Elevate Information Security to the Level of National Security
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 27, 2014
Summary: Information warfare takes place on an invisible battlefield. It can determine the outcome of a war. The government must elevate information security to the level of national security. Offensive and defensive strategy should include a complete set of plans and drills. Only this can ensure that we do not fall behind. Reviewing the nation's progress in network information and Internet access is not just about speed or convenience. It is also about information security.
Full text below:
The newly implemented online household registry system was supposed to be a public convenience. But system instability, snail's pace connections and frequent crashes, have turned it into a public nuisance. What went wrong? Was it hardware or software design? Was it blunders by the contractors, the manufacturers, or officials? Public anger boiled over. Premier Chiang Yi-hua declared that "The search for administrative responsibility will be no respecter of rank." He ordered the Ministry of the Interior to review the report and make a presention this week. Interior Minister Li Hong-yuan has resigned. But information security issues cannot be ignored , The review must go on. Chiang Yi-hua must keep a close eye till the very end. He must uncover the truth.
Problems with eTag information security have already provoked considerable controversy. The new household registry system was contracted out. The information infrastructure is closely related to public welfare. When things go awry, they highlight potential security risks. The government must not view the household registry system crash only from a technical perspective. That would be negligent and slapdash. The crash should be viewed from a national security perspective, as a comprehensive review of domestic information security. Just exactly which information security vulnerabilities need reinforcement?
Take eTag. The Executive Yuan Information Security Office found that the outsourced contractor programming was faulty. There was also insufficient bandwidth. The result was traffic jams and gridlock, rather than distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks by hackers. The eTag network has numerous external links. Yuantong failed to build a sufficiently high firewall. Yuantong itself is a "data tycoon." It possesses information on millions of vehicles on the national highways. There is no guarantee that hackers will not zero on on this fatted calf.
The household registry system is a closed network. It has no links to the outside. But staff or system vendors could plant a virus to steal data. Government officials used USB sockets on the PCs to charge their cell phones. The phones contained malware which then stole passwords. Audio files were sent out via USB devices.
Ministry of Defence information projects are outsourced. Huan An Da is the 2014 contractor for Department of Defense computer equipment maintenance. It is the 2014 contractor for its document management system, NSB telephone exchange system maintenance, national road traffic control systems, and Railway Bureau Information System maintenance. If people with ulterior motives intrude through the vendor, the consequences could be disastrous.
No national infrastructure Internet attacks have occurred so far. But if they had, they could have caused aircraft collisions, stopped water and electricity, caused traffic light failures, forced medical facilities to shut down, and wreaked havoc to the banking system. A "9-11 of the Internet" could well be part of any future war. Information warfare could be combined with military operations. First, hackers paralyze the infrastructure, including the electrical power grid. Then, troops invade.
North Korea may already have begun to use the Internet as a means of warfare. Late last March, computer networks for three television stations and six financial institutions in South Korea were hacked. South Korea tracked the hacker's IP address to the Mainland. They think North Korea may have launched an indirect attack on South Korea. They think the hackers may have used a complex Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack to paralyze their computer networks.
The Mainland Peoples Liberation Army already understands future war strategy. Mouse clicks are more important than trigger pulls. It is rapidly building up its "Internet Brigades." The United States and the European Union also hold regular information security exercises. They have upgraded Internet offense and defense to the level of military offense and defense, all in the name of national security. Many nations engage in cyberwarfare. In the past, they merely sole secrets. Now they have graduated. Now they access the infrastructure. They can then enter any time they wish. They can destroy or damage a hostile nation's transportation and financial systems.
The National Security Council and the Executive Yuan have established an information security office to coordinate overall national security. Information security exercises will be held annually. The Hengshan Command's annual political and economic military exercises include network attacks that paralyze transportation and administrative systems. But these by themselves are not sufficient.
Late last year the Executive Yuan Office of Information Security issued its "Internet Attack and Defense Scenarios," which noted that social networking engineering message drills show that some agencies open or click on as many as 20% of all webpages. They lack vigilance. It is clearly necessary to improve information security education. The Executive Yuan should develop incentive mechanisms to prevent civil servants from becoming Internet liabilities.
The Executive Yuan has divided government agencies into four categories. These include "defense, administrative, and academic," "water, electricity, oil , and natural gas," "transportation, communications, networking, ATC," and "financial, securities, GATT, medical." Information security protection systems will be built around them. But technological advances never end. Hacker tactics are constantly evolving. The government must provide budgets. It must regularly update its protection measures.
The government outsources its BOT projects. These include major construction projects such as high-speed rail and Yuantong ETC systems. These must be built according to government information security protection measures. These requirements must be written into contracts, and be applied to all future BOT projects. BOT project involve the outsourcing of operations. But most are part of basic infrastructure. If problems arise, they affect the rights of everyone. Therefore the government must assume responsibility.
How should we prevent information leaks? Take the technical perspective. An eTag system or household registry system may contain leaks. Hackers may be able to steal information through various channels. Therefore strengthening network information security is essential for confidentiality. Other nations have adopted the concept of differential privacy. Some information will deliberately be made ambiguous. This will avoid disclosing exact information when performing Internet searches or when making use of data.
Information warfare takes place on an invisible battlefield. It can determine the outcome of a war. The government must elevate information security to the level of national security. Offensive and defensive strategy should include a complete set of plans and drills. Only this can ensure that we do not fall behind. Reviewing the nation's progress in network information and Internet access is not just about speed or convenience. It is also about information security.
社論－從國安層級防範資安風險
稍後再讀
中國時報 編輯部 2014年02月27日 04:10
宣稱是便民措施的新戶政系統上線，卻因系統不穩、龜速連線、頻頻當機，結果變成擾民措施，到底是軟硬體設計、承包廠商施工或官員決策錯誤，哪一個環節出了紕漏？民怨沸騰下，行政院長江宜樺宣示「行政究責沒有層級限制」，要求內政部本周內提出檢討報告。內政部長李鴻源雖已去職，但資安問題不容輕忽，檢討工作不可停頓，江院長必須緊盯到底，讓真相水落石出。
eTag資安已引起重大爭議，新戶政系統又出包，這些與民眾息息相關的資訊基礎建設相繼出狀況，凸顯資安潛藏極大風險。政府若把戶政當機視為個案，僅從技術端來檢討，恐流於輕忽、草率，應從國安層級來全面檢視國內資安問題，到底還有哪些資安漏洞需要補強？
就以eTag為例，行政院資安辦公室認定委外包商程式設計不良，加上頻寬不足，才導致塞車癱瘓，而非是遭駭客阻斷式（DDos）攻擊。然而，不論eTag網路系統與外部連結，加上遠通並未建置高規格的防火牆，遠通本身已是「資料大亨」，握有每日上國道數百萬輛車子的資訊，難保不會成為駭客覬覦的肥羊。
至於戶政系統雖屬於封閉網路系統，並未與外部網路連結，仍可能透過工作人員或系統廠商接觸，植入病毒竊取資料。先前就有某政府機關官員，利用電腦USB讓手機充電，結果因為手機內部藏有惡意程式而中毒，導致內部電腦系統遭盜取密碼並錄音檔透過USB裝置傳送出去。
而國防部建置的資訊工程都是委外承包，光是「環安達」就承包國防部103年度電腦設備維護、後指部103年公文暨檔案管理系統、國安局電話交換機系統維護，還有國道交通管制系統、鐵路局資訊系統維護等多項工程，倘若有心人士透過廠商端入侵，後果不堪設想。
雖然尚未發生任何針對國家基礎設施的網路攻擊事件，但若發生，可能造成飛機相撞、斷水斷電、紅綠燈失靈、醫療設施停擺、銀行帳戶錯亂情勢；所謂的「網路911」，在未來戰爭是極可能發生的，而且是資訊戰結合軍事行動，先由網軍出擊癱瘓電力等基礎設施，接著派兵入侵。
北韓可能已經開始運用網路戰爭手段，去年3月下旬，南韓3家電視台和6家金融機構的電腦網路，遭駭客攻擊大當機；南韓追蹤出駭客的IP位址來自大陸，研判北韓可能間接對南韓發動網攻，而且駭客可能是以複雜的「進階持續性滲透攻擊」（APT）癱瘓電腦網路。
大陸解放軍早已了解未來的戰爭型態，「動滑鼠」比「扣扳機」還重要，急起直追建立網軍部隊；美國與歐盟也固定舉行資安演習，將網路攻防提升到國家層級的軍事演練。如今，許多國家的網軍攻擊型態，已從過去的單純竊取機密，慢慢變成對基礎設施的入侵，一旦需要的時候就可以進入、破壞，危害到敵對國的交通運輸和金融秩序等。
國安會與行政院已成立「資訊安全辦公室」統籌國家的整體安全防護，每年固定舉辦資安演習；在衡山指揮的年度政經兵推，也把網路攻擊、駭客癱瘓交通與行政系統列為演習想定，但這些作為仍有不足。
行政院資安辦公室去年底「網路攻防演練辦理情形」指出，社交工程郵件演練，居然有少數機關的開啟或點閱率高達20%，根本毫無警覺心，顯然有必要強化資安教育，行政院應擬定獎懲機制，避免公務員變成網路漏洞。
行政院雖把政府機關區分為「國防、行政、學術」、「水、電、石油、瓦斯」、「交通、通信、網路、航管」、「金融、證券、關貿、醫療」等4級來建置資安防護體系，但科技日新月異，駭客手法不斷翻新，政府更要編列預算，定期更新防護措施。
此外，政府委外BOT案，諸如重大建設如高鐵、遠通ETC等系統，也要比照政府機關的資安防護措施來建置，這些要求必須寫入合約，並適用於未來所有BOT案。因為BOT案雖是委外經營，大都屬於重大基礎建設，一旦出問題不僅影響民眾權益，政府也有相對責任。
至於如何防範個資外洩？從技術上看，不論是eTag或戶政系統都有漏洞，駭客仍可能透過各種管道來竊取大量的民眾資訊，因而強化網路資訊保密是最基本的要求。目前國外也開始推行差分隱私（differential privacy）的概念，刻意將某些資料模糊化，避免在查詢或使用資料時，透露確切的資訊。
資訊戰是一個看不見的戰場，卻能決定一場戰爭的勝負，政府除將資安提升至國安層級外，相關攻防戰略亦應有套完備計畫與演練，才不會落至後手；檢驗一個國家網路資訊進步程度，不只是網路速度或上網便利性，資安也是重要一環。
Wednesday, February 26, 2014
Tuesday, February 25, 2014
Sun Yat-sen: Nanjing Can Accept Him. Tainan Cannot
Sun Yat-sen: Nanjing Can Accept Him. Tainan Cannot
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 26, 2014
Summary: Compare the bronze statue in the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing with the Sun Yat-sen statue in Tainan's Tang Dezhang Park. Sun Yatsen was broad-minded and profound. Taiwan independence zealots are narrow-minded and superficial. The two sides must think anew and confront the reality of the Republic of China.
Full text below:
On February 12, Wang Yu-chi, in his official capacity as Mainland Affairs Council Chairman, laid a wreath at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing. He then delivered a speech. He spoke of the era of Republic of China rule over the Mainland, using official titles. He spoke of "extolling the Father of the Nation," of the "Founding of the Republic," of the "Three People's Principles and Five Powers Constitution," of the "1992 consensus, seeking common ground while setting aside differences," of "facing reality," and of "Win-win." At the Bo Ai Plaza he declared, "The Republic of China has been in existence for 103 years."
On February 18, at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, Lien Chan told Xi Jinping, "Everyone should acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China." He said, "During the process of expanding cross-strait relations, the Republic of China is an asset, not a liability." Xi Jinping's response was, "As long as something helps cross-strait relations, it can be discussed."
On February 22, at the Tainan Tangde Memorial Park, Green Camp Taiwan independence advocates pulled down the bronze statue of Sun Yat-sen. On the back of the statue they spray painted the words "ROC OUT." This is Chinglish for "Throw the ROC out!" On the front they spray painted the words, "KMT DOWN." This is Chinglish for "KMT, step down!"
These three scenes played out on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait over a ten day period. The Blue Camp seeks to uphold the Republic of China's status within the "one China framework." Green Camp Taiwan independence zealots seek to repudiate the Republic of China, and sever all links with "China." Pulling down the statue of Sun Yat-sen was a symbolic attempt to sever the cross-strait link. This is the major difference between the Blue and Green camps on cross-strait policy. It can be evaluated from two perspectives, "inside Taiwan" and "internationally and cross-strait."
Consider the "inside Taiwan" perspective. The Republic of China's constitutional democracy has evolved to the point where calls for the KMT to step down are not a problem. After all, the DPP controlled the central government for eight years. In the Tainan region, the KMT has been out of power for over 16 years. Even calls to "Throw the ROC out!" are tolerated. For example, some political parties openly demand Taiwan independence. Even ROC President Chen Shui-bian openly demagogued the "rectification of names" issue. Consequently, pulling down the statue of Sun Yat-sen is merely "destruction of public property." And spray painting "Throw out the Republic of China!" is merely "freedom of speech."
The Republic of China is a rare bird. It is a democratic nation that tolerates demands tha tit be overthrown. It is highly tolerant of Taiwan independence. It bends over backwards for it. The political shennanigans perpetrated by the DPP during its eight year rule demonstrated that independence is unattainable to everyone inside and outside Taiwan. Taiwan independence has been unable to implement the "rectification of names" and subvert the Republic of China by means of the democratic process. Pulling down a bronze statue of Sun Yat-sen does not prove that Taiwan independence is a righteous cause. It is a political faux pas that merely reveals one's intolerance. Without 65 years of Republic of China governance, established by Sun Yat-sen, the statue in the park would have been Mao Zedong's, and the Tang Dezhang Park would did not exist.
Consider the "international and cross-strait" perspective. The Wang Zhang meeting and Lien Xi meeting in February show that the two sides seek a solution in between "not state to state relations" and "acknowledging the existence of the Republic of China." In other words, they must establish a big roof concept of one China that can acknowledge and accomodate the Republic of China. This is precisely why when Wang and Zhang referred to each other by their official titles, it was seen as a sign of progress by the international community, especially the U.S. and the EU.
Consider international "one China" strategic theory. For Taiwan, Sun Yat-sen and the ROC are links within the "one China framework" difficult to break. They are the primary lever by which Taipei can counter political pressure from Beijing. Sun Yat-sen's authority on Mainland China is unchallenged. This is due to the ideal of the Three People's Principles. Its moral authority cannot be denied. Even Beijing reveres Sun Yat-sen. Can a handful of Taiwan independence zealots demonize Sun Yat-sen by pulling down his statue? Cross-strait relations have entered "deep water." Sun Yat-sen and the ROC are Taipei's chief credentials vis a vis Beijing. Pulling down a statue of Sun Yat-sen and shouting "Throw the ROC out!" are foolish and suicidal acts that merely reveal one's ignorance about the international strategic situation.
Taiwan independence zealots pulled down the statue of Sun Yat-sen. They abetted the Taiwan independence agenda. They rejected the trade in services agreement. Taiwan must become more closely associated with Sun Yatsen and the Republic of China. This will enable it cope with growing pressure from Beijing. Yet Taiwan independence zealots choose to spit into the wind.
Beijing once said that "The Republic of China is no more." Taiwan independence zealots scream, "Throw the ROC out!" At the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum Wang Yu-chi said, "The ROC has been in existence for 103 years." In Beijing, Lien Chan urged everyone to "acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China." Yet Taiwan independence zealots pulled down the statue of Sun Yat-sen. Beijing told "Republic of China" officials that "Anything can be discussed." Yet Taiwan independence zealots still want to "Throw the Republic of China out!" Little do they know that Taiwan is the water. The ROC is the glass. As long as the glass remains, the water will stay in the glass. Once the glass is broken, the water will run off.
Compare the bronze statue in the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing with the Sun Yat-sen statue in Tainan's Tang Dezhang Park. Sun Yatsen was broad-minded and profound. Taiwan independence zealots are narrow-minded and superficial. The two sides must think anew and confront the reality of the Republic of China.
孫中山：南京能容 台南不容
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.26 03:04 am
二月十二日，在南京中山陵，王郁琦以陸委會主委的正式官銜獻花，並以中華民國紀元及正式官銜宣讀祭文，內容呈現「偉哉國父」、「民國肇建」、「三民主義、五權憲法」、「九二共識，求同存異」、「正視現實」、「共創雙贏」等立場。又在陵區博愛廣場宣示：「中華民國已經一○三年了。」
二月十八日，在北京釣魚台賓館，連戰對習近平說，「中華民國大家應該來正視」；又說，「中華民國在兩岸關係拓展的過程中，是一個資產，不是負債」。習近平的回應是：「只要對兩岸關係有幫助，都可以提出來談。」
二月二十二日，在台南湯德章紀念公園，綠營獨派拖倒了孫中山銅像，在銅像背面噴漆寫著「ROC OUT」（中華民國滾蛋），正面噴上「KMT DOWN」（國民黨下台）。
這十日之間出現在兩岸的三個場景顯示：藍營兩岸政策的主軸訴求是，在「一中架構」中力爭中華民國的地位；綠營獨派兩岸政策的主軸訴求則是否定中華民國，並據以斬斷與「中國」的一切「連結點」，拖倒孫中山銅像正是企圖斬斷兩岸「連結點」的象徵之作。這是台灣藍綠雙方對兩岸政策「兩條路線」的主要分歧，可從「台灣內部」及「國際與兩岸」兩方面略作析論：
就台灣內部言。中華民國的憲政民主進展至今日，其實，「KMT DOWN」已不是問題，因為民進黨曾執中央政權八年（在大台南地區，KMT也已OUT超過十六年）；甚至連「ROC OUT」亦可存在於中華民國的民主議程之中，例如，有公開倡議台獨的政黨、有公開運作的台獨活動，連中華民國總統陳水扁亦可公開操作「正名制憲」。所以，拖倒「國父銅像」可能只涉「毀損公物」，而噴漆「中華民國滾蛋」也是「言論自由」。
其實，中華民國是全世界少見竟能容忍「顛覆國家」的民主體制；這對台獨而言，已是最大的包容，可謂「仁至義盡」。但是，民進黨執中央政權八年的台獨操作，已可證實無論對內及對外，台獨皆無可能實現。爾今，台獨不能循民主路徑「正名制憲」來顛覆中華民國，卻出以拖倒孫中山銅像的這一幕；這絕不能顯示台獨的正大，其實卻是違背民主互重共容的政治醜行。如果台灣六十五年來在法理上不是由孫中山創建的中華民國治理，在這個公園裡的銅像將是毛澤東，而「湯德章公園」也根本不可能存在。
再談國際及兩岸。二月的王張會及連習會顯示，兩岸正嘗試在「不是國與國的關係」及「正視中華民國」之間，找尋解決方案。也就是說，必須建立一個「正視及容納中華民國」的「大屋頂一中架構」；這也正是「王張互稱官銜」的進展受到國際輿論高度肯定的理由（尤其是美國與歐盟）。
就國際間「一個中國」的戰略論，對台灣而言，「孫中山／中華民國」既是與「一中架構」難以切割的連結點，也是平衡北京壓力的主要政治槓桿。孫中山在中國大陸之所以屹立不搖，是因三民主義的理想性、道德性不可能被摧毀；而連北京政府亦仍尊崇孫中山，幾個台獨分子難道想用拖倒銅像就否定孫中山？伴隨兩岸關係進入「深水區」，「孫中山／中華民國」將是台灣應對北京的主要憑藉；拖倒孫中山銅像及叫囂「ROC OUT」，這類愚妄行為不啻皆是對國際戰略無知的政治自殺行徑。
台獨人士拖倒孫中山銅像、包庇台獨課綱、杯葛《服貿協議》，這些作為顯然與台灣必須愈來愈憑藉「孫中山／中華民國」來應對北京壓力的大局走勢背道而馳，因而亦隱然呈現了一個值得玩味的政治悖論：
北京曾謂「中華民國已經滅亡」，台獨則迄仍叫囂「ROC OUT」；王郁琦在中山陵說「中華民國已一○三年」，連戰在北京主張「正視中華民國」，台獨入士則在台南拖倒孫中山銅像；北京當局對「中華民國」釋出「什麼都可以提出來談」的訊息，台獨仍兀自主張「中華民國滾蛋」，殊不知：「台灣是水，中華民國是杯；杯在水在，杯破水覆。」
這儼然是南京中山陵國父銅像與台南湯德章公園國父銅像的一個政治對照；映照出孫中山的博大深厚、台獨的愚妄淺薄，與兩岸必須對「正視中華民國」作出新思考。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 26, 2014
Summary: Compare the bronze statue in the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing with the Sun Yat-sen statue in Tainan's Tang Dezhang Park. Sun Yatsen was broad-minded and profound. Taiwan independence zealots are narrow-minded and superficial. The two sides must think anew and confront the reality of the Republic of China.
Full text below:
On February 12, Wang Yu-chi, in his official capacity as Mainland Affairs Council Chairman, laid a wreath at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing. He then delivered a speech. He spoke of the era of Republic of China rule over the Mainland, using official titles. He spoke of "extolling the Father of the Nation," of the "Founding of the Republic," of the "Three People's Principles and Five Powers Constitution," of the "1992 consensus, seeking common ground while setting aside differences," of "facing reality," and of "Win-win." At the Bo Ai Plaza he declared, "The Republic of China has been in existence for 103 years."
On February 18, at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, Lien Chan told Xi Jinping, "Everyone should acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China." He said, "During the process of expanding cross-strait relations, the Republic of China is an asset, not a liability." Xi Jinping's response was, "As long as something helps cross-strait relations, it can be discussed."
On February 22, at the Tainan Tangde Memorial Park, Green Camp Taiwan independence advocates pulled down the bronze statue of Sun Yat-sen. On the back of the statue they spray painted the words "ROC OUT." This is Chinglish for "Throw the ROC out!" On the front they spray painted the words, "KMT DOWN." This is Chinglish for "KMT, step down!"
These three scenes played out on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait over a ten day period. The Blue Camp seeks to uphold the Republic of China's status within the "one China framework." Green Camp Taiwan independence zealots seek to repudiate the Republic of China, and sever all links with "China." Pulling down the statue of Sun Yat-sen was a symbolic attempt to sever the cross-strait link. This is the major difference between the Blue and Green camps on cross-strait policy. It can be evaluated from two perspectives, "inside Taiwan" and "internationally and cross-strait."
Consider the "inside Taiwan" perspective. The Republic of China's constitutional democracy has evolved to the point where calls for the KMT to step down are not a problem. After all, the DPP controlled the central government for eight years. In the Tainan region, the KMT has been out of power for over 16 years. Even calls to "Throw the ROC out!" are tolerated. For example, some political parties openly demand Taiwan independence. Even ROC President Chen Shui-bian openly demagogued the "rectification of names" issue. Consequently, pulling down the statue of Sun Yat-sen is merely "destruction of public property." And spray painting "Throw out the Republic of China!" is merely "freedom of speech."
The Republic of China is a rare bird. It is a democratic nation that tolerates demands tha tit be overthrown. It is highly tolerant of Taiwan independence. It bends over backwards for it. The political shennanigans perpetrated by the DPP during its eight year rule demonstrated that independence is unattainable to everyone inside and outside Taiwan. Taiwan independence has been unable to implement the "rectification of names" and subvert the Republic of China by means of the democratic process. Pulling down a bronze statue of Sun Yat-sen does not prove that Taiwan independence is a righteous cause. It is a political faux pas that merely reveals one's intolerance. Without 65 years of Republic of China governance, established by Sun Yat-sen, the statue in the park would have been Mao Zedong's, and the Tang Dezhang Park would did not exist.
Consider the "international and cross-strait" perspective. The Wang Zhang meeting and Lien Xi meeting in February show that the two sides seek a solution in between "not state to state relations" and "acknowledging the existence of the Republic of China." In other words, they must establish a big roof concept of one China that can acknowledge and accomodate the Republic of China. This is precisely why when Wang and Zhang referred to each other by their official titles, it was seen as a sign of progress by the international community, especially the U.S. and the EU.
Consider international "one China" strategic theory. For Taiwan, Sun Yat-sen and the ROC are links within the "one China framework" difficult to break. They are the primary lever by which Taipei can counter political pressure from Beijing. Sun Yat-sen's authority on Mainland China is unchallenged. This is due to the ideal of the Three People's Principles. Its moral authority cannot be denied. Even Beijing reveres Sun Yat-sen. Can a handful of Taiwan independence zealots demonize Sun Yat-sen by pulling down his statue? Cross-strait relations have entered "deep water." Sun Yat-sen and the ROC are Taipei's chief credentials vis a vis Beijing. Pulling down a statue of Sun Yat-sen and shouting "Throw the ROC out!" are foolish and suicidal acts that merely reveal one's ignorance about the international strategic situation.
Taiwan independence zealots pulled down the statue of Sun Yat-sen. They abetted the Taiwan independence agenda. They rejected the trade in services agreement. Taiwan must become more closely associated with Sun Yatsen and the Republic of China. This will enable it cope with growing pressure from Beijing. Yet Taiwan independence zealots choose to spit into the wind.
Beijing once said that "The Republic of China is no more." Taiwan independence zealots scream, "Throw the ROC out!" At the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum Wang Yu-chi said, "The ROC has been in existence for 103 years." In Beijing, Lien Chan urged everyone to "acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China." Yet Taiwan independence zealots pulled down the statue of Sun Yat-sen. Beijing told "Republic of China" officials that "Anything can be discussed." Yet Taiwan independence zealots still want to "Throw the Republic of China out!" Little do they know that Taiwan is the water. The ROC is the glass. As long as the glass remains, the water will stay in the glass. Once the glass is broken, the water will run off.
Compare the bronze statue in the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing with the Sun Yat-sen statue in Tainan's Tang Dezhang Park. Sun Yatsen was broad-minded and profound. Taiwan independence zealots are narrow-minded and superficial. The two sides must think anew and confront the reality of the Republic of China.
孫中山：南京能容 台南不容
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.26 03:04 am
二月十二日，在南京中山陵，王郁琦以陸委會主委的正式官銜獻花，並以中華民國紀元及正式官銜宣讀祭文，內容呈現「偉哉國父」、「民國肇建」、「三民主義、五權憲法」、「九二共識，求同存異」、「正視現實」、「共創雙贏」等立場。又在陵區博愛廣場宣示：「中華民國已經一○三年了。」
二月十八日，在北京釣魚台賓館，連戰對習近平說，「中華民國大家應該來正視」；又說，「中華民國在兩岸關係拓展的過程中，是一個資產，不是負債」。習近平的回應是：「只要對兩岸關係有幫助，都可以提出來談。」
二月二十二日，在台南湯德章紀念公園，綠營獨派拖倒了孫中山銅像，在銅像背面噴漆寫著「ROC OUT」（中華民國滾蛋），正面噴上「KMT DOWN」（國民黨下台）。
這十日之間出現在兩岸的三個場景顯示：藍營兩岸政策的主軸訴求是，在「一中架構」中力爭中華民國的地位；綠營獨派兩岸政策的主軸訴求則是否定中華民國，並據以斬斷與「中國」的一切「連結點」，拖倒孫中山銅像正是企圖斬斷兩岸「連結點」的象徵之作。這是台灣藍綠雙方對兩岸政策「兩條路線」的主要分歧，可從「台灣內部」及「國際與兩岸」兩方面略作析論：
就台灣內部言。中華民國的憲政民主進展至今日，其實，「KMT DOWN」已不是問題，因為民進黨曾執中央政權八年（在大台南地區，KMT也已OUT超過十六年）；甚至連「ROC OUT」亦可存在於中華民國的民主議程之中，例如，有公開倡議台獨的政黨、有公開運作的台獨活動，連中華民國總統陳水扁亦可公開操作「正名制憲」。所以，拖倒「國父銅像」可能只涉「毀損公物」，而噴漆「中華民國滾蛋」也是「言論自由」。
其實，中華民國是全世界少見竟能容忍「顛覆國家」的民主體制；這對台獨而言，已是最大的包容，可謂「仁至義盡」。但是，民進黨執中央政權八年的台獨操作，已可證實無論對內及對外，台獨皆無可能實現。爾今，台獨不能循民主路徑「正名制憲」來顛覆中華民國，卻出以拖倒孫中山銅像的這一幕；這絕不能顯示台獨的正大，其實卻是違背民主互重共容的政治醜行。如果台灣六十五年來在法理上不是由孫中山創建的中華民國治理，在這個公園裡的銅像將是毛澤東，而「湯德章公園」也根本不可能存在。
再談國際及兩岸。二月的王張會及連習會顯示，兩岸正嘗試在「不是國與國的關係」及「正視中華民國」之間，找尋解決方案。也就是說，必須建立一個「正視及容納中華民國」的「大屋頂一中架構」；這也正是「王張互稱官銜」的進展受到國際輿論高度肯定的理由（尤其是美國與歐盟）。
就國際間「一個中國」的戰略論，對台灣而言，「孫中山／中華民國」既是與「一中架構」難以切割的連結點，也是平衡北京壓力的主要政治槓桿。孫中山在中國大陸之所以屹立不搖，是因三民主義的理想性、道德性不可能被摧毀；而連北京政府亦仍尊崇孫中山，幾個台獨分子難道想用拖倒銅像就否定孫中山？伴隨兩岸關係進入「深水區」，「孫中山／中華民國」將是台灣應對北京的主要憑藉；拖倒孫中山銅像及叫囂「ROC OUT」，這類愚妄行為不啻皆是對國際戰略無知的政治自殺行徑。
台獨人士拖倒孫中山銅像、包庇台獨課綱、杯葛《服貿協議》，這些作為顯然與台灣必須愈來愈憑藉「孫中山／中華民國」來應對北京壓力的大局走勢背道而馳，因而亦隱然呈現了一個值得玩味的政治悖論：
北京曾謂「中華民國已經滅亡」，台獨則迄仍叫囂「ROC OUT」；王郁琦在中山陵說「中華民國已一○三年」，連戰在北京主張「正視中華民國」，台獨入士則在台南拖倒孫中山銅像；北京當局對「中華民國」釋出「什麼都可以提出來談」的訊息，台獨仍兀自主張「中華民國滾蛋」，殊不知：「台灣是水，中華民國是杯；杯在水在，杯破水覆。」
這儼然是南京中山陵國父銅像與台南湯德章公園國父銅像的一個政治對照；映照出孫中山的博大深厚、台獨的愚妄淺薄，與兩岸必須對「正視中華民國」作出新思考。
Privatization of State Owned Enterprises Requires a Steady Hand and a Clear Eye
Privatization of State Owned Enterprises Requires a Steady Hand and a Clear Eye
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 25, 2014
Summary: The NDC is the cerebrum of the Executive Yuan. The CEPD's role is more important than in the past. The National Development Council plan for privatization and the issuance of public shares must be financially sound and carefully planned. It must be executed as soon as possible, in order to save Taiwan's economic future.
Full text below:
The National Development Council will report to the Executive Yuan on the economic feasibility of the privatization policy and shares issuance plan. The nation needs long-term competitiveness. The privatization of state-owned enterprises is painful but inescapable. The public has long been skeptical of SOE privatization and share issuance. The NDC must be cautious. It must not plunder the national treasury and enrich the conglomerates. It must not result in a chilling effect.
First, we must point out why the public is so unhappy with government policy. Two years ago, hikes in gasoline prices and electricity rates provoked intense public resentment. Last year, electricity rates were hiked yet again. The government claimed that 80% of households and businesses were unaffected. But the knock-on effect was widespread. This is why the government's approval rating is down to single digits. Another cause was the first hike in gasoline prices and electricity rates. The government vowed to conduct a thorough review of Taipower and China Petroleum. But it failed to deliver. This led to the second rate hike and intensified public dissatisfaction. The government must of course act. The government dispatched two vice ministers of economic affairs to assume the chairmanship of Taipower and the chairmanship of China Petroleum. After serving as chairmen of the two SOEs, the two mean repeatedly said the SOEs should be privatized. They even drafted plans. But these never got beyond the planning stage. They failed to take any real action. They failed to implement any state-owned enterprise reform. As a result, the public lost faith in the government.
The NDC mentioned the issuance of public shares. The government intends to retain control over most of the shares, which exceed the number of shares issued. They will be non-voting shares. The legislature will not decide who has priority. Shares will be issued to the public. The assets were obtained from the public. The benefits will be returned to the public. This will avoid suspicions about conglomerates monopolizing the shares. The government intends to completely divest itself of all shares. But it has adopted a phased approach to share issuance. The government is reducing its interference in the private sector to a minimum. This is basically the right direction. But a problem persists. How will future privatization be conducted? For the moment the National Development Council has no answer.
We suggested a better way to privatize SOEs and improve operational efficiency in a previous editorial. Transform them into "publicly held but privately operated" enterprises, by issuing shares on the market. We suggested clearly calculating the cost of operating state-owned enterprises. They must all becomee profit centers. Let business be business. Let the market be the market. Let authority and responsibilities be clearly defined. This will provide incentives and boost performance. Those parts to be privatized should be dissolved. Shares should be issued, allowing them to compete with similar companies. The state-owned enterprises that are privatized will no longer be a burden. They will become cash cows. They may even generate sustainable financial returns that enrich the treasury.
Market competition is the most important concept in economics. Manufacturers want to maximize profits. But competition forces them to redouble their efforts and reduce costs. Otherwise they will not survive. In a competitive market, consumers may pick and choose as they wish. They may choose the products they are most satisfied with. Societies allocate resources more efficiently. Nations grow more rapidly.
So how should shares be issued? Actually, over the past several years, the government has been in the red. Every year share dividends become income for the National Treasury. But the price is often high and the turnover limited. Therefore the government must not sell the stock too cheaply. But there is another problem. Fair market value is currently 1.7 trillion. When the public shares are all sold, the government will cease receiving revenue.
Unions for state-owned enterprises argue that selling off state-owned enterprises sells off our national heritage. They equate it with the euphemistic "second financial reform," which made a present of national assets to well connected conglomerates. They say it will result in future electricity rate hikes and gasoline price hikes. But these concerns have solutions.
We propose that the government incorporate shares issued into a new fund. The fund may make additional investments and profits to cover the budget deficit. In other words, the income from the issuance of shares must not be treated as disposable income for the national treasury. The state-owned enterprises should receive private blue chip stocks in exchange for their shares. This will enable them to continue generating revenue.
Privatized state-owned enterprises must issue stock. Allowing every citizen to purchase shares will prevent conglomerates from monopolizing ownership. But state-owned enterprises such as China Petroleum and Taipower affect people's livelihood. The government should sell only a portion of the shares, and retain control over the companies. The government need not appoint the chairman or general manager. These duties can be handed over to professional managers. Companies must be able to withstand the test of the market. Their finances must be transparent. Those parts of state-owned enterprises that cannot be isolated and sold off, must abide by government policy. Pricing must be clear. Budgets must cover them. No ambiguity, corruption, opacity, or lack of accountabilty is allowed.
The NDC is the cerebrum of the Executive Yuan. The CEPD's role is more important than in the past. The National Development Council plan for privatization and the issuance of public shares must be financially sound and carefully planned. It must be executed as soon as possible, in order to save Taiwan's economic future.
社論－國營事業民營化 須行穩致遠
稍後再讀
中國時報 編輯部 2014年02月25日 04:10
國發會將向政院報告財政健全方案中的民營化政策及公股釋股計畫，基於國家長期競爭力的考量，國營事業民營化是無可逃避的痛苦選擇，但長期以來，社會對國營事業民營化及其釋股頗有疑慮，國發會規畫方案必須謹慎，既不能造成掏空國家資產、圖利財團的疑慮，更不容產生殺雞取卵的後果。
首先我們要指出，為什麼目前政府的施政滿意度如此低迷？前年油電雙漲引起巨大民怨，去年電價再漲，雖然政府宣稱80％家庭、商家不受影響，但引起廣泛的物價上漲連鎖效應，是讓施政滿意度降到個位數重大的原因。另一個關鍵是第一次漲價後，政府承諾要檢討台電中油，但是並沒有交出成績單，造成第二次上漲，人民不能心服。當然，政府也不是沒有作為，先後派了兩位經濟部次長分任台電、中油的董座，兩位董座任職後多次表示應該民營化，也提出了藍圖，但是迄今止於紙上談兵，沒有實際的作為，也沒有讓人民看到國營事業有任何改革跡象，人心因而對政府失望。
國發會提到針對公股釋股，擬選擇政府持股比率大、釋出金額多、不具政策性任務、立院無決議限制的對象為優先。釋股策略傾向優先採全民釋股，取之於民，還利於民，以免引來財團化疑慮，政府持股目標降為零，但採分年分階段釋出，將政府對民間企業干涉降至最低。這些方向基本上正確，但仍有問題，未來如何民營化，目前國發會並沒有陳述。
我們曾在社論中指出，推動國營事業民營化，提升營運效率，轉型為「公有民營」讓股票上市，可能是更適當的道路。我們也提出，要清楚計算國營事業負擔的政策任務，各單位要改為利潤中心制，讓任務歸任務、市場歸市場，權責分明，可以提高努力誘因、提振績效。宜市場化的部分可拆解出來讓股票上市，與類似的公司競爭，引進民間的營運監督機制；則國營事業，不但不會是負擔，也會變成金雞母，甚至可以持續的帶來財源，充裕國庫。
市場的競爭機制是經濟學最重要的理念，廠商雖然追求最大利潤，但在競爭機制中必須卯足全力，降低成本，否則無法生存。消費者在競爭的市場中可以撿三挑四，選擇最大滿足的產品。整體而言，社會就可以得到資源的最有效配置，國家也可以成功的發展。
至於有關釋股部分，其實過去幾年，政府因為財政赤字，每年都有編列釋股收入挹注國庫。但多次因為價位不理想，實際上成交有限。因此政府是不會隨便賤賣股票，但另外的問題是，目前公股市值1.7兆元。當公股全賣光時，政府就沒有後續的收入。
我們也不能苟同一般國營事業工會的論點，認為國營事業市場化就是賣祖產，就是等同二次金改，就是會落入財團手裡，就會造成未來的電費、油價亂漲。這些疑慮是有辦法解決的。
我們的主張是，政府應將釋股收入整合成新的基金，基金可以進行其他的投資，利潤才能填補財政赤字。換句話說，釋股收入不應是一次性的挹注國庫；而應該以國營事業的股票來換取民間績優公司的股票，進而產生後續綿延的收入。
國營事業民營化股票必須上市，全民釋股可以避免財團獨買，但中油台電等與人民生計有關的國營事業，政府只可賣出部分股票以保有公司主導權。事業的經營，政府不見得要派董事長或總經理，可以交給專業經理人，公司必須在市場接受考驗，但公司的財務是透明的。沒有辦法切割出來上市的國營事業部分，未來接受政府政策任務時，應該有清楚的價格化，政府必須編列預算來執行，而不是不清不楚，藏汙納垢，渾水摸魚，無法檢驗。
國發會是行政院大腦中樞，比過去經建會的角色更重。我們期望國發會對財政健全方案的民營化政策及公股釋股計畫能有充分的規畫，盡速的執行，挽救台灣目前發展的困頓。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 25, 2014
Summary: The NDC is the cerebrum of the Executive Yuan. The CEPD's role is more important than in the past. The National Development Council plan for privatization and the issuance of public shares must be financially sound and carefully planned. It must be executed as soon as possible, in order to save Taiwan's economic future.
Full text below:
The National Development Council will report to the Executive Yuan on the economic feasibility of the privatization policy and shares issuance plan. The nation needs long-term competitiveness. The privatization of state-owned enterprises is painful but inescapable. The public has long been skeptical of SOE privatization and share issuance. The NDC must be cautious. It must not plunder the national treasury and enrich the conglomerates. It must not result in a chilling effect.
First, we must point out why the public is so unhappy with government policy. Two years ago, hikes in gasoline prices and electricity rates provoked intense public resentment. Last year, electricity rates were hiked yet again. The government claimed that 80% of households and businesses were unaffected. But the knock-on effect was widespread. This is why the government's approval rating is down to single digits. Another cause was the first hike in gasoline prices and electricity rates. The government vowed to conduct a thorough review of Taipower and China Petroleum. But it failed to deliver. This led to the second rate hike and intensified public dissatisfaction. The government must of course act. The government dispatched two vice ministers of economic affairs to assume the chairmanship of Taipower and the chairmanship of China Petroleum. After serving as chairmen of the two SOEs, the two mean repeatedly said the SOEs should be privatized. They even drafted plans. But these never got beyond the planning stage. They failed to take any real action. They failed to implement any state-owned enterprise reform. As a result, the public lost faith in the government.
The NDC mentioned the issuance of public shares. The government intends to retain control over most of the shares, which exceed the number of shares issued. They will be non-voting shares. The legislature will not decide who has priority. Shares will be issued to the public. The assets were obtained from the public. The benefits will be returned to the public. This will avoid suspicions about conglomerates monopolizing the shares. The government intends to completely divest itself of all shares. But it has adopted a phased approach to share issuance. The government is reducing its interference in the private sector to a minimum. This is basically the right direction. But a problem persists. How will future privatization be conducted? For the moment the National Development Council has no answer.
We suggested a better way to privatize SOEs and improve operational efficiency in a previous editorial. Transform them into "publicly held but privately operated" enterprises, by issuing shares on the market. We suggested clearly calculating the cost of operating state-owned enterprises. They must all becomee profit centers. Let business be business. Let the market be the market. Let authority and responsibilities be clearly defined. This will provide incentives and boost performance. Those parts to be privatized should be dissolved. Shares should be issued, allowing them to compete with similar companies. The state-owned enterprises that are privatized will no longer be a burden. They will become cash cows. They may even generate sustainable financial returns that enrich the treasury.
Market competition is the most important concept in economics. Manufacturers want to maximize profits. But competition forces them to redouble their efforts and reduce costs. Otherwise they will not survive. In a competitive market, consumers may pick and choose as they wish. They may choose the products they are most satisfied with. Societies allocate resources more efficiently. Nations grow more rapidly.
So how should shares be issued? Actually, over the past several years, the government has been in the red. Every year share dividends become income for the National Treasury. But the price is often high and the turnover limited. Therefore the government must not sell the stock too cheaply. But there is another problem. Fair market value is currently 1.7 trillion. When the public shares are all sold, the government will cease receiving revenue.
Unions for state-owned enterprises argue that selling off state-owned enterprises sells off our national heritage. They equate it with the euphemistic "second financial reform," which made a present of national assets to well connected conglomerates. They say it will result in future electricity rate hikes and gasoline price hikes. But these concerns have solutions.
We propose that the government incorporate shares issued into a new fund. The fund may make additional investments and profits to cover the budget deficit. In other words, the income from the issuance of shares must not be treated as disposable income for the national treasury. The state-owned enterprises should receive private blue chip stocks in exchange for their shares. This will enable them to continue generating revenue.
Privatized state-owned enterprises must issue stock. Allowing every citizen to purchase shares will prevent conglomerates from monopolizing ownership. But state-owned enterprises such as China Petroleum and Taipower affect people's livelihood. The government should sell only a portion of the shares, and retain control over the companies. The government need not appoint the chairman or general manager. These duties can be handed over to professional managers. Companies must be able to withstand the test of the market. Their finances must be transparent. Those parts of state-owned enterprises that cannot be isolated and sold off, must abide by government policy. Pricing must be clear. Budgets must cover them. No ambiguity, corruption, opacity, or lack of accountabilty is allowed.
The NDC is the cerebrum of the Executive Yuan. The CEPD's role is more important than in the past. The National Development Council plan for privatization and the issuance of public shares must be financially sound and carefully planned. It must be executed as soon as possible, in order to save Taiwan's economic future.
社論－國營事業民營化 須行穩致遠
稍後再讀
中國時報 編輯部 2014年02月25日 04:10
國發會將向政院報告財政健全方案中的民營化政策及公股釋股計畫，基於國家長期競爭力的考量，國營事業民營化是無可逃避的痛苦選擇，但長期以來，社會對國營事業民營化及其釋股頗有疑慮，國發會規畫方案必須謹慎，既不能造成掏空國家資產、圖利財團的疑慮，更不容產生殺雞取卵的後果。
首先我們要指出，為什麼目前政府的施政滿意度如此低迷？前年油電雙漲引起巨大民怨，去年電價再漲，雖然政府宣稱80％家庭、商家不受影響，但引起廣泛的物價上漲連鎖效應，是讓施政滿意度降到個位數重大的原因。另一個關鍵是第一次漲價後，政府承諾要檢討台電中油，但是並沒有交出成績單，造成第二次上漲，人民不能心服。當然，政府也不是沒有作為，先後派了兩位經濟部次長分任台電、中油的董座，兩位董座任職後多次表示應該民營化，也提出了藍圖，但是迄今止於紙上談兵，沒有實際的作為，也沒有讓人民看到國營事業有任何改革跡象，人心因而對政府失望。
國發會提到針對公股釋股，擬選擇政府持股比率大、釋出金額多、不具政策性任務、立院無決議限制的對象為優先。釋股策略傾向優先採全民釋股，取之於民，還利於民，以免引來財團化疑慮，政府持股目標降為零，但採分年分階段釋出，將政府對民間企業干涉降至最低。這些方向基本上正確，但仍有問題，未來如何民營化，目前國發會並沒有陳述。
我們曾在社論中指出，推動國營事業民營化，提升營運效率，轉型為「公有民營」讓股票上市，可能是更適當的道路。我們也提出，要清楚計算國營事業負擔的政策任務，各單位要改為利潤中心制，讓任務歸任務、市場歸市場，權責分明，可以提高努力誘因、提振績效。宜市場化的部分可拆解出來讓股票上市，與類似的公司競爭，引進民間的營運監督機制；則國營事業，不但不會是負擔，也會變成金雞母，甚至可以持續的帶來財源，充裕國庫。
市場的競爭機制是經濟學最重要的理念，廠商雖然追求最大利潤，但在競爭機制中必須卯足全力，降低成本，否則無法生存。消費者在競爭的市場中可以撿三挑四，選擇最大滿足的產品。整體而言，社會就可以得到資源的最有效配置，國家也可以成功的發展。
至於有關釋股部分，其實過去幾年，政府因為財政赤字，每年都有編列釋股收入挹注國庫。但多次因為價位不理想，實際上成交有限。因此政府是不會隨便賤賣股票，但另外的問題是，目前公股市值1.7兆元。當公股全賣光時，政府就沒有後續的收入。
我們也不能苟同一般國營事業工會的論點，認為國營事業市場化就是賣祖產，就是等同二次金改，就是會落入財團手裡，就會造成未來的電費、油價亂漲。這些疑慮是有辦法解決的。
我們的主張是，政府應將釋股收入整合成新的基金，基金可以進行其他的投資，利潤才能填補財政赤字。換句話說，釋股收入不應是一次性的挹注國庫；而應該以國營事業的股票來換取民間績優公司的股票，進而產生後續綿延的收入。
國營事業民營化股票必須上市，全民釋股可以避免財團獨買，但中油台電等與人民生計有關的國營事業，政府只可賣出部分股票以保有公司主導權。事業的經營，政府不見得要派董事長或總經理，可以交給專業經理人，公司必須在市場接受考驗，但公司的財務是透明的。沒有辦法切割出來上市的國營事業部分，未來接受政府政策任務時，應該有清楚的價格化，政府必須編列預算來執行，而不是不清不楚，藏汙納垢，渾水摸魚，無法檢驗。
國發會是行政院大腦中樞，比過去經建會的角色更重。我們期望國發會對財政健全方案的民營化政策及公股釋股計畫能有充分的規畫，盡速的執行，挽救台灣目前發展的困頓。
Monday, February 24, 2014
Raise Wages to Drive Wage Growth
Raise Wages to Drive Wage Growth
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 21, 2014
Summary: Salaries on Taiwan are too low. They have not increased for years. After accounting for inflation little remains. Private consumption is increasingly conservative. Salaries are apparently the most critical economic issue. Overall, salary increases will spur domestic consumption, thereby increasing revenue for all industries. They will enable Taiwan to lift the lid on its stifled economy, and advance toward greater growth and equal prosperity.
Full text below:
Salaries on Taiwan are too low. They have not increased for years. After accounting for inflation little remains. Private consumption is increasingly conservative. Salaries are apparently the most critical economic issue. According to reports, between January and November of last year, average real wages in the industrial and service sectors was 44,700 NTD. This is lower than the 44,900 NTD wage figure 15 years ago. The main reason is that in comparison to 1998, the consumer price index has increased 16%, while wages have increased only 15.5%. As a result, real wages have decreased relative to 15 years ago.
Subdivide real wages into industrial sector wages and service sector wages. Stagnation in industrial sector real wage growth began in 2007, and in the service sector in 2001. In 2007 the average real wage in Taiwan's industrial sector was 45,500 NTD. By 2012, it had fallen to 43,400 NTD. Exclude allowances, bonuses, and other non-recurring income. These sources of income are the most easily influenced by external conditions. Look only at regular salaries. One will find they have stagnated in recent years, or even retreated.
Regular salaries have decreased rather than increased. This is not because the economic situation is poor, or corporate profits have fallen. Double-digit growth is a thing of the past. We live in the aftermath of the financial tsunami. But Taiwan's average economic growth rate over the past 5 years has been 3.3%. Over the past 10 years it has been 4%. Taiwan's labor productivity has kept pace. Since the 1980s, it has risen in a straight line. Over the past 10 years, the labor productivity index for all industries rose, from 87.9 in 2003, to 105.8 in 2008. In 2012 it rose to 119.27. The 10 year average growth rate was 3.5 %. The 5 year average was 2.5%.
Labor productivity rose. But wages did not. This led to declining company unit labor costs since 1999. This means that in the production of a given unit of goods or services, labor compensation as a proportion of total production costs has declined. The labor cost burden on businesses is increasingly light. Considered separately. the most obvious decline has been in the industrial sector. In 2003 the index was 109.3. In 2007 it was 95.6. In 2012, it was only 80.7. Over 10 years, it declined 26%.
Consider overall economic performance. As past editorials have noted, the employee compensation to GDP ratio has decreased. The GDP is the sum of employee compensation, net indirect taxes, consumption of fixed capital, plus the total operating surplus. Our nation's enterprises operating surplus to GDP ratio shows a long term upward trend. This is the oppositie of employee compensation to the GDP ratio. During the 1980s and 1990s, the ratio was approximately 3%. After 1996 the corporate earnings to GDP ratio increased. In 2003 and 2004 it increased to 35%. Since 2007 it has fluctuated between 32.5% to 35.5%. In 2011 it again exceeded 35%. According to the latest first quarter data, the 2012 operating surplus to GDP ratio is 33%.
Corporate surpluses account for more and more of the GDP ratio. In recent years, average real GDP growth was 3.3%. Taiwan business performance has been quite good. Profits have also been handsome. But this means companies have benefitted from their employees' productivity gains. Yet the companies have not shared enough of the fruits of growth with their staff. The result has been a decline in real wages. As a result, wage earners enjoy no economic growth, and feel exploited. This has exacerbated the antagonism between employers and employees within the community.
The government has recently undergonoe significant restructuring. The establishment of the Ministry of Labour underscores the government's increased attention to income differences. The new structure has introduced a new climate. We urge the Ministry of Labour to act swiftly, and promote the "Ten Year Basic Salary Adjustment Plan."
Over the past five years, labor productivity has grown an average of 2.5%. The Ministry of Labour should consider making this figure its targe for real wage hikes over the next 10 years. That way wages and productivity growth can be synchronized. Diligent workers' job performance will then receive the rewards they deserve. Over the long run the national distribution of wealth will become more equitable.
Such a mechanism would not make corporate profits decline. Rising labor productivity increases will not erode the surplus. They will merely slow down the growth of corporate earnings. For enterprises, there may be other benefits. Productivity gains can become a criterion for raises. This will give staff members a further incentive to improve their productivity. Businesses may become more efficient. This would favor any company that seeks sustainable development.
Overall, salary increases will spur domestic consumption, thereby increasing revenue for all industries. They will enable Taiwan to lift the lid on its stifled economy, and advance toward greater growth and equal prosperity.
社論－以提高基本工資帶動薪資成長
稍後再讀
中國時報 編輯部 2014年02月24日 04:10
台灣薪資水準太低，多年來未見成長，扣除物價上漲後所剩無幾，民間消費日趨保守，薪資問題儼然是當前悶經濟最關鍵的一環。據報導，去年一至十一月工業及服務業受僱員工實質薪資平均為44700元，尚不及15年前的44900元，主要是因為與1998年相較，消費者物價指數增加了16％，高於15.5％的薪資成長，實質薪資反較15年前減少。
若將實質薪資分工業、服務業兩部門來看，我國實質薪資成長停滯的現象在工業部門是從2007年、服務業是從2001年就開始出現，比如說，2007年台灣工業部門平均實質薪資為45500元，2012年反降至43400元。即使扣除最容易受外在條件變動影響的津貼、加給、獎金等非經常性薪資，只觀察實質經常性薪資的情形也差不多，近年來都呈現停滯、甚至衰退的態勢。
經常性薪資不增反減，並不是因為經濟情勢不佳、企業獲利減少所致。儘管昔年動輒二位數的高成長榮景不再，金融海嘯餘波盪漾，但是近5年來台灣經濟成長率平均也有3.3％，10年平均為4％；另一方面，台灣的勞動生產力逐年上升的腳步並未停頓，自1980年代以來始終直線攀升，近10年全體產業勞動生產力指數從2003年87.9增加至2008年的105.8，2012年則是119.27。10年間平均成長率高達3.5％，5年平均則是2.5％。
勞動生產力上升但薪資不升，導致企業的單位產出勞動成本自1999年開始逐年下降。代表了在生產一單位商品或服務時，勞動報酬占生產總額的比例減少，企業的勞動成本負擔越來越輕。分部門來看，以工業部門的降幅最為明顯，指數從2003年的109.3及2007年的95.6,減至2012年的80.7，10年間減少了2成6。
表現在總體經濟方面，如同先前社論說過，受僱人員報酬占GDP比率勢必減少。GDP是受僱人員報酬、間接稅淨額、固定資本消耗、營業盈餘的加總；我國企業營業盈餘占GDP比，和薪資占GDP比相反，長期呈現上升的趨勢。1980、90年代該比例多在3成左右，1996年以後企業盈餘占GDP比開始連年增加，到了2003、2004年已經超過3成5，自2007年開始在32.5％至35.5％之間波動，2011年一度又超過3成5，據最新一期資料，2012年營業盈餘占GDP比率為3成3。
企業盈餘占GDP比上升，實質GDP近年平均有3.3％的成長，表示台灣企業經營表現相當亮眼，利潤滿滿。另一方面，也代表了儘管公司從員工生產力提升上得到了好處，但公司將成長的果實分享給員工的程度不夠，導致實質薪資倒退。如此一來，受薪階級對經濟成長無感、甚至反感，也加劇了社會上勞資雙方的對立。
政府最近大幅度組織再造，勞動部的成立彰示了政府對廣大受薪階級的重視。趁著新部門新氣象，我們建議勞動部應該盡快為所當為，推動制定「十年基本薪資調整計畫」。
可以考慮將過去5年的勞動生產力平均成長率，也就是2.5％，作為未來10年實質薪資調漲的目標。如此一來薪資與生產力可以同步成長，勞動者工作表現的精進才能適切地反應在應得報酬上，長期下來我國所得分配就可以趨向平均。
這樣的機制不會讓企業利潤下降；勞工取得其生產力上升而增加的部分，不會侵蝕盈餘，只會讓企業盈餘的成長減緩。對企業而言，也可能有益處：以生產力提升作為加薪的理由，將提供員工進一步提升自身生產力的誘因，未來企業經營將可能因此更有效率，對任何希望以永續經營為目標的公司均有利。
在總體方面，薪水的調升更可帶動國內消費，進而增加各業收益，使台灣早日掀開悶經濟的鍋蓋，邁向成長與均富並進的大道。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 21, 2014
Summary: Salaries on Taiwan are too low. They have not increased for years. After accounting for inflation little remains. Private consumption is increasingly conservative. Salaries are apparently the most critical economic issue. Overall, salary increases will spur domestic consumption, thereby increasing revenue for all industries. They will enable Taiwan to lift the lid on its stifled economy, and advance toward greater growth and equal prosperity.
Full text below:
Salaries on Taiwan are too low. They have not increased for years. After accounting for inflation little remains. Private consumption is increasingly conservative. Salaries are apparently the most critical economic issue. According to reports, between January and November of last year, average real wages in the industrial and service sectors was 44,700 NTD. This is lower than the 44,900 NTD wage figure 15 years ago. The main reason is that in comparison to 1998, the consumer price index has increased 16%, while wages have increased only 15.5%. As a result, real wages have decreased relative to 15 years ago.
Subdivide real wages into industrial sector wages and service sector wages. Stagnation in industrial sector real wage growth began in 2007, and in the service sector in 2001. In 2007 the average real wage in Taiwan's industrial sector was 45,500 NTD. By 2012, it had fallen to 43,400 NTD. Exclude allowances, bonuses, and other non-recurring income. These sources of income are the most easily influenced by external conditions. Look only at regular salaries. One will find they have stagnated in recent years, or even retreated.
Regular salaries have decreased rather than increased. This is not because the economic situation is poor, or corporate profits have fallen. Double-digit growth is a thing of the past. We live in the aftermath of the financial tsunami. But Taiwan's average economic growth rate over the past 5 years has been 3.3%. Over the past 10 years it has been 4%. Taiwan's labor productivity has kept pace. Since the 1980s, it has risen in a straight line. Over the past 10 years, the labor productivity index for all industries rose, from 87.9 in 2003, to 105.8 in 2008. In 2012 it rose to 119.27. The 10 year average growth rate was 3.5 %. The 5 year average was 2.5%.
Labor productivity rose. But wages did not. This led to declining company unit labor costs since 1999. This means that in the production of a given unit of goods or services, labor compensation as a proportion of total production costs has declined. The labor cost burden on businesses is increasingly light. Considered separately. the most obvious decline has been in the industrial sector. In 2003 the index was 109.3. In 2007 it was 95.6. In 2012, it was only 80.7. Over 10 years, it declined 26%.
Consider overall economic performance. As past editorials have noted, the employee compensation to GDP ratio has decreased. The GDP is the sum of employee compensation, net indirect taxes, consumption of fixed capital, plus the total operating surplus. Our nation's enterprises operating surplus to GDP ratio shows a long term upward trend. This is the oppositie of employee compensation to the GDP ratio. During the 1980s and 1990s, the ratio was approximately 3%. After 1996 the corporate earnings to GDP ratio increased. In 2003 and 2004 it increased to 35%. Since 2007 it has fluctuated between 32.5% to 35.5%. In 2011 it again exceeded 35%. According to the latest first quarter data, the 2012 operating surplus to GDP ratio is 33%.
Corporate surpluses account for more and more of the GDP ratio. In recent years, average real GDP growth was 3.3%. Taiwan business performance has been quite good. Profits have also been handsome. But this means companies have benefitted from their employees' productivity gains. Yet the companies have not shared enough of the fruits of growth with their staff. The result has been a decline in real wages. As a result, wage earners enjoy no economic growth, and feel exploited. This has exacerbated the antagonism between employers and employees within the community.
The government has recently undergonoe significant restructuring. The establishment of the Ministry of Labour underscores the government's increased attention to income differences. The new structure has introduced a new climate. We urge the Ministry of Labour to act swiftly, and promote the "Ten Year Basic Salary Adjustment Plan."
Over the past five years, labor productivity has grown an average of 2.5%. The Ministry of Labour should consider making this figure its targe for real wage hikes over the next 10 years. That way wages and productivity growth can be synchronized. Diligent workers' job performance will then receive the rewards they deserve. Over the long run the national distribution of wealth will become more equitable.
Such a mechanism would not make corporate profits decline. Rising labor productivity increases will not erode the surplus. They will merely slow down the growth of corporate earnings. For enterprises, there may be other benefits. Productivity gains can become a criterion for raises. This will give staff members a further incentive to improve their productivity. Businesses may become more efficient. This would favor any company that seeks sustainable development.
Overall, salary increases will spur domestic consumption, thereby increasing revenue for all industries. They will enable Taiwan to lift the lid on its stifled economy, and advance toward greater growth and equal prosperity.
社論－以提高基本工資帶動薪資成長
稍後再讀
中國時報 編輯部 2014年02月24日 04:10
台灣薪資水準太低，多年來未見成長，扣除物價上漲後所剩無幾，民間消費日趨保守，薪資問題儼然是當前悶經濟最關鍵的一環。據報導，去年一至十一月工業及服務業受僱員工實質薪資平均為44700元，尚不及15年前的44900元，主要是因為與1998年相較，消費者物價指數增加了16％，高於15.5％的薪資成長，實質薪資反較15年前減少。
若將實質薪資分工業、服務業兩部門來看，我國實質薪資成長停滯的現象在工業部門是從2007年、服務業是從2001年就開始出現，比如說，2007年台灣工業部門平均實質薪資為45500元，2012年反降至43400元。即使扣除最容易受外在條件變動影響的津貼、加給、獎金等非經常性薪資，只觀察實質經常性薪資的情形也差不多，近年來都呈現停滯、甚至衰退的態勢。
經常性薪資不增反減，並不是因為經濟情勢不佳、企業獲利減少所致。儘管昔年動輒二位數的高成長榮景不再，金融海嘯餘波盪漾，但是近5年來台灣經濟成長率平均也有3.3％，10年平均為4％；另一方面，台灣的勞動生產力逐年上升的腳步並未停頓，自1980年代以來始終直線攀升，近10年全體產業勞動生產力指數從2003年87.9增加至2008年的105.8，2012年則是119.27。10年間平均成長率高達3.5％，5年平均則是2.5％。
勞動生產力上升但薪資不升，導致企業的單位產出勞動成本自1999年開始逐年下降。代表了在生產一單位商品或服務時，勞動報酬占生產總額的比例減少，企業的勞動成本負擔越來越輕。分部門來看，以工業部門的降幅最為明顯，指數從2003年的109.3及2007年的95.6,減至2012年的80.7，10年間減少了2成6。
表現在總體經濟方面，如同先前社論說過，受僱人員報酬占GDP比率勢必減少。GDP是受僱人員報酬、間接稅淨額、固定資本消耗、營業盈餘的加總；我國企業營業盈餘占GDP比，和薪資占GDP比相反，長期呈現上升的趨勢。1980、90年代該比例多在3成左右，1996年以後企業盈餘占GDP比開始連年增加，到了2003、2004年已經超過3成5，自2007年開始在32.5％至35.5％之間波動，2011年一度又超過3成5，據最新一期資料，2012年營業盈餘占GDP比率為3成3。
企業盈餘占GDP比上升，實質GDP近年平均有3.3％的成長，表示台灣企業經營表現相當亮眼，利潤滿滿。另一方面，也代表了儘管公司從員工生產力提升上得到了好處，但公司將成長的果實分享給員工的程度不夠，導致實質薪資倒退。如此一來，受薪階級對經濟成長無感、甚至反感，也加劇了社會上勞資雙方的對立。
政府最近大幅度組織再造，勞動部的成立彰示了政府對廣大受薪階級的重視。趁著新部門新氣象，我們建議勞動部應該盡快為所當為，推動制定「十年基本薪資調整計畫」。
可以考慮將過去5年的勞動生產力平均成長率，也就是2.5％，作為未來10年實質薪資調漲的目標。如此一來薪資與生產力可以同步成長，勞動者工作表現的精進才能適切地反應在應得報酬上，長期下來我國所得分配就可以趨向平均。
這樣的機制不會讓企業利潤下降；勞工取得其生產力上升而增加的部分，不會侵蝕盈餘，只會讓企業盈餘的成長減緩。對企業而言，也可能有益處：以生產力提升作為加薪的理由，將提供員工進一步提升自身生產力的誘因，未來企業經營將可能因此更有效率，對任何希望以永續經營為目標的公司均有利。
在總體方面，薪水的調升更可帶動國內消費，進而增加各業收益，使台灣早日掀開悶經濟的鍋蓋，邁向成長與均富並進的大道。
Thursday, February 20, 2014
Global Economy is Changing Tracks: Taiwan Cannot Afford to Remain Idle
Global Economy is Changing Tracks: Taiwan Cannot Afford to Remain Idle
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 21, 2014
Summary: In recent years, Taiwan's economy has remained in the doldrums. Every year government economic revitalization efforts promise the moon. But over the past year the government has struggled to maintain a low growth rate of one, two, or three percent. People have understandably lost confidence in the future. The economy has long been Taiwan's lifeline. How can we revive our economic competitiveness? How can we escape the plight of low growth? This is without a doubt our most urgent issue.
Full text below:
In recent years, Taiwan's economy has remained in the doldrums. Every year government economic revitalization efforts promise the moon. But over the past year the government has struggled to maintain a low growth rate of one, two, or three percent. People have understandably lost confidence in the future. The economy has long been Taiwan's lifeline. How can we revive our economic competitiveness? How can we escape the plight of low growth? This is without a doubt our most urgent issue.
Beginning in 2008, the global economy underwent the global financial tsunami and the European debt crisis. Two "track changes" took place. The first track change involved the de-leveraging of the United States, Europe, Japan, and other advanced industrial countries. They became low-growth economies. Emerging markets, especially in emerging Asian countries, became the main engine of global economic growth. The second track change involved the advanced industrial countries, which underwent several years of economic reform and adjustment. Beginning last year, they regained growth momentum. Emerging markets will be impacted by the U.S. Federal Reserve, which will begin tapering its quantitative easing (QE) policy. Over the past several years, short-term hot money created a boom. This boom faces substantial adjustment. The Economist said that in 2014 the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan will dominate the headlines.
This is an era of dramatic economic change. The rise and fall of a nation's economic strength and competitiveness often depends on its ability to change and adjust. Consider the first track change in the global economy. Compare the key competitors. Taiwan was like a race car on fast idle but which went nowhere. It missed a golden opportunity to change and adjust, This led to weakened competitiveness.
Taiwan's economic idling took five different forms. One. It was unable to change its emphasis on hardware manufacturing and foundry exports. It was unable to drive economic growth and link to the global supply chain. It could neither go forward nor retreat as exports declined. Two. It failed to commit to economic restructuring, It was slow to develop new industries and services. Long-term private investment and consumption slumped, weakening domestic demand. Three. It failed to respond to the huge disparity in the scale and structure of the two cross-strait economies. This led to increasing capital flight and a brain drain, from Taiwan to the Mainland. The cross-strait economy went from "more complementary than competitive," to "more competitive than complementary." Four. The government blundered. It failed to fully grasp the internal and external scenario change. Its economic leadership was weak. Its policies flip-flopped. It boasted about reform, but failed to prescribe the right medicine. It intensified the chaos. Five. The government and the political opposition bickered endlessly. Major policies remained stalled. This worsened economic wheel-spinning.
Over the years, a golden opportunity for reform was lost. Taiwan's economy is no longer what it used to be. The global economy has begun its second track change. The potential risks and challenges will be even more difficult to address effectively
First, the U.S. Federal Reserve may taper QE this year. Global capital will quickly return to the U.S. from emerging markets. The emerging markets depended upon the influx of money to create economic bubbles. These bubbles will collapse. Latin America, Asia, and other emerging market countries or regions will be impacted to different degrees. Taiwan will not be immune.
Secondly, the Mainland is deeply committed to economic reform. It too will be affected by QE tapering. Slowed economic growth will become the norm. Taiwan's dependence on the mainland market in recent years has increased. Therefore, its relative impact will increase accordingly.
Taiwan's economy remains highly dependent on IT industry exports. But brand names and specialized OEM industries face the impact of United States and Korean industry consolidation on the supply chain. This year Mainland industry is catching up. Following the track change in the global economy, information and communications industry competition will be increasingly fierce. Taiwan's industry crisis is imminent. It is the biggest variable for the future.
In view of this, the government has no right to be blindly optimistic about the future. In particular, it must recognize the harsh reality. Taiwan's competitiveness has plummeted. Therefore it is imperative to cease economic idling, and implement four major economic changes.
First, immediate action is required to stabilize the economy. Taiwan's economic momentum is increasingly inadequate. It is vulnerable to fluctuations in the international economy. Therefore, the government must take short-term measures to revive exports and domestic demand. It must also take immediate countermeasures to assist industrial restructuring and upgrading.
Second, comprehensive economic reform is essential. Taiwan must attempt to change its economic growth mode from "efficiency-driven" to "innovation-driven." Both exports and domestic demand require a new industrial structure in line with the future needs of the community.
Third, a strategy is required that integrates us into the global economy. To survive, Taiwan's economy must become tightly linked to the global economy. The government must join the TPP and RCEP. But more than that, it requires a political and economic strategy to overcome resistance, at home and abroad. Only then will the bigger pie it draws on paper become an objective reality.
Fourth, the two sides must be willing to adapt to each other. Cross-strait trade must become Taiwan's economic advantage in long term economic development. Cross-strait adaptation is of critical importance. Cross-strait economic policy coordination and strategic dialogue mechanisms must be established, as soon as possible. Only this can ensure a long-lasting win-win scenario.
The above four policy directions are nothing new. But the government must redouble its efforts, in order to make up for years of wheel-spinning. Only then can it restore Taiwan's economic vitality.
全球經濟換軌，台灣不能再繼續空轉
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.21 05:00 am
近年台灣經濟持續低迷，政府對拚經濟每年都抱以高度期待，但從前年到今年，ＧＤＰ成長率只能掙扎於保一、保二、保三等低度成長，難免讓人民對未來經濟信心喪失。經濟始終是台灣生存的命脈，如何重振經濟競爭力，擺脫低成長困境，無疑是當前最迫切的課題。
自二○○八年迄今，全球經濟歷經金融海嘯及歐債危機的衝擊，並出現兩次「換軌」：第一次換軌是美、歐、日本等工業先進國家經濟厲行去槓桿化，陷入低成長，新興市場（尤其是亞洲新興市場國家）成為全球經濟成長的主要引擎；第二次換軌是工業先進國家歷經數年的經濟變革及調整後，自去年開始已重拾成長動能，新興市場國家則因美國聯準會啟動量化寬鬆（ＱＥ）政策退場，過去幾年熱錢造就的短期榮景面臨大幅調整。《經濟學人》雜誌稍早即指出，二○一四年全球經濟將由美國、英國、德國、日本等「發達四國」再領風騷。
在劇烈變動的經濟時代裡，一個國家經濟興衰及競爭力強弱，往往取決於變革及調整的速度。在第一次全球經濟換軌過程中，相對於主要競爭對手，台灣宛如一輛怠速空轉的賽車，錯失最佳的變革及調整時機，以致競爭力日益削弱。
台灣經濟空轉呈現在五大面向：一是未能力圖改變側重硬體製造及代工出口、以效率驅動的經濟成長模式，以致無法肆應全球供應鏈的大幅改變，陷入被前後包夾、出口衰退危機；二是未能致力經濟結構調整，新興產業及服務業發展遲緩，民間投資及消費意願長期低迷不振，削弱內需動能；三是未能妥適因應兩岸經濟規模及經濟體制的巨大差異，導致台灣對大陸日益擴大的投資及人才赤字，以及兩岸產業從「互補大於競爭」轉變成「競爭大於互補」；四是政府失能，未能充分掌握內外情勢變化，經濟掌舵無力，政策反覆，夸談改革卻不能對症下藥，加深各種亂象；五是朝野不斷內耗，很多重大政策都在原地踏步，更陷經濟於空轉。
正因為幾年來錯失改革的大好時機，台灣經濟體質已大不如前，在全球經濟進入第二次換軌的新情勢下，更難有力應對潛在的風險和挑戰。
首先，美國聯準會可能在今年內讓ＱＥ全面退場，全球資金將從新興市場加速回流美國等，前幾年新興市場靠錢潮吹大的經濟泡沫將隨之崩解，拉丁美洲及亞洲等新興市場國家將受不同程度衝擊，台灣亦難置身事外。
其次，大陸正致力於深化經濟改革，又受ＱＥ退場的雙重影響，未來經濟成長趨緩將成常態現象；近年台灣對大陸市場依賴愈來愈深，故相對衝擊也愈大。
再者，台灣經濟迄今仍高度依賴資通產業出口，但無論品牌或專業代工業者近年皆面臨美、韓業者整合供應鏈的衝擊，這兩年更受到急起直追的大陸業者節節進逼。在全球經濟二次換軌後，資通產業競爭將更趨激烈，台灣業者危機迫在眉睫，也是未來最大變數。
鑑此，政府對未來經濟實無一味樂觀的本錢，尤其須認知台灣競爭力已落人於後的殘酷現實；因此，當務之急，須擺脫經濟空轉，朝四大方向致力經濟變革及調整：
第一，要有穩住經濟的立即行動。台灣經濟動能日益不足，極易受國際景氣波動衝擊，故政府須有振興出口及內需的短期措施，並應採即時對策協助資通產業轉型升級。
第二，要有改革經濟的通盤計畫。台灣須致力改變經濟成長模式，從「效率驅動」轉變成「創新驅動」，兼顧出口和內需，打造符合未來社會需要的嶄新產業結構。
第三，要有接軌全球的宏圖大略。台灣經濟要有活路，必須和全球緊密接軌，政府固須有加入ＴＰＰ、ＲＣＥＰ的雄心壯志，但更須有突破國內外阻力的政治謀略及經濟對策，其規劃才不致淪為畫餅。
第四，要有磨合兩岸的深謀遠慮。兩岸經貿要成為台灣經濟發展的長期優勢，雙方「磨合」實至關重要，須及早建置兩岸經濟戰略對話及政策協調機制，才能建構可長可久的雙贏路徑。
以上四大方向，並非新論，但政府須有加倍決心和加倍努力，才能彌補多年空轉，再造台灣經濟生機。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 21, 2014
Summary: In recent years, Taiwan's economy has remained in the doldrums. Every year government economic revitalization efforts promise the moon. But over the past year the government has struggled to maintain a low growth rate of one, two, or three percent. People have understandably lost confidence in the future. The economy has long been Taiwan's lifeline. How can we revive our economic competitiveness? How can we escape the plight of low growth? This is without a doubt our most urgent issue.
Full text below:
In recent years, Taiwan's economy has remained in the doldrums. Every year government economic revitalization efforts promise the moon. But over the past year the government has struggled to maintain a low growth rate of one, two, or three percent. People have understandably lost confidence in the future. The economy has long been Taiwan's lifeline. How can we revive our economic competitiveness? How can we escape the plight of low growth? This is without a doubt our most urgent issue.
Beginning in 2008, the global economy underwent the global financial tsunami and the European debt crisis. Two "track changes" took place. The first track change involved the de-leveraging of the United States, Europe, Japan, and other advanced industrial countries. They became low-growth economies. Emerging markets, especially in emerging Asian countries, became the main engine of global economic growth. The second track change involved the advanced industrial countries, which underwent several years of economic reform and adjustment. Beginning last year, they regained growth momentum. Emerging markets will be impacted by the U.S. Federal Reserve, which will begin tapering its quantitative easing (QE) policy. Over the past several years, short-term hot money created a boom. This boom faces substantial adjustment. The Economist said that in 2014 the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan will dominate the headlines.
This is an era of dramatic economic change. The rise and fall of a nation's economic strength and competitiveness often depends on its ability to change and adjust. Consider the first track change in the global economy. Compare the key competitors. Taiwan was like a race car on fast idle but which went nowhere. It missed a golden opportunity to change and adjust, This led to weakened competitiveness.
Taiwan's economic idling took five different forms. One. It was unable to change its emphasis on hardware manufacturing and foundry exports. It was unable to drive economic growth and link to the global supply chain. It could neither go forward nor retreat as exports declined. Two. It failed to commit to economic restructuring, It was slow to develop new industries and services. Long-term private investment and consumption slumped, weakening domestic demand. Three. It failed to respond to the huge disparity in the scale and structure of the two cross-strait economies. This led to increasing capital flight and a brain drain, from Taiwan to the Mainland. The cross-strait economy went from "more complementary than competitive," to "more competitive than complementary." Four. The government blundered. It failed to fully grasp the internal and external scenario change. Its economic leadership was weak. Its policies flip-flopped. It boasted about reform, but failed to prescribe the right medicine. It intensified the chaos. Five. The government and the political opposition bickered endlessly. Major policies remained stalled. This worsened economic wheel-spinning.
Over the years, a golden opportunity for reform was lost. Taiwan's economy is no longer what it used to be. The global economy has begun its second track change. The potential risks and challenges will be even more difficult to address effectively
First, the U.S. Federal Reserve may taper QE this year. Global capital will quickly return to the U.S. from emerging markets. The emerging markets depended upon the influx of money to create economic bubbles. These bubbles will collapse. Latin America, Asia, and other emerging market countries or regions will be impacted to different degrees. Taiwan will not be immune.
Secondly, the Mainland is deeply committed to economic reform. It too will be affected by QE tapering. Slowed economic growth will become the norm. Taiwan's dependence on the mainland market in recent years has increased. Therefore, its relative impact will increase accordingly.
Taiwan's economy remains highly dependent on IT industry exports. But brand names and specialized OEM industries face the impact of United States and Korean industry consolidation on the supply chain. This year Mainland industry is catching up. Following the track change in the global economy, information and communications industry competition will be increasingly fierce. Taiwan's industry crisis is imminent. It is the biggest variable for the future.
In view of this, the government has no right to be blindly optimistic about the future. In particular, it must recognize the harsh reality. Taiwan's competitiveness has plummeted. Therefore it is imperative to cease economic idling, and implement four major economic changes.
First, immediate action is required to stabilize the economy. Taiwan's economic momentum is increasingly inadequate. It is vulnerable to fluctuations in the international economy. Therefore, the government must take short-term measures to revive exports and domestic demand. It must also take immediate countermeasures to assist industrial restructuring and upgrading.
Second, comprehensive economic reform is essential. Taiwan must attempt to change its economic growth mode from "efficiency-driven" to "innovation-driven." Both exports and domestic demand require a new industrial structure in line with the future needs of the community.
Third, a strategy is required that integrates us into the global economy. To survive, Taiwan's economy must become tightly linked to the global economy. The government must join the TPP and RCEP. But more than that, it requires a political and economic strategy to overcome resistance, at home and abroad. Only then will the bigger pie it draws on paper become an objective reality.
Fourth, the two sides must be willing to adapt to each other. Cross-strait trade must become Taiwan's economic advantage in long term economic development. Cross-strait adaptation is of critical importance. Cross-strait economic policy coordination and strategic dialogue mechanisms must be established, as soon as possible. Only this can ensure a long-lasting win-win scenario.
The above four policy directions are nothing new. But the government must redouble its efforts, in order to make up for years of wheel-spinning. Only then can it restore Taiwan's economic vitality.
全球經濟換軌，台灣不能再繼續空轉
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.21 05:00 am
近年台灣經濟持續低迷，政府對拚經濟每年都抱以高度期待，但從前年到今年，ＧＤＰ成長率只能掙扎於保一、保二、保三等低度成長，難免讓人民對未來經濟信心喪失。經濟始終是台灣生存的命脈，如何重振經濟競爭力，擺脫低成長困境，無疑是當前最迫切的課題。
自二○○八年迄今，全球經濟歷經金融海嘯及歐債危機的衝擊，並出現兩次「換軌」：第一次換軌是美、歐、日本等工業先進國家經濟厲行去槓桿化，陷入低成長，新興市場（尤其是亞洲新興市場國家）成為全球經濟成長的主要引擎；第二次換軌是工業先進國家歷經數年的經濟變革及調整後，自去年開始已重拾成長動能，新興市場國家則因美國聯準會啟動量化寬鬆（ＱＥ）政策退場，過去幾年熱錢造就的短期榮景面臨大幅調整。《經濟學人》雜誌稍早即指出，二○一四年全球經濟將由美國、英國、德國、日本等「發達四國」再領風騷。
在劇烈變動的經濟時代裡，一個國家經濟興衰及競爭力強弱，往往取決於變革及調整的速度。在第一次全球經濟換軌過程中，相對於主要競爭對手，台灣宛如一輛怠速空轉的賽車，錯失最佳的變革及調整時機，以致競爭力日益削弱。
台灣經濟空轉呈現在五大面向：一是未能力圖改變側重硬體製造及代工出口、以效率驅動的經濟成長模式，以致無法肆應全球供應鏈的大幅改變，陷入被前後包夾、出口衰退危機；二是未能致力經濟結構調整，新興產業及服務業發展遲緩，民間投資及消費意願長期低迷不振，削弱內需動能；三是未能妥適因應兩岸經濟規模及經濟體制的巨大差異，導致台灣對大陸日益擴大的投資及人才赤字，以及兩岸產業從「互補大於競爭」轉變成「競爭大於互補」；四是政府失能，未能充分掌握內外情勢變化，經濟掌舵無力，政策反覆，夸談改革卻不能對症下藥，加深各種亂象；五是朝野不斷內耗，很多重大政策都在原地踏步，更陷經濟於空轉。
正因為幾年來錯失改革的大好時機，台灣經濟體質已大不如前，在全球經濟進入第二次換軌的新情勢下，更難有力應對潛在的風險和挑戰。
首先，美國聯準會可能在今年內讓ＱＥ全面退場，全球資金將從新興市場加速回流美國等，前幾年新興市場靠錢潮吹大的經濟泡沫將隨之崩解，拉丁美洲及亞洲等新興市場國家將受不同程度衝擊，台灣亦難置身事外。
其次，大陸正致力於深化經濟改革，又受ＱＥ退場的雙重影響，未來經濟成長趨緩將成常態現象；近年台灣對大陸市場依賴愈來愈深，故相對衝擊也愈大。
再者，台灣經濟迄今仍高度依賴資通產業出口，但無論品牌或專業代工業者近年皆面臨美、韓業者整合供應鏈的衝擊，這兩年更受到急起直追的大陸業者節節進逼。在全球經濟二次換軌後，資通產業競爭將更趨激烈，台灣業者危機迫在眉睫，也是未來最大變數。
鑑此，政府對未來經濟實無一味樂觀的本錢，尤其須認知台灣競爭力已落人於後的殘酷現實；因此，當務之急，須擺脫經濟空轉，朝四大方向致力經濟變革及調整：
第一，要有穩住經濟的立即行動。台灣經濟動能日益不足，極易受國際景氣波動衝擊，故政府須有振興出口及內需的短期措施，並應採即時對策協助資通產業轉型升級。
第二，要有改革經濟的通盤計畫。台灣須致力改變經濟成長模式，從「效率驅動」轉變成「創新驅動」，兼顧出口和內需，打造符合未來社會需要的嶄新產業結構。
第三，要有接軌全球的宏圖大略。台灣經濟要有活路，必須和全球緊密接軌，政府固須有加入ＴＰＰ、ＲＣＥＰ的雄心壯志，但更須有突破國內外阻力的政治謀略及經濟對策，其規劃才不致淪為畫餅。
第四，要有磨合兩岸的深謀遠慮。兩岸經貿要成為台灣經濟發展的長期優勢，雙方「磨合」實至關重要，須及早建置兩岸經濟戰略對話及政策協調機制，才能建構可長可久的雙贏路徑。
以上四大方向，並非新論，但政府須有加倍決心和加倍努力，才能彌補多年空轉，再造台灣經濟生機。
Wednesday, February 19, 2014
DPP and Ko Wen-je: Backdoor Listing Game
DPP and Ko Wen-je: Backdoor Listing Game
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 20, 2014
Summary: Ko Wen-je's fast-talking routine has set a trend. It has made politics entertaining. The DPP has long prided itself as a pool of sharks. Yet the whole lot of them are no match for a dark horse such as Ko Wen-je. They have conceded him anything and everything. Is this perverse spectacle a reflection of DPP weakness, or Ko Wen-je's boundless ambition? Is it a reflection of Taipei voters' "Town without Pity" predilections? Will the DPP and Ko Wen-je's backdoor listing tactics work their magic? That will depend on the wisdom of Taipei City voters.
Full text below:
Today, the DPP begins its nomination process. Ko Wen-je says he has been "biting his tongue." He is unwilling to relent and join the DPP. Put bluntly, this is a game of mutual "backdoor listing." It is merely that the two parties have yet to add up their own profit and loss columns.
What do we mean by "backdoor listing?" The DPP is placing its bets on Ko Wen-je's popularity. It hopes to bring the long-besieged capital city under Green Camp control. Ko Wen-je hopes to exploit the DPP's organizational structure, financial resources, and grassroots support. He hopes to turn this near term advantage into votes, and himself into the head of the municipal government .
In other words, the DPP is betting that Ko Wen-je is electable. Ko Wen-je meanwhile, needs DPP money and manpower to carry him into City Hall. This should have been a done deal. Each side should have gotten what it wanted. Yet it has run into a major obstacle. Ko Wen-je needs DPP support, but is unwilling to carry the DPP colors. He wants to carry his own personal banner into battle. As a result, aspiring DPP candidates feel as if they are being trampled underfoot. DPP leadership feel they are being humiliated. This is why the two sides' "backdoor listing" agreement has yet to be concluded.
The DPP is eager for victory. Ko Wen-je is reluctant to forsake this opportunity. Ko Wen-je knows of course what the DPP is thinking. He has held out for over two months, refusing to give an inch. He as even boasted on many occasions that "joining the party would make me unelectable." He insisted he must retain his non-partisan status, only then will he be able to seek the critical five percent that could swing the election. His implication is that joining the DPP would not be a benefit, but rather a burden. Ko overestimates himself. He also insults the DPP. Ko Wen-je has gotten carried away. This will make cooperation between the two parties even more difficult.
Let us take a closer look. Ko Wen-je has a chance to become Mayor of Taipei. He insists that joining the DPP could limit his chances. In fact, the limitations may be his own. Ko Wen-je currently enjoys considerable popularity. A major factor is his "ordinary Joe" political discourse, his atypical manner of speech, with its "enfant terrible" flavor. These make him appear fresher than the usual Blue or Green candidates. But this sort of freshness will inevitably grow stale as the campaign wears on. Voters will begin to plumb the depths of this candidate's character. When election day rolls around, will this political freshman still be fresh? That is the 64,000 dollar question.
For example, yesterday he joked about Shao Hsiao-ling's illness. He revealed a highly questionable sense of "humor." Ko is a surgeon whose self-proclaimed mission is to save lives. Yet here he was casually making jokes about a patient's condition. In fact, he violated medical ethics. Ko Wen-je actually used the words "brains were scrambled" to describe a dying patient. Where was the good doctor's compassion? Ko said "Jason Hu laughed loudly." Perhaps he cannot understand the joy a husband felt when his wife was snatched from the jaws of death. But did he really need to use such language to mock a political opponent? Ko Wen-je revealed what went on an operating room. His only motive, apparently, what to give the audience a good laugh. Does such a person really have the wisdom, the ethics, and the compassion to be the mayor of a nation's capital? Such gaffes go way beyond the matter of good manners. What's worse, they are likely to happen again.
Ko Wen-je is essentially Deep Green in his political outlook. In recent months he has been canvassing the farm markets seeking Green camp support. This is true of this behind the scenes campaign advisers as well. Most of them are younger generation DPP and TSU leaders. Ko Wen-je is attempting to maintain an "ordinary Joe, political outsider" image. He refuses to join the DPP. He refuses to display the party colors. In fact, what he has done is don a political disguise. On the surface, he is an "ordinary Joe" without party or factional affiliation. But underneath this purported "tabula rasa," he remains a Deep Green DPP candidate. Alas, many people eat this up. They listen to his political spiel, and follow him around as they would a celebrity. But voters have yet to hear him seriously address a single public policy or municipal policy issue .
Blue vs. Green political divisions disgust the public. Ko Wen-je's fast-talking routine has set a trend. It has made politics entertaining. But one point is particularly fascinating. The DPP has long prided itself as a pool of sharks. Yet the whole lot of them are no match for a dark horse such as Ko Wen-je . They have conceded him anything and everything. They are even willing to sacrifce their party at his urging. Is this perverse spectacle a reflection of DPP weakness, or Ko Wen-je's boundless ambition? Is it a reflection of Taipei voters' "Town without Pity" predilections? Will the DPP and Ko Wen-je's backdoor listing tactics work their magic? That will depend on the wisdom of Taipei City voters.
民進黨與柯文哲的借殼上市大戲
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.20 03:48 am
民進黨內部的提名工作今天展開，而柯文哲則聲稱還在「憋氣」，不願鬆口加入民進黨。說穿了，這其實是一場彼此「借殼上市」的遊戲，只是雙方還沒計算好自己的損益底線罷了。
所謂「借殼上市」，在民進黨方面，是想借用柯文哲現有的高人氣押賭，或許能把久違的首都市長寶座撈回綠營手裡。在柯文哲方面，圖的則是民進黨組織、財力和基層的動員支持，才能確保他眼下的民調優勢化為一張張選票，把自己送進市政府。
換言之，民進黨看中的投資標的，是柯文哲的當選機率；而柯文哲需要的，則是民進黨傾黨出錢出力為他抬轎，衝出直抵市府的便道。這本來是個一拍即合、各取所需的買賣；但目前最大的障礙，是需要民進黨抬轎的柯文哲卻不願披掛民進黨的戰袍上陣，只想打著「柯Ｐ」的個人旗號出征；如此一來，不僅黨內表態參選的戰將覺得被踩在腳下，連民進黨都感到臉上無光。這也是雙方為如何「借殼」問題一直喬不攏的原因。
以民進黨急於「想贏」的欲望，一定不會放棄柯文哲這個「機會」；當然，柯文哲也是看準了民進黨這點心情，拗了兩個多月仍不願作出寸讓。不僅如此，柯文哲數度揚言「入了黨會選不上」，他必須保持「無黨」之身，才能爭取那關鍵的百分之五選票；言下之意，加入民進黨不是加持，而是包袱。這種說法，不僅高估了自己，也羞辱了民進黨；而柯文哲的得意忘形，恐將會使雙方的合作關係越來越不容易維持。
進一步看，柯文哲出線成為台北市長的機會，與其說可能因加入民進黨而受到限制，倒不如說最後的限制可能出在他自身的主觀條件。柯文哲目前的高人氣，當然極大的因素是來自所謂「素人政治」的魅力；比較不「八股」的談話，有時帶點「脫線」的趣味，都讓他比傳統藍綠政黨出身的人多了一些新鮮感。然而，這樣的新鮮感，無論如何會隨著選舉進入持久戰而變調走味，也會隨著選民對候選人檢驗程度的升高而露餡。一旦到了投票時刻，這位政治新鮮人還能保持多少「新鮮」感，就是很大的考驗。
以柯文哲日昨談到邵曉鈴病情時的輕佻為例，即暴露了他的「趣味」品質不高。一位自命以救人為職志的外科醫師，在公開場合隨便談論特定患者的病情，其實已違反了醫師的專業倫理；柯文哲竟用了「腦筋秀斗」這樣的詞句來形容一名垂危病人，醫生的仁心何在？而他在形容「胡志強竟笑得很開心」時，就算不能理解一個丈夫目睹從鬼門關前搶救回妻子性命的喜悅，需要用這種語言來譏嘲政治對手嗎？而柯文哲大爆手術室內情，似只為博取聽眾一笑；他的智慧、道德和同情心恐怕都無法勝任首都市長之職。這種事，已經不是厚不厚道的問題了，而且恐怕會一演再演。
再說，柯文哲的基本色彩偏屬「深綠」，近數月他的跑攤活動也以拜會綠色選民居多；包括他幕後的各路軍師，也以民進黨和台聯的中生代為主。在這種情況下，柯文哲卻為了保持「政治素人」的形象，而拒絕加入民進黨，拒絕披掛政黨徽誌；對選民而言，這其實已是一種政治辨識上的「偽裝」。從表面上看，這或許是位無黨無派的「素人」；實質上，在外表的「白牌」底下，裡頭卻藏著一個比民進黨還「綠」的人。最麻煩的是，不少民眾像追星般咀嚼他每場政治脫口秀的餘味，然而選民從來沒聽他嚴肅談論過任何公共政策或市政議題。
就台灣令人厭煩的藍綠政治而言，柯文哲的「快板說書」，確實創造了一股新的風潮，也增添了政治趣味和社會想像。其中最耐人尋味的一點是，長年在政治上翻雲覆雨的民進黨，如今整個團隊加起來竟然玩不過柯文哲這匹黑馬，任他予取予求，並甘願舉黨供他驅策。如此倒錯的景象，究竟是反映民進黨的外強中乾，或是柯文哲神力無邊，還是「無情城市」台北市選民的奇特癖好所致？民進黨和柯文哲的借殼戰術能否奏功，就看台北市民的眼光了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 20, 2014
Summary: Ko Wen-je's fast-talking routine has set a trend. It has made politics entertaining. The DPP has long prided itself as a pool of sharks. Yet the whole lot of them are no match for a dark horse such as Ko Wen-je. They have conceded him anything and everything. Is this perverse spectacle a reflection of DPP weakness, or Ko Wen-je's boundless ambition? Is it a reflection of Taipei voters' "Town without Pity" predilections? Will the DPP and Ko Wen-je's backdoor listing tactics work their magic? That will depend on the wisdom of Taipei City voters.
Full text below:
Today, the DPP begins its nomination process. Ko Wen-je says he has been "biting his tongue." He is unwilling to relent and join the DPP. Put bluntly, this is a game of mutual "backdoor listing." It is merely that the two parties have yet to add up their own profit and loss columns.
What do we mean by "backdoor listing?" The DPP is placing its bets on Ko Wen-je's popularity. It hopes to bring the long-besieged capital city under Green Camp control. Ko Wen-je hopes to exploit the DPP's organizational structure, financial resources, and grassroots support. He hopes to turn this near term advantage into votes, and himself into the head of the municipal government .
In other words, the DPP is betting that Ko Wen-je is electable. Ko Wen-je meanwhile, needs DPP money and manpower to carry him into City Hall. This should have been a done deal. Each side should have gotten what it wanted. Yet it has run into a major obstacle. Ko Wen-je needs DPP support, but is unwilling to carry the DPP colors. He wants to carry his own personal banner into battle. As a result, aspiring DPP candidates feel as if they are being trampled underfoot. DPP leadership feel they are being humiliated. This is why the two sides' "backdoor listing" agreement has yet to be concluded.
The DPP is eager for victory. Ko Wen-je is reluctant to forsake this opportunity. Ko Wen-je knows of course what the DPP is thinking. He has held out for over two months, refusing to give an inch. He as even boasted on many occasions that "joining the party would make me unelectable." He insisted he must retain his non-partisan status, only then will he be able to seek the critical five percent that could swing the election. His implication is that joining the DPP would not be a benefit, but rather a burden. Ko overestimates himself. He also insults the DPP. Ko Wen-je has gotten carried away. This will make cooperation between the two parties even more difficult.
Let us take a closer look. Ko Wen-je has a chance to become Mayor of Taipei. He insists that joining the DPP could limit his chances. In fact, the limitations may be his own. Ko Wen-je currently enjoys considerable popularity. A major factor is his "ordinary Joe" political discourse, his atypical manner of speech, with its "enfant terrible" flavor. These make him appear fresher than the usual Blue or Green candidates. But this sort of freshness will inevitably grow stale as the campaign wears on. Voters will begin to plumb the depths of this candidate's character. When election day rolls around, will this political freshman still be fresh? That is the 64,000 dollar question.
For example, yesterday he joked about Shao Hsiao-ling's illness. He revealed a highly questionable sense of "humor." Ko is a surgeon whose self-proclaimed mission is to save lives. Yet here he was casually making jokes about a patient's condition. In fact, he violated medical ethics. Ko Wen-je actually used the words "brains were scrambled" to describe a dying patient. Where was the good doctor's compassion? Ko said "Jason Hu laughed loudly." Perhaps he cannot understand the joy a husband felt when his wife was snatched from the jaws of death. But did he really need to use such language to mock a political opponent? Ko Wen-je revealed what went on an operating room. His only motive, apparently, what to give the audience a good laugh. Does such a person really have the wisdom, the ethics, and the compassion to be the mayor of a nation's capital? Such gaffes go way beyond the matter of good manners. What's worse, they are likely to happen again.
Ko Wen-je is essentially Deep Green in his political outlook. In recent months he has been canvassing the farm markets seeking Green camp support. This is true of this behind the scenes campaign advisers as well. Most of them are younger generation DPP and TSU leaders. Ko Wen-je is attempting to maintain an "ordinary Joe, political outsider" image. He refuses to join the DPP. He refuses to display the party colors. In fact, what he has done is don a political disguise. On the surface, he is an "ordinary Joe" without party or factional affiliation. But underneath this purported "tabula rasa," he remains a Deep Green DPP candidate. Alas, many people eat this up. They listen to his political spiel, and follow him around as they would a celebrity. But voters have yet to hear him seriously address a single public policy or municipal policy issue .
Blue vs. Green political divisions disgust the public. Ko Wen-je's fast-talking routine has set a trend. It has made politics entertaining. But one point is particularly fascinating. The DPP has long prided itself as a pool of sharks. Yet the whole lot of them are no match for a dark horse such as Ko Wen-je . They have conceded him anything and everything. They are even willing to sacrifce their party at his urging. Is this perverse spectacle a reflection of DPP weakness, or Ko Wen-je's boundless ambition? Is it a reflection of Taipei voters' "Town without Pity" predilections? Will the DPP and Ko Wen-je's backdoor listing tactics work their magic? That will depend on the wisdom of Taipei City voters.
民進黨與柯文哲的借殼上市大戲
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.20 03:48 am
民進黨內部的提名工作今天展開，而柯文哲則聲稱還在「憋氣」，不願鬆口加入民進黨。說穿了，這其實是一場彼此「借殼上市」的遊戲，只是雙方還沒計算好自己的損益底線罷了。
所謂「借殼上市」，在民進黨方面，是想借用柯文哲現有的高人氣押賭，或許能把久違的首都市長寶座撈回綠營手裡。在柯文哲方面，圖的則是民進黨組織、財力和基層的動員支持，才能確保他眼下的民調優勢化為一張張選票，把自己送進市政府。
換言之，民進黨看中的投資標的，是柯文哲的當選機率；而柯文哲需要的，則是民進黨傾黨出錢出力為他抬轎，衝出直抵市府的便道。這本來是個一拍即合、各取所需的買賣；但目前最大的障礙，是需要民進黨抬轎的柯文哲卻不願披掛民進黨的戰袍上陣，只想打著「柯Ｐ」的個人旗號出征；如此一來，不僅黨內表態參選的戰將覺得被踩在腳下，連民進黨都感到臉上無光。這也是雙方為如何「借殼」問題一直喬不攏的原因。
以民進黨急於「想贏」的欲望，一定不會放棄柯文哲這個「機會」；當然，柯文哲也是看準了民進黨這點心情，拗了兩個多月仍不願作出寸讓。不僅如此，柯文哲數度揚言「入了黨會選不上」，他必須保持「無黨」之身，才能爭取那關鍵的百分之五選票；言下之意，加入民進黨不是加持，而是包袱。這種說法，不僅高估了自己，也羞辱了民進黨；而柯文哲的得意忘形，恐將會使雙方的合作關係越來越不容易維持。
進一步看，柯文哲出線成為台北市長的機會，與其說可能因加入民進黨而受到限制，倒不如說最後的限制可能出在他自身的主觀條件。柯文哲目前的高人氣，當然極大的因素是來自所謂「素人政治」的魅力；比較不「八股」的談話，有時帶點「脫線」的趣味，都讓他比傳統藍綠政黨出身的人多了一些新鮮感。然而，這樣的新鮮感，無論如何會隨著選舉進入持久戰而變調走味，也會隨著選民對候選人檢驗程度的升高而露餡。一旦到了投票時刻，這位政治新鮮人還能保持多少「新鮮」感，就是很大的考驗。
以柯文哲日昨談到邵曉鈴病情時的輕佻為例，即暴露了他的「趣味」品質不高。一位自命以救人為職志的外科醫師，在公開場合隨便談論特定患者的病情，其實已違反了醫師的專業倫理；柯文哲竟用了「腦筋秀斗」這樣的詞句來形容一名垂危病人，醫生的仁心何在？而他在形容「胡志強竟笑得很開心」時，就算不能理解一個丈夫目睹從鬼門關前搶救回妻子性命的喜悅，需要用這種語言來譏嘲政治對手嗎？而柯文哲大爆手術室內情，似只為博取聽眾一笑；他的智慧、道德和同情心恐怕都無法勝任首都市長之職。這種事，已經不是厚不厚道的問題了，而且恐怕會一演再演。
再說，柯文哲的基本色彩偏屬「深綠」，近數月他的跑攤活動也以拜會綠色選民居多；包括他幕後的各路軍師，也以民進黨和台聯的中生代為主。在這種情況下，柯文哲卻為了保持「政治素人」的形象，而拒絕加入民進黨，拒絕披掛政黨徽誌；對選民而言，這其實已是一種政治辨識上的「偽裝」。從表面上看，這或許是位無黨無派的「素人」；實質上，在外表的「白牌」底下，裡頭卻藏著一個比民進黨還「綠」的人。最麻煩的是，不少民眾像追星般咀嚼他每場政治脫口秀的餘味，然而選民從來沒聽他嚴肅談論過任何公共政策或市政議題。
就台灣令人厭煩的藍綠政治而言，柯文哲的「快板說書」，確實創造了一股新的風潮，也增添了政治趣味和社會想像。其中最耐人尋味的一點是，長年在政治上翻雲覆雨的民進黨，如今整個團隊加起來竟然玩不過柯文哲這匹黑馬，任他予取予求，並甘願舉黨供他驅策。如此倒錯的景象，究竟是反映民進黨的外強中乾，或是柯文哲神力無邊，還是「無情城市」台北市選民的奇特癖好所致？民進黨和柯文哲的借殼戰術能否奏功，就看台北市民的眼光了。
Tuesday, February 18, 2014
Grey Crisis: Government and Individuals Must Prepare
Grey Crisis: Government and Individuals Must Prepare
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 19, 2014
Summary: "On occasion I venture forth with my staff. At days end I sit behind closed doors. I dare not gaze upon myself in my mirror. I can no longer read books containing fine print." This was Bai Juyi's description of old age. Thirteen hundred years later, elders on Taiwan ought not consider this acceptable.
Full text below:
Within four to five years, Taiwan will become a "grey society." Early retirements in addition to those who are over 65, will account for over one fifth of the population. This means we do not have much time. The average life expectancy has increased. Over the past two decades, many families have experienced tremendous pressure caring for their elders. Baby boomers are now facing old age. Therefore government and society must learn to deal with the problem of aging.
This newspaper's Vision Engineering Department recently published a series of articles on "active aging." They addressed productive aging, care for the elderly, support for the elderly, and end of life care. It depicted what a greying society on Taiwan would look like. It explored what sort of care is required by the elderly. It provided examples of similar experiences from other countries. We hope Taiwan can develop similar elderly care institutions, but with local characteristics.
From a practical perspective, the most pressing issues for Taiwan are support for the elderly and care for the elderly. This is where the concern is the greatest, and the demand is the greatest. But government policies and private industry have failed to meet these needs.
Consider care for the elderly. The public on Taiwan values family. As many as 60 percent of Taiwan's elderly prefer to live with their children. Most people prefer aging in place. Only 20 percent are willing to live in a retirement home. Yet in recent years the government has invested immense resources in institutional care. Support for aging in place within the community or at home remains extremely weak. Substantial changes in policy are necessary to meet the needs of the community. Thankfully, some local governments and non-governmental organizations seem better able to appreciate public needs. The "in place nursing" model is taking root within society. For example, Taichung City has established a "senior citizen academy." New Taipei City has established combined nursery daycare centers that enable the elderly to attend classes along with their grandchildren, and interact with the very young.
Consider support for the elderly. This is where the government has invested the most resources. It has established long-term care services, long-term care insurance planning, and linked it to NHI sick care. The goal is to use one-stop care to ease peoples' concerns. But diseases have different impacts on the elderly, and their ability to age in place. The government must be more flexibile in how it provides care for the elderly. It must relieve the pressure on people who adopt different means of care. The government must be more imaginative. Long-term care planning is proceeding at a snail's pace. Legislation and enforcement cannot meet the needs of the community.
Institutions and systems must be established. But care for the elderly involves other, more important issues. The public must learn how to care for their elders. The elderly are not necessarily people who must be dependent upon society. A UK "White Paper on Social Policy for Senior Citizens" shows that during all periods of life, "self-reliance, opportunity, and choice" are of primary importance. The US has also proposed "self-reliance, opportunity, and " dignity" as a social norm for the elderly. The human lifespan is akin to the four seasons of the year. Ideally one will be able to preserve one's autonomy and dignity between eldership and the end of life. One should make plans. One should continue learning. One should continue working. If one retires, one should do volunteer work to remain active. This makes one's life more meaningful. It also helps one maintain physical and mental health.
In recent years, many advanced nations have been promoting "age friendly" employment policies. They hope to promote the employment of senior citizens. This makes more effective use of the elderly population's accumulated wisdom. It also reduces the impact of an aging society on the nation's finances. Mainstream society on Taiwan has long lacked this age friendly consciousness. For years its "respect for the elderly" policy has merely kept them at arm's length. The labor market imposes mandatory retirement ages. Health clubs impose age restrictions. Such conduct passes off age discrimination as "compassion."
Consider end of life care. Hospice care is the most significant domestic social trend in recent years. The hospice concept is widely accepted. But resources are inadequate. The government has emphasized hospital hospice care. In fact, end of life care should not be limited to the final farewell. Lifelong health planning for autonomy, for combatting unnecessary medical procedures, and for finding a final resting place for one's remaining years, and for avoiding a "lonely death" may be far more important. End of life care is a long road. The individual and the family must cultivate a more positive view of life. Governments need to invest greater resources to help society complete the rites of life.
"On occasion I venture forth with my staff. At days end I sit behind closed doors. I dare not gaze upon myself in my mirror. I can no longer read books containing fine print." This was Bai Juyi's description of old age. Thirteen hundred years later, elders on Taiwan ought not consider this acceptable.
銀髮衝擊：政府和個人都須做好準備
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.19 04:23 am
再隔四、五年，台灣即將步入「高齡社會」，六十五歲以上加提早退休的人口，將佔總人口的五分之一以上。這表示我們在時間上已沒有很多餘裕。事實上，隨著國民平均壽命的拉長，許多家庭近一、二十年來已經承受了照護家中長輩的莫大壓力，即連嬰兒潮世代也即將面對自己的老年；因此，如何調整政府及社會因應老年的制度和心態，已刻不容緩。
本報系願景工程近日推出「活躍老化」──老有所為、老有所托、老有所養、老有所終的系列專題，目的即在勾勒台灣熟齡社會的生活樣態，探討民眾對於老年生活照養的各項問題與需求，並提供其他國家的類似經驗，希望台灣能夠發展出具本土特色的老年生活哲學和照護機制。
從現實面觀察，台灣社會目前最迫切的老年議題，主要集中在老者的托養與照護上。在這兩方面，民眾的焦慮最多、需求也最大，但政府政策上和民間產業面似仍遠遠落後社會的需求。
在老有所托的部分，由於台灣社會講究家庭倫理的特質，有高達六成以上的台灣老人喜歡與子女同住，不少人願意在家養老，而願意去住安養機構的僅百分之二。然而，近年政府投入的資源卻大量集中在機構照護，對於支持老人留在社區或家中的服務及支援體系十分薄弱；這樣的差距，恐須在政策上作出大幅調整，才能符合社會的實際需要。值得慶幸的是，一些地方政府或民間團體似乎較能體察民間的需求，不少「在地安養」的模式在社區萌芽：例如台中市設立了「托老學園」，新北市出現了「托幼也托老」的托育中心，讓長者與孫兒一起上學，也調和世代間的情感互動。
在老有所養的部分，是目前政府著力最深的一塊，從長照服務機構的設立、長照保險的規畫，銜接全民健保展開的疾病生活照護，希望一條龍式地掃除人民的後顧之憂。但是，由於老人疾病的多樣化對生活自理能力的影響程度各異，政府如何在照護模式上提供更彈性的設計，以紓解民眾不同的照護壓力，實在需要有更大的想像力。以目前牛步化的長照規畫、立法及執行，恐怕無法滿足社會的需要。
除了機構和制度的建立，老年議題還有更重要的一個面向，那就是人民學習如何處理自己的老去。熟齡人口未必就是社會的依賴人口，英國「高齡社會政策白皮書」即楬櫫，在不同的生命周期，都應確保「自立、機會與選擇」三項基本原則；美國也提出「自立」、「機會」與「尊嚴」三大方向，作為建構中高齡族群的社會準則。人生成長猶如四季的輪替，從熟齡至人生的終點站，如能抱持自主且有尊嚴、有規畫的態度，善用終身學習、延長就業、志工服務等來活躍自己的退休生活，不僅讓生命更有意義，也有助保持身心的健康。
近年，不少先進國家都在提倡「友善年齡」的就業政策，希望促成中高齡公民的就業，除更有效運用中高齡人口的智慧和人力，也減輕高齡社會對國家財政的衝擊。在台灣的主流社會，一向缺乏這種友善的自覺，長年來的各種「敬老」政策都隱含著「敬而遠之」的輕慢；諸如勞動市場設有強制退休年齡，運動俱樂部對一定年齡的老人設限等，都反映了這種假「體恤」為名的年齡歧視。
在老有所終方面，「安寧緩和照顧」是國內近年民間發起的社會運動中，成效極顯著的一項。安寧療護的觀念逐漸深入人心，但它的資源卻永遠不足，而且始終偏重醫院的安寧療護。事實上，「老有所終」並不應只局限於向生命告別的這項最後儀式，如何規畫終身醫療自主計畫、對抗無效醫療的凌遲，為自己找到一個最後的安身終老場所，而不會「孤獨死」等，可能更為重要。善終的過程是一條漫漫長路，除了個人與家族要培養更積極的生命觀，也需要政府投入更多資源，協助社會完成生命的儀式。
「有時扶杖出，盡日閉門居。懶照新磨鏡，休看小字書。」這是白居易描繪的老年生活，一千三百年後的今天，台灣老人們不應再以此為足了吧！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 19, 2014
Summary: "On occasion I venture forth with my staff. At days end I sit behind closed doors. I dare not gaze upon myself in my mirror. I can no longer read books containing fine print." This was Bai Juyi's description of old age. Thirteen hundred years later, elders on Taiwan ought not consider this acceptable.
Full text below:
Within four to five years, Taiwan will become a "grey society." Early retirements in addition to those who are over 65, will account for over one fifth of the population. This means we do not have much time. The average life expectancy has increased. Over the past two decades, many families have experienced tremendous pressure caring for their elders. Baby boomers are now facing old age. Therefore government and society must learn to deal with the problem of aging.
This newspaper's Vision Engineering Department recently published a series of articles on "active aging." They addressed productive aging, care for the elderly, support for the elderly, and end of life care. It depicted what a greying society on Taiwan would look like. It explored what sort of care is required by the elderly. It provided examples of similar experiences from other countries. We hope Taiwan can develop similar elderly care institutions, but with local characteristics.
From a practical perspective, the most pressing issues for Taiwan are support for the elderly and care for the elderly. This is where the concern is the greatest, and the demand is the greatest. But government policies and private industry have failed to meet these needs.
Consider care for the elderly. The public on Taiwan values family. As many as 60 percent of Taiwan's elderly prefer to live with their children. Most people prefer aging in place. Only 20 percent are willing to live in a retirement home. Yet in recent years the government has invested immense resources in institutional care. Support for aging in place within the community or at home remains extremely weak. Substantial changes in policy are necessary to meet the needs of the community. Thankfully, some local governments and non-governmental organizations seem better able to appreciate public needs. The "in place nursing" model is taking root within society. For example, Taichung City has established a "senior citizen academy." New Taipei City has established combined nursery daycare centers that enable the elderly to attend classes along with their grandchildren, and interact with the very young.
Consider support for the elderly. This is where the government has invested the most resources. It has established long-term care services, long-term care insurance planning, and linked it to NHI sick care. The goal is to use one-stop care to ease peoples' concerns. But diseases have different impacts on the elderly, and their ability to age in place. The government must be more flexibile in how it provides care for the elderly. It must relieve the pressure on people who adopt different means of care. The government must be more imaginative. Long-term care planning is proceeding at a snail's pace. Legislation and enforcement cannot meet the needs of the community.
Institutions and systems must be established. But care for the elderly involves other, more important issues. The public must learn how to care for their elders. The elderly are not necessarily people who must be dependent upon society. A UK "White Paper on Social Policy for Senior Citizens" shows that during all periods of life, "self-reliance, opportunity, and choice" are of primary importance. The US has also proposed "self-reliance, opportunity, and " dignity" as a social norm for the elderly. The human lifespan is akin to the four seasons of the year. Ideally one will be able to preserve one's autonomy and dignity between eldership and the end of life. One should make plans. One should continue learning. One should continue working. If one retires, one should do volunteer work to remain active. This makes one's life more meaningful. It also helps one maintain physical and mental health.
In recent years, many advanced nations have been promoting "age friendly" employment policies. They hope to promote the employment of senior citizens. This makes more effective use of the elderly population's accumulated wisdom. It also reduces the impact of an aging society on the nation's finances. Mainstream society on Taiwan has long lacked this age friendly consciousness. For years its "respect for the elderly" policy has merely kept them at arm's length. The labor market imposes mandatory retirement ages. Health clubs impose age restrictions. Such conduct passes off age discrimination as "compassion."
Consider end of life care. Hospice care is the most significant domestic social trend in recent years. The hospice concept is widely accepted. But resources are inadequate. The government has emphasized hospital hospice care. In fact, end of life care should not be limited to the final farewell. Lifelong health planning for autonomy, for combatting unnecessary medical procedures, and for finding a final resting place for one's remaining years, and for avoiding a "lonely death" may be far more important. End of life care is a long road. The individual and the family must cultivate a more positive view of life. Governments need to invest greater resources to help society complete the rites of life.
"On occasion I venture forth with my staff. At days end I sit behind closed doors. I dare not gaze upon myself in my mirror. I can no longer read books containing fine print." This was Bai Juyi's description of old age. Thirteen hundred years later, elders on Taiwan ought not consider this acceptable.
銀髮衝擊：政府和個人都須做好準備
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.19 04:23 am
再隔四、五年，台灣即將步入「高齡社會」，六十五歲以上加提早退休的人口，將佔總人口的五分之一以上。這表示我們在時間上已沒有很多餘裕。事實上，隨著國民平均壽命的拉長，許多家庭近一、二十年來已經承受了照護家中長輩的莫大壓力，即連嬰兒潮世代也即將面對自己的老年；因此，如何調整政府及社會因應老年的制度和心態，已刻不容緩。
本報系願景工程近日推出「活躍老化」──老有所為、老有所托、老有所養、老有所終的系列專題，目的即在勾勒台灣熟齡社會的生活樣態，探討民眾對於老年生活照養的各項問題與需求，並提供其他國家的類似經驗，希望台灣能夠發展出具本土特色的老年生活哲學和照護機制。
從現實面觀察，台灣社會目前最迫切的老年議題，主要集中在老者的托養與照護上。在這兩方面，民眾的焦慮最多、需求也最大，但政府政策上和民間產業面似仍遠遠落後社會的需求。
在老有所托的部分，由於台灣社會講究家庭倫理的特質，有高達六成以上的台灣老人喜歡與子女同住，不少人願意在家養老，而願意去住安養機構的僅百分之二。然而，近年政府投入的資源卻大量集中在機構照護，對於支持老人留在社區或家中的服務及支援體系十分薄弱；這樣的差距，恐須在政策上作出大幅調整，才能符合社會的實際需要。值得慶幸的是，一些地方政府或民間團體似乎較能體察民間的需求，不少「在地安養」的模式在社區萌芽：例如台中市設立了「托老學園」，新北市出現了「托幼也托老」的托育中心，讓長者與孫兒一起上學，也調和世代間的情感互動。
在老有所養的部分，是目前政府著力最深的一塊，從長照服務機構的設立、長照保險的規畫，銜接全民健保展開的疾病生活照護，希望一條龍式地掃除人民的後顧之憂。但是，由於老人疾病的多樣化對生活自理能力的影響程度各異，政府如何在照護模式上提供更彈性的設計，以紓解民眾不同的照護壓力，實在需要有更大的想像力。以目前牛步化的長照規畫、立法及執行，恐怕無法滿足社會的需要。
除了機構和制度的建立，老年議題還有更重要的一個面向，那就是人民學習如何處理自己的老去。熟齡人口未必就是社會的依賴人口，英國「高齡社會政策白皮書」即楬櫫，在不同的生命周期，都應確保「自立、機會與選擇」三項基本原則；美國也提出「自立」、「機會」與「尊嚴」三大方向，作為建構中高齡族群的社會準則。人生成長猶如四季的輪替，從熟齡至人生的終點站，如能抱持自主且有尊嚴、有規畫的態度，善用終身學習、延長就業、志工服務等來活躍自己的退休生活，不僅讓生命更有意義，也有助保持身心的健康。
近年，不少先進國家都在提倡「友善年齡」的就業政策，希望促成中高齡公民的就業，除更有效運用中高齡人口的智慧和人力，也減輕高齡社會對國家財政的衝擊。在台灣的主流社會，一向缺乏這種友善的自覺，長年來的各種「敬老」政策都隱含著「敬而遠之」的輕慢；諸如勞動市場設有強制退休年齡，運動俱樂部對一定年齡的老人設限等，都反映了這種假「體恤」為名的年齡歧視。
在老有所終方面，「安寧緩和照顧」是國內近年民間發起的社會運動中，成效極顯著的一項。安寧療護的觀念逐漸深入人心，但它的資源卻永遠不足，而且始終偏重醫院的安寧療護。事實上，「老有所終」並不應只局限於向生命告別的這項最後儀式，如何規畫終身醫療自主計畫、對抗無效醫療的凌遲，為自己找到一個最後的安身終老場所，而不會「孤獨死」等，可能更為重要。善終的過程是一條漫漫長路，除了個人與家族要培養更積極的生命觀，也需要政府投入更多資源，協助社會完成生命的儀式。
「有時扶杖出，盡日閉門居。懶照新磨鏡，休看小字書。」這是白居易描繪的老年生活，一千三百年後的今天，台灣老人們不應再以此為足了吧！
Monday, February 17, 2014
Cross-Strait Relations: The Frail Vessel Has Weathered Many Storms
Cross-Strait Relations: The Frail Vessel Has Weathered Many Storms
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 18, 2014
Summary: The two sides have been separately governed for 65 years. This is longer than a "jiazi," or a 60 year cycle in Chinese time keeping. Even from an historical perspective, this is a long time. China has been divided and reunified repeatedly throughout its history. Are the Chinese people on both sides of the strait unable to learn from history and seek answers in reality? The Wang Zhang meeting is an important step in the history of cross-strait relations. We hope that subsequent steps will proceed in the right direction.
Full text below:
To determine the historical significance of the Wang Zhang meeting, we must begin by reviewing history. This year is the 65th anniversary of divided rule. Over the past 65 years, the two sides have experienced the flames of civil war, the Cold War standoff, the exchange of secret emissaries, the establishment of communications channels through the SEF and ARATS, and an eventual breaking of the deadlock. The journey has been tortuous. From the Koo-Wang meeting to the 2005 Lien Hu meeting and the KMT's return to power in 2008, this period has been one of repeated advances and retreats. Every step has been excruciatingly difficult. The recent Wang Zhang meeting marks a new phase in the peaceful evolution of cross-strait relations. As chairman Wang Yu-chi noted, the two sides were divided 65 years ago. He is the first government official to visit the Mainland as MAC Chairman. He said the visit was "an important milestone in the course of cross-strait relations, and an indicator of official normalization of cross-strait interaction."
Wang spoke of the "official normalization of cross-strait interaction." It may not sound like much, but it has far-reaching significance. As we all know, consultation mechanisms between the two sides have long been institutionalized. Since their initial establishment, these mechanisms have been deactivated then reactivated. Today, it is standard operating procedure. But it was always burdened with the "private sector" label. The SEF and ARATS are not official institutions. The two sides have signed a number of agreements. At the end of this month in Taipei they will sign the "Cross-Strait Meteorological Cooperation Agreement" and the "Cross-Strait Seismic Monitoring Cooperation Agreement." Nearly all cross-strait agreements require official participation and official jurisdiction. Such agreements pertain to cooperation on matters of transportation, mutual legal assistance, agricultural quarantine and inspection, customs cooperation, financial supervision, food safety, and nuclear safety. None of these agreements can be signed by private sector entities. During negotiations official representatives may be in attendance. But they have always attended as consultants or private sector participants. This is not normal.
Cross-strait consultation is conducted on a "first economics, then politics; first the easy, then the hard basis." But politics has always been the key. Without the highly political Lien Hu meeting, the evolution of peaceful cross-strait relations would have remained impossible. Ma Ying-jeou would never have come to power. The vision of cross-strait peace could never have been translated into concrete policy, and be given its kick start. So far the political channels between the two sides remain at the party to party level. Party to party dialogue and cooperation is not sufficiently representative and comprehensive. It is not sufficiently stable. That is a major problem.
To ensure functionality, representativeness, legitimacy, and permanence, cross-strait "official normalization of interaction" is essential. But at this stage the most important requirement for peaceful cross-strait relations is consensus and wisdom. By consensus we mean official interaction. We mean ending cross-strait confrontation and division, and promoting the peaceful evolution of cross-strait relations, cross-strait integration, and national revival. By wisdom, we mean the insight offered by Hong Kong's "China Review," which wrote, "If the Taiwan side drags its feet on everything, it will Inevitably lose out on golden opportunities. If the Mainland side is too narrow in its calculations, it will inevitably make improved cross-strait relations impossible."
After the Wang Zhang meeting, Taiwan's two largest political parties began confronting this new development. As a China Times editorial on February 16 pointed out, the Ma government and the ruling party must promote cross-strait political contacts, dialogue, communications, and negotiations. It must consider defense strategy, economic integration, immigration, culture, and education. Systemically speaking, it must establish a committee for the peaceful evolution of cross-strait relations. It must author a cross-strait peace program, and restore the National Unification Guidelines.
More importantly, the DPP must stop making monkey sounds. The frail vessel of cross-strait relations has already weathered countless storms. When will the DPP finally arrive at Baidicheng? The DPP must think hard. The KMT and CCP are willing to set aside their historical grievances and practical interests. They are willing to confront the cross-strait reality head on, with open hearts. They are willing to propose solutions to resolve the political obstacles in the way of peaceful development of cross-strait relations. The DPP, meanwhile, persists in foot dragging, flip-flopping, and flailing. It will be seen as out of touch with reality. The DPP has greeted the Wang Zhang meeting with narrow-minded disdain. Once again it has highlighted the party's grave limitations. Look back at the peaceful evolution of cross-strait relations. The key to breaking through political barriers is political will. The DPP must face its demons on cross-strait issues. All it requires is the will. It must jettison outdated dogma. It must transcend short-term political advantage. When the DPP does that, it will find the road ahead of it wide open.
The two sides have been separately governed for 65 years. This is longer than a "jiazi," or a 60 year cycle in Chinese time keeping. Even from an historical perspective, this is a long time. China has been divided and reunified repeatedly throughout its history. People often speak of the Three Kingdoms Era. Tsao Tsao usurped the Han throne. The Jin dynasty reunified the land. This took 60 years. Another major division was the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms era. This too took 60 to 70 years. China has been divided and reunified repeatedly throughout its history. Are the Chinese people on both sides of the strait unable to learn from history and seek answers in reality? The Wang Zhang meeting is an important step in the history of cross-strait relations. We hope that subsequent steps will proceed in the right direction.
社論－兩岸輕舟已過萬重山
稍後再讀
中國時報 編輯部 2014年02月18日 04:10
要為王張會確定歷史定位，應該從歷史看起。今年是兩岸分治分立65周年，65年來，兩岸從內戰烽火、冷戰對峙、密使往來，再到建立海基、海協兩會管道，打破僵局，已經是十分曲折，而從第一次辜汪會談到2005年連胡會，再到2008年國民黨重新執政，這一段歷史更是進退反覆，舉步維艱。如今，王張會可說是在兩岸關係和平發展的進程上又開啟了一個新階段，誠如王郁琦主委所說，兩岸分治65年來，他是第一位正式以政府官員登陸訪問的陸委會主委，這是「兩岸關係歷程上的一個重要里程碑，對兩岸官方常態化互動具有指標意義」。
「兩岸官方常態化互動」短短9個字，卻蘊含深遠的意義。眾所周知，兩岸之間雖然有了制度化的協商機制與管道，這個機制從初始建立、中間停擺，到恢復運行，如今確實已經確立了常態化運作的模式，但卻始終冠有個「民間」的大帽子，海基海協兩會不是官方機構，兩岸之間簽署了大量的協議，本月底在台北又將簽署《兩岸氣象合作協議》與《兩岸地震監測合作協議》，這一整批的兩岸協議，包括交通、司法互助、農產品檢疫檢驗、海關合作、金融監理、食品安全、核電安全合作等等，不但範圍寬廣，更幾乎無一不涉及官方角色、不涉及治權課題，但又沒有一個協議不是以兩岸兩個民間團體的身分來代表簽訂，在協商會談過程，即使有官方代表出席，也都是以民間團體的顧問或其他職務身分來參與，這不能不說是一種非正常的現象。
另一方面，兩岸協商對話，雖說是先經後政，先易後難，但「政治」始終是關鍵要素，沒有高度政治性的連胡會，就不會有兩岸和平發展局面的開啟，沒有馬英九上台執政，兩岸和平發展的願景也不可能落實為具體政策，進而獲得實際推動。但是到目前為止，兩岸間的政治管道，仍然處在黨對黨的階段，政黨間的對話與合作，終究有代表性不夠全面、穩定性不夠堅固的大問題。
從功能性、代表性、正當性、未來性等各種角度來看，兩岸始終要走上「官方常態化互動」的階段，然而，要走上、走穩這個階段，除了兩岸和平發展客觀現實的需要外，更重要的是共識與智慧。所謂共識，應該是指官方互動的意義「不是維持兩岸的對峙與分裂，而是要促進兩岸關係的持續和平發展」，進而推進兩岸整合、民族復興。所謂智慧，香港中國評論網的短評點出了關鍵─「台灣方面如果事事怯步，必然失去大好時機。大陸方面如果狹窄算計，必然導致兩岸關係寸步難行」。
王張會之後，台灣兩大主流政黨要面對的新課題才剛剛開始，中國時報2月16日社論已經指出，馬政府及執政黨要從國防戰略、經濟統合及移民、文化、教育各方面分階段分緩急來推進兩岸政治接觸、對話、溝通進而談判。在體制上，應建立兩岸和平發展委員會、制訂兩岸和平發展綱領，進而恢復國統綱領。
更重要的是民進黨，兩岸猿聲啼不住，輕舟已過萬重山，民進黨何時才能抵達白帝城呢？民進黨應該嚴肅思考，當國共兩黨願意拋開歷史恩怨、現實利害等糾葛，以積極與包容的態度來正視兩岸現實，逐步提出辦法來解決橫亙在兩岸和平發展道路上的政治障礙，民進黨卻繼續故步自封，政策反覆，步伐凌亂，只會被現實遠遠拋在後面。民進黨面對此次王張會的態度曖昧與小鼻子小眼睛，再度證明了該黨的嚴重侷限性。回顧兩岸和平發展的道路，其實突破政治障礙的關鍵往往是在主事者的一念之間，民進黨人如何面對自己在兩岸問題上的心魔，其實也是在一念之間。拋棄過時的教條思維，超越短期的政治利害，民進黨當會發現在自己面前的道路絕對是柳暗花明。
兩岸分立分治達65年，這超過一甲子的光陰，即使從大歷史的角度來看，都不能算短。要論中國歷史上分合一統的大勢，人們往往首提三國時代，從曹丕篡漢到晉一統天下，也不過60年的時間，中國歷史上另一個大分裂時代─五代十國，也是60、70年的光景。面對分久必合的歷史大勢，兩岸的中國人難道沒有足夠的胸襟與智慧從歷史汲取教訓，從現實找尋解答嗎？王張會確實是兩岸關係史上重要的一步，我們期待後續跨出的每一步都是邁向正確的方向。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 18, 2014
Summary: The two sides have been separately governed for 65 years. This is longer than a "jiazi," or a 60 year cycle in Chinese time keeping. Even from an historical perspective, this is a long time. China has been divided and reunified repeatedly throughout its history. Are the Chinese people on both sides of the strait unable to learn from history and seek answers in reality? The Wang Zhang meeting is an important step in the history of cross-strait relations. We hope that subsequent steps will proceed in the right direction.
Full text below:
To determine the historical significance of the Wang Zhang meeting, we must begin by reviewing history. This year is the 65th anniversary of divided rule. Over the past 65 years, the two sides have experienced the flames of civil war, the Cold War standoff, the exchange of secret emissaries, the establishment of communications channels through the SEF and ARATS, and an eventual breaking of the deadlock. The journey has been tortuous. From the Koo-Wang meeting to the 2005 Lien Hu meeting and the KMT's return to power in 2008, this period has been one of repeated advances and retreats. Every step has been excruciatingly difficult. The recent Wang Zhang meeting marks a new phase in the peaceful evolution of cross-strait relations. As chairman Wang Yu-chi noted, the two sides were divided 65 years ago. He is the first government official to visit the Mainland as MAC Chairman. He said the visit was "an important milestone in the course of cross-strait relations, and an indicator of official normalization of cross-strait interaction."
Wang spoke of the "official normalization of cross-strait interaction." It may not sound like much, but it has far-reaching significance. As we all know, consultation mechanisms between the two sides have long been institutionalized. Since their initial establishment, these mechanisms have been deactivated then reactivated. Today, it is standard operating procedure. But it was always burdened with the "private sector" label. The SEF and ARATS are not official institutions. The two sides have signed a number of agreements. At the end of this month in Taipei they will sign the "Cross-Strait Meteorological Cooperation Agreement" and the "Cross-Strait Seismic Monitoring Cooperation Agreement." Nearly all cross-strait agreements require official participation and official jurisdiction. Such agreements pertain to cooperation on matters of transportation, mutual legal assistance, agricultural quarantine and inspection, customs cooperation, financial supervision, food safety, and nuclear safety. None of these agreements can be signed by private sector entities. During negotiations official representatives may be in attendance. But they have always attended as consultants or private sector participants. This is not normal.
Cross-strait consultation is conducted on a "first economics, then politics; first the easy, then the hard basis." But politics has always been the key. Without the highly political Lien Hu meeting, the evolution of peaceful cross-strait relations would have remained impossible. Ma Ying-jeou would never have come to power. The vision of cross-strait peace could never have been translated into concrete policy, and be given its kick start. So far the political channels between the two sides remain at the party to party level. Party to party dialogue and cooperation is not sufficiently representative and comprehensive. It is not sufficiently stable. That is a major problem.
To ensure functionality, representativeness, legitimacy, and permanence, cross-strait "official normalization of interaction" is essential. But at this stage the most important requirement for peaceful cross-strait relations is consensus and wisdom. By consensus we mean official interaction. We mean ending cross-strait confrontation and division, and promoting the peaceful evolution of cross-strait relations, cross-strait integration, and national revival. By wisdom, we mean the insight offered by Hong Kong's "China Review," which wrote, "If the Taiwan side drags its feet on everything, it will Inevitably lose out on golden opportunities. If the Mainland side is too narrow in its calculations, it will inevitably make improved cross-strait relations impossible."
After the Wang Zhang meeting, Taiwan's two largest political parties began confronting this new development. As a China Times editorial on February 16 pointed out, the Ma government and the ruling party must promote cross-strait political contacts, dialogue, communications, and negotiations. It must consider defense strategy, economic integration, immigration, culture, and education. Systemically speaking, it must establish a committee for the peaceful evolution of cross-strait relations. It must author a cross-strait peace program, and restore the National Unification Guidelines.
More importantly, the DPP must stop making monkey sounds. The frail vessel of cross-strait relations has already weathered countless storms. When will the DPP finally arrive at Baidicheng? The DPP must think hard. The KMT and CCP are willing to set aside their historical grievances and practical interests. They are willing to confront the cross-strait reality head on, with open hearts. They are willing to propose solutions to resolve the political obstacles in the way of peaceful development of cross-strait relations. The DPP, meanwhile, persists in foot dragging, flip-flopping, and flailing. It will be seen as out of touch with reality. The DPP has greeted the Wang Zhang meeting with narrow-minded disdain. Once again it has highlighted the party's grave limitations. Look back at the peaceful evolution of cross-strait relations. The key to breaking through political barriers is political will. The DPP must face its demons on cross-strait issues. All it requires is the will. It must jettison outdated dogma. It must transcend short-term political advantage. When the DPP does that, it will find the road ahead of it wide open.
The two sides have been separately governed for 65 years. This is longer than a "jiazi," or a 60 year cycle in Chinese time keeping. Even from an historical perspective, this is a long time. China has been divided and reunified repeatedly throughout its history. People often speak of the Three Kingdoms Era. Tsao Tsao usurped the Han throne. The Jin dynasty reunified the land. This took 60 years. Another major division was the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms era. This too took 60 to 70 years. China has been divided and reunified repeatedly throughout its history. Are the Chinese people on both sides of the strait unable to learn from history and seek answers in reality? The Wang Zhang meeting is an important step in the history of cross-strait relations. We hope that subsequent steps will proceed in the right direction.
社論－兩岸輕舟已過萬重山
稍後再讀
中國時報 編輯部 2014年02月18日 04:10
要為王張會確定歷史定位，應該從歷史看起。今年是兩岸分治分立65周年，65年來，兩岸從內戰烽火、冷戰對峙、密使往來，再到建立海基、海協兩會管道，打破僵局，已經是十分曲折，而從第一次辜汪會談到2005年連胡會，再到2008年國民黨重新執政，這一段歷史更是進退反覆，舉步維艱。如今，王張會可說是在兩岸關係和平發展的進程上又開啟了一個新階段，誠如王郁琦主委所說，兩岸分治65年來，他是第一位正式以政府官員登陸訪問的陸委會主委，這是「兩岸關係歷程上的一個重要里程碑，對兩岸官方常態化互動具有指標意義」。
「兩岸官方常態化互動」短短9個字，卻蘊含深遠的意義。眾所周知，兩岸之間雖然有了制度化的協商機制與管道，這個機制從初始建立、中間停擺，到恢復運行，如今確實已經確立了常態化運作的模式，但卻始終冠有個「民間」的大帽子，海基海協兩會不是官方機構，兩岸之間簽署了大量的協議，本月底在台北又將簽署《兩岸氣象合作協議》與《兩岸地震監測合作協議》，這一整批的兩岸協議，包括交通、司法互助、農產品檢疫檢驗、海關合作、金融監理、食品安全、核電安全合作等等，不但範圍寬廣，更幾乎無一不涉及官方角色、不涉及治權課題，但又沒有一個協議不是以兩岸兩個民間團體的身分來代表簽訂，在協商會談過程，即使有官方代表出席，也都是以民間團體的顧問或其他職務身分來參與，這不能不說是一種非正常的現象。
另一方面，兩岸協商對話，雖說是先經後政，先易後難，但「政治」始終是關鍵要素，沒有高度政治性的連胡會，就不會有兩岸和平發展局面的開啟，沒有馬英九上台執政，兩岸和平發展的願景也不可能落實為具體政策，進而獲得實際推動。但是到目前為止，兩岸間的政治管道，仍然處在黨對黨的階段，政黨間的對話與合作，終究有代表性不夠全面、穩定性不夠堅固的大問題。
從功能性、代表性、正當性、未來性等各種角度來看，兩岸始終要走上「官方常態化互動」的階段，然而，要走上、走穩這個階段，除了兩岸和平發展客觀現實的需要外，更重要的是共識與智慧。所謂共識，應該是指官方互動的意義「不是維持兩岸的對峙與分裂，而是要促進兩岸關係的持續和平發展」，進而推進兩岸整合、民族復興。所謂智慧，香港中國評論網的短評點出了關鍵─「台灣方面如果事事怯步，必然失去大好時機。大陸方面如果狹窄算計，必然導致兩岸關係寸步難行」。
王張會之後，台灣兩大主流政黨要面對的新課題才剛剛開始，中國時報2月16日社論已經指出，馬政府及執政黨要從國防戰略、經濟統合及移民、文化、教育各方面分階段分緩急來推進兩岸政治接觸、對話、溝通進而談判。在體制上，應建立兩岸和平發展委員會、制訂兩岸和平發展綱領，進而恢復國統綱領。
更重要的是民進黨，兩岸猿聲啼不住，輕舟已過萬重山，民進黨何時才能抵達白帝城呢？民進黨應該嚴肅思考，當國共兩黨願意拋開歷史恩怨、現實利害等糾葛，以積極與包容的態度來正視兩岸現實，逐步提出辦法來解決橫亙在兩岸和平發展道路上的政治障礙，民進黨卻繼續故步自封，政策反覆，步伐凌亂，只會被現實遠遠拋在後面。民進黨面對此次王張會的態度曖昧與小鼻子小眼睛，再度證明了該黨的嚴重侷限性。回顧兩岸和平發展的道路，其實突破政治障礙的關鍵往往是在主事者的一念之間，民進黨人如何面對自己在兩岸問題上的心魔，其實也是在一念之間。拋棄過時的教條思維，超越短期的政治利害，民進黨當會發現在自己面前的道路絕對是柳暗花明。
兩岸分立分治達65年，這超過一甲子的光陰，即使從大歷史的角度來看，都不能算短。要論中國歷史上分合一統的大勢，人們往往首提三國時代，從曹丕篡漢到晉一統天下，也不過60年的時間，中國歷史上另一個大分裂時代─五代十國，也是60、70年的光景。面對分久必合的歷史大勢，兩岸的中國人難道沒有足夠的胸襟與智慧從歷史汲取教訓，從現實找尋解答嗎？王張會確實是兩岸關係史上重要的一步，我們期待後續跨出的每一步都是邁向正確的方向。
Sunday, February 16, 2014
From Seattle to Beijing: More Imagination Needed
From Seattle to Beijing: More Imagination Needed
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 17, 2014
Summary: Cross-strait relations are undergoing historic changes. Can they move from a Wang Zhang meeting to a Ma Xi meeting? That remains to be seen. Haste makes waste. Taipei must not be in too big a hurry to promote a Ma Xi meeting. But let us back up a moment. Is a Ma Xi meeting possible? That depends on whether the two sides can transcend the " Seattle model." That depends on whether they are innovative enough and imaginative enough to adopt a "Beijing model." That depends on the wisdom and imagination of leaders on both sides, on their ability to overcome resistance and their determination to think anew.
Full text below:
When Wang and Zhang met in Shanghai they talked about the prospect of a "Ma Xi meeting." The message Mainland Affairs Council Chief Wang Yu-chi brought back was, "A Ma Xi meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference is unlikely, and there is as yet no alternative." His words can be interpreted three ways. One. Beijing does not oppose a Ma Xi meeting. Two. APEC is not an appropriate venue. Three. A Ma Xi meeting could be held elsewhere.
A meeting between the leaders of the two sides is something the Mainland has urged for years. Growing cross-strait peace makes this an opportunity not to be missed. This is a critical opportunity to cement the legacy of Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping. But Beijing has reservations about a Ma Xi meeting at APEC. Several considerations are involved. One. Bureaucratic caution regarding rapid developments in cross-strait relations. Two. The asking price for negotiations is a factor. Cross-strait economic interaction must not be equated with unlimited concessions to Taipei. Cross-strait political interaction must not be predicated upon Taipei getting whatever it demands. Three. Political concerns remain. Beijing may wish to avoid giving the impression that there are "two Chinas" or "One China and one Taiwan," both domestically and internationally. In the event of a change in ruling parties on Taiwan, Beijing may wish to avoid making the same concessions to the new ruling party.
Which of the above problems is the most important? It may not matter. Resolution wil requires greater imagination. The official exchange of views on this issue is already an important step.
The Wang Zhang meeting was an historic event. The two men decided not to discuss a Ma Xi meeting in Nanjing. They were still probing each other's bottom line. They chose to wait two days to exchange views during a tea party in Shanghai. The arrangement was political artistry. During the tea party, Wang Yu-chi suggested that the Beijing APEC conference in autumn might be the ideal venue for a Ma Xi meeting. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun however, said that Beijing considered such a venue "inappropriate." The result was no agreement. But as long as the two sides are careful to clarify the historical obstacles, the problem is not insoluble.
Taipei leaders' participation in the APEC conference informal leaders summit is limited. Beijing has long cited the provisions of the MOU as a shield. But consider its history. The "MOU" pertaining to the Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong's participation in APEC, was signed in 1991. APEC was merely a ministerial level forum for the Asian-Pacific economies. Therefore the Taiwan Region was labeled "Chinese Taipei." Taipei was limited to sending ministerial level officials to participate in meetings limited to economic affairs. Sending Ministers of Foreign Affairs was forbidden.
But during the informal APEC "Leadership Summit" in 1993, held at the behest of then U.S. President Bill Clinton, leaders from Taipei were unable to attend the Seattle summit. This was the result of consultation between Beijing and Washington. Beijing asked Clinton not to invite leaders from Taipei. Since then pressure from Beijing has become standard operating procedure. In other words, the "MOU" does not actually specifiy that only economic officials may attend. Beijing has grossly exaggerated the meaning of the MOU. This, coupled with the realities of international power politics, has made this, the "Seattle model," standard operating procedure,
Actually, after President Ma took office, officials from Taipei attended an informal APEC leaders summit. The rank of the attendees was raised from the level of ministers to the level of retired vice presidents. The specialties of the attendees was broadened from the economics and trade realm, to include the political realm. In other words, the peaceful development of cross-strait relations has increased mutual trust. The "MOU" can be selectively overlooked. The restrictions imposed by the "Seattle model" have been quietly relaxed.
As we can see, this is a valuable opportunity to improve cross-strait relations. A Ma Xi meeting could materialize. As long as the two sides can establish a framework for political discourse acceptable to both, the "MOU" and the "Seattle model" are constraints that can be shrugged off. Beijing's thinking regarding Taipei, cross-strait political and economic negotiations, and the direction of cross-strait peaceful development, are problems that can be solved. The two sides have the ability to clear away any political obstacles.
Cross-strait relations are undergoing historic changes. Can they move from a Wang Zhang meeting to a Ma Xi meeting? That remains to be seen. Haste makes waste. Taipei must not be in too big a hurry to promote a Ma Xi meeting. But let us back up a moment. Is a Ma Xi meeting possible? That depends on whether the two sides can transcend the " Seattle model." That depends on whether they are innovative enough and imaginative enough to adopt a "Beijing model." That depends on the wisdom and imagination of leaders on both sides, on their ability to overcome resistance and their determination to think anew.
從西雅圖跨向北京，需要更多想像力
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.17 02:44 am
王張上海會中閒聊了「馬習會」議題後，陸委會主委王郁琦帶回來的訊息是：「馬習在亞太經合會（APEC）見面的可能性不高，且尚無其他替代方案。」此話可作三層解讀：一，北京不反對馬習會；二，但場合不在APEC；三，馬習可另覓場合會面。
兩岸領導人會面是大陸多年的主張，正逢兩岸和平發展不可錯失的機遇期，更是確立馬英九與習近平歷史定位的關鍵時機；但就馬習在APEC會面議題，北京躊躇不前，主要問題在：其一，或許是官僚謹慎，對兩岸關係發展的無限可能未能放開思想；其二，可能基於談判要價，認為兩岸互動不能在經濟上一味對台灣讓利，在政治上尤不能讓台灣予取予求；其三，是因政治疑慮未除，既需避免對內對外造成「兩個中國」、「一中一台」印象，又要防範台灣萬一政黨輪替新執政黨要求比照辦理。
上述問題，不論何者是最主要的因素，都需要更多想像力來解決、穿透。事實上，兩岸官方能夠就此議題面對面交換意見，已經跨出了重要的一步。
兩岸歷史性的「王張會」，未選擇在南京的會晤中討論「馬習會」這個仍處於意向及底線試探的題目，而選擇隔兩日在上海以茶敘「閒聊」方式交換意見，這樣的安排，毋寧也是一種政治藝術。茶敘中，王郁琦談到今秋北京APEC是「馬習會」最適當場合，中共國台辦主任張志軍則說北京的立場認為「不合適」云云；雖然結論是消極的，但只要細心釐清歷史的來龍去脈和包袱糾結，這點並非無解。
對於台灣出席APEC非正式領袖峰會的限制，中共一向以APEC有關「諒解備忘錄」的規定和慣例作為擋箭牌。回溯歷史，當年為兩岸三地加入APEC而形成的「諒解備忘錄」，是在一九九一年所簽署，當時的APEC主要還是一個亞太經濟體「部長級」的對話論壇；因此，除規定台灣名稱為「Chinese Taipei」外，更限制台灣只能派經濟事務有關的部長出席部長會議，不得派外交部長與會。
然而，APEC的非正式「領袖峰會」，卻是一九九三年才在當時美國總統柯林頓的倡議下召開；台灣領導人無法出席那次西雅圖峰會，則只是源於中共與美國的磋商，要求柯林頓不邀請台灣領袖與會，此後並年年施壓形成北京所稱的「慣例」。換言之，「諒解備忘錄」其實規範不到經濟體領袖出席的問題，而是北京以雞毛當令箭擴大解釋，再加上國際權力政治的現實所致。這項慣例因循成習，被稱為「西雅圖模式」。
事實上，馬總統上任後，我代表出席APEC非正式領袖峰會，在身分位階上，已從部會首長層級提升到副總統（卸任）層級；在代表專業上，也已經跨出經貿領域而及於政治領域。換言之，隨著兩岸關係的和平發展以及兩岸互信的不斷積累，「諒解備忘錄」可以有時或忘，「西雅圖模式」也早就悄悄鬆綁了。
由此看來，在兩岸關係發展的重要機遇時刻，面對「馬習會」的可能曙光，只要兩岸能夠建立雙方都可接受的政治論述架構，「諒解備忘錄」與「西雅圖模式」的包袱和框架都能順勢解開，不僅如此，包括中共涉台思考、兩岸政經談判，到兩岸和平發展方向的確立，這些問題都能迎刃而解，而兩岸也得以廓清政治迷障。
兩岸關係發展的歷史腳步，能不能從「王張會」邁向「馬習會」，尚不得而知。不可諱言，對台灣而言，推動「馬習會」不能「呷緊弄破碗」；退一步說，「馬習會」實現的可能性，寓於兩岸超越「西雅圖模式」進而創新「北京模式」的政治想像。這點，則有賴雙方更多的智慧和想像，以及兩岸領導人克服阻力、創新局面的決心。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 17, 2014
Summary: Cross-strait relations are undergoing historic changes. Can they move from a Wang Zhang meeting to a Ma Xi meeting? That remains to be seen. Haste makes waste. Taipei must not be in too big a hurry to promote a Ma Xi meeting. But let us back up a moment. Is a Ma Xi meeting possible? That depends on whether the two sides can transcend the " Seattle model." That depends on whether they are innovative enough and imaginative enough to adopt a "Beijing model." That depends on the wisdom and imagination of leaders on both sides, on their ability to overcome resistance and their determination to think anew.
Full text below:
When Wang and Zhang met in Shanghai they talked about the prospect of a "Ma Xi meeting." The message Mainland Affairs Council Chief Wang Yu-chi brought back was, "A Ma Xi meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference is unlikely, and there is as yet no alternative." His words can be interpreted three ways. One. Beijing does not oppose a Ma Xi meeting. Two. APEC is not an appropriate venue. Three. A Ma Xi meeting could be held elsewhere.
A meeting between the leaders of the two sides is something the Mainland has urged for years. Growing cross-strait peace makes this an opportunity not to be missed. This is a critical opportunity to cement the legacy of Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping. But Beijing has reservations about a Ma Xi meeting at APEC. Several considerations are involved. One. Bureaucratic caution regarding rapid developments in cross-strait relations. Two. The asking price for negotiations is a factor. Cross-strait economic interaction must not be equated with unlimited concessions to Taipei. Cross-strait political interaction must not be predicated upon Taipei getting whatever it demands. Three. Political concerns remain. Beijing may wish to avoid giving the impression that there are "two Chinas" or "One China and one Taiwan," both domestically and internationally. In the event of a change in ruling parties on Taiwan, Beijing may wish to avoid making the same concessions to the new ruling party.
Which of the above problems is the most important? It may not matter. Resolution wil requires greater imagination. The official exchange of views on this issue is already an important step.
The Wang Zhang meeting was an historic event. The two men decided not to discuss a Ma Xi meeting in Nanjing. They were still probing each other's bottom line. They chose to wait two days to exchange views during a tea party in Shanghai. The arrangement was political artistry. During the tea party, Wang Yu-chi suggested that the Beijing APEC conference in autumn might be the ideal venue for a Ma Xi meeting. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun however, said that Beijing considered such a venue "inappropriate." The result was no agreement. But as long as the two sides are careful to clarify the historical obstacles, the problem is not insoluble.
Taipei leaders' participation in the APEC conference informal leaders summit is limited. Beijing has long cited the provisions of the MOU as a shield. But consider its history. The "MOU" pertaining to the Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong's participation in APEC, was signed in 1991. APEC was merely a ministerial level forum for the Asian-Pacific economies. Therefore the Taiwan Region was labeled "Chinese Taipei." Taipei was limited to sending ministerial level officials to participate in meetings limited to economic affairs. Sending Ministers of Foreign Affairs was forbidden.
But during the informal APEC "Leadership Summit" in 1993, held at the behest of then U.S. President Bill Clinton, leaders from Taipei were unable to attend the Seattle summit. This was the result of consultation between Beijing and Washington. Beijing asked Clinton not to invite leaders from Taipei. Since then pressure from Beijing has become standard operating procedure. In other words, the "MOU" does not actually specifiy that only economic officials may attend. Beijing has grossly exaggerated the meaning of the MOU. This, coupled with the realities of international power politics, has made this, the "Seattle model," standard operating procedure,
Actually, after President Ma took office, officials from Taipei attended an informal APEC leaders summit. The rank of the attendees was raised from the level of ministers to the level of retired vice presidents. The specialties of the attendees was broadened from the economics and trade realm, to include the political realm. In other words, the peaceful development of cross-strait relations has increased mutual trust. The "MOU" can be selectively overlooked. The restrictions imposed by the "Seattle model" have been quietly relaxed.
As we can see, this is a valuable opportunity to improve cross-strait relations. A Ma Xi meeting could materialize. As long as the two sides can establish a framework for political discourse acceptable to both, the "MOU" and the "Seattle model" are constraints that can be shrugged off. Beijing's thinking regarding Taipei, cross-strait political and economic negotiations, and the direction of cross-strait peaceful development, are problems that can be solved. The two sides have the ability to clear away any political obstacles.
Cross-strait relations are undergoing historic changes. Can they move from a Wang Zhang meeting to a Ma Xi meeting? That remains to be seen. Haste makes waste. Taipei must not be in too big a hurry to promote a Ma Xi meeting. But let us back up a moment. Is a Ma Xi meeting possible? That depends on whether the two sides can transcend the " Seattle model." That depends on whether they are innovative enough and imaginative enough to adopt a "Beijing model." That depends on the wisdom and imagination of leaders on both sides, on their ability to overcome resistance and their determination to think anew.
從西雅圖跨向北京，需要更多想像力
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.17 02:44 am
王張上海會中閒聊了「馬習會」議題後，陸委會主委王郁琦帶回來的訊息是：「馬習在亞太經合會（APEC）見面的可能性不高，且尚無其他替代方案。」此話可作三層解讀：一，北京不反對馬習會；二，但場合不在APEC；三，馬習可另覓場合會面。
兩岸領導人會面是大陸多年的主張，正逢兩岸和平發展不可錯失的機遇期，更是確立馬英九與習近平歷史定位的關鍵時機；但就馬習在APEC會面議題，北京躊躇不前，主要問題在：其一，或許是官僚謹慎，對兩岸關係發展的無限可能未能放開思想；其二，可能基於談判要價，認為兩岸互動不能在經濟上一味對台灣讓利，在政治上尤不能讓台灣予取予求；其三，是因政治疑慮未除，既需避免對內對外造成「兩個中國」、「一中一台」印象，又要防範台灣萬一政黨輪替新執政黨要求比照辦理。
上述問題，不論何者是最主要的因素，都需要更多想像力來解決、穿透。事實上，兩岸官方能夠就此議題面對面交換意見，已經跨出了重要的一步。
兩岸歷史性的「王張會」，未選擇在南京的會晤中討論「馬習會」這個仍處於意向及底線試探的題目，而選擇隔兩日在上海以茶敘「閒聊」方式交換意見，這樣的安排，毋寧也是一種政治藝術。茶敘中，王郁琦談到今秋北京APEC是「馬習會」最適當場合，中共國台辦主任張志軍則說北京的立場認為「不合適」云云；雖然結論是消極的，但只要細心釐清歷史的來龍去脈和包袱糾結，這點並非無解。
對於台灣出席APEC非正式領袖峰會的限制，中共一向以APEC有關「諒解備忘錄」的規定和慣例作為擋箭牌。回溯歷史，當年為兩岸三地加入APEC而形成的「諒解備忘錄」，是在一九九一年所簽署，當時的APEC主要還是一個亞太經濟體「部長級」的對話論壇；因此，除規定台灣名稱為「Chinese Taipei」外，更限制台灣只能派經濟事務有關的部長出席部長會議，不得派外交部長與會。
然而，APEC的非正式「領袖峰會」，卻是一九九三年才在當時美國總統柯林頓的倡議下召開；台灣領導人無法出席那次西雅圖峰會，則只是源於中共與美國的磋商，要求柯林頓不邀請台灣領袖與會，此後並年年施壓形成北京所稱的「慣例」。換言之，「諒解備忘錄」其實規範不到經濟體領袖出席的問題，而是北京以雞毛當令箭擴大解釋，再加上國際權力政治的現實所致。這項慣例因循成習，被稱為「西雅圖模式」。
事實上，馬總統上任後，我代表出席APEC非正式領袖峰會，在身分位階上，已從部會首長層級提升到副總統（卸任）層級；在代表專業上，也已經跨出經貿領域而及於政治領域。換言之，隨著兩岸關係的和平發展以及兩岸互信的不斷積累，「諒解備忘錄」可以有時或忘，「西雅圖模式」也早就悄悄鬆綁了。
由此看來，在兩岸關係發展的重要機遇時刻，面對「馬習會」的可能曙光，只要兩岸能夠建立雙方都可接受的政治論述架構，「諒解備忘錄」與「西雅圖模式」的包袱和框架都能順勢解開，不僅如此，包括中共涉台思考、兩岸政經談判，到兩岸和平發展方向的確立，這些問題都能迎刃而解，而兩岸也得以廓清政治迷障。
兩岸關係發展的歷史腳步，能不能從「王張會」邁向「馬習會」，尚不得而知。不可諱言，對台灣而言，推動「馬習會」不能「呷緊弄破碗」；退一步說，「馬習會」實現的可能性，寓於兩岸超越「西雅圖模式」進而創新「北京模式」的政治想像。這點，則有賴雙方更多的智慧和想像，以及兩岸領導人克服阻力、創新局面的決心。
From Seattle to Beijing: More Imagination Needed
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 17, 2014
Summary:
Full text below:
When Wang and Zhang met in Shanghai they talked about the possibility of a "Ma Xi meeting."
The message Mainland Affairs Council Chief Wang Yu-chi brought back was,
"A Ma Xi meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting is unlikely, and there is as yet no alternative."
His words can be interpreted three ways.
One. Beijing does not oppose a Ma Xi meeting.
Two. APEC is not an appropriate venue.
Three. A Ma Xi meeting could be held elsewhere.
A meeting between the leaders of the two sides is something the Mainland has urged for many years.
Growing cross-strait peace makes it an opportunity that must not be missed.
This is a critical opportunity to cement the legacy of Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping.
But Beijing has reservations about a Ma Xi meeting at APEC.
Several problems are involved.
One. Bureaucratic caution regarding rapid developments in cross-strait relations.
Two. The asking price for negotiations may be a consideration.
Cross-strait economic interaction must not be predicated upon unconditional concessions to Taipei.
Cross-strait political interaction must not be predicated upon Taipei getting anything and everything it wants.
Three. Political concerns have yet to be eliminated.
Beijing may want to avoid the internal and external impression that there are "two Chinas" or
"One China and one Taiwan."
In the event of a change in the ruling party on Taiwan, Beijing may want to avoid having to make the came concessions to the new ruling party.
It matters not which of the above problems
is most important.
They will all require greater imagination to resolve and get past.
The official exchange of views on this issue is already an important step.
The Wang Zhang meeting was an historic event.
The decision was made not to discuss a Ma Xi meeting in Nanjing.
The two sides were still exploring each other's intent and bottom line.
And the choice of every tea Syria " chat " two- way exchange of views in Shanghai ,
With this arrangement,
Rather is also a political art .
Tea Syria , Wang Yu-chi comes autumn Beijing APEC is " Ma Xi will be " the most appropriate forum ,
Communist China 's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun said that Beijing 's position that " inappropriate " and so on ;
Although the conclusion is negative,
But as long as careful to clarify the historical context and the burden of tangled,
This is not no solution.
For Taiwan to attend the APEC informal leaders summit limit ,
CCP has always been about APEC "MOU" provisions and practices as a shield.
Back in history ,
"MOU" year of the three places to join the formation of APEC ,
Was signed in 1991 ,
The APEC was still a major Asia-Pacific economies , " ministerial " forum for dialogue ;
Therefore , in addition to the provisions of the Taiwan name " Chinese Taipei " , the
Taiwan can only send more restrictions related to the Minister of Economic Affairs to attend the ministerial meeting ,
Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be sent .
However, the informal " Leadership Summit " of APEC ,
But it is only held in 1993 under the initiative of the then U.S. President Bill Clinton ;
Taiwan leader that Seattle was unable to attend the summit ,
It just comes from the CCP in consultation with the United States ,
Clinton asked the participants not to invite the leaders of Taiwan ,
Since the formation of Beijing and mid- pressure call " practice ."
In other words , the "MOU" In fact, the problem can not regulate economy leaders attended ,
But Beijing with a feather when the authority arrow to expand explained
Coupled with the realities of international power politics caused .
Follow this convention into practice ,
Known as the " Seattle model ."
In fact, after President Ma took office,
I attended an informal APEC leaders summit ,
On the identity of rank ,
From ministers promoted to vice president level ( retired ) level ;
On behalf of the professional ,
And has taken the economic and trade fields and in the political sphere .
In other words , with the continuous accumulation of peaceful development of cross-strait relations and cross-strait mutual trust ,
"MOU" can sometimes be forgotten ,
" Seattle model" has also long been quietly being relaxed .
Seen in this light ,
In an important opportunity for the development of cross-strait relations moment ,
May face the dawn of " Ma Xi will ", the
As long as the two sides can establish political discourse framework acceptable to both parties ,
" Memorandum of Understanding " and " Seattle model"
Burden and frameworks can unlock homeopathy ,
Moreover ,
Communist China , including thinking,
Cross-strait political and economic negotiations ,
To establish the direction of development of cross-strait peace ,
These problems can be solved,
The two sides also able clearance political maze .
History pace of cross-strait relations,
Can you move towards " Ma Xi will " from the " king sheets will "
Not yet known.
Can not be denied ,
Taiwan is concerned ,
Promoting " Ma Xi will " not " break sipping tight Bowl" ;
To say the least ,
" Ma Xi will " realize the possibilities
Resides on both sides beyond the " Seattle model"
Further innovations political imagination " Beijing model" .
This will require the two sides more wisdom and imagination ,
As well as leaders from both sides to overcome the resistance ,
Innovative situation determination.
從西雅圖跨向北京，需要更多想像力
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.17 02:44 am
王張上海會中閒聊了「馬習會」議題後，陸委會主委王郁琦帶回來的訊息是：「馬習在亞太經合會（APEC）見面的可能性不高，且尚無其他替代方案。」此話可作三層解讀：一，北京不反對馬習會；二，但場合不在APEC；三，馬習可另覓場合會面。
兩岸領導人會面是大陸多年的主張，正逢兩岸和平發展不可錯失的機遇期，更是確立馬英九與習近平歷史定位的關鍵時機；但就馬習在APEC會面議題，北京躊躇不前，主要問題在：其一，或許是官僚謹慎，對兩岸關係發展的無限可能未能放開思想；其二，可能基於談判要價，認為兩岸互動不能在經濟上一味對台灣讓利，在政治上尤不能讓台灣予取予求；其三，是因政治疑慮未除，既需避免對內對外造成「兩個中國」、「一中一台」印象，又要防範台灣萬一政黨輪替新執政黨要求比照辦理。
上述問題，不論何者是最主要的因素，都需要更多想像力來解決、穿透。事實上，兩岸官方能夠就此議題面對面交換意見，已經跨出了重要的一步。
兩岸歷史性的「王張會」，未選擇在南京的會晤中討論「馬習會」這個仍處於意向及底線試探的題目，而選擇隔兩日在上海以茶敘「閒聊」方式交換意見，這樣的安排，毋寧也是一種政治藝術。茶敘中，王郁琦談到今秋北京APEC是「馬習會」最適當場合，中共國台辦主任張志軍則說北京的立場認為「不合適」云云；雖然結論是消極的，但只要細心釐清歷史的來龍去脈和包袱糾結，這點並非無解。
對於台灣出席APEC非正式領袖峰會的限制，中共一向以APEC有關「諒解備忘錄」的規定和慣例作為擋箭牌。回溯歷史，當年為兩岸三地加入APEC而形成的「諒解備忘錄」，是在一九九一年所簽署，當時的APEC主要還是一個亞太經濟體「部長級」的對話論壇；因此，除規定台灣名稱為「Chinese Taipei」外，更限制台灣只能派經濟事務有關的部長出席部長會議，不得派外交部長與會。
然而，APEC的非正式「領袖峰會」，卻是一九九三年才在當時美國總統柯林頓的倡議下召開；台灣領導人無法出席那次西雅圖峰會，則只是源於中共與美國的磋商，要求柯林頓不邀請台灣領袖與會，此後並年年施壓形成北京所稱的「慣例」。換言之，「諒解備忘錄」其實規範不到經濟體領袖出席的問題，而是北京以雞毛當令箭擴大解釋，再加上國際權力政治的現實所致。這項慣例因循成習，被稱為「西雅圖模式」。
事實上，馬總統上任後，我代表出席APEC非正式領袖峰會，在身分位階上，已從部會首長層級提升到副總統（卸任）層級；在代表專業上，也已經跨出經貿領域而及於政治領域。換言之，隨著兩岸關係的和平發展以及兩岸互信的不斷積累，「諒解備忘錄」可以有時或忘，「西雅圖模式」也早就悄悄鬆綁了。
由此看來，在兩岸關係發展的重要機遇時刻，面對「馬習會」的可能曙光，只要兩岸能夠建立雙方都可接受的政治論述架構，「諒解備忘錄」與「西雅圖模式」的包袱和框架都能順勢解開，不僅如此，包括中共涉台思考、兩岸政經談判，到兩岸和平發展方向的確立，這些問題都能迎刃而解，而兩岸也得以廓清政治迷障。
兩岸關係發展的歷史腳步，能不能從「王張會」邁向「馬習會」，尚不得而知。不可諱言，對台灣而言，推動「馬習會」不能「呷緊弄破碗」；退一步說，「馬習會」實現的可能性，寓於兩岸超越「西雅圖模式」進而創新「北京模式」的政治想像。這點，則有賴雙方更多的智慧和想像，以及兩岸領導人克服阻力、創新局面的決心。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 17, 2014
Summary:
Full text below:
When Wang and Zhang met in Shanghai they talked about the possibility of a "Ma Xi meeting."
The message Mainland Affairs Council Chief Wang Yu-chi brought back was,
"A Ma Xi meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting is unlikely, and there is as yet no alternative."
His words can be interpreted three ways.
One. Beijing does not oppose a Ma Xi meeting.
Two. APEC is not an appropriate venue.
Three. A Ma Xi meeting could be held elsewhere.
A meeting between the leaders of the two sides is something the Mainland has urged for many years.
Growing cross-strait peace makes it an opportunity that must not be missed.
This is a critical opportunity to cement the legacy of Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping.
But Beijing has reservations about a Ma Xi meeting at APEC.
Several problems are involved.
One. Bureaucratic caution regarding rapid developments in cross-strait relations.
Two. The asking price for negotiations may be a consideration.
Cross-strait economic interaction must not be predicated upon unconditional concessions to Taipei.
Cross-strait political interaction must not be predicated upon Taipei getting anything and everything it wants.
Three. Political concerns have yet to be eliminated.
Beijing may want to avoid the internal and external impression that there are "two Chinas" or
"One China and one Taiwan."
In the event of a change in the ruling party on Taiwan, Beijing may want to avoid having to make the came concessions to the new ruling party.
It matters not which of the above problems
is most important.
They will all require greater imagination to resolve and get past.
The official exchange of views on this issue is already an important step.
The Wang Zhang meeting was an historic event.
The decision was made not to discuss a Ma Xi meeting in Nanjing.
The two sides were still exploring each other's intent and bottom line.
And the choice of every tea Syria " chat " two- way exchange of views in Shanghai ,
With this arrangement,
Rather is also a political art .
Tea Syria , Wang Yu-chi comes autumn Beijing APEC is " Ma Xi will be " the most appropriate forum ,
Communist China 's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun said that Beijing 's position that " inappropriate " and so on ;
Although the conclusion is negative,
But as long as careful to clarify the historical context and the burden of tangled,
This is not no solution.
For Taiwan to attend the APEC informal leaders summit limit ,
CCP has always been about APEC "MOU" provisions and practices as a shield.
Back in history ,
"MOU" year of the three places to join the formation of APEC ,
Was signed in 1991 ,
The APEC was still a major Asia-Pacific economies , " ministerial " forum for dialogue ;
Therefore , in addition to the provisions of the Taiwan name " Chinese Taipei " , the
Taiwan can only send more restrictions related to the Minister of Economic Affairs to attend the ministerial meeting ,
Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be sent .
However, the informal " Leadership Summit " of APEC ,
But it is only held in 1993 under the initiative of the then U.S. President Bill Clinton ;
Taiwan leader that Seattle was unable to attend the summit ,
It just comes from the CCP in consultation with the United States ,
Clinton asked the participants not to invite the leaders of Taiwan ,
Since the formation of Beijing and mid- pressure call " practice ."
In other words , the "MOU" In fact, the problem can not regulate economy leaders attended ,
But Beijing with a feather when the authority arrow to expand explained
Coupled with the realities of international power politics caused .
Follow this convention into practice ,
Known as the " Seattle model ."
In fact, after President Ma took office,
I attended an informal APEC leaders summit ,
On the identity of rank ,
From ministers promoted to vice president level ( retired ) level ;
On behalf of the professional ,
And has taken the economic and trade fields and in the political sphere .
In other words , with the continuous accumulation of peaceful development of cross-strait relations and cross-strait mutual trust ,
"MOU" can sometimes be forgotten ,
" Seattle model" has also long been quietly being relaxed .
Seen in this light ,
In an important opportunity for the development of cross-strait relations moment ,
May face the dawn of " Ma Xi will ", the
As long as the two sides can establish political discourse framework acceptable to both parties ,
" Memorandum of Understanding " and " Seattle model"
Burden and frameworks can unlock homeopathy ,
Moreover ,
Communist China , including thinking,
Cross-strait political and economic negotiations ,
To establish the direction of development of cross-strait peace ,
These problems can be solved,
The two sides also able clearance political maze .
History pace of cross-strait relations,
Can you move towards " Ma Xi will " from the " king sheets will "
Not yet known.
Can not be denied ,
Taiwan is concerned ,
Promoting " Ma Xi will " not " break sipping tight Bowl" ;
To say the least ,
" Ma Xi will " realize the possibilities
Resides on both sides beyond the " Seattle model"
Further innovations political imagination " Beijing model" .
This will require the two sides more wisdom and imagination ,
As well as leaders from both sides to overcome the resistance ,
Innovative situation determination.
從西雅圖跨向北京，需要更多想像力
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.17 02:44 am
王張上海會中閒聊了「馬習會」議題後，陸委會主委王郁琦帶回來的訊息是：「馬習在亞太經合會（APEC）見面的可能性不高，且尚無其他替代方案。」此話可作三層解讀：一，北京不反對馬習會；二，但場合不在APEC；三，馬習可另覓場合會面。
兩岸領導人會面是大陸多年的主張，正逢兩岸和平發展不可錯失的機遇期，更是確立馬英九與習近平歷史定位的關鍵時機；但就馬習在APEC會面議題，北京躊躇不前，主要問題在：其一，或許是官僚謹慎，對兩岸關係發展的無限可能未能放開思想；其二，可能基於談判要價，認為兩岸互動不能在經濟上一味對台灣讓利，在政治上尤不能讓台灣予取予求；其三，是因政治疑慮未除，既需避免對內對外造成「兩個中國」、「一中一台」印象，又要防範台灣萬一政黨輪替新執政黨要求比照辦理。
上述問題，不論何者是最主要的因素，都需要更多想像力來解決、穿透。事實上，兩岸官方能夠就此議題面對面交換意見，已經跨出了重要的一步。
兩岸歷史性的「王張會」，未選擇在南京的會晤中討論「馬習會」這個仍處於意向及底線試探的題目，而選擇隔兩日在上海以茶敘「閒聊」方式交換意見，這樣的安排，毋寧也是一種政治藝術。茶敘中，王郁琦談到今秋北京APEC是「馬習會」最適當場合，中共國台辦主任張志軍則說北京的立場認為「不合適」云云；雖然結論是消極的，但只要細心釐清歷史的來龍去脈和包袱糾結，這點並非無解。
對於台灣出席APEC非正式領袖峰會的限制，中共一向以APEC有關「諒解備忘錄」的規定和慣例作為擋箭牌。回溯歷史，當年為兩岸三地加入APEC而形成的「諒解備忘錄」，是在一九九一年所簽署，當時的APEC主要還是一個亞太經濟體「部長級」的對話論壇；因此，除規定台灣名稱為「Chinese Taipei」外，更限制台灣只能派經濟事務有關的部長出席部長會議，不得派外交部長與會。
然而，APEC的非正式「領袖峰會」，卻是一九九三年才在當時美國總統柯林頓的倡議下召開；台灣領導人無法出席那次西雅圖峰會，則只是源於中共與美國的磋商，要求柯林頓不邀請台灣領袖與會，此後並年年施壓形成北京所稱的「慣例」。換言之，「諒解備忘錄」其實規範不到經濟體領袖出席的問題，而是北京以雞毛當令箭擴大解釋，再加上國際權力政治的現實所致。這項慣例因循成習，被稱為「西雅圖模式」。
事實上，馬總統上任後，我代表出席APEC非正式領袖峰會，在身分位階上，已從部會首長層級提升到副總統（卸任）層級；在代表專業上，也已經跨出經貿領域而及於政治領域。換言之，隨著兩岸關係的和平發展以及兩岸互信的不斷積累，「諒解備忘錄」可以有時或忘，「西雅圖模式」也早就悄悄鬆綁了。
由此看來，在兩岸關係發展的重要機遇時刻，面對「馬習會」的可能曙光，只要兩岸能夠建立雙方都可接受的政治論述架構，「諒解備忘錄」與「西雅圖模式」的包袱和框架都能順勢解開，不僅如此，包括中共涉台思考、兩岸政經談判，到兩岸和平發展方向的確立，這些問題都能迎刃而解，而兩岸也得以廓清政治迷障。
兩岸關係發展的歷史腳步，能不能從「王張會」邁向「馬習會」，尚不得而知。不可諱言，對台灣而言，推動「馬習會」不能「呷緊弄破碗」；退一步說，「馬習會」實現的可能性，寓於兩岸超越「西雅圖模式」進而創新「北京模式」的政治想像。這點，則有賴雙方更多的智慧和想像，以及兩岸領導人克服阻力、創新局面的決心。
Thursday, February 13, 2014
Blasting the Party Leadership: Blue and Green Camp Political Maneuvering
Blasting the Party Leadership:
Blue and Green Camp Political Maneuvering
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 14, 2014
Summary: Su Tseng-chang has been sniped at by his peers. Ma Ying-jeou has been challenged by younger party leaders. It is hard to say who is less fortunate. In any case, President Ma has abundant government and party resources. He is overly biased regarding personnel and policy matters. He has failed to use the available resources to benefit the people and to ensure the passing of the baton within the party. This is highly regrettable. Leaders within the Blue and Green camps are restlessness. If this is reduced to the level of invidual power struggles, that will be a negative development. But if this is seen as a response to the Big Picture, then those shrill voices are reminding us of hard realities that must be dealt with.
Full text below:
Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin recently said, "If we lose the seven in elections, the party chairman should step down." KMT comrades roundly criticized him. They said his remark inflicted pain upon friends and gave comfort to the enemy. They called it a violation of party ethics. Chairman Ma Ying-jeou reminded local government officials to watch what they say. About remarks unconducive to unity, he said "Enough is enough." The implied threat was clear.
KMT party leaders have the "unity" and "ethics" card. This implies that Hau's remark embarrassed the party and the president, and hurt his comrades's feelings. The Ma administration's performance has been poor. The seven in one elections loom. Discouraging words from within the party are of course embarrassing. But two issues must be addressed. One. Is the Ma administration giving Blue Camp county chiefs and city mayors enough opportunities to be heard and seen? Have personnel appointments alienated them? If not, why are they sounding off to outsiders? Two. Can the KMT party leadership rein in and discourage such acts? Can it offer nothing more in response than feeble moralizing?
Of the two issues, the former pertains to causes. The latter pertains to effects. The KMT elites and local princes are blasting the party leadership. This began last year, and has since recurred. It shows that comrades are dissatisfied with the party leadership's policy. It shows that certain people are uneasy about the mechanism for power transfer. Divisions have arisen over local and central level personnel appointments. Members are anxious about power tradeoffs. They are angry about being dragged down by the poor performance of the cabinet. Ma Ying-jeou apparently does not understand these feelings and refuses to respond. He is both president and chairman. But his carrots have not mollified them, and his sticks have not silenced them. His cavalier attitude has contributed to the spread of these sentiments.
Take Hau Lung-bin for example. Hau is ruling party mayor of the capital city. He has spoken out on several major policy matters. He has often sung a different tune than the Ma administration. He has even flatly contradicted it. For example, on the issue of Chen Shui-bian's health, Hau favors granting Chen "medical parole." On the issue of the nuclear plant referendum, Hau maintains an anti-nuclear stance. On the issue of influence peddling, Hau advocates doing away with the Special Investigation Unit, in order to mollify the public. On the issue of personnel reshuffling, Hau wants President Ma to let Chiang Yi-hua form his own cabinet. Hau is determined to demonstrate his independence and personal style. That is his prerogative. Ma has never tried to communicate with him. Therefore Hau's increasingly harsh words and his call for Ma to resign are hardly surprising.
Hau Lung-bin is not alone. New Taipei City Mayor Eric Chu intends to run for president in 2016. His recent comments about the party leadership have been equally blunt. For example, when he criticized the "Green Regime" era "Two Trillion, Twin Stars" policy, he underscored the economic downturn. He called for more vacations to reduce public discontent. He implied that "five municipalities" were too many and that "three municipalities" were just right and should be restored. His remarks carried an edge. Lien Sheng-wen intends to run for Taipei Mayor. During last September's political struggle he sided witih Wang Jin-pyng. He went so far as to refer to the "Ming Dynasty." Perhaps one should not read too much into his remarks. But they reflect the extent of Blue Camp discontent with the party leadership. They also show that their views are being ignored within the party.
The Blue Camp is not alone. DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang has been blasted by DPP leaders, perhaps even more harshly than Ma Ying-jeou. Should he continue to serve as party chairman? The Hsieh and Tsai camps have given him plenty of grief. Su has procrastinated about running for Taipei mayor. He finds himself caught between Wen-Je Ko, Wellington Ku, and Annette Lu. He has been accused of "defeatism." On cross-strait policy he has been too conservative. He has been accused of wavering and self- contradiction. Consider the matter of leadership ability. Lin Yi-hsiung is reportedly organizing a new political group. Younger leaders are ridiculing him, saying he is not the man he once was.
As one can see, after two changes in ruling parties, both the Blue and Green camps have undergone subtle changes in their make up and culture. A chairman with feet of clay can no longer wield supreme authority. The party machinery can no longer carry out his will. More importantly, the current leaders lack the ability to lead reform or make political breakthroughs. They have left the public disillusioned. They have allowed the party to become disorganized. This has inspired the rebellious and the angry to direct their fire at the center whenever possible. Will those who have opened fire be injured themselves? That is another matter altogether.
Su Tseng-chang has been sniped at by his peers. Ma Ying-jeou has been challenged by younger party leaders. It is hard to say who is less fortunate. In any case, President Ma has abundant government and party resources. He is overly biased regarding personnel and policy matters. He has failed to use the available resources to benefit the people and to ensure the passing of the baton within the party. This is highly regrettable. Leaders within the Blue and Green camps are restlessness. If this is reduced to the level of invidual power struggles, that will be a negative development. But if this is seen as a response to the Big Picture, then those shrill voices are reminding us of hard realities that must be dealt with.
砲打中央：看藍綠菁英的躁動現象
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.14 03:47 am
台北市長郝龍斌最近一席「七合一選舉失利，黨主席應下台」的談話，引起國民黨同志的圍攻，認為其發言令親痛仇快，有違政黨倫理。馬英九主席也提醒從政縣市首長要謹言慎行，無助團結的話要「適可而止」，頗有警告意味。
祭出「團結」和「倫理」的大旗，意味郝龍斌的發言已損及黨和主席的顏面，也傷害了同志的感情。正當馬政府政績欠佳、而七合一選舉告急的情況下，這種內部的唱衰言論當然令人難堪。但這裡也有兩個問題需要討論：一，馬政府是否讓藍軍縣市長有足夠的發言或發揮機會？若非因為人事上的偏歧讓他們感到疏離，為何在外放砲宣洩？二，黨中央對於這類行為有沒有辦法收服或勸止？或者僅有微弱的道德喊話一招可以因應？
這兩個問題，前者要探討的是「因」，後者要探討的是「果」。國民黨內部菁英或地方諸侯「砲打中央」的現象，去年以來一演再演，不僅顯示了黨內同志對中央施政的不滿，也反映了特定人士對權力傳承的躁動不安。其中，除了有地方與中央的人事隔閡，有面臨權力交替的焦慮，也有遭內閣政績拖累的憤怒。然而，馬英九對這些情緒似乎不紓解也不回應，既無法運用其總統或主席的「恩」來收攏，又無法運用其「威」來鎮懾對方；如此漫不經心的作風，似愈發助長這類情緒的擴散。
以郝龍斌為例，作為執政黨的首都市長，他在若干重大政策上的發言，屢屢出現和馬政府不同調乃至相牴觸的情況，一直顯得突兀。例如，對陳水扁的健康問題，郝龍斌主張讓扁「保外就醫」；在核四公投議題中，郝龍斌持反核立場；在關說風波中，郝龍斌主張廢特偵組來挽救民心；在人事改組時，他要求馬總統放手讓江宜樺組閣。郝龍斌要表現個人的風格或其獨立性，是他個人的選擇；但可以想見，馬英九從未嘗試透過管道與他溝通，也因此，郝龍斌更進一步說刺耳或逼宮的話，也就不足為奇。
不止郝龍斌，有意挑戰二○一六大位的新北市長朱立倫，最近對中央的意見也顯得不太保留。諸如，在批綠朝「兩兆雙星」政策時，順帶點了一下經濟低迷，要求多放假紓解民怨；他更暗指「五都」數目太多，應以回歸「三都」為宜，言下暗藏機鋒。至於有意參選北市長的連勝文，在去年九月政爭中偏袒王金平，連「大明王朝」的話都脫口而出。這些談話也許不必過度演繹，但這反映藍軍菁英對於中央施為的不滿，也顯示他們的意見在日常的黨或政的管道裡無法被聽見。
不唯藍營，民進黨主席蘇貞昌最近遭黨內菁英圍攻之激烈，其程度恐怕不亞於馬英九。在應不應續任黨主席議題上，他飽受謝長廷和蔡英文陣營的挑釁；在台北市長候選人上的遲疑，他夾在柯文哲、顧立雄和呂秀蓮之間，被批充滿「失敗主義」；在兩岸政策及課綱議題上的抱殘守缺，被批搖擺不定及自我矛盾。在領導能力上，林義雄傳出要另組新政團，中生代則譏諷其能力遠不及前幾任。
由此可見，歷經兩次政黨輪替，藍綠兩黨的體質與文化都有了微妙的變化：被看破手腳的主席不再擁有無上的權威，黨機器的控制和意志的貫徹也無法再得心應手。更重要的是，現任領導者缺乏帶領政局突圍脫困的能耐，使人民失望，也讓黨的意志變得渙散；從而鼓舞了有心人和憤怒者的叛逆，一有機會就向中央開火。當然，這些開砲者會不會遭逆火自傷，則又是另一回事。
比起蘇貞昌屢屢遭到同輩戰友的挑激，馬英九受到更多中生代的質疑，我們實在很難分斷誰比誰幸運。無論如何，對於擁有豐厚黨政資源的馬總統而言，他對人對事的關注過度偏倚，而未能運用各種資源來厚植政府的利民政績和政黨的人才傳承，著實令人嘆惋。藍綠黨內菁英的躁動，如果完全從個人的權鬥和爭勝去解讀，將只會走向負面發展；但如果從大局的變動和因應看，那些刺耳的聲音所傳達的現實，恐怕也值得好好處理。
Blue and Green Camp Political Maneuvering
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 14, 2014
Summary: Su Tseng-chang has been sniped at by his peers. Ma Ying-jeou has been challenged by younger party leaders. It is hard to say who is less fortunate. In any case, President Ma has abundant government and party resources. He is overly biased regarding personnel and policy matters. He has failed to use the available resources to benefit the people and to ensure the passing of the baton within the party. This is highly regrettable. Leaders within the Blue and Green camps are restlessness. If this is reduced to the level of invidual power struggles, that will be a negative development. But if this is seen as a response to the Big Picture, then those shrill voices are reminding us of hard realities that must be dealt with.
Full text below:
Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin recently said, "If we lose the seven in elections, the party chairman should step down." KMT comrades roundly criticized him. They said his remark inflicted pain upon friends and gave comfort to the enemy. They called it a violation of party ethics. Chairman Ma Ying-jeou reminded local government officials to watch what they say. About remarks unconducive to unity, he said "Enough is enough." The implied threat was clear.
KMT party leaders have the "unity" and "ethics" card. This implies that Hau's remark embarrassed the party and the president, and hurt his comrades's feelings. The Ma administration's performance has been poor. The seven in one elections loom. Discouraging words from within the party are of course embarrassing. But two issues must be addressed. One. Is the Ma administration giving Blue Camp county chiefs and city mayors enough opportunities to be heard and seen? Have personnel appointments alienated them? If not, why are they sounding off to outsiders? Two. Can the KMT party leadership rein in and discourage such acts? Can it offer nothing more in response than feeble moralizing?
Of the two issues, the former pertains to causes. The latter pertains to effects. The KMT elites and local princes are blasting the party leadership. This began last year, and has since recurred. It shows that comrades are dissatisfied with the party leadership's policy. It shows that certain people are uneasy about the mechanism for power transfer. Divisions have arisen over local and central level personnel appointments. Members are anxious about power tradeoffs. They are angry about being dragged down by the poor performance of the cabinet. Ma Ying-jeou apparently does not understand these feelings and refuses to respond. He is both president and chairman. But his carrots have not mollified them, and his sticks have not silenced them. His cavalier attitude has contributed to the spread of these sentiments.
Take Hau Lung-bin for example. Hau is ruling party mayor of the capital city. He has spoken out on several major policy matters. He has often sung a different tune than the Ma administration. He has even flatly contradicted it. For example, on the issue of Chen Shui-bian's health, Hau favors granting Chen "medical parole." On the issue of the nuclear plant referendum, Hau maintains an anti-nuclear stance. On the issue of influence peddling, Hau advocates doing away with the Special Investigation Unit, in order to mollify the public. On the issue of personnel reshuffling, Hau wants President Ma to let Chiang Yi-hua form his own cabinet. Hau is determined to demonstrate his independence and personal style. That is his prerogative. Ma has never tried to communicate with him. Therefore Hau's increasingly harsh words and his call for Ma to resign are hardly surprising.
Hau Lung-bin is not alone. New Taipei City Mayor Eric Chu intends to run for president in 2016. His recent comments about the party leadership have been equally blunt. For example, when he criticized the "Green Regime" era "Two Trillion, Twin Stars" policy, he underscored the economic downturn. He called for more vacations to reduce public discontent. He implied that "five municipalities" were too many and that "three municipalities" were just right and should be restored. His remarks carried an edge. Lien Sheng-wen intends to run for Taipei Mayor. During last September's political struggle he sided witih Wang Jin-pyng. He went so far as to refer to the "Ming Dynasty." Perhaps one should not read too much into his remarks. But they reflect the extent of Blue Camp discontent with the party leadership. They also show that their views are being ignored within the party.
The Blue Camp is not alone. DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang has been blasted by DPP leaders, perhaps even more harshly than Ma Ying-jeou. Should he continue to serve as party chairman? The Hsieh and Tsai camps have given him plenty of grief. Su has procrastinated about running for Taipei mayor. He finds himself caught between Wen-Je Ko, Wellington Ku, and Annette Lu. He has been accused of "defeatism." On cross-strait policy he has been too conservative. He has been accused of wavering and self- contradiction. Consider the matter of leadership ability. Lin Yi-hsiung is reportedly organizing a new political group. Younger leaders are ridiculing him, saying he is not the man he once was.
As one can see, after two changes in ruling parties, both the Blue and Green camps have undergone subtle changes in their make up and culture. A chairman with feet of clay can no longer wield supreme authority. The party machinery can no longer carry out his will. More importantly, the current leaders lack the ability to lead reform or make political breakthroughs. They have left the public disillusioned. They have allowed the party to become disorganized. This has inspired the rebellious and the angry to direct their fire at the center whenever possible. Will those who have opened fire be injured themselves? That is another matter altogether.
Su Tseng-chang has been sniped at by his peers. Ma Ying-jeou has been challenged by younger party leaders. It is hard to say who is less fortunate. In any case, President Ma has abundant government and party resources. He is overly biased regarding personnel and policy matters. He has failed to use the available resources to benefit the people and to ensure the passing of the baton within the party. This is highly regrettable. Leaders within the Blue and Green camps are restlessness. If this is reduced to the level of invidual power struggles, that will be a negative development. But if this is seen as a response to the Big Picture, then those shrill voices are reminding us of hard realities that must be dealt with.
砲打中央：看藍綠菁英的躁動現象
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.14 03:47 am
台北市長郝龍斌最近一席「七合一選舉失利，黨主席應下台」的談話，引起國民黨同志的圍攻，認為其發言令親痛仇快，有違政黨倫理。馬英九主席也提醒從政縣市首長要謹言慎行，無助團結的話要「適可而止」，頗有警告意味。
祭出「團結」和「倫理」的大旗，意味郝龍斌的發言已損及黨和主席的顏面，也傷害了同志的感情。正當馬政府政績欠佳、而七合一選舉告急的情況下，這種內部的唱衰言論當然令人難堪。但這裡也有兩個問題需要討論：一，馬政府是否讓藍軍縣市長有足夠的發言或發揮機會？若非因為人事上的偏歧讓他們感到疏離，為何在外放砲宣洩？二，黨中央對於這類行為有沒有辦法收服或勸止？或者僅有微弱的道德喊話一招可以因應？
這兩個問題，前者要探討的是「因」，後者要探討的是「果」。國民黨內部菁英或地方諸侯「砲打中央」的現象，去年以來一演再演，不僅顯示了黨內同志對中央施政的不滿，也反映了特定人士對權力傳承的躁動不安。其中，除了有地方與中央的人事隔閡，有面臨權力交替的焦慮，也有遭內閣政績拖累的憤怒。然而，馬英九對這些情緒似乎不紓解也不回應，既無法運用其總統或主席的「恩」來收攏，又無法運用其「威」來鎮懾對方；如此漫不經心的作風，似愈發助長這類情緒的擴散。
以郝龍斌為例，作為執政黨的首都市長，他在若干重大政策上的發言，屢屢出現和馬政府不同調乃至相牴觸的情況，一直顯得突兀。例如，對陳水扁的健康問題，郝龍斌主張讓扁「保外就醫」；在核四公投議題中，郝龍斌持反核立場；在關說風波中，郝龍斌主張廢特偵組來挽救民心；在人事改組時，他要求馬總統放手讓江宜樺組閣。郝龍斌要表現個人的風格或其獨立性，是他個人的選擇；但可以想見，馬英九從未嘗試透過管道與他溝通，也因此，郝龍斌更進一步說刺耳或逼宮的話，也就不足為奇。
不止郝龍斌，有意挑戰二○一六大位的新北市長朱立倫，最近對中央的意見也顯得不太保留。諸如，在批綠朝「兩兆雙星」政策時，順帶點了一下經濟低迷，要求多放假紓解民怨；他更暗指「五都」數目太多，應以回歸「三都」為宜，言下暗藏機鋒。至於有意參選北市長的連勝文，在去年九月政爭中偏袒王金平，連「大明王朝」的話都脫口而出。這些談話也許不必過度演繹，但這反映藍軍菁英對於中央施為的不滿，也顯示他們的意見在日常的黨或政的管道裡無法被聽見。
不唯藍營，民進黨主席蘇貞昌最近遭黨內菁英圍攻之激烈，其程度恐怕不亞於馬英九。在應不應續任黨主席議題上，他飽受謝長廷和蔡英文陣營的挑釁；在台北市長候選人上的遲疑，他夾在柯文哲、顧立雄和呂秀蓮之間，被批充滿「失敗主義」；在兩岸政策及課綱議題上的抱殘守缺，被批搖擺不定及自我矛盾。在領導能力上，林義雄傳出要另組新政團，中生代則譏諷其能力遠不及前幾任。
由此可見，歷經兩次政黨輪替，藍綠兩黨的體質與文化都有了微妙的變化：被看破手腳的主席不再擁有無上的權威，黨機器的控制和意志的貫徹也無法再得心應手。更重要的是，現任領導者缺乏帶領政局突圍脫困的能耐，使人民失望，也讓黨的意志變得渙散；從而鼓舞了有心人和憤怒者的叛逆，一有機會就向中央開火。當然，這些開砲者會不會遭逆火自傷，則又是另一回事。
比起蘇貞昌屢屢遭到同輩戰友的挑激，馬英九受到更多中生代的質疑，我們實在很難分斷誰比誰幸運。無論如何，對於擁有豐厚黨政資源的馬總統而言，他對人對事的關注過度偏倚，而未能運用各種資源來厚植政府的利民政績和政黨的人才傳承，著實令人嘆惋。藍綠黨內菁英的躁動，如果完全從個人的權鬥和爭勝去解讀，將只會走向負面發展；但如果從大局的變動和因應看，那些刺耳的聲音所傳達的現實，恐怕也值得好好處理。
Wednesday, February 12, 2014
Cross-Straits Future Requires Greater Imagination
Cross-Straits Future Requires Greater Imagination
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 13, 2014
Summary: During the recent Wang Zhang meeting the Mainland media removed the scare quotes when referring to Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council Leader Wang Yu-chi. If during a Ma Xi meeting they use the expression "Taiwan authorities leader Ma Ying-jeou," that too will be perfectly natural. As long as we have the "big roof concept of China," there should be no obstacles to a Ma Xi meeting. Wang Yu-chi spoke at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. He essentially declared that "The Republic of China is an integral part of the one China framework." This may well be interpreted as tentative acceptance of the " big roof concept of China." How is one to make sense of all these loose ends? That will require greater imagination.
Full text below:
MAC Chairman Wang Yu-chi visited the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. He read aloud the official Republic of China funeral oration. He gave a speech at BoAi Plaza, saying that Sun Yat-sen founded the Republic of China, Asia's first democratic republic 103 years ago.
When Chairman Wang spoke, the accompanying officials from Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office deliberately stood to one side. Mainland Chinese on the plaza gathered around to listen. Wang Yu-chi's actions were part of a tacit understanding with the Beijing authorities. This was a major move that marks a turning point in cross-strait relations. It inspires greater confidence in future cross-strait relations. This scenario, assuming it was the result of an understanding reached between the two sides, was a bold and imaginative move by Xi Jinping and Zhang Zhijun.
The Wang Zhang meeting has now adjourned. Zhang Zhijun made a comment that has attracted considerable attention. He said, "To overcome (cross-strait) barriers, we must use our imagination. Not just this (Wang Zhang) meeting, but future cross-strait relations require greater imagination."
Zhang's comment included the phrase "Not just this (Wang Zhang) meeting." Observers have concluded that what Zhang meant was that "a future Ma Xi meeting" will also require greater imagination. We need not interpret Zhang's comment this way. But Zhang did say that the two sides are currently not exercising enough imagination, and that the future "will require greater imagination."
Take negotiations. The 'Wang Zhang meeting made less progress than other recent bilateral talks. The discussion of most issues began with hollow terms as "concrete implementation," "pragmatic handling," "early solution," or "explore possible avenues." On the other hand, Wang and Zhang agreed to address each other by their official titles. They deliberately characterized the meeting as the very first between "one head of government and another." They began the transition from middle men to direct government to government contacts. That is the most significant political statement to emerge from this meeting.
Wang Yu-chi's speech at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum used the official language of the Republican era and represented the views of the "Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council." Wang also delivered an official speech at Nanjing University. This shows that the Wang Zhang meeting has already exceeded most peoples' expectations. Someone once said, "Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum on which to place it, and I shall move the world." Will future historians say that Chairman Wang and Director Zhang changed the cross-strait scenario and the destiny of the two sides?
Consider what the Wang Zhang meeting has already accomplished. Wang and Zhang addressed each other by their official titles. This affirmed the two sides' jurisdiction. Wang Yu-chi visited the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and made an explicit reference to the Republic of China's 103 year long existence. This affirmed the two sides' sovereignty. This scenario amounts to an implicit understanding between the two sides. It means that cross-strait relations are undergoing transition. They are entering a "non-repudiation of each other's sovereignty" and "acknowledgement of each other's jurisdiction" stage. Zhang said "future cross-strait relations require greater imagination." This, perhaps, is precisely the sort of imagination that is required.
During the recent Wang Zhang meeting, the Beijing authorities approached the matter of Wang Yu-chi's official title with caution. Director Zhang Zhijun verbally addressed Wang as "Chairman Wang" or "Chairman Yu-chi." But the Mainland media referred to Wang as "Wang Yu-chi, the head of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council." It accepted the term "Mainland Affairs Council," but held back on using the title "chairman." This arrangement suggests that the Mainland media may accept the ROC government's official titles, and that it will no longer use scare quotes around these titles. Not using official titles, but instead using "Taiwan side leader Chiang Yi-hua" also amounts to a major breakthrough. By contrast, Wang Yu-chi's address at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum used Republican era official titles and the national title of the Republic of China. The TAO said "Sun's achievements are a matter of historical record." The recent Wang Zhang meeting, which addressed official titles, jurisdiction, and sovereignty, constitutes an imaginative breakthrough. Its significance is extraordinary.
Addressing each other by their official titles is not merely a matter of jurisdiction. Mere "mutual recognition of the other's jurisdiction" does not address the real problem. One must also deal with the matter of sovereignty. Merely addressing each other by their official titles could even be misinterpreted as "one country on each side." Therefore in order to avoid having the use of official titles misinterpreted as "one country on each side," one must first deal with "cross-strait political relations under conditions in which the nation has yet to be reunified." This is the language of the CCP 18th National Congress Political Report.
The solution to the problem is the "big roof concept of China." Under the big roof concept of China, both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China belong to one China. Their sovereignty both overlaps and coincides.
If the two sides together accept the "big roof concept of China," then the ROC and the PRC are both "part of China." In that case, when officials from the two sides address each other by their official titles, it will not lead to the presumption of "one country on each side." Instead, it will take place under and within the "big roof concept of China."
During the recent Wang Zhang meeting the Mainland media removed the scare quotes when referring to Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council Leader Wang Yu-chi. If during a Ma Xi meeting they use the expression "Taiwan authorities leader Ma Ying-jeou," that too will be perfectly natural. As long as we have the "big roof concept of China," there should be no obstacles to a Ma Xi meeting. Wang Yu-chi spoke at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. He essentially declared that "The Republic of China is an integral part of the one China framework." This may well be interpreted as tentative acceptance of the " big roof concept of China." How is one to make sense of all these loose ends? That will require greater imagination.
兩岸未來 需要更大的想像力
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.13 04:02 am
陸委會主委王郁琦謁中山陵，宣讀民國紀元及署名官銜的祭文，並在博愛廣場發表談話稱，國父孫中山創建的亞洲第一個民主共和國中華民國，現在已一○三年了。
王主委談話時，陪同的北京國台辦官員刻意避開，廣場上的大陸民眾則圍聚聆聽。若王郁琦此一動作是在北京當局的默契之中，這將是一個扭轉兩岸格局的大動作，也令人對兩岸未來的新境界增添了信心。這個場景，若是出自雙方默契，真堪謂是習近平與張志軍的一個充滿想像空間的大手筆。
王張會落幕，張志軍留下了餘音繞梁的一句話。他說：「要破解（兩岸）一些難題的話，我們必須要有一點想像力；不僅是這樣的會見（王張會），對兩岸未來的發展，也應有更大的想像力。」
由於他話中帶到「不僅是王張會」，因而此語被解讀為是對「未來的馬習會」應有更大的想像力。但即使不作此解，這句話應在說：兩岸現在的想像力不夠，面對未來「應有更大的想像力」。
就議題的談判言，此次王張會也許是近年雙邊會談中進展最小的一次。幾乎所有的議題皆以「具體落實」、「務實處理」、「盡早解決」或「探討可行途徑」等懸念語詞帶過。對照之下，雙方達成了王張二人互稱官銜的協議，與刻意呈現「政府首長對政府首長」首次會談的場景，及啟動了白手套與政府之間的換軌工程，即儼然成為舉行此會的主要政治宣示。
何況，王郁琦的謁中山陵祭文，是以民國紀元及「大陸委員會主任委員」的官銜署名，又以正式官銜在南京大學演說；在在顯示，這次王張會的表現已超越了一般人的想像。有人說，給我一個支點，我就可以撐起整個地球；未來的歷史會不會說，從互稱王主委、張主任開始，你就可以改變兩岸的格局與命運？
王張會發展至今，王張互稱官銜涉及了治權層次；而王郁琦在中山陵說中華民國一○三年，則關乎主權層次。倘若這個全景，皆是在雙方的默契之中，則兩岸關係即有可能從「主權互不承認／治權互不否認」的階段，進入「主權互不否認／治權相互承認」的境界。張志軍說「兩岸未來應有更大的想像力」，莫非正是需要這方面的想像力？
此次王張會中，北京當局對王郁琦的官銜仍是「謹慎處理」。張志軍主任在口頭上稱「王主委」、「郁琦主委」；但大陸媒體則稱「台灣方面陸委會負責人王郁琦」，也就是接受了「陸委會」，卻保留了「主委」。這樣的安排，若顯示大陸媒體未來亦可接受中華民國政府其他部會的官稱，不再「加引號」，但不稱官銜，如稱作「台灣方面行政院負責人江宜樺」，亦是重大的突破。相較而言，王郁琦以民國紀元與官銜及直稱國父與中華民國國號的謁陵動作，如果亦在國台辦「孫中山的豐功偉業已經載入史冊」的默認範圍，則此次王張會可謂一舉對兩岸的「稱謂論述／治權論述／主權論述」皆有了想像力破表的試探。如此，豈不是意義非凡？
「互稱官銜」不只是「治權論述」的問題，因而若只是「相互承認治權」，仍不能解決問題；因為，如果不能往上處理「主權論述」，則「互稱官銜」即可能呈現「一邊一國」。於是，為了不使「互稱官銜」流為「一邊一國」，即須首先處理「國家尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」（中共十八大政治報告語）。
解決的方案即是「大屋頂中國」：在大屋頂中國下，中華民國和中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國，同屬主權相互含蘊並共同合成的「一個中國」。
兩岸若是共同接受一個「大屋頂中國」，使中華民國與中華人民共和國皆為「一部分的中國」，雙方官員互稱官銜，即不致呈現「一邊一國」，而是同在「一個大屋頂中國」之下及之內。
此次王張會，大陸媒體至少已將陸委會「去引號」；則既可稱「台灣方面陸委會負責人王郁琦」，則若在馬習會稱「台灣當局領導人馬英九」，亦是順理成章。只要有「大屋頂中國」的念想，馬習會也就沒有障礙。至於王郁琦的中山陵談話，若可視為在主張「中華民國是一中架構中不可或缺的一部分」，則也不妨看成對「大屋頂中國」的探索。這些端緒將如何發展，都需要更大的想像力。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 13, 2014
Summary: During the recent Wang Zhang meeting the Mainland media removed the scare quotes when referring to Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council Leader Wang Yu-chi. If during a Ma Xi meeting they use the expression "Taiwan authorities leader Ma Ying-jeou," that too will be perfectly natural. As long as we have the "big roof concept of China," there should be no obstacles to a Ma Xi meeting. Wang Yu-chi spoke at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. He essentially declared that "The Republic of China is an integral part of the one China framework." This may well be interpreted as tentative acceptance of the " big roof concept of China." How is one to make sense of all these loose ends? That will require greater imagination.
Full text below:
MAC Chairman Wang Yu-chi visited the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. He read aloud the official Republic of China funeral oration. He gave a speech at BoAi Plaza, saying that Sun Yat-sen founded the Republic of China, Asia's first democratic republic 103 years ago.
When Chairman Wang spoke, the accompanying officials from Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office deliberately stood to one side. Mainland Chinese on the plaza gathered around to listen. Wang Yu-chi's actions were part of a tacit understanding with the Beijing authorities. This was a major move that marks a turning point in cross-strait relations. It inspires greater confidence in future cross-strait relations. This scenario, assuming it was the result of an understanding reached between the two sides, was a bold and imaginative move by Xi Jinping and Zhang Zhijun.
The Wang Zhang meeting has now adjourned. Zhang Zhijun made a comment that has attracted considerable attention. He said, "To overcome (cross-strait) barriers, we must use our imagination. Not just this (Wang Zhang) meeting, but future cross-strait relations require greater imagination."
Zhang's comment included the phrase "Not just this (Wang Zhang) meeting." Observers have concluded that what Zhang meant was that "a future Ma Xi meeting" will also require greater imagination. We need not interpret Zhang's comment this way. But Zhang did say that the two sides are currently not exercising enough imagination, and that the future "will require greater imagination."
Take negotiations. The 'Wang Zhang meeting made less progress than other recent bilateral talks. The discussion of most issues began with hollow terms as "concrete implementation," "pragmatic handling," "early solution," or "explore possible avenues." On the other hand, Wang and Zhang agreed to address each other by their official titles. They deliberately characterized the meeting as the very first between "one head of government and another." They began the transition from middle men to direct government to government contacts. That is the most significant political statement to emerge from this meeting.
Wang Yu-chi's speech at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum used the official language of the Republican era and represented the views of the "Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council." Wang also delivered an official speech at Nanjing University. This shows that the Wang Zhang meeting has already exceeded most peoples' expectations. Someone once said, "Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum on which to place it, and I shall move the world." Will future historians say that Chairman Wang and Director Zhang changed the cross-strait scenario and the destiny of the two sides?
Consider what the Wang Zhang meeting has already accomplished. Wang and Zhang addressed each other by their official titles. This affirmed the two sides' jurisdiction. Wang Yu-chi visited the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and made an explicit reference to the Republic of China's 103 year long existence. This affirmed the two sides' sovereignty. This scenario amounts to an implicit understanding between the two sides. It means that cross-strait relations are undergoing transition. They are entering a "non-repudiation of each other's sovereignty" and "acknowledgement of each other's jurisdiction" stage. Zhang said "future cross-strait relations require greater imagination." This, perhaps, is precisely the sort of imagination that is required.
During the recent Wang Zhang meeting, the Beijing authorities approached the matter of Wang Yu-chi's official title with caution. Director Zhang Zhijun verbally addressed Wang as "Chairman Wang" or "Chairman Yu-chi." But the Mainland media referred to Wang as "Wang Yu-chi, the head of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council." It accepted the term "Mainland Affairs Council," but held back on using the title "chairman." This arrangement suggests that the Mainland media may accept the ROC government's official titles, and that it will no longer use scare quotes around these titles. Not using official titles, but instead using "Taiwan side leader Chiang Yi-hua" also amounts to a major breakthrough. By contrast, Wang Yu-chi's address at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum used Republican era official titles and the national title of the Republic of China. The TAO said "Sun's achievements are a matter of historical record." The recent Wang Zhang meeting, which addressed official titles, jurisdiction, and sovereignty, constitutes an imaginative breakthrough. Its significance is extraordinary.
Addressing each other by their official titles is not merely a matter of jurisdiction. Mere "mutual recognition of the other's jurisdiction" does not address the real problem. One must also deal with the matter of sovereignty. Merely addressing each other by their official titles could even be misinterpreted as "one country on each side." Therefore in order to avoid having the use of official titles misinterpreted as "one country on each side," one must first deal with "cross-strait political relations under conditions in which the nation has yet to be reunified." This is the language of the CCP 18th National Congress Political Report.
The solution to the problem is the "big roof concept of China." Under the big roof concept of China, both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China belong to one China. Their sovereignty both overlaps and coincides.
If the two sides together accept the "big roof concept of China," then the ROC and the PRC are both "part of China." In that case, when officials from the two sides address each other by their official titles, it will not lead to the presumption of "one country on each side." Instead, it will take place under and within the "big roof concept of China."
During the recent Wang Zhang meeting the Mainland media removed the scare quotes when referring to Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council Leader Wang Yu-chi. If during a Ma Xi meeting they use the expression "Taiwan authorities leader Ma Ying-jeou," that too will be perfectly natural. As long as we have the "big roof concept of China," there should be no obstacles to a Ma Xi meeting. Wang Yu-chi spoke at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. He essentially declared that "The Republic of China is an integral part of the one China framework." This may well be interpreted as tentative acceptance of the " big roof concept of China." How is one to make sense of all these loose ends? That will require greater imagination.
兩岸未來 需要更大的想像力
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.13 04:02 am
陸委會主委王郁琦謁中山陵，宣讀民國紀元及署名官銜的祭文，並在博愛廣場發表談話稱，國父孫中山創建的亞洲第一個民主共和國中華民國，現在已一○三年了。
王主委談話時，陪同的北京國台辦官員刻意避開，廣場上的大陸民眾則圍聚聆聽。若王郁琦此一動作是在北京當局的默契之中，這將是一個扭轉兩岸格局的大動作，也令人對兩岸未來的新境界增添了信心。這個場景，若是出自雙方默契，真堪謂是習近平與張志軍的一個充滿想像空間的大手筆。
王張會落幕，張志軍留下了餘音繞梁的一句話。他說：「要破解（兩岸）一些難題的話，我們必須要有一點想像力；不僅是這樣的會見（王張會），對兩岸未來的發展，也應有更大的想像力。」
由於他話中帶到「不僅是王張會」，因而此語被解讀為是對「未來的馬習會」應有更大的想像力。但即使不作此解，這句話應在說：兩岸現在的想像力不夠，面對未來「應有更大的想像力」。
就議題的談判言，此次王張會也許是近年雙邊會談中進展最小的一次。幾乎所有的議題皆以「具體落實」、「務實處理」、「盡早解決」或「探討可行途徑」等懸念語詞帶過。對照之下，雙方達成了王張二人互稱官銜的協議，與刻意呈現「政府首長對政府首長」首次會談的場景，及啟動了白手套與政府之間的換軌工程，即儼然成為舉行此會的主要政治宣示。
何況，王郁琦的謁中山陵祭文，是以民國紀元及「大陸委員會主任委員」的官銜署名，又以正式官銜在南京大學演說；在在顯示，這次王張會的表現已超越了一般人的想像。有人說，給我一個支點，我就可以撐起整個地球；未來的歷史會不會說，從互稱王主委、張主任開始，你就可以改變兩岸的格局與命運？
王張會發展至今，王張互稱官銜涉及了治權層次；而王郁琦在中山陵說中華民國一○三年，則關乎主權層次。倘若這個全景，皆是在雙方的默契之中，則兩岸關係即有可能從「主權互不承認／治權互不否認」的階段，進入「主權互不否認／治權相互承認」的境界。張志軍說「兩岸未來應有更大的想像力」，莫非正是需要這方面的想像力？
此次王張會中，北京當局對王郁琦的官銜仍是「謹慎處理」。張志軍主任在口頭上稱「王主委」、「郁琦主委」；但大陸媒體則稱「台灣方面陸委會負責人王郁琦」，也就是接受了「陸委會」，卻保留了「主委」。這樣的安排，若顯示大陸媒體未來亦可接受中華民國政府其他部會的官稱，不再「加引號」，但不稱官銜，如稱作「台灣方面行政院負責人江宜樺」，亦是重大的突破。相較而言，王郁琦以民國紀元與官銜及直稱國父與中華民國國號的謁陵動作，如果亦在國台辦「孫中山的豐功偉業已經載入史冊」的默認範圍，則此次王張會可謂一舉對兩岸的「稱謂論述／治權論述／主權論述」皆有了想像力破表的試探。如此，豈不是意義非凡？
「互稱官銜」不只是「治權論述」的問題，因而若只是「相互承認治權」，仍不能解決問題；因為，如果不能往上處理「主權論述」，則「互稱官銜」即可能呈現「一邊一國」。於是，為了不使「互稱官銜」流為「一邊一國」，即須首先處理「國家尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」（中共十八大政治報告語）。
解決的方案即是「大屋頂中國」：在大屋頂中國下，中華民國和中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國，同屬主權相互含蘊並共同合成的「一個中國」。
兩岸若是共同接受一個「大屋頂中國」，使中華民國與中華人民共和國皆為「一部分的中國」，雙方官員互稱官銜，即不致呈現「一邊一國」，而是同在「一個大屋頂中國」之下及之內。
此次王張會，大陸媒體至少已將陸委會「去引號」；則既可稱「台灣方面陸委會負責人王郁琦」，則若在馬習會稱「台灣當局領導人馬英九」，亦是順理成章。只要有「大屋頂中國」的念想，馬習會也就沒有障礙。至於王郁琦的中山陵談話，若可視為在主張「中華民國是一中架構中不可或缺的一部分」，則也不妨看成對「大屋頂中國」的探索。這些端緒將如何發展，都需要更大的想像力。
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