Lee Teng-hui Misruled the Nation, Shredded Its Constitution, Left Behind Chaos
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 31, 2013
Summary: Lee Teng-hui, who left office long ago, has authored yet another book.
He has followed up on his previous book, published a decade ago,
entitled, "Taiwan's National Goals for the 21st Century." His new book
is entitled "Whither 21st Century Taiwan?" It drew immediate media
attention as soon as its publication was announced. We beseech Lee Teng-hui. Cease inflicting any further pain upon the ROC.
Full Text below:
Lee Teng-hui, who left office long ago, has authored yet another book. He has followed up on his previous book, published a decade ago, entitled, "Taiwan's National Goals for the 21st Century." His new book is entitled "Whither 21st Century Taiwan?" It drew immediate media attention as soon as its publication was announced.
The book's starting point is a question posed by Lee Teng-hui: "Who am I?" Lee Teng-hui argues that this "identity crisis" is the "most difficult fundamental problem Taiwanese face in the 21st century." Needless to say, in Lee Teng-hui's heart of hearts, the answer to the question "Who am I?" is, "I am Taiwanese, not Chinese." This question obsessed Lee Teng-hui during his 12 years in power. It was his underlying motivation for splitting the KMT, dividing Taiwan society, and subverting the Constitution of the Republic of China.
Lee Teng-hui has longed to found a "Republic of Taiwan." But despite two decades of Pan Green ideological indoctrination, he has concluded that "although substantively [Taiwan] has long been an independent and sovereign state, legally it still faces problems." In other words, "Taiwan's de facto status situation cannot be manifested in de jure terms." What is the solution to this "(Taiwan) nation which cannot become a nation" problem? Why it is what he proposed a decade ago: "Author a new constitution, and found a nation that Taiwanese can identify with." In other words, Lee Teng-hui personally undermined the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. He created a situation in which the "(Republic of China) nation was no longer a nation." He now advocates yet another step: Nullify the Republic of China Constitution, and begin anew by authoring a "Nation of Taiwan" constitution.
When Lee Teng-hui came to power, he and the DPP conspired to push for "constitutional reform." The means he adopted violated every principle of constitutional rule. Lee Teng-hui is the culprit responsible for the current constitutional chaos in the Republic of China. He and the DPP conspired to throttle the Republic of China, until it was on the brink of death. Now he hopes to deliver the coup de gras, and totally nullify the ROC as a legal entity.
Lee pushed for what he called, "constitutional reform." His goal was to transform a figurehead president into the actual wielder of political power. This would enable him to abuse the power to promote Taiwan independence. Toward this end, he usurped powers related to national defense, foreign diplomacy, and Mainland policy. He left only those domestic powers with no direct relationship to the promotion of Taiwan independence in the handss of the Premier. This reduced the Premier's powers to almost nothing. It infringed upon the oversight powers of the Legislative Yuan. It fundamentally perverted the cabinet system specified in the ROC Constitution. Lee's "constitutional reform" did not explicitly confer powers related to national defense, foreign diplomacy, and Mainland policy upon the President. It did not even touch upon Article 53, the key, which stipulates that "the Executive Yuan is the nation's highest administrative body," or Article 57, which stipulates that "the Executive Yuan must answer to the Legislative Yuan." Instead, it simply stipuated a directly-elected president and abolished the Legislative Yuan's right of approval for Presidential appointments of the Premier. It conferred the right to hold a no-confidence vote upon the Legislative Yuan. The result was a giant constitutional loophole. Lee then abused his "popular mandate" to incite hatred, to exploit loopholes in the Constitution, and undermine the workings of the Constitution. He reduced the Executive Yuan, "the nation's highest administrative body," into a body answerable to him and him alone. He not only usurped powers that did not belong to the president, he seized all real executive powers. He no longer needed to answer to the Legislative Yuan, in total violation of the constitutional principle that powers must match responsibilities. Now the only remaining legal constraint on the president was his periodic need for re-election. The "vestigial" Premier was reduced to the status of the president's "chief of staff." He was reduced to being the whipping boy for the President in the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan was deprived of the authority to challenge the President's unconstitutional usurpation of power. It was reduced to quarreling with the Executive Yuan. The constitutional chaos we see today is played out mostly in the Legislative Yuan. But behind the constitutional chaos, is a president with an unconstitutional monopoly on power, answerable to no one.
Lee Teng-hui rationalized away the political sleight of hand by which he violated the Constitution and the principle of constitutional rule. He openly incited "ethnic" (communal group) antagonism, euphemistically spinning it as "democratic civil war." On October 22 of last year, this newspaper published an essay entitled, "Taiwanese Style Democracy?" We pointed out how Lee Teng-hui characterized the political conflict on Taiwan as a "civil war" with "clashes between us and the enemy." Since it was a war, then one must battle to the death. Since it was a war, then "all is fair" in love and war. This is the source of the Taiwan independence-oriented political parties' election fraud, unconstitutional conduct, illegal conduct, double standards, shameless hypocrisy, coarse braggadocio, and rhetoric of violence. In his new book, Lee reaffirms his views on "democratic civil war." He clearly believes that "Until the Republic of China is dead, civil war on Taiwan cannot end." Lee Teng-hui sees the very nation he inhabits and the people who inhabit it as his enemy. On three occasions he flagrantly violated Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of China, namely, the presidential inauguration oath. Even more than Chen Shui-bian, he ought to face "severe legal sanctions."
In his new book Lee says, "Taiwan's past national leadership style emphasized Asian values. In other words, it implemented an imperial style of leadership." Lee concluded that this approach was not suitable as a model for Taiwan. But looking back at the "constitutional reform achievements" of Lee Teng-hui, at his abuses and usurpations of power during his terms as President, what difference was there between it and absolute monarchy? Lee Teng-hui said he admired France's Fifth Republic Constitution. He said he admired the founder of the Fifth Republic, President Charles de Gaulle. But once Charles de Gaulle left office, he desisted from meddling in the affairs of state. Lee Teng-hui, by contrast, seems determined to direct the affairs of the Republic of China from behind the scenes. He shows no signs of withdrawing from the political stage. Is this part of his "imperial overlord style of leadership"?
We beseech Lee Teng-hui. Cease inflicting any further pain upon the ROC.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.05.31
社論－詭道治國、毀憲亂政的李登輝 可以休矣
本報訊
卸任已久的李登輝又要出書了。這一次，他延續十年前發表的《台灣二十一世紀國家總目標》，繼續指點《二十一世紀台灣要到哪裡去》。消息一出，再度引起媒體熱議。
此書的出發點，就是由李登輝所認定的「我是誰？」這個認同問題而衍生出來的所謂「二十一世紀台灣人民遭遇最困難的基本問題」。當然，李登輝心中的「我是誰？」的答案，是「我是台灣人，不是中國人」。這就是李登輝當政十二年間最為念茲在茲的問題，也是他不惜裂解國民黨、撕裂台灣社會、顛覆中華民國憲法的根本動機。
然而，經過了超過二十年的綠化，李登輝認為他所企盼的「台灣國」雖然「實質上早就是獨立的主權國家，但法理方面可能還有一些問題」，也就是「台灣的實際狀況沒辦法在法理上面反映出來」。而要解決這個他稱為「（台灣）國不成國」問題的辦法，就是他在十年前提出的「透過制定新憲法的動作，確立台灣人對台灣這個國家的自我認同」。換言之，李登輝在親手把中華民國憲政秩序破壞到「（中華民）國不成國」的境地之後，還主張進一步廢憲、重新制定「台灣國」憲法。
我們回顧李登輝當政期間與民進黨合謀推動的「憲改」，他所採用的手段根本超過了任何正規的憲政秩序所能容許的範圍。目前中華民國的憲政亂象之罪魁禍首就是李登輝。而今，他還主張將這部被他和民進黨聯手凌遲到氣息奄奄的中華民國憲法一刀斃命，徹底從法理上消滅中華民國！
李登輝當年推動憲改，目標是把憲法上的虛位元首改為實權總統，以主導推進台獨。為此，他認為他應掌握國防、外交、大陸政策等權力，只把與台獨較無直接關係的內政事務留給行政院長。這不僅大幅削減閣揆的權力，同時也侵犯國會得以過問的國家政務範圍，根本改變中華民國憲法內閣制的架構。但是，他推動的憲改不是在憲法條文上將國防、外交、大陸政策的權力明文賦予總統，甚至於根本不觸及關鍵性的憲法第五十三條「行政院為國家最高行政機關」及第五十七條「行政院…對立法院負責」，而只是將總統改為由直接民選產生，並取消立法院的「閣揆同意權」（但卻又賦予立院倒閣權），造成一個憲法大漏洞。然後，他便藉由其選票帶來的「民意基礎」興風作浪，利用憲法漏洞扭曲憲政運作，強使「國家最高行政機關」的行政院變成他的下級機關。於是，他不但使總統違憲地收攬了全部行政實權，並且還完全不用向國會負責，完全違反權責相副的憲政原則。唯一可牽制總統的，只剩下定期改選一事。「殘留」下來的行政院長，成為在立法院代替總統背黑鍋的「總統幕僚長」；立法院既不能追究違憲擴權的實權總統的政治責任，也只能陪著行政院吵鬧度日。今日所見的憲政亂象，大部分是在立法院內演出，但是背後的憲政亂源，實為違憲獨攬大權卻不用負責的總統。
李登輝為了合理化他那些違反憲法和憲政原理的政治手法，還公開把他所挑起的族群對立稱為「民主內戰」。本報在去年十月二十二日的短評《台式民主？》中就指出：李登輝把台灣內部的政治衝突視為「敵我矛盾」的「內戰」。既然是戰爭，就要你死我活、不擇手段。這是獨派政黨常有選舉奧步、違憲違法、雙重標準、言行不一、粗口硬拗、語言暴力的根源所在。李登輝在他的新書裡仍然延續「民主內戰」的看法，顯然認為「中華民國不死，台灣內戰不止」。李登輝這種以國家和人民為敵的心態，根據他曾三度宣讀而又公然違反的中華民國憲法第四十八條總統就職誓詞，他比陳水扁更應受到「國家嚴厲之制裁」！
李登輝在其新書裡指出：「台灣的國家領導型態過去偏重『亞洲價值型』，也就是實施皇帝型的領導方式」，並主張這種方式不適合作為台灣的統治型態。然而，回看李登輝主導的憲改「成果」，他所行使的「總統」權力除了有任期限制以外，與帝制有多大差別？並且，李登輝欣賞法國第五共和憲法，也欣賞締造第五共和的戴高樂總統。但是，作風強勢的戴高樂一旦不在其位，就不再指點江山。李登輝熱衷對中華民國政治下指導棋，無休無止。難道這是「太上皇的領導方式」？
我們誠摯地期望：李登輝先生，放過中華民國吧！
Thursday, May 30, 2013
Wednesday, May 29, 2013
Taipei, Tokyo, Manila Conflict Exposes US Political Opportunism
Taipei, Tokyo, Manila Conflict Exposes US Political Opportunism
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 30, 2013
Summary: Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton practices "realpolitik" political opportunism. In this case, the realpolitik involves the East China Sea and South China Sea. The US has incited territorial sovereignty disputes between other nations and China, and is sitting on the sidelines hoping to reap the benefits. The United States' "return to Asia" aspires to contain Mainland China. But no amount of realpolitik gamesmanship is going to be successful. Macroeconomic factors militate against it. So does the Taiwan factor.
Full Text below:
Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton practices "realpolitik" political opportunism. In this case, the realpolitik involves the East China Sea and South China Sea. The US has incited territorial sovereignty disputes between other nations and China, and is sitting on the sidelines hoping to reap the benefits.
Ever since China's power declined in modern times, it has been unable to defend its territorial waters. After WWII, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were divided. The Diaoyutai Islands in the East China Sea and the Nansha Islands in the South China Sea belong to the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China. The Republic of China was unable to reoccupy the Mainland Region. Needless to say it was incapable of defending its islands and reefs in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The Mainland Region of China was preoccupied with the Three Antis and Five Antis movements, the Cultural Revolution, and the "liberation of Taiwan." It too was unable to defend these islands and reefs. The Japanese illegally occupied the Diaoyutai Islands. One by one, China's long-held islands and reefs in the South China Sea were illegally occupied by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and other countries. The ROC government on Taiwan was only able to hold on to Taiping Island in the Nansha Archipelago.
Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam took advantage of the opportunities provided by Hillary Clinton's "realpolitik." Clinton hoped to incite territorial sovereignty disputes between other nations and China. Sure enough, with no cost to itself, the US played politics in the East and South China Seas with islands and reefs belonging to the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China. Foreign nations have invaded and occupied territory belonging to the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China. Can Republic of China President Ma Ying-jeou sit on the sidelines and turn a blind eye to what is going on?
The controversy over the alleged "nationalization" of the Diaoyutai Islands" has persisted for one year. Fishing season is approaching. Ma Ying-jeou refused to join forces with Beijing to defend the Diaoyutai Islands. He risked the condemnation of Chinese people the world over. But Taiwanese fishermen poured into traditional fishing grounds in Diaoyutai Island waters. They were not expelled or arrested. If Japan does nothing, have they given up their claims to sovereignty? Mainland Chinese ocean surveillance ships have acted as escorts. Can Taiwanese fishermen refuse their assistance? Can Japan open fire on Mainland China's ocean surveillance ships? Ma Ying-jeou has allowed Taiwan fishermen to accept protection provided by Mainland China's ocean surveillance ships. Is Ma Ying-jeou still president? Or should he resign? Ma must patrol the ocean and provide protection for ROC fishing vessels. Will the Japanese open fire on ROC Coast Guard ships?
Taiwan was a central link in the United States Cold War era Western Pacific island chain. If the two sides of the Taiwan Strait join hands to defend the Diaoyutai Islands, the U.S. island chain will be missing a link. Therefore, under pressure from Washington, Tokyo hurriedly signed a fisheries agreement with Taipei, just before fishing season.
Henceforth Taiwanese fishermen fishing in their traditional Diaoyutai Island waters, apart from not being permitted to not land on the island, will no longer be subject to expulsion. Japan no longer expels Taiwanese fishing boats in order to "defend" the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Taiwanese fishermen need no longer clash with Japan. Nor do they anyone's protection, Still less do they need joint, cross-Strait protection. Unless Japan opens fire, it cannot expel Mainland Chinese ocean surveillance ships that regularly patrol China's territorial waters. Nor can they expel Taiwanese fishermen as a show of "defending sovereignty." Over time, Taipei and Tokyo will go without conflicts over the Diaoyutai Islands. Beijing and Tokyo will not open fire on each other over the Diaoyutai Islands. The dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands has returned to where it began. At least for the near term, there will be peace. There will be no conflict between Taipei and Tokyo. Nor will the islands remain a flashpoint for Sino-Japanese conflict.
Hillary Clinton's realpolitik uses the Diaoyutai Islands as bait, to provoke Sino-Japanese conflict. Ma Ying-jeou declared that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait would not join hands with Beijing to defend the Diaoyutai Islands. But Ma's insistence on providing protection for fishing vessels fishing in the Diaoyutai Islands exposed his declaration for what it was.
The Philippines and Mainland China clashed near Huangyan Island, for over a month. On May 9, the Philippines machine-gunned a Taiwanese fishing vessel, the Kuang Ta Hsing, Taiwanese fisherman Hong Shi-cheng was shot and killed. News sources intially reported that an "unknown" Philippines' vessel opened fire on one of our fishing vessels. Following consultation with Chiang Yi-hua, Ma Ying-jeou instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue a declaration of solemn concern. He demanded that the Philippines side immediately investigate the case, and bring the perpetrators to justice. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also issued rare statements condemning the shooting, demanding the truth and punishment for the murderer.
In the Taipei vs. Manila conflict, Washington stood by Manila. But it could not allow the Taipei vs. Manila conflict to bring the two sides of the Taiwan Strait closer together. In fact, Washington's position in this conflict, is consistent with Washington's position in the conflict between Taipei and Tokyo.
Washington knows that the Nansha Islands and Diaoyutai Islands both belong to the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China. Washington is inciting other nations to violate China's sovereignty in the Nansha Islands. It knows that the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China will bear the brunt of the aggression. Taiwan has not aggressed against America's allies. Rather America's allies have aggressed against Taiwan. Since the US is not treating Taiwan as an ally, Taiwan has no need to treat the US as an ally. Is this a greater threat to Taipei or to Washington?
Will the Taipei vs. Manila conflict be resolved the same way as the Diaoyutai Islands conflict? Will it lead to Taipei-Manila fisheries negotiations? We do not know. If the conflict cannot be resolved and escalates, Washington will have to choose sides between Manila and Taipei. This will be a real headache for the United States. The U.S.'s strategic target is the Mainland, not Taiwan. But it is being forced to move against Taiwan. Can the U.S. "return to Asia" reestablish containment against the Mainland?
Suppose Taipei and Manila finally reach a fisheries agreement? Manila will not experience territorial conflicts with the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China. It will not experience territorial conflicts with the Mainland Region of the Republic of China. The South China Sea will be "pacific," i.e., conflict free. What then will Washington use to incite conflict between Manila and Beijng?
The United States' "return to Asia" aspires to contain Mainland China. But no amount of realpolitik gamesmanship is going to be successful. Macroeconomic factors militate against it. So does the Taiwan factor.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.05.30
社論－從台日菲衝突 看透美國「巧實力」
本報訊
美國前國務卿希拉蕊有「巧實力」。所謂「巧實力」就是在東海和南海，挑起各國與中國的領土主權之爭，以坐收漁人之利。
自從近代中國衰微以來，就無力經營海疆。戰後，兩岸分裂，東海的釣魚台列嶼和南海南沙群島均屬中華民國「台灣地區」。中華民國反攻大陸猶不及，何有能力經營東海和南海各島礁；中國大陸也忙於「三反五反」、「文化大革命」和「解放台灣」，對各島礁也鞭長莫及。因此，除了日本侵占釣魚台列嶼外，南海各島礁屬中國固有領土者，也遭越南、菲律賓、馬來西亞等國竊占，台灣則占有南沙的太平島。
響應希拉蕊「巧實力」者，有日本、菲律賓、越南。希拉蕊要挑起各國與中國領土主權之爭，果然做起無本生意的「巧實力」。東、南海各島礁還屬於中華民國的「台灣地區」。要侵占中華民國「台灣地區」的領土主權，擔任中華民國總統的馬英九能置身事外，視若無睹？
釣魚台的「國有化」從去年鬧到今天，漁季將屆，雖然馬英九甘冒全球華人之大不韙，而堅拒「兩岸聯手保釣」。但台灣漁民湧進了傳統的釣魚台漁場海域，要不要驅逐或逮捕，若日本無所動作，是否放棄主權主張？要作為，大陸海監船護漁，台灣漁民能不接受嗎？日本對大陸海監船開火？馬英九讓台灣漁民接受大陸海監船的護漁，馬英九的總統還要不要幹？故馬也必須海巡艦護漁，那麼日本對台灣海巡艦開火？
冷戰時期台灣處於美國西太平洋鏈島防線的中央環節，兩岸一連手保釣，美國的鏈島防線即「斷鏈」。所以，在美國的壓力下，日本才在漁季前，匆匆簽下台日漁業協議。
從此，台灣漁民在釣魚台傳統海域除了不能登島外，不再受驅逐。換言之，即日本不再以驅逐台灣漁船來「保衛」釣魚台主權，也就是，台灣漁民不必和日本衝突，而需要任何一方保護，更不需要兩岸聯手護漁。除非開火，日本無法驅逐大陸海監船的常態巡航，又不會驅逐台灣漁民以示「保衛」主權。長此以往，台日固無保釣的衝突，中日也不因保釣開火，釣魚台問題回歸原點雖有爭議，但處於和平，至少近期內，沒有台日衝突，也就不再成為中日衝突的爆發點。
希拉蕊要以釣魚台為餌作為挑撥中日衝突的「巧實力」，雖然馬英九宣稱兩岸「不聯手」，但卻在馬英九堅持保釣護漁下，破功了。
另外，菲律賓在黃岩島和大陸船艦對峙一個多月後退卻，但卻在五月九日，掃射台灣「廣大興廿八號」漁船，漁民洪石成中彈身亡。事發後，最初消息是菲「不明船隻」開槍掃射我漁船。第一時間，馬英九與江宜樺會商後，即指示外交部向菲國表態嚴正關切，要求菲方必須立即查明真相，將凶手繩之以法。此外，北京國台辦和外交部，也罕見的雙雙發表聲明，同聲譴責，要求查明真相，懲辦凶手。
美國在台菲衝突上，立場袒菲，又不能讓台菲衝突而迫使兩岸聯手，其實是和台日衝突的美國立場是一致的。
美國當知道，南沙島礁和釣魚台列嶼一樣，其實是屬於中華民國「台灣地區」，要以南沙島礁衝擊中國主權，首當其衝的是中華民國「台灣地區」。所以，不是台灣卯上美國的盟邦，而是美國的盟邦卯上台灣。美國既不把台灣當「盟邦」，台灣也不必把美國當盟邦了。這究竟是對台北威脅還是對華盛頓的威脅？
台菲衝突是否其最後解決和釣魚台一樣，落實到台菲漁業談判，我們尚不得而知。如衝突升高而不得解決，美國則得在台菲之間選邊，這當是讓美國頭疼的事情。美國的戰略對象是大陸，不是台灣，現在卻被迫轉移到台灣來，美國「重返亞洲」，能對大陸築起新的圍堵？
如果台菲最後也來個漁業協定，菲律賓不會和中華民國「台灣地區」發生主權衝突，就不會和中華民國「大陸地區」發生主權衝突。南中國海將無風也無浪，但美國又要拿什麼來挑撥菲律賓和中國大陸的衝突？
所以，美國「重返亞洲」意欲對大陸新圍堵，有再多的「巧實力」，也是不能成功的，不能成功的因素除了宏觀的理由外，還有台灣因素在內。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 30, 2013
Summary: Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton practices "realpolitik" political opportunism. In this case, the realpolitik involves the East China Sea and South China Sea. The US has incited territorial sovereignty disputes between other nations and China, and is sitting on the sidelines hoping to reap the benefits. The United States' "return to Asia" aspires to contain Mainland China. But no amount of realpolitik gamesmanship is going to be successful. Macroeconomic factors militate against it. So does the Taiwan factor.
Full Text below:
Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton practices "realpolitik" political opportunism. In this case, the realpolitik involves the East China Sea and South China Sea. The US has incited territorial sovereignty disputes between other nations and China, and is sitting on the sidelines hoping to reap the benefits.
Ever since China's power declined in modern times, it has been unable to defend its territorial waters. After WWII, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were divided. The Diaoyutai Islands in the East China Sea and the Nansha Islands in the South China Sea belong to the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China. The Republic of China was unable to reoccupy the Mainland Region. Needless to say it was incapable of defending its islands and reefs in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The Mainland Region of China was preoccupied with the Three Antis and Five Antis movements, the Cultural Revolution, and the "liberation of Taiwan." It too was unable to defend these islands and reefs. The Japanese illegally occupied the Diaoyutai Islands. One by one, China's long-held islands and reefs in the South China Sea were illegally occupied by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and other countries. The ROC government on Taiwan was only able to hold on to Taiping Island in the Nansha Archipelago.
Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam took advantage of the opportunities provided by Hillary Clinton's "realpolitik." Clinton hoped to incite territorial sovereignty disputes between other nations and China. Sure enough, with no cost to itself, the US played politics in the East and South China Seas with islands and reefs belonging to the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China. Foreign nations have invaded and occupied territory belonging to the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China. Can Republic of China President Ma Ying-jeou sit on the sidelines and turn a blind eye to what is going on?
The controversy over the alleged "nationalization" of the Diaoyutai Islands" has persisted for one year. Fishing season is approaching. Ma Ying-jeou refused to join forces with Beijing to defend the Diaoyutai Islands. He risked the condemnation of Chinese people the world over. But Taiwanese fishermen poured into traditional fishing grounds in Diaoyutai Island waters. They were not expelled or arrested. If Japan does nothing, have they given up their claims to sovereignty? Mainland Chinese ocean surveillance ships have acted as escorts. Can Taiwanese fishermen refuse their assistance? Can Japan open fire on Mainland China's ocean surveillance ships? Ma Ying-jeou has allowed Taiwan fishermen to accept protection provided by Mainland China's ocean surveillance ships. Is Ma Ying-jeou still president? Or should he resign? Ma must patrol the ocean and provide protection for ROC fishing vessels. Will the Japanese open fire on ROC Coast Guard ships?
Taiwan was a central link in the United States Cold War era Western Pacific island chain. If the two sides of the Taiwan Strait join hands to defend the Diaoyutai Islands, the U.S. island chain will be missing a link. Therefore, under pressure from Washington, Tokyo hurriedly signed a fisheries agreement with Taipei, just before fishing season.
Henceforth Taiwanese fishermen fishing in their traditional Diaoyutai Island waters, apart from not being permitted to not land on the island, will no longer be subject to expulsion. Japan no longer expels Taiwanese fishing boats in order to "defend" the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Taiwanese fishermen need no longer clash with Japan. Nor do they anyone's protection, Still less do they need joint, cross-Strait protection. Unless Japan opens fire, it cannot expel Mainland Chinese ocean surveillance ships that regularly patrol China's territorial waters. Nor can they expel Taiwanese fishermen as a show of "defending sovereignty." Over time, Taipei and Tokyo will go without conflicts over the Diaoyutai Islands. Beijing and Tokyo will not open fire on each other over the Diaoyutai Islands. The dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands has returned to where it began. At least for the near term, there will be peace. There will be no conflict between Taipei and Tokyo. Nor will the islands remain a flashpoint for Sino-Japanese conflict.
Hillary Clinton's realpolitik uses the Diaoyutai Islands as bait, to provoke Sino-Japanese conflict. Ma Ying-jeou declared that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait would not join hands with Beijing to defend the Diaoyutai Islands. But Ma's insistence on providing protection for fishing vessels fishing in the Diaoyutai Islands exposed his declaration for what it was.
The Philippines and Mainland China clashed near Huangyan Island, for over a month. On May 9, the Philippines machine-gunned a Taiwanese fishing vessel, the Kuang Ta Hsing, Taiwanese fisherman Hong Shi-cheng was shot and killed. News sources intially reported that an "unknown" Philippines' vessel opened fire on one of our fishing vessels. Following consultation with Chiang Yi-hua, Ma Ying-jeou instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue a declaration of solemn concern. He demanded that the Philippines side immediately investigate the case, and bring the perpetrators to justice. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also issued rare statements condemning the shooting, demanding the truth and punishment for the murderer.
In the Taipei vs. Manila conflict, Washington stood by Manila. But it could not allow the Taipei vs. Manila conflict to bring the two sides of the Taiwan Strait closer together. In fact, Washington's position in this conflict, is consistent with Washington's position in the conflict between Taipei and Tokyo.
Washington knows that the Nansha Islands and Diaoyutai Islands both belong to the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China. Washington is inciting other nations to violate China's sovereignty in the Nansha Islands. It knows that the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China will bear the brunt of the aggression. Taiwan has not aggressed against America's allies. Rather America's allies have aggressed against Taiwan. Since the US is not treating Taiwan as an ally, Taiwan has no need to treat the US as an ally. Is this a greater threat to Taipei or to Washington?
Will the Taipei vs. Manila conflict be resolved the same way as the Diaoyutai Islands conflict? Will it lead to Taipei-Manila fisheries negotiations? We do not know. If the conflict cannot be resolved and escalates, Washington will have to choose sides between Manila and Taipei. This will be a real headache for the United States. The U.S.'s strategic target is the Mainland, not Taiwan. But it is being forced to move against Taiwan. Can the U.S. "return to Asia" reestablish containment against the Mainland?
Suppose Taipei and Manila finally reach a fisheries agreement? Manila will not experience territorial conflicts with the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China. It will not experience territorial conflicts with the Mainland Region of the Republic of China. The South China Sea will be "pacific," i.e., conflict free. What then will Washington use to incite conflict between Manila and Beijng?
The United States' "return to Asia" aspires to contain Mainland China. But no amount of realpolitik gamesmanship is going to be successful. Macroeconomic factors militate against it. So does the Taiwan factor.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.05.30
社論－從台日菲衝突 看透美國「巧實力」
本報訊
美國前國務卿希拉蕊有「巧實力」。所謂「巧實力」就是在東海和南海，挑起各國與中國的領土主權之爭，以坐收漁人之利。
自從近代中國衰微以來，就無力經營海疆。戰後，兩岸分裂，東海的釣魚台列嶼和南海南沙群島均屬中華民國「台灣地區」。中華民國反攻大陸猶不及，何有能力經營東海和南海各島礁；中國大陸也忙於「三反五反」、「文化大革命」和「解放台灣」，對各島礁也鞭長莫及。因此，除了日本侵占釣魚台列嶼外，南海各島礁屬中國固有領土者，也遭越南、菲律賓、馬來西亞等國竊占，台灣則占有南沙的太平島。
響應希拉蕊「巧實力」者，有日本、菲律賓、越南。希拉蕊要挑起各國與中國領土主權之爭，果然做起無本生意的「巧實力」。東、南海各島礁還屬於中華民國的「台灣地區」。要侵占中華民國「台灣地區」的領土主權，擔任中華民國總統的馬英九能置身事外，視若無睹？
釣魚台的「國有化」從去年鬧到今天，漁季將屆，雖然馬英九甘冒全球華人之大不韙，而堅拒「兩岸聯手保釣」。但台灣漁民湧進了傳統的釣魚台漁場海域，要不要驅逐或逮捕，若日本無所動作，是否放棄主權主張？要作為，大陸海監船護漁，台灣漁民能不接受嗎？日本對大陸海監船開火？馬英九讓台灣漁民接受大陸海監船的護漁，馬英九的總統還要不要幹？故馬也必須海巡艦護漁，那麼日本對台灣海巡艦開火？
冷戰時期台灣處於美國西太平洋鏈島防線的中央環節，兩岸一連手保釣，美國的鏈島防線即「斷鏈」。所以，在美國的壓力下，日本才在漁季前，匆匆簽下台日漁業協議。
從此，台灣漁民在釣魚台傳統海域除了不能登島外，不再受驅逐。換言之，即日本不再以驅逐台灣漁船來「保衛」釣魚台主權，也就是，台灣漁民不必和日本衝突，而需要任何一方保護，更不需要兩岸聯手護漁。除非開火，日本無法驅逐大陸海監船的常態巡航，又不會驅逐台灣漁民以示「保衛」主權。長此以往，台日固無保釣的衝突，中日也不因保釣開火，釣魚台問題回歸原點雖有爭議，但處於和平，至少近期內，沒有台日衝突，也就不再成為中日衝突的爆發點。
希拉蕊要以釣魚台為餌作為挑撥中日衝突的「巧實力」，雖然馬英九宣稱兩岸「不聯手」，但卻在馬英九堅持保釣護漁下，破功了。
另外，菲律賓在黃岩島和大陸船艦對峙一個多月後退卻，但卻在五月九日，掃射台灣「廣大興廿八號」漁船，漁民洪石成中彈身亡。事發後，最初消息是菲「不明船隻」開槍掃射我漁船。第一時間，馬英九與江宜樺會商後，即指示外交部向菲國表態嚴正關切，要求菲方必須立即查明真相，將凶手繩之以法。此外，北京國台辦和外交部，也罕見的雙雙發表聲明，同聲譴責，要求查明真相，懲辦凶手。
美國在台菲衝突上，立場袒菲，又不能讓台菲衝突而迫使兩岸聯手，其實是和台日衝突的美國立場是一致的。
美國當知道，南沙島礁和釣魚台列嶼一樣，其實是屬於中華民國「台灣地區」，要以南沙島礁衝擊中國主權，首當其衝的是中華民國「台灣地區」。所以，不是台灣卯上美國的盟邦，而是美國的盟邦卯上台灣。美國既不把台灣當「盟邦」，台灣也不必把美國當盟邦了。這究竟是對台北威脅還是對華盛頓的威脅？
台菲衝突是否其最後解決和釣魚台一樣，落實到台菲漁業談判，我們尚不得而知。如衝突升高而不得解決，美國則得在台菲之間選邊，這當是讓美國頭疼的事情。美國的戰略對象是大陸，不是台灣，現在卻被迫轉移到台灣來，美國「重返亞洲」，能對大陸築起新的圍堵？
如果台菲最後也來個漁業協定，菲律賓不會和中華民國「台灣地區」發生主權衝突，就不會和中華民國「大陸地區」發生主權衝突。南中國海將無風也無浪，但美國又要拿什麼來挑撥菲律賓和中國大陸的衝突？
所以，美國「重返亞洲」意欲對大陸新圍堵，有再多的「巧實力」，也是不能成功的，不能成功的因素除了宏觀的理由外，還有台灣因素在內。
Tuesday, May 28, 2013
The Withering Away of the State vs. the Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait
The Withering Away of the State vs. the Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2013
Summary: The Beijing authorities have asked the DPP whether it dares to forswear calls for de jure Taiwan independence. Actually, it should ask the DPP whether it dares to reaffirm the Republic of China. Does the DPP really wish to use "cross-Strait civil society exchanges" as its counter-argument? Does it really wish to offer a fantastical response to a real question? Isn't it being just a tad unrealistic?
Full Text below:
The DPP is attempting to establish a new rhetorical framework for cross-Strait political relations. Apparently it favors the "Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait," proposed by Pan Green academics from "Taiwan Democracy Watch." The DPP's "China Affairs Committee" has made reference to "Taiwan's China Agenda." During its recent All Peoples Conference it made reference to a Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait. These documents complement each other.
These three documents have certain key phrases in common. The first is "human rights.' The second is "civil society." Their primary purpose is to persuade fundamentalists within the party to agree to open communications with the Mainland. It is to reduce political resistance from within the party. These documents argue that exchanges promote democracy and human rights on the Mainland. They argue that "civil society" is the participant in these exchanges. The Democratic Progressive Party purports to be throwing open the doors of communication. Yet it resorts to these sorts of mealy-mouthed obfuscations. They merely reveal the deep-seated contradictions within the party.
The Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait, was originally entitled the Resolution on Human Rights in China. It originally contained the passage, "If our government intends to reach any political agreements with China [sic], then the people in China must first implement universal suffrage and democratic government." But this passage is missing in the "Taiwan Strait" version. Why the change? The question is intriguing. The "Free Person's Declaration" should be examined on the basis of its original wording.
The Declaration argues that "Until the regime in China [sic] has democratized, the two parties should not conduct any consultations with political implications." It even argued that "China is a one party state. Therefore it has no real "people's sovereignty." Therefore it is not a "fully independent nation." This is a fantastical variant on "withering away of the state" rhetoric. It is a pretext to deny that China is an independent state and to reject political consultations with the opposite shore. The Declaration purports to be an argument championing communication. But it has determined that "China is not a fully independent state." So how does the Declaration intend to interpret the 18 agreements the two sides have signed and implemented, including ECFA? Were these agreements with the opposite shore not signed with a government not established by means of universal suffrage? Were these agreements signed instead by the two sides' civil societies?
These three documents no longer call for "Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation." The China Agenda and Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait do not mention the "Republic of China." The Declaration mentions the "Republic of China." But it asserts that the ROC is not a fully independent state. This is surprising. The Declaration argues that the "constitutional government implemented by the public on Taiwan" and the constitutional framework of the" ROC " allow for confrontation, compromise, and divisions." If that is the case, then how did the Republic of China, allegedly not a fully independent state magically become "Taiwan, a sovereign and independent state?" The Republic of China is allegedly not a fully independent state. Yet Taiwan somehow qualifies as a sovereign and independent state. Is this political reality, or political dogma?
The "withering away of the state" rhetoric originated with the Communist Manifesto of 1848. Yet today, in the 21st century, it has found a home in the thinking of the Democratic Progressive Party. Is this not surprising? These three documents denigrate or flat out repudidate both the PRC and the ROC. Yet they purport to champion cross-Strait exchanges. They argue that the framework for such exchanges is civil society. This "withering away of the state" rhetoric amounts to talking to oneself. How can it possibly provide a framework for cross-Strait strategic relations?
The People's Republic of China is not a democracy. But its state and its government are real enough. Otherwise, consider nations such as North Korea. One need only argue that they are nations that fail to embody "popular sovereignty." One can then ignore the need for conflict resolution with them. The assertion that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country is essentially a phony proposition that can only be heard among citizens of the Republic of China, a truly sovereign and independent state.
The term "Republic of Taiwan" has vanished from the three documents. The DPP must turn back. It must come to grips with the fact that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China exist. How can the DPP deny that the two exist? How can it attempt to invoke civil society to argue that both states are dead, or to deconstruct the two sides' political systems? Beijing would ridicule such an argument. Such an argument would undermine the Republic of China's cross-Strait status. It would provide even less support for their pipe dream of Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state. In fact, if one wishes to advocate human rights in the Taiwan Strait, one would be on firmer footing championing the Republic of China, which has in fact implemented them.
The DPP's Taiwan independence path was originally Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation. It called for opposition to the People's Republic of China, which claimed to represent all of China. It amounted to a confrontation between one state and another. Who knew the DPP would suddenly perform a total about face? It now no longer mentions the "Republic of Taiwan." It now argues that the People's Republic of China is not a sovereign state because it lacks universal suffrage and democracy. It even alleges that the Republic of China is not a fully independent nation. Yet, somehow it has concluded that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent state. In one fell swoop, it has concluded that cross-Strait relations are "people to people," and "civil society to civil society" based. What does this underscore, if not the failure of the Taiwan independence movement's confrontation between states rhetoric? It is now attempting to substitute an ostrich head in the sand "withering away of the state" rhetoric in its place.
The Beijing authorities have asked the DPP whether it dares to forswear calls for de jure Taiwan independence. Actually, it should ask the DPP whether it dares to reaffirm the Republic of China. Does the DPP really wish to use "cross-Strait civil society exchanges" as its counter-argument? Does it really wish to offer a fantastical response to a real question? Isn't it being just a tad unrealistic?
「國家死滅論」與「台海人權決議文」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.27 01:48 am
民進黨正在嘗試建立兩岸新論述。跡象顯示，傾綠學者的「守護台灣民主平台」所提《自由人宣言》、民進黨「中國事務委員會」所提《台灣的中國議程》，及此次民進黨全代會所提《台海人權決議文》，皆是互為表裡的同一動作。
這三個文件（下稱三文件）有兩個共同的關鍵字：一、人權。二、公民社會。此一論述主要是用於說服黨內的基本教義派，欲取得開放民進黨與對岸交流的令狀，降低黨內阻力。其意是指：交流是為了促進大陸的民主人權，交流對象則以「公民社會」為主體。民進黨為了在黨內打開交流之門，竟至使出此種障眼法的地步，即可見黨內矛盾之深重。
《台海人權決議文》原名《中國人權決議文》。《中國版》原有一段文字是：我政府要與中國進行任何政治協議，應在中國人民以民主普選方式產生政府後為之；但是，到了《台海版》，這段文字卻好像不見了。為何有此變化，自是耐人尋味；這要從此一論述架構的原型，即《自由人宣言》論起。
《宣言》主張：「在中國體制尚未民主化之前，雙方不應進行任何具有政治意涵的協商。」甚至認為：「中國是一黨專政的國家，因此沒有真正的『人民主權』，也就不是完全獨立的國家。」這是一種奇幻的「國家死滅論」，以否定中國是一「獨立的國家」，來拒絕與對岸進行政治協商。然而《宣言》畢竟也是一種「交流論」；但既然認定「中國不是一個完全獨立的國家」，《宣言》將如何解釋兩岸已經簽成並實施的十八項協議（包括ＥＣＦＡ）？難道這些協議都不是與對岸「非普選產生之政府」所簽？而難道這些協議皆是兩岸「公民社會」所簽成？
三文件皆不再倡言「台獨建國」，而《中國議程》及《台海決議文》已揭示的部分亦未見「中華民國」。《宣言》雖提及「中華民國」，卻稱中華民國也不是一個「完全獨立的國家」；但奇怪的是，《宣言》既然認為「台灣人民的憲政實踐與『中華民國』體制與憲法，實際上有著對抗而又共存，妥協而又分裂的關係」，則如何從「中華民國這個不是完全獨立的國家」中，能夠得到「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」的結論？中華民國不是一個「完全獨立的國家」，但台灣卻是一個「主權獨立的國家」，這是政治事實，或是政治宗教？
「國家死滅論」源出一八四八年的《共產黨宣言》，如今竟在二十一世紀又現於民進黨的思維中，能不令人拍案驚奇？三文件貶抑了或根本否定了中華人民共和國與中華民國，而欲將兩岸的交流，架構在所謂「公民社會」上，此種自說自話的「國家死滅論」如何能支撐起兩岸大局？
中華人民共和國並非民主政體，但其國家與政府皆為現實的存在；否則，如北韓這樣的國家，只要否定其為「人民主權」之國家即可，各國又何必與之折衝？而「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」，更根本是一寓居在「中華民國是一主權獨立國家」之中的假議題。
如今，「台灣國」既已從「三文件」上消失，民進黨即必須回過頭來認真面對中華民國與中華人民共和國的事實存在；豈能逕自否定二者，而欲以「公民社會」來「死滅」或解構兩岸的政治體制？那將被北京訕笑，亦傷及中華民國在兩岸間的地位，更不可能支撐「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」的幻夢。其實，若要主張「台海人權」，站在中華民國的真正實踐之立場上，更加能說得義正詞嚴。
民進黨的台獨路線，原是以「台獨建國」對抗「代表一個中國的中華人民共和國」，這是國家與國家的對抗；不料，如今卻一退十萬八千里，除了不再提「台灣國」，又指中華人民共和國「不是人民主權國家」，更聲稱中華民國「不是完全獨立的國家」（但「台灣」卻是「一個主權獨立的國家」？），而一舉將兩岸關係化約為「人民對人民」、「公民社會對公民社會」的關係，這豈不正顯示了台獨「國家對抗論」的失敗，而欲以鴕鳥鑽沙的「國家死滅論」來取代？
北京問民進黨：敢不敢說「不搞法理台獨」？其實是問民進黨：要不要先回到中華民國再說？民進黨若竟以「兩岸公民社會交流」回應，實問虛答到了奇幻的地步，會不會太離譜了一些？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2013
Summary: The Beijing authorities have asked the DPP whether it dares to forswear calls for de jure Taiwan independence. Actually, it should ask the DPP whether it dares to reaffirm the Republic of China. Does the DPP really wish to use "cross-Strait civil society exchanges" as its counter-argument? Does it really wish to offer a fantastical response to a real question? Isn't it being just a tad unrealistic?
Full Text below:
The DPP is attempting to establish a new rhetorical framework for cross-Strait political relations. Apparently it favors the "Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait," proposed by Pan Green academics from "Taiwan Democracy Watch." The DPP's "China Affairs Committee" has made reference to "Taiwan's China Agenda." During its recent All Peoples Conference it made reference to a Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait. These documents complement each other.
These three documents have certain key phrases in common. The first is "human rights.' The second is "civil society." Their primary purpose is to persuade fundamentalists within the party to agree to open communications with the Mainland. It is to reduce political resistance from within the party. These documents argue that exchanges promote democracy and human rights on the Mainland. They argue that "civil society" is the participant in these exchanges. The Democratic Progressive Party purports to be throwing open the doors of communication. Yet it resorts to these sorts of mealy-mouthed obfuscations. They merely reveal the deep-seated contradictions within the party.
The Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait, was originally entitled the Resolution on Human Rights in China. It originally contained the passage, "If our government intends to reach any political agreements with China [sic], then the people in China must first implement universal suffrage and democratic government." But this passage is missing in the "Taiwan Strait" version. Why the change? The question is intriguing. The "Free Person's Declaration" should be examined on the basis of its original wording.
The Declaration argues that "Until the regime in China [sic] has democratized, the two parties should not conduct any consultations with political implications." It even argued that "China is a one party state. Therefore it has no real "people's sovereignty." Therefore it is not a "fully independent nation." This is a fantastical variant on "withering away of the state" rhetoric. It is a pretext to deny that China is an independent state and to reject political consultations with the opposite shore. The Declaration purports to be an argument championing communication. But it has determined that "China is not a fully independent state." So how does the Declaration intend to interpret the 18 agreements the two sides have signed and implemented, including ECFA? Were these agreements with the opposite shore not signed with a government not established by means of universal suffrage? Were these agreements signed instead by the two sides' civil societies?
These three documents no longer call for "Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation." The China Agenda and Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait do not mention the "Republic of China." The Declaration mentions the "Republic of China." But it asserts that the ROC is not a fully independent state. This is surprising. The Declaration argues that the "constitutional government implemented by the public on Taiwan" and the constitutional framework of the" ROC " allow for confrontation, compromise, and divisions." If that is the case, then how did the Republic of China, allegedly not a fully independent state magically become "Taiwan, a sovereign and independent state?" The Republic of China is allegedly not a fully independent state. Yet Taiwan somehow qualifies as a sovereign and independent state. Is this political reality, or political dogma?
The "withering away of the state" rhetoric originated with the Communist Manifesto of 1848. Yet today, in the 21st century, it has found a home in the thinking of the Democratic Progressive Party. Is this not surprising? These three documents denigrate or flat out repudidate both the PRC and the ROC. Yet they purport to champion cross-Strait exchanges. They argue that the framework for such exchanges is civil society. This "withering away of the state" rhetoric amounts to talking to oneself. How can it possibly provide a framework for cross-Strait strategic relations?
The People's Republic of China is not a democracy. But its state and its government are real enough. Otherwise, consider nations such as North Korea. One need only argue that they are nations that fail to embody "popular sovereignty." One can then ignore the need for conflict resolution with them. The assertion that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country is essentially a phony proposition that can only be heard among citizens of the Republic of China, a truly sovereign and independent state.
The term "Republic of Taiwan" has vanished from the three documents. The DPP must turn back. It must come to grips with the fact that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China exist. How can the DPP deny that the two exist? How can it attempt to invoke civil society to argue that both states are dead, or to deconstruct the two sides' political systems? Beijing would ridicule such an argument. Such an argument would undermine the Republic of China's cross-Strait status. It would provide even less support for their pipe dream of Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state. In fact, if one wishes to advocate human rights in the Taiwan Strait, one would be on firmer footing championing the Republic of China, which has in fact implemented them.
The DPP's Taiwan independence path was originally Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation. It called for opposition to the People's Republic of China, which claimed to represent all of China. It amounted to a confrontation between one state and another. Who knew the DPP would suddenly perform a total about face? It now no longer mentions the "Republic of Taiwan." It now argues that the People's Republic of China is not a sovereign state because it lacks universal suffrage and democracy. It even alleges that the Republic of China is not a fully independent nation. Yet, somehow it has concluded that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent state. In one fell swoop, it has concluded that cross-Strait relations are "people to people," and "civil society to civil society" based. What does this underscore, if not the failure of the Taiwan independence movement's confrontation between states rhetoric? It is now attempting to substitute an ostrich head in the sand "withering away of the state" rhetoric in its place.
The Beijing authorities have asked the DPP whether it dares to forswear calls for de jure Taiwan independence. Actually, it should ask the DPP whether it dares to reaffirm the Republic of China. Does the DPP really wish to use "cross-Strait civil society exchanges" as its counter-argument? Does it really wish to offer a fantastical response to a real question? Isn't it being just a tad unrealistic?
「國家死滅論」與「台海人權決議文」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.27 01:48 am
民進黨正在嘗試建立兩岸新論述。跡象顯示，傾綠學者的「守護台灣民主平台」所提《自由人宣言》、民進黨「中國事務委員會」所提《台灣的中國議程》，及此次民進黨全代會所提《台海人權決議文》，皆是互為表裡的同一動作。
這三個文件（下稱三文件）有兩個共同的關鍵字：一、人權。二、公民社會。此一論述主要是用於說服黨內的基本教義派，欲取得開放民進黨與對岸交流的令狀，降低黨內阻力。其意是指：交流是為了促進大陸的民主人權，交流對象則以「公民社會」為主體。民進黨為了在黨內打開交流之門，竟至使出此種障眼法的地步，即可見黨內矛盾之深重。
《台海人權決議文》原名《中國人權決議文》。《中國版》原有一段文字是：我政府要與中國進行任何政治協議，應在中國人民以民主普選方式產生政府後為之；但是，到了《台海版》，這段文字卻好像不見了。為何有此變化，自是耐人尋味；這要從此一論述架構的原型，即《自由人宣言》論起。
《宣言》主張：「在中國體制尚未民主化之前，雙方不應進行任何具有政治意涵的協商。」甚至認為：「中國是一黨專政的國家，因此沒有真正的『人民主權』，也就不是完全獨立的國家。」這是一種奇幻的「國家死滅論」，以否定中國是一「獨立的國家」，來拒絕與對岸進行政治協商。然而《宣言》畢竟也是一種「交流論」；但既然認定「中國不是一個完全獨立的國家」，《宣言》將如何解釋兩岸已經簽成並實施的十八項協議（包括ＥＣＦＡ）？難道這些協議都不是與對岸「非普選產生之政府」所簽？而難道這些協議皆是兩岸「公民社會」所簽成？
三文件皆不再倡言「台獨建國」，而《中國議程》及《台海決議文》已揭示的部分亦未見「中華民國」。《宣言》雖提及「中華民國」，卻稱中華民國也不是一個「完全獨立的國家」；但奇怪的是，《宣言》既然認為「台灣人民的憲政實踐與『中華民國』體制與憲法，實際上有著對抗而又共存，妥協而又分裂的關係」，則如何從「中華民國這個不是完全獨立的國家」中，能夠得到「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」的結論？中華民國不是一個「完全獨立的國家」，但台灣卻是一個「主權獨立的國家」，這是政治事實，或是政治宗教？
「國家死滅論」源出一八四八年的《共產黨宣言》，如今竟在二十一世紀又現於民進黨的思維中，能不令人拍案驚奇？三文件貶抑了或根本否定了中華人民共和國與中華民國，而欲將兩岸的交流，架構在所謂「公民社會」上，此種自說自話的「國家死滅論」如何能支撐起兩岸大局？
中華人民共和國並非民主政體，但其國家與政府皆為現實的存在；否則，如北韓這樣的國家，只要否定其為「人民主權」之國家即可，各國又何必與之折衝？而「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」，更根本是一寓居在「中華民國是一主權獨立國家」之中的假議題。
如今，「台灣國」既已從「三文件」上消失，民進黨即必須回過頭來認真面對中華民國與中華人民共和國的事實存在；豈能逕自否定二者，而欲以「公民社會」來「死滅」或解構兩岸的政治體制？那將被北京訕笑，亦傷及中華民國在兩岸間的地位，更不可能支撐「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」的幻夢。其實，若要主張「台海人權」，站在中華民國的真正實踐之立場上，更加能說得義正詞嚴。
民進黨的台獨路線，原是以「台獨建國」對抗「代表一個中國的中華人民共和國」，這是國家與國家的對抗；不料，如今卻一退十萬八千里，除了不再提「台灣國」，又指中華人民共和國「不是人民主權國家」，更聲稱中華民國「不是完全獨立的國家」（但「台灣」卻是「一個主權獨立的國家」？），而一舉將兩岸關係化約為「人民對人民」、「公民社會對公民社會」的關係，這豈不正顯示了台獨「國家對抗論」的失敗，而欲以鴕鳥鑽沙的「國家死滅論」來取代？
北京問民進黨：敢不敢說「不搞法理台獨」？其實是問民進黨：要不要先回到中華民國再說？民進黨若竟以「兩岸公民社會交流」回應，實問虛答到了奇幻的地步，會不會太離譜了一些？
Monday, May 27, 2013
A Crooked Triangle: Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen
A Crooked Triangle: Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 28, 2013
Summary: A power struggle and policy struggle took place recently within the DPP, during its All Peoples Conference. What direction the party takes will depend in large part on the triangular relationship between Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and Tsai Ing-wen. As recent events have shown, this changeable scalene triangle might appropriately be termed a "crooked triangle."
Full Text below:
A power struggle and policy struggle took place recently within the DPP, during its All Peoples Conference. What direction the party takes will depend in large part on the triangular relationship between Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and Tsai Ing-wen. As recent events have shown, this changeable scalene triangle might appropriately be termed a "crooked triangle."
Last Saturday the DPP held its All Peoples Conference. Yet again, Tsai Ing-wen left early. She left a parting shot. Addressing Su Tseng-chang, she said "I am leaving early. This way the current chairman will feel less constrained." Addressing Chen Shui-bian, she said "I hope he (Chen Shui-bian) will make more of an effort, and allow the community to accept him, and sympathize with him."
Her tone suggested someone of higher status addressing someone of lower status, of someone more powerful addressing someone less powerful. Yet again, Tsai Ing-wen left early. This means "Su Tseng-chang was ill at ease." It also means Tsai Ing-wen is under no duty to endorse Su Tseng-chang. Tsai Ing-wen urged Chen Shui-bian to "make more of an effort." She said "the DPP's basic values and judgments regarding right and wrong must not be obscured." She was solemnly warning party members who support Chen Shui-bian that enough is enough, and to quit while they are ahead.
Tsai Ing-wen can be considered the biggest winner of the All Peoples Conference. One. So-called "party member balloting" was Su Tseng-chang's "political accomplishment." Tsai Ing-wen championed opinion polls that poll the entire population. In the end, 221 votes trumped 66 votes, and upheld opinion polls that poll the entire population. Two. Regarding "restoring Chen Shui-bian's party membership" Su Tseng-chang originally said he would respect the All Peoples Conference "public verdict." Later he changed his tune. He said "Chen must personally request restoration of party membership," and shelved the issue for later. This provoked Tsai Ing-wen's later statement, "The DPP's basic values and judgments about right and wrong must not be obscured." The shelving of this issue also reflected Tsai Ing-wen's original intent. Three. The "Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait" was spearheaded by Tsai Ing-wen forces. This invokes the name of "human rights" in exchanges with Mainland China. It was passed on to the Central Executive Committee. But it reveals the Tsai faction's ambition to set cross-Strait policy.
During the recent All Peoples Conference Chen Shui-bian elevated his criminal prosecution from a matter of "inmate treatment" to what Annette Lu referred to as the "regrouping of political forces." Chen now demands "political vindication," and not merely "medical parole."
As matters stand, the All Peoples Conference will not grant Ah-Bian "political vindication." Even the proposal that "Chen must personally request restoration of party membership" remains controversial. Ah-Bian did not resign from the party. His party membership was revoked. Chen Shui-bian says he does not want to force the All Peoples Conference to vote on whether to restore his party membership. He says it has already indicated its goodwill, and that he is backing off. He said that if he personally requests restoration of party membership, touching off a firestorm, he will be subject to insults by anti-Chen elements, and the situation will worsen. Given this trend, Tsai Ing-wen would be Chen Shui-bian supporters number one target. This is immediately evident from Ah-Bian supporters' recent violent attacks against Tsai Ing-wen.
Tsai has attempted to reject Ah-Bian and defend against attacks by Ah-Bian from the very beginning. This is clear for all to see, But she also hopped on the party's "humane treatment" and "political persecution" bandwagons. She did not expect the Ah-Bian forces to be so insatiable. They raised the ante. They are now demanding "political rehabilitation" and the "regrouping of political forces." This forced Tsai Ing-wen to slam on the brakes. Chen Chih-chung asked, "Shouldn't we be asking Tsai Ing-wen to make more of an effort, and run for president once more in 2016?" But who does not know that Chen Shui-bian's demands for "political vindication" and a "regrouping of political forces" must be kept under the radar, assuming Tsai Ing-wen wishes to make a run for the presidency in 2016.
Within both the party and the community, Su Tseng-chang enjoys less support than Tsai Ing-wen. Su Tseng-chang's strategy is to pander to Taiwan independence elements, most of whom are Ah-Bian supporters. But opinion polls that poll the entire population renders this approach useless in the party's presidential primaries. Therefore, Su Tseng-chang has been forced to change tactics. Instead of attempting to prevail over Tsai during the the party primaries, he must now throw obstacles in the way of Tsai Ing-wen's policy path and election campaign. He must also attempt to make life difficult for Tsai Ing-wen in the event she is actually elected. Given Su Tseng-chang's current plight, assuming he is petty and narrow-minded, he may choose to position himself as a champion of DPP fundamentalism. He may refuse to help Tsai Ing-wen clear away obstacles to her election campaign or her ruling administration. People such as this are irrational and unreasonable. But the DPP has no shortage of them. Therefore if a different Su Tseng-chang emerges, one should not be surprised.
Chen Chih-chung said "Tsai Ing-wen must also make an effort." He sounded the trumpets. Chen Shui-bian's counterattack has begun. If the conflict cannot be resolved, the "restoration of party membership" issue will become even more controversial during next year's All Peoples Conference. The 2016 general election will be even closer. The situation will become even more sinister. Given such developments, Su Tseng-chang will be at a greater disadvantage than ever. He will bear even greater responsibility. Tsai Ing-wen holds the upper hand. For her, suppressing Chen Shui-bian and promoting DPP cross-Strait policy reform is of greater urgency than it is for Su Tseng-chang. Su Tseng-chang is still pandering to Taiwan independence elements in a last-ditch attempt to prevail over Tsai Ing-wen. He knows he is weak, but is unwilling to set the ball up for Tsai Ing-wen. Therefore he is ambivalent about these issues. Su and Tsai might well end up in a lose-lose situation, Of course, this may be precisely what Su Tseng-chang is counting on.
Ah-Bian, Su, and Tsai form a crooked triangle. It is already crooked. The only question is how much more crooked will it get.
歪三角：陳水扁‧蘇貞昌‧蔡英文
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.28 02:43 am
經此次全代會，民進黨內部權力路線的鬥爭，相當大的一部分將取決於陳水扁、蘇貞昌與蔡英文的三角關係。事態顯示，這是一個變動不居的不等邊三角形，可稱為歪三角。
上周六民進黨舉行全代會，蔡英文「又」提前退場，且留下兩句話。一句話她對蘇貞昌說：「我早些離場，這樣讓現任主席主持得比較自在一點。」另一句話她對陳水扁說：「希望他（陳水扁）要多作努力，讓社會能接受他、同情他。」
這兩句話的口吻，皆透露出一種上對下、強對弱的口氣。蔡英文「又」提早離場，一方面是「蘇貞昌不自在」，另一方面當然亦在表示蔡英文不是蘇貞昌的背書者；至於蔡英文要陳水扁「多作努力」，並謂「民進黨清廉的基本價值及是非判斷不要被模糊掉」，這更儼然是要黨內的挺扁派適可而止。
蔡英文可謂是此次全代會的最大贏家。一、「黨員投票」是蘇貞昌的「政見」，全民調則是蔡英文的主張；最後全代會以二二一對六十六票的懸殊比數，維持了全民調。二、陳水扁「恢復黨籍案」，蘇貞昌原持尊重全代會「公決」的立場，後來改以「自請返黨」擱延此案；證諸蔡英文事後「是非判斷不能模糊」的表態，此案之擱延自亦符合蔡英文的本意。三、《台海人權決議文》的領銜者皆蔡英文之人馬，此案主張藉「人權」之名義與中國交流，雖移交中執會處理，但已透露出蔡系人馬欲主導兩岸政策之企圖。
經歷此次全代會，陳水扁已將其司法事件，由「受刑人處遇的議題」，升高至「重建政治勢力的議題」（呂秀蓮語）；他要的是「政治平反」，已不只是「保外就醫」。
依目前進度看，此次全代會未對扁作出「政治平反」，而「自請返黨案」亦有爭議（因為，扁不只是「退黨」，而是事實上已「除名」）。但是，陳水扁方面則認為未強求全代會表決「恢復黨籍」已表善意與退讓，而若「自請返黨」又生波折，則必認為遭到反扁者的戲弄羞辱，勢將更不善罷干休。勢若趨此，蔡英文將是「阿扁們」首選的箭靶；這從最近扁系對蔡英文的狂暴攻擊，可見一斑。
蔡一路走來拒扁防扁的「努力」有目共睹，但她也捲入黨內「人道處遇」、「政治迫害」的潮流中；只是未料擁扁勢力得寸進尺，將事態升高到「政治平反」及「重建政治勢力」的高度，這逼得蔡英文不得不踩煞車。陳致中說：「那是不是請蔡英文自己多作努力，再選二○一六？」其實又何嘗不知，必須將陳水扁的喉嚨壓在「政治平反」、「重建政治勢力」的水線以下，正是蔡英文若欲選二○一六所必須之「努力」。
此時的蘇貞昌，無論在黨內及社會上，聲勢均不如蔡英文。蘇貞昌的策略是向獨派（大多也是扁的支持者）靠攏，但「全民調」卻使此計在黨內總統初選上失去作用。因此，蘇貞昌如今的計謀，已不由自主地從「如何在黨內初選中勝過蔡英文」，轉向「如何增加蔡英文出線及當選的難度」，以及「如何使蔡英文即使當選也將面對困境」的方向思考。以蘇貞昌今日境地，倘若其心胸狹窄，他很可能會選擇在歷史上定位做為一個民進黨基本教義的護持者，而拒絕做一個替蔡英文清掃競選障礙或執政障礙的轎夫。這種類型的人雖是一般情理所難理解，但民進黨內最不缺這種人；所以，若多出一個蘇貞昌，也毋庸驚怪。
在陳致中「蔡英文也要努力」的號角聲中，陳水扁的反撲已經發動。事態如果不可開交，「恢復黨籍案」若在明年全代會以更加凌厲的聲勢再度登場亦非意外；彼時已更接近二○一四及二○一六選舉，情勢將更加險惡。在這樣的情境中，蘇貞昌愈是處於劣勢，其實愈應負起愈大的責任。因為，居於上風的蔡英文，對壓制陳水扁及引導兩岸政策轉型二事上皆有大於蘇貞昌的迫切性；但蘇貞昌一方面是仍欲以拉攏獨派與蔡英文作最後一搏，另一方面則明知自己勢弱而不願「作球」給蔡英文，所以對二事極盡曖昧。倘係如此，蘇蔡二人即不無可能落得兩敗俱傷的下場；或者，其實這也正是蘇貞昌打的算盤。
扁蘇蔡這個歪三角，已經歪了，唯不知將歪到何
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 28, 2013
Summary: A power struggle and policy struggle took place recently within the DPP, during its All Peoples Conference. What direction the party takes will depend in large part on the triangular relationship between Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and Tsai Ing-wen. As recent events have shown, this changeable scalene triangle might appropriately be termed a "crooked triangle."
Full Text below:
A power struggle and policy struggle took place recently within the DPP, during its All Peoples Conference. What direction the party takes will depend in large part on the triangular relationship between Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and Tsai Ing-wen. As recent events have shown, this changeable scalene triangle might appropriately be termed a "crooked triangle."
Last Saturday the DPP held its All Peoples Conference. Yet again, Tsai Ing-wen left early. She left a parting shot. Addressing Su Tseng-chang, she said "I am leaving early. This way the current chairman will feel less constrained." Addressing Chen Shui-bian, she said "I hope he (Chen Shui-bian) will make more of an effort, and allow the community to accept him, and sympathize with him."
Her tone suggested someone of higher status addressing someone of lower status, of someone more powerful addressing someone less powerful. Yet again, Tsai Ing-wen left early. This means "Su Tseng-chang was ill at ease." It also means Tsai Ing-wen is under no duty to endorse Su Tseng-chang. Tsai Ing-wen urged Chen Shui-bian to "make more of an effort." She said "the DPP's basic values and judgments regarding right and wrong must not be obscured." She was solemnly warning party members who support Chen Shui-bian that enough is enough, and to quit while they are ahead.
Tsai Ing-wen can be considered the biggest winner of the All Peoples Conference. One. So-called "party member balloting" was Su Tseng-chang's "political accomplishment." Tsai Ing-wen championed opinion polls that poll the entire population. In the end, 221 votes trumped 66 votes, and upheld opinion polls that poll the entire population. Two. Regarding "restoring Chen Shui-bian's party membership" Su Tseng-chang originally said he would respect the All Peoples Conference "public verdict." Later he changed his tune. He said "Chen must personally request restoration of party membership," and shelved the issue for later. This provoked Tsai Ing-wen's later statement, "The DPP's basic values and judgments about right and wrong must not be obscured." The shelving of this issue also reflected Tsai Ing-wen's original intent. Three. The "Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait" was spearheaded by Tsai Ing-wen forces. This invokes the name of "human rights" in exchanges with Mainland China. It was passed on to the Central Executive Committee. But it reveals the Tsai faction's ambition to set cross-Strait policy.
During the recent All Peoples Conference Chen Shui-bian elevated his criminal prosecution from a matter of "inmate treatment" to what Annette Lu referred to as the "regrouping of political forces." Chen now demands "political vindication," and not merely "medical parole."
As matters stand, the All Peoples Conference will not grant Ah-Bian "political vindication." Even the proposal that "Chen must personally request restoration of party membership" remains controversial. Ah-Bian did not resign from the party. His party membership was revoked. Chen Shui-bian says he does not want to force the All Peoples Conference to vote on whether to restore his party membership. He says it has already indicated its goodwill, and that he is backing off. He said that if he personally requests restoration of party membership, touching off a firestorm, he will be subject to insults by anti-Chen elements, and the situation will worsen. Given this trend, Tsai Ing-wen would be Chen Shui-bian supporters number one target. This is immediately evident from Ah-Bian supporters' recent violent attacks against Tsai Ing-wen.
Tsai has attempted to reject Ah-Bian and defend against attacks by Ah-Bian from the very beginning. This is clear for all to see, But she also hopped on the party's "humane treatment" and "political persecution" bandwagons. She did not expect the Ah-Bian forces to be so insatiable. They raised the ante. They are now demanding "political rehabilitation" and the "regrouping of political forces." This forced Tsai Ing-wen to slam on the brakes. Chen Chih-chung asked, "Shouldn't we be asking Tsai Ing-wen to make more of an effort, and run for president once more in 2016?" But who does not know that Chen Shui-bian's demands for "political vindication" and a "regrouping of political forces" must be kept under the radar, assuming Tsai Ing-wen wishes to make a run for the presidency in 2016.
Within both the party and the community, Su Tseng-chang enjoys less support than Tsai Ing-wen. Su Tseng-chang's strategy is to pander to Taiwan independence elements, most of whom are Ah-Bian supporters. But opinion polls that poll the entire population renders this approach useless in the party's presidential primaries. Therefore, Su Tseng-chang has been forced to change tactics. Instead of attempting to prevail over Tsai during the the party primaries, he must now throw obstacles in the way of Tsai Ing-wen's policy path and election campaign. He must also attempt to make life difficult for Tsai Ing-wen in the event she is actually elected. Given Su Tseng-chang's current plight, assuming he is petty and narrow-minded, he may choose to position himself as a champion of DPP fundamentalism. He may refuse to help Tsai Ing-wen clear away obstacles to her election campaign or her ruling administration. People such as this are irrational and unreasonable. But the DPP has no shortage of them. Therefore if a different Su Tseng-chang emerges, one should not be surprised.
Chen Chih-chung said "Tsai Ing-wen must also make an effort." He sounded the trumpets. Chen Shui-bian's counterattack has begun. If the conflict cannot be resolved, the "restoration of party membership" issue will become even more controversial during next year's All Peoples Conference. The 2016 general election will be even closer. The situation will become even more sinister. Given such developments, Su Tseng-chang will be at a greater disadvantage than ever. He will bear even greater responsibility. Tsai Ing-wen holds the upper hand. For her, suppressing Chen Shui-bian and promoting DPP cross-Strait policy reform is of greater urgency than it is for Su Tseng-chang. Su Tseng-chang is still pandering to Taiwan independence elements in a last-ditch attempt to prevail over Tsai Ing-wen. He knows he is weak, but is unwilling to set the ball up for Tsai Ing-wen. Therefore he is ambivalent about these issues. Su and Tsai might well end up in a lose-lose situation, Of course, this may be precisely what Su Tseng-chang is counting on.
Ah-Bian, Su, and Tsai form a crooked triangle. It is already crooked. The only question is how much more crooked will it get.
歪三角：陳水扁‧蘇貞昌‧蔡英文
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.28 02:43 am
經此次全代會，民進黨內部權力路線的鬥爭，相當大的一部分將取決於陳水扁、蘇貞昌與蔡英文的三角關係。事態顯示，這是一個變動不居的不等邊三角形，可稱為歪三角。
上周六民進黨舉行全代會，蔡英文「又」提前退場，且留下兩句話。一句話她對蘇貞昌說：「我早些離場，這樣讓現任主席主持得比較自在一點。」另一句話她對陳水扁說：「希望他（陳水扁）要多作努力，讓社會能接受他、同情他。」
這兩句話的口吻，皆透露出一種上對下、強對弱的口氣。蔡英文「又」提早離場，一方面是「蘇貞昌不自在」，另一方面當然亦在表示蔡英文不是蘇貞昌的背書者；至於蔡英文要陳水扁「多作努力」，並謂「民進黨清廉的基本價值及是非判斷不要被模糊掉」，這更儼然是要黨內的挺扁派適可而止。
蔡英文可謂是此次全代會的最大贏家。一、「黨員投票」是蘇貞昌的「政見」，全民調則是蔡英文的主張；最後全代會以二二一對六十六票的懸殊比數，維持了全民調。二、陳水扁「恢復黨籍案」，蘇貞昌原持尊重全代會「公決」的立場，後來改以「自請返黨」擱延此案；證諸蔡英文事後「是非判斷不能模糊」的表態，此案之擱延自亦符合蔡英文的本意。三、《台海人權決議文》的領銜者皆蔡英文之人馬，此案主張藉「人權」之名義與中國交流，雖移交中執會處理，但已透露出蔡系人馬欲主導兩岸政策之企圖。
經歷此次全代會，陳水扁已將其司法事件，由「受刑人處遇的議題」，升高至「重建政治勢力的議題」（呂秀蓮語）；他要的是「政治平反」，已不只是「保外就醫」。
依目前進度看，此次全代會未對扁作出「政治平反」，而「自請返黨案」亦有爭議（因為，扁不只是「退黨」，而是事實上已「除名」）。但是，陳水扁方面則認為未強求全代會表決「恢復黨籍」已表善意與退讓，而若「自請返黨」又生波折，則必認為遭到反扁者的戲弄羞辱，勢將更不善罷干休。勢若趨此，蔡英文將是「阿扁們」首選的箭靶；這從最近扁系對蔡英文的狂暴攻擊，可見一斑。
蔡一路走來拒扁防扁的「努力」有目共睹，但她也捲入黨內「人道處遇」、「政治迫害」的潮流中；只是未料擁扁勢力得寸進尺，將事態升高到「政治平反」及「重建政治勢力」的高度，這逼得蔡英文不得不踩煞車。陳致中說：「那是不是請蔡英文自己多作努力，再選二○一六？」其實又何嘗不知，必須將陳水扁的喉嚨壓在「政治平反」、「重建政治勢力」的水線以下，正是蔡英文若欲選二○一六所必須之「努力」。
此時的蘇貞昌，無論在黨內及社會上，聲勢均不如蔡英文。蘇貞昌的策略是向獨派（大多也是扁的支持者）靠攏，但「全民調」卻使此計在黨內總統初選上失去作用。因此，蘇貞昌如今的計謀，已不由自主地從「如何在黨內初選中勝過蔡英文」，轉向「如何增加蔡英文出線及當選的難度」，以及「如何使蔡英文即使當選也將面對困境」的方向思考。以蘇貞昌今日境地，倘若其心胸狹窄，他很可能會選擇在歷史上定位做為一個民進黨基本教義的護持者，而拒絕做一個替蔡英文清掃競選障礙或執政障礙的轎夫。這種類型的人雖是一般情理所難理解，但民進黨內最不缺這種人；所以，若多出一個蘇貞昌，也毋庸驚怪。
在陳致中「蔡英文也要努力」的號角聲中，陳水扁的反撲已經發動。事態如果不可開交，「恢復黨籍案」若在明年全代會以更加凌厲的聲勢再度登場亦非意外；彼時已更接近二○一四及二○一六選舉，情勢將更加險惡。在這樣的情境中，蘇貞昌愈是處於劣勢，其實愈應負起愈大的責任。因為，居於上風的蔡英文，對壓制陳水扁及引導兩岸政策轉型二事上皆有大於蘇貞昌的迫切性；但蘇貞昌一方面是仍欲以拉攏獨派與蔡英文作最後一搏，另一方面則明知自己勢弱而不願「作球」給蔡英文，所以對二事極盡曖昧。倘係如此，蘇蔡二人即不無可能落得兩敗俱傷的下場；或者，其實這也正是蘇貞昌打的算盤。
扁蘇蔡這個歪三角，已經歪了，唯不知將歪到何
Sunday, May 26, 2013
Any DPP Cross-Strait Policy that Positions Taiwan Outside of China is in Vain
Any DPP Cross-Strait Policy that Positions Taiwan Outside of China is in Vain
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2013
Summary: The KMT-CCP Civil War led to a divided nation. Taiwan was under the control of others for long periods of time. The Mainland's national defense was threatened. Today, cross-Strait peace has finally established a basis for exchanges. But the DPP seems determined to depart from the straight and narrow, and go its own way, As long as the DPP classifies Taiwan as not part of China, as long as it persists in painting Mainland China as the enemy, then any of its "China Policy" declarations trumpeting "universal values" will be in vain.
Full Text below:
The DPP has lost two general elections in a row. It is acutely aware that cross-Strait relations is its Achilles Heel. Therefore it is eager to remedy its plight. It is eager to pave the way for another presidential bid in 2016. Younger generation DPP leaders have recently exerted pressure on the DPP party leadership. Recently, during the party's All Peoples Conference, they called for a "Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Straits." They demanded that cross-Strait relations be based on a "foundation of universal human rights." On the one hand, they called for "supporting the Chinese people in their adoption of democracy." On the other hand, they insisted that any agreement between the two sides "must be consistent with the principles of democracy, equality, and dignity." They said they hoped that "the Chinese people could establish a government based on democracy and universal suffrage, that the two sides could develop a relationship of trust and friendship rooted in human rights and democracy." Obviously, they were using "universal values" as stalking horse for a "relationship of trust and friendship." Needless to say, this was the same old "China, Taiwan, one country on each side" wine in a not so new bottle.
Su Tseng-chang addressed this topic when he first announced the China Affairs Committee Plan on June 20. He convened nine "Hua Shan Conferences on China Policy." He then said the All Peoples Conference was short on time, and used it as an excuse to pass the "Resolution on Taiwan Straits Human Rights" on to the Central Executive Committee. The resolution was apparently shelved. But rumor has it the DPP's long-awaited "Great China Policy Debate" will soon convene.
Let us review the DPP's so-called "China Policy," beginning with the founding of the party. In 1991, the DPP passed its "Taiwan Independence Party Platform." In 1999, the DPP passed its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." In 2007, the DPP passed its "Resolution for a Normal Nation." Now the DPP has passed its "Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Straits." Every last one of them was predicated upon Taiwan independence. The DPP constantly replaces the bottles. But inside it always serves up the same old Taiwan independence wine. The DPP seems to think that it need only concoct a glib rationale to camouflage the underlying premise of "Taiwan, China, one country on each side." The party will then magically surmount the difficulties it has encountered in cross-Strait relations. As we have solemnly underscored, such self-deception will have no effect whatsoever. If the DPP is truly seeking a way out of its dilemma, it must make a fresh start. It must revisit the historical roots of cross-Strait relations, and rethink its position.
The DPP loves to point out how the two sides have long been separately ruled. It loves to cite this "historical fact." But it is unwilling to face another historical fact. Mainland Chinese governments have long valued a very different historical fact. Beginning with the Emperor Kangxi, Mainland governments have considered Taiwan of vital importance. For starters, the island is important for the defense of Mainland China. Three hundred years ago, the Qing court annihilated the Koxinga regime. It originally intended to relocate the population to the Mainland, and leave the island unoccupied. But in the 22nd year of Kangxi's reign, Shi Lang wrote "The Pros and Cons of Abandoning Taiwan." He pointed out that "Taiwan's location was strategic. Jiangsu was to the north. Guangdong was to the south. It protected the flanks of four provinces, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. Abandoning it will lead to disaster. Retaining it will permanently protect our flank." As a result Kangxi included Taiwan in China's territory based on national defense considerations. Ten years later, Yu Yonghe traveled to Taiwan. Recalling earlier arguments for abandoning Taiwan. he said "Those who advocate abandoning Taiwan do not realize that if we abandon it, others will surely seize it. I was able to travel here. I know it would not be difficult to implement immigration. The example of Koxinga is fresh in our memory. Why demolish our own fences? Why provide Japanese pirates with a nest? This is something a wise person would not do!" Henceforth Qing dynasty defense policy always gave national defense the highest priority. It ceded Taiwan only under duress, after being militarily defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894.
Taiwan independence advocates love to talk about how since 1895, Taiwan and Mainland China have been under the same government for only four years. Therefore, they argue, for the two sides to be governed separately is "normal." But from the Mainland perspective, during the past century, those four years were the only years in which Taiwan was not a threat to the Mainland's national defense. Japan once referred to Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." Prior to Japan's defeat, it built over 60 military airbases on Taiwan. It took full advantage of Taiwan's geographical location as a base for aggression against the Chinese mainland and Southeast Asia. During the Cold War, the KMT drew the U.S. into the Chinese Civil War. It became a willing pawn of the United States' effort to contain the Chinese mainland. It constantly harassed, invaded, investigated both the Mainland coastal and inland regions. These "historical facts" tell anyone who cares about the future of China what Kangxi knew, long ago. Abandoning Taiwan "will lead to disaster. Retaining it will permanently protect our flank."
Taiwan independence advocates' perception of history lumps Chinese governments such as the Koxinga regime, the Qing Dynasty, and the Republic of China, in the same category as Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese colonialists, as "foreign regimes." This is the result of their own identity confusion. As the late sociologist Chen Shao-hsing noted, "The rapid increase in Chinese population on Taiwan began during the late Kangxi era." Its "basis for growth began during the Ming dynasty Koxinga era." "In particular, the larger population required political organization. This political organization, and its sovereignty, played a decisive role in increasing the size of the population. The Dutch may have welcomed the Han Chinese coming to Taiwan to live. But their purpose was mercantilist. As soon as the Han Chinese population increased sufficiently to threaten their interests, they resorted to suppression, and even mass slaughter. Under such conditions, the Han Chinese population would have remained quite small. Koxinga expelled the Dutch. He successfully restored sovereignty to the Chinese people. From a demographic perspective, this Is an important fact." Similarly, without Kangxi to continue Koxinga's restoration of Taiwan to China, the Han Chinese population on the island of Taiwan would never have become so large. Most Taiwan independence advocates are Han Chinese. Their ancestors were able to come to Taiwan, to multiply and prosper, only because they were the beneficiaries of Koxinga and the Qing dynasty. Yet today they look down their noses at these Chinese governments as "outsiders." From any perspective, emotional or rational, their attitude is simply untenable.
The KMT-CCP Civil War led to a divided nation. Taiwan was under the control of others for long periods of time. The Mainland's national defense was threatened. Today, cross-Strait peace has finally established a basis for exchanges. But the DPP seems determined to depart from the straight and narrow, and go its own way, As long as the DPP classifies Taiwan as not part of China, as long as it persists in painting Mainland China as the enemy, then any of its "China Policy" declarations trumpeting "universal values" will be in vain.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.05.27
社論－民進黨何去何從 系列2 自外於中國 任何兩岸政策都徒然
本報訊
輸掉兩次大選的民進黨，深知兩岸關係是其罩門，因此亟思有所作為，以為二○一六年鋪路。最近民進黨中生代為向黨中央施壓，於日前的全代會中提出「台海人 權決議文」，希望將兩岸關係「建立在人權的普世價值上」，一方面「支持中國人民推進民主化工程」，另一方面堅持兩岸任何協議「均應符合『民主、對等、尊 嚴』原則」，期許「中國人民得以民主普選方式產生政府，雙方以人權與民主的價值為基礎，發展信睦關係」。很顯然，這種用「普世價值」的新瓶包裝起來的「信 睦關係」，還是「一邊一國」的舊酒。
蘇貞昌針對此議題，先提出由中國事務部規畫從六月二十日起召開九場「對中政策華山會議」，再於全代會中藉口時間不夠，將「台海人權決議文」移交中執會續議。看來，此一決議雖遭擱置，但傳說已久的「中國政策大辯論」卻將上場。
回顧民進黨建黨以來的「中國政策」，從一九九一年「台獨黨綱」、一九九九年「台灣前途決議文」、二○○七年「正常國家決議文」，直到此次「台海人權決議 文」，無一不是由台獨立場出發。酒瓶不斷換新，內容還是獨酒。民進黨人似乎以為：只要能找到某種「論述」，可以把「一邊一國」包裝成面目模糊，就能突破該 黨在兩岸關係上的困境。我們嚴正指出：這種自欺欺人的作法，不會有任何作用。民進黨如真要找到出路，就須改弦更張，回歸兩岸關係的歷史原點重新考察。
長期以來，民進黨喜談兩岸長期分治的「歷史事實」，但卻不願面對中國大陸執政者所看重的另一「歷史事實」。從清康熙皇帝開始，大陸的治國者對台灣的重 視，首先就是這個島嶼對中國大陸的國防重要性。三百多年前，清朝剿滅鄭氏政權後，原打算遷其民、棄其地。施琅便在康熙二十二年底上奏〈恭陳台灣棄留疏〉， 指出「台灣地方，北連吳會，南接粵嶠，…乃江、浙、閩、粵四省之左護」，「棄之必釀成大禍，留之誠永固邊圉」。於是康熙乃基於國防考慮，將台灣納入版圖。 十餘年後，郁永河來台遊歷，回顧當時的棄台論，謂：「議者…不知我棄之，人必取之；我能徙之，彼不難移民以實之。…鄭鑒不遠，何異自壞藩籬，以資寇巢？是 智者所不為也！」其後清朝的治台政策便始終是國防掛帥，直至甲午戰敗、乙未割台。
獨派人士喜言台灣自一八九五年後，只有四年時間與大陸屬同一政府，因此兩岸分治似是「常態」。但從大陸觀點看來，這一百多年間也只有那四年時間台灣不是 中國大陸潛在的或現實的國防威脅。日本曾將台灣稱為「不沉之空母（航母）」，在戰敗前於台各地修建六十多座軍用機場，充分利用其地緣位置作為侵略中國和南 洋的基地。冷戰期間，國民黨為將美國捲入國共內戰，又甘為美國圍堵中國大陸的馬前卒，不斷騷擾、進犯、偵查大陸沿海和內陸。這些史實，都告訴任何關心中國 未來者一個康熙早已參透的至理：台灣「棄之必釀成大禍，留之誠永固邊圉」。
在台獨的史觀中，將鄭氏、清朝、中華民國這些中國政權，與荷、西、日並列為「外來政權」。這是認同錯亂的表現。已故社會學者陳紹馨指出：「台灣華人人口 之急遽增加，始於康熙末年」，而其「增長之基礎，實肇始於明鄭時代」，因為「較大之人口，尤須有政治組織，而此政治組織之性質與其主權所在，對人口能增至 何種規模，具有決定性之作用。荷人雖歡迎漢人來住，但其目的在於推行重商主義；漢人人口增至足以威脅其利益時，輒被壓制，甚至遭受屠殺。在此情形下，漢人 人口實難增至偌大規模。鄭成功驅逐荷人，收回主權於國人手中，以人口觀點而言，為一重要事實」。同理，若無康熙繼鄭氏之後將台灣收入版圖，今日台灣島上的 漢人人口絕不可能如斯之盛。獨派人士多為漢人之後，其祖先能來台墾殖，實受惠於鄭氏和清朝，如今卻醜詆這些中國政權為外來者，於情於理皆站不住腳。
國共內戰導致國家分裂，不僅台灣長期受制於人，大陸國防也備受威脅。如今兩岸好不容易建立了和平交流的基礎，民進黨卻始終想偏離正軌，另闢蹊徑。只要民進黨自外於中國、把對岸當敵人的心態不改變，任何「中國政策」、各色宣言、「普世價值」都徒勞無功。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2013
Summary: The KMT-CCP Civil War led to a divided nation. Taiwan was under the control of others for long periods of time. The Mainland's national defense was threatened. Today, cross-Strait peace has finally established a basis for exchanges. But the DPP seems determined to depart from the straight and narrow, and go its own way, As long as the DPP classifies Taiwan as not part of China, as long as it persists in painting Mainland China as the enemy, then any of its "China Policy" declarations trumpeting "universal values" will be in vain.
Full Text below:
The DPP has lost two general elections in a row. It is acutely aware that cross-Strait relations is its Achilles Heel. Therefore it is eager to remedy its plight. It is eager to pave the way for another presidential bid in 2016. Younger generation DPP leaders have recently exerted pressure on the DPP party leadership. Recently, during the party's All Peoples Conference, they called for a "Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Straits." They demanded that cross-Strait relations be based on a "foundation of universal human rights." On the one hand, they called for "supporting the Chinese people in their adoption of democracy." On the other hand, they insisted that any agreement between the two sides "must be consistent with the principles of democracy, equality, and dignity." They said they hoped that "the Chinese people could establish a government based on democracy and universal suffrage, that the two sides could develop a relationship of trust and friendship rooted in human rights and democracy." Obviously, they were using "universal values" as stalking horse for a "relationship of trust and friendship." Needless to say, this was the same old "China, Taiwan, one country on each side" wine in a not so new bottle.
Su Tseng-chang addressed this topic when he first announced the China Affairs Committee Plan on June 20. He convened nine "Hua Shan Conferences on China Policy." He then said the All Peoples Conference was short on time, and used it as an excuse to pass the "Resolution on Taiwan Straits Human Rights" on to the Central Executive Committee. The resolution was apparently shelved. But rumor has it the DPP's long-awaited "Great China Policy Debate" will soon convene.
Let us review the DPP's so-called "China Policy," beginning with the founding of the party. In 1991, the DPP passed its "Taiwan Independence Party Platform." In 1999, the DPP passed its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." In 2007, the DPP passed its "Resolution for a Normal Nation." Now the DPP has passed its "Resolution on Human Rights in the Taiwan Straits." Every last one of them was predicated upon Taiwan independence. The DPP constantly replaces the bottles. But inside it always serves up the same old Taiwan independence wine. The DPP seems to think that it need only concoct a glib rationale to camouflage the underlying premise of "Taiwan, China, one country on each side." The party will then magically surmount the difficulties it has encountered in cross-Strait relations. As we have solemnly underscored, such self-deception will have no effect whatsoever. If the DPP is truly seeking a way out of its dilemma, it must make a fresh start. It must revisit the historical roots of cross-Strait relations, and rethink its position.
The DPP loves to point out how the two sides have long been separately ruled. It loves to cite this "historical fact." But it is unwilling to face another historical fact. Mainland Chinese governments have long valued a very different historical fact. Beginning with the Emperor Kangxi, Mainland governments have considered Taiwan of vital importance. For starters, the island is important for the defense of Mainland China. Three hundred years ago, the Qing court annihilated the Koxinga regime. It originally intended to relocate the population to the Mainland, and leave the island unoccupied. But in the 22nd year of Kangxi's reign, Shi Lang wrote "The Pros and Cons of Abandoning Taiwan." He pointed out that "Taiwan's location was strategic. Jiangsu was to the north. Guangdong was to the south. It protected the flanks of four provinces, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. Abandoning it will lead to disaster. Retaining it will permanently protect our flank." As a result Kangxi included Taiwan in China's territory based on national defense considerations. Ten years later, Yu Yonghe traveled to Taiwan. Recalling earlier arguments for abandoning Taiwan. he said "Those who advocate abandoning Taiwan do not realize that if we abandon it, others will surely seize it. I was able to travel here. I know it would not be difficult to implement immigration. The example of Koxinga is fresh in our memory. Why demolish our own fences? Why provide Japanese pirates with a nest? This is something a wise person would not do!" Henceforth Qing dynasty defense policy always gave national defense the highest priority. It ceded Taiwan only under duress, after being militarily defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894.
Taiwan independence advocates love to talk about how since 1895, Taiwan and Mainland China have been under the same government for only four years. Therefore, they argue, for the two sides to be governed separately is "normal." But from the Mainland perspective, during the past century, those four years were the only years in which Taiwan was not a threat to the Mainland's national defense. Japan once referred to Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." Prior to Japan's defeat, it built over 60 military airbases on Taiwan. It took full advantage of Taiwan's geographical location as a base for aggression against the Chinese mainland and Southeast Asia. During the Cold War, the KMT drew the U.S. into the Chinese Civil War. It became a willing pawn of the United States' effort to contain the Chinese mainland. It constantly harassed, invaded, investigated both the Mainland coastal and inland regions. These "historical facts" tell anyone who cares about the future of China what Kangxi knew, long ago. Abandoning Taiwan "will lead to disaster. Retaining it will permanently protect our flank."
Taiwan independence advocates' perception of history lumps Chinese governments such as the Koxinga regime, the Qing Dynasty, and the Republic of China, in the same category as Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese colonialists, as "foreign regimes." This is the result of their own identity confusion. As the late sociologist Chen Shao-hsing noted, "The rapid increase in Chinese population on Taiwan began during the late Kangxi era." Its "basis for growth began during the Ming dynasty Koxinga era." "In particular, the larger population required political organization. This political organization, and its sovereignty, played a decisive role in increasing the size of the population. The Dutch may have welcomed the Han Chinese coming to Taiwan to live. But their purpose was mercantilist. As soon as the Han Chinese population increased sufficiently to threaten their interests, they resorted to suppression, and even mass slaughter. Under such conditions, the Han Chinese population would have remained quite small. Koxinga expelled the Dutch. He successfully restored sovereignty to the Chinese people. From a demographic perspective, this Is an important fact." Similarly, without Kangxi to continue Koxinga's restoration of Taiwan to China, the Han Chinese population on the island of Taiwan would never have become so large. Most Taiwan independence advocates are Han Chinese. Their ancestors were able to come to Taiwan, to multiply and prosper, only because they were the beneficiaries of Koxinga and the Qing dynasty. Yet today they look down their noses at these Chinese governments as "outsiders." From any perspective, emotional or rational, their attitude is simply untenable.
The KMT-CCP Civil War led to a divided nation. Taiwan was under the control of others for long periods of time. The Mainland's national defense was threatened. Today, cross-Strait peace has finally established a basis for exchanges. But the DPP seems determined to depart from the straight and narrow, and go its own way, As long as the DPP classifies Taiwan as not part of China, as long as it persists in painting Mainland China as the enemy, then any of its "China Policy" declarations trumpeting "universal values" will be in vain.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.05.27
社論－民進黨何去何從 系列2 自外於中國 任何兩岸政策都徒然
本報訊
輸掉兩次大選的民進黨，深知兩岸關係是其罩門，因此亟思有所作為，以為二○一六年鋪路。最近民進黨中生代為向黨中央施壓，於日前的全代會中提出「台海人 權決議文」，希望將兩岸關係「建立在人權的普世價值上」，一方面「支持中國人民推進民主化工程」，另一方面堅持兩岸任何協議「均應符合『民主、對等、尊 嚴』原則」，期許「中國人民得以民主普選方式產生政府，雙方以人權與民主的價值為基礎，發展信睦關係」。很顯然，這種用「普世價值」的新瓶包裝起來的「信 睦關係」，還是「一邊一國」的舊酒。
蘇貞昌針對此議題，先提出由中國事務部規畫從六月二十日起召開九場「對中政策華山會議」，再於全代會中藉口時間不夠，將「台海人權決議文」移交中執會續議。看來，此一決議雖遭擱置，但傳說已久的「中國政策大辯論」卻將上場。
回顧民進黨建黨以來的「中國政策」，從一九九一年「台獨黨綱」、一九九九年「台灣前途決議文」、二○○七年「正常國家決議文」，直到此次「台海人權決議 文」，無一不是由台獨立場出發。酒瓶不斷換新，內容還是獨酒。民進黨人似乎以為：只要能找到某種「論述」，可以把「一邊一國」包裝成面目模糊，就能突破該 黨在兩岸關係上的困境。我們嚴正指出：這種自欺欺人的作法，不會有任何作用。民進黨如真要找到出路，就須改弦更張，回歸兩岸關係的歷史原點重新考察。
長期以來，民進黨喜談兩岸長期分治的「歷史事實」，但卻不願面對中國大陸執政者所看重的另一「歷史事實」。從清康熙皇帝開始，大陸的治國者對台灣的重 視，首先就是這個島嶼對中國大陸的國防重要性。三百多年前，清朝剿滅鄭氏政權後，原打算遷其民、棄其地。施琅便在康熙二十二年底上奏〈恭陳台灣棄留疏〉， 指出「台灣地方，北連吳會，南接粵嶠，…乃江、浙、閩、粵四省之左護」，「棄之必釀成大禍，留之誠永固邊圉」。於是康熙乃基於國防考慮，將台灣納入版圖。 十餘年後，郁永河來台遊歷，回顧當時的棄台論，謂：「議者…不知我棄之，人必取之；我能徙之，彼不難移民以實之。…鄭鑒不遠，何異自壞藩籬，以資寇巢？是 智者所不為也！」其後清朝的治台政策便始終是國防掛帥，直至甲午戰敗、乙未割台。
獨派人士喜言台灣自一八九五年後，只有四年時間與大陸屬同一政府，因此兩岸分治似是「常態」。但從大陸觀點看來，這一百多年間也只有那四年時間台灣不是 中國大陸潛在的或現實的國防威脅。日本曾將台灣稱為「不沉之空母（航母）」，在戰敗前於台各地修建六十多座軍用機場，充分利用其地緣位置作為侵略中國和南 洋的基地。冷戰期間，國民黨為將美國捲入國共內戰，又甘為美國圍堵中國大陸的馬前卒，不斷騷擾、進犯、偵查大陸沿海和內陸。這些史實，都告訴任何關心中國 未來者一個康熙早已參透的至理：台灣「棄之必釀成大禍，留之誠永固邊圉」。
在台獨的史觀中，將鄭氏、清朝、中華民國這些中國政權，與荷、西、日並列為「外來政權」。這是認同錯亂的表現。已故社會學者陳紹馨指出：「台灣華人人口 之急遽增加，始於康熙末年」，而其「增長之基礎，實肇始於明鄭時代」，因為「較大之人口，尤須有政治組織，而此政治組織之性質與其主權所在，對人口能增至 何種規模，具有決定性之作用。荷人雖歡迎漢人來住，但其目的在於推行重商主義；漢人人口增至足以威脅其利益時，輒被壓制，甚至遭受屠殺。在此情形下，漢人 人口實難增至偌大規模。鄭成功驅逐荷人，收回主權於國人手中，以人口觀點而言，為一重要事實」。同理，若無康熙繼鄭氏之後將台灣收入版圖，今日台灣島上的 漢人人口絕不可能如斯之盛。獨派人士多為漢人之後，其祖先能來台墾殖，實受惠於鄭氏和清朝，如今卻醜詆這些中國政權為外來者，於情於理皆站不住腳。
國共內戰導致國家分裂，不僅台灣長期受制於人，大陸國防也備受威脅。如今兩岸好不容易建立了和平交流的基礎，民進黨卻始終想偏離正軌，另闢蹊徑。只要民進黨自外於中國、把對岸當敵人的心態不改變，任何「中國政策」、各色宣言、「普世價值」都徒勞無功。
Thursday, May 23, 2013
Necessity and Feasibility: Relations with the Philippines
Necessity and Feasibility:
Relations with the Philippines
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 24, 2013
Summary: Have people on Taiwan had any dreams while hung over? We do not know. But we do know we cannot depend upon the goodwill of others to protect our fishing rights, We must depend upon our own military strength. Otherwise, Taipei-Manila Dispute Resolution will remain a nightmare.
Full Text below:
After many days of emotional protests against the Philippines, it is finally the morning after. People are gradually emerging from their intoxication. They must now face reality. Our government, along with the Philippines government, must begin an investigation and agree on compensation. We imbibed high proof liquor. Given an arrogant and capricious Philippines, the Ma administration's headaches will persist.
In dealing with the Taipei-Manila dispute, President Ma has repeatedly demanded a formal apology, damages, a thorough investigation of the facts with punishment for the murderers. and a restart of Taipei-Manila fishing rights negotiations. These are four bottom line conditions that must be met in the Kuang Ta Hsing 28 murder case. These four demands have never changed.
But the Philippines is not Japan. From a practical perspective, getting the Philippines government to make concessions, and honor these four principles above the "one China principle," is not going to be easy. The Philippines government has repeatedly played games. It has put different government agencies in charge. It has used "public contributions" to downgrade the status of the damages. This is all too clear. In particular, Taipei and Manila define "fact-finding" very differently. The material evidence (the firearm used, the fishing vessel attacked) and witness testimony (the shooter) are geographically separated. Some are on Taiwan. Some are in the Philippines. The Philippines have already declared their unwillingness to take part in a joint investigation on Taiwan. Waiting for the two sides' legal systems to interact, and for the two sides' investigative reports to be released, is certain to waste time. There is no guarantee we will not repeat the experience of three years ago, when a Hong Kong tour group was kidnapped. In the end, nothing was resolved, and the case was left hanging.
Under pressure from international opinion, the Philippine government's attitude softened. But this does not mean the Philippines has changed its policy. Philippines President Aquino said it is willing to negotiate fisheries agreements with Taipei and other neighboring governments. But on Taiwan, when the Philippines participated in criminal investigations, whenever the Philippine government came across sensitive material evidence, they adopted an uncooperative and evasive stance. For example, our government identified eight articles of evidence to be analyzed. The Philippine government only agreed to two of them. It agreed to examine the fishing vessel and perform ballistic tests on the firearm that fired the fatal rounds. The Philippines resorted to passive resistance. This means the diplomatic dispute will not end. Fishing rights negotiations between the two governments will remain elusive.
The government may be willing to wait. But the public is not. The murder investigation and fishing rights negotiations will remain stalled for the foreseeable future. President Ma's prestige is sure to tumble. Therefore, we should keep a close eye on the government, to see whether it follows up. We must evaluate its performance based on both necessity and feasibility,
President Ma issued four demands. Our government is looking forward the most to officially restarting fisheries negotiations with the Philippines. It wants to delineate the boundary between the two sides' overlapping economic zones. This would provide long-term stability for our fishermen operating in the Bashi Channel. This is a matter of absolute necessity. Secondly, it demanded a formal apology, damages and prosecution of the criminals involved in the homicide case. This does not conflict with Taipei-Manila fisheries negotiations. Therefore, our government can adopt a twin-pronged fact-finding and fishing rights negotiations approach. It can use investigating the facts as a basis for strengthening our bargaining position on fishing rights. This is a matter of feasibility.
When establishing what is a necessity and what is feasibile, can the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement adopted just months ago serve as a model for Taipei-Manila fisheries talks?
The Japanese are adept at manipulating "one China, one Taiwan." Leave that issue aside for the moment. The Philippines adhere to the "one China principle." Leave that difference aside for the moment alsowell. Taipei was able to sign a fisheries agreement with Tokyo, mainly because Taipei and Beijing launched a coordinated attack on the Diaoyutai Islands issue. The United States' passivity and non-intervention contributed as well. These two external factors resulted in a qualitative change. This qualitative change is sure to affect Taipei-Manila fisheries talks.
Firstly, coordination between Taipei and Beijing appeared to have weakened. Obama was re-elected. US rebalancing in Asia is gradually increasing in intensity. This is sure to make Beijing feel beseiged along its borders. Myanmar President Thein Sein visited the United States. North Korea arbitrarily detained Mainland fishing vessels. This forced Beijing to busy itself shoring up its foundations, and concentrate on protecting Diaoyutai. This left it unable to take care of the situation in the South China Sea. Xi Jinping visited the U.S. on June 7. Beijing would never have provoked a South China Sea dispute just before that. An incident would have undermined the atmosphere necesary for successful negotiations with the US. This is the main reason Beijing paid only lip service to helping Taipei in its conflict with Manila.
Secondly, U.S. intervention is expanding. The Diaoyutai Islands dispute is heating up. Beijing will then be able to use the Diaoyutai Islands as leverage to breakthrough the US's Western Pacific island containment chain. The United States has lost the initiative in the East China Sea. It will gradually find itself defending the South China Sea full force. The Philippines is the US's most important pawn in the South China Sea. Therefore at this stage the Taipei-Manila dispute, the U.S. will be paying particular attention to any signs of cross-Strait coordination. It will do its utmost to avoid giving Beijing a justification to use military force in the South China Sea. This is the main reason Taipei has been so cautious about using military deterrence against the Philippines.
Have people on Taiwan had any dreams while hung over? We do not know. But we do know we cannot depend upon the goodwill of others to protect our fishing rights, We must depend upon our own military strength. Otherwise, Taipei-Manila Dispute Resolution will remain a nightmare.
從必要性與操作性談對菲交涉
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.24 04:16 am
在歷經多日的抗菲激情過後，逐漸從宿醉中醒來的台灣，終究要面對現實，開始與菲律賓政府進行後續的事實調查與補償談判。這次我們喝的雖非劣酒，但面對傲慢、反覆無常的菲律賓，馬政府卻仍難免繼續頭痛。
馬總統對於處理台菲爭議，一再重申正式道歉、賠償損失、徹查事實嚴懲凶手，以及重啟台菲漁權談判，是我國政府處理這次廣大興二十八號喋血案的四大底線，這四項原則絲毫不容改變。
但是菲律賓並非日本！從現實層面來看，這四項原則想要全部取得高舉「一中原則」大旗的菲國政府讓步，顯然並非易事，這從菲律賓政府一再操弄「對口單位」與「人民捐款」等矮化我國的字眼，即可以清楚看出。尤其，台菲雙方在事實認定上的認知差距過大，事證（凶槍）、人證（凶嫌）與物證（漁船）又分處台菲兩地，在台菲已確定無法共組聯合調查團的情況下，若單要依賴雙方的司法互助，等待彼此的調查報告出爐，勢必曠日廢時。如此，難保不會重蹈三年前香港旅遊團劫持事件最後不了了之的覆轍。
在國際輿論壓力下，菲政府的態度雖似軟化，但這並不代表菲國的政策已經產生變化。菲國總統艾奎諾日前稱，在處理台菲外交糾紛後，願意與台灣等鄰國協商漁業協定；然而，在台菲協調進行司法調查時，卻可發現菲律賓政府一碰觸到關鍵性的證據便採取消極、不配合及躲避的政策。例如，在我國政府所提出的八項證據調查當中，菲國政府便只部分同意登船、驗槍比對彈道等兩項。依菲國這種「擠牙膏式」的做法，此一外交糾紛勢必遲遲無法落幕，兩國漁權談判更將遙遙無期。
對此，也許政府可以等，但人民卻無法等。血案司法調查的停滯與漁權談判的遙遙無期，勢將重挫馬總統的威信，因此，我們應須從必要性與操作性兩個面向，嚴肅看待政府的後續作為。
在馬總統所提的四原則中，我國政府最期待的當然是與菲國正式開啟漁業談判，劃定雙方重疊經濟海域的分界線，以確保今後我漁民在巴士海峽作業的長治久安，這是「必要性」。其次，正式道歉、賠償損失與嚴懲凶手則是涉及這次喋血案的事實認定調查，這與台菲漁業談判並不相背斥；因此，我國可以採取事實調查與漁權談判雙管並進的方式，並以調查的事實為基礎來強化我國在漁權談判上的有力籌碼，這是「操作性」。
在確立必要性的目標、並擬定操作性原則之後，月前剛通過的台日漁業協議是否可以作為今後台菲漁業會談的標準範本呢？
撇開日本善於操弄「一中一台」，以及菲律賓堅持「一中原則」的對台政策差異性不論，台日簽署漁業協議主要是來自於兩岸在釣魚台分進合擊的壓力，以及美國消極的不干預政策所促成的。而今，這兩項外在因素都逐漸產生質變，而此一質變勢將影響台菲漁業會談的力度與進度。
首先，是兩岸聯手的想像因形格勢禁而弱化：歐巴馬連任後，美國在亞洲再平衡的力度便逐漸加大，不免讓中國大陸出現「周邊有事」的狀況，例如緬甸總統登盛訪美，北韓恣意逮捕大陸的漁船，這迫使中國大陸忙於固樁，並集中力量保護釣魚台，而無力兼顧南海情勢。在六月七日習近平訪問美國之前，中國大陸不可能主動挑起南海爭端，破壞美中談判的氛圍，這是北京在台菲爭議當中口惠而實不至的主要原因。
其次，是美國干預力道的加大：在釣魚台爭議升高後，中國大陸以釣魚台為支點，找到突破西太平洋第一島鏈的缺口；而美國眼見在東海失去先機後，將逐漸全力防守南海，而菲律賓便是美國在南海最重要的馬前卒。於是，在這次台菲爭執中，美國便格外注意兩岸聯手的可能性，極力避免中國大陸藉由此次衝突取得軍事力量進入南海的正當性。這點，也是我對菲進行軍事嚇阻時前瞻後顧的主因。
我們不知道當台灣在宿醉時有沒有做夢？但我們知道如果護漁只處處在依賴別人的善意，而不靠自身的武力，台菲爭議的解決，恐將會是南柯一夢。
Relations with the Philippines
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 24, 2013
Summary: Have people on Taiwan had any dreams while hung over? We do not know. But we do know we cannot depend upon the goodwill of others to protect our fishing rights, We must depend upon our own military strength. Otherwise, Taipei-Manila Dispute Resolution will remain a nightmare.
Full Text below:
After many days of emotional protests against the Philippines, it is finally the morning after. People are gradually emerging from their intoxication. They must now face reality. Our government, along with the Philippines government, must begin an investigation and agree on compensation. We imbibed high proof liquor. Given an arrogant and capricious Philippines, the Ma administration's headaches will persist.
In dealing with the Taipei-Manila dispute, President Ma has repeatedly demanded a formal apology, damages, a thorough investigation of the facts with punishment for the murderers. and a restart of Taipei-Manila fishing rights negotiations. These are four bottom line conditions that must be met in the Kuang Ta Hsing 28 murder case. These four demands have never changed.
But the Philippines is not Japan. From a practical perspective, getting the Philippines government to make concessions, and honor these four principles above the "one China principle," is not going to be easy. The Philippines government has repeatedly played games. It has put different government agencies in charge. It has used "public contributions" to downgrade the status of the damages. This is all too clear. In particular, Taipei and Manila define "fact-finding" very differently. The material evidence (the firearm used, the fishing vessel attacked) and witness testimony (the shooter) are geographically separated. Some are on Taiwan. Some are in the Philippines. The Philippines have already declared their unwillingness to take part in a joint investigation on Taiwan. Waiting for the two sides' legal systems to interact, and for the two sides' investigative reports to be released, is certain to waste time. There is no guarantee we will not repeat the experience of three years ago, when a Hong Kong tour group was kidnapped. In the end, nothing was resolved, and the case was left hanging.
Under pressure from international opinion, the Philippine government's attitude softened. But this does not mean the Philippines has changed its policy. Philippines President Aquino said it is willing to negotiate fisheries agreements with Taipei and other neighboring governments. But on Taiwan, when the Philippines participated in criminal investigations, whenever the Philippine government came across sensitive material evidence, they adopted an uncooperative and evasive stance. For example, our government identified eight articles of evidence to be analyzed. The Philippine government only agreed to two of them. It agreed to examine the fishing vessel and perform ballistic tests on the firearm that fired the fatal rounds. The Philippines resorted to passive resistance. This means the diplomatic dispute will not end. Fishing rights negotiations between the two governments will remain elusive.
The government may be willing to wait. But the public is not. The murder investigation and fishing rights negotiations will remain stalled for the foreseeable future. President Ma's prestige is sure to tumble. Therefore, we should keep a close eye on the government, to see whether it follows up. We must evaluate its performance based on both necessity and feasibility,
President Ma issued four demands. Our government is looking forward the most to officially restarting fisheries negotiations with the Philippines. It wants to delineate the boundary between the two sides' overlapping economic zones. This would provide long-term stability for our fishermen operating in the Bashi Channel. This is a matter of absolute necessity. Secondly, it demanded a formal apology, damages and prosecution of the criminals involved in the homicide case. This does not conflict with Taipei-Manila fisheries negotiations. Therefore, our government can adopt a twin-pronged fact-finding and fishing rights negotiations approach. It can use investigating the facts as a basis for strengthening our bargaining position on fishing rights. This is a matter of feasibility.
When establishing what is a necessity and what is feasibile, can the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement adopted just months ago serve as a model for Taipei-Manila fisheries talks?
The Japanese are adept at manipulating "one China, one Taiwan." Leave that issue aside for the moment. The Philippines adhere to the "one China principle." Leave that difference aside for the moment alsowell. Taipei was able to sign a fisheries agreement with Tokyo, mainly because Taipei and Beijing launched a coordinated attack on the Diaoyutai Islands issue. The United States' passivity and non-intervention contributed as well. These two external factors resulted in a qualitative change. This qualitative change is sure to affect Taipei-Manila fisheries talks.
Firstly, coordination between Taipei and Beijing appeared to have weakened. Obama was re-elected. US rebalancing in Asia is gradually increasing in intensity. This is sure to make Beijing feel beseiged along its borders. Myanmar President Thein Sein visited the United States. North Korea arbitrarily detained Mainland fishing vessels. This forced Beijing to busy itself shoring up its foundations, and concentrate on protecting Diaoyutai. This left it unable to take care of the situation in the South China Sea. Xi Jinping visited the U.S. on June 7. Beijing would never have provoked a South China Sea dispute just before that. An incident would have undermined the atmosphere necesary for successful negotiations with the US. This is the main reason Beijing paid only lip service to helping Taipei in its conflict with Manila.
Secondly, U.S. intervention is expanding. The Diaoyutai Islands dispute is heating up. Beijing will then be able to use the Diaoyutai Islands as leverage to breakthrough the US's Western Pacific island containment chain. The United States has lost the initiative in the East China Sea. It will gradually find itself defending the South China Sea full force. The Philippines is the US's most important pawn in the South China Sea. Therefore at this stage the Taipei-Manila dispute, the U.S. will be paying particular attention to any signs of cross-Strait coordination. It will do its utmost to avoid giving Beijing a justification to use military force in the South China Sea. This is the main reason Taipei has been so cautious about using military deterrence against the Philippines.
Have people on Taiwan had any dreams while hung over? We do not know. But we do know we cannot depend upon the goodwill of others to protect our fishing rights, We must depend upon our own military strength. Otherwise, Taipei-Manila Dispute Resolution will remain a nightmare.
從必要性與操作性談對菲交涉
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.24 04:16 am
在歷經多日的抗菲激情過後，逐漸從宿醉中醒來的台灣，終究要面對現實，開始與菲律賓政府進行後續的事實調查與補償談判。這次我們喝的雖非劣酒，但面對傲慢、反覆無常的菲律賓，馬政府卻仍難免繼續頭痛。
馬總統對於處理台菲爭議，一再重申正式道歉、賠償損失、徹查事實嚴懲凶手，以及重啟台菲漁權談判，是我國政府處理這次廣大興二十八號喋血案的四大底線，這四項原則絲毫不容改變。
但是菲律賓並非日本！從現實層面來看，這四項原則想要全部取得高舉「一中原則」大旗的菲國政府讓步，顯然並非易事，這從菲律賓政府一再操弄「對口單位」與「人民捐款」等矮化我國的字眼，即可以清楚看出。尤其，台菲雙方在事實認定上的認知差距過大，事證（凶槍）、人證（凶嫌）與物證（漁船）又分處台菲兩地，在台菲已確定無法共組聯合調查團的情況下，若單要依賴雙方的司法互助，等待彼此的調查報告出爐，勢必曠日廢時。如此，難保不會重蹈三年前香港旅遊團劫持事件最後不了了之的覆轍。
在國際輿論壓力下，菲政府的態度雖似軟化，但這並不代表菲國的政策已經產生變化。菲國總統艾奎諾日前稱，在處理台菲外交糾紛後，願意與台灣等鄰國協商漁業協定；然而，在台菲協調進行司法調查時，卻可發現菲律賓政府一碰觸到關鍵性的證據便採取消極、不配合及躲避的政策。例如，在我國政府所提出的八項證據調查當中，菲國政府便只部分同意登船、驗槍比對彈道等兩項。依菲國這種「擠牙膏式」的做法，此一外交糾紛勢必遲遲無法落幕，兩國漁權談判更將遙遙無期。
對此，也許政府可以等，但人民卻無法等。血案司法調查的停滯與漁權談判的遙遙無期，勢將重挫馬總統的威信，因此，我們應須從必要性與操作性兩個面向，嚴肅看待政府的後續作為。
在馬總統所提的四原則中，我國政府最期待的當然是與菲國正式開啟漁業談判，劃定雙方重疊經濟海域的分界線，以確保今後我漁民在巴士海峽作業的長治久安，這是「必要性」。其次，正式道歉、賠償損失與嚴懲凶手則是涉及這次喋血案的事實認定調查，這與台菲漁業談判並不相背斥；因此，我國可以採取事實調查與漁權談判雙管並進的方式，並以調查的事實為基礎來強化我國在漁權談判上的有力籌碼，這是「操作性」。
在確立必要性的目標、並擬定操作性原則之後，月前剛通過的台日漁業協議是否可以作為今後台菲漁業會談的標準範本呢？
撇開日本善於操弄「一中一台」，以及菲律賓堅持「一中原則」的對台政策差異性不論，台日簽署漁業協議主要是來自於兩岸在釣魚台分進合擊的壓力，以及美國消極的不干預政策所促成的。而今，這兩項外在因素都逐漸產生質變，而此一質變勢將影響台菲漁業會談的力度與進度。
首先，是兩岸聯手的想像因形格勢禁而弱化：歐巴馬連任後，美國在亞洲再平衡的力度便逐漸加大，不免讓中國大陸出現「周邊有事」的狀況，例如緬甸總統登盛訪美，北韓恣意逮捕大陸的漁船，這迫使中國大陸忙於固樁，並集中力量保護釣魚台，而無力兼顧南海情勢。在六月七日習近平訪問美國之前，中國大陸不可能主動挑起南海爭端，破壞美中談判的氛圍，這是北京在台菲爭議當中口惠而實不至的主要原因。
其次，是美國干預力道的加大：在釣魚台爭議升高後，中國大陸以釣魚台為支點，找到突破西太平洋第一島鏈的缺口；而美國眼見在東海失去先機後，將逐漸全力防守南海，而菲律賓便是美國在南海最重要的馬前卒。於是，在這次台菲爭執中，美國便格外注意兩岸聯手的可能性，極力避免中國大陸藉由此次衝突取得軍事力量進入南海的正當性。這點，也是我對菲進行軍事嚇阻時前瞻後顧的主因。
我們不知道當台灣在宿醉時有沒有做夢？但我們知道如果護漁只處處在依賴別人的善意，而不靠自身的武力，台菲爭議的解決，恐將會是南柯一夢。
Wednesday, May 22, 2013
Taipei-Beijing Joint Participation in Regional Cooperation
Taipei-Beijing Joint Participation in Regional Cooperation
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 22, 2013
Summary: We have entered the post-Cold War era. The threat of global thermo-nuclear conflict has diminished. Regional conflicts however continue unabated in the Asian-Pacific region, in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and on the Korean Peninsula. These have long been seen as three of the most dangerous powder kegs. Cross-Strait reconciliation has eased the situation in the Taiwan Strait. But the situation in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula remain tense, and the threat of war looms.
Full Text below:
We have entered the post-Cold War era. The threat of global thermo-nuclear conflict has diminished. Regional conflicts however continue unabated in the Asian-Pacific region, in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and on the Korean Peninsula. These have long been seen as three of the most dangerous powder kegs. Cross-Strait reconciliation has eased the situation in the Taiwan Strait. But the situation in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula remain tense, and the threat of war looms.
The Chinese people love peace. Chinese culture emphasizes "yi de fu ren," i.e., "persuasion through moral example," rather than "yi li fu ren," i.e., "persuasion through physical coercion." Beijing Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited the ASEAN countries earlier this month. He said Beijing would work to make the South China Sea a "sea of peace, a sea of friendship, and a sea of co-operation." This proposal coincides with Taipei's "South China Sea Peace Initiative." Unfortunately not aggressing against others does not guarantee that others will not aggress against you. The Philippines murdered a Taiwanese fisherman in cold blood. Its behavior in the wake of the incident was outrageous. This reminds us that peace is not manna from heaven. It will not fall out of the sky and into our laps. It is something we must fight for, with both the carrot and the stick. through negotiations and through strength.
The two sides of the Strait have abided by the principle of "first economics, then politics." They have made the normalization of economic and trade relations a priority. Interaction between the two sides in the international arena touch on sensitive political issues. This has long mired the two sides in the "different interpretations" stage. But reality has underscored a simple fact. Cross-strait reconciliation has given the Ma administration's "flexible diplomacy" a boost. It has made it the first line of defense in our national security. Take relations with Japan. In President Ma Ying-jeou's eyes, Taipei-Tokyo relations are "the best they have been in 40 years." Cross-strait reconciliation played a major role in making that possible. There is no denying that Taiwan and Japan have a peculiar history. Polls show that many people on both sides feel good about the other. Many on Taiwan provided massive aid for Japanese earthquake victims. The Japanese people expressed heart-felt appreciation. But the Japanese government is not about to sacrifice its national interests to reciprocate. Japan, under pressure from realpolitik, has been running to "catch the bus." For example, Tokyo established diplomatic relations with Beijing before Washington. Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008. Taipei-Tokyo relations have yielded significant results. But Tokyo felt it could not fall behind cross-strait reconciliation. To avoid that eventuality, it became more willing to reach out to Taipei.
Compared to Japan, the Philippines has misjudged the situation. It failed to accurately assess the repercussions of cross-strait reconciliation. The Philippines attempted to use the one China policy to undermine Taipei's legitimacy and weaken its bargaining position. But Beijing was hardly that gullible. Soon after the incident, Beijing strictly condemned the Philippines' barbaric act. It also strongly urged Manila to issue Taipei an apology. The international community sided almost unanimously with the Philippines. This expression of solidarity with Taiwan from the other side of the Strait, gave the people on Taiwan a shot in the arm.
Recently the Taipei-Manila diplomatic conflict and the North Korea crisis have heated up. This underscores the need for Taipei and Beijing to cooperate on regional issues, and engage in serious discussions.
With regards regional economic cooperation, the Doha Round multilateral trade negotiations have stalled. Regional economic integration has become the focus of every nation's trade policies. This is especially true of the East Asian region. The integrated ASEAN+N and bilateral free trade agreements model has accelerated economic cooperation. Among these, the ASEAN countries' regional economic partnerships (RCEP) and the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are the most striking. Once integrated, this region will become the world's largest free trade zone, and will have the greatest impact on the global economic recovery.
Taiwan's experience with economic development should have become an asset to Asian regional economic integration. Unfortunately, being subject to the constraints of cross-Strait political relations, Taiwan failed to participate fully. Former Vice President Vincent Siew heads the Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation at the Boao Forum. Siew suggested that the two sides strengthen policy coordination and discuss economic strategies. He looks forward to joint participation in regional economic integration. He wants the two sides "to work together to their mutual benefit, common prosperity, and economic revitalization."
Siew's suggestion has received a positive response from CCP leaders. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, also in attendence, said, "The two sides can participate in timely and pragmatic discussions to promote shared economic development. They can seek appropriate and feasible means of achieving regional economic cooperation." Xi Jinping emphasized that "As long as the two sides consider the larger interests of the Chinese nation, we can overcome all difficulties and obstacles on the road ahead. We can continue to promote the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and continue to achieve new goals."
Regarding cooperation over regional security, the situation in the Asian-Pacific region is rapidly changing. Security has become an important issue for all parties. All want the establishment of regional cooperative security mechanisms rooted in "common security" and "cooperative security." From either a geopolitical or geo-economic point of view, Taipei cannot remain outside the regional security cooperation process. Security includes traditional and non-traditional security. Both sides are already working together in the fight against crime, vaccinations, environmental protection, and other non-traditional security issues. Cooperation has yielded remarkable results. In the future they should also be able to take on traditional security issues, and test out different possibilities for cooperation.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.05.22
社論－共同參與區域合作 兩岸新課題
本報訊
進入後冷戰時代，世界核戰威脅降低，區域衝突卻有增無減。在亞太地區，台海、南海和朝鮮半島，曾被視為最具戰爭危險的三個爆炸點。如今，台海形勢因兩岸和解趨於緩和；南海和朝鮮半島情勢卻是劍拔弩張，布滿戰爭陰影。
中華民族愛好和平，中華文化強調「以德服人」，而非「以力服人」。中共外交部長王毅於本月初訪問東協國家時，特別指出中共將努力把南海建設成「和平之海、友誼之海和合作之海」。這個主張和我方的「東海和平倡議」不謀而合。但「我不犯人」，不能保證「人不犯我」。菲律賓這次對台灣漁民進行「冷血謀殺」，案發後又表現的如此蠻不講理，顯示和平不會是「天上掉下來的禮物」，必須軟硬兼施，用談判和實力去爭取。
兩岸本著「先經後政」的原則，把經貿關係正常化視為優先課題。至於雙方如何在國際舞台上互動，則因事涉敏感的政治議題，而始終停留在「各自表述」的階段。但事實顯示，作為我方國家安全戰略的「第一道防線」，兩岸和解巳成為馬政府推動「活路外交」的一項助力。以對日外交工作為例，台日關係能出現馬英九總統眼中「四十年來的最佳狀態」，兩岸和解即起了推波助瀾的作用。不容諱言，台灣和日本有其特殊的歷史淵源，民調顯示雙方民眾都對對方具有好感。台灣對於日本震災提供的巨額援助，令日本人民十分「有感」，但日本政府卻不會以犧牲國家利益來投桃報李。例如，日本當年就是在現實主義的考量下「趕搭巴士」，搶在美國之前與中共建交。二○○八年馬英九上任後，台日關係的取得重大成果，也是因為日方覺得不能落於兩岸和解形勢之後，認為在免於後顧之憂的情況下，可以在對台政策上有積極主動的作為。
與日本相較，菲律賓顯然錯估形勢，不能對兩岸和解的擴散效應作出正確判斷。菲國企圖拿「一個中國」政策作文章，削弱台灣與它談判的正當性。但中國大陸豈是省油的燈，怎會輕易上當。在事件發生後第一時間，北京就對菲國的野蠻行徑嚴加譴責，並強烈要求菲國向台灣道歉。相較於國際輿論對菲律賓的一意偏袒，來自對岸的上述表態，應讓台灣人民點滴在心頭。
最近台菲外交衝突和北韓局勢升溫，在在顯示兩岸應就區域合作課題，進行嚴肅的探討。
在區域經濟合作方面，由於「杜哈回合」（Doha Round）多邊貿易談判停滯不前，區域經濟整合已成為各國貿易政策的重心。尤其在東亞地區，透過「東協加Ｎ」及雙邊「自由貿易協定」的整合模式，各國紛紛加速彼此間的經濟合作。其中，以東協國家倡議的「區域廣泛經濟夥伴」（RCEP）和美國主導的「跨太平洋夥伴」（TPP）最引人注目。一般認為，一旦完成整合，這個地區將成為全球最大的經濟自由貿易區域，影響全球的經濟復甦腳步。
台灣的經濟發展經驗和價值，本應成為亞洲區域經濟整合的「資產」。遺憾的是，受到兩岸政治關係的掣肘，台灣一直未能正常地參與區域經濟整合活動。針對這點，代表兩岸共同市場基金會出席「博鰲論壇」的前副總統蕭萬長，建議兩岸應加強政策協調和經濟戰略的探討。期盼以共同參與區域經濟整合，讓雙方「攜手合作，互利共榮，振興中華。」
蕭萬長的說法得到中共領導人的正面回應。與會的中共總書記習近平表示：「兩岸可以適時務實探討經濟共同發展、區域經濟合作進程相銜接的適當方式和可行途徑。」習近平特別強調，「只要兩岸凡事都從中華民族整體利益考慮，就一定能克服前進道路上的各種困難和阻礙，推動兩岸關係和平發展不斷取得新成就。」
在區域安全合作方面，由於亞太地區形勢的急遽變化，安全問題已成為各方關切的重要議題，並且希望透過「共同安全」和「合作安全」的概念，建立地區合作安全機制。無論從地緣政治或地緣經濟角度看，台灣都不能自外於地區的安全合作進程。安全議題包括傳統安全和非傳統安全。兩岸已在打擊犯罪、防疫和環境保護等非傳統安全問題方面，取得顯著合作成果。未來也應針對傳統安全領域涉及的各項問題，嘗試進行不同形式合作的可能性。
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 22, 2013
Summary: We have entered the post-Cold War era. The threat of global thermo-nuclear conflict has diminished. Regional conflicts however continue unabated in the Asian-Pacific region, in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and on the Korean Peninsula. These have long been seen as three of the most dangerous powder kegs. Cross-Strait reconciliation has eased the situation in the Taiwan Strait. But the situation in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula remain tense, and the threat of war looms.
Full Text below:
We have entered the post-Cold War era. The threat of global thermo-nuclear conflict has diminished. Regional conflicts however continue unabated in the Asian-Pacific region, in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and on the Korean Peninsula. These have long been seen as three of the most dangerous powder kegs. Cross-Strait reconciliation has eased the situation in the Taiwan Strait. But the situation in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula remain tense, and the threat of war looms.
The Chinese people love peace. Chinese culture emphasizes "yi de fu ren," i.e., "persuasion through moral example," rather than "yi li fu ren," i.e., "persuasion through physical coercion." Beijing Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited the ASEAN countries earlier this month. He said Beijing would work to make the South China Sea a "sea of peace, a sea of friendship, and a sea of co-operation." This proposal coincides with Taipei's "South China Sea Peace Initiative." Unfortunately not aggressing against others does not guarantee that others will not aggress against you. The Philippines murdered a Taiwanese fisherman in cold blood. Its behavior in the wake of the incident was outrageous. This reminds us that peace is not manna from heaven. It will not fall out of the sky and into our laps. It is something we must fight for, with both the carrot and the stick. through negotiations and through strength.
The two sides of the Strait have abided by the principle of "first economics, then politics." They have made the normalization of economic and trade relations a priority. Interaction between the two sides in the international arena touch on sensitive political issues. This has long mired the two sides in the "different interpretations" stage. But reality has underscored a simple fact. Cross-strait reconciliation has given the Ma administration's "flexible diplomacy" a boost. It has made it the first line of defense in our national security. Take relations with Japan. In President Ma Ying-jeou's eyes, Taipei-Tokyo relations are "the best they have been in 40 years." Cross-strait reconciliation played a major role in making that possible. There is no denying that Taiwan and Japan have a peculiar history. Polls show that many people on both sides feel good about the other. Many on Taiwan provided massive aid for Japanese earthquake victims. The Japanese people expressed heart-felt appreciation. But the Japanese government is not about to sacrifice its national interests to reciprocate. Japan, under pressure from realpolitik, has been running to "catch the bus." For example, Tokyo established diplomatic relations with Beijing before Washington. Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008. Taipei-Tokyo relations have yielded significant results. But Tokyo felt it could not fall behind cross-strait reconciliation. To avoid that eventuality, it became more willing to reach out to Taipei.
Compared to Japan, the Philippines has misjudged the situation. It failed to accurately assess the repercussions of cross-strait reconciliation. The Philippines attempted to use the one China policy to undermine Taipei's legitimacy and weaken its bargaining position. But Beijing was hardly that gullible. Soon after the incident, Beijing strictly condemned the Philippines' barbaric act. It also strongly urged Manila to issue Taipei an apology. The international community sided almost unanimously with the Philippines. This expression of solidarity with Taiwan from the other side of the Strait, gave the people on Taiwan a shot in the arm.
Recently the Taipei-Manila diplomatic conflict and the North Korea crisis have heated up. This underscores the need for Taipei and Beijing to cooperate on regional issues, and engage in serious discussions.
With regards regional economic cooperation, the Doha Round multilateral trade negotiations have stalled. Regional economic integration has become the focus of every nation's trade policies. This is especially true of the East Asian region. The integrated ASEAN+N and bilateral free trade agreements model has accelerated economic cooperation. Among these, the ASEAN countries' regional economic partnerships (RCEP) and the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are the most striking. Once integrated, this region will become the world's largest free trade zone, and will have the greatest impact on the global economic recovery.
Taiwan's experience with economic development should have become an asset to Asian regional economic integration. Unfortunately, being subject to the constraints of cross-Strait political relations, Taiwan failed to participate fully. Former Vice President Vincent Siew heads the Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation at the Boao Forum. Siew suggested that the two sides strengthen policy coordination and discuss economic strategies. He looks forward to joint participation in regional economic integration. He wants the two sides "to work together to their mutual benefit, common prosperity, and economic revitalization."
Siew's suggestion has received a positive response from CCP leaders. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, also in attendence, said, "The two sides can participate in timely and pragmatic discussions to promote shared economic development. They can seek appropriate and feasible means of achieving regional economic cooperation." Xi Jinping emphasized that "As long as the two sides consider the larger interests of the Chinese nation, we can overcome all difficulties and obstacles on the road ahead. We can continue to promote the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and continue to achieve new goals."
Regarding cooperation over regional security, the situation in the Asian-Pacific region is rapidly changing. Security has become an important issue for all parties. All want the establishment of regional cooperative security mechanisms rooted in "common security" and "cooperative security." From either a geopolitical or geo-economic point of view, Taipei cannot remain outside the regional security cooperation process. Security includes traditional and non-traditional security. Both sides are already working together in the fight against crime, vaccinations, environmental protection, and other non-traditional security issues. Cooperation has yielded remarkable results. In the future they should also be able to take on traditional security issues, and test out different possibilities for cooperation.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.05.22
社論－共同參與區域合作 兩岸新課題
本報訊
進入後冷戰時代，世界核戰威脅降低，區域衝突卻有增無減。在亞太地區，台海、南海和朝鮮半島，曾被視為最具戰爭危險的三個爆炸點。如今，台海形勢因兩岸和解趨於緩和；南海和朝鮮半島情勢卻是劍拔弩張，布滿戰爭陰影。
中華民族愛好和平，中華文化強調「以德服人」，而非「以力服人」。中共外交部長王毅於本月初訪問東協國家時，特別指出中共將努力把南海建設成「和平之海、友誼之海和合作之海」。這個主張和我方的「東海和平倡議」不謀而合。但「我不犯人」，不能保證「人不犯我」。菲律賓這次對台灣漁民進行「冷血謀殺」，案發後又表現的如此蠻不講理，顯示和平不會是「天上掉下來的禮物」，必須軟硬兼施，用談判和實力去爭取。
兩岸本著「先經後政」的原則，把經貿關係正常化視為優先課題。至於雙方如何在國際舞台上互動，則因事涉敏感的政治議題，而始終停留在「各自表述」的階段。但事實顯示，作為我方國家安全戰略的「第一道防線」，兩岸和解巳成為馬政府推動「活路外交」的一項助力。以對日外交工作為例，台日關係能出現馬英九總統眼中「四十年來的最佳狀態」，兩岸和解即起了推波助瀾的作用。不容諱言，台灣和日本有其特殊的歷史淵源，民調顯示雙方民眾都對對方具有好感。台灣對於日本震災提供的巨額援助，令日本人民十分「有感」，但日本政府卻不會以犧牲國家利益來投桃報李。例如，日本當年就是在現實主義的考量下「趕搭巴士」，搶在美國之前與中共建交。二○○八年馬英九上任後，台日關係的取得重大成果，也是因為日方覺得不能落於兩岸和解形勢之後，認為在免於後顧之憂的情況下，可以在對台政策上有積極主動的作為。
與日本相較，菲律賓顯然錯估形勢，不能對兩岸和解的擴散效應作出正確判斷。菲國企圖拿「一個中國」政策作文章，削弱台灣與它談判的正當性。但中國大陸豈是省油的燈，怎會輕易上當。在事件發生後第一時間，北京就對菲國的野蠻行徑嚴加譴責，並強烈要求菲國向台灣道歉。相較於國際輿論對菲律賓的一意偏袒，來自對岸的上述表態，應讓台灣人民點滴在心頭。
最近台菲外交衝突和北韓局勢升溫，在在顯示兩岸應就區域合作課題，進行嚴肅的探討。
在區域經濟合作方面，由於「杜哈回合」（Doha Round）多邊貿易談判停滯不前，區域經濟整合已成為各國貿易政策的重心。尤其在東亞地區，透過「東協加Ｎ」及雙邊「自由貿易協定」的整合模式，各國紛紛加速彼此間的經濟合作。其中，以東協國家倡議的「區域廣泛經濟夥伴」（RCEP）和美國主導的「跨太平洋夥伴」（TPP）最引人注目。一般認為，一旦完成整合，這個地區將成為全球最大的經濟自由貿易區域，影響全球的經濟復甦腳步。
台灣的經濟發展經驗和價值，本應成為亞洲區域經濟整合的「資產」。遺憾的是，受到兩岸政治關係的掣肘，台灣一直未能正常地參與區域經濟整合活動。針對這點，代表兩岸共同市場基金會出席「博鰲論壇」的前副總統蕭萬長，建議兩岸應加強政策協調和經濟戰略的探討。期盼以共同參與區域經濟整合，讓雙方「攜手合作，互利共榮，振興中華。」
蕭萬長的說法得到中共領導人的正面回應。與會的中共總書記習近平表示：「兩岸可以適時務實探討經濟共同發展、區域經濟合作進程相銜接的適當方式和可行途徑。」習近平特別強調，「只要兩岸凡事都從中華民族整體利益考慮，就一定能克服前進道路上的各種困難和阻礙，推動兩岸關係和平發展不斷取得新成就。」
在區域安全合作方面，由於亞太地區形勢的急遽變化，安全問題已成為各方關切的重要議題，並且希望透過「共同安全」和「合作安全」的概念，建立地區合作安全機制。無論從地緣政治或地緣經濟角度看，台灣都不能自外於地區的安全合作進程。安全議題包括傳統安全和非傳統安全。兩岸已在打擊犯罪、防疫和環境保護等非傳統安全問題方面，取得顯著合作成果。未來也應針對傳統安全領域涉及的各項問題，嘗試進行不同形式合作的可能性。
Tuesday, May 21, 2013
Pick the Peoples' Brains, Find a Solution for Taiwan
Pick the Peoples' Brains, Find a Solution for Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 22, 2013
Summary: We would like to remind the public on Taiwan that blaming every problem, large or small, on "presidential incompetence" is unfair. It does not help. We would also like to remind the president that wielding immense power and resources, but failing to respond to people's aspirations, is an intolerable tragedy.
Full Text below:
President Ma proclaimed that he wanted to be "a president to all the people." But five years have gone by. He has not become "a president to all the people." Instead, his approval rating has hit rock bottom. Let us look back. Let us see if we can better understand why. The cause of Ma Ying-jeou's predicament is not confined to irreconciliable Blue vs. Green differences. He shrank his own leadership role to administrative decision-making. He neglected his party. He almost forgot the existence of the people.
Leave aside for the moment opposition party obstructionism. Government efficiency rests mainly on two pillars, ruling adminstration efficiency, and ruling party fighting spirit. President Ma's administration has offered few solutions to Taiwan's political and social problems. Leave aside his dispirited policy implementation. Under President Ma's leadership for the past five years, the ruling party has undergone a fundamental change in its makeup. Its legislative caucus members frequently sing a different tune from the central government. They frequently obstruct its policy proposals. Given an undisciplined party and a lax administration, the Ma administration has squandered the Blue Camp's supermajority and a golden opportunity for reform. It has dashed the public's hopes for Taiwan's transformation.
The president's character has been a major factor. Consider the systemic roots of the problem. This newspaper's polls show that 74% of the public is dissatisfied with the ruling administration's performance. This is higher than the 69% who are dissatisfied with President Ma's performance. Clearly the ruling administration's weakness and ineptitude is the main reason Ma has lost popularity. The Ma administration has undergone several cabinet reshuffles over the past five years. But these have merely amounted to tinkering around the edges. When President Ma holds forth on national policy, one seldom hears fresh thinking or creative insights. Clearly the decision-making circles in his brain trust have been unable to provide him with any extraordinary advice.
The adminstration's ineptitude, is due in part to the sinister political atmosphere that has prevailed in recent years. Intelligent people have no desire to become involved in politics. But another factor is President Ma's inability to judge character, and his inability to use people. President Ma does everything by the book. He is often obstinate about such matters. This makes it difficult for him to understand the current situation or offer a strong defense of his position. This, coupled with cabinet officials accustomed to following orders, and Blue vs. Green legislative gridlock, the machinery of state has ground to a halt. How can it possibly respond deftly to internal and external developments?
President Ma may say that he often visits the countryside and participates in civic activities. He may say that accusations he has forgotten the people are unfair. But the issue is how he perceives the people. President Ma does indeed often visit the countryside or participate in civic activities. But is he merely engaging in "noblesse oblige?" Is he merely blessing the event with his presence? Is he merely putting on a show of being "close to his constituents." If so, then it is the misuse of a national leader's precious time and power. It matters not whether the two parties enjoy the process. It is not beneficial to overall national policy. Put more bluntly, it is more akin to electioneering. It has nothing to do with soliciting public opinion.
President Ma must draw upon the strength and wisdom of the public. The reasons are clear. First of all, Taiwan's economic hardships must be overcome. But for the past five years the ruling administration has exhausted its programs, all to no effect. It must now draw upon the wisdom of the private sector. Only this can avoid public sector blind spots. Secondly, Blue-Green reconciliation has stalled. President Ma has refused to convene a National Affairs Conference, such as that proposed by the opposition DPP. The government and the opposition have almost no room for negotiation. This deadlock must be broken. The most feasible approach is for non-governmental elements to reestablish a social consensus. Thirdly, President Ma's approval rating is now only 20%. The public is either cynical or dazed. The administration must draw upon the intellect of the private sector. It must have the humility to consult civil society. It must reverse this cynical mindset, Otherwise over the next three years Taiwan will be unable to move.
The Ma administration has no lack of erudition. But these elites lack the ability to inspire men's hearts. They even lack communication skills and the ability to persuade. They may be good at contemplating the issues. But they are often inept at finding solutions and putting them into practice. Compare this to the DPP era. Chen Shui-bian's populism incited public passions. It brimmed over with boastfulness. Its rashness concealed hidden dangers. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou's populism is motivated by the desire to please, by an overweening desire to be liked. It shifts direction like the wind, according to the likes and dislikes of the outside world. It invariably falls victim to the "Father and Son Ride a Donkey" syndrome, and finds it is unable to please all the people all the time. The Chen administration's populism relied on intuition. It required little knowledge. The Ma administration, on the other hand, has a surfeit of theory, and an excesso fpopulist pretensions. Its implementation cannot keep pace with its aspirations.
During an era of peace, Ma Ying-jeou might have been an ideal president. Today, faced with thorny problems such as stagnant growth, a lack of competitiveness, youth unemployment, and social discontent. a strong helmsman is needed to lead the country. The administration lacks the necessary dynamism. President Ma must draw upon the intellect of the private sector. This includes members of his brain trust whom he has forgotten about, his national policy advisers and other elites. He must rally the people to action. He must break the pattern of "the government is working overtime, but the public experiences no benefits" phenomenon.
We would like to remind the public on Taiwan that blaming every problem, large or small, on "presidential incompetence" is unfair. It does not help. We would also like to remind the president that wielding immense power and resources, but failing to respond to people's aspirations, is an intolerable tragedy.
向民間借腦，尋找台灣突圍重振之路
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.22 04:15 am
馬總統曾宣示要當「全民總統」，但倏忽五年過去，他未變成全民總統，聲望卻跌至谷底。回首檢視，馬英九的困局，不只在他無法調和藍綠歧見，更在他將自己的領導角色限縮在行政決策的枝節，疏忽了黨，更幾乎遺忘了「民間」的存在。
撇開在野的杯葛不談，政府效能主要由「行政團隊的效率」與「執政黨的士氣」兩大支柱支撐。馬總統領導的行政團隊，對台灣政經社會問題常端不出有效的對策，遑論其泄沓的執行力；而馬主席領導的執政黨，五年來亦未見體質結構的根本改造，立院黨團成員甚至不時與中央大唱反調，杯葛施政。在「黨散漫、政鬆弛」的情勢下，馬政府蹉跎了坐擁藍營優勢進行改革的機會，也使人民對台灣轉型提升的期待落空。
總統的性格因素自是一大原因，若再從體制去探尋源頭，本報民調顯示，七成四民眾不滿意行政團隊表現，高於不滿意馬總統的六成九；可見，行政團隊荏弱失能更是他失去人氣的主因。五年來馬政府幾次改組內閣，皆僅在小圈圈進行微調；包括馬總統談論國政，亦罕聞令人耳目一新的思維及創見，顯示其決策圈之智囊策士已無法提供他卓越的建言。
行政團隊的失能，與近年政治氛圍險惡致才智之士不願涉入政壇有關；但另一因素，則恐是由於馬總統拙於識人。馬總統行事循規蹈矩，時而膠柱鼓瑟，這不利他在巨變中體察時勢或奮力抗搏；再加上內閣官員習於聽命行事，又頻遭藍綠立委喧譁掣肘，這部國家機器連正常運作都有困難，豈有可能靈敏因應各種內外形勢？
馬總統或許會辯稱，他經常下鄉探訪，也不時參與民間活動，說他「遺忘民間」並不公允。但這裡所談論的「民間」，是一個思維層次的問題。馬總統確實經常下鄉或參加民間活動，然而，若只是以「君臨」之姿為活動演講加持添光，或只是為表現「親民」，那是徒將國家領導人的寶貴時光和權力拿來作低度利用，無論賓主歡或不歡，對整體國政並無裨益。說露骨些，那比較接近競選活動，與廣納民意無關。
馬總統何以需要向民間借力和借腦，原因非常清楚：第一，台灣經濟的困頓亟待突破，但五年來行政團隊已窮盡各種方案依然罔效，唯有引入民間智慧，才能突破公部門的盲點；第二，藍綠的和解停滯不前，馬總統拒絕召開在野黨所提的國是會議，朝野幾無對話空間；要解除這種癱瘓狀態，透過民間力量來重建社會共識是最可行途徑；第三，馬總統的支持度僅剩兩成，民間飄浮著冷嘲熱諷又茫然失措的氣味；若不能藉助各界才智之士的力量撐開社會思考格局，扭轉這種憤世嫉俗的心理，台灣未來三年恐寸步難行。
馬政府團隊當然不乏博學之士，但這些菁英普遍缺乏激勵人心的能耐，甚至缺乏溝通說服的技巧；他們或許長於思考問題，卻拙於解決與實踐。與民進黨執政時代相比，陳水扁的民粹是「煽惑式」的，充滿誇大的能量，卻存在盲動的危險；相對的，馬英九的民粹是「取悅式」的，常隨著外界的好惡載沉載浮，掉入父子騎驢的處境。扁政府的民粹靠的是直覺，不需要太多知識；而馬政府的民粹則充斥過多理論和虛矯，而行動卻追不上理想。
在太平年代，馬英九也許會是理想的總統；但台灣今天面對成長停滯、競爭力不足、青年失業、社會怨氣沖天等棘手難題，在在需要一個強有力的舵手來領導國家。那麼，在行政機器動能不足的情況下，馬總統必須向民間借腦借力──包括那些被他遺忘的資政、國策顧問以及各界賢能，同時也須著意喚起人民行動，打破「政府窮忙、人民無感」的空轉現象。
我們要提醒台灣民眾，不論大小問題皆歸咎於總統無能軟弱，有欠公允，也無濟於事。同樣的，我們也要提醒總統，擁有莫大的權力和資源卻無法回應人民的期待，是不可承受的悲哀。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 22, 2013
Summary: We would like to remind the public on Taiwan that blaming every problem, large or small, on "presidential incompetence" is unfair. It does not help. We would also like to remind the president that wielding immense power and resources, but failing to respond to people's aspirations, is an intolerable tragedy.
Full Text below:
President Ma proclaimed that he wanted to be "a president to all the people." But five years have gone by. He has not become "a president to all the people." Instead, his approval rating has hit rock bottom. Let us look back. Let us see if we can better understand why. The cause of Ma Ying-jeou's predicament is not confined to irreconciliable Blue vs. Green differences. He shrank his own leadership role to administrative decision-making. He neglected his party. He almost forgot the existence of the people.
Leave aside for the moment opposition party obstructionism. Government efficiency rests mainly on two pillars, ruling adminstration efficiency, and ruling party fighting spirit. President Ma's administration has offered few solutions to Taiwan's political and social problems. Leave aside his dispirited policy implementation. Under President Ma's leadership for the past five years, the ruling party has undergone a fundamental change in its makeup. Its legislative caucus members frequently sing a different tune from the central government. They frequently obstruct its policy proposals. Given an undisciplined party and a lax administration, the Ma administration has squandered the Blue Camp's supermajority and a golden opportunity for reform. It has dashed the public's hopes for Taiwan's transformation.
The president's character has been a major factor. Consider the systemic roots of the problem. This newspaper's polls show that 74% of the public is dissatisfied with the ruling administration's performance. This is higher than the 69% who are dissatisfied with President Ma's performance. Clearly the ruling administration's weakness and ineptitude is the main reason Ma has lost popularity. The Ma administration has undergone several cabinet reshuffles over the past five years. But these have merely amounted to tinkering around the edges. When President Ma holds forth on national policy, one seldom hears fresh thinking or creative insights. Clearly the decision-making circles in his brain trust have been unable to provide him with any extraordinary advice.
The adminstration's ineptitude, is due in part to the sinister political atmosphere that has prevailed in recent years. Intelligent people have no desire to become involved in politics. But another factor is President Ma's inability to judge character, and his inability to use people. President Ma does everything by the book. He is often obstinate about such matters. This makes it difficult for him to understand the current situation or offer a strong defense of his position. This, coupled with cabinet officials accustomed to following orders, and Blue vs. Green legislative gridlock, the machinery of state has ground to a halt. How can it possibly respond deftly to internal and external developments?
President Ma may say that he often visits the countryside and participates in civic activities. He may say that accusations he has forgotten the people are unfair. But the issue is how he perceives the people. President Ma does indeed often visit the countryside or participate in civic activities. But is he merely engaging in "noblesse oblige?" Is he merely blessing the event with his presence? Is he merely putting on a show of being "close to his constituents." If so, then it is the misuse of a national leader's precious time and power. It matters not whether the two parties enjoy the process. It is not beneficial to overall national policy. Put more bluntly, it is more akin to electioneering. It has nothing to do with soliciting public opinion.
President Ma must draw upon the strength and wisdom of the public. The reasons are clear. First of all, Taiwan's economic hardships must be overcome. But for the past five years the ruling administration has exhausted its programs, all to no effect. It must now draw upon the wisdom of the private sector. Only this can avoid public sector blind spots. Secondly, Blue-Green reconciliation has stalled. President Ma has refused to convene a National Affairs Conference, such as that proposed by the opposition DPP. The government and the opposition have almost no room for negotiation. This deadlock must be broken. The most feasible approach is for non-governmental elements to reestablish a social consensus. Thirdly, President Ma's approval rating is now only 20%. The public is either cynical or dazed. The administration must draw upon the intellect of the private sector. It must have the humility to consult civil society. It must reverse this cynical mindset, Otherwise over the next three years Taiwan will be unable to move.
The Ma administration has no lack of erudition. But these elites lack the ability to inspire men's hearts. They even lack communication skills and the ability to persuade. They may be good at contemplating the issues. But they are often inept at finding solutions and putting them into practice. Compare this to the DPP era. Chen Shui-bian's populism incited public passions. It brimmed over with boastfulness. Its rashness concealed hidden dangers. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou's populism is motivated by the desire to please, by an overweening desire to be liked. It shifts direction like the wind, according to the likes and dislikes of the outside world. It invariably falls victim to the "Father and Son Ride a Donkey" syndrome, and finds it is unable to please all the people all the time. The Chen administration's populism relied on intuition. It required little knowledge. The Ma administration, on the other hand, has a surfeit of theory, and an excesso fpopulist pretensions. Its implementation cannot keep pace with its aspirations.
During an era of peace, Ma Ying-jeou might have been an ideal president. Today, faced with thorny problems such as stagnant growth, a lack of competitiveness, youth unemployment, and social discontent. a strong helmsman is needed to lead the country. The administration lacks the necessary dynamism. President Ma must draw upon the intellect of the private sector. This includes members of his brain trust whom he has forgotten about, his national policy advisers and other elites. He must rally the people to action. He must break the pattern of "the government is working overtime, but the public experiences no benefits" phenomenon.
We would like to remind the public on Taiwan that blaming every problem, large or small, on "presidential incompetence" is unfair. It does not help. We would also like to remind the president that wielding immense power and resources, but failing to respond to people's aspirations, is an intolerable tragedy.
向民間借腦，尋找台灣突圍重振之路
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.22 04:15 am
馬總統曾宣示要當「全民總統」，但倏忽五年過去，他未變成全民總統，聲望卻跌至谷底。回首檢視，馬英九的困局，不只在他無法調和藍綠歧見，更在他將自己的領導角色限縮在行政決策的枝節，疏忽了黨，更幾乎遺忘了「民間」的存在。
撇開在野的杯葛不談，政府效能主要由「行政團隊的效率」與「執政黨的士氣」兩大支柱支撐。馬總統領導的行政團隊，對台灣政經社會問題常端不出有效的對策，遑論其泄沓的執行力；而馬主席領導的執政黨，五年來亦未見體質結構的根本改造，立院黨團成員甚至不時與中央大唱反調，杯葛施政。在「黨散漫、政鬆弛」的情勢下，馬政府蹉跎了坐擁藍營優勢進行改革的機會，也使人民對台灣轉型提升的期待落空。
總統的性格因素自是一大原因，若再從體制去探尋源頭，本報民調顯示，七成四民眾不滿意行政團隊表現，高於不滿意馬總統的六成九；可見，行政團隊荏弱失能更是他失去人氣的主因。五年來馬政府幾次改組內閣，皆僅在小圈圈進行微調；包括馬總統談論國政，亦罕聞令人耳目一新的思維及創見，顯示其決策圈之智囊策士已無法提供他卓越的建言。
行政團隊的失能，與近年政治氛圍險惡致才智之士不願涉入政壇有關；但另一因素，則恐是由於馬總統拙於識人。馬總統行事循規蹈矩，時而膠柱鼓瑟，這不利他在巨變中體察時勢或奮力抗搏；再加上內閣官員習於聽命行事，又頻遭藍綠立委喧譁掣肘，這部國家機器連正常運作都有困難，豈有可能靈敏因應各種內外形勢？
馬總統或許會辯稱，他經常下鄉探訪，也不時參與民間活動，說他「遺忘民間」並不公允。但這裡所談論的「民間」，是一個思維層次的問題。馬總統確實經常下鄉或參加民間活動，然而，若只是以「君臨」之姿為活動演講加持添光，或只是為表現「親民」，那是徒將國家領導人的寶貴時光和權力拿來作低度利用，無論賓主歡或不歡，對整體國政並無裨益。說露骨些，那比較接近競選活動，與廣納民意無關。
馬總統何以需要向民間借力和借腦，原因非常清楚：第一，台灣經濟的困頓亟待突破，但五年來行政團隊已窮盡各種方案依然罔效，唯有引入民間智慧，才能突破公部門的盲點；第二，藍綠的和解停滯不前，馬總統拒絕召開在野黨所提的國是會議，朝野幾無對話空間；要解除這種癱瘓狀態，透過民間力量來重建社會共識是最可行途徑；第三，馬總統的支持度僅剩兩成，民間飄浮著冷嘲熱諷又茫然失措的氣味；若不能藉助各界才智之士的力量撐開社會思考格局，扭轉這種憤世嫉俗的心理，台灣未來三年恐寸步難行。
馬政府團隊當然不乏博學之士，但這些菁英普遍缺乏激勵人心的能耐，甚至缺乏溝通說服的技巧；他們或許長於思考問題，卻拙於解決與實踐。與民進黨執政時代相比，陳水扁的民粹是「煽惑式」的，充滿誇大的能量，卻存在盲動的危險；相對的，馬英九的民粹是「取悅式」的，常隨著外界的好惡載沉載浮，掉入父子騎驢的處境。扁政府的民粹靠的是直覺，不需要太多知識；而馬政府的民粹則充斥過多理論和虛矯，而行動卻追不上理想。
在太平年代，馬英九也許會是理想的總統；但台灣今天面對成長停滯、競爭力不足、青年失業、社會怨氣沖天等棘手難題，在在需要一個強有力的舵手來領導國家。那麼，在行政機器動能不足的情況下，馬總統必須向民間借腦借力──包括那些被他遺忘的資政、國策顧問以及各界賢能，同時也須著意喚起人民行動，打破「政府窮忙、人民無感」的空轉現象。
我們要提醒台灣民眾，不論大小問題皆歸咎於總統無能軟弱，有欠公允，也無濟於事。同樣的，我們也要提醒總統，擁有莫大的權力和資源卻無法回應人民的期待，是不可承受的悲哀。
Monday, May 20, 2013
Ma Ying-jeou's Last Three Years, Taiwan's Next Three Years
Ma Ying-jeou's Last Three Years, Taiwan's Next Three Years
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2013
Summary: By the first anniversary of President Ma's second term, President Ma's public approval rating fell to 20%. His administration has stumbled all the way. Danger continues to loom for the remaining three years of his second and final term. For both President Ma and the Taiwan Region, there is no light at the end of the tunnel.
Full Text below:
By the first anniversary of President Ma's second term, President Ma's public approval rating fell to 20%. His administration has stumbled all the way. Danger continues to loom for the remaining three years of his second and final term. For both President Ma and the Taiwan Region, there is no light at the end of the tunnel.
During the five years since 2008, Ma Ying-jeou has gone from charismatic national leader to lame duck president. Ma Ying-jeou faces more than just a decline in national morale. He also faces difficult to overcome obstacles to his leadership. Among these are a deepening "national malaise," intense obstruction from the political opposition, but most of all, his administration has lost its bearings and its ability to move the nation forward. He has run up against a brick wall. These three factors are related and connected. In any event, the remedy for the "lame duck syndrome" lies in President Ma's hands. He must find a way to break through the brick wall.
Given his plight, President Ma is sure to be confused and anxious. But one must never forget that the confusion and anxiety experienced by the public on Taiwan far exceeds his. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian governed for 20 years. They left the nation a mess. The public desperately hoped the chaos of Taiwan's democracy would end under the Ma administration, given strong public support. They hoped the economy would regain its vitality. They hoped social divisions would be healed. But five years later, it is clear their hopes were in vain. During the 2008 general election, some "elders" predicted that if elected, Ma Ying-jeou would bring about a wave of "peace and prosperity." The result however, has been an uncertain peace and an ever elusive prosperity.
For precisely this reason, Ma Ying-jeou is thinking hard about what he will do during the next three years. He must not remain preoccupied with honoring unfulfilled campaign promises, and with filling in the gaps in his blueprint for governance. Otherwise, he will find himself trapped, chasing after outdated commitments. What Ma Ying-jeou must do, is understand and respond to the yearnings of the public. He must come up with a concrete antidote to its problems. He cannot pull a rabbit out of a hat. He cannot suddenly announce some secret formula to stimulate the economy. Instead he must summon up the passion and sense of mission befitting a national leader. He must win back those members of the public who lost confidence in him. He must aggressively seek to restore Taiwan society's lost cohesion.
President Ma's halo has lost its luster. This is due to three factors. The first factor is personal. Ma has a bland personality. He led a charmed life. He never experienced setbacks during his development. He never acquired a feel for what it was like to be ordinary folk. He lacks heartfelt social concern. He often allows himself to become caught up in trivial or superficial matters. He has never evinced the boldness expected of a leader. He has never been able to inspire people with his own passion. The result has been a society mired in apathy and helplessness.
The second factor is governmental. President Ma has a tendency toward homogenization. This is not conducive to the diversity of though or dynamic decision-making. Add to this Blue vs. Green ideological confrontation, and it became increasingly difficult for him to recruit talent. Political appointees settled into career official positions. It was impossible for him to establish an effective brain trust. His policy making ability failed to meet public expectations.
The third factor was social. During President Ma's first four years, the bar was set extremely low. Chen Shui-bian was corrupt. The DPP was incompetent. Ma championed clean government and cross-Strait rapproachment. These were easy to reach political objectives. But peoples' expectations for national progress continued to rise. The fruits of cross-strait reconciliation have already been harvested. Meanwhile, the clean government he championed was soon tainted by Lin Yi-shi on his left, and Lai Shu-ju on his right. Currently the public looks forward most eagerly to vital issues such as economic development, social equity, and justice. They see no progress. Instead the ruling administration remains engrossed in organizational transformation, national education reform, and other non-urgent matters. Little wonder the public is anxious and dissatisfied. The administration's agenda utterly ignores the peoples' feelings.
President Ma's achievements in cross-strait reconciliation are clear for all to see. But this is his second term. Virtually all of the benefits have been reaped. There is not much more to be had. Over the past year, the Ma administration's energy has been devoted almost entirely to U.S. beef imports, capital gains taxes, pension reform, and a referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Not one of the four problems has been solved. How can such governance win the support of the people?
Over the next three years, President Ma must not think about how many items on his "to do" list have been checked off. He must lift his eyes and see what the public on Taiwan wants. Some of what it wants are missed opportunites. Some of what it wants he can still accomplish. He must think about how to do them. Only then can he avoid betraying the expectations of 23 million people. For an individual, three years is a short period. But for the nation as a whole, three years of ups and downs, of missed opportunities, means that millions of people cannot be rescued from their plight. If President Ma squanders these three years, he will waste three years out of the lives of 23 million people. This is not something he can afford to be cavalier about!
馬英九的三年與台灣未來三年
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.21 01:23 am
在兩成的低支持度中一路蹣跚，馬總統度過了他連任後的第一個周年。剩下的三年任期，形勢依然處處險峻；對馬總統和對台灣而言，隧道出口的光明似乎仍然可望而不可即。
自二○○八年以來領導台灣五年至今，從魅力領袖變成跛鴨總統，馬英九面對的其實不只是民氣的滑坡，而是一道難以突破的領導障礙，有如銅牆。其中，有社會鬱悶的加深，有在野的強力杯葛，更大的因素則是他領導的執政團隊失去指引及推動國家前進的力量；三種因素陳陳相因，交互糾纏。但無論如何，打破「跛鴨魔咒」的金鑰其實掌握在馬總統自己手裡，他必須找出正確的鑰匙來開啟穿越銅牆之門。
面對自己的領導困境，馬總統一定懷有極大的困惑和焦慮；但切勿忘記，人民對台灣欲進不前的憂心和焦慮，絕對遠甚於他的心情。因為，歷經李、扁廿年的紛亂治理，人們極度渴望台灣民主的亂象能在馬政府的絕對優勢治理下定紛止爭，使經濟重拾活力、社會撕裂重新彌合；但是，五年來，這樣的期待顯然落空。二○○八年大選時，曾有政壇大老預言馬英九若當選將可為台灣帶來一波「太平盛世」，結果太平縹緲不定，而盛世則不見影蹤。
正因如此，馬英九在思考未來三年的作為時，絕不能一心只想著自己還有多少大選政見尚待兌現，自己的執政藍圖還有什麼角落尚未構築；那樣的話，他將繼續陷於在虛妄的思維裡追逐自己過期的承諾。馬英九必須做的，是從理解及回應台灣人民的渴望入手，拿出積極而具體的作為。這個解藥，絕非從懷中掏出一個神奇錦囊，或是宣布一帖刺激景氣的祕方；而是必須拿出領導人的熱情和使命，鼓舞對他喪失信心的民眾，並積極重新召喚台灣社會消散的凝聚力。
馬總統魅力的下滑，可大致歸因於三項因素：第一，個人因素方面：他個性平和，且因成長過程缺乏挫折及草根歷練，社會關注之厚度及縱深不足，有時流於瑣碎或膚淺，乃至欠缺大開大闔的領導氣魄。尤其，他一直難以用自己的熱情來激發人民的感動，也讓社會充滿冷感和無奈。
第二，執政團隊因素：馬總統用人有同質化之傾向，這不利於政府決策的多元化思考及機動因應。加上藍綠對峙，延攬人才日益不易，政務官「事務官化」的現象已極為明顯，不僅無法形成強有力的決策智囊，決策執行力也常難以滿足民間的期待。
第三，社會變遷因素：馬總統的首屆四年，是建立在陳水扁貪腐及民進黨執政失能的低標準基礎上，他推動清廉訴求及兩岸融冰，即能輕易建立政績。但人民對於國家進步的期待不斷在提高，兩岸和解的成果已經收割，而清廉訴求卻被林益世、賴素如等左右手的貪腐污損殆盡。目前民間期待最切的經濟發展、社會公平及司法正義等切身議題，遲遲看不到進展；而執政團隊汲汲經營的卻是組織改造、國教改制等非迫切事項，也難怪人民躁鬱不滿，因為政府的施政時程表無法對應民間感受。
馬總統在兩岸和解上的成績，自然有目共睹；但這對他的第二屆任期而言，其實幾乎已是「利多出盡」，助益無多。而過去一年，馬政府的精力幾乎全部耗費在美牛、證所稅、年金改革及核四公投等四個議題上；一年連四個政策都無法解決，這樣的治理效能如何獲得人民支持？
總結而言，未來三年的任期，馬總統必須思考的，絕不是自己手上的記事本還有多少件沒結案的計畫，而是要抬起頭來看看整個台灣對他的期待──有些是錯過了，有些則來得及彌補，想想自己要怎麼做，才不會辜負這兩千三百萬人的未來。就個人而言，三年不過是生命裡的一小段軌跡；但對整個國家而言，三年的興衰升沉，錯過了時機，就是千萬人難以挽回的命運。馬總統若浪費這三年，就是浪費了兩千三百萬人的三年，不可不慎！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2013
Summary: By the first anniversary of President Ma's second term, President Ma's public approval rating fell to 20%. His administration has stumbled all the way. Danger continues to loom for the remaining three years of his second and final term. For both President Ma and the Taiwan Region, there is no light at the end of the tunnel.
Full Text below:
By the first anniversary of President Ma's second term, President Ma's public approval rating fell to 20%. His administration has stumbled all the way. Danger continues to loom for the remaining three years of his second and final term. For both President Ma and the Taiwan Region, there is no light at the end of the tunnel.
During the five years since 2008, Ma Ying-jeou has gone from charismatic national leader to lame duck president. Ma Ying-jeou faces more than just a decline in national morale. He also faces difficult to overcome obstacles to his leadership. Among these are a deepening "national malaise," intense obstruction from the political opposition, but most of all, his administration has lost its bearings and its ability to move the nation forward. He has run up against a brick wall. These three factors are related and connected. In any event, the remedy for the "lame duck syndrome" lies in President Ma's hands. He must find a way to break through the brick wall.
Given his plight, President Ma is sure to be confused and anxious. But one must never forget that the confusion and anxiety experienced by the public on Taiwan far exceeds his. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian governed for 20 years. They left the nation a mess. The public desperately hoped the chaos of Taiwan's democracy would end under the Ma administration, given strong public support. They hoped the economy would regain its vitality. They hoped social divisions would be healed. But five years later, it is clear their hopes were in vain. During the 2008 general election, some "elders" predicted that if elected, Ma Ying-jeou would bring about a wave of "peace and prosperity." The result however, has been an uncertain peace and an ever elusive prosperity.
For precisely this reason, Ma Ying-jeou is thinking hard about what he will do during the next three years. He must not remain preoccupied with honoring unfulfilled campaign promises, and with filling in the gaps in his blueprint for governance. Otherwise, he will find himself trapped, chasing after outdated commitments. What Ma Ying-jeou must do, is understand and respond to the yearnings of the public. He must come up with a concrete antidote to its problems. He cannot pull a rabbit out of a hat. He cannot suddenly announce some secret formula to stimulate the economy. Instead he must summon up the passion and sense of mission befitting a national leader. He must win back those members of the public who lost confidence in him. He must aggressively seek to restore Taiwan society's lost cohesion.
President Ma's halo has lost its luster. This is due to three factors. The first factor is personal. Ma has a bland personality. He led a charmed life. He never experienced setbacks during his development. He never acquired a feel for what it was like to be ordinary folk. He lacks heartfelt social concern. He often allows himself to become caught up in trivial or superficial matters. He has never evinced the boldness expected of a leader. He has never been able to inspire people with his own passion. The result has been a society mired in apathy and helplessness.
The second factor is governmental. President Ma has a tendency toward homogenization. This is not conducive to the diversity of though or dynamic decision-making. Add to this Blue vs. Green ideological confrontation, and it became increasingly difficult for him to recruit talent. Political appointees settled into career official positions. It was impossible for him to establish an effective brain trust. His policy making ability failed to meet public expectations.
The third factor was social. During President Ma's first four years, the bar was set extremely low. Chen Shui-bian was corrupt. The DPP was incompetent. Ma championed clean government and cross-Strait rapproachment. These were easy to reach political objectives. But peoples' expectations for national progress continued to rise. The fruits of cross-strait reconciliation have already been harvested. Meanwhile, the clean government he championed was soon tainted by Lin Yi-shi on his left, and Lai Shu-ju on his right. Currently the public looks forward most eagerly to vital issues such as economic development, social equity, and justice. They see no progress. Instead the ruling administration remains engrossed in organizational transformation, national education reform, and other non-urgent matters. Little wonder the public is anxious and dissatisfied. The administration's agenda utterly ignores the peoples' feelings.
President Ma's achievements in cross-strait reconciliation are clear for all to see. But this is his second term. Virtually all of the benefits have been reaped. There is not much more to be had. Over the past year, the Ma administration's energy has been devoted almost entirely to U.S. beef imports, capital gains taxes, pension reform, and a referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Not one of the four problems has been solved. How can such governance win the support of the people?
Over the next three years, President Ma must not think about how many items on his "to do" list have been checked off. He must lift his eyes and see what the public on Taiwan wants. Some of what it wants are missed opportunites. Some of what it wants he can still accomplish. He must think about how to do them. Only then can he avoid betraying the expectations of 23 million people. For an individual, three years is a short period. But for the nation as a whole, three years of ups and downs, of missed opportunities, means that millions of people cannot be rescued from their plight. If President Ma squanders these three years, he will waste three years out of the lives of 23 million people. This is not something he can afford to be cavalier about!
馬英九的三年與台灣未來三年
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.21 01:23 am
在兩成的低支持度中一路蹣跚，馬總統度過了他連任後的第一個周年。剩下的三年任期，形勢依然處處險峻；對馬總統和對台灣而言，隧道出口的光明似乎仍然可望而不可即。
自二○○八年以來領導台灣五年至今，從魅力領袖變成跛鴨總統，馬英九面對的其實不只是民氣的滑坡，而是一道難以突破的領導障礙，有如銅牆。其中，有社會鬱悶的加深，有在野的強力杯葛，更大的因素則是他領導的執政團隊失去指引及推動國家前進的力量；三種因素陳陳相因，交互糾纏。但無論如何，打破「跛鴨魔咒」的金鑰其實掌握在馬總統自己手裡，他必須找出正確的鑰匙來開啟穿越銅牆之門。
面對自己的領導困境，馬總統一定懷有極大的困惑和焦慮；但切勿忘記，人民對台灣欲進不前的憂心和焦慮，絕對遠甚於他的心情。因為，歷經李、扁廿年的紛亂治理，人們極度渴望台灣民主的亂象能在馬政府的絕對優勢治理下定紛止爭，使經濟重拾活力、社會撕裂重新彌合；但是，五年來，這樣的期待顯然落空。二○○八年大選時，曾有政壇大老預言馬英九若當選將可為台灣帶來一波「太平盛世」，結果太平縹緲不定，而盛世則不見影蹤。
正因如此，馬英九在思考未來三年的作為時，絕不能一心只想著自己還有多少大選政見尚待兌現，自己的執政藍圖還有什麼角落尚未構築；那樣的話，他將繼續陷於在虛妄的思維裡追逐自己過期的承諾。馬英九必須做的，是從理解及回應台灣人民的渴望入手，拿出積極而具體的作為。這個解藥，絕非從懷中掏出一個神奇錦囊，或是宣布一帖刺激景氣的祕方；而是必須拿出領導人的熱情和使命，鼓舞對他喪失信心的民眾，並積極重新召喚台灣社會消散的凝聚力。
馬總統魅力的下滑，可大致歸因於三項因素：第一，個人因素方面：他個性平和，且因成長過程缺乏挫折及草根歷練，社會關注之厚度及縱深不足，有時流於瑣碎或膚淺，乃至欠缺大開大闔的領導氣魄。尤其，他一直難以用自己的熱情來激發人民的感動，也讓社會充滿冷感和無奈。
第二，執政團隊因素：馬總統用人有同質化之傾向，這不利於政府決策的多元化思考及機動因應。加上藍綠對峙，延攬人才日益不易，政務官「事務官化」的現象已極為明顯，不僅無法形成強有力的決策智囊，決策執行力也常難以滿足民間的期待。
第三，社會變遷因素：馬總統的首屆四年，是建立在陳水扁貪腐及民進黨執政失能的低標準基礎上，他推動清廉訴求及兩岸融冰，即能輕易建立政績。但人民對於國家進步的期待不斷在提高，兩岸和解的成果已經收割，而清廉訴求卻被林益世、賴素如等左右手的貪腐污損殆盡。目前民間期待最切的經濟發展、社會公平及司法正義等切身議題，遲遲看不到進展；而執政團隊汲汲經營的卻是組織改造、國教改制等非迫切事項，也難怪人民躁鬱不滿，因為政府的施政時程表無法對應民間感受。
馬總統在兩岸和解上的成績，自然有目共睹；但這對他的第二屆任期而言，其實幾乎已是「利多出盡」，助益無多。而過去一年，馬政府的精力幾乎全部耗費在美牛、證所稅、年金改革及核四公投等四個議題上；一年連四個政策都無法解決，這樣的治理效能如何獲得人民支持？
總結而言，未來三年的任期，馬總統必須思考的，絕不是自己手上的記事本還有多少件沒結案的計畫，而是要抬起頭來看看整個台灣對他的期待──有些是錯過了，有些則來得及彌補，想想自己要怎麼做，才不會辜負這兩千三百萬人的未來。就個人而言，三年不過是生命裡的一小段軌跡；但對整個國家而言，三年的興衰升沉，錯過了時機，就是千萬人難以挽回的命運。馬總統若浪費這三年，就是浪費了兩千三百萬人的三年，不可不慎！
Sunday, May 19, 2013
Opportunities are Fleeting: Establish an Interim Political Structure
Opportunities are Fleeting:
Establish an Interim Political Structure
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 20, 2013
Summary: Ma Ying-jeou has only three years left in his second and final term. When it comes to the conduct of cross-strait policy, to its upgrading and innovation, Ma Ying-jeou must realize that time is fleeting. Beijing must also be aware of the fleeting historical opportunity. It must not complain only that Ma Ying-jeou is not sufficiently pro-reunification. It must realize that the two sides' "yet to be reunified" status is a more pressing issue than "reunification."
Full Text below:
Time flies. During the last three years of his second and final term, President Ma Ying-jeou faces an array of internal and external challenges. From time to time he may feel a sense of urgency. On the opposite side of the Strait, the Beijing government is probably increasingly concerned that the rosy historic scenario which began in 2008 may not last.
As everyone knows, this precious opportunity for improved cross-Strait relations presented itself in 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou was elected president. Also, as everyone knows, this opportunity may vanish if the KMT loses the presidential election in 2016.
The KMT could lose in 2106. This is something we have mentioned before in this editorial series. If the KMT loses, it will be because it failed to improve the economy. It will constitute an unstoppable historical inevitability, akin to a landslide. During this period of history, Lien Chan, Ma Ying-jeou, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping created unprecedented opportunities for cross-Strait co-operation. Their achievements are before us, for all the world to see. Therefore even if the KMT loses in 2016, the defeat must not be interpreted as a defeat for cross-Strait policy. In other words, suppose the KMT loses in 2016. The two sides must not allow their cumulative achievements to be nullified. They must not descend into purgatory, as they did once before.
Therefore the authorities on both sides must work together. They must cherish the last three years of Ma Ying-jeou's second and final term. The two sides must use the opportunity to establish a more stable and durable cross-Strait framework, one that will not be swayed by any variables that might appear in 2016. Such a framework was mentioned in the 18th CCP Political Report. "Explore cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified, and make fair and reasonable arrangements." This is similar in spirit to provisions in the amended ROC Constitution. This framework could be termed "a cross-strait political structure in response to the requirements of national unity prior to reunification." The above two could be termed an "interim political structure."
In recent years, the focus of policy for Beijing has shifted from "reunification" to "political relations under circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." This is a tremendous breakthrough. It is a paradigm shift. It has liberated cross-Strait relations from the dilemma of goal-orientated reunification, and embraced process-oriented peaceful development. Hu Jintao has long advocated a peace agreement. His advocacy reflected his awareness that reunification was no easy matter. He attempted to take advantage of a peace agreement to establish cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, He sought an interim solution. But Beijing has yet to establish a framework of "fair and reasonable arrangements." As a result, Ma Ying-jeou has remained fearful of a public backlash.
By now both sides know they must establish a "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise Beijing must bear the burden of reunification, while Taipei must live with the fear of "being reunified." Reunification has become an obstacle to improved cross-Strait political relations. The peace agreement meanwhile, has run aground. Therefore we should seek an alternative. We should establish "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." This framework should be the representative offices the two sides are currently discussing and seeking to implement.
Zhang Nienshi heads up Shanghai's East Asian Institute. He thinks the two sides should establish representative offices consistent with a "one country, two governments" framework. If one does not recognize a "one country, two governments" framework, then one cannot possibly agree to the establishment of two representative offices, both with official authority. Zhang Nianshi does not speak for the Beijing government. But his logic is consistent with cross-Strait thinking in recent years. One may wrack one's brains. But probably nothing besides "one country, two governments" thinking can establish a "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." This newspaper's "big roof concept of China" is just this sort of thinking. Either "one country, two governments" or a "big roof concept of China" can be regarded as a "reasonable interim political structure".
Lee Teng-hui advocated the "National Unification Guidelines." Chen Shui-bian advocated the "Five Noes." Beijing forced them back into the Taiwan independence fold. Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy is "one China, different interpretations." It is "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It is "One China is the Republic of China." It is the rejection of "one China, one Taiwan," and the rejection of "Taiwan independence." This represents the current state of public opinion on Taiwan. Beijing must cherish this hard-won cross-strait consensus. It must take this success and apply "one country, two governments" or "big roof concept of China" thinking to it. In the coming "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified" this can be made explicit. This would protect this hard-won result. We must not end up with neither "reunification" nor "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
Ma Ying-jeou has only three years left in his second and final term. When it comes to the conduct of cross-strait policy, to its upgrading and innovation, Ma Ying-jeou must realize that time is fleeting. Beijing must also be aware of the fleeting historical opportunity. It must not complain only that Ma Ying-jeou is not sufficiently pro-reunification. It must realize that the two sides' "yet to be reunified" status is a more pressing issue than "reunification."
機遇稍縱即逝 兩岸思酌建立中程政治架構
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.20 02:14 am
歲月如馳，馬英九總統在未來三年任期中，面對千頭萬緒的內外難題，或許已有時不我與的緊迫感；其實，對岸的北京政府，面對這段自二○○八年出現的兩岸歷史機遇之漸趨消磨，恐怕亦生好景不常的警惕。
眾所皆知，兩岸這段珍貴機遇是自馬英九二○○八年當選總統而確立；同樣亦有目共睹的是，這段機緣不無可能在二○一六年因國民黨的敗選而畫下句點。
國民黨若在二○一六敗選，如本系列社論前文所述，主要可能是因經濟未能改善及儼如土石流一般的歷史擠兌未能解決使然。但是，這一段經連戰、馬英九及胡錦濤、習近平所共同經營的兩岸機遇，其成就卻是舉世共見的；國民黨即使在二○一六年敗選，應亦不能解釋為敗於兩岸政策；換句話說，國民黨即使在二○一六敗選，兩岸亦不可使雙方所累積的成就即此化作烏有，而令兩岸再又墜入另一次的煉獄輪迴。
因此，兩岸當局應當共同珍惜馬英九的最後三年任期，務期趁此在兩岸關係上建立一個更加穩固且可長可久的架構，要穩固到不會受二○一六的任何變數所動搖的地步。此一架構即是中共十八大政治報告所說：「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排。」相對於中華民國憲法增修條文的精神意涵，此一架構亦可稱作：「為因應國家統一前之需要的兩岸政治架構。」以上二者，皆可說是一個「中程政治架構」。
北京近年來的政策焦點能從「統一」轉移至「尚未統一的政治關係」，這是極大的突破與超越；也使兩岸得以從「目的論」的困局中，走向「和平發展」的「過程論」。胡錦濤始終主張《和平協議》，應當即是反映出已然認知「統一不易」，而欲藉《和平協議》，來建立「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」，此即一種「中程思考」；但是由於北京方面始終未提出一個「合情合理的安排」之架構，致使馬英九方面在顧忌民意反彈之下不願迎對。
兩岸其實均確知，事到如今，必須建立一「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的兩岸政治關係」，否則北京扛著「統一」的包袱，台灣懷著「統一」的憂懼，「統一」反而成了兩岸穩固與提升政治關係的障礙。而《和平協議》既已擱淺，即應設法找到一個可以替代《和平協議》的機制，用以建構「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的兩岸政治關係」，而此一機制應當就是兩岸正在議商的互設辦事處。
上海東亞研究所所長章念馳最近表示，兩岸互設辦事處即是按照「一國兩府」的架構進行；如果不承認「一國兩府」就不會同意互設代表雙方公權力的辦事處。章念馳所述雖非官方說法，卻是對於近年來兩岸思維演化的一個符合邏輯且能證諸事實的論證。而窮盡思考，恐怕也想不出除了「一國兩府」之類的思維，還有什麼機制能夠體現「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的兩岸政治關係」之架構，本報所倡「大屋頂中國」亦可歸屬此類。亦即，「一國兩府」或「大屋頂中國」之屬，皆可視作一種「合情合理的中程政治架構」。
北京曾將主張《國統綱領》的李登輝，及主張「四不一沒有」的陳水扁，逼回到台獨的牆角。如今，馬英九已將兩岸政策帶到「一個中國／各自表述」、「不統／不獨／不武」、「一個中國就是中華民國」、「不推兩個中國、一中一台、台灣獨立」的位置，這已是現階段台灣民意的極致；如果北京尚知珍惜此一得來不易的兩岸共同成果，即應努力將此一成果，透過「一國兩府」或「大屋頂中國」之類的思維，進階內建於「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的政治關係架構」之上，而在未來的《兩岸互設辦事處協議》作出明文體現，以保全此一辛苦果實；不要最後落得不但沒有「統一」，也沒有了「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」。
馬英九僅剩三年任期，在兩岸政策的開展、升級與創新上，馬英九應知珍惜光陰，北京也要有歷史機遇一去即不再有的警惕。不要只嫌馬英九不夠「統」，應知「尚未統一」是一個比「統一」更應妥適處理的課題。
Establish an Interim Political Structure
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 20, 2013
Summary: Ma Ying-jeou has only three years left in his second and final term. When it comes to the conduct of cross-strait policy, to its upgrading and innovation, Ma Ying-jeou must realize that time is fleeting. Beijing must also be aware of the fleeting historical opportunity. It must not complain only that Ma Ying-jeou is not sufficiently pro-reunification. It must realize that the two sides' "yet to be reunified" status is a more pressing issue than "reunification."
Full Text below:
Time flies. During the last three years of his second and final term, President Ma Ying-jeou faces an array of internal and external challenges. From time to time he may feel a sense of urgency. On the opposite side of the Strait, the Beijing government is probably increasingly concerned that the rosy historic scenario which began in 2008 may not last.
As everyone knows, this precious opportunity for improved cross-Strait relations presented itself in 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou was elected president. Also, as everyone knows, this opportunity may vanish if the KMT loses the presidential election in 2016.
The KMT could lose in 2106. This is something we have mentioned before in this editorial series. If the KMT loses, it will be because it failed to improve the economy. It will constitute an unstoppable historical inevitability, akin to a landslide. During this period of history, Lien Chan, Ma Ying-jeou, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping created unprecedented opportunities for cross-Strait co-operation. Their achievements are before us, for all the world to see. Therefore even if the KMT loses in 2016, the defeat must not be interpreted as a defeat for cross-Strait policy. In other words, suppose the KMT loses in 2016. The two sides must not allow their cumulative achievements to be nullified. They must not descend into purgatory, as they did once before.
Therefore the authorities on both sides must work together. They must cherish the last three years of Ma Ying-jeou's second and final term. The two sides must use the opportunity to establish a more stable and durable cross-Strait framework, one that will not be swayed by any variables that might appear in 2016. Such a framework was mentioned in the 18th CCP Political Report. "Explore cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified, and make fair and reasonable arrangements." This is similar in spirit to provisions in the amended ROC Constitution. This framework could be termed "a cross-strait political structure in response to the requirements of national unity prior to reunification." The above two could be termed an "interim political structure."
In recent years, the focus of policy for Beijing has shifted from "reunification" to "political relations under circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." This is a tremendous breakthrough. It is a paradigm shift. It has liberated cross-Strait relations from the dilemma of goal-orientated reunification, and embraced process-oriented peaceful development. Hu Jintao has long advocated a peace agreement. His advocacy reflected his awareness that reunification was no easy matter. He attempted to take advantage of a peace agreement to establish cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, He sought an interim solution. But Beijing has yet to establish a framework of "fair and reasonable arrangements." As a result, Ma Ying-jeou has remained fearful of a public backlash.
By now both sides know they must establish a "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise Beijing must bear the burden of reunification, while Taipei must live with the fear of "being reunified." Reunification has become an obstacle to improved cross-Strait political relations. The peace agreement meanwhile, has run aground. Therefore we should seek an alternative. We should establish "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." This framework should be the representative offices the two sides are currently discussing and seeking to implement.
Zhang Nienshi heads up Shanghai's East Asian Institute. He thinks the two sides should establish representative offices consistent with a "one country, two governments" framework. If one does not recognize a "one country, two governments" framework, then one cannot possibly agree to the establishment of two representative offices, both with official authority. Zhang Nianshi does not speak for the Beijing government. But his logic is consistent with cross-Strait thinking in recent years. One may wrack one's brains. But probably nothing besides "one country, two governments" thinking can establish a "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." This newspaper's "big roof concept of China" is just this sort of thinking. Either "one country, two governments" or a "big roof concept of China" can be regarded as a "reasonable interim political structure".
Lee Teng-hui advocated the "National Unification Guidelines." Chen Shui-bian advocated the "Five Noes." Beijing forced them back into the Taiwan independence fold. Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy is "one China, different interpretations." It is "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It is "One China is the Republic of China." It is the rejection of "one China, one Taiwan," and the rejection of "Taiwan independence." This represents the current state of public opinion on Taiwan. Beijing must cherish this hard-won cross-strait consensus. It must take this success and apply "one country, two governments" or "big roof concept of China" thinking to it. In the coming "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified" this can be made explicit. This would protect this hard-won result. We must not end up with neither "reunification" nor "fair and reasonable framework for cross-Strait political relations, under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
Ma Ying-jeou has only three years left in his second and final term. When it comes to the conduct of cross-strait policy, to its upgrading and innovation, Ma Ying-jeou must realize that time is fleeting. Beijing must also be aware of the fleeting historical opportunity. It must not complain only that Ma Ying-jeou is not sufficiently pro-reunification. It must realize that the two sides' "yet to be reunified" status is a more pressing issue than "reunification."
機遇稍縱即逝 兩岸思酌建立中程政治架構
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.05.20 02:14 am
歲月如馳，馬英九總統在未來三年任期中，面對千頭萬緒的內外難題，或許已有時不我與的緊迫感；其實，對岸的北京政府，面對這段自二○○八年出現的兩岸歷史機遇之漸趨消磨，恐怕亦生好景不常的警惕。
眾所皆知，兩岸這段珍貴機遇是自馬英九二○○八年當選總統而確立；同樣亦有目共睹的是，這段機緣不無可能在二○一六年因國民黨的敗選而畫下句點。
國民黨若在二○一六敗選，如本系列社論前文所述，主要可能是因經濟未能改善及儼如土石流一般的歷史擠兌未能解決使然。但是，這一段經連戰、馬英九及胡錦濤、習近平所共同經營的兩岸機遇，其成就卻是舉世共見的；國民黨即使在二○一六年敗選，應亦不能解釋為敗於兩岸政策；換句話說，國民黨即使在二○一六敗選，兩岸亦不可使雙方所累積的成就即此化作烏有，而令兩岸再又墜入另一次的煉獄輪迴。
因此，兩岸當局應當共同珍惜馬英九的最後三年任期，務期趁此在兩岸關係上建立一個更加穩固且可長可久的架構，要穩固到不會受二○一六的任何變數所動搖的地步。此一架構即是中共十八大政治報告所說：「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排。」相對於中華民國憲法增修條文的精神意涵，此一架構亦可稱作：「為因應國家統一前之需要的兩岸政治架構。」以上二者，皆可說是一個「中程政治架構」。
北京近年來的政策焦點能從「統一」轉移至「尚未統一的政治關係」，這是極大的突破與超越；也使兩岸得以從「目的論」的困局中，走向「和平發展」的「過程論」。胡錦濤始終主張《和平協議》，應當即是反映出已然認知「統一不易」，而欲藉《和平協議》，來建立「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」，此即一種「中程思考」；但是由於北京方面始終未提出一個「合情合理的安排」之架構，致使馬英九方面在顧忌民意反彈之下不願迎對。
兩岸其實均確知，事到如今，必須建立一「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的兩岸政治關係」，否則北京扛著「統一」的包袱，台灣懷著「統一」的憂懼，「統一」反而成了兩岸穩固與提升政治關係的障礙。而《和平協議》既已擱淺，即應設法找到一個可以替代《和平協議》的機制，用以建構「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的兩岸政治關係」，而此一機制應當就是兩岸正在議商的互設辦事處。
上海東亞研究所所長章念馳最近表示，兩岸互設辦事處即是按照「一國兩府」的架構進行；如果不承認「一國兩府」就不會同意互設代表雙方公權力的辦事處。章念馳所述雖非官方說法，卻是對於近年來兩岸思維演化的一個符合邏輯且能證諸事實的論證。而窮盡思考，恐怕也想不出除了「一國兩府」之類的思維，還有什麼機制能夠體現「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的兩岸政治關係」之架構，本報所倡「大屋頂中國」亦可歸屬此類。亦即，「一國兩府」或「大屋頂中國」之屬，皆可視作一種「合情合理的中程政治架構」。
北京曾將主張《國統綱領》的李登輝，及主張「四不一沒有」的陳水扁，逼回到台獨的牆角。如今，馬英九已將兩岸政策帶到「一個中國／各自表述」、「不統／不獨／不武」、「一個中國就是中華民國」、「不推兩個中國、一中一台、台灣獨立」的位置，這已是現階段台灣民意的極致；如果北京尚知珍惜此一得來不易的兩岸共同成果，即應努力將此一成果，透過「一國兩府」或「大屋頂中國」之類的思維，進階內建於「尚未統一特殊情況下合情合理的政治關係架構」之上，而在未來的《兩岸互設辦事處協議》作出明文體現，以保全此一辛苦果實；不要最後落得不但沒有「統一」，也沒有了「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」。
馬英九僅剩三年任期，在兩岸政策的開展、升級與創新上，馬英九應知珍惜光陰，北京也要有歷史機遇一去即不再有的警惕。不要只嫌馬英九不夠「統」，應知「尚未統一」是一個比「統一」更應妥適處理的課題。
Thursday, May 16, 2013
Rationality is not Weakness, Present a United Front
Rationality is not Weakness, Present a United Front
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 17, 2013
Summary: President Ma has "institutionalized cross-Strait reconciliation." He sees it as the "first line of defense" in our national security strategy. The Philippines provocation showed that threats to our security do not come only from the Mainland, as many would imagine. Mainland policy and foreign policy complement each other. The Ma administration must continue to reconcile with the Mainland. It must cash in on the cross-Strait "peace dividend." It must use it to strengthen our hand in foreign diplomatic negotiations and foreign military conflicts.
Full Text below:
For shooting up a Taiwanese fishing vessel and killing a Taiwanese fisherman, President Ma Ying-jeou issued the Philippines an ultimatum. Seventy-two hours later, the Philippines attitude noticeably softened. It dispatched an envoy to Taiwan to confer. He appeared alongside a presidential spokesman, and read aloud a statement of "regret and apology." But the statement lacked sincerity. Therefore the Ma administration decided to impose additional sanctions on the Philippines. It imposed a freeze on Filipino workers applying for work on Taiwan. First it recalled its representative to the Philippines. Then it demanded that the Philippines representatives leave Taiwan. It then imposed additional sanctions. We support the government's position. We believe the government's decision was the result of a rational decision-making process.
Being rational does not mean showing weakness. The label of "cowardly" was attached to the Ma administration by its critics, because amidst seething mob sentiment, the Ma administration delayed "getting tough."
War and peace are major issues in the life of a nation. Should a government get tough or remain pliable? Should it declare war or seek accomodation? The criterion must be the interests of the nation as a whole. The Republic of China is in a difficult situation. The incident showed us how hard it is to make a living from the sea. It also reflected the frustration of the general public over the Republic of China's continually shrinking breathing space. Think about it. The Philippines government had the temerity to harass our fishing vessels. During this incident it behaved even more high-handedly. We were "easy pickings." The Philppines saw that "weak states have no diplomacy." Such is realpolitik.
The Ma administration's crisis management during this incident was far from perfect. But it was passable. As Mao Zedong put it, "Unless one has conducted an investigation, one has no right to speak." The government decided to take action only after it conducted a comprehensive analysis of the situation. It arrived at judgments about the facts, values, and consequences, only after a rational decision-making process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was nearly struck by a stray bullet. We should offer it encouragement. Diplomacy is the art of negotiation. Until all hope is lost, never give up on peace. The ministry staff burned the midnight oil to avoid escalating the conflict.
The public demonstrated solidarity during the incident. It too should give itself a pat on the back. As Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu said a few days ago, "This incident concerned national security and national dignity. One must remain non-partisan and of one mind. One must support the central government in its political, economic, and other sanctions against the Philippines."
We hope this incident will transform a crisis into an opportunity. We hope it will promote a sense of shared destiny. We hope the unity it inspired will become the cornerstone of a "Taiwan consensus."
The "Taiwan consensus" was an important plank in former DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's presidential campaign platform. Her hope was it would displace the KMT Ma Wu camp's "1992 Consensus." But as we all know, the "Taiwan consensus" and the "1992 Consensus" are not comparable. They cannot replace each other. Tsai Ing-wen lost. That does not invalidate what she said. We must not neglect the need for a "Taiwan consensus." The Taiwan Region of the Republic of China has long lacked an internal consensus regarding its core values and the national interest. As a result internal politics have not become an asset when the government implements foreign policy. It has become instead a liability, and the nation's prime source of internal friction. Professor Samuel P. Huntington once noted that "National interests derive from national identity." This national identity crisis is an Achilles heel that erodes the the vitality of the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China.
The Philippines committed an act of foreign aggression. We hope this external threat will transform a long-hidden internal problem. Before others can humiliate an individual, an individual must humiliate himself. Before others can destroy a family, a family must first destroy itself. Does anyone really think the Philippines failed to perceive our internal weakness?
Finally, the government must learn from its mistakes. It must learn to be more aggressive in order to make a difference. President Ma says he "does not think the current conflict is a state of war." We respect his judgment. But in The Art of War, Sunzi wrote, "Do not hope that the enemy will not come. Instead, be ready to receive him." Those in power must ask themselves whether they wish to be prepared for danger in times of peace. If so, they must prepare for the possibility of military conflict. President Ma sees himself as a peacemaker. His "East China Sea Peace Initiative" has been affirmed by the international community. It has also secured the interests of our own fishermen at home. But real world power is the basis of peaceful negotiation. The fruits of peace must sometimes be won at the price of war.
East China Sea issues remain unresolved. South China Sea issues have also flared up. The Philippines departed from civilized behavior. Is it even possible to "set aside differences in order to jointly develop the region's resources?" This is a question worth pondering.
In response to the conflict, the government should conduct a comprehensieve review of its perimeter security. It should make the appropriate strategic policy decisions. President Ma has "institutionalized cross-Strait reconciliation." He sees it as the "first line of defense" in our national security strategy. The Philippines provocation showed that threats to our security do not come only from the Mainland, as many would imagine. Mainland policy and foreign policy complement each other. The Ma administration must continue to reconcile with the Mainland. It must cash in on the cross-Strait "peace dividend." It must use it to strengthen our hand in foreign diplomatic negotiations and foreign military conflicts.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.05.17
社論－理性不是示弱 團結才能禦侮
本報訊
在馬英九總統對菲國「毀船殺人」罪行下達七十二小時最後通牒令後，雖然菲國的態度已顯軟化，不但遣使來台斡旋，並由總統府發言人出面，宣讀了一段表達「遺憾和道歉」的聲明；但因誠意不足，馬政府已決定升高對菲律賓的制裁行動。繼第一波的凍結菲勞申請、召回駐菲大使和要求菲國駐華代表離台後，並決定啟動第二波的反制措施。我們支持政府的立場，也相信政府的決定，是經過一個理性的決策過程。
理性不代表懦弱，而「懦弱」正是外界在這次事件中為馬政府貼上的「標籤」。因為，在群情激憤之下，馬政府並沒有在第一時間「硬起來」。
戰爭與和平是攸關國家生存的重大問題。是硬？是軟？是戰？是和？要以國家利益作為取捨標準。中華民國的處境非常艱困。在這次事件中，我們深切體會到「討海人」的辛酸；而某種程度上，這不也反映出一般民眾對中華民國生存空間不斷受到擠壓的無奈。試想，菲律賓政府膽敢三番五次地騷擾我國漁船。在這次事件發生後，又表現的如此狂妄自大，其實還不是「柿子挑軟的捏」，看準了「弱國無外交」這個國際現實。
馬政府這次的危機處理，表現雖不滿意，但卻可以接受。借用毛澤東的一句話，「沒有調查就沒有發言權」。政府全盤分析形勢後再決定採取行動，應該符合事實判斷、價值判斷和後果判斷的決策研究途徑。另外，外交部門因職責所在，幾乎被這次事件的「流彈」所傷。對此，我們也有必要為他們加油打氣。外交是談判的藝術，所謂「和平不到絕望時期，絕不放棄和平」，外交工作人員挑燈夜戰，就是為了避免升高衝突。
對於國人在這次事件中表現的團結一致，我們也應自我肯定一番。尤其肯定高雄市長陳菊日前所說，「此事關係到國人安全與國家尊嚴，必須不分黨派，上下一心，支持中央政府對菲律賓採取政治、經濟等各方面的措施與制裁。」
我們期待這次事件，能提供國人化危機為契機，形成「命運共同體」的動力。讓大家把團結作為建立「台灣共識」的基礎！
「台灣共識」是民進黨前主席蔡英文在去年總統大選時提出的重要政見，用意在取代國民黨馬吳陣營主張的「九二共識」。但眾所周知，「台灣共識」與「九二共識」內涵不同，無法相提並論，甚至取而代之。蔡英文最後雖然敗選，但我們不能因人廢言，忽視建立「台灣共識」的重要性。例如，台灣內部長久以來，即對國家利益的核心價值，嚴重缺乏共識。影響所及，內政不但不能成為政府實施對外政策的資產，反而變成導致國家不斷內耗的負債。杭庭頓（Samuel P. Huntington）教授曾經指出：「國家利益源自於國家認同」。而國家認同危機正是台灣內部的一個「阿奇里斯的足踝」，它不斷地在腐蝕台灣的生命力。
我們期待因為面對這次菲律賓製造的「外患」，能轉而消除我們潛藏已久的「內憂」。所謂「人必自侮而後人侮之，家必自毀而後人毀之」，菲律賓難道不是看透了我們內部的弱點。
最後，政府在痛定思痛之餘，應思如何積極有所作為。雖然，我們尊重馬總統的判斷，「不認為現在的衝突是一個戰爭的狀態」；但兵法有云：「無恃其不來，恃吾有以待之。」執政者應自問，是否居安思危，作好軍事衝突的準備。馬總統以「和平締造者」自我期許，提出的「東海和平倡議」，不但得到國際社會的支持，並且為國內漁民爭取到重大的權益。但實力是談判的後盾，爭取和平的果實，有時候必須被迫付出戰爭的代價。
東海問題懸而未決，南海問題也將甚囂塵上。對待像菲律賓這樣遠離現代文明軌道的國家，能否採取「擱置爭議，共同開發」的相同標準？這是一個值得思考的問題。
針對這次衝突事件，我們認為政府應就台灣面對的周邊安全形勢，進行全盤性的分析和檢討，並因應形勢，作出適當的戰略和策略選擇。馬總統把「兩岸和解制度化」視為國家安全戰略的「第一道防線」。這次菲律賓的挑釁舉動顯示，台灣的安全威脅來源並不止於一般人印像中的對岸而已。基於大陸政策和外交政策相輔相成的功能，馬政府除了持續與大陸和解外，也應思考如何讓兩岸取得的「和平紅利」，成為處理外交和對外軍事衝突的助力。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 17, 2013
Summary: President Ma has "institutionalized cross-Strait reconciliation." He sees it as the "first line of defense" in our national security strategy. The Philippines provocation showed that threats to our security do not come only from the Mainland, as many would imagine. Mainland policy and foreign policy complement each other. The Ma administration must continue to reconcile with the Mainland. It must cash in on the cross-Strait "peace dividend." It must use it to strengthen our hand in foreign diplomatic negotiations and foreign military conflicts.
Full Text below:
For shooting up a Taiwanese fishing vessel and killing a Taiwanese fisherman, President Ma Ying-jeou issued the Philippines an ultimatum. Seventy-two hours later, the Philippines attitude noticeably softened. It dispatched an envoy to Taiwan to confer. He appeared alongside a presidential spokesman, and read aloud a statement of "regret and apology." But the statement lacked sincerity. Therefore the Ma administration decided to impose additional sanctions on the Philippines. It imposed a freeze on Filipino workers applying for work on Taiwan. First it recalled its representative to the Philippines. Then it demanded that the Philippines representatives leave Taiwan. It then imposed additional sanctions. We support the government's position. We believe the government's decision was the result of a rational decision-making process.
Being rational does not mean showing weakness. The label of "cowardly" was attached to the Ma administration by its critics, because amidst seething mob sentiment, the Ma administration delayed "getting tough."
War and peace are major issues in the life of a nation. Should a government get tough or remain pliable? Should it declare war or seek accomodation? The criterion must be the interests of the nation as a whole. The Republic of China is in a difficult situation. The incident showed us how hard it is to make a living from the sea. It also reflected the frustration of the general public over the Republic of China's continually shrinking breathing space. Think about it. The Philippines government had the temerity to harass our fishing vessels. During this incident it behaved even more high-handedly. We were "easy pickings." The Philppines saw that "weak states have no diplomacy." Such is realpolitik.
The Ma administration's crisis management during this incident was far from perfect. But it was passable. As Mao Zedong put it, "Unless one has conducted an investigation, one has no right to speak." The government decided to take action only after it conducted a comprehensive analysis of the situation. It arrived at judgments about the facts, values, and consequences, only after a rational decision-making process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was nearly struck by a stray bullet. We should offer it encouragement. Diplomacy is the art of negotiation. Until all hope is lost, never give up on peace. The ministry staff burned the midnight oil to avoid escalating the conflict.
The public demonstrated solidarity during the incident. It too should give itself a pat on the back. As Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu said a few days ago, "This incident concerned national security and national dignity. One must remain non-partisan and of one mind. One must support the central government in its political, economic, and other sanctions against the Philippines."
We hope this incident will transform a crisis into an opportunity. We hope it will promote a sense of shared destiny. We hope the unity it inspired will become the cornerstone of a "Taiwan consensus."
The "Taiwan consensus" was an important plank in former DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's presidential campaign platform. Her hope was it would displace the KMT Ma Wu camp's "1992 Consensus." But as we all know, the "Taiwan consensus" and the "1992 Consensus" are not comparable. They cannot replace each other. Tsai Ing-wen lost. That does not invalidate what she said. We must not neglect the need for a "Taiwan consensus." The Taiwan Region of the Republic of China has long lacked an internal consensus regarding its core values and the national interest. As a result internal politics have not become an asset when the government implements foreign policy. It has become instead a liability, and the nation's prime source of internal friction. Professor Samuel P. Huntington once noted that "National interests derive from national identity." This national identity crisis is an Achilles heel that erodes the the vitality of the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China.
The Philippines committed an act of foreign aggression. We hope this external threat will transform a long-hidden internal problem. Before others can humiliate an individual, an individual must humiliate himself. Before others can destroy a family, a family must first destroy itself. Does anyone really think the Philippines failed to perceive our internal weakness?
Finally, the government must learn from its mistakes. It must learn to be more aggressive in order to make a difference. President Ma says he "does not think the current conflict is a state of war." We respect his judgment. But in The Art of War, Sunzi wrote, "Do not hope that the enemy will not come. Instead, be ready to receive him." Those in power must ask themselves whether they wish to be prepared for danger in times of peace. If so, they must prepare for the possibility of military conflict. President Ma sees himself as a peacemaker. His "East China Sea Peace Initiative" has been affirmed by the international community. It has also secured the interests of our own fishermen at home. But real world power is the basis of peaceful negotiation. The fruits of peace must sometimes be won at the price of war.
East China Sea issues remain unresolved. South China Sea issues have also flared up. The Philippines departed from civilized behavior. Is it even possible to "set aside differences in order to jointly develop the region's resources?" This is a question worth pondering.
In response to the conflict, the government should conduct a comprehensieve review of its perimeter security. It should make the appropriate strategic policy decisions. President Ma has "institutionalized cross-Strait reconciliation." He sees it as the "first line of defense" in our national security strategy. The Philippines provocation showed that threats to our security do not come only from the Mainland, as many would imagine. Mainland policy and foreign policy complement each other. The Ma administration must continue to reconcile with the Mainland. It must cash in on the cross-Strait "peace dividend." It must use it to strengthen our hand in foreign diplomatic negotiations and foreign military conflicts.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.05.17
社論－理性不是示弱 團結才能禦侮
本報訊
在馬英九總統對菲國「毀船殺人」罪行下達七十二小時最後通牒令後，雖然菲國的態度已顯軟化，不但遣使來台斡旋，並由總統府發言人出面，宣讀了一段表達「遺憾和道歉」的聲明；但因誠意不足，馬政府已決定升高對菲律賓的制裁行動。繼第一波的凍結菲勞申請、召回駐菲大使和要求菲國駐華代表離台後，並決定啟動第二波的反制措施。我們支持政府的立場，也相信政府的決定，是經過一個理性的決策過程。
理性不代表懦弱，而「懦弱」正是外界在這次事件中為馬政府貼上的「標籤」。因為，在群情激憤之下，馬政府並沒有在第一時間「硬起來」。
戰爭與和平是攸關國家生存的重大問題。是硬？是軟？是戰？是和？要以國家利益作為取捨標準。中華民國的處境非常艱困。在這次事件中，我們深切體會到「討海人」的辛酸；而某種程度上，這不也反映出一般民眾對中華民國生存空間不斷受到擠壓的無奈。試想，菲律賓政府膽敢三番五次地騷擾我國漁船。在這次事件發生後，又表現的如此狂妄自大，其實還不是「柿子挑軟的捏」，看準了「弱國無外交」這個國際現實。
馬政府這次的危機處理，表現雖不滿意，但卻可以接受。借用毛澤東的一句話，「沒有調查就沒有發言權」。政府全盤分析形勢後再決定採取行動，應該符合事實判斷、價值判斷和後果判斷的決策研究途徑。另外，外交部門因職責所在，幾乎被這次事件的「流彈」所傷。對此，我們也有必要為他們加油打氣。外交是談判的藝術，所謂「和平不到絕望時期，絕不放棄和平」，外交工作人員挑燈夜戰，就是為了避免升高衝突。
對於國人在這次事件中表現的團結一致，我們也應自我肯定一番。尤其肯定高雄市長陳菊日前所說，「此事關係到國人安全與國家尊嚴，必須不分黨派，上下一心，支持中央政府對菲律賓採取政治、經濟等各方面的措施與制裁。」
我們期待這次事件，能提供國人化危機為契機，形成「命運共同體」的動力。讓大家把團結作為建立「台灣共識」的基礎！
「台灣共識」是民進黨前主席蔡英文在去年總統大選時提出的重要政見，用意在取代國民黨馬吳陣營主張的「九二共識」。但眾所周知，「台灣共識」與「九二共識」內涵不同，無法相提並論，甚至取而代之。蔡英文最後雖然敗選，但我們不能因人廢言，忽視建立「台灣共識」的重要性。例如，台灣內部長久以來，即對國家利益的核心價值，嚴重缺乏共識。影響所及，內政不但不能成為政府實施對外政策的資產，反而變成導致國家不斷內耗的負債。杭庭頓（Samuel P. Huntington）教授曾經指出：「國家利益源自於國家認同」。而國家認同危機正是台灣內部的一個「阿奇里斯的足踝」，它不斷地在腐蝕台灣的生命力。
我們期待因為面對這次菲律賓製造的「外患」，能轉而消除我們潛藏已久的「內憂」。所謂「人必自侮而後人侮之，家必自毀而後人毀之」，菲律賓難道不是看透了我們內部的弱點。
最後，政府在痛定思痛之餘，應思如何積極有所作為。雖然，我們尊重馬總統的判斷，「不認為現在的衝突是一個戰爭的狀態」；但兵法有云：「無恃其不來，恃吾有以待之。」執政者應自問，是否居安思危，作好軍事衝突的準備。馬總統以「和平締造者」自我期許，提出的「東海和平倡議」，不但得到國際社會的支持，並且為國內漁民爭取到重大的權益。但實力是談判的後盾，爭取和平的果實，有時候必須被迫付出戰爭的代價。
東海問題懸而未決，南海問題也將甚囂塵上。對待像菲律賓這樣遠離現代文明軌道的國家，能否採取「擱置爭議，共同開發」的相同標準？這是一個值得思考的問題。
針對這次衝突事件，我們認為政府應就台灣面對的周邊安全形勢，進行全盤性的分析和檢討，並因應形勢，作出適當的戰略和策略選擇。馬總統把「兩岸和解制度化」視為國家安全戰略的「第一道防線」。這次菲律賓的挑釁舉動顯示，台灣的安全威脅來源並不止於一般人印像中的對岸而已。基於大陸政策和外交政策相輔相成的功能，馬政府除了持續與大陸和解外，也應思考如何讓兩岸取得的「和平紅利」，成為處理外交和對外軍事衝突的助力。
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)