A Cosmopolitan Taiwanese View of History

A Cosmopolitan Taiwanese View of History
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 30, 2015

Executive Summary: The “fine tuning” or final editing of texts used in twelve year compulsory education has long been a political football. This August, the process will be complete. This prospect has touched off a new wave of controversy. Controversy formerly centered on history texts and the national language. More recently controversy has spread to civics texts and social studies texts. Controversy over the texts now involves the key to all political disputes, namely, what view of history do we wish to instill? A cosmopolitan view, or a Taiwanese nationalist view? The expanding controversy requires a society wide, in depth investigation. The president, the legislature, and the political parties must give it careful consideration.

Full Text Below:

The “fine tuning” or final editing of texts used in twelve year compulsory education has long been a political football. This August, the process will be complete. This prospect has touched off a new wave of controversy. Controversy formerly centered on history texts and the national language. More recently controversy has spread to civics texts and social studies texts. Controversy over the texts now involves the key to all political disputes, namely, what view of history do we wish to instill? A cosmopolitan view, or a Taiwanese nationalist view? The expanding controversy requires a society wide, in depth investigation. The president, the legislature, and the political parties must give it careful consideration.

Opposition groups have formulated a comprehensive strategy. First, they have defined the Ministry of Education final edit of the textbooks as a "black box operation". They are attempting to discredit the Ministry of Education edition on procedural grounds. They have invoked Taiwanese nationalist sentiment and denounced the curriculum as a "three peoples edition". They have alleged that the High School Citizens and Society text redacted sections about the White Terror and illustrations of the 2/28 Incident, and added content relating to "Chinese tradition and culture". Even more extremist protest groups such as the "Taiwan Centric Textbook Alliance" have demanded the "rejection of a Chinese colonial curriculum," and the "creation of a Taiwan centric curriculum". Allegations of "black box operations" and "colonialism" have been hurled left and right. How did the Ministry of Education respond? It meekly explained the minutiae of its bureaucratic procedures in excruciating detail. The media battle has only just begun, and the government is already in retreat.

Worse still, the Ministry of Education finds itself in an embarrassing position regarding legal procedure. The Taiwan Association for Human Rights and other organizations say that when the Ministry of Education edited the texts, it failed to fully disclose information and made unreasonable and unlawful decisions. They have demanded that the Ministry of Education provide their minutes of meetings, voting rosters, membership lists, and other information. The Ministry of Education says some of the information cannot be disclosed. The Taiwan Association for Human Rights responded by filing an administrative lawsuit. Recently the Taipei High Administrative Court ruled against the Ministry of Education, adding to the impression that the final editing of the curriculum was a "black box operation" that "lacked legitimacy". DPP ruled counties and cities will continue using the old texts, and reject the new texts. As matters stand, the government has suffered a crushing defeat. The courts have ruled that it engaged in black box operations. Worse still, it has been painted as an enemy of Taiwan centrism and democracy. Implementation will now be even more difficult. But are the new texts really so execrable?

First, let us establish the facts. The final versions of the civics texts and social studies texts merely deleted comparisons of the White Terror and 2/28 Incident to the Nazi Holocaust. History texts already cover the relevant historical facts. They do not need to be repeated. The final version of the history texts did not avoid mention of the White Terror. On the contrary, it described it in far greater detail and gave it far greater emphasis. It stressed the importance of the era to Taiwan's history. Charges that educational authorities conspired to whitewash the history of the White Terror are ludicrous.

Second, the civics texts and social studies texts mention "multicultural society and globalization". They stress the importance of multiculturalism. They note that "Taiwan society is deeply imbued with traditional Chinese culture" and that "This means Taiwan society includes traditional Chinese culture". Under "politics and democracy", the texts mention the "founding spirit and purpose of our Constitution". Under "evolution of cross-strait relations." the phrase "the basis for Taiwan's China policy" is revised to read "the basis for our national policy toward the Mainland". Opponents assert that this is "de-Taiwanization" and "re-Sinicization". But the point of departure for the revised Ministry of Education texts is the Republic of China Constitution. Its goal is constitutionality. It is clearly fully justified in this endeavor.

Sad to say, amidst all the controversy, the Ministry of Education issued long winded and cumbersome press releases. Lower echelon officials issued feeble and impotent rebuttals. Where was the government of the Republic of China? Nowhere to be found. Where was the cabinet, armed with powerful arguments, able to fight back? Nowhere to be found. The truth was drowned by an ocean of saliva. No one stepped forward to champion the defense of the constitution, adherence to the constitution, and implementation of the constitution. When Chen Shui-bian was in power, the presidential palace, the ruling party, and the Executive Yuan, all rallied behind Minister of Education Tu Cheng-sheng. They defended his "concentric circle theory" of Taiwan independence and de-Sinicization. Can the KMT do any less?

Educational authorities used the term "fine tuning" to reduce controversy and avoid questions. They revealed their lack of character, courage, and ability in the face of controversy. Assuming the spirit of the ROC Constitution is one's point of departure, the texts require more than "fine tuning". They require wholesale revision. Such revisions are hardly subtle administrative procedures. Nor are they tedious academic arguments. Rather, they are the defense and implementation of the Republic of China's founding philosophy, spirit, and history. These are matters of right and wrong which must be set right.

No one, from educational authorities to upper echelon Presidential Office and Executive Yuan officials, had the courage to stand up and offer an effective defense. They doomed the text revisions to oblivion, and consigned themselves to self-imolation. The Ma administration has been in office nearly seven years. It was slow to correct the texts. This made the process more difficult. Now the entire enterprise may be stillborn. How can one not be distraught?

One simply must ask. Is there anyone in the ROC government or cabinet with the capacity to govern? Or have they all become zombies? The fate of the revised texts now hangs in the balance. Society must think rationally. What does the future hold for Taiwan? Will it carry forward traditional Chinese culture? Will it connect with Chinese consciousness? Will it use the opportunity to preserve a cosmopolitan view of Taiwanese history rooted in China's heartland? Or will it mire itself in de-Sinicization and collide head on with the CCP by embracing "Taiwan Nationalist History"?

建構開闊的台灣人史觀

2015年04月30日 中國時報

紛擾多年，早已成為政壇喧囂焦點的十二年國教課綱「微調」案，即將於8月上路，新一波戰火再度點燃。先前課綱爭議集中在歷史與國文，近來更延燒到公民與社會。課綱微調爭議涉及當下所有政治紛爭的核心：我們究竟要建構何種史觀：是開闊的台灣人史觀或台灣民族主義史觀？面對爭議延燒，社會各方有必要深入探究，府院黨也要慎謀能斷。

反對團體有一套完整的抗爭策略，先將教育部課綱微調定位為「黑箱」微調，在程序正義上先否定掉教育部版微調課綱，進一步訴諸台灣民族主義情緒，指控「三民版」高中公民與社會教科書去掉了「白色恐怖」的篇幅與二二八事件歷史插圖，卻增加了「中華傳統與文化」相關內容。更極端的抗議團體「台灣主體課綱聯盟」更喊出了「拒絕中國殖民課綱」、「制定台灣主體課綱」的訴求。左一句黑箱作業，右一句殖民主義，教育部卻只在官僚作業技術面做出澄清，在媒體攻防戰上已經先落居下風。

雪上加霜的是，在法律程序上，教育部立場也很難堪。台灣人權促進會等團體認為教育部微調課綱的決議過程沒有充分公開資訊，決策過程不合理、不合法，行文教育部要求提供相關的會議紀錄、表決名冊、委員名單等資料。教育部認為部分資料得不公開，台權會便提起行政訴訟，日前台北高等行政法院判決教育部敗訴，更加深了課綱微調「黑箱作業」、「缺乏正當性」的惡劣印象。民進黨執政縣市也決議未來將延續使用舊課綱，拒絕微調後的新課綱。事件發展至此，政府的課綱微調似乎已經一敗塗地，不但是「法院認證」的黑箱課綱，更是去台灣、反民主的罪人，在執行上也難上加難。然而新課綱是否真的如此不堪？

首先還原事實真相，所謂刪除白色恐怖與二二八的爭議，只是在公民與社會課程「人與人權」主題下，將白色恐怖、二二八事件和納粹大屠殺等例證刪去，原因在於歷史課程中已經詳述相關歷史事實，不再重複。微調後的歷史新課綱，不但沒有刪除「白色恐怖」，反而將其由「說明」之欄位，提高到「重點」的欄位，表示對此階段歷史的重視。要說教育當局意圖湮滅白色恐怖等歷史，恐怕是過甚其詞。

其次，公民與社會課綱中的「多元文化社會與全球化」主題裡，在維持原來重視多元文化理念的同時，增加了「台灣社會具有濃厚的中華文化傳統」、「說明台灣社會所具有的中華文化傳統」。另外，在「政治與民主」主題中，增列了「陳述我國憲法的立國精神與宗旨」，在「台海兩岸關係的演變」主題中，則是把「台灣的中國政策依據」，改成了「我國的大陸政策依據」等等，反對者皆認為是「去台灣化」、「再中國化」，但是教育部新課綱修訂的出發點卻是「中華民國憲法」，目的是追求「合憲」，自然有相當的正當性。

悲哀的是，在新課綱的爭論過程中，除了見到教育部冗長、繁瑣的新聞稿，和事務層級官員的蒼白無力辯駁外，完全看不到中華民國政府、看不到內閣團隊強而有力的論證與回擊，非但讓事實真相淹沒在口水之中，更看不到、聽不見本於護憲、合憲、行憲之大義名分，而做出的立場捍衛和理念辯論。回顧陳水扁任內，從總統府、執政黨到行政院全面捍衛當時教育部長杜正勝建構「同心圓理論」的去中國化台獨史綱，國民黨能無愧乎？

教育當局使用「微調」字眼，就是有降低爭議、迴避質疑的用意，顯示其缺乏面對爭論的格局、勇氣與能力。若從中華民國憲法精神出發，課綱需要的不僅僅是微調，而是明確的改正。改正決不是細微的行政程序，也不是繁瑣的學術論證，而是中華民國立國理念、精神與歷史的捍衛與貫徹，這是真正屬於大是大非的課題，也是撥亂反正的要務。

從教育當局到府院高層這種缺乏堂堂正正立場說明、堅定有效政策辯護的心態與作為，已經注定課綱微調不但將是一場空，更反而引火自焚。馬政府執政近7年，在課綱改正上起步緩慢，推行艱難，如今更有胎死腹中之勢，怎能不令人扼腕、浩歎？

不得不讓人質問：中華民國是否還存在政府，內閣是否還有施政能力，還是早已成為僵屍？在課綱微調案存亡關鍵時刻，我們期待社會冷靜思考，台灣的前途究竟是要發揚中華文化傳統、連結中國意識、保留逐鹿中原機會的「開闊的台灣人史觀」，或去中國、與中共對立的「台灣民族主義史觀」。

 

Why Not Ride the Momentum of China's Heartland?

Why Not Ride the Momentum of China's Heartland?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 29, 2015

Executive Summary: Anyone sensitive to global trends has noticed what blue vs. green partisan bickering over the years has done to people on Taiwan. It has narrowed their vision. Ever more trivial issues occupy peoples' attention. Mere trivia monopolizes the Internet, often for weeks on end. The public, it would seem, has nothing more important to attend to than waste valuable time on the Internet gossiping or worse, cyberbullying. When a society loses its ability to focus on the external world, to reflect on the past, to care about world events, or to remember history, how can it avoid a descent into crisis?

Full Text Below:

Anyone sensitive to global trends has noticed what blue vs. green partisan bickering over the years has done to people on Taiwan. It has narrowed their vision. Ever more trivial issues occupy peoples' attention. Mere trivia monopolizes the Internet, often for weeks on end. The public, it would seem, has nothing more important to attend to than waste valuable time on the Internet gossiping or worse, cyberbullying. When a society loses its ability to focus on the external world, to reflect on the past, to care about world events, or to remember history, how can it avoid a descent into crisis?

People on Taiwan may be feeling sorry for themselves. But the rest of the world is not about to wait for them to get over it. The Mainland, in particular, has picked up its pace. Many intelligentsia who have visited the Mainland or conducted interviews on the Mainland, have arrived a the same conclusion. In many ways, Taiwan already lags far behind the Mainland. Yet many on Taiwan continue to wallow in self-congratulatory, feel-good sentiments, such as "Taiwan's greatest tourist attraction is her people!" But look at our endless food safety crises and vicious cyberbullying. What do we really have to be proud about?

It is time to open our eyes. The world has changed. Mainland President Xi Jinping recently visited Pakistan. Soon afterwards, the long-anticipated "One Belt, One Road" plan went into effect. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is already a sensation, even though it has yet to debut.  What matters now is no longer who joined the AIIB first, but who is still dithering and has yet to join. The AIIB and One Belt, One Road are already paving the way for Mainland China's peaceful rise.

Of course the United States is not happy to see this. Japan too, is anxious. That is why Japanese Prime Minister Abe visited Washington recently to seek reassurance. US-Japan relations are closer than ever before. But Abe's rhetoric about World War II history will only further alienate Japan from the rest of Asia. Actually, for other Asian countries, this long ceased to be an issue. Does Japan really want to integrate itself into Asia? It won't if it uncritically accomodates the United States effort to contain China. Doing so will only marginalize Japan, reducing it to a mere pawn.

Most Asian countries have long left the Cold War behind. The US and Japan however, remain frozen in their Cold War mentality. The goal of US President Obama's "return to Asia" is not about contributing to Asian prosperity, but about "containing China".

That is why in recent years the United States has deployed aircraft carriers and conducted joint military exercises in the Western Pacific, provoking sovereignty disputes over territorial waters. That is why the 20th century Cold War dramas in the Western Pacific and South China Sea first island chain and second island chain are being reenacted.

The United States and Japan cling to old thinking. They are determined to contain China. Beijing, by contrast, has already freed itself from the outmoded framework of the past. Why should Beijing care about containment? When has China ever been overly dependent upon the ocean? The Han and Tang dynasties both relied on overland connections to the West. Besides, today's China is already active in the ocean.

The Mainland's One Belt, One Road and AIIB have revived overland Silk Roads. Europe and Asia are no longer far from one another. The Central Asian section of the chain has been repaired. The international map has been redrawn. Conceptual categories have been redefined. Put bluntly, international relations have turned a new page. Meanhile, the United States and Japan cling to the framework of the 20th century.

US and Japanese think-tank experts must admit that their predictions about the coming collapse of China have not come to pass. China has escaped every financial crisis experienced by other countries the world over. Many Western theories about international relations do not apply to China.  Likewise, many theories about economics that are prevalent in the West do not apply to China. China has its own practices, its own models, and its own logic. Its pattern and logic has never needed the endorsement of Western theorists.

Meanwhile on Taiwan, blue vs. green partisan bickering spells Mutually Assured Destruction. Such bickering does more than obstruct progress. It swiftly cancels any progress. Newly-elected green camp local officials have been hastily dismantling their predecessors' achievements. Taipei Mayor Ko cannot wait to dismantle the Taipei Dome. Taichung Mayor Lin Chia-lung has dismantled the Taiwan Tower and canceled the BRT Light Rail system. This purge of consortiums and political predecessors, will surely destroy any desire to participate in future infrastructure projects. The impact will be massive. Meanwhile, landmark projects on the Mainland will debut in 2015. They include China United in Beijing, the Chaotianmen Plaza and Pier in Chongqing, the Greenland Center in Wuhan, the Twin Towers in Hangzhou. One side is destroying. The other side is building. So exactly who is being left behind?

Open your eyes and look at the world. The outside world will not stop and wait for people on Taiwan. People on Taiwan have long needed a global perspective. Xi Jinping has demonstrated economic and strategic boldness. Who says people of Taiwan cannot do the same? Who says 't people on Taiwan lack the determination shown by their compatriots in China's heartland? People on Taiwan persist in bickering behind closed doors, making petty calculations for petty advantage. Should we be surprised that their hearts and minds have gotten smaller and smaller?

為何不能有逐鹿中原的氣勢

2015-4-29 旺報

只要對全球趨勢稍為敏感的人都會察覺，台灣這幾年在藍綠對立的擠壓下，視野眼界愈加狹窄，關注議題愈加瑣碎，一些芝麻綠豆小事，也可能被網路或媒體翻炒數周，視聽空間彷彿找不到其它更重要的事，甚至還有不少人寧願將珍貴的光陰花費在網路八卦甚或霸凌他人。試想：當一個社會失去關注外在世界與反省往事的能力，既不關心世界，也不回顧歷史，怎麼不會是個危機？

當台灣只顧影自憐，世界卻沒有停下腳步等待台灣！特別是對岸加速前進的步伐，許多赴大陸訪問或採訪的台灣菁英都有共同的感覺，在許多方面台灣早已遠遠落後大陸！但不少人還活在「台灣最美的風景是人」自我良好感覺中，但看看此起彼落的食安危機，殺伐凶狠的網路霸凌，有什麼可以自豪呢？

打開眼睛吧！世界地圖真的已經改變了，大陸國家主席習近平日前出訪巴基斯坦後，倡議許久的「一帶一路」正式從藍圖變成實踐；亞投行的規畫未演先轟動，焦點早就不是誰搶先加入，而是誰懊惱還未加入。在亞投行與一帶一路的彼此搭配下，大陸的和平崛起之路已經逐步啟動。

當然，這般的光景，美國不樂見，日本很焦慮！因此就在這幾天，日本首相安倍跑到華府取暖，美日關係呈現空前的緊密。但安倍所有針對戰爭歷史的發言，只可能讓日本與整個亞洲的距離越來越遠！但這一點對亞洲其它國家而言，其實早已不重要！畢竟所謂日本要融入亞洲，心中所掛念的如果只是如何配合美國圍堵中國，怎麼防止自己不被邊緣化，那麼也就只能充當一個棋子而已！

對亞洲多數國家而言，前進的步伐早就已經「脫冷戰」，美日兩國卻依舊凍結在冷戰思維裡。美國總統歐巴馬的所謂「重返亞洲」，心中想的從不是如何繁榮亞洲，而是如何「遏制中國」！

所以大家看到這幾年美國在西太平洋合縱連橫，又是部署航母又是聯合軍演，挑動各國海域與島嶼主權的敏感神經，在西太平洋與南中國海構築第一島鏈、第二島鏈，所有在廿世紀冷戰世紀搬演過戲碼，現在全本都在上演！

就在美日還在依循舊思維積極部署圍堵中國，北京卻早就從陳舊的框架中走出來。對北京而言，何必在乎這些封阻？中國歷史上盛世何曾依賴過海洋？漢唐盛世不都是透過經略西域而締造，何況今日中國早已活躍於海洋！

如今大陸藉著一帶一路與亞投行的搭配，幾條陸上的黃金絲路已經大復活，歐亞之間早就不是遙遠的東方與西方，藉由中亞這個曾經失落的鏈條重新被連結，整個國際版圖被定義、被分類的方式也完全被改寫了！講得再直白一些，如今的國際關係已經都翻到歷史新頁了，美日卻還死守在廿世紀的框架裡！

恐怕美日智庫專家都不得不承認，過去幾年所有針對中國即將崩潰的預言，最終沒有一個應驗實現！所有在世界各國曾上演過財政金融危機，都被中國一一躲過。可以說，不僅許多西方的國際關係理論不適用於中國，許多盛行於西方經濟理論，亦同樣不適用於中國！大陸已經透過其自身的實踐，走出其自己的模式與邏輯，而這一套模式與邏輯，從來不需要任何西方理論大師的背書。

回到台灣，在藍綠保證相互毀滅的對立下，不僅封阻了前進的步伐，甚至加速彼此抵消，幾位新上任的綠營地方首長，匆匆清算前朝建設。柯P想拆巨蛋，林佳龍先後拆了台灣塔，廢了BRT輕軌，這股反財團，清算前朝的效應，肯定大幅摧毀民間未來參與公共建設的任何動力，影響不可謂不大！在此同時，大陸各城市的標竿建設，將在2015年陸續登場：北京的中國聯、重慶的朝天門、武漢的綠地中心、杭州的雙子塔……，一拆一建之間，究竟是誰被扔在後頭呢？

 

One Belt, One Road is Taiwan's New Economic Blue Ocean

One Belt, One Road is Taiwan's New Economic Blue Ocean
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 28, 2015

Executive Summary: One Belt, One Road is the Mainland's new political and economic strategy. It is an attempt by the Mainland to integrate its economic policy with its good neighbor diplomacy. With the Mainland as core, this global strategy will reconnect the Eurasian continent. It will create the world's largest and most comprehensive strategic and economic integration zone, and limit US hegemony.

Full Text Below:

One Belt, One Road is the Mainland's new political and economic strategy. It is an attempt by the Mainland to integrate its economic policy with its good neighbor diplomacy. With the Mainland as core, this global strategy will reconnect the Eurasian continent. It will create the world's largest and most comprehensive strategic and economic integration zone, and limit US hegemony.

People on Taiwan have noticed the implications of the Mainland's One Belt, One Road strategy for Taiwan. But people in industry, government, and academia have yet to notice how its larger implications. The One Belt, One Road includes 26 countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. It includes 4.4 billion people and involves 21 trillion US dollars. Within 10 years, it will invest 1.6 trillion US dollars in infrastructure, and exert a transnational investment multiplier effect. It offers Taiwan a new economic and industrial blue ocean. It expands cross-Strait economic relations. Taiwan must become part of the One Belt, One Road. The authorities on both sides of the Strait must acknowledge this.

Taiwan exports have grown less than 3% for three consecutive years. Slow export growth is unusual for Taiwan. Exports from Taiwan to the Mainland, the United States, Europe, and ASEAN, have peaked. Clinging to the old ways will only make economic growth impossible.

Taiwan Semiconductor and the ICT industry caught the wireless communications wave. Otherwise Taiwan exports would not have grown at all. Taiwan's domestic market is too small. To expand Taiwan's economy, new export channels must be found. The appearance of "One Belt, One Road" at this moment, has presented Taiwan with a "new blue ocean".

Key Factor One. Taiwan exports little to countries along the Silk Road in Central Asia, West Asia, and South Asia. India accounts for 1% of Taiwan's total exports. Altogether, the other regions account for less than 1%. Taiwan tried to establish trade relations with these countries through Russia, but never got anywhere. Expanding trade was difficult, so Taiwan gave up. But connect with these countries with an overland Silk Road, and they could become an export market for Taiwan. Investments in the Silk Road will facilitate the use of local resources and increase cost competitiveness in new markets, and become a source of consumer exports. Controlling this vast infrastructure supply chain will enable one to address the biggest gap in Taiwan's export growth.

Key Factor Two. In recent years, Taiwan has been exporting more to ASEAN and investing more in ASEAN. But Taiwan is dependent upon Singapore as a hub for ASEAN exports and investment. Taiwan has a number of important foundries in ASEAN countries. But it has never actually entered the ASEAN internal market. At most it has established OEM bases outside Mainland China. The Fujian Free Trade Zone, the start point of the Maritime Silk Road, offers cost and geographic advantages. It provides a new entry point into the ASEAN internal market, one that could be the prime mover in Taiwan's development of the Asia Pacific market.

One aspect of the One Belt, One Road should concern Taiwan. Both the terrestrial Silk Road and the maritime Silk Road bypass Taiwan. Once the One Belt, One Road is completed, Taiwan will be economically isolated from ten of millions of people. The Taiwan economy will suffer irreparable harm. Failure to actively participate in One Belt, One Road amounts to self-isolation. Taipei and Bejing must seek a swift solution. Taipei in particular, must seek a breakthrough in strategic thinking.

Both the terrestrial Silk Route and maritime Silk Route affect Taiwan. To participate in One Belt, One Road business opportunities, we must increase cooperation with the Tianjin Free Trade Zone and Fujian Free Trade Zone. This is the most effective way to participate in One Belt, One Road.

First of all, the Tianjin Free Trade Zone has just begun operation. It is the closest point to the beginning of the Silk Road in Xi'an. It is a northern Chinese city important to Taiwan industriies. If the Taiwan Free Trade Zone and Tianjin Free Trade Zone can be integrated into a free trade system, Taiwan industry will be able to connect to them. They would not be subject to tariffs, and would benefit the most from the supply chain.

The Fujian Free Trade Zone is the starting point for the Maritime Silk Road. It is the Mainland's Free Trade Zone connection to Taiwan. Combining Taiwan's Free Trade Zone with Fujian's Free Trade zone will turn Taiwan into another starting point for the Maritime Silk Road. Taiwan could take advantage of the Free Trade Zone, linking its trade to Amsterdam. This is the geographical advantage Taiwan enjoys.

The geographical advantages are great. The authorities only have to give it the nod. Taiwan will then be able to circumvent obstacles to ECFA. Taiwan Free Trade Zones can then link up with Mainland Free Trade Zones. This would open up a second channel for Taiwan's participation in One Belt, One Road, and become the ideal way to connect with the terrestrial Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road.

One Belt, One Road will be the world's largest economic link over the next decade. Taiwan must have the courage and confidence to participate.

一帶一路是台灣經濟新藍海

2015年04月28日 中國時報

「一帶一路」是大陸的政經新戰略，標示中國大陸企圖藉著經濟整合為經，外交敦親睦鄰為緯，建構以中國為核心的全球戰略棋盤，將歐亞大陸重新連結，形成全球跨度最大、縱深最長的經濟整合及戰略地帶，進而擠壓美國的霸權地位。

「一帶一路」戰略提出後，台灣雖然也注意大陸的企圖心，但是產官學界都沒有意識到，「一帶一路」沿線經過亞非歐26國，合計44億人口、21兆美元經濟規模，10年內將在基建投資1.6兆元的大商機，以及其帶來的跨國投資乘數效果，對台灣未來經濟儼然就是一個「經濟產業的新藍海」，也是深化兩岸經濟關係的有效觸媒。兩岸當局要正視台灣參與「一帶一路」的重要性。

台灣出口成長已連續3年低於3%，出口成長緩慢，是台灣出口史上所罕見。然而不論對陸、美、歐、東協地區，台灣的出口值均站在高峰上，遵循舊思維很難再出現大幅成長。

若非台灣半導體和資通訊產業搭上無線通信的熱潮，台灣出口成長已幾近枯竭。受限內需市場過小，台灣經濟要成長，勢必要在出口找到新的出路，此時「一帶一路」的出現，可說正好為台灣經濟產業開拓「新藍海」鋪了前路。

關鍵因素之一是，經由陸上絲路所經之國家，皆為台灣出口極少的國家地區，包括中、西亞和南亞，其中除了印度占台灣出口比重達1%外，台灣對此地區的其他國家出口總和比重都低於1%。過去台灣曾一度想透過俄羅斯的途徑與這些國家地區建構新的貿易關係，均不得其門而入，難以達到拓展貿易的效果，因而半途而廢。但若能透過陸上絲路串連這些國家的出口，就是台灣的一個新市場，透過對陸上絲路的投資，即可運用在地資源，強化對這一新市場的成本競爭力，不僅是消費產品出口動能來源，只要掌握龐大的基建供應鏈連結，就足以補足台灣出口成長的最大缺口。

關鍵因素之二是，台灣近年正加強東協的出口與投資，但是台灣現在是依賴新加坡作為台灣進入東協的樞紐，台灣在東協國家固然布局了一些重要的產業代工，但始終沒有真正的進入東協內部市場，充其量只是布局了中國大陸以外的代工基地而已。因而透過由福建自貿區起點的海上絲路，則可創造另一個成本與地緣優勢，由全新的經濟視野切進東協的內部市場，將其形容為是台灣開拓亞太市場的最大引擎亦不為過。

更值得我們關切的是，在「一帶一路」的路線圖中，不難發現不論在陸上絲路或海上絲路的連結，中國大陸都繞過了台灣，倘使「一帶一路」成功完成經戰略的連結，台灣就將面臨另外一個孤立於十數億人口的經濟版圖，這將對台灣未來經濟造成不可彌補的危害！不積極參與「一帶一路」形同自我封閉，兩岸應加快找出解決之道，台灣尤其須在「找尋突破口」上思考戰略出路。

不論在陸上絲路或海上絲路，台灣都是間接關係的連結，而要想參與「一帶一路」的商機，勢必要由擴大與中國大陸天津自貿區和福建自貿區的合作，作為有效參與「一帶一路」的最佳突破點。

首先，甫掛牌運作的天津自貿區，是距陸上絲路起點西安最短的捷徑，也是近年台灣產業在華北地區布局的重鎮，因此若能將台灣自經區與天津自貿區連成一體的「自貿體系」，台灣產業就可在兩個直接相通、沒有關稅障礙的新形勢下，取得陸上絲路基建供應鏈的絕對優勢。

福建自貿區作為海上絲路的起點，又是大陸針對台灣所連結的自貿區，若將台灣自經區與福建自貿區融合於一體，則形同打造台灣成為海上絲路的另類起點，台灣可藉自貿區的優勢，將貿易連結到歐陸的阿姆斯特丹，這是台灣的地緣之便。

藉著地緣之便，只要兩岸當局點頭，台灣即可繞過兩岸ECFA的障礙，以台灣自經區與大陸自貿區形成對接，就可打通台灣參與「一帶一路」的任督二脈，成為陸上絲路和海上絲路的最佳途徑。

「一帶一路」是未來10年全球最大經濟版圖的連結，台灣要有當仁不讓的勇氣與自信參與。

China Collapse Theory" Collapses

China Collapse Theory" Collapses
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 27, 2015

Executive Summary: "The Coming Collapse of China" is a book by Chinese-American lawyer Gordon Chang. It was published in 2001. Fifteen years later, the Chinese mainland has not collapsed. The events predicted in the book have not come to pass. But one of this has silenced these doomsday prophets. Last year Gordon Chang wrote an article for Forbes magazine. He alleged that the economic growth rate on the Chinese mainland during 2013 was not the officially announced 7.5%, but only 2%.

Full Text Below:

"The Coming Collapse of China" is a book by Chinese-American lawyer Gordon Chang. It was published in 2001. Fifteen years later, the Chinese mainland has not collapsed. The events predicted in the book have not come to pass. But one of this has silenced these doomsday prophets. Last year Gordon Chang wrote an article for Forbes magazine. He alleged that the economic growth rate on the Chinese mainland during 2013 was not the officially announced 7.5%, but only 2%.

Gordon Chang cited numbers provided by Rhodes Raul, IMF Asia and Pacific Department Deputy Director, who said that "Ten to fifteen years ago, China created 1 million jobs. That required a GDP growth rate of 1.4%. Five to ten years ago, it required 1%. Now it requires only 0.8%." In 2013, the Chinese mainland created 2.73 million more jobs in 2013. According to Raul Rhodes' formula, the Chinese mainland's annual economic growth rate should be 2.2%.

If Gordon Chang read more about economic growth, he probably would not make such crude estimates to confirm his pessimism. The Economist, by contrast, published a more professional article on the Chinese mainland in its latest issue, entitled "Quiet Revolution: A slowing economy commands headlines, but the real story is reform." The article said rapid development of the service sector on the Mainland in 2014, led to the creation of 13 million urban jobs. Therefore the slowdown in the growth rate will not lead to social problems. Indeed, urbanization and raised income levels, coupled with policies to encourage domestic demand, have increased the Mainland service sector to GDP ratio significantly, from 24% in 1978, over 30% in the 1990s. Last year, it reached a record high of 46.1%. That is why even though overall GDP growth has slowed, job growth has remained at a tolerable level.

The Economist noted that the real reason behind the Chinese mainland's economic slowdown is three reforms. The first is financial reform, including the internationalization of foreign exchange and the liberalization of interest rates. Many state-owned enterprises now pay market interest rates. The second is fiscal reform. Local government debt is more transparent and market-oriented. This inhibits overcapacity and the inflation of GDP caused by blind and excessive investment. The third is administrative reform, including anti-corruption and deregulation. Last year, 3.6 million new businesses were established on the Mainland, twice as many as the previous year, evidence of its swift success .

Besides Gordon Chang, we have David Shen, an academic at George Washington University in Washington, DC. In a Wall Street Journal article, Shen offers a pessimistic prediction. He says the Chinese mainland's political system has obvious weaknesses, the first of which is a brain drain of its best and brightest. Over half of the Mainland's wealthy hope to emigrate. An unprecedented number of children of wealthy Mainlanders are studying abroad. Mainland women hope to move to the US before bearing children.

This behavior is supposed to mean that the Mainland is about to collapse. But haven't wealthy people the world over been doing the same thing? Didn't they do the same thing in Taiwan and South Korea? Aren't they doing the same thing now in India, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia? The wealthy move their assets, property and their children to nations where they believe private property is the most secure. Usually that means the US. But do these children of the wealthy invest in their country of birth? Do these students return home to find work? If they do, it means they are optimistic about the economic prospects of the country in which they were born.

Shen noted other "significant weaknesses", including "intensified political pressure", lack of enthusiasm within the CCP for the "Chinese Dream", "lack of talent within the anti-corruption movement that has endangered the Xi regime", and "ineffective financial and administrative reforms". Former US State Department official Stephen Harner currently works in Japan. In the Asian edition of Forbes, Harner disagreed. He believes Mainland anti-corruption reforms have won universal approval. Other reforms will pave the way for smooth Mainland development.

The Mainland economy is of course huge and complex. Sound governance is definitely a challenge. The economic future of the Mainland has its bright side as well as dark side. The real answer may be found somewhere in between Shen's view and Harner's view. But indications are that Shen's view is less and less likely, while Harner's view is more and more likely. Not only is growth not decelerating, it may even be accelerating.

Any decisions made by businesses, individuals, and government based on the assumption that the Mainland is about to collapse, are probably grossly mistaken. The best approach is to take advantage of the opportunity provided by Mainland development to grow Taiwan's economy, giving more people on Taiwan a way out. In the meantime, one must also have risk awareness and use risk management. Those who hope the Mainland will collapse will not listen to other views. Those who actually need to make decisions must distinguish between subjective wishes and objective analyses by professionals. Only then can they arrive at scientific, empirically-based conclusions. People must learn how to think independently and decide for themselves.

「中國崩潰論」走向崩潰

2015年04月27日 中國時報

《中國即將崩潰》是美籍華裔律師章家敦在2001年出版的一本著作。15年過去了，大陸沒有崩潰，該書所預測的事沒有發生，卻沒有讓這些末日的預言家封口。章律師去年在美國《福布斯》雜誌撰文，懷疑2013年中國大陸經濟成長率不是官方公布的7.5%，而是只有2%。

章律師所舉證的數字來源，是國際貨幣基金亞洲及太平洋部副主任羅德勞爾曾說的：「10到15年前，中國創造100萬就業，需要1.4%的GDP增長；5到10年前，需要1%；現在只需要0.8%。」而中國大陸在2013年增加了273萬就業，依照羅德勞爾的公式，在該年經濟成長率應為2.2%。

如果章律師多讀過一點經濟成長的書籍，大概就不會以如此粗糙的估算，來證明他的悲觀論。相形之下，英國《經濟學人》最近一期刊登了一篇有關中國大陸的文章，標題為〈寧靜革命：經濟放緩成為標題，但真正的故事是改革〉，比較專業。這篇文章指出，由於服務業的快速發展，大陸經濟在2014年創造了1300萬個城市工作，使得放緩的成長率不至於造成社會問題。的確，城市化、所得水準增加，加上政策鼓勵內需，大陸服務業占GDP的比率大幅提升，由1978年的24%，上升到1990年代的3成以上，而去年則達到46.1%的歷史新高，這就是整體GDP成長減緩但就業成長還是維持在可容忍水準的真正原因。

《經濟學人》該文還指出，大陸經濟成長趨緩背後的真正原因是三個改革。一是金融改革，包含外匯的國際化、利率的自由化，使得眾多國營事業開始必須支付市場利率；二是財政改革，讓地方政府的債務透明化、市場化；兩者都會抑制盲目舉債和過度投資所引起的產能過剩和GDP虛胖；第三個改革是行政，包含反貪和鬆綁；去年大陸民營事業新增了360萬家，約是前年的1倍，由此可看出其快速的成效。

即便如此，最近除了章氏以外，還有一位華府喬治華盛頓大學的學者沈大衛，在《華爾街日報》撰文，提出了悲觀的觀點。他認為大陸的政治系統有明顯的弱點，其中第一個就是「菁英出走」：一半以上的大陸富豪有意移民，富人子女在海外留學人數創新高，婦女則爭相來美生子。

但這代表國家快崩潰，還是全世界有錢人都在做的事？早期的台灣、南韓不都這樣在做嗎？甚至到現在，不是也還在做？印度、泰國、印尼、馬來西亞，不都一樣？有錢人為了鞏固其資產，把財產和子女的國籍，放在一個他們認為對私人財產權最有保障的國家，那不就是美國嗎？其實，只要看這些富豪和其子女是不是繼續在其出生國投資，留學生是否有意願回國就業就知端倪；如果有，而且日益興盛，就表示他們看好出生國經濟成長遠景。

沈氏提到的幾個其他「明顯弱點」還包括「政治高壓變本加厲」、「『中國夢』無法激起忠貞黨員的熱情」、「可用人才不多造成反貪運動最終危及習政權」和「財政和行政改革推動不力」等。對於這些看法，目前在日本工作的前美國國務院官員何思文在《福布斯》亞洲版上撰文指出，他並不贊同。他認為大陸的反貪改革明顯獲得社會普遍的認同，其他的改革也會讓未來發展的道路更加平順，對大陸的發展前景看好。

當然，以大陸經濟之龐大與複雜，能否落實良好的治理，絕對會是莫大的挑戰。未來大陸經濟的走向，有其光明面，也有其風險面，真實的答案可能在沈氏和何氏的看法之間；但目前所有的跡象均顯示，往沈氏方向走的機率愈來愈小，而往何氏看法走的機率，不但不因成長趨緩而變小，反而愈來愈大。

企業也好、個人也好、政府也好，如果是在「中國大陸即將崩潰」的假設下做決策，恐怕會有很大的錯誤風險。最好的作法是，利用大陸發展的機會，壯大台灣的經濟，為台灣的人才多找到出路；但在此同時，也具有風險意識，對風險有所控管。對於「希望」看到大陸崩潰的人，他們聽不進去其他的看法；真正需要做決策的人，必須分辨何種言論代表了立論者的「主觀期待」，何種言論代表了專業的「客觀分析」，才能做出合乎科學和實證基礎的判斷。民眾也應該自我訓練獨立思考、自我判斷的能力。

DPP Cross-Strait Policy Change: Whether, When and How

DPP Cross-Strait Policy Change: Whether, When and How
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 24, 2015

Executive Summary: If the DPP wins the 2016 presidential election and returns to power, what will happen to cross-Strait relations? Will the waters remain calm, as Tsai Ing-wen predicts? Or will or the earth shake, as Xi Jinping warns? Will the DPP ever change its cross-Strait policy? If so, when and how? 

Full Text Below:

If the DPP wins the 2016 presidential election and returns to power, what will happen to cross-Strait relations? Will the waters remain calm, as Tsai Ing-wen predicts? Or will or the earth shake, as Xi Jinping warns? Will the DPP ever change its cross-Strait policy? If so, when and how? 

The first question is "Will the DPP will ever change?"  The DPP is split into two camps. Camp One argues that the DPP presidential campaign is obviously going well. So why change the party's cross-Strait policy? Camp Two also argues that the election is going well. But it concludes therefore that the time is ripe for change. These two camps differ because they interpret public opinion differently. Those who oppose change, attribute DPP public support to hatred of Mainland China and support for Taiwan independence. Their focus is on short term election advantage. Those who advocate change, understand that the public expects more from the DPP. It hopes the DPP will improve. It hopes that the DPP will become more than what it has been. Their focus is on the long term.

We believe the DPP must change. As Hsu Hsing-liang said, if the DPP fails to change its cross-Strait policy, then even if it wins the election, it will not be able to govern the nation. Tsai Ing-wen would be insane to challenge Xi Jinping's political power when the earth might move. Moreover, the KMT's election prospects are grim. That gives the DPP a chance to change. More and more, the public expects Tsai Ing-wen to implement change. If Tsai Ing-wen seizes the opportunity, and realigns public support, she could pave the way for a return to power that transcends blue vs. green political divisions, echoing Wen-Je Ko.

The next question is "When should the DPP change?" On this there are again two camps. Camp One advocates change before the election. Camp Two advocates change after the election. Those who advocate change after the election, argue "If it ain't broke, don't fix it!" The campaign is going well, they say, so why introduce a new variable? Those who advocate change before the election, also say the campaign is going well. But they way the DPP should seize the opportunity to realign voter support, broaden the party's power base, and change the party's policy commitments. This would, they argue, change the character of the DPP in one fell swoop, and make DPP campaign promises consistent with DPP policy implementation.

We believe change should take place before the election. If change takes place after the election, it will likely be the result of joint pressure from Beijing and Washington. It will be coerced change. Picture Tsai Ing-wen losing seven or eight diplomatic allies upon taking power. Picture the two cross-Strait organizations ending communications. Picture hundreds of direct flights discontinued. Picture hundreds, even thousands of Taiwan tour buses sitting idle. Why wait for the earth to shake before changing? Taiwan has already taken a huge hit. The damage done to Tsai Ing-wen's political prestige will be hard to repair. Why wait until the situation degenerates to that level before changing? Isn't that a blunder one would regret for the rest of one's life? Unless of course Tsai Ing-wen has already dispatched secret emissaries to Beijing and reached an understanding. No change before the election, but guaranteed change after the election. Put on a good show for Taiwan voters. Is that what has happened? If so, such under the table deals will only discredit the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen. They will enable Beijing to lead the DPP around by the nose That is unacceptable and must be ruled out.

The next question is "How should the DPP change?"  Some advocate single-stage change. They say for example, that the DPP should freeze the "Taiwan independence party platform". Others advocate staged-change. They say the DPP should advocate "maintaining the status quo" and "adhering to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future". But staged change will allow Beijing take a mile when given an inch. For example, if the DPP reverts to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, Beijing will respond with "opposition to one country one each side". If Tsai Ing-wen advocates "maintaining the status quo", Beijing will again respond with "opposition to one country on each side". In other words, no matter where the DPP seeks refuge, Beijing will respond with d"opposition to one country on each side", in which case the place of refuge will be blown. By contrast, single-stage change, such as freezing the Taiwan independence party platform, would better stabilize DPP-CCP relations. But for the moment that would probably be difficult to achieve within the DPP.

Therefore when it comes to change, the answer is still the 1992 consensus. In fact, between 2005 and 2012, Beijing often approached the 1992 consensus/one China framework differently than and separately from, opposition to Taiwan independence. But the Ma government dragged its feet in 2012. Therefore Beijing began linking the 1992 consensus to the one China framework. Now that support for the DPP has increased, Beijing equates support for the 1992 consensus with opposition to Taiwan independence. It has even added the phrase, "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China." Because the situation has changed, Beijing has narrowed and clarified the meaning of the 1992 consensus. Now all that remains is "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China," What does Beijing mean by "one China"? It has yet to openly define "one China" as the People's Republic of China, but that could be its very next step.

The DPP must revert to the 1992 consensus. If the DPP loses the 1992 consensus, it loses "one China, different interpretations". The ROC will lose the only remaining rhetorical basis for its sovereignty. Therefore the DPP must immediately freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. It cannot rely on the Resolution on Taiwan's Future and backdoor listing to resist pressure from Beijing. It must revert to the 1992 consensus. The DPP can of course continue to deny that anyone ever actually used the term "1992 consensus". But it must consider adopting Hung Chi-chang's approach. As Hung put it, "If the 1992 consensus refers to one China, different interpretations, I can accept it."

After all, Tsai Ing-wen is a Republic of China presidential candidate, running for office under the ROC Constitution. She is not running for office under the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Without the 1992 consensus as a buffer, the DPP will no longer be able to advocate "one China, different interpretations". It will come under direct pressure to "oppose Taiwan independence". Such pressure is a cocoon that will leave the DPP with even less room to wriggle.

民進黨兩岸政策：是否、何時、如何轉型

2015-04-24聯合報

民進黨若贏得二○一六大選重返執政，兩岸關係究竟會如蔡英文所期「波平浪靜」，或如習近平所說「地動山搖」，端視民進黨的兩岸政策是否、何時及如何轉型。

先談是否轉型。民進黨內有兩種看法：一、既然選情呈現明顯優勢，則兩岸政策何必轉型？二、既然選情有明顯優勢，則正是轉型時機！這兩種不同見解，出於對民意的不同解讀與側重。主張不轉型者，是看出民意中的「反中傾獨」因素，也就是側重選舉的利益；主張轉型者，則是認知民意中亦蘊有對民進黨尋求提升及超越的期待，是側重未來的發展。

我們認為，民進黨應當轉型。因為，如許信良所說，倘不在兩岸政策轉型，民進黨即使贏得大選，也不能平順執政。畢竟，蔡英文若欲以「地動山搖」的代價去試測習近平的政治實力，不能被視為理性行為。何況，由於國民黨的選情不看好，民進黨轉型的空間明顯增大，民意對蔡英文轉型的寄望亦相對升高；蔡英文若趁此機遇重整民意結構，可能為自己若重返執政建立一個超越藍綠的政權基礎，那就有一點「柯文哲」的味道了。

次談何時轉型。也有兩種看法：一、選前轉型。二、選後轉型。主張選後轉型者，是因選情看來很穩，不欲因轉型而增添變數。主張選前轉型者，則是認為在選情看好的寬裕空間下，轉型可改造民意結構，深化政權基礎，改訂政策契約，並一舉改變民進黨的體質，可使「選舉／執政」並顧，又有「選舉／執政」貫通之效。

我們認為，應當選前轉型。因為，如果選後轉型，極可能是在北京和華府壓力下，被架著脖子轉型。倘若蔡英文上台後，丟掉了七、八個邦交國，兩會溝通停斷，減少了幾百班次直航班機，又使台灣上百成千的遊覽車閒置路旁……；那麼，待「地動山搖」再來轉型，台灣遭受的巨創已然造成，對蔡政權統治威望的傷害亦難彌補。若要到了那個地步再來轉型，豈非「再回頭已百年身」？除非，蔡英文透過密使與北京商妥，在選前不轉型，選後一定轉型，只是演一齣戲給台灣選民看而已；但這樣的密使政治，必使蔡英文的人格與民進黨的黨格完全破產，日後更將被北京牽著鼻子走。使不得也，切勿輕試。

再談如何轉型。一種看法是一步到位的轉型，如「凍結台獨黨綱」；另一種看法是分段轉型，如「維持現狀」、「台灣前途決議文」等。分段轉型的困境在必使北京「得寸進尺」。例如，民進黨說退回到台灣前途決議文的立場，北京回嗆「反對一邊一國」。又如，蔡英文說「維持現狀」，北京仍稱「反對一邊一國」。也就是說，不論民進黨往哪裡躲，只要北京說「反對一邊一國」，那個地方即不是民進黨的藏身處。相對而言，一步到位的轉型，如凍結台獨黨綱，雖較有可能穩定民共關係，但在民進黨內一時似不易實現。

因而，談到如何轉型，答案也許仍在「九二共識」。其實，在二○○五到二○一二年前後，北京對「九二共識」與「一中框架」及「反對台獨」，往往是分開講述的；但自二○一二年前後，為因應馬政府的遲緩，北京開始將九二共識與一中框架並稱；接著，又為因應民進黨的聲勢上升，如今已是「言及九二共識／必稱反對台獨」，再加上一句「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國」。也就是說，隨著局勢變化，北京已將九二共識這個原本存有模糊空間的概念，愈來愈明晰化。現在剩下的空間只有「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國」，此處的「一個中國」，北京尚未公開定義為「中華人民共和國」，但這個潛台詞隨時可以浮現。

民進黨必須回到九二共識。因為，民進黨若丟掉九二共識，就是連「一中各表」都丟掉了，台灣的主體性將失去最後一個只存在於口頭上的立足點。所以，民進黨如果不能立即處理「凍結台獨黨綱」之類的問題，又無法藉台灣前途決議文之類借殼上市的論述抵擋北京的壓力，那麼最好還是回到九二共識。民進黨當然可以繼續否認當年有「九二共識」這四個字，但仍宜思考洪奇昌所說的「如果九二共識是指一中各表，我可以接受」。

畢竟，蔡英文是在中華民國憲法下參選中華民國總統，而非在台灣前途決議文之下參選。若無「九二共識」的緩衝，民進黨既失「一中各表」的空間，又直接面對「反對台獨」的壓力，不啻作繭自縛，必將更加進退失據。

New Chu Xi Framework: Legacy of Lien Hu Meeting

New Chu Xi Framework: Legacy of Lien Hu Meeting
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 23, 2015

Executive Summary: On May 3, KMT Chairman Eric Chu will head a delegation to the KMT-CCP Forum. This high profile Chu Xi meeting will take place in Beijing on May 4. KMT sources reveal that in addition to reaffirming the 1992 consensus, Chu will propose a new cross-Strait framework that "goes beyond the 1992 consensus".

Full Text Below:

On May 3, KMT Chairman Eric Chu will head a delegation to the KMT-CCP Forum. This high profile Chu Xi meeting will take place in Beijing on May 4. KMT sources reveal that in addition to reaffirming the 1992 consensus, Chu will propose a new cross-Strait framework that "goes beyond the 1992 consensus".

Predictably, the Chu Xi meeting will invite green camp allegations that Chu is a "puppet emperor" who is "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan". Sure enough, a physical altercation erupted in the New Taipei City Council yesterday over the Chu Xi meeting. Eric Chu knows full well he will be the target of defamation. Yet he remains determined to meet with Xi Jinping. Surely he has the confidence required to shrug off accusations that he is selling out Taiwan. Surely he has clear goals and is reasonably confident he can achieve them.

If the Chu Xi meeting is successful, the public on Taiwan will witness an historic breakthrough. At best, it may disperse the fog that has shrouded Taiwan since the 3/18 Sunflower Student Movement. Failing that, it may give the Kuomintang, a patient under intensive care, a shot in the arm. Finally, it may reduce the political fallout from Eric Chu's decision not to run for president, and even reverse the KMT's political fortunes.

The political situation is such that even the tiniest move can affect the entire situation. For the moment, Eric Chu has chosen not to run in 2016. If the politcal picture improves, Eric Chu may have the option of reconsidering. The "three benefits" could fall flat and become "three disappointments", That is something Eric Chu must consider. This is a critical moment. The success of cross-Strait relations and the realization of the China Dream require unprecedented wisdom and courage on the part of the Mainland. In this regard, we offer three reminders.

Reminder One. Eric Chu leading a delegation to participate in KMT-CCP talks and meeting with Xi Jinping on the tenth anniversary of the Lien Hu meeting has enormous significance, both past and future. In 2005, Lien Chan embarked on his Journey of Peace. He met with President Hu Jintao and together they reached a five-point consensus. They agreed to promote cross-Strait exchanges and negotiations on the basis of the 1992 consensus. Lien Chan became the first KMT leader since the Chinese Civil War and the KMT's relocation of the nation's capital to Taiwan in 1949. Lien laid the foundation for healthy development of cross-Strait relations once Ma Ying-jeou took office.

Given the historical background, can Eric Chu write a new chapter of cross-Strait relations, based on but different from the Lien Hu meeting? Given the current cross-Strait atmosphere, that may be difficult. Yet that is the outcome Chu must strive for during his trip. Cross-Strait relations have undeniably entered the deep water zone. One may talk about "going beyond" or "transcending" the 1992 consensus. But one must at least attain the same heights. Many obstacles stand in the way. The Chu Xi meeting must build a bridge for cross-Strait relations, one that enables us to cross the ravine without falling into the water below. It must establish a horizontal link connecting the two sides, enabling them to enjoy a new beginning.

Reminder Two. Pay attention to changes in the way the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen respond. Tsai Ing-wen has long denied that the 1992 consensus even exists. Recently, under pressure from Mainland China and the United States, she has changed her tune. She has begun assuring people that she wishes to "maintain the cross-Strait status quo". On the one hand, that is a deliberately vague statement. The cross-Strait status quo covers a lot of ground. Strictly speaking, the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations also maintain the status quo. One could say that Tsai has moved in the direction of KMT cross-Strait policy.

Tsai Ing-wen's "maintenance of the status quo" is still based on the DPP's Resolution on Taiwan's Future, and even its Taiwan Independence Party Platform. This too distinguishes it from KMT cross-Strait policy. The two together, constitute a "Taiwan version of one China, different interpretations". This could lead to a "bat effect" in politics, making birds mistake bats for birds, and making rats mistake bats for rats. In other words, "maintaining the status quo" can reassure those who hope the DPP will undergo transformation, without making Taiwan independence fundamentalists too alarmed.

How will Eric Chu deal with Tsai Ing-wen's deliberate ambiguity? What sort of new framework will Eric Chu propose during the Chu Xi meeting? We think the "cross-Strait version of one China, different interpretations" should become the Kuomintang's version of the 1992 consensus, namely, both sides of the Strait are part of one China.

Reminder Three. This "cross-Strait version of one China, different interpretations" is not Eric Chu's one-man show. It must meet with the approval of the United States and the Chu Xi meeting.

Xi Jinping has reiterated that his most important task is the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This great rejuvenation means that both sides of the Strait are part of one nation. The link that makes both sides of the Strait part of one China, is the "Republic of China." For Taiwan, the Republic of China constitutes a shared domestic consensus. For the Mainland, the Republic of China is more than just a political symbol. It also means shared history, shared culture, and shared emotions. The Mainland should view these emotions in a positive light. Let the "Republic of China" have a larger say and greater participation in shaping the cross-Strait framework and in contributing to Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream.

If Xi Jinping is willing to accept such sentiments, Eric Chu should highlight the positive role the Republic of China plays in the one China based 1992 consensus, and incorporate it into cross-Strait policy.

Do we really not know how Eric Chu feels about the 1992 Consensus? Allow the "ROC" to become the basis for discussion. Allow Eric Chu to lead the Kuomintang, and even the Republic of China into deep water. He, at least, will not lose his way.

傳承連胡會 朱習會開兩岸新局

2015年04月23日 中國時報

國民黨主席朱立倫將於5月3日率團參加國共論壇，各方關注的「朱習會」也敲定5月4日北京登場，國民黨方面透露，朱除將重申延續「九二共識」立場外，更將提出「跨越九二共識」兩岸新政策論述。

可以預見的，朱習會的舉行，必將招來綠營「兒皇帝」、「傾中賣台」等政治語言的攻擊批評，昨天新北市議會果然因朱習會的確定而爆發藍綠議員肢體衝突。朱立倫明知謗之必來，仍決定與習近平會面，想必已有充分信心擺脫賣台的牽制，且已設定清楚的目標，並有相當把握取得一定成果。

可以合理推斷，如果朱習會能取得讓台灣人民眼睛一亮的突破性成果，大則有助撥開318學運後籠罩台灣上空的兩岸霧霾；中則可以為國民黨幾已進入加護病房的選情打一劑強心針；小則對朱立倫因選不選總統而多面受傷的政治能量，產生修補乃至於逆轉強化的作用。

政治局勢牽一髮動全身，若氛圍有正向變化，目前宣布不選2016的朱立倫，也多了重新思考布局的可能性。然而，三利多如果操作不順，也可能變成三利空。這一點朱立倫必須審慎思量。同時，面對關鍵時刻，大陸對兩岸關係大局與中國夢的圓滿也必須有開創性的智慧與大魄力。對此，我們有3個提醒。

首先，朱立倫在連胡會十周年時率團參加國共論壇與習近平會談，具有承先啟後的重要意義。2005年，連戰的和平之旅，與胡錦濤見面取得五點共識，並同意在九二共識的基礎上推動兩岸交流談判，連戰成為國共內戰、1949年國民政府遷台後，第一位登陸的國民黨最高領導人，也為馬英九上台後兩岸關係的良性發展打下了基礎。

朱立倫如何在這個歷史基礎下，開創植基於「連胡」而又有別於「連胡」、屬於「朱習」的歷史性篇章？這一點，在兩岸交流氛圍趨下、懸壁在前的此刻，並不容易，這應是朱立倫此行必須取得的成果。不容否認，兩岸關係已進入深水區，九二共識無論是要「跨越」或「超越」，都必須「再攀巔峰」，但眺望前景障礙不小。朱習會至少要能搭木築橋，讓兩岸關係跨過河谷深水，不要跌入溝壑，也就是要能水平式的建立讓兩岸關係開啟新氣象的新局面。

第二提醒，要注意蔡英文與民進黨的若干轉變並有所回應。長期主張九二共識不存在的蔡英文，在中國大陸與美國雙重壓力下近來已改變論述，取而代之的是「維持兩岸現狀」。一方面，這是一種大圈包小圈的論述法，何謂兩岸現狀，此圈疆界極廣，嚴格來說，一中各表的九二共識，也涵蓋在維持現狀的大圈之中，可以說，是一種向國民黨兩岸政策的貼近。

二方面，蔡英文的「維持現狀」，仍是立足於民進黨的台灣前途決議文甚至台獨黨綱。這又形成與國民黨兩岸政策的區隔。二者結合，即形成一種「台灣版的一中各表」。這在政治上可以發揮「蝙蝠效應」，讓鳥視蝠為鳥，讓鼠視蝠為鼠，也就是，維持現狀說，可以讓期待民進黨轉型的民眾，看見轉型的希望而安心，又同時讓基本教義派不致於太不放心。

朱立倫要在朱習會中端出什麼樣的新論述，來應對蔡英文這種外貼近內區隔的論述呢？我們認為，「兩岸版的一中各表」，應可做為國民黨對「九二共識」的新認知，也就是兩岸同屬一中。

這就必須進入第三提醒，這「兩岸版的一中各表」，不能只是朱立倫的獨角戲，必須至少是在美方配樂下的朱習雙人舞。

習近平多次宣示，他最重要的任務，是實現中華民族的偉大復興，要偉大復興，就不能缺少「兩岸同屬一中」的偉大建構。建構「兩岸同屬一中」的連結點無他，就是「中華民國」。對台灣來說，中華民國是內部情感的公約數；對大陸來說，中華民國也不只是政治圖象，更包涵了歷史與文化的意義與情感。大陸應該從這個角度去正視這樣的情感。讓「中華民國」在兩岸論述的建構上、在習近平重視的中華民族偉大復興上，擁有更大的決定權、更多的參與權。

如果習近平願意迎納這樣的情感，朱立倫也應積極的把凸顯中華民國元素的兩岸一中做為九二共識的認知，並融入兩岸政策。

我們還不知道朱立倫對九二共識的態度是什麼？只要讓「中華民國」成為論述的指南針，朱立倫帶領國民黨，甚至帶領中華民國進入兩岸深水區，至少不會迷失方向。