Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement: Impact on Cross-Strait Investment Agreement
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 30, 2011
Summary: The Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement was signed on Thursday. This economic and trade agreement has the deepest significance and is the most widely covered topic since Taipei and Tokyo severed diplomatic relations in 1972. On the basis of this milestone, the future of Taipei/Tokyo economic and trade liberalization talks looks bright. We salute the Ma administration's accomplishments. Tokyo now sees Taipei/Tokyo relations in a new light. Many new opportunities are now available. By contrast, negotiations over the Cross-Strait Investment Agreement have stalled. They are all thunder and no lightning. Everyone is anxious. But certain considerations mean they cannot be rushed.
Full Text below:
The Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement was signed on Thursday. This economic and trade agreement has the deepest significance and is the most widely covered topic since Taipei and Tokyo severed diplomatic relations in 1972. On the basis of this milestone, the future of Taipei/Tokyo economic and trade liberalization talks looks bright. We salute the Ma administration's accomplishments. Tokyo now sees Taipei/Tokyo relations in a new light. Many new opportunities are now available. By contrast, negotiations over the Cross-Strait Investment Agreement have stalled. They are all thunder and no lightning. Everyone is anxious. But certain considerations mean they cannot be rushed.
The Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement keeps pace with international trends. The degree of investment liberalization, the scope and extent of protections provided, including international arbitration, break with Taiwan's current system. Take land acquisition compensation for example, Taiwan and Japan must provide compensation. The compensation must be immediate. Furthermore, it must reflect fair market value. So-called "fair" market value means it must exclude the devaluation resuting from acquisition. All levels of government must implement these compensation mechanisms. The spirit of fair market value compensation must be implemented, both internally and externally. This will help resolve many domestic disputes over land acquisition. The Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement includes three codiciles. They list our government's current restrictions on foreign investment, making them part of an international agreement. In the future the government must gradually lift these restrictions, It can no longer renege. The effect will clearly be liberalizing.
We must uphold the the rule of law. Developed nations have transparent administrative procedures, Their institutional mechanisms and relief programs already provide adequate protection for investors. Unpredictable incidents are rare. For them, bilateral insurance agreements have limited significance. The scope of the the Taiwan-Japan Insurance Agreement is wide. The justice system on Taiwan is defective. But it is improving. Therefore, as far as attracting Japanese investment, the insurance agreement is probably icing on the cake. It is not the decisive factor. If we truly wish to attract Japanese and other foreign investments, we must improve our overall investment environment, improve cross-Strait relations, and take concrete steps to liberalize our markets,
Consider the impact of the Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement: on the Cross-Strait Investment Agreement. The differences are clear. Taiwan businesses have been investing on the Chinese mainland for years. They have amassed vast investment interests. The legal system on the Chinese mainland provides inadequate legal protections, Therefore the Cross-Strait Investment Agreement is far more significant than the Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement. The Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement was reached in short order. Negotiations over the Cross-Strait Investment Agreement have gone back and forth repeatedly, They remain stuck on issues of personal safety and investment dispute resolution. Cross-strait relations are far more complex than Taiwan-Japan relations. But a more important reason is the sensitivities the two sides stillhave regarding sovereignty and other forms of political authority.
Beijing wants us to afford Mainland capital the same protections we normally give other countries. But it also wants to avoid the internationalization of cross-Strait arrangements. This may be the basis for insurance agreement negotiations. We want to allow in Mainland capital and to increase protections for Taiwan businesses on the Chinese mainland. We want equal treatment and a mandatory investment dispute settlement mechanism. These are difficult problems. But they do not figure into Taiwan-Japan relations. They have made a Cross-Strait Investment Agreement difficult to reach. That is understandable. Our side must normalize the investment of capital from the Chinese mainland. That is only reasonable. The other side is responding positively to concerns about personal safety. But it remains reluctant to accept an impartial, compulsory, third party dispute settlement mechanism. These are the key issues for the two sides. Apparently various forces are still wrestling with each other. A significant gap must be closed.
Cross-Strait relations are different from Taiwan-Japan relations. But the Taiwan-Japan insurance Agreement has yielded an early harvest. Everone on Taiwan, including the business community, sees the Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement as a benchmark for a future Cross-Strait Investment Agreement. The Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement has taken one giant leap. The cross-Strait agreement must offer more than merely proclamations and voluntary provisions. If it offers little more than the current Taiwan Business Protection Act, the government will have a hard time anwering to the public. The issue would become a political football. Therefore the Cross-Strait Investment Agreement must not be rushed. The most important thing is substance, Only then can we protect the interests of Taiwan capital on the Chinese mainland. In the end, it is more important that the Cross-Strait Investment Agreement be done right than done fast.
從台日投保協議看兩岸投保協議
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.09.30 02:57 am
台日投保協議上周四完成簽署。這是台日在一九七二年斷交以來，涵蓋議題最廣最深的經貿協議。在這個里程碑的基礎上，台日未來繼續推動經貿自由化談判，也會相對容易許多。政府的努力，值得肯定；日本對於台日關係的新思維，也帶來許多契機。反觀在同一時間展開協商的兩岸投保協議，卻還停留在只聞樓梯響的階段；各界固然心急，但也有急不得的考量。
無論在投資開放、保護範圍與程度，以及國際仲裁等方面，台日投保協議的內容都與國際趨勢高度接軌，甚至還有超越台灣現行制度的突破。以土地徵收補償為例，台日投保協議非但規定補償必須即時，更進一步要求應與公平市場價值相當，而所謂「公平」市價，指的是必須排除社會知悉徵收規劃後所造成的貶值。如果各級政府能藉此推動徵收補償機制，對內、對外都落實「公平市價補償」的精神，更可一併解決許多國內的土地徵收糾紛。此外，台日投保協議的三個附件中，將我國目前實際上對外資的保留限制都逐一列出，成為國際協議的一部分；這意味著未來政府只能逐步解除這些限制，再無法倒退反悔，也具有一定的自由化效果。
不過，對於法治健全、行政程序透明成熟的國家而言，其本身各種機制及救濟程序原本就已對投資提供充分保障，不可預測的突襲性行為也不常出現，故洽簽雙邊投保協議的意義仍屬相對有限。對此，台日投保協議的涵蓋範圍固然廣泛，但因台灣行政司法制度雖不盡完善，卻也日趨現代化，因此對吸引日資而言，投保協議本身大抵僅有錦上添花之效，而非決定性的因素；整體投資環境的完備、兩岸關係的持續改善，再結合市場開放的決心與具體作為，才是吸引日資、外資的根本之道。
由台日投保協議來看兩岸投保協議，即可明顯辨識其不同。由於台商在中國大陸投資多年，已累積巨大投資利益，加上對岸行政司法制度對台商保護相對不足，兩岸投保協議對台灣的重要性及實質意義，遠超過台日投保協議。相較於台日投保協議的迅速達陣，兩岸投保協議的協商進展卻反反覆覆，始終在人身保護及投資爭端解決等幾個老問題上打轉。其中，兩岸關係的複雜性固然遠非台日關係所能比擬，但更重要的原因，可能還是雙方在涉及主權等敏感問題尚未取得政治上的授權。
對陸方而言，要求我方給予陸資比照其他國家的正常待遇，以及避免任何可能造成兩岸關係國際化的安排，可能是其協商投保協議的基本原則；我方則以不失去陸資開放的自主空間，強化台商人身安全，以及爭取公平、具強制性的投資爭端解決機制為準則。這些在台日關係中都不存在的難題，造成兩岸投保協議難產，是可以理解的。目前看來，我方必須在陸資投資正常化部分有所交代才合情合理，而對岸對人身安全機制也漸有正面回應，但仍不願接受某種強制由公正第三方進行爭端解決的機制。目前兩岸在這些關鍵議題上，似乎還有各種力量在角力對抗，仍有相當落差需要校準。
不過，雖然兩岸關係不同於台日關係，但在台日投保協議先一步收割的局面下，很難不期待台灣各界及台商社群，以台日投保協議的成果及內涵，作為檢視兩岸投保協議的基準。因此，相較於台日投保協議的跨大步，兩岸投保協議的內容若多屬宣示性條款、自願性規定，只比中國大陸現行的「台商保護法」向前走出一小步，則非但很難對內交代，更可能在此時此刻變成政治炒作的話題。就此而言，兩岸投保協議並不需要急於在時間上追趕，最重要的還是要有具體的作為，能夠顯著提升對台商大陸投資權益的保障。所以，還是一句老話：兩岸投保協議談得快，不如談得好！
Thursday, September 29, 2011
Challenge Those Who Challenge the Taiwan Japan Investment Agreement
Challenge Those Who Challenge the Taiwan Japan Investment Agreement
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 29, 2011
Summary: The Taiwan Japan Investment Agreement has been signed. It must now be sent to the Legislative Yuan. The relevant procedures must be followed, enabling it to take effect. The Legislative Yuan has no reason to reject this ground-breaking agreement between Taipei and Tokyo. Taipei can use this precedent to increase its international economic and trading space. It can use it to attract foreign investment. Who has the heart to belittle this investment agreement between Taipei and Tokyo? Opposition motivated by sheer orneriness. Now that is something we truly do not need!
Full Text below:
On April 22, the Association of East Asian Relations and the Chinese Commerce and Cultural Exchange Association signed a cooperation agreement to protect investments between Taiwan and Japan. This is the first major breakthrough on trade and economic diplomacy since the two sides signed ECFA. It is also the most substantive agreement signed between Taipei and Tokyo since diplomatic relations were severed in 1972. The linkage between this agreement and ECFA is obvious. For the first time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for signing the agreement. This shows how much relations between Tokyo and Taipei have improved. The gains were hard-won. An agreement was far from assured. This is a happy milestone for Taipei in the international arena, where it has expanded its foreign relations. It deserves recognition. But domestic political struggles are vicious. Therefore it has become a target for criticism. Can political parties on Taiwan arrive at any sort of consensus? This agreement will be a litmus test. We will soon discover whether a consensus can be reached on this investment agreement between Taipei and Tokyo.
Some critics challenge the use of the English term "arrangement" for "agreement." Why not call it an agreement an agreement, instead of an arrangement? International agreements written in English are common. English is not the mother tongue for either the Republic of China or for Japan. Using English avoids an affront to the dignity of either nation. Using a single language rather than two languages-- Chinese and Japanese -- to sign this important document, avoids problems that arise when the text is changed. The benefits are obvious. In 1972 the first of two protocols were signed. In Chinese it was referred to as an agreement. The current document is consistent with the document signed then, which was referred to as an "arrangement." An international agreement can be referred to as an agreement or an arrangement. There is no difference. The DPP is splitting hairs. It is making much ado about nothing. Does the DPP really believe the Taiwan Japan investment agreement is not an international agreement? Its criticisms are pointless. They are as pointless as questions about why the Association for East Asian Relations and the Chinese Commerce and Cultural Exchange Association signed on behalf of the two parties.
Other critics demand to know why investors are defined on the Japanese side as "natural persons of Japanese nationality," but as "natural persons with Taiwan citizenship" on the Taiwan side. The fact is the agreement refers to the two sides as 台灣 / Taiwan and 日本 / Japan. These can be understood as geographical names. But they also allow the term "Taiwan" to appear. This was the greatest common denominator. Other critics said the name of the nation should have been the Republic of China. But in that case, there would have been no need for such terms as the "Association for East Asian Relations" and the "Chinese Commerce and Cultural Exchange Association." Would critics prefer that the two sides use terminology they consider acceptable, and not sign the agreement at all? Actually, for inhabitants of the global village, "citizen" is a considerably more progressive term than "national." An overweening preoccupation with sovereignty has left some critics mummified. This is one of the reasons Taiwan continues to spin its wheels and to go nowhere. Critics should listen to criticisms of their own criticisms. Are they binding Taiwan hand and foot? Are they making non-negotiable demands?
Others claim this agreement has little connection with ECFA, that it will not necessarily persuade Japanese capital to enter Taiwan as a prelude to venturing into the Chinese mainland. They say Tokyo and Beijing signed a similar agreement earlier. But for Japanese businessmen who entered the Chinese mainland directly but lost money, joint ventures with businessmen on Taiwan as a prelude to entering the Chinese mainland are an attractive option. The Taiwan Japan Investment Agreement addresses Japanese concerns about the lack of legal protections on Taiwan. Are critics saying that Taipei and Tokyo should even not bother signing an investment agreement? Does that make any sense? Taipei and Tokyo have signed a bilateral investment agreement. The next step is to negotiate and sign a bilateral trade agreement. Suppose the two sides had not signed ECFA earlier? Would Tokyo have begun consultations with Taipei during the second half of last year? Would it have signed the Taiwan Japan Investment Agreement? Whenever the DPP is out of office, no political or diplomatic success is ever deemed a success. This is probably the most regrettable aspect of DPP criticism. Given the DPP's attitude, Taiwan is unlikely to ever achieve consensus.
As international investment protection agreements go, the Taiwan Japan investment agreement is considered a rare masterpiece. It covers norms local governments ought to follow when placing levies on foreign governments, including direct and indirect levies. It covers the prompt collection of compensation, adequate and effective compensation, and the fair market value of compensation. It covers International Chamber of Commerce arbitration and ad hoc arbitration, in accordance with United Nations rules or other agreed upon cross-border arbitration. It is simultaneously idealistic and pragmatic. It is no exaggeration to describe it as exemplary.
The Taiwan Japan Investment Agreement has been signed. It must now be sent to the Legislative Yuan. The relevant procedures must be followed, enabling it to take effect. The Legislative Yuan has no reason to reject this ground-breaking agreement between Taipei and Tokyo. Taipei can use this precedent to increase its international economic and trading space. It can use it to attract foreign investment. Who has the heart to belittle this investment agreement between Taipei and Tokyo? Opposition motivated by sheer orneriness. Now that is something we truly do not need!
質疑台日投資協議 心態可議
2011-09-29 中國時報
亞東關係協會與交流協會於本月廿二日簽署了台日投資保護合作協議。這是兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ之後，第一個經貿外交上的重要突破，也是台日自一九七二年因斷交而簽署兩會協議之後，最有分量的協議。這分協議與ＥＣＦＡ間之連鎖關係十分明顯，日方首次由外務省負責主導簽署此項協議，也顯示出日台實質關係親密與改善的程度。對於這來之不易、事前也難以期待的協議，原應視做台灣在國際舞台上拓展對外關係一項令人高興的里程碑，值得肯定，卻因為國內政治鬥爭環境險惡，出現了若干批評。如果台灣內部要形成任何共識，不妨就用這分協議做個觀察，台灣共識的追求者，會認為台灣可以對台日投資協議形成什麼樣的共識！
一項批評是質疑此項以英文簽訂的協議使用arrangement的名稱，而且認為何不稱「協定」而要稱為「協議」。國際書面協議使用英文，本極常見，英語並非台日任何一方的母語，即不發生任何一方尊嚴受損的問題，用一種語言而非兩種語言（中文與日文）簽署此項重要文件，可以避免文字改簽所產生的問題，好處也顯而易見。一九七二年兩會簽署的首分協議，中文即稱為「協議」；此次簽署的文件第一條即將當年的協議稱為arrangement，維持了一致性。國際協議稱做「協議」或「協定」，本無不同，雞蛋裡挑骨頭，只是庸人自擾。如果懷疑台日投資協議不是國際協議，猶如質疑為什麼要由亞東關係協會與交流協會代表雙方出面簽署，一樣地無聊。
另一項批評，則是質疑為何「投資人」的定義日方寫的是「擁有日本國籍之自然人」，台方則稱「具台灣公民身分之自然人」？其實此項協議稱呼雙方為「台灣（Taiwan）」及「日本（Japan）」，做為地理名稱加以理解，又看見了台灣的名稱，不但是最大的公約數，本來也是值得高興的事。批評者如果認為該稱中華民國的國名，那還用得著亞東關係協會與交流協會嗎？難道認為雙方各使用自己較能接受的字眼不如不簽嗎？其實從身為地球村的一分子而言，「公民」可是遠比「國民」進步的字眼。過度陷在主權的泥淖中故步自封，甚而不可自拔，正是台灣不斷內耗自傷的主因之一。批評者值得思考所提出的類似批評，是否正在傷害台灣自己的能動性，是否也是強人所難的要求？
還有的說法，則是此項協議與ＥＣＦＡ的關係不大，也未必有助於引日資進入台灣以為再圖西進的策略。日方與中方已簽有相關協議在先，對於直接進入中國市場投資失利的日商而言，先在台灣與台商合作再共同進入中國市場，的確是一個誘人的選項。台日投資協議，恰可彌補日商進入台灣法律保障不足的顧慮。批評者的說法倒像是在說台日投資協議不如不簽了？有任何道理嗎？台日簽了雙邊投資協議的下一步，就該是協商簽訂雙邊貿易協定了。試問，如果不是兩岸已有ＥＣＦＡ在先，日本會從去年下半年開始與我方協商簽署台日投資協議嗎？不是由我主政，一切的政治外交成就都不是成就的心態，恐怕最要不得。這樣的心態始終存在，台灣恐怕永遠成不了任何共識。
從國際投資保障協議的理想模式看，台日協議稱得上是一分難得的佳作。它涵蓋了在地政府對於外資的徵收應該遵守的規範，及於直接徵收與間接徵收，徵收賠償應該符合即時、適當與有效的補償，而且以徵收時的公平市場價值為準，也納入了國際商會仲裁、依聯合國規則進行專案仲裁，或是其他雙方同意的跨國仲裁，務實卻符合理想性，稱為一項典範性的協議，亦不為過。
台日投資協議簽署之後，應該要送到立法院，完成相關的程序後，才會生效。我們肯定台日這份突破性的協議，也認為立法院沒有不予接受的理由。如果希望台灣能夠用這一個例子開啟後續的國際經貿活動更為廣闊的空間，也做為吸引外資進入台灣投資的張本，誰又忍心對於台日投資協議妄自菲薄？為了反對而反對的批評，真的不需要！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 29, 2011
Summary: The Taiwan Japan Investment Agreement has been signed. It must now be sent to the Legislative Yuan. The relevant procedures must be followed, enabling it to take effect. The Legislative Yuan has no reason to reject this ground-breaking agreement between Taipei and Tokyo. Taipei can use this precedent to increase its international economic and trading space. It can use it to attract foreign investment. Who has the heart to belittle this investment agreement between Taipei and Tokyo? Opposition motivated by sheer orneriness. Now that is something we truly do not need!
Full Text below:
On April 22, the Association of East Asian Relations and the Chinese Commerce and Cultural Exchange Association signed a cooperation agreement to protect investments between Taiwan and Japan. This is the first major breakthrough on trade and economic diplomacy since the two sides signed ECFA. It is also the most substantive agreement signed between Taipei and Tokyo since diplomatic relations were severed in 1972. The linkage between this agreement and ECFA is obvious. For the first time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for signing the agreement. This shows how much relations between Tokyo and Taipei have improved. The gains were hard-won. An agreement was far from assured. This is a happy milestone for Taipei in the international arena, where it has expanded its foreign relations. It deserves recognition. But domestic political struggles are vicious. Therefore it has become a target for criticism. Can political parties on Taiwan arrive at any sort of consensus? This agreement will be a litmus test. We will soon discover whether a consensus can be reached on this investment agreement between Taipei and Tokyo.
Some critics challenge the use of the English term "arrangement" for "agreement." Why not call it an agreement an agreement, instead of an arrangement? International agreements written in English are common. English is not the mother tongue for either the Republic of China or for Japan. Using English avoids an affront to the dignity of either nation. Using a single language rather than two languages-- Chinese and Japanese -- to sign this important document, avoids problems that arise when the text is changed. The benefits are obvious. In 1972 the first of two protocols were signed. In Chinese it was referred to as an agreement. The current document is consistent with the document signed then, which was referred to as an "arrangement." An international agreement can be referred to as an agreement or an arrangement. There is no difference. The DPP is splitting hairs. It is making much ado about nothing. Does the DPP really believe the Taiwan Japan investment agreement is not an international agreement? Its criticisms are pointless. They are as pointless as questions about why the Association for East Asian Relations and the Chinese Commerce and Cultural Exchange Association signed on behalf of the two parties.
Other critics demand to know why investors are defined on the Japanese side as "natural persons of Japanese nationality," but as "natural persons with Taiwan citizenship" on the Taiwan side. The fact is the agreement refers to the two sides as 台灣 / Taiwan and 日本 / Japan. These can be understood as geographical names. But they also allow the term "Taiwan" to appear. This was the greatest common denominator. Other critics said the name of the nation should have been the Republic of China. But in that case, there would have been no need for such terms as the "Association for East Asian Relations" and the "Chinese Commerce and Cultural Exchange Association." Would critics prefer that the two sides use terminology they consider acceptable, and not sign the agreement at all? Actually, for inhabitants of the global village, "citizen" is a considerably more progressive term than "national." An overweening preoccupation with sovereignty has left some critics mummified. This is one of the reasons Taiwan continues to spin its wheels and to go nowhere. Critics should listen to criticisms of their own criticisms. Are they binding Taiwan hand and foot? Are they making non-negotiable demands?
Others claim this agreement has little connection with ECFA, that it will not necessarily persuade Japanese capital to enter Taiwan as a prelude to venturing into the Chinese mainland. They say Tokyo and Beijing signed a similar agreement earlier. But for Japanese businessmen who entered the Chinese mainland directly but lost money, joint ventures with businessmen on Taiwan as a prelude to entering the Chinese mainland are an attractive option. The Taiwan Japan Investment Agreement addresses Japanese concerns about the lack of legal protections on Taiwan. Are critics saying that Taipei and Tokyo should even not bother signing an investment agreement? Does that make any sense? Taipei and Tokyo have signed a bilateral investment agreement. The next step is to negotiate and sign a bilateral trade agreement. Suppose the two sides had not signed ECFA earlier? Would Tokyo have begun consultations with Taipei during the second half of last year? Would it have signed the Taiwan Japan Investment Agreement? Whenever the DPP is out of office, no political or diplomatic success is ever deemed a success. This is probably the most regrettable aspect of DPP criticism. Given the DPP's attitude, Taiwan is unlikely to ever achieve consensus.
As international investment protection agreements go, the Taiwan Japan investment agreement is considered a rare masterpiece. It covers norms local governments ought to follow when placing levies on foreign governments, including direct and indirect levies. It covers the prompt collection of compensation, adequate and effective compensation, and the fair market value of compensation. It covers International Chamber of Commerce arbitration and ad hoc arbitration, in accordance with United Nations rules or other agreed upon cross-border arbitration. It is simultaneously idealistic and pragmatic. It is no exaggeration to describe it as exemplary.
The Taiwan Japan Investment Agreement has been signed. It must now be sent to the Legislative Yuan. The relevant procedures must be followed, enabling it to take effect. The Legislative Yuan has no reason to reject this ground-breaking agreement between Taipei and Tokyo. Taipei can use this precedent to increase its international economic and trading space. It can use it to attract foreign investment. Who has the heart to belittle this investment agreement between Taipei and Tokyo? Opposition motivated by sheer orneriness. Now that is something we truly do not need!
質疑台日投資協議 心態可議
2011-09-29 中國時報
亞東關係協會與交流協會於本月廿二日簽署了台日投資保護合作協議。這是兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ之後，第一個經貿外交上的重要突破，也是台日自一九七二年因斷交而簽署兩會協議之後，最有分量的協議。這分協議與ＥＣＦＡ間之連鎖關係十分明顯，日方首次由外務省負責主導簽署此項協議，也顯示出日台實質關係親密與改善的程度。對於這來之不易、事前也難以期待的協議，原應視做台灣在國際舞台上拓展對外關係一項令人高興的里程碑，值得肯定，卻因為國內政治鬥爭環境險惡，出現了若干批評。如果台灣內部要形成任何共識，不妨就用這分協議做個觀察，台灣共識的追求者，會認為台灣可以對台日投資協議形成什麼樣的共識！
一項批評是質疑此項以英文簽訂的協議使用arrangement的名稱，而且認為何不稱「協定」而要稱為「協議」。國際書面協議使用英文，本極常見，英語並非台日任何一方的母語，即不發生任何一方尊嚴受損的問題，用一種語言而非兩種語言（中文與日文）簽署此項重要文件，可以避免文字改簽所產生的問題，好處也顯而易見。一九七二年兩會簽署的首分協議，中文即稱為「協議」；此次簽署的文件第一條即將當年的協議稱為arrangement，維持了一致性。國際協議稱做「協議」或「協定」，本無不同，雞蛋裡挑骨頭，只是庸人自擾。如果懷疑台日投資協議不是國際協議，猶如質疑為什麼要由亞東關係協會與交流協會代表雙方出面簽署，一樣地無聊。
另一項批評，則是質疑為何「投資人」的定義日方寫的是「擁有日本國籍之自然人」，台方則稱「具台灣公民身分之自然人」？其實此項協議稱呼雙方為「台灣（Taiwan）」及「日本（Japan）」，做為地理名稱加以理解，又看見了台灣的名稱，不但是最大的公約數，本來也是值得高興的事。批評者如果認為該稱中華民國的國名，那還用得著亞東關係協會與交流協會嗎？難道認為雙方各使用自己較能接受的字眼不如不簽嗎？其實從身為地球村的一分子而言，「公民」可是遠比「國民」進步的字眼。過度陷在主權的泥淖中故步自封，甚而不可自拔，正是台灣不斷內耗自傷的主因之一。批評者值得思考所提出的類似批評，是否正在傷害台灣自己的能動性，是否也是強人所難的要求？
還有的說法，則是此項協議與ＥＣＦＡ的關係不大，也未必有助於引日資進入台灣以為再圖西進的策略。日方與中方已簽有相關協議在先，對於直接進入中國市場投資失利的日商而言，先在台灣與台商合作再共同進入中國市場，的確是一個誘人的選項。台日投資協議，恰可彌補日商進入台灣法律保障不足的顧慮。批評者的說法倒像是在說台日投資協議不如不簽了？有任何道理嗎？台日簽了雙邊投資協議的下一步，就該是協商簽訂雙邊貿易協定了。試問，如果不是兩岸已有ＥＣＦＡ在先，日本會從去年下半年開始與我方協商簽署台日投資協議嗎？不是由我主政，一切的政治外交成就都不是成就的心態，恐怕最要不得。這樣的心態始終存在，台灣恐怕永遠成不了任何共識。
從國際投資保障協議的理想模式看，台日協議稱得上是一分難得的佳作。它涵蓋了在地政府對於外資的徵收應該遵守的規範，及於直接徵收與間接徵收，徵收賠償應該符合即時、適當與有效的補償，而且以徵收時的公平市場價值為準，也納入了國際商會仲裁、依聯合國規則進行專案仲裁，或是其他雙方同意的跨國仲裁，務實卻符合理想性，稱為一項典範性的協議，亦不為過。
台日投資協議簽署之後，應該要送到立法院，完成相關的程序後，才會生效。我們肯定台日這份突破性的協議，也認為立法院沒有不予接受的理由。如果希望台灣能夠用這一個例子開啟後續的國際經貿活動更為廣闊的空間，也做為吸引外資進入台灣投資的張本，誰又忍心對於台日投資協議妄自菲薄？為了反對而反對的批評，真的不需要！
Wednesday, September 28, 2011
Can Taiwan Build a Platform with a Total War Strategy?
Can Taiwan Build a Platform with a Total War Strategy?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 28, 2011
Summary: Tokyo and Taipei have signed an investment agreement. This proves two things. One. the positive effects of ECFA are beginning to show, and are accelerating. Two. The Ma administration's peace strategy has stabilized cross-Strait relations. It has also increased Taipei's international breathing space. By contrast, the Chen regime's "total war strategy" only brought hardship and suffering upon the nation. This much is abundantly clear.
Full Text below:
Tokyo and Taipei have signed an investment agreement. This proves two things. One. the positive effects of ECFA are beginning to show, and are accelerating. Two. The Ma administration's peace strategy has stabilized cross-Strait relations. It has also increased Taipei's international breathing space. By contrast, the Chen regime's "total war strategy" only brought hardship and suffering upon the nation. This much is abundantly clear.
ECFA is merely a cross-Strait economic cooperation framework. But its impact has already exceeded the impact of cross-Strait interaction. Its impact has already exceeded the impact of economics and investment. Taipei and Tokyo have signed an investment agreement. This shows that the impact of ECFA has widened out. Its scope is no longer merely cross-Strait, but international. Its nature is no longer merely economic, but diplomatic. In short, Taiwan boasts a mature economy that enjoys a unique advantage -- it understands the Chinese mainland. ECFA shows that Taiwan has a role to play. It is no longer merely a case of "Go west, young man!" Taiwan can serve as a launching pad and middleman for those venturing forth to the Chinese mainland.
It's ironic when you think about it. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian loudly thumped the tub for "Taiwan's primacy." Meanwhile, unbeknownst to the public, they imposed a Closed Door Policy upon the nation, sealing it shut, forcing its people to miss once in a lifetime opportunities that came with globalization. Many people on Taiwan hoped to transform Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific operations center. Their dreams came to naught. Today, ECFA and the Taipei/Tokyo Investment Agreement are partial remedies to their monumental blunders.
If the Democratic Progressive Party were in office today, Taipei and Tokyo could not have signed such an agreement. The reasons are not hard to imagine. One. The Democratic Progressive Party has done its utmost to incite cross-Strait confrontation whenever possible. Under such circumstances, Taiwan could never function as a gateway to the Chinese mainland. Two. The DPP has a narcissistic strategic outlook. It constantly seeks to create conflict and launch attacks. Japan would never choose Taiwan as an auxiliary base of operations, With so many variables, the investment risks would be far too great. During Chen Shui-bian's eight long years of misrule, Taiwan acquired a reputation as "isolationist." This is the reason why.
On the one hand, the DPP challenges the effectiveness of ECFA. On the other hand, it contradicts itself, and accuses the Ma administration of "selling out Taiwan." The DPP merely exposes its ignorance and ambivalence regarding cross-Strait strategy. As we all know, ECFA is merely one indicator of economic and trade relations. Other indicators are even more significant. The agreement conveys a message of peace, and implies a state of truce. Based on this atmosphere of peace, cross-Strait exchanges can increase. Taiwan can become a launching pad for entry into the Chinese mainland. Even more importantly, other nations engaged in exchanges with Taipei once had to fret about Beijing's reaction. This problem is gradually receding. Improvements of this kind are far more important than cross-Strait economic growth alone.
Consider the most obvious example. Over the past three years, our nation has squandered fewer and fewer resources on diplomatic confrontation. Our citizens may now travel abroad and enjoy preferential visa-free treatment in 117 countries. These are concrete achievements that truly enhance "Taiwan's dignity." Washington has reportedly promised visa-free treatment as well. It may be formally implemented early next year. Citizens of the ROC hoping to visit the United States must line up in front of the AIT, to await cross-examination. This will become a thing of the past. Is this not something to be proud of? Chen Shui-bian used ersatz state visits as a pretext to transit the United States. In a fit of petulance he even embarked on a round the world "lost voyage." He used the nation's dignity as a bargaining chip, in a reckless gamble to further his own political ambition. Contrast the two individuals. Under whose administration did the people of Taiwan experience greater dignity? Is it even necessary to ask?
The DPP often says that "Taiwan must stand up and venture forth." Upon first hearing this rallying cry, one may feel a sense of tragic heroism. But on closer scrutiny, one realizes it is actually a perversion of logic. To insist that one must "stand up and venture forth," presumes that one is trapped and besieged, that one must rise up and take arms. In reality, even when times were their toughest, Taiwan businessmen ventured forth into the world with only a suitcase. Who was prevented from venturing forth? Who needed the DPP's "Pity poor me!" act? Just who is standing before the nation's door, blocking the way, preventing its citizens from venturing forth into the world? Just who is provoking conflict everywhere, then feigning victimization? Just who is defaming others, accusing them of "selling out Taiwan?" Who else, but the DPP?
Today, Taipei and Tokyo signed an investment agreement. This shows that if Taiwan can transform itself into a mature, business-friendly, international platform, it will have no trouble persuading international investors to establish operations headquarters on Taiwan, from which they can venture forth to the Chinese mainland. Such a Taiwan will be able to feel pride and self-confidence. Such a Taiwan need not put on a show of "standing up and venturing forth." Such a Taiwan need not make a ridiculous detour by "venturing forth into the world before venturing forth into [Mainland] China ."
Weaker states survive not by building impenetrable fortresses. They survive by becoming middlemen for international trade and commerce. That is their most secure defense. The peace they secure can be shared by all. Only one political party on Taiwan stands to gain a political advantage by adopting self-destructive national policies. The DPP knows which party that is, but makes a point not to tell.
台灣堅壁清野，何如構築平台？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.28
日本和我國簽署投資協議，說明兩件事：第一，ＥＣＦＡ的積極效應正在發酵，文火已慢慢燒熱；第二，馬政府的「和平戰略」不僅能穩定兩岸關係，也有助於擴大台灣的國際活動空間和量能。相形之下，扁政府時代的「烽火戰略」，只為國家帶來困頓和麻煩，已一目了然。
亦即，ＥＣＦＡ規範的雖只是兩岸的經濟合作框架，但它的溢出效果，卻已超越兩岸互動，甚至超越了經濟和投資的範疇。台日投資協議的簽訂，顯示其擴散效果已從兩岸移向國際，從經貿移向外交。簡單地說，透過ＥＣＦＡ，台灣使自己作為一個了解中國、接近中國的成熟經濟體的優勢得以彰顯；台商可以扮演的角色，不再只是冒險西進，更可擔任世界前進中國的平台與媒介。
說來諷刺，在李登輝和陳水扁把「主體性」的高調唱得最熱烈的時候，台灣也不知不覺把堅壁清野的鎖國堡壘築到了最高點，也從而在那一波全球化潮流中錯失了先機，台灣成為亞太營運中心的夢想化為烏有。如今，ＥＣＦＡ及台日投資協議之簽成，可謂皆是對此一缺憾的補救。
如果今天還是民進黨執政，台日之間絕不可能簽署這紙協議。原因可想而知：其一，在民進黨極力構築的兩岸對立態勢下，台灣毫無可能存在這麼一個「中國門戶」的平台地位或想像；其二，以民進黨的單邊主義戰略思維，總是在尋找藉口製造衝突、發動攻擊，日本絕不可能選擇台灣作為「備援基地」，因為那樣變數太多，投資風險也太高。陳水扁執政的八年，被稱為「鎖國」，原因就在於此。
當民進黨一方面質疑ＥＣＦＡ的成效，一方面又指責馬政府「賣台」，只是愈發暴露了它自己對兩岸戰略的無知與矛盾。殊不知，ＥＣＦＡ只是具體顯現的經貿座標之一，但兩岸之間更重要的東西，其實是蘊含在這個協議背後的「休兵」概念及「和平」氛圍。在這個和平氛圍的基礎上，不僅兩岸之間的交流得以不斷擴展，台灣成為轉進中國的平台地位也變得更為清晰可欲。更重要的是，以往第三國與我交往隨時得「看北京臉色」的障礙，也因此日漸消弭。此一價值，絕對比兩岸純粹經貿增長的成果更值得重視。
最明顯的例子，是近三年我國虛耗在外交對峙上的問題大為減少，且國人出國旅遊享有一百一十七國「免簽證」的優惠待遇，這是「台灣尊嚴」提升的具體成就。最近傳出美國也承諾給我免簽待遇，明年初即有機會正式實施；意味著國人赴美需在ＡＩＴ排隊接受盤問的經驗將成為歷史，這難道不是值得驕傲的事？當年陳水扁屢屢假藉出訪以求「過境」美國，乃至因羞憤而大搞「全球謎航」，把國家的尊嚴當成個人政治豪賭的籌碼；兩相對照，誰主政下的台灣人民更有尊嚴，還需要爭辯嗎？
民進黨常說台灣要「站起來，走出去」，乍聽之下，極其悲壯；但仔細推敲，卻是邏輯倒錯。「站起來、走出去」是假設台灣陷於被圍困狀態，因此要奮起一搏；事實上，台灣早在更艱苦的年代，台商提著一只手提箱就能行遍天下，誰走不出去？又何需民進黨偽裝苦悶來收割悲情？事實上，在那裡擋著國家大門、四處挑釁，再裝成被打壓狀，然後誣指別人出賣台灣的，不都是民進黨嗎？
今天台日投資協議的簽訂，證明台灣若能把自己經營成一個成熟、友善的國際平台，大可吸引各國投資者走進台灣，再經此走向中國。這樣的台灣，可以充滿驕傲與自信，而毋需賣弄「站起來、走出去」那一套悲情，更不必被「從世界走向中國」的捨近求遠詭辯所愚弄。
小國的生存之道，與其拚命興築堅壁清野的鎖國堡壘，不如勤於搭建友善的平台，使自己成為國際間近悅遠來的中轉媒介，那才是最安全的國防。和平的成果可以全民共享，鬥爭的政治操作卻只是一黨獨享刀口舔血的利益，這是民進黨心知肚明、卻不告訴大家的祕密。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 28, 2011
Summary: Tokyo and Taipei have signed an investment agreement. This proves two things. One. the positive effects of ECFA are beginning to show, and are accelerating. Two. The Ma administration's peace strategy has stabilized cross-Strait relations. It has also increased Taipei's international breathing space. By contrast, the Chen regime's "total war strategy" only brought hardship and suffering upon the nation. This much is abundantly clear.
Full Text below:
Tokyo and Taipei have signed an investment agreement. This proves two things. One. the positive effects of ECFA are beginning to show, and are accelerating. Two. The Ma administration's peace strategy has stabilized cross-Strait relations. It has also increased Taipei's international breathing space. By contrast, the Chen regime's "total war strategy" only brought hardship and suffering upon the nation. This much is abundantly clear.
ECFA is merely a cross-Strait economic cooperation framework. But its impact has already exceeded the impact of cross-Strait interaction. Its impact has already exceeded the impact of economics and investment. Taipei and Tokyo have signed an investment agreement. This shows that the impact of ECFA has widened out. Its scope is no longer merely cross-Strait, but international. Its nature is no longer merely economic, but diplomatic. In short, Taiwan boasts a mature economy that enjoys a unique advantage -- it understands the Chinese mainland. ECFA shows that Taiwan has a role to play. It is no longer merely a case of "Go west, young man!" Taiwan can serve as a launching pad and middleman for those venturing forth to the Chinese mainland.
It's ironic when you think about it. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian loudly thumped the tub for "Taiwan's primacy." Meanwhile, unbeknownst to the public, they imposed a Closed Door Policy upon the nation, sealing it shut, forcing its people to miss once in a lifetime opportunities that came with globalization. Many people on Taiwan hoped to transform Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific operations center. Their dreams came to naught. Today, ECFA and the Taipei/Tokyo Investment Agreement are partial remedies to their monumental blunders.
If the Democratic Progressive Party were in office today, Taipei and Tokyo could not have signed such an agreement. The reasons are not hard to imagine. One. The Democratic Progressive Party has done its utmost to incite cross-Strait confrontation whenever possible. Under such circumstances, Taiwan could never function as a gateway to the Chinese mainland. Two. The DPP has a narcissistic strategic outlook. It constantly seeks to create conflict and launch attacks. Japan would never choose Taiwan as an auxiliary base of operations, With so many variables, the investment risks would be far too great. During Chen Shui-bian's eight long years of misrule, Taiwan acquired a reputation as "isolationist." This is the reason why.
On the one hand, the DPP challenges the effectiveness of ECFA. On the other hand, it contradicts itself, and accuses the Ma administration of "selling out Taiwan." The DPP merely exposes its ignorance and ambivalence regarding cross-Strait strategy. As we all know, ECFA is merely one indicator of economic and trade relations. Other indicators are even more significant. The agreement conveys a message of peace, and implies a state of truce. Based on this atmosphere of peace, cross-Strait exchanges can increase. Taiwan can become a launching pad for entry into the Chinese mainland. Even more importantly, other nations engaged in exchanges with Taipei once had to fret about Beijing's reaction. This problem is gradually receding. Improvements of this kind are far more important than cross-Strait economic growth alone.
Consider the most obvious example. Over the past three years, our nation has squandered fewer and fewer resources on diplomatic confrontation. Our citizens may now travel abroad and enjoy preferential visa-free treatment in 117 countries. These are concrete achievements that truly enhance "Taiwan's dignity." Washington has reportedly promised visa-free treatment as well. It may be formally implemented early next year. Citizens of the ROC hoping to visit the United States must line up in front of the AIT, to await cross-examination. This will become a thing of the past. Is this not something to be proud of? Chen Shui-bian used ersatz state visits as a pretext to transit the United States. In a fit of petulance he even embarked on a round the world "lost voyage." He used the nation's dignity as a bargaining chip, in a reckless gamble to further his own political ambition. Contrast the two individuals. Under whose administration did the people of Taiwan experience greater dignity? Is it even necessary to ask?
The DPP often says that "Taiwan must stand up and venture forth." Upon first hearing this rallying cry, one may feel a sense of tragic heroism. But on closer scrutiny, one realizes it is actually a perversion of logic. To insist that one must "stand up and venture forth," presumes that one is trapped and besieged, that one must rise up and take arms. In reality, even when times were their toughest, Taiwan businessmen ventured forth into the world with only a suitcase. Who was prevented from venturing forth? Who needed the DPP's "Pity poor me!" act? Just who is standing before the nation's door, blocking the way, preventing its citizens from venturing forth into the world? Just who is provoking conflict everywhere, then feigning victimization? Just who is defaming others, accusing them of "selling out Taiwan?" Who else, but the DPP?
Today, Taipei and Tokyo signed an investment agreement. This shows that if Taiwan can transform itself into a mature, business-friendly, international platform, it will have no trouble persuading international investors to establish operations headquarters on Taiwan, from which they can venture forth to the Chinese mainland. Such a Taiwan will be able to feel pride and self-confidence. Such a Taiwan need not put on a show of "standing up and venturing forth." Such a Taiwan need not make a ridiculous detour by "venturing forth into the world before venturing forth into [Mainland] China ."
Weaker states survive not by building impenetrable fortresses. They survive by becoming middlemen for international trade and commerce. That is their most secure defense. The peace they secure can be shared by all. Only one political party on Taiwan stands to gain a political advantage by adopting self-destructive national policies. The DPP knows which party that is, but makes a point not to tell.
台灣堅壁清野，何如構築平台？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.28
日本和我國簽署投資協議，說明兩件事：第一，ＥＣＦＡ的積極效應正在發酵，文火已慢慢燒熱；第二，馬政府的「和平戰略」不僅能穩定兩岸關係，也有助於擴大台灣的國際活動空間和量能。相形之下，扁政府時代的「烽火戰略」，只為國家帶來困頓和麻煩，已一目了然。
亦即，ＥＣＦＡ規範的雖只是兩岸的經濟合作框架，但它的溢出效果，卻已超越兩岸互動，甚至超越了經濟和投資的範疇。台日投資協議的簽訂，顯示其擴散效果已從兩岸移向國際，從經貿移向外交。簡單地說，透過ＥＣＦＡ，台灣使自己作為一個了解中國、接近中國的成熟經濟體的優勢得以彰顯；台商可以扮演的角色，不再只是冒險西進，更可擔任世界前進中國的平台與媒介。
說來諷刺，在李登輝和陳水扁把「主體性」的高調唱得最熱烈的時候，台灣也不知不覺把堅壁清野的鎖國堡壘築到了最高點，也從而在那一波全球化潮流中錯失了先機，台灣成為亞太營運中心的夢想化為烏有。如今，ＥＣＦＡ及台日投資協議之簽成，可謂皆是對此一缺憾的補救。
如果今天還是民進黨執政，台日之間絕不可能簽署這紙協議。原因可想而知：其一，在民進黨極力構築的兩岸對立態勢下，台灣毫無可能存在這麼一個「中國門戶」的平台地位或想像；其二，以民進黨的單邊主義戰略思維，總是在尋找藉口製造衝突、發動攻擊，日本絕不可能選擇台灣作為「備援基地」，因為那樣變數太多，投資風險也太高。陳水扁執政的八年，被稱為「鎖國」，原因就在於此。
當民進黨一方面質疑ＥＣＦＡ的成效，一方面又指責馬政府「賣台」，只是愈發暴露了它自己對兩岸戰略的無知與矛盾。殊不知，ＥＣＦＡ只是具體顯現的經貿座標之一，但兩岸之間更重要的東西，其實是蘊含在這個協議背後的「休兵」概念及「和平」氛圍。在這個和平氛圍的基礎上，不僅兩岸之間的交流得以不斷擴展，台灣成為轉進中國的平台地位也變得更為清晰可欲。更重要的是，以往第三國與我交往隨時得「看北京臉色」的障礙，也因此日漸消弭。此一價值，絕對比兩岸純粹經貿增長的成果更值得重視。
最明顯的例子，是近三年我國虛耗在外交對峙上的問題大為減少，且國人出國旅遊享有一百一十七國「免簽證」的優惠待遇，這是「台灣尊嚴」提升的具體成就。最近傳出美國也承諾給我免簽待遇，明年初即有機會正式實施；意味著國人赴美需在ＡＩＴ排隊接受盤問的經驗將成為歷史，這難道不是值得驕傲的事？當年陳水扁屢屢假藉出訪以求「過境」美國，乃至因羞憤而大搞「全球謎航」，把國家的尊嚴當成個人政治豪賭的籌碼；兩相對照，誰主政下的台灣人民更有尊嚴，還需要爭辯嗎？
民進黨常說台灣要「站起來，走出去」，乍聽之下，極其悲壯；但仔細推敲，卻是邏輯倒錯。「站起來、走出去」是假設台灣陷於被圍困狀態，因此要奮起一搏；事實上，台灣早在更艱苦的年代，台商提著一只手提箱就能行遍天下，誰走不出去？又何需民進黨偽裝苦悶來收割悲情？事實上，在那裡擋著國家大門、四處挑釁，再裝成被打壓狀，然後誣指別人出賣台灣的，不都是民進黨嗎？
今天台日投資協議的簽訂，證明台灣若能把自己經營成一個成熟、友善的國際平台，大可吸引各國投資者走進台灣，再經此走向中國。這樣的台灣，可以充滿驕傲與自信，而毋需賣弄「站起來、走出去」那一套悲情，更不必被「從世界走向中國」的捨近求遠詭辯所愚弄。
小國的生存之道，與其拚命興築堅壁清野的鎖國堡壘，不如勤於搭建友善的平台，使自己成為國際間近悅遠來的中轉媒介，那才是最安全的國防。和平的成果可以全民共享，鬥爭的政治操作卻只是一黨獨享刀口舔血的利益，這是民進黨心知肚明、卻不告訴大家的祕密。
Tuesday, September 27, 2011
The DPP is a Taiwan Independence Party
The DPP is a Taiwan Independence Party
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 27, 2011
Summary: When Tsai Ing-wen says "I am Taiwanese," she means that "Ma Ying-jeou is not Taiwanese." When Tsai Ing-wen says "Ma Ying-jeou is selling out Taiwan," she means "I on the other hand, am not selling out Taiwan." Such political rhetoric is laughable and ludicrous. But it has long been the DPP's stock in trade. Tsai Ing-wen has eagerly adopted it as her own.
When Tsai Ing-wen says "I am Taiwanese," she means that "Ma Ying-jeou is not Taiwanese." When Tsai Ing-wen says "Ma Ying-jeou is selling out Taiwan," she means "I on the other hand, am not selling out Taiwan." Such political rhetoric is laughable and ludicrous. But it has long been the DPP's stock in trade. Tsai Ing-wen has eagerly adopted it as her own.
This argument however, contains two major holes. First of all, if Ma Ying-jeou is "selling out Taiwan," how is he doing it? Does the 1992 consensus sell out Taiwan? How? The Republic of China Constitution is a "one China, different interpretations" constitution. This constitution was amended seven times. Cross-strait policy is predicated upon this constitution. So is the 1992 consensus. This constitution was amended with the active participation of Lee Teng-hui and the DPP. The DPP upheld this constitution for eight years. One China, different interpretations is predicated upon this constitution. The 1992 consensus is predicated upon this constitution. How can it possibly "sell out Taiwan?" Does ECFA "sell out Taiwan?" ECFA can not solve all of Taiwan's political and economic problems. But it is the most significant political and economic achievement in recent years. Just look at how effusively the U.S. government has praised the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy. Just look at the recently signed trade agreement with Japan. These bear eloquent witness to its effectiveness. Besides, ECFA is the very cross-Strait policy that the Democratic Progressive Party must continue "if it returns to power." The DPP clearly appreciates its value. How can it claim that ECFA "sells out Taiwan?"
Secondly, the DPP says "Ma Ying-jeou is leaning toward [Mainland] China? That is beyond debate." But "leaning toward [Mainland] China" hardly implies "selling out Taiwan." If "leaning toward [Mainland] China" means championing win-win policies such as ECFA, how exactly does that "sell out Taiwan?" When the DPP equates peaceful exchanges with "selling out Taiwan" the charge is clearly spurious.
Such DPP rhetoric comes straight out and declares, "You are not Taiwanese." and "I, on the other hand, am Taiwanese." It then concludes "Therefore you are selling out Taiwan," whereas "I am not selling out Taiwan." Such one sided arguments cite no evidence and apply no logic. The DPP simply lays down the law. Tsai Ing-wen simply lays down the law.
The DPP is a Taiwan independence party. That is beyond debate. The DPP's mission is Taiwan independence nation-building, the rectification of names, and the authoring of a new constitution. So far Tsai Ing-wen has issued no denials about this. According to DPP logic, advocating the overthrow of the Republic of China and advocating the rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution is not "selling out Taiwan." Conversely, upholding the Republic of China and one China, different interpretations is dismissed as "selling out Taiwan." DPP political logic is consistent. Supporting Taiwan independence is "loving Taiwan." Supporting the Republic of China is "selling out Taiwan." This is the DPP's unchanging yardstick for measuring "loving Taiwan" and "selling out Taiwan." It is now being used to distinguish between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen.
Why is advocating Taiwan independence, or opposing cross-Strait exchanges, "loving Taiwan?" Why is upholding "one China, different interpretations," the ROC Constitution, cross-Strait exchanges, and peaceful development, "selling out Taiwan?" Is this all beyond debate? The DPP was founded 25 years ago. Since then it has always resorted to this logic. Tsai Ing-wen says "Reason will make democracy more effective." But even she resorts to this logic. This truly is regressive. The arrow in the "Taiwan Next" logo should be turned completely around until it is facing backwards.
The general election is almost upon us. The big question the public must ask itself, is whether Taiwan independence is "loving Taiwan" or harming Taiwan. Are cross-Strait exchanges and peaceful development loving Taiwan or harming Taiwan? The Democratic Progressive Party continues to demand Taiwan independence. It simultaneously issues threats. It says Beijing "may not unilaterally discontinue cross-Strait exchanges." Is this "loving Taiwan" or harming Taiwan? Tsai Ing-wen is hoping to repudiate the 1992 consensus in order to promote Taiwan independence and precipitate a showdown with Beijing. Is this "loving Taiwan" or harming Taiwan?
These political and economic disputes on Taiwan must be clarified. Otherwise, the DPP will continue to say "Ma Ying-jeou leans toward [Mainland] China. That is beyond debate." But the real question is whether Taiwan independence is "loving Taiwan" or harmng Taiwan. This question must be thoroughly hashed out. Otherwise, how will we know whether to support one China, different interpretations? How will we know whether to support ECFA? And of course, how will we know whether Ma Ying-jeou is "selling out Taiwan?"
Tsai Ing-wen says "Ma Ying-jeou is selling out Taiwan." She does not use the term "selling out Taiwan" per se. But she attempts to evade debate over whether peaceful cross-Strait exchanges harm Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen has repudiated the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations, from beginning to end. She is also attempting to evade debate over whether Taiwan independence is "loving Taiwan" or harming Taiwan. To hint that Taiwan independence might harm Taiwan, or worse, sell out Taiwan, is taboo. Only if this taboo is broken, can free and normal political and economic debate on Taiwan take place.
The DPP says Ma Ying-jeou leans toward [Mainland] China. It says this is beyond debate. But that is not the real problem. The real problem is that the Democratic Progressive Party is a Taiwan independence party, and this fact is not being discussed. If the DPP is not a Taiwan independence party, how can one explain away the bizarre political and economic rhetoric one hears on Taiwan?
According to DPP rhetoric, Tsai Ing-wen is Taiwanese. Ma Ying-jeou is not. Ma Ying-jeou advocates one China, different interpretations, and cross-Strait peaceful development. Therefore he is "selling out Taiwan." Tsai Ing-wen advocates Taiwan independence. She wants to undo cross-Strait peaceful development. Therefore she "loves Taiwan." But is that really how it is?
民進黨是台獨黨還須辯論嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.27
當蔡英文說「我是台灣人」，她同時是在說「馬英九不是台灣人」；當蔡英文說「馬英九賣台」，她同時是在說「我不是賣台」。這樣的政治論述，荒唐可笑之至，但這卻正是民進黨的一貫伎倆，至今蔡英文仍如法炮製，樂此不疲。
此一論述有兩大缺口：一、若謂馬英九賣台，證據在哪裡？是「九二共識」嗎？但九二共識是依據經七次修憲後「一中各表」的中華民國憲法所執行的兩岸政策，而此部憲法係經李登輝主導及民進黨參與所修訂，且民進黨尚曾秉持這部憲法執政八年，則豈能謂根據「一中各表」的憲法所發展的「一中各表」的「九二共識」是賣台？或者，ＥＣＦＡ是賣台嗎？ＥＣＦＡ當然不能解決台灣所有的政經難題，卻是近年來最重大的政經成就，看美國盛譽馬政府的兩岸政策，及最近與日簽訂貿易協議，即知其效益，更何況ＥＣＦＡ顯然是「民進黨若再執政必欲延續的前朝兩岸政策」，亦即民進黨明明也知其效益，則豈能謂ＥＣＦＡ賣台？
二、民進黨稱「馬英九傾中還須辯論嗎？」然而，莫說「傾中」未必就能得到「賣台」的結論，且「傾中」若是指主張「交流雙贏」的兩岸政經政策（如ＥＣＦＡ），則豈能扣以「賣台」的罪名？民進黨將「交流論」等同「賣台論」，這擺明了是羅織成罪。
民進黨的此類論述，劈頭就說「你不是台灣人」，而「我是台灣人」；然後就跳躍出一個結論，「所以你賣台」，「我不賣台」。這類「單邊主義」的論述，完全不必證據及邏輯支撐，只要民進黨說了就算，如今則是蔡英文說了就算。
其實，民進黨是台獨黨，這才是一個不必辯論的題目。民進黨以「台獨建國」及「正名制憲」為宗旨，迄今蔡英文亦未加否認。在民進黨的邏輯中，主張推翻中華民國及「正名制憲」，不是「賣台」；反而是欲維持中華民國或「一中各表」，就被它斥為「賣台」。民進黨始終如一的政治邏輯就是：支持台獨就是愛台，支持中華民國就是賣台。這是民進黨對「愛台／賣台」的不可動搖的區別標尺，如今又用這只標尺來區別馬英九與蔡英文。
為什麼主張台獨或反對兩岸交流，就是愛台？為什麼主張維護「一中各表」的中華民國憲法及兩岸交流、和平發展，即是賣台？這難道皆是一個「不必辯論的題目」？民進黨創黨廿五年來，一貫使用此種論述伎倆，甚至到了宣稱「理性使民主更有力」的蔡英文也依然照本宣科，這真是大開倒車，那隻Taiwan Next的箭頭應當倒轉一百八十度！
這次大選，國人終究必須辯明的一個大題目是：台獨是愛台或害台？反對兩岸提升交流、和平發展是愛台或害台？民進黨一方面不放棄台獨主張，另一方面又威脅北京「不可片面停廢兩岸交流」，這是愛台或害台？更有甚者，蔡英文如今欲以「否定九二共識」的台獨路線，與北京攤牌對撞，這又是愛台或害台？
台灣政經的核心爭議，即在必須辯明這些問題。否則，就只會聽到民進黨說「馬英九傾中還須辯論嗎？」，但真正的問題在於「台獨究竟是愛台或害台」必須獲得通透的辯論。不如此，即不知應否支持一中各表，不知應否支持ＥＣＦＡ，當然亦不知馬英九是否賣台？
蔡英文喊出「馬英九賣台」，這是故意迴避她欲反轉兩岸和平交流的政策是否害台的辯論（即使不用「賣台」一詞）。另者，蔡英文一路否定「九二共識／一中各表」，則亦迴避了台獨路線是愛台或害台的辯論。不打破「台獨可能害台及賣台」的辯論禁忌，台灣的一切政經辯論皆無以正常開展。
民進黨說：馬英九傾中還須辯論嗎？真正的問題卻在於：民進黨是台獨黨還須辯論嗎？如果民進黨不是台獨黨，即無以解釋台灣的一切政經辯論竟會呈現出如下的面貌：
蔡英文是台灣人，馬英九不是台灣人；馬英九主張「一中各表」及兩岸和平發展是賣台，蔡英文主張台獨及欲反轉兩岸和平發展則是愛台。其然乎？其不然乎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 27, 2011
Summary: When Tsai Ing-wen says "I am Taiwanese," she means that "Ma Ying-jeou is not Taiwanese." When Tsai Ing-wen says "Ma Ying-jeou is selling out Taiwan," she means "I on the other hand, am not selling out Taiwan." Such political rhetoric is laughable and ludicrous. But it has long been the DPP's stock in trade. Tsai Ing-wen has eagerly adopted it as her own.
When Tsai Ing-wen says "I am Taiwanese," she means that "Ma Ying-jeou is not Taiwanese." When Tsai Ing-wen says "Ma Ying-jeou is selling out Taiwan," she means "I on the other hand, am not selling out Taiwan." Such political rhetoric is laughable and ludicrous. But it has long been the DPP's stock in trade. Tsai Ing-wen has eagerly adopted it as her own.
This argument however, contains two major holes. First of all, if Ma Ying-jeou is "selling out Taiwan," how is he doing it? Does the 1992 consensus sell out Taiwan? How? The Republic of China Constitution is a "one China, different interpretations" constitution. This constitution was amended seven times. Cross-strait policy is predicated upon this constitution. So is the 1992 consensus. This constitution was amended with the active participation of Lee Teng-hui and the DPP. The DPP upheld this constitution for eight years. One China, different interpretations is predicated upon this constitution. The 1992 consensus is predicated upon this constitution. How can it possibly "sell out Taiwan?" Does ECFA "sell out Taiwan?" ECFA can not solve all of Taiwan's political and economic problems. But it is the most significant political and economic achievement in recent years. Just look at how effusively the U.S. government has praised the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy. Just look at the recently signed trade agreement with Japan. These bear eloquent witness to its effectiveness. Besides, ECFA is the very cross-Strait policy that the Democratic Progressive Party must continue "if it returns to power." The DPP clearly appreciates its value. How can it claim that ECFA "sells out Taiwan?"
Secondly, the DPP says "Ma Ying-jeou is leaning toward [Mainland] China? That is beyond debate." But "leaning toward [Mainland] China" hardly implies "selling out Taiwan." If "leaning toward [Mainland] China" means championing win-win policies such as ECFA, how exactly does that "sell out Taiwan?" When the DPP equates peaceful exchanges with "selling out Taiwan" the charge is clearly spurious.
Such DPP rhetoric comes straight out and declares, "You are not Taiwanese." and "I, on the other hand, am Taiwanese." It then concludes "Therefore you are selling out Taiwan," whereas "I am not selling out Taiwan." Such one sided arguments cite no evidence and apply no logic. The DPP simply lays down the law. Tsai Ing-wen simply lays down the law.
The DPP is a Taiwan independence party. That is beyond debate. The DPP's mission is Taiwan independence nation-building, the rectification of names, and the authoring of a new constitution. So far Tsai Ing-wen has issued no denials about this. According to DPP logic, advocating the overthrow of the Republic of China and advocating the rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution is not "selling out Taiwan." Conversely, upholding the Republic of China and one China, different interpretations is dismissed as "selling out Taiwan." DPP political logic is consistent. Supporting Taiwan independence is "loving Taiwan." Supporting the Republic of China is "selling out Taiwan." This is the DPP's unchanging yardstick for measuring "loving Taiwan" and "selling out Taiwan." It is now being used to distinguish between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen.
Why is advocating Taiwan independence, or opposing cross-Strait exchanges, "loving Taiwan?" Why is upholding "one China, different interpretations," the ROC Constitution, cross-Strait exchanges, and peaceful development, "selling out Taiwan?" Is this all beyond debate? The DPP was founded 25 years ago. Since then it has always resorted to this logic. Tsai Ing-wen says "Reason will make democracy more effective." But even she resorts to this logic. This truly is regressive. The arrow in the "Taiwan Next" logo should be turned completely around until it is facing backwards.
The general election is almost upon us. The big question the public must ask itself, is whether Taiwan independence is "loving Taiwan" or harming Taiwan. Are cross-Strait exchanges and peaceful development loving Taiwan or harming Taiwan? The Democratic Progressive Party continues to demand Taiwan independence. It simultaneously issues threats. It says Beijing "may not unilaterally discontinue cross-Strait exchanges." Is this "loving Taiwan" or harming Taiwan? Tsai Ing-wen is hoping to repudiate the 1992 consensus in order to promote Taiwan independence and precipitate a showdown with Beijing. Is this "loving Taiwan" or harming Taiwan?
These political and economic disputes on Taiwan must be clarified. Otherwise, the DPP will continue to say "Ma Ying-jeou leans toward [Mainland] China. That is beyond debate." But the real question is whether Taiwan independence is "loving Taiwan" or harmng Taiwan. This question must be thoroughly hashed out. Otherwise, how will we know whether to support one China, different interpretations? How will we know whether to support ECFA? And of course, how will we know whether Ma Ying-jeou is "selling out Taiwan?"
Tsai Ing-wen says "Ma Ying-jeou is selling out Taiwan." She does not use the term "selling out Taiwan" per se. But she attempts to evade debate over whether peaceful cross-Strait exchanges harm Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen has repudiated the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations, from beginning to end. She is also attempting to evade debate over whether Taiwan independence is "loving Taiwan" or harming Taiwan. To hint that Taiwan independence might harm Taiwan, or worse, sell out Taiwan, is taboo. Only if this taboo is broken, can free and normal political and economic debate on Taiwan take place.
The DPP says Ma Ying-jeou leans toward [Mainland] China. It says this is beyond debate. But that is not the real problem. The real problem is that the Democratic Progressive Party is a Taiwan independence party, and this fact is not being discussed. If the DPP is not a Taiwan independence party, how can one explain away the bizarre political and economic rhetoric one hears on Taiwan?
According to DPP rhetoric, Tsai Ing-wen is Taiwanese. Ma Ying-jeou is not. Ma Ying-jeou advocates one China, different interpretations, and cross-Strait peaceful development. Therefore he is "selling out Taiwan." Tsai Ing-wen advocates Taiwan independence. She wants to undo cross-Strait peaceful development. Therefore she "loves Taiwan." But is that really how it is?
民進黨是台獨黨還須辯論嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.27
當蔡英文說「我是台灣人」，她同時是在說「馬英九不是台灣人」；當蔡英文說「馬英九賣台」，她同時是在說「我不是賣台」。這樣的政治論述，荒唐可笑之至，但這卻正是民進黨的一貫伎倆，至今蔡英文仍如法炮製，樂此不疲。
此一論述有兩大缺口：一、若謂馬英九賣台，證據在哪裡？是「九二共識」嗎？但九二共識是依據經七次修憲後「一中各表」的中華民國憲法所執行的兩岸政策，而此部憲法係經李登輝主導及民進黨參與所修訂，且民進黨尚曾秉持這部憲法執政八年，則豈能謂根據「一中各表」的憲法所發展的「一中各表」的「九二共識」是賣台？或者，ＥＣＦＡ是賣台嗎？ＥＣＦＡ當然不能解決台灣所有的政經難題，卻是近年來最重大的政經成就，看美國盛譽馬政府的兩岸政策，及最近與日簽訂貿易協議，即知其效益，更何況ＥＣＦＡ顯然是「民進黨若再執政必欲延續的前朝兩岸政策」，亦即民進黨明明也知其效益，則豈能謂ＥＣＦＡ賣台？
二、民進黨稱「馬英九傾中還須辯論嗎？」然而，莫說「傾中」未必就能得到「賣台」的結論，且「傾中」若是指主張「交流雙贏」的兩岸政經政策（如ＥＣＦＡ），則豈能扣以「賣台」的罪名？民進黨將「交流論」等同「賣台論」，這擺明了是羅織成罪。
民進黨的此類論述，劈頭就說「你不是台灣人」，而「我是台灣人」；然後就跳躍出一個結論，「所以你賣台」，「我不賣台」。這類「單邊主義」的論述，完全不必證據及邏輯支撐，只要民進黨說了就算，如今則是蔡英文說了就算。
其實，民進黨是台獨黨，這才是一個不必辯論的題目。民進黨以「台獨建國」及「正名制憲」為宗旨，迄今蔡英文亦未加否認。在民進黨的邏輯中，主張推翻中華民國及「正名制憲」，不是「賣台」；反而是欲維持中華民國或「一中各表」，就被它斥為「賣台」。民進黨始終如一的政治邏輯就是：支持台獨就是愛台，支持中華民國就是賣台。這是民進黨對「愛台／賣台」的不可動搖的區別標尺，如今又用這只標尺來區別馬英九與蔡英文。
為什麼主張台獨或反對兩岸交流，就是愛台？為什麼主張維護「一中各表」的中華民國憲法及兩岸交流、和平發展，即是賣台？這難道皆是一個「不必辯論的題目」？民進黨創黨廿五年來，一貫使用此種論述伎倆，甚至到了宣稱「理性使民主更有力」的蔡英文也依然照本宣科，這真是大開倒車，那隻Taiwan Next的箭頭應當倒轉一百八十度！
這次大選，國人終究必須辯明的一個大題目是：台獨是愛台或害台？反對兩岸提升交流、和平發展是愛台或害台？民進黨一方面不放棄台獨主張，另一方面又威脅北京「不可片面停廢兩岸交流」，這是愛台或害台？更有甚者，蔡英文如今欲以「否定九二共識」的台獨路線，與北京攤牌對撞，這又是愛台或害台？
台灣政經的核心爭議，即在必須辯明這些問題。否則，就只會聽到民進黨說「馬英九傾中還須辯論嗎？」，但真正的問題在於「台獨究竟是愛台或害台」必須獲得通透的辯論。不如此，即不知應否支持一中各表，不知應否支持ＥＣＦＡ，當然亦不知馬英九是否賣台？
蔡英文喊出「馬英九賣台」，這是故意迴避她欲反轉兩岸和平交流的政策是否害台的辯論（即使不用「賣台」一詞）。另者，蔡英文一路否定「九二共識／一中各表」，則亦迴避了台獨路線是愛台或害台的辯論。不打破「台獨可能害台及賣台」的辯論禁忌，台灣的一切政經辯論皆無以正常開展。
民進黨說：馬英九傾中還須辯論嗎？真正的問題卻在於：民進黨是台獨黨還須辯論嗎？如果民進黨不是台獨黨，即無以解釋台灣的一切政經辯論竟會呈現出如下的面貌：
蔡英文是台灣人，馬英九不是台灣人；馬英九主張「一中各表」及兩岸和平發展是賣台，蔡英文主張台獨及欲反轉兩岸和平發展則是愛台。其然乎？其不然乎？
Monday, September 26, 2011
A Third Force Could Influence the Outcome of the Election
A Third Force Could Influence the Outcome of the Election
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 26, 2011
Summary: In his bid for president, People First Party Chairman James Soong has launched a petition drive. James Soong boasts about a "million signature petition." His vice presidential running mate, Professor Lin Jui-hsiung, vows that "If we receive fewer than one million signatures, we will not run." Other People First Party spokespersons have publicly vowed that "As long as we achieve the minimum number of signatures required by law, it won't matter whether we collect a million signatures or not. James Soong will run." The likelihood that a third force will enter the 2012 presidential race has significantly increased. Moreover, this third force clearly has a good chance of influencing the outcome of the election.
Full Text below:
In his bid for president, People First Party Chairman James Soong has launched a petition drive. James Soong boasts about a "million signature petition." His vice presidential running mate, Professor Lin Jui-hsiung, vows that "If we receive fewer than one million signatures, we will not run." Other People First Party spokespersons have publicly vowed that "As long as we achieve the minimum number of signatures required by law, it won't matter whether we collect a million signatures or not. James Soong will run." The likelihood that a third force will enter the 2012 presidential race has significantly increased. Moreover, this third force clearly has a good chance of influencing the outcome of the election.
Direct presidential elections have been held on Taiwan for some time now. But is there room for a third force besides the KMT and DPP? Politicians and the public have both been asking this veryquestion. Over the past decade or so, there has been the New Party, the People First Party, and the Taiwan Solidarity Union. There has also been the Red Shirts. It had no formal organization, but some referred to as the Red Party. Former DPP legislator Hsu Jung-shu referred to the Red Shirts as the "biggest party of all -- the people." Several political parties have from time to time achieved some degree of notoriety or fame. But the most important election is the presidential election. Here, they have had little opportunity to compete. The 2012 presidential election may be the key event that determines whether a third force will have a say. From this perspective, Blue camp supporters may feel anxious. But they cannot evade their duty. They must use their votes to tell aspiring third force politicians to accept political reality.
Just exactly what role can a third force play in the political process? Before the New Party was founded, it was preceded by the "New KMT Connection." It was already influencing the legislative process. A third or fourth party can indeed play a pivotal role. When the People First Party was at the height of its power, it too played a pivotal role between the KMT and DPP. It influenced legislation, budgets, even personnel appointments, For example, when the Chen family corruption scandal erupted, former Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming was the focus of controversy. Support from the People First Party enabled his approval in the legislature.
Whether third force influence enhances the people's livelihood, the people's interests, or creates more turbulence, is a matter of opinion. This is especially true when more and more legislation requires ruling and opposition party compromise. Consultation between the two largest parties may not be enough. Consultation with smaller parties or independents may be required. Backroom deals have long tarnished the image of the legislature. For example, during the first Chen administration, none of the three largest parties commanded an absolute majority. The DPP regime exploited the lack of a legislative majority by exerting monetary or judicial pressure, It used threats or inducements to bend legislators to the ruling DPP's will, The Chen regime boasted that it would increase integrity in government. Not only did it not combat black gold, it was even more corrupt than its predecessor.
The People First Party clings to a superstitious belief in the power of political manipulation. It is determined to walk the line between the KMT and the DPP. In 2004, it collaborated with Lien Chan during the presidential election. In 2006, it held secret meetings with Chen Shui-bian. Controversy erupted over cross-Strait communications. In the end, the People First Party wound up persona non grata to both Blue Camp and Green Camp supporters, Blue Camp supporters cannot forgive Soong for the secret Chen/Soong Meetings, Even Chen Shui-bian has repeatedly blasted James Soong from his prison cell, accusing Soong of failing to fulfill his mission.
Soong is indeed a rare talent in the political arena. Few people can match his political and administrative ability. He has experienced many ups and downs over the decades, but still commands the loyalty of his core supporters. But even more people are filled with doubts about his trickery, for the very same reason. For the sake of political advantage, Soong can be your enemy today and your friend tomorrow. It may be true that in politics there are no permanent enemies or permanent friends. But if one's friends and foes are based entirely on political interests and considerations of power, how can one possibly win another person's trust?
James Soong long ago declared that he was retiring from politics. Now however, he has popped up again. The Blue and Green parties may react differently. But both know James Soong cannot win, All he can do is act as a spoiler. The Green Camp is only too happy to see James Soong run as an independent. The Blue Camp is worried James Soong may remain in the race to the bitter end, They are both concerned, because the most likely consequence of James Soong's presidential bid is a replay of the 2000 change in ruling parties. As the saying goes, what's past is prologue. We have already endured the 2000 change in ruling parties. We have already suffered through eight years of Democratic Progressive Party misrule. Do we really need to relive this ordeal?
James Soong enjoys far less momentum today than he did in 2000. Yet he still commands a certain degree of support. Why? Because neither of the two major parties, Blue or Green, has been able to win the people's hearts. The DPP is not to blame for the current situation. Democratic Progressive Party rule was ineffectual and scandal-ridden. The DPP paid the price when it was ejected from office. But the KMT lost power once before. It regained that power with great difficulty, but showed itself incapable of serious soul-searching. After regaining power, it missed the opportunity to reunite the Blue Camp. As a result, Ma Ying-jeou's second term is in serious jeopardy.
Any independent party candidate has a constitutionally guaranteed right to run for president, It makes no difference whether they emerged from the same camp or not, James Soong does not need to worry about whether his candidacy will derail Ma Ying-jeou's bid for a second term. If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP win as a result of Soong, they will have nothing to boast about. James Soong petitioned with all his might for 45 days. The KMT faces enemies front and rear. Even if it fails to win an absolute majority, it must win at least 45% of the vote to be safe. When the People First Party or a third force has its back to the wall, it is a test of the two major parties.
第三勢力叫陣 影響選局機率大
2011-09-26 中國時報
親民黨主席宋楚瑜正式展開獨立參選的連署工程，儘管是否能如宋楚瑜所言「百萬連署就參選」、或者宋的副手搭檔林瑞雄教授聲稱「不到百萬連署就不參選」，親民黨人已公開保證「只要跨過連署門檻，不管有沒有百萬，宋楚瑜一定會選」，二○一二年總統大選必然有第三組人選的可能性，已經大幅向上攀升，而且，第三組人選顯然有很大機率影響選局。
台灣自有總統直選以來，國、民兩黨之外，到底有沒有第三勢力的存活空間？始終是政壇乃至民間無法停止的想像。然而，十多年來從新黨、親民黨、台聯甚至紅衫軍看似並無具體組織卻依舊喊出的紅黨、前民進黨立委許榮淑搞出的全民最大黨…，林林種種，若干政黨也曾經風風火火搞出一點名堂，但是，在總統大選最重要的戰役上，的確空間狹窄，二○一二年大選或許就是第三勢力拍板定案的關鍵選戰。從這個角度觀察，即使藍營支持者再焦慮，都不能不面對此役，讓選票告訴對第三勢力還有嚮往的政治人物們，就此接受政治現實。
第三勢力到底能在政治運作過程中，扮演多大角色？新黨尚未組黨前的新連線，已經證實國會議事，第三或第四黨的確可以發揮牽制功能，親民黨聲勢最盛時期，也能在國、民兩黨之間合縱連橫，左右法案、預算乃至人事同意權，隨便舉例，在扁家弊案中一度引爆爭議的前檢察總長陳聰明，就是在親民黨支持下過關。
唯牽制的結果到底有利於國計民生、人民利益，或者徒增紛擾，那可就見仁見智了。特別是國會議事朝野協商佔有比例愈益吃重的情況下，兩黨協商不夠，還要與兩黨外的小黨或無黨籍協商，不透明的密室協商就一直是國會形象敗壞的原因之一，舉例而言，扁政府執政第一任，三黨不過半，民進黨政府運用破碎的國會多數的結果，以金權或司法施壓，威脅兼利誘以促使國會議事朝民進黨政府的方向行進，標舉向上提昇的扁政府不但沒能向黑金宣戰，反倒愈趨沉淪。
親民黨迷信政治操作的結果，在國民黨與民進黨間遊走，二○○四年與連戰合作競選總統失利後，二○○六年又與陳水扁密會，鬧出兩岸傳話爭議，最後搞到親民黨兩面不是人，藍營支持者迄今無法諒解扁宋會，人在獄中的陳水扁還三不五時挑剔宋楚瑜有辱使命。
宋楚瑜確是政壇少見的幹才，他對政治與行政事務的能力，少有人能出其右，因此在政壇起伏數十年，依舊還有一群信賴他的死忠支持者，但也因為如此，有更大一群人對他的權謀充滿疑慮。為了政治上的需要，他可以今日為敵，明日是友，雖然政治沒有永遠的敵人或朋友，但是，如果是敵是友都以政治利益或權力考量為依據，又如何取信於民？
對藍綠政黨而言，迸出一個早已宣布退出政壇的宋楚瑜，或許有著不同的觀察和期待，但立足點都在於宋楚瑜不可能當選，但可能逆轉選局，不論是綠營樂見宋楚瑜獨立參選，或藍營焦慮宋楚瑜參選到底，都是因為宋楚瑜出馬最大可能的結果，就是重製二○○○年政黨輪替的經驗。所謂「前事不忘後事之師」，已經有過二○○○年政黨輪替，並經過民進黨八年執政經驗的選民們，還需要再次經歷這種後果嗎？
藍綠兩大黨已經輪替執政，卻始終無法得到人民的滿意，是宋楚瑜此番參選，在聲勢不若二○○○年的情況下，還能得到一定支持的最主要原因。民進黨不必負什麼責任，因為民進黨執政不力，弊案叢生，已經付出失去執政權的代價；但是，對於曾經失去政權，好不容易重新執政的國民黨而言，卻不能不深刻檢討，為什麼取得權力後，卻錯失了整合藍營的機會，以致馬英九連任之途，變數橫生？
對任何獨立政黨而言，參選是其憲法保障的權利，即使系出同門，宋楚瑜是否參選完全不必考量馬英九是否因此落選，民進黨和蔡英文若因此倖勝，也不值得驕傲，連署期程是宋楚瑜全力造勢的關鍵四十五天，腹背受敵的國民黨則必須戒慎恐懼迎戰，就算選票無法過半，至少要衝過百分之四十五才能逼進當選安全區。親民黨或第三勢力背水一戰，又何嘗不是對兩大黨的考驗。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 26, 2011
Summary: In his bid for president, People First Party Chairman James Soong has launched a petition drive. James Soong boasts about a "million signature petition." His vice presidential running mate, Professor Lin Jui-hsiung, vows that "If we receive fewer than one million signatures, we will not run." Other People First Party spokespersons have publicly vowed that "As long as we achieve the minimum number of signatures required by law, it won't matter whether we collect a million signatures or not. James Soong will run." The likelihood that a third force will enter the 2012 presidential race has significantly increased. Moreover, this third force clearly has a good chance of influencing the outcome of the election.
Full Text below:
In his bid for president, People First Party Chairman James Soong has launched a petition drive. James Soong boasts about a "million signature petition." His vice presidential running mate, Professor Lin Jui-hsiung, vows that "If we receive fewer than one million signatures, we will not run." Other People First Party spokespersons have publicly vowed that "As long as we achieve the minimum number of signatures required by law, it won't matter whether we collect a million signatures or not. James Soong will run." The likelihood that a third force will enter the 2012 presidential race has significantly increased. Moreover, this third force clearly has a good chance of influencing the outcome of the election.
Direct presidential elections have been held on Taiwan for some time now. But is there room for a third force besides the KMT and DPP? Politicians and the public have both been asking this veryquestion. Over the past decade or so, there has been the New Party, the People First Party, and the Taiwan Solidarity Union. There has also been the Red Shirts. It had no formal organization, but some referred to as the Red Party. Former DPP legislator Hsu Jung-shu referred to the Red Shirts as the "biggest party of all -- the people." Several political parties have from time to time achieved some degree of notoriety or fame. But the most important election is the presidential election. Here, they have had little opportunity to compete. The 2012 presidential election may be the key event that determines whether a third force will have a say. From this perspective, Blue camp supporters may feel anxious. But they cannot evade their duty. They must use their votes to tell aspiring third force politicians to accept political reality.
Just exactly what role can a third force play in the political process? Before the New Party was founded, it was preceded by the "New KMT Connection." It was already influencing the legislative process. A third or fourth party can indeed play a pivotal role. When the People First Party was at the height of its power, it too played a pivotal role between the KMT and DPP. It influenced legislation, budgets, even personnel appointments, For example, when the Chen family corruption scandal erupted, former Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming was the focus of controversy. Support from the People First Party enabled his approval in the legislature.
Whether third force influence enhances the people's livelihood, the people's interests, or creates more turbulence, is a matter of opinion. This is especially true when more and more legislation requires ruling and opposition party compromise. Consultation between the two largest parties may not be enough. Consultation with smaller parties or independents may be required. Backroom deals have long tarnished the image of the legislature. For example, during the first Chen administration, none of the three largest parties commanded an absolute majority. The DPP regime exploited the lack of a legislative majority by exerting monetary or judicial pressure, It used threats or inducements to bend legislators to the ruling DPP's will, The Chen regime boasted that it would increase integrity in government. Not only did it not combat black gold, it was even more corrupt than its predecessor.
The People First Party clings to a superstitious belief in the power of political manipulation. It is determined to walk the line between the KMT and the DPP. In 2004, it collaborated with Lien Chan during the presidential election. In 2006, it held secret meetings with Chen Shui-bian. Controversy erupted over cross-Strait communications. In the end, the People First Party wound up persona non grata to both Blue Camp and Green Camp supporters, Blue Camp supporters cannot forgive Soong for the secret Chen/Soong Meetings, Even Chen Shui-bian has repeatedly blasted James Soong from his prison cell, accusing Soong of failing to fulfill his mission.
Soong is indeed a rare talent in the political arena. Few people can match his political and administrative ability. He has experienced many ups and downs over the decades, but still commands the loyalty of his core supporters. But even more people are filled with doubts about his trickery, for the very same reason. For the sake of political advantage, Soong can be your enemy today and your friend tomorrow. It may be true that in politics there are no permanent enemies or permanent friends. But if one's friends and foes are based entirely on political interests and considerations of power, how can one possibly win another person's trust?
James Soong long ago declared that he was retiring from politics. Now however, he has popped up again. The Blue and Green parties may react differently. But both know James Soong cannot win, All he can do is act as a spoiler. The Green Camp is only too happy to see James Soong run as an independent. The Blue Camp is worried James Soong may remain in the race to the bitter end, They are both concerned, because the most likely consequence of James Soong's presidential bid is a replay of the 2000 change in ruling parties. As the saying goes, what's past is prologue. We have already endured the 2000 change in ruling parties. We have already suffered through eight years of Democratic Progressive Party misrule. Do we really need to relive this ordeal?
James Soong enjoys far less momentum today than he did in 2000. Yet he still commands a certain degree of support. Why? Because neither of the two major parties, Blue or Green, has been able to win the people's hearts. The DPP is not to blame for the current situation. Democratic Progressive Party rule was ineffectual and scandal-ridden. The DPP paid the price when it was ejected from office. But the KMT lost power once before. It regained that power with great difficulty, but showed itself incapable of serious soul-searching. After regaining power, it missed the opportunity to reunite the Blue Camp. As a result, Ma Ying-jeou's second term is in serious jeopardy.
Any independent party candidate has a constitutionally guaranteed right to run for president, It makes no difference whether they emerged from the same camp or not, James Soong does not need to worry about whether his candidacy will derail Ma Ying-jeou's bid for a second term. If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP win as a result of Soong, they will have nothing to boast about. James Soong petitioned with all his might for 45 days. The KMT faces enemies front and rear. Even if it fails to win an absolute majority, it must win at least 45% of the vote to be safe. When the People First Party or a third force has its back to the wall, it is a test of the two major parties.
第三勢力叫陣 影響選局機率大
2011-09-26 中國時報
親民黨主席宋楚瑜正式展開獨立參選的連署工程，儘管是否能如宋楚瑜所言「百萬連署就參選」、或者宋的副手搭檔林瑞雄教授聲稱「不到百萬連署就不參選」，親民黨人已公開保證「只要跨過連署門檻，不管有沒有百萬，宋楚瑜一定會選」，二○一二年總統大選必然有第三組人選的可能性，已經大幅向上攀升，而且，第三組人選顯然有很大機率影響選局。
台灣自有總統直選以來，國、民兩黨之外，到底有沒有第三勢力的存活空間？始終是政壇乃至民間無法停止的想像。然而，十多年來從新黨、親民黨、台聯甚至紅衫軍看似並無具體組織卻依舊喊出的紅黨、前民進黨立委許榮淑搞出的全民最大黨…，林林種種，若干政黨也曾經風風火火搞出一點名堂，但是，在總統大選最重要的戰役上，的確空間狹窄，二○一二年大選或許就是第三勢力拍板定案的關鍵選戰。從這個角度觀察，即使藍營支持者再焦慮，都不能不面對此役，讓選票告訴對第三勢力還有嚮往的政治人物們，就此接受政治現實。
第三勢力到底能在政治運作過程中，扮演多大角色？新黨尚未組黨前的新連線，已經證實國會議事，第三或第四黨的確可以發揮牽制功能，親民黨聲勢最盛時期，也能在國、民兩黨之間合縱連橫，左右法案、預算乃至人事同意權，隨便舉例，在扁家弊案中一度引爆爭議的前檢察總長陳聰明，就是在親民黨支持下過關。
唯牽制的結果到底有利於國計民生、人民利益，或者徒增紛擾，那可就見仁見智了。特別是國會議事朝野協商佔有比例愈益吃重的情況下，兩黨協商不夠，還要與兩黨外的小黨或無黨籍協商，不透明的密室協商就一直是國會形象敗壞的原因之一，舉例而言，扁政府執政第一任，三黨不過半，民進黨政府運用破碎的國會多數的結果，以金權或司法施壓，威脅兼利誘以促使國會議事朝民進黨政府的方向行進，標舉向上提昇的扁政府不但沒能向黑金宣戰，反倒愈趨沉淪。
親民黨迷信政治操作的結果，在國民黨與民進黨間遊走，二○○四年與連戰合作競選總統失利後，二○○六年又與陳水扁密會，鬧出兩岸傳話爭議，最後搞到親民黨兩面不是人，藍營支持者迄今無法諒解扁宋會，人在獄中的陳水扁還三不五時挑剔宋楚瑜有辱使命。
宋楚瑜確是政壇少見的幹才，他對政治與行政事務的能力，少有人能出其右，因此在政壇起伏數十年，依舊還有一群信賴他的死忠支持者，但也因為如此，有更大一群人對他的權謀充滿疑慮。為了政治上的需要，他可以今日為敵，明日是友，雖然政治沒有永遠的敵人或朋友，但是，如果是敵是友都以政治利益或權力考量為依據，又如何取信於民？
對藍綠政黨而言，迸出一個早已宣布退出政壇的宋楚瑜，或許有著不同的觀察和期待，但立足點都在於宋楚瑜不可能當選，但可能逆轉選局，不論是綠營樂見宋楚瑜獨立參選，或藍營焦慮宋楚瑜參選到底，都是因為宋楚瑜出馬最大可能的結果，就是重製二○○○年政黨輪替的經驗。所謂「前事不忘後事之師」，已經有過二○○○年政黨輪替，並經過民進黨八年執政經驗的選民們，還需要再次經歷這種後果嗎？
藍綠兩大黨已經輪替執政，卻始終無法得到人民的滿意，是宋楚瑜此番參選，在聲勢不若二○○○年的情況下，還能得到一定支持的最主要原因。民進黨不必負什麼責任，因為民進黨執政不力，弊案叢生，已經付出失去執政權的代價；但是，對於曾經失去政權，好不容易重新執政的國民黨而言，卻不能不深刻檢討，為什麼取得權力後，卻錯失了整合藍營的機會，以致馬英九連任之途，變數橫生？
對任何獨立政黨而言，參選是其憲法保障的權利，即使系出同門，宋楚瑜是否參選完全不必考量馬英九是否因此落選，民進黨和蔡英文若因此倖勝，也不值得驕傲，連署期程是宋楚瑜全力造勢的關鍵四十五天，腹背受敵的國民黨則必須戒慎恐懼迎戰，就算選票無法過半，至少要衝過百分之四十五才能逼進當選安全區。親民黨或第三勢力背水一戰，又何嘗不是對兩大黨的考驗。
Thursday, September 22, 2011
The Purpose of Tsai's "Taiwan Consensus" is to Repudiate the Republic of China
The Purpose of Tsai's "Taiwan Consensus" is to Repudiate the Republic of China
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 23, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen recently began peddling her "Taiwan consensus." Her motive? To deny that the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution already constitute a Taiwan consensus. Her motive is to repudiate the Republic of China, and demean the Constitution of the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to swear allegiance to the Republic of China, and to defend the Republic of China Constitution before the election. So what is she doing? Is she waiting until after she is elected before deciding whether to swear allegiance to the nation and its constitution?
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen recently began peddling her "Taiwan consensus." Her motive? To deny that the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution already constitute a Taiwan consensus. Her motive is to repudiate the Republic of China, and demean the Constitution of the Republic of China.
Taiwan independence refuses to recognize the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. It calls for Taiwan independence and nation-building. It attempts to achieve these ends by means of deceit, by means of "backdoor listing," or the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." Tsai Ing-wen's latest gimmick is her "Taiwan consensus."
Taiwan independence advocates sneer at the Republic of China and extol Taiwan independence. But the public doubts the feasibility of Taiwan independence. Therefore most of the time Taiwan independence advocates settle for poo-pooing the Republic of China. They seldom argue the feasibility of Taiwan independence. They know they would convince no one. Taiwan independence advocates sneer at the Republic of China. They revel in the fact that few governments recognize it. When the Republic of China participates in international sporting events, it cannot use its official name. It is forced to use the name "Chinese Taipei." Chen Yunlin referred to President Ma as "you," and even "Special Executive." The Republic of China has endured these indignities. The DPP plays these up for what they are worth. It rubs salt in the wound. It is now peddling its "Taiwan consensus." The DPP belittles the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. It hopes its attitude will become the "Taiwan consensus." That is bad enough. But if one looks more closely, Tsai's "Taiwan consensus" is utterly devoid of content.
The Republic of China is covered with wounds. But most people know how to turn grief into strength. The DPP however only knows how to rub salt in the wound. The DPP has adopted a facile political logic. Other countries refuse to recognize the Republic of China, therefore the DPP refuses to recognize the Republic of China. Beijing refuses to explicitly recognize "one China, different interpretations," therefore the DPP refuses to recognize "one China, different interpretations" and the Republic of China Constitution. In short, if other people refuse to recognize the Republic of China, then the DPP must go along with them and refuse to recognize the Republic of China as well. Others demean the Republic of China Constitution, therefore we must go along with them and demean the Republic of China constitution as well.
Consider the controversy over the 1992 consensus, and "one China, different interpretations." Put simply, it declares that "We are the Republic of China!" Also, Beijing has changed its position. It now says that "Although the two sides have a different understanding of the meaning of one China, they can nevertheless seek common ground." This is what it now says about "one China, different interpretations." The DPP should be urging Beijing to further accept "one China, different interpretations." Instead, it shrilly insists that "Beijing does not recognize one China, different interpretations." The DPP seems terrified at the prospect that Beijing might explicitly recognize "one China, different interpretations." As long as Beijing refuses to explicitly recognize "one China, different interpretations," the DPP will have an excuse to repudiate "one China, different interpretations."
Beijing repudiates the Republic of China. Therefore we must repudiate the Republic of China. This is Taiwan independence political logic. But the world has changed. The 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations," have influenced cross-Strait thinking. In recent years, Beijing reached the point where it no longer openly disputed the Republic of China government's jurisdiction. It apparently accepts the "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force" aspect of the cross-Strait consensus. The same is true for "peaceful development." Taipei's cross-Strait policy is based on the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations." Taipei hopes Beijing will accept the Republic of China. The DPP however, still repudiates the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations." It repudiates the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. What is this sort of Taiwan independence thinking, if not political suicide?
A few days ago, rumors spread that in the event Ma Ying-jeou is re-elected he may visit the Chinese mainland. Democratic Progressive Party spokesman Chen Chi-ma responded. He said President Ma Ying-jeou must visit in his capacity as president, not as KMT party chairman. He said "If someone else refuses to refer to you as President, then you are not a president!"
Let's examine his logic. If someone else refuses to refer to you as president, then you are not a president. If someone else refuses to refer to you as the Republic of China, then you are not the Republic of China. If someone else refuses to recognize the Republic of China Constitution, then you must refuse to recognize the Republic of China Constitution. If some else refuses to accept "one China, different interpretations," then you must refuse to accept "one China, different interpretations." Never mind that Beijing is gradually beginning to accept all of these propositions. At least it is not denying it.
Taiwan independence advocates have long mocked and repudiated the Republic of China. But they know Taiwan independence cannot replace the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen is now trying to use her "Taiwan consensus" as a replacement for "one China, different interpretations" and the Republic of China Constitution. She is attempting to demean the Republic of China Constitution. She is attempting to deny the fact that the Republic of China Constitution is the "Taiwan consensus." Worse still, Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" is utterly devoid of content. She says voters must wait until after the election to find out what the "Taiwan consensus" is. A more unreal, more opportunistic, more underhanded attempt to promote Taiwan independence one will not find.
Tsai Ing-wen surely realizes that if she is elected president, she will hace to swear allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of China. She will have to say "I solemnly and sincerely swear to the people of the nation, that I will abide by the constitution, and remain loyal to the nation. If I violate this oath, I am willing to accept the severest sanctions that the nation may wish to impose upon me."
This is the oath of office for the presidencyof the Republic of China. If it does not qualify as the bedrock foundation for a "Taiwan consensus," what does? Tsai Ing-wen refuses to swear allegiance to the Republic of China, and to defend the Republic of China Constitution before the election. So what is she doing? Is she waiting until after she is elected before deciding whether to swear allegiance to the nation and its constitution?
「台灣共識」意在否定中華民國
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.09.23 03:03 am
蔡英文拋出「台灣共識」，其主要意圖在否定「中華民國及中華民國憲法」是「台灣共識」；亦即意在否定中華民國，羞辱中華民國憲法。
台獨理論的核心論述是：由於否定中華民國及中華民國憲法，所以要「台獨建國」、「借殼上市」，或「正名制憲」；蔡英文這一次使用的新花樣是「台灣共識」。
台獨的傳統操作手法是，一方面羞辱中華民國，另一方面將台獨光榮化；然而，由於台獨的可行性頗受質疑，因此在大多情況下，台獨實際上只是以否定及羞辱中華民國為能事，卻無法誇耀台獨的可行性，因為不具說服力。例如，台獨經常羞辱中華民國走不出去，世界上沒有幾個國家承認中華民國，參與國際體育活動不能用國號而用「中華台北」，甚至陳雲林也不稱「馬總統」而稱「您」，又指「馬總統」是「馬區長」；誠然，這些皆是中華民國的傷疤，民進黨即動輒翻攪，在傷口撒鹽；這次又提「台灣共識」，其意亦只是在羞辱中華民國及中華民國憲法不應成為「台灣共識」罷了。但細細看去，蔡的「台灣共識」卻是一碟「空心菜」。
面對中華民國的滿身傷痛，多數國人皆知化悲憤為力量；但民進黨的一貫手法則是傷口撒鹽。民進黨的政治邏輯是：別國不承認中華民國，所以我們自己也不能承認中華民國；北京未明確承認「一中各表」，所以我們也不要承認「一中各表」的中華民國憲法。總之，別人不承認中華民國，所以我們也要自我否認；別人羞辱中華民國憲法，所以我們也要自我羞辱。
即以「九二共識」的爭議而言，所謂「一中各表」，簡白地說，就是主張：「我們是中華民國！」何況，北京今日已經走到「儘管對於一個中國的涵義雙方認知不同，但可以求同存異」（即「一中各表」）的地步；可是，民進黨非僅不催迫北京進一步落實「一中各表」，反而口口聲聲皆指「北京不承認一中各表」，好像深恐北京竟然承認了「一中各表」，更好像只要北京未明確承認「一中各表」，民進黨就有了否認「一中各表」的正當性。
以北京否定中華民國，來做為我們自我否定為中華民國的理由；這是台獨的政治邏輯。事實的演化卻是：由於「九二共識／一中各表」的影響，近年來北京對中華民國至少已近「治權互不否認」，且顯然已經接受了「不統／不獨／不武」的階段性兩岸共識，同赴「和平發展」。然而，即使當前政府的兩岸政策是以「九二共識／一中各表」，積極爭取北京接受中華民國；但民進黨卻仍然否定「九二共識／一中各表」，亦即自我否定中華民國及中華民國憲法。這種台獨思維，豈不近似政治自殺？
日前爆出馬英九可能在連任後訪問大陸的話題，民進黨發言人陳其邁稱，馬英九必須以總統身分往訪，不可用國民黨主席身分往訪，且說：「不是別人不叫你總統，你就不是總統！」
我們深然此說。不是別人不叫你總統，你就不是總統；不是別人不叫你中華民國，你就自我否定是中華民國；不是別人不承認中華民國憲法，你就自我否定中華民國憲法；不是別人不接受「一中各表」（何況北京已漸接受，至少未否認），你就也要自我否定「一中各表」。
台獨一向以羞辱、否定中華民國為能事，卻亦明知台獨不可能為中華民國的替代方案。如今，蔡英文又欲以《台灣共識法》取代「一中各表」的《中華民國憲法》，其實亦是在羞辱中華民國憲法，及否定中華民國為「台灣共識」；變本加厲的是，蔡英文的「台灣共識」又根本是一碟「空心菜」，竟說是「共識如何，選後再說」。這不啻是最虛幻、最投機、最不入流的台獨操作！
蔡英文應知，她若當選總統，必須依憲法宣誓：「余謹以至誠，向全國人民宣誓，余必遵守憲法，效忠國家，如違誓言，願受國家嚴厲之制裁。謹誓。」
這則中華民國總統就職誓詞，是不是「台灣共識」的根本基礎？蔡英文若不在選前宣示效忠中華民國，及捍衛中華民國憲法；難道連她若當選後的就職誓詞，也要「到時候再說」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 23, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen recently began peddling her "Taiwan consensus." Her motive? To deny that the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution already constitute a Taiwan consensus. Her motive is to repudiate the Republic of China, and demean the Constitution of the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to swear allegiance to the Republic of China, and to defend the Republic of China Constitution before the election. So what is she doing? Is she waiting until after she is elected before deciding whether to swear allegiance to the nation and its constitution?
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen recently began peddling her "Taiwan consensus." Her motive? To deny that the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution already constitute a Taiwan consensus. Her motive is to repudiate the Republic of China, and demean the Constitution of the Republic of China.
Taiwan independence refuses to recognize the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. It calls for Taiwan independence and nation-building. It attempts to achieve these ends by means of deceit, by means of "backdoor listing," or the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." Tsai Ing-wen's latest gimmick is her "Taiwan consensus."
Taiwan independence advocates sneer at the Republic of China and extol Taiwan independence. But the public doubts the feasibility of Taiwan independence. Therefore most of the time Taiwan independence advocates settle for poo-pooing the Republic of China. They seldom argue the feasibility of Taiwan independence. They know they would convince no one. Taiwan independence advocates sneer at the Republic of China. They revel in the fact that few governments recognize it. When the Republic of China participates in international sporting events, it cannot use its official name. It is forced to use the name "Chinese Taipei." Chen Yunlin referred to President Ma as "you," and even "Special Executive." The Republic of China has endured these indignities. The DPP plays these up for what they are worth. It rubs salt in the wound. It is now peddling its "Taiwan consensus." The DPP belittles the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. It hopes its attitude will become the "Taiwan consensus." That is bad enough. But if one looks more closely, Tsai's "Taiwan consensus" is utterly devoid of content.
The Republic of China is covered with wounds. But most people know how to turn grief into strength. The DPP however only knows how to rub salt in the wound. The DPP has adopted a facile political logic. Other countries refuse to recognize the Republic of China, therefore the DPP refuses to recognize the Republic of China. Beijing refuses to explicitly recognize "one China, different interpretations," therefore the DPP refuses to recognize "one China, different interpretations" and the Republic of China Constitution. In short, if other people refuse to recognize the Republic of China, then the DPP must go along with them and refuse to recognize the Republic of China as well. Others demean the Republic of China Constitution, therefore we must go along with them and demean the Republic of China constitution as well.
Consider the controversy over the 1992 consensus, and "one China, different interpretations." Put simply, it declares that "We are the Republic of China!" Also, Beijing has changed its position. It now says that "Although the two sides have a different understanding of the meaning of one China, they can nevertheless seek common ground." This is what it now says about "one China, different interpretations." The DPP should be urging Beijing to further accept "one China, different interpretations." Instead, it shrilly insists that "Beijing does not recognize one China, different interpretations." The DPP seems terrified at the prospect that Beijing might explicitly recognize "one China, different interpretations." As long as Beijing refuses to explicitly recognize "one China, different interpretations," the DPP will have an excuse to repudiate "one China, different interpretations."
Beijing repudiates the Republic of China. Therefore we must repudiate the Republic of China. This is Taiwan independence political logic. But the world has changed. The 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations," have influenced cross-Strait thinking. In recent years, Beijing reached the point where it no longer openly disputed the Republic of China government's jurisdiction. It apparently accepts the "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force" aspect of the cross-Strait consensus. The same is true for "peaceful development." Taipei's cross-Strait policy is based on the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations." Taipei hopes Beijing will accept the Republic of China. The DPP however, still repudiates the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations." It repudiates the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. What is this sort of Taiwan independence thinking, if not political suicide?
A few days ago, rumors spread that in the event Ma Ying-jeou is re-elected he may visit the Chinese mainland. Democratic Progressive Party spokesman Chen Chi-ma responded. He said President Ma Ying-jeou must visit in his capacity as president, not as KMT party chairman. He said "If someone else refuses to refer to you as President, then you are not a president!"
Let's examine his logic. If someone else refuses to refer to you as president, then you are not a president. If someone else refuses to refer to you as the Republic of China, then you are not the Republic of China. If someone else refuses to recognize the Republic of China Constitution, then you must refuse to recognize the Republic of China Constitution. If some else refuses to accept "one China, different interpretations," then you must refuse to accept "one China, different interpretations." Never mind that Beijing is gradually beginning to accept all of these propositions. At least it is not denying it.
Taiwan independence advocates have long mocked and repudiated the Republic of China. But they know Taiwan independence cannot replace the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen is now trying to use her "Taiwan consensus" as a replacement for "one China, different interpretations" and the Republic of China Constitution. She is attempting to demean the Republic of China Constitution. She is attempting to deny the fact that the Republic of China Constitution is the "Taiwan consensus." Worse still, Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" is utterly devoid of content. She says voters must wait until after the election to find out what the "Taiwan consensus" is. A more unreal, more opportunistic, more underhanded attempt to promote Taiwan independence one will not find.
Tsai Ing-wen surely realizes that if she is elected president, she will hace to swear allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of China. She will have to say "I solemnly and sincerely swear to the people of the nation, that I will abide by the constitution, and remain loyal to the nation. If I violate this oath, I am willing to accept the severest sanctions that the nation may wish to impose upon me."
This is the oath of office for the presidencyof the Republic of China. If it does not qualify as the bedrock foundation for a "Taiwan consensus," what does? Tsai Ing-wen refuses to swear allegiance to the Republic of China, and to defend the Republic of China Constitution before the election. So what is she doing? Is she waiting until after she is elected before deciding whether to swear allegiance to the nation and its constitution?
「台灣共識」意在否定中華民國
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.09.23 03:03 am
蔡英文拋出「台灣共識」，其主要意圖在否定「中華民國及中華民國憲法」是「台灣共識」；亦即意在否定中華民國，羞辱中華民國憲法。
台獨理論的核心論述是：由於否定中華民國及中華民國憲法，所以要「台獨建國」、「借殼上市」，或「正名制憲」；蔡英文這一次使用的新花樣是「台灣共識」。
台獨的傳統操作手法是，一方面羞辱中華民國，另一方面將台獨光榮化；然而，由於台獨的可行性頗受質疑，因此在大多情況下，台獨實際上只是以否定及羞辱中華民國為能事，卻無法誇耀台獨的可行性，因為不具說服力。例如，台獨經常羞辱中華民國走不出去，世界上沒有幾個國家承認中華民國，參與國際體育活動不能用國號而用「中華台北」，甚至陳雲林也不稱「馬總統」而稱「您」，又指「馬總統」是「馬區長」；誠然，這些皆是中華民國的傷疤，民進黨即動輒翻攪，在傷口撒鹽；這次又提「台灣共識」，其意亦只是在羞辱中華民國及中華民國憲法不應成為「台灣共識」罷了。但細細看去，蔡的「台灣共識」卻是一碟「空心菜」。
面對中華民國的滿身傷痛，多數國人皆知化悲憤為力量；但民進黨的一貫手法則是傷口撒鹽。民進黨的政治邏輯是：別國不承認中華民國，所以我們自己也不能承認中華民國；北京未明確承認「一中各表」，所以我們也不要承認「一中各表」的中華民國憲法。總之，別人不承認中華民國，所以我們也要自我否認；別人羞辱中華民國憲法，所以我們也要自我羞辱。
即以「九二共識」的爭議而言，所謂「一中各表」，簡白地說，就是主張：「我們是中華民國！」何況，北京今日已經走到「儘管對於一個中國的涵義雙方認知不同，但可以求同存異」（即「一中各表」）的地步；可是，民進黨非僅不催迫北京進一步落實「一中各表」，反而口口聲聲皆指「北京不承認一中各表」，好像深恐北京竟然承認了「一中各表」，更好像只要北京未明確承認「一中各表」，民進黨就有了否認「一中各表」的正當性。
以北京否定中華民國，來做為我們自我否定為中華民國的理由；這是台獨的政治邏輯。事實的演化卻是：由於「九二共識／一中各表」的影響，近年來北京對中華民國至少已近「治權互不否認」，且顯然已經接受了「不統／不獨／不武」的階段性兩岸共識，同赴「和平發展」。然而，即使當前政府的兩岸政策是以「九二共識／一中各表」，積極爭取北京接受中華民國；但民進黨卻仍然否定「九二共識／一中各表」，亦即自我否定中華民國及中華民國憲法。這種台獨思維，豈不近似政治自殺？
日前爆出馬英九可能在連任後訪問大陸的話題，民進黨發言人陳其邁稱，馬英九必須以總統身分往訪，不可用國民黨主席身分往訪，且說：「不是別人不叫你總統，你就不是總統！」
我們深然此說。不是別人不叫你總統，你就不是總統；不是別人不叫你中華民國，你就自我否定是中華民國；不是別人不承認中華民國憲法，你就自我否定中華民國憲法；不是別人不接受「一中各表」（何況北京已漸接受，至少未否認），你就也要自我否定「一中各表」。
台獨一向以羞辱、否定中華民國為能事，卻亦明知台獨不可能為中華民國的替代方案。如今，蔡英文又欲以《台灣共識法》取代「一中各表」的《中華民國憲法》，其實亦是在羞辱中華民國憲法，及否定中華民國為「台灣共識」；變本加厲的是，蔡英文的「台灣共識」又根本是一碟「空心菜」，竟說是「共識如何，選後再說」。這不啻是最虛幻、最投機、最不入流的台獨操作！
蔡英文應知，她若當選總統，必須依憲法宣誓：「余謹以至誠，向全國人民宣誓，余必遵守憲法，效忠國家，如違誓言，願受國家嚴厲之制裁。謹誓。」
這則中華民國總統就職誓詞，是不是「台灣共識」的根本基礎？蔡英文若不在選前宣示效忠中華民國，及捍衛中華民國憲法；難道連她若當選後的就職誓詞，也要「到時候再說」？
Our First Line of Defense: Not F16s, but One China, Different Interpretations
Our First Line of Defense:
Not F16s, but One China, Different Interpretations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 22, 2011
Summary: Washington will help Taipei upgrade its existing 145 F-16 A/B fighter planes. For years the Chen administration and the Ma administration tried to purchase F-16 C/D fighters. But neither was successful. The greatest benefit derived from Taipei's recent arms procurement attempt was the revelation that the Republic of China's first line of defense is not F-16s, but one China, different interpretations.
Full Text below:
Washington will help Taipei upgrade its existing 145 F-16 A/B fighter planes. For years the Chen administration and the Ma administration tried to purchase F-16 C/D fighters. But neither was successful.
Washington attempted to strike a balance between Taipei and Beijing. On the one hand, to mollify Taipei, Washington promised to upgrade Taipei's F-16 A/Bs. On the other hand, to mollify Beijing, it rejected Taipei's attempts to purchase F-16 C/Ds. According to reports, the upgrades to the A/Bs will increase their performance, making them functionally equivalent to the C/Ds. Essentially, Washington is playing a name game.
The arms purchase is more symbol than substance. Its political significance outweighs its military significance. For Washington, it strikes a strategic balance between Taipei and Beijing. For Taipei, it reaffirms the Taiwan Relations Act. It symbolizes Washington's military links with Taipei. For Beijing, Washington's refusal to sell Taipei the C/Ds, and its substitution of upgrades to Taipei's existing A/Bs, constitutes an abrogation of its political commitment to Taipei, and its military commitment to upgrade its weaponry.
Former premier Hau Pei-tsun commented on the U.S. arms purchases. He said that "Frankly, how many arms Washington sells us and what kind of arms Washington sells us, is not the most important thing. What is important is that this [buyer/seller] relationship exists, and that it have a legal basis. That is the purpose of the Taiwan Relations Act." The current arms purchase should be measured against this standard.
When one gets down to it, Washington is not selling fighter planes to Taipei so that Taipei and Beijing can go to war. Taipei is not buying fighter planes from Washington so that it can fight with Beijing. The Cold War is over. The Chinese mainland is on the rise. Washington's unilateralism is in decline. Taipei's arms purchases from Washington are primarily a political declaration. They are not however, a declaration of an intention to fight. Instead these military procurements are a political declaration. The are a declaration of an intention not to fight. In other words, they are more symbol than substance, and their significance is more political than military.
If the two sides go to war, the F-16 C/Ds will not be inadequate. If the two sides engage in peaceful development, the F-16 A/B upgrade will more than adequate -- as political symbolism. Washington has refused to sell Taipei the C/Ds. But it has agreed to upgrade the existing A/Bs, Washington has concluded that the two sides will not resort to force to resolve their differences, but instead will resolve their differences by peaceful and democratic means.
Therefore, the Republic of China's national defense thinking must change with the times. Ultimately its national defense will depend not primarily on submarines, aircraft, and missiles. It will depend on adherence to the One China, Different Interpretations strategy, consistent with the Republic of China Constitution.
The One China, Different Interpretations national constitution strategy involves several premises. One. It defends the Republic of China and upholds the Republic of China Constitution. Taiwan independence must inevitably lead to cross-Strait military conflict. Therefore it is hostile to peaceful development. Two. Upholding the Republic of China Constitution, and implementing constitutional republicanism, is defending the nation. As long as the Republic of China continues directly electing its president, as long as the Legislative Yuan continues to convene, then cross-Strait relations will be determined in accordance with Republic of China constitutional procedures. It will be determined by 23 million people, This is the basis of cross-Strait peaceful development. This is the basis of the Republic of China's national defense.
Expressed as a negative, the Republic of China's national defense means not giving Beijing an excuse for military action, for example, by moving toward Taiwan independence. Expressed as a positive, it means defending the Republic of China and upholding the Republic of China Constitution. It means maintaining cross-Strait peace and development, As long as our constitutional republic continues to operate, business as usual, it will be able to determine the future of cross-Strait relations, peacefully and democratically, A rational process will enable the two sides to better resolve their differences.
One China, different Interpretations is the best means of national defense. As long as we adhere to a constitutionally mandated One China, we can invoke One China, different interpretations to maintain the status quo. But once we repudiate the Republic of China Constitution, once we repudiate the Republic of China, we forfeit our right to demand different interpretations. We forfeit the basis for peaceful development. When we forfeit our right to different interpretations. Beijing will immediately attempt to impose its interpretation of one China. We will then forfeit the basis of our national defense.
In other words, the biggest threat to the Republic of China's national defense is Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen's recent policy statements did not explicitly advocate Taiwan independence. Clearly she knows the risks. But she repudiated the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. She spun her repudiation as a "Taiwan consensus." She also repudiated One China, different interpretations. This is not rational cross-Strait policy. It is definitely not rational national defense policy.
One China, different interpretations is a three way consensus among Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. On March 26, 2008, Hu spoke to Bush on the hotline. He told George W. Bush that the two sides were about to resume talks on the basis of One China, different interpretations. Washington has repeatedly affirmed the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy achievements, Of course it knows these achievements are predicated upon the 1992 consensus, and one China, different interpretations. Therefore "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use force" and one China,different interpretations is the greatest common denominator among Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. It is also the Republic of China's first line of defense. To repudiate one China, different interpretations, is to subvert the cross-Strait status quo.
The greatest benefit derived from Taipei's recent arms procurement attempt was the revelation that the Republic of China's first line of defense is not F-16s, but one China, different interpretations.
國防主要憑藉：不在F16，而在一中各表
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.22
美國當局將協助台灣提升現有一四五架Ｆ十六Ａ／Ｂ戰機機隊性能；至此，扁馬兩屆政府爭取多年的Ｆ十六Ｃ／Ｄ戰機採購案終未實現。
這是美國在現階段對台美中三邊關係的衡量結果。一方面仍然承諾了Ｆ十六Ａ／Ｂ的升級案，這是向台灣交代；另一方面則拒絕了Ｆ十六Ｃ／Ｄ的採購案，這是向北京交代。消息並指出，升級的Ａ／Ｂ，性能等同於Ｃ／Ｄ，這是美國在「名」與「實」之間的操作。
總的來說，這項軍購案，其象徵意義大於實質意義，政治意義大於軍事意義。對美國言，是表達在台北與北京之間的戰略平衡；對台北言，是在再次確定《台灣關係法》的地位，並藉以表徵美國與台灣的軍事關聯；對北京言，則美國拒Ｃ／Ｄ而改售Ａ／Ｂ升級，也形同阻擋了美國對台政治承諾及軍事承諾在名目上的升級。
前行政院長郝柏村論台美軍購，曾說：「美國賣多少（軍備），賣什麼，老實說不是最重要的；但這個（軍售）關係一定要存在，且一定要有法律基礎，這就是《台灣關係法》。」本次軍購案，亦可用這個標準評量。
說到底，美國賣戰機給台北，不是要台北與北京開戰；台北向美國買戰機，也不是要與北京打仗。冷戰結束、中國崛起、美國單邊主義式微以後的台美軍購，主要是在作政治宣示，目的不在「要打仗」，反而是在借軍購作出政治姿態，目的在「不要打仗」。這就是說：象徵意義大於實質意義，政治意義大於軍事意義。
如果兩岸要開戰，Ｆ十六Ｃ／Ｄ也不夠用；如果兩岸能「和平發展」，則Ｆ十六Ａ／Ｂ升級，已足作為政治象徵。美國拒Ｃ／Ｄ，而升級Ａ／B，可視為它認定兩岸的未來不能訴諸武力解決，而必須循和平民主的途徑解決。
因而，中華民國的國防思維，亦必須與時推移；歸結而言，未來國防的憑藉，不再只是潛艇、戰機、飛彈，而主要是在堅持「一中各表」的國憲戰略。
「一中各表」國憲戰略的主要內涵是：一、堅持中華民國與中華民國憲法，亦即「不獨」；台獨必會升高兩岸軍事衝突，有違「和平發展」的國防基調。二、堅持基於中華民國憲法，實行民主憲政，即是堅實的國防憑藉；因為，只要中華民國繼續直選總統、立法院如常運作，則兩岸關係的未來，必然須由中華民國憲法程序決定，亦即由兩千三百萬人決定，這是兩岸「和平發展」的憑藉，更是中華民國的國防憑藉。
換句話說，中華民國的國防，在消極面，就是不要授予北京採取軍事動作的口實（如台獨）；在積極面，則應堅守中華民國與中華民國憲法的國憲戰略，秉持兩岸和平發展的立場，只要民主憲政正常運作，自有可能使兩岸關係的未來透過和平與民主的途徑，「由合理的過程到改善之目的」。
「一中各表」是最佳國防憑藉。因為，堅守「憲法一中」，始能藉「一中各表」維持現狀；倘若否定中華民國憲法，否定中華民國，即失「各表」的憑藉，亦失「和平發展」的憑藉；且既然拒絕「各表」，就會直接面對北京「一中」的壓力，國防即失憑藉。
也就是說，中華民國最大的國防威脅即是台獨。以蔡英文近日的競選政見言，她雖不敢直接倡議台獨（可見亦知風險），卻否定中華民國及中華民國憲法為「台灣共識」，又否定「一中各表」；這絕非理智的兩岸政策，更絕非理智的國防政策。
「一中各表」可謂是當前台美中三方的「三邊兩岸共識」。胡錦濤在二○○八年三月二十六日「布胡熱線」中，即告知小布希，兩岸將以「一中各表」恢復談判；而華府屢次盛譽馬政府的兩岸政策成就，自然亦知是植基於「九二共識／一中各表」。因此，毫無疑問，「不統／不獨／不武」的「一中各表」，是台美中三邊對「兩岸現狀」的最大默契，這當然也是中華民國最主要的國防憑藉。否定「一中各表」，就是顛覆「兩岸現狀」。
此次軍購案給台灣最大的啟示是：國防的主要憑藉，不在Ｆ十六，而在一中各表。
Not F16s, but One China, Different Interpretations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 22, 2011
Summary: Washington will help Taipei upgrade its existing 145 F-16 A/B fighter planes. For years the Chen administration and the Ma administration tried to purchase F-16 C/D fighters. But neither was successful. The greatest benefit derived from Taipei's recent arms procurement attempt was the revelation that the Republic of China's first line of defense is not F-16s, but one China, different interpretations.
Full Text below:
Washington will help Taipei upgrade its existing 145 F-16 A/B fighter planes. For years the Chen administration and the Ma administration tried to purchase F-16 C/D fighters. But neither was successful.
Washington attempted to strike a balance between Taipei and Beijing. On the one hand, to mollify Taipei, Washington promised to upgrade Taipei's F-16 A/Bs. On the other hand, to mollify Beijing, it rejected Taipei's attempts to purchase F-16 C/Ds. According to reports, the upgrades to the A/Bs will increase their performance, making them functionally equivalent to the C/Ds. Essentially, Washington is playing a name game.
The arms purchase is more symbol than substance. Its political significance outweighs its military significance. For Washington, it strikes a strategic balance between Taipei and Beijing. For Taipei, it reaffirms the Taiwan Relations Act. It symbolizes Washington's military links with Taipei. For Beijing, Washington's refusal to sell Taipei the C/Ds, and its substitution of upgrades to Taipei's existing A/Bs, constitutes an abrogation of its political commitment to Taipei, and its military commitment to upgrade its weaponry.
Former premier Hau Pei-tsun commented on the U.S. arms purchases. He said that "Frankly, how many arms Washington sells us and what kind of arms Washington sells us, is not the most important thing. What is important is that this [buyer/seller] relationship exists, and that it have a legal basis. That is the purpose of the Taiwan Relations Act." The current arms purchase should be measured against this standard.
When one gets down to it, Washington is not selling fighter planes to Taipei so that Taipei and Beijing can go to war. Taipei is not buying fighter planes from Washington so that it can fight with Beijing. The Cold War is over. The Chinese mainland is on the rise. Washington's unilateralism is in decline. Taipei's arms purchases from Washington are primarily a political declaration. They are not however, a declaration of an intention to fight. Instead these military procurements are a political declaration. The are a declaration of an intention not to fight. In other words, they are more symbol than substance, and their significance is more political than military.
If the two sides go to war, the F-16 C/Ds will not be inadequate. If the two sides engage in peaceful development, the F-16 A/B upgrade will more than adequate -- as political symbolism. Washington has refused to sell Taipei the C/Ds. But it has agreed to upgrade the existing A/Bs, Washington has concluded that the two sides will not resort to force to resolve their differences, but instead will resolve their differences by peaceful and democratic means.
Therefore, the Republic of China's national defense thinking must change with the times. Ultimately its national defense will depend not primarily on submarines, aircraft, and missiles. It will depend on adherence to the One China, Different Interpretations strategy, consistent with the Republic of China Constitution.
The One China, Different Interpretations national constitution strategy involves several premises. One. It defends the Republic of China and upholds the Republic of China Constitution. Taiwan independence must inevitably lead to cross-Strait military conflict. Therefore it is hostile to peaceful development. Two. Upholding the Republic of China Constitution, and implementing constitutional republicanism, is defending the nation. As long as the Republic of China continues directly electing its president, as long as the Legislative Yuan continues to convene, then cross-Strait relations will be determined in accordance with Republic of China constitutional procedures. It will be determined by 23 million people, This is the basis of cross-Strait peaceful development. This is the basis of the Republic of China's national defense.
Expressed as a negative, the Republic of China's national defense means not giving Beijing an excuse for military action, for example, by moving toward Taiwan independence. Expressed as a positive, it means defending the Republic of China and upholding the Republic of China Constitution. It means maintaining cross-Strait peace and development, As long as our constitutional republic continues to operate, business as usual, it will be able to determine the future of cross-Strait relations, peacefully and democratically, A rational process will enable the two sides to better resolve their differences.
One China, different Interpretations is the best means of national defense. As long as we adhere to a constitutionally mandated One China, we can invoke One China, different interpretations to maintain the status quo. But once we repudiate the Republic of China Constitution, once we repudiate the Republic of China, we forfeit our right to demand different interpretations. We forfeit the basis for peaceful development. When we forfeit our right to different interpretations. Beijing will immediately attempt to impose its interpretation of one China. We will then forfeit the basis of our national defense.
In other words, the biggest threat to the Republic of China's national defense is Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen's recent policy statements did not explicitly advocate Taiwan independence. Clearly she knows the risks. But she repudiated the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. She spun her repudiation as a "Taiwan consensus." She also repudiated One China, different interpretations. This is not rational cross-Strait policy. It is definitely not rational national defense policy.
One China, different interpretations is a three way consensus among Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. On March 26, 2008, Hu spoke to Bush on the hotline. He told George W. Bush that the two sides were about to resume talks on the basis of One China, different interpretations. Washington has repeatedly affirmed the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy achievements, Of course it knows these achievements are predicated upon the 1992 consensus, and one China, different interpretations. Therefore "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use force" and one China,different interpretations is the greatest common denominator among Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. It is also the Republic of China's first line of defense. To repudiate one China, different interpretations, is to subvert the cross-Strait status quo.
The greatest benefit derived from Taipei's recent arms procurement attempt was the revelation that the Republic of China's first line of defense is not F-16s, but one China, different interpretations.
國防主要憑藉：不在F16，而在一中各表
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.22
美國當局將協助台灣提升現有一四五架Ｆ十六Ａ／Ｂ戰機機隊性能；至此，扁馬兩屆政府爭取多年的Ｆ十六Ｃ／Ｄ戰機採購案終未實現。
這是美國在現階段對台美中三邊關係的衡量結果。一方面仍然承諾了Ｆ十六Ａ／Ｂ的升級案，這是向台灣交代；另一方面則拒絕了Ｆ十六Ｃ／Ｄ的採購案，這是向北京交代。消息並指出，升級的Ａ／Ｂ，性能等同於Ｃ／Ｄ，這是美國在「名」與「實」之間的操作。
總的來說，這項軍購案，其象徵意義大於實質意義，政治意義大於軍事意義。對美國言，是表達在台北與北京之間的戰略平衡；對台北言，是在再次確定《台灣關係法》的地位，並藉以表徵美國與台灣的軍事關聯；對北京言，則美國拒Ｃ／Ｄ而改售Ａ／Ｂ升級，也形同阻擋了美國對台政治承諾及軍事承諾在名目上的升級。
前行政院長郝柏村論台美軍購，曾說：「美國賣多少（軍備），賣什麼，老實說不是最重要的；但這個（軍售）關係一定要存在，且一定要有法律基礎，這就是《台灣關係法》。」本次軍購案，亦可用這個標準評量。
說到底，美國賣戰機給台北，不是要台北與北京開戰；台北向美國買戰機，也不是要與北京打仗。冷戰結束、中國崛起、美國單邊主義式微以後的台美軍購，主要是在作政治宣示，目的不在「要打仗」，反而是在借軍購作出政治姿態，目的在「不要打仗」。這就是說：象徵意義大於實質意義，政治意義大於軍事意義。
如果兩岸要開戰，Ｆ十六Ｃ／Ｄ也不夠用；如果兩岸能「和平發展」，則Ｆ十六Ａ／Ｂ升級，已足作為政治象徵。美國拒Ｃ／Ｄ，而升級Ａ／B，可視為它認定兩岸的未來不能訴諸武力解決，而必須循和平民主的途徑解決。
因而，中華民國的國防思維，亦必須與時推移；歸結而言，未來國防的憑藉，不再只是潛艇、戰機、飛彈，而主要是在堅持「一中各表」的國憲戰略。
「一中各表」國憲戰略的主要內涵是：一、堅持中華民國與中華民國憲法，亦即「不獨」；台獨必會升高兩岸軍事衝突，有違「和平發展」的國防基調。二、堅持基於中華民國憲法，實行民主憲政，即是堅實的國防憑藉；因為，只要中華民國繼續直選總統、立法院如常運作，則兩岸關係的未來，必然須由中華民國憲法程序決定，亦即由兩千三百萬人決定，這是兩岸「和平發展」的憑藉，更是中華民國的國防憑藉。
換句話說，中華民國的國防，在消極面，就是不要授予北京採取軍事動作的口實（如台獨）；在積極面，則應堅守中華民國與中華民國憲法的國憲戰略，秉持兩岸和平發展的立場，只要民主憲政正常運作，自有可能使兩岸關係的未來透過和平與民主的途徑，「由合理的過程到改善之目的」。
「一中各表」是最佳國防憑藉。因為，堅守「憲法一中」，始能藉「一中各表」維持現狀；倘若否定中華民國憲法，否定中華民國，即失「各表」的憑藉，亦失「和平發展」的憑藉；且既然拒絕「各表」，就會直接面對北京「一中」的壓力，國防即失憑藉。
也就是說，中華民國最大的國防威脅即是台獨。以蔡英文近日的競選政見言，她雖不敢直接倡議台獨（可見亦知風險），卻否定中華民國及中華民國憲法為「台灣共識」，又否定「一中各表」；這絕非理智的兩岸政策，更絕非理智的國防政策。
「一中各表」可謂是當前台美中三方的「三邊兩岸共識」。胡錦濤在二○○八年三月二十六日「布胡熱線」中，即告知小布希，兩岸將以「一中各表」恢復談判；而華府屢次盛譽馬政府的兩岸政策成就，自然亦知是植基於「九二共識／一中各表」。因此，毫無疑問，「不統／不獨／不武」的「一中各表」，是台美中三邊對「兩岸現狀」的最大默契，這當然也是中華民國最主要的國防憑藉。否定「一中各表」，就是顛覆「兩岸現狀」。
此次軍購案給台灣最大的啟示是：國防的主要憑藉，不在Ｆ十六，而在一中各表。
Wednesday, September 21, 2011
Why Do People on Taiwan Hate Each Other?
Why Do People on Taiwan Hate Each Other?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 21, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen recently spoke at Harvard University. When asked about DPP violence, she glibly answered that speaking a little louder is normal in a democratic society. One wants to be sure one is heard. But when asked "Why do people on Taiwan hate each other?" she was suddenly flustered and at a loss for words. It was all she could do mumble the question back to the questioner. Tsai Ing-wen was unable to answer that question. But that is a question everyone on Taiwan should ask themselves. When exactly did people on Taiwan begin to hate each other?
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen recently spoke at Harvard University. When asked about DPP violence, she glibly answered that speaking a little louder is normal in a democratic society. One wants to be sure one is heard. But when asked "Why do people on Taiwan hate each other?" she was suddenly flustered and at a loss for words. It was all she could do mumble the question back to the questioner.
The first question was posed by a student from the Chinese mainland. The student was referring specifically to Chen Yunlin, who was surrounded by a mob during his his visit to Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen countered by invoking a "democratic society" and "freedom of speech," She adroitly deflected her opponent's question and won the audience's approval. The second question was posed by the host of the lecture, Steven M. Goldstein, head of the Taiwan Studies Workshop at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Professor Goldstein asked the question on behalf of an audience member. Now that she faced American professors, Tsai Ing-wen could no longer thump the tub for democracy, She could no longer indulge in cheap rhetoric. She could no longer parry the thrust. She found herself at a total loss for words.
Tsai Ing-wen's reaction to these two questions was a realistic reflection of Taiwan's democracy, of its internal contradictions and its loss of balance. When confronted with compatriots from the Chinese mainland, we wear our democracy like a halo, We know it is the Chinese mainland's Achilles Heel. But when confronted with scholars from the United States, we realize boasting about our democratic achievements would only make our listeners cringe. We realize we lack the cultivation demanded of citizens in a mature democracy. But the second question, "Why do people on Taiwan hate each other?" is even more telling. It targets Taiwan's own Achilles Heel, its "illiberal democracy." Can a political system rooted in the incitement of hatred establish a genuinely democratic society?
Has Blue vs. Green confrontation on Taiwan descended the level of mutual hatred that Professor Goldstein suggested? That is debatable. But compared to ten years ago, divisions within Taiwan society have deepened. Divisions over reunification vs. independence, over provincial origin, and over northern and southern Taiwan, have all become part of Blue vs. Green polarization. Taiwan is well down the path of no return. After two ruling party changes, the number of swing voters has risen and fallen. But both the Blue camp and the Green camp have solidified their positions. Comlpromise is no longer possible. Political talk shows have become fixed in their format. Restaurants and corporations have all been labeled Blue or Green. Ideological differences prevent experts and scholars from appearing on the same TV shows and talking to each other, The divisions in Taiwan society are no exaggeration.
The reason is not hard to imagine. Partisan politics on Taiwan has long been suffused with the language of hatred and self-righteousness. During the era of single party rule, the opposition DPP resorted to violent protests. Their reaction then was understandable. But the DPP behaved exactly the same way even after it assumed power. If anything, its behavior was worse. Over time, how can people not be influenced by such intense hostility? Political violence on Taiwan can be found everywhere. It can be found in the legislature and on the streets, Political violence had some degree of justification in the beginning. But the Democratic Progressive Party changed. Before, it was calling for democracy. Now it is calling for a nation-building Jihad. Democratic elections have become life or death struggles between the Republic of China and the "Nation of Taiwan." As a result, each successive election has instilled a sense of crisis among voters adhering to different ideologies. Each successive election has increased the emotional intensity of confrontations between these same voters .
Democracy was supposed to promote equality and justice, through diversity and universal participation. But on today's Taiwan, democracy generates more extreme polarization. Should this be trumpeted as an achievement of democracy? Other disturbing signs have appeared on Taiwan. Too many care only about ideology. They are indifferent about right and wrong. Too many care only about partisan gain. They are indifferent to the national interest. Each side preaches to the choir. Neither side talks to the other. One sees little evidence of the civilized behavior commensurate with citizens in a mature democracy. Consider an obvious example. When the student from the Chinese mainland challenged Tsai Ing-wen, the audience immediately attempted to boo him into silence. But whenever Tsai Ing-wen responded, the audience roared with uncritical approval. This manner of treating "others" is hardly evidence of a democratic temperament.
Tsai Ing-wen would have us believe that citizens in democratic societies "merely speak a little louder." What a glibly dishonest response. Tsai Ing-wen clearly came prepared. She also conveyed a false impression of politics on Taiwan. In reality, only a certain party is in the habit of "speaking loudly." Only a certain party never listens to others. Only a certain party habitually physically assaults political opponents with fists. Only a certain party habitually abuses the system. How can mutual respect and tolerance prevail under this sort of democracy?
Why do people hate each other on Taiwan? Because they are too fearful, Both Blue and Green camps feel compelled to resort to methods of their own choosing to defend their beloved homeland. Certain politicians constantly incite such feelings of anxiety. They incite divisions among members of the public, over matters of identity, They intensify peoples' sense of polarization. Tsai Ing-wen flatly refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, but then pontificates about a "Taiwan consensus." She probably never imagined she would enjoy this luxury. The hardest part of eitehr the 1992 consensus or Tsai's so-called "Taiwan consensus," is "consensus." Twenty years of political polarization has left its mark. What consensus if any still survives? What consensus, if any, can heal the wounds inflicted upon the public?
Tsai Ing-wen was unable to answer that question. But that is a question everyone on Taiwan should ask themselves. When exactly did people on Taiwan begin to hate each other?
為什麼台灣人彼此仇視？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.21
蔡英文在哈佛大學演講，被問到民進黨的暴力表現時，她輕鬆答稱：在民主社會講話比較大聲是正常的，目的只是希望對方聽見。但隨後被問到「台灣人為什麼互相仇恨」時，她彷彿瞬間失去了辯才，只是把問題喃喃重覆了一次。
前一個問題，是一名大陸學生所問，具體針對陳雲林來台遭遇而發；蔡英文拋出「民主社會」、「言論自由」的大帽子對付，四兩撥千斤應付對手，贏得滿場掌聲。後一個問題，是演講會主持人費正清中心台灣研究小組教授戈迪溫借觀眾的發言提問；面對美國教授，蔡英文無法再即席販賣民主、自由那套便宜說詞，一時竟無力招架，為之語塞。
蔡英文對這兩個問題的反應，其實相當寫實地反映了台灣民主的困境和內外失調。面對大陸人民，我們可以理所當然地拿民主來自我炫耀，知道那是中國的罩門；但一轉頭面對美國，我們立刻知道自己誇耀的民主成就其實相當虛浮，也缺乏根本的品質。更重要的是第二個問題：台灣人為什麼彼此仇恨？這個問題直指台灣民主的要害，一個建立在仇恨煽動上的政治，可能建立真正的民主社會嗎？
台灣的藍綠對峙，是否已達到戈迪溫教授所說的「互相仇恨」的地步，也許有待進一步考察；但比起十幾年前，台灣社會的切割，從統獨、省籍、南北的歸類，到變成藍綠的兩極對立，已一步步走上無法回頭的道路。歷經兩次政黨輪替，中間選民或有若干起伏，但藍綠兩邊的基本盤卻只是愈發鞏固，愈不相容。從政論節目言論分殊的定型化，從餐廳、企業被貼上藍綠標籤，從專家學者因立場歧異而無法再同台交流，台灣社會的「決裂現象」絕對不是危言聳聽。
此中原因，其實不難想像。台灣的政黨政治中，長期充滿仇恨語言，也充滿偽正義腔調的暴力。在一黨獨大時期，在野黨採取激烈手段杯葛，或許難以苛責；但民進黨在執政後依然故我，甚至變本加厲，長期以往，人民如何不感染那股敵意？台灣的政治暴力，從國會殿堂一直打到街頭，一開始也確具有某種程度的正當性；但當民進黨搖身把政治變成了所謂建立新國家的「聖戰」，民主選舉遂變成了中華民國與台灣國的生死存亡鬥爭。也因此，一次次的選戰，不僅激盪著不同信仰的選民的危機感，也升高了他們的對峙情緒。
民主政治原是要透過多元、普遍的參與，達到更公平、正義的目的；今天台灣的政治，卻是透過鬥爭使人民一步步走向更深的分歧，這配稱為民主成就嗎？台灣政治的另一惡兆，是只問「立場」、而不問「是非」，只問黨派得失、而不計全民利益，一味各說各話、而拒絕溝通協商，看不出多少民主素養。最明顯的例子，在蔡英文那場哈佛演說會上，大陸學生一提問，立刻遭到全場噓聲；蔡英文每次答畢，則獲得熱烈掌聲。這種對待異己的方式，又表現了什麼民主氣質？
民主社會只是「講話比較大聲」而已，真是漂亮的回答！這充分顯示了蔡英文的有備而來，卻一點也無法反映台灣政治的真實。在現實中，永遠只是某個黨講話大聲、卻從不傾聽別人，總是它率先動手推打、總是它企圖凌虐體制，那麼台灣如何在相互尊重與容忍的基礎上建立起有厚度的民主？
台灣人民為何彼此仇視？因為他們有太多不安，藍綠皆認為必須用自己的方法來捍衛他們鍾愛的土地。而一些政治人物不斷殘酷地撩撥他們的焦慮，分化他們的認同和感情，加深他們的對立。當蔡英文一口否定「九二共識」、卻夸夸大談「台灣共識」時，她大概沒想到自己有多奢侈。事實上，困難的不是「九二」或「台灣」，困難的是後面那兩個字──共識；經過廿年的政治分化，還有什麼共識能當作台灣人民感情的黏合劑呢？
那個蔡英文答不出來的問題，也是所有台灣人應該思考的問題。台灣人什麼時候開始彼此仇視的？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 21, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen recently spoke at Harvard University. When asked about DPP violence, she glibly answered that speaking a little louder is normal in a democratic society. One wants to be sure one is heard. But when asked "Why do people on Taiwan hate each other?" she was suddenly flustered and at a loss for words. It was all she could do mumble the question back to the questioner. Tsai Ing-wen was unable to answer that question. But that is a question everyone on Taiwan should ask themselves. When exactly did people on Taiwan begin to hate each other?
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen recently spoke at Harvard University. When asked about DPP violence, she glibly answered that speaking a little louder is normal in a democratic society. One wants to be sure one is heard. But when asked "Why do people on Taiwan hate each other?" she was suddenly flustered and at a loss for words. It was all she could do mumble the question back to the questioner.
The first question was posed by a student from the Chinese mainland. The student was referring specifically to Chen Yunlin, who was surrounded by a mob during his his visit to Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen countered by invoking a "democratic society" and "freedom of speech," She adroitly deflected her opponent's question and won the audience's approval. The second question was posed by the host of the lecture, Steven M. Goldstein, head of the Taiwan Studies Workshop at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Professor Goldstein asked the question on behalf of an audience member. Now that she faced American professors, Tsai Ing-wen could no longer thump the tub for democracy, She could no longer indulge in cheap rhetoric. She could no longer parry the thrust. She found herself at a total loss for words.
Tsai Ing-wen's reaction to these two questions was a realistic reflection of Taiwan's democracy, of its internal contradictions and its loss of balance. When confronted with compatriots from the Chinese mainland, we wear our democracy like a halo, We know it is the Chinese mainland's Achilles Heel. But when confronted with scholars from the United States, we realize boasting about our democratic achievements would only make our listeners cringe. We realize we lack the cultivation demanded of citizens in a mature democracy. But the second question, "Why do people on Taiwan hate each other?" is even more telling. It targets Taiwan's own Achilles Heel, its "illiberal democracy." Can a political system rooted in the incitement of hatred establish a genuinely democratic society?
Has Blue vs. Green confrontation on Taiwan descended the level of mutual hatred that Professor Goldstein suggested? That is debatable. But compared to ten years ago, divisions within Taiwan society have deepened. Divisions over reunification vs. independence, over provincial origin, and over northern and southern Taiwan, have all become part of Blue vs. Green polarization. Taiwan is well down the path of no return. After two ruling party changes, the number of swing voters has risen and fallen. But both the Blue camp and the Green camp have solidified their positions. Comlpromise is no longer possible. Political talk shows have become fixed in their format. Restaurants and corporations have all been labeled Blue or Green. Ideological differences prevent experts and scholars from appearing on the same TV shows and talking to each other, The divisions in Taiwan society are no exaggeration.
The reason is not hard to imagine. Partisan politics on Taiwan has long been suffused with the language of hatred and self-righteousness. During the era of single party rule, the opposition DPP resorted to violent protests. Their reaction then was understandable. But the DPP behaved exactly the same way even after it assumed power. If anything, its behavior was worse. Over time, how can people not be influenced by such intense hostility? Political violence on Taiwan can be found everywhere. It can be found in the legislature and on the streets, Political violence had some degree of justification in the beginning. But the Democratic Progressive Party changed. Before, it was calling for democracy. Now it is calling for a nation-building Jihad. Democratic elections have become life or death struggles between the Republic of China and the "Nation of Taiwan." As a result, each successive election has instilled a sense of crisis among voters adhering to different ideologies. Each successive election has increased the emotional intensity of confrontations between these same voters .
Democracy was supposed to promote equality and justice, through diversity and universal participation. But on today's Taiwan, democracy generates more extreme polarization. Should this be trumpeted as an achievement of democracy? Other disturbing signs have appeared on Taiwan. Too many care only about ideology. They are indifferent about right and wrong. Too many care only about partisan gain. They are indifferent to the national interest. Each side preaches to the choir. Neither side talks to the other. One sees little evidence of the civilized behavior commensurate with citizens in a mature democracy. Consider an obvious example. When the student from the Chinese mainland challenged Tsai Ing-wen, the audience immediately attempted to boo him into silence. But whenever Tsai Ing-wen responded, the audience roared with uncritical approval. This manner of treating "others" is hardly evidence of a democratic temperament.
Tsai Ing-wen would have us believe that citizens in democratic societies "merely speak a little louder." What a glibly dishonest response. Tsai Ing-wen clearly came prepared. She also conveyed a false impression of politics on Taiwan. In reality, only a certain party is in the habit of "speaking loudly." Only a certain party never listens to others. Only a certain party habitually physically assaults political opponents with fists. Only a certain party habitually abuses the system. How can mutual respect and tolerance prevail under this sort of democracy?
Why do people hate each other on Taiwan? Because they are too fearful, Both Blue and Green camps feel compelled to resort to methods of their own choosing to defend their beloved homeland. Certain politicians constantly incite such feelings of anxiety. They incite divisions among members of the public, over matters of identity, They intensify peoples' sense of polarization. Tsai Ing-wen flatly refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, but then pontificates about a "Taiwan consensus." She probably never imagined she would enjoy this luxury. The hardest part of eitehr the 1992 consensus or Tsai's so-called "Taiwan consensus," is "consensus." Twenty years of political polarization has left its mark. What consensus if any still survives? What consensus, if any, can heal the wounds inflicted upon the public?
Tsai Ing-wen was unable to answer that question. But that is a question everyone on Taiwan should ask themselves. When exactly did people on Taiwan begin to hate each other?
為什麼台灣人彼此仇視？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.21
蔡英文在哈佛大學演講，被問到民進黨的暴力表現時，她輕鬆答稱：在民主社會講話比較大聲是正常的，目的只是希望對方聽見。但隨後被問到「台灣人為什麼互相仇恨」時，她彷彿瞬間失去了辯才，只是把問題喃喃重覆了一次。
前一個問題，是一名大陸學生所問，具體針對陳雲林來台遭遇而發；蔡英文拋出「民主社會」、「言論自由」的大帽子對付，四兩撥千斤應付對手，贏得滿場掌聲。後一個問題，是演講會主持人費正清中心台灣研究小組教授戈迪溫借觀眾的發言提問；面對美國教授，蔡英文無法再即席販賣民主、自由那套便宜說詞，一時竟無力招架，為之語塞。
蔡英文對這兩個問題的反應，其實相當寫實地反映了台灣民主的困境和內外失調。面對大陸人民，我們可以理所當然地拿民主來自我炫耀，知道那是中國的罩門；但一轉頭面對美國，我們立刻知道自己誇耀的民主成就其實相當虛浮，也缺乏根本的品質。更重要的是第二個問題：台灣人為什麼彼此仇恨？這個問題直指台灣民主的要害，一個建立在仇恨煽動上的政治，可能建立真正的民主社會嗎？
台灣的藍綠對峙，是否已達到戈迪溫教授所說的「互相仇恨」的地步，也許有待進一步考察；但比起十幾年前，台灣社會的切割，從統獨、省籍、南北的歸類，到變成藍綠的兩極對立，已一步步走上無法回頭的道路。歷經兩次政黨輪替，中間選民或有若干起伏，但藍綠兩邊的基本盤卻只是愈發鞏固，愈不相容。從政論節目言論分殊的定型化，從餐廳、企業被貼上藍綠標籤，從專家學者因立場歧異而無法再同台交流，台灣社會的「決裂現象」絕對不是危言聳聽。
此中原因，其實不難想像。台灣的政黨政治中，長期充滿仇恨語言，也充滿偽正義腔調的暴力。在一黨獨大時期，在野黨採取激烈手段杯葛，或許難以苛責；但民進黨在執政後依然故我，甚至變本加厲，長期以往，人民如何不感染那股敵意？台灣的政治暴力，從國會殿堂一直打到街頭，一開始也確具有某種程度的正當性；但當民進黨搖身把政治變成了所謂建立新國家的「聖戰」，民主選舉遂變成了中華民國與台灣國的生死存亡鬥爭。也因此，一次次的選戰，不僅激盪著不同信仰的選民的危機感，也升高了他們的對峙情緒。
民主政治原是要透過多元、普遍的參與，達到更公平、正義的目的；今天台灣的政治，卻是透過鬥爭使人民一步步走向更深的分歧，這配稱為民主成就嗎？台灣政治的另一惡兆，是只問「立場」、而不問「是非」，只問黨派得失、而不計全民利益，一味各說各話、而拒絕溝通協商，看不出多少民主素養。最明顯的例子，在蔡英文那場哈佛演說會上，大陸學生一提問，立刻遭到全場噓聲；蔡英文每次答畢，則獲得熱烈掌聲。這種對待異己的方式，又表現了什麼民主氣質？
民主社會只是「講話比較大聲」而已，真是漂亮的回答！這充分顯示了蔡英文的有備而來，卻一點也無法反映台灣政治的真實。在現實中，永遠只是某個黨講話大聲、卻從不傾聽別人，總是它率先動手推打、總是它企圖凌虐體制，那麼台灣如何在相互尊重與容忍的基礎上建立起有厚度的民主？
台灣人民為何彼此仇視？因為他們有太多不安，藍綠皆認為必須用自己的方法來捍衛他們鍾愛的土地。而一些政治人物不斷殘酷地撩撥他們的焦慮，分化他們的認同和感情，加深他們的對立。當蔡英文一口否定「九二共識」、卻夸夸大談「台灣共識」時，她大概沒想到自己有多奢侈。事實上，困難的不是「九二」或「台灣」，困難的是後面那兩個字──共識；經過廿年的政治分化，還有什麼共識能當作台灣人民感情的黏合劑呢？
那個蔡英文答不出來的問題，也是所有台灣人應該思考的問題。台灣人什麼時候開始彼此仇視的？
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan Consensus" is Devoid of Content
Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan Consensus" is Devoid of Content
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 20, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen's primary motive for promoting her "Taiwan consensus," is to bolster her claim that "Taiwan has no consensus." Tsai Ing-wen is not really advocating any "Taiwan consensus." Her so-called "Taiwan consensus" is devoid of content. Her only motive is to repudiate the real "Taiwan consensus," the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution.
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen's primary motive for promoting her "Taiwan consensus," is to bolster her claim that "Taiwan has no consensus."
Tsai Ing-wen's so-called "Taiwan consensus" refers to a consensus on national identity and cross-Strait relations. She argues that there is no consensus on these issues. She calls for an "open and transparent democratic process" to establish a "Taiwan consensus." She even wants to pass a "Taiwan consensus law," by which national identity and cross-Strait relations can be calibrated.
But when it comes to national identity and cross-Strait relations, why doesn't Tsai Ing-wen consider the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution indicative of a "Taiwan consensus?" If the the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution are indicators of a "Taiwan consensus," is there really any need for some other "Taiwan consensus?" Therefore, when Tsai Ing-wen promotes her "Taiwan consensus," her real motive is to deny that the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution represent a "Taiwan consensus."
Tsai Ing-wen is runnng for president on behalf of the Taiwan independence movement. She has nothing good to say about the Republic of China, which she refers to as a "government in exile." She has nothing good to say about the Republic of China Constitution, which she hopes to subject to "name rectifications" and replace following the "authoring of a new constitution." She does not think the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution represent a "Taiwan consensus." She wants to replace them with a "Taiwan Consensus Law." But is the opinion of Tsai Ing-wen and Taiwan independence forces shared by most people on Taiwan?
Tsai Ing-wen's so-called "Taiwan consensus" is a new twist on how to promote Taiwan independence. But one that differs little from past attempts to promote Taiwan independence. If anything, it is even more illusory, and devoid of substance. The Taiwan independence has long had two goals. One. Repudiate the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. Two. Demand that the future of Taiwan be determined by "democratic procedure" such as public referenda. Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" is merely more of the same old bromides.
Past attempts to promote Taiwan independence include the Taiwan Independence Party Platform, the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, and the Resolution for a Normal Nation. These openly advocated various Taiwan independence policies, including Taiwan independence nation-building, backdoor listing, the Rectification of Names, and the authoring of a new constitution. Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" resolutedly repudiates the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. But amazingly enough it makes no concrete proposals. All it says is that "everything will be decided in accordance with democratic procedures." It is utterly devoid of content.
DPP calls for Taiwan independence have turned the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution into objects of political controversy. But when it comes to national identity and cross-Strait relations, the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution are the greatest common denominators on Taiwan. In short, they are a "Taiwan consensus." Therefore what excuse do Tsai Ing-wen and the Taiwan independence movement have for repudiating the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution? The DPP cannot deny that most people on Taiwan endorse the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. To most people on Taiwan, the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution do constitute a "Taiwan consensus."
In fact, the 1992 consensus is the one thing on which there is the greatest agreement. The 1992 consensus affirms the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution." In terms of national identity, The 1992 consensus accords with the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. In terms of cross-Strait relations, The 1992 consensus accords with one China, different interpretations. The 1992 consensus accords with no [immediate] reunification, no independence,and no use of force. The 1992 consensus accords with non-recognition of each other's sovereignty, and non-repudiation of each other's jurisdiction. The 1992 consensus accords with the premise that future cross-strait relations will be determined in accordance with ROC constitutional procedures, and the decisions made by 23 million people." Furthermore, the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution have long been characterized by "open and transparent democratic procedures." The Republic of China will soon hold its fifth direct presidential election. Which of these long standing political realities does not constitute a "Taiwan consensus?" Which of these long standing political realities was not the product of "open and transparent democratic procedures?" Which of these long standing political realities does not trump and transcend Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan's consensus?" Can there possibly be a more legitimate, more rational, more practical "Taiwan consensus" than the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution?
Tsai Ing-wen is not really advocating any "Taiwan consensus." Her so-called "Taiwan consensus" is devoid of content. Her only motive is to repudiate the real "Taiwan consensus," the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution.
To underscore the "democratic process," Tsai Ing-wen went so far as to admit that "Reunification is also an option when establishing a Taiwan consensus." One. Will Tsai Ing-wen include this option in her updated "Taiwan Next Cross-Strait Issues?" Two. Will Tsai Ing-wen make it a major part of her election campaign? Does Tsai Ing-wen plan to compete with President Ma's "no reunification" clause? Three. Has Tsai Ing-wen reached an agreement with Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and other Taiwan independence elements? Four. In the event she is elected, does Tsai Ing-wen intend to pledge allegiance to the Republic of China, as specified in her oath of office? Five. If she does, what justification does she have for repudiating the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution, the 1992 consensus, and one China, different interpretations?
Tsai Ing-wen later retracted her statement, exposing her dilemma, her desperation, and her lack of coherent arguments.
「台灣共識」又是一碟空心菜
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.20
蔡英文拋出「台灣共識」，其主要目的是在強調「台灣沒有共識」。
蔡英文所謂的「台灣共識」，是指國家認同與兩岸關係方面的「共識」。對此，她否認目前存有「共識」，而認為必須另循「公開透明的民主程序」，建立「台灣共識」，甚至立法，做為國家認同及兩岸關係的準據。
然而，在國家認同與兩岸關係方面，蔡英文何以認為中華民國及中華民國憲法不是「台灣共識」？如果中華民國及中華民國憲法就是「台灣共識」，則何必另倡「台灣共識」？所以，蔡英文提「台灣共識」，其真正意圖是在否認中華民國及中華民國憲法為「台灣共識」。
蔡英文代表台獨勢力參選總統，她迄未對中華民國（是她所稱的流亡政府？）及中華民國憲法（仍待正名制憲？）表達正面看法；且不以中華民國及中華民國憲法為「台灣共識」，而欲代以《台灣共識法》。但是，若說中華民國與中華民國憲法「不是台灣共識」，這究竟只是蔡英文及台獨勢力的看法？還是台灣多數民眾的見解？
蔡英文的「台灣共識」，是台獨理論的新版本；唯較過去所有的台獨老版本更虛幻，根本是一碟空心菜。台獨理論的一貫基本邏輯架構是：一、否定中華民國及中華民國憲法；二、台灣未來由「民主程序」（如公投）決定。蔡英文的「台灣共識」無非又是如法炮製。
然而，過去的台獨主張，自《台獨黨綱》、《台灣前途決議文》、《正常國家決議文》，皆曾明白宣示具體主張，表達了「台獨建國」、「借殼上市」及「正名制憲」等不同的台獨政策。但令人嘆為觀止的是蔡英文如今提出的「台灣共識」，雖仍然一貫否定中華民國及中華民國憲法，卻未提出任何具體主張，竟謂「一切待當選後以民主程序決定」。這豈不分明是一碟空心菜？
眾所皆知，由於民進黨的台獨操作，使中華民國及中華民國憲法一直成為政治爭議；但中華民國及中華民國憲法，畢竟是台灣社會在國家認同及兩岸關係上的最大公約數（亦即共識）。然則，只憑蔡英文及台獨否認中華民國及中華民國憲法，就能一口否定中華民國及中華民國憲法作為多數人民參與並認同的「台灣共識」嗎？
其實，九二共識，對台灣而言，不啻就是主張「中華民國及中華民國憲法是最高的台灣共識」。在國家認同上，我們是遵行中華民國憲法的中華民國，在兩岸關係上則是「一中各表」、「不統／不獨／不武」，「主權互不承認／治權互不否認」，「兩岸關係的未來，由中華民國憲法程序決定，亦即由兩千三百萬人民決定」；何況，中華民國及中華民國憲法，始終皆在「公開透明的民主程序」下運作，且如今將舉行第五次總統直選，這些政治事實，哪一點不是已經正在積澱「台灣共識」？又哪一點不是已經相當程度地形成了「台灣共識」？有哪一點不是經過「公開透明的民主程序」？又哪一點不是取代並超越了蔡英文所能想像的「台灣共識」？捨中華民國及中華民國憲法，寧有其他更正當合理可行的「台灣共識」？
所以，蔡英文不是要提出「台灣共識」（根本是空心菜），她的目的只是要否認中華民國與中華民國憲法為「台灣共識」。
為了凸顯「民主程序」，蔡英文居然說：「統一也是台灣共識的選項。」一、蔡英文是否要將此作為《十年政綱兩岸篇》的增訂版？二、是否將以此作為主要競選政見，並與馬總統的「不統」抗衡？三、是否已與李扁等台獨勢力取得「共識」？四、是否承諾在若當選後將列為就職文告的明文宣示？五、倘係如此，更有何理由否認中華民國、中華民國憲法、九二共識、一中各表？
蔡英文後來竟又吞回了這句話，徒然暴露出她的進退失據，走投無路，似已到了語無倫次的程度。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 20, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen's primary motive for promoting her "Taiwan consensus," is to bolster her claim that "Taiwan has no consensus." Tsai Ing-wen is not really advocating any "Taiwan consensus." Her so-called "Taiwan consensus" is devoid of content. Her only motive is to repudiate the real "Taiwan consensus," the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution.
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen's primary motive for promoting her "Taiwan consensus," is to bolster her claim that "Taiwan has no consensus."
Tsai Ing-wen's so-called "Taiwan consensus" refers to a consensus on national identity and cross-Strait relations. She argues that there is no consensus on these issues. She calls for an "open and transparent democratic process" to establish a "Taiwan consensus." She even wants to pass a "Taiwan consensus law," by which national identity and cross-Strait relations can be calibrated.
But when it comes to national identity and cross-Strait relations, why doesn't Tsai Ing-wen consider the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution indicative of a "Taiwan consensus?" If the the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution are indicators of a "Taiwan consensus," is there really any need for some other "Taiwan consensus?" Therefore, when Tsai Ing-wen promotes her "Taiwan consensus," her real motive is to deny that the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution represent a "Taiwan consensus."
Tsai Ing-wen is runnng for president on behalf of the Taiwan independence movement. She has nothing good to say about the Republic of China, which she refers to as a "government in exile." She has nothing good to say about the Republic of China Constitution, which she hopes to subject to "name rectifications" and replace following the "authoring of a new constitution." She does not think the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution represent a "Taiwan consensus." She wants to replace them with a "Taiwan Consensus Law." But is the opinion of Tsai Ing-wen and Taiwan independence forces shared by most people on Taiwan?
Tsai Ing-wen's so-called "Taiwan consensus" is a new twist on how to promote Taiwan independence. But one that differs little from past attempts to promote Taiwan independence. If anything, it is even more illusory, and devoid of substance. The Taiwan independence has long had two goals. One. Repudiate the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. Two. Demand that the future of Taiwan be determined by "democratic procedure" such as public referenda. Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" is merely more of the same old bromides.
Past attempts to promote Taiwan independence include the Taiwan Independence Party Platform, the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, and the Resolution for a Normal Nation. These openly advocated various Taiwan independence policies, including Taiwan independence nation-building, backdoor listing, the Rectification of Names, and the authoring of a new constitution. Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus" resolutedly repudiates the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. But amazingly enough it makes no concrete proposals. All it says is that "everything will be decided in accordance with democratic procedures." It is utterly devoid of content.
DPP calls for Taiwan independence have turned the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution into objects of political controversy. But when it comes to national identity and cross-Strait relations, the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution are the greatest common denominators on Taiwan. In short, they are a "Taiwan consensus." Therefore what excuse do Tsai Ing-wen and the Taiwan independence movement have for repudiating the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution? The DPP cannot deny that most people on Taiwan endorse the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. To most people on Taiwan, the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution do constitute a "Taiwan consensus."
In fact, the 1992 consensus is the one thing on which there is the greatest agreement. The 1992 consensus affirms the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution." In terms of national identity, The 1992 consensus accords with the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. In terms of cross-Strait relations, The 1992 consensus accords with one China, different interpretations. The 1992 consensus accords with no [immediate] reunification, no independence,and no use of force. The 1992 consensus accords with non-recognition of each other's sovereignty, and non-repudiation of each other's jurisdiction. The 1992 consensus accords with the premise that future cross-strait relations will be determined in accordance with ROC constitutional procedures, and the decisions made by 23 million people." Furthermore, the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution have long been characterized by "open and transparent democratic procedures." The Republic of China will soon hold its fifth direct presidential election. Which of these long standing political realities does not constitute a "Taiwan consensus?" Which of these long standing political realities was not the product of "open and transparent democratic procedures?" Which of these long standing political realities does not trump and transcend Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan's consensus?" Can there possibly be a more legitimate, more rational, more practical "Taiwan consensus" than the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution?
Tsai Ing-wen is not really advocating any "Taiwan consensus." Her so-called "Taiwan consensus" is devoid of content. Her only motive is to repudiate the real "Taiwan consensus," the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution.
To underscore the "democratic process," Tsai Ing-wen went so far as to admit that "Reunification is also an option when establishing a Taiwan consensus." One. Will Tsai Ing-wen include this option in her updated "Taiwan Next Cross-Strait Issues?" Two. Will Tsai Ing-wen make it a major part of her election campaign? Does Tsai Ing-wen plan to compete with President Ma's "no reunification" clause? Three. Has Tsai Ing-wen reached an agreement with Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and other Taiwan independence elements? Four. In the event she is elected, does Tsai Ing-wen intend to pledge allegiance to the Republic of China, as specified in her oath of office? Five. If she does, what justification does she have for repudiating the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution, the 1992 consensus, and one China, different interpretations?
Tsai Ing-wen later retracted her statement, exposing her dilemma, her desperation, and her lack of coherent arguments.
「台灣共識」又是一碟空心菜
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.20
蔡英文拋出「台灣共識」，其主要目的是在強調「台灣沒有共識」。
蔡英文所謂的「台灣共識」，是指國家認同與兩岸關係方面的「共識」。對此，她否認目前存有「共識」，而認為必須另循「公開透明的民主程序」，建立「台灣共識」，甚至立法，做為國家認同及兩岸關係的準據。
然而，在國家認同與兩岸關係方面，蔡英文何以認為中華民國及中華民國憲法不是「台灣共識」？如果中華民國及中華民國憲法就是「台灣共識」，則何必另倡「台灣共識」？所以，蔡英文提「台灣共識」，其真正意圖是在否認中華民國及中華民國憲法為「台灣共識」。
蔡英文代表台獨勢力參選總統，她迄未對中華民國（是她所稱的流亡政府？）及中華民國憲法（仍待正名制憲？）表達正面看法；且不以中華民國及中華民國憲法為「台灣共識」，而欲代以《台灣共識法》。但是，若說中華民國與中華民國憲法「不是台灣共識」，這究竟只是蔡英文及台獨勢力的看法？還是台灣多數民眾的見解？
蔡英文的「台灣共識」，是台獨理論的新版本；唯較過去所有的台獨老版本更虛幻，根本是一碟空心菜。台獨理論的一貫基本邏輯架構是：一、否定中華民國及中華民國憲法；二、台灣未來由「民主程序」（如公投）決定。蔡英文的「台灣共識」無非又是如法炮製。
然而，過去的台獨主張，自《台獨黨綱》、《台灣前途決議文》、《正常國家決議文》，皆曾明白宣示具體主張，表達了「台獨建國」、「借殼上市」及「正名制憲」等不同的台獨政策。但令人嘆為觀止的是蔡英文如今提出的「台灣共識」，雖仍然一貫否定中華民國及中華民國憲法，卻未提出任何具體主張，竟謂「一切待當選後以民主程序決定」。這豈不分明是一碟空心菜？
眾所皆知，由於民進黨的台獨操作，使中華民國及中華民國憲法一直成為政治爭議；但中華民國及中華民國憲法，畢竟是台灣社會在國家認同及兩岸關係上的最大公約數（亦即共識）。然則，只憑蔡英文及台獨否認中華民國及中華民國憲法，就能一口否定中華民國及中華民國憲法作為多數人民參與並認同的「台灣共識」嗎？
其實，九二共識，對台灣而言，不啻就是主張「中華民國及中華民國憲法是最高的台灣共識」。在國家認同上，我們是遵行中華民國憲法的中華民國，在兩岸關係上則是「一中各表」、「不統／不獨／不武」，「主權互不承認／治權互不否認」，「兩岸關係的未來，由中華民國憲法程序決定，亦即由兩千三百萬人民決定」；何況，中華民國及中華民國憲法，始終皆在「公開透明的民主程序」下運作，且如今將舉行第五次總統直選，這些政治事實，哪一點不是已經正在積澱「台灣共識」？又哪一點不是已經相當程度地形成了「台灣共識」？有哪一點不是經過「公開透明的民主程序」？又哪一點不是取代並超越了蔡英文所能想像的「台灣共識」？捨中華民國及中華民國憲法，寧有其他更正當合理可行的「台灣共識」？
所以，蔡英文不是要提出「台灣共識」（根本是空心菜），她的目的只是要否認中華民國與中華民國憲法為「台灣共識」。
為了凸顯「民主程序」，蔡英文居然說：「統一也是台灣共識的選項。」一、蔡英文是否要將此作為《十年政綱兩岸篇》的增訂版？二、是否將以此作為主要競選政見，並與馬總統的「不統」抗衡？三、是否已與李扁等台獨勢力取得「共識」？四、是否承諾在若當選後將列為就職文告的明文宣示？五、倘係如此，更有何理由否認中華民國、中華民國憲法、九二共識、一中各表？
蔡英文後來竟又吞回了這句話，徒然暴露出她的進退失據，走投無路，似已到了語無倫次的程度。
Monday, September 19, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen's Visit to the US Underscores Her Dilemma
Tsai Ing-wen's Visit to the US Underscores Her Dilemma
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 19, 2011
Summary: The Democratic Progressive Party's real reason for opposing the 1992 consensus is that it cannot accept the "One China" part of One China, Different Interpretations, even though the "One China" part refers to the Republic of China, as specified by the Republic of China Constitution. Where should consensus be sought? Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must seek it within themselves, through introspection. If they cannot even accept the Republic of China Constitution, where can they possibly find consensus on Taiwan?
Full Text below:
DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen recently visited the United States. The biggest bonus for voters on Taiwan was a partial explanation of what she means by "Taiwan consensus." Unfortunately her explanation was extremely vague. Also, her explanation changed from day to day over her three day visit. This underscored Tsai Ing-wen's dilemma, and highlighted the DPP's inability to face its cross-Strait Achilles Heel.
Tsai Ing-wen raised the issue of "Taiwan consensus" one month ago, at home on Taiwan. But she has never fully explained what it means. Her very first explanation was made not to fellow citizens, but to a think tank in Washington -- the American Enterprise Institute. Apparently a "Taiwan consensus" is something that must be explained to Americans first. Apparently this how Tsai Ing-wen seeks a national consensus.
Her choice of venue was strange. So was what she said. She said that if she was elected president, she would emulate the precedent set by the Taiwan Relations Act, which is domestic US law. She would turn her "Taiwan consensus" into domestic law. She said this would enable rival political parties to reach some degree of understanding with each other. Tsai Ing-wen was supposed to explain what her "Taiwan consensus" meant. Instead, she merely explained how her "Taiwan consensus" would be implemented. She implied that the Ma administration's 1992 consensus was merely an agreement between two parties, and not a consensus among the public on Taiwan. Therefore, if she was elected president, she would turn her "Taiwan consensus" into the law of the land.
Tsai Ing-wen's argument is seriously out of step with the assumptions of a modern democracy. After all, the KMT is the ruling party. Fifteen agreements were signed with the Chinese mainland based on the 1992 Consensus. These agreements, including ECFA, were approved by the Legislative Yuan. Tsai's "consensus legislation" is dangerous sophistry. According to her, legislation passed by the national legislature under a KMT legislative majority is not "consensus legislation." Therefore it lacks legitimacy. So-called "consensus legislation" presumably requires taking to the streets and railing against the legislature. So-called "consensus legislation" presumably requires only a minority stonewalling the majority. Such confrontational practices have nothing to do with seeking consensus. They have nothing to do with any manner of political order.
Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus legislation" is a non-solution that only makes matters worse. Three days later, she visited the United States and held several press conferences in New York. Again and again, she told us what a "Taiwan consensus" is not. Apparently a "Taiwan consensus" is not simple majority rule. A "Taiwan consensus" is not ordinary legislation. A "Taiwan consensus" is not an ordinary public policy issue. A "Taiwan consensus" is not a ordinary domestic policy issue. A "Taiwan consensus" requires talks with the Chinese mainland. Tsai talked about "consensus legislation" for three straight days. Her explanations were internally self-contradictory, and never really explained what a "Taiwan consensus" is. She spoke only about procedure, not about content. She spoke only about vague abstractions. She said "A Taiwan consensus seeks commonalities among different beliefs. It seeks something acceptable to all through mutual compromise."
Such formulations might be appropriate for a religious leader or talking head. But Tsai Ing-wen is running for president. The stakes are high in this election. She is not some unconcerned bystander. She is the candidate for the largest opposition party on Taiwan. She must offer concrete and practical policy proposals. She cannot say: I'll wait until everyone has debated the issue, and tells me what the Taiwan consensus is." Tsai said "If I tell you now what the Taiwan consensus is, it would not be the product of the democratic process." But party leaders in a democracy have a responsibility to lead, not just follow. Tsai's argument is totally at odds with the concept of political leadership.
Most bizarre of all, she agreed that "Reunification is one option for a Taiwan consensus." In fact this election is not primarily about reunification vs. independence. Even Beijing seldom mentions reunification these days. On Taiwan the most pressing question is how to shelve controversy over reunification vs. independence, to allow Taipei and Beijing to carry on exchanges. The greatest achievement of the Ma administration's 1992 consensus is a tacit understanding between the two sides, founded on One China, Different Interpretations. Only such a foundation can advance public welfare on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The Ma administration has already progressed to "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force," Tsai Ing-wen meanwhile, is still seeking to resolve disputes over reunification vs. independence. The Ma administration has already established a Taiwan consensus. Tsai Ing-wen on the other hand, is apparently still casting about for one.
Tsai Ing-wen remains unable to offer specific policy prescriptions. On the one hand, she wants to attract moderate voters. Therefore she cannot obsessively promote hatred and antagonism toward the Chinese mainland. On the other hand, she is afraid to offend Deep Green voters. To many of these voters, any contact with the other side is construed as "pandering to Beijing and selling out Taiwan." The 1992 consensus is construed as a secret accord with the CCP, one that betrays "the people of Taiwan." Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP characterize the 1992 consensus as fictitious. But that is a subterfuge. Many institutional arrangements among human beings are fictitious. When former president Lee Teng-hui advanced his "Two States Theory," it too was an artifice. It too was fictitious.
The Democratic Progressive Party's real reason for opposing the 1992 consensus is that it cannot accept the "One China" part of One China, Different Interpretations, even though the "One China" part refers to the Republic of China, as specified by the Republic of China Constitution. Where should consensus be sought? Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must seek it within themselves, through introspection. If they cannot even accept the Republic of China Constitution, where can they possibly find consensus on Taiwan?
美國之行 曝露蔡英文當前困境
2011-09-19 中國時報
民進黨總統參選人蔡英文這一趟美國行，台灣選民最大的收穫是，她終於對「台灣共識」提出一些說明；可惜的是，這一連串的說明不但非常模糊，而且是三日一變，這凸顯的不但是蔡英文的困境，也曝露民進黨還是無法面對長年無解的兩岸罩門。
首先還是要表達一點遺憾，蔡英文自從月前在國內提出「台灣共識」以來，從未予以闡釋，她的首度說明竟然不是對著國人，而是在華府智庫「美國企業研究所」演說時提出，「台灣共識」竟要先對著美國人說，這豈是尋求國人共識之道！
其實，不只是發表的場所怪異，內容也頗為詭異，她表示，未來若當選總統，將仿效美國制定的《台灣關係法》，透過立法將「台灣共識」變成國內法，讓不同政黨的執政都能維持一定的穩定性。在這一段談話中，原該談「台灣共識」實質內容的，蔡英文卻以程序語言來表達，潛台詞還是在批評馬政府的「九二共識」是國共兩黨的協議，並非台灣人民的共識，因此她如果當選總統，要另將「台灣共識」立法。
蔡英文的說法相當違背現代民主政治的認知，畢竟，國民黨是執政黨，以九二共識為前提與大陸簽訂的十五項協議，這些協議及ＥＣＦＡ都還是要經過立法院；「以共識立法」說法的危險性在於，如果國民黨的國會多數立法還不能算是共識，因此不具立法的正當性，則所謂的共識，難道要發動街頭對抗國會，或以少數來扺制多數，這種衝突作法別說要尋找共識，政治更可能完全脫序。
蔡英文丟出的「台灣共識立法」可說是治絲益棼，三天後她在紐約舉行訪美記者會，則以一連串的否定來說明「台灣共識」：不是簡單的民主多數決、不是普通的立法或公共議題、不是單純的國內議題，也牽涉和中國協商往來；這一段說法不但和三天前的「共識立法」前後矛盾，而且還是沒說出何為「台灣共識」，她的語言不但是程序性語言、而且相當抽象，「台灣共識就是把不同理念的相同點找出來，或是透過相互妥協找出大家都能接受的部分」。
坦白說，這番話如果出自宗教界或輿論界領袖，可算恰如其分，但蔡英文畢竟是參選總統，在這場攸關重要的大選中，她可不是第三者，作為最大在野黨的參選人，她必須要提出具體可行的政見，可不能說：等你們都討論好了，再告訴我台灣共識是什麼！她那一番「如果我現在就告訴你台灣共識是怎樣的話，那就不會是經過民主過程所產生的東西了。」可說是完全違背政黨領導人的責任。
最怪異的莫過於，她面對媒體詢問時還不否認，「統一也是台灣共識選項之一」，事實上，統獨爭議並非這次大選主軸，連北京近來都不常提及統一大業，而台灣當前最關切的是如何在擱置統獨爭議前提下，兩岸可以正常交流互動；馬政府「九二共識」最大的優勢在於，至少可透過「一中各表」來取得兩岸默契，然後才能在此一基礎上建構對人民有利的兩岸關係；相較起來，當馬政府已經進展到「不統、不獨、不武」的階段，蔡英文卻還在尋求化解統獨爭議時，看來，馬政府已經達到某種台灣共識，蔡英文卻還在尋尋覓覓。
蔡英文之所以無法提出具體政見，最大的困難在於，她一方面要拉攏溫和的中間選民，不能一昧仇中反中；偏偏她也不敢得罪深綠選民，在這些選民心目中，只要和對岸往來就是傾中賣台，「九二共識」因此是國共密談、出賣台灣人；民進黨及蔡英文抨擊「九二共識」是虛構的，這其實是托詞，人類許多制度安排都是虛構的，當前總統李登輝提出「兩國論」時，何嘗不也是一種創造、虛構。
民進黨反對「九二共識」的真正癥結在於，他們無論如何都無法接受「一中各表」中的「一中」，即使「一中」指的是中華民國或是中華民國憲法。共識何處尋？蔡英文還是應該反求諸己，問問民進黨，如果他們連中華民國憲法都無法接受，又如何能尋求台灣共識！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 19, 2011
Summary: The Democratic Progressive Party's real reason for opposing the 1992 consensus is that it cannot accept the "One China" part of One China, Different Interpretations, even though the "One China" part refers to the Republic of China, as specified by the Republic of China Constitution. Where should consensus be sought? Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must seek it within themselves, through introspection. If they cannot even accept the Republic of China Constitution, where can they possibly find consensus on Taiwan?
Full Text below:
DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen recently visited the United States. The biggest bonus for voters on Taiwan was a partial explanation of what she means by "Taiwan consensus." Unfortunately her explanation was extremely vague. Also, her explanation changed from day to day over her three day visit. This underscored Tsai Ing-wen's dilemma, and highlighted the DPP's inability to face its cross-Strait Achilles Heel.
Tsai Ing-wen raised the issue of "Taiwan consensus" one month ago, at home on Taiwan. But she has never fully explained what it means. Her very first explanation was made not to fellow citizens, but to a think tank in Washington -- the American Enterprise Institute. Apparently a "Taiwan consensus" is something that must be explained to Americans first. Apparently this how Tsai Ing-wen seeks a national consensus.
Her choice of venue was strange. So was what she said. She said that if she was elected president, she would emulate the precedent set by the Taiwan Relations Act, which is domestic US law. She would turn her "Taiwan consensus" into domestic law. She said this would enable rival political parties to reach some degree of understanding with each other. Tsai Ing-wen was supposed to explain what her "Taiwan consensus" meant. Instead, she merely explained how her "Taiwan consensus" would be implemented. She implied that the Ma administration's 1992 consensus was merely an agreement between two parties, and not a consensus among the public on Taiwan. Therefore, if she was elected president, she would turn her "Taiwan consensus" into the law of the land.
Tsai Ing-wen's argument is seriously out of step with the assumptions of a modern democracy. After all, the KMT is the ruling party. Fifteen agreements were signed with the Chinese mainland based on the 1992 Consensus. These agreements, including ECFA, were approved by the Legislative Yuan. Tsai's "consensus legislation" is dangerous sophistry. According to her, legislation passed by the national legislature under a KMT legislative majority is not "consensus legislation." Therefore it lacks legitimacy. So-called "consensus legislation" presumably requires taking to the streets and railing against the legislature. So-called "consensus legislation" presumably requires only a minority stonewalling the majority. Such confrontational practices have nothing to do with seeking consensus. They have nothing to do with any manner of political order.
Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus legislation" is a non-solution that only makes matters worse. Three days later, she visited the United States and held several press conferences in New York. Again and again, she told us what a "Taiwan consensus" is not. Apparently a "Taiwan consensus" is not simple majority rule. A "Taiwan consensus" is not ordinary legislation. A "Taiwan consensus" is not an ordinary public policy issue. A "Taiwan consensus" is not a ordinary domestic policy issue. A "Taiwan consensus" requires talks with the Chinese mainland. Tsai talked about "consensus legislation" for three straight days. Her explanations were internally self-contradictory, and never really explained what a "Taiwan consensus" is. She spoke only about procedure, not about content. She spoke only about vague abstractions. She said "A Taiwan consensus seeks commonalities among different beliefs. It seeks something acceptable to all through mutual compromise."
Such formulations might be appropriate for a religious leader or talking head. But Tsai Ing-wen is running for president. The stakes are high in this election. She is not some unconcerned bystander. She is the candidate for the largest opposition party on Taiwan. She must offer concrete and practical policy proposals. She cannot say: I'll wait until everyone has debated the issue, and tells me what the Taiwan consensus is." Tsai said "If I tell you now what the Taiwan consensus is, it would not be the product of the democratic process." But party leaders in a democracy have a responsibility to lead, not just follow. Tsai's argument is totally at odds with the concept of political leadership.
Most bizarre of all, she agreed that "Reunification is one option for a Taiwan consensus." In fact this election is not primarily about reunification vs. independence. Even Beijing seldom mentions reunification these days. On Taiwan the most pressing question is how to shelve controversy over reunification vs. independence, to allow Taipei and Beijing to carry on exchanges. The greatest achievement of the Ma administration's 1992 consensus is a tacit understanding between the two sides, founded on One China, Different Interpretations. Only such a foundation can advance public welfare on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The Ma administration has already progressed to "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force," Tsai Ing-wen meanwhile, is still seeking to resolve disputes over reunification vs. independence. The Ma administration has already established a Taiwan consensus. Tsai Ing-wen on the other hand, is apparently still casting about for one.
Tsai Ing-wen remains unable to offer specific policy prescriptions. On the one hand, she wants to attract moderate voters. Therefore she cannot obsessively promote hatred and antagonism toward the Chinese mainland. On the other hand, she is afraid to offend Deep Green voters. To many of these voters, any contact with the other side is construed as "pandering to Beijing and selling out Taiwan." The 1992 consensus is construed as a secret accord with the CCP, one that betrays "the people of Taiwan." Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP characterize the 1992 consensus as fictitious. But that is a subterfuge. Many institutional arrangements among human beings are fictitious. When former president Lee Teng-hui advanced his "Two States Theory," it too was an artifice. It too was fictitious.
The Democratic Progressive Party's real reason for opposing the 1992 consensus is that it cannot accept the "One China" part of One China, Different Interpretations, even though the "One China" part refers to the Republic of China, as specified by the Republic of China Constitution. Where should consensus be sought? Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must seek it within themselves, through introspection. If they cannot even accept the Republic of China Constitution, where can they possibly find consensus on Taiwan?
美國之行 曝露蔡英文當前困境
2011-09-19 中國時報
民進黨總統參選人蔡英文這一趟美國行，台灣選民最大的收穫是，她終於對「台灣共識」提出一些說明；可惜的是，這一連串的說明不但非常模糊，而且是三日一變，這凸顯的不但是蔡英文的困境，也曝露民進黨還是無法面對長年無解的兩岸罩門。
首先還是要表達一點遺憾，蔡英文自從月前在國內提出「台灣共識」以來，從未予以闡釋，她的首度說明竟然不是對著國人，而是在華府智庫「美國企業研究所」演說時提出，「台灣共識」竟要先對著美國人說，這豈是尋求國人共識之道！
其實，不只是發表的場所怪異，內容也頗為詭異，她表示，未來若當選總統，將仿效美國制定的《台灣關係法》，透過立法將「台灣共識」變成國內法，讓不同政黨的執政都能維持一定的穩定性。在這一段談話中，原該談「台灣共識」實質內容的，蔡英文卻以程序語言來表達，潛台詞還是在批評馬政府的「九二共識」是國共兩黨的協議，並非台灣人民的共識，因此她如果當選總統，要另將「台灣共識」立法。
蔡英文的說法相當違背現代民主政治的認知，畢竟，國民黨是執政黨，以九二共識為前提與大陸簽訂的十五項協議，這些協議及ＥＣＦＡ都還是要經過立法院；「以共識立法」說法的危險性在於，如果國民黨的國會多數立法還不能算是共識，因此不具立法的正當性，則所謂的共識，難道要發動街頭對抗國會，或以少數來扺制多數，這種衝突作法別說要尋找共識，政治更可能完全脫序。
蔡英文丟出的「台灣共識立法」可說是治絲益棼，三天後她在紐約舉行訪美記者會，則以一連串的否定來說明「台灣共識」：不是簡單的民主多數決、不是普通的立法或公共議題、不是單純的國內議題，也牽涉和中國協商往來；這一段說法不但和三天前的「共識立法」前後矛盾，而且還是沒說出何為「台灣共識」，她的語言不但是程序性語言、而且相當抽象，「台灣共識就是把不同理念的相同點找出來，或是透過相互妥協找出大家都能接受的部分」。
坦白說，這番話如果出自宗教界或輿論界領袖，可算恰如其分，但蔡英文畢竟是參選總統，在這場攸關重要的大選中，她可不是第三者，作為最大在野黨的參選人，她必須要提出具體可行的政見，可不能說：等你們都討論好了，再告訴我台灣共識是什麼！她那一番「如果我現在就告訴你台灣共識是怎樣的話，那就不會是經過民主過程所產生的東西了。」可說是完全違背政黨領導人的責任。
最怪異的莫過於，她面對媒體詢問時還不否認，「統一也是台灣共識選項之一」，事實上，統獨爭議並非這次大選主軸，連北京近來都不常提及統一大業，而台灣當前最關切的是如何在擱置統獨爭議前提下，兩岸可以正常交流互動；馬政府「九二共識」最大的優勢在於，至少可透過「一中各表」來取得兩岸默契，然後才能在此一基礎上建構對人民有利的兩岸關係；相較起來，當馬政府已經進展到「不統、不獨、不武」的階段，蔡英文卻還在尋求化解統獨爭議時，看來，馬政府已經達到某種台灣共識，蔡英文卻還在尋尋覓覓。
蔡英文之所以無法提出具體政見，最大的困難在於，她一方面要拉攏溫和的中間選民，不能一昧仇中反中；偏偏她也不敢得罪深綠選民，在這些選民心目中，只要和對岸往來就是傾中賣台，「九二共識」因此是國共密談、出賣台灣人；民進黨及蔡英文抨擊「九二共識」是虛構的，這其實是托詞，人類許多制度安排都是虛構的，當前總統李登輝提出「兩國論」時，何嘗不也是一種創造、虛構。
民進黨反對「九二共識」的真正癥結在於，他們無論如何都無法接受「一中各表」中的「一中」，即使「一中」指的是中華民國或是中華民國憲法。共識何處尋？蔡英文還是應該反求諸己，問問民進黨，如果他們連中華民國憲法都無法接受，又如何能尋求台灣共識！
Thursday, September 15, 2011
Eliminate Barriers to Imported Talent
Eliminate Barriers to Imported Talent
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 16, 2011
Summary: Globalization and technological innovation have had a long term impact on the global economy and the labor market. Markets have expanded. Talented individuals with special expertise who are well versed in managing the global market have become targets for international recruitment. Salaries have risen. In this ever-intensifying global battle for talent, those nations able to attract international talent will be the winners. Those nations unable to attract international talent will be the losers.
Full Text below:
Globalization and technological innovation have had a long term impact on the global economy and the labor market. Markets have expanded. Talented individuals with special expertise who are well versed in managing the global market have become targets for international recruitment. Salaries have risen. In this ever-intensifying global battle for talent, those nations able to attract international talent will be the winners. Those nations unable to attract international talent will be the losers.
Taiwan's brain drain has grown into a crisis. Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey and a dozen or so community leaders recently published a research paper entitled "Declaration on Talent." They called on the government to address the brain drain. How serious is the brain drain? What policy myths hinder the introduction of international talent? This newspaper published a series of reports entitled "Brain Drain, Save Our Nation." In recent years Taiwan has suffered a serious high-tech brain drain. Eighty percent have moved to the Chinese mainland. The Chinese mainland is offering executives over four times what they can make on Taiwan. Talented individuals within the financial sector, the medical community, and the academic world have all been lured away by the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The situation is already very serious.
Talented individuals on Taiwan have become targets of recruitment by neighboring countries. This ought to be a matter of pride. But competition for talent is coming at us from all directions. Domestic businesses and academia lament the lack of talented individuals. They lament even more their inability to retain talented individuals. Tsai Ching-yen of the Industrial Technology Research Institute directly named the Executive Yuan's "anti-fat cat provision" as a "stumbling block for recruiters." This provision limits the Industrial Technology Research Institute's ability to recruit international talent. Salaries are capped at the vice ministerial level -- 160,000 NT per month. This does not accord with international realities. Since it went into effect in March, the ITRI has been unable to recruit any skilled employees. Over the same period, many researchers were hired away to the Chinese mainland at high salaries.
To the mind of a populist, talented individuals are "fat cats." And this is how some officials within the government see things. These officials evince the mentality of "frogs contemplating the sky from the bottom of the well." They completely ignore the fact that transnational competition for talent has long been in full swing. Can the Executive Yuan's "anti-fat cat provision" prevent "fat cat" patronage? That remains to be seen, But its most serious side effect has been to hinder public foundations such as the ITRI and the National Health Research Institutes from recruiting international talent. Taiwan suffers from a serious talent deficit. This provision merely binds ourselves hand and foot. It must be reevaluated.
Under globalization, individuals with special expertise are in heavy demand. Are all those who receive high salaries necessarily "fat cats?" In the United States and Europe the term "fat cat" applies primarily to executives of financial institutions. During the financial tsunami, governments used taxpayer money to bail out large financial institutions. Executives within these financial institutions demanded and received huge pay increases and bonuses. They were justly villified as "fat cats." The public on Taiwan understandably has no desire to see retired high government officials become beneficiaries of political patronage. But the "anti-fat cat provision" must not hinder the introduction of international talent. One cannot apply the label "fat cat" to anyone receiving a high salary.
This is the era of the Internet. Borders are disappearing. Talented individuals enjoy increased mobility. Multinational corporations offer the highest salaries, best benefits, and most amenable work environments in their effort to attract top talent, Talented individuals are their most important resource. Face book founder Mark Zuckerberg asked rhetorically, "If you are building a company, would you prefer one standout person over one hundred pretty good people?" South Korea's Samsung Group Chairman Lee Kun-hee said, "One genius can feed a million people," That is why the Samsung Group never scrimps on talent. Google has long offered generous employee benefits. It allows employees to use part of their working hours to do whatever they wish to do, Late last year Google announced a 10% pay increase and a US$1000 cash bonus. They are generous to their employees because they want to defeat their competitors.
Taiwan is poor in natural resources. Today's prosperity and achievements are mainly the result of talented individuals. But neighboring countries are now offering salaries several times higher. They are offering vastly more generous benefits in their effort to poach talent from every business sector on Taiwan. Domestic R&D and academic institutions, hampered by legal restrictions on the introduction of top international players, are unable to retain talented employees, High-level talent is leaving faster than it is arriving, This serious brain drain will stifle our international competitiveness.
The nation is suffering from a talent deficit. The Academia Sinica's "Declaration on Talent" offers a number of suggestions. In the short term, the government must eliminate barriers to the introduction of international talent. For example, it must review the "anti-fat cat provisions," Salaries for government-owned corporations should be handled by an Executive Yuan "Remuneration Committee." In the long term, systemic and legal reforms must be carried out, Can our talent deficit crisis be resolved? That depends upon the Ma administration's determination and courage.
破除進口障礙 引進頂尖人才
2011-09-16 中國時報
全球化與科技創新的影響下，全球經濟與勞動市場結構產生了長遠的變化；由於市場版圖擴大了，擁有特殊專長或全球市場管理長才者，成為各國爭相挖角的對象，薪水也水漲船高。在這場空前激烈的全球人才爭奪戰之下，有能力吸引國際頂尖人才進駐的國家，成為當然的贏家；無力留住本國人才又無法吸引國際頂尖人才的國家，註定成為輸家。
近年來台灣的人才外流危機日益嚴重，中央研究院院長翁啟惠與十多位橫跨產學研媒各界領袖日前發表《人才宣言》，呼籲政府重視人才失衡的危機。台灣人才外流危機有多嚴重？那些政策迷思阻礙了國際頂尖人才的引進？本報在「人才流失、搶救國力」系列報導中指出，近年台灣高科技人才流失嚴重，八成去了大陸，對岸開出相當於四倍以上的薪資挖角台灣中高階主管。此外，金融界、醫界、學術界人才遭大陸、香港、新加坡等挖角的情形亦非常驚人。
台灣的優秀人才成為鄰近國家爭相挖角的對象，原本值得國人驕傲，但面對來自四面八方的人才爭奪戰，國內企業界與學術界卻大嘆找不到足夠的人才，更糟的是沒有足夠的籌碼留住優秀人才。工業技術研究院院長蔡清彥直言「行政院『反肥貓』條款，已成為求才絆腳石。」這項規定限制工研院挖角國際人才時，薪資不得超過次長一個月十六萬多元的行情，如此不符合國際趨勢與現實的規定自三月生效後，工研院迄今未聘用高階人才，但這段期間卻有多位研究人員已遭大陸高薪挖角。
在民粹思維下，政府錯把國際頂尖人才視為「肥貓」，顯示部分人士坐井觀天的心態，完全無視於跨國人才爭奪戰早已如火如荼開打。行政院這項「反肥貓」條款是否能夠有效阻止那些酬庸的「肥貓」仍有待檢驗，但最大後遺症是阻礙了公股財團法人如工研院、國衛院等聘用國際頂尖人才的路，這項規定對於「人才赤字」嚴重的台灣無異「自縛手腳」，有必要重新檢討。
在全球化效應下，擁有特殊專長的國際頂尖人才炙手可熱，領取高薪的人都是「肥貓」嗎？其實，歐美各國所謂的「肥貓」主要指金融海嘯期間，政府動用納稅人的錢為大型金融機構紓困，這些金融界執行長、高階主管在風暴過後率先為自己加薪且領取巨額紅利，被各界痛批為無恥的「肥貓」。反觀台灣，國人當然不希望看到大批退休高官被政治酬庸為「肥貓」，但「反肥貓」條款也不能阻礙了國際頂尖人才的引進，尤其不能把「肥貓」現象無限上綱至所有領取高薪者。
在國界逐漸消失的網路科技時代，人才的流動更加頻繁。各大跨國企業無不以最優的薪資、福利與工作環境吸引最頂尖人才，因為人才是最重要的資源。臉書創辦人馬克．祖克伯指出，「一個領域中的頂尖人才，比其他優秀人才好一百倍。」韓國三星集團總裁李健熙曾說「一個天才可以養活一百萬人」，因此三星集團培養人才絕對不省錢。向來最重視員工福利的谷歌，允許員工利用一部分上班時間做自己想做的事，去年底宣布為員工加薪一成並加發一千美元現金紅利，如此大手筆寵愛員工就是要把競爭對手比下去。
天然資源貧乏的台灣，能有今日的發展與成就，主要靠的就是充沛的人才優勢。不過，眼看著鄰近國家以數倍高薪、超優福利積極挖角台灣各界優秀人才，相對地，國內科技研發與學術機構卻因相關法令限制無法引進國際頂尖好手，也無法留住優秀人才，在高階人才輸出大於輸入的情況下，嚴重的人才外流將扼殺國家的競爭力。
針對國內的人才赤字危機，中研院在《人才宣言》中提出多項建言，短期內必須把引進國際人才的相關障礙排除，例如適時檢討「反肥貓」條款，政府所屬法人主管之待遇由行政院成立「薪酬委員會」來負責；長期而言，則必須進行制度、法令等結構性的改革。台灣的人才赤字危機能否化解，就看馬政府的決心與魄力了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 16, 2011
Summary: Globalization and technological innovation have had a long term impact on the global economy and the labor market. Markets have expanded. Talented individuals with special expertise who are well versed in managing the global market have become targets for international recruitment. Salaries have risen. In this ever-intensifying global battle for talent, those nations able to attract international talent will be the winners. Those nations unable to attract international talent will be the losers.
Full Text below:
Globalization and technological innovation have had a long term impact on the global economy and the labor market. Markets have expanded. Talented individuals with special expertise who are well versed in managing the global market have become targets for international recruitment. Salaries have risen. In this ever-intensifying global battle for talent, those nations able to attract international talent will be the winners. Those nations unable to attract international talent will be the losers.
Taiwan's brain drain has grown into a crisis. Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey and a dozen or so community leaders recently published a research paper entitled "Declaration on Talent." They called on the government to address the brain drain. How serious is the brain drain? What policy myths hinder the introduction of international talent? This newspaper published a series of reports entitled "Brain Drain, Save Our Nation." In recent years Taiwan has suffered a serious high-tech brain drain. Eighty percent have moved to the Chinese mainland. The Chinese mainland is offering executives over four times what they can make on Taiwan. Talented individuals within the financial sector, the medical community, and the academic world have all been lured away by the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The situation is already very serious.
Talented individuals on Taiwan have become targets of recruitment by neighboring countries. This ought to be a matter of pride. But competition for talent is coming at us from all directions. Domestic businesses and academia lament the lack of talented individuals. They lament even more their inability to retain talented individuals. Tsai Ching-yen of the Industrial Technology Research Institute directly named the Executive Yuan's "anti-fat cat provision" as a "stumbling block for recruiters." This provision limits the Industrial Technology Research Institute's ability to recruit international talent. Salaries are capped at the vice ministerial level -- 160,000 NT per month. This does not accord with international realities. Since it went into effect in March, the ITRI has been unable to recruit any skilled employees. Over the same period, many researchers were hired away to the Chinese mainland at high salaries.
To the mind of a populist, talented individuals are "fat cats." And this is how some officials within the government see things. These officials evince the mentality of "frogs contemplating the sky from the bottom of the well." They completely ignore the fact that transnational competition for talent has long been in full swing. Can the Executive Yuan's "anti-fat cat provision" prevent "fat cat" patronage? That remains to be seen, But its most serious side effect has been to hinder public foundations such as the ITRI and the National Health Research Institutes from recruiting international talent. Taiwan suffers from a serious talent deficit. This provision merely binds ourselves hand and foot. It must be reevaluated.
Under globalization, individuals with special expertise are in heavy demand. Are all those who receive high salaries necessarily "fat cats?" In the United States and Europe the term "fat cat" applies primarily to executives of financial institutions. During the financial tsunami, governments used taxpayer money to bail out large financial institutions. Executives within these financial institutions demanded and received huge pay increases and bonuses. They were justly villified as "fat cats." The public on Taiwan understandably has no desire to see retired high government officials become beneficiaries of political patronage. But the "anti-fat cat provision" must not hinder the introduction of international talent. One cannot apply the label "fat cat" to anyone receiving a high salary.
This is the era of the Internet. Borders are disappearing. Talented individuals enjoy increased mobility. Multinational corporations offer the highest salaries, best benefits, and most amenable work environments in their effort to attract top talent, Talented individuals are their most important resource. Face book founder Mark Zuckerberg asked rhetorically, "If you are building a company, would you prefer one standout person over one hundred pretty good people?" South Korea's Samsung Group Chairman Lee Kun-hee said, "One genius can feed a million people," That is why the Samsung Group never scrimps on talent. Google has long offered generous employee benefits. It allows employees to use part of their working hours to do whatever they wish to do, Late last year Google announced a 10% pay increase and a US$1000 cash bonus. They are generous to their employees because they want to defeat their competitors.
Taiwan is poor in natural resources. Today's prosperity and achievements are mainly the result of talented individuals. But neighboring countries are now offering salaries several times higher. They are offering vastly more generous benefits in their effort to poach talent from every business sector on Taiwan. Domestic R&D and academic institutions, hampered by legal restrictions on the introduction of top international players, are unable to retain talented employees, High-level talent is leaving faster than it is arriving, This serious brain drain will stifle our international competitiveness.
The nation is suffering from a talent deficit. The Academia Sinica's "Declaration on Talent" offers a number of suggestions. In the short term, the government must eliminate barriers to the introduction of international talent. For example, it must review the "anti-fat cat provisions," Salaries for government-owned corporations should be handled by an Executive Yuan "Remuneration Committee." In the long term, systemic and legal reforms must be carried out, Can our talent deficit crisis be resolved? That depends upon the Ma administration's determination and courage.
破除進口障礙 引進頂尖人才
2011-09-16 中國時報
全球化與科技創新的影響下，全球經濟與勞動市場結構產生了長遠的變化；由於市場版圖擴大了，擁有特殊專長或全球市場管理長才者，成為各國爭相挖角的對象，薪水也水漲船高。在這場空前激烈的全球人才爭奪戰之下，有能力吸引國際頂尖人才進駐的國家，成為當然的贏家；無力留住本國人才又無法吸引國際頂尖人才的國家，註定成為輸家。
近年來台灣的人才外流危機日益嚴重，中央研究院院長翁啟惠與十多位橫跨產學研媒各界領袖日前發表《人才宣言》，呼籲政府重視人才失衡的危機。台灣人才外流危機有多嚴重？那些政策迷思阻礙了國際頂尖人才的引進？本報在「人才流失、搶救國力」系列報導中指出，近年台灣高科技人才流失嚴重，八成去了大陸，對岸開出相當於四倍以上的薪資挖角台灣中高階主管。此外，金融界、醫界、學術界人才遭大陸、香港、新加坡等挖角的情形亦非常驚人。
台灣的優秀人才成為鄰近國家爭相挖角的對象，原本值得國人驕傲，但面對來自四面八方的人才爭奪戰，國內企業界與學術界卻大嘆找不到足夠的人才，更糟的是沒有足夠的籌碼留住優秀人才。工業技術研究院院長蔡清彥直言「行政院『反肥貓』條款，已成為求才絆腳石。」這項規定限制工研院挖角國際人才時，薪資不得超過次長一個月十六萬多元的行情，如此不符合國際趨勢與現實的規定自三月生效後，工研院迄今未聘用高階人才，但這段期間卻有多位研究人員已遭大陸高薪挖角。
在民粹思維下，政府錯把國際頂尖人才視為「肥貓」，顯示部分人士坐井觀天的心態，完全無視於跨國人才爭奪戰早已如火如荼開打。行政院這項「反肥貓」條款是否能夠有效阻止那些酬庸的「肥貓」仍有待檢驗，但最大後遺症是阻礙了公股財團法人如工研院、國衛院等聘用國際頂尖人才的路，這項規定對於「人才赤字」嚴重的台灣無異「自縛手腳」，有必要重新檢討。
在全球化效應下，擁有特殊專長的國際頂尖人才炙手可熱，領取高薪的人都是「肥貓」嗎？其實，歐美各國所謂的「肥貓」主要指金融海嘯期間，政府動用納稅人的錢為大型金融機構紓困，這些金融界執行長、高階主管在風暴過後率先為自己加薪且領取巨額紅利，被各界痛批為無恥的「肥貓」。反觀台灣，國人當然不希望看到大批退休高官被政治酬庸為「肥貓」，但「反肥貓」條款也不能阻礙了國際頂尖人才的引進，尤其不能把「肥貓」現象無限上綱至所有領取高薪者。
在國界逐漸消失的網路科技時代，人才的流動更加頻繁。各大跨國企業無不以最優的薪資、福利與工作環境吸引最頂尖人才，因為人才是最重要的資源。臉書創辦人馬克．祖克伯指出，「一個領域中的頂尖人才，比其他優秀人才好一百倍。」韓國三星集團總裁李健熙曾說「一個天才可以養活一百萬人」，因此三星集團培養人才絕對不省錢。向來最重視員工福利的谷歌，允許員工利用一部分上班時間做自己想做的事，去年底宣布為員工加薪一成並加發一千美元現金紅利，如此大手筆寵愛員工就是要把競爭對手比下去。
天然資源貧乏的台灣，能有今日的發展與成就，主要靠的就是充沛的人才優勢。不過，眼看著鄰近國家以數倍高薪、超優福利積極挖角台灣各界優秀人才，相對地，國內科技研發與學術機構卻因相關法令限制無法引進國際頂尖好手，也無法留住優秀人才，在高階人才輸出大於輸入的情況下，嚴重的人才外流將扼殺國家的競爭力。
針對國內的人才赤字危機，中研院在《人才宣言》中提出多項建言，短期內必須把引進國際人才的相關障礙排除，例如適時檢討「反肥貓」條款，政府所屬法人主管之待遇由行政院成立「薪酬委員會」來負責；長期而言，則必須進行制度、法令等結構性的改革。台灣的人才赤字危機能否化解，就看馬政府的決心與魄力了。
Wednesday, September 14, 2011
A Cross-Strait Peace Agreement Requires Mutual Trust
A Cross-Strait Peace Agreement Requires Mutual Trust
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 14, 2011
Summary: If re-elected, might President Ma Ying-jeou visit the Chinese mainland? Might he even sign a cross-Strait peace agreement? The question has raised concerns and provoked Blue vs. Green controversy. The Republic of China is a democratic republic. The president is answerable to its citizens. Any decisions and actions must be consistent with the will of the people. Any visit to the Chinese mainland must consider public sentiment and cross-Strait reality. Speculation about such a visit now is premature.
Full Text below:
If re-elected, might President Ma Ying-jeou visit the Chinese mainland? Might he even sign a cross-Strait peace agreement? The question has raised concerns and provoked Blue vs. Green controversy. The Republic of China is a democratic republic. The president is answerable to its citizens. Any decisions and actions must be consistent with the will of the people. Any visit to the Chinese mainland must consider public sentiment and cross-Strait reality. Speculation about such visit now is premature.
Presidential Office Chief of Staff King Pu-tsung and DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen visited the United States at the same time. The two sides continue to do battle overseas. Cross-Strait policy has become a controversial topic. An exclusive interview with Phoenix News misreported King Pu-tsung as saying that if reelected, President Ma would visit the Chinese mainland, in his capacity as KMT Party Chairman. This invited an attack by the DPP. But the Presidential Office had already cleared up the matter. A Presidential Office spokesman made clear that if President Ma Ying-jeou ever conducts an official visit to the Chinese mainland, it will be in his capacity as Republic of China President.
King Pu-tsung followed up by saying that as long as we uphold the Republic of China's sovereignty and dignity, all sorts of favorable cross-Strait developments are possible. This includes the signing of a peace agreement. "If it [a cross-Strait peace agreement] benefits Taiwan, why not?" He responded to Tsai Ing-wen, saying, "As long as Chairman Tsai is willing to talk to the Beijing about the Republic of China's sovereignty under the constitutional frameworld of the Republic of China, that accords with the national interest, and I applaud it."
King Pu-tsung said nothing new. President Ma has reiterated that cross-Strait relations must address economics first and politics last. It must address easy issues first and harder issues last. This includes any peace agreement or military confidence building mechanism. No exact timetable exists for any of these. In a 2008 interview with CNR, Ma Ying-jeou said visiting the Chinese mainland is important. But the time is not ripe. Nor is it the most urgent matter we have to deal with. The two sides need not touch on political issues for the moment.
When President Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian were in office, they both expressed a willingness to visit the Chinese mainland in the furtherance of cross-Strait peace. Of course, offering an olive branch is one thing. Genuinely wanting to implement cross-Strait peace is another. Anyone can posture. Not everyone can see a vision through to its fulfillment.
Any presidential visit or cross-Strait peace agreement would require a solid foundation and proper timing. The cross-Strait situation at the moment is not right. A Republic of China president visiting the Chinese mainland in his capacity as Republic of China president would be unacceptable to the PRC. Recognition of the Republic of China's sovereign status would be political suicide for PRC authorities. It would provoke an intense nationalist backlash. On the other hand, a Republic of China president visiting the Chinese mainland in his capacity as KMT party chairman would demean the Republic of China in the eyes of the public on Taiwan. Beijing would have good reason to be concerned about the impact such a visit from the leader of the Republic of China might have on Taiwan society.
The dispute over sovereignty is the real sticking point in cross-Strait relations. After President Ma Ying-jeou took office, his greatest achievement was to break the deadlock in cross-Strait relations, and transform it into an examplar of "effective management." The Ma administration has successfully shelved cross-Strait disputes. The two sides are seeking common ground and setting aside differences. They are promoting cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, allowing people and understand each other. This will enable them to discover what they share in common. Bit by bit, they can build trust and friendship, and arrive at some shared expectations about the future. Under the aegis of the 1992 Consensus, disputes over sovereignty have encouraged Beijing to acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China. During cross-Strait negotiations, officials have visited each other, qua officials. To some extent, government to government exchanges have already taken place. The two sides have merely refrained from underscoring this fact.
Nevertheless, only three short years have passed. Only modest progress has been made. A Republic of China president still cannot attend an APEC summit. Talk of visiting the Chinese mainland is still premature.
A cross-Strait peace agreement sounds good. But before an agreement can be signed, both sides must have something to gain. They must trust the other to keep its promises. There must be sufficient trust between the public on both sides. People on Taiwan have long lived under a threat. Absent concrete, long-term demonstrations of good faith, it will be difficult for them to lower their guard. If the PRC attempts to assert sovereignty over the ROC, it will be unacceptable to the public on Taiwan. Sixty years of PRC military aggression has never caused the ROC to yield its sovereignty or dignity. It is not about to do so now merely for the sake of some ink on paper. The two sides can cooperate on certain matters, for example, sea rescues and military visits. At this stage these would be considered major victories.
The Republic of China is a democratic republic. The will of the people constrains the president's decision-making process. It affects the progress of cross-Strait relations. The Republic of China's national interests include its prosperity and growth, its sovereignty and dignity, its security and international space. Its heads of state have been entrusted by the people to achieve these ends. Other goals are not yet feasible. Better to improve cross-Strait relations step by step. Only then will more favorable possibilities unfold in the future.
兩岸簽和平協議 須先建立互信
2011-09-15 中國時報
馬英九總統如果連任，是否將訪問大陸，甚至兩岸簽署和平協議，引發各界關注甚至藍綠爭議。事實上，台灣是個民主國家，總統承受國民付託，任何決策與行動都必須符合國民意志，訪中也必須依循民意趨向並考量兩岸現實，現在談論，實在言之過早。
馬辦執行長金溥聰與民進黨總統參選人蔡英文同時訪美，雙方在海外不斷交鋒，兩岸政策更成為爭議話題。金溥聰接受「鳳凰衛視」專訪的新聞，被誤報為馬總統連任後可能會以黨主席身分訪問中國大陸，引發民進黨抨擊；但馬辦已經予以澄清，總統府發言人也強調只要是正式出訪行程，總統馬英九的身分只有一個，即是「中華民國總統」。
接著金溥聰在華府表示，若能堅持中華民國主權與尊嚴前提下，兩岸未來任何發展都有可能性，包括簽署和平協議，「若是對台灣有利，（兩岸簽和平協議）why not?」他還向蔡英文喊話，「只要蔡主席願意在中華民國憲法架構下，與大陸談台灣主權，就是符合國家利益，我會舉雙手贊成」。
其實金溥聰並沒有說出什麼新的政策，馬總統早已多次公開表示，兩岸的互動要先經後政、先易後難，包括簽署和平協議、軍事互信機制沒有確切時間表。馬英九在二○○八年底接受央廣專訪也說，訪問大陸是重大的事，但目前時機未到，也不是最迫切要處理；兩岸目前沒有觸及政治議題的急迫性。
而回溯前總統李登輝與陳水扁，其實也都曾在任內表達願意訪中進行和平之旅的意願。當然，擺出遞出橄欖枝的和平姿態是一回事，真要付諸實行又是另一回事，畢竟姿態人人會擺，宏願不是每個都能實現。
基本上，無論是總統訪問中國大陸，還是兩岸簽署和平協議，都需要能夠有一個堅實的基礎與成熟的環境。以兩岸現在的狀況，台灣總統訪問中國，以總統的身分，大陸政府不可能接受，因為如果承認台灣的主權地位，對中國大陸執政者將是政治自殺，也會引發社會上強烈的民族主義反彈浪潮。如果以黨主席身分，台灣會認為是自我矮化，中共則可能擔心台灣領導人登陸帶來的社會衝擊。
主權之爭是目前兩岸最困難的僵持點，馬英九總統就任後，最大的成就是把原本凍結對立的兩岸關係，轉化成可順利推動並有效管理。馬政府成功地促成兩岸擱置爭議，求同存異，先推動雙方的各項交流合作，讓人民相互認識、相互理解，進而逐漸了解並開發彼此的共同性，在友誼中點滴建立起互信，以及對未來打造一些共同期望的願景。主權爭議在九二共識下，爭取到了讓對岸多少對中華民國有些認可，甚至兩岸協商時官員上桌以及官員相互訪問，在某種程度上，都已經有政府對政府的意涵了，只是雙方也暫不點明而已。
但這只是在三年多的時間裡營造出來的一點進展，在台灣總統還不能出席亞太經合會議峰會時，要談訪問中國大陸，真的還遠得很。
至於兩岸和平協議，聽起來固然美好，但協議之所以能簽署，必須要雙方都覺得可以獲利，並且信任對方能信守承諾，這一定需要彼此的民眾都對對方有了足夠的信賴。對於一直處於武力威脅下的台灣民眾來說，沒有長期看到具體的善意表現，很難放下戒心。而如果中國想在協議套上任何可以彰顯其對台主權的前提，台灣社會不可能願意接受。面對中共武力壓迫了六十多年，台灣從來都不曾對主權尊嚴退縮過，自然也不可能為一紙於己不利的和平協議而放棄立場。能夠先試著在一些事務上進行合作，例如海上救難、軍事互訪等，就已經是現階段的重大進展了。
台灣是民主國家，人民的集體意志不只約束著總統的決策，也牽動著兩岸關係進展。台灣的國家利益包括了繁榮發展、主權尊嚴、安全及國際空間，元首受國民付託必須追求這些利益的實現。與其爭執眼前尚不可行的事，不如好好一步步落實推動兩岸關係，才能讓未來出現更多有利的可能性。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 14, 2011
Summary: If re-elected, might President Ma Ying-jeou visit the Chinese mainland? Might he even sign a cross-Strait peace agreement? The question has raised concerns and provoked Blue vs. Green controversy. The Republic of China is a democratic republic. The president is answerable to its citizens. Any decisions and actions must be consistent with the will of the people. Any visit to the Chinese mainland must consider public sentiment and cross-Strait reality. Speculation about such a visit now is premature.
Full Text below:
If re-elected, might President Ma Ying-jeou visit the Chinese mainland? Might he even sign a cross-Strait peace agreement? The question has raised concerns and provoked Blue vs. Green controversy. The Republic of China is a democratic republic. The president is answerable to its citizens. Any decisions and actions must be consistent with the will of the people. Any visit to the Chinese mainland must consider public sentiment and cross-Strait reality. Speculation about such visit now is premature.
Presidential Office Chief of Staff King Pu-tsung and DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen visited the United States at the same time. The two sides continue to do battle overseas. Cross-Strait policy has become a controversial topic. An exclusive interview with Phoenix News misreported King Pu-tsung as saying that if reelected, President Ma would visit the Chinese mainland, in his capacity as KMT Party Chairman. This invited an attack by the DPP. But the Presidential Office had already cleared up the matter. A Presidential Office spokesman made clear that if President Ma Ying-jeou ever conducts an official visit to the Chinese mainland, it will be in his capacity as Republic of China President.
King Pu-tsung followed up by saying that as long as we uphold the Republic of China's sovereignty and dignity, all sorts of favorable cross-Strait developments are possible. This includes the signing of a peace agreement. "If it [a cross-Strait peace agreement] benefits Taiwan, why not?" He responded to Tsai Ing-wen, saying, "As long as Chairman Tsai is willing to talk to the Beijing about the Republic of China's sovereignty under the constitutional frameworld of the Republic of China, that accords with the national interest, and I applaud it."
King Pu-tsung said nothing new. President Ma has reiterated that cross-Strait relations must address economics first and politics last. It must address easy issues first and harder issues last. This includes any peace agreement or military confidence building mechanism. No exact timetable exists for any of these. In a 2008 interview with CNR, Ma Ying-jeou said visiting the Chinese mainland is important. But the time is not ripe. Nor is it the most urgent matter we have to deal with. The two sides need not touch on political issues for the moment.
When President Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian were in office, they both expressed a willingness to visit the Chinese mainland in the furtherance of cross-Strait peace. Of course, offering an olive branch is one thing. Genuinely wanting to implement cross-Strait peace is another. Anyone can posture. Not everyone can see a vision through to its fulfillment.
Any presidential visit or cross-Strait peace agreement would require a solid foundation and proper timing. The cross-Strait situation at the moment is not right. A Republic of China president visiting the Chinese mainland in his capacity as Republic of China president would be unacceptable to the PRC. Recognition of the Republic of China's sovereign status would be political suicide for PRC authorities. It would provoke an intense nationalist backlash. On the other hand, a Republic of China president visiting the Chinese mainland in his capacity as KMT party chairman would demean the Republic of China in the eyes of the public on Taiwan. Beijing would have good reason to be concerned about the impact such a visit from the leader of the Republic of China might have on Taiwan society.
The dispute over sovereignty is the real sticking point in cross-Strait relations. After President Ma Ying-jeou took office, his greatest achievement was to break the deadlock in cross-Strait relations, and transform it into an examplar of "effective management." The Ma administration has successfully shelved cross-Strait disputes. The two sides are seeking common ground and setting aside differences. They are promoting cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, allowing people and understand each other. This will enable them to discover what they share in common. Bit by bit, they can build trust and friendship, and arrive at some shared expectations about the future. Under the aegis of the 1992 Consensus, disputes over sovereignty have encouraged Beijing to acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China. During cross-Strait negotiations, officials have visited each other, qua officials. To some extent, government to government exchanges have already taken place. The two sides have merely refrained from underscoring this fact.
Nevertheless, only three short years have passed. Only modest progress has been made. A Republic of China president still cannot attend an APEC summit. Talk of visiting the Chinese mainland is still premature.
A cross-Strait peace agreement sounds good. But before an agreement can be signed, both sides must have something to gain. They must trust the other to keep its promises. There must be sufficient trust between the public on both sides. People on Taiwan have long lived under a threat. Absent concrete, long-term demonstrations of good faith, it will be difficult for them to lower their guard. If the PRC attempts to assert sovereignty over the ROC, it will be unacceptable to the public on Taiwan. Sixty years of PRC military aggression has never caused the ROC to yield its sovereignty or dignity. It is not about to do so now merely for the sake of some ink on paper. The two sides can cooperate on certain matters, for example, sea rescues and military visits. At this stage these would be considered major victories.
The Republic of China is a democratic republic. The will of the people constrains the president's decision-making process. It affects the progress of cross-Strait relations. The Republic of China's national interests include its prosperity and growth, its sovereignty and dignity, its security and international space. Its heads of state have been entrusted by the people to achieve these ends. Other goals are not yet feasible. Better to improve cross-Strait relations step by step. Only then will more favorable possibilities unfold in the future.
兩岸簽和平協議 須先建立互信
2011-09-15 中國時報
馬英九總統如果連任，是否將訪問大陸，甚至兩岸簽署和平協議，引發各界關注甚至藍綠爭議。事實上，台灣是個民主國家，總統承受國民付託，任何決策與行動都必須符合國民意志，訪中也必須依循民意趨向並考量兩岸現實，現在談論，實在言之過早。
馬辦執行長金溥聰與民進黨總統參選人蔡英文同時訪美，雙方在海外不斷交鋒，兩岸政策更成為爭議話題。金溥聰接受「鳳凰衛視」專訪的新聞，被誤報為馬總統連任後可能會以黨主席身分訪問中國大陸，引發民進黨抨擊；但馬辦已經予以澄清，總統府發言人也強調只要是正式出訪行程，總統馬英九的身分只有一個，即是「中華民國總統」。
接著金溥聰在華府表示，若能堅持中華民國主權與尊嚴前提下，兩岸未來任何發展都有可能性，包括簽署和平協議，「若是對台灣有利，（兩岸簽和平協議）why not?」他還向蔡英文喊話，「只要蔡主席願意在中華民國憲法架構下，與大陸談台灣主權，就是符合國家利益，我會舉雙手贊成」。
其實金溥聰並沒有說出什麼新的政策，馬總統早已多次公開表示，兩岸的互動要先經後政、先易後難，包括簽署和平協議、軍事互信機制沒有確切時間表。馬英九在二○○八年底接受央廣專訪也說，訪問大陸是重大的事，但目前時機未到，也不是最迫切要處理；兩岸目前沒有觸及政治議題的急迫性。
而回溯前總統李登輝與陳水扁，其實也都曾在任內表達願意訪中進行和平之旅的意願。當然，擺出遞出橄欖枝的和平姿態是一回事，真要付諸實行又是另一回事，畢竟姿態人人會擺，宏願不是每個都能實現。
基本上，無論是總統訪問中國大陸，還是兩岸簽署和平協議，都需要能夠有一個堅實的基礎與成熟的環境。以兩岸現在的狀況，台灣總統訪問中國，以總統的身分，大陸政府不可能接受，因為如果承認台灣的主權地位，對中國大陸執政者將是政治自殺，也會引發社會上強烈的民族主義反彈浪潮。如果以黨主席身分，台灣會認為是自我矮化，中共則可能擔心台灣領導人登陸帶來的社會衝擊。
主權之爭是目前兩岸最困難的僵持點，馬英九總統就任後，最大的成就是把原本凍結對立的兩岸關係，轉化成可順利推動並有效管理。馬政府成功地促成兩岸擱置爭議，求同存異，先推動雙方的各項交流合作，讓人民相互認識、相互理解，進而逐漸了解並開發彼此的共同性，在友誼中點滴建立起互信，以及對未來打造一些共同期望的願景。主權爭議在九二共識下，爭取到了讓對岸多少對中華民國有些認可，甚至兩岸協商時官員上桌以及官員相互訪問，在某種程度上，都已經有政府對政府的意涵了，只是雙方也暫不點明而已。
但這只是在三年多的時間裡營造出來的一點進展，在台灣總統還不能出席亞太經合會議峰會時，要談訪問中國大陸，真的還遠得很。
至於兩岸和平協議，聽起來固然美好，但協議之所以能簽署，必須要雙方都覺得可以獲利，並且信任對方能信守承諾，這一定需要彼此的民眾都對對方有了足夠的信賴。對於一直處於武力威脅下的台灣民眾來說，沒有長期看到具體的善意表現，很難放下戒心。而如果中國想在協議套上任何可以彰顯其對台主權的前提，台灣社會不可能願意接受。面對中共武力壓迫了六十多年，台灣從來都不曾對主權尊嚴退縮過，自然也不可能為一紙於己不利的和平協議而放棄立場。能夠先試著在一些事務上進行合作，例如海上救難、軍事互訪等，就已經是現階段的重大進展了。
台灣是民主國家，人民的集體意志不只約束著總統的決策，也牽動著兩岸關係進展。台灣的國家利益包括了繁榮發展、主權尊嚴、安全及國際空間，元首受國民付託必須追求這些利益的實現。與其爭執眼前尚不可行的事，不如好好一步步落實推動兩岸關係，才能讓未來出現更多有利的可能性。
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