No Room for Cabinet System, Even Less Room for Pseudo-Dual Leadership System
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 1, 2015
Executive Summary: The KMT and DPP have announced their constitutional amendment proposals. The KMT advocates "a cabinet system in which responsibilities are commensurate with powers". Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, says that "Current mainstream public opinion demands the presidential election. Therefore there is no room for a cabinet system." But if there is no room for the cabinet system, there is even less room for a pseudo-dual-leadership system.
Full Text Below:
The KMT and DPP have announced their constitutional amendment proposals. The KMT advocates "a cabinet system in which responsibilities are commensurate with powers". Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, says that "Current mainstream public opinion demands the presidential election. Therefore there is no room for a cabinet system."
If the president continues to be directly elected, and a cabinet system is adopted, the two will definitely clash. But direct presidential elections in conjuctions with a dual leadership system has a precedent in France. A constitutional crisis has arisen because our current system is a dual-leadership system in name, but a super-presidential system in practice.
Tsai Ing-wen must acknowledge that although the current constitution may calls for direct presidential elections, but it is not a presidential system in fact. It merely became a presidential system by default. This is the cause of the current constitutional crisis, and this is the matter that must be addressed.
The constitution has been severely undermined by seven previous amendments. The current constitution fails to clearly outline the president's authority and responsibility. Current constitutional powers include national defense, foreign diplomacy, and cross-Strait policy. But these so-called presidential powers come from the "Organic Law of the National Security Council", and not from the Constitution. This is the source of the controversy over "legislation trumping the constitution".
Assume for the moment that these so-called "three presidential powers" are derived from the current constitution and legislation. President Ma Ying-jeou's record in defense, diplomacy, and cross-Strait relations has been outstanding. So why has he been blasted for the 8/8 Typhoon, hikes in gasoline prices and electricity rates, the capital gains tax, and other social welfare issues? Why does even he believe he must bear total responsibility for the success or failure of these matters? As we can see, the dual leadership system has degenerated into a presidential system. In practice, Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Ma Ying-jeou have departed from the constitution. Put simply, constitution qua constitution, this is unconstitutional.
Therefore we must amend Tsai Ing-wen's observation: "According to the current constitution, there is no room for a presidential system." Constitutional amendments have been proposed under the current dual leadership structure. Some say we must not adopt a cabinet system in which responsibilities are commensurate with powers. Actually, we could say that we must not adopt a presidential system in which responsibilities are commensurate with powers. The key is "responsibilities commensurate with powers". Direct presidential elections pose an obstacle to the adoption of a cabinet system. Adopting a presidential system in toto could lead to an even greater constitutional crisis. That is not something the public can tolerate.
We are recutting our garments while wearing them. We are attempting to change the pseudo-dual-leadership system back to a true dual leadership system. In doing so, we must consider constitutional principles, of which there are three. One. Presidential elections should require an absolute majority. Two. The Legislative Yuan's powers of consent in premiership appointments must be restored. |Three. We must adopt an "chief executive rechanneling system". When the president enjoys a majority in the Legislative Yuan, a "Presidential cabinet system" is in force. When the president lacks a majority in the Legislative Yuan, a "Prime Ministerial cabinet system" is in force. This is the key to the French dual leadership system, in which "'responsibilities are commensurate with powers". Alas, this system has been butchered, and turned into our "pseudo-dual-leadership system". Tsai Ing-wen says that "Under direct presidential elections, there is no room for a cabinet system". But "Under direct presidential elections, there is room for a dual leadership system" either.
Therefore future constitutional amendments should move toward a "dynamic cabinet dual leadership system". In other words, the KMT should discard the cabinet system. The DPP should cease attempting to turn a dual leadership system into a presidential system.
The dual leadership system carries a hidden risk. Serious disagreements about national identity and cross-Strait policy may arise. Suppose a pro-Taiwan independence president clashes with an anti-Taiwan independence cabinet? How can they "govern jointly"? This is a problem not easily overcome within the institutional framework. A solution can be found only through practical politics.
Tsai Ing-wen said she originally supported the cabinet system. The DPP has repeatedly trumpted constitutional amendments in which "responsibilities are commensurate with powers". Yet Tsai Ing-wen now argues that "There is no room for a cabinet system". She has made a complete about face. She said that if she returned to power, she would continue to change the dual leadership system into a presidential system. Her motives for this are now clear. Constitutional amendments have been proposed, primarily by the DPP and civic groups. The public has begun to re-examine the defects in the constitutional structure. Tsai Ing-wen may return to power. But will she still be able to exploit this pseudo-dual executive system, in which responsibilities are not commensurate with powers? Will she still be able to transform it into a presidential system?
Tsai Ing-wen has ringingly proclaimed that "There is no room for a cabinet system". She has prevented a pseudo-dual leadership system from becoming a genuine dual-leadership system. The current constitutional amendment process has been stopped dead in its tracks. But a "second stage constitutional amendment" remains. We expect the debate on constitutional reform to continue. Otherwise, the pseudo-dual-leadership system will remain a presidential system in practice, thereby undermining the constitution. The people will end up as accomplices in the destruction of the constitution.
If there is no room for the cabinet system, there is even less room for a pseudo-dual-leadership system.
聯合／內閣制無空間 但更不容偽雙首長制有空間
2015-04-01 03:00:30 聯合報 聯合報社論
國民黨及民進黨的修憲版本皆已攤牌。國民黨主張「推動權責相符的內閣制」，蔡英文則說：「目前主流民意堅持總統直選，因此內閣制沒有存在空間。」
若維持總統直選，而欲改行內閣制，確實有其鑿枘扞格之處。但是，在維持總統直選下，行「雙首長制」卻已有成例，如法國。當前我國憲政的癥結，正是將一部宣稱以雙首長制為架構的憲法，運作成了超級總統制。
蔡英文必須認知：依據現行憲法，雖然實行總統直選，但絕不是總統制，卻又被操作成了總統制，這始是當前修憲必須處理的核心問題。
這部憲法經七次修憲，已遭嚴重毀傷。現行憲法對於總統權責的規範，非但未課以明確的憲政責任，甚至亦未授以明確的憲政權力。如今列舉總統之憲政權力，常謂總統具有「國防／外交／兩岸」的大政方針之權，但這所謂的「總統三權」，全係出自《國安會組織法》，而非源自憲法明文之頒授，因而仍有「以法代憲」之爭議。
然而，若謂此「總統三權」是在「憲」及「法」的現制中找得到法源的總統權力，則馬英九總統在「國防／外交／兩岸」上的治理均有優異表現；卻為何在實際憲政運作中，他竟因八八風災、油電雙漲、證所稅及其他經濟民生之治理爭議而遭強烈非難，而他自己亦認為應當負起國家全盤治理成敗之責任？由此可知，雙首長制已經「變質」為總統制；李扁馬三位總統以來的此種實際憲政運作，其實已自憲法的軌道上脫軌。直白而言，就憲法論憲法，這根本是違憲的。
因此，必須把蔡英文的那一句話補充說完：「依現行憲法，若要將其操作成總統制，也是沒有存在空間的。」所以，在當前雙首長制架構下談修憲議題，有人說要不要改行「權責相符」的內閣制，其實也可以說要不要改行「權責相符」的總統制。其中，「權責相符」四字始是關鍵。然而，若欲改行內閣制，固然卡在總統直選上，但若真要改行全碗捧去的總統制，亦恐將釀成更大的憲政難題甚至災難，非民意所容。
於是：既然是穿著衣服改衣服，將現行憲法的「偽雙首長制」改回「真雙首長制」，應是可以思考的修憲方針。主要架構有三：一、總統選舉採「絕對多數制」。二、恢復立法院的「閣揆任命同意權」。三、採「行政權換軌制」：當總統與立法院之多數為同黨，行「總統內閣制」；總統與立院之多數為異黨，則採「總理內閣制」。此一「權責相符」的架構係法國雙首長制的關鍵，而竟遭我國梟首肢解成「偽雙首長制」。準此，蔡英文謂「在總統直選下，內閣制沒有存在空間」；但是，「在總統直選下，雙首長制有存在空間」。
因而，未來修憲，可朝「在雙首長制下的動態內閣制」之方向來發想。也就是說，國民黨應擺脫「內閣制」的框架，民進黨則不能再有「將雙首長制操作成總統制」的非非之想。
不過，雙首長制有一隱憂。在國家認同與兩岸政策有嚴重分歧下，若出現一位「獨」的總統與「非獨」的內閣，如何「共治」？這是體制架構不易克服的問題，唯賴在現實政治的推移中尋求解方。
蔡英文原本說過「支持內閣制」，民進黨亦屢次宣示「權責相符」是修憲綱領。但蔡英文如今卻稱「內閣制沒有存在空間」，其出爾反爾猶在其次，實則已將她若重返執政後「繼續將雙首長制操作成總統制」的居心暴露無遺。但是，修憲之議既起，且主要是由民進黨及公民團體發動，全民既又開始重新檢視憲政架構之缺陷，則蔡英文即使重返執政，還能繼續將這種「權責不相符」的「偽雙首長制」操作成她的總統制嗎？
蔡英文既喊出「內閣制無空間」，不啻亦是堵死了「化偽雙首長制為真雙首長制」的空間，此次修憲其實可謂已告破局。但即使破局，卻又稱將有「二階段修憲」，我們仍期望關於憲政改革的辯論必須繼續進行；否則，如果坐視現今這種「偽雙首長制」操作成「總統制」的憲政脫軌惡象繼續存在，全民不啻皆是毀憲亂憲的共犯結構。
內閣制若無空間，但更不容「偽雙首長制」有空間。
Tuesday, March 31, 2015
Monday, March 30, 2015
The 1992 Consensus: Uphold and Go Beyond
The 1992 Consensus: Uphold and Go Beyond
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 29, 2015
Executive Summary: Beijing is reluctant to declare that "one China is the People's Republic of China". It realizes that harping on this point too vehemently will kill the 1992 consensus, and there will be nothing left to uphold. Taipei may argue that "One China is the Republic of China". But agreement about this is lacking on Taiwan, and so is trust across the Strait. The 1992 consensus may be defective, but it is nevertheless effective. Therefore if one wishes to see the 1992 consensus "upheld", then one really must think about "going beyond" it.
Full Text Below:
The 1992 consensus has become the core political issue of the 2016 general election. A storm is brewing. Change is at hand. Everyone has declared where they stand.
One. Xi Jinping said the 1992 consensus is the political basis for cross-Strait relations. If it is damaged, "The foundation will be undermined, and the ground will shake." Two. Tsai Ing-wen said that if the 1992 consensus is merely a “label”, it cannot improve cross-Strait relations. Three. Eric Chu's father in law Kao Yu-jen said, "We must go beyond the 1992 consensus". Kao said the two sides must negotiate "political relations, foreign affairs, military confidence-building measures, and a peace framework", as soon as possible. Four. Eric Chu remained guarded about "going beyond" the 1992 consensus. He said the KMT “upholds” the 1992 consensus. Five. MAC chairwoman Hsia Li-yen domestic agreement on the 1992 consensus is lacking, as is cross-Strait trust. Therefore talk of “going beyond” the 1992 consensus is premature. He said talk of “going beyond” the 1992 consensus was Kao Yu-jen's personal opinion, and that the time is not yet ripe. Hsia reaffirmed the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Six. Former executive director of the AIT Barbara Schrage said that the DPP should acknowledge the importance of the 1992 consensus and not duck the issue.
These declarations show that the 1992 consensus cannot be ignored during the 2016 general election. Each of the parties talked about either upholding the 1992 consensus, or going beyond it. Tsai Ing-wen said that the 1992 consensus must be more than a "label". She has apparently acknowledged the existence of 1992 consensus, and does not wish to see it reduced to a mere “label”. Hsia Li-yen was blunt, saying domestic agreement on the 1992 consensus was lacking, therefore “going beyond” it was out of the question. In fact the 1992 consensus is already the political basis for cross-Strait relations, precisely because it is a "label". When different parties see this "label", they know exactly where the ambiguity lies. The 1992 consensus is controversial because the "label" remains ambiguous. This leads to a lack of domestic agreement and a lack of cross-Strait trust. This is why some oppose “labeling” the 1992 consensus, some advocate "upholding" the 1992 consensus, and some advocate “going beyond” the 1992 consensus.
Suppose the two sides and the public on Taiwan cannot agree on the meaning of the 1992 consensus? What would "upholding” the 1992 consensus mean? What would “going beyond” the 1992 consensus mean? For example, everyone knows that the core meaning of the 1992 consensus is the "one China framework". But what is “one China”? On that there is no consensus. To the Ma government, "one China" means “one China, different interpretations” under the ROC Constitution. It has repeatedly affirmed that "one China is the Republic of China". Beijing's "one China" means "the defense of one China in accordance with the constitution". For Beijing, "China is the People's Republic of China", therefore it operates on that basis. But it currently emphasizes peaceful development. Therefore it seldom openly proclaims that "One China is the People's Republic of China". The Ma government openly proclaims that "One China is the Republic of China". But can it continue doing this? Even Beijing is reluctant to assert that "One China is the People's Republic of China". Can it continue doing this?
Alas, upholding the 1992 consensus is still necessary. It remains the most balanced "one China definition" that still leaves room for interpretation. Under the 1992 consensus, the Ma government can openly proclaim that "One China is the Republic of China", and advocate "one China, different interpretations". Beijing on the other hand, finds it awkward to proclaim that "One China is the People's Republic of China", and to advocate "one country, two systems". That is a good reason to uphold the 1992 consensus. Beijing must acknowledge that under the 1992 consensus, “recognizing the Republic of China does not mean recognizing Taiwan independence". Tacit recognition of the "Republic of China" does not contradict the "one China framework". Meanwhile, we can either uphold the 1992 consensus or go beyond it.
The wise move is not to hack up the 1992 consensus. We should not create another term to replace the 1992 consensus. We should uphold the 1992 consensus, then seek to go beyond it. We can uphold the 1992 consensus "one China framework" even as we seek to go beyond its “one China content”.
Even the DPP should consider upholding the 1992 consensus. The core of the 1992 consensus is the "one China framework” and “opposition to Taiwan independence". Given global and domestic conditions, Taiwan independence is impossible. If the DPP abandons Taiwan independence, it can only win, not lose. If the DPP is willing to work within the 1992 consensus and the "one China framework", it can go beyond the 1992 consensus and oppose “labeling”. If it rejects the 1992 consensus, to the point where the earth shakes, then even “one China, different interpretations” will no longer be an option.
Upholding the 1992 consensus means upholding “one China, different interpretations” and “different interpretations of one China”. This is something that Hu Jintao pledged Bush Jr. on the hotline. This is what Schrage was covertly authorized by the US to say. This is something that can be upheld for some time into the future, unless of course Taipei, Washington, and Beijing all agree to go beyond the 1992 consensus. Going beyond the 1992 consensus should entail a "big roof concept of China”. It should entail wartime governments transformed into separate ruling governments, consistent with Kao Yu-jen's four questions. This upholds and goes beyond the 1992 consensus. Unless we go beyond the path, all we can do is continue down our own path.
Beijing is reluctant to declare that "one China is the People's Republic of China". It realizes that harping on this point too vehemently will kill the 1992 consensus, and there will be nothing left to uphold. Taipei may argue that "One China is the Republic of China". But agreement about this is lacking on Taiwan, and so is trust across the Strait. The 1992 consensus may be defective, but it is nevertheless effective. Therefore if one wishes to see the 1992 consensus "upheld", then one really must think about "going beyond" it.
聯合／九二共識的延續與超越
2015-03-29 01:29:44 聯合報 聯合報社論
九二共識儼然成為二○一六年的核心政治議題。山雨欲來風滿樓，各方相繼表態：
一、習近平稱，兩岸共同政治基礎「九二共識」若遭破壞，將是「基礎不牢，地動山搖」。二、蔡英文說，九二共識若只是「標籤化」，無法有利兩岸關係進展。三、朱立倫的岳父高育仁說，應當「超越九二共識」，兩岸政府盡速協商「政治關係／涉外事務／軍事互信機制／和平架構」四個問題。四、朱立倫諱言「超越」而回應稱，國民黨對「九二共識」是「相延續」的。四、陸委會主委夏立言說：國內對「九二共識」尚無共識，兩岸互信不足，不適合談超越。他說，談超越是高育仁個人意見，但目前時機尚未成熟。夏並再申「九二共識／一中各表」。五、ＡＩＴ前執行理事施藍旗說，民進黨應知「九二共識」的嚴重性，而不是閃躲。
這五人的談話顯示，九二共識在二○一六年是分明繞不過去的，各方折衝只是在九二共識的延續或超越而已。蔡英文說，九二共識不要「標籤化」；她似已承認「九二共識」之存在，只是不願見其成為「標籤」。夏立言則直言，「九二共識」在國內尚無「共識」，更遑論「超越」。其實，「九二共識」之所以成為兩岸「共同政治基礎」，正因其已然「標籤化」，各方見此「標籤」，皆知其中「眉角」何在；但「九二共識」之所以仍有爭議，亦正因「標籤」的內涵不明，致台灣內部迄無「共識」，兩岸互信不足。因而，始有「反標籤化」，及「延續」或「超越」的不同見解。
然而，倘兩岸及台灣內部對「九二共識」的內涵尚無共識，則若論「延續」，究竟在延續什麼？若談「超越」，又在超越什麼？例如：眾人皆知「九二共識」的核心是「一中架構（框架）」；但「一個中國」的定義為何？卻迄無共識。馬政府所持「一個中國」，是在中華民國憲法架構下「一中各表」，並屢申「一個中國就是中華民國」。北京所採「一個中國」，其潛台詞應是「依憲捍衛一個中國」、「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，並據此進行實際操作，但自其強調兩岸關係和平發展以來，畢竟已未見或罕見其公開宣揚「一個中國是中華人民共和國」。然則，馬政府雖公開宣示「一中就是中華民國」，但能否延續？而北京連「一中就是中華人民共和國」都覺得不便或不能說清楚，又遑論延續？
但是，九二共識的延續仍是必要的。它大致確立了「一中架構」，但仍為「一中定義」的平衡與發展存留了空間。眼前所見，在九二共識下，馬政府可以公開宣示「一中就是中華民國」及「一中各表」，而北京忌言「一中就是中華人民共和國」及「一國兩制」，這就是「九二共識」值得延續的理由。因為，在九二共識下，北京不啻承認「中華民國不是台獨」，亦即默認「中華民國」的存在與「一中架構」並無牴觸，而其間就存有「九二共識」得以「既延續／又超越」的可能性。
明智之舉，不是要切割九二共識，另創取代九二共識的名詞或架構；而是應維持並延續九二共識，再尋求發展與超越。因為，論述上可延續九二共識的「一中架構」，但亦可尋求「一中內涵」的平衡與超越。
即使對民進黨而言，亦當考慮「延續」九二共識。因為，九二共識的核心是「一中架構／反對台獨」；而在世局國情的發展趨勢下，台獨其實已絕無可能，民進黨之放棄台獨只是自救而非損失，但民進黨卻可在「九二共識」中爭取「一中架構」的發展與超越，反對其「標籤化」。否則，若因否定九二共識而鬧到地動山搖，將連「一中各表」的空間亦失。
九二共識若「延續」，其實即是延續「各表一中／一中各表」的平衡。而且，此一胡錦濤在熱線中曾向小布希承諾的架構，由施藍旗的談話可知已得美國背書，在未來相當期間應當仍可「延續」，除非「九二共識」取得了符合「台／美／中」三方面共識的「超越」。至於談「九二共識」的超越，應是「在大屋頂中國下／兩岸交戰政府轉為分治政府」，並據以處理高育仁所說的四個問題。這是對九二共識的「既延續／又超越」；但若無「超越」的路徑，就只能在各自表述中「延續」。
北京忌言「一中就是中華人民共和國」，應是深知，如果強調此語，「九二共識」即無以「延續」。而台北雖曰「一中就是中華民國」，亦知台灣內部無共識，兩岸互信不足。由此可見，九二共識的功效雖在，但缺陷仍存；因而，九二共識若欲「延續」，確實當思「超越」之道。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 29, 2015
Executive Summary: Beijing is reluctant to declare that "one China is the People's Republic of China". It realizes that harping on this point too vehemently will kill the 1992 consensus, and there will be nothing left to uphold. Taipei may argue that "One China is the Republic of China". But agreement about this is lacking on Taiwan, and so is trust across the Strait. The 1992 consensus may be defective, but it is nevertheless effective. Therefore if one wishes to see the 1992 consensus "upheld", then one really must think about "going beyond" it.
Full Text Below:
The 1992 consensus has become the core political issue of the 2016 general election. A storm is brewing. Change is at hand. Everyone has declared where they stand.
One. Xi Jinping said the 1992 consensus is the political basis for cross-Strait relations. If it is damaged, "The foundation will be undermined, and the ground will shake." Two. Tsai Ing-wen said that if the 1992 consensus is merely a “label”, it cannot improve cross-Strait relations. Three. Eric Chu's father in law Kao Yu-jen said, "We must go beyond the 1992 consensus". Kao said the two sides must negotiate "political relations, foreign affairs, military confidence-building measures, and a peace framework", as soon as possible. Four. Eric Chu remained guarded about "going beyond" the 1992 consensus. He said the KMT “upholds” the 1992 consensus. Five. MAC chairwoman Hsia Li-yen domestic agreement on the 1992 consensus is lacking, as is cross-Strait trust. Therefore talk of “going beyond” the 1992 consensus is premature. He said talk of “going beyond” the 1992 consensus was Kao Yu-jen's personal opinion, and that the time is not yet ripe. Hsia reaffirmed the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Six. Former executive director of the AIT Barbara Schrage said that the DPP should acknowledge the importance of the 1992 consensus and not duck the issue.
These declarations show that the 1992 consensus cannot be ignored during the 2016 general election. Each of the parties talked about either upholding the 1992 consensus, or going beyond it. Tsai Ing-wen said that the 1992 consensus must be more than a "label". She has apparently acknowledged the existence of 1992 consensus, and does not wish to see it reduced to a mere “label”. Hsia Li-yen was blunt, saying domestic agreement on the 1992 consensus was lacking, therefore “going beyond” it was out of the question. In fact the 1992 consensus is already the political basis for cross-Strait relations, precisely because it is a "label". When different parties see this "label", they know exactly where the ambiguity lies. The 1992 consensus is controversial because the "label" remains ambiguous. This leads to a lack of domestic agreement and a lack of cross-Strait trust. This is why some oppose “labeling” the 1992 consensus, some advocate "upholding" the 1992 consensus, and some advocate “going beyond” the 1992 consensus.
Suppose the two sides and the public on Taiwan cannot agree on the meaning of the 1992 consensus? What would "upholding” the 1992 consensus mean? What would “going beyond” the 1992 consensus mean? For example, everyone knows that the core meaning of the 1992 consensus is the "one China framework". But what is “one China”? On that there is no consensus. To the Ma government, "one China" means “one China, different interpretations” under the ROC Constitution. It has repeatedly affirmed that "one China is the Republic of China". Beijing's "one China" means "the defense of one China in accordance with the constitution". For Beijing, "China is the People's Republic of China", therefore it operates on that basis. But it currently emphasizes peaceful development. Therefore it seldom openly proclaims that "One China is the People's Republic of China". The Ma government openly proclaims that "One China is the Republic of China". But can it continue doing this? Even Beijing is reluctant to assert that "One China is the People's Republic of China". Can it continue doing this?
Alas, upholding the 1992 consensus is still necessary. It remains the most balanced "one China definition" that still leaves room for interpretation. Under the 1992 consensus, the Ma government can openly proclaim that "One China is the Republic of China", and advocate "one China, different interpretations". Beijing on the other hand, finds it awkward to proclaim that "One China is the People's Republic of China", and to advocate "one country, two systems". That is a good reason to uphold the 1992 consensus. Beijing must acknowledge that under the 1992 consensus, “recognizing the Republic of China does not mean recognizing Taiwan independence". Tacit recognition of the "Republic of China" does not contradict the "one China framework". Meanwhile, we can either uphold the 1992 consensus or go beyond it.
The wise move is not to hack up the 1992 consensus. We should not create another term to replace the 1992 consensus. We should uphold the 1992 consensus, then seek to go beyond it. We can uphold the 1992 consensus "one China framework" even as we seek to go beyond its “one China content”.
Even the DPP should consider upholding the 1992 consensus. The core of the 1992 consensus is the "one China framework” and “opposition to Taiwan independence". Given global and domestic conditions, Taiwan independence is impossible. If the DPP abandons Taiwan independence, it can only win, not lose. If the DPP is willing to work within the 1992 consensus and the "one China framework", it can go beyond the 1992 consensus and oppose “labeling”. If it rejects the 1992 consensus, to the point where the earth shakes, then even “one China, different interpretations” will no longer be an option.
Upholding the 1992 consensus means upholding “one China, different interpretations” and “different interpretations of one China”. This is something that Hu Jintao pledged Bush Jr. on the hotline. This is what Schrage was covertly authorized by the US to say. This is something that can be upheld for some time into the future, unless of course Taipei, Washington, and Beijing all agree to go beyond the 1992 consensus. Going beyond the 1992 consensus should entail a "big roof concept of China”. It should entail wartime governments transformed into separate ruling governments, consistent with Kao Yu-jen's four questions. This upholds and goes beyond the 1992 consensus. Unless we go beyond the path, all we can do is continue down our own path.
Beijing is reluctant to declare that "one China is the People's Republic of China". It realizes that harping on this point too vehemently will kill the 1992 consensus, and there will be nothing left to uphold. Taipei may argue that "One China is the Republic of China". But agreement about this is lacking on Taiwan, and so is trust across the Strait. The 1992 consensus may be defective, but it is nevertheless effective. Therefore if one wishes to see the 1992 consensus "upheld", then one really must think about "going beyond" it.
聯合／九二共識的延續與超越
2015-03-29 01:29:44 聯合報 聯合報社論
九二共識儼然成為二○一六年的核心政治議題。山雨欲來風滿樓，各方相繼表態：
一、習近平稱，兩岸共同政治基礎「九二共識」若遭破壞，將是「基礎不牢，地動山搖」。二、蔡英文說，九二共識若只是「標籤化」，無法有利兩岸關係進展。三、朱立倫的岳父高育仁說，應當「超越九二共識」，兩岸政府盡速協商「政治關係／涉外事務／軍事互信機制／和平架構」四個問題。四、朱立倫諱言「超越」而回應稱，國民黨對「九二共識」是「相延續」的。四、陸委會主委夏立言說：國內對「九二共識」尚無共識，兩岸互信不足，不適合談超越。他說，談超越是高育仁個人意見，但目前時機尚未成熟。夏並再申「九二共識／一中各表」。五、ＡＩＴ前執行理事施藍旗說，民進黨應知「九二共識」的嚴重性，而不是閃躲。
這五人的談話顯示，九二共識在二○一六年是分明繞不過去的，各方折衝只是在九二共識的延續或超越而已。蔡英文說，九二共識不要「標籤化」；她似已承認「九二共識」之存在，只是不願見其成為「標籤」。夏立言則直言，「九二共識」在國內尚無「共識」，更遑論「超越」。其實，「九二共識」之所以成為兩岸「共同政治基礎」，正因其已然「標籤化」，各方見此「標籤」，皆知其中「眉角」何在；但「九二共識」之所以仍有爭議，亦正因「標籤」的內涵不明，致台灣內部迄無「共識」，兩岸互信不足。因而，始有「反標籤化」，及「延續」或「超越」的不同見解。
然而，倘兩岸及台灣內部對「九二共識」的內涵尚無共識，則若論「延續」，究竟在延續什麼？若談「超越」，又在超越什麼？例如：眾人皆知「九二共識」的核心是「一中架構（框架）」；但「一個中國」的定義為何？卻迄無共識。馬政府所持「一個中國」，是在中華民國憲法架構下「一中各表」，並屢申「一個中國就是中華民國」。北京所採「一個中國」，其潛台詞應是「依憲捍衛一個中國」、「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，並據此進行實際操作，但自其強調兩岸關係和平發展以來，畢竟已未見或罕見其公開宣揚「一個中國是中華人民共和國」。然則，馬政府雖公開宣示「一中就是中華民國」，但能否延續？而北京連「一中就是中華人民共和國」都覺得不便或不能說清楚，又遑論延續？
但是，九二共識的延續仍是必要的。它大致確立了「一中架構」，但仍為「一中定義」的平衡與發展存留了空間。眼前所見，在九二共識下，馬政府可以公開宣示「一中就是中華民國」及「一中各表」，而北京忌言「一中就是中華人民共和國」及「一國兩制」，這就是「九二共識」值得延續的理由。因為，在九二共識下，北京不啻承認「中華民國不是台獨」，亦即默認「中華民國」的存在與「一中架構」並無牴觸，而其間就存有「九二共識」得以「既延續／又超越」的可能性。
明智之舉，不是要切割九二共識，另創取代九二共識的名詞或架構；而是應維持並延續九二共識，再尋求發展與超越。因為，論述上可延續九二共識的「一中架構」，但亦可尋求「一中內涵」的平衡與超越。
即使對民進黨而言，亦當考慮「延續」九二共識。因為，九二共識的核心是「一中架構／反對台獨」；而在世局國情的發展趨勢下，台獨其實已絕無可能，民進黨之放棄台獨只是自救而非損失，但民進黨卻可在「九二共識」中爭取「一中架構」的發展與超越，反對其「標籤化」。否則，若因否定九二共識而鬧到地動山搖，將連「一中各表」的空間亦失。
九二共識若「延續」，其實即是延續「各表一中／一中各表」的平衡。而且，此一胡錦濤在熱線中曾向小布希承諾的架構，由施藍旗的談話可知已得美國背書，在未來相當期間應當仍可「延續」，除非「九二共識」取得了符合「台／美／中」三方面共識的「超越」。至於談「九二共識」的超越，應是「在大屋頂中國下／兩岸交戰政府轉為分治政府」，並據以處理高育仁所說的四個問題。這是對九二共識的「既延續／又超越」；但若無「超越」的路徑，就只能在各自表述中「延續」。
北京忌言「一中就是中華人民共和國」，應是深知，如果強調此語，「九二共識」即無以「延續」。而台北雖曰「一中就是中華民國」，亦知台灣內部無共識，兩岸互信不足。由此可見，九二共識的功效雖在，但缺陷仍存；因而，九二共識若欲「延續」，確實當思「超越」之道。
The AIIB: Beijing should be Understanding, Taiwan should be Pragmatic
The AIIB: Beijing should be Understanding, Taiwan should be Pragmatic
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 30, 2015
Executive Summary: Should Taipei join the Mainland China sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)? If so, how? Questions such as these have become the focus of attention at the Boao Forum. Before the meeting, President Ma, Premier Mao, and the MAC expressed Taipei's desire to join the AIIB. Once the government authorized Taipei's membership, former Vice President Vincent Siew told Xi Jinping that Taipei was willing to become an active participant. Xi nodded understanding. Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun then said Taipei is welcome to join. Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who is in charge of foreign affairs, pointed out that the AIIB is a multilateral bank. Taipei's membership is subject to consultation. Even the name must be handled according to international conventions.
Full Text Below:
Should Taipei join the Mainland China sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)? If so, how? Questions such as these have become the focus of attention at the Boao Forum. Before the meeting, President Ma, Premier Mao, and the MAC expressed Taipei's desire to join the AIIB. Once the government authorized Taipei's membership, former Vice President Vincent Siew told Xi Jinping that Taipei was willing to become an active participant. Xi nodded understanding. Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun then said Taipei is welcome to join. Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who is in charge of foreign affairs, pointed out that the AIIB is a multilateral bank. Taipei's membership is subject to consultation. Even the name must be handled according to international conventions.
The Mainland and Taiwan have made their positions and attitudes abundantly clear. Taipei has expressed a willingness to join, provided of course it is treated as an equal. Beijing has told Taipei it is welcome, but that the details need to be negotiated. The case is complex, involving many levels. Obviously they cannot be resolved immediately. But the exchange was positive. The two sides have gotten oft to a good start. They must now remember the big picture. They must maintain an historical and strategic perspective, engage in dialogue, negotiation, consultation, and put themselves in the other's place. They must succeed against all odds, make the impossible possible, and ensure its implementation, as soon as possible. If successful, both Taiwan and the Mainland will be winners.
Can Taiwan join international organizations? If so, how? For years the two sides fought bitterly over national identity, the name of the nation, and timing. They fought over terms such as Chinese Taipei, China Taipei, and Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Customs Territory. , They fought over every comma and every period, often dispensing with decorum. For both sides, the matter involves national dignity, national sovereignty, political stance, and face saving. Many ordinary people on both sides, and even foreign governments, do not understand the complexities of the issue. To them the two sides are merely playing word games or quibbling over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. The arguments are often incomprehensible. Decades later, many remain baffled. The authorities on both sides, as well as the public, must now free up their thinking, and keep pace with the times.
Past experience with the Asian Development Bank, the International Olympic Committee, and the WTO, have shown Beijing to be firm, principled, and consistent. But on some matters it has been flexible and willing to work around problems. Taiwan has also been firm. It has tried to both save face and get what it wants. It has not always been happy with the results. But it has been able to live with them. It protests, but participates nonetheless. This rational and pragmatic approach is the correct one. After all, substantive benefits are more important than saving face. Taipei's participation in the AIIB should be handled in the same spirit and same fashion.
Regarding international conventions and the name issue, we agree with the Mainland on the one-China principle. We should insist on the one China concept or one China policy. Taipei wants meaningful participation in international organizations and activities. But it has absolutely no intention to create two Chinas, one China, one Taiwan, or Taiwan independence. It ruled this possibility out long ago. Knowing this, the Mainland may be able to deal with such issues with greater tolerance and patience. Using the Hong Kong or Macao model to deal with Taipei's membership in the AIIB is probably not the best approach. Xi spoke to Taiwan last year about his “three requirements”, including understanding, care, and respect for the status and interests of the people on Taiwan. Taiwan, after all, is not Hong Kong or Macau. A future "one country, two systems" on Taiwan would also be different. The Mainland should abide by the spirit of Xi Jinping's talk, and not engage in exaggeration.
Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties must set aside their differences. They must consider Taiwan's long term interests. They must not resort to trickery. They must not allow themselves to be hijacked by a minority of extremists and politicians concerned only about myopic political or personal advantage. After all, in the international community, power is the most important consideration. Dignity does not to come from begging. Having both the name and the game is best of course. But if one cannot have both, substantive benefits are what most people prefer. Central Bank CEO Perng Huai-nan said that all proposals must be pragmatic or submitted for public consideration. The current ruling party has expressed just such a willingness. We expect the DPP to offer concrete proposals for public consideration.
We understand that the Mainland has many concerns. One. Beijing is far more powerful today then it was back then. Even EU nations ignore the United States' recommendations and objections in order to join. Does Beijing intend to dictate the conditions of Taiwan's entry because it can? Or does it have other considerations? Two. The KMT was defeated in last year's election. This suggests that Taiwan may undergo yet another change in ruling parties in 2016. Beijing and the KMT enjoy mutual trust, rooted in the 1992 consensus. Beijing is willing to be lenient about Taiwan's membership in the AIIB. If next year the DPP returns to power however, this could turn into a serious problem. Academics and government officials in Beijing will experience headaches. We however must not exceed our brief by worrying about this problem on Beijing's behalf.
入亞投行 北京應包容台灣要務實
2015年03月30日 中國時報
台灣能否及如何參加由中國大陸倡議成立的亞洲基礎建設投資銀行（亞投行）一事，這次博鼇論壇中成為關注的焦點。會前，馬總統、毛院長及陸委會先後對台灣參與亞投行一事表達了正面的態度，經過政府授權，前副總統蕭萬長更是當面向習近平表達了台灣願意積極參與的立場。習近平對此點頭表示理解，而國台辦主任張志軍則說台灣有機會，大陸歡迎台灣加入，主管涉外事務的外長王毅則指出，亞投行是多邊銀行，需要經過一定的協商程序，至於名稱則應按國際慣例來辦理。
中國大陸和台灣都已經把立場和態度表達得非常清楚，台北積極表態願意加入，前提當然是要對等尊嚴，北京表示理解歡迎，但細節仍要協商。本案複雜，牽涉不少層面，事情顯然不可能立刻獲得解決，但就當前雙方反應看來，算是一個好的開場。今後就看兩岸雙方是否能夠從大局出發，站在歷史及戰略的高度，嘗試透過對話、談判、協商，易位思考，發揮化不可能為可能的藝術，排除萬難，早日促其實現。如能成功，對台灣、對大陸、對兩岸這都會是一個雙贏、多贏的結果。
兩岸為了台灣能否加入國際組織、如何參與國際活動，多年來鬥得不可開交，身分、名稱與時機都是爭議，從中華台北、中國台北到台澎金馬關稅領域，由逗點到句點，爭執幾度到了幾乎撕破臉的地步。對兩岸來說，這裡面牽涉到國格主權、政治立場和面子的問題，但對不了解兩岸問題複雜性的民眾和外國政府來說，雙方簡直是在玩弄文字魔術或大搞玄學，有時甚至到了難以理解的地步，幾十年後再回過頭來看，恐怕不少人還真會覺得有點莫名其妙。兩岸當局和民眾現在都要能夠解放思想、與時俱進才行。
從過去的經驗來看，從亞銀到國際奧會再到世界貿易組織，北京固然有其原則的堅定性和一貫性，但在某些安排上也展現了一定的靈活性，願意以變通的辦法來解決問題；台灣雖然也有所堅持，上策當然是面子、裡子兼而有之最好，但最後總在雖不滿意，但還能接受，或以抗議但仍然參與的方式，在理性務實的基礎上能做出正確的抉擇，畢竟裡子和實惠才是重要的考量。對於台灣參加亞投行的問題，雙方都應本著同樣的精神和方法來處理問題才是上上之策。
有關國際慣例與名稱問題，我們同意中國大陸對於一中原則、一中概念或一中政策應該有所堅持，台灣雖然理當有意義的參與相關國際組織和活動，但其前提是絕對不能成為兩個中國、一中一台或台灣獨立，只要排除了這種可能，中國大陸或許可以用更大的包容與耐心來處理問題。如果要以香港或澳門的模式來處理台灣的入行問題，這恐怕未必是最好的作法，按照習近平去年講過對台灣的三個充分，要包容、照顧、尊重台灣的現況與民眾利益，台灣畢竟不是香港、澳門，而且未來「一國兩制」在台灣的具體實現也將有所不同，大陸各方應當把握習講話的精神，不宜過度上綱上線。
除此而外，我們更要呼籲台灣朝野政黨捐棄成見，由台灣的整體及長遠利益出發，不要再機關算盡，不要再被少數極端分子和政客所挾持，只想到眼前短期的政黨或個人利益，畢竟在國際社會裡，實力才是最重要的考量，尊嚴不是要來的，如果魚與熊掌能夠兼而有之當然最好，但如果沒法兼得，現實的利益恐怕還是多數民眾追求的目標，中央銀行總裁彭淮南有謂，一切還是要務實以待的主張或值各界參考。如今，執政黨已表明態度和立場，我們期望民進黨也要拿出一套具體的主張，以供全民檢驗。
我們當然理解，中國大陸當前還有各種不同的考量。首先，北京今日的實力已非當年可比，連歐盟各國都敢置美國的規勸和阻擾於不顧，北京是否要以新的條件來對應台灣入行的要求或有不同考量；其次，國民黨去年底選舉大敗，隱然之間2016台灣可能再次出現政黨輪替，如果北京出於和國民黨的互信，在九二共識的基礎上，願意對台灣的入行問題採取相對較為寬鬆的態度，萬一明年民進黨重新執政，這確實是個讓人操煩的問題，就讓北京的學者、官員去頭疼吧，咱們暫且犯不著越俎代庖的為北京去操心了。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 30, 2015
Executive Summary: Should Taipei join the Mainland China sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)? If so, how? Questions such as these have become the focus of attention at the Boao Forum. Before the meeting, President Ma, Premier Mao, and the MAC expressed Taipei's desire to join the AIIB. Once the government authorized Taipei's membership, former Vice President Vincent Siew told Xi Jinping that Taipei was willing to become an active participant. Xi nodded understanding. Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun then said Taipei is welcome to join. Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who is in charge of foreign affairs, pointed out that the AIIB is a multilateral bank. Taipei's membership is subject to consultation. Even the name must be handled according to international conventions.
Full Text Below:
Should Taipei join the Mainland China sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)? If so, how? Questions such as these have become the focus of attention at the Boao Forum. Before the meeting, President Ma, Premier Mao, and the MAC expressed Taipei's desire to join the AIIB. Once the government authorized Taipei's membership, former Vice President Vincent Siew told Xi Jinping that Taipei was willing to become an active participant. Xi nodded understanding. Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun then said Taipei is welcome to join. Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who is in charge of foreign affairs, pointed out that the AIIB is a multilateral bank. Taipei's membership is subject to consultation. Even the name must be handled according to international conventions.
The Mainland and Taiwan have made their positions and attitudes abundantly clear. Taipei has expressed a willingness to join, provided of course it is treated as an equal. Beijing has told Taipei it is welcome, but that the details need to be negotiated. The case is complex, involving many levels. Obviously they cannot be resolved immediately. But the exchange was positive. The two sides have gotten oft to a good start. They must now remember the big picture. They must maintain an historical and strategic perspective, engage in dialogue, negotiation, consultation, and put themselves in the other's place. They must succeed against all odds, make the impossible possible, and ensure its implementation, as soon as possible. If successful, both Taiwan and the Mainland will be winners.
Can Taiwan join international organizations? If so, how? For years the two sides fought bitterly over national identity, the name of the nation, and timing. They fought over terms such as Chinese Taipei, China Taipei, and Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Customs Territory. , They fought over every comma and every period, often dispensing with decorum. For both sides, the matter involves national dignity, national sovereignty, political stance, and face saving. Many ordinary people on both sides, and even foreign governments, do not understand the complexities of the issue. To them the two sides are merely playing word games or quibbling over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. The arguments are often incomprehensible. Decades later, many remain baffled. The authorities on both sides, as well as the public, must now free up their thinking, and keep pace with the times.
Past experience with the Asian Development Bank, the International Olympic Committee, and the WTO, have shown Beijing to be firm, principled, and consistent. But on some matters it has been flexible and willing to work around problems. Taiwan has also been firm. It has tried to both save face and get what it wants. It has not always been happy with the results. But it has been able to live with them. It protests, but participates nonetheless. This rational and pragmatic approach is the correct one. After all, substantive benefits are more important than saving face. Taipei's participation in the AIIB should be handled in the same spirit and same fashion.
Regarding international conventions and the name issue, we agree with the Mainland on the one-China principle. We should insist on the one China concept or one China policy. Taipei wants meaningful participation in international organizations and activities. But it has absolutely no intention to create two Chinas, one China, one Taiwan, or Taiwan independence. It ruled this possibility out long ago. Knowing this, the Mainland may be able to deal with such issues with greater tolerance and patience. Using the Hong Kong or Macao model to deal with Taipei's membership in the AIIB is probably not the best approach. Xi spoke to Taiwan last year about his “three requirements”, including understanding, care, and respect for the status and interests of the people on Taiwan. Taiwan, after all, is not Hong Kong or Macau. A future "one country, two systems" on Taiwan would also be different. The Mainland should abide by the spirit of Xi Jinping's talk, and not engage in exaggeration.
Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties must set aside their differences. They must consider Taiwan's long term interests. They must not resort to trickery. They must not allow themselves to be hijacked by a minority of extremists and politicians concerned only about myopic political or personal advantage. After all, in the international community, power is the most important consideration. Dignity does not to come from begging. Having both the name and the game is best of course. But if one cannot have both, substantive benefits are what most people prefer. Central Bank CEO Perng Huai-nan said that all proposals must be pragmatic or submitted for public consideration. The current ruling party has expressed just such a willingness. We expect the DPP to offer concrete proposals for public consideration.
We understand that the Mainland has many concerns. One. Beijing is far more powerful today then it was back then. Even EU nations ignore the United States' recommendations and objections in order to join. Does Beijing intend to dictate the conditions of Taiwan's entry because it can? Or does it have other considerations? Two. The KMT was defeated in last year's election. This suggests that Taiwan may undergo yet another change in ruling parties in 2016. Beijing and the KMT enjoy mutual trust, rooted in the 1992 consensus. Beijing is willing to be lenient about Taiwan's membership in the AIIB. If next year the DPP returns to power however, this could turn into a serious problem. Academics and government officials in Beijing will experience headaches. We however must not exceed our brief by worrying about this problem on Beijing's behalf.
入亞投行 北京應包容台灣要務實
2015年03月30日 中國時報
台灣能否及如何參加由中國大陸倡議成立的亞洲基礎建設投資銀行（亞投行）一事，這次博鼇論壇中成為關注的焦點。會前，馬總統、毛院長及陸委會先後對台灣參與亞投行一事表達了正面的態度，經過政府授權，前副總統蕭萬長更是當面向習近平表達了台灣願意積極參與的立場。習近平對此點頭表示理解，而國台辦主任張志軍則說台灣有機會，大陸歡迎台灣加入，主管涉外事務的外長王毅則指出，亞投行是多邊銀行，需要經過一定的協商程序，至於名稱則應按國際慣例來辦理。
中國大陸和台灣都已經把立場和態度表達得非常清楚，台北積極表態願意加入，前提當然是要對等尊嚴，北京表示理解歡迎，但細節仍要協商。本案複雜，牽涉不少層面，事情顯然不可能立刻獲得解決，但就當前雙方反應看來，算是一個好的開場。今後就看兩岸雙方是否能夠從大局出發，站在歷史及戰略的高度，嘗試透過對話、談判、協商，易位思考，發揮化不可能為可能的藝術，排除萬難，早日促其實現。如能成功，對台灣、對大陸、對兩岸這都會是一個雙贏、多贏的結果。
兩岸為了台灣能否加入國際組織、如何參與國際活動，多年來鬥得不可開交，身分、名稱與時機都是爭議，從中華台北、中國台北到台澎金馬關稅領域，由逗點到句點，爭執幾度到了幾乎撕破臉的地步。對兩岸來說，這裡面牽涉到國格主權、政治立場和面子的問題，但對不了解兩岸問題複雜性的民眾和外國政府來說，雙方簡直是在玩弄文字魔術或大搞玄學，有時甚至到了難以理解的地步，幾十年後再回過頭來看，恐怕不少人還真會覺得有點莫名其妙。兩岸當局和民眾現在都要能夠解放思想、與時俱進才行。
從過去的經驗來看，從亞銀到國際奧會再到世界貿易組織，北京固然有其原則的堅定性和一貫性，但在某些安排上也展現了一定的靈活性，願意以變通的辦法來解決問題；台灣雖然也有所堅持，上策當然是面子、裡子兼而有之最好，但最後總在雖不滿意，但還能接受，或以抗議但仍然參與的方式，在理性務實的基礎上能做出正確的抉擇，畢竟裡子和實惠才是重要的考量。對於台灣參加亞投行的問題，雙方都應本著同樣的精神和方法來處理問題才是上上之策。
有關國際慣例與名稱問題，我們同意中國大陸對於一中原則、一中概念或一中政策應該有所堅持，台灣雖然理當有意義的參與相關國際組織和活動，但其前提是絕對不能成為兩個中國、一中一台或台灣獨立，只要排除了這種可能，中國大陸或許可以用更大的包容與耐心來處理問題。如果要以香港或澳門的模式來處理台灣的入行問題，這恐怕未必是最好的作法，按照習近平去年講過對台灣的三個充分，要包容、照顧、尊重台灣的現況與民眾利益，台灣畢竟不是香港、澳門，而且未來「一國兩制」在台灣的具體實現也將有所不同，大陸各方應當把握習講話的精神，不宜過度上綱上線。
除此而外，我們更要呼籲台灣朝野政黨捐棄成見，由台灣的整體及長遠利益出發，不要再機關算盡，不要再被少數極端分子和政客所挾持，只想到眼前短期的政黨或個人利益，畢竟在國際社會裡，實力才是最重要的考量，尊嚴不是要來的，如果魚與熊掌能夠兼而有之當然最好，但如果沒法兼得，現實的利益恐怕還是多數民眾追求的目標，中央銀行總裁彭淮南有謂，一切還是要務實以待的主張或值各界參考。如今，執政黨已表明態度和立場，我們期望民進黨也要拿出一套具體的主張，以供全民檢驗。
我們當然理解，中國大陸當前還有各種不同的考量。首先，北京今日的實力已非當年可比，連歐盟各國都敢置美國的規勸和阻擾於不顧，北京是否要以新的條件來對應台灣入行的要求或有不同考量；其次，國民黨去年底選舉大敗，隱然之間2016台灣可能再次出現政黨輪替，如果北京出於和國民黨的互信，在九二共識的基礎上，願意對台灣的入行問題採取相對較為寬鬆的態度，萬一明年民進黨重新執政，這確實是個讓人操煩的問題，就讓北京的學者、官員去頭疼吧，咱們暫且犯不著越俎代庖的為北京去操心了。
Thursday, March 26, 2015
Dark Cloud or Silver Lining: Barbara Schrage's Warning to Tsai Ing-wen
Dark Cloud or Silver Lining: Barbara Schrage's Warning to Tsai Ing-wen
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 27, 2015
Executive Summary: As a Western expression notes, "Every cloud has a silver lining." The DPP and Tsai Ing-wen must acknowledge the true meaning of Barbara Schrage's comments. They must be wiser and less reckless. They must cease forcing Washington's hand. Constant evasion, and failure to offer a mutually acceptable cross-Strait policy, amounts to a refusal to see Washington's silver linings.
Full Text Below:
Former American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) executive director Barbara Schrage recently urged Tsai Ing-wen to offer a concrete and feasible cross-Strait policy in advance of next year's presidential election. She said that the people of Taiwan have a right to know. Former AIT Taipei Office Director Douglas Paal said that the 1992 consensus is Beijing's bottom line. Alas, Tsai Ing-wen's response was, "Comments by retired officials do not represent the US position."
Barbara Schrage said the United States respects Taiwan's democracy, and should not intervene in its election. But she also said continued cross-Strait cooperation was consistent with US interests. Therefore she looked forward to US government agencies, "current or future", quietly pressuring the DPP leadership, especially Tsai Ing-wen, to narrow the differences in cross-Strait policy. Barbara Schrage left the AIT early last year. Only then did she relinquish her responsibilities as executive director. She was responsible for Taiwan affairs for many years. In all that time she was always extremely guarded in her statements. Therefore, when she suddenly spoke so frankly and straightforwardly, this alarmed the DPP leadership.
Tsai Ing-wen's first response was fairly calm. She said she would endeavour to maintain the cross-Strait status quo. DPP Secretary-General Joseph Wu however, panicked. He immediately denied that this was the United States' official position. He blasted Schrage's comments. He even denounced the venue that Barbara Schrage spoke at, saying it was "sponsored by a pro-China group". He demanded that retired US officials refrain from commenting. The DPP reacted virtually the same way it reacts to political opponents inside Taiwan.
The DPP reaction was so vehement, the nightmare of September 2011, when Tsai Ing-wen was “ambushed” by White House National Security Council senior officials, may well repeat itself. At the time, Tsai Ing-wen and Ma Ying-jeou were running for president. Ma Ying-jeou governed for four years. The US repeatedly affirmed the Ma government's cross-Strait policy. By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy consisted of vague references to a "Taiwan consensus". This is unconvincing to the public on Taiwan. It is even less convincing to US officials.
As a result, Tsai Ing-wen and her party left Washington early. She was still on the plane to Boston when the Financial Times quoted an unnamed senior US official, who said the Obama administration was worried that if Tsai Ing-wen was elected, that might strain relations with Mainland China. This took Tsai Ing-wen by surprise. It even affected the election results. The senior official in question was believed to be National Security Adviser Thomas E. Donilon.
At the time, Tsai Ing-wen was accompanied by Barbara Schrage. This time, speaking at the symposium, she mentioned this incident from the past. She said Tsai Ing-wen focused only on the process, and failed to offer any clear conclusions. What the US government wanted to hear, was concrete solutions to cross-Strait issues. Barbara Schrage was blunt. She said Tsai's remarks were disappointing.
Barbara Schrage pointed out Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy Achilles Heel. That was of course embarrassing. But the DPP should not have responded in such a negative manner. In fact, Barbara Schrage's comments were a gesture of Washington's goodwill.
Tsai Ing-wen is preparing to visit Washington. She will meet senior Obama administration officials. She will run into the same people who distrusted her in 2011, such as Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes, and then National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Daniel Russel, who is currently Assistant Secretary of State for Asian-Pacific Affairs. Succeeding him is Evan Medeiros, a novice. The DPP hopes that Washington will allow Tsai Ing-wen to meet Undersecretary of State Anthony Blinken, just as it allowed Ma Ying-jeou back then.
Washington has observed Tsai Ing-wen for many years. It is no stranger to her thought patterns and habits. Its perception of her as "lacking in substance" remains unchanged. Therefore it intentionally asked Barbara Schrage to give Tsai advance warning, lest she repeat her past mistake of spewing hollow rhetoric. This was Washington's first gesture of goodwill.
Washington understands Tsai Ing-wen quite well. But four years have passed. Times have changed. It noted the outcome of the nine in one elections. Barbara Schrage's comments suggest that the US knows the DPP could win in 2016. Taiwan could undergo yet another change in ruling parties. The United States is prepared to accept a "President Tsai". This was Washington's second gesture of goodwill.
Barbara Schrage represents mainstream opinion in Washington. She is hoping that Tsai Ing-wen will demonstrate courageous leadership on cross-Strait policy. She is hoping that Tsai Ing-wen will not offer vague policies that fail to meet outside concerns. or introduce any unclear consensus that leads to international or internal Taiwan uncertainty. As we can see, Washington has not criticized her comments. This lack of criticism, was Washington's third gesture of goodwill.
As a Western expression notes, "Every cloud has a silver lining." The DPP and Tsai Ing-wen must acknowledge the true meaning of Barbara Schrage's comments. They must be wiser and less reckless. They must cease forcing Washington's hand. Constant evasion, and failure to offer a mutually acceptable cross-Strait policy, amounts to a refusal to see Washington's silver linings.
聯合／烏雲或銀邊：施藍旗給蔡英文的訊息
2015-03-27 02:07:34 聯合報 聯合報社論
美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）前執行理事施藍旗最近敦促蔡英文提出實質可行的兩岸政策，因為明年總統大選前「台灣人民有權利知道」；ＡＩＴ台北辦事處前處長包道格也提醒，「九二共識」是北京的底線。對於兩人談話，蔡英文的反應都是間接迴避：「卸任官員的談話不代表美國的立場。」
施藍旗雖表明美國應尊重台灣的民主體制，不應介入選舉，卻提到兩岸持續合作才符合美國的利益。也因此，她期待美國行政部門「已經或在未來」繼續積極把握機會，「悄悄施壓民進黨的領導階層，尤其是蔡英文」，以形塑縮小兩岸歧異的中國政策。施藍旗去年初才卸下ＡＩＴ執行理事職務，儘管她負責美國對台事務多年，但一向謹言慎行；因此，如此坦率直白的發言，很快就驚動了民進黨高層。
蔡英文第一時間的反應還算平和，重申會盡力維持兩岸的現狀；但民進黨秘書長吳釗燮就顯得氣急敗壞，除了馬上否認這是美國的官方立場，貶抑施藍旗談話的代表性外，還把施藍旗發言的場合貼上「傾中團體主辦」的標籤，要求美國退休官員自制。這樣的反應，幾乎就是民進黨對付台灣內部政敵的制式態度。
民進黨的反應如此強烈，恐怕還是擔心二○一一年九月蔡英文訪美時，遭到白宮國安會高層官員「突襲」的噩夢重演，有以致之。當時，蔡英文正和馬英九競選總統，馬英九執政四年，美方已多次肯定馬政府開展兩岸關係的努力；反觀蔡英文，在兩岸政策上只能提出空泛的「台灣共識」，對台灣而言已經顯得缺乏說服力，更難讓美方官員信服。
因此，俟蔡英文一行一離開華府，人還在前往波士頓的飛機上，英國「金融時報」就引述一位不具名美國資深官員稱，歐巴馬政府擔心若蔡英文當選，可能升高與中國的緊張關係。此舉，不僅讓蔡英文措手不及，某種程度也影響到其選舉結果。據信，這位資深官員正是當時的國家安全顧問唐尼倫。
當時曾陪同蔡英文的施藍旗，在這次發言的研討會上，也提到了這段過往。她說，蔡英文「只注重過程，沒有明確的結論；美國政府想聽的是，她處理兩岸問題的明確計畫是什麼？」施藍旗隨即直言：「老實說，她在這方面的說法，讓人感到失望。」
施藍旗點出了蔡英文的兩岸政策迄今曖昧不明的罩門，這固然難堪，但民進黨沒有必要立刻還以如此負面的反應。事實上，若調整一下角度看施藍旗的談話，還能看到華府的善意。
蔡英文籌備中的華府行，將見到的歐巴馬政府資深官員，仍會是二○一一年幾個不信任她的老面孔，例如副國家安全顧問羅茲。當時的國安會亞洲事務資深主任羅素，如今已成了國務院亞太事務助理國務卿，接任的麥艾文，則還是新手。民進黨希望華府能比照當年的馬英九，安排蔡英文見到副國務卿布林肯。
對華府而言，已觀察、應對蔡英文多年，對她的思考模式與習性毫不陌生，認為她「務虛」的主觀認知依然未變。因此，或許故意透過施藍旗預先提醒，免得蔡又重蹈「空心」覆轍。此為善意之一。
此外，雖然華府十分了解蔡英文，但和四年前比，客觀環境卻已大相逕庭。如施藍旗所言，九合一選舉民進黨大勝後，美國已意識到台灣可能再度政黨輪替，等於表明美國已經準備接受「蔡總統」。此為善意之二。
因此，施藍旗代表華府的主流意見，希望蔡英文拿出「有勇氣的領導力」，在兩岸政策上不要用無法滿足外界關切的模糊方案，或推出不清楚的共識，造成國際社會與台灣內部疑慮。也可視為華府對她的期許，而非批評，此為善意之三。
誠如西諺所云：「每朵烏雲都鑲著銀邊（silver lining）。」民進黨和蔡英文若能正視施藍旗談話的真正意涵，多點智慧，少點魯莽，就不會自限在華府施壓或警告的烏雲中；否則，一直閃爍迴避，提不出各方較可接受的兩岸政策，就看不到華府指點迷津的銀邊。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 27, 2015
Executive Summary: As a Western expression notes, "Every cloud has a silver lining." The DPP and Tsai Ing-wen must acknowledge the true meaning of Barbara Schrage's comments. They must be wiser and less reckless. They must cease forcing Washington's hand. Constant evasion, and failure to offer a mutually acceptable cross-Strait policy, amounts to a refusal to see Washington's silver linings.
Full Text Below:
Former American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) executive director Barbara Schrage recently urged Tsai Ing-wen to offer a concrete and feasible cross-Strait policy in advance of next year's presidential election. She said that the people of Taiwan have a right to know. Former AIT Taipei Office Director Douglas Paal said that the 1992 consensus is Beijing's bottom line. Alas, Tsai Ing-wen's response was, "Comments by retired officials do not represent the US position."
Barbara Schrage said the United States respects Taiwan's democracy, and should not intervene in its election. But she also said continued cross-Strait cooperation was consistent with US interests. Therefore she looked forward to US government agencies, "current or future", quietly pressuring the DPP leadership, especially Tsai Ing-wen, to narrow the differences in cross-Strait policy. Barbara Schrage left the AIT early last year. Only then did she relinquish her responsibilities as executive director. She was responsible for Taiwan affairs for many years. In all that time she was always extremely guarded in her statements. Therefore, when she suddenly spoke so frankly and straightforwardly, this alarmed the DPP leadership.
Tsai Ing-wen's first response was fairly calm. She said she would endeavour to maintain the cross-Strait status quo. DPP Secretary-General Joseph Wu however, panicked. He immediately denied that this was the United States' official position. He blasted Schrage's comments. He even denounced the venue that Barbara Schrage spoke at, saying it was "sponsored by a pro-China group". He demanded that retired US officials refrain from commenting. The DPP reacted virtually the same way it reacts to political opponents inside Taiwan.
The DPP reaction was so vehement, the nightmare of September 2011, when Tsai Ing-wen was “ambushed” by White House National Security Council senior officials, may well repeat itself. At the time, Tsai Ing-wen and Ma Ying-jeou were running for president. Ma Ying-jeou governed for four years. The US repeatedly affirmed the Ma government's cross-Strait policy. By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy consisted of vague references to a "Taiwan consensus". This is unconvincing to the public on Taiwan. It is even less convincing to US officials.
As a result, Tsai Ing-wen and her party left Washington early. She was still on the plane to Boston when the Financial Times quoted an unnamed senior US official, who said the Obama administration was worried that if Tsai Ing-wen was elected, that might strain relations with Mainland China. This took Tsai Ing-wen by surprise. It even affected the election results. The senior official in question was believed to be National Security Adviser Thomas E. Donilon.
At the time, Tsai Ing-wen was accompanied by Barbara Schrage. This time, speaking at the symposium, she mentioned this incident from the past. She said Tsai Ing-wen focused only on the process, and failed to offer any clear conclusions. What the US government wanted to hear, was concrete solutions to cross-Strait issues. Barbara Schrage was blunt. She said Tsai's remarks were disappointing.
Barbara Schrage pointed out Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy Achilles Heel. That was of course embarrassing. But the DPP should not have responded in such a negative manner. In fact, Barbara Schrage's comments were a gesture of Washington's goodwill.
Tsai Ing-wen is preparing to visit Washington. She will meet senior Obama administration officials. She will run into the same people who distrusted her in 2011, such as Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes, and then National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Daniel Russel, who is currently Assistant Secretary of State for Asian-Pacific Affairs. Succeeding him is Evan Medeiros, a novice. The DPP hopes that Washington will allow Tsai Ing-wen to meet Undersecretary of State Anthony Blinken, just as it allowed Ma Ying-jeou back then.
Washington has observed Tsai Ing-wen for many years. It is no stranger to her thought patterns and habits. Its perception of her as "lacking in substance" remains unchanged. Therefore it intentionally asked Barbara Schrage to give Tsai advance warning, lest she repeat her past mistake of spewing hollow rhetoric. This was Washington's first gesture of goodwill.
Washington understands Tsai Ing-wen quite well. But four years have passed. Times have changed. It noted the outcome of the nine in one elections. Barbara Schrage's comments suggest that the US knows the DPP could win in 2016. Taiwan could undergo yet another change in ruling parties. The United States is prepared to accept a "President Tsai". This was Washington's second gesture of goodwill.
Barbara Schrage represents mainstream opinion in Washington. She is hoping that Tsai Ing-wen will demonstrate courageous leadership on cross-Strait policy. She is hoping that Tsai Ing-wen will not offer vague policies that fail to meet outside concerns. or introduce any unclear consensus that leads to international or internal Taiwan uncertainty. As we can see, Washington has not criticized her comments. This lack of criticism, was Washington's third gesture of goodwill.
As a Western expression notes, "Every cloud has a silver lining." The DPP and Tsai Ing-wen must acknowledge the true meaning of Barbara Schrage's comments. They must be wiser and less reckless. They must cease forcing Washington's hand. Constant evasion, and failure to offer a mutually acceptable cross-Strait policy, amounts to a refusal to see Washington's silver linings.
聯合／烏雲或銀邊：施藍旗給蔡英文的訊息
2015-03-27 02:07:34 聯合報 聯合報社論
美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）前執行理事施藍旗最近敦促蔡英文提出實質可行的兩岸政策，因為明年總統大選前「台灣人民有權利知道」；ＡＩＴ台北辦事處前處長包道格也提醒，「九二共識」是北京的底線。對於兩人談話，蔡英文的反應都是間接迴避：「卸任官員的談話不代表美國的立場。」
施藍旗雖表明美國應尊重台灣的民主體制，不應介入選舉，卻提到兩岸持續合作才符合美國的利益。也因此，她期待美國行政部門「已經或在未來」繼續積極把握機會，「悄悄施壓民進黨的領導階層，尤其是蔡英文」，以形塑縮小兩岸歧異的中國政策。施藍旗去年初才卸下ＡＩＴ執行理事職務，儘管她負責美國對台事務多年，但一向謹言慎行；因此，如此坦率直白的發言，很快就驚動了民進黨高層。
蔡英文第一時間的反應還算平和，重申會盡力維持兩岸的現狀；但民進黨秘書長吳釗燮就顯得氣急敗壞，除了馬上否認這是美國的官方立場，貶抑施藍旗談話的代表性外，還把施藍旗發言的場合貼上「傾中團體主辦」的標籤，要求美國退休官員自制。這樣的反應，幾乎就是民進黨對付台灣內部政敵的制式態度。
民進黨的反應如此強烈，恐怕還是擔心二○一一年九月蔡英文訪美時，遭到白宮國安會高層官員「突襲」的噩夢重演，有以致之。當時，蔡英文正和馬英九競選總統，馬英九執政四年，美方已多次肯定馬政府開展兩岸關係的努力；反觀蔡英文，在兩岸政策上只能提出空泛的「台灣共識」，對台灣而言已經顯得缺乏說服力，更難讓美方官員信服。
因此，俟蔡英文一行一離開華府，人還在前往波士頓的飛機上，英國「金融時報」就引述一位不具名美國資深官員稱，歐巴馬政府擔心若蔡英文當選，可能升高與中國的緊張關係。此舉，不僅讓蔡英文措手不及，某種程度也影響到其選舉結果。據信，這位資深官員正是當時的國家安全顧問唐尼倫。
當時曾陪同蔡英文的施藍旗，在這次發言的研討會上，也提到了這段過往。她說，蔡英文「只注重過程，沒有明確的結論；美國政府想聽的是，她處理兩岸問題的明確計畫是什麼？」施藍旗隨即直言：「老實說，她在這方面的說法，讓人感到失望。」
施藍旗點出了蔡英文的兩岸政策迄今曖昧不明的罩門，這固然難堪，但民進黨沒有必要立刻還以如此負面的反應。事實上，若調整一下角度看施藍旗的談話，還能看到華府的善意。
蔡英文籌備中的華府行，將見到的歐巴馬政府資深官員，仍會是二○一一年幾個不信任她的老面孔，例如副國家安全顧問羅茲。當時的國安會亞洲事務資深主任羅素，如今已成了國務院亞太事務助理國務卿，接任的麥艾文，則還是新手。民進黨希望華府能比照當年的馬英九，安排蔡英文見到副國務卿布林肯。
對華府而言，已觀察、應對蔡英文多年，對她的思考模式與習性毫不陌生，認為她「務虛」的主觀認知依然未變。因此，或許故意透過施藍旗預先提醒，免得蔡又重蹈「空心」覆轍。此為善意之一。
此外，雖然華府十分了解蔡英文，但和四年前比，客觀環境卻已大相逕庭。如施藍旗所言，九合一選舉民進黨大勝後，美國已意識到台灣可能再度政黨輪替，等於表明美國已經準備接受「蔡總統」。此為善意之二。
因此，施藍旗代表華府的主流意見，希望蔡英文拿出「有勇氣的領導力」，在兩岸政策上不要用無法滿足外界關切的模糊方案，或推出不清楚的共識，造成國際社會與台灣內部疑慮。也可視為華府對她的期許，而非批評，此為善意之三。
誠如西諺所云：「每朵烏雲都鑲著銀邊（silver lining）。」民進黨和蔡英文若能正視施藍旗談話的真正意涵，多點智慧，少點魯莽，就不會自限在華府施壓或警告的烏雲中；否則，一直閃爍迴避，提不出各方較可接受的兩岸政策，就看不到華府指點迷津的銀邊。
Without Chiang Kai-shek, Wither Lai Ching-teh?
Without Chiang Kai-shek, Wither Lai Ching-teh?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 26, 2015
Executive Summary: Tainan City Mayor Lai Ching-teh has ordered the demolition of 14 bronze statues of Chiang Kai-shek currently standing in Tainan elementary schools. He has rubbed salt into historic wounds. He has shown that some politicians and members of the public are incapable of viewing historical figures with perspective, tolerance, and reason. Lai Ching-teh would do well to listen to the words of Taipei Mayor Wen-Je Ko. Ko said he would not dismantle the statues of Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei City. He said "Leaving the statues in place does not mean one has surrendered to history, It means one has transcended history. It means one has become one's own master."
Full Text Below:
Tainan City Mayor Lai Ching-teh has ordered the demolition of 14 bronze statues of Chiang Kai-shek currently standing in Tainan elementary schools. He has rubbed salt into historic wounds. He has shown that some politicians and members of the public are incapable of viewing historical figures with perspective, tolerance, and reason.
What were Chiang Kai-shek's merits and demerits? This question involves three levels: the world, China, and Taiwan. At any of these levels, Chiang Kai-shek's merits outweighed his demerits. We would like to ask Lai Ching-teh three questions about these three levels.
First consider the world as a whole. During World War II Chinese troops led by Chiang Kai-shek waged an eight-year long struggle against Japanese invaders. They forced Japan to dispatch and keep nearly one million troops to China. This prevented the Soviet Union from being simultaneously attacked from both east and west. It reduced Japanese pressure on the US in the Pacific Theater. This produced yet another "force multiplier" effect, by enhancing the United States' ability to reinforce Europe. Without Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Japanese leadership, world history might have been rewritten. The winners might well have been the Axis powers, rather than the Allies.
Even at the global level, Chiang Kai-shek has no shortage of detractors. But Chiang Kai-shek's contribution to the Allied victory in World War II has been affirmed by major political figures and historians, not just in Europe and America, but even defeated Japan. All of them recognize Chiang Kai-shek as one of the world's outstanding political leaders. Chiang Kai-shek's diary covered over 40 years of history. Ever since it was made public, his contribution has become even clearer. His contribution in the Chinese Theater during World War II has been widely acknowledged by US scholars. This is the basis for Chiang Kai-shek's historic stature. Is Lai Ching-teh capable of seeing the larger picture?
Now consider China as a whole. Chiang Kai-shek's sworn enemy, Mao Zedong, blasted Chiang Kai-shek as an "autocrat and traitor". But even he acknowledged his historical contribution. In 1971 Mao addressed the Ministry of Information. He said "Chiang Kai-shek had a number of virtues. That is objective fact. We must be careful to acknowledge historical facts. One, he unified China with the Northern Expedition. Two, he won the second Sino-Japanese War. Three, he recovered Taiwan and Penghu. Four, he expanded our territorial waters."
The KMT and the CCP were political rivals. As a result, the Mainland authorities once characterized the KMT as the "Jiang Gang", and "lackeys of US imperialism" in their domestic propaganda and educational material. Following cross-Strait reconciliation and exchanges, the Mainland authorities were more willing to concede the facts of history. In 2005, on the 60th anniversary of the war, General Secretary Hu Jintao told the General Assembly that, "The anti-Japanese forces led by the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party were responsible for frontline and behind the lines battles against Japan". He affirmed Chiang Kai-shek's leadership of the nation's military during the war. In 2011, the Mainland published a "History of China", and praised Chiang, saying that he "did not hesitate to fight a war of resistance against Japan." Many Chiang biographies that chronicle Chiang Kai-shek's achievements have been published on the Mainland and become best-sellers. As we can see, the Mainland has granted Chiang Kai-shek an objective re-evaluation.
Chiang's sworn enemies, Mao Zedong and the Mainland authorities, did their utmost to demonize Chiang Kai-shek. But even they could keeo an open mind and affirm Chiang Kai-shek's historic contributions. Lai Ching-teh grew up under Taiwan's vaunted democracy. Yet witness the reactionary attitude he has adopted toward history. Look at his narrow-mindedness. Look at how reluctant he is to render an objective re-evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek's merits.
Now consider Taiwan. President Ma Ying-jeou recently offered an evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek's three major contributions to Taiwan: Taiwan's retrocession, Taiwan's defense, and Taiwan's development. Let us not list Chiang Kai-shek's high profile, macro level achievements. Let us instead examine one of his micro level "people stories", and see how a single individual would have fared without Chiang Kai-shek. This inspirational story concerns Lai Ching-teh, a miner's son, who became the mayor of a directly administered municipality.
Lai Ching-teh's father died when Lai was still a child. His mother performed odd jobs to raise six children, including Lai Ching-teh. Lai excelled academically. He graduated from Chienkuo Middle School, National Taiwan University, National Cheng Kung University, and was eventually awarded a master's degree from Harvard University. After returning to Taiwan, he excelled in medicine, then emerged a political star.
Why could Lai rise to the rank of high official, in spite of his humble background? Lai's political achievements involve personal effort on his part of course. But shouldn't we recall how Chiang Kai-shek promoted national education in 1968? Were it not for Chiang's reforms, ensuring educational opportunities for the children of underprivileged families, could Lai Ching-teh or Chen Shui-bian ever have become political legends? This is merely one example. But it tells us Chiang Kai-shek's development of Taiwan was not mere abstraction. It was concrete action that benefitted the people of Taiwan, including Lai Ching-teh.
Leave aside for the moment Chiang Kai-shek's development of Taiwan. Allow us to ask Mayor Lai a question. Suppose Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government had chosen not to relocate to Taiwan? Suppose Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces had not won a commanding victory at Kuningtou in 1949, or during the 8/23 artillery battle in 1958? Then six decades ago the Communists would have taken over Taiwan. Would Lai Ching-teh be the mayor of a directly administered municipality?
Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarianism, White Terror, and the 2/28 Incident harmed some on Taiwan. This harm cannot be forgotten merely because he also made contributions. But this is precisely the time to test the mettle of political leaders. Lai Ching-teh is a government official. He is one of the DPP's future stars. Can he do more than wallow in hatred? Can he "honor the tree whose fruit he consumes?” Can he feel a sense of gratitude? Can he acknowledge that an historical figure's merits outweighed his demerits? If he cannot, that is Taiwan's real tragedy.
Finally, Lai Ching-teh would do well to listen to the words of Taipei Mayor Wen-Je Ko. Ko said he would not dismantle the statues of Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei City. He said "Leaving the statues in place does not mean one has surrendered to history, It means one has transcended history. It means one has become one's own master." One may not be able to identify with Chiang Kai-shek. But one ought to be able to transcend history, instead of beating the drums of hatred.
沒有蔣中正，何來賴清德？
2015年03月26日 中國時報
台南市長賴清德下令拆除台南市14所國中小校園內的蔣中正銅像，不只是再度在歷史傷口上撒鹽，也顯示部分政治人物與民眾缺乏用歷史眼光看待歷史人物的包容與理性。
蔣中正功過何大？這中間存在著世界、中國、台灣3個角度。不管從哪個角度言，蔣中正的貢獻都可用「有功有過、功大於過」來總結。從這3個角度，也是我們要對賴清德提出的3問。
從世界角度言，第二次世界大戰，蔣介石領導的中國軍隊，以八年抗戰拖住近百萬的日本部隊身陷中國戰場，使得蘇聯避免東西兩線同時夾擊，也減少美國在太平洋戰區的壓力，這又產生了另一個「戰力循環」效用，讓美國有更大的能力增援歐洲。可以這麼說，如果沒有蔣中正領導的抗日，世界的歷史將改寫，獲得勝利的一方很可能不是同盟國，而是軸心國。
即便世人對蔣中正的評價不乏貶抑，但當視角觸向蔣中正對第二次世界大戰之功，不只是歐美等國主要的政治人物與歷史學者，包括戰敗的日本，都咸認蔣中正是一個對世界卓有貢獻的政治領袖。尤其自從蔣介石持續將近40年的日記開放公眾閱覽後，他在二戰中國戰場的貢獻，廣泛受到美國學界的肯定，蔣介石的歷史地位因而有了新的正面評價。賴清德有沒有這樣的世界觀？
從中國角度言，曾批評蔣中正為「獨夫民賊」的蔣之死敵毛澤東，也從歷史的角度肯定蔣。1971年毛對文宣部進行內部談話，認為「蔣介石有幾個優點是客觀的史實，我們講史必須留心，一北伐統一中國，二抗日戰爭，三收復台澎，四開拓海疆。」
由於國共對立的政治因素，原本一直以「蔣幫」、「美帝走狗」對內宣傳及教育的大陸當局，在兩岸和解交流後，也開始願意面對歷史，中共前總書記胡錦濤2005年在紀念抗戰60周年大會上說，「中國國民黨和中國共產黨領導的抗日軍隊，分別擔負抗日戰爭中『正面戰場』和『敵後戰場』作戰任務。」正面肯定了蔣中正領導的國軍的抗戰功勞；大陸2011年出版的《中華民國史》稱蔣介石「義無反顧決定對日抗戰」。而許多肯定蔣中正歷史功績的《蔣介石傳》也在大陸出版並暢銷熱賣，都可以看到大陸方面對蔣中正已能客觀評價。
如果，曾為蔣之死敵的毛澤東、曾極力醜化蔣中正的大陸當局，都能秉著開放心胸，肯定蔣中正的歷史功績，在自詡民主社會的台灣長大的賴清德，卻在歷史態度上選擇倒退、沒有客觀評價蔣中正功過的胸襟？
再從台灣角度言，馬英九總統在評價蔣中正對台灣功績時，歸納了三大貢獻：光復台灣、保衛台灣與建設台灣。我們姑且不在此犖犖列舉蔣中正的宏觀功過，不妨從一個微觀的「人的故事」來看看，沒有了蔣中正會如何？這故事就是賴清德，礦工之子當上直轄市長的勵志故事。
賴清德幼年喪父，母親靠打零工拉拔賴清德等6位子女長大。賴的學習成績優異，從建中、台大、成大，一路讀到哈佛大學碩士。回國後從醫界到政界，嶄露頭角，成為耀眼的政治明星。
賴之所以能夠寒門仕官，展現政治成就，固有個人努力成分，但該不該回頭想想蔣中正在民國57年推動的國民義務教育，如果沒有這項改革，全面保障弱勢家庭子弟的受教機會，賴清德或陳水扁還能不能成就他們的政治傳奇？這只是舉一隅之例，告訴大家，蔣中正建設台灣之功，不是抽象概念，而是具體作用在包括賴清德在內的台灣人民身上。
就算漠視蔣建設台灣之功，還是可以再問賴市長，若沒有蔣中正將國民政府遷台的決定，若沒有蔣中正指揮的國軍在1949年的古寧頭大捷、1958年823炮戰的奮戰，早在一甲子前就被赤化的台灣，還有今天的直轄市長賴清德嗎？
當然，對於威權政治、白色恐怖乃至於228事件中，蔣中正的角色以及他對部分台灣人民及其家人帶來的傷害，其過，並不會因功就可一筆遺忘。但這就正是對政治領袖的考驗時刻，賴身為政府首長、民進黨的未來之星，如果只能從褊狹的仇恨出發，而不能有「吃果子拜樹頭」的感恩心，去看待一位功大於過的歷史人物，那才是台灣真正的悲哀。
最後，請賴清德不妨聽聽柯文哲市長的話，柯文哲說他不會拆除這些蔣公銅像，因為「留下銅像並非屈服歷史，而是超越歷史，做自己的主人。」就算不認同蔣中正，也應展現超越歷史而非鼓唆仇恨的胸襟氣度。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 26, 2015
Executive Summary: Tainan City Mayor Lai Ching-teh has ordered the demolition of 14 bronze statues of Chiang Kai-shek currently standing in Tainan elementary schools. He has rubbed salt into historic wounds. He has shown that some politicians and members of the public are incapable of viewing historical figures with perspective, tolerance, and reason. Lai Ching-teh would do well to listen to the words of Taipei Mayor Wen-Je Ko. Ko said he would not dismantle the statues of Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei City. He said "Leaving the statues in place does not mean one has surrendered to history, It means one has transcended history. It means one has become one's own master."
Full Text Below:
Tainan City Mayor Lai Ching-teh has ordered the demolition of 14 bronze statues of Chiang Kai-shek currently standing in Tainan elementary schools. He has rubbed salt into historic wounds. He has shown that some politicians and members of the public are incapable of viewing historical figures with perspective, tolerance, and reason.
What were Chiang Kai-shek's merits and demerits? This question involves three levels: the world, China, and Taiwan. At any of these levels, Chiang Kai-shek's merits outweighed his demerits. We would like to ask Lai Ching-teh three questions about these three levels.
First consider the world as a whole. During World War II Chinese troops led by Chiang Kai-shek waged an eight-year long struggle against Japanese invaders. They forced Japan to dispatch and keep nearly one million troops to China. This prevented the Soviet Union from being simultaneously attacked from both east and west. It reduced Japanese pressure on the US in the Pacific Theater. This produced yet another "force multiplier" effect, by enhancing the United States' ability to reinforce Europe. Without Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Japanese leadership, world history might have been rewritten. The winners might well have been the Axis powers, rather than the Allies.
Even at the global level, Chiang Kai-shek has no shortage of detractors. But Chiang Kai-shek's contribution to the Allied victory in World War II has been affirmed by major political figures and historians, not just in Europe and America, but even defeated Japan. All of them recognize Chiang Kai-shek as one of the world's outstanding political leaders. Chiang Kai-shek's diary covered over 40 years of history. Ever since it was made public, his contribution has become even clearer. His contribution in the Chinese Theater during World War II has been widely acknowledged by US scholars. This is the basis for Chiang Kai-shek's historic stature. Is Lai Ching-teh capable of seeing the larger picture?
Now consider China as a whole. Chiang Kai-shek's sworn enemy, Mao Zedong, blasted Chiang Kai-shek as an "autocrat and traitor". But even he acknowledged his historical contribution. In 1971 Mao addressed the Ministry of Information. He said "Chiang Kai-shek had a number of virtues. That is objective fact. We must be careful to acknowledge historical facts. One, he unified China with the Northern Expedition. Two, he won the second Sino-Japanese War. Three, he recovered Taiwan and Penghu. Four, he expanded our territorial waters."
The KMT and the CCP were political rivals. As a result, the Mainland authorities once characterized the KMT as the "Jiang Gang", and "lackeys of US imperialism" in their domestic propaganda and educational material. Following cross-Strait reconciliation and exchanges, the Mainland authorities were more willing to concede the facts of history. In 2005, on the 60th anniversary of the war, General Secretary Hu Jintao told the General Assembly that, "The anti-Japanese forces led by the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party were responsible for frontline and behind the lines battles against Japan". He affirmed Chiang Kai-shek's leadership of the nation's military during the war. In 2011, the Mainland published a "History of China", and praised Chiang, saying that he "did not hesitate to fight a war of resistance against Japan." Many Chiang biographies that chronicle Chiang Kai-shek's achievements have been published on the Mainland and become best-sellers. As we can see, the Mainland has granted Chiang Kai-shek an objective re-evaluation.
Chiang's sworn enemies, Mao Zedong and the Mainland authorities, did their utmost to demonize Chiang Kai-shek. But even they could keeo an open mind and affirm Chiang Kai-shek's historic contributions. Lai Ching-teh grew up under Taiwan's vaunted democracy. Yet witness the reactionary attitude he has adopted toward history. Look at his narrow-mindedness. Look at how reluctant he is to render an objective re-evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek's merits.
Now consider Taiwan. President Ma Ying-jeou recently offered an evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek's three major contributions to Taiwan: Taiwan's retrocession, Taiwan's defense, and Taiwan's development. Let us not list Chiang Kai-shek's high profile, macro level achievements. Let us instead examine one of his micro level "people stories", and see how a single individual would have fared without Chiang Kai-shek. This inspirational story concerns Lai Ching-teh, a miner's son, who became the mayor of a directly administered municipality.
Lai Ching-teh's father died when Lai was still a child. His mother performed odd jobs to raise six children, including Lai Ching-teh. Lai excelled academically. He graduated from Chienkuo Middle School, National Taiwan University, National Cheng Kung University, and was eventually awarded a master's degree from Harvard University. After returning to Taiwan, he excelled in medicine, then emerged a political star.
Why could Lai rise to the rank of high official, in spite of his humble background? Lai's political achievements involve personal effort on his part of course. But shouldn't we recall how Chiang Kai-shek promoted national education in 1968? Were it not for Chiang's reforms, ensuring educational opportunities for the children of underprivileged families, could Lai Ching-teh or Chen Shui-bian ever have become political legends? This is merely one example. But it tells us Chiang Kai-shek's development of Taiwan was not mere abstraction. It was concrete action that benefitted the people of Taiwan, including Lai Ching-teh.
Leave aside for the moment Chiang Kai-shek's development of Taiwan. Allow us to ask Mayor Lai a question. Suppose Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government had chosen not to relocate to Taiwan? Suppose Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces had not won a commanding victory at Kuningtou in 1949, or during the 8/23 artillery battle in 1958? Then six decades ago the Communists would have taken over Taiwan. Would Lai Ching-teh be the mayor of a directly administered municipality?
Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarianism, White Terror, and the 2/28 Incident harmed some on Taiwan. This harm cannot be forgotten merely because he also made contributions. But this is precisely the time to test the mettle of political leaders. Lai Ching-teh is a government official. He is one of the DPP's future stars. Can he do more than wallow in hatred? Can he "honor the tree whose fruit he consumes?” Can he feel a sense of gratitude? Can he acknowledge that an historical figure's merits outweighed his demerits? If he cannot, that is Taiwan's real tragedy.
Finally, Lai Ching-teh would do well to listen to the words of Taipei Mayor Wen-Je Ko. Ko said he would not dismantle the statues of Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei City. He said "Leaving the statues in place does not mean one has surrendered to history, It means one has transcended history. It means one has become one's own master." One may not be able to identify with Chiang Kai-shek. But one ought to be able to transcend history, instead of beating the drums of hatred.
沒有蔣中正，何來賴清德？
2015年03月26日 中國時報
台南市長賴清德下令拆除台南市14所國中小校園內的蔣中正銅像，不只是再度在歷史傷口上撒鹽，也顯示部分政治人物與民眾缺乏用歷史眼光看待歷史人物的包容與理性。
蔣中正功過何大？這中間存在著世界、中國、台灣3個角度。不管從哪個角度言，蔣中正的貢獻都可用「有功有過、功大於過」來總結。從這3個角度，也是我們要對賴清德提出的3問。
從世界角度言，第二次世界大戰，蔣介石領導的中國軍隊，以八年抗戰拖住近百萬的日本部隊身陷中國戰場，使得蘇聯避免東西兩線同時夾擊，也減少美國在太平洋戰區的壓力，這又產生了另一個「戰力循環」效用，讓美國有更大的能力增援歐洲。可以這麼說，如果沒有蔣中正領導的抗日，世界的歷史將改寫，獲得勝利的一方很可能不是同盟國，而是軸心國。
即便世人對蔣中正的評價不乏貶抑，但當視角觸向蔣中正對第二次世界大戰之功，不只是歐美等國主要的政治人物與歷史學者，包括戰敗的日本，都咸認蔣中正是一個對世界卓有貢獻的政治領袖。尤其自從蔣介石持續將近40年的日記開放公眾閱覽後，他在二戰中國戰場的貢獻，廣泛受到美國學界的肯定，蔣介石的歷史地位因而有了新的正面評價。賴清德有沒有這樣的世界觀？
從中國角度言，曾批評蔣中正為「獨夫民賊」的蔣之死敵毛澤東，也從歷史的角度肯定蔣。1971年毛對文宣部進行內部談話，認為「蔣介石有幾個優點是客觀的史實，我們講史必須留心，一北伐統一中國，二抗日戰爭，三收復台澎，四開拓海疆。」
由於國共對立的政治因素，原本一直以「蔣幫」、「美帝走狗」對內宣傳及教育的大陸當局，在兩岸和解交流後，也開始願意面對歷史，中共前總書記胡錦濤2005年在紀念抗戰60周年大會上說，「中國國民黨和中國共產黨領導的抗日軍隊，分別擔負抗日戰爭中『正面戰場』和『敵後戰場』作戰任務。」正面肯定了蔣中正領導的國軍的抗戰功勞；大陸2011年出版的《中華民國史》稱蔣介石「義無反顧決定對日抗戰」。而許多肯定蔣中正歷史功績的《蔣介石傳》也在大陸出版並暢銷熱賣，都可以看到大陸方面對蔣中正已能客觀評價。
如果，曾為蔣之死敵的毛澤東、曾極力醜化蔣中正的大陸當局，都能秉著開放心胸，肯定蔣中正的歷史功績，在自詡民主社會的台灣長大的賴清德，卻在歷史態度上選擇倒退、沒有客觀評價蔣中正功過的胸襟？
再從台灣角度言，馬英九總統在評價蔣中正對台灣功績時，歸納了三大貢獻：光復台灣、保衛台灣與建設台灣。我們姑且不在此犖犖列舉蔣中正的宏觀功過，不妨從一個微觀的「人的故事」來看看，沒有了蔣中正會如何？這故事就是賴清德，礦工之子當上直轄市長的勵志故事。
賴清德幼年喪父，母親靠打零工拉拔賴清德等6位子女長大。賴的學習成績優異，從建中、台大、成大，一路讀到哈佛大學碩士。回國後從醫界到政界，嶄露頭角，成為耀眼的政治明星。
賴之所以能夠寒門仕官，展現政治成就，固有個人努力成分，但該不該回頭想想蔣中正在民國57年推動的國民義務教育，如果沒有這項改革，全面保障弱勢家庭子弟的受教機會，賴清德或陳水扁還能不能成就他們的政治傳奇？這只是舉一隅之例，告訴大家，蔣中正建設台灣之功，不是抽象概念，而是具體作用在包括賴清德在內的台灣人民身上。
就算漠視蔣建設台灣之功，還是可以再問賴市長，若沒有蔣中正將國民政府遷台的決定，若沒有蔣中正指揮的國軍在1949年的古寧頭大捷、1958年823炮戰的奮戰，早在一甲子前就被赤化的台灣，還有今天的直轄市長賴清德嗎？
當然，對於威權政治、白色恐怖乃至於228事件中，蔣中正的角色以及他對部分台灣人民及其家人帶來的傷害，其過，並不會因功就可一筆遺忘。但這就正是對政治領袖的考驗時刻，賴身為政府首長、民進黨的未來之星，如果只能從褊狹的仇恨出發，而不能有「吃果子拜樹頭」的感恩心，去看待一位功大於過的歷史人物，那才是台灣真正的悲哀。
最後，請賴清德不妨聽聽柯文哲市長的話，柯文哲說他不會拆除這些蔣公銅像，因為「留下銅像並非屈服歷史，而是超越歷史，做自己的主人。」就算不認同蔣中正，也應展現超越歷史而非鼓唆仇恨的胸襟氣度。
Tuesday, March 24, 2015
Failure of US Containment: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Makes History
Failure of US Containment: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Makes History
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 25, 2015
Executive Summary: Globalization and the Internet are blurring the boundaries between West and East. International politics and international power will be increasingly dependent upon realpolitik rather than ideology. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy rushing to join the AIIB is a manifestation of this phenomenon. Under the circumstances, will Taiwan raise the barrier between the two sides? Will it cut off relations with the World Island? The STA, MTA must be approved as soon as possible. Every agency of the ROC government should be thinking about how to join the AIIB.
Full Text Below:
Let us recall some history. In 1793, Lord Macartney, the British special envoy to Beijing, refused to kneel before
Emperor Qianlong on the latter's birthday. The implication was that China was in decline. In 2015 however, in defiance of US objectiions, Britain chose to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), headquartered in Beijing. Is the implication that China is now ascendant?
Britain has never been a nation ruled by ideology. She has long practiced realpolitik. Her policies invariably favor commercial interests. Two Opium Wars during the 19th century humiliated China. But for the British, they merely cleared the way for trade. Today, despite powerful opposition from her staunch Anglo-Saxon ally, she has decided to join the AIIB. She has relied on old-fashioned business sense, and sniffed out the astonishing commercial potential of the AIIB and “One Belt, One Road”.
Britain ignored US opposition and joined the AIIB. This makes it a landmark event. The US postures as the global hegemon. Last year, when Beijing announced its intention to establish the AIIB, the US categorically opposed any of its allies joining. The EU, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, having been warned, all did nothing. On March 12, however, Britain defected, and the situation changed overnight. To everyone's surprise, the staunchest members of "Team America" were first to break rank. Britain led, followed by Germany, France, and Italy, all running for the door. Luxembourg and Switzerland, two little financial giants, followed in the footsteps of the Big Guy. Without a trace of embarrassment, they joined the ranks of “Team China”.
Strategic analysts the world over regard this as a major geopolitical event. This was not merely a diplomatic defeat for United States. This hinted at an historical trend. This suggests that the US hegemon's China containment strategy will probably fail.
The US boycotted the AIIB for a very superficial reason. It hinted darkly that “AIIB lending standards may be too low, resulting in risk." But as former US Treasury official Ted Truman noted, if the US hopes to influence the AIIB, it must be inside the tent, not outside. Put bluntly, this is all part of a long term Sino-US struggle for hegemony, one that is ending in US defeat. The United States is attempting to use the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) to shut Mainland China out. That is another way of excluding Mainland China. That is the next battle, one in which the outcome remains hard to foresee.
The AIIB incident has yet another meaning. It represents a geopolitical tectonic shift. The century old "European-American alliance" shows signs of fracturing. By contrast, Europe and Asia show signs of coming together. Beginning with Marco Polo in the 13th century, "Eurasia" was equated with “the world”, with a "world island". By the end of the 19th century however, the United States was reunified in the wake of the Civil War. It abandoned isolationism and participated in European affairs. Europe and America merged into "The West”. By contrast, Asia remained under colonial subjugation, and was plunged into darkness.
Over the past 20 years however, Mainland China and India have re-emerged and caught up. Formerly backward Asia, once again leapt onto the world stage. The "One Belt, One Road” paradigm has reconnected India and Mainland China with Europe by means of an historic "Silk Road". The AIIB attempts to build a even more powerful "World Island” financial mechanism, linking Europe and Asia. The European nations saw the cultural and economic implications, and did an abrupt about face.
Years from now, when the "world island" has been successfully formed in accordance with the two Silk Roads blueprint, the world will consist of a "World Island" and an "American Island". When the time comes, Mainland China will not necessarily be the World Island chief. She has many internal defects, including an authoritarian political system. She may not be able to create an entirely new model. But she will play an important role. By then, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Mainland China, India and Russia will form one team, while Team America will boast only the US, Canada and Brazil.
The tide is putting several East Asian members of "Team America" to the test. As we look to the future, the awakened World Island comes as a shock. Will Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan cling to their Cold War mentality? Will they persist in their attempts to contain Mainland China? Will they align themselves with the nearby World Island, or with Team American thousands of nautical miles away? Will they resign themselves to being America's Kinmen, Wuqui, and Matsu?
Globalization and the Internet are blurring the boundaries between West and East. International politics and international power will be increasingly dependent upon realpolitik rather than ideology. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy rushing to join the AIIB is a manifestation of this phenomenon. Under the circumstances, will Taiwan raise the barrier between the two sides? Will it cut off relations with the World Island? The STA, MTA must be approved as soon as possible. Every agency of the ROC government should be thinking about how to join the AIIB.
聯合／美國圍堵失靈：亞投行事件的歷史徵候
2015-03-25 02:25:57 聯合報 聯合報社論
從大歷史的角度看，一七九三年到北京祝壽的英國特使馬戛爾尼拒絕向乾隆皇帝下跪，暗示了中國的衰落；而二○一五年英國不顧美國勸阻，決定加入以北京為總部的「亞洲基礎設施投資銀行」，是否將注解中國的復興？
英國向來不以意識形態作為國家指針，她遵循現實主義，商業利益是其政策依歸。十九世紀兩次鴉片戰爭，對中國是民族的恥辱；但對英國而言，卻不過是替貿易鑿出孔道。這次，她不顧盎格魯撒克遜民族堅定盟友的反對，毅然加入「亞投行」，依舊是出於老派行家的商業嗅覺，她顯然嗅出了「亞投行」眺目的陸海兩條絲路所蟄藏的驚人金脈。
英國不顧美國勸阻加入「亞投行」，是一樁標誌性事件。美國以全球霸主之姿，從前年北京倡議成立亞投行開始，即全面性地攔阻其盟友加入，歐盟各國與日、韓、澳大利亞都受到警告按兵不動；直到三月十二日英國發動了這起堪稱「叛逃」的行動，情勢一夕翻轉。事前沒人料到，軍容壯闊的「美國隊伍」竟由她最堅定的盟友打破了陣線缺口，不列顛的槍聲劃過，德、法、義也奪門而出，盧森堡、瑞士兩個金融小巨人則跟著前面的大個子，臉不紅氣不喘地踱到對方的中國隊伍裡。
全球外交戰略學者都把這次事件當成一樁重大的全球地緣政治事件。首先，它不只是美國的一次外交挫敗，它也可能洩漏了一個歷史風聲：美國對可能挑戰她全球霸主地位的中國所採取的圍堵戰略，長期而言恐將歸於失效。
美國抵制亞投行，用了一個十分膚淺的理由：「亞投行的放貸標準可能太低，造成風險」。但誠如美國前財政部官員泰德．杜魯門（Ted Truman）所言，「如果你想對亞投行發生影響力，你應該在帳篷裡面，而不是在帳篷外面。」說穿了，這完全是美中爭霸長遠戲碼的一段折子，並暫以美國慘敗收場。但美國正藉著跨太平洋夥伴協議（ＴＰＰ），以排斥中國加入方式，組成另一道反華防線；那是下一場搏鬥，而勝負尚難以逆料。
其次，這樁「亞投行事件」的另一意涵，是地緣政治板塊的劇烈滑動：被鑄造在一起已超過百年的「歐美」合稱，出現了裂解的跡象，而分隔許久的「歐亞」則正被重新黏合起來。自十三世紀馬可波羅開始，「歐亞」已被理解是整個地球的「世界島」，但十九世紀美國結束南北戰爭重歸統一後，逐漸拋棄孤立主義，參與歐洲事務，歐美反而融成一個「西方」；相對的，亞洲則陷入被殖民的命運，跌進了黑暗。
但近廿年來，不僅中國重新崛起，印度也迎頭趕上，衰落的亞洲再度躍上世界舞台。而「一帶一路」兩條絲路主張，是將印、中與歐洲再度藉由歷史上的那條「絲路」連結起來，亞投行是歐、亞試圖打造較諸中世紀更強大的「世界島」的資金機制，歐洲看到了它在文化與經濟上的意涵，遂翩然來歸。
若干年後，當「世界島」依據兩條絲路的藍圖與願望被成功塑造之後，世界的格局將成為「世界島」vs.「美洲島」的態勢，那時，中國未必是世界島的盟主，因為她有諸多內在缺陷，包括其專制的政治，但她未必不能演繹出一個全新的模式而依然舉足輕重。屆時，有可能英德法義中印俄將是一隊，而美洲隊卻只剩美加和巴西。
浪潮正在拷問東亞的幾個「美國隊員」，當我們遠眺未來時，赫然看見了世界島的甦醒；那麼，此刻仍在冷戰的思維框架中，圍堵中國的日本、韓國與台灣，究竟應歸向近在咫尺的世界島，抑是依戀數萬浬外的美國隊，自願作為美國在太平洋西岸的金門、烏坵與馬祖？
全球化與網路正在泯除西方與東方的界線，國際政治與權力將更大比例地根據現實利益為取捨，而不是依賴意識形態，英法德義奔向亞投行，正是這個現象的表徵。就此而論，台灣豈應再加高兩岸的藩籬，更與世界島阻絕？今天，不只是服、貨貿應該儘速通過，各部門更應思索如何向亞投行叩門。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 25, 2015
Executive Summary: Globalization and the Internet are blurring the boundaries between West and East. International politics and international power will be increasingly dependent upon realpolitik rather than ideology. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy rushing to join the AIIB is a manifestation of this phenomenon. Under the circumstances, will Taiwan raise the barrier between the two sides? Will it cut off relations with the World Island? The STA, MTA must be approved as soon as possible. Every agency of the ROC government should be thinking about how to join the AIIB.
Full Text Below:
Let us recall some history. In 1793, Lord Macartney, the British special envoy to Beijing, refused to kneel before
Emperor Qianlong on the latter's birthday. The implication was that China was in decline. In 2015 however, in defiance of US objectiions, Britain chose to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), headquartered in Beijing. Is the implication that China is now ascendant?
Britain has never been a nation ruled by ideology. She has long practiced realpolitik. Her policies invariably favor commercial interests. Two Opium Wars during the 19th century humiliated China. But for the British, they merely cleared the way for trade. Today, despite powerful opposition from her staunch Anglo-Saxon ally, she has decided to join the AIIB. She has relied on old-fashioned business sense, and sniffed out the astonishing commercial potential of the AIIB and “One Belt, One Road”.
Britain ignored US opposition and joined the AIIB. This makes it a landmark event. The US postures as the global hegemon. Last year, when Beijing announced its intention to establish the AIIB, the US categorically opposed any of its allies joining. The EU, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, having been warned, all did nothing. On March 12, however, Britain defected, and the situation changed overnight. To everyone's surprise, the staunchest members of "Team America" were first to break rank. Britain led, followed by Germany, France, and Italy, all running for the door. Luxembourg and Switzerland, two little financial giants, followed in the footsteps of the Big Guy. Without a trace of embarrassment, they joined the ranks of “Team China”.
Strategic analysts the world over regard this as a major geopolitical event. This was not merely a diplomatic defeat for United States. This hinted at an historical trend. This suggests that the US hegemon's China containment strategy will probably fail.
The US boycotted the AIIB for a very superficial reason. It hinted darkly that “AIIB lending standards may be too low, resulting in risk." But as former US Treasury official Ted Truman noted, if the US hopes to influence the AIIB, it must be inside the tent, not outside. Put bluntly, this is all part of a long term Sino-US struggle for hegemony, one that is ending in US defeat. The United States is attempting to use the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) to shut Mainland China out. That is another way of excluding Mainland China. That is the next battle, one in which the outcome remains hard to foresee.
The AIIB incident has yet another meaning. It represents a geopolitical tectonic shift. The century old "European-American alliance" shows signs of fracturing. By contrast, Europe and Asia show signs of coming together. Beginning with Marco Polo in the 13th century, "Eurasia" was equated with “the world”, with a "world island". By the end of the 19th century however, the United States was reunified in the wake of the Civil War. It abandoned isolationism and participated in European affairs. Europe and America merged into "The West”. By contrast, Asia remained under colonial subjugation, and was plunged into darkness.
Over the past 20 years however, Mainland China and India have re-emerged and caught up. Formerly backward Asia, once again leapt onto the world stage. The "One Belt, One Road” paradigm has reconnected India and Mainland China with Europe by means of an historic "Silk Road". The AIIB attempts to build a even more powerful "World Island” financial mechanism, linking Europe and Asia. The European nations saw the cultural and economic implications, and did an abrupt about face.
Years from now, when the "world island" has been successfully formed in accordance with the two Silk Roads blueprint, the world will consist of a "World Island" and an "American Island". When the time comes, Mainland China will not necessarily be the World Island chief. She has many internal defects, including an authoritarian political system. She may not be able to create an entirely new model. But she will play an important role. By then, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Mainland China, India and Russia will form one team, while Team America will boast only the US, Canada and Brazil.
The tide is putting several East Asian members of "Team America" to the test. As we look to the future, the awakened World Island comes as a shock. Will Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan cling to their Cold War mentality? Will they persist in their attempts to contain Mainland China? Will they align themselves with the nearby World Island, or with Team American thousands of nautical miles away? Will they resign themselves to being America's Kinmen, Wuqui, and Matsu?
Globalization and the Internet are blurring the boundaries between West and East. International politics and international power will be increasingly dependent upon realpolitik rather than ideology. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy rushing to join the AIIB is a manifestation of this phenomenon. Under the circumstances, will Taiwan raise the barrier between the two sides? Will it cut off relations with the World Island? The STA, MTA must be approved as soon as possible. Every agency of the ROC government should be thinking about how to join the AIIB.
聯合／美國圍堵失靈：亞投行事件的歷史徵候
2015-03-25 02:25:57 聯合報 聯合報社論
從大歷史的角度看，一七九三年到北京祝壽的英國特使馬戛爾尼拒絕向乾隆皇帝下跪，暗示了中國的衰落；而二○一五年英國不顧美國勸阻，決定加入以北京為總部的「亞洲基礎設施投資銀行」，是否將注解中國的復興？
英國向來不以意識形態作為國家指針，她遵循現實主義，商業利益是其政策依歸。十九世紀兩次鴉片戰爭，對中國是民族的恥辱；但對英國而言，卻不過是替貿易鑿出孔道。這次，她不顧盎格魯撒克遜民族堅定盟友的反對，毅然加入「亞投行」，依舊是出於老派行家的商業嗅覺，她顯然嗅出了「亞投行」眺目的陸海兩條絲路所蟄藏的驚人金脈。
英國不顧美國勸阻加入「亞投行」，是一樁標誌性事件。美國以全球霸主之姿，從前年北京倡議成立亞投行開始，即全面性地攔阻其盟友加入，歐盟各國與日、韓、澳大利亞都受到警告按兵不動；直到三月十二日英國發動了這起堪稱「叛逃」的行動，情勢一夕翻轉。事前沒人料到，軍容壯闊的「美國隊伍」竟由她最堅定的盟友打破了陣線缺口，不列顛的槍聲劃過，德、法、義也奪門而出，盧森堡、瑞士兩個金融小巨人則跟著前面的大個子，臉不紅氣不喘地踱到對方的中國隊伍裡。
全球外交戰略學者都把這次事件當成一樁重大的全球地緣政治事件。首先，它不只是美國的一次外交挫敗，它也可能洩漏了一個歷史風聲：美國對可能挑戰她全球霸主地位的中國所採取的圍堵戰略，長期而言恐將歸於失效。
美國抵制亞投行，用了一個十分膚淺的理由：「亞投行的放貸標準可能太低，造成風險」。但誠如美國前財政部官員泰德．杜魯門（Ted Truman）所言，「如果你想對亞投行發生影響力，你應該在帳篷裡面，而不是在帳篷外面。」說穿了，這完全是美中爭霸長遠戲碼的一段折子，並暫以美國慘敗收場。但美國正藉著跨太平洋夥伴協議（ＴＰＰ），以排斥中國加入方式，組成另一道反華防線；那是下一場搏鬥，而勝負尚難以逆料。
其次，這樁「亞投行事件」的另一意涵，是地緣政治板塊的劇烈滑動：被鑄造在一起已超過百年的「歐美」合稱，出現了裂解的跡象，而分隔許久的「歐亞」則正被重新黏合起來。自十三世紀馬可波羅開始，「歐亞」已被理解是整個地球的「世界島」，但十九世紀美國結束南北戰爭重歸統一後，逐漸拋棄孤立主義，參與歐洲事務，歐美反而融成一個「西方」；相對的，亞洲則陷入被殖民的命運，跌進了黑暗。
但近廿年來，不僅中國重新崛起，印度也迎頭趕上，衰落的亞洲再度躍上世界舞台。而「一帶一路」兩條絲路主張，是將印、中與歐洲再度藉由歷史上的那條「絲路」連結起來，亞投行是歐、亞試圖打造較諸中世紀更強大的「世界島」的資金機制，歐洲看到了它在文化與經濟上的意涵，遂翩然來歸。
若干年後，當「世界島」依據兩條絲路的藍圖與願望被成功塑造之後，世界的格局將成為「世界島」vs.「美洲島」的態勢，那時，中國未必是世界島的盟主，因為她有諸多內在缺陷，包括其專制的政治，但她未必不能演繹出一個全新的模式而依然舉足輕重。屆時，有可能英德法義中印俄將是一隊，而美洲隊卻只剩美加和巴西。
浪潮正在拷問東亞的幾個「美國隊員」，當我們遠眺未來時，赫然看見了世界島的甦醒；那麼，此刻仍在冷戰的思維框架中，圍堵中國的日本、韓國與台灣，究竟應歸向近在咫尺的世界島，抑是依戀數萬浬外的美國隊，自願作為美國在太平洋西岸的金門、烏坵與馬祖？
全球化與網路正在泯除西方與東方的界線，國際政治與權力將更大比例地根據現實利益為取捨，而不是依賴意識形態，英法德義奔向亞投行，正是這個現象的表徵。就此而論，台灣豈應再加高兩岸的藩籬，更與世界島阻絕？今天，不只是服、貨貿應該儘速通過，各部門更應思索如何向亞投行叩門。
Monday, March 23, 2015
Lee Kuan Yew: A Legend Who Broke the Mold
Lee Kuan Yew: A Legend Who Broke the Mold
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 24, 2015
Executive Summary: Lee Kuan Yew has passed on. This superstar of history has fallen. His life was dogged by controversy. But when all is said and done, he was without a doubt one of the great men of history. Lee Kuan Yew plus Singapore appears to be an accident of history. But this accident provided a unique solution to the political, economic, and social problems every nation is sure to encounter and cannot ignore. One may praise Lee or condemn him. But Lee's death spells the end of a legend, one whom the world will not see again.
Full Text Below:
Without Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore would not have become the miracle it is today. Conversely, without Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew would not have achieved the standing he enjoys today. Lee Kuan Yew led Singapore to independence. That was his first chess move. That move paved the way for the Singapore and Lee Kuan Yew we see today. Singapore was an ethnic Chinese society that Malaysia expelled from the federation. Lee Kuan Yew successfully transformed Singapore's Chinese society into an "English speaking society". This involved two paradoxes. One. Lee Kuan Yew took advantage of the expulsion. He did not advocate independence on his own initiative. Had he done so, Singapore today would be very different. Two. Following independence, Lee Kuan Yew retained English as the primary language. He took advantage of the fact that ethnic Chinese were the majority, to make English an instrument of Singapore's globalization. Had Lee Kuan Yew indulged in Chinese Chauvinism, had he acceded to majority calls for Mandarin Chinese, Singapore would undoubtedly be very different from what it is today. The policy choices made by Lee Kuan Yew during Singapore's founding revealed his extraordinary magnanimity.
Lee Kuan Yew's political philosophy has a number of notable features. One. Elitism. He often invoked "genetic determinism" and "eugenics first”. For example, he openly advocated that men with university educations should marry women with university degrees, He encouraged women with university degrees to bear more children. Two. Social Darwinism. He advocated fairness and the protection of the poor and underprivileged. In Singapore 84% of the population lives in government housing. But he also advocated social competition, and opposed populist social welfare policies. Three. Platonic Utopianism. Lee Kuan Yew denied any Platonist influences. But Singapore's political and economic structure differs little from Plato's ideal state. It features a philosopher king, Lee Kuan Yew, and a ruling elite. It features soldiers and teachers who protect the nation. It features businessmen and ordinary people. It even features “slaves”. There is of course no current equivalent to slaves. But among the 5.4 million people in Singapore, 1.3 million have the right to work but lack citizenship. Four. Machiavellianism. Lee Kuan Yew agrees with Machiavelli. He said Machiavelli was right about the choice between being loved and being admired. He said that if no one was afraid of him, he would have no value. Five. Paternalism. Lee Kuan Yew created "one-party dictatorship style democracy" in Singapore. Singapore holds regular elections. But it features a special form of partisan politics. The electoral system in Singapore enables Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP to win 60% of the vote, yet occupy 99% of the seats in parliament. This leads to "one-party dictatorship style democracy", under which opposition parties may have 40% of the votes but none of the power. The strict rule of law and generous salaries ensure clean government, with restrictions on freedom of speech. Singapore has a special form of elections and accountability, but lacks changes in the ruling party. Lee Kuan Yew has openly predicted that if Singapore ever implements Western-style political parties, it will inevitably descend into mediocrity.
In summary, politically speaking, the "Lee Kuan Yew model" does not repudiate democracy, but has reservations about democracy. It does not reject the rule of law and accountability. Socially speaking. It emphasizes social competition, embraces elitism, provides for social welfare, but rejects populism that panders to the poor and under-privileged. Singapore does not pander to either left or right oriented major powers. It treats the whole world as its hinterland, making possible the "Lee Kuan Yew miracle."
Lee Kuan Yew has global and historic stature. Obama called him an Asian legend. Kissinger said there is no other national leader who is a better strategist. Lee's role in the Taiwan Strait was also prominent. He visited Taiwan over 25 times. The first Koo-Wang talks in 1993 took place in Singapore. Beijing acknowledges that Deng Xiaoping's determination to embark upon reform and liberalization, began in 1978, when Deng visited Singapore. In fact, the Chinese mainland's political and economic reforms have long been aimed at transforming the Mainland into a "larger scale Singapore". This may be difficult to achieve. Lee Kuan Yew deeply concerned about the relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland. But during his twilight years, many on Taiwan were angry with him, and pessimistic about Taiwan's future. Lee Kuan Yew is gone. Taiwan has lost a close friend willing to speak the truth.
Lee Kuan Yew said Singapore was too small. He said it was so small it could not change the world. But he changed Singapore, making it into a nation that commanded the world's attention. Lee Kuan Yew's rule was a unique and unprecedented combination of democracy and authoritarianism, market competition and social welfare, elitism and populism, globalization and localization. It was the product of Singapore plus Lee Kuan Yew. One may ajudge Singapore a success or a failure. Either way, it is probably impossible to replicate. Having lost Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's prospects are now uncertain.
Lee Kuan Yew plus Singapore appears to be an accident of history. But this accident provided a unique solution to the
political, economic, and social problems every nation is sure to encounter and cannot ignore. One may praise Lee or condemn him. But Lee's death spells the end of a legend, one whom the world will not see again.
聯合／李光耀逝世：一個無可複製的傳奇之句點
2015-03-24 01:40:07 聯合報 聯合報社論
李光耀去世。這是歷史天體中的巨星殞落。他的一生充滿爭議性，但加加減減之後，應當無損其足當被視為歷史偉人的評價。他的成就不僅反映在新加坡的治理，也反映在歷史與全球的高度上。當然，他受到的批評亦復如此。
新加坡沒有李光耀，不會有今日奇蹟；李光耀若不在新加坡，亦難有今日地位。李光耀領導新加坡獨立的第一手棋，即奠定了新加坡與李光耀的今日。新加坡當年是因「華人社會」而被馬來西亞「逐出」聯邦，但李光耀卻成功地以「英語社會」改造了新加坡的「華人社會」。此處有兩個吊詭：一、若李光耀不是善用「被逐出」的氛圍，而是主動鼓吹獨立，新加坡的外在情勢發展必不同於今日；二、獨立後，李光耀堅持以英語為主要語言，藉此將華人的優勢加以概平，英語並成為新加坡全球化的利器；若李光耀當時沉溺在華人優勢的思想，而順從多數主張以華語為國語，則新加坡今日的內部情勢亦必不同於今日。僅就新加坡建國時期的此類政策抉擇言，李光耀已流露出不同凡響的格局。
李光耀的政治哲學有幾點顯著的特徵。一、菁英主義：他常發表類似「基因決定論」及「優生至上」的言論。例如：他公開倡議大學以上學歷的男士應迎娶大學以上學歷的女士，並鼓勵大學以上學歷的女性多生育。二、社會達爾文主義：他雖倡導公平與保護貧弱，例如新加坡有八十四％人口住在政府興建的組屋中。但他更支持社會競爭，反對民粹媚俗的社會福利政策。三、柏拉圖式理想國：李光耀否認受到柏拉圖的影響，但新加坡的政經架構卻幾與柏拉圖的理想國無異：「哲君（李光耀）／金質人（菁英統治）／銀質人（軍人或教師等護國者）／銅質人（工商百業及庶民）／奴隸（不宜今昔相比，但新加坡五百四十餘萬人口中，有約一百三十萬僅有工作權而無公民權者）」。四、馬基維利主義：李光耀不諱言認同馬基維利。他曾說：「在被敬愛及被敬畏之間，我認為馬基維利是對的。如果沒有人怕我，我就沒有價值了。」五、家長式政治：李光耀在新加坡創造了「一黨專政的民主政治」。新加坡有定期選舉，也有特殊形式及內涵的政黨競爭；但新加坡的選舉制度，可使李光耀所屬的人民行動黨雖僅得六十％的選票，卻幾占九成九的國會席位。這種容許呈現四十％的反對者選票的「一黨專政的民主政治」，以嚴明的法治與優渥薪酬維持廉能政府，緊縮言論自由，雖說亦有特殊形式的選舉與問責，卻迄無政黨輪替的表現。李光耀更公開預言，新加坡如果推行西方模式的兩黨政治，「必然走向平庸」。
綜上所論，這種「李光耀模式」，在政治面，他不諱言質疑民主，對民主有保留，但不棄法治與問責；在社會面，強調社會競爭，以高薪收攬菁英，亦維持基本社福，但不以民粹籠絡貧弱。再加上新加坡不在列強之間左偏右袒，而以全世界為腹地，因而成就了「李光耀奇蹟」。
李光耀的地位是全球性的，也是歷史性的。歐巴馬稱他是「亞洲的傳奇人物」，季辛吉稱他為「再沒有比他更好的策略思想領導人」。李光耀在台海兩岸的角色也十分突出，他曾訪台逾二十五次，一九九三年第一次辜汪會談亦是在新加坡舉行；而北京也不諱言，鄧小平的改革開放思想與決心，肇始於他一九七八年的訪星之旅。其實，中國大陸在政經改革上，始終以成為「大一號的新加坡」為目標，但恐難效顰複製。李光耀原對台灣與大陸的競合關係甚表關切，但暮年對台灣的應對不以為然，並對台灣的未來表示悲觀。李光耀走了，台灣失去了一位摯友及諍友。
李光耀曾說，新加坡太小，小得無法改變全世界；但他卻改變了新加坡，使之成為全世界矚目的國家。李光耀的國家治理，將「民主／專制」、「競爭／福利」、「菁英／平庸」、「全球／在地」作成了史無前例的特殊比例組合。但畢竟這是新加坡與李光耀的組合，因而，無論視其為成就，或加以批評，恐怕均不可能再複製，甚至失去了李光耀的新加坡之前景如何，亦是未定之數。
李光耀與新加坡的組合，看似歷史的一場偶然；但這場偶然卻為所有的國家社會必然會遭遇到的政經難題，提供了令人無法忽視的特殊解答。李光耀辭世，這似乎是一個無可複製的傳奇之句點，無論你推崇李光耀或抨擊李光耀。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 24, 2015
Executive Summary: Lee Kuan Yew has passed on. This superstar of history has fallen. His life was dogged by controversy. But when all is said and done, he was without a doubt one of the great men of history. Lee Kuan Yew plus Singapore appears to be an accident of history. But this accident provided a unique solution to the political, economic, and social problems every nation is sure to encounter and cannot ignore. One may praise Lee or condemn him. But Lee's death spells the end of a legend, one whom the world will not see again.
Full Text Below:
Without Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore would not have become the miracle it is today. Conversely, without Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew would not have achieved the standing he enjoys today. Lee Kuan Yew led Singapore to independence. That was his first chess move. That move paved the way for the Singapore and Lee Kuan Yew we see today. Singapore was an ethnic Chinese society that Malaysia expelled from the federation. Lee Kuan Yew successfully transformed Singapore's Chinese society into an "English speaking society". This involved two paradoxes. One. Lee Kuan Yew took advantage of the expulsion. He did not advocate independence on his own initiative. Had he done so, Singapore today would be very different. Two. Following independence, Lee Kuan Yew retained English as the primary language. He took advantage of the fact that ethnic Chinese were the majority, to make English an instrument of Singapore's globalization. Had Lee Kuan Yew indulged in Chinese Chauvinism, had he acceded to majority calls for Mandarin Chinese, Singapore would undoubtedly be very different from what it is today. The policy choices made by Lee Kuan Yew during Singapore's founding revealed his extraordinary magnanimity.
Lee Kuan Yew's political philosophy has a number of notable features. One. Elitism. He often invoked "genetic determinism" and "eugenics first”. For example, he openly advocated that men with university educations should marry women with university degrees, He encouraged women with university degrees to bear more children. Two. Social Darwinism. He advocated fairness and the protection of the poor and underprivileged. In Singapore 84% of the population lives in government housing. But he also advocated social competition, and opposed populist social welfare policies. Three. Platonic Utopianism. Lee Kuan Yew denied any Platonist influences. But Singapore's political and economic structure differs little from Plato's ideal state. It features a philosopher king, Lee Kuan Yew, and a ruling elite. It features soldiers and teachers who protect the nation. It features businessmen and ordinary people. It even features “slaves”. There is of course no current equivalent to slaves. But among the 5.4 million people in Singapore, 1.3 million have the right to work but lack citizenship. Four. Machiavellianism. Lee Kuan Yew agrees with Machiavelli. He said Machiavelli was right about the choice between being loved and being admired. He said that if no one was afraid of him, he would have no value. Five. Paternalism. Lee Kuan Yew created "one-party dictatorship style democracy" in Singapore. Singapore holds regular elections. But it features a special form of partisan politics. The electoral system in Singapore enables Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP to win 60% of the vote, yet occupy 99% of the seats in parliament. This leads to "one-party dictatorship style democracy", under which opposition parties may have 40% of the votes but none of the power. The strict rule of law and generous salaries ensure clean government, with restrictions on freedom of speech. Singapore has a special form of elections and accountability, but lacks changes in the ruling party. Lee Kuan Yew has openly predicted that if Singapore ever implements Western-style political parties, it will inevitably descend into mediocrity.
In summary, politically speaking, the "Lee Kuan Yew model" does not repudiate democracy, but has reservations about democracy. It does not reject the rule of law and accountability. Socially speaking. It emphasizes social competition, embraces elitism, provides for social welfare, but rejects populism that panders to the poor and under-privileged. Singapore does not pander to either left or right oriented major powers. It treats the whole world as its hinterland, making possible the "Lee Kuan Yew miracle."
Lee Kuan Yew has global and historic stature. Obama called him an Asian legend. Kissinger said there is no other national leader who is a better strategist. Lee's role in the Taiwan Strait was also prominent. He visited Taiwan over 25 times. The first Koo-Wang talks in 1993 took place in Singapore. Beijing acknowledges that Deng Xiaoping's determination to embark upon reform and liberalization, began in 1978, when Deng visited Singapore. In fact, the Chinese mainland's political and economic reforms have long been aimed at transforming the Mainland into a "larger scale Singapore". This may be difficult to achieve. Lee Kuan Yew deeply concerned about the relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland. But during his twilight years, many on Taiwan were angry with him, and pessimistic about Taiwan's future. Lee Kuan Yew is gone. Taiwan has lost a close friend willing to speak the truth.
Lee Kuan Yew said Singapore was too small. He said it was so small it could not change the world. But he changed Singapore, making it into a nation that commanded the world's attention. Lee Kuan Yew's rule was a unique and unprecedented combination of democracy and authoritarianism, market competition and social welfare, elitism and populism, globalization and localization. It was the product of Singapore plus Lee Kuan Yew. One may ajudge Singapore a success or a failure. Either way, it is probably impossible to replicate. Having lost Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's prospects are now uncertain.
Lee Kuan Yew plus Singapore appears to be an accident of history. But this accident provided a unique solution to the
political, economic, and social problems every nation is sure to encounter and cannot ignore. One may praise Lee or condemn him. But Lee's death spells the end of a legend, one whom the world will not see again.
聯合／李光耀逝世：一個無可複製的傳奇之句點
2015-03-24 01:40:07 聯合報 聯合報社論
李光耀去世。這是歷史天體中的巨星殞落。他的一生充滿爭議性，但加加減減之後，應當無損其足當被視為歷史偉人的評價。他的成就不僅反映在新加坡的治理，也反映在歷史與全球的高度上。當然，他受到的批評亦復如此。
新加坡沒有李光耀，不會有今日奇蹟；李光耀若不在新加坡，亦難有今日地位。李光耀領導新加坡獨立的第一手棋，即奠定了新加坡與李光耀的今日。新加坡當年是因「華人社會」而被馬來西亞「逐出」聯邦，但李光耀卻成功地以「英語社會」改造了新加坡的「華人社會」。此處有兩個吊詭：一、若李光耀不是善用「被逐出」的氛圍，而是主動鼓吹獨立，新加坡的外在情勢發展必不同於今日；二、獨立後，李光耀堅持以英語為主要語言，藉此將華人的優勢加以概平，英語並成為新加坡全球化的利器；若李光耀當時沉溺在華人優勢的思想，而順從多數主張以華語為國語，則新加坡今日的內部情勢亦必不同於今日。僅就新加坡建國時期的此類政策抉擇言，李光耀已流露出不同凡響的格局。
李光耀的政治哲學有幾點顯著的特徵。一、菁英主義：他常發表類似「基因決定論」及「優生至上」的言論。例如：他公開倡議大學以上學歷的男士應迎娶大學以上學歷的女士，並鼓勵大學以上學歷的女性多生育。二、社會達爾文主義：他雖倡導公平與保護貧弱，例如新加坡有八十四％人口住在政府興建的組屋中。但他更支持社會競爭，反對民粹媚俗的社會福利政策。三、柏拉圖式理想國：李光耀否認受到柏拉圖的影響，但新加坡的政經架構卻幾與柏拉圖的理想國無異：「哲君（李光耀）／金質人（菁英統治）／銀質人（軍人或教師等護國者）／銅質人（工商百業及庶民）／奴隸（不宜今昔相比，但新加坡五百四十餘萬人口中，有約一百三十萬僅有工作權而無公民權者）」。四、馬基維利主義：李光耀不諱言認同馬基維利。他曾說：「在被敬愛及被敬畏之間，我認為馬基維利是對的。如果沒有人怕我，我就沒有價值了。」五、家長式政治：李光耀在新加坡創造了「一黨專政的民主政治」。新加坡有定期選舉，也有特殊形式及內涵的政黨競爭；但新加坡的選舉制度，可使李光耀所屬的人民行動黨雖僅得六十％的選票，卻幾占九成九的國會席位。這種容許呈現四十％的反對者選票的「一黨專政的民主政治」，以嚴明的法治與優渥薪酬維持廉能政府，緊縮言論自由，雖說亦有特殊形式的選舉與問責，卻迄無政黨輪替的表現。李光耀更公開預言，新加坡如果推行西方模式的兩黨政治，「必然走向平庸」。
綜上所論，這種「李光耀模式」，在政治面，他不諱言質疑民主，對民主有保留，但不棄法治與問責；在社會面，強調社會競爭，以高薪收攬菁英，亦維持基本社福，但不以民粹籠絡貧弱。再加上新加坡不在列強之間左偏右袒，而以全世界為腹地，因而成就了「李光耀奇蹟」。
李光耀的地位是全球性的，也是歷史性的。歐巴馬稱他是「亞洲的傳奇人物」，季辛吉稱他為「再沒有比他更好的策略思想領導人」。李光耀在台海兩岸的角色也十分突出，他曾訪台逾二十五次，一九九三年第一次辜汪會談亦是在新加坡舉行；而北京也不諱言，鄧小平的改革開放思想與決心，肇始於他一九七八年的訪星之旅。其實，中國大陸在政經改革上，始終以成為「大一號的新加坡」為目標，但恐難效顰複製。李光耀原對台灣與大陸的競合關係甚表關切，但暮年對台灣的應對不以為然，並對台灣的未來表示悲觀。李光耀走了，台灣失去了一位摯友及諍友。
李光耀曾說，新加坡太小，小得無法改變全世界；但他卻改變了新加坡，使之成為全世界矚目的國家。李光耀的國家治理，將「民主／專制」、「競爭／福利」、「菁英／平庸」、「全球／在地」作成了史無前例的特殊比例組合。但畢竟這是新加坡與李光耀的組合，因而，無論視其為成就，或加以批評，恐怕均不可能再複製，甚至失去了李光耀的新加坡之前景如何，亦是未定之數。
李光耀與新加坡的組合，看似歷史的一場偶然；但這場偶然卻為所有的國家社會必然會遭遇到的政經難題，提供了令人無法忽視的特殊解答。李光耀辭世，這似乎是一個無可複製的傳奇之句點，無論你推崇李光耀或抨擊李光耀。
Sunday, March 22, 2015
Washington Should Join AIIB, Taipei Can Hardly Remain Outside
Washington Should Join AIIB, Taipei Can Hardly Remain Outside
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 23, 2015
Executive Summary: US attempts to prevent its allies from joining the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, or AIIB, have clearly failed. Britain recently announced that it has just joined the AIIB. Germany, France, Italy, and others have declared their support. Australia, South Korea, and others are expected to follow suit. How will the AIIB work? That has yet to be specified. Washington has suffered a diplomatic setback. Beijing has scored a victory in Sino-US strategic wrangling.
Full Text Below:
US attempts to prevent its allies from joining the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, or AIIB, have clearly failed. Britain recently announced that it has just joined the AIIB. Germany, France, Italy, and others have declared their support. Australia, South Korea, and others are expected to follow suit. How will the AIIB work? That has yet to be specified. Washington has suffered a diplomatic setback. Beijing has scored a victory in Sino-US strategic wrangling.
British support for the AIIB is not about choosing between the United States and Mainland China. It is about national interests. It seeks opportunities for economic growth and investment in Asia. The US has criticized Britain for "accommodating" Mainland China. Instead, it merely demonstrated its own narrow-mindedness. It merely demonstrated that it lacked the generosity of spirit befitting a great nation. Washington cast aspersions on AIIB governance and operating standards. It implied that a Beijing led AIIB would disregard international lending principles and eventually become Mainland China's diplomatic and political tool.
Actually, the United States is worried that the AIIB will weaken the monopoly over international financial organizations the US has enjoyed since the end of World War II, and its unrestricted ability to print money. Takehiko Nakao, president of the Japanese Asian Development Bank (ADB), opposed the AIIB, on grounds that the US-led postwar norms of international finance must remain unchanged.
US attempts to prevent other nations from joining the AIIB were a serious strategic miscalculation. The AIIB is designed to meet Asian countries' need for large investments in energy, electricity, transportation, telecommunications, and other infrastructure. It will promote regional interoperability, and accelerate regional economic growth. The statutory requirement for AIIB capital is 100 billion USD. The founding members have decided that member nation rights and shares will be apportioned according to GDP. As the world's second largest economy, Mainland China plans to invest 50 billion USD. Naturally it will have the largest number of shares. But that does not mean Beijing can do whatever it wants.
Washington's resistance to the AIIB confirms that its Asian-Pacific rebalancing strategy was aimed at containing Mainland China. Its alleged desire for “Asian regional peace, stability and prosperity" was mere lip service. The result of obdurate US unilateralism, will probably only further alienate Asian countries.
Beijing has repeatedly stressed that the AIIB is an open, inclusive, accountable, transparent, and equitable multilateral development institution. Its governance structure and operating policies will draw on existing international financial organizations, and strive to reduce costs and improve operational efficiency. Mainland China welcomes countries outside Asia as founding members of the AIIB. It wants broad outside AIIB representation, to create a win-win situation in both Asia and Europe.
Mainland China's GDP accounts for 16% of total global GDP. But in the World Bank, it has only 4.87% of the voting rights, far less than the United States, with 16.28% of the voting rights. It has 3.81% of the voting rights in the IMF, while the United States has a disproportionate 16.75%. In 2010, Obama began promoting international financial organization reform. But so far it has not received Congressional support. This has led to a major loss of trust among US allies.
The United States is unable to raise the status of emerging economies in international financial organizations. It also objects to increases in ADB capital. So why not join the AIIB? On the one hand, it could encourage existing international financial organizations to work closely with the AIIB. On the other hand, it could invite Mainland China to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, and jointly establish new norms for international finance.
Britain will urge the AIIB to set high standards for its operational procedures. Britain has repeatedly urged the United States not to boycott the AIIB. It reminded the US of its hope that Mainland China would become a responsible major power. If Washington is worried about its waning political and economic influence, it would be wise to join the AIIB. US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew recently warned that when the Mainland China led AIIB gains general support from US allies, it means America's international influence has declined. Lew's intention was to persuade Republicans to support international financial organization reform. But it also highlighted repeated US attempts to silence Mainland China and other emerging economies. This will eventually weaken the ability of the US to shape international economic standards. This is something the United States must consider.
Fighting for the right to lead global economic and financial regulation during this century, has apparently become one of America's core issues. Mainland China has promoted the AIIB. Last year it led the establishment of the BRICS Development Bank, and invested over 40 billion USD in the Silk Road. America is going to find it difficult to stop the Mainland Chinese from building a new generation international financial order. Washington is worried that Beijing will use AIIB loans to gain political and military strategic advantage. It may conclude that "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em."
The British joined the AIIB in a dramatic fashion. It realized that the rise of China has led to a reshuffling of the global order. The establishment of the AIIB and "one belt, one road" grand strategy, (Eurasian Economic silk belt and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century) will accelerate the economic integration of Eurasia. The global economy is about to be overtur turned on its head. Washington must join. Taipei can hardly remain outside.
美應加入亞投行 我更不能自外
2015年03月23日 中國時報
美國反對其盟邦加入「亞洲基礎設施投資銀行」（AIIB）的政策，儼然已經失敗。英國日前宣布加入AIIB，德國、法國、義大利等隨後表態支持，一般預期澳洲與南韓等國也會陸續跟進。AIIB運作方案尚未具體，華府外交先行受挫，北京則在中美戰略競逐中扳回一城。
英國支持AIIB，並非在中美兩強間選邊站，只是著眼國家利益，為自身與亞洲共創經濟成長與投資的機會。美國批評英國「遷就」中國，反顯出自身缺乏大國的胸襟與氣度。表面上，華府否定AIIB的治理能力與制定低標準的運作規範，質疑北京主導的AIIB恐無視國際貸款原則，最終淪為中國外交與政治工具。
實際上，美國的不安是憂慮AIIB將削弱美國自二次大戰結束後長期在國際金融組織的壟斷性影響力，讓美國擁有無限制的印鈔權。「亞洲開發銀行」（ADB）日籍總裁中尾武彥表明反對AIIB成立，理由就是不想改變戰後美國主導的既定國際金融規範。
美國反對他國加入AIIB，犯了嚴重的戰略誤判。AIIB旨在協助亞洲國家滿足能源、電力、交通、電信等基礎設施所需求的龐大投資金額，進而促進區域互聯互通，加速區域經濟發展。AIIB的法定資本為千億美元，創始成員國決議以國內生產總值（GDP）衡量權力比重與股份配額，身為全球第二大經濟體的中國計畫投入500億美元，自然持有最多股份，但不代表北京可為所欲為。
華府抵制AIIB只印證了亞太再平衡戰略意在圍堵中國，凸顯「樂見亞洲地區和平、穩定、繁榮」只淪於口惠。美國執意孤行的結果，恐難避免與亞洲國家的關係漸行漸遠。
北京曾多次強調，AIIB屬開放、包容、負責、透明與公平的多邊開發機構，未來的治理架構與營運政策會借鏡現有國際金融組織，力求降低成本及提高營運效能。中國表態歡迎亞洲以外國家成為AIIB的創始成員，除了想體現AIIB的廣泛代表性外，主要還是營造亞歐互助共贏的局面。
中國的GDP已占全球總量的16%，在世界銀行卻僅擁有4.87%的投票權，遠低於美國的16.28%，在國際貨幣基金組織的3.81%投票權，與美國的16.75%也不成正比。歐巴馬從2010年開始推動國際金融組織的改革，迄今仍未獲國會支持，間接導致美國在盟邦心中的信用大打折扣。
美國目前既無法提升新興經濟體在國際金融組織的角色和地位，又反對ADB增資，何不考慮加入AIIB，一方面能敦促現存國際金融組織與AIIB緊密合作，另一方面也試著邀請中國加入《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》的談判，共同建立出國際金融的新規範。
英國承諾會敦促AIIB制定高標準的營運規範，多次期望中國扮演負責任大國角色的美國，更不宜置身事外。華府與其憂心政經影響力是否受到削弱，不如參與AIIB的體制運作。美國財政部長盧傑克最近就提出警示，當中國主導的AIIB獲得美國盟邦普遍支持，亦即表示美國的國際影響力已逐漸下降。他的用心雖然是為了說服共和黨支持國際金融組織改革，但也凸顯了美國再三壓縮中國或其他新興經濟體的發言權，終將削弱美國今後塑造國際經濟規範能力的事實，美國應該有所體認。
爭取本世紀主導全球經濟與金融規範權，顯然已成為中美競逐的核心議題，中國除了倡議AIIB，去年還主導成立金磚國家開發銀行，更投資400億美元成立絲路基金。美國此刻已難阻擋中國打造新一代國際金融秩序的雄心，華府若憂心北京利用AIIB貸款獲取政治與軍事戰略利益，或許「不能打敗他，就加入他」。
就台灣而言，應該就英國戲劇性表態加入AIIB事件，體認中國崛起已帶動全球秩序重組的事實，AIIB的成立與「一帶一路」大戰略（歐亞絲綢經濟帶與21世紀海上絲綢之路）的啟動，將加速推動歐亞板塊經濟一體化的實現，全球經濟座標即將翻轉，美國必須加入，台灣更不能自外。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 23, 2015
Executive Summary: US attempts to prevent its allies from joining the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, or AIIB, have clearly failed. Britain recently announced that it has just joined the AIIB. Germany, France, Italy, and others have declared their support. Australia, South Korea, and others are expected to follow suit. How will the AIIB work? That has yet to be specified. Washington has suffered a diplomatic setback. Beijing has scored a victory in Sino-US strategic wrangling.
Full Text Below:
US attempts to prevent its allies from joining the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, or AIIB, have clearly failed. Britain recently announced that it has just joined the AIIB. Germany, France, Italy, and others have declared their support. Australia, South Korea, and others are expected to follow suit. How will the AIIB work? That has yet to be specified. Washington has suffered a diplomatic setback. Beijing has scored a victory in Sino-US strategic wrangling.
British support for the AIIB is not about choosing between the United States and Mainland China. It is about national interests. It seeks opportunities for economic growth and investment in Asia. The US has criticized Britain for "accommodating" Mainland China. Instead, it merely demonstrated its own narrow-mindedness. It merely demonstrated that it lacked the generosity of spirit befitting a great nation. Washington cast aspersions on AIIB governance and operating standards. It implied that a Beijing led AIIB would disregard international lending principles and eventually become Mainland China's diplomatic and political tool.
Actually, the United States is worried that the AIIB will weaken the monopoly over international financial organizations the US has enjoyed since the end of World War II, and its unrestricted ability to print money. Takehiko Nakao, president of the Japanese Asian Development Bank (ADB), opposed the AIIB, on grounds that the US-led postwar norms of international finance must remain unchanged.
US attempts to prevent other nations from joining the AIIB were a serious strategic miscalculation. The AIIB is designed to meet Asian countries' need for large investments in energy, electricity, transportation, telecommunications, and other infrastructure. It will promote regional interoperability, and accelerate regional economic growth. The statutory requirement for AIIB capital is 100 billion USD. The founding members have decided that member nation rights and shares will be apportioned according to GDP. As the world's second largest economy, Mainland China plans to invest 50 billion USD. Naturally it will have the largest number of shares. But that does not mean Beijing can do whatever it wants.
Washington's resistance to the AIIB confirms that its Asian-Pacific rebalancing strategy was aimed at containing Mainland China. Its alleged desire for “Asian regional peace, stability and prosperity" was mere lip service. The result of obdurate US unilateralism, will probably only further alienate Asian countries.
Beijing has repeatedly stressed that the AIIB is an open, inclusive, accountable, transparent, and equitable multilateral development institution. Its governance structure and operating policies will draw on existing international financial organizations, and strive to reduce costs and improve operational efficiency. Mainland China welcomes countries outside Asia as founding members of the AIIB. It wants broad outside AIIB representation, to create a win-win situation in both Asia and Europe.
Mainland China's GDP accounts for 16% of total global GDP. But in the World Bank, it has only 4.87% of the voting rights, far less than the United States, with 16.28% of the voting rights. It has 3.81% of the voting rights in the IMF, while the United States has a disproportionate 16.75%. In 2010, Obama began promoting international financial organization reform. But so far it has not received Congressional support. This has led to a major loss of trust among US allies.
The United States is unable to raise the status of emerging economies in international financial organizations. It also objects to increases in ADB capital. So why not join the AIIB? On the one hand, it could encourage existing international financial organizations to work closely with the AIIB. On the other hand, it could invite Mainland China to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, and jointly establish new norms for international finance.
Britain will urge the AIIB to set high standards for its operational procedures. Britain has repeatedly urged the United States not to boycott the AIIB. It reminded the US of its hope that Mainland China would become a responsible major power. If Washington is worried about its waning political and economic influence, it would be wise to join the AIIB. US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew recently warned that when the Mainland China led AIIB gains general support from US allies, it means America's international influence has declined. Lew's intention was to persuade Republicans to support international financial organization reform. But it also highlighted repeated US attempts to silence Mainland China and other emerging economies. This will eventually weaken the ability of the US to shape international economic standards. This is something the United States must consider.
Fighting for the right to lead global economic and financial regulation during this century, has apparently become one of America's core issues. Mainland China has promoted the AIIB. Last year it led the establishment of the BRICS Development Bank, and invested over 40 billion USD in the Silk Road. America is going to find it difficult to stop the Mainland Chinese from building a new generation international financial order. Washington is worried that Beijing will use AIIB loans to gain political and military strategic advantage. It may conclude that "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em."
The British joined the AIIB in a dramatic fashion. It realized that the rise of China has led to a reshuffling of the global order. The establishment of the AIIB and "one belt, one road" grand strategy, (Eurasian Economic silk belt and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century) will accelerate the economic integration of Eurasia. The global economy is about to be overtur turned on its head. Washington must join. Taipei can hardly remain outside.
美應加入亞投行 我更不能自外
2015年03月23日 中國時報
美國反對其盟邦加入「亞洲基礎設施投資銀行」（AIIB）的政策，儼然已經失敗。英國日前宣布加入AIIB，德國、法國、義大利等隨後表態支持，一般預期澳洲與南韓等國也會陸續跟進。AIIB運作方案尚未具體，華府外交先行受挫，北京則在中美戰略競逐中扳回一城。
英國支持AIIB，並非在中美兩強間選邊站，只是著眼國家利益，為自身與亞洲共創經濟成長與投資的機會。美國批評英國「遷就」中國，反顯出自身缺乏大國的胸襟與氣度。表面上，華府否定AIIB的治理能力與制定低標準的運作規範，質疑北京主導的AIIB恐無視國際貸款原則，最終淪為中國外交與政治工具。
實際上，美國的不安是憂慮AIIB將削弱美國自二次大戰結束後長期在國際金融組織的壟斷性影響力，讓美國擁有無限制的印鈔權。「亞洲開發銀行」（ADB）日籍總裁中尾武彥表明反對AIIB成立，理由就是不想改變戰後美國主導的既定國際金融規範。
美國反對他國加入AIIB，犯了嚴重的戰略誤判。AIIB旨在協助亞洲國家滿足能源、電力、交通、電信等基礎設施所需求的龐大投資金額，進而促進區域互聯互通，加速區域經濟發展。AIIB的法定資本為千億美元，創始成員國決議以國內生產總值（GDP）衡量權力比重與股份配額，身為全球第二大經濟體的中國計畫投入500億美元，自然持有最多股份，但不代表北京可為所欲為。
華府抵制AIIB只印證了亞太再平衡戰略意在圍堵中國，凸顯「樂見亞洲地區和平、穩定、繁榮」只淪於口惠。美國執意孤行的結果，恐難避免與亞洲國家的關係漸行漸遠。
北京曾多次強調，AIIB屬開放、包容、負責、透明與公平的多邊開發機構，未來的治理架構與營運政策會借鏡現有國際金融組織，力求降低成本及提高營運效能。中國表態歡迎亞洲以外國家成為AIIB的創始成員，除了想體現AIIB的廣泛代表性外，主要還是營造亞歐互助共贏的局面。
中國的GDP已占全球總量的16%，在世界銀行卻僅擁有4.87%的投票權，遠低於美國的16.28%，在國際貨幣基金組織的3.81%投票權，與美國的16.75%也不成正比。歐巴馬從2010年開始推動國際金融組織的改革，迄今仍未獲國會支持，間接導致美國在盟邦心中的信用大打折扣。
美國目前既無法提升新興經濟體在國際金融組織的角色和地位，又反對ADB增資，何不考慮加入AIIB，一方面能敦促現存國際金融組織與AIIB緊密合作，另一方面也試著邀請中國加入《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》的談判，共同建立出國際金融的新規範。
英國承諾會敦促AIIB制定高標準的營運規範，多次期望中國扮演負責任大國角色的美國，更不宜置身事外。華府與其憂心政經影響力是否受到削弱，不如參與AIIB的體制運作。美國財政部長盧傑克最近就提出警示，當中國主導的AIIB獲得美國盟邦普遍支持，亦即表示美國的國際影響力已逐漸下降。他的用心雖然是為了說服共和黨支持國際金融組織改革，但也凸顯了美國再三壓縮中國或其他新興經濟體的發言權，終將削弱美國今後塑造國際經濟規範能力的事實，美國應該有所體認。
爭取本世紀主導全球經濟與金融規範權，顯然已成為中美競逐的核心議題，中國除了倡議AIIB，去年還主導成立金磚國家開發銀行，更投資400億美元成立絲路基金。美國此刻已難阻擋中國打造新一代國際金融秩序的雄心，華府若憂心北京利用AIIB貸款獲取政治與軍事戰略利益，或許「不能打敗他，就加入他」。
就台灣而言，應該就英國戲劇性表態加入AIIB事件，體認中國崛起已帶動全球秩序重組的事實，AIIB的成立與「一帶一路」大戰略（歐亞絲綢經濟帶與21世紀海上絲綢之路）的啟動，將加速推動歐亞板塊經濟一體化的實現，全球經濟座標即將翻轉，美國必須加入，台灣更不能自外。
Thursday, March 19, 2015
Impetuous Mobs and Indolent Politicians Cannot Move a Nation
Impetuous Mobs and Indolent Politicians Cannot Move a Nation
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 20, 2015
Executive Summary: The Sunflower Student Movement revealed the passion of youth. They issued an idealistic challenge to political realism. For that they deserve recognition. But political movements are no substitute for national governance. Simple slogans cannot resolve Taiwan's complex problems. The Sunflower Student Movement touted itself as "citizen politics". It challenged democratic norms. But social movements are no substitute for normally functioning political mechanisms. This is reality.
Full Text Below:
The Sunflower Student Movement revealed the passion of youth. They issued an idealistic challenge to political realism. For that they deserve recognition. But political movements are no substitute for national governance. Simple slogans cannot resolve Taiwan's complex problems. The Sunflower Student Movement touted itself as "citizen politics". It challenged democratic norms. But social movements are no substitute for normally functioning political mechanisms. This is reality.
The 3/18 student movement conveyed a warning. It revealed widespread dissatisfaction among the younger generation. It also revealed a bigger problem, the vulnerability of Taiwan's democracy. The machinery of state could not withstand the impact of a group of students. It was instantly stunned and paralyzed. Why? Not because the students and mobs were tough or ferocious. But because the entire political system was rigid and incompetent. The feeble Ma administration bore the brunt of the impact. By contrast, legislative indolence was ignored, and DPP opportunism was rewarded. This is a truly shocking irony.
In any democracy, the occupation of its legislature is taboo. The students waved banners in the name of “the people". But can they sweep aside members of the legislature elected by 10 million people? Alas, during the student movement, these legislators were the first to jump ship, and allow students to occupy the legislature for over 20 days without voicing objections. No government or opposition legislators gave a whit about our system of representation. The Legislative Yuan is supposed to defend the dignity, autonomy, and sanctity of the legislature. But the only thing on Wang Jin-pyng's mind was how to exploit the student movement to embarrass the Ma administration. Wang went so far as to personally aid and abet the students. Taiwan has undergone over 20 years of democratization. Yet private scores are still settled by public means. This is the ugly reality behind the Sunflower Student Movement.
The student movement also revealed the ugly reality behind the two major parties, that the Emperor has no clothes. Political parties are ostensibly "quasi-constitutional authorities". They are the channels through which the people make themselves heard. They purportedly "shape the will of the people" and "catalyze the national will”. But in recent years, the KMT and DPP have consistently diluted the will of the people, and even divided the national will.
The KMT has long been inept at rhetoric. It has also been inept at rallying support. Last year, critics attacked the STA and other cross-Strait policies. The Ma government failed to advance a strong macro level defense. It could not refute arguments that cross-Strait political and business groups were monopolizing the benefits of cross-Strait exchanges. Worse still, when students occupied the Legislative Yuan, the executive branch sat on the sidelines, watching as the situation deteriorated. It had no idea how to respond to the demands of the community. As a result, Ma administration impotence during the student movement led directly to its nine in one election debacle. The KMT's cross-strait policy has been skinned alive. It has been reduced to passivity on domestic policy, and unable to take positive action.
Whether the Kuomintang wins or loses is a small matter. What matters is that government wheel-spinning is highly detrimental to national prosperity. The Ma government failed to set a new direction for the nation during the "post-Chen era". If failed to summon support for a new political and economic vision. It clung to "post-Lee era" thinking. It failed seize the opportunity to change the nation's direction. This amounted to a dereliction of duty. Over the past two years, one social movement has followed another. On the surface, it would appear that certain social forces are asserting themselves. In fact, social movements are tools of political manipulation. They may have taught the ruling KMT a painful lesson. But government paralysis squanders the people's time, energy, and opportunities.
Consider the DPP. On the surface it benefited enormously from the Sunflower Student Movement. It is now much closer to a return to power. But the student movement is also an albatross around the DPP's neck. One. Most people know that during the 3/18 student movement, the DPP played the role of demagogue and profiteer, but did little actual work. Therefore its victory in the nine in one elections was hollow. Two. The Sunflower Student Movement robbed the DPP of its initiative. It no longer has an independent and proactive policy. The DPP knows it must alter its cross-Strait policy. But the Sunflower Student Movement has forced it to revert to the past, revealing its flagrant opportunism. Three. The DPP enjoys the support of social movements. It can lash out against the Kuomintang on certain issues. But the DPP must convince the public that it has the ability to govern. It must formulate an overall framework for national policy. The DPP may have strategies, but it lacks policies. It cannot withstand scrutiny. That is why DPP poll numbers have declined recently.
The 3/18 student movement was a powerful citizens movement. On its first anniversary, “the usual suspects” have returned to the scene of the crime, the Legislative Yuan. They are attempting to claim credit for the movement. Even more alarmingly, the ruling party remains in shock, and the opposition party wallows in Schadenfreude. The public must realize that the student movement may have shown the way. But that is no substitute for national governance. Otherwise impetuous mobs and indolent politicians will leave Taiwan perplexed and in chaos. If so, what will become of the next generation?
躁動群眾與怠惰政客推不動一個國家
2015-03-20聯合報
太陽花學運表現了年輕人的熱血，他們向現實政治挑戰的理想也值得肯定；但必須承認：一場運動不可能替代國政治理，簡單的口號也不可能解決台灣面臨的諸多問題。太陽花學運標舉「公民政治」，旨在挑戰常態的民主過程，然而社運無法取代常態的政治機器運作，這是必須認清的現實。
三一八學運所傳達的警訊，除了年輕世代的不滿，更大的問題是台灣民主體質的脆弱。龐大的國家機器運作，禁不起一批學生的衝擊，瞬間即陷入癱瘓，讓人瞠目結舌；究其原因，其實不是學生和群眾多麼強悍凶猛，而是整個政治體制僵化無能。其中，馬政府的懦弱首當其衝，受到了激烈撞擊；然而，立法院的怠惰卻不曾受檢討，而民進黨的投機反而受到了獎賞，實在是頗為怵目的弔詭。
在任何民主國家，占領國會都是大忌，因為這群學生雖打著「人民」的旗號，無論如何皆不能否定全國一千多萬票所選出來的人民代表。但在這場學運中，立法院卻率先棄守，讓學生占領廿多天而不以為意，可見朝野立委對於代議體制毫無珍惜之心。尤其立法院長，本應嚴正捍衛國會的尊嚴、自主與不可侵犯，但王金平的全部心思卻放在如何利用學運給馬政府難堪，最後甚至自己親自上場做球給學生，拿法案作為交易。台灣廿多年的民主化，仍無法擺脫政治體制與私人恩怨的夾纏，這是太陽花學運牽動的醜陋現實！
除了立法院，學運也揭穿了兩大政黨的「國王新衣」真相。政黨號稱「準憲政機關」，是民主政治將「人民」過渡至「人民主治」的關鍵渠道，負有「形塑公共意志」及「催化國民意志」的責任。然而，近年國、民兩黨的表現，卻是不斷在稀釋公共意志，甚至是在撕裂及分化國民意志。
國民黨一向拙於論述，也拙於凝聚支持者的熱情。去年在服貿等兩岸政策面臨外界質疑時，馬政府始終無法從宏觀大局提出有力的辯論；對所謂「兩岸政商集團」壟斷兩岸交流紅利的說法，亦無力具體反駁。更致命的是，當發生學生占領立院這樣的重大事件，行政部門卻觀望躊躇，坐視情勢惡化，甚至不知如何訴求社會大眾的支持。也因此，在學運中的挨打局面直接導致了九合一選舉的大敗，國民黨的兩岸政策已體無完膚，內政上也淪為看守，難再有積極作為。
國民黨一黨的得失輸贏事小，問題在，政局的空轉對整個國家的發展極為不利。馬政府沒有在「後扁時代」建立完整的國家方向與願景，沒有召喚出支持的力量為台灣政治經濟開拓新的願景，卻仍抱持「後李」時代的思維在為國家掌舵，嚴重失去了時空轉換的方向感，這是它的失職。近兩年社運抗爭一波接一波，表面上看是社會力勃發；然而社運在無法擺脫政治操弄下，雖然嚴重「教訓」了執政黨，國政卻寸步難行，浪費的其實是全體台灣人的時光、能量和機遇。
再看民進黨，表面上它雖大大受益於太陽花學運，距離取得執政權又跨進一大步；但不可否認，這場學運也對民進黨構成了很大的負擔。首先，多數民眾都清楚，民進黨在三一八事件中雖扮演了「煽動者」與「收割者」的角色，但它其實沒有貢獻什麼心力耕耘，它在九合一贏得很「虛」。其次，面對太陽花，民進黨喪失了政策上的自主與主動。民進黨原已意識到必須調整兩岸政策，但在太陽花風潮下，它又被迫退回保守立場，暴露其機會主義作風。第三，民進黨藉由與社運團體的應和，雖能在特定議題上給國民黨重擊，但民進黨要說服人民它具有執政能力，仍必須就總體國政提出架構性的主張和思維。這點，民進黨只有「戰略」沒有「政策」的本質，恐怕禁不起檢驗；民進黨最近的民調下滑，原因也在此。
三一八事件誠是場轟轟烈烈的公民運動，但從一周年當天重返立院現場的隊伍，不難看出是誰想把運動的成果據為己有。更值得警惕的是，執政黨的驚魂未定也好，在野黨的私心竊喜也罷，人們都必須意識到學運可以牽引社會腳步，卻不能替代國家治理。否則，浮躁的群眾加上怠惰的政客，台灣將一直陷於茫然與脫序的狀態。果若如此，下一代的前途又在哪裡？
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 20, 2015
Executive Summary: The Sunflower Student Movement revealed the passion of youth. They issued an idealistic challenge to political realism. For that they deserve recognition. But political movements are no substitute for national governance. Simple slogans cannot resolve Taiwan's complex problems. The Sunflower Student Movement touted itself as "citizen politics". It challenged democratic norms. But social movements are no substitute for normally functioning political mechanisms. This is reality.
Full Text Below:
The Sunflower Student Movement revealed the passion of youth. They issued an idealistic challenge to political realism. For that they deserve recognition. But political movements are no substitute for national governance. Simple slogans cannot resolve Taiwan's complex problems. The Sunflower Student Movement touted itself as "citizen politics". It challenged democratic norms. But social movements are no substitute for normally functioning political mechanisms. This is reality.
The 3/18 student movement conveyed a warning. It revealed widespread dissatisfaction among the younger generation. It also revealed a bigger problem, the vulnerability of Taiwan's democracy. The machinery of state could not withstand the impact of a group of students. It was instantly stunned and paralyzed. Why? Not because the students and mobs were tough or ferocious. But because the entire political system was rigid and incompetent. The feeble Ma administration bore the brunt of the impact. By contrast, legislative indolence was ignored, and DPP opportunism was rewarded. This is a truly shocking irony.
In any democracy, the occupation of its legislature is taboo. The students waved banners in the name of “the people". But can they sweep aside members of the legislature elected by 10 million people? Alas, during the student movement, these legislators were the first to jump ship, and allow students to occupy the legislature for over 20 days without voicing objections. No government or opposition legislators gave a whit about our system of representation. The Legislative Yuan is supposed to defend the dignity, autonomy, and sanctity of the legislature. But the only thing on Wang Jin-pyng's mind was how to exploit the student movement to embarrass the Ma administration. Wang went so far as to personally aid and abet the students. Taiwan has undergone over 20 years of democratization. Yet private scores are still settled by public means. This is the ugly reality behind the Sunflower Student Movement.
The student movement also revealed the ugly reality behind the two major parties, that the Emperor has no clothes. Political parties are ostensibly "quasi-constitutional authorities". They are the channels through which the people make themselves heard. They purportedly "shape the will of the people" and "catalyze the national will”. But in recent years, the KMT and DPP have consistently diluted the will of the people, and even divided the national will.
The KMT has long been inept at rhetoric. It has also been inept at rallying support. Last year, critics attacked the STA and other cross-Strait policies. The Ma government failed to advance a strong macro level defense. It could not refute arguments that cross-Strait political and business groups were monopolizing the benefits of cross-Strait exchanges. Worse still, when students occupied the Legislative Yuan, the executive branch sat on the sidelines, watching as the situation deteriorated. It had no idea how to respond to the demands of the community. As a result, Ma administration impotence during the student movement led directly to its nine in one election debacle. The KMT's cross-strait policy has been skinned alive. It has been reduced to passivity on domestic policy, and unable to take positive action.
Whether the Kuomintang wins or loses is a small matter. What matters is that government wheel-spinning is highly detrimental to national prosperity. The Ma government failed to set a new direction for the nation during the "post-Chen era". If failed to summon support for a new political and economic vision. It clung to "post-Lee era" thinking. It failed seize the opportunity to change the nation's direction. This amounted to a dereliction of duty. Over the past two years, one social movement has followed another. On the surface, it would appear that certain social forces are asserting themselves. In fact, social movements are tools of political manipulation. They may have taught the ruling KMT a painful lesson. But government paralysis squanders the people's time, energy, and opportunities.
Consider the DPP. On the surface it benefited enormously from the Sunflower Student Movement. It is now much closer to a return to power. But the student movement is also an albatross around the DPP's neck. One. Most people know that during the 3/18 student movement, the DPP played the role of demagogue and profiteer, but did little actual work. Therefore its victory in the nine in one elections was hollow. Two. The Sunflower Student Movement robbed the DPP of its initiative. It no longer has an independent and proactive policy. The DPP knows it must alter its cross-Strait policy. But the Sunflower Student Movement has forced it to revert to the past, revealing its flagrant opportunism. Three. The DPP enjoys the support of social movements. It can lash out against the Kuomintang on certain issues. But the DPP must convince the public that it has the ability to govern. It must formulate an overall framework for national policy. The DPP may have strategies, but it lacks policies. It cannot withstand scrutiny. That is why DPP poll numbers have declined recently.
The 3/18 student movement was a powerful citizens movement. On its first anniversary, “the usual suspects” have returned to the scene of the crime, the Legislative Yuan. They are attempting to claim credit for the movement. Even more alarmingly, the ruling party remains in shock, and the opposition party wallows in Schadenfreude. The public must realize that the student movement may have shown the way. But that is no substitute for national governance. Otherwise impetuous mobs and indolent politicians will leave Taiwan perplexed and in chaos. If so, what will become of the next generation?
躁動群眾與怠惰政客推不動一個國家
2015-03-20聯合報
太陽花學運表現了年輕人的熱血，他們向現實政治挑戰的理想也值得肯定；但必須承認：一場運動不可能替代國政治理，簡單的口號也不可能解決台灣面臨的諸多問題。太陽花學運標舉「公民政治」，旨在挑戰常態的民主過程，然而社運無法取代常態的政治機器運作，這是必須認清的現實。
三一八學運所傳達的警訊，除了年輕世代的不滿，更大的問題是台灣民主體質的脆弱。龐大的國家機器運作，禁不起一批學生的衝擊，瞬間即陷入癱瘓，讓人瞠目結舌；究其原因，其實不是學生和群眾多麼強悍凶猛，而是整個政治體制僵化無能。其中，馬政府的懦弱首當其衝，受到了激烈撞擊；然而，立法院的怠惰卻不曾受檢討，而民進黨的投機反而受到了獎賞，實在是頗為怵目的弔詭。
在任何民主國家，占領國會都是大忌，因為這群學生雖打著「人民」的旗號，無論如何皆不能否定全國一千多萬票所選出來的人民代表。但在這場學運中，立法院卻率先棄守，讓學生占領廿多天而不以為意，可見朝野立委對於代議體制毫無珍惜之心。尤其立法院長，本應嚴正捍衛國會的尊嚴、自主與不可侵犯，但王金平的全部心思卻放在如何利用學運給馬政府難堪，最後甚至自己親自上場做球給學生，拿法案作為交易。台灣廿多年的民主化，仍無法擺脫政治體制與私人恩怨的夾纏，這是太陽花學運牽動的醜陋現實！
除了立法院，學運也揭穿了兩大政黨的「國王新衣」真相。政黨號稱「準憲政機關」，是民主政治將「人民」過渡至「人民主治」的關鍵渠道，負有「形塑公共意志」及「催化國民意志」的責任。然而，近年國、民兩黨的表現，卻是不斷在稀釋公共意志，甚至是在撕裂及分化國民意志。
國民黨一向拙於論述，也拙於凝聚支持者的熱情。去年在服貿等兩岸政策面臨外界質疑時，馬政府始終無法從宏觀大局提出有力的辯論；對所謂「兩岸政商集團」壟斷兩岸交流紅利的說法，亦無力具體反駁。更致命的是，當發生學生占領立院這樣的重大事件，行政部門卻觀望躊躇，坐視情勢惡化，甚至不知如何訴求社會大眾的支持。也因此，在學運中的挨打局面直接導致了九合一選舉的大敗，國民黨的兩岸政策已體無完膚，內政上也淪為看守，難再有積極作為。
國民黨一黨的得失輸贏事小，問題在，政局的空轉對整個國家的發展極為不利。馬政府沒有在「後扁時代」建立完整的國家方向與願景，沒有召喚出支持的力量為台灣政治經濟開拓新的願景，卻仍抱持「後李」時代的思維在為國家掌舵，嚴重失去了時空轉換的方向感，這是它的失職。近兩年社運抗爭一波接一波，表面上看是社會力勃發；然而社運在無法擺脫政治操弄下，雖然嚴重「教訓」了執政黨，國政卻寸步難行，浪費的其實是全體台灣人的時光、能量和機遇。
再看民進黨，表面上它雖大大受益於太陽花學運，距離取得執政權又跨進一大步；但不可否認，這場學運也對民進黨構成了很大的負擔。首先，多數民眾都清楚，民進黨在三一八事件中雖扮演了「煽動者」與「收割者」的角色，但它其實沒有貢獻什麼心力耕耘，它在九合一贏得很「虛」。其次，面對太陽花，民進黨喪失了政策上的自主與主動。民進黨原已意識到必須調整兩岸政策，但在太陽花風潮下，它又被迫退回保守立場，暴露其機會主義作風。第三，民進黨藉由與社運團體的應和，雖能在特定議題上給國民黨重擊，但民進黨要說服人民它具有執政能力，仍必須就總體國政提出架構性的主張和思維。這點，民進黨只有「戰略」沒有「政策」的本質，恐怕禁不起檢驗；民進黨最近的民調下滑，原因也在此。
三一八事件誠是場轟轟烈烈的公民運動，但從一周年當天重返立院現場的隊伍，不難看出是誰想把運動的成果據為己有。更值得警惕的是，執政黨的驚魂未定也好，在野黨的私心竊喜也罷，人們都必須意識到學運可以牽引社會腳步，卻不能替代國家治理。否則，浮躁的群眾加上怠惰的政客，台灣將一直陷於茫然與脫序的狀態。果若如此，下一代的前途又在哪裡？
Wednesday, March 18, 2015
Sunflower Countercurrent: Reasonable Questions, Wrong Answers
Sunflower Countercurrent: Reasonable Questions, Wrong Answers
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 19, 2015
Executive Summary: The Sunflower Student Movement reflects popular discontent and concerns over national policy. That is understandable. But problems such as generational deprivation, economic depression, globalization, and cross-Strait policy, cannot be addressed by resort to Taiwan independence. Surely Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are still able to distinquish between truth and falsehood, between safety and danger. They must not follow the crowd, and persist in self-deception.
Full Text Below:
The Sunflower Student Movement exposed an undercurrent of intense anger among Taiwan youth. Alas, these youths have proposed the wrong answers for the right questions.
The Sunflower Student Movement was a reflection of social discontent. This is understandable. One. This generation feels deprived, as a result of social inequality, high prices, low wages, poor education, and job shortages. Two. This generation is concerned about cross-Strait relations, including the distribution of economic benefits, violations of legal process, the weakening of Taiwan centrism, cross-Strait power imbalances, and the prospect of Taiwan being swallowed up by the Mainland. Such concerns are understandable and reasonable.
Unfortunately the answers Sunflower Student Movement leaders have offered for these problems are the wrong ones. One. They fail to understand the distinction between revolution and democracy. Key players in the Sunflower Student Movement concede that they made revolutionary demands, and called for the government to be overthrown. But they hardly had grounds to occupy the Legislative Yuan. By doing so, they forfeited any democratic legitimacy. Two. They fail to understand the distinction between Taiwan independence and Taiwan interests. First they demanded a "line item consideration of STA regulations". They then rejected the STA altogether. The hidden agenda behind their opposition to the MTA and FPEZs was Taiwan independence. But does Taiwan independence actually equate with Taiwan interests? Do Taiwan interests equate with Taiwan independence? Three. They fail to understand the distinction between Taiwan independence and economic policy. The Sunflower Student Movement is attempting to solve economic problems through Taiwan independence. They have mistakenly attributed Taiwan's economic problems to closer cross-Strait relations. Therefore they demand the suppression of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, and question globalization. But can Taiwan independence really solve Taiwan's economic problems? Won't Taiwan independence make Taiwan even more marginalized and economically isolated?
Here is something especially worth pondering. Many older generation DPP leaders now suggest forsaking Taiwan independence altogether. They have even urged freezing the Taiwan independence party platform. and revising the text of the "Resolution on the Republic of China". Yet this current generation of Sunflower Student Movement leaders have generated a new wave of Taiwan independence consciousness. Betrand Russell said that every individual's political awareness begins with the Stone Age. Over the past 30 years green camp elders have exhausted Taiwan independence. They have come to understand the futility of Taiwan independence. They have begun revising their stand on Taiwan independence. They have even begun jettisoning Taiwan independence. Now however, Sunflower Student Movement Taiwan independence “newbies” have dragged Taiwan independence thought back to the Stone Age. The DPP has become a captive of the Sunflower Student Movement. Is has been taken hostage by this resurgence of Taiwan independence. This shocking countercurrent has set the movement back three decades.
Tsai Ing-wen recently committed two fallacies. One. She said that “for the younger generation, Taiwan independence is a natural ingredient". But this new generation Taiwan independence thinking is merely the product of protracted viewing of the world in green camp/DPP fun house mirrors. It is the result of distortions to Taiwan history and Republic of China history. It is the result of decades of indoctrination. It is not natural, but artificial. For example, Taiwan independence zealots claim that "The Republic of China is a foreign regime". What is the ratio of “natural” and “artificial” behind that claim? Two. Tsai Ing-wen said that if the DPP wins by a large enough margin, [Mainland] China will change to accommodate the DPP. In fact, Xi Jinping recently said that if the 1992 consensus is destroyed "The foundation will be undermined and the ground will shake". The Sunflower Student Movement's Stone Age Taiwan independence thinking is the product of its inexperience and naivete. Tsai Ing-wen's assertion that "Taiwan independence is a natural ingredient” and that “[Mainland] China will change to accommodate the DPP" are sheer folly. Over the past three decades. Taiwan independence zealots have learned painful lessons about the state of the world and the state of the nation. Do they actually intend to turn the clock back 30 years, merely to pander to the Sunflower Student Movement?
In fact, Taiwan independence is not a “natural ingredient". It is largely an artificial construct. Otherwise the DPP would never have proposed that the Taiwan independence party platform be frozen. Taiwan must deal with external factors such as the challenges of globalization and the threat of "the ground shaking". It is hardly assured that the Mainland will “change to accommodate the DPP ". This matter calls for a wise and rational response.
Tsai Ing-wen rejoices because she thinks "Taiwan independence is a natural ingredients" of the Sunflower Student Movement. But in reality, the DPP should be more worried about these newly-minted Taiwan independence zealots, replete with Stone Age political mindsets. Tsai Ing-wen assumes that "[Mainland] China will change to accommodate the DPP". But in reality the DPP should be worried that the "ground will shake". Tsai Ing-wen's two aforementioned fallacies make no distinction between reality and falsehood, between safety and danger. For someone with her mindset to return to power, is dangerous indeed.
Tsai Ing-wen sees Taiwan independence as a natural ingredient. This is tantamount to saying that she can only accept it and cannot change it. This amounts to fastening a Taiwan independence leash around her own neck. This is ostrich head in the sand behaviour. Taiwan independence could precipitate political and economic disaster. Tsai Ing-wen must bear political responsibility in the event she returns to power. Tsai Ing-wen is publicly pandering to Taiwan independence zealots. But she cannot govern the nation by means of Taiwan independence. If these contradictions precipitate catastrophe, upon Tsai Ing-wen, upon the DPP, and upon all Taiwan, who will apologize then?
The Sunflower Student Movement reflects popular discontent and concerns over national policy. That is understandable. But problems such as generational deprivation, economic depression, globalization, and cross-Strait policy, cannot be addressed by resort to Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence zealots may delight in the Sunflower Student Movement's primitive violence. They may believe they have found a Taiwan independence based solution for the economic and political problems confronting Taiwan. But they fail to realize these are mere relics of the Stone Age. Surely Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are still able to distinquish between truth and falsehood, between safety and danger. They must not follow the crowd, and persist in self-deception.
太陽花逆流：問題合理 答案錯誤
2015-03-19聯合報
太陽花事件揭露了台灣青年族群的強烈憤懣，卻為相關問題提供了一個錯誤的解答。
太陽花所反映的社會不滿情緒，誠然是可以理解的。一、世代剝奪：社會貧富不均、高房價、低薪資、對教育成果不滿意、就業困難……。二、對兩岸關係的疑慮：影響經濟利益分配、程序正義不周全、台灣主體性的流失、兩岸均勢失衡造成台灣可能被併吞的危機……。這些疑慮皆是可以理解的，亦是合理的。
但是，太陽花事件為這些問題提供的解答卻是錯誤的。一、革命與民主的錯亂：太陽花要角皆不否認其「革命性」及「推翻政府」的訴求；但占領立院的革命理由不足，而民主的倫理已失。二、台獨與台灣利益的錯亂：運動以主張「逐條審議服貿條例」之程序正義始，卻以推翻服貿協議、反對貨貿協議及抵制自由經濟示範區收尾，亦即是台獨立場的圖窮匕現。但台獨是否等於台灣利益？或台灣利益是否即是台獨？三、台獨與經濟政策的錯亂：太陽花欲以台獨路線來解決台灣的經濟難題，並把台灣經濟難題歸因於漸趨密切的兩岸關係；因此主張抑制兩岸經貿交流，並質疑全球化。但台獨能解決台灣的經濟難題嗎？或台獨反而將使台灣邊緣化而經濟更陷困境？
尤其值得深思的是：正當民進黨內的許多老一輩人物開始嘗試修正台獨路線，甚至主張「凍結《台獨黨綱》」及「改提《中華民國決議文》」之際，太陽花新世代竟然掀起了台獨意識的大回潮。西哲羅素嘗言：「每一個人的政治認知皆是從石器時代開始。」當綠營許多老輩人物三十多年來「用盡了台獨／認識了台獨」，而開始考慮「修正台獨／甩掉台獨」，竟被那些初嘗台獨思想的太陽花人物一舉又拖回到台獨的「石器時代」。而今民進黨已成太陽花的俘虜，被挾持著返回台獨，這是大約倒退三十年的大逆流，令人怵目驚心。
蔡英文最近有兩大謬論。一、她說：台獨已是「年輕世代的天然成分」。但是，台灣新世代的台獨思維，卻是長期在綠營及民進黨的哈哈鏡下，對台灣史及中華民國內涵的變造、扭曲及汙蔑中教育而成的。它不是「天然」，而是「人造」。比如說，台獨稱「中華民國是外來政權」，其中「天然／人造」的比例如何？二、蔡英文說：民進黨若選得好，中國也會向民進黨調整。但習近平卻說，如果九二共識被破壞，將是「基礎不牢／地動山搖」。可見，太陽花若沉溺台獨石器時代猶可說是涉世未深，但蔡英文竟也發表「台獨是天然成分／中國會向民進黨調整」的謬論，卻是匪夷所思。難道這三十年來台獨在世局及國情中的歷練，皆因一次太陽花又退回到三十年前？
事實上，台獨不是「天然成分」，其大部分皆是出自「人為構造」，否則民進黨中即不會出現「凍結台獨黨綱」的思維；而台灣的外在因素，如全球化的挑戰及「地動山搖」的威脅，也不見得會「向民進黨調整」，而須要以智慧及理性來因應。
蔡英文似以太陽花的「台獨天然成分」為喜，實則民進黨當以面對這群石器時代的新台獨為憂；蔡英文似以「中國會向民進黨調整」為傲，實則民進黨更當以「地動山搖」為慮。前述蔡英文的兩大謬論，幾至不識真偽、不辨吉凶的地步，以此心態而欲重返執政，豈非奔車朽索？
蔡英文將台獨視作天然成分，不啻明示她將只能接受之而無法改變之，這不啻在自己的脖子上套上台獨枷鎖，十足是一尾蓋頭鰻；而台獨方案可能面對的政經災難後果，則是蔡若重返執政必須承負的政治責任。蔡英文公開籠絡諂媚台獨，卻顯然不能以台獨為治國方案；其中的矛盾，若陷蔡英文、民進黨及整個台灣於「地動山搖」，試問將伊於胡底？
太陽花反映的民心不滿及國政疑慮皆是可理解的，但解決台灣世代剝奪、經濟困境、全球化挑戰及兩岸競合的方案絕非台獨路線。野人獻曝的太陽花或許猶可沾沾自喜於為台灣找到了台獨的政經方案，卻渾然不知這是石器時代的遺物；但蔡英文與民進黨不可不識其真偽吉凶，更不可隨波逐流，自欺欺人。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 19, 2015
Executive Summary: The Sunflower Student Movement reflects popular discontent and concerns over national policy. That is understandable. But problems such as generational deprivation, economic depression, globalization, and cross-Strait policy, cannot be addressed by resort to Taiwan independence. Surely Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are still able to distinquish between truth and falsehood, between safety and danger. They must not follow the crowd, and persist in self-deception.
Full Text Below:
The Sunflower Student Movement exposed an undercurrent of intense anger among Taiwan youth. Alas, these youths have proposed the wrong answers for the right questions.
The Sunflower Student Movement was a reflection of social discontent. This is understandable. One. This generation feels deprived, as a result of social inequality, high prices, low wages, poor education, and job shortages. Two. This generation is concerned about cross-Strait relations, including the distribution of economic benefits, violations of legal process, the weakening of Taiwan centrism, cross-Strait power imbalances, and the prospect of Taiwan being swallowed up by the Mainland. Such concerns are understandable and reasonable.
Unfortunately the answers Sunflower Student Movement leaders have offered for these problems are the wrong ones. One. They fail to understand the distinction between revolution and democracy. Key players in the Sunflower Student Movement concede that they made revolutionary demands, and called for the government to be overthrown. But they hardly had grounds to occupy the Legislative Yuan. By doing so, they forfeited any democratic legitimacy. Two. They fail to understand the distinction between Taiwan independence and Taiwan interests. First they demanded a "line item consideration of STA regulations". They then rejected the STA altogether. The hidden agenda behind their opposition to the MTA and FPEZs was Taiwan independence. But does Taiwan independence actually equate with Taiwan interests? Do Taiwan interests equate with Taiwan independence? Three. They fail to understand the distinction between Taiwan independence and economic policy. The Sunflower Student Movement is attempting to solve economic problems through Taiwan independence. They have mistakenly attributed Taiwan's economic problems to closer cross-Strait relations. Therefore they demand the suppression of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, and question globalization. But can Taiwan independence really solve Taiwan's economic problems? Won't Taiwan independence make Taiwan even more marginalized and economically isolated?
Here is something especially worth pondering. Many older generation DPP leaders now suggest forsaking Taiwan independence altogether. They have even urged freezing the Taiwan independence party platform. and revising the text of the "Resolution on the Republic of China". Yet this current generation of Sunflower Student Movement leaders have generated a new wave of Taiwan independence consciousness. Betrand Russell said that every individual's political awareness begins with the Stone Age. Over the past 30 years green camp elders have exhausted Taiwan independence. They have come to understand the futility of Taiwan independence. They have begun revising their stand on Taiwan independence. They have even begun jettisoning Taiwan independence. Now however, Sunflower Student Movement Taiwan independence “newbies” have dragged Taiwan independence thought back to the Stone Age. The DPP has become a captive of the Sunflower Student Movement. Is has been taken hostage by this resurgence of Taiwan independence. This shocking countercurrent has set the movement back three decades.
Tsai Ing-wen recently committed two fallacies. One. She said that “for the younger generation, Taiwan independence is a natural ingredient". But this new generation Taiwan independence thinking is merely the product of protracted viewing of the world in green camp/DPP fun house mirrors. It is the result of distortions to Taiwan history and Republic of China history. It is the result of decades of indoctrination. It is not natural, but artificial. For example, Taiwan independence zealots claim that "The Republic of China is a foreign regime". What is the ratio of “natural” and “artificial” behind that claim? Two. Tsai Ing-wen said that if the DPP wins by a large enough margin, [Mainland] China will change to accommodate the DPP. In fact, Xi Jinping recently said that if the 1992 consensus is destroyed "The foundation will be undermined and the ground will shake". The Sunflower Student Movement's Stone Age Taiwan independence thinking is the product of its inexperience and naivete. Tsai Ing-wen's assertion that "Taiwan independence is a natural ingredient” and that “[Mainland] China will change to accommodate the DPP" are sheer folly. Over the past three decades. Taiwan independence zealots have learned painful lessons about the state of the world and the state of the nation. Do they actually intend to turn the clock back 30 years, merely to pander to the Sunflower Student Movement?
In fact, Taiwan independence is not a “natural ingredient". It is largely an artificial construct. Otherwise the DPP would never have proposed that the Taiwan independence party platform be frozen. Taiwan must deal with external factors such as the challenges of globalization and the threat of "the ground shaking". It is hardly assured that the Mainland will “change to accommodate the DPP ". This matter calls for a wise and rational response.
Tsai Ing-wen rejoices because she thinks "Taiwan independence is a natural ingredients" of the Sunflower Student Movement. But in reality, the DPP should be more worried about these newly-minted Taiwan independence zealots, replete with Stone Age political mindsets. Tsai Ing-wen assumes that "[Mainland] China will change to accommodate the DPP". But in reality the DPP should be worried that the "ground will shake". Tsai Ing-wen's two aforementioned fallacies make no distinction between reality and falsehood, between safety and danger. For someone with her mindset to return to power, is dangerous indeed.
Tsai Ing-wen sees Taiwan independence as a natural ingredient. This is tantamount to saying that she can only accept it and cannot change it. This amounts to fastening a Taiwan independence leash around her own neck. This is ostrich head in the sand behaviour. Taiwan independence could precipitate political and economic disaster. Tsai Ing-wen must bear political responsibility in the event she returns to power. Tsai Ing-wen is publicly pandering to Taiwan independence zealots. But she cannot govern the nation by means of Taiwan independence. If these contradictions precipitate catastrophe, upon Tsai Ing-wen, upon the DPP, and upon all Taiwan, who will apologize then?
The Sunflower Student Movement reflects popular discontent and concerns over national policy. That is understandable. But problems such as generational deprivation, economic depression, globalization, and cross-Strait policy, cannot be addressed by resort to Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence zealots may delight in the Sunflower Student Movement's primitive violence. They may believe they have found a Taiwan independence based solution for the economic and political problems confronting Taiwan. But they fail to realize these are mere relics of the Stone Age. Surely Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are still able to distinquish between truth and falsehood, between safety and danger. They must not follow the crowd, and persist in self-deception.
太陽花逆流：問題合理 答案錯誤
2015-03-19聯合報
太陽花事件揭露了台灣青年族群的強烈憤懣，卻為相關問題提供了一個錯誤的解答。
太陽花所反映的社會不滿情緒，誠然是可以理解的。一、世代剝奪：社會貧富不均、高房價、低薪資、對教育成果不滿意、就業困難……。二、對兩岸關係的疑慮：影響經濟利益分配、程序正義不周全、台灣主體性的流失、兩岸均勢失衡造成台灣可能被併吞的危機……。這些疑慮皆是可以理解的，亦是合理的。
但是，太陽花事件為這些問題提供的解答卻是錯誤的。一、革命與民主的錯亂：太陽花要角皆不否認其「革命性」及「推翻政府」的訴求；但占領立院的革命理由不足，而民主的倫理已失。二、台獨與台灣利益的錯亂：運動以主張「逐條審議服貿條例」之程序正義始，卻以推翻服貿協議、反對貨貿協議及抵制自由經濟示範區收尾，亦即是台獨立場的圖窮匕現。但台獨是否等於台灣利益？或台灣利益是否即是台獨？三、台獨與經濟政策的錯亂：太陽花欲以台獨路線來解決台灣的經濟難題，並把台灣經濟難題歸因於漸趨密切的兩岸關係；因此主張抑制兩岸經貿交流，並質疑全球化。但台獨能解決台灣的經濟難題嗎？或台獨反而將使台灣邊緣化而經濟更陷困境？
尤其值得深思的是：正當民進黨內的許多老一輩人物開始嘗試修正台獨路線，甚至主張「凍結《台獨黨綱》」及「改提《中華民國決議文》」之際，太陽花新世代竟然掀起了台獨意識的大回潮。西哲羅素嘗言：「每一個人的政治認知皆是從石器時代開始。」當綠營許多老輩人物三十多年來「用盡了台獨／認識了台獨」，而開始考慮「修正台獨／甩掉台獨」，竟被那些初嘗台獨思想的太陽花人物一舉又拖回到台獨的「石器時代」。而今民進黨已成太陽花的俘虜，被挾持著返回台獨，這是大約倒退三十年的大逆流，令人怵目驚心。
蔡英文最近有兩大謬論。一、她說：台獨已是「年輕世代的天然成分」。但是，台灣新世代的台獨思維，卻是長期在綠營及民進黨的哈哈鏡下，對台灣史及中華民國內涵的變造、扭曲及汙蔑中教育而成的。它不是「天然」，而是「人造」。比如說，台獨稱「中華民國是外來政權」，其中「天然／人造」的比例如何？二、蔡英文說：民進黨若選得好，中國也會向民進黨調整。但習近平卻說，如果九二共識被破壞，將是「基礎不牢／地動山搖」。可見，太陽花若沉溺台獨石器時代猶可說是涉世未深，但蔡英文竟也發表「台獨是天然成分／中國會向民進黨調整」的謬論，卻是匪夷所思。難道這三十年來台獨在世局及國情中的歷練，皆因一次太陽花又退回到三十年前？
事實上，台獨不是「天然成分」，其大部分皆是出自「人為構造」，否則民進黨中即不會出現「凍結台獨黨綱」的思維；而台灣的外在因素，如全球化的挑戰及「地動山搖」的威脅，也不見得會「向民進黨調整」，而須要以智慧及理性來因應。
蔡英文似以太陽花的「台獨天然成分」為喜，實則民進黨當以面對這群石器時代的新台獨為憂；蔡英文似以「中國會向民進黨調整」為傲，實則民進黨更當以「地動山搖」為慮。前述蔡英文的兩大謬論，幾至不識真偽、不辨吉凶的地步，以此心態而欲重返執政，豈非奔車朽索？
蔡英文將台獨視作天然成分，不啻明示她將只能接受之而無法改變之，這不啻在自己的脖子上套上台獨枷鎖，十足是一尾蓋頭鰻；而台獨方案可能面對的政經災難後果，則是蔡若重返執政必須承負的政治責任。蔡英文公開籠絡諂媚台獨，卻顯然不能以台獨為治國方案；其中的矛盾，若陷蔡英文、民進黨及整個台灣於「地動山搖」，試問將伊於胡底？
太陽花反映的民心不滿及國政疑慮皆是可理解的，但解決台灣世代剝奪、經濟困境、全球化挑戰及兩岸競合的方案絕非台獨路線。野人獻曝的太陽花或許猶可沾沾自喜於為台灣找到了台獨的政經方案，卻渾然不知這是石器時代的遺物；但蔡英文與民進黨不可不識其真偽吉凶，更不可隨波逐流，自欺欺人。
Tuesday, March 17, 2015
The Sunflower Student Movement: Successful Protest, Failed Evolution
The Sunflower Student Movement: Successful Protest, Failed Evolution
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 18, 2015
Executive Summary: Last March 18, opponents of the STA occupied the legislature. Today is the one year anniversary of that occupation, commonly known as the Sunflower Student Movement. The occupation impacted people. It sent political, social, and economic shockwaves throughout Taiwan, and led to the year end KMT election debacle. Today, on the one year anniversary of that event, we can evaluate it calmly and thoroughly. We can reflect on both the Sunflower Student Movements' successes and failures.
Full Text Below:
Last March 18, opponents of the STA occupied the legislature. Today is the one year anniversary of that occupation, commonly known as the Sunflower Student Movement. The occupation impacted people. It sent political, social, and economic shockwaves throughout Taiwan, and led to the year end KMT election debacle. Today, on the one year anniversary of that event, we can evaluate it calmly and thoroughly. We can reflect on both the Sunflower Student Movements' successes and failures.
If one considers only the force and impact of a social movement, the Sunflower Student Movement was undoubtedly a success. It attracted attention from society, and established solidarity with the public. It forced those in power to make concessions. The participants demonstrated organizational skills and the ability to make transnational connections. They enabled outsiders to see the new generation's vitality and creativity. They successfully motivated the younger generation to confront the difficulties it faces. The large turnout among younger voters during the year end election, and the government's new found respect for the cyber army, were positive developments. The student movement inspired youth in Hong Kong, and ignited the flames of the Occupy Central movement as a spillover effect.
But if one considers Taiwan's democratic evolution, the student movement was a shock to the system, one that inflicted grave damage to the rule of law on Taiwan. This "youth" and "student" social movement won public sympathy. But the occupation of the legislature crossed the line for social protest by trampling over the rule of law. It laid siege to a police precint station, and turned a deaf ear to appeals to reason. Under the guise of a moral crusade, it endangered the public through institutional paralysis. A closer look tells all. Many of those directing the student movement from behind the scenes, were members of the DPP inner circle. The students may not have felt used. But subsequent developments showed that they were. The DPP effortlessly reaped the fruits of the student movement, as evidenced by its nine in one election victory. Was this not a setback for democracy?
The 3/18 student movement was dualistic in nature, due to a combination of accidental and inevitable circumstances. At the macro level, recent youth protests around the world have all been staged events. The Sunflower Student Movement on Taiwan was of course influenced by the color revolutions in North Africa and Ukraine, and the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US. Angry youths felt the need to speak out. At the micro level, the recent economic downturn led to wage stagnation. Soaring housing prices led to a new generation suffering from "relative deprivation". As a result, the STA became a fuse that ignited younger generation collective frenzy.
But comparing the 3/18 student movement to the "color revolutions" is wrong and dangerous. The nations that underwent color revolutions were all authoritarian or totalitarian regimes which have not held elections for several decades. Taiwan is different. It may be an immature democracy, but its system is sound. In any event, the mobs that occupied government buildings in protest, trampled over democracy and the rule of law. Occupy Wall Street protesters in New York were evicted on grounds that the park needed cleaning. The Sunflower Student Movement occupied the legislature for over 20 days. Wang Jin-pyng used the occupation as a means of political retaliation, because Ma Ying-jeou accused Wang of influence peddling. Otherwise the occupation would have been impossible. Mobs occupied the Legislative Yuan, then the Executive Yuan. For them, the government and authority did not exist. Had the Executive Yuan not been cleared that night, Taiwan might well have descended into chaos. Do people really wish to see the nation brought to that level?
Taiwan society has long been happy to see people stand up and fight for their rights. The general public has long been compassionate towards the disadvantaged. But the Sunflower Student Movement resorted to illegal occupations. It took advantage of student naivete to make extreme political demands. It undermined public authority and endangered social order. It made rational consideration of the issues impossible. The legislature is responsible for determining national policy. The mobs brought the legislature to a standstill. They then began debating national policy on the streets outside the legislature. The irony did not escape public notice. If people really think this is the way a democracy should operate, then Taiwan's democratization efforts over the past 20 years has been in vain.
So how should the public respond to the Sunflower Student Movement? The honest response is to seek solutions for low wages, high unemployment, and high prices inside the system. The honest response would be to consider the Executive Yuan sponsored "four methods to increase salaries" and Wen-Je Ko's proposal to build more social housing. A more hypocritical response would be to pay lip service to cyber army demands, but do nothing to resolve their predicament or make substantial improvements. The worst response possible would be to hail a few of the leaders as heroes, encourage them to continue their struggle, profit politically from their efforts, then ignore the younger generations' dilemma. Those who have participated involved in youth movements in the past, should recognize a selfish politician when they see one.
太陽花：成功的抗爭 失敗的演化
2015-03-18聯合報
去年三月十八日反服貿群眾占領立法院抗爭，至今屆滿周年。這場俗稱「太陽花學運」的事件，除在當時激盪人心，更對台灣政治、社會、經濟各方面都造成了衝擊，並導致國民黨去年底選舉的大敗。在事件周年回顧這場波瀾，我們不妨從比較冷靜而深刻的角度，來反省太陽花運動的得與失。
純就一場社會運動的能量與效果而言，太陽花學運無疑是成功的。它不僅吸引了社會的廣泛注目，它也獲取了許多民眾的聲援，並迫使執政者作出退讓。參與者在抗爭過程中展現組織整合、跨國連線的能力，讓外界看到新世代的活力與創意，也成功喚起社會對這一代青年困境的正視。這點，表現在去年底年輕世代的踴躍投票，以及政府重視「婉君」力量，都是正面的發展。甚至，這場學運也隱然鼓舞了香港青年的熱情，點燃了「占中」的火花，這是它的溢出效果。
但是，如果放在台灣民主的進程看，這場學運對於政治的演化卻是一顆意外的炸彈，對台灣好不容易建立的法治價值造成了嚴重破壞。原因是，這個以「青年」和「學生」面貌為表的社運，雖以其特殊的清純攫取了民眾的同情，但它採取的「占領國會」手段，卻踰越了社會抗爭的法治界線，包括後來的包圍警局及拒絕應訊等，皆有假藉抗爭的道德性來癱瘓體制的危險。深一層看，學運的幕後指導者不少是來自民進黨內外環的綠色力量，也許學生們不覺得自己受到「利用」，但後來的發展卻產生了這種效果。民進黨不費吹灰之力，僅拾取學運的落果即在九合一選舉大勝，這難道不是民主的歧路與中挫？
三一八學運之所以有這樣的「雙面性」，是時空條件碰撞的偶然與必然。從大環境看，青年抗爭是近幾年全球各地都在上演的活動，台灣的太陽花自然也是受到北非和烏克蘭的顏色革命及美國「占領華爾街」運動的啟發，覺得青年憤怒不吐不快。從小環境看，近年經濟成長的低迷導致薪資的停滯，房價的飛漲導致新世代「相對剝奪感」的惡化；於是，一個服貿協議的導火線，便引爆了青年世代的集體狂潮。
然而，把三一八學運放在「顏色革命」這樣的脈絡中類比，其實是一個錯誤而危險的思維。那些發生花朵革命或顏色革命的國家，都是數十年未曾改選的獨裁或極權體制，而台灣則是一個不成熟但體制完備的民主國家；無論如何，群眾以「占領官署」的非常手段從事抗爭，完全踰越了民主與法治。試想，即使是紐約的「占領華爾街」示威，最後也僅以「維護祖科提公園的清潔」為由，便將示威者驅逐；而太陽花學運能占領立法院達廿多日，其實是王金平藉此反擊馬英九對他的關說指控，否則絕無可能。再說，群眾在占領國會後又攻占行政院，幾乎是視政府和公權力如無物；如果當夜行政院沒有設法清場，那麼，台灣陷入無政府狀態不是沒可能的事。人們願意看到國家社會墜入那步田地嗎？
簡言之，台灣社會一向很樂於看到不同群體的群眾站出來爭取權益，一般民眾對於弱勢群體也始終懷抱同情；但是，太陽花運動訴諸非法的占領手段，藉用學生的清純挾帶偏激的政治訴求，不僅使公權力與社會秩序瀕於傾頹的險境，也導致外界無法以理性的態度探討相關問題的是非曲直。尤其諷刺的是，理當議決國家大政的立法院遭到癱瘓，大批烏合群眾卻在街道上大談國是；如果人們覺得這是一個民主國家的正常景象，那麼台灣過去廿多年的民主化努力實如付東流。
面對太陽花的怒潮，社會大眾又應如何看待？比較誠懇的辦法，應該是各界努力從制度上尋求破解低薪、高失業及高房價之道，例如行政院提出「加薪四法」、柯文哲承諾廣建社會住宅，皆在朝此方向前進。比較虛偽的應付，則是言必稱青年與「婉君」，表面上對他們爭相拉攏與呵護，卻無意對其困境作任何實質的改善。更惡劣的方式，則是將少數領袖捧為英雄，鼓動他們繼續在各個陣線進行抗爭，藉此收割自己的政治利益，卻對整個世代的處境不聞不問。曾參與那場運動的青年，應該能分辨得出自私政治人物的嘴臉吧！
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 18, 2015
Executive Summary: Last March 18, opponents of the STA occupied the legislature. Today is the one year anniversary of that occupation, commonly known as the Sunflower Student Movement. The occupation impacted people. It sent political, social, and economic shockwaves throughout Taiwan, and led to the year end KMT election debacle. Today, on the one year anniversary of that event, we can evaluate it calmly and thoroughly. We can reflect on both the Sunflower Student Movements' successes and failures.
Full Text Below:
Last March 18, opponents of the STA occupied the legislature. Today is the one year anniversary of that occupation, commonly known as the Sunflower Student Movement. The occupation impacted people. It sent political, social, and economic shockwaves throughout Taiwan, and led to the year end KMT election debacle. Today, on the one year anniversary of that event, we can evaluate it calmly and thoroughly. We can reflect on both the Sunflower Student Movements' successes and failures.
If one considers only the force and impact of a social movement, the Sunflower Student Movement was undoubtedly a success. It attracted attention from society, and established solidarity with the public. It forced those in power to make concessions. The participants demonstrated organizational skills and the ability to make transnational connections. They enabled outsiders to see the new generation's vitality and creativity. They successfully motivated the younger generation to confront the difficulties it faces. The large turnout among younger voters during the year end election, and the government's new found respect for the cyber army, were positive developments. The student movement inspired youth in Hong Kong, and ignited the flames of the Occupy Central movement as a spillover effect.
But if one considers Taiwan's democratic evolution, the student movement was a shock to the system, one that inflicted grave damage to the rule of law on Taiwan. This "youth" and "student" social movement won public sympathy. But the occupation of the legislature crossed the line for social protest by trampling over the rule of law. It laid siege to a police precint station, and turned a deaf ear to appeals to reason. Under the guise of a moral crusade, it endangered the public through institutional paralysis. A closer look tells all. Many of those directing the student movement from behind the scenes, were members of the DPP inner circle. The students may not have felt used. But subsequent developments showed that they were. The DPP effortlessly reaped the fruits of the student movement, as evidenced by its nine in one election victory. Was this not a setback for democracy?
The 3/18 student movement was dualistic in nature, due to a combination of accidental and inevitable circumstances. At the macro level, recent youth protests around the world have all been staged events. The Sunflower Student Movement on Taiwan was of course influenced by the color revolutions in North Africa and Ukraine, and the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US. Angry youths felt the need to speak out. At the micro level, the recent economic downturn led to wage stagnation. Soaring housing prices led to a new generation suffering from "relative deprivation". As a result, the STA became a fuse that ignited younger generation collective frenzy.
But comparing the 3/18 student movement to the "color revolutions" is wrong and dangerous. The nations that underwent color revolutions were all authoritarian or totalitarian regimes which have not held elections for several decades. Taiwan is different. It may be an immature democracy, but its system is sound. In any event, the mobs that occupied government buildings in protest, trampled over democracy and the rule of law. Occupy Wall Street protesters in New York were evicted on grounds that the park needed cleaning. The Sunflower Student Movement occupied the legislature for over 20 days. Wang Jin-pyng used the occupation as a means of political retaliation, because Ma Ying-jeou accused Wang of influence peddling. Otherwise the occupation would have been impossible. Mobs occupied the Legislative Yuan, then the Executive Yuan. For them, the government and authority did not exist. Had the Executive Yuan not been cleared that night, Taiwan might well have descended into chaos. Do people really wish to see the nation brought to that level?
Taiwan society has long been happy to see people stand up and fight for their rights. The general public has long been compassionate towards the disadvantaged. But the Sunflower Student Movement resorted to illegal occupations. It took advantage of student naivete to make extreme political demands. It undermined public authority and endangered social order. It made rational consideration of the issues impossible. The legislature is responsible for determining national policy. The mobs brought the legislature to a standstill. They then began debating national policy on the streets outside the legislature. The irony did not escape public notice. If people really think this is the way a democracy should operate, then Taiwan's democratization efforts over the past 20 years has been in vain.
So how should the public respond to the Sunflower Student Movement? The honest response is to seek solutions for low wages, high unemployment, and high prices inside the system. The honest response would be to consider the Executive Yuan sponsored "four methods to increase salaries" and Wen-Je Ko's proposal to build more social housing. A more hypocritical response would be to pay lip service to cyber army demands, but do nothing to resolve their predicament or make substantial improvements. The worst response possible would be to hail a few of the leaders as heroes, encourage them to continue their struggle, profit politically from their efforts, then ignore the younger generations' dilemma. Those who have participated involved in youth movements in the past, should recognize a selfish politician when they see one.
太陽花：成功的抗爭 失敗的演化
2015-03-18聯合報
去年三月十八日反服貿群眾占領立法院抗爭，至今屆滿周年。這場俗稱「太陽花學運」的事件，除在當時激盪人心，更對台灣政治、社會、經濟各方面都造成了衝擊，並導致國民黨去年底選舉的大敗。在事件周年回顧這場波瀾，我們不妨從比較冷靜而深刻的角度，來反省太陽花運動的得與失。
純就一場社會運動的能量與效果而言，太陽花學運無疑是成功的。它不僅吸引了社會的廣泛注目，它也獲取了許多民眾的聲援，並迫使執政者作出退讓。參與者在抗爭過程中展現組織整合、跨國連線的能力，讓外界看到新世代的活力與創意，也成功喚起社會對這一代青年困境的正視。這點，表現在去年底年輕世代的踴躍投票，以及政府重視「婉君」力量，都是正面的發展。甚至，這場學運也隱然鼓舞了香港青年的熱情，點燃了「占中」的火花，這是它的溢出效果。
但是，如果放在台灣民主的進程看，這場學運對於政治的演化卻是一顆意外的炸彈，對台灣好不容易建立的法治價值造成了嚴重破壞。原因是，這個以「青年」和「學生」面貌為表的社運，雖以其特殊的清純攫取了民眾的同情，但它採取的「占領國會」手段，卻踰越了社會抗爭的法治界線，包括後來的包圍警局及拒絕應訊等，皆有假藉抗爭的道德性來癱瘓體制的危險。深一層看，學運的幕後指導者不少是來自民進黨內外環的綠色力量，也許學生們不覺得自己受到「利用」，但後來的發展卻產生了這種效果。民進黨不費吹灰之力，僅拾取學運的落果即在九合一選舉大勝，這難道不是民主的歧路與中挫？
三一八學運之所以有這樣的「雙面性」，是時空條件碰撞的偶然與必然。從大環境看，青年抗爭是近幾年全球各地都在上演的活動，台灣的太陽花自然也是受到北非和烏克蘭的顏色革命及美國「占領華爾街」運動的啟發，覺得青年憤怒不吐不快。從小環境看，近年經濟成長的低迷導致薪資的停滯，房價的飛漲導致新世代「相對剝奪感」的惡化；於是，一個服貿協議的導火線，便引爆了青年世代的集體狂潮。
然而，把三一八學運放在「顏色革命」這樣的脈絡中類比，其實是一個錯誤而危險的思維。那些發生花朵革命或顏色革命的國家，都是數十年未曾改選的獨裁或極權體制，而台灣則是一個不成熟但體制完備的民主國家；無論如何，群眾以「占領官署」的非常手段從事抗爭，完全踰越了民主與法治。試想，即使是紐約的「占領華爾街」示威，最後也僅以「維護祖科提公園的清潔」為由，便將示威者驅逐；而太陽花學運能占領立法院達廿多日，其實是王金平藉此反擊馬英九對他的關說指控，否則絕無可能。再說，群眾在占領國會後又攻占行政院，幾乎是視政府和公權力如無物；如果當夜行政院沒有設法清場，那麼，台灣陷入無政府狀態不是沒可能的事。人們願意看到國家社會墜入那步田地嗎？
簡言之，台灣社會一向很樂於看到不同群體的群眾站出來爭取權益，一般民眾對於弱勢群體也始終懷抱同情；但是，太陽花運動訴諸非法的占領手段，藉用學生的清純挾帶偏激的政治訴求，不僅使公權力與社會秩序瀕於傾頹的險境，也導致外界無法以理性的態度探討相關問題的是非曲直。尤其諷刺的是，理當議決國家大政的立法院遭到癱瘓，大批烏合群眾卻在街道上大談國是；如果人們覺得這是一個民主國家的正常景象，那麼台灣過去廿多年的民主化努力實如付東流。
面對太陽花的怒潮，社會大眾又應如何看待？比較誠懇的辦法，應該是各界努力從制度上尋求破解低薪、高失業及高房價之道，例如行政院提出「加薪四法」、柯文哲承諾廣建社會住宅，皆在朝此方向前進。比較虛偽的應付，則是言必稱青年與「婉君」，表面上對他們爭相拉攏與呵護，卻無意對其困境作任何實質的改善。更惡劣的方式，則是將少數領袖捧為英雄，鼓動他們繼續在各個陣線進行抗爭，藉此收割自己的政治利益，卻對整個世代的處境不聞不問。曾參與那場運動的青年，應該能分辨得出自私政治人物的嘴臉吧！
Monday, March 16, 2015
We Welcome the Sunflower Student Movement into the System
We Welcome the Sunflower Student Movement into the System
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 17, 2015
Executive Summary: The Sunflower Student Movement has ended. Student leaders and closely linked citizens' groups are licking their lips as they gear up for the elections. The Sunflower Student Movement leaders have the passion and determination to foment revolution. They think and act outside the system. They have no shortage of revolutionary policy ideas. But no matter how passionate their battle cries, participating in elections amounts to recognition of the system. It means accepting reform within the system instead of protesting the system from without. It means seeking the most votes, rather than recruiting most revolutionary-minded comrades.
Full Text Below:
Tomorrow is the first anniversary of the Sunflower Student Movement. One year ago, the leaders of the student movement stormed the legislature. But even they probably did not realize that they had just started the largest student movement in Taiwan's history. The impact was a political tsunami that altered Taiwan's political stage and political atmosphere.
The Sunflower Student Movement did not materialize suddenly out of nowhere. It originated with interpersonal relations and shared ideological perspectives. It originated with opposition to the demolition and relocation of Ta Pu, and opposition to the Want Daily/China Times news organization. The flames of this increasingly politicized student movement originally belonged to a social movement. But they were vigorously fanned until they became a political movement for a specific political party.
Consider the broader social context. When Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, the two sides of the Strait began formal negotiations. Following a brief slump, the defeated DPP launched a new “anti-China” opposition movement. The anti-China sentiments of the DPP and its allies was cloaked in the rhetoric of "democracy, human rights, and social justice". But their real motivation was "Taiwan independence consciousness, Taiwanese consciousness, and anti-KMT consciousness". This opposition force advanced on the KMT. The Ma Ying-jeou government's cross-Strait rationale was rooted in economic interests and Taiwan's survival and prosperity. But cold economic data and remote international issues, invoked by ivory tower bureaucrats, failed to impress. They were no match for feelings and emotions.
After five or six years of agitation and ferment, the conditions for the Sunflower Student Movement were ripe. The Ma vs. Wang power struggle divided the KMT. The administration and the legislature could not work together. Ruling party rifts stalled the STA. Flames from the student movement spread upwards through the political cracks, eventually erupting into full scale student protests and civic movements. Recall the connivance of those in charge of the Legislative Yuan. Recall the political calculations of Ma and Wang -- their moves and counter moves. Under normal circumstances, as soon as the students stormed the legislature, they would have been immediately expelled. They would never have been able to continue their occupation and receive endless outside aid. The sunflower would never have bloomed.
Sunflower Student Movement influence is significant. Is that influence positive or negative? No matter. Either way, it was a rebellion of Taiwan's younger generation. It was a generational rebellion. Active participants in the student movement were mostly in the 20 to 40 age group. The Sunflower Student Movement was their movement. Movemetn leaders were actually quite opaque in their decision-making. The vast majority of participants were not privy to the “inner circle”. Nevertheless they became enthusiastic participants. They protested, attacked, propagandized, maintained discipline, cleaned, administered medical care, and learned by example. The manner in which they participated in the adult world has been heavily criticized. But in the passion and collective memory is unquestionably theirs.
These passions and memories have altered Taiwan's political landscape for the next 20 or 30 years. Many examples illustrate this point. Take Wen-Je Ko, for example. He said that before the student movement, he was only slightly ahead in the polls. After the student movement, the gap between him and Sean Lien widened significantly. Polls show that the younger generation supported Wen-Je Ko three to five times more than Sean Lien. As we all know, the KMT suffered an unprecedented defeat during last year's nine in one elections. The Taipei mayoral battle highlighted a key factor – the ideological and physical aging of the KMT. The Taipei mayoral election was closely watched and played a decisive role. The Sunflower Student Movement will continue to impact Taiwan's political landscape. Wen-Je Ko illustrates this point.
Equally important is the matter of cross-Strait relations. The media concluded that once the student movement blocked trade negotiations on the STA and MTA, the Ma Xi meeting was probably a bust. The Sunflower Student Movement interrupted Ma Ying-jeou's “[Mainland] China agenda." . If this agenda was Ma's personal agenda, it would not be a matter of importance. But this agenda is critical to Taiwan's survival and prosperity. Did the Sunflower Student Movement have any positive value? Perhaps it reminded leaders on both sides that fairness and justice are important. Emotional factors must also be considered. That said, we must ask the younger generation on Taiwan, what constitutes a reasonable cross-Strait policy? What is the proper balance between economic benefits, social justice, dignity, and sovereignty? This is the first anniversary of the Sunflower Student Movement, But society has yet to reach a consensus on these key issues. Obviously election season will lead to even greater divisions. Such divisions are not to Taiwan's benefit. When can we finally approach these questions calmly and peacefully?
The Sunflower Student Movement has ended. Student leaders and closely linked citizens' groups are licking their lips as they gear up for the elections. The Sunflower Student Movement leaders have the passion and determination to foment revolution. They think and act outside the system. They have no shortage of revolutionary policy ideas. But no matter how passionate their battle cries, participating in elections amounts to recognition of the system. It means accepting reform within the system instead of protesting the system from without. It means seeking the most votes, rather than recruiting most revolutionary-minded comrades. Under these circumstances, Sunflower Student Movement participation in the elections means that it must become more responsible than other party factions. In particular, it must seek cooperation and compromise with voters who hold different positions. It must determine what is necessary for Taiwan's survival and prosperity. It must seek the most feasible option, rather than the most “idealistic” goal.
This is our hope for the Sunflower Student Movement on its one year anniversary.
社論－歡迎太陽花進入體制
2015年03月17日 04:10
本報訊
明天是太陽花學運1周年，那個晚上，當帶領學運的人衝進立法院時，包括他們自己在內，大概都沒有想到，不但開啟了台灣最大規模的學生運動，後續效應更如同「政治海嘯」般，嚴重衝擊並改變了台灣的政治板塊與政治氛圍。
太陽花學運不是無源之水突如其來，從人際脈絡與思想淵源來看，它來自於從反大埔拆遷、反旺中等議題以來，一系列越來越政治化的學生運動，這些原本屬於「社會性」的議題，在不斷延燒之下，逐漸變成了針對特定政黨的「政治性」議題。
從更寬廣的社會環境來觀察，2008年馬英九執政後，開啟了兩岸正式談判協商，民進黨則在重挫敗選後，經過短暫的低潮，開啟了以「反傾中」、「反親中」為號召的新「反對運動」。民進黨及其周邊團體的「反傾中」、「反親中」論述，是以「台獨意識」、「台灣人意識」、「反國民黨意識」為核心，卻包裝上「民主」、「人權」、「社會公義」外衣。面對反對勢力的進逼，國民黨、馬英九政府的兩岸論述向來是「經濟利益」掛帥，間或談台灣的生存發展空間，但冰冷的經濟數據和遙遠的國際議題，從不食人間煙火的政府官僚口中說出，總是無法打動人心，無法和情感與情緒對抗。
經過了5、6年的激盪與醞釀，爆發太陽花學運的客觀形勢已經營造成熟，國民黨卻在「馬王政爭」後，陷入嚴重的實質分裂，府院國會之間無法通力合作。執政裂痕不但造成服貿協議遲遲無法過關，學運的火苗更立刻從政治縫隙向上延燒，最後成為波瀾壯闊的大型學潮與公民運動。我們可以反向思考，如果不是立法院主事者的縱容，以及馬王之間的政治計算與攻防，在通常情況下，學運學生在衝進立法院之後，應該會立即遭到驅離，完全不會存在占領議場以及外援源源不絕的景況，太陽花也就沒有綻放的機會。
太陽花學運的影響是重大的，首先，不論其是正是負，但這確實是一場台灣年輕世代的總反叛，是「整個世代的反叛」。積極參與學運的成員，多是以20至40歲年齡層為主的年輕人，太陽花學運確實是他們的運動。他們當中，由少數人擔任領袖，進行實際上極為封閉的決策，絕大多數參與者無緣進入議場，卻依然成為積極的成員：抗議、出擊、宣傳、維安、清潔、醫護、學習等等都是他們參與的方式，成人世界對他們有很多批評，但無論如何，這是那個世代的激情，那個世代的共同記憶。
也正是這樣的激情與記憶，台灣政局因而大大改變，更可能影響未來至少20年、30年的台灣政治，很多例子可以說明這一點。以柯文哲為例，他自己曾表示，在學運之前，民調支持度僅微幅領先；在學運之後，他與連勝文的差距明顯拉大，各家民調更顯示，柯文哲在年輕世代的支持度竟以3到5倍的幅度超越連勝文。眾所周知，去年九合一大選，國民黨之所以空前的慘輸，台北市長一戰凸顯國民黨在思想與體質上的老化，是關鍵因素之一。台北市長這個職務，動見觀瞻，舉足輕重，太陽花學運對台灣政治格局的衝擊，顯然將會持續發酵，柯P熱正說明了這一點。
同樣重要的課題是兩岸關係，有媒體評論認為，在學運之後，服貿協議擱置、貨貿談判達成遙遙無期，馬習會更已破局，太陽花學運已中斷了馬英九的「中國議程」。然而，如果只是馬英九個人的中國議程，那還是小問題，真正大的問題在「台灣生存發展的議程」。在這方面，太陽花學運若說有正面價值，那就是再度提醒兩岸領導層：公平正義的議題極其重要，情感情緒的因素也需要更為重視，但即使如此，我們仍要追問：對台灣年輕世代來說，什麼是合理、妥適的兩岸議程？什麼是經濟利益、社會公義和主權尊嚴與主體意識的平衡點？這個大哉問，在太陽花學運1周年後，社會仍然沒有共識，很明顯地還會因為選舉熱季而更為撕裂，但這樣的撕裂終究不是台灣之福，我們究竟要何時才能冷靜、持平的深入探討？
從這個角度而來的延伸思考是，在太陽花學運之後，學生領袖以及和他們有密切連結的公民團體與相關人士正摩拳擦掌準備投入選舉。乍看之下，太陽花學運的主導者曾經有「革命」的激情與決心，有「體制外抗爭」的思維與行動，更不缺革命性質的政策主張，但參與選舉就不是搞革命，無論再怎麼激情吶喊，參選就等同對現有體制的承認，基本邏輯就是「體制內改革」而非體制外抗爭，是爭取最多民眾選票，而非發掘最多革命同志。在這樣的前提下，太陽花學運主事者的參選或許有其積極意義，那就是必須更負責任地和其他黨派、尤其是不同立場的選民共謀合作、妥協，找出現實「台灣生存發展議程」的最可行方案，而非理想中的最美好方案。
在太陽花學運1周年之際，我們有這樣的期盼。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 17, 2015
Executive Summary: The Sunflower Student Movement has ended. Student leaders and closely linked citizens' groups are licking their lips as they gear up for the elections. The Sunflower Student Movement leaders have the passion and determination to foment revolution. They think and act outside the system. They have no shortage of revolutionary policy ideas. But no matter how passionate their battle cries, participating in elections amounts to recognition of the system. It means accepting reform within the system instead of protesting the system from without. It means seeking the most votes, rather than recruiting most revolutionary-minded comrades.
Full Text Below:
Tomorrow is the first anniversary of the Sunflower Student Movement. One year ago, the leaders of the student movement stormed the legislature. But even they probably did not realize that they had just started the largest student movement in Taiwan's history. The impact was a political tsunami that altered Taiwan's political stage and political atmosphere.
The Sunflower Student Movement did not materialize suddenly out of nowhere. It originated with interpersonal relations and shared ideological perspectives. It originated with opposition to the demolition and relocation of Ta Pu, and opposition to the Want Daily/China Times news organization. The flames of this increasingly politicized student movement originally belonged to a social movement. But they were vigorously fanned until they became a political movement for a specific political party.
Consider the broader social context. When Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, the two sides of the Strait began formal negotiations. Following a brief slump, the defeated DPP launched a new “anti-China” opposition movement. The anti-China sentiments of the DPP and its allies was cloaked in the rhetoric of "democracy, human rights, and social justice". But their real motivation was "Taiwan independence consciousness, Taiwanese consciousness, and anti-KMT consciousness". This opposition force advanced on the KMT. The Ma Ying-jeou government's cross-Strait rationale was rooted in economic interests and Taiwan's survival and prosperity. But cold economic data and remote international issues, invoked by ivory tower bureaucrats, failed to impress. They were no match for feelings and emotions.
After five or six years of agitation and ferment, the conditions for the Sunflower Student Movement were ripe. The Ma vs. Wang power struggle divided the KMT. The administration and the legislature could not work together. Ruling party rifts stalled the STA. Flames from the student movement spread upwards through the political cracks, eventually erupting into full scale student protests and civic movements. Recall the connivance of those in charge of the Legislative Yuan. Recall the political calculations of Ma and Wang -- their moves and counter moves. Under normal circumstances, as soon as the students stormed the legislature, they would have been immediately expelled. They would never have been able to continue their occupation and receive endless outside aid. The sunflower would never have bloomed.
Sunflower Student Movement influence is significant. Is that influence positive or negative? No matter. Either way, it was a rebellion of Taiwan's younger generation. It was a generational rebellion. Active participants in the student movement were mostly in the 20 to 40 age group. The Sunflower Student Movement was their movement. Movemetn leaders were actually quite opaque in their decision-making. The vast majority of participants were not privy to the “inner circle”. Nevertheless they became enthusiastic participants. They protested, attacked, propagandized, maintained discipline, cleaned, administered medical care, and learned by example. The manner in which they participated in the adult world has been heavily criticized. But in the passion and collective memory is unquestionably theirs.
These passions and memories have altered Taiwan's political landscape for the next 20 or 30 years. Many examples illustrate this point. Take Wen-Je Ko, for example. He said that before the student movement, he was only slightly ahead in the polls. After the student movement, the gap between him and Sean Lien widened significantly. Polls show that the younger generation supported Wen-Je Ko three to five times more than Sean Lien. As we all know, the KMT suffered an unprecedented defeat during last year's nine in one elections. The Taipei mayoral battle highlighted a key factor – the ideological and physical aging of the KMT. The Taipei mayoral election was closely watched and played a decisive role. The Sunflower Student Movement will continue to impact Taiwan's political landscape. Wen-Je Ko illustrates this point.
Equally important is the matter of cross-Strait relations. The media concluded that once the student movement blocked trade negotiations on the STA and MTA, the Ma Xi meeting was probably a bust. The Sunflower Student Movement interrupted Ma Ying-jeou's “[Mainland] China agenda." . If this agenda was Ma's personal agenda, it would not be a matter of importance. But this agenda is critical to Taiwan's survival and prosperity. Did the Sunflower Student Movement have any positive value? Perhaps it reminded leaders on both sides that fairness and justice are important. Emotional factors must also be considered. That said, we must ask the younger generation on Taiwan, what constitutes a reasonable cross-Strait policy? What is the proper balance between economic benefits, social justice, dignity, and sovereignty? This is the first anniversary of the Sunflower Student Movement, But society has yet to reach a consensus on these key issues. Obviously election season will lead to even greater divisions. Such divisions are not to Taiwan's benefit. When can we finally approach these questions calmly and peacefully?
The Sunflower Student Movement has ended. Student leaders and closely linked citizens' groups are licking their lips as they gear up for the elections. The Sunflower Student Movement leaders have the passion and determination to foment revolution. They think and act outside the system. They have no shortage of revolutionary policy ideas. But no matter how passionate their battle cries, participating in elections amounts to recognition of the system. It means accepting reform within the system instead of protesting the system from without. It means seeking the most votes, rather than recruiting most revolutionary-minded comrades. Under these circumstances, Sunflower Student Movement participation in the elections means that it must become more responsible than other party factions. In particular, it must seek cooperation and compromise with voters who hold different positions. It must determine what is necessary for Taiwan's survival and prosperity. It must seek the most feasible option, rather than the most “idealistic” goal.
This is our hope for the Sunflower Student Movement on its one year anniversary.
社論－歡迎太陽花進入體制
2015年03月17日 04:10
本報訊
明天是太陽花學運1周年，那個晚上，當帶領學運的人衝進立法院時，包括他們自己在內，大概都沒有想到，不但開啟了台灣最大規模的學生運動，後續效應更如同「政治海嘯」般，嚴重衝擊並改變了台灣的政治板塊與政治氛圍。
太陽花學運不是無源之水突如其來，從人際脈絡與思想淵源來看，它來自於從反大埔拆遷、反旺中等議題以來，一系列越來越政治化的學生運動，這些原本屬於「社會性」的議題，在不斷延燒之下，逐漸變成了針對特定政黨的「政治性」議題。
從更寬廣的社會環境來觀察，2008年馬英九執政後，開啟了兩岸正式談判協商，民進黨則在重挫敗選後，經過短暫的低潮，開啟了以「反傾中」、「反親中」為號召的新「反對運動」。民進黨及其周邊團體的「反傾中」、「反親中」論述，是以「台獨意識」、「台灣人意識」、「反國民黨意識」為核心，卻包裝上「民主」、「人權」、「社會公義」外衣。面對反對勢力的進逼，國民黨、馬英九政府的兩岸論述向來是「經濟利益」掛帥，間或談台灣的生存發展空間，但冰冷的經濟數據和遙遠的國際議題，從不食人間煙火的政府官僚口中說出，總是無法打動人心，無法和情感與情緒對抗。
經過了5、6年的激盪與醞釀，爆發太陽花學運的客觀形勢已經營造成熟，國民黨卻在「馬王政爭」後，陷入嚴重的實質分裂，府院國會之間無法通力合作。執政裂痕不但造成服貿協議遲遲無法過關，學運的火苗更立刻從政治縫隙向上延燒，最後成為波瀾壯闊的大型學潮與公民運動。我們可以反向思考，如果不是立法院主事者的縱容，以及馬王之間的政治計算與攻防，在通常情況下，學運學生在衝進立法院之後，應該會立即遭到驅離，完全不會存在占領議場以及外援源源不絕的景況，太陽花也就沒有綻放的機會。
太陽花學運的影響是重大的，首先，不論其是正是負，但這確實是一場台灣年輕世代的總反叛，是「整個世代的反叛」。積極參與學運的成員，多是以20至40歲年齡層為主的年輕人，太陽花學運確實是他們的運動。他們當中，由少數人擔任領袖，進行實際上極為封閉的決策，絕大多數參與者無緣進入議場，卻依然成為積極的成員：抗議、出擊、宣傳、維安、清潔、醫護、學習等等都是他們參與的方式，成人世界對他們有很多批評，但無論如何，這是那個世代的激情，那個世代的共同記憶。
也正是這樣的激情與記憶，台灣政局因而大大改變，更可能影響未來至少20年、30年的台灣政治，很多例子可以說明這一點。以柯文哲為例，他自己曾表示，在學運之前，民調支持度僅微幅領先；在學運之後，他與連勝文的差距明顯拉大，各家民調更顯示，柯文哲在年輕世代的支持度竟以3到5倍的幅度超越連勝文。眾所周知，去年九合一大選，國民黨之所以空前的慘輸，台北市長一戰凸顯國民黨在思想與體質上的老化，是關鍵因素之一。台北市長這個職務，動見觀瞻，舉足輕重，太陽花學運對台灣政治格局的衝擊，顯然將會持續發酵，柯P熱正說明了這一點。
同樣重要的課題是兩岸關係，有媒體評論認為，在學運之後，服貿協議擱置、貨貿談判達成遙遙無期，馬習會更已破局，太陽花學運已中斷了馬英九的「中國議程」。然而，如果只是馬英九個人的中國議程，那還是小問題，真正大的問題在「台灣生存發展的議程」。在這方面，太陽花學運若說有正面價值，那就是再度提醒兩岸領導層：公平正義的議題極其重要，情感情緒的因素也需要更為重視，但即使如此，我們仍要追問：對台灣年輕世代來說，什麼是合理、妥適的兩岸議程？什麼是經濟利益、社會公義和主權尊嚴與主體意識的平衡點？這個大哉問，在太陽花學運1周年後，社會仍然沒有共識，很明顯地還會因為選舉熱季而更為撕裂，但這樣的撕裂終究不是台灣之福，我們究竟要何時才能冷靜、持平的深入探討？
從這個角度而來的延伸思考是，在太陽花學運之後，學生領袖以及和他們有密切連結的公民團體與相關人士正摩拳擦掌準備投入選舉。乍看之下，太陽花學運的主導者曾經有「革命」的激情與決心，有「體制外抗爭」的思維與行動，更不缺革命性質的政策主張，但參與選舉就不是搞革命，無論再怎麼激情吶喊，參選就等同對現有體制的承認，基本邏輯就是「體制內改革」而非體制外抗爭，是爭取最多民眾選票，而非發掘最多革命同志。在這樣的前提下，太陽花學運主事者的參選或許有其積極意義，那就是必須更負責任地和其他黨派、尤其是不同立場的選民共謀合作、妥協，找出現實「台灣生存發展議程」的最可行方案，而非理想中的最美好方案。
在太陽花學運1周年之際，我們有這樣的期盼。
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