Unrealistic Expectations: Ma Stumbles
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 1, 2012
Summary: Christina Liu's resignation has been approved. This has ended her brief two month campaign on behalf of the administration's capital gains tax bill. Her unceremonious departure was an admission that her tax reform campaign had failed. It was an accusation that her ruling party colleagues had betrayed their principles. For Christina Liu, this was a painful and tragic struggle. The Ma administration was attacked from both front and rear, The public was also betrayed.
Full Text below:
Christina Liu's resignation has been approved. This has ended her brief two month campaign on behalf of the administration's capital gains tax bill. Her unceremonious departure was an admission that her tax reform campaign had failed. It was an accusation that her ruling party colleagues had betrayed their principles. For Christina Liu, this was a painful and tragic struggle. The Ma administration was attacked from both front and rear, The public was also betrayed.
Reform is cause for celebration. Yet this is what it has come to. It is hard to contemplate, but equally hard to turn away. Why did it happen? The biggest problem was the Ma administration's unrealistic expectations. Ma wanted reform, but lacked the required finesse. . He built castles in the air. But he had no concept of what he had to do to turn them into reality. .
On May 20, President Ma assumed office amidst public protests. A mere 10 days later, he lost an important tax reform official. This is a painful lesson for President Ma, the Chen Cabinet, and the entire governing team.
The capital gains tax initiative has come to nothing. Evaluations of Christina Liu are polarized. Some praise her for standing by her ideals. Some condemn her for being too extreme. To be fair, Christina Liu devoted herself to reform. She cared nothing for power or prestige, She was tough in her manner. But she lacked the EQ necessary to communicate with the rest of the administration. She never saw the the larger political picture. She lacked the ability to coordinate with colleagues. She threw in the towel and did not fight to the very end. She even failed to inform the premier before announcing her resignation, This caught the presidential office and the executive branch off guard. This is not how a competent and knowledgeable political appointee conducts herself. .
Christina Liu is confident and resolute. She has been described as a "born princess." Was this because President Ma placed such a heavy responsibility on her shoulders? Or was it because she expected so much from herself? We will never know. One thing is undeniable. These two factors contributed to her "go your own way" personal style. She was absent when they shot the cabinet's group portrait, for no good reason. She resigned, then refused to attend the final coordination meeting. This "desertion under fire" conduct is difficult to justify, no matter how noble the motives. This is probably the main reason Sean Chen found it difficult to keep her on. Christina Liu sealed off her own options.
Twenty-four years ago, Kuo Wan-jung championed capital gains tax reform. In the end she failed. Twenty-four years later her daughter Christina Liu could not escape the same fate. She failed as well. Is Taiwan's stock market too reactionary to tolerate reform? Or is the government's determination too weak? Is it too incapable of taking a punch? Has Taiwan's democracy made too little progress? Has it already lost the ability to innovate? Each of these alternatives is depressing to contemplate.
According to an Executive Yuan poll, 60% of all investors support a capital gains tax. Nearly 70% of all non-investors support a capital gains tax. The conditions are so favorable. Promoting a capital gains tax should be a cinch. Yet the result has been widespread public discontent. A minister has resigned. The various and sundry political parties and government agencies have each retreated into their own shells. In the final analysis, one can only conclude that the Ma adminstration was incompetent.
Good governance requires coordination between the administration and political parties. It requires communications between government agencies, It requires input from experts and the general public. It requires appropriate means and accurate timing. Recall the past two months. What has the public seen, besides the Ma administration in a state of complete disunity? The KMT and the Ma administration each went their own way. Each sang their own tune. The cabinet sat back and watched the stock market plummet, helpless to do anything about it. Even worse, just when it was most critical, just when the adminstration was seeking political unity, President Ma vanished. He was nowhere to be found. The administration turned into a free for all. A wonderful reform proposal went from asset to liability. But how could it have been otherwise?
One thing must be mentioned. The capital gains tax incident has left the KMT in disarray. It is now the Ma administration's "tempest in a teapot." It has little to do with opposition obstructionism. Therefore President Ma must exercise greater vigilance. He is both president and party chairman. Yet he failed to promote party/administration cooperation. He personally handed Christina Liu the banner of reform, then stifled communication and coordination within the cabinet. He tried to show his commitment to reform. Instead he allowed himself to be stymied by street violence and a governing team alienated from its professed ideals. Does this look like an adminstration with four years of governing experience?
Christina Liu demonstrated her personal style. Earlier in the year, she replaced the bureacratic Lee Shuh-der as finance minister. People had great expectations. They thought she would do some good. Ironically, Christina Liu's departure undermined the administration's image even before she achieved a single goal. Some political appointees march only to their own drummer. Others constantly monitor the wind to see which way it is blowing. Neither makes the ideal political appointee. What a cabinet needs is professionals with vision. They must see the Big Picture, They must have character and integrity. They must "know when to hold, and know when to fold." Only then can they make a contribution to the public welfare.
The capital gains tax debacle cannot be blamed on Christina Liu alone. Everyone in the Ma administration, from top to bottom, must learn how to put two words together: "team," and "work." They must learn how to reconcile "goals" and "means." Otherwise, they will be gazing at the stars while lying in the gutter. Now how glamorous is that?
眼高手低：馬政府痛跌一跤
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.01 02:44 am
劉憶如請辭獲准，結束了她短短兩個月推動證所稅的衝刺；如此不歡而散，除宣告她自己的稅改心念失敗，也形同指控執政黨同僚悖離理想。這一役，對劉憶如是痛苦慘烈，對馬政府而言則是腹背受敵，社會亦同蒙其殃。
一樁改革美事，演變至這步田地，讓人不忍卒睹。究其原因，最大癥結就在馬政府的「眼高手低」：徒有改革意志，卻缺乏推動手腕；徒然高懸理想，卻不知如何調和鼎鼐，以竟其功。
馬總統五二○在沸沸民怨中就任，至今不過十日即又折損了他重要的稅改大將；這一課，對馬總統、陳內閣乃至整個執政團隊都是椎心刺骨的教訓。
證所稅無功而退，劉憶如得到的評價兩極：有人稱許她堅持理想，有人指責她過度偏執。持平而言，劉憶如執著改革理想、不戀棧權位，展現了她強悍的風格。但就整個政府團隊的運作看，她在溝通過程缺乏協調的ＥＱ，在政治運作上缺乏大局著眼的豁達；尤其在最後階段的院際協調，她未拚搏到最後一刻即宣告棄守，又未告知閣揆即自行公布請辭訊息，導致府院各方陣腳大亂。這些，都不是一個有器識的政務官應有的作風。
劉憶如的自信與強悍，是來自她被形容為「公主」的出身，或來自馬總統授以重任的自我期許，如今恐已無從查究。但不可否認，上述兩種因素，都助長了她處事的個人英雄主義作風。從內閣畢業照的無故缺席，到「請辭待命」中拒赴最後的協調會，這種「臨陣棄甲」的表現，縱有再多高尚理由，也難自圓其說。這點，恐怕也是陳?難以再留她的主因，劉憶如把自己的退路堵死了。
廿四年前郭婉容推動證所稅改革，結果以敗北收場；廿四年後其女劉憶如重披戰袍，卻仍難逃下台的命運。這是台灣股市的「反改革」魔性太強？還是政府的決心太弱，不堪一擊？或是台灣民主政治毫無寸進，已失去推動新制度的能力？令人低迴沉思。
根據行政院的民調，股民中有六成支持課徵證所稅，在非股民中更獲得近七成的民意支持。擁有如此大好形勢，推動證所稅原應水到渠成，卻弄到民怨四起、部長掛冠、黨政各自為政；追根究柢，不能不說是馬政府的政治管理能力太差。
所謂的政治管理能力，除了黨政之間的協調，還包括不同部會的溝通、專家及社會意見的徵詢，乃至政策手段的選擇及時機的調整。但觀察兩個月來的發展，人們看到的，卻是馬政府的一盤散沙現象：黨政各行其是，部會各吹其調，內閣坐視股市連挫卻不知所措；而且，就在最需要進行宏觀政治整合之際，馬總統卻神隱置身事外。這種各自為政的表現，怎能不讓美好的改革口號從得分變成失分？
必須一提的是，這次的證所稅事件，完全是國民黨內部自亂陣腳，堪稱是馬政府的「茶壺風暴」，與在野黨杯葛的關係不大。也因此，馬總統更須自我警惕：他以總統身兼黨主席，卻不能促使黨、政的合作更臻密切；他親授劉憶如改革令旗，卻反加深內閣溝通協調的窒礙；他企圖展現新政銳意，卻被暴衝、離心離德的團隊絆倒在陣前。這個隊伍，像是支有四年執政經驗的大軍嗎？
個人風格突出的劉憶如，在年初取代官僚性格濃厚的李述德出任財長時，外界原寄予莫大期待，以為她可以有所表現。諷刺的是，劉憶如迄今還來不及完成任何一件大事，而她的去職帶給政府形象的傷害，已是創鉅痛深。只顧自己揮灑或唯唯諾諾的人物，其實都不是理想的政務官典型；內閣需要的，是有專業瞻矚、同時具有大局著眼的閣員，志節清朗、進退有度，才可能留下有利國計民生的貢獻。
然而，證所稅這筆爛帳，不能推給劉憶如一人。整個馬政府上上下下，除須學習「團隊」與「協調」的一課，更不可忘記「目標」和「手段」的平衡和對稱。否則，抬頭仰望著星星，卻一腳踩進壕溝，能說是浪漫嗎？
Thursday, May 31, 2012
Beijing's Response to President Ma's May 20 Speech
Beijing's Response to President Ma's May 20 Speech
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 31, 2012
Summary: President Ma Ying-jeou delivered his inaugural speech ten days ago. Yesterday Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office finally made a formal response. Spokesman Yang Yi was asked about President Ma's "One Republic of China, Two Regions" comment. Yang said that this was Mr. Ma's long held policy position regarding the Mainland. We are not the least bit surprised. Yang was asked whether President Ma's speech would affect follow-up consultations between the two sides. Yang Yi replied bluntly, "It will not."
Full Text below:
President Ma Ying-jeou delivered his inaugural speech ten days ago. Yesterday Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office finally made a formal response. Spokesman Yang Yi was asked about President Ma's "One Republic of China, Two Regions" comment. Yang said that this was Mr. Ma's long held policy position regarding the Mainland. We are not the least bit surprised. Yang was asked whether President Ma's speech would affect follow-up consultations between the two sides. Yang Yi replied bluntly, "It will not."
Yang Yi's remarks were comparatively piecemeal. But a comparison between them and the language of the Wu/Hu Meeting in Beijing, back in March, may give us a clearer picture. One. Beijing opposes Taiwan independence. It recognizes the 1992 consensus. Two. The Ma administration handles cross-Strait relations according to the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. Beijing has not responded to this fact directly. But it has acknowledged that it is the Ma administration's "long held policy regarding the Mainland." It has acknowledged that it "has never voiced any objections in the past." Beijing is clearly "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements."
During the March Wu/Hu Meeting Hu Jintao said, "We affirm that (both the Mainland and Taiwan are part of one China). This is consistent with the two sides' legal provisions. It is something the two sides can agree upon." The "two sides' legal provisions" refers of course to the two sides' constitutions. In fact Hu Jintao told the Taiwan side, "Actually this is what your Republic of China Constitution stipulates. This is what you should abide by."
Meanwhile, Wu Poh-hsiung said, "According to the two sides' current systems and relevant legal provisions, the two sides maintain that they are both part of one China." Wu Poh-hsiung then proposed a "one country, two regions" perspective. He qualified his remarks by adding that under the Republic of China Constitution. "one China" has "different interpetations."
This is the first time the two sides have attempted to build political trust at the constitutional level, by referring to their current systems and legal provisions. The Beijing authorities have clearly acknowledged this. Something akin to a peace agreement may be difficult to achieve. Until then the sole basis for stable cross-Strait relations is the Republic of China Constitution, e.g. the "one China Constitution."
Consider President Ma's cross-Strait policy, including his "one Republic of China, two regions" phrasing. Its premise is the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations is similarly rooted in the constitutional framework of the Republic of China.
Beijing's response to Taipei's May 20 policy statement can be summed up in two ways. One. Its guiding principle is opposition to Taiwan independence. Opposing Taiwan independence takes precedence over promoting Chinese reunification. As the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office often says, "As long as everyone recognizes one China, all other issues are negotiable." Two. Beijng considers Taipei's cross-Strait policy acceptable. The bottom line is adherence to the Republic of China Constitution, since "this is what Taiwan ought to abide by."
The above analysis is somewhat loose. After all, Beijing did not state its position in quite so explicit terms. But it catches Beijing's drift. It offers new meaning for the three parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. One. Beijing now acknowledges that the Republic of China Constitution stabilizes cross-Strait relations. This is a huge step. Two. The Ma administration included the phrases "one China means the Republic of China," and "one Republic of China, two regions" in Ma's inaugural speech. In short, Ma expressed support for one China, different interpetations "under the constitutional framework of the Republic of China." Beijing does not consider his an obstacle to cross-Strait peaceful development. This represents significant progress in cross-Strait interaction. Three. Yesterday Yang Yi repudiated the DPP's "one country on each side" rhetoric. The DPP can choose to return to its "rectification of names" policy. It can choose to have a showdown with Beijing. Or it can do the smart thing and choose to reaffirm the Republic of China Constitution.
The UDN News uses the "glass theory" to describe the situation. The Republic of China Constitution is the glass. Taiwan is the water. As long as the glass remains, the water is contained within. But once the glass is broken, the water is lost.
Therefore, absent further breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations, the Republic of China Constitution remains the bottom line for the three-parties on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, the DPP's "rectification of names" is impossible. It cannot ignore the Republic of China Constitution. It must contend with the Republic of China Constitution, as well as objections from Beijing. It must defend Taiwan by defending the Republic of China Constitution. Conversely, Taiwan approaches cross-Strait relations from the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. Beijing must accept this. It must accept that for Taiwan "one China, different interpretations" is rooted in the Republic of China Constitution. This too is a line that cannot be easily crossed.
The Taiwan Affairs Office responded to President Ma's May 5 speech. Its response was both aggressive and passive. It was aggressive when it treated the Republic of China Constitution as the bottom line in cross-Strait relations. It was aggressive when it insisted it was "not the least bit surprised" that the Taiwan side predicated its "one China, different interpretations" argument on the Republic of China Constitution, It was aggressive when it adopted a pragmatic stance. It was passive when it avoided referring to the Republic of China Constitution. It was passivve when it avoided calling a spade a spade, and the constitution the constitution. It was not quite willing to say what it was thinking. This may be something we can anticipate in the future.
解讀北京對五二○演說的回應
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.31 01:54 am
馬英九總統發表就職演說後的第十天，北京國台辦昨日終於作出正式回應。發言人楊毅被問及對馬總統所說「一個中華民國，兩個地區」有何評論時表示：這是馬先生自己一貫的大陸政策，我們並不感到意外。又被問及，馬總統的演說會否影響兩岸後續協商？楊毅直截了當地答說：不會。
楊毅昨天的談話比較細碎，不過如將之與北京三月「吳胡會」以來的主要論述作綜合比對，或許能看出比較完整的輪廓。總體的印象是：一、北京仍以反對台獨及認同九二共識為政策主軸；二、對於馬政府「在中華民國憲法架構下處理兩岸關係」的立場，北京未直接表示態度；但既認知是馬政府「一貫的大陸政策」，而北京「一貫未表示異議」，可知這是在北京所說「求同存異」的範圍內。
在三月「吳胡會」中，胡錦濤說：「確認（大陸和台灣同屬一個中國）這一事實，符合兩岸現行現定，應該是雙方都可以做到的」。其中，所謂符合「兩岸現行規定」，即是指符合兩岸現行憲法；亦即，胡錦濤不啻是向台灣方面說：「這其實就是你們中華民國憲法的規定，應該是你們做得到的。」
相對而言，吳伯雄在「吳胡會」說：「根據雙方現行體制和相關規定，兩岸都堅持一個中國」。吳伯雄並因而提出「一國兩區」的觀點，這是在強調：雖是「一個中國」，卻是「各自表述」，根據則在中華民國憲法。
這是兩岸之間首度嘗試以憲法層次（現行體制與規定）來建立政治信任。北京當局顯已認知，在《和平協議》之類的機制不易達成時，唯一可以確定兩岸關係者，即是中華民國憲法，亦即「一中憲法」。
至於馬總統的兩岸政策，包括「一個中華民國，兩個地區」的論述，其脊柱即是「在中華民國憲法架構下」；而「九二共識／一中各表」，也正是建立在「中華民國憲法架構下」。
因而，對五二○後北京的對台政策或許可以作出兩點總結：一、「反對台獨」為最高前提，反獨先於促統；也就是國台辦常說的，「只要認同一個中國，其他問題都可討論」。二、北京對台灣兩岸政策的接受範圍，將以「中華民國憲法」為底線，因為「這應該是台灣做得到的」。
以上的分析，或許略嫌寬鬆（因北京畢竟未明言），但應是勢之所趨，而對兩岸三黨皆有新的意義：一、對北京而言，認知到中華民國憲法是穩定兩岸走向的基本憑藉，這可視為邁出了一大步。二、對馬政府而言，能將「一中，即是中華民國」，及「一個中華民國，兩個地區」明白載入就職演說，亦即以「在中華民國憲法架構下」建立了「一中各表」，而北京認為此一論述無礙兩岸和平發展，這應是兩岸互動的重要進展。三、楊毅昨天否定了一切「一邊一國」的觀點，對民進黨而言，除非再回到「正名制憲」，決志與北京攤牌；否則，回到中華民國憲法的底線，恐是民進黨在兩岸關係上唯一的選擇。
或許可用本報所倡「杯子理論」來形容此一情勢，那就是：中華民國（憲法）是杯，台灣是水；杯在水在，杯破水覆。
於是：在兩岸關係未有進一步突破前，中華民國憲法，應在兩岸三黨「互為底線」：一方面，民進黨再無「正名制憲」的可能性，亦即絕無突破中華民國底線的機會；必須以中華民國憲法與北京抗衡，並以中華民國憲法來捍衛台灣；反過來說，北京也必須接受台灣方面「在中華民國憲法架構下處理兩岸關係」，亦即必須接受台灣以「一中憲法／一中各表」為兩岸政策的底線，不可輕易逾越。
解讀國台辦昨日對馬總統五二○演說的回應，可以見到有其積極的一面，亦可見其消極的一面。積極面是：將中華民國憲法視為維持兩岸關係的底線，也「不意外」台灣方面以中華民國憲法為「一中各表」的根據，此皆是朝務實方向移動。消極面則是：畢竟未能明白稱述中華民國憲法，亦即未能「把黑桃叫做黑桃，把憲法叫做憲法」，心有所指而言不能宣，這或許就要寄望下一階段的發展了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 31, 2012
Summary: President Ma Ying-jeou delivered his inaugural speech ten days ago. Yesterday Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office finally made a formal response. Spokesman Yang Yi was asked about President Ma's "One Republic of China, Two Regions" comment. Yang said that this was Mr. Ma's long held policy position regarding the Mainland. We are not the least bit surprised. Yang was asked whether President Ma's speech would affect follow-up consultations between the two sides. Yang Yi replied bluntly, "It will not."
Full Text below:
President Ma Ying-jeou delivered his inaugural speech ten days ago. Yesterday Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office finally made a formal response. Spokesman Yang Yi was asked about President Ma's "One Republic of China, Two Regions" comment. Yang said that this was Mr. Ma's long held policy position regarding the Mainland. We are not the least bit surprised. Yang was asked whether President Ma's speech would affect follow-up consultations between the two sides. Yang Yi replied bluntly, "It will not."
Yang Yi's remarks were comparatively piecemeal. But a comparison between them and the language of the Wu/Hu Meeting in Beijing, back in March, may give us a clearer picture. One. Beijing opposes Taiwan independence. It recognizes the 1992 consensus. Two. The Ma administration handles cross-Strait relations according to the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. Beijing has not responded to this fact directly. But it has acknowledged that it is the Ma administration's "long held policy regarding the Mainland." It has acknowledged that it "has never voiced any objections in the past." Beijing is clearly "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements."
During the March Wu/Hu Meeting Hu Jintao said, "We affirm that (both the Mainland and Taiwan are part of one China). This is consistent with the two sides' legal provisions. It is something the two sides can agree upon." The "two sides' legal provisions" refers of course to the two sides' constitutions. In fact Hu Jintao told the Taiwan side, "Actually this is what your Republic of China Constitution stipulates. This is what you should abide by."
Meanwhile, Wu Poh-hsiung said, "According to the two sides' current systems and relevant legal provisions, the two sides maintain that they are both part of one China." Wu Poh-hsiung then proposed a "one country, two regions" perspective. He qualified his remarks by adding that under the Republic of China Constitution. "one China" has "different interpetations."
This is the first time the two sides have attempted to build political trust at the constitutional level, by referring to their current systems and legal provisions. The Beijing authorities have clearly acknowledged this. Something akin to a peace agreement may be difficult to achieve. Until then the sole basis for stable cross-Strait relations is the Republic of China Constitution, e.g. the "one China Constitution."
Consider President Ma's cross-Strait policy, including his "one Republic of China, two regions" phrasing. Its premise is the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations is similarly rooted in the constitutional framework of the Republic of China.
Beijing's response to Taipei's May 20 policy statement can be summed up in two ways. One. Its guiding principle is opposition to Taiwan independence. Opposing Taiwan independence takes precedence over promoting Chinese reunification. As the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office often says, "As long as everyone recognizes one China, all other issues are negotiable." Two. Beijng considers Taipei's cross-Strait policy acceptable. The bottom line is adherence to the Republic of China Constitution, since "this is what Taiwan ought to abide by."
The above analysis is somewhat loose. After all, Beijing did not state its position in quite so explicit terms. But it catches Beijing's drift. It offers new meaning for the three parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. One. Beijing now acknowledges that the Republic of China Constitution stabilizes cross-Strait relations. This is a huge step. Two. The Ma administration included the phrases "one China means the Republic of China," and "one Republic of China, two regions" in Ma's inaugural speech. In short, Ma expressed support for one China, different interpetations "under the constitutional framework of the Republic of China." Beijing does not consider his an obstacle to cross-Strait peaceful development. This represents significant progress in cross-Strait interaction. Three. Yesterday Yang Yi repudiated the DPP's "one country on each side" rhetoric. The DPP can choose to return to its "rectification of names" policy. It can choose to have a showdown with Beijing. Or it can do the smart thing and choose to reaffirm the Republic of China Constitution.
The UDN News uses the "glass theory" to describe the situation. The Republic of China Constitution is the glass. Taiwan is the water. As long as the glass remains, the water is contained within. But once the glass is broken, the water is lost.
Therefore, absent further breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations, the Republic of China Constitution remains the bottom line for the three-parties on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, the DPP's "rectification of names" is impossible. It cannot ignore the Republic of China Constitution. It must contend with the Republic of China Constitution, as well as objections from Beijing. It must defend Taiwan by defending the Republic of China Constitution. Conversely, Taiwan approaches cross-Strait relations from the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. Beijing must accept this. It must accept that for Taiwan "one China, different interpretations" is rooted in the Republic of China Constitution. This too is a line that cannot be easily crossed.
The Taiwan Affairs Office responded to President Ma's May 5 speech. Its response was both aggressive and passive. It was aggressive when it treated the Republic of China Constitution as the bottom line in cross-Strait relations. It was aggressive when it insisted it was "not the least bit surprised" that the Taiwan side predicated its "one China, different interpretations" argument on the Republic of China Constitution, It was aggressive when it adopted a pragmatic stance. It was passive when it avoided referring to the Republic of China Constitution. It was passivve when it avoided calling a spade a spade, and the constitution the constitution. It was not quite willing to say what it was thinking. This may be something we can anticipate in the future.
解讀北京對五二○演說的回應
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.31 01:54 am
馬英九總統發表就職演說後的第十天，北京國台辦昨日終於作出正式回應。發言人楊毅被問及對馬總統所說「一個中華民國，兩個地區」有何評論時表示：這是馬先生自己一貫的大陸政策，我們並不感到意外。又被問及，馬總統的演說會否影響兩岸後續協商？楊毅直截了當地答說：不會。
楊毅昨天的談話比較細碎，不過如將之與北京三月「吳胡會」以來的主要論述作綜合比對，或許能看出比較完整的輪廓。總體的印象是：一、北京仍以反對台獨及認同九二共識為政策主軸；二、對於馬政府「在中華民國憲法架構下處理兩岸關係」的立場，北京未直接表示態度；但既認知是馬政府「一貫的大陸政策」，而北京「一貫未表示異議」，可知這是在北京所說「求同存異」的範圍內。
在三月「吳胡會」中，胡錦濤說：「確認（大陸和台灣同屬一個中國）這一事實，符合兩岸現行現定，應該是雙方都可以做到的」。其中，所謂符合「兩岸現行規定」，即是指符合兩岸現行憲法；亦即，胡錦濤不啻是向台灣方面說：「這其實就是你們中華民國憲法的規定，應該是你們做得到的。」
相對而言，吳伯雄在「吳胡會」說：「根據雙方現行體制和相關規定，兩岸都堅持一個中國」。吳伯雄並因而提出「一國兩區」的觀點，這是在強調：雖是「一個中國」，卻是「各自表述」，根據則在中華民國憲法。
這是兩岸之間首度嘗試以憲法層次（現行體制與規定）來建立政治信任。北京當局顯已認知，在《和平協議》之類的機制不易達成時，唯一可以確定兩岸關係者，即是中華民國憲法，亦即「一中憲法」。
至於馬總統的兩岸政策，包括「一個中華民國，兩個地區」的論述，其脊柱即是「在中華民國憲法架構下」；而「九二共識／一中各表」，也正是建立在「中華民國憲法架構下」。
因而，對五二○後北京的對台政策或許可以作出兩點總結：一、「反對台獨」為最高前提，反獨先於促統；也就是國台辦常說的，「只要認同一個中國，其他問題都可討論」。二、北京對台灣兩岸政策的接受範圍，將以「中華民國憲法」為底線，因為「這應該是台灣做得到的」。
以上的分析，或許略嫌寬鬆（因北京畢竟未明言），但應是勢之所趨，而對兩岸三黨皆有新的意義：一、對北京而言，認知到中華民國憲法是穩定兩岸走向的基本憑藉，這可視為邁出了一大步。二、對馬政府而言，能將「一中，即是中華民國」，及「一個中華民國，兩個地區」明白載入就職演說，亦即以「在中華民國憲法架構下」建立了「一中各表」，而北京認為此一論述無礙兩岸和平發展，這應是兩岸互動的重要進展。三、楊毅昨天否定了一切「一邊一國」的觀點，對民進黨而言，除非再回到「正名制憲」，決志與北京攤牌；否則，回到中華民國憲法的底線，恐是民進黨在兩岸關係上唯一的選擇。
或許可用本報所倡「杯子理論」來形容此一情勢，那就是：中華民國（憲法）是杯，台灣是水；杯在水在，杯破水覆。
於是：在兩岸關係未有進一步突破前，中華民國憲法，應在兩岸三黨「互為底線」：一方面，民進黨再無「正名制憲」的可能性，亦即絕無突破中華民國底線的機會；必須以中華民國憲法與北京抗衡，並以中華民國憲法來捍衛台灣；反過來說，北京也必須接受台灣方面「在中華民國憲法架構下處理兩岸關係」，亦即必須接受台灣以「一中憲法／一中各表」為兩岸政策的底線，不可輕易逾越。
解讀國台辦昨日對馬總統五二○演說的回應，可以見到有其積極的一面，亦可見其消極的一面。積極面是：將中華民國憲法視為維持兩岸關係的底線，也「不意外」台灣方面以中華民國憲法為「一中各表」的根據，此皆是朝務實方向移動。消極面則是：畢竟未能明白稱述中華民國憲法，亦即未能「把黑桃叫做黑桃，把憲法叫做憲法」，心有所指而言不能宣，這或許就要寄望下一階段的發展了。
Wednesday, May 30, 2012
His Last Hurrah: Su Tseng-chang Must Transform the DPP
His Last Hurrah: Su Tseng-chang Must Transform the DPP
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 28, 2012
Summary: Su Tseng-chang was, as predicted, the standout during the Democratic Progressive Party party chairmanship election. He won over half of the votes. He gained the lead and held it with little difficulty. But a strange thing is happening inside and outside the party. Will Su Tseng-chang be able to fulfill his role as chairman of the party? This question bears on his personal political future. It bears on the transformation of the DPP. It even bears on the political situation on Taiwan.
Full Text below:
Su Tseng-chang was, as predicted, the standout during the Democratic Progressive Party party chairmanship election. He won over half of the votes. He gained the lead and held it with little difficulty. But a strange thing is happening inside and outside the party. Will Su Tseng-chang be able to fulfill his role as chairman of the party? This question bears on his personal political future. It bears on the transformation of the DPP. It even bears on the political situation on Taiwan.
Five candidates took part in the recent party chairmanship election. Su Tseng-chang's resume was impressive and his support was solid. Given his lead over the other four candidates, he should have been a shoo-in. Instead, Su Tseng-chang found himself besieged by the other four candidates. The fog of war obscured the larger picture. Objections to Su Tseng-chang's political style, along with long-simmering factional grievances within the DPP, conspired against him. His rivalry with Tsai Ing-wen turned the party chairmanship election into a war against Su. In response, the Su camp resolved to win over half the votes, to prove just how much support he enjoyed within the party.
The other four candidates leveld two major criticisms against Su Tseng-chang. They said he was narrow-minded, not a team player, and lacked the ability to formulate any groundbreaking policy measures. Their criticisms became the theme of the campaign. Su assumes the chairmanship of the party this Wednesday. All eyes will be on him. Political opponents and allies alike will taking the measure of the man. They will be asking themselves whether Su Tseng-chang can silence his critics. Only then will they decide what to do next. His allies will be wondering whether to double down on their bets. Su Tseng-chang has high ambitions. His performance over the next two years will be critical.
Su Tseng-chang has long been domineering in his manner. Fellow party members have criticized him for this. This is his biggest stumbling block as the attempts his move to the next level. During the party chairmanship election debates, the other candidates blasted Su Tseng-chang's unilateral decision to run for Taipei mayor. They blasted him for resigning the party chairmanship before notifying the Central Standing Committee. The DPP has a long tradition of consensus. The nomination committee is highly respected. It accomodates members of various factions. Su Tseng-chang had no right to act on his own. Hopefully Su Tseng-chang will learn from his mistake. He should emulate Abraham Lincoln's "Team of Rivals." He should recruit supporters of perennial rivals Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh. Over time he may change peoples impression of him.
Other problems may be more difficult to resolve. How can Su Tseng-chang unify the party? What concrete policies can he champion to tranform the DPP into a responsible opposition party? During the debates Su Tseng-chang noted that support for President Ma Ying-jeou during his first term was weak. So why was Ma reelected, Su asked. Nearly 60% of the public believes Taiwan should be sovereign and independent, Su said. So why is the DPP unable to win more than half the votes? The key reason is that during its four years in the opposition. the DPP did nothing bu protest and object. It never offered any feasible policy alternatives. Voters on Taiwan are smart. They will not support a political party that says no just for the sake of saying no.
Consider the many recent policy debates. The Ma administration was bruised and battered by controversies over Clenbuterol treated beef imports, gasoline and and electricity price hikes, and capital gains tax proposals. The DPP smelled blood. Drunk with schadenfreude, it jumped on the protest bandwagon. But how will the DPP deal with these problems if it is in power? How will it handle Clenbuterol treated beef imports? How will it handle trade agreements with Washington? Can it really get away with cozying up to Washington whenever it is in power, then lashing out at it whenever it is out? Similarly, the DPP opposes nuclear power, even as it opposes electricity price hikes. It prefers to take the taxpayers' money and subsidize major users of electricity. If the DPP returns to power it would saddle our children and grandchildren with debt. For a party such as this to talk about "generational justice" is a joke.
To become a responsible opposition party is no easy task. The KMT waffled repeatedly over whether and how to impose a capital gains tax. The market complained, loudly. The Democratic Progressive Party recently met to discuss the capital gains tax as well. This too led to factional infighting. The party could not reach an agreement. Frankly, such a policy debate within the DPP is a good thing. Nothing under the sun is supposed to come easy. An opposition party that knows only how to say no, can never become the ruling party. The DPP must first talk turkey. Only then can it order convince voters it is ready to return to power.
This is a problem the DPP must face. It is one of Chairman Su's key challenges. Fortunately Su Tseng-chang won an absolute majority during the party chairmanship election. Even second place Su Huan-chih was not a representative of Deep Green forces. Together these two relative moderates accounted for 70% of the vote. Clearly pragmatists still have the upper hand, These comparatively rational party members will become Su Tseng-chang backers as he adopts a more centrist path.
Politicians always say "This is my last hurrah." But the 65-year-old Su Tseng-chang really is running out of time. In the two years to come, he must win over the many factions within the party. He must transform the DPP into an opposition party the people can trust. Achieving either of these goals is hard enough. Achieving both of is harder still. They are in many ways mutually contradictory. This is a tough challenge for Su Tseng-chang, who has no room for error. This truly is his last hurrah.
迎接最後一戰 蘇貞昌得讓民進黨轉型
2012-05-28中國時報
一如預期，蘇貞昌不但在民進黨黨主席選舉一役脫穎而出，而且贏得過半選票，讓他順利取得領導優勢。但是，在黨內外情勢詭譎的此刻，蘇貞昌能不能扮演好黨主席的角色，關乎他個人的政治前途，也關乎民進黨的轉型，甚而可能左右台灣的政治局勢。
在此次五人參賽的黨主席選舉之中，蘇貞昌具有傲人的資歷及實力，和其他四位候選人實力懸殊，勝選應該如同是探囊取物，但是蘇貞昌卻因遭受其他四人圍攻，而讓戰局顯得混亂；其間有蘇貞昌個人作風問題，民進黨長年派系恩怨，再夾雜蘇貞昌、蔡英文之爭，黨主席選舉變成「反蘇」大戰；因此，蘇陣營一開始的目標就是要拿下過半選票，以實力來證明自己在黨內的人望。
雖然如此，在競選過程中四位候選人對蘇貞昌的兩大質疑，分別是心胸狹窄、無法群策群力，及政策能力空泛缺乏開創性，則成為話題。他本周三就任黨主席後，必然是十目所視，無論是政敵還是盟友，都會隨時秤他的斤兩，看蘇貞昌能不能克服這些質疑，再來決定後續要戰要和，盟友也會決定是否值得後續投資。可以說，對志在大位的蘇貞昌而言，這一任兩年的表現，事關重大。
表面上看來，蘇貞昌向來有點霸氣的作風，備受黨內訾議，是他更上一層樓的最大阻力。確實，黨主席政見發表會時，其他候選人攻擊蘇貞昌自行決定參選台北市、及未向中常會請辭就宣布辭去黨主席，就是著眼於此；只是，民進黨向來有合議制的傳統，最受重視的選舉提名小組，往往容納各派系成員，蘇貞昌事實上不可能獨斷獨行；當然，蘇貞昌如果能更進一步、從這次選舉學到教訓，效法美國總統林肯組成「政敵團隊」，廣納素來不和的蔡英文、謝長廷人馬，長期還是有機會讓大家對其印象改觀的。
比較困難的是，蘇貞昌如何整合黨內眾意，提出具體政策，成為負責任的反對黨。就如蘇貞昌自己在政見發表會所說，馬英九總統第一任時支持度不高，為何還是連任？支持台灣主權獨立的民意曾高達六成，民進黨為何就是無法拿下過半選票？關鍵原因在於，在野這四年多，民進黨除了抗爭、反對外，從未提出可行的政策方案，精明的台灣選民，當然不會支持一個「為反對而反對」的政黨。
就以近日的諸多政策爭議為例，受困於瘦肉精開放、油電漲價、課徵證所稅等議題，馬政府焦頭爛額；民進黨見獵心喜，加入抗爭陣營，但如果換成民進黨執政，他們如何處理開放瘦肉精及與美簽訂貿易協議的兩難問題，不能說執政時親美，在野就變成反美；同樣的，民進黨既不要核電，卻不同意電價調漲，寧願拿納稅人的錢去補貼用電大戶，這樣的民進黨如果執政，怎麼可能不債留子孫！該黨談世代正義，豈非笑話一則！
確實，要成為負責任的在野黨，絕非易事，國民黨為了是否課徵證所稅、要怎麼課，一再游疑不定，市場怨聲載道；同樣的，民進黨黨團會議日前討論證所稅時，一樣引爆兩派內訌，黨版證所稅難產；坦白說，這樣的政策爭議對民進黨而言，卻是好事一椿，因為，天下沒有那麼便宜的事，只靠反對就能成為執政黨的，民進黨一定要經過政策討論整合的過程，才能說服選民，同意他們重返執政。
這是民進黨必須面對的難題，也是蘇貞昌擔任主席後的重要挑戰。幸運的是，這次黨主席選舉，不但蘇貞昌拿下過半選票，連第二名的蘇煥智，也不是黨內深綠陣營，立場比較溫和的大蘇小蘇加起來，囊括七成選票，可見民進黨內的務實派黨員仍占上風，這些相對理性的聲音，將是蘇貞昌走中間路線的最大後盾。
政治人物永遠會說這是最後一戰，但是對已經六十五歲的蘇貞昌而言，他真的有時間的壓力，這兩年不但要能讓黨內各派系心服口服，更要讓民進黨成為令人可以信任的反對黨，要達到這兩個目標的任何一項，都已是高難度，更何況，兩項目標之間經常是矛盾的；這是嚴苛的挑戰，但是蘇貞昌沒有犯錯的空間，因為這已是他最後的一次機會！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 28, 2012
Summary: Su Tseng-chang was, as predicted, the standout during the Democratic Progressive Party party chairmanship election. He won over half of the votes. He gained the lead and held it with little difficulty. But a strange thing is happening inside and outside the party. Will Su Tseng-chang be able to fulfill his role as chairman of the party? This question bears on his personal political future. It bears on the transformation of the DPP. It even bears on the political situation on Taiwan.
Full Text below:
Su Tseng-chang was, as predicted, the standout during the Democratic Progressive Party party chairmanship election. He won over half of the votes. He gained the lead and held it with little difficulty. But a strange thing is happening inside and outside the party. Will Su Tseng-chang be able to fulfill his role as chairman of the party? This question bears on his personal political future. It bears on the transformation of the DPP. It even bears on the political situation on Taiwan.
Five candidates took part in the recent party chairmanship election. Su Tseng-chang's resume was impressive and his support was solid. Given his lead over the other four candidates, he should have been a shoo-in. Instead, Su Tseng-chang found himself besieged by the other four candidates. The fog of war obscured the larger picture. Objections to Su Tseng-chang's political style, along with long-simmering factional grievances within the DPP, conspired against him. His rivalry with Tsai Ing-wen turned the party chairmanship election into a war against Su. In response, the Su camp resolved to win over half the votes, to prove just how much support he enjoyed within the party.
The other four candidates leveld two major criticisms against Su Tseng-chang. They said he was narrow-minded, not a team player, and lacked the ability to formulate any groundbreaking policy measures. Their criticisms became the theme of the campaign. Su assumes the chairmanship of the party this Wednesday. All eyes will be on him. Political opponents and allies alike will taking the measure of the man. They will be asking themselves whether Su Tseng-chang can silence his critics. Only then will they decide what to do next. His allies will be wondering whether to double down on their bets. Su Tseng-chang has high ambitions. His performance over the next two years will be critical.
Su Tseng-chang has long been domineering in his manner. Fellow party members have criticized him for this. This is his biggest stumbling block as the attempts his move to the next level. During the party chairmanship election debates, the other candidates blasted Su Tseng-chang's unilateral decision to run for Taipei mayor. They blasted him for resigning the party chairmanship before notifying the Central Standing Committee. The DPP has a long tradition of consensus. The nomination committee is highly respected. It accomodates members of various factions. Su Tseng-chang had no right to act on his own. Hopefully Su Tseng-chang will learn from his mistake. He should emulate Abraham Lincoln's "Team of Rivals." He should recruit supporters of perennial rivals Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh. Over time he may change peoples impression of him.
Other problems may be more difficult to resolve. How can Su Tseng-chang unify the party? What concrete policies can he champion to tranform the DPP into a responsible opposition party? During the debates Su Tseng-chang noted that support for President Ma Ying-jeou during his first term was weak. So why was Ma reelected, Su asked. Nearly 60% of the public believes Taiwan should be sovereign and independent, Su said. So why is the DPP unable to win more than half the votes? The key reason is that during its four years in the opposition. the DPP did nothing bu protest and object. It never offered any feasible policy alternatives. Voters on Taiwan are smart. They will not support a political party that says no just for the sake of saying no.
Consider the many recent policy debates. The Ma administration was bruised and battered by controversies over Clenbuterol treated beef imports, gasoline and and electricity price hikes, and capital gains tax proposals. The DPP smelled blood. Drunk with schadenfreude, it jumped on the protest bandwagon. But how will the DPP deal with these problems if it is in power? How will it handle Clenbuterol treated beef imports? How will it handle trade agreements with Washington? Can it really get away with cozying up to Washington whenever it is in power, then lashing out at it whenever it is out? Similarly, the DPP opposes nuclear power, even as it opposes electricity price hikes. It prefers to take the taxpayers' money and subsidize major users of electricity. If the DPP returns to power it would saddle our children and grandchildren with debt. For a party such as this to talk about "generational justice" is a joke.
To become a responsible opposition party is no easy task. The KMT waffled repeatedly over whether and how to impose a capital gains tax. The market complained, loudly. The Democratic Progressive Party recently met to discuss the capital gains tax as well. This too led to factional infighting. The party could not reach an agreement. Frankly, such a policy debate within the DPP is a good thing. Nothing under the sun is supposed to come easy. An opposition party that knows only how to say no, can never become the ruling party. The DPP must first talk turkey. Only then can it order convince voters it is ready to return to power.
This is a problem the DPP must face. It is one of Chairman Su's key challenges. Fortunately Su Tseng-chang won an absolute majority during the party chairmanship election. Even second place Su Huan-chih was not a representative of Deep Green forces. Together these two relative moderates accounted for 70% of the vote. Clearly pragmatists still have the upper hand, These comparatively rational party members will become Su Tseng-chang backers as he adopts a more centrist path.
Politicians always say "This is my last hurrah." But the 65-year-old Su Tseng-chang really is running out of time. In the two years to come, he must win over the many factions within the party. He must transform the DPP into an opposition party the people can trust. Achieving either of these goals is hard enough. Achieving both of is harder still. They are in many ways mutually contradictory. This is a tough challenge for Su Tseng-chang, who has no room for error. This truly is his last hurrah.
迎接最後一戰 蘇貞昌得讓民進黨轉型
2012-05-28中國時報
一如預期，蘇貞昌不但在民進黨黨主席選舉一役脫穎而出，而且贏得過半選票，讓他順利取得領導優勢。但是，在黨內外情勢詭譎的此刻，蘇貞昌能不能扮演好黨主席的角色，關乎他個人的政治前途，也關乎民進黨的轉型，甚而可能左右台灣的政治局勢。
在此次五人參賽的黨主席選舉之中，蘇貞昌具有傲人的資歷及實力，和其他四位候選人實力懸殊，勝選應該如同是探囊取物，但是蘇貞昌卻因遭受其他四人圍攻，而讓戰局顯得混亂；其間有蘇貞昌個人作風問題，民進黨長年派系恩怨，再夾雜蘇貞昌、蔡英文之爭，黨主席選舉變成「反蘇」大戰；因此，蘇陣營一開始的目標就是要拿下過半選票，以實力來證明自己在黨內的人望。
雖然如此，在競選過程中四位候選人對蘇貞昌的兩大質疑，分別是心胸狹窄、無法群策群力，及政策能力空泛缺乏開創性，則成為話題。他本周三就任黨主席後，必然是十目所視，無論是政敵還是盟友，都會隨時秤他的斤兩，看蘇貞昌能不能克服這些質疑，再來決定後續要戰要和，盟友也會決定是否值得後續投資。可以說，對志在大位的蘇貞昌而言，這一任兩年的表現，事關重大。
表面上看來，蘇貞昌向來有點霸氣的作風，備受黨內訾議，是他更上一層樓的最大阻力。確實，黨主席政見發表會時，其他候選人攻擊蘇貞昌自行決定參選台北市、及未向中常會請辭就宣布辭去黨主席，就是著眼於此；只是，民進黨向來有合議制的傳統，最受重視的選舉提名小組，往往容納各派系成員，蘇貞昌事實上不可能獨斷獨行；當然，蘇貞昌如果能更進一步、從這次選舉學到教訓，效法美國總統林肯組成「政敵團隊」，廣納素來不和的蔡英文、謝長廷人馬，長期還是有機會讓大家對其印象改觀的。
比較困難的是，蘇貞昌如何整合黨內眾意，提出具體政策，成為負責任的反對黨。就如蘇貞昌自己在政見發表會所說，馬英九總統第一任時支持度不高，為何還是連任？支持台灣主權獨立的民意曾高達六成，民進黨為何就是無法拿下過半選票？關鍵原因在於，在野這四年多，民進黨除了抗爭、反對外，從未提出可行的政策方案，精明的台灣選民，當然不會支持一個「為反對而反對」的政黨。
就以近日的諸多政策爭議為例，受困於瘦肉精開放、油電漲價、課徵證所稅等議題，馬政府焦頭爛額；民進黨見獵心喜，加入抗爭陣營，但如果換成民進黨執政，他們如何處理開放瘦肉精及與美簽訂貿易協議的兩難問題，不能說執政時親美，在野就變成反美；同樣的，民進黨既不要核電，卻不同意電價調漲，寧願拿納稅人的錢去補貼用電大戶，這樣的民進黨如果執政，怎麼可能不債留子孫！該黨談世代正義，豈非笑話一則！
確實，要成為負責任的在野黨，絕非易事，國民黨為了是否課徵證所稅、要怎麼課，一再游疑不定，市場怨聲載道；同樣的，民進黨黨團會議日前討論證所稅時，一樣引爆兩派內訌，黨版證所稅難產；坦白說，這樣的政策爭議對民進黨而言，卻是好事一椿，因為，天下沒有那麼便宜的事，只靠反對就能成為執政黨的，民進黨一定要經過政策討論整合的過程，才能說服選民，同意他們重返執政。
這是民進黨必須面對的難題，也是蘇貞昌擔任主席後的重要挑戰。幸運的是，這次黨主席選舉，不但蘇貞昌拿下過半選票，連第二名的蘇煥智，也不是黨內深綠陣營，立場比較溫和的大蘇小蘇加起來，囊括七成選票，可見民進黨內的務實派黨員仍占上風，這些相對理性的聲音，將是蘇貞昌走中間路線的最大後盾。
政治人物永遠會說這是最後一戰，但是對已經六十五歲的蘇貞昌而言，他真的有時間的壓力，這兩年不但要能讓黨內各派系心服口服，更要讓民進黨成為令人可以信任的反對黨，要達到這兩個目標的任何一項，都已是高難度，更何況，兩項目標之間經常是矛盾的；這是嚴苛的挑戰，但是蘇貞昌沒有犯錯的空間，因為這已是他最後的一次機會！
Ma/Su Dialogue: Ruling and Opposition Party Reconciliation
Ma/Su Dialogue: Ruling and Opposition Party Reconciliation
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 29, 2012
Summary: Su Tseng-chang faces some daunting challenges. He must unify the party from within. He must promote ruling and opposition party dialogue. He must even help Taipei and Beijing achieve rapprochement. Su Tseng-chang's problems are also problems for President Ma Ying-jeou.chairman of the ruling KMT. Ma and Su must take practical action. They must let the public on Taiwan know that relations between the ruling and opposition parties is entering a new phase. Changes have led to a watershed in ruling and opposition party relations. From this day forward, the national interest will take precedence over partisan interests.
Full Text below:
The DPP has completed its hotly contested party chairman by-election. The election set a new record for voter turnout in a DPP by-election -- 69.6% -- the highest since 1998. The election also set a new record for the winning candidate, Su Tseng-chang -- 50.47% -- the lowest since the previous party chairmanship election. These figures show that Su Tseng-chang faces some daunting challenges. He must unify the party from within. He must promote ruling and opposition party dialogue. He must even help Taipei and Beijing achieve rapprochement. Su Tseng-chang's problems are also problems for President Ma Ying-jeou.chairman of the ruling KMT. Ma and Su must take practical action. They must let the public on Taiwan know that relations between the ruling and opposition parties is entering a new phase. Changes have led to a watershed in ruling and opposition party relations. From this day forward, the national interest will take precedence over partisan interests.
Su Tseng-chang was once a party official. When Su retired as Pingtung County Chief, DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh appointed him DPP Secretary General. During Su's term as Secretary General, the DPP held its first ever general audit of party members. It held its first ever party primaries for ROC President, Taiwan Provincial Governor, and city mayors. Su's record was exemplary. He gained a reputation as "the secretary-general who let the chairman get all the applause." After the DPP came to power in 2005, Su ran unopposed for the position of party chairman. He received 99.71% of the vote. The following year, under Su's leadership, the DPP won 127 seats in the National Assembly. For the first time in history, the DPP was the largest party in the legislature. Together with the Chen administration, they successfully passed an amendment abolishing the National Assembly.
The second time Su was elected party chairman, the political situation was dramatically different. The rivalry between Su and Hsieh was now a rivalry between Su and Tsai. The "Ah-Bian Problem" constantly demanded attention. The DPP no longer commanded the resources and power of the ruling party. The former may have been more serious than the latter. The Democratic Progressive Party went from opposition party to ruling party. Starting over from scratch probably felt perfectly normal. Consider the DPP's current situation. It is looking to the seven in one election two years from now. For the DPP the odds are good. As an opposition party, it has nothing to lose. Su Tseng-chang is a former defense lawyer, a former Taiwan Provincial Assembly Member, and a former local government leader. For him dialoguing with the ruling KMT is not a problem. The problem is persuading comrades within his own party. The problem is persuading them to dialogue with Ma Ying-jeou.
Based on past experience, Su Tseng-chang may be able to persuade himself and persuade his comrades. The DPP may be an ideologically-motivated political party. But it has never been an irrational political party. Ever since the party was founded, the DPP has never ruled out dialogue with those in power. This was true under Jiang Pengjian. This was true under Huang Hsin-chieh. This was also true under Hsu Hsin-liang, Shih Ming-teh, and Chen Shui-bian. It was true even during the era of street protests. The DPP never refused to communicate with those in power. It carried on its struggle and communicated with those in power simultaneously. This allowed the DPP to grow. This allowed democracy to evolve. As a result the legislature underwent a thoroughgoing re-election. The President was directly elected. Eventually the DPP came to power. The Republic of China government experienced a change in ruling parties. It finally had a democracy worthy of the name. This would have been impossible without ruling and opposition party cooperation and competition.
The DPP came to power for the first time. President Chen Shui-bian served two terms, or eight years. No matter how bad relations became between the ruling and opposition parties, no one gave up on interparty consultations. Most importantly, when Chen Shui-bian was in office, he advanced his "New Centrist Path." For the very first time the DPP entered a new realm. This is something even Ma Ying-jeou failed to achieve during his first term. Ma Ying-jeou failed to do his homework. Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen failed as well. Tsai Ing-wen lost the opportunity to transform the DPP. Now the opportunity has fallen into the hands of Su Tseng-chang. Su Tseng-chang should approach the challenge with greater aggressiveness.
Consider the matter from another angle. What does the DPP have to lose? As political elders, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen must clash. But they must also wait four years. Much lot can happen in four years. Never mind whether Su Tseng-chang's leadership style differs from Tsai Ing-wen's. Ask yourself why the DPP is always a day late and a dollar short vis a vis party transformation. Does it really intend to squander the next four years in a standoff with the ruling KMT? As party chairman, Su Tseng-chang must lead the party to election victory. But he must also lead the party through its transformation. The latter is the key to the former. How can a decrepit, even mummified DPP possibly return to power?
On election night, President Ma telephoned Su Tseng-chang to congratulate him. This one telephone call broke through barriers Tsai Ing-wen erected over four-years. Both ruling and opposition party leaders have demonstrated greater tolerance and forbearance. Su Tseng-chang did not immediately reject President Ma's invitation. He later said "The KMT and DPP should increase dialogue over social welfare issues. If a Ma/Su meeting can achieve this goal, there is no reason to refuse." He acted in a manner befitting the chairman of an opposition party, Of course, he also added, "If we are meeting only to put on a show, then we need not bother." In effect, Su dared Ma Ying-jeou to put his money where his mouth is.
The ruling and opposition parties have begun reconciling. The ruling and opposition parties have also begun competing. The KMT and the DPP are the latitude and longitude of our democracy, Both are indispensable. The Ma/Su meeting is a competition between the ruling and opposition parties, over which demonstrates greater tolerance and forbearance. They are also competing over policy and vision. From this moment forward, Ma Ying-jeou and Su Tseng-chang must give greater thought to "just what is in the national interest." The sooner Ma and Su address this problem, the sooner they can promote the general welfare.
馬蘇對話 展開朝野和解新局
2012-05-29 01:28
中國時報
在多方競逐中，民進黨完成黨主席改選，這次選舉創下民進黨自一九九八年以來的最高投票率百分之六十八點六二，當選人蘇貞昌則創下歷屆黨主席最低得票率百分之五十點四七，這兩個數字凸顯蘇貞昌必須面對的重大考驗，從黨內整合到朝野對話，乃至兩岸破冰；對應於蘇貞昌的難題，同樣也是執政黨主席、馬英九總統的課題，馬蘇必須以實際行動告訴台灣人民：朝野關係將步入新局，台灣將因為朝野關係的改變邁向新的分水嶺，全民利益從此可置於政黨利益之上。
蘇貞昌歷任黨公職，屏東縣長卸任後即受黨主席施明德邀，出任民進黨祕書長，在他任內辦理首次民進黨籍總檢查，舉辦首次總統和省市長的黨內初選，其幹練表露無遺，博得「把掌聲留給主席的祕書長」的聲譽。民進黨執政之後，他在二○○五年以一人參選高達百分之九十九點七一的得票率當選黨主席，隔年即帶領民進黨取得一百廿七席的任務型國民大會代表，讓民進黨第一次成為「國會第一大黨」，成功配合扁政府任內的最後一次修憲，廢掉國民大會。
回顧過往，第二次當選黨主席，政治形勢丕變，黨內從「蘇謝情結」到「蘇蔡之爭」，還要處理一時半刻難以消化的「扁問題」，對外民進黨不再是擁有資源與權力的執政黨，前者或許比後者還難搞，畢竟民進黨從在野到執政，從草根重新出發，理應視為正常，尤其是衡酌當前形勢，面對兩年後的七合一選舉，民進黨相對勝算大，質言之，立於不敗之地的在野黨要與執政黨對話，對曾經擔任美麗島辯護律師、省議員、地方首長的蘇貞昌而言，一點都不困難，難處反而在如何說服黨內同志，接受他與馬英九的對話。
從過去的發展經驗，或許比較能提供蘇貞昌說服自己和同志的理由。民進黨是有理念的政黨，但從來不是不理性的政黨，自創黨以來，民進黨從未排除與執政者對話，江鵬堅時代如此、黃信介時代如此、接續的許信良、施明德、陳水扁亦復如此；即使街頭抗爭的年代，民進黨也從未疏於與執政者溝通，抗爭與溝通雙線並進，讓民進黨一路壯大，也讓台灣民主政治不斷前進，國會因而全面改選、總統因而得以直選，最終也讓民進黨取得政權，讓台灣政黨輪替，民主政治得以名實相符，這個歷程，不是朝野有競有合的關係無法竟其功。
民進黨第一次執政之後，前總統陳水扁兩任八年期間，不論與在野關係多惡劣，從沒放棄朝野協商的可能。最重要的，陳水扁得以執政就是他首倡「新中間路線」，第一次把民進黨帶進新的境界，這一點，即使馬英九當選總統後的第一任亦未能達到，然而，馬英九沒做到的功課，同樣是民進黨前主席蔡英文的失落，蔡英文失去帶領民進黨轉型的契機，現在這個機遇落到了蘇貞昌手裡，蘇貞昌應該用更積極的態度面對。
換個角度想，民進黨還有什麼可以失去的？做為政壇前輩，蘇貞昌與蔡英文之間再有競爭，還得等四年，四年之間可能發生各種變化，先不想蘇貞昌如何展現有別於蔡英文的領導風格，就想想談轉型老是缺最後一哩的民進黨，還要浪擲四年時光在僵硬的朝野關係嗎？身為黨主席，蘇貞昌的任務除了帶領黨勝選之外，不就是要引領黨轉型嗎？而後者甚至是前者的關鍵因素，一個老化、甚至僵化的民進黨如何重返執政？
當選之夜，蘇貞昌接了馬總統的道賀電話，僅僅這通電話就已經突破蔡英文四年立下的壁壘，朝野領袖既有氣度更有風度，蘇貞昌並未立刻回拒馬總統邀約對話之舉，並稍後公開表示「當前國、民兩黨應該為增加社會福祉對話，馬蘇會若能達到這個目標，就不必迴避。」已然表現在野黨主席的高度，當然，他直言，「如果只是見面作秀，就大可不必。」等於出了一道功課讓馬英九準備。
這是朝野和解的開始，也是朝野新競爭關係的起步，國、民兩黨形同台灣民主的經緯，缺一不可，馬蘇會是朝野風度與氣度的競爭，也是政策思辯的競爭，從此刻開始，馬英九和蘇貞昌都得更費心思考與籌畫「什麼才是攸關全民利益」的課題，馬蘇愈早做好這道課題，愈有利於社會福祉。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 29, 2012
Summary: Su Tseng-chang faces some daunting challenges. He must unify the party from within. He must promote ruling and opposition party dialogue. He must even help Taipei and Beijing achieve rapprochement. Su Tseng-chang's problems are also problems for President Ma Ying-jeou.chairman of the ruling KMT. Ma and Su must take practical action. They must let the public on Taiwan know that relations between the ruling and opposition parties is entering a new phase. Changes have led to a watershed in ruling and opposition party relations. From this day forward, the national interest will take precedence over partisan interests.
Full Text below:
The DPP has completed its hotly contested party chairman by-election. The election set a new record for voter turnout in a DPP by-election -- 69.6% -- the highest since 1998. The election also set a new record for the winning candidate, Su Tseng-chang -- 50.47% -- the lowest since the previous party chairmanship election. These figures show that Su Tseng-chang faces some daunting challenges. He must unify the party from within. He must promote ruling and opposition party dialogue. He must even help Taipei and Beijing achieve rapprochement. Su Tseng-chang's problems are also problems for President Ma Ying-jeou.chairman of the ruling KMT. Ma and Su must take practical action. They must let the public on Taiwan know that relations between the ruling and opposition parties is entering a new phase. Changes have led to a watershed in ruling and opposition party relations. From this day forward, the national interest will take precedence over partisan interests.
Su Tseng-chang was once a party official. When Su retired as Pingtung County Chief, DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh appointed him DPP Secretary General. During Su's term as Secretary General, the DPP held its first ever general audit of party members. It held its first ever party primaries for ROC President, Taiwan Provincial Governor, and city mayors. Su's record was exemplary. He gained a reputation as "the secretary-general who let the chairman get all the applause." After the DPP came to power in 2005, Su ran unopposed for the position of party chairman. He received 99.71% of the vote. The following year, under Su's leadership, the DPP won 127 seats in the National Assembly. For the first time in history, the DPP was the largest party in the legislature. Together with the Chen administration, they successfully passed an amendment abolishing the National Assembly.
The second time Su was elected party chairman, the political situation was dramatically different. The rivalry between Su and Hsieh was now a rivalry between Su and Tsai. The "Ah-Bian Problem" constantly demanded attention. The DPP no longer commanded the resources and power of the ruling party. The former may have been more serious than the latter. The Democratic Progressive Party went from opposition party to ruling party. Starting over from scratch probably felt perfectly normal. Consider the DPP's current situation. It is looking to the seven in one election two years from now. For the DPP the odds are good. As an opposition party, it has nothing to lose. Su Tseng-chang is a former defense lawyer, a former Taiwan Provincial Assembly Member, and a former local government leader. For him dialoguing with the ruling KMT is not a problem. The problem is persuading comrades within his own party. The problem is persuading them to dialogue with Ma Ying-jeou.
Based on past experience, Su Tseng-chang may be able to persuade himself and persuade his comrades. The DPP may be an ideologically-motivated political party. But it has never been an irrational political party. Ever since the party was founded, the DPP has never ruled out dialogue with those in power. This was true under Jiang Pengjian. This was true under Huang Hsin-chieh. This was also true under Hsu Hsin-liang, Shih Ming-teh, and Chen Shui-bian. It was true even during the era of street protests. The DPP never refused to communicate with those in power. It carried on its struggle and communicated with those in power simultaneously. This allowed the DPP to grow. This allowed democracy to evolve. As a result the legislature underwent a thoroughgoing re-election. The President was directly elected. Eventually the DPP came to power. The Republic of China government experienced a change in ruling parties. It finally had a democracy worthy of the name. This would have been impossible without ruling and opposition party cooperation and competition.
The DPP came to power for the first time. President Chen Shui-bian served two terms, or eight years. No matter how bad relations became between the ruling and opposition parties, no one gave up on interparty consultations. Most importantly, when Chen Shui-bian was in office, he advanced his "New Centrist Path." For the very first time the DPP entered a new realm. This is something even Ma Ying-jeou failed to achieve during his first term. Ma Ying-jeou failed to do his homework. Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen failed as well. Tsai Ing-wen lost the opportunity to transform the DPP. Now the opportunity has fallen into the hands of Su Tseng-chang. Su Tseng-chang should approach the challenge with greater aggressiveness.
Consider the matter from another angle. What does the DPP have to lose? As political elders, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen must clash. But they must also wait four years. Much lot can happen in four years. Never mind whether Su Tseng-chang's leadership style differs from Tsai Ing-wen's. Ask yourself why the DPP is always a day late and a dollar short vis a vis party transformation. Does it really intend to squander the next four years in a standoff with the ruling KMT? As party chairman, Su Tseng-chang must lead the party to election victory. But he must also lead the party through its transformation. The latter is the key to the former. How can a decrepit, even mummified DPP possibly return to power?
On election night, President Ma telephoned Su Tseng-chang to congratulate him. This one telephone call broke through barriers Tsai Ing-wen erected over four-years. Both ruling and opposition party leaders have demonstrated greater tolerance and forbearance. Su Tseng-chang did not immediately reject President Ma's invitation. He later said "The KMT and DPP should increase dialogue over social welfare issues. If a Ma/Su meeting can achieve this goal, there is no reason to refuse." He acted in a manner befitting the chairman of an opposition party, Of course, he also added, "If we are meeting only to put on a show, then we need not bother." In effect, Su dared Ma Ying-jeou to put his money where his mouth is.
The ruling and opposition parties have begun reconciling. The ruling and opposition parties have also begun competing. The KMT and the DPP are the latitude and longitude of our democracy, Both are indispensable. The Ma/Su meeting is a competition between the ruling and opposition parties, over which demonstrates greater tolerance and forbearance. They are also competing over policy and vision. From this moment forward, Ma Ying-jeou and Su Tseng-chang must give greater thought to "just what is in the national interest." The sooner Ma and Su address this problem, the sooner they can promote the general welfare.
馬蘇對話 展開朝野和解新局
2012-05-29 01:28
中國時報
在多方競逐中，民進黨完成黨主席改選，這次選舉創下民進黨自一九九八年以來的最高投票率百分之六十八點六二，當選人蘇貞昌則創下歷屆黨主席最低得票率百分之五十點四七，這兩個數字凸顯蘇貞昌必須面對的重大考驗，從黨內整合到朝野對話，乃至兩岸破冰；對應於蘇貞昌的難題，同樣也是執政黨主席、馬英九總統的課題，馬蘇必須以實際行動告訴台灣人民：朝野關係將步入新局，台灣將因為朝野關係的改變邁向新的分水嶺，全民利益從此可置於政黨利益之上。
蘇貞昌歷任黨公職，屏東縣長卸任後即受黨主席施明德邀，出任民進黨祕書長，在他任內辦理首次民進黨籍總檢查，舉辦首次總統和省市長的黨內初選，其幹練表露無遺，博得「把掌聲留給主席的祕書長」的聲譽。民進黨執政之後，他在二○○五年以一人參選高達百分之九十九點七一的得票率當選黨主席，隔年即帶領民進黨取得一百廿七席的任務型國民大會代表，讓民進黨第一次成為「國會第一大黨」，成功配合扁政府任內的最後一次修憲，廢掉國民大會。
回顧過往，第二次當選黨主席，政治形勢丕變，黨內從「蘇謝情結」到「蘇蔡之爭」，還要處理一時半刻難以消化的「扁問題」，對外民進黨不再是擁有資源與權力的執政黨，前者或許比後者還難搞，畢竟民進黨從在野到執政，從草根重新出發，理應視為正常，尤其是衡酌當前形勢，面對兩年後的七合一選舉，民進黨相對勝算大，質言之，立於不敗之地的在野黨要與執政黨對話，對曾經擔任美麗島辯護律師、省議員、地方首長的蘇貞昌而言，一點都不困難，難處反而在如何說服黨內同志，接受他與馬英九的對話。
從過去的發展經驗，或許比較能提供蘇貞昌說服自己和同志的理由。民進黨是有理念的政黨，但從來不是不理性的政黨，自創黨以來，民進黨從未排除與執政者對話，江鵬堅時代如此、黃信介時代如此、接續的許信良、施明德、陳水扁亦復如此；即使街頭抗爭的年代，民進黨也從未疏於與執政者溝通，抗爭與溝通雙線並進，讓民進黨一路壯大，也讓台灣民主政治不斷前進，國會因而全面改選、總統因而得以直選，最終也讓民進黨取得政權，讓台灣政黨輪替，民主政治得以名實相符，這個歷程，不是朝野有競有合的關係無法竟其功。
民進黨第一次執政之後，前總統陳水扁兩任八年期間，不論與在野關係多惡劣，從沒放棄朝野協商的可能。最重要的，陳水扁得以執政就是他首倡「新中間路線」，第一次把民進黨帶進新的境界，這一點，即使馬英九當選總統後的第一任亦未能達到，然而，馬英九沒做到的功課，同樣是民進黨前主席蔡英文的失落，蔡英文失去帶領民進黨轉型的契機，現在這個機遇落到了蘇貞昌手裡，蘇貞昌應該用更積極的態度面對。
換個角度想，民進黨還有什麼可以失去的？做為政壇前輩，蘇貞昌與蔡英文之間再有競爭，還得等四年，四年之間可能發生各種變化，先不想蘇貞昌如何展現有別於蔡英文的領導風格，就想想談轉型老是缺最後一哩的民進黨，還要浪擲四年時光在僵硬的朝野關係嗎？身為黨主席，蘇貞昌的任務除了帶領黨勝選之外，不就是要引領黨轉型嗎？而後者甚至是前者的關鍵因素，一個老化、甚至僵化的民進黨如何重返執政？
當選之夜，蘇貞昌接了馬總統的道賀電話，僅僅這通電話就已經突破蔡英文四年立下的壁壘，朝野領袖既有氣度更有風度，蘇貞昌並未立刻回拒馬總統邀約對話之舉，並稍後公開表示「當前國、民兩黨應該為增加社會福祉對話，馬蘇會若能達到這個目標，就不必迴避。」已然表現在野黨主席的高度，當然，他直言，「如果只是見面作秀，就大可不必。」等於出了一道功課讓馬英九準備。
這是朝野和解的開始，也是朝野新競爭關係的起步，國、民兩黨形同台灣民主的經緯，缺一不可，馬蘇會是朝野風度與氣度的競爭，也是政策思辯的競爭，從此刻開始，馬英九和蘇貞昌都得更費心思考與籌畫「什麼才是攸關全民利益」的課題，馬蘇愈早做好這道課題，愈有利於社會福祉。
Tuesday, May 29, 2012
President Ma, Chairman Su, and the Free Trade Zone
President Ma, Chairman Su, and the Free Trade Zone
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 29, 2012
Summary: We hope the ruling and opposition parties can reach a bipartisan consensus. We hope they can establish a Free Trade Zone, as a prelude to the TPP and a Free Trade Island. If they cannot, then we suggest turning Greater Taichung or Greater Taipei into pilot projects. Transform them into harbingers of the future for all Taiwan. We must not allow the DPP to repeat its mistakes.
Full Text below:
Su Tseng-chang has been elected Democratic Progressive Party Chairman. President Ma Ying-jeou phoned and congratulated him. He invited Su to hold ruling and opposition party talks. Su agreed, saying "Yes, yes." Afterwards they expressed their willingness to keep their appointment. They agreed that the the ruling and opposition parties must ensure the peoples' welfare and reduce the peoples' suffering.
The nation is besieged with problems. Ma and Su can of course discuss anything they wish. But we hope they will focus their attention on the Kaohsiung Free Trade Zone. They should look to the future. This is the key that will open a hundred doors. This project is vital to the future of the nation.
The Ma administration announced that it would set up a Free Trade Zone in Kaohsiung. In the months since, DPP leaders have yet to respond. Chen Chu was both DPP Chairman Pro Tem and Mayor of Kaohsiung. Yet she said nothing about the Free Trade Zone. Do DPP leaders support the project or not? Do they want revisions for improvements? So far we have no idea.
A few days ago DPP Legislator Hsu Tien-tsai finally spoke out. He said the Free Trade Zone unilaterally opened itself to Mainland China. He said it embodied "one country, two regions" political thinking. He said it was a policy blunder that could undermine Taiwan's economy, trade, and the peoples' livelihood. He said it ran a real risk of "selling out Taiwan." He said the Free Trade Zone could be a way for Mainland China to enter the Taiwan market and establish an SAR. He accused Minister of Economic Affairs Ying Chi-min, who presides over the project, of being the "Wu San-kuei of Taiwan's economy."
Hsu Tien-tsai's allegations about the Free Trade Zone bear no resemblance to reality. If anything, the Free Trade Zone is a pilot program for gradual trade and economic liberalization. Consider it preparatory work for the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement). Its ultimate goal is to establish Taiwan as a Free Trade Island.
Hsu Tien-tsai's allegations are nonsense. One. The goal of the Free Trade Area is to join the TPP. Its purpose is to move towards a Free Trade Island. Its purpose is obviously not to enable Mainland China to enter the Taiwan market and transform Taiwan into an SAR. It has nothing to do with political disputes over "one country, two regions." Two. The opposite is true. Its goals are TPP and a Free Trade Island. These will reduce cross-Strait economic and trade dependency. These will help integrate Taiwan into the international trade system. The Free Trade Zone and TPP will establish deep-rooted international economic and trade relations. These will bolster the Republic of China' political stature and increase its national security. Therefore the Free Trade Zone is a plan to save Taiwan, not "sell out Taiwan."
Taiwan today faces a dilemma. It has powerful economic and trade competitors such as South Korea. Several of these competitors have signed FTAs. Taiwan's primary export market and trading partner is Mainland China. It has signed or will sign FTAs with Taiwan's major competitors. Taiwan hopes to reduce dependency on the Mainland. The effectiveness of ECFA is gradually being weakened by other nations' FTAs. If we do not join the TPP, Taiwan will be economically and politically marginalized. Taiwan will be in dire straits. In order to save Taiwan, why not start by establishing a Free Trade Zone?
It should be obvious to all. A Sword of Damocles hangs over the island. Can Taiwan join the TPP and become a Free Trade Island? Taiwan still lacks political and economic support. The going will be tough. If Taiwan cannot join the TPP and become a Free Trade Island, it will not escape economic and political marginalization. Besides, Taiwan is still undergoing liberalization. The tug of war between "giving and taking" remains intense. Even if the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan reach an agreement, the going will remain tough. If the ruling and opposition parties cannot agree, the going will be impossible. Taiwan will be denied a new lease on life.
The Ma administration proposes establishing a Free Trade Zone, as a prelude to the TPP, and eventually a Free Trade Island. We now await the DPP's response. The pilot project is in Kaohsiung, which is under Green administration. Fortunately, Hsu Tien-tsai's charges are still considered "personal opinions." But if his rhetoric becomes official DPP policy, the party will find it difficult to change course. Therefore we hope that when President Ma and Chairman Su meet, they will affirm the value of the Free Trade Zone. For one thing it will broaden the horizons for the DPP. For another it will rescue Taiwan from concurrent crises.
Hsu Tien-tsai's allegations essentially parrot the allegations the DPP made against ECFA over the past five years. They say cross-Strait exchanges and ECFA "sell out Taiwan," and "humiliate the nation." They call it a "Trojan Horse." They say "it will leave workers on Taiwan unable to find work, and women on Taiwan unable to find husbands." These allegations are worse than cliches. They are inversions of the truth. The DPP held high the anti-ECFA banner during the 2012 election, only to suffer a painful setback. Does the DPP really intend to hold high an anti-free market banner as it heads into the 2016 general election?
We hope the ruling and opposition parties can reach a bipartisan consensus. We hope they can establish a Free Trade Zone, as a prelude to the TPP and a Free Trade Island. If they cannot, then we suggest turning Greater Taichung or Greater Taipei into pilot projects. Transform them into harbingers of the future for all Taiwan. We must not allow the DPP to repeat its mistakes.
馬總統速邀蘇主席談自由經濟示範區
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.29 02:59 am
蘇貞昌當選民進黨主席，馬英九總統致電道賀。馬在電話中邀請蘇進行朝野對談，蘇在電話中連稱「好、好」，事後又表示願意赴約，以期朝野共同為人民創造福祉、減少痛苦。
國事經緯萬端，馬蘇見面自可無話不談，但我們認為，會談的核心主題應是：在高雄設立自由經濟示範區。因為，瞻望前路，這是個一脈通、百脈通，提綱挈領的國政綱領。
馬政府宣布將在高雄設置自由經濟示範區後，數月以來，民進黨中央幾乎完全未見回應；甚至連陳菊兼具民進黨代理主席及高雄市長雙重身分，亦對示範區未置一詞。因而，民進黨中央對此案贊成與否，或有何修正改善意見，迄今不得而知。
數日前，民進黨立委許添財首先發難稱，自由經濟示範區是單方向對中國開放，以符合「一國兩區」的政治思維，無視政策錯誤可能對台灣造成經貿及民生上的影響，而有「賣台」之實；他認為，自由經濟示範區將是專為中國進入台灣市場而打造的特區，並指主持此案的經建會主委尹啟銘為「台灣經濟的吳三桂」。
許添財對自由經濟示範區的指控，完全偏離事實；實則，自由經濟示範區，是對台灣經貿自由化的一個漸進化與區域化的試點，藉此做為加入ＴＰＰ（跨太平洋夥伴協議）的前置工程，而以建設台灣為「自由經貿島」為終極目標。
許添財的指控，其謬誤顯而易見：一、示範區是以加入ＴＰＰ為目標，亦即以邁向「自由經貿島」為宗旨；既絕非專為中國進入台灣市場的特區，更與「一國兩區」的政治爭議毫無關聯。二、正好相反，既以ＴＰＰ及「自由經貿島」為目標，即是欲藉此一設計降低並改善兩岸經貿依存關係，使台灣融入國際經貿體系，並藉示範區及未來ＴＰＰ所建立的盤根錯節的國際經貿關係，來強化、深化台灣的政治及國防安全。因而，示範區是一個徹頭徹尾的「救台計劃」，而絕不是「賣台」。
台灣今日所處危境，簡略而言即是：台灣經貿的強力競爭對手（如韓國），幾已完成全球架構的「ＦＴＡ網」（自由貿易協定）；而台灣的主要市場及協作地區中國大陸，亦已經或即將與台灣的主要經貿競爭國家簽成ＦＴＡ網。在此情勢下，一方面台灣若要降低對中國大陸的依存關係，而ＥＣＦＡ的機能亦因各國ＦＴＡ的包夾而逐漸趨弱，則台灣若再不以加入ＴＰＰ為目標，屆時台灣在經濟與政治上的複合式邊緣化，將對台灣形成致命性的風險。為了救台灣，如何不該從自由經濟示範區做起？
有目共睹，懸在台灣頭上的利劍是：如果台灣能加入ＴＰＰ，實現了「自由經貿島」的目標，台灣在政治及經濟上的撐持，仍將十分艱辛；而倘若台灣不能加入ＴＰＰ及完成「自由經貿島」的目標，則台灣在經濟及政治上的複合式邊緣化即無可逃避。何況，全面自由化的過程中，由於「取與給」的衝突皆十分強烈；台灣若朝野兩黨一致，尚且不易通過考驗，何況朝野兩黨倘續分裂，則台灣將絕無機會度此難關，獲得新生。
由於「從自由經濟示範區到ＴＰＰ到自由經貿島」，是馬政府提出的方案；現在所等待的是民進黨的表態，何況試點所在的高雄又是綠色執政。所幸許添財現在的指控，目前尚停留在「個人意見」的層次；一旦這套論述成為民進黨中央的政策，事情即難有轉圜的餘地。因而，我們希望，在蘇主席與馬總統會面時，對自由經濟示範區的議題，能有正面的表態，一以為民進黨開闢一條較寬廣的前路，一以解救台灣於複合式的政經危機之厄。
其實，許添財的指控，幾乎是全盤抄襲民進黨四、五年來反對兩岸交流及ＥＣＦＡ的指控；什麼「傾中賣台」、「喪權辱國」、「木馬屠城」及「查甫找無工、查某找無尪」等等，非但是陳腔濫調，更且是顛倒黑白。民進黨既經扛著反ＥＣＦＡ大旗進入二○一二大選的慘痛經驗，如今難道又要揹著反自由經濟示範區的黑鍋走向二○一六大選？
我們希望，朝野二黨能在「從自由經濟示範區到ＴＰＰ到自由經貿島」的政經大計上，建立兩黨一致（bipartisanship）。如果破局，則我們建議，不妨改以大台中甚至大台北為試點，整個台灣的命脈前景，不可讓民進黨一誤再誤！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 29, 2012
Summary: We hope the ruling and opposition parties can reach a bipartisan consensus. We hope they can establish a Free Trade Zone, as a prelude to the TPP and a Free Trade Island. If they cannot, then we suggest turning Greater Taichung or Greater Taipei into pilot projects. Transform them into harbingers of the future for all Taiwan. We must not allow the DPP to repeat its mistakes.
Full Text below:
Su Tseng-chang has been elected Democratic Progressive Party Chairman. President Ma Ying-jeou phoned and congratulated him. He invited Su to hold ruling and opposition party talks. Su agreed, saying "Yes, yes." Afterwards they expressed their willingness to keep their appointment. They agreed that the the ruling and opposition parties must ensure the peoples' welfare and reduce the peoples' suffering.
The nation is besieged with problems. Ma and Su can of course discuss anything they wish. But we hope they will focus their attention on the Kaohsiung Free Trade Zone. They should look to the future. This is the key that will open a hundred doors. This project is vital to the future of the nation.
The Ma administration announced that it would set up a Free Trade Zone in Kaohsiung. In the months since, DPP leaders have yet to respond. Chen Chu was both DPP Chairman Pro Tem and Mayor of Kaohsiung. Yet she said nothing about the Free Trade Zone. Do DPP leaders support the project or not? Do they want revisions for improvements? So far we have no idea.
A few days ago DPP Legislator Hsu Tien-tsai finally spoke out. He said the Free Trade Zone unilaterally opened itself to Mainland China. He said it embodied "one country, two regions" political thinking. He said it was a policy blunder that could undermine Taiwan's economy, trade, and the peoples' livelihood. He said it ran a real risk of "selling out Taiwan." He said the Free Trade Zone could be a way for Mainland China to enter the Taiwan market and establish an SAR. He accused Minister of Economic Affairs Ying Chi-min, who presides over the project, of being the "Wu San-kuei of Taiwan's economy."
Hsu Tien-tsai's allegations about the Free Trade Zone bear no resemblance to reality. If anything, the Free Trade Zone is a pilot program for gradual trade and economic liberalization. Consider it preparatory work for the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement). Its ultimate goal is to establish Taiwan as a Free Trade Island.
Hsu Tien-tsai's allegations are nonsense. One. The goal of the Free Trade Area is to join the TPP. Its purpose is to move towards a Free Trade Island. Its purpose is obviously not to enable Mainland China to enter the Taiwan market and transform Taiwan into an SAR. It has nothing to do with political disputes over "one country, two regions." Two. The opposite is true. Its goals are TPP and a Free Trade Island. These will reduce cross-Strait economic and trade dependency. These will help integrate Taiwan into the international trade system. The Free Trade Zone and TPP will establish deep-rooted international economic and trade relations. These will bolster the Republic of China' political stature and increase its national security. Therefore the Free Trade Zone is a plan to save Taiwan, not "sell out Taiwan."
Taiwan today faces a dilemma. It has powerful economic and trade competitors such as South Korea. Several of these competitors have signed FTAs. Taiwan's primary export market and trading partner is Mainland China. It has signed or will sign FTAs with Taiwan's major competitors. Taiwan hopes to reduce dependency on the Mainland. The effectiveness of ECFA is gradually being weakened by other nations' FTAs. If we do not join the TPP, Taiwan will be economically and politically marginalized. Taiwan will be in dire straits. In order to save Taiwan, why not start by establishing a Free Trade Zone?
It should be obvious to all. A Sword of Damocles hangs over the island. Can Taiwan join the TPP and become a Free Trade Island? Taiwan still lacks political and economic support. The going will be tough. If Taiwan cannot join the TPP and become a Free Trade Island, it will not escape economic and political marginalization. Besides, Taiwan is still undergoing liberalization. The tug of war between "giving and taking" remains intense. Even if the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan reach an agreement, the going will remain tough. If the ruling and opposition parties cannot agree, the going will be impossible. Taiwan will be denied a new lease on life.
The Ma administration proposes establishing a Free Trade Zone, as a prelude to the TPP, and eventually a Free Trade Island. We now await the DPP's response. The pilot project is in Kaohsiung, which is under Green administration. Fortunately, Hsu Tien-tsai's charges are still considered "personal opinions." But if his rhetoric becomes official DPP policy, the party will find it difficult to change course. Therefore we hope that when President Ma and Chairman Su meet, they will affirm the value of the Free Trade Zone. For one thing it will broaden the horizons for the DPP. For another it will rescue Taiwan from concurrent crises.
Hsu Tien-tsai's allegations essentially parrot the allegations the DPP made against ECFA over the past five years. They say cross-Strait exchanges and ECFA "sell out Taiwan," and "humiliate the nation." They call it a "Trojan Horse." They say "it will leave workers on Taiwan unable to find work, and women on Taiwan unable to find husbands." These allegations are worse than cliches. They are inversions of the truth. The DPP held high the anti-ECFA banner during the 2012 election, only to suffer a painful setback. Does the DPP really intend to hold high an anti-free market banner as it heads into the 2016 general election?
We hope the ruling and opposition parties can reach a bipartisan consensus. We hope they can establish a Free Trade Zone, as a prelude to the TPP and a Free Trade Island. If they cannot, then we suggest turning Greater Taichung or Greater Taipei into pilot projects. Transform them into harbingers of the future for all Taiwan. We must not allow the DPP to repeat its mistakes.
馬總統速邀蘇主席談自由經濟示範區
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.29 02:59 am
蘇貞昌當選民進黨主席，馬英九總統致電道賀。馬在電話中邀請蘇進行朝野對談，蘇在電話中連稱「好、好」，事後又表示願意赴約，以期朝野共同為人民創造福祉、減少痛苦。
國事經緯萬端，馬蘇見面自可無話不談，但我們認為，會談的核心主題應是：在高雄設立自由經濟示範區。因為，瞻望前路，這是個一脈通、百脈通，提綱挈領的國政綱領。
馬政府宣布將在高雄設置自由經濟示範區後，數月以來，民進黨中央幾乎完全未見回應；甚至連陳菊兼具民進黨代理主席及高雄市長雙重身分，亦對示範區未置一詞。因而，民進黨中央對此案贊成與否，或有何修正改善意見，迄今不得而知。
數日前，民進黨立委許添財首先發難稱，自由經濟示範區是單方向對中國開放，以符合「一國兩區」的政治思維，無視政策錯誤可能對台灣造成經貿及民生上的影響，而有「賣台」之實；他認為，自由經濟示範區將是專為中國進入台灣市場而打造的特區，並指主持此案的經建會主委尹啟銘為「台灣經濟的吳三桂」。
許添財對自由經濟示範區的指控，完全偏離事實；實則，自由經濟示範區，是對台灣經貿自由化的一個漸進化與區域化的試點，藉此做為加入ＴＰＰ（跨太平洋夥伴協議）的前置工程，而以建設台灣為「自由經貿島」為終極目標。
許添財的指控，其謬誤顯而易見：一、示範區是以加入ＴＰＰ為目標，亦即以邁向「自由經貿島」為宗旨；既絕非專為中國進入台灣市場的特區，更與「一國兩區」的政治爭議毫無關聯。二、正好相反，既以ＴＰＰ及「自由經貿島」為目標，即是欲藉此一設計降低並改善兩岸經貿依存關係，使台灣融入國際經貿體系，並藉示範區及未來ＴＰＰ所建立的盤根錯節的國際經貿關係，來強化、深化台灣的政治及國防安全。因而，示範區是一個徹頭徹尾的「救台計劃」，而絕不是「賣台」。
台灣今日所處危境，簡略而言即是：台灣經貿的強力競爭對手（如韓國），幾已完成全球架構的「ＦＴＡ網」（自由貿易協定）；而台灣的主要市場及協作地區中國大陸，亦已經或即將與台灣的主要經貿競爭國家簽成ＦＴＡ網。在此情勢下，一方面台灣若要降低對中國大陸的依存關係，而ＥＣＦＡ的機能亦因各國ＦＴＡ的包夾而逐漸趨弱，則台灣若再不以加入ＴＰＰ為目標，屆時台灣在經濟與政治上的複合式邊緣化，將對台灣形成致命性的風險。為了救台灣，如何不該從自由經濟示範區做起？
有目共睹，懸在台灣頭上的利劍是：如果台灣能加入ＴＰＰ，實現了「自由經貿島」的目標，台灣在政治及經濟上的撐持，仍將十分艱辛；而倘若台灣不能加入ＴＰＰ及完成「自由經貿島」的目標，則台灣在經濟及政治上的複合式邊緣化即無可逃避。何況，全面自由化的過程中，由於「取與給」的衝突皆十分強烈；台灣若朝野兩黨一致，尚且不易通過考驗，何況朝野兩黨倘續分裂，則台灣將絕無機會度此難關，獲得新生。
由於「從自由經濟示範區到ＴＰＰ到自由經貿島」，是馬政府提出的方案；現在所等待的是民進黨的表態，何況試點所在的高雄又是綠色執政。所幸許添財現在的指控，目前尚停留在「個人意見」的層次；一旦這套論述成為民進黨中央的政策，事情即難有轉圜的餘地。因而，我們希望，在蘇主席與馬總統會面時，對自由經濟示範區的議題，能有正面的表態，一以為民進黨開闢一條較寬廣的前路，一以解救台灣於複合式的政經危機之厄。
其實，許添財的指控，幾乎是全盤抄襲民進黨四、五年來反對兩岸交流及ＥＣＦＡ的指控；什麼「傾中賣台」、「喪權辱國」、「木馬屠城」及「查甫找無工、查某找無尪」等等，非但是陳腔濫調，更且是顛倒黑白。民進黨既經扛著反ＥＣＦＡ大旗進入二○一二大選的慘痛經驗，如今難道又要揹著反自由經濟示範區的黑鍋走向二○一六大選？
我們希望，朝野二黨能在「從自由經濟示範區到ＴＰＰ到自由經貿島」的政經大計上，建立兩黨一致（bipartisanship）。如果破局，則我們建議，不妨改以大台中甚至大台北為試點，整個台灣的命脈前景，不可讓民進黨一誤再誤！
Sunday, May 27, 2012
Leadership Practice Before Leadership Theory
Leadership Practice Before Leadership Theory
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 28, 2012
Summary: A determined government will stick to its ideals and demand reform. It will stress fairness and justice. But the purpose of reform is to achieve one's ideals. Fairness and justice is not socialism. This is the anniversary of the luxury tax. This is the eve of the capital gains tax. Have administration officials considered the pros and cons? Do not allow leadership theory to override leadership practice. Do not allow empty rhetoric to replace hard reality.
Full Text below:
Over the past two years, the Ma administration has held high the banner of social justice. It hopes to narrow the gap between rich and poor. It hopes to change the "M-shaped society." But as we all know, the gap between rich and poor has widened. This represents a long-term change in the social structure. The change has international, domestic, and even cross-Strait causes. The Ma administration has oversimplified a complex process of evolution. It assumed that a few luxury taxes and capital gains taxes would rid us of injustice. Once again the Ma administration has adopted a one size fits all approach. It hoped to lay claim to righteousness. It hope to extricate itself from an increasingly embarrassing fiscal dilemma. The results prove otherwise. These policies merely throw gasoline on the fire. They merely intensify rich vs. poor class antagonisms. They depict the middle class as semi-impoverish. As a result the entire society lives in fear. Naturally it looks to a better tomorrow.
Take the luxury tax. This is considered an unassailable PC policy move that seizes the moral high ground. It asserts that everyone should be able to afford to own a house. But are peoples' lives really that tragic? "Are people on Taiwan really homeless? Hasn't the government long boasted that over 80% of the public owns their own homes?
It is not that people cannot afford housing. It is that they cannot afford to upgrade to a "decent home." What is a "decent home?" The media usually shows us luxury mansions. It says that people cannot afford them, even if they were to spend all their food money on house payments. But do ordinary people live in luxury mansions? If they don't, then what's wrong with imposing high land taxes and high real estate taxes on luxury mansions? The rich consider this chump change. Why drag the middle class into the equation?
Take housing prices in Greater Taipei. They are higher than for areas outside of Taipei. Far more expensive. But why? "Speculation!" is the Ma administration's standard answer. But speculators account for only three percent of all housing transactions. They have raised housing prices sky high. Prosecute these opportunists. But why lump the homes of the middle-class into the same category?
Taipei housing prices have risen for a variety of factors. For decades the government favored the North at the expense of the South. Cross-Strait relations have improved. Inheritance taxes have been lowered. Global capital has flooded Asia. This is the macro level. Now consider the micro level. Better city and county water quality, more convenient transportation, higher quality medical care, greater employment opportunities, and higher incomes, are all factors. Builders begin new projects. Brokers sell older housing units. If prices stray too far from market value, they fall naturally. Sellers naturally cut prices. If prices in other areas are too low, the government should do something about it. It should not artificially depress Greater Taipei prices. That is not fairness. That sort of fairness is fake.
Can a fake policy of fairness fool the people? One year ago the Ma administration had grand ambitions. Over 60 percent of the people supported the luxury tax -- a 15 billion dollar a year levy. It would enable justice to prevail. Fifteen billion in one year. But deduct luxury tax and land tax collection costs. How much does the government actually take in? Last year people complained about not being able to afford housing. This year they hold housewarmings. What percentage of people think justice has been "partially achieved?" Fame and fortune are "like fish and bear paws." One cannot have both. But one can have one.
Now take the capital gains tax. Minister of Finance Liu cited two examples. He justified the capital gains tax. Suppose a client earns four million in the stock market but fails to pay 200,000 in capital gains taxes? That is an injustice. But Minister Liu forgets. Individual investors must pay transaction taxes. According to the Securities Association, an individual trader must make three to four billion in transactions to make 4 million dollars. In other words, small investor transaction taxes already amount to millions. According to marginal tax rate calculations, small investors pay as much as 25%.
Minister Liu cited another example, Hon Hai chairman Terry Gou. He said in 2010 Guo earned 1 billion from stock sales, but only paid 3.48 million in stock transaction taxes. Suppose we adopt the Executive Yuan's version of the capital gains tax. Start with 2010. By the end of 2009, Hon Hai's closing price was 151.5 NT. In 2010 Hon Hai shares ranged from 155.5 NT to 106 NT. How could Gou possibly have made one billion? Assume everything was sold at the peak. One share earned 4 NT. In other words, how could Guo dispose of 250,000 Honghai shares before and after January 5, 2010? Is it really possible? Assume the face value was the price paid. The Executive Yuan version cost calculation does not match. Is this fair?
Political appointees must of course defend the government's policies. But their defense must be based in fact. They must be objective and neutral. The first example stigmatizes small shareholders. The second stigmatizes major shareholders. The Taiwan stock market is like Hong Tong County. Small investors and large investors alike are victims of unfairness and injustice.
The capital gains taxes are a case of "If only I knew then what I know now." The administration is riding a tiger. It can neither stay on nor get off. But we say better late than never. Better to know than not know. Gasoline and electricity price hikes and capital gains taxes cannot be implemented simultaneously. Therefore the administration should ask itself which policy is more urgent. Policy implementation always involves priorities.
A determined government will stick to its ideals and demand reform. It will stress fairness and justice. But the purpose of reform is to achieve one's ideals. Fairness and justice is not socialism. This is the anniversary of the luxury tax. This is the eve of the capital gains tax. Have administration officials considered the pros and cons? Do not allow leadership theory to override leadership practice. Do not allow empty rhetoric to replace hard reality.
中時電子報 新聞
工商時報 2012.05.28
社論－勿讓理論領導實務、勿讓務虛取代務實
本報訊
馬政府這兩年高舉社會公義大旗，希望縮小Ｍ型社會的貧富差距，殊不知，貧富差距的形成、乃至於擴大，是社會結構的長期調整過程，其中有國際的、國內的、甚至兩岸的方方面面因素。馬政府把一個複雜的演變過程簡單化，以為幾個「奢侈稅」、「證所稅」的政策，就可以去化不公不義；馬政府又把一元化的政策多元化，以為既可坐享公義美名，又可健全日趨困窘的財政現況。事實證明，這些提油救火的政策出台，貧富階級對立由此激化，中產階級也因此被打成準貧族，整個社會惶惶不可終日，自然「指日可待」。
先說奢侈稅吧，這塊標榜「居住正義」的王命鐵牌，希望老百姓都能買得起房子。但要問的是，台灣的老百姓如此悲慘？連一套房都住不起？政府不是對台灣自有住宅率高達8成以上，一向沾沾自喜嗎？
所以，老百姓不是住不起房，正確的說，是住不起、或換不起一套像樣的房。什麼叫一套「像樣的房」，媒體通常會舉豪宅為例，說老百姓終其一生不吃不喝，也買不起。豪宅，這是一般人住的嗎？如果不是，單純對豪宅課以高的地價稅、房屋稅，不行嗎？富人不在乎這些小錢，為何要胡攪蠻纏的把中產階級拖下水？
再以大台北的房價為例，是比台北以外的地區要貴，甚至貴得多，何以致之？投機，這是馬政府的標準答案。試問，3％的投機客能把房價拉到雲端，就算是，把投機客繩之於法就是了，有必要連中產階級的房子一起放鍋裡嗎？
台北房價上漲，和政府幾十年來重北輕南、兩岸關係的和解、遺贈稅調降、資金由全球湧向亞洲，都有密不可分的關聯性，這是從大處看；從小處看，肇因於各縣市的水質、交通、生活便利性、醫療品質、就業機會及所得。建商推新案、仲介賣中古屋，如果定價和以上的大處、小處偏離太遠，自然門可羅雀，自然要降價；其他地區房價漲不起來，政府也應該朝以上幾個方向努力，而不是把大台北的房價打下來，就認為公平了，這種公平，是假的。
一個假公平的政策，能唬弄老百姓？看看一年前馬政府的豪情壯志：超過60％的人支持奢侈稅，一年徵150億，要讓居住正義得以實現。一年了，別說150億了，把奢侈稅扣掉稽徵成本和少收的土增稅、契稅，政府賺到什麼？哪一個去年抱怨買不起房的，今年有喬遷之喜；又有多少百分比的人認為，居住正義被「部分實現」了。名與利，雖如魚與熊掌，不可兼得，但總得有一個落袋吧。
接下來看證所稅，財政部劉部長舉了兩個例子，說明復徵證所稅的正當性。一個是在股市賺了400萬的散戶，如不繳納20萬的證所稅，是不公不義。劉部長可能忘了，散戶在交易過程中，要繳證交稅，根據券商公會的計算，一個散戶進進出出、得交易3、4億，才能賺400萬，換言之，該散戶所納之證交稅即上百萬，以邊際稅率算，高達25％。
劉部長舉的另一個例子，是鴻海董事長郭台銘，說他99年賣股賺了10億，只繳了348萬的證交稅。假設證所稅依據政院版本，自99年實施，成本價應為98年底的鴻海收盤價151.5元，而觀察鴻海99年的股價高低點為155.5~106元，郭台銘如何賺到10億？如果全部都在最高點售出，一股賺4元，換言之，郭董於99年1月5日前後，處分了25萬張鴻海股票，這可能嗎？如果是以面額作為成本價，又與政院版的成本計算不符，這公平嗎？
政務官為政策辯護，理所當然，但講出來的話必須有所本，必須客觀中立，前一個例子，散戶被汙名化了；後一個例子，大戶也被汙名化了。台股就像個洪桐縣，散戶也好、大戶也罷，都成了不公不義的代名詞。
證所稅如今落到個「早知如何，必定推遲」的境地，現在推也不是，不推也不是。我們必須說，知道無論早晚，晚知總比不知、無知要強，既然油電雙漲和證所稅不能同步為之，就看哪一個政策有迫切性，施政優先總要有個次序吧。
一個有為政府，堅持理想與改革、強調公平與正義，很好！但不要忘了，改革的目的在於實現理想，公平正義也不是社會主義。值奢侈稅屆滿周年、證所稅開徵前夕，朝中諸公是否斟酌損益，勿讓理論領導實務，勿讓務虛取代務實。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 28, 2012
Summary: A determined government will stick to its ideals and demand reform. It will stress fairness and justice. But the purpose of reform is to achieve one's ideals. Fairness and justice is not socialism. This is the anniversary of the luxury tax. This is the eve of the capital gains tax. Have administration officials considered the pros and cons? Do not allow leadership theory to override leadership practice. Do not allow empty rhetoric to replace hard reality.
Full Text below:
Over the past two years, the Ma administration has held high the banner of social justice. It hopes to narrow the gap between rich and poor. It hopes to change the "M-shaped society." But as we all know, the gap between rich and poor has widened. This represents a long-term change in the social structure. The change has international, domestic, and even cross-Strait causes. The Ma administration has oversimplified a complex process of evolution. It assumed that a few luxury taxes and capital gains taxes would rid us of injustice. Once again the Ma administration has adopted a one size fits all approach. It hoped to lay claim to righteousness. It hope to extricate itself from an increasingly embarrassing fiscal dilemma. The results prove otherwise. These policies merely throw gasoline on the fire. They merely intensify rich vs. poor class antagonisms. They depict the middle class as semi-impoverish. As a result the entire society lives in fear. Naturally it looks to a better tomorrow.
Take the luxury tax. This is considered an unassailable PC policy move that seizes the moral high ground. It asserts that everyone should be able to afford to own a house. But are peoples' lives really that tragic? "Are people on Taiwan really homeless? Hasn't the government long boasted that over 80% of the public owns their own homes?
It is not that people cannot afford housing. It is that they cannot afford to upgrade to a "decent home." What is a "decent home?" The media usually shows us luxury mansions. It says that people cannot afford them, even if they were to spend all their food money on house payments. But do ordinary people live in luxury mansions? If they don't, then what's wrong with imposing high land taxes and high real estate taxes on luxury mansions? The rich consider this chump change. Why drag the middle class into the equation?
Take housing prices in Greater Taipei. They are higher than for areas outside of Taipei. Far more expensive. But why? "Speculation!" is the Ma administration's standard answer. But speculators account for only three percent of all housing transactions. They have raised housing prices sky high. Prosecute these opportunists. But why lump the homes of the middle-class into the same category?
Taipei housing prices have risen for a variety of factors. For decades the government favored the North at the expense of the South. Cross-Strait relations have improved. Inheritance taxes have been lowered. Global capital has flooded Asia. This is the macro level. Now consider the micro level. Better city and county water quality, more convenient transportation, higher quality medical care, greater employment opportunities, and higher incomes, are all factors. Builders begin new projects. Brokers sell older housing units. If prices stray too far from market value, they fall naturally. Sellers naturally cut prices. If prices in other areas are too low, the government should do something about it. It should not artificially depress Greater Taipei prices. That is not fairness. That sort of fairness is fake.
Can a fake policy of fairness fool the people? One year ago the Ma administration had grand ambitions. Over 60 percent of the people supported the luxury tax -- a 15 billion dollar a year levy. It would enable justice to prevail. Fifteen billion in one year. But deduct luxury tax and land tax collection costs. How much does the government actually take in? Last year people complained about not being able to afford housing. This year they hold housewarmings. What percentage of people think justice has been "partially achieved?" Fame and fortune are "like fish and bear paws." One cannot have both. But one can have one.
Now take the capital gains tax. Minister of Finance Liu cited two examples. He justified the capital gains tax. Suppose a client earns four million in the stock market but fails to pay 200,000 in capital gains taxes? That is an injustice. But Minister Liu forgets. Individual investors must pay transaction taxes. According to the Securities Association, an individual trader must make three to four billion in transactions to make 4 million dollars. In other words, small investor transaction taxes already amount to millions. According to marginal tax rate calculations, small investors pay as much as 25%.
Minister Liu cited another example, Hon Hai chairman Terry Gou. He said in 2010 Guo earned 1 billion from stock sales, but only paid 3.48 million in stock transaction taxes. Suppose we adopt the Executive Yuan's version of the capital gains tax. Start with 2010. By the end of 2009, Hon Hai's closing price was 151.5 NT. In 2010 Hon Hai shares ranged from 155.5 NT to 106 NT. How could Gou possibly have made one billion? Assume everything was sold at the peak. One share earned 4 NT. In other words, how could Guo dispose of 250,000 Honghai shares before and after January 5, 2010? Is it really possible? Assume the face value was the price paid. The Executive Yuan version cost calculation does not match. Is this fair?
Political appointees must of course defend the government's policies. But their defense must be based in fact. They must be objective and neutral. The first example stigmatizes small shareholders. The second stigmatizes major shareholders. The Taiwan stock market is like Hong Tong County. Small investors and large investors alike are victims of unfairness and injustice.
The capital gains taxes are a case of "If only I knew then what I know now." The administration is riding a tiger. It can neither stay on nor get off. But we say better late than never. Better to know than not know. Gasoline and electricity price hikes and capital gains taxes cannot be implemented simultaneously. Therefore the administration should ask itself which policy is more urgent. Policy implementation always involves priorities.
A determined government will stick to its ideals and demand reform. It will stress fairness and justice. But the purpose of reform is to achieve one's ideals. Fairness and justice is not socialism. This is the anniversary of the luxury tax. This is the eve of the capital gains tax. Have administration officials considered the pros and cons? Do not allow leadership theory to override leadership practice. Do not allow empty rhetoric to replace hard reality.
中時電子報 新聞
工商時報 2012.05.28
社論－勿讓理論領導實務、勿讓務虛取代務實
本報訊
馬政府這兩年高舉社會公義大旗，希望縮小Ｍ型社會的貧富差距，殊不知，貧富差距的形成、乃至於擴大，是社會結構的長期調整過程，其中有國際的、國內的、甚至兩岸的方方面面因素。馬政府把一個複雜的演變過程簡單化，以為幾個「奢侈稅」、「證所稅」的政策，就可以去化不公不義；馬政府又把一元化的政策多元化，以為既可坐享公義美名，又可健全日趨困窘的財政現況。事實證明，這些提油救火的政策出台，貧富階級對立由此激化，中產階級也因此被打成準貧族，整個社會惶惶不可終日，自然「指日可待」。
先說奢侈稅吧，這塊標榜「居住正義」的王命鐵牌，希望老百姓都能買得起房子。但要問的是，台灣的老百姓如此悲慘？連一套房都住不起？政府不是對台灣自有住宅率高達8成以上，一向沾沾自喜嗎？
所以，老百姓不是住不起房，正確的說，是住不起、或換不起一套像樣的房。什麼叫一套「像樣的房」，媒體通常會舉豪宅為例，說老百姓終其一生不吃不喝，也買不起。豪宅，這是一般人住的嗎？如果不是，單純對豪宅課以高的地價稅、房屋稅，不行嗎？富人不在乎這些小錢，為何要胡攪蠻纏的把中產階級拖下水？
再以大台北的房價為例，是比台北以外的地區要貴，甚至貴得多，何以致之？投機，這是馬政府的標準答案。試問，3％的投機客能把房價拉到雲端，就算是，把投機客繩之於法就是了，有必要連中產階級的房子一起放鍋裡嗎？
台北房價上漲，和政府幾十年來重北輕南、兩岸關係的和解、遺贈稅調降、資金由全球湧向亞洲，都有密不可分的關聯性，這是從大處看；從小處看，肇因於各縣市的水質、交通、生活便利性、醫療品質、就業機會及所得。建商推新案、仲介賣中古屋，如果定價和以上的大處、小處偏離太遠，自然門可羅雀，自然要降價；其他地區房價漲不起來，政府也應該朝以上幾個方向努力，而不是把大台北的房價打下來，就認為公平了，這種公平，是假的。
一個假公平的政策，能唬弄老百姓？看看一年前馬政府的豪情壯志：超過60％的人支持奢侈稅，一年徵150億，要讓居住正義得以實現。一年了，別說150億了，把奢侈稅扣掉稽徵成本和少收的土增稅、契稅，政府賺到什麼？哪一個去年抱怨買不起房的，今年有喬遷之喜；又有多少百分比的人認為，居住正義被「部分實現」了。名與利，雖如魚與熊掌，不可兼得，但總得有一個落袋吧。
接下來看證所稅，財政部劉部長舉了兩個例子，說明復徵證所稅的正當性。一個是在股市賺了400萬的散戶，如不繳納20萬的證所稅，是不公不義。劉部長可能忘了，散戶在交易過程中，要繳證交稅，根據券商公會的計算，一個散戶進進出出、得交易3、4億，才能賺400萬，換言之，該散戶所納之證交稅即上百萬，以邊際稅率算，高達25％。
劉部長舉的另一個例子，是鴻海董事長郭台銘，說他99年賣股賺了10億，只繳了348萬的證交稅。假設證所稅依據政院版本，自99年實施，成本價應為98年底的鴻海收盤價151.5元，而觀察鴻海99年的股價高低點為155.5~106元，郭台銘如何賺到10億？如果全部都在最高點售出，一股賺4元，換言之，郭董於99年1月5日前後，處分了25萬張鴻海股票，這可能嗎？如果是以面額作為成本價，又與政院版的成本計算不符，這公平嗎？
政務官為政策辯護，理所當然，但講出來的話必須有所本，必須客觀中立，前一個例子，散戶被汙名化了；後一個例子，大戶也被汙名化了。台股就像個洪桐縣，散戶也好、大戶也罷，都成了不公不義的代名詞。
證所稅如今落到個「早知如何，必定推遲」的境地，現在推也不是，不推也不是。我們必須說，知道無論早晚，晚知總比不知、無知要強，既然油電雙漲和證所稅不能同步為之，就看哪一個政策有迫切性，施政優先總要有個次序吧。
一個有為政府，堅持理想與改革、強調公平與正義，很好！但不要忘了，改革的目的在於實現理想，公平正義也不是社會主義。值奢侈稅屆滿周年、證所稅開徵前夕，朝中諸公是否斟酌損益，勿讓理論領導實務，勿讓務虛取代務實。
Thursday, May 24, 2012
Su Chi's Advice May Grate on the Ears, But Reforms Must Not be Delayed
Su Chi's Advice May Grate on the Ears, But Reforms Must Not be Delayed
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 25, 2012
Summary: Three days after President Ma was inaugurated to his second term, former Secretary General of the National Security Council Su Chi published a critique of the government, including the legislature. Su Chi was one of President Ma's most important aides. His words may grate on the ears of many current administration officials and legislators. Needless to say it generated political waves. But if we calmly review what Su Chi actually said, we must admit he made a number of excellent points.
Full Text below:
Three days after President Ma was inaugurated to his second term, former Secretary General of the National Security Council Su Chi published a critique of the government, including the legislature. Su Chi was one of President Ma's most important aides. His words may grate on the ears of many current administration officials and legislators. Needless to say it generated political waves. But if we calmly review what Su Chi actually said, we must admit he made a number of excellent points.
Su Chi played an extraordinary role in Ma Ying-jeou's brain trust. He was a key member of the Ma administration, responsible for overall national strategy. He is a highly ranked formulator of KMT mainland policy. His experience dates back to the Lee Teng-hui era. He served with the KMT [陸工會], the Mainland Affairs Council, the Government Information Office, and the Office of the President. Most importantly, he was the man responsible for the term, "1992 consensus." His recommendations cannot be dismissed as the uninformed opinion of some outsider who does not understand the situation. The fact is, Su Chi understands better than anyone the workings of the Kuomintang government. If he says the Ma administration has problems, then it has problems.
Su Chi was Secretary General of the National Security Council during President Ma's first term. He was a key member of President Ma's brain trust on cross-Strait and foreign policy. He was a key policy maker on national security matters. After he resigned as National Security Council Secretary-General in 2010, he presided over Ma Ying-jeou's video conference at Harvard University, then organized a forum in Taipei. He helped the Ma administration establish a second channel for cross-strait dialogue. Su has long been at the center of power. He understands Ma Ying-jeou's way of doing things. He understands the ruling administration's approach to decision-making. In this regard, few people are his peer.
He is a seasoned veteran, deeply involved in government affairs. His friendship with President Ma is deep. Su Chi's criticisms cannot be dismissed as either ignorant or malicious. Were Su Chi's remarks fair? Did they smear the Legislative Yuan? Instead of asking such questions, we should examine what Su Chi actually said. Did he identify the underlying problems? After all, our concern is not with winning arguments. Our concern with uncovering problems, and mobilizing the government so solve them. We must not wait until the president is a lame-duck. By then it will be too late.
Su Chi's leveled four criticisms. One. The administration lacks expert political appointees. As a result many career civil servants have been appointed in their stead. This is why the current administration is "more conservative and less innovative" than the KMT was during the 1990s. Career civil servants lack the courage to defend administration policy. The result? For the past four years, the Ma administration has been a solo act, with no chorus to back him up. This means the administration lacked leadership. Political appointees lacked both the initiative and the ability to champion administration policy. Su Chi says President Ma must take the lead. He must inspire the entire government through his beliefs and his determination. He must inspire even the private sector. He must persuade or even compel officials to undertake reform, and strengthen Taiwan's democracy. On this point, President Ma himself must be willing to listen.
Two. The problems are systemic. Su Chi says many people blame President Ma. President Ma shares responsibility of course. But the biggest problem is systemic. Everyone is unhappy with the status quo. So they project their dissatisfaction onto President Ma. Su Chi says Taiwan's leaders are "squirrels in a cage." They run and run, only to find themselves in the same place. Su Chi says "If Taiwan's democracy is not strengthened, whichever person or party wins power will merely enter the cage and become the new squirrel." The ruling and opposition parties must subject the existing constitutional system and party system to fundamental review. They may even need to amend the constitution. These options should be discussed and evaluated.
Three. The Legislative Yuan is broken. Ruling and opposition political party consultations are back room deals. Su Chi said the Legislative Yuan mechanism for ruling and opposition party consultation "distorts the results of democratic elections, and is the darkest corner of our democratic system." Su Chi noted that our Legislative Yuan passes only about 160 bills a year. As a result, the nation is shackled by outdated laws and regulations. Adults are forced to wear children's shoes. Meanwhile career civil servants mechanically enforce outdated laws. This makes it difficult to deal with complex issues, and even more difficult to ensure national prosperity. The public considers the government less effective than it was before, and considers the Legislative Yuan the root of the problem. The problem may not be with cross-party consultation per se. It may be with unqualified legislators. But the result is inefficient legislative review, which turns party consultations into a necessary evil. This has long been the consensus. Legislators should not offer rebuttals. They should engage in soul searching.
Four. Government leaders offer not hope for the future. Su Chi spoke of his own youth. Taiwan was poor, closed, and subject to authoritarian rule. It was wracked by cross-strait tensions. It was ostracized by the international community. Yet young people were confident, brimming with hopes and dreams. They looked to the future with enthusiasm. By contrast, today's young people hold out little hope for the future. Society has no template. Society has lost its vitality. The prospect is depressing.
These are the problems President Ma must ponder. Veteran KMT officials agree. What sort of vision can we offer society for the future? This is the question the Ma administration must ask itself during its second term.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.25
蘇起建言雖刺耳 改革現況不容緩
本報訊
在馬總統第二任就職的第三天，曾為馬總統最重要幕僚之一的國安會前秘書長蘇起發表了對政府（包括立法院）的一些批評。讓不少現任官員和立法委員聽了很不舒服，當然也引發若干政壇漣漪，然而平心靜氣再檢視蘇起的發言內容，恐怕也不得不承認，他確實點出了若干值得思考的課題。
蘇起在決策團隊的角色非比一般。他曾是馬政府負責總體國家戰略的最核心成員，也是非常資深的國民黨大陸政策制定者，從李登輝前總統時代，即曾任職國民黨陸工會、行政院陸委會、新聞局、總統府，更是「九二共識」一詞的提出者。他所提出的意見，不可能被輕易視為外行或不了解實際情況。事實是蘇起對國民黨政府的運作比誰都了解，如果他說馬政府存在著某些問題，恐怕也很難反駁說那些問題不存在。
蘇起在馬總統第一任期內擔任國安會秘書長，不僅是馬總統在兩岸與外交上的最重要智囊，也是國安政策的重要制定者。二○一○年辭去國安會秘書長之後，蘇起還曾到美國哈佛大學為馬英九主持視訊會議，後來更組織了台北論壇，為馬政府的兩岸對話搭起第二軌道。長期處在這樣核心的位置，蘇起對馬英九行事風格的了解，對執政團隊決策模式的體會，恐怕也是極少人能夠比擬的。
以對政府參與經驗之老到、與馬總統交情之深厚，要說蘇起的批評是外行或出於惡意，都是不可能的。因此，與其檢討蘇的發言是否公平，或是有無汙名化立院，不如正面檢視蘇起這些諫言的內容，究竟有無點出真正問題？畢竟當前更該關注的不是政治口水，而是發掘出真正的問題，讓整個政府積極動起來，不要等到總統權力真正進入跛鴨階段，要做什麼就已經來不及了。
綜合蘇起的批評，大概可以理出四個重點：首先，政府缺乏政務官人才。他認為政務官人才不足，多由事務官出任，造成現在行政部門比九十年代「保守多、創新少」；事務官缺乏替政策辯護的勇氣，也造成過去四年馬政府「只有獨唱，沒有合唱」的現象。這其實就是說政府的領導人才不足，政務官沒有擔負起主動倡議政策的責任，也沒有為政策辯護的能力。在這點上，蘇起的建議是馬總統要作「林上風」，也就是以理念和決心來領導整個政府，甚至影響民間。說服、感動、甚至強迫相關人士從事制度改革，讓台灣民主深化。這一點，恐怕得馬總統自己願意聽得進去。
其次，則是制度面的問題。蘇起說，很多人把不滿歸咎於馬總統，馬總統固然有責任，但更大的責任其實是在制度面；大家只是把對現狀的不滿，投射在馬總統身上。蘇起說，台灣的執政者現在像「籠子裡的松鼠」，跑了發現自己原地踏步；「如果台灣民主不在制度面深化，任何人或黨贏得政權，只是進入籠子當新的松鼠而已」。就此，朝野或許都該再思考，現有的憲政制度、政黨制度，是否該進行深層的檢討，未來包括修憲的可能性，都該好好討論評估。
再其次，立法院的運作很差，政黨朝野協商很黑暗。蘇起指立法院朝野協商機制「扭曲民主選舉的結果，是我民主制度最黑暗的角落」。蘇起指出台灣立法院平均一年僅通過約一百六十個法案，使國家受到許多過時法規的束縛；「大人穿小鞋」再加上事務官「依法行政」，當然不易處理當下的複雜問題，更難為國興利。這是台灣近年來，民間普遍感受到的問題，政府的行動力反而不如從前。而立法院的問題根源，或許還不在朝野協商，而是立法委員的素質仍未有提升，導致法案審查效率低落，使得朝野協商成為必要之惡。這個問題，本來就是大家的共識，立委諸公與其反駁，不如反思吧！
最後，蘇起認為政府領導人沒有給人民希望。他特別提及年輕時台灣社會雖然貧窮封閉、威權統治、兩岸緊張加上國際打壓，但當時年輕人有信心、希望和目標，普遍對未來充滿衝勁；反觀現在台灣年輕人沒有希望，社會沒有典範，整個社會失去活力，看了令人傷心。
這些確實都是馬總統最該深入思考的問題。如果連資深的國民黨官員都這樣認為，那麼如何提出整個台灣社會的願景，讓人民對未來有較為明確的想像，還真是馬政府第二任期最急迫的課題了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 25, 2012
Summary: Three days after President Ma was inaugurated to his second term, former Secretary General of the National Security Council Su Chi published a critique of the government, including the legislature. Su Chi was one of President Ma's most important aides. His words may grate on the ears of many current administration officials and legislators. Needless to say it generated political waves. But if we calmly review what Su Chi actually said, we must admit he made a number of excellent points.
Full Text below:
Three days after President Ma was inaugurated to his second term, former Secretary General of the National Security Council Su Chi published a critique of the government, including the legislature. Su Chi was one of President Ma's most important aides. His words may grate on the ears of many current administration officials and legislators. Needless to say it generated political waves. But if we calmly review what Su Chi actually said, we must admit he made a number of excellent points.
Su Chi played an extraordinary role in Ma Ying-jeou's brain trust. He was a key member of the Ma administration, responsible for overall national strategy. He is a highly ranked formulator of KMT mainland policy. His experience dates back to the Lee Teng-hui era. He served with the KMT [陸工會], the Mainland Affairs Council, the Government Information Office, and the Office of the President. Most importantly, he was the man responsible for the term, "1992 consensus." His recommendations cannot be dismissed as the uninformed opinion of some outsider who does not understand the situation. The fact is, Su Chi understands better than anyone the workings of the Kuomintang government. If he says the Ma administration has problems, then it has problems.
Su Chi was Secretary General of the National Security Council during President Ma's first term. He was a key member of President Ma's brain trust on cross-Strait and foreign policy. He was a key policy maker on national security matters. After he resigned as National Security Council Secretary-General in 2010, he presided over Ma Ying-jeou's video conference at Harvard University, then organized a forum in Taipei. He helped the Ma administration establish a second channel for cross-strait dialogue. Su has long been at the center of power. He understands Ma Ying-jeou's way of doing things. He understands the ruling administration's approach to decision-making. In this regard, few people are his peer.
He is a seasoned veteran, deeply involved in government affairs. His friendship with President Ma is deep. Su Chi's criticisms cannot be dismissed as either ignorant or malicious. Were Su Chi's remarks fair? Did they smear the Legislative Yuan? Instead of asking such questions, we should examine what Su Chi actually said. Did he identify the underlying problems? After all, our concern is not with winning arguments. Our concern with uncovering problems, and mobilizing the government so solve them. We must not wait until the president is a lame-duck. By then it will be too late.
Su Chi's leveled four criticisms. One. The administration lacks expert political appointees. As a result many career civil servants have been appointed in their stead. This is why the current administration is "more conservative and less innovative" than the KMT was during the 1990s. Career civil servants lack the courage to defend administration policy. The result? For the past four years, the Ma administration has been a solo act, with no chorus to back him up. This means the administration lacked leadership. Political appointees lacked both the initiative and the ability to champion administration policy. Su Chi says President Ma must take the lead. He must inspire the entire government through his beliefs and his determination. He must inspire even the private sector. He must persuade or even compel officials to undertake reform, and strengthen Taiwan's democracy. On this point, President Ma himself must be willing to listen.
Two. The problems are systemic. Su Chi says many people blame President Ma. President Ma shares responsibility of course. But the biggest problem is systemic. Everyone is unhappy with the status quo. So they project their dissatisfaction onto President Ma. Su Chi says Taiwan's leaders are "squirrels in a cage." They run and run, only to find themselves in the same place. Su Chi says "If Taiwan's democracy is not strengthened, whichever person or party wins power will merely enter the cage and become the new squirrel." The ruling and opposition parties must subject the existing constitutional system and party system to fundamental review. They may even need to amend the constitution. These options should be discussed and evaluated.
Three. The Legislative Yuan is broken. Ruling and opposition political party consultations are back room deals. Su Chi said the Legislative Yuan mechanism for ruling and opposition party consultation "distorts the results of democratic elections, and is the darkest corner of our democratic system." Su Chi noted that our Legislative Yuan passes only about 160 bills a year. As a result, the nation is shackled by outdated laws and regulations. Adults are forced to wear children's shoes. Meanwhile career civil servants mechanically enforce outdated laws. This makes it difficult to deal with complex issues, and even more difficult to ensure national prosperity. The public considers the government less effective than it was before, and considers the Legislative Yuan the root of the problem. The problem may not be with cross-party consultation per se. It may be with unqualified legislators. But the result is inefficient legislative review, which turns party consultations into a necessary evil. This has long been the consensus. Legislators should not offer rebuttals. They should engage in soul searching.
Four. Government leaders offer not hope for the future. Su Chi spoke of his own youth. Taiwan was poor, closed, and subject to authoritarian rule. It was wracked by cross-strait tensions. It was ostracized by the international community. Yet young people were confident, brimming with hopes and dreams. They looked to the future with enthusiasm. By contrast, today's young people hold out little hope for the future. Society has no template. Society has lost its vitality. The prospect is depressing.
These are the problems President Ma must ponder. Veteran KMT officials agree. What sort of vision can we offer society for the future? This is the question the Ma administration must ask itself during its second term.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.25
蘇起建言雖刺耳 改革現況不容緩
本報訊
在馬總統第二任就職的第三天，曾為馬總統最重要幕僚之一的國安會前秘書長蘇起發表了對政府（包括立法院）的一些批評。讓不少現任官員和立法委員聽了很不舒服，當然也引發若干政壇漣漪，然而平心靜氣再檢視蘇起的發言內容，恐怕也不得不承認，他確實點出了若干值得思考的課題。
蘇起在決策團隊的角色非比一般。他曾是馬政府負責總體國家戰略的最核心成員，也是非常資深的國民黨大陸政策制定者，從李登輝前總統時代，即曾任職國民黨陸工會、行政院陸委會、新聞局、總統府，更是「九二共識」一詞的提出者。他所提出的意見，不可能被輕易視為外行或不了解實際情況。事實是蘇起對國民黨政府的運作比誰都了解，如果他說馬政府存在著某些問題，恐怕也很難反駁說那些問題不存在。
蘇起在馬總統第一任期內擔任國安會秘書長，不僅是馬總統在兩岸與外交上的最重要智囊，也是國安政策的重要制定者。二○一○年辭去國安會秘書長之後，蘇起還曾到美國哈佛大學為馬英九主持視訊會議，後來更組織了台北論壇，為馬政府的兩岸對話搭起第二軌道。長期處在這樣核心的位置，蘇起對馬英九行事風格的了解，對執政團隊決策模式的體會，恐怕也是極少人能夠比擬的。
以對政府參與經驗之老到、與馬總統交情之深厚，要說蘇起的批評是外行或出於惡意，都是不可能的。因此，與其檢討蘇的發言是否公平，或是有無汙名化立院，不如正面檢視蘇起這些諫言的內容，究竟有無點出真正問題？畢竟當前更該關注的不是政治口水，而是發掘出真正的問題，讓整個政府積極動起來，不要等到總統權力真正進入跛鴨階段，要做什麼就已經來不及了。
綜合蘇起的批評，大概可以理出四個重點：首先，政府缺乏政務官人才。他認為政務官人才不足，多由事務官出任，造成現在行政部門比九十年代「保守多、創新少」；事務官缺乏替政策辯護的勇氣，也造成過去四年馬政府「只有獨唱，沒有合唱」的現象。這其實就是說政府的領導人才不足，政務官沒有擔負起主動倡議政策的責任，也沒有為政策辯護的能力。在這點上，蘇起的建議是馬總統要作「林上風」，也就是以理念和決心來領導整個政府，甚至影響民間。說服、感動、甚至強迫相關人士從事制度改革，讓台灣民主深化。這一點，恐怕得馬總統自己願意聽得進去。
其次，則是制度面的問題。蘇起說，很多人把不滿歸咎於馬總統，馬總統固然有責任，但更大的責任其實是在制度面；大家只是把對現狀的不滿，投射在馬總統身上。蘇起說，台灣的執政者現在像「籠子裡的松鼠」，跑了發現自己原地踏步；「如果台灣民主不在制度面深化，任何人或黨贏得政權，只是進入籠子當新的松鼠而已」。就此，朝野或許都該再思考，現有的憲政制度、政黨制度，是否該進行深層的檢討，未來包括修憲的可能性，都該好好討論評估。
再其次，立法院的運作很差，政黨朝野協商很黑暗。蘇起指立法院朝野協商機制「扭曲民主選舉的結果，是我民主制度最黑暗的角落」。蘇起指出台灣立法院平均一年僅通過約一百六十個法案，使國家受到許多過時法規的束縛；「大人穿小鞋」再加上事務官「依法行政」，當然不易處理當下的複雜問題，更難為國興利。這是台灣近年來，民間普遍感受到的問題，政府的行動力反而不如從前。而立法院的問題根源，或許還不在朝野協商，而是立法委員的素質仍未有提升，導致法案審查效率低落，使得朝野協商成為必要之惡。這個問題，本來就是大家的共識，立委諸公與其反駁，不如反思吧！
最後，蘇起認為政府領導人沒有給人民希望。他特別提及年輕時台灣社會雖然貧窮封閉、威權統治、兩岸緊張加上國際打壓，但當時年輕人有信心、希望和目標，普遍對未來充滿衝勁；反觀現在台灣年輕人沒有希望，社會沒有典範，整個社會失去活力，看了令人傷心。
這些確實都是馬總統最該深入思考的問題。如果連資深的國民黨官員都這樣認為，那麼如何提出整個台灣社會的願景，讓人民對未來有較為明確的想像，還真是馬政府第二任期最急迫的課題了。
The DPP's Head in the Sand Policy on US Beef Imports
The DPP's Head in the Sand Policy on US Beef Imports
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 24, 2012
Summary: In his inaugural speech, President Ma clearly designated Kaohsiung as a "Free Economy Demonstration Zone." The DPP should not oppose him. It should join him. The Kaohsiung Free Economy Demonstration Zone can become a pilot program. We can join TIFA and the TPP, We can turn Taiwan into a "Free Economic and Trade Island." If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power one day, it can then "accept responsibility in toto." Just as when the Democratic Progressive Party declared that if it returns to power it will "accept ECFA, in toto."
Full Text below:
Wu Shu-cheng once criticized Chao Chien-ming as "an eel with his head in the sand, with no idea where to run." This characterization could be applied to the DPP on the issue of US beef imports.
For the DPP, U.S. beef imports involves at least five issues. One. Food safety. Two. Impact on local industry. Three. The Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Four. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). Five. The Chen regime and the credibility of the DPP in the eyes of the US.
Take food safety. Cigarettes and betel nuts are commercially available. They pose health risks. Meanwhile not a single instance of poisoning from beef containing Ractopamine has ever been recorded, anywhere in the world. Japan, Korea and other nations have agreed to allow US beef imports providing they are clearly marked as such. Take the impact on local industry. The United States has pledged to treat pork and beef separately. That means pig farmers on Taiwan will not be affected. The DPP knows this. So why does it continue to oppose US beef imports? Perhaps it thinks it can exploit the issue by inciting mob sentiment. But doing so means forfeiting all claim to being a rational decision-maker.
Washington considers beef imports a scientific issue. Washington regards the DPP's refusal to allow US beef imports as an economic and trade issue. As a result it has broken off talks on TIFA. That is because TIFA is also an economic and trade issue. If talks on TIFA fail to go forward, forget about talks on TPP. For Taiwan, TIFA is an FTA of critical, landmark significance. If talks on TIFA are successful, they will dramatically upgrade political and economic relations between Taipei and Washington. They will help Taipei negotiate other types of FTAs. More importantly, if talks on TIFA fail, we can forget about joining the US-led TPP. The importance of the TPP for Taiwan's political and economic future requires no comment.
The DPP opposes U.S. beef imports. The ultimate impact is to kill TIFA, which in turn kills the TPP. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak said "FTAs are not a political issue. They are a survival issue." What the DPP is doing, is to kill TIFA, kill TPP, and thereby endangering Taiwan's survival.
The most important issue for the DPP is its credibility in the eyes of the United States. The United States has openly reminded the DPP that the Chen Shui-bian administration promised to allow US beef imports, but his successor Tsai Ing-wen reneged. Interim DPP chairman Chen Chu has made matters even worse. She depicts U.S. beef as poison that is killing the Taiwanese people. The new DPP chairman, to be chosen by the end of the month, apparently intends to fight the US to the bitter end. As a result, the DPP now has a vendetta against the United States over US beef imports.
As mentioned before, there has never been a single case of Ractopamine treated beef poisoning anywhere in the world. Beef and pork are being handled separately. Furthermore, US beef will be clearly marked as such. There is no reason to obstruct U.S. beef imports. Japan, South Korea, and a hundred other countries have adopted the same policy. Under the circumstances, opposition to US beef imports is opposition to TIFA. It is opposition to TPP. This is not a political issue, This is a survival issue.
The DPP must allow Taiwan to survive. Four years ago, the DPP opposed ECFA. It accused President Ma of "forfeiting sovereignty and demeaning the nation." and of "pandering to (Mainland) China and selling out Taiwan." But four years later, the DPP is singing a different tune. It now says it "accepts ECFA in toto." The DPP needs to realize that if it ever returns to power, it must accept TIFA, FTAs and the TPP. Without them Taiwan cannot survive. Therefore in order to ensure Taiwan's survival, the DPP must not obstruct U.S. beef imports, TIFA, and the TPP. Instead it should encourage the Ma administration to seize the moment and implement these measures ASAP. Then if the DPP ever returns to power, it can "assume responsibility in toto." Otherwise, it may miss the opportunity, If the DPP returns to power then, Taiwan may already be terminal.
The DPP cannot possibly be that short-sighted. When it was in power, it argued, "Whose skirts are we going to hide behind, if not the United States'?" Now that it is out of power, it dismisses even TIFA and TPP as sour grapes. When it is in power, it wants Taiwan to survive. When it is out of power, it no longer cares whether Taiwan lives or dies. A political party like this cannot win our allies' trust. Beijing will soon discover its Achilles Heel. The public on Taiwan will see through its lies. Such behavior is short-sighted opportunism. This is not the way a political party that intends to be around long term ought to conduct itself.
The DPP is currently out of power. It longs to return to power. It must not champion the petrochemical industry when it in power, only to seek to destroy it when it is out of power. Otherwise, if the DPP returns to power one day, Taiwan's petrochemical industry will already be devastated. U.S. beef imports have been dealt with. Food safety, Industry influence, and truth in labeling have been as well. The DPP has no reason to oppose U.S. beef imports, TIFA, and the TPP. Opposing them will have lethal consequences for Taiwan. The DPP should not rub salt in the wound. It should not lick blood from the knife. It should not think only about exploiting mob sentiment. It should consider the future of the Democratic Progressive Party. It should consider how Taiwan can survive. It should not oppose Ma, denounce Ma, and ignore Taiwan's future, Isn't Taiwan's future the DPP's future as well?
Out of concern for the nation, we would like to offer the DPP three well-intentioned warnings. One, Stop demagoguing the "one country, two regions" issue. Even Beijing accepts "Taiwan's long held basic position regarding the legal aspects of cross-strait relations." All the DPP needs to do is uphold the ROC Constitution. Why should it voluntarily shred the constitution? Two. The DPP must mend fences with the United States. It must restore mutual trust. It must not seek a vendetta against the United States. Three. Do not obstruct TIFA and the TPP. Do everything to realize them. In short, forsake blind hatred of Mainland China, opposition to the United States, liberalization, and globalization will merely destroy Taiwan. The DPP must not act like "an eel with his head in the sand, who doesn't know where to run."
The Ma administration vowed to ensure food safety, minimize the impact on local industry, and truthfully label US beef imports as such. It has fulfilled its duty. It should now turn around and ask the DPP why it is using U.S. beef imports to obstruct TIFA? It should ask the DPP whether it is willing to be answerable to the public for delaying or even killing TIFA?
In his inaugural speech, President Ma clearly designated Kaohsiung as a "Free Economy Demonstration Zone." The DPP should not oppose him. It should join him. The Kaohsiung Free Economy Demonstration Zone can become a pilot program. We can join TIFA and the TPP, We can turn Taiwan into a "Free Economic and Trade Island." If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power one day, it can then "accept responsibility in toto." Just as when the Democratic Progressive Party declared that if it returns to power it will "accept ECFA, in toto."
民進黨美牛政策：蓋頭鰻不知生死門
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.24 02:22 am
吳淑珍曾指趙建銘是「蓋頭鰻不知生死門」。這句話現在可用在民進黨頭上，說的是美牛政策。
就民進黨而言，美牛政策至少牽涉五個層次：一、食品安全；二、產業衝擊；三、ＴＩＦＡ（台美貿易及投資架構協定）；四、ＴＰＰ（跨太平洋夥伴協議）；五、扁政府及民進黨對美國的誠信。
就食品安全言，市售的香菸、檳榔尚有健康風險，但舉世迄今查無一名因食用萊克多巴胺牛肉而中毒的病例，韓日等國因此同意在明白標示後上架；關於產業衝擊，則美方已承諾「牛豬分離」，意謂台灣的豬農不受影響。有了以上的認知，民進黨反美牛，或許可煽動及利用民間的情緒，但失去了理性決策的立場。
在美方所說的「科學」前提下，不容美牛進口，被美國視之為「經貿問題」，於是停斷了ＴＩＦＡ的談判，因為ＴＩＦＡ也是「經貿問題」；而ＴＩＦＡ若談不成，自更不用說未來ＴＰＰ的磋商了。尤其，ＴＩＦＡ是台灣關鍵性、指標性的「類ＦＴＡ」，若談得成，非但台美的政經關係得以巨幅提升，對於台灣其他「類ＦＴＡ」談判亦必有助益；更重要的是，倘若談不成ＴＩＦＡ，就更別奢望能進入美國主導的ＴＰＰ，而ＴＰＰ對台灣未來政經發展之重要尤是不言可喻。
民進黨反對美牛，其終極效應就是封殺ＴＩＦＡ，就是封殺ＴＰＰ。如韓國總統李明博說：「ＦＴＡ不是政治問題，而是生存問題。」民進黨現在做的，就是在阻擋ＴＩＦＡ，阻擋ＴＰＰ，就是觸及了台灣的「生存問題」。
對民進黨自身關係最大的，則是與美國之間的誠信互動。美國方面公開宣告，陳水扁政府曾對開放美牛有承諾，但接著在蔡英文主席任內卻食言，如今到了陳菊任內更是變本加厲，將美牛指為鴆殺台灣人的毒藥，且看樣子月底將出爐的新主席也將與美國硬幹到底。如此一來，民進黨豈不因美牛問題而與美國成了「世仇」？
如前所述，如果舉世查無萊劑牛肉中毒之例，且採「牛豬分離政策」，再加上標示嚴管，即無阻擋美牛的理由，至少日韓等百餘國均持此類政策立場。在這種情況下，反美牛，就是反ＴＩＦＡ，就是反ＴＰＰ；這就不是政治問題，而是生存問題。
民進黨必須為台灣留一條活路。回顧四年前，民進黨反ＥＣＦＡ，指為喪權辱國、傾中賣台；但四年後，民進黨竟靦顏改稱「概括承受ＥＣＦＡ」。民進黨應知，民進黨若要再執政，也非要走向ＴＩＦＡ、ＦＴＡ及ＴＰＰ不可，捨此台灣絕無生路；因而，為台灣的生存計，民進黨不可用美牛來阻擋ＴＩＦＡ、ＴＰＰ，反而應該敦促馬政府利用寶貴的時機，早日進行；如此，倘待民進黨另日執政，尚可「概括承受」其成果；否則，若錯失時機，民進黨即使再執政，台灣亦恐已不可為矣。
民進黨不可再如此短視。執政時宣示「不抱美國大腿抱誰的」，下野卻連ＴＩＦＡ、ＴＰＰ也不屑一顧。這種執政時想要台灣活，下野後卻不顧台灣死活的政黨，不會獲得盟友的信任，極易被北京掐住罩門，也必會被台灣人民看破手腳。這是短線操作，不是一個永續經營的政黨所應為。
民進黨在野要想到仍有回朝時。不能在朝大力推動石化業，在野又反過來大力摧毀石化業，如此，待民進黨另日回朝執政，台灣的石化業已受重創。同理，當美牛在食品安全、產業影響及標示嚴管等皆得到對應處理，民進黨即沒有理由再以美牛去卡住ＴＩＦＡ及ＴＰＰ，因為那對台灣會有致命性的後果。民進黨不宜再有傷口灑鹽、刀口舔血的操作，不能只見到當前「民氣可欺」，要想到未來民進黨及台灣將如何活下去；亦即不能只知反馬嗆馬，不問台灣的未來，難道台灣的未來不是民進黨的未來？
憂時憂國，我們願對民進黨提出三個善意的警告：一、不要再狂打「一國兩區」，如果連北京都接受這是「長期以來台灣在法律層面對兩岸關係所持基本態度」，則只要固守中華民國憲法即可，何必自毀憲法？二、民進黨與美國之間的誠信關係必須修補重建，不要與美國成為「世仇」；三、ＴＩＦＡ、ＴＰＰ不要阻擋，應全力促成。總之，一味仇中反美及反自由化、全球化，那是毀台傷國之舉，民進黨不可做不知死活的蓋頭鰻。
至於馬政府，倘若確認食品安全、產業衝擊與標示嚴管皆已盡到最大可能的治理責任；則應回過頭來請教民進黨，為何仍要以美牛卡住ＴＩＦＡ？民進黨願不願對ＴＩＦＡ之遲誤或破局向台灣人民負責？
馬總統在就職演說中，明白標舉將以高雄為「自由經濟示範區」；民進黨切勿反對，而應共襄盛舉。如果能以高雄「自由經濟示範區」為試點，加入ＴＩＦＡ、ＴＰＰ，進而將台灣建設為「自由經濟貿易島」；則另日民進黨執政，即可「概括承受」，一如民進黨宣示若執政將「概括承受」ＥＣＦＡ。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 24, 2012
Summary: In his inaugural speech, President Ma clearly designated Kaohsiung as a "Free Economy Demonstration Zone." The DPP should not oppose him. It should join him. The Kaohsiung Free Economy Demonstration Zone can become a pilot program. We can join TIFA and the TPP, We can turn Taiwan into a "Free Economic and Trade Island." If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power one day, it can then "accept responsibility in toto." Just as when the Democratic Progressive Party declared that if it returns to power it will "accept ECFA, in toto."
Full Text below:
Wu Shu-cheng once criticized Chao Chien-ming as "an eel with his head in the sand, with no idea where to run." This characterization could be applied to the DPP on the issue of US beef imports.
For the DPP, U.S. beef imports involves at least five issues. One. Food safety. Two. Impact on local industry. Three. The Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Four. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). Five. The Chen regime and the credibility of the DPP in the eyes of the US.
Take food safety. Cigarettes and betel nuts are commercially available. They pose health risks. Meanwhile not a single instance of poisoning from beef containing Ractopamine has ever been recorded, anywhere in the world. Japan, Korea and other nations have agreed to allow US beef imports providing they are clearly marked as such. Take the impact on local industry. The United States has pledged to treat pork and beef separately. That means pig farmers on Taiwan will not be affected. The DPP knows this. So why does it continue to oppose US beef imports? Perhaps it thinks it can exploit the issue by inciting mob sentiment. But doing so means forfeiting all claim to being a rational decision-maker.
Washington considers beef imports a scientific issue. Washington regards the DPP's refusal to allow US beef imports as an economic and trade issue. As a result it has broken off talks on TIFA. That is because TIFA is also an economic and trade issue. If talks on TIFA fail to go forward, forget about talks on TPP. For Taiwan, TIFA is an FTA of critical, landmark significance. If talks on TIFA are successful, they will dramatically upgrade political and economic relations between Taipei and Washington. They will help Taipei negotiate other types of FTAs. More importantly, if talks on TIFA fail, we can forget about joining the US-led TPP. The importance of the TPP for Taiwan's political and economic future requires no comment.
The DPP opposes U.S. beef imports. The ultimate impact is to kill TIFA, which in turn kills the TPP. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak said "FTAs are not a political issue. They are a survival issue." What the DPP is doing, is to kill TIFA, kill TPP, and thereby endangering Taiwan's survival.
The most important issue for the DPP is its credibility in the eyes of the United States. The United States has openly reminded the DPP that the Chen Shui-bian administration promised to allow US beef imports, but his successor Tsai Ing-wen reneged. Interim DPP chairman Chen Chu has made matters even worse. She depicts U.S. beef as poison that is killing the Taiwanese people. The new DPP chairman, to be chosen by the end of the month, apparently intends to fight the US to the bitter end. As a result, the DPP now has a vendetta against the United States over US beef imports.
As mentioned before, there has never been a single case of Ractopamine treated beef poisoning anywhere in the world. Beef and pork are being handled separately. Furthermore, US beef will be clearly marked as such. There is no reason to obstruct U.S. beef imports. Japan, South Korea, and a hundred other countries have adopted the same policy. Under the circumstances, opposition to US beef imports is opposition to TIFA. It is opposition to TPP. This is not a political issue, This is a survival issue.
The DPP must allow Taiwan to survive. Four years ago, the DPP opposed ECFA. It accused President Ma of "forfeiting sovereignty and demeaning the nation." and of "pandering to (Mainland) China and selling out Taiwan." But four years later, the DPP is singing a different tune. It now says it "accepts ECFA in toto." The DPP needs to realize that if it ever returns to power, it must accept TIFA, FTAs and the TPP. Without them Taiwan cannot survive. Therefore in order to ensure Taiwan's survival, the DPP must not obstruct U.S. beef imports, TIFA, and the TPP. Instead it should encourage the Ma administration to seize the moment and implement these measures ASAP. Then if the DPP ever returns to power, it can "assume responsibility in toto." Otherwise, it may miss the opportunity, If the DPP returns to power then, Taiwan may already be terminal.
The DPP cannot possibly be that short-sighted. When it was in power, it argued, "Whose skirts are we going to hide behind, if not the United States'?" Now that it is out of power, it dismisses even TIFA and TPP as sour grapes. When it is in power, it wants Taiwan to survive. When it is out of power, it no longer cares whether Taiwan lives or dies. A political party like this cannot win our allies' trust. Beijing will soon discover its Achilles Heel. The public on Taiwan will see through its lies. Such behavior is short-sighted opportunism. This is not the way a political party that intends to be around long term ought to conduct itself.
The DPP is currently out of power. It longs to return to power. It must not champion the petrochemical industry when it in power, only to seek to destroy it when it is out of power. Otherwise, if the DPP returns to power one day, Taiwan's petrochemical industry will already be devastated. U.S. beef imports have been dealt with. Food safety, Industry influence, and truth in labeling have been as well. The DPP has no reason to oppose U.S. beef imports, TIFA, and the TPP. Opposing them will have lethal consequences for Taiwan. The DPP should not rub salt in the wound. It should not lick blood from the knife. It should not think only about exploiting mob sentiment. It should consider the future of the Democratic Progressive Party. It should consider how Taiwan can survive. It should not oppose Ma, denounce Ma, and ignore Taiwan's future, Isn't Taiwan's future the DPP's future as well?
Out of concern for the nation, we would like to offer the DPP three well-intentioned warnings. One, Stop demagoguing the "one country, two regions" issue. Even Beijing accepts "Taiwan's long held basic position regarding the legal aspects of cross-strait relations." All the DPP needs to do is uphold the ROC Constitution. Why should it voluntarily shred the constitution? Two. The DPP must mend fences with the United States. It must restore mutual trust. It must not seek a vendetta against the United States. Three. Do not obstruct TIFA and the TPP. Do everything to realize them. In short, forsake blind hatred of Mainland China, opposition to the United States, liberalization, and globalization will merely destroy Taiwan. The DPP must not act like "an eel with his head in the sand, who doesn't know where to run."
The Ma administration vowed to ensure food safety, minimize the impact on local industry, and truthfully label US beef imports as such. It has fulfilled its duty. It should now turn around and ask the DPP why it is using U.S. beef imports to obstruct TIFA? It should ask the DPP whether it is willing to be answerable to the public for delaying or even killing TIFA?
In his inaugural speech, President Ma clearly designated Kaohsiung as a "Free Economy Demonstration Zone." The DPP should not oppose him. It should join him. The Kaohsiung Free Economy Demonstration Zone can become a pilot program. We can join TIFA and the TPP, We can turn Taiwan into a "Free Economic and Trade Island." If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power one day, it can then "accept responsibility in toto." Just as when the Democratic Progressive Party declared that if it returns to power it will "accept ECFA, in toto."
民進黨美牛政策：蓋頭鰻不知生死門
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.24 02:22 am
吳淑珍曾指趙建銘是「蓋頭鰻不知生死門」。這句話現在可用在民進黨頭上，說的是美牛政策。
就民進黨而言，美牛政策至少牽涉五個層次：一、食品安全；二、產業衝擊；三、ＴＩＦＡ（台美貿易及投資架構協定）；四、ＴＰＰ（跨太平洋夥伴協議）；五、扁政府及民進黨對美國的誠信。
就食品安全言，市售的香菸、檳榔尚有健康風險，但舉世迄今查無一名因食用萊克多巴胺牛肉而中毒的病例，韓日等國因此同意在明白標示後上架；關於產業衝擊，則美方已承諾「牛豬分離」，意謂台灣的豬農不受影響。有了以上的認知，民進黨反美牛，或許可煽動及利用民間的情緒，但失去了理性決策的立場。
在美方所說的「科學」前提下，不容美牛進口，被美國視之為「經貿問題」，於是停斷了ＴＩＦＡ的談判，因為ＴＩＦＡ也是「經貿問題」；而ＴＩＦＡ若談不成，自更不用說未來ＴＰＰ的磋商了。尤其，ＴＩＦＡ是台灣關鍵性、指標性的「類ＦＴＡ」，若談得成，非但台美的政經關係得以巨幅提升，對於台灣其他「類ＦＴＡ」談判亦必有助益；更重要的是，倘若談不成ＴＩＦＡ，就更別奢望能進入美國主導的ＴＰＰ，而ＴＰＰ對台灣未來政經發展之重要尤是不言可喻。
民進黨反對美牛，其終極效應就是封殺ＴＩＦＡ，就是封殺ＴＰＰ。如韓國總統李明博說：「ＦＴＡ不是政治問題，而是生存問題。」民進黨現在做的，就是在阻擋ＴＩＦＡ，阻擋ＴＰＰ，就是觸及了台灣的「生存問題」。
對民進黨自身關係最大的，則是與美國之間的誠信互動。美國方面公開宣告，陳水扁政府曾對開放美牛有承諾，但接著在蔡英文主席任內卻食言，如今到了陳菊任內更是變本加厲，將美牛指為鴆殺台灣人的毒藥，且看樣子月底將出爐的新主席也將與美國硬幹到底。如此一來，民進黨豈不因美牛問題而與美國成了「世仇」？
如前所述，如果舉世查無萊劑牛肉中毒之例，且採「牛豬分離政策」，再加上標示嚴管，即無阻擋美牛的理由，至少日韓等百餘國均持此類政策立場。在這種情況下，反美牛，就是反ＴＩＦＡ，就是反ＴＰＰ；這就不是政治問題，而是生存問題。
民進黨必須為台灣留一條活路。回顧四年前，民進黨反ＥＣＦＡ，指為喪權辱國、傾中賣台；但四年後，民進黨竟靦顏改稱「概括承受ＥＣＦＡ」。民進黨應知，民進黨若要再執政，也非要走向ＴＩＦＡ、ＦＴＡ及ＴＰＰ不可，捨此台灣絕無生路；因而，為台灣的生存計，民進黨不可用美牛來阻擋ＴＩＦＡ、ＴＰＰ，反而應該敦促馬政府利用寶貴的時機，早日進行；如此，倘待民進黨另日執政，尚可「概括承受」其成果；否則，若錯失時機，民進黨即使再執政，台灣亦恐已不可為矣。
民進黨不可再如此短視。執政時宣示「不抱美國大腿抱誰的」，下野卻連ＴＩＦＡ、ＴＰＰ也不屑一顧。這種執政時想要台灣活，下野後卻不顧台灣死活的政黨，不會獲得盟友的信任，極易被北京掐住罩門，也必會被台灣人民看破手腳。這是短線操作，不是一個永續經營的政黨所應為。
民進黨在野要想到仍有回朝時。不能在朝大力推動石化業，在野又反過來大力摧毀石化業，如此，待民進黨另日回朝執政，台灣的石化業已受重創。同理，當美牛在食品安全、產業影響及標示嚴管等皆得到對應處理，民進黨即沒有理由再以美牛去卡住ＴＩＦＡ及ＴＰＰ，因為那對台灣會有致命性的後果。民進黨不宜再有傷口灑鹽、刀口舔血的操作，不能只見到當前「民氣可欺」，要想到未來民進黨及台灣將如何活下去；亦即不能只知反馬嗆馬，不問台灣的未來，難道台灣的未來不是民進黨的未來？
憂時憂國，我們願對民進黨提出三個善意的警告：一、不要再狂打「一國兩區」，如果連北京都接受這是「長期以來台灣在法律層面對兩岸關係所持基本態度」，則只要固守中華民國憲法即可，何必自毀憲法？二、民進黨與美國之間的誠信關係必須修補重建，不要與美國成為「世仇」；三、ＴＩＦＡ、ＴＰＰ不要阻擋，應全力促成。總之，一味仇中反美及反自由化、全球化，那是毀台傷國之舉，民進黨不可做不知死活的蓋頭鰻。
至於馬政府，倘若確認食品安全、產業衝擊與標示嚴管皆已盡到最大可能的治理責任；則應回過頭來請教民進黨，為何仍要以美牛卡住ＴＩＦＡ？民進黨願不願對ＴＩＦＡ之遲誤或破局向台灣人民負責？
馬總統在就職演說中，明白標舉將以高雄為「自由經濟示範區」；民進黨切勿反對，而應共襄盛舉。如果能以高雄「自由經濟示範區」為試點，加入ＴＩＦＡ、ＴＰＰ，進而將台灣建設為「自由經濟貿易島」；則另日民進黨執政，即可「概括承受」，一如民進黨宣示若執政將「概括承受」ＥＣＦＡ。
Wednesday, May 23, 2012
Does Everyone Have Multiple Personality Disorder?
Does Everyone Have Multiple Personality Disorder?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 23, 2012
Summary: Opposition parties have a duty to oversee the government. But while overseeing others, one also has a duty to be logically consistent. One may not oppose everything indiscriminately. One may not contradict oneself from one day to the next. Think back to US beef imports, ECFA, gasoline and electricity rate hikes, and capital gains taxes. The DPP has opposed everything from beginning to end. It has pointed the finger at others, while remaining blind to the contradictions in its own position. The DPP has "Multiple Personality Disorder."
Full Text below:
Opposition parties have a duty to oversee the government. But while overseeing others, one also has a duty to be logically consistent. One may not oppose everything indiscriminately. One may not contradict oneself from one day to the next. Think back to US beef imports, ECFA, gasoline and electricity rate hikes, and capital gains taxes. The DPP has opposed everything from beginning to end. It has pointed the finger at others, while remaining blind to the contradictions in its own position. The DPP has "Multiple Personality Disorder."
Take ECFA and FTAs. On the one hand, the DPP condemns ECFA. It argues that ECFA is not as effective as the Ma administration says it is. On the other hand, it advocates FTAs with the US and Europe. But ECFA is an FTA. It may not be as effective as initially anticipated. But one thing we can be sure of. Without ECFA Taiwan's economic and industrial plight would be far worse.
It gets worse. On the one hand the DPP condemns the Ma administration's Mainland policy, saying it "panders to [Mainland] China." It claims this makes Taiwan's trade and economy dependent upon the Mainland. It obdurately opposes US beef imports. It has launched several "sneak attacks" in the Legislative Yuan. It has demanded the passage of a "Zero Clenbuterol Act" that would destroy Taipei/Washington relations. The ruling and opposition parties both know that permitting U.S. beef imports is the policy issue with the biggest impact on current and future Taipei/Washington relations. Washington no longer drops hints about the importance of US beef imports to Taipei/Washington relations. Washington shouts it, loud and clear. U.S. beef imports affects Taipei/Washington relations, It also affects TIFA (Trade and Investment Framework Agreement). US beef imports will determine whether consultations between Taipei and Washington resume.
Washington has made the situation crystal clear. Yet the DPP continues to use "national health" as its pretext for continued opposition to U.S. beef imports. Taiwan desperately needs a solution to its economic and trade problems. But the DPP has none. Taiwan's largest exporter is the Chinese Mainland, The DPP is alarmed about that. It opposes expanded cross-Strait economic and trade relations, cross-strait investment, Mainland investments on Taiwan, or Taiwan investments on the Mainland, It oppose every one of them. But Taiwan has another important trading partner, the US. The US is Taiwan's second largest exporter. The DPP yammers on about how the government must expedite an FTA between Taipei and Washington, even as it mulishly opposes US beef imports. As a result Taipei and Washington cannot even sign TIFA, which is not even an FTA.
The DPP condemns the government's gasoline and electricity price hikes. Hsu Hsing-liang, currently a candidate for DPP chairman, has even staged a hunger strike. But has the DPP forgotten its anti-nuclear stance? Has it forgotten its vision of a nuclear-free homeland? To achieve a nuclear-free homeland, one must first increase the percentage of renewable energy. One must then improve energy efficiency and reduce electricity demand. These goals require higher, more reasonable gasoline and electricity prices. The government must not artificially depress gasoline and electricity prices. It must not bleed red ink in order to provide subsidies. Artificially low gasoline and electricity prices inevitably lead to wasteful use of resources. They make it impossible for higher priced renewable energy to survive and prosper.
The opposition DPP has also accused the government of borrowing too much. The national debt has reached new heights. Meanwhile, the price of gasoline and electricity are kept artificially low. That means each year the government spends hundreds of billions of dollars subsidizing gasoline and electricity. Doesn't this increase the government's fiscal burden? Is the DPP really oblivious to its own contradictions?
Now take the capital gains tax. During the presidential election the DPP called for a "fair and just society." But tax experts and citizen's groups have stressed that the capital gains tax is the first step to social equality. But where does the DPP stand? The DPP does not dare openly oppose the capital gains tax. But while criticizing the Ma administration, it stresses that shareholders would lose money. When the DPP held its "Condemn Ma Protest March," one group demanded "fairness." Why is the DPP so evasive about the capital gains tax, even when launching sneak attacks in opposition? Just how is it championing equality?
Actually, the DPP is not alone. Society as a whole is this way, Everyone ignores the cost of reform. But as the saying goes, "There ain't no such thing as a free lunch." Do the opposition DPP and the public truly object to the widening gap between rich and poor? Do they truly object to social injustice? Do they truly demand reform? If they do, the capital gains tax and even the real estate tax are essential. Just know that if one promotes them, one must be willing to bear the cost -- lower short-term stock prices.
Do the opposition DPP and the public truly appreciate Taiwan's loss of economic and trade competitiveness and the widening gap between Taiwan and South Korea? If they do, we must sign FTAs with other nations as soon as possible. Only then can we reverse our decline. Everyone must understand that negotiating FTAs is a give and take proposition. If we want the other side to open its markets and lower its tariffs, we must make the same concessions. That is why when Korea signed an FTA with the United States, Back home protests erupted everywhere. Disturbances broke out in the legislature. Given the political atmosphere and the posture adopted by the opposition DPP, we can take but not give. Where in the world can one find international negotiations like these? The business community has repeatedly urged accelerated follow-up negotiations over ECFA, One reason is our representatives are authorized only to take, not to give. They are afraid to be scolded upon their return, Naturally negotiations like this are bound to run aground. Beijing's FTA with Seoul will be finalized. Follow-up negotiations on ECFA will remain incomplete. Taiwan will watch as it loses everything.
In today's world there are two typical extremes. In Greece, political rivalry, partisan bickering, and populism overshadowed professionalism. What was the result? Just look at Greece's political and economic fate. South Korea had internal quarrels. But at least the government and the public kept moving ahead. As a result the economy and industry continued to grow. It grew so much Taipei, Beijing, and Tokyo now hope to join forces against it. The lesson is staring us in the face. The opposition DPP and the public have some serious soul-searching to do.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.23
社論－大家都「人格分裂」了嗎？
本報訊
在野黨以監督政府為天職，但在監督的同時，自己也要有一貫的邏輯、理念與立場，而不是凡事反對卻又自相矛盾。從美牛案、ＥＣＦＡ、油電政策、再到證所稅，我們卻看到民進黨一路反對、指責，但卻未察覺本身理念、立場的矛盾與「人格分裂」。
以ＥＣＦＡ與ＦＴＡ而言，我們看到民進黨一方面反對、指責ＥＣＦＡ，說ＥＣＦＡ的成效不如馬政府當年說的好；另一方面又要政府趕快推動與美、歐的ＦＴＡ。其實，ＥＣＦＡ就是一種ＦＴＡ，即使其效益不如原先預期好，但可以肯定的是，如果連ＥＣＦＡ都沒有，台灣的經濟與產業處境將更困窘。
更矛盾的是，民進黨一方面大罵馬政府的政策向中傾斜，讓台灣的經貿更依賴大陸；但對美牛案卻強力反對，而且是多次在立院「偷襲」、力推會讓台美關係「翻臉」的「零瘦肉精法案」。朝野皆知，關係著台灣是否開放美牛進口的美牛案，是美國現階段最重視的政策，也影響著台美未來關係。而且，美方已不是用暗示，而是明白表示：美牛案影響台美關係、同時也是台美的ＴＩＦＡ（貿易暨投資架構協定）能否恢復協商談判的前提。
講得這麼明白了，民進黨還是以「國民健康」為由，大力反對美牛案。那麼，台灣的經貿總要有一個出口吧？民進黨給了什麼答案？對台灣最大的出口國大陸，民進黨心存疑慮，一直阻擋兩岸經貿關係的再擴大與深化，對兩岸投資的開放、陸資來台或台資登陸，都有反對的理由。但對台灣另一個重要貿易夥伴、第二大出口國美國，則又是嘴巴說要政府趕快推動、完成台美的ＦＴＡ，但實際作法卻是大力反對美牛案，讓台美間連ＦＴＡ都算不上的ＴＩＦＡ都僵死無法動彈。
再看民進黨痛責政府的油電雙漲政策，現正競選民進黨黨主席的許信良甚至為此「絕食抗議」。但民進黨難道忘了自己的反核立場、非核家園的政策遠景了嗎？要達到非核家園的目標，一是要增加再生能源比重，二是要提高能源運用效率、降低用電需求。而這些，需要的是一個較高、較合理的油電價格，而不能由政府流血補貼、人為的壓低油電價。低廉的油電價必然讓資源使用浪費、價格較高昂的再生能源亦無從生存發展。
此外，在野黨也指責政府舉債過高，國債金額不斷創新高，但持續壓低油電價格，等於每年要政府補貼上千億元的油電費用，這豈不是又增加政府財政負擔嗎？難道民進黨從來沒有感覺到自己的矛盾嗎？
再談證所稅案，民進黨在總統大選中以「公平正義的社會」為號召，但對所有財稅學者、公民團體強調實現社會公平第一步的證所稅案，又持什麼立場？民進黨雖然還不敢公然反對證所稅案，但在批評馬政府時，總也強調證所稅案讓股民失血等。民進黨在「嗆馬遊行」中有一隊叫「要公平」，但請問民進黨對證所稅案如此閃爍其詞、還不時偷襲反對，那到底是要那門子的公平？
其實，不止是民進黨，整體社會亦如此，大家都忽略了改革的陣痛與代價，天下沒有白吃的午餐。如果，在野黨與社會大眾，真的對貧富差距拉大、社會不公有怨言、要改革，那麼，證所稅─甚至接著的不動產實價課稅，都有其必要，但在推動時，必然要承受短期的股市下跌的代價。
如果，在野黨與社會大眾真體認到台灣經貿競爭力日失，與韓國的差距越拉越大，我們必須盡快與其它國家簽訂ＦＴＡ，以挽回頹勢；那麼，大家也該了解，ＦＴＡ是「有拿有給」的談判過程，要對方開放市場、降低關稅的同時，自己也要作出讓步。否則，韓國不會在完成與美國的ＦＴＡ時，國內社會抗議四起、國會反對鬧場。但現在台灣的社會氛圍與在野黨的立場，似乎是只能取不能給，天下那有這種國際談判？企業界再三催促加快腳步的ＥＣＦＡ後續談判進度緩慢，重要原因就是我方代表「只能拿不能給」，免得回國被罵，談判當然觸礁。最後的結果可能是中韓ＦＴＡ完成了，ＥＣＦＡ擴大成果還未談好，台灣坐失江山。
現世有兩個極端但典型的案例：希臘政爭、黨爭、民粹蓋過專業，結果如何？請看現在的希臘政經情勢。韓國則雖內部仍有爭吵，但至少政府與社會堅定的向一個方向前進，結果經濟、產業日益壯大，甚至兩岸與日本要「聯手抗韓」。殷鑑不遠，在野黨與社會，是該省思。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 23, 2012
Summary: Opposition parties have a duty to oversee the government. But while overseeing others, one also has a duty to be logically consistent. One may not oppose everything indiscriminately. One may not contradict oneself from one day to the next. Think back to US beef imports, ECFA, gasoline and electricity rate hikes, and capital gains taxes. The DPP has opposed everything from beginning to end. It has pointed the finger at others, while remaining blind to the contradictions in its own position. The DPP has "Multiple Personality Disorder."
Full Text below:
Opposition parties have a duty to oversee the government. But while overseeing others, one also has a duty to be logically consistent. One may not oppose everything indiscriminately. One may not contradict oneself from one day to the next. Think back to US beef imports, ECFA, gasoline and electricity rate hikes, and capital gains taxes. The DPP has opposed everything from beginning to end. It has pointed the finger at others, while remaining blind to the contradictions in its own position. The DPP has "Multiple Personality Disorder."
Take ECFA and FTAs. On the one hand, the DPP condemns ECFA. It argues that ECFA is not as effective as the Ma administration says it is. On the other hand, it advocates FTAs with the US and Europe. But ECFA is an FTA. It may not be as effective as initially anticipated. But one thing we can be sure of. Without ECFA Taiwan's economic and industrial plight would be far worse.
It gets worse. On the one hand the DPP condemns the Ma administration's Mainland policy, saying it "panders to [Mainland] China." It claims this makes Taiwan's trade and economy dependent upon the Mainland. It obdurately opposes US beef imports. It has launched several "sneak attacks" in the Legislative Yuan. It has demanded the passage of a "Zero Clenbuterol Act" that would destroy Taipei/Washington relations. The ruling and opposition parties both know that permitting U.S. beef imports is the policy issue with the biggest impact on current and future Taipei/Washington relations. Washington no longer drops hints about the importance of US beef imports to Taipei/Washington relations. Washington shouts it, loud and clear. U.S. beef imports affects Taipei/Washington relations, It also affects TIFA (Trade and Investment Framework Agreement). US beef imports will determine whether consultations between Taipei and Washington resume.
Washington has made the situation crystal clear. Yet the DPP continues to use "national health" as its pretext for continued opposition to U.S. beef imports. Taiwan desperately needs a solution to its economic and trade problems. But the DPP has none. Taiwan's largest exporter is the Chinese Mainland, The DPP is alarmed about that. It opposes expanded cross-Strait economic and trade relations, cross-strait investment, Mainland investments on Taiwan, or Taiwan investments on the Mainland, It oppose every one of them. But Taiwan has another important trading partner, the US. The US is Taiwan's second largest exporter. The DPP yammers on about how the government must expedite an FTA between Taipei and Washington, even as it mulishly opposes US beef imports. As a result Taipei and Washington cannot even sign TIFA, which is not even an FTA.
The DPP condemns the government's gasoline and electricity price hikes. Hsu Hsing-liang, currently a candidate for DPP chairman, has even staged a hunger strike. But has the DPP forgotten its anti-nuclear stance? Has it forgotten its vision of a nuclear-free homeland? To achieve a nuclear-free homeland, one must first increase the percentage of renewable energy. One must then improve energy efficiency and reduce electricity demand. These goals require higher, more reasonable gasoline and electricity prices. The government must not artificially depress gasoline and electricity prices. It must not bleed red ink in order to provide subsidies. Artificially low gasoline and electricity prices inevitably lead to wasteful use of resources. They make it impossible for higher priced renewable energy to survive and prosper.
The opposition DPP has also accused the government of borrowing too much. The national debt has reached new heights. Meanwhile, the price of gasoline and electricity are kept artificially low. That means each year the government spends hundreds of billions of dollars subsidizing gasoline and electricity. Doesn't this increase the government's fiscal burden? Is the DPP really oblivious to its own contradictions?
Now take the capital gains tax. During the presidential election the DPP called for a "fair and just society." But tax experts and citizen's groups have stressed that the capital gains tax is the first step to social equality. But where does the DPP stand? The DPP does not dare openly oppose the capital gains tax. But while criticizing the Ma administration, it stresses that shareholders would lose money. When the DPP held its "Condemn Ma Protest March," one group demanded "fairness." Why is the DPP so evasive about the capital gains tax, even when launching sneak attacks in opposition? Just how is it championing equality?
Actually, the DPP is not alone. Society as a whole is this way, Everyone ignores the cost of reform. But as the saying goes, "There ain't no such thing as a free lunch." Do the opposition DPP and the public truly object to the widening gap between rich and poor? Do they truly object to social injustice? Do they truly demand reform? If they do, the capital gains tax and even the real estate tax are essential. Just know that if one promotes them, one must be willing to bear the cost -- lower short-term stock prices.
Do the opposition DPP and the public truly appreciate Taiwan's loss of economic and trade competitiveness and the widening gap between Taiwan and South Korea? If they do, we must sign FTAs with other nations as soon as possible. Only then can we reverse our decline. Everyone must understand that negotiating FTAs is a give and take proposition. If we want the other side to open its markets and lower its tariffs, we must make the same concessions. That is why when Korea signed an FTA with the United States, Back home protests erupted everywhere. Disturbances broke out in the legislature. Given the political atmosphere and the posture adopted by the opposition DPP, we can take but not give. Where in the world can one find international negotiations like these? The business community has repeatedly urged accelerated follow-up negotiations over ECFA, One reason is our representatives are authorized only to take, not to give. They are afraid to be scolded upon their return, Naturally negotiations like this are bound to run aground. Beijing's FTA with Seoul will be finalized. Follow-up negotiations on ECFA will remain incomplete. Taiwan will watch as it loses everything.
In today's world there are two typical extremes. In Greece, political rivalry, partisan bickering, and populism overshadowed professionalism. What was the result? Just look at Greece's political and economic fate. South Korea had internal quarrels. But at least the government and the public kept moving ahead. As a result the economy and industry continued to grow. It grew so much Taipei, Beijing, and Tokyo now hope to join forces against it. The lesson is staring us in the face. The opposition DPP and the public have some serious soul-searching to do.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.23
社論－大家都「人格分裂」了嗎？
本報訊
在野黨以監督政府為天職，但在監督的同時，自己也要有一貫的邏輯、理念與立場，而不是凡事反對卻又自相矛盾。從美牛案、ＥＣＦＡ、油電政策、再到證所稅，我們卻看到民進黨一路反對、指責，但卻未察覺本身理念、立場的矛盾與「人格分裂」。
以ＥＣＦＡ與ＦＴＡ而言，我們看到民進黨一方面反對、指責ＥＣＦＡ，說ＥＣＦＡ的成效不如馬政府當年說的好；另一方面又要政府趕快推動與美、歐的ＦＴＡ。其實，ＥＣＦＡ就是一種ＦＴＡ，即使其效益不如原先預期好，但可以肯定的是，如果連ＥＣＦＡ都沒有，台灣的經濟與產業處境將更困窘。
更矛盾的是，民進黨一方面大罵馬政府的政策向中傾斜，讓台灣的經貿更依賴大陸；但對美牛案卻強力反對，而且是多次在立院「偷襲」、力推會讓台美關係「翻臉」的「零瘦肉精法案」。朝野皆知，關係著台灣是否開放美牛進口的美牛案，是美國現階段最重視的政策，也影響著台美未來關係。而且，美方已不是用暗示，而是明白表示：美牛案影響台美關係、同時也是台美的ＴＩＦＡ（貿易暨投資架構協定）能否恢復協商談判的前提。
講得這麼明白了，民進黨還是以「國民健康」為由，大力反對美牛案。那麼，台灣的經貿總要有一個出口吧？民進黨給了什麼答案？對台灣最大的出口國大陸，民進黨心存疑慮，一直阻擋兩岸經貿關係的再擴大與深化，對兩岸投資的開放、陸資來台或台資登陸，都有反對的理由。但對台灣另一個重要貿易夥伴、第二大出口國美國，則又是嘴巴說要政府趕快推動、完成台美的ＦＴＡ，但實際作法卻是大力反對美牛案，讓台美間連ＦＴＡ都算不上的ＴＩＦＡ都僵死無法動彈。
再看民進黨痛責政府的油電雙漲政策，現正競選民進黨黨主席的許信良甚至為此「絕食抗議」。但民進黨難道忘了自己的反核立場、非核家園的政策遠景了嗎？要達到非核家園的目標，一是要增加再生能源比重，二是要提高能源運用效率、降低用電需求。而這些，需要的是一個較高、較合理的油電價格，而不能由政府流血補貼、人為的壓低油電價。低廉的油電價必然讓資源使用浪費、價格較高昂的再生能源亦無從生存發展。
此外，在野黨也指責政府舉債過高，國債金額不斷創新高，但持續壓低油電價格，等於每年要政府補貼上千億元的油電費用，這豈不是又增加政府財政負擔嗎？難道民進黨從來沒有感覺到自己的矛盾嗎？
再談證所稅案，民進黨在總統大選中以「公平正義的社會」為號召，但對所有財稅學者、公民團體強調實現社會公平第一步的證所稅案，又持什麼立場？民進黨雖然還不敢公然反對證所稅案，但在批評馬政府時，總也強調證所稅案讓股民失血等。民進黨在「嗆馬遊行」中有一隊叫「要公平」，但請問民進黨對證所稅案如此閃爍其詞、還不時偷襲反對，那到底是要那門子的公平？
其實，不止是民進黨，整體社會亦如此，大家都忽略了改革的陣痛與代價，天下沒有白吃的午餐。如果，在野黨與社會大眾，真的對貧富差距拉大、社會不公有怨言、要改革，那麼，證所稅─甚至接著的不動產實價課稅，都有其必要，但在推動時，必然要承受短期的股市下跌的代價。
如果，在野黨與社會大眾真體認到台灣經貿競爭力日失，與韓國的差距越拉越大，我們必須盡快與其它國家簽訂ＦＴＡ，以挽回頹勢；那麼，大家也該了解，ＦＴＡ是「有拿有給」的談判過程，要對方開放市場、降低關稅的同時，自己也要作出讓步。否則，韓國不會在完成與美國的ＦＴＡ時，國內社會抗議四起、國會反對鬧場。但現在台灣的社會氛圍與在野黨的立場，似乎是只能取不能給，天下那有這種國際談判？企業界再三催促加快腳步的ＥＣＦＡ後續談判進度緩慢，重要原因就是我方代表「只能拿不能給」，免得回國被罵，談判當然觸礁。最後的結果可能是中韓ＦＴＡ完成了，ＥＣＦＡ擴大成果還未談好，台灣坐失江山。
現世有兩個極端但典型的案例：希臘政爭、黨爭、民粹蓋過專業，結果如何？請看現在的希臘政經情勢。韓國則雖內部仍有爭吵，但至少政府與社會堅定的向一個方向前進，結果經濟、產業日益壯大，甚至兩岸與日本要「聯手抗韓」。殷鑑不遠，在野黨與社會，是該省思。
Tuesday, May 22, 2012
May 20 Speech and Cross-Strait Three Party Interaction
May 20 Speech and Cross-Strait Three Party Interaction
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2012
Summary: The two sides have fallen back on "existing systems and legal provisions," i.e., their constitutions, to define the cross-Strait relationship. But this does not resolve all problems pertaining to "one China." This is why President Ma has yet to utter the words, "both sides are part of one China." Instead, he says that people on both sides are part of the Chinese nation. That is because "one China" still requires "different interpretations." If the two sides wish to proceed, they should reach an "interim agreement" based on a "big roof."
Full Text below:
President Ma Ying-jeou's second term inaugural speech contained about 6000 words. The portion addressing cross-Strait issues was based on a "national security iron triangle" and contained over 2000 words. It was the most anticipated part of the speech. It was the portion on which he expended the most ink.
President Ma's position on cross-Strait issues remains largely unchanged from what it was in 2008, when he delivered his first term inaugural speech. As we can see, his framework is right and it works. But certain addenda have already resulted in fresh controversies.
For four years, one thing has been consistent. As Ma noted, "Ying-jeou solemnly points out that the Constitution of the Republic of China is the government's final arbiter vis a vis cross-Strait relations. Cross-strait policy must adhere to the framework of the ROC Constitution. It must maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, i.e., "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It must be based on the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations, It must promote cross-Strait peace and development." This framework has become a three-way understanding between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing. It withstood the acid test of the 2012 presidential election. It is right and it works.
The addenda states that "According to the constitution, the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of China includes both Taiwan and the Mainland. The government's current jurisdiction however, covers only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu." In other words, for the past two decades the constitution's position vis a vis the cross-Strait situation is "one Republic of China, two regions." Over the past two months the portion pertaining to "one country, two regions" became a point of contention. The public also wondered whether President Ma would say "both sides are part of one China." Instead, President Ma said "People on both sides of the Strait are part of the Chinese nation." But this too became a point of contention.
The source of the controversy was the "Wu-Hu meeting" in March. Hu Jintao said, "We affirm that (the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China). This is consistent with existing legal provisions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This is something both sides consider doable." Wu Poh-hsiung said, "The two sides' existing systems and legal provisions affirm that they are both "part of one China." Wu Poh-hsiung said, "Taiwan's existing legal provisions (i.e., the Statute Governing Relations Between the Peoples of the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region) is the legal basis for "one country, two regions." The relationship between the two sides is not a state-to-state relation. It is a special type of relationship."
Did President Ma's inaugural speech have any connection to the Wu Hu Meeting? That remains unknown. It is possible Beijing saw the cross-Strait situation as volatile and unpredictable. It wanted a to characterize the cross-Strait relationship in a new way. it wanted to say, "Both two sides are part of one China." But the Ma administration may have been wary of the "one China" portion. It responded by "reaffirming the Constitution of the Republic of China," It reaffirmed that "one country, two regions" was part of the Constitution of the Republic of China.
The Ma administration's response was reasonable. Article 11 of the Amended Constitution "responds to the need for national unity." It refers to the "Free Region" and the "Mainland Region." It refers to the "Statute Governing Relations Between the Peoples of the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region." It renames the regions the "Taiwan Region" and the "Mainland Region." Without such a legal basis, we could not have "Taiwan Compatriot Permits" and "Mainland Compatriot Permits." The two sides would have no basis by which to interact. President Ma said "For two decades the constitution has defined the cross-Strait situation as "one Republic of China, two regions," We have elected three presidents during that time. But that legal provision has never changed." This is absolutely correct.
But three political parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are competing for power. This "new framework" could have either positive or negative consequences. Consider one negative consequence. Actually this "new framework" is part of the old legal framework. The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations is well established. It is a stable and workable framework. Adding "one country, two regions" to it is gilding the lily. It could lead to new disputes. The past two months confirm this.
Now consider a positive consequence. As mentioned above, the Wu Hu Meeting said both sides were part of "one China." The basis for this was the two sides' "existing systems and legal provisions." The "existing systems and legal provisions" are the two sides' ' constitutions. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said, "One country, two regions is the underlying legal basis for cross-Strait relations, one that both sides have long supported." Can Beijing support the Republic of China's "one China Constitution?" Can it lean this way? Can it modify its "one China, different interpretations" policy? If it can, we anticipate positive consequences.
The DPP must handle this situation carefully. Four years ago it mindlessly opposed ECFA. Ultimately it merely painted itself into a corner. This is a matter of record. Today the DPP is apparently licking its chops over "one country, two regions." Apparently it thinks this provides an escape clause from the 1992 consensus. It has latched onto "one country, two regions" and refuses to let go. But "one country, two regions" merely revisits the debate over the constitution. Frank Hsieh is itching to pontificate about the "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutional interpretations." But if one repudiates "one country, two regions" how can one maintain the constitutional framework for the "Taiwan Compatriot Permits" and "Mainlander Compatriot Permits?" No wonder Su Tseng-chang ridiculed Frank Hsieh's theory, calling it a "Kuomintang knock-off." Su said they must conduct themselves as a "genuine Democratic Progressive Party." But how can the DPP hide behind the Constitution of the Republic of China? After all, they want to dismember the Constitution of the Republic of China. How can this possibly offer them a way out?
As we see it, "one country, two regions" is merely another way to reaffirm the constitutional basis for "one China, different interpretations." But the more one reaffirms this constitutional basis, the more one ratchets up social and psychological pressure, and the more likely one will have to confront the problem. One country, two regions means reaffirming the Constitution of the Republic of China. It means using it to define the cross-Strait relationship. This of course is much better that allowing Beijing to define it unilaterally. Hence the reaffirmation of the constitution and "one country, two regions." Agreement concerning the constitution may facilitate mutual trust. The DPP should capitalize on the trend, and not proceed down a blind alley.
The DPP hopes to repudiate "one country, two regions." This is nothing less than repudiating the constitution. Beijing calls it "mulish Taiwan independence." The DPP opposes US beef imports. Washington could choose to see this as a vendetta. The DPP should remember its painful experience with ECFA. It condemned it as "selling out Taiwan and pandering to [Mainland] China." But eventually it was compelled to "accept it in toto." The DPP should not seek short term advantage, only to find itself in a blind alley.
The two sides have fallen back on "existing systems and legal provisions," i.e., their constitutions. to define the cross-Strait relationship. But this does not resolve all problems pertaining to "one China." This is why President Ma has yet to utter the words, "both sides are part of one China." Instead, he says that people on both sides are part of the Chinese nation. That is because "one China" still requires "different interpretations." If the two sides wish to proceed, they should reach an "interim agreement" based on a "big roof."
從520演說看兩岸三黨互動
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.21
馬英九總統的連任就職演說，全文約六千字，其中涉及兩岸議題部分，以「國家安全鐵三角」為主框架，超過二千字；這是最受各界矚目的部分，也是演說著墨最重的部分。
馬總統對兩岸議題的論述，大體上仍維持其在二○○八年首任就職演說的架構，可證此一架構之正確與有效；但也有新的引申的部分，卻已形成了新的爭議。
四年來維持一貫的部分是：「英九要在此鄭重指出：中華民國憲法是政府處理兩岸關係的最高指導原則；兩岸政策必須在中華民國憲法架構下，維持臺海『不統、不獨、不武』的現狀，在『九二共識、一中各表』的基礎上，推動兩岸和平發展。」此一架構，如今已成台美中三方的共識或默契，並已經歷二○一二年總統大選的考驗，可謂正確與有效。
至於引申的部分則是：「依據憲法，中華民國領土主權涵蓋臺灣與大陸，目前政府的統治權僅及於臺、澎、金、馬。換言之，二十年來兩岸的憲法定位就是『一個中華民國，兩個地區』。」此段論述，即是所謂的「一國兩區」，已成近兩個月來政治爭議的焦點。另外，各界關注馬總統會不會說出「兩岸同屬一中」，則在演說中馬總統說了「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」，亦是一個爭議。
事情的源頭來自三月間的「吳胡會」。當時，胡錦濤說：「確認（大陸和台灣同屬一個中國）這一事實，符合兩岸現行規定，應該是雙方都可以做到的。」吳伯雄說：「根據雙方現行體制和相關規定，兩岸都堅持一個中國。」吳伯雄並說：「台灣現行的《兩岸人民關係條例》，即是以『一國兩區』為法理基礎的，兩岸並非國與國的關係，而是特殊的關係。」
馬總統在就職演說的相關表述，與吳胡會之間有何關連，尚不得而知。可能的情況是：北京鑒於兩岸情勢的變數莫測，希望提出兩岸論述新的主命題「兩岸同屬一中」；但馬政府對「一中」的定義有所疑忌，因而以「回歸中華民國憲法」作為回應，而「一國兩區」即是中華民國憲法的法理架構。
馬政府的此一應對，至目前看來，應屬合理。因為，依據「為因應國家統一前需要」而頒定的增修憲法第十一條，即稱「自由地區」與「大陸地區」，至《兩岸人民關係條例》，則改稱「台灣地區」及「大陸地區」；若無此一法理基礎，就根本不會有「台胞證」與「陸胞證」，則兩岸一切交流互動即失根據。因而，馬總統說：「二十年來兩岸的憲法定位即是『一個中華民國，兩個地區』，歷經三位總統，從未改變。」此說無錯，此理無誤。
然而，在兩岸三黨的競合架構中，這個新的論述架構（其實是原本即在法理體系中）卻可能引致正負兩向的發展。可能的負向發展是：「九二共識，一中各表」已是一個相當成熟、穩定且有效的架構，如今加上了畫蛇添足的「一國兩區」，即可能引發新的爭議與衝突；近兩個月來的擾攘，便是印證。
可能的正向發展則是：如前所述，吳胡會中，兩岸皆稱「一個中國」，是根據雙方現行之體制與規定；而所謂「現行體制與規定」即是指各自的憲法。國台辦主任王毅且說：「一國兩區是長期以來台灣在法律層面對兩岸關係所持的基本態度。」倘若北京對中華民國的「一中憲法」能持此見解，並朝此一方向調整「一中存異各表」的政策，應當可作正向期待。
民進黨處此情勢，必須謹慎因應。四年前魯莽反對ＥＣＦＡ，最後落至作繭自縛，可為殷鑑。目前所見，民進黨似對「一國兩區」見獵心喜，彷彿認為這是從「九二共識」脫困的出路，對著「一國兩區」狂追猛打。但是，「一國兩區」最後必將回到「憲法之辯（辨）」；如謝長廷等正擬以「憲法共識／憲法各表」為轉型槓桿，倘若否定「一國兩區」，將如何維持由「台胞證」與「陸胞證」所支撐的憲法架構？難怪謝長廷的理論被蘇貞昌暗譏為「山寨版的國民黨」，而謂應當作「正港的民進黨」。試問，民進黨若又想托庇於中華民國憲法，卻又要切割支解中華民國憲法，豈有生路可言？
我們認為，「一國兩區」其實是「一中各表」更加深入憲法法理的一種表達形態。當然，愈深入憲法法理，愈會形成社會的心理壓力，卻也是面對問題的契機。因為，如果「一國兩區」意味著回歸至中華民國憲法來界定兩岸關係的定位，當然比由北京片面去決定要好得多。因而，回歸憲法的「一國兩區」表述，潛藏著兩岸有可能在相互認知的憲法層次去建立互信的機制，民進黨應當因勢利導，不要自絕出路。
民進黨否定「一國兩區」，不啻自我否定憲法架構，已被北京指為「頑固台獨」；而其反美牛的姿態，亦極可能被美國視為「世仇」。民進黨應記取由「ＥＣＦＡ親中賣台」至「概括承受ＥＣＦＡ」的慘痛經歷，不要逞一時之快，又將自己逼進一條無尾巷。
不過，兩岸各依「現行體制及規定」（即憲法）所界定的兩岸關係，並不能解決「一個中國」的疑義；這也應是馬總統未言「兩岸同屬一中」，而只說「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」的理由，因為，「一中」仍在「存異各表」狀態。我們的建議是：兩岸若要平穩走下去，仍應當有一「屋頂中國」的「中程方案」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2012
Summary: The two sides have fallen back on "existing systems and legal provisions," i.e., their constitutions, to define the cross-Strait relationship. But this does not resolve all problems pertaining to "one China." This is why President Ma has yet to utter the words, "both sides are part of one China." Instead, he says that people on both sides are part of the Chinese nation. That is because "one China" still requires "different interpretations." If the two sides wish to proceed, they should reach an "interim agreement" based on a "big roof."
Full Text below:
President Ma Ying-jeou's second term inaugural speech contained about 6000 words. The portion addressing cross-Strait issues was based on a "national security iron triangle" and contained over 2000 words. It was the most anticipated part of the speech. It was the portion on which he expended the most ink.
President Ma's position on cross-Strait issues remains largely unchanged from what it was in 2008, when he delivered his first term inaugural speech. As we can see, his framework is right and it works. But certain addenda have already resulted in fresh controversies.
For four years, one thing has been consistent. As Ma noted, "Ying-jeou solemnly points out that the Constitution of the Republic of China is the government's final arbiter vis a vis cross-Strait relations. Cross-strait policy must adhere to the framework of the ROC Constitution. It must maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, i.e., "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It must be based on the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations, It must promote cross-Strait peace and development." This framework has become a three-way understanding between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing. It withstood the acid test of the 2012 presidential election. It is right and it works.
The addenda states that "According to the constitution, the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of China includes both Taiwan and the Mainland. The government's current jurisdiction however, covers only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu." In other words, for the past two decades the constitution's position vis a vis the cross-Strait situation is "one Republic of China, two regions." Over the past two months the portion pertaining to "one country, two regions" became a point of contention. The public also wondered whether President Ma would say "both sides are part of one China." Instead, President Ma said "People on both sides of the Strait are part of the Chinese nation." But this too became a point of contention.
The source of the controversy was the "Wu-Hu meeting" in March. Hu Jintao said, "We affirm that (the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China). This is consistent with existing legal provisions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This is something both sides consider doable." Wu Poh-hsiung said, "The two sides' existing systems and legal provisions affirm that they are both "part of one China." Wu Poh-hsiung said, "Taiwan's existing legal provisions (i.e., the Statute Governing Relations Between the Peoples of the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region) is the legal basis for "one country, two regions." The relationship between the two sides is not a state-to-state relation. It is a special type of relationship."
Did President Ma's inaugural speech have any connection to the Wu Hu Meeting? That remains unknown. It is possible Beijing saw the cross-Strait situation as volatile and unpredictable. It wanted a to characterize the cross-Strait relationship in a new way. it wanted to say, "Both two sides are part of one China." But the Ma administration may have been wary of the "one China" portion. It responded by "reaffirming the Constitution of the Republic of China," It reaffirmed that "one country, two regions" was part of the Constitution of the Republic of China.
The Ma administration's response was reasonable. Article 11 of the Amended Constitution "responds to the need for national unity." It refers to the "Free Region" and the "Mainland Region." It refers to the "Statute Governing Relations Between the Peoples of the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region." It renames the regions the "Taiwan Region" and the "Mainland Region." Without such a legal basis, we could not have "Taiwan Compatriot Permits" and "Mainland Compatriot Permits." The two sides would have no basis by which to interact. President Ma said "For two decades the constitution has defined the cross-Strait situation as "one Republic of China, two regions," We have elected three presidents during that time. But that legal provision has never changed." This is absolutely correct.
But three political parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are competing for power. This "new framework" could have either positive or negative consequences. Consider one negative consequence. Actually this "new framework" is part of the old legal framework. The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations is well established. It is a stable and workable framework. Adding "one country, two regions" to it is gilding the lily. It could lead to new disputes. The past two months confirm this.
Now consider a positive consequence. As mentioned above, the Wu Hu Meeting said both sides were part of "one China." The basis for this was the two sides' "existing systems and legal provisions." The "existing systems and legal provisions" are the two sides' ' constitutions. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said, "One country, two regions is the underlying legal basis for cross-Strait relations, one that both sides have long supported." Can Beijing support the Republic of China's "one China Constitution?" Can it lean this way? Can it modify its "one China, different interpretations" policy? If it can, we anticipate positive consequences.
The DPP must handle this situation carefully. Four years ago it mindlessly opposed ECFA. Ultimately it merely painted itself into a corner. This is a matter of record. Today the DPP is apparently licking its chops over "one country, two regions." Apparently it thinks this provides an escape clause from the 1992 consensus. It has latched onto "one country, two regions" and refuses to let go. But "one country, two regions" merely revisits the debate over the constitution. Frank Hsieh is itching to pontificate about the "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutional interpretations." But if one repudiates "one country, two regions" how can one maintain the constitutional framework for the "Taiwan Compatriot Permits" and "Mainlander Compatriot Permits?" No wonder Su Tseng-chang ridiculed Frank Hsieh's theory, calling it a "Kuomintang knock-off." Su said they must conduct themselves as a "genuine Democratic Progressive Party." But how can the DPP hide behind the Constitution of the Republic of China? After all, they want to dismember the Constitution of the Republic of China. How can this possibly offer them a way out?
As we see it, "one country, two regions" is merely another way to reaffirm the constitutional basis for "one China, different interpretations." But the more one reaffirms this constitutional basis, the more one ratchets up social and psychological pressure, and the more likely one will have to confront the problem. One country, two regions means reaffirming the Constitution of the Republic of China. It means using it to define the cross-Strait relationship. This of course is much better that allowing Beijing to define it unilaterally. Hence the reaffirmation of the constitution and "one country, two regions." Agreement concerning the constitution may facilitate mutual trust. The DPP should capitalize on the trend, and not proceed down a blind alley.
The DPP hopes to repudiate "one country, two regions." This is nothing less than repudiating the constitution. Beijing calls it "mulish Taiwan independence." The DPP opposes US beef imports. Washington could choose to see this as a vendetta. The DPP should remember its painful experience with ECFA. It condemned it as "selling out Taiwan and pandering to [Mainland] China." But eventually it was compelled to "accept it in toto." The DPP should not seek short term advantage, only to find itself in a blind alley.
The two sides have fallen back on "existing systems and legal provisions," i.e., their constitutions. to define the cross-Strait relationship. But this does not resolve all problems pertaining to "one China." This is why President Ma has yet to utter the words, "both sides are part of one China." Instead, he says that people on both sides are part of the Chinese nation. That is because "one China" still requires "different interpretations." If the two sides wish to proceed, they should reach an "interim agreement" based on a "big roof."
從520演說看兩岸三黨互動
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.21
馬英九總統的連任就職演說，全文約六千字，其中涉及兩岸議題部分，以「國家安全鐵三角」為主框架，超過二千字；這是最受各界矚目的部分，也是演說著墨最重的部分。
馬總統對兩岸議題的論述，大體上仍維持其在二○○八年首任就職演說的架構，可證此一架構之正確與有效；但也有新的引申的部分，卻已形成了新的爭議。
四年來維持一貫的部分是：「英九要在此鄭重指出：中華民國憲法是政府處理兩岸關係的最高指導原則；兩岸政策必須在中華民國憲法架構下，維持臺海『不統、不獨、不武』的現狀，在『九二共識、一中各表』的基礎上，推動兩岸和平發展。」此一架構，如今已成台美中三方的共識或默契，並已經歷二○一二年總統大選的考驗，可謂正確與有效。
至於引申的部分則是：「依據憲法，中華民國領土主權涵蓋臺灣與大陸，目前政府的統治權僅及於臺、澎、金、馬。換言之，二十年來兩岸的憲法定位就是『一個中華民國，兩個地區』。」此段論述，即是所謂的「一國兩區」，已成近兩個月來政治爭議的焦點。另外，各界關注馬總統會不會說出「兩岸同屬一中」，則在演說中馬總統說了「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」，亦是一個爭議。
事情的源頭來自三月間的「吳胡會」。當時，胡錦濤說：「確認（大陸和台灣同屬一個中國）這一事實，符合兩岸現行規定，應該是雙方都可以做到的。」吳伯雄說：「根據雙方現行體制和相關規定，兩岸都堅持一個中國。」吳伯雄並說：「台灣現行的《兩岸人民關係條例》，即是以『一國兩區』為法理基礎的，兩岸並非國與國的關係，而是特殊的關係。」
馬總統在就職演說的相關表述，與吳胡會之間有何關連，尚不得而知。可能的情況是：北京鑒於兩岸情勢的變數莫測，希望提出兩岸論述新的主命題「兩岸同屬一中」；但馬政府對「一中」的定義有所疑忌，因而以「回歸中華民國憲法」作為回應，而「一國兩區」即是中華民國憲法的法理架構。
馬政府的此一應對，至目前看來，應屬合理。因為，依據「為因應國家統一前需要」而頒定的增修憲法第十一條，即稱「自由地區」與「大陸地區」，至《兩岸人民關係條例》，則改稱「台灣地區」及「大陸地區」；若無此一法理基礎，就根本不會有「台胞證」與「陸胞證」，則兩岸一切交流互動即失根據。因而，馬總統說：「二十年來兩岸的憲法定位即是『一個中華民國，兩個地區』，歷經三位總統，從未改變。」此說無錯，此理無誤。
然而，在兩岸三黨的競合架構中，這個新的論述架構（其實是原本即在法理體系中）卻可能引致正負兩向的發展。可能的負向發展是：「九二共識，一中各表」已是一個相當成熟、穩定且有效的架構，如今加上了畫蛇添足的「一國兩區」，即可能引發新的爭議與衝突；近兩個月來的擾攘，便是印證。
可能的正向發展則是：如前所述，吳胡會中，兩岸皆稱「一個中國」，是根據雙方現行之體制與規定；而所謂「現行體制與規定」即是指各自的憲法。國台辦主任王毅且說：「一國兩區是長期以來台灣在法律層面對兩岸關係所持的基本態度。」倘若北京對中華民國的「一中憲法」能持此見解，並朝此一方向調整「一中存異各表」的政策，應當可作正向期待。
民進黨處此情勢，必須謹慎因應。四年前魯莽反對ＥＣＦＡ，最後落至作繭自縛，可為殷鑑。目前所見，民進黨似對「一國兩區」見獵心喜，彷彿認為這是從「九二共識」脫困的出路，對著「一國兩區」狂追猛打。但是，「一國兩區」最後必將回到「憲法之辯（辨）」；如謝長廷等正擬以「憲法共識／憲法各表」為轉型槓桿，倘若否定「一國兩區」，將如何維持由「台胞證」與「陸胞證」所支撐的憲法架構？難怪謝長廷的理論被蘇貞昌暗譏為「山寨版的國民黨」，而謂應當作「正港的民進黨」。試問，民進黨若又想托庇於中華民國憲法，卻又要切割支解中華民國憲法，豈有生路可言？
我們認為，「一國兩區」其實是「一中各表」更加深入憲法法理的一種表達形態。當然，愈深入憲法法理，愈會形成社會的心理壓力，卻也是面對問題的契機。因為，如果「一國兩區」意味著回歸至中華民國憲法來界定兩岸關係的定位，當然比由北京片面去決定要好得多。因而，回歸憲法的「一國兩區」表述，潛藏著兩岸有可能在相互認知的憲法層次去建立互信的機制，民進黨應當因勢利導，不要自絕出路。
民進黨否定「一國兩區」，不啻自我否定憲法架構，已被北京指為「頑固台獨」；而其反美牛的姿態，亦極可能被美國視為「世仇」。民進黨應記取由「ＥＣＦＡ親中賣台」至「概括承受ＥＣＦＡ」的慘痛經歷，不要逞一時之快，又將自己逼進一條無尾巷。
不過，兩岸各依「現行體制及規定」（即憲法）所界定的兩岸關係，並不能解決「一個中國」的疑義；這也應是馬總統未言「兩岸同屬一中」，而只說「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」的理由，因為，「一中」仍在「存異各表」狀態。我們的建議是：兩岸若要平穩走下去，仍應當有一「屋頂中國」的「中程方案」。
Sunday, May 20, 2012
Ma Administration Must Understand Public Discontent
Ma Administration Must Understand Public Discontent
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2012
Summary: President Ma Ying-jeou has been inaugurated to a second term amidst cries of protest. When re-elected, he vowed to leave behind a legacy. This makes his current situation doubly ironic. President Ma surely did not expect his second term to begin this way. His feelings are written all over his face. Can President Ma reverse the decline in his approval rating over the next four years? Can he change how the public feels about his administration?
Full Text below:
President Ma Ying-jeou has been inaugurated to a second term amid street protests. When re-elected, he vowed to leave behind a shining legacy. This makes his current situation doubly ironic. President Ma surely did not expect his second term to begin this way. His feelings are written on his face. Can President Ma reverse the decline in his approval rating over the next four years? Can he change how the public feels about his administration?
It is inherently difficult for a democratically elected president to win the support of the public as whole. This is especially true when partisan political rivalry is intense. History often cannot render a verdict until a president has stepped down and time has passed. Only then can his virtues shine. If Ma Ying-jeou were leaving office today, he could do so with a clear conscience. He could ignore politically motivated protests aimed at seizing power. But today is the beginning of his second term. He still has four times 365 days to get through. Every day important decisions must be made, The president is the leader of the nation. If one day for him feels like a year, imagine what it feel like for ordinary citizens.
President Ma downplayed the celebrations as much as possible. He put his own feelings last. He must ask himself, "How did it come to this?" In his inauguration speech, President Ma broke down the past four years. He spoke of the global financial tsunami and Typhoon Morakot. He spoke of cleaning up corruption, of streamlining the central government, of upgrading three municipalities, of ensuring six decades of peace across the Taiwan Strait, of winning visa-free entry to 127 countries and regions for Republic of China citizens. These achievements are not merely talking points in a presidential speech. They are real. They happened. So why are people still dissatisfied?
The Ma administration must understand public sentiment. To some degree its achievements can withstand public scrutiny. Otherwise, in a closely contested race, Ma Ying-jeou would not have been re-elected. A four month gap separated his re-election and his inauguration. The Ma administration reached a watershed during the cabinet reshuffle. The Sean Chen cabinet received high praise -- until the Legislative Yuan convened. A number of policies required Legislative Yuan review. The review revealed the utter lack of coordination between the presidential office, the party, and and the legislature. If anything, they worked against each other. This led to serious grievances concerning administration policy. Even when President Ma was being sworn in, no solution was in sight.
During his second inaugural address, President Ma set forth "five pillars." These five pillars would enhance Taiwan's international competitiveness. They would enable Taiwan to undergo an economic rebirth over the next four years. But protesters were furious. They were in no mood to listen to the President's rosy scenarios about where Taiwan must go. Public anger was visceral, emotional. The president's itemized accounting of administration achievements did nothing to win people over. It did nothing to address public grievances. It did nothing to improve his approval ratings, which were at their nadir.
The protesters cared nothing about President Ma's promises. The Ma administration however, must. It must achieve its objectives. It must recruit the necessary talent. It must ensure that Taiwan meets international standards. It can no longer delay, not even for a moment. Otherwise it will reinforce doubts about the Ma administration's competence and determination.
In his second inaugural speech, President Ma spoke of maintaining the status quo in cross-Strait relations and policy. Cross-Strait policy is the Ma administration's most important achievement. Stability must be maintained over the next four years. The atmosphere must be improved. President Ma once again called for dialogue between the government and the opposition. He wants to set a precedent. This is something the opposition must treat seriously.
The Republic of China belongs to everyone. The fate of the nation does not rest on the shoulders of the president alone. One week after the president is inaugurated, the DPP will elect a new party chairman. The DPP lost power in 2008. How will it rebuild public confidence in its effort to return to power? Street protests alone are clearly not enough. DPP policy must enable it to dialogue with the ruling KMT. Criticizing the presidential office for putting up barricades against the protesters, merely reveals the DPP's policy vacuum. The barbed wire in front of the presidential office was installed by the DPP when Chen Shui-bian was in office. The barricades were added by Lee Teng-hui when he was in office. This is how democratic Taiwan normally deals with mass movements. It is hardly unique to the Ma administration.
As head of state, President Ma seeks dialogue between the ruling and opposition parties. He must ask himself what can the ruling party offer. What will make it impossible for the opposition DPP to say no. The last thing he needs to consider is "setting a precedent." Lee Teng-hui set a precedent. He helped the opposition DPP raise funds. He even established a political party subsidy system. Chen Shui-bian set a precedent. He dialogued with the opposition parties. But Chen's Machiavellian intrigues did not promote harmony. On the contrary, they deepened divisions. President Ma should take note of Lee and Chen's precedents. He should stop fantasizing about ruling and opposition party dialogue. He should simply do what must be done.
Taiwan is our home. President Ma invoked Mainland author Han Han, who said that even Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan praise Taiwan. Even foreign tourists feel a connection to the people of Taiwan. The Ma administration has no excuse for alienating the public. The Ma Ying-jeou administration and the Sean Chen cabinet must do better.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.21
民眾反彈情緒 馬政府須正確看待
本報訊
在抗議聲中，馬英九總統宣誓第二任就職，對比連任當選時聲言要建立歷史評價的場景，格外反諷。馬總統必然不願見自己第二任總統的第一頁，是用這種方式翻開，沉重寫在他的臉上，更值得馬總統深思的是，未來四年，他還有沒有機會和方法，扭轉頹勢，改寫各界對馬政府的評價。
民選總統、特別在政黨激烈競爭下產生的總統，本來就很難獲得普遍的民意高支持，歷史的正確評價往往是在總統卸任後才會在時間的洗鍊下，逐漸綻放出光彩，如果馬英九即將卸任，他大可問心無愧，不必太介意基於政黨奪權而來的抗議聲浪，但此刻正是他第二任的開始，他還有四個三百六十五天要度過，每天都有重要決策要拍板，做為國家領導人，總統如果度日如年，可以預期一般民眾的生活肯定更難過。
把一切慶祝活動都降到最低的馬總統，得把自己的難堪擺在最後，冷靜且不動氣地分析何以致此？馬總統在就職演說中細數過去四年的成果：走過全球金融海嘯、度過莫拉克風災、導正政治風氣、完成中央政府精簡和三都升格、締造六十年來最和平的台海情勢，贏得國際肯定讓中華民國獲得一百廿七個國家地區免簽證的待遇…，這些成就不是總統演說的文字而已，這是確實發生的事，為什麼民眾還是不滿意？
馬政府必須正確看待民眾的反彈情緒，這些成績某種程度已經得到民意肯定，否則馬英九不會在緊繃的選情中連任。從當選連任到就職這四個月空窗期中，馬政府的聲望在內閣改組時到達一個分水嶺，陳內閣組成過程中好評不斷，直到立法院開議，諸多政策必須經過最高民意機關檢驗，從而曝露府院黨協調各環節不要說做不到環環相扣，相反的，簡直是環環衝突，所有激起民怨的重大政策，在馬總統宣誓就職的同時，相信還是毫無解套方案。
馬總統在第二任就職演說提出「五大支柱」，要全面提昇台灣的國際競爭力，讓台灣在未來四年脫胎換骨，可以想見，當眾多抗議民眾傳達憤怒情緒的時候，沒人在乎總統到底規畫了什麼願景，要把台灣帶到哪裡去，民眾的「怒」是直觀的、情緒性的，總統一篇匯整各機關流水帳的演說，感情上無法得到民眾的共鳴，對抒解民怨沒什麼作用，對提升跌到谷底的民調滿意度更沒有任何效果。
但是，抗議民眾不在乎馬總統到底宣示了什麼，馬政府執政團隊卻不能不把總統的宣示當回事，並全力達成其目標，特別在延攬人才、開放台灣與國際接軌等目標，須臾不能再耽誤，否則只會強化外界對馬政府能力、魄力的質疑。
馬總統連任就職演說中對兩岸關係和政策著墨大抵維持現狀，這是馬政府第一任最重要的成就之一，未來四年穩定向前推進，建構更良好的氣氛即可；相對的，馬總統再次呼籲朝野對話，建立典範，必須嚴肅以對。
中華民國是大家的，國運不只繫於總統一人之身。總統就職後的下一周，民進黨也要選出新任黨主席，自二○○八年即失去政權的民進黨到底要如何重建民眾對其重返執政的信心？光靠街頭抗爭顯然是不夠的，民進黨必須拿出足堪與執政黨對話的政策內涵，空口說白話痛批總統府以拒馬阻絕抗議群眾，徒然反應民進黨的單薄空虛，總統府的拒馬釘可是民進黨執政時期新設的，拒馬則是從李登輝執政時期就開始運用的，這是民主台灣處理群眾運動的制式做法，非馬政府所獨有。
當然，身為執政者，馬總統在公開呼籲朝野對話之餘，必須思考執政黨能拿出什麼好菜讓在野黨很難說「不」，建立典範是最不必考慮的，典範，李登輝早已建立，他還幫在野黨募款並建立政黨補助制度；陳水扁執政也曾朝野對話，然而權謀操作讓對話不但未獲和解之效，反而加深對立。馬總統要以李、扁的經驗為殷鑑，不要妄想只邀在野對話，卻沒有任何付出。
台灣是我們共同的家園，馬總統引用包括大陸作家韓寒在內的觀光客在台灣旅遊經驗述說台灣的美好，當外來觀光客都能與台灣基層民眾的感情接軌，馬政府執政團隊更沒有理由疏離民意和人民感情，馬政府、陳內閣：加油！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2012
Summary: President Ma Ying-jeou has been inaugurated to a second term amidst cries of protest. When re-elected, he vowed to leave behind a legacy. This makes his current situation doubly ironic. President Ma surely did not expect his second term to begin this way. His feelings are written all over his face. Can President Ma reverse the decline in his approval rating over the next four years? Can he change how the public feels about his administration?
Full Text below:
President Ma Ying-jeou has been inaugurated to a second term amid street protests. When re-elected, he vowed to leave behind a shining legacy. This makes his current situation doubly ironic. President Ma surely did not expect his second term to begin this way. His feelings are written on his face. Can President Ma reverse the decline in his approval rating over the next four years? Can he change how the public feels about his administration?
It is inherently difficult for a democratically elected president to win the support of the public as whole. This is especially true when partisan political rivalry is intense. History often cannot render a verdict until a president has stepped down and time has passed. Only then can his virtues shine. If Ma Ying-jeou were leaving office today, he could do so with a clear conscience. He could ignore politically motivated protests aimed at seizing power. But today is the beginning of his second term. He still has four times 365 days to get through. Every day important decisions must be made, The president is the leader of the nation. If one day for him feels like a year, imagine what it feel like for ordinary citizens.
President Ma downplayed the celebrations as much as possible. He put his own feelings last. He must ask himself, "How did it come to this?" In his inauguration speech, President Ma broke down the past four years. He spoke of the global financial tsunami and Typhoon Morakot. He spoke of cleaning up corruption, of streamlining the central government, of upgrading three municipalities, of ensuring six decades of peace across the Taiwan Strait, of winning visa-free entry to 127 countries and regions for Republic of China citizens. These achievements are not merely talking points in a presidential speech. They are real. They happened. So why are people still dissatisfied?
The Ma administration must understand public sentiment. To some degree its achievements can withstand public scrutiny. Otherwise, in a closely contested race, Ma Ying-jeou would not have been re-elected. A four month gap separated his re-election and his inauguration. The Ma administration reached a watershed during the cabinet reshuffle. The Sean Chen cabinet received high praise -- until the Legislative Yuan convened. A number of policies required Legislative Yuan review. The review revealed the utter lack of coordination between the presidential office, the party, and and the legislature. If anything, they worked against each other. This led to serious grievances concerning administration policy. Even when President Ma was being sworn in, no solution was in sight.
During his second inaugural address, President Ma set forth "five pillars." These five pillars would enhance Taiwan's international competitiveness. They would enable Taiwan to undergo an economic rebirth over the next four years. But protesters were furious. They were in no mood to listen to the President's rosy scenarios about where Taiwan must go. Public anger was visceral, emotional. The president's itemized accounting of administration achievements did nothing to win people over. It did nothing to address public grievances. It did nothing to improve his approval ratings, which were at their nadir.
The protesters cared nothing about President Ma's promises. The Ma administration however, must. It must achieve its objectives. It must recruit the necessary talent. It must ensure that Taiwan meets international standards. It can no longer delay, not even for a moment. Otherwise it will reinforce doubts about the Ma administration's competence and determination.
In his second inaugural speech, President Ma spoke of maintaining the status quo in cross-Strait relations and policy. Cross-Strait policy is the Ma administration's most important achievement. Stability must be maintained over the next four years. The atmosphere must be improved. President Ma once again called for dialogue between the government and the opposition. He wants to set a precedent. This is something the opposition must treat seriously.
The Republic of China belongs to everyone. The fate of the nation does not rest on the shoulders of the president alone. One week after the president is inaugurated, the DPP will elect a new party chairman. The DPP lost power in 2008. How will it rebuild public confidence in its effort to return to power? Street protests alone are clearly not enough. DPP policy must enable it to dialogue with the ruling KMT. Criticizing the presidential office for putting up barricades against the protesters, merely reveals the DPP's policy vacuum. The barbed wire in front of the presidential office was installed by the DPP when Chen Shui-bian was in office. The barricades were added by Lee Teng-hui when he was in office. This is how democratic Taiwan normally deals with mass movements. It is hardly unique to the Ma administration.
As head of state, President Ma seeks dialogue between the ruling and opposition parties. He must ask himself what can the ruling party offer. What will make it impossible for the opposition DPP to say no. The last thing he needs to consider is "setting a precedent." Lee Teng-hui set a precedent. He helped the opposition DPP raise funds. He even established a political party subsidy system. Chen Shui-bian set a precedent. He dialogued with the opposition parties. But Chen's Machiavellian intrigues did not promote harmony. On the contrary, they deepened divisions. President Ma should take note of Lee and Chen's precedents. He should stop fantasizing about ruling and opposition party dialogue. He should simply do what must be done.
Taiwan is our home. President Ma invoked Mainland author Han Han, who said that even Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan praise Taiwan. Even foreign tourists feel a connection to the people of Taiwan. The Ma administration has no excuse for alienating the public. The Ma Ying-jeou administration and the Sean Chen cabinet must do better.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.21
民眾反彈情緒 馬政府須正確看待
本報訊
在抗議聲中，馬英九總統宣誓第二任就職，對比連任當選時聲言要建立歷史評價的場景，格外反諷。馬總統必然不願見自己第二任總統的第一頁，是用這種方式翻開，沉重寫在他的臉上，更值得馬總統深思的是，未來四年，他還有沒有機會和方法，扭轉頹勢，改寫各界對馬政府的評價。
民選總統、特別在政黨激烈競爭下產生的總統，本來就很難獲得普遍的民意高支持，歷史的正確評價往往是在總統卸任後才會在時間的洗鍊下，逐漸綻放出光彩，如果馬英九即將卸任，他大可問心無愧，不必太介意基於政黨奪權而來的抗議聲浪，但此刻正是他第二任的開始，他還有四個三百六十五天要度過，每天都有重要決策要拍板，做為國家領導人，總統如果度日如年，可以預期一般民眾的生活肯定更難過。
把一切慶祝活動都降到最低的馬總統，得把自己的難堪擺在最後，冷靜且不動氣地分析何以致此？馬總統在就職演說中細數過去四年的成果：走過全球金融海嘯、度過莫拉克風災、導正政治風氣、完成中央政府精簡和三都升格、締造六十年來最和平的台海情勢，贏得國際肯定讓中華民國獲得一百廿七個國家地區免簽證的待遇…，這些成就不是總統演說的文字而已，這是確實發生的事，為什麼民眾還是不滿意？
馬政府必須正確看待民眾的反彈情緒，這些成績某種程度已經得到民意肯定，否則馬英九不會在緊繃的選情中連任。從當選連任到就職這四個月空窗期中，馬政府的聲望在內閣改組時到達一個分水嶺，陳內閣組成過程中好評不斷，直到立法院開議，諸多政策必須經過最高民意機關檢驗，從而曝露府院黨協調各環節不要說做不到環環相扣，相反的，簡直是環環衝突，所有激起民怨的重大政策，在馬總統宣誓就職的同時，相信還是毫無解套方案。
馬總統在第二任就職演說提出「五大支柱」，要全面提昇台灣的國際競爭力，讓台灣在未來四年脫胎換骨，可以想見，當眾多抗議民眾傳達憤怒情緒的時候，沒人在乎總統到底規畫了什麼願景，要把台灣帶到哪裡去，民眾的「怒」是直觀的、情緒性的，總統一篇匯整各機關流水帳的演說，感情上無法得到民眾的共鳴，對抒解民怨沒什麼作用，對提升跌到谷底的民調滿意度更沒有任何效果。
但是，抗議民眾不在乎馬總統到底宣示了什麼，馬政府執政團隊卻不能不把總統的宣示當回事，並全力達成其目標，特別在延攬人才、開放台灣與國際接軌等目標，須臾不能再耽誤，否則只會強化外界對馬政府能力、魄力的質疑。
馬總統連任就職演說中對兩岸關係和政策著墨大抵維持現狀，這是馬政府第一任最重要的成就之一，未來四年穩定向前推進，建構更良好的氣氛即可；相對的，馬總統再次呼籲朝野對話，建立典範，必須嚴肅以對。
中華民國是大家的，國運不只繫於總統一人之身。總統就職後的下一周，民進黨也要選出新任黨主席，自二○○八年即失去政權的民進黨到底要如何重建民眾對其重返執政的信心？光靠街頭抗爭顯然是不夠的，民進黨必須拿出足堪與執政黨對話的政策內涵，空口說白話痛批總統府以拒馬阻絕抗議群眾，徒然反應民進黨的單薄空虛，總統府的拒馬釘可是民進黨執政時期新設的，拒馬則是從李登輝執政時期就開始運用的，這是民主台灣處理群眾運動的制式做法，非馬政府所獨有。
當然，身為執政者，馬總統在公開呼籲朝野對話之餘，必須思考執政黨能拿出什麼好菜讓在野黨很難說「不」，建立典範是最不必考慮的，典範，李登輝早已建立，他還幫在野黨募款並建立政黨補助制度；陳水扁執政也曾朝野對話，然而權謀操作讓對話不但未獲和解之效，反而加深對立。馬總統要以李、扁的經驗為殷鑑，不要妄想只邀在野對話，卻沒有任何付出。
台灣是我們共同的家園，馬總統引用包括大陸作家韓寒在內的觀光客在台灣旅遊經驗述說台灣的美好，當外來觀光客都能與台灣基層民眾的感情接軌，馬政府執政團隊更沒有理由疏離民意和人民感情，馬政府、陳內閣：加油！
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