Kai-fu Lee Addresses TISA and the Need for Large Markets
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
November 1, 2013
Summary: Tech sector celebrity Kai-fu Lee is about to undergo chemotherapy. He compared his to the illness that has overtaken Taiwan's high-tech industries. He issued a warning about Taiwan's sick economy, Taiwan's economy must expand outward. In order to do so, it must expand into the Mainland market. Taiwan must recognize reality. It must seize every opportunity to expand outward. Only then can it breath new life into its nearly suffocated economy.
Full text below:
Tech sector celebrity Kai-fu Lee is about to undergo chemotherapy. He compared his to the illness that has overtaken Taiwan's high-tech industries. He issued a warning about Taiwan's sick economy, We wish him a speedy recovery. The high-tech industry is indeed sick. Taiwan's economy is indeed sick. But does the public understand where the problem lies? Does it know whether the sickness is being given proper treatment? Does it know whether the right medicine has been prescribed? We are deeply concerned.
Kai-fu Lee believes that "Taiwan entrepreneurs who hope to found Internet and software empires, must seek large markets." Only large markets will enable one to create large companies. Large markets can be found in the United States, Mainland China, or Southeast Asia, But not on the Taiwan, which is simply too small. "Small markets cannot create large companies." Lee said that when the United States talks about Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, facebook, and Twitter, Taiwan harps on TSMC, Hon Hai or MediaTek. These old line companies are solid companies. But when it comes to innovation, market scale, market listing, international connectedness, and international participation, they have much room for improvement.
Kai-fu Lee was born and raised on Taiwan. He emigrated to the U.S. during high school. He was educated in American universities and attended American graduate schools. He was an executive at Apple, Microsoft, Google and other important companies. He worked at length on Mainland China. He has commented on current affairs and become an influential blogger. His breadth of vision has enabled him to zero in on Taiwan's plight. He has prescribed seven cures for what ails Taiwan. These provide an antidote to what ails Taiwan's business environment. But entrepreneurial problems are not the most urgent ones. First of all, one must have a grand strategy. Only that will enable Taiwan to expand outward. Only that will ensure a healthy business environment. Only that will enable Mr. Lee's cure to take effect. Consider the most serious problem bedeviling Taiwan -- its economy is being suffocated. That is why it cannot expand outward.
We are proud of our high-tech industries because they were able to expand outward. They were able to compete on the international stage. They were able to market their products all over the world. But Taiwan missed the software and cell phone revolutions. We took the expedient route. We blindly pursued cost savings. We created economic efficiency. But in recent years, the U.S. financial crisis and European debt crisis have greatly reduced their purchasing power. Taiwan based desktop computer and laptop manufacturers' profits are now flat. Mobile phone market share has been nibbled away. We are not a player in the new wearable watch phones and glasses phones market. Taiwan has no new large scale investments. Foreign businesses look at the Taiwan market and see paper thin profit margins and uninspired products. They can't wait to pull out. let alone make new investments. Taiwan is now at the bottom of the list of Asian countries in foreign direct investment (FDI).
Taiwan's business model must change. High-tech industries must take on all market sectors, not just the easy ones. Products and services must link up. Can it be done? IBM (International Business Machines) was originally a company that sold machines. It successfully transitioned to a company that sells services. As we can see, high-tech industries alone are not enough to rescue Taiwan's economy. High-tech industries on Taiwan create limited employment opportunities. Taiwan's service sector accounts for 68% of its total output. It provides a large number of jobs. This is consistent with modern economic trends. Therefore Taiwan's service industries must take on this challenge. To thrive they must expand outward.
This is why TISA is so important to Taiwan. In a software and mobile computing era, culture and services are key. E-commerce, information services, games, and the cultural and creative industries are all affected. Taiwan has a limited market -- only 23 million people. For the service sector, this market is even smaller. Only large markets can produce large companies. The Mainland already has two Internet companies worth over 100 billion -- Tencent and Alibaba. Taiwan's Yam and PC Home have not been able to expand outward. Taiwan needs to understand that TISA is a golden opportunity to enter the Mainland market. The Mainland market is vastly larger than the Taiwan market. For Taiwan's service industry this is a huge opportunity. TISA affects these industries. Other industries, including finance, environmental protection, logistics and transportion will also benefit.
Obviously TISA is beneficial to Taiwan. Yet many still oppose it. There are a number of reasons why. They include the Ma administration's poor communication skills, and the fact that it completed negotiations without notifying the legislature. The private sector raised questions. The Speaker and the Legislative Yuan refused to support it. Their attitude became imprinted in the hearts and minds of the public. Relentless sniping by opponents may have been ridiculous. But by then allaying public concerns had already become a Herculean effort. Hence today's predicament.
Taiwan must stop and think. If TISA were renegotiated today, does anyone really believe the terms would be better than they are already? The government assures us there are no national security issues, and that TISA is not a CCP "Trojan horse." Unless one doubts this, how is TISA not a windfall for Taiwan? If we pick TISA apart, if we hedge our bets, half accepting and half rejecting it, we will become an international laughing stock. Further delay will be Taiwan's loss. South Korea and the Mainland will soon sign an FTA. South Korean products will receive preferential tariff treatment in the Mainland market, as will services. Can Taiwan really afford to fritter away this opportunity?
Taiwan's economy must expand outward. In order to do so, it must expand into the Mainland market. Taiwan must recognize reality. It must seize every opportunity to expand outward. Only then can it breath new life into its nearly suffocated economy.
社論－從李開復「大市場」談服貿協議
2013-11-01 01:37
中國時報
本報訊
科技界名人李開復在接受化療前夕，引自己的病談台灣高科技產業之病，並對台灣經濟的病提出了諍言，我們衷心祝福他早日康復。只是高科技產業的病、台灣經濟的病，社會知道不知道問題所在？有沒有開始治療？能否對症下藥？我們深感疑慮。
李開復認為，「台灣創業者如果想在網路、軟體領域走出去，一定要找出大市場。」因為大市場才能孵化出大公司，這個大市場可以是美國、大陸或東南亞，只看台灣市場絕對做不大，「小市場不可能成就偉大的公司」。他又說，當美國都在談微軟、谷歌、雅虎、facebook、Twitter時，台灣還是不斷談台積電、鴻海或聯發科。這些老牌公司都是好公司，但若要談創新，在市場規模、上市規則、國際接軌、註冊條款等部分，都有許多改善空間。
李開復在台灣出生、成長，中學時移民美國，接受美國大學、研究所教育，擔任過蘋果、微軟、谷歌等公司的重要負責人，並在大陸長期工作，因批評時政而成為微博有影響力的大V。眼界之廣，更一語道破台灣的困境。他開給台灣的7帖藥方，的確是台灣創業環境問題的解藥。但就急迫性而言，創業的問題還在其次，如果沒有更大的戰略，更高的格局讓台灣走出去，就不會有好的創業環境，李先生的藥石就罔效。我們先看一下，現在台灣經濟的大問題，就是「悶經濟」，就是走不出去的問題。
我們引以為傲的高科技產業，是「走出去」的成果，可以在國際舞台上爭奪全世界的訂單，但台灣錯過了軟體、行動的革命。我們吃軟不吃硬，一味在生產上追求成本的節約，也創造效率經濟的表率。可是近年因為美國金融海嘯、歐洲債務危機，其購買力、有效需求都大大減少。加上傳統台灣擅長的桌上型電腦、筆電，都逐漸地被平板、手機蠶食鯨吞，最近新的穿戴型手表手機、眼鏡手機，我們又都沒有份。台灣自己沒有新的大投資，外商看到台灣市場的低利潤，產品又缺乏前瞻性，撤退都來不及了，遑論新的投資。台灣淪為外人直接投資（FDI）在亞洲墊底的國家。
台灣的商業模式要改弦易轍。高科技業者要軟硬通吃，要將產品與服務連結起來。能不能做到？IBM（國際商業機器公司）就是一個從賣機器，轉型成功到現在是賣服務公司的例子。另外，我們也看到，只靠高科技產業並不足以解救台灣經濟，因為高科技產業，在台灣能夠創造的就業機會相當有限。台灣的服務業已經占整體產值的68％，能夠提供大量就業的其實是服務業。這也完全符合現代經濟發展的軌跡。因此台灣的服務業，要擔當此重任，要成長茁壯，更要走出去。
準此，服貿協議對台灣就太重要了。在軟體、行動革命的時代，文化、服務就是其關鍵元素，電子商務、資訊服務業，乃至遊戲、文創產業都大大的受其影響。台灣只有2300萬人的市場，以服務業而言更是淺碟子市場，大市場才能孵化出大公司。就像大陸已經有兩家千億起跳的網路公司（騰訊、阿里巴巴），但台灣的蕃薯藤、網家集團（PC Home）卻一直走不出去。台灣應該掌握服貿協議讓台灣進軍大陸的機會。大陸市場規模遠大於台灣，對於台灣服務業來說是個大機會。除了上述產業受影響，在服貿協議中金融、環保、物流與運輸，也是台灣受惠產業。
明明服貿協議是對台灣有利的，但仍有許多人反對。究其原因，行政單位溝通不良，談判過程沒有事先完整照會立法院，第一時間民間的質疑，立院諸公及國會議長卻不肯表示支持，避之唯恐不及的態度已烙印在人民心中。而後種種的見縫插針及某些反對者的作秀演出，雖然不值識者一笑，但百倍功夫也難化解民眾疑慮，終於造成今天的困境。
台灣應該靜下心來仔細思考，服貿協議如果重談，是否會談得比現在還好？如果相信政府信誓旦旦的保證沒有國安問題，也不是中共的「屠城木馬」，服貿協議還會不利於台灣嗎？如果服貿協議逐條意見一堆，半接受、半不接受，到時會不會在國際上形成笑話？延宕之下，對台灣是不是損失？韓國即將與中國大陸簽訂FTA，不但貨物商品將獲得關稅優惠，服務業也將長驅直入大陸市場，台灣還可以再蹉跎嗎？
台灣經濟要走入世界，得先進入中國大陸，台灣要認清現實，抓住可以讓台灣走出去的每一個機會，才能改善悶經濟。
Thursday, October 31, 2013
Wednesday, October 30, 2013
Do Not Allow DPP Sinophobia to Hijack Taiwan's Economy
Do Not Allow DPP Sinophobia to Hijack Taiwan's Economy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 31, 2013
Summary: Taiwan is not some remote Shangrila. It cannot remain aloof to global competition and political realities. Preventing free trade with the Mainland means preventing the establishment of FTAs between Taiwan and the global economy. The reactionary and Sinophobic Democratic Progressive Party cannot lead Taiwan during the current wave of globalization. How can we possibly allow the DPP to hijack Taiwan's economy and lead us to ruin?
Full text below:
The day before yesterday the legislature swiftly passed the Taiwan New Zealand Economic Partnership Agreement (ANZTEC) and amended the Trade Law. Ruling and opposition party legislators agreed that the law should go into effect as soon as possible. They agreed to amend the Customs Import Tariff next Tuesday during its third reading. This shows that TISA was stalled in the Legislative Yuan because the Legislative Yuan refused to act, and not because it could not act. TISA took an excruciatingly long time to pass.
The Mainland Region is Taiwan's largest trading partner. In 2012, bilateral trade reached $160 billion. New Zealand is our 10th largest trading partner. Taiwan New Zealand trade last year amounted to 12 billion NT, only 10% of cross-Strait trade. New Zealand's main exports to Taiwan are agricultural products. They have a greater impact on our agriculture. In today's Legislative Yuan, the DPP has the final word. Alas, the DPP's attitude toward the Taiwan New Zealand Economic Cooperation Agreement and the highly advantageous TISA has been mindlessly Sinophobic. Some DPP officials are enthusiastic. They are trying to improve relations with the Mainland. But the essence of the DPP has not changed since the Chen Shui-bian era. The DPP would rather starve to death than end its enmity with Mainland China. As long politics trumps economics, Taiwan's economy will find it difficult to survive.
Taiwan's economy is sick. It is on life support. According to Ministry of Economic Affairs and Department of Statistics, Europe and America have bounced back. As a result Taiwan exports grew 2% over last year, better than expected. But among the traditional industries, including machinery and base metals, demand has remained weak. We have traditionally led Korea in machine tool exports to the U.S.. But purchase orders show that in September of this year, our positions were reversed for the first time in history. This was probably due to the impact of the US South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Six ASEAN countries have apparently ordered petroleum products from the Mainland instead of from us. This is probably due to the impact of the Mainland's trade agreements with six ASEAN countries.
Taiwan must swiflty increase its participation in global FTAs. Only then will it be able to compete with South Korea and the Mainland. Zhu Yunpeng, former Chairman of the Insurance Stabilization Fund, has warned that Taiwan and South Korean exports have a 63% overlap. South Korea and the Mainland will sign an FTA next year. This is sure to impact the domestic textile, petrochemical, and semiconductor industries. Korean service industries will also make a major drive into the Mainland market. They have swiftly passed TISA and TIGA. Taiwan may have difficulty maintaining even a 2% growth rate. Mainland "department store king" Wang Heng is the Chairman of the Golden Eagle Group. Wang said Taiwan has lagged behind Singapore and South Korea in signing FTAs with foreign governments. This has led to a decline in Taiwan's imports and exports. Taiwan must be alert to this.
Taiwan is accustomed to being first among the Asian Tigers. Today however, it is first only in unemployment. The public is worried sick. But the politicians persist in their mud slinging. Major bills remain stalled in the legislature while the ruling and opposition parties dither. Demagogues take to the street to denounce the president, oblivious to the fact that political protests merely increase domestic strife and universal anxiety. They do nothing to improve the stifling economic atmosphere. The Ma government lines up economic advisors who paint a rosy pictures. Noted economic advisors on the periphery of government offer clear and logical solutions. But given the realities of politics they are all for naught.
Take TISA for example. The legislature called for 16 public hearings before beginning its review. The KMT has held eight public hearings in short order. The DPP by contrast, has held one public hearing every two weeks. It will take four months to hold them all. The DPP's intention is obvious. It is determined to delay the bill until next year. It wants to make TISA its opening shot in next year's Seven in One Elections. It wants to turn a plain and simple economic and trade agreement into a DPP campaign tool. Taiwan's economy has long been crippled this way by the DPP.
Every year millions of people from Taiwan visit the Mainland, for tourism, education, employment, business, or capital investment. The emigration of people with talent is obvious. Taiwan's spending power has been relocated. Some fear Taiwanese will weary of Mainland tourists if too many are allowed in. Mainland capital is considered as fearsome as a man-eating tiger. Mainland talent is considered just as fearsome because they might steal our childrens' jobs. We no longer have the courage to fight. We expect a life of ease. We want our little pleasures. People overseas with lofty aspirations scramble to make something of themselves. But here on Taiwan, such ambitions have vanished amidst political bickering and confrontation. Our capital and talent have steadily flowed outward. Outside capital and talent meanwhile, have not flowed inward. Taiwan's economy has steadily shrunk. Taiwan's atmosphere has become stifling. Even the little pleasures have become luxuries.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. Does it really not understand the importance of opening Taiwan to the global economy? As Vision Magazine founder Charles Kao said, the global economy may be in an indeterminate state. But the Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have evolved into an economic region rivaling the United States. This represents the "Chinese Century." The world cannot ignore the existence of Mainland China. How can Taiwan remain outside of it, and forsake an advantage that is rightfully ours? Economic opening involves shocks. The Taiwan New Zealand Economic Partnership Agreement will result in shocks. But when the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, the choice is clear. One must welcome competition in order to move forward.
Taiwan has never been afraid of competition. It has only been afraid of not having a stage. In the early years, Taiwan businessmen traveled the world over with only a suitcase in hand, drumming up business. In the early years, Mainland policy was uncertain. Courageous businessmen ventured onto the Mainland to seek their fortunes. They long ago proved that Taiwanese have the courage and determination. Yet the DPP continues to dig its heels in over TISA. It purports to be "protecting Taiwan businesses." In fact, it is doing just the opposite. It is binding them hand and foot.
Taiwan is not some remote Shangrila. It cannot remain aloof to global competition and political realities. Preventing free trade with the Mainland means preventing the establishment of FTAs between Taiwan and the global economy. The reactionary and Sinophobic Democratic Progressive Party cannot lead Taiwan during the current wave of globalization. How can we possibly allow the DPP to hijack Taiwan's economy and lead us to ruin?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.10.31
不容恐中民進黨綁架台灣經濟
本報訊
立法院前天火速通過《台紐經濟合作協定》（ANZTEC）和《貿易法》配套修正案，朝野立委為了讓協定盡速生效，協商確定下周二將三讀通過《海關進口稅則》配套修正案，證明《兩岸服貿協議》在立法院卡關，是立法院不為，而非不能，《服貿協議》果然是「不可承受之慢」。
中國大陸是台灣最大貿易夥伴，2012年雙邊貿易額達1600億美元，紐西蘭是第10大貿易伙伴，台紐去年貿易額為120億元，為兩岸貿易量的10％，紐西蘭主要輸出農業產品，對我農業影響較大。今日立法院「民進黨說了算」，而民進黨在《台紐經合協定》與《兩岸服貿協議》間捨大就小，赤裸裸展現「逢中必反」姿態，我們必須指出，部分民進黨人士雖熱衷登陸，試圖與大陸改善關係，但本質並未改變陳水扁時代「寧餓肚皮誓與中國為敵」的思維，台灣在先政後經政黨勢力干擾下，經濟將很難死裡逃生。
是的，台灣經濟生病了，而且病得嚴重。根據經濟部統計處數據，在歐美景氣回溫情勢下，台灣外銷訂單較去年同期成長2％，表現優於預期。然傳統產業包括機械、基本金屬在內，需求卻仍然疲弱。分析訂單變動情形發現，我工具機在美國進口市占率始終領先韓國，9月卻出現逆轉首次超越我國，可能與美韓自由貿易協定（FTA）生效有關；東協六國油品訂單有由我國轉往中國大陸的跡象，應是受大陸與東協六國貿易協定的衝擊。
台灣必須加速進入全球FTA體系，才有機會與韓國、中國大陸競爭。前政務委員、保險安定基金董事長朱雲鵬曾經警告，台灣與南韓出口產品有63％重疊，南韓明年將和大陸簽署FTA，勢必衝擊國內紡織、石化、半導體等產業，服務業也將大舉進軍大陸市場，不盡速通過《服貿協議》與貨貿協議，台灣經濟成長率可能連「保二」都困難。有大陸百貨王之稱的金鷹集團董事長王恒提醒，台灣與外國簽署FTA的進度落後於新加坡和南韓，造成台灣進出口下滑趨勢，台灣必須警覺。
習慣亞洲四小龍第一地位的台灣，如今只剩下失業率第一，全民陷入焦慮，卻依舊在政治爛泥中打轉，重大法案在國會苦等朝野協商，街頭流行鞋嗆總統，絲毫未察覺政治抗爭只是加重內耗與全民焦慮，無益改善形同窒息的經濟情勢。馬政府一字排開不可謂不亮眼的財經官員、乃至政府外圍的重要財經顧問，講起解決方案頭頭是道，面對政治卻個個一籌莫展。
拿《服貿協議》為例，立法院要求舉辦16場公聽會後才開始逐條審查，國民黨已經密集舉行8場公聽會，民進黨卻2周舉辦1場，得4個月才能完成前置作業，其用心路人皆知，就是要硬拖過今年，把《服貿協議》當成明年七合一選舉的子彈，單純的經貿協議成為民進黨拚選舉的工具。台灣經濟飛毛腿早就被民進黨打成半殘了。
台灣每年有上百萬人次在大陸，不論是觀光、就學、就業或經商，資金、人才外移趨勢明顯，意味台灣消費力的外移；畏懼開放的結果是大陸觀光客來台多了，台灣人嫌煩，講到陸資就像碰到吃人的老虎，講到外來人才就怕搶了子弟的工作機會，我們不再有爭第一的氣魄，卻期望過「小日子」、享受「小確幸」，海洋子民爭逐世界的豪情壯志，早在持續不斷的爭辯與對抗中消磨殆盡，資金、人才不斷流出，外面的資金、人才卻進不來，台灣經濟規模愈壓縮，社會氣氛愈悶，最終連享受小小幸福都成了奢侈。
曾經執政8年的民進黨，豈不知向世界開放對台灣海島型經濟體的重要？誠如《遠見》雜誌創辦人高希均所言，儘管全球經濟處於不確定狀態，但兩岸三地已發展成為僅次美國的經濟實力，可稱為「中華興起」的時代，世界不能無視中國大陸的存在，台灣又豈能自外於原本就該屬於我們的優勢？開放必有衝擊，《台紐經濟合作協定》何嘗沒有衝擊？當利大於弊，如何選擇就非常清楚，只有迎向競爭才能進步。
台灣從來不怕競爭，只怕沒有舞台，不論是早年拎著皮箱全球闖蕩的外銷商，或早在大陸政策環境仍不明朗之際，就勇於登陸闖出一片天的企業主，早已證明台灣人的勇氣與拚勁。民進黨卡住《服貿協議》自以為「保護台灣產業」，卻恰恰相反綁住台商的拚搏幹勁。
台灣不是孤立的世外桃源，不可能免於全球競爭，政治現實下，擋住與大陸的自由貿易進程，就是擋住台灣與全球建立FTA的進程。保守恐中的民進黨不可能帶領台灣衝上這一波全球化浪潮，台灣經濟豈能讓民進黨綁架而至滅頂？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 31, 2013
Summary: Taiwan is not some remote Shangrila. It cannot remain aloof to global competition and political realities. Preventing free trade with the Mainland means preventing the establishment of FTAs between Taiwan and the global economy. The reactionary and Sinophobic Democratic Progressive Party cannot lead Taiwan during the current wave of globalization. How can we possibly allow the DPP to hijack Taiwan's economy and lead us to ruin?
Full text below:
The day before yesterday the legislature swiftly passed the Taiwan New Zealand Economic Partnership Agreement (ANZTEC) and amended the Trade Law. Ruling and opposition party legislators agreed that the law should go into effect as soon as possible. They agreed to amend the Customs Import Tariff next Tuesday during its third reading. This shows that TISA was stalled in the Legislative Yuan because the Legislative Yuan refused to act, and not because it could not act. TISA took an excruciatingly long time to pass.
The Mainland Region is Taiwan's largest trading partner. In 2012, bilateral trade reached $160 billion. New Zealand is our 10th largest trading partner. Taiwan New Zealand trade last year amounted to 12 billion NT, only 10% of cross-Strait trade. New Zealand's main exports to Taiwan are agricultural products. They have a greater impact on our agriculture. In today's Legislative Yuan, the DPP has the final word. Alas, the DPP's attitude toward the Taiwan New Zealand Economic Cooperation Agreement and the highly advantageous TISA has been mindlessly Sinophobic. Some DPP officials are enthusiastic. They are trying to improve relations with the Mainland. But the essence of the DPP has not changed since the Chen Shui-bian era. The DPP would rather starve to death than end its enmity with Mainland China. As long politics trumps economics, Taiwan's economy will find it difficult to survive.
Taiwan's economy is sick. It is on life support. According to Ministry of Economic Affairs and Department of Statistics, Europe and America have bounced back. As a result Taiwan exports grew 2% over last year, better than expected. But among the traditional industries, including machinery and base metals, demand has remained weak. We have traditionally led Korea in machine tool exports to the U.S.. But purchase orders show that in September of this year, our positions were reversed for the first time in history. This was probably due to the impact of the US South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Six ASEAN countries have apparently ordered petroleum products from the Mainland instead of from us. This is probably due to the impact of the Mainland's trade agreements with six ASEAN countries.
Taiwan must swiflty increase its participation in global FTAs. Only then will it be able to compete with South Korea and the Mainland. Zhu Yunpeng, former Chairman of the Insurance Stabilization Fund, has warned that Taiwan and South Korean exports have a 63% overlap. South Korea and the Mainland will sign an FTA next year. This is sure to impact the domestic textile, petrochemical, and semiconductor industries. Korean service industries will also make a major drive into the Mainland market. They have swiftly passed TISA and TIGA. Taiwan may have difficulty maintaining even a 2% growth rate. Mainland "department store king" Wang Heng is the Chairman of the Golden Eagle Group. Wang said Taiwan has lagged behind Singapore and South Korea in signing FTAs with foreign governments. This has led to a decline in Taiwan's imports and exports. Taiwan must be alert to this.
Taiwan is accustomed to being first among the Asian Tigers. Today however, it is first only in unemployment. The public is worried sick. But the politicians persist in their mud slinging. Major bills remain stalled in the legislature while the ruling and opposition parties dither. Demagogues take to the street to denounce the president, oblivious to the fact that political protests merely increase domestic strife and universal anxiety. They do nothing to improve the stifling economic atmosphere. The Ma government lines up economic advisors who paint a rosy pictures. Noted economic advisors on the periphery of government offer clear and logical solutions. But given the realities of politics they are all for naught.
Take TISA for example. The legislature called for 16 public hearings before beginning its review. The KMT has held eight public hearings in short order. The DPP by contrast, has held one public hearing every two weeks. It will take four months to hold them all. The DPP's intention is obvious. It is determined to delay the bill until next year. It wants to make TISA its opening shot in next year's Seven in One Elections. It wants to turn a plain and simple economic and trade agreement into a DPP campaign tool. Taiwan's economy has long been crippled this way by the DPP.
Every year millions of people from Taiwan visit the Mainland, for tourism, education, employment, business, or capital investment. The emigration of people with talent is obvious. Taiwan's spending power has been relocated. Some fear Taiwanese will weary of Mainland tourists if too many are allowed in. Mainland capital is considered as fearsome as a man-eating tiger. Mainland talent is considered just as fearsome because they might steal our childrens' jobs. We no longer have the courage to fight. We expect a life of ease. We want our little pleasures. People overseas with lofty aspirations scramble to make something of themselves. But here on Taiwan, such ambitions have vanished amidst political bickering and confrontation. Our capital and talent have steadily flowed outward. Outside capital and talent meanwhile, have not flowed inward. Taiwan's economy has steadily shrunk. Taiwan's atmosphere has become stifling. Even the little pleasures have become luxuries.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. Does it really not understand the importance of opening Taiwan to the global economy? As Vision Magazine founder Charles Kao said, the global economy may be in an indeterminate state. But the Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have evolved into an economic region rivaling the United States. This represents the "Chinese Century." The world cannot ignore the existence of Mainland China. How can Taiwan remain outside of it, and forsake an advantage that is rightfully ours? Economic opening involves shocks. The Taiwan New Zealand Economic Partnership Agreement will result in shocks. But when the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, the choice is clear. One must welcome competition in order to move forward.
Taiwan has never been afraid of competition. It has only been afraid of not having a stage. In the early years, Taiwan businessmen traveled the world over with only a suitcase in hand, drumming up business. In the early years, Mainland policy was uncertain. Courageous businessmen ventured onto the Mainland to seek their fortunes. They long ago proved that Taiwanese have the courage and determination. Yet the DPP continues to dig its heels in over TISA. It purports to be "protecting Taiwan businesses." In fact, it is doing just the opposite. It is binding them hand and foot.
Taiwan is not some remote Shangrila. It cannot remain aloof to global competition and political realities. Preventing free trade with the Mainland means preventing the establishment of FTAs between Taiwan and the global economy. The reactionary and Sinophobic Democratic Progressive Party cannot lead Taiwan during the current wave of globalization. How can we possibly allow the DPP to hijack Taiwan's economy and lead us to ruin?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.10.31
不容恐中民進黨綁架台灣經濟
本報訊
立法院前天火速通過《台紐經濟合作協定》（ANZTEC）和《貿易法》配套修正案，朝野立委為了讓協定盡速生效，協商確定下周二將三讀通過《海關進口稅則》配套修正案，證明《兩岸服貿協議》在立法院卡關，是立法院不為，而非不能，《服貿協議》果然是「不可承受之慢」。
中國大陸是台灣最大貿易夥伴，2012年雙邊貿易額達1600億美元，紐西蘭是第10大貿易伙伴，台紐去年貿易額為120億元，為兩岸貿易量的10％，紐西蘭主要輸出農業產品，對我農業影響較大。今日立法院「民進黨說了算」，而民進黨在《台紐經合協定》與《兩岸服貿協議》間捨大就小，赤裸裸展現「逢中必反」姿態，我們必須指出，部分民進黨人士雖熱衷登陸，試圖與大陸改善關係，但本質並未改變陳水扁時代「寧餓肚皮誓與中國為敵」的思維，台灣在先政後經政黨勢力干擾下，經濟將很難死裡逃生。
是的，台灣經濟生病了，而且病得嚴重。根據經濟部統計處數據，在歐美景氣回溫情勢下，台灣外銷訂單較去年同期成長2％，表現優於預期。然傳統產業包括機械、基本金屬在內，需求卻仍然疲弱。分析訂單變動情形發現，我工具機在美國進口市占率始終領先韓國，9月卻出現逆轉首次超越我國，可能與美韓自由貿易協定（FTA）生效有關；東協六國油品訂單有由我國轉往中國大陸的跡象，應是受大陸與東協六國貿易協定的衝擊。
台灣必須加速進入全球FTA體系，才有機會與韓國、中國大陸競爭。前政務委員、保險安定基金董事長朱雲鵬曾經警告，台灣與南韓出口產品有63％重疊，南韓明年將和大陸簽署FTA，勢必衝擊國內紡織、石化、半導體等產業，服務業也將大舉進軍大陸市場，不盡速通過《服貿協議》與貨貿協議，台灣經濟成長率可能連「保二」都困難。有大陸百貨王之稱的金鷹集團董事長王恒提醒，台灣與外國簽署FTA的進度落後於新加坡和南韓，造成台灣進出口下滑趨勢，台灣必須警覺。
習慣亞洲四小龍第一地位的台灣，如今只剩下失業率第一，全民陷入焦慮，卻依舊在政治爛泥中打轉，重大法案在國會苦等朝野協商，街頭流行鞋嗆總統，絲毫未察覺政治抗爭只是加重內耗與全民焦慮，無益改善形同窒息的經濟情勢。馬政府一字排開不可謂不亮眼的財經官員、乃至政府外圍的重要財經顧問，講起解決方案頭頭是道，面對政治卻個個一籌莫展。
拿《服貿協議》為例，立法院要求舉辦16場公聽會後才開始逐條審查，國民黨已經密集舉行8場公聽會，民進黨卻2周舉辦1場，得4個月才能完成前置作業，其用心路人皆知，就是要硬拖過今年，把《服貿協議》當成明年七合一選舉的子彈，單純的經貿協議成為民進黨拚選舉的工具。台灣經濟飛毛腿早就被民進黨打成半殘了。
台灣每年有上百萬人次在大陸，不論是觀光、就學、就業或經商，資金、人才外移趨勢明顯，意味台灣消費力的外移；畏懼開放的結果是大陸觀光客來台多了，台灣人嫌煩，講到陸資就像碰到吃人的老虎，講到外來人才就怕搶了子弟的工作機會，我們不再有爭第一的氣魄，卻期望過「小日子」、享受「小確幸」，海洋子民爭逐世界的豪情壯志，早在持續不斷的爭辯與對抗中消磨殆盡，資金、人才不斷流出，外面的資金、人才卻進不來，台灣經濟規模愈壓縮，社會氣氛愈悶，最終連享受小小幸福都成了奢侈。
曾經執政8年的民進黨，豈不知向世界開放對台灣海島型經濟體的重要？誠如《遠見》雜誌創辦人高希均所言，儘管全球經濟處於不確定狀態，但兩岸三地已發展成為僅次美國的經濟實力，可稱為「中華興起」的時代，世界不能無視中國大陸的存在，台灣又豈能自外於原本就該屬於我們的優勢？開放必有衝擊，《台紐經濟合作協定》何嘗沒有衝擊？當利大於弊，如何選擇就非常清楚，只有迎向競爭才能進步。
台灣從來不怕競爭，只怕沒有舞台，不論是早年拎著皮箱全球闖蕩的外銷商，或早在大陸政策環境仍不明朗之際，就勇於登陸闖出一片天的企業主，早已證明台灣人的勇氣與拚勁。民進黨卡住《服貿協議》自以為「保護台灣產業」，卻恰恰相反綁住台商的拚搏幹勁。
台灣不是孤立的世外桃源，不可能免於全球競爭，政治現實下，擋住與大陸的自由貿易進程，就是擋住台灣與全球建立FTA的進程。保守恐中的民進黨不可能帶領台灣衝上這一波全球化浪潮，台灣經濟豈能讓民進黨綁架而至滅頂？
Giving In Order to Get: Fair and Reasonable Cross-Strait Arrangements
Giving In Order to Get: Fair and Reasonable Cross-Strait Arrangements
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 30, 2013
Summary: Recently Liu Guosheng, President of the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, issued some "Suggestions for Peaceful Development and Fair and Reasonable Arrangements." This should be considered a breakthrough on the Mainland side. Liu's suggestions are worth affirming. The two sides need not remain mired in empty rhetoric and vain babblings. Liu's suggestions offer a rough draft. The two sides should see them as food for thought.
Full text below:
The CCP 18th National Congress Political Report spoke of "exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation is not yet reunified, and making fair and reasonable arrangements." Recently Liu Guosheng, President of the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, issued some "Suggestions for Peaceful Development and Fair and Reasonable Arrangements." This should be considered a breakthrough on the Mainland side. Nevertheless, Liu's suggestions include some serious blind spots.
During the Cross-Strait Peace Forum Liu Guosheng said, "Current cross-Strait political relations are relations within the same nation's sovereign territory. They are relations between two opposing regimes of differing strength." He added, "Do not lightly equate one China with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China." These two passages made two breakthroughs.
One. Liu publicly referred to the two sides as "two opposing regimes." Two. Liu added that "One China should not be lightly equated with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China." But Liu's suggestions also included a blind spot. Since "one China" should not be equated with either the PRC or the ROC, just what is the "one China" he is referring to? As we can see, Liu Guosheng's suggestions may contain breakthroughs. But they also contain blind spots.
A. Liu offered six suggestions. Liu apparently wanted to make breakthroughs in order to improve the situation. But his six suggestions call for an "end to hostilities and the signing of a peace agreement" as a precondition. They do not see these breakthroughs and improvements as paving the way for the signing of the peace agreement.
For example, Liu suggests that the "Taiwan side first formally approve the two sides, one nation position." He suggested that with the exception of the Olympic Games and other high-visibility international events, the ROC national title, national flag, and national anthem could be displayed at ordinary international events, and that the PRC need not directly intervene whenever the ROC publicly displays its political symbols.
Liu's suggestions recognize that the ROC has a national title, a national flag, and a national anthem. But these breakthroughs and improvements should be viewed as a means of enhancing friendship and mutual trust before the signing of a peace agreement. They should not be used as bargaining chips in exchange for a peace agreement. In recent years, Beijing has changed its stand on the display of ROC flags at international sports events. It no longer advocates public and direct interference. It knows that if it reacts too harshly, the public on Taiwan will be even more opposed to a peace agreement. Liu spoke of "two sides, one country." He spoke of "after the Taiwan side officially recognizes that the two sides are one country." He said "Do not lightly equate one China with either the Peoples Republic of China or the Republic of China." What did Liu mean by "one country" in his suggestions? That has yet to be made clear. His premise has yet to be defined. Therefore it cannot serve as an instrument of theoretical interpretation or political implementation.
B. Liu's suggestions also say that "with the end of hostilities and the signing of a peace agreement, the Mainland may gradually relax restrictions on the Taiwan side's central government, with the exception of agencies involved in national defense and foreign diplomacy. It may gradually relax restrictions on the terminology for Taiwan side agencies. Scare quotes would no longer be used. Officials would be addressed by their official titles. Under these preconditions the two sides could increase mutual trust. Even the Taiwan authorities official titles are negotiable.
Such remarks show that Beijing is aware of what cross-Strait improvements and breakthroughs must be made. But if we already know that cross-Strait relations are "relations between two regimes," why characterize them as "relations between two hostile regimes?" Why not characterize them as "coopetition between two friendly regimes?" If we can do this, then the changes in official titles can lay the groundwork for a peace agreement, instead of presenting an obstacle to a peace agreement.
C. The chief blind spot in Liu's suggestions is the sovereignty issue. Liu supports "mutual non-recognition of sovereignty claims" and opposes "two Chinas with different names but the same substance." This is Beijing's proposal. The Ma government refers to it as "non-recognition of each other's sovereignty." But according to this logic, the two sides "do not recognize each other's sovereignty." According to this logic, the PRC and the ROC are "two opposing regimes" that constitute "two governments." But neither the PRC nor the ROC can be "lightly equated with one China." We must work together to create a "Third Concept of China," or a "Big Roof Concept of China" that transcends both the PRC and the ROC. Otherwise how can we establish what Liu spoke of, "two regimes within one China?"
Liu's suggestions show that Beijing realizes the current arrangement includes many senseless and unreasonable conditions. These senseless and unreasonable conditions should not exist. Therefore a peace agreement is all the more urgent. We must try to improve these conditions. We must create the conditions necessary for a peace agreement. Two conditions are essential. One. Do not equate one China with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China. Instead, create a "Third Concept of China" or "Big Roof Concept of China." Two. Before the two sides sign a peace agreement or reach a final solution, they should see each other as "two regimes enagaged in friendly coopetition." They should see each other as "hostile regimes." After all, the two sides are no longer fighting a civil war.
Liu's suggestions are worth affirming. The two sides need not remain mired in empty rhetoric and vain babblings. Liu's suggestions offer a rough draft. The two sides should see them as food for thought.
拋玉引玉：兩岸共議合情合理的安排
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.30 02:34 am
中共十八大政治報告指出，「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」；最近，廈門大學台灣研究院院長劉國深提出「和平發展合情合理安排幾點建議」，可視為陸方首次推出的試探方案。劉案有若干突破，但仍有重大盲點。
劉國深在「兩岸和平論壇」中說：「當前兩岸政治關係是同一國家領土主權之內的兩個綜合實力懸殊的對立政權關係。」又說：「不要輕易將一個中國等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國。」這兩段話的突破點是，將兩岸公開稱作「兩個對立的政權」，並稱「不宜將一個中國等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國」；其盲點則在，既不宜將「一個中國」等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國，則「一個中國」究何所指？劉國深的突破及盲點，延續存在於他的「幾點建議」中：
一、劉案提出六點「建議」，似有突破及改善現狀之意，但這六點建議皆以「在結束敵對狀態、簽署和平協議後」為前提，卻非主張用這些突破及改善，來作為「簽署和平協議之前」的氛圍及條件。
例如，劉案建議：「在兩岸一國的立場得到台方正式認可後，除了奧運會等少數高能見度的國際活動嚴格要求暫時不出現台灣方面的國號、國旗、國歌外，一般性國際活動不再公開直接干預台灣方面政治符號和政治象徵出現。」
劉案至少已承認台灣方面有國號、國旗及國歌。但此一突破及改善，似應用在「和平協議簽署之前」，作為創造友善及互信的方法，而非作為「簽署和平協議」的交換條件。實際上，近年來北京對國際運動會看台上的青天白日滿地紅國旗已「不再公開直接干涉」，自是已知倘再蠻橫禁阻，台灣民意就會更加反對簽署《和平協議》。至於「在兩岸一國的立場得到台方正式認可後」，其中的「兩岸一國」，倘是「不要輕易等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國」，則究竟指的是什麼「一國」，劉案仍未釋明，而由於此一前提既無明確定義，即不能作為理論演繹及實政執行的工具。
二、劉案又稱：「在結束敵對狀態、簽署和平協議後，大陸在兩岸交往場合遇到台方的中央機構，除涉及國防、外交等少數機構外，可考慮逐步放寬稱謂限制……不必加引號；其主管官員頭銜可直接稱呼……在兩岸政治互信進一步深化的前提下，可以在兩岸之間直接稱呼台方所有官職，甚至包括台灣當局領導人的正式頭銜問題也可以進行有意義的討論。」
此段論述可見，北京其實完全知道兩岸的改善及突破口在何處；但如前文所引，如果已知應將兩岸視為「兩個政權的關係」，卻為何要將其定性為「兩個敵對的政權」，而不能將之定性為「兩個友善的競合政權」？倘能如此，一切稱謂的改善即可能成為簽署《和平協議》的前置工作，而非簽署的交易條件。
三、劉案主要的盲點仍在「主權」問題，因此主張「互不承認主權的主張……與反對兩個中國有異曲同工之處」。由於北京如此主張，馬政府亦稱「互不承認主權」。然而，若照此說，劉案即不啻指兩岸竟成「互不承認主權」的中華人民共和國與中華民國之間，存有「兩個對立的政權」，遂成「兩國兩府」。然而，既皆知中華人民共和國與中華民國皆「不能輕易等同於一個中國」，則若不能共同創造一個在中華人民共和國與中華民國之上的「第三概念的中國」或「大屋頂中國」，如何可能出現劉案所說「一個中國之內的兩個政權」？
劉案顯示，北京既明知現今的安排有諸多「不合情不合理」，即不應以這些「不合情不合理」作為催迫簽署《和平協議》的政治籌碼，而當盡力改善，用以創造「簽署和平協議」的條件與氛圍。關鍵有二：一、勿將一個中國等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國，而應共創一個「第三概念或上位概念的大屋頂中國」；二、在簽署和平協議或在兩岸獲致終極解決方案之前，應將兩岸視為「大一中架構下的兩個友善的競合政權」，而不宜輕易將兩岸等同於「兩個敵對政權」，畢竟如今兩岸已絕非內戰情境。
劉案的提出十分值得肯定，今後雙方至少不必陷於無案可資論證的空言虛談。不妨即以劉案為底稿，在兩岸之間形成拋玉引玉的腦力激盪。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 30, 2013
Summary: Recently Liu Guosheng, President of the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, issued some "Suggestions for Peaceful Development and Fair and Reasonable Arrangements." This should be considered a breakthrough on the Mainland side. Liu's suggestions are worth affirming. The two sides need not remain mired in empty rhetoric and vain babblings. Liu's suggestions offer a rough draft. The two sides should see them as food for thought.
Full text below:
The CCP 18th National Congress Political Report spoke of "exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation is not yet reunified, and making fair and reasonable arrangements." Recently Liu Guosheng, President of the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, issued some "Suggestions for Peaceful Development and Fair and Reasonable Arrangements." This should be considered a breakthrough on the Mainland side. Nevertheless, Liu's suggestions include some serious blind spots.
During the Cross-Strait Peace Forum Liu Guosheng said, "Current cross-Strait political relations are relations within the same nation's sovereign territory. They are relations between two opposing regimes of differing strength." He added, "Do not lightly equate one China with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China." These two passages made two breakthroughs.
One. Liu publicly referred to the two sides as "two opposing regimes." Two. Liu added that "One China should not be lightly equated with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China." But Liu's suggestions also included a blind spot. Since "one China" should not be equated with either the PRC or the ROC, just what is the "one China" he is referring to? As we can see, Liu Guosheng's suggestions may contain breakthroughs. But they also contain blind spots.
A. Liu offered six suggestions. Liu apparently wanted to make breakthroughs in order to improve the situation. But his six suggestions call for an "end to hostilities and the signing of a peace agreement" as a precondition. They do not see these breakthroughs and improvements as paving the way for the signing of the peace agreement.
For example, Liu suggests that the "Taiwan side first formally approve the two sides, one nation position." He suggested that with the exception of the Olympic Games and other high-visibility international events, the ROC national title, national flag, and national anthem could be displayed at ordinary international events, and that the PRC need not directly intervene whenever the ROC publicly displays its political symbols.
Liu's suggestions recognize that the ROC has a national title, a national flag, and a national anthem. But these breakthroughs and improvements should be viewed as a means of enhancing friendship and mutual trust before the signing of a peace agreement. They should not be used as bargaining chips in exchange for a peace agreement. In recent years, Beijing has changed its stand on the display of ROC flags at international sports events. It no longer advocates public and direct interference. It knows that if it reacts too harshly, the public on Taiwan will be even more opposed to a peace agreement. Liu spoke of "two sides, one country." He spoke of "after the Taiwan side officially recognizes that the two sides are one country." He said "Do not lightly equate one China with either the Peoples Republic of China or the Republic of China." What did Liu mean by "one country" in his suggestions? That has yet to be made clear. His premise has yet to be defined. Therefore it cannot serve as an instrument of theoretical interpretation or political implementation.
B. Liu's suggestions also say that "with the end of hostilities and the signing of a peace agreement, the Mainland may gradually relax restrictions on the Taiwan side's central government, with the exception of agencies involved in national defense and foreign diplomacy. It may gradually relax restrictions on the terminology for Taiwan side agencies. Scare quotes would no longer be used. Officials would be addressed by their official titles. Under these preconditions the two sides could increase mutual trust. Even the Taiwan authorities official titles are negotiable.
Such remarks show that Beijing is aware of what cross-Strait improvements and breakthroughs must be made. But if we already know that cross-Strait relations are "relations between two regimes," why characterize them as "relations between two hostile regimes?" Why not characterize them as "coopetition between two friendly regimes?" If we can do this, then the changes in official titles can lay the groundwork for a peace agreement, instead of presenting an obstacle to a peace agreement.
C. The chief blind spot in Liu's suggestions is the sovereignty issue. Liu supports "mutual non-recognition of sovereignty claims" and opposes "two Chinas with different names but the same substance." This is Beijing's proposal. The Ma government refers to it as "non-recognition of each other's sovereignty." But according to this logic, the two sides "do not recognize each other's sovereignty." According to this logic, the PRC and the ROC are "two opposing regimes" that constitute "two governments." But neither the PRC nor the ROC can be "lightly equated with one China." We must work together to create a "Third Concept of China," or a "Big Roof Concept of China" that transcends both the PRC and the ROC. Otherwise how can we establish what Liu spoke of, "two regimes within one China?"
Liu's suggestions show that Beijing realizes the current arrangement includes many senseless and unreasonable conditions. These senseless and unreasonable conditions should not exist. Therefore a peace agreement is all the more urgent. We must try to improve these conditions. We must create the conditions necessary for a peace agreement. Two conditions are essential. One. Do not equate one China with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China. Instead, create a "Third Concept of China" or "Big Roof Concept of China." Two. Before the two sides sign a peace agreement or reach a final solution, they should see each other as "two regimes enagaged in friendly coopetition." They should see each other as "hostile regimes." After all, the two sides are no longer fighting a civil war.
Liu's suggestions are worth affirming. The two sides need not remain mired in empty rhetoric and vain babblings. Liu's suggestions offer a rough draft. The two sides should see them as food for thought.
拋玉引玉：兩岸共議合情合理的安排
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.30 02:34 am
中共十八大政治報告指出，「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」；最近，廈門大學台灣研究院院長劉國深提出「和平發展合情合理安排幾點建議」，可視為陸方首次推出的試探方案。劉案有若干突破，但仍有重大盲點。
劉國深在「兩岸和平論壇」中說：「當前兩岸政治關係是同一國家領土主權之內的兩個綜合實力懸殊的對立政權關係。」又說：「不要輕易將一個中國等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國。」這兩段話的突破點是，將兩岸公開稱作「兩個對立的政權」，並稱「不宜將一個中國等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國」；其盲點則在，既不宜將「一個中國」等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國，則「一個中國」究何所指？劉國深的突破及盲點，延續存在於他的「幾點建議」中：
一、劉案提出六點「建議」，似有突破及改善現狀之意，但這六點建議皆以「在結束敵對狀態、簽署和平協議後」為前提，卻非主張用這些突破及改善，來作為「簽署和平協議之前」的氛圍及條件。
例如，劉案建議：「在兩岸一國的立場得到台方正式認可後，除了奧運會等少數高能見度的國際活動嚴格要求暫時不出現台灣方面的國號、國旗、國歌外，一般性國際活動不再公開直接干預台灣方面政治符號和政治象徵出現。」
劉案至少已承認台灣方面有國號、國旗及國歌。但此一突破及改善，似應用在「和平協議簽署之前」，作為創造友善及互信的方法，而非作為「簽署和平協議」的交換條件。實際上，近年來北京對國際運動會看台上的青天白日滿地紅國旗已「不再公開直接干涉」，自是已知倘再蠻橫禁阻，台灣民意就會更加反對簽署《和平協議》。至於「在兩岸一國的立場得到台方正式認可後」，其中的「兩岸一國」，倘是「不要輕易等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國」，則究竟指的是什麼「一國」，劉案仍未釋明，而由於此一前提既無明確定義，即不能作為理論演繹及實政執行的工具。
二、劉案又稱：「在結束敵對狀態、簽署和平協議後，大陸在兩岸交往場合遇到台方的中央機構，除涉及國防、外交等少數機構外，可考慮逐步放寬稱謂限制……不必加引號；其主管官員頭銜可直接稱呼……在兩岸政治互信進一步深化的前提下，可以在兩岸之間直接稱呼台方所有官職，甚至包括台灣當局領導人的正式頭銜問題也可以進行有意義的討論。」
此段論述可見，北京其實完全知道兩岸的改善及突破口在何處；但如前文所引，如果已知應將兩岸視為「兩個政權的關係」，卻為何要將其定性為「兩個敵對的政權」，而不能將之定性為「兩個友善的競合政權」？倘能如此，一切稱謂的改善即可能成為簽署《和平協議》的前置工作，而非簽署的交易條件。
三、劉案主要的盲點仍在「主權」問題，因此主張「互不承認主權的主張……與反對兩個中國有異曲同工之處」。由於北京如此主張，馬政府亦稱「互不承認主權」。然而，若照此說，劉案即不啻指兩岸竟成「互不承認主權」的中華人民共和國與中華民國之間，存有「兩個對立的政權」，遂成「兩國兩府」。然而，既皆知中華人民共和國與中華民國皆「不能輕易等同於一個中國」，則若不能共同創造一個在中華人民共和國與中華民國之上的「第三概念的中國」或「大屋頂中國」，如何可能出現劉案所說「一個中國之內的兩個政權」？
劉案顯示，北京既明知現今的安排有諸多「不合情不合理」，即不應以這些「不合情不合理」作為催迫簽署《和平協議》的政治籌碼，而當盡力改善，用以創造「簽署和平協議」的條件與氛圍。關鍵有二：一、勿將一個中國等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國，而應共創一個「第三概念或上位概念的大屋頂中國」；二、在簽署和平協議或在兩岸獲致終極解決方案之前，應將兩岸視為「大一中架構下的兩個友善的競合政權」，而不宜輕易將兩岸等同於「兩個敵對政權」，畢竟如今兩岸已絕非內戰情境。
劉案的提出十分值得肯定，今後雙方至少不必陷於無案可資論證的空言虛談。不妨即以劉案為底稿，在兩岸之間形成拋玉引玉的腦力激盪。
Tuesday, October 29, 2013
Political Dialogue Will Enable Win/Win
Political Dialogue Will Enable Win/Win
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 29, 2013
Summary: Today the two sides must set aside their prejudices. They must refrain from further self-righteousness. They must plant their feet firmly on solid ground. They must proceed from low-level political dialogue to high-level political negotiation. We hope the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait will be guided by their wisdom. We hope they will find a win-win situation, and achieve the best possible result.
Full text below:
In early October, scholars from private sector Red, Blue, and Green camp think tanks participated in a Cross-Strait Peace Forum held in Shanghai. The forum focused on cross-Strait political dialogue. It addressed such issues as a peace agreement, military confidence building measures, and Taipei's international space. The two sides also discussed the complex issue of sovereignty and jurisdiction. On the 18th, President Ma Ying-jeou met for the first time with Foreign Policy Committee members from the US. He told them that the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices was political, not economic in nature. On the 26th, Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung attended a cross-Strait trade and cultural forum on the Chinese mainland. He said that the two sides encountered political problems while discussing economics. There is a reason for this. The time for cross-Strait political dialogue has arrived.
Here, we would like to emphasize that political dialogue is not something to be dreaded. Political negotiations are not synonymous with reunification. The picture for Taiwan is worsening. Military conflict is a lose/lose proposition. It is the worst case scenario. Only cross-Strait political negotiation can resolve these problems. As long as conditions are right, and we are well-prepared, there is no reason why political dialogue between the two sides cannot become political negotiations. Cross-Strait relations are of course not relations between separate nations. Cross-Strait issues are not international issues. The United States and the CCP held talks in Geneva and Warsaw from the mid-1950s until the late 1960s. The two sides talked for ten years. Nothing concrete came of the talks. But continuing to interact with each other increased understanding. It served a purpose, and provides us with a precedent.
During this very first peace forum in Shanghai, many scholars from Taiwan spoke of "mutual non-recognition of sovereignty, mutual non-repudiation of jurisdiction." This to a considerable extent, reflects the Ma administration's thinking. Many even suggested that Mainland Affairs Council Director Chang Chi-jun and Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yuqi have already addressed each other by their official titles. Therefore Beijing may wish to consider the possibility of the two sides recognizing each others' jurisdiction. This argument has something to be said for it. The CCP never directly addresses the cross-Strait diplomatic truce. Beijing is concerned. If it agrees that the two sides do not recognize each others' sovereignty, that means that another sovereign entity besides Beijing exists. The mutual recognition of jurisdiction could lead to the erosion of Beijing's sovereignty. Beijing's concerns are not entirely baseless.
During the Peace Forum in Shanghai, some compared current cross-Strait relations to a wedding engagement. Taipei is not ready, but Beijing wants to deceive Taipei or force Taipei to marry, and even abduct her. Academics emerging from their ivory towers and making themselves understood by the general public by discussing cross-Strait relations in everyday vernacular is not a bad thing. But we have a different analogy. The Mainland is a big lug pursuing Taiwan, a delicate beauty. He constantly seeks intimacy. He wants to hold her tiny hand. Taiwan initally sought wealth and objected to his poverty. But when the Mainland became immensely wealthy, Taiwan complained that he was not civilized enough. When the Mainland obtained advanced degrees, and a level of sophistication, Taiwan complained that he could not speak any foreign languages. When the Mainland finally meets all of Taiwan's demands, Taiwan will object that the Mainland is too old, and refuse any further advances. Where there is no will, there is no way.
Another, even more vivid metaphor is that Taiwan merely wants to cohabitate. Taiwan does not want to get married. Taiwan merely wants to enjoy the relationship. Taiwan wants all the benefits of a relationship, but one of the legal obligations of marriage. In cross-Strait relations, it means that as long as Taiwan can benefit, it will want all the benefits, but will refuse to commit to marriage, i.e., reunification. Instead, Taiwan is merely playing the Mainland for a fool. Some may ask whether Taiwan the male or the female? Perhaps it is the male or the female as conditions demand. Time drags on, but the two sides remain incapable of establishing their legal status. What if one day Taiwan finds itself playing the role of "the other woman?" Is time really on Taiwan's side? This is a question worth pondering.
Objectively speaking, if a Ma Xi meeting can be arranged, the two sides' leaders can issue a joint declaration or joint communique expressing their proposals and positions. They can progress from cross-Strait peaceful dialogue to political negotiations to the signing of a peace agreement. The language need not include any explicit rejection of Taiwan independence secession or support for national reunification. But we are pursuing cross-Strait coexistence, cooperation, and a renaissance of Chinese civilization. If even such implications and declarations of intent are ruled out, why would Beijing bother to sign such an agreement? Negotiation means compromise. Taking without giving, or giving without taking, while expecting completely open negotiatons could backfire. One could paint oneself into a corner, and find oneself forced to solve the problem some other way. The possibility of success under such circumstances would be slight.
Recall the past. The two sides may consider their own official policies flawless. But that is hardly the case. Beijing once harbored doubts about Taipei's National Unification Council and Guidelines for National Unification. It harbored the same doubts about the 1992 Consensus. As a result, the percentage of people on Taiwan who consider themselves Chinese continues to decline. Reunification has become a desirable but unachievable luxury. As for Taiwan, in 1989 Chen Lifu proposed a US$10 billion dollar cooperative venture with Beijing. It would promote Sun Yatsen's Industrial Plan, cross-Strait mutual trust, and help achieve the goal of national reunification. Today, 10 billion, 100 billion, even a trillion would not help. The relative strength of the two sides is already clear. Time, as it turns out, was not on our side. Obviously both sides have much soul-searching to do.
Today the two sides must set aside their prejudices. They must refrain from further self-righteousness. They must plant their feet firmly on solid ground. They must proceed from low-level political dialogue to high-level political negotiation. We hope the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait will be guided by their wisdom. We hope they will find a win-win situation, and achieve the best possible result.
社論－從政治對話創造兩岸雙贏
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年10月29日 04:10
10月上旬，兩岸民間智庫廣邀紅、藍、綠三方學者在上海舉行和平論壇，討論重點在於兩岸政治對話，其中除了觸及和平協議、軍事安全互信、台灣的國際活動空間等議題之外，也討論了複雜的兩岸主權和治權的問題；18日，馬英九總統在接見美國外交政策全國委員會訪問團時首度表示，兩岸互設辦事處的協議不是經濟性質，而是屬於政治性質；26日，在中國大陸出席兩岸經貿文化論壇的國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄也表示，兩岸終究會碰到經中有政的問題。事出有因，看來兩岸政治對話已經逐漸提到日程表上來了。
於此，我們要強調的是，政治對話並不是洪水猛獸，政治談判並不等於統一談判，既然現況對台灣逐漸不利，而軍事衝突又是雙輸的最壞結果，兩岸未來只有透過政治談判解決問題，所以只要在條件成熟，準備周詳的情況下，雙方循序漸進的由政治對話進入政治談判並非絕不可為。當然，兩岸關係並非國與國關係，兩岸問題也非國際問題，但當年美國與中共的會談，從日內瓦會談到華沙會談，由1950年代中期一直到1960年代末期，雙方談了十幾年雖無具體成就，但對維持彼此互動及增加了解，還是起了一定程度的作用，可為借鏡。
在上海首屆和平論壇中，許多台灣學者提及兩岸主權互不承認、治權互不否認一事，這在相當程度上確實反應了馬英九政府的政策思維。不少人甚至主張，既然國台辦主任張志軍和陸委會主委王郁琦已經以官銜相互稱呼，大陸不妨進一步思考兩岸治權相互承認的可能。此說，表面上有其合理之處，但就像中共從來不曾正面回應兩岸外交休兵一樣，北京所擔心的是，只要一回應主權互不承認就意味著除了北京之外還有一個主權存在，而治權的相互承認則又有可能對主權造成侵蝕性的效果，大陸的顧忌並非全然無的放矢。
在上海和平論壇中，有人提及兩岸關係目前像是訂婚，台灣還沒準備好中共就想要騙婚、逼婚，甚至搶婚。學者願意走出象牙塔，用一般民眾可以理解的辭彙來討論兩岸關係當然不是件壞事，但是我們想到的另一個比喻是，大陸這個粗壯大漢正在追求台灣這位美女，總想一親芳澤、牽牽小手，台灣先是嫌貧愛富，等到大陸財富倍增又嫌對方不夠文明，直到大陸也得了高級學位，文明程度精進，此時台灣又嫌北京不懂外語，等到北京一切滿足了台北的需要，台灣此時卻嫌北京已經太老，仍然拒絕往來，沒有意願一切白搭。
另外一個更形象的比喻是，台灣現在只要同居，不要結婚，只想享受兩人世界，美好關係的一切好處，但就是不要承擔任何因為婚姻關係而來的法律義務。在兩岸關係上，這就意味著台灣只要好處，所有的好處都要，但就是不肯做出對統一（婚姻）的承諾，直把中國大陸當個傻大個耍得暈頭轉向。不過這裡有些人不禁要問的是，到底台灣是男是女，還是既可男又是女，角色居然能夠相互轉換？久拖不決，雙方不能有個合法名份，萬一台灣有一天把自己玩成所謂的剩女，時間到底站不站在台灣的一方，還真值得深思。
客觀的來看，未來的馬習會若能成局，雙方領導人可以用共同宣言、聯合公報的方式來表達各自或共同的主張和立場。而未來兩岸從和平對話、政治談判走向簽署和平協議時，其中或許可以沒有直接反對台獨分裂主義、支持國家統一的明確字眼，但若連追求兩岸共存共榮、合作振興中華這些具有特定意涵，隱晦、指向性的表述也被完全排除，北京能否簽下類此協議實在讓人懷疑？談判是一個妥協的過程，只要不給或只給不要，期望一個完全開放式的協議，最後反而成了局限自己以其他方式解決問題的政策選項，這種可能性委實不大。
回顧過去，兩岸官方或許認為自己的政策一貫正確，但事實並非如此。北京當年對台灣的國統會、國統綱領曾有疑慮，對於九二共識一度也有看法，結果今日台灣自認自己也是中國人的比例仍在持續下滑，統一如果不是奢望也成了個可欲而不可得的盼望；至於台灣方面，八九年之後陳立夫曾經主張以100億美元與中共合作，推動國父的實業計畫，促進兩岸互信，希望有助實現國家統一的目標，如今莫說百億，千億、萬億也已於事無補，兩岸強弱已然易勢，時不我予已成事實。雙方顯然都有值得檢討之處。
於今之計，放下成見，切莫再自以為是，雙方都要腳踏實地的在已有的基礎上，先由低階的政治對話往前發展，再往高階的政治談判方面進行規畫，我們熱切期望，用兩岸中國人的智慧，早日找到一條雙贏、多贏的出路和最佳結果。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 29, 2013
Summary: Today the two sides must set aside their prejudices. They must refrain from further self-righteousness. They must plant their feet firmly on solid ground. They must proceed from low-level political dialogue to high-level political negotiation. We hope the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait will be guided by their wisdom. We hope they will find a win-win situation, and achieve the best possible result.
Full text below:
In early October, scholars from private sector Red, Blue, and Green camp think tanks participated in a Cross-Strait Peace Forum held in Shanghai. The forum focused on cross-Strait political dialogue. It addressed such issues as a peace agreement, military confidence building measures, and Taipei's international space. The two sides also discussed the complex issue of sovereignty and jurisdiction. On the 18th, President Ma Ying-jeou met for the first time with Foreign Policy Committee members from the US. He told them that the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices was political, not economic in nature. On the 26th, Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung attended a cross-Strait trade and cultural forum on the Chinese mainland. He said that the two sides encountered political problems while discussing economics. There is a reason for this. The time for cross-Strait political dialogue has arrived.
Here, we would like to emphasize that political dialogue is not something to be dreaded. Political negotiations are not synonymous with reunification. The picture for Taiwan is worsening. Military conflict is a lose/lose proposition. It is the worst case scenario. Only cross-Strait political negotiation can resolve these problems. As long as conditions are right, and we are well-prepared, there is no reason why political dialogue between the two sides cannot become political negotiations. Cross-Strait relations are of course not relations between separate nations. Cross-Strait issues are not international issues. The United States and the CCP held talks in Geneva and Warsaw from the mid-1950s until the late 1960s. The two sides talked for ten years. Nothing concrete came of the talks. But continuing to interact with each other increased understanding. It served a purpose, and provides us with a precedent.
During this very first peace forum in Shanghai, many scholars from Taiwan spoke of "mutual non-recognition of sovereignty, mutual non-repudiation of jurisdiction." This to a considerable extent, reflects the Ma administration's thinking. Many even suggested that Mainland Affairs Council Director Chang Chi-jun and Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yuqi have already addressed each other by their official titles. Therefore Beijing may wish to consider the possibility of the two sides recognizing each others' jurisdiction. This argument has something to be said for it. The CCP never directly addresses the cross-Strait diplomatic truce. Beijing is concerned. If it agrees that the two sides do not recognize each others' sovereignty, that means that another sovereign entity besides Beijing exists. The mutual recognition of jurisdiction could lead to the erosion of Beijing's sovereignty. Beijing's concerns are not entirely baseless.
During the Peace Forum in Shanghai, some compared current cross-Strait relations to a wedding engagement. Taipei is not ready, but Beijing wants to deceive Taipei or force Taipei to marry, and even abduct her. Academics emerging from their ivory towers and making themselves understood by the general public by discussing cross-Strait relations in everyday vernacular is not a bad thing. But we have a different analogy. The Mainland is a big lug pursuing Taiwan, a delicate beauty. He constantly seeks intimacy. He wants to hold her tiny hand. Taiwan initally sought wealth and objected to his poverty. But when the Mainland became immensely wealthy, Taiwan complained that he was not civilized enough. When the Mainland obtained advanced degrees, and a level of sophistication, Taiwan complained that he could not speak any foreign languages. When the Mainland finally meets all of Taiwan's demands, Taiwan will object that the Mainland is too old, and refuse any further advances. Where there is no will, there is no way.
Another, even more vivid metaphor is that Taiwan merely wants to cohabitate. Taiwan does not want to get married. Taiwan merely wants to enjoy the relationship. Taiwan wants all the benefits of a relationship, but one of the legal obligations of marriage. In cross-Strait relations, it means that as long as Taiwan can benefit, it will want all the benefits, but will refuse to commit to marriage, i.e., reunification. Instead, Taiwan is merely playing the Mainland for a fool. Some may ask whether Taiwan the male or the female? Perhaps it is the male or the female as conditions demand. Time drags on, but the two sides remain incapable of establishing their legal status. What if one day Taiwan finds itself playing the role of "the other woman?" Is time really on Taiwan's side? This is a question worth pondering.
Objectively speaking, if a Ma Xi meeting can be arranged, the two sides' leaders can issue a joint declaration or joint communique expressing their proposals and positions. They can progress from cross-Strait peaceful dialogue to political negotiations to the signing of a peace agreement. The language need not include any explicit rejection of Taiwan independence secession or support for national reunification. But we are pursuing cross-Strait coexistence, cooperation, and a renaissance of Chinese civilization. If even such implications and declarations of intent are ruled out, why would Beijing bother to sign such an agreement? Negotiation means compromise. Taking without giving, or giving without taking, while expecting completely open negotiatons could backfire. One could paint oneself into a corner, and find oneself forced to solve the problem some other way. The possibility of success under such circumstances would be slight.
Recall the past. The two sides may consider their own official policies flawless. But that is hardly the case. Beijing once harbored doubts about Taipei's National Unification Council and Guidelines for National Unification. It harbored the same doubts about the 1992 Consensus. As a result, the percentage of people on Taiwan who consider themselves Chinese continues to decline. Reunification has become a desirable but unachievable luxury. As for Taiwan, in 1989 Chen Lifu proposed a US$10 billion dollar cooperative venture with Beijing. It would promote Sun Yatsen's Industrial Plan, cross-Strait mutual trust, and help achieve the goal of national reunification. Today, 10 billion, 100 billion, even a trillion would not help. The relative strength of the two sides is already clear. Time, as it turns out, was not on our side. Obviously both sides have much soul-searching to do.
Today the two sides must set aside their prejudices. They must refrain from further self-righteousness. They must plant their feet firmly on solid ground. They must proceed from low-level political dialogue to high-level political negotiation. We hope the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait will be guided by their wisdom. We hope they will find a win-win situation, and achieve the best possible result.
社論－從政治對話創造兩岸雙贏
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年10月29日 04:10
10月上旬，兩岸民間智庫廣邀紅、藍、綠三方學者在上海舉行和平論壇，討論重點在於兩岸政治對話，其中除了觸及和平協議、軍事安全互信、台灣的國際活動空間等議題之外，也討論了複雜的兩岸主權和治權的問題；18日，馬英九總統在接見美國外交政策全國委員會訪問團時首度表示，兩岸互設辦事處的協議不是經濟性質，而是屬於政治性質；26日，在中國大陸出席兩岸經貿文化論壇的國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄也表示，兩岸終究會碰到經中有政的問題。事出有因，看來兩岸政治對話已經逐漸提到日程表上來了。
於此，我們要強調的是，政治對話並不是洪水猛獸，政治談判並不等於統一談判，既然現況對台灣逐漸不利，而軍事衝突又是雙輸的最壞結果，兩岸未來只有透過政治談判解決問題，所以只要在條件成熟，準備周詳的情況下，雙方循序漸進的由政治對話進入政治談判並非絕不可為。當然，兩岸關係並非國與國關係，兩岸問題也非國際問題，但當年美國與中共的會談，從日內瓦會談到華沙會談，由1950年代中期一直到1960年代末期，雙方談了十幾年雖無具體成就，但對維持彼此互動及增加了解，還是起了一定程度的作用，可為借鏡。
在上海首屆和平論壇中，許多台灣學者提及兩岸主權互不承認、治權互不否認一事，這在相當程度上確實反應了馬英九政府的政策思維。不少人甚至主張，既然國台辦主任張志軍和陸委會主委王郁琦已經以官銜相互稱呼，大陸不妨進一步思考兩岸治權相互承認的可能。此說，表面上有其合理之處，但就像中共從來不曾正面回應兩岸外交休兵一樣，北京所擔心的是，只要一回應主權互不承認就意味著除了北京之外還有一個主權存在，而治權的相互承認則又有可能對主權造成侵蝕性的效果，大陸的顧忌並非全然無的放矢。
在上海和平論壇中，有人提及兩岸關係目前像是訂婚，台灣還沒準備好中共就想要騙婚、逼婚，甚至搶婚。學者願意走出象牙塔，用一般民眾可以理解的辭彙來討論兩岸關係當然不是件壞事，但是我們想到的另一個比喻是，大陸這個粗壯大漢正在追求台灣這位美女，總想一親芳澤、牽牽小手，台灣先是嫌貧愛富，等到大陸財富倍增又嫌對方不夠文明，直到大陸也得了高級學位，文明程度精進，此時台灣又嫌北京不懂外語，等到北京一切滿足了台北的需要，台灣此時卻嫌北京已經太老，仍然拒絕往來，沒有意願一切白搭。
另外一個更形象的比喻是，台灣現在只要同居，不要結婚，只想享受兩人世界，美好關係的一切好處，但就是不要承擔任何因為婚姻關係而來的法律義務。在兩岸關係上，這就意味著台灣只要好處，所有的好處都要，但就是不肯做出對統一（婚姻）的承諾，直把中國大陸當個傻大個耍得暈頭轉向。不過這裡有些人不禁要問的是，到底台灣是男是女，還是既可男又是女，角色居然能夠相互轉換？久拖不決，雙方不能有個合法名份，萬一台灣有一天把自己玩成所謂的剩女，時間到底站不站在台灣的一方，還真值得深思。
客觀的來看，未來的馬習會若能成局，雙方領導人可以用共同宣言、聯合公報的方式來表達各自或共同的主張和立場。而未來兩岸從和平對話、政治談判走向簽署和平協議時，其中或許可以沒有直接反對台獨分裂主義、支持國家統一的明確字眼，但若連追求兩岸共存共榮、合作振興中華這些具有特定意涵，隱晦、指向性的表述也被完全排除，北京能否簽下類此協議實在讓人懷疑？談判是一個妥協的過程，只要不給或只給不要，期望一個完全開放式的協議，最後反而成了局限自己以其他方式解決問題的政策選項，這種可能性委實不大。
回顧過去，兩岸官方或許認為自己的政策一貫正確，但事實並非如此。北京當年對台灣的國統會、國統綱領曾有疑慮，對於九二共識一度也有看法，結果今日台灣自認自己也是中國人的比例仍在持續下滑，統一如果不是奢望也成了個可欲而不可得的盼望；至於台灣方面，八九年之後陳立夫曾經主張以100億美元與中共合作，推動國父的實業計畫，促進兩岸互信，希望有助實現國家統一的目標，如今莫說百億，千億、萬億也已於事無補，兩岸強弱已然易勢，時不我予已成事實。雙方顯然都有值得檢討之處。
於今之計，放下成見，切莫再自以為是，雙方都要腳踏實地的在已有的基礎上，先由低階的政治對話往前發展，再往高階的政治談判方面進行規畫，我們熱切期望，用兩岸中國人的智慧，早日找到一條雙贏、多贏的出路和最佳結果。
Sunday, October 27, 2013
South Korean FTAs Take Effect, Taiwan Exports Threatened
South Korean FTAs Take Effect, Taiwan Exports Threatened
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 28, 2013
Summary: The Free Trade Island policy is a step in the right direction. What's missing is execution and implementation. Taiwan's exports have set off alarms. The government must move quickly. it must respond to short-term economic risks. It must carefully plan and implement mid and long term strategy. It must make hay while the sun shines. Only then can it revive Taiwan's economy.
Full text below:
Taiwan's exports in September were unexpectedly weak. They spelled an end to four consecutive months of positive growth. The annual growth rate declined 7%. The total amount in dollars decreased by 1.5% since August. Aggregate exports from January to September amounted to $ 226.64 billion. This spelled an increase of only 1.3% over last year. The lack of export momentum is worrisome. Imports in September increased 8.8% over August. But decreased 0.7% over the year. Cumulative January to September imports decreased by 0.9%. Overall, the foreign trade situation looks bad.
Consider the status of exports to different regions. Exports to Europe have accelerated significantly. Exports to the United States and Japan have remained steady. Mainland China and the ASEAN region account for nearly 60% of our exports. What is worrisome is that 3rd quarter growth is now negative. The future remains uncertain.
Consider the third quarter as it affects the global economy. The United States, Europe, Japan, and Mainland China are the largest economies. Their manufacturing PMI has remained at 50 or more for three straight months. This means the economy is still growing. Theoretically Taiwan's export numbers should be improving. Yet the latest statistical data is unsatisfactory. September exports fell unexpectedly. This cannot be explained away as a short-term fluctuation. This may be due to long-term structural changes. If exports to the Chinese Mainland and the ASEAN region continue to underperform this month, it will be a major warning sign for Taiwan's economy.
Taiwan's exports and the international economic situation have diverged. This is something seldom seen in the past. Eurozone GDP growth rate in the second quarter ended a seven quarter long recession, the longest in postwar history. Growth resumed. It was the fastest since the first quarter of 2011. This was apparent in the increase in imports to Taiwan. The U.S. economy is back on track. Japan's Abenomics is beginning to take effect. The two economies are generally stable. Taiwan's exports to these two countries has remained steady. What is worrisome is Asian-Pacific region emerging markets. Mainland reforms are in full swing. Long-term economic uncertainties have been intensified. Sooner or later, the US must cease QE. When it does, Asian-Pacific emerging market funds will withdraw. This will impact the economic outlook for the Chinese Mainland and East Asian markets, exchange rates, and stock markets. These factors will all affect demand.
In short, concerns about the tapering off of QE, Mainland Region reforms, and the excessive concentration of export structures, may explain Taiwan's poor foreign trade numbers. But the question remains. How should Taiwan deal with them?
First, we must understand the changes in the global economic situation. Currently there are three major concerns. One. The Fed has yet to announce when and how it will end quantitative easing. Uncertainty remains. Past talk of QE unsettled the East Asian economy. Subsequent market reactions have moderated. But the damage done to the real economy remains unknown. Two. The U.S. government shut down in October for 16 days. U.S. GDP growth is expected to decrease 0.4% to 0.5%. Worse, the fiscal cliff has merely been postponed, not resolved. US economic risk remains. Three. The Chinese Mainland is undergoing reform. Economic growth has been downgraded from "high speed" to "medium speed." The economic structure has been changed from "factory" to "market." Dividends from reforms continue coming. But the attendant risk has increased. This will accelerate cross-Strait economic and trade coopetition.
In addition to short-term economic risks, Taiwan faces mid and long-term challenges. Taiwan requires other strategies. Put plainly, it requires FTAs and regional integration. Taiwan's main competitor is South Korea. It has been the most aggressive signer of FTAs. In recent years, its FTAs have begun to pay off. In July 2011 the Europe-Korean FTA took effect. In March 2012 the US-Korean FTA took effect. The Chinese Mainland-Korean FTA is expected to take effect in early 2014. The numbers tell the story. Take March 2012 to February 2013, and the US-Korea FTA trade situation. Taiwan's exports to the United States during this period to fell by a total of $1.9 billion, by 4.65%. South Korean exports to the U.S. grew by 3.87%. The US-Korean FTA changed the competitiveness of Taiwan and Korean products in the U.S. market. This happened after only one year. The gap in the growth rate will obviously widen. How can Taiwan companies not be concerned?
The government is aware of the increasingly harsh economic environment. In recent years, it has made efforts to promote ECFA, the Taiwan New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, GATS, and the soon to be signed Taiwan Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement. It has attempted to increase the international competitiveness of our companies. It has attempted to create more favorable conditions for them. It has sought to join the TPP, RCEP and other forms of regional cooperation, to seek equal economic status, to help Taiwan businesses break into international markets, and to expand their economic territory.
It has helped Taiwan businesses expand outward. It must also take advantage of Taiwan's geographical location and industrial structure. It must transform Taiwan into an Asian-Pacific international financial center, operating center, and capital-raising center. Its foreign policy must be to actively negotiate FTAs, while seeking to join the TPP, RCEP and other forms of regional cooperation. Its domestic policy must be to change its domestic environment. People flow, cash flow, business flow, and product flows must be liberalized. Market opening must be accelerated. This will attract a foreign presence, and create an international free trade environment. These two strategies complement each other. Implementation of a Free Trade Island is also the best strategy to revive Taiwan's stifled economy.
The Free Trade Island policy is a step in the right direction. What's missing is execution and implementation. Taiwan's exports have set off alarms. The government must move quickly. it must respond to short-term economic risks. It must carefully plan and implement mid and long term strategy. It must make hay while the sun shines. Only then can it revive Taiwan's economy.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.10.28
社論－韓FTA成果發酵 台出口現危機
本報訊
台灣9月出口意外疲軟，終止連續4個月正成長，年成長率下滑7％，總金額亦較8月減少1.5％。1至9月出口累計總金額為2266.4億美元，僅較去年同期成長1.3％，出口動能堪慮。同時9月進口雖較8月份增加8.8％，但年減0.7％，且累計1至9月進口較去年同期減少0.9％，整體來看，外貿狀況真的不好。
檢視對各地區的出口狀況，出口至歐洲地區幅度明顯加快，對美、日兩國的出口表現持穩，令人擔心的是，占我國出口近60％的大陸及東協地區，第3季成長率掉落至負成長區，且未來動能仍不明朗。
綜觀第3季全球景氣，美、歐、日、中四大經濟體製造業PMI連3個月維持在50以上，代表景氣維持擴張，理論上台灣出口數據應該漸入佳境，但最新的統計數據卻不盡人意，9月份出口出現的意外衰退，似乎不是暫時性短期波動所能解釋，可能是長期性的結構轉變，如果本月對大陸及東協地區出口依然表現不佳，將是台灣經濟的大警訊。
台灣出口與國際經濟情勢趨勢呈背離現象，是過去少見的現象。歐元區第2季GDP成長率已擺脫戰後最長的連7季衰退困境，漲幅是2011年第1季以來最快，景氣回溫立即呈現在對台灣商品進口的增加上。美國經濟也回到正軌，日本安倍經濟學仍在發酵中，兩國經濟大體穩定，台灣對這兩個國家持穩的出口表現十分合理。令人擔心的則是亞太新興市場，尤其大陸改革如火如荼，長期的經濟不確性加劇，且美國QE遲早必須退場，退場將導致資金撤出亞太新興市場，造成對大陸及東亞各國市場、匯率、股市及對經濟前景衝擊的擔憂，這些因素都會影響實質需求。
簡言之，QE退場疑慮、大陸改革及過度集中的出口結構都可以做為台灣近期外貿數據不佳的解釋，但我們不免要問，台灣要如何應對？
首先，必須明白全球經濟局勢的變化，目前三大重點值得關注。第一，Fed仍未宣布量化寬鬆退場的時機與方式，使得不確定性延後，由過去幾次QE討論震盪東亞經濟，市場的反應雖已逐次遞減，但對於實體經濟的損傷仍是未知。第二，10月份美國政府停擺16日，市場預期將使美國GDP減少0.4％~0.5％的成長幅度，加上財政懸崖只是暫緩並未解決，美經濟風險仍存。第三，大陸進入改革時期，經濟成長目標已由「高速」轉為「中速」，經濟結構亦計畫由「工廠」轉為「市場」，改革紅利仍將持續釋放，但其背後必然伴隨著風險的提升，且將加速兩岸經貿的「競合」賽局。
其次，除了短期對於經濟風險的掌握，面對中、長期的挑戰，台灣必須還要有其他的戰略。明白的說，就是FTA及區域整合的布局，以台灣主要競爭對手韓國為例，其近年來最為積極簽談FTA，成果已經開始發酵了。2011年7月歐韓FTA生效，2012年3月美韓FTA生效，預計2014年初中韓FTA也將啟動，數據會說話，就2012年3月至2013年2月美韓FTA生效1年的貿易情況來看，這段期間台灣出口至美國總金額減少19億美元，衰退幅度達4.65％，但韓國對美國的出口成長了3.87％，顯示美韓FTA改變了台、韓產品在美國市場的競爭力，僅僅施行1年，成長率就明顯拉開了，台灣企業怎麼能不擔心？
政府也知道愈來愈惡劣的經貿環境，近年來努力推動ECFA、台紐貿協、服貿及即將簽訂的台星經濟夥伴協定等等FTA，盡力強化企業國際競爭力，創造有利的條件，同時積極爭取加入TPP與RCEP之區域合作，爭取平等經貿地位，協助台灣企業進入國際市場，更全面拓展經貿版圖。
此外，除了協助台灣企業走出去，未來也應把握地理位置及產業結構優勢，打造台灣成為亞太國際級的金融、營運、籌資中心。具體來說，對外策略是積極協商FTA，同時爭取加入TPP及RCEP等區域合作；再來就是要改變國內環境，透過人流、金流、商流、物流的鬆綁，加速市場開放、吸引外資進駐，創造國際化的自由經貿環境，兩大戰略相輔相成，落實「自由經濟島」的目標，這也是解救台灣「悶經濟」的最佳戰略。
「自由經濟島」的施政方向正確，缺的是執行與落實，台灣出口已拉警報，政府必須加速作為，短期經濟風險小心因應，中、長期戰略必須用心規畫、積極落實，晴天先備雨具，才能帶領台灣經濟再起飛。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 28, 2013
Summary: The Free Trade Island policy is a step in the right direction. What's missing is execution and implementation. Taiwan's exports have set off alarms. The government must move quickly. it must respond to short-term economic risks. It must carefully plan and implement mid and long term strategy. It must make hay while the sun shines. Only then can it revive Taiwan's economy.
Full text below:
Taiwan's exports in September were unexpectedly weak. They spelled an end to four consecutive months of positive growth. The annual growth rate declined 7%. The total amount in dollars decreased by 1.5% since August. Aggregate exports from January to September amounted to $ 226.64 billion. This spelled an increase of only 1.3% over last year. The lack of export momentum is worrisome. Imports in September increased 8.8% over August. But decreased 0.7% over the year. Cumulative January to September imports decreased by 0.9%. Overall, the foreign trade situation looks bad.
Consider the status of exports to different regions. Exports to Europe have accelerated significantly. Exports to the United States and Japan have remained steady. Mainland China and the ASEAN region account for nearly 60% of our exports. What is worrisome is that 3rd quarter growth is now negative. The future remains uncertain.
Consider the third quarter as it affects the global economy. The United States, Europe, Japan, and Mainland China are the largest economies. Their manufacturing PMI has remained at 50 or more for three straight months. This means the economy is still growing. Theoretically Taiwan's export numbers should be improving. Yet the latest statistical data is unsatisfactory. September exports fell unexpectedly. This cannot be explained away as a short-term fluctuation. This may be due to long-term structural changes. If exports to the Chinese Mainland and the ASEAN region continue to underperform this month, it will be a major warning sign for Taiwan's economy.
Taiwan's exports and the international economic situation have diverged. This is something seldom seen in the past. Eurozone GDP growth rate in the second quarter ended a seven quarter long recession, the longest in postwar history. Growth resumed. It was the fastest since the first quarter of 2011. This was apparent in the increase in imports to Taiwan. The U.S. economy is back on track. Japan's Abenomics is beginning to take effect. The two economies are generally stable. Taiwan's exports to these two countries has remained steady. What is worrisome is Asian-Pacific region emerging markets. Mainland reforms are in full swing. Long-term economic uncertainties have been intensified. Sooner or later, the US must cease QE. When it does, Asian-Pacific emerging market funds will withdraw. This will impact the economic outlook for the Chinese Mainland and East Asian markets, exchange rates, and stock markets. These factors will all affect demand.
In short, concerns about the tapering off of QE, Mainland Region reforms, and the excessive concentration of export structures, may explain Taiwan's poor foreign trade numbers. But the question remains. How should Taiwan deal with them?
First, we must understand the changes in the global economic situation. Currently there are three major concerns. One. The Fed has yet to announce when and how it will end quantitative easing. Uncertainty remains. Past talk of QE unsettled the East Asian economy. Subsequent market reactions have moderated. But the damage done to the real economy remains unknown. Two. The U.S. government shut down in October for 16 days. U.S. GDP growth is expected to decrease 0.4% to 0.5%. Worse, the fiscal cliff has merely been postponed, not resolved. US economic risk remains. Three. The Chinese Mainland is undergoing reform. Economic growth has been downgraded from "high speed" to "medium speed." The economic structure has been changed from "factory" to "market." Dividends from reforms continue coming. But the attendant risk has increased. This will accelerate cross-Strait economic and trade coopetition.
In addition to short-term economic risks, Taiwan faces mid and long-term challenges. Taiwan requires other strategies. Put plainly, it requires FTAs and regional integration. Taiwan's main competitor is South Korea. It has been the most aggressive signer of FTAs. In recent years, its FTAs have begun to pay off. In July 2011 the Europe-Korean FTA took effect. In March 2012 the US-Korean FTA took effect. The Chinese Mainland-Korean FTA is expected to take effect in early 2014. The numbers tell the story. Take March 2012 to February 2013, and the US-Korea FTA trade situation. Taiwan's exports to the United States during this period to fell by a total of $1.9 billion, by 4.65%. South Korean exports to the U.S. grew by 3.87%. The US-Korean FTA changed the competitiveness of Taiwan and Korean products in the U.S. market. This happened after only one year. The gap in the growth rate will obviously widen. How can Taiwan companies not be concerned?
The government is aware of the increasingly harsh economic environment. In recent years, it has made efforts to promote ECFA, the Taiwan New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, GATS, and the soon to be signed Taiwan Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement. It has attempted to increase the international competitiveness of our companies. It has attempted to create more favorable conditions for them. It has sought to join the TPP, RCEP and other forms of regional cooperation, to seek equal economic status, to help Taiwan businesses break into international markets, and to expand their economic territory.
It has helped Taiwan businesses expand outward. It must also take advantage of Taiwan's geographical location and industrial structure. It must transform Taiwan into an Asian-Pacific international financial center, operating center, and capital-raising center. Its foreign policy must be to actively negotiate FTAs, while seeking to join the TPP, RCEP and other forms of regional cooperation. Its domestic policy must be to change its domestic environment. People flow, cash flow, business flow, and product flows must be liberalized. Market opening must be accelerated. This will attract a foreign presence, and create an international free trade environment. These two strategies complement each other. Implementation of a Free Trade Island is also the best strategy to revive Taiwan's stifled economy.
The Free Trade Island policy is a step in the right direction. What's missing is execution and implementation. Taiwan's exports have set off alarms. The government must move quickly. it must respond to short-term economic risks. It must carefully plan and implement mid and long term strategy. It must make hay while the sun shines. Only then can it revive Taiwan's economy.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.10.28
社論－韓FTA成果發酵 台出口現危機
本報訊
台灣9月出口意外疲軟，終止連續4個月正成長，年成長率下滑7％，總金額亦較8月減少1.5％。1至9月出口累計總金額為2266.4億美元，僅較去年同期成長1.3％，出口動能堪慮。同時9月進口雖較8月份增加8.8％，但年減0.7％，且累計1至9月進口較去年同期減少0.9％，整體來看，外貿狀況真的不好。
檢視對各地區的出口狀況，出口至歐洲地區幅度明顯加快，對美、日兩國的出口表現持穩，令人擔心的是，占我國出口近60％的大陸及東協地區，第3季成長率掉落至負成長區，且未來動能仍不明朗。
綜觀第3季全球景氣，美、歐、日、中四大經濟體製造業PMI連3個月維持在50以上，代表景氣維持擴張，理論上台灣出口數據應該漸入佳境，但最新的統計數據卻不盡人意，9月份出口出現的意外衰退，似乎不是暫時性短期波動所能解釋，可能是長期性的結構轉變，如果本月對大陸及東協地區出口依然表現不佳，將是台灣經濟的大警訊。
台灣出口與國際經濟情勢趨勢呈背離現象，是過去少見的現象。歐元區第2季GDP成長率已擺脫戰後最長的連7季衰退困境，漲幅是2011年第1季以來最快，景氣回溫立即呈現在對台灣商品進口的增加上。美國經濟也回到正軌，日本安倍經濟學仍在發酵中，兩國經濟大體穩定，台灣對這兩個國家持穩的出口表現十分合理。令人擔心的則是亞太新興市場，尤其大陸改革如火如荼，長期的經濟不確性加劇，且美國QE遲早必須退場，退場將導致資金撤出亞太新興市場，造成對大陸及東亞各國市場、匯率、股市及對經濟前景衝擊的擔憂，這些因素都會影響實質需求。
簡言之，QE退場疑慮、大陸改革及過度集中的出口結構都可以做為台灣近期外貿數據不佳的解釋，但我們不免要問，台灣要如何應對？
首先，必須明白全球經濟局勢的變化，目前三大重點值得關注。第一，Fed仍未宣布量化寬鬆退場的時機與方式，使得不確定性延後，由過去幾次QE討論震盪東亞經濟，市場的反應雖已逐次遞減，但對於實體經濟的損傷仍是未知。第二，10月份美國政府停擺16日，市場預期將使美國GDP減少0.4％~0.5％的成長幅度，加上財政懸崖只是暫緩並未解決，美經濟風險仍存。第三，大陸進入改革時期，經濟成長目標已由「高速」轉為「中速」，經濟結構亦計畫由「工廠」轉為「市場」，改革紅利仍將持續釋放，但其背後必然伴隨著風險的提升，且將加速兩岸經貿的「競合」賽局。
其次，除了短期對於經濟風險的掌握，面對中、長期的挑戰，台灣必須還要有其他的戰略。明白的說，就是FTA及區域整合的布局，以台灣主要競爭對手韓國為例，其近年來最為積極簽談FTA，成果已經開始發酵了。2011年7月歐韓FTA生效，2012年3月美韓FTA生效，預計2014年初中韓FTA也將啟動，數據會說話，就2012年3月至2013年2月美韓FTA生效1年的貿易情況來看，這段期間台灣出口至美國總金額減少19億美元，衰退幅度達4.65％，但韓國對美國的出口成長了3.87％，顯示美韓FTA改變了台、韓產品在美國市場的競爭力，僅僅施行1年，成長率就明顯拉開了，台灣企業怎麼能不擔心？
政府也知道愈來愈惡劣的經貿環境，近年來努力推動ECFA、台紐貿協、服貿及即將簽訂的台星經濟夥伴協定等等FTA，盡力強化企業國際競爭力，創造有利的條件，同時積極爭取加入TPP與RCEP之區域合作，爭取平等經貿地位，協助台灣企業進入國際市場，更全面拓展經貿版圖。
此外，除了協助台灣企業走出去，未來也應把握地理位置及產業結構優勢，打造台灣成為亞太國際級的金融、營運、籌資中心。具體來說，對外策略是積極協商FTA，同時爭取加入TPP及RCEP等區域合作；再來就是要改變國內環境，透過人流、金流、商流、物流的鬆綁，加速市場開放、吸引外資進駐，創造國際化的自由經貿環境，兩大戰略相輔相成，落實「自由經濟島」的目標，這也是解救台灣「悶經濟」的最佳戰略。
「自由經濟島」的施政方向正確，缺的是執行與落實，台灣出口已拉警報，政府必須加速作為，短期經濟風險小心因應，中、長期戰略必須用心規畫、積極落實，晴天先備雨具，才能帶領台灣經濟再起飛。
Thursday, October 24, 2013
Martial Law: Victim Mentality and Original Sin
Martial Law: Victim Mentality and Original Sin
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 25, 2013
Summary: Martial law was lifted on Taiwan 25 years ago. Nevertheless the DPP clings to its "martial law victim mentality." Meanwhile, the KMT continues agonizing over its "martial law original sin." To a considerable extent, the current political chaos reflects these two mindsets. It reflects the failure to establish a post-martial law understanding of right and wrong
Full text below:
Martial law was lifted on Taiwan 25 years ago. Nevertheless the DPP clings to its "martial law victim mentality." Meanwhile, the KMT continues agonizing over its "martial law original sin." To a considerable extent, the current political chaos reflects these two mindsets. It reflects the failure to establish a post-martial law understanding of right and wrong
Martial law lasted 38 years. Many injustices occurred. They include one-party dictatorship, the "10,000 Year Legislature," bans on the formation of new political parties and press freedom, a non-independent criminal justice system, and the White Terror. The DPP has long trumpeted itself as a martial law victim dedicated to the righetous overthrow of martial law, beginning with the "dang wai (outside the KMT) era"). By assuming these roles, it won considerable public sympathy and support. The DPP did contribute to Taiwan's democratization. But once martial law was lifted, the DPP adopted its 1991 "Taiwan Independence Party Platform." It combined "support for democracy" with " Taiwan independence" in a package deal. It established a Conventional Wisdom according to which "Democracy is Taiwan independence and Taiwan independence is democracy," and to which "Taiwan independence equals justice and opposition to Taiwan independence equals injustice." The DPP appointed itself the "official spokesperson for the love of Taiwan." It turned the KMT and the Republic of China into a "foreign regime that is selling out Taiwan." From start to finish, the DPP has cast itself as martial law victims and Taiwan independence leaders. It has used this to rationalize and justify its political subversion.
Conversely, the KMT has never rid itself of martial law original sin. Toward the end of the Lee Teng-hui era, the KMT was afraid even to display the red, white, and blue ROC flag at campaign rallies. One reason was the deterrent effect of ubiquitous green and white DPP flags, and "Naiton of Taiwan " banners. In 1999, in order to enter the following year's presidential election. Chen Shui-bian recognize the Republic of China. The DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" shifted towards the political center. That same year, Lee Teng-hui proposed his "two states theory" to gain Taiwan independence votes from Chen Shui-bian. Lee waxed poetic about "the sorrow of the Taiwanese." He declared that "The Republic of China no longer exists." This reflected his ethnic Japanese nostalgia for Japanese colonial rule, coupled with feelings of guilt over martial law original sin. ROC President Lee Teng-hui demagoguing "ROC original sin" merely made Taiwan independence zealots even more arrogant.
The whole "martial law consciousness" phenomenon eventually led to a Republic of China vs. "Nation of Taiwan" struggle. The ROC was cast as the unrighteous victimizer. Taiwan independence was cast as the righteouis victims. The object was to totally discredit the Republic of China. The DPP opposes everything about the ROC, Including the ROC Constitution, Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen, and the use of Mandarin Chinese. As a result, any struggle against the Republic of China is rationalized and justified. After all, as long as one is attempting to overthrow the Republic of China, how could anything one does be unjust?
By contrast, the political debt owned by Republic of China and the Kuomintang to the DPP dated back to the martial law era, can apparently never be paid. For example, every year on February 28, Ma Ying-jeou apologizes for the 2-28 Incident. The DPP and Taiwan independence zealots do not limit themselves to demanding reparations from the KMT. The entire society must repay this "perpetual debt." But martial law was lifted 25 years ago. During that time the DPP ruled the Republic of China for eight years. Can the DPP's martial law victimization and the KMT's martial law original sin really go on forever?
The world is changing. Cross-Strait relations are changing. Taiwan is changing. The Republic of China is changing. The DPP vs KMT struggle was a struggle between the Republic of China and Taiwan Independence. But according to the DPP's own criteria, the Republic of China has changed from Taiwan's victimizer to Taiwan's protector. Taiwan independence has changed from Taiwan's savior to Taiwan's increasingly marginalized trouble-maker. This underlying change is our cue to establish a post-martial law understanding of right and wrong. The DPP can no longer do whatever it wishes. It must base its actions on justice. The KMT must strive to rehabilitate its demonized public image. .
A post-martial law understanding of right and wrong means the DPP can no longer invoke martial law era Taiwan independence thinking to justify its political policy. It cannot argue that "Since we advocate Taiwan independence, we must destroy the Republic of China." Instead, it must avoid any irreversible actions that would harm Taiwan and subvert the ROC. The KMT should gradually let go of its guilt over martial law original sin. It must cease shrinking in stature whenever the issue of right and wrong arise. The key is the rehabilitation of the ROC's reputation for credibility. honor, and justice. The debate must no longer be about "How to subvert the Republic of China." It must be about "How to support and improve the Republic of China."
Taiwan no longer needs to subvert the Republic of China to achieve justice. Perhaps a post- martial law understanding of right and wrong can establish this principle. All that is required is a change in our thinking. Partisan struggles must not cross the red line. They must not harm Taiwan and subvert the ROC. Otherwise, the DPP and KMT will not be the only ones that suffer. Taiwan will be harmed and the ROC will be destroyed.
「戒嚴受害感」與「戒嚴原罪感」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.25 02:44 am
台灣解嚴已二十五年，但民進黨的「戒嚴受害感」與國民黨的「戒嚴原罪感」皆仍存在。眼下所見政治亂局，相當程度皆與上述「兩感」有關，亦即與未能建立「後解嚴時代的政治是非思維」有關。
在長達三十八年的戒嚴時期，存有諸多不正義，如一黨專政、萬年國會、黨禁報禁、司法不獨立、白色恐怖等等。民進黨自黨外時代開始，即以「戒嚴體制的受害者」及「推翻戒嚴體制的正義者」自命；這兩個角色皆相當程度地受到社會的同情與支持，而民進黨對台灣的民主化工程亦實具貢獻。解嚴後，民進黨又以一九九一年的《台獨黨綱》，將「民主運動」與「台獨革命」糾纏在一起；遂至形成一種「民主即台獨／台獨即民主／台獨即正義／反台獨即不民主、不正義」的政治氛圍，民進黨成了「愛台灣」的獨家代言人，而將國民黨、中華民國的那一邊，說成「賣台」的「外來政權」。一路走來，民進黨以「戒嚴受害者」及「台獨領導人」自命，遂將其一切政治抗爭合理化、正義化。
相對而言，國民黨卻始終未擺脫「戒嚴原罪感」的心態。李登輝執政的後期，在國民黨的選舉場合，甚至不敢舉出青天白日滿地紅的國旗，原因之一是受到民進黨滿天綠旗與「台灣國」旗幟的震懾所致。後來到了一九九九年，陳水扁為次年總統大選而推出了接受中華民國國號的《台灣前途決議文》，向中間靠攏；同一年，李登輝卻竟然提出《兩國論》，想與陳水扁搶台獨票。李登輝所說的「台灣人的悲哀」，及「中華民國已不存在」，正是深沉的皇民後裔之悵惘，加上濃重的「戒嚴原罪感」所致。甚至可說，李登輝身為中華民國總統，居然竟有「中華民國原罪感」，遂使台獨的氣焰更熾。
整個「戒嚴思維」，最後就形成了「中華民國vs.台灣國」的鬥爭。「中華民國」是迫害者、不義者，「台獨」是受害者、人格者。而既然是要完全否定中華民國，民進黨即反對中華民國的一切，包括反對中華民國憲法、蔣介石、孫中山、國語等等；亦因此，任何反對中華民國的鬥爭，亦皆被合理化、正義化了。因為，既是要推翻中華民國，還有什麼手段是不正義的？
相對而言，中華民國與國民黨在戒嚴時代「欠」民進黨的政治債務，卻好像永遠也還不完。比如說，馬英九年年都要為「二二八血債」道歉，民進黨與台獨則到現在仍以「債權人」自居。但這筆「永遠的債務」卻不只是國民黨在償還，而是整個社會都要陪著一起向「永遠的債權人」還償。問題是：解嚴都已二十五年了，民進黨在其間還統治了中華民國八年之久，民進黨此種「戒嚴受害感」與國民黨的「戒嚴原罪感」，難道要漫無止境地延續下去？
然而，世界在變，兩岸在變，台灣在變，中華民國也在變。民進黨與國民黨的鬥爭，其軸心即在「中華民國vs.台獨」的鬥爭；但是，如今即使從民進黨的政治標準來看，中華民國也已漸從「台灣的加害者」，變成了守護者；而台獨似也從「台灣的拯救者」，變成了徒亂人心、無裨大局的邊緣化角色。由於此一軸心的轉變，這應當是一個建立「後解嚴時代政治是非思維」的時候了。也就是說，今日的民進黨不可再不擇手段卻一切皆以正義自居，而今日的國民黨也應努力修補、擺脫其被妖魔化的形象。
所謂「後解嚴時代的政治是非思維」，就是民進黨不應再以「戒嚴時代」的「台獨思維」來問政，也就是不宜再用「既主張台獨／就要毀了中華民國」的心態來問政，而應在「不要導致無可回復的傷台毀國」的界限之內來問政。國民黨則應慢慢放下那種「戒嚴原罪感」，不要一旦面對政治是非就好像矮人一截，其關鍵即在重建「中華民國」的可信任感、光榮感與正義性，使得政治是非的辯論不再糾纏於「如何毀了中華民國」，而應引導至「如何扶持及改善中華民國」。
當台灣不再「以毀滅中華民國為正義」，或許「後解嚴時代的政治是非思維」始有可能建立。只要存此一念，黨爭即可能節制在「傷台毀國」的紅線之內；否則，恐不止是民進黨與國民黨的兩敗俱傷，而終將步上「傷台毀國」的下場。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 25, 2013
Summary: Martial law was lifted on Taiwan 25 years ago. Nevertheless the DPP clings to its "martial law victim mentality." Meanwhile, the KMT continues agonizing over its "martial law original sin." To a considerable extent, the current political chaos reflects these two mindsets. It reflects the failure to establish a post-martial law understanding of right and wrong
Full text below:
Martial law was lifted on Taiwan 25 years ago. Nevertheless the DPP clings to its "martial law victim mentality." Meanwhile, the KMT continues agonizing over its "martial law original sin." To a considerable extent, the current political chaos reflects these two mindsets. It reflects the failure to establish a post-martial law understanding of right and wrong
Martial law lasted 38 years. Many injustices occurred. They include one-party dictatorship, the "10,000 Year Legislature," bans on the formation of new political parties and press freedom, a non-independent criminal justice system, and the White Terror. The DPP has long trumpeted itself as a martial law victim dedicated to the righetous overthrow of martial law, beginning with the "dang wai (outside the KMT) era"). By assuming these roles, it won considerable public sympathy and support. The DPP did contribute to Taiwan's democratization. But once martial law was lifted, the DPP adopted its 1991 "Taiwan Independence Party Platform." It combined "support for democracy" with " Taiwan independence" in a package deal. It established a Conventional Wisdom according to which "Democracy is Taiwan independence and Taiwan independence is democracy," and to which "Taiwan independence equals justice and opposition to Taiwan independence equals injustice." The DPP appointed itself the "official spokesperson for the love of Taiwan." It turned the KMT and the Republic of China into a "foreign regime that is selling out Taiwan." From start to finish, the DPP has cast itself as martial law victims and Taiwan independence leaders. It has used this to rationalize and justify its political subversion.
Conversely, the KMT has never rid itself of martial law original sin. Toward the end of the Lee Teng-hui era, the KMT was afraid even to display the red, white, and blue ROC flag at campaign rallies. One reason was the deterrent effect of ubiquitous green and white DPP flags, and "Naiton of Taiwan " banners. In 1999, in order to enter the following year's presidential election. Chen Shui-bian recognize the Republic of China. The DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" shifted towards the political center. That same year, Lee Teng-hui proposed his "two states theory" to gain Taiwan independence votes from Chen Shui-bian. Lee waxed poetic about "the sorrow of the Taiwanese." He declared that "The Republic of China no longer exists." This reflected his ethnic Japanese nostalgia for Japanese colonial rule, coupled with feelings of guilt over martial law original sin. ROC President Lee Teng-hui demagoguing "ROC original sin" merely made Taiwan independence zealots even more arrogant.
The whole "martial law consciousness" phenomenon eventually led to a Republic of China vs. "Nation of Taiwan" struggle. The ROC was cast as the unrighteous victimizer. Taiwan independence was cast as the righteouis victims. The object was to totally discredit the Republic of China. The DPP opposes everything about the ROC, Including the ROC Constitution, Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen, and the use of Mandarin Chinese. As a result, any struggle against the Republic of China is rationalized and justified. After all, as long as one is attempting to overthrow the Republic of China, how could anything one does be unjust?
By contrast, the political debt owned by Republic of China and the Kuomintang to the DPP dated back to the martial law era, can apparently never be paid. For example, every year on February 28, Ma Ying-jeou apologizes for the 2-28 Incident. The DPP and Taiwan independence zealots do not limit themselves to demanding reparations from the KMT. The entire society must repay this "perpetual debt." But martial law was lifted 25 years ago. During that time the DPP ruled the Republic of China for eight years. Can the DPP's martial law victimization and the KMT's martial law original sin really go on forever?
The world is changing. Cross-Strait relations are changing. Taiwan is changing. The Republic of China is changing. The DPP vs KMT struggle was a struggle between the Republic of China and Taiwan Independence. But according to the DPP's own criteria, the Republic of China has changed from Taiwan's victimizer to Taiwan's protector. Taiwan independence has changed from Taiwan's savior to Taiwan's increasingly marginalized trouble-maker. This underlying change is our cue to establish a post-martial law understanding of right and wrong. The DPP can no longer do whatever it wishes. It must base its actions on justice. The KMT must strive to rehabilitate its demonized public image. .
A post-martial law understanding of right and wrong means the DPP can no longer invoke martial law era Taiwan independence thinking to justify its political policy. It cannot argue that "Since we advocate Taiwan independence, we must destroy the Republic of China." Instead, it must avoid any irreversible actions that would harm Taiwan and subvert the ROC. The KMT should gradually let go of its guilt over martial law original sin. It must cease shrinking in stature whenever the issue of right and wrong arise. The key is the rehabilitation of the ROC's reputation for credibility. honor, and justice. The debate must no longer be about "How to subvert the Republic of China." It must be about "How to support and improve the Republic of China."
Taiwan no longer needs to subvert the Republic of China to achieve justice. Perhaps a post- martial law understanding of right and wrong can establish this principle. All that is required is a change in our thinking. Partisan struggles must not cross the red line. They must not harm Taiwan and subvert the ROC. Otherwise, the DPP and KMT will not be the only ones that suffer. Taiwan will be harmed and the ROC will be destroyed.
「戒嚴受害感」與「戒嚴原罪感」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.25 02:44 am
台灣解嚴已二十五年，但民進黨的「戒嚴受害感」與國民黨的「戒嚴原罪感」皆仍存在。眼下所見政治亂局，相當程度皆與上述「兩感」有關，亦即與未能建立「後解嚴時代的政治是非思維」有關。
在長達三十八年的戒嚴時期，存有諸多不正義，如一黨專政、萬年國會、黨禁報禁、司法不獨立、白色恐怖等等。民進黨自黨外時代開始，即以「戒嚴體制的受害者」及「推翻戒嚴體制的正義者」自命；這兩個角色皆相當程度地受到社會的同情與支持，而民進黨對台灣的民主化工程亦實具貢獻。解嚴後，民進黨又以一九九一年的《台獨黨綱》，將「民主運動」與「台獨革命」糾纏在一起；遂至形成一種「民主即台獨／台獨即民主／台獨即正義／反台獨即不民主、不正義」的政治氛圍，民進黨成了「愛台灣」的獨家代言人，而將國民黨、中華民國的那一邊，說成「賣台」的「外來政權」。一路走來，民進黨以「戒嚴受害者」及「台獨領導人」自命，遂將其一切政治抗爭合理化、正義化。
相對而言，國民黨卻始終未擺脫「戒嚴原罪感」的心態。李登輝執政的後期，在國民黨的選舉場合，甚至不敢舉出青天白日滿地紅的國旗，原因之一是受到民進黨滿天綠旗與「台灣國」旗幟的震懾所致。後來到了一九九九年，陳水扁為次年總統大選而推出了接受中華民國國號的《台灣前途決議文》，向中間靠攏；同一年，李登輝卻竟然提出《兩國論》，想與陳水扁搶台獨票。李登輝所說的「台灣人的悲哀」，及「中華民國已不存在」，正是深沉的皇民後裔之悵惘，加上濃重的「戒嚴原罪感」所致。甚至可說，李登輝身為中華民國總統，居然竟有「中華民國原罪感」，遂使台獨的氣焰更熾。
整個「戒嚴思維」，最後就形成了「中華民國vs.台灣國」的鬥爭。「中華民國」是迫害者、不義者，「台獨」是受害者、人格者。而既然是要完全否定中華民國，民進黨即反對中華民國的一切，包括反對中華民國憲法、蔣介石、孫中山、國語等等；亦因此，任何反對中華民國的鬥爭，亦皆被合理化、正義化了。因為，既是要推翻中華民國，還有什麼手段是不正義的？
相對而言，中華民國與國民黨在戒嚴時代「欠」民進黨的政治債務，卻好像永遠也還不完。比如說，馬英九年年都要為「二二八血債」道歉，民進黨與台獨則到現在仍以「債權人」自居。但這筆「永遠的債務」卻不只是國民黨在償還，而是整個社會都要陪著一起向「永遠的債權人」還償。問題是：解嚴都已二十五年了，民進黨在其間還統治了中華民國八年之久，民進黨此種「戒嚴受害感」與國民黨的「戒嚴原罪感」，難道要漫無止境地延續下去？
然而，世界在變，兩岸在變，台灣在變，中華民國也在變。民進黨與國民黨的鬥爭，其軸心即在「中華民國vs.台獨」的鬥爭；但是，如今即使從民進黨的政治標準來看，中華民國也已漸從「台灣的加害者」，變成了守護者；而台獨似也從「台灣的拯救者」，變成了徒亂人心、無裨大局的邊緣化角色。由於此一軸心的轉變，這應當是一個建立「後解嚴時代政治是非思維」的時候了。也就是說，今日的民進黨不可再不擇手段卻一切皆以正義自居，而今日的國民黨也應努力修補、擺脫其被妖魔化的形象。
所謂「後解嚴時代的政治是非思維」，就是民進黨不應再以「戒嚴時代」的「台獨思維」來問政，也就是不宜再用「既主張台獨／就要毀了中華民國」的心態來問政，而應在「不要導致無可回復的傷台毀國」的界限之內來問政。國民黨則應慢慢放下那種「戒嚴原罪感」，不要一旦面對政治是非就好像矮人一截，其關鍵即在重建「中華民國」的可信任感、光榮感與正義性，使得政治是非的辯論不再糾纏於「如何毀了中華民國」，而應引導至「如何扶持及改善中華民國」。
當台灣不再「以毀滅中華民國為正義」，或許「後解嚴時代的政治是非思維」始有可能建立。只要存此一念，黨爭即可能節制在「傷台毀國」的紅線之內；否則，恐不止是民進黨與國民黨的兩敗俱傷，而終將步上「傷台毀國」的下場。
Why President Ma is Tone Deaf to Public Sentiment
Why President Ma is Tone Deaf to Public Sentiment
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 24, 2013
Summary: After a month and a half of political pressure, the cabinet finally announced that it has reassigned two political appointees, and two vice ministers. Strangely enough, the replacement of four important political appointees has attracted little media attention. No one seems interested. Once again the Ma government has implemented another "clueless" cabinet personnel change.
Full text below:
After a month and a half of political pressure, the cabinet finally announced that it has reassigned two political appointees, and two vice ministers. Strangely enough, the replacement of four important political appointees has attracted little media attention. No one seems interested. Once again the Ma government has implemented another "clueless" cabinet personnel change.
It is easy to recall. Everyone remembers. Ma administration cabinet reshuffles have seldom excited the public. Recent political troubles led to popular discontent. People took to the streets to denounce Ma and throw shoes in protest. The Ma government cabinet reshuffle could have broken new ground, united public sentiment, and soothed public anxiety. Instead, when the new personnel list was announced, people felt nothing. Is the administration tone deaf to public sentiment? Or has the administration merely lost the will to make any breakthroughs?
Recent cabinet personnel changes were lackluster. The newcomers were not the problem. The problem was at the macro level. The personnel assignments signified nothing. The administration merely filled a row of empty seats. President Ma has been blasted for this since he took office five years ago. The government hires too many academics. They are much too alike. They lack the ability to innovate. They lack practical experience. This is why the Ma administration lacks the ability to respond to public sentiment, and why even today it continues to spin its wheels. When the ruling Ma administration runs into a major dilemma, troubles inside and outside the party become intensified. Under current circumstances, it cannot offer President Ma a new approach to governing. Needless to say, the public is deeply disappointed.
Take Andrew Hsia. He is a veteran of the diplomatic field. Four years ago, during Typhoon Morakot, he "politely declined foreign aid." As a result he was forced to resign from the Foreign Ministry and transferred overseas. The current reshuffling brought him home. Now he is filling the vacancy left when the Deputy Minister of Defence resigned in response to the Hung Chung-chiu scandal. This is not to say that diplomats cannot serve in the field of national defense, and vice versa. But four years ago Hsia was abruply removed from his post. Today he has been unexpectedly transferred to a military post. This shows that under President Ma, political appointees are "easy come, easy go." Andrew Hsia has been appointed Deputy Defense Minister. One can euphemistically say that he promoting "military diplomacy," and facilitating "military exchanges" with the United States. But is there really no one else in the military capable of filling that roles? Will appointing a diplomat to the post of Deputy MInister of Defense undermine military morale even more. Not long ago, Andrew Yang resigned after six days on the job, in response to allegations of plagiarism. Did the Ma administration learn nothing?
Now take Chen Yi-Hsing, who was forced to resign from the Ministry of Education for reneging on free tuition for 12 year compulsory education. Chen Yi-hsing did not "resign on his own." That was understandable. But an Executive Yuan news release said "his resignation was accepted." Why complicate the issue? Why make people suspicious? The fact is 12 year compulsory education cannot be totally free. There are important fiscal and fairness considerations. These need to be explained to the public. It is not necessary to throw a talented political appointee to the wolves. Suppose Chen Yi-hsing had upheld President Ma's political commitment on totally free tuition? He would eventually have been sacrificed. His allegedly "left upon fulfilling his mission." The administration was apparently not unconcerned about accusations that it was treating people like Kleenex.
The current round of personnel changes received few public accolades. If anything, they have instilled increased skepticism. People can smell the Ma administration's fear. President Ma remains isolated from the hoi polloi. He remains clueless about public expectations. This is where his real crisis lies. One. Political wrangling and low poll numbers have "shocked the system." Observers see no desire or effort on the part of President Ma to break out of his siege. Two. The Ma administration remains a poor judge of character. Its decision-making inner circle has apparently shrunk even further. This means it will have difficulty breaking out of its current policy dilemma and reversing its fate. Three. President Ma's National Day speech shows that he intends to devote most of his energy to cross-Strait relations and diplomacy. Unfortunately the public is more concerned about domestic issues, including political deadlock, economic stagnation, and social inequality. But Ma and Chiang personnel failed to meet public expectations. How can they regain public support?
Put simply, the recent personnel changes may have given the new recruits a career move of extraordinary significance. But they are the only beneficiaries. For the nation as a whole, President Ma has missed yet another opportunity to inspire the public and prove his worth. He has revealed passivity and negativity. He has adopted a caretaker mentality. He appears content to merely hold out until the end of his term. If so, this is bad news for Taiwan. A government content to remain mired in quicksand, wracked by indecision, that constantly tests the political winds, will never have the strength to venture forth and lead the nation.
馬總統為何抓不住人民的感覺
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.24 02:29 am
在連綿一個半月的政治低壓中，內閣宣布了兩位政務委員和兩名政務次長的異動。奇特的是，四個重要政務官職務的更替，似乎引不起媒體多少報導和討論的興趣。又一次，讓人「無感」的內閣人事異動。
無需太用力回想，人們都記得，馬政府的內閣異動甚少給社會大眾帶來振奮的感覺。這次，正當持續的政治紛擾帶給民眾不安，而街頭的嗆馬丟鞋仍喧囂未已，在這種情況下，馬政府原本可以採取更突破性的內閣改組行動來凝聚人心、平撫焦慮；然而，新人事名單此時公布，卻依然激不起人們一絲熱情。這是馬政府對社會大眾的期待缺乏感應，或者是執政團隊已失去進取突破的雄心？
這次內閣人事異動之所以乏善可陳，倒不是幾位新人本身條件有什麼問題，而是從宏觀面看不出布局的意義何在，只是把職位「填滿」罷了。這其實也是馬總統上任五年多來屢受批評之處：政府團隊用人學者太多、同質性太高、開創性不足、實務經驗缺乏，這些，都和馬政府政績欠佳陳陳相因；如今，卻依舊重蹈覆轍。尤其，馬政府在執政上正面臨重大的困境，黨內外的困頓紛擾加劇，在這種情況下，都無法激出馬總統用人的新思維和新格局，未免讓人失望。
以夏立言為例，他是外交界資深幹練之士，四年前因八八風災中一次小小的「婉謝外援」風波，被迫請辭外交部政次而外放出使；這次異動回國，卻是奉命填補洪仲丘事件後出缺的國防部副部長。並不是說外交、國防領域的人才不能彼此流通，但夏立言四年前去職如此突兀，如今轉任軍職依然如此突兀，在在顯示馬總統棄才之輕易與用人之輕易。夏立言出任國防部副部長，就算可美其名為協助「軍事外交」及對美「軍事交流」，但這些工作軍中目前難道無人堪當大任？任命外交官為國防副首長，會不會引起原已破損的國軍士氣越發離散，以稍早楊念祖因抄襲案六天閃辭之前例，難道沒得到警惕？
再看，教育部政次陳益興為十二年國教免學費政策跳票而去職，原本並非不能理解之事；但是陳益興既非「主動請辭」，行政院發布的人事異動消息，卻說成他「請辭獲准」，豈非節外生枝、啟人疑竇？事實上，十二年國教無法實施全部免費，如果有更重要的財政及公平性考量，只要能向社會大眾解說清楚即可，未必非得以犧牲一名嫻熟的政務官為代價。再說，如果陳益興是因為捍衛馬總統的政治承諾而堅持免學費，最後反因此成為代罪羔羊，甚至被說成他已完成「階段性任務」，不怕給人「用完即棄」的話柄嗎？
這波人事異動得不到什麼掌聲，反而是質疑的聲音更多，可以嗅出人們對馬政府的意興闌珊。其中，馬總統對於社會輿情的隔閡、對民間期待的疏離，這才是他的真正危機所在。第一，歷經政爭及低民調的震盪，外界似乎看不出馬總統有力圖擺脫其「圍城處境」的決心或努力；第二，馬政府用人的眼界仍未見開展，其決策核心圈則似乎越來越小，這意味目前的施政困境難有大破大立的轉機。第三，馬總統的國慶談話顯示他將多數心力放在兩岸及外交關係，但民眾的感受卻對內政問題的擔憂更大，包括政治的對立、經濟的停滯、社會的不平等等皆是；然而，馬江團隊人事布局和施政作為，卻不求在這些問題上對人民的期待作出有效回應，要如何挽回支持？
簡單地說，這次的人事異動，對新應邀入閣的人而言，或許具有個人生涯上不同凡響的意義，但那僅屬於個人事業層次的開展。從國家總體層次看，馬總統又錯過了一次激勵人民、證明自己的機會，也暴露了他的被動和消極，難道只想抱著「看守」的心態直到任期終了。果真如此的話，那對台灣將是個噩耗，因為一個坐困泥沼、徘徊瞻顧的政府不會有力氣帶人民往前走。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 24, 2013
Summary: After a month and a half of political pressure, the cabinet finally announced that it has reassigned two political appointees, and two vice ministers. Strangely enough, the replacement of four important political appointees has attracted little media attention. No one seems interested. Once again the Ma government has implemented another "clueless" cabinet personnel change.
Full text below:
After a month and a half of political pressure, the cabinet finally announced that it has reassigned two political appointees, and two vice ministers. Strangely enough, the replacement of four important political appointees has attracted little media attention. No one seems interested. Once again the Ma government has implemented another "clueless" cabinet personnel change.
It is easy to recall. Everyone remembers. Ma administration cabinet reshuffles have seldom excited the public. Recent political troubles led to popular discontent. People took to the streets to denounce Ma and throw shoes in protest. The Ma government cabinet reshuffle could have broken new ground, united public sentiment, and soothed public anxiety. Instead, when the new personnel list was announced, people felt nothing. Is the administration tone deaf to public sentiment? Or has the administration merely lost the will to make any breakthroughs?
Recent cabinet personnel changes were lackluster. The newcomers were not the problem. The problem was at the macro level. The personnel assignments signified nothing. The administration merely filled a row of empty seats. President Ma has been blasted for this since he took office five years ago. The government hires too many academics. They are much too alike. They lack the ability to innovate. They lack practical experience. This is why the Ma administration lacks the ability to respond to public sentiment, and why even today it continues to spin its wheels. When the ruling Ma administration runs into a major dilemma, troubles inside and outside the party become intensified. Under current circumstances, it cannot offer President Ma a new approach to governing. Needless to say, the public is deeply disappointed.
Take Andrew Hsia. He is a veteran of the diplomatic field. Four years ago, during Typhoon Morakot, he "politely declined foreign aid." As a result he was forced to resign from the Foreign Ministry and transferred overseas. The current reshuffling brought him home. Now he is filling the vacancy left when the Deputy Minister of Defence resigned in response to the Hung Chung-chiu scandal. This is not to say that diplomats cannot serve in the field of national defense, and vice versa. But four years ago Hsia was abruply removed from his post. Today he has been unexpectedly transferred to a military post. This shows that under President Ma, political appointees are "easy come, easy go." Andrew Hsia has been appointed Deputy Defense Minister. One can euphemistically say that he promoting "military diplomacy," and facilitating "military exchanges" with the United States. But is there really no one else in the military capable of filling that roles? Will appointing a diplomat to the post of Deputy MInister of Defense undermine military morale even more. Not long ago, Andrew Yang resigned after six days on the job, in response to allegations of plagiarism. Did the Ma administration learn nothing?
Now take Chen Yi-Hsing, who was forced to resign from the Ministry of Education for reneging on free tuition for 12 year compulsory education. Chen Yi-hsing did not "resign on his own." That was understandable. But an Executive Yuan news release said "his resignation was accepted." Why complicate the issue? Why make people suspicious? The fact is 12 year compulsory education cannot be totally free. There are important fiscal and fairness considerations. These need to be explained to the public. It is not necessary to throw a talented political appointee to the wolves. Suppose Chen Yi-hsing had upheld President Ma's political commitment on totally free tuition? He would eventually have been sacrificed. His allegedly "left upon fulfilling his mission." The administration was apparently not unconcerned about accusations that it was treating people like Kleenex.
The current round of personnel changes received few public accolades. If anything, they have instilled increased skepticism. People can smell the Ma administration's fear. President Ma remains isolated from the hoi polloi. He remains clueless about public expectations. This is where his real crisis lies. One. Political wrangling and low poll numbers have "shocked the system." Observers see no desire or effort on the part of President Ma to break out of his siege. Two. The Ma administration remains a poor judge of character. Its decision-making inner circle has apparently shrunk even further. This means it will have difficulty breaking out of its current policy dilemma and reversing its fate. Three. President Ma's National Day speech shows that he intends to devote most of his energy to cross-Strait relations and diplomacy. Unfortunately the public is more concerned about domestic issues, including political deadlock, economic stagnation, and social inequality. But Ma and Chiang personnel failed to meet public expectations. How can they regain public support?
Put simply, the recent personnel changes may have given the new recruits a career move of extraordinary significance. But they are the only beneficiaries. For the nation as a whole, President Ma has missed yet another opportunity to inspire the public and prove his worth. He has revealed passivity and negativity. He has adopted a caretaker mentality. He appears content to merely hold out until the end of his term. If so, this is bad news for Taiwan. A government content to remain mired in quicksand, wracked by indecision, that constantly tests the political winds, will never have the strength to venture forth and lead the nation.
馬總統為何抓不住人民的感覺
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.24 02:29 am
在連綿一個半月的政治低壓中，內閣宣布了兩位政務委員和兩名政務次長的異動。奇特的是，四個重要政務官職務的更替，似乎引不起媒體多少報導和討論的興趣。又一次，讓人「無感」的內閣人事異動。
無需太用力回想，人們都記得，馬政府的內閣異動甚少給社會大眾帶來振奮的感覺。這次，正當持續的政治紛擾帶給民眾不安，而街頭的嗆馬丟鞋仍喧囂未已，在這種情況下，馬政府原本可以採取更突破性的內閣改組行動來凝聚人心、平撫焦慮；然而，新人事名單此時公布，卻依然激不起人們一絲熱情。這是馬政府對社會大眾的期待缺乏感應，或者是執政團隊已失去進取突破的雄心？
這次內閣人事異動之所以乏善可陳，倒不是幾位新人本身條件有什麼問題，而是從宏觀面看不出布局的意義何在，只是把職位「填滿」罷了。這其實也是馬總統上任五年多來屢受批評之處：政府團隊用人學者太多、同質性太高、開創性不足、實務經驗缺乏，這些，都和馬政府政績欠佳陳陳相因；如今，卻依舊重蹈覆轍。尤其，馬政府在執政上正面臨重大的困境，黨內外的困頓紛擾加劇，在這種情況下，都無法激出馬總統用人的新思維和新格局，未免讓人失望。
以夏立言為例，他是外交界資深幹練之士，四年前因八八風災中一次小小的「婉謝外援」風波，被迫請辭外交部政次而外放出使；這次異動回國，卻是奉命填補洪仲丘事件後出缺的國防部副部長。並不是說外交、國防領域的人才不能彼此流通，但夏立言四年前去職如此突兀，如今轉任軍職依然如此突兀，在在顯示馬總統棄才之輕易與用人之輕易。夏立言出任國防部副部長，就算可美其名為協助「軍事外交」及對美「軍事交流」，但這些工作軍中目前難道無人堪當大任？任命外交官為國防副首長，會不會引起原已破損的國軍士氣越發離散，以稍早楊念祖因抄襲案六天閃辭之前例，難道沒得到警惕？
再看，教育部政次陳益興為十二年國教免學費政策跳票而去職，原本並非不能理解之事；但是陳益興既非「主動請辭」，行政院發布的人事異動消息，卻說成他「請辭獲准」，豈非節外生枝、啟人疑竇？事實上，十二年國教無法實施全部免費，如果有更重要的財政及公平性考量，只要能向社會大眾解說清楚即可，未必非得以犧牲一名嫻熟的政務官為代價。再說，如果陳益興是因為捍衛馬總統的政治承諾而堅持免學費，最後反因此成為代罪羔羊，甚至被說成他已完成「階段性任務」，不怕給人「用完即棄」的話柄嗎？
這波人事異動得不到什麼掌聲，反而是質疑的聲音更多，可以嗅出人們對馬政府的意興闌珊。其中，馬總統對於社會輿情的隔閡、對民間期待的疏離，這才是他的真正危機所在。第一，歷經政爭及低民調的震盪，外界似乎看不出馬總統有力圖擺脫其「圍城處境」的決心或努力；第二，馬政府用人的眼界仍未見開展，其決策核心圈則似乎越來越小，這意味目前的施政困境難有大破大立的轉機。第三，馬總統的國慶談話顯示他將多數心力放在兩岸及外交關係，但民眾的感受卻對內政問題的擔憂更大，包括政治的對立、經濟的停滯、社會的不平等等皆是；然而，馬江團隊人事布局和施政作為，卻不求在這些問題上對人民的期待作出有效回應，要如何挽回支持？
簡單地說，這次的人事異動，對新應邀入閣的人而言，或許具有個人生涯上不同凡響的意義，但那僅屬於個人事業層次的開展。從國家總體層次看，馬總統又錯過了一次激勵人民、證明自己的機會，也暴露了他的被動和消極，難道只想抱著「看守」的心態直到任期終了。果真如此的話，那對台灣將是個噩耗，因為一個坐困泥沼、徘徊瞻顧的政府不會有力氣帶人民往前走。
Tuesday, October 22, 2013
Taipei and Beijing: Problems Must Be Named Before They Can Be Solved
Taipei and Beijing: Problems Must Be Named Before They Can Be Solved
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 23, 2013
Summary: During the first Cross-Strait Peace Forum, the Blue, Green, and Red camps all openly referred to the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and "President Ma." This gave us an insight into the meaning of the "deep end of the pool." In the past, neither Taiwan nor the Mainland could talk openly about such matters. Dialogue was impossible. Now the two sides can venture into the deep end of the pool. They can use controversial terminology. They can ask the hard questions. Only this will enable them to solve the difficult problems.
Full text below:
During the first Cross-Strait Peace Forum, the Blue, Green, and Red camps all openly referred to the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and "President Ma." This gave us an insight into the meaning of the "deep end of the pool."
On similar occasions in the past, terms such as the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and "President Ma" were taboo. They were unmentionable. One could not even say them aloud. How then, could anyone address the problems associated with them? No agreement has ever been reached on terms such as "one China," or the "one China framework." Even Beijing, which formulated the concepts, cannot not tell you precisely what they mean. Nor has anyone ever asked Beijing, "Just what is is the one China framework you refer to?" The recent Cross-Strait Peace Forum at least asked the question, "How can we define the one China framework and the legal relationship between the two sides' existing constitutions?" These are hard questions. They require wading into the deep end of the pool. Asking and answering such questions requires courage.
In other words, before one can ask hard questions, one must first be willing to use controversial terminology. One must be willing to use such controversial terms as the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and " President Ma." Only then can one ask the hard questions, including the question, "How can we define the one China framework and the legal relationship between the two sides' existing constitutions?" If we dare not use these controversial terms, how can we enter the deep end of the pool? In this respect, the forum offered two bright spots.
One. This forum earnestly and frankly addressed the issue of the two sides' sovereignty and jurisdiction. Kao Yu-jen argued for "mutual recognition of overlapping sovereignty, and mutual respect for separate jurisdiction." This would establish a consensus on some of the controversial terminology. During the forum, Mainland and other conference participants were impressive in their frankness. First, Mainland participants showed no reservations about using terms such as the "Republic of China" and the " Constitution of the Republic of China." Secondly, Mainland participants tended to agree with other participants' references to "mutual recognition of each others' jurisdiction" or " one country, two governments." For example, Xiamen University scholar Liu Xuesheng said, "The People's Republic of China and the Republic of China are two hostile regimes inside the territory of one country." He said, "One China should not be equated with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China." Peking University scholar Li Yihu said, "Linkages should be actively sought between the two sides. The one China Constitution is worth considering." Renmin University scholar Huang Jiashu said, "The Mainland must face the fact that on Taiwan there is a system of government that is not part of the People's Republic of China system of government." Finally, the "Minutes of the General Assembly" pointed out that "problems involving interactions between public officials from the two sides must be properly dealt with." The term "public officials" attracted the most attention.
Such acknowledgements point to the hard question "How can we define the one China framework and the legal relationship between the two sides' existing constitutions?" Kao Yu-jen argued for "mutual recognition of overlapping sovereignty." He even hinted at the possibility of a "third concept" transcending the ROC and the PRC, a "generic concept of China" or "Big Roof Concept of China." In short, this was one of the bright spots of the forum. It introduced controversial terminology into the debate. It waded into the deep end of the pool.
Two. The forum affirmed the understanding reached during the Ma Xi meeting. The forum noted that, "Leaders from both sides of the Strait made an important contribution to regional and world peace. They recommended and actively created the requisite conditions. The form and content of the forum helped bring about mutually acceptable solutions." The forum reached a consensus on the term "leaders from the two sides." They agreed that Ma and Xi should address each other as "leader of the Taiwan authorities" and "leader of the Mainland authorities." This would facilitate a Ma Xi meeting. If the two sides can refer to each other as "leaders," then the question of sovereignty and jurisdiction has been sorted out to some degree.
Peace forum members differed over the Ma Xi meeting. Mainland think tanks wanted a peace agreement first, and a Ma Xi meeting next. Taiwan scholars thought that a peace agreement might be difficult to achieve. If a peace agreement was made a precondition to a Ma Xi meeting, that might be a deal breaker. They suggested substituting a "Peace Declaration." Actually the two sides differed on the peace agreement itself. Mainland think tanks said a peace agreement would not be a "reunification agreement," but it would not preclude a move toward reunification. Taiwan scholars thought that an "agreement" should not be a "legal commitment." It should not amount to "kidnapping" or even a "wedding engagement." These are the controversial terms. These are the hard questions that require wading into the deep end of the pool.
The recent Cross-Strait Peace Forum amounted to "private sector trail blazing." On the Taiwan side, Kao Yu-jen shrugged off government and partisan strictures. He said things the Ma government could not say. He said things the KMT and the DPP dare not say. On the Mainland side, Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun fulfilled his pledge to "shatter taboos" upon taking office. He opened the floodgates. He gave Mainland and other forum participants additional room to maneuver. They could now speak openly about the "Republic of China" and the "Constitution of the Republic of China." This was all possible because the forum was a private sector initiative. The two sides confonted reality. This contributed to the success of the forum.
In the past, neither Taiwan nor the Mainland could talk openly about such matters. Dialogue was impossible. Now the two sides can venture into the deep end of the pool. They can use controversial terminology. They can ask the hard questions. Only this will enable them to solve the difficult problems.
兩岸先蓄水，才有深水區
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.23 02:37 am
在首屆兩岸和平論壇上，藍綠紅三方與會者嘴上「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」、「馬總統」不絕於口，這才令人見識到什麼叫做「深水區」。
在過去的類似場合，「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」、「馬總統」之類語彙幾皆屬禁忌，可說根本「無水」，形同在旱地游泳，如何進入「深水區」？另如，「一個中國」或「一中框架」，過去從來皆未有一共認的定義，連作此主張的北京亦說不出個所以然來，卻也沒有人追問北京「你說的一中框架究竟是什麼？」；但此次兩岸和平論壇上，至少提出了「如何釐清一個中國框架和兩岸各自現行規定之間的法理關係？」這類問題。這才是「深水區」的問題，能夠提出並解答此類問題才能叫做進入「深水區」。
也就是說，要進入深水區，先得蓄水。先要使用深水區的語言，包括「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」、「馬總統」等；再要面對深水區的問題，包括「如何釐清一個中國框架和中華民國憲法與中華人民共和國憲法之間的法理關係」。倘若不肯注水，如何進入深水區？簡略而言，此會有兩大亮點：
第一、此會真正進入兩岸主權與治權關係的公開探討。高育仁在揭幕式提出「互相承認重疊的主權，互相尊重分立的治權」之主張，確立了此會「深水區」的格局。會中，大陸與會者在這方面的發言令人印象深刻。首先，大陸與會者完全不忌諱使用「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」等語彙。其次，大陸與會者透露出傾向同意「相互承認治權」或「一國兩府」的意向。例如，廈門大學劉學深說，「中華人民共和國與中華民國是一個中國境內兩個敵對政權的關係」，又說，「一個中國不要輕易等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國」；北京大學李義虎說，「應積極尋找能實現兩岸雙方對接的紐帶，『憲法一中』可作參考」；人民大學黃嘉樹說，「大陸首先面對一個事實，即在台灣存在著一個不隸屬於中華人民共和國的政府體系」。最後，在《大會紀要》中，又指出「妥善處理兩岸公務機關人員互動之相關問題」；其中，「公務機關人員」六字最受矚目。
這類發言與認知，均指向了「如何釐清一個中國框架和中華民國憲法與中華人民共和國憲法之間的法理關係」的深水區問題，而高育仁所倡「相互承認重疊的主權」，更不啻指出中華民國與中華人民共和國二者之上，有無可能出現一個「第三概念」或「上位概念」的「屋頂中國」？總之，此會最亮麗的成果即在：要進入深水區，先得使用深水區的語彙，更要提出深水區的問題。
第二，此會表達了兩岸為馬習會催生的「共同認知」。大會指出：「兩岸領導人會晤的實現……是對地區及世界和平的重要貢獻。建議……積極創造條件，就會晤之形式和內容等安排，努力促成雙方均可接受的方案」。其實，若能採納此會所達成共同認知的「兩岸領導人」五字，引導馬習互稱「台灣當局領導人」及「大陸當局領導人」，則馬習會即有實現之可能。因為，雙方若互稱「領導人」，即顯示已經在某種程度上階段性地理順了兩岸治權與主權的「法理關係」。
關於馬習會，和平論壇中有一爭議。大陸智囊主張，先有《和平協議》，再有馬習會；台灣學者則認為《和平協議》有難度，若主張以《和平協議》為前提，馬習會必破局，可代以《和平宣言》。其實，關於《和平協議》，兩岸亦有歧見。大陸有智囊主張，雖非「統一協議」，但「不排除統一的政治指向」；台灣有學者則認為，《協議》不是「綁約」，並非「綁架」，也不是「雙方婚約」。這些，才是紮紮實實的深水區語言，也才是結結棍棍的深水區問題。
此次兩岸和平論壇，可謂建立了「民間先行」的典範。在台灣方面，高育仁擺脫了政府與政黨的牽絆，言馬政府所不能言，亦言國民黨與民進黨所不敢言；大陸方面，在習李體制下的台辦主任張志軍，相當程度地履行了他就任時「打破禁區」的承諾，開閘放水，使得大陸與會者較有自主發揮的空間，至少已可把「中華民國」與「中華民國憲法」掛在嘴上，因此較具「民間」色彩。雙方正視現實，促成了此會的成功。
過去，台灣之不敢談，與大陸之不准說，皆使深水區無水。現在，雙方要往池中注水，用深水區的語言，談深水區的問題，才有可能找到出入深水區的方案。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 23, 2013
Summary: During the first Cross-Strait Peace Forum, the Blue, Green, and Red camps all openly referred to the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and "President Ma." This gave us an insight into the meaning of the "deep end of the pool." In the past, neither Taiwan nor the Mainland could talk openly about such matters. Dialogue was impossible. Now the two sides can venture into the deep end of the pool. They can use controversial terminology. They can ask the hard questions. Only this will enable them to solve the difficult problems.
Full text below:
During the first Cross-Strait Peace Forum, the Blue, Green, and Red camps all openly referred to the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and "President Ma." This gave us an insight into the meaning of the "deep end of the pool."
On similar occasions in the past, terms such as the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and "President Ma" were taboo. They were unmentionable. One could not even say them aloud. How then, could anyone address the problems associated with them? No agreement has ever been reached on terms such as "one China," or the "one China framework." Even Beijing, which formulated the concepts, cannot not tell you precisely what they mean. Nor has anyone ever asked Beijing, "Just what is is the one China framework you refer to?" The recent Cross-Strait Peace Forum at least asked the question, "How can we define the one China framework and the legal relationship between the two sides' existing constitutions?" These are hard questions. They require wading into the deep end of the pool. Asking and answering such questions requires courage.
In other words, before one can ask hard questions, one must first be willing to use controversial terminology. One must be willing to use such controversial terms as the "Republic of China," the "Constitution of the Republic of China," and " President Ma." Only then can one ask the hard questions, including the question, "How can we define the one China framework and the legal relationship between the two sides' existing constitutions?" If we dare not use these controversial terms, how can we enter the deep end of the pool? In this respect, the forum offered two bright spots.
One. This forum earnestly and frankly addressed the issue of the two sides' sovereignty and jurisdiction. Kao Yu-jen argued for "mutual recognition of overlapping sovereignty, and mutual respect for separate jurisdiction." This would establish a consensus on some of the controversial terminology. During the forum, Mainland and other conference participants were impressive in their frankness. First, Mainland participants showed no reservations about using terms such as the "Republic of China" and the " Constitution of the Republic of China." Secondly, Mainland participants tended to agree with other participants' references to "mutual recognition of each others' jurisdiction" or " one country, two governments." For example, Xiamen University scholar Liu Xuesheng said, "The People's Republic of China and the Republic of China are two hostile regimes inside the territory of one country." He said, "One China should not be equated with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China." Peking University scholar Li Yihu said, "Linkages should be actively sought between the two sides. The one China Constitution is worth considering." Renmin University scholar Huang Jiashu said, "The Mainland must face the fact that on Taiwan there is a system of government that is not part of the People's Republic of China system of government." Finally, the "Minutes of the General Assembly" pointed out that "problems involving interactions between public officials from the two sides must be properly dealt with." The term "public officials" attracted the most attention.
Such acknowledgements point to the hard question "How can we define the one China framework and the legal relationship between the two sides' existing constitutions?" Kao Yu-jen argued for "mutual recognition of overlapping sovereignty." He even hinted at the possibility of a "third concept" transcending the ROC and the PRC, a "generic concept of China" or "Big Roof Concept of China." In short, this was one of the bright spots of the forum. It introduced controversial terminology into the debate. It waded into the deep end of the pool.
Two. The forum affirmed the understanding reached during the Ma Xi meeting. The forum noted that, "Leaders from both sides of the Strait made an important contribution to regional and world peace. They recommended and actively created the requisite conditions. The form and content of the forum helped bring about mutually acceptable solutions." The forum reached a consensus on the term "leaders from the two sides." They agreed that Ma and Xi should address each other as "leader of the Taiwan authorities" and "leader of the Mainland authorities." This would facilitate a Ma Xi meeting. If the two sides can refer to each other as "leaders," then the question of sovereignty and jurisdiction has been sorted out to some degree.
Peace forum members differed over the Ma Xi meeting. Mainland think tanks wanted a peace agreement first, and a Ma Xi meeting next. Taiwan scholars thought that a peace agreement might be difficult to achieve. If a peace agreement was made a precondition to a Ma Xi meeting, that might be a deal breaker. They suggested substituting a "Peace Declaration." Actually the two sides differed on the peace agreement itself. Mainland think tanks said a peace agreement would not be a "reunification agreement," but it would not preclude a move toward reunification. Taiwan scholars thought that an "agreement" should not be a "legal commitment." It should not amount to "kidnapping" or even a "wedding engagement." These are the controversial terms. These are the hard questions that require wading into the deep end of the pool.
The recent Cross-Strait Peace Forum amounted to "private sector trail blazing." On the Taiwan side, Kao Yu-jen shrugged off government and partisan strictures. He said things the Ma government could not say. He said things the KMT and the DPP dare not say. On the Mainland side, Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun fulfilled his pledge to "shatter taboos" upon taking office. He opened the floodgates. He gave Mainland and other forum participants additional room to maneuver. They could now speak openly about the "Republic of China" and the "Constitution of the Republic of China." This was all possible because the forum was a private sector initiative. The two sides confonted reality. This contributed to the success of the forum.
In the past, neither Taiwan nor the Mainland could talk openly about such matters. Dialogue was impossible. Now the two sides can venture into the deep end of the pool. They can use controversial terminology. They can ask the hard questions. Only this will enable them to solve the difficult problems.
兩岸先蓄水，才有深水區
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.23 02:37 am
在首屆兩岸和平論壇上，藍綠紅三方與會者嘴上「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」、「馬總統」不絕於口，這才令人見識到什麼叫做「深水區」。
在過去的類似場合，「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」、「馬總統」之類語彙幾皆屬禁忌，可說根本「無水」，形同在旱地游泳，如何進入「深水區」？另如，「一個中國」或「一中框架」，過去從來皆未有一共認的定義，連作此主張的北京亦說不出個所以然來，卻也沒有人追問北京「你說的一中框架究竟是什麼？」；但此次兩岸和平論壇上，至少提出了「如何釐清一個中國框架和兩岸各自現行規定之間的法理關係？」這類問題。這才是「深水區」的問題，能夠提出並解答此類問題才能叫做進入「深水區」。
也就是說，要進入深水區，先得蓄水。先要使用深水區的語言，包括「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」、「馬總統」等；再要面對深水區的問題，包括「如何釐清一個中國框架和中華民國憲法與中華人民共和國憲法之間的法理關係」。倘若不肯注水，如何進入深水區？簡略而言，此會有兩大亮點：
第一、此會真正進入兩岸主權與治權關係的公開探討。高育仁在揭幕式提出「互相承認重疊的主權，互相尊重分立的治權」之主張，確立了此會「深水區」的格局。會中，大陸與會者在這方面的發言令人印象深刻。首先，大陸與會者完全不忌諱使用「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」等語彙。其次，大陸與會者透露出傾向同意「相互承認治權」或「一國兩府」的意向。例如，廈門大學劉學深說，「中華人民共和國與中華民國是一個中國境內兩個敵對政權的關係」，又說，「一個中國不要輕易等同於中華人民共和國或中華民國」；北京大學李義虎說，「應積極尋找能實現兩岸雙方對接的紐帶，『憲法一中』可作參考」；人民大學黃嘉樹說，「大陸首先面對一個事實，即在台灣存在著一個不隸屬於中華人民共和國的政府體系」。最後，在《大會紀要》中，又指出「妥善處理兩岸公務機關人員互動之相關問題」；其中，「公務機關人員」六字最受矚目。
這類發言與認知，均指向了「如何釐清一個中國框架和中華民國憲法與中華人民共和國憲法之間的法理關係」的深水區問題，而高育仁所倡「相互承認重疊的主權」，更不啻指出中華民國與中華人民共和國二者之上，有無可能出現一個「第三概念」或「上位概念」的「屋頂中國」？總之，此會最亮麗的成果即在：要進入深水區，先得使用深水區的語彙，更要提出深水區的問題。
第二，此會表達了兩岸為馬習會催生的「共同認知」。大會指出：「兩岸領導人會晤的實現……是對地區及世界和平的重要貢獻。建議……積極創造條件，就會晤之形式和內容等安排，努力促成雙方均可接受的方案」。其實，若能採納此會所達成共同認知的「兩岸領導人」五字，引導馬習互稱「台灣當局領導人」及「大陸當局領導人」，則馬習會即有實現之可能。因為，雙方若互稱「領導人」，即顯示已經在某種程度上階段性地理順了兩岸治權與主權的「法理關係」。
關於馬習會，和平論壇中有一爭議。大陸智囊主張，先有《和平協議》，再有馬習會；台灣學者則認為《和平協議》有難度，若主張以《和平協議》為前提，馬習會必破局，可代以《和平宣言》。其實，關於《和平協議》，兩岸亦有歧見。大陸有智囊主張，雖非「統一協議」，但「不排除統一的政治指向」；台灣有學者則認為，《協議》不是「綁約」，並非「綁架」，也不是「雙方婚約」。這些，才是紮紮實實的深水區語言，也才是結結棍棍的深水區問題。
此次兩岸和平論壇，可謂建立了「民間先行」的典範。在台灣方面，高育仁擺脫了政府與政黨的牽絆，言馬政府所不能言，亦言國民黨與民進黨所不敢言；大陸方面，在習李體制下的台辦主任張志軍，相當程度地履行了他就任時「打破禁區」的承諾，開閘放水，使得大陸與會者較有自主發揮的空間，至少已可把「中華民國」與「中華民國憲法」掛在嘴上，因此較具「民間」色彩。雙方正視現實，促成了此會的成功。
過去，台灣之不敢談，與大陸之不准說，皆使深水區無水。現在，雙方要往池中注水，用深水區的語言，談深水區的問題，才有可能找到出入深水區的方案。
Monday, October 21, 2013
Three Major Reported Trends
Three Major Reported Trends
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 22, 2013
Summary: Changes on the Mainland and changes in Sino-US relations have taken place. The Mainland's Taiwan policy also shows signs of change. Xi Jinping spoke during the "Siew Xi Meeting." He said "The cross-Strait political divide cannot be passed down endlessly from generation to generation." After meeting with United States Secretary of State John Kerry, Wang Yi said the "Taiwan issue remains within the realm of control." These two statements indicate unprecedented Mainland confidence regarding cross-Strait relations. We on Taiwan must think carefully. When the Mainland's comprehensive national strength can no longer be denied, when the balance of power in US-China relations changes, how will we on Taiwan cope?
Full text below:
Most of the daily news is trivial. Most people are not interested in keeping up with it. They skim it and forget what they just read. But some developments that fail to attract public attention may have fatal consequences. They are like continuously dripping water that over time even cuts through stone. By the time people become aware of it, it is often too late to do anything about it.
Three recent reported trends are like this. They appear to be nearly irreversible. They may well determine Taiwan's fate. The public should pay attention and attempt to understand.
Since World War II, the US led nations in the first island chain of East Asia have remained in a standoff with the PRC and the former USSR. The ROC, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines have maintained an essentially stable strategic cooperative relationship. But in recent years the rise of Mainland China has led to structural changes. U.S. dominance in Asia has gradually diminished. In late 2011, while visiting Hawaii, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a keynote speech entitled, "The 21st Century will be America's Pacific Century." She declared that the United States would create a "Trans-Pacific System" in the Asian Pacific region, and continue to play a central role. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta added that the United States has decided to strengthen its military presence in the Asian Pacific region, in order to prevent growing Mainland China military power from affecting U.S. vital interests in the region. The United States began promoting its "Return to Asia" policy. During his second term Obama renamed this the " Asian Rebalancing Policy."
The U.S. national debt crisis continues to worsen. The US federal government farcically shut down for 16 days. Next February 7, the total U.S. debt will be close to 18 trillion dollars. The US federal government will face yet another shutdown. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel could not resist complaining. The prolonged U.S. debt crisis has undermined Asian-Pacific nations' confidence in the U.S. Obama even stayed away from the APEC Leadership Conference in Indonesia. Mainland Chinese President Xi Jinping dominated.
Leaders in Beijing are using hard and soft diplomacy, as well as a policy of "friendship, security, and prosperity" to counter the U.S. Return to Asia strategy. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang took advantage of separate visits to Indonesia, Vietnam, and other countries. In particular, they are using the construction of the Sino-Vietnamese Railroad to establish a consensus and kickstart Sino-Vietnamese maritime, onshore, and financial cooperation. Li Keqiang's success prompted Vietnam to adopt a more balanced posture between the two powers
South Korea recently declared publicly that it would not join the U.S. missile defense system. President Park Geun-hye proposed a new strategic "Eurasian Program." He hopes to strengthen cooperation between China and Russia and other neighboring countries. The Indian Defense Ministry has publicly rejected the establishment of U.S. military bases in India. At the 2013 National Day ceremonies, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong delivered his address in Chinese for the very first time. This reflected Singapore's desire to strike a balance between the United States and Mainland China. Vietnam, Korea, India, and Singapore have made their choices. These choices will have a significant impact on strategic competition in Sino-US relations.
The second major trend involves the Third Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee. It will trumpet Mainland China's economic and social reforms. The outcome of the session will determine the fate of the Chinese mainland for the next 10 years. It will undoubtedly affect the future of Taiwan. According to CCP protocol, the Third Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee is held one year after the new leadership takes over. The session often announces major changes in the party's path. Mainland China has already taken on a very different look under the leadership of Xi and Li than it did under the leadership of Hu and Wen. The social atmosphere has also changed. Xi and Li have launched major anti -corruption campaigns. They have returned to the traditional values of the Chinese Communist Party. They have demonstrated self-confidence and strength toward the outside world. They have already won considerable public support. They have created an atmosphere of unity. They have create conditions favorable to the successful convening of the Third Plenary Session and the smooth passage of their proposals.
The Third Plenary Sesson cannot of course merely go through the motions. To be successful, Xi and Li must pass their plans for reform. As we all know, the CCP must undergo reform. Only reform can ensure Mainland China's sustained economic and social development. But reforms will affect vested interests. They will inevitably lead to revolt. Xi and Li must obtain sufficient public support. Only then can they resist vested interests.
Xi and Li have adopted an "economics turns right, politics turns left" strategy. The Third Plenary Session reform plans will focus on economics. We hope they will promote a market economy, financial liberalization, and internationalization. We hope they will foster private enterprise and micro-enterprises, promote tax reform, and reduce taxes. Political reform will be limited to administrative reforms, such as reduced government functions. The courts will no longer be monopolized by local leaders. Both economic and administrative reforms must overcome enormous political obstacles. Xi and Li have built up a considerable head of steam. Will they finally be able to implement their reforms? That remains hard to say. But Mainland China will surely undergo change.
The third major trend pertains to cross-Strait relations. Changes on the Mainland and changes in Sino-US relations have taken place. The Mainland's Taiwan policy also shows signs of change. Xi Jinping spoke during the "Siew Xi Meeting." He said "The cross-Strait political divide cannot be passed down endlessly from generation to generation." After meeting with United States Secretary of State John Kerry, Wang Yi said the "Taiwan issue remains within the realm of control." These two statements indicate unprecedented Mainland confidence regarding cross-Strait relations. We on Taiwan must think carefully. When the Mainland's comprehensive national strength can no longer be denied, when the balance of power in US-China relations changes, how will we on Taiwan cope?
社論－從最近三大趨勢性新聞談起
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年10月22日 04:09
日常新聞非常瑣碎，一般人不太有興趣盯著進度每天閱讀，或著太過瑣碎，讀過就忘。但非常致命的是，有些不能吸引大眾眼球的日常性新聞，卻如同穿石水滴，一旦讓人察覺，往往已達到不可逆程度，屆時再「痛心疾首」已於事無補。
最近有3個趨勢性新聞就具有此一特質，而且似乎已接近不可逆階段，將對台灣的命運產生顛覆性影響，國人必須重視並了解。
自二戰結束後，美國領導東亞第一島鏈國家與中國大陸、蘇聯對峙，台灣與美國、日本、南韓、菲律賓始終維持大致穩定的戰略合作關係。但近年來，亞太形勢隨著中國的崛起，已經出現結構性變化，美國在亞太主導地位逐漸鬆動。美國國務卿希拉蕊於2011年底，在夏威夷以「21世紀將是美國的太平洋世紀」為題發表專題演講，宣示美國將在亞太地區建立「跨太平洋體系」，繼續扮演核心角色。隨後前國防部長潘尼塔亦強調，美國決定持續增強在亞太的軍事能量，以避免中國軍力的增長影響到美國在亞太地區的關鍵利益。美國開始推動「重返亞洲政策」，歐巴馬第2任期修正為「亞洲再平衡政策」。
隨著美國國債問題持續惡化，甚至演出聯邦政府局部關閉16天鬧劇，而且明年2月7日前，美國總債務將逼近18兆美元，聯邦政府又要面臨關閉的凌遲，國防部長海格爾忍不住抱怨，美債危機延伸，已重創亞太國家對美國信心。歐巴馬甚至放棄出席在印尼舉行的APEC年會領袖會議，讓中國國家主席習近平獨領風騷。
北京領導人卻以剛柔並濟的外交手腕和「睦鄰、安鄰、富鄰」的政策宣示，破解美國重返亞洲戰略。習近平與李克強趁勢分別訪問了印尼、越南等國家，尤其促成中越鐵公路建設共識，啟動中越雙邊海上、陸上與金融領域合作。李克強成功促使越南，在中美兩強間採取更平衡的政策。
南韓日前公開表示，不加入美國的飛彈防禦系統，朴槿惠總統同時提出「歐亞計畫」新戰略構想，希望與中國及俄羅斯加強鄰國合作關係。印度國防部亦公開拒絕美國在印度設立軍事基地，新加坡總理李顯龍在2013年國慶時，首度用中文講演，也反映出其在美中之間，運用平衡策略的用心與巧思。越南、韓國、印度、新加坡相繼做出選擇，將對中美戰略競爭關係產生重大影響。
第2件重大趨勢性新聞事件，是中共11月即將召開三中全會，將吹起改革號角，推動中國經濟體制與社會的轉型改革。這次會議的成果將決定未來10年中國大陸的命運，無疑亦將牽動台灣的發展。依據中共體制，歷屆三中全會都在新領導班子接任1年後召開，往往出現路線的重大宣示。習李領導下的中國已展現與胡溫時代大為不同的面貌，社會氛圍也有很大改變。習李接班後大力倡廉反腐、回歸中共傳統價值、對外展現自信與強勢作風，已贏得相當程度的民意支持，創造出團結的社會氛圍，為三中全會的順利召開與各項提案的順利通過創造良好條件。
不過，三中全會不能只是行禮如儀，必須通過習李改革大計，才算成功。眾所周知，中共必須改革，唯有改革才能推動大陸經濟與社會的持續發展。但改革牽動既得利益，勢必引起反抗，習李必須獲得足夠的社會支持能量，才能對抗既得利益的反抗。
從習李「經濟向右、政治向左」的施政作為觀察，三中的改革大計將集中在經濟層面，希望更向市場經濟傾斜、金融更自由化與國際化、更加重扶植民企與微型企業、推動稅改減輕民企稅賦等。政治方面則將限制在行政改革，如政府職能縮小、司法脫離地方一把手控制等。但據了解，無論經濟或行政改革，都遭遇很大的政治困難。習李已累積相當的能量推動改革，最後能否完全實現改革仍難預言，但中國肯定會改變。
第3個趨勢是兩岸關係的變動，隨著大陸內部情勢與中美關係的變化，大陸對台政策思維也出現一些改變跡象。習近平在「蕭習會」中說，「兩岸政治分歧不能一代一代傳下去」、王毅在美國會晤國務卿柯瑞後表示「台灣問題在可控範圍內」，這兩句話都流露出中國大陸領導層對兩岸關係前所未有的自信。台灣須審慎思考，當大陸綜合國力已非吳下阿蒙，美中關係平衡出現改變，台灣應如何應對？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 22, 2013
Summary: Changes on the Mainland and changes in Sino-US relations have taken place. The Mainland's Taiwan policy also shows signs of change. Xi Jinping spoke during the "Siew Xi Meeting." He said "The cross-Strait political divide cannot be passed down endlessly from generation to generation." After meeting with United States Secretary of State John Kerry, Wang Yi said the "Taiwan issue remains within the realm of control." These two statements indicate unprecedented Mainland confidence regarding cross-Strait relations. We on Taiwan must think carefully. When the Mainland's comprehensive national strength can no longer be denied, when the balance of power in US-China relations changes, how will we on Taiwan cope?
Full text below:
Most of the daily news is trivial. Most people are not interested in keeping up with it. They skim it and forget what they just read. But some developments that fail to attract public attention may have fatal consequences. They are like continuously dripping water that over time even cuts through stone. By the time people become aware of it, it is often too late to do anything about it.
Three recent reported trends are like this. They appear to be nearly irreversible. They may well determine Taiwan's fate. The public should pay attention and attempt to understand.
Since World War II, the US led nations in the first island chain of East Asia have remained in a standoff with the PRC and the former USSR. The ROC, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines have maintained an essentially stable strategic cooperative relationship. But in recent years the rise of Mainland China has led to structural changes. U.S. dominance in Asia has gradually diminished. In late 2011, while visiting Hawaii, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a keynote speech entitled, "The 21st Century will be America's Pacific Century." She declared that the United States would create a "Trans-Pacific System" in the Asian Pacific region, and continue to play a central role. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta added that the United States has decided to strengthen its military presence in the Asian Pacific region, in order to prevent growing Mainland China military power from affecting U.S. vital interests in the region. The United States began promoting its "Return to Asia" policy. During his second term Obama renamed this the " Asian Rebalancing Policy."
The U.S. national debt crisis continues to worsen. The US federal government farcically shut down for 16 days. Next February 7, the total U.S. debt will be close to 18 trillion dollars. The US federal government will face yet another shutdown. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel could not resist complaining. The prolonged U.S. debt crisis has undermined Asian-Pacific nations' confidence in the U.S. Obama even stayed away from the APEC Leadership Conference in Indonesia. Mainland Chinese President Xi Jinping dominated.
Leaders in Beijing are using hard and soft diplomacy, as well as a policy of "friendship, security, and prosperity" to counter the U.S. Return to Asia strategy. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang took advantage of separate visits to Indonesia, Vietnam, and other countries. In particular, they are using the construction of the Sino-Vietnamese Railroad to establish a consensus and kickstart Sino-Vietnamese maritime, onshore, and financial cooperation. Li Keqiang's success prompted Vietnam to adopt a more balanced posture between the two powers
South Korea recently declared publicly that it would not join the U.S. missile defense system. President Park Geun-hye proposed a new strategic "Eurasian Program." He hopes to strengthen cooperation between China and Russia and other neighboring countries. The Indian Defense Ministry has publicly rejected the establishment of U.S. military bases in India. At the 2013 National Day ceremonies, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong delivered his address in Chinese for the very first time. This reflected Singapore's desire to strike a balance between the United States and Mainland China. Vietnam, Korea, India, and Singapore have made their choices. These choices will have a significant impact on strategic competition in Sino-US relations.
The second major trend involves the Third Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee. It will trumpet Mainland China's economic and social reforms. The outcome of the session will determine the fate of the Chinese mainland for the next 10 years. It will undoubtedly affect the future of Taiwan. According to CCP protocol, the Third Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee is held one year after the new leadership takes over. The session often announces major changes in the party's path. Mainland China has already taken on a very different look under the leadership of Xi and Li than it did under the leadership of Hu and Wen. The social atmosphere has also changed. Xi and Li have launched major anti -corruption campaigns. They have returned to the traditional values of the Chinese Communist Party. They have demonstrated self-confidence and strength toward the outside world. They have already won considerable public support. They have created an atmosphere of unity. They have create conditions favorable to the successful convening of the Third Plenary Session and the smooth passage of their proposals.
The Third Plenary Sesson cannot of course merely go through the motions. To be successful, Xi and Li must pass their plans for reform. As we all know, the CCP must undergo reform. Only reform can ensure Mainland China's sustained economic and social development. But reforms will affect vested interests. They will inevitably lead to revolt. Xi and Li must obtain sufficient public support. Only then can they resist vested interests.
Xi and Li have adopted an "economics turns right, politics turns left" strategy. The Third Plenary Session reform plans will focus on economics. We hope they will promote a market economy, financial liberalization, and internationalization. We hope they will foster private enterprise and micro-enterprises, promote tax reform, and reduce taxes. Political reform will be limited to administrative reforms, such as reduced government functions. The courts will no longer be monopolized by local leaders. Both economic and administrative reforms must overcome enormous political obstacles. Xi and Li have built up a considerable head of steam. Will they finally be able to implement their reforms? That remains hard to say. But Mainland China will surely undergo change.
The third major trend pertains to cross-Strait relations. Changes on the Mainland and changes in Sino-US relations have taken place. The Mainland's Taiwan policy also shows signs of change. Xi Jinping spoke during the "Siew Xi Meeting." He said "The cross-Strait political divide cannot be passed down endlessly from generation to generation." After meeting with United States Secretary of State John Kerry, Wang Yi said the "Taiwan issue remains within the realm of control." These two statements indicate unprecedented Mainland confidence regarding cross-Strait relations. We on Taiwan must think carefully. When the Mainland's comprehensive national strength can no longer be denied, when the balance of power in US-China relations changes, how will we on Taiwan cope?
社論－從最近三大趨勢性新聞談起
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年10月22日 04:09
日常新聞非常瑣碎，一般人不太有興趣盯著進度每天閱讀，或著太過瑣碎，讀過就忘。但非常致命的是，有些不能吸引大眾眼球的日常性新聞，卻如同穿石水滴，一旦讓人察覺，往往已達到不可逆程度，屆時再「痛心疾首」已於事無補。
最近有3個趨勢性新聞就具有此一特質，而且似乎已接近不可逆階段，將對台灣的命運產生顛覆性影響，國人必須重視並了解。
自二戰結束後，美國領導東亞第一島鏈國家與中國大陸、蘇聯對峙，台灣與美國、日本、南韓、菲律賓始終維持大致穩定的戰略合作關係。但近年來，亞太形勢隨著中國的崛起，已經出現結構性變化，美國在亞太主導地位逐漸鬆動。美國國務卿希拉蕊於2011年底，在夏威夷以「21世紀將是美國的太平洋世紀」為題發表專題演講，宣示美國將在亞太地區建立「跨太平洋體系」，繼續扮演核心角色。隨後前國防部長潘尼塔亦強調，美國決定持續增強在亞太的軍事能量，以避免中國軍力的增長影響到美國在亞太地區的關鍵利益。美國開始推動「重返亞洲政策」，歐巴馬第2任期修正為「亞洲再平衡政策」。
隨著美國國債問題持續惡化，甚至演出聯邦政府局部關閉16天鬧劇，而且明年2月7日前，美國總債務將逼近18兆美元，聯邦政府又要面臨關閉的凌遲，國防部長海格爾忍不住抱怨，美債危機延伸，已重創亞太國家對美國信心。歐巴馬甚至放棄出席在印尼舉行的APEC年會領袖會議，讓中國國家主席習近平獨領風騷。
北京領導人卻以剛柔並濟的外交手腕和「睦鄰、安鄰、富鄰」的政策宣示，破解美國重返亞洲戰略。習近平與李克強趁勢分別訪問了印尼、越南等國家，尤其促成中越鐵公路建設共識，啟動中越雙邊海上、陸上與金融領域合作。李克強成功促使越南，在中美兩強間採取更平衡的政策。
南韓日前公開表示，不加入美國的飛彈防禦系統，朴槿惠總統同時提出「歐亞計畫」新戰略構想，希望與中國及俄羅斯加強鄰國合作關係。印度國防部亦公開拒絕美國在印度設立軍事基地，新加坡總理李顯龍在2013年國慶時，首度用中文講演，也反映出其在美中之間，運用平衡策略的用心與巧思。越南、韓國、印度、新加坡相繼做出選擇，將對中美戰略競爭關係產生重大影響。
第2件重大趨勢性新聞事件，是中共11月即將召開三中全會，將吹起改革號角，推動中國經濟體制與社會的轉型改革。這次會議的成果將決定未來10年中國大陸的命運，無疑亦將牽動台灣的發展。依據中共體制，歷屆三中全會都在新領導班子接任1年後召開，往往出現路線的重大宣示。習李領導下的中國已展現與胡溫時代大為不同的面貌，社會氛圍也有很大改變。習李接班後大力倡廉反腐、回歸中共傳統價值、對外展現自信與強勢作風，已贏得相當程度的民意支持，創造出團結的社會氛圍，為三中全會的順利召開與各項提案的順利通過創造良好條件。
不過，三中全會不能只是行禮如儀，必須通過習李改革大計，才算成功。眾所周知，中共必須改革，唯有改革才能推動大陸經濟與社會的持續發展。但改革牽動既得利益，勢必引起反抗，習李必須獲得足夠的社會支持能量，才能對抗既得利益的反抗。
從習李「經濟向右、政治向左」的施政作為觀察，三中的改革大計將集中在經濟層面，希望更向市場經濟傾斜、金融更自由化與國際化、更加重扶植民企與微型企業、推動稅改減輕民企稅賦等。政治方面則將限制在行政改革，如政府職能縮小、司法脫離地方一把手控制等。但據了解，無論經濟或行政改革，都遭遇很大的政治困難。習李已累積相當的能量推動改革，最後能否完全實現改革仍難預言，但中國肯定會改變。
第3個趨勢是兩岸關係的變動，隨著大陸內部情勢與中美關係的變化，大陸對台政策思維也出現一些改變跡象。習近平在「蕭習會」中說，「兩岸政治分歧不能一代一代傳下去」、王毅在美國會晤國務卿柯瑞後表示「台灣問題在可控範圍內」，這兩句話都流露出中國大陸領導層對兩岸關係前所未有的自信。台灣須審慎思考，當大陸綜合國力已非吳下阿蒙，美中關係平衡出現改變，台灣應如何應對？
Sunday, October 20, 2013
DPP: From the Good Fight to Dirty Pool
DPP: From the Good Fight to Dirty Pool
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 18, 2013
Summary: The DPP gained legitimacy through its calls for the lifting of martial law and for a "Taiwan independence consciousness." This historical background shaped the DPP's basic character. Today however, martial law is a fading memory. Taiwan independence is a pipe dream. Yet the DPP continues to live in the past. It continues to dwell on martial law and Taiwan independence. This reveals how anachronistic the DPP's thinking is.
Full text below:
The DPP gained legitimacy through its calls for the lifting of martial law and for a "Taiwan independence consciousness." This historical background shaped the DPP's basic character. Today however, martial law is a fading memory. Taiwan independence is a pipe dream. Yet the DPP continues to live in the past. It continues to dwell on martial law and Taiwan independence. This reveals how anachronistic the DPP's thinking is.
Today's DPP cannot distinguish between providing checks on the ruling administration and harming Taiwan's interests. It cannot distinguish between opposition to Ma and undermining the nation. By aiding and abetting Wang Jin-pyng and Ker Chien-ming, it hijacked and paralyzed the Legislative Yuan. TISA is considered the most generous cross-Strait trade concession to Taiwan ever offered by the Mainland authorities. Yet the DPP has obstinately opposed it to the bitter end. It once demanded a public referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Now however it has done an about faced and killed it. It has not hesitated to use the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant as a political tool to undermine the nation and society. Do such actions really "oppose Ma?" Or do they merely harm Taiwan and undermine the ROC?
Martial law was unjust. The "10,000 year Legislature," the prohibition against opposition political parties, the censorship of the press, and the lack of an independent criminal justice system provided the political opposition with moral legitimacy. As a result the DPP often resorted to physical violence in the streets or in the legislature. Society supported or tolerated it. That is why the then Kuomintang government implemented a policy of "non-retaliation in response to verbal or physical attacks." Its feelings of guilt over the "original sin" of martial law" reduced it to silence in the face of DPP insults and disruptions within the legislature. The DPP's "Taiwan independence consciousness" in particular was motivated by the desire to overthrow the Republic of China. As a result, it viewed the nation, the constitution, government officials, the military, and civil servants as the enemy of a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." All were to be demeaned and destroyed. Nothing and no one were to be spared. This attitude was reflected in the recent Hung Chung-chiu case. The DPP's actions in the Hung case were motivated not by a longing for justice. They were motivated by a desire to destroy the military, discredit its reputation, and undermine its fighting ability. This was a case of partisan battles harming Taiwan and undermining the ROC. If the DPP returns to power, can we still expect the military to defend the nation and the public?
The Taiwan independence movement no longer has issues such as the "10,000 year Legislature" to demagogue. As a result, its Taiwan independence appeals no longer carry the same force. DPP social issues no longer evince idealism, morality, and legitimacy. In recent years, DPP politlcal struggles have been waged over two issues. The first is cross-Strait relations. The second is public policy. On cross-Strait relations, the DPP has been wracked by internal power struggles over Taiwan independence, unable to extricate itself. It has redoubled its efforts on behalf of Taiwan independence in an effort to rally public sentiment. But it has also expressed support for cross-Strait policies such as ECFA. It went from street protests to "acceptance of ECFA in toto." Clearly the DPP finds itself in a dilemma on cross-Strait policy. On public policy, the DPP opposes virtually every one of the ruling party's public policies. U.S. beef imports are a classic example. The DPP demands the immediate shutdown of nuclear power plants. It can suggest no alternative energy solutions, yet simultaneously objects to electricty rate hikes. It demands membership in the TPP and RCEP, yet simultaneously opposes the "Free Trade Zone Pilot Program." It even opposes TISA, the most one-sidedly beneficial to Taiwan trade agreement the Mainland has ever offered. Under the circumstances, how can Taiwan possibly withstand the TPP's acid test? Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell recently addressed the matter of Taiwan's participation in the TPP. He said it would require political courage. He said it was not something any single political party on Taiwan could achieve on its own. His remark equated partisan partisan political struggle with undermining the nation. .
The DPP obstinately opposes almost all major ruling party public policies out of sheer spite. It adopts the same posture toward all major cross-Strait policies that it once adopted toward martial law and the "10,000 year Legislature." This includes ECFA and TISA. It brings the same Taiwan independence mindset to all national policy debates, leading inevitably to total paralysis. It risks harming Taiwan and undermining the ROC. The DPP is fully within its rights to oppose Ma and the KMT. But it has no right to harm Taiwan and undermine the ROC. That is an inexcusable crime. The Chen Shui-bian regime ruled for eight years. It left the Taipei/Washington/Beijing relationship in shambles. Does the DPP really intend to reenact this political farce again in 2016?
Today the president is directly elected. The legislature is completely "localized." DPP moral legitimacy must be based on the electoral system and majority rule. In recent years, Wang Jin-pyng and Ker Chien-ming have coauthored a script. The DPP is a minority party that toccupies only one third of all seats in the legislature. But by forcibly occupying the podium and other techniques, it has exercised an influence obviously at variance with the principle of proportional representation. This is not post-martial law era constitutional rule, and it has led to DPP vainglory. It has made political progress more difficult. It has forstalled systemic improvements.
During the battle over martial law, the DPP "fought the good fight." Chen Shui-bian's "rectification of names" on the other hand, was both self-deception and deception of others. During the recent legislative turmoil the DPP Chairman became Ker Chien-ming's puppet. The DPP became Ker Chien-ming's political tool. The DPP's good fight has become dirty pool. Its sole purpose is to oppose Ma out of spite, and to harm Taiwan and undermine the ROC. The DPP has lost its badge of honor. It has lost track of time. it no longer knows what era it is living in. It has exceeded all bounds of reason.
民進黨從美好的一仗沉淪至打爛仗
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.18 04:11 am
民進黨以「推翻戒嚴體制」與「台獨意識」起家，此一歷史背景塑造了民進黨的根本氣質；然而，如今已經解嚴，台獨也已渺無希望，民進黨卻仍以「戒嚴時代」的「台獨思維」來問政。這是今日所見民進黨種種表現經常顯得時空錯亂的主要原因之一。
今日所見，民進黨似乎搞不清楚政黨制衡與傷害台灣的界際何在，也搞不清楚反馬與毀滅國家的界際何在。例如，將「挺王保柯」鬧到挾持癱瘓立法院的地步；再如，揚言對被稱為「全世界最讓利的FTA─兩岸服貿協議」將採焦土杯葛；又如，自毀「核四公投」的承諾，不惜以核四議題為其凌遲國家社會的政治工具。這些，究竟是在反馬？抑或傷台毀國？
由於戒嚴體制所存在的不正義，如萬年國會、黨禁報禁、司法不獨立等，使民進黨當年的反對運動具有道德性、正當性；於是，民進黨在街頭或議會常以暴力作強勢抗爭，但仍能獲得社會的支持或容忍。也因此，當年的國民黨政府在街頭「罵不還口／打不還手」，在議會則因「戒嚴原罪感」聽任民進黨羞辱官員、破壞議事。尤其，民進黨的台獨意識，心中原本以顛覆中華民國為宗旨，於是不論國家、憲法、政府、官員、國軍、公務員均視為「台灣國」的敵人，從而對之加以羞辱、毀傷，皆無所顧惜；此種心態也反映在最近的洪仲丘案上。民進黨對洪案的操作其實不在為個案伸張正義，而在趁勢摧毀整個國軍的榮譽與戰力，這已是將「黨爭」導向了「傷台毀國」。但另日民進黨若再上台執政時，難道可以不依靠國軍保國衛民？
由於如今已無「萬年國會」之類的大題目，台獨訴求亦渺無希望，民進黨遂在引領社會議題的理想性、道德性及正當性上失所寄託。於是，近年的政爭集中在兩類議題上。一、兩岸議題：一方面，民進黨內部的權力鬥爭已陷於台獨漩渦不能自拔，遑論再以台獨之主張來號召社會；另一方面，在兩岸政策上，如ECF
A，又自街頭全面抗爭轉至「概括承受」，俱見民進黨在兩岸政策上已是進退失據。二、公共政策：民進黨幾乎反對執政黨所有的公共政策，美牛案即是其經典作。再如，完全拿不出替代能源方案，又反對電價上漲，卻主張立即停建核四；又如，主張參加TPP、RCEP，卻一度反對「自由經濟示範區」，如今又反《服貿協議》，但連對岸片面大讓利的《服貿協議》也反；如此，台灣將如何禁得起TPP的考驗？美國前亞太助卿坎貝爾最近論及台灣參與TPP時說，「這需要政治雄心，不是（台灣）單一政黨的事」；此言不啻亦在標示「黨爭」與「毀國」的界際。
民進黨如果刻意反對執政黨所提一切重大公共政策，皆以「反戒嚴體制」及「反萬年國會」的高度及手法來操作；並反對一切重大的兩岸政策，如反ECFA及反服貿協議，且皆以「台獨思維」來操作反對，最後必定會造成國政癱瘓，甚至有傷台毀國之虞。民進黨當然可以反馬及反國民黨，但如因此不惜傷台毀國，那是不可原諒的罪行。陳水扁執政八年，留下了一個台美中三邊皆受重傷的政治廢墟；難道民進黨又要再製造一個政治廢墟，讓自己在二○一六年接手？
如今已是總統直選與國會全面本土化的時代，民進黨的道德性及正當性必須建立在選舉體制所標示的「多數原則」上。近年來，在王金平與柯建銘二人編導的劇本下，民進黨以僅占立院約三分之一餘席次的少數黨，用「霸占主席台」等手法，造成了一種「非如其分的」及「嚴重違反比例原則的」聲勢，此絕非「後解嚴時代」的憲政正義，且會造成民進黨的虛榮與虛胖，使其更不知轉型上進，對改善其體質絕無裨益。
在「戒嚴時代」的重大抗爭中，民進黨可謂「那美好的一仗已經打過」；至於陳水扁的「正名制憲」，則已是「自欺欺人」；再至最近這場立院風暴，民進黨主席儼然已成柯建銘的傀儡，民進黨全黨亦已成柯建銘之工具，不啻已成一場「逢馬必反／傷台毀國」的「爛仗」。榮辱殊途，時空錯亂，豈非莫此為甚？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 18, 2013
Summary: The DPP gained legitimacy through its calls for the lifting of martial law and for a "Taiwan independence consciousness." This historical background shaped the DPP's basic character. Today however, martial law is a fading memory. Taiwan independence is a pipe dream. Yet the DPP continues to live in the past. It continues to dwell on martial law and Taiwan independence. This reveals how anachronistic the DPP's thinking is.
Full text below:
The DPP gained legitimacy through its calls for the lifting of martial law and for a "Taiwan independence consciousness." This historical background shaped the DPP's basic character. Today however, martial law is a fading memory. Taiwan independence is a pipe dream. Yet the DPP continues to live in the past. It continues to dwell on martial law and Taiwan independence. This reveals how anachronistic the DPP's thinking is.
Today's DPP cannot distinguish between providing checks on the ruling administration and harming Taiwan's interests. It cannot distinguish between opposition to Ma and undermining the nation. By aiding and abetting Wang Jin-pyng and Ker Chien-ming, it hijacked and paralyzed the Legislative Yuan. TISA is considered the most generous cross-Strait trade concession to Taiwan ever offered by the Mainland authorities. Yet the DPP has obstinately opposed it to the bitter end. It once demanded a public referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Now however it has done an about faced and killed it. It has not hesitated to use the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant as a political tool to undermine the nation and society. Do such actions really "oppose Ma?" Or do they merely harm Taiwan and undermine the ROC?
Martial law was unjust. The "10,000 year Legislature," the prohibition against opposition political parties, the censorship of the press, and the lack of an independent criminal justice system provided the political opposition with moral legitimacy. As a result the DPP often resorted to physical violence in the streets or in the legislature. Society supported or tolerated it. That is why the then Kuomintang government implemented a policy of "non-retaliation in response to verbal or physical attacks." Its feelings of guilt over the "original sin" of martial law" reduced it to silence in the face of DPP insults and disruptions within the legislature. The DPP's "Taiwan independence consciousness" in particular was motivated by the desire to overthrow the Republic of China. As a result, it viewed the nation, the constitution, government officials, the military, and civil servants as the enemy of a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." All were to be demeaned and destroyed. Nothing and no one were to be spared. This attitude was reflected in the recent Hung Chung-chiu case. The DPP's actions in the Hung case were motivated not by a longing for justice. They were motivated by a desire to destroy the military, discredit its reputation, and undermine its fighting ability. This was a case of partisan battles harming Taiwan and undermining the ROC. If the DPP returns to power, can we still expect the military to defend the nation and the public?
The Taiwan independence movement no longer has issues such as the "10,000 year Legislature" to demagogue. As a result, its Taiwan independence appeals no longer carry the same force. DPP social issues no longer evince idealism, morality, and legitimacy. In recent years, DPP politlcal struggles have been waged over two issues. The first is cross-Strait relations. The second is public policy. On cross-Strait relations, the DPP has been wracked by internal power struggles over Taiwan independence, unable to extricate itself. It has redoubled its efforts on behalf of Taiwan independence in an effort to rally public sentiment. But it has also expressed support for cross-Strait policies such as ECFA. It went from street protests to "acceptance of ECFA in toto." Clearly the DPP finds itself in a dilemma on cross-Strait policy. On public policy, the DPP opposes virtually every one of the ruling party's public policies. U.S. beef imports are a classic example. The DPP demands the immediate shutdown of nuclear power plants. It can suggest no alternative energy solutions, yet simultaneously objects to electricty rate hikes. It demands membership in the TPP and RCEP, yet simultaneously opposes the "Free Trade Zone Pilot Program." It even opposes TISA, the most one-sidedly beneficial to Taiwan trade agreement the Mainland has ever offered. Under the circumstances, how can Taiwan possibly withstand the TPP's acid test? Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell recently addressed the matter of Taiwan's participation in the TPP. He said it would require political courage. He said it was not something any single political party on Taiwan could achieve on its own. His remark equated partisan partisan political struggle with undermining the nation. .
The DPP obstinately opposes almost all major ruling party public policies out of sheer spite. It adopts the same posture toward all major cross-Strait policies that it once adopted toward martial law and the "10,000 year Legislature." This includes ECFA and TISA. It brings the same Taiwan independence mindset to all national policy debates, leading inevitably to total paralysis. It risks harming Taiwan and undermining the ROC. The DPP is fully within its rights to oppose Ma and the KMT. But it has no right to harm Taiwan and undermine the ROC. That is an inexcusable crime. The Chen Shui-bian regime ruled for eight years. It left the Taipei/Washington/Beijing relationship in shambles. Does the DPP really intend to reenact this political farce again in 2016?
Today the president is directly elected. The legislature is completely "localized." DPP moral legitimacy must be based on the electoral system and majority rule. In recent years, Wang Jin-pyng and Ker Chien-ming have coauthored a script. The DPP is a minority party that toccupies only one third of all seats in the legislature. But by forcibly occupying the podium and other techniques, it has exercised an influence obviously at variance with the principle of proportional representation. This is not post-martial law era constitutional rule, and it has led to DPP vainglory. It has made political progress more difficult. It has forstalled systemic improvements.
During the battle over martial law, the DPP "fought the good fight." Chen Shui-bian's "rectification of names" on the other hand, was both self-deception and deception of others. During the recent legislative turmoil the DPP Chairman became Ker Chien-ming's puppet. The DPP became Ker Chien-ming's political tool. The DPP's good fight has become dirty pool. Its sole purpose is to oppose Ma out of spite, and to harm Taiwan and undermine the ROC. The DPP has lost its badge of honor. It has lost track of time. it no longer knows what era it is living in. It has exceeded all bounds of reason.
民進黨從美好的一仗沉淪至打爛仗
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.18 04:11 am
民進黨以「推翻戒嚴體制」與「台獨意識」起家，此一歷史背景塑造了民進黨的根本氣質；然而，如今已經解嚴，台獨也已渺無希望，民進黨卻仍以「戒嚴時代」的「台獨思維」來問政。這是今日所見民進黨種種表現經常顯得時空錯亂的主要原因之一。
今日所見，民進黨似乎搞不清楚政黨制衡與傷害台灣的界際何在，也搞不清楚反馬與毀滅國家的界際何在。例如，將「挺王保柯」鬧到挾持癱瘓立法院的地步；再如，揚言對被稱為「全世界最讓利的FTA─兩岸服貿協議」將採焦土杯葛；又如，自毀「核四公投」的承諾，不惜以核四議題為其凌遲國家社會的政治工具。這些，究竟是在反馬？抑或傷台毀國？
由於戒嚴體制所存在的不正義，如萬年國會、黨禁報禁、司法不獨立等，使民進黨當年的反對運動具有道德性、正當性；於是，民進黨在街頭或議會常以暴力作強勢抗爭，但仍能獲得社會的支持或容忍。也因此，當年的國民黨政府在街頭「罵不還口／打不還手」，在議會則因「戒嚴原罪感」聽任民進黨羞辱官員、破壞議事。尤其，民進黨的台獨意識，心中原本以顛覆中華民國為宗旨，於是不論國家、憲法、政府、官員、國軍、公務員均視為「台灣國」的敵人，從而對之加以羞辱、毀傷，皆無所顧惜；此種心態也反映在最近的洪仲丘案上。民進黨對洪案的操作其實不在為個案伸張正義，而在趁勢摧毀整個國軍的榮譽與戰力，這已是將「黨爭」導向了「傷台毀國」。但另日民進黨若再上台執政時，難道可以不依靠國軍保國衛民？
由於如今已無「萬年國會」之類的大題目，台獨訴求亦渺無希望，民進黨遂在引領社會議題的理想性、道德性及正當性上失所寄託。於是，近年的政爭集中在兩類議題上。一、兩岸議題：一方面，民進黨內部的權力鬥爭已陷於台獨漩渦不能自拔，遑論再以台獨之主張來號召社會；另一方面，在兩岸政策上，如ECF
A，又自街頭全面抗爭轉至「概括承受」，俱見民進黨在兩岸政策上已是進退失據。二、公共政策：民進黨幾乎反對執政黨所有的公共政策，美牛案即是其經典作。再如，完全拿不出替代能源方案，又反對電價上漲，卻主張立即停建核四；又如，主張參加TPP、RCEP，卻一度反對「自由經濟示範區」，如今又反《服貿協議》，但連對岸片面大讓利的《服貿協議》也反；如此，台灣將如何禁得起TPP的考驗？美國前亞太助卿坎貝爾最近論及台灣參與TPP時說，「這需要政治雄心，不是（台灣）單一政黨的事」；此言不啻亦在標示「黨爭」與「毀國」的界際。
民進黨如果刻意反對執政黨所提一切重大公共政策，皆以「反戒嚴體制」及「反萬年國會」的高度及手法來操作；並反對一切重大的兩岸政策，如反ECFA及反服貿協議，且皆以「台獨思維」來操作反對，最後必定會造成國政癱瘓，甚至有傷台毀國之虞。民進黨當然可以反馬及反國民黨，但如因此不惜傷台毀國，那是不可原諒的罪行。陳水扁執政八年，留下了一個台美中三邊皆受重傷的政治廢墟；難道民進黨又要再製造一個政治廢墟，讓自己在二○一六年接手？
如今已是總統直選與國會全面本土化的時代，民進黨的道德性及正當性必須建立在選舉體制所標示的「多數原則」上。近年來，在王金平與柯建銘二人編導的劇本下，民進黨以僅占立院約三分之一餘席次的少數黨，用「霸占主席台」等手法，造成了一種「非如其分的」及「嚴重違反比例原則的」聲勢，此絕非「後解嚴時代」的憲政正義，且會造成民進黨的虛榮與虛胖，使其更不知轉型上進，對改善其體質絕無裨益。
在「戒嚴時代」的重大抗爭中，民進黨可謂「那美好的一仗已經打過」；至於陳水扁的「正名制憲」，則已是「自欺欺人」；再至最近這場立院風暴，民進黨主席儼然已成柯建銘的傀儡，民進黨全黨亦已成柯建銘之工具，不啻已成一場「逢馬必反／傷台毀國」的「爛仗」。榮辱殊途，時空錯亂，豈非莫此為甚？
Thursday, October 17, 2013
Chiang Yi-hua and Ker Chien-ming: Who Really Trampled over the Constitution?
Chiang Yi-hua and Ker Chien-ming: Who Really Trampled over the Constitution?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 18, 2013
Summary: The DPP's call for a no-confidence vote was defeated. Will this persuade the DPP to compromise? Will it agree to allow Premier Chiang to deliver his policy report and to respond to questioning? This has become a litmus test, an indicator of whether Taiwan's democracy can function rationally. The DPP's motion for a no confidence vote was defeated. This means the legislature does have confidence in the premier. The DPP may refuse to acknowledge this. But the defeat of the DPP motion proves once again that the KMT is the ruling majority in the legislature, not the DPP.
Full text below:
The US Congress has finally broken its deadlock and reached a tenative agreement on the national budget and the debt ceiling. Can the ROC break its own legislative deadlock? The DPP's call for a no-confidence vote was defeated. Will this persuade the DPP to compromise? Will it agree to allow Premier Chiang to deliver his policy report and to respond to questioning? This has become a litmus test, an indicator of whether Taiwan's democracy can function rationally. The DPP's motion for a no confidence vote was defeated. This means the legislature does have confidence in the premier. The DPP may refuse to acknowledge this. But the defeat of the DPP motion proves once again that the KMT is the ruling majority in the legislature, not the DPP.
The halls of legislature are not city streets. It has its own operating mechanism and its own set of rules. Neither the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan Wang Jin-pyng nor the KMT, should permit the DPP to obstruct the normal functioning of the legislature. The DPP must not be permitted to repeatedly bring the business of the legislature to a grinding halt. The DPP has no excuse for its obstructionism motivated by sheer spite.
As Premier Chiang noted, "A motion for a no confidence vote is a very serious and substantive constitutional matter." A call for the resignation of the cabinet is not about long winded speeches, obstructing legislative proceedings, or occupying the podium. It is about resolving political impasses according to constitutional procedures. Every motion for a no confidence vote is recorded in the annals of the Republic of China's constitutional history.
Consider the political reality. The Ma government and Chiang cabinet both suffer single digit approval ratings. The Speaker of the Legislature Wang Jin-pyng has made clear that the legislature has already expressed its confidence in Chiang Yi-hua. The DPP should therefore allow Premier Chiang to ascend to the podium. In the past, for the sake of harmony, Wang Jin-pyng used party consultation procedures to overcome obstacles. It was his first resort. It was probably his only resort. The result was often legislative wheel-spinning. Wang Jin-pyng should clear away obstacles and allow Premier Chiang to deliver his policy address, in accordance with normal legislature procedure.
The KMT is the majority party, hence the ruling party. The opposition DPP often engages in obstructionism. Yet the KMT never takes any counter-measures. This, to some extent, is the reason for public dissatisfaction with the Ma administration. The DPP motion for a no confidence vote failed. Yet the KMT remains impotent, unable to let the premier address the legislature. Public dissatisfaction will not be directed only at the DPP.
Wang Jin-pyng and the KMT legislative caucus must prove that the Legislative Yuan is not the hallmark of a malfunctioning democracy. They must prove that the KMT is not a ruling party in name only.
The Legislative Yuan weilds police power. It has many other means of removing obstacles to the conduct of legislative business. The DPP legislative caucus can forcibly occupy the podium. But why can't the KMT caucus maintain the dignity of the speaker's podium? The DPP legislative caucus can hold slumber parties on the floor of the legislature. But why can't the KMT caucus enter the hall earlier and seize the initiative? This is not a matter of whether the KMT wants to aid and abet the DPP. KMT legislators must ask themselves whether they value their constituents' trust. Are they willing to leave people with the impression they can do absolutely nothing? Calls went out for the resignation of the cabinet. They came from the DPP. But what about calls for the dissolution of the legislature? Did the public really want Premier Chiang replaced? Or was what they really wanted the dissolution of the legislature? The motion for a no confidence vote failed. The legislature will not be dissolved. But if the legislature fails to restore normal order, public discontent will not abate .
On the Judicial Committee, Ker Chien-ming rammed through an independent investigation. Special Investigative Unit prosecutors must now respond to legislative questioning. This was flagrant political pressure. Ker Chien-ming's influence peddling was exposed. His shame turned to anger. Does the DPP intend to allow itself to be hijacked by this "Party Whip for Life?" Is the DPP really that muddle-headed? Ker Chien-ming has been exploiting the DPP for the past month. If he still refuses to let up, a tide of criticism is inevitable. The KMT's prestige will remain low. But the DPP's prestige will also plummet. Does the DPP really intend to allow this party whip persist in his antics?
Ker Chien-ming seldom questions officials. But since the influence peddling scandal broke, he has been extraordinarily diligent about speaking out on the Judicial Committee. He has questioned administration officials more times than during his entire career as a legislator. Whether his questions were groundless is not the point. As a legislator, it is his prerogative. But Ker Chien-ming and other legislators have asked no questions of Premier Chiang. They have merely held press conferences outside the legislature and called Chiang names. Meanwhile, they refuse to allow Premier Chiang to respond and explain, in accordance with the constitution. This is political persecution. This is not something legislators should be doing.
Ker Chien-ming says we will finally be able to see him go head to head with Premier Chiang today. This is a belated but correct decision. We believe various units of the Executive Yuan and Premier Chiang will agree to confront the matter of the no confidence vote. They will solemnly perform their constitutional duties and responsibilities. The people as a whole look forward to both Yuans confronting each other democratically. This will allow the truth behind the controversy to emerge. It will allow the public to see whether legislative whip Ker Chien-ming or Premier Chiang trampled over the constitution.
社論－江宜樺、柯建銘 誰才是憲政罪人
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年10月18日 04:10
當美國國會終於打破僵局，達成預算與債務暫時性協議，台灣的立法僵局，能否因閣揆不信任案的否決，使民進黨願意妥協，同意江揆提出施政報告並備詢而打破，已經成為台灣民主政治能否理性運作的指標。即使民進黨不承認倒閣案未通過代表國會對閣揆的信任，但倒閣案的否決，畢竟再一次證明國會多數執政的是國民黨而非民進黨。
國會不是街頭，自有其文明的運作機制，不論是立法院長王金平，乃至國民黨都沒有理由再讓民進黨的杯葛策略，一而再、再而三癱瘓院會議事，民進黨更沒有理由堅持為反對而反對路線。
誠如江揆所言，「不信任案是憲法中非常嚴肅而具實質效力的議案」，倒閣案絕對不僅只是冗長發言、霸佔主席台的議事杯葛手段，而是明載於憲法條文處理或解決政治僵局的憲政議案，每一次倒閣案的提出，在中華民國憲政史上都留下紀錄。
就政治現實而論，不論馬政府、江內閣的民意支持度有幾趴，立法院長王金平已明確詮釋：國會已對江宜樺投下信任票，那麼，民進黨就應該讓江揆上台。如果過去王金平為求議事和諧，而以朝野協商為排除議事障礙的優先、甚至唯一手段，致使國會議事經常性陷入空轉，現在，王金平就應該依照正常議事程序邀請江院長提出施政報告，並依議事規則排除障礙。
做為多數執政的國民黨，如果面對反對黨杯葛，卻始終拿不出反制辦法，某種程度也是民意對馬政府不滿的原因。如果否決了倒閣案，卻還是一籌莫展，不能讓行政院長順利進行施政報告，民意的反彈必然不只衝著民進黨。
此刻，王金平與國民黨團必須證明立法院不是「不能運作的民主」淵藪，國民黨也不是空有虛名的執政黨。
除了動用警察權，立法院排除議事障礙的方法很多，民進黨團能霸佔主席台，為什麼國民黨團不能維護主席台的尊嚴？民進黨團能夜宿議場，國民黨團為什麼不能更早進場搶得先機？這不是國民黨要不要護航的問題，國民黨立委得捫心自問，身受選民負託，是要讓自己在國會一籌莫展嗎？倒閣之聲起，除了民進黨團衝著江揆來？還有多少民意是衝著解散國會而來？真實的民意到底是期待撤換行政院長？還是解散國會重選？儘管倒閣案未過，沒有解散國會的問題，但若立法院始終無法正常議事，類似民怨就不會消減。
柯建銘在司法委員會硬逼獨立偵辦案件的特偵組檢察官列席備詢，已經是公然政治施壓，柯建銘因為個人司法案件關說遭揭露而腦羞成怒，民進黨難道也全黨昏頭放任被萬年總召一人綁架？ 柯建銘主導民進黨已一個月，此時再不放手，屆時批評聲浪必然高漲，國民黨聲望不振，民進黨同樣江河日下，這樣的總召還可以繼續做下去嗎？
柯建銘平常不太對官員提出質詢，關說案發生以來，卻異常勤快在司法委員會登記發言，質詢次數大概已超過他擔任立委以來的總和，不論有理沒理，這是立委的職權。但柯建銘或其他立委對江揆有任何質疑，卻只到場外舉行記者會片面罵人，卻不讓江揆依憲法答覆說明，這是一種政治凌遲，非立委所應為。
柯建銘聲稱，今日將可以看到他和江院長對話的畫面，這是個遲來但正確的決定，相信行政院各部會和江揆都會如同面對倒閣案般，嚴正以待憲政的義務與責任，全民都期待兩院以民主方式交鋒，讓政治爭議背後的真相在國會殿堂再現，也讓他們看看到底江揆與柯總召，誰尊重憲政，誰是憲政罪人？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 18, 2013
Summary: The DPP's call for a no-confidence vote was defeated. Will this persuade the DPP to compromise? Will it agree to allow Premier Chiang to deliver his policy report and to respond to questioning? This has become a litmus test, an indicator of whether Taiwan's democracy can function rationally. The DPP's motion for a no confidence vote was defeated. This means the legislature does have confidence in the premier. The DPP may refuse to acknowledge this. But the defeat of the DPP motion proves once again that the KMT is the ruling majority in the legislature, not the DPP.
Full text below:
The US Congress has finally broken its deadlock and reached a tenative agreement on the national budget and the debt ceiling. Can the ROC break its own legislative deadlock? The DPP's call for a no-confidence vote was defeated. Will this persuade the DPP to compromise? Will it agree to allow Premier Chiang to deliver his policy report and to respond to questioning? This has become a litmus test, an indicator of whether Taiwan's democracy can function rationally. The DPP's motion for a no confidence vote was defeated. This means the legislature does have confidence in the premier. The DPP may refuse to acknowledge this. But the defeat of the DPP motion proves once again that the KMT is the ruling majority in the legislature, not the DPP.
The halls of legislature are not city streets. It has its own operating mechanism and its own set of rules. Neither the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan Wang Jin-pyng nor the KMT, should permit the DPP to obstruct the normal functioning of the legislature. The DPP must not be permitted to repeatedly bring the business of the legislature to a grinding halt. The DPP has no excuse for its obstructionism motivated by sheer spite.
As Premier Chiang noted, "A motion for a no confidence vote is a very serious and substantive constitutional matter." A call for the resignation of the cabinet is not about long winded speeches, obstructing legislative proceedings, or occupying the podium. It is about resolving political impasses according to constitutional procedures. Every motion for a no confidence vote is recorded in the annals of the Republic of China's constitutional history.
Consider the political reality. The Ma government and Chiang cabinet both suffer single digit approval ratings. The Speaker of the Legislature Wang Jin-pyng has made clear that the legislature has already expressed its confidence in Chiang Yi-hua. The DPP should therefore allow Premier Chiang to ascend to the podium. In the past, for the sake of harmony, Wang Jin-pyng used party consultation procedures to overcome obstacles. It was his first resort. It was probably his only resort. The result was often legislative wheel-spinning. Wang Jin-pyng should clear away obstacles and allow Premier Chiang to deliver his policy address, in accordance with normal legislature procedure.
The KMT is the majority party, hence the ruling party. The opposition DPP often engages in obstructionism. Yet the KMT never takes any counter-measures. This, to some extent, is the reason for public dissatisfaction with the Ma administration. The DPP motion for a no confidence vote failed. Yet the KMT remains impotent, unable to let the premier address the legislature. Public dissatisfaction will not be directed only at the DPP.
Wang Jin-pyng and the KMT legislative caucus must prove that the Legislative Yuan is not the hallmark of a malfunctioning democracy. They must prove that the KMT is not a ruling party in name only.
The Legislative Yuan weilds police power. It has many other means of removing obstacles to the conduct of legislative business. The DPP legislative caucus can forcibly occupy the podium. But why can't the KMT caucus maintain the dignity of the speaker's podium? The DPP legislative caucus can hold slumber parties on the floor of the legislature. But why can't the KMT caucus enter the hall earlier and seize the initiative? This is not a matter of whether the KMT wants to aid and abet the DPP. KMT legislators must ask themselves whether they value their constituents' trust. Are they willing to leave people with the impression they can do absolutely nothing? Calls went out for the resignation of the cabinet. They came from the DPP. But what about calls for the dissolution of the legislature? Did the public really want Premier Chiang replaced? Or was what they really wanted the dissolution of the legislature? The motion for a no confidence vote failed. The legislature will not be dissolved. But if the legislature fails to restore normal order, public discontent will not abate .
On the Judicial Committee, Ker Chien-ming rammed through an independent investigation. Special Investigative Unit prosecutors must now respond to legislative questioning. This was flagrant political pressure. Ker Chien-ming's influence peddling was exposed. His shame turned to anger. Does the DPP intend to allow itself to be hijacked by this "Party Whip for Life?" Is the DPP really that muddle-headed? Ker Chien-ming has been exploiting the DPP for the past month. If he still refuses to let up, a tide of criticism is inevitable. The KMT's prestige will remain low. But the DPP's prestige will also plummet. Does the DPP really intend to allow this party whip persist in his antics?
Ker Chien-ming seldom questions officials. But since the influence peddling scandal broke, he has been extraordinarily diligent about speaking out on the Judicial Committee. He has questioned administration officials more times than during his entire career as a legislator. Whether his questions were groundless is not the point. As a legislator, it is his prerogative. But Ker Chien-ming and other legislators have asked no questions of Premier Chiang. They have merely held press conferences outside the legislature and called Chiang names. Meanwhile, they refuse to allow Premier Chiang to respond and explain, in accordance with the constitution. This is political persecution. This is not something legislators should be doing.
Ker Chien-ming says we will finally be able to see him go head to head with Premier Chiang today. This is a belated but correct decision. We believe various units of the Executive Yuan and Premier Chiang will agree to confront the matter of the no confidence vote. They will solemnly perform their constitutional duties and responsibilities. The people as a whole look forward to both Yuans confronting each other democratically. This will allow the truth behind the controversy to emerge. It will allow the public to see whether legislative whip Ker Chien-ming or Premier Chiang trampled over the constitution.
社論－江宜樺、柯建銘 誰才是憲政罪人
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年10月18日 04:10
當美國國會終於打破僵局，達成預算與債務暫時性協議，台灣的立法僵局，能否因閣揆不信任案的否決，使民進黨願意妥協，同意江揆提出施政報告並備詢而打破，已經成為台灣民主政治能否理性運作的指標。即使民進黨不承認倒閣案未通過代表國會對閣揆的信任，但倒閣案的否決，畢竟再一次證明國會多數執政的是國民黨而非民進黨。
國會不是街頭，自有其文明的運作機制，不論是立法院長王金平，乃至國民黨都沒有理由再讓民進黨的杯葛策略，一而再、再而三癱瘓院會議事，民進黨更沒有理由堅持為反對而反對路線。
誠如江揆所言，「不信任案是憲法中非常嚴肅而具實質效力的議案」，倒閣案絕對不僅只是冗長發言、霸佔主席台的議事杯葛手段，而是明載於憲法條文處理或解決政治僵局的憲政議案，每一次倒閣案的提出，在中華民國憲政史上都留下紀錄。
就政治現實而論，不論馬政府、江內閣的民意支持度有幾趴，立法院長王金平已明確詮釋：國會已對江宜樺投下信任票，那麼，民進黨就應該讓江揆上台。如果過去王金平為求議事和諧，而以朝野協商為排除議事障礙的優先、甚至唯一手段，致使國會議事經常性陷入空轉，現在，王金平就應該依照正常議事程序邀請江院長提出施政報告，並依議事規則排除障礙。
做為多數執政的國民黨，如果面對反對黨杯葛，卻始終拿不出反制辦法，某種程度也是民意對馬政府不滿的原因。如果否決了倒閣案，卻還是一籌莫展，不能讓行政院長順利進行施政報告，民意的反彈必然不只衝著民進黨。
此刻，王金平與國民黨團必須證明立法院不是「不能運作的民主」淵藪，國民黨也不是空有虛名的執政黨。
除了動用警察權，立法院排除議事障礙的方法很多，民進黨團能霸佔主席台，為什麼國民黨團不能維護主席台的尊嚴？民進黨團能夜宿議場，國民黨團為什麼不能更早進場搶得先機？這不是國民黨要不要護航的問題，國民黨立委得捫心自問，身受選民負託，是要讓自己在國會一籌莫展嗎？倒閣之聲起，除了民進黨團衝著江揆來？還有多少民意是衝著解散國會而來？真實的民意到底是期待撤換行政院長？還是解散國會重選？儘管倒閣案未過，沒有解散國會的問題，但若立法院始終無法正常議事，類似民怨就不會消減。
柯建銘在司法委員會硬逼獨立偵辦案件的特偵組檢察官列席備詢，已經是公然政治施壓，柯建銘因為個人司法案件關說遭揭露而腦羞成怒，民進黨難道也全黨昏頭放任被萬年總召一人綁架？ 柯建銘主導民進黨已一個月，此時再不放手，屆時批評聲浪必然高漲，國民黨聲望不振，民進黨同樣江河日下，這樣的總召還可以繼續做下去嗎？
柯建銘平常不太對官員提出質詢，關說案發生以來，卻異常勤快在司法委員會登記發言，質詢次數大概已超過他擔任立委以來的總和，不論有理沒理，這是立委的職權。但柯建銘或其他立委對江揆有任何質疑，卻只到場外舉行記者會片面罵人，卻不讓江揆依憲法答覆說明，這是一種政治凌遲，非立委所應為。
柯建銘聲稱，今日將可以看到他和江院長對話的畫面，這是個遲來但正確的決定，相信行政院各部會和江揆都會如同面對倒閣案般，嚴正以待憲政的義務與責任，全民都期待兩院以民主方式交鋒，讓政治爭議背後的真相在國會殿堂再現，也讓他們看看到底江揆與柯總召，誰尊重憲政，誰是憲政罪人？
Wednesday, October 16, 2013
How Long Will the Legislative Yuan Remain Ker Chien-ming's Hostage?
How Long Will the Legislative Yuan Remain Ker Chien-ming's Hostage?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 17, 2013
Summary: The DPP's call for a no confidence vote failed. Party insiders are pointing fingers. Legislator Chiu Yi -ying was blunt. "The entire party has been hijacked by Ker Chien-ming!" The DPP has finally realized the danger presented by Ker Chien-ming. Consider the matter carefully. As soon as the Green Camp's motion for a no confidence vote failed, it declared an immediate end to all ruling and opposition party consultations. As things now stand, the entire legislature remains locked in a cage built by Ker Chien-ming.
Full text below:
The DPP's call for a no confidence vote failed. Party insiders are pointing fingers. Legislator Chiu Yi -ying was blunt. "The entire party has been hijacked by Ker Chien-ming!" The DPP has finally realized the danger presented by Ker Chien-ming. Consider the matter carefully. As soon as the Green Camp's motion for a no confidence vote failed, it declared an immediate end to all ruling and opposition party consultations. As things now stand, the entire legislature remains locked in a cage built by Ker Chien-ming.
When the influence peddling scandal first broke, the DPP's behavior was outrageous. It allowed Ker Chien-ming to lead it around by the nose. First the Green Camp acted as "Wang Jin-pyng's Praetorian Guard. Then it acted as Ker Chien-ming's pawn. Su Tseng-chang personally spearheaded the "Topple Chiang" and "Impeach Ma" campaigns. Meanwhile DPP elders were sitting pretty in their sedan chairs, the image of righteousness. On the one hand, they demanded justice. On the other, they whitewashed their own officials' misconduct. Their words and deeds were so far apart, they could hardly expect the public to buy their arguments.
Did Schadenfreude do President Ma in when the influence peddling scandal erupted? Perhaps. But the DPP was equally guilty, and paid just as high a price. Was President Ma's punishment of Wang Jin-pyng for influence peddling disproportionate? Perhaps. But the DPP's call for Ma's impeachment was even more disproportionate. The DPP is smart. It is adept at spotting other's weaknesses. Unfortunately the DPP is too smart for its own good. It is not so adept at spotting its own weaknesses. it foolishly assumes others cannot see its mistakes.
Were Huang Shi-ming's reports to Ma Ying-jeou conducted in a proper manner? Were the Special Investigation Unit's wire taps indiscriminate and illegal? These are all fair questions. They must be examined, both systemically and practically. Strategically speaking, the Green Camp took advantage of Ma Ying-jeou's low approval numbers. It attempted to kick him while he was down. Its attempt to profit from his troubles was a good plan. But Schadenfreude got the better of its leaders. Its leaders got greedy and overplayed their hand. They refused to call a spade a spade. Needless to say, people saw through their game. Hence the failed motion for a no confidence vote. Was this the result of Ker Chien-ming's hijacking of the party? Or was it merely the result of DPP combativeness, combined with Ker's selfishness? It is probably impossible to tell.
DPP insiders offer several reasons why the party's motion for a no confidence vote failed. One. They misjudged the situation. Two. They failed to discuss the matter within the party. Three. Their timing and approach were off. These reasons are true enough. But when the entire party is hijacked by Su Tseng-chang and Ker Chien-ming, why were cooler heads unable to prevail? The DPP can blame Su and Ker's reckless abandon. But a major contributor to the party's problems is a kind of false pride and arrogance, or perhaps lack of pragmatism, that permeates the DPP. The DPP saw President Ma's approval rating fall to under 10%. They leapt to the conclusion that 90% of the public identified with the Green Camp. The DPP saw Premier Chiang's disapproval rating rise to 70%. They assumed that a motion for a no confidence vote would be a sure thing. They clutched a poll consisting of less than 1000 samples and held it up as a "new mandate." They turned their noses up at the actual mandate manifested in the number of Legislative Yuan seats, Such is the Green Camp's false pride and misjudgment.
This false pride is the reason the Democratic Progressive Party has never been able to position itself as an opposition political party. All it cares about is regaining political office. When Su Tseng-chang proposed a no confidence vote he said, "If we do nothing, how can we oversee the ruling party?" In his mind, only mindless obstructionism qualifies as "oversight." Ensuring budgetary restraint, questioning administration officials in the legislature, proposing alternatives to ruling adminstration policies, updating obsolete governmental structures, amending outdated laws, and exposing official incompetence, apparently count for nothing. Apparently these are not what opposition parties responsible for oversight should be doing. The DPP never wants to solve problems as they arise. It only wants to engage in mindless obstructionism and politlcal vendettas. It only wants to topple the premier and impeach the president, the peoples' peace of mind be damned.
The motion for a no confidence vote failed. Su Tseng-chang and Ker Chien-ming demanded that the "Kuomintang pay double indemnity." They were combative in the extreme. Some in the Green Camp even argued that the DPP's "legislative approach' had failed. The implication was that it must take to the streets in order to win. But this perception will only sink the DPP deeper and deeper into its quagmire. The Ma administration faces difficult political, economic, and social problems. All of these are the result of Taiwan's long-term internal frictions. There is no magic formula that can cure the patient. The DPP wants to regain power. But to do so it must give serious thought to these issues. Otherwise cross-Strait relations and economic development will present problems. The DPP has left painful and repugnant memories. If it assumes that taking to the streets will win elections, it will be sorely disappointed.
Is the DPP willing to be hijacked by Ker Chien-ming? We do not care. But if Ker Chien-ming repeatedly uses the DPP to hijack the Legislative Yuan, then the public on Taiwan must decide whether they want this show to go on.
立法院還要被柯建銘綁架到何時？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.17 03:08 am
民進黨倒閣失敗，黨內檢討聲音四起，立委邱議瑩直言：「整個黨被柯建銘綁架了！」民進黨現在總算看出柯建銘的危險了，但仔細思索，綠營倒閣失敗後立刻宣布關閉朝野協商，如此一來，整個立法院其實仍形同坐困在柯建銘架設的牢籠之中。
關說案發生後，民進黨的表現荒腔走板，一路被柯建銘牽著鼻子走。綠營先是扮演「王金平的親衛隊」，然後又變成「柯建銘的馬前卒」；蘇貞昌親自率領全黨「倒江」、「罷馬」，喊打喊殺，卻忘了回頭看看坐在自己抬的轎子上的大老又是什麼德行。一邊高呼正義，一邊卻簇擁著失德者，如此言行分裂，民進黨如何期待民眾相信它的主張？
如果說馬總統在關說事件中犯了「見獵心喜」的錯誤，那民進黨因見獵心喜而付出的代價不會更小；如果說馬總統為司法關說鍘王金平是不符合比例原則，那民進黨為關說案而發動倒閣倒馬，更是不符比例原則。問題在，民進黨太聰明，太容易抓住別人的弱點；問題也在，民進黨太自以為聰明，因而看不見自己的缺點，甚至以為別人也看不到自己的錯誤。
平情而論，馬英九聽取黃世銘報告的程序正當性如何、特偵組監聽有無浮濫不法，都是可受公評之事，也必須從制度面和實踐面去檢討釐清。而從戰略面看，綠營趁著馬英九民調低迷，一舉將他打倒打趴，以求坐收漁利，也不失為一個好盤算。然而，為了見獵心喜而無限上綱，由於貪功躁進而罔顧事理，兩相加乘而無法就事論事，當然會被看破手腳；失敗的「倒閣」之役便是這樣來的。事實上，這究竟是民進黨遭到柯建銘「綁架」，或是民進黨的好戰與老柯的私心一拍即合，恐已難分難解。
民進黨內部對於倒閣失利的反省主要有幾：一是誤判形勢，二是未經黨內討論程序，三是時機和策略選擇不當。這些意見皆所言不虛，然而，在全黨被蘇貞昌、柯建銘牽著走的時候，為什麼理性的聲音出不來？這除了要歸咎蘇、柯的獨斷外，一個主要的因素是，民進黨內部存在一種虛驕狂妄或至少很不務實的想法：以為馬總統的支持度不到一成，即意味另九成民意是「歸心」綠營；以為有某個民調說七成民眾不支持江揆，倒閣便具正當性或有成功之希望。捧著空氣中不到一千個樣本數的浮泛民調，稱之為「新民意」，對立法院一票票堆砌出來的真實民意卻嗤之以鼻，這就是綠營的驕妄和誤判。
事實上，這種驕妄心態，和民進黨始終無法在反對黨的位置上找到積極角色，卻只是一心想奪回執政權有關。就如蘇貞昌在發動倒閣時說：「什麼都不做，作什麼監督者！」在他的認知中，好像只有窮盡手段阻擋施政進行，才是反對黨的「監督」功能。然而，對預算把關，在國會質詢，就各項決策提出相對方案，對過時的國家制度和法令提出修正法案，乃至向公眾揭發不正當的官員和施政，這些不都是反對黨、監督者可以扮演的角色嗎？如果不想一件一件地解決問題，卻每天只想著杯葛、算總帳、推倒內閣、罷免總統，人民豈有寧日？
倒閣失敗後，蘇貞昌和柯建銘揚言「要讓國民黨加倍奉還」，好戰意味強烈。綠營更有人主張，這是民進黨「議會路線」的失敗，言下之意，必須用「街頭路線」奪回勝利。但這樣的認知，恐怕只會使民進黨越陷越深。試想，馬政府目前面對的政經、社會難題，無一不是台灣長期在內耗中日積月累種下的病灶，皆不是任何神奇祕方可以藥到病除；民進黨一面想著如何奪回政權，同時也得嚴肅思考這些問題的解方。否則，光是兩岸關係和經濟發展兩項，民進黨留給人民的慘痛記憶已夠令人反胃，倘若還想靠「街頭路線」贏得選舉，結果恐將適得其反。
民進黨是不是甘願被柯建銘綁架，我們並不關心；但是，如果柯建銘竟一再驅使民進黨來綁架立法院，那就要看台灣人民是否欣賞這樣的演出了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
October 17, 2013
Summary: The DPP's call for a no confidence vote failed. Party insiders are pointing fingers. Legislator Chiu Yi -ying was blunt. "The entire party has been hijacked by Ker Chien-ming!" The DPP has finally realized the danger presented by Ker Chien-ming. Consider the matter carefully. As soon as the Green Camp's motion for a no confidence vote failed, it declared an immediate end to all ruling and opposition party consultations. As things now stand, the entire legislature remains locked in a cage built by Ker Chien-ming.
Full text below:
The DPP's call for a no confidence vote failed. Party insiders are pointing fingers. Legislator Chiu Yi -ying was blunt. "The entire party has been hijacked by Ker Chien-ming!" The DPP has finally realized the danger presented by Ker Chien-ming. Consider the matter carefully. As soon as the Green Camp's motion for a no confidence vote failed, it declared an immediate end to all ruling and opposition party consultations. As things now stand, the entire legislature remains locked in a cage built by Ker Chien-ming.
When the influence peddling scandal first broke, the DPP's behavior was outrageous. It allowed Ker Chien-ming to lead it around by the nose. First the Green Camp acted as "Wang Jin-pyng's Praetorian Guard. Then it acted as Ker Chien-ming's pawn. Su Tseng-chang personally spearheaded the "Topple Chiang" and "Impeach Ma" campaigns. Meanwhile DPP elders were sitting pretty in their sedan chairs, the image of righteousness. On the one hand, they demanded justice. On the other, they whitewashed their own officials' misconduct. Their words and deeds were so far apart, they could hardly expect the public to buy their arguments.
Did Schadenfreude do President Ma in when the influence peddling scandal erupted? Perhaps. But the DPP was equally guilty, and paid just as high a price. Was President Ma's punishment of Wang Jin-pyng for influence peddling disproportionate? Perhaps. But the DPP's call for Ma's impeachment was even more disproportionate. The DPP is smart. It is adept at spotting other's weaknesses. Unfortunately the DPP is too smart for its own good. It is not so adept at spotting its own weaknesses. it foolishly assumes others cannot see its mistakes.
Were Huang Shi-ming's reports to Ma Ying-jeou conducted in a proper manner? Were the Special Investigation Unit's wire taps indiscriminate and illegal? These are all fair questions. They must be examined, both systemically and practically. Strategically speaking, the Green Camp took advantage of Ma Ying-jeou's low approval numbers. It attempted to kick him while he was down. Its attempt to profit from his troubles was a good plan. But Schadenfreude got the better of its leaders. Its leaders got greedy and overplayed their hand. They refused to call a spade a spade. Needless to say, people saw through their game. Hence the failed motion for a no confidence vote. Was this the result of Ker Chien-ming's hijacking of the party? Or was it merely the result of DPP combativeness, combined with Ker's selfishness? It is probably impossible to tell.
DPP insiders offer several reasons why the party's motion for a no confidence vote failed. One. They misjudged the situation. Two. They failed to discuss the matter within the party. Three. Their timing and approach were off. These reasons are true enough. But when the entire party is hijacked by Su Tseng-chang and Ker Chien-ming, why were cooler heads unable to prevail? The DPP can blame Su and Ker's reckless abandon. But a major contributor to the party's problems is a kind of false pride and arrogance, or perhaps lack of pragmatism, that permeates the DPP. The DPP saw President Ma's approval rating fall to under 10%. They leapt to the conclusion that 90% of the public identified with the Green Camp. The DPP saw Premier Chiang's disapproval rating rise to 70%. They assumed that a motion for a no confidence vote would be a sure thing. They clutched a poll consisting of less than 1000 samples and held it up as a "new mandate." They turned their noses up at the actual mandate manifested in the number of Legislative Yuan seats, Such is the Green Camp's false pride and misjudgment.
This false pride is the reason the Democratic Progressive Party has never been able to position itself as an opposition political party. All it cares about is regaining political office. When Su Tseng-chang proposed a no confidence vote he said, "If we do nothing, how can we oversee the ruling party?" In his mind, only mindless obstructionism qualifies as "oversight." Ensuring budgetary restraint, questioning administration officials in the legislature, proposing alternatives to ruling adminstration policies, updating obsolete governmental structures, amending outdated laws, and exposing official incompetence, apparently count for nothing. Apparently these are not what opposition parties responsible for oversight should be doing. The DPP never wants to solve problems as they arise. It only wants to engage in mindless obstructionism and politlcal vendettas. It only wants to topple the premier and impeach the president, the peoples' peace of mind be damned.
The motion for a no confidence vote failed. Su Tseng-chang and Ker Chien-ming demanded that the "Kuomintang pay double indemnity." They were combative in the extreme. Some in the Green Camp even argued that the DPP's "legislative approach' had failed. The implication was that it must take to the streets in order to win. But this perception will only sink the DPP deeper and deeper into its quagmire. The Ma administration faces difficult political, economic, and social problems. All of these are the result of Taiwan's long-term internal frictions. There is no magic formula that can cure the patient. The DPP wants to regain power. But to do so it must give serious thought to these issues. Otherwise cross-Strait relations and economic development will present problems. The DPP has left painful and repugnant memories. If it assumes that taking to the streets will win elections, it will be sorely disappointed.
Is the DPP willing to be hijacked by Ker Chien-ming? We do not care. But if Ker Chien-ming repeatedly uses the DPP to hijack the Legislative Yuan, then the public on Taiwan must decide whether they want this show to go on.
立法院還要被柯建銘綁架到何時？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.10.17 03:08 am
民進黨倒閣失敗，黨內檢討聲音四起，立委邱議瑩直言：「整個黨被柯建銘綁架了！」民進黨現在總算看出柯建銘的危險了，但仔細思索，綠營倒閣失敗後立刻宣布關閉朝野協商，如此一來，整個立法院其實仍形同坐困在柯建銘架設的牢籠之中。
關說案發生後，民進黨的表現荒腔走板，一路被柯建銘牽著鼻子走。綠營先是扮演「王金平的親衛隊」，然後又變成「柯建銘的馬前卒」；蘇貞昌親自率領全黨「倒江」、「罷馬」，喊打喊殺，卻忘了回頭看看坐在自己抬的轎子上的大老又是什麼德行。一邊高呼正義，一邊卻簇擁著失德者，如此言行分裂，民進黨如何期待民眾相信它的主張？
如果說馬總統在關說事件中犯了「見獵心喜」的錯誤，那民進黨因見獵心喜而付出的代價不會更小；如果說馬總統為司法關說鍘王金平是不符合比例原則，那民進黨為關說案而發動倒閣倒馬，更是不符比例原則。問題在，民進黨太聰明，太容易抓住別人的弱點；問題也在，民進黨太自以為聰明，因而看不見自己的缺點，甚至以為別人也看不到自己的錯誤。
平情而論，馬英九聽取黃世銘報告的程序正當性如何、特偵組監聽有無浮濫不法，都是可受公評之事，也必須從制度面和實踐面去檢討釐清。而從戰略面看，綠營趁著馬英九民調低迷，一舉將他打倒打趴，以求坐收漁利，也不失為一個好盤算。然而，為了見獵心喜而無限上綱，由於貪功躁進而罔顧事理，兩相加乘而無法就事論事，當然會被看破手腳；失敗的「倒閣」之役便是這樣來的。事實上，這究竟是民進黨遭到柯建銘「綁架」，或是民進黨的好戰與老柯的私心一拍即合，恐已難分難解。
民進黨內部對於倒閣失利的反省主要有幾：一是誤判形勢，二是未經黨內討論程序，三是時機和策略選擇不當。這些意見皆所言不虛，然而，在全黨被蘇貞昌、柯建銘牽著走的時候，為什麼理性的聲音出不來？這除了要歸咎蘇、柯的獨斷外，一個主要的因素是，民進黨內部存在一種虛驕狂妄或至少很不務實的想法：以為馬總統的支持度不到一成，即意味另九成民意是「歸心」綠營；以為有某個民調說七成民眾不支持江揆，倒閣便具正當性或有成功之希望。捧著空氣中不到一千個樣本數的浮泛民調，稱之為「新民意」，對立法院一票票堆砌出來的真實民意卻嗤之以鼻，這就是綠營的驕妄和誤判。
事實上，這種驕妄心態，和民進黨始終無法在反對黨的位置上找到積極角色，卻只是一心想奪回執政權有關。就如蘇貞昌在發動倒閣時說：「什麼都不做，作什麼監督者！」在他的認知中，好像只有窮盡手段阻擋施政進行，才是反對黨的「監督」功能。然而，對預算把關，在國會質詢，就各項決策提出相對方案，對過時的國家制度和法令提出修正法案，乃至向公眾揭發不正當的官員和施政，這些不都是反對黨、監督者可以扮演的角色嗎？如果不想一件一件地解決問題，卻每天只想著杯葛、算總帳、推倒內閣、罷免總統，人民豈有寧日？
倒閣失敗後，蘇貞昌和柯建銘揚言「要讓國民黨加倍奉還」，好戰意味強烈。綠營更有人主張，這是民進黨「議會路線」的失敗，言下之意，必須用「街頭路線」奪回勝利。但這樣的認知，恐怕只會使民進黨越陷越深。試想，馬政府目前面對的政經、社會難題，無一不是台灣長期在內耗中日積月累種下的病灶，皆不是任何神奇祕方可以藥到病除；民進黨一面想著如何奪回政權，同時也得嚴肅思考這些問題的解方。否則，光是兩岸關係和經濟發展兩項，民進黨留給人民的慘痛記憶已夠令人反胃，倘若還想靠「街頭路線」贏得選舉，結果恐將適得其反。
民進黨是不是甘願被柯建銘綁架，我們並不關心；但是，如果柯建銘竟一再驅使民進黨來綁架立法院，那就要看台灣人民是否欣賞這樣的演出了。
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