Wool Comes From Sheep: No to Pension Reform Grandstanding
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 2, 2013
Summary: The Blue and Green camps' pension reform programs have been released. The two camps differ slightly on the income replacement rate and burden rates. But otherwise the two camps' reforms show no significant differences. If the ruling and opposition parties are willing to discuss the issues in earnest, a better version may be possible.
Full text below:
The Blue and Green camps' pension reform programs have been released. The two camps differ slightly on the income replacement rate and burden rates. But otherwise the two camps' reforms show no significant differences. If the ruling and opposition parties are willing to discuss the issues in earnest, a better version may be possible.
Compare the Blue and Green camp versions. They involve three key differences. One. They differ on the monthly benefits income replacement rate for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers. The Executive Yuan wants the rate reduced to somewhere between 75% and 80%. The DPP wants it reduced to somewhere between 60% and 70%. Two. They differ on premium-sharing. The Blue camp wants the government employee/civil service employee debt burden ratio set at 65:35. The Green camp wants it changed to 60:40. They differ on labor health insurance. The Blue camp wants the government/employer/labor burden set at 10:70:20. Green Camp wants the government burden eliminated, and employers and employees to pay 60:40. Three. They differ on the labor insurance premium rate. The Blue camp wants the current 8% divided over 23 years, increased to 19%. The Green camp wants it increased to 16.25%, divided over 30 years.
The DPP has offered an opposition party alternative on a major policy issue. This has enabled the public to compare and to choose. This is healthy rivalry that merits acknowledgment. But the Green camp released its alternative late at night. In terms of content, it was "plenty of thunder, but little rain." As we can see, Taiwan's pension reform dilemma must be dealt with pragmatically. There is no room for boasting and grandstanding. The two camps' versions are so close. If the Green camp persists in characterizing President Ma's version as "a scam," and as "phony reform," it is merely revealing its limited vocabulary.
Examine both versions closely. The Blue and Green camp versions both leave room for ruling and opposition party haggling. Take the income replacement ratio. Can a compromise be found between the 80% Blue camp version, and the 70% Green camp version? That depends on phase two negotiations. Take the labor insurance premium rate. Will the Blue camp 19% version move toward the Green camp 16.25% version? That will require broader society wide negotiations. Both the Blue and Green camps are seeking to satisfy the demands of 9 million laborers. This includes the basis for monthly pension retirement calculations. Will it be the Blue camp version of 10 to 15 years for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers, and 15 years for labor? Or will it be the Green camp version of 10 years for everyone? These are all negotiable.
The ruling and opposition parties can jockey for political advantage all they want. But the final version must be reasonable. Haggling over details must not undermine the integrity of the pension reform program as a whole. In essence, the pension reform is a money problem. Whose pockets will be picked for the money needed? Any change in the rates or burden will affect the interests of other groups within the system. All of this must be carefully calculated. Only then can we avoid repeating the 18% preferential interest rate experience.
Take the Blue and Green camp's premium sharing ratios. It is obvious why a tiny change can affect the overall result. The Blue camp version places a greater burden on the government, both for public health insurance and labor health insurance. The government is responsible for 65% of the burden for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers. It is responsible for 10% of the burden for labor. The Green camp version places even more of the burden on wage earners. The government is responsible for 40% of the burden for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers, as well as for labor health insurance. But the "employer" for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers. is the government, The Blue and Green camp versions' "employer's share" are in fact paid out of taxes. The "employer" for labor health insurance meanwhile, is private enterprise. Both the Blue camp 70% version and the Green camp 60% version, impose a heavy burden on the employer. If adopted, the Green camp version would result in the labor health insurance premium burden surging from 20% to 40%. This is a heavy burden as well.
According to detailed estimates, by 2036 the Blue camp version will require employers to bear an additional 124.5 billion in labor expenditures. This is nearly double what it is under the current system. If labor costs must remain unchanged, the inevitable result will be downward pressure on compensation levels. The Green camp version would reduce government spending, but double the burden on labor. To subject labor to downward pressure on compensation, would peel another layer of skin from an already skinned goose.
In fact, the entire pension reform program is nothing more than robbing Peter to pay Paul. This includes the "18% preferential interest rate" and "income replacement rate 121%." They are clear examples of "relative deprivation" and violations of social justice. The most critical issue is where the money is coming from. In fact, the "employer" for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers is the government. The government's wool comes out of the hide of the sheep, i.e., the taxpayers. The employer for labor is private enterprise. The bosses' wool comes out of the hide of the sheep, i.e, labor. Whether the money comes from the government, the employer, or the employee, all of them will be feeling the pain.
Both the Blue and Green camp versions, to put it bluntly, are mere band aids that require one to pay more to get less. The real problem is not whether people will swallow this bitter medicine. The real question is whether once this pension reform time bomb has been disarmed, Taiwan can make an economic comeback. Can everyone's concerns about retirement be allayed? Can everyone's hopes for a better life be restored? Only then will the current pension reform program be possible and make sense.
羊毛出在羊身上 年金方案不能耍花槍
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.01
藍綠版的年金改革案皆已出爐。兩者除替代率、負擔比、費率等主張略有差異，雙方提出的改革手段，並無太大分別。朝野如能站在這樣的見解上誠懇討論，那麼年金改革或許有可能尋得較佳版本。
比較藍綠版本，主要差別包括：第一，軍公教月退所得替代率，政院版主張減至七成五到八成，民進黨版則主張降為六至七成。第二，保費分擔方面，藍版主張政府／公務員的負擔比為六成五比三成五，綠版則主張改為六與四比。勞保部分，藍版主張政府／雇主／勞工各負擔一比七比二，綠營則主張取消政府負擔，雇主和勞工各負擔六與四。第三，勞保費率方面，藍版主張由現行的八趴分廿三年調高至十九趴，綠版則主張在卅年內調至十六點二五趴即可。
民進黨能就重大政策提出在野黨的相對方案，供人民參考比較與選擇，這是政黨政治良性競爭的表現，值得肯定。然而，綠營更晚提出對案，其內容卻只留下「無甚高論／不過爾爾」的印象；可見當前台灣年金面臨的困境只能務實面對，沒有太多買空賣空、耍花槍的餘地。在雙方版本雷同度如此高的情況下，綠營若再批評馬總統的提案是「騙局」、「假改革」，顯已辭窮。
仔細觀察，藍綠版本都各自保留了一些供未來朝野協商、角力的空間。以所得替代率為例，未來會不會在藍版的八成及綠版的七成之間找到新的折衷點，要看第二階段的溝通如何。以勞保費率為例，會不會由藍版的十九趴往綠版的十六點二五趴下移，則涉及更大範圍的社會溝通，藍綠都在競向九百萬勞工訴求。包括退休金的月退計算基礎，是要以藍版的軍公教十到十五年、勞保十五年為準，或以綠版標準向十年一致化，都有討論空間。
但無論朝野如何攻防，我們認為最後的版本都必須照顧整體改革方案結構的合理性，不能為了若干枝節討價還價或刪砍，而導致改革架構的傾斜。質言之，年金改革圍繞的不外是一個「錢」的問題：多繳的錢要由誰的口袋裡掏，不夠的錢要讓誰少拿一些？任何一環的費率或比重稍有改變，就會影響整個制度中另一群人的權益，必須精密計算，才不致重蹈十八趴的覆轍。
以藍綠版的「保費分擔比」為例，即可看出為何些微的調整能影響大局。藍營的版本，無論是公保或勞保均賦予政府較大的負擔（軍公教部分政府負擔六成五，勞保部分則是一成），綠營版本則更重視受薪者負擔（軍公教及勞保均為四成）。然而，軍公教的「雇主」是政府，藍綠版的「雇主分擔」其實皆由稅金支付；但在勞保部分，「雇主」是企業，不論是藍版的七成或綠版的六成，「雇主」的負擔都不輕。而若採綠版，勞工保費分擔要從兩成驟增為四成，亦是極沉重的負擔。
根據精算，藍版到了民國一二五年，全國雇主在勞保支出上將增加一二四五億的負擔，較現制幾乎倍增。而若必須維持勞動成本不變，必然的結果就是薪資水準的壓低。若依照綠版，政府減少支出，而勞工的負擔則是倍增；若再承受減薪壓力，無異一隻瘦鵝要剝兩層皮。
事實上，整個年金方案，在處理完如「十八趴」及「所得替代率一二○趴」等明顯「相對剝奪」及違反「社會正義」的案類後，剩下的都只是「朝三暮四」、「捉襟見肘」、「挖東牆／補西牆」的手法而已。最關鍵的問題皆在：錢從哪裡來？其實，軍公教的雇主是政府，政府的羊毛出在納稅人的羊身上；勞工的雇主則是企業，而老闆的羊毛出在勞工的羊身上。不論出錢的是政府、雇主或受雇者，誰都會喊痛。
無論藍綠版本，說穿了，今天年金問題都只有「多繳、少領」一帖解藥，別無良方。真正的問題，其實不在人們吞不吞得下這帖苦藥；而在拆解了這顆年金炸彈後，台灣能不能努力把經濟的榮景找回來，把大家從為退休生活的憂心盤算，拉回到更充實的人生憧憬。那樣，此次年金改革，才有可能，也才有意義。
Thursday, January 31, 2013
A Step in the Right Direction: Hope for Pension Reform
A Step in the Right Direction: Hope for Pension Reform
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 31, 2013
Summary: Yesterday President Ma held a press conference at the presidential palace. He invited Premier Sean Chen, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, Examination Yuan President Kuan Chung, and others. He explained the general outlines of the government's pension reform program. Everyone has high hopes for the pension reform express train. He gave the order to begin implementation.
Full text below:
Yesterday President Ma held a press conference at the presidential palace. He invited Premier Sean Chen, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, Examination Yuan President Kuan Chung, and others. He explained the general outlines of the government's pension reform program. Everyone has high hopes for the pension reform express train. He gave the order to begin implementation.
Many people are concerned about the details of the pension reform program. Who will be affected? How large will the impact be? This reaction is perfectly natural. But we are more concerned about the how. Compared to other policy making fiascoes over the past six months, this reform was carried out in a remarkably deft manner.
First of all, this reform was not the product of a handful of civil servants gathered in a conference room. Before the first phase was announced yesterday, the Executive held 124 seminars. As we understand it, even after yesterday's announcement, the government continued holding seminars eliciting the views of the public.
Some people are criticizing the first phase of the pension reform program. They are saying it includes no details. They are even implying that the lack of details means a lack of commitment to reform. Such criticism is worse than unfair. It is misleading. This phase is only supposed to indicate a general direction. Many details must await the next gathering, when they solicit the views of all parties. Only when a consensus forms, will the program be made into law. This is the correct procedure. The reason is simple. This reform is important. It cannot be a decision arrived at by a handful of officials, then rammed down everyones' throats. Major policy reforms must be submitted to everyone in advance, in order to solicit their opinions.
We hope the seminars held between now and April will invite reform groups or their representatives. We hope there will be close coordination. We hope that once the agencies in charge hear these opinions, they will not dig in their heels, but instead make any needed changes.
Secondly, regarding labor insurance, we applaud the government for not treating the outsourced actuarial report, which provoked public panic, as gospel. This newspaper has mentioned this before on its editorial page. The conclusion of the actuarial report is based on numerous assumptions. The most significant were interest rate assumptions. When interest rates were low, the assumption was that interest rates would always be low. But this was overly pessimistic.
Based on assumptions of low interest rates, the labor insurance actuarial report's target rate was 27.8%. But a preliminary version of the Executive Yuan's pension reform plan sets the ceiling at 19.5%. This is a far more reasonable figure than 27.8%. We applaud the Executive Yuan's professional and unhurried attitude.
We hope that during the coming months coordination continues, and that details of the policy will continue to emerge. We hope the Examination Yuan, which is responsible for the Public Service Pension, has the same understanding, and makes sound decisions. The outsourced actuarial report included hidden liabilities within the 18% preferential interest rate. It made long term discount rate assumptions for the next three to five decades. It used the average yield of 1.8% for 20 year government bonds in 2011. But who can say that the interest rate will be that low for the next three to five decades? For example, U.S. 10-year government bond yields over the past 50 years has been an average of 6.5%. That is much higher than this number.
Currently interest rates are low. Using ultra low discount rates to estimate future government liabilities, will lead to number inflation. The calculated financial risk will be exaggerated. Using these figures to make decisions is premature. This is also true for the Public Service Pension Fund actuarial report, and premium rates in the civil servants and public school teachers actuarial report. The ROI for the next three to five decades is set at 3.5%. This estimate is probably low. We hope the Executive Yuan will consider the views of all parties, and arrive at a sound decision.
We would like to say something on behalf of the government regarding pension reform for civil servants and public school teachers. After the Ma administration took office, it made five changes. These are changes that the opposition DPP boasted it would implement for several decades. But during its rule it implemented almost nothing. This includes the 2010 civil service retirement system, which was changed from the "75 system" to the "85 system." This includes setting a ceiling on the retirement income replacement rate for civil servants. This includes the January 2010 cancellation of tax exemptions for primary and secondary school teachers and military personnel. This includes lowering the ceiling for political appointees preferential savings from 3.3 million to 2.2 million. This includes last year's cancellation of most military and government retirees condolence payments.
This experience, along with labor insurance reform, provide a ray of hope for the social security system. There is only one fly in the ointment. The government has not indicated how it intends to cope with the declining birthrate. It has not offered an incentive program to encourage childbirth. Such a program is urgently needed. The falling birth rate must be slowed. Doing so would help solve social security's structural problem. We hope the government will tackle this problem as soon as possible, in its next wave of plans.
踏出正確第一步 年金改革露曙光
2013-01-31
中國時報
馬總統昨天在總統府親自召開記者會，邀集行政院長陳?、立法院長王金平及考試院長關中等，說明我國年金制度改革的基本理念和大方向，為各界期許甚高的年金改革列車，下達了啟動的號令。
在這個時候，很多人關心改革的細節是什麼？哪些人會受到影響？影響的幅度有多大？有這樣的反應是很自然的，不過我們更重視的是進行的方式和程序。基本上，相較於過去半年多項政策的制訂過程而言，本次改革的進行方式可圈可點。
首先，這次的改革並不只是少數公務員在辦公室裡討論，就產生了最終方案。在昨天宣布第一階段方案之前，行政院已經舉辦了一百二十四場座談會；而據了解，在昨天階段性的宣布之後，還會繼續辦座談會，聽取各界的意見。
有些人批評第一階段改革方案只有方向，沒有確定的細節，甚至因此推論看不出改革的決心；這樣的批評不但很不公平，事實上更是誤導。現階段本來就應該只定大方向，很多細節要等到接下來蒐集各方意見、凝聚共識之後形成，然後再去立法，這才是正確的程序。原因很簡單，這個改革事關重大，絕對不容許只是少數官員做成決議，就強迫大家接受；重大政策改革本來就應該多方聽取各界意見。
我們希望從現在到四月之間所舉行的座談會，一定要邀請被改革者的團體或代表參加，做好充分的溝通。相關單位在聽取意見之後，也請不要堅持己見，要作出必要的修正，當改則改。
其次我們要肯定的是在勞保方面，政府沒有把先前引發恐慌的委外精算報告當作聖旨。先前本報社論已經提及，精算報告的結論是基於很多前提假設，其中攸關重大的就是利率的假設；在現在低利率時代，假設未來永遠都會維持低利率實在是過度悲觀。
基於低利率的假設，那一份勞保精算報告中所建議的費率目標是二七．八％，但是我們現在看到行政院初步版本，費率上限會訂在十九．五％，這就是一個遠比二七．八％合理的數字；我們對於這種重專業、不躁進的態度表示肯定。
我們希望在未來幾個月的溝通和細節政策形成過程中，主管公務人員退撫的考試院應當要有同樣的認知和態度，做出合理的決定。該機關委外的十八趴潛藏負債精算報告中，對未來三、五十年長期折現率的假設，是採用民國一百年度二十年期以上政府公債的平均殖利率一．八％。問題是，誰敢說未來三、五十年利率都會這麼低？例如美國十年期公債殖利率過去五十年平均數為六．五％，即遠高於此數。
在目前低利率環境下，以此種超低折現率來估算未來政府負債，必然被過度膨脹，所計算的財務風險，必然被過度誇大，如果根據這些數字來做決策，也必然過度躁進。同理，公務人員退休撫卹基金精算報告，以及公教人員保險費率精算報告書，將未來三、五十的投資報酬率訂為三．五％，恐怕也是偏低的估計。我們希望該院能妥善衡量各方意見，做出合理決定。
對於公教人員的改革，我們還要為政府講一句公道話。事實上馬政府上台以後，已經做了五項變革，這些是過去幾十年來反對黨口口聲聲說要做，但在其執政期間，幾乎是掛零的改革，包含：九十九年把公務員退休制度「七五制」改為「八五制」；為公務人員退休所得替代率設定上限；民國一百年元月取消中小學教師及軍人免稅優惠；領月退政務人員優惠存款金額上限由三百三十萬降到二百萬；去年年底取消大多數軍公教退休人士的年終慰問金等。
經過這樣的歷程，加上勞保這次也同步進行改革，我們相信可以為這些社會保險制度未來的前景，建構出一線曙光。這次改革方案中，唯一美中不足的就是政府沒有同時提出如何因應少子化、提高國人生育率的正面激勵方案。我們現在亟需這樣的方案，來降低少子化的速度，這對解決社會保險根本性的結構問題一定會有幫助，希望政府在接下來的進一步規畫中，能盡快推出。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 31, 2013
Summary: Yesterday President Ma held a press conference at the presidential palace. He invited Premier Sean Chen, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, Examination Yuan President Kuan Chung, and others. He explained the general outlines of the government's pension reform program. Everyone has high hopes for the pension reform express train. He gave the order to begin implementation.
Full text below:
Yesterday President Ma held a press conference at the presidential palace. He invited Premier Sean Chen, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, Examination Yuan President Kuan Chung, and others. He explained the general outlines of the government's pension reform program. Everyone has high hopes for the pension reform express train. He gave the order to begin implementation.
Many people are concerned about the details of the pension reform program. Who will be affected? How large will the impact be? This reaction is perfectly natural. But we are more concerned about the how. Compared to other policy making fiascoes over the past six months, this reform was carried out in a remarkably deft manner.
First of all, this reform was not the product of a handful of civil servants gathered in a conference room. Before the first phase was announced yesterday, the Executive held 124 seminars. As we understand it, even after yesterday's announcement, the government continued holding seminars eliciting the views of the public.
Some people are criticizing the first phase of the pension reform program. They are saying it includes no details. They are even implying that the lack of details means a lack of commitment to reform. Such criticism is worse than unfair. It is misleading. This phase is only supposed to indicate a general direction. Many details must await the next gathering, when they solicit the views of all parties. Only when a consensus forms, will the program be made into law. This is the correct procedure. The reason is simple. This reform is important. It cannot be a decision arrived at by a handful of officials, then rammed down everyones' throats. Major policy reforms must be submitted to everyone in advance, in order to solicit their opinions.
We hope the seminars held between now and April will invite reform groups or their representatives. We hope there will be close coordination. We hope that once the agencies in charge hear these opinions, they will not dig in their heels, but instead make any needed changes.
Secondly, regarding labor insurance, we applaud the government for not treating the outsourced actuarial report, which provoked public panic, as gospel. This newspaper has mentioned this before on its editorial page. The conclusion of the actuarial report is based on numerous assumptions. The most significant were interest rate assumptions. When interest rates were low, the assumption was that interest rates would always be low. But this was overly pessimistic.
Based on assumptions of low interest rates, the labor insurance actuarial report's target rate was 27.8%. But a preliminary version of the Executive Yuan's pension reform plan sets the ceiling at 19.5%. This is a far more reasonable figure than 27.8%. We applaud the Executive Yuan's professional and unhurried attitude.
We hope that during the coming months coordination continues, and that details of the policy will continue to emerge. We hope the Examination Yuan, which is responsible for the Public Service Pension, has the same understanding, and makes sound decisions. The outsourced actuarial report included hidden liabilities within the 18% preferential interest rate. It made long term discount rate assumptions for the next three to five decades. It used the average yield of 1.8% for 20 year government bonds in 2011. But who can say that the interest rate will be that low for the next three to five decades? For example, U.S. 10-year government bond yields over the past 50 years has been an average of 6.5%. That is much higher than this number.
Currently interest rates are low. Using ultra low discount rates to estimate future government liabilities, will lead to number inflation. The calculated financial risk will be exaggerated. Using these figures to make decisions is premature. This is also true for the Public Service Pension Fund actuarial report, and premium rates in the civil servants and public school teachers actuarial report. The ROI for the next three to five decades is set at 3.5%. This estimate is probably low. We hope the Executive Yuan will consider the views of all parties, and arrive at a sound decision.
We would like to say something on behalf of the government regarding pension reform for civil servants and public school teachers. After the Ma administration took office, it made five changes. These are changes that the opposition DPP boasted it would implement for several decades. But during its rule it implemented almost nothing. This includes the 2010 civil service retirement system, which was changed from the "75 system" to the "85 system." This includes setting a ceiling on the retirement income replacement rate for civil servants. This includes the January 2010 cancellation of tax exemptions for primary and secondary school teachers and military personnel. This includes lowering the ceiling for political appointees preferential savings from 3.3 million to 2.2 million. This includes last year's cancellation of most military and government retirees condolence payments.
This experience, along with labor insurance reform, provide a ray of hope for the social security system. There is only one fly in the ointment. The government has not indicated how it intends to cope with the declining birthrate. It has not offered an incentive program to encourage childbirth. Such a program is urgently needed. The falling birth rate must be slowed. Doing so would help solve social security's structural problem. We hope the government will tackle this problem as soon as possible, in its next wave of plans.
踏出正確第一步 年金改革露曙光
2013-01-31
中國時報
馬總統昨天在總統府親自召開記者會，邀集行政院長陳?、立法院長王金平及考試院長關中等，說明我國年金制度改革的基本理念和大方向，為各界期許甚高的年金改革列車，下達了啟動的號令。
在這個時候，很多人關心改革的細節是什麼？哪些人會受到影響？影響的幅度有多大？有這樣的反應是很自然的，不過我們更重視的是進行的方式和程序。基本上，相較於過去半年多項政策的制訂過程而言，本次改革的進行方式可圈可點。
首先，這次的改革並不只是少數公務員在辦公室裡討論，就產生了最終方案。在昨天宣布第一階段方案之前，行政院已經舉辦了一百二十四場座談會；而據了解，在昨天階段性的宣布之後，還會繼續辦座談會，聽取各界的意見。
有些人批評第一階段改革方案只有方向，沒有確定的細節，甚至因此推論看不出改革的決心；這樣的批評不但很不公平，事實上更是誤導。現階段本來就應該只定大方向，很多細節要等到接下來蒐集各方意見、凝聚共識之後形成，然後再去立法，這才是正確的程序。原因很簡單，這個改革事關重大，絕對不容許只是少數官員做成決議，就強迫大家接受；重大政策改革本來就應該多方聽取各界意見。
我們希望從現在到四月之間所舉行的座談會，一定要邀請被改革者的團體或代表參加，做好充分的溝通。相關單位在聽取意見之後，也請不要堅持己見，要作出必要的修正，當改則改。
其次我們要肯定的是在勞保方面，政府沒有把先前引發恐慌的委外精算報告當作聖旨。先前本報社論已經提及，精算報告的結論是基於很多前提假設，其中攸關重大的就是利率的假設；在現在低利率時代，假設未來永遠都會維持低利率實在是過度悲觀。
基於低利率的假設，那一份勞保精算報告中所建議的費率目標是二七．八％，但是我們現在看到行政院初步版本，費率上限會訂在十九．五％，這就是一個遠比二七．八％合理的數字；我們對於這種重專業、不躁進的態度表示肯定。
我們希望在未來幾個月的溝通和細節政策形成過程中，主管公務人員退撫的考試院應當要有同樣的認知和態度，做出合理的決定。該機關委外的十八趴潛藏負債精算報告中，對未來三、五十年長期折現率的假設，是採用民國一百年度二十年期以上政府公債的平均殖利率一．八％。問題是，誰敢說未來三、五十年利率都會這麼低？例如美國十年期公債殖利率過去五十年平均數為六．五％，即遠高於此數。
在目前低利率環境下，以此種超低折現率來估算未來政府負債，必然被過度膨脹，所計算的財務風險，必然被過度誇大，如果根據這些數字來做決策，也必然過度躁進。同理，公務人員退休撫卹基金精算報告，以及公教人員保險費率精算報告書，將未來三、五十的投資報酬率訂為三．五％，恐怕也是偏低的估計。我們希望該院能妥善衡量各方意見，做出合理決定。
對於公教人員的改革，我們還要為政府講一句公道話。事實上馬政府上台以後，已經做了五項變革，這些是過去幾十年來反對黨口口聲聲說要做，但在其執政期間，幾乎是掛零的改革，包含：九十九年把公務員退休制度「七五制」改為「八五制」；為公務人員退休所得替代率設定上限；民國一百年元月取消中小學教師及軍人免稅優惠；領月退政務人員優惠存款金額上限由三百三十萬降到二百萬；去年年底取消大多數軍公教退休人士的年終慰問金等。
經過這樣的歷程，加上勞保這次也同步進行改革，我們相信可以為這些社會保險制度未來的前景，建構出一線曙光。這次改革方案中，唯一美中不足的就是政府沒有同時提出如何因應少子化、提高國人生育率的正面激勵方案。我們現在亟需這樣的方案，來降低少子化的速度，這對解決社會保險根本性的結構問題一定會有幫助，希望政府在接下來的進一步規畫中，能盡快推出。
Wednesday, January 30, 2013
A Pension Plan for the Nation, not Blue vs. Green Confrontation
A Pension Plan for the Nation, not Blue vs. Green Confrontation
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 30, 2013
Summary: The broad outlines of the Executive Yuan's pension reform program have become clear. From what we see so far, the 18% preferential interest rate for retired civil servants is history. Past absurdities such as retirement benefits exceeding salaries are a thing of the past, never to be seen again. These two points alone show that pension reform is headed in the right direction.
Full text below:
The broad outlines of the Executive Yuan's pension reform program have become clear. From what we see so far, the 18% preferential interest rate for retired civil servants is history. Past absurdities such as retirement benefits exceeding salaries are a thing of the past, never to be seen again. These two points alone show that pension reform is headed in the right direction. But one form of preferential treatment remains, the income replacement rate and monthly retirement benefit calculations. This will determine whether pension reform will win public support and persuade veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. There is no room for opportunism or carelessness.
Yesterday, before reporting to President Ma, the Executive Yuan and the KMT legislative caucus coordinated with each other. The process was smoother than expected. No significant disagreements arose. The main reason for this was that the Executive Yuan made adequate preparations. They considered the ramifications of pension reform at all levels. They left little for legislators to criticize. The channels of communication this time were also relatively open. They held over 100 grassroots level forums. They consulted people far and wide. They enabled the Examination Yuan and Legislative Yuan to coordinate with each other. They allowed dissenters opportunities to amend the bill. Even more importantly, the nation's circumstances are different. The public is more supportive of pension reform. People have examined the issue more closely and concluded that the arguments in favor of reform are valid.
In all fairness, sweeping the 18% interest rate into the dustbin of history was no easy task. The Executive Yuan sought relief. It distanced itself from the 1995 dividing line approach. It looked after impoverished early retirees. It used the income replacement rate to reduce preferential deposits for affluent veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. It deftly performed an end run around the 18% preferential interest dilemma. For some time, the 18% preferential interest rate has amounted to a form of Original Sin that veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers have been forced to assume. With this reform, at least those veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers who have no chance of receiving these government benefits will no longer need to bear this cross.
Contrast this with the DPP's pension reform alternative. The ruling and opposition party versions have roughly the same income replacement rate for monthly benefits. But the Green camp version, also advocates incorporating the 18% preferential interest rate into the income replacement rate, gradually phasing it out. On this point, both sides seem to be thinking alike. Should the income replacement rate be high or low? Should it be 70%, 75%, or 80%? This may require some debate.
On what basis should government pensions for veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers be calculated? In the past it was calculated on the basis of one's salary during the year of retirement. The Ministry of Civil Service advocates using the labor insurance model. It would base pensions on one's average salary over one's last 15 years of service. This seems reasonable. This standard is more stringent than the last 10 years version proposed by the DPP. Seen in this light, the ruling KMT's attitude toward pension reform is no more conservative than the opposition DPP's. The Executive Yuan later changed its wording, to a vaguer "ten to twenty years." This was probably a response to ruling vs opposition party confrontation within the legislature. They wanted to allow for haggling.
Overall, this version of the Executive Yuan's pension reform proposal is solid. But many blank spaces still need to be filled. These will require delicate handling. If the Ma administration wants to convince all parties, he must adopt a more aggressive approach. He can emulate the approach used to care for impoverished veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. He can establish a floor as well as a ceiling. This would eliminate the phenomenon of 100,000 to 200,000 NT monthly benefits for wealthy retired officlals.
The government is distributing monthly benefits. Its aim is to provide retirees with benefits that are appropriate. It is not to enable them to strike it rich from retirement benefits. That would be contrary to justice and reason. That would be wrong even if the nation had the money, which it does not. Also, more highly paid civil servants received large salaries while in office. They usually have considerable savings. After retirement they often have other sources of income or part-time employment. Yet again the government provided them with exorbitant monthly benefits. This was merely icing on the cake. This merely increased the injustice. Take the Executive Yuan's thinking about labor insurance pension reform. For pensions over 30,000 NT, it would reduce its annual capital payment rate from 1.55% to 1.3%. This "law of diminishing marginal utility" could be applied to highly paid officials. This would be more consistent with the spirit of reform. This would also mollify ordinary veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers.
The current pension reform underwent negotiations within the Executive Yuan. The ruling and opposition parties' versions are comparable. Differences remain, but the basic direction is the same. Therefore one can be optimistic. What's important is that everyone, including the ruling and opposition parties and the public, understand that pension reform is inevitable, and the only just and reasonable course. Only reform can win public approval. Only reform can satisfy reformers. Therefore, the Ma administration must proceed cautiously. It must not repeat the capital gains tax fiasco, which was fair yet won little public approval. Labor insurance issues must not be broached now. Mentioning them in the same breath is sure to provoke controversy. If nine million laborers and one million veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers lash out simultaneously, the Ma administration would be unable to survive the political storm.
We would like to remind the DPP. Successful pension reform is good for everyone on Taiwan. The Green camp must not use the issue to make political hay and engage in irrational obstructionism. If the DPP can offer a sound alternative, the public will be only too happy to support it.
這是國家大計，不是藍綠對決
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.30
行政院版的年金改革方案輪廓成形。從既有的內容看，十八趴確定將走入歷史，以往「退休比在職領得多」的荒謬現象將不復見。僅這兩點，即說明年金改革走在正確的方向上。然而，最後的優利基準、所得替代率、及月退本俸計算基礎的選擇，仍是決定年金改革能否贏得民眾掌聲及軍公教信服的關鍵，絲毫沒有投機或馬虎的空間。
在向馬總統報告前，行政院日昨和執政黨立院黨團進行溝通，過程較預期順利，雙方沒有重大的歧見。主要原因是，行政院事前準備充分，對改革涉及的各個層面作了周全思慮，沒有太多偏失或疏漏讓立委挑剔。此外，這次的整個溝通運作也比較成熟，除在基層辦了百場座談廣徵民意，和考試、立法兩院的協調也都預留足夠空間，使不同意見有修正的機會。更重要的是，鑑於國家大環境變化的前提，社會各界對於這次的年金改革普遍有更大的共識，以嚴格眼光檢驗著論證的合理性。
平心而論，光是如何將十八趴送入歷史，就是一項極其棘手的艱鉅工程。行政院的解套方式，是採取以民國八十四年為界的切割辦法，既照顧了早年退休的清寒人員，又以所得替代率連動的設計讓較豐裕的軍公教必須降領優惠存款；如此，不失聰明地迂迴化解了十八趴的難題。長期以來，十八趴幾已成為軍公教難以承受的「原罪」，經過這次改革，至少可讓那些根本無緣領受此一「德政」的軍公教人員不必再背負罵名。
比對民進黨目前已浮現的改革對案，雖然朝野版本對於月退所得替代率的高低還有約莫一成的差距，但綠營的版本，也是主張將十八趴納入所得替代率計算，使之漸次消失於無形。這點，雙方似乎是英雄所見略同。而所得替代率應該從高或從低，是七成、七成五或八成為宜，恐怕還需經一番辯論。
至於軍公教退休年金的計算基礎，過去一直是以退休當年的本俸從高計算；銓敘部主張比照勞保模式，以「最後十五年」的平均計算，似乎是合理的方式。這個標準，甚至比民進黨版所提的「最後十年」，是更嚴的標準。由此看來，執政黨的改革思維並不比在野黨保守。雖然最後行政部門又改口以比較模糊的「十年或廿年」的訴求代替，這恐怕只是為因應朝野國會修法角力而預留的討價還價空間。
整體而言，這次行政院的年金改革版本堪稱架構穩健，但其中還有不少留白等待填補，這些都需要再作細膩處理。如果馬政府有更大的企圖想要讓各方心服口服，我們建議還可採取一個更積極的作法：可仿照照顧弱勢軍公教設置門檻下限的作法，相對提出一個天花板上限，以消弭領取一、二十萬月退的「退休富官」現象。
政府發放月退，目的是在維持退休人員一個有尊嚴的退休生活，而不是讓他們甚至以退休金儲蓄致富，那就完全違反了公平合理。國家有錢不宜如此，何況國家沒錢。再說，高等公務員在任內領有高薪，通常應有一定積蓄，退休後又往往另有酬庸或兼職，政府再發放超高月退，只是錦上添花、徒增不公而已。再參考行政院在勞保年金乙案的改革思維，對於年金超過三萬以上的被保險人，將削減其年資給付率，由百分之一點五五降至一點三。這樣的「遞減法則」，如果也能適用在高薪官員，不僅更符合改革精神，也更能讓一般軍公教較感心服。
這次公教年金改革，從跨院際的協商氣氛，到朝野版本的比較，儘管若干差異仍然存在，但基本方向相去不遠，值得大家樂觀以待。重要的是，不論朝野或人民都明白年金改革是台灣無可迴避的改造工程，也唯有站穩公平、合理的立場，改革才能得到人們的掌聲，並獲得被改革者的信服。因此，馬政府必須步步為營，審慎因應，絕不能重蹈證所稅「有公平、無掌聲」的覆轍。尤其勞保問題要不要放在此際一併處理，勢必被相提並論進而引發爭議；如果九百萬勞工和一百萬軍公教同時反彈，馬政府消受得了嗎？
我們也要提醒民進黨：年金改革成功，是台灣人民同蒙其利，綠營千萬不可將之視作政治鬥爭而濫行杯葛。如果能提出好的對案，相信民眾都樂於支持。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 30, 2013
Summary: The broad outlines of the Executive Yuan's pension reform program have become clear. From what we see so far, the 18% preferential interest rate for retired civil servants is history. Past absurdities such as retirement benefits exceeding salaries are a thing of the past, never to be seen again. These two points alone show that pension reform is headed in the right direction.
Full text below:
The broad outlines of the Executive Yuan's pension reform program have become clear. From what we see so far, the 18% preferential interest rate for retired civil servants is history. Past absurdities such as retirement benefits exceeding salaries are a thing of the past, never to be seen again. These two points alone show that pension reform is headed in the right direction. But one form of preferential treatment remains, the income replacement rate and monthly retirement benefit calculations. This will determine whether pension reform will win public support and persuade veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. There is no room for opportunism or carelessness.
Yesterday, before reporting to President Ma, the Executive Yuan and the KMT legislative caucus coordinated with each other. The process was smoother than expected. No significant disagreements arose. The main reason for this was that the Executive Yuan made adequate preparations. They considered the ramifications of pension reform at all levels. They left little for legislators to criticize. The channels of communication this time were also relatively open. They held over 100 grassroots level forums. They consulted people far and wide. They enabled the Examination Yuan and Legislative Yuan to coordinate with each other. They allowed dissenters opportunities to amend the bill. Even more importantly, the nation's circumstances are different. The public is more supportive of pension reform. People have examined the issue more closely and concluded that the arguments in favor of reform are valid.
In all fairness, sweeping the 18% interest rate into the dustbin of history was no easy task. The Executive Yuan sought relief. It distanced itself from the 1995 dividing line approach. It looked after impoverished early retirees. It used the income replacement rate to reduce preferential deposits for affluent veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. It deftly performed an end run around the 18% preferential interest dilemma. For some time, the 18% preferential interest rate has amounted to a form of Original Sin that veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers have been forced to assume. With this reform, at least those veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers who have no chance of receiving these government benefits will no longer need to bear this cross.
Contrast this with the DPP's pension reform alternative. The ruling and opposition party versions have roughly the same income replacement rate for monthly benefits. But the Green camp version, also advocates incorporating the 18% preferential interest rate into the income replacement rate, gradually phasing it out. On this point, both sides seem to be thinking alike. Should the income replacement rate be high or low? Should it be 70%, 75%, or 80%? This may require some debate.
On what basis should government pensions for veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers be calculated? In the past it was calculated on the basis of one's salary during the year of retirement. The Ministry of Civil Service advocates using the labor insurance model. It would base pensions on one's average salary over one's last 15 years of service. This seems reasonable. This standard is more stringent than the last 10 years version proposed by the DPP. Seen in this light, the ruling KMT's attitude toward pension reform is no more conservative than the opposition DPP's. The Executive Yuan later changed its wording, to a vaguer "ten to twenty years." This was probably a response to ruling vs opposition party confrontation within the legislature. They wanted to allow for haggling.
Overall, this version of the Executive Yuan's pension reform proposal is solid. But many blank spaces still need to be filled. These will require delicate handling. If the Ma administration wants to convince all parties, he must adopt a more aggressive approach. He can emulate the approach used to care for impoverished veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. He can establish a floor as well as a ceiling. This would eliminate the phenomenon of 100,000 to 200,000 NT monthly benefits for wealthy retired officlals.
The government is distributing monthly benefits. Its aim is to provide retirees with benefits that are appropriate. It is not to enable them to strike it rich from retirement benefits. That would be contrary to justice and reason. That would be wrong even if the nation had the money, which it does not. Also, more highly paid civil servants received large salaries while in office. They usually have considerable savings. After retirement they often have other sources of income or part-time employment. Yet again the government provided them with exorbitant monthly benefits. This was merely icing on the cake. This merely increased the injustice. Take the Executive Yuan's thinking about labor insurance pension reform. For pensions over 30,000 NT, it would reduce its annual capital payment rate from 1.55% to 1.3%. This "law of diminishing marginal utility" could be applied to highly paid officials. This would be more consistent with the spirit of reform. This would also mollify ordinary veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers.
The current pension reform underwent negotiations within the Executive Yuan. The ruling and opposition parties' versions are comparable. Differences remain, but the basic direction is the same. Therefore one can be optimistic. What's important is that everyone, including the ruling and opposition parties and the public, understand that pension reform is inevitable, and the only just and reasonable course. Only reform can win public approval. Only reform can satisfy reformers. Therefore, the Ma administration must proceed cautiously. It must not repeat the capital gains tax fiasco, which was fair yet won little public approval. Labor insurance issues must not be broached now. Mentioning them in the same breath is sure to provoke controversy. If nine million laborers and one million veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers lash out simultaneously, the Ma administration would be unable to survive the political storm.
We would like to remind the DPP. Successful pension reform is good for everyone on Taiwan. The Green camp must not use the issue to make political hay and engage in irrational obstructionism. If the DPP can offer a sound alternative, the public will be only too happy to support it.
這是國家大計，不是藍綠對決
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.30
行政院版的年金改革方案輪廓成形。從既有的內容看，十八趴確定將走入歷史，以往「退休比在職領得多」的荒謬現象將不復見。僅這兩點，即說明年金改革走在正確的方向上。然而，最後的優利基準、所得替代率、及月退本俸計算基礎的選擇，仍是決定年金改革能否贏得民眾掌聲及軍公教信服的關鍵，絲毫沒有投機或馬虎的空間。
在向馬總統報告前，行政院日昨和執政黨立院黨團進行溝通，過程較預期順利，雙方沒有重大的歧見。主要原因是，行政院事前準備充分，對改革涉及的各個層面作了周全思慮，沒有太多偏失或疏漏讓立委挑剔。此外，這次的整個溝通運作也比較成熟，除在基層辦了百場座談廣徵民意，和考試、立法兩院的協調也都預留足夠空間，使不同意見有修正的機會。更重要的是，鑑於國家大環境變化的前提，社會各界對於這次的年金改革普遍有更大的共識，以嚴格眼光檢驗著論證的合理性。
平心而論，光是如何將十八趴送入歷史，就是一項極其棘手的艱鉅工程。行政院的解套方式，是採取以民國八十四年為界的切割辦法，既照顧了早年退休的清寒人員，又以所得替代率連動的設計讓較豐裕的軍公教必須降領優惠存款；如此，不失聰明地迂迴化解了十八趴的難題。長期以來，十八趴幾已成為軍公教難以承受的「原罪」，經過這次改革，至少可讓那些根本無緣領受此一「德政」的軍公教人員不必再背負罵名。
比對民進黨目前已浮現的改革對案，雖然朝野版本對於月退所得替代率的高低還有約莫一成的差距，但綠營的版本，也是主張將十八趴納入所得替代率計算，使之漸次消失於無形。這點，雙方似乎是英雄所見略同。而所得替代率應該從高或從低，是七成、七成五或八成為宜，恐怕還需經一番辯論。
至於軍公教退休年金的計算基礎，過去一直是以退休當年的本俸從高計算；銓敘部主張比照勞保模式，以「最後十五年」的平均計算，似乎是合理的方式。這個標準，甚至比民進黨版所提的「最後十年」，是更嚴的標準。由此看來，執政黨的改革思維並不比在野黨保守。雖然最後行政部門又改口以比較模糊的「十年或廿年」的訴求代替，這恐怕只是為因應朝野國會修法角力而預留的討價還價空間。
整體而言，這次行政院的年金改革版本堪稱架構穩健，但其中還有不少留白等待填補，這些都需要再作細膩處理。如果馬政府有更大的企圖想要讓各方心服口服，我們建議還可採取一個更積極的作法：可仿照照顧弱勢軍公教設置門檻下限的作法，相對提出一個天花板上限，以消弭領取一、二十萬月退的「退休富官」現象。
政府發放月退，目的是在維持退休人員一個有尊嚴的退休生活，而不是讓他們甚至以退休金儲蓄致富，那就完全違反了公平合理。國家有錢不宜如此，何況國家沒錢。再說，高等公務員在任內領有高薪，通常應有一定積蓄，退休後又往往另有酬庸或兼職，政府再發放超高月退，只是錦上添花、徒增不公而已。再參考行政院在勞保年金乙案的改革思維，對於年金超過三萬以上的被保險人，將削減其年資給付率，由百分之一點五五降至一點三。這樣的「遞減法則」，如果也能適用在高薪官員，不僅更符合改革精神，也更能讓一般軍公教較感心服。
這次公教年金改革，從跨院際的協商氣氛，到朝野版本的比較，儘管若干差異仍然存在，但基本方向相去不遠，值得大家樂觀以待。重要的是，不論朝野或人民都明白年金改革是台灣無可迴避的改造工程，也唯有站穩公平、合理的立場，改革才能得到人們的掌聲，並獲得被改革者的信服。因此，馬政府必須步步為營，審慎因應，絕不能重蹈證所稅「有公平、無掌聲」的覆轍。尤其勞保問題要不要放在此際一併處理，勢必被相提並論進而引發爭議；如果九百萬勞工和一百萬軍公教同時反彈，馬政府消受得了嗎？
我們也要提醒民進黨：年金改革成功，是台灣人民同蒙其利，綠營千萬不可將之視作政治鬥爭而濫行杯葛。如果能提出好的對案，相信民眾都樂於支持。
Tuesday, January 29, 2013
Pension Reform: Equal Wealth, not Equal Poverty
Pension Reform: Equal Wealth, not Equal Poverty
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 29, 2013
Summary: The government is about to announce its pension reform plan. Debate has centered on salaries and benefits for retired civil servants. It has centered on how they can be made equal with those of most of the work force. It has had an poweful emotional effect on 800,000 civil servants. The backlash is felt everywhere. It has enabled DPP legislators to propose amending the law. The situation is complex. Any reform faces a high degree of difficulty. Reforms might do much harm before they do much good.
Full text below:
The government is about to announce its pension reform plan. Debate has centered on salaries and benefits for retired civil servants. It has centered on how they can be made equal with those of most of the work force. It has had an poweful emotional effect on 800,000 civil servants. The backlash is felt everywhere. It has enabled DPP legislators to propose amending the law. The situation is complex. Any reform faces a high degree of difficulty. Reforms might do much harm before they do much good.
In any discussion of pension reform, a few points must first be made clear. First of all, fiscal constraints are all too real. This phenomenon is not unique to the ROC. Governments the world over are cutting back on expenditures. The fiscal burden is not limited to civil service pensions. It also includes labour. If the problem remains unresolved, the burden will inevitably fall on the shoulders of the next generation. Pension reform affects generational justice. Laborers are not the only ones who have offspring. So do civil servants. This is something our generation must confront.
Secondly, pension reform for labor could lead to bankruptcies. This could include excessively high public sector retirement benefits and welfare. This could lead to conflicts between the government and the public. But public officials and private citizens have always been separate groups. One may try, but one can never make them completely the same. Private enterprise valiues results. Its evaluations are harsh. Performance levels are clearly reflected in income levels. Labor exploits any opportunity to demand high pay. But labor also risk being laid off or dismissed for poor performance. Civil servants are in a different boat altogether. No matter how hard they work, their salaries and benefits are fixed according to the system. Their annual salaries increase according to seniority. They do not receive annual bonuses. No matter how effective their department's performance might be, they will not receive bonuses. These life choices are made the moment one enters the workplace. During the course of one's career, one has many opportunities to change occupations. Whether one changes occupations depends on one's personal choices, personal values, and personal ambitions. As a civil servant, one must be psychologically prepared to do a good job even if one has job security and no chance to strike it rich. Making money should not be a priority for civil servants.
Thirdly, civil servants receive a preferential 18% interest rate on their savings. This has remained controversial for many years, and has undergone several adjustments. Those who entered the civil service after 1992 do not qualify for the special 18% interest rate. Their benefits have been reduced. Yet they remain targets during the current pension reforms. The reason why is simple. When the preferential 18% interest rate was set years ago, bank interest rates were 12% to 13%. Today bank interest rates have fallen sharply, to a mere 2% to 3%. This is clearly inconsistent with market level interest rates. Civil servants who chose early retirement have already benefitted from the 18% interest rate. They have already received ten to twenty years of preferential interest. They have not been mistreated by the government. Others retired late. Some retired after 1978. Taiwan's economy was then making a quantum leap. By then, civil service pay levels were already caught up with those in the private sector. Current salaries in the public sector are about the same as those in the private sector. Therefore there is no need to retain the 18% interest rate. Why make civil servants suffer such long-term humiliation?
To be fair, ROC civil servants are required to pass national exams before being hired. The standards are comparable to those in advanced countries. This is especially true for the Department of Household Registration and the Department of Civil Affairs. These civil servants stand on the front lines. They deal with the public. They are trained to be cordial and patient. Now consider the matter from another perspective. What's the difference between the civil service and private enterprise? In the civil service, the employer is the government. The government is the manager authorized by the public. In short, the boss of the civil service is every tax-paying citizen. In any agency, their job is to serve the people. Those who lack a sense of mission serving the public, cannot be good public servants. Consider government administration from the perspective of corporate governance. When government revenue shrinks, how can one make government sustainable? This is the shared responsibility of every civil servant. So why has pension reform provoked such a backlash?
Outgoing CLA Comprehensive Planning Director Lee Lai-hsi is being removed as manager. His labor pension reform called for employers to increase their contribution from six percent to eight percent. This may improve the labor retirement income replacement rate. So why is it necessary to cut civil service pensions? He also appealed to civil servants. "Raise your pens, use your keyboards, get the message out, show your strength." Lee Lai-hsi's removal suggests that he is being punished for criticizing his superiors. CLA chairman Pan Shi-wei tried to explain this away. Pan said. "Lee Lai-hsi's was a director. He was made an advisor. His salary is the same. How is this punishment?" Lee Lai-hsi's advocacy on behalf of civil servants is worth considering. Isn't the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) supposed to serve labor? Isn't it supposed to negotiate labor disputes. Isn't it supposed to put labor interests first? Government is a unified entity. The pension program controversy has just begun. Those responsible for labor matters must not allow themselves to descend into total chaos.
The CLA is responsible for civil servants from the central to local government level. Civil servants must be clear in their understanding of the situation. They must be resolute in their purpose. Making money is a laudable goal in life, but not for civil servants. Once one enters public service, the most one can expect to enjoy is adequate safeguards and a modicum of security. One may feel a sense of accomplishment, but it will never be the result of personal achievements. They will be the result of serving the people as a whole. They will be the result of giving the people the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor. The vast majority of civil servants, including Lee Lai-hsi, will be happy if most laborers are happy. The purpsoe of pension reform is equal wealth, not equal poverty. The people will respect and appreciate civil servants willing to sacrifice their own vested interests.
年金改革追求的是富而均 非均而貧
2013-01-29
中國時報
年金改革方案即將正式出爐，然而，多數討論集中於退休公務員的待遇福利，如何與廣大的勞工盡可能拉平，讓八十萬公務員處於近乎集體情緒挫折狀態之中，反彈聲四起，讓執政黨立委紛紛醞釀提出不同的修法版本，情勢之複雜，已可預見改革難度之高，將讓改革未蒙其利先受其害。
年金改革的討論中，有幾個觀點必須釐清，第一，國家財政拮据是不爭的事實，而且，這個現象不僅台灣獨有，全球各國政府都在精簡支出，財政的負荷不僅在於公務員的年金，包括勞工亦然，如果不解決，包袱勢必遞延到下一代，年金改革攸關世代正義，不只勞工有下一代，公務員也有下一代，這是我們這一代人必須正視的課題。
第二，年金改革從勞保可能破產延伸到公部門退休待遇福利過高，隱隱有政府、民間相抗之勢，然而，官、民本來就是兩個系統，盡量拉平但不可能完全齊平，民間企業講究業績，考核銳利，績效高低反映在薪給落差極大，勞工有機會因為認真有戰功而暴得高薪，也有風險因為績效不彰而遭資遣或解雇；公務員則不然，再忠勤任事者，其薪給福利還是得照制度走，年度能加薪依年資順加，年度不能加薪則部門再有績效都不能獨加，人生在踏出職場的第一步時就做了抉擇，過程中有許多機會轉職，轉與不轉間自有個人對人生價值與志向的選擇。既為公務員，就要做好一輩子固有保障卻發不了大財的心理準備；賺錢，應該不是公務員的選項。
第三，公務員退休十八％優惠存款，在爭議多年並經幾次調整後，凡民國八十四年以後進入公部門的公務員、以及之後的年資都不計入十八％的適用範圍，相對過去已經縮減許多，還是在這一波年金改革中成為箭靶子，何以致此？理由很簡單，當年訂出十八％優存利率時，銀行利率還有十二到十三％，如今銀行利率大幅下滑到只剩下一.二或一.三％，顯然不符合利率市場所謂的公平。對已退休享受過十八％的公務員而言，早退者已經享受過十幾、廿多年的優惠存款，就政府的照顧而言，不能再說有所虧待，晚退者特別是民國七十多年之後台灣經濟大幅躍升，公務員薪給水準已經跟上民間部門，至於現任公務員的薪給待遇甚至比一般民間企業也不差，又何須強留十八％，讓公務員的尊嚴長期遭此羞辱？
持平而論，台灣公務員都得經過國家考試晉用，水準相對於先進國家一點都不差，尤其戶政、民政等第一線與民眾接觸的基層公務員，都得練就親切隨和耐煩的本事，但換一個角度想，公務員為什麼和一般民間企業不同？公務員的雇主是政府，政府是人民授權的管理單位，質言之，公務員的老闆是每一位納稅公民，不論在任何單位，其工作就是服務人民，沒有服務人民的使命感，就不可能做一個好的公僕。從企業治理看政府管理，當政府稅收拮据之際，如何讓政府永續經營，就是每一位公務員共同的責任，那麼又何須對年金改革反彈至此？
原任勞委會綜合規畫處長的李來希，傳出將調離主管職，他為年金改革發聲主張只要將勞退新制的雇主提撥率由現行六％提高到八％，就可能提高勞工退休的所得替代率，何須調降公務員退休年金？他更呼籲公務員「提起你的筆，用你的鍵盤，把訊息傳遞出去，展現力量…。」李來希的調動被聯想為因嗆高層而遭打壓，勞委會主委潘世偉嚴正澄清，「李來希從處長調參事，薪水、（主管）加給都沒少，這叫打壓嗎？」李來希為公務員發聲，值得深思，然而，勞委會不是該以服務勞工、協調勞資以為勞工爭權益為先嗎？政府一體，年金方案才冒出一點頭，勞工主管部門不能自己先亂了套。
從勞委會擴及政府中央到地方各部門的公務員們都要有正確的認知、堅強的心志，人生可以賺錢牟利為目的，但不是公務員，既入公門，能享受的頂多是足夠的保障，追求現世安妥，而其成就感的來源不單是個人的成功，而是服務最大多數人，讓人民有最多機會享受成功的果實；相信包括李來希在內的絕大多數公務員，都會以看到廣大勞工的笑容為樂。年金改革追求的是富而均，而非均而貧，相信全民也會向所有願意犧牲些微既有利益的公務員致上敬意和謝意。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 29, 2013
Summary: The government is about to announce its pension reform plan. Debate has centered on salaries and benefits for retired civil servants. It has centered on how they can be made equal with those of most of the work force. It has had an poweful emotional effect on 800,000 civil servants. The backlash is felt everywhere. It has enabled DPP legislators to propose amending the law. The situation is complex. Any reform faces a high degree of difficulty. Reforms might do much harm before they do much good.
Full text below:
The government is about to announce its pension reform plan. Debate has centered on salaries and benefits for retired civil servants. It has centered on how they can be made equal with those of most of the work force. It has had an poweful emotional effect on 800,000 civil servants. The backlash is felt everywhere. It has enabled DPP legislators to propose amending the law. The situation is complex. Any reform faces a high degree of difficulty. Reforms might do much harm before they do much good.
In any discussion of pension reform, a few points must first be made clear. First of all, fiscal constraints are all too real. This phenomenon is not unique to the ROC. Governments the world over are cutting back on expenditures. The fiscal burden is not limited to civil service pensions. It also includes labour. If the problem remains unresolved, the burden will inevitably fall on the shoulders of the next generation. Pension reform affects generational justice. Laborers are not the only ones who have offspring. So do civil servants. This is something our generation must confront.
Secondly, pension reform for labor could lead to bankruptcies. This could include excessively high public sector retirement benefits and welfare. This could lead to conflicts between the government and the public. But public officials and private citizens have always been separate groups. One may try, but one can never make them completely the same. Private enterprise valiues results. Its evaluations are harsh. Performance levels are clearly reflected in income levels. Labor exploits any opportunity to demand high pay. But labor also risk being laid off or dismissed for poor performance. Civil servants are in a different boat altogether. No matter how hard they work, their salaries and benefits are fixed according to the system. Their annual salaries increase according to seniority. They do not receive annual bonuses. No matter how effective their department's performance might be, they will not receive bonuses. These life choices are made the moment one enters the workplace. During the course of one's career, one has many opportunities to change occupations. Whether one changes occupations depends on one's personal choices, personal values, and personal ambitions. As a civil servant, one must be psychologically prepared to do a good job even if one has job security and no chance to strike it rich. Making money should not be a priority for civil servants.
Thirdly, civil servants receive a preferential 18% interest rate on their savings. This has remained controversial for many years, and has undergone several adjustments. Those who entered the civil service after 1992 do not qualify for the special 18% interest rate. Their benefits have been reduced. Yet they remain targets during the current pension reforms. The reason why is simple. When the preferential 18% interest rate was set years ago, bank interest rates were 12% to 13%. Today bank interest rates have fallen sharply, to a mere 2% to 3%. This is clearly inconsistent with market level interest rates. Civil servants who chose early retirement have already benefitted from the 18% interest rate. They have already received ten to twenty years of preferential interest. They have not been mistreated by the government. Others retired late. Some retired after 1978. Taiwan's economy was then making a quantum leap. By then, civil service pay levels were already caught up with those in the private sector. Current salaries in the public sector are about the same as those in the private sector. Therefore there is no need to retain the 18% interest rate. Why make civil servants suffer such long-term humiliation?
To be fair, ROC civil servants are required to pass national exams before being hired. The standards are comparable to those in advanced countries. This is especially true for the Department of Household Registration and the Department of Civil Affairs. These civil servants stand on the front lines. They deal with the public. They are trained to be cordial and patient. Now consider the matter from another perspective. What's the difference between the civil service and private enterprise? In the civil service, the employer is the government. The government is the manager authorized by the public. In short, the boss of the civil service is every tax-paying citizen. In any agency, their job is to serve the people. Those who lack a sense of mission serving the public, cannot be good public servants. Consider government administration from the perspective of corporate governance. When government revenue shrinks, how can one make government sustainable? This is the shared responsibility of every civil servant. So why has pension reform provoked such a backlash?
Outgoing CLA Comprehensive Planning Director Lee Lai-hsi is being removed as manager. His labor pension reform called for employers to increase their contribution from six percent to eight percent. This may improve the labor retirement income replacement rate. So why is it necessary to cut civil service pensions? He also appealed to civil servants. "Raise your pens, use your keyboards, get the message out, show your strength." Lee Lai-hsi's removal suggests that he is being punished for criticizing his superiors. CLA chairman Pan Shi-wei tried to explain this away. Pan said. "Lee Lai-hsi's was a director. He was made an advisor. His salary is the same. How is this punishment?" Lee Lai-hsi's advocacy on behalf of civil servants is worth considering. Isn't the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) supposed to serve labor? Isn't it supposed to negotiate labor disputes. Isn't it supposed to put labor interests first? Government is a unified entity. The pension program controversy has just begun. Those responsible for labor matters must not allow themselves to descend into total chaos.
The CLA is responsible for civil servants from the central to local government level. Civil servants must be clear in their understanding of the situation. They must be resolute in their purpose. Making money is a laudable goal in life, but not for civil servants. Once one enters public service, the most one can expect to enjoy is adequate safeguards and a modicum of security. One may feel a sense of accomplishment, but it will never be the result of personal achievements. They will be the result of serving the people as a whole. They will be the result of giving the people the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor. The vast majority of civil servants, including Lee Lai-hsi, will be happy if most laborers are happy. The purpsoe of pension reform is equal wealth, not equal poverty. The people will respect and appreciate civil servants willing to sacrifice their own vested interests.
年金改革追求的是富而均 非均而貧
2013-01-29
中國時報
年金改革方案即將正式出爐，然而，多數討論集中於退休公務員的待遇福利，如何與廣大的勞工盡可能拉平，讓八十萬公務員處於近乎集體情緒挫折狀態之中，反彈聲四起，讓執政黨立委紛紛醞釀提出不同的修法版本，情勢之複雜，已可預見改革難度之高，將讓改革未蒙其利先受其害。
年金改革的討論中，有幾個觀點必須釐清，第一，國家財政拮据是不爭的事實，而且，這個現象不僅台灣獨有，全球各國政府都在精簡支出，財政的負荷不僅在於公務員的年金，包括勞工亦然，如果不解決，包袱勢必遞延到下一代，年金改革攸關世代正義，不只勞工有下一代，公務員也有下一代，這是我們這一代人必須正視的課題。
第二，年金改革從勞保可能破產延伸到公部門退休待遇福利過高，隱隱有政府、民間相抗之勢，然而，官、民本來就是兩個系統，盡量拉平但不可能完全齊平，民間企業講究業績，考核銳利，績效高低反映在薪給落差極大，勞工有機會因為認真有戰功而暴得高薪，也有風險因為績效不彰而遭資遣或解雇；公務員則不然，再忠勤任事者，其薪給福利還是得照制度走，年度能加薪依年資順加，年度不能加薪則部門再有績效都不能獨加，人生在踏出職場的第一步時就做了抉擇，過程中有許多機會轉職，轉與不轉間自有個人對人生價值與志向的選擇。既為公務員，就要做好一輩子固有保障卻發不了大財的心理準備；賺錢，應該不是公務員的選項。
第三，公務員退休十八％優惠存款，在爭議多年並經幾次調整後，凡民國八十四年以後進入公部門的公務員、以及之後的年資都不計入十八％的適用範圍，相對過去已經縮減許多，還是在這一波年金改革中成為箭靶子，何以致此？理由很簡單，當年訂出十八％優存利率時，銀行利率還有十二到十三％，如今銀行利率大幅下滑到只剩下一.二或一.三％，顯然不符合利率市場所謂的公平。對已退休享受過十八％的公務員而言，早退者已經享受過十幾、廿多年的優惠存款，就政府的照顧而言，不能再說有所虧待，晚退者特別是民國七十多年之後台灣經濟大幅躍升，公務員薪給水準已經跟上民間部門，至於現任公務員的薪給待遇甚至比一般民間企業也不差，又何須強留十八％，讓公務員的尊嚴長期遭此羞辱？
持平而論，台灣公務員都得經過國家考試晉用，水準相對於先進國家一點都不差，尤其戶政、民政等第一線與民眾接觸的基層公務員，都得練就親切隨和耐煩的本事，但換一個角度想，公務員為什麼和一般民間企業不同？公務員的雇主是政府，政府是人民授權的管理單位，質言之，公務員的老闆是每一位納稅公民，不論在任何單位，其工作就是服務人民，沒有服務人民的使命感，就不可能做一個好的公僕。從企業治理看政府管理，當政府稅收拮据之際，如何讓政府永續經營，就是每一位公務員共同的責任，那麼又何須對年金改革反彈至此？
原任勞委會綜合規畫處長的李來希，傳出將調離主管職，他為年金改革發聲主張只要將勞退新制的雇主提撥率由現行六％提高到八％，就可能提高勞工退休的所得替代率，何須調降公務員退休年金？他更呼籲公務員「提起你的筆，用你的鍵盤，把訊息傳遞出去，展現力量…。」李來希的調動被聯想為因嗆高層而遭打壓，勞委會主委潘世偉嚴正澄清，「李來希從處長調參事，薪水、（主管）加給都沒少，這叫打壓嗎？」李來希為公務員發聲，值得深思，然而，勞委會不是該以服務勞工、協調勞資以為勞工爭權益為先嗎？政府一體，年金方案才冒出一點頭，勞工主管部門不能自己先亂了套。
從勞委會擴及政府中央到地方各部門的公務員們都要有正確的認知、堅強的心志，人生可以賺錢牟利為目的，但不是公務員，既入公門，能享受的頂多是足夠的保障，追求現世安妥，而其成就感的來源不單是個人的成功，而是服務最大多數人，讓人民有最多機會享受成功的果實；相信包括李來希在內的絕大多數公務員，都會以看到廣大勞工的笑容為樂。年金改革追求的是富而均，而非均而貧，相信全民也會向所有願意犧牲些微既有利益的公務員致上敬意和謝意。
Monday, January 28, 2013
One More Blue Seat: No Thanks to Ma Ying-jeou
One More Blue Seat: No Thanks to Ma Ying-jeou
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 27, 2013
Summary: KMT candidate Yen Kuan-hen won a hard-fought battle in the Legislative By-Election for Taichung. His win has unexpectedly given the Blue camp an additional seat in the Legislative Yuan. It has also halted the Green Camp offensive in Chiayi and Tainan. This battle has enabled Yen Ching-piao to complete a "from father to son" turnover of the family business, and to breathe a sigh of relief. But Ma Ying-jeou and the Blue camp leadership have little cause to celebrate. They must remain vigilant and concerned.
Full text below:
KMT candidate Yen Kuan-hen won a hard-fought battle in the Legislative By-Election for Taichung. His win has unexpectedly given the Blue camp an additional seat in the Legislative Yuan. It has also halted the Green Camp offensive in Chiayi and Tainan. This battle has enabled Yen Ching-piao to complete a "from father to son" turnover of the family business, and to breathe a sigh of relief. But Ma Ying-jeou and the Blue camp leadership have little cause to celebrate. They must remain vigilant and concerned.
Yesterday the ballots were counted. The process was filled with tension. Yan Kuan-hen and his opponent Chen Shi-kai repeatedly traded places. The gap between the two never exceeded a thousand votes. Die-hard supporters held a vigil at their Shalu campaign headquarters. In the end, the came back and won by just over one thousand votes. The ballot counting process was unusually tense. What flashed through Ma Ying-jeou's mind as the process unfolded? One cannot help but wonder.
From any perspective, this was a critical election. This was essentially a local level legislative by-election. But it was elevated to the level of "a message for President Ma." On the stage, Yen and his son played out a familiar drama -- "a son does battle on behalf of his father." In the orchestra pit, the orchestra provided accompaniment, in the form of ruling vs. opposition wrangling. One aspect was particularly odd. The Green camp saw Ma Ying-jeou as its primary target. But the Yen family explicitly asked Ma to keep his distance. Therefore from start to finish, Ma never appeared at a single Yen campaign rally. The Green camp mobilized every one of its party princes., But the Blue camp mobilzed only Wang Jin-pyng, Eric Chu, and Jason Hu. Ma Ying-jeou was relegated to the role of "stealth chairman."
Recall last January's legislative elections. Yen Ching-piao received over 118,000 votes, and trounced his opponent by a margin of nearly 40,000 votes. One year later, Yen Kuan-hen won by a mere 1000 votes, and the campaign was a nail-biter. The difference was dramatic. Yen Ching-piao had no party affiliation. His political support was the result of years of local service and contacts among local religious leaders. Yet in one short month, he came under such a serious threat. The DPP's recuperative powers must never be underestimated. Consider party rivalry. Ignore for the moment such personal factors as the Yen family father and son relationship. Ignore the fact that by-election turnouts tend to be low. Voters used their ballots to express dissatisfaction with the Ma administration. The signs were obvious, and cannot be ignored. Slow economic growth and corruption scandals in the Nantou and Changhua county governments undermined the Blue camp image. The Pension Reform controversy undermined core support from veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. Rightly or wrongly, voters used the election to settle scores.
Ma Ying-jeou's bid for reelection as KMT party chairman drew fire from his own comrades. He became an "absentee president." He is clearly becoming more and more of a lame duck. This must be handled judiciously and decisively, with an iron fist, as soon as possible. He must restore his prestige. Otherwise he will find it impossible to get anything done during the remaining three years of his term. Consider the recent by-election. Was the KMT lending its banner to Yen Kuan-hen? Or was it using the opportunity to cultivate grass roots support? If it wasn't, then the victory means little. It will merely confuse those who cast their ballots for candidates flying the Blue camp banner.
Consider the DPP. Had it won this battle, Taichung would have an equal number of Blue and Green legislative seats. The Blue vs. Green battlefront would have shifted to Taichung. Fortunately for the Blue camp, it was a "Bridge Too Far." Green camp momentum, nevertheless, was impressive. It forced people to stop and stare. The Green camp launched "hate tactics." These tactics successfully diminished Blue camp supporters' desire to vote. Green camp support has increased. By how much? That is hard to tell. Small scale local elections are susceptible to such extremist tactics. But they could provoke a backlash in larger scale elections. The DPP has often experienced such setbacks. This must be be understood. We need not harp on it.
Did the Blue camp help Yen Ching-piao during this by-election? Or did Yen Kuan-hen help the KMT win another seat? Cause and effect are deeply intertwined and difficult to discern. The important point is not that the KMT has another seat in the Legislative Yuan. The important point is that the Blue camp line of defense in Taichung City has not been breached. But the held because of Yen Ching-piao's underlying strength, not because of the KMT's mobilization.
People burdened this by-election with too many irrelevant symbols and metaphors. They include the Yen family "son doing battle on behalf of his father," Chairman Ma's absence during the campaign, and the DPP's high-profile "raging citizens" protest marches. The process may have be exciting. But the results did nothing to advance democracy or partisan politics. The good thing about this election was that Yen Kuan-hen won. But what if he had lost? The loss would have been attributed to President Ma, to his failure to win the hearts and minds of the people. No one would have concluded that the public had grown tired of Yen Ching-piao. Yen Kuan-hen won by a narrow margin. This can only be attributed to Yen Ching-piao, who worked long and hard to cultivate grass roots support. This support trumped any local level strategic impact. The candidate's reputation and background were not the issue. Cause and effect for politics on Taiwan have long been reversed. This is hardly the first time this has happened.
The Blue camp may have one more seat in the legislature. But it is hard to consider this a victory. Chairman Ma remained invisible during the election. How could he possibly have contributed to the victory?
藍增一席 馬英九卻無功可慶
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.27
顏寬恒披藍袍艱苦打贏台中立委補選之役，使藍軍在國會意外多了一席，同時斬斷了綠營將決戰陣線從嘉南推向台中的攻勢。但這次戰役，就算能使顏清標為「子繼父業」放下心中的大石頭，對馬英九和他領導的藍軍而言，恐怕談不上勝利的喜悅，而是警惕與驚心居多。
昨天的開票過程，可謂步步驚險。顏寬恒和對手陳世凱自始即在千百票的差距內拉鋸，且處於落後狀態的時候居多；最後，靠著沙鹿大本營的死忠支持，才得以千餘票的差距翻盤取勝。在觀看如此緊繃的開票過程時，馬英九腦海裡閃過的感想是什麼，不禁令人好奇。
從任何角度看，這都是一場極其微妙的選舉。本質上，這是一場區域立委的補選，卻被拉升到最高等級的「教訓馬總統」的意義；形式上，台上演的是顏氏父子「代父出征」的傳統戲碼，場邊配樂卻是高亢的「朝野對決」唱腔。尤其詭異的是，被綠營當成主打對象的馬英九，卻因顏家刻意要求「保持距離」，從頭到尾沒有現身輔選現場的餘地。當綠營天王全員出動，藍營卻是由王金平、朱立倫、胡志強上陣代打，馬英九只能選擇當「隱形的主席」。
回看去年元月的立委選舉，顏清標在此選區以十一萬八千多票大贏對手將近四萬票；一年後，顏寬恒卻僅一千多票驚險勝出，選情變化不可謂不劇烈。無黨籍的顏清標，靠著長年的地方服務和宗教人脈打下的根基，竟在短短一個月遭到嚴重威脅，民進黨的造勢能力確不可低估。從政黨競爭的跨度看，扣除顏家父子個人因素及補選投票率低的常態因素，選民藉選票發洩對馬政府的不滿則痕跡斑斑，不可輕忽。包括經濟成長緩慢，南投、彰化的縣府弊案影響藍營形象，年金改革爭議動搖軍公教基本盤，是是非非，選民都藉此次選舉算了總帳。
對照馬英九為連任主席之事遭到黨內同志砲火，他在這次補選變成「缺席主席」，顯示他的「跛鴨」處境有擴大之勢。若不妥慎處理，儘速展現決策鐵腕挽回威望，他剩餘的三年多任期只會局面日蹙，難有作為。即以這次補選而論，如果國民黨只是純粹「借牌」供顏寬恒使用，而不是藉機在這個長期淪陷地區耕耘收復；那麼，勝這一場其實意義不大，反而會讓支持者對藍軍的標誌認同產生混亂。
就民進黨而言，若拿下這一戰，即可將台中市藍綠立委席次扳成平手，將藍綠決戰陣線殺進台中；最後雖功敗垂成，但氣勢不凡，令人刮目。退一步看，綠營發動「仇恨戰術」，成功催出綠營鐵票，也削弱了藍營群眾的投票意志；但綠營基本面是否擴大，效果其實尚難斷言。畢竟，在小規模選舉易於奏效的極端手段，遇到大型選舉反而可能產生後座力；民進黨經驗多端，對此應了然於心，毋需我們贅言。
這場補選，究竟是藍軍幫顏清標打了一仗？或者是顏寬恒幫國民黨奪下一席？由於因果交錯糾纏，已難以釐清。重要的，並不是國民黨在立法院多了一席，而是藍軍在台中市海線的防線沒有被攻破；但能守住這關，靠的是顏清標的實力，而不是國民黨的動員。
總括而言，這場補選充滿了太多不協調的符號和隱喻：從顏家的代父出征、借袍上陣，到馬主席的缺席輔選，乃至民進黨的高調火大，雖然過程精采有餘，但從其結果卻無法讀出民主或政黨政治的進步意義。試想，這場選舉所幸是顏寬恒勝出，如果輸了，必定歸咎於馬總統政績不獲人心，而不是民眾厭棄顏清標的作為；而顏寬恒險勝，也只能歸功顏清標地方耕耘績效深厚，及壓低層次的戰略奏效，而不是因為人選眾望所歸。台灣政治的邏輯糾纏與錯因倒果，何止卡在這一役？
藍軍雖在國會多了一席，卻很難歡呼稱勝。在選戰過程中保持隱形的馬主席，又如何有功可慶？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 27, 2013
Summary: KMT candidate Yen Kuan-hen won a hard-fought battle in the Legislative By-Election for Taichung. His win has unexpectedly given the Blue camp an additional seat in the Legislative Yuan. It has also halted the Green Camp offensive in Chiayi and Tainan. This battle has enabled Yen Ching-piao to complete a "from father to son" turnover of the family business, and to breathe a sigh of relief. But Ma Ying-jeou and the Blue camp leadership have little cause to celebrate. They must remain vigilant and concerned.
Full text below:
KMT candidate Yen Kuan-hen won a hard-fought battle in the Legislative By-Election for Taichung. His win has unexpectedly given the Blue camp an additional seat in the Legislative Yuan. It has also halted the Green Camp offensive in Chiayi and Tainan. This battle has enabled Yen Ching-piao to complete a "from father to son" turnover of the family business, and to breathe a sigh of relief. But Ma Ying-jeou and the Blue camp leadership have little cause to celebrate. They must remain vigilant and concerned.
Yesterday the ballots were counted. The process was filled with tension. Yan Kuan-hen and his opponent Chen Shi-kai repeatedly traded places. The gap between the two never exceeded a thousand votes. Die-hard supporters held a vigil at their Shalu campaign headquarters. In the end, the came back and won by just over one thousand votes. The ballot counting process was unusually tense. What flashed through Ma Ying-jeou's mind as the process unfolded? One cannot help but wonder.
From any perspective, this was a critical election. This was essentially a local level legislative by-election. But it was elevated to the level of "a message for President Ma." On the stage, Yen and his son played out a familiar drama -- "a son does battle on behalf of his father." In the orchestra pit, the orchestra provided accompaniment, in the form of ruling vs. opposition wrangling. One aspect was particularly odd. The Green camp saw Ma Ying-jeou as its primary target. But the Yen family explicitly asked Ma to keep his distance. Therefore from start to finish, Ma never appeared at a single Yen campaign rally. The Green camp mobilized every one of its party princes., But the Blue camp mobilzed only Wang Jin-pyng, Eric Chu, and Jason Hu. Ma Ying-jeou was relegated to the role of "stealth chairman."
Recall last January's legislative elections. Yen Ching-piao received over 118,000 votes, and trounced his opponent by a margin of nearly 40,000 votes. One year later, Yen Kuan-hen won by a mere 1000 votes, and the campaign was a nail-biter. The difference was dramatic. Yen Ching-piao had no party affiliation. His political support was the result of years of local service and contacts among local religious leaders. Yet in one short month, he came under such a serious threat. The DPP's recuperative powers must never be underestimated. Consider party rivalry. Ignore for the moment such personal factors as the Yen family father and son relationship. Ignore the fact that by-election turnouts tend to be low. Voters used their ballots to express dissatisfaction with the Ma administration. The signs were obvious, and cannot be ignored. Slow economic growth and corruption scandals in the Nantou and Changhua county governments undermined the Blue camp image. The Pension Reform controversy undermined core support from veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. Rightly or wrongly, voters used the election to settle scores.
Ma Ying-jeou's bid for reelection as KMT party chairman drew fire from his own comrades. He became an "absentee president." He is clearly becoming more and more of a lame duck. This must be handled judiciously and decisively, with an iron fist, as soon as possible. He must restore his prestige. Otherwise he will find it impossible to get anything done during the remaining three years of his term. Consider the recent by-election. Was the KMT lending its banner to Yen Kuan-hen? Or was it using the opportunity to cultivate grass roots support? If it wasn't, then the victory means little. It will merely confuse those who cast their ballots for candidates flying the Blue camp banner.
Consider the DPP. Had it won this battle, Taichung would have an equal number of Blue and Green legislative seats. The Blue vs. Green battlefront would have shifted to Taichung. Fortunately for the Blue camp, it was a "Bridge Too Far." Green camp momentum, nevertheless, was impressive. It forced people to stop and stare. The Green camp launched "hate tactics." These tactics successfully diminished Blue camp supporters' desire to vote. Green camp support has increased. By how much? That is hard to tell. Small scale local elections are susceptible to such extremist tactics. But they could provoke a backlash in larger scale elections. The DPP has often experienced such setbacks. This must be be understood. We need not harp on it.
Did the Blue camp help Yen Ching-piao during this by-election? Or did Yen Kuan-hen help the KMT win another seat? Cause and effect are deeply intertwined and difficult to discern. The important point is not that the KMT has another seat in the Legislative Yuan. The important point is that the Blue camp line of defense in Taichung City has not been breached. But the held because of Yen Ching-piao's underlying strength, not because of the KMT's mobilization.
People burdened this by-election with too many irrelevant symbols and metaphors. They include the Yen family "son doing battle on behalf of his father," Chairman Ma's absence during the campaign, and the DPP's high-profile "raging citizens" protest marches. The process may have be exciting. But the results did nothing to advance democracy or partisan politics. The good thing about this election was that Yen Kuan-hen won. But what if he had lost? The loss would have been attributed to President Ma, to his failure to win the hearts and minds of the people. No one would have concluded that the public had grown tired of Yen Ching-piao. Yen Kuan-hen won by a narrow margin. This can only be attributed to Yen Ching-piao, who worked long and hard to cultivate grass roots support. This support trumped any local level strategic impact. The candidate's reputation and background were not the issue. Cause and effect for politics on Taiwan have long been reversed. This is hardly the first time this has happened.
The Blue camp may have one more seat in the legislature. But it is hard to consider this a victory. Chairman Ma remained invisible during the election. How could he possibly have contributed to the victory?
藍增一席 馬英九卻無功可慶
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.27
顏寬恒披藍袍艱苦打贏台中立委補選之役，使藍軍在國會意外多了一席，同時斬斷了綠營將決戰陣線從嘉南推向台中的攻勢。但這次戰役，就算能使顏清標為「子繼父業」放下心中的大石頭，對馬英九和他領導的藍軍而言，恐怕談不上勝利的喜悅，而是警惕與驚心居多。
昨天的開票過程，可謂步步驚險。顏寬恒和對手陳世凱自始即在千百票的差距內拉鋸，且處於落後狀態的時候居多；最後，靠著沙鹿大本營的死忠支持，才得以千餘票的差距翻盤取勝。在觀看如此緊繃的開票過程時，馬英九腦海裡閃過的感想是什麼，不禁令人好奇。
從任何角度看，這都是一場極其微妙的選舉。本質上，這是一場區域立委的補選，卻被拉升到最高等級的「教訓馬總統」的意義；形式上，台上演的是顏氏父子「代父出征」的傳統戲碼，場邊配樂卻是高亢的「朝野對決」唱腔。尤其詭異的是，被綠營當成主打對象的馬英九，卻因顏家刻意要求「保持距離」，從頭到尾沒有現身輔選現場的餘地。當綠營天王全員出動，藍營卻是由王金平、朱立倫、胡志強上陣代打，馬英九只能選擇當「隱形的主席」。
回看去年元月的立委選舉，顏清標在此選區以十一萬八千多票大贏對手將近四萬票；一年後，顏寬恒卻僅一千多票驚險勝出，選情變化不可謂不劇烈。無黨籍的顏清標，靠著長年的地方服務和宗教人脈打下的根基，竟在短短一個月遭到嚴重威脅，民進黨的造勢能力確不可低估。從政黨競爭的跨度看，扣除顏家父子個人因素及補選投票率低的常態因素，選民藉選票發洩對馬政府的不滿則痕跡斑斑，不可輕忽。包括經濟成長緩慢，南投、彰化的縣府弊案影響藍營形象，年金改革爭議動搖軍公教基本盤，是是非非，選民都藉此次選舉算了總帳。
對照馬英九為連任主席之事遭到黨內同志砲火，他在這次補選變成「缺席主席」，顯示他的「跛鴨」處境有擴大之勢。若不妥慎處理，儘速展現決策鐵腕挽回威望，他剩餘的三年多任期只會局面日蹙，難有作為。即以這次補選而論，如果國民黨只是純粹「借牌」供顏寬恒使用，而不是藉機在這個長期淪陷地區耕耘收復；那麼，勝這一場其實意義不大，反而會讓支持者對藍軍的標誌認同產生混亂。
就民進黨而言，若拿下這一戰，即可將台中市藍綠立委席次扳成平手，將藍綠決戰陣線殺進台中；最後雖功敗垂成，但氣勢不凡，令人刮目。退一步看，綠營發動「仇恨戰術」，成功催出綠營鐵票，也削弱了藍營群眾的投票意志；但綠營基本面是否擴大，效果其實尚難斷言。畢竟，在小規模選舉易於奏效的極端手段，遇到大型選舉反而可能產生後座力；民進黨經驗多端，對此應了然於心，毋需我們贅言。
這場補選，究竟是藍軍幫顏清標打了一仗？或者是顏寬恒幫國民黨奪下一席？由於因果交錯糾纏，已難以釐清。重要的，並不是國民黨在立法院多了一席，而是藍軍在台中市海線的防線沒有被攻破；但能守住這關，靠的是顏清標的實力，而不是國民黨的動員。
總括而言，這場補選充滿了太多不協調的符號和隱喻：從顏家的代父出征、借袍上陣，到馬主席的缺席輔選，乃至民進黨的高調火大，雖然過程精采有餘，但從其結果卻無法讀出民主或政黨政治的進步意義。試想，這場選舉所幸是顏寬恒勝出，如果輸了，必定歸咎於馬總統政績不獲人心，而不是民眾厭棄顏清標的作為；而顏寬恒險勝，也只能歸功顏清標地方耕耘績效深厚，及壓低層次的戰略奏效，而不是因為人選眾望所歸。台灣政治的邏輯糾纏與錯因倒果，何止卡在這一役？
藍軍雖在國會多了一席，卻很難歡呼稱勝。在選戰過程中保持隱形的馬主席，又如何有功可慶？
Thursday, January 24, 2013
Referendum on Nuclear Energy is Inevitable
Referendum on Nuclear Energy is Inevitable
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 25, 2013
Summary: The political turmoil brought about by the nuclear energy controversy is unavoidable. In order to minimize the impact and to find answers, a referendum is essential. The KMT and DPP should come up with a comprehensive long-term energy policy. They should hold a referendum. They should make the referendum an inside the system forum for public debate. Nuclear energy policy must be divorced from partisan political struggle. A public referendum is essential.
Full text below:
The nuclear energy controversy is increasingly urgent. Fuel rods are about to be loaded into the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. The controversy is increasingly intense. The moment of decision is increasingly near.
To avoid divisiveness and chaos, the ruling and opposition parties should consider the possibility of a public referendum. They should establish a forum for debate. The people as a whole should cast their ballots and make their decision. They should ensure that the debate is conducted inside the institutional framework. They should ensure that any decision making takes place inside the institutional framework also. They must not allow the pros and cons to be argued and settled outside the system. Such outside the system decision-making will only tear the nation apart.
Consider both the "nuclear energy" and the "referendum" aspects of a "nuclear energy referendum." First consider the "referendum" aspect. Past experience tells us that the spirit and utility of the referendum process has been destroyed. Referenda are not used for policy making. They are used to mobilize political struggle. During the 2004 presidential election, the "missile purchase referendum" became a political football. During the 2008 presidential elections the "referendum on UN membership" served the same purpose. Referenda invariably become tools for ideological struggle, not means for decision making inside the institutional framework.
Suppose a referendum on nuclear energy is held? It would be the first time any public policy was ever determined by a referendum. As expected, DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang declared that the DPP would demand that an "anti-nuclear referendum" be incorporated into the 2014 "seven in one elections." Interestingly enough, party insiders soundly rejected his proposal. Some even accused him of being "out of his mind." Opponents utterly rejected his Machiavellian calculation. They thought the issue of nuclear energy and the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant must be fought and settled outside the institutional framework. They felt that greater political capital could be accumulated by working outside the system than within. Therefore they opposed any referendum.
The DPP once advocated a "Taiwan independence referendum." Yet the Chen Shui-bian regime amended the referendum law on its own initiative, ruling out any Taiwan independence referendum. They did this to make sure they could continue clamoring for Taiwan independence outside the system. They dared not demand a showdown within the system on Taiwan independence. The fact is the DPP has long demanded a referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant and on a non-nuclear homeland. Chen Shui-bian once tried to package deal a referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant with the presidential election. At the time this newspaper endorsed his proposal. Now that the moment of truth is near, however, most DPP insiders have suddenly gotten cold feet. They no longer demand a referendum. They are determined to block any referendum. Protests held outside the system, they have decided, are more advantageous. Such is their mentality. They are preoccupied with such trickery.
Now take the "nuclear energy" aspect. This has two levels. One. Does one want to oppose nuclear energy generation and eliminate nuclear energy generation? Two. Does one want to shut down the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant? This is a question of nuclear power plant safety. Is one's ultimate goal the elimination of nuclear energy altogether? If so, then that is more controversial than whether the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant should be used as a transitional measure or shut down altogether. Suppose one does not believe that Taiwan can afford to totally eliminate nuclear energy? Then the continuation or termination of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant can be determined on the basis of objective and quantifiable nuclear safety standards. If a referendum is held, opposition to nuclear energy and whether to shut down the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant will be key issues.
Currently, global opposition to nuclear energy generation is on the rise. Germany and other countries are attempting to eliminate nuclear energy altogether. This is not in dispute. But over 100 nuclear reactors are currently in planning. Over 50 are under construction. France, South Korea, Russia, the United States, and the Chinese mainland are still increasing their use of nuclear energy. Japan was hit hard by the Fukushima nuclear disaster. But even Japan does not advocate the total elimination of nuclear energy. The whole world may demand nuclear safety. Some countries equate nuclear safety with the elimination of nuclear energy altogether. But other countries prefer safe nuclear energy.
We on Taiwan also face such a decision. The impact of opposition to nuclear energy is great. We all know this. Those who advocate the elimination of nuclear energy advocate an increase in the use of alternative energy, such as wind, solar, and biomass energy. But talk is cheap. Those who advocate scrapping nuclear energy also advocate industrial restructuring and the development of low-energy industries. Again, what is this, except more hot air? Are non-nuclear electricity prices something Taiwan's economy can withstand? That is in serious doubt.
Nuclear safety concerns cast a giant shadow in peoples' hearts. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant's credibility has been the victim of political struggle. Its construction has been started and stopped repeatedly. Is it still safe? Taipower says that if the public has doubts, they can visit the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant and see for themselves. That is a joke. If laymen such as Kevin Tsai and Chen Ai Ling visit the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant site, what will they see? Unless Taipower is endorsed by internationally recognized professionals, it will not be able to gain the publc trust. If the operation of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant once again falls victim to masses taking to the streets and surrounding the plant, the issue of nuclear energy will remain insoluble, and the nation will be torn asunder.
Concern for nuclear safety, and opposition to nuclear energy and the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, are far reaching issues. Should the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant continue to operate or be shut down? This cannot be decided by skeptical laymen visiting the site. The ruling and opposition parties must realize that an ambiguous nuclear policy is the greatest threat to nuclear safety.
The political turmoil brought about by the nuclear energy controversy is unavoidable. In order to minimize the impact and to find answers, a referendum is essential. The KMT and DPP should come up with a comprehensive long-term energy policy. They should hold a referendum. They should make the referendum an inside the system forum for public debate. Nuclear energy policy must be divorced from partisan political struggle. A public referendum is essential.
核電公投恐怕終須面對
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.25 02:56 am
核電爭議日亟，核四裝填燃料在即；這是一個辯論更趨激烈的時刻，也是一個必須作出決定的時刻。
為了避免撕裂動亂，朝野應考慮經由公民投票的體制，建立全民思考辯論的平台，並由全民票決作出政策抉擇。讓一切議論折衝能在體制內表達，並作出體制性的決策；勿使正反雙方在體制外對決，那樣非但作不出體制化的決策，也撕裂了國家。
可從「核電」與「公投」兩頭談起，先談「公投」。在往昔的經驗中，公投的精神與功能已經被毀壞；公投不是真正用來作公民決策，而只是用來動員政治鬥爭。綁二○○四年總統大選的「買飛彈公投」，與綁二○○八年總統大選的「入聯公投」，皆在鼓動意識形態的鬥爭，而不在真正要作出體制性的決策。
核電公投如果進行，將是首次對真正的「公共政策」進行公民投票。詎料，民進黨主席蘇貞昌宣示將以「反核公投」綁二○一四「七合一」選舉後，竟引致黨內一片反對之聲，有人甚至說他「頭殼壞去」。其實，反對者全然是出自權謀的算計，他們認為核電及核四的議題，在體制外進行抗爭，較在體制內以公投機制折衝，可以獲取更大的政治鬥爭利益，因此反對公投。
這正如民進黨過去主張「台獨公投」，竟在扁政府主導修頒的《公投法》自行排除了「台獨公投」；這是欲在體制外保有「鬧台獨」的政治利益，卻不願也不敢在體制內用公投來對「台獨」攤牌。其實，民進黨一直主張「核四公投」及「非核公投」，陳水扁亦曾欲以「核四公投」綁總統大選（本報當時即表贊同）；但現在問題已迫在眉睫，民進黨內的主流意見卻反而認為：不要公投，而應阻擋公投，因為在體制外抗爭比較有利。此等心態，誠是機關算盡。
再談「核電」。這可分成兩個層次：一、是否要非核、廢核？二、核四停續的問題，亦即核電廠安全的問題。如果最終要非核、廢核，是否要用核四來做為過渡的爭議即大，停廢核四的壓力亦大；但如果不認為台灣能夠完全非核廢核，則核四的停續或許可用核安的標準來衡量。若要公投，「非核」與「核四停續」的關聯應如何表述，應當是一個關鍵。
目前，在世界上反核非核的聲浪上揚，並有德國等國正在執行廢核政策，此無疑義。但是，全球仍有上百個反應爐計畫興建，且有五十餘座正在施工之中；法國、韓國、俄國、美國、中國大陸皆仍採核電擴張政策，連遭受福島核災重創的日本也不主張「零核電」。所以，全世界皆主張「沒有核安，沒有核能」，但此刻有些國家「以廢核電為核安」，有些國家則在政策上仍傾向「作好核安，維持核電」。
此時的台灣，也正面臨抉擇的關口。廢核非核的影響重大，此為盡人皆知。倡議廢核者主張增加替代能源，但風力、太陽能、生質能源，皆只是說來容易而已；倡議廢核者亦主張產業轉型，發展低耗能產業，這又豈可只是紙上談兵？再者，非核的電價是否台灣這個淺碟經濟能夠承受，也是一個茲事體大的問題。
當然，核安的顧慮已是民心上的一大陰影，核四的公信力已被政治鬥爭搞得停停建建、摧殘至此地步；台電卻說，不放心的民眾可到核四現場參觀，這簡直是個大笑話，倘蔡康永及陳藹玲赴核四現場，他們能看出什麼名堂？如果台電不能經由國際性的專業背書，恐怕絕無可能取得國人信任；而核四的運作一旦陷於群眾上街及圍廠的動亂之中，不但核電找不到答案，國家亦陷於撕裂。
非核、核安、核四，無一不是牽動重大的議題。核電政策必須重新建立在體制化的人民公意上，核四的停續更不可能用「不相信的可到現場參觀」的方法來解決。朝野須知，核電政策曖昧不明的本身，即是核安的最大威脅。
核電爭議帶來的政治動盪已不可免，為減低衝擊、尋求答案，公民投票恐怕是必須面對的機制；國、民兩黨應拿出各自全面長久的能源政策，用公投來作為體制性的社會辯論平台，也用公投來作出體制化的全民決策。核電政策若不想陷於政黨惡鬥，公民投票殆是終須面對的課題。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 25, 2013
Summary: The political turmoil brought about by the nuclear energy controversy is unavoidable. In order to minimize the impact and to find answers, a referendum is essential. The KMT and DPP should come up with a comprehensive long-term energy policy. They should hold a referendum. They should make the referendum an inside the system forum for public debate. Nuclear energy policy must be divorced from partisan political struggle. A public referendum is essential.
Full text below:
The nuclear energy controversy is increasingly urgent. Fuel rods are about to be loaded into the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. The controversy is increasingly intense. The moment of decision is increasingly near.
To avoid divisiveness and chaos, the ruling and opposition parties should consider the possibility of a public referendum. They should establish a forum for debate. The people as a whole should cast their ballots and make their decision. They should ensure that the debate is conducted inside the institutional framework. They should ensure that any decision making takes place inside the institutional framework also. They must not allow the pros and cons to be argued and settled outside the system. Such outside the system decision-making will only tear the nation apart.
Consider both the "nuclear energy" and the "referendum" aspects of a "nuclear energy referendum." First consider the "referendum" aspect. Past experience tells us that the spirit and utility of the referendum process has been destroyed. Referenda are not used for policy making. They are used to mobilize political struggle. During the 2004 presidential election, the "missile purchase referendum" became a political football. During the 2008 presidential elections the "referendum on UN membership" served the same purpose. Referenda invariably become tools for ideological struggle, not means for decision making inside the institutional framework.
Suppose a referendum on nuclear energy is held? It would be the first time any public policy was ever determined by a referendum. As expected, DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang declared that the DPP would demand that an "anti-nuclear referendum" be incorporated into the 2014 "seven in one elections." Interestingly enough, party insiders soundly rejected his proposal. Some even accused him of being "out of his mind." Opponents utterly rejected his Machiavellian calculation. They thought the issue of nuclear energy and the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant must be fought and settled outside the institutional framework. They felt that greater political capital could be accumulated by working outside the system than within. Therefore they opposed any referendum.
The DPP once advocated a "Taiwan independence referendum." Yet the Chen Shui-bian regime amended the referendum law on its own initiative, ruling out any Taiwan independence referendum. They did this to make sure they could continue clamoring for Taiwan independence outside the system. They dared not demand a showdown within the system on Taiwan independence. The fact is the DPP has long demanded a referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant and on a non-nuclear homeland. Chen Shui-bian once tried to package deal a referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant with the presidential election. At the time this newspaper endorsed his proposal. Now that the moment of truth is near, however, most DPP insiders have suddenly gotten cold feet. They no longer demand a referendum. They are determined to block any referendum. Protests held outside the system, they have decided, are more advantageous. Such is their mentality. They are preoccupied with such trickery.
Now take the "nuclear energy" aspect. This has two levels. One. Does one want to oppose nuclear energy generation and eliminate nuclear energy generation? Two. Does one want to shut down the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant? This is a question of nuclear power plant safety. Is one's ultimate goal the elimination of nuclear energy altogether? If so, then that is more controversial than whether the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant should be used as a transitional measure or shut down altogether. Suppose one does not believe that Taiwan can afford to totally eliminate nuclear energy? Then the continuation or termination of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant can be determined on the basis of objective and quantifiable nuclear safety standards. If a referendum is held, opposition to nuclear energy and whether to shut down the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant will be key issues.
Currently, global opposition to nuclear energy generation is on the rise. Germany and other countries are attempting to eliminate nuclear energy altogether. This is not in dispute. But over 100 nuclear reactors are currently in planning. Over 50 are under construction. France, South Korea, Russia, the United States, and the Chinese mainland are still increasing their use of nuclear energy. Japan was hit hard by the Fukushima nuclear disaster. But even Japan does not advocate the total elimination of nuclear energy. The whole world may demand nuclear safety. Some countries equate nuclear safety with the elimination of nuclear energy altogether. But other countries prefer safe nuclear energy.
We on Taiwan also face such a decision. The impact of opposition to nuclear energy is great. We all know this. Those who advocate the elimination of nuclear energy advocate an increase in the use of alternative energy, such as wind, solar, and biomass energy. But talk is cheap. Those who advocate scrapping nuclear energy also advocate industrial restructuring and the development of low-energy industries. Again, what is this, except more hot air? Are non-nuclear electricity prices something Taiwan's economy can withstand? That is in serious doubt.
Nuclear safety concerns cast a giant shadow in peoples' hearts. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant's credibility has been the victim of political struggle. Its construction has been started and stopped repeatedly. Is it still safe? Taipower says that if the public has doubts, they can visit the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant and see for themselves. That is a joke. If laymen such as Kevin Tsai and Chen Ai Ling visit the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant site, what will they see? Unless Taipower is endorsed by internationally recognized professionals, it will not be able to gain the publc trust. If the operation of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant once again falls victim to masses taking to the streets and surrounding the plant, the issue of nuclear energy will remain insoluble, and the nation will be torn asunder.
Concern for nuclear safety, and opposition to nuclear energy and the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, are far reaching issues. Should the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant continue to operate or be shut down? This cannot be decided by skeptical laymen visiting the site. The ruling and opposition parties must realize that an ambiguous nuclear policy is the greatest threat to nuclear safety.
The political turmoil brought about by the nuclear energy controversy is unavoidable. In order to minimize the impact and to find answers, a referendum is essential. The KMT and DPP should come up with a comprehensive long-term energy policy. They should hold a referendum. They should make the referendum an inside the system forum for public debate. Nuclear energy policy must be divorced from partisan political struggle. A public referendum is essential.
核電公投恐怕終須面對
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.25 02:56 am
核電爭議日亟，核四裝填燃料在即；這是一個辯論更趨激烈的時刻，也是一個必須作出決定的時刻。
為了避免撕裂動亂，朝野應考慮經由公民投票的體制，建立全民思考辯論的平台，並由全民票決作出政策抉擇。讓一切議論折衝能在體制內表達，並作出體制性的決策；勿使正反雙方在體制外對決，那樣非但作不出體制化的決策，也撕裂了國家。
可從「核電」與「公投」兩頭談起，先談「公投」。在往昔的經驗中，公投的精神與功能已經被毀壞；公投不是真正用來作公民決策，而只是用來動員政治鬥爭。綁二○○四年總統大選的「買飛彈公投」，與綁二○○八年總統大選的「入聯公投」，皆在鼓動意識形態的鬥爭，而不在真正要作出體制性的決策。
核電公投如果進行，將是首次對真正的「公共政策」進行公民投票。詎料，民進黨主席蘇貞昌宣示將以「反核公投」綁二○一四「七合一」選舉後，竟引致黨內一片反對之聲，有人甚至說他「頭殼壞去」。其實，反對者全然是出自權謀的算計，他們認為核電及核四的議題，在體制外進行抗爭，較在體制內以公投機制折衝，可以獲取更大的政治鬥爭利益，因此反對公投。
這正如民進黨過去主張「台獨公投」，竟在扁政府主導修頒的《公投法》自行排除了「台獨公投」；這是欲在體制外保有「鬧台獨」的政治利益，卻不願也不敢在體制內用公投來對「台獨」攤牌。其實，民進黨一直主張「核四公投」及「非核公投」，陳水扁亦曾欲以「核四公投」綁總統大選（本報當時即表贊同）；但現在問題已迫在眉睫，民進黨內的主流意見卻反而認為：不要公投，而應阻擋公投，因為在體制外抗爭比較有利。此等心態，誠是機關算盡。
再談「核電」。這可分成兩個層次：一、是否要非核、廢核？二、核四停續的問題，亦即核電廠安全的問題。如果最終要非核、廢核，是否要用核四來做為過渡的爭議即大，停廢核四的壓力亦大；但如果不認為台灣能夠完全非核廢核，則核四的停續或許可用核安的標準來衡量。若要公投，「非核」與「核四停續」的關聯應如何表述，應當是一個關鍵。
目前，在世界上反核非核的聲浪上揚，並有德國等國正在執行廢核政策，此無疑義。但是，全球仍有上百個反應爐計畫興建，且有五十餘座正在施工之中；法國、韓國、俄國、美國、中國大陸皆仍採核電擴張政策，連遭受福島核災重創的日本也不主張「零核電」。所以，全世界皆主張「沒有核安，沒有核能」，但此刻有些國家「以廢核電為核安」，有些國家則在政策上仍傾向「作好核安，維持核電」。
此時的台灣，也正面臨抉擇的關口。廢核非核的影響重大，此為盡人皆知。倡議廢核者主張增加替代能源，但風力、太陽能、生質能源，皆只是說來容易而已；倡議廢核者亦主張產業轉型，發展低耗能產業，這又豈可只是紙上談兵？再者，非核的電價是否台灣這個淺碟經濟能夠承受，也是一個茲事體大的問題。
當然，核安的顧慮已是民心上的一大陰影，核四的公信力已被政治鬥爭搞得停停建建、摧殘至此地步；台電卻說，不放心的民眾可到核四現場參觀，這簡直是個大笑話，倘蔡康永及陳藹玲赴核四現場，他們能看出什麼名堂？如果台電不能經由國際性的專業背書，恐怕絕無可能取得國人信任；而核四的運作一旦陷於群眾上街及圍廠的動亂之中，不但核電找不到答案，國家亦陷於撕裂。
非核、核安、核四，無一不是牽動重大的議題。核電政策必須重新建立在體制化的人民公意上，核四的停續更不可能用「不相信的可到現場參觀」的方法來解決。朝野須知，核電政策曖昧不明的本身，即是核安的最大威脅。
核電爭議帶來的政治動盪已不可免，為減低衝擊、尋求答案，公民投票恐怕是必須面對的機制；國、民兩黨應拿出各自全面長久的能源政策，用公投來作為體制性的社會辯論平台，也用公投來作出體制化的全民決策。核電政策若不想陷於政黨惡鬥，公民投票殆是終須面對的課題。
Our Public Television Service is not Your Public Television Service
Our Public Television Service is not Your Public Television Service
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 24, 2013
Summary: We do not need the wisdom of Solomon. Most people can see the truth with their own eyes. Two factions are fighting over the Public Television Service (PTS), but neither cares whether the infant lives or dies. The facts are inescapable. PTS is being smothered in the struggle. It is on the verge of suffocation. Yet neither party is willing to let go. No one is even waiting for a King Solomon to come forth and uphold justice.
Full text below:
We do not need the wisdom of Solomon. Most people can see the truth with their own eyes. Two factions are fighting over the Public Television Service (PTS), but neither cares whether the infant lives or dies. The facts are inescapable. PTS is being smothered in the struggle. It is on the verge of suffocation. Yet neither party is willing to let go. No one is even waiting for a King Solomon to come forth and uphold justice.
The selection process for the Public Television Service Board of Directors has dragged on for over two years. Why? Because two ersatz mothers are fighting over who will be on it. Both claim to love the infant more than the other. Both claim to be more qualified to care for it than the other. Both find excuses to stonewall and complain. Neither hesitates to suffocate the infant in order to express their love. This sort of "love" makes one's skin crawl. Besides, the Public Television Service is the property of the people as a whole. It is ours. It does not belong to either would be mother. It definitely does not belong to them.
The PTS farce is a case of wrangling over non-existent "ownership." The means have become the ends. That makes the wrangling even more morbid. The Blue and Green factions ignore the raison d'etre for the Public Television Service channel. Just what has the Public Television Service provided the public with at the government's expense? They don't bother to aks. What goes on in the tall and majestic PTS headquarters building? They don't care. All their attention is focuses on keeping people they dislike off the board. This has prevented PTS from resuming normal operations. This has delayed the selection of a PTS board of directors by over seven hundred days. Are the Public Television Service Committee Members so politically backwards? Does this wrangling mean Taiwan does not deserve public television?
President Ma was re-elected less than a year ago. Yet the DPP has twice tried to have him impeached. The stillborn Public Television Service Board of Directors is a microscosm of the political battlefield that is today's Taiwan. The annual budget for the Public Television Service is merely 10 billion NT. Its ratings are a measly 0.2%. Yet the ruling and opposition parties persist in fighting over over this, tooth and nail. They have dragged the two camps' communication experts into the battle. PTS is a small scale public institution. Can a reasonable democratic solution be found to the problem? Taiwan has undergone three decades of democratization. Has it really all been for naught?
Consider the problem at the systemic level. No agreement has been reached regarding the Public Television Service Board of Directors, for two reasons. One. The three-fourths majority threshold for the approval is commissioners is too high. Two. The requirement that commissioners represent political parties, based on proportional representation, is unreasonable. Consider the former. based on the ruling and opposition party composition in the legislature. If the threshold were changed to a simple majority, it might be more reasonable. Why? Because the threshold to impeach a president is a mere two-thirds super majority. Currently a mere three nay votes can bring the entire selection process to a grinding halt. The high threshold merely enables a minority to engage in obstructionism.
Consider the latter problem. Observers disagree about how to improve the process for selecting commissioners. But all agree about one thing. Nominations by political parties based on proportional representation should be abolished. Nominations by political parties based on proportional representation was intended to best reflect public opinion. Who knew it would merely replicate ruling vs. opposition party rivalry inside the commission? Who knew that politics would trump professionalism? The same problem raised its ugly head inside the National Communications Commission (NCC). It too, led to a stillborn commission. Seven years ago, the ruling and opposition parties agreed to modify the Organic Law. It was changed to nomination by the Premier. Legislators were granted the right of approval. The threshold was set at a simple majority. The system of proportional representation was abandoned. NCC reform should become the template for Public Television Service reform.
PTS as a TV channel receives less than one billion NT in annual funding. It is nothing like the NCC, which has decision-making powers. Its directors are nominated by the Minister of Culture. Therefore having the legislature approve their nominations strikes us as overkill. Lung Ying-tai advocates having the Ministry of Culture preside over commissioners who would elect the board directors. Either that, or it should add another step to ensure balance. For example, some balance should be required regarding the political coloration of board nominees. This should be taken into account.
In any event, the process of selecting the Public Television Service Board of Directors has dragged on for over seven hundred days. It cannot be delayed any longer. The goal must be a normally functioning PTS for the public. The solution can be two-pronged. The first prong is ruling and opposition party consultation along the NCC model, leading to an amending of the law, the abandonment of nominations by political parties based on proportional representation, the lowering of the threshold for approval, and a reduction in the number of directors. The second prong is to listen to suggestions from media reform groups. Allow the dozen or so new directors to take office now. End the farcical fourth session of the board, which has been prolonged for over two years. Allow PTS operations to get back on track. This should be the authorities' top priority.
It matters not whether we have a King Solomon. The public on Taiwan must be aware. Two ersatz political mothers are fighting over a TV channel that belongs to the people as a whole. It is our infant. Do not allow them to trample it under foot. Commercialism is rampant. Content has been vulgarized. How should social resources be invested to enhance public television growth and visibility? Contemplating these questions beats sitting by as this intolerable farce drags on.
我們的公視，不是你們的公視
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.24
不需要「所羅門王」再世，一般人憑肉眼都看得出來，正在爭奪公視的兩派人馬到底有沒有誰更在乎這個嬰兒的生死。擺在眼前的事實是，公視已被雙方掐到快要窒息，但爭奪者沒有一方願意鬆手；甚至，大家也沒等到所羅門王出來主持正義。
公視董事會之所以難產超過兩年，是因為有兩個「假母親」都搶著要它；她們都宣稱自己有更大的愛心，更有資格擁有這個嬰兒，並以此為由不斷杯葛、不斷控訴。用這種不惜扼殺的方式來表達自己的愛，這種「愛」，令人毛骨悚然。更何況，公視是全民共同擁有，是「我們的」；它也不屬於哪位母親，更絕對不是「你們的」。
公視的荒謬劇，除纏鬥於不存在的「所有權」之爭，更病態到抱著「手段」當「目的」的地步。藍綠兩派不顧公視的成立初衷，不問公視花費政府預算究竟提供了民眾什麼樣的節目，不關心那座美輪美奐大樓裡的一切運作；卻將全部用心放在阻止自己不喜歡的人進入董事會，阻擋公視恢復正常運作。耗時七百多天，公視還走不完董事會誕生的程序，公視審查委員這樣的「民主素養」，難道真說明台灣不配擁有公共電視？
比起馬總統連任不到一年已遭民進黨兩次發動罷免，公視董事會的難產，不過是台灣政治硝煙的一隅縮影。但更惡劣的是，公視一年經費不過十多億元，收視率約僅百分之零點二，竟值得朝野如此不惜血本地廝殺，同時還把各自陣營的傳播學者都拖下渾水。如果連這麼小的公共機構都無法找到合理的民主手段解決問題，台灣二三十年的民主進程，豈非是白走一遭？
從制度上看，公視董事會難產主要的癥結有二：一是須經四分之三審委同意的門檻太高，二是審查委員由政黨依比例推薦的設計不合理。前者，從朝野國會結構看，若修改成二分之一的多數同意，應屬合理。理由是，即連罷免總統，門檻要求也不過是三分之二同意；而目前公視的審查卻只要有三票反對，即可杯葛全局。高門檻其實只保障了少數暴力。
後者，關於審查會員的產生方式應如何改進，外界各有不同的思考，但一致的主張都認為應廢除政黨比例推薦制。當初之所以有政黨比例推薦的設計，是以為如此最能反映比例民意；孰料，現實上卻造成審查會赤裸裸複製朝野的惡鬥，以政治凌駕專業。同樣的問題，當年也出現在國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ），導致難產；而ＮＣＣ七年前在朝野同意下修改組織法，改為院長提名、立委行使同意權，門檻則設在二分之一，拋棄了政黨比例制。ＮＣＣ的改革，應可作為公視改革的範本。
不同的是，公視不過是個年度經費十幾億的電視台，又不像ＮＣＣ那樣擁有決策權或行政權；且其董事只是由文化部長提名，因此若要送交立委審查，似乎過嫌大動干戈。那麼，如龍應台主張的，改由文化部組織遴選委員來推舉董事；或者如何在其中增加一層平衡機制，例如要求董事提名人的色彩平衡，則都應加以考慮。
無論如何，難產七百多天的公視董事會，不能再漫無方向地延宕下去，一切需朝「還民眾一個正常運作的公視」為目標前進。解決之道，可以兩路並進：一是由朝野協商比照ＮＣＣ模式進行修法，拋棄政黨比例制的審查委員，降低同意門檻，同時降低董事人數；二是聽取媒改團體的建言，讓已產生的十多名第五屆新任董事先行就任，結束第四屆董事會延任兩年多的荒謬戲碼。使公視回歸運作常軌，是當局第一要務。
不管有沒有所羅門王，台灣民眾都要意識到：這兩個政治假母親爭奪不休的，其實是人民共同擁有的電視頻道；我們的嬰兒，不容他們如此蹂躪。更進一步說，在商業氾濫及內容低俗化的趨勢下，我們要如何擴大社會資源的投注，以充實公視的成長空間及能見度，都比消極在那裡坐觀這齣拖棚歹戲重要得多。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 24, 2013
Summary: We do not need the wisdom of Solomon. Most people can see the truth with their own eyes. Two factions are fighting over the Public Television Service (PTS), but neither cares whether the infant lives or dies. The facts are inescapable. PTS is being smothered in the struggle. It is on the verge of suffocation. Yet neither party is willing to let go. No one is even waiting for a King Solomon to come forth and uphold justice.
Full text below:
We do not need the wisdom of Solomon. Most people can see the truth with their own eyes. Two factions are fighting over the Public Television Service (PTS), but neither cares whether the infant lives or dies. The facts are inescapable. PTS is being smothered in the struggle. It is on the verge of suffocation. Yet neither party is willing to let go. No one is even waiting for a King Solomon to come forth and uphold justice.
The selection process for the Public Television Service Board of Directors has dragged on for over two years. Why? Because two ersatz mothers are fighting over who will be on it. Both claim to love the infant more than the other. Both claim to be more qualified to care for it than the other. Both find excuses to stonewall and complain. Neither hesitates to suffocate the infant in order to express their love. This sort of "love" makes one's skin crawl. Besides, the Public Television Service is the property of the people as a whole. It is ours. It does not belong to either would be mother. It definitely does not belong to them.
The PTS farce is a case of wrangling over non-existent "ownership." The means have become the ends. That makes the wrangling even more morbid. The Blue and Green factions ignore the raison d'etre for the Public Television Service channel. Just what has the Public Television Service provided the public with at the government's expense? They don't bother to aks. What goes on in the tall and majestic PTS headquarters building? They don't care. All their attention is focuses on keeping people they dislike off the board. This has prevented PTS from resuming normal operations. This has delayed the selection of a PTS board of directors by over seven hundred days. Are the Public Television Service Committee Members so politically backwards? Does this wrangling mean Taiwan does not deserve public television?
President Ma was re-elected less than a year ago. Yet the DPP has twice tried to have him impeached. The stillborn Public Television Service Board of Directors is a microscosm of the political battlefield that is today's Taiwan. The annual budget for the Public Television Service is merely 10 billion NT. Its ratings are a measly 0.2%. Yet the ruling and opposition parties persist in fighting over over this, tooth and nail. They have dragged the two camps' communication experts into the battle. PTS is a small scale public institution. Can a reasonable democratic solution be found to the problem? Taiwan has undergone three decades of democratization. Has it really all been for naught?
Consider the problem at the systemic level. No agreement has been reached regarding the Public Television Service Board of Directors, for two reasons. One. The three-fourths majority threshold for the approval is commissioners is too high. Two. The requirement that commissioners represent political parties, based on proportional representation, is unreasonable. Consider the former. based on the ruling and opposition party composition in the legislature. If the threshold were changed to a simple majority, it might be more reasonable. Why? Because the threshold to impeach a president is a mere two-thirds super majority. Currently a mere three nay votes can bring the entire selection process to a grinding halt. The high threshold merely enables a minority to engage in obstructionism.
Consider the latter problem. Observers disagree about how to improve the process for selecting commissioners. But all agree about one thing. Nominations by political parties based on proportional representation should be abolished. Nominations by political parties based on proportional representation was intended to best reflect public opinion. Who knew it would merely replicate ruling vs. opposition party rivalry inside the commission? Who knew that politics would trump professionalism? The same problem raised its ugly head inside the National Communications Commission (NCC). It too, led to a stillborn commission. Seven years ago, the ruling and opposition parties agreed to modify the Organic Law. It was changed to nomination by the Premier. Legislators were granted the right of approval. The threshold was set at a simple majority. The system of proportional representation was abandoned. NCC reform should become the template for Public Television Service reform.
PTS as a TV channel receives less than one billion NT in annual funding. It is nothing like the NCC, which has decision-making powers. Its directors are nominated by the Minister of Culture. Therefore having the legislature approve their nominations strikes us as overkill. Lung Ying-tai advocates having the Ministry of Culture preside over commissioners who would elect the board directors. Either that, or it should add another step to ensure balance. For example, some balance should be required regarding the political coloration of board nominees. This should be taken into account.
In any event, the process of selecting the Public Television Service Board of Directors has dragged on for over seven hundred days. It cannot be delayed any longer. The goal must be a normally functioning PTS for the public. The solution can be two-pronged. The first prong is ruling and opposition party consultation along the NCC model, leading to an amending of the law, the abandonment of nominations by political parties based on proportional representation, the lowering of the threshold for approval, and a reduction in the number of directors. The second prong is to listen to suggestions from media reform groups. Allow the dozen or so new directors to take office now. End the farcical fourth session of the board, which has been prolonged for over two years. Allow PTS operations to get back on track. This should be the authorities' top priority.
It matters not whether we have a King Solomon. The public on Taiwan must be aware. Two ersatz political mothers are fighting over a TV channel that belongs to the people as a whole. It is our infant. Do not allow them to trample it under foot. Commercialism is rampant. Content has been vulgarized. How should social resources be invested to enhance public television growth and visibility? Contemplating these questions beats sitting by as this intolerable farce drags on.
我們的公視，不是你們的公視
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.24
不需要「所羅門王」再世，一般人憑肉眼都看得出來，正在爭奪公視的兩派人馬到底有沒有誰更在乎這個嬰兒的生死。擺在眼前的事實是，公視已被雙方掐到快要窒息，但爭奪者沒有一方願意鬆手；甚至，大家也沒等到所羅門王出來主持正義。
公視董事會之所以難產超過兩年，是因為有兩個「假母親」都搶著要它；她們都宣稱自己有更大的愛心，更有資格擁有這個嬰兒，並以此為由不斷杯葛、不斷控訴。用這種不惜扼殺的方式來表達自己的愛，這種「愛」，令人毛骨悚然。更何況，公視是全民共同擁有，是「我們的」；它也不屬於哪位母親，更絕對不是「你們的」。
公視的荒謬劇，除纏鬥於不存在的「所有權」之爭，更病態到抱著「手段」當「目的」的地步。藍綠兩派不顧公視的成立初衷，不問公視花費政府預算究竟提供了民眾什麼樣的節目，不關心那座美輪美奐大樓裡的一切運作；卻將全部用心放在阻止自己不喜歡的人進入董事會，阻擋公視恢復正常運作。耗時七百多天，公視還走不完董事會誕生的程序，公視審查委員這樣的「民主素養」，難道真說明台灣不配擁有公共電視？
比起馬總統連任不到一年已遭民進黨兩次發動罷免，公視董事會的難產，不過是台灣政治硝煙的一隅縮影。但更惡劣的是，公視一年經費不過十多億元，收視率約僅百分之零點二，竟值得朝野如此不惜血本地廝殺，同時還把各自陣營的傳播學者都拖下渾水。如果連這麼小的公共機構都無法找到合理的民主手段解決問題，台灣二三十年的民主進程，豈非是白走一遭？
從制度上看，公視董事會難產主要的癥結有二：一是須經四分之三審委同意的門檻太高，二是審查委員由政黨依比例推薦的設計不合理。前者，從朝野國會結構看，若修改成二分之一的多數同意，應屬合理。理由是，即連罷免總統，門檻要求也不過是三分之二同意；而目前公視的審查卻只要有三票反對，即可杯葛全局。高門檻其實只保障了少數暴力。
後者，關於審查會員的產生方式應如何改進，外界各有不同的思考，但一致的主張都認為應廢除政黨比例推薦制。當初之所以有政黨比例推薦的設計，是以為如此最能反映比例民意；孰料，現實上卻造成審查會赤裸裸複製朝野的惡鬥，以政治凌駕專業。同樣的問題，當年也出現在國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ），導致難產；而ＮＣＣ七年前在朝野同意下修改組織法，改為院長提名、立委行使同意權，門檻則設在二分之一，拋棄了政黨比例制。ＮＣＣ的改革，應可作為公視改革的範本。
不同的是，公視不過是個年度經費十幾億的電視台，又不像ＮＣＣ那樣擁有決策權或行政權；且其董事只是由文化部長提名，因此若要送交立委審查，似乎過嫌大動干戈。那麼，如龍應台主張的，改由文化部組織遴選委員來推舉董事；或者如何在其中增加一層平衡機制，例如要求董事提名人的色彩平衡，則都應加以考慮。
無論如何，難產七百多天的公視董事會，不能再漫無方向地延宕下去，一切需朝「還民眾一個正常運作的公視」為目標前進。解決之道，可以兩路並進：一是由朝野協商比照ＮＣＣ模式進行修法，拋棄政黨比例制的審查委員，降低同意門檻，同時降低董事人數；二是聽取媒改團體的建言，讓已產生的十多名第五屆新任董事先行就任，結束第四屆董事會延任兩年多的荒謬戲碼。使公視回歸運作常軌，是當局第一要務。
不管有沒有所羅門王，台灣民眾都要意識到：這兩個政治假母親爭奪不休的，其實是人民共同擁有的電視頻道；我們的嬰兒，不容他們如此蹂躪。更進一步說，在商業氾濫及內容低俗化的趨勢下，我們要如何擴大社會資源的投注，以充實公視的成長空間及能見度，都比消極在那裡坐觀這齣拖棚歹戲重要得多。
Wednesday, January 23, 2013
Reform or Infighting: Ma Ying-jeou as Party Chairman
Reform or Infighting: Ma Ying-jeou as Party Chairman
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 23, 2013
Summary: Everywhere storm clouds are gathering. The KMT leadership has declared that it will increase the number of votes that Ma Ying-jeou receives during the July party chairman election. KMT legislator Tsai Cheng-yuan, on the other hand, has questioned the legality of a Ma Ying-jeou third term.
Full text below:
Everywhere storm clouds are gathering. The KMT leadership has declared that it will increase the number of votes that Ma Ying-jeou receives during the July party chairman election. KMT legislator Tsai Cheng-yuan, on the other hand, has questioned the legality of a Ma Ying-jeou third term.
This question has a bearing on both KMT infighting and Blue vs. Green partisan wrangling. It may be difficult to resolve, especially since it has legal implications. If Ma remains in the running until the bitter end, dissent will remain vocal. If Ma is re-elected, legal actions could follow. If Ma withdraws his candidacy, his supporters will lament his failure to live up to his potential. His political enemies will pile on. Each of these scenarios have already been scripted. The outcomes are predictable. Suppose they result in party insiders blocking Ma's reelection as party chairman. Suppose the DPP attempts to impeach the president? What will happen then?
The Ma administration finds itself in a pickle. To say that he is an inept leader of the Kuomintang may be an overstatement. Essentially Ma Ying-jeou has never been an effective leader of the KMT legislative caucus. His communicates with the KMT legislative caucus primarily as party chairman. Ma Ying-jeou is currently KMT party chairman. But suppose Ma Ying-jeou steps down? What will happen then?
The divisions between Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT legislative caucus first appeared in 2008. The legislature refused to approve his personnel appointments for the Control Yuan an the Examination Yuan. His Sunshine Bill was seriously compromised, and led to outside criticism. This forced Ma Ying-jeou to renege on his promise, and personally assume the party chairmanship. The most important task during President Ma's first term was cross-Strait relations, including issues such as ECFA. As a result, Blue vs. Green partisan wrangling overshadowed KMT infighting. But during Ma's second term, U.S. beef imports, capital gains taxes, gasoline price hikes and electricity rate hikes, year-end condolence payments for veterans, retired civil servants, retired public school teachers, and the issue of pensions, led to both KMT infighting and Blue vs. Green partisan wrangling. Ma Ying-jeou found himself faced with crises within and without. He found himself surrounded by enemies, both front and back. This and his inability to communicate and express himself, resulted in his losing the bully pulpit.
Tsai Cheng-yuan's challenge comes in "legal issue" guise. It appears to be "strictly a matter of the law." In fact, it is a plain and simple political struggle. It is KMT infighting that is certain to lead to Blue vs. Green partisan wrangling. Legal issues can be settled in court. But the KMT must clarify what this wave of anti-Ma, depose Ma sentiment is really about. At the very least, it must make clear whether the agenda is reform, or merely a pretext for infighting.
The first distinction between reform and infighting pertains to one's philosophy of governance. The Ma administration's policy theme has four parts. The first is cross-Strait relations. The second is opposition to corruption. The third is support for an independent judiciary. The fourth is responding to the pressures of history. For example, capital gains taxes, gasoline price hikes, electricity rate hikes, 12 year compulsory education, nuclear power generation, and government pensions. On the first three items, the Ma administration has demonstrated decisiveness and made visible progress. As for responding to the pressures of history, its execution may have been inadequate. Its countermeasures may have been misdirected. These errors led to chaos. But these were errors in execution, not errors in policy. KMT insiders may oppose Ma Ying-jeou. But they must not repudiate the Ma administration's basic policy.
The second distinction between reform and infighting differences is whether they divide or integrate. Divisive tactics will drag down Ma Ying-jeou. They will turn him into a lame duck. They may pave the way for "post-Ma administration." But creating a lame duck Ma administration will undermine policy. If the KMT is defeated in 2014 and 2016, how can there possibly be a "post-Ma adiminstration?" On the other hand, integration tactics would mean that Ma Ying-jeou no longer needs to be party chairman. He would only need to maintain a relationship with the party chairman. The day to day running of the party and the Legislative Yuan would be left to the party chairman. The situation would be different. When Wu Poh-hsiung was party chairman, he had credentials, respect. flexibility, and sophistication. Yet he and President Ma still had difficulty coordinating their moves. If another person is made party chairman, what will happen? Will they complement each other, or become clash with each other?
To describe this as a "divided KMT" may be overstating the problem. But alienation and confrontation between Ma Ying-jeou and a small number of legislators is the main reason the Ma administration is in chaos. Several KMT legislators are naysayers, in word and deed. Sometimes their objections are valid. But often they sing a different tune out of sheer cussedness. Tsai Cheng-yuan is doing this right now. This is trouble from within. President Ma's second term has been characterized by repeated policy flip-flops, on gasoline prices, electricity rates, U.S. beef imports, and pensions. It is damned if it does, and damned if it doesn't. This is in part due to the Ma administration's own lack of leadership. But it is also due to a lack of transparency in the Legislative Yuan.
Ma Ying-jeou may or may not be re-elected party chairman. Either way, it means another crisis. The objections to a Ma third term have been a legal veneer. Therefore the problem is not amenable to a purely political solution. If Ma Ying-jeou withdraws his candidacy, politically it will be perceived as a KMT vote of non-confidence. Therefore the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou must think hard. Reform and infighting are essentially different. Reform integrates. In-fighting divides. Reform focuses on policy formulation. Infighting focuses on political survival.
Consider the public perspective. Should Ma Ying-jeou continue as party chairman? The key consideration is the Ma presidency still has three more years to go. Can the KMT lead the nation out of chaos and despair? The question provokes deep concern.
改革或內鬥：馬英九是否兼任黨主席
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.23 02:55 am
無端平地起風雲。正當國民黨中央宣稱將衝高馬英九在七月黨主席選舉的得票數之際，國民黨籍立委蔡正元發文質疑馬英九「吾三連」的正當性。
這個話題，處在國民黨內鬥及藍綠互鬥的交集點，恐怕難以善了。尤其事涉法律疑義問題，馬若參選到底，質疑聲恐不會止息；馬若當選連任，亦可能捲入司法訴訟。但若馬宣布退選，支持者恨鐵不成鋼，政治對手則落井下石。這一幕一幕場景，劇本俱已備妥，皆可預見。再若演成黨內抵制連任主席，民進黨又發動罷免總統，將如何收拾？
馬政府的局面走到今日地步，若說是因他不能有效領導國民黨，也許是把範圍說得大了一些；其實，最主要的原因，在於馬英九始終不能有效領導立法院黨團，而他與黨團的聯繫管道則是透過黨主席的角色。現在，馬英九自兼黨主席，已是如此局面；則他若不兼黨主席，將會變成何種地步？
其實，馬英九與國民黨立院黨團之間的裂縫自二○○八首任伊始即告出現，監察院、考試院人事受到杯葛，及陽光法案打折扣引起外界訾議等一連串事件，使得馬英九毀諾自兼黨主席。馬總統第一任期的主要議題是兩岸關係，如ＥＣＦＡ等，使藍綠鬥爭掩蓋了國民黨內鬥；但第二任開始，美牛案、證所稅、油電雙漲，以迄現今的軍公教退休人員年終慰問金，及年金案等，卻皆是在國民黨內鬥及藍綠互鬥的交集地帶，馬英九頓臨內憂外患、腹背受敵的困境，加以不擅溝通，拙於表意，遂失主導話語權的優勢地位。
蔡正元的質疑帶著「法律」的包裝，有了「就法論法」的形貌；但此事的根本性質或必然效應仍是政治鬥爭；也就是國民黨的內鬥，而必將牽動藍綠互鬥。法律疑義或許必須由法院裁定，但國民黨內卻應當弄清楚，這一股反馬倒馬氛圍，究竟意欲何為。至少應知：這究竟是一個改革的議題，或是內鬥的題材？
改革或內鬥的分野之一，在於施政理念。馬政府的政策主軸是：一、兩岸關係；二、反貪；三、司法獨立；四、因應歷史擠兌（如證所稅、油電漲價、十二年國教、核電及年金等）。至少在前三項，皆可見馬政府的決志及成就；至於在因應歷史擠兌上，或因操作能力不足，或因對策出現偏差，以致陷入危境亂局，而難謂是理念的錯誤。所以，國民黨內可以反對馬英九兼任黨主席，卻未必能夠根本否定馬政府的施政理念。
改革或內鬥的分野之二，在於撕裂或整合。若以撕裂的手法，拉下馬英九是要製造一匹跛腳馬，並為「後馬團隊」鋪路；但跛腳馬影響施政，則國民黨若敗在二○一四及二○一六，尚有何「後馬團隊」可言？反之，若以整合的手法，則馬英九不兼黨主席，他只要維繫與黨主席的關係即可，黨務及立院的操作皆可委諸黨主席，其實亦是另一番局面。但以當年吳伯雄任黨主席的資望、柔軟、練達，與馬總統尚不能互為手足，則此番若另舉黨主席，究竟是要相輔相成或分庭抗禮？
若說這是「分裂的國民黨」，也許過甚其詞；但馬英九與少數立法委員之間的疏離與對立，卻是形成馬政府今日亂局的主因。有幾名國民黨籍唱反調的立法委員之言行，雖有時不無道理，但往往皆是「你說東來，我說西」而已；現在，蔡正元又演出這一幕，可謂禍起蕭牆之內。馬總統第二任以來，自油電雙漲、美牛案，迄今日的年金案，屢屢陷於政策反覆、父子騎驢；一方面固然是出自馬的領導失能，另一方面則亦是因立法院的生態混濁所致。
是否連任黨主席，成了馬英九的又一危機。由於有了「法律」包裝，似不易僅憑政治途徑解決；但若馬英九因此退選，在政治上即不啻象徵國民黨對他發動的不信任案。因而，國民黨及馬英九皆應深思，改革與內鬥有本質上的不同：改革可以整合，內鬥即是撕裂；改革注重理念的型塑，內鬥則著眼人物的去留。
其實，站在社會公眾的觀點，馬英九是否繼續兼任黨主席應是其次之事，主要是在馬的總統任期尚有三年多，整個國民黨能否帶領國家社會跳脫這個亂局與困境，委實令人深憂。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 23, 2013
Summary: Everywhere storm clouds are gathering. The KMT leadership has declared that it will increase the number of votes that Ma Ying-jeou receives during the July party chairman election. KMT legislator Tsai Cheng-yuan, on the other hand, has questioned the legality of a Ma Ying-jeou third term.
Full text below:
Everywhere storm clouds are gathering. The KMT leadership has declared that it will increase the number of votes that Ma Ying-jeou receives during the July party chairman election. KMT legislator Tsai Cheng-yuan, on the other hand, has questioned the legality of a Ma Ying-jeou third term.
This question has a bearing on both KMT infighting and Blue vs. Green partisan wrangling. It may be difficult to resolve, especially since it has legal implications. If Ma remains in the running until the bitter end, dissent will remain vocal. If Ma is re-elected, legal actions could follow. If Ma withdraws his candidacy, his supporters will lament his failure to live up to his potential. His political enemies will pile on. Each of these scenarios have already been scripted. The outcomes are predictable. Suppose they result in party insiders blocking Ma's reelection as party chairman. Suppose the DPP attempts to impeach the president? What will happen then?
The Ma administration finds itself in a pickle. To say that he is an inept leader of the Kuomintang may be an overstatement. Essentially Ma Ying-jeou has never been an effective leader of the KMT legislative caucus. His communicates with the KMT legislative caucus primarily as party chairman. Ma Ying-jeou is currently KMT party chairman. But suppose Ma Ying-jeou steps down? What will happen then?
The divisions between Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT legislative caucus first appeared in 2008. The legislature refused to approve his personnel appointments for the Control Yuan an the Examination Yuan. His Sunshine Bill was seriously compromised, and led to outside criticism. This forced Ma Ying-jeou to renege on his promise, and personally assume the party chairmanship. The most important task during President Ma's first term was cross-Strait relations, including issues such as ECFA. As a result, Blue vs. Green partisan wrangling overshadowed KMT infighting. But during Ma's second term, U.S. beef imports, capital gains taxes, gasoline price hikes and electricity rate hikes, year-end condolence payments for veterans, retired civil servants, retired public school teachers, and the issue of pensions, led to both KMT infighting and Blue vs. Green partisan wrangling. Ma Ying-jeou found himself faced with crises within and without. He found himself surrounded by enemies, both front and back. This and his inability to communicate and express himself, resulted in his losing the bully pulpit.
Tsai Cheng-yuan's challenge comes in "legal issue" guise. It appears to be "strictly a matter of the law." In fact, it is a plain and simple political struggle. It is KMT infighting that is certain to lead to Blue vs. Green partisan wrangling. Legal issues can be settled in court. But the KMT must clarify what this wave of anti-Ma, depose Ma sentiment is really about. At the very least, it must make clear whether the agenda is reform, or merely a pretext for infighting.
The first distinction between reform and infighting pertains to one's philosophy of governance. The Ma administration's policy theme has four parts. The first is cross-Strait relations. The second is opposition to corruption. The third is support for an independent judiciary. The fourth is responding to the pressures of history. For example, capital gains taxes, gasoline price hikes, electricity rate hikes, 12 year compulsory education, nuclear power generation, and government pensions. On the first three items, the Ma administration has demonstrated decisiveness and made visible progress. As for responding to the pressures of history, its execution may have been inadequate. Its countermeasures may have been misdirected. These errors led to chaos. But these were errors in execution, not errors in policy. KMT insiders may oppose Ma Ying-jeou. But they must not repudiate the Ma administration's basic policy.
The second distinction between reform and infighting differences is whether they divide or integrate. Divisive tactics will drag down Ma Ying-jeou. They will turn him into a lame duck. They may pave the way for "post-Ma administration." But creating a lame duck Ma administration will undermine policy. If the KMT is defeated in 2014 and 2016, how can there possibly be a "post-Ma adiminstration?" On the other hand, integration tactics would mean that Ma Ying-jeou no longer needs to be party chairman. He would only need to maintain a relationship with the party chairman. The day to day running of the party and the Legislative Yuan would be left to the party chairman. The situation would be different. When Wu Poh-hsiung was party chairman, he had credentials, respect. flexibility, and sophistication. Yet he and President Ma still had difficulty coordinating their moves. If another person is made party chairman, what will happen? Will they complement each other, or become clash with each other?
To describe this as a "divided KMT" may be overstating the problem. But alienation and confrontation between Ma Ying-jeou and a small number of legislators is the main reason the Ma administration is in chaos. Several KMT legislators are naysayers, in word and deed. Sometimes their objections are valid. But often they sing a different tune out of sheer cussedness. Tsai Cheng-yuan is doing this right now. This is trouble from within. President Ma's second term has been characterized by repeated policy flip-flops, on gasoline prices, electricity rates, U.S. beef imports, and pensions. It is damned if it does, and damned if it doesn't. This is in part due to the Ma administration's own lack of leadership. But it is also due to a lack of transparency in the Legislative Yuan.
Ma Ying-jeou may or may not be re-elected party chairman. Either way, it means another crisis. The objections to a Ma third term have been a legal veneer. Therefore the problem is not amenable to a purely political solution. If Ma Ying-jeou withdraws his candidacy, politically it will be perceived as a KMT vote of non-confidence. Therefore the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou must think hard. Reform and infighting are essentially different. Reform integrates. In-fighting divides. Reform focuses on policy formulation. Infighting focuses on political survival.
Consider the public perspective. Should Ma Ying-jeou continue as party chairman? The key consideration is the Ma presidency still has three more years to go. Can the KMT lead the nation out of chaos and despair? The question provokes deep concern.
改革或內鬥：馬英九是否兼任黨主席
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.23 02:55 am
無端平地起風雲。正當國民黨中央宣稱將衝高馬英九在七月黨主席選舉的得票數之際，國民黨籍立委蔡正元發文質疑馬英九「吾三連」的正當性。
這個話題，處在國民黨內鬥及藍綠互鬥的交集點，恐怕難以善了。尤其事涉法律疑義問題，馬若參選到底，質疑聲恐不會止息；馬若當選連任，亦可能捲入司法訴訟。但若馬宣布退選，支持者恨鐵不成鋼，政治對手則落井下石。這一幕一幕場景，劇本俱已備妥，皆可預見。再若演成黨內抵制連任主席，民進黨又發動罷免總統，將如何收拾？
馬政府的局面走到今日地步，若說是因他不能有效領導國民黨，也許是把範圍說得大了一些；其實，最主要的原因，在於馬英九始終不能有效領導立法院黨團，而他與黨團的聯繫管道則是透過黨主席的角色。現在，馬英九自兼黨主席，已是如此局面；則他若不兼黨主席，將會變成何種地步？
其實，馬英九與國民黨立院黨團之間的裂縫自二○○八首任伊始即告出現，監察院、考試院人事受到杯葛，及陽光法案打折扣引起外界訾議等一連串事件，使得馬英九毀諾自兼黨主席。馬總統第一任期的主要議題是兩岸關係，如ＥＣＦＡ等，使藍綠鬥爭掩蓋了國民黨內鬥；但第二任開始，美牛案、證所稅、油電雙漲，以迄現今的軍公教退休人員年終慰問金，及年金案等，卻皆是在國民黨內鬥及藍綠互鬥的交集地帶，馬英九頓臨內憂外患、腹背受敵的困境，加以不擅溝通，拙於表意，遂失主導話語權的優勢地位。
蔡正元的質疑帶著「法律」的包裝，有了「就法論法」的形貌；但此事的根本性質或必然效應仍是政治鬥爭；也就是國民黨的內鬥，而必將牽動藍綠互鬥。法律疑義或許必須由法院裁定，但國民黨內卻應當弄清楚，這一股反馬倒馬氛圍，究竟意欲何為。至少應知：這究竟是一個改革的議題，或是內鬥的題材？
改革或內鬥的分野之一，在於施政理念。馬政府的政策主軸是：一、兩岸關係；二、反貪；三、司法獨立；四、因應歷史擠兌（如證所稅、油電漲價、十二年國教、核電及年金等）。至少在前三項，皆可見馬政府的決志及成就；至於在因應歷史擠兌上，或因操作能力不足，或因對策出現偏差，以致陷入危境亂局，而難謂是理念的錯誤。所以，國民黨內可以反對馬英九兼任黨主席，卻未必能夠根本否定馬政府的施政理念。
改革或內鬥的分野之二，在於撕裂或整合。若以撕裂的手法，拉下馬英九是要製造一匹跛腳馬，並為「後馬團隊」鋪路；但跛腳馬影響施政，則國民黨若敗在二○一四及二○一六，尚有何「後馬團隊」可言？反之，若以整合的手法，則馬英九不兼黨主席，他只要維繫與黨主席的關係即可，黨務及立院的操作皆可委諸黨主席，其實亦是另一番局面。但以當年吳伯雄任黨主席的資望、柔軟、練達，與馬總統尚不能互為手足，則此番若另舉黨主席，究竟是要相輔相成或分庭抗禮？
若說這是「分裂的國民黨」，也許過甚其詞；但馬英九與少數立法委員之間的疏離與對立，卻是形成馬政府今日亂局的主因。有幾名國民黨籍唱反調的立法委員之言行，雖有時不無道理，但往往皆是「你說東來，我說西」而已；現在，蔡正元又演出這一幕，可謂禍起蕭牆之內。馬總統第二任以來，自油電雙漲、美牛案，迄今日的年金案，屢屢陷於政策反覆、父子騎驢；一方面固然是出自馬的領導失能，另一方面則亦是因立法院的生態混濁所致。
是否連任黨主席，成了馬英九的又一危機。由於有了「法律」包裝，似不易僅憑政治途徑解決；但若馬英九因此退選，在政治上即不啻象徵國民黨對他發動的不信任案。因而，國民黨及馬英九皆應深思，改革與內鬥有本質上的不同：改革可以整合，內鬥即是撕裂；改革注重理念的型塑，內鬥則著眼人物的去留。
其實，站在社會公眾的觀點，馬英九是否繼續兼任黨主席應是其次之事，主要是在馬的總統任期尚有三年多，整個國民黨能否帶領國家社會跳脫這個亂局與困境，委實令人深憂。
Tuesday, January 22, 2013
Obama at the Crossroads: The Rise and Fall of the United States
Obama at the Crossroads:
The Rise and Fall of the United States
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
January 22, 2013
Summary: The U.S. Presidential Inauguration a coronation of the world's most powerful individual. But this position is not an easy one to fill. President Obama knows the next four years will be strewn with obstacles. He knows this because he has filled this position for the past four years. As an old friend of his put it, he is more confident than he was four years ago. But he is also more isolated than he was four years ago, and he is black and blue all over.
Full text below:
The U.S. Presidential Inauguration a coronation of the world's most powerful individual. But this position is not an easy one to fill. President Obama knows the next four years will be strewn with obstacles. He knows this because he has filled this position for the past four years. As an old friend of his put it, he is more confident than he was four years ago. But he is also more isolated than he was four years ago, and he is black and blue all over.
Only 16 presidents in the history of the United States have ever won a second term. The voters have given him a tremendous vote of confidence. But they have also presented him with an enormous challenge. This is especially true for Obama. He is America's first black president. He made history. His first Inaugural Address, all about "hope and change," was especially inspiring.
He will be inaugurated yet again. But this time the luster is off his halo. No matter how eloquent Obama's second Inaugural Address might be, it will befall the same fate as those delivered by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. No one remembers their second Inaugural Addresses either. The number of people attending the inauguration has also fallen, from 1.8 million 500,000. As we can see, Obama fever has cooled substantially
When Obama steps down four years from now, he will leave behind a record of achievements. That is something Obama has been concerned about lately. He invited a number of historians to the White House for dinner, before his swearing in. He wants to know how future historians will judge him.
Like Taiwan, the United States is plagued by ruling vs. opposition party bickering. The problem is more serious than in the past. During Obama's first term, he boasted that he would end petty grievances. But the Republicans became increasingly extreme. They and Obama became increasingly polarized. During last year's election, Obama was severely criticized by his opponents. Following the election, he had no chance to heal. He forced the Republicans to make concessions on fiscal cliff policy. Now he is pushing for tougher gun control laws.
Republican hawks are ascendant. They are determined to limit the debt ceiling, as well as make spending cuts, in order to teach Obama a lesson. Some in the Democratic Party have also argued that Obama speech must not be a half-hearted appeal to solidarity. After all, the Democrats now have public support. They must underscore the differences between themselves and the opposition GOP. But most people think the inauguration should be an occasion for smoothing over partisan differences and consolidating a national consensus. The president is not the president of a political party. The president is the president of the entire nation. Obama's speech should reflect an atmosphere of solidarity.
This is what Taiwan lacks. Elections on Taiwan are perceived as instances of "winner takes all" and "the devil take the hindmost." As a result, the opposition party has no desire to attend the presidential inauguration. It also makes it difficult to heal the grudges from previous elections.
Obama is said to be studying his hero, Abraham Lincoln. One hundred and fifty years ago, during Lincoln's second term inauguration, the American Civil War raged. Lincoln spoke of binding the nation's wounds. Today, the United States faces challenges similar to those in the wake of the Civil War. The two sides remain at loggerheads. Only ruling and opposition party cooperation can enable to nation to cope.
The ruling and opposition parties must cooperate because the United States faces daunting challenges. The United States faces no immediate crisis. But the long-term crisis is unprecedented. America is wracked periodically by deficit battles between the ruling and opposition parties. This shows that Obama's governance has considerable room for improvement. The direct result is the decline in America's international reputation. Its allies fear that the United States' promises cannot be fulfilled. Its enemies search for weaknesses in its armor, at home and abroad. They are waiting for an opportunity to make their move. The challengers are testing America's bottom line.
There has never been a time like now. American power is on the wane. This is having a huge global impact. Prior to the 19th century, the United States was relatively isolated. It had no quarrels with other nations. But ever since the beginning of the 20th century, America has repeatedly challenged other nations the world over. The United States has behaved in an increasingly hawkish manner, leading to a century of global hegemony. Today, the United States must recognize that it is no longer is the sole global hegemon. Mainland China's economic strength will overtake the United States' in 2017. Europe and Japan are not what they used to be. Only America still commands deference. Obama does not want historians to record that he was the president who presided over the end of American hegemony.
But if Obama acts rashly, his term may well be characterized just that way. This is not because of his policies, but because of outside circumstances. Such developments are often beyond the control of the individual. For example, President George W. Bush's legacy will be all about the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Obama's legacy will be determined by the following two circumstances.
The first is the situation in the Middle East. Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Israel is on the verge of striking out. The increasingly hawkish Israeli Government may take countermeasures. Obama may face war with Iran. This will not merely affect the global energy supply and America's economic recovery. It also risks nuclear war.
The second is the situation in East Asia. The Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute between Japan and Mainland China is reminiscent of the dispute between Israel and the Muslim world. The United States is offering one-sided support to Japan. It is underestimating nationalism on Mainland China and Taiwan. This has forced Mainland China to put the United States on its enemies list. It also makes Taipei-Washington relations and cross-Strait relations highly volatile.
As an ally of the United States, we hope President Obama's second term is a success. But as a member of the international community, we cannot help worring about the next four years. The path is strewn with obstacles. How will Obama respond to domestic and foreign challenges and to his place in history? Only he can decide.
歐巴馬站在美國興衰的歷史關口
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.22 03:05 am
美國總統就職典禮，就像替全世界最有權力的人加冕，但是這個職位並不好做；歐巴馬總統非常清楚，未來四年充滿困難險阻，因為這個工作他已經做了四年。誠如他的老朋友所形容的，比起四年前，他更自信，但也更孤立，已是遍體鱗傷。
美國歷史上只有十六位總統曾經連任過，這是選民對他們莫大的信任，但是也構成他們莫大的挑戰；對歐巴馬尤其如此，他是第一位黑人總統，創造了歷史，他的第一任就職演說「希望與改變」，更是激勵人心。
此次就職，雖然還是他，但歷史光環已減，第二任就職演說，即使歐巴馬再雄辯滔滔，也會落入前任柯林頓、小布希總統一樣命運，沒有人記得他們的第二任就職演說，從參與就職典禮的人數，自一百八十萬銳減為五十萬，可見到期待的熱度已經退燒。
他四年卸任後，必須留下政績，而這也是歐巴馬近日非常在意的，在宣誓就職前，他已經邀請多位歷史學者赴白宮餐敘，希望了解史家將來會怎樣評價他。
像台灣一樣，美國如今也是朝野對立，而且比過去更嚴重，歐巴馬在第一任開始時，宣稱要融合歧見，但是隨著共和黨越來越極端，歐巴馬也越來越對抗，去年選舉期間，他就猛烈批評對手，選後還來不及療傷，逼共和黨在財政懸崖上讓步，現在又加上強硬推出槍枝管制法案。
共和黨目前主戰派抬頭，認為一定要在舉債上限，以及削減支出上，給歐巴馬好看，而民主黨也有人主張，歐巴馬演說中不應該和稀泥呼籲團結，既然自己有最新民意，就要明確點出自己與在野黨的不同，但是更多人認為就職典禮是凝塑全國共識的場合，總統不是任何黨派的總統，而是全國人民的總統，歐巴馬的演講中應該反映出團結的氣氛。
我們認為這正是台灣所缺乏的，選舉所帶來的成王敗寇觀念，讓在野黨不願意出席總統就職典禮，也讓台灣歷次選舉恩怨不易癒合。
歐巴馬據說會學習他的英雄林肯總統，在一百五十年前的第二任就職典禮上，針對南北內戰所撕裂的美國，呼籲「包紮國家的傷口」，此刻美國所面對的挑戰，比起內戰之後，不遑多讓，只有朝野兩黨合作，才能夠應付。
朝野需要合作，是因為美國正潛伏著險峻的挑戰，現在美國雖然沒有立即的危機，但長遠的危機是空前的，時時出現的財政赤字與朝野惡鬥，這都反映出歐巴馬治理未臻善境，直接造成國際聲望下跌，盟國擔心美國的承諾、無法實現，敵人則會尋找國內外漏洞、伺機攻擊，而挑戰者利用不同時空、來測試底線。
從來沒有一個時刻，像現在一樣，美國國力是在下跌中的，而且造成巨大的全球影響。在十九世紀之前，美國相對孤立，與世無爭，但廿世紀初以來，一次又一次全球挑戰，美國一再以更強健的方式回應，建立了一世紀的全球霸權。如今，美國則必須認清，自己已經不再是全球唯一霸主，中國的經濟實力會在二○一七年超越美國，歐洲與日本也不像過去，唯美國是從，歐巴馬絕不希望在自己卸任時，被史家認定為失去美國霸權的總統。
但是歐巴馬如果不謹慎因應，很可能他的任內，會落入上述的評價，這不是因為他的政策做了甚麼，而是因為外界突發事件，往往不是以個人意志為轉移的，就像小布希的總統評價，受到九一一恐怖攻擊事件所主導，而歐巴馬的端看未來兩個事件的變化所決定。
一是中東局勢，伊朗的核武發展，即將逼近以色列所稱的臨界點，越來越鷹派的以色列政府，會採取甚麼對策，歐巴馬將面臨與伊朗開戰的關頭，不僅會牽動全球能源供應與經濟復甦，更有核戰的風險。
二是在東亞，日本與中國大陸的釣魚台主權爭議，就像對以色列一樣，美國目前一邊倒的支持日本，低估中國大陸與台灣的民族主義，這讓中國開始把美國列入假想敵，也使得台美關係與兩岸關係，進入動盪不安的局面。
做為美國的友邦，我們期望歐巴馬總統的第二任，成功順利；但是做為國際社會的一份子，我們也不免憂心他的未來四年，充滿著險阻。歐巴馬要如何因應國內與國外的挑戰，他的歷史定位，只有他自己可以決定。
The Rise and Fall of the United States
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
January 22, 2013
Summary: The U.S. Presidential Inauguration a coronation of the world's most powerful individual. But this position is not an easy one to fill. President Obama knows the next four years will be strewn with obstacles. He knows this because he has filled this position for the past four years. As an old friend of his put it, he is more confident than he was four years ago. But he is also more isolated than he was four years ago, and he is black and blue all over.
Full text below:
The U.S. Presidential Inauguration a coronation of the world's most powerful individual. But this position is not an easy one to fill. President Obama knows the next four years will be strewn with obstacles. He knows this because he has filled this position for the past four years. As an old friend of his put it, he is more confident than he was four years ago. But he is also more isolated than he was four years ago, and he is black and blue all over.
Only 16 presidents in the history of the United States have ever won a second term. The voters have given him a tremendous vote of confidence. But they have also presented him with an enormous challenge. This is especially true for Obama. He is America's first black president. He made history. His first Inaugural Address, all about "hope and change," was especially inspiring.
He will be inaugurated yet again. But this time the luster is off his halo. No matter how eloquent Obama's second Inaugural Address might be, it will befall the same fate as those delivered by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. No one remembers their second Inaugural Addresses either. The number of people attending the inauguration has also fallen, from 1.8 million 500,000. As we can see, Obama fever has cooled substantially
When Obama steps down four years from now, he will leave behind a record of achievements. That is something Obama has been concerned about lately. He invited a number of historians to the White House for dinner, before his swearing in. He wants to know how future historians will judge him.
Like Taiwan, the United States is plagued by ruling vs. opposition party bickering. The problem is more serious than in the past. During Obama's first term, he boasted that he would end petty grievances. But the Republicans became increasingly extreme. They and Obama became increasingly polarized. During last year's election, Obama was severely criticized by his opponents. Following the election, he had no chance to heal. He forced the Republicans to make concessions on fiscal cliff policy. Now he is pushing for tougher gun control laws.
Republican hawks are ascendant. They are determined to limit the debt ceiling, as well as make spending cuts, in order to teach Obama a lesson. Some in the Democratic Party have also argued that Obama speech must not be a half-hearted appeal to solidarity. After all, the Democrats now have public support. They must underscore the differences between themselves and the opposition GOP. But most people think the inauguration should be an occasion for smoothing over partisan differences and consolidating a national consensus. The president is not the president of a political party. The president is the president of the entire nation. Obama's speech should reflect an atmosphere of solidarity.
This is what Taiwan lacks. Elections on Taiwan are perceived as instances of "winner takes all" and "the devil take the hindmost." As a result, the opposition party has no desire to attend the presidential inauguration. It also makes it difficult to heal the grudges from previous elections.
Obama is said to be studying his hero, Abraham Lincoln. One hundred and fifty years ago, during Lincoln's second term inauguration, the American Civil War raged. Lincoln spoke of binding the nation's wounds. Today, the United States faces challenges similar to those in the wake of the Civil War. The two sides remain at loggerheads. Only ruling and opposition party cooperation can enable to nation to cope.
The ruling and opposition parties must cooperate because the United States faces daunting challenges. The United States faces no immediate crisis. But the long-term crisis is unprecedented. America is wracked periodically by deficit battles between the ruling and opposition parties. This shows that Obama's governance has considerable room for improvement. The direct result is the decline in America's international reputation. Its allies fear that the United States' promises cannot be fulfilled. Its enemies search for weaknesses in its armor, at home and abroad. They are waiting for an opportunity to make their move. The challengers are testing America's bottom line.
There has never been a time like now. American power is on the wane. This is having a huge global impact. Prior to the 19th century, the United States was relatively isolated. It had no quarrels with other nations. But ever since the beginning of the 20th century, America has repeatedly challenged other nations the world over. The United States has behaved in an increasingly hawkish manner, leading to a century of global hegemony. Today, the United States must recognize that it is no longer is the sole global hegemon. Mainland China's economic strength will overtake the United States' in 2017. Europe and Japan are not what they used to be. Only America still commands deference. Obama does not want historians to record that he was the president who presided over the end of American hegemony.
But if Obama acts rashly, his term may well be characterized just that way. This is not because of his policies, but because of outside circumstances. Such developments are often beyond the control of the individual. For example, President George W. Bush's legacy will be all about the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Obama's legacy will be determined by the following two circumstances.
The first is the situation in the Middle East. Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Israel is on the verge of striking out. The increasingly hawkish Israeli Government may take countermeasures. Obama may face war with Iran. This will not merely affect the global energy supply and America's economic recovery. It also risks nuclear war.
The second is the situation in East Asia. The Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute between Japan and Mainland China is reminiscent of the dispute between Israel and the Muslim world. The United States is offering one-sided support to Japan. It is underestimating nationalism on Mainland China and Taiwan. This has forced Mainland China to put the United States on its enemies list. It also makes Taipei-Washington relations and cross-Strait relations highly volatile.
As an ally of the United States, we hope President Obama's second term is a success. But as a member of the international community, we cannot help worring about the next four years. The path is strewn with obstacles. How will Obama respond to domestic and foreign challenges and to his place in history? Only he can decide.
歐巴馬站在美國興衰的歷史關口
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.22 03:05 am
美國總統就職典禮，就像替全世界最有權力的人加冕，但是這個職位並不好做；歐巴馬總統非常清楚，未來四年充滿困難險阻，因為這個工作他已經做了四年。誠如他的老朋友所形容的，比起四年前，他更自信，但也更孤立，已是遍體鱗傷。
美國歷史上只有十六位總統曾經連任過，這是選民對他們莫大的信任，但是也構成他們莫大的挑戰；對歐巴馬尤其如此，他是第一位黑人總統，創造了歷史，他的第一任就職演說「希望與改變」，更是激勵人心。
此次就職，雖然還是他，但歷史光環已減，第二任就職演說，即使歐巴馬再雄辯滔滔，也會落入前任柯林頓、小布希總統一樣命運，沒有人記得他們的第二任就職演說，從參與就職典禮的人數，自一百八十萬銳減為五十萬，可見到期待的熱度已經退燒。
他四年卸任後，必須留下政績，而這也是歐巴馬近日非常在意的，在宣誓就職前，他已經邀請多位歷史學者赴白宮餐敘，希望了解史家將來會怎樣評價他。
像台灣一樣，美國如今也是朝野對立，而且比過去更嚴重，歐巴馬在第一任開始時，宣稱要融合歧見，但是隨著共和黨越來越極端，歐巴馬也越來越對抗，去年選舉期間，他就猛烈批評對手，選後還來不及療傷，逼共和黨在財政懸崖上讓步，現在又加上強硬推出槍枝管制法案。
共和黨目前主戰派抬頭，認為一定要在舉債上限，以及削減支出上，給歐巴馬好看，而民主黨也有人主張，歐巴馬演說中不應該和稀泥呼籲團結，既然自己有最新民意，就要明確點出自己與在野黨的不同，但是更多人認為就職典禮是凝塑全國共識的場合，總統不是任何黨派的總統，而是全國人民的總統，歐巴馬的演講中應該反映出團結的氣氛。
我們認為這正是台灣所缺乏的，選舉所帶來的成王敗寇觀念，讓在野黨不願意出席總統就職典禮，也讓台灣歷次選舉恩怨不易癒合。
歐巴馬據說會學習他的英雄林肯總統，在一百五十年前的第二任就職典禮上，針對南北內戰所撕裂的美國，呼籲「包紮國家的傷口」，此刻美國所面對的挑戰，比起內戰之後，不遑多讓，只有朝野兩黨合作，才能夠應付。
朝野需要合作，是因為美國正潛伏著險峻的挑戰，現在美國雖然沒有立即的危機，但長遠的危機是空前的，時時出現的財政赤字與朝野惡鬥，這都反映出歐巴馬治理未臻善境，直接造成國際聲望下跌，盟國擔心美國的承諾、無法實現，敵人則會尋找國內外漏洞、伺機攻擊，而挑戰者利用不同時空、來測試底線。
從來沒有一個時刻，像現在一樣，美國國力是在下跌中的，而且造成巨大的全球影響。在十九世紀之前，美國相對孤立，與世無爭，但廿世紀初以來，一次又一次全球挑戰，美國一再以更強健的方式回應，建立了一世紀的全球霸權。如今，美國則必須認清，自己已經不再是全球唯一霸主，中國的經濟實力會在二○一七年超越美國，歐洲與日本也不像過去，唯美國是從，歐巴馬絕不希望在自己卸任時，被史家認定為失去美國霸權的總統。
但是歐巴馬如果不謹慎因應，很可能他的任內，會落入上述的評價，這不是因為他的政策做了甚麼，而是因為外界突發事件，往往不是以個人意志為轉移的，就像小布希的總統評價，受到九一一恐怖攻擊事件所主導，而歐巴馬的端看未來兩個事件的變化所決定。
一是中東局勢，伊朗的核武發展，即將逼近以色列所稱的臨界點，越來越鷹派的以色列政府，會採取甚麼對策，歐巴馬將面臨與伊朗開戰的關頭，不僅會牽動全球能源供應與經濟復甦，更有核戰的風險。
二是在東亞，日本與中國大陸的釣魚台主權爭議，就像對以色列一樣，美國目前一邊倒的支持日本，低估中國大陸與台灣的民族主義，這讓中國開始把美國列入假想敵，也使得台美關係與兩岸關係，進入動盪不安的局面。
做為美國的友邦，我們期望歐巴馬總統的第二任，成功順利；但是做為國際社會的一份子，我們也不免憂心他的未來四年，充滿著險阻。歐巴馬要如何因應國內與國外的挑戰，他的歷史定位，只有他自己可以決定。
Monday, January 21, 2013
Diaoyutai Islands Crisis: Acknowledge the Dispute to Shelve the Dispute
Diaoyutai Islands Crisis:
Acknowledge the Dispute to Shelve the Dispute
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A translation
January 19, 2013
Summary: From Taipei's perspective, Beijing and Tokyo's aircraft and ships are traveling back on forth in Republic of China territorial waters and airspace. We cannot "stand atop the mountain and watch horses kick each other below." We must maintain peace in the Diaoyutai Islands.
Full text below:
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made three visits to ASEAN nations. His visits are seen as an effort to "contain" the Chinese mainland. Former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio visited Mainland China. He went to the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall to issue a sincere apology.
Meanwhile, the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute continues raging. The two very different actions offered a powerful contrast. Members of the Japanese public have different opinions on how to conduct Sino-Japanese relations, and how to respond to the Diaoyutai Islands crisis. The two politicians' conduct merely reflect these differences in public opinion.
Shintaro Ishihara represents the extreme right-wing. He advocates repealing the peace constitution, manufacturing atomic bombs to use against China. On the other hand, Kenzaburo Oe urges the Japanese government to cease alleging that "There is no territorial dispute." Haruki Murakami says "Territorial ambition is like strong liquor. Afterwards one wakes up with a terrible headache and finds oneself stripped clean." Public opinion is divided. This makes political leadership even more important.
After all, China and Japan have a past that no one wishes to repeat. Now they must deal with the Diaoyutai Islands conflict. Mainstream opinion on Japan favors the right-wing. But Hatoyama, Oe, and Murakami also have support among the public. Japanese politicians must cherish democratic freedom and democratic debate. They must correct public misconceptions, not fan populist sentiment. Japan is at a crossroads. The entire country is at risk.
Japan today is a democracy that engages in rational debate. Think back to 70 or 80 years ago. Japan had no room for rational debate. During the 1930s Japanese invaded China and waged a Pacific War.
Japan invaded China. It launched its "Southern Expansion Doctrine," its "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Doctrine," and the Pacific War. There was no shortage of internal dissent. But under the militarist regime, there was no room for rational debate. The military hijacked the cabinet. The Cabinet threatened the Emperor. The Emperor supported the military. The entire country marched down a path of no return. Recall Emperor Hirohito's belated assessment of Prime Minister Konoe Mo: "Without any preparation, he led us into war. Once the war began, we could only pursue it to the end." Recall Harada Kumao's assessment of Konoe Mo. "Prime Minister Konoe Mo is like Mount Fuji. From afar it is beautiful. But up close it is merely a pile of ugly rocks. Having someone like him as Prime Minister sends a chill up one's spine.
That was an era during which rational debate was impossible. Today should be an era of rational debate. Japanese politicians should use democracy to encourage rational thought. They should not use democracy to incite populist sentiment.
The best way to deal with the Diaoyutai Islands conflict is to "maintain the disputed status quo" in order to ensure a peaceful settlement. This is the view expressed in the first editorial this newspaper wrote in response to the Diaoyutai Islands conflict. We still see it this way today. Even the United States says it takes no position on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. It says it gave Japan the right to administer the islands, nothing more. Yet Prime Minister Shinzo Abe insists that Japanese sovereignty over the "Senkaku Islands" is not in question. He insists that there is no room for negotiation, and that Japan will not allow the "Senkaku Islands" to become an object of negotiation. He rejects the "disputed status quo."
Prime Minister Abe insists that "The Senkaku Islands are Japanese territory." He insists that this is a simple matter of fact. But if it is, why did he promise not to station Japanese officials on the island? Could it be because sovereignty over the island remains disputed? By contrast, Beijing says that "We have not overflown Diaoyutai Islands airspace. We have already exercised self-restraint." This is tantamount to accepting "disputed status." Japan should agree not to station officials on the islands. Beijing should agree not to overfly the islands' airspace. To assert that the sovereignty of the islands is not in dispute is irrational. Such a claim is reminiscent of Mount Fuji. It may look attractive from a distance, but not from up close.
The Diaoyutai Islands conflict has turned into a Mexican standoff. It is an explosive situation. The concerned parties should acknowledge the islands' disputed status. They should then shelve the dispute. Neither side should dispatch aircraft or ships to make shows of force or to test the waters to maintain the islands' "disputed status." The politicians must acknowledge the islands' disputed status, either verbally or in writing. This will avoid risk to their aircraft and ships.
One must acknowledge a dispute before one can shelve a dispute. Refusal to acknowledge a dispute will merely make it impossible to end a dispute. Aircraft and ships must then be used to maintain the disputed status. The Abe Cabinet must bear the bulk of the responsibility. Japan has the advantage of "effective management" of the islands. If it refuses to acknowledge the islands' "disputed status," its opponents will not be able to show weakness. Otherwise one wrong move, and all bets are off.
From Taipei's perspective, Beijing and Tokyo's aircraft and ships are traveling back on forth in Republic of China territorial waters and airspace. We cannot "stand atop the mountain and watch horses kick each other below." We must maintain peace in the Diaoyutai Islands.
釣島危機：承認爭議，始能擱置爭議
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.19 02:15 am
正當日本首相安倍晉三進行東盟三國訪問，而被視為有策動「圍堵」中國大陸之意時；前首相鳩山由紀夫訪中，赴「南京大屠殺紀念館」致哀，並表示由衷道歉。
正值釣島主權爭議急遽升溫之際，兩人的鮮明動作所反映的強烈反差顯示：日本公眾對如何處理中日關係及如何因應釣魚台危機，存有不同的立場；二人的表現，只是反映了民眾見解的差異。
例如，以石原慎太郎為代表的極右翼，主張以廢除《和平憲法》，製造原子彈來對付中國；但也有大江健三郎主張，日本政府應停止「領土爭議問題不存在」的虛構認知；而村上春樹也說：「領土狂熱，猶如劣酒；醒後頭痛，一無所有。」在這種分歧的民意中，政治人物的抉擇與領導就更為重要。
畢竟，中日兩國曾有一段不堪回首的過去。如今面對釣島事件，即使日本的民意以右傾為主流，但如鳩山、大江及村上的思考亦必定存在於民間。日本的政治人物應當珍惜自由民主的思辨體制，來協助導正國民的認知；而不可利用民粹的氛圍煽風點火，將整個國家引致歧路危境。
因為，日本今日畢竟是一可以理性思辨的民主體制；如果將時間推到七、八十年前，日本就不具理性思辨的空間。此處要說的是，一九三○年代的日本侵華與一九四○年代的太平洋戰爭。
當年，日本在發動侵華、南進論、大東亞共榮圈及太平洋戰爭時，內部不是沒有議論，但在軍國體制下卻不具理性思辨的空間。軍部挾持內閣，內閣脅制天皇，天皇支持軍部，整個國家就踏上了不歸路。如今回視裕仁天皇事後評論首相近衛文?：「毫無準備就帶領我們進入戰爭……一旦開戰了，就只能進行到底。」再看當時的原田熊雄評近衛文?：「近衛首相像富士山，從遠望去很漂亮，但近看全是岩石，粗糙不堪……由這樣的人擔任首相，真是叫人寒心哪。」
那是一個不具理性思辨的年代，但今日卻是應當體現理性思辨的時代。日本的政治人物應當用民主來引導民眾的理性思維，而不是用民主來鼓動民眾的民粹情緒。
釣島事件的最佳對策即是「維持爭議狀態」，以徐圖和平解決，這是本報在此次釣島風潮中所寫的第一篇社論所持的觀點，現今亦作如是觀。其實，連美國亦稱，對釣島的主權不持立場，移交給日本的只是行政權或管理權。然而，安倍晉三首相卻說，日本對尖閣群島的主權無庸置疑，沒有談判餘地，也不會讓尖閣群島成為談判對象。此一立場，是在否定「維持爭議狀態」。
事實卻是，倘若安倍首相以「尖閣群島為日本領土」係理所當然之事，又為何承諾不在島上派駐公務員，難道不是因為「爭議狀態」？相對而言，北京方面稱「未穿越釣島領空，已是自我節制」，亦形同接受了「爭議狀態」。釣島未來的局面，應當即是維持在「日本不派駐公務員／北京不穿越領空」的雙方底線之間；在此種情勢下堅稱「釣島主權不容爭議」，這絕不是理性思考，而會不會又是一座可以遠觀不可近玩的富士山？
釣島問題已成僵局，亦成一觸即發的危局。相關各方，應當經由「承認爭議」，轉至「擱置爭議」。亦即不必用飛機、船艦的相互示威及試探，來維持此種「爭議狀態」；只須以政治領袖的言語或文字承認「爭議狀態」，即可免去用飛機船艦的成本與風險。
承認爭議，始能擱置爭議；不承認爭議，即不可能止息爭議，而必須用飛機、船艦來「維持爭議狀態」。在這一方面，安倍內閣應負較大的責任；因為，日本在釣島既已占有「實際管理」的優勢，若不承認「爭議狀態」，對手自然不能示弱，以免一棋失手，全盤皆輸。
對於台灣而言，中國大陸與日本的飛機、船艦，正在釣魚台「中華民國領海領空」上尬來尬去；我們不能只是「站高山看馬相踢」，而應為維持釣島的「和平爭議」出一些心力。
Acknowledge the Dispute to Shelve the Dispute
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A translation
January 19, 2013
Summary: From Taipei's perspective, Beijing and Tokyo's aircraft and ships are traveling back on forth in Republic of China territorial waters and airspace. We cannot "stand atop the mountain and watch horses kick each other below." We must maintain peace in the Diaoyutai Islands.
Full text below:
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made three visits to ASEAN nations. His visits are seen as an effort to "contain" the Chinese mainland. Former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio visited Mainland China. He went to the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall to issue a sincere apology.
Meanwhile, the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute continues raging. The two very different actions offered a powerful contrast. Members of the Japanese public have different opinions on how to conduct Sino-Japanese relations, and how to respond to the Diaoyutai Islands crisis. The two politicians' conduct merely reflect these differences in public opinion.
Shintaro Ishihara represents the extreme right-wing. He advocates repealing the peace constitution, manufacturing atomic bombs to use against China. On the other hand, Kenzaburo Oe urges the Japanese government to cease alleging that "There is no territorial dispute." Haruki Murakami says "Territorial ambition is like strong liquor. Afterwards one wakes up with a terrible headache and finds oneself stripped clean." Public opinion is divided. This makes political leadership even more important.
After all, China and Japan have a past that no one wishes to repeat. Now they must deal with the Diaoyutai Islands conflict. Mainstream opinion on Japan favors the right-wing. But Hatoyama, Oe, and Murakami also have support among the public. Japanese politicians must cherish democratic freedom and democratic debate. They must correct public misconceptions, not fan populist sentiment. Japan is at a crossroads. The entire country is at risk.
Japan today is a democracy that engages in rational debate. Think back to 70 or 80 years ago. Japan had no room for rational debate. During the 1930s Japanese invaded China and waged a Pacific War.
Japan invaded China. It launched its "Southern Expansion Doctrine," its "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Doctrine," and the Pacific War. There was no shortage of internal dissent. But under the militarist regime, there was no room for rational debate. The military hijacked the cabinet. The Cabinet threatened the Emperor. The Emperor supported the military. The entire country marched down a path of no return. Recall Emperor Hirohito's belated assessment of Prime Minister Konoe Mo: "Without any preparation, he led us into war. Once the war began, we could only pursue it to the end." Recall Harada Kumao's assessment of Konoe Mo. "Prime Minister Konoe Mo is like Mount Fuji. From afar it is beautiful. But up close it is merely a pile of ugly rocks. Having someone like him as Prime Minister sends a chill up one's spine.
That was an era during which rational debate was impossible. Today should be an era of rational debate. Japanese politicians should use democracy to encourage rational thought. They should not use democracy to incite populist sentiment.
The best way to deal with the Diaoyutai Islands conflict is to "maintain the disputed status quo" in order to ensure a peaceful settlement. This is the view expressed in the first editorial this newspaper wrote in response to the Diaoyutai Islands conflict. We still see it this way today. Even the United States says it takes no position on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. It says it gave Japan the right to administer the islands, nothing more. Yet Prime Minister Shinzo Abe insists that Japanese sovereignty over the "Senkaku Islands" is not in question. He insists that there is no room for negotiation, and that Japan will not allow the "Senkaku Islands" to become an object of negotiation. He rejects the "disputed status quo."
Prime Minister Abe insists that "The Senkaku Islands are Japanese territory." He insists that this is a simple matter of fact. But if it is, why did he promise not to station Japanese officials on the island? Could it be because sovereignty over the island remains disputed? By contrast, Beijing says that "We have not overflown Diaoyutai Islands airspace. We have already exercised self-restraint." This is tantamount to accepting "disputed status." Japan should agree not to station officials on the islands. Beijing should agree not to overfly the islands' airspace. To assert that the sovereignty of the islands is not in dispute is irrational. Such a claim is reminiscent of Mount Fuji. It may look attractive from a distance, but not from up close.
The Diaoyutai Islands conflict has turned into a Mexican standoff. It is an explosive situation. The concerned parties should acknowledge the islands' disputed status. They should then shelve the dispute. Neither side should dispatch aircraft or ships to make shows of force or to test the waters to maintain the islands' "disputed status." The politicians must acknowledge the islands' disputed status, either verbally or in writing. This will avoid risk to their aircraft and ships.
One must acknowledge a dispute before one can shelve a dispute. Refusal to acknowledge a dispute will merely make it impossible to end a dispute. Aircraft and ships must then be used to maintain the disputed status. The Abe Cabinet must bear the bulk of the responsibility. Japan has the advantage of "effective management" of the islands. If it refuses to acknowledge the islands' "disputed status," its opponents will not be able to show weakness. Otherwise one wrong move, and all bets are off.
From Taipei's perspective, Beijing and Tokyo's aircraft and ships are traveling back on forth in Republic of China territorial waters and airspace. We cannot "stand atop the mountain and watch horses kick each other below." We must maintain peace in the Diaoyutai Islands.
釣島危機：承認爭議，始能擱置爭議
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.19 02:15 am
正當日本首相安倍晉三進行東盟三國訪問，而被視為有策動「圍堵」中國大陸之意時；前首相鳩山由紀夫訪中，赴「南京大屠殺紀念館」致哀，並表示由衷道歉。
正值釣島主權爭議急遽升溫之際，兩人的鮮明動作所反映的強烈反差顯示：日本公眾對如何處理中日關係及如何因應釣魚台危機，存有不同的立場；二人的表現，只是反映了民眾見解的差異。
例如，以石原慎太郎為代表的極右翼，主張以廢除《和平憲法》，製造原子彈來對付中國；但也有大江健三郎主張，日本政府應停止「領土爭議問題不存在」的虛構認知；而村上春樹也說：「領土狂熱，猶如劣酒；醒後頭痛，一無所有。」在這種分歧的民意中，政治人物的抉擇與領導就更為重要。
畢竟，中日兩國曾有一段不堪回首的過去。如今面對釣島事件，即使日本的民意以右傾為主流，但如鳩山、大江及村上的思考亦必定存在於民間。日本的政治人物應當珍惜自由民主的思辨體制，來協助導正國民的認知；而不可利用民粹的氛圍煽風點火，將整個國家引致歧路危境。
因為，日本今日畢竟是一可以理性思辨的民主體制；如果將時間推到七、八十年前，日本就不具理性思辨的空間。此處要說的是，一九三○年代的日本侵華與一九四○年代的太平洋戰爭。
當年，日本在發動侵華、南進論、大東亞共榮圈及太平洋戰爭時，內部不是沒有議論，但在軍國體制下卻不具理性思辨的空間。軍部挾持內閣，內閣脅制天皇，天皇支持軍部，整個國家就踏上了不歸路。如今回視裕仁天皇事後評論首相近衛文?：「毫無準備就帶領我們進入戰爭……一旦開戰了，就只能進行到底。」再看當時的原田熊雄評近衛文?：「近衛首相像富士山，從遠望去很漂亮，但近看全是岩石，粗糙不堪……由這樣的人擔任首相，真是叫人寒心哪。」
那是一個不具理性思辨的年代，但今日卻是應當體現理性思辨的時代。日本的政治人物應當用民主來引導民眾的理性思維，而不是用民主來鼓動民眾的民粹情緒。
釣島事件的最佳對策即是「維持爭議狀態」，以徐圖和平解決，這是本報在此次釣島風潮中所寫的第一篇社論所持的觀點，現今亦作如是觀。其實，連美國亦稱，對釣島的主權不持立場，移交給日本的只是行政權或管理權。然而，安倍晉三首相卻說，日本對尖閣群島的主權無庸置疑，沒有談判餘地，也不會讓尖閣群島成為談判對象。此一立場，是在否定「維持爭議狀態」。
事實卻是，倘若安倍首相以「尖閣群島為日本領土」係理所當然之事，又為何承諾不在島上派駐公務員，難道不是因為「爭議狀態」？相對而言，北京方面稱「未穿越釣島領空，已是自我節制」，亦形同接受了「爭議狀態」。釣島未來的局面，應當即是維持在「日本不派駐公務員／北京不穿越領空」的雙方底線之間；在此種情勢下堅稱「釣島主權不容爭議」，這絕不是理性思考，而會不會又是一座可以遠觀不可近玩的富士山？
釣島問題已成僵局，亦成一觸即發的危局。相關各方，應當經由「承認爭議」，轉至「擱置爭議」。亦即不必用飛機、船艦的相互示威及試探，來維持此種「爭議狀態」；只須以政治領袖的言語或文字承認「爭議狀態」，即可免去用飛機船艦的成本與風險。
承認爭議，始能擱置爭議；不承認爭議，即不可能止息爭議，而必須用飛機、船艦來「維持爭議狀態」。在這一方面，安倍內閣應負較大的責任；因為，日本在釣島既已占有「實際管理」的優勢，若不承認「爭議狀態」，對手自然不能示弱，以免一棋失手，全盤皆輸。
對於台灣而言，中國大陸與日本的飛機、船艦，正在釣魚台「中華民國領海領空」上尬來尬去；我們不能只是「站高山看馬相踢」，而應為維持釣島的「和平爭議」出一些心力。
Thursday, January 17, 2013
Sacrifices in the National Interest: ROC, or USA?
Sacrifices in the National Interest: ROC, or USA?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 18, 2012
Summary: The truth is, Taipei may have no choice but to be Washington's tool. It may have to be Washington's pawn in its effort to contain Mainland China. But changes are taking place, both short-term and long. We must distinguish between being active and being passive. The Ma Ying-jeou administration must maintain a sense of direction. It must see the Big Picture. It must distinguish between right and wrong. It must turn passivity into activity. It must maximize Taipei's advantage. Taipei's direction will then be self-evident.
Full Text below:
President Ma Ying-jeou met with U.S. Senator Murkowski on the 15th. He said cross-Strait relations and Taipei-Washington relations do not conflict. He said the Republic of China government will continue purchasing advanced weapons from the United States, to ensure national security and maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait. But Taipei will also continue to improve relations with Mainland China. It will continue to expand bilateral exchanges. Simply put, arms sales from the US and cross-Strait reconciliation will coexist.
The day before, former AIT Director Richard Bush published a summary of his new book, "The Unknown Strait," at the Brookings Institution website. He said that if Beijing is hoping Washington will abandon Taipei, it is in for a disappointment. He said U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are not the biggest obstacle to reunification across the Strait. He said Washington's current policy will encourage Beijing to be more creative and seek a better way to resolve cross-Strait disputes. Put plainly, Washington has no intention of letting go.
On the surface, some of the arguments in President Ma's remarks and Richard Bush's new book make sense. But both men are merely looking after their own interests. At the theoretical level, both fail to see the strategic picture. Both lack vision. In practice, their views contain blind spots and internal contradictions. Everyone wants to avoid risk. But the current practice is to procratinate, and hope that circumstances will change for the better. But this "feeling one's way across the river" approach may not be the answer.
From President Ma's perspective, Taipei will continue improving relations with the Mainland. It will increase interaction and exchanges with the Mainland. Taipei must also be able to to defend itself. One must never assume that one's enemy is not coming. One must always ensure that one can defend oneself. U.S. arms sales mean that Taipei and Beijing cannot engage in comprehensive, long-term military confrontation. But perhaps they can offer the public on Taiwan temporary psychological reassurances. Perhaps they can show Washington's determination to defend Taipei. The two appear to go hand in hand. They seem to have no down side.
Taipei cannot and should not bet its future on the Beijing's good faith. It cannot bet its future on US arms purchases it cannot afford. Otherwise it will end ups as Washington's anti-China tool and patsy. It could even provoke a cross-Strait arms race. That would hardly be consistent with the interests of the Republic of China or the Chinese people as a whole. After all, national and ethnic identity on Taiwan are also involved. Many considerations must be weighed against each other. Taipei must be extremely cautious.
Richard Bush warned Taipei not to give Beijing the impression that reunification is hopeless. Do not make Beijing lose patience and misjudge the situation, he warned. Taipei must strengthen Taiwan's economy and reform the ROC's political system. It must prevent cross-Strait relations from becoming an asymmetrical form of interdependence. It must increase the price Beijing must pay if it attempts to pressure Taipei. Superficially such arguments sound reasonable. But on closer examination, they are actually rather questionable.
Washington has long urged the two sides to maintain a dynamic balance. The two sides should not increase tensions, thereby upsetting the status quo. But Washington's definition of the status quo must be clarified. On the one hand, Washington hopes that cross-Strait relations will improve, that the two sides will increase cross-Strait exchanges and reduce regional tensions. On the other hand, it wants to maintain over the situation. It does not want the two sides to move too fast, and become too close. Washington cares only about its own interests. It refuses to allow Taiwan independence. It also refuses to allow reunification. It refuses to allow Taipei to provoke the Mainland. It also refuses to allow Beijing to use force.
In concrete terms, Taipei's arms purchases merely fulfill its own false and temporary psychological need for security. But they are consistent with Washington's military interests. Taipei cannot and must not accept unreasonable terms for reunification imposed by Beijing. But for Taipei, Washington's continued intervention in cross-Strait affairs reeks of insufferable arrogance. It can only undermine future opportunities for cross-Strait integration. Washington wants Taipei to adopt the lowest possible standards. It does not want Beijing to feel that reunification is hopeless. Such thinking may accord wtih Washington's interests. But does it accord with the best interests of the public on Taiwan and the Mainland? That is debatable.
In fact, knowledgeable parties in the US understand that as long as the two sides reduce tensions, increase interaction, increase people to people exchanges, intermarry, and facilitate investments, then relations between Taiwan and the Mainland will become closer. Taiwan's need for psychological and military assurances will change. The process will take time. But this natural process is not subject to personal whims. One day Washington's policy of procrastination will no longer be viable.
Former American Institute in Taiwan Representative Stephen M. Young said that he is neither pro-blue, nor pro-green, he is pro-American. Similarly, Richard Bush's views reflect Washington's interests. Will Washington abandon Taipei? This question will be decided by whether it is in Washington's national interests. Washington's dismal record in this respect is well known. One need only recall the Polish uprising, the Prague Spring, the fall of South Vietnam, the assassination of President Allende in Chile.
The truth is, Taipei may have no choice but to be Washington's tool. It may have to be Washington's pawn in its effort to contain Mainland China. But changes are taking place, both short-term and long. We must distinguish between being active and being passive. The Ma Ying-jeou administration must maintain a sense of direction. It must see the Big Picture. It must distinguish between right and wrong. It must turn passivity into activity. It must maximize Taipei's advantage. Taipei's direction will then be self-evident.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.01.18
社論－在棄台與棄美間 審思國家最高利益
本報訊
馬英九總統十五日接見美國聯邦參議員穆考斯基時表示，兩岸關係與台美關係的發展並不衝突，因此中華民國政府將來會繼續向美國採購各項先進武器，以保障國家安全和維護台海和平，但台灣同時也要持續和中國大陸改善關係，擴大雙方交流。簡單的說，這就是武器照買、和解照走。
此前一天，美國在台協會前理事主席卜睿哲在布魯金斯研究院網站發表《未知的海峽》新書摘要，略稱北京若寄望美國放棄台灣這是行不通的，美國對台軍售並非兩岸無法統一的最大障礙，美國堅持現行政策將會促使中共以更具創意、更有意義的方式來解決兩岸爭議等等。直白的講，這就是美國無意放手。
表面上，馬總統的講話和卜睿哲新作中的某些觀點都能言之成理，但也都只是從各自的角度和利益出發。在理論上，既缺乏戰略的高度，也沒有新的視野，而且在實踐上，還有其盲點和內生的矛盾存在。大家都只想「避險」，但目前這種以拖待變及摸著石頭過河的做法與想法，恐有進一步討論的空間。
從馬總統的角度來看，台灣一方面要和中國大陸持續改善關係，加強互動與往來，但另一方也要有自衛的能力，勿恃敵之不來、而恃我有備之，對美軍事採購即使無法讓台北與北京進行全面、長期的軍事對抗，但或許可以暫時滿足台灣心理上的安全感，同時對美展現台灣自衛的決心。兩者並行不悖，似乎好處全拿。
台灣當然不能、也不應把自身前途寄託在對岸不確定的善意上，但持續以超過能力所及的對美軍購，萬一使自己成了美國的反華工具或剝削對象，甚而造成兩岸軍備競賽，這些都並不符合中華民國和整個民族的利益，畢竟這其中還涉及台灣的自我定位與國家、民族的認同問題。輕重之間的拿捏，台北必須極為謹慎。
卜睿哲在書中提醒台灣，不要讓中共產生統一無望的印象，不要使北京喪失耐心，錯估整體形勢，而要加強台灣的經濟發展，進行政治體制改革，避免兩岸關係發展成一種不對稱的相互依賴，要增加北京萬一對台施壓的成本和不確定性。這些主張表面還算可以理解，但一經深入思考就發現其中頗有可資商榷之處。
從過去到現在，美國一直主張兩岸維持動態的平衡，兩岸都不應增加緊張，破壞現狀，但現狀的定義卻是要由美國來加以界定；美國一方面希望兩岸關係能夠改善，雙方加強往來，降低區域緊張，但又不希望在華府不能掌握的情況下，兩岸走得太快、太近。美國在乎的只是自己的利益，既不准台灣獨立、也不讓兩岸統一，不要台灣挑釁，但也不許中共動武。
具體的說，台灣對美軍購固然滿足了自己虛假、暫時的安全感，但更成就了美國的軍工利益；台灣確實不能也不宜接受中共所設定的不合理統一條件，但讓美國不斷插手兩岸事務，對台灣頤指氣使，亦將破壞兩岸未來整合的機會。美國只希望台灣採取最低的標準，不要讓大陸對統一感到絕望，而目前這種想像中的奢望或許更符合美國的利益，但這是否也符合兩岸之間的最大利益，顯有討論的空間。
其實，美國有識之士也已看出，只要兩岸降低緊張，加強互動，民眾往來、通婚、投資更為便利，雙方關係自然將會更為緊密，屆時台灣的心理和實體防衛需求自然隨之調整；這雖然需要一段發展的過程，但這種自然的規律並不隨人的主觀意志而轉移，美國當前的這種以拖待變的政策終將有無以為繼的一天。
就像在台協會前駐台代表楊甦棣所說，他既不親藍、也不親綠，他只親美。同樣的，卜睿哲的觀點反映和追求的主要還是美國的國家利益，美國的棄台與否完全是由美國的國家利益來決定。美國承諾的記錄不佳眾所皆知，從當年的波蘭抗暴、捷克的自由化事件到後來的南越淪陷、智利的阿葉德總統遇害都是例子。
在現實上，台灣或許不得不被美國利用，做為牽制中國大陸發展的棋子，但在長短期效應變化、主動與被動之間還是應有所區別、掌握；馬英九政府如果能夠抓穩方向、掌握大局、明辨是非，化被動為主動，發揮台灣尚有的優勢，台灣的何去何從應該已經不言自明。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 18, 2012
Summary: The truth is, Taipei may have no choice but to be Washington's tool. It may have to be Washington's pawn in its effort to contain Mainland China. But changes are taking place, both short-term and long. We must distinguish between being active and being passive. The Ma Ying-jeou administration must maintain a sense of direction. It must see the Big Picture. It must distinguish between right and wrong. It must turn passivity into activity. It must maximize Taipei's advantage. Taipei's direction will then be self-evident.
Full Text below:
President Ma Ying-jeou met with U.S. Senator Murkowski on the 15th. He said cross-Strait relations and Taipei-Washington relations do not conflict. He said the Republic of China government will continue purchasing advanced weapons from the United States, to ensure national security and maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait. But Taipei will also continue to improve relations with Mainland China. It will continue to expand bilateral exchanges. Simply put, arms sales from the US and cross-Strait reconciliation will coexist.
The day before, former AIT Director Richard Bush published a summary of his new book, "The Unknown Strait," at the Brookings Institution website. He said that if Beijing is hoping Washington will abandon Taipei, it is in for a disappointment. He said U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are not the biggest obstacle to reunification across the Strait. He said Washington's current policy will encourage Beijing to be more creative and seek a better way to resolve cross-Strait disputes. Put plainly, Washington has no intention of letting go.
On the surface, some of the arguments in President Ma's remarks and Richard Bush's new book make sense. But both men are merely looking after their own interests. At the theoretical level, both fail to see the strategic picture. Both lack vision. In practice, their views contain blind spots and internal contradictions. Everyone wants to avoid risk. But the current practice is to procratinate, and hope that circumstances will change for the better. But this "feeling one's way across the river" approach may not be the answer.
From President Ma's perspective, Taipei will continue improving relations with the Mainland. It will increase interaction and exchanges with the Mainland. Taipei must also be able to to defend itself. One must never assume that one's enemy is not coming. One must always ensure that one can defend oneself. U.S. arms sales mean that Taipei and Beijing cannot engage in comprehensive, long-term military confrontation. But perhaps they can offer the public on Taiwan temporary psychological reassurances. Perhaps they can show Washington's determination to defend Taipei. The two appear to go hand in hand. They seem to have no down side.
Taipei cannot and should not bet its future on the Beijing's good faith. It cannot bet its future on US arms purchases it cannot afford. Otherwise it will end ups as Washington's anti-China tool and patsy. It could even provoke a cross-Strait arms race. That would hardly be consistent with the interests of the Republic of China or the Chinese people as a whole. After all, national and ethnic identity on Taiwan are also involved. Many considerations must be weighed against each other. Taipei must be extremely cautious.
Richard Bush warned Taipei not to give Beijing the impression that reunification is hopeless. Do not make Beijing lose patience and misjudge the situation, he warned. Taipei must strengthen Taiwan's economy and reform the ROC's political system. It must prevent cross-Strait relations from becoming an asymmetrical form of interdependence. It must increase the price Beijing must pay if it attempts to pressure Taipei. Superficially such arguments sound reasonable. But on closer examination, they are actually rather questionable.
Washington has long urged the two sides to maintain a dynamic balance. The two sides should not increase tensions, thereby upsetting the status quo. But Washington's definition of the status quo must be clarified. On the one hand, Washington hopes that cross-Strait relations will improve, that the two sides will increase cross-Strait exchanges and reduce regional tensions. On the other hand, it wants to maintain over the situation. It does not want the two sides to move too fast, and become too close. Washington cares only about its own interests. It refuses to allow Taiwan independence. It also refuses to allow reunification. It refuses to allow Taipei to provoke the Mainland. It also refuses to allow Beijing to use force.
In concrete terms, Taipei's arms purchases merely fulfill its own false and temporary psychological need for security. But they are consistent with Washington's military interests. Taipei cannot and must not accept unreasonable terms for reunification imposed by Beijing. But for Taipei, Washington's continued intervention in cross-Strait affairs reeks of insufferable arrogance. It can only undermine future opportunities for cross-Strait integration. Washington wants Taipei to adopt the lowest possible standards. It does not want Beijing to feel that reunification is hopeless. Such thinking may accord wtih Washington's interests. But does it accord with the best interests of the public on Taiwan and the Mainland? That is debatable.
In fact, knowledgeable parties in the US understand that as long as the two sides reduce tensions, increase interaction, increase people to people exchanges, intermarry, and facilitate investments, then relations between Taiwan and the Mainland will become closer. Taiwan's need for psychological and military assurances will change. The process will take time. But this natural process is not subject to personal whims. One day Washington's policy of procrastination will no longer be viable.
Former American Institute in Taiwan Representative Stephen M. Young said that he is neither pro-blue, nor pro-green, he is pro-American. Similarly, Richard Bush's views reflect Washington's interests. Will Washington abandon Taipei? This question will be decided by whether it is in Washington's national interests. Washington's dismal record in this respect is well known. One need only recall the Polish uprising, the Prague Spring, the fall of South Vietnam, the assassination of President Allende in Chile.
The truth is, Taipei may have no choice but to be Washington's tool. It may have to be Washington's pawn in its effort to contain Mainland China. But changes are taking place, both short-term and long. We must distinguish between being active and being passive. The Ma Ying-jeou administration must maintain a sense of direction. It must see the Big Picture. It must distinguish between right and wrong. It must turn passivity into activity. It must maximize Taipei's advantage. Taipei's direction will then be self-evident.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.01.18
社論－在棄台與棄美間 審思國家最高利益
本報訊
馬英九總統十五日接見美國聯邦參議員穆考斯基時表示，兩岸關係與台美關係的發展並不衝突，因此中華民國政府將來會繼續向美國採購各項先進武器，以保障國家安全和維護台海和平，但台灣同時也要持續和中國大陸改善關係，擴大雙方交流。簡單的說，這就是武器照買、和解照走。
此前一天，美國在台協會前理事主席卜睿哲在布魯金斯研究院網站發表《未知的海峽》新書摘要，略稱北京若寄望美國放棄台灣這是行不通的，美國對台軍售並非兩岸無法統一的最大障礙，美國堅持現行政策將會促使中共以更具創意、更有意義的方式來解決兩岸爭議等等。直白的講，這就是美國無意放手。
表面上，馬總統的講話和卜睿哲新作中的某些觀點都能言之成理，但也都只是從各自的角度和利益出發。在理論上，既缺乏戰略的高度，也沒有新的視野，而且在實踐上，還有其盲點和內生的矛盾存在。大家都只想「避險」，但目前這種以拖待變及摸著石頭過河的做法與想法，恐有進一步討論的空間。
從馬總統的角度來看，台灣一方面要和中國大陸持續改善關係，加強互動與往來，但另一方也要有自衛的能力，勿恃敵之不來、而恃我有備之，對美軍事採購即使無法讓台北與北京進行全面、長期的軍事對抗，但或許可以暫時滿足台灣心理上的安全感，同時對美展現台灣自衛的決心。兩者並行不悖，似乎好處全拿。
台灣當然不能、也不應把自身前途寄託在對岸不確定的善意上，但持續以超過能力所及的對美軍購，萬一使自己成了美國的反華工具或剝削對象，甚而造成兩岸軍備競賽，這些都並不符合中華民國和整個民族的利益，畢竟這其中還涉及台灣的自我定位與國家、民族的認同問題。輕重之間的拿捏，台北必須極為謹慎。
卜睿哲在書中提醒台灣，不要讓中共產生統一無望的印象，不要使北京喪失耐心，錯估整體形勢，而要加強台灣的經濟發展，進行政治體制改革，避免兩岸關係發展成一種不對稱的相互依賴，要增加北京萬一對台施壓的成本和不確定性。這些主張表面還算可以理解，但一經深入思考就發現其中頗有可資商榷之處。
從過去到現在，美國一直主張兩岸維持動態的平衡，兩岸都不應增加緊張，破壞現狀，但現狀的定義卻是要由美國來加以界定；美國一方面希望兩岸關係能夠改善，雙方加強往來，降低區域緊張，但又不希望在華府不能掌握的情況下，兩岸走得太快、太近。美國在乎的只是自己的利益，既不准台灣獨立、也不讓兩岸統一，不要台灣挑釁，但也不許中共動武。
具體的說，台灣對美軍購固然滿足了自己虛假、暫時的安全感，但更成就了美國的軍工利益；台灣確實不能也不宜接受中共所設定的不合理統一條件，但讓美國不斷插手兩岸事務，對台灣頤指氣使，亦將破壞兩岸未來整合的機會。美國只希望台灣採取最低的標準，不要讓大陸對統一感到絕望，而目前這種想像中的奢望或許更符合美國的利益，但這是否也符合兩岸之間的最大利益，顯有討論的空間。
其實，美國有識之士也已看出，只要兩岸降低緊張，加強互動，民眾往來、通婚、投資更為便利，雙方關係自然將會更為緊密，屆時台灣的心理和實體防衛需求自然隨之調整；這雖然需要一段發展的過程，但這種自然的規律並不隨人的主觀意志而轉移，美國當前的這種以拖待變的政策終將有無以為繼的一天。
就像在台協會前駐台代表楊甦棣所說，他既不親藍、也不親綠，他只親美。同樣的，卜睿哲的觀點反映和追求的主要還是美國的國家利益，美國的棄台與否完全是由美國的國家利益來決定。美國承諾的記錄不佳眾所皆知，從當年的波蘭抗暴、捷克的自由化事件到後來的南越淪陷、智利的阿葉德總統遇害都是例子。
在現實上，台灣或許不得不被美國利用，做為牽制中國大陸發展的棋子，但在長短期效應變化、主動與被動之間還是應有所區別、掌握；馬英九政府如果能夠抓穩方向、掌握大局、明辨是非，化被動為主動，發揮台灣尚有的優勢，台灣的何去何從應該已經不言自明。
Diversification for Competitiveness: 12 Year Compulsory Education Needs Broader Horizons
Diversification for Competitiveness:
12 Year Compulsory Education Needs Broader Horizons
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 17, 2012
Summary: Today, 12 year compulsory education is a response to the Basic Entrance Examination. The slogan "adaptive learning" sounds good. But the Ministry of Education must explain the significance of 12 year compulsory education. It must offer a clear and viable program. It must eliminate uncertainty for students, parents, and teachers. This will ensure that this large-scale reform proceeds smoothly, and that follow-up implementation will be a success.
Full Text below:
Twelve year compulsory education will be implemented next year. Among the major changes will be the abolition of the Basic Competence Test. It will be replaced by a Junior High School Examination. To help students and teachers understand the examination process, the Ministry of Education has made an announcement. At the end of March this year it will test the exam system by means of a pilot program. The pilot program will be implemented in the Keelung/Taipei and Changhua districts. Approximately 100,000 third year junior high students will be tested. The Pilot Examination will be administered by the National Taiwan Normal University Center for Psychology and Education Testing, which wrote the tests. It will determine whether these important tests are being administered properly. The pilot program tests only the technical aspects of 12 year compulsory education. But it amounts to a declaration that 12 year compulsory education has gone from promotion to implementation. It has considerable symbolic significance.
The government implemented nine year compulsory education in 1968. Twelve year compulsory education is the most important reform to basic national education since then. For the moment however, many issues remain unclear. The educational authorities need to offer clearer explanations. First, what is the central goal of 12 year compulsory education? The Ministry of Education says the main goal of 12 year compulsory education is to "reduce examination pressure on students, enable them to learn a wider range of subjects, and to ensure their proper development." Exam pressure is the most serious problem in our educational system. It must be addressed and resolved. But twelve years of compulsory education will have a major impact on teachers, students, and parents. Implementing 12 year compulsory education merely to relieve exam pressure is far too narrow a goal for such a major change in the educational system.
Consider nine year compulsory education. It was a change in educational policy implemented under martial law. There is not much one can say about it. There is not much doubt about what it was. In 1967 Chiang Kai-shek transformed all secondary schools in the nation to junior high schools by the following year. Elementary school students could enter junior high school without taking entrance examinations. The announcement of the nine year compulsory education program coincided with the successful "land to the tiller" policy. Peoples' lives were afforded basic protections. Therefore the national government turned its eyes to education. It attempted to improve the educational level of the people. Society on Taiwan was undergoing transformation, from an agricultural society to an industrial society. This was advance preparation. Later developments confirmed the predicted transformation. Nine-year compulsory education reduced the adult illiteracy rate dramatically, to only two percent. It cultivated many highly qualified mid-level technicians. It established a solid foundation for Taiwan's economic take-off in the 1970s.
Let us examine 12 year compulsory education using our experience with nine year compulsory education. A major change in educational policy should enhance the competitiveness of the nation as a whole. It should reflect a macro-level perspective. It should not be limited to freeing students and parents from exam pressure. It should allow people to feel that the government has made a courageous breakthrough. that it has eliminated a checkpoint between junior high and senior high, that it is maintaining and enhancing the public's scholastic ability and cultural sophistication, that It facilitates the cultivation of talent, that it makes Taiwan more diversified in its abilities, and better able to confront the more diversified and competitive world of the twenty-first century.
Consider the current situation. Educational authorities have done little to explain 12 year compulsory education policy. This and a lack of promotion, has led to chaos and divisions. Some parents fear that elimination of the entrance exam means an absence of exam pressure. An absence of exam pressure means students will slack off, and hurt their chances of getting into college. As a result, many parents are seeking ways to send their children to private schools, mainly to combat the enrollment rate. This may not improve their children's learning. It may create another unfair educational gap between rich students, and poor, disadvantaged, rural students.
The nation will be divided into 15 admission districts. Each district will have different requirements for the "special recruiting" of students. The information provided is chaotic. Many parents cannot tell what kind of future their children face, and what screening checkpoints they will encounter. They are confused and anxious. Consider the "no entrance examination required" admissions aspect. Not every student will be able to gain admission to the school they want. Many students will seek admission to school districts with superior academic records. It may be necessary to either exceed the admissions quotas or to draw lots.
Admissions based on test results are not so bad. But what about reliance on test results, volunteer work, or community service? The pressure on the child may not be any less than it is now. Drawing lots involves mere luck. It is an even less desirable way to determine admissions.
Ten years ago, educational reform was born in an atmosphere of optimism. The Basic Competence Test for junior high was being used for admission to senior high. But the changes were too great. Critics said "it turns students into guinea pigs" or "diversified admissions equals wealthy admissions." The intended impact of educational reform was obliterated.
Today, 12 year compulsory education is a response to the Basic Entrance Examination. The slogan "adaptive learning" sounds good. But the Ministry of Education must explain the significance of 12 year compulsory education. It must offer a clear and viable program. It must eliminate uncertainty for students, parents, and teachers. This will ensure that this large-scale reform proceeds smoothly, and that follow-up implementation will be a success.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.01.17
社論－迎向多樣化競爭 12年國教應放大視野
本報訊
十二年國教即將於明年正式實施，主要變革之一是廢除基測，改考國中會考。為讓學生及老師了解會考形式，教育部宣布，今年三月底要進行會考的試考，實施地點也選定基北區及彰化區約十萬名國三生施測；試辦會考也是檢視試務單位師大心測中心的出題、評鑑度等重大試務是否執行得當。試辦會考的性質雖然只是十二年國教的技術性測試，但也形同宣示十二年國教已從宣導階段進入執行階段，具有重大的象徵性意義。
十二年國教是台灣繼民國五十七年實施九年義務教育後，最重要的國民基礎教育變革，但目前仍有若干疑慮不清之處，需要教育主管單位更清楚的闡釋釐清。其一，是十二國教的中心思想。教育部對實施十二國教的主要目的是集中強調「減輕學生考試壓力、多元學習、適性發展」。考試壓力可說是國內教育制度最嚴重的問題，應該徹底解決，但十二年國教的實施，對教師教學、學生學習、家長適應各方面都形成不小的影響，如果只是以減輕考試壓力為十二國教的宗旨，則似乎侷限了這項重大教育變革的意義。
以九年國民義務教育而言，那是一個在戒嚴時代宣布的教育政策變革，沒有太多討論、質疑的空間，蔣中正在民國五十六年指示後，隔年全國的中學就變成了「國中」，全體小學生不用考試就能快樂進入國中。當年宣布九年義務教育的時空背景是，在「耕者有其田」政策成功、人民生活有了基本保障以後，國家施政目光因而轉向「教育」，以提高人民教育水準，做為將台灣由農業社會轉型到工業社會的先期準備。事實上，由後來的發展也證實，九年義務教育不但大幅降低成人的文盲率到只有二％左右，更為台灣培養了大批素質優良的中級技術人力，成為台灣在七○年代經濟起飛的紮實基礎。
由九年義務教育的經驗來檢視十二國教，一項重大教育政策的改變與實施，應該具有提升國家整體競爭力的功能與宏觀視野，不是只讓學生與家長感到能自考試壓力中解放出來，必須同時讓人民感到，政府以大魄力衝破、消除國中升高中的考試關卡，不但能維持並進一步提升人才學力與素質，更能達成人才分流培養的目標，替台灣建立多元能力板塊，以面對廿一世紀更多樣化競爭的世界。
但目前的狀況是，教育單位對十二年國教的政策願景說明有限，加上宣導不足，以致亂象紛陳。有家長們怕學生都免試入學後，沒有考試壓力而落後，影響後面更重要的大學進路，於是紛紛想辦法把孩子送進以拚升學率為主的私校。此舉不但無助改善孩子的學習模式，又可能製造了另一個由貧富差距形成的弱勢及偏鄉學生受教權的不公平。
而未來全國分成十五個招生區，各區對「特色招生」的選才條件各自不同，在資訊混亂的情況下，許多家長因搞不清楚自己的孩子未來要面對什麼樣的升學篩選關卡而困惑、緊張。在「免試入學」部分，也不見得每個學生都能進入自己想進的理想學校，因為，一旦各招生區內辦學績優的學校有太多學生選填志願而超過學校招生名額的話，就要超額比序或抽籤。
超額比序若按照會考成績還好，若又要看競賽成績、志工或社團表現，那麼，孩子的壓力就不一定比現在減輕。抽籤入學純粹靠運氣、手氣，是一種更不可取的入學方式！
十多年前，教改在一片期待中誕生，並且以國中基測為高中升學方式，最後卻因變動太多，「讓學生變成白老鼠」、「多元入學等於多錢入學」等負面評價，幾乎掩蓋了教改應有的成效。
如今，十二年國教是針對改革國中基測應運而生，免試入學、適性學習的口號固然美麗，但教育部必須先說明十二國教的意義，提出清楚可行的方案，才能消除學生、家長、教學現場對新制的不確定感，以確保這項大規模改革起步順利，後續執行成功。
12 Year Compulsory Education Needs Broader Horizons
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 17, 2012
Summary: Today, 12 year compulsory education is a response to the Basic Entrance Examination. The slogan "adaptive learning" sounds good. But the Ministry of Education must explain the significance of 12 year compulsory education. It must offer a clear and viable program. It must eliminate uncertainty for students, parents, and teachers. This will ensure that this large-scale reform proceeds smoothly, and that follow-up implementation will be a success.
Full Text below:
Twelve year compulsory education will be implemented next year. Among the major changes will be the abolition of the Basic Competence Test. It will be replaced by a Junior High School Examination. To help students and teachers understand the examination process, the Ministry of Education has made an announcement. At the end of March this year it will test the exam system by means of a pilot program. The pilot program will be implemented in the Keelung/Taipei and Changhua districts. Approximately 100,000 third year junior high students will be tested. The Pilot Examination will be administered by the National Taiwan Normal University Center for Psychology and Education Testing, which wrote the tests. It will determine whether these important tests are being administered properly. The pilot program tests only the technical aspects of 12 year compulsory education. But it amounts to a declaration that 12 year compulsory education has gone from promotion to implementation. It has considerable symbolic significance.
The government implemented nine year compulsory education in 1968. Twelve year compulsory education is the most important reform to basic national education since then. For the moment however, many issues remain unclear. The educational authorities need to offer clearer explanations. First, what is the central goal of 12 year compulsory education? The Ministry of Education says the main goal of 12 year compulsory education is to "reduce examination pressure on students, enable them to learn a wider range of subjects, and to ensure their proper development." Exam pressure is the most serious problem in our educational system. It must be addressed and resolved. But twelve years of compulsory education will have a major impact on teachers, students, and parents. Implementing 12 year compulsory education merely to relieve exam pressure is far too narrow a goal for such a major change in the educational system.
Consider nine year compulsory education. It was a change in educational policy implemented under martial law. There is not much one can say about it. There is not much doubt about what it was. In 1967 Chiang Kai-shek transformed all secondary schools in the nation to junior high schools by the following year. Elementary school students could enter junior high school without taking entrance examinations. The announcement of the nine year compulsory education program coincided with the successful "land to the tiller" policy. Peoples' lives were afforded basic protections. Therefore the national government turned its eyes to education. It attempted to improve the educational level of the people. Society on Taiwan was undergoing transformation, from an agricultural society to an industrial society. This was advance preparation. Later developments confirmed the predicted transformation. Nine-year compulsory education reduced the adult illiteracy rate dramatically, to only two percent. It cultivated many highly qualified mid-level technicians. It established a solid foundation for Taiwan's economic take-off in the 1970s.
Let us examine 12 year compulsory education using our experience with nine year compulsory education. A major change in educational policy should enhance the competitiveness of the nation as a whole. It should reflect a macro-level perspective. It should not be limited to freeing students and parents from exam pressure. It should allow people to feel that the government has made a courageous breakthrough. that it has eliminated a checkpoint between junior high and senior high, that it is maintaining and enhancing the public's scholastic ability and cultural sophistication, that It facilitates the cultivation of talent, that it makes Taiwan more diversified in its abilities, and better able to confront the more diversified and competitive world of the twenty-first century.
Consider the current situation. Educational authorities have done little to explain 12 year compulsory education policy. This and a lack of promotion, has led to chaos and divisions. Some parents fear that elimination of the entrance exam means an absence of exam pressure. An absence of exam pressure means students will slack off, and hurt their chances of getting into college. As a result, many parents are seeking ways to send their children to private schools, mainly to combat the enrollment rate. This may not improve their children's learning. It may create another unfair educational gap between rich students, and poor, disadvantaged, rural students.
The nation will be divided into 15 admission districts. Each district will have different requirements for the "special recruiting" of students. The information provided is chaotic. Many parents cannot tell what kind of future their children face, and what screening checkpoints they will encounter. They are confused and anxious. Consider the "no entrance examination required" admissions aspect. Not every student will be able to gain admission to the school they want. Many students will seek admission to school districts with superior academic records. It may be necessary to either exceed the admissions quotas or to draw lots.
Admissions based on test results are not so bad. But what about reliance on test results, volunteer work, or community service? The pressure on the child may not be any less than it is now. Drawing lots involves mere luck. It is an even less desirable way to determine admissions.
Ten years ago, educational reform was born in an atmosphere of optimism. The Basic Competence Test for junior high was being used for admission to senior high. But the changes were too great. Critics said "it turns students into guinea pigs" or "diversified admissions equals wealthy admissions." The intended impact of educational reform was obliterated.
Today, 12 year compulsory education is a response to the Basic Entrance Examination. The slogan "adaptive learning" sounds good. But the Ministry of Education must explain the significance of 12 year compulsory education. It must offer a clear and viable program. It must eliminate uncertainty for students, parents, and teachers. This will ensure that this large-scale reform proceeds smoothly, and that follow-up implementation will be a success.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.01.17
社論－迎向多樣化競爭 12年國教應放大視野
本報訊
十二年國教即將於明年正式實施，主要變革之一是廢除基測，改考國中會考。為讓學生及老師了解會考形式，教育部宣布，今年三月底要進行會考的試考，實施地點也選定基北區及彰化區約十萬名國三生施測；試辦會考也是檢視試務單位師大心測中心的出題、評鑑度等重大試務是否執行得當。試辦會考的性質雖然只是十二年國教的技術性測試，但也形同宣示十二年國教已從宣導階段進入執行階段，具有重大的象徵性意義。
十二年國教是台灣繼民國五十七年實施九年義務教育後，最重要的國民基礎教育變革，但目前仍有若干疑慮不清之處，需要教育主管單位更清楚的闡釋釐清。其一，是十二國教的中心思想。教育部對實施十二國教的主要目的是集中強調「減輕學生考試壓力、多元學習、適性發展」。考試壓力可說是國內教育制度最嚴重的問題，應該徹底解決，但十二年國教的實施，對教師教學、學生學習、家長適應各方面都形成不小的影響，如果只是以減輕考試壓力為十二國教的宗旨，則似乎侷限了這項重大教育變革的意義。
以九年國民義務教育而言，那是一個在戒嚴時代宣布的教育政策變革，沒有太多討論、質疑的空間，蔣中正在民國五十六年指示後，隔年全國的中學就變成了「國中」，全體小學生不用考試就能快樂進入國中。當年宣布九年義務教育的時空背景是，在「耕者有其田」政策成功、人民生活有了基本保障以後，國家施政目光因而轉向「教育」，以提高人民教育水準，做為將台灣由農業社會轉型到工業社會的先期準備。事實上，由後來的發展也證實，九年義務教育不但大幅降低成人的文盲率到只有二％左右，更為台灣培養了大批素質優良的中級技術人力，成為台灣在七○年代經濟起飛的紮實基礎。
由九年義務教育的經驗來檢視十二國教，一項重大教育政策的改變與實施，應該具有提升國家整體競爭力的功能與宏觀視野，不是只讓學生與家長感到能自考試壓力中解放出來，必須同時讓人民感到，政府以大魄力衝破、消除國中升高中的考試關卡，不但能維持並進一步提升人才學力與素質，更能達成人才分流培養的目標，替台灣建立多元能力板塊，以面對廿一世紀更多樣化競爭的世界。
但目前的狀況是，教育單位對十二年國教的政策願景說明有限，加上宣導不足，以致亂象紛陳。有家長們怕學生都免試入學後，沒有考試壓力而落後，影響後面更重要的大學進路，於是紛紛想辦法把孩子送進以拚升學率為主的私校。此舉不但無助改善孩子的學習模式，又可能製造了另一個由貧富差距形成的弱勢及偏鄉學生受教權的不公平。
而未來全國分成十五個招生區，各區對「特色招生」的選才條件各自不同，在資訊混亂的情況下，許多家長因搞不清楚自己的孩子未來要面對什麼樣的升學篩選關卡而困惑、緊張。在「免試入學」部分，也不見得每個學生都能進入自己想進的理想學校，因為，一旦各招生區內辦學績優的學校有太多學生選填志願而超過學校招生名額的話，就要超額比序或抽籤。
超額比序若按照會考成績還好，若又要看競賽成績、志工或社團表現，那麼，孩子的壓力就不一定比現在減輕。抽籤入學純粹靠運氣、手氣，是一種更不可取的入學方式！
十多年前，教改在一片期待中誕生，並且以國中基測為高中升學方式，最後卻因變動太多，「讓學生變成白老鼠」、「多元入學等於多錢入學」等負面評價，幾乎掩蓋了教改應有的成效。
如今，十二年國教是針對改革國中基測應運而生，免試入學、適性學習的口號固然美麗，但教育部必須先說明十二國教的意義，提出清楚可行的方案，才能消除學生、家長、教學現場對新制的不確定感，以確保這項大規模改革起步順利，後續執行成功。
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