The DPP's Four Year Struggle over 2016 Has Begun
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
Thursday, April 30, 2012
Summary: The Democratic Progressive Party held its first party chairmanship election "policy presentation session" yesterday. Chen Chu yawned. Su Jia-chyuan slumped in his chair, like a sack of flour. This was perhaps the most boring and inept high-level policy presentation session that the DPP has ever held. It was truly surprising.
Full Text below:
The Democratic Progressive Party held its first party chairmanship election "policy presentation session" yesterday. Chen Chu yawned. Su Jia-chyuan slumped in his chair, like a sack of flour. This was perhaps the most boring and inept high-level policy presentation session that the DPP has ever held. It was truly surprising.
When the five candidates spoke about their political and economic programs, their statements were rife with cliches. When they spoke about countering the media, their statements were incomprehensible. Su Huan-chih spoke of "reestablishing rational debate, reestablishing brotherhood." His statement was the only bright spot in the entire affair. Su Tseng-chang actually refused to cross-examine his opponents. He said it was for the sake of party "unity." His explanation provoked embarrassed and skeptical laughter.
But the vague and superficial debate could not conceal underlying tensions. During the policy presentation session, Hsu Hsin-liang acted as if he were Tsai Ing-wen's campaign manager. Su Huan-chih expressed opposition to the party chairman running for president in 2016. The two men directed their attacks against Su Tseng-chang. This was the real truth behind this outwardly relaxed but inwardly tense party chairmanship election.
For the time being, there is no possibility that Hsu Hsin-liang can be elected party chairman. But he is unquestionably dominating the debate. He is unquestionably setting the agenda for the party chairmanship election. One. He supports Tsai Ing-wen's candidacy in 2016. Two. He wants the DPP to deal with Mainland China "on the basis of the Constitution of the Republic of China" He heaped praise on Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus." Three. He openly opposes Su Tseng-chang. He says Su "dropped the ball" when he was party chairman in 2008. Tsai Ing-wen later picked it up. He said Su's bid for mayor of Taipei proved that Su was "not someone who considered the bigger picture."
Hsu Hsin-liang's endorsement is a double-edged sword. He has linked his 2016 presidential endorsement to transforming the DPP's cross-Strait policy. He has endorsed Tsai Ing-wen for president. He has endorsed Frank Hsieh's cross-Strait policy. Outsiders are referring to this confluence of forces as "Hsu/Tsai/Hsieh." The three may not be an alliance in fact. But they are already an alliance in spirit. Hsu Hsin-liang has clearly touched off a struggle within the DPP over the 2016 general election. He has extended and consolidated the 2012 "Tsai/Hsieh" alliance against Su Tseng-chang.
Su, Tsai, Hsieh, and Hsu all see 2016 as their last hurrah. Su Tseng-chang has yet to openly declare his candidacy for 2016. He said "A meal is consumed one bite at a time. A job is completed one task at a time." The implication being that between the 2014 "seven in one election" and the 2016 general election, he intends to take it one step at a time. As for Tsai Ing-wen, her momentum has not diminished with her defeat in the general election. She is followed everywhere she goes. If she mutters a few innocent words into a microphone, it becomes news. She is thinking of 2016 of course. Frank Hsieh may not be destined to become president. His current ambition is to transform the DPP's cross-Strait policy. He undoubtedly hopes to make this his historical legacy. Hsu Hsin-liang championed "boldly going west." That made him a leper within his own party. Now he has made a comeback. He is participating at the highest levels in party affairs. He is publicly expounding principles once seen as heretical. He hopes to save himself from the ash heap of history. He even hopes to be seen as the Savior of the DPP, as the one who brought order out of chaos. Outsiders however, see him as a Don Quixote.
This struggle within the DPP over the 2016 presidential election, is also a struggle over the transformation of its cross-Strait policy. It is a struggle among Su, Tsai, Hsieh, and Hsu over values. Su Tseng-chang will probably win the party chairmanship election. But under election pressure, the alliance in spirit between Tsai, Hsieh, and Hsu, may morph into an alliance in fact. Su Tseng-chang may become party chairman. Tsai Ing-wen may become party spiritual leader. The two sides will probably engage in overt and covert struggles over the 2016 general election during the next four years. The competition between Su and Tsai, may transform the run up to the 2016 general election into the longest lasting party primary in DPP history.
The DPP chairmanship election has force the internal struggle over 2016 to break out in advance. This is what the DPP most fears. When rain falls from the heavens, it cannot be stopped. And so is with the coming two year party chairman term. If Su Tseng-chang remains in control of the party center, and Tsai, Hsieh, and Hsu are relegated to the periphery, how can they join forces? If they cannot join forces, and if Su is defeated in 2016, can Tsai replace him? Can the DPP afford a four year long internecine power struggle?
This struggle over power is intertwined with a struggle over the party line. One can hardly characterize this internal struggle as a critical or box office success. Hsu Hsin-liang is the self-appointed director of the show. The performers were reluctant to make their entrance so early. Hsu has attracted much public attention, provoked much public aversion, and inspired much public hope. Not without reason. It was inevitable.
Su Tseng-chang yesterday refused to cross-examine his opponents. But he can hardly refuse to take part in the struggle between himself and Tsai.
民進黨內長達4年的2016內戰開打
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.04.30 01:27 am
民進黨昨日首場黨主席選舉政見會，陳菊打瞌睡，蘇嘉全像一袋麵粉陷在座椅上；這或許是民進黨歷次高層政見會中最乏味及最低水準的一次演出，實在出人意表。
五人發言，關於政經大計，陳腔濫調；談到反制媒體，不知所云；全場大概只有蘇煥智的「重建理性討論，大家重新做兄弟」，算是一個亮點。蘇貞昌更居然無厘頭地為了「團結」，放棄交互詰問，令舉座在解嘲的尷尬笑聲中過場。
然而，空泛淺薄的論述，掩蓋不住背後的劍拔弩張。在政見會中，許信良形同是蔡英文的助選員，蘇煥智則反對黨主席參選二○一六，二人皆針對蘇貞昌而來，這才是這場黨主席選舉外弛內張的真相。
目前看不出許信良當選黨主席的可能性，但他無疑主導了這場黨主席選舉的論述與定義。他的政見主軸是：一、支持蔡英文再戰二○一六。二、主張民進黨應「根據中華民國憲法」與中國打交道，高度推讚謝長廷提出的「憲法共識」。三、他在接受媒體訪問時，公開否定蘇貞昌，謂蘇在二○○八拒任黨主席，「沒有承擔責任」（後來由蔡英文出任）；又稱蘇自行宣佈參選台北市長，「不是顧全大局的人」。
許信良「一箭雙鵰」，他將民進黨二○一六總統大選的人選抉擇，與民進黨兩岸政策的轉型綁在一起；又把總統人選綁住蔡英文，再將兩岸政策綁住謝長廷。於是，外界所稱的「許蔡謝」，即使不是操作面的聯手，亦已成精神面的結盟；許信良無疑提早掀開了民進黨內二○一六大選內戰的戰火，且是延續二○一二「蔡謝」二人對抗蘇貞昌的架構，將之再度定型化。
蘇蔡謝許四人，皆將二○一六視為人生最後一役。蘇貞昌當然志在二○一六，只是未便明言。他說，「飯要一口口吃，事情一件一件做」，言外之意就是，要從二○一四「七合一」，通往二○一六大選，「一步一步爬樓梯」。至於蔡英文，其聲勢行情並未因大選落敗而受挫，迄今在任何場合，不論她對麥克風說兩句什麼無關痛癢的話，皆能成為新聞；她心中當然有二○一六。謝長廷或許已與總統大位無緣，如今他的志業在創造民進黨的兩岸新論述，不啻欲以此為自己的歷史品牌。許信良則曾因倡議「大膽西進」，成為黨內過街老鼠，如今竟又回到黨內最高論壇，公開闡述那些過去被視為離經叛道的主張；他非但要將自己從歷史灰燼中救出來，儼然亦自視為民進黨內「撥亂反正」的救主，雖然在外人看來似唐吉訶德。
這是民進黨內二○一六總統大選之戰，也是民進黨兩岸政策轉型之戰，更是蘇蔡謝許四人的人生最後價值之戰。目前看來，蘇貞昌可能贏得黨主席選舉，但「蔡謝許」的「精神結盟」在選後即可能轉化成「操作結盟」；蘇貞昌在黨體制內做「黨主席」，蔡英文則在黨體制外做「精神領袖」，雙方勢將在明槍暗箭中為二○一六大選進行角力拔河；未來四年，這場蘇蔡競爭，可能使得二○一六大選成為民進黨史上耗時最長、拖延最久的一場總統候選人逐鹿大賽。
黨主席選舉使民進黨二○一六的內戰提前開打，這正是民進黨最擔憂的局面；但是，現在看來，這卻已然是天要下雨攔不住的事。未來兩年黨主席任期內，倘若蘇貞昌在黨中央，蔡謝許在黨外圍，能否整合？倘不能整合，蘇若敗於二○一四，蔡會否代之而起，民進黨又能否承受得起內部長達四年的切割與拉鋸？
這場權力競逐與路線轉型交纏糾葛的黨內競合大戲，若想演得叫好又叫座，誠非易事；許信良儼然是毛遂自薦的導演，逼出了原來還不想這麼早出場的演員們，許之所以受大家矚目，及在黨內惹有些人憎厭又令有些人期待，皆非無因，實屬必然。
蘇貞昌昨日放棄了向對手交互詰問，但他自己卻躲不過這場蘇蔡競爭即將撲面而來的所有難題。
Monday, April 30, 2012
Thursday, April 26, 2012
State of the Nation Report: Avoid a War of Words
State of the Nation Report: Avoid a War of Words
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 27, 2012
Summary: After due deliberation and discussion, the Office of the President has clarified its position. President Ma is pleased that the Legislative Yuan passed a formal resolution. He will be happy to use the State of the Nation Report to explain the government's policies to the public. But Ma has preconditions. Everything must be consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Nothing must blur the distinction between the powers and responsibilities of the president and the premier.
Full Text below:
After due deliberation and discussion, the Office of the President has clarified its position. President Ma is pleased that the Legislative Yuan passed a formal resolution. He will be happy to use the State of the Nation Report to explain the government's policies to the public. But Ma has preconditions. Everything must be consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Nothing must blur the distinction between the powers and responsibilities of the president and the premier.
On the surface, the Office of the President has signed off on the State of the Nation Report. But it set preconditions. It made clear that any questioning by legislators, whether multiple questions followed by a single answer, or single questions followed by single answers, would imply that the president is answerable to the Legislative Yuan. This would obfuscate the roles of the president and the premier. This would blur the distinction between the two leaders' rights and responsibilities. Therefore the disagreements between the ruling and opposition parties over the State of the Nation Report will not be resolved any time soon.
President Ma Ying-jeou insists on strict adherence to the constitution. For this, he deserves affirmation. But he also clings obstinately to the Additional Articles to the Constitution. He insists that any Q&A session following the State of the Nation Report would set a negative constitutional precedent. His obstinacy does nothing to facilitate interparty consultation. It will merely turn the president's State of the Nation Report before the Legislative Yuan and other policy issues into an occasion for partisan political rhetoric. .
According to the Additional Articles to the Constitution, "When the Legislative Yuan convenes each year, it may listen to the State of the Nation Report." In other words, the Legislative Yuan may or may not choose to listen to the State of the Nation Report, and delivering a State of the Nation Report is not the president's constitutional obligation. Prior to these constitutional precedents, former President Lee Teng-hui already visited the National Assembly and delivered the State of the Nation Report. He set a precedent by responding to recommendations made by the National Assembly on behalf of the nation. Following the abolition of the National Assembly, its powers and responsibilities were transferred to the Legislative Yuan. The Chen Shui-bian administration ruled for eight years, President Chen Shui-bian requested an opportunity to make a State of the Nation Report before the Legislative Yuan on more than one occasion. But opposition Kuomintang Legislators were hardly prepared to allow Chen Shui-bian to make a grand entrance before the legislature, and bask in the honors bestowed upon a head of state.
In May 2008, President Chen Shui-bian was preparing to leave office. The Legislative Yuan amended the Legislative Yuan Duties Enforcement Act. This provided the constitutional amendments with a clearer legal basis. Under the newly amended "Legislative Yuan Powers Law," the "Legislators would ask questions about unclear aspects of the State of the Nation Report." It also stipulated that "The aforementioned legislator questioning would be subject to presidential approval. Legislators would first ask their questions. The president would combine their questions into one, and answer them all at one time."
From this we know that the president's State of the Nation Report is a form of communication with legislators, But what terminology should be used to describe this communication? Basically legislators may ask questions. But the president may choose not to answer them, based on his right of consent. The president may choose to reply or not. In other words, President Ma Ying-jeou will decide whether to deliver the State of the Nation Report before the Legislative Yuan. The decision does not belong to the legislature. The Legislative Yuan resolution does not specify whether the President must respond to one question at a time, or to all questions at one time. At most it asks the President to listen to the legislators' questions and offer a supplementary report. Whether the president provides a supplementary report, is up to him. The ruling and opposition legislators have no say in the matter.
The President's State of the Nation Report is a major constitutional issue. But for most people, it is a matter of no particular urgency, They may even want to subject the presidential to written or verbal abuse. They cannot be bothered to listen to what legislators have to say. More importantly, according to the constitution the president is the head of state, But the premier is the highest ranking executive official within the Executive Yuan. The premier is responsible to the Legislative Yuan. When ruling and opposition legislators oversee government policy and review bills, they are overseeing the Executive Yuan and the heads of various ministries, not the president.
The President is a symbol of the nation. He must be accorded some degree of respect, In January 1794, George Washington, the first president of the United States, visited Congress and delivered a speech. He established this tradition. Many changes have taken place since then. Thomas Jefferson, the third president, changed policy in writing. He wanted to avoid making the presidential speech appear too condescending, and therefore inconsistent with the principles of republicanism. U.S. presidents appear before Congress. They deliver their State of the Union Addresses. The ruling and opposition parties often find themselves at loggerheads. But opposition legislators invariably give the president a standing ovation, in accordance with tradition. This is a show of respect for the President. It is also a show of respect for the nation.
Kuomintang legislators refused to allow Chen Shui-bian to address the Legislative Yuan. To some extent their intent was to prevent Chen Shui-bian from basking in the applause of the legislature. DPP legislators must now ask themselves a question. Are they willing to give Ma Ying-jeou a standing ovation when he appears before the Legislative Yuan? Suppose they are unwilling. Suppose they refuse to do so. Suppose they attempt to use the opportunity to humiliate the president. Ma Ying-jeou is not the one who will be hurt. Those hurt will be DPP leaders, who lack political maturity. .
Will the President appear before the legislature? What protocols should be observed when he does? This dilemma is not the President's. This dilemma is the Legislative Yuan's, If the president wants to address the nation. he need not do to before the Legislative Yuan. He can do so any time at any place. The issues of concern to legislators, are whether to impose license taxes, whether to raise gasoline and electricity prices, whether to delay 12 year compulsory education. .. None of these are the president's constitutional powers or responsibilities. Suppose the president appears before the Legislative Yuan. The legislators raise questions. The President can simply refer the questions to the Executive Yuan and be done with them. The President occupies a position of dominance as the head of state. The majority of people prefer a head of state who displays good manners and evinces political maturity. The Office of the President need not refuse to respond to legislators' questions in advance, or become caught up in a war of words between the ruling and opposition parties.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.27
赴立院國情報告 何苦陷入口水戰
本報訊
經過一段時間的醞釀和討論，總統府日前明確表達，馬總統樂於在立法院通過正式決議後，透過國情報告向民眾說明政府的施政理念，但前提是必須合乎憲法明定的方式與精神，且不混淆總統與行政院長權責分際。
表面上看，總統府對國情報告已經點了頭，然而，因為前提設定，且總統府直言不論屆時立委對總統的國情報告採取「綜合問答」或者「一問一答」，都形同總統對立法院負責，都會混淆總統與閣揆的角色分際與權責，可預見的相關朝野協商絕對不可能一時半刻有所解決。
馬英九總統恪遵憲法的堅持值得肯定，但死守憲法條文且嚴詞認為國情報告後加入問答係創下「憲政惡例」，也無助於朝野協商，只會讓總統是否赴立法院提出國情報告，和其他政策或政治議題般流為政黨鬥爭耍嘴皮的題目。
根據憲法增修條文規定，「立法院於每年集會時，得聽取國情報告。」換言之，立法院可聽可不聽，而國情報告亦非總統的憲法義務；在此一憲法規範前，前總統李登輝已經創下赴國民大會提出國情咨文，並答覆國民大會代表國是建言的前例；國民大會廢除後，是項權責轉移到立法院，扁政府八年，陳水扁總統不只一次想赴立法院提出國情報告，但是，當年在野的國民黨立委完全沒意願讓陳水扁風光進入國會，享受國家元首的尊榮。
直到二○○八年五月陳水扁總統卸任前，立法院修改《立法院職權行使法》，讓相關憲法規定有了比較明確的法律依據和進行，根據新修正的《立法院職權行使法》，「立法委員於總統國情報告完畢後，得就報告不明瞭處，提出問題」，且「就前項委員發言，經總統同意時，得綜合再做補充報告」的條文。
由此可知，不論總統國情報告後與立委間的「溝通」，到底用什麼字眼描述，基本上，立委可以提問，但總統答不答是以總統的同意為前提，總統可以答覆也可以不答覆。換言之，馬英九總統在考慮自己要不要赴立法院進行國情報告時，是不能以立委不得提問為前提的；但同樣的，立法院決議邀請總統提出國情報告的文字也不宜明述要求總統做「綜合問答」或「一問一答」，頂多只能請總統在聆聽立委問題後再做補充報告。但是，總統要不要補充報告還是以總統意願為優先，不是朝野立委說了算。
總統的國情報告在憲政體制上是大事，但對多數民眾而言，卻是不急之務，他們甚至寧可上總統臉書留言或捧或罵，就是懶得聽立委說什麼；更重要的，根據憲法總統是國家元首，但行政院長才是向立院負責的最高行政首長，朝野立委監督政府政策、審查法案的對象是行政院和各部會首長，而非總統。
此外，總統身為國家象徵，本來就該享有基本的尊重，美國首任總統華盛頓在一七九○年元月赴國會發表演說，並從此建立這個傳統。歷屆不乏有若干改變，如第三任總統傑佛遜改以書面提出施政方向，以免總統演說太居高臨下，不符美國的民主原則，即使如此，美國歷任總統赴國會提出國情演說，朝野政黨再對立，在野議員一定依例起立鼓掌，這是對總統的尊重，也是對國家的尊重。
當年國民黨立委不讓陳水扁到立法院，某種程度就是不讓陳水扁享受國會的掌聲；同樣的，此刻民進黨立委也要想想，當馬英九總統赴立法院的時候，他們願不願意起身給予馬英九基本的掌聲？如果不肯，甚至當面讓馬總統難看，受傷的可能未必是馬英九，反而是不具民主風度的民進黨。
總統到底要不要、或者用什麼形式赴立法院提出國情報告，其實不是總統的問題，而是立法院的問題，總統想說話，不必到立法院，任何時刻任何地點都能說；而立委關切的問題，不論是證所稅課不課、油電該不該漲價、十二年國教要不要延後實施…，都不是總統的憲法權責，就算到了立法院，立委提了問題，總統大可以一句這是行政院長的職權而打發。正因為總統居於國家元首的優勢地位，而多數民眾更喜歡看到一位有民主風度和素養的國家元首，總統府真的也不必事前設定前提拒絕立委提問，捲入朝野協商的口水戰。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 27, 2012
Summary: After due deliberation and discussion, the Office of the President has clarified its position. President Ma is pleased that the Legislative Yuan passed a formal resolution. He will be happy to use the State of the Nation Report to explain the government's policies to the public. But Ma has preconditions. Everything must be consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Nothing must blur the distinction between the powers and responsibilities of the president and the premier.
Full Text below:
After due deliberation and discussion, the Office of the President has clarified its position. President Ma is pleased that the Legislative Yuan passed a formal resolution. He will be happy to use the State of the Nation Report to explain the government's policies to the public. But Ma has preconditions. Everything must be consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Nothing must blur the distinction between the powers and responsibilities of the president and the premier.
On the surface, the Office of the President has signed off on the State of the Nation Report. But it set preconditions. It made clear that any questioning by legislators, whether multiple questions followed by a single answer, or single questions followed by single answers, would imply that the president is answerable to the Legislative Yuan. This would obfuscate the roles of the president and the premier. This would blur the distinction between the two leaders' rights and responsibilities. Therefore the disagreements between the ruling and opposition parties over the State of the Nation Report will not be resolved any time soon.
President Ma Ying-jeou insists on strict adherence to the constitution. For this, he deserves affirmation. But he also clings obstinately to the Additional Articles to the Constitution. He insists that any Q&A session following the State of the Nation Report would set a negative constitutional precedent. His obstinacy does nothing to facilitate interparty consultation. It will merely turn the president's State of the Nation Report before the Legislative Yuan and other policy issues into an occasion for partisan political rhetoric. .
According to the Additional Articles to the Constitution, "When the Legislative Yuan convenes each year, it may listen to the State of the Nation Report." In other words, the Legislative Yuan may or may not choose to listen to the State of the Nation Report, and delivering a State of the Nation Report is not the president's constitutional obligation. Prior to these constitutional precedents, former President Lee Teng-hui already visited the National Assembly and delivered the State of the Nation Report. He set a precedent by responding to recommendations made by the National Assembly on behalf of the nation. Following the abolition of the National Assembly, its powers and responsibilities were transferred to the Legislative Yuan. The Chen Shui-bian administration ruled for eight years, President Chen Shui-bian requested an opportunity to make a State of the Nation Report before the Legislative Yuan on more than one occasion. But opposition Kuomintang Legislators were hardly prepared to allow Chen Shui-bian to make a grand entrance before the legislature, and bask in the honors bestowed upon a head of state.
In May 2008, President Chen Shui-bian was preparing to leave office. The Legislative Yuan amended the Legislative Yuan Duties Enforcement Act. This provided the constitutional amendments with a clearer legal basis. Under the newly amended "Legislative Yuan Powers Law," the "Legislators would ask questions about unclear aspects of the State of the Nation Report." It also stipulated that "The aforementioned legislator questioning would be subject to presidential approval. Legislators would first ask their questions. The president would combine their questions into one, and answer them all at one time."
From this we know that the president's State of the Nation Report is a form of communication with legislators, But what terminology should be used to describe this communication? Basically legislators may ask questions. But the president may choose not to answer them, based on his right of consent. The president may choose to reply or not. In other words, President Ma Ying-jeou will decide whether to deliver the State of the Nation Report before the Legislative Yuan. The decision does not belong to the legislature. The Legislative Yuan resolution does not specify whether the President must respond to one question at a time, or to all questions at one time. At most it asks the President to listen to the legislators' questions and offer a supplementary report. Whether the president provides a supplementary report, is up to him. The ruling and opposition legislators have no say in the matter.
The President's State of the Nation Report is a major constitutional issue. But for most people, it is a matter of no particular urgency, They may even want to subject the presidential to written or verbal abuse. They cannot be bothered to listen to what legislators have to say. More importantly, according to the constitution the president is the head of state, But the premier is the highest ranking executive official within the Executive Yuan. The premier is responsible to the Legislative Yuan. When ruling and opposition legislators oversee government policy and review bills, they are overseeing the Executive Yuan and the heads of various ministries, not the president.
The President is a symbol of the nation. He must be accorded some degree of respect, In January 1794, George Washington, the first president of the United States, visited Congress and delivered a speech. He established this tradition. Many changes have taken place since then. Thomas Jefferson, the third president, changed policy in writing. He wanted to avoid making the presidential speech appear too condescending, and therefore inconsistent with the principles of republicanism. U.S. presidents appear before Congress. They deliver their State of the Union Addresses. The ruling and opposition parties often find themselves at loggerheads. But opposition legislators invariably give the president a standing ovation, in accordance with tradition. This is a show of respect for the President. It is also a show of respect for the nation.
Kuomintang legislators refused to allow Chen Shui-bian to address the Legislative Yuan. To some extent their intent was to prevent Chen Shui-bian from basking in the applause of the legislature. DPP legislators must now ask themselves a question. Are they willing to give Ma Ying-jeou a standing ovation when he appears before the Legislative Yuan? Suppose they are unwilling. Suppose they refuse to do so. Suppose they attempt to use the opportunity to humiliate the president. Ma Ying-jeou is not the one who will be hurt. Those hurt will be DPP leaders, who lack political maturity. .
Will the President appear before the legislature? What protocols should be observed when he does? This dilemma is not the President's. This dilemma is the Legislative Yuan's, If the president wants to address the nation. he need not do to before the Legislative Yuan. He can do so any time at any place. The issues of concern to legislators, are whether to impose license taxes, whether to raise gasoline and electricity prices, whether to delay 12 year compulsory education. .. None of these are the president's constitutional powers or responsibilities. Suppose the president appears before the Legislative Yuan. The legislators raise questions. The President can simply refer the questions to the Executive Yuan and be done with them. The President occupies a position of dominance as the head of state. The majority of people prefer a head of state who displays good manners and evinces political maturity. The Office of the President need not refuse to respond to legislators' questions in advance, or become caught up in a war of words between the ruling and opposition parties.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.27
赴立院國情報告 何苦陷入口水戰
本報訊
經過一段時間的醞釀和討論，總統府日前明確表達，馬總統樂於在立法院通過正式決議後，透過國情報告向民眾說明政府的施政理念，但前提是必須合乎憲法明定的方式與精神，且不混淆總統與行政院長權責分際。
表面上看，總統府對國情報告已經點了頭，然而，因為前提設定，且總統府直言不論屆時立委對總統的國情報告採取「綜合問答」或者「一問一答」，都形同總統對立法院負責，都會混淆總統與閣揆的角色分際與權責，可預見的相關朝野協商絕對不可能一時半刻有所解決。
馬英九總統恪遵憲法的堅持值得肯定，但死守憲法條文且嚴詞認為國情報告後加入問答係創下「憲政惡例」，也無助於朝野協商，只會讓總統是否赴立法院提出國情報告，和其他政策或政治議題般流為政黨鬥爭耍嘴皮的題目。
根據憲法增修條文規定，「立法院於每年集會時，得聽取國情報告。」換言之，立法院可聽可不聽，而國情報告亦非總統的憲法義務；在此一憲法規範前，前總統李登輝已經創下赴國民大會提出國情咨文，並答覆國民大會代表國是建言的前例；國民大會廢除後，是項權責轉移到立法院，扁政府八年，陳水扁總統不只一次想赴立法院提出國情報告，但是，當年在野的國民黨立委完全沒意願讓陳水扁風光進入國會，享受國家元首的尊榮。
直到二○○八年五月陳水扁總統卸任前，立法院修改《立法院職權行使法》，讓相關憲法規定有了比較明確的法律依據和進行，根據新修正的《立法院職權行使法》，「立法委員於總統國情報告完畢後，得就報告不明瞭處，提出問題」，且「就前項委員發言，經總統同意時，得綜合再做補充報告」的條文。
由此可知，不論總統國情報告後與立委間的「溝通」，到底用什麼字眼描述，基本上，立委可以提問，但總統答不答是以總統的同意為前提，總統可以答覆也可以不答覆。換言之，馬英九總統在考慮自己要不要赴立法院進行國情報告時，是不能以立委不得提問為前提的；但同樣的，立法院決議邀請總統提出國情報告的文字也不宜明述要求總統做「綜合問答」或「一問一答」，頂多只能請總統在聆聽立委問題後再做補充報告。但是，總統要不要補充報告還是以總統意願為優先，不是朝野立委說了算。
總統的國情報告在憲政體制上是大事，但對多數民眾而言，卻是不急之務，他們甚至寧可上總統臉書留言或捧或罵，就是懶得聽立委說什麼；更重要的，根據憲法總統是國家元首，但行政院長才是向立院負責的最高行政首長，朝野立委監督政府政策、審查法案的對象是行政院和各部會首長，而非總統。
此外，總統身為國家象徵，本來就該享有基本的尊重，美國首任總統華盛頓在一七九○年元月赴國會發表演說，並從此建立這個傳統。歷屆不乏有若干改變，如第三任總統傑佛遜改以書面提出施政方向，以免總統演說太居高臨下，不符美國的民主原則，即使如此，美國歷任總統赴國會提出國情演說，朝野政黨再對立，在野議員一定依例起立鼓掌，這是對總統的尊重，也是對國家的尊重。
當年國民黨立委不讓陳水扁到立法院，某種程度就是不讓陳水扁享受國會的掌聲；同樣的，此刻民進黨立委也要想想，當馬英九總統赴立法院的時候，他們願不願意起身給予馬英九基本的掌聲？如果不肯，甚至當面讓馬總統難看，受傷的可能未必是馬英九，反而是不具民主風度的民進黨。
總統到底要不要、或者用什麼形式赴立法院提出國情報告，其實不是總統的問題，而是立法院的問題，總統想說話，不必到立法院，任何時刻任何地點都能說；而立委關切的問題，不論是證所稅課不課、油電該不該漲價、十二年國教要不要延後實施…，都不是總統的憲法權責，就算到了立法院，立委提了問題，總統大可以一句這是行政院長的職權而打發。正因為總統居於國家元首的優勢地位，而多數民眾更喜歡看到一位有民主風度和素養的國家元首，總統府真的也不必事前設定前提拒絕立委提問，捲入朝野協商的口水戰。
Taiwan Independence: The Vestigial Tail on the DPP Dog
Taiwan Independence: The Vestigial Tail on the DPP Dog
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 25, 2012
Summary: Following the presidential election, Taiwan independence elements repeatedly said, "We have not ruled founding another party, outside the DPP." But the Taiwan Independence Party has been around for years. So has the the Taiwan Solidarity Union. Clearly founding yet another party will not save the Taiwan independence movement. Therefore the DPP must confront reality. It must shed its vestigial Taiwan independence tail.
Full Text below:
During the Democratic Progressive Party's campaign for the presidency, it became abundantly clear that Taiwan independence is a vestigial tail on the Democratic Progressive Party dog.
The expression "the tail wagging the dog" denotes a subsidiary force so powerful that it influences or even dominates the main force. Taiwan independence was once a powerful tail attached to the DPP dog. It had enough energy to wag the dog. It could be viewed as a case of "the tail wagging the dog." But in recent years conditions have changed dramatically, both inside the nation and around the world. The Taiwan independence tail has atrophied and weakened. It has even become diseased. It no longer has enough energy to wag the dog. It could be viewed as a "vestigial organ." This Taiwan independence tail may not have the ability to wag the dog. Nevertheless it remains an albatross around the party's neck, one the party cannot remove, and one that is taking the party down with it.
The recent DPP party chairman election showed that Taiwan independence forces are neither able to lead the party, nor willing to obey it. For the DPP, they are a dilemma. Su Huan-chih was the first to announce his candidacy for party chairman. Next, Taiwan independence forces backed Wu Rong-i. Su Tseng-chang had yet to declare his candidacy. Taiwan independence elder Yao Chia-wen openly accused Su Tseng-chang of failing to ever mention the term "Taiwan independence." Yao said, "I do not think Su Tseng-chang is sufficiently Taiwan-centric or pro Taiwan independence." He airily branded Su Tseng-chang "Not one of us."
During past party chairman elections, Taiwan independence forces made certain moves. For example, in 2008, Taiwan independence elder Koo Kwan-min challenged Tsai Ing-wen. But he never accused Tsai Ing-wen of being "insufficiently Taiwan-centric or pro Taiwan independence." During the recent election however, Taiwan independence candidates sank to Wu Rong-i's level. If they were merely reminding voters that Taiwan independence candidates were still in the picture, that would have been understandable. But Wu Rong-i and Trong Chai, who had yet to declare his candidacy, had no chance of being elected party chairman. Yet they rudely and loudly accused Su Tseng-chang of "not being sufficiently Taiwan-centric or pro Taiwan independence." What sort of logic was that?
When Yao Chia-wen leveled his accusation, Hsu Hsin-liang had yet to make his move. Soon afterward, Hsu Hsin-liang entered the party chairmanship race. He declared he was "fighting for Tsai Ing-wen's policy path." He said he "supported a second Tsai Ing-wen presidential bid in 2016." This immediately led to the formation of two opposing factions within the DPP. One faction was represented by people such as Julian J. Kuo. Kuo said that Hsu's candidacy "set off two depth charges." One, Hsu linked the party chairmanship election to the 2016 presidential election. Two, Hsu made cross-Strait policy the issue. The other faction was represented by people such as Chin Heng-wei. Chin called Hsu Hsin-liang "dog shit." He accused Hsu of "using" Tsai Ing-wen. He accused Hsu of "using a tiger skin as a banner."
As matters stand, the DPP can expect two heavyweights to run in 2016. But both of these have been repudiated by Taiwan independence forces. Su Tseng-chang has been denounced as "not sufficiently Taiwan-centric or pro Taiwan independence." Many Taiwan independence hardliners hoped that Tsai Ing-wen would make another run at the presidency in 2016. But they see Hsu Hsin-liang using Tsai Ing-wen as his proxy. They hate Hsu Hsin-liang's cross-Strait policy leanings. Therefore they would rather withdraw their support for Tsai Ing-wen, smear Su Tseng-chang, and block Tsai Ing-wen. The Taiwan independence forces' bark is worse than its bite. Just exactly what role will it play in the party chairmanship election?
Taiwan independence is impossible. But consider the political views of the two Taiwan independence candidates for party chairman. Wu Rong-i advocates a "refounding of the party." Trong Chai advocates "redoubling efforts to lobby the U.S." and "the addition of a party vice chairman." Why don't the two candidates advocate Taiwan independence? Yao Chia-wen blasted Su Tseng-chang for failing to mention the term "Taiwan independence." But according to Yao, the party chairman has three functions: "party reform, resistance to the Ma administration's tilt toward [Mainland] China, and dealing with Ah-Bian." Lo and behold, he made no mention whatsoever of "Taiwan independence."
In the past, the DPP openly proclaimed its support for Taiwan independence. But it never bothered to consult the general public. It never resolved the problems surrounding Taiwan independence. Today, however, the problem is Taiwan independence elements who dare not declare their support for Taiwan independence. They resort to euphemisms such as "one country on each side." Or they resort to backdoor listing, such as the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." Taiwan independence elements are afraid to mention the term "Taiwan independence." This makes the problems surrounding Taiwan independence even more difficult to resolve. Taiwan independence elements accuse Su Tseng-chang of "not being sufficiently Taiwan-centric or pro Taiwan independence." But Taiwan independence candidates themselves categorically refuse to mention the term "Taiwan independence." What is this, except self-deception?
Taiwan independence elements are guilty of two blunders. One. They inextricably linked Taiwan independence to a convicted embezzler -- Chen Shui-bian. They equated "Taiwan independence" with "Save Ah-Bian." But for most people on Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian was an unending nightmare. Two. Taiwan independence elements have reached an impasse. But they refuse to allow the DPP to take an alternate path. Is Su Tseng-chang really not pro Taiwan independence? Is Tsai Ing-wen really revisionist? The two represent the DPP's only chance of survival. Yet Taiwan independence hardliners persist in smearing Su Tseng-chang and blocking Tsai Ing-wen. Are we to understand that Wu Rong-i, Trong Chai, or Su Huan-chih will save the DPP?
Following the presidential election, Taiwan independence elements repeatedly said, "We have not ruled founding another party, outside the DPP." But the Taiwan Independence Party has been around for years. So has the the Taiwan Solidarity Union. Clearly founding yet another party will not save the Taiwan independence movement. Today, Taiwan independence elements within the DPP grow weaker by the day. The stinger on a scorpion's tail may be small. But it can prevent people from becoming friendly with the scorpion. Therefore the DPP must confront reality. Washington, Beijing. and most voters on Taiwan have a problem with the stinger on the scorpion's tail. Therefore the DPP must shed its vestigial Taiwan independence tail.
民進黨內「尾小不掉」的台獨
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.04.25
在此次民進黨黨主席選舉的景況中，可見台獨在民進黨內已呈「尾小不掉」之局。
一般習稱「尾大不掉」，是說附屬勢力逐漸坐大後，影響並支配了主體；台獨在民進黨中原本是一條強有力的大尾巴，具有「尾巴搖狗」的能量，可稱「尾大不掉」。但是，經由近幾年來國情世局丕變，台獨這條尾巴顯然已經縮小、耗弱，甚至發生嚴重病變，亦無「尾巴搖狗」的能量，已呈「尾小不掉」之局；但這條台獨尾巴，雖已無力「搖狗」，卻仍使該黨脫不掉台獨的項圈，足以把它拖垮。
此次民進黨黨主席選舉，充分顯現台獨勢力「既不能令，又不受命」的兩難處境。蘇煥智率先宣告參選黨主席，接著獨派推出吳榮義；當時，蘇貞昌尚未表態，獨派大老姚嘉文卻公開指稱：蘇貞昌從來沒有講過「台獨」、或「台灣獨立」，「我不認為蘇貞昌是台派、獨派」。一句話，就給蘇貞昌貼下了「非我族類」的標籤。
在歷屆黨主席選舉中，獨派皆有動作；例如，二○○八年，獨派大老辜寬敏甚至出馬挑戰蔡英文，但也未曾把蔡英文說成「不是台派、獨派」。如今，在此次選舉中，獨派參選者的資望已下降至吳榮義的層次，若謂只是要作出「台獨不缺席」的姿態，尚可理解；但如今竟然是在吳榮義（及當時尚未表態的蔡同榮）絕不可能當選黨主席的態勢下，粗暴地將呼聲最高的蘇貞昌說成「不是台派、獨派」，這究竟是什麼學問？
姚嘉文說此話時，許信良尚無動靜；待許信良打著「為蔡英文路線而戰」、「支持小英再戰二○一六」的口號加入黨主席選戰，立即使民進黨內形成對立的兩派。一派如郭正亮稱，許的參選，「引爆兩顆深水炸彈」：「黨主席與二○一六掛鉤」及「兩岸政策」。另一派則如金恆煒，指許信良為「狗屁」，是在「利用」蔡英文，「拉虎皮當大旗」。
事態至此，民進黨可望前進二○一六的兩大天王人物，皆遭獨派否定。一方面，蘇貞昌被指為「不是台派、獨派」；另一方面，縱使許多獨派對蔡英文再戰二○一六仍寄厚望，但如今明知許信良打的是蔡英文的「代理人戰爭」，卻因厭惡許信良的兩岸政策傾向，也就寧可不顧惜蔡英文了。抹黑蘇貞昌，堵住蔡英文，獨派的嗓門不成比例地大過其實力，究竟欲在此次黨主席選舉扮演何種角色？
台獨已絕無可為。且看兩名獨派的黨主席參選者的政見：吳榮義主張「二次創黨」，蔡同榮主張「加強對美國遊說工作」及「增設黨副主席」。請問：為何不見二人主張「台灣獨立」或「台獨」？甚至，姚嘉文批評蘇貞昌不講「台灣獨立」或「台獨」，但他在自己標舉的黨主席三大功能「黨務改革／抵抗馬政府傾中／處理扁問題」之中，竟然也沒有「台灣獨立」或「台獨」。
在過去，民進黨公開宣示「台獨」，倒尚可經社會辯論來化解問題；然而，如今的問題卻是，台獨人士現在已不敢再公開宣示「台獨」，不是用「一邊一國」的「化名」，就是用「台灣前途決議文」的「借殼」，「台獨」不說「台獨」，這遂使得問題更不易化解。現在，獨派指蘇貞昌「不是台派、獨派」，但獨派參選者自己竟亦絕口不提「台獨」、「台灣獨立」。這豈不是自欺欺人？
現今台獨操作的根本謬誤有二：一、把台獨與貪污犯陳水扁綁在一起，甚至將「台獨」與「救扁」畫上等號；但陳水扁對大多數台灣人而言，只是一場夢魘。二、台獨自己走不下去，卻不容民進黨另尋活路。倘若蘇貞昌真的不是「獨派」，且「蔡英文路線」也象徵著「修正主義」，那倒是民進黨的一線生機。但獨派像現在這樣抹黑蘇貞昌、堵住蔡英文，難道是要吳榮義、蔡同榮，或蘇煥智來拯救民進黨？
總統大選後，常聞獨派說，「不排除另外組黨」；但早先已有建國黨，如今仍有台聯，可見「另外組黨」也救不了台獨。如今在民進黨內的台獨因素已是日漸耗弱，但猶如蠍子的尾針雖小，卻可使整隻蠍子讓人不敢親近；於是，民進黨必須正視台灣多數選民、華府，及北京對這一截小尾針的看法，不要「尾小不掉」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 25, 2012
Summary: Following the presidential election, Taiwan independence elements repeatedly said, "We have not ruled founding another party, outside the DPP." But the Taiwan Independence Party has been around for years. So has the the Taiwan Solidarity Union. Clearly founding yet another party will not save the Taiwan independence movement. Therefore the DPP must confront reality. It must shed its vestigial Taiwan independence tail.
Full Text below:
During the Democratic Progressive Party's campaign for the presidency, it became abundantly clear that Taiwan independence is a vestigial tail on the Democratic Progressive Party dog.
The expression "the tail wagging the dog" denotes a subsidiary force so powerful that it influences or even dominates the main force. Taiwan independence was once a powerful tail attached to the DPP dog. It had enough energy to wag the dog. It could be viewed as a case of "the tail wagging the dog." But in recent years conditions have changed dramatically, both inside the nation and around the world. The Taiwan independence tail has atrophied and weakened. It has even become diseased. It no longer has enough energy to wag the dog. It could be viewed as a "vestigial organ." This Taiwan independence tail may not have the ability to wag the dog. Nevertheless it remains an albatross around the party's neck, one the party cannot remove, and one that is taking the party down with it.
The recent DPP party chairman election showed that Taiwan independence forces are neither able to lead the party, nor willing to obey it. For the DPP, they are a dilemma. Su Huan-chih was the first to announce his candidacy for party chairman. Next, Taiwan independence forces backed Wu Rong-i. Su Tseng-chang had yet to declare his candidacy. Taiwan independence elder Yao Chia-wen openly accused Su Tseng-chang of failing to ever mention the term "Taiwan independence." Yao said, "I do not think Su Tseng-chang is sufficiently Taiwan-centric or pro Taiwan independence." He airily branded Su Tseng-chang "Not one of us."
During past party chairman elections, Taiwan independence forces made certain moves. For example, in 2008, Taiwan independence elder Koo Kwan-min challenged Tsai Ing-wen. But he never accused Tsai Ing-wen of being "insufficiently Taiwan-centric or pro Taiwan independence." During the recent election however, Taiwan independence candidates sank to Wu Rong-i's level. If they were merely reminding voters that Taiwan independence candidates were still in the picture, that would have been understandable. But Wu Rong-i and Trong Chai, who had yet to declare his candidacy, had no chance of being elected party chairman. Yet they rudely and loudly accused Su Tseng-chang of "not being sufficiently Taiwan-centric or pro Taiwan independence." What sort of logic was that?
When Yao Chia-wen leveled his accusation, Hsu Hsin-liang had yet to make his move. Soon afterward, Hsu Hsin-liang entered the party chairmanship race. He declared he was "fighting for Tsai Ing-wen's policy path." He said he "supported a second Tsai Ing-wen presidential bid in 2016." This immediately led to the formation of two opposing factions within the DPP. One faction was represented by people such as Julian J. Kuo. Kuo said that Hsu's candidacy "set off two depth charges." One, Hsu linked the party chairmanship election to the 2016 presidential election. Two, Hsu made cross-Strait policy the issue. The other faction was represented by people such as Chin Heng-wei. Chin called Hsu Hsin-liang "dog shit." He accused Hsu of "using" Tsai Ing-wen. He accused Hsu of "using a tiger skin as a banner."
As matters stand, the DPP can expect two heavyweights to run in 2016. But both of these have been repudiated by Taiwan independence forces. Su Tseng-chang has been denounced as "not sufficiently Taiwan-centric or pro Taiwan independence." Many Taiwan independence hardliners hoped that Tsai Ing-wen would make another run at the presidency in 2016. But they see Hsu Hsin-liang using Tsai Ing-wen as his proxy. They hate Hsu Hsin-liang's cross-Strait policy leanings. Therefore they would rather withdraw their support for Tsai Ing-wen, smear Su Tseng-chang, and block Tsai Ing-wen. The Taiwan independence forces' bark is worse than its bite. Just exactly what role will it play in the party chairmanship election?
Taiwan independence is impossible. But consider the political views of the two Taiwan independence candidates for party chairman. Wu Rong-i advocates a "refounding of the party." Trong Chai advocates "redoubling efforts to lobby the U.S." and "the addition of a party vice chairman." Why don't the two candidates advocate Taiwan independence? Yao Chia-wen blasted Su Tseng-chang for failing to mention the term "Taiwan independence." But according to Yao, the party chairman has three functions: "party reform, resistance to the Ma administration's tilt toward [Mainland] China, and dealing with Ah-Bian." Lo and behold, he made no mention whatsoever of "Taiwan independence."
In the past, the DPP openly proclaimed its support for Taiwan independence. But it never bothered to consult the general public. It never resolved the problems surrounding Taiwan independence. Today, however, the problem is Taiwan independence elements who dare not declare their support for Taiwan independence. They resort to euphemisms such as "one country on each side." Or they resort to backdoor listing, such as the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." Taiwan independence elements are afraid to mention the term "Taiwan independence." This makes the problems surrounding Taiwan independence even more difficult to resolve. Taiwan independence elements accuse Su Tseng-chang of "not being sufficiently Taiwan-centric or pro Taiwan independence." But Taiwan independence candidates themselves categorically refuse to mention the term "Taiwan independence." What is this, except self-deception?
Taiwan independence elements are guilty of two blunders. One. They inextricably linked Taiwan independence to a convicted embezzler -- Chen Shui-bian. They equated "Taiwan independence" with "Save Ah-Bian." But for most people on Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian was an unending nightmare. Two. Taiwan independence elements have reached an impasse. But they refuse to allow the DPP to take an alternate path. Is Su Tseng-chang really not pro Taiwan independence? Is Tsai Ing-wen really revisionist? The two represent the DPP's only chance of survival. Yet Taiwan independence hardliners persist in smearing Su Tseng-chang and blocking Tsai Ing-wen. Are we to understand that Wu Rong-i, Trong Chai, or Su Huan-chih will save the DPP?
Following the presidential election, Taiwan independence elements repeatedly said, "We have not ruled founding another party, outside the DPP." But the Taiwan Independence Party has been around for years. So has the the Taiwan Solidarity Union. Clearly founding yet another party will not save the Taiwan independence movement. Today, Taiwan independence elements within the DPP grow weaker by the day. The stinger on a scorpion's tail may be small. But it can prevent people from becoming friendly with the scorpion. Therefore the DPP must confront reality. Washington, Beijing. and most voters on Taiwan have a problem with the stinger on the scorpion's tail. Therefore the DPP must shed its vestigial Taiwan independence tail.
民進黨內「尾小不掉」的台獨
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.04.25
在此次民進黨黨主席選舉的景況中，可見台獨在民進黨內已呈「尾小不掉」之局。
一般習稱「尾大不掉」，是說附屬勢力逐漸坐大後，影響並支配了主體；台獨在民進黨中原本是一條強有力的大尾巴，具有「尾巴搖狗」的能量，可稱「尾大不掉」。但是，經由近幾年來國情世局丕變，台獨這條尾巴顯然已經縮小、耗弱，甚至發生嚴重病變，亦無「尾巴搖狗」的能量，已呈「尾小不掉」之局；但這條台獨尾巴，雖已無力「搖狗」，卻仍使該黨脫不掉台獨的項圈，足以把它拖垮。
此次民進黨黨主席選舉，充分顯現台獨勢力「既不能令，又不受命」的兩難處境。蘇煥智率先宣告參選黨主席，接著獨派推出吳榮義；當時，蘇貞昌尚未表態，獨派大老姚嘉文卻公開指稱：蘇貞昌從來沒有講過「台獨」、或「台灣獨立」，「我不認為蘇貞昌是台派、獨派」。一句話，就給蘇貞昌貼下了「非我族類」的標籤。
在歷屆黨主席選舉中，獨派皆有動作；例如，二○○八年，獨派大老辜寬敏甚至出馬挑戰蔡英文，但也未曾把蔡英文說成「不是台派、獨派」。如今，在此次選舉中，獨派參選者的資望已下降至吳榮義的層次，若謂只是要作出「台獨不缺席」的姿態，尚可理解；但如今竟然是在吳榮義（及當時尚未表態的蔡同榮）絕不可能當選黨主席的態勢下，粗暴地將呼聲最高的蘇貞昌說成「不是台派、獨派」，這究竟是什麼學問？
姚嘉文說此話時，許信良尚無動靜；待許信良打著「為蔡英文路線而戰」、「支持小英再戰二○一六」的口號加入黨主席選戰，立即使民進黨內形成對立的兩派。一派如郭正亮稱，許的參選，「引爆兩顆深水炸彈」：「黨主席與二○一六掛鉤」及「兩岸政策」。另一派則如金恆煒，指許信良為「狗屁」，是在「利用」蔡英文，「拉虎皮當大旗」。
事態至此，民進黨可望前進二○一六的兩大天王人物，皆遭獨派否定。一方面，蘇貞昌被指為「不是台派、獨派」；另一方面，縱使許多獨派對蔡英文再戰二○一六仍寄厚望，但如今明知許信良打的是蔡英文的「代理人戰爭」，卻因厭惡許信良的兩岸政策傾向，也就寧可不顧惜蔡英文了。抹黑蘇貞昌，堵住蔡英文，獨派的嗓門不成比例地大過其實力，究竟欲在此次黨主席選舉扮演何種角色？
台獨已絕無可為。且看兩名獨派的黨主席參選者的政見：吳榮義主張「二次創黨」，蔡同榮主張「加強對美國遊說工作」及「增設黨副主席」。請問：為何不見二人主張「台灣獨立」或「台獨」？甚至，姚嘉文批評蘇貞昌不講「台灣獨立」或「台獨」，但他在自己標舉的黨主席三大功能「黨務改革／抵抗馬政府傾中／處理扁問題」之中，竟然也沒有「台灣獨立」或「台獨」。
在過去，民進黨公開宣示「台獨」，倒尚可經社會辯論來化解問題；然而，如今的問題卻是，台獨人士現在已不敢再公開宣示「台獨」，不是用「一邊一國」的「化名」，就是用「台灣前途決議文」的「借殼」，「台獨」不說「台獨」，這遂使得問題更不易化解。現在，獨派指蘇貞昌「不是台派、獨派」，但獨派參選者自己竟亦絕口不提「台獨」、「台灣獨立」。這豈不是自欺欺人？
現今台獨操作的根本謬誤有二：一、把台獨與貪污犯陳水扁綁在一起，甚至將「台獨」與「救扁」畫上等號；但陳水扁對大多數台灣人而言，只是一場夢魘。二、台獨自己走不下去，卻不容民進黨另尋活路。倘若蘇貞昌真的不是「獨派」，且「蔡英文路線」也象徵著「修正主義」，那倒是民進黨的一線生機。但獨派像現在這樣抹黑蘇貞昌、堵住蔡英文，難道是要吳榮義、蔡同榮，或蘇煥智來拯救民進黨？
總統大選後，常聞獨派說，「不排除另外組黨」；但早先已有建國黨，如今仍有台聯，可見「另外組黨」也救不了台獨。如今在民進黨內的台獨因素已是日漸耗弱，但猶如蠍子的尾針雖小，卻可使整隻蠍子讓人不敢親近；於是，民進黨必須正視台灣多數選民、華府，及北京對這一截小尾針的看法，不要「尾小不掉」。
Wednesday, April 25, 2012
We Cannot Evade the South China Sea Issue
We Cannot Evade the South China Sea Issue
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 25, 2012
Summary: Recently the Asian-Pacific region has been far from pacific. Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara has announced that Tokyo intends to purchase the Diaoyutai Islands. The United States has conducted joint military exercises with the Philippines, and joint military exercises with Vietnam. Russia and Mainland China have conducted joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea. The clash between Mainland China and the Philippines over Huangyan Island in the South China Sea has gone on for 14 days.
Full Text below:
Recently the Asian-Pacific region has been far from pacific. Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara has announced that Tokyo intends to purchase the Diaoyutai Islands. The United States has conducted joint military exercises with the Philippines, and joint military exercises with Vietnam. Russia and Mainland China have conducted joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea. The clash between Mainland China and the Philippines over Huangyan Island in the South China Sea has gone on for 14 days.
Under the circumstances, this may well become the norm, and not the exception. With the rise of Mainland China, the power structure in the Asian-Pacific region has undergone irreversible changes.
Other Asian-Pacific countries are wary about Mainland China's rise. In economics and trade, they may be increasingly dependent upon Mainland China for resources and markets. But when it comes to national security, they fear Mainland Chinese dominance. That is why several nations have welcomed the United States' announcement that it is returning to the Asian-Pacific region.
On the surface, the United States does not oppose Mainland China's rise, Yet it repeatedly stresses that Mainland China must own up to its international responsibilities, and comply with international norms. One of the most sensitive areas is the South China Sea issue.
The United States itself refused to sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Yet it supports ASEAN countries expanding their territorial claims based on the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Two years ago, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued on behalf of Philippines and Vietnamese claims in the South China Sea. The US position has become increasingly clear. She expressed support for these claims through her terminology. She pointedly used the term "Western Philippine Sea," instead of South China Sea. She also donated a decommissioned warship, stationed U.S. troops. and held a joint annual exercise.
The South China Sea is one of the United States' many interests. Mainland China however, considers the South China Sea a core interest. Mainland China cannot help but wonder. Is the US attempting to use these countries in the Asian-Pacific region to bring down Mainland China? With the backing of the United States, the Philippines and Vietnam have become increasingly aggressive. They have announced the development of tourist routes and international competitive bidding for the exploitation of oil and gas in the South China Sea.
The current confrontation in the South China Sea between Mainland China and the Philippines is over Huangyan Island. Twelve fishing boats from the Mainland were operating in a Huangyan Island lagoon. Philippine warships first attempted to seize the fishing vessels. They then attempted to bottle the fishing vessels up in the lagoon, As a result, two Mainland ocean surveillance ships rushed to the scene to intervene. The result was a confrontation between the two sides at sea.
Militarily the Philippines is the weakest of the ASEAN countries, The reason it behaved so brashly, was the joint US-Philippine military exercises held on the 16th, code named "Balikatan" (shoulder to shoulder). The U.S. military stressed that this was just a routine disaster relief exercise, not directed against any particular party, But the scale was unprecedented. The exercises took place in Palawan waters, near the South China Sea. Drills included "attacks against offshore drilling platforms and a joint US-Philippine military force regaining control." These may have misled leaders in Manila and encouraged them to precipitate a confrontation with Beijing.
This forced Mainland China to adopt a less ambiguous attitude and to take more forceful action. In recent years, Beijing has placed increased importance on its core interests. PLA military spending has increased. Aircraft carriers have been incorporated into its military in order to defend its core interests. The People's Liberation Army aggressively mobilized. It got tough with the Philippines. The Mainland's most advanced armed fisheries ship arrived at Huangyan Island, Nuclear submarines were deployed, and proceeded to the disputed waters. When Defense Minister Liang Xian-lie inspected the Guangzhou Military Region, he said, "The Guangzhou Military Region will be in the vanguard in the event of a major assignment."
More recently tensions have eased. On the 22nd, the two Mainland ships left Huangyan Island in the South China Sea. Only one ocean surveillance ship remains in the waters to enforce the law. The Mainland Ambassador in Manila said the Mainland is reducing tensions on Huangyan Island. He said it is clearly willing to resolve the incident through amicable diplomatic means.
Officials hope to reduce tensions. But the Mainland public is willing to fight to protect the nation's sovereignty in the South China Sea. The issue is particularly sensitive on the eve of the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Party Congress, Power struggles could play a role. That means Beijing might attempt to teach the Philippines a lesson. But even if a new leader takes over, the South China Sea issue will remain difficult to resolve. It can only become increasingly intractable.
In the East China Sea, the Diaoyutai Islands dispute has turned Japan and Mainland China inside out. The imaginary enemy in annual US-Japan security treaty exercises is no longer an amphibious landing with tanks from the north (Russia), It is an enemy occupying outlying islands (Mainland China). Extreme right-wing politician Shintaro Ishihara is stirring the pot. He said "If Tokyo does not open fire, the country will not face up to and deal with this problem." He has made the situation even more complicated.
On the 23rd Mainland China and Russia held joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, on an unprecedented scale. The theme of the exercise was "joint maritime defense and the defense of sea lanes." On the 21st, the Russian fleet sailed south through the Sea of Japan. It did not bypass the Japanese archipelago. This too was seen as a show of strength toward the US and Japan.
Consider the Asian-Pacific strategic scenario. The US and Mainland China are the two major powers. The other countries are reluctant to choose sides. By siding with the US against Mainland China, some countries have received increased U.S. military support. But they are reluctant to give up their seat on China's economic bandwagon.
The Republic of China is an Asian-Pacific government, It has relations with the Mainland. The two sides have a special relationship. It also has relations with the entire region, The United States is returning to Asia. That too is a problem we must face.
The Republic of China government has a stake in the South China Sea sovereignty dispute. It occupies the largest island -- Nansha Taiping Island. In March, armed Vietnamese ships approached Nansha Taiping Island, twice. They even fired shots in provocation, Our own Coast Guard station personnel fired warning shots in response. Our government lodged a protest through channels. The Vietnam claimed its ships were merely conducting routine patrols.
Both Taiping Island and Diaoyutai are Republic of China territory, It is not often that there is consensus between the ruling and opposition parties. Hundreds of Blue vs. Green issues are side issues. The government has a good chance to reach a clear consensus. More importantly, it has a chance to develop a set of specific strategies. Whether we are dealing with the Mainland, the United States, or with our Asian-Pacific neighbors. we should do so thoroughly and smoothly, without sacrificing our national interests.
We sit at home. But the controversy has come knocking on our door. We cannot evade the South China Sea issue.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.25
社論－南海問題 不容我們忽視逃避
本報訊
最近亞太很不平靜。日本東京都知事石原慎太郎宣布，東京要買下釣魚台群島；美國分別與與菲律賓、越南演習；而俄羅斯與中國則在黃海舉行海上軍事演習；中國與菲律賓為了南海黃岩島的海上對恃，已經進入第十四天。
這樣的情況，未來將是常態，而不是偶發；因為亞太的權力結構，隨著中國崛起，已經有了不可逆的變化。
亞太國家對中國崛起是有戒心的；雖然經貿上，越來越依賴中國的資源與市場，但是在戰略安全上，擔心中國獨霸；所以美國宣布要重返亞太，受到各國熱烈的歡迎。
美國表面上雖不反對中國崛起，但是卻一再強調要中國負擔國際責任，遵守國際規範；其中最敏感的區域，就是在南海問題。
美國自己不通過聯合國海洋法公約，卻支持東協各國基於海洋法公約而擴張領海。兩年前，希拉蕊國務卿在東協外長會議上，支持菲律賓與越南的南海主張，政策就越來越明顯。她除了以言語表達支持「西菲律賓海」（即南中國海）的主權要求，還贈送退役的軍艦，派出美軍駐紮，舉行聯合年度演習。
南海僅是美國利益之一，中國卻認定是核心利益，這不禁讓中國懷疑，美國是否有藉亞太各國拖垮中國的企圖；而有美國的撐腰，菲律賓與越南等國，越加強勢，不時宣布要開發旅遊路線、開採南海石油和天然氣問題公開國際競標。
這次中菲在南海黃岩島海域對峙，起因於十二艘大陸籍漁船在黃岩島瀉湖內作業時，遭菲律賓軍艦企圖扣押並把漁船圍堵在瀉湖內，結果被隨後趕到的兩艘大陸海監船阻止，引發雙方船艦在海域對峙。
菲律賓是東協各國軍力最弱的，之所以敢如此，與十六日開始的美菲「肩併肩二○一二」聯合演習有關。儘管美軍強調此次只是例行的救災演習，不針對任何人，但規模空前龐大，演習地點選在靠近中國南海海域的巴拉望海域，具體操演包括「海上鑽井平臺遇襲，美菲武力奪回」，都會誤導馬尼拉高層，敢於與北京對抗。
這逼得中國也必須要採取更明確的態度與動作。近年來北京對核心利益特別重視，解放軍軍費的增加，航空母艦的成軍都是為了保衛核心利益。解放軍一度積極動員要強硬對付菲律賓，大陸最先進的武裝漁政船已抵達黃岩島，核潛艇也已出動駛往爭議海域，國防部長梁光烈巡視廣州軍區時更說：「廣州軍區將在重大任務中當尖兵」。
不過最近事態已經緩和下來，大陸兩艘船艦二十二日已駛離南海黃岩島海域，只剩一艘海監船仍在海域執法；駐馬尼拉大使館表示，大陸正在使黃岩島的緊張局勢降級，願意透過外交手段友好解決這一事件。
雖然官方希望降低緊張，但大陸輿論仍強調不惜一戰，以維護南海主權；此事在十八大前格外敏感，在權力鬥爭的影響下，也不排除北京會想給菲律賓「教訓」，但即使是新領導人接任，南海問題也難以解決，只會越來越棘手。
在東海，由於釣魚台爭議，日本與中國也外弛內張。美日安保年度演習的假想敵已經不是從北部登陸的坦克（俄羅斯），而改為突襲佔據離島的敵國（中國大陸）；現在極右派政客石原慎太郎進來攪局，表示「東京如果不鳴槍，國家就不會面對、處理這個問題」，更把情況變得更複雜化。
廿三日在黃海海域進行的中俄海上軍演規模空前。此次演習的主題是「海上聯合防禦和保衛海上交通線作戰」，俄羅斯艦隊廿一日直穿日本海南下，而非繞過日本列島，也被視為有向美日示威的意味。
綜觀亞太局勢，現在呈現出美中兩雄爭霸，各國其實並不願意被迫選邊，即使部分國家得到更多美國軍力支援與中國抗衡，也不願放棄搭中國發展的便車。
台灣是亞太國家之一，與大陸關係，有兩岸的特殊性，同時也有本區域的一般性，美國重返亞洲，也是我們所必須面對的新問題。
台灣在南海主權爭議中，佔有最大的島嶼南沙太平島，越南武裝船在三月，曾經二度靠近南沙太平島，還開槍挑釁，海巡署駐守人員也鳴槍示警。對此，我方透過管道抗議，越方則解釋艦艇是例行巡邏。
無論是太平島，或是釣魚台，都是我國領土，難得的是朝野各黨對此都有共識，比起其他動輒藍綠分邊的議題，政府有更好的機會可以凝聚明確立場。更重要的，發展出一套具體策略，無論是對大陸、對美國，或是對亞太鄰國，都能夠肆應裕如，不至於違背我國的國家利益。
人在家中坐，爭議已經打到門口，南海問題已經不容我們逃避。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 25, 2012
Summary: Recently the Asian-Pacific region has been far from pacific. Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara has announced that Tokyo intends to purchase the Diaoyutai Islands. The United States has conducted joint military exercises with the Philippines, and joint military exercises with Vietnam. Russia and Mainland China have conducted joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea. The clash between Mainland China and the Philippines over Huangyan Island in the South China Sea has gone on for 14 days.
Full Text below:
Recently the Asian-Pacific region has been far from pacific. Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara has announced that Tokyo intends to purchase the Diaoyutai Islands. The United States has conducted joint military exercises with the Philippines, and joint military exercises with Vietnam. Russia and Mainland China have conducted joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea. The clash between Mainland China and the Philippines over Huangyan Island in the South China Sea has gone on for 14 days.
Under the circumstances, this may well become the norm, and not the exception. With the rise of Mainland China, the power structure in the Asian-Pacific region has undergone irreversible changes.
Other Asian-Pacific countries are wary about Mainland China's rise. In economics and trade, they may be increasingly dependent upon Mainland China for resources and markets. But when it comes to national security, they fear Mainland Chinese dominance. That is why several nations have welcomed the United States' announcement that it is returning to the Asian-Pacific region.
On the surface, the United States does not oppose Mainland China's rise, Yet it repeatedly stresses that Mainland China must own up to its international responsibilities, and comply with international norms. One of the most sensitive areas is the South China Sea issue.
The United States itself refused to sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Yet it supports ASEAN countries expanding their territorial claims based on the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Two years ago, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued on behalf of Philippines and Vietnamese claims in the South China Sea. The US position has become increasingly clear. She expressed support for these claims through her terminology. She pointedly used the term "Western Philippine Sea," instead of South China Sea. She also donated a decommissioned warship, stationed U.S. troops. and held a joint annual exercise.
The South China Sea is one of the United States' many interests. Mainland China however, considers the South China Sea a core interest. Mainland China cannot help but wonder. Is the US attempting to use these countries in the Asian-Pacific region to bring down Mainland China? With the backing of the United States, the Philippines and Vietnam have become increasingly aggressive. They have announced the development of tourist routes and international competitive bidding for the exploitation of oil and gas in the South China Sea.
The current confrontation in the South China Sea between Mainland China and the Philippines is over Huangyan Island. Twelve fishing boats from the Mainland were operating in a Huangyan Island lagoon. Philippine warships first attempted to seize the fishing vessels. They then attempted to bottle the fishing vessels up in the lagoon, As a result, two Mainland ocean surveillance ships rushed to the scene to intervene. The result was a confrontation between the two sides at sea.
Militarily the Philippines is the weakest of the ASEAN countries, The reason it behaved so brashly, was the joint US-Philippine military exercises held on the 16th, code named "Balikatan" (shoulder to shoulder). The U.S. military stressed that this was just a routine disaster relief exercise, not directed against any particular party, But the scale was unprecedented. The exercises took place in Palawan waters, near the South China Sea. Drills included "attacks against offshore drilling platforms and a joint US-Philippine military force regaining control." These may have misled leaders in Manila and encouraged them to precipitate a confrontation with Beijing.
This forced Mainland China to adopt a less ambiguous attitude and to take more forceful action. In recent years, Beijing has placed increased importance on its core interests. PLA military spending has increased. Aircraft carriers have been incorporated into its military in order to defend its core interests. The People's Liberation Army aggressively mobilized. It got tough with the Philippines. The Mainland's most advanced armed fisheries ship arrived at Huangyan Island, Nuclear submarines were deployed, and proceeded to the disputed waters. When Defense Minister Liang Xian-lie inspected the Guangzhou Military Region, he said, "The Guangzhou Military Region will be in the vanguard in the event of a major assignment."
More recently tensions have eased. On the 22nd, the two Mainland ships left Huangyan Island in the South China Sea. Only one ocean surveillance ship remains in the waters to enforce the law. The Mainland Ambassador in Manila said the Mainland is reducing tensions on Huangyan Island. He said it is clearly willing to resolve the incident through amicable diplomatic means.
Officials hope to reduce tensions. But the Mainland public is willing to fight to protect the nation's sovereignty in the South China Sea. The issue is particularly sensitive on the eve of the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Party Congress, Power struggles could play a role. That means Beijing might attempt to teach the Philippines a lesson. But even if a new leader takes over, the South China Sea issue will remain difficult to resolve. It can only become increasingly intractable.
In the East China Sea, the Diaoyutai Islands dispute has turned Japan and Mainland China inside out. The imaginary enemy in annual US-Japan security treaty exercises is no longer an amphibious landing with tanks from the north (Russia), It is an enemy occupying outlying islands (Mainland China). Extreme right-wing politician Shintaro Ishihara is stirring the pot. He said "If Tokyo does not open fire, the country will not face up to and deal with this problem." He has made the situation even more complicated.
On the 23rd Mainland China and Russia held joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, on an unprecedented scale. The theme of the exercise was "joint maritime defense and the defense of sea lanes." On the 21st, the Russian fleet sailed south through the Sea of Japan. It did not bypass the Japanese archipelago. This too was seen as a show of strength toward the US and Japan.
Consider the Asian-Pacific strategic scenario. The US and Mainland China are the two major powers. The other countries are reluctant to choose sides. By siding with the US against Mainland China, some countries have received increased U.S. military support. But they are reluctant to give up their seat on China's economic bandwagon.
The Republic of China is an Asian-Pacific government, It has relations with the Mainland. The two sides have a special relationship. It also has relations with the entire region, The United States is returning to Asia. That too is a problem we must face.
The Republic of China government has a stake in the South China Sea sovereignty dispute. It occupies the largest island -- Nansha Taiping Island. In March, armed Vietnamese ships approached Nansha Taiping Island, twice. They even fired shots in provocation, Our own Coast Guard station personnel fired warning shots in response. Our government lodged a protest through channels. The Vietnam claimed its ships were merely conducting routine patrols.
Both Taiping Island and Diaoyutai are Republic of China territory, It is not often that there is consensus between the ruling and opposition parties. Hundreds of Blue vs. Green issues are side issues. The government has a good chance to reach a clear consensus. More importantly, it has a chance to develop a set of specific strategies. Whether we are dealing with the Mainland, the United States, or with our Asian-Pacific neighbors. we should do so thoroughly and smoothly, without sacrificing our national interests.
We sit at home. But the controversy has come knocking on our door. We cannot evade the South China Sea issue.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.25
社論－南海問題 不容我們忽視逃避
本報訊
最近亞太很不平靜。日本東京都知事石原慎太郎宣布，東京要買下釣魚台群島；美國分別與與菲律賓、越南演習；而俄羅斯與中國則在黃海舉行海上軍事演習；中國與菲律賓為了南海黃岩島的海上對恃，已經進入第十四天。
這樣的情況，未來將是常態，而不是偶發；因為亞太的權力結構，隨著中國崛起，已經有了不可逆的變化。
亞太國家對中國崛起是有戒心的；雖然經貿上，越來越依賴中國的資源與市場，但是在戰略安全上，擔心中國獨霸；所以美國宣布要重返亞太，受到各國熱烈的歡迎。
美國表面上雖不反對中國崛起，但是卻一再強調要中國負擔國際責任，遵守國際規範；其中最敏感的區域，就是在南海問題。
美國自己不通過聯合國海洋法公約，卻支持東協各國基於海洋法公約而擴張領海。兩年前，希拉蕊國務卿在東協外長會議上，支持菲律賓與越南的南海主張，政策就越來越明顯。她除了以言語表達支持「西菲律賓海」（即南中國海）的主權要求，還贈送退役的軍艦，派出美軍駐紮，舉行聯合年度演習。
南海僅是美國利益之一，中國卻認定是核心利益，這不禁讓中國懷疑，美國是否有藉亞太各國拖垮中國的企圖；而有美國的撐腰，菲律賓與越南等國，越加強勢，不時宣布要開發旅遊路線、開採南海石油和天然氣問題公開國際競標。
這次中菲在南海黃岩島海域對峙，起因於十二艘大陸籍漁船在黃岩島瀉湖內作業時，遭菲律賓軍艦企圖扣押並把漁船圍堵在瀉湖內，結果被隨後趕到的兩艘大陸海監船阻止，引發雙方船艦在海域對峙。
菲律賓是東協各國軍力最弱的，之所以敢如此，與十六日開始的美菲「肩併肩二○一二」聯合演習有關。儘管美軍強調此次只是例行的救災演習，不針對任何人，但規模空前龐大，演習地點選在靠近中國南海海域的巴拉望海域，具體操演包括「海上鑽井平臺遇襲，美菲武力奪回」，都會誤導馬尼拉高層，敢於與北京對抗。
這逼得中國也必須要採取更明確的態度與動作。近年來北京對核心利益特別重視，解放軍軍費的增加，航空母艦的成軍都是為了保衛核心利益。解放軍一度積極動員要強硬對付菲律賓，大陸最先進的武裝漁政船已抵達黃岩島，核潛艇也已出動駛往爭議海域，國防部長梁光烈巡視廣州軍區時更說：「廣州軍區將在重大任務中當尖兵」。
不過最近事態已經緩和下來，大陸兩艘船艦二十二日已駛離南海黃岩島海域，只剩一艘海監船仍在海域執法；駐馬尼拉大使館表示，大陸正在使黃岩島的緊張局勢降級，願意透過外交手段友好解決這一事件。
雖然官方希望降低緊張，但大陸輿論仍強調不惜一戰，以維護南海主權；此事在十八大前格外敏感，在權力鬥爭的影響下，也不排除北京會想給菲律賓「教訓」，但即使是新領導人接任，南海問題也難以解決，只會越來越棘手。
在東海，由於釣魚台爭議，日本與中國也外弛內張。美日安保年度演習的假想敵已經不是從北部登陸的坦克（俄羅斯），而改為突襲佔據離島的敵國（中國大陸）；現在極右派政客石原慎太郎進來攪局，表示「東京如果不鳴槍，國家就不會面對、處理這個問題」，更把情況變得更複雜化。
廿三日在黃海海域進行的中俄海上軍演規模空前。此次演習的主題是「海上聯合防禦和保衛海上交通線作戰」，俄羅斯艦隊廿一日直穿日本海南下，而非繞過日本列島，也被視為有向美日示威的意味。
綜觀亞太局勢，現在呈現出美中兩雄爭霸，各國其實並不願意被迫選邊，即使部分國家得到更多美國軍力支援與中國抗衡，也不願放棄搭中國發展的便車。
台灣是亞太國家之一，與大陸關係，有兩岸的特殊性，同時也有本區域的一般性，美國重返亞洲，也是我們所必須面對的新問題。
台灣在南海主權爭議中，佔有最大的島嶼南沙太平島，越南武裝船在三月，曾經二度靠近南沙太平島，還開槍挑釁，海巡署駐守人員也鳴槍示警。對此，我方透過管道抗議，越方則解釋艦艇是例行巡邏。
無論是太平島，或是釣魚台，都是我國領土，難得的是朝野各黨對此都有共識，比起其他動輒藍綠分邊的議題，政府有更好的機會可以凝聚明確立場。更重要的，發展出一套具體策略，無論是對大陸、對美國，或是對亞太鄰國，都能夠肆應裕如，不至於違背我國的國家利益。
人在家中坐，爭議已經打到門口，南海問題已經不容我們逃避。
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
The President Reporting to the Legislature Has Constitutional Implications
The President Reporting to the Legislature Has Constitutional Implications
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 23, 2012
Summary: Should President Ma deliver his State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan? Once the legislature approves this bill with a majority vote, a constitutional precedent is likely to become a constitutional norm. The Republic of China's constitutional framework will resemble a presidential system. The power of the premier and the legislature may be weakened. That is something all parties need to consider.
Full Text below:
Should President Ma deliver his State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan? Once the legislature approves this bill with a majority vote, a constitutional precedent is likely to become a constitutional norm. The Republic of China's constitutional framework will resemble a presidential system. The power of the premier and the legislature may be weakened. That is something all parties need to consider.
The Additional Articles of the Constitution, Article IV, paragraph 3, states that "when the Legislative Yuan convenes each year, it must listen to the president's State of the Nation Report." They authorize the legislature to ask the president to report to the Legislative Yuan. President Ma has been re-elected, but has yet to officially begin his second term. His poll numbers are in the cellar. The opposition DPP caucus is sharpening its knives. The ruling KMT caucus is hoping to use the president's State of the Nation Report to enhance the KMT's political stature. President Ma has already indicated that he has no objection to delivering the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan.
The various parties have made their own political calculations. But they all appear to have overlooked one thing. If a legislative majority passes this bill requiring the President to deliver his State of the Nation Address in the Legislative Yuan, it will have far-reaching constitutional and political implications. A constitutional amendment abolished the National Assembly. Additional Articles gave the Legislative Yuan the power to hear the President's State of the Nation Report. But the fact remains the president has never reported to the Legislative Yuan. If the president reports to the Legislative Yuan, his action will have constitutional implications. It will establish a legal precedent. It will transform the existing dual-leadership system into a presidential system.
Under the presidential system in the United States, the president must report to Congress. But the Additional Articles of the Constitution state that only the Legislative Yuan shall listen to the President's State of the Nation Report. Once this happens, this constitutional precedent is certain to become a constitutional norm. It will transform the existing dual leadership system into a presidential system. On the surface it expands the power of the legislature. It authorizes the legislature to demand that the president deliver the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan. But does the Legislative Yuan really have the power to oversee the President? That remains a giant question mark. The legislators may think that having the president deliver the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan makes the President answerable to the legislature. But that is mere illusion. The Legislative Yuan has essentially no power to oversee the President. The Legislative Yuan can only oversee the Executive Yuan, not the president. Making the President report to the Legislative Yuan, merely derogates both the authority of the Legislative Yuan and the authority of the Executive Yuan.
Consider the political impact. Consider the number of votes received. The president clearly has greater voter support than any legislator. President Ma Ying-jeou's approval ratings may be low. But that does not mean that the Legislative Yuan will prevail in a clash with the president. The Legislative Yuan can oversee the Executive Yuan, whose officials are not elected. But suppose a precedent is established? Suppose the President delivers the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan? Suppose that he even submits to interrogation by legislators? Not only would that be unconstitutional, it would also weaken the Executive Yuan.
When President Chen Shui-bian was re-elected, the DPP held a minority in the legislature. The ruling DPP was small, The opposition KMT was large. Chen's policies were often blocked. Had he been permitted to report to the Legislative Yuan, it would have enabled him to look more powerful than he was. It would have provided him with a better bully pulpit. That is why being asked to deliver the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan is a dream come true. The KMT, as the majority party, could have permitted Chen Shui-bian to speak before the Legislature. But in the end it insisted that "Without the truth, there is no president." Chen Shui-bian was denied his wish.
If the President is allowed to deliver the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan, he will be the big winner. Take the United States for example. When the president delivers a State of the Union Address, the opposition party must give him a standing ovation. They cannot cross-examine him, The President delivers his address, then walks away. At such a moment who does not know the president is the star of the show? On the surface, the president is reporting to Congress, In fact, the president is reporting to the public. That is why in the United States, even President George W. Bush, who is has zero public appeal, sees his approval ratings climb after reporting to Congress.
For the DPP, the Legislative Yuan is the real battlefield, The Executive Yuan is the branch of government over which the Legislative Yuan has true oversight. The Legislative Yuan has no powers of oversight over the president. Once he has been "invited" to the Legislative Yuan, it will become a case of "inviting someone to the party is easy. asking them to leave is difficult." The president will be in a better position to manipulate the legislature. The DPP has no consensus on the constitutional framework. Before, DPP legislators held differing veiws on whether Chen Shui-bian should be allowed to speak before the Legislative Yuan. They may have been right, or they may have been wrong. But do they still hold the same views today as they did back then? For the KMT, once the president delivering a State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan becomes standard practice, they will be unable to prevent a loose cannon like Chen Shui-bian from doing the same thing.
The impact on the Executive Yuan would be the same. Before, when the president reported to the National Assembly. it was over constitutional amendments and major policies. But when reporting to the legislature, the issues would be social issues that could and should be answered by the Executive Yuan. If the president answers these questions, who is going to listen to wha tthe Executive Yuan has to say? For President Ma, the Additional Articles of the Constitution allow him to report to the Legislative Yuan. But if the existing constitutional framework undergoes substantive change. will they contradict President Ma's long-term constitutional proposals? This is something President Ma needs to consider.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.23
社論－總統赴立院報告將衝擊憲政體制
本報訊
馬總統是否要到立法院國情報告，一旦國會多數黨提案通過，這個「憲政先例」很可能成為未來的「憲政慣例」，將使台灣憲政體制更向總統制傾斜。也很可能進一步弱化閣揆與立院的權力，這一點各方恐怕都需要再深思熟慮。
《憲法》增修條文第四條第三項「立法院於每年集會時，得聽取總統國情報告」，賦予立院有權邀請總統赴立法院報告。值此馬總統連任尚未就職前民調就已跌落谷底之際，不僅在野黨團磨刀霍霍，執政黨團也希望總統能藉國情報告拉抬執政黨聲勢；至於馬總統則已表態並不反對到立法院國情報告。
不論各方怎麼算計，似乎都忽略若是這次國會多數黨通過總統到立法院國情報告的提案，將可能造成憲政意涵及政治上重大的衝擊。畢竟自修憲廢除國民大會後，雖然增修條文賦予立法院聽取總統報告的權力，但事實上總統從未到立法院做過報告，這是因為總統到立法院報告這件事，具有極大的憲政意涵，會形成新的慣例，使得現有的雙首長制更朝向總統制傾斜。
實施「總統制」的美國，總統必須向國會報告。但依《憲法》增修條文，只有立法院得聽取總統國情報告的文字，而一旦這個「得」實現之後，勢必就會成為「憲政慣例」，這也意味我們也將逐漸成為「向總統制傾斜的雙首長制」，表面上看似立院的權力變大，可以把總統請到立法院報告，但立法院是否就真的有權力監督總統？恐怕是個大問號。立委可能以為讓總統到立法院做國情報告，有了讓總統向立院負責的感覺，但這不過是一種錯覺。立法院實質上並沒有監督總統的權力，立法院能夠監督的是行政院而非總統。讓總統到立法院報告，反而是讓立法院與行政院的權力同時減損。
再從政治上的衝擊看，以得票數來看，總統的民意基礎肯定大過立委，雖然目前馬英九總統看似民調低迷，但並不意味立法院與總統有衝突時，獲利一定是立法院。原本立法院還可監督沒有民意基礎的行政院，未來若是開啟總統到立法院國情報告的先例，甚至還接受立委詢答後，不再只有違憲問題，而是讓行政院更為弱化。
當年陳水扁總統連任，民進黨在國會是少數黨，朝小野大，政策常遭杯葛，若能到立法院報告，反而讓他從弱者轉為強者，更可以直接與人民對話；所以對到立法院國情報告，可說是求之不得，若以當時國民黨一樣為多數黨的情況下，要讓陳水扁到立法院，並不是不可能的事，但最後還是以「沒有真相就沒有總統」，讓陳水扁沒有「得逞」。
總統赴立法院國情報告，總統往往是最大贏家。以美國為例，總統發表國情咨文時，在野黨不僅也要起立鼓掌，更不能質詢，總統報告完就走人；這一刻誰不知道，總統才是國會殿堂真正的主角，表面上看似總統向國會報告，其實是在對人民報告，因此在美國，就連最無群眾魅力的小布希總統，一到國會報告，民調也是跟著攀升。
對民進黨而言，國會才是真正的戰場，行政院才是它真正有權力監督的對象，一旦把不受監督的總統「請」到立法院，「請神容易送神難」，反而讓總統有更大力量操縱國會。何況目前民進黨對憲政體制看法莫衷一是；而那些當年對陳水扁立法院報告的看法不論抱持是對或錯的人，現在是否也是同樣見解？對國民黨而言，一旦讓總統赴立法院國是報告形成憲政慣例後，若以後再碰到一個像陳水扁這樣不受控制的總統，將毫無招架之力。
對行政院衝擊也一樣。以前總統到國民大會報告，至少內容與修憲、國家重大政策有關，但場合轉到立法院，內容將變成行政院即可回答的民生議題，未來從總統的口中，就可以回答這些問題，還有人要聽行政院回應嗎？同樣對馬總統而言，雖然《憲法》增修條文可以讓他到立法院報告，但如果此舉將對現行憲政制度造成實質的改變。是否與馬總統長期的憲政主張有隱含的矛盾？也是馬總統可以思考的問題。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 23, 2012
Summary: Should President Ma deliver his State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan? Once the legislature approves this bill with a majority vote, a constitutional precedent is likely to become a constitutional norm. The Republic of China's constitutional framework will resemble a presidential system. The power of the premier and the legislature may be weakened. That is something all parties need to consider.
Full Text below:
Should President Ma deliver his State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan? Once the legislature approves this bill with a majority vote, a constitutional precedent is likely to become a constitutional norm. The Republic of China's constitutional framework will resemble a presidential system. The power of the premier and the legislature may be weakened. That is something all parties need to consider.
The Additional Articles of the Constitution, Article IV, paragraph 3, states that "when the Legislative Yuan convenes each year, it must listen to the president's State of the Nation Report." They authorize the legislature to ask the president to report to the Legislative Yuan. President Ma has been re-elected, but has yet to officially begin his second term. His poll numbers are in the cellar. The opposition DPP caucus is sharpening its knives. The ruling KMT caucus is hoping to use the president's State of the Nation Report to enhance the KMT's political stature. President Ma has already indicated that he has no objection to delivering the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan.
The various parties have made their own political calculations. But they all appear to have overlooked one thing. If a legislative majority passes this bill requiring the President to deliver his State of the Nation Address in the Legislative Yuan, it will have far-reaching constitutional and political implications. A constitutional amendment abolished the National Assembly. Additional Articles gave the Legislative Yuan the power to hear the President's State of the Nation Report. But the fact remains the president has never reported to the Legislative Yuan. If the president reports to the Legislative Yuan, his action will have constitutional implications. It will establish a legal precedent. It will transform the existing dual-leadership system into a presidential system.
Under the presidential system in the United States, the president must report to Congress. But the Additional Articles of the Constitution state that only the Legislative Yuan shall listen to the President's State of the Nation Report. Once this happens, this constitutional precedent is certain to become a constitutional norm. It will transform the existing dual leadership system into a presidential system. On the surface it expands the power of the legislature. It authorizes the legislature to demand that the president deliver the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan. But does the Legislative Yuan really have the power to oversee the President? That remains a giant question mark. The legislators may think that having the president deliver the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan makes the President answerable to the legislature. But that is mere illusion. The Legislative Yuan has essentially no power to oversee the President. The Legislative Yuan can only oversee the Executive Yuan, not the president. Making the President report to the Legislative Yuan, merely derogates both the authority of the Legislative Yuan and the authority of the Executive Yuan.
Consider the political impact. Consider the number of votes received. The president clearly has greater voter support than any legislator. President Ma Ying-jeou's approval ratings may be low. But that does not mean that the Legislative Yuan will prevail in a clash with the president. The Legislative Yuan can oversee the Executive Yuan, whose officials are not elected. But suppose a precedent is established? Suppose the President delivers the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan? Suppose that he even submits to interrogation by legislators? Not only would that be unconstitutional, it would also weaken the Executive Yuan.
When President Chen Shui-bian was re-elected, the DPP held a minority in the legislature. The ruling DPP was small, The opposition KMT was large. Chen's policies were often blocked. Had he been permitted to report to the Legislative Yuan, it would have enabled him to look more powerful than he was. It would have provided him with a better bully pulpit. That is why being asked to deliver the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan is a dream come true. The KMT, as the majority party, could have permitted Chen Shui-bian to speak before the Legislature. But in the end it insisted that "Without the truth, there is no president." Chen Shui-bian was denied his wish.
If the President is allowed to deliver the State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan, he will be the big winner. Take the United States for example. When the president delivers a State of the Union Address, the opposition party must give him a standing ovation. They cannot cross-examine him, The President delivers his address, then walks away. At such a moment who does not know the president is the star of the show? On the surface, the president is reporting to Congress, In fact, the president is reporting to the public. That is why in the United States, even President George W. Bush, who is has zero public appeal, sees his approval ratings climb after reporting to Congress.
For the DPP, the Legislative Yuan is the real battlefield, The Executive Yuan is the branch of government over which the Legislative Yuan has true oversight. The Legislative Yuan has no powers of oversight over the president. Once he has been "invited" to the Legislative Yuan, it will become a case of "inviting someone to the party is easy. asking them to leave is difficult." The president will be in a better position to manipulate the legislature. The DPP has no consensus on the constitutional framework. Before, DPP legislators held differing veiws on whether Chen Shui-bian should be allowed to speak before the Legislative Yuan. They may have been right, or they may have been wrong. But do they still hold the same views today as they did back then? For the KMT, once the president delivering a State of the Nation Report in the Legislative Yuan becomes standard practice, they will be unable to prevent a loose cannon like Chen Shui-bian from doing the same thing.
The impact on the Executive Yuan would be the same. Before, when the president reported to the National Assembly. it was over constitutional amendments and major policies. But when reporting to the legislature, the issues would be social issues that could and should be answered by the Executive Yuan. If the president answers these questions, who is going to listen to wha tthe Executive Yuan has to say? For President Ma, the Additional Articles of the Constitution allow him to report to the Legislative Yuan. But if the existing constitutional framework undergoes substantive change. will they contradict President Ma's long-term constitutional proposals? This is something President Ma needs to consider.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.23
社論－總統赴立院報告將衝擊憲政體制
本報訊
馬總統是否要到立法院國情報告，一旦國會多數黨提案通過，這個「憲政先例」很可能成為未來的「憲政慣例」，將使台灣憲政體制更向總統制傾斜。也很可能進一步弱化閣揆與立院的權力，這一點各方恐怕都需要再深思熟慮。
《憲法》增修條文第四條第三項「立法院於每年集會時，得聽取總統國情報告」，賦予立院有權邀請總統赴立法院報告。值此馬總統連任尚未就職前民調就已跌落谷底之際，不僅在野黨團磨刀霍霍，執政黨團也希望總統能藉國情報告拉抬執政黨聲勢；至於馬總統則已表態並不反對到立法院國情報告。
不論各方怎麼算計，似乎都忽略若是這次國會多數黨通過總統到立法院國情報告的提案，將可能造成憲政意涵及政治上重大的衝擊。畢竟自修憲廢除國民大會後，雖然增修條文賦予立法院聽取總統報告的權力，但事實上總統從未到立法院做過報告，這是因為總統到立法院報告這件事，具有極大的憲政意涵，會形成新的慣例，使得現有的雙首長制更朝向總統制傾斜。
實施「總統制」的美國，總統必須向國會報告。但依《憲法》增修條文，只有立法院得聽取總統國情報告的文字，而一旦這個「得」實現之後，勢必就會成為「憲政慣例」，這也意味我們也將逐漸成為「向總統制傾斜的雙首長制」，表面上看似立院的權力變大，可以把總統請到立法院報告，但立法院是否就真的有權力監督總統？恐怕是個大問號。立委可能以為讓總統到立法院做國情報告，有了讓總統向立院負責的感覺，但這不過是一種錯覺。立法院實質上並沒有監督總統的權力，立法院能夠監督的是行政院而非總統。讓總統到立法院報告，反而是讓立法院與行政院的權力同時減損。
再從政治上的衝擊看，以得票數來看，總統的民意基礎肯定大過立委，雖然目前馬英九總統看似民調低迷，但並不意味立法院與總統有衝突時，獲利一定是立法院。原本立法院還可監督沒有民意基礎的行政院，未來若是開啟總統到立法院國情報告的先例，甚至還接受立委詢答後，不再只有違憲問題，而是讓行政院更為弱化。
當年陳水扁總統連任，民進黨在國會是少數黨，朝小野大，政策常遭杯葛，若能到立法院報告，反而讓他從弱者轉為強者，更可以直接與人民對話；所以對到立法院國情報告，可說是求之不得，若以當時國民黨一樣為多數黨的情況下，要讓陳水扁到立法院，並不是不可能的事，但最後還是以「沒有真相就沒有總統」，讓陳水扁沒有「得逞」。
總統赴立法院國情報告，總統往往是最大贏家。以美國為例，總統發表國情咨文時，在野黨不僅也要起立鼓掌，更不能質詢，總統報告完就走人；這一刻誰不知道，總統才是國會殿堂真正的主角，表面上看似總統向國會報告，其實是在對人民報告，因此在美國，就連最無群眾魅力的小布希總統，一到國會報告，民調也是跟著攀升。
對民進黨而言，國會才是真正的戰場，行政院才是它真正有權力監督的對象，一旦把不受監督的總統「請」到立法院，「請神容易送神難」，反而讓總統有更大力量操縱國會。何況目前民進黨對憲政體制看法莫衷一是；而那些當年對陳水扁立法院報告的看法不論抱持是對或錯的人，現在是否也是同樣見解？對國民黨而言，一旦讓總統赴立法院國是報告形成憲政慣例後，若以後再碰到一個像陳水扁這樣不受控制的總統，將毫無招架之力。
對行政院衝擊也一樣。以前總統到國民大會報告，至少內容與修憲、國家重大政策有關，但場合轉到立法院，內容將變成行政院即可回答的民生議題，未來從總統的口中，就可以回答這些問題，還有人要聽行政院回應嗎？同樣對馬總統而言，雖然《憲法》增修條文可以讓他到立法院報告，但如果此舉將對現行憲政制度造成實質的改變。是否與馬總統長期的憲政主張有隱含的矛盾？也是馬總統可以思考的問題。
Monday, April 23, 2012
Transparency Will Expedite FTA Negotiations
Transparency Will Expedite FTA Negotiations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 23, 2012
Summary: The Taiwan stock market continues to stumble. The regularly scheduled meeting of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee will be held on Thursday. The two sides will begin a new round of follow up ECFA consultations. They will address the mutual opening of markets, and add new items pertaining to the Taiwan stock market. ECFA cannot be quite as transparent as other bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). To the public, the government's FTA policy is smoke and mirrors. Do the pros in this case outweigh the cons? This is a question the government needs to ask itself.
Full Text below:
The Taiwan stock market continues to stumble. The regularly scheduled meeting of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee will be held on Thursday. The two sides will begin a new round of follow up ECFA consultations. They will address the mutual opening of markets, and add new items pertaining to the Taiwan stock market. ECFA cannot be quite as transparent as other bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). To the public, the government's FTA policy is smoke and mirrors. Do the pros in this case outweigh the cons? This is a question the government needs to ask itself.
Negotiating a bilateral FTA is the government's main economic and trade policy. Everyone from the president to the heads of industry have vowed to expedite the signing of an agreement. Everyone wants to get a leg up on South Korea, Singapore, and other major trading competitors, who already enjoy the advantages of FTAs. A few days ago President Ma even said he hoped to complete follow-up negotiations on ECFA with Mainland China, to sign economic cooperation agreements with New Zealand and Singapore, and to resume negotiations over the US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). If so, our economy will experience a rebirth. But in most in people's eyes FTA negotiations have stalled. They have yet to pay off. Is this mere appearance? Or is it fact? The public has no idea, and the government is unwilling to say.
Take FTA negotiations between Taipei and Singapore. FTA negotiations between South Korea and the European Union required a total of 19 months, from start to finish. Economic negotiations between us and Singapore are much smaller in scale than FTA negotiations between South Korea and the EU. The FTA between Taipei and Singapore was supposed to take only 12 months. Instead, it has already taken 19 months, and a signing is nowhere in sight. Worse still, Singapore demanded the recall of our representative to Singapore. Just how many items are on the Taipei/Singapore FTA agenda? We have already held many consultations. What exactly is the impasse? Did the recall of our representative to Singapore have anything to do with it? Outsiders have no idea. They don't even have any idea how far the talks have progressed.
Government officials may think that secret negotiations minimize outside interference, internal dissent, and political obstructionism by Beijing. But considering the lack of progress made with several FTAs, the alleged benefits of secrecy are far from obvious. On the contrary. secret negotiations offer protectionists a perfect refuge, Outsiders have no idea what is holding up the FTAs. They have no idea whether they should support the FTAs or not. They fear backroom deals over FTAs may discredit the government's policies. Even if the FTAs are eventually successful, the damage may be irreparable. .
FTA negotiations involve disputes between vested interests. They involve legal technicalities. They are difficult for outsiders to understand. But the United States, Europe, even Japan, Korea, and other countries do their best to explain what is going on, both during the negotiations and after the FTA is signed. They tell the public where negotiations are being held, and which topics are being negotiated. Afterwards they explain the progress and achievements they made, or failed to make. This transparency begins when negotiations begin. Actually it begins before negotiations begin. The scope of the FTA and its main framework is also made known.
Transparent consultations have advantages. They reduce recriminations against the government, for springing surprises on the public. They increase policy predictability. Domestic and foreign trade and economic agreements are made public once consultations have been concluded. Springing the results on the public all at once catches people by surprise. It provokes as much controversy as secret negotiations. It is more vulnerable to charges of "un-democratic," Legislative oversight is not the only way to honor democracy.
Furthermore, transparency allows affected industries and interested parties to express their views. Currently views are sought only from a handful of industries via small scale inquiries that lack breadth and depth. They are not conducted according to the Administrative Procedure Act as it pertains to public hearings. The industries queried may not need protection. Departments not queried many be the ones most in need of relief. More importantly, transparency enables the public to understand the negotiation progress. It enables them to understand the achievements made along the way, and the obstacles encountered along the way. It subjects the negotiations to scrutiny under the bright light of day. It enables the public to understand the urgency of liberalization. Otherwise, high officials invariably set illusory economic goals. They invariably use unconvincing arguments to make us accept real world changes.
Our government's FTA provisions specify the need for transparency. Ironically, the FTA talks are almost completely lacking in transparency. The negotiation process must be made transparent. This does not mean the detailed arguments and bargaining chips used in the talks must be disclosed. It is absolutely unnecessary to undermine the negotiations. The two sides agreed to make their FTA negotiations public. Secrecy is unnecessary. Beijing has raised no obstacles. Outsiders can be apprised of the obstacles encountered during negotiations through many means. Even the agenda and number of consultations for sensitive cross-Strait agreements can be indirectly released to the media. If this can be achieved during cross-Strait consultations, it can be achieved during FTA consultations with other countries. Let us begin with the Taipei/Singapore FTA negotiations.
透明化是加速FTA協商的促進劑
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.04.23
正在台股跌跌不休之際，為推動ＥＣＦＡ而設的兩岸經合會例行會議在本周四舉行，雙方將進入ＥＣＦＡ後續協商新一回合談判，觸及相互開放市場等議題，為台股增添新題材。相比ＥＣＦＡ，其他洽談中的雙邊自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）可沒有這麼透明化，讓國人對政府的ＦＴＡ政策猶如霧裡看花，其利弊得失，值得政府再好好盤算。
洽簽雙邊ＦＴＡ是政府的主要經貿政策，從總統到產業界均誓言要加速洽簽，以突破韓國、新加坡等主要貿易競爭對手的ＦＴＡ優勢；馬總統日前更表示，如果能與中國大陸完成兩岸ＥＣＦＡ後續談判，與紐西蘭、新加坡談好經濟合作協議，又和美國恢復台美貿易暨投資架構協定（ＴＩＦＡ）談判，則台灣一定可以脫胎換骨。然而，呈現在國人眼前的卻是，除ＥＣＦＡ外，ＦＴＡ談判似乎全都陷入膠著，遲遲未見成效；這是表象，還是真相，民眾不知，政府也不明說。
就拿台星之間的ＦＴＡ談判來說，韓國與歐盟洽談ＦＴＡ，從開始到結束共花費十九個月的時間，而我國與新加坡之間這個經濟量體、談判規模均比韓歐盟ＦＴＡ小得多的ＦＴＡ，原訂是十二個月完成，但迄今已耗時十九個月，不僅短期內沒有完成的跡象，這段期間還歷經駐星代表換人的風波。台星ＦＴＡ到底包含那些議題、迄今協商幾次、瓶頸僵局何在、換人風波有無影響等一連串問題，外界非但無從知悉，就連到底談到什麼程度，也是毫無頭緒。
政府官員或許認為，鴨子划水式談判可以減少外部干擾，除了內部不同聲音，也可防止中國大陸的政治性阻攔。然而，從幾個ＦＴＡ進展來看，秘密進行的利益並不明顯，反而是黑箱作業提供了保護主義者絕佳的藏身處，外界既不清楚究竟是什麼阻礙了ＦＴＡ，也不知道應不應該支持；相對的，外界對ＦＴＡ利益分配的穿鑿附會，卻可能傷害政策信譽。這些內傷，即使未來ＦＴＡ順利完成，也未必能夠治癒。
ＦＴＡ協商涉及既有利益的折衝，又有法律技術議題，外界確實並不易瞭解，但美、歐乃至於日、韓等國在洽簽過程中，仍會儘可能簡要在事前進行預告，事後加以說明；其預告內容主要包含時間、地點及主要議題，事後則會說明進度及成果（或無成果）。這些透明化項目，是談判啟動後的工作；在協商開始前的初始階段，也會公開協定的涵蓋範圍及主要架構。
這種協商透明化的優點，首先是可降低突襲式執政的責難，提升政策的可預測性。目前國內涉外經貿協定都是協商完成後，一次性地向國內公開結果，不免令人有措手不及之感，引發的爭議也不會比秘密進行少，更容易遭到不符合民主程序的批評，畢竟民主絕非只有國會監督一種方式。
再者，透明化也可使受影響的產業與利害關係人，能夠即時反映意見。目前徵詢意見的程序中，除針對少數產業進行小規模探詢外，廣度及深度都不足，更不曾依據行政程序法辦理公聽會。然而，受政府關愛的產業未必都需要保護，而未獲得徵詢機會的部門，卻可能很需要關懷。更重要的是，透明化能夠使社會各界瞭解協商進展、各階段的成就及困難，讓內部阻力及障礙攤在陽光下受到檢視，也使各界理解自由化的急迫性；否則，政府高官每次都以虛幻的經貿目標，要求大家接受現實世界的改變，實在不具說服力。
我國ＦＴＡ規定都有透明化條款，但諷刺的是，ＦＴＡ談判卻幾乎沒有絲毫透明化可言。談判過程的透明化，並非公開具體談判內容、爭議及籌碼，斷無影響談判的問題，而這些ＦＴＡ協商既然已經雙方同意公開，也失去秘密進行以降低彼岸阻礙的考量。事實上，相對敏感的兩岸協議，從談判議題到回合協商，至少會以間接方式，透過媒體預告說明，也有許多管道讓外界知悉談判的困難與障礙。如果兩岸協商可以做到，與他國的ＦＴＡ更無窒礙難行之理。就以公開台星ＦＴＡ的進展，當做開始吧！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 23, 2012
Summary: The Taiwan stock market continues to stumble. The regularly scheduled meeting of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee will be held on Thursday. The two sides will begin a new round of follow up ECFA consultations. They will address the mutual opening of markets, and add new items pertaining to the Taiwan stock market. ECFA cannot be quite as transparent as other bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). To the public, the government's FTA policy is smoke and mirrors. Do the pros in this case outweigh the cons? This is a question the government needs to ask itself.
Full Text below:
The Taiwan stock market continues to stumble. The regularly scheduled meeting of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee will be held on Thursday. The two sides will begin a new round of follow up ECFA consultations. They will address the mutual opening of markets, and add new items pertaining to the Taiwan stock market. ECFA cannot be quite as transparent as other bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). To the public, the government's FTA policy is smoke and mirrors. Do the pros in this case outweigh the cons? This is a question the government needs to ask itself.
Negotiating a bilateral FTA is the government's main economic and trade policy. Everyone from the president to the heads of industry have vowed to expedite the signing of an agreement. Everyone wants to get a leg up on South Korea, Singapore, and other major trading competitors, who already enjoy the advantages of FTAs. A few days ago President Ma even said he hoped to complete follow-up negotiations on ECFA with Mainland China, to sign economic cooperation agreements with New Zealand and Singapore, and to resume negotiations over the US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). If so, our economy will experience a rebirth. But in most in people's eyes FTA negotiations have stalled. They have yet to pay off. Is this mere appearance? Or is it fact? The public has no idea, and the government is unwilling to say.
Take FTA negotiations between Taipei and Singapore. FTA negotiations between South Korea and the European Union required a total of 19 months, from start to finish. Economic negotiations between us and Singapore are much smaller in scale than FTA negotiations between South Korea and the EU. The FTA between Taipei and Singapore was supposed to take only 12 months. Instead, it has already taken 19 months, and a signing is nowhere in sight. Worse still, Singapore demanded the recall of our representative to Singapore. Just how many items are on the Taipei/Singapore FTA agenda? We have already held many consultations. What exactly is the impasse? Did the recall of our representative to Singapore have anything to do with it? Outsiders have no idea. They don't even have any idea how far the talks have progressed.
Government officials may think that secret negotiations minimize outside interference, internal dissent, and political obstructionism by Beijing. But considering the lack of progress made with several FTAs, the alleged benefits of secrecy are far from obvious. On the contrary. secret negotiations offer protectionists a perfect refuge, Outsiders have no idea what is holding up the FTAs. They have no idea whether they should support the FTAs or not. They fear backroom deals over FTAs may discredit the government's policies. Even if the FTAs are eventually successful, the damage may be irreparable. .
FTA negotiations involve disputes between vested interests. They involve legal technicalities. They are difficult for outsiders to understand. But the United States, Europe, even Japan, Korea, and other countries do their best to explain what is going on, both during the negotiations and after the FTA is signed. They tell the public where negotiations are being held, and which topics are being negotiated. Afterwards they explain the progress and achievements they made, or failed to make. This transparency begins when negotiations begin. Actually it begins before negotiations begin. The scope of the FTA and its main framework is also made known.
Transparent consultations have advantages. They reduce recriminations against the government, for springing surprises on the public. They increase policy predictability. Domestic and foreign trade and economic agreements are made public once consultations have been concluded. Springing the results on the public all at once catches people by surprise. It provokes as much controversy as secret negotiations. It is more vulnerable to charges of "un-democratic," Legislative oversight is not the only way to honor democracy.
Furthermore, transparency allows affected industries and interested parties to express their views. Currently views are sought only from a handful of industries via small scale inquiries that lack breadth and depth. They are not conducted according to the Administrative Procedure Act as it pertains to public hearings. The industries queried may not need protection. Departments not queried many be the ones most in need of relief. More importantly, transparency enables the public to understand the negotiation progress. It enables them to understand the achievements made along the way, and the obstacles encountered along the way. It subjects the negotiations to scrutiny under the bright light of day. It enables the public to understand the urgency of liberalization. Otherwise, high officials invariably set illusory economic goals. They invariably use unconvincing arguments to make us accept real world changes.
Our government's FTA provisions specify the need for transparency. Ironically, the FTA talks are almost completely lacking in transparency. The negotiation process must be made transparent. This does not mean the detailed arguments and bargaining chips used in the talks must be disclosed. It is absolutely unnecessary to undermine the negotiations. The two sides agreed to make their FTA negotiations public. Secrecy is unnecessary. Beijing has raised no obstacles. Outsiders can be apprised of the obstacles encountered during negotiations through many means. Even the agenda and number of consultations for sensitive cross-Strait agreements can be indirectly released to the media. If this can be achieved during cross-Strait consultations, it can be achieved during FTA consultations with other countries. Let us begin with the Taipei/Singapore FTA negotiations.
透明化是加速FTA協商的促進劑
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.04.23
正在台股跌跌不休之際，為推動ＥＣＦＡ而設的兩岸經合會例行會議在本周四舉行，雙方將進入ＥＣＦＡ後續協商新一回合談判，觸及相互開放市場等議題，為台股增添新題材。相比ＥＣＦＡ，其他洽談中的雙邊自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）可沒有這麼透明化，讓國人對政府的ＦＴＡ政策猶如霧裡看花，其利弊得失，值得政府再好好盤算。
洽簽雙邊ＦＴＡ是政府的主要經貿政策，從總統到產業界均誓言要加速洽簽，以突破韓國、新加坡等主要貿易競爭對手的ＦＴＡ優勢；馬總統日前更表示，如果能與中國大陸完成兩岸ＥＣＦＡ後續談判，與紐西蘭、新加坡談好經濟合作協議，又和美國恢復台美貿易暨投資架構協定（ＴＩＦＡ）談判，則台灣一定可以脫胎換骨。然而，呈現在國人眼前的卻是，除ＥＣＦＡ外，ＦＴＡ談判似乎全都陷入膠著，遲遲未見成效；這是表象，還是真相，民眾不知，政府也不明說。
就拿台星之間的ＦＴＡ談判來說，韓國與歐盟洽談ＦＴＡ，從開始到結束共花費十九個月的時間，而我國與新加坡之間這個經濟量體、談判規模均比韓歐盟ＦＴＡ小得多的ＦＴＡ，原訂是十二個月完成，但迄今已耗時十九個月，不僅短期內沒有完成的跡象，這段期間還歷經駐星代表換人的風波。台星ＦＴＡ到底包含那些議題、迄今協商幾次、瓶頸僵局何在、換人風波有無影響等一連串問題，外界非但無從知悉，就連到底談到什麼程度，也是毫無頭緒。
政府官員或許認為，鴨子划水式談判可以減少外部干擾，除了內部不同聲音，也可防止中國大陸的政治性阻攔。然而，從幾個ＦＴＡ進展來看，秘密進行的利益並不明顯，反而是黑箱作業提供了保護主義者絕佳的藏身處，外界既不清楚究竟是什麼阻礙了ＦＴＡ，也不知道應不應該支持；相對的，外界對ＦＴＡ利益分配的穿鑿附會，卻可能傷害政策信譽。這些內傷，即使未來ＦＴＡ順利完成，也未必能夠治癒。
ＦＴＡ協商涉及既有利益的折衝，又有法律技術議題，外界確實並不易瞭解，但美、歐乃至於日、韓等國在洽簽過程中，仍會儘可能簡要在事前進行預告，事後加以說明；其預告內容主要包含時間、地點及主要議題，事後則會說明進度及成果（或無成果）。這些透明化項目，是談判啟動後的工作；在協商開始前的初始階段，也會公開協定的涵蓋範圍及主要架構。
這種協商透明化的優點，首先是可降低突襲式執政的責難，提升政策的可預測性。目前國內涉外經貿協定都是協商完成後，一次性地向國內公開結果，不免令人有措手不及之感，引發的爭議也不會比秘密進行少，更容易遭到不符合民主程序的批評，畢竟民主絕非只有國會監督一種方式。
再者，透明化也可使受影響的產業與利害關係人，能夠即時反映意見。目前徵詢意見的程序中，除針對少數產業進行小規模探詢外，廣度及深度都不足，更不曾依據行政程序法辦理公聽會。然而，受政府關愛的產業未必都需要保護，而未獲得徵詢機會的部門，卻可能很需要關懷。更重要的是，透明化能夠使社會各界瞭解協商進展、各階段的成就及困難，讓內部阻力及障礙攤在陽光下受到檢視，也使各界理解自由化的急迫性；否則，政府高官每次都以虛幻的經貿目標，要求大家接受現實世界的改變，實在不具說服力。
我國ＦＴＡ規定都有透明化條款，但諷刺的是，ＦＴＡ談判卻幾乎沒有絲毫透明化可言。談判過程的透明化，並非公開具體談判內容、爭議及籌碼，斷無影響談判的問題，而這些ＦＴＡ協商既然已經雙方同意公開，也失去秘密進行以降低彼岸阻礙的考量。事實上，相對敏感的兩岸協議，從談判議題到回合協商，至少會以間接方式，透過媒體預告說明，也有許多管道讓外界知悉談判的困難與障礙。如果兩岸協商可以做到，與他國的ＦＴＡ更無窒礙難行之理。就以公開台星ＦＴＡ的進展，當做開始吧！
Thursday, April 19, 2012
China Petroleum and Taipower Need Reform
China Petroleum and Taipower Need Reform
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 19, 2012
Summary: China Petroleum and Taipower are plagued by gross inefficiency. The Ministry of Economic Affairs can hardly escape blame. If the organization and management of China Petroleum and Taipower remain unchanged, then to expect a report of enhanced operational efficiency three months from now is the height of naivete. Gasoline and electricity prices have both been hiked. Everyone is demanding a review of the performance of China Petroleum and Taipower. These two state-owned enterprises should seize the opportunity to push through reforms so that their organizations may be reborn.
Full Text below:
Both gasoline and electricity prices have been hiked. This has led to price hikes in many consumer goods. Everyone is grumbling. Middle and low income people have been the hardest hit. China Petroleum and Taipower are losing money. Yet their employees continue receiving high salaries and excellent benefits. Even security guards receive one million NT annual salaries. Regardless of whether the companies earn profits or suffer losses, employee bonuses continue increasing. They have become a whole new category of fat cats. Gasoline and electricity prices have both been hiked. If China Petroleum and Taipower can turn their companies around. employees will receive even larger bonuses. The general public is being ripped off to enrich China Petroleum and TaiPower, The system is so twisted, it must be reformed.
Gasoline prices recently rose over 10%. Electricity prices rose between 16% and 31%. The Ministry of Economic Affairs estimates that gasoline and electricity prices will result in a 0.83% to 2.29% increase in this year's CPI. The growth rate will decrease 0.48%, lowering it to 3.37%. These averages imply tha tthe impact is limited. But many businesses are fighthing to survive. Taxi drivers are one example. Rising gasoline prices mean increased overhead and diminished profits. Consumer prices have steadily increased. The impact is not hard to imagine.
Taiwan's energy is totally dependent on imports, We lack the wherewithal to maintain low across the board gasoline and electricity prices. Attempting to do so encourages waste and forces taxpayers to subsidize the biggest users of gasoline and electricity. The result is an even greater injustice. Gasoline and electricity prices must reflect their costs, This is necessary and legitimate. But people have begun tightening their belts. China Petroleum and TaiPower's problems are long-standing, and must be closely scrutinized. Operating losses must not simply be covered by the price freeze.
China Petroleum and TaiPower are oligopolies. What sort of strange developments has this led to? A report from the Bureau of Audit tells all. Last year China Petroleum's pre-tax loss was 38.6 billion NT. Performance bonuses amounted to 4.8 billion NT. Last year Taipower's pre-tax loss was 43.3 billion NT. Performance bonuses amounted to 8.4 billion NT, This far exceeds the budget estimate of 3.9 billion NT. China Petroleum and TaiPower together lost 80 billion NT, Yet they paid out over 13 billion NT in bonuses. State-owned enterprises rack up one loss after another. Yet bonuses increase, again and again. China Petroleum and TaiPower say the performance bonuses were approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. No wonder Wang Chung-yu, Chairman of the ROC-USA Business Council, and former Chairman of China Steel, said "The poor performance of state-owned enterprises was caused by the government."
Now look at personnel costs, According to the Bureau of Audit, Last year China Petroleum personnel costs were over 24.7 billion NT. Each employee cost 1.62 million NT. Last year Taipower personnel costs were over 4.35 billion NT. Each employee cost 1.59 million NT. Such high personnel costs are roughly double the industrial and service sector average. The two companies' employees are aging. A crisis of continuity looms. China Petroleum and Taipower claim that personnel costs are not that high relative to total expenditures. But China Petroleum and TaiPower employee salaries are better than other private enterprises. That is an indisputable fact. Compare the annual per capita contribution made by the employees of China Petroleum against those of the Formosa Plastics Group. China Petroleum contributes only 160 million NT. Formosa Plastics contributes as much as 280 million NT. This further highlights China Petroleum's inefficiency.
Now look at employee benefits. Each year China Petroleum provides its employees with over $100 million NT in gasoline subsidies, as a fringe benefit. Each year Taipower provides its employees with over 27 million NT in electricity subsidies. Gasoline and electricity prices have both been hiked. China Petroleum and TaiPower employees meanwhile, enjoy generous gasoline and electricity subsidies. Naturally people are angry. Ruling and opposition legislators are blasting them. Taipower has decided to abolish several electricity subsidies. China Petroleum has said it will reduce or cancel gasoline subsidies. This shows that under the existing system of state owned enterprises, everyone dips into the same pot. Outside pressure must be overwhelming. Expecting China Petroleum, Taipower, and other state-owned enterprises to reform themselves from within, is expecting pigs to fly.
To quell public discontent, the Ministry of Economic Affairs recently established "Taiwan Power Company and Chinese Petroleum Corporation Business Improvement Teams." They recruited people from the business community, management experts, consumer advocates, and others, These people will conduct a comprehensive review of TaiPower and China Petroleum. They will examine their operational efficiency, procurement systems, personnel systems, privatization process, then submit a report in three months. How should we liberalize the market for gasoline and electricity? How should we accelerate the privatization of China Petroleum and TaiPower? These are the fundamental questions that will be asked.
Facing a financial black hole and a shortage of talent, Taipower Chairman Chen Ku-ming said, "I find it almost impossible to sleep at night." We wonder. Does the chairman of China Petroleum find it almost impossible to sleep at night? Rome was not built in a day. China Petroleum and Taipower are plagued by gross inefficiency. The Ministry of Economic Affairs can hardly escape blame. If the organization and management of China Petroleum and Taipower remain unchanged, then to expect a report of enhanced operational efficiency three months from now is the height of naivete. Gasoline and electricity prices have both been hiked. Everyone is demanding a review of the performance of China Petroleum and Taipower. These two state-owned enterprises should seize the opportunity to push through reforms so that their organizations may be reborn.
中油台電的內部改革刻不容緩
2012-04-19中國時報
油電雙漲，帶動各項民生用品百物齊漲，民怨滿天，尤其中低收入者受到衝擊最大；另一方面，中油、台電虧損累累，員工卻享高薪與優渥福利，連保全人員都有百萬年薪，且不論盈虧獎金越領越多，成為另一種「肥貓」。油電雙漲後，中油、台電若轉虧為盈，員工還可領更多獎金，形同瘦了百姓，肥了中油、台電，這樣畸形的制度已到了非改革不可的地步。
這次油價平均上漲逾一成，電價上漲一成六至三成五。經濟部評估，油電雙漲將使今年物價年增率增加○．八三個百分點，為二．二九％；經濟成長率降低○．四八個百分點，勉強維持三．三七％。儘管平均數來看，影響有限，但對個別產業則是生死存亡之戰，以計程車業者為例，油價上漲一成，意味著成本增加而獲利減少，在民生物價紛紛喊漲情況下，衝擊之大可想而之。
台灣的能源完全依賴進口，沒有實施全球最低油、電價格的本錢，如此不但變相鼓勵浪費且由全體納稅人補貼用油用電大戶，形成更大的不公不義。因此，油電價格適度反應成本，有其必要性與正當性。不過，民眾開始勒緊褲帶過苦日子之際，中油、台電長期存在的沉痾也必須徹底檢討，不能完全把經營虧損的帳算在「凍漲」上。
中油、台電在寡占經營之下，究竟有那些畸形發展？看看審計部報告就知道。依審計部調查，中油去年稅前虧損三八六億餘元，績效獎金總額高達四十八億餘元；台電去年稅前虧損四三三億餘元，績效獎金編列八十四億餘元，遠超過預算數卅九億餘元。中油、台電總計共虧損八百多億元，獎金卻發放一百三十多億元。為何國營事業虧損累累，獎金越領越多，依中油、台電的說法，這些績效獎金的發放都經過經濟部核准，難怪中美經濟策進會理事長、前中鋼董事長王鍾渝批評，「國營事業績效不好，是政府造成的。」
再看人事成本，依審計部調查，中油去年人事費用約二四七億餘元，每位員工人事成本一六二萬元；台電去年人事費用約四三五億餘元，每位員工人事成本一五九萬元。這樣高的人事成本大約是一般工業及服務業平均值的二點五倍。兩家公司由於人力結構老化，呈現人力斷層危機。儘管中油、台電聲稱人事成本占總支出比例不高，不過，中油、台電員工薪資優於其他民營事業是不爭事實。比較中油、台塑員工每人每年的貢獻度，中油只有六千多萬元，台塑則高達一億八千多萬元，更凸顯了中油的績效不彰。
至於員工福利方面，中油每年編列高達一億多元做為員工多種購油優惠補貼，台電則每年編列二千七百多萬元電價補貼支出。在油電雙漲的效應下，中油、台電員工享受這麼高的購油、購電優惠補助，的確令民眾氣結。如今在朝野立委強烈炮轟下，台電已決定全數取消員工用電優惠，中油也表示將研擬縮減或取消購油優惠補貼。從這個小小例子可以發現，在現行國營體制下，大家一起吃大鍋飯，如果不是外界壓力大到難以抗衡，要寄望中油、台電等國營事業進行體制內的改革，難如登天。
為平息民怨，經濟部日前成立「台電及中油公司經營改善小組」，延攬企業界、管理學者、消費者代表等，全面檢討台電、中油的經營效率、採購制度、人事制度與民營化進程，三個月內提出檢討報告。究竟台灣的油、電市場該如何落實自由化，中油與台電如何加速民營化，這些根本問題都該一併檢討。
面對財務黑洞、人才斷層等問題，台電董事長陳貴明曾表示「晚上幾乎都睡不著覺。」不知道中油董事長是否同樣睡不著？冰凍三尺非一日之寒，中油與台電內部充滿這麼多不效率，主管機關經濟部難辭其咎；如果中油與台電的組織與經營形態不改變，期待三個月後出爐的檢討報告就能提升其經營效率，這樣的想法未免太過天真。油電雙漲，各界要求中油與台電檢討績效的聲浪居高不下，兩家國營企業應把握時機進行改革，讓自己脫胎換骨。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 19, 2012
Summary: China Petroleum and Taipower are plagued by gross inefficiency. The Ministry of Economic Affairs can hardly escape blame. If the organization and management of China Petroleum and Taipower remain unchanged, then to expect a report of enhanced operational efficiency three months from now is the height of naivete. Gasoline and electricity prices have both been hiked. Everyone is demanding a review of the performance of China Petroleum and Taipower. These two state-owned enterprises should seize the opportunity to push through reforms so that their organizations may be reborn.
Full Text below:
Both gasoline and electricity prices have been hiked. This has led to price hikes in many consumer goods. Everyone is grumbling. Middle and low income people have been the hardest hit. China Petroleum and Taipower are losing money. Yet their employees continue receiving high salaries and excellent benefits. Even security guards receive one million NT annual salaries. Regardless of whether the companies earn profits or suffer losses, employee bonuses continue increasing. They have become a whole new category of fat cats. Gasoline and electricity prices have both been hiked. If China Petroleum and Taipower can turn their companies around. employees will receive even larger bonuses. The general public is being ripped off to enrich China Petroleum and TaiPower, The system is so twisted, it must be reformed.
Gasoline prices recently rose over 10%. Electricity prices rose between 16% and 31%. The Ministry of Economic Affairs estimates that gasoline and electricity prices will result in a 0.83% to 2.29% increase in this year's CPI. The growth rate will decrease 0.48%, lowering it to 3.37%. These averages imply tha tthe impact is limited. But many businesses are fighthing to survive. Taxi drivers are one example. Rising gasoline prices mean increased overhead and diminished profits. Consumer prices have steadily increased. The impact is not hard to imagine.
Taiwan's energy is totally dependent on imports, We lack the wherewithal to maintain low across the board gasoline and electricity prices. Attempting to do so encourages waste and forces taxpayers to subsidize the biggest users of gasoline and electricity. The result is an even greater injustice. Gasoline and electricity prices must reflect their costs, This is necessary and legitimate. But people have begun tightening their belts. China Petroleum and TaiPower's problems are long-standing, and must be closely scrutinized. Operating losses must not simply be covered by the price freeze.
China Petroleum and TaiPower are oligopolies. What sort of strange developments has this led to? A report from the Bureau of Audit tells all. Last year China Petroleum's pre-tax loss was 38.6 billion NT. Performance bonuses amounted to 4.8 billion NT. Last year Taipower's pre-tax loss was 43.3 billion NT. Performance bonuses amounted to 8.4 billion NT, This far exceeds the budget estimate of 3.9 billion NT. China Petroleum and TaiPower together lost 80 billion NT, Yet they paid out over 13 billion NT in bonuses. State-owned enterprises rack up one loss after another. Yet bonuses increase, again and again. China Petroleum and TaiPower say the performance bonuses were approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. No wonder Wang Chung-yu, Chairman of the ROC-USA Business Council, and former Chairman of China Steel, said "The poor performance of state-owned enterprises was caused by the government."
Now look at personnel costs, According to the Bureau of Audit, Last year China Petroleum personnel costs were over 24.7 billion NT. Each employee cost 1.62 million NT. Last year Taipower personnel costs were over 4.35 billion NT. Each employee cost 1.59 million NT. Such high personnel costs are roughly double the industrial and service sector average. The two companies' employees are aging. A crisis of continuity looms. China Petroleum and Taipower claim that personnel costs are not that high relative to total expenditures. But China Petroleum and TaiPower employee salaries are better than other private enterprises. That is an indisputable fact. Compare the annual per capita contribution made by the employees of China Petroleum against those of the Formosa Plastics Group. China Petroleum contributes only 160 million NT. Formosa Plastics contributes as much as 280 million NT. This further highlights China Petroleum's inefficiency.
Now look at employee benefits. Each year China Petroleum provides its employees with over $100 million NT in gasoline subsidies, as a fringe benefit. Each year Taipower provides its employees with over 27 million NT in electricity subsidies. Gasoline and electricity prices have both been hiked. China Petroleum and TaiPower employees meanwhile, enjoy generous gasoline and electricity subsidies. Naturally people are angry. Ruling and opposition legislators are blasting them. Taipower has decided to abolish several electricity subsidies. China Petroleum has said it will reduce or cancel gasoline subsidies. This shows that under the existing system of state owned enterprises, everyone dips into the same pot. Outside pressure must be overwhelming. Expecting China Petroleum, Taipower, and other state-owned enterprises to reform themselves from within, is expecting pigs to fly.
To quell public discontent, the Ministry of Economic Affairs recently established "Taiwan Power Company and Chinese Petroleum Corporation Business Improvement Teams." They recruited people from the business community, management experts, consumer advocates, and others, These people will conduct a comprehensive review of TaiPower and China Petroleum. They will examine their operational efficiency, procurement systems, personnel systems, privatization process, then submit a report in three months. How should we liberalize the market for gasoline and electricity? How should we accelerate the privatization of China Petroleum and TaiPower? These are the fundamental questions that will be asked.
Facing a financial black hole and a shortage of talent, Taipower Chairman Chen Ku-ming said, "I find it almost impossible to sleep at night." We wonder. Does the chairman of China Petroleum find it almost impossible to sleep at night? Rome was not built in a day. China Petroleum and Taipower are plagued by gross inefficiency. The Ministry of Economic Affairs can hardly escape blame. If the organization and management of China Petroleum and Taipower remain unchanged, then to expect a report of enhanced operational efficiency three months from now is the height of naivete. Gasoline and electricity prices have both been hiked. Everyone is demanding a review of the performance of China Petroleum and Taipower. These two state-owned enterprises should seize the opportunity to push through reforms so that their organizations may be reborn.
中油台電的內部改革刻不容緩
2012-04-19中國時報
油電雙漲，帶動各項民生用品百物齊漲，民怨滿天，尤其中低收入者受到衝擊最大；另一方面，中油、台電虧損累累，員工卻享高薪與優渥福利，連保全人員都有百萬年薪，且不論盈虧獎金越領越多，成為另一種「肥貓」。油電雙漲後，中油、台電若轉虧為盈，員工還可領更多獎金，形同瘦了百姓，肥了中油、台電，這樣畸形的制度已到了非改革不可的地步。
這次油價平均上漲逾一成，電價上漲一成六至三成五。經濟部評估，油電雙漲將使今年物價年增率增加○．八三個百分點，為二．二九％；經濟成長率降低○．四八個百分點，勉強維持三．三七％。儘管平均數來看，影響有限，但對個別產業則是生死存亡之戰，以計程車業者為例，油價上漲一成，意味著成本增加而獲利減少，在民生物價紛紛喊漲情況下，衝擊之大可想而之。
台灣的能源完全依賴進口，沒有實施全球最低油、電價格的本錢，如此不但變相鼓勵浪費且由全體納稅人補貼用油用電大戶，形成更大的不公不義。因此，油電價格適度反應成本，有其必要性與正當性。不過，民眾開始勒緊褲帶過苦日子之際，中油、台電長期存在的沉痾也必須徹底檢討，不能完全把經營虧損的帳算在「凍漲」上。
中油、台電在寡占經營之下，究竟有那些畸形發展？看看審計部報告就知道。依審計部調查，中油去年稅前虧損三八六億餘元，績效獎金總額高達四十八億餘元；台電去年稅前虧損四三三億餘元，績效獎金編列八十四億餘元，遠超過預算數卅九億餘元。中油、台電總計共虧損八百多億元，獎金卻發放一百三十多億元。為何國營事業虧損累累，獎金越領越多，依中油、台電的說法，這些績效獎金的發放都經過經濟部核准，難怪中美經濟策進會理事長、前中鋼董事長王鍾渝批評，「國營事業績效不好，是政府造成的。」
再看人事成本，依審計部調查，中油去年人事費用約二四七億餘元，每位員工人事成本一六二萬元；台電去年人事費用約四三五億餘元，每位員工人事成本一五九萬元。這樣高的人事成本大約是一般工業及服務業平均值的二點五倍。兩家公司由於人力結構老化，呈現人力斷層危機。儘管中油、台電聲稱人事成本占總支出比例不高，不過，中油、台電員工薪資優於其他民營事業是不爭事實。比較中油、台塑員工每人每年的貢獻度，中油只有六千多萬元，台塑則高達一億八千多萬元，更凸顯了中油的績效不彰。
至於員工福利方面，中油每年編列高達一億多元做為員工多種購油優惠補貼，台電則每年編列二千七百多萬元電價補貼支出。在油電雙漲的效應下，中油、台電員工享受這麼高的購油、購電優惠補助，的確令民眾氣結。如今在朝野立委強烈炮轟下，台電已決定全數取消員工用電優惠，中油也表示將研擬縮減或取消購油優惠補貼。從這個小小例子可以發現，在現行國營體制下，大家一起吃大鍋飯，如果不是外界壓力大到難以抗衡，要寄望中油、台電等國營事業進行體制內的改革，難如登天。
為平息民怨，經濟部日前成立「台電及中油公司經營改善小組」，延攬企業界、管理學者、消費者代表等，全面檢討台電、中油的經營效率、採購制度、人事制度與民營化進程，三個月內提出檢討報告。究竟台灣的油、電市場該如何落實自由化，中油與台電如何加速民營化，這些根本問題都該一併檢討。
面對財務黑洞、人才斷層等問題，台電董事長陳貴明曾表示「晚上幾乎都睡不著覺。」不知道中油董事長是否同樣睡不著？冰凍三尺非一日之寒，中油與台電內部充滿這麼多不效率，主管機關經濟部難辭其咎；如果中油與台電的組織與經營形態不改變，期待三個月後出爐的檢討報告就能提升其經營效率，這樣的想法未免太過天真。油電雙漲，各界要求中油與台電檢討績效的聲浪居高不下，兩家國營企業應把握時機進行改革，讓自己脫胎換骨。
Wednesday, April 18, 2012
Establish a Protocol for the State of the Nation Report
Establish a Protocol for the State of the Nation Report
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 19, 2012
Summary: We believe the president's State of the Nation Report should retain its multipurpose nature. It should be a policy statement, a vision, and a national ritual. We believe the best mechanism for communication and coopetition between political parties, is a one-on-one, face to face "Party Leaders Summit."
Full Text below:
First, compare two scenarios. One. President Ma has long advocated a "Party Leader Summit." He has long hoped for one-on-one meetings with party leaders, and face to face, in-depth deliberations on national policy. But the opposition DPP has long given him the cold shoulder. Two. The President visits the Legislative Yuan to make his or her State of the Nation Report. But the opposition DPP insists on subjecting the president to Legislative Yuan "interrogation."
This is a consistent pattern in partisan political struggles on Taiwan. An unwillingness to hold one-on-one, face to face, in-depth deliberations on natonal policy, and a preference for free for all gang rumbles. Consider a current example. The ruling and opposition parties are quarreling over whether President Ma should deliver a State of the Nation Report before the Legislative Yuan. President Ma is willing. But the opposition DPP insists on turning it into a Q&A style interrogation.
Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng says he personally believes any interaction "should not be in the form of a question and answer session." According to the constitution, the president is not subject to Legislative Yuan oversight. He is not answerable to the Legislative Yuan. If the president were to accept such a challenge, he would merely muddy the constitutional framework. Wang Jin-pyng's statement is consistent with the constitutional framework of the dual-leadership system.
Consider the framework of the dual-leadership system. If the president submits to Legislative Yuan interrogation, then his role will clash with the premier's. Also, suppose the president is a minority president and must deal with an opposition controlled legislature? Suppose a minority president must deal with an opposition cabinet? The constitutional crisis could be disastrous.
Consider the original intent of the Additional Articles of the Constitution. The president delivered his State of the Nation Report before the National Assembly. It was clearly different from questioning under the framework of the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan. The National Assembly was later dissolved. The system was transferred to the Legislative Yuan, But the distinction should be preserved. It must not be undermined.
But the constitution merely provides the KMT with a shield. The real reason is to prevent opposition parties from using the State of the Nation Report to humiliate the President, and turning a solemn constitutional ritual into a farce. What this would do to the atmosphere in the Legislative Yuan, and what sort of scenarios would appear, can easily be imagined.
The United States adopted a tripartite system for the separation of powers. The president is not answerable to Congress. The President of the United States visits the Congress annually and delivers his State of the Union Address. He reports on the situation at home and abroad. He offers his political vision. He does not take part in an impromptu Q&A session. Once the President finishes speaking, the entire Congress, regardless of party affilition, gives him a standing ovation, and watches as he or she leaves. This has become an important American political rite, a remarkable event that occurs once each year.
Partisan political clashes in the U.S. Congress are quite vehement. Yet the opposition party would never use the president's State of the Union Address as an opportunity to stage a political protest. The same cannot be said of our own Legislative Yuan. The president might not be subjected to interrogation. But the opposition DPP would have all sorts of tricks up its sleeve. If a Q&A style interrogation were actually held, the scenario can easily be imagined.
Actually, if the president visited the Legislative Yuan to make a State of the Nation Report, it would enhance constitutional rule. Each year the president could offer a vision for national policy. He or she could create a national consensus. He or she could establish guidelines for the national policy and administrative efficiency. This is the key role of the President of the United States' annual State of the Union Address. After all, the U.S. President's State of the Union Address remains subject to rigorous scrutiny by rival political parties and by the general public. This message, first heard in Congress, is communicated through various channels. It is not conducted in the form of a live Q&A session. Is our Legislative Yuan incapable of first listening to the Chief Executive's State of the Nation Report and giving him a standing ovation before subjecting his remarks to rigorous scrutiny through other channels?
As mentioned above, under the current "dual-leadership system," interactions between the president and the legislature must adhere strictly to the constitution. Anything else could precipitate a constitutional crisis. Ruling and opposition party legislators have reached a consensus on the State of the Nation Report. They say "If the president refuses to submit to interrogation, he will not be allowed to deliver his report." They flatter themselves. They put the cart before the horse. If for this reason the president is prevented from delivering his State of the Nation Report before the legislature, it will be a major blow to constitutional rule.
We believe the president's State of the Nation Report should retain its multipurpose nature. It should be a policy statement, a vision, and a national ritual. We believe the best mechanism for communication and coopetition between political parties, is a one-on-one, face to face "Party Leaders Summit."
遵行憲法 設立總統國情報告體制
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.04.19 02:03 am
先比較一下這兩個場景：一、馬總統一直鼓吹「政黨領袖高峰會」，希望與各黨黨魁一對一、面對面深入研議國政，但在野黨始終反應冷漠；二、如今，關於總統赴立院作國情報告的體制，在野黨則非要主張把總統拉到立院「質詢」。
這正是台灣政黨鬥爭的一貫模式：不願一對一、面對面深入研議國政，反而喜歡打群架。當前的實例是：為了馬總統是否赴立法院作國情報告，朝野政黨吵得不可開交；馬總統願意應邀前往，但在野黨堅持要一問一答地「質詢」。
立法院長王金平說，他個人認為「不宜一問一答」；因為，依據憲法，總統不受立法院監督，不對立法院負責；如果總統接受「質詢」，憲法體制即告混亂。王金平的說法，符合「雙首長制」的憲政架構。
就「雙首長制」的架構言，倘總統在立法院答覆質詢，非但將與行政院長發生角色衝突，且若總統為「朝小野大」的「少數總統」，或「少數總統」任命了國會多數黨組閣，其可能引爆的憲政危機將至不堪設想。
按憲法增修條文原本設計，總統作國情報告的對象為國民大會，可證與行政及立法院之間的質詢體制有所區隔；後來因廢了國民大會，此制乃移至立法院，但其區隔仍應維持，不宜破壞。
不過，引據憲法規定，只是國民黨的擋箭牌；真正的原因，是防備在野黨運用國情報告的場域羞辱總統，把莊嚴的憲法儀節扭曲成一場鬧劇。就立法院的文化及氣質言，那種場景是用膝蓋也可想像的。
美國採三權分立，總統亦不對國會負責。美國總統每年赴國會作國情咨文，報告國內外情勢，發表政治願景，亦不作即席詢答；總統言畢，全院舉座不分黨派一律起立鼓掌，目送總統離席。此一節目，已成美國政治的重要儀節，是一年一度舉世矚目的大事。
美國國會的政黨制衡相當嚴厲，然在野黨不會拿總統國情咨文這樣的場域作政治抗爭；但我們的立法院，即使總統不作答詢，已可預見在野黨必是花樣百出，若真進行一問一答，那種場景豈堪想像？
其實，若能創下總統赴立院作國情報告的憲例，對民主憲政的提升極具意義。一方面，在每個年度能由總統發表國政願景，可以凝聚國人共識；另一方面，對政府的政策方向及執政績效，亦具指引及砥礪的功能。這正是美國總統每年國情咨文的主要作用；何況，美國總統的國情咨文，亦必然受到各政黨及輿論的嚴格檢視，這在國會聽取咨文後即循各種管道及機制體現，卻不是以現場詢答的方式進行。我們的立法院，能不能也在聽罷國家元首的國情報告後，給予起立鼓掌，然後再循其他管道及機制加以嚴格檢驗？
如前所述，在目前「雙首長制」下，總統與立院的憲政互動，必須準確規範，否則即可能發生憲政危機。目前朝野對國情報告的爭執，大有「不給質詢，就不要報告」的態勢；這猶如抱櫝還珠，實在是本末倒置。倘若因此而不能建立總統國情報告的體制，那將是國家憲政的重大損傷。
我們認為，總統國情報告的體制，仍應維持其「政策宣示／願景呈現／國家典儀」的多重性質；至於各政黨之間的溝通及競合互動，若能舉行一對一、面對面的「政黨領袖高峰會」，當為最佳機制。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 19, 2012
Summary: We believe the president's State of the Nation Report should retain its multipurpose nature. It should be a policy statement, a vision, and a national ritual. We believe the best mechanism for communication and coopetition between political parties, is a one-on-one, face to face "Party Leaders Summit."
Full Text below:
First, compare two scenarios. One. President Ma has long advocated a "Party Leader Summit." He has long hoped for one-on-one meetings with party leaders, and face to face, in-depth deliberations on national policy. But the opposition DPP has long given him the cold shoulder. Two. The President visits the Legislative Yuan to make his or her State of the Nation Report. But the opposition DPP insists on subjecting the president to Legislative Yuan "interrogation."
This is a consistent pattern in partisan political struggles on Taiwan. An unwillingness to hold one-on-one, face to face, in-depth deliberations on natonal policy, and a preference for free for all gang rumbles. Consider a current example. The ruling and opposition parties are quarreling over whether President Ma should deliver a State of the Nation Report before the Legislative Yuan. President Ma is willing. But the opposition DPP insists on turning it into a Q&A style interrogation.
Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng says he personally believes any interaction "should not be in the form of a question and answer session." According to the constitution, the president is not subject to Legislative Yuan oversight. He is not answerable to the Legislative Yuan. If the president were to accept such a challenge, he would merely muddy the constitutional framework. Wang Jin-pyng's statement is consistent with the constitutional framework of the dual-leadership system.
Consider the framework of the dual-leadership system. If the president submits to Legislative Yuan interrogation, then his role will clash with the premier's. Also, suppose the president is a minority president and must deal with an opposition controlled legislature? Suppose a minority president must deal with an opposition cabinet? The constitutional crisis could be disastrous.
Consider the original intent of the Additional Articles of the Constitution. The president delivered his State of the Nation Report before the National Assembly. It was clearly different from questioning under the framework of the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan. The National Assembly was later dissolved. The system was transferred to the Legislative Yuan, But the distinction should be preserved. It must not be undermined.
But the constitution merely provides the KMT with a shield. The real reason is to prevent opposition parties from using the State of the Nation Report to humiliate the President, and turning a solemn constitutional ritual into a farce. What this would do to the atmosphere in the Legislative Yuan, and what sort of scenarios would appear, can easily be imagined.
The United States adopted a tripartite system for the separation of powers. The president is not answerable to Congress. The President of the United States visits the Congress annually and delivers his State of the Union Address. He reports on the situation at home and abroad. He offers his political vision. He does not take part in an impromptu Q&A session. Once the President finishes speaking, the entire Congress, regardless of party affilition, gives him a standing ovation, and watches as he or she leaves. This has become an important American political rite, a remarkable event that occurs once each year.
Partisan political clashes in the U.S. Congress are quite vehement. Yet the opposition party would never use the president's State of the Union Address as an opportunity to stage a political protest. The same cannot be said of our own Legislative Yuan. The president might not be subjected to interrogation. But the opposition DPP would have all sorts of tricks up its sleeve. If a Q&A style interrogation were actually held, the scenario can easily be imagined.
Actually, if the president visited the Legislative Yuan to make a State of the Nation Report, it would enhance constitutional rule. Each year the president could offer a vision for national policy. He or she could create a national consensus. He or she could establish guidelines for the national policy and administrative efficiency. This is the key role of the President of the United States' annual State of the Union Address. After all, the U.S. President's State of the Union Address remains subject to rigorous scrutiny by rival political parties and by the general public. This message, first heard in Congress, is communicated through various channels. It is not conducted in the form of a live Q&A session. Is our Legislative Yuan incapable of first listening to the Chief Executive's State of the Nation Report and giving him a standing ovation before subjecting his remarks to rigorous scrutiny through other channels?
As mentioned above, under the current "dual-leadership system," interactions between the president and the legislature must adhere strictly to the constitution. Anything else could precipitate a constitutional crisis. Ruling and opposition party legislators have reached a consensus on the State of the Nation Report. They say "If the president refuses to submit to interrogation, he will not be allowed to deliver his report." They flatter themselves. They put the cart before the horse. If for this reason the president is prevented from delivering his State of the Nation Report before the legislature, it will be a major blow to constitutional rule.
We believe the president's State of the Nation Report should retain its multipurpose nature. It should be a policy statement, a vision, and a national ritual. We believe the best mechanism for communication and coopetition between political parties, is a one-on-one, face to face "Party Leaders Summit."
遵行憲法 設立總統國情報告體制
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.04.19 02:03 am
先比較一下這兩個場景：一、馬總統一直鼓吹「政黨領袖高峰會」，希望與各黨黨魁一對一、面對面深入研議國政，但在野黨始終反應冷漠；二、如今，關於總統赴立院作國情報告的體制，在野黨則非要主張把總統拉到立院「質詢」。
這正是台灣政黨鬥爭的一貫模式：不願一對一、面對面深入研議國政，反而喜歡打群架。當前的實例是：為了馬總統是否赴立法院作國情報告，朝野政黨吵得不可開交；馬總統願意應邀前往，但在野黨堅持要一問一答地「質詢」。
立法院長王金平說，他個人認為「不宜一問一答」；因為，依據憲法，總統不受立法院監督，不對立法院負責；如果總統接受「質詢」，憲法體制即告混亂。王金平的說法，符合「雙首長制」的憲政架構。
就「雙首長制」的架構言，倘總統在立法院答覆質詢，非但將與行政院長發生角色衝突，且若總統為「朝小野大」的「少數總統」，或「少數總統」任命了國會多數黨組閣，其可能引爆的憲政危機將至不堪設想。
按憲法增修條文原本設計，總統作國情報告的對象為國民大會，可證與行政及立法院之間的質詢體制有所區隔；後來因廢了國民大會，此制乃移至立法院，但其區隔仍應維持，不宜破壞。
不過，引據憲法規定，只是國民黨的擋箭牌；真正的原因，是防備在野黨運用國情報告的場域羞辱總統，把莊嚴的憲法儀節扭曲成一場鬧劇。就立法院的文化及氣質言，那種場景是用膝蓋也可想像的。
美國採三權分立，總統亦不對國會負責。美國總統每年赴國會作國情咨文，報告國內外情勢，發表政治願景，亦不作即席詢答；總統言畢，全院舉座不分黨派一律起立鼓掌，目送總統離席。此一節目，已成美國政治的重要儀節，是一年一度舉世矚目的大事。
美國國會的政黨制衡相當嚴厲，然在野黨不會拿總統國情咨文這樣的場域作政治抗爭；但我們的立法院，即使總統不作答詢，已可預見在野黨必是花樣百出，若真進行一問一答，那種場景豈堪想像？
其實，若能創下總統赴立院作國情報告的憲例，對民主憲政的提升極具意義。一方面，在每個年度能由總統發表國政願景，可以凝聚國人共識；另一方面，對政府的政策方向及執政績效，亦具指引及砥礪的功能。這正是美國總統每年國情咨文的主要作用；何況，美國總統的國情咨文，亦必然受到各政黨及輿論的嚴格檢視，這在國會聽取咨文後即循各種管道及機制體現，卻不是以現場詢答的方式進行。我們的立法院，能不能也在聽罷國家元首的國情報告後，給予起立鼓掌，然後再循其他管道及機制加以嚴格檢驗？
如前所述，在目前「雙首長制」下，總統與立院的憲政互動，必須準確規範，否則即可能發生憲政危機。目前朝野對國情報告的爭執，大有「不給質詢，就不要報告」的態勢；這猶如抱櫝還珠，實在是本末倒置。倘若因此而不能建立總統國情報告的體制，那將是國家憲政的重大損傷。
我們認為，總統國情報告的體制，仍應維持其「政策宣示／願景呈現／國家典儀」的多重性質；至於各政黨之間的溝通及競合互動，若能舉行一對一、面對面的「政黨領袖高峰會」，當為最佳機制。
Diplomatic Relations: A Common Asset
Diplomatic Relations: A Common Asset
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 17, 2012
Summary: The Republic of China's participation in the activities of the international community is relevant to everyone's welfare, to our nation's survival, and to our continued prosperity. Foreign aid must be subject to reasonable oversight and effective supervision. Foreign aid that must be spent, should be spent. The Republic of China's foreign aid provided the children of Burkina Faso with solar powered table lamps, enabling them to do their homework. If the Republic of China can ignite a few lamps, and increase the amount of light and warmth in the world, what's wrong with that?
Full Text below:
Today, President Ma Ying-jeou concluded his Voyage of Friendship visit to Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Swaziland. This is the sixth state visit he has embarked upon since taking office. This is the first time he has visited Africa. His visit bolstered ties between the Republic of China and her African allies. It gave the public an opportunity to understand the upside of the Republic of China's friendly relations with others.
The visit included a great deal of diplomatic protocol. It also included a great deal of interaction with the local population. It enabled President Ma to show the public on Taiwan how our support for the local populace was actually helping people. It enabled everyone to see that our money was doing many positive things. President Ma and other heads of state even did push-ups, hauled bags of rice, and otherwise entertained themselves. Their interactions brought the two sides closer together.
Unfortunately, opposition DPP legislators have been sniping at Ma's diplomatic truce. They claim that Taipei has become a vassal of Beijing. They claim that the visit was pointless. During the visit, Ma announced that we were providing them with financial assistance. Meanwhile, back home, the government raised gasoline and electricity prices. It imposed a capital gains tax, This invited criticism. President Ma's overseas trip was rushed. Yet he felt compelled to respond from time to time through facebook.
It is true that the Republic of China does not have many allies in Africa. They are having a difficult time with economic development. Their living standards are not as high as Taiwan's. Some on Taiwan may look down their noses at these tiny allies. Subconsciously, we feel more than just a sense of superiority. The only nations willing to establish diplomatic relations with us are small and poor. In order to maintain diplomatic relations with them, we are forced to provide them with economic resources. As a result, we feel low self-esteem. We feel humiliated. We feel resentful. Our resentment distorts the way we perceive our allies and the foreign aid we provide them.
The fact is, exchanges between members of the international community have always been based on mutual benefit, cooperation, and quid pro quo relationships. Cooperation must be beneficial to all, Only by benefiting others, can one obtain others' cooperation. Only by benefiting oneself, can one make sure that cooperation is worthwhile. What each country wants and what each country is able to give, are not the same thing. Both sides must communicate with each other, consult with each other, bargain with each other. They must seek the optimum conditions for exchanges. Only then can they reach a cooperative arrangement.
Under international law, the Republic of China government needs diplomatic recognition to support its claim as a sovereign state. It makes no difference that we enjoy diplomatic relations with only 20 odd states. That is enough to provides international proof of our sovereign status. That is enough to ensure votes or expressions of solidarity during our calls for participation in international organizations. Diplomacy is a common asset that must be cultivated regardless which party one belongs to. To use the epithet "pointless" to describe our diplomacy or our allies, demonstrates a lack of respect for this essential national asset.
The Republic of China has been isolated by the international community. But it seeks to return to the international community. The Republic of China hopes to regain international recognition and respect. As a member of the international community, we have exceptional economic strength. Living standards are relatively high. We have the wherewithal to provide economic support for our allies. We have the wherewithal to contribute to the welfare of the disadvantaged. These are all worthwhile assets.
We have sought participation in international activities for many years, including the Conference on International Cooperation and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Republic of China has contributed to charitable activities in many countries, not just our diplomatic allies. Self interest is often the prime consideration in international politics. But many other activities are rooted in human compassion and transcend politics. This is exactly how friendship and mutual understanding take root.
The Republic of China hopes to participate in the activities of the international community. Therefore we must demonstrate that we are a developed nation that can make a positive contribution to others. That will enable us to join. The international community will receive real benefits. If the Republic of China is democratic, open, and willing to give back the international community, it will be affirmed by the international community. If we wish to return to the international arena, but are unwilling to contribute, how can we convince others to let us join? The OECD requires foreign aid expenditures amounting to 0.28% of GDP. Our government's foreign aid expenditures amount to only 0.10% of GDP. The fact is our contributions are still too small.
Domestic prices are rising at the moment. That is why our foreign aid has provoked controversy. Scare resources may have a crowding out effect. But these are matters that must not be conflated. Our financial structure needs improvement. It must reflect costs. We must make taxes more equitable. We must ensure long term fiscal stability. Only then can the ship of state operate smoothly. Only then can we improve foreign relations, enhance the Republic of China's international image, and safeguard her sovereignty and dignity. These are all equally important.
The Republic of China's participation in the activities of the international community is relevant to everyone's welfare, to our nation's survival, and to our continued prosperity. Foreign aid must be subject to reasonable oversight and effective supervision. Foreign aid that must be spent, should be spent. The Republic of China's foreign aid provided the children of Burkina Faso with solar powered table lamps, enabling them to do their homework. If the Republic of China can ignite a few lamps, and increase the amount of light and warmth in the world, what's wrong with that?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.18
社論－外交是全民資產 需要齊心維護
本報訊
馬英九總統今天完成訪問布吉納法索、甘比亞及史瓦濟蘭王國的「仁誼之旅」，這是他就任以來第六度出訪，也是首度走訪非洲。此行不僅進一步加強我國與非洲友邦的邦誼，也讓國人了解台灣援助友邦的正面意義。
這次訪問除了正式儀節之外，還安排了不少與當地民眾的互動，馬總統藉此讓台灣民眾看到我們的支援，為當地人民提供了哪些具體的幫助，讓大家知道我們的錢做了不少善事；甚至馬總統還和對方元首比起伏地挺身、扛米袋，娛樂之餘，也在活潑互動中拉近友誼。
遺憾的是，在野黨立委批判馬英九的外交休兵，已經讓台灣彷彿成為中國的藩屬，此次出訪是可有可無的「雞肋出訪」。而在訪問期間宣布提供經濟援助後，由於國內正值油電調漲、證所稅研擬開徵，也引發若干批評，以至於馬總統人在海外行程忙碌之餘，還不時得透過臉書提出答辯。
沒錯，我國在非洲的友邦規模並不大，經濟發展也相當困難，民眾生活狀況明顯不如台灣。台灣有些人也許因此看不起這些小友邦，因為潛意識裡，我們不只有優越感，還為只能和小而窮的國家建交，為維持邦交必須持續付出經濟資源，感到既屈辱又自卑，這樣的怨恨，扭曲了我們看待友邦及對外援助的心態。
其實，在國際社會中，國與國之間的交往，本來就建立在互利、合作與利益交換上。合作必須利人利己，利人才能得到對方的配合，利己才有推動合作的價值。而每個國家想要的、能給的都不一樣，雙方必須溝通磋商討價還價，找到合適的交換條件，便能形成合作關係的內涵。
在國際法上，台灣仍然需要外交承認作為主權國家地位的支撐，不管我們的邦交國是不是只有廿幾國，它仍然是一項國際承認的證明，也是我們在參與國際組織需要表決或聲援時的基本支持聲音。外交是全民的資產，不管哪個政黨執政都一樣要經營。「雞肋」這種字眼，不管是在形容外交還是對方國家，都對外交這項重要國家資產缺乏尊重與維護之心。
受到國際孤立的台灣，一直希望能重回國際社會，也希望台灣的存在價值能夠得到國際間的肯定與尊重。那麼，作為國際社會的一員，尤其是經貿實力屬於前段班、人民生活相對富足的台灣，對後段班的友邦加以扶持，為促進弱勢民眾福祉作出些貢獻，也是很有意義的事。
事實上，台灣這些年來努力尋求參與國際事務，包括國際合作會議、歐洲復興銀行的發展計畫等等，台灣對許多國家的公益活動都提供資源，而且並不限於對邦交國。國際政治固然往往以利害算計為主要考量，但仍舊有許多實質交流活動，是超越政治而回歸於單純人性的，這也正是友誼與相互了解能夠植根之處。
台灣想參與國際社會，就必須展現自己是個能帶來正面能量與貢獻的優質國家，能夠得到台灣的加入，對國際社會將有實質助益。而一個民主開放並且願意回饋國際的台灣，在各方面都會受到國際社會肯定；如果我們一味要求重回國際舞台，卻吝於付出，何以說服別人讓台灣加入呢？ＯＥＣＤ（國際經合組織）規定援外經費占ＧＤＰ的○．二八％，而我國僅占○．一％，其實仍屬偏低。
由於正逢國內多項費用起漲之際，我國對外金援也引發議論，但是，資源固然可能有排擠效應，卻也不能全部混在一起談。國家的財政結構的確需要更加健全化，在反映成本、加強賦稅正義下，使財政運作可長可久，國家各項事務才能夠順利推展。而推動對外關係、提升台灣國際形象、維護台灣主權尊嚴，同樣也是重要的國家事務。
台灣的國際參與攸關人民福祉與國家生存發展機會，只要是經過合理審查與有效監督，應該花的援外錢還是應該花。看一看布吉納法索的小朋友在台灣援贈的太陽能檯燈下做功課的畫面，如果台灣能夠為這個世界點燃幾盞溫暖的燈，有什麼不好？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 17, 2012
Summary: The Republic of China's participation in the activities of the international community is relevant to everyone's welfare, to our nation's survival, and to our continued prosperity. Foreign aid must be subject to reasonable oversight and effective supervision. Foreign aid that must be spent, should be spent. The Republic of China's foreign aid provided the children of Burkina Faso with solar powered table lamps, enabling them to do their homework. If the Republic of China can ignite a few lamps, and increase the amount of light and warmth in the world, what's wrong with that?
Full Text below:
Today, President Ma Ying-jeou concluded his Voyage of Friendship visit to Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Swaziland. This is the sixth state visit he has embarked upon since taking office. This is the first time he has visited Africa. His visit bolstered ties between the Republic of China and her African allies. It gave the public an opportunity to understand the upside of the Republic of China's friendly relations with others.
The visit included a great deal of diplomatic protocol. It also included a great deal of interaction with the local population. It enabled President Ma to show the public on Taiwan how our support for the local populace was actually helping people. It enabled everyone to see that our money was doing many positive things. President Ma and other heads of state even did push-ups, hauled bags of rice, and otherwise entertained themselves. Their interactions brought the two sides closer together.
Unfortunately, opposition DPP legislators have been sniping at Ma's diplomatic truce. They claim that Taipei has become a vassal of Beijing. They claim that the visit was pointless. During the visit, Ma announced that we were providing them with financial assistance. Meanwhile, back home, the government raised gasoline and electricity prices. It imposed a capital gains tax, This invited criticism. President Ma's overseas trip was rushed. Yet he felt compelled to respond from time to time through facebook.
It is true that the Republic of China does not have many allies in Africa. They are having a difficult time with economic development. Their living standards are not as high as Taiwan's. Some on Taiwan may look down their noses at these tiny allies. Subconsciously, we feel more than just a sense of superiority. The only nations willing to establish diplomatic relations with us are small and poor. In order to maintain diplomatic relations with them, we are forced to provide them with economic resources. As a result, we feel low self-esteem. We feel humiliated. We feel resentful. Our resentment distorts the way we perceive our allies and the foreign aid we provide them.
The fact is, exchanges between members of the international community have always been based on mutual benefit, cooperation, and quid pro quo relationships. Cooperation must be beneficial to all, Only by benefiting others, can one obtain others' cooperation. Only by benefiting oneself, can one make sure that cooperation is worthwhile. What each country wants and what each country is able to give, are not the same thing. Both sides must communicate with each other, consult with each other, bargain with each other. They must seek the optimum conditions for exchanges. Only then can they reach a cooperative arrangement.
Under international law, the Republic of China government needs diplomatic recognition to support its claim as a sovereign state. It makes no difference that we enjoy diplomatic relations with only 20 odd states. That is enough to provides international proof of our sovereign status. That is enough to ensure votes or expressions of solidarity during our calls for participation in international organizations. Diplomacy is a common asset that must be cultivated regardless which party one belongs to. To use the epithet "pointless" to describe our diplomacy or our allies, demonstrates a lack of respect for this essential national asset.
The Republic of China has been isolated by the international community. But it seeks to return to the international community. The Republic of China hopes to regain international recognition and respect. As a member of the international community, we have exceptional economic strength. Living standards are relatively high. We have the wherewithal to provide economic support for our allies. We have the wherewithal to contribute to the welfare of the disadvantaged. These are all worthwhile assets.
We have sought participation in international activities for many years, including the Conference on International Cooperation and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Republic of China has contributed to charitable activities in many countries, not just our diplomatic allies. Self interest is often the prime consideration in international politics. But many other activities are rooted in human compassion and transcend politics. This is exactly how friendship and mutual understanding take root.
The Republic of China hopes to participate in the activities of the international community. Therefore we must demonstrate that we are a developed nation that can make a positive contribution to others. That will enable us to join. The international community will receive real benefits. If the Republic of China is democratic, open, and willing to give back the international community, it will be affirmed by the international community. If we wish to return to the international arena, but are unwilling to contribute, how can we convince others to let us join? The OECD requires foreign aid expenditures amounting to 0.28% of GDP. Our government's foreign aid expenditures amount to only 0.10% of GDP. The fact is our contributions are still too small.
Domestic prices are rising at the moment. That is why our foreign aid has provoked controversy. Scare resources may have a crowding out effect. But these are matters that must not be conflated. Our financial structure needs improvement. It must reflect costs. We must make taxes more equitable. We must ensure long term fiscal stability. Only then can the ship of state operate smoothly. Only then can we improve foreign relations, enhance the Republic of China's international image, and safeguard her sovereignty and dignity. These are all equally important.
The Republic of China's participation in the activities of the international community is relevant to everyone's welfare, to our nation's survival, and to our continued prosperity. Foreign aid must be subject to reasonable oversight and effective supervision. Foreign aid that must be spent, should be spent. The Republic of China's foreign aid provided the children of Burkina Faso with solar powered table lamps, enabling them to do their homework. If the Republic of China can ignite a few lamps, and increase the amount of light and warmth in the world, what's wrong with that?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.18
社論－外交是全民資產 需要齊心維護
本報訊
馬英九總統今天完成訪問布吉納法索、甘比亞及史瓦濟蘭王國的「仁誼之旅」，這是他就任以來第六度出訪，也是首度走訪非洲。此行不僅進一步加強我國與非洲友邦的邦誼，也讓國人了解台灣援助友邦的正面意義。
這次訪問除了正式儀節之外，還安排了不少與當地民眾的互動，馬總統藉此讓台灣民眾看到我們的支援，為當地人民提供了哪些具體的幫助，讓大家知道我們的錢做了不少善事；甚至馬總統還和對方元首比起伏地挺身、扛米袋，娛樂之餘，也在活潑互動中拉近友誼。
遺憾的是，在野黨立委批判馬英九的外交休兵，已經讓台灣彷彿成為中國的藩屬，此次出訪是可有可無的「雞肋出訪」。而在訪問期間宣布提供經濟援助後，由於國內正值油電調漲、證所稅研擬開徵，也引發若干批評，以至於馬總統人在海外行程忙碌之餘，還不時得透過臉書提出答辯。
沒錯，我國在非洲的友邦規模並不大，經濟發展也相當困難，民眾生活狀況明顯不如台灣。台灣有些人也許因此看不起這些小友邦，因為潛意識裡，我們不只有優越感，還為只能和小而窮的國家建交，為維持邦交必須持續付出經濟資源，感到既屈辱又自卑，這樣的怨恨，扭曲了我們看待友邦及對外援助的心態。
其實，在國際社會中，國與國之間的交往，本來就建立在互利、合作與利益交換上。合作必須利人利己，利人才能得到對方的配合，利己才有推動合作的價值。而每個國家想要的、能給的都不一樣，雙方必須溝通磋商討價還價，找到合適的交換條件，便能形成合作關係的內涵。
在國際法上，台灣仍然需要外交承認作為主權國家地位的支撐，不管我們的邦交國是不是只有廿幾國，它仍然是一項國際承認的證明，也是我們在參與國際組織需要表決或聲援時的基本支持聲音。外交是全民的資產，不管哪個政黨執政都一樣要經營。「雞肋」這種字眼，不管是在形容外交還是對方國家，都對外交這項重要國家資產缺乏尊重與維護之心。
受到國際孤立的台灣，一直希望能重回國際社會，也希望台灣的存在價值能夠得到國際間的肯定與尊重。那麼，作為國際社會的一員，尤其是經貿實力屬於前段班、人民生活相對富足的台灣，對後段班的友邦加以扶持，為促進弱勢民眾福祉作出些貢獻，也是很有意義的事。
事實上，台灣這些年來努力尋求參與國際事務，包括國際合作會議、歐洲復興銀行的發展計畫等等，台灣對許多國家的公益活動都提供資源，而且並不限於對邦交國。國際政治固然往往以利害算計為主要考量，但仍舊有許多實質交流活動，是超越政治而回歸於單純人性的，這也正是友誼與相互了解能夠植根之處。
台灣想參與國際社會，就必須展現自己是個能帶來正面能量與貢獻的優質國家，能夠得到台灣的加入，對國際社會將有實質助益。而一個民主開放並且願意回饋國際的台灣，在各方面都會受到國際社會肯定；如果我們一味要求重回國際舞台，卻吝於付出，何以說服別人讓台灣加入呢？ＯＥＣＤ（國際經合組織）規定援外經費占ＧＤＰ的○．二八％，而我國僅占○．一％，其實仍屬偏低。
由於正逢國內多項費用起漲之際，我國對外金援也引發議論，但是，資源固然可能有排擠效應，卻也不能全部混在一起談。國家的財政結構的確需要更加健全化，在反映成本、加強賦稅正義下，使財政運作可長可久，國家各項事務才能夠順利推展。而推動對外關係、提升台灣國際形象、維護台灣主權尊嚴，同樣也是重要的國家事務。
台灣的國際參與攸關人民福祉與國家生存發展機會，只要是經過合理審查與有效監督，應該花的援外錢還是應該花。看一看布吉納法索的小朋友在台灣援贈的太陽能檯燈下做功課的畫面，如果台灣能夠為這個世界點燃幾盞溫暖的燈，有什麼不好？
Tuesday, April 17, 2012
Restore Justice: Reopen the 3/19 Shooting Case
Restore Justice: Reopen the 3/19 Shooting Case
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 17, 2012
Summary: Eight years ago, the 3/19 Shooting Incident reversed the outcome of the presidential election, and divided the public on Taiwan. This divide has yet to be healed. Most members of the public have put the incident out of their minds, intentionally or otherwise. Fortunately, a handful of individuals have continued to uncover the truth behind the 3/19 Shooting Incident. Without the truth. there can be no justice. Without the truth, there can be no public trust. The Ma administration must seize the opportunity to reopen the government's investigation into the 3/19 Shooting Incident. Only by doing so can it restore public trust in the government.
Full Text below:
Eight years ago, the 3/19 Shooting Incident reversed the outcome of the presidential election, and divided the public on Taiwan. This divide has yet to be healed. Most members of the public have put the incident out of their minds, intentionally or otherwise. Fortunately, a handful of individuals have continued to uncover the truth behind the 3/19 Shooting Incident. Without the truth. there can be no justice. Without the truth, there can be no public trust. The Ma administration must seize the opportunity to reopen the government's investigation into the 3/19 Shooting Incident. Only by doing so can it restore public trust in the government.
The 3/19 Shooting Incident occurred on the afternoon of March 19, 2004, Many strange events occurred just before the incident. Many suspicions linger because the incident was mishandled. The Prosecutor General's Office convened an ad hoc investigate group. On August 17, 2005 the group announced its findings. It alleged that Chen Yi-hsiung was the lone gunman, and that he fired two rounds from a single pistol. But according to a poll conducted by this newspaper at the time, only 19% of the public believed the group's conclusions. On January 21, the 3/19 Truth Commission, which the DPP regime resolutely stonewalled, released its summary report of the incident. The commission blasted the DPP government for gross discrepancies between its "official report" and the facts.
After the KMT returned to power, it expressed doubts about the 3/19 Shooting Incident. The Special Investigation Unit began investigating in 2002. They interviewed over 94 witnesses. But it has yet to make a single breakthrough. Government agencies have been passive. They have showed no initiative whatsoever. Fortunately a number of individuals have continued investigating the incident on their own over the past eight years. They have even introduced material evidence that casts doubt on the "official report." These individuals include "Miss Fu," who appeared briefly eight years ago, but then vanished mysteriously. They include Academia Sinica researcher Chu Hung-yuan. They include former Vice President Annette Lu, who was herself a victim of the shooting.
Last week the China Times Weekly News Magazine ran a cover story on Miss Fu, who investigated the 3/19 Shooting Incident eight years ago, Yesterday an exclusive report published photos of bullet holes in the right front side of the Jeep, taken immediately after the shooting occurred. The photos prove that the bullet holes in the windshield of President Chen's Jeep were fired from inside the vehicle. The bullet holes in the windshield were smaller on the inside, and larger on the outside, proving that the bullets were fired from inside Chen's Jeep. This evidence, if confirmed, is of critical importance, because it proves that the 3/19 Shooting Incident was a false flag operation from beginning to end. It proves that Chen Yi-hsiung was framed, and died for no good reason.
In the "official report," every photo of the bullet holes is taken from the outside looking in. Either that, or they are taken perpendicular to the windshield, from the inside looking out. Not one of the photos published in the "official report" is taken from the same angle as Miss Fu's. Miss Fu's photos are taken from an angle, and show a three-dimensional image of the bullet hole, from the interior of the vehicle. Was it mere chance that the "official report" failed to show holes made by bullets fired from the within? Or was the omission deliberate? This provokes even deeper suspicions. If the Special Investigation Unit refuses to investigate, it will be difficult to quell the rumors.
Historian Chu Hung-yuan is another investigator who maintains that the 3/19 Shooting Incident was a false flag operation. According to Chu Hung-yuan, he is in touch with three key witnesses. As soon as the government reopens an investigation, these witnesses will come forward. According to Chu, one of the witnesses says that on March 13, three days before the shooting, the planners of the false flag operation met. The key conspirators were present and in attendance. They include a National Security Bureau (NSB) bodyguard. the Commandant of the Military Police, and a senior DPP legislator. They discussed work assignments. The focus was on how to shoot Annette Lu with a steel BB.
Some people say claims that the 3/19 Shooting Incident was a false flag operation are too fantastic to believe. But the "official report" trotted out by the Chen regime's ad hoc group is more fantastic by far. Even Annette Lu, a victim of the shooting, finds it utterly incredible. After she read the "official report" she listed a number of major questions. One. Forensic expert Henry Lee's rushed forensic analysis is riddle with errors. The trajectory of the bullet was not downward. It was upward. This erroneous assumption about the trajectory led to erroneous assumptions about the hot zone. Two. The pistol used in the 3/19 Shooting Incident was never found. The Chen regime alleged that the pistol used was manufactured by Tang Shou-yi. But as soon as Tang fled the Mainland, he publicly denied that his bullets caused the alleged gunshot wounds to Chen Shui-bian's abdomen. Three. The allegation that Chen Yi-hsiung bought a pistol, is based solely on the word of his brother-in-law. The ad hoc group has never accounted for the money allegedly used in the purchase of the pistol. Four. Chen Yi-hsiung's death was bizarre. It was probably neither accidental drowning nor suicide. Yet the ad hoc group never conducted a detailed investigation of Chen Yi-hsiung's whereabouts prior to his death.
Other points are also suspicious. The ad hoc group deliberately twisted Henry Lee's words. They rushed to judgment, alleging that the copper-jacketed bullet and plain lead bullet were fired from the same pistol. They arbitrarily concluded that a lone gunman fired two rounds from a single pistol. Even the process by which they found two empty cartridge cases is dubious. The shooting occurred at 13:45. But the empty cartridge cases were found at about 17:30. The hot zone was not roped off in the interim. Therefore, how can we conclude that the two empty cartridge cases were actually the ones used in the shooting? Annette Lu has posed a number of serious questions. Each involves clear and concrete instances of negligence. The DPP regime's ad hoc group nevertheless hastily closed the books on the case, As a result, the public is right to be skeptical. The so-called ad hoc group clearly had no intention of uncovering the truth. The same is true of the Special Investigation Unit, which has been going through the motions for the past four years. They have never accounted for these new facts and evidence. They cannot escape responsibility for negligence.
For many people, the 3/19 Shooting Incident is a symbolic wound. As long as the truth remains hidden, democracy on Taiwan remains blemished. After all, uncovering the truth about the 3/19 Shooting Incident ought to transcend Blue or Green political allegiances. It ought to transcend which regime is in office. For the sake of democracy and justice, the government bears full responsibility.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.17
社論－重啟319槍擊案調查 找回公義
本報訊
八年前的三一九槍擊案，不但逆轉總統選情，台灣社會更因此割裂，至今仍無法彌合；值得慶幸的是，在眾人有意無意的遺忘中，仍有極少數人，鍥而不捨的追查三一九真相；沒有真相，就沒有公理與信任，馬政府應該掌握這個契機，重新檢視三一九槍擊案，才能找回台灣的信任。
發生在二○○四年三月十九日下午的三一九槍擊案，事前有許多蹊蹺，事後處置則是疑雲重重。當時由最高檢察署檢察長擔任召集人的專案小組，在二○○五年八月十七日宣布偵結，認定陳義雄是凶手，一人一槍兩彈，但那時本報的民調卻顯示，只有約一成九的民眾相信這個結論，而備受民進黨政府杯葛的三一九真相調查委員會，則於二○○八年一月三十一日公布三一九槍擊事件總結報告，批評民進黨政府公布的真相與證據多所不合。
國民黨重返執政後，針對三一九槍擊案疑點，特偵組已從民國九十九年重啟調查，並陸續約談超過九十四人次的相關人證；但至今仍無任何突破性發展，相對於官方的消極被動，這八年來仍然有少數人持續不懈的以個人之力調查，並提出關鍵性的證據及疑點，他們是八年前曾經短暫出現卻又神祕消失的「福小姐」、中研院研究員朱浤源以及三一九當事人的前副總統呂秀蓮等。
根據上周出刊的時報周刊封面故事，追查三一九長達八年的福小姐，日前獨家披露一張案發時吉普車右側前方拍攝的彈孔照片，在擋風玻璃上出現的彈孔，呈現「內縮外擴」的碗狀痕跡，證明子彈是由扁車內射出；此一證據若屬實，可說是攸關重大。因為，這將顯示三一九槍擊案一開始就是自導自演，陳義雄則是被栽贓的對象，而且因此冤死。
而官方報告中，所有關於彈孔的照片，不是從外往內照，就是從內往外拍的平面圖像，沒有任何一張照片，能像福小姐提供的角度一樣，從車子內部呈現玻璃側面的立體圖像，是巧合沒拍到？還是刻意不放？更是引人疑竇，未來特偵組若不調查、重新勘驗，只怕難杜悠悠之口。
支持三一九槍擊案是自導自演說法的，還有歷史學者朱浤源，根據時報周刊報導，朱浤源接受專訪時透露，他掌握了三位關鍵證人，只要重啟調查，他們應可現身；其中一位關鍵證人證稱，槍擊案發生前三天，即三月十三日有一個關鍵聚會，重要策畫人都在場，包括一名國安局隨扈、憲兵司令、還有一位民進黨重量級國會議員，當時就是討論工作分配，重點在於如何以鋼珠打中呂秀蓮。
如果說，三一九自導自演說太過匪夷所思，則官方版的專案小組偵結報告，顯然更為離譜，連當事人的呂秀蓮都完全不相信，她閱讀整理三一九相關報告後，提出數大疑點：第一、刑事鑑定專家李昌鈺鑑識忙中有錯，彈道不但不是下傾，應該是上揚，彈道軌跡出錯，整個槍擊案熱區完全錯置；二、三一九的手槍始終未被發現，但是被指為製槍的唐守義，則在逃到大陸後公開否認他的子彈會造成陳水扁腹部的槍傷；三、陳義雄買槍之說，只憑其姐夫片面之詞，至於買槍的錢，專案小組從未交代；四、陳義雄死因離奇，應非意外落水，也非自殺，但專案小組卻未詳查陳義雄死前行蹤。
其它可疑之點，還有專案小組曲解李昌鈺原意，冒然認定案發後的銅、鉛兩顆子彈都是出自同一把槍，因此武斷的認定是一人一槍兩彈。甚至，兩顆彈殼發現的過程也是疑雲重重，槍擊案是一點四十五分發生，但是彈殼卻是在五時三十分左右才發現，其間，槍擊案熱區並未被車輛覆蓋，因此，這兩顆彈殼真的和槍擊案有關嗎？呂秀蓮所提出數大疑點，都是明顯而具體的疏失，民進黨政府時代的專案小組仍草草結案，令人合理的懷疑，所謂的專案調查小組，顯然無意找到真相；同樣的，特偵組既然已經重啟調查四年，對於這些相關新事證，卻從未檢視，也難逃怠責之嫌。
對許多人而言，三一九已是個象徵性的創傷，只要真相不明，台灣的民主永遠存在著重大污點；畢竟，找出三一九真相，並無關藍綠，也無關政權，而是為了台灣的民主及公義，政府責無旁貸。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 17, 2012
Summary: Eight years ago, the 3/19 Shooting Incident reversed the outcome of the presidential election, and divided the public on Taiwan. This divide has yet to be healed. Most members of the public have put the incident out of their minds, intentionally or otherwise. Fortunately, a handful of individuals have continued to uncover the truth behind the 3/19 Shooting Incident. Without the truth. there can be no justice. Without the truth, there can be no public trust. The Ma administration must seize the opportunity to reopen the government's investigation into the 3/19 Shooting Incident. Only by doing so can it restore public trust in the government.
Full Text below:
Eight years ago, the 3/19 Shooting Incident reversed the outcome of the presidential election, and divided the public on Taiwan. This divide has yet to be healed. Most members of the public have put the incident out of their minds, intentionally or otherwise. Fortunately, a handful of individuals have continued to uncover the truth behind the 3/19 Shooting Incident. Without the truth. there can be no justice. Without the truth, there can be no public trust. The Ma administration must seize the opportunity to reopen the government's investigation into the 3/19 Shooting Incident. Only by doing so can it restore public trust in the government.
The 3/19 Shooting Incident occurred on the afternoon of March 19, 2004, Many strange events occurred just before the incident. Many suspicions linger because the incident was mishandled. The Prosecutor General's Office convened an ad hoc investigate group. On August 17, 2005 the group announced its findings. It alleged that Chen Yi-hsiung was the lone gunman, and that he fired two rounds from a single pistol. But according to a poll conducted by this newspaper at the time, only 19% of the public believed the group's conclusions. On January 21, the 3/19 Truth Commission, which the DPP regime resolutely stonewalled, released its summary report of the incident. The commission blasted the DPP government for gross discrepancies between its "official report" and the facts.
After the KMT returned to power, it expressed doubts about the 3/19 Shooting Incident. The Special Investigation Unit began investigating in 2002. They interviewed over 94 witnesses. But it has yet to make a single breakthrough. Government agencies have been passive. They have showed no initiative whatsoever. Fortunately a number of individuals have continued investigating the incident on their own over the past eight years. They have even introduced material evidence that casts doubt on the "official report." These individuals include "Miss Fu," who appeared briefly eight years ago, but then vanished mysteriously. They include Academia Sinica researcher Chu Hung-yuan. They include former Vice President Annette Lu, who was herself a victim of the shooting.
Last week the China Times Weekly News Magazine ran a cover story on Miss Fu, who investigated the 3/19 Shooting Incident eight years ago, Yesterday an exclusive report published photos of bullet holes in the right front side of the Jeep, taken immediately after the shooting occurred. The photos prove that the bullet holes in the windshield of President Chen's Jeep were fired from inside the vehicle. The bullet holes in the windshield were smaller on the inside, and larger on the outside, proving that the bullets were fired from inside Chen's Jeep. This evidence, if confirmed, is of critical importance, because it proves that the 3/19 Shooting Incident was a false flag operation from beginning to end. It proves that Chen Yi-hsiung was framed, and died for no good reason.
In the "official report," every photo of the bullet holes is taken from the outside looking in. Either that, or they are taken perpendicular to the windshield, from the inside looking out. Not one of the photos published in the "official report" is taken from the same angle as Miss Fu's. Miss Fu's photos are taken from an angle, and show a three-dimensional image of the bullet hole, from the interior of the vehicle. Was it mere chance that the "official report" failed to show holes made by bullets fired from the within? Or was the omission deliberate? This provokes even deeper suspicions. If the Special Investigation Unit refuses to investigate, it will be difficult to quell the rumors.
Historian Chu Hung-yuan is another investigator who maintains that the 3/19 Shooting Incident was a false flag operation. According to Chu Hung-yuan, he is in touch with three key witnesses. As soon as the government reopens an investigation, these witnesses will come forward. According to Chu, one of the witnesses says that on March 13, three days before the shooting, the planners of the false flag operation met. The key conspirators were present and in attendance. They include a National Security Bureau (NSB) bodyguard. the Commandant of the Military Police, and a senior DPP legislator. They discussed work assignments. The focus was on how to shoot Annette Lu with a steel BB.
Some people say claims that the 3/19 Shooting Incident was a false flag operation are too fantastic to believe. But the "official report" trotted out by the Chen regime's ad hoc group is more fantastic by far. Even Annette Lu, a victim of the shooting, finds it utterly incredible. After she read the "official report" she listed a number of major questions. One. Forensic expert Henry Lee's rushed forensic analysis is riddle with errors. The trajectory of the bullet was not downward. It was upward. This erroneous assumption about the trajectory led to erroneous assumptions about the hot zone. Two. The pistol used in the 3/19 Shooting Incident was never found. The Chen regime alleged that the pistol used was manufactured by Tang Shou-yi. But as soon as Tang fled the Mainland, he publicly denied that his bullets caused the alleged gunshot wounds to Chen Shui-bian's abdomen. Three. The allegation that Chen Yi-hsiung bought a pistol, is based solely on the word of his brother-in-law. The ad hoc group has never accounted for the money allegedly used in the purchase of the pistol. Four. Chen Yi-hsiung's death was bizarre. It was probably neither accidental drowning nor suicide. Yet the ad hoc group never conducted a detailed investigation of Chen Yi-hsiung's whereabouts prior to his death.
Other points are also suspicious. The ad hoc group deliberately twisted Henry Lee's words. They rushed to judgment, alleging that the copper-jacketed bullet and plain lead bullet were fired from the same pistol. They arbitrarily concluded that a lone gunman fired two rounds from a single pistol. Even the process by which they found two empty cartridge cases is dubious. The shooting occurred at 13:45. But the empty cartridge cases were found at about 17:30. The hot zone was not roped off in the interim. Therefore, how can we conclude that the two empty cartridge cases were actually the ones used in the shooting? Annette Lu has posed a number of serious questions. Each involves clear and concrete instances of negligence. The DPP regime's ad hoc group nevertheless hastily closed the books on the case, As a result, the public is right to be skeptical. The so-called ad hoc group clearly had no intention of uncovering the truth. The same is true of the Special Investigation Unit, which has been going through the motions for the past four years. They have never accounted for these new facts and evidence. They cannot escape responsibility for negligence.
For many people, the 3/19 Shooting Incident is a symbolic wound. As long as the truth remains hidden, democracy on Taiwan remains blemished. After all, uncovering the truth about the 3/19 Shooting Incident ought to transcend Blue or Green political allegiances. It ought to transcend which regime is in office. For the sake of democracy and justice, the government bears full responsibility.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.17
社論－重啟319槍擊案調查 找回公義
本報訊
八年前的三一九槍擊案，不但逆轉總統選情，台灣社會更因此割裂，至今仍無法彌合；值得慶幸的是，在眾人有意無意的遺忘中，仍有極少數人，鍥而不捨的追查三一九真相；沒有真相，就沒有公理與信任，馬政府應該掌握這個契機，重新檢視三一九槍擊案，才能找回台灣的信任。
發生在二○○四年三月十九日下午的三一九槍擊案，事前有許多蹊蹺，事後處置則是疑雲重重。當時由最高檢察署檢察長擔任召集人的專案小組，在二○○五年八月十七日宣布偵結，認定陳義雄是凶手，一人一槍兩彈，但那時本報的民調卻顯示，只有約一成九的民眾相信這個結論，而備受民進黨政府杯葛的三一九真相調查委員會，則於二○○八年一月三十一日公布三一九槍擊事件總結報告，批評民進黨政府公布的真相與證據多所不合。
國民黨重返執政後，針對三一九槍擊案疑點，特偵組已從民國九十九年重啟調查，並陸續約談超過九十四人次的相關人證；但至今仍無任何突破性發展，相對於官方的消極被動，這八年來仍然有少數人持續不懈的以個人之力調查，並提出關鍵性的證據及疑點，他們是八年前曾經短暫出現卻又神祕消失的「福小姐」、中研院研究員朱浤源以及三一九當事人的前副總統呂秀蓮等。
根據上周出刊的時報周刊封面故事，追查三一九長達八年的福小姐，日前獨家披露一張案發時吉普車右側前方拍攝的彈孔照片，在擋風玻璃上出現的彈孔，呈現「內縮外擴」的碗狀痕跡，證明子彈是由扁車內射出；此一證據若屬實，可說是攸關重大。因為，這將顯示三一九槍擊案一開始就是自導自演，陳義雄則是被栽贓的對象，而且因此冤死。
而官方報告中，所有關於彈孔的照片，不是從外往內照，就是從內往外拍的平面圖像，沒有任何一張照片，能像福小姐提供的角度一樣，從車子內部呈現玻璃側面的立體圖像，是巧合沒拍到？還是刻意不放？更是引人疑竇，未來特偵組若不調查、重新勘驗，只怕難杜悠悠之口。
支持三一九槍擊案是自導自演說法的，還有歷史學者朱浤源，根據時報周刊報導，朱浤源接受專訪時透露，他掌握了三位關鍵證人，只要重啟調查，他們應可現身；其中一位關鍵證人證稱，槍擊案發生前三天，即三月十三日有一個關鍵聚會，重要策畫人都在場，包括一名國安局隨扈、憲兵司令、還有一位民進黨重量級國會議員，當時就是討論工作分配，重點在於如何以鋼珠打中呂秀蓮。
如果說，三一九自導自演說太過匪夷所思，則官方版的專案小組偵結報告，顯然更為離譜，連當事人的呂秀蓮都完全不相信，她閱讀整理三一九相關報告後，提出數大疑點：第一、刑事鑑定專家李昌鈺鑑識忙中有錯，彈道不但不是下傾，應該是上揚，彈道軌跡出錯，整個槍擊案熱區完全錯置；二、三一九的手槍始終未被發現，但是被指為製槍的唐守義，則在逃到大陸後公開否認他的子彈會造成陳水扁腹部的槍傷；三、陳義雄買槍之說，只憑其姐夫片面之詞，至於買槍的錢，專案小組從未交代；四、陳義雄死因離奇，應非意外落水，也非自殺，但專案小組卻未詳查陳義雄死前行蹤。
其它可疑之點，還有專案小組曲解李昌鈺原意，冒然認定案發後的銅、鉛兩顆子彈都是出自同一把槍，因此武斷的認定是一人一槍兩彈。甚至，兩顆彈殼發現的過程也是疑雲重重，槍擊案是一點四十五分發生，但是彈殼卻是在五時三十分左右才發現，其間，槍擊案熱區並未被車輛覆蓋，因此，這兩顆彈殼真的和槍擊案有關嗎？呂秀蓮所提出數大疑點，都是明顯而具體的疏失，民進黨政府時代的專案小組仍草草結案，令人合理的懷疑，所謂的專案調查小組，顯然無意找到真相；同樣的，特偵組既然已經重啟調查四年，對於這些相關新事證，卻從未檢視，也難逃怠責之嫌。
對許多人而言，三一九已是個象徵性的創傷，只要真相不明，台灣的民主永遠存在著重大污點；畢竟，找出三一九真相，並無關藍綠，也無關政權，而是為了台灣的民主及公義，政府責無旁貸。
Monday, April 16, 2012
DPP Chairmanship Struggle: The Real Problem
DPP Chairmanship Struggle: The Real Problem
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 16, 2012
Summary: More candidates are seeking the Democratic Progressive Party chairmanship than at any other time in the party's history. Taiwan independence hardliners and Hsu Hsing-liang, who advocates "boldly going west," have long been polar opposites. But both understand the DPP. Both agree on one thing. They must prevent Su Tseng-chang from becoming the party chairman. If they cannot stop Su Tseng-chang from becoming the party chairman, they must at least rein him in. They must prevent Su from gathering strength before the 2016 general election and running for president.
Full Text below:
More candidates are seeking the Democratic Progressive Party chairmanship than at any other time in the party's history. Taiwan independence hardliners and Hsu Hsing-liang, who advocates "boldly going west," have long been polar opposites. But both understand the DPP. Both agree on one thing. They must prevent Su Tseng-chang from becoming the party chairman. If they cannot stop Su Tseng-chang from becoming the party chairman, they must at least rein him in. They must prevent Su from gathering strength before the 2016 general election and running for president.
This is the first party chairman election since the DPP was defeated in the presidential election. Tsai Ing-wen has no intention of seeking another term. According to party regulations, she has already succeeded herself. She cannot run again. In principle, Su Tseng-chang is the leader of another powerful faction within the party. Not everyone welcomes him as party chairman. But for him to become party chairman would be entirely reasonable. Yet opposition within the party is building. Attempts are being made to purge leaders with certain ideological positions and political paths, as are attempts to settle scores with rival factions.
Taiwan independence hardliners within the DPP are openly opposed to Su Tseng-chang. Without naming names, legislator Chen Tang-shan mocked Su. He said "If a candidate for President or Vice President is unelectable, he should give up. He should stop running." Former DPP chairman Yao Chia-wen openly criticized Su. He said "We do not think Su is sufficiently Taiwan-centric and Taiwan independence oriented." Others even urged Wu Rong-i and Trong Chai, two Taiwan independence hardliners, to join forces. That would prevent Su Tseng-chang from taking advantage of a split vote among Taiwan independence hardliners.
The Taiwan independence hardliners are at least up front about their opposition. They have wounded Su Tseng-chang. But the wound is merely a flesh wound. What could really cost Su the election is factional strife. This includes strife between the New Tide Faction and its opponents, and strife between Su and Hsieh. More important of all is the contest for the 2016 presidential nomination. The presidential election has just concluded. But inside the DPP, many argue that Tsai Ing-wen remains the DPP's best choice for 2016. Whoever becomes the next party chairman should not use the office to run for president. He should concentrate on party affairs. Hsu Hsin-liang is running for party chairman. But Hsu has made clear he is doing it "in order to support another presidential bid by Tsai Ing-wen in 2016." Tsai Ing-wen demurred, saying these were Hsu Hsin-liang's own views. But it probably represents the thinking of many party members.
Taiwan independence hardliners have considerable influence within the DPP. But they have yet to find a spokesperson of adequate stature within the party. For the time being, Su Tseng-chang need not worry. By contrast, factional strife has simmered for years. It remains difficult to resolve. Little wonder Su Tseng-chang rushed to the Taipei Detention Center last week to visit Chen Shui-bian. He hoped to moderate the backlash from Taiwan independence hardliners.
A pardon for Ah-Bian is one of the Taiwan independence hardliners' key demands. Su Tseng-chang may be forced to compromise. The Taiwan independence hardliners demand the founding of an independent nation. They demand "one nation on each side." Is Su Tseng-chang willing to accept such terms? For the Democratic Progressive Party, the 2012 presidential election was a baptism by fire. They finally understand. They finally realize their cross-Strait policy is their Achilles Heel. They finally realize it is the reason the party has been unable to win the presidency. The DPP must review its cross-Strait policy. This is the first party chairman election since the presidential election. If the debate between the candidates is over whether the Mainland is an enemy, then the party will be turning the clock back. It will be moving farther and farther away from a return to power.
From this perspective, Hsu Hsin-liang's candidacy has strategic significance. There is little chance he will be elected. But that does not mean his candidacy is without strategic significance, He can at least influence the agenda. He can make his political views heard. He can refocus the party chairman election on real issues, and not on historical grievances that can never be resolved. Taiwan is currently undergoing industrial restructuring. It is suffering from a brain drain and other pressing problems. When confronted with such problems, isolation is never an option. Besides, DPP leaders learned from the 2012 election that they must offer a pragmatic and reasonable cross-Strait policy, They cannot muddle their way through. Otherwise Washington, Beijing, and swing voters on Taiwan will never give the DPP a vote of confidence.
The next two years are critical for the DPP party chairman. He or she will lead the DPP in the 2014 Seven in One Election. No elections are scheduled for the next two years. The DPP must take advantage of this opportunity to transform itself and change its cross-Strait policy path. This is the Democratic Progressive Party's top priority. But those who understand politics know that anyone with presidential ambitions must not commit prematurely. Otherwise they will be embroiled in disputes over the party's future. They will invite problems prematurely. These problems obviously do not concern Su Tseng-chang.
Su Tseng-chang has garnered the most attention during the election, He has never relinquished his ambition to run for president. He is also among the DPP favorites for 2016. But Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, his most formidable rival within the party, have hedged their bets on cross-Strait policy. When Su Tseng-chang registered as a candidate for party chairman, he declared that the DPP must "replace [cross-Strait] confrontation with dialogue" and that "the two sides must coexist and prosper together]. But he too proposed a "Taiwan Consensus" just as vague as Tsai Ing-wen's.
Su Tseng-chang as an individual, and the DPP as a party, are undergoing crises. If Su Tseng-chang caves in to the Taiwan independence hardliners in order to win the party chairmanship, the Democratic Progressive Party will squander this two year opportunity to transform itself. Su Tseng-chang as an individual will be unable to win over swing voters. He can forget about winning the presidency. Su Tseng-chang must strike a balance between Taiwan independence hardliners and swing voters. He must offer a pragmatic cross-Strait policy, This is also the key to winning the DPP party chairmanship.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.16
社論－民進黨黨主席競爭背後的真正問題
本報訊
這次的民進黨黨魁之爭，雖然號稱是史上競爭者最多的一次，但是了解民進黨的人都知道，無論是來自黨內極獨，或是主張大膽西進的許信良，這兩股向來勢不兩立的勢力，這次有志一同，參選都是為了「擋蘇」；即使無法阻止蘇貞昌當選黨主席，但是至少要達到牽制的目的，防蘇在二○一六大選前累積實力、趁勢角逐總統大位。
民進黨敗選後首次黨主席選舉，蔡英文既無意續任，而且按照黨綱規定，她已連任一次，這次也無法參選；理論上，蘇貞昌應是黨內的另一位實力派領袖，角逐黨主席即使不是眾望所歸，也應是理所當然；相反的，黨內的反對力量卻來勢洶洶，其間有對立場、路線的清算，也有黨內的派系恩怨。
民進黨極獨力量公開反對蘇貞昌最力，先是立委陳唐山不點名的批評，「有人選過總統、副總統，再怎麼選都選不上，應該放棄，不要再出來。」；民進黨前主席姚嘉文則公開批評，「我們不認為蘇貞昌是台派、獨派」；更有人呼籲吳榮義、蔡同榮這兩股獨派勢力要整合，以免蘇貞昌漁翁得利。
不過，獨派耍的是明槍，只傷蘇貞昌的皮肉，真的可能會讓蘇貞昌中箭落馬的是黨內的派系恩怨。這包括民進黨反新潮流勢力，還有過去的蘇謝之爭，更重要的則是二○一六總統大位之爭。事實上，總統大選剛結束，民進黨內就有不少人放話，蔡英文才是二○一六最適合的總統候選人，這一任的黨主席應表明不角逐總統大位，專事輔佐工作。許信良這一次參選，表態是為了「支持蔡英文再戰二○一六」，即使蔡英文宣稱這是「許信良個人說法」，但這卻是不少黨內人士思考的邏輯。
可以說，即使民進黨內極獨聲勢不小，但是只要他們還未在黨內找到實力派的代理人，蘇貞昌暫無後顧之憂；相對的，派系長年的恩怨及競爭態勢，反而難以化解，這也就難怪蘇貞昌上周急奔台北監獄、探視陳水扁，為的就是要先化解獨派的反彈聲浪。
如果說「挺扁特赦」是獨派的一項主訴求，蘇貞昌未來可能被迫妥協，那麼，獨派堅持獨立建國、一邊一國的主訴求呢？蘇貞昌是否要照單全收？民進黨經過二○一二總統大選的洗禮，好不容易認清，兩岸罩門正是該黨無法登上執政寶座的最後一哩路，民進黨應該檢討兩岸政策，選後第一次黨主席選舉，如果討論的竟然還是要與大陸為敵，豈不是走回頭路，離執政之路愈來愈遠。
從這個角度來看許信良參選的戰略意義，他當選的機會微乎其微，但並非沒有戰略意義，他至少可以透過公開談話、黨內的政見發表，將黨主席選舉焦點拉回當務之急，而不是停留在永難解決的歷史問題上；台灣目前有產業轉型、人才流失等種種迫切的難題，要面對這些問題，閉關自守絕對不該是選項。更何況，民進黨領導人該從二○一二大選學到的一件事是：如果未能提出一套務實、合理的兩岸政策及作法，只想含混過關，則從美國、對岸、乃至台灣的中間選民，都無法對民進黨投下信任票。
可以說，未來二年的黨主席攸關重要，他不只要帶領民進黨迎戰二○一四年的七合一選舉，更要趁未來沒有大選的這兩年時機，好好對民進黨兩岸路線轉型定調，這才是民進黨的當務之急；但是，懂政治的人都知道，志在總統大位者，若提前投入這些黨內糾纏經年的路線問題，只怕會提前折翼，但這些隱憂顯然不在蘇貞昌的思維中。
在這次選舉中，蘇貞昌最受矚目，他從未放棄角逐總統的鴻鵠大志，也是民進黨被看好的二○一六人選之一；但是到目前為止，蘇貞昌和他黨內最強對手蔡英文一樣，在兩岸政策一直採取模糊策略。蘇貞昌雖然於登記時宣示，民進黨未來對兩岸要「對話代替對抗，兩岸要共存共榮」，但是他提出的「台灣共識」，和蔡英文的說法一樣模糊。
這對蘇貞昌個人或是民進黨而言，都是危機。如果蘇貞昌為了黨主席勝選向極獨社團妥協，形同是民進黨浪費了兩年的轉型好時機；同時，蘇貞昌個人也無法取得中道勢力的信任、更別想贏得大位；如何在極獨與中間平衡，並提出務實的兩岸主張，既是蘇貞昌的挑戰，也是這次民進黨黨主席選舉的最關鍵主軸。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 16, 2012
Summary: More candidates are seeking the Democratic Progressive Party chairmanship than at any other time in the party's history. Taiwan independence hardliners and Hsu Hsing-liang, who advocates "boldly going west," have long been polar opposites. But both understand the DPP. Both agree on one thing. They must prevent Su Tseng-chang from becoming the party chairman. If they cannot stop Su Tseng-chang from becoming the party chairman, they must at least rein him in. They must prevent Su from gathering strength before the 2016 general election and running for president.
Full Text below:
More candidates are seeking the Democratic Progressive Party chairmanship than at any other time in the party's history. Taiwan independence hardliners and Hsu Hsing-liang, who advocates "boldly going west," have long been polar opposites. But both understand the DPP. Both agree on one thing. They must prevent Su Tseng-chang from becoming the party chairman. If they cannot stop Su Tseng-chang from becoming the party chairman, they must at least rein him in. They must prevent Su from gathering strength before the 2016 general election and running for president.
This is the first party chairman election since the DPP was defeated in the presidential election. Tsai Ing-wen has no intention of seeking another term. According to party regulations, she has already succeeded herself. She cannot run again. In principle, Su Tseng-chang is the leader of another powerful faction within the party. Not everyone welcomes him as party chairman. But for him to become party chairman would be entirely reasonable. Yet opposition within the party is building. Attempts are being made to purge leaders with certain ideological positions and political paths, as are attempts to settle scores with rival factions.
Taiwan independence hardliners within the DPP are openly opposed to Su Tseng-chang. Without naming names, legislator Chen Tang-shan mocked Su. He said "If a candidate for President or Vice President is unelectable, he should give up. He should stop running." Former DPP chairman Yao Chia-wen openly criticized Su. He said "We do not think Su is sufficiently Taiwan-centric and Taiwan independence oriented." Others even urged Wu Rong-i and Trong Chai, two Taiwan independence hardliners, to join forces. That would prevent Su Tseng-chang from taking advantage of a split vote among Taiwan independence hardliners.
The Taiwan independence hardliners are at least up front about their opposition. They have wounded Su Tseng-chang. But the wound is merely a flesh wound. What could really cost Su the election is factional strife. This includes strife between the New Tide Faction and its opponents, and strife between Su and Hsieh. More important of all is the contest for the 2016 presidential nomination. The presidential election has just concluded. But inside the DPP, many argue that Tsai Ing-wen remains the DPP's best choice for 2016. Whoever becomes the next party chairman should not use the office to run for president. He should concentrate on party affairs. Hsu Hsin-liang is running for party chairman. But Hsu has made clear he is doing it "in order to support another presidential bid by Tsai Ing-wen in 2016." Tsai Ing-wen demurred, saying these were Hsu Hsin-liang's own views. But it probably represents the thinking of many party members.
Taiwan independence hardliners have considerable influence within the DPP. But they have yet to find a spokesperson of adequate stature within the party. For the time being, Su Tseng-chang need not worry. By contrast, factional strife has simmered for years. It remains difficult to resolve. Little wonder Su Tseng-chang rushed to the Taipei Detention Center last week to visit Chen Shui-bian. He hoped to moderate the backlash from Taiwan independence hardliners.
A pardon for Ah-Bian is one of the Taiwan independence hardliners' key demands. Su Tseng-chang may be forced to compromise. The Taiwan independence hardliners demand the founding of an independent nation. They demand "one nation on each side." Is Su Tseng-chang willing to accept such terms? For the Democratic Progressive Party, the 2012 presidential election was a baptism by fire. They finally understand. They finally realize their cross-Strait policy is their Achilles Heel. They finally realize it is the reason the party has been unable to win the presidency. The DPP must review its cross-Strait policy. This is the first party chairman election since the presidential election. If the debate between the candidates is over whether the Mainland is an enemy, then the party will be turning the clock back. It will be moving farther and farther away from a return to power.
From this perspective, Hsu Hsin-liang's candidacy has strategic significance. There is little chance he will be elected. But that does not mean his candidacy is without strategic significance, He can at least influence the agenda. He can make his political views heard. He can refocus the party chairman election on real issues, and not on historical grievances that can never be resolved. Taiwan is currently undergoing industrial restructuring. It is suffering from a brain drain and other pressing problems. When confronted with such problems, isolation is never an option. Besides, DPP leaders learned from the 2012 election that they must offer a pragmatic and reasonable cross-Strait policy, They cannot muddle their way through. Otherwise Washington, Beijing, and swing voters on Taiwan will never give the DPP a vote of confidence.
The next two years are critical for the DPP party chairman. He or she will lead the DPP in the 2014 Seven in One Election. No elections are scheduled for the next two years. The DPP must take advantage of this opportunity to transform itself and change its cross-Strait policy path. This is the Democratic Progressive Party's top priority. But those who understand politics know that anyone with presidential ambitions must not commit prematurely. Otherwise they will be embroiled in disputes over the party's future. They will invite problems prematurely. These problems obviously do not concern Su Tseng-chang.
Su Tseng-chang has garnered the most attention during the election, He has never relinquished his ambition to run for president. He is also among the DPP favorites for 2016. But Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, his most formidable rival within the party, have hedged their bets on cross-Strait policy. When Su Tseng-chang registered as a candidate for party chairman, he declared that the DPP must "replace [cross-Strait] confrontation with dialogue" and that "the two sides must coexist and prosper together]. But he too proposed a "Taiwan Consensus" just as vague as Tsai Ing-wen's.
Su Tseng-chang as an individual, and the DPP as a party, are undergoing crises. If Su Tseng-chang caves in to the Taiwan independence hardliners in order to win the party chairmanship, the Democratic Progressive Party will squander this two year opportunity to transform itself. Su Tseng-chang as an individual will be unable to win over swing voters. He can forget about winning the presidency. Su Tseng-chang must strike a balance between Taiwan independence hardliners and swing voters. He must offer a pragmatic cross-Strait policy, This is also the key to winning the DPP party chairmanship.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.04.16
社論－民進黨黨主席競爭背後的真正問題
本報訊
這次的民進黨黨魁之爭，雖然號稱是史上競爭者最多的一次，但是了解民進黨的人都知道，無論是來自黨內極獨，或是主張大膽西進的許信良，這兩股向來勢不兩立的勢力，這次有志一同，參選都是為了「擋蘇」；即使無法阻止蘇貞昌當選黨主席，但是至少要達到牽制的目的，防蘇在二○一六大選前累積實力、趁勢角逐總統大位。
民進黨敗選後首次黨主席選舉，蔡英文既無意續任，而且按照黨綱規定，她已連任一次，這次也無法參選；理論上，蘇貞昌應是黨內的另一位實力派領袖，角逐黨主席即使不是眾望所歸，也應是理所當然；相反的，黨內的反對力量卻來勢洶洶，其間有對立場、路線的清算，也有黨內的派系恩怨。
民進黨極獨力量公開反對蘇貞昌最力，先是立委陳唐山不點名的批評，「有人選過總統、副總統，再怎麼選都選不上，應該放棄，不要再出來。」；民進黨前主席姚嘉文則公開批評，「我們不認為蘇貞昌是台派、獨派」；更有人呼籲吳榮義、蔡同榮這兩股獨派勢力要整合，以免蘇貞昌漁翁得利。
不過，獨派耍的是明槍，只傷蘇貞昌的皮肉，真的可能會讓蘇貞昌中箭落馬的是黨內的派系恩怨。這包括民進黨反新潮流勢力，還有過去的蘇謝之爭，更重要的則是二○一六總統大位之爭。事實上，總統大選剛結束，民進黨內就有不少人放話，蔡英文才是二○一六最適合的總統候選人，這一任的黨主席應表明不角逐總統大位，專事輔佐工作。許信良這一次參選，表態是為了「支持蔡英文再戰二○一六」，即使蔡英文宣稱這是「許信良個人說法」，但這卻是不少黨內人士思考的邏輯。
可以說，即使民進黨內極獨聲勢不小，但是只要他們還未在黨內找到實力派的代理人，蘇貞昌暫無後顧之憂；相對的，派系長年的恩怨及競爭態勢，反而難以化解，這也就難怪蘇貞昌上周急奔台北監獄、探視陳水扁，為的就是要先化解獨派的反彈聲浪。
如果說「挺扁特赦」是獨派的一項主訴求，蘇貞昌未來可能被迫妥協，那麼，獨派堅持獨立建國、一邊一國的主訴求呢？蘇貞昌是否要照單全收？民進黨經過二○一二總統大選的洗禮，好不容易認清，兩岸罩門正是該黨無法登上執政寶座的最後一哩路，民進黨應該檢討兩岸政策，選後第一次黨主席選舉，如果討論的竟然還是要與大陸為敵，豈不是走回頭路，離執政之路愈來愈遠。
從這個角度來看許信良參選的戰略意義，他當選的機會微乎其微，但並非沒有戰略意義，他至少可以透過公開談話、黨內的政見發表，將黨主席選舉焦點拉回當務之急，而不是停留在永難解決的歷史問題上；台灣目前有產業轉型、人才流失等種種迫切的難題，要面對這些問題，閉關自守絕對不該是選項。更何況，民進黨領導人該從二○一二大選學到的一件事是：如果未能提出一套務實、合理的兩岸政策及作法，只想含混過關，則從美國、對岸、乃至台灣的中間選民，都無法對民進黨投下信任票。
可以說，未來二年的黨主席攸關重要，他不只要帶領民進黨迎戰二○一四年的七合一選舉，更要趁未來沒有大選的這兩年時機，好好對民進黨兩岸路線轉型定調，這才是民進黨的當務之急；但是，懂政治的人都知道，志在總統大位者，若提前投入這些黨內糾纏經年的路線問題，只怕會提前折翼，但這些隱憂顯然不在蘇貞昌的思維中。
在這次選舉中，蘇貞昌最受矚目，他從未放棄角逐總統的鴻鵠大志，也是民進黨被看好的二○一六人選之一；但是到目前為止，蘇貞昌和他黨內最強對手蔡英文一樣，在兩岸政策一直採取模糊策略。蘇貞昌雖然於登記時宣示，民進黨未來對兩岸要「對話代替對抗，兩岸要共存共榮」，但是他提出的「台灣共識」，和蔡英文的說法一樣模糊。
這對蘇貞昌個人或是民進黨而言，都是危機。如果蘇貞昌為了黨主席勝選向極獨社團妥協，形同是民進黨浪費了兩年的轉型好時機；同時，蘇貞昌個人也無法取得中道勢力的信任、更別想贏得大位；如何在極獨與中間平衡，並提出務實的兩岸主張，既是蘇貞昌的挑戰，也是這次民進黨黨主席選舉的最關鍵主軸。
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