eight years. She advocates increasing the percentage of students admitted to public universities by more than half. She advocates minimum quotas and special concessions for local students. If Tsai Ing-wen has her way, universities may soon be community-based.
Not long ago, Tsai Ing-wen was visiting the United Kingdom. She reminded the public on Taiwan that she received a doctorate from the prestigious London School of Economics. She stressed her outstanding international outlook. But predictably, when addressing higher education back home, she adopted an egalitarian outlook, She championed "Nativization" and state sponsored education, She spoke of quotas and preferential treatment, rather than competitiveness. Her double standards were surprising and worrisome.
They were surprising because Tsai Ing-wen is the beneficiary of her education at elite universities, at home and abroad. She ought to know that the nurturing of talent is an extremely complex undertaking. Yet when she addresses higher education on Taiwan, she frames issues in such simplistic terms. She equates increasing enrollment in public institutions with educational reform. In recent years, the supply of higher education has outstripped demand. Quality has steadily fallen. This is deeply worrisome. Irrational, xenophobic, community-based educational policies will only reduce the international competitiveness of students from Taiwan.
Educational policies such as these may be subject to the imperatives of DPP "Nativism," under which everything must be directed toward the ultimate goal -- Taiwan independence. They must move towards "egalitarianism" and away from "elitism." In fact, charges that higher education on Taiwan is "elitist" are trumped-up. Forcibly altering the educational system in the name of egalitarianism is more likely to sacrifice its essence, and lead to its collapse. Community-based senior high schools may be harmless. But to lump elite schools into the same category clearly represents a naive understanding of egalitarianism. This is especially true for universities. The government should encourage universities to develop their own strengths, instead of binding them hand and feet with all sorts of restrictions.
Over the past half century, Chen Shui-bian, Vincent Siew, Su Tseng-chang and other offspring of farming families have reached the top of the political pyramid, Many entrepreneurs have built empires out of nothing. This means our educational system is an effective channel for social mobility. It enables people who exert the necessary effort, to change their destinies. Nor is that all. It allows them to attend university in foreign lands. It allows young people from Taiwan to experience independent living for the first time. Different towns, different origins, different classes of people communicate with each other in dormitories. Their adaptation, learning, and sharing are important and valuable life experiences. Yet Tsai Ing-wen's policy would require universities to reserve places for local students. Young people would hide out at home for four more years, What will become of those experiences of living abroad and learning from others? Should slots for NTU be reserved for children of Da-an District residents? If so, then what will become of the desired balance between urban and rural areas?
DPP Nativism depicts venturing abroad and foreign competition as a brutal and traumatic experience, It does everything in its power to defend against them. It discourages students from venturing out into the world. It prevents students from the Chinese mainland from coming to Taiwan to compete against them. It attempts to establish a safe haven, sequestered far from the world outside. Competition today is globalized. If we attempt to create a sterile classroom, if we insist on perceiving examinations and competition as snakes and scorpions, what will happen to the international competitiveness of the next generation on Taiwan?
Take Tsai Ing-wen, for example. Her father left his native Chaochou in Pingtung during his youth, and made his fortune in Taipei, As a result, Tsai Ing-wen grew up in Taipei and successfully found her way into National Taiwan University, Cornell University, the London School of Economics, and is now waging a campaign for the presidency. That is social mobility. Tsai Ing-wen still considers herself a native of Chaochou. But would she have preferred that her father had not left home? Would she have preferred attending a community college in Pingtung? She told students at Chungsham Girls High School that she "never attended an elite school." That was hypocritical beyond belief. She was the beneficiary of abundant opportunities for upward mobility. Yet her educational policy would reduce and even eliminate such opportunities for for others. The contradiction is too glaring for wordss.
When the DPP was in power, it introduced its "five year, fifty billion" plan to establish world-class universities on Taiwan. The plan grossly misallocated resources. But at least it recognized the importance of national competitiveness. Tsai Ing-wen's educational platform, on the other hand, offers only such simplistic ideas as community colleges, egalitarianism, and exemption from testing. It promises to implement 12 year national education within eight years, but cannot tell us how it will get there, or how it will be paid for. Apparently Tsai intends to treat education as yet another social welfare program. .
Such an educational platform is worse than devoid of content. It is downright bizarre. How did Tsai Ing-wen arrive at such a bizarre proposal?
奇怪，蔡英文為何會這樣想？
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.08.23 02:26 am
蔡英文公布教育政綱，除主張加速推動十二年國教，八年內高中職要全面社區化；她也主張增加公立大學學生比率到半數以上，並要求公立大學提供一定名額及優惠給在地學生。在蔡英文眼中，大學教育似乎也必須朝「社區化」發展。
不久前，蔡英文才走訪英國，提醒台灣民眾她是名校倫敦大學政經學院畢業的博士，無非在強調自己具有出眾的國際觀。孰料，回頭面對本國高等教育問題，她採取的卻是「平均主義」策略，要走「在地化」、「公立化」路線，談的是保障名額及優惠待遇，而不是競爭力。她的雙重標準，委實令人訝異，也令人擔心。
令人訝異的是，她在國內外菁英大學受益良多，應知人才的打造是一件複雜萬端的「百年樹人」工程；為何自己談論起台灣的高教，竟用如此簡單的眼光來衡量，以為增加公立院校招生就是改革。令人擔心的則是，台灣近年高教因大量供過於求，品質正逐漸降低；若再用莫名所以的理念迫使其走向「社區化」、「排外化」，台灣學生的國際競爭力恐將更矮人一截。
其所以端出這樣的教育政綱，或許是受到民進黨「本土化」眼光的侷限，一切都要朝末端拉扯，而走向以「平均主義」牽制或取代「菁英主義」的極端思維。事實上，把台灣的高等教育視為「菁英主義」，根本是莫須有的罪名；要用「平均主義」來強行改造教育體系的結構，更可能導致其本質精神的瓦解。試想，高中職要社區化容或無妨，但要把明星學校既有的光榮都一起推平，那就顯然是幼稚的平均主義。大學更是如此，政府要鼓勵的是大學創造自己的長處和特色，而不是設定各種限制，讓它們更難自由行動。
過去半世紀，諸如陳水扁、蕭萬長、蘇貞昌等農家子弟都登上政治頂峰，多少企業家白手起家打出天下，表示我們的教育體系是一個有效的「社會流動」管道，讓努力的人可以改變自己的命運和出身。不僅如此，到異鄉上大學，也是台灣年輕人體驗獨立生活的重要起步。不同鄉鎮、不同出身、不同科別的人在宿舍裡彼此交流、適應、學習及分享，是人生重要且美好的經驗。依照蔡英文的政綱，若大學都要保留名額給在地生，年輕人可以繼續在家鄉窩四年，那麼，異地生活、同儕交流等人生際遇要從何而來？台大的名額，需要保留給大安區的子弟嗎？那還談什麼平衡城鄉差距？
民進黨的本土化論述，把出外打拚、外來競爭形容成殘酷及可怕的經驗，所以要盡力提供本地生保護，不僅避免學生離鄉背井，更要防止陸生來台構成競爭。然而，他們想要構築的那個安樂世界，與真實的世界卻有莫大的差距。當競爭已經進入全球化時代，如果我們還企圖打造無菌室教育，視考試與競爭如蛇蠍，台灣下一代的國際競爭力將何等令人憂心？
以蔡英文為例，她的父親早年離開故鄉屏東潮州到台北打天下，所以在台北生長的蔡英文得以一路順利讀進台大、康乃爾、倫敦大學，以至於今要參選總統，這就是社會流動的功能。蔡英文還記得自己是潮州人，但她會希望父親當年不要離開老家，或自己也只能在屏東上大學嗎？從這個角度看，她在中山女中向她的高中學妹聲稱自己「從沒上過明星學校」，不僅太過矯情，也分明是言不由衷。她自己享受了向上流動的美好機遇，但她構想的教育政綱卻是要減緩及消除這樣的流動機會，也太矛盾了。
民進黨執政時推出「五年五百億」計畫，要打造世界一流的頂尖大學，雖嚴重扭曲了資源的利用，卻至少還知道國家競爭力的重要。但在蔡英文的教育政綱裡，看到的卻只有社區化、平均化、免試化的簡單思維，包括要在八年內速成的十二年國教都無法陳述具體步驟和財源，只怕是把教育大計當成社會福利來辦了。
這樣的政綱，已不止是空心不空心，而是邏輯怪誕，思維畸形。不禁要問：奇怪，蔡英文為何會這樣想？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 23, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her public education platform. She advocates fast tracking 12-year national education. She advocates a comprehensive community-based system of vocational high schools within eight years. She advocates increasing the percentage of students admitted to public universities by more than half. She advocates minimum quotas and special concessions for local students. If Tsai Ing-wen has her way, universities may soon be community-based. Such an educational platform is worse than devoid of content. It is downright bizarre. How did Tsai Ing-wen arrive at such a bizarre proposal?
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her public education platform. She advocates fast tracking 12-year national education. She advocates a comprehensive community-based system of vocational high schools within eight years. She advocates increasing the percentage of students admitted to public universities by more than half. She advocates minimum quotas and special concessions for local students. If Tsai Ing-wen has her way, universities may soon be community-based.
Not long ago, Tsai Ing-wen was visiting the United Kingdom. She reminded the public on Taiwan that she received a doctorate from the prestigious London School of Economics. She stressed her outstanding international outlook. But predictably, when addressing higher education back home, she adopted an egalitarian outlook, She championed "Nativization" and state sponsored education, She spoke of quotas and preferential treatment, rather than competitiveness. Her double standards were surprising and worrisome.
They were surprising because Tsai Ing-wen is the beneficiary of her education at elite universities, at home and abroad. She ought to know that the nurturing of talent is an extremely complex undertaking. Yet when she addresses higher education on Taiwan, she frames issues in such simplistic terms. She equates increasing enrollment in public institutions with educational reform. In recent years, the supply of higher education has outstripped demand. Quality has steadily fallen. This is deeply worrisome. Irrational, xenophobic, community-based educational policies will only reduce the international competitiveness of students from Taiwan.
Educational policies such as these may be subject to the imperatives of DPP "Nativism," under which everything must be directed toward the ultimate goal -- Taiwan independence. They must move towards "egalitarianism" and away from "elitism." In fact, charges that higher education on Taiwan is "elitist" are trumped-up. Forcibly altering the educational system in the name of egalitarianism is more likely to sacrifice its essence, and lead to its collapse. Community-based senior high schools may be harmless. But to lump elite schools into the same category clearly represents a naive understanding of egalitarianism. This is especially true for universities. The government should encourage universities to develop their own strengths, instead of binding them hand and feet with all sorts of restrictions.
Over the past half century, Chen Shui-bian, Vincent Siew, Su Tseng-chang and other offspring of farming families have reached the top of the political pyramid, Many entrepreneurs have built empires out of nothing. This means our educational system is an effective channel for social mobility. It enables people who exert the necessary effort, to change their destinies. Nor is that all. It allows them to attend university in foreign lands. It allows young people from Taiwan to experience independent living for the first time. Different towns, different origins, different classes of people communicate with each other in dormitories. Their adaptation, learning, and sharing are important and valuable life experiences. Yet Tsai Ing-wen's policy would require universities to reserve places for local students. Young people would hide out at home for four more years, What will become of those experiences of living abroad and learning from others? Should slots for NTU be reserved for children of Da-an District residents? If so, then what will become of the desired balance between urban and rural areas?
DPP Nativism depicts venturing abroad and foreign competition as a brutal and traumatic experience, It does everything in its power to defend against them. It discourages students from venturing out into the world. It prevents students from the Chinese mainland from coming to Taiwan to compete against them. It attempts to establish a safe haven, sequestered far from the world outside. Competition today is globalized. If we attempt to create a sterile classroom, if we insist on perceiving examinations and competition as snakes and scorpions, what will happen to the international competitiveness of the next generation on Taiwan?
Take Tsai Ing-wen, for example. Her father left his native Chaochou in Pingtung during his youth, and made his fortune in Taipei, As a result, Tsai Ing-wen grew up in Taipei and successfully found her way into National Taiwan University, Cornell University, the London School of Economics, and is now waging a campaign for the presidency. That is social mobility. Tsai Ing-wen still considers herself a native of Chaochou. But would she have preferred that her father had not left home? Would she have preferred attending a community college in Pingtung? She told students at Chungsham Girls High School that she "never attended an elite school." That was hypocritical beyond belief. She was the beneficiary of abundant opportunities for upward mobility. Yet her educational policy would reduce and even eliminate such opportunities for for others. The contradiction is too glaring for wordss.
When the DPP was in power, it introduced its "five year, fifty billion" plan to establish world-class universities on Taiwan. The plan grossly misallocated resources. But at least it recognized the importance of national competitiveness. Tsai Ing-wen's educational platform, on the other hand, offers only such simplistic ideas as community colleges, egalitarianism, and exemption from testing. It promises to implement 12 year national education within eight years, but cannot tell us how it will get there, or how it will be paid for. Apparently Tsai intends to treat education as yet another social welfare program. .
Such an educational platform is worse than devoid of content. It is downright bizarre. How did Tsai Ing-wen arrive at such a bizarre proposal?
奇怪，蔡英文為何會這樣想？
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.08.23 02:26 am
蔡英文公布教育政綱，除主張加速推動十二年國教，八年內高中職要全面社區化；她也主張增加公立大學學生比率到半數以上，並要求公立大學提供一定名額及優惠給在地學生。在蔡英文眼中，大學教育似乎也必須朝「社區化」發展。
不久前，蔡英文才走訪英國，提醒台灣民眾她是名校倫敦大學政經學院畢業的博士，無非在強調自己具有出眾的國際觀。孰料，回頭面對本國高等教育問題，她採取的卻是「平均主義」策略，要走「在地化」、「公立化」路線，談的是保障名額及優惠待遇，而不是競爭力。她的雙重標準，委實令人訝異，也令人擔心。
令人訝異的是，她在國內外菁英大學受益良多，應知人才的打造是一件複雜萬端的「百年樹人」工程；為何自己談論起台灣的高教，竟用如此簡單的眼光來衡量，以為增加公立院校招生就是改革。令人擔心的則是，台灣近年高教因大量供過於求，品質正逐漸降低；若再用莫名所以的理念迫使其走向「社區化」、「排外化」，台灣學生的國際競爭力恐將更矮人一截。
其所以端出這樣的教育政綱，或許是受到民進黨「本土化」眼光的侷限，一切都要朝末端拉扯，而走向以「平均主義」牽制或取代「菁英主義」的極端思維。事實上，把台灣的高等教育視為「菁英主義」，根本是莫須有的罪名；要用「平均主義」來強行改造教育體系的結構，更可能導致其本質精神的瓦解。試想，高中職要社區化容或無妨，但要把明星學校既有的光榮都一起推平，那就顯然是幼稚的平均主義。大學更是如此，政府要鼓勵的是大學創造自己的長處和特色，而不是設定各種限制，讓它們更難自由行動。
過去半世紀，諸如陳水扁、蕭萬長、蘇貞昌等農家子弟都登上政治頂峰，多少企業家白手起家打出天下，表示我們的教育體系是一個有效的「社會流動」管道，讓努力的人可以改變自己的命運和出身。不僅如此，到異鄉上大學，也是台灣年輕人體驗獨立生活的重要起步。不同鄉鎮、不同出身、不同科別的人在宿舍裡彼此交流、適應、學習及分享，是人生重要且美好的經驗。依照蔡英文的政綱，若大學都要保留名額給在地生，年輕人可以繼續在家鄉窩四年，那麼，異地生活、同儕交流等人生際遇要從何而來？台大的名額，需要保留給大安區的子弟嗎？那還談什麼平衡城鄉差距？
民進黨的本土化論述，把出外打拚、外來競爭形容成殘酷及可怕的經驗，所以要盡力提供本地生保護，不僅避免學生離鄉背井，更要防止陸生來台構成競爭。然而，他們想要構築的那個安樂世界，與真實的世界卻有莫大的差距。當競爭已經進入全球化時代，如果我們還企圖打造無菌室教育，視考試與競爭如蛇蠍，台灣下一代的國際競爭力將何等令人憂心？
以蔡英文為例，她的父親早年離開故鄉屏東潮州到台北打天下，所以在台北生長的蔡英文得以一路順利讀進台大、康乃爾、倫敦大學，以至於今要參選總統，這就是社會流動的功能。蔡英文還記得自己是潮州人，但她會希望父親當年不要離開老家，或自己也只能在屏東上大學嗎？從這個角度看，她在中山女中向她的高中學妹聲稱自己「從沒上過明星學校」，不僅太過矯情，也分明是言不由衷。她自己享受了向上流動的美好機遇，但她構想的教育政綱卻是要減緩及消除這樣的流動機會，也太矛盾了。
民進黨執政時推出「五年五百億」計畫，要打造世界一流的頂尖大學，雖嚴重扭曲了資源的利用，卻至少還知道國家競爭力的重要。但在蔡英文的教育政綱裡，看到的卻只有社區化、平均化、免試化的簡單思維，包括要在八年內速成的十二年國教都無法陳述具體步驟和財源，只怕是把教育大計當成社會福利來辦了。
這樣的政綱，已不止是空心不空心，而是邏輯怪誕，思維畸形。不禁要問：奇怪，蔡英文為何會這樣想？
Monday, August 22, 2011
Ensure a Five Percent Growth Rate
Ensure a Five Percent Growth Rate
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 22, 2011
Summary: President Ma is in the final stages of his current term. His team of advisors must show the same determination they did three years ago, when they safely led Taiwan through the financial tsunami. They must ensure a 5% growth rate at all cost. This is not just about ensuring economic growth rates. It is about ensuring one's political legacy. it is about ensuring confidence, security, and stability. And finally, it is about ensuring a second term.
Full Text below:
Dark clouds menace the presidential election, The DGBAS has just announced its economic forecast for the next two years. The result is a preliminary report card on President Ma's first four-year term. Overall economic growth has been positive according to three criteria, and negative according to one. On the whole, gains have exceeded losses. But the economic growth rate this year was 4.81%, not the hoped for 5%. Next year's estimate is for 4.58%, even worse than this year. President Ma's economic advisors and policies have scored a partial victory. They need to work harder, and achieve more. The January 2012 Presidential Election is five months away. The Ma administration still has time to reach its 5% goal, and add a little extra luster to its report card.
There are many ways to produce a good economic policy report card. One way is to introduce a large number of policies. Another is to amend a large number of regulations. Still another is to complete a large number of public works projects. Politicians usually cite the most favorable indicators. But no matter which indicators they cite, they will only be part of the picture. In the end, one must reevaluate one's larger goal. What is this larger goal? It is the same goal that every government pursues, every waking moment of the day. It is economic growth, price stability, reduced unemployment, higher average incomes, and greater equality.
President Ma and his economic advisors have a good idea where they are headed. For example, real gross domestic product (GDP) may reach 15.6 trillion NT next year, a 19% increase over 13.2 trillion NT figure in 2008. That averages out to about 4.45% a year. The financial tsunami had a huge impact. The economy declined, but commodity prices remained stable despite huge increases in the price of international oil and raw materials. Over four years the increases were kept under 2% a year. The Ma administration's record has been remarkable. The aggregate price index, the pain index, and the unemployment rate, have all fallen over the last two years. But they are still higher than when President Ma took office. Consider national income. This year the gross national product per capita (GNP) will exceed 20,000 USD. Next year it will reach new highs. Incomes have increased. Income distribution, which affects social stability. also improved last year. The gap between the highest and lowest incomes shrank 6.19 times.
But a political record is not graded purely on the basis of policy direction. One has a responsibility to meet one's initial targets. The former represents a policy choice, The latter reflects the level of effort. By this standard President Ma's campaign established a "viable economy" policy blueprint. It included industry deregulation, the normalization of cross-Strait economic and trade relations, and the 12 "I-Taiwan" infrastructure projects. He unquestionably moved Taiwan in the right direction. But the government still has a long way to go before it achieves its "6:3:3" goals, These include a 6% average annual economic growth rate, a 3% unemployment rate, and a 30,000 USD per capita GNP after eight years in office. The Ma administration's efforts are inadequate. The public knows that the administration is not to blame for the European and US financial crisis. But the Ma administration cannot use this as an excuse to rest on its laurels.
The global economy is in chaos. The US economy risks going into recession. The European sovereign debt crisis is entering a new wave of turmoil. The Chinese mainland is feeling the after-effects of gradually tightening monetary policy. Japan is undergoing reconstruction following the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster, and coping with the strong Japanese yen. Nouriel Roubini, aka Dr. Doom, predicted a perfect storm by 2013. That storm seems to be gathering even now. Over 60% of Taiwan's trade is with these four economies. Harsh challenges threaten from without. In the short term, the government most needs to guard against international stock market collapse, and the ripple effect on the Taiwan stock market. Superficially it is concerned about the stock price index. But in essence, its real concern is financial system liquidity and stability. The real economy must not be dragged down by the financial crisis.
The domestic situation is hardly optimistic. Private sector consumer confidence has been undermined by the global stock market crash. Over the past two years, the only factor that has maintained momentum in private consumption has been Mainland tourism to Taiwan. During the first half this declined. The second half shows no signs of improvement. People have already scaled back investments due to the vagaries of the international economy. Public construction projects are nearing completion. ECFA, which exerted an impact for almost a full year, has not inspired much desire to invest in Taiwan. Domestic demand has cooled, making the already slow pace of recovery even slower. If events continue to develop the way they have, they will further weaken consumption and investor confidence, creating a vicious circle. Confidence is defined as expectation of future economic growth. It manifests in the moment, Strong confidence in the economy has a multiplier effect. Therefore, the government must not overlook the warning signs of weakening domestic demand. It must increase domestic demand to increase confidence. This is the government's top economic policy priority.
President Ma is in the final stages of his current term. His team of advisors must show the same determination they did three years ago, when they safely led Taiwan through the financial tsunami. They must ensure a 5% growth rate at all cost. This is not just about ensuring economic growth rates. It is about ensuring one's political legacy. it is about ensuring confidence, security, and stability. And finally, it is about ensuring a second term.
保五 保政績 保信心 保穩定
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.22
在總統大選戰雲密布之際，行政院主計處公布了今、明兩年的最新經濟預測，為馬總統這一任四年經濟施政做出了初步成績單。總括來說，經濟成長率三正一負，得多於失；但今年經濟成長率百分之四‧八一，未能保五，明年預估百分之四‧五八，比今年更差，顯示馬總統的財經政策及團隊似乎只打了半場好球，後繼有些乏力。距明年一月總統選舉投票日還有五個月，馬政府仍有足夠的時間再衝刺保五目標，為這份成績單添上光采。
經濟施政成績單可以有很多種，推出多少政策是一種，檢修多少法規是一種，做了多少公共建設也是一種，政治人物通常是選用最有利於己的指標；但無論那一種，都只是局部的呈現，最終還是要回歸總目標的檢驗；而這個總目標，正是任何國家無時無刻不在追求的目標，那就是經濟成長、物價穩定、失業減少、所得成長及平均分配等五項。
就此而言，馬總統及其行政團隊大致達成「方向性」的要求。例如明年實質國內生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）可達十五‧六兆元，比二○○八年就任當年的十三‧一兆元，增加約百分之十九，平均每年約百分之四‧四五，儘管其間經歷了金融海嘯的巨大撞擊，使經濟一度衰退；物價則在國際油價及原物料大漲的環境下保持了穩定，四年間每年漲幅都穩穩控在百分之二以下，馬政府表現可圈可點；與物價合計組成痛苦指數的失業率，近兩年已下降，但仍高於馬總統上任之時；在國民所得方面，今年平均每人國民生產毛額（ＧＮＰ）將跨越二萬美元大關，明年再挑戰新高；在所得增加的同時，影響社會安定的所得分配，去年也獲得改善，最高最低所得差距倍數縮小到六‧一九倍。
不過，施政績效的檢視不只是方向性的達成，亦不能忽視初始預期目標賦予的執行責任，前者代表的是政策方針的選擇，後者反映的是努力程度。準此而言，馬總統競選時訂下的「活力經濟」政策藍圖，包括產業政策鬆綁、兩岸經貿關係正常化、愛台十二項建設等，確是推動台灣經濟前進的正確方向；但距離與這些政策對應的「六三三」目標，政府還有長路要走，包括平均每年經濟成長率百分之六、失業率百分之三及八年後平均每人ＧＮＰ三萬美元等，顯示馬政府團隊的執行力及努力程度都不夠；儘管人民能夠體諒源自歐美的金融海嘯衝擊是非戰之罪，馬政府卻不能以此為藉口而自滿於現狀。
尤其，目前全球經濟、金融情勢混亂不堪，美國經濟再次衰退的風險如影隨形、歐洲主權債務危機又將進入新一波還債高峰的動盪期、中國大陸貨幣政策緊縮的後遺症逐步發酵，災後重建中的日本亦正與日圓強升的衝擊搏鬥，新末日博士羅比尼之前預言的二○一三年「完美風暴」儼然已正匯聚之中，台灣對這四大經濟體的貿易依存度逾六成，外部的嚴酷挑戰已在眼前；但短期面，政府最需嚴防的是國際股市崩跌對台股的波及效應，其形式上關注的雖是股價指數，但實質上須確保的是金融體系的流動性及穩定性，以避免實體經濟遭受金融周轉不順的拖累。
目前內部情勢也無一樂觀，民間消費信心已因全球股災而受到打擊，近兩年維繫民間消費動力於不墜的大陸民眾來台觀光，上半年更已出現衰退，下半年也尚無起色；投資方面，民間已因國際景氣變幻莫測而縮手，擴大公共建設計畫則進入尾聲，而生效快滿一年的兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）也沒有激起明顯的投資台灣意願。國內需求的降溫，讓本已緩慢復甦的步伐走得更沈重；若任令其發展下去，更會反向削弱消費、投資信心，形成惡性循環。信心是對未來經濟成長的預期，並實踐於當下，其強弱會對經濟產生自我實現的加乘力量，因此，政府不能輕忽內需轉弱的警訊，拚內需以振信心，已是政府經濟施政首要之務。
進入馬總統本屆任期的最後階段，行政團隊必須再次拿出三年前帶領台灣安度金融海嘯的決心，全力衝刺保五目標，因為這不僅是在保經濟成長率，更在保政績、保信心、保穩定，以及保下一個任期。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 22, 2011
Summary: President Ma is in the final stages of his current term. His team of advisors must show the same determination they did three years ago, when they safely led Taiwan through the financial tsunami. They must ensure a 5% growth rate at all cost. This is not just about ensuring economic growth rates. It is about ensuring one's political legacy. it is about ensuring confidence, security, and stability. And finally, it is about ensuring a second term.
Full Text below:
Dark clouds menace the presidential election, The DGBAS has just announced its economic forecast for the next two years. The result is a preliminary report card on President Ma's first four-year term. Overall economic growth has been positive according to three criteria, and negative according to one. On the whole, gains have exceeded losses. But the economic growth rate this year was 4.81%, not the hoped for 5%. Next year's estimate is for 4.58%, even worse than this year. President Ma's economic advisors and policies have scored a partial victory. They need to work harder, and achieve more. The January 2012 Presidential Election is five months away. The Ma administration still has time to reach its 5% goal, and add a little extra luster to its report card.
There are many ways to produce a good economic policy report card. One way is to introduce a large number of policies. Another is to amend a large number of regulations. Still another is to complete a large number of public works projects. Politicians usually cite the most favorable indicators. But no matter which indicators they cite, they will only be part of the picture. In the end, one must reevaluate one's larger goal. What is this larger goal? It is the same goal that every government pursues, every waking moment of the day. It is economic growth, price stability, reduced unemployment, higher average incomes, and greater equality.
President Ma and his economic advisors have a good idea where they are headed. For example, real gross domestic product (GDP) may reach 15.6 trillion NT next year, a 19% increase over 13.2 trillion NT figure in 2008. That averages out to about 4.45% a year. The financial tsunami had a huge impact. The economy declined, but commodity prices remained stable despite huge increases in the price of international oil and raw materials. Over four years the increases were kept under 2% a year. The Ma administration's record has been remarkable. The aggregate price index, the pain index, and the unemployment rate, have all fallen over the last two years. But they are still higher than when President Ma took office. Consider national income. This year the gross national product per capita (GNP) will exceed 20,000 USD. Next year it will reach new highs. Incomes have increased. Income distribution, which affects social stability. also improved last year. The gap between the highest and lowest incomes shrank 6.19 times.
But a political record is not graded purely on the basis of policy direction. One has a responsibility to meet one's initial targets. The former represents a policy choice, The latter reflects the level of effort. By this standard President Ma's campaign established a "viable economy" policy blueprint. It included industry deregulation, the normalization of cross-Strait economic and trade relations, and the 12 "I-Taiwan" infrastructure projects. He unquestionably moved Taiwan in the right direction. But the government still has a long way to go before it achieves its "6:3:3" goals, These include a 6% average annual economic growth rate, a 3% unemployment rate, and a 30,000 USD per capita GNP after eight years in office. The Ma administration's efforts are inadequate. The public knows that the administration is not to blame for the European and US financial crisis. But the Ma administration cannot use this as an excuse to rest on its laurels.
The global economy is in chaos. The US economy risks going into recession. The European sovereign debt crisis is entering a new wave of turmoil. The Chinese mainland is feeling the after-effects of gradually tightening monetary policy. Japan is undergoing reconstruction following the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster, and coping with the strong Japanese yen. Nouriel Roubini, aka Dr. Doom, predicted a perfect storm by 2013. That storm seems to be gathering even now. Over 60% of Taiwan's trade is with these four economies. Harsh challenges threaten from without. In the short term, the government most needs to guard against international stock market collapse, and the ripple effect on the Taiwan stock market. Superficially it is concerned about the stock price index. But in essence, its real concern is financial system liquidity and stability. The real economy must not be dragged down by the financial crisis.
The domestic situation is hardly optimistic. Private sector consumer confidence has been undermined by the global stock market crash. Over the past two years, the only factor that has maintained momentum in private consumption has been Mainland tourism to Taiwan. During the first half this declined. The second half shows no signs of improvement. People have already scaled back investments due to the vagaries of the international economy. Public construction projects are nearing completion. ECFA, which exerted an impact for almost a full year, has not inspired much desire to invest in Taiwan. Domestic demand has cooled, making the already slow pace of recovery even slower. If events continue to develop the way they have, they will further weaken consumption and investor confidence, creating a vicious circle. Confidence is defined as expectation of future economic growth. It manifests in the moment, Strong confidence in the economy has a multiplier effect. Therefore, the government must not overlook the warning signs of weakening domestic demand. It must increase domestic demand to increase confidence. This is the government's top economic policy priority.
President Ma is in the final stages of his current term. His team of advisors must show the same determination they did three years ago, when they safely led Taiwan through the financial tsunami. They must ensure a 5% growth rate at all cost. This is not just about ensuring economic growth rates. It is about ensuring one's political legacy. it is about ensuring confidence, security, and stability. And finally, it is about ensuring a second term.
保五 保政績 保信心 保穩定
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.22
在總統大選戰雲密布之際，行政院主計處公布了今、明兩年的最新經濟預測，為馬總統這一任四年經濟施政做出了初步成績單。總括來說，經濟成長率三正一負，得多於失；但今年經濟成長率百分之四‧八一，未能保五，明年預估百分之四‧五八，比今年更差，顯示馬總統的財經政策及團隊似乎只打了半場好球，後繼有些乏力。距明年一月總統選舉投票日還有五個月，馬政府仍有足夠的時間再衝刺保五目標，為這份成績單添上光采。
經濟施政成績單可以有很多種，推出多少政策是一種，檢修多少法規是一種，做了多少公共建設也是一種，政治人物通常是選用最有利於己的指標；但無論那一種，都只是局部的呈現，最終還是要回歸總目標的檢驗；而這個總目標，正是任何國家無時無刻不在追求的目標，那就是經濟成長、物價穩定、失業減少、所得成長及平均分配等五項。
就此而言，馬總統及其行政團隊大致達成「方向性」的要求。例如明年實質國內生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）可達十五‧六兆元，比二○○八年就任當年的十三‧一兆元，增加約百分之十九，平均每年約百分之四‧四五，儘管其間經歷了金融海嘯的巨大撞擊，使經濟一度衰退；物價則在國際油價及原物料大漲的環境下保持了穩定，四年間每年漲幅都穩穩控在百分之二以下，馬政府表現可圈可點；與物價合計組成痛苦指數的失業率，近兩年已下降，但仍高於馬總統上任之時；在國民所得方面，今年平均每人國民生產毛額（ＧＮＰ）將跨越二萬美元大關，明年再挑戰新高；在所得增加的同時，影響社會安定的所得分配，去年也獲得改善，最高最低所得差距倍數縮小到六‧一九倍。
不過，施政績效的檢視不只是方向性的達成，亦不能忽視初始預期目標賦予的執行責任，前者代表的是政策方針的選擇，後者反映的是努力程度。準此而言，馬總統競選時訂下的「活力經濟」政策藍圖，包括產業政策鬆綁、兩岸經貿關係正常化、愛台十二項建設等，確是推動台灣經濟前進的正確方向；但距離與這些政策對應的「六三三」目標，政府還有長路要走，包括平均每年經濟成長率百分之六、失業率百分之三及八年後平均每人ＧＮＰ三萬美元等，顯示馬政府團隊的執行力及努力程度都不夠；儘管人民能夠體諒源自歐美的金融海嘯衝擊是非戰之罪，馬政府卻不能以此為藉口而自滿於現狀。
尤其，目前全球經濟、金融情勢混亂不堪，美國經濟再次衰退的風險如影隨形、歐洲主權債務危機又將進入新一波還債高峰的動盪期、中國大陸貨幣政策緊縮的後遺症逐步發酵，災後重建中的日本亦正與日圓強升的衝擊搏鬥，新末日博士羅比尼之前預言的二○一三年「完美風暴」儼然已正匯聚之中，台灣對這四大經濟體的貿易依存度逾六成，外部的嚴酷挑戰已在眼前；但短期面，政府最需嚴防的是國際股市崩跌對台股的波及效應，其形式上關注的雖是股價指數，但實質上須確保的是金融體系的流動性及穩定性，以避免實體經濟遭受金融周轉不順的拖累。
目前內部情勢也無一樂觀，民間消費信心已因全球股災而受到打擊，近兩年維繫民間消費動力於不墜的大陸民眾來台觀光，上半年更已出現衰退，下半年也尚無起色；投資方面，民間已因國際景氣變幻莫測而縮手，擴大公共建設計畫則進入尾聲，而生效快滿一年的兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）也沒有激起明顯的投資台灣意願。國內需求的降溫，讓本已緩慢復甦的步伐走得更沈重；若任令其發展下去，更會反向削弱消費、投資信心，形成惡性循環。信心是對未來經濟成長的預期，並實踐於當下，其強弱會對經濟產生自我實現的加乘力量，因此，政府不能輕忽內需轉弱的警訊，拚內需以振信心，已是政府經濟施政首要之務。
進入馬總統本屆任期的最後階段，行政團隊必須再次拿出三年前帶領台灣安度金融海嘯的決心，全力衝刺保五目標，因為這不僅是在保經濟成長率，更在保政績、保信心、保穩定，以及保下一個任期。
Thursday, August 18, 2011
Mainland Tourists are More than Just Dollar Signs
Mainland Tourists are More than Just Dollar Signs
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 19, 2011
Summary: The number of Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan has fallen off recently as a result of the recession. Group tours were once filled to overflowing. But second quarter numbers have fallen off sharply, The numbers for the newly implemented Free and Independent Travel Policy are also much lower than expected. What is the problem? So far the government and the tourism industry haven't a clue. That may be the most serious problem of all.
Full Text below:
The number of Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan has fallen off recently as a result of the recession. Group tours were once filled to overflowing. But second quarter numbers have fallen off sharply, The numbers for the newly implemented Free and Independent Travel Policy are also much lower than expected. What is the problem? So far the government and the tourism industry haven't a clue. That may be the most serious problem of all.
The number of Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan as part of group tours fell off this spring. The tourism industry inititally attributed the decline to the overly restrictive nature of group tours, Cutthroat competition within the travel industry also led to lowball bids and poor service, Therefore observers predicted that large numbers of Mainland tourists would switch to individual travel under the Free and Independent Travel Policy Act. The Free and Independent Travel Policy Act went into effect in June. But by the end of the month, only 500 tourists had arrived on Taiwan, only slightly more than the quota for a single day. The assumption that tourists would switch from group tours to individual tourism the Free and Independent Travel Policy was apparently mistaken.
Tourism Bureau officials believe the main reasons for the decline are the plasticizing agent scandal and Alishan train accidents. Overcrowding at the National Palace Museum and other attractions have also dampened visitor interest. Indeed, transportation safety, service quality, as well as Taiwan's overall credibilty and image, are all factors that have affected visitor interest. Taiwan opened itself up to Mainland tourism only three years ago. Has fatigue already set in after such a brief period? Is Mainland tourism to Taiwan merely a flash in the pan? If that is the case, then the quality of our tourism services and tourism facilities are substandard and not sustainable in the long term. Are these factors sufficient to explain the decline in Mainland tourism to Taiwan? If not, what other factors are there?
Mainland tourists have never come to Taiwan purely for the sake of tourism. For Mainland tourists, Taiwan's primarly selling point is the 50 year long separation between the two sides. Relatives and friends can now be reunified. They can experience the economic and social contrast between democracy and authoritarianism. They can satisfly their curiosity about each other, learn about each other, learn from each other, compete against each other, amidst a "quasi-divided" state of affairs. Two years ago Taiwan opened itself up to Mainland tourism. Mainland tourists replaced Japanese tourists as Taiwan's most important source of tourism revenue. Why? Because many Mainland tourists want to see with their own eyes the symbolic differences between the two sides that have resulted from a half-century of separation. They want to experience for themselves another model of development for the Chinese people. Therefore, if we insist on seeing Mainland tourists to Taiwan merely as "business opportunities," we will inevitably make the mistake of focusing on short term profits.
Cross-Strait exchanges involve the more complex problem of politics. This has two aspects. On Taiwan, the opposition DPP opposes opening the island to Mainland tourism. Not everyone agrees that is a good thing. Not everyone is happy about it. As a result, Mainland tourists are strictly limited in their movements. They are not permitted to leave their tour groups. Free movement is prohibited. Travel agents are made liable for any violations. This discriminates against Mainland tourists. It also encourages the tourism industry to find ways to evade system oversight. We want the business opportunities afforded by Mainland tourists. But we refuse to offer Mainland tourists reasonable treatment. Alas, the government is utterly oblivious about its own internal contradictions. It is even less interested in seeking ways to remedy the situation.
Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan also involve a hidden variable in cross-Strait political relations. To a considerable extent, cross-Strait policy requires Beijing's cooperation, and its belief in the Ma administration's good faith. This however, forces the administration to exercise greater discretionary authority in response to the gray area. For example, rumor has it that the first 200 visitors traveling under the Free and Independent Travel Policy were mobilized by the Beijing authorities, If true, this cannot help but distort the nature of what ensues. Also, election season is approaching. The government has asked Beijing to reduce the number of political and business visits, in order to avoid harming the ruling party's election prospects, Such a move is highly artificial. Many Mainland visitors want to come to Taiwan to witness the elections, "up close and personal," But they are forbidden to do so out of political considerations. Outsiders cannot see what is going on behind the scenes. This makes finding a remedy even more difficult.
Mainland visitors to Taiwan can help the two sides understand each other, This is indisputable. But government and business choose to see the matter as nothing more than business. The government boasts about waves of tourists spreading money around. Businesses think only of Mainland tourists' immense purchasing power. Both value only group size, purchasing power, and making a fast buck. As for how to provide the commensurate services, how to showcase Taiwan's sophistication, how to to leave a good impression, those are matters they cannot be bothered with.
The plasticizer scandal severely damaged Taiwan's image. The Alishan train accidents and Suhua Highway accidents have also dampened tourist enthusiasm, But a far more serious is Mainland tourists who have concluded that "Taiwanese are no longer honest." When they return to the Mainland and speak of their disillusionment, more and more people will have second thoughts. Tourism industry insiders on Taiwan have expressed regrets over the self-destructive myopia of their industry peers, including hotels and stores. Can a market that kills the goose that lays the golden egg have a future?
The number of Mainland visitors has decline, But if they enjoy greater freedom of movement, if they can travel in greater safety, if they can have more fun, that may not be a bad thing. Taiwanese visitors to the Mainland have also experienced incidents in which they were treated as "dai bao" (clueless tourists). Who wants such unpleasant experiences repeated with Mainland tourists to Taiwan? More importantly, Mainland tourists' fascination with Taiwan must not be destroyed by businessmen interested only in making a fast buck. Perhaps Taipei and Beijing have not had sufficient time to implement their plans. But they must, if tourism exchanges are to enhance mutual understanding.
陸客來台不能只論「商機」
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.08.19 02:26 am
最近陸客來台出現衰退現象，不僅原來爆滿的旅行團第二季起大幅退燒，新開放的「自由行」人數亦遠低於預期。其中癥結究竟為何，政府和旅行業者至今都還說不出所以然，這恐怕才是更嚴重的問題。
今春陸客旅遊團來台人數驟降，當時旅行業研判，認為是團體旅遊限制太多，加上業者低價搶客導致旅遊品質不佳，因此預期許多陸客將大量轉向自由行。然而，驗證六月底自由行開放一個月來台人數才五百多人，僅略高於一天的開放量，足見「自由行取代團遊」的說法尚難立足。
觀光局官員則認為，這主要是受塑化劑風波及阿里山火車翻覆事件的衝擊，包括故宮等景點過度擁擠也敗壞參觀遊興。的確，交通安全、旅遊品質乃至台灣整體誠信形象，都是影響遊興的深層因素；但台灣開放陸客觀光不過三年，如果歷經短暫的曇花一現即進入了疲怠期，則不啻顯示我們的觀光軟硬體架構不堪一擊。若這些因素仍不足以解釋全部的現象，那麼陸客來台的減退，還有什麼可能的原因？
從本質而言，陸客來台從來不是一種純純粹粹的觀光活動。對陸客而言，台灣的賣點主要是建立在兩岸五十年分隔的對應關係上，由此衍生出親友的離散再重聚、民主與威權體制的對比、經濟體質與社會價值的差異等，彼此在「分而不裂」的關係中互相好奇、參照、學習與競爭。在開放觀光兩年後，陸客即取代日本成為台灣最重要的客源，原因在此。許多陸客來台，是想要親眼見證兩岸分治半世紀的各種象徵、傳說與差異，乃至體驗華人社會的另一種發展模式。因此，若把陸客來台定位為「觀光商機」，勢必因著眼於近利而產生偏差。
兩岸交流更複雜的面向是政治。這又可以分成兩方面來看：在台灣內部，因為在野黨的反對，開放陸客並不是全台同感欣然的共識；也因此，政策上要對陸客活動嚴格設限，防範脫隊、禁止自由行動、對旅行社課以重責。這不僅是對陸客的歧視，也讓台灣對觀光出現目的與手段背離的管理：既想要陸客的商機，又不給其合理的旅遊待遇。遺憾的是，政府對此矛盾毫無自覺，更遑論有何改進的機制。
此外，在兩岸政治關係上，也潛藏著陸客來台觀光的一個隱性變數。現行的兩岸政策某種程度是倚賴北京對馬政府的「善意」配合，但這也增加了行政操縱的模糊地帶。例如，據傳首批自由行旅客中有兩百人是北京所動員，不免使盛事失真；再如近期大選逼近，我方主動要求對岸政商減少來訪，以免因故波及執政黨選情，操作也顯得極不自然。相對的，不少陸客希望此時來台見識選戰交鋒，卻可能因政治考量而無法獲准。正因為外界無法窺知其間的操作，也使得對症下藥越發困難。
陸客來台有助兩岸的多面向交流和理解，這是不爭的事實；但在實務面，不論政府或業者卻都只把此事當成「商機」操作：政府誇示的是龐大觀光人潮的擴散效益，業者心動的是陸客強大的購買力。也因此，雙方重視的就是出團人數、購買金額，如何讓對方掏出荷包。至於如何提供相稱的服務，如何表現台灣的氣質，如何留下美好的印象，都難以顧及。
塑化劑風暴重創台灣的品質形象，阿里山和蘇花高的交通事故也會讓觀光客卻步，但這些都比不上來台陸客覺得「台灣人不再誠實」來得嚴重。因為他們帶回去的失望評價，將使更多人觀望不前。聽國內旅行業對同業、飯店、賣場的短視作風發出「自作孽」的感嘆，一個殺雞取卵的市場，如何會近悅遠來？又如何能經營長久？
陸客人數減少，若能換得更多自由行動、更多旅遊安全及樂趣，未嘗不是件好事。台灣人遊大陸，也經歷過「呆胞」的階段，誰希望不愉快的經驗在陸客身上重演？重要的是，陸客來台的興致，不能毀在第一線商人的唯利是圖，或者兩岸政府言不及行的操作上，這樣，觀光交流才有增進理解的意義。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 19, 2011
Summary: The number of Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan has fallen off recently as a result of the recession. Group tours were once filled to overflowing. But second quarter numbers have fallen off sharply, The numbers for the newly implemented Free and Independent Travel Policy are also much lower than expected. What is the problem? So far the government and the tourism industry haven't a clue. That may be the most serious problem of all.
Full Text below:
The number of Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan has fallen off recently as a result of the recession. Group tours were once filled to overflowing. But second quarter numbers have fallen off sharply, The numbers for the newly implemented Free and Independent Travel Policy are also much lower than expected. What is the problem? So far the government and the tourism industry haven't a clue. That may be the most serious problem of all.
The number of Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan as part of group tours fell off this spring. The tourism industry inititally attributed the decline to the overly restrictive nature of group tours, Cutthroat competition within the travel industry also led to lowball bids and poor service, Therefore observers predicted that large numbers of Mainland tourists would switch to individual travel under the Free and Independent Travel Policy Act. The Free and Independent Travel Policy Act went into effect in June. But by the end of the month, only 500 tourists had arrived on Taiwan, only slightly more than the quota for a single day. The assumption that tourists would switch from group tours to individual tourism the Free and Independent Travel Policy was apparently mistaken.
Tourism Bureau officials believe the main reasons for the decline are the plasticizing agent scandal and Alishan train accidents. Overcrowding at the National Palace Museum and other attractions have also dampened visitor interest. Indeed, transportation safety, service quality, as well as Taiwan's overall credibilty and image, are all factors that have affected visitor interest. Taiwan opened itself up to Mainland tourism only three years ago. Has fatigue already set in after such a brief period? Is Mainland tourism to Taiwan merely a flash in the pan? If that is the case, then the quality of our tourism services and tourism facilities are substandard and not sustainable in the long term. Are these factors sufficient to explain the decline in Mainland tourism to Taiwan? If not, what other factors are there?
Mainland tourists have never come to Taiwan purely for the sake of tourism. For Mainland tourists, Taiwan's primarly selling point is the 50 year long separation between the two sides. Relatives and friends can now be reunified. They can experience the economic and social contrast between democracy and authoritarianism. They can satisfly their curiosity about each other, learn about each other, learn from each other, compete against each other, amidst a "quasi-divided" state of affairs. Two years ago Taiwan opened itself up to Mainland tourism. Mainland tourists replaced Japanese tourists as Taiwan's most important source of tourism revenue. Why? Because many Mainland tourists want to see with their own eyes the symbolic differences between the two sides that have resulted from a half-century of separation. They want to experience for themselves another model of development for the Chinese people. Therefore, if we insist on seeing Mainland tourists to Taiwan merely as "business opportunities," we will inevitably make the mistake of focusing on short term profits.
Cross-Strait exchanges involve the more complex problem of politics. This has two aspects. On Taiwan, the opposition DPP opposes opening the island to Mainland tourism. Not everyone agrees that is a good thing. Not everyone is happy about it. As a result, Mainland tourists are strictly limited in their movements. They are not permitted to leave their tour groups. Free movement is prohibited. Travel agents are made liable for any violations. This discriminates against Mainland tourists. It also encourages the tourism industry to find ways to evade system oversight. We want the business opportunities afforded by Mainland tourists. But we refuse to offer Mainland tourists reasonable treatment. Alas, the government is utterly oblivious about its own internal contradictions. It is even less interested in seeking ways to remedy the situation.
Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan also involve a hidden variable in cross-Strait political relations. To a considerable extent, cross-Strait policy requires Beijing's cooperation, and its belief in the Ma administration's good faith. This however, forces the administration to exercise greater discretionary authority in response to the gray area. For example, rumor has it that the first 200 visitors traveling under the Free and Independent Travel Policy were mobilized by the Beijing authorities, If true, this cannot help but distort the nature of what ensues. Also, election season is approaching. The government has asked Beijing to reduce the number of political and business visits, in order to avoid harming the ruling party's election prospects, Such a move is highly artificial. Many Mainland visitors want to come to Taiwan to witness the elections, "up close and personal," But they are forbidden to do so out of political considerations. Outsiders cannot see what is going on behind the scenes. This makes finding a remedy even more difficult.
Mainland visitors to Taiwan can help the two sides understand each other, This is indisputable. But government and business choose to see the matter as nothing more than business. The government boasts about waves of tourists spreading money around. Businesses think only of Mainland tourists' immense purchasing power. Both value only group size, purchasing power, and making a fast buck. As for how to provide the commensurate services, how to showcase Taiwan's sophistication, how to to leave a good impression, those are matters they cannot be bothered with.
The plasticizer scandal severely damaged Taiwan's image. The Alishan train accidents and Suhua Highway accidents have also dampened tourist enthusiasm, But a far more serious is Mainland tourists who have concluded that "Taiwanese are no longer honest." When they return to the Mainland and speak of their disillusionment, more and more people will have second thoughts. Tourism industry insiders on Taiwan have expressed regrets over the self-destructive myopia of their industry peers, including hotels and stores. Can a market that kills the goose that lays the golden egg have a future?
The number of Mainland visitors has decline, But if they enjoy greater freedom of movement, if they can travel in greater safety, if they can have more fun, that may not be a bad thing. Taiwanese visitors to the Mainland have also experienced incidents in which they were treated as "dai bao" (clueless tourists). Who wants such unpleasant experiences repeated with Mainland tourists to Taiwan? More importantly, Mainland tourists' fascination with Taiwan must not be destroyed by businessmen interested only in making a fast buck. Perhaps Taipei and Beijing have not had sufficient time to implement their plans. But they must, if tourism exchanges are to enhance mutual understanding.
陸客來台不能只論「商機」
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.08.19 02:26 am
最近陸客來台出現衰退現象，不僅原來爆滿的旅行團第二季起大幅退燒，新開放的「自由行」人數亦遠低於預期。其中癥結究竟為何，政府和旅行業者至今都還說不出所以然，這恐怕才是更嚴重的問題。
今春陸客旅遊團來台人數驟降，當時旅行業研判，認為是團體旅遊限制太多，加上業者低價搶客導致旅遊品質不佳，因此預期許多陸客將大量轉向自由行。然而，驗證六月底自由行開放一個月來台人數才五百多人，僅略高於一天的開放量，足見「自由行取代團遊」的說法尚難立足。
觀光局官員則認為，這主要是受塑化劑風波及阿里山火車翻覆事件的衝擊，包括故宮等景點過度擁擠也敗壞參觀遊興。的確，交通安全、旅遊品質乃至台灣整體誠信形象，都是影響遊興的深層因素；但台灣開放陸客觀光不過三年，如果歷經短暫的曇花一現即進入了疲怠期，則不啻顯示我們的觀光軟硬體架構不堪一擊。若這些因素仍不足以解釋全部的現象，那麼陸客來台的減退，還有什麼可能的原因？
從本質而言，陸客來台從來不是一種純純粹粹的觀光活動。對陸客而言，台灣的賣點主要是建立在兩岸五十年分隔的對應關係上，由此衍生出親友的離散再重聚、民主與威權體制的對比、經濟體質與社會價值的差異等，彼此在「分而不裂」的關係中互相好奇、參照、學習與競爭。在開放觀光兩年後，陸客即取代日本成為台灣最重要的客源，原因在此。許多陸客來台，是想要親眼見證兩岸分治半世紀的各種象徵、傳說與差異，乃至體驗華人社會的另一種發展模式。因此，若把陸客來台定位為「觀光商機」，勢必因著眼於近利而產生偏差。
兩岸交流更複雜的面向是政治。這又可以分成兩方面來看：在台灣內部，因為在野黨的反對，開放陸客並不是全台同感欣然的共識；也因此，政策上要對陸客活動嚴格設限，防範脫隊、禁止自由行動、對旅行社課以重責。這不僅是對陸客的歧視，也讓台灣對觀光出現目的與手段背離的管理：既想要陸客的商機，又不給其合理的旅遊待遇。遺憾的是，政府對此矛盾毫無自覺，更遑論有何改進的機制。
此外，在兩岸政治關係上，也潛藏著陸客來台觀光的一個隱性變數。現行的兩岸政策某種程度是倚賴北京對馬政府的「善意」配合，但這也增加了行政操縱的模糊地帶。例如，據傳首批自由行旅客中有兩百人是北京所動員，不免使盛事失真；再如近期大選逼近，我方主動要求對岸政商減少來訪，以免因故波及執政黨選情，操作也顯得極不自然。相對的，不少陸客希望此時來台見識選戰交鋒，卻可能因政治考量而無法獲准。正因為外界無法窺知其間的操作，也使得對症下藥越發困難。
陸客來台有助兩岸的多面向交流和理解，這是不爭的事實；但在實務面，不論政府或業者卻都只把此事當成「商機」操作：政府誇示的是龐大觀光人潮的擴散效益，業者心動的是陸客強大的購買力。也因此，雙方重視的就是出團人數、購買金額，如何讓對方掏出荷包。至於如何提供相稱的服務，如何表現台灣的氣質，如何留下美好的印象，都難以顧及。
塑化劑風暴重創台灣的品質形象，阿里山和蘇花高的交通事故也會讓觀光客卻步，但這些都比不上來台陸客覺得「台灣人不再誠實」來得嚴重。因為他們帶回去的失望評價，將使更多人觀望不前。聽國內旅行業對同業、飯店、賣場的短視作風發出「自作孽」的感嘆，一個殺雞取卵的市場，如何會近悅遠來？又如何能經營長久？
陸客人數減少，若能換得更多自由行動、更多旅遊安全及樂趣，未嘗不是件好事。台灣人遊大陸，也經歷過「呆胞」的階段，誰希望不愉快的經驗在陸客身上重演？重要的是，陸客來台的興致，不能毀在第一線商人的唯利是圖，或者兩岸政府言不及行的操作上，這樣，觀光交流才有增進理解的意義。
To Eliminate Debt, First Eliminate Populism
To Eliminate Debt, First Eliminate Populism
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 18, 2011
Summary: In response to repeated public exhortations, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has finally unveiled the first plank in her "Platform for the Coming Decade." In the section on taxes, Tsai Ing-wen has promised that if she is elected president, and the DPP wins an absolute majority in the legislature, the DPP will reduce the deficit by half in four years, and balance the budget in eight years. Tsai Ing-wen has boldly proposed fiscal reform. For this she deserves praise. But what specifically has she proposed? Can her proposal negotiate Taiwan's populist political gauntlet, particularly the DPP's? It will be interesting to see.
Full Text below:
In response to repeated public exhortations, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has finally unveiled the first plank in her "Platform for the Coming Decade." In the section on taxes, Tsai Ing-wen has promised that if she is elected president, and the DPP wins an absolute majority in the legislature, the DPP will reduce the deficit by half in four years, and balance the budget in eight years. Tsai Ing-wen has boldly proposed fiscal reform. For this she deserves praise. But what specifically has she proposed? Can her proposal negotiate Taiwan's populist political gauntlet, particularly the DPP's? It will be interesting to see.
Recent opinion polls show Tsai Ing-wen's momentum fading. Even if James Soong runs for president, and the Blue Camp falls prey to internal divisions, Tsai Ing-wen's momentum will be insufficient. If anything, she risks marginalization. Party insiders are extraordinarily anxious. They fear Tsai Ing-wen has no idea how to run a campaign. Many people have even suggested that Tsai Ing-wen learn at the feet of Chen Shui-bian. They have urged her to adopt Ah-Bian's "divide and conquer," Blue vs. Green campaign methods. So far, Tsai Ing-wen has resisted the temptation. She has kept the election focused on public policy, For Taiwan's election climate, this can be considered a small step forward.
Political candidates have a responsibility to maintain a constructive election climate. Tsai Ing-wen has finally set forth a substantive policy proposal. Now it must undergo public scrutiny.
Compared to the United States and Europe, the Republic of China is not on the verge of a financial crisis. If we go strictly by the book, the national debt has yet to exceed the statutory limit of 40% of gross domestic product. Some financial and economic experts fear that if the 13 trillion NT in hidden debt is included, the Republic of China's national debt will reach astronomical proportions. Even more worrisome than the huge national debt is the Republic of China's 11.9% tax rate, This is lower even than Singapore's, famous for its low tax rate. The annual budget deficit is now 240 billion NT. Such a financial arrangement is unsustainable in the long term.
During its eight years in power, the Democratic Progressive Party increased the national debt by one trillion two hundred billion NT. Since the KMT returned to power three years ago, the national debt has increased nearly one trillion three hundred billion NT. The increase in the national debt accelerated. The 8/8 Floods and the financial tsunami reduced government revenue and increased government expenditures. The government's frequent tax cuts have worsened the debt crisis. The problem is that whenever the issue of tax cuts comes up, both the ruling and opposition parties, which usually fight each other tooth and nail, immediately sing the exact same tune. For example, the government's proposal that the sales tax be raised was put on indefinite hold. But the ruling and opposition parties both jumped on the business tax cuts bandwagon. They outbid each other, and abruptly cut the business tax rate from 25% to 17%.
During an interview last week, Premier Wu Den-yih lamented that the Republic of China's tax rate is far too low. But at the same time the public wants everything other nations have to offer. They want social welfare as comprehensive as those in Scandinavia. The government can only do its best. Premier Wu understands the fiscal structure issues, but cannot carry out fiscal reforms. The ruling party is clearly not above reproach.
Tsai Ing-wen has proposed balancing the budget. Her promises must be subject to the same scrutiny. With this plank in its campaign platform, the DPP has vowed to reduce the budget deficit, But it failed to specify how. What precisely does it intend to do? Does it intend to increase taxes? Or does it intend to reduce expenditures? The DPP's Platform for the Coming Decade has done nothing but proclaim a goal. It has said nothing about how to achieve it.
Fiscal policy proposals cannot be discussed in isolation. They must be discussed alongside government spending. The social welfare plank in the Platform for the Coming Decade will be announced on Friday. Based on past remarks by Tsai Ing-wen, one of the DPP's highest priorities is the establishment of an extensive social welfare system. But the DPP has never had the guts to call for a tax increase. Therefore what is all this talk about defict reduction, except hot air?
In fact, the DPP Central Standing Committee has just adopted a resolution. it has decided to increase subsidies to elderly farmers 1000 dollars, It has increased the subsidy from 6000 NT per month to 7000 NT per month. This will increase the burden on the state treasury by 8.4 billion NT. Throughout the process, the DPP has never explained where it would obtain the funds. It has never considered reintegrating the subsidies for elderly farmers into the national pension system. Its proposal is pure populism, utterly bereft of fiscal discipline.
Neither the KMT nor the DPP have any qualms about issuing rubber checks to cover subsidies for elderly farmers. Tseng Chen-wei, a fiscal affairs expert says, "When it comes to taxation and fiscal affairs, there is no distinction between the ruling and opposition parties." This is the sad truth about populist politics on Taiwan. The ruling and opposition parties understand the problem. But they have no desire to work together to solve the problem. Just the opposite. Extreme political polarization has encouraged both the ruling and opposition parties to outbid each other, to buy off voters for short term electoral advantage. In the long term of course, we will all have to pay the price.
In fact, behind Tsai Ing-wen's proposal for a balance budget, lies the concept of intergenerational equity. Birth rates are declining. The heavy burden of debt accumulated by this generation will be borne by the next generation. Is the DPP sincere about the concept of intergenerational equity? If it is, why wait until a DPP candidate is elected president and DPP legislators constitute an absolute majority in the legislature? Shouldn't the DPP practice what it preaches, here and now?
改掉民粹 才能解決巨額國債問題
2011-08-18 中國時報
各界千呼萬喚，民進黨總統參選人蔡英文終於推出「十年政綱」第一道菜，在財稅篇中，蔡英文承諾，只要總統勝選、國會過半，民進黨將在四年內達成赤字減半、八年達到財政平衡的目標。蔡英文勇於提出改革財政的主張，值得肯定；但是具體做法為何？能否扺擋台灣政治、尤其是民進黨的民粹傾向，都相當值得觀察。
近來蔡英文民調、聲勢下挫，即使宋楚瑜出馬、藍營內鬨，都無法拉抬蔡英文氣勢，反而出現邊緣化危機；黨內異常焦慮，擔心蔡英文不懂選舉，甚至有不少人建議蔡英文向陳水扁取經，採取扁式割裂藍綠的選舉作風。目前，蔡英文尚能抗拒這種誘惑，讓選舉停留在公共政策的討論；就台灣的選舉文化而言，可說是進了一小步。
當然，維持良好的選舉文化，是政治人物的基本道德，蔡英文終於推出實質政見，就必須接受各界的詳細檢視。
和美國、歐洲相比，台灣現階段並未面臨迫在眉睫的財政危機；就帳面上來看，國債尚未超過法定的國內生產毛額百分之四十上限。有財政學者憂心，如果加上十三兆的隱藏性債務，台灣國債可能已達天文數；不過，比巨額國債更令人擔憂的是，台灣租稅負擔率只有百分之十一點九，比低稅率的新加坡還要低，每年的預算赤字就高達二千五百億，長期來看，這樣的財政結構不可能支撐。
事實上，民進黨八年執政增加一兆二千億國債，國民黨重返執政三年來，也已增加近一兆三千億，國債加速度增加，除了八八風災、金融風暴導致政府稅收減少、支出增加外，政府頻頻減稅，更讓債務危機雪上加霜。問題是，只要談到減稅，一向鬥得你死我活的朝野政黨，馬上就有志一同；例如，政府原先調升營業稅的主張遲遲沒下文，但針對調降營所稅，朝野卻大方送禮，競相加碼，從百分之二十五，一下子就降到百分之十七。
行政院長吳敦義上周接受專訪時感嘆，台灣的稅賦負擔偏低，但每樣事都想要國際最好的，社福水準想和北歐一樣，政府只能盡量努力；由此可見，吳揆並非不了解財政結構困境，但就是無法貫徹財政改革，執政黨確有可議之處。
在這樣的背景下，蔡英文提出財政平衡的政見，同樣要接受言行是否一致的考驗。在這份政見中，民進黨雖矢言降低財政赤字，卻並未提出具體做法；究竟要增加哪些稅收、減少哪些支出，民進黨的十年政綱除了宣言式的目標外，並未具體說明項目。
事實上，財政政見絕對不可能獨立，必須和政府支出一起討論；十年政綱中的社福篇，將於周五公布，依蔡英文過去的言論，民進黨執政後仍以建構社福體系為優先目標。但民進黨一樣不敢喊加稅，如此一來，要談降低赤字，豈非緣木求魚？
事實上，民進黨中常會日前才通過決議，決定調高老農津貼一千元，從每月六千元增為七千元，國庫為此又將增加八十四億。在整個過程中，民進黨未交代財源，不考慮老農津貼回歸國民年金體制，形同只有民粹主張，完全不見財政紀律。
持平而言，有關老農津貼加碼等濫開支票做法，國民黨和民進黨一樣毫不手軟；就如同財政學者曾巨威所說，「在租稅和財政問題，我們沒有在野黨和執政黨的分別」。這是台灣民粹政治的可悲，朝野政黨並非不了解問題所在，但卻不願合作解決問題，反而因為極端對立的政治氣氛，讓朝野政黨競相加碼籠絡選民，短期也許有選舉利益，但長期大家都會受害。
事實上，蔡英文財政平衡的主張背後，有著世代公平的理念；因為這一代累積的債務，在少子化的趨勢下，下一代將背負更沉重的包袱。民進黨若要真誠的實踐世代公平的理念，不用等到「當選總統、國會過半」，現在就必須提出言行一致的政見主張。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 18, 2011
Summary: In response to repeated public exhortations, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has finally unveiled the first plank in her "Platform for the Coming Decade." In the section on taxes, Tsai Ing-wen has promised that if she is elected president, and the DPP wins an absolute majority in the legislature, the DPP will reduce the deficit by half in four years, and balance the budget in eight years. Tsai Ing-wen has boldly proposed fiscal reform. For this she deserves praise. But what specifically has she proposed? Can her proposal negotiate Taiwan's populist political gauntlet, particularly the DPP's? It will be interesting to see.
Full Text below:
In response to repeated public exhortations, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has finally unveiled the first plank in her "Platform for the Coming Decade." In the section on taxes, Tsai Ing-wen has promised that if she is elected president, and the DPP wins an absolute majority in the legislature, the DPP will reduce the deficit by half in four years, and balance the budget in eight years. Tsai Ing-wen has boldly proposed fiscal reform. For this she deserves praise. But what specifically has she proposed? Can her proposal negotiate Taiwan's populist political gauntlet, particularly the DPP's? It will be interesting to see.
Recent opinion polls show Tsai Ing-wen's momentum fading. Even if James Soong runs for president, and the Blue Camp falls prey to internal divisions, Tsai Ing-wen's momentum will be insufficient. If anything, she risks marginalization. Party insiders are extraordinarily anxious. They fear Tsai Ing-wen has no idea how to run a campaign. Many people have even suggested that Tsai Ing-wen learn at the feet of Chen Shui-bian. They have urged her to adopt Ah-Bian's "divide and conquer," Blue vs. Green campaign methods. So far, Tsai Ing-wen has resisted the temptation. She has kept the election focused on public policy, For Taiwan's election climate, this can be considered a small step forward.
Political candidates have a responsibility to maintain a constructive election climate. Tsai Ing-wen has finally set forth a substantive policy proposal. Now it must undergo public scrutiny.
Compared to the United States and Europe, the Republic of China is not on the verge of a financial crisis. If we go strictly by the book, the national debt has yet to exceed the statutory limit of 40% of gross domestic product. Some financial and economic experts fear that if the 13 trillion NT in hidden debt is included, the Republic of China's national debt will reach astronomical proportions. Even more worrisome than the huge national debt is the Republic of China's 11.9% tax rate, This is lower even than Singapore's, famous for its low tax rate. The annual budget deficit is now 240 billion NT. Such a financial arrangement is unsustainable in the long term.
During its eight years in power, the Democratic Progressive Party increased the national debt by one trillion two hundred billion NT. Since the KMT returned to power three years ago, the national debt has increased nearly one trillion three hundred billion NT. The increase in the national debt accelerated. The 8/8 Floods and the financial tsunami reduced government revenue and increased government expenditures. The government's frequent tax cuts have worsened the debt crisis. The problem is that whenever the issue of tax cuts comes up, both the ruling and opposition parties, which usually fight each other tooth and nail, immediately sing the exact same tune. For example, the government's proposal that the sales tax be raised was put on indefinite hold. But the ruling and opposition parties both jumped on the business tax cuts bandwagon. They outbid each other, and abruptly cut the business tax rate from 25% to 17%.
During an interview last week, Premier Wu Den-yih lamented that the Republic of China's tax rate is far too low. But at the same time the public wants everything other nations have to offer. They want social welfare as comprehensive as those in Scandinavia. The government can only do its best. Premier Wu understands the fiscal structure issues, but cannot carry out fiscal reforms. The ruling party is clearly not above reproach.
Tsai Ing-wen has proposed balancing the budget. Her promises must be subject to the same scrutiny. With this plank in its campaign platform, the DPP has vowed to reduce the budget deficit, But it failed to specify how. What precisely does it intend to do? Does it intend to increase taxes? Or does it intend to reduce expenditures? The DPP's Platform for the Coming Decade has done nothing but proclaim a goal. It has said nothing about how to achieve it.
Fiscal policy proposals cannot be discussed in isolation. They must be discussed alongside government spending. The social welfare plank in the Platform for the Coming Decade will be announced on Friday. Based on past remarks by Tsai Ing-wen, one of the DPP's highest priorities is the establishment of an extensive social welfare system. But the DPP has never had the guts to call for a tax increase. Therefore what is all this talk about defict reduction, except hot air?
In fact, the DPP Central Standing Committee has just adopted a resolution. it has decided to increase subsidies to elderly farmers 1000 dollars, It has increased the subsidy from 6000 NT per month to 7000 NT per month. This will increase the burden on the state treasury by 8.4 billion NT. Throughout the process, the DPP has never explained where it would obtain the funds. It has never considered reintegrating the subsidies for elderly farmers into the national pension system. Its proposal is pure populism, utterly bereft of fiscal discipline.
Neither the KMT nor the DPP have any qualms about issuing rubber checks to cover subsidies for elderly farmers. Tseng Chen-wei, a fiscal affairs expert says, "When it comes to taxation and fiscal affairs, there is no distinction between the ruling and opposition parties." This is the sad truth about populist politics on Taiwan. The ruling and opposition parties understand the problem. But they have no desire to work together to solve the problem. Just the opposite. Extreme political polarization has encouraged both the ruling and opposition parties to outbid each other, to buy off voters for short term electoral advantage. In the long term of course, we will all have to pay the price.
In fact, behind Tsai Ing-wen's proposal for a balance budget, lies the concept of intergenerational equity. Birth rates are declining. The heavy burden of debt accumulated by this generation will be borne by the next generation. Is the DPP sincere about the concept of intergenerational equity? If it is, why wait until a DPP candidate is elected president and DPP legislators constitute an absolute majority in the legislature? Shouldn't the DPP practice what it preaches, here and now?
改掉民粹 才能解決巨額國債問題
2011-08-18 中國時報
各界千呼萬喚，民進黨總統參選人蔡英文終於推出「十年政綱」第一道菜，在財稅篇中，蔡英文承諾，只要總統勝選、國會過半，民進黨將在四年內達成赤字減半、八年達到財政平衡的目標。蔡英文勇於提出改革財政的主張，值得肯定；但是具體做法為何？能否扺擋台灣政治、尤其是民進黨的民粹傾向，都相當值得觀察。
近來蔡英文民調、聲勢下挫，即使宋楚瑜出馬、藍營內鬨，都無法拉抬蔡英文氣勢，反而出現邊緣化危機；黨內異常焦慮，擔心蔡英文不懂選舉，甚至有不少人建議蔡英文向陳水扁取經，採取扁式割裂藍綠的選舉作風。目前，蔡英文尚能抗拒這種誘惑，讓選舉停留在公共政策的討論；就台灣的選舉文化而言，可說是進了一小步。
當然，維持良好的選舉文化，是政治人物的基本道德，蔡英文終於推出實質政見，就必須接受各界的詳細檢視。
和美國、歐洲相比，台灣現階段並未面臨迫在眉睫的財政危機；就帳面上來看，國債尚未超過法定的國內生產毛額百分之四十上限。有財政學者憂心，如果加上十三兆的隱藏性債務，台灣國債可能已達天文數；不過，比巨額國債更令人擔憂的是，台灣租稅負擔率只有百分之十一點九，比低稅率的新加坡還要低，每年的預算赤字就高達二千五百億，長期來看，這樣的財政結構不可能支撐。
事實上，民進黨八年執政增加一兆二千億國債，國民黨重返執政三年來，也已增加近一兆三千億，國債加速度增加，除了八八風災、金融風暴導致政府稅收減少、支出增加外，政府頻頻減稅，更讓債務危機雪上加霜。問題是，只要談到減稅，一向鬥得你死我活的朝野政黨，馬上就有志一同；例如，政府原先調升營業稅的主張遲遲沒下文，但針對調降營所稅，朝野卻大方送禮，競相加碼，從百分之二十五，一下子就降到百分之十七。
行政院長吳敦義上周接受專訪時感嘆，台灣的稅賦負擔偏低，但每樣事都想要國際最好的，社福水準想和北歐一樣，政府只能盡量努力；由此可見，吳揆並非不了解財政結構困境，但就是無法貫徹財政改革，執政黨確有可議之處。
在這樣的背景下，蔡英文提出財政平衡的政見，同樣要接受言行是否一致的考驗。在這份政見中，民進黨雖矢言降低財政赤字，卻並未提出具體做法；究竟要增加哪些稅收、減少哪些支出，民進黨的十年政綱除了宣言式的目標外，並未具體說明項目。
事實上，財政政見絕對不可能獨立，必須和政府支出一起討論；十年政綱中的社福篇，將於周五公布，依蔡英文過去的言論，民進黨執政後仍以建構社福體系為優先目標。但民進黨一樣不敢喊加稅，如此一來，要談降低赤字，豈非緣木求魚？
事實上，民進黨中常會日前才通過決議，決定調高老農津貼一千元，從每月六千元增為七千元，國庫為此又將增加八十四億。在整個過程中，民進黨未交代財源，不考慮老農津貼回歸國民年金體制，形同只有民粹主張，完全不見財政紀律。
持平而言，有關老農津貼加碼等濫開支票做法，國民黨和民進黨一樣毫不手軟；就如同財政學者曾巨威所說，「在租稅和財政問題，我們沒有在野黨和執政黨的分別」。這是台灣民粹政治的可悲，朝野政黨並非不了解問題所在，但卻不願合作解決問題，反而因為極端對立的政治氣氛，讓朝野政黨競相加碼籠絡選民，短期也許有選舉利益，但長期大家都會受害。
事實上，蔡英文財政平衡的主張背後，有著世代公平的理念；因為這一代累積的債務，在少子化的趨勢下，下一代將背負更沉重的包袱。民進黨若要真誠的實踐世代公平的理念，不用等到「當選總統、國會過半」，現在就必須提出言行一致的政見主張。
Wednesday, August 17, 2011
Middle-Aged DPP Supporters Express Reservations about Tsai Ing-wen
Middle-Aged DPP Supporters Express Reservations about Tsai Ing-wen
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 17, 2011
Summary: Recently, middle-aged DPP members have repeatedly expressed reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. Former legislator Julian Kuo said Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy is "too abstract." Former MAC Vice Chairman You Ying-long said that an election campaign without Chen Shui-bian is "very boring." You also criticized current party leaders, saying they failed to inspire a "sense of pride" among the people of Taiwan. Former Chen Shui-bian Office Director Chen Song-shan was even more blunt. He said Tsai Ing-wen's "Plaftorm for the Coming Decade" is probably a "hollow political platform."
Full Text below:
Recently, middle-aged DPP members have repeatedly expressed reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. Former legislator Julian Kuo said Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy is "too abstract." Former MAC Vice Chairman You Ying-long said that an election campaign without Chen Shui-bian is "very boring." You also criticized current party leaders, saying they failed to inspire a "sense of pride" among the people of Taiwan. Former Chen Shui-bian Office Director Chen Song-shan was even more blunt. He said Tsai Ing-wen's "Plaftorm for the Coming Decade" is probably a "hollow political platform."
That middle-aged Green Camp supporters have expressed such doubts about Tsai Ing-wen is not surprising. In fact, those outside the Green Camp have long felt that Tsai Ing-wen is guilty of "policy ambiguity." They voiced many of these same criticisms long ago. Now these same doubts are being voiced within the Green Camp. Now the public sees how anxious and conflicted middle-aged DPP supporters feel. Some middle-aged DPP supporters are even openly expressing "nostalgia" for Chen Shui-bian. They are clearly far more conflicted about the direction Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are taking than the general population.
Tsai Ing-wen joined the party relatively recently, in 2004. She never participated in the street protests and violent clashes during the DPP's wild days. She has no trouble drawing a line between herself and that period of DPP history. Therefore, in the eyes of the general public, she has a unique appeal. This chairman has been a party member for only seven years. She is about to name a mysterious person with no party affiliation as her vice presidential runnng mate. Suppose the two are lucky enough to win next year? Will the Democratic Progressive Party be hijacked by these two strangers? This is a concern shared by many within the Green Camp. Even Taiwan independence elder Koo Kuan-min objects to Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy, saying it "lacks content." Clearly the vacuum at the heart of Tsai Ing-wen's political platform has many people worried. The Blue Camp has Blue Camp worries. The Green Camp has Green Camp worries.
Tsai Ing-wen's vagueness and ambiguity is puzzling. What exactly is her problem? Is it that she "does not want to express her position?" Or is it that she simply "cannot express her position?" Is she maintaining a low profile merely to leave as much room as possible for the imagination? Or is she remaining ambiguous merely to avoid criticism and to avoid provoking a backlash inside and outside the party? If so, her lack of specificity is understandable. But perhaps her lack of specificity is merely high-profile posturing. Perhaps her campaign committee cannot think of a reasonable response? If so, her artful dodging deserves the epithet, "kong xin cai," or "hollow at the center Tsai," a pun on the word for water spinach. Real world evidence suggests the latter is more likely.
Over the past few days, a number of middle-aged DPP insiders have attacked Tsai Ing-wen. This phenomenon is worth pondering. Tsai Ing-wen won her party's nomination through fierce competition. She forced the party princes and Taiwan independence elders into silence. But many party insiders were part of the student movement. They consider themselves war veterans. To win votes, the DPP is afraid to say what it stands for. They consider this intolerable. Worst of all, they have been sidelined during the campaign. They cannot hear what plays the coach is shouting. They cannot see the numbers on the green flag. Naturally they are plagued with doubts.
These middle-aged DPP supporters are expressing reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. One point must not be ignored. During their conversations they have expressed nostalgia for Chen Shui-bian. They feel Tsai Ing-wen is less able to rally the troops than Chen Shui-bian. Julian Kuo said that Tsai Ing-wen's "policy is hazy, voters are few, and the mood is indifferent." He said she should study "A-Bian's Art of War," and generate a little excitement. You Ying-long was more blunt. He said "Chen Shui-bian enabled the people of Taiwan to feel proud, very proud." He said those who control the party machinery, but who distance themselves from Ah-Bian, are "definitely lost, confused people. They are people who are holding Taiwan back from its destiny."
We do not know why Tsai Ing-wen has failed to win the hearts of these middle-aged DPP insiders. But You Ying-long's remarks suggest that three years in the political wilderness has taught the DPP nothing. Chen Shui-bian was notorious for his rampant corruption and disastrous policies. How could You Ying-long possibly boast that Chen Shui-bian enabled the people of Taiwan to feel proud? He could only do so by totally blanking out Chen Shui-bian's crimes against the people. Elections in which Chen Shui-bian ran as a candidate may have been "more interesting." But lest we forget, Chen Shui-bian's campaign approach was "winning is everything, therefore win by any means available." He ignored the consequences, and the price paid by society. If DPP insiders are still waxing nostalgic over those days, what does that say about the future of our democracy?
A wave of criticism against Tsai has been followed by a wave of nostalgia for Ah-Bian. This suggests a sense of loss among these middle-aged DPP insiders. They cannot forget the glory days, when they followed Chen Shui-bian into battle. But they have also blanked out the shame and dishonor Chen Shui-bian brought upon their party. They wring their hands. They fear the DPP has lost its direction. But in their desperation they seek answers in the wrong places. In fact, the problem is not limited to middle-aged DPP insiders. This is a problem that plagues the DPP as a whole. Tsai Ing-wen's prevarication and equivocation, also reflect this problem.
Middle-aged Green Camp supporters have reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. In fact, everyone in the DPP seeks answers to this problem. But unless they can be honest about their eight years of corruption and scandal, answers will not be forthcoming.
民進黨中生代對蔡英文的質疑
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.08.17 03:03 am
民進黨中生代最近連續對蔡英文提出質疑。前立委郭正亮認為，蔡英文的兩岸政策「太抽象」；陸委會前副主委游盈隆認為沒有陳水扁的選舉「很無趣」，並批當今黨內領導人無法帶來台灣人的「光榮感」；前扁辦主任陳淞山則直言，蔡英文的十年政綱恐將淪為「空心政見」。
綠營中生代對蔡英文發出這樣的疑問，並不奇怪；事實上，外界對蔡英文一貫保持的「政見模糊」，早提過許多批評。比較有趣的是，從這些來自綠營內部的質疑，人們也看到了民進黨中生代內心的焦慮和矛盾；尤其，當若干中生代竟開始公開「懷念」陳水扁，可見他們對蔡英文乃至民進黨走向的迷惘，比一般民眾深得多。
蔡英文二○○四年才入黨，由於不曾參加過民進黨草莽年代的激烈衝撞或街頭抗爭，她可以輕易切割民進黨的歷史沾染，也因此在一般民眾眼中有一種恍惚的魅力。然而，這位黨齡才七年的主席，又準備選擇一位神祕的無黨籍搭檔代表民進黨出征；就算兩人明年幸運打下了天下，未來民進黨會不會被這對陌生人「金蟬脫殼」，這恐怕是很多綠營人士心中的憂慮。連獨派大老辜寬敏都嫌蔡英文的兩岸政策「沒內容」，可見蔡英文政見之「空洞」確讓各方不安；只是藍營有藍營的不安，綠營有綠營的不安。
更耐人尋味的是，蔡英文的含混模糊，究竟是「不願說」、「無法說」，或者是根本「說不出來」？如果她的低調曖昧，目的是在保持一個比較大的想像空間，避免過度具體的主張反而引發黨內外的批評及反彈，或許還能理解。但如果她裝腔作勢的抽象高調，其實只是因為自己和團隊找不到合理與正當的對策；那麼，她的造作閃躲，恐怕就是名副其實的「空心菜」了。就現實觀察，後者的可能性似乎還高一些。
幾日內，連續多名黨內中生代向蔡英文發難，是值得玩味的現象。蔡英文經激烈的提名爭逐勝出，迫使民進黨「天王」和「大老」的一代喪失了發言資格；但不少學運世代出身、且自認有過戰功的中生代，卻不能忍受民進黨為了選舉竟扭曲到連政策都不敢說清楚。尤其，他們在選戰中被推到邊緣位置，聽不到主帥營帳呼喊的是什麼口令，看不清綠旗上打的是什麼字號，當然有滿腹疑問要發。
在觀察這些中生代質疑蔡英文時，不可忽略的一點是，他們在言談中流露出來的對陳水扁的懷念，包括對蔡英文造勢能力遠不及阿扁的擔心。郭正亮說，蔡英文「政策霧濛濛，選民稀落落，選戰冷颼颼」，應借鏡「阿扁兵法」炒熱選情。游盈隆的說法更露骨，他聲稱「阿扁讓身為台灣人感到很光榮、很驕傲」，還說那些掌握黨機器卻切割阿扁的人，「絕對是迷惘、糊塗的人，是耽誤台灣前途的人」。
我們不知道蔡英文為何抓不住這些黨內中生代的心，但游盈隆的說法，似顯示三年多的政黨輪替對民進黨沒產生任何警惕作用。否則，阿扁的貪腐誤國惡名舉世皆知，游盈隆怎還能說出阿扁讓台灣人感到驕傲的話來？的確，有陳水扁的選舉會比較「有趣」；但別忘了，阿扁的渾身解數，都是建立在「只求勝選、不擇手段」的前提上，也因而不顧後果、不計社會代價。如果今天還在追思緬懷那樣的政治氛圍，台灣的民主如何會有進境？
隨著這股「批蔡」潮而湧至的「懷扁」風，反映的是民進黨一批中生代的嚴重失落感。他們不能忘情自己追隨陳水扁征戰的榮光，卻略過了阿扁給民進黨帶來的可恥和不名譽；他們掛慮著民進黨可能失去了方向，但眼光卻是在錯誤的舊日中尋找答案。這其實不止是綠營中生代的問題，恐怕也是整個民進黨的逃避與徬徨情結；而蔡英文的支吾曖昧，亦是反映了其中的一隅。
綠營中生代對蔡英文的質疑，其實是整個民進黨要共同回答的事。但如果不能誠實面對執政八年的腐敗和醜陋，誰又能幫他們找到答案？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 17, 2011
Summary: Recently, middle-aged DPP members have repeatedly expressed reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. Former legislator Julian Kuo said Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy is "too abstract." Former MAC Vice Chairman You Ying-long said that an election campaign without Chen Shui-bian is "very boring." You also criticized current party leaders, saying they failed to inspire a "sense of pride" among the people of Taiwan. Former Chen Shui-bian Office Director Chen Song-shan was even more blunt. He said Tsai Ing-wen's "Plaftorm for the Coming Decade" is probably a "hollow political platform."
Full Text below:
Recently, middle-aged DPP members have repeatedly expressed reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. Former legislator Julian Kuo said Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy is "too abstract." Former MAC Vice Chairman You Ying-long said that an election campaign without Chen Shui-bian is "very boring." You also criticized current party leaders, saying they failed to inspire a "sense of pride" among the people of Taiwan. Former Chen Shui-bian Office Director Chen Song-shan was even more blunt. He said Tsai Ing-wen's "Plaftorm for the Coming Decade" is probably a "hollow political platform."
That middle-aged Green Camp supporters have expressed such doubts about Tsai Ing-wen is not surprising. In fact, those outside the Green Camp have long felt that Tsai Ing-wen is guilty of "policy ambiguity." They voiced many of these same criticisms long ago. Now these same doubts are being voiced within the Green Camp. Now the public sees how anxious and conflicted middle-aged DPP supporters feel. Some middle-aged DPP supporters are even openly expressing "nostalgia" for Chen Shui-bian. They are clearly far more conflicted about the direction Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are taking than the general population.
Tsai Ing-wen joined the party relatively recently, in 2004. She never participated in the street protests and violent clashes during the DPP's wild days. She has no trouble drawing a line between herself and that period of DPP history. Therefore, in the eyes of the general public, she has a unique appeal. This chairman has been a party member for only seven years. She is about to name a mysterious person with no party affiliation as her vice presidential runnng mate. Suppose the two are lucky enough to win next year? Will the Democratic Progressive Party be hijacked by these two strangers? This is a concern shared by many within the Green Camp. Even Taiwan independence elder Koo Kuan-min objects to Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy, saying it "lacks content." Clearly the vacuum at the heart of Tsai Ing-wen's political platform has many people worried. The Blue Camp has Blue Camp worries. The Green Camp has Green Camp worries.
Tsai Ing-wen's vagueness and ambiguity is puzzling. What exactly is her problem? Is it that she "does not want to express her position?" Or is it that she simply "cannot express her position?" Is she maintaining a low profile merely to leave as much room as possible for the imagination? Or is she remaining ambiguous merely to avoid criticism and to avoid provoking a backlash inside and outside the party? If so, her lack of specificity is understandable. But perhaps her lack of specificity is merely high-profile posturing. Perhaps her campaign committee cannot think of a reasonable response? If so, her artful dodging deserves the epithet, "kong xin cai," or "hollow at the center Tsai," a pun on the word for water spinach. Real world evidence suggests the latter is more likely.
Over the past few days, a number of middle-aged DPP insiders have attacked Tsai Ing-wen. This phenomenon is worth pondering. Tsai Ing-wen won her party's nomination through fierce competition. She forced the party princes and Taiwan independence elders into silence. But many party insiders were part of the student movement. They consider themselves war veterans. To win votes, the DPP is afraid to say what it stands for. They consider this intolerable. Worst of all, they have been sidelined during the campaign. They cannot hear what plays the coach is shouting. They cannot see the numbers on the green flag. Naturally they are plagued with doubts.
These middle-aged DPP supporters are expressing reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. One point must not be ignored. During their conversations they have expressed nostalgia for Chen Shui-bian. They feel Tsai Ing-wen is less able to rally the troops than Chen Shui-bian. Julian Kuo said that Tsai Ing-wen's "policy is hazy, voters are few, and the mood is indifferent." He said she should study "A-Bian's Art of War," and generate a little excitement. You Ying-long was more blunt. He said "Chen Shui-bian enabled the people of Taiwan to feel proud, very proud." He said those who control the party machinery, but who distance themselves from Ah-Bian, are "definitely lost, confused people. They are people who are holding Taiwan back from its destiny."
We do not know why Tsai Ing-wen has failed to win the hearts of these middle-aged DPP insiders. But You Ying-long's remarks suggest that three years in the political wilderness has taught the DPP nothing. Chen Shui-bian was notorious for his rampant corruption and disastrous policies. How could You Ying-long possibly boast that Chen Shui-bian enabled the people of Taiwan to feel proud? He could only do so by totally blanking out Chen Shui-bian's crimes against the people. Elections in which Chen Shui-bian ran as a candidate may have been "more interesting." But lest we forget, Chen Shui-bian's campaign approach was "winning is everything, therefore win by any means available." He ignored the consequences, and the price paid by society. If DPP insiders are still waxing nostalgic over those days, what does that say about the future of our democracy?
A wave of criticism against Tsai has been followed by a wave of nostalgia for Ah-Bian. This suggests a sense of loss among these middle-aged DPP insiders. They cannot forget the glory days, when they followed Chen Shui-bian into battle. But they have also blanked out the shame and dishonor Chen Shui-bian brought upon their party. They wring their hands. They fear the DPP has lost its direction. But in their desperation they seek answers in the wrong places. In fact, the problem is not limited to middle-aged DPP insiders. This is a problem that plagues the DPP as a whole. Tsai Ing-wen's prevarication and equivocation, also reflect this problem.
Middle-aged Green Camp supporters have reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. In fact, everyone in the DPP seeks answers to this problem. But unless they can be honest about their eight years of corruption and scandal, answers will not be forthcoming.
民進黨中生代對蔡英文的質疑
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.08.17 03:03 am
民進黨中生代最近連續對蔡英文提出質疑。前立委郭正亮認為，蔡英文的兩岸政策「太抽象」；陸委會前副主委游盈隆認為沒有陳水扁的選舉「很無趣」，並批當今黨內領導人無法帶來台灣人的「光榮感」；前扁辦主任陳淞山則直言，蔡英文的十年政綱恐將淪為「空心政見」。
綠營中生代對蔡英文發出這樣的疑問，並不奇怪；事實上，外界對蔡英文一貫保持的「政見模糊」，早提過許多批評。比較有趣的是，從這些來自綠營內部的質疑，人們也看到了民進黨中生代內心的焦慮和矛盾；尤其，當若干中生代竟開始公開「懷念」陳水扁，可見他們對蔡英文乃至民進黨走向的迷惘，比一般民眾深得多。
蔡英文二○○四年才入黨，由於不曾參加過民進黨草莽年代的激烈衝撞或街頭抗爭，她可以輕易切割民進黨的歷史沾染，也因此在一般民眾眼中有一種恍惚的魅力。然而，這位黨齡才七年的主席，又準備選擇一位神祕的無黨籍搭檔代表民進黨出征；就算兩人明年幸運打下了天下，未來民進黨會不會被這對陌生人「金蟬脫殼」，這恐怕是很多綠營人士心中的憂慮。連獨派大老辜寬敏都嫌蔡英文的兩岸政策「沒內容」，可見蔡英文政見之「空洞」確讓各方不安；只是藍營有藍營的不安，綠營有綠營的不安。
更耐人尋味的是，蔡英文的含混模糊，究竟是「不願說」、「無法說」，或者是根本「說不出來」？如果她的低調曖昧，目的是在保持一個比較大的想像空間，避免過度具體的主張反而引發黨內外的批評及反彈，或許還能理解。但如果她裝腔作勢的抽象高調，其實只是因為自己和團隊找不到合理與正當的對策；那麼，她的造作閃躲，恐怕就是名副其實的「空心菜」了。就現實觀察，後者的可能性似乎還高一些。
幾日內，連續多名黨內中生代向蔡英文發難，是值得玩味的現象。蔡英文經激烈的提名爭逐勝出，迫使民進黨「天王」和「大老」的一代喪失了發言資格；但不少學運世代出身、且自認有過戰功的中生代，卻不能忍受民進黨為了選舉竟扭曲到連政策都不敢說清楚。尤其，他們在選戰中被推到邊緣位置，聽不到主帥營帳呼喊的是什麼口令，看不清綠旗上打的是什麼字號，當然有滿腹疑問要發。
在觀察這些中生代質疑蔡英文時，不可忽略的一點是，他們在言談中流露出來的對陳水扁的懷念，包括對蔡英文造勢能力遠不及阿扁的擔心。郭正亮說，蔡英文「政策霧濛濛，選民稀落落，選戰冷颼颼」，應借鏡「阿扁兵法」炒熱選情。游盈隆的說法更露骨，他聲稱「阿扁讓身為台灣人感到很光榮、很驕傲」，還說那些掌握黨機器卻切割阿扁的人，「絕對是迷惘、糊塗的人，是耽誤台灣前途的人」。
我們不知道蔡英文為何抓不住這些黨內中生代的心，但游盈隆的說法，似顯示三年多的政黨輪替對民進黨沒產生任何警惕作用。否則，阿扁的貪腐誤國惡名舉世皆知，游盈隆怎還能說出阿扁讓台灣人感到驕傲的話來？的確，有陳水扁的選舉會比較「有趣」；但別忘了，阿扁的渾身解數，都是建立在「只求勝選、不擇手段」的前提上，也因而不顧後果、不計社會代價。如果今天還在追思緬懷那樣的政治氛圍，台灣的民主如何會有進境？
隨著這股「批蔡」潮而湧至的「懷扁」風，反映的是民進黨一批中生代的嚴重失落感。他們不能忘情自己追隨陳水扁征戰的榮光，卻略過了阿扁給民進黨帶來的可恥和不名譽；他們掛慮著民進黨可能失去了方向，但眼光卻是在錯誤的舊日中尋找答案。這其實不止是綠營中生代的問題，恐怕也是整個民進黨的逃避與徬徨情結；而蔡英文的支吾曖昧，亦是反映了其中的一隅。
綠營中生代對蔡英文的質疑，其實是整個民進黨要共同回答的事。但如果不能誠實面對執政八年的腐敗和醜陋，誰又能幫他們找到答案？
Tuesday, August 16, 2011
Hsiao Yang-kui Should Have Retired Immediately
Hsiao Yang-kui Should Have Retired Immediately
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 16, 2011
Summary: Supreme Court Judge Hsiao Yang-kui's son was involved in hit and run accident. Hsiao was suspended for six months, then applied for reinstatement. At the urging of the Judicial Yuan, he was reinstated but also forced to retire. If a judge is found guilty of exerting undue influence, he may no longer preside over court cases. Society considers this necessary, and so it must be. Hsiao Yang-kui inititally sought reinstatement in order to return to his job. But he was forced into retirement by public pressure.
Full Text below:
Supreme Court Judge Hsiao Yang-kui's son was involved in hit and run accident. Hsiao was suspended for six months, then applied for reinstatement. At the urging of the Judicial Yuan, he was reinstated but also forced to retire. If a judge is found guilty of exerting undue influence, he may no longer preside over court cases. Society considers this necessary, and so it must be. Hsiao Yang-kui inititally sought reinstatement in order to return to his job. But he was forced into retirement by public pressure.
Undue influence undermines justice. For the credibility of the court system, it is lethal. Historically, only three categories of people have been able to influence the court system. They are those who wield political influence, those who wield administrative authority, and judges, prosecutors, and other court system insiders.
Take those who wield political influence. The most famous example occurred in 1994. Lin Ping-kun, a Member of the Legislature, was a suspect in the China Petroleum wastewater scandal. KMT Secretary-General Hsu Shui-teh telephoned the President of the Taipei District Court, Hu Chih-chung. He asked Hu to delay announcement of the verdict, and allow additional time for deliberation. He even joked that the courts were run by the KMT.
During the 1990s, Tainan District Court Judge Hsieh Shuo-jung, going strictly by the book, submitted the verdict for the Tainan County Nan Kunshen Dai Tianfu slander case to another judge for review. President Wang Hsing-jen then "communicated" with Hsieh Shuo-jung. Hsieh secretly recorded their conversation, including Wang's remark, "Why is the sentence so harsh?" Once the truth emerged, the public was outraged. The President of the Judicial Yuan transferred Wang to a court in another jurisdiction. The system by which other judges would review the verdict before it was announced was subsequently abolished.
As democracy matures, those able to exert political influence and wield administrative authority find themselves less able to influence the court system. Ironically, officials within the court system have come to consider the lobbying of court system officials as "no big deal." Hsiao Yang-kui exerted undue influence on behalf of his son. He remained on suspension until he qualified for reinstatement. From this we can see the implicit standards officials within the court system hold, and how remote their notion of justice is from that of the public.
Hsiao Yang-kui feared that his son, who was studying law, would end up with a criminal record, that he would be washed out during the oral examination stage. Hsiao exerted undue influence in the hope of obtaining a not guilty verdict. His efforts led to a first instance guilty verdict with a suspended sentence. But Hsiao was not satisfied. He made another attempt during the second instance trial. He was determined to get a not guilty verdict. Hsiao's conduct revealed his implicit attitudes. As Hsiao saw it, he was, after all, not guilty of corruption. What father wouldn't do everything in his power to protect his own child? What's wrong with Hsiao putting in a good word for his son? Judges who exerted undue influence in the past received a slap on the wrist. Others who exerted undue influence received nothing more than a demerit. So what if Hsiao was forced to retire. He was disciplined for exerting undue influence on behalf of his son, nothing more.
These are the implicit attitudes of officials within judicial circles. Their attitudes are utterly incomprehensible to those outside judicial circles. Hsiao is implicitly inculcating such attitudes in his own son. He is characterizing the exertion of undue influence as "removing obstacles." He has put his selfish interests above the interests of justice. He has set the worst possible example. Whether a judge is corrupt is hardly the standard by which judicial conduct should be evaluated. Not being corrupt hardly merits a medal. Not being corrupt does not confer the right to grant special treatment to other court system insiders. A Supreme Court judgeship is a high honor and a weighty responsibility. How can we allow it to become synonymous with the exertion of undue influence in first and second instance court cases?
In the past, the punishment for undue influence was a slap on the wrist. But that was then. This is now. Today that cannot be our standard of reference. The exertion of undue influence constitues a fundamental perversion of justice. Judges who have knowingly exerted undue influence, must step down. There is nothing more to discuss. Even political parties and executive branch officials may not exert undue influence on the court system. How can judges be permitted to cite personal relationships as a justification for undue influence and backroom deals?
What defendant is not someone's son or daughter? Most people count themselves lucky if they can find a competent lawyer, and have their case adjudicated by a fair-minded judge. Officials within the court system cover up for their fellows, yet act as if they have done nothing wrong. What kind of attitude is that?
Hsiao Yang-kui had the temerity to thumb his nose at the public, and to ignore the law. He dared to do so because the civil service disciplinary committee merely imposed a six month suspension, before reinstating him as a judge. Fellow judges, particularly judges his age, overtly or covertly covered up for him. They argued that undue influence exerted on behalf of one's own child did not warrant a major demerit. This enabled Hsiao to evince utter contempt for public sentiment.
This climate of hypocrisy dulled their sense of the evil of undue influence. It diminished court system officials' sense of shame. It frittered away the victories won by court system officials along the way. These court system officials rid the court system of undue influence exerted by those with political influence and administrative authority, only to have the court system become the private instrument of decadent judges. These decadent judges trample over the Judges Law, whose purpose is to safeguard judicial independence. The Judges Law, which liberated judges from the constraints of the civil service system, now enables them to cover up each others' crimes.
When the Supreme Court addressed the Hsiao Yang-kui undue influence case, it cited an ancient proverb, to rally public sentiment. It urged the public not to "yield to human passions, give free reign to joy and anger, indulge in cronyism, fear bold and heroic gestures, feel anxiety about disasters." It urged the public to unite to establish a system of justice worthy of emulation. It said that such a system would not happen by itself. It would have to be created incrementally, through case law, and that reinstating Hsiao Yang-kui would be the ideal beginning.
A Supreme Court judge decided to exert undue influence. It matter not for whom it was done. It was a perversion of justice. If the court system wants public respect, judges must be impartial guardians of justice. No one may be permitted to exert undue influence on the court system. If Hsiao Yang-kui cannot abide by the law, if his fellow judges persist in covering for him, then the entire system has degenerated. In which case, how can anyone still believe in it? The courts must not be operated by political parties. Nor can the courts become judges' private fiefdom. Judges must never forget that the source of their judical authority is the public. There is no room for private interests.
蕭仰歸惜未在第一時間申請退休
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.16
最高法院法官蕭仰歸為兒子的肇事逃逸案關說，休職半年期滿依法申請復職，在司法院極力勸說下，終於以復職同時退休收場。法官關說，就該離開審判工作的社會通念價值，於焉實現；可惜的是，蕭仰歸的原意在復職續任，退休則是出於輿論壓力。
關說，是破壞公平、司法公信的殺手。歷來可以輕易穿透司法的關說，不外乎三大力量，政治力關說、行政力關說，以及法官、檢察官等自己人的關說。
政治力關說，最有名的是八十三年間，國民黨秘書長許水德為涉入中油廢水弊案的立委林炳坤，打電話給台北地方法院院長胡致中，希望案子不要馬上宣判，能再開辯論，以致法院被譏為是國民黨開的。
也是八十年間，台南地方法院法官謝說容，依規定在宣判前將台南縣南鯤鯓代天府謗誹糾紛案判決書送閱，院長王興仁即找謝法官「溝通」，謝偷偷錄音，錄到王說「怎麼判這麼重」；此事爆出後，社會譁然。司法院後來將王調到其他法院，候補法官事前送閱判決書的制度更因此廢止。
隨著民主政治的成熟，政黨關說、行政關說勢力不再；但奇怪的是，司法界自己人的關說，反而被司法人認為「沒什麼」。從蕭仰歸為子關說案發生、休職到申請復職過程，就可看出司法界所呈現的「潛價值」，與民間實為天差地別。
蕭仰歸是因擔心學法的兒子留下前科，將來在口試中被刷掉，乃以關說「拚無罪」，關說完一審，有罪但得緩刑，猶不滿意，再試二審，非達無罪目的不可。支撐蕭的「潛價值」包括：蕭又沒有貪瀆，哪個父親不護子，蕭為兒子說一下情，有什麼關係；過去司法官關說，罰得都不重，為別人關說，都只記過，蕭為兒子受休職懲戒，足矣。
這些司法圈內的潛價值，實難見容於司法圈外：蕭不啻為教育兒子以關說「清除障礙」，將個人的前途價值，凌駕於司法公義之上，作了最壞的示範。其實，不貪瀆是法官應備的基本操守，並非榮譽勳章或「圖利」自己人的免死金牌；最高法院法官的名銜隆重，怎可輕賤成為個案穿梭一、二審的招牌？
對於關說，過去罰得輕，有時代背景之故，不應作為如今處罰的參考值。關說的行為破壞了司法公正的基本面，法官明知故犯，理應退場，無可商量。連政黨、行政力都不能關說司法，憑什麼法官獨可以人情為藉口，進行暗室交易？
更何況，哪一個被告不是父母親的子女；一般人能夠找到好律師，拜拜祈求遇到好法官，就算福氣；司法人幫司法人拚無罪，卻理直氣壯，這是那門子的「福利」？
蕭仰歸膽敢無憚社會觀感，恃法而行，因先有公務員懲戒委員會僅處以休職，給蕭復職之權，後有同儕法官，尤其是同齡法官或明或暗的相挺。為子關說非大過的鄉愿人情，讓蕭可以無視外界指責的風雨。
但也正是此種鄉愿氣候，弱化了關說之惡，削去司法人的恥感，更糟蹋了司法一路以來，好不容易才擺脫政治力、行政力的成果，致司法淪為法官相護的私人工具，踐踏「法官法」為維護審判獨立，將法官抽離於公務員系統之外的用心。
最高法院處理蕭仰歸關說案時，曾引古訓勉勵大家，不要「徇人情、任喜怒、黨親昵、畏豪雄、顧禍害」，共同形塑更理想的司法典範。典範不會自然生成，必須從個案實踐累積，那麼，蕭仰歸復職案就是最好的開始。
最高法院法官從起心動念到進行關說，無論為誰，都已褻瀆司法。司法要讓人瞧得起，法官必須戒慎恐懼地共同守護公正的信念，誰都不能關說。如果蕭仰歸做不到，同儕法官還要呵護容忍，形同集體淪落，則誰還敢相信司法？法院不是政黨開的，當然也不是法官可以妄自據地為王的自家大院；法官別忘了審判權力的源泉是來自公眾的託付，絕對沒有私用的空間。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 16, 2011
Summary: Supreme Court Judge Hsiao Yang-kui's son was involved in hit and run accident. Hsiao was suspended for six months, then applied for reinstatement. At the urging of the Judicial Yuan, he was reinstated but also forced to retire. If a judge is found guilty of exerting undue influence, he may no longer preside over court cases. Society considers this necessary, and so it must be. Hsiao Yang-kui inititally sought reinstatement in order to return to his job. But he was forced into retirement by public pressure.
Full Text below:
Supreme Court Judge Hsiao Yang-kui's son was involved in hit and run accident. Hsiao was suspended for six months, then applied for reinstatement. At the urging of the Judicial Yuan, he was reinstated but also forced to retire. If a judge is found guilty of exerting undue influence, he may no longer preside over court cases. Society considers this necessary, and so it must be. Hsiao Yang-kui inititally sought reinstatement in order to return to his job. But he was forced into retirement by public pressure.
Undue influence undermines justice. For the credibility of the court system, it is lethal. Historically, only three categories of people have been able to influence the court system. They are those who wield political influence, those who wield administrative authority, and judges, prosecutors, and other court system insiders.
Take those who wield political influence. The most famous example occurred in 1994. Lin Ping-kun, a Member of the Legislature, was a suspect in the China Petroleum wastewater scandal. KMT Secretary-General Hsu Shui-teh telephoned the President of the Taipei District Court, Hu Chih-chung. He asked Hu to delay announcement of the verdict, and allow additional time for deliberation. He even joked that the courts were run by the KMT.
During the 1990s, Tainan District Court Judge Hsieh Shuo-jung, going strictly by the book, submitted the verdict for the Tainan County Nan Kunshen Dai Tianfu slander case to another judge for review. President Wang Hsing-jen then "communicated" with Hsieh Shuo-jung. Hsieh secretly recorded their conversation, including Wang's remark, "Why is the sentence so harsh?" Once the truth emerged, the public was outraged. The President of the Judicial Yuan transferred Wang to a court in another jurisdiction. The system by which other judges would review the verdict before it was announced was subsequently abolished.
As democracy matures, those able to exert political influence and wield administrative authority find themselves less able to influence the court system. Ironically, officials within the court system have come to consider the lobbying of court system officials as "no big deal." Hsiao Yang-kui exerted undue influence on behalf of his son. He remained on suspension until he qualified for reinstatement. From this we can see the implicit standards officials within the court system hold, and how remote their notion of justice is from that of the public.
Hsiao Yang-kui feared that his son, who was studying law, would end up with a criminal record, that he would be washed out during the oral examination stage. Hsiao exerted undue influence in the hope of obtaining a not guilty verdict. His efforts led to a first instance guilty verdict with a suspended sentence. But Hsiao was not satisfied. He made another attempt during the second instance trial. He was determined to get a not guilty verdict. Hsiao's conduct revealed his implicit attitudes. As Hsiao saw it, he was, after all, not guilty of corruption. What father wouldn't do everything in his power to protect his own child? What's wrong with Hsiao putting in a good word for his son? Judges who exerted undue influence in the past received a slap on the wrist. Others who exerted undue influence received nothing more than a demerit. So what if Hsiao was forced to retire. He was disciplined for exerting undue influence on behalf of his son, nothing more.
These are the implicit attitudes of officials within judicial circles. Their attitudes are utterly incomprehensible to those outside judicial circles. Hsiao is implicitly inculcating such attitudes in his own son. He is characterizing the exertion of undue influence as "removing obstacles." He has put his selfish interests above the interests of justice. He has set the worst possible example. Whether a judge is corrupt is hardly the standard by which judicial conduct should be evaluated. Not being corrupt hardly merits a medal. Not being corrupt does not confer the right to grant special treatment to other court system insiders. A Supreme Court judgeship is a high honor and a weighty responsibility. How can we allow it to become synonymous with the exertion of undue influence in first and second instance court cases?
In the past, the punishment for undue influence was a slap on the wrist. But that was then. This is now. Today that cannot be our standard of reference. The exertion of undue influence constitues a fundamental perversion of justice. Judges who have knowingly exerted undue influence, must step down. There is nothing more to discuss. Even political parties and executive branch officials may not exert undue influence on the court system. How can judges be permitted to cite personal relationships as a justification for undue influence and backroom deals?
What defendant is not someone's son or daughter? Most people count themselves lucky if they can find a competent lawyer, and have their case adjudicated by a fair-minded judge. Officials within the court system cover up for their fellows, yet act as if they have done nothing wrong. What kind of attitude is that?
Hsiao Yang-kui had the temerity to thumb his nose at the public, and to ignore the law. He dared to do so because the civil service disciplinary committee merely imposed a six month suspension, before reinstating him as a judge. Fellow judges, particularly judges his age, overtly or covertly covered up for him. They argued that undue influence exerted on behalf of one's own child did not warrant a major demerit. This enabled Hsiao to evince utter contempt for public sentiment.
This climate of hypocrisy dulled their sense of the evil of undue influence. It diminished court system officials' sense of shame. It frittered away the victories won by court system officials along the way. These court system officials rid the court system of undue influence exerted by those with political influence and administrative authority, only to have the court system become the private instrument of decadent judges. These decadent judges trample over the Judges Law, whose purpose is to safeguard judicial independence. The Judges Law, which liberated judges from the constraints of the civil service system, now enables them to cover up each others' crimes.
When the Supreme Court addressed the Hsiao Yang-kui undue influence case, it cited an ancient proverb, to rally public sentiment. It urged the public not to "yield to human passions, give free reign to joy and anger, indulge in cronyism, fear bold and heroic gestures, feel anxiety about disasters." It urged the public to unite to establish a system of justice worthy of emulation. It said that such a system would not happen by itself. It would have to be created incrementally, through case law, and that reinstating Hsiao Yang-kui would be the ideal beginning.
A Supreme Court judge decided to exert undue influence. It matter not for whom it was done. It was a perversion of justice. If the court system wants public respect, judges must be impartial guardians of justice. No one may be permitted to exert undue influence on the court system. If Hsiao Yang-kui cannot abide by the law, if his fellow judges persist in covering for him, then the entire system has degenerated. In which case, how can anyone still believe in it? The courts must not be operated by political parties. Nor can the courts become judges' private fiefdom. Judges must never forget that the source of their judical authority is the public. There is no room for private interests.
蕭仰歸惜未在第一時間申請退休
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.16
最高法院法官蕭仰歸為兒子的肇事逃逸案關說，休職半年期滿依法申請復職，在司法院極力勸說下，終於以復職同時退休收場。法官關說，就該離開審判工作的社會通念價值，於焉實現；可惜的是，蕭仰歸的原意在復職續任，退休則是出於輿論壓力。
關說，是破壞公平、司法公信的殺手。歷來可以輕易穿透司法的關說，不外乎三大力量，政治力關說、行政力關說，以及法官、檢察官等自己人的關說。
政治力關說，最有名的是八十三年間，國民黨秘書長許水德為涉入中油廢水弊案的立委林炳坤，打電話給台北地方法院院長胡致中，希望案子不要馬上宣判，能再開辯論，以致法院被譏為是國民黨開的。
也是八十年間，台南地方法院法官謝說容，依規定在宣判前將台南縣南鯤鯓代天府謗誹糾紛案判決書送閱，院長王興仁即找謝法官「溝通」，謝偷偷錄音，錄到王說「怎麼判這麼重」；此事爆出後，社會譁然。司法院後來將王調到其他法院，候補法官事前送閱判決書的制度更因此廢止。
隨著民主政治的成熟，政黨關說、行政關說勢力不再；但奇怪的是，司法界自己人的關說，反而被司法人認為「沒什麼」。從蕭仰歸為子關說案發生、休職到申請復職過程，就可看出司法界所呈現的「潛價值」，與民間實為天差地別。
蕭仰歸是因擔心學法的兒子留下前科，將來在口試中被刷掉，乃以關說「拚無罪」，關說完一審，有罪但得緩刑，猶不滿意，再試二審，非達無罪目的不可。支撐蕭的「潛價值」包括：蕭又沒有貪瀆，哪個父親不護子，蕭為兒子說一下情，有什麼關係；過去司法官關說，罰得都不重，為別人關說，都只記過，蕭為兒子受休職懲戒，足矣。
這些司法圈內的潛價值，實難見容於司法圈外：蕭不啻為教育兒子以關說「清除障礙」，將個人的前途價值，凌駕於司法公義之上，作了最壞的示範。其實，不貪瀆是法官應備的基本操守，並非榮譽勳章或「圖利」自己人的免死金牌；最高法院法官的名銜隆重，怎可輕賤成為個案穿梭一、二審的招牌？
對於關說，過去罰得輕，有時代背景之故，不應作為如今處罰的參考值。關說的行為破壞了司法公正的基本面，法官明知故犯，理應退場，無可商量。連政黨、行政力都不能關說司法，憑什麼法官獨可以人情為藉口，進行暗室交易？
更何況，哪一個被告不是父母親的子女；一般人能夠找到好律師，拜拜祈求遇到好法官，就算福氣；司法人幫司法人拚無罪，卻理直氣壯，這是那門子的「福利」？
蕭仰歸膽敢無憚社會觀感，恃法而行，因先有公務員懲戒委員會僅處以休職，給蕭復職之權，後有同儕法官，尤其是同齡法官或明或暗的相挺。為子關說非大過的鄉愿人情，讓蕭可以無視外界指責的風雨。
但也正是此種鄉愿氣候，弱化了關說之惡，削去司法人的恥感，更糟蹋了司法一路以來，好不容易才擺脫政治力、行政力的成果，致司法淪為法官相護的私人工具，踐踏「法官法」為維護審判獨立，將法官抽離於公務員系統之外的用心。
最高法院處理蕭仰歸關說案時，曾引古訓勉勵大家，不要「徇人情、任喜怒、黨親昵、畏豪雄、顧禍害」，共同形塑更理想的司法典範。典範不會自然生成，必須從個案實踐累積，那麼，蕭仰歸復職案就是最好的開始。
最高法院法官從起心動念到進行關說，無論為誰，都已褻瀆司法。司法要讓人瞧得起，法官必須戒慎恐懼地共同守護公正的信念，誰都不能關說。如果蕭仰歸做不到，同儕法官還要呵護容忍，形同集體淪落，則誰還敢相信司法？法院不是政黨開的，當然也不是法官可以妄自據地為王的自家大院；法官別忘了審判權力的源泉是來自公眾的託付，絕對沒有私用的空間。
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