Tsai Ing-wen Has Yet to Complete the Final Mile

Tsai Ing-wen Has Yet to Complete the Final Mile
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 31, 2015

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen may be able to hijack the public on Taiwan. She may be able to craft a shrewd election strategy.  She may be able to survive the election debate. She may even be able to win the ultimate prize. But if she is elected, she must deal with the 1992 Consensus. She must be pragmatic in her diplomacy and her cross-Strait policy. She must win the Mainland's trust and stabilize cross-Strait and Taipei-Washington relations. Anything less is self-deception.

Full Text Below:

Did the presidential debate clarify the 1992 consensus or not? Will the Mainland buy Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric or not?

Mainland China is too big. Taiwan is too small. The 1992 Consensus may be nothing more than a word. Nevertheless it has served as the political foundation for cross-Strait relations for the past eight years. These two questions are too important. The election must not present any surprises. The voters' choices must be made clear. Only then will they be able to make the right choice. Only then will Taiwan enjoy a stable external environment, and address its multitude of intractable political, economic and social problems.

During the recent TV debate, Eric Chu cross-examined Tsai Ing-wen face to face. He demanded to know "Do you recognize the 1992 Consensus or not?" He hoped to pin Tsai Ing-wen down. But Tsai Ing-wen adroitly replied, "Isn't my attitude clear enough?" She implied that she her position was already abundantly clear. She implied that her opponent's endless questioning was unreasonable. She did not forget to take a jab at Eric Chu, who at one time endorsed the two-states theory.

Tsai Ing-wen is skilled at debating. But has she in fact made her position on the 1992 Consensus clear? Let us summarize her past speeches, policy statements, and answers during live question and answer sessions. One. She concedes the fact that talks were held in 1992, but refuses to accept the term “1992 Consensus”. She argues that "It's a question of how the term is used and interpreted".  Essentially she has reverted to the Chen Shui-bian era "1992 Spirit". Two. She argues that the KMT decision to adhere to the 1992 Consensus is an option, but not the only option. She argues that the DPP seeks to "maintain the status quo" to ensure that the public on Taiwan retains its options. Three. She pledges to conduct cross-Strait relations within the "framework of the ROC”. She intends to use past relations as a foundation, and conduct cross-Strait relations in accordance with public opinion and the democratic process.

Chen Shui-bian used the term "1992 Spirit". He stressed  "mutual understanding, seeking common ground and shelving differences". This is exactly what Tsai Ing-wen is saying today. As former Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council during the Chen Shui-bian era, Tsai Ing-wen knows full well that the 1992 Consensus is not a word game. Besides “mutual understanding, seeking common ground and shelving differences", far more important matters loom, specifically the matter of “China”.

According to Mainland understanding, the 1992 Consensus means that “Both sides of the Taiwan Strait are part of one China. Cross-Strait relations are not international relations”. During an address at the Ma Xi summit, Ma Ying-jeou proclaimed to the entire world that “The consensus reached on the One China Principle by the two sides of the Strait in November 1992, is what we refer to, in shortened form, as the 1992 Consensus". In other words, Tsai Ing-wen refuses to accept the KMT's definition of the 1992 Consensus. But the real question is “Does she accept one China?" Has Tsai Ing-wen made that clear or not?

When questioned by Eric Chu and reporters, Tsai Ing-wen said “The 1992 Consensus is an option, but not the only option". She persisted in claiming that there were other options.

But for the Mainland, Taiwan has only one future -- reunification. Flip open the DPP's Taiwan Independence Party Platform, its Resolution on Taiwan's Future, and its Resolution for a Normal Nation. First the DPP sought an independent state. Later it argued that Taiwan is already independent, but “according to its current constitution it is known as the Republic of China”. Eventually however, its bottom line became clear. The DPP publicly proclaimed that the two sides of the Strait are separate nations, neither belongs to the other, and neither governs the other. So, the question arises: Is the status quo in cross-Strait relations "one country on each side"? If the public on Taiwan and on the Mainland choose to reunify one day, how will the DPP respond? The Mainland has consistently opposed Taiwan independence. Taiwan has struggled long and hard over reunification vs. independence. Will Tsai Ing-wen return to the point and make her position clear?

Tsai Ing-wen hopes to complete her final mile on the road to the presidency. She has forsaken her "Republic of China is a government in exile" argument. She has consciously reverted to the ROC constitutional framework, to legitimize her arguments, and to win over swing voters and even blue camp voters. But as we all know, the blue and green camps have very different interpretations of the term "Republic of China". Ma Ying-jeou has publicly proclaimed that the Republic of China includes both Taiwan and the Mainland. During the Ma Xi summit press conference, he put it even more bluntly: Two Chinas, one China and one Taiwan, and Taiwan independence, all violate the Republic of China Constitution. The DPP equates the Republic of China with Taiwan. It misuses the term in order to engage in backdoor listing.

As cross-Strait relations expert Shao Tsung-hai noted, in Tsai Ing-wen's mind "the Republic of China's current constitutional framework" is not the same as "the ROC constitutional framework". The 1991 "Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China" provides for regular presidential and legislative elections in the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu area. Lee Teng-hui argued that "Since 1991, the two sides have in fact been two countries." Tsai Ing-wen's terminology tells us she is a follower of Lee Teng-hui's path toward Taiwan independence.

So the question arises, yet again. Article Four of the Constitution clearly refers to the "Republic of China's long-held territory". But the preamble of the "Upgraded Provisions to the Constitution" includes the phrase "to respond to the needs of the nation prior to reunification".  So does the territory of the Republic of China prior to reunification include the Mainland? Are the two sides two countries, or not? Is Tsai Ing-wen willing to speak plainly, or not?

Tsai Ing-wen may brim with confidence. Her responses may reek of glibness. Yet she persists in evading the most crucial issue in cross-Strait relations -- the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen has offered some degree of goodwill to the Mainland. For example, she occasionally uses the term “Mainland”, instead of “China”. She has pledged to continue cross-Strait exchanges following the election. But these alone fail to demonstrate a sincere belief in the concept of China. They cannot gain the trust of either the Mainland or the public on either side.

Tsai Ing-wen may be able to hijack the public on Taiwan. She may be able to craft a shrewd election strategy.  She may be able to survive the election debate. She may even be able to win the ultimate prize. But if she is elected, she must deal with the 1992 Consensus. She must be pragmatic in her diplomacy and her cross-Strait policy. She must win the Mainland's trust and stabilize cross-Strait and Taipei-Washington relations. Anything less is self-deception.

蔡英文的最後一哩路仍未跨越

2015年12月31日 中國時報

九二共識究竟辯論清楚沒有？大陸會接受蔡英文的論述嗎？

大陸太大、台灣太小，九二共識雖然只是一個名詞，卻是過去8年兩岸關係的政治基礎，前述兩個問題實在太重要，選舉關鍵時刻必須毫無懸念的釐清，選民才能做出正確的抉擇，台灣才能有安定的外部環境，解決當前種種嚴酷的政治、經濟與社會問題。

日前電視辯論會上，朱立倫當面詰問蔡英文：「到底接不接受九二共識？」希望抓住蔡英文的痛腳，蔡英文卻很有技巧地反擊：「我的態度還不夠清楚嗎？」凸顯了她自認說清楚的自信及對手纏鬥不休的無理，還不忘順便諷刺朱立倫，當年也是兩國論的附和者。

蔡英文的辯論技巧高明，但她真的說清楚了九二共識嗎？綜合她歷次相關演講、政見和現場答問，大致可以歸納以下幾個要點：第一，承認九二會談的「事實」，但不接受九二共識「名詞」，她強調「這是一個名詞的使用和詮釋的問題」，大致回到了陳水扁時代「九二精神」的立場；第二，國民黨堅持的「九二共識」是一個選項但不是唯一的選項，民進黨堅持「維持現狀」是要確保台灣人民的選擇權；第三，將在「中華民國的體制」下，以兩岸關係過去累積的成果為基礎，遵循民意和民主機制來推動兩岸關係。

陳水扁時代使用「九二精神」，強調的就是蔡英文現在的說語：「相互諒解和求同存異」。曾任陳水扁時代陸委會主委的蔡英文不可能不清楚，九二共識絕不是文字遊戲，而且在「相互諒解和求同存異」之外，還有更重要的內涵，就是「中國」。

具言之，大陸對九二共識的詮釋是「兩岸同屬一個中國，兩岸不是國與國關係。」馬英九在馬習會致辭時也當著全世界面宣布：「海峽兩岸在1992年11月就一個中國原則達成的共識簡稱九二共識」。換言之，蔡英文可以不接受國民黨發明的「九二共識」這一表述，但必須回答是否接受「一中」？蔡英文講清了嗎？

蔡英文面對朱立倫的詰問和記者的追問，表示「九二共識是一個選項但不是唯一的選項」，仍然依違兩可。

但在大陸看來，台灣的前途只有一個，就是實現統一。翻開民進黨的台獨黨綱、台灣前途決議文和正常國家決議文，先是謀求獨立建國，後又辯稱台灣本就獨立，「依目前憲法稱為中華民國」，最後圖窮匕首見，公開宣布兩岸一邊一國，互不隸屬，互不治理。那麼，問題來了：兩岸關係的現狀是不是「一邊一國」？如果台灣人民未來選擇要和大陸統一，民進黨該怎麼辦？面對大陸一以貫之的反台獨立場和台灣經久不息的統獨之爭，蔡英文能回歸原點講清楚嗎？

希望順利走完最後一哩路的蔡英文，一改「中華民國是流亡政府」論調，開始有意識回歸中華民國憲政體制，以取得論述的合法性，並爭取中間選民甚至藍營群眾的認可。但是眾所周知，對於「中華民國」，藍綠陣營是各自表述的。馬英九曾公開講過，中華民國底下有台灣地區和大陸地區，馬習會後記者會上更直陳：兩個中國、一中一台和台灣獨立都是《中華民國憲法》所不容許的。然而，民進黨把中華民國與台灣畫上等號，後者借前者之殼以求苟活。

兩岸學者邵宗海曾提醒，蔡英文口中的「中華民國『現行』憲政體制」與「中華民國憲政體制」是不一樣的。兩字之別的要害在1991年的《憲法增修條文》，規定總統與國會在台澎金馬地區定期直選，李登輝曾解讀「自1991年開始，兩岸實際上已是兩個國家」。蔡英文的遣詞造句可能暗示她遵循的是李登輝的台獨路線。

那麼，問題又來了：憲法本文第四條明定「中華民國依其固有疆域」，但《憲法增修條文》前言規定其「因應國家統一前的需要」，那麼，統一前中華民國的領土是否包括大陸地區？甚至，兩岸到底是不是兩個國家？這些蔡英文能講得清楚嗎？

蔡英文雖然自信滿滿，巧舌如簧，但仍然迴避九二共識這一兩岸關係中最要害的政治問題。當然，蔡英文確實也對大陸釋放出了一些善意，包括多處措辭使用中國大陸而不是中國，承諾當選後會推動兩岸關係繼續發展等，但光有這些恐怕還不足以展現接受「中國概念」的誠意，更無法取信大陸和兩岸人民。

蔡英文或可挾民意支持與高超的選舉策略，順利通過大選辯論的考驗，甚至最終問鼎。但如果她當選後不能正確處理九二共識核心問題，不能以務實的外交與兩岸政策及實際作為取得大陸信賴，要想穩定兩岸及台美關係只能說是自欺欺人。

Compensation for Comfort Women: Korea Can. Can Taiwan?

Compensation for Comfort Women: Korea Can. Can Taiwan?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 30, 2015

Executive Summary: Taiwan has long been friendly towards Japan. During the 3/11 earthquake, Taiwan made the largest contributions to Japan. But Japan's apology and compensation for comfort women from Korea, showed no consideration whatsoever for feelings on Taiwan. For the Ma government, which has prided itself on Taiwan-Japan relations being “the best ever", this comes as an embarrassment. Worse still, idolatry of Japan has never abated on Taiwan. Hsu Wen-lung has insisted that the comfort women "volunteered”. Lee Teng-hui has insisted that the comfort women issue is “settled". Do they have a shred of self-respect? Are they not the least bit ashamed?

Full Text Below:

Japan and South Korea have struggled interminably over the issue of compensation for comfort women. Under pressure from the United States, the two nations have reached an unprecedented agreement. Shinzo Abe, who has always taken an unyielding stance, has finally agreed to offer South Korea an apology and compensation. Park Geun-hye is a long-time defender of women's rights and national dignity. Park has promised that if Japan fulfills its commitments to the comfort women, the Korean government will cease to raise it as an issue. This agreement has unfrozen diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan, and paved the way for visits between political leaders. It has mended the trilateral relationship between South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Sino-US conflict in the South China Sea has intensified. The agreement has bolstered the United States' Asia rebalancing strategy.

Judging from the agreement, the Japanese government made major concessions to South Korea. Japan gave South Korea considerable face. Prime Minister Abe officially apologized to South Korea, and established an official one billion yen fund for comfort women, in the name of the Japanese government. Korean comfort women support groups however, were not impressed. They termed it the "diplomacy of humiliation". They accused the Korean government of betraying people's expectations. The Japanese government hopes the Korean government will remove the bronze statue of Korean comfort women from the front of the Japanese Embassy in South Korea. But the South Korean government has yet to make explicit promises. The private sector groups who erected the bronze statue are unlikely to back down.

Why was South Korea able to force the the Japanese government to apologize and provide compensation? One reason was behind the scenes pressure from the United States. But the most important reason was that South Korea has long refused to compromise, but instead aggressively demanded and achieved results.

The Korean people are tough. Japanese colonial rule was painful. Japan trampled over people in many countries. But South Korea has reacted with unparalleled intensity, and adopted the toughest stance. As far back as 1993, South Korea passed a "Special Articles for Comfort Women", providing victims with housing, medical care, and living expenses. Private sector support groups such as the Korean Council for Women Drafted into Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, have been even more steadfast and relentless. Its members erected the bronze statue of Korean comfort women that stands before the Japanese Embassy. The Korean public has staunchly backed the Korean government. As a result, they have been a thorn in Japan's side. After Park Geun-hye took office, the comfort women issue became the focus of controversy in both Japan and South Korea. Park Geun-hye demanded an apology and compensation from Japan. Otherwise, he promised, there would be no peace between Japan and South Korea. This led to an unprecedented downturn in Japanese-South Korean relations.

Japan has long insisted that its enslavement of comfort women was "normal for wartime". So why was it willing to offer South Korea an apology and compensation? First of all, Japan was subject to heavy US diplomatic pressure. It was forced to yield. America's "Asia rebalancing" policy includes three pillars: the US-Japan alliance, the US-ROK alliance, and the US-Australia alliance. But prolonged discord between Japan and South Korea left a hole in the United States, Japan, and South Korea relationship. It weakened the United States' blockade of Mainland China. It prevented full deployment of the US military. Therefore, beginning last year, the US government pressured Abe to improve relations with South Korea.

Secondly, Abe is attempting to implement "finalization diplomacy". He seeks to restore Japan to its former glory as a great nation. He seeks to end collective self-defense and shrug off the Peace Constitution. Ideologically, he seeks to end historical grievances, once and for all, such that the Japanese people need no longer need bear responsibility for past aggressions. He hopes that a one-time apology will silence Japan's neighbors, forever. This is his primary goal. This year is the 70th anniversary of end of WWII. Abe hopes an apology will silence critics of Japan's past aggressions, once and for all.

But can such a cruel record of past aggressions be so easily erased? Let us examine the agreement between Japan and South Korea. Japan has offered an apology on the comfort women issue to Korea alone, to the exclusion of others. This suggests that the apology lacks sincerity. Even the South Korean public remains unsatisfied. And we have not even mentioned Japan's enslavement of comfort women throughout the region, from Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Chinese mainland. Japan has offered an apology and compensation to Korea alone, while ignoring the feelings of people in other countries. Japan's selective apology will only provoke resentment in other countries. How can it possibly end criticism of Japan's history of war crimes?

Now turn to Taiwan. Taiwan has long been friendly towards Japan. During the 3/11 earthquake, Taiwan made the largest contributions to Japan. But Japan's apology and compensation for comfort women from Korea, showed no consideration whatsoever for feelings on Taiwan. For the Ma government, which has prided itself on Taiwan-Japan relations being “the best ever", this comes as an embarrassment. Taiwan's past responses have been limited to verbal condemnation. Seldom has there been concrete action. Private sector organizations have not done enough to back the government. As a result, the Taiwan comfort women issue has been ignored. That is hardly surprising. Worse still, idolatry of Japan has never abated on Taiwan. Hsu Wen-lung has insisted that the comfort women "volunteered”. Lee Teng-hui has insisted that the comfort women issue is “settled". Do they have a shred of self-respect? Are they not the least bit ashamed?

Taiwan has many bronze statues of Hatta Yoichi. So why do we lack the courage to erect memorial statues for Taiwan's comfort women?

慰安婦賠償：韓國能，台灣不能？

2015-12-30 聯合報

在美國的操盤和施壓下，日韓兩國長期以來爭執不下的慰安婦賠償問題，最近破天荒地達成協議。一向態度強硬的安倍，同意向韓國道歉賠償；而堅持女權及民族尊嚴的朴槿惠則承諾，日本若落實撫慰措施，今後不再往事重提。這項協議，不但成功讓日韓的外交關係解凍，為日韓領袖的政治互訪鋪路，也適時修補了美日韓三邊關係的缺口。正當中美在南海衝突日益激烈之際，此舉也為美國的亞洲再平衡戰略再添一支柱。

從協議內容看，日本政府向韓國作出了極大的讓步。日本不僅為韓國做足了面子，由安倍首相具名正式向韓國道歉，日本也以「政府」的名義撥款，供韓國成立十億日圓的慰安婦救助基金。然而，韓國聲援慰安婦的民間團體對這項協議並不領情，甚至稱之為「屈辱外交」，認為政府的作法背叛了國民感情。也因此，日方希望韓國能撤除日本駐韓使館前的慰安婦少女銅像，但韓方未明確承諾；事實上，設立該銅像的民間團體恐怕不會輕易退讓。

韓國之所以在慰安婦問題上，能迫使日本政府道歉又作出賠償，除了美國在幕後施壓，最主要的因素，是韓國長久以來對日交涉的寸步不讓，並不斷積極爭取而獲致的成果。

由於民族性的驃悍，再加上當年遭日本高壓殖民的慘痛經驗，在曾遭日本蹂躝的國家中，韓國一直是反應最強烈、立場最強硬的國家。韓國早在一九九三年就訂定《慰安婦特別法》，為受害慰安婦提供住宅、醫療服務及生活費。民間聲援慰安婦的團體《韓國挺身隊問題對策協議會》，更是不屈不撓地進行抗爭，日本駐韓使館前的慰安婦少女銅像就是他們所設立。韓國民間的聲音，有效地成為政府的後盾，讓日本感到芒刺在背。朴槿惠上台後，慰安婦問題更成為日韓兩國爭議的焦點，朴槿惠堅持，日本若不道歉賠償，日韓關係就沒有緩和的可能性，這讓日韓關係陷入前所未有的低潮。

一向堅持徵用慰安婦是「戰爭常態」的日本，這次為何願意對韓國彎腰道歉賠償呢？首先，主要是日本承受了美國的外交壓力，不得不低頭。美國的「亞洲再平衡」政策，包括了美日同盟、美韓同盟及美澳同盟等三大支柱；但日韓的長期不睦，讓美日韓三邊關係出現缺口；這不僅影響美國圍堵中國大陸的力道，也讓美國的軍事部署難以從「點」展開為「面」。因此，從去年開始，美國政府便要求安倍能夠積極改善與韓國的關係。

其次，安倍正試圖實施「終了外交」，他認為，要讓日本恢復昔日的大國榮光，除了在制度上要解禁集體自衛權，擺脫和平憲法的束縛外，在意識型態上要擺脫歷史恩怨的束縛，讓日本國民不再背負過往侵略歷史的包袱。也因此，採取一次性的道歉，讓鄰國不再重提歷史，便成為他的主要目標。今年終戰七十周年，安倍便以道歉的方式，希望為過去的侵略歷史做個了結。

問題是，殘酷的侵略歷史，可能這麼輕易就抹掉嗎？觀察日韓協議的效應，日本在慰安婦問題上獨厚韓國，但態度缺乏誠懇，連韓國民間都無法感到滿意；何況，日本強徵慰安婦的暴行遍及台灣、菲律賓、印尼、中國大陸等國，如今卻獨獨對韓國作出道歉和賠償，而無視於其他國家的感受。這樣的選擇性道歉，只會引起其他國家的不滿，如何可能終結日本的歷史罪行？

把視角回到台灣。台灣人對日本一向友好，在三一一大地震時，台灣也是捐款最多的國家；但這次日本的慰安婦道歉賠償，卻絲毫不顧台灣的感受，讓自詡現今是「台日關係最好」的馬政府感到難堪。然而，台灣過去對慰安婦問題多半只有宣示性的聲明或譴責，而缺乏實際的行動，更不見民間團體主動聲援當政府的後盾；因此，今天台灣慰安婦問題受到漠視，恐怕不令人意外。更何況，台灣內部的媚日言論不曾間斷，諸如許文龍所說的慰安婦「自願論」，李登輝則說慰安婦問題已經「解決了」；這種毫無民族自尊的說法，他們自己不汗顏嗎？

要問的是：台灣有八田與一的銅像，為何大家沒有勇氣力挺慰安婦為她們建立紀念銅像？

Tsai Ing-wen's Surreptitious Recognition of the 1992 Consensus

Tsai Ing-wen's Surreptitious Recognition of the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 29, 2015

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen need not quibble over "1992 consensus" vs. "1992 fact". That is merely the skin of the dumpling. That is mere self-deception. After all, does Tsai Ing-wen really want to trade "one China, different interpretations”, the meat inside the dumpling, for the skin? Once again, we urge Tsai Ing-wen to bite the bullet. Tsai must ask herself how she can recognize then benefit from the 1992 consensus, within the framework of the ROC Constitution. 

Full Text Below:

Following the Ma Xi summit, Zhang Zhijun, Director of Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office, addressed the DPP. He said, "Recognizing the historical fact of the 1992 Consensus and agreeing with its core meaning (is sufficient)".  Tsai Ing-wen recently declared, "The DPP has not denied historical facts. The two sides held talks in 1992. The DPP also recognizes that the two sides sought common ground and shelved differences that year. It recognizes the fact of these consultations".

Tsai Ing-wen has flip-flopped on the 1992 Consensus yet again. But her flip-flop is not complete. This time, as we can see, Tsai Ing-wen yielded to Beijing. Beijing has not, as Tsai Ing-wen predicted, “yielded to the DPP because it won the general election".

Zhang Zhijun asked, and Tsai Ing-wen answered. Such terms as "historical facts" and "recognize", were all part of Zhang Zhijun's vocabulary. Tsai Ing-wen changed "1992 Consensus" to "1992 Cross-Strait Talks" and substituted the phrase "sought common ground while shelving differences through consultations” for "core meaning".

Tsai Ing-wen has long refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Now, however, she finds herself painted into a corner. She is now splitting “1992” off from “Consensus”. She acknowledges that a meeting was held in 1992. She refers to the “consultation” as “a fact”, one that “sought common ground while shelving differences". Since she cannot refer to the result of the meeting as the 1992 Consensus, can she refer to it as “the fact of a 1992 Consultation"? But the two are one and the same. So why has she made such a fuss over the 1992 Consensus up until now?

Tsai Ing-wen's retreat can be viewed from two perspectives: Beijing's and Tsai Ing-wen's.

Consider Beijing's perspective. Can Tsai Ing-wen accept the historical facts? Beijing has been monitoring her stealthy retreat. But she refuses to stick to the script. She refuses to come right out and recognize the 1992 Consensus. Cross-Strait relations remain unsettled. Tsai Ing-wen has substituted "1992 fact" for “1992 Consensus”. Has she reinforced the levee? Or is she merely fleeing before the flood waters?

Consider Tsai Ing-wen's perspective. She has substituted the “1992 fact” for "1992 Consensus". She has prolonged the cross-Strait stalemate and increased its cost. Chronic confrontations are not necessarily to her advantage. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen might as well recognize the 1992 Consensus outright, and make the most of “seeking common ground while shelving differences”.

Tsai Ing-wen has acknowledged that the 1992 consensus sought common ground while shelving differences. But she has not explained just what the common ground and differences are. The 1992 Consensus sought common ground and shelved differences by stipulating that, "Both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one China principle. But they differ on the meaning of one China”. Accordingly, "Both sides agree to express their own position verbally". Based on this premise, Beijing has emphasized "opposition to Taiwan independence”, and reiterated that “both sides are part of one China". The Ma government has emphasized "one China, different interpretations", and "no (immediate) reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force". This is the framework of the 1992 Consensus. This is what enables "seeking common ground while shelving differences". If Tsai Ing-wen recognizes "seeking common ground" in the 1992 Consensus, she must affirm that pursuant to the ROC Constitution, she must recognize the "one China principle" and uphold "one China, different interpretations”.

The phrase "seeking common ground while shelving differences" necessarily implies "one China, different interpretations". It necessarily precludes "one nation on each side" and the Taiwan independence party platform. In other words, "seeking common ground while shelving differences" is not empty rhetoric. One must specify “What common ground? What differences?”

Tsai Ing-wen says she wishes to "maintain the status quo". But her "status quo" is not Ma Ying-jeou's “status quo”. Tsai has held forth on “democracy vs. black box operations”, on “shared vs. monopolized”, on “selective vs. limited”. But that was mere rhetoric. She was invoking technical details, not fundamental principles. Tsai Ing-wen has said that her Republic of China and Ma Ying-jeou's Republic of China are different. Her Republic of China includes only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. It includes only the Tamshui River and Tsoshui Creek, whereas Ma Ying-jeou's one China includes the Yangtze River and Heilongjiang. Tsai Ing-wen said that Ma Ying-jeou's one China is the same as Beijing's one China.

Does Tsai Ing-wen wish to affirm the 1992 Consensus? If so, she can no longer obfuscate in order to hide her true position. Her “status quo” is different. Her “ROC” is different. Her “China” is different. These are all matters of fundamental principle. The 1992 Consensus refers to “seeking common ground while shelving differences”. Does she really think the differences she refers to are the same as those referred to in the 1992 Consensus? Does she really think that her definition of the Republic of China will enable her to interact with Beijing?

Tsai Ing-wen has already yielded to Beijing on the 1992 consensus. This move is worth encouraging. It is also inevitable. Tsai must not say, "Ma Ying-jeou and I are not the same". If she is elected and assumes power, she will be the beneficiary of Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait legacy. That includes 23 cross-Strait agreements, Mainland tourists coming to Taiwan, peaceful development, a diplomatic truce, one China, different interpretations, the consultation mechanism for cross-Strait laws, and the Ma Xi summit. She should be respectful and grateful. She should ask herself how she can be more like Ma Ying-jeou. Ma Ying-jeou blazed a trail for Tsai Ing-wen. From the 1992 consensus, he got one China, different interpretations.

Tsai Ing-wen need not quibble over "1992 consensus" vs. "1992 fact". That is merely the skin of the dumpling. That is mere self-deception. After all, does Tsai Ing-wen really want to trade "one China, different interpretations”, the meat inside the dumpling, for the skin?

Once again, we urge Tsai Ing-wen to bite the bullet. Tsai must ask herself how she can recognize then benefit from the 1992 consensus, within the framework of the ROC Constitution. 

九二共識：蔡英文馬步鬆動

2015-12-29 聯合報

馬習會後，國台辦主任張志軍對民進黨喊話：「只要承認九二共識的歷史事實，認同其核心內涵（即可）。」蔡英文的最新說法是：「民進黨沒有否認一九九二年兩岸會談的歷史事實，也認同當年……求同存異……的這段協商溝通的經過和事實。」

至此，在九二共識上，蔡英文再次轉身，但仍未完全到位。這次轉身，可以看出蔡英文是朝北京的方向轉去；而非如蔡英文所預言，「只要勝選，中國會朝民進黨的方向調整」。

張志軍出題，蔡英文按題回答。其中，「歷史事實」、「認同」等語，皆是張志軍的詞彙；蔡英文只是把「九二共識」改成了「一九九二年兩岸會談」，又將「認同求同存異的協商溝通經過和事實」，代換了「核心內涵」。

蔡英文一路否定九二共識，現在卻陷於不能不尋求解套的尷尬境地。她如今把「九二」與「共識」拆開：承認一九九二年開會的「事實」，又稱此會曾有「求同存異」的「協商事實」。那麼，如果不稱作「九二共識」，能不能就稱為「九二協商事實」呢？但如果二者其實是同一回事，那又何必為「九二共識」四個字鬧到今天這步田地？

蔡英文的轉身，不妨從對北京與對蔡英文自身的兩個角度分別略論：

對北京來說，蔡英文顯露了不能不接受「歷史事實」的態勢，使北京看出她的馬步鬆動；但她又作出了不肯照本接受「九二共識」的姿態，仍然未能解決兩岸之間的不確定性。蔡英文這個以「九二事實」來替代「九二共識」的說法，究竟是築高了河堤？還是潰堤的前兆？

對蔡英文自己來說，將「九二共識」換成「九二事實」，則極可能拖長了兩岸僵持的時間與代價，而每一次糾纏皆未必對大局有益。因此，蔡英文實不如在「九二共識」四字上果敢認賠殺出，打脫牙和血吞，再回過頭來經營九二共識「求同存異」的政治效能。

蔡英文認同九二共識的求同存異，卻未說明同者為何與異者為何？九二共識求同存異的原型是：「海峽兩岸雖均堅持一個中國原則，但對一個中國的涵義，認知各有不同」，據此，「雙方同意各自以口頭方式表述」。出自此一原型，發展引伸開來，北京方面強調「反對台獨／兩岸同屬一個中國」，而馬政府強調「一中各表」「不統／不獨／不武」，這始是九二共識「求同存異」的完整架構。蔡英文若認同九二共識的「求同存異」，就必須表態：她是否依據中華民國憲法，認知「一個中國原則」，並力守「一中各表」的防線。

「求同存異」必須包涵「一中各表」，但未必能包括「一邊一國」和「台獨黨綱」。也就是說，「求同存異」不是一句空話，必須明言求什麼同？存什麼異？

蔡英文說要「維持現狀」，卻稱她的「現狀」與馬英九的「現狀」不同，謂是民主vs.黑箱，共享vs.寡占，選擇vs.限縮云云。但這些空泛的言語皆只在技術層次，而不在原則層次。蔡英文曾說，她的中華民國與馬英九的中華民國不同。她的中華民國，指的就是台澎金馬，只包括淡水河、濁水溪；而馬英九主張的一個中國，卻是包括長江、黑龍江。蔡英文並說：馬英九主張的一個中國，與北京主張的一個中國相同。

但若回到九二共識，蔡英文就不能再用技術面來掩飾原則面。她既然有不同的現狀，不同的中華民國，不同的中國，這些皆是原則問題。難道她認為這也是九二共識的「求同存異」？難道她將在這般的「求同存異」上與北京發展互動？

蔡英文在九二共識上，正朝著北京的方向調整。這是值得鼓勵的轉身，更是不得不然的轉身。蔡英文不要說，「我和馬英九不一樣」。待她若當選主政，面對馬英九留下的兩岸二十三協議、陸客來台、和平發展、外交休兵、一中各表、兩岸三級法制化協商平台，及馬習會等資產，心中應當存有敬謹、感恩與珍惜之情，並思如何才能和馬英九一樣。因為，馬英九已為蔡英文打開了出路：從「九二共識」進，由「一中各表」出。

蔡英文不必糾纏在把餃子皮稱作「九二共識」或「九二事實」之爭，那其實是自欺欺人。畢竟，蔡英文難道要丟棄台灣賴以繫命的「一中各表」餃子餡？

我們再次建議，一步到位，蔡英文應當思考：「在中華民國憲法架構下，認知並發展九二共識。」

Today's Promises, Tomorrow's Lies?

Today's Promises, Tomorrow's Lies?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 28, 2015

Executive Summary: The first televised 2016 presidential election debate was held yesterday. It would be hard for voters who spent two and a half hours sitting in front of their computers or television sets, not to be disappointed with the three candidates' performances. The event was referred to as a "political debate". But where was the beef? The three candidates spent most of their time pointing fingers at each other and shirking responsibility. By debate's end, many people were more confused than ever, unclear where political differences between the three, if any, lie.

Full Text Below:

The first televised 2016 presidential election debate was held yesterday. It would be hard for voters who spent two and a half hours sitting in front of their computers or television sets, not to be disappointed with the three candidates' performances. The event was referred to as a "political debate". But where was the beef? The three candidates spent most of their time pointing fingers at each other and shirking responsibility. By debate's end, many people were more confused than ever, unclear where political differences between the three, if any, lie.

During the policy presentation stage, James Soong and Eric Chu each made explicit policy commitments. Soong proposed to "Surpass Korea by 2030". He promised to surpass South Korea's annual growth rate by 1.5%, to cut government debt to 1% under the growth rate, and to increase Internet speed on Taiwan to the world's top ten within a decade. Chu proposed a "three policy strategy". He promised that four years after taking office, he would increase base salaries to 30,000 dollars or more, impose a wealth tax on the wealthiest One Percent, and provide interest free student loans within five years. These policies provide specific numbers that can be tested.

Tsai, meanwhile, probably assumed victory was at hand. She may have recalled President Ma's "Six Three Three Policy” rubber check. She offered virtually no explanation of her vision, let alone specific policy objectives. Instead she devoted all her energy to attacking Chu and Ma. Was she overly defensive, or insufficiently tolerant? That is hard to say. She took only one clear position yesterday. She would allow the importation of US pork containing clenbuterol, providing they met the same standards as Japan and South Korea.

The first thing Tsai did during her opening remarks, was attack the KMT. She said "No matter how poorly a ruling party has performed, as long it is pleased with itself, it can tell pretty lies, make empty promises, and ignore peoples' pain". Her own words were pretty enough. In fact, they applies just as well to every president beginning with Lee Teng-hui, including Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou. In fact, they were a warning that applied to herself. If she becomes president next year, will another challenger accuse her of precisely the same sins four years later?

Based on yesterday's performance, the political differences between Chu, Tsai, and Soong are imperceptible. There are three reasons for this. One. The largest political parties on Taiwan differ mainly over blue vs green, and reunification vs. independence orientation. Their differences are not over left vs. right, or poor vs. rich. As a result their basic policies overlap considerably. It is easy for one candidate to claim his opponent's position as his own. Two. The blue and green camps differ primarily over cross-Strait policy. Reporters yesterday were particularly concerned about the 1992 Consensus. As usual, Tsai fell back on "strategic ambiguity". Most voters could not even begin to decipher her meaning. Three. All three candidates unanimously emphasize unity, communication, transcending partisanship. Their rhetoric is pretty. But voters have been listening to their braggadocio for the past 20 years. Have they not tired of it yet? Judging by the expressions on the faces of the three candidates yesterday, they don't think so. They hold out little hope that their ideals will ever materialize.

Eric Chu, Tsai Ing-wen, and James Soong are battle-hardened veterans. The three were provided an opportunity to clarify their political philosophies by means of political debate. They were given a chance to present elevated political visions and broad-minded national policies. Instead, they wallowed in Taiwan's political morass, which necessitates grandstanding and belittling one's opponents. For example, Tsai Ing-wen accused the KMT of not knowing how to engage in self-reflection. She then boasted of her own achievements under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. She engaged in not one iota of self-reflection. She displayed not one iota of humility. Eric Chu began by saying that a leader must advise people what to do, rather than merely parrot what they say. But when someone mentioned the high-handed manner in which he replaced Hung Hsiu-chu, he argued that his candidacy was "a response to public opinion". James Soong said leaders must "build trust by practicing what they preach”. But how many times has Soong said, "If I lose this election, I will quit politics"? How many times has Soong said, "This is my final battle”? Given all Soong's inconsistencies, where is this alleged "trust"?

How candidates perform during an election debate, demonstrates the maturity of a nation's political culture. Yesterday's presidential debate was lackluster, and demonstrated the inadequacies in Taiwan's democracy. We can only hope that the next debate will be better.

The debate left much to be desired. Yesterday's broadcast showed Tsai Ing-wen subtly changing her stand as she gets closer to the presidential palace. For example, the DPP has obstructed passage of the “Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations” for two years. But yesterday Tsai Ing-wen announced that the DPP will pass this most important bill during the next legislative session. Another example is US pork imports. The DPP formerly vowed undying opposition to US pork imports containing clenbuterol, on the grounds of national interest, Taiwan's pig farmers, and public health. Now however, Tsai Ing-wen is tacitly backing down. She now says she will adopt “the same standards as Japan and South Korea". Such changes are at best a case of "new position, new tune”. At worst, they are a case of "I am allowed to commit arson, but you are forbidden to light a lamp”.

Will solemn promises become pretty lies? Time will tell. But wise voters must act now, and not wait on Father Time.

今天的美麗承諾，會不會變成明天的謊言

2015-12-28聯合報

首場總統大選電視辯論會昨天舉行，花了兩個半小時坐在電視機或電腦前面收看的選民，恐怕很難不對三位候選人的表現感到失望。名為「政見辯論」，但三名候選人多數時候卻「辯而不論」，提出的政策牛肉不多，反倒是互相指責、推卸責任之詞不少。也因此，在辯論大戲結束後，許多民眾恐怕仍然覺得霧煞煞，不清楚三人之間的政見差別何在。

在申論階段，宋楚瑜和朱立倫分別作出了一些具體的政治承諾。宋楚瑜提出「二○三○超韓趕星計畫」，稱未來每年經濟成長要高於韓國一點五個百分點，政府債務成長要低於經濟成長一個百分點，上網速度則要在十年內進步到全球前十名等。朱立倫則提出了「戰略三策」，承諾一旦執政，四年內基本薪資將提高到三萬元以上，並對所得前一％的富人課徵富人稅，學生畢業五年內免除助學貸款利息等。這些，都是有具體數字的政策，可供來日檢驗。

反觀蔡英文，不知是否她自覺勝券在握，或者鑑於馬總統「六三三」的跳票紀錄，在整場辯論中，她幾乎未就其執政願景提出任何說明，遑論宣示具體的施政目標，反而將全部重心放在批朱打馬。這點，不論是不是防衛過當，都顯得她氣度不足。昨天會中她唯一明確的表態，是上任後採取「和日韓一樣的標準」，開放含瘦肉精的美國豬肉進口。

值得注意的是，蔡英文的申論發言一開口就痛批國民黨：「一個執政黨不管做得再怎麼差，只要自我感覺良好，都可以編出美麗的謊言，開出美麗的空頭支票，對人民的痛苦卻無動於衷。」這段話說得鏗鏘有力，但如果將語境的時空背景抽離，此話似乎適於送給所有任期即將終了的執政者，包括李登輝、陳水扁、和馬英九在內。同樣的話，其實更像蔡英文送給自己的警語：明年她若如願拿下政權，四年之後，她會不會也遭到挑戰者同樣的質問？

觀察朱蔡宋昨天的表現，三人的政見差異並不明顯，原因有三：第一，台灣藍綠政黨的基本差異主要在統獨，而不在路線的左右或社會階級，因此各黨在一般政策主張的相似度很高，也很容易隨手吸收對手的論點融為己有；第二，對於藍綠基本差異的兩岸政策，尤其是昨天提問者關注最深的九二共識，蔡英文一路以其慣有之「戰略模糊」閃避；對一般選民而言，根本無法意會她言下之奧義；第三，三位候選人異口同聲強調團結、強調溝通、強調超越黨派，這些都是「想當然爾」的美麗詞藻；但對選民而言，如果廿年來還沒聽膩這些大話，昨天人們從三人臉上恐怕依然讀不到誠懇，也依然看不到實現的機會。

朱立倫、蔡英文和宋楚瑜都是久經政壇的沙場老將，原本三人有機會透過政見辯論，幫選民釐清一些政治理念，甚至提升彼此的政治瞻矚和治國胸襟。遺憾的是，他們卻拘囿於台灣既有的格局，既要譁眾取寵，又要貶抑對手。例如，蔡英文批國民黨不懂得反省，卻對自己在李登輝、陳水扁時代的功績自吹自擂，而無一句反省，也無一絲謙卑。至於朱立倫，前一句才說領導人應該要指導民眾怎麼做，而不是人云亦云；但提到換柱，他卻又說自己參選是「回應民意」。再如宋楚瑜，聲稱領導人必須「昭大信，言出必行」，但他自己說過多少次「落選退出政治」、「最後一戰」，卻不斷出爾反爾，他的「大信」又在哪裡？

大選辯論的表現，反映的是一個國家政治文化的厚度；從這點看，昨天的總統辯論儘管精采不足，反映的正是台灣民主的底蘊，難以強求，只能期待下一場辯論更進步。

而即使是這麼一場強度不足的辯論演出，透過昨天的轉播，人們也看到了距離執政權越來越近的蔡英文，如何悄悄移動了她的立場和角色。例如，遭民進黨杯葛了兩年的《兩岸協議監督條例》，蔡英文昨天宣稱，民進黨會將之列為立法院下會期最重要的法案。再如美豬的進口，過去民進黨以國民健康和台灣豬農的利益為由，誓死反對含瘦肉精的美豬開放；而如今，蔡英文也悄悄鬆口，把底線退至「採取和日韓同一標準」。這樣的變化，說輕鬆點，是「換了屁股、就換了腦袋」；說嚴重點，不就是「只准我放火，不許你點燈」嗎？

嚴肅的承諾，會不會變成美麗的謊言，時間是最好的檢驗；而真正明智的選民，則能跑得比時間還快。

Tsai Ing-wen: Character is Destiny

Tsai Ing-wen: Character is Destiny
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 25, 2015

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen must not delude herself. She must not imagine that vague language can gloss over substantive differences. Confidence in a person can only be established through personal integrity, within and without. Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus implies outer toughness. Her three principles betray inner weakness. Tsai Ing-wen must acknowledge the contradiction between her character and policy. Do not allow others to paint you into a corner, where Beijing can get a handle on you. Do not allow the defects in your character to determine your destiny.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen has vowed that when talking to business leaders, she will abide by “three principles”. She will “communicate, avoid provocation, and avoid surprises". She will maintain stable cross-Strait relations, with and emphasis on "maintaining the status quo". But she refuses to mention the 1992 Consensus. She refuses to say whether she recognizes the 1992 Consensus.

This will probably be Tsai's final word on cross-Strait policy before election day. Nevertheless it contains a major contradiction. Tsai Ing-wen has promised to “communicate, avoid provocations, and avoid surprises". Her tone has been soft. Her profile has been low key. Her promises ooze “good faith”. They hold out great hope. But if she refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, how can she communicate? How can her obstinacy not be construed as provocation? How can she avoid surprises? How will her stance not be construed as “undermining the status quo"? Tsai Ing-wen offers no explanations.

Tsai Ing-wen's three principles are self-contradictory in terms of policy. Closer examination reveals them to be self-contradictory at rhetorically as well. Her three principles are soft line rhetorical cover for hard line rejection of the 1992 Consensus. Is this a case of carrot and stick? Or is this a case of tough on the outside, weak on the inside? Will soft prevail over hard? Or will hard prevail over soft? Better yet, why is she engaged in high stakes gambling with national policy? Is she truly oblivious to the dangerous?

Tsai Ing-wen is waffling on the 1992 Consensus. Flip-flopping and evasion for her is a habit. She began by categorically denying the existence of the 1992 Consensus. She later "objected to the 1992 Consensus being turned into a label". In doing so, she essentially conceded the existence of the 1992 Consensus. Later she avoided mention of the 1992 Consensus altogether. Actually the 1992 Consensus is merely a corollary of "constitutional one China”, “one country, two regions”, and “one country, different interpretations”. Tsai Ing-wen has vowed to “conduct cross-Strait exchanges under the current Republic of China constitutional framework”. If so, what justification can she possibly offer for refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus?

Tsai Ing-wen's stance on the 1992 Consensus is riddled with contradictions. One. She has yet to comment on the 1992 Consensus. She has yet to say whether the 1992 Consensus is consistent with the “ROC constitutional framework".
Two. She has yet to specify the content of the 1992 Consensus, as she understands the term. She has yet to say whether she supports the "one China, different interpretations" provision within the 1992 Consensus. She has yet to provide any justification for her refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus.

Her refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus is undoubtedly Tsai Ing-wen's most important and controversial political stance. It is a stance that affects the fate of the nation. Recognizing the 1992 Consensus enables one to maintain the cross-Strait status quo. Refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus undermines the cross-Strait status quo. Can Tsai Ing-wen explain why she refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus? Tsai Ing-wen, what are you hiding from us?

Tsai Ing-wen announced her three principles in a low keyed, ever so humble manner, in order to peddle her “communicate, avoid provocations, and avoid surprises" line. Tsai Ing-wen sees the conflict over the 1992 Consensus as a battle between two sock puppets, one on her right hand, and one on her left hand. Her self-contradictory character is about to determine her political destiny.

Compare and contrast Tsai Ing-wen's approach to cross-Strait power struggle, against that of three other Taiwan independence leaders: Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and Ko Wen-je. Lee is brazen. Chen is corrupt. Ko is smarmy. All three have sprung unwelcome political surprises. Their record is clear for all to see. It is not in dispute. Tsai Ing-wen, by contrast, is the most bookish, and the thinnest skinned of the group. If she springs a surprise, and precipitates a catastrophe, the price paid may turn out to be the highest of all. Lee is ruthless. Chen is manic. Ko is shifty. None of them has any problem flip-flopping on cue. Tsai Ing-wen, by contrast, is neither thick-skinned enough, nor manic enough, nor shifty enough to do the same. If she flip-flops, the price paid may be far higher. Besides, the Taiwan independence movement has already tried these approaches against Beijing. Lee, Chen, and Ko have tried different approaches. These approaches include the two-states theory, one country on each side, the rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution, and the 2015 new perspective. Tsai Ing-wen cannot adopt the same brazen, corrupt, smarmy approach that Lee, Chen, and Ko did. That is not in the cards for her. Tsai Ing-wen cannot possibly adopt the same approach as Lee, Chen, and Ko. The Lee Chen approach failed. Ko is busy playing word games.

Moreover, Lee started out with the National Unification Guidelines. When he fell from favor, he moved toward Taiwan independence. Chen started out with the "five noes". When corruption left him exposed, he invoked “one country on each side”. Tsai Ing-wen, by contrast, is starting out by refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus, even as she promises to “communicate, avoid provocations, and avoid surprises". She has made this the focus of her cross-Strait policy platform. Hasn't she chosen the wrong battlefield?

Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric is characterized by flip-flopping and evasion. The ebb and flow of world events has compelled Tsai Ing-wen to soft sell her three principles before election day. But the political mirage created by the Sunflower Student Movement has allowed Tsai Ing-wen to hide behind "public opinion” and “democracy", and drag her feet on recognizing the 1992 Consensus. Such flip-flopping and evasion may be possible for an opposition chairman and presidential candidate. But if she becomes president of the Republic of China, she will no longer be able to flip-flop with such facility. She will no longer be able to evade harsh reality.

Tsai Ing-wen may well become president of the Republic of China. If so, she will not benefit from Lee Teng-hui's "National Unification Guidelines". She will not be able to use Chen Shui-bian's "five noes" as buffer. She will not be able to scratch her head the way Ko Wen-je does to cover his embarrassment. Her repeated flip-flopping and evasion will not enable her to perform an end run around the 1992 Consensus. If she flat out refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, and rejects Beijing's goodwill, her “bet the farm” gamble will leave her penniless.

Tsai Ing-wen must not delude herself. She must not imagine that vague language can gloss over substantive differences. Confidence in a person can only be established through personal integrity, within and without. Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus implies outer toughness. Her three principles betray inner weakness. Tsai Ing-wen must acknowledge the contradiction between her character and policy. Do not allow others to paint you into a corner, where Beijing can get a handle on you. Do not allow the defects in your character to determine your destiny.

看蔡英文的風格如何決定其命運

2015-12-25聯合報

蔡英文與工商領袖會談稱，她將以「溝通／不挑釁／不會有意外」三原則，來維持兩岸關係的穩定，主軸是「維持現狀」。但她仍避諱提到「九二共識」四個字，更未說她究竟接不接受九二共識。

這應就是蔡在選前最後的兩岸政策表述，卻仍是一個大矛盾。蔡英文說「溝通／不挑釁／不會有意外」，語調很柔、很軟、很低、很有善意，很有想像空間；但是，她如果拒不接受九二共識，將如何溝通？算不算挑釁？會不會製造意外？又算不算摧毀了「現狀」？蔡英文對這些均無解釋。

蔡英文的三原則，一眼即可看出是政策的矛盾；更深一層看，也是蔡英文論述上的矛盾。她似乎想以「三原則」的軟一手，來支撐其「不接受九二共識」的硬一手。這是剛柔相濟？還是色厲內荏？最後，將是她的軟一手撐住了硬一手？或是硬一手壓垮了軟一手？問題是：國政若陷於此種賭局，何其凶險？

蔡英文在九二共識上的猶豫擺盪，充分顯示其反覆與閃躲的論述特質。她起初根本否認有「九二共識」，後來又說「反對九二共識標籤化」，算是承認了「九二共識」，但後來又執意閃爍、遁避。其實，九二共識正是「憲法一中／一國兩區／一中各表」，蔡英文既稱「在現行中華民國憲政體制下，推動兩岸關係」，則何以竟反對「九二共識」？

蔡英文對「九二共識」立場的奇異在於：一、迄今她未對九二共識下過註解，也未說過九二共識是否符合「中華民國憲政體制」？亦未說過她是否支持九二共識的「一中各表」？二、她不說她所認知的「九二共識」是何內涵，所以，她亦迄未說過她不接受九二共識的理由究竟何在？

但在當下情勢中，「不接受九二共識」無疑是蔡英文最重大、最具爭議性及最與國家未來禍福攸關的政策立場。接受「九二共識」四字，即可能維持住兩岸一切現狀；否定「九二共識」四字，即可能傾覆兩岸一切現狀。蔡英文難道可以堅拒說明她何以否定九二共識的理由嗎？蔡英文，妳在閃躲什麼？

說出「三原則」這麼軟、這麼低姿態的話，卻想支撐那般「不易溝通／分明挑釁／意外爆表」的政策立場。面對「九二共識」這場惡鬥，蔡英文若竟看成只是她左手打右手的戰爭，即形同將其政治命運交給了她自我矛盾的性格。

蔡英文面對兩岸角力，可與李登輝、陳水扁及柯文哲三名獨派領袖對照。在人格特質上，李厚、扁黑、柯皮；三人在政治上製造「意外」，皆如翻書之易，見者亦視為當然。但蔡英文的書卷氣最重，臉皮最薄，她若製造「意外」，付出的代價可能更大。在性格特徵上，李狠、扁狂、柯賴，三人的反覆易如反掌。但蔡英文狠不夠厚、狂不夠黑、賴不夠皮，則若執政出現重大反覆，付出的代價也可能更大。再者，獨派與北京的角力手法，李扁柯三人皆已試過，將種種路徑如兩國論、一邊一國、正名制憲、一五新觀點等皆走完，蔡英文勢無可能走三人「狠／狂／賴」之路，而她的性格與風格，也不可能走三人之路。蔡英文不可自比李扁柯，且李扁路線已經失敗，柯則在打迷糊仗。

何況，李是以國統綱領出發，到最後失敗始攀住台獨；扁亦以「四不一沒有」開張，至施政失敗才操弄一邊一國。蔡英文如今正在起步，卻以「否定九二共識」這「溝通不易／分明挑釁／意外爆表」的議題為二○一六的兩岸焦點；這是不是選錯了戰場？

蔡英文的論述特徵是反覆與閃躲。世局的消長，使蔡英文在選前說出「三原則」的軟話；但太陽花製造的政治幻覺，又使蔡英文躲在「民意／民主」的背後，迄未接受「九二共識」。這種反覆與閃躲，作為在野黨主席及總統候選人，或可見仁見智；但若成為中華民國總統，則豈能輕易反覆，且亦躲無可躲。

可能出任中華民國總統的蔡英文，沒有李登輝「國統綱領」的掩飾，沒有陳水扁「四不一沒有」的緩衝，也不可能如柯文哲用搔首撓耳來應付尷尬。她的反覆及閃躲，不可能平順處理九二共識，而若將「終結九二共識」完全祈諸北京的善意，那將是一場「一著失手／滿盤皆輸」的賭局。

蔡英文不必想以空泛的語言來穩定大局，重要的是要在內外建立可以信任的人格。「否定九二共識」是色厲，「三原則」是內荏。蔡英文必須警覺此種在政策上與性格上的矛盾。勿授人以柄致為北京所乘，也勿使自己的作風誤了自己的命運。

No Fighting in the Legislature, No Policy-Making in the Streets

No Fighting in the Legislature, No Policy-Making in the Streets
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 24, 2015

Executive Summary: Taiwan's economy is unquestionably in dire straits. It faces countless risks and uncertainties. Some think that given Taiwan's abundant capital and industrial base, it will always get by. That is not necessarily true. The two major parties differ on political direction and economic policy. Internal conflict prevents Taiwan from moving forward. At this critical moment, just before the election, we hope the candidates will think clearly and speak plainly, letting us know their policies, and which way they intend to lead the nation. In particular, the must tell us how they intend to resolve economic difficulties generated by political factors. Once the candidates have explained what they intend to do, and voters have cast their ballots, we hope the two major parties will be good losers and conduct themselves in a manner befitting the loyal opposition for the next four years.

Full Text Below:

Taiwan's economy is unquestionably in dire straits. It faces countless risks and uncertainties. Some think that given Taiwan's abundant capital and industrial base, it will always get by. That is not necessarily true. The two major parties differ on political direction and economic policy. Internal conflict prevents Taiwan from moving forward. At this critical moment, just before the election, we hope the candidates will think clearly and speak plainly, letting us know their policies, and which way they intend to lead the nation. In particular, the must tell us how they intend to resolve economic difficulties generated by political factors. Once the candidates have explained what they intend to do, and voters have cast their ballots, we hope the two major parties will be good losers and conduct themselves in a manner befitting the loyal opposition for the next four years.

Over the past six decades, Taiwan has gone from a closed command economy, to an open free economy. Foreign rating agencies consider Taiwan's open and vibrant economy among the best in the world. But the financial and economic policies that have guided Taiwan over the past decades have been stealthily undermined. Last year the Sunflower Student movement obstructed passage of the STA and the FEPZ. This year it opposes membership in regional trade organizations and cross-Strait investment. Many people on Taiwan have undergone a complete change in mindset, towards feudalism and against freedom.

We hope the two major party candidates will think clearly. Will Taiwan continue to advance toward freedom and openness? Or will it revert to feudalism and dictatorship? The candidates must explain their policies. They cannot say on the one hand that they wish to join the US-led TPP, and on the other hand demand protectionism for domestic agriculture and vulnerable industries. They cannot oppose the FEPZ merely because they oppose unconditional opening. Taiwan-US trade imbalances once forced Taiwan to open its markets. Taiwan eventually joined the World Trade Organization. Cross-Strait trade has continued for nearly a decade. With so many historical precedents, candidates must make clear where they stand.

Taiwan faces trade marginalization. KMT candidate Eric Chu and DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen both call for joining the TPP. But neither have explained how they intend to achieve this goal. The US is the sponsor of the TPP. It has made clear that Taiwan must allow US pork imports before it approves Taiwan's membership. Do Chu and Tsai advocate allowing US pork imports? Actually, even with US support, Taiwan still needs the support of 11 other TPP Member States. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen must tell everyone how Taiwan can possibly "bypass” Mainland China, yet win support from these countries?

Cross-Strait trade and investment relations, the red supply chain, and the red capital red tide loom large. They are likely to rewrite the future of cross-Strait industry. Where do Chu and Tsai stand on actual cases? These include the opening of IC design, domestic IC packaging and testing, and allowing UNIS to purchase shares of companies on Taiwan. Do they have reservations? Or do they oppose these policies outright? Where precisely do they stand? Where do they draw the line?

In the past, Taiwan's flat panel industry enjoyed a clear advantage over the Mainland's. The Mainland welcomed Taiwan panel maker investments. But the government stopped such investments dead. The result was the swift rise of Mainland panel manufacturers. South Korean companies also built factories on the Mainland. Mainland panel makers will probably surpass Taiwan panel makers within two years. Taiwan IC designers may have the skills. But they lack the capital for plant expansion. The brain drain continues unabated. Given the flat panel industry history, shouldn't Chu and Tsai tell us where they stand? How do they propose to shut out Mainland investment in IC packaging and testing, reject open IC design, yet avoid the mistakes made with the flat panel industry?

The domestic investment environment is deteriorating. The causes are varied. Marginalization is leading to capital flight. The most serious domestic problem is power shortages. Chu and Tsai both promise that there will be no shortages. But neither has laid out a clear plan.

Both Chu and Tsai support a non-nuclear homeland. Tsai wants to totally eliminate nuclear power and substitute renewable energy alternatives. But the public has opposed increased renewable energy for decades. Many projects have run up against local protests. Just how feasible are Tsai Ing-wen's renewable energy targets? Tsai has promised "absolutely no power shortages". She advocates the construction of thermal power plants. But how does that square with her carbon reduction goals? More and more counties and municipalities oppose the burning of bituminous coal. If Tsai Ing-wen is proposing to use natural gas for power generation, how can she promise "prices will not rise"? Tsai advocates so many contradictory goals. She must think clearly and speak plainly.

Economic policy and industrial development require professionalism. But in recent years government fiscal policy and decision-making is no longer determined by professionals and is instead being determined by mobs. It is even being determined by pressure groups. What's worse, in the wake of last year's anti-STA movement, The Economist predicted that “In the future Taiwan's policies will be decided on the street". Last week Central Bank President Perng Huai-nan's Supervisory Board proposed an economic revitalization plan to "promote public and private sector governance reform". Clearly he had this in mind.

Blue vs. green battles damage the economy even more than populism. The DPP must not foolishly assume that "As long as the KMT falls, Taiwan will be fine". It must aggressively attempt to revive the economy. The KMT must not seek revenge by maliciously obstructing everything the DPP proposes. Eric Chu faces a KMT crisis unprecedented in 60 years. He must acknowledge reality, make a last stand, and clear the way for a future Kuomintang recovery. He must participate in the debate, not merely to win votes, but to show that the KMT has transcended narrow party interests, that it is determined to defend the nation and protect the people. Only then can he lay a foundation for a KMT rebirth. Tsai Ing-wen must demonstrate a respect for professionalism. She must rethink fiscal policy, improve governing ability, and not allow Taiwan to formulate policy in the streets.

不在國會惡鬥 不在街頭定政策

2015年12月24日 中國時報

台灣經濟毫無懸念已陷入困境，更可慮處在未來的風險與不確定性。一些人總認為，以台灣豐沛的資金與產業基底，應該可以順利突圍。很遺憾，答案可能是「未必」。兩大黨對經濟的方向與政策莫衷一是，內部衝突抵消了前進的力量。選前關鍵時刻，我們希望候選人想清楚，講明白未來的方向與政策，尤其對造成經濟困境的政治因素要如何解決？等候選人說清楚了、選民做出選擇了，我們更希望兩大黨「願選服輸」，做4年忠誠的反對黨。

台灣超過一甲子的經濟發展史，大致是一部從管制封閉走向自由開放的歷史。在國外評比機構眼中，台灣開放又充滿活力的經濟自由度在全球名列前茅。但是，此一主導台灣數十年的財經政策主軸似乎已悄然翻轉，從去年的反服貿學運到反自由經濟示範區，再到今日反對加入區域組織的開放、反對兩岸投資的再開放等，台灣社會在心態與思潮上，早已反轉走向封閉、反自由開放之路。

我們希望兩位主要候選人想清楚：未來台灣經濟大方向，到底是繼續走向自由開放、還是管制封閉？而且，候選人該說清楚全套政策，而非一方面說要爭取加入美國主導的TPP，一方面又說要保護國內農業與弱勢產業，不能隨便開放，所以反對自經區。台灣從早年台美貿易失衡而被迫開放市場，到加入WTO（世界貿易組織）及近十年兩岸的開放，其實有不少歷史案例可供參考，候選人該可以談得更明白。

面對經貿邊緣化危機，國民黨朱立倫與民進黨蔡英文的藥方都包括「加入TPP」。但朱、蔡都從未告訴大家，要如何達成此目標？主導TPP的美國已明白地說，開放美豬進口是美國支持台灣加入TPP的前提，那麼朱、蔡的主張呢？即使美國支持，台灣仍需要其他11個TPP會員國的支持才能加入，那蔡英文應告訴大家，台灣有無可能、及要如何「繞過中國」得到其他國家的支持？

兩岸經貿與投資關係方面，紅色供應鏈及紅色資本潮步步進逼，很可能改寫未來兩岸產業態勢，朱、蔡對近日幾個實際案例，包括是否開放IC設計、是否開放紫光入股國內封測企業，都持保留甚至反對態度。那麼，政策的界線與分寸到底在哪裡？

過去，台灣面板產業相對大陸是擁有絕對優勢，對岸一直歡迎台灣面板廠去投資，當年政府卡住廠商，結果是大陸本土廠商快速崛起，韓國廠商亦赴大陸設廠，台灣面板廠商預估在兩年內就要被大陸超越。IC設計台灣廠商雖有技術，但無資金擴廠發展，人才還不斷流失，眼看即將步上面板產業前塵，朱、蔡是不是應該更實際說清楚，有何妙方拒絕中資入股封測、拒絕開放IC設計後，可以避免重蹈面板的覆轍？

至於國內投資環境惡化問題，可謂千頭萬緒，除了邊緣化導致的投資出走外，內部問題最嚴重且明確者在缺電風險，朱、蔡都保證不缺電，卻未提出有執行可能的計畫。

朱、蔡都支持非核家園，蔡更明確要達成全面廢核目標，以再生能源增加替代。不過，以過去數十年再生能源增加的速度，更有部分碰到地方抗爭，蔡英文提高再生能源的時程目標是否有可行性？而蔡英文承諾「絕對不缺電」的另一個前提是：興建中的火力電廠依計畫執行，是否與減碳目標衝突？更與地方縣市「反生煤」立場不同？如果都以天然氣發電，蔡英文又該如何實現其「電價不漲」的保證？蔡要如何調節這麼多衝突矛盾的目標，請想清楚、說明白。

經濟政策與產業發展有其專業性，但近年政府財經政策與相關決策日益偏離專業、走向民粹，甚至完全被社會運動左右，更糟糕的是，如去年反服貿運動後《經濟學人》雜誌所預言者，「台灣未來將在街頭決定政策」。央行總裁彭淮南上周在理監事會提出的振興經濟方案，提出「推動公私部門治理改革」建議，顯然意有所指。

藍綠惡鬥傷害經濟尤甚於民粹，民進黨不能誤認為「國民黨倒，台灣就會好」，要有積極作為重振經濟，國民黨也不能心存報復，事事反對、惡意杯葛。朱立倫面對國民黨60年前所未見危局，更應認清現實，以「背水一戰」的決心，想清楚國民黨的復興之路，參加辯論不但要盡量爭取選票，更要展現超脫一黨之私的愛國家、護人民之心，才能為國民黨再起奠基。蔡英文則展現重建財經政策專業、提升政府治理能力的決心與能力，不會讓台灣「在街頭決定政策」。

KMT Must Connect with the Grassroots, DPP Must Demonstrate Integrity and Ability

KMT Must Connect with the Grassroots, DPP Must Demonstrate Integrity and Ability
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 23, 2015

Executive Summary: The presidential debate is about to begin. For the ruling and opposition parties, as well as ROC voters, this is a chance to reflect on the past and speculate about the future. Taiwan's “democratic civil war” is a long-term structural crisis that has gradually led to economic and social crisis. The two major parties should treat the series of three debates as an opportunity to transform their parties and the nation.

Full Text Below:

The presidential debate is about to begin. For the ruling and opposition parties, as well as ROC voters, this is a chance to reflect on the past and speculate about the future. Taiwan's “democratic civil war” is a long-term structural crisis that has gradually led to economic and social crisis. The two major parties should treat the series of three debates as an opportunity to transform their parties and the nation.

The ruling KMT faces an unprecedented crisis. Poll data suggests that the KMT may well break apart after the election. This is not mere alarmism. Before the debate, the KMT must think clearly. After ceding control of the central government and the legislature, how can it transform itself into a party in touch with the grassroots? The DPP, meanwhile, can hardly wallow in its victory, on the assumption that voters will grant a ruling DPP carte blanche. It too must think clearly before the debate. How can a DPP president and DPP controlled legislature transform the party into one with integrity and ability? The DPP must determine its core values before the debate, explain them to the people, enabling the people to cast votes they will not regret.

The evolution of the KMT and DPP as parties is easy to discern. The KMT's biggest problem is that it is out of touch with the grassroots and with public opinion. The DPP is better able to gauge public opinion, because it is in closer touch with the grassroots, hence better able to rehabilitate itself and reclaim power. But comparisons between its manner of behavior when it was out of power and when it was in power between 2000 and 2008 invariably raise questions about both its integrity and its ability.

Both parties must consider their weaknesses and shortcomings. They must address their weaknesses, and tranform their shortcomings into virtues. Only then can they raise the quality of their parties. If the can do so, this will be good for Taiwan. It will help strengthen its political parties, and establish higher standards for democracy. 

Take the KMT. Ma Ying-jeou governed for two-terms. He focused too much on higher level issues. He had high ideals. One cannot these were wrong. They included rational hikes in gasoline prices and electricity rates, the prudent reduction of reliance on nuclear energy, and a capital gains tax to ensure tax justice. His point of departure was correct. He even delivered on many of his promises. He secured visa-free and visa on arrival treatment for 158 countries and regions. He enabled Taipei and Beijing to sign 23 agreements. He enabled millions of Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan annually. He enabled Taipei and Tokyo to sign a Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement. Taiwan fishermen could then fish in waters twice the area of Taiwan. His achievements were numerous and visible.

But his ideals and achievements were not grounded in public sentiment. As a result their implementation provoked overwhelming public anger. The entire government was oblivious to the public reaction. They failed to feel the peoples' pain. Their response was sluggish and often off the mark. They misjudged the situation, again and again. These accumulated grievances eventually resulted in Humpty Dumpty having a great fall. The KMT seven year record can be summed up simply as: failed implementation leading to failed policy.

Can the KMT engage in humble soul-searching, followed by thorough transformation? If it can, then despite the double defeat in 2016, it can still make a comeback. One could say that an opposition party unable to implement policy, needs to be in even closer touch with grassroots opinion than the party in power. Following the election, the KMT must focus on better understanding and responding to public opinion. It must transform the KMT into a party in touch with the grassroots.

The DPP offers a contrast to the KMT. The KMT is an immovable mountain. The DPP is a flowing river. It moves negotiates its way around obstacles, it penetrates crevices, it flows around rocks, it dissolves any mud it encounters. Whenever public opinion shifts, the DPP immediately responds. Sometimes it goes further, and creates and controls public opinion. Public opinion becomes the fertilizer than nourishes the party. The DPP also knows how to direct public opinion, how to turn it into a weapon to undermine ruling party prestige. In principle at least, the DPP is a party in close touch with grassroots sentiment.

But this DPP strength is also its weakness. Just because its methods are successful, does not mean its policies are correct. One may rely on this method when one is out of power. But once one is in power, one must address policy. At such a time, the two most important criteria are integrity and ability.

On these points, the DPP record has been anything but reassuring. Take integrity. Chen Shui-bian was in power for eight years. The memory of his endemic corruption has faded over time. The younger generation has no clear impression. But Chen's troops are making a triumphant return to the capital. Tsai Ing-wen's administration contains numerous Chen Shui-bian regime staffers. When the DPP was out of power, it blasted the KMT mercilessly for corruption. But it made excuses for the DPP's own flagrant corruption. The people cannot help being concerned. If the DPP returns to power, will Chen Shui-bian era corruption resurface?

Consider the matter of ability. When it was out of power, the DPP demonstrated its ability to check the KMT. But such a destructive force is not the same a constructive force. The final test for any ruling party, is performance. The DPP must perform. It must demonstrate the ability to govern. All democracies currently have trouble governing. Does the DPP have a special trick up its sleeve? Can it avoid the crises of governance plaguing all democracies? If so, people are eager to hear about it.

Remoteness from the grassroots is the Achilles' Heel of the KMT. A woeful lack of integrity and ability is the Achilles Heel of the DPP. We hope that during the debates, Eric Chu and Tsai Ing-wen think clearly, and speak plainly. They must not allow their own weaknesses to drag Taiwan down with them.

國民黨要接地氣 民進黨要廉能

2015年12月23日 中國時報

即將舉行的總統選舉大辯論對朝野政黨、台灣選民來說，都是反省過去、尋找未來的一次考驗。台灣長期民主內戰造成的政治結構危機已逐漸擴散成為經濟與社會危機，兩黨應該把這3場辯論當做自我調整、帶動國家調整的契機。

就政黨而言，國民黨面臨前所未見的危局，就目前所有民調數據，判斷選後國民黨將走向「碎片化」，並非聳動浮誇之論。國民黨辯論展開前就應該先思考清楚，交出中央執政與國會多數黨地位後，未來應如何自我改造，讓自己成為一個「接地氣」的政黨？民進黨也不能沉溺在勝利的氛圍裡過度驕傲，認為選民會交給民進黨一張空白執政授權書，同樣應在辯論前想好，總統與國會雙勝後應如何成為廉能的政黨？把選後大局的核心定位想清楚後再上辯論場，向人民報告清楚，讓人民有一個不會後悔的投票準據。

檢視國、民兩黨的發展脈絡不難發現，國民黨最大的問題是不接地氣，與民意脫節；民進黨比較能掌握民意，能接地氣故能引領風潮，盈蓄重新執政的實力，然而檢視其在野作風與2000年到2008年的執政表現，卻也始終讓人民在「廉」與「能」這兩個項目打上問號。

兩黨都應自我檢視自己的劣勢與弱點，轉弱為強，逆劣為優，才能健全其政黨品質，這對台灣也是一件好事，有助於建立優質民主、強化政黨政治。

先來看國民黨，馬英九執政的兩任，過於重視上層問題的解決，陳義極高、理念也不能說不對，不管是油電價格合理化的主張、對於核能政策基於能源安全採取「穩健減核」的態度、提出證所稅要落實租稅正義，出發點都沒錯，甚至論起政績，不論是為台灣爭取到158個免簽與落地簽的國家與地區、兩岸簽署的23項協議、一年破千萬的觀光人次、台日漁業協議為台灣漁民爭取到2個台灣大的作業海域，這林林總總，建樹也斑斑可見。

但這些理念與建樹，卻由於做法上不接地氣，在執行上惹來鋪天蓋地的民怒。而對於民意的反應，整個政府更呈現不食人間煙火、不知民間疾苦的遲鈍迂腐，屢屢拿捏失準、誤判情勢，日復一日累積民怨的結果，終至今天積重難返、敗局難挽之境。可以這麼總結國民黨過去7年多的表現：方法失敗，導致路線失敗。

如果國民黨能夠虛心檢討，徹底反省改變，那麼就算2016選舉雙敗，也仍有再得民意、東山再起的機會。甚至可以這麼說，在野黨由於沒有政策主導權，比當執政黨會更需要接地氣。就此而言，國民黨在選後的再造重心，應是如何增加其掌握民意的精確度與回應民意的靈活度，讓國民黨成為一個接地氣的政黨。

民進黨，剛好是國民黨的對照組。如果國民黨是一座笨重的山，民進黨就是一灣靈活的水。遇澗則過、見隙即穿、遇石則繞、見泥即化。民意如何變形，民進黨就能立刻跟著變形，甚至更進一步掀風帶潮，透過對民意的精確掌握與精確導引，讓民意一方面成為茁壯政黨的養分，另一方面又能驅使民意成為連環冰箭，挫傷執政黨的威信。由此來論，民進黨可說是地氣十足的政黨。

然而，這項強處，卻也正是民進黨的弱處。因為，方法成功，不代表民進黨路線正確。在野成功可以只靠「方法」，但執政成功，終究要回到路線，而其中最重要的兩個檢驗標準，就是「廉」與「能」。

就這兩點而論，民進黨到目前為止並沒有讓人信服的表現。就廉而論，陳水扁執政8年的貪腐陰霾雖然年輕世代記憶不深，但檢視民進黨「班師回朝」的團隊，和陳水扁時代的團隊重疊度不低，加以民進黨在野的期間，對國民黨涉弊人士的攻擊火力從來強勇，但對民進黨自身的涉弊人士的護短更是梟悍。這些表現，都讓人不能不憂心，民進黨執政，會不會再陷陳水扁時代的貪腐糾結？

就能而論，在野的民進黨展現了牽制國民黨施政的高超能力，但這樣的破壞力不等於建設力，檢驗執政黨的最終標準，就是政績，民進黨要端得出政績，就得端出治國的能力。但放諸舉世的民主國家都陷入治理困境，民進黨有什麼特別的壓箱寶，能獨樹一幟的掙脫民主政府近來的失能危機。國人都引頸期待。

地氣與廉能，是國民黨與民進黨各自的軟肋，希望在總統辯論前，看到朱立倫與蔡英文想清楚並說明白，如何不讓這各自的軟肋，成為未來政黨表現不佳、拖累台灣發展的阿基里斯之腱。

Why has the Cross-Strait Card Lost Its Effect?

Why has the Cross-Strait Card Lost Its Effect?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 22, 2015

Executive Summary: The cross-Strait card has long been the Kuomintang's trump card. But this time it has been utterly ineffective. The historic Ma Xi summit last month should have been the KMT's trump card. Yet it had little if any effect. What's even more frustrating, Tsai Ing-wen refuses to budge on the 1992 Consensus. Yet her approval rating remains unchanged. Green camp voters are unafraid cross-Strait relations will be undermined. They do not think "the earth will move and the mountains will shake". Tsai Ing-wen lost before due to the cross-Strait card. So why isn't it working now?

Full Text Below:

The general election is entering its final stages. The largest blue and green parties finally have an opportunity to debate major issues. The cross-Strait card has long been the Kuomintang's trump card. But this time it has been utterly ineffective. The historic Ma Xi summit last month should have been the KMT's trump card. Yet it had little if any effect. What's even more frustrating, Tsai Ing-wen refuses to budge on the 1992 Consensus. Yet her approval rating remains unchanged. Green camp voters are unafraid cross-Strait relations will be undermined. They do not think "the earth will move and the mountains will shake". That is understandable. The blue camp has long played the cross-Strait "safety card". But this time even cautious voters appear unconcerned that the Democratic Progressive Party will lead Taiwan in the wrong direction. Tsai Ing-wen lost before due to the cross-Strait card. So why isn't it working now?

Cross-strait issues “lack heat” during this election for three reasons. One. Public opinion has shifted. Two. The DPP has changed its strategy. Three. The KMT has no idea how to fight back. Political, economic, social, environmental protection, and food safety issues have provoked public discontent. The stage has been set for ruling party change. The KMT has handled cross-Strait relations well. But precisely because cross-strait relations are so calm, the issue has been sidelined and considered irrelevant.

Secondly, the DPP has changed its strategy. It has succeeded in inciting anti-Mainland hatred among the public, particularly among young people. The cross-Strait policy card has gradually become a liability. Tsai Ing-wen's disingenuously ambiguous “maintaining the status quo” appeals to both ends of the political spectrum, and is a vote getter. Finally, the KMT has been a major disappointment. It has been expert at intraparty backbiting, but hopelessly amateurish at fighting the DPP. It has betrayed its ideals, lost public support, and destroyed itself from within.

Actually, as the strongest player in cross-Strait relations, the Mainland really ought to be the one playing the cross-Strait card. In 2012, Tsai Ing-wen lost during the home stretch on cross-Strait relations. This time however, the cross-Strait card has misfired, in part due to internal factors. But the more important reason is the Mainland. It apparently feels caught in a dilemma. It sent out strong signals, only to follow them up with moderate signals. Confusing signals led to confusion and loss of impact. Apparently the Mainland is uncertain how to respond in the event Tsai wins the election, comes to power, yet refuses to accept the 1992 consensus.

Should it use force against Taiwan, and resolve the Taiwan issue once and for all? Some Mainland hawks think so. They are happy to see Tsai Ing-wen come to power. But the Mainland's "anti-secession law" includes preconditions before force can be used against Taiwan. It permits force only if “Taiwan independence separatist forces using any pretext, in any fashion, cause Taiwan's secession from China, or incite a major incident that results in Taiwan's secession from China, or all means of peaceful reunification have been exhausted".

The problem is that after the anti-secession law went into force, the Chen regime openly resisted. It announced the termination of the National Unification Council and the National Unification Guidelines. It promoted the “four imperatives and one non-issue”. It demanded “membership in the United Nations under the name of Taiwan". Yet the Mainland did nothing to punish Chen Shui-bian. Tsai Ing-wen is ever cautious. She knows how to use the title “Republic of China” as a shield. As a result, the Democratic Progressive Party, if it returns to power, will not give the Mainland any pretext to use force against Taiwan. Therefore, using force against Taiwan is not the Mainland's preferred option.

If one cannot use force, how can one make “the earth move and the mountains shake”? Taiwan media organizations have speculated that the Mainland will first sever official relations between the MAC and the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, then poach ROC diplomatic allies, and finally repudiate several cross-Strait agreements that have already been concluded. One Mainland specialist on Taiwan, Wang Hailiang, made a prediction in the "China Review". He predicted "high level cross-Strait tensions, a moderate level of cross-Strait exchanges, and a low level of cross-Strait cooperation”.  In the future, only a moderate level of cross-Strait exchanges will continue in private sector culture, education, science and technology, society, and industry. Only some of the 21 agreements signed by the two sides will be implemented. Others may be unsustainable. Overall, cross-Strait cooperation in the professional realm will be low level.”

The problem is that severing official cross-Strait exchanges, or even declaring diplomatic war to punish a pan green government, is not something that will be felt by the public. To ensure that the public feels the impact of sanctions, the Mainland must fundamentally change its policy of concessions to Taiwan. It must reduce or even end such concessions. But this runs directly counter to the Mainland's Taiwan policy. Therefore next year, once Tsai Ing-wen is safely ensconced in office, she will enjoy the powers of the presidency. She will even be the beneficiary of the peace dividend made possible by blue camp cross-Strait policy over the past seven years. The benefits may be cut, but she will continue receiving them. As a result, the solemn warnings issued by the Mainland to the DPP and its supporters have fallen on deaf ears. The DPP and its supporters may have even been emboldened. In a way, this is not hard to understand.

The first election debate is about to begin. Eric Chu may be tempted to play the cross-Strait policy card, to take the offensive by invoking cross-Strait policy, to underscore the benefits of KMT rule, and to launch new attack on the DPP. But unless he understands the shift in the political climate, he must not think in these terms. Tsai Ing-wen has chosen to pay lip service to the "Republic of China framework" as her cross-Strait bottom line. The KMT opposes a merger between UNIS and SPIL. Therefore the KMT cannot revive itself by playing the cross-Strait policy card. Both the Blue and Green parties are moving toward the middle. This has altered the political climate on Taiwan. It is now election season. Beijing, Taipei, the CCP, the KMT, and the DPP must all reevaluate their political paths, formulate clear policies, issue public statements, and enable the people to make their choice.

「兩岸牌」為什麼失靈？

2015年12月22日 中國時報

大選進入衝刺階段，藍綠兩大黨終於有機會針對重大問題交鋒。兩岸牌一向是國民黨強項，這次選舉完全失靈，上個月進行的歷史性馬習會，本應成為國民黨的王牌，卻依然失效。更令人沮喪的是，對九二共識死不鬆口的蔡英文，支持率卻居高不下。綠營選民不怕兩岸關係「地動山搖」可以理解，藍營與一向在兩岸議題選擇「安全牌」的謹慎型選民，好像也不怎麼擔心民進黨會把台灣帶錯方向了。曾經讓蔡英文輸掉最後一哩路的「兩岸牌」，這回為什麼不顯靈了呢？

兩岸議題在這次大選「失溫」，可以歸納三個原因：一是民意變化，二是民進黨策略成功，三是國民黨無力出擊。在政治、經濟、社會、環保與食安等內部議題上，這幾年民怨沸騰，政黨輪替大環境已經形成。國民黨固然在兩岸關係上經營有術，無奈正因為兩岸關係風平浪靜，這個議題反而靠邊站了。

其次，民進黨調整了策略，在民間社會，特別是年輕人中成功煽動起了反中情緒，兩岸因素逐漸負面化。含混的維持現狀倒是左右逢源，得到選舉市場的青睞。最後則是國民黨「不爭氣」，內鬥內行、外鬥外行、離心離德、自失民心、自毀長城。

其實，作為兩岸關係中的強勢一方，大陸應該是「兩岸牌」的真正出牌手，2012年大選蔡英文就輸在兩岸議題的最後一哩路。這次「兩岸牌」不顯靈，除了內政因素外，更重要的原因恐怕是大陸出牌顯得進退失據，忽然釋出強硬訊號，突然又出現溫和訊號，訊號混亂以致失去引導作用。看來大陸對蔡英文如果真的勝選上台，卻仍然不接受九二共識時，究竟該怎麼辦並無定論。

對台動武，一勞永逸解決台灣問題？大陸一些鷹派正是從這個角度出發，對蔡英文上台「樂觀其成」。但翻開《反分裂國家法》，對台動武有先決條件：「台獨分裂勢力以任何名義、任何方式造成台灣從中國分裂出去的事實，或者發生將會導致台灣從中國分裂出去的重大事變，或者和平統一的可能性完全喪失。」

問題在於《反分裂國家法》生效後，扁政府曾經鮮明對抗，先後宣布終止國統會和國統綱領、發表「四要一沒有」、提出「以台灣名義加入聯合國」等等。即使如此，陳水扁也不曾遭受來自大陸的滅頂之災，更何況是一貫謹言慎行、擅用中華民國作擋箭牌的蔡英文。由此可見，民進黨一旦再次執政，絕對不會給大陸提供動武的任何口實。因此，對台動武不會是大陸的優先選項。

如果不能動武，又如何體現兩岸關係的「地動山搖」？台灣媒體曾猜測，大陸首先會中斷陸委會和國台辦之間的官方聯繫管道，然後挖走台灣的邦交國，最後會考慮中斷兩岸已經達成的若干協議。一位大陸涉台學者王海良在《中國評論》預言：「兩岸之間會出現高度緊張、中度交流、低度合作的局面。未來只能維持中低度的交流合作，如民間的文化、教育、科技、社會、行業等交流合作，兩岸業已簽署的21項協定有些將得以繼續實施，有的可能難以為繼。總體說來，兩岸專業領域的合作將局限於低度合作。」

問題在於，中斷兩岸官方交往甚至重啟兩岸外交戰最多是對政府部門的「懲罰」，民眾基本無感。要讓民眾有感，就必須在根本上改變惠台政策，削減甚至取消對台讓利，但這與大陸對台的大政方針是背道而馳的。因此，可以預見，明年蔡英文一旦上台，接收的不但是執政權，還有兩岸關係過去7年多來和平發展的紅利，雖然後者肯定要打點折扣。由此觀之，民進黨及其支持者把大陸的嚴重警告當作耳邊風，甚至有恃無恐，我行我素，也就不難理解了。

大選首場辯論即將開打，朱立倫可能很想運用手上的兩岸牌，採取攻勢提出更多的兩岸政策亮點，以凸顯國民黨執政優勢，並發動對民進黨的新一波進攻。但他如果理解政治生態的改變，就不該做如是想，當蔡英文選擇「中華民國體制」作為兩岸關係的底線、國民黨卻反對紫光併矽品，國民黨就不可能靠兩岸牌起死回生。藍綠兩黨都往中間移動，已改變了台灣的政治生態，兩岸也好，紅藍綠也罷，選戰關鍵時刻，都該認真思考前方道路，提出明確政策，公開說請楚，讓民眾做出選擇。