The DPP is Becoming a Hollow Shell
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 29, 2014
Summary: The DPP faces a major crisis. It is becoming a hollow shell. Ko Wen-je refused to join the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen established cross-strait communications channels outside the framework of the party. These and other developments are all warning signs.
Full text below:
The DPP faces a major crisis. It is becoming a hollow shell. Ko Wen-je refused to join the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen established cross-strait communications channels outside the framework of the party. These and other developments are all warning signs.
Ko Wen-je refused to join the DPP. He thinks that if he runs for Taipei Mayor as a DPP candidate, he will not be able to attract non-Green Camp support. He went so far as to say that if he doesn't join the party before the election, he is not about to join the party after he is elected. This is Ko Wen-je's election strategy. He has retained his political momentum even after raising this controversy. The DPP may well be compelled to yield. This is a bizzare development worth watching. Ko Wen-je put down the DPP in order to elevate himself. The DPP could only sit and watch as Ko Wen-je heaped all manner of humiliation upon it. Ko Wen-je single-handedly overrode the nomination rules stipulated by the DPP party charter. He left the party stranded, high and dry. Is this not incredible?
Tsai Ing-wen is Ko Wen-je redux. In 2000, she became a Chen administration cabinet member, even though she was not a party member. In 2004, she became a DPP legislator without portfolio, then joined the party. In 2008, after only four years as a DPP party member, she was elected party chairman. Today she and Su Tseng-chang are locked in a battle for the 2016 DPP presidential nomination. She successfully demoted DPP Chairman Su's Huashan Conference "China Policy Summary Report" to a "China Policy Review Minutes." She dispatched a delegation from her Thinking Taiwan Foundation to the Mainland. Su Tseng-chang could not force Tsai Ing-wen to merge her cross-strait policy into official DPP cross-strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen, by contrast was able to establish her own "outside the party" policy agenda. Tsai Ing-wen ignored Su Tseng-chang and left the DPP party leadership stranded, high and dry.
Ko and Tsai have something in common. Both reject party strictures. Both have established their own power base outside party strictures, Ko Wen-je is running for Taipei Mayor. He takes pride in his refusal to join the party. The DPP, by contrast, finds itself led around by the nose. Tsai Ing-wen is running for president. She has established her own cross-strait communicaiton channel outside the DPP party framework. She intends to ignore the party framework. The party leadership can only grin and bear it. Consider these two cases. If this does not represent a hollowing out of the DPP party framework, what does?
Ko and Tsai have cast off the party framework. Yet consider the public reaction. People are applauding Ko and Tsai, and booing Chairman Su. This is the first time that DPP rebels have prevailed over the DPP leadership. Hsu Hsing-liang, Shi Ming-teh, and the Eleven Brigands were defeated. So why has the authority and legitimacy of the DPP been undermined to such a degree? Because the party leadership's core values and core interests no longer offer them an advantage. Therefore they have handed others the reigns of power.
The DPP party leadership has lost its authority and legitimacy. This is the result of a long-term erosion of moral authority, moral legitimacy, ideological credibility, policy credibility, and public trust. The Chen corruption case and the Ker Chien-ming influence peddling case have shown that the party no longer has any sense of shame. Ideologically, it clings to such arguments as "Taiwan must reach an internal consensus before it can engage in cross-strait dialogue," and "We are like seagulls on the beach." Policy-wise, it flip-flops from "ECFA undermines sovereignty and humiliates the nation" to "We accept ECFA unconditionally." The DPP held a "sleep-in" in the legislature over U.S. beef imports, then fell silent. The DPP has lost the public trust. With all that has happened, how could it not? Ko Wen-je rejected party strictures. Tsai Ing-wen ignored party strictures. The party was already a hollow shell.The two merely exposed that fact
The DPP acquiesced to Ko Wen-je's refusal to join the party. Alas, this will not remedy the situation. The DPP acquiesced to Tsai Ing-wen's end run around DPP strictures. Alas, this will not remedy the situation either. Ko refused to join the party. He was afraid the party would drag him down. Tsai Ing-wen ignored party strictures. She had two motives. One was to beat down Su Tseng-chang. The other was to bypass party strictures, since the party no longer had anything to contribute, at least not to cross-strait policy.
DPP support in southern Taiwan counties and municipalities remains solid. But this cannot hide its bankruptcy in morals, rhetoric, policy, and public trust. Ko Wen-je refused to join the party. Tsai Ing-wen bypassed the party. Their actions reveal the seriousness of the party's crisis. A major political party cannot even reach a consensus on cross-strait policy. The Taipei mayoral candidate endorsed by the DPP and the Green Camp obviously has the DPP's support. Yet the DPP is being forced to conceal its party identity behind an "Opposition Alliance" fig leaf. Does this not constitute a crisis for the party?
By DPP standards, Ko and Tsai have heterodox personal images and character traits. This has attracted public notice. The two are well versed in how to market their heterodoxy and attract non-Green Camp support. The DPP has chosen to swallow its pride and put up with this heterodoxy. But doing so will not address the DPP's bankruptcy in morals, rhetoric, policy, and public trust. Doing so will not restore trust and legitimacy in the party.
Ko Wen-je refused to become a party member. He even declared that if elected, he would not join the party. Tsai Ing-wen agreed that Ko need not join. But she cannot resign from the party. She may be able to perform an end run around Su Tseng-chang, But suppose she reclaims the party chairmanship? Suppose she becomes its presidential candidate? Can she really ignore the DPP completely? The fact is, she must rebuild the DPP's morals, rhetoric, policy, and public trust. Otherwise, in 2016, Tsai Ing-wen will merely reenact the debacle of 2012.
體制空洞化 民進黨危機
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.29 04:22 am
民進黨正面臨體制空洞化的重大危機。柯文哲拒入民進黨，與蔡英文在體制外另樹兩岸關係的旗幟，皆是顯著的徵兆。
柯文哲拒入民進黨，認為若以民進黨籍參加台北市長選舉，即不可能打破藍綠的界線；他甚至說，若選前不入黨，則即使當選後可能仍不入黨。柯文哲此計，固然是一種選舉謀略，但他在造成話題後仍能維持聲勢不墜，甚至竟迫使整個民進黨可能屈從於他，卻是一個值得深思的異象。柯文哲是以貶抑民進黨來抬高自己，而民進黨則坐視柯文哲羞辱民進黨卻仍必須百般將就；僅憑一個柯文哲，即能推翻黨章所定提名規範，甚至架空了整個民進黨的體制，豈不是匪夷所思？
蔡英文則是另一種形式的柯文哲。她於二○○○年以無黨籍身分進入扁政府內閣，再於二○○四年為取得不分區立委地位而加入民進黨，至二○○八當選民進黨主席時僅四年黨齡。此時，她與蘇貞昌陷於二○一六年總統候選人的提名之戰；因而將蘇主持的華山會議的「對中政策總結報告」降格為「檢討紀要」，她自己則大陣仗遣小英基金會登陸訪問。這一方面是因蘇貞昌沒有能力將蔡英文整合在黨中央的兩岸政策中，但相對而言，另一方面卻更彰顯了蔡英文藉貶抑黨體制來自樹一幟的政治意圖。此時的蔡英文，甩掉了蘇貞昌，也架空了黨中央。
柯蔡二人的共同點是抵制體制，在體制外另樹旗幟，另立門戶。欲競選台北市長的柯文哲，以拒入黨體制為榮，民進黨卻被他牽著鼻子走；欲競選總統的蔡英文，則在黨中央之外，另闢兩岸關係的蹊徑，也以甩開黨體制為得計，黨中央對她亦無可奈何。以柯蔡二人之例，這若不是民進黨體制的空洞化，什麼叫做空洞化？
柯蔡二人甩掉黨體制，然就社會反應來看，柯蔡的掌聲大而蘇主席的噓聲響；這是民進黨內首次出現「造反派」凌越「當權派」的政治異象（自許信良、施明德、十一寇，均是造反派敗陣），民進黨黨體制的權威性與正當性何以會空洞化到如此地步？這是因黨體制的當權派在掌握黨的核心價值及核心利益上已失優勢，以致太阿倒持。
今日民進黨中央黨體制之權威性及正當性的空洞化，其實是緣自長期的道德空洞化、論述空洞化、政策空洞化及信任空洞化。道德空洞化，從扁案及柯建銘關說案，可見已無廉恥可言；論述空洞化，至今仍停滯在「應該積極凝聚台灣內部的共識做為兩岸對話基礎」的階段，如何進行「海鷗與沙灘客」的對話？政策空洞化，ＥＣＦＡ從「喪權辱國」翻覆至「概括承受」，美牛案竟在立法院打了幾天地鋪後在鼾聲中消失；信任空洞化，則有了以上的空洞化，社會信任如何不空洞化？黨體制的權威性及正當性更如何不空洞化？而柯文哲的否定體制與蔡英文的甩開體制，可謂皆是鑽過這個已然存在的體制空洞罷了。
問題在於：柯文哲不肯入黨，並不能補救黨體制的空洞化；蔡英文架空了黨中央，也不能補救黨體制的空洞化。柯不入黨，是怕黨拖累了他；蔡英文架空黨體制，一方面是要壓倒蘇貞昌，另一方面亦是因在這樣的黨體制內，至少在兩岸政策上已經難有作為。
民進黨在南部縣市的磐石穩固，不能掩蓋其在道德、論述、政策、信任及黨體制上的空洞化。柯文哲的逃，及蔡英文的閃，皆只能反襯空洞化危機之深重。一個大黨，連兩岸政策亦無法在黨體制內獲得結論，連明明是由民進黨及綠營主力支持的台北市長候選人也要戴上「在野大聯盟」的假面具，這難道不是黨的危機？
柯蔡二人，皆是以個人的形象與人格特質在民進黨內屬於「非典」，而引得社會注目；且二人亦深諳如何以其「非典」特質，來吸引超溢綠營的選票。但此計雖可能贏得選舉，卻無可能補救民進黨在道德、論述、政策、信任及黨體制正當性上的空洞化危機。
柯文哲不入黨，甚至說若當選也不入黨。但是，蔡英文儘管贊同柯不入黨，自己則無可能退黨；今日她或有可能閃過蘇貞昌，但在她倘若復任黨主席或又成民進黨總統候選人後，還能甩掉民進黨嗎？如果不從道德、論述、政策、信任上再造民進黨，二○一六的蔡英文，恐怕又會步上二○一二的覆車之轍。
Tuesday, January 28, 2014
Monday, January 27, 2014
Let Su Tseng-chang Suffer the Consequences
Let Su Tseng-chang Suffer the Consequences
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 28, 2014
Summary: The future of cross-strait relations affects the welfare of the people. Do not force the people live in fear. Do not make cross-strait relations grind to a halt. Do not encourage the DPP to remain mired in quicksand. Frank Hsieh said, "Let Su Tseng-chang suffer the consequences." We may have no other choice.
Full text below:
It is now 2014. The atmosphere of the Seven in One Elections is gradually enveloping Taiwan. Election season has arrived. We initially assumed that cross-strait relations would develop along a preordained track. The Ma administration's priorities must be security, stability, and election victory. At the very least, it must not give its opponents any pretext to attack it. If it loses power it will not matter how grand its ambitions were. All it will be able to do is rage at its fate. The big picture however, is not what most people imagine it to be.
Consider cross-strait relations. Exchanges have continued all year. Cross-strait representative offices have been established. The trade in services and trade in goods agreements have been signed. These are bright spots. Mainland Affairs Council Chief Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun, Director of Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office, met following the Spring Festival. They attempted to pave the way for a Ma Xi Meeting at APEC. But that may be difficult to arrange. Authorities on both sides may want it. But election pressures may limit what they can do. There might not be any major breakthrough.
Meanwhile, observers have watched the DPP undergo policy transformation and power change. Frank Hsieh visited the Mainland and advocated a "constitutional consensus." The impact is still being felt. DPP legislative whip Ker Chien-ming advocated freezing the Taiwan independence party platform. His proposal has faded into obscurity. But it too made waves. On January 15, key members of the Thinking Taiwan Foundation visited the mainland for a "professional exchange" on economics. Such activities provoke curiosity about Beijing's rapid response capabilities. We hope to make an accurate assessment. But we doubt this was a "DPP to CCP exchange." The DPP has not forsaken its separatist stance, At most this was an exchange between CCP agencies or research institutions and DPP individuals or foundations. We need not read too much into it.
The CCP has long been adept at "United Front" tactics. It has long been adept at noting and exploiting its enemy's internal squabbles, at uniting with the left, at appealing to the center, in order to attack the right. It has long been skilled at distinguishing between its primary enemies and its secondary enemies, and between its leaders and followers. It has long been skilled at distinguishing between those who can be won over, and those who must be fought. They use tomorrow's enemies to fight today's enemies. They have waged both wars of words and wars with weapons. A war of words values reason. It requires propaganda. A war with weapons values power. It requires strength. The KMT is no match for the CCP. The DPP has learned many of the tricks that the CCP used against the KMT. These include using the countryside to lay seige to the cities. The DPP is adept at using propaganda and organizing mass movements. Many DPP politicians have even stood on the podium with the CCP and sung the "Internationale." But is the DPP a match for the CCP? That is highly debatable.
Consider the downside. Some have concluded that the Mainland authorities are attempting to divide and conquer the DPP, to win them over and change them, to exploit factional rivalries within the DPP, the standoff between the "two suns," and differences between many of its elders. Some have concluded that the Mainland authorities are attempting to use quantitative change to effect qualitative change, starting small but growing large, to force the DPP to abandon its secessionist ideology. Others have concluded that Beijing feels it already has a handle on the strategic picture, that it stands on right side of history, and that time is on its side. They have concluded that Beijing feels it commands nationalist sentiment, that its strategy reflects current global realities, and that its current conduct reflects its contempt for its enemies. Strategically, it adheres to its principles. Tactically, it does not underestimate its enemies. Methodologically, it retains its flexibility.
CCP strategic principles or struggle methods are worth noting. But Taiwan's own positions and practices are more important. We feel compelled to make some veiled criticisms of President Ma's "no reunification, no Taiwan independence, no use of force" stance. We have no objections to "no Taiwan independence" and "no use of force." But our nation is the Republic of China. It goes without saying that we insist on national unity and national revival. The difference between us and the CCP is the manner by which, and conditions under which national reunification and national revival are achieved. We understand the DPP's views regarding "Taiwan consciousness." But it must not become a fig leaf for separatism. It must not become a basis for Taiwan independence. A future in which Taiwan is not part of China, incarcerates us within the limits of Taiwan for temporary safety. This "hiding out in a remote corner" mindset is unworthy of us. The Republic of China deserves better. Our sons and grandsons deserve better. This mindset deprives them of the opportunity to be part of China's future.
Therefore the DPP must undergo reform, the sooner the better. It must adopt new principles. It must undergo fundamental change. Su Tseng-chang visited the UK SOAS on the 24th, and declared that the DPP would not amend its Taiwan independence party platform. We strongly condemn his statement. We endorse former Premier Frank Hsieh's view. Hsieh said "The DPP is large. It cannot be governed by a single individual. Su Tseng-chang's leadership of the DPP falls far short of public expectations." We agree with those DPP elected representatives who said, "Su Tseng-chang has no sense of direction and no point of view."
The future of cross-strait relations affects the welfare of the people. Do not force the people live in fear. Do not make cross-strait relations grind to a halt. Do not encourage the DPP to remain mired in quicksand. Frank Hsieh said, "Let Su Tseng-chang suffer the consequences." We may have no other choice.
社論－就讓蘇貞昌痛苦到底吧
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月28日 04:09
2014年才開始，台灣已經逐漸籠罩在年底七合一選舉氛圍中，既然政治旺季即將到來，本來大家以為兩岸關係只會在既定的軌道上發展，因為馬政府須以安全、穩健、勝選為重，或至少不要給對手抓到把柄，做為攻擊的口實，丟了政權就是再有天大的抱負也只能徒呼負負。不過，大勢似乎與一般想像不同。
今年在兩岸關係方面，除了持續的交流活動、設立兩岸兩會辦事機構及服貿、貨貿協議之外，再加上可能的亮點，如陸委會主委王郁琦與國台辦主任張志軍春節過後的會晤，以及還在努力創造條件，但難度甚高的APEC馬習會之外，選舉壓力下，兩岸當局即使主觀上都有意願，但客觀上能做的已然有限，應該不致再有太大突破。
於此同時，外界卻看到民進黨嘗試調整及其權變的一面，謝長廷登陸的效應及其主張的「憲法共識」仍在發酵。民進黨立院黨鞭柯建銘的凍獨主張最後無疾而終，但也攪動一池春水。1月15日，小英基金會重要成員相偕前往大陸進行經濟方面的「專業交流」。這類活動，我們雖對中共的某些明快反應感到好奇，期望能夠正確解讀其中意涵，但並不認為這種互動就是所謂的「民、共交流」，在民進黨沒有放棄台獨分離主義立場之前，充其量而言，這只是中國共產黨的某些單位、個別的機構或研究單位與民進黨個別人士或基金會的交流活動罷了，實不必有過度的解讀。
共產黨一向擅長所謂統一戰線，善於分析矛盾、利用矛盾，習於聯左、拉中、打右，不但能夠區別主要敵人與次要敵人，甚至還會區分主從，查明哪些是可以爭取、哪些是必須打擊的對象，利用明天的敵人打擊今天的敵人。在過去，不管是文鬥或武鬥，文鬥講道理、要宣傳，武鬥憑本事、講實力，國民黨都不是共產黨對手；民進黨雖然學了許多共產黨當年對付國民政府的鬥爭技巧，如以鄉村包圍城市、擅長宣傳及群眾運動，而且許多檯面上政治人物甚至能夠高唱共產國際歌，但民進黨是否真是共產黨對手，恐怕還有不少討論的空間。
若從負面出發，有些人或會認定大陸當前是以分化、利用、爭取、轉化的方式來對付民進黨，嘗試利用並且擴大民進黨內不同派系、兩個太陽，不同大老之間的矛盾，希望由量變的方式逐漸讓民進黨走向質變，由小變轉為大變，迫使或至少是誘使民進黨放棄其分離主義的意識形態、主張、活動和立場，但更持平的看法是，北京可能自認為，它已掌握了戰略的制高點，自己不但站在歷史正確的一邊，時間也站在北京的一方，它不但掌握了民族主義的情緒，也反映了當前世界的現實格局，它目前所展現的不過是在戰略上輕視敵人，把握原則的堅定性之外的一種戰術上重視敵人和策略上的靈活性罷了。
其實，從我們的立場來看，中共的戰略原則或鬥爭策略當然值得關注，但更重要的是台灣自己應有的立場與作法。坦白的說，我們對於馬總統不統、不獨、不武的立場是有微詞的，不獨、不武，勢所當然，但是站在中華民國的立場，我們當然仍然要堅持追求國家統一、民族復興的立場，我們和中共的差別在於究竟是要以何種方式、在什麼條件下實現國家的統一。我們可以理解民進黨有關台灣主體意識的說法，但如果將其變為分離主義的遮羞布，做為台獨的張本則期期以為不可。這種自外於中國的未來，把自己侷限在台灣茍且偷安、偏安江左的心態，不但對中華民國不公，也對後代的子孫不公，剝奪了他們經略中原的大好機會。
準此，我們認為民進黨非改不可，越早改越好，而且是要原則性、更本上的改，我們必須對蘇貞昌24日在英國倫敦大學亞非學院有關民進黨不修台獨黨綱的談話提出嚴正批判，並同意前行政院長謝長廷的觀點「民進黨之大，非一人之所能治，蘇貞昌所領導下的民進黨的表現與人民的期待有很大落差」，更同意其他民進黨民意代表有關「蘇貞昌是個沒有方向感、沒有觀念的人」的說法。
兩岸關係的未來發展方向事涉全民福祉，與其讓全民惶恐不安，與其讓兩岸關係陷於困境，與其讓民進黨陷入進退兩難的處境，謝長廷所謂「讓蘇貞昌痛苦到底」的講法或許是一個不得不然的選擇。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 28, 2014
Summary: The future of cross-strait relations affects the welfare of the people. Do not force the people live in fear. Do not make cross-strait relations grind to a halt. Do not encourage the DPP to remain mired in quicksand. Frank Hsieh said, "Let Su Tseng-chang suffer the consequences." We may have no other choice.
Full text below:
It is now 2014. The atmosphere of the Seven in One Elections is gradually enveloping Taiwan. Election season has arrived. We initially assumed that cross-strait relations would develop along a preordained track. The Ma administration's priorities must be security, stability, and election victory. At the very least, it must not give its opponents any pretext to attack it. If it loses power it will not matter how grand its ambitions were. All it will be able to do is rage at its fate. The big picture however, is not what most people imagine it to be.
Consider cross-strait relations. Exchanges have continued all year. Cross-strait representative offices have been established. The trade in services and trade in goods agreements have been signed. These are bright spots. Mainland Affairs Council Chief Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun, Director of Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office, met following the Spring Festival. They attempted to pave the way for a Ma Xi Meeting at APEC. But that may be difficult to arrange. Authorities on both sides may want it. But election pressures may limit what they can do. There might not be any major breakthrough.
Meanwhile, observers have watched the DPP undergo policy transformation and power change. Frank Hsieh visited the Mainland and advocated a "constitutional consensus." The impact is still being felt. DPP legislative whip Ker Chien-ming advocated freezing the Taiwan independence party platform. His proposal has faded into obscurity. But it too made waves. On January 15, key members of the Thinking Taiwan Foundation visited the mainland for a "professional exchange" on economics. Such activities provoke curiosity about Beijing's rapid response capabilities. We hope to make an accurate assessment. But we doubt this was a "DPP to CCP exchange." The DPP has not forsaken its separatist stance, At most this was an exchange between CCP agencies or research institutions and DPP individuals or foundations. We need not read too much into it.
The CCP has long been adept at "United Front" tactics. It has long been adept at noting and exploiting its enemy's internal squabbles, at uniting with the left, at appealing to the center, in order to attack the right. It has long been skilled at distinguishing between its primary enemies and its secondary enemies, and between its leaders and followers. It has long been skilled at distinguishing between those who can be won over, and those who must be fought. They use tomorrow's enemies to fight today's enemies. They have waged both wars of words and wars with weapons. A war of words values reason. It requires propaganda. A war with weapons values power. It requires strength. The KMT is no match for the CCP. The DPP has learned many of the tricks that the CCP used against the KMT. These include using the countryside to lay seige to the cities. The DPP is adept at using propaganda and organizing mass movements. Many DPP politicians have even stood on the podium with the CCP and sung the "Internationale." But is the DPP a match for the CCP? That is highly debatable.
Consider the downside. Some have concluded that the Mainland authorities are attempting to divide and conquer the DPP, to win them over and change them, to exploit factional rivalries within the DPP, the standoff between the "two suns," and differences between many of its elders. Some have concluded that the Mainland authorities are attempting to use quantitative change to effect qualitative change, starting small but growing large, to force the DPP to abandon its secessionist ideology. Others have concluded that Beijing feels it already has a handle on the strategic picture, that it stands on right side of history, and that time is on its side. They have concluded that Beijing feels it commands nationalist sentiment, that its strategy reflects current global realities, and that its current conduct reflects its contempt for its enemies. Strategically, it adheres to its principles. Tactically, it does not underestimate its enemies. Methodologically, it retains its flexibility.
CCP strategic principles or struggle methods are worth noting. But Taiwan's own positions and practices are more important. We feel compelled to make some veiled criticisms of President Ma's "no reunification, no Taiwan independence, no use of force" stance. We have no objections to "no Taiwan independence" and "no use of force." But our nation is the Republic of China. It goes without saying that we insist on national unity and national revival. The difference between us and the CCP is the manner by which, and conditions under which national reunification and national revival are achieved. We understand the DPP's views regarding "Taiwan consciousness." But it must not become a fig leaf for separatism. It must not become a basis for Taiwan independence. A future in which Taiwan is not part of China, incarcerates us within the limits of Taiwan for temporary safety. This "hiding out in a remote corner" mindset is unworthy of us. The Republic of China deserves better. Our sons and grandsons deserve better. This mindset deprives them of the opportunity to be part of China's future.
Therefore the DPP must undergo reform, the sooner the better. It must adopt new principles. It must undergo fundamental change. Su Tseng-chang visited the UK SOAS on the 24th, and declared that the DPP would not amend its Taiwan independence party platform. We strongly condemn his statement. We endorse former Premier Frank Hsieh's view. Hsieh said "The DPP is large. It cannot be governed by a single individual. Su Tseng-chang's leadership of the DPP falls far short of public expectations." We agree with those DPP elected representatives who said, "Su Tseng-chang has no sense of direction and no point of view."
The future of cross-strait relations affects the welfare of the people. Do not force the people live in fear. Do not make cross-strait relations grind to a halt. Do not encourage the DPP to remain mired in quicksand. Frank Hsieh said, "Let Su Tseng-chang suffer the consequences." We may have no other choice.
社論－就讓蘇貞昌痛苦到底吧
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月28日 04:09
2014年才開始，台灣已經逐漸籠罩在年底七合一選舉氛圍中，既然政治旺季即將到來，本來大家以為兩岸關係只會在既定的軌道上發展，因為馬政府須以安全、穩健、勝選為重，或至少不要給對手抓到把柄，做為攻擊的口實，丟了政權就是再有天大的抱負也只能徒呼負負。不過，大勢似乎與一般想像不同。
今年在兩岸關係方面，除了持續的交流活動、設立兩岸兩會辦事機構及服貿、貨貿協議之外，再加上可能的亮點，如陸委會主委王郁琦與國台辦主任張志軍春節過後的會晤，以及還在努力創造條件，但難度甚高的APEC馬習會之外，選舉壓力下，兩岸當局即使主觀上都有意願，但客觀上能做的已然有限，應該不致再有太大突破。
於此同時，外界卻看到民進黨嘗試調整及其權變的一面，謝長廷登陸的效應及其主張的「憲法共識」仍在發酵。民進黨立院黨鞭柯建銘的凍獨主張最後無疾而終，但也攪動一池春水。1月15日，小英基金會重要成員相偕前往大陸進行經濟方面的「專業交流」。這類活動，我們雖對中共的某些明快反應感到好奇，期望能夠正確解讀其中意涵，但並不認為這種互動就是所謂的「民、共交流」，在民進黨沒有放棄台獨分離主義立場之前，充其量而言，這只是中國共產黨的某些單位、個別的機構或研究單位與民進黨個別人士或基金會的交流活動罷了，實不必有過度的解讀。
共產黨一向擅長所謂統一戰線，善於分析矛盾、利用矛盾，習於聯左、拉中、打右，不但能夠區別主要敵人與次要敵人，甚至還會區分主從，查明哪些是可以爭取、哪些是必須打擊的對象，利用明天的敵人打擊今天的敵人。在過去，不管是文鬥或武鬥，文鬥講道理、要宣傳，武鬥憑本事、講實力，國民黨都不是共產黨對手；民進黨雖然學了許多共產黨當年對付國民政府的鬥爭技巧，如以鄉村包圍城市、擅長宣傳及群眾運動，而且許多檯面上政治人物甚至能夠高唱共產國際歌，但民進黨是否真是共產黨對手，恐怕還有不少討論的空間。
若從負面出發，有些人或會認定大陸當前是以分化、利用、爭取、轉化的方式來對付民進黨，嘗試利用並且擴大民進黨內不同派系、兩個太陽，不同大老之間的矛盾，希望由量變的方式逐漸讓民進黨走向質變，由小變轉為大變，迫使或至少是誘使民進黨放棄其分離主義的意識形態、主張、活動和立場，但更持平的看法是，北京可能自認為，它已掌握了戰略的制高點，自己不但站在歷史正確的一邊，時間也站在北京的一方，它不但掌握了民族主義的情緒，也反映了當前世界的現實格局，它目前所展現的不過是在戰略上輕視敵人，把握原則的堅定性之外的一種戰術上重視敵人和策略上的靈活性罷了。
其實，從我們的立場來看，中共的戰略原則或鬥爭策略當然值得關注，但更重要的是台灣自己應有的立場與作法。坦白的說，我們對於馬總統不統、不獨、不武的立場是有微詞的，不獨、不武，勢所當然，但是站在中華民國的立場，我們當然仍然要堅持追求國家統一、民族復興的立場，我們和中共的差別在於究竟是要以何種方式、在什麼條件下實現國家的統一。我們可以理解民進黨有關台灣主體意識的說法，但如果將其變為分離主義的遮羞布，做為台獨的張本則期期以為不可。這種自外於中國的未來，把自己侷限在台灣茍且偷安、偏安江左的心態，不但對中華民國不公，也對後代的子孫不公，剝奪了他們經略中原的大好機會。
準此，我們認為民進黨非改不可，越早改越好，而且是要原則性、更本上的改，我們必須對蘇貞昌24日在英國倫敦大學亞非學院有關民進黨不修台獨黨綱的談話提出嚴正批判，並同意前行政院長謝長廷的觀點「民進黨之大，非一人之所能治，蘇貞昌所領導下的民進黨的表現與人民的期待有很大落差」，更同意其他民進黨民意代表有關「蘇貞昌是個沒有方向感、沒有觀念的人」的說法。
兩岸關係的未來發展方向事涉全民福祉，與其讓全民惶恐不安，與其讓兩岸關係陷於困境，與其讓民進黨陷入進退兩難的處境，謝長廷所謂「讓蘇貞昌痛苦到底」的講法或許是一個不得不然的選擇。
Talent Flow Will Decide Taiwan's Future
Talent Flow Will Decide Taiwan's Future
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 27, 2014
Summary: The business community must become more aware. It must appreciate its workers. It must raise wages to encourage innovation. It must raise productivity. Only then can it retain talent. The government must encourage businesses to cultivate talent, underwite R&D, and encourage innovation. Business and government must work together. Only then can they alleviate the brain drain. The government must cultivate talent. It must have a policy that attracts outside talent. Only then will Taiwan's economy have any hope.
Full text below:
TSMC Chairman Morris Chang recently delivered a blunt speech. He said Taiwan's economy is being suffocated. It is in chaos. He said this was all due to a shortage of human talent. The lack of talent makes entrepreneural innovation, transformation, and reform a pipe dream. The cultivation of talent takes a generation, or approximately a decade. Opening up Taiwan to foreign talent is the fastest way. He also criticized Taiwan for liberalizing only politics and nothing else.
Morris Chang spoke from the heart. He pointed out a fundamental problem that arose in recent years -- a domestic shortage of talent. The public on Taiwan wants the government to demonstrate strong leadership. But the government lacks the necessary talent. As a result political appointees are mediocre. The government is reduced to constantly fighting fires. It is incapable of reforming itself and moving Taiwan forward.
Taiwan's economic growth is overly reliant on IT industry exports, as well as the cost-based, efficiency-driven foundry export model. In recent years, transnational companies based in the US and Korea have offered strong competition. Companies in Mainland China and other emerging markets are catching up. Taiwan's export competitiveness is rapidly weakening. The only way out is a new, innovation-driven marketing model. But As Morris Chang pointed noted, Taiwan companies lack leaders with sufficient vision and wisdom. They lack mid-level talent able to transform and upgrade companies. Taiwan businesses face harsh competition in the market place, front and rear. Many teeter on the brink of extinction.
That is even more worrisome. Taiwan lacks talent. Even worse, it faces a growing brain drain. According to Academia Sinica and National Science Council estimates, over the past decade talent has bid farewell to Taiwan at the rate of nearly 20,000 a year. These elites are rapidly being lost. According to a survey conducted by an international organization last year, Taiwan will have the world's most serious talent shortage by 2021.
National renewal requires human talent. When talent is missing, and a massive brain drain is in progress, everything else is reduced to empty talk. The shortfall in domestic talent necessitates the long term cultivation of talent. It requires the short term introduction of foreign talent and retention of local talent.
The cultivation of talent is the responsibility of businesses. It is also the responsibility of government.
Morris Chang said that graduation from university is merely the beginning of the learning process. He cited his own experience. He said 99% of his knowledge was acquired after the end of his 24 years of academic studies. Therefore businesses are the real hotbed that fosters innovation. Business owners must view talent as a valuable asset. They must constantly consider personnel issues. They must provide a sound environment that nurtures talent. Only then can they innovate. Only then can development become sustainable.
Take government responsibility. It must correct years of misguided "pro forma" and "academic credentials above all" educational policies. It must address the gap between supply and demand. It must narrow the gap between elementary school and high school graduates. The government must revive vocational education. It must cultivate creative talent for society and industry.
There is already a domestic shortfall in talent. Relying solely on cultivating talent is too slow. It cannot save the day. Admitting overseas talent is a feasible and effective shortcut. Alas, the agencies charged with admitting overseas talent are ultraconservative. They are deeply worried about admitting foreign white-collar workers who might create local unemployment. The result is layer upon layer of restrictions on salaries and other factors, Confronted by such obstacles, industries give up. Admitting talent from the Mainland has more to do with political sensitivitiesy. Current laws and regulations strictly limit admission of Mainland professionals. Very few Mainland professionals are allowe to work on Taiwan.
Admitting Mainland talent onto Taiwan involves two matters: mindset and controls. Take mindset. Morris Chang cited Beijing's experience. In 1978, it decided to implement then leader Deng Xiaoping's reforms. As Deng put it, "The entry of talent should be liberalized. The entry of capital should be liberalized. The entry of technology should be liberalized. Even the system itself should be liberalized." Taiwan faces a talent shortage. If people on Taiwan cannot open their hearts and minds, the problem will only become worse.
Take management. Formal restrictions and measures limit the introduction of foreign talent. This prevents industry from introducing talent. Therefore, future controls must be dramatically changed. Controls after the fact should focus on reviews before the fact. This will expedite matters for industry and prevent fiscal abuse. Take the admission of Mainland talent. We propose designating a "free trade zone" as a test case. Mainland talent would be allowed to work there. If it is successful, it can be gradually expanded.
Retaining local Taiwan talent is another pressing issue. The European Chamber of Commerce said Taiwan's high-end brain drain is due mainly to low salaries. Average salaries on Taiwan trail the three other Asian Tigers. Some industries have salaries no higher than Mainland China's coastal cities. When it comes to high wages, Taiwan lags far behind. More and more people are drawn overseas and to Mainland China.
Salaries on Taiwan are low. The reason is overdependence on the OEM export model, in which "The Mainland is our factory," and in which "Taiwan takes the orders, overseas plants make the product." This results in a disconnect between industry sales and domestic wages and domestic employment. To change this model, we need creative talent. This has become a "chicken or the egg" problem.
The business community must become more aware. It must appreciate its workers. It must raise wages to encourage innovation. It must raise productivity. Only then can it retain talent. The government must encourage businesses to cultivate talent, underwite R&D, and encourage innovation. Business and government must work together. Only then can they alleviate the brain drain. The government must cultivate talent. It must have a policy that attracts outside talent. Only then will Taiwan's economy have any hope.
社論－人才流動決定台灣的命運
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月27日 04:09
台積電董事長張忠謀在一場演講中直言，台灣經濟的悶和亂，都和人才缺乏有關；沒有人才，企業要創新、轉型升級根本是緣木求魚；人才培養需要一代、約10年的時間，開放國外人才來台是最快速的方法；他更批評台灣除了政治開放，別的都不開放！
張忠謀的直言，點出近年國內人才斷層及人才荒的根本問題。台灣人民希望政府展現積極有力的領導作為，但治國人才不足，政務官平庸化結果，讓政府幾乎淪為救火隊功能，遑論開展新政，領導台灣向前行。
台灣經濟成長過度依賴資訊電子產業出口，以及由廉價要素及效率驅動的代工出口模式，面對近年美韓國際大廠強力競爭及中國大陸等新興市場國家業者急起直追，台商出口競爭力正快速削弱，未來唯一出路，是轉向以「創新驅動」的新產銷模式。但誠如張忠謀指出，台灣企業缺乏「器大識深、識廣」的領導人才，也缺少可以帶動企業轉型升級的中層創新人才；面對前後夾擊的嚴酷市場競爭，很多台商正處於苟延殘喘的存亡邊緣。
更讓人擔憂的是，台灣非但人才不足，而且人才外流問題日益嚴重。根據中央研究院及國科會估計，近10年台灣人才赤字平均每年逾2萬人，亦即菁英人口正快速流失。根據去年一份國際組織調查報告顯示，2021年台灣將出現全球最嚴重的人才短缺危機。
「中興以人才為本」，人才不足、甚至大量出走，一切都將成為空談。要解決當前國內人才不足問題，根本之計在長期培養人才，但短期之策則在引進外來人才及留住本地人才。
培養人才是企業的責任，也是政府的責任。
張忠謀特別強調，大學畢業，才是學習的開始，他並以自身經驗為例，指現在99％的知識是24歲結束學術之路後學來的。所以，企業才是培育創新人才的溫床，企業主必須將人才視為資產，時時思考人才問題，提供人才培育的良好環境，才能不斷創新，永續經營。
至於政府的責任，就是要導正多年來存在國內的「形式主義」及「學位至上」的教育迷思，改善產學和供需脫鉤現象，縮小高教畢業生學用落差。因此，重振技職教育是政府當務之急，也是為社會及企業培養創新人才的基礎工程。
當下國內人才已出現斷層危機，光靠培育人才緩不濟急，開放海外人才來台是可行及有效的捷徑。但是，主管機關對開放海外人才心態十分保守，究其原因，主要是擔心大幅開放外國白領人才來台工作，可能影響本地就業，因而在薪資及配套管理上層層設限，讓業者望而卻步。至於開放大陸人才來台工作更涉及到敏感政治問題，目前皆是引用有嚴格限制的大陸專業人士來台相關法規，讓數量極有限的大陸人才變相在台工作。
其實，解決開放海外人才來台工作問題，關鍵在心態和管理兩個層面。就心態言，張忠謀特別引述1978年大陸決定實施改革開放當時領導人鄧小平的談話：「人才要開放、資金要開放、技術要開放，連制度都要開放」。面臨當前人才短缺問題，台灣若沒有開放的心胸和器識，只會讓問題更加惡化。
就管理層面言，對引進外國人才形式上設限及防弊措施，只是阻礙業者引進可用的人才，因此，未來應大幅改變管理方式，事後管理應重於事前審核，即可兼顧業者便利及防杜流弊。至於大陸人才引進部分，我們主張，應選擇「自由經濟示範區」的特定實體園區，作為開放大陸人才來台工作的試點，若成效良好，即可逐步推廣。
另一方面，留住台灣本地人才亦是迫切課題。歐洲商會指出，台灣高端人才外流問題，主因是薪資偏低。事實上，台灣平均薪資水準不僅落居四小龍之末，部分行業甚至已被中國大陸沿海城市追上；在高端人力薪資方面，台灣落後幅度更大，愈來愈多的人才被磁吸到海外及大陸。
台灣薪資水準低，關鍵是在過於依賴「以大陸為工廠」、「台灣接單，海外生產」的代工出口模式，導致企業產銷和國內薪資及就業脫節；但要改變此一模式，又須先創新人才始能克竟其功。這又變成「雞生蛋」或「蛋生雞」問題。
所以，企業界必須有所覺悟，重視員工價值，以提高薪資刺激創新，才能提高生產力，也才留得住人才。至於政府角色，就是在產業政策及制度面上，鼓勵企業培育人才及研發創新。企業和政府必須共同努力，方可紓緩人才外流問題，再配合育才、引才政策，台灣經濟的未來才會有希望。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 27, 2014
Summary: The business community must become more aware. It must appreciate its workers. It must raise wages to encourage innovation. It must raise productivity. Only then can it retain talent. The government must encourage businesses to cultivate talent, underwite R&D, and encourage innovation. Business and government must work together. Only then can they alleviate the brain drain. The government must cultivate talent. It must have a policy that attracts outside talent. Only then will Taiwan's economy have any hope.
Full text below:
TSMC Chairman Morris Chang recently delivered a blunt speech. He said Taiwan's economy is being suffocated. It is in chaos. He said this was all due to a shortage of human talent. The lack of talent makes entrepreneural innovation, transformation, and reform a pipe dream. The cultivation of talent takes a generation, or approximately a decade. Opening up Taiwan to foreign talent is the fastest way. He also criticized Taiwan for liberalizing only politics and nothing else.
Morris Chang spoke from the heart. He pointed out a fundamental problem that arose in recent years -- a domestic shortage of talent. The public on Taiwan wants the government to demonstrate strong leadership. But the government lacks the necessary talent. As a result political appointees are mediocre. The government is reduced to constantly fighting fires. It is incapable of reforming itself and moving Taiwan forward.
Taiwan's economic growth is overly reliant on IT industry exports, as well as the cost-based, efficiency-driven foundry export model. In recent years, transnational companies based in the US and Korea have offered strong competition. Companies in Mainland China and other emerging markets are catching up. Taiwan's export competitiveness is rapidly weakening. The only way out is a new, innovation-driven marketing model. But As Morris Chang pointed noted, Taiwan companies lack leaders with sufficient vision and wisdom. They lack mid-level talent able to transform and upgrade companies. Taiwan businesses face harsh competition in the market place, front and rear. Many teeter on the brink of extinction.
That is even more worrisome. Taiwan lacks talent. Even worse, it faces a growing brain drain. According to Academia Sinica and National Science Council estimates, over the past decade talent has bid farewell to Taiwan at the rate of nearly 20,000 a year. These elites are rapidly being lost. According to a survey conducted by an international organization last year, Taiwan will have the world's most serious talent shortage by 2021.
National renewal requires human talent. When talent is missing, and a massive brain drain is in progress, everything else is reduced to empty talk. The shortfall in domestic talent necessitates the long term cultivation of talent. It requires the short term introduction of foreign talent and retention of local talent.
The cultivation of talent is the responsibility of businesses. It is also the responsibility of government.
Morris Chang said that graduation from university is merely the beginning of the learning process. He cited his own experience. He said 99% of his knowledge was acquired after the end of his 24 years of academic studies. Therefore businesses are the real hotbed that fosters innovation. Business owners must view talent as a valuable asset. They must constantly consider personnel issues. They must provide a sound environment that nurtures talent. Only then can they innovate. Only then can development become sustainable.
Take government responsibility. It must correct years of misguided "pro forma" and "academic credentials above all" educational policies. It must address the gap between supply and demand. It must narrow the gap between elementary school and high school graduates. The government must revive vocational education. It must cultivate creative talent for society and industry.
There is already a domestic shortfall in talent. Relying solely on cultivating talent is too slow. It cannot save the day. Admitting overseas talent is a feasible and effective shortcut. Alas, the agencies charged with admitting overseas talent are ultraconservative. They are deeply worried about admitting foreign white-collar workers who might create local unemployment. The result is layer upon layer of restrictions on salaries and other factors, Confronted by such obstacles, industries give up. Admitting talent from the Mainland has more to do with political sensitivitiesy. Current laws and regulations strictly limit admission of Mainland professionals. Very few Mainland professionals are allowe to work on Taiwan.
Admitting Mainland talent onto Taiwan involves two matters: mindset and controls. Take mindset. Morris Chang cited Beijing's experience. In 1978, it decided to implement then leader Deng Xiaoping's reforms. As Deng put it, "The entry of talent should be liberalized. The entry of capital should be liberalized. The entry of technology should be liberalized. Even the system itself should be liberalized." Taiwan faces a talent shortage. If people on Taiwan cannot open their hearts and minds, the problem will only become worse.
Take management. Formal restrictions and measures limit the introduction of foreign talent. This prevents industry from introducing talent. Therefore, future controls must be dramatically changed. Controls after the fact should focus on reviews before the fact. This will expedite matters for industry and prevent fiscal abuse. Take the admission of Mainland talent. We propose designating a "free trade zone" as a test case. Mainland talent would be allowed to work there. If it is successful, it can be gradually expanded.
Retaining local Taiwan talent is another pressing issue. The European Chamber of Commerce said Taiwan's high-end brain drain is due mainly to low salaries. Average salaries on Taiwan trail the three other Asian Tigers. Some industries have salaries no higher than Mainland China's coastal cities. When it comes to high wages, Taiwan lags far behind. More and more people are drawn overseas and to Mainland China.
Salaries on Taiwan are low. The reason is overdependence on the OEM export model, in which "The Mainland is our factory," and in which "Taiwan takes the orders, overseas plants make the product." This results in a disconnect between industry sales and domestic wages and domestic employment. To change this model, we need creative talent. This has become a "chicken or the egg" problem.
The business community must become more aware. It must appreciate its workers. It must raise wages to encourage innovation. It must raise productivity. Only then can it retain talent. The government must encourage businesses to cultivate talent, underwite R&D, and encourage innovation. Business and government must work together. Only then can they alleviate the brain drain. The government must cultivate talent. It must have a policy that attracts outside talent. Only then will Taiwan's economy have any hope.
社論－人才流動決定台灣的命運
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月27日 04:09
台積電董事長張忠謀在一場演講中直言，台灣經濟的悶和亂，都和人才缺乏有關；沒有人才，企業要創新、轉型升級根本是緣木求魚；人才培養需要一代、約10年的時間，開放國外人才來台是最快速的方法；他更批評台灣除了政治開放，別的都不開放！
張忠謀的直言，點出近年國內人才斷層及人才荒的根本問題。台灣人民希望政府展現積極有力的領導作為，但治國人才不足，政務官平庸化結果，讓政府幾乎淪為救火隊功能，遑論開展新政，領導台灣向前行。
台灣經濟成長過度依賴資訊電子產業出口，以及由廉價要素及效率驅動的代工出口模式，面對近年美韓國際大廠強力競爭及中國大陸等新興市場國家業者急起直追，台商出口競爭力正快速削弱，未來唯一出路，是轉向以「創新驅動」的新產銷模式。但誠如張忠謀指出，台灣企業缺乏「器大識深、識廣」的領導人才，也缺少可以帶動企業轉型升級的中層創新人才；面對前後夾擊的嚴酷市場競爭，很多台商正處於苟延殘喘的存亡邊緣。
更讓人擔憂的是，台灣非但人才不足，而且人才外流問題日益嚴重。根據中央研究院及國科會估計，近10年台灣人才赤字平均每年逾2萬人，亦即菁英人口正快速流失。根據去年一份國際組織調查報告顯示，2021年台灣將出現全球最嚴重的人才短缺危機。
「中興以人才為本」，人才不足、甚至大量出走，一切都將成為空談。要解決當前國內人才不足問題，根本之計在長期培養人才，但短期之策則在引進外來人才及留住本地人才。
培養人才是企業的責任，也是政府的責任。
張忠謀特別強調，大學畢業，才是學習的開始，他並以自身經驗為例，指現在99％的知識是24歲結束學術之路後學來的。所以，企業才是培育創新人才的溫床，企業主必須將人才視為資產，時時思考人才問題，提供人才培育的良好環境，才能不斷創新，永續經營。
至於政府的責任，就是要導正多年來存在國內的「形式主義」及「學位至上」的教育迷思，改善產學和供需脫鉤現象，縮小高教畢業生學用落差。因此，重振技職教育是政府當務之急，也是為社會及企業培養創新人才的基礎工程。
當下國內人才已出現斷層危機，光靠培育人才緩不濟急，開放海外人才來台是可行及有效的捷徑。但是，主管機關對開放海外人才心態十分保守，究其原因，主要是擔心大幅開放外國白領人才來台工作，可能影響本地就業，因而在薪資及配套管理上層層設限，讓業者望而卻步。至於開放大陸人才來台工作更涉及到敏感政治問題，目前皆是引用有嚴格限制的大陸專業人士來台相關法規，讓數量極有限的大陸人才變相在台工作。
其實，解決開放海外人才來台工作問題，關鍵在心態和管理兩個層面。就心態言，張忠謀特別引述1978年大陸決定實施改革開放當時領導人鄧小平的談話：「人才要開放、資金要開放、技術要開放，連制度都要開放」。面臨當前人才短缺問題，台灣若沒有開放的心胸和器識，只會讓問題更加惡化。
就管理層面言，對引進外國人才形式上設限及防弊措施，只是阻礙業者引進可用的人才，因此，未來應大幅改變管理方式，事後管理應重於事前審核，即可兼顧業者便利及防杜流弊。至於大陸人才引進部分，我們主張，應選擇「自由經濟示範區」的特定實體園區，作為開放大陸人才來台工作的試點，若成效良好，即可逐步推廣。
另一方面，留住台灣本地人才亦是迫切課題。歐洲商會指出，台灣高端人才外流問題，主因是薪資偏低。事實上，台灣平均薪資水準不僅落居四小龍之末，部分行業甚至已被中國大陸沿海城市追上；在高端人力薪資方面，台灣落後幅度更大，愈來愈多的人才被磁吸到海外及大陸。
台灣薪資水準低，關鍵是在過於依賴「以大陸為工廠」、「台灣接單，海外生產」的代工出口模式，導致企業產銷和國內薪資及就業脫節；但要改變此一模式，又須先創新人才始能克竟其功。這又變成「雞生蛋」或「蛋生雞」問題。
所以，企業界必須有所覺悟，重視員工價值，以提高薪資刺激創新，才能提高生產力，也才留得住人才。至於政府角色，就是在產業政策及制度面上，鼓勵企業培育人才及研發創新。企業和政府必須共同努力，方可紓緩人才外流問題，再配合育才、引才政策，台灣經濟的未來才會有希望。
Thursday, January 23, 2014
The DPP Cannot Cross the Chasm with Two Small Jumps
The DPP Cannot Cross the Chasm with Two Small Jumps
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 24, 2014
Summary: "Don't be afraid to take a big step if one is indicated. You can't cross a chasm in two small jumps." If the DPP refuses to reaffirm the "one China Constitution," it will not matter what rhetoric it spouts. In Beijing's eyes it will remain the same old Taiwan independence path with different street signs. The DPP must take a big step. It must affirm the "one China constitution." It cannot cross the chasm with two small jumps.
Full text below:
"Don't be afraid to take a big step if one is indicated. You can't cross a chasm in two small jumps."
Several DPP Taoyuan County elected officials recently held a press conference. They said "Su Tseng-chang is a man with no sense of direction and no point of view." They begged Su Tseng-chang not to run for a second term as party chairman. Their focus was the DPP nomination process. But they directed their attention at Su Tseng-chang's leadership style. Their first observation sums up Su Tseng-chang's cross-strait policy.
"Don't be afraid to take a big step if one is indicated. You can't cross a chasm in two small jumps." So said former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, in his now famous quote. Su Tseng-chang's cross-strait policy howeer, is just that. It is a futile effort to cross a chasm in two small jumps. Actually Su has no policy, only ploys. One. He wants to take two small jumps chronologically. He wants to avoid cross-strait issues during the run up to the Seven in One Elections. He wants to wait until 2016 before tackling them. Two. He wants to take two small jumps thematically. He wants to use the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" to stall for time. He wants to hold the " constitutional consensus," "freezing the Taiwan independence party platform," and the "Resolution on the Republic of China" in reserve.
But Su Tseng-chang's attempts to stall for time will not work. The more he evades, the more he shines a spotlight on the DPP's unresolved cross-strait policy. Take timing. This is what happened with the recent "cross-strait policy debate" proposal. This is what happened with the "three in one debate" proposal floated during the party chairmanship election. Take themes. Beijing openly criticized the "China Policy Review Minutes" as a "one country on each side Taiwan independence stance." It added that "Taiwan independence is a dead end. No matter what street signs one posts along the road, a dead end remains a dead end."
Clearly Su Tseng-chang's "two small jumps strategy" is "no sale," either inside the party, or with Beijing. During an interview with Radio Taiwan International, Su tried to hide his embarrassment by presenting three views. Ironically, they provoked even more controversy. One. He said "The Taiwan independence party platform is history. It is past tense." This implied he was has not "turned back the clock, and is not promoting Taiwan independence." But if so, why was such language not found in the "China Policy Review Minutes?" Two. His "seagulls on a beach" metaphor for cross-strait relations equated humans with seagulls. It implied "one country on each side, you go your way, I go mine" thinking. Seaguls can avoid humans by flying away. Can Taiwan increase the 130 kilometer wide Taiwan Strait by hundreds of kilometers? Three. He said, "China plus one" would be even more potent [than one China]. It implied good will toward Beijing. But "China plus one" left people with the impression that Taiwan would be nothing more than an accessory to Mainland China.
Su Tseng-chang's three views made his "two small jumps strategy" even less convincing. His waffling mollified neither camp within the party. His abortive goodwill gesture is unlikely to ingratiate him with Beijing.
DPP officials have floated several trial balloons. They include "freezing the Taiwan independence party plaform," a "constitution consensus," and a "Resolution on the the Republic of China." They do not appear in the "China Policy Review Minutes." But they have inadvertently revealed the DPP's bottom line. Public pressure inside Taiwan, and moves by Beijing, will force the DPP to put its cards on the table, sooner or later. The only difference is whether it will show its hand voluntarily, or wait until it has been painted into a corner.
The DPP will be forced to play its "freezing Taiwan independence party platform" card. The next step will naturally be "annulling its Taiwan independence party platform." The DPP will be forced to play its "constitutional consensus" card. The next step will naturally be "different constitutional interpretations" and "a constitutional one China." In fact the DPP knows that without the big step of "annulling the Taiwan independence party platform" and "constitutional one China" cards, the chasm of cross-strait policy is unbridgeable.
Nevertheless Su Tseng-chang and DPP conservatives cling to a "two small jumps strategy." They are only willing to take one small jump. They are only willing to engage in "back door listing" via the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." They refuse to accept the "one China framework." The China Policy Review Minutes excluded terms such as "freezing," "annulling," "constitutional consensus" "constitutional one China," and "Resolution on the Republic of China." But what is the Republic of China, if it is detached from a "constitutional one China?" If the DPP insists on taking this small jump, how can it take a big step across the abyss?
The DPP insists that "one China is the Peoples Republic of China," Therefore it "refuses to be locked into the one China framework." But repudiating the "one China framework" is an admission that one is engaged in "backdoor listing." It is an admission that one is repudiating the Republic of China's "one China Constitution." Of course Beijing is going to denounce that as "one nation on each side." Therefore the DPP may tell itself that "backdoor listing" is a small jump. But in fact it is a small jump straight into the chasm.
The "One China framework" has two aspects. The first is "one China, different interpretations." This means that the ROC and PRC "do not recognize each other's sovereignty." The second aspect is the "big roof concept of China." ROC and PRC sovereignty together equal the "big roof concept of one China."
If the DPP wishes to reaffirm the Republic of China, it cannot repudiate the "one China Constitution." When the DPP genuinely reaffirms the "Republic of China stipulated by the one China Constitution," Taiwan's efforts to promote "one China, different interpretations" will be enhanced. This could be the beginning of a united Taiwan. The next step could be wrangling over the "big roof concept of China."
If the DPP refuses to reaffirm the "one China Constitution," it will not matter what rhetoric it spouts. In Beijing's eyes it will remain the same old Taiwan independence path with different street signs. The DPP must take a big step. It must affirm the "one China constitution." It cannot cross the chasm with two small jumps.
民進黨無法用兩小步跨越深淵
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.24 03:44 am
「不要害怕跨一大步，你無法用兩小步跨越深淵。」
桃園縣的幾名民進黨民意代表日前聯名舉行記者會，宣稱「蘇貞昌是沒有方向感、沒有觀念的人」，並「拜託蘇貞昌不要再連任黨主席」；他們的議論焦點雖在批評民進黨的提名問題，卻亦直指蘇貞昌的領導風格，文首那句話即他們所說，也很適用於評量蘇貞昌的兩岸政策。
「你無法用兩小步跨越深淵」，這是英國前首相勞合‧喬治的名言。蘇貞昌的兩岸政策（其實沒有政策，只有謀略），正是「想用兩小步跨越深淵」。一、時間上的兩小步：七合一選舉前不談兩岸，想等到二○一六再談。二、議題上的兩小步：先用《台灣前途決議文》抵擋一陣子，「憲法共識」、「凍獨」、「中華民國決議文」等皆按下不表。
但是，蘇貞昌愈拖延、愈閃躲，愈凸顯了民進黨的兩岸政策未獲解決。就時間上說，近期再舉行「兩岸政策大辯論」之議有之，在黨主席選舉時舉行「三合一辯論」之議亦有之；就議題上說，北京更直指《對中政策檢討紀要》仍為「一邊一國的台獨立場」，更稱「台獨是一條死胡同，無論掛上什麼路牌，死胡同就是死胡同」。
可見，蘇貞昌的「兩小步戰略」，在黨內及在北京皆計不得售。為化解尷尬，他在中央廣播電台的專訪中表達了三個觀點，卻皆引起更多的議論。一、他說：「《台獨黨綱》在歷史進程中已成過去式」，這是在表示他並未「回過頭去搞台獨」；但是，為什麼此語未能見諸《對中政策檢討紀要》？二、他以「沙灘之鷗」來比喻兩岸關係，但人鷗殊途，這卻有「一邊一國，你走你的，我走我的」之意味；然而，海鷗避人可飛去，但台灣難道能將最狹處一三○公里的海峽再推開幾百公里？三、他說「中國加一」更有力量，此語有向北京示好的意味；但「中國加一」的圖像，會使人覺得台灣成了中國的一個附件或零件。
蘇貞昌的這三個觀點，不免使他的「兩小步戰略」愈描愈黑。他的搖擺，不能同時滿足黨內兩條路線的不同人馬；他的示好，也未必能使北京領情。
其實，民進黨中「凍獨」、「憲法共識」、「中華民國決議文」等主張，雖未能在《對中政策檢討紀要》中出現，但皆已經成為民進黨暴露的底牌；在台灣內部民意的壓力之下，及北京的操作之下，這些底牌早晚都會打出來，只有「自己擇時打出」或「被現實所迫打出」的不同而已。
等到民進黨打出「凍獨」，下一張牌自然就是「廢獨」；等到民進黨打出「憲法共識」，下一張牌當然就是「憲法各表」及「憲法一中」。其實，民進黨何嘗不知道，若沒有「廢獨」及「憲法一中」兩張牌跨出的一大步，無法跨越兩岸政策的深淵。
但是，蘇貞昌及民進黨內保守派的「兩小步戰略」，只跨出以《台灣前途決議文》來「借殼上市」的一小步，並停在「拒絕鎖進『一個中國』的框架」（《對中政策檢討紀要》用語）的半空中；而將「凍獨／廢獨」、「憲法共識／憲法一中」、「中華民國決議文」均「排除在議程之外」。問題是：脫離「憲法一中」的中華民國還算是中華民國嗎？這一步踏空了，又如何跨越深淵？
民進黨堅持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，因此「拒絕鎖進一中框架」；但否定「一中架構」，即形同以「借殼上市」面目出現，而否定了中華民國的「一中憲法」，當然會被北京指為「一邊一國」。所以「借殼上市」這一步，對民進黨而言雖看似跨出了一小步，卻是一腳踩空的一步。
「一中架構」有兩個層次。第一個層次是「一中各表」；亦即「主權互不承認」的中華民國與中華人民共和國；第二個層次則是在「大屋頂中國」下「主權相加」的中華民國與中華人民共和國，亦即「大一中架構」。
若欲回到中華民國，民進黨即不能否定「一中憲法」。等到民進黨真正回到「一中憲法的中華民國」，台灣在「一中各表」的力度必可增強，且始有可能以團結的台灣，進一步與北京就「大屋頂中國」之「大一中架構」的營造進行角力。
民進黨如果不回到「一中憲法」，不管提出甚麼說詞，在北京眼裡都只是換一個路牌的台獨。民進黨必須邁出「一中憲法」的一大步，無法用兩小步跨越深淵。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 24, 2014
Summary: "Don't be afraid to take a big step if one is indicated. You can't cross a chasm in two small jumps." If the DPP refuses to reaffirm the "one China Constitution," it will not matter what rhetoric it spouts. In Beijing's eyes it will remain the same old Taiwan independence path with different street signs. The DPP must take a big step. It must affirm the "one China constitution." It cannot cross the chasm with two small jumps.
Full text below:
"Don't be afraid to take a big step if one is indicated. You can't cross a chasm in two small jumps."
Several DPP Taoyuan County elected officials recently held a press conference. They said "Su Tseng-chang is a man with no sense of direction and no point of view." They begged Su Tseng-chang not to run for a second term as party chairman. Their focus was the DPP nomination process. But they directed their attention at Su Tseng-chang's leadership style. Their first observation sums up Su Tseng-chang's cross-strait policy.
"Don't be afraid to take a big step if one is indicated. You can't cross a chasm in two small jumps." So said former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, in his now famous quote. Su Tseng-chang's cross-strait policy howeer, is just that. It is a futile effort to cross a chasm in two small jumps. Actually Su has no policy, only ploys. One. He wants to take two small jumps chronologically. He wants to avoid cross-strait issues during the run up to the Seven in One Elections. He wants to wait until 2016 before tackling them. Two. He wants to take two small jumps thematically. He wants to use the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" to stall for time. He wants to hold the " constitutional consensus," "freezing the Taiwan independence party platform," and the "Resolution on the Republic of China" in reserve.
But Su Tseng-chang's attempts to stall for time will not work. The more he evades, the more he shines a spotlight on the DPP's unresolved cross-strait policy. Take timing. This is what happened with the recent "cross-strait policy debate" proposal. This is what happened with the "three in one debate" proposal floated during the party chairmanship election. Take themes. Beijing openly criticized the "China Policy Review Minutes" as a "one country on each side Taiwan independence stance." It added that "Taiwan independence is a dead end. No matter what street signs one posts along the road, a dead end remains a dead end."
Clearly Su Tseng-chang's "two small jumps strategy" is "no sale," either inside the party, or with Beijing. During an interview with Radio Taiwan International, Su tried to hide his embarrassment by presenting three views. Ironically, they provoked even more controversy. One. He said "The Taiwan independence party platform is history. It is past tense." This implied he was has not "turned back the clock, and is not promoting Taiwan independence." But if so, why was such language not found in the "China Policy Review Minutes?" Two. His "seagulls on a beach" metaphor for cross-strait relations equated humans with seagulls. It implied "one country on each side, you go your way, I go mine" thinking. Seaguls can avoid humans by flying away. Can Taiwan increase the 130 kilometer wide Taiwan Strait by hundreds of kilometers? Three. He said, "China plus one" would be even more potent [than one China]. It implied good will toward Beijing. But "China plus one" left people with the impression that Taiwan would be nothing more than an accessory to Mainland China.
Su Tseng-chang's three views made his "two small jumps strategy" even less convincing. His waffling mollified neither camp within the party. His abortive goodwill gesture is unlikely to ingratiate him with Beijing.
DPP officials have floated several trial balloons. They include "freezing the Taiwan independence party plaform," a "constitution consensus," and a "Resolution on the the Republic of China." They do not appear in the "China Policy Review Minutes." But they have inadvertently revealed the DPP's bottom line. Public pressure inside Taiwan, and moves by Beijing, will force the DPP to put its cards on the table, sooner or later. The only difference is whether it will show its hand voluntarily, or wait until it has been painted into a corner.
The DPP will be forced to play its "freezing Taiwan independence party platform" card. The next step will naturally be "annulling its Taiwan independence party platform." The DPP will be forced to play its "constitutional consensus" card. The next step will naturally be "different constitutional interpretations" and "a constitutional one China." In fact the DPP knows that without the big step of "annulling the Taiwan independence party platform" and "constitutional one China" cards, the chasm of cross-strait policy is unbridgeable.
Nevertheless Su Tseng-chang and DPP conservatives cling to a "two small jumps strategy." They are only willing to take one small jump. They are only willing to engage in "back door listing" via the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." They refuse to accept the "one China framework." The China Policy Review Minutes excluded terms such as "freezing," "annulling," "constitutional consensus" "constitutional one China," and "Resolution on the Republic of China." But what is the Republic of China, if it is detached from a "constitutional one China?" If the DPP insists on taking this small jump, how can it take a big step across the abyss?
The DPP insists that "one China is the Peoples Republic of China," Therefore it "refuses to be locked into the one China framework." But repudiating the "one China framework" is an admission that one is engaged in "backdoor listing." It is an admission that one is repudiating the Republic of China's "one China Constitution." Of course Beijing is going to denounce that as "one nation on each side." Therefore the DPP may tell itself that "backdoor listing" is a small jump. But in fact it is a small jump straight into the chasm.
The "One China framework" has two aspects. The first is "one China, different interpretations." This means that the ROC and PRC "do not recognize each other's sovereignty." The second aspect is the "big roof concept of China." ROC and PRC sovereignty together equal the "big roof concept of one China."
If the DPP wishes to reaffirm the Republic of China, it cannot repudiate the "one China Constitution." When the DPP genuinely reaffirms the "Republic of China stipulated by the one China Constitution," Taiwan's efforts to promote "one China, different interpretations" will be enhanced. This could be the beginning of a united Taiwan. The next step could be wrangling over the "big roof concept of China."
If the DPP refuses to reaffirm the "one China Constitution," it will not matter what rhetoric it spouts. In Beijing's eyes it will remain the same old Taiwan independence path with different street signs. The DPP must take a big step. It must affirm the "one China constitution." It cannot cross the chasm with two small jumps.
民進黨無法用兩小步跨越深淵
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.24 03:44 am
「不要害怕跨一大步，你無法用兩小步跨越深淵。」
桃園縣的幾名民進黨民意代表日前聯名舉行記者會，宣稱「蘇貞昌是沒有方向感、沒有觀念的人」，並「拜託蘇貞昌不要再連任黨主席」；他們的議論焦點雖在批評民進黨的提名問題，卻亦直指蘇貞昌的領導風格，文首那句話即他們所說，也很適用於評量蘇貞昌的兩岸政策。
「你無法用兩小步跨越深淵」，這是英國前首相勞合‧喬治的名言。蘇貞昌的兩岸政策（其實沒有政策，只有謀略），正是「想用兩小步跨越深淵」。一、時間上的兩小步：七合一選舉前不談兩岸，想等到二○一六再談。二、議題上的兩小步：先用《台灣前途決議文》抵擋一陣子，「憲法共識」、「凍獨」、「中華民國決議文」等皆按下不表。
但是，蘇貞昌愈拖延、愈閃躲，愈凸顯了民進黨的兩岸政策未獲解決。就時間上說，近期再舉行「兩岸政策大辯論」之議有之，在黨主席選舉時舉行「三合一辯論」之議亦有之；就議題上說，北京更直指《對中政策檢討紀要》仍為「一邊一國的台獨立場」，更稱「台獨是一條死胡同，無論掛上什麼路牌，死胡同就是死胡同」。
可見，蘇貞昌的「兩小步戰略」，在黨內及在北京皆計不得售。為化解尷尬，他在中央廣播電台的專訪中表達了三個觀點，卻皆引起更多的議論。一、他說：「《台獨黨綱》在歷史進程中已成過去式」，這是在表示他並未「回過頭去搞台獨」；但是，為什麼此語未能見諸《對中政策檢討紀要》？二、他以「沙灘之鷗」來比喻兩岸關係，但人鷗殊途，這卻有「一邊一國，你走你的，我走我的」之意味；然而，海鷗避人可飛去，但台灣難道能將最狹處一三○公里的海峽再推開幾百公里？三、他說「中國加一」更有力量，此語有向北京示好的意味；但「中國加一」的圖像，會使人覺得台灣成了中國的一個附件或零件。
蘇貞昌的這三個觀點，不免使他的「兩小步戰略」愈描愈黑。他的搖擺，不能同時滿足黨內兩條路線的不同人馬；他的示好，也未必能使北京領情。
其實，民進黨中「凍獨」、「憲法共識」、「中華民國決議文」等主張，雖未能在《對中政策檢討紀要》中出現，但皆已經成為民進黨暴露的底牌；在台灣內部民意的壓力之下，及北京的操作之下，這些底牌早晚都會打出來，只有「自己擇時打出」或「被現實所迫打出」的不同而已。
等到民進黨打出「凍獨」，下一張牌自然就是「廢獨」；等到民進黨打出「憲法共識」，下一張牌當然就是「憲法各表」及「憲法一中」。其實，民進黨何嘗不知道，若沒有「廢獨」及「憲法一中」兩張牌跨出的一大步，無法跨越兩岸政策的深淵。
但是，蘇貞昌及民進黨內保守派的「兩小步戰略」，只跨出以《台灣前途決議文》來「借殼上市」的一小步，並停在「拒絕鎖進『一個中國』的框架」（《對中政策檢討紀要》用語）的半空中；而將「凍獨／廢獨」、「憲法共識／憲法一中」、「中華民國決議文」均「排除在議程之外」。問題是：脫離「憲法一中」的中華民國還算是中華民國嗎？這一步踏空了，又如何跨越深淵？
民進黨堅持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，因此「拒絕鎖進一中框架」；但否定「一中架構」，即形同以「借殼上市」面目出現，而否定了中華民國的「一中憲法」，當然會被北京指為「一邊一國」。所以「借殼上市」這一步，對民進黨而言雖看似跨出了一小步，卻是一腳踩空的一步。
「一中架構」有兩個層次。第一個層次是「一中各表」；亦即「主權互不承認」的中華民國與中華人民共和國；第二個層次則是在「大屋頂中國」下「主權相加」的中華民國與中華人民共和國，亦即「大一中架構」。
若欲回到中華民國，民進黨即不能否定「一中憲法」。等到民進黨真正回到「一中憲法的中華民國」，台灣在「一中各表」的力度必可增強，且始有可能以團結的台灣，進一步與北京就「大屋頂中國」之「大一中架構」的營造進行角力。
民進黨如果不回到「一中憲法」，不管提出甚麼說詞，在北京眼裡都只是換一個路牌的台獨。民進黨必須邁出「一中憲法」的一大步，無法用兩小步跨越深淵。
Wednesday, January 22, 2014
Greater Economic Freedom: So Why No Foreign Investment?
Greater Economic Freedom: So Why No Foreign Investment?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 23, 2014
Summary: We are glad the FSC and Ministry of Economic Affairs are taking action. But other ministries must make an effort as well. We live in the present. We cannot rest on our laurels. We cannot cling to outdated concepts of manangement. Taiwan's economy is suffocating. This did not happen overnight. What exactly is the problem? The answer is clear.
Full text below:
The Heritage Foundation has released its 2014 Index of Economic Freedom. Hong Kong and Singapore were ranked 1st and 2nd in economic freedom. Australia, Switzerland and New Zealand were ranked 3rd, 4th, and 5th. The Republic of China was ranked 17th this year, up three places from last year. Much excitement ensued. But besides these indices, is there anything else the government should be looking at?
This index has been around for years. It is an important reference point for foreign investors. The Heritage Foundation uses four criteria in its annual evaluations: Rule of Law, Limited Government, Regulatory Efficiency, and Open Markets. It evaluates the degree of freedom in the global economy according to ten criteria: property rights, freedom from corruption, fiscal freedom, government spending, business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom. Among the 185 economies evaluated, the US, which loudly champions liberalization, fell two ranks to 12th place. Britain ranked 14th. Germany ranked 18th. Japan ranked 25th. South Korea ranked 31st. The Chinese mainland ranked 137th. Taiwan's ranking rose to 17th, the best it has ever achieved. Since President Ma took office, Taiwan's ranking has risen 18 places. This shows that Taiwan's liberalization has had an effect.
Taiwan received a business freedom score of 93.9 points, and a trade freedom score of 85.8 points. But on labor freedom and freedom from corruption, it scored less than 60 points. A score of 80 points or more is classified as free, 70-80 points is classified as mostly free, 60-70 points is classified as mostly unfree, 60 points or less is classified as unfree. Our overall score of 73.9 points, and 17th place ranking, is 1.2 points higher than last year.
The Heritage Foundation report notes that Taiwan has an appropriate degree of economic freedom. Its overall score was among the highest in the world and other Asian-Pacific economies. Its overall freedom score was higher than last year. This was due mainly to significantly improved fiscal freedom and investment freedom. Fiscal freedom rose from 70th last year to 41st this year. Investment freedom rose from 56th last year to 46th this year. This was the fruit of the year long effort by the FSC and the Ministry of Economic Affairs to promote liberalization.
Taiwan has made substantial progress in its degree of freedom. So why are we still having trouble attracting foreign investments? In recent years, Taiwan has almost always ranked last among the Asian economies in foreign direct investment (FDI). As a result, people cannot feel the improvements. The overall economy continues to suffocate. Kuan Chung-min is the new chairman of the National Development Committee. He said that businesses feel the impact of economic freedom immediately, whereas the general public often do not, at least not in the short term. In the long term however, liberalization leads to increased employment and higher wages. Unfortunately, as John Maynard Keynes quipped, "In the long run we are all dead." We must consider the long-term lethal factors. We must make corrections. Only then can Taiwan's economy achieve a breakthrough.
Why are foreign investors not investing in Taiwan? Fiona Woolf, the Lord Mayor of London visited Taiwan on the 14th. She thinks Taiwan's financial regulations are too strict. Without good services and products, one cannot become an offshore RMB center. She recommended that the limitations be relaxed, especially for domestic, foreign, and international banks looking to provide investors with financial products and services. Therefore the first step must be liberalized financial services. These will eliminate the gap between domestic and foreign banking. They will enable domestic banking to achieve the same status as other financial centers. What was our government's response? Officials said our government has made many efforts at financial liberalization. Many regulations have been relaxed. The professional edition of Taiwan's debt review process has been simplified. Cross-strait economic and trade exchanges between the two sids are close. This makes Taiwan suitable for the development of regional RMB business. The government's response was deeply disappointing.
The merger of Taishin and CHB remains stalled. Newbridge Capital became frustrated and went home. Carlyle's acquisition of ASE failed. Orion Investments' acquisition of Yageo was rejected. Private equity funds cannot receive fair and equitable treatment at home. If funds are suspected of having originated on the Mainland, the Investment Commission begins a witch hunt to track down the source. Entrepreneurs are required to show passports or ID cards. They find this intolerable. Foreign investors have concluded that we simply do not know the rules of the game. Too many agencies wield too much discretionary authority. A Wall Street Journal article last year said that investors have difficulty withdrawing their investments from Taiwan. This factor alone has prevented many new investments from coming in. In response to criticisms, Taiwan regulators sometimes impose unnecessarily stringent requirements. Management on Taiwan is opaque. The rules are uncertain.
Our financial sector regulations also need review. As we all know, the review of new financial products often takes over six months, after which they are often rejected. Penalties for financial institutions are often a way to force them to limit or cease operations. Entrepreneurs feel like the late lamented goose that laid the golden egg. Currently bank deposit spreads are narrow. Yields are flat, and remain in a prolonged slump. The capital market remains unsound. It remains unfavorable to interest rates, insurance products, and annuities. Many hoped the "free trade zone pilot program" would include financial sector liberalization. But the central bank has issued its "three noes." Financial services will not be liberalized. One. They may not offer NTD denominated commodities. Two. Their derivatives may not be linked to Taiwan interest rates and exchange rates. Three. Their portfolios may not include NTD denominated commodities. Given such rules, how can businesses grow? They may as well invest in Hong Kong or Singapore. Why bother coming to Taiwan?
All of the above are manifestation of an unfree economy. They hinder Taiwan's progress. They are responsible for Taiwan's lost opportunities. We are glad the FSC and Ministry of Economic Affairs are taking action. But other ministries must make an effort as well. We live in the present. We cannot rest on our laurels. We cannot cling to outdated concepts of manangement. Taiwan's economy is suffocating. This did not happen overnight. What exactly is the problem? The answer is clear. How can we remedy the situation? How can we provide domestic industry with greater opportunities for growth? How can we renrew international and foreign investors confidence? These are all questions worth pondering.
社論－經濟自由度進步 外資為何不來
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中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月23日 04:09
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美國傳統基金會公布2014年全球經濟自由度報告，港、星蟬聯前兩名，澳洲、瑞士、紐西蘭分別為三、四、五名。我國今年排名17，比去年進步3名。在欣喜之餘，在這些指標的背後，還有什麼值得政府參考的地方？
這份排行榜，行之有年，往往成為外商投資的重要參考。傳統基金會每年透過市場開放、法治水準、政府干預及監管效能等四大範疇，評估全球經濟體的自由程度；當中包括財產權、廉潔度、政府開支、財政、營商、勞工、貨幣、經貿、投資與金融等10項自由度的評比。在被評比的185個經濟體裡，倡議自由化最力的美國退步兩名居第12，英國第14，德國第18，日本25，南韓31，中國大陸137。台灣排名升至第17，是有史以來最好的排名，自馬總統上任以來已進步18名，顯示台灣在自由化已取得成效。
台灣在商業自由的分數為93.9分、自由貿易的得分為85.8分，但勞動自由、免於貪腐卻低於60分。這項自由度指數80分以上代表自由，70到80分代表大部分自由，60到70分大多數不自由，而60分以下代表不自由。我國整體分數為73.9分，排行第17名，與去年相比分數增加了1.2分。
傳統基金會的報告指出，台灣有適當的經濟自由程度，總分也高於全球和亞太地區其他國家的水準。整體自由度得分比去年提高，主要是金融與投資自由度有顯著改善，金融自由從去年第70升至41，投資自由從第56升至46，這與金管會、經濟部近一年努力推動自由化有關。
但是台灣自由度排名大幅進步，何以我國的招商引資仍成效不佳？以至於外人直接投資（FDI）近年在亞洲中幾乎敬陪末座，造成現在民眾沒有感覺，整體的悶經濟？新掛牌的國發會主委管中閔說，經商環境是否自由，企業感受強烈，短期內也許民眾感受不到，但長期而言，自由化最後一定會反映在就業機會與工資的成長上。但誠如凱因斯講的「長期而言，我們都死了」。我們還必須檢討長期來的致命因素，經過修正，才能讓台灣的經濟能有所突破。
為什麼外資不來台灣，倫敦金融城市長吳斐娜14日訪問台灣的話很有代表性。她認為台灣當前對金融法規限制還是過嚴，若沒有好的服務及產品，難以發展成人民幣離岸中心。她建議現在法規的限制要鬆綁。特別是想要為投資者提供金融商品及服務的境內銀行、境外及國際銀行，所以台灣的第一步是讓金融服務部分更自由化，來消除境內跟境外的鴻溝，達到跟其他金融中心一樣。對此我們官員的回應只有：台灣在金融自由化方面做了許多努力，許多法規多已鬆綁，專業版的寶島債審核流程已簡化；由於兩岸經貿往來密切，台灣適合發展區域性人民幣業務。這樣的回答，真是令人失望。
其實從台新彰銀的合併案迄今無解、新橋投資鎩羽而歸、凱雷收購日月光失敗到遨睿收購國巨的被駁回，私募基金在國內無法得到一個公平公正的對待。而投審會對於來台投資的資金，可能有大陸色彩，動不動就要追查資金來源，或要業者提供護照等身分證明，讓業者不堪其擾。外資普遍認為我們的遊戲規則不清楚，主管機關有太多的行政裁量權。《華爾街日報》去年底有篇文章指出投資者發現，他們難以從台灣成功退出投資，這一因素已經阻止新投資的進入；也藉此批評台灣監管機構有時會提出不必要的嚴格要求，台灣的管理是不透明、規則不確定。
另外，我們的主管機關對於金融業的管制，尤該檢討。眾所周知，對新金融商品的審查，不僅審核時間經常達半年以上，還常常打回票。對金融機構的處罰，也常是以限制或停止業務為手段，令業者覺得是殺雞取卵。而台灣目前銀行存放利差狹窄，收益曲線長期低迷且平躺，無法健全資本市場功能，不利利率、保險產品及年金財務規畫的業務發展。而之前寄望「自由經濟示範區」納入金融業，大幅開放。但央行提出「三不」原則，即開放之金融業務，一、不能涉新台幣計價商品；二、衍生性商品不以連結台灣利率及匯率為標的；三、投資組合不涉新台幣計價商品。加了這些條條框框，我們的業者如何發展？投資人在香港、新加坡做就好了，何必來台灣？
以上種種，在在都是經濟不自由的表現，阻礙台灣的進步，喪失台灣的機會。很高興看到金管會、經濟部已經動起來，但其他部會也需有更多的努力。在現在的時代，不能因為過去的榮耀，而延用舊思維來管理。台灣的悶經濟，不是一天造成的，問題出在哪裡？已很清楚。如何亡羊補牢，讓國內業者有更多的發展機會，讓國際外資重拾對台的信心，值得相關單位深思。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 23, 2014
Summary: We are glad the FSC and Ministry of Economic Affairs are taking action. But other ministries must make an effort as well. We live in the present. We cannot rest on our laurels. We cannot cling to outdated concepts of manangement. Taiwan's economy is suffocating. This did not happen overnight. What exactly is the problem? The answer is clear.
Full text below:
The Heritage Foundation has released its 2014 Index of Economic Freedom. Hong Kong and Singapore were ranked 1st and 2nd in economic freedom. Australia, Switzerland and New Zealand were ranked 3rd, 4th, and 5th. The Republic of China was ranked 17th this year, up three places from last year. Much excitement ensued. But besides these indices, is there anything else the government should be looking at?
This index has been around for years. It is an important reference point for foreign investors. The Heritage Foundation uses four criteria in its annual evaluations: Rule of Law, Limited Government, Regulatory Efficiency, and Open Markets. It evaluates the degree of freedom in the global economy according to ten criteria: property rights, freedom from corruption, fiscal freedom, government spending, business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom. Among the 185 economies evaluated, the US, which loudly champions liberalization, fell two ranks to 12th place. Britain ranked 14th. Germany ranked 18th. Japan ranked 25th. South Korea ranked 31st. The Chinese mainland ranked 137th. Taiwan's ranking rose to 17th, the best it has ever achieved. Since President Ma took office, Taiwan's ranking has risen 18 places. This shows that Taiwan's liberalization has had an effect.
Taiwan received a business freedom score of 93.9 points, and a trade freedom score of 85.8 points. But on labor freedom and freedom from corruption, it scored less than 60 points. A score of 80 points or more is classified as free, 70-80 points is classified as mostly free, 60-70 points is classified as mostly unfree, 60 points or less is classified as unfree. Our overall score of 73.9 points, and 17th place ranking, is 1.2 points higher than last year.
The Heritage Foundation report notes that Taiwan has an appropriate degree of economic freedom. Its overall score was among the highest in the world and other Asian-Pacific economies. Its overall freedom score was higher than last year. This was due mainly to significantly improved fiscal freedom and investment freedom. Fiscal freedom rose from 70th last year to 41st this year. Investment freedom rose from 56th last year to 46th this year. This was the fruit of the year long effort by the FSC and the Ministry of Economic Affairs to promote liberalization.
Taiwan has made substantial progress in its degree of freedom. So why are we still having trouble attracting foreign investments? In recent years, Taiwan has almost always ranked last among the Asian economies in foreign direct investment (FDI). As a result, people cannot feel the improvements. The overall economy continues to suffocate. Kuan Chung-min is the new chairman of the National Development Committee. He said that businesses feel the impact of economic freedom immediately, whereas the general public often do not, at least not in the short term. In the long term however, liberalization leads to increased employment and higher wages. Unfortunately, as John Maynard Keynes quipped, "In the long run we are all dead." We must consider the long-term lethal factors. We must make corrections. Only then can Taiwan's economy achieve a breakthrough.
Why are foreign investors not investing in Taiwan? Fiona Woolf, the Lord Mayor of London visited Taiwan on the 14th. She thinks Taiwan's financial regulations are too strict. Without good services and products, one cannot become an offshore RMB center. She recommended that the limitations be relaxed, especially for domestic, foreign, and international banks looking to provide investors with financial products and services. Therefore the first step must be liberalized financial services. These will eliminate the gap between domestic and foreign banking. They will enable domestic banking to achieve the same status as other financial centers. What was our government's response? Officials said our government has made many efforts at financial liberalization. Many regulations have been relaxed. The professional edition of Taiwan's debt review process has been simplified. Cross-strait economic and trade exchanges between the two sids are close. This makes Taiwan suitable for the development of regional RMB business. The government's response was deeply disappointing.
The merger of Taishin and CHB remains stalled. Newbridge Capital became frustrated and went home. Carlyle's acquisition of ASE failed. Orion Investments' acquisition of Yageo was rejected. Private equity funds cannot receive fair and equitable treatment at home. If funds are suspected of having originated on the Mainland, the Investment Commission begins a witch hunt to track down the source. Entrepreneurs are required to show passports or ID cards. They find this intolerable. Foreign investors have concluded that we simply do not know the rules of the game. Too many agencies wield too much discretionary authority. A Wall Street Journal article last year said that investors have difficulty withdrawing their investments from Taiwan. This factor alone has prevented many new investments from coming in. In response to criticisms, Taiwan regulators sometimes impose unnecessarily stringent requirements. Management on Taiwan is opaque. The rules are uncertain.
Our financial sector regulations also need review. As we all know, the review of new financial products often takes over six months, after which they are often rejected. Penalties for financial institutions are often a way to force them to limit or cease operations. Entrepreneurs feel like the late lamented goose that laid the golden egg. Currently bank deposit spreads are narrow. Yields are flat, and remain in a prolonged slump. The capital market remains unsound. It remains unfavorable to interest rates, insurance products, and annuities. Many hoped the "free trade zone pilot program" would include financial sector liberalization. But the central bank has issued its "three noes." Financial services will not be liberalized. One. They may not offer NTD denominated commodities. Two. Their derivatives may not be linked to Taiwan interest rates and exchange rates. Three. Their portfolios may not include NTD denominated commodities. Given such rules, how can businesses grow? They may as well invest in Hong Kong or Singapore. Why bother coming to Taiwan?
All of the above are manifestation of an unfree economy. They hinder Taiwan's progress. They are responsible for Taiwan's lost opportunities. We are glad the FSC and Ministry of Economic Affairs are taking action. But other ministries must make an effort as well. We live in the present. We cannot rest on our laurels. We cannot cling to outdated concepts of manangement. Taiwan's economy is suffocating. This did not happen overnight. What exactly is the problem? The answer is clear. How can we remedy the situation? How can we provide domestic industry with greater opportunities for growth? How can we renrew international and foreign investors confidence? These are all questions worth pondering.
社論－經濟自由度進步 外資為何不來
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中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月23日 04:09
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跟隨 @tw_chinatimes
美國傳統基金會公布2014年全球經濟自由度報告，港、星蟬聯前兩名，澳洲、瑞士、紐西蘭分別為三、四、五名。我國今年排名17，比去年進步3名。在欣喜之餘，在這些指標的背後，還有什麼值得政府參考的地方？
這份排行榜，行之有年，往往成為外商投資的重要參考。傳統基金會每年透過市場開放、法治水準、政府干預及監管效能等四大範疇，評估全球經濟體的自由程度；當中包括財產權、廉潔度、政府開支、財政、營商、勞工、貨幣、經貿、投資與金融等10項自由度的評比。在被評比的185個經濟體裡，倡議自由化最力的美國退步兩名居第12，英國第14，德國第18，日本25，南韓31，中國大陸137。台灣排名升至第17，是有史以來最好的排名，自馬總統上任以來已進步18名，顯示台灣在自由化已取得成效。
台灣在商業自由的分數為93.9分、自由貿易的得分為85.8分，但勞動自由、免於貪腐卻低於60分。這項自由度指數80分以上代表自由，70到80分代表大部分自由，60到70分大多數不自由，而60分以下代表不自由。我國整體分數為73.9分，排行第17名，與去年相比分數增加了1.2分。
傳統基金會的報告指出，台灣有適當的經濟自由程度，總分也高於全球和亞太地區其他國家的水準。整體自由度得分比去年提高，主要是金融與投資自由度有顯著改善，金融自由從去年第70升至41，投資自由從第56升至46，這與金管會、經濟部近一年努力推動自由化有關。
但是台灣自由度排名大幅進步，何以我國的招商引資仍成效不佳？以至於外人直接投資（FDI）近年在亞洲中幾乎敬陪末座，造成現在民眾沒有感覺，整體的悶經濟？新掛牌的國發會主委管中閔說，經商環境是否自由，企業感受強烈，短期內也許民眾感受不到，但長期而言，自由化最後一定會反映在就業機會與工資的成長上。但誠如凱因斯講的「長期而言，我們都死了」。我們還必須檢討長期來的致命因素，經過修正，才能讓台灣的經濟能有所突破。
為什麼外資不來台灣，倫敦金融城市長吳斐娜14日訪問台灣的話很有代表性。她認為台灣當前對金融法規限制還是過嚴，若沒有好的服務及產品，難以發展成人民幣離岸中心。她建議現在法規的限制要鬆綁。特別是想要為投資者提供金融商品及服務的境內銀行、境外及國際銀行，所以台灣的第一步是讓金融服務部分更自由化，來消除境內跟境外的鴻溝，達到跟其他金融中心一樣。對此我們官員的回應只有：台灣在金融自由化方面做了許多努力，許多法規多已鬆綁，專業版的寶島債審核流程已簡化；由於兩岸經貿往來密切，台灣適合發展區域性人民幣業務。這樣的回答，真是令人失望。
其實從台新彰銀的合併案迄今無解、新橋投資鎩羽而歸、凱雷收購日月光失敗到遨睿收購國巨的被駁回，私募基金在國內無法得到一個公平公正的對待。而投審會對於來台投資的資金，可能有大陸色彩，動不動就要追查資金來源，或要業者提供護照等身分證明，讓業者不堪其擾。外資普遍認為我們的遊戲規則不清楚，主管機關有太多的行政裁量權。《華爾街日報》去年底有篇文章指出投資者發現，他們難以從台灣成功退出投資，這一因素已經阻止新投資的進入；也藉此批評台灣監管機構有時會提出不必要的嚴格要求，台灣的管理是不透明、規則不確定。
另外，我們的主管機關對於金融業的管制，尤該檢討。眾所周知，對新金融商品的審查，不僅審核時間經常達半年以上，還常常打回票。對金融機構的處罰，也常是以限制或停止業務為手段，令業者覺得是殺雞取卵。而台灣目前銀行存放利差狹窄，收益曲線長期低迷且平躺，無法健全資本市場功能，不利利率、保險產品及年金財務規畫的業務發展。而之前寄望「自由經濟示範區」納入金融業，大幅開放。但央行提出「三不」原則，即開放之金融業務，一、不能涉新台幣計價商品；二、衍生性商品不以連結台灣利率及匯率為標的；三、投資組合不涉新台幣計價商品。加了這些條條框框，我們的業者如何發展？投資人在香港、新加坡做就好了，何必來台灣？
以上種種，在在都是經濟不自由的表現，阻礙台灣的進步，喪失台灣的機會。很高興看到金管會、經濟部已經動起來，但其他部會也需有更多的努力。在現在的時代，不能因為過去的榮耀，而延用舊思維來管理。台灣的悶經濟，不是一天造成的，問題出在哪裡？已很清楚。如何亡羊補牢，讓國內業者有更多的發展機會，讓國際外資重拾對台的信心，值得相關單位深思。
Tuesday, January 21, 2014
Two DPP Suns with a Difference
Two DPP Suns with a Difference
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 21, 2014
Summary: The Mainland economy is about to undergo transformation. The internationalization and liberalization of the renminbi is the key to successful transformation. Taiwan is promoting the liberalization of the NTD and financial liberalization. The results have been mixed. Lin Chuan and Hu Sheng-cheng are educated and have a wealth of practical experience. Beijing is very interested in meeting them. Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen and the delegates held a press conference. The newness of official DPP contacts with the Mainland was palpable. Those in attendance could not disguise the excitement in their faces. This sun is rising. The Kuomintang should beware.
Full text below:
On the 9th of this month the DPP China Affairs Committee issued its "2014 China Policy Review Minutes." Criticism was widespread. Critics felt the DPP failed to honestly confront the final obstacle standing in the way of a DPP return to power. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office criticized it as well. It said "it takes the same old Taiwan independence path," and "a dead end is still a dead end." During the conference Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly asked "Then what?" Afterwards, she quietly dispatched a group of aides on a secret visit to Beijing. Su Tseng-chang embarked on a European trip, and said he would deliver a DPP China Policy speech while in the United Kingdom. The two began a wrestling match over the party chairmanship election. They laid the groundwork for the 2016 presidential nomination. As the two camps' visits show, Tsai and Su are fighting over the final obstacle standing in the way of a DPP return to power. Each has made a different choice. Who made the right choice is obvious.
Su announced the "Review Minutes," then went on a radio talk show. He presented his "seagulls on the beach" and "China plus one" arguments. His so-called "seagulls on the beach" argument compares cross-strait relations to seagulls on the beach. Each goes his own way. Each is independent of the other. At most, they appreciate each other. His "China plus one" argument borrows from the "ASEAN plus 3" international convention. His cross-strait relations metaphors show that in his heart of hearts, Su thinks in terms of "one nation on each side." Given such attitudes, exchanges with the Mainland are impossible.
Frank Hsieh thinks Su Tseng-chang's "seagulls on a beach" argument is inappropriate. Does the Mainland want to "capture" Taiwan? Does the DPP want to communicate with the Mainland? Either way, contact cannot be avoided. Since it is impossible to avoid contacts, how can one argue that each will go his own way? Hsieh said he was puzzled by the "China plus one" argument. Instead of talking about "China plus one," why not talk about "Taiwan plus one?" Tsai Ing-wen expressed no objection to Su's argument. She said Su merely meant that "If Taiwan and China can respect each other, they can live in peace."
The Taiwan independence coloration in Su Tseng-chang's speech was unmistakable. Tsai Ing-wen was more ambiguous. On the one hand, she did not want to offend Taiwan independence fundamentalists. On the other hand, she wanted to remain pragmatic and flexible. Her statements regarding China policy are more of the same. She says cross-strait relations are complicated. If one wishes to debate them, one must first make comprehensive and precise advance plans. Some things are suitable for debate. Some things are not. Such is Tsai Ing-wen's style. Unclear statements and vague generalities. The two politicians exemplify the DPP's cross-strait policy dilemma.
We do more than listen to what they say. We also look at what they do. Su Tseng-chang has embarked on his European tour. Tsai Ing-wen has dispatched aides to Mainland China. Each has chosen a different path. Su Tseng-chang's visit to Europe is shrouded in mystery. Before his departure he disclosed nothing. The only part of his itinerary made public was his speech in the UK, at the Centre of Taiwan Studies at SOAS, University of London. He was accompanied by DPP Representative to the US Joseph Wu and Director of International Affaris Liu Shi-chung. Sure enough, he said the DPP would continue to "join the international community before approaching China" He said the DPP would continue its "democratic alliance" strategy. In other words, it would ally with Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and other Asian democracies to contain Mainland China. But this conflicts with cross-strait peaceful development. This is inconsistent with the bigger strategic picture between Beijing, Washington and the major powers. Instead it echoes Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Cold War mentality.
Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric remains vague. It maintains flexibility. Her actions meanwhile, reflect changed thinking. She has begun communicating directly with the Mainland. The experience of the last election taught her a lesson, that "joining the international community before approaching the Mainland" is not feasible. In 2012 Tsai Ing-wen aggressively distanced herself from Ma Ying-jeou's "joiningg iwth Mainland before joining the world" strategy. She visited Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines. She fired her opening shot at the very spot where Philippines President Corazon Aquino was inaugurated. But in the end, the final obstacle standing in the way of the DPP's return to power, remained cross-strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen remembers the lesson. This time her path has changed.
The roster of Tsai Ing-wen aides is long. They include Thinking Taiwan Foundation leader Lin Chuan, former National Security Council Deputy Secretary-General Chiang Chun-nan, former CEPD Hu Sheng-cheng, Vice Chairman Chang Ching-sen, former FSC chairman Shi Chun-chi, former MAC Vice Chairman Chiu Tai-san, former Comptroller Hsu Chang-yao, DPP legislator Hsiao Bi-khim, and Chai Chi-chang. It has all the earmarks of a shadow cabinet. It contrasts sharply with Su Tseng-chang's lineup. It reveals the increasing gap between the strength of the "two DPP suns." The pragmatists within the party now constitute the mainstream.
The main purpose of Lin Chuan's visit was to understand the Mainland economy. Lin visited think tanks, the National Bureau of Statistics, and other official institutions and private enterprises. Lin Chuan said the visit was the result of bilateral discussions. He said he looked forward to more exchanges. Tsai Ing-wen expressed hope that the trip would help Taiwan society.
The Mainland economy is about to undergo transformation. The internationalization and liberalization of the renminbi is the key to successful transformation. Taiwan is promoting the liberalization of the NTD and financial liberalization. The results have been mixed. Lin Chuan and Hu Sheng-cheng are educated and have a wealth of practical experience. Beijing is very interested in meeting them. Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen and the delegates held a press conference. The newness of official DPP contacts with the Mainland was palpable. Those in attendance could not disguise the excitement in their faces .
This sun is rising. The Kuomintang should beware.
社論－民進黨兩顆太陽 格局大不同
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月21日 04:09
民進黨中國事務委員會9日做出《2014對中政策檢討紀要》後，各界批評不斷，認為並沒有誠實面對執政最後一哩路問題，大陸國台辦也批評為「走台獨老路，死胡同就是死胡同」。蔡英文在會中提出連珠炮式的「然後呢」質疑，隨後悄悄派出核心幕僚群密訪北京，蘇貞昌同時展開歐洲行，預定在英國發表民進黨對中政策演說。兩個人揭開了黨主席選舉角力的帷幕，也為2016總統大選精心布局。從兩個陣營的出訪安排可以看出，蘇蔡拚民進黨最後一哩路，已經做出不同選擇，而且高下立判。
蘇貞昌《檢討紀要》發布後，曾經接受電台訪問，提出所謂「海灘之鷗」和「中國加1」的論述，所謂「海灘之鷗」，比喻兩岸關係如同人和海灘的鷗，各走各的，互不相干，頂多是彼此欣賞。而「中國加1」的說法就是借用「東協加3」的國際慣例，這樣的比喻充分說明蘇貞昌內心中的兩岸關係是「一邊一國」，在這樣的心態下想要和大陸打交道，基本上不存在可能性。
針對蘇貞昌的說法，謝長廷就認為「海灘之鷗」說不恰當，如果說大陸要「抓」台灣，或是民進黨想要與大陸交流，就不可能不接觸，既然要接觸就不可能兩不相干；而「中國加1」說，謝長廷表示不解，既要講「中國加1」，為何不講「台灣加1」？但是蔡英文沒有對蘇貞昌的說法表示反對，他認為蘇貞昌的意思就是「台灣跟中國如果能夠互相尊重，一定可以和平相處。」
在言語上，蘇貞昌台獨本質鮮明，蔡英文則表現得較為含糊，一方面不得罪基本教義派，另一方面也預留了較為務實彈性空間，就如同她對於中國政策辯論的表態一樣，她認為兩岸關係很複雜，如果要辦辯論必須作完整而精密的規畫，有些事適合辯論，有些事不適合。不清楚表態，含糊籠統，展現了蔡氏風格，也說明民進黨處理兩岸關係的兩難。
我們不僅察其言，更要觀其行。蘇貞昌展開歐洲之行，蔡英文派出核心幕僚訪大陸，兩人選擇了不同的道路。蘇貞昌訪歐行程非常神祕，出發前並未多所透露，唯一公開行程是在英國亞非學院台灣研究中心演講，隨行的有民進黨駐美代表吳釗燮和國際事務部主任劉世忠。無可避免的，他將繼續強調民進黨「結合國際走向中國」的「民主同盟」策略，也就是和美、日、韓等亞洲民主國家結盟，對中國進行圍堵，不過這根本不符合兩岸當前和平發展的大勢，也不符合美中倡議的新型大國關係的大局，不過是呼應日本安倍的冷戰思維。
蔡英文在言語上保持模糊、保留彈性，行動上卻已經改變了過去的思維，開始和大陸進行直接的溝通，畢竟上次大選的經驗告訴她，從「全球走向大陸」的路徑是行不通的。2012年蔡英文積極和馬英九「從大陸走向全球」的策略做區隔，她從歐洲德國到英國再到菲律賓，在菲律賓女總統柯拉蓉宣示就職的地方鳴槍起跑，但是最後證明，民進黨的最後一哩路還是差在兩岸關係。蔡英文記取了教訓，這次改變路徑了。
蔡英文幕僚團陣容龐大，以小英基金會執行長林全領軍，包括前國安會副祕書長江春男、前經建會主委胡勝正、副主委張景森、前金管會主委施俊吉、前陸委會副主委邱太三、前主計長許璋瑤、立委蕭美琴、蔡其昌等人，呈現了影子內閣的氣勢，和蘇貞昌出訪陣容形成了強烈的對比，不但說明了民進黨「兩個太陽」強弱態勢逐漸明朗，黨內務實派也已占據主流地位。
林全一行主要目的是了解中國經濟，除了與智庫交流外，也參訪了國家統計局等官方機構及民間企業。林全表示，行程是雙方討論出來的，期待未來能有更多的交流。蔡英文也表示希望這次的旅程對台灣社會有幫助。
中國經濟正要轉型，人民幣的國際化與自由化是轉型成敗的關鍵，台灣在推動新台幣自由化與金融開放過程中，留下許多正面與負面經驗，林全、胡勝正等人學養與實務經驗都很豐富，是大陸非常有興趣接觸的人。從昨天蔡英文和出訪人員的記者會中，可以感受到民進黨正式接觸大陸之後的新鮮感，也不掩他們臉上的興奮之情。
這顆上升的太陽，國民黨該警惕了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 21, 2014
Summary: The Mainland economy is about to undergo transformation. The internationalization and liberalization of the renminbi is the key to successful transformation. Taiwan is promoting the liberalization of the NTD and financial liberalization. The results have been mixed. Lin Chuan and Hu Sheng-cheng are educated and have a wealth of practical experience. Beijing is very interested in meeting them. Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen and the delegates held a press conference. The newness of official DPP contacts with the Mainland was palpable. Those in attendance could not disguise the excitement in their faces. This sun is rising. The Kuomintang should beware.
Full text below:
On the 9th of this month the DPP China Affairs Committee issued its "2014 China Policy Review Minutes." Criticism was widespread. Critics felt the DPP failed to honestly confront the final obstacle standing in the way of a DPP return to power. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office criticized it as well. It said "it takes the same old Taiwan independence path," and "a dead end is still a dead end." During the conference Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly asked "Then what?" Afterwards, she quietly dispatched a group of aides on a secret visit to Beijing. Su Tseng-chang embarked on a European trip, and said he would deliver a DPP China Policy speech while in the United Kingdom. The two began a wrestling match over the party chairmanship election. They laid the groundwork for the 2016 presidential nomination. As the two camps' visits show, Tsai and Su are fighting over the final obstacle standing in the way of a DPP return to power. Each has made a different choice. Who made the right choice is obvious.
Su announced the "Review Minutes," then went on a radio talk show. He presented his "seagulls on the beach" and "China plus one" arguments. His so-called "seagulls on the beach" argument compares cross-strait relations to seagulls on the beach. Each goes his own way. Each is independent of the other. At most, they appreciate each other. His "China plus one" argument borrows from the "ASEAN plus 3" international convention. His cross-strait relations metaphors show that in his heart of hearts, Su thinks in terms of "one nation on each side." Given such attitudes, exchanges with the Mainland are impossible.
Frank Hsieh thinks Su Tseng-chang's "seagulls on a beach" argument is inappropriate. Does the Mainland want to "capture" Taiwan? Does the DPP want to communicate with the Mainland? Either way, contact cannot be avoided. Since it is impossible to avoid contacts, how can one argue that each will go his own way? Hsieh said he was puzzled by the "China plus one" argument. Instead of talking about "China plus one," why not talk about "Taiwan plus one?" Tsai Ing-wen expressed no objection to Su's argument. She said Su merely meant that "If Taiwan and China can respect each other, they can live in peace."
The Taiwan independence coloration in Su Tseng-chang's speech was unmistakable. Tsai Ing-wen was more ambiguous. On the one hand, she did not want to offend Taiwan independence fundamentalists. On the other hand, she wanted to remain pragmatic and flexible. Her statements regarding China policy are more of the same. She says cross-strait relations are complicated. If one wishes to debate them, one must first make comprehensive and precise advance plans. Some things are suitable for debate. Some things are not. Such is Tsai Ing-wen's style. Unclear statements and vague generalities. The two politicians exemplify the DPP's cross-strait policy dilemma.
We do more than listen to what they say. We also look at what they do. Su Tseng-chang has embarked on his European tour. Tsai Ing-wen has dispatched aides to Mainland China. Each has chosen a different path. Su Tseng-chang's visit to Europe is shrouded in mystery. Before his departure he disclosed nothing. The only part of his itinerary made public was his speech in the UK, at the Centre of Taiwan Studies at SOAS, University of London. He was accompanied by DPP Representative to the US Joseph Wu and Director of International Affaris Liu Shi-chung. Sure enough, he said the DPP would continue to "join the international community before approaching China" He said the DPP would continue its "democratic alliance" strategy. In other words, it would ally with Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and other Asian democracies to contain Mainland China. But this conflicts with cross-strait peaceful development. This is inconsistent with the bigger strategic picture between Beijing, Washington and the major powers. Instead it echoes Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Cold War mentality.
Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric remains vague. It maintains flexibility. Her actions meanwhile, reflect changed thinking. She has begun communicating directly with the Mainland. The experience of the last election taught her a lesson, that "joining the international community before approaching the Mainland" is not feasible. In 2012 Tsai Ing-wen aggressively distanced herself from Ma Ying-jeou's "joiningg iwth Mainland before joining the world" strategy. She visited Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines. She fired her opening shot at the very spot where Philippines President Corazon Aquino was inaugurated. But in the end, the final obstacle standing in the way of the DPP's return to power, remained cross-strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen remembers the lesson. This time her path has changed.
The roster of Tsai Ing-wen aides is long. They include Thinking Taiwan Foundation leader Lin Chuan, former National Security Council Deputy Secretary-General Chiang Chun-nan, former CEPD Hu Sheng-cheng, Vice Chairman Chang Ching-sen, former FSC chairman Shi Chun-chi, former MAC Vice Chairman Chiu Tai-san, former Comptroller Hsu Chang-yao, DPP legislator Hsiao Bi-khim, and Chai Chi-chang. It has all the earmarks of a shadow cabinet. It contrasts sharply with Su Tseng-chang's lineup. It reveals the increasing gap between the strength of the "two DPP suns." The pragmatists within the party now constitute the mainstream.
The main purpose of Lin Chuan's visit was to understand the Mainland economy. Lin visited think tanks, the National Bureau of Statistics, and other official institutions and private enterprises. Lin Chuan said the visit was the result of bilateral discussions. He said he looked forward to more exchanges. Tsai Ing-wen expressed hope that the trip would help Taiwan society.
The Mainland economy is about to undergo transformation. The internationalization and liberalization of the renminbi is the key to successful transformation. Taiwan is promoting the liberalization of the NTD and financial liberalization. The results have been mixed. Lin Chuan and Hu Sheng-cheng are educated and have a wealth of practical experience. Beijing is very interested in meeting them. Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen and the delegates held a press conference. The newness of official DPP contacts with the Mainland was palpable. Those in attendance could not disguise the excitement in their faces .
This sun is rising. The Kuomintang should beware.
社論－民進黨兩顆太陽 格局大不同
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月21日 04:09
民進黨中國事務委員會9日做出《2014對中政策檢討紀要》後，各界批評不斷，認為並沒有誠實面對執政最後一哩路問題，大陸國台辦也批評為「走台獨老路，死胡同就是死胡同」。蔡英文在會中提出連珠炮式的「然後呢」質疑，隨後悄悄派出核心幕僚群密訪北京，蘇貞昌同時展開歐洲行，預定在英國發表民進黨對中政策演說。兩個人揭開了黨主席選舉角力的帷幕，也為2016總統大選精心布局。從兩個陣營的出訪安排可以看出，蘇蔡拚民進黨最後一哩路，已經做出不同選擇，而且高下立判。
蘇貞昌《檢討紀要》發布後，曾經接受電台訪問，提出所謂「海灘之鷗」和「中國加1」的論述，所謂「海灘之鷗」，比喻兩岸關係如同人和海灘的鷗，各走各的，互不相干，頂多是彼此欣賞。而「中國加1」的說法就是借用「東協加3」的國際慣例，這樣的比喻充分說明蘇貞昌內心中的兩岸關係是「一邊一國」，在這樣的心態下想要和大陸打交道，基本上不存在可能性。
針對蘇貞昌的說法，謝長廷就認為「海灘之鷗」說不恰當，如果說大陸要「抓」台灣，或是民進黨想要與大陸交流，就不可能不接觸，既然要接觸就不可能兩不相干；而「中國加1」說，謝長廷表示不解，既要講「中國加1」，為何不講「台灣加1」？但是蔡英文沒有對蘇貞昌的說法表示反對，他認為蘇貞昌的意思就是「台灣跟中國如果能夠互相尊重，一定可以和平相處。」
在言語上，蘇貞昌台獨本質鮮明，蔡英文則表現得較為含糊，一方面不得罪基本教義派，另一方面也預留了較為務實彈性空間，就如同她對於中國政策辯論的表態一樣，她認為兩岸關係很複雜，如果要辦辯論必須作完整而精密的規畫，有些事適合辯論，有些事不適合。不清楚表態，含糊籠統，展現了蔡氏風格，也說明民進黨處理兩岸關係的兩難。
我們不僅察其言，更要觀其行。蘇貞昌展開歐洲之行，蔡英文派出核心幕僚訪大陸，兩人選擇了不同的道路。蘇貞昌訪歐行程非常神祕，出發前並未多所透露，唯一公開行程是在英國亞非學院台灣研究中心演講，隨行的有民進黨駐美代表吳釗燮和國際事務部主任劉世忠。無可避免的，他將繼續強調民進黨「結合國際走向中國」的「民主同盟」策略，也就是和美、日、韓等亞洲民主國家結盟，對中國進行圍堵，不過這根本不符合兩岸當前和平發展的大勢，也不符合美中倡議的新型大國關係的大局，不過是呼應日本安倍的冷戰思維。
蔡英文在言語上保持模糊、保留彈性，行動上卻已經改變了過去的思維，開始和大陸進行直接的溝通，畢竟上次大選的經驗告訴她，從「全球走向大陸」的路徑是行不通的。2012年蔡英文積極和馬英九「從大陸走向全球」的策略做區隔，她從歐洲德國到英國再到菲律賓，在菲律賓女總統柯拉蓉宣示就職的地方鳴槍起跑，但是最後證明，民進黨的最後一哩路還是差在兩岸關係。蔡英文記取了教訓，這次改變路徑了。
蔡英文幕僚團陣容龐大，以小英基金會執行長林全領軍，包括前國安會副祕書長江春男、前經建會主委胡勝正、副主委張景森、前金管會主委施俊吉、前陸委會副主委邱太三、前主計長許璋瑤、立委蕭美琴、蔡其昌等人，呈現了影子內閣的氣勢，和蘇貞昌出訪陣容形成了強烈的對比，不但說明了民進黨「兩個太陽」強弱態勢逐漸明朗，黨內務實派也已占據主流地位。
林全一行主要目的是了解中國經濟，除了與智庫交流外，也參訪了國家統計局等官方機構及民間企業。林全表示，行程是雙方討論出來的，期待未來能有更多的交流。蔡英文也表示希望這次的旅程對台灣社會有幫助。
中國經濟正要轉型，人民幣的國際化與自由化是轉型成敗的關鍵，台灣在推動新台幣自由化與金融開放過程中，留下許多正面與負面經驗，林全、胡勝正等人學養與實務經驗都很豐富，是大陸非常有興趣接觸的人。從昨天蔡英文和出訪人員的記者會中，可以感受到民進黨正式接觸大陸之後的新鮮感，也不掩他們臉上的興奮之情。
這顆上升的太陽，國民黨該警惕了。
Monday, January 20, 2014
Tsai Ing-wen: Outside Official Channels and Inside the Black Box
Tsai Ing-wen: Outside Official Channels and Inside the Black Box
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 21, 2014
Summary: The Thinking Taiwan Foundation sneaked into the Mainland under the radar. Its actions were exposed. Meanwhile, Su Tseng-chang was visiting Europe, to promote his "China Policy." Beijing referred to it as the "same old Taiwan independence." But this was no joke. It is a tragedy for Taiwan, one that could well become a disaster.
Full text below:
The "Thinking Taiwan Foundation" has arrived on the Mainland for a visit. Frank Hsieh is clinging to his "constitutional consensus." Su Tseng-chang is in Europe, ostensibly to promote his "[Mainland] China Policy."
This reveals the three way power struggle inside the DPP, among Su, Tsai, and Hsieh. One. The three are vying for the party chairmanship and the 2016 presidential nomination. Two. The three seek to be the standard bearer for DPP cross-strait policy, because this will improve their prospects for the aforementioned two positions of power. Three. The three seek to be the one who reestablishes relations with Beijing. Beijing has the power to decide which of the three will be the DPP's standard-bearer for cross-strait policy. Beiing has the power to decide which of the three will reform the DPP. Therefore Beijing has the power to influence the two elections. DPP cross-strait policy reform is linked to the party chairmanship and presidential nomination. It is also linked to the restoration of relations with Beijing. It has already precipitated a DPP power struggle and a crisis over the DPP's policy path, and may precipitate a crisis for Taiwan.
Any DPP cross-strait policy reform must receive Beijing's understanding and acceptance. If Beijing casually notes that the DPP is engaged in the "same old Taiwan independence" or "Taiwan independence under a new label," it will "game over" for the DPP. If Beijing refuses to give the DPP's cross-strait policy the nod, Washington will conclude that the DPP is still a " troublemaker." This will undermine the DPP's party chairmanship election and its presidential primaries. This is why when the "China Policy Minutes" ran into a brick wall, Su Tseng-chang quickly added that the "Taiwan independence party platform was part of history, but is now past tense." He also invoked the term "China plus one." This of course was a nod to Beijing. It was a show of peace, a show of goodwill, and a show of weakness. Tsai Ing-wen however, turned out to be a shrewd chess hand. She used her "Thinking Taiwan Foundation" as cover. Foundation head Lin Chuan led a delegation on a five day, four night tour of the Mainland. This revealed that channels of communication between Tsai and Beijing were a fait accompli. The two parties already had a hotline and had exchanged emissaries. That went without saying. Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing were already in communications. This fact could impact Frank Hsieh. Since Tsai already has a direct line to Beijing, therefore she has no need of Hsieh as a go between.
The evolving situation has two implications for cross-strait exchanges. . The first is that they involve exchanges outside official channels. The second is that they involve black box operations. First, consider what takes place outside official channels. The power struggle among Su, Tsai, and Hsieh has made it impossible for the DPP to reform its cross-strait policy inside official channels.
Tsai and Hsieh joined forces at the Huashan Conference. They downgraded the "summary report " to the status of "conference minutes." They changed the "constitutional consensus" to "aggressive consolidation of an internal Taiwan consensus." In other words, they conceded that the DPP had no consensus. One thing is forbidden. These cross-strait policies may not become official policy. Only when official channels fail, are Tsai and Hsieh permitted to become standard bearers for cross-strait policy "outside official channels." During the Huashan Conference Tsai Ing-wen downgraded the "summary report" to the status of "conference minutes." Meanwhile, Lin Chuan was packing his bags to visit Beijing, bring them gifts, and wish them well.
The DPP uses non-official channels to divide official DPP policy. It uses the result, a divided Democratic Progressive Party, to deal with Beijing. Su, Tsai, and Hsieh have each submitted their own cross-strait policies to Beijing for approval. It is akin to an auction, and may create a worrisome "buyer's market" for Beijing.
Now let us return to "black box operations." In October 2012, Frank Hsieh's "exploratory visit" to the Mainland was nominally transparent. Lin Chuan's visit to the Mainland however, was "under the radar." News of it was leaked, probably by Beijing. Otherwise, it might rightly have been characterized as a "secret mission" kept hidden from the public. Two legislators accompanied the delegation and reported to the party. Yet DPP leaders insist they "only learned of it from news reports on the Internet." In other words, the visit was a "black box operation."
Why was the visit hidden? Should it have been hidden? What was being hidden? Tsai Ing-wen's black box operations, conducted outside official channels, have seriously undermined public trust. Annette Lu has already come forward and said, "It should have been transparent. It should have been announced before hand." DPP cross-strait policy has become an election ploy that DPP presidential candidates use to cope with Beijing. Under the circumstances, how can they win the public trust?
This is an extremely dangerous situation. It could lead to the DPP's collapse. It could mire Taiwan in black box operations. Tsai Ing-wen said the trip was merely an "exchange of views on fiscal policy" without political implications. Is such a disclaimer even the least bit credible? The circumstances surrounding the trip were highly political. They proved that Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing have already established a black box operations outside of official channels. Now back up. Suppose the trip was as Tsai Ing-wen insisted, merely about "fiscal matters?" Lest we forget, Tsai Ing-wen originally demanded "globalization that circumvents [Mainland] China." She advocated "connecting with the world before connecting with [Mainland] China." Has she changed her position on this and other economic strategies? How does she view the trade in services agreement, which is currently on life support?
Su, Tsai, and Hsieh should work within official DPP channels. They should work together and call for cross-strait policy reform. They should present a united front to Beijing. In particular, they must not condone individual members engaging in "black box deals" with Beijing "outside of official channels," while depicting themselves as the DPP's cross-strait policy standard bearers.
The Thinking Taiwan Foundation sneaked into the Mainland under the radar. Its actions were exposed. Meanwhile, Su Tseng-chang was visiting Europe, to promote his "China Policy." Beijing referred to it as the "same old Taiwan independence." But this was no joke. It is a tragedy for Taiwan, one that could well become a disaster.
小英登陸的體制外與黑箱內
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.21 02:34 am
小英基金會登陸訪問，謝長廷抱著他的「憲法共識」，蘇貞昌赴歐據稱是為宣傳「對中政策」。
此情此景，暴露了民進黨內蘇蔡謝三人的分裂與爭奪：一、三人爭奪五月黨主席與二○一六總統候選人；二、三人爭奪兩岸政策的掌旗者地位，因為此一地位與上開兩項選舉有關；三、三人爭奪與北京重建關係，因為北京可以決定誰能在民進黨內擔任兩岸政策的轉型旗手，並進而影響那兩項選舉。這些跡象顯示，民進黨兩岸政策的變革已與黨主席及總統候選人選舉掛鉤，又與重建與北京的關係掛鉤。勢若趨此，可謂已然引爆民進黨內權力及路線交纏鬥爭的危機，亦可能引爆台灣的危機。
民進黨兩岸政策的轉型，必須得到北京的理解與認可；因為，北京只要隨口一句「台獨老鞋」或「換了路牌的台獨」，民進黨的戲就唱不下去了。而北京若不點頭，美國就會覺得民進黨是「麻煩製造者」，也就會影響到民進黨兩項選舉的選情。因此，蘇貞昌在《對中政策紀要》碰壁後，補上一句「《台獨黨綱》在歷史進程已成過去式」及「中國加一」，當然是向北京示和、示好、示弱。沒想到，蔡英文棋高一著，居然以小英基金會的正式名義，由林全率團登陸訪問了五天四夜；此行顯示，蔡與北京的管道已經布建完成，雙方已有熱線密使的往來，皆不待言。而蔡英文與北京搭上線，即可能影響了謝長廷的角色；因為，蔡既已有直達車，即未必要再借用謝為白手套。
此一情勢的發展有兩大特徵。一是體制外，二是黑箱內。先談「體制外」，亦即由於蘇蔡謝三人的權力鬥爭，使得民進黨無法在黨的「體制內」完成兩岸政策的轉型；蔡謝二人合力將華山會議的「總結報告」降格為「紀要」，又將「憲法共識」改為「積極凝聚台灣內部的共識」（亦即「沒有共識」），就是不容在「體制內」作成兩岸決策之用意。而唯有當「體制內」不能做出決策時，蔡謝才有可能從「體制外」成為兩岸政策轉型的旗手。當蔡英文將華山的「總結報告」降格為「紀要」之時，正是林全一行盤點進京拜會禮品，準備打包上路之時。
這個情勢，是以「體制外」的民進黨，去分裂「體制內」的民進黨，再進而以分裂的民進黨去應對團結的北京。至此，蘇蔡謝三方，分別提出其兩岸政策，呈交北京評點，這儼然是一競價競標的局面，可能成就北京的買方市場，令人心憂。
再言「黑箱內」。二○一二年十月，謝長廷登陸的「開展之旅」，尚稱公開透明。但林全一行卻是「潛赴」大陸，若非消息走漏（可能是由北京方面漏出？），此團即可能成為一個偷偷摸摸的「密使團」。且非但對公眾不公開，甚至除二名隨行立委曾向黨報備外，黨中央似亦是「看網路新聞才知道」。此即「黑箱化」。
然而，此事為什麼隱瞞？應不應隱瞞？還隱瞞了什麼？蔡英文將此行操作成「體制外／黑箱內」，對其社會信任恐成重傷；呂秀蓮就已出面表示，「應當透明，最好出門前對外宣布」。因為，倘若民進黨的兩岸政策成了總統候選人與北京套招的選舉手法，如何能贏得國人的信任？
這是一個十分危疑凶險的情勢。非但可能造成民進黨體制瓦解的危機，亦且可能造成台灣陷於黑箱內的危機。蔡英文方面稱，此行只是「財經議題交流」，不涉政治議題；這種說詞，孰其能信？因為，此行的整個態勢本即是高度的政治動作，證實了蔡英文與北京已達成「體制外／黑箱內」的交涉管道。退一步言，即使是「財經議題」，蔡英文亦當說明，此行之後，她對她原本所持「繞開中國的全球化」「由世界走向中國」等經濟戰略有否調整？她又對躺在加護病房的《服貿協議》作何看法？
我們認為，蘇蔡謝三人仍應努力在民進黨的體制內，攜手提出一個兩岸政策轉型方案，在團結一致下共同因應北京；尤不可縱容姑息個別黨員，以「體制外／黑箱內」的手法與北京交易，而將自己塑造為民進黨兩岸政策的掌旗人。
正當小英基金會潛赴大陸的消息被揭爆之時，蘇貞昌居然赴歐據稱要宣揚他被北京指為「台獨老鞋」的「對中政策」。這不是笑話，而是悲劇，更可能是台灣的災禍。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 21, 2014
Summary: The Thinking Taiwan Foundation sneaked into the Mainland under the radar. Its actions were exposed. Meanwhile, Su Tseng-chang was visiting Europe, to promote his "China Policy." Beijing referred to it as the "same old Taiwan independence." But this was no joke. It is a tragedy for Taiwan, one that could well become a disaster.
Full text below:
The "Thinking Taiwan Foundation" has arrived on the Mainland for a visit. Frank Hsieh is clinging to his "constitutional consensus." Su Tseng-chang is in Europe, ostensibly to promote his "[Mainland] China Policy."
This reveals the three way power struggle inside the DPP, among Su, Tsai, and Hsieh. One. The three are vying for the party chairmanship and the 2016 presidential nomination. Two. The three seek to be the standard bearer for DPP cross-strait policy, because this will improve their prospects for the aforementioned two positions of power. Three. The three seek to be the one who reestablishes relations with Beijing. Beijing has the power to decide which of the three will be the DPP's standard-bearer for cross-strait policy. Beiing has the power to decide which of the three will reform the DPP. Therefore Beijing has the power to influence the two elections. DPP cross-strait policy reform is linked to the party chairmanship and presidential nomination. It is also linked to the restoration of relations with Beijing. It has already precipitated a DPP power struggle and a crisis over the DPP's policy path, and may precipitate a crisis for Taiwan.
Any DPP cross-strait policy reform must receive Beijing's understanding and acceptance. If Beijing casually notes that the DPP is engaged in the "same old Taiwan independence" or "Taiwan independence under a new label," it will "game over" for the DPP. If Beijing refuses to give the DPP's cross-strait policy the nod, Washington will conclude that the DPP is still a " troublemaker." This will undermine the DPP's party chairmanship election and its presidential primaries. This is why when the "China Policy Minutes" ran into a brick wall, Su Tseng-chang quickly added that the "Taiwan independence party platform was part of history, but is now past tense." He also invoked the term "China plus one." This of course was a nod to Beijing. It was a show of peace, a show of goodwill, and a show of weakness. Tsai Ing-wen however, turned out to be a shrewd chess hand. She used her "Thinking Taiwan Foundation" as cover. Foundation head Lin Chuan led a delegation on a five day, four night tour of the Mainland. This revealed that channels of communication between Tsai and Beijing were a fait accompli. The two parties already had a hotline and had exchanged emissaries. That went without saying. Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing were already in communications. This fact could impact Frank Hsieh. Since Tsai already has a direct line to Beijing, therefore she has no need of Hsieh as a go between.
The evolving situation has two implications for cross-strait exchanges. . The first is that they involve exchanges outside official channels. The second is that they involve black box operations. First, consider what takes place outside official channels. The power struggle among Su, Tsai, and Hsieh has made it impossible for the DPP to reform its cross-strait policy inside official channels.
Tsai and Hsieh joined forces at the Huashan Conference. They downgraded the "summary report " to the status of "conference minutes." They changed the "constitutional consensus" to "aggressive consolidation of an internal Taiwan consensus." In other words, they conceded that the DPP had no consensus. One thing is forbidden. These cross-strait policies may not become official policy. Only when official channels fail, are Tsai and Hsieh permitted to become standard bearers for cross-strait policy "outside official channels." During the Huashan Conference Tsai Ing-wen downgraded the "summary report" to the status of "conference minutes." Meanwhile, Lin Chuan was packing his bags to visit Beijing, bring them gifts, and wish them well.
The DPP uses non-official channels to divide official DPP policy. It uses the result, a divided Democratic Progressive Party, to deal with Beijing. Su, Tsai, and Hsieh have each submitted their own cross-strait policies to Beijing for approval. It is akin to an auction, and may create a worrisome "buyer's market" for Beijing.
Now let us return to "black box operations." In October 2012, Frank Hsieh's "exploratory visit" to the Mainland was nominally transparent. Lin Chuan's visit to the Mainland however, was "under the radar." News of it was leaked, probably by Beijing. Otherwise, it might rightly have been characterized as a "secret mission" kept hidden from the public. Two legislators accompanied the delegation and reported to the party. Yet DPP leaders insist they "only learned of it from news reports on the Internet." In other words, the visit was a "black box operation."
Why was the visit hidden? Should it have been hidden? What was being hidden? Tsai Ing-wen's black box operations, conducted outside official channels, have seriously undermined public trust. Annette Lu has already come forward and said, "It should have been transparent. It should have been announced before hand." DPP cross-strait policy has become an election ploy that DPP presidential candidates use to cope with Beijing. Under the circumstances, how can they win the public trust?
This is an extremely dangerous situation. It could lead to the DPP's collapse. It could mire Taiwan in black box operations. Tsai Ing-wen said the trip was merely an "exchange of views on fiscal policy" without political implications. Is such a disclaimer even the least bit credible? The circumstances surrounding the trip were highly political. They proved that Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing have already established a black box operations outside of official channels. Now back up. Suppose the trip was as Tsai Ing-wen insisted, merely about "fiscal matters?" Lest we forget, Tsai Ing-wen originally demanded "globalization that circumvents [Mainland] China." She advocated "connecting with the world before connecting with [Mainland] China." Has she changed her position on this and other economic strategies? How does she view the trade in services agreement, which is currently on life support?
Su, Tsai, and Hsieh should work within official DPP channels. They should work together and call for cross-strait policy reform. They should present a united front to Beijing. In particular, they must not condone individual members engaging in "black box deals" with Beijing "outside of official channels," while depicting themselves as the DPP's cross-strait policy standard bearers.
The Thinking Taiwan Foundation sneaked into the Mainland under the radar. Its actions were exposed. Meanwhile, Su Tseng-chang was visiting Europe, to promote his "China Policy." Beijing referred to it as the "same old Taiwan independence." But this was no joke. It is a tragedy for Taiwan, one that could well become a disaster.
小英登陸的體制外與黑箱內
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.21 02:34 am
小英基金會登陸訪問，謝長廷抱著他的「憲法共識」，蘇貞昌赴歐據稱是為宣傳「對中政策」。
此情此景，暴露了民進黨內蘇蔡謝三人的分裂與爭奪：一、三人爭奪五月黨主席與二○一六總統候選人；二、三人爭奪兩岸政策的掌旗者地位，因為此一地位與上開兩項選舉有關；三、三人爭奪與北京重建關係，因為北京可以決定誰能在民進黨內擔任兩岸政策的轉型旗手，並進而影響那兩項選舉。這些跡象顯示，民進黨兩岸政策的變革已與黨主席及總統候選人選舉掛鉤，又與重建與北京的關係掛鉤。勢若趨此，可謂已然引爆民進黨內權力及路線交纏鬥爭的危機，亦可能引爆台灣的危機。
民進黨兩岸政策的轉型，必須得到北京的理解與認可；因為，北京只要隨口一句「台獨老鞋」或「換了路牌的台獨」，民進黨的戲就唱不下去了。而北京若不點頭，美國就會覺得民進黨是「麻煩製造者」，也就會影響到民進黨兩項選舉的選情。因此，蘇貞昌在《對中政策紀要》碰壁後，補上一句「《台獨黨綱》在歷史進程已成過去式」及「中國加一」，當然是向北京示和、示好、示弱。沒想到，蔡英文棋高一著，居然以小英基金會的正式名義，由林全率團登陸訪問了五天四夜；此行顯示，蔡與北京的管道已經布建完成，雙方已有熱線密使的往來，皆不待言。而蔡英文與北京搭上線，即可能影響了謝長廷的角色；因為，蔡既已有直達車，即未必要再借用謝為白手套。
此一情勢的發展有兩大特徵。一是體制外，二是黑箱內。先談「體制外」，亦即由於蘇蔡謝三人的權力鬥爭，使得民進黨無法在黨的「體制內」完成兩岸政策的轉型；蔡謝二人合力將華山會議的「總結報告」降格為「紀要」，又將「憲法共識」改為「積極凝聚台灣內部的共識」（亦即「沒有共識」），就是不容在「體制內」作成兩岸決策之用意。而唯有當「體制內」不能做出決策時，蔡謝才有可能從「體制外」成為兩岸政策轉型的旗手。當蔡英文將華山的「總結報告」降格為「紀要」之時，正是林全一行盤點進京拜會禮品，準備打包上路之時。
這個情勢，是以「體制外」的民進黨，去分裂「體制內」的民進黨，再進而以分裂的民進黨去應對團結的北京。至此，蘇蔡謝三方，分別提出其兩岸政策，呈交北京評點，這儼然是一競價競標的局面，可能成就北京的買方市場，令人心憂。
再言「黑箱內」。二○一二年十月，謝長廷登陸的「開展之旅」，尚稱公開透明。但林全一行卻是「潛赴」大陸，若非消息走漏（可能是由北京方面漏出？），此團即可能成為一個偷偷摸摸的「密使團」。且非但對公眾不公開，甚至除二名隨行立委曾向黨報備外，黨中央似亦是「看網路新聞才知道」。此即「黑箱化」。
然而，此事為什麼隱瞞？應不應隱瞞？還隱瞞了什麼？蔡英文將此行操作成「體制外／黑箱內」，對其社會信任恐成重傷；呂秀蓮就已出面表示，「應當透明，最好出門前對外宣布」。因為，倘若民進黨的兩岸政策成了總統候選人與北京套招的選舉手法，如何能贏得國人的信任？
這是一個十分危疑凶險的情勢。非但可能造成民進黨體制瓦解的危機，亦且可能造成台灣陷於黑箱內的危機。蔡英文方面稱，此行只是「財經議題交流」，不涉政治議題；這種說詞，孰其能信？因為，此行的整個態勢本即是高度的政治動作，證實了蔡英文與北京已達成「體制外／黑箱內」的交涉管道。退一步言，即使是「財經議題」，蔡英文亦當說明，此行之後，她對她原本所持「繞開中國的全球化」「由世界走向中國」等經濟戰略有否調整？她又對躺在加護病房的《服貿協議》作何看法？
我們認為，蘇蔡謝三人仍應努力在民進黨的體制內，攜手提出一個兩岸政策轉型方案，在團結一致下共同因應北京；尤不可縱容姑息個別黨員，以「體制外／黑箱內」的手法與北京交易，而將自己塑造為民進黨兩岸政策的掌旗人。
正當小英基金會潛赴大陸的消息被揭爆之時，蘇貞昌居然赴歐據稱要宣揚他被北京指為「台獨老鞋」的「對中政策」。這不是笑話，而是悲劇，更可能是台灣的災禍。
Sunday, January 19, 2014
DPP: Beware the Specter of Corruption
DPP: Beware the Specter of Corruption
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 19, 2014
Summary: One need not talk about fairness and justice. Democratic Progressive Party comrades must first learn to confront their comrades' scandals. They must accept the same standards for criminal justice as ordinary people. Only then will they be eligible to return to power.
Full text below:
Transportation Minister Kuo Yao-chi has been sentenced to eight years for corruption. Nevertheless DPP leaders spin his conviction as "political persecution." Apologists for Kuo include the "two suns" Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, Taipei mayoral candidate Wen-Je Ko, and most members of the DPP legislative caucus. All have stood behind Kuo Yao-chi from the outset. Kuo Yao-chi may be locked up. But controversy rages on.
This scenario is nothing new. In recent years, every time a prominent DPP politician becomes mired in scandal, the DPP enacts the same charade. Yunlin County Chief Su Chih-fen and Chiayi County Chief Chang Hua-kuan are under indictment for corruption. Former TSC chairman Wu Nai-jen and former legislator Hong Chi-chang have been convicted of corruption in the TSC land purchase scandal. DPP legislative caucus leader Ker Chien-ming has been charged with influence peddling within the criminal justice system. Every time an investigation goes forward, or the court announces a verdict, the DPP dismisses the case as political persecution, and condemns it as a miscarriages of justice.
In all fairness, not all the scandals that the DPP repudiate are the same, in nature or content. Some warrant different conclusions. Others are clear cases of lawlessness. Take the TSC land purchase scandal. Legislators used "serving constituents" as a pretext to open the doors of state owned enterprises to political "sugar daddies." Take the Kuo Yao-chi bribery scandal. Read the wiretap transcripts, the perpetrators' testimony, and the minutes of internal meetings. They clearly point to government-business collusion. Take the Ker Chien-ming and Wang Jin-pyng's influence peddling within the criminal justice system. Both the Special Investigation Unit and the Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee uncovered influence peddling. Yet the DPP obdurately ignores right and wrong and backs Wang and Ker unconditionally. The Legislative Yuan Disciplinary Committee whitewashes Ker Chien-ming's crimes. It even amended the law to protect him, in flagrant disregard of public perception.
The DPP's "solidarity" in the face of such scandals is reminiscent of its attitude during the former first family scandal. Evidence of Chen family corruption was overwhelming. The DPP realized the scandal could not be covered up. Nevertheless the entire party supported Chen to the bitter end. Worst of all, idealistic party members who raised even mild objections to what the party was doing, had their loyalty questioned and were subjected to harsh discipline. This resulted in the "Eleven Brigands" incident. Until today "Save Ah-Bian!" remains one of the DPP's main themes.
The DPP's methods have led to three outcomes. One. They have confused the public. The DPP has deliberately created the impression that criminal justice discriminates on the basis of Blue or Green. This misleads the public into thinking that the KMT is still manipulating the criminal justice system. It incites hatred against the ruling KMT. Two. They have enabled the DPP to evade political responsibility. A comrade involved in corruption brings dishonor to the entire party. The DPP uses an old trick. A thief diverts attention from himself by being the first to shout "Catch the thief!" The DPP invokes a fictitious victim status to cover up its actual criminal status. Three. They have suppressed dissent within the party. They force those who know the truth, or who demand an internal review, to remain silent. They enable the party to maintain the illusion of unity.
Such practices underscore the contradiction between the DPP's words and deeds. Whenever the KMT is involved in a scandal, the DPP mounts its moral high horse. It convicts first, then asks questions later. But when one of their own is involved in corruption, they turn a blind eye to right and wrong. They rush to cover up his or her wrongdoing. Internally, this reveals the party's moral decline. Externally, this reveals the party's eagerness to subvert criminal justice and deceive the public. Such double standards are the main reason the DPP's moral image has crumbled.
Years ago the DPP collectively supported Chen Shui-bian's corruption. It paid a painfully high price. It lost a long string of local and central government level elections. Today, the DPP obstinately abets influence peddling and bribery. It thumbs its nose at voter perceptions of justice and morality. How much more moral credibility can the DPP afford to lose? Is the DPP really indifferent to renewed charges of "abetting corruption?"
The DPP repudiates the ROC Constitution. Its excuse is ideological differences. It disagrees with the political framework. But what about the rulings handed down by the criminal justice system, and ethical standards? Does the DPP imagine it can apply different standards to itself? Does it imagine it can use political ideology to render itself immune to the Republic of China's criminal justice system? If so, how many norms of the system is this arrogant political party willing to abide by?
Think about it. The Democratic Progressive Party today is merely an opposition party. When the party became involved in bribery and corruption, it rejected the rulings of the criminal justice system. It resorted to political means to whitewash its crimes. Suppose one day such a party regains political power? Suppose a variety of scandals erupt? How can the system constrain the DPP's deviant behavior?
One need not talk about fairness and justice. Democratic Progressive Party comrades must first learn to confront their comrades' scandals. They must accept the same standards for criminal justice as ordinary people. Only then will they be eligible to return to power.
民進黨須慎防挺貪腐的幽靈重現
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.19 04:11 am
交通部前部長郭瑤琪因貪汙案遭判刑八年定讞入獄，對此，民進黨上從「兩個太陽」蘇貞昌和蔡英文，到台北市長熱門人選柯文哲，乃至多數立院黨團成員，都在第一時間力挺郭瑤琪，指控這是「政治清算」。郭瑤琪雖已入獄，但爭議並未停歇。
這樣的場景，其實並不陌生。近年，民進黨每逢黨內重要政治人物涉及弊案，皆會上演相同戲碼。如雲林縣長蘇治芬、嘉義縣長張花冠因貪瀆案遭起訴，前台糖董事長吳乃仁、前立委洪奇昌因台糖購地弊案遭判刑，以及民進黨立院黨團總召柯建銘的司法關說案等，每有偵辦進展或遇法院宣判，民進黨總是上下一心指控相關案件是政治迫害，並譴責司法不公。
平心而論，這些民進黨內上下「力挺」的弊案，事件本質和弊情內容並不盡相同，有些案件或有不同見解，有些則是違法亂紀跡證昭然若揭。以台糖購地弊案為例，就是立委以「選民服務」之名，帶著政治「金主」登堂入室，要求國營企業為其大開方便之門。又如郭瑤琪的收賄案，看監聽譯文、行賄者證詞及內部會議紀錄，都已讓官商勾結事實無所遁形。至於王金平為柯建銘關說司法的案件，不論特偵組或檢評會的報告都直指司法關說確實存在；但民進黨仍然不顧是非黑白一致聲援王柯，立院紀律委員會並為柯建銘放水護航，甚至悍然為其修法，罔顧社會視聽。
民進黨這種面對弊案的「團結氣氛」，不由得讓人想起它面對前第一家庭弊案的態度。當時，儘管種種跡證都直指扁家涉貪，民進黨也明白事態已無法遮掩，但全黨上下卻仍選擇堅持挺扁到底。令人扼腕的是，黨內少數有理想的同志稍稍發表意見，即遭其他同志質疑忠誠度並嚴厲打壓，因而有「十一寇」事件發生。直至今日，「救扁」仍是民進黨的主旋律之一。
民進黨的做法，作用有三：一是混淆社會視聽：故意營造「司法藍綠有別」的氣氛，讓民眾誤以為國民黨仍在操縱司法，從而對執政黨產生反感；二是迴避政治責任：同志涉貪必使全黨蒙羞，「作賊的先喊抓賊」，用「受害人」的身分來掩蓋「犯罪者」的事實；三是藉此整肅黨內雜音，迫使可能知曉真相或企圖評論的黨內同志噤聲不語，以免真相外露，以便共同團結在黨的清廉假象之下。
這種手法，也反映了民進黨言行不一的矛盾。面對國民黨的弊案時，民進黨總是義正辭嚴、未審先判；但面對自家人涉貪，卻往往不問是非、極力包庇。對內而言，這是政黨的道德墮落；對外而言，則是對司法的壓迫與對社會的誤導。這種雙重標準，也是民進黨道德形象日益剝落的主因。
當年民進黨因為挺扁而不惜集體「挺貪腐」，結果付出慘痛的代價，接連輸掉地方及中央的選舉。如今，民進黨還在不斷「挺關說」、「挺收賄」，不斷挑戰選民的正義與價值認知；它有多少道德資產可以揮霍？真不怕挺「挺貪腐」的幽靈重現嗎？
民進黨對中華民國憲法的否定，一直是以意識形態的歧異為藉口，來矯飾自己對體制的不認同。但在司法判決和道德標準上，民進黨若以為自己亦可享受一套超乎社會的標準，甚至可以透過政治力的營造，使自己不受中華民國司法的拘限；那麼，如此唯我獨尊、自行其是的政黨，到底還能服從什麼體制的規範？
試想，今天民進黨只是在野，如果對於黨內涉貪、涉弊案件都要抗拒司法判決，都要透過政治手段包庇；當有朝一日，若它重新奪回政權，一旦各種弊案連環上演，政府體制內還有什麼力量約束其越軌行為？
不必奢談什麼公理正義，民進黨要先學會坦然面對黨內同志的弊案，接受和庶民相同的標準接受司法制裁，才能證明自己有資格重新執政。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 19, 2014
Summary: One need not talk about fairness and justice. Democratic Progressive Party comrades must first learn to confront their comrades' scandals. They must accept the same standards for criminal justice as ordinary people. Only then will they be eligible to return to power.
Full text below:
Transportation Minister Kuo Yao-chi has been sentenced to eight years for corruption. Nevertheless DPP leaders spin his conviction as "political persecution." Apologists for Kuo include the "two suns" Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, Taipei mayoral candidate Wen-Je Ko, and most members of the DPP legislative caucus. All have stood behind Kuo Yao-chi from the outset. Kuo Yao-chi may be locked up. But controversy rages on.
This scenario is nothing new. In recent years, every time a prominent DPP politician becomes mired in scandal, the DPP enacts the same charade. Yunlin County Chief Su Chih-fen and Chiayi County Chief Chang Hua-kuan are under indictment for corruption. Former TSC chairman Wu Nai-jen and former legislator Hong Chi-chang have been convicted of corruption in the TSC land purchase scandal. DPP legislative caucus leader Ker Chien-ming has been charged with influence peddling within the criminal justice system. Every time an investigation goes forward, or the court announces a verdict, the DPP dismisses the case as political persecution, and condemns it as a miscarriages of justice.
In all fairness, not all the scandals that the DPP repudiate are the same, in nature or content. Some warrant different conclusions. Others are clear cases of lawlessness. Take the TSC land purchase scandal. Legislators used "serving constituents" as a pretext to open the doors of state owned enterprises to political "sugar daddies." Take the Kuo Yao-chi bribery scandal. Read the wiretap transcripts, the perpetrators' testimony, and the minutes of internal meetings. They clearly point to government-business collusion. Take the Ker Chien-ming and Wang Jin-pyng's influence peddling within the criminal justice system. Both the Special Investigation Unit and the Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee uncovered influence peddling. Yet the DPP obdurately ignores right and wrong and backs Wang and Ker unconditionally. The Legislative Yuan Disciplinary Committee whitewashes Ker Chien-ming's crimes. It even amended the law to protect him, in flagrant disregard of public perception.
The DPP's "solidarity" in the face of such scandals is reminiscent of its attitude during the former first family scandal. Evidence of Chen family corruption was overwhelming. The DPP realized the scandal could not be covered up. Nevertheless the entire party supported Chen to the bitter end. Worst of all, idealistic party members who raised even mild objections to what the party was doing, had their loyalty questioned and were subjected to harsh discipline. This resulted in the "Eleven Brigands" incident. Until today "Save Ah-Bian!" remains one of the DPP's main themes.
The DPP's methods have led to three outcomes. One. They have confused the public. The DPP has deliberately created the impression that criminal justice discriminates on the basis of Blue or Green. This misleads the public into thinking that the KMT is still manipulating the criminal justice system. It incites hatred against the ruling KMT. Two. They have enabled the DPP to evade political responsibility. A comrade involved in corruption brings dishonor to the entire party. The DPP uses an old trick. A thief diverts attention from himself by being the first to shout "Catch the thief!" The DPP invokes a fictitious victim status to cover up its actual criminal status. Three. They have suppressed dissent within the party. They force those who know the truth, or who demand an internal review, to remain silent. They enable the party to maintain the illusion of unity.
Such practices underscore the contradiction between the DPP's words and deeds. Whenever the KMT is involved in a scandal, the DPP mounts its moral high horse. It convicts first, then asks questions later. But when one of their own is involved in corruption, they turn a blind eye to right and wrong. They rush to cover up his or her wrongdoing. Internally, this reveals the party's moral decline. Externally, this reveals the party's eagerness to subvert criminal justice and deceive the public. Such double standards are the main reason the DPP's moral image has crumbled.
Years ago the DPP collectively supported Chen Shui-bian's corruption. It paid a painfully high price. It lost a long string of local and central government level elections. Today, the DPP obstinately abets influence peddling and bribery. It thumbs its nose at voter perceptions of justice and morality. How much more moral credibility can the DPP afford to lose? Is the DPP really indifferent to renewed charges of "abetting corruption?"
The DPP repudiates the ROC Constitution. Its excuse is ideological differences. It disagrees with the political framework. But what about the rulings handed down by the criminal justice system, and ethical standards? Does the DPP imagine it can apply different standards to itself? Does it imagine it can use political ideology to render itself immune to the Republic of China's criminal justice system? If so, how many norms of the system is this arrogant political party willing to abide by?
Think about it. The Democratic Progressive Party today is merely an opposition party. When the party became involved in bribery and corruption, it rejected the rulings of the criminal justice system. It resorted to political means to whitewash its crimes. Suppose one day such a party regains political power? Suppose a variety of scandals erupt? How can the system constrain the DPP's deviant behavior?
One need not talk about fairness and justice. Democratic Progressive Party comrades must first learn to confront their comrades' scandals. They must accept the same standards for criminal justice as ordinary people. Only then will they be eligible to return to power.
民進黨須慎防挺貪腐的幽靈重現
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.19 04:11 am
交通部前部長郭瑤琪因貪汙案遭判刑八年定讞入獄，對此，民進黨上從「兩個太陽」蘇貞昌和蔡英文，到台北市長熱門人選柯文哲，乃至多數立院黨團成員，都在第一時間力挺郭瑤琪，指控這是「政治清算」。郭瑤琪雖已入獄，但爭議並未停歇。
這樣的場景，其實並不陌生。近年，民進黨每逢黨內重要政治人物涉及弊案，皆會上演相同戲碼。如雲林縣長蘇治芬、嘉義縣長張花冠因貪瀆案遭起訴，前台糖董事長吳乃仁、前立委洪奇昌因台糖購地弊案遭判刑，以及民進黨立院黨團總召柯建銘的司法關說案等，每有偵辦進展或遇法院宣判，民進黨總是上下一心指控相關案件是政治迫害，並譴責司法不公。
平心而論，這些民進黨內上下「力挺」的弊案，事件本質和弊情內容並不盡相同，有些案件或有不同見解，有些則是違法亂紀跡證昭然若揭。以台糖購地弊案為例，就是立委以「選民服務」之名，帶著政治「金主」登堂入室，要求國營企業為其大開方便之門。又如郭瑤琪的收賄案，看監聽譯文、行賄者證詞及內部會議紀錄，都已讓官商勾結事實無所遁形。至於王金平為柯建銘關說司法的案件，不論特偵組或檢評會的報告都直指司法關說確實存在；但民進黨仍然不顧是非黑白一致聲援王柯，立院紀律委員會並為柯建銘放水護航，甚至悍然為其修法，罔顧社會視聽。
民進黨這種面對弊案的「團結氣氛」，不由得讓人想起它面對前第一家庭弊案的態度。當時，儘管種種跡證都直指扁家涉貪，民進黨也明白事態已無法遮掩，但全黨上下卻仍選擇堅持挺扁到底。令人扼腕的是，黨內少數有理想的同志稍稍發表意見，即遭其他同志質疑忠誠度並嚴厲打壓，因而有「十一寇」事件發生。直至今日，「救扁」仍是民進黨的主旋律之一。
民進黨的做法，作用有三：一是混淆社會視聽：故意營造「司法藍綠有別」的氣氛，讓民眾誤以為國民黨仍在操縱司法，從而對執政黨產生反感；二是迴避政治責任：同志涉貪必使全黨蒙羞，「作賊的先喊抓賊」，用「受害人」的身分來掩蓋「犯罪者」的事實；三是藉此整肅黨內雜音，迫使可能知曉真相或企圖評論的黨內同志噤聲不語，以免真相外露，以便共同團結在黨的清廉假象之下。
這種手法，也反映了民進黨言行不一的矛盾。面對國民黨的弊案時，民進黨總是義正辭嚴、未審先判；但面對自家人涉貪，卻往往不問是非、極力包庇。對內而言，這是政黨的道德墮落；對外而言，則是對司法的壓迫與對社會的誤導。這種雙重標準，也是民進黨道德形象日益剝落的主因。
當年民進黨因為挺扁而不惜集體「挺貪腐」，結果付出慘痛的代價，接連輸掉地方及中央的選舉。如今，民進黨還在不斷「挺關說」、「挺收賄」，不斷挑戰選民的正義與價值認知；它有多少道德資產可以揮霍？真不怕挺「挺貪腐」的幽靈重現嗎？
民進黨對中華民國憲法的否定，一直是以意識形態的歧異為藉口，來矯飾自己對體制的不認同。但在司法判決和道德標準上，民進黨若以為自己亦可享受一套超乎社會的標準，甚至可以透過政治力的營造，使自己不受中華民國司法的拘限；那麼，如此唯我獨尊、自行其是的政黨，到底還能服從什麼體制的規範？
試想，今天民進黨只是在野，如果對於黨內涉貪、涉弊案件都要抗拒司法判決，都要透過政治手段包庇；當有朝一日，若它重新奪回政權，一旦各種弊案連環上演，政府體制內還有什麼力量約束其越軌行為？
不必奢談什麼公理正義，民進黨要先學會坦然面對黨內同志的弊案，接受和庶民相同的標準接受司法制裁，才能證明自己有資格重新執政。
Thursday, January 16, 2014
The President's Brain Trust Cannot Consist of Only of "Friends of Ma."
The President's Brain Trust Cannot Consist of Only of "Friends of Ma."
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 17, 2014
Summary: Who comprises the President's brain trust? That is a serious question. One must consider the nation's framework. Individuals of talent must engage in long-term thinking. If one relies solely on the "Friends of Ma," the risks to the nation are simply too great.
Full text below:
King Pu-tsung was recently called home by the Legislative Yuan Foreign Policy and Defense Policy Committee. He was ordered to report and answer questions. The legislators' questions included questions about the Huang Shi-ming case. They asked King Pu-tsung whether he would consider becoming Secretary General of the National Security Committee or Deputy Premier. They assumed he knew the answers to all sorts of questions. This brought to the fore two anomalies. One. The ROC Representative to the US was ordered to return home and answer questions on utterly irrelevant matters. Legislators clearly exceeded their authority. They interfered with the nation's diplomacy. Two. King Pu-tsung continues to be perceived as President Ma's "closest crony." Everything must go through him. The administration continues to have blind spots and remains unable to make full use of talented individuals.
One month ago rumors flew. US EPA Chief Gina McCarthy would visit Taiwan. It would be the first time a US cabinet member visited Taiwan in over a decade, and would be highly significant. It would also be a feather in King Pu-tsung's cap. But the visit was aborted as soon as it became public knowledge. There is no evidence to suggest that Beijing protested or blocked the visit. The visit can now be recorded in the "Chronicle of Events that Never Happened." Why? Because someone leaked the information prematurely, and Washington was unhappy. When U.S. officials visit Taiwan, this is something the media is likely to uncover. Sudden developments such as this underscore the lack of trust between Washington and Taipei. This is a matter of concern. This is also a sign that our national security strategy is in trouble.
When President Ma took office, he made a special effort to ease cross-strait relations. He reversed Taiwan's "troublemaker" image -- an image created by Chen Shui-bian during his administration. He is proud of these achievements. But in recent years, the regional situation has changed. The Mainland has begun to stress the "Chinese Dream." Cross-strait interactions are now at the deep end of the pool. New tensions have arisen, and a new relationship between Washington and Tokyo has formed. Washington and Tokyo are demanding that Taipei fulfill its regional security obligations. Their demands are getting louder. President Ma clings to his "East China Sea Peace Initiative." If he thinks it constitutes an ace in the hole, he has misjudged the situation. Current Secretary-General Yuan Chien-sheng cites it, just as Su Chi did when Ma first took office. Representative to the United States King Pu-tsung cites it also. President Ma has long been pro-Washington. It has become his only card he knows how to play.
National security should not reflect the president's individual whims alone. Ma no longer has the full support of his brain trust. In advanced nations such responsibilities are assigned to its most experienced strategists. The ROC clearly lacks such talent. Its national security system lacks the brain power. This is also true for cross-strait relations. When Kao Koong-lian stepped down, continuity problems appeared. When veteran cross-strait negotiator Kao Koong-lian resigned, the SEF was left with Lin Chung-sheng. Lin was elderly and inexperienced in cross-strait affairs. The MAC was left with Wang Yu-chi, who was required to meet immediately with Zhang Zhijun from the Mainland side. Wang Yu-chi was a former presidential spokesman. That was his sole qualification. At most he could precisely execute Ma Ying-jeou's cross-strait policies. He could contribute little in the way of original thinking.
In other words, the administration lacked individuals of talent, in everything from national security to cross-strait relations. Their thinking was limited. The best they could do was carry out President Ma's wishes. But decisions such as these are complex and have far-reaching repercussions. Knowing this, how can any of us feel at ease?
President Ma's brain trust is miniscule. It has been mocked as "Yo-Yo Ma," a pun on the famed cellist's name, meaning "Friends of Ma." Ma's personal preferences often determine the shape and manner of his decision-making. He often chases his own tail and cannot come up with anything new. For example, on New Years Day, the president proclaimed that Vice President Vincent Siew would return to head up economic revitalization. It was a surprise, but it was not terribly convincing. When Vincent Siew was Vice President, he was seldom consulted about anything. When Ma ran for a second term, Siew was replaced with Wu Den-yih. Wu Den-yih is running for president in 2016. Time is not on his side. Instead, Vincent Siew has suddenly resurfaced. Is "economic revitalization" his sole mission? Even Sean Chen, lauded as "the best economic cabinet member in two decades," was unceremoniously forced out of office. Who today can fill the role of economic advisor to the President? What kind of person will he or she be? That is a major question. Vincent Siew has made a comeback. He is a respected official. But his return merely underscores the Ma government's lack of talent.
According to Wikipedia, a United States Presidential Advisor's role is clear, and his or her resources are abundant. The advisor's role may be either administraive or merely advisory. A senior advisor my have others under his or her command. There are many kinds of advisors. They may grow into an army. The ROC Constitution provides for senior policy advisors and national policy advisors. But does the president seek out their opinions? Or are they merely decoration? Were they merely being paid off?
President Ma has been in office nearly six years. His performance has been poor. Is he hoping to turn things around? If he looks around, all he sess are King Pu-tsung, Vincent Siew, and a handful of others. If this is not a crisis, what is a crisis? If his policies are wrong, and his first rank officials are blasted, can second rank officials remedy the situation, or provide it with warnings? The president cannot stand on the front lines and fight every battle by himself. Besides, if national security depends entirely on a president's personal whims, that is hazardous to the nation.
Who comprises the President's brain trust? That is a serious question. One must consider the nation's framework. Individuals of talent must engage in long-term thinking. If one relies solely on the "Friends of Ma," the risks to the nation are simply too great.
總統智囊團不能只有「馬友友」
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.17 02:35 am
金溥聰最近被立院外交國防委員會「召回」，進行業務報告及備詢。立委的質詢，從黃世銘案到他金溥聰是否將接任國安會秘書長或副閣揆等要職無所不包，彷彿任何重要議題均可從他身上找到答案。這反映了兩個不正常現象：第一，駐美代表若動輒被要求返國備詢，議題卻又風馬牛不相及，這是立委撈過界，外交工作也受干擾。第二，這凸顯金溥聰至今仍未脫離馬總統「第一親信」的形象，任何職務皆非他不可的態勢，反映了當局用人的貧乏與盲點。
月前政壇盛傳美國環保署長吉娜麥卡錫將來台訪問，如果成行，將是十數年來首位美國閣員訪台，意義重大，也將是金溥聰任內重要政績。但此事「見光死」，雖未聞中共抗議阻撓，只能計入「未發生事件簿」，歸因於我方事前曝光引起美方不滿。但美國政要來訪之事，本來就有高機率遭媒體探知；臨時生變顯示美台關係信任基礎薄弱，是值得警惕之處，也是國安戰略生鏽的警訊。
馬總統上任後，格外致力於緩和兩岸關係，也扭轉了陳水扁任內造成台灣是「麻煩製造者」的形象，是他頗引為自得的成就。但近年區域情勢丕變，大陸進入張揚「中國夢」的時代，兩岸互動漸入深水區；而美日中出現新的緊張關係和新的合縱連橫態勢，美日要求台灣善盡區域間安全義務，呼聲日緊。馬總統此時若仍以乏人附議的「東海和平倡議」為王牌，顯然錯估情勢。而現任國安會秘書長袁健生和馬初上任時啟用的蘇起一樣，乃至金溥聰的駐美，反映的都是馬總統一向的親美路線，卻也變成唯一的路線。
國家安全其實最不應該是「以總統個人意志為意志」的一個領域，近年來卻見不到瞻矚更全面的幕僚群作為支撐。這在先進國家屬於「最高戰略大腦」的角色，台灣卻顯得人才單薄。和國安體系同樣「大腦」薄弱的，還包括兩岸領域，在高孔廉去職後，出現了老幹新枝銜接不上的問題。兩岸談判身經百戰的高孔廉去職後，海基會僅留下年紀不輕、但兩岸事務資歷甚淺的林中森；陸委會則馬上要由王郁琦會見對岸張志軍，而王郁琦先前只有總統府發言人等淺薄資歷，充其量只是「精準執行」馬英九的兩岸思維，談不上「大腦」功能。
換言之，從國安到兩岸，有人才斷層的問題，有思維局限的限制，只剩馬總統一人以意志貫徹；這在如此影響重大而內容龐雜的決策範疇，豈能讓人安心？
馬總統因用人圈狹小，被譏受包圍於「馬友友」。而他的個人好惡，往往決定了決策圈的形態與模式，似乎已到了不斷自我循環而難以產生新意的狀態。例如，近日總統元旦文告宣布前副總統蕭萬長「復出」統領拚經濟的重任，讓人意外。並非老驥伏櫪不堪重用，而是蕭萬長在副總統任內少有用武之地，在馬競選連任時旋遭吳敦義取代；如今吳敦義在競逐二○一六大位之路已被預言時不我予，反而再由蕭萬長出山重膺要職。若純粹論「拚經濟」的任務，連曾被稱為「二十年來最佳財經內閣」的陳?都已被「後浪推前浪」而去，則如今擔當總統財經顧問角色的到底還有何等樣人，令人疑惑。蕭萬長之復出，展現國之重臣的分量，卻更反襯馬政府人才不繼的窘況。
一般民眾上維基百科查一下「美國總統顧問」(United States Presidential Advisors)，不但功能性分類清晰，編制龐大，且具有行政職的、諮詢頭銜的、資深幕僚之下再統領次級幕僚群的……，分門別類，堪稱「軍容壯大」。中華民國在憲政設計上，亦有資政、國策顧問等濟濟之士；但總統究竟何時徵詢過他們的高見？或只是把他們擺在那裡裝飾、酬庸之用？
馬總統執政快六年了，如果政績欠佳，想要振衰起敝，左顧右盼卻只有金溥聰、蕭萬長等區區幾人可供調度，這不是危機，什麼才是危機？如果政策出錯，以致第一線的決策官員受到批評時，有沒有第二軌的資深顧問可以發揮匡正或諫言功能？總不能凡事由總統親上火線，更別說國安議題全由總統發揮個人意志，潛藏多少國家危險。
「誰是總統智囊」是個嚴肅的話題，必須從國家的制度面、人才面作長遠思考擘畫。若只靠一群「馬友友」治國，那就太危險了！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 17, 2014
Summary: Who comprises the President's brain trust? That is a serious question. One must consider the nation's framework. Individuals of talent must engage in long-term thinking. If one relies solely on the "Friends of Ma," the risks to the nation are simply too great.
Full text below:
King Pu-tsung was recently called home by the Legislative Yuan Foreign Policy and Defense Policy Committee. He was ordered to report and answer questions. The legislators' questions included questions about the Huang Shi-ming case. They asked King Pu-tsung whether he would consider becoming Secretary General of the National Security Committee or Deputy Premier. They assumed he knew the answers to all sorts of questions. This brought to the fore two anomalies. One. The ROC Representative to the US was ordered to return home and answer questions on utterly irrelevant matters. Legislators clearly exceeded their authority. They interfered with the nation's diplomacy. Two. King Pu-tsung continues to be perceived as President Ma's "closest crony." Everything must go through him. The administration continues to have blind spots and remains unable to make full use of talented individuals.
One month ago rumors flew. US EPA Chief Gina McCarthy would visit Taiwan. It would be the first time a US cabinet member visited Taiwan in over a decade, and would be highly significant. It would also be a feather in King Pu-tsung's cap. But the visit was aborted as soon as it became public knowledge. There is no evidence to suggest that Beijing protested or blocked the visit. The visit can now be recorded in the "Chronicle of Events that Never Happened." Why? Because someone leaked the information prematurely, and Washington was unhappy. When U.S. officials visit Taiwan, this is something the media is likely to uncover. Sudden developments such as this underscore the lack of trust between Washington and Taipei. This is a matter of concern. This is also a sign that our national security strategy is in trouble.
When President Ma took office, he made a special effort to ease cross-strait relations. He reversed Taiwan's "troublemaker" image -- an image created by Chen Shui-bian during his administration. He is proud of these achievements. But in recent years, the regional situation has changed. The Mainland has begun to stress the "Chinese Dream." Cross-strait interactions are now at the deep end of the pool. New tensions have arisen, and a new relationship between Washington and Tokyo has formed. Washington and Tokyo are demanding that Taipei fulfill its regional security obligations. Their demands are getting louder. President Ma clings to his "East China Sea Peace Initiative." If he thinks it constitutes an ace in the hole, he has misjudged the situation. Current Secretary-General Yuan Chien-sheng cites it, just as Su Chi did when Ma first took office. Representative to the United States King Pu-tsung cites it also. President Ma has long been pro-Washington. It has become his only card he knows how to play.
National security should not reflect the president's individual whims alone. Ma no longer has the full support of his brain trust. In advanced nations such responsibilities are assigned to its most experienced strategists. The ROC clearly lacks such talent. Its national security system lacks the brain power. This is also true for cross-strait relations. When Kao Koong-lian stepped down, continuity problems appeared. When veteran cross-strait negotiator Kao Koong-lian resigned, the SEF was left with Lin Chung-sheng. Lin was elderly and inexperienced in cross-strait affairs. The MAC was left with Wang Yu-chi, who was required to meet immediately with Zhang Zhijun from the Mainland side. Wang Yu-chi was a former presidential spokesman. That was his sole qualification. At most he could precisely execute Ma Ying-jeou's cross-strait policies. He could contribute little in the way of original thinking.
In other words, the administration lacked individuals of talent, in everything from national security to cross-strait relations. Their thinking was limited. The best they could do was carry out President Ma's wishes. But decisions such as these are complex and have far-reaching repercussions. Knowing this, how can any of us feel at ease?
President Ma's brain trust is miniscule. It has been mocked as "Yo-Yo Ma," a pun on the famed cellist's name, meaning "Friends of Ma." Ma's personal preferences often determine the shape and manner of his decision-making. He often chases his own tail and cannot come up with anything new. For example, on New Years Day, the president proclaimed that Vice President Vincent Siew would return to head up economic revitalization. It was a surprise, but it was not terribly convincing. When Vincent Siew was Vice President, he was seldom consulted about anything. When Ma ran for a second term, Siew was replaced with Wu Den-yih. Wu Den-yih is running for president in 2016. Time is not on his side. Instead, Vincent Siew has suddenly resurfaced. Is "economic revitalization" his sole mission? Even Sean Chen, lauded as "the best economic cabinet member in two decades," was unceremoniously forced out of office. Who today can fill the role of economic advisor to the President? What kind of person will he or she be? That is a major question. Vincent Siew has made a comeback. He is a respected official. But his return merely underscores the Ma government's lack of talent.
According to Wikipedia, a United States Presidential Advisor's role is clear, and his or her resources are abundant. The advisor's role may be either administraive or merely advisory. A senior advisor my have others under his or her command. There are many kinds of advisors. They may grow into an army. The ROC Constitution provides for senior policy advisors and national policy advisors. But does the president seek out their opinions? Or are they merely decoration? Were they merely being paid off?
President Ma has been in office nearly six years. His performance has been poor. Is he hoping to turn things around? If he looks around, all he sess are King Pu-tsung, Vincent Siew, and a handful of others. If this is not a crisis, what is a crisis? If his policies are wrong, and his first rank officials are blasted, can second rank officials remedy the situation, or provide it with warnings? The president cannot stand on the front lines and fight every battle by himself. Besides, if national security depends entirely on a president's personal whims, that is hazardous to the nation.
Who comprises the President's brain trust? That is a serious question. One must consider the nation's framework. Individuals of talent must engage in long-term thinking. If one relies solely on the "Friends of Ma," the risks to the nation are simply too great.
總統智囊團不能只有「馬友友」
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.17 02:35 am
金溥聰最近被立院外交國防委員會「召回」，進行業務報告及備詢。立委的質詢，從黃世銘案到他金溥聰是否將接任國安會秘書長或副閣揆等要職無所不包，彷彿任何重要議題均可從他身上找到答案。這反映了兩個不正常現象：第一，駐美代表若動輒被要求返國備詢，議題卻又風馬牛不相及，這是立委撈過界，外交工作也受干擾。第二，這凸顯金溥聰至今仍未脫離馬總統「第一親信」的形象，任何職務皆非他不可的態勢，反映了當局用人的貧乏與盲點。
月前政壇盛傳美國環保署長吉娜麥卡錫將來台訪問，如果成行，將是十數年來首位美國閣員訪台，意義重大，也將是金溥聰任內重要政績。但此事「見光死」，雖未聞中共抗議阻撓，只能計入「未發生事件簿」，歸因於我方事前曝光引起美方不滿。但美國政要來訪之事，本來就有高機率遭媒體探知；臨時生變顯示美台關係信任基礎薄弱，是值得警惕之處，也是國安戰略生鏽的警訊。
馬總統上任後，格外致力於緩和兩岸關係，也扭轉了陳水扁任內造成台灣是「麻煩製造者」的形象，是他頗引為自得的成就。但近年區域情勢丕變，大陸進入張揚「中國夢」的時代，兩岸互動漸入深水區；而美日中出現新的緊張關係和新的合縱連橫態勢，美日要求台灣善盡區域間安全義務，呼聲日緊。馬總統此時若仍以乏人附議的「東海和平倡議」為王牌，顯然錯估情勢。而現任國安會秘書長袁健生和馬初上任時啟用的蘇起一樣，乃至金溥聰的駐美，反映的都是馬總統一向的親美路線，卻也變成唯一的路線。
國家安全其實最不應該是「以總統個人意志為意志」的一個領域，近年來卻見不到瞻矚更全面的幕僚群作為支撐。這在先進國家屬於「最高戰略大腦」的角色，台灣卻顯得人才單薄。和國安體系同樣「大腦」薄弱的，還包括兩岸領域，在高孔廉去職後，出現了老幹新枝銜接不上的問題。兩岸談判身經百戰的高孔廉去職後，海基會僅留下年紀不輕、但兩岸事務資歷甚淺的林中森；陸委會則馬上要由王郁琦會見對岸張志軍，而王郁琦先前只有總統府發言人等淺薄資歷，充其量只是「精準執行」馬英九的兩岸思維，談不上「大腦」功能。
換言之，從國安到兩岸，有人才斷層的問題，有思維局限的限制，只剩馬總統一人以意志貫徹；這在如此影響重大而內容龐雜的決策範疇，豈能讓人安心？
馬總統因用人圈狹小，被譏受包圍於「馬友友」。而他的個人好惡，往往決定了決策圈的形態與模式，似乎已到了不斷自我循環而難以產生新意的狀態。例如，近日總統元旦文告宣布前副總統蕭萬長「復出」統領拚經濟的重任，讓人意外。並非老驥伏櫪不堪重用，而是蕭萬長在副總統任內少有用武之地，在馬競選連任時旋遭吳敦義取代；如今吳敦義在競逐二○一六大位之路已被預言時不我予，反而再由蕭萬長出山重膺要職。若純粹論「拚經濟」的任務，連曾被稱為「二十年來最佳財經內閣」的陳?都已被「後浪推前浪」而去，則如今擔當總統財經顧問角色的到底還有何等樣人，令人疑惑。蕭萬長之復出，展現國之重臣的分量，卻更反襯馬政府人才不繼的窘況。
一般民眾上維基百科查一下「美國總統顧問」(United States Presidential Advisors)，不但功能性分類清晰，編制龐大，且具有行政職的、諮詢頭銜的、資深幕僚之下再統領次級幕僚群的……，分門別類，堪稱「軍容壯大」。中華民國在憲政設計上，亦有資政、國策顧問等濟濟之士；但總統究竟何時徵詢過他們的高見？或只是把他們擺在那裡裝飾、酬庸之用？
馬總統執政快六年了，如果政績欠佳，想要振衰起敝，左顧右盼卻只有金溥聰、蕭萬長等區區幾人可供調度，這不是危機，什麼才是危機？如果政策出錯，以致第一線的決策官員受到批評時，有沒有第二軌的資深顧問可以發揮匡正或諫言功能？總不能凡事由總統親上火線，更別說國安議題全由總統發揮個人意志，潛藏多少國家危險。
「誰是總統智囊」是個嚴肅的話題，必須從國家的制度面、人才面作長遠思考擘畫。若只靠一群「馬友友」治國，那就太危險了！
Now is the Time for Legislative Reform -- Again
Now is the Time for Legislative Reform -- Again
China Times News (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 17, 2014
Summary: The legislature is of course not the executive branch's "legislative bureau." But neither should it be able to hijack major bills, and make it impossible to implement government policy. We must restore healthy competition between the two branches. The executive branch must improve its decision-making and communications with the outside. The legislative branch must increase its self-discipline and discipline of others. The problem of legislative abuse of power must be solved. Now is the time to demand legislative reform.
Full text below:
Late into the night of the 14th, Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng brought down his gavel and adjourned the legislature. Amidst public demands for increased oversight, the legislature passed 146 central government budgets, setting a record for the year. But quantity is not quality. The Executive Yuan called for a referendum on the nuclear power plant number four, for pension reform , for the trade in services agreement, for the food safety bill, and for other high priority bills. These have yet to be reviewed. We must determine precisely where the problem arose, what led to legislative inaction, and what stalled national and social development?
The constitutional separation of powers treats the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan as "two wings of a bird, or two wheels of a cart." The ruling party enjoys a legislative majority. Legislation ought to pass easily. Policy ought to be easy to implement, enabling it to promote progress and prosperity. But consider the legislative record. The executive has been weak. The legislature has been strong. The balance between the two has been shattered. Power has become concentrated in the Legislative Yuan. As a result, legislation has been delayed, and the performance of the executive has suffered.
Take the referendum on the nuclear power plant number four. Jiang Yi-hua put his job on the line. He vowed that if the referendum on the nuclear power plant number four failed to pass, he would resign. But Blue Camp legislators who sponsored the referendum took advantage of the the September Ma/Wang political struggle to temporary adjourn. Ma Ying-jeou's cherished pension reform bill would have given people 30 years peace of mind. Now it is lies stillborn in the legislature. The trade in services agreement affects Taiwan's regional trade and economic integration. It also failed to receive a Third Reading.
Such is the fate of politically sensitive motions. But public welfare bills have been even less successful. The food safety bill plugs loopholes related to contaminated foodstuffs. The Executive Yuan draft amendment was presented to the Legislative Yuan. Yet 54 days later, it remains adrift, yet to be given a third reading. If this is not legislative inaction, what is legislative inaction?
This highlights a major problem confronting Taiwan: "Populism rules!" Even the legislature cannot avoid populist legislation. Legislators face reelection pressures. Consider the pension bill. Blue Camp legislators fear alienating rank and file level civil service employees and public school teachers. Green Camp legislators fear alienating labor. The result? Sacrifice pension reform. Allow the pension fund to expand until it is forced to declare bankruptcy.
Legislative inaction remains an intractable problem. When the executive branch makes mistakes, officials are given demerits, punishments, or transfers. Political appointees may be forced to resign. Legislative inaction by contrast, is only subject to voter approval every four years. This discrepancy conflicts with the principle of proportionality.
In a democracy, legislators represent the people by passing legislation and overseeing the government. Passing effective legislation is an important part of their job. The legislature must exercise greater self-discipline and improve its performance. But instead, in September, it provoked political struggle. Ker Chien-ming had the chutzpah to spin influence peddling within the criminal justice system as "judicial appeal." He affected the pose of a "fixer" who can "get you whatever you want." The Legislative Disciplinary Committee was utterly useless. As we can see, legislative self-discipline is a dead letter.
Compare the Legislative Yuan Disciplinary Commitee with the Judicial Yuan Disciplinary Committee. External forces must be introduced into the legislature. The Disciplinary Committee need not be limited to legislators. It may include civic groups approved by the legislature. It may include retired judges or legal scholars. This would prevent the Disciplinary Committee from becoming nothing more than cover-up artists. This is the first step in legislative reform.
Currently such groups as the Citizens Congress Watch and the Pocket Congress website oversee the legislature, The Legislature can incorporate these into the Disciplinary Committee. The media can send monitors to increase oversight and encourage the legislature to undergo further reform.
The executive and legislative powers have become imbalanced. This anomaly must be addressed. The executive must do a better job of explaining its policies to outsiders. Before each legislative session, it must determine which bills ought to be given priority. The ruling party must impose party discipline. As soon as talks between the ruling and opposition parties resume, it must send its bills to the legislature for a vote, and take full advantage of its legislative majority.
During the 2010 Review of the "Local Government Act," the KMT held a majority. It guided the bill to its third reading. Ma Ying-jeou was a Kuomintang Central Standing Committee member. His rallying cry was, "The majority party in the legislature is unable set the legislative agenda. If this situation is not changed, we do not deserve to be called the ruling party!" The KMT must reestablish the decisiveness and self-confidence it had back then.
Thirdly, we must enable the major and minor party whips to do their job. They must ensure that the government, the executive, and the party act in unison. The trade in services agreement has encountered obstacles to its passage. This is the result of KMT party whip Ling Hung-chi's agreeing to 16 public hearings. The "Communications Protection and Surveillance Act" swiftly passed its third reading. The Ministry of Justice, the National Police Agency complained that it would be "difficult to implement, and tie law enforcement's hands." This shows that the ruling party has serious problems with internal communications and coordination.
Ma Ying-jeou's term is nearing its end. He is about to become a lame duck. But President Ma Ying-jeou is also party chairman. This gives him certain political advantages. He has the power to nominate legislators without portfolio and regional legislators. He has many political tools at his disposal. In 2010, the government, the executive, and the party were unified under one leader. This could happen again. It all depends on how well President Ma and Chairman Ma make use of the tools at their disposal.
Backroom deals between the ruling and opposition parties have long plagued the legislature. In June of last year, the "Accounting Law" fiasco erupted. It forced the government and the executive to pass emergency legislative as corrective. The ruling and opposition party consultation system was faulty. A transparent mechanism for future negotiations must be established. The threshold for legislative caucuses may need to be raised. This would prevent obstructionism by splinter parties. A committee leader system must be established. All of the above measures must be considered.
Finally, we have the role of Wang Jin-pying. Ma and Wang, as well as the ruling and opposition parties, relate to each other in certain ways. This is the political reality. Wang Jin-pyng must choose between being a neutral Legislative Speaker and a loyal KMT member. Only then can legislative efficiency be restored. Wang Jin-pyng recently proposed the establishment of a "Legislative Yuan cross-strait affairs countermeasures team" to increase legislative oversight. This proposal would deprive the executive branch of control over cross-strait policy. Wang Jin-pying could resign from the KMT Central Standing Committee. He could assume a neutral role as legislative speaker, and mediate between the ruling and opposition parties. Perhaps then the ruling and opposition parties could develop a consensus on cross-strait policy. This could be a blessing for cross-strait relations. But given the the political realities. the odds are against it.
The legislature is of course not the executive branch's "legislative bureau." But neither should it be able to hijack major bills, and make it impossible to implement government policy. We must restore healthy competition between the two branches. The executive branch must improve its decision-making and communications with the outside. The legislative branch must increase its self-discipline and discipline of others. The problem of legislative abuse of power must be solved. Now is the time to demand legislative reform.
社論－是立法院再改革的時候了
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月16日 04:09
14日深夜，立法院長王金平敲槌宣布散會。在輿論強化對立法效能監督壓力下，本會期共通過中央政府總預算等146項議案，創下本屆最高紀錄。然而，量多不代表質精，核四公投、年金改革、《服貿協議》、《食管法》等政院設定的優先法案，仍跨不出立院大門。我們必須檢討，究竟哪個環節出了問題，造成立法怠惰、國家社會發展呆滯現象？
依憲法權力分立原則，行政、立法兩院應是「鳥之雙翼、車之兩輪」，加上執政黨擁有國會多數，本應有效掌握立法節奏，順利推動政務，帶動國家進步繁榮。但攤開立法成績單，由於行政弱勢、立法強勢，兩權均勢已被打破，權力向立法院集中，結果立法延宕、行政效能不彰。
以核四公投為例，當江宜樺賭上烏紗帽，宣稱核四公投不過就下台，提案藍委卻趁著9月馬王政爭，臨時撤案；馬英九念茲在茲的年金改革，可讓民眾安心30年，如今法案還躺在立法院；攸關台灣參與區域經貿整合的《服貿協議》，也未能三讀。
政治議案如此，民生法案更是命運坎坷。《食管法》要補起黑心食品的漏洞，政院把修正草案送到立法院後，「漂流」54天仍無法完成三讀。試問：這不是立法怠惰，什麼才叫立法怠惰？
這也凸顯台灣當前一大問題，就是民粹當道，國會也擺脫不了民粹立法。立委有連任壓力，諸如年金法案，藍委不願意得罪公教基本盤、綠委也要顧勞工選票，最後就是犧牲年金改革，放任年金破產危機繼續擴大。
立法怠惰問題難解，行政部門犯錯，還有記過、懲處或調職的處分機制，政務官也有下台的風險；立法怠惰則只能交4年一次選票檢驗，不符權責比例原則。
民主國家，國會代表人民制訂法律、監督政府，立法效能是國家效能重要環節，應靠國會自律與他律來提升效能。然而，9月政爭鬧得沸沸揚揚，當事人柯建銘竟能把「司法關說」硬拗成「司法訴苦」，發揮一皮天下無難事的功夫，立法院紀律委員會形同虛設，毫無功能，可以看出國會自律已淪為表面文章。
立法院可比照司法院檢評會，引進外部力量進入國會體制，未來紀律委員會不必由立委組成，可改由國會同意的社會公正獨立人士如卸任大法官、學者來擔任，避免紀委會淪為護航委員會，這是國會改革的第一步。
目前有公督盟、口袋國會網站等公民團體監督立法院，立法院可將其納入紀律委員會運作。此外媒體要發會監督鞭策力量，鼓動風潮，推動國會再改革工程。
導正行政與立法兩權傾斜怪現象，行政部門除了要加強對各界的政策溝通、每會期也要檢視優先法案的立法進度，執政黨更要貫徹黨紀，一過朝野協商冷凍期，就要排案送到全院院會進行表決，有效發揮國會多數優勢。
2010年審查《地方制度法》時，國民黨挾著多數席次，讓《地制法》完成三讀，馬英九當時在國民黨中常會振臂高呼，「如果沒辦法改變多數黨無法主導立法院議事運作的現象，就不配叫執政黨！」國民黨需要重建當年的決斷力與自信心。
第三，要充分發揮大小黨鞭的角色，貫徹府院黨一條鞭的領導模式。《服貿協議》至今難產，是大黨鞭林鴻池簽字同意在野黨舉辦16場公聽會的結果，這次《通保法》火速完成三讀，法務部，警政署抱怨「窒礙難行、打擊犯罪的手被束縛」，顯示執政黨內部溝通整合出了嚴重問題。
即使馬英九任期進入倒數，跛腳危機開始浮現，但馬英九仍然擁有總統兼任黨主席的政治優勢，至少握有不分區與區域立委的提名權，還有不少政治工具可用，再現2010年府院黨一條鞭領導，不是不可能，就看馬總統兼主席如何運用工具。
朝野密室協商屢被詬病，去年6月《會計法》甚至爆發烏龍修法，迫使政院必須緊急提出覆議案補正。朝野協商制度弊端叢生，未來如何建立協商透明化機制，包括是否提高黨團組成門檻、避免小黨杯葛，建立委員會領袖制度等，都是可考慮方向。
最後談到王金平的角色，以目前馬王關係及朝野關係的政治現實，王金平必須在中立的國會議長與忠誠國民黨員間做出明確選擇，立法院才能恢復應有的效率。王金平日前拋出設立「立法院兩岸事務因應對策小組」，藉此強化國會的監督機制，此議絕對會造成行政部門喪失兩岸主導權的結果，但如果王金平退出國民黨中常會，以中立的國會議長角色在朝野間調和鼎鼐，如能發展出朝野兩岸共識，也許反而是兩岸關係的好事，但政治現實上可能性不高。
立法院絕非行政部門的「立法局」，卻也不能綁架重大法案，讓政府施政窒礙難行。要恢復兩院的良性競爭，除了行政部門強化決策品質與加強對外溝通，恐怕還得加強國會的自律與他律。解決立法濫權問題，推動國會再次改革，此其時也。
China Times News (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 17, 2014
Summary: The legislature is of course not the executive branch's "legislative bureau." But neither should it be able to hijack major bills, and make it impossible to implement government policy. We must restore healthy competition between the two branches. The executive branch must improve its decision-making and communications with the outside. The legislative branch must increase its self-discipline and discipline of others. The problem of legislative abuse of power must be solved. Now is the time to demand legislative reform.
Full text below:
Late into the night of the 14th, Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng brought down his gavel and adjourned the legislature. Amidst public demands for increased oversight, the legislature passed 146 central government budgets, setting a record for the year. But quantity is not quality. The Executive Yuan called for a referendum on the nuclear power plant number four, for pension reform , for the trade in services agreement, for the food safety bill, and for other high priority bills. These have yet to be reviewed. We must determine precisely where the problem arose, what led to legislative inaction, and what stalled national and social development?
The constitutional separation of powers treats the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan as "two wings of a bird, or two wheels of a cart." The ruling party enjoys a legislative majority. Legislation ought to pass easily. Policy ought to be easy to implement, enabling it to promote progress and prosperity. But consider the legislative record. The executive has been weak. The legislature has been strong. The balance between the two has been shattered. Power has become concentrated in the Legislative Yuan. As a result, legislation has been delayed, and the performance of the executive has suffered.
Take the referendum on the nuclear power plant number four. Jiang Yi-hua put his job on the line. He vowed that if the referendum on the nuclear power plant number four failed to pass, he would resign. But Blue Camp legislators who sponsored the referendum took advantage of the the September Ma/Wang political struggle to temporary adjourn. Ma Ying-jeou's cherished pension reform bill would have given people 30 years peace of mind. Now it is lies stillborn in the legislature. The trade in services agreement affects Taiwan's regional trade and economic integration. It also failed to receive a Third Reading.
Such is the fate of politically sensitive motions. But public welfare bills have been even less successful. The food safety bill plugs loopholes related to contaminated foodstuffs. The Executive Yuan draft amendment was presented to the Legislative Yuan. Yet 54 days later, it remains adrift, yet to be given a third reading. If this is not legislative inaction, what is legislative inaction?
This highlights a major problem confronting Taiwan: "Populism rules!" Even the legislature cannot avoid populist legislation. Legislators face reelection pressures. Consider the pension bill. Blue Camp legislators fear alienating rank and file level civil service employees and public school teachers. Green Camp legislators fear alienating labor. The result? Sacrifice pension reform. Allow the pension fund to expand until it is forced to declare bankruptcy.
Legislative inaction remains an intractable problem. When the executive branch makes mistakes, officials are given demerits, punishments, or transfers. Political appointees may be forced to resign. Legislative inaction by contrast, is only subject to voter approval every four years. This discrepancy conflicts with the principle of proportionality.
In a democracy, legislators represent the people by passing legislation and overseeing the government. Passing effective legislation is an important part of their job. The legislature must exercise greater self-discipline and improve its performance. But instead, in September, it provoked political struggle. Ker Chien-ming had the chutzpah to spin influence peddling within the criminal justice system as "judicial appeal." He affected the pose of a "fixer" who can "get you whatever you want." The Legislative Disciplinary Committee was utterly useless. As we can see, legislative self-discipline is a dead letter.
Compare the Legislative Yuan Disciplinary Commitee with the Judicial Yuan Disciplinary Committee. External forces must be introduced into the legislature. The Disciplinary Committee need not be limited to legislators. It may include civic groups approved by the legislature. It may include retired judges or legal scholars. This would prevent the Disciplinary Committee from becoming nothing more than cover-up artists. This is the first step in legislative reform.
Currently such groups as the Citizens Congress Watch and the Pocket Congress website oversee the legislature, The Legislature can incorporate these into the Disciplinary Committee. The media can send monitors to increase oversight and encourage the legislature to undergo further reform.
The executive and legislative powers have become imbalanced. This anomaly must be addressed. The executive must do a better job of explaining its policies to outsiders. Before each legislative session, it must determine which bills ought to be given priority. The ruling party must impose party discipline. As soon as talks between the ruling and opposition parties resume, it must send its bills to the legislature for a vote, and take full advantage of its legislative majority.
During the 2010 Review of the "Local Government Act," the KMT held a majority. It guided the bill to its third reading. Ma Ying-jeou was a Kuomintang Central Standing Committee member. His rallying cry was, "The majority party in the legislature is unable set the legislative agenda. If this situation is not changed, we do not deserve to be called the ruling party!" The KMT must reestablish the decisiveness and self-confidence it had back then.
Thirdly, we must enable the major and minor party whips to do their job. They must ensure that the government, the executive, and the party act in unison. The trade in services agreement has encountered obstacles to its passage. This is the result of KMT party whip Ling Hung-chi's agreeing to 16 public hearings. The "Communications Protection and Surveillance Act" swiftly passed its third reading. The Ministry of Justice, the National Police Agency complained that it would be "difficult to implement, and tie law enforcement's hands." This shows that the ruling party has serious problems with internal communications and coordination.
Ma Ying-jeou's term is nearing its end. He is about to become a lame duck. But President Ma Ying-jeou is also party chairman. This gives him certain political advantages. He has the power to nominate legislators without portfolio and regional legislators. He has many political tools at his disposal. In 2010, the government, the executive, and the party were unified under one leader. This could happen again. It all depends on how well President Ma and Chairman Ma make use of the tools at their disposal.
Backroom deals between the ruling and opposition parties have long plagued the legislature. In June of last year, the "Accounting Law" fiasco erupted. It forced the government and the executive to pass emergency legislative as corrective. The ruling and opposition party consultation system was faulty. A transparent mechanism for future negotiations must be established. The threshold for legislative caucuses may need to be raised. This would prevent obstructionism by splinter parties. A committee leader system must be established. All of the above measures must be considered.
Finally, we have the role of Wang Jin-pying. Ma and Wang, as well as the ruling and opposition parties, relate to each other in certain ways. This is the political reality. Wang Jin-pyng must choose between being a neutral Legislative Speaker and a loyal KMT member. Only then can legislative efficiency be restored. Wang Jin-pyng recently proposed the establishment of a "Legislative Yuan cross-strait affairs countermeasures team" to increase legislative oversight. This proposal would deprive the executive branch of control over cross-strait policy. Wang Jin-pying could resign from the KMT Central Standing Committee. He could assume a neutral role as legislative speaker, and mediate between the ruling and opposition parties. Perhaps then the ruling and opposition parties could develop a consensus on cross-strait policy. This could be a blessing for cross-strait relations. But given the the political realities. the odds are against it.
The legislature is of course not the executive branch's "legislative bureau." But neither should it be able to hijack major bills, and make it impossible to implement government policy. We must restore healthy competition between the two branches. The executive branch must improve its decision-making and communications with the outside. The legislative branch must increase its self-discipline and discipline of others. The problem of legislative abuse of power must be solved. Now is the time to demand legislative reform.
社論－是立法院再改革的時候了
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月16日 04:09
14日深夜，立法院長王金平敲槌宣布散會。在輿論強化對立法效能監督壓力下，本會期共通過中央政府總預算等146項議案，創下本屆最高紀錄。然而，量多不代表質精，核四公投、年金改革、《服貿協議》、《食管法》等政院設定的優先法案，仍跨不出立院大門。我們必須檢討，究竟哪個環節出了問題，造成立法怠惰、國家社會發展呆滯現象？
依憲法權力分立原則，行政、立法兩院應是「鳥之雙翼、車之兩輪」，加上執政黨擁有國會多數，本應有效掌握立法節奏，順利推動政務，帶動國家進步繁榮。但攤開立法成績單，由於行政弱勢、立法強勢，兩權均勢已被打破，權力向立法院集中，結果立法延宕、行政效能不彰。
以核四公投為例，當江宜樺賭上烏紗帽，宣稱核四公投不過就下台，提案藍委卻趁著9月馬王政爭，臨時撤案；馬英九念茲在茲的年金改革，可讓民眾安心30年，如今法案還躺在立法院；攸關台灣參與區域經貿整合的《服貿協議》，也未能三讀。
政治議案如此，民生法案更是命運坎坷。《食管法》要補起黑心食品的漏洞，政院把修正草案送到立法院後，「漂流」54天仍無法完成三讀。試問：這不是立法怠惰，什麼才叫立法怠惰？
這也凸顯台灣當前一大問題，就是民粹當道，國會也擺脫不了民粹立法。立委有連任壓力，諸如年金法案，藍委不願意得罪公教基本盤、綠委也要顧勞工選票，最後就是犧牲年金改革，放任年金破產危機繼續擴大。
立法怠惰問題難解，行政部門犯錯，還有記過、懲處或調職的處分機制，政務官也有下台的風險；立法怠惰則只能交4年一次選票檢驗，不符權責比例原則。
民主國家，國會代表人民制訂法律、監督政府，立法效能是國家效能重要環節，應靠國會自律與他律來提升效能。然而，9月政爭鬧得沸沸揚揚，當事人柯建銘竟能把「司法關說」硬拗成「司法訴苦」，發揮一皮天下無難事的功夫，立法院紀律委員會形同虛設，毫無功能，可以看出國會自律已淪為表面文章。
立法院可比照司法院檢評會，引進外部力量進入國會體制，未來紀律委員會不必由立委組成，可改由國會同意的社會公正獨立人士如卸任大法官、學者來擔任，避免紀委會淪為護航委員會，這是國會改革的第一步。
目前有公督盟、口袋國會網站等公民團體監督立法院，立法院可將其納入紀律委員會運作。此外媒體要發會監督鞭策力量，鼓動風潮，推動國會再改革工程。
導正行政與立法兩權傾斜怪現象，行政部門除了要加強對各界的政策溝通、每會期也要檢視優先法案的立法進度，執政黨更要貫徹黨紀，一過朝野協商冷凍期，就要排案送到全院院會進行表決，有效發揮國會多數優勢。
2010年審查《地方制度法》時，國民黨挾著多數席次，讓《地制法》完成三讀，馬英九當時在國民黨中常會振臂高呼，「如果沒辦法改變多數黨無法主導立法院議事運作的現象，就不配叫執政黨！」國民黨需要重建當年的決斷力與自信心。
第三，要充分發揮大小黨鞭的角色，貫徹府院黨一條鞭的領導模式。《服貿協議》至今難產，是大黨鞭林鴻池簽字同意在野黨舉辦16場公聽會的結果，這次《通保法》火速完成三讀，法務部，警政署抱怨「窒礙難行、打擊犯罪的手被束縛」，顯示執政黨內部溝通整合出了嚴重問題。
即使馬英九任期進入倒數，跛腳危機開始浮現，但馬英九仍然擁有總統兼任黨主席的政治優勢，至少握有不分區與區域立委的提名權，還有不少政治工具可用，再現2010年府院黨一條鞭領導，不是不可能，就看馬總統兼主席如何運用工具。
朝野密室協商屢被詬病，去年6月《會計法》甚至爆發烏龍修法，迫使政院必須緊急提出覆議案補正。朝野協商制度弊端叢生，未來如何建立協商透明化機制，包括是否提高黨團組成門檻、避免小黨杯葛，建立委員會領袖制度等，都是可考慮方向。
最後談到王金平的角色，以目前馬王關係及朝野關係的政治現實，王金平必須在中立的國會議長與忠誠國民黨員間做出明確選擇，立法院才能恢復應有的效率。王金平日前拋出設立「立法院兩岸事務因應對策小組」，藉此強化國會的監督機制，此議絕對會造成行政部門喪失兩岸主導權的結果，但如果王金平退出國民黨中常會，以中立的國會議長角色在朝野間調和鼎鼐，如能發展出朝野兩岸共識，也許反而是兩岸關係的好事，但政治現實上可能性不高。
立法院絕非行政部門的「立法局」，卻也不能綁架重大法案，讓政府施政窒礙難行。要恢復兩院的良性競爭，除了行政部門強化決策品質與加強對外溝通，恐怕還得加強國會的自律與他律。解決立法濫權問題，推動國會再次改革，此其時也。
Tuesday, January 14, 2014
Squaring the Circle: Su Tseng-chang Reverts to Taiwan Independence
Squaring the Circle: Su Tseng-chang Reverts to Taiwan Independence
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 15, 2014
Summary: The DPP cannot overthrow the "one China framework." In particular, it cannot successfully maintain that "one China is the People's Republic of China." This is a suicidal position. It must fight for the dignity and interests of the Republic of China under the "one China constitutional framework."
Full text below:
On May 29 last year, Su Tseng-chang said, "The DPP will not turn the clock back and promote Taiwan independence."
On Thursday however, the DPP issued its "Minutes of the 2014 China Policy Review." Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office read it, and concluded that it "obdurately clings to the one country on each side Taiwan independence stance," and that its "so-called core values are incitement of hostility and confrontation."
Has Su Tseng-chang "reverted to promoting Taiwan independence?" If he has not, and the Taiwan Affairs Office has misunderstood, then Su Tseng-chang ought to come forward and declare "I have not reverted to promoting Taiwan independence." Conversely, if the Taiwan Affairs Office is correct in its reading of the minutes, Su should come forward and explain why he reverted to promoting Taiwan independence .
In response to the Taiwan Affairs Office allegations, a DPP spokesman said, "The DPP's basic values and positions remain unchanged. However its policies must be modified for changing times." The DPP spokesman added, "It is firmer where it must be firm, and more flexible where it must be flexible." The DPP was responding to an earlier Beijing statement that "we will be firmer where we must be firm, and softer where we must be soft." This, however, precisely underscored the fundamental contradictions within the minutes. The minutes basically said "Our Taiwan independence stance must be firmer, our willingness to engage in exchanges must be more flexible." In other words, the DPP would continue its rejection of the one China constitution. it would cling to its hardcore Taiwan independence stance even while advocating broader exchanges with the Mainland.
But this is squaring the circle. It is impossible, logically as well as practically. Just as there can be no such thing as "white colored black" or "living corpses," so there can be no "flexible cross-strait exchanges under hardcore Taiwan independence." This fundamental contradiction is precisely what the minutes illustrates so clearly.
The TAO said the minutes promoted Taiwan independence. The DPP issued no denial. By default, it conceded that the minutes were essentially "Taiwan independence minutes." Ker Chien-ming proposed "freezing the Taiwan independence party platform." But the DPP rejected his proposal. This also proves that the DPP clings to Taiwan independence. Frank Hsieh advocated a "constitutional consensus." The DPP rejected that as well. One aspect was especially absurd. The DPP worked on its "China Policy" for six months. It published it on Thursday. Su Tseng-chang then announced that the DPP might consider holding a "China Policy Debate." If so, what were the five committee meetings and nine Huashan meetings all about? Game playing? Now the question is, until such a "great debate" is held and its conclusions made public, what are we to make of the DPP's "China Policy?" The DPP's "China Policy" asserts that "Our Taiwan independence stance must be firmer, our willingness to engage in exchanges must be more flexible?" Does that still count for anything at all?
The underlying premise of the minutes is that "One China is the People's Republic of China." The rest of the minutes refer to "China vs. Taiwan," to "Chinese vs. Taiwanese," and invoke "one nation on each side" political reasoning. It advocates strengthening national defense, rejecting diplomatic truce, and emphasizing Taiwan's role in the "first island chain." It even refers to cross-strait economic exchange "verbiage," to use Frank Hsieh's term. It argues that cross-strait trade "helps reinstate the KMT's old authoritarian state capitalism." (Do Taiwan companies such as Foxconn and 85 Degrees Celsius doing business on the Mainland really amount to the reinstatement of KMT authoritarian state capitalism?) it argues that cross-strait trade has widened the class gap in society. (Is cross-strait trade really the sole reason or even the main reason for the widening of the class gap?) The minutes also calls for Taiwan to join the TPP and RCEP. It underscores the DPP's irrational opposition to the trade in services agreement. (If Taiwan participates in the TPP or RCEP, how can it possibly avoid the "China factor?" The DPP wants to shut out the "China factor" by obstructing the trade in services agreement issue. But if Taiwan joins the TPP or RCEP, the "China factor" will be overwhelming.)
The "China Policy Review Minutes" brims over with Cultural Revolution era rhetoric. It is tough on the outside, but soft on the inside. It contains faulty reasoning masquerading as fierce determination. The Taiwan Affairs Office characterized it as a declaration of war on Mainland China by "hardcore Taiwan independence" elements. Needless to say, it is also a DPP declaration of war on "China Policy" within Taiwan. In practical terms, the minutes backs down. It states that "Taiwan must aggressively consolidate an internal consensus as the basis for cross-strait dialogue." This inadvertently acknowledges that a "Taiwan consensus" is nowhere to be found, and has yet to be "consolidated." The DPP inadvertently acknowledges that "to date there is no consensus, therefore we must await its consolidation." So just what is the DPP's "China Policy?" Is it self-deception, or self-amusement?
There is no such thing a "circular square." It is impossible to "square the circle." It is impossible to have "flexible cross-strait exchanges under hardcore Taiwan independence." The DPP advocates "flexible exchanges," but its rhetoric rings false. The DPP clings to Taiwan independence, but it is clearly unable to rid itself of this albatross around its neck. The minutes attempt to square the circle. The result is neither circular nor square. The square is Taiwan independence being shot. The circle is DPP exchanges being mocked.
The DPP's cross-strait policy debate has entered the "deep end of the pool." The DPP must return to one China as defined by the Republic of China Constitution. It must cease "backdoor listing" via the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." Its first step should be to reaffirm the Republic of China by endorsing "different constitutional interpretations" or "one China, different interpretations." This is the first level of the "one China framework." Its second step should be to embrace a "generic concept of China" such as the "big roof concept of China." It should seek to co-exist side by side with the People's Republic of China. This is the second level of the "one China framework."
The DPP cannot overthrow the "one China framework." In particular, it cannot successfully maintain that "one China is the People's Republic of China." This is a suicidal position. It must fight for the dignity and interests of the Republic of China under the "one China constitutional framework."
圓形的方塊：蘇貞昌回頭搞台獨
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.15 04:43 am
蘇貞昌在去年五月二十九日說：「民進黨不會回過頭去搞台獨。」
上周四，民進黨發布《二○一四對中政策檢討紀要》，被北京國台辦指為「依然頑固堅持一邊一國的台獨立場」，「以所謂核心價值煽動敵意和對抗」。
蘇貞昌是不是又「回過頭去搞台獨」了？如果不是，而是國台辦的誤讀誤解，蘇貞昌即應出面聲明「我沒有搞台獨」；反之，倘若國台辦的判讀正確，蘇貞昌也當出面解釋自己為何出爾反爾，又回頭搞台獨。
回應國台辦的指控，民進黨發言人說：「民進黨的基本價值與立場不變，但政策與時調整。」並稱：「堅定的更堅定，靈活的更靈活。」（這是針對北京的「硬的更硬，軟的更軟」）然而，這卻正是通篇《紀要》的根本矛盾所在，因為《紀要》的基本架構即是：「台獨更堅定，交流更靈活。」也就是：「否定憲法一中，站在鐵桿台獨的立場上，主張與中國擴大和平交流」。
這正如要畫一個「圓形的方塊」，在邏輯及現實上皆無可能。正如天下沒有「白的黑色」與「活的死人」，因此亦不會有「堅持台獨的兩岸靈活交流」。這個根本矛盾，正是《檢討紀要》呈現的自我矛盾。
國台辦指《紀要》是台獨，民進黨不作辯解，即是默認《紀要》本是「台獨紀要」。柯建銘主張「凍獨」，民進黨加以否定，亦反證民進黨仍是台獨。謝長廷主張「憲法共識」被排除，也反證民進黨拒絕「憲法一中」。尤其荒謬的是，經營半年的《對中政策》在上周四發布後，蘇貞昌居然又說可在黨內舉行「中國政策大辯論」，那麼，半年來這五場委員會與九場華山會議，豈不皆成兒戲？請問：在「大辯論」得出結論之前，這一套「台獨更堅定，交流更靈活」的「對中政策」究竟還算不算數？
《紀要》潛在的主軸命題是：「一個中國就是中華人民共和國。」然後通篇皆以「中國／台灣」、「中國人／台灣人」的「一邊一國」邏輯思維來進行政治推理，因而主張加強國防軍力、反對「外交休兵」，強調台灣在「第一島鏈」的角色；甚至在論及兩岸經濟交流的「堆砌文字」中（謝長廷語），也不忘回過頭來提醒兩岸經貿將促成「國民黨舊有的威權國家資本主義的復辟」（難道登陸的台商富士康與八十五度Ｃ是國民黨的威權國家資本主義復辟？），及兩岸經貿對擴大社會階級化的影響（難道兩岸經貿是階級深化的唯一原因或主要原因？）。再者，《紀要》又主張加入ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ，亦更彰顯民進黨反對《服貿協議》的無理取鬧（台灣若欲參加ＴＰＰ或ＲＣＥＰ，哪一個躲得過「中國因素」？民進黨想在《服貿協議》堵住的「中國因素」，若到了ＴＰＰ或ＲＣＥＰ，恐怕更加擋不住）。
此篇《對中政策檢討紀要》，文字充滿「文革風情」，色厲內荏，理不直而假裝氣壯。這是一篇被國台辦指為「頑固台獨」的對中國宣戰檄文，當然也是一篇觸發民進黨「對中政策內戰」的開戰公告。而在實務上，《紀要》又倒退至「應該積極凝聚台灣內部的共識做為兩岸對話基礎」，正可顯示，「台灣共識」迄今仍是不知所云，而尚待「凝聚」。然則，民進黨居然堂皇隆重推出一部「迄無共識／尚待凝聚」的「對中政策」，這是自欺欺人，或自娛娛人？
世無「圓形的方塊」，亦無「方形的圓圈」，也不可能有「堅持台獨的兩岸靈活交流」。民進黨主張「靈活交流」，可見氣虛；卻又「堅持台獨」，則可見已是不能自拔。《檢討紀要》想畫出一個「圓形的方塊」，卻不是圓又不是方；方的台獨被打槍，圓的交流被譏嘲。
民進黨內部的兩岸政策辯論已經進入「深水區」。於今之計，必須回到「一中憲法的中華民國」，不要再搞《台灣前途決議文》那一套「借殼上市」。第一步，經「憲法各表」或「一中各表」先進入中華民國的門檻（這是第一層次的「一中架構」）；然後第二步，再設法在「上位概念」的「大屋頂中國」下，尋求中華民國與中華人民共和國並立並存之道（此為第二層次的「一中架構」）。
民進黨無可能推翻「一中架構」，尤不可持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」的自殺立場，而必須在「一中憲法架構」下，爭取中華民國的尊嚴與利益。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 15, 2014
Summary: The DPP cannot overthrow the "one China framework." In particular, it cannot successfully maintain that "one China is the People's Republic of China." This is a suicidal position. It must fight for the dignity and interests of the Republic of China under the "one China constitutional framework."
Full text below:
On May 29 last year, Su Tseng-chang said, "The DPP will not turn the clock back and promote Taiwan independence."
On Thursday however, the DPP issued its "Minutes of the 2014 China Policy Review." Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office read it, and concluded that it "obdurately clings to the one country on each side Taiwan independence stance," and that its "so-called core values are incitement of hostility and confrontation."
Has Su Tseng-chang "reverted to promoting Taiwan independence?" If he has not, and the Taiwan Affairs Office has misunderstood, then Su Tseng-chang ought to come forward and declare "I have not reverted to promoting Taiwan independence." Conversely, if the Taiwan Affairs Office is correct in its reading of the minutes, Su should come forward and explain why he reverted to promoting Taiwan independence .
In response to the Taiwan Affairs Office allegations, a DPP spokesman said, "The DPP's basic values and positions remain unchanged. However its policies must be modified for changing times." The DPP spokesman added, "It is firmer where it must be firm, and more flexible where it must be flexible." The DPP was responding to an earlier Beijing statement that "we will be firmer where we must be firm, and softer where we must be soft." This, however, precisely underscored the fundamental contradictions within the minutes. The minutes basically said "Our Taiwan independence stance must be firmer, our willingness to engage in exchanges must be more flexible." In other words, the DPP would continue its rejection of the one China constitution. it would cling to its hardcore Taiwan independence stance even while advocating broader exchanges with the Mainland.
But this is squaring the circle. It is impossible, logically as well as practically. Just as there can be no such thing as "white colored black" or "living corpses," so there can be no "flexible cross-strait exchanges under hardcore Taiwan independence." This fundamental contradiction is precisely what the minutes illustrates so clearly.
The TAO said the minutes promoted Taiwan independence. The DPP issued no denial. By default, it conceded that the minutes were essentially "Taiwan independence minutes." Ker Chien-ming proposed "freezing the Taiwan independence party platform." But the DPP rejected his proposal. This also proves that the DPP clings to Taiwan independence. Frank Hsieh advocated a "constitutional consensus." The DPP rejected that as well. One aspect was especially absurd. The DPP worked on its "China Policy" for six months. It published it on Thursday. Su Tseng-chang then announced that the DPP might consider holding a "China Policy Debate." If so, what were the five committee meetings and nine Huashan meetings all about? Game playing? Now the question is, until such a "great debate" is held and its conclusions made public, what are we to make of the DPP's "China Policy?" The DPP's "China Policy" asserts that "Our Taiwan independence stance must be firmer, our willingness to engage in exchanges must be more flexible?" Does that still count for anything at all?
The underlying premise of the minutes is that "One China is the People's Republic of China." The rest of the minutes refer to "China vs. Taiwan," to "Chinese vs. Taiwanese," and invoke "one nation on each side" political reasoning. It advocates strengthening national defense, rejecting diplomatic truce, and emphasizing Taiwan's role in the "first island chain." It even refers to cross-strait economic exchange "verbiage," to use Frank Hsieh's term. It argues that cross-strait trade "helps reinstate the KMT's old authoritarian state capitalism." (Do Taiwan companies such as Foxconn and 85 Degrees Celsius doing business on the Mainland really amount to the reinstatement of KMT authoritarian state capitalism?) it argues that cross-strait trade has widened the class gap in society. (Is cross-strait trade really the sole reason or even the main reason for the widening of the class gap?) The minutes also calls for Taiwan to join the TPP and RCEP. It underscores the DPP's irrational opposition to the trade in services agreement. (If Taiwan participates in the TPP or RCEP, how can it possibly avoid the "China factor?" The DPP wants to shut out the "China factor" by obstructing the trade in services agreement issue. But if Taiwan joins the TPP or RCEP, the "China factor" will be overwhelming.)
The "China Policy Review Minutes" brims over with Cultural Revolution era rhetoric. It is tough on the outside, but soft on the inside. It contains faulty reasoning masquerading as fierce determination. The Taiwan Affairs Office characterized it as a declaration of war on Mainland China by "hardcore Taiwan independence" elements. Needless to say, it is also a DPP declaration of war on "China Policy" within Taiwan. In practical terms, the minutes backs down. It states that "Taiwan must aggressively consolidate an internal consensus as the basis for cross-strait dialogue." This inadvertently acknowledges that a "Taiwan consensus" is nowhere to be found, and has yet to be "consolidated." The DPP inadvertently acknowledges that "to date there is no consensus, therefore we must await its consolidation." So just what is the DPP's "China Policy?" Is it self-deception, or self-amusement?
There is no such thing a "circular square." It is impossible to "square the circle." It is impossible to have "flexible cross-strait exchanges under hardcore Taiwan independence." The DPP advocates "flexible exchanges," but its rhetoric rings false. The DPP clings to Taiwan independence, but it is clearly unable to rid itself of this albatross around its neck. The minutes attempt to square the circle. The result is neither circular nor square. The square is Taiwan independence being shot. The circle is DPP exchanges being mocked.
The DPP's cross-strait policy debate has entered the "deep end of the pool." The DPP must return to one China as defined by the Republic of China Constitution. It must cease "backdoor listing" via the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." Its first step should be to reaffirm the Republic of China by endorsing "different constitutional interpretations" or "one China, different interpretations." This is the first level of the "one China framework." Its second step should be to embrace a "generic concept of China" such as the "big roof concept of China." It should seek to co-exist side by side with the People's Republic of China. This is the second level of the "one China framework."
The DPP cannot overthrow the "one China framework." In particular, it cannot successfully maintain that "one China is the People's Republic of China." This is a suicidal position. It must fight for the dignity and interests of the Republic of China under the "one China constitutional framework."
圓形的方塊：蘇貞昌回頭搞台獨
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.15 04:43 am
蘇貞昌在去年五月二十九日說：「民進黨不會回過頭去搞台獨。」
上周四，民進黨發布《二○一四對中政策檢討紀要》，被北京國台辦指為「依然頑固堅持一邊一國的台獨立場」，「以所謂核心價值煽動敵意和對抗」。
蘇貞昌是不是又「回過頭去搞台獨」了？如果不是，而是國台辦的誤讀誤解，蘇貞昌即應出面聲明「我沒有搞台獨」；反之，倘若國台辦的判讀正確，蘇貞昌也當出面解釋自己為何出爾反爾，又回頭搞台獨。
回應國台辦的指控，民進黨發言人說：「民進黨的基本價值與立場不變，但政策與時調整。」並稱：「堅定的更堅定，靈活的更靈活。」（這是針對北京的「硬的更硬，軟的更軟」）然而，這卻正是通篇《紀要》的根本矛盾所在，因為《紀要》的基本架構即是：「台獨更堅定，交流更靈活。」也就是：「否定憲法一中，站在鐵桿台獨的立場上，主張與中國擴大和平交流」。
這正如要畫一個「圓形的方塊」，在邏輯及現實上皆無可能。正如天下沒有「白的黑色」與「活的死人」，因此亦不會有「堅持台獨的兩岸靈活交流」。這個根本矛盾，正是《檢討紀要》呈現的自我矛盾。
國台辦指《紀要》是台獨，民進黨不作辯解，即是默認《紀要》本是「台獨紀要」。柯建銘主張「凍獨」，民進黨加以否定，亦反證民進黨仍是台獨。謝長廷主張「憲法共識」被排除，也反證民進黨拒絕「憲法一中」。尤其荒謬的是，經營半年的《對中政策》在上周四發布後，蘇貞昌居然又說可在黨內舉行「中國政策大辯論」，那麼，半年來這五場委員會與九場華山會議，豈不皆成兒戲？請問：在「大辯論」得出結論之前，這一套「台獨更堅定，交流更靈活」的「對中政策」究竟還算不算數？
《紀要》潛在的主軸命題是：「一個中國就是中華人民共和國。」然後通篇皆以「中國／台灣」、「中國人／台灣人」的「一邊一國」邏輯思維來進行政治推理，因而主張加強國防軍力、反對「外交休兵」，強調台灣在「第一島鏈」的角色；甚至在論及兩岸經濟交流的「堆砌文字」中（謝長廷語），也不忘回過頭來提醒兩岸經貿將促成「國民黨舊有的威權國家資本主義的復辟」（難道登陸的台商富士康與八十五度Ｃ是國民黨的威權國家資本主義復辟？），及兩岸經貿對擴大社會階級化的影響（難道兩岸經貿是階級深化的唯一原因或主要原因？）。再者，《紀要》又主張加入ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ，亦更彰顯民進黨反對《服貿協議》的無理取鬧（台灣若欲參加ＴＰＰ或ＲＣＥＰ，哪一個躲得過「中國因素」？民進黨想在《服貿協議》堵住的「中國因素」，若到了ＴＰＰ或ＲＣＥＰ，恐怕更加擋不住）。
此篇《對中政策檢討紀要》，文字充滿「文革風情」，色厲內荏，理不直而假裝氣壯。這是一篇被國台辦指為「頑固台獨」的對中國宣戰檄文，當然也是一篇觸發民進黨「對中政策內戰」的開戰公告。而在實務上，《紀要》又倒退至「應該積極凝聚台灣內部的共識做為兩岸對話基礎」，正可顯示，「台灣共識」迄今仍是不知所云，而尚待「凝聚」。然則，民進黨居然堂皇隆重推出一部「迄無共識／尚待凝聚」的「對中政策」，這是自欺欺人，或自娛娛人？
世無「圓形的方塊」，亦無「方形的圓圈」，也不可能有「堅持台獨的兩岸靈活交流」。民進黨主張「靈活交流」，可見氣虛；卻又「堅持台獨」，則可見已是不能自拔。《檢討紀要》想畫出一個「圓形的方塊」，卻不是圓又不是方；方的台獨被打槍，圓的交流被譏嘲。
民進黨內部的兩岸政策辯論已經進入「深水區」。於今之計，必須回到「一中憲法的中華民國」，不要再搞《台灣前途決議文》那一套「借殼上市」。第一步，經「憲法各表」或「一中各表」先進入中華民國的門檻（這是第一層次的「一中架構」）；然後第二步，再設法在「上位概念」的「大屋頂中國」下，尋求中華民國與中華人民共和國並立並存之道（此為第二層次的「一中架構」）。
民進黨無可能推翻「一中架構」，尤不可持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」的自殺立場，而必須在「一中憲法架構」下，爭取中華民國的尊嚴與利益。
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