Taipei/Singapore Relations Require Joint Effort
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 29, 2012
Summary: State-to-state exchanges must be based on reciprocity. The purpose of diplomacy is to safeguard and promote the national interest. The considerations for each side will be different. But as long as each side respects the other's needs, the relationship will be mutally beneficial. The Taipei/Singapore relationship is not one-sided. Singapore is not Taipei's benefactor. Past exchanges and cooperation took place only because Singapore reaped certain desired benefits. Taipei must not expect too much from Singapore. But it hopes Singapore will take another look at close cooperation in the past, sound development in the future, and cherish the opportunities the relationship has made available.
Full Text below:
Taipei and Singapore lack formal diplomatic relations. Yet the relationship, friendship, and cooperation between Taipei and Singapore is even closer and older than between many diplomatic allies. Recently however, puzzling rumors about frictions between leaders in Taipei and Singapore have emerged. Friendship and cooperation between Taipei and Singapore is in the interest of both sides. But friendship and cooperation must be based on mutual respect and the preservation of each side's national interests. Healthy relations must be maintained by Taipei and Singapore together.
The public on Taiwan feels particularly close to Singapore. Both the Republic of China and the Republic of Singapore have predominantly Chinese populations. They have also engaged in long-term exchanges. Officially and unofficially, the two have remained extremely close. In earlier years, Singapore was concerned about anti-China sentiment in Indonesia. That is why it refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing. That is also why it was free to deal with Taipei. Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew repeatedly visited Taipei, and enjoyed a close personal relationship with the late president Chiang Ching-kuo. Singapore lacked appropriate training sites for its military. The "Starlight Plan" solved the problem by enabling Singapore's military to train on Taiwan. The two sides also established channels for military cooperation.
In 1998, Singapore invited newly inaugurated President Lee Teng-hui to Singapore for a visit. Singapore established a diplomatic precedent for Republic of China Presidents visiting nations with which it had no diplomatic relations. Singapore served as a host for the Koo/Wang Summit. It played a positive role in promoting peaceful relations across the Taiwan Strait. The relationship between Taipei and Singapore has of course also suffered temporary setbacks, such as the Chen regime's "booger controversy." But more recently the two sides stabilized relations. Taipei and Beijing reconciled and signed ECFA. Singapore and Taipei signed an Economic Cooperation Agreement.
The general impression was that Singapore was very friendly to Taipei. This of course was why the recent rumors were so surprising. First rumors emerged that Shi Ya-ping, the ROC representative to Singapore, had offended Singapore's leadership and the two sides had broken off relations. Shi Yaping was transferred home. One reason offered was that he sang the national anthem and hoisted the national flag on National Day, and met with opposition parties. Another reason offered was that Shi Ya-ping forcefully demanded to see Lee Kuan Yew for economic and trade negotiations.
Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Shi Yaping have denied such rumors. News emerged that Defense Minister Kao Hua-chu led a delegation to Singapore to participate in an aerospace exhibition. This provoked strong dissatisfaction in Singapore. Singapore even instructed the commander of the Starlight Forces to send a letter of protest to the ROC Ministry of Defense, terminating Taipei/Singapore military cooperation. The ROC government was scheduled to visit Singapore toward the end of February to conduct military exchanges. That too has been "postponed indefinitely."
The Ministry of Defense and the Minstry of Foreign Affairs have already issued denials. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that Taipei and Singapore have close and friendly relations. They will continue to promote the Economic Partnership Agreement with Singapore. They said Taipei values its relationship with Singapore. The Ministry of Defense said that cooperation was not being terminated, The activities were merely undergoing adjustments.
Frankly, the truth of diplomacy often cannot be made fully public. What frictions if any actually arose between Taipei and Singapore? Both sides are likely treat them as top secret, They will trade blows privately, But to outsiders they will remain tight-lipped. The current rumors are not necessarily true. But they are not necessarily false either. News of Kao Hua-chu's visit to Singapore provoked a strong reaction from the Singapore government. According to some analysts, Singapore was putting on a show for Beijing's sake.
Relations between Taipei and Singapore have endured long term.. According to some analysts, this is because amidst exchange and cooperation, the two sides have been able to maintain and promote their own national interests, Also, the two sides have built up considerable mutual trust, cooperation, and friendship through past interactions. This result was not easy to achieve. It is a valuable legacy for both Taipei and Singapore. It is a relationship worth preserving. If Singapore has refused to deal with Shi Yaping and has broken off military cooperation with Taipei, they would be strong measures that will be difficult to counter. They would be inconsistent with the principle of proportionality. They would fail to consider the long tradition of relations between Taipei and Singapore.
News that Kao Hua-chu visited the Singapore Air Show was leaked by a legislator. It was not Kao Hua-chu's intent. Nor was it an act of malice on the part of the legislator. It may have been contrary to the two sides' long held tacit agreement. But the political and media environment on Taiwan is completely different from Singapore's. This was an isolated incident. It was neither deliberate nor malicious. It did not undermine bilateral cooperation. Will Singapore cut the military cooperation that it has maintained with Taipei over so many years? Even assuming it has, and that it was a pragmatic decision based on political expediency, the public on Taiwan will nevertheless perceive it as extremely hurtful.
State-to-state exchanges must be based on reciprocity. The purpose of diplomacy is to safeguard and promote the national interest. The considerations for each side will be different. But as long as each side respects the other's needs, the relationship will be mutally beneficial. The Taipei/Singapore relationship is not one-sided. Singapore is not Taipei's benefactor. Past exchanges and cooperation took place only because Singapore reaped certain desired benefits. Taipei must not expect too much from Singapore. But it hopes Singapore will take another look at close cooperation in the past, sound development in the future, and cherish the opportunities the relationship has made available.
維繫台星關係需要雙方共同努力
2012-02-29中國時報
台灣與新加坡雖然沒有正式邦交,但關係之友好、合作之密切,甚至超過了許多邦交國。擁有悠久邦誼的台星兩國,近來卻傳出不少風波,而且撼及高層,頗令人不解。台星之間的友誼與合作讓雙方互蒙其利,但前提是相互尊重並維護各自的國家利益,而雙邊關係的正面發展,需要台星雙方共同維護。
國人對新加坡特別有親切感,除了因為其人口大部分是華人外,兩國長期以來的交往,官方也好民間也罷,都十分密切。早年新加坡為了顧慮印尼反華的立場而沒有和中國建交時,與台灣來往較無顧忌,前總理李光耀多次來台,並且和我國故總統蔣經國私交甚篤。經由「星光計畫」,新加坡的軍隊在台灣進行訓練,解決了缺乏適當訓練場地的問題,雙方也建立軍事合作的管道。
新加坡曾經在一九八八年邀請剛繼任不久的李登輝總統前往訪問,開啟我國總統訪問無邦交國家之先例。接著又擔任「辜汪會談」的東道主,對促進兩岸和平交流扮演正面角色。當然,台星關係也曾經短暫受到「鼻屎風波」的影響,但雙方近年來各項交流穩定推動,在兩岸和解與ECFA簽署下,新加坡更與台灣洽簽經濟合作協定。
正是因為普遍的印象是新加坡對台灣相當友好,因此最近的幾項傳聞格外讓人驚訝。先是傳出我駐新加坡代表史亞平觸怒星國高層,雙方接觸中斷,史亞平更被調回國內。原因一說是國慶時唱國歌、掛國旗及與星國反對黨人士會面,一說是史亞平為經貿談判強行求見李光耀。
就在外交部與史亞平都對傳聞提出否認後,又傳出國防部長高華柱率團到星國參加航太展的消息曝光,引發星國強烈不滿,還派星光部隊指揮官至國防部宣讀抗議信,聲明中斷台星軍事合作。我方預定二月底要到新加坡交流的軍事考察團,也被告知「無限期延後」。
對此,國防部、外交部都已出面否認。外交部強調,台灣與新加坡關係密切友好,台星經濟夥伴協議在內的各項合作持續推動,強調台灣很珍惜與新加坡的關係。國防部也表示不是終止合作,而是對活動內容做一些調整。
坦白說,外交的真相常常不會完全公諸於眾,台星之間到底為了什麼事而發生了什麼磨擦,很可能雙方都會當成最高機密,私下過招連連,但對外守口如瓶。現在流傳的風聲不見得是事實,但也不見得不是。據分析,高華柱訪星消息曝光引發新加坡政府強烈反彈,可能是為了向中國大陸表態。
台星關係之所以能長期友好,固然因為雙方在各項互惠的交流合作中,都能維護並增進各自的國家利益,並且也因為在無數的互動過程中,累積出相互的信任與合作情誼,能夠經營出這樣的成果並不容易。無論是對台灣還是對新加坡,這都是一項難得的資產,也是值得珍惜並繼續推進的關係。新加坡拒絕史亞平以及中斷台星軍事合作,如果屬實,都是強度非常高的抵制措施,不僅不符比例原則,也似乎未將台星傳統邦誼納入慎重考量。
尤其,高華柱參觀新加坡航空展的消息,是被立委曝光的。這既非高華柱之蓄意,也不是立委有惡意。就算是違背了雙方長久以來的默契,但台灣的政治生態與媒體環境與新加坡完全不同,這只能說是一次意外的疏誤。既非蓄意,亦無惡意,更沒有要破壞雙邊合作。新加坡如果因此就切斷了和台灣多年來良好的軍事合作,就算這是在兩岸之間基於政治利害的現實選擇,但對台灣民眾來說,仍然是蠻傷感情的。
國與國的交往必然基於互惠,外交的目的在於維護並增進國家利益,但各自的考量點會有不同。只要各取所需並對等尊重,對雙方都有利。台星關係並不是一面倒地由新加坡方面施惠於台灣,過去推動各項交流合作,必然也因為新加坡能從中得到想要的利益。台灣不必對新加坡有一廂情願的過多期待,但也希望新加坡能多著眼過去的緊密合作,以及未來的良性發展,並珍惜其中的機會。
從臺北看天下 . chinese language newspaper editorials . translated by bevin chu . no endorsement of the editorials should be inferred
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
Thursday, February 23, 2012
The DPP Must Reaffirm the Republic of China
The DPP Must Reaffirm the Republic of China
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2012
Summary: The DPP faces a fundamental dilemma. Taiwan independence is impossible. But reaffirming the Republic of China is unthinkable. If the DPP cannot find a way to deal with the Republic of China, then it cannot find a way to deal with Mainland China. The DPP wants to go the final mile. But if not a single Republic of China flag can be seen at DPP rallies, then the DPP's dream of returning to power will remain an ever receding pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.
Full Text below:
Why did the Democratic Progressive Party lose the presidential election? The DPP's review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls contains an unspoken but obvious truth. The DPP lost because it clings for dear life to its narrowly divisive concept of "Taiwan," and hands the expansive and broadly unifying concept of the "Republic of China" over to the KMT.
The Democratic Progressive Party's slogan during election campaign was "uphold the sovereignty of Taiwan." Consider the DPP's review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls. The wording was changed to read, "The DPP is a political party that upholds the sovereignty of the nation." Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT, by contrast, said that they "uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of China."
So the question is, what is the difference between upholding "the sovereignty of Taiwan," "the sovereignty of the nation," and "the sovereignty of the Republic of China?" Do they overlap? Are they mutually exclusive?
When the DPP uses the term "Taiwan," it generally means "tai wan guo," i.e,, a future "Nation of Taiwan" or "Republic of Taiwan." That is why its slogans read, "upholding the sovereignty of Taiwan," instead of "upholding the sovereignty of the Republic of China." This is how it differentiates itself politically from the KMT. These conscious DPP distinctions have made "Taiwan" and the "Republic of China" a mutually exclusive, friend or foe proposition. Today the dreams of Taiwan independence and of founding a Nation of Taiwan have faded into nothingness. The primary challenge facing the DPP is how to reaffirm the Republic of China.
The world and the nation are undergoing massive changes. Martial law was lifted over two decades ago. The constitution has been amended repeatedly. The inescapable conclusion is that Taiwan independence has failed to overthrow the Republic of China. Instead the Republic of China has accommodated, moderated, and mollified the Taiwan independence movement. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian were unable to overthrow the Republic of China and realize Taiwan independence. Nor will anyone else be able to do so in the future.
The first reason the DPP review should have cited for its defeat at the polls should have been: Taiwan independence is simply impossible. Based on this premise, the DPP should have inferred what path the party ought to follow and what reforms the party ought to implement. Instead, the DPP lacked the courage to honestly state this truth. That is why all the arguments that followed were irrelevant and beside the point.
The 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, not use of force" all reject de jure Taiwan independence, and uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of China. The 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations are accepted on the international stage. For example, Washington and Beijing endorsed One China, Different Interpretations when they were on the Bush/Hu Hotline. When Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT reaffirm One China, Different Interpretations, they stand on solid ground. The 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations have enabled Taipei and Beijing to clear the way for political and economic exchanges amidst cross-Strait deadlock.
By contrast, the DPP remains a prisoner of its Sinophobia and insularity. Its attitude is, if we want Taiwan independence, how can we not be Sinophobes? If we want Taiwan independence, how can we not padlock the door to our island? But Taiwan independence is impossible. Therefore what choice does the DPP have? DPP must reaffirm the Republic of China Constitution. It must uphold One China, Different Interpretations. It must uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of China. Can any other political logic convince the DPP to forsake its Sinophobia and insularity? The DPP is unable to implement Taiwan independence. It rejects the Republic of China. This leaves it with nowhere to go.
The DPP review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls states that the DPP must rid itself of its Sinophobic and insular image. This is a tacit admission that Taiwan independence is impossible. The DPP however, refuses to admit this openly and explicitly. After all, how can one possibly promote Taiwan independence unless one is rabidly Sinophobic and stubbornly insular? The DPP already knows that Taiwan independence is impossible. But it refuses to openly and explicitly reaffirm One China, Different Interpretations, the Republic of China Constitution, and the sovereignty of the Republic of China. Instead it relinquishes this vast political and economic realm, turning it over to the KMT. As a result, the DPP has left itself with no leg to stand on.
The DPP review says the DPP must understand [Mainland] China when interacting with [Mainland] China. It says this will enable it to "discover new ways to deal with [Mainland] China." But the DPP was in power for eight years. Did it really learn nothing from its interactions with [Mainland] China in all that time? Other than forsaking Taiwan independence, reaffirming One China, Different Interpretations and the Republic of China, and upholding the sovereignty of the Republic of China, how else can the DPP "discover new ways to deal with [Mainland] China?"
The DPP has long imprisoned itself in an either/or mindset: either Taiwan, or the Republic of China. Never both. During the election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen said that "Taiwan is the Republic of China. The Republic of China is Taiwan." But Tsai Ing-wen's "Republic of China" is the Republic of China in name only. Tsai Ing-wen's "Republic of China" is a shell company for Tsai Ing-wen's narrowly defined, division riddled "Taiwan."
The DPP faces a fundamental dilemma. Taiwan independence is impossible. But reaffirming the Republic of China is unthinkable. If the DPP cannot find a way to deal with the Republic of China, then it cannot find a way to deal with Mainland China. The DPP wants to go the final mile. But if not a single Republic of China flag can be seen at DPP rallies, then the DPP's dream of returning to power will remain an ever receding pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.
民進黨應先找到面對中華民國的新方法
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.24
民進黨為何敗選,其檢討報告透露了一個沒有明說卻一目了然的訊息,那就是敗在:民進黨死抱被它窄化、分化的「台灣」,卻把「中華民國」這個廣大的政經空間送給了國民黨。
民進黨在大選期間的關鍵詞是「堅持台灣主權」;如今在檢討報告中,修辭則變化成「民進黨作為一個堅持國家主權的政黨」。此一論述與馬英九及國民黨的差異在於,馬英九說的是:「堅持中華民國的主權。」
問題在於:「台灣主權」、「國家主權」及「中華民國主權」三者,有何交集、有何排擠?
民進黨在使用「台灣」這個名詞之時,其潛台詞往往即是指「台灣國」;因而標舉「堅持台灣主權」,而不談「堅持中華民國主權」,藉此與國民黨作出政治區隔。民進黨此種刻意建構的政治區隔,一貫將「台灣」與「中華民國」操作成敵對關係;因而,在今日台獨建國已然全盤幻滅的現實下,民進黨面臨的主要難題即是:它該如何回到中華民國?
在世局國情巨變中,解嚴二十餘年來憲政變遷的結論是:台獨未能推翻、顛覆中華民國,而是中華民國包容、緩和、化解了台獨。李登輝、陳水扁皆未能以台獨篡奪中華民國得逞,未來也無人能作得到。
其實,民進黨敗選報告理當標舉的第一個前提應是:台獨已絕無可能。然後,再依據這個前提去演繹推論民進黨路線及政策的興革。但是,如今民進黨卻不敢誠實標舉這個前提,遂使其餘議論都點不出真正的痛處。
「九二共識」的「一中各表」,及「不統/不獨/不武」,即是不採「法理台獨」路線,而「堅持中華民國的主權」。且「九二共識/一中各表」,在國際上即是「布胡熱線/一中各表」。馬英九及國民黨站穩了「一中各表」的立場,在兩岸僵局中清理出政經脈絡。
反觀民進黨何以予人「反中/鎖國」的印象?實情是:要台獨,豈能不反中?要台獨,豈能不鎖國?試問:台獨既絕不可能,民進黨除了回到中華民國憲法,持守「一中各表」,「堅持中華民國主權」之外,豈有其他的政治邏輯,可以使民進黨撤守「反中鎖國」的陣地?否則,不能台獨,又不要中華民國,如何立足?
敗選檢討報告稱,要使民進黨擺脫「反中鎖國」的刻板印象,這應即是對「台獨已絕無可能」作出了結論,只是不敢明說。因為,不反中、不鎖國,如何台獨?但是,民進黨若明知台獨已不可能,又不明明白白地回到「一中各表」的中華民國憲法,「堅持中華民國主權」,卻將此一廣大政經空間全部送給了國民黨,試問民進黨將寄身何處?
敗選報告說:民進黨必須在互動中了解中國,以找出「面對中國的新方法」。問題是,民進黨甚至曾執政八年,難道仍未能「從互動中了解中國」?而除了放棄台獨路線,回到「一中各表」的中華民國,「堅持中華民國主權」之外,民進黨還能想出什麼「面對中國的新方法」?
長久以來,民進黨皆自陷於「將台灣與中華民國敵對」的困境,即使蔡英文在選季說「台灣就是中華民國/中華民國就是台灣」,那也只是一個被「分化、窄化的台灣」所掏空的「中華民國」,已非「一中各表」的中華民國憲法上的中華民國。
民進黨的根本困局,在於既不能台獨,又不肯誠實回到中華民國;實際上,民進黨若不能找到「面對中華民國新方法」,即不能找到「面對中國的新方法」。在民進黨的「最後一哩路」上,如果在造勢場合仍然看不到一面中華民國的國旗,這虛擬的一哩路將看不到實體的終點與歸宿。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2012
Summary: The DPP faces a fundamental dilemma. Taiwan independence is impossible. But reaffirming the Republic of China is unthinkable. If the DPP cannot find a way to deal with the Republic of China, then it cannot find a way to deal with Mainland China. The DPP wants to go the final mile. But if not a single Republic of China flag can be seen at DPP rallies, then the DPP's dream of returning to power will remain an ever receding pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.
Full Text below:
Why did the Democratic Progressive Party lose the presidential election? The DPP's review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls contains an unspoken but obvious truth. The DPP lost because it clings for dear life to its narrowly divisive concept of "Taiwan," and hands the expansive and broadly unifying concept of the "Republic of China" over to the KMT.
The Democratic Progressive Party's slogan during election campaign was "uphold the sovereignty of Taiwan." Consider the DPP's review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls. The wording was changed to read, "The DPP is a political party that upholds the sovereignty of the nation." Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT, by contrast, said that they "uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of China."
So the question is, what is the difference between upholding "the sovereignty of Taiwan," "the sovereignty of the nation," and "the sovereignty of the Republic of China?" Do they overlap? Are they mutually exclusive?
When the DPP uses the term "Taiwan," it generally means "tai wan guo," i.e,, a future "Nation of Taiwan" or "Republic of Taiwan." That is why its slogans read, "upholding the sovereignty of Taiwan," instead of "upholding the sovereignty of the Republic of China." This is how it differentiates itself politically from the KMT. These conscious DPP distinctions have made "Taiwan" and the "Republic of China" a mutually exclusive, friend or foe proposition. Today the dreams of Taiwan independence and of founding a Nation of Taiwan have faded into nothingness. The primary challenge facing the DPP is how to reaffirm the Republic of China.
The world and the nation are undergoing massive changes. Martial law was lifted over two decades ago. The constitution has been amended repeatedly. The inescapable conclusion is that Taiwan independence has failed to overthrow the Republic of China. Instead the Republic of China has accommodated, moderated, and mollified the Taiwan independence movement. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian were unable to overthrow the Republic of China and realize Taiwan independence. Nor will anyone else be able to do so in the future.
The first reason the DPP review should have cited for its defeat at the polls should have been: Taiwan independence is simply impossible. Based on this premise, the DPP should have inferred what path the party ought to follow and what reforms the party ought to implement. Instead, the DPP lacked the courage to honestly state this truth. That is why all the arguments that followed were irrelevant and beside the point.
The 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, not use of force" all reject de jure Taiwan independence, and uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of China. The 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations are accepted on the international stage. For example, Washington and Beijing endorsed One China, Different Interpretations when they were on the Bush/Hu Hotline. When Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT reaffirm One China, Different Interpretations, they stand on solid ground. The 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations have enabled Taipei and Beijing to clear the way for political and economic exchanges amidst cross-Strait deadlock.
By contrast, the DPP remains a prisoner of its Sinophobia and insularity. Its attitude is, if we want Taiwan independence, how can we not be Sinophobes? If we want Taiwan independence, how can we not padlock the door to our island? But Taiwan independence is impossible. Therefore what choice does the DPP have? DPP must reaffirm the Republic of China Constitution. It must uphold One China, Different Interpretations. It must uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of China. Can any other political logic convince the DPP to forsake its Sinophobia and insularity? The DPP is unable to implement Taiwan independence. It rejects the Republic of China. This leaves it with nowhere to go.
The DPP review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls states that the DPP must rid itself of its Sinophobic and insular image. This is a tacit admission that Taiwan independence is impossible. The DPP however, refuses to admit this openly and explicitly. After all, how can one possibly promote Taiwan independence unless one is rabidly Sinophobic and stubbornly insular? The DPP already knows that Taiwan independence is impossible. But it refuses to openly and explicitly reaffirm One China, Different Interpretations, the Republic of China Constitution, and the sovereignty of the Republic of China. Instead it relinquishes this vast political and economic realm, turning it over to the KMT. As a result, the DPP has left itself with no leg to stand on.
The DPP review says the DPP must understand [Mainland] China when interacting with [Mainland] China. It says this will enable it to "discover new ways to deal with [Mainland] China." But the DPP was in power for eight years. Did it really learn nothing from its interactions with [Mainland] China in all that time? Other than forsaking Taiwan independence, reaffirming One China, Different Interpretations and the Republic of China, and upholding the sovereignty of the Republic of China, how else can the DPP "discover new ways to deal with [Mainland] China?"
The DPP has long imprisoned itself in an either/or mindset: either Taiwan, or the Republic of China. Never both. During the election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen said that "Taiwan is the Republic of China. The Republic of China is Taiwan." But Tsai Ing-wen's "Republic of China" is the Republic of China in name only. Tsai Ing-wen's "Republic of China" is a shell company for Tsai Ing-wen's narrowly defined, division riddled "Taiwan."
The DPP faces a fundamental dilemma. Taiwan independence is impossible. But reaffirming the Republic of China is unthinkable. If the DPP cannot find a way to deal with the Republic of China, then it cannot find a way to deal with Mainland China. The DPP wants to go the final mile. But if not a single Republic of China flag can be seen at DPP rallies, then the DPP's dream of returning to power will remain an ever receding pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.
民進黨應先找到面對中華民國的新方法
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.24
民進黨為何敗選,其檢討報告透露了一個沒有明說卻一目了然的訊息,那就是敗在:民進黨死抱被它窄化、分化的「台灣」,卻把「中華民國」這個廣大的政經空間送給了國民黨。
民進黨在大選期間的關鍵詞是「堅持台灣主權」;如今在檢討報告中,修辭則變化成「民進黨作為一個堅持國家主權的政黨」。此一論述與馬英九及國民黨的差異在於,馬英九說的是:「堅持中華民國的主權。」
問題在於:「台灣主權」、「國家主權」及「中華民國主權」三者,有何交集、有何排擠?
民進黨在使用「台灣」這個名詞之時,其潛台詞往往即是指「台灣國」;因而標舉「堅持台灣主權」,而不談「堅持中華民國主權」,藉此與國民黨作出政治區隔。民進黨此種刻意建構的政治區隔,一貫將「台灣」與「中華民國」操作成敵對關係;因而,在今日台獨建國已然全盤幻滅的現實下,民進黨面臨的主要難題即是:它該如何回到中華民國?
在世局國情巨變中,解嚴二十餘年來憲政變遷的結論是:台獨未能推翻、顛覆中華民國,而是中華民國包容、緩和、化解了台獨。李登輝、陳水扁皆未能以台獨篡奪中華民國得逞,未來也無人能作得到。
其實,民進黨敗選報告理當標舉的第一個前提應是:台獨已絕無可能。然後,再依據這個前提去演繹推論民進黨路線及政策的興革。但是,如今民進黨卻不敢誠實標舉這個前提,遂使其餘議論都點不出真正的痛處。
「九二共識」的「一中各表」,及「不統/不獨/不武」,即是不採「法理台獨」路線,而「堅持中華民國的主權」。且「九二共識/一中各表」,在國際上即是「布胡熱線/一中各表」。馬英九及國民黨站穩了「一中各表」的立場,在兩岸僵局中清理出政經脈絡。
反觀民進黨何以予人「反中/鎖國」的印象?實情是:要台獨,豈能不反中?要台獨,豈能不鎖國?試問:台獨既絕不可能,民進黨除了回到中華民國憲法,持守「一中各表」,「堅持中華民國主權」之外,豈有其他的政治邏輯,可以使民進黨撤守「反中鎖國」的陣地?否則,不能台獨,又不要中華民國,如何立足?
敗選檢討報告稱,要使民進黨擺脫「反中鎖國」的刻板印象,這應即是對「台獨已絕無可能」作出了結論,只是不敢明說。因為,不反中、不鎖國,如何台獨?但是,民進黨若明知台獨已不可能,又不明明白白地回到「一中各表」的中華民國憲法,「堅持中華民國主權」,卻將此一廣大政經空間全部送給了國民黨,試問民進黨將寄身何處?
敗選報告說:民進黨必須在互動中了解中國,以找出「面對中國的新方法」。問題是,民進黨甚至曾執政八年,難道仍未能「從互動中了解中國」?而除了放棄台獨路線,回到「一中各表」的中華民國,「堅持中華民國主權」之外,民進黨還能想出什麼「面對中國的新方法」?
長久以來,民進黨皆自陷於「將台灣與中華民國敵對」的困境,即使蔡英文在選季說「台灣就是中華民國/中華民國就是台灣」,那也只是一個被「分化、窄化的台灣」所掏空的「中華民國」,已非「一中各表」的中華民國憲法上的中華民國。
民進黨的根本困局,在於既不能台獨,又不肯誠實回到中華民國;實際上,民進黨若不能找到「面對中華民國新方法」,即不能找到「面對中國的新方法」。在民進黨的「最後一哩路」上,如果在造勢場合仍然看不到一面中華民國的國旗,這虛擬的一哩路將看不到實體的終點與歸宿。
DPP Post-Election Review: First Reclaim Your Common Sense
DPP Post-Election Review: First Reclaim Your Common Sense
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2012
Summary: Yesterday the Democratic Progressive Party finally published its official review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls. The review is riddled with holes. Even party leaders are skeptical. Fortunately, the election debacle was also shock therapy. Some party leaders have finally reclaimed the party's erstwhile spirit of self-examination. The DPP wants to become a competitive political party, one able to return to power. But in order to do so, it must first establish an atmosphere of open debate, under which it can discuss the future of the party.
Full Text below:
Yesterday the Democratic Progressive Party finally published its official review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls. The review is riddled with holes. Even party leaders are skeptical. Fortunately, the election debacle was also shock therapy. Some party leaders have finally reclaimed the party's erstwhile spirit of self-examination. The DPP wants to become a competitive political party, one able to return to power. But in order to do so, it must first establish an atmosphere of open debate, under which it can discuss the future of the party.
The DPP's official review has itself been the subject of highly critical reviews. This is where Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP leadership currently stand. Former Vice President Annette Lu used the occasion to announce her own "10,000 Word Manifesto," entitled "A Report to the People." Her every word drew blood. She said what the DPP leadership was afraid to say. For example, she blasted Tsai Ing-wen for dodging questions about the TaiMed corruption scandal. She questioned the propriety of Tsai's conduct. She even questioned Tsai's ability to defend herself. She demanded to know why Tsai Ing-wen failed to change the DPP's reputation for corruption. She demanded to know "why the party refused to discipline corrupt members, and why they were dealt with selectively, or not at all." She said no wonder the KMT's TV spot featuring Russian matryoshka dolls were so devastatingly effective.
Annette Lu's public manifesto could be termed a "common sense" review. For example, she criticized Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus," saying it was devoid of content. She criticized the DPP's "Three Little Pigs vs. the Big Bad Wolf" campaign pitch. She criticized the DPP campaign for provoking discontent with the DPP within the business community. Lu's manifesto merely said what everyone already knew. By contrast, the DPP's official review blurs and evades the real issues. It is a living illustration of the Emperor's New Clothes.
The DPP 's reluctance to face reality is nothing new. The DPP has been out of touch with public perception and common sense for quite some time. The DPP's official review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls is merely an indicator. Lu's manifesto may have identified the problems. But blaming the candidates merely makes a mountain out of a molehill. It fails to address the DPP's real problem. In fact the "party princes," including Lu herself, are all part of the problem. Annette Lu criticized the Tsai Ing-wen led Democratic Progressive Party. She blamed a "historical fault line, a leadership succession fault line." But what about before Tsai Ing-wen? Did the party princes even have an "historical legacy" worth mentioning?
When the DPP party princes headed up the Democratic Progressive Party, their ideology was Taiwan independence extremism. Their rhetoric was populist extremism. They not only rejected cross-Strait exchanges. They even incited divisions on Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen at least presented a rational public face. She softened the party's rhetoric. She moderated Taiwan's political atmosphere. She refrained from inciting "ethnic" (social) divisions and reunification vs. independence controversy. Unfortunately Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic Progressive Party elites merely whitewashed the DPP edifice. They did not bother to repair its structure. They never addressed their cross-Strait Achilles Heel. They assumed they could squeak by. They assumed these surface gestures would enable the DPP to return to power.
The election results showed that a coat of whitewash or a new leader with a feelgood public image was not enough to instill voter confidence in the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen must have repeated a hundred times that if elected, the DPP would continue exchanges with the Mainland. But actions spoke louder than words. Voters recalled all too clearly DPP legislators fighting tooth and nail against the recognition of Mainland academic credentials, and against the admission of Mainland students to Taiwan. Voters long ago pegged the DPP as a political party filled with unregenerate Sinophobes opposed to cross-Strait reconciliation. Mere lip service to cross-Strait rapprochement at election time was clearly insufficient to change voter perceptions.
After all, cross-Strait or internal trust must be earned, long-term. As middle-aged DPP leader Tuan Yi-kang put it, the DPP habitually views the Mainland with hostility. No elections are scheduled for the next two years. The DPP should use the opportunity to reverse this impression. Such impressions cannot be changed by slogans coined just before election day. Li Ying-yuan was even more blunt. He said that if the DPP fails to rethink its cross-Strait policy, the results will be the same in 2016. No matter how high election fever may run, no matter how loud election slogans are shouted, during the final week the party will once again discover that its situation is hopeless.
Fortunately for the DPP, in the aftermath of its defeat. pragmatists within the party are gaining the upper hand. Tsai Ing-wen's defeat is important because it has given DPP elites a healthy dose of reality. If DPP leaders still refuse to acknowledge the party's cross-Strait policy Achilles Heel, they will never go the final mile to victory. The DPP has finally adopted a policy of "Let a hundred flowers bloom." This is essential to the DPP's transformation.
Political party transformation sounds enigmatic. Actually, it is quite prosaic. The key is common sense. As former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang said, the DPP's cross-Strait stance must keep pace with the rest of the world. Otherwise, it will suffer the same fate it did during this election. It will be shut out by both Beijing and Washington. The whole world is reaching out to the Mainland. If the DPP tries to remain aloof, it will merely be swept into the dustbin of history.
The DPP's official review of the reasons for defeat at the polls has been released. But the DPP has only just begun its transformation. The Green Camp remains a prisoner of the past. It is also wracked by a power struggle for the party chairmanship. The road ahead will inevitably be strewn with obstacles. But if it refuses to transform itself, the DPP will have no future whatsoever, members of the Democratic Progressive Party elite have already begun debating the party's future. They must have the determination to begin anew. Looking back is no longer an option.
社論-民進黨反省,先回歸常識
2012-02-23 00:55
中國時報
【本報訊】
民進黨昨日終於正式提出敗選檢討報告,這一份留白甚多的報告,連黨內人士都多所質疑;值得慶幸的是,隨著此次敗選帶來的震撼教育,黨內總算又找回檢討批判的風氣,民進黨若要成為一個有競爭力的政黨、進而重返執政,黨內建立開放討論路線的風氣,是必要的第一步。
「檢討報告被檢討」,這是蔡英文及黨中央當前的處境。前副總統呂秀蓮搶在同一天發表萬言書,號稱是「民間版」的檢討報告,字字犀利,言民進黨中央所不敢言,例如,她批評蔡英文大選時迴避宇昌案,最後不但操守、連應變能力也受質疑;再如,她直言蔡英文並未切割貪腐印記,「為何黨紀對許多涉案人可以選擇性地處理或不處理」?難怪國民黨大選前一則「俄羅斯娃娃廣告」會造成巨大的殺傷力。
呂秀蓮這一份報告也可稱之為「常識版」的檢討報告。例如,她批評蔡英文提出的「台灣共識」語焉不詳,競選總部的「小豬對抗大野狼」訴求,也播下與企業界對立的種子。可以說,呂秀蓮的萬言書,說得是大家都知道的事,反襯出民進黨黨中央檢討報告模糊遮掩,活生生就是國王沒有穿衣服的翻版。
當然,民進黨之不願面對現實、與人民常識脫節久矣,敗選報告只是一個表徵;因此,呂秀蓮的萬言書雖然點出問題,但是單單責怪候選人,某種程度是挑小放大,沒有直指民進黨問題的核心;事實上,包括呂在內的天王,同時也是問題的一部分,呂秀蓮批評蔡英文領導下的民進黨,是「歷史斷層、經驗也斷層」,但是蔡英文之前的天王階段,又有什麼經驗是值得傳承的呢?
天王時代的民進黨,不但理念極獨,連修辭也極端民粹化,不只排斥兩岸交流,更不惜在台灣內部挑起對立;蔡英文至少以她溫和理性的形象,重整了反對黨的修辭學,改善台灣的政治文化,不再動輒挑起族群、統獨爭議;但是,蔡英文的問題在於,她及民進黨菁英認為,只要表面上的調整,不必徹底轉型,更不必處理兩岸罩門,就可以「頭過身就過」,讓民進黨重回執政。
這次的選舉結果證明,只是表面的擦脂抹粉,或是換了一個令人有好感的領導人,並不足以讓選民對民進黨產生信任感。蔡英文選舉時講一百遍將持續與中國交流,都比不上立法院朝野為了承認大陸學歷以及陸生來台大打出手,來得讓選民印象深刻。選民已將民進黨定位為反中、反兩岸交流的政黨,單憑大選時的承諾,顯然無法改變選民心中的觀感。
畢竟,不論是兩岸之間還是在台灣內部,所謂的信任必須是長期培養的。正如該黨中生代段宜康所說,民進黨平時的態度和政策對中國太不友善,未來兩年,民進黨要趁沒選舉時扭轉這種印象,因為這不是選前用幾句新創的口號或論述就能改變的;李應元更直言,民進黨如果不檢討兩岸政策,到二○一六年還是一樣,選舉再熱、呼聲再高,到最後一個禮拜還是發現大勢已去。
值得慶幸的是,民進黨雖然第二度遭逢敗選,但黨內務實派卻逐漸抬頭,蔡英文敗選的最大意義在於,民進黨菁英某種程度開始認清現實,如果他們不正視黨內的兩岸罩門,就不可能走完最後一哩路。因此,近來民進黨終於重現百花齊放的場面,這對民進黨轉型攸關重要。
所謂政黨轉型,聽來莫測高深,但其實平淡無奇,關鍵重點在於依常識而行。正如前民進黨黨主席許信良所說,民進黨的兩岸立場至少要和全球同步,否則就如這次大選,必將引來中美聯手封鎖;當全球都和中國打交道,民進黨如果置身事外,最後只有等待被歷史淘汰。
敗選報告出爐,民進黨轉型卻才要踏上第一哩路,鑑於綠營長年情結,再加上黨主席選舉所牽扯的權力鬥爭,此路必然險阻重重;但是,如果不轉型,民進黨毫無前途可言,已經啟動辯論的民進黨菁英,要有破釜沉舟的決心,因為他們已無回頭路!
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2012
Summary: Yesterday the Democratic Progressive Party finally published its official review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls. The review is riddled with holes. Even party leaders are skeptical. Fortunately, the election debacle was also shock therapy. Some party leaders have finally reclaimed the party's erstwhile spirit of self-examination. The DPP wants to become a competitive political party, one able to return to power. But in order to do so, it must first establish an atmosphere of open debate, under which it can discuss the future of the party.
Full Text below:
Yesterday the Democratic Progressive Party finally published its official review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls. The review is riddled with holes. Even party leaders are skeptical. Fortunately, the election debacle was also shock therapy. Some party leaders have finally reclaimed the party's erstwhile spirit of self-examination. The DPP wants to become a competitive political party, one able to return to power. But in order to do so, it must first establish an atmosphere of open debate, under which it can discuss the future of the party.
The DPP's official review has itself been the subject of highly critical reviews. This is where Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP leadership currently stand. Former Vice President Annette Lu used the occasion to announce her own "10,000 Word Manifesto," entitled "A Report to the People." Her every word drew blood. She said what the DPP leadership was afraid to say. For example, she blasted Tsai Ing-wen for dodging questions about the TaiMed corruption scandal. She questioned the propriety of Tsai's conduct. She even questioned Tsai's ability to defend herself. She demanded to know why Tsai Ing-wen failed to change the DPP's reputation for corruption. She demanded to know "why the party refused to discipline corrupt members, and why they were dealt with selectively, or not at all." She said no wonder the KMT's TV spot featuring Russian matryoshka dolls were so devastatingly effective.
Annette Lu's public manifesto could be termed a "common sense" review. For example, she criticized Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus," saying it was devoid of content. She criticized the DPP's "Three Little Pigs vs. the Big Bad Wolf" campaign pitch. She criticized the DPP campaign for provoking discontent with the DPP within the business community. Lu's manifesto merely said what everyone already knew. By contrast, the DPP's official review blurs and evades the real issues. It is a living illustration of the Emperor's New Clothes.
The DPP 's reluctance to face reality is nothing new. The DPP has been out of touch with public perception and common sense for quite some time. The DPP's official review of the reasons for its defeat at the polls is merely an indicator. Lu's manifesto may have identified the problems. But blaming the candidates merely makes a mountain out of a molehill. It fails to address the DPP's real problem. In fact the "party princes," including Lu herself, are all part of the problem. Annette Lu criticized the Tsai Ing-wen led Democratic Progressive Party. She blamed a "historical fault line, a leadership succession fault line." But what about before Tsai Ing-wen? Did the party princes even have an "historical legacy" worth mentioning?
When the DPP party princes headed up the Democratic Progressive Party, their ideology was Taiwan independence extremism. Their rhetoric was populist extremism. They not only rejected cross-Strait exchanges. They even incited divisions on Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen at least presented a rational public face. She softened the party's rhetoric. She moderated Taiwan's political atmosphere. She refrained from inciting "ethnic" (social) divisions and reunification vs. independence controversy. Unfortunately Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic Progressive Party elites merely whitewashed the DPP edifice. They did not bother to repair its structure. They never addressed their cross-Strait Achilles Heel. They assumed they could squeak by. They assumed these surface gestures would enable the DPP to return to power.
The election results showed that a coat of whitewash or a new leader with a feelgood public image was not enough to instill voter confidence in the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen must have repeated a hundred times that if elected, the DPP would continue exchanges with the Mainland. But actions spoke louder than words. Voters recalled all too clearly DPP legislators fighting tooth and nail against the recognition of Mainland academic credentials, and against the admission of Mainland students to Taiwan. Voters long ago pegged the DPP as a political party filled with unregenerate Sinophobes opposed to cross-Strait reconciliation. Mere lip service to cross-Strait rapprochement at election time was clearly insufficient to change voter perceptions.
After all, cross-Strait or internal trust must be earned, long-term. As middle-aged DPP leader Tuan Yi-kang put it, the DPP habitually views the Mainland with hostility. No elections are scheduled for the next two years. The DPP should use the opportunity to reverse this impression. Such impressions cannot be changed by slogans coined just before election day. Li Ying-yuan was even more blunt. He said that if the DPP fails to rethink its cross-Strait policy, the results will be the same in 2016. No matter how high election fever may run, no matter how loud election slogans are shouted, during the final week the party will once again discover that its situation is hopeless.
Fortunately for the DPP, in the aftermath of its defeat. pragmatists within the party are gaining the upper hand. Tsai Ing-wen's defeat is important because it has given DPP elites a healthy dose of reality. If DPP leaders still refuse to acknowledge the party's cross-Strait policy Achilles Heel, they will never go the final mile to victory. The DPP has finally adopted a policy of "Let a hundred flowers bloom." This is essential to the DPP's transformation.
Political party transformation sounds enigmatic. Actually, it is quite prosaic. The key is common sense. As former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang said, the DPP's cross-Strait stance must keep pace with the rest of the world. Otherwise, it will suffer the same fate it did during this election. It will be shut out by both Beijing and Washington. The whole world is reaching out to the Mainland. If the DPP tries to remain aloof, it will merely be swept into the dustbin of history.
The DPP's official review of the reasons for defeat at the polls has been released. But the DPP has only just begun its transformation. The Green Camp remains a prisoner of the past. It is also wracked by a power struggle for the party chairmanship. The road ahead will inevitably be strewn with obstacles. But if it refuses to transform itself, the DPP will have no future whatsoever, members of the Democratic Progressive Party elite have already begun debating the party's future. They must have the determination to begin anew. Looking back is no longer an option.
社論-民進黨反省,先回歸常識
2012-02-23 00:55
中國時報
【本報訊】
民進黨昨日終於正式提出敗選檢討報告,這一份留白甚多的報告,連黨內人士都多所質疑;值得慶幸的是,隨著此次敗選帶來的震撼教育,黨內總算又找回檢討批判的風氣,民進黨若要成為一個有競爭力的政黨、進而重返執政,黨內建立開放討論路線的風氣,是必要的第一步。
「檢討報告被檢討」,這是蔡英文及黨中央當前的處境。前副總統呂秀蓮搶在同一天發表萬言書,號稱是「民間版」的檢討報告,字字犀利,言民進黨中央所不敢言,例如,她批評蔡英文大選時迴避宇昌案,最後不但操守、連應變能力也受質疑;再如,她直言蔡英文並未切割貪腐印記,「為何黨紀對許多涉案人可以選擇性地處理或不處理」?難怪國民黨大選前一則「俄羅斯娃娃廣告」會造成巨大的殺傷力。
呂秀蓮這一份報告也可稱之為「常識版」的檢討報告。例如,她批評蔡英文提出的「台灣共識」語焉不詳,競選總部的「小豬對抗大野狼」訴求,也播下與企業界對立的種子。可以說,呂秀蓮的萬言書,說得是大家都知道的事,反襯出民進黨黨中央檢討報告模糊遮掩,活生生就是國王沒有穿衣服的翻版。
當然,民進黨之不願面對現實、與人民常識脫節久矣,敗選報告只是一個表徵;因此,呂秀蓮的萬言書雖然點出問題,但是單單責怪候選人,某種程度是挑小放大,沒有直指民進黨問題的核心;事實上,包括呂在內的天王,同時也是問題的一部分,呂秀蓮批評蔡英文領導下的民進黨,是「歷史斷層、經驗也斷層」,但是蔡英文之前的天王階段,又有什麼經驗是值得傳承的呢?
天王時代的民進黨,不但理念極獨,連修辭也極端民粹化,不只排斥兩岸交流,更不惜在台灣內部挑起對立;蔡英文至少以她溫和理性的形象,重整了反對黨的修辭學,改善台灣的政治文化,不再動輒挑起族群、統獨爭議;但是,蔡英文的問題在於,她及民進黨菁英認為,只要表面上的調整,不必徹底轉型,更不必處理兩岸罩門,就可以「頭過身就過」,讓民進黨重回執政。
這次的選舉結果證明,只是表面的擦脂抹粉,或是換了一個令人有好感的領導人,並不足以讓選民對民進黨產生信任感。蔡英文選舉時講一百遍將持續與中國交流,都比不上立法院朝野為了承認大陸學歷以及陸生來台大打出手,來得讓選民印象深刻。選民已將民進黨定位為反中、反兩岸交流的政黨,單憑大選時的承諾,顯然無法改變選民心中的觀感。
畢竟,不論是兩岸之間還是在台灣內部,所謂的信任必須是長期培養的。正如該黨中生代段宜康所說,民進黨平時的態度和政策對中國太不友善,未來兩年,民進黨要趁沒選舉時扭轉這種印象,因為這不是選前用幾句新創的口號或論述就能改變的;李應元更直言,民進黨如果不檢討兩岸政策,到二○一六年還是一樣,選舉再熱、呼聲再高,到最後一個禮拜還是發現大勢已去。
值得慶幸的是,民進黨雖然第二度遭逢敗選,但黨內務實派卻逐漸抬頭,蔡英文敗選的最大意義在於,民進黨菁英某種程度開始認清現實,如果他們不正視黨內的兩岸罩門,就不可能走完最後一哩路。因此,近來民進黨終於重現百花齊放的場面,這對民進黨轉型攸關重要。
所謂政黨轉型,聽來莫測高深,但其實平淡無奇,關鍵重點在於依常識而行。正如前民進黨黨主席許信良所說,民進黨的兩岸立場至少要和全球同步,否則就如這次大選,必將引來中美聯手封鎖;當全球都和中國打交道,民進黨如果置身事外,最後只有等待被歷史淘汰。
敗選報告出爐,民進黨轉型卻才要踏上第一哩路,鑑於綠營長年情結,再加上黨主席選舉所牽扯的權力鬥爭,此路必然險阻重重;但是,如果不轉型,民進黨毫無前途可言,已經啟動辯論的民進黨菁英,要有破釜沉舟的決心,因為他們已無回頭路!
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
Jeremy Lin Inspires Fans and Rivals Alike to Excel
Jeremy Lin Inspires Fans and Rivals Alike to Excel
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 21, 2012
Summary: Half a month ago, you might have been indifferent about the NBA. Now however, you have begun watching basketball game broadcasts. Half a month ago, American basketball was a black and white world. Now however, the world has gone "Lin-sane" over the performance of a kid with a yellow face. Half a month ago, Asian Americans were frequently called "Chink!" Now however, throwing that word around could get a person fired.
Full Text below:
Half a month ago, you might have been indifferent about the NBA. Now however, you have begun watching basketball game broadcasts. Half a month ago, American basketball was a black and white world. Now however, the world has gone "Lin-sane" over the performance of a kid with a yellow face. Half a month ago, Asian Americans were frequently called "Chink!" Now however, throwing that word around could get a person fired.
These changes are all due to Jeremy Lin. In a mere half month. Jeremy Lin has changed his own destiny. He has changed the way people view destiny. Now people believe they make their own destiny.
Jeremy Lin's quickness and skill overcame the limitations of physical size. LIn shattered the myth that Asians cannot become basketball champions. Lin's head sports a halo from Harvard. Lin shattered the myth that sports does not require intelligence. Lin is at home with a pen as he is with a sword. He has added a spectacular page to the annals of basketball. He has sparked debate about the limits of human potential.
"Lin-sanity" has inspired praise for Lin's achievements. More importantly, many more people are sharing in his surprise and his joy. Take the Knicks, Lin pulled them out of a long slump. Take Coach Mike D'Antoni. Lin enabled him to implement his blitzkreig tactics. This enabled the two to emerge from obscurity and stand in the spotlight. Take New York. His "Lin-derella tale" has made the Big Apple proud. Take the NBA. The halo from an outstanding colorful Asian player has vastly expanded its market. Take Asian Americans. "Lin-sanity" has shattered racist psychological barriers. it has helped Asian Americans stand tall, with heads held high. Take children learning to play ball. Lin is model student, who excelled both in his studies and at sports. Take people who have suffered setbacks on the road of life. His "Lin-derella tale" has encouraged them and given them hope.
To insist that Jeremy Lin is "Taiwan's Glory," is to define him and his achievements far too parochially. It falls into the trap of racism we were trying to avoid in the first place. Jeremy Lin's success is something the public on Taiwan can be truly proud of. But LIn's significance reaches far beyond this. By blood, he is the product of locally born and Mainland born grandparents. He is the offspring of so-called "yam/tarot" forebears. He grew up as a dyed in the wool American kid. During his pursuit of a career in basketball, he was contemptuously dismissed based on his skin color. But in the end his extraordinary determination and intelligence transformed him from benchwarmer to sports star.
Note that Jeremy Lin gained fame playing the Nets only half a month ago. Yesterday, half a month later, he faced the Nets once more. This time he suffered a defeated. This confirms that basketball is a team sport, not a one man circus act. Half a month ago, during that game, Jeremy Lin subbed for an injured veteran who had to be benched. This gave him a chance to strut his stuff, to demonstrate his quickness and agility. Every player who participated in the previous game returned for yesterday's game. This time however, the Knicks tactics were disorganized and stiff. This suggests that the changes made by the Knicks coach and the team failed to keep pace with "Lin-sanity." The Knicks played nine games and lost twice, both times to weaker teams, including the recent loss to the Hornets. This may be worth noting.
One thing however stands out. Jeremy Lin is acutely aware of how his personal fame has changed his relationship to his team. He is seeking to perform at his personal best, while striving to retain his teammates' trust. The signs are obvious. During every game, he tries to make as many assists as possible. He tries to help his teammates score. This enables him to integrate himself into an attacking formation under his control. While playing the Kings, everyone was wondering whether Lin would break Shaquille O'Neal's scoring record. Jeremy Lin forsook the chance to break Shaq's record. Instead he made 13 assists. He helped seven of his teammates achieve double-digit scores. One might say that this is nothing more than what a point guard is supposed to to do. But it would be more accurate to say this was a demonstration of Jeremy Lin's basketball EQ. It was his unique way of earning his teammates' trust.
In the annals of basketball, Jeremy Lin is a breed apart, He is the second Harvard graduate in NBA history, He is seventh Asian player in NBA history. He refrains from exploiting his minority status. Even after a stellar performance, he remains modest. He credits the team for the win. Jeremy Lin's success is no accident. If not for his parents education and understanding, he could never have embarked on such a journey. If not for his love of basketball, he could never have developed his magical "man and ball are one" skills. If not for his devotion and faith, he could never have remained so grounded and generous amidst newfound superstar status. People forget. Lin is merely a 23-year-old kid.
If not for his two-year stint warming the bench, the Jeremy Lin legend would not be so dazzling, This is the source of "Lin-sanity." Scan the stands from the court, and one sees many in the audience wearing Jeremy Lin masks. They are projecting their own psyches on to him. Many NBA teams are busy studying Knicks tactics, trying to crack the "Lin method." Jeremy Lin has given followers and opponents alike the "Lin-spiration" to do better, That is Jeremy Lin's greatest achievement.
林書豪使朋友與對手都變得更好
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.02.22 09:04 am
半個月前,也許你根本不關心NBA;現在,你開始看起籃球轉播。半個月前,美國籃壇只是黑人和白人的天下;現在,幾乎全球都在瘋一個黃皮膚小子的演出。半個月前,亞裔遭辱罵Chink的事時有所聞;現在,使用那個字眼的人可能會丟掉飯碗。
這些改變,全因林書豪而起。僅僅半個月,林書豪改寫了他自己的命運,他也改變了人們對命運的看法:命運是可以創造的。
林書豪以速度和美技突破了體格的限制,粉碎了亞洲人無法成為籃球高手的假說。他頂著哈佛的光環,打破運動不需要智慧的錯誤印象,允文也允武。他為籃球運動締造了美好的一頁,也激起了人們對人類可能性的大聲驚嘆。
「林來瘋」的傳奇,不僅讓人讚賞他的光芒,更重要的是,他的驚奇和喜悅能被許許多多人分享。對尼克隊而言,豪小子使它走出了長期的低迷;對教練丹東尼而言,找到了一個能實現他「快打戰術」的好手,使兩人從裁員邊緣變成世所矚目;對紐約而言,「豪小子」奇蹟增添了城市的驕傲;對NBA而言,因亞裔球員的傑出光芒而更顯色彩繽紛,也擴大了市場;對美國亞裔而言,因種族心理藩籬的破除,而揚眉吐氣;對打球的孩子而言,多了一個文武雙全的偶像;對在人生道路上受挫折的人,因為林書豪的故事而得到莫大鼓舞。
把林書豪說成「台灣之光」,是窄化了他的表現,同時也掉入了大家原想避免的種族陷阱。林書豪的成功,台灣人與有榮焉;但「豪小子」崛起的意義,要遠大於此。在血緣上,他是父系加母系的「番薯芋頭」;在成長經驗上,他是如假包換的美國小子;在籃壇追逐的過程,他曾因膚色而受到壓抑與輕視;但最後他憑著過人的毅力和智慧,把自己從板凳球員變成了一顆璀璨的新星。
值得注意的是,半個月前,林書豪在對籃網之役暴紅;半個月後,昨天他再度面對籃網,卻以敗北收場。這恰恰說明了籃球是一種團隊比賽,而不是個人的特技演出。半月前那場比賽,林書豪因為隊上老將受傷而替補上陣,而得以大顯身手,將他個人快速、靈活的特質發揮到極致;昨天之役所有老將全部歸隊,尼克的打法反而失去體系和靈活。這說明尼克教練的調度,以及球隊的調整,都還沒跟上「林來瘋」的驟變。尼克近九場的兩次敗績,都輸給較弱的隊伍,包括日前輸給黃蜂,或許皆可作如是觀。
難得的是,林書豪非常意識到自己崛起與團隊關係的改變,他在追求表現之際,也努力維持隊友的信賴。最明顯的是,他每場比賽都製造大量助攻,幫助隊友得分,讓他們融入由他掌控及發動的攻擊隊形。對國王隊一役,當外界都在觀察他會不會打破「俠客」歐尼爾的得分紀錄時,林書豪放棄破紀錄的機會,卻送出十三次助攻,幫七位隊友取得兩位數以上的得分。與其說這是一名控衛的精神,不如說這是林書豪的籃球EQ,也是他贏取團隊信任的不二法門。
在籃球史上,林書豪絕對是一個異數。作為NBA史上的第二位哈佛畢業球員、第七名亞裔球員,他小心翼翼經營這個「少數」的位置;即使在大放異采後,他依舊保持謙抑,把榮耀歸諸團隊。林書豪的成功,也絕非偶然。若不是雙親的教養與理解,他不可能有如此華麗的人生冒險;若不是出於對籃球的熱愛,他不可能鍛練出如此「人球一體」的神奇技巧;也正因為有虔誠的信仰,他才能在暴紅後仍表現超齡的穩健與寬容,讓人忘了他不過是個廿三歲的小伙子。
如果沒有兩年板凳生涯的襯托,林書豪的傳奇就不可能如此炫麗,這正是「林來瘋」耐人咀嚼之處。在球場看台上,許多觀眾戴著林書豪的面具,把自己投射為他;在NBA,許多球隊忙著研究尼克隊戰術,設法破解「林體系」。讓追隨者和對手都想要變得更好,這是林書豪最大的成功。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 21, 2012
Summary: Half a month ago, you might have been indifferent about the NBA. Now however, you have begun watching basketball game broadcasts. Half a month ago, American basketball was a black and white world. Now however, the world has gone "Lin-sane" over the performance of a kid with a yellow face. Half a month ago, Asian Americans were frequently called "Chink!" Now however, throwing that word around could get a person fired.
Full Text below:
Half a month ago, you might have been indifferent about the NBA. Now however, you have begun watching basketball game broadcasts. Half a month ago, American basketball was a black and white world. Now however, the world has gone "Lin-sane" over the performance of a kid with a yellow face. Half a month ago, Asian Americans were frequently called "Chink!" Now however, throwing that word around could get a person fired.
These changes are all due to Jeremy Lin. In a mere half month. Jeremy Lin has changed his own destiny. He has changed the way people view destiny. Now people believe they make their own destiny.
Jeremy Lin's quickness and skill overcame the limitations of physical size. LIn shattered the myth that Asians cannot become basketball champions. Lin's head sports a halo from Harvard. Lin shattered the myth that sports does not require intelligence. Lin is at home with a pen as he is with a sword. He has added a spectacular page to the annals of basketball. He has sparked debate about the limits of human potential.
"Lin-sanity" has inspired praise for Lin's achievements. More importantly, many more people are sharing in his surprise and his joy. Take the Knicks, Lin pulled them out of a long slump. Take Coach Mike D'Antoni. Lin enabled him to implement his blitzkreig tactics. This enabled the two to emerge from obscurity and stand in the spotlight. Take New York. His "Lin-derella tale" has made the Big Apple proud. Take the NBA. The halo from an outstanding colorful Asian player has vastly expanded its market. Take Asian Americans. "Lin-sanity" has shattered racist psychological barriers. it has helped Asian Americans stand tall, with heads held high. Take children learning to play ball. Lin is model student, who excelled both in his studies and at sports. Take people who have suffered setbacks on the road of life. His "Lin-derella tale" has encouraged them and given them hope.
To insist that Jeremy Lin is "Taiwan's Glory," is to define him and his achievements far too parochially. It falls into the trap of racism we were trying to avoid in the first place. Jeremy Lin's success is something the public on Taiwan can be truly proud of. But LIn's significance reaches far beyond this. By blood, he is the product of locally born and Mainland born grandparents. He is the offspring of so-called "yam/tarot" forebears. He grew up as a dyed in the wool American kid. During his pursuit of a career in basketball, he was contemptuously dismissed based on his skin color. But in the end his extraordinary determination and intelligence transformed him from benchwarmer to sports star.
Note that Jeremy Lin gained fame playing the Nets only half a month ago. Yesterday, half a month later, he faced the Nets once more. This time he suffered a defeated. This confirms that basketball is a team sport, not a one man circus act. Half a month ago, during that game, Jeremy Lin subbed for an injured veteran who had to be benched. This gave him a chance to strut his stuff, to demonstrate his quickness and agility. Every player who participated in the previous game returned for yesterday's game. This time however, the Knicks tactics were disorganized and stiff. This suggests that the changes made by the Knicks coach and the team failed to keep pace with "Lin-sanity." The Knicks played nine games and lost twice, both times to weaker teams, including the recent loss to the Hornets. This may be worth noting.
One thing however stands out. Jeremy Lin is acutely aware of how his personal fame has changed his relationship to his team. He is seeking to perform at his personal best, while striving to retain his teammates' trust. The signs are obvious. During every game, he tries to make as many assists as possible. He tries to help his teammates score. This enables him to integrate himself into an attacking formation under his control. While playing the Kings, everyone was wondering whether Lin would break Shaquille O'Neal's scoring record. Jeremy Lin forsook the chance to break Shaq's record. Instead he made 13 assists. He helped seven of his teammates achieve double-digit scores. One might say that this is nothing more than what a point guard is supposed to to do. But it would be more accurate to say this was a demonstration of Jeremy Lin's basketball EQ. It was his unique way of earning his teammates' trust.
In the annals of basketball, Jeremy Lin is a breed apart, He is the second Harvard graduate in NBA history, He is seventh Asian player in NBA history. He refrains from exploiting his minority status. Even after a stellar performance, he remains modest. He credits the team for the win. Jeremy Lin's success is no accident. If not for his parents education and understanding, he could never have embarked on such a journey. If not for his love of basketball, he could never have developed his magical "man and ball are one" skills. If not for his devotion and faith, he could never have remained so grounded and generous amidst newfound superstar status. People forget. Lin is merely a 23-year-old kid.
If not for his two-year stint warming the bench, the Jeremy Lin legend would not be so dazzling, This is the source of "Lin-sanity." Scan the stands from the court, and one sees many in the audience wearing Jeremy Lin masks. They are projecting their own psyches on to him. Many NBA teams are busy studying Knicks tactics, trying to crack the "Lin method." Jeremy Lin has given followers and opponents alike the "Lin-spiration" to do better, That is Jeremy Lin's greatest achievement.
林書豪使朋友與對手都變得更好
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.02.22 09:04 am
半個月前,也許你根本不關心NBA;現在,你開始看起籃球轉播。半個月前,美國籃壇只是黑人和白人的天下;現在,幾乎全球都在瘋一個黃皮膚小子的演出。半個月前,亞裔遭辱罵Chink的事時有所聞;現在,使用那個字眼的人可能會丟掉飯碗。
這些改變,全因林書豪而起。僅僅半個月,林書豪改寫了他自己的命運,他也改變了人們對命運的看法:命運是可以創造的。
林書豪以速度和美技突破了體格的限制,粉碎了亞洲人無法成為籃球高手的假說。他頂著哈佛的光環,打破運動不需要智慧的錯誤印象,允文也允武。他為籃球運動締造了美好的一頁,也激起了人們對人類可能性的大聲驚嘆。
「林來瘋」的傳奇,不僅讓人讚賞他的光芒,更重要的是,他的驚奇和喜悅能被許許多多人分享。對尼克隊而言,豪小子使它走出了長期的低迷;對教練丹東尼而言,找到了一個能實現他「快打戰術」的好手,使兩人從裁員邊緣變成世所矚目;對紐約而言,「豪小子」奇蹟增添了城市的驕傲;對NBA而言,因亞裔球員的傑出光芒而更顯色彩繽紛,也擴大了市場;對美國亞裔而言,因種族心理藩籬的破除,而揚眉吐氣;對打球的孩子而言,多了一個文武雙全的偶像;對在人生道路上受挫折的人,因為林書豪的故事而得到莫大鼓舞。
把林書豪說成「台灣之光」,是窄化了他的表現,同時也掉入了大家原想避免的種族陷阱。林書豪的成功,台灣人與有榮焉;但「豪小子」崛起的意義,要遠大於此。在血緣上,他是父系加母系的「番薯芋頭」;在成長經驗上,他是如假包換的美國小子;在籃壇追逐的過程,他曾因膚色而受到壓抑與輕視;但最後他憑著過人的毅力和智慧,把自己從板凳球員變成了一顆璀璨的新星。
值得注意的是,半個月前,林書豪在對籃網之役暴紅;半個月後,昨天他再度面對籃網,卻以敗北收場。這恰恰說明了籃球是一種團隊比賽,而不是個人的特技演出。半月前那場比賽,林書豪因為隊上老將受傷而替補上陣,而得以大顯身手,將他個人快速、靈活的特質發揮到極致;昨天之役所有老將全部歸隊,尼克的打法反而失去體系和靈活。這說明尼克教練的調度,以及球隊的調整,都還沒跟上「林來瘋」的驟變。尼克近九場的兩次敗績,都輸給較弱的隊伍,包括日前輸給黃蜂,或許皆可作如是觀。
難得的是,林書豪非常意識到自己崛起與團隊關係的改變,他在追求表現之際,也努力維持隊友的信賴。最明顯的是,他每場比賽都製造大量助攻,幫助隊友得分,讓他們融入由他掌控及發動的攻擊隊形。對國王隊一役,當外界都在觀察他會不會打破「俠客」歐尼爾的得分紀錄時,林書豪放棄破紀錄的機會,卻送出十三次助攻,幫七位隊友取得兩位數以上的得分。與其說這是一名控衛的精神,不如說這是林書豪的籃球EQ,也是他贏取團隊信任的不二法門。
在籃球史上,林書豪絕對是一個異數。作為NBA史上的第二位哈佛畢業球員、第七名亞裔球員,他小心翼翼經營這個「少數」的位置;即使在大放異采後,他依舊保持謙抑,把榮耀歸諸團隊。林書豪的成功,也絕非偶然。若不是雙親的教養與理解,他不可能有如此華麗的人生冒險;若不是出於對籃球的熱愛,他不可能鍛練出如此「人球一體」的神奇技巧;也正因為有虔誠的信仰,他才能在暴紅後仍表現超齡的穩健與寬容,讓人忘了他不過是個廿三歲的小伙子。
如果沒有兩年板凳生涯的襯托,林書豪的傳奇就不可能如此炫麗,這正是「林來瘋」耐人咀嚼之處。在球場看台上,許多觀眾戴著林書豪的面具,把自己投射為他;在NBA,許多球隊忙著研究尼克隊戰術,設法破解「林體系」。讓追隨者和對手都想要變得更好,這是林書豪最大的成功。
Tuesday, February 21, 2012
The DPP is Behind the Times
The DPP is Behind the Times
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 21, 2012
Summary: The DPP has begun discussing how to deal with the 1992 Consensus. It has begun talking about a new cross-Strait policy approach. But none of these matters are basic. They are all superficial matters of secondary importance. The DPP equates severing relations with Mainland China with maintaining "Taiwan's sovereignty." It defines itself as a party that knows only how to make war with the Chinese Mainland, not how to make peace. The fact is it no longer needs to define itself in this manner. The DPP is not merely behind the times. It is falling further and further behind the times. This is why it has been forced to engage in its post election defeat review. The DPP's definition of its role and its goal, must be rethought, from top to bottom.
Full Text below:
The DPP lost the presidential election by 800,000 votes. The DPP is currently reviewing why it was unable to close the gap. In fact the remaining gap is the gap between the times the DPP lives in, and the way the DPP defines itself.
Outsiders have sharply criticized the DPP's post-mortem review of its election defeat. Many within the party have raised questions about what went wrong in the DPP's bid to return to power. Why was it unable to go the distance? Many within the party have demanded serious soul-searching. Most agree that the DPP's stance on cross-Strait issues is the reason it is unable to gain the public trust. But most know that when faced with this problem, the DPP remains incapable of offering concrete alternatives. Internal dissent could even lead to a split within the party. Does the DPP really want to remain stuck where it is, unable to go the final mile?
Many charges have been leveled against outsiders. One charge is that the DPP was unfairly portrayed as opposed to Taiwanese businessmen. Another charge is that the KMT engaged in economic intimidation, and the intimidation worked. But these are all tactical matters. The real reason the DPP is stuck. is the way the DPP perceives itself. It is also the way outsiders perceive the DPP and its raison d'etre.
Taiwan was once under authoritarian rule. Local consciousness and local culture were suppressed. Cross-Strait confrontation led to a prolonged Mainland diplomatic blockade and military intimidation. It did not take long for "ethnic" (communal group) demagoguery to appear within the pro democracy movement. This "ethnic" demagoguery characterized the Kuomintang as a regime from the mainland whose goal was to annex Taiwan. It cast the KMT as the enemy of Taiwan. Inciting "ethnic" divisions and antagonisms became a convenient tool for political mobilization. Local people suffered many historical traumas. They feared and loathed Mainland authority.
The DPP became the spokesperson for this fear and loathing. The DPP habitually accused others of being "traitors who are selling out Taiwan." It cast itself as Taiwan's solitary champion. It made Taiwan independence the party's Holy Grail. It swore to defend Taiwan from Mainland China. This has been the core value of the DPP since its very inception. These are its most distinctive trademarks. That is why the DPP must cast the Chinese Mainland as a Evil Incarnate, and itself as Taiwan's only salvation. But what happens when the enemy is no longer the enemy? What happens when the cross-Strait standoff winds down? What happens when confrontation gradually becomes exchanges and cooperation? The reason for the DPP's existence begins to look outdated. Time has marched on. It has cast aside the life and death cross-Strait struggle. But the DPP knows only how to battle the "Communist bandits." Little wonder it has been left behind by the general public.
The DPP's self-definition is a throwback to a past in which the two sides faced each other with swords drawn. But the situation has changed. One. People on both sides of the Strait have spontaneously engaged in close interaction. Tourism, education, business, investment, marriage, medical treatment, and other exchanges have steadily increased. Two. The Chinese Mainland is increasingly important, politically and economically, to the international community, Europe looks to the Mainland for its debt problems. Businessmen from Taiwan are even more dependent upon the business opportunities made available. The United States needs Mainland cooperation on North Korea and Syria. Three. The Chinese mainland is changing. Economic growth, the free flow of information, and Internet communications, have steadily loosened its formerly monolithic rule. Wu Kan Village protests and elections are seen as an important step in the fight for democracy. The DPP has not addressed or dealt with these changes.
The changes on Mainland China have not occurred as quickly as the outside world might wish. There is still much to criticize. Cross-Strait sovereignty disputes remain unsolved. But the changes are already obvious, Yet the DPP's attitudes remain rigid and its policies calcified, inapplicable to a cross-Strait situation in which the two sides no longer face each other with swords drawn. Instead of changing with the times, the DPP has chosen to turn a blind eye to the changes that have taken place. It has chosen to minimize or distort their significance.
The DPP rejects Mainland China. It refuses to recognize its importance. The DPP is out of touch with reality. People on Taiwan have real world concerns about their continued livelihood. Worse still for the DPP, cross-Strait relations continue to increase. As a result, the DPP is increasingly perceived as obdurately obstructionist. It forfeited the opportunity to function in a positive manner. The public sees this. The DPP is a political party that remains mired in the past, incapable of dealing with the present. It is incapable of offering a practical blueprint for the future. How can it possibly win the peoples trust?
Let us speak frankly, from the heart. The people do not believe that if the DPP were to return to power, that it would make a genuine effort to reduce cross-Strait tensions and promote reconciliation and cooperation, Any such effort would be antithetical to the DPP's very justification for existence. Meanwhile, whenever the KMT promotes cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, it is invariably the target of DPP character assassination. This confirms and bolsters the impression that the DPP is unregenerate in its Sinophobia.
The DPP has begun discussing how to deal with the 1992 Consensus. It has begun talking about a new cross-Strait policy approach. But none of these matters are basic. They are all superficial matters of secondary importance. The DPP equates severing relations with Mainland China with maintaining "Taiwan's sovereignty." It defines itself as a party that knows only how to make war with the Chinese Mainland, not how to make peace. The fact is it no longer needs to define itself in this manner. The DPP is not merely behind the times. It is falling further and further behind the times. This is why it has been forced to engage in its post election defeat review. The DPP's definition of its role and its goal, must be rethought, from top to bottom.
民進黨落後時代一哩路
2012-02-21中國時報
總統大選以八十萬票落敗,民進黨正在檢討為什麼走不到這最後一哩路。其實,這一哩路的差距,就是民進黨的核心自我定位與時代的距離。
外界對民進黨敗選檢討報告的初稿有不少批評,對於民進黨重返執政的這最後一哩路出了什麼問題,黨內也提出了許多檢討。大部分人都同意,兩岸問題是民進黨無法取得人民信任的最重要關鍵;但大部分人也發現,對於這個問題,民進黨仍然拿不出什麼具體對策,而且也不保證將來討論時不會引發黨內分裂。民進黨,真的就要卡在這最後一哩了嗎?
現在許多檢討,包括被塑造成反台商、國民黨的經濟恐嚇奏效等等,其實都是戰術面的問題,真正把民進黨卡住的,是自己認定、也被外界認定的核心價值與基本功能定位。
台灣過去被威權統治,本土民意與文化都被壓抑,加上兩岸對抗下中國長期以外交封鎖與軍事威嚇對付台灣,台灣的民主運動在開始沒多久就出現了族群化的現象,簡單地把來自大陸的國民黨政權和一直想併吞台灣的中國都打成台灣的敵人。族群切割與對立是很好的動員工具,尤其是本省族群承受了不少歷史創傷,對來自中國大陸的力量有深刻的恐懼與仇視。
民進黨於是成為這種創傷、恐懼與仇恨的代言人,並且在經常指控別人是賣台叛徒後,把自己打造成台灣唯一的捍衛者,更把台獨列為政黨目標。保護台灣對抗中國大陸,是民進黨之所以存在至今的最核心價值,也是最鮮明的商標。所以,中國大陸必須是妖魔般的敵人,而唯有民進黨才能和敵人作戰。可是,當敵人不再是敵人,或者兩岸的對抗趨緩,逐漸走向交流合作時,民進黨的存在基礎就開始顯得過時。當時代往前走,把兩岸的你死我活拋下時,只會對匪作戰的民進黨,也跟著被主流民意拋下了。
民進黨的自我設定擺在過去的兩岸對峙狀況,但現在情況已經大有變化。第一、兩岸人民自發的互動綿密進行,旅遊、求學、經商、投資、通婚、就醫,交流不斷擴大深化。第二、中國大陸在國際舞台的政經地位愈形重要,歐債想找中國幫忙,台商更是不能放棄大陸商機,美國要處理北韓、敘利亞,一樣需要中國合作。第三、中國大陸內部也在改變,隨著經濟成長、資訊流通與網路傳播,原本鐵板一塊的統治不斷在各角落出現鬆動,烏坎村的抗爭與選舉更被視為爭民主的重要一步。而這些,民進黨都沒有好好正視及因應。
當然,中國大陸的變化沒有外界希望地快速,許多方面仍然遭到批評,而兩岸主權之爭仍然無解。但是,當時代變化已經非常明顯時,民進黨卻因為理念與政策路線太過僵化,不能適用在一個不再劍拔弩張的兩岸關係裡,因此選擇對變化視而不見、淡化或扭曲。
但是,民進黨排斥中國大陸、拒絕承認其重要性的態度,和當前台灣人民要生活的現實是脫節的。更糟的是,在未來兩岸發展的可能性裡,民進黨因而被視為一味阻撓交流的負面因素,失去了產生正面功能的機會。人民的眼睛是雪亮的,一個政黨,如果只背負著過去,卻沒有能力因應現在,更提不出什麼未來可行藍圖,如何得到人民的付託?
其實,更坦白講,打從心底,民眾就不相信如果民進黨上台執政,會真心想降低兩岸緊張、積極推動和解合作,因為這和民進黨本身的存在設定是完全相反的。而國民黨推動兩岸交流合作總是遭到民進黨人士批判,也一再印證並強化了民進黨「逢中必反」的形象。
民進黨內部已開始討論如何面對「九二共識」、要提出新的兩岸論述等等,但和更本質的東西相比,這些都只是次要的、表面性的東西而已。民進黨把切斷與中國的關係,和維護台灣主權劃上等號,把自己設定為只會戰不會和的角色,其實未必需要如此。現在民進黨不但落後時代一哩,距離還日益擴大。眼前固然要檢討敗選原因,但整個黨的核心定位與功能目標,更需要徹底做一番省思。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 21, 2012
Summary: The DPP has begun discussing how to deal with the 1992 Consensus. It has begun talking about a new cross-Strait policy approach. But none of these matters are basic. They are all superficial matters of secondary importance. The DPP equates severing relations with Mainland China with maintaining "Taiwan's sovereignty." It defines itself as a party that knows only how to make war with the Chinese Mainland, not how to make peace. The fact is it no longer needs to define itself in this manner. The DPP is not merely behind the times. It is falling further and further behind the times. This is why it has been forced to engage in its post election defeat review. The DPP's definition of its role and its goal, must be rethought, from top to bottom.
Full Text below:
The DPP lost the presidential election by 800,000 votes. The DPP is currently reviewing why it was unable to close the gap. In fact the remaining gap is the gap between the times the DPP lives in, and the way the DPP defines itself.
Outsiders have sharply criticized the DPP's post-mortem review of its election defeat. Many within the party have raised questions about what went wrong in the DPP's bid to return to power. Why was it unable to go the distance? Many within the party have demanded serious soul-searching. Most agree that the DPP's stance on cross-Strait issues is the reason it is unable to gain the public trust. But most know that when faced with this problem, the DPP remains incapable of offering concrete alternatives. Internal dissent could even lead to a split within the party. Does the DPP really want to remain stuck where it is, unable to go the final mile?
Many charges have been leveled against outsiders. One charge is that the DPP was unfairly portrayed as opposed to Taiwanese businessmen. Another charge is that the KMT engaged in economic intimidation, and the intimidation worked. But these are all tactical matters. The real reason the DPP is stuck. is the way the DPP perceives itself. It is also the way outsiders perceive the DPP and its raison d'etre.
Taiwan was once under authoritarian rule. Local consciousness and local culture were suppressed. Cross-Strait confrontation led to a prolonged Mainland diplomatic blockade and military intimidation. It did not take long for "ethnic" (communal group) demagoguery to appear within the pro democracy movement. This "ethnic" demagoguery characterized the Kuomintang as a regime from the mainland whose goal was to annex Taiwan. It cast the KMT as the enemy of Taiwan. Inciting "ethnic" divisions and antagonisms became a convenient tool for political mobilization. Local people suffered many historical traumas. They feared and loathed Mainland authority.
The DPP became the spokesperson for this fear and loathing. The DPP habitually accused others of being "traitors who are selling out Taiwan." It cast itself as Taiwan's solitary champion. It made Taiwan independence the party's Holy Grail. It swore to defend Taiwan from Mainland China. This has been the core value of the DPP since its very inception. These are its most distinctive trademarks. That is why the DPP must cast the Chinese Mainland as a Evil Incarnate, and itself as Taiwan's only salvation. But what happens when the enemy is no longer the enemy? What happens when the cross-Strait standoff winds down? What happens when confrontation gradually becomes exchanges and cooperation? The reason for the DPP's existence begins to look outdated. Time has marched on. It has cast aside the life and death cross-Strait struggle. But the DPP knows only how to battle the "Communist bandits." Little wonder it has been left behind by the general public.
The DPP's self-definition is a throwback to a past in which the two sides faced each other with swords drawn. But the situation has changed. One. People on both sides of the Strait have spontaneously engaged in close interaction. Tourism, education, business, investment, marriage, medical treatment, and other exchanges have steadily increased. Two. The Chinese Mainland is increasingly important, politically and economically, to the international community, Europe looks to the Mainland for its debt problems. Businessmen from Taiwan are even more dependent upon the business opportunities made available. The United States needs Mainland cooperation on North Korea and Syria. Three. The Chinese mainland is changing. Economic growth, the free flow of information, and Internet communications, have steadily loosened its formerly monolithic rule. Wu Kan Village protests and elections are seen as an important step in the fight for democracy. The DPP has not addressed or dealt with these changes.
The changes on Mainland China have not occurred as quickly as the outside world might wish. There is still much to criticize. Cross-Strait sovereignty disputes remain unsolved. But the changes are already obvious, Yet the DPP's attitudes remain rigid and its policies calcified, inapplicable to a cross-Strait situation in which the two sides no longer face each other with swords drawn. Instead of changing with the times, the DPP has chosen to turn a blind eye to the changes that have taken place. It has chosen to minimize or distort their significance.
The DPP rejects Mainland China. It refuses to recognize its importance. The DPP is out of touch with reality. People on Taiwan have real world concerns about their continued livelihood. Worse still for the DPP, cross-Strait relations continue to increase. As a result, the DPP is increasingly perceived as obdurately obstructionist. It forfeited the opportunity to function in a positive manner. The public sees this. The DPP is a political party that remains mired in the past, incapable of dealing with the present. It is incapable of offering a practical blueprint for the future. How can it possibly win the peoples trust?
Let us speak frankly, from the heart. The people do not believe that if the DPP were to return to power, that it would make a genuine effort to reduce cross-Strait tensions and promote reconciliation and cooperation, Any such effort would be antithetical to the DPP's very justification for existence. Meanwhile, whenever the KMT promotes cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, it is invariably the target of DPP character assassination. This confirms and bolsters the impression that the DPP is unregenerate in its Sinophobia.
The DPP has begun discussing how to deal with the 1992 Consensus. It has begun talking about a new cross-Strait policy approach. But none of these matters are basic. They are all superficial matters of secondary importance. The DPP equates severing relations with Mainland China with maintaining "Taiwan's sovereignty." It defines itself as a party that knows only how to make war with the Chinese Mainland, not how to make peace. The fact is it no longer needs to define itself in this manner. The DPP is not merely behind the times. It is falling further and further behind the times. This is why it has been forced to engage in its post election defeat review. The DPP's definition of its role and its goal, must be rethought, from top to bottom.
民進黨落後時代一哩路
2012-02-21中國時報
總統大選以八十萬票落敗,民進黨正在檢討為什麼走不到這最後一哩路。其實,這一哩路的差距,就是民進黨的核心自我定位與時代的距離。
外界對民進黨敗選檢討報告的初稿有不少批評,對於民進黨重返執政的這最後一哩路出了什麼問題,黨內也提出了許多檢討。大部分人都同意,兩岸問題是民進黨無法取得人民信任的最重要關鍵;但大部分人也發現,對於這個問題,民進黨仍然拿不出什麼具體對策,而且也不保證將來討論時不會引發黨內分裂。民進黨,真的就要卡在這最後一哩了嗎?
現在許多檢討,包括被塑造成反台商、國民黨的經濟恐嚇奏效等等,其實都是戰術面的問題,真正把民進黨卡住的,是自己認定、也被外界認定的核心價值與基本功能定位。
台灣過去被威權統治,本土民意與文化都被壓抑,加上兩岸對抗下中國長期以外交封鎖與軍事威嚇對付台灣,台灣的民主運動在開始沒多久就出現了族群化的現象,簡單地把來自大陸的國民黨政權和一直想併吞台灣的中國都打成台灣的敵人。族群切割與對立是很好的動員工具,尤其是本省族群承受了不少歷史創傷,對來自中國大陸的力量有深刻的恐懼與仇視。
民進黨於是成為這種創傷、恐懼與仇恨的代言人,並且在經常指控別人是賣台叛徒後,把自己打造成台灣唯一的捍衛者,更把台獨列為政黨目標。保護台灣對抗中國大陸,是民進黨之所以存在至今的最核心價值,也是最鮮明的商標。所以,中國大陸必須是妖魔般的敵人,而唯有民進黨才能和敵人作戰。可是,當敵人不再是敵人,或者兩岸的對抗趨緩,逐漸走向交流合作時,民進黨的存在基礎就開始顯得過時。當時代往前走,把兩岸的你死我活拋下時,只會對匪作戰的民進黨,也跟著被主流民意拋下了。
民進黨的自我設定擺在過去的兩岸對峙狀況,但現在情況已經大有變化。第一、兩岸人民自發的互動綿密進行,旅遊、求學、經商、投資、通婚、就醫,交流不斷擴大深化。第二、中國大陸在國際舞台的政經地位愈形重要,歐債想找中國幫忙,台商更是不能放棄大陸商機,美國要處理北韓、敘利亞,一樣需要中國合作。第三、中國大陸內部也在改變,隨著經濟成長、資訊流通與網路傳播,原本鐵板一塊的統治不斷在各角落出現鬆動,烏坎村的抗爭與選舉更被視為爭民主的重要一步。而這些,民進黨都沒有好好正視及因應。
當然,中國大陸的變化沒有外界希望地快速,許多方面仍然遭到批評,而兩岸主權之爭仍然無解。但是,當時代變化已經非常明顯時,民進黨卻因為理念與政策路線太過僵化,不能適用在一個不再劍拔弩張的兩岸關係裡,因此選擇對變化視而不見、淡化或扭曲。
但是,民進黨排斥中國大陸、拒絕承認其重要性的態度,和當前台灣人民要生活的現實是脫節的。更糟的是,在未來兩岸發展的可能性裡,民進黨因而被視為一味阻撓交流的負面因素,失去了產生正面功能的機會。人民的眼睛是雪亮的,一個政黨,如果只背負著過去,卻沒有能力因應現在,更提不出什麼未來可行藍圖,如何得到人民的付託?
其實,更坦白講,打從心底,民眾就不相信如果民進黨上台執政,會真心想降低兩岸緊張、積極推動和解合作,因為這和民進黨本身的存在設定是完全相反的。而國民黨推動兩岸交流合作總是遭到民進黨人士批判,也一再印證並強化了民進黨「逢中必反」的形象。
民進黨內部已開始討論如何面對「九二共識」、要提出新的兩岸論述等等,但和更本質的東西相比,這些都只是次要的、表面性的東西而已。民進黨把切斷與中國的關係,和維護台灣主權劃上等號,把自己設定為只會戰不會和的角色,其實未必需要如此。現在民進黨不但落後時代一哩,距離還日益擴大。眼前固然要檢討敗選原因,但整個黨的核心定位與功能目標,更需要徹底做一番省思。
Monday, February 20, 2012
Should We Implement Absentee Voting?
Should We Implement Absentee Voting?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 20, 2012
Summary: The current election system fails to allow absentee voting. This alone constitutes a breach of the constitution. The DPP, which casts itself as a "champion of human rights," has no excuse to oppose absentee voting. Alternate polling station voting has just been implemented for the central government level presidential and legislative elections. As long as one registers and specifies the polling station in advance, the technical aspects should be no problem. Absentee voting is necessary to uphold voter rights and enhance the quality of our democracy. Everything now depends on the DPP, on whether it insists on behaving as an obstacle to democracy.
Full Text below:
Ma Ying-jeou won the 2012 presidential election. The reasons were manifold. Everyone has his own take on why. Some say "The 1992 Consensus won the day." Lee Teng-hui objects to this interpretation. He blames the DPP's election defeat on the Ma administration. He accuses it of deliberately moving election day to the eve of the Spring Festival. He says this prevented many voters who work or study far from their voting districts from returning home to vote.
Actually the DPP's own post-election review said the fact that few voters returned home to vote was merely one of many reasons for its defeat. Also, who does not know that the most adamant opponent of absentee voting is the Green Camp itself?
In fact, the Green Camp has long considered voters working and studying far from their voting districts as the key to election outcomes. Two years ago, during the Three in One Municipal and County Elections, the DPP's slogan was "return home to vote, prosperity will appear." They asked young expatriates and those living far from their voting districts to return home and vote for the DPP.
On the one hand, the DPP encourages its supporters to return home to vote. On the other hand, it has long opposed absentee voting, which would enable voters to cast their ballots without returning in person to their voting districts. Every time the Ministry of the Interior attempts to promote absentee voting, the Green Camp opposes it, alleging that the KMT wants to use absentee voting to "implement political machine voting" or even "commit election fraud." Even Lee Teng-hui believes the main reason Tsai Ing-wen lost was that many voters were unable to return home to vote. Following the election, the Executive Yuan and the Ministry of the Interior urged the implmentation of absentee voting. Nevertheless the DPP remains obdurately opposed,
In general, absentee voting can be divided into five types: Mail-in voting. Proxy voting. Advance voting. Designated polling station voting. Alternate polling station voting. Mail-in voting is the most commonly used system in other countries. But many on Taiwan are concerned about possible abuses, making it difficult to implement near term. The Ministry of the Interior has indicated that initial implementation of absentee voting will not include the more controversial mail-in voting. Instead, it will give priority to Alternate polling station voting.
Alternate polling station voting would enable voters who find it difficult to return to their voting districts in person, to choose an alternative polling station in advance. The system would enable students, office workers, and laborers to cast their ballots at a polling station nearby, instead of in their own voting district. It would spare them the need to rush back to the voting district listed in their household registry. It would protect their precious and sacred right to vote.
The Green Camp professes concern that absentee voting would give rise to all manner of ills. Basically opposition political parties mistrust the party in power. But the voting system on Taiwan is long-established. These concerns can be overcome by narrowing the scope of the changes, and through attention to technical means. For example, for the presidential election, the electoral district is the entire nation. The ballots are the simplest of all. It would be the most suitable candidate for the initial implementation of absentee voting. The DPP deeply distrusts the Chinese diaspora and businessmen from Taiwan who do business on the Mainland. The ruling and opposition parties still have concerns over mail-in voting. Therefore the government will not prematurely implement mail-in voting. It will only implement alternative polling station voting. This will enable domestic voters who find it inconvenient to return home to their voting districts to transfer to a more convenient polling station nearby, and exercise their right to vote. From a practical point of view, given an increasingly trustworthy voting system, any problems with alternate polling station voting can be dealt with.
The DPP has long loved pontificating about human rights. The constitution stipulates that "The people have the freedom to reside or migrate" at their discretion. It stipulates that "The people have the basic human rights of election, recall, initiative and referendum." The DPP's opposition to absentee voting infringes the rights of voters who live abroad. It also violates the provisions of the Additional Articles of the Constitution, which stipulates that "The nation will ensure the political participation of citizens residing abroad."
The DGBAS has conducted surveys, At least 15% of the people who live in the Taiwan Region have their household registry in one place, but reside in another. This 15% of the electorate in unable to exercise its voting rights. The fact is, this 15% could have a decisive impact on election results. During the presidential election, for example, Tsai Ing-wen lost to Ma Ying-jeou by less than 6%. Filling this gap in the current voting system, which does not permit absentee voting, could well reverse election results. This could affect any election and any candidate. This being the case, refusal to implement absentee voting deprives voters of the right to vote. It is also a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, in order to enhance the quality of our democracy, and fully honor the Will of the People, how can we not implement absentee voting?
The current election system fails to allow absentee voting. This alone constitutes a breach of the constitution. The DPP, which casts itself as a "champion of human rights," has no excuse to oppose absentee voting. Alternate polling station voting has just been implemented for the central government level presidential and legislative elections. As long as one registers and specifies the polling station in advance, the technical aspects should be no problem. Absentee voting is necessary to uphold voter rights and enhance the quality of our democracy. Everything now depends on the DPP, on whether it insists on behaving as an obstacle to democracy.
應當實施「不在籍移轉投票」
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.20
馬英九贏得二○一二總統大選,諸多原因,各有說法。有人解讀為「九二共識贏了」,但李登輝頗不以為然,他認為民進黨敗選,與馬政府刻意將投票日選在春節前夕有關,讓很多在外打拚、求學的選民都無法返鄉投票。
其實,民進黨的敗選報告也指出,返鄉投票率偏低是敗選的原因之一;但是,殊不知目前反對「不在籍投票」最力的,正是綠營本身。
其實,綠營一直視在外地工作、求學的選民是對選舉勝負最有影響力的支持群,早在兩年前的縣市三合一選舉,民進黨就力推「返鄉投票、幸福看得見」口號,呼籲在外打拚的年輕人或居住他鄉的選民回到家鄉,投給民進黨候選人一票。
但是,民進黨一方面鼓勵支持者返鄉投票,另一方面卻始終反對推行「不必返鄉,也能投票」的「不在籍投票」。每次內政部提出準備修法推動不在籍投票,綠營就強烈反對;聲稱國民黨就是要藉不在籍投票「發動投票部隊」、甚至「作票」。即使這次連李登輝都認為很多選民無法返鄉投票,是造成蔡英文落敗的主因;但當行政院及內政部選後檢討談到要修法引入不在籍投票時,民進黨仍持反對立場。
一般而言,不在籍投票可分為「通訊投票」、「代理投票」、「提前投票」、「指定投票所投票」、「移轉投票」五種。通訊投票雖是各國最普遍採用的方式,但在我國卻被質疑流弊較多,短期內要推動似有困難。但內政部已表明,不在籍投票實施初期,並不考慮納入爭議較多的通訊投票,而是優先推動移轉投票。
所謂移轉投票,即考慮選民在投票日不便或不能到戶籍地親自投票,容許選舉人事先向選務機關申請「移轉投票處所」,以便行使投票權利的一種制度。這種制度的好處,就是讓符合投票資格的學生、上班族或勞動者,可以就近在申請移轉的投票所輕鬆投票,而不必趕返戶籍地投票,以維護珍貴神聖的選舉權。
綠營擔心不在籍投票會生弊病,基本上是出自政黨對抗衍生的不信任感;但以我國投票實務運作之成熟度,這些疑慮其實可以從限縮實施範圍等技術上加以克服。例如,總統選舉,全國都是同一個選區,選票最單純,也最適合以此做為實施不在籍投票的開端;且最讓民進黨不放心的海外僑民或在大陸台商,不會在朝野仍有疑慮下貿然進行通訊投票;如今只是要照顧不便返回戶籍地投票的國內選民,在國內申請轉移投票所,行使其投票權而已。從實務上看,以越來越具公信力的選務水準言,「移轉投票」的弊端可以控制。
民進黨素來愛講人權,但憲法規定的「人民有居住及遷徙之自由」、「人民有選舉、罷免、創制及複決之權」等基本人權,都因為民進黨反對不在籍投票而使得居留外鄉的選民權利受損,更不必談憲法增修條文規定「國家對於僑居國外國民之政治參與,應予保障」。
主計處曾作調查,台灣地區至少有百分之十五民眾的戶籍地與現居地不一致。這十五趴選民能否便利行使投票權,對選舉結果其實有決定性的影響。以這次總統大選為例,蔡英文輸給馬英九不到六趴;因此,不能說現行投票制度缺的不在籍投票這一角,沒有讓選情反轉的可能性。這種情況,在任何一次選舉,及對任何候選人而言,皆可能發生;倘若如此,則全民意志因未設不在籍投票而不能完整呈現,非但是選民的選舉權被剝奪,更是對國家公義的重大傷害。因而,為提升民主品質,完整呈現全民意志,豈能不推行不在籍投票?
現行選制少了不在籍投票,已有違憲之虞;言必稱「保障人權」的民進黨,實在沒有理由始終反對。「移轉投票」實施初期,得以總統及立委兩項中央級選舉為目標,只要事前申請登記並擇定「移轉投票所」,選務技術必不成問題。這是伸張民權、提升民主品質的要著,全看民進黨是否仍要扮演阻路的大石頭了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 20, 2012
Summary: The current election system fails to allow absentee voting. This alone constitutes a breach of the constitution. The DPP, which casts itself as a "champion of human rights," has no excuse to oppose absentee voting. Alternate polling station voting has just been implemented for the central government level presidential and legislative elections. As long as one registers and specifies the polling station in advance, the technical aspects should be no problem. Absentee voting is necessary to uphold voter rights and enhance the quality of our democracy. Everything now depends on the DPP, on whether it insists on behaving as an obstacle to democracy.
Full Text below:
Ma Ying-jeou won the 2012 presidential election. The reasons were manifold. Everyone has his own take on why. Some say "The 1992 Consensus won the day." Lee Teng-hui objects to this interpretation. He blames the DPP's election defeat on the Ma administration. He accuses it of deliberately moving election day to the eve of the Spring Festival. He says this prevented many voters who work or study far from their voting districts from returning home to vote.
Actually the DPP's own post-election review said the fact that few voters returned home to vote was merely one of many reasons for its defeat. Also, who does not know that the most adamant opponent of absentee voting is the Green Camp itself?
In fact, the Green Camp has long considered voters working and studying far from their voting districts as the key to election outcomes. Two years ago, during the Three in One Municipal and County Elections, the DPP's slogan was "return home to vote, prosperity will appear." They asked young expatriates and those living far from their voting districts to return home and vote for the DPP.
On the one hand, the DPP encourages its supporters to return home to vote. On the other hand, it has long opposed absentee voting, which would enable voters to cast their ballots without returning in person to their voting districts. Every time the Ministry of the Interior attempts to promote absentee voting, the Green Camp opposes it, alleging that the KMT wants to use absentee voting to "implement political machine voting" or even "commit election fraud." Even Lee Teng-hui believes the main reason Tsai Ing-wen lost was that many voters were unable to return home to vote. Following the election, the Executive Yuan and the Ministry of the Interior urged the implmentation of absentee voting. Nevertheless the DPP remains obdurately opposed,
In general, absentee voting can be divided into five types: Mail-in voting. Proxy voting. Advance voting. Designated polling station voting. Alternate polling station voting. Mail-in voting is the most commonly used system in other countries. But many on Taiwan are concerned about possible abuses, making it difficult to implement near term. The Ministry of the Interior has indicated that initial implementation of absentee voting will not include the more controversial mail-in voting. Instead, it will give priority to Alternate polling station voting.
Alternate polling station voting would enable voters who find it difficult to return to their voting districts in person, to choose an alternative polling station in advance. The system would enable students, office workers, and laborers to cast their ballots at a polling station nearby, instead of in their own voting district. It would spare them the need to rush back to the voting district listed in their household registry. It would protect their precious and sacred right to vote.
The Green Camp professes concern that absentee voting would give rise to all manner of ills. Basically opposition political parties mistrust the party in power. But the voting system on Taiwan is long-established. These concerns can be overcome by narrowing the scope of the changes, and through attention to technical means. For example, for the presidential election, the electoral district is the entire nation. The ballots are the simplest of all. It would be the most suitable candidate for the initial implementation of absentee voting. The DPP deeply distrusts the Chinese diaspora and businessmen from Taiwan who do business on the Mainland. The ruling and opposition parties still have concerns over mail-in voting. Therefore the government will not prematurely implement mail-in voting. It will only implement alternative polling station voting. This will enable domestic voters who find it inconvenient to return home to their voting districts to transfer to a more convenient polling station nearby, and exercise their right to vote. From a practical point of view, given an increasingly trustworthy voting system, any problems with alternate polling station voting can be dealt with.
The DPP has long loved pontificating about human rights. The constitution stipulates that "The people have the freedom to reside or migrate" at their discretion. It stipulates that "The people have the basic human rights of election, recall, initiative and referendum." The DPP's opposition to absentee voting infringes the rights of voters who live abroad. It also violates the provisions of the Additional Articles of the Constitution, which stipulates that "The nation will ensure the political participation of citizens residing abroad."
The DGBAS has conducted surveys, At least 15% of the people who live in the Taiwan Region have their household registry in one place, but reside in another. This 15% of the electorate in unable to exercise its voting rights. The fact is, this 15% could have a decisive impact on election results. During the presidential election, for example, Tsai Ing-wen lost to Ma Ying-jeou by less than 6%. Filling this gap in the current voting system, which does not permit absentee voting, could well reverse election results. This could affect any election and any candidate. This being the case, refusal to implement absentee voting deprives voters of the right to vote. It is also a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, in order to enhance the quality of our democracy, and fully honor the Will of the People, how can we not implement absentee voting?
The current election system fails to allow absentee voting. This alone constitutes a breach of the constitution. The DPP, which casts itself as a "champion of human rights," has no excuse to oppose absentee voting. Alternate polling station voting has just been implemented for the central government level presidential and legislative elections. As long as one registers and specifies the polling station in advance, the technical aspects should be no problem. Absentee voting is necessary to uphold voter rights and enhance the quality of our democracy. Everything now depends on the DPP, on whether it insists on behaving as an obstacle to democracy.
應當實施「不在籍移轉投票」
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.20
馬英九贏得二○一二總統大選,諸多原因,各有說法。有人解讀為「九二共識贏了」,但李登輝頗不以為然,他認為民進黨敗選,與馬政府刻意將投票日選在春節前夕有關,讓很多在外打拚、求學的選民都無法返鄉投票。
其實,民進黨的敗選報告也指出,返鄉投票率偏低是敗選的原因之一;但是,殊不知目前反對「不在籍投票」最力的,正是綠營本身。
其實,綠營一直視在外地工作、求學的選民是對選舉勝負最有影響力的支持群,早在兩年前的縣市三合一選舉,民進黨就力推「返鄉投票、幸福看得見」口號,呼籲在外打拚的年輕人或居住他鄉的選民回到家鄉,投給民進黨候選人一票。
但是,民進黨一方面鼓勵支持者返鄉投票,另一方面卻始終反對推行「不必返鄉,也能投票」的「不在籍投票」。每次內政部提出準備修法推動不在籍投票,綠營就強烈反對;聲稱國民黨就是要藉不在籍投票「發動投票部隊」、甚至「作票」。即使這次連李登輝都認為很多選民無法返鄉投票,是造成蔡英文落敗的主因;但當行政院及內政部選後檢討談到要修法引入不在籍投票時,民進黨仍持反對立場。
一般而言,不在籍投票可分為「通訊投票」、「代理投票」、「提前投票」、「指定投票所投票」、「移轉投票」五種。通訊投票雖是各國最普遍採用的方式,但在我國卻被質疑流弊較多,短期內要推動似有困難。但內政部已表明,不在籍投票實施初期,並不考慮納入爭議較多的通訊投票,而是優先推動移轉投票。
所謂移轉投票,即考慮選民在投票日不便或不能到戶籍地親自投票,容許選舉人事先向選務機關申請「移轉投票處所」,以便行使投票權利的一種制度。這種制度的好處,就是讓符合投票資格的學生、上班族或勞動者,可以就近在申請移轉的投票所輕鬆投票,而不必趕返戶籍地投票,以維護珍貴神聖的選舉權。
綠營擔心不在籍投票會生弊病,基本上是出自政黨對抗衍生的不信任感;但以我國投票實務運作之成熟度,這些疑慮其實可以從限縮實施範圍等技術上加以克服。例如,總統選舉,全國都是同一個選區,選票最單純,也最適合以此做為實施不在籍投票的開端;且最讓民進黨不放心的海外僑民或在大陸台商,不會在朝野仍有疑慮下貿然進行通訊投票;如今只是要照顧不便返回戶籍地投票的國內選民,在國內申請轉移投票所,行使其投票權而已。從實務上看,以越來越具公信力的選務水準言,「移轉投票」的弊端可以控制。
民進黨素來愛講人權,但憲法規定的「人民有居住及遷徙之自由」、「人民有選舉、罷免、創制及複決之權」等基本人權,都因為民進黨反對不在籍投票而使得居留外鄉的選民權利受損,更不必談憲法增修條文規定「國家對於僑居國外國民之政治參與,應予保障」。
主計處曾作調查,台灣地區至少有百分之十五民眾的戶籍地與現居地不一致。這十五趴選民能否便利行使投票權,對選舉結果其實有決定性的影響。以這次總統大選為例,蔡英文輸給馬英九不到六趴;因此,不能說現行投票制度缺的不在籍投票這一角,沒有讓選情反轉的可能性。這種情況,在任何一次選舉,及對任何候選人而言,皆可能發生;倘若如此,則全民意志因未設不在籍投票而不能完整呈現,非但是選民的選舉權被剝奪,更是對國家公義的重大傷害。因而,為提升民主品質,完整呈現全民意志,豈能不推行不在籍投票?
現行選制少了不在籍投票,已有違憲之虞;言必稱「保障人權」的民進黨,實在沒有理由始終反對。「移轉投票」實施初期,得以總統及立委兩項中央級選舉為目標,只要事前申請登記並擇定「移轉投票所」,選務技術必不成問題。這是伸張民權、提升民主品質的要著,全看民進黨是否仍要扮演阻路的大石頭了。
Thursday, February 16, 2012
DPP Unable to See Itself in the Mirror
DPP Unable to See Itself in the Mirror
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 17, 2012
Summary: The DPP has long boasted that it is a political party able to reflect on its own shortcomings. But this is a virtue it has moved farther and farther away from. Consider the DPP review of the reasons for its defeat in the recent election. On the surface, it brims over with eloquence, But on the inside, it is shot through with evasions, It acknowledged committing venial sins, but denied committing any mortal sins. It pointed fingers left and right at others for its plight. It avoided zeroing in its worst defects, the ones that desperately demand self-reflection.
Full Text below:
The DPP has long boasted that it is a political party able to reflect on its own shortcomings. But this is a virtue it has moved farther and farther away from. Consider the DPP review of the reasons for its defeat in the recent election. On the surface, it brims over with eloquence, But on the inside, it is shot through with evasions, It acknowledged committing venial sins, but denied committing any mortal sins. It pointed fingers left and right at others for its plight. It avoided zeroing in its worst defects, the ones that desperately demand self-reflection.
Outsiders said the draft of the DPP post-election review read like a technical paper. A Green Camp Central Standing Committee Member criticized Tsai's "Platform for the Coming Decade" as "too hard to understand." The same was true of the DPP's post-election review. It was written in typical "Tsai Ing-wen style." Tsai Ing-wen is the outgoing party chairman. Perhaps she did not want to paint too grim a picture of the DPP's plight, Perhaps she did not want to make it too difficult for the DPP to face its problems. Perhaps she wanted to retain her "guest host" status. Perhaps she was polite to a fault, because she wanted to let her comrades feel better about themselves. Unfortunately what ails the DPP can be cured only by shock therapy.
Tsai Ing-wen's review bobbed and weaved. It failed to come right out and name the problem. Swing voters lost confidence in the DPP's ability to govern, the report claimed, during the final two weeks of the campaign. The DPP refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Its cross-Strait policy left voters unsettled. A number of Green Camp legislators were in complete accord. They said the DPP lost the general election on cross-Strait issues. Alas, the review blamed the KMT. It accused the KMT of misusing administrative resources. It blamed difficulties encountered by voters returning home to vote. It blamed the Song/Yu Effect, saying it failed to kick in. It blamed numerous other technical issues. It blamed everything but the real reason.
Voters lost confidence in the DPP's governing ability. The Green Camp opposed the 1992 Consensus. But several other factors played a part too. One. The DPP's vision was too narrow. It remained a captive of its own "Nativist" mentality. In an era of globalization, such a mentality will not do. It cannot help Taiwan cope with international competition. Two. The DPP was too ideologically oriented. It was too stubborn. It sometimes stonewalled. It refused to make pragmatic adjustments in response to changes in the environment. Three. It could talk the talk, but it couldn't walk the walk. Its reach was beyond its grasp. It engaged in obstructionism out of sheer spite, even though it was unable to offer any solutions. Four. It was intolerant of other groups within the community. It incited hatred of other groups, or turned a blind eye to others who did. Five. It was adept at political mobilization, but inept at economic development. Its record while in office failed to meet with the approval of the economic pillars of the community.
These are character traits and ingrained habits the DPP accumulated over time. Some in the Green Camp actually consider these character traits and ingrained habits "extraordinary strengths." As you can imagine, these problems were not included in the report. They were not cited as reasons for the DPP's defeat. Take the most obvious example, DPP rhetoric on cross-Strait relations. The global political and economic situation has changed. As a result, the DPP is seriously out of touch with reality. This prevents the DPP from broadening its democratic appeas. Within the party, leaders still kowtow before the party's holy icons. Therefore, its election defeat can be chalked up as a failure to deal with the 1992 Consensus. Closing one's eyes to a problem may be easy. But does it work?
The fact is, Chen Shui-bian's eight years of misrule brought disaster upon Taiwan. Yet the DPP has never seriously reflected upon it. The DPP longs to return to power at the central government level. But as long as this specter is not exorcised, it will remain a psychological barrier for voters. The DPP review said voters lost confidence in the DPP's ability to govern. This was correct. But the review then said this loss of confidence occurred only in the last two weeks. This is self-delusion. The DPP taught supporters how to mislead pollsters by giving them phony answers, The DPP invented this trick. Does the DPP actually believe Tsai Ing-wen led Ma Ying-jeou in the polls until the last two weeks? Assume that she does. Perhaps bleak memories of eight years of Green Government reawakened voters and brought them back to reality?
During its early years as a rising opposition party, the DPP boasted a relatively clean image. It had a sharp eye, and used it to check the ruling KMT. It gained the voters' trust. But following the second change in ruling parties, the Blue Camp outshone the DPP with its ability to govern and its dependable nature. The DPP's old image as an uncorrupt political party with a concern for justice, no longer exists. The review made absolutely no mention of the TaiMed corruption scandal or the luxury "farmhouse" scandal. These scandals clearly contributed to the public's loss of confidence in the Tsai/Su ticket. The DPP refuses to adopt a comprehensive and balanced approach to governance. This is especially true with national issues that require the long view, The DPP habitually adopts an obstructionist attitude, merely to frustrate the ruling administration's efforts to get things done, Given its attitude, how can it win voter confidence?
Every failure is an opportunity for self-reflection, a chance to better one's self. But not if one approaches the matter convinced that one is already perfect. Then when one looks in the mirror, all one sees are other peoples faults, never one's own. If one is determined not to see one's own faults, then it matters not how thick the review is. It will remain pointless. The DPP longs to cross the 50% threshold. To do so, it must engage in more than technical analysis. It must not pander to its core supporters. It must not count on Blue Camp supporters being divided. They will not always enable the DPP to win by default. Based on what we have seen, it would appear that , over half the draft should be deleted.
民進黨在鏡子裡看不到自己
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.02.17 02:13 am
民進黨曾號稱是個「有反省能力」的政黨,但這項美德已日漸離它遠去。看這次民進黨的敗選檢討,表面上洋洋灑灑,內容卻避重就輕、顧左右而言他,始終避免把焦點對準自己最脆弱、最該反省的環節。
這份檢討報告初稿,被外界形容寫得「像學術報告」;就如綠營中常委批十年政綱「太難懂」一樣,都具有典型的「蔡式風格」。蔡英文即將卸任黨主席,或許她不願丟下一個太沉重、太尖銳的局面,讓民進黨難以面對;或許她仍想保持自己一直以來客卿般的優雅,所以她面面俱到,讓同志們好過一些。問題是,此刻民進黨面對的情勢,恐怕非要「休克療法」才能解決。
蔡英文隱隱掩掩寫在檢討報告、卻未直接明言的重點是:中間選民在最後兩週失去了對民進黨「執政的信賴感」;其中,包括了民進黨不承認九二共識,導致選民對其兩岸走向的不確定感。這點,和若干綠委直指此次大選就敗在兩岸問題上,若合符節。遺憾的是,檢討報告卻故意另列舉國民黨運用行政資源、返鄉投票不便、及宋瑜效應未發酵等諸多技術性問題,把這個核心因素稀釋掉了。
選民失去對民進黨的執政信賴,除了綠營反對「九二共識」外,確實還有更多元的因素。茲列舉數例:一,視野過度褊狹,走不出本土化的框架,這在全球化年代顯不足以帶領台灣迎接國際競爭。二,意識形態取向太強,常流於執拗、乃至硬拗,無法面對環境務實調整。三,論述能力高於實踐能力,眼高手低,為反對而反對,卻無能找出解決方案。四,對不同族群及不同意見缺乏包容,有時更煽動或縱容仇視。五,長於政治動員卻拙於經濟發展,治理成績難以獲得經濟支柱型選民的認同。
這些,都是民進黨長期發展累積下來的性格和積習,其中有些甚至還是綠營自認不凡的「長處」;可以想見,這些問題絕不會在敗選報告中提及。最明顯的例子是,民進黨的兩岸關係論述,隨著世界政經局勢的演變,已嚴重與現實脫節,甚至妨礙了民進黨整體民主論述的擴充;然而在黨內,這卻仍是其供桌上必須遵古法膜拜的神主牌,也因此這次敗選也只能含混簡化為「九二共識」的提法失當。鋸箭法雖好用,但問題真有這麼簡單嗎?
事實是,陳水扁執政八年帶給台灣的災難,從來沒有被好好反省過;只要這個陰影不消除,民進黨要重回中央執政,它就會成為選民的心理障礙。檢討報告說,選民失去對民進黨的「執政信賴」,這是正確的解讀;但報告說這發生在「最後兩週」,卻是自欺欺人。別忘了,教導民眾提供假意見來誤導民調,不正是民進黨發明的伎倆嗎?那麼,它真的相信蔡英文的民調一路領先馬英九,直到「最後兩週」才急轉直下的嗎?就算是吧,那麼,不是綠執政八年的慘澹記憶驚醒選民回到現實嗎?
早年在野崛起時,民進黨以銳利的監督眼光及相對清純的形象,取得了選民信賴。但在兩度政黨輪替後,它執政的能力和穩定度已被藍軍比了下去,而它的清廉、公正形象也已東耗西損。就如檢討報告避談的宇昌案和豪華農舍案,絕對是「蔡蘇配」失去民眾信賴的因素。尤其對於全國性及前瞻性的議題,民進黨不僅不願表現它具有完整而平衡的執政視野,反而不時以唱反調的方式來杯葛中央,這種態度如何獲得選民的信賴?
每一次的失敗經驗,都可以作為反省的借鏡,以求自我提升。但如果堅信自己完美無瑕,面對鏡子只看到別人的錯,而無意看清自己的缺失,那檢討報告寫得再厚也沒用。民進黨要跨過百分之五十的門檻,不能只作技術性分析,不能只滿足於基本盤,不能期待藍軍分裂以獲漁翁之利。這樣看的話,這份檢討報告初稿該刪掉一半以上了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 17, 2012
Summary: The DPP has long boasted that it is a political party able to reflect on its own shortcomings. But this is a virtue it has moved farther and farther away from. Consider the DPP review of the reasons for its defeat in the recent election. On the surface, it brims over with eloquence, But on the inside, it is shot through with evasions, It acknowledged committing venial sins, but denied committing any mortal sins. It pointed fingers left and right at others for its plight. It avoided zeroing in its worst defects, the ones that desperately demand self-reflection.
Full Text below:
The DPP has long boasted that it is a political party able to reflect on its own shortcomings. But this is a virtue it has moved farther and farther away from. Consider the DPP review of the reasons for its defeat in the recent election. On the surface, it brims over with eloquence, But on the inside, it is shot through with evasions, It acknowledged committing venial sins, but denied committing any mortal sins. It pointed fingers left and right at others for its plight. It avoided zeroing in its worst defects, the ones that desperately demand self-reflection.
Outsiders said the draft of the DPP post-election review read like a technical paper. A Green Camp Central Standing Committee Member criticized Tsai's "Platform for the Coming Decade" as "too hard to understand." The same was true of the DPP's post-election review. It was written in typical "Tsai Ing-wen style." Tsai Ing-wen is the outgoing party chairman. Perhaps she did not want to paint too grim a picture of the DPP's plight, Perhaps she did not want to make it too difficult for the DPP to face its problems. Perhaps she wanted to retain her "guest host" status. Perhaps she was polite to a fault, because she wanted to let her comrades feel better about themselves. Unfortunately what ails the DPP can be cured only by shock therapy.
Tsai Ing-wen's review bobbed and weaved. It failed to come right out and name the problem. Swing voters lost confidence in the DPP's ability to govern, the report claimed, during the final two weeks of the campaign. The DPP refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Its cross-Strait policy left voters unsettled. A number of Green Camp legislators were in complete accord. They said the DPP lost the general election on cross-Strait issues. Alas, the review blamed the KMT. It accused the KMT of misusing administrative resources. It blamed difficulties encountered by voters returning home to vote. It blamed the Song/Yu Effect, saying it failed to kick in. It blamed numerous other technical issues. It blamed everything but the real reason.
Voters lost confidence in the DPP's governing ability. The Green Camp opposed the 1992 Consensus. But several other factors played a part too. One. The DPP's vision was too narrow. It remained a captive of its own "Nativist" mentality. In an era of globalization, such a mentality will not do. It cannot help Taiwan cope with international competition. Two. The DPP was too ideologically oriented. It was too stubborn. It sometimes stonewalled. It refused to make pragmatic adjustments in response to changes in the environment. Three. It could talk the talk, but it couldn't walk the walk. Its reach was beyond its grasp. It engaged in obstructionism out of sheer spite, even though it was unable to offer any solutions. Four. It was intolerant of other groups within the community. It incited hatred of other groups, or turned a blind eye to others who did. Five. It was adept at political mobilization, but inept at economic development. Its record while in office failed to meet with the approval of the economic pillars of the community.
These are character traits and ingrained habits the DPP accumulated over time. Some in the Green Camp actually consider these character traits and ingrained habits "extraordinary strengths." As you can imagine, these problems were not included in the report. They were not cited as reasons for the DPP's defeat. Take the most obvious example, DPP rhetoric on cross-Strait relations. The global political and economic situation has changed. As a result, the DPP is seriously out of touch with reality. This prevents the DPP from broadening its democratic appeas. Within the party, leaders still kowtow before the party's holy icons. Therefore, its election defeat can be chalked up as a failure to deal with the 1992 Consensus. Closing one's eyes to a problem may be easy. But does it work?
The fact is, Chen Shui-bian's eight years of misrule brought disaster upon Taiwan. Yet the DPP has never seriously reflected upon it. The DPP longs to return to power at the central government level. But as long as this specter is not exorcised, it will remain a psychological barrier for voters. The DPP review said voters lost confidence in the DPP's ability to govern. This was correct. But the review then said this loss of confidence occurred only in the last two weeks. This is self-delusion. The DPP taught supporters how to mislead pollsters by giving them phony answers, The DPP invented this trick. Does the DPP actually believe Tsai Ing-wen led Ma Ying-jeou in the polls until the last two weeks? Assume that she does. Perhaps bleak memories of eight years of Green Government reawakened voters and brought them back to reality?
During its early years as a rising opposition party, the DPP boasted a relatively clean image. It had a sharp eye, and used it to check the ruling KMT. It gained the voters' trust. But following the second change in ruling parties, the Blue Camp outshone the DPP with its ability to govern and its dependable nature. The DPP's old image as an uncorrupt political party with a concern for justice, no longer exists. The review made absolutely no mention of the TaiMed corruption scandal or the luxury "farmhouse" scandal. These scandals clearly contributed to the public's loss of confidence in the Tsai/Su ticket. The DPP refuses to adopt a comprehensive and balanced approach to governance. This is especially true with national issues that require the long view, The DPP habitually adopts an obstructionist attitude, merely to frustrate the ruling administration's efforts to get things done, Given its attitude, how can it win voter confidence?
Every failure is an opportunity for self-reflection, a chance to better one's self. But not if one approaches the matter convinced that one is already perfect. Then when one looks in the mirror, all one sees are other peoples faults, never one's own. If one is determined not to see one's own faults, then it matters not how thick the review is. It will remain pointless. The DPP longs to cross the 50% threshold. To do so, it must engage in more than technical analysis. It must not pander to its core supporters. It must not count on Blue Camp supporters being divided. They will not always enable the DPP to win by default. Based on what we have seen, it would appear that , over half the draft should be deleted.
民進黨在鏡子裡看不到自己
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.02.17 02:13 am
民進黨曾號稱是個「有反省能力」的政黨,但這項美德已日漸離它遠去。看這次民進黨的敗選檢討,表面上洋洋灑灑,內容卻避重就輕、顧左右而言他,始終避免把焦點對準自己最脆弱、最該反省的環節。
這份檢討報告初稿,被外界形容寫得「像學術報告」;就如綠營中常委批十年政綱「太難懂」一樣,都具有典型的「蔡式風格」。蔡英文即將卸任黨主席,或許她不願丟下一個太沉重、太尖銳的局面,讓民進黨難以面對;或許她仍想保持自己一直以來客卿般的優雅,所以她面面俱到,讓同志們好過一些。問題是,此刻民進黨面對的情勢,恐怕非要「休克療法」才能解決。
蔡英文隱隱掩掩寫在檢討報告、卻未直接明言的重點是:中間選民在最後兩週失去了對民進黨「執政的信賴感」;其中,包括了民進黨不承認九二共識,導致選民對其兩岸走向的不確定感。這點,和若干綠委直指此次大選就敗在兩岸問題上,若合符節。遺憾的是,檢討報告卻故意另列舉國民黨運用行政資源、返鄉投票不便、及宋瑜效應未發酵等諸多技術性問題,把這個核心因素稀釋掉了。
選民失去對民進黨的執政信賴,除了綠營反對「九二共識」外,確實還有更多元的因素。茲列舉數例:一,視野過度褊狹,走不出本土化的框架,這在全球化年代顯不足以帶領台灣迎接國際競爭。二,意識形態取向太強,常流於執拗、乃至硬拗,無法面對環境務實調整。三,論述能力高於實踐能力,眼高手低,為反對而反對,卻無能找出解決方案。四,對不同族群及不同意見缺乏包容,有時更煽動或縱容仇視。五,長於政治動員卻拙於經濟發展,治理成績難以獲得經濟支柱型選民的認同。
這些,都是民進黨長期發展累積下來的性格和積習,其中有些甚至還是綠營自認不凡的「長處」;可以想見,這些問題絕不會在敗選報告中提及。最明顯的例子是,民進黨的兩岸關係論述,隨著世界政經局勢的演變,已嚴重與現實脫節,甚至妨礙了民進黨整體民主論述的擴充;然而在黨內,這卻仍是其供桌上必須遵古法膜拜的神主牌,也因此這次敗選也只能含混簡化為「九二共識」的提法失當。鋸箭法雖好用,但問題真有這麼簡單嗎?
事實是,陳水扁執政八年帶給台灣的災難,從來沒有被好好反省過;只要這個陰影不消除,民進黨要重回中央執政,它就會成為選民的心理障礙。檢討報告說,選民失去對民進黨的「執政信賴」,這是正確的解讀;但報告說這發生在「最後兩週」,卻是自欺欺人。別忘了,教導民眾提供假意見來誤導民調,不正是民進黨發明的伎倆嗎?那麼,它真的相信蔡英文的民調一路領先馬英九,直到「最後兩週」才急轉直下的嗎?就算是吧,那麼,不是綠執政八年的慘澹記憶驚醒選民回到現實嗎?
早年在野崛起時,民進黨以銳利的監督眼光及相對清純的形象,取得了選民信賴。但在兩度政黨輪替後,它執政的能力和穩定度已被藍軍比了下去,而它的清廉、公正形象也已東耗西損。就如檢討報告避談的宇昌案和豪華農舍案,絕對是「蔡蘇配」失去民眾信賴的因素。尤其對於全國性及前瞻性的議題,民進黨不僅不願表現它具有完整而平衡的執政視野,反而不時以唱反調的方式來杯葛中央,這種態度如何獲得選民的信賴?
每一次的失敗經驗,都可以作為反省的借鏡,以求自我提升。但如果堅信自己完美無瑕,面對鏡子只看到別人的錯,而無意看清自己的缺失,那檢討報告寫得再厚也沒用。民進黨要跨過百分之五十的門檻,不能只作技術性分析,不能只滿足於基本盤,不能期待藍軍分裂以獲漁翁之利。這樣看的話,這份檢討報告初稿該刪掉一半以上了。
Supreme Hopes for the Supreme Court
Supreme Hopes for the Supreme Court
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 16, 2012
Summary: Never before has the appointment of a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court drawn so much attention. Calls for reform have been arriving, wave upon wave, from lower downs at higher ups, and from outsiders at insiders. Yang Ting-chang is now the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He is riding the crest of these waves. He cannot avoid them. All he can do is ride them in the directin they are going. All he can do is lead the realm of jurisprudence through its crisis of confidence.
Full Text below:
Never before has the appointment of a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court drawn so much attention. Calls for reform have been arriving, wave upon wave, from lower downs at higher ups, and from outsiders at insiders. Yang Ting-chang is now the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He is riding the crest of these waves. He cannot avoid them. All he can do is ride them in the directin they are going. All he can do is lead the realm of jurisprudence through its crisis of confidence.
Yang has attracted considerable attention. The reason is the reactionary nature of the system. In early January, a lower court judge circulated a petition that was eventually signed by over 500 judges. They expressed their hopes for the Supreme Court appointment. They expressed a desire to meet with President Ma once he won re-election. They recommended the establishment of an evaluation process. They offered numerous suggestions for reforming the Supreme Court.
This is the first time in our legal history that judges have expressed a collective opinion about Supreme Court nominees. The petition expressing the judges' hopes was not a sudden move. It was a continuation of wave upon wave of quiet revolution. At one time, judges said, "We will give you back the ballot box, if you give us back our independence." Judges wanted to repeal the requirement that court judgments be subjected to advance review. Judges flexed their administrative muscle, and won judicial independence. Judges appealed to the National Assembly on Yangmingshan, and gained fiscal independence, even whiled retaining judicial independence. Today's movement is directed inward. Its goal is to establish a more refined trial process able to inspire public confidence.
On the surface this movement, begun by lower court judges, constitutes a severe censure of the Supreme Court justices. Actually, it is an example of "tough love." In recent years the judicial system has undergone dramatic changes. The Supreme Court has habitually remanded cases back to the trial courts for further consideration. Its judgments have run counter to society's values. It has been tardy in reaching judgments. The facts of cases are often the same, yet the court's conclusions are often up poles apart. The controversy provoked by the White Rose Movement, which called for reasonable laws and sentences that fit the crime, enabled "dinosaur judges" (judges slow to react to injustice) to make a travesty of justice.
Given these dramatic changes, the justice system must change. The Supreme Court is the court of last appeal. It seals the fate of both defendants and plaintiffs. Logically speaking, judges ought to lead reforms. They ought to prevent trivialities from muddying the waters. They ought to focus on the legal opinions. They ought to be diliegent in resolving conflicts. They ought be courageous enough assume responsibility for their judgments. They ought to serve as examples for the lower courts. They ought to limit contention and discourage conflict. They ought to establish a system that inspires public trust.
The lower courts eagerly look forward to Supreme Court reform. The percentage of cases remanded back to the lower courts has substantially diminished. But members of the Supreme Court seldom provide legal guidance, seldom resolve discrepancies in their legal rulings, and seldom demonstrate initiative. Appointments to the Supreme Court are even more disastrous. They are made strictly on the basis of cronyism and seniority. Who decides which judges will be transferred to the Supreme Court? The views of the Supreme Court Chief Justice count for more than the views of the President of the Judicial Yuan. Becoming a Chief Justice requires only seniority. One's rulings are irrelevant. When the time comes, the position is guaranteed. One has no term limits. One can squat in office until one chooses to retire.
The Supreme Court should seek change under stable conditions. But stability is no excuse to delay reform. Waiting to be made Chief Justice hinders the rise of talent. It results in a race to the bottom. How can it motivate judges of superior merit? These are the reasons lower court judges have lost all patience.
Before the petition was circulated, lower court judges tried to break these bad habits. They refused to accept candidates nominated by Supreme Court judges. They began evaluating judges on the basis of their character, and on the basis of their rulings. They proposed standards for the evaluation of judges, in order to transform the Supreme Court. They tracked the schedule for Supreme Court Chief Justice appointments, in order to dialogue with the president, and so they could better explain the issue to the general public. The easiest reform easiest was the repeal of the "secret case assignment" system. This would shake the Supreme Court to its foundations, This would give the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court a dose of "shock and awe."
As one can imagine, when the president agreed to the petitioning judges' demands, the Supreme Court justices were thoroughly embarrassed. When lower court judges lent their expertise to exposing the Supreme Court's warts, the Supreme Court found it impossible to refute their charges. The reform movement was a direct attack on the Supreme Court. But if it were to degenerate into mutual recrimination between the lower and higher courts, then it would merely undermine the justice system. But if the lower and higher courts can stand united, and engage in constructive dialogue. they can accelerate the pace of reform.
Amidst this turmoil, Yang Ting-chang was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He faces no small challenge. He must build a bridge between the lower and higher courts. He must transform accusations into dialogue. He must convert other insiders. He must exploit the momentum provided by lower court judges, to jumpstart the Supreme Court appointments, and reform the court system.
The court system exists to solve peoples' problems. It must not become a bastion of professional arrogance. Judges must not become kings comfortably ensconced within their realms. The language of court decisions is often incomprehensible. Defendants often waste years of their lives awaiting court decisions. The trial process is so ossified judges write judgments for each other. How can the public believe in such a system of justice? The key to the question is in the hands of the Supreme Court. As long as the Supreme Court has the necessary determination, it can lead the lower courts toward qualitative change. All of this is possible.
The trial process cannot be changed overnight. But we must make a start. Once we do, a butterfly effect will soon take place. This is an ideal time to transform the trial process. We hope the new President of Judicial Yuan can ride the wave forward, and make a fresh start.
對最高法院的高度期許
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.16
從來沒有一位最高法院院長的產生,如此次受到矚目。面對由下而上,由外而內,呼喊改革的聲浪,站在浪頭上的新任最高法院院長楊鼎章無法迴避,只能乘浪前進,帶領審判界勇渡內外紛至的信任危機。
楊受到矚目,起因於體系內的反動。就在一月初,由一審法官發動,五百多名法官加入連署,表達能由法官票選、慎選最高法院院長的訴求,並於馬總統贏得連任後爭取會面,提出建立審薦程序,改革最高法院的多項建言。
這是司法史上首次由法官對終審的院長人選展現集體主張,這波連署法官們的參與期待,並非突發之舉,而是一波波寧靜革命的延續。過去的「箱子還你,獨立還我」,廢除判決書事前送閱的運動,法官向司法行政權爭取審判獨立;法官上陽明山向國大代表爭取司法預算獨立,也在護衛審判獨立;如今的運動,轉向內求,目標是建立精緻而服眾的審判文化。
基層法官的運動,表面上是對老大哥的嚴厲責難,實為愛深責切的期許。近幾年來,司法外部環境產生鉅大變化,最高法院長久以來的發回文化、歧異文化,致案件久久定讞、案情相近卻可能命運不同,以及「白玫瑰運動」挑起的法律適用,量刑妥適性爭議,讓審判受困於恐龍法官的牢籠,無法翻身。
值此巨變,審判界不能不變。最高法院既是判決定讞的落槌處,當事人的生死輸贏由其定奪,理應為法官界的翹楚,引領興革,減少瑣細事項的糾纏,著力法理見解的論述,勤於歧見的整合,勇於自為判決負責,作為下級審的表率,建立定紛止爭,受人民信賴的審判文化。
下級審引頸期盼,最高法院的改變蹣跚。案件發回率雖大幅降低,但發人省思的法理指引仍少,歧異見解的解決,猶缺積極的努力。人事上更見圈圈文化、排隊文化,哪些法官可以調任最高法院,最高院庭長的意見,比院長、司法院長有分量;升庭長,但看年資,判決擺一邊,時間到了自然到手,且無任期,做到退休為止。
最高法院固應在穩定下求變,但不能以安定為理由延宕改變。等著做庭長的既得利益,阻礙人才出頭,齊頭平等的安逸,如何激勵裁判品質的精進?凡此種種,都讓基層法官不願再等待。
在連署前,基層法官已嘗試打破慣習,不再照單全收由最高法院法官屬意的調任人選,開始從人品、判決品質,提出可供評比的標準,以改造最高法院。此外,更進一步抓緊最高法院院長更迭的時機與總統對話,以庶民容易理解、最容易達到改革的廢除「保密分案」制度,撼動最高法院的心牆,也給新任最高法院院長一枚震撼彈。
可以想見,當總統認同連署法官的訴求,最高法院的法官多麼尷尬難過。而當基層法官以內行人之姿揭開最高法院的沉痾,最高法院亦難對外辯駁。但直攻最高法院的改革運動,若淪為上下交相責的惡鬥,反會拉下審判的品質,反之,如能上下齊心、友善對話,就能加速帶動改革。
值此動盪的時機,楊鼎章出任最高法院院長,任務非比小可。他必須搭起上下審級間溝通的橋梁,化指責為對話,展開說服內部的工作,以基層法官的期盼為動力,帶動最高法院建立新的人事、審判文化。
審判是為人民解決問題而存在,不能自築專業傲慢的高塔,關起門來做大王。當判決文字艱澀難懂,原被告要用青春歲月癡等一個結果,審判僵化成法官群體說給自己人聽的呢喃,人民如何信服司法。而解決問題的鑰匙,有一大串掌握在最高法院的手裡,只要最高法院有心,帶領下級審「質變」,並非不可能的事。
審判文化雖然不能一蹴改變,有心開始,就會產生蝴蝶效應。這是審判脫胎換骨的絕佳時機,期盼新任院長能與所有法官破浪前行,開創新局。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 16, 2012
Summary: Never before has the appointment of a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court drawn so much attention. Calls for reform have been arriving, wave upon wave, from lower downs at higher ups, and from outsiders at insiders. Yang Ting-chang is now the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He is riding the crest of these waves. He cannot avoid them. All he can do is ride them in the directin they are going. All he can do is lead the realm of jurisprudence through its crisis of confidence.
Full Text below:
Never before has the appointment of a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court drawn so much attention. Calls for reform have been arriving, wave upon wave, from lower downs at higher ups, and from outsiders at insiders. Yang Ting-chang is now the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He is riding the crest of these waves. He cannot avoid them. All he can do is ride them in the directin they are going. All he can do is lead the realm of jurisprudence through its crisis of confidence.
Yang has attracted considerable attention. The reason is the reactionary nature of the system. In early January, a lower court judge circulated a petition that was eventually signed by over 500 judges. They expressed their hopes for the Supreme Court appointment. They expressed a desire to meet with President Ma once he won re-election. They recommended the establishment of an evaluation process. They offered numerous suggestions for reforming the Supreme Court.
This is the first time in our legal history that judges have expressed a collective opinion about Supreme Court nominees. The petition expressing the judges' hopes was not a sudden move. It was a continuation of wave upon wave of quiet revolution. At one time, judges said, "We will give you back the ballot box, if you give us back our independence." Judges wanted to repeal the requirement that court judgments be subjected to advance review. Judges flexed their administrative muscle, and won judicial independence. Judges appealed to the National Assembly on Yangmingshan, and gained fiscal independence, even whiled retaining judicial independence. Today's movement is directed inward. Its goal is to establish a more refined trial process able to inspire public confidence.
On the surface this movement, begun by lower court judges, constitutes a severe censure of the Supreme Court justices. Actually, it is an example of "tough love." In recent years the judicial system has undergone dramatic changes. The Supreme Court has habitually remanded cases back to the trial courts for further consideration. Its judgments have run counter to society's values. It has been tardy in reaching judgments. The facts of cases are often the same, yet the court's conclusions are often up poles apart. The controversy provoked by the White Rose Movement, which called for reasonable laws and sentences that fit the crime, enabled "dinosaur judges" (judges slow to react to injustice) to make a travesty of justice.
Given these dramatic changes, the justice system must change. The Supreme Court is the court of last appeal. It seals the fate of both defendants and plaintiffs. Logically speaking, judges ought to lead reforms. They ought to prevent trivialities from muddying the waters. They ought to focus on the legal opinions. They ought to be diliegent in resolving conflicts. They ought be courageous enough assume responsibility for their judgments. They ought to serve as examples for the lower courts. They ought to limit contention and discourage conflict. They ought to establish a system that inspires public trust.
The lower courts eagerly look forward to Supreme Court reform. The percentage of cases remanded back to the lower courts has substantially diminished. But members of the Supreme Court seldom provide legal guidance, seldom resolve discrepancies in their legal rulings, and seldom demonstrate initiative. Appointments to the Supreme Court are even more disastrous. They are made strictly on the basis of cronyism and seniority. Who decides which judges will be transferred to the Supreme Court? The views of the Supreme Court Chief Justice count for more than the views of the President of the Judicial Yuan. Becoming a Chief Justice requires only seniority. One's rulings are irrelevant. When the time comes, the position is guaranteed. One has no term limits. One can squat in office until one chooses to retire.
The Supreme Court should seek change under stable conditions. But stability is no excuse to delay reform. Waiting to be made Chief Justice hinders the rise of talent. It results in a race to the bottom. How can it motivate judges of superior merit? These are the reasons lower court judges have lost all patience.
Before the petition was circulated, lower court judges tried to break these bad habits. They refused to accept candidates nominated by Supreme Court judges. They began evaluating judges on the basis of their character, and on the basis of their rulings. They proposed standards for the evaluation of judges, in order to transform the Supreme Court. They tracked the schedule for Supreme Court Chief Justice appointments, in order to dialogue with the president, and so they could better explain the issue to the general public. The easiest reform easiest was the repeal of the "secret case assignment" system. This would shake the Supreme Court to its foundations, This would give the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court a dose of "shock and awe."
As one can imagine, when the president agreed to the petitioning judges' demands, the Supreme Court justices were thoroughly embarrassed. When lower court judges lent their expertise to exposing the Supreme Court's warts, the Supreme Court found it impossible to refute their charges. The reform movement was a direct attack on the Supreme Court. But if it were to degenerate into mutual recrimination between the lower and higher courts, then it would merely undermine the justice system. But if the lower and higher courts can stand united, and engage in constructive dialogue. they can accelerate the pace of reform.
Amidst this turmoil, Yang Ting-chang was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He faces no small challenge. He must build a bridge between the lower and higher courts. He must transform accusations into dialogue. He must convert other insiders. He must exploit the momentum provided by lower court judges, to jumpstart the Supreme Court appointments, and reform the court system.
The court system exists to solve peoples' problems. It must not become a bastion of professional arrogance. Judges must not become kings comfortably ensconced within their realms. The language of court decisions is often incomprehensible. Defendants often waste years of their lives awaiting court decisions. The trial process is so ossified judges write judgments for each other. How can the public believe in such a system of justice? The key to the question is in the hands of the Supreme Court. As long as the Supreme Court has the necessary determination, it can lead the lower courts toward qualitative change. All of this is possible.
The trial process cannot be changed overnight. But we must make a start. Once we do, a butterfly effect will soon take place. This is an ideal time to transform the trial process. We hope the new President of Judicial Yuan can ride the wave forward, and make a fresh start.
對最高法院的高度期許
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.16
從來沒有一位最高法院院長的產生,如此次受到矚目。面對由下而上,由外而內,呼喊改革的聲浪,站在浪頭上的新任最高法院院長楊鼎章無法迴避,只能乘浪前進,帶領審判界勇渡內外紛至的信任危機。
楊受到矚目,起因於體系內的反動。就在一月初,由一審法官發動,五百多名法官加入連署,表達能由法官票選、慎選最高法院院長的訴求,並於馬總統贏得連任後爭取會面,提出建立審薦程序,改革最高法院的多項建言。
這是司法史上首次由法官對終審的院長人選展現集體主張,這波連署法官們的參與期待,並非突發之舉,而是一波波寧靜革命的延續。過去的「箱子還你,獨立還我」,廢除判決書事前送閱的運動,法官向司法行政權爭取審判獨立;法官上陽明山向國大代表爭取司法預算獨立,也在護衛審判獨立;如今的運動,轉向內求,目標是建立精緻而服眾的審判文化。
基層法官的運動,表面上是對老大哥的嚴厲責難,實為愛深責切的期許。近幾年來,司法外部環境產生鉅大變化,最高法院長久以來的發回文化、歧異文化,致案件久久定讞、案情相近卻可能命運不同,以及「白玫瑰運動」挑起的法律適用,量刑妥適性爭議,讓審判受困於恐龍法官的牢籠,無法翻身。
值此巨變,審判界不能不變。最高法院既是判決定讞的落槌處,當事人的生死輸贏由其定奪,理應為法官界的翹楚,引領興革,減少瑣細事項的糾纏,著力法理見解的論述,勤於歧見的整合,勇於自為判決負責,作為下級審的表率,建立定紛止爭,受人民信賴的審判文化。
下級審引頸期盼,最高法院的改變蹣跚。案件發回率雖大幅降低,但發人省思的法理指引仍少,歧異見解的解決,猶缺積極的努力。人事上更見圈圈文化、排隊文化,哪些法官可以調任最高法院,最高院庭長的意見,比院長、司法院長有分量;升庭長,但看年資,判決擺一邊,時間到了自然到手,且無任期,做到退休為止。
最高法院固應在穩定下求變,但不能以安定為理由延宕改變。等著做庭長的既得利益,阻礙人才出頭,齊頭平等的安逸,如何激勵裁判品質的精進?凡此種種,都讓基層法官不願再等待。
在連署前,基層法官已嘗試打破慣習,不再照單全收由最高法院法官屬意的調任人選,開始從人品、判決品質,提出可供評比的標準,以改造最高法院。此外,更進一步抓緊最高法院院長更迭的時機與總統對話,以庶民容易理解、最容易達到改革的廢除「保密分案」制度,撼動最高法院的心牆,也給新任最高法院院長一枚震撼彈。
可以想見,當總統認同連署法官的訴求,最高法院的法官多麼尷尬難過。而當基層法官以內行人之姿揭開最高法院的沉痾,最高法院亦難對外辯駁。但直攻最高法院的改革運動,若淪為上下交相責的惡鬥,反會拉下審判的品質,反之,如能上下齊心、友善對話,就能加速帶動改革。
值此動盪的時機,楊鼎章出任最高法院院長,任務非比小可。他必須搭起上下審級間溝通的橋梁,化指責為對話,展開說服內部的工作,以基層法官的期盼為動力,帶動最高法院建立新的人事、審判文化。
審判是為人民解決問題而存在,不能自築專業傲慢的高塔,關起門來做大王。當判決文字艱澀難懂,原被告要用青春歲月癡等一個結果,審判僵化成法官群體說給自己人聽的呢喃,人民如何信服司法。而解決問題的鑰匙,有一大串掌握在最高法院的手裡,只要最高法院有心,帶領下級審「質變」,並非不可能的事。
審判文化雖然不能一蹴改變,有心開始,就會產生蝴蝶效應。這是審判脫胎換骨的絕佳時機,期盼新任院長能與所有法官破浪前行,開創新局。
Wednesday, February 15, 2012
Boao Forum: What's Behind the Veil
Boao Forum: What's Behind the Veil
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 15, 2012
Summary: Rumor has it that in 2008 President elect Ma Ying-jeou envisioned attending the Boao Forum in his capacity as President elect of the Republic of China. Had he actually done so, he might have overplayed his hand. He might have betrayed impatience. But the Republic of China government and the People's Republic of China government may sign a Peace Agreement one day. This is a goal both governments look forward to. When can the veil over the Boao Forum be pulled back? That may depend on how the two sides interpret the Bush/Hu hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations.
Full Text below:
Vice President-elect Wu Den-yih has finished registering for the Boao Forum. He expects to attend in early April. Beijing may send current Mainland Vice President Xi Jinping, who will assume the Presidency in the fall. Or they may send current Mainland Vice Premier Li Keqiang, who will assume the Premiership.
Authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are undergoing personnel changes. The upcoming Wu Xi Summit or Wu Li Summit suggests that authorities on both sides will continue their previously established policy path. This path was set in mid-2008, at the Boao Forum, by Vice President elect Vincent Siew and Mainland President Hu Jintao.
The 2008 Boao Forum was a major milestone for cross-Strait relations. In 2005 the Lien/Hu Meeting reached an agreement on the 1992 Consensus and Peaceful Development. The 2008 Boao Forum transformed a shared vision between two political parties, the KMT and CCP, into a real world working arrangement between two political authorities.
Let us put the known pieces of the puzzle together. Consider the Boao Forum four years ago. On March 22, 2008 Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, with 58% of the vote. That night, National Security Council Secretary-General designate Su Chi suggested that next month's Boao Forum offered a perfect opportunity to break the cross-Strait ice. Four days later, on March 26, Mainland President Hu Jintao spoke with U.S. President George W. Bush on the hotline. Hu said, "The Chinese Mainland and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. This means that both sides recognize that there is only one China, but each side will define one China its own way." Hu Jintao defined the 1992 Consensus as "One China, Different Interpretations." One China, Different Interpretations became the Bush/Hu Hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations. When Ma Ying-jeou listened to Hu's remarks, he was "very surprised." He decided to send Vice President elect Vincent Siew to the Boao Forum, as a further measure of the two sides' political path. The registration deadline had already passed. But two days later they received confirmation. Forum officials had arranged a fifty-seater private charter plane to fly Vincent Siew from Hong Kong to Haikou, but only charged him for an ordinary commercial flight.
Two events during the meeting underscored the important policy implications. One. Vincent Siew and Mainland Commerce Minister Chen Deming held a round-table. The Mainland press release said the two sides "participated in a dialogue under the One China Principle." When Vincent Siew objected to the wording. Mainland officials deleted it. Two. Vincent Siew conveyed President Ma's concept of "Face reality, create the future, shelve disagreement, pursue win/win." Hu Jintao responded in kind: "Work shoulder to shoulder, establish mutual trust, shelve disagreements, create win/win." Chen Deming withdrew his press release. Vincent Siew spoke of "facing reality." As we can see, the 2008 Boao Forum enabled the two sides to test each other's bottom lines and to agree on the 1992 Consensus. It enabled the two sides to experience four years of Peaceful Development.
We are now at an historical turning point. One point is especially worth affirming. Leaders on both sides of the Strait today have sound judgment, They appreciate the value of this historic opportunity. They know enough to take advantage of it. For example, when Hu Jintao spoke to Bush on the hotline, he did not inform Ma Ying-jeou in advance. But he exercised initiative. He showed good faith. He established a new pattern for Washington/Beijing/Taipei relations. For example, when Ma asked Siew to attend the Boao Forum, it was not at the invitation of Beijing. But he seized the initiative. He gave Beijing the opportunity to "refrain from repudiating" Siew's assertion that he was the Vice President elect of the Republic of China. For example, when Chen Deming deleted the controversial wording from Beijing's press release, he did so quietly and without protest. This enabled Siew and Hu to reach a consensus on "shelving disputes and co-creating a win/win scenario." These bits and pieces may seem trivial today, But at the time they crossed a high and risky historical threshold.
Forty days from now. Wu Den-yih will attend the Boao Forum. It will be the second time a "Vice President elect of the Republic of China" attends the meeting. This means that even though Beijing does not recognize the Republic of China as a matter of law, it must nevertheless recognize the Republic of China's system of direct presidential elections. Bejing knew that Vincent Siew and Wu Den-yih were Vice Presidents elect. Therefore, the Boao Forum shows that cross-Strait relations are evolving. They are evolving from mutual non-repudiation, toward mutual recognition. In other words, they are moving toward the Bush/Hu Hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations. Over the past four years, officials from both sides have seated themselve at the same negotiating table. But the Boao Forum veil of "Vice President elect" remains.
Rumor has it that in 2008 President elect Ma Ying-jeou envisioned attending the Boao Forum in his capacity as President elect of the Republic of China. Had he actually done so, he might have overplayed his hand. He might have betrayed impatience. But the Republic of China government and the People's Republic of China government may sign a Peace Agreement one day. This is a goal both governments look forward to. When can the veil over the Boao Forum be pulled back? That may depend on how the two sides interpret the Bush/Hu hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations.
何時揭去博鰲論壇那一層薄紗 【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.15
候任副總統吳敦義,已完成博鰲論壇的報名手續,可望於四月初赴會;北京方面可能由即將在今秋接任國家主席的現任國家副主席習近平,或即將接任國務院總理的現任國務院副總理李克強出面接待。
即將登場的「吳習會」或「吳李會」顯示,在兩岸政府皆出現換屆遞繼之際,雙方的兩岸政策皆可望依既定方向延續發展;而這個方向,則是在二○○八年,當時的候任副總統蕭萬長,與大陸國家主席胡錦濤在當年的博鰲論壇上所確立。
二○○八年的博鰲論壇,是兩岸關係的重大里程碑;它使二○○五年「連胡會」所建立的「九二共識/和平發展」原則,由國共兩黨的憧憬共識,轉移成了自二○○八年以來雙方政府所實際執行運作的具體政策。
且依目前已知的資訊進行拼圖,來看一看四年前那一次博鰲論壇的概貌。二○○八年三月二十二日,馬英九以百分之五十八的選票贏得首任總統大選;當晚,內定為國安會秘書長的蘇起即提議,可藉下月舉行的博鰲論壇為兩岸破冰的契機。四天後,三月二十六日,大陸國家主席胡錦濤在熱線中對美國總統小布希說:「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識的基礎上恢復談判,意即雙方承認只有一個中國,但同意對其定義各自表述。」在此,胡錦濤將「九二共識」定義為「一個中國/各自表述」;而「九二共識/一中各表」,儼然也成為「布胡熱線/一中各表」。馬英九在事後追述說,他看到胡錦濤的談話「十分驚訝」,於是決定請候任副總統蕭萬長出席博鰲論壇,進一步試測雙方的路數。當時,報名已經逾期,但兩天後即收到確認;博鰲官方並安排了一架五十人座的私人包機,協助蕭萬長一行由香港轉往海口,僅收取一般客機的票價。
會議期間,有兩個事件可以點出此會的政策意義。一、蕭萬長與大陸商務部長陳德銘舉行圓桌會議,會後大陸方面的新聞稿出現「在一個中國的原則下展開對話」等語;經蕭萬長提出異議,大陸方面加以刪除。二、蕭萬長向胡錦濤提出馬總統所楬櫫的「正視現實/開創未來/擱置爭議/追求雙贏」十六字箴言;胡錦濤則回以「共同努力/建立互信/擱置爭議/共創雙贏」十六字訣。由此可見,陳德銘的撤回新聞稿,與蕭萬長「正視現實」的表態,使二○○八的博鰲會可謂是兩岸政府對「九二共識」內涵的相互試探與定調,於是兩岸有了四年來的「和平發展」。
在這個歷史大拐點中,最值得肯定的是兩岸領導人對當時出現的歷史機遇皆有明智的判斷力,並知所珍惜。例如,胡錦濤在布胡熱線中的談話,事先當未告知馬英九;但他操持了主動,並表現了善意,建構起美中台三邊的政策新格局;又如,馬英九請蕭萬長赴博鰲論壇,亦非出於北京方面的邀請,而是主動出牌,給北京製造「不否認」蕭萬長為「中華民國候任副總統」的場域;再如,陳德銘刪除了強勢的片面語言,及蕭胡達成「擱置爭議/共創雙贏」的共識。這些點點滴滴,在今日看來皆似理所當然,但在當年卻是邁過了一個又一個高大危疑的歷史門檻。
再過四十幾天,吳敦義將出席博鰲論壇,這也是第二位「中華民國候任副總統」赴會。此中意義顯示,北京方面雖在「法理上」未承認中華民國,卻不能不面對中華民國公民直選總統的體制,因為明知蕭萬長及吳敦義皆為「候任副總統」;因此,博鰲論壇顯示,兩岸關係可由「互不否認」朝往「相互承認」的方向發展,也就是循「布胡熱線」及「一中各表」的方向發展。然而,四年來兩岸政府官員雖皆已直接上了談判桌,但在博鰲論壇上卻仍存有「候任副總統」的這一層紗簾。
據說,二○○八年曾有由「中華民國候任總統」馬英九親赴博鰲論壇的擬想。倘若當時真的那麼做了,也許是過猶不及,太過躁進。但是,未來可由中華民國政府與中華人民共和國政府,商簽建立《和平協議》等機制,應是兩岸政府可以期望的目標。博鰲的那一層薄紗何時可以拉開,也許要看「布胡熱線/一中各表」在兩岸政府換屆後如何解讀與發展。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 15, 2012
Summary: Rumor has it that in 2008 President elect Ma Ying-jeou envisioned attending the Boao Forum in his capacity as President elect of the Republic of China. Had he actually done so, he might have overplayed his hand. He might have betrayed impatience. But the Republic of China government and the People's Republic of China government may sign a Peace Agreement one day. This is a goal both governments look forward to. When can the veil over the Boao Forum be pulled back? That may depend on how the two sides interpret the Bush/Hu hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations.
Full Text below:
Vice President-elect Wu Den-yih has finished registering for the Boao Forum. He expects to attend in early April. Beijing may send current Mainland Vice President Xi Jinping, who will assume the Presidency in the fall. Or they may send current Mainland Vice Premier Li Keqiang, who will assume the Premiership.
Authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are undergoing personnel changes. The upcoming Wu Xi Summit or Wu Li Summit suggests that authorities on both sides will continue their previously established policy path. This path was set in mid-2008, at the Boao Forum, by Vice President elect Vincent Siew and Mainland President Hu Jintao.
The 2008 Boao Forum was a major milestone for cross-Strait relations. In 2005 the Lien/Hu Meeting reached an agreement on the 1992 Consensus and Peaceful Development. The 2008 Boao Forum transformed a shared vision between two political parties, the KMT and CCP, into a real world working arrangement between two political authorities.
Let us put the known pieces of the puzzle together. Consider the Boao Forum four years ago. On March 22, 2008 Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, with 58% of the vote. That night, National Security Council Secretary-General designate Su Chi suggested that next month's Boao Forum offered a perfect opportunity to break the cross-Strait ice. Four days later, on March 26, Mainland President Hu Jintao spoke with U.S. President George W. Bush on the hotline. Hu said, "The Chinese Mainland and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. This means that both sides recognize that there is only one China, but each side will define one China its own way." Hu Jintao defined the 1992 Consensus as "One China, Different Interpretations." One China, Different Interpretations became the Bush/Hu Hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations. When Ma Ying-jeou listened to Hu's remarks, he was "very surprised." He decided to send Vice President elect Vincent Siew to the Boao Forum, as a further measure of the two sides' political path. The registration deadline had already passed. But two days later they received confirmation. Forum officials had arranged a fifty-seater private charter plane to fly Vincent Siew from Hong Kong to Haikou, but only charged him for an ordinary commercial flight.
Two events during the meeting underscored the important policy implications. One. Vincent Siew and Mainland Commerce Minister Chen Deming held a round-table. The Mainland press release said the two sides "participated in a dialogue under the One China Principle." When Vincent Siew objected to the wording. Mainland officials deleted it. Two. Vincent Siew conveyed President Ma's concept of "Face reality, create the future, shelve disagreement, pursue win/win." Hu Jintao responded in kind: "Work shoulder to shoulder, establish mutual trust, shelve disagreements, create win/win." Chen Deming withdrew his press release. Vincent Siew spoke of "facing reality." As we can see, the 2008 Boao Forum enabled the two sides to test each other's bottom lines and to agree on the 1992 Consensus. It enabled the two sides to experience four years of Peaceful Development.
We are now at an historical turning point. One point is especially worth affirming. Leaders on both sides of the Strait today have sound judgment, They appreciate the value of this historic opportunity. They know enough to take advantage of it. For example, when Hu Jintao spoke to Bush on the hotline, he did not inform Ma Ying-jeou in advance. But he exercised initiative. He showed good faith. He established a new pattern for Washington/Beijing/Taipei relations. For example, when Ma asked Siew to attend the Boao Forum, it was not at the invitation of Beijing. But he seized the initiative. He gave Beijing the opportunity to "refrain from repudiating" Siew's assertion that he was the Vice President elect of the Republic of China. For example, when Chen Deming deleted the controversial wording from Beijing's press release, he did so quietly and without protest. This enabled Siew and Hu to reach a consensus on "shelving disputes and co-creating a win/win scenario." These bits and pieces may seem trivial today, But at the time they crossed a high and risky historical threshold.
Forty days from now. Wu Den-yih will attend the Boao Forum. It will be the second time a "Vice President elect of the Republic of China" attends the meeting. This means that even though Beijing does not recognize the Republic of China as a matter of law, it must nevertheless recognize the Republic of China's system of direct presidential elections. Bejing knew that Vincent Siew and Wu Den-yih were Vice Presidents elect. Therefore, the Boao Forum shows that cross-Strait relations are evolving. They are evolving from mutual non-repudiation, toward mutual recognition. In other words, they are moving toward the Bush/Hu Hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations. Over the past four years, officials from both sides have seated themselve at the same negotiating table. But the Boao Forum veil of "Vice President elect" remains.
Rumor has it that in 2008 President elect Ma Ying-jeou envisioned attending the Boao Forum in his capacity as President elect of the Republic of China. Had he actually done so, he might have overplayed his hand. He might have betrayed impatience. But the Republic of China government and the People's Republic of China government may sign a Peace Agreement one day. This is a goal both governments look forward to. When can the veil over the Boao Forum be pulled back? That may depend on how the two sides interpret the Bush/Hu hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations.
何時揭去博鰲論壇那一層薄紗 【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.15
候任副總統吳敦義,已完成博鰲論壇的報名手續,可望於四月初赴會;北京方面可能由即將在今秋接任國家主席的現任國家副主席習近平,或即將接任國務院總理的現任國務院副總理李克強出面接待。
即將登場的「吳習會」或「吳李會」顯示,在兩岸政府皆出現換屆遞繼之際,雙方的兩岸政策皆可望依既定方向延續發展;而這個方向,則是在二○○八年,當時的候任副總統蕭萬長,與大陸國家主席胡錦濤在當年的博鰲論壇上所確立。
二○○八年的博鰲論壇,是兩岸關係的重大里程碑;它使二○○五年「連胡會」所建立的「九二共識/和平發展」原則,由國共兩黨的憧憬共識,轉移成了自二○○八年以來雙方政府所實際執行運作的具體政策。
且依目前已知的資訊進行拼圖,來看一看四年前那一次博鰲論壇的概貌。二○○八年三月二十二日,馬英九以百分之五十八的選票贏得首任總統大選;當晚,內定為國安會秘書長的蘇起即提議,可藉下月舉行的博鰲論壇為兩岸破冰的契機。四天後,三月二十六日,大陸國家主席胡錦濤在熱線中對美國總統小布希說:「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識的基礎上恢復談判,意即雙方承認只有一個中國,但同意對其定義各自表述。」在此,胡錦濤將「九二共識」定義為「一個中國/各自表述」;而「九二共識/一中各表」,儼然也成為「布胡熱線/一中各表」。馬英九在事後追述說,他看到胡錦濤的談話「十分驚訝」,於是決定請候任副總統蕭萬長出席博鰲論壇,進一步試測雙方的路數。當時,報名已經逾期,但兩天後即收到確認;博鰲官方並安排了一架五十人座的私人包機,協助蕭萬長一行由香港轉往海口,僅收取一般客機的票價。
會議期間,有兩個事件可以點出此會的政策意義。一、蕭萬長與大陸商務部長陳德銘舉行圓桌會議,會後大陸方面的新聞稿出現「在一個中國的原則下展開對話」等語;經蕭萬長提出異議,大陸方面加以刪除。二、蕭萬長向胡錦濤提出馬總統所楬櫫的「正視現實/開創未來/擱置爭議/追求雙贏」十六字箴言;胡錦濤則回以「共同努力/建立互信/擱置爭議/共創雙贏」十六字訣。由此可見,陳德銘的撤回新聞稿,與蕭萬長「正視現實」的表態,使二○○八的博鰲會可謂是兩岸政府對「九二共識」內涵的相互試探與定調,於是兩岸有了四年來的「和平發展」。
在這個歷史大拐點中,最值得肯定的是兩岸領導人對當時出現的歷史機遇皆有明智的判斷力,並知所珍惜。例如,胡錦濤在布胡熱線中的談話,事先當未告知馬英九;但他操持了主動,並表現了善意,建構起美中台三邊的政策新格局;又如,馬英九請蕭萬長赴博鰲論壇,亦非出於北京方面的邀請,而是主動出牌,給北京製造「不否認」蕭萬長為「中華民國候任副總統」的場域;再如,陳德銘刪除了強勢的片面語言,及蕭胡達成「擱置爭議/共創雙贏」的共識。這些點點滴滴,在今日看來皆似理所當然,但在當年卻是邁過了一個又一個高大危疑的歷史門檻。
再過四十幾天,吳敦義將出席博鰲論壇,這也是第二位「中華民國候任副總統」赴會。此中意義顯示,北京方面雖在「法理上」未承認中華民國,卻不能不面對中華民國公民直選總統的體制,因為明知蕭萬長及吳敦義皆為「候任副總統」;因此,博鰲論壇顯示,兩岸關係可由「互不否認」朝往「相互承認」的方向發展,也就是循「布胡熱線」及「一中各表」的方向發展。然而,四年來兩岸政府官員雖皆已直接上了談判桌,但在博鰲論壇上卻仍存有「候任副總統」的這一層紗簾。
據說,二○○八年曾有由「中華民國候任總統」馬英九親赴博鰲論壇的擬想。倘若當時真的那麼做了,也許是過猶不及,太過躁進。但是,未來可由中華民國政府與中華人民共和國政府,商簽建立《和平協議》等機制,應是兩岸政府可以期望的目標。博鰲的那一層薄紗何時可以拉開,也許要看「布胡熱線/一中各表」在兩岸政府換屆後如何解讀與發展。
Tuesday, February 14, 2012
Why Implement Tax Reform?
Why Implement Tax Reform?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 14, 2012
Summary: The new cabinet has been in office one week. Tax reform will undoubtedly become its most closely followed policy issue. The government's endless flip-flopping reflects the pressure it is under. Last Saturday, President Ma finally announced his tax reform policy, which will be based on "fairness and justice, geared to one's ability to pay." This raises the question, "Why implement tax reform?"
Full Text below:
The new cabinet has been in office one week. Tax reform will undoubtedly become its most closely followed policy issue. Control Yuan President Wang Chien-hsiuan strongly recommends a tax increase. Kuomintang legislator without portfolio Tseng Chu-wei walked out without addressing the capital gains tax issue. The securities transaction tax, profits tax, and "new tax every day" on the rich, remain unresolved. The government's endless flip-flopping reflects the pressure it is under. Last Saturday, President Ma finally announced his tax reform policy, which will be based on "fairness and justice, geared to one's ability to pay." This raises the question, "Why implement tax reform?"
The government has offered countless reasons for tax reform. For example: The tax system must be reformed because government revenue is inadequate. The tax system must be reformed because economic development demands it. The tax system must be reformed because it is too messy. The tax system must be reformed because the election is over. The tax system must be reformed because public resentment must be appeased. Regardless what justifications are offered for tax reform, one must never reform merely for the sake of reform. One must never reform on a selective, piecemeal basis. One must never pander to populist sentiment. One must never abandon one's principles and ideals. Especially since current tax reform program was begun only after President Ma had already won a second term. President Ma is not under any reelection pressure. He has an excellent opportunity to ensure that the reforms are sound. The financial tsunami has highlighted the increasing wealth gap and social opposition between rich and poor due to excessive capitalism. Tax reform is the social consensus. There is no excuse to postpone it or shrink from it. It represents the hopes of a majority of the community. Tax reform will be a critical part of President Ma and the KMT's legacy.
Compare the current tax reform program to previous tax reform programs. Current tax reform has two causes. The first is excessively low tax rates. The tax burden rate is the ratio of taxes to gross domestic product (GDP). Last year it was 12.8%. It has risen from the global low of 11.9% two years ago. But it remains low nonetheless. The tax burden rate is merely an indicator. It represents the effect, not the cause. Problems with the tax burden rate cannot be resolved by uttering the magic word, "tax increase." Otherwise raising the business tax rate by one percentage point would increase income by about $50 billion dollars. The tax burden rate would also immediately increase. One need not even amend the law. Wouldn't that be so much simpler? The sales tax does not distinguish between rich and poor. It is a consumption tax. The bulk of the tax burden is born by the proletariat. Such tax increases are inconsistent with President Ma's "fairness and justice, geared to one's ability to pay."
The tax burden rate measures the national tax burden. It also measures the soundness of the financial base. It reflects the impact of taxation on economic activity. In recent years the national tax rate has decreased. This means the national tax burden is lower. But the fiscal base has also become weaker. This is harmful to long-term development. More importantly, the gross domestic product and taxes cannot interact. They may even have become delinked. The tax system has a major problem. The economy has grown, but the tax rate has not grown with it. This affects more than fiscal income. It undermines the tax system's ability to stabilize the economy. It is even a source of unfair income distribution. The lower tax burden rate causes serious problems. This is why the tax system requires study and reform. Fiscal income is only one reason for the problems we face. It is not the sole reason. It is not the primary reason.
Another reason for tax reform is to achieve "fairness and justice." The pursuit of fairness and justice may seem like a given. But it only became an international issue after the financial tsunami struck. The World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland last month called the unequal and unjust gap between rich and poor a significant risk to economic development, It called on nations to give it their full attention. In order to encourage investment and promote development on Taiwan, the government once provided tax relief. That has gradually been phased out. But exceptions remain. To attract foreign capital following the financial tsunami, the government implemented massive cuts for inheritance taxes, gift taxes. and income taxes for profit-making enterprises. The deeper problems remain. The tax system increasingly benefits the rich. President Ma likes to cite statistics. But he should keep one number in mind. According to income statistics, over the past five years the average tax rate for the highest income group, was 4.18%, the lowest in three years. The rate for the lowest income group was 2.4%, higher than when the Ma administration first took office. The income gap between rich and poor is widening. The tax gap between rich and poor is narrowing. This is a crowning irony for a tax system ostensibly geared on one's ability to pay.
Therefore the unequal and unjust provisions of the current tax system must be corrected, This is the key to achieving equality and justice. This is the direction we must take. Tax reform has four principles. One. A review of the tax system must not be confined to any specific tax. The income tax system is the best showcase for a tax system geared to one's ability to pay. Naturally it is going to be the focus of any review conducted, But capital gains taxes include the income tax and land taxes. New economic behavior and taxes must be harmonized. This too requires review, to avoid robbing Peter to pay Paul. Two. The administration must look forward. Some scholars say tax reform studies can never be anything but incomprehensible. They must nevertheless make them comprehensible. One need not waste time re-convening a fiscal reform conference. But past research is outdated. It may serve as a starting point. But discussion and communication are essential for any conclusion. Three. Reform must not be limited to amending the law. One can also promote reform through administrative means. One need not wait for tax reforms before acting. For example, real estate and land taxes should be determined on the basis of actual market prices. Four. Less talk. More action. Once the decisions have been made, one should "just do it." The "new tax every day" approach forces the administration to waste time explaining everything to everybody. This is pointless, and is unhelpful to tax reform.
稅改為何而改?
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.14
新內閣上任一周,稅制改革無疑成為各界最關注的政策,監察院長王建?力主加稅,國民黨不分區立委曾巨威謂不談資本利得稅就走人;而證券交易所得稅、暴利稅,到富人稅的「每日一稅」,官方反覆不定的說詞則反映了所承受的龐大壓力。直到上周六,馬總統終於為稅改定下「公平正義、量能課稅」的方向,這才讓稅改回到了「為何而改」的正題。
政府稅改的理由千百種,政府收入不夠要改,發展經濟要改,稅制凌亂要改,選舉過後也要改,排解民怨更要改,但不論怎麼改,就是不能為改而改,以選擇性修補、投民所好的民粹式改革交差了事,使稅改失去原則及理想;尤其這次稅改,是在馬總統當選連任後啟動,沒有選票壓力的馬總統在政治面擁有了絕佳的改革時機,而金融海嘯凸顯資本主義過度發展下的貧富差距惡化與貧富對立分化亂象,亦為稅改注入最需要的基本社會共識,稅改不只沒有任何藉口推遲或縮水,還承載了社會的廣大期待,更是馬總統、國民黨以稅改留下歷史評價的關鍵一役。
相對於歷次稅改,這次稅改有兩個清楚的源頭。第一個是租稅負擔率偏低。租稅負擔率是稅收占國內生產毛額(GDP)的比率,去年為百分之十二點八,雖比前年全球最低的百分之十一點九有所回升,但仍屬低水準。然而,租稅負擔率是一個表象數字,呈現的是結果而非成因,絕非一句「加稅」就可以解決,否則只要提高營業稅稅率一個百分點就可增收約五百億元,租稅負擔率也可立即上升,還不必修法,豈不簡單易行?但營業稅是不論貧富,有消費就課稅,繳稅占大宗的還是普羅大眾,這樣的加稅自不符合馬總統所說的「公平正義、量能課稅」。
再者,租稅負擔率除用以衡量國民租稅負擔,也在測量財政基礎的穩健度,更在於反映稅收與經濟活動的連動性。因此,近年我國租稅負擔率下降,雖然代表國民租稅的負擔降低了,但財政基礎的穩健度也跟著下降,不利長期建設發展;更重要的是,國內生產毛額與稅收間無法互動,甚或脫離,顯示稅制出了很大問題,以致經濟有成長,但稅收未有相應成長,其影響的不只是財政收入,也未發揮稅制應有的景氣穩定機制,甚至成為所得分配不公之源。這些才是租稅負擔率下降所反映出來的重要課題,也正是稅改須研究改革的內涵,財政收入僅是其中之一,但非唯一,更非主要面向。
另一個源頭就是實現「公平正義」。追求公平正義看似理所當然,但直到金融海嘯之後才成為國際顯學,上月在瑞士達沃斯舉行的世界經濟論壇更將不公不義導致的貧富分化列為經濟發展的重大風險,疾呼各國重視。在台灣,早年為促進投資、發展經濟而採行的租稅減免雖已逐步取消,但仍留下不少特例,甚至在金融海嘯後為了吸引外來資金而大舉調降遺產贈與稅、營利事業所得稅,加以沉痾未除,使得稅制愈來愈有利富人。馬總統喜歡用數字說明政績,但有一個數字他應警惕在心,依所得統計,前年五等分最高所得組的平均稅率為百分之四點一八,是三年來最低,而最低所得組是百分之二點四一,卻比馬政府上任時高,貧富「所得」差距擴大而「稅負」差距縮小,實為稅制量能課稅精神的最大諷刺。
因此,矯正當前稅制中不公不義的規定,是實現公平正義的核心。依此方向,稅改的推展有四個原則:第一,檢討不限於特定稅目,所得稅制是最能彰顯量能課稅精神的稅目,自是檢討重點,但資本利得稅涵蓋的稅目除了所得稅,還有土地相關稅目等,加以新經濟行為以及各稅目間的調和等,都應一併檢討,以免挖東補西;第二,要有前瞻性觀點,雖有學者認為稅改研究已是汗牛充棟,方向亦明,不必再召開財改會浪費時間,但過去的研究畢竟有時空差異,可以當基礎卻不能做結論,研討、溝通流程仍屬必要;第三,改革不限於修法,能以行政手段達成者應即推動,不必等待稅改結論,例如讓房地課稅價格貼近市價等;第四,少說多做,謀定後動,「每日一稅」搞得府院時時澄清,就是一種虛耗,於稅改無益。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 14, 2012
Summary: The new cabinet has been in office one week. Tax reform will undoubtedly become its most closely followed policy issue. The government's endless flip-flopping reflects the pressure it is under. Last Saturday, President Ma finally announced his tax reform policy, which will be based on "fairness and justice, geared to one's ability to pay." This raises the question, "Why implement tax reform?"
Full Text below:
The new cabinet has been in office one week. Tax reform will undoubtedly become its most closely followed policy issue. Control Yuan President Wang Chien-hsiuan strongly recommends a tax increase. Kuomintang legislator without portfolio Tseng Chu-wei walked out without addressing the capital gains tax issue. The securities transaction tax, profits tax, and "new tax every day" on the rich, remain unresolved. The government's endless flip-flopping reflects the pressure it is under. Last Saturday, President Ma finally announced his tax reform policy, which will be based on "fairness and justice, geared to one's ability to pay." This raises the question, "Why implement tax reform?"
The government has offered countless reasons for tax reform. For example: The tax system must be reformed because government revenue is inadequate. The tax system must be reformed because economic development demands it. The tax system must be reformed because it is too messy. The tax system must be reformed because the election is over. The tax system must be reformed because public resentment must be appeased. Regardless what justifications are offered for tax reform, one must never reform merely for the sake of reform. One must never reform on a selective, piecemeal basis. One must never pander to populist sentiment. One must never abandon one's principles and ideals. Especially since current tax reform program was begun only after President Ma had already won a second term. President Ma is not under any reelection pressure. He has an excellent opportunity to ensure that the reforms are sound. The financial tsunami has highlighted the increasing wealth gap and social opposition between rich and poor due to excessive capitalism. Tax reform is the social consensus. There is no excuse to postpone it or shrink from it. It represents the hopes of a majority of the community. Tax reform will be a critical part of President Ma and the KMT's legacy.
Compare the current tax reform program to previous tax reform programs. Current tax reform has two causes. The first is excessively low tax rates. The tax burden rate is the ratio of taxes to gross domestic product (GDP). Last year it was 12.8%. It has risen from the global low of 11.9% two years ago. But it remains low nonetheless. The tax burden rate is merely an indicator. It represents the effect, not the cause. Problems with the tax burden rate cannot be resolved by uttering the magic word, "tax increase." Otherwise raising the business tax rate by one percentage point would increase income by about $50 billion dollars. The tax burden rate would also immediately increase. One need not even amend the law. Wouldn't that be so much simpler? The sales tax does not distinguish between rich and poor. It is a consumption tax. The bulk of the tax burden is born by the proletariat. Such tax increases are inconsistent with President Ma's "fairness and justice, geared to one's ability to pay."
The tax burden rate measures the national tax burden. It also measures the soundness of the financial base. It reflects the impact of taxation on economic activity. In recent years the national tax rate has decreased. This means the national tax burden is lower. But the fiscal base has also become weaker. This is harmful to long-term development. More importantly, the gross domestic product and taxes cannot interact. They may even have become delinked. The tax system has a major problem. The economy has grown, but the tax rate has not grown with it. This affects more than fiscal income. It undermines the tax system's ability to stabilize the economy. It is even a source of unfair income distribution. The lower tax burden rate causes serious problems. This is why the tax system requires study and reform. Fiscal income is only one reason for the problems we face. It is not the sole reason. It is not the primary reason.
Another reason for tax reform is to achieve "fairness and justice." The pursuit of fairness and justice may seem like a given. But it only became an international issue after the financial tsunami struck. The World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland last month called the unequal and unjust gap between rich and poor a significant risk to economic development, It called on nations to give it their full attention. In order to encourage investment and promote development on Taiwan, the government once provided tax relief. That has gradually been phased out. But exceptions remain. To attract foreign capital following the financial tsunami, the government implemented massive cuts for inheritance taxes, gift taxes. and income taxes for profit-making enterprises. The deeper problems remain. The tax system increasingly benefits the rich. President Ma likes to cite statistics. But he should keep one number in mind. According to income statistics, over the past five years the average tax rate for the highest income group, was 4.18%, the lowest in three years. The rate for the lowest income group was 2.4%, higher than when the Ma administration first took office. The income gap between rich and poor is widening. The tax gap between rich and poor is narrowing. This is a crowning irony for a tax system ostensibly geared on one's ability to pay.
Therefore the unequal and unjust provisions of the current tax system must be corrected, This is the key to achieving equality and justice. This is the direction we must take. Tax reform has four principles. One. A review of the tax system must not be confined to any specific tax. The income tax system is the best showcase for a tax system geared to one's ability to pay. Naturally it is going to be the focus of any review conducted, But capital gains taxes include the income tax and land taxes. New economic behavior and taxes must be harmonized. This too requires review, to avoid robbing Peter to pay Paul. Two. The administration must look forward. Some scholars say tax reform studies can never be anything but incomprehensible. They must nevertheless make them comprehensible. One need not waste time re-convening a fiscal reform conference. But past research is outdated. It may serve as a starting point. But discussion and communication are essential for any conclusion. Three. Reform must not be limited to amending the law. One can also promote reform through administrative means. One need not wait for tax reforms before acting. For example, real estate and land taxes should be determined on the basis of actual market prices. Four. Less talk. More action. Once the decisions have been made, one should "just do it." The "new tax every day" approach forces the administration to waste time explaining everything to everybody. This is pointless, and is unhelpful to tax reform.
稅改為何而改?
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.14
新內閣上任一周,稅制改革無疑成為各界最關注的政策,監察院長王建?力主加稅,國民黨不分區立委曾巨威謂不談資本利得稅就走人;而證券交易所得稅、暴利稅,到富人稅的「每日一稅」,官方反覆不定的說詞則反映了所承受的龐大壓力。直到上周六,馬總統終於為稅改定下「公平正義、量能課稅」的方向,這才讓稅改回到了「為何而改」的正題。
政府稅改的理由千百種,政府收入不夠要改,發展經濟要改,稅制凌亂要改,選舉過後也要改,排解民怨更要改,但不論怎麼改,就是不能為改而改,以選擇性修補、投民所好的民粹式改革交差了事,使稅改失去原則及理想;尤其這次稅改,是在馬總統當選連任後啟動,沒有選票壓力的馬總統在政治面擁有了絕佳的改革時機,而金融海嘯凸顯資本主義過度發展下的貧富差距惡化與貧富對立分化亂象,亦為稅改注入最需要的基本社會共識,稅改不只沒有任何藉口推遲或縮水,還承載了社會的廣大期待,更是馬總統、國民黨以稅改留下歷史評價的關鍵一役。
相對於歷次稅改,這次稅改有兩個清楚的源頭。第一個是租稅負擔率偏低。租稅負擔率是稅收占國內生產毛額(GDP)的比率,去年為百分之十二點八,雖比前年全球最低的百分之十一點九有所回升,但仍屬低水準。然而,租稅負擔率是一個表象數字,呈現的是結果而非成因,絕非一句「加稅」就可以解決,否則只要提高營業稅稅率一個百分點就可增收約五百億元,租稅負擔率也可立即上升,還不必修法,豈不簡單易行?但營業稅是不論貧富,有消費就課稅,繳稅占大宗的還是普羅大眾,這樣的加稅自不符合馬總統所說的「公平正義、量能課稅」。
再者,租稅負擔率除用以衡量國民租稅負擔,也在測量財政基礎的穩健度,更在於反映稅收與經濟活動的連動性。因此,近年我國租稅負擔率下降,雖然代表國民租稅的負擔降低了,但財政基礎的穩健度也跟著下降,不利長期建設發展;更重要的是,國內生產毛額與稅收間無法互動,甚或脫離,顯示稅制出了很大問題,以致經濟有成長,但稅收未有相應成長,其影響的不只是財政收入,也未發揮稅制應有的景氣穩定機制,甚至成為所得分配不公之源。這些才是租稅負擔率下降所反映出來的重要課題,也正是稅改須研究改革的內涵,財政收入僅是其中之一,但非唯一,更非主要面向。
另一個源頭就是實現「公平正義」。追求公平正義看似理所當然,但直到金融海嘯之後才成為國際顯學,上月在瑞士達沃斯舉行的世界經濟論壇更將不公不義導致的貧富分化列為經濟發展的重大風險,疾呼各國重視。在台灣,早年為促進投資、發展經濟而採行的租稅減免雖已逐步取消,但仍留下不少特例,甚至在金融海嘯後為了吸引外來資金而大舉調降遺產贈與稅、營利事業所得稅,加以沉痾未除,使得稅制愈來愈有利富人。馬總統喜歡用數字說明政績,但有一個數字他應警惕在心,依所得統計,前年五等分最高所得組的平均稅率為百分之四點一八,是三年來最低,而最低所得組是百分之二點四一,卻比馬政府上任時高,貧富「所得」差距擴大而「稅負」差距縮小,實為稅制量能課稅精神的最大諷刺。
因此,矯正當前稅制中不公不義的規定,是實現公平正義的核心。依此方向,稅改的推展有四個原則:第一,檢討不限於特定稅目,所得稅制是最能彰顯量能課稅精神的稅目,自是檢討重點,但資本利得稅涵蓋的稅目除了所得稅,還有土地相關稅目等,加以新經濟行為以及各稅目間的調和等,都應一併檢討,以免挖東補西;第二,要有前瞻性觀點,雖有學者認為稅改研究已是汗牛充棟,方向亦明,不必再召開財改會浪費時間,但過去的研究畢竟有時空差異,可以當基礎卻不能做結論,研討、溝通流程仍屬必要;第三,改革不限於修法,能以行政手段達成者應即推動,不必等待稅改結論,例如讓房地課稅價格貼近市價等;第四,少說多做,謀定後動,「每日一稅」搞得府院時時澄清,就是一種虛耗,於稅改無益。
Monday, February 13, 2012
New Cabinet: Courage and Communications Will See You Through
New Cabinet: Courage and Communications Will See You Through
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 13, 2012
Summary: The Ma administration's second term.has begun. The new administrative team has assumed office. it inclues veterans and novices. This is the cabinet's second term. Therefore no one is going to accept the excuse that the cabinet is new and therefore lacks experience. The cabinet does not need "star players." Nor does it need designated fall guys to take the heat for their colleagues. Self confidence and a responsible attitude are the only qualities essential for the cabinet. As long as cabinet members understand their areas of responsibility, as long as they have confidence, as long as they assume responsibility, communications will be no problem.
Full Text below:
Just before the Legislative Yuan officially convened, the newly formed cabinet underwent a marathon, nine hour, weekend long "intensive training" session. They focused on a single idea: communications. This included communication with the public, communication with the legislature, communication with the media, and even internal communications witin the Executive Yuan itself. President Ma Ying-jeou may want cabinet members to take the lead in reaching out to the grassroots. Talking heads may demand that Ma keep up with current events and keep his his finger on the public pulse. But these are all technical details. A head of state must have confidence in the ability of government heads to handle those matters under their purvue. The key is a willingness to assume responsibility.
The Ma administration was hurt by criticisms directed against the cabinet during Typhoon Morakot. Since then, it has significantly increased the number of ministries and departments charged with visual communications and public relations. So much that its efforts eventually attracted the attention of the Control Yuan, which investigated and scaled back some of its excesses. Some ministry heads have established private channels of communication with talking heads, under the table. Theoretically this should enable them to convince the talking heads to say a few kind words about them before the TV cameras. At the very least this should convince the talking heads to criticize them less harshly. The results however, have been mixed. Attempts to secure support for administration policies have had limited success.
Just how should government heads communicate with the public? Current CEPD chairman Yin Chi-ming provides an excellent object lesson. The Ma administration made him Minister of Economic Affairs during its first term. The cabinet was reshuffled following Typhoon Morakot. Yin was made Minister without Portfolio. No one however, has ever explained why. One reason offered was that Yin was "ineffective in promoting a cross-Strait agreement on ECFA." But why weren't other cabinet members replaced? No one has ever explained why. Once Yin was made Minister without Portfolio, he no longer had to deal with the media. Nor did the media have time to seek him out. Six months before the presidential election. Yin Chi-ming buried his nose in his keyboard, blogging every day. He refuted DPP attacks on the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies. His firepower was so intense, the media could no longer ignore his existence. They had no choice but to visit his blog and leave their own comments.
Yin took substantive action, He showed that he was a political appointee fully capable of championing the administration's policies. But why was he so outspoken during the first two years of Ma's first term, only to later fall silent. Eventually some reporters criticized the administration for its "Silence of the Words." Actually Yin Chi-min reflected the twofold plight endured by many Ma administration political appointees. One. Many reporters in the front ranks lack professional experience. They simply could not understand his policy. Two. Many reporters pandered to popular sentiment. Policy debates garner low ratings. Naturally no one wants to calmy report them, let alone analyze them.
Some political appointees have the courage to assume responsibility. Take former Department of Health Director Yaung Chi-liang. He stood in the line of fire defending administration policy. But in the end he was still forced to resign. Sadly, no one remembers how staunchly he defended "second generation health care." All they remember is that he had the guts to stand up to the Taiwan independence "san min zhi" media, i.e., SET TV, Formosa TV, and the Liberty Times, Take Yin Chi-ming, who quietly blogged away. He blogged so much the media was forced to come back and seek him out. He penned thousands of words defending administration policy. Even if reporters didn't understand his meaning. at least they couldn't say they copied what he wrote down wrong. Finally, take the numerous former government heads who panic before the media. They hide from the media while in office. They run from the media when stepping down. Their guilty demeanor is utterly inappropriate for high-ranking officials. No wonder they have become the butt of media jokes.
In fact, political appointees and the media can communicate and interact in a more constructive fashion. Reporters are not academics or experts. They will inevitably ask stupid questions that leave the political appointee wondering whether to laugh or cry. But when asked senseless questions, political appointees must stand their ground and say "Thank you." They need not cover their faces and flee. They need not be so deficient in courage. When government heads avoid the media, it invariably means they will be both unpopular and unsuited for their jobs.
Recently Taiwan "celebrity" Makiyo and some friends got drunk and precipitated an incident. Recently Harvard graduate pro ball player Jeremy Lin became a star in the NBA. Political appointees must know what the public is talking about. But knowing what the public is talking about, does not t mean becoming the object of media attention. Last week a KMT Central Standing Committee Member wanted Party Chairman Ma Ying-jeou to express his views on Makiyo. President Ma surprised everyone. He said that when he he heard the term "Ma bang" he thought it meant the Ma family. Ma's humor was unfunny and pointless. Must the President respond even to celebrities who get drunk and make trouble? If so, then why not make the President clean every gutter in front of every house in the country?
Jeremy Lin is famous throughout the United States. The entire country is gripped by "Linsanity." But a president is responsible for a nation's affairs of state. To cast oneself as just another Jeremy Lin fan is trying too hard to share Jeremy Lin's spotlight. Jeremy Lin won several games in a row. The U.S. beef imports issue still awaits resolution. The 12 year compulsory education programe still needs promotion, Tax reform still needs to be added to the policy agenda. Foreseeable policy storms will not go away as a result of such distractions, One cannot fail to make preparations.
The Ma administration's second term.has begun. The new administrative team has assumed office. it inclues veterans and novices. This is the cabinet's second term. Therefore no one is going to accept the excuse that the cabinet is new and therefore lacks experience. The cabinet does not need "star players." Nor does it need designated fall guys to take the heat for their colleagues. Self confidence and a responsible attitude are the only qualities essential for the cabinet. As long as cabinet members understand their areas of responsibility, as long as they have confidence, as long as they assume responsibility, communications will be no problem.
新內閣勇於擔當 溝通就不是問題
2012-02-13中國時報
在立法院新會期正式開議前,甫改組成軍的新內閣周末以馬拉松的九個小時,為閣員進行「密集特訓」,重點只有兩個字:溝通。不論是對民眾、對國會、對媒體、乃至行政院各部會的內部溝通。但不論是馬英九總統樂見閣員訂定自己的下鄉計畫,或名嘴提醒首長隨時盯緊時事,掌握民意脈動,均屬「技術問題」,首長們對所轄部會的政策是否有信心、有擔當才是最重要的。
馬政府自第一任莫拉克風災重創內閣團隊後,就視溝通與宣傳為要務,見諸於媒體者即各部會置入性報導大量增加,終至引起監察院的關切,乃至調查和糾正;檯面下,則各部會首長不乏私下與眾名嘴建立溝通管道,好一點可說服名嘴們在電視機前為己美言,再差至少爭取名嘴少罵自己幾句,結果是好壞參半,對政策順利獲得民意支持的效果有限。
政府首長到底該如何落實溝通?現任經建會主委尹啟銘可做為一個典型教案,馬政府第一任時他是經濟部長,莫拉克風災後內閣改組,他調任政務委員,其間原因究竟為何沒人說得出所以然,勉強要論就是「為兩岸簽署ECFA不力」, 那為什麼其他閣員不更換呢?還是沒人說出一個道理。卸任部長後的尹啟銘轉任政務委員後,既不必面對媒體,也沒有媒體有這個閑情找他,尹啟銘在總統大選前後至少半年以上,每天悶著頭寫部落格,反批民進黨對馬政府兩岸政策的攻擊,火力強大到讓媒體不能忽視他的存在,回過頭抓他在部落格上的意見。
尹啟銘以實際行動證明自己是有絕佳辯護能力的政務官,問題是為什麼第一任前兩年敢言,之後反而噤聲,直到大選前才用「沉默的文字」進行政策攻擊?尹啟銘的狀況其實是許多馬政府政務官的困境,第一,不少媒體第一線記者缺乏足夠的專業,根本聽不懂他的政策;第二,媒體跟著民意感覺走,政策既無收視率,自然沒人肯冷靜報導,遑談分析。
於是勇於任事的政務官,上焉者如前衛生署長楊志良站在火線上為政策辯護,結果還是非離開官職不可,而且,沒人記得他用力推動的「二代健保」具體內容究竟為何,只記得他敢和「三民自」對抗;中焉者如尹啟銘,安靜的寫部落格,寫到讓媒體回過頭找他,而且,寫好千字政策辯護,就算記者聽不懂,至少不會抄錯;下焉者還有不少卸任部會首長見媒體如見鬼,上台時躲記者,下台時照樣跑給記者追,心虛的姿態全然不似一品大員,莫怪被媒體當成調笑的箭靶。
政務官與媒體其實可以有更健康的溝通和互動,媒體不是學者專家,難免出口問出許多讓人哭笑不得的問題,但是,身為政務官即使碰到無厘頭的問題,站定說聲「謝謝」即可,何須抱頭鼠竄,缺乏勇氣至此?當首長躲避媒體的那一刻,就註定自己必然是個不會受歡迎、也不適任的官員。
名嘴並以最近當紅的Makiyo與友人醉後鬧事事件與哈佛小子林書豪揚名NBA為例,提點政務官要時時刻刻知道民眾關心的話題。然而,知道和了解發燒話題不表示要成為「媒體反應爐」,以上周國民黨中常會為例,有中常委要黨主席馬英九對Makiyo表達看法,馬總統則意外說出一段他聽到媒體「馬幫」的說法,以為馬家又出了什麼事,這則冷笑話簡直是無聊透頂,如果連藝人喝酒鬧事總統都要管,那不如叫總統管每個人家門口的水溝算了。
同樣的,林書豪揚名全美,舉國皆瘋狂,但是,身為主掌國家大政的執政團隊,把自己當成「一般球迷」即可,不必過度消費林書豪的光芒,畢竟不論林書豪連贏幾場球,美牛進口問題還是得解決,十二年國教還是得推動,稅制改革依舊擺在政策時程表上,可預見的政策風波不會因此而稍減,同樣不能不預為因應。
馬政府第二任,執政團隊就定位,有老手有新人,因為是連任內閣,沒有人會接受新閣員缺乏經驗的托詞,內閣不需要「明星球員」或者專為同僚擋砲火的稻草人,信心和擔當是內閣必須建立的整體特質,只要全體閣員對自己職權範圍內的業務與政策深入了解、充滿信心、勇於擔當,溝通就不會是問題。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 13, 2012
Summary: The Ma administration's second term.has begun. The new administrative team has assumed office. it inclues veterans and novices. This is the cabinet's second term. Therefore no one is going to accept the excuse that the cabinet is new and therefore lacks experience. The cabinet does not need "star players." Nor does it need designated fall guys to take the heat for their colleagues. Self confidence and a responsible attitude are the only qualities essential for the cabinet. As long as cabinet members understand their areas of responsibility, as long as they have confidence, as long as they assume responsibility, communications will be no problem.
Full Text below:
Just before the Legislative Yuan officially convened, the newly formed cabinet underwent a marathon, nine hour, weekend long "intensive training" session. They focused on a single idea: communications. This included communication with the public, communication with the legislature, communication with the media, and even internal communications witin the Executive Yuan itself. President Ma Ying-jeou may want cabinet members to take the lead in reaching out to the grassroots. Talking heads may demand that Ma keep up with current events and keep his his finger on the public pulse. But these are all technical details. A head of state must have confidence in the ability of government heads to handle those matters under their purvue. The key is a willingness to assume responsibility.
The Ma administration was hurt by criticisms directed against the cabinet during Typhoon Morakot. Since then, it has significantly increased the number of ministries and departments charged with visual communications and public relations. So much that its efforts eventually attracted the attention of the Control Yuan, which investigated and scaled back some of its excesses. Some ministry heads have established private channels of communication with talking heads, under the table. Theoretically this should enable them to convince the talking heads to say a few kind words about them before the TV cameras. At the very least this should convince the talking heads to criticize them less harshly. The results however, have been mixed. Attempts to secure support for administration policies have had limited success.
Just how should government heads communicate with the public? Current CEPD chairman Yin Chi-ming provides an excellent object lesson. The Ma administration made him Minister of Economic Affairs during its first term. The cabinet was reshuffled following Typhoon Morakot. Yin was made Minister without Portfolio. No one however, has ever explained why. One reason offered was that Yin was "ineffective in promoting a cross-Strait agreement on ECFA." But why weren't other cabinet members replaced? No one has ever explained why. Once Yin was made Minister without Portfolio, he no longer had to deal with the media. Nor did the media have time to seek him out. Six months before the presidential election. Yin Chi-ming buried his nose in his keyboard, blogging every day. He refuted DPP attacks on the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies. His firepower was so intense, the media could no longer ignore his existence. They had no choice but to visit his blog and leave their own comments.
Yin took substantive action, He showed that he was a political appointee fully capable of championing the administration's policies. But why was he so outspoken during the first two years of Ma's first term, only to later fall silent. Eventually some reporters criticized the administration for its "Silence of the Words." Actually Yin Chi-min reflected the twofold plight endured by many Ma administration political appointees. One. Many reporters in the front ranks lack professional experience. They simply could not understand his policy. Two. Many reporters pandered to popular sentiment. Policy debates garner low ratings. Naturally no one wants to calmy report them, let alone analyze them.
Some political appointees have the courage to assume responsibility. Take former Department of Health Director Yaung Chi-liang. He stood in the line of fire defending administration policy. But in the end he was still forced to resign. Sadly, no one remembers how staunchly he defended "second generation health care." All they remember is that he had the guts to stand up to the Taiwan independence "san min zhi" media, i.e., SET TV, Formosa TV, and the Liberty Times, Take Yin Chi-ming, who quietly blogged away. He blogged so much the media was forced to come back and seek him out. He penned thousands of words defending administration policy. Even if reporters didn't understand his meaning. at least they couldn't say they copied what he wrote down wrong. Finally, take the numerous former government heads who panic before the media. They hide from the media while in office. They run from the media when stepping down. Their guilty demeanor is utterly inappropriate for high-ranking officials. No wonder they have become the butt of media jokes.
In fact, political appointees and the media can communicate and interact in a more constructive fashion. Reporters are not academics or experts. They will inevitably ask stupid questions that leave the political appointee wondering whether to laugh or cry. But when asked senseless questions, political appointees must stand their ground and say "Thank you." They need not cover their faces and flee. They need not be so deficient in courage. When government heads avoid the media, it invariably means they will be both unpopular and unsuited for their jobs.
Recently Taiwan "celebrity" Makiyo and some friends got drunk and precipitated an incident. Recently Harvard graduate pro ball player Jeremy Lin became a star in the NBA. Political appointees must know what the public is talking about. But knowing what the public is talking about, does not t mean becoming the object of media attention. Last week a KMT Central Standing Committee Member wanted Party Chairman Ma Ying-jeou to express his views on Makiyo. President Ma surprised everyone. He said that when he he heard the term "Ma bang" he thought it meant the Ma family. Ma's humor was unfunny and pointless. Must the President respond even to celebrities who get drunk and make trouble? If so, then why not make the President clean every gutter in front of every house in the country?
Jeremy Lin is famous throughout the United States. The entire country is gripped by "Linsanity." But a president is responsible for a nation's affairs of state. To cast oneself as just another Jeremy Lin fan is trying too hard to share Jeremy Lin's spotlight. Jeremy Lin won several games in a row. The U.S. beef imports issue still awaits resolution. The 12 year compulsory education programe still needs promotion, Tax reform still needs to be added to the policy agenda. Foreseeable policy storms will not go away as a result of such distractions, One cannot fail to make preparations.
The Ma administration's second term.has begun. The new administrative team has assumed office. it inclues veterans and novices. This is the cabinet's second term. Therefore no one is going to accept the excuse that the cabinet is new and therefore lacks experience. The cabinet does not need "star players." Nor does it need designated fall guys to take the heat for their colleagues. Self confidence and a responsible attitude are the only qualities essential for the cabinet. As long as cabinet members understand their areas of responsibility, as long as they have confidence, as long as they assume responsibility, communications will be no problem.
新內閣勇於擔當 溝通就不是問題
2012-02-13中國時報
在立法院新會期正式開議前,甫改組成軍的新內閣周末以馬拉松的九個小時,為閣員進行「密集特訓」,重點只有兩個字:溝通。不論是對民眾、對國會、對媒體、乃至行政院各部會的內部溝通。但不論是馬英九總統樂見閣員訂定自己的下鄉計畫,或名嘴提醒首長隨時盯緊時事,掌握民意脈動,均屬「技術問題」,首長們對所轄部會的政策是否有信心、有擔當才是最重要的。
馬政府自第一任莫拉克風災重創內閣團隊後,就視溝通與宣傳為要務,見諸於媒體者即各部會置入性報導大量增加,終至引起監察院的關切,乃至調查和糾正;檯面下,則各部會首長不乏私下與眾名嘴建立溝通管道,好一點可說服名嘴們在電視機前為己美言,再差至少爭取名嘴少罵自己幾句,結果是好壞參半,對政策順利獲得民意支持的效果有限。
政府首長到底該如何落實溝通?現任經建會主委尹啟銘可做為一個典型教案,馬政府第一任時他是經濟部長,莫拉克風災後內閣改組,他調任政務委員,其間原因究竟為何沒人說得出所以然,勉強要論就是「為兩岸簽署ECFA不力」, 那為什麼其他閣員不更換呢?還是沒人說出一個道理。卸任部長後的尹啟銘轉任政務委員後,既不必面對媒體,也沒有媒體有這個閑情找他,尹啟銘在總統大選前後至少半年以上,每天悶著頭寫部落格,反批民進黨對馬政府兩岸政策的攻擊,火力強大到讓媒體不能忽視他的存在,回過頭抓他在部落格上的意見。
尹啟銘以實際行動證明自己是有絕佳辯護能力的政務官,問題是為什麼第一任前兩年敢言,之後反而噤聲,直到大選前才用「沉默的文字」進行政策攻擊?尹啟銘的狀況其實是許多馬政府政務官的困境,第一,不少媒體第一線記者缺乏足夠的專業,根本聽不懂他的政策;第二,媒體跟著民意感覺走,政策既無收視率,自然沒人肯冷靜報導,遑談分析。
於是勇於任事的政務官,上焉者如前衛生署長楊志良站在火線上為政策辯護,結果還是非離開官職不可,而且,沒人記得他用力推動的「二代健保」具體內容究竟為何,只記得他敢和「三民自」對抗;中焉者如尹啟銘,安靜的寫部落格,寫到讓媒體回過頭找他,而且,寫好千字政策辯護,就算記者聽不懂,至少不會抄錯;下焉者還有不少卸任部會首長見媒體如見鬼,上台時躲記者,下台時照樣跑給記者追,心虛的姿態全然不似一品大員,莫怪被媒體當成調笑的箭靶。
政務官與媒體其實可以有更健康的溝通和互動,媒體不是學者專家,難免出口問出許多讓人哭笑不得的問題,但是,身為政務官即使碰到無厘頭的問題,站定說聲「謝謝」即可,何須抱頭鼠竄,缺乏勇氣至此?當首長躲避媒體的那一刻,就註定自己必然是個不會受歡迎、也不適任的官員。
名嘴並以最近當紅的Makiyo與友人醉後鬧事事件與哈佛小子林書豪揚名NBA為例,提點政務官要時時刻刻知道民眾關心的話題。然而,知道和了解發燒話題不表示要成為「媒體反應爐」,以上周國民黨中常會為例,有中常委要黨主席馬英九對Makiyo表達看法,馬總統則意外說出一段他聽到媒體「馬幫」的說法,以為馬家又出了什麼事,這則冷笑話簡直是無聊透頂,如果連藝人喝酒鬧事總統都要管,那不如叫總統管每個人家門口的水溝算了。
同樣的,林書豪揚名全美,舉國皆瘋狂,但是,身為主掌國家大政的執政團隊,把自己當成「一般球迷」即可,不必過度消費林書豪的光芒,畢竟不論林書豪連贏幾場球,美牛進口問題還是得解決,十二年國教還是得推動,稅制改革依舊擺在政策時程表上,可預見的政策風波不會因此而稍減,同樣不能不預為因應。
馬政府第二任,執政團隊就定位,有老手有新人,因為是連任內閣,沒有人會接受新閣員缺乏經驗的托詞,內閣不需要「明星球員」或者專為同僚擋砲火的稻草人,信心和擔當是內閣必須建立的整體特質,只要全體閣員對自己職權範圍內的業務與政策深入了解、充滿信心、勇於擔當,溝通就不會是問題。
Thursday, February 9, 2012
Traitor? Turncoat? Feudal Thinking in the Modern Era
Traitor? Turncoat? Feudal Thinking in the Modern Era
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 10, 2012
Summary: Former Kaohsiung County Chief Yang Chiu-hsing has been appointed Ma administration cabinet minister without portfolio, His former DPP comrades have excoriated him as a "turncoat." One could say the Green Camp "has a bee in its bonnet" about anyone becoming a "turncoat," and about anyone "not one of us," who therefore must be "one of them." By contrast, the Blue Camp has a more subtle issue with "traitors." This is a feudal conception of loyalty. As long as these two attitudes persist, politics on Taiwan cannot be rational.
Full Text below:
Former Kaohsiung County Chief Yang Chiu-hsing has been appointed Ma administration cabinet minister without portfolio, His former DPP comrades have excoriated him as a "turncoat." One could say the Green Camp "has a bee in its bonnet" about anyone becoming a "turncoat," and about anyone "not one of us," who therefore must be "one of them." By contrast, the Blue Camp has a more subtle issue with "traitors." This is a feudal conception of loyalty. As long as these two attitudes persist, politics on Taiwan cannot be rational.
As Yang Chiu-hsing noted, for politicians to switch political parties is nothing new. In other countries Britain's Winston Churchill and Japan's Ichiro Ozawa changed parties. On Taiwan, former President Lee Teng-hui, Huang Kun-hui, Chen Ming-wen, and Chang Hua-kuan changed parties. The political arena is filled with people who have changed political parties. The fact is, in modern democracies the nation trumps any party, Political parties are voluntary associations. If one remains in agreement, one stays. If one finds oneself in disagreement, one leaves. This ought to be the norm. Conversely, when one puts political party and ideology ahead of all else, and carelessly hurls feudalistic accusations of "turncoat" or "traitor," one is does more harm than good to one's party and one's nation. One merely demonstrates one's indifference to one's nation.
The general election has just concluded. DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen made a commitment during her presidential campaign, one that still rings in our ears. If the Democratic Progressive Party wins office, she vowed, the campaign committee will not be the ruling administration. Not will her administration transcend partisanship, she vowed, it will even form a grand coalition. What does it mean to "transcend partisanship?" What does it mean to "form a coalition?" Doesn't it mean co-operating and communicating with different political parties? Doesn't it mean recruiting the most talented individuals, regardless of party affiliation? When the DPP recruits people from other parties, the DPP praises them as "individuals of talent." But when the KMT recruits people from the DPP, the DPP swiftly denounces them as "turncoats."
The DPP once lacked governing experience. Its ruling administration had a serious shortage of individuals with talent. It desperately needed to transcend partisanship, Only then would these talented individuals be able to contribute at the crucial moment. The most obvious example was Tang Fei. During the 2000 change in ruling parties, the first in the Repubic of China's history, he served as Premier, even though he was ill at the time. The ruling DPP refused to agree to KMT demands for party to party consultations as a precondition of his recruitment. As a result Tang Fei found himself alone in the DPP cabinet for 140 days, after which he was denounced as a "stumbling block" and rushed off the stage. But during this first change in ruling parties, Tang Fei played an crucial role. He reassured the public. He even bolstered the morale of the armed forces. History will remember this.
Another example was Vice President Vincent Siew. When the Democratic Progressive Party was in office, Siew was not part of the government. Yet he was willing to act as economic advisor to the Chen Shui-bian adminstration. The pressing concern was the overall economy. When the DPP government was in office, it appointed New Party official Hau Lung-bin as EPA Chief. Hau defied the local political bosses and cleaned up the Erhjen Creek. As a result, public support for the administration soared. This was the most successful example of DPP transcending partisanship while recruiting talent.
The DPP must seek talent from outside the party. So why not the KMT? The Republic of China during election season may be a nation divided down the middle. But the Ma administration cannot be a government for half the people. The new government and the new cabinet must recruit the most qualified individuals for the job. If it can recruit from other parties, that will surely help it govern the nation. Even though the KMT is a century old political party, the new cabinet is not really a dyed in the wool Kuomintang cabinet. Yang Chiu-hsing was recruited from the DPP. Minister of the Interior Hong-Yuan Lee and MAC Vice Chairman Chen Chang Hsien-yao were recruited from the People First Party. Interior Minister Jiang Yi Hua and the majority of academics in the cabinet are independents.
Of course President Ma Ying-jeou's non-partisan staff have encountered obstacles within the party. In 2008, shortly after Ma took office. he nominated Green Camp leader Shen Fu-hsiung and Chen Hui-chang to the Control Yuan. Ma nominations were sharply rejected by Kuomintang legislators. Tang Fei helped stabilize the political situation. Yet KMT elders were still critical of his decision to serve the DPP. This preoccupation with "traitors" is completely out of touch with modern politics. In ancient times a minister would not serve two masters. But in modern democracies, political parties alternate, Individuals of talent do not belong to any one party, because they served the people.
By comparison, the DPP's preoccupation with "turncoats" is more serious. Party politics is about open competition between different political beliefs. But communications and consultation are also priorities for political parties. Alas, many Green Camp people see competition among political parties as battles between good and evil, between "them" and "us," Therefore they see no middle ground. To them, the KMT is the enemy, Anyone who suggests cooperation and communication with the KMT therefore, is a "traitor" and a "turncoat." Sad to say, political parties may use ideology to evaluate their opponents. But they also use it to persecute their own comrades. When political parties go down such a partisan road, they move farther and farther away from the people.
When Yang Chiu-hsing served as Kaohsiung County Chief, his governance was highly praised. He was referred to as the "five-star county chief," The Ma administration has recruited this individual of talent. The DPP ought to give him its blessing. More importantly, if one day the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will need to draw on talent from the KMT, This should give them pause. When such feudal concepts as "turncoats" and "traitors" persist with the DPP, it is going to have a hard time forming a competent ruling cabinet.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.02.10
社論-背骨?貳臣?現代還需要封建思想?
本報訊
前高雄縣長楊秋興出任新內閣政務委員,昔日民進黨戰友痛批他「背骨」;可以說,綠營有濃厚「背骨」情結:非我族類、其心必異;相對的,藍營則有微妙的「貳臣」情結,這是封建時代的忠君思想;只要這兩種情結還在,台灣就難有理性問政的一天。
正如楊秋興所說,政治人物轉換政黨並非新鮮事。在國外,從邱吉爾到日本的小澤一郎,在台灣,從前總統李登輝以下,到黃昆輝、陳明文、張花冠等人,政壇中轉換政黨者比比皆是,事實上,現代民主國家中,國家高於政黨,政黨是志願性社團,合則來、不合則去,應該是常態;相反的,當有人將政黨、意識形態無限上綱、動輒抬出「背骨」、「貳臣」如此封建的觀念時,則不啻是以黨害國、心中完全沒有國家的存在。
大選才剛結束,民進黨總統候選人蔡英文當時的承諾言猶在耳:如果民進黨執政,競選團隊不代表執政團隊,不但用人要超越黨派,甚至還要組成大聯合政府;何謂超黨派、何謂「聯合」,不就是要能與不同黨派溝通合作、跨黨派拔擢最適人才嗎?總不能民進黨任用他黨人才就是菁英,但被國民黨重用的民進黨人士,就成了「背骨」吧!
事實上,民進黨過去缺乏執政經驗,治國團隊嚴重不足,確實需要跨黨派用人,這些人才也都在關鍵時刻發揮作用。最明顯的例子就是唐飛,他在二千年台灣首次政黨輪替時,毅然抱病出任閣揆,即使當時民進黨政府不同意國民黨中央「黨進黨出」的做法,讓唐飛隻身入閣一百四十天後,就被當成絆腳石、匆匆下台;但是唐飛在台灣首次政黨輪替時,發揮的穩定民心、甚至軍心的關鍵力量,未來的歷史必然要記上一筆。
另一個例子是副總統蕭萬長,民進黨執政時,蕭萬長雖未進入政府,但是他之所以願意出任陳水扁政府的經濟顧問,念茲在茲的還是台灣的經濟大局。另外,民進黨政府當時任用新黨藉的郝龍斌出任環保署長,他不畏地方勢力整治二仁溪等作為,讓其民意支持度一度飆到最高,也是民進黨跨黨派用人的成功典範。
民進黨必須從黨外尋覓人才,國民黨何嘗不是如此?台灣在選舉時也許是一個五十對五十的國家,但馬總統治國,卻不能只做一位百分之五十的總統,因此新政府新內閣,用人除了要適才適所外,若能兼容各黨派,當然有助政府施政。確實,即使國民黨是百年政黨,新閣的國民黨屬性並不強,除了楊秋興曾是民進黨外,內政部長李鴻源、陸委會副主委張顯耀是親民藉,而內政部長江宜樺則和多數剛入閣的學者一樣,都是無黨藉。
當然,總統馬英九的跨黨派用人,也曾在黨內面臨重重阻力,二○○八年他上任後不久,提名屬性偏綠的沈富雄、陳耀昌擔任監委時,就硬生生被國民黨立委否決;唐飛即使對穩定政局有貢獻,國民黨仍有大老對其有微詞;這樣的「貳臣」情結,和現代政治完全脫節,過去是改朝換代,一臣不事二主;但現在是民主國家的政黨輪替,人才不屬於任何黨派,因為他們是為人民服務。
相較起來,民進黨的「背骨」情結更嚴重。政黨政治是本諸不同理念、公平競爭,但溝通協商也是政黨要務,只是,很多綠營人士卻將政黨競爭視為敵我、善惡之爭,因此毫無中間地帶,國民黨形同敵人,和國民黨溝通合作的就是「叛徒」、「背骨」;可悲的是,政黨可以用意識形態來檢驗對手,同樣也可以用來鬥爭同志,當政黨走上這樣黨同伐異的道路,也就離多數民意愈來愈遠。
楊秋興任高雄縣長時,多次得到施政第一的肯定,號稱五星級縣長,馬政府重用這樣的幹才,民進黨何妨祝福;更重要的是,假如有一天民進黨重新執政,屆時勢必也要借重國民黨的人才,他們現在該深思的是,當背骨、貳臣這樣的封建觀念揮之不去,民進黨恐伯無法組成像樣的治國團隊!
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 10, 2012
Summary: Former Kaohsiung County Chief Yang Chiu-hsing has been appointed Ma administration cabinet minister without portfolio, His former DPP comrades have excoriated him as a "turncoat." One could say the Green Camp "has a bee in its bonnet" about anyone becoming a "turncoat," and about anyone "not one of us," who therefore must be "one of them." By contrast, the Blue Camp has a more subtle issue with "traitors." This is a feudal conception of loyalty. As long as these two attitudes persist, politics on Taiwan cannot be rational.
Full Text below:
Former Kaohsiung County Chief Yang Chiu-hsing has been appointed Ma administration cabinet minister without portfolio, His former DPP comrades have excoriated him as a "turncoat." One could say the Green Camp "has a bee in its bonnet" about anyone becoming a "turncoat," and about anyone "not one of us," who therefore must be "one of them." By contrast, the Blue Camp has a more subtle issue with "traitors." This is a feudal conception of loyalty. As long as these two attitudes persist, politics on Taiwan cannot be rational.
As Yang Chiu-hsing noted, for politicians to switch political parties is nothing new. In other countries Britain's Winston Churchill and Japan's Ichiro Ozawa changed parties. On Taiwan, former President Lee Teng-hui, Huang Kun-hui, Chen Ming-wen, and Chang Hua-kuan changed parties. The political arena is filled with people who have changed political parties. The fact is, in modern democracies the nation trumps any party, Political parties are voluntary associations. If one remains in agreement, one stays. If one finds oneself in disagreement, one leaves. This ought to be the norm. Conversely, when one puts political party and ideology ahead of all else, and carelessly hurls feudalistic accusations of "turncoat" or "traitor," one is does more harm than good to one's party and one's nation. One merely demonstrates one's indifference to one's nation.
The general election has just concluded. DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen made a commitment during her presidential campaign, one that still rings in our ears. If the Democratic Progressive Party wins office, she vowed, the campaign committee will not be the ruling administration. Not will her administration transcend partisanship, she vowed, it will even form a grand coalition. What does it mean to "transcend partisanship?" What does it mean to "form a coalition?" Doesn't it mean co-operating and communicating with different political parties? Doesn't it mean recruiting the most talented individuals, regardless of party affiliation? When the DPP recruits people from other parties, the DPP praises them as "individuals of talent." But when the KMT recruits people from the DPP, the DPP swiftly denounces them as "turncoats."
The DPP once lacked governing experience. Its ruling administration had a serious shortage of individuals with talent. It desperately needed to transcend partisanship, Only then would these talented individuals be able to contribute at the crucial moment. The most obvious example was Tang Fei. During the 2000 change in ruling parties, the first in the Repubic of China's history, he served as Premier, even though he was ill at the time. The ruling DPP refused to agree to KMT demands for party to party consultations as a precondition of his recruitment. As a result Tang Fei found himself alone in the DPP cabinet for 140 days, after which he was denounced as a "stumbling block" and rushed off the stage. But during this first change in ruling parties, Tang Fei played an crucial role. He reassured the public. He even bolstered the morale of the armed forces. History will remember this.
Another example was Vice President Vincent Siew. When the Democratic Progressive Party was in office, Siew was not part of the government. Yet he was willing to act as economic advisor to the Chen Shui-bian adminstration. The pressing concern was the overall economy. When the DPP government was in office, it appointed New Party official Hau Lung-bin as EPA Chief. Hau defied the local political bosses and cleaned up the Erhjen Creek. As a result, public support for the administration soared. This was the most successful example of DPP transcending partisanship while recruiting talent.
The DPP must seek talent from outside the party. So why not the KMT? The Republic of China during election season may be a nation divided down the middle. But the Ma administration cannot be a government for half the people. The new government and the new cabinet must recruit the most qualified individuals for the job. If it can recruit from other parties, that will surely help it govern the nation. Even though the KMT is a century old political party, the new cabinet is not really a dyed in the wool Kuomintang cabinet. Yang Chiu-hsing was recruited from the DPP. Minister of the Interior Hong-Yuan Lee and MAC Vice Chairman Chen Chang Hsien-yao were recruited from the People First Party. Interior Minister Jiang Yi Hua and the majority of academics in the cabinet are independents.
Of course President Ma Ying-jeou's non-partisan staff have encountered obstacles within the party. In 2008, shortly after Ma took office. he nominated Green Camp leader Shen Fu-hsiung and Chen Hui-chang to the Control Yuan. Ma nominations were sharply rejected by Kuomintang legislators. Tang Fei helped stabilize the political situation. Yet KMT elders were still critical of his decision to serve the DPP. This preoccupation with "traitors" is completely out of touch with modern politics. In ancient times a minister would not serve two masters. But in modern democracies, political parties alternate, Individuals of talent do not belong to any one party, because they served the people.
By comparison, the DPP's preoccupation with "turncoats" is more serious. Party politics is about open competition between different political beliefs. But communications and consultation are also priorities for political parties. Alas, many Green Camp people see competition among political parties as battles between good and evil, between "them" and "us," Therefore they see no middle ground. To them, the KMT is the enemy, Anyone who suggests cooperation and communication with the KMT therefore, is a "traitor" and a "turncoat." Sad to say, political parties may use ideology to evaluate their opponents. But they also use it to persecute their own comrades. When political parties go down such a partisan road, they move farther and farther away from the people.
When Yang Chiu-hsing served as Kaohsiung County Chief, his governance was highly praised. He was referred to as the "five-star county chief," The Ma administration has recruited this individual of talent. The DPP ought to give him its blessing. More importantly, if one day the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will need to draw on talent from the KMT, This should give them pause. When such feudal concepts as "turncoats" and "traitors" persist with the DPP, it is going to have a hard time forming a competent ruling cabinet.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.02.10
社論-背骨?貳臣?現代還需要封建思想?
本報訊
前高雄縣長楊秋興出任新內閣政務委員,昔日民進黨戰友痛批他「背骨」;可以說,綠營有濃厚「背骨」情結:非我族類、其心必異;相對的,藍營則有微妙的「貳臣」情結,這是封建時代的忠君思想;只要這兩種情結還在,台灣就難有理性問政的一天。
正如楊秋興所說,政治人物轉換政黨並非新鮮事。在國外,從邱吉爾到日本的小澤一郎,在台灣,從前總統李登輝以下,到黃昆輝、陳明文、張花冠等人,政壇中轉換政黨者比比皆是,事實上,現代民主國家中,國家高於政黨,政黨是志願性社團,合則來、不合則去,應該是常態;相反的,當有人將政黨、意識形態無限上綱、動輒抬出「背骨」、「貳臣」如此封建的觀念時,則不啻是以黨害國、心中完全沒有國家的存在。
大選才剛結束,民進黨總統候選人蔡英文當時的承諾言猶在耳:如果民進黨執政,競選團隊不代表執政團隊,不但用人要超越黨派,甚至還要組成大聯合政府;何謂超黨派、何謂「聯合」,不就是要能與不同黨派溝通合作、跨黨派拔擢最適人才嗎?總不能民進黨任用他黨人才就是菁英,但被國民黨重用的民進黨人士,就成了「背骨」吧!
事實上,民進黨過去缺乏執政經驗,治國團隊嚴重不足,確實需要跨黨派用人,這些人才也都在關鍵時刻發揮作用。最明顯的例子就是唐飛,他在二千年台灣首次政黨輪替時,毅然抱病出任閣揆,即使當時民進黨政府不同意國民黨中央「黨進黨出」的做法,讓唐飛隻身入閣一百四十天後,就被當成絆腳石、匆匆下台;但是唐飛在台灣首次政黨輪替時,發揮的穩定民心、甚至軍心的關鍵力量,未來的歷史必然要記上一筆。
另一個例子是副總統蕭萬長,民進黨執政時,蕭萬長雖未進入政府,但是他之所以願意出任陳水扁政府的經濟顧問,念茲在茲的還是台灣的經濟大局。另外,民進黨政府當時任用新黨藉的郝龍斌出任環保署長,他不畏地方勢力整治二仁溪等作為,讓其民意支持度一度飆到最高,也是民進黨跨黨派用人的成功典範。
民進黨必須從黨外尋覓人才,國民黨何嘗不是如此?台灣在選舉時也許是一個五十對五十的國家,但馬總統治國,卻不能只做一位百分之五十的總統,因此新政府新內閣,用人除了要適才適所外,若能兼容各黨派,當然有助政府施政。確實,即使國民黨是百年政黨,新閣的國民黨屬性並不強,除了楊秋興曾是民進黨外,內政部長李鴻源、陸委會副主委張顯耀是親民藉,而內政部長江宜樺則和多數剛入閣的學者一樣,都是無黨藉。
當然,總統馬英九的跨黨派用人,也曾在黨內面臨重重阻力,二○○八年他上任後不久,提名屬性偏綠的沈富雄、陳耀昌擔任監委時,就硬生生被國民黨立委否決;唐飛即使對穩定政局有貢獻,國民黨仍有大老對其有微詞;這樣的「貳臣」情結,和現代政治完全脫節,過去是改朝換代,一臣不事二主;但現在是民主國家的政黨輪替,人才不屬於任何黨派,因為他們是為人民服務。
相較起來,民進黨的「背骨」情結更嚴重。政黨政治是本諸不同理念、公平競爭,但溝通協商也是政黨要務,只是,很多綠營人士卻將政黨競爭視為敵我、善惡之爭,因此毫無中間地帶,國民黨形同敵人,和國民黨溝通合作的就是「叛徒」、「背骨」;可悲的是,政黨可以用意識形態來檢驗對手,同樣也可以用來鬥爭同志,當政黨走上這樣黨同伐異的道路,也就離多數民意愈來愈遠。
楊秋興任高雄縣長時,多次得到施政第一的肯定,號稱五星級縣長,馬政府重用這樣的幹才,民進黨何妨祝福;更重要的是,假如有一天民進黨重新執政,屆時勢必也要借重國民黨的人才,他們現在該深思的是,當背骨、貳臣這樣的封建觀念揮之不去,民進黨恐伯無法組成像樣的治國團隊!
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