The Constitution is the Constitution: A Spade is a Spade

The Constitution is the Constitution: A Spade is a Spade
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 30, 2012

Summary: The Wu/Hu Summit reached an important agreement. The two sides agreed that their "existing constitutions" stipulate that both are part of One China. This was the two leaders' greatest achievement. Unfortunately the two leaders also referred to their constitutions as "existing provisions." But everyone knows they were referring to the two sides' "existing constitutions." This is a major blind spot in a major breakthrough. The two sides must "ascend to the next level in order to see farther." The key is the wisdom and courage to call a spade a spade, and to call the constitution the constitution.

Full Text below:

The Wu/Hu Summit reached an important agreement. The two sides agreed that their "existing constitutions" stipulate that both are part of One China. This was the two leaders' greatest achievement. Unfortunately the two leaders also referred to their constitutions as "existing provisions." This constitutes a massive blind spot.

The two sides have been dealing with each other for some time now. They have gone from "mutual non-recognition" to "mutual non-repudiation." They are now just short of "mutual recognition." Westerners speak of "calling a spade a spade." The Chinese speak of "calling things by their proper name." Do we wish to open a channel for cross-Strait relations? Then we must level with ourselves. We must refer to a constitution as a constitution.

One. The public on Taiwan, and especially the DPP, must acknowledge that Taiwan independence is impossible. Taipei's strategic posture towards the Mainland must change. It must change from "oppose [Mainland] China, demand Taiwan independence," to "accept [Mainland] China, demand democracy." Taiwan cannot wish away One China or Chinese reunification. Instead, it must use democracy to define the nature of One China and to modulate the pace of reunification. Twenty-three million people living on Taiwan must reaffirm the Republic of China, as it carries on its semantic tug of war with the People's Republic of China. We must uphold the Constitution of the Republic of China. We must view it as our most valuable asset in our ongoing struggle. We must not divide the Republic of China as it confronts a centralized People's Republic of China.

Unless Mainland China vanishes from the face of the earth, Taiwan independence is impossible. To take a leaf from Tsai Ing-wen, the shrewdest strategy for the Republic of China is to uphold One China, Different Interpretations. This strategy most cloesly approximates the strategy adopted by our opponents. The public on Taiwan cannot make Mainland China vanish. But a democratic Republic of China can change Mainland China for the better. History has presented Taiwan with an arduous but grand mission, one that it cannot shirk. The Republic of China is divided as a result of Taiwan independence. We must reunite. Taiwan must conductd a democratic dialogue with 1.3 billion compatriots across the Strait. We must seize the initiative. We must assert our right to speak.

Two. Beijing must accept certain realities. Cross-Strait relations may evolve in any number of ways. They include "peaceful development," a "One China in progress," a "One China in development," a politically integrated confederation, or "reunification." But one of them can ignore or invalidate the Republic of China. Beijing must admit that One China is not the same as the forceful eradication of the Republic of China. The two are not the same, and must not be conflated. Reunification is not the same as the forceful eradication of the Republic of China. The two are not the same, and must not be conflated. After all, we are not talking about coerced reunification.

Consider "One China in development." Recognizing the Republic of China does not violate the One China Principle. Recognizing the Republic of China does not preclude reunification. Beijing is unwilling to countenance Taiwan independence and the founding of a "Nation of Taiwan." But this hardly necessitates destroying the Republic of China. On the contrary, preserving the Republic of China is the same as precluding Taiwan independence.

As this newspaper's editorials have suggested, the two sides should write into law the special political relationship between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. This formulation paraphrases Hu Jintao's words. The two sides should sign a Cross-Strait Trust Agreement. They should cease communicating through middlemen. They should refer to the constitution as the constitution. They should enter a new stage of mutual recognition. Beijing must recognize the Republic of China, in this form or that. The public on Taiwan can then reach a firmer consensus on the One China Constitution, Taiwan independence will no longer have a leg to stand on. The two sides can then adopt a "One China in progress" stance. This can lead to a "One China in development." Beijing can hardly ask the Republic of China to reaffirm its One China Constitution, then ask it to repudiate the Republic of China. That would hardly be "calling things by their proper name."

Three. The two sides must consider a "Third Concept of China." The current cross-Strait arrangement is One China, Different Intepretations, and "seeking common ground while shelving differences." It is an ingenious formulation. But it has reached a bottleneck. One China, Different Intepretations and "seeking common ground while shelving differences" reflects a "You are you, and I am me" attitude. The People's Republic of China does not recognize the Republic of China. It refuses to refer to President Ma by his title. The Republic of China does not recognize the People's Republic of China. It refuses to refer to President Hu by his title. This is not merely self-deception. It is worse. It amounts to "Two Chinas." We need a "Third Concept of China" than the sum of its parts. We need a more transcendent concept of China that will link the two sides. Only that will be a genuine One China. That of course, is the "roof theory." Otherwise the public on Taiwan will take "One China" to mean the People's Republic of China. It will not perceive the Republic of China as part of "One China." That is why the public on Taiwan has become increasingly alienated from the notion that "Taiwanese are Chinese." That is why the public on Taiwan has a diminishing sense of Chinese consciousness.

CCP leaders since Deng Xiaoping often repeat, "You will not annex me. I will not annex you." This is absolutely correct. But the language should be reworded to "The People's Republic of China will not annex the Republic of China. The Republic of China will not annex the People's Republic of China." Since we have "One China in progress," we need a "Third Concept of China." We need a transcendent China based on the roof theory, in both our imagination and in law, Only then can the two sides cease perceiving each other as "foreign nations." Only then can we look forward to a brighter future.

Four. We need an interim solution. Consider the "One China in development" concept. One China is evolving organically from one stage to another. The current "One China in progress" concept must be rooted in a "separately administered but undivided Third Concept of China." It must be written into law. Therefore we need a peace agreement or Cross-Strait Trust Agreement. An interim solution must be found. This will enable the Republic of China's One China Constitution and the People's Republic of China's One China Framework to find common ground. This will eliminate fears of Taiwan independence. This will moderate pressure for premature reunification. This will enable the two sides to approach the One China issue with a more rational attitude and clearer goals. This is what this newspaper refers to as "process orienation."

Over four short years, the Ma Ying-jeou and Hu Jintao administrations have successfully walked a pragmatic path toward "peaceful development."  Their hard-won achievements merit the highest praise. Cross-strait interactions must preclude "you annexing me, me annexing you." Cross-Strait interactions must set an example for mankind.

The Wu/Hu Summit referred to the two sides' "existing provisions." But everyone knows they were referring to the two sides' "existing constitutions." This is a major blind spot in a major breakthrough. The two sides must "ascend to the next level in order to see farther." The key is the wisdom and courage to call a spade a spade, and to call the constitution the constitution.

把黑桃叫做黑桃 把憲法叫做憲法
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.03.30

吳胡會以「雙方現行憲法」來支撐「一個中國」，這是最大的成就；但二人卻又稱憲法為「雙方現行規定」，則是巨大的盲點。

兩岸關係走到今天，其實已從「互不承認」走到了「互不否認」，九仞一簣是在「相互承認」；也就是西諺所說：「把黑桃叫做黑桃。」中國人則說：「名正言順。」欲打通兩岸關係的任督二脈，關鍵即在還元歸真「把憲法叫做憲法」。

一、台灣方面必須認清，台獨已絕無可能，民進黨尤須有此認知。台灣對大陸的戰略原則，必須從「反對中國，我要台獨」，轉至「不反對中國，我要民主」；台灣不可能使「一個中國」或「統一」這些課題消滅，必須努力施展的是對「中國」的內容及「統一」的進度之民主制約力量。兩千三百萬人應當回到中華民國的基本立場，在與中華人民共和國的拔河角力中，以中華民國憲法為進退攻守的最高準據；不能以分裂的中華民國，去面對實施集中制的中華人民共和國。

事實上，除非使「中國」從地球上消失，台獨建國絕無可能實現；倘借用蔡英文的說法，中華民國持守「一中各表」的原則，正是最最「貼近你的對手」的明智戰略。台灣不可能使「中國」消滅，但應有透過中華民國的民主優勢使「中國」改變的決志；這是歷史給台灣的艱苦又光榮的使命，在現實上台灣亦捨此別無出路。中華民國因台獨而分裂，只要團結起來，台灣透過與對岸十三億人及全世界的民主對話，必可取得較具主動、自主與優勢的話語權。

二、北京必須認清，無論兩岸關係未來如何演進，或是「和平發展」，或是「現在進行式的一個中國」，或是「一個中國的發展論」，或是進行高度政治整合（如邦聯），抑或是「統一」，皆不能跳過、略過或否定「中華民國」這個平台。北京應知：「一個中國」與「強制消滅中華民國」並非同一概念，二者之間不能畫上等號；且「統一」亦與「強制消滅中華民國」並非同一概念，二者之間也不能畫上等號（除非「霸統一」）。

從「一個中國的發展論」之原理而論，承認中華民國，並不違反「一中原則」；而接受了中華民國，也並非就不能談「統一」。北京的核心關注在不願見台獨建國，但這與「消滅中華民國」不是同一個題目；正好相反，維持中華民國，卻與排除台獨是同一課題。

因此，如本系列社論所建議，兩岸應當建構一個「中華民國與中華人民共和國在特殊情況下的法制化政治關係」（修飾胡錦濤語），以簽定ＣＢＦＡ（兩岸信任架構協議）之類文件的方式，脫掉白手套，「把憲法叫做憲法」，進入「相互承認」的新階段；只要北京透過某種形式承認了中華民國，台灣內部「一中憲法」的共識必可更趨一致並強固，台獨自更無立足空間，兩岸即可走上「現在進行式的一個中國」，通往「一個中國的發展論」。否則，又要中華民國堅持「一中憲法」，卻又否定中華民國，如何「名正言順」？

三、兩岸之間須有一個「第三概念中國」的想像。兩岸現行的架構是「一中各表／求同存異」，這是極為巧慧的發明，但漸也瀕近瓶頸。因為，「一中各表／求同存異」，基本上是「爾為爾，我為我」的態度；中華人民共和國不承認中華民國（不稱馬總統），所以中華民國也不承認中華人民共和國（不稱胡主席）。這不僅是自欺欺人，其實更是「兩個中國」；必須要有一個高於並大於二者的「第三概念」或「上位概念」的「中國」作為二者的連結，這才是「一個中國」，亦即屋頂理論。否則，每稱「一個中國」，在台灣人的思緒中必是指「中華人民共和國」，而無由產生「中華民國是一部分的中國」，「台灣人是中國人」的意識；則中國議題在台灣之所以愈趨異化甚至惡化，實亦情理之必然。

倘若自鄧小平以來中共領導階層常說的「不是你吃掉我，不是我吃掉你」，確為真實可信，則此語應是指「不是中華人民共和國吃掉中華民國，也不是中華民國吃掉中華人民共和國」。倘係如此，在「現在進行式的一個中國」的進程中，自應有一「第三概念」、「上位概念」或「屋頂理論」的更高更大之「中國」，存在於想像或法制之中，始有可能使兩岸互視為「非外國之國家」。進此一步，海闊天空。

四、必須有一「中程方案」。若以「一個中國的發展論」而言，「一個中國」是從一個階段演化、進化、發展、成長至另一個階段的有機過程。此一「現在進行式的一個中國」，必須以「一個分治而不分裂的第三概念的中國」為運作準據，並應當取得法制化的架構。因此，「和平協議」或「兩岸信任架構協議／ＣＢＦＡ」之類的「中程方案」仍為必要的建構，可使中華民國的「一中憲法」與中華人民共和國的「一中框架」在此尋得交集，一以免除「台獨」的疑忌，一以減輕「統一」的緊迫感，俾使「一個中國」的課題，能夠較有餘裕地「經由合理的過程，通向改善之目的」，此即本報社論所說的「過程論」。

馬英九與胡錦濤兩個政府，能在短短四年之中，將兩岸帶上如此務實的「和平發展」之路，這是難能可貴的優異表現。兩岸的互動，絕不可是「你吃掉我，我吃掉你」；因為，兩岸的互動，應以「為人類歷史創造文明典範」為目標。

吳胡會雖稱「雙方現行規定」，但盡人皆知所指為「雙方現行憲法」，這是重大突破中存有的巨大盲點；兩岸值此「欲窮千里目／更上一層樓」之際，關鍵的作為應是：智慧而勇敢地，把黑桃叫做黑桃，把憲法叫做憲法！

Abandonment of Taiwan independence is Beginning of Wisdom

Abandonment of Taiwan independence is Beginning of Wisdom
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 29, 2012

Summary: The DPP finds itself in a dilemma. It knows Taiwan independence is infeasible and a dead end. But it is unwilling to abandon Taiwan independence. It is unwilling to accept the Republic of China. The DPP wants to transform itself in order to save itself. Therefore its first step should be to repudiate Taiwan independence and reaffirm the Constitution of the Republic of China. Only this premise, only this fundamental choice, only this allegiance to the nation and to its constitution, will enable the DPP to transform its cross-Strait policy and its platform for governing the nation. For the DPP, the abandonment of Taiwan independence is the beginning of wisdom.

Full Text below:

The DPP is in total disarray and internal contradiction over the Wu/Hu Summit. That is because party officials cannot decide whether to critique the Wu/Hu Summit from the perspective of Taiwan independence.

Tsai Ing-wen persists in critiquing the Wu/Hu Summit from the perspective of Taiwan independence. She says One Country, Two Areas is a very dangerous concept."

One Country, Two Areas can be understood on several levels. One. The concept of One Country, Two Areas is derived from Article 11 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China, which refers to the Free Area and the Mainland Area. It also derives from the Act Governing Relations Between Peoples Of The Taiwan Area And The Mainland Area, which refers to the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. Why should such a concept be considered "dangerous?" Two. The two sides of the Strait have long been engaged in a semantic tug of war. The concept of One Country, Two Areas is actually One China, Different Interpretations in another form. The government of the Republic of China must interpret the Mainland as an "area." This is consistent with its position on the One China Constitution. Otherwise, in its cross-Strait semantic tug of war, it will undermine its position that Taiwan is legally an "area" of the Republic of China. Legally it must insist that the Mainland is an "area." Only then can it affirm that Taiwan is also an "area." This perspective may involve certain "dangers" for the Republic of China. But it also provides the Republic of China with many more assurances. Three. One Country, Two Areas is consistent with constitutional thought regarding the Republic of China over the past 60 years, Lee Teng-hui presided over the amending of the constitution. The Preface in the Additional Articles established a constitutional framework entitled, In Response to the Need for National Unity. One Country, Two Areas became an explicit part of the constitution. The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years, during which Tsai Ing-wen served as Vice Premier and Mainland Affairs Council Chairman. Without the One Country, Two Areas concept, and the Republic of China Constitution as a legal mandate, would her position have been assured, or "dangerous?" What is Tsai doing, other than using One Country, Two Areas to denounce One Country, Two Areas?

Taiwan independence advocates are determined to repudiate the Constitution of the Republic of China. They are determined to distort it, to treat it with contempt, and to demean it. Therefore they mock One Country, Two Areas. Therefore they resort to populist demagoguery. Therefore they refer to President Ma as "Regional Governor Ma." Therefore they utterly fail to grasp the legal arguments. Therefore they ignore the question of how the cross-Strait semantic tug of war must be waged. Therefore they stubbornly persist in reckless brinksmanship. The One Country, Two Areas framework upholds the Republic of China. It ensures equality in cross-Strait negotiations. Yet Taiwan independence demagogues persist in characterizing it as One Country, Two Systems, and allege that it is "destroying the Republic of China."

Just what constitutes "dangerous?" Any cross-Strait policy involves dangers. But is there any cross-Strait policy more dangerous than Taiwan independence? As for the "destruction of the Republic of China," isn't that precisely what advocates of Taiwan independence propose?

The election is over. Several prominent figures within the DPP have spoken up. They have all declared that Taiwan independence is infeasible, and that Taiwan independence is a dead end. Julian J. Kuo was the first to speak. He said that unless the DPP changes its Taiwan independence party platform, it has no future. Hong Chi-chang chimed in. He said Taiwan cannot pursue de jure Taiwan independence. Conditions domestic and foreign do not support it. Finally, Chen Ming-tong said that objectively speaking, Taiwan independence is a dead end.

This trio have different backgrounds. Julian J. Kuo served as the DPP's ECFA Response Group convener during the general election. Hong Chi-chang served as SEF chairman during the Chen administration. Chen Ming-tong served as Mainland Affairs Council Chairman during the Chen administration. Among the three, Julian J. Kuo and Hong Chi-chang, both propose accepting the constitutional framework of One Country, Two Areas.

Given the state of the nation and global trends, Taiwan independence is impossible. The DPP must change its political path. It must admit that Taiwan independence is infeasible, that it is a dead end. It must establish a consensus within the party. Otherwise some will accept the One Country, Two Areas constitutional framework. Others will oppose it. Some will conclude that Taiwan independence is infeasible. Others will insist that the goal of Taiwan independence must be retained. Without unity, the DPP will remain stuck.

Over 20 years of experience have shown that Beijing opposes Taiwan independence. The United States opposes Taiwan independence. The majority of people on Taiwan oppose Taiwan independence.  Globalization and liberalization the world over rule out Taiwan independence. This is the global scenario. If the DPP persists in promoting Taiwan independence, it is effectively opposing Mainland China, opposing the US, opposing the business world, opposing democracy, and opposing globalization. Needless to say such opposition is infeasible, and constitutes a dead end.

Kuo, Hong, and Chen have pointed out that the DPP must earnestly confront a number of essential and fundamental issues. Namely, if the DPP refuses to abandon Taiwan independence, all talk of transforming the DPP will be for naught. The Democratic Progressive Party is akin to a child who has fallen into a Taiwan independence water tank. Only Shi-ma Kuang can shatter the tank. Only then will the DPP have a future.

The Republic of China's survival and prosperity depend upon the Constitution of the Republic of China, not on the DPP's Resolution for Taiwan's Future and "backdoor listing." The DPP finds itself in a dilemma. It knows Taiwan independence is infeasible and a dead end. But it is unwilling to abandon Taiwan independence. It is unwilling to accept the Republic of China. As a result it remains tied to its "backdoor listing." It failed to implement Taiwan independence. It succeeded in tearing the Republic of China apart. It failed in both endeavors. The DPP wants to transform itself in order to save itself. Therefore its first step should be to repudiate Taiwan independence and reaffirm the Constitution of the Republic of China. Only this premise, only this fundamental choice, pnly this allegiance to the nation and to its constitution, will enable the DPP to transform its cross-Strait policy and its platform for governing the nation.

For the DPP, the abandonment of Taiwan independence is the beginning of wisdom.

否棄台獨，是民進黨智慧的開端
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.29 02:10 am

《2012吳胡會系列社論》六之五

民進黨對吳胡會評論的錯亂無章、自相矛盾，是因黨人不知是否仍要以台獨的立場評論吳胡會。

例如，蔡英文就是仍以台獨的立場評論吳胡會。她說：「一國兩區是個滿危險的說法。」

「一國兩區」的說法有幾個層面：一、一國兩區是根據中華民國憲法增修條文第十一條所稱「自由地區」及「大陸地區」而來，至《兩岸人民關係條例》則稱為「台灣地區」、「大陸地區」。這個「說法」有何「危險」？二、就兩岸拔河的政治操作言，「一國兩區」其實是「一中各表」的另一種表達形式。中華民國政府若不視大陸為「一區」，維持住「憲法一中」的立場，則在兩岸拔河中，亦將失去主張台灣為中華民國「一區」的法理地位。法理上維持大陸「一區」，始能鞏固台灣「一區」。這個說法，對中華民國而言，縱有「風險」，卻更是「保障」。三、一國兩區是中華民國在台灣六十餘年來一貫的憲法思維，至李登輝主持修憲，在增修條文序文中設定「為因應國家統一前的需要」的憲法架構，自此「一國兩區」即成憲法所規範的明文體制；在民進黨執政八年期間，蔡英文任行政院副院長及陸委會主委，若無此部「一國兩區」的中華民國憲法可為憑恃，試問那景況會是「安全」或「危險」？這豈不又是「用一國兩區，罵一國兩區」？

台獨觀點，就是要否定中華民國憲法，扭曲之，輕蔑之，羞辱之；因此，欲譏嘲「一國兩區」，就玩弄民粹語言污辱說，「馬總統」就是「馬區長」，而完全不問法理何在，亦不問如何因應兩岸的拔河角力；硬要將在兩岸凶險情勢中，得以「維護中華民國主體」並與對岸形成「對等」的「一國兩區」架構，說成「一國兩制」，說成「消滅中華民國」。

其實，若說「危險」，任何兩岸政策皆必有一定風險；但就台灣的安全而言，還有比「台獨」更「危險」的兩岸政策嗎？至於「消滅中華民國」，這豈不正是台獨的主張？

大選後，民進黨中幾位具代表性人物，異口同聲地說：台獨已不可行，台獨已走不通了。最早是郭正亮說：不改台獨黨綱，民進黨沒有前途；接著，洪奇昌說：台灣已經沒有追求法理台獨的條件，國內和國外皆不會支持；繼之，陳明通又說：客觀形勢看來，台獨是走不通的。

此三人各有來歷，郭正亮為大選期間民進黨「ＥＣＦＡ因應小組」召集人，洪奇昌曾任扁政府的海基會董事長，陳明通則曾任扁政府的陸委會主委。三人之中，郭正亮與洪奇昌此次主張接受「一國兩區」的憲法架構。

就世局國情的大趨勢言，台獨已絕無可能。民進黨在重新調整路線之前，首先要承認台獨已不可行、走不通；如若不能在黨內建立這樣的共識，有些人接受「一國兩區」的憲法架構，有些人反對；有些人認為台獨不可行，有些人卻主張台獨不能丟，莫衷一是，則民進黨仍將找不到出路。

這二十餘年來的總結經驗是：北京不贊同台獨，美國不贊同台獨，台灣多數民眾也不贊同台獨，全球化、自由化的世界趨勢，尤其不容台獨。在這樣的全球場景中，民進黨若仍續持台獨立場，不啻就是要續持「反中／反美／反商／反民主／反全球化」的路線，這當然不可行，也走不通。

郭洪陳三人，其實共同指出了民進黨當前必須認真面對的一個前提性及根本性的課題。那就是：如果不否棄台獨路線，民進黨的一切轉型都不用談了；現在的民進黨，猶如掉進台獨大水缸的孺子，只能靠司馬光打破缸，才能重見天日。

關鍵在於：中華民國是根據《中華民國憲法》而生存發展的中華民國，而不是民進黨根據《台灣前途決議文》以「借殼上市」的中華民國。然而，民進黨的現狀卻是：明知台獨已不可行、走不通，卻不敢否棄台獨，又不願接受原汁原味的中華民國，以致陷於「借殼上市」的操作之中，台獨搞不成，中華民國又遭撕裂，兩頭落空。因而，民進黨若要轉型自救，第一步自應從否棄台獨做起，回歸中華民國憲法；有了這個前提性、根本性的抉擇，其國憲認同、兩岸政策及治國綱領的轉型易轍，始能順理成章。

否棄台獨，是民進黨智慧的開端。

A Pardon for Chen Shui-bian Must Be Preceded by an Admission of Guilt

A Pardon for Chen Shui-bian Must Be Preceded by an Admission of Guilt
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 28, 2012

Summary: In classical tragedy, the characters often find themselves in a quandary. The "Should we or should we not pardon Ah-Bian?" debate has mired the DPP in a quandary. But this quandary is not a tragedy. It is a farce. It is a yawner that has somehow managed to drag on for five years, with no end in sight. Ironically, the Democratic Progressive Party has become its biggest victim.

Full Text below:

In classical tragedy, the characters often find themselves in a quandary. The "Should we or should we not support Ah-Bian?" debate has mired the DPP in a quandary. But this quandary is not a tragedy. It is a farce. It is a yawner that has somehow managed to drag on for five years, with no end in sight. Ironically, the Democratic Progressive Party has become its biggest victim.


The election of a corrupt president suggests that our democracy still leaves much to be desired. The result was our collective doing, and a national embarrassment. No one derives any pleasure out of seeing a former President behind bars for years to come. But is this really the right time to talk about a pardon? As an unnamed DPP legislator observed, "Does our society really support a pardon at this time? If not, can the DPP really rush things?" In other words, the president may have the authority to pardon a convict. But when society disagrees, does a president really dare to exercise that authority?

Taiwan today urgently needs to address many issues. They include U.S. beef imports containing Beta-Adrenergic Agonists, second generation health care, 12 year compulsory education, and local labor and foreign labor salaries. Every one of these issues affects people's livelihood. Every one of these issues competes for government attention. That a pardon for Ah-Bian suddenly erupted amidst these pressing issues, and has become the top priority on the Green Camp agenda, proves that Ah-Bian supporters have done their homework, and are truly adept at tugging at the heartstrings of DPP officials.

For example, Wu Shu-chen has threatened to ignore her physical infirmity and launch a personal protest. If the authorities do not release Ah-Bian on medical grounds, she threatens to rally the troops on Ketegelan Boulevard and stage a protest. Knowing full well that Premier Sean Chen lacks the authority to grant a pardon, Ah-Bian supporter Kao Chi-peng deliberately staged a publicity stunt in the legislature. He mounted the podium and repeated, 88 times, "Should we or should we not pardon Ah-Bian?" Nativist social organizations staged their own coordinated antics. Pirate radio shock jocks launched an offensive. They demanded that DPP Chairman Chen Chu, DPP county chiefs, DPP city mayors, and DPP legislators speak up on behalf of Ah-Bian. DPP officials were swamped. The DPP faced an even greater dilemma. In the past TSU "spiritual leader" Lee Teng-hui harshly condemned Ah-Bian's corruption. But the TSU's three legislators adopted diametrically opposite positions from their spiritual mentor. They became the vanguard of Ah-Bian's defense. The big Green Camp party and the little Green Camp party clashed. The TSU set its sights on the Deep Green vote. DPP legislators felt compelled to express support for Ah-Bian.

Eventually calls to "Pardon Ah-Bian!" began to exert pressure on the DPP, Wu Shu-chen's ability to manipulate people is astonishing. During a radio interview, Wu was blunt. She let it be known that Ah-Bian took money from financial conglomerates. She even said he donated it to the DPP. The amount totaled 1.4 billion. She even named names, saying who took money. She held up a notebook, saying everyone's name was in the book. Her speech was virtually extortion, and struck terror in the hearts of DPP legislators. Ker Chien-ming was forced to come forward, apply media spin, and call a halt to the process. 

Clearly this is not the ideal time to demand a pardon for Ah-Bian, mainly because of the legal process. A presidential pardon is not a straightforward judicial process.. It involves a modicum of political discretion. But a president pardon has strict preconditions. The convict must first exhaust all other forms of legal recourse. Only then can he be pardoned or exonerated. As DPP legislative caucus leader Ker Chien-ming said, "It is illogical to demand a pardon for him now. Ah-Bian must plead guilty to the Second Financial Reform scandal first."

Ker Chien-ming failed to make clear why it is illogical to demand a pardon now. Put simply, in order to qualify for a pardon, Ah-Bian must first exhaust all other means of legal recourse. But would Ah-bian really be willing to plead guilty? Would he really be willing to explain how to intervened on behalf of financial conglomerates? Based on past Chen family conduct, he clearly has no such intention. Ah-Bian does not merely deny that he is guilty of corruption. He insists he is the victim of political and judicial persecution. Since he shows no remorse, is the president really authorized to pardon him?

The degree to which Ah-Bian and his supporters are willing to engage in deception, is difficult for most people to appreciate. Ah-Bian and his supporters compare him to Myanmar champion of human rights Aung San Suu Kyi, or the political prisoners of the Formosa Incident. Actually Chen Shui-bian's closest counterparts are two former South Korean presidents, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo. They are the ones he most closely resembles. They are the ones he should seek to emulate. They pled guilty to their crimes and apologized to their compatriots. They returned the money they embezzled. That is why they were eventually pardoned.

Chen Shui-bian finds himself in a dilemma. The president has the authority to grant a pardon. But he has no right to interfere with the administration of justice. If Chen Shui-bian wants a pardon, he must abide by the judicial process. He must admit that he is not a political prisoner. He must confess to corruption in open court. Only then will it be possible expedite the legal process. Only then will it be possible to grant him a pardon, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the law.

Admit guilt. An admission of guilt is not merely in the political and moral interest of the nation. It is in the interest of Ah-Bian as a person. Only by admitting guilt can he meet the preconditions for a presidential pardon.

中國時報 　2012.03.28
社論－扁想特赦 應先認罪再求解套
本報訊

    　經典的悲劇中，常會出現兩難的困局；不過，目前上演的「挺扁不挺扁」戲碼，雖然也讓民進黨左右為難，卻是一場典型的鬧劇；而且歹戲拖棚，五年多還看不到完結篇，民進黨反倒成了最大的受害者。

    　某種程度而言，會選出貪腐的總統，這代表我們的民主仍有諸多缺失之處；這是全民共業，也是國家之恥。即使如此，沒有人會樂於見到前總統長年身繫囹圄；但關鍵的問題是，現在已到了談特赦的時機了嗎？正如某位不具名的民進黨立委所說：「現階段社會大眾支持對你的特赦嗎？如果不是，民進黨真能趕鴨子上架嗎？」換句話說，即使特赦權是總統的專屬權力，但是當社會輿論觀感不佳時，總統敢行使他的特赦權力嗎？

    　當前的台灣，亟須迫切處理的問題不少，從美牛瘦肉精、二代健保上路、十二年國教規畫、到本勞外勞薪資是否脫鉤，每一件都是攸關民生的大事，主事者也都爭相要將其搶上政府施政優先名單；在諸多政策中，「特赦救扁」議題竟然能夠異軍突起，成為綠營的主旋律，足證挺扁人士的精心營造，尤其是擅於掌握民進黨公職的心理弱點。

    　例如，扁嫂吳淑珍不顧自己待罪之身，親自出馬呼籲，若不讓扁就醫，就要帶人到凱道抗爭；接下來，明知閣揆陳冲並無特赦權，但是扁的子弟兵高志鵬卻刻意在國會質詢台上跳針大演出，連續追問了八十八次「應不應特赦阿扁」；配合這些公開的戲碼，本土社團、地下電台名嘴也配合發動攻勢，要求民進黨黨主席陳菊、縣市長、立委表態，讓民進黨要員左支右絀。更將民進黨逼入窘境的是，台聯的精神領袖李登輝過去曾直言批扁貪腐，但是台聯三立委的作為和精神導師背道而馳，竟然成了挺扁急先鋒，大綠小綠票源衝突，當台聯搶攻深綠市場，民進黨立委還敢不挺扁嗎？

    　最後，「特赦救扁」會成為民進黨的壓力，還必須佩服扁嫂吳淑珍的操作能力。她接受電台訪問時放話，扁即使拿了財團的錢，也是捐給民進黨，總數高達十四億；她還意有所指的說，誰有拿到錢，她手中還留著一本簿子，大家都有簽！這個幾近恐嚇的談話，讓民進黨立委心生畏懼，才不得不由柯建銘出面公開定調、踩煞車。

    　只是，現在顯然不是要求「特赦救扁」的最佳時機，最主要的原因在於法律時程。確實，總統特赦權並非單純的司法權，而有某種程度的政治裁量；但總統行使特赦權對象的前提要件是，已受罪刑宣告之人，所有官司都走完司法程序，才會有免刑或免責的問題。正如民進黨團總召柯建銘所說：「此刻要求特赦，等於後面二次金改等案，阿扁要先承認有罪，這個邏輯上是有問題的。」

    　所謂邏輯有問題，柯建銘沒有明說的是，扁若想符合特赦要件，趕快走完司法流程，扁肯認罪嗎？他肯承認自己如何介入，為商賈喬金控利益嗎？從扁家過去的作為來看，他顯然並無此意。目前，扁不但矢口否認貪瀆，更揚言自己受到政治、司法迫害，當他毫無悔意，總統有行使特赦權的正當性嗎？

    　扁及挺扁人士自欺欺人的程度難以想像，竟然自比緬甸人權鬥士翁山蘇姬，或是台灣的美麗島受刑人；事實上，陳水扁目前該學習的對象，是南韓兩位前總統全斗煥、盧泰愚，他們不但認罪道歉，而且還將貪腐款項匯回，最後才能得到特赦的待遇。

    　可以說，陳水扁自己現在也掉入兩難困局。總統雖有特赦權，但他卻無權干預司法審判流程；陳水扁如果想要爭取特赦，必須加速司法流程。那麼，他必須承認自己不是政治犯，在法庭上坦白自己的貪瀆罪行，才可能早日走完司法流程，屆時也才有依法特赦的可能。

    　認罪吧！這不只是政治道德問題，也為了扁的司法利益，唯有如此，他才符合被特赦的條件。

DPP Must Address Its Cross-Strait Achilles Heel

DPP Must Address Its Cross-Strait Achilles Heel
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 24, 2012

Summary: The DPP reviewed the reasons for its electoral defeat for one month. Now it is finally taking the next step. Party spokesman Lo Chih-cheng is visiting the Mainland "in an individual capacity" to conduct cross-Strait exchanges. Whether this is one small step for the DPP, or one giant leap for cross-Strait history, remains to be seen. It all depends on whether the DPP leadership has the wisdom, determination, and courage, to formulate a new cross-Strait policy.

Full Text below:

The DPP reviewed the reasons for its electoral defeat for one month. Now it is finally taking the next step. Party spokesman Lo Chih-cheng is visiting the Mainland "in an individual capacity" to conduct cross-Strait exchanges. Whether this is one small step for the DPP, or one giant leap for cross-Strait history, remains to be seen. It all depends on whether the DPP leadership has the wisdom, determination, and courage, to formulate a new cross-Strait policy.

Tsai Ing-wen, despite her enormous popularity, lost the 2012 presidential election. This amounted to a wake up call for the DPP leadership. If it refuses to honestly re-examine its cross-Strait policy, it will never return to power. As a result, before she stepped down as party chairman, Tsai Ing-wen urged the DPP to "Understand [Mainland] China while it interacts with it." Acting party chairman Chen Chu openly declared that party officials are encouraged to learn more about the Chinese Mainland and to enage in more exchanges.

Unfortunately the DPP's cross-strait policy Gordian Knot is not the result of a lack of communication. DPP county chiefs and city mayors have visited the Mainland to promote the sale of Taiwan grown fruits. DPP officials have frequently had private dealings with the other side. The DPP conducts frequent exchanges with the other side. The problem is that these exchanges have never induced the DPP to change its party line. This time Lo Chih-cheng is breaking the ice. But objections have also been voiced within the Green Camp. Former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Joseph Wu criticized the party's review of its election defeat. He said the DPP had "allowed the KMT and CCP to set the agenda." He said "The responsibility of the opposition party is oversight. The ruling KMT says the DPP must conduct exchanges with [Mainland] China. If the DPP obediently complies, it amounts to opposition party negligence."

Joseph Wu's argument reflects the thinking of many Deep Green people. They believe the DPP must clearly differentiate itself from the KMT on cross-Strait policy, As they see it, the two sides are not engaged policy rivalry. They are mortal enemies engaged in a life and death struggle. The DPP has been guilty of even greater hyperbole. They have reinforced cross-Strait segregation. They have engaged in populist demagoguery each time an election rolled around. They have deliberately cast the KMT, which advocates cross-Strait exchanges, as an "organization that panders to [Mainland] China and sells out Taiwan." They have demonized Lien Chan and Ma Ying-jeou's policy of cross-Strait reconciliation as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." In the past, the DPP benefitted from such populist demagoguery. The KMT was unable to defend itself against such smears. But the biggest victim of these political dirty tricks is actually the DPP.

This time, those who voted their pocketbooks swung the the presidential election. They were praised for making a wise choice. The public perceives the two parties a certain way The KMT is responsible for exchanges. The DPP is responsible for confrontations. One plays good cop. The other plays bad cop. The result? Taiwan benefits. In other words, the confrontation between the two major Blue and Green parties may be a zero sum game for them. But it has unintentionally resulted in a division of labor. The DPP acts as a powerful counter-force. This forces the other side to make concessions to the more moderate KMT. This division of labor, ensures the ROC's sovereignty and a peace dividend for the voters. They are the biggest winners. Alas, it also relegates the DPP to the role of perpetual opposition party. It must forever play the role of opposition party.

As former Democratic Progressive Party legislator Julian J. Kuo observed, if the DPP is willing only to play bad cop, it will remain forever outside the loop on cross-Strait affairs. It will remain forever outside the loop when it comes to improving the quality of cross-Strait policy. It will remain forever outside the loop as more and more citizens vote their pocket books on cross-Strait policy. This good cop/bad cop cross-Strait scenario is clearly unfavorable to the DPP. Julian Kuo laments, "The DPP must not forever play bad cop."

The DPP is trapped within the role it chose for itself. The DPP has effectively incarcerated itself within its own cocoon. The DPP can compete with the KMT on cross-Strait policy. But it must not persist in irrational, win/lose style confrontation, It must not oppose direct links, oppose ECFA, oppose the entry of Mainland capital, oppose Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, and oppose the recognition of Mainland academic credentials. These have made the DPP appear out of touch with reality. These have made it impossible for the DPP to win over voters.

In fact, many DPP leaders are aware of this systemic problem; The DPP has long relied on inciting cross-Strait antagonism to win votes. But this has mired them in another predicament. The DPP hopes to remake itself as a centrist party, But it fears Deep Green voters will then turn to the Taiwan Solidarity Union, or even join with Deep Green leaders in the DPP who hope to begin anew. Over the past few days, these Deep Green elements began making a move within the Legislative Yuan.  Three extremist TSU legislators experienced a meteoric rise within the legislature. Green Camp supporters have complained that the DPP is doing nothing DPP legislators are concerned that the TSU will become the tail that wags the dog, This reflects the predicament the DPP is in.

Lo Chih-cheng and others may have taken the first step, But the way forward remains strewn with obstacles, His effort may not bear fruit. But unless the DPP wishes to remain an opposition party, it cannot retreat. Fortunately, no elections are scheduled for the next two years, DPP leaders need not deal with populist pressure, They can calmly consider new cross-Strait policy paths.

Exchanges are merely the first step. DPP cross-Strait policy must be realistic. In particular, DPP legislators must change their political agenda and political style within the legislature. How can the DPP rid itself of its ideological strait-jacket?. How can it establish a stable framework for interaction with the other side? That depends on the wisdom on the party's leaders.

民進黨該思考如何從兩岸罩門脫困了
2012-03-24中國時報

敗選檢討一個月後，民進黨終於踏出一步，該黨發言人羅致政以「個人」身分登陸、進行兩岸交流；只是，民進黨一小步是否成為兩岸歷史的一大步，仍要視民進黨菁英是否有智慧、決心及勇氣，來貫徹兩岸政策轉型的工作。

二○一二總統大選，蔡英文以超高人氣敗選，終於讓民進黨菁英認知到，如果不誠實面對兩岸路線，未來將永遠和執政絕緣。於是，蔡英文在卸任前呼籲民進黨「要在互動中了解中國」，代理黨主席陳菊也公開表示，歡迎所有黨公職同仁，對中國大陸有更多了解交流。

只是，民進黨兩岸政策最大癥結，並不在缺乏交流；事實上，從民進黨縣市長赴陸賣水果、到民進黨要員私下與對岸的往來，民進黨和對岸交流不能算少，但幾乎從未影響黨的路線走向；而這次羅致政等人的小破冰，綠營內也出現異音，前陸委會主委吳釗燮就批評，敗選後民進黨內有關「與中國交流」討論，是「跳入國共設定的議題」，認為「在野黨責任是監督政府，如果執政黨說民進黨應該和中國交流，民進黨就照單全收，這將是反對黨失職」。

吳釗燮說法，反映出不少深綠人士想法，他們認為民進黨兩岸政策必須與國民黨明顯區隔，雙方不是政策競爭，而是敵我鬥爭；民進黨更是無限上綱、強化這股兩岸區隔論，在選舉時大肆民粹操作，刻意將主張兩岸交往的國民黨抹黑為「賣台集團」，連戰或馬英九的兩岸和解政策則是「傾中賣台」。過去，民進黨也許曾經從這股民粹操作中獲利，讓國民黨左支右絀，但此一惡毒招數最大的受害者，卻是民進黨自己！

事實上，這次由一成經濟選民定輸贏的總統大選，之所以被讚譽為台灣選民精明的抉擇，背後的假設在於：國民黨負責交流，民進黨負責對抗，一扮白臉一扮黑臉，台灣可獲最大利益；換句話說，藍綠兩大黨雖然零和對抗，但這卻也無意間形成一種分工架構，只要有民進黨的強烈反抗力量存在，對岸就必須對相對溫和的國民黨釋出利多；在這個分工架構中，選民可以主權及和平紅利兼顧，是最大贏家，但民進黨將成為萬年在野黨、永遠扮演反對黨的角色。

正如民進黨前立委郭正亮所說，民進黨如只會扮黑臉，將繼續自外於兩岸事務主導權，自外於改進兩岸政策品質，自外於愈來愈多的兩岸經濟選民。這種「兩岸黑白臉」論述，明顯不利民進黨發展；郭大聲疾呼，「民進黨不能老是扮黑臉」。

陷於這樣的分工架構，民進黨可說作繭自縛。民進黨可與國民黨在兩岸政策競爭，但不能是不理性的零和對抗，從過去的反對大三通、扺制ＥＣＦＡ、反對陸資、陸客來台，到拒絕承認大陸學歷等，都只是讓民進黨處處顯得與現實脫節，無法贏得選民的認同。

事實上，民進黨已有不少菁英認知到這樣的結構性困境；但在此同時併發的是，民進黨過去激化兩岸對立來贏取選票，也讓他們陷入另一個困境：即使民進黨有意朝中間轉型，深綠選民是否轉向台聯，甚或民進黨內的不滿人士出走另起爐灶；事實上，近日來的立法院運作，台聯三位不分區立委因為走激烈路線異軍突起，綠營群眾抱怨民進黨無所作為，該黨立委則擔憂會成為台聯的尾巴黨，正反映出民進黨腹背受敵的處境。

所以，羅致政等人也許踏出了第一步，但是前路險阻重重，不代表可以開花結果。但是除非民進黨真的要淪為萬年在野黨，否則該黨已無退路；幸運的是，未來兩年並無選舉，民進黨領導人比較可以不必面對民粹壓力，展開兩岸路線的檢討。

交流只是第一步，更關鍵的是民進黨兩岸政策要合乎現實，這尤其需要民進黨立委調整在國會問政內容及方式；至於，民進黨如何在兩岸政策意識形態上解套，建立起一個和對岸穩定互動的架構，就要看該黨領導人智慧了。

From Mutual Non-Repudiation to Mutual Recognition

From Mutual Non-Repudiation to Mutual Recognition
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 24, 2012

Summary: Making the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China part of the same realm poses enormous difficulties, both legal and logical. But bilateral efforts and achievements in recent years prove that political ideals and political will trump legality and logic. The two sides have already recognized each others' "existing provisions." What is that, if not the recognition of "one China?" What is that, if not the recognition of each others' constitutions?

Full Text below:

The recent Wu/Hu Summit made major breakthroughs. But huge blind spots remain.

First, consider the breakthroughs. According to the Xinhua News Agency, Hu Jintao said, "Beijing and Taipei have reaffirmed that the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China. This is consistent with the two sides' existing provisions. It is something both sides consider doable." Wu Poh-hsiung said, "According to the two sides' existing systems and relevant provisions, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain that both are part of one China."

As everyone knows, the "existing provisions" and "relevant provisions" that Wu and Hu referred to are the two sides' constitutions. Aside from their constitutions, they have no "existing provisions" or "relevant provisions" that support a declaration at this level. Hu Jintao expressed this view in 2005. He said, "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China. This fact has never changed... This is clear from Taiwan's existing provisions and documents." Hu Jintao was of course referring to the Constitution of the Republic of China. During the recent Wu/Hu Summit, the two leaders concurrently underscored "the two sides' existing provisions." They underscored the constitution aspect and highlighted this logic.

Nevertheless the two sides have a blind spot. They are clearly referring to "existing constitutions." But they demote "existing constitutions" to the level of "existing provisions." They obviously know that cross-Strait relations must be predicated upon the two sides' constitutions. But they refuse to recognize each others' constitutions. They persist in demoting each others' existing constitutions to the level of "existing provisions." This is the most serious blind spot in cross-Strait relations.

The "One China" principle essentially states that the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China. This framework has two implications. One. China is a concept that transcends both the Mainland and Taiwan. Two. The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China. Therefore the Mainland is not subordinate to Taiwan, and Taiwan is not subordinate to the Mainland. The Mainland and Taiwan are merely geographical terms. Therefore any policy measures must be consistent with the two sides' "existing provisions." By implication, "There is only one China in the world. The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are both part of that one China." This is what UDN News editorials refer to as the "Newest Three Principles."

"Taiwan" and "the Mainland" are geographical terms. They have no legal force behind them. The names "Republic of China" and "People's Republic of China" are often demoted to "Taiwan" and "the Mainland." By the same token, "existing constitutions" are often demoted to "existing provisions."

The two sides' current policy is "non-recognition of each others' sovereignty, non-repudiation of each others' jurisdiction." This is President Ma's mantra. The Mainland also adheres to this position. Therefore, the government of the Republic of China refuses to recognize the People's Republic of China and its Constitution. The government of the Peoples Republic of China does not recognize the Republic of China and its Constitution. That is why both sides insist that "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China," instead of "The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are both part of one China." But as mentioned before, one fact is obvious to everyone. Both sides agree that their existing constitutions support the "One China" principle.

Today's "one China" is no longer rooted in the "Old Three Principles." Nor is it rooted in the assertion that "Taiwan is part of China." Today's One China Principle has evolved. It now proclaims that "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China." Another, third concept of China has also emerged. It proclaims that "I will not annex you. You will not annex me." Under that One China, the People's Republic of China will not annex the Republic of China. Nor will the Republic of China annex the People's Republic of China. This being the case, why do the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China still refuse to recognize each other?

The status quo is one in which "Neither side recognizes each others' sovereignty. But neither sides repudiates each others' jurisdiction." But this is self-deception. Without sovereignty, how can one assert jurisdiction? Without jurisdiction, how can one assert sovereignty? How can the two sides implement three links? How can they implement ECFA? This is not a problem of logic. Politics has transcended logic.

Suppose the two sides accept the One China Principle? Then the status quo, in which "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China" actually means that "The Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China are both part of one China." This One China is a "transcendent concept," or "third concept." It is part of a "big roof theory." It represents the evolution of "mutual non-recognition" into "mutual non-repudiation," and eventually into "mutual recognition." Only then can the two sides establish a "We will not annex you. You will not annex us" understanding of One China.

Of course, making the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China part of the same realm poses enormous difficulties, both legal and logical. But bilateral efforts and achievements in recent years prove that political ideals and political will trump legality and logic. The two sides have already recognized each others' "existing provisions." What is that, if not the recognition of "one China?" What is that, if not the recognition of each others' constitutions?

兩岸新試探：從互不否認到相互承認
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.03.24

這次的吳胡會，有重大突破，但也仍然存在著向來皆有的一個大盲點。

先談突破。新華社報導，胡錦濤說：「確認（大陸和台灣同屬一個中國）這一事實，符合兩岸現行規定，應該是雙方都可以做到的。」同時報導，吳伯雄說：「根據雙方現行體制和相關規定，兩岸都堅持一個中國。」

眾所皆知，吳胡二人所稱之「現行規定」，即是各自的憲法。除了憲法，沒有任何「相關規定」可有效支撐此一層次的宣示。胡錦濤在二○○五年曾表達過此一觀點，當時的用語是：「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國的事實從未改變……，也見之於台灣現有的規定和文件。」當然，胡錦濤當年所指，無非亦是中華民國憲法。而此次吳胡會，二人更同時引據「雙方現行規定」，觸及憲法層次，使得此一論點尤其凸顯。

盲點則是，明明是指「雙方現行憲法」，卻矮化成「雙方現行規定」。一方面明知必須憑藉「雙方憲法」為兩岸的主要支撐，另一方面卻又不能相互承認其為「憲法」，以至於矮稱之為「現行規定」，正是兩岸一向以來的盲點所在。

「一個中國」的原則，其基本論述是：大陸和台灣同屬一個中國。此一架構的引申意義是：一、中國是一高於亦大於大陸及台灣的概念；二、大陸與台灣同屬一個中國，因此不能說，大陸屬於台灣，或台灣屬於大陸。而且，大陸與台灣畢竟只是地理名詞；因此，若落實至政治現實及「雙方現行規定」，其必然引申出來的定義應當是：「世界上只有一個中國，中華民國與中華人民共和國皆是一部分的中國。」（此為本報社論所稱的「新新三句」）。

「台灣」與「大陸」是地理名詞，不能有法律行為能力；如此，何以諱言「中華民國／中華人民共和國」，而矮稱為「台灣／大陸」？正如將「雙方現行憲法」矮稱為「雙方現行規定」？

兩岸雙方現今所採政策皆是「主權互不承認／治權互不否認」。這雖是馬總統的箴言，其實大陸方面亦持此立場。所以，中華民國政府不承認中華人民共和國及其憲法；中華人民共和國政府亦不承認中華民國及其憲法。因此才會說，「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國」，而不說「中華民國與中華人民共和國同屬一個中國」；然而，如前所述，有目共睹的事實卻是，雙方卻又明知是以雙方各自的現行憲法來支撐「一個中國」的概念。

現今所稱的「一個中國」，已非「老三句」時代的定義；也就是不再只說「台灣是中國的一部分」，而是已演化、進化至「大陸與台灣同屬於」另一個「第三概念」的「中國」；亦即演化、進化至「不是你吃掉我，也不是我吃掉你」的思維，那也就是「不是中華人民共和國吃掉中華民國，也不是中華民國吃掉中華人民共和國」。如此，為什麼「中華人民共和國」與「中華民國」仍互不承認？

「主權互不承認，治權互不否認」是兩岸的現在情境，卻是自欺欺人的行為。沒有主權，哪來的治權？若否認主權，豈可不否認其治權？然而，如果否認治權，兩岸如何能有三通？如何能有ＥＣＦＡ？由此可見，這不是一個邏輯的問題，政治有超越邏輯的力量。

如前所述，如果兩岸皆接受「一個中國」的概念，則「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國」的現況，實際上應是「中華民國與中華人民共和國同屬一個中國」。這個「一個中國」，是一個高於大於二者的「上位概念」或「第三概念」，亦即屋頂理論；亦唯有二者之間逐漸從「互不承認」演化、進化至「互不否認」，再演化、進化至「相互承認」，始有可能建構一個「不是你吃掉我，也不是我吃掉你」的「一個中國」。

當然，要想像一個「中華民國與中華人民共和國同是一部分的中國」的境界，在法理及邏輯上皆有極大的困難；但是，近年來兩岸的努力及成果皆已證實，政治的理想與決志，比法理及邏輯更有力。如今既已相互承認了「雙方現行規定」，這難道不是已經承認了「一個中國」是一個攸關兩岸雙方憲法層次的議題？

Policy Implementation Requires Reason and Determination

Policy Implementation Requires Reason and Determination
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 22, 2012

Summary: Sean Chen never imagined this. He was highly praised. The public felt blessed to have a cabinet staffed by the fiscal and economic experts who helped us weather the European debt crisis. Sean Chen has been in office less than two months. The European debt crisis has eased. But the Chen Cabinet is now being battered by the beef and chicken imports controversies. The beef and chicken issues have yet to be resolved. But the the cabinet is already being blasted over gas prices, electricity prices, health care fees, and university tuition. Public approval has plummeted.

Full Text below:

Sean Chen never imagined this. He was highly praised. The public felt blessed to have a cabinet staffed by the fiscal and economic experts who helped us weather the European debt crisis. Sean Chen has been in office less than two months. The European debt crisis has eased. But the Chen Cabinet is now being battered by the beef and chicken imports controversies. The beef and chicken issues have yet to be resolved. But the the cabinet is already being blasted over gas prices, electricity prices, health care fees, and university tuition. Public approval has plummeted.

The beef and chicken imports issue has been politicized, But people can choose to eat or not eat on their own, The problem is manageable. But price increases affect ordinary people's pocketbooks and daily lives. The public reacts badly to price increases. It seldom bothers to ascertain where the price increases are taking place, or who is benefiting. It assumes the price increases are always at its expense. Public discontent of this sort is often difficult to assuage.

But viewed calmly, gas prices, electricity prices, health care fees, and university tuition are different. They increase for very different reasons, and by very different degrees. The public often fails to understand this. The government often fails to communicate why to the public. Its policies are often sound. But it lacks the determination to stay the course. In the end, the most severe blow is to the morale of the cabinet. This makes it increasingly difficult for the administration to implement perfectly sound policies.

Take the gas and electricity price increases. Gasoline and electricity prices have been frozen for quite some time. No matter how moderate the price increases or decreases might be, the taxpayers are always the victims. The reason is simple. The larger the losses suffered by China Petroleum and Taipower, the larger the subsidies they receive. Any shortfall is invariably made up by subsidies from the national treasury. It is invariably borne by taxpayers as a whole. Ordinary wage earners enjoy no tax breaks. Not a dime's worth. Ordinary wage earners do not realize that price freezes victimize them the most. Take electricity for example. The government subsidies the industrial use of electricity to the tune of 90 billion dollars per year. This is a vast sum. The average household uses only about 300 kWh per month. Super-rich households use about 10,000 kWh per month, The average large commercial and industrial firm uses nearly seven million kWh per month. Those who use the most electricity benefit the most from a price freeze. This is the obvious reason.

If gas and electricity prices return to normal, Taipower and China Petroleum will no longer receive 180 billion dollars in subsidies. That 180 billion dollars could do so much good. It could underwrite so many social welfare, educational, and cultural programs.

The fact is, electricity prices on Taiwan are low by international standards. Any government hikes would take into account the needs of the disadvantaged. Take electricity for example. The government has established a clear power consumption threshold. Anyone using less than 110 kWh per month will not be subject to a price increase. Those who use the most electricity will be subjected to the largest rate increases. To some extent this will encourage electricity conservation. Government agencies have been thinking in terms of "reasonable price hikes." Of course it must explain what it means by "reasonable." It must avoid a public backlash provoked by erroneous perceptions.

The main reason health insurance will increase is the debut of second-generation health care in July. Last year the health care premium was hiked. The government tried to smooth over public discontent. It adopted a single rate, variable subsidy program. These government subsidies will end upon the implementation of second generation health care, An estimated 10.1 million people will see their monthly premiums increase anywhere from 19 to 44 dollars. No matter what adjustments are made, we must ensure medical treatment for disadvantaged members of society. for low-income households, for those with disabilities, for low and middle-income households, and for elderly people over 70. They must continue to benefit from premium subsidies.

Let those who are able, pay an additional ten or twenty dollars a month. This will maintain Taiwan's internationally acclaimed health care system. Who can complain? Besides, each penny paid is eventually returned in the form of medical care resources needed over the rest of a person's life. The government knows its policies are reasonable. It must now communicate this fact to the public. it must convince them. After all, if the health care system collapses everyone will suffer.

University tuition has not risen for seven years. During these seven years, prices have risen. Compulsory education depends on government subsidies. This is one of the government's most important policies. University education is no exception. Everyone who has studied abroad knows that university tuition on Taiwan is low by international standards. We live in a knowledge-based economy, Yet we undervalue the seeking of knowledge. This is a huge irony.

Admittedly, hiking university tuition will impose a heavy burden on households with students. But scholarships and school loan programs will make students appreciate the sacrifices families make for their education. They will make them appreciate their learning opportunities. This is a good thing.

Society on Taiwan is different from the past. The era when everything relied on the government is long past. Everyone must understand the relationship between taxes and benefits. The government cannot shoulder the cost of everything. We reject tax increases. We refuse to allow the price mechanism to return to normal. As a result, the the government cannot make ends meet. The public will not benefit. It can only suffer.

The Sean Chen Cabinet is determined to get things done. It has not been entirely successful. Many major policies are being implemented. This makes it even more important to prioritize. Take gas and electricity prices, for example. Taipower and China Petroleum are overwhelmed by heavy subsidies. This has gone on for some long time. Must we launch both at the same time? The Chen Shui-bian era "scorched earth diplomacy" left bitter memories. The Ma administration must not unwittingly provoke unrest where there was none. It must not unwittingly implement "scorched earth domestic policy." Political appointees are responsible for policy. Their first responsibility is to defend their policies. They must have sound justifications for their policies. They must also be determined to implement their policies. They must not be timid. The Sean Chen Cabinet must roll up its sleeves and get down to work.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2012.03.22
社論－為政策辯護 理要直氣更要壯
本報訊

陳?一定想不到，本來備受好評，國人多半對於歐債危機下的財經專業內閣深慶得人；上任不到兩個月，歐債危機緩解，陳內閣卻為了牛雞風暴焦頭爛額；牛雞問題還沒全部解決，又為了油、電、健保和大學學雜費紛傳漲價被罵臭頭，民意支持度驟降。

牛雞問題被政治化，但是，民眾可以選擇不吃或安全吃，未必處理不了；漲價風四起卻攸關小老百姓的荷包與生活，民眾聞漲色變，卻不大深究到底漲在哪？受惠的是誰？只想到吃虧的是自己，民怨相對擺平不易。

但是，持平來看，油、電、健保、及大學學雜費性質不同，漲價原因也不同；即使調漲方案差異更大，民眾沒這個力氣細想其中道理，政府卻不能不理直氣壯溝通；有理而無氣，最後打擊的還是內閣整體士氣，讓政府施政愈發舉步維艱。

先從油電雙漲來看，油電長期凍漲、半漲或緩漲，其結果還是納稅人倒楣。原因很簡單，中油、台電虧損愈大，表示國庫補貼愈多；國庫補貼的缺口最終還是得納稅人集體承擔，一毛錢跑不掉的受薪階級，卻不知反漲結果還是自己受害最大。以用電來說，政府補貼的工業用電一年高達九百多億；這筆龐大的金額，一般家庭用電每個月不過三百多度，富豪之家每個月用電差不多一萬度，大型工商業用電平均更高達七百萬度；用電愈多者受惠於凍漲就更大，這是顯而易見的道理。

油電價格回歸正常，台電、中油至少可以不必再負擔高達一千八百多億的補貼；一千八百多億可以做太多事了，從社會福利到教育文化支出都相對可以寬鬆許多。

事實上，台灣電價相對於國際都是偏低的；而政府任何調漲方案不可能不照顧弱勢。以電價為例，政府方案中很明確訂出最低用電門檻，諸如一百一十度以下完全不漲，用電愈高漲幅愈大，某種程度也是鼓勵節電。政府部門在思考所謂「合理調漲」的時候，當然要把何謂「合理」說得清清楚楚，避免民眾因為錯誤認知而沒來由的反彈。

健保費漲主要是因為二代健保將於七月上路。去年健全健保財務調漲保費，為撫平民怨，政府採訪單一費率、差別補貼方案；政府的補貼將在二代健保實施後告一段落，估計一千一百多萬人每個月將增加十九到四十四元不等的保費。但是，不論如何調整，為保障弱勢民眾就醫權益，低收入戶、身心障礙者、中低收入戶、七十歲以上老人依舊享有保費補助的權益。

讓有能力的人每個月多繳十數或數十元保費，維繫台灣讓國際稱羡的健保制度，誰曰不宜？更何況，自己每一分繳出去的錢，最終還是回到自己一輩子都必然用得上的醫療照護資源。就這點而言，政府當然應該理直氣也壯地全力溝通與說服，畢竟健保若垮台，受害者將是全體民眾。

大學學雜費已經七年未調漲。在這七年中物價水準不可能維持不變，國民義務教育當然有賴政府補貼，因為這是政府最重要的政策之一；大學教育則不然，留學國外的人都明白，台灣大學學費在國際間同樣偏低，在知識經濟的時代，卻想低價攫取學問，不啻是一大反諷。

無可諱言，調漲大學學雜費，對家中有學子者會是一大負擔。但是，以目前國內的環境，只要做好獎學金制度和學貸方案，讓學生因為體會家庭對自己受教育的付出，更珍惜自己有限的學習機會，未始不是好事。

台灣社會終究已經不同於以往。事事都靠政府平準的年代早就過去了；每一個人都要理解所得與付出的道理，不可能大小事都要政府一肩扛起或補貼；既不讓加稅，又不讓價格機制回歸正常，結局是政府施政左支右絀，於全民非但不利反而有害。

陳內閣有心做事，卻顯然並不得法。在這麼多重大施政中，必須更縝密思考輕重緩急。以油電價格為例，台電中油被沉重的補貼壓得喘不過氣來不是一天兩天的事了，有必要急於同時間推出嗎？扁政府時代的「烽火外交」燒出惡評，馬政府何必沒事四處起戰端，搞成「烽火內政」卻收拾不了？最重要的，政務官要為政策負責，負責的第一步就是辯護，理要直、氣要壯，尤其不能心虛。陳內閣，加油！

Chen Chu Should Beware of the Tail Wagging the Dog

Chen Chu Should Beware of the Tail Wagging the Dog
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 22, 2012

Summary: DPP Legislator Gao Jyh-peng questioned Premier Sean Chen in the Legislature. He set a record by asking the same question 88 times. "Should Ah-bian be pardoned?" Gao Jyh-peng was pleased with his own performance, His colleagues in the Legislature however, considered his behavior pointless grandstanding. But let us take a closer look. Behavior such as this reflects the DPP's loss of direction in its ongoing effort to save Ah-Bian. It is a perfect case of "the tail wagging the dog."

Full Text below:

DPP Legislator Gao Jyh-peng questioned Premier Sean Chen in the Legislature. He set a record by asking the same question 88 times. "Should Ah-bian be pardoned?" Gao Jyh-peng was pleased with his own performance, His colleagues in the Legislature however, considered his behavior pointless grandstanding. But let us take a closer look. Behavior such as this reflects the DPP's loss of direction in its ongoing effort to save Ah-Bian. It is a perfect case of "the tail wagging the dog."

The "Save Ah-Bian!" movement was initiated by the Hakka Society, the Northern Society, and other "Nativist" oriented social groups. Claiming that Chen Shui-bian was suffering from coronary artery disease, joined hands with Chen faction members and circulated a petition. They demanded that the Ministry of Justice grant Ah-Bian medical leave. This demand was followed by pressure from party factions. Within the Democratic Progressive Party, demands for medical parole soon escalated, and became demands for a pardon. The very next day, Lin Chia-lung and other younger generation legislators proposed a "Save Ah-Bian!" bill according the former head of state special medical privileges. Gao Jyh-peng simultaneously staged his 88 questions stunt, demanding that Ah-Bian be pardoned.

A few days later. the DPP abandoned its battle against US beef imports. It turned all its attention to a crusade to "Save Ah-Bian!" This was an unexpected turn of events. Viewed positively, the DPP displayed party unity. They DPP has long been a party able to fight shoulder to shoulder. Viewed negatively, the DPP has lost its sense of direction. It has even lost its sense of proportion. Its army of believers may be combative, but it is also foolhardy. Otherwise, why would it channel the party's energy into saving Ah-Bian, protecting Ah-Bian?

Question: Is Chen Shui-bian really being subjected to inhumane treatment in prison? Is the Ministry of Justice really indifferent to his health? The answer is no. On what basis is the DPP claiming inhumane treatment? Question: Has Chen Shui-bian acknowledged the error of his ways? Has he engaged in genuine soul-searching? Has he coughed up the money he embezzled and squirreled away overseas? Does the majority on Taiwan feel that Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen's crimes deserve sympathy? The answer is no. Are the DPP's demands that Ah-Bian be pardoned and granted special privileges valid?

Lest we forget, the DPP was an accomplice to the Chen family's corruption. The DPP has never apologized to the people of Taiwan over the past four years. Now they assume that with the passage of time, they can use Chen Shui-bian to tighten the screws on the Ma administration. Aren't they being a little naive? Consider an even more interesting fact. Tsai Ing-wen kept Chen Shui-bian at arm's length for four years. Her actio0n was highly calculated. But at least it was not unseemly. Chen Chu has been acting chairman for under a month. Yet the entire party has suddenly swarmed toward Chen Shui-bian. Why?

The DPP's effort to "Save Ah-bian!" has been characterized as a case of the tail wagging the dog. There are three reasons for this. One. Chen Shui-bian's plight is of course a matter for DPP concern. But it is hardly the party's highest priority. Social organizations that back Ah-Bian started the movement. All the DPP had to do was cheer them from the sidelines. There was no need for the entire party to join in a feeding frenzy. Now the entire party is being led around by the nose by sundry support groups. If this is not the tail wagging the dog, what is it? If this is not the loss of a sense of proportion, what is it?

Two. The DPP's way of saving Ah-Bian was excessive. The Democratic Progressive Party is the largest opposition party on Taiwan. The ruling party would never disdain any reasonable questioning by opposition party legislators, or any reasonable demands by members of the press. But Green Camp legislators are abusing the power of the legislature to pass a law custom-tailored to Ah-Bian alone. They have even sunk to using inappropriate questioning methods to attack the ruling party. This approach, in the public's eyes, is a typical case of private abuse of public resources. It is a waste of the nation's resources and of legislative responsibilities, merely to shield a greedy kleptocrat. It is a clear case of putting the cart before the horse.

Three. The movement to "Save Ah-Bian!" is now in full swing, Rumor has it the Ah-Bian faction is applying pressure behind the scenes. It is forcing other legislators to back Ah-Bian out of guilt. This shows that the DPP leadership has lost both its sense of direction and its sense of proportion. Chen Chu is merely acting chairman. Perhaps she has no intention of aggressively asserting her leadership at this point. But the result has been a lack of policy direction. The result has been chaos created by factional maneuvering. What is this, but the tail wagging the dog?

The DPP lost the general election. The DPP is lost. Therefore its legislators snipe at the Ma administration in a vain effort to rally voters. The DPP has a number of freshmen legislators able to put up a good fight. But they cannot rid themselves of combative attitudes and contrarian habits. They have been unable to offer a positive example of a loyal opposition party concerned for the larger interests of the nation. The current "Save Ah-Bian!" movement is a perfect example. The flames may burn bright. But the banner being waved is not the banner of exalted justice or the banner of the greater good, It cannot move peoples' hearts. It merely reveals the DPP's lack of impulse control. The deficits outweigh the benefits.

The DPP has put the cart before the horse, again and again. The outside world now has a clearer picture. Tsai Ing-wen's leadership style had its strengths. Chen Chu may consider herself merely an interim leader. She may relinquish the chairmanship in May. But until then she still has a responsibility to be a good leader. She must not allow the DPP to squander its energy.

陳菊要小心這波尾巴搖狗現象
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.22 01:49 am

民進黨立委高志鵬在國會質詢，面對陳?。以同一問題連續追問了八十八次「應不應特赦阿扁」，創下紀錄。高志鵬頗以自己的質詢招數自得，立院同仁則認為是無聊的作秀；但仔細觀察，這其實反映了民進黨在這波救扁運動中「尾巴搖狗」的失衡現象。

「救扁行動」最初是由客社、北社等本土社團發起，以陳水扁患有冠心症為由，串連扁系人馬連署，要求法務部讓扁保外就醫。接著，在派系施壓及操作下，保外就醫的籲求很快在民進黨內升高為要求「特赦」。再隔一日，林佳龍等一批青壯立委連署提案，要求要為扁修法恢復卸任元首的醫療「禮遇」；同時，也有了高志鵬跳針八十八次的挺扁演出。

短短數日，民進黨拋棄「反美牛」的戰場，全力轉攻「搶救阿扁」的聖戰，不能不說是一個突兀的轉折。往好處看，民進黨確實很團結，總是能齊心合力作戰；往壞處看，當下的民進黨似乎缺乏方向感，甚且輕重不分，因此大軍徒有戰力卻只會蠻幹。否則，在這個節骨眼，有何必要傾全黨之力去進行救扁、護扁之役？

試問：陳水扁在獄中受到了非人道待遇嗎？或者法務部門置他的健康於不顧了嗎？答案是沒有。那麼，民進黨要求的人道待遇，立論根據何在？再問：陳水扁懇切認錯反省了嗎？他的貪瀆款項全數吐清了嗎？台灣多數民眾已覺得扁珍之罪「其情可憫」嗎？答案也全是否定。那麼，民進黨要求給他特赦和禮遇，又正當性何在？

更別忘了，作為扁家貪瀆的共犯結構，民進黨本身過去四年也從未就此向台灣人民道過歉。如今，卻以為時過境遷，又可以拿阿扁來向馬政府施壓，豈非太過天真？更耐人尋味的是，蔡英文過去四年和陳水扁保持「敬而遠之」的關係，雖嫌機巧，至少無礙觀瞻；而陳菊代理主席職務不到一個月，整個黨即瞬間向阿扁轟然傾斜，這又是什麼原因？

之所以形容民進黨這波救扁運動是「尾巴搖狗」，有幾個原因：第一，陳水扁的處境當然可以關切，卻不是黨當前的迫切要務；挺扁社團發起行動後，民進黨只要敲敲邊鼓略事聲援即可，無需全黨上下群起呼喝響應。而如今鬧到整個黨被周邊社團牽著鼻子走，不是「尾巴搖狗」、輕重不分，卻是什麼？

第二，救援行動的手段選擇，超乎了界線。以民進黨最大在野黨的地位，只要透過質詢或記者會提出合理訴求，相信執政黨絕對不敢輕慢；但綠委卻要動用立法權去為阿扁量身打造禮遇，甚至利用不恰當的質詢手段來壓迫執政黨。這種作法，在民眾看來，才是典型的公器私用；浪費國家資源和國會職務來保護一個敗德者，當然是本末倒置。

第三，救扁行動之所以如火如荼，據傳主要是扁系人馬在幕後施壓，迫使其他立委表態挺扁；這樣的運作，也反映了黨中央在青黃不接之際的失控狀態。陳菊只是代理主席，或許因此無意在此期間表現積極領導的作為，但缺乏政策指引的結果，便造成了派系操作引導政黨走向的錯亂現象，這能說不是尾巴搖狗嗎？

大選失敗後，民進黨可以做的，應該是利用立委在國會的犀利問政，來鞭策馬政府，並召喚選民的認同。遺憾的是，民進黨雖有一批戰力不錯的新秀進入國會，卻無法改掉好戰、為反而反的習性，因而難以展現反對黨矯正國家決策的積極作用。尤其這波救扁行動，烽火雖然燒得熾烈，高舉的卻不是讓人振奮的正義或公益的大旗，徒然讓人感到師心自用，甚至暴露了黨內的盲動與失控，得不償失。

看到民進黨連串的本末倒置景象，外界也許更能看出，蔡英文任內的領導模式確有其所長。陳菊或許只是以過渡者自居，但在五月交卸主席職務前，她仍有責任扮好領導角色，不要再讓民進黨的能量虛擲。

Prosecute Those Who Obstructed Investigation of the 3/19 Shooting Incident

Prosecute Those Who Obstructed Investigation of the 3/19 Shooting Incident
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 21, 2012

Summary: This is the eighth anniversary of the 3/19 Shooting Incident, which had a major impact on political and social evolution on Taiwan. Most people have been unwilling to revisit this event, which tore society apart. The key figures in the shooting incident were former president Chen Shui-bian and former vice president Annette Lu. Paradoxically, they are the very ones who have called on the Ma administration to reopen the case. The DPP legislative caucus has proposed the establishment of a fact-finding commission within the Legislative Yuan. These moves have left observers wondering. Maybe the shooting was a hoax after all?

Full Text below:

This is the eighth anniversary of the 3/19 Shooting Incident, which had a major impact on political and social evolution on Taiwan. Most people have been unwilling to revisit this event, which tore society apart. The key figures in the shooting incident were former president Chen Shui-bian and former vice president Annette Lu. Paradoxically, they are the very ones who have called on the Ma administration to reopen the case. The DPP legislative caucus has proposed the establishment of a fact-finding commission within the Legislative Yuan. These moves have left observers wondering. Maybe the shooting was a hoax after all?

The 3/19 Shooting Incident occurred eight years ago, on the eve of the presidential election. It is widely seen as the reason for the election upset. Two bullets allowed Chen and Lu to win re-election, by the slimmest of margins. Following the incident, the National Security Bureau and the president's right-hand man Chiou I-jen, replete with his Cheshire Cat smile, prevented Chang Shi-liang, former National Police Administration Chief, from entering Chi Mei hospital to investigate. As a result, over half the people do not believe the incident was a genuine assassination attempt.

Over the next four years, the ruling and opposition parties spent most of their time at loggerheads with each other. The Chen regime invited internationally renowned forensic scientist Henry Lee home to investigate. But even he could not gain the public trust. Eight years later, Henry Lee expressed regret. He conducted so many investigations. This one was a "minor case." But due to political factors, it was the most difficult one he ever dealt with.

As a forensic scientist, Henry Lee could only carry out forensic analysis of the physical evidence. He discovered the vehicle used during the presidential campaign had not been properly taken into evidence. This raised eyebrows. Some think those in charge may even have replaced the car's windshield. If so, Henry Lee's painstaking forensic analysis was all for naught.

Henry Lee even cited "CSI: Crime Scene Investigation," a TV series the public on Taiwan is familiar with. He said real world cases are handled very differently from the way they are depicted on TV. To conduct a proper investigation one needs a good team. One needs good detectives, crime scene investigators, forensic specialists, medical examiners, and prosecutors. The TV series was correct about one thing. The physical evidence must be analyzed as soon as possible. The chain of custody must be maintained to avoid suspicion that it has been altered or damaged. Failure to do so could lead to questions about the credibility of the investigation. That is how we know the investigation of the 3/19 Shooting Incident was carried out reluctantly, under unprofessional circumstances.

The crime scene was also the scene of a mass gathering. It was almost completely destroyed. The two bullets were retrieved long after the incident took place. The authorities used the bullets to find the pistol. They used the pistol to find the suspects. They tracked the pistol to Tang Shou-yi, the maker of the pistol. But was this home-made pistol really powerful enough to fire two rounds in a matter of seconds? No one can answer this question. The pistol was tracked to its owner, Chen Yi-hsiung. But he was already dead. Not only had he drowned, he had been hastily cremated, without a post-mortem, in contravention of normal procedure. It is now impossible to determine whether Chen Yi-hsiung drowned, or was already dead when he landed in the water.

Annette Lu was shot. She has never believed the police and prosecutors' account of the 3/19 Shooting Incident. She has long suspected that she was the real target. Alleged gunman Chen Yi-hsiung's family members have long maintained that there was sufficient evidence to prove he was the perpetrator. They want Chen Yi-hsiung's name cleared. But the case was mishandled. Discovering the truth at this late date is no longer possible. None of the questions have been answered over the past eight years. Many members of the public have offered their own accounts of the incident. Academia Sinica researcher Chu Hung-yuan says the 3/19 Shooting Incident was unquestionably a hoax. He even claims to have three witnesses. All he needs is for the case to be reopened.

Lest we forget, eight years ago the KMT established a Truth Commission within the legislature. The Chen regime could easily have cooperated with the Truth Commission investigation and proved Chen Shui-bian's innocence. It could easily have proved that he did not orchestrate a false flag operation. Instead, Chen did everything in his power to obstruct the investigation. He even declared an "executive right of resistance." Former Justice Minister Wang Ching-feng attempted to investigate. Chen denied her access to the information and the witnesses. Her efforts ran into a brick wall, and went nowhere.

Eight years ago, Chen Shui-bian and the DPP refused to uncover the truth. Now suddenly, eight years later. they want the current legislature to establish a fact-finding commission to uncover the truth. The two bullets are in the custody of the CIB. But what other evidence can legislators examine? Then presidential bodyguard Chen Chai-fu made a last moment phone call to Chen Shui-bian. Just exactly what was the call about? And what about the vehicle they used. None of these will help us discover the truth. Does the DPP expect Chen Chai-fu to confess that he orchestrated a hoax? Former CIB Commissioner Hou Yu-yi is now Xinbei City deputy mayor. Does the DPP expect him to confess that he conspired with Chen Shui-bian to fake the grazing wound on his abdomen? Does the DPP expect former Agricultural Minister and former National Security Council Secretary-General Chiou I-jen to confess that the shooting was a hoax, and that Chen Shui-bian was its mastermind?

Chen Shui-bian and the DPP's biggest mistake eight years ago was to stonewall the Truth Commission, and to flatly refuse to allow a credible investigation to take place. They left a black mark on the island's history that can never be erased. This black mark haunts Chen Shui-bian. The people do not trust Chen Shui-bian. They do not believe the 3/19 Shooting Incident was a genuine assassination attempt. They believe the Chen regime orchestrated a false flag operation against itself. Chen wants the Ma administration to reopen the case. Chen knows the Ma administration cannot possibly uncover the truth. The public knows this. The Ma administration can do one thing however. It can prosecute the police, the prosecutors, and the national security personnel who obstructed the fact-finding process. It can make them pay for concealing the truth, and for dividing the nation.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2012.03.21
社論－嚴懲阻礙319槍擊案真相調查者
本報訊

影響台灣政治社會重大的「三一九槍擊案」八周年，本來沒有多少人願意再想起這個撕裂社會的案件，偏偏槍擊案當事人、前正副總統陳水扁與呂秀蓮都呼籲馬政府重啟調查，民進黨立院黨團更將提案在立法院成立真相調閱委員會；種種動作直令人匪夷所思，難不成這起槍擊案還真是造假的？

三一九槍擊案發生在八年前的總統大選前夕，一般相信這也是讓選情逆轉的關鍵，兩顆子彈讓陳、呂以極小票差當選連任；但是，事發後包括國安局和總統身邊左右手邱義仁等神祕的微笑，或阻擋前警政署長張四良進入奇美醫院探視，搞得舉國大半民眾不相信此案真偽。

接續下來的四年中，有大半時間是在朝野嚴重對立的情勢下度過，即使扁政府請回國際知名鑑識專家李昌鈺返國調查，還是無法取信於國人。整整八年之後，李昌鈺感慨，這個案子在他辦過這麼多案件中「算是小案」，然而政治因素的壓力卻是最大。

身為鑑識人員，李昌鈺只能就現有證物進行鑑識。他回國的時候，總統競選座車有沒有妥善保管不無疑問；迄今甚至有人相信有關單位可能根本就把座車的擋風玻璃換掉了；如果此說為真，那李昌鈺的任何鑑識都是枉然。

李昌鈺還以國人非常熟悉的《ＣＳＩ犯罪現場》舉例，辦案的真實情況和影集差距甚遠，辦好一件案子要有好的團隊，包括優秀的刑警、現場人員、鑑識人員、法醫和檢察官等等。然而，單就影集裡任何現場物證一定要在最短時間送驗，中途不得逗留以避免變造或毀損的可能，連引發無謂的揣測都不行，就可以知道三一九槍擊案是在多麼不專業的情況下勉強查辦。

不要說事發現場是一個群眾場合，幾乎全毀，兩顆子彈的彈頭還是事後街上撿回來的；即使以彈追槍，以槍追人，追到了造槍的唐守義，但這把土製手槍真能這麼厲害的在短短數秒內擊發兩彈嗎？這個疑問到現在沒人能給一個答案；由槍還追到了用槍的陳義雄，然而，追到人之後，此人不但已經溺水，甚至未經正常程序驗屍即在最短時間內火化，到現在已無人可以再調查陳義雄到底是落水死亡，或落水前即已身故。

挨彈之一的呂秀蓮始終不相信三一九槍擊案的真相確如檢警當時的調查，甚至始終懷疑槍手根本是衝著她而來；被視為用槍者陳義雄的家屬迄今都認為沒有足夠證據認定陳是嫌犯，要求還給陳義雄和他們一個清白。但是，錯失辦案的第一時間，再想追索真相簡直就是緣木求魚；八年來所有的疑問都無法得到答案，民間調查版本紛紛出爐；中研院研究員朱浤源指證三一九槍擊案確係造假，甚至他還聲言掌握「三位核心證人」，就等重啟調查。

但是，別忘了，八年前國民黨在立法院成立真相調查委員會的時候，最可配合調查以證明自己清白沒造假的扁政府，傾全力抗拒，甚至行使「行政抵抗權」；參與調查的前法務部長王清峰不論想調閱任何資料，或詢問任何相關人等，全部碰壁，無功而返。

八年前拒絕調查真相的陳水扁和民進黨，突然在八年後想通了，要在立法院成立調閱委員會追查真相。但是，除了還擺在刑事局的兩顆子彈，請問還能留下什麼資料給立委調閱？當年身為總統侍衛長的陳再福最後一通電話到底是給陳水扁買碗粿，或者變更宣傳車內容，都無助於釐清真相，民進黨是要陳再福承認配合造假？還是要已轉任新北市副市長的前刑事局長侯友宜承認配合陳水扁的腹遭彈擊擦傷？或要卸任務農的前國安會秘書長邱義仁承認安排造假？還是要陳水扁承認主導造假？

陳水扁和民進黨犯的最大錯誤就是在八年前阻擋真調會。全面抗拒可讓民眾信賴的調查，讓台灣民主政治烙下一個永難抹滅的恥辱。這個恥辱同樣標記在陳水扁身上，民眾不信任陳水扁、不相信三一九槍擊案，也是扁政府自己造成的。要求馬政府重啟調查，可以預見查不出真相，但是至少可以做到一件事：嚴懲所有在過程中阻礙真相調查的檢警調和國安人員，讓他們付出真相難明撕裂社會人心的代價。

Must Ordinary Taxpayers Subsidize Big Business?

Must Ordinary Taxpayers Subsidize Big Business?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 20, 2012

Summary: Suppose someone proposed having ordinary citizens subsidize Big Businesses such as TSMC, Hon Hai, China Steel, and the filthy rich? Everyone would express angry opposition. There would be a public backlash. The government would be terrified of doing so. But consider the current gas and electricity price control system. It is precisely that. It is a system that compels ordinary citizens to subsidize Big Business and the filthy rich. Many people don't see this. That is why when the government proposes unfreezing prices, they say no.

Full Text below:

Suppose someone proposed having ordinary citizens subsidize Big Businesses such as TSMC, Hon Hai, China Steel, and the filthy rich? Everyone would express angry opposition. There would be a public backlash. The government would be terrified of doing so. But consider the current gas and electricity price control system. It is precisely that. It is a system that compels ordinary citizens to subsidize Big Business and the filthy rich. Many people don't see this. That is why when the government proposes unfreezing prices, they say no.

Taipower and China Petroleum are state owned enterprises. Any profits they earn are returned to the treasury. Any losses they suffer are made up by the national treasury. In other words, when gas and electricity prices fall, China Petroleum and Taipower suffer losses. The treasury, i.e., taxpayers, are compelled to subsidize users of gas and electricity. This subsidy resembles the social welfare system. Social welfare is a form of income redistribution. It redistributes money from those who have more, to those who have less. Gas and electricity subsidies are also a form of income redistribution, in reverse. They redistribute wealth from ordinary taxpayers to Big Business and the filthy rich. Big Business and the filthy rich receive the most. The economically disadvantaged receive little -- pitifully little.

Let us examine the data. Say the cost of Taipower's power generation is $100. Industrial users of electricity and ordinary users of electricity pay about $70. In other words, the government subsidizes industrial users of electricity and ordinary users of electricity about $30. Ordinary users of electricity receive slightly more. This arrangment appears to benefit the general public. But examine some of the other data. The average family consumes about 350 kWh of electricity per month. But major commercial and industrial users consume an average of seven million kWh of electricity per month, or about 20,000 times as much as the average family. Homes of the super-rich consume about 10,000 kWh of electricity per month, or about 30 times as much as the average family.

Mega-enterprise power consumption is even more mind-boggling. Each month they use hundreds of millions of kWh of electricity. China Steel's electric bill last year was 4.86 billion NT, If we continue to freeze electricity rates this year, the taxpayer will be compelled to subsidize the steel industry to the tune of one billion NT. TSMC's electric bill accounts for only 3% of its annual revenues, One year of electricity costs 12 billion NT. Freezing the price of electricity this year will cost taxpayers 2.5 billion NT in subsidies to TSMC. These figures show that Big Business and the filthy rich consume the most electricity and receive the largest subsidies from the nation's coffers.

The gas price control system means a China Petroleum shortfall of 600 million NT per year. The price of electricity has been rising. Therefore Taipower estimates it will lose $1.1 billion this year, This year's electricity price freeze will cost $1.8 billion NT. If gas and electricity prices reflected costs, the treasury would not have to bear this $1.8 billion NT burden, Consider what this means. The money could then be used on people and society. It could expand social welfare, strengthen investment in education, improve technology and public investment. It could benefit the people as a whole. It could improve our national competitiveness. But as matters currently stand, it can do none of these things.

By now everyone realizes who the biggest beneficiaries of gas and electricity price freezes are. They are classic examples of "robbing the poor to pay the rich." How can we begin to speak of fairness and justice? These Big Businesses demand government subsidies. Electricity prices are kept artificially and unreasonably low for them out of political considerations.

Some businesses have been screaming that if gas and electricity prices increase further, they will not survive. But Taiwan's gas and electricity prices are among the lowest in the developed world, Even after they are hiked, they will still be among the lowest. If these businesses cannot survive, even with such low energy prices, it means they lack competitiveness and ought to be phased out. Moreover, in manufacturing, electricity accounts for only two to three percent of total capital costs. Even if the price of electricity increased 20%, it would only increase capital costs 4%. Its impact on business is limited. It definitely does not imply that capital costs will increase 20%. If a business cannot survive without taxpayer gas and electricity subsidies, it should be ashamed of itself. Why should taxpayers be compelled to underwrite such uncompetitive businesses?

The most important and most convincing reason to oppose unfreezing gas and electricity prices, is concern for the general public, particularly the underprivileged. This concern is justified. The government should look after the economically disadvantaged. The solution however, is simple. Within a certain range of energy consumption, prices would be kept low. The government currently sets the cap at 110 kWh. This would look after the disadvantaged. It would not increase their cost of living. If on the other hand, we freeze prices across the board. Big Business and the filthy rich will be the ones looked after. Artificially low prices would also lead to energy waste.

Therefore the government must offer a convincing policy. It must hike the price of gas and electricity, as soon as possible. Delays will only undermine China Petroleum and Taipower's fiscal health. The treasury will only have to make to make up a greater shortfall. The government must establish a gas and electricity pricing mechanism. It must take advantage of the opportunity to create a floating price mechanism. Officials on Taiwan lack courage. Elected representatives on Taiwan are populists who pander to the mob. The current rate hike has proceeded smoothly. But one day a smooth rate hike will no longer be possible. Every rate hike will become a major political and social crisis. The problem must be solved, once and for all,Gas and electricity prices are a political football that must be solved, once and for all. Give us a floating price mechanism.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2012.03.20
社論－豈有小市民補貼大企業的道理
本報訊

如果有人主張，讓小市民去補貼如台積電、鴻海、中鋼等大企業，去補貼富豪、有錢人，大概任何人都會強烈反對，民眾更會憤怒反彈，讓政府不敢如此做。但可知現在的油電價格凍漲、緩漲機制，就是這麼一個「小市民補貼大企業、富豪」的制度。因為看不透這個事實，現實上反而是政府想解除凍漲，外界反對。

台電、中油是公營企業，賺錢是繳回國庫，虧損則是最後終究要由國庫補貼。換句話說，油、電價格壓低，讓中油、台電虧損，其實就是拿國庫─也就是納稅人的錢去補貼用油、用電者。如果這個補貼過程就如一些社會福利制度一樣，是一個正向的所得重分配─即把多一點的錢從有錢人手上移轉到弱勢者身上─也罷，但遺憾的是油電價的補貼，卻正好是一種逆向的所得重分配；它把小市民繳交的稅做移轉補貼，但卻是企業、富豪拿得多，經濟弱勢者分得少，而且少得可憐。

讓我們看一些數據吧。如果台電的發電成本是一百元，工業用電與民生用電價格大概在七十多元，也就是說政府給予工業用電與民生用電同樣接受廿多元的補貼，而且，民生用電的補貼還多一點哩，聽起來似乎一般民眾受惠較多。不過，再看另一個數據，一般家庭平均每個月用電大概是三百五十度，但一個大型工商業用戶，一個月的用電度數平均是七百萬度─大概是一般家庭的二萬倍；富豪家庭每個月用電度數也都在萬度左右，也是小市民的三十倍左右。

至於超大型企業用電量之龐大就更不在話下了，每個月是以數億元計。中鋼去年電費支出四八．六億，如果繼續涷漲，今年納稅人給中鋼的電費補貼至少十億元。台積電的電費占營收約三％左右，以一年四千億營收計，一年電費支出一二○億；凍漲則今年納稅人補貼台積電約廿五億元。這些數字非常明顯看得出，規模越龐大、用電量越多的企業、富豪，得到國庫的補貼就越多。

中油因為油價緩漲機制，一年要短收六百億元；台電因為電價凍漲，加上燃料成本一直漲，估計今年要虧損一千一百億元，今年油電凍漲的成本是一千八百億元。如果油電反映成本，國庫不必負擔這一千八百億元，想想：這可以為民眾、社會做多少事？增加社會福利、加強教育投入、提高科技及公共投資…，這些都能讓全民受惠、提高國家競爭力。但現在，都沒有了！

看到這裡，大家應該知道油電凍漲，最大的受惠者是誰了吧？這種補貼，算是標準的「劫貧濟富」，有什麼公平正義可言？更何況，也不是這些大企業要求政府補貼，而是電價在政治考量下，人為、不合理的被壓低。

雖然也有部分企業高喊：油電再漲，企業就活不下去了。但台灣的油、電已經是主要國家中幾乎最低者，即使調漲後還是最低者。這些低的能源價格都無法生存的企業，代表其根本缺乏競爭力，該被淘汰。更何況在製造業中，電費占成本的比重大概只有二到三％不到，即使電價漲兩成，對其成本的增加也只有○．四％，其影響應在企業承受範圍內，更絕對不是一般直覺性聯想的「成本漲兩成」。如果一個企業須靠納稅人補貼油電費用才能生存，豈不汗顏？納稅人有什麼義務要養這種沒有競爭力的企業？

反對油電價格解凍，最重要、也最有說服力的理由是：擔心影響一般民眾─特別是弱勢者的生活。這個擔心有道理，政府也該照顧經濟弱勢者，解決方式更簡單，一定度數內的基本用電量完全不調漲─政府目前的方案是訂為一一○度內，這樣就能達到照顧弱勢、不增加其生活成本的目的。如採取一律凍漲方式，我們可發現其實被「照顧」補貼最多者，反而是企業與富豪。更別提這種刻意壓低價格造成的能源浪費了。

因此，政府應該展現良好的政策說服力，不僅應該儘快調漲油電價格，因為慢一天調，中油台電的財務就傷得更重，也代表國庫未來要「回補」的金額就更多；而且，這次就該建立一套油電價調整制度。如果不趁這次建立浮動調整機制，以台灣官員的缺乏擔當、民代的民粹習性，這次即使順利調漲，未來還是要碰到無法再調漲的問題，搞得每次電價調整都成為「重大政治與社會事件」。要一勞永逸、永遠解決油電價的「政治問題」，就給我們一個浮動機制吧！

Even Chen Shui-bian Considers 3/19 Shooting Incident Unsolved

Even Chen Shui-bian Considers 3/19 Shooting Incident Unsolved
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 19, 2012

Summary: Tomorrow is the eighth anniversary of the 3/19 Shooting Incident. Chen Shui-bian recently wrote Annette Lu, saying "I implore you. Call on President Ma. Persuade him to re-open the 3/19 Shooting Incident case, Uncover the real truth. After all, the Ma administration has been in office for over four years. Yet it still has no explanation for what took place."

Full Text below:

Tomorrow is the eighth anniversary of the 3/19 Shooting Incident. Chen Shui-bian recently wrote Annette Lu, saying "I implore you. Call on President Ma. Persuade him to re-open the 3/19 Shooting Incident case, Uncover the real truth. After all, the Ma administration has been in office for over four years. Yet it still has no explanation for what took place."

Even Chen Shui-bian says he considers the 3/19 Shooting Incident unsolved. Even he says the truth remains unknown. That is why he wrote a letter to Annette Lu, imploring her to persuade President Ma to reopen the case. That is why Chen complained that the Ma administration has no explanation for what took place, even though it has been in office for over four years.

Without the truth, there is no president. The 3/19 Shooting Incident led to the complete and utter discrediting of DPP rule and the Chen Shui-bian regime. It was one of the main reasons the Democratic Progressive Party was unable to restore public trust in its governance. Eight years later, Chen Shui-bian has the temerity to make an about face, and demand that the case be reopened so that we may uncover the truth. His gesture is absurd and shameless. After all, the Chen regime ruled for four years following the 3/19 Shooting Incident. It dismissed the incident as "water under the bridge." It offered "no explanation for what took place."

Let us click the rewind button. Consider the results of the report issued by the Chen Shui-bian regime's ad hoc investigative group. Consider the actions of the Chen Shui-bian regime's "fact finding group," eight years ago.

On August 17, 2005, the fact finding group announced the results of its investigation. It identified the murderer as Chen Yi-hsiung. It claimed he fired two rounds. One bullet struck one person. The other bullet struck another. That same day, President Chen Shui-bian issued a comment. He said, "The ad hoc group took over a year to investigate the case. It expended enormous manpower and materiel. It aggressively pursued the matter. It made use of forensic techniques to examine the evidence and question the witnesses. It did the best job it could, I, Chen Shui-bian, respect the investigators' findings. I hope the community will respect the findings of the ad hoc group's professional, objective, and independent investigation."

This was how Chen Shui-bian spun the incident seven years ago, Later he often cited the group's findings. He said it proved he was innocent of any wrongdoing. Now however, he repudiates this "professional, objective, and independent" investigative report. Now he wants the case reopened.

Does Chen Shui-bian really want to uncover the truth? Consider his attitude eight years ago. Blue Camp legislators established a "3/19 Shooting Incident Fact-Finding Group" within the Legislative Yuan, to be headed by Wang Ching-feng. No sooner had they begun to investigate, then the Chen regime asserted an "executive right of resistance." It stonewalled completely, obstructing any effort to investigate. In October 2004, when Su Jia-chyuan was Minister of the Interior, he argued that "Civil servants have a 'executive right of resistance' to illegal and unconstitutional demands. They can refuse to comply." Eight years ago, Chen Shui-bian asserted an "executive right of resistance." Eight years later, Chen Shui-bian wants President Ma to re-open the case and uncover the truth. Are we supposed to believe that Chen Shui-bian experienced a Pauline conversion, on the Road to Damascus?

Even Chen Shui-bian has repudiated the results of the 3/19 Shooting Incident Report. The case may remain unsolved. The case was riddled with problems from the start, from the traces of ointment and blood on Chen Shui-bian's abdomen. In particular, the assertion that "one gunman fired two shots from one gun" was incredible. According to the report, the two rounds were light loads with only half the amount of powder. The round loaded with a copper jacketed bullet was slightly more powerful. It could wound a human target. But it was fired through the windshield. It lost much of its energy after penetrating the windshield. The round loaded with a plain lead bullet was less powerful. It merely scratched the skin. It was the one that grazed Chen Shui-bian's abdomen. If the two bullets had been reversed, then the lead bullet would not have penetrated the windshield. The copper plated bullet would have inflicted more damage on the person struck. Most incredible of all, the report, purportly based on "forensic science," alleges that the two rounds were fired within 0.63 seconds of each other. Anyone can simulate this scenario by pulling a trigger twice in 0.63 seconds. It is extremely difficult. Furthermore, the recoil from the first round would elevate the muzzle. Could one really aim the second round accurately enough to merely graze Chen Shui-bian across the belly?

We can be certain of only one thing about the 3/19 Shooting Incident: one copper jacketed bullet penetrated the windshield and wounded Annette Lu in the knee. This however, does not prove that Chen Shui-bian's wounds were inflicted at the same time and at the same location. This does not prove that "two rounds were fired from one gun" within 0.63 seconds of each other.

For years, the catechism about the 3/19 Shooting Incident report has been: "Believers remain believers. Skeptics remain skeptics." But Chen Shui-bian once insisted that the report was "professional, objective, and independent." Now he openly repudiates the report, and wants the case re-opened, to uncover the truth. Now he argues that the report was utterly incredible. Chen Shui-bian has in effect, affirmed the skeptics who never believed the original report.

The most suspicious aspect of the 3/19 Shooting Incident was its role Chen Shui-bian's "re-election." This suspicion discredited DPP rule and Chen Shui-bian's second term. The conclusions of the report were suspicious. The Chen regime invoked an "executive right of resistance" to obstruct any investigation. It deepened public suspicion of Chen Shui-bian, and inspired contempt for the Chen regime. The lesson of the 3/19 Shooting Incident is: Without the truth, there is no president.

The report claimed that two rounds were fired within 0.63 seconds of each other. But people who have been asked to duplicate the feat own their own find it difficult to believe. Chen Shui-bian is the last person who ought to give any credence to the report. Now, even he has declared that he does not believe the report. As far as the world is concerned, the 3/19 Shooting Incident investigation is back to square one.

連陳水扁也不相信三一九槍擊案破案
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.19 02:37 am

明天是三一九槍擊案八周年。陳水扁致函呂秀蓮說：「懇請您代為籲請馬總統，能下令重查『三一九事件』的真相。畢竟馬政府四年過去了，迄無交代。」

也就是說，連陳水扁也不相信三一九槍擊案已經偵結破案；他認為「真相」未明，因此函呂秀蓮轉請馬總統重啟調查；且抱怨馬政府「畢竟四年過去了，迄無交代」。

沒有真相，沒有總統。三一九槍擊案是造成民進黨扁政府統治正當性崩盤的事件，影響所致，這也是民進黨迄今難以恢復「執政信賴感」的主因之一。陳水扁在八年後的今天，居然回過頭來，要求重新調查「真相」，尤其顯得荒唐無恥；「畢竟」扁政府在槍擊案後的執政四年也早已「過去了」，亦是「迄無交代」。

歷史倒帶，先看陳水扁在七年前如何評價專案小組的偵結報告，再看陳水扁在八年前如何應對「真相調查小組」的查案動作。

二○○五年八月十七日，專案小組宣布偵結，認定陳義雄是兇手，一人一槍兩彈。當日，陳水扁總統發表評論稱：「專案小組一年多來投入大量人力、物力，積極偵辦，以科學鑑證方式找尋所有可能證據、證人，已盡全力，阿扁尊重此項司法調查結果，並希望社會各界也都能尊重專案小組專業、客觀、獨立的調查結果。」

這是七年前陳水扁的說法，後來他又幾次引據此項偵結報告，謂已洗刷了他的「不白之冤」。但是，現在竟連他自己也否定了這個「專業、客觀、獨立」的偵結報告，主張重啟調查真相。

陳水扁真的想調查真相嗎？且看八年前他的態度。八年前，藍營經立法院的程序成立「三一九槍擊案真相調查小組」，由王清峰領軍；進行之際，扁政府發動「行政抵抗權」，全面杯葛，阻撓調查。二○○四年十月，時任內政部長的蘇嘉全說：「公務員對違法違憲的要求有『行政抵抗權』，可以不遵從指揮。」如今，八年前發動「行政抵抗權」的陳水扁，竟然在八年後籲請馬總統重新調查真相，莫非真是此一時彼一時耶？

現在，連陳水扁也否定了三一九槍擊案的偵結報告，本案可能成為永遠的歷史懸案。此案自第一現場陳水扁肚子上油膏多於血跡開始，即充滿疑點；偵結報告謂為「一人一槍兩彈」，尤其匪夷所思。這兩彈，火藥裝填量都極少（僅正常量的五成）；銅彈的力道略強，可以傷人，但用於射擋風玻璃，唯在射穿玻璃後已無殺傷力；鉛彈的力道更弱，剛好可以劃傷皮層，是劃破陳水扁肚皮的一彈。如果兩彈對調，則鉛彈射不穿玻璃，銅彈直接射人卻可能傷況較重。尤其不可思議者，偵結報告據「科學鑑證」，指兩彈連發射擊是在○‧六三秒內完成；其實，任何人皆不妨自我模擬在○‧六三秒鐘內紮實連扣兩次板機的情境，莫說在生理上幾無可能，更何況因第一彈射出後的後座力所抬高的槍口，如何能使子彈水平劃過陳水扁的肚皮？

因此，三一九槍擊案迄今唯一可以確定的事實是，有一發銅彈在現場射穿擋風玻璃並傷了呂秀蓮的膝蓋；但此一事實，並不能引伸證明陳水扁的傷口是在同一現場造成，尤其不可能是「一槍兩彈」在○‧六三秒內造成。

多年來，對於三一九槍擊案的偵結報告，常聞「信者恆信，不信者恆不信」的說法；但是，如今連當年視此報告為「專業、客觀、獨立」的陳水扁，也公開否定此一報告，並主張「重查真相」，則此一報告之不可置信，不啻已經獲得陳水扁的背書。

對三一九槍擊案的最核心質疑，是懷疑陳水扁贏得大選的手法不正當，因而亦使扁政府的第二任期失去統治正當性；而偵結報告之疑竇叢生，及扁政府以「行政抵抗權」之阻擾調查真相，更深化了國人對陳水扁的懷疑與鄙視。三一九案的教訓是：沒有真相，沒有總統。

偵結報告可以主張○‧六三秒兩彈連發，但模擬摳動自己手指的國人都可以不相信。本來，陳水扁應是這世界上最後一個仍然相信偵結報告者，如今竟然連他自己也宣示其否定這個報告的立場，則世人對三一九槍擊案的所有質疑皆可回到原點。

Beta-Adrenergic Agonist Controversy Undercuts Government Credibility

Beta-Adrenergic Agonist Controversy Undercuts Government Credibility
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 16, 2012

Summary: The U.S. beef and Taiwan pork controversies have taught us a lesson. We face an endless stream of food safety issues. We must approach the problem from a scientific and rational perspective. We must uncover the truth and ascertain the severity of the problem. We must review of our policy direction and management techniques. Otherwise both the public and industry will suffer. The government will both remain mired in old problems and entangled in new ones. It will lose credibility, and contribute nothing to the solution of our problems.

Full Text below:

The U.S. beef controvery has raged for an entire month. This is no small feat, and is bringing with it new problems, It has led to a controversy over whether Taiwan pork contains beta-adrenergic agonists such as clenbuterol and ractopamine. Suddenly no one knows what meat is safe to eat, Government agricultural authorities were supposed to be the gatekeepers. What have they been doing? Is there really a conspiracy to attack Taiwan pork to divert attention from US beef? Another controversy is now sweeping the island, It is the topic on everyone's lips.

Is Taiwan pork safe or unsafe? Is there a conspiracy or not? Consider a story that has been circulating on the Internet.

A young man applies for a job, The interviewer is duly impressed. The young man and his parents assume the job is his. The family is overjoyed. But suddenly they receive a letter saying he has been rejected. The family is desolate. Despondent, the young man threatens suicide. Soon afterwards, the employer arrives to apologize. The notice was mailed to the wrong address. The young man has been hired.

The story does not end there. It goes on to show how the scenario unfolds in different countries and regions, with people of a different national character. In Japan the company says, if the young man cannot even endure such a minor setback, and threatens to commit suicide, how can he possibly cope with future work pressure? In Germany, the parents forbid the young man to report to work, If blunders as serious as this can happen, then company efficiency is clearly poor. The job is clearly one with no future. In America, the young man becomes a folk hero. He reports to work amidst cheering throngs. Lawyers to swarm about him and threaten to sue the company for causing him mental anguish.

On Taiwan scholars and experts of all political stripes. talking heads, civic organizations, emerge from the woodwork. They demand to know why he was first rejected then hired. Did someone with connections lobby on his behalf? Did the interviewer accept a bribe? Who was the young woman who accompaned the young man during his interview? Questions like these multiply. But does the young man ever get the job? No one knows, and no one cares.

The story is an allegory. Questions about food safety have arisen over U.S. beef, Taiwan pork, chicken, and goose containing beta-adrenergic agonists. The real issue is what toxins are involved, and in what amounts? The former concerns the nature of the toxin. The latter concerns the amount. The nature and amount of the toxin must be made clear. Only then can we conduct a risk assessment. Only then can we decide whether to allow their sale. How should the government determine the permissible limits? Not by attacking pork to divert attention from beef. That hardly addresses the problem. We must retrace our steps. So what if the conspiracy theories are true? The uncovering of domestic inspection loopholes or unscrupulous breeders using illegal drugs is forcing the government to remedy the situation. That is hardly a bad thing.

That said, the authorities should be ashamed. The AIT's Taipei Office Chief issued a list of Taiwan agricultural products containing hundreds of illegal additives. It presented scientific evidence. Leave aside the issue of whether the government made concessions and allowed US beef imports, at least for the moment. How can our own agricultural authorities face the public? Have consumers been ingesting toxins on a daily basis? Why was everyone unaware of this?

The agricultural authorities explained that they uncovered these violations long ago. They merely failed to publicize them, Either that, or they publicized them but the media failed to report them. Blaming the media in this manner is extremely unfair. The Government Information Office (GIO) recently issued a press release on domestic pork with salbutamol, It contained only one word: salbutamol. But is salbutamol more toxic than ractopamine? The report said nothing. Do government agencies expect citizens to be experts in toxicology? Do they expect citizens to understand the significance of these reports at a glance? The government did its job, but failed to communicate with the public. As the expression goes, it "performed twice the work, and received half the credit." It performed a truly thankless task.

The public is bickering over U.S. beef imports. It ought to be more concerned about food safety inspections. Legislators are applying pressure, Health Director Wen-Ta Chiu has made a commitment. Beginning next week the government will conduct lot by lot inspections of U.S. beef imports. Is such a promise realistic? The Food and Drug Administration has a staff of only 45, spread out over four control centers on the island: north, south, east, and west. Currently customs has the ability to sample 5% of the U.S. beef entering the country. Beef imports from past offenders are sampled at a 20% rate, or more. The Department of Health has committed to test every batch of beef from every country. Privately, officials confide that this is unreasonable and unscientific. Other countries could protest the erection of non-tariff barriers. It could lead to international trade disputes.

The U.S. beef and Taiwan pork controversies have taught us a lesson. We face an endless stream of food safety issues. We must approach the problem from a scientific and rational perspective. We must uncover the truth and ascertain the severity of the problem. We must review of our policy direction and management techniques. Otherwise both the public and industry will suffer. The government will both remain mired in old problems and entangled in new ones. It will lose credibility, and contribute nothing to the solution of our problems.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2012.03.16
社論－這場肉的風暴 瘦了政府的公信力
本報訊

美牛風暴果然兇猛，連吹一個月不但欲小不易，還吹出新問題，又產生台灣豬肉究竟有無使用更毒的瘦肉精的爭議！一時間，到底什麼肉能吃、該把關的政府農政單位到底在幹什麼、到底有沒有圍魏（豬）救趙（牛）的陰謀等問題，又舖天蓋地的橫掃全台，成了熱門話題！

在討論台灣豬肉安不安全、到底有沒有陰謀論之前，先說一個在網路流傳已久的故事。

有個年輕人去應徵工作，主考官對他頗表肯定，年輕人與父母都以為錄取已是囊中物，舉家欣喜。哪知，對方寄來的通知單竟然是「未錄取」，舉家皆悲，年輕人難過到鬧自殺。不久，對方登門道歉，原來之前的通知寄錯了，年輕人名列錄取。

故事還沒完。如果這個情境發生在不同的國家、不同民族性的人身上，會有什麼結果？若是日本人，公司方面會說，年輕人這一點挫折都受不了就自殺，將來還能應付工作壓力嗎？不錄取。如果在德國，父母一定不讓年輕人去公司報到，這種事都弄錯，可見公司效率之差，是一個沒有前途的單位。如果在美國，年輕人必定如英雄般、在眾人掌聲和歡迎酒會中報到，並且全美律師蜂擁而至，爭取代表他控告公司造成精神損失。

如果是在台灣呢？非常可能的場景是，各方學者專家、媒體名嘴、民間團體齊出，追究為何先不錄取、後來又錄取？有沒有人事關說？主考官是否受賄？當初陪年輕人去應徵的女朋友是誰？…等等。至於年輕人最後有沒有去上班，沒有人知道、也沒有人關心。

說這個故事的意思是，這從美牛、台豬到雞、鵝含瘦肉精一波波的食品安全問題，真正的核心是：到底含的是何種毒物？劑量多寡？前者是對毒物「定性」，後者是對毒物「定量」，當徹底釐清這兩大有關毒物的真相事實後，才能做風險評估、決定是否開放、政府又該擬定何種強度的管制方式。是不是圍豬救牛，根本不是重點。退一萬步說，即使陰謀論成立，但因此發現國內檢驗漏洞或不肖畜牧業者違法用藥，使政府開始亡羊補牢，也是好事一件。

但國內主管機關應汗顏的是，當ＡＩＴ台北辦事處長司徒文出示一份台灣各種農產品使用禁藥的清單時，羅列了上百項法所禁止的毒物，面對科學的舉證，先不論政府是否因此讓步，開放美牛進口，我們的農政單位就難以面對民眾的質疑：難道消費者天天都在「服毒」？為什麼大家不知道這些訊息？

農政單位的辯解是，以前也有查到，只是沒有公布，或公布了媒體也不報導。這種把責任推給媒體的說法，非常不公平。以新聞局日前發出國內豬肉查到沙丁胺醇的新聞稿來說，白紙黑字只寫了「沙丁胺醇」四個字，至於其毒性是否比萊克多巴胺高，隻字未提。難道，政府單位把國民都當成毒物學專家，一看就懂？政府做了事，卻沒有將資訊清楚傳達給民眾，這是事倍功半，非常吃力不討好。

其實，國內與其為美牛爭吵不休，更應該關切的是食品安全檢驗能量的問題。在立委壓力下，衛生署長邱文達承諾，最快下周一開始，逐批檢驗進口美牛。這個承諾的可行性，大有問題。食品藥物管理局北中南東四大區管中心的總人力只有四十五人，目前對美牛的邊境抽驗比率一般只有五％，對有前科的業者才會上升到廿％或更多。但衛生署承諾對來自各國的牛肉逐批檢驗，食管局官員私下認為這是不合理、不科學的做法，甚至可能導致他國以非關稅障礙的名義抗議，產生國際貿易糾紛的風險。

美牛與台豬瘦肉精風波教我們的是，面對層出不窮的食品安全問題，先要從科學與理性的觀點弄清事實真相與問題輕重，再檢討政策走向與管理方式。否則，只會讓民眾困擾、業者受害，政府則困在新舊夾纏的問題中，瘦了公信力而於事無補。