Tiananmen Square Parade Power Struggles

Tiananmen Square Parade Power Struggles
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 1, 2015

Executive Summary: President Ma Ying-jeou has warned Lien Chan that "participation would be inappropriate". Nevertheless Lien Chan has decided to take part in the War of Resistance Against Japan victory celebration organized by Beijing. South Korean President Park Geun-hye is also ignoring Washington's "moral entreaties”. He too intends to take part in the victory parade to be held in Beijing. The difference is that Taipei's concern is over how the victory is being depicted in the history books. Washington's concern is over its erstwhile allies defecting to Beijing.

Full Text Below:

President Ma Ying-jeou has warned Lien Chan that "participation would be inappropriate". Nevertheless Lien Chan has decided to take part in the War of Resistance Against Japan victory celebration organized by Beijing. South Korean President Park Geun-hye is also ignoring Washington's "moral entreaties”. He too intends to take part in the victory parade to be held in Beijing. The difference is that Taipei's concern is over how the victory is being depicted in the history books. Washington's concern is over its erstwhile allies defecting to Beijing.

Commemorating the War of Resistance Against Japan is a means by which the CCP can rewrite the history of KMT-CCP resistance against Japan. The parade is an attempt by Beijing to redress past humiliations and prove that it has become a major military power. Whether people should attend the September 3 parade in Beijing has become a matter of controversy in Taipei, Beijing, and the international community. In Taipei, the debate is over which regime contributed the most to winning the war. Among foreign nations, the debate is over which side to choose. The commemoration of the War of Resistance Against Japan, has become an occasion for the nations of the world to show just where they stand.

Consider the list of nations whose heads of state will attend the parade in Tiananmen Square. Those countries attending are mostly former republics of the Soviet Union and traditional allies of Mainland China. They include Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Egypt, Cambodia, and Myanmar. The United States and most Western democracies are missing from the list. Only foreign ministers or ambassador-level representatives from those nations will attend. Japan and the Philippines, whom China is currently at loggerheads with in the East and South China Seas, have indicated that they will not attend. This major commemoration of the War of Resistance against Japan appears to be a microcosm of the United States' Asian rebalancing strategy.

Consider the scale of the parade. The nations whose troops will march in the Tiananmen Square parade include Russia and members of the the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is led by Beijing. They include Cuba, Egypt, Mexico, Mongolia, and Pakistan. These countries have never been invaded or ruled by Japan. They are driven by economic interests. They have chosen to stand with Mainland China to enhance the scale of the military parade. As we can see, the post-Cold War world is one with China and Russia on one side, and the United States and Japan on the other.

The May victory parade held in Russia's Red Square this year was mainly dedicated to victory over Nazi Germany in the European theater. This parade is mainly dedicated to the China and Russia's victory over the Japanese in the Asian theater. The irony is that South and North Korea, both of which were victims of Japanese colonial rule, are taking very different approaches on Beijing's commemoration of the war.

North Korea has long been pro-Beijing. But Beijing has been struggling to win over South Korea. As a result, Kim Jong-un has chosen not to attend the commemoration. Instead, on the eve of this victory celebration, he has blasted South Korea for raising regional tensions. North Korea's absence suggests that relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have undergone qualitative change. The Tiananmen Square military parade is a rear view mirror that reflects changes in Washington-Beijing-Pyongyang power relations.

By contrast, President Park Geun-hye of South Korea, a US military ally, has ignored pleas from Washington, and has decided to attend the parade in Beijing. Even UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, a Korean national, has ignored protests from Tokyo, and chosen to attend the victory parade. This shows that when choosing between colonial history and political reality, Korea has chosen to oppose colonialism and aggression. The two Koreas have each made political calculations. The Korean peninsula has become the front line in the competition between Washington and Beijing.

The eight-year long War of Resistance Against Japan was led by the Nationalist government. This is an ironclad fact. The Communist Eighth Route Army played a "Behind Enemy Lines" guerrilla role. It even took advantage of the war effort to expand its own power. But the main battlefield in the War of Resistance Against Japan was China. As a result most of the lives lost were Chinese. Victory over Japan took place before the People's Republic of China was even born. The CCP's attempt to depict itself as the main force of resistance against Japan, is flagrant historical revisionism. The Chinese Communist Party is holding a grand parade, a high-profile commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the war effort. It is demonstrating its power and bolstering military morale. It is overriding the original intention of the parade, which was to commemorate victory over Japan. It is using the occasion to display its military strength to the outside world. It is ignoring the historical reality of joint KMT-CCP resistance to Japan. All we see is a great power struggle between Beijing and Washington. Forgotten are the lessons of war's brutality.

Seventy years ago, China, the US, the UK, France, the Soviet Union, and other Allied nations jointly accepted Japan's surrender. Seventy years later, they are commemorating the 70th anniversary of the war effort. Beijing's parade has suddenly omitted the UK and France. Mainland China and Russia have become the only remaining players. The war effort was led by the Republic of China government. Power has since shifted from the KMT to the CCP.  Should Lien Chan and retired ROC generals attend the parade? These questions have stirred lively debate. Such is political reality, which underscores history's merciless brutality.

一場天安門閱兵 多少大國角力

2015-09-01聯合報

在馬總統呼籲「不宜參加」的告誡下，連戰仍然執意赴北京參加中共舉辦的抗戰紀念活動；同樣的，韓國總統朴槿惠也不顧美國的「道德勸說」，決定出席大陸舉辦的紀念抗戰勝利閱兵大典。所不同的是，台灣關心的是「抗戰勝利」的歷史話語權，而美國關注的是「大閱兵」的倒戈效應。

「抗戰勝利」紀念活動，是中共改變國共抗日歷史詮釋權的重要手段；而舉辦「大閱兵」，則是中國大陸企圖擺脫過去被侵略的屈辱歷史，證明自己儼已成為世界軍事強權的圖騰。無論如何，要不要參加北京的九三大閱兵，在兩岸和國際上都成為爭議話題：在台灣內部，則變成誰是抗戰「中流砥柱」的角色爭辯；在國際戰略運用，則成為各國爭相選邊站、合縱連橫的角力場域。一場對日抗戰的紀念活動，在「大閱兵」號角的催化下，竟成為眾家的各自表述。

從出席天安門閱兵的國家元首名單來看，這次出席的國家大多是過去蘇聯的加盟共和國及中國大陸的傳統盟友，包括俄羅斯、白俄羅斯、哈薩克、吉爾吉斯、蒙古、巴基斯坦、埃及、柬埔寨及緬甸等；而美國及西方民主國家幾乎全告缺席，僅派部長層級或由當地國的大使代表出席。至於與中國正面臨海域衝突的日本與菲律賓，更是表明拒絕出席這項活動。這場抗戰紀念活動的大戲，彷彿就是美國的亞洲再平衡戰略運用的縮影。

從閱兵大典的規模來看，這次正式派遣軍隊參加天安門閱兵式的國家，主要是俄羅斯以及中國大陸所主導的上海合作組織成員國，包括古巴、埃及、墨西哥、蒙古、巴基斯坦等國。這些國家過去沒有被日本侵略統治的經驗，而如今則在龐大經濟利益的驅使下，選擇站在中國大陸的這一邊，為閱兵典禮壯大聲色。可見，在後冷戰時期，中俄與美日相互對抗的格局，似乎又儼然成形。

有別於今年五月在俄羅斯舉行的紅場閱兵，那場閱兵主要是針對歐洲戰場的納粹德國；而這次中俄兩國移師至亞洲戰場，自然是共同針對日本。弔詭的是，過去同樣曾遭日本殖民統治的南北韓，在這次中共的抗戰紀念活動上，卻採取截然不同的做法。

一向立場親北京的朝鮮，在中國大陸處處刻意拉攏韓國的情況下，這次金正恩不但選擇不出席北京的紀念活動，還在中共抗戰紀念的慶典前夕，以砲擊韓國來製造區域的緊張關係。北韓的缺席，代表中朝關係似乎有質變的跡象。這場天安門大閱兵，有如一面反光鏡，反射出美中朝權力關係的變化。

反觀身為美國軍事同盟國的韓國，朴槿惠總統卻無視來自美國的勸阻，決定出席北京的閱兵大典；連韓國籍的聯合國秘書長潘基文，也不顧日本政府的抗議，參加這次的抗戰紀念活動。這顯示，韓國在殖民歷史及政治現實的權衡上，選擇回歸「反殖民」、「反侵略」的歷史。而南北韓各自的政治盤算，讓朝鮮半島成為美中相互競逐的前線。

當年的八年抗戰，是國民政府所領導，這是鐵錚錚的事實；中共的八路軍扮演的是「敵後」游擊角色，並假藉抗日來壯大自己的勢力。然而，由於抗日主戰場在中國，為抗日而犧牲的人民絕大多數是中國人，此一事實，使得抗日勝利時尚未誕生的中華人民共和國因而主客易位，中共將自己裝扮成抗戰的主力，這是歷史的變調。中共這次大張旗鼓舉辦「大閱兵」，高調紀念抗戰勝利七十周年，除為對外宣揚國威，也是為了對內穩定軍心。只是，在「大閱兵」的喧賓奪主下，逐漸掩蓋了紀念抗日的初衷和反省，讓外界只看到壯盛的軍容，忽略了國共共同抗日的史實，只看到中美兩大強權的角力，遺忘戰爭摧殘的殘酷教訓。

七十年前，中美英法蘇等同盟國浩浩蕩蕩共同接受日本投降；七十年後紀念抗戰七十周年，在中共大閱兵的政治效應下，頓時少了英美法三國，淪為中俄兩國的獨角戲。而領銜抗戰的中華民國，在兩岸權力轉移的效應下，卻為了連戰及退將應不應出席閱兵鬧得沸沸揚揚；這是政治現實的殘酷，也是歷史無情的作弄。

Erotic Guide EasyCard Reflects Taiwan's Moral Degeneration

Erotic Guide EasyCard Reflects Taiwan's Moral Degeneration
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 31, 2015

Executive Summary: Taiwan has undergone nearly 20 years of relatively smooth political development. Elections have led to ruling party changes. Democracy has been consolidated. People can feel proud. Personal dignity and political rights have been ensured. Unfortunately governmental effectiveness has significantly declined. Hysterical campaign tactics have induced politicians to adopt a myopic “whatever it takes to win” mindset. This has led to the degeneration of morals and the undermining of democratic values.

Full Text Below:

Taiwan has undergone nearly 20 years of relatively smooth political development. Elections have led to ruling party changes. Democracy has been consolidated. People can feel proud. Personal dignity and political rights have been ensured. Unfortunately governmental effectiveness has significantly declined. Hysterical campaign tactics have induced politicians to adopt a myopic “whatever it takes to win” mindset. This has led to the degeneration of morals and the undermining of democratic values.

The EasyCard Corporation has issued a stored value card featuring Japanese porn star Hatano Yui, provoking criticism by the traditional media. Yet an online group of Ko Wen-je fans and green camp supporters has responded with a "feminist" defense. Why shouldn't Hatano Yui be a stored value card spokesperson, they demand to know. They have accused critics of sex discrimination and job discrimination. They have argued that “the desire for food and sex is part of human nature” and denounced critics of the stored value card as hypocrites.

Mainstream society on Taiwan has its own moral evaluation of the sex industry, sexual liberation, and sex workers. These are reflected in the law.  Sex workers and sex consumers are subject to strict laws and regulations. Violators are prosecuted. This reflects public perception. The public might not make a point of condemning foreign sex workers such as Yui Hatano. But neither will it idolize them. The EasyCard Corporation is predominantly publicly owned. It has with much fanfare, made a porn star its product spokesperson. This is unacceptable to mainstream society. That is why the introduction of the porn star stored value card provoked such an intense public backlash.

Consider the feminist or women's rights perspective. Most feminists or women's rights activists disapprove of the EasyCard Corporation's move. They consider it male voyeurism and the objectification of the female body. They think this commercialization of the female body deprives women of their dignity and publicly humiliates them. Of course other feminists believe that women engaged in sex work should be viewed as any normal occupation. They think discrimination against sex workers should end, and lead to the true liberation of women. Some point to the sex industry in the Netherlands and the Nordic countries as examples to emulate. They say their sex industries do not prevent them from being seen as progressive and civilized nations.

This moral debate is a classic case of "he says, she says". The bottom line is this. No matter where one stands, one must be consistent, and apply the same standards in all instances. Whether one is an amoralist or moralist, one must at the very least be consistent. The most lamentable aspect of this debate is moral inconsistency. Many who denounced the sex industry yesterday, praise it today. Many who denounced the sex industry when one party was in power, praise it now that another party is in power. These hypocrites repeatedly contradict themselves. They lack any standards whatsoever. Their sole standard is selfish political advantage.

History offers us the clearest mirror of ourselves. The "Erotic Guide to Taiwan" incident occurred in 2002. A Japanese language sex tourism guide book sold on Taiwan entitled the "Erotic Guide to Taiwan" openly listed information on Taiwan's sex industry. It informed Japanese “Johns” where to solicit prostitutes. As soon as the story broke, then Mayor Ma Ying-jeou was promptly excoriated by various sectors, most notably the green camp. They denounced his anti-vice campaign as ineffective. They accused him of bringing shame upon Taipei. They blamed him for undermining Taipei's international reputation. DPP Taipei City council members held a press conference and denounced this sex industry guidebook for Japanese tourists.

Under public pressure, an angry Ma Ying-jeou aggressively prosecuted the sex industry. Booksellers who sold the book were prosecuted for "harming public morals". Not one green camp supporter came forward to applaud the "Erotic Guide to Taiwan" for “promoting Taiwan” or “popularizing Taipei”. During the “Erotic Guide to Taiwan” controversy, the Taipei City Government opposed the sex industry. But this did not spare it from wholesale condemnation. Today the predominantly publicly owned EasyCard Corporation has issued a Taipei City stored value card with a porn star as spokesperson, indirectly endorsing the sex industry. Yet fans of Ko Wen-je and green camp supporters sympathize with it and abet it. What is this, if not “selective indignation”?

Another politician who has embraced the EasyCard Corporation and engaged in “selective indignation” is Tainan City Mayor Lai Ching-teh, who has refused to appear before the Tainan City Council for over 200 days. During his standoff with the Tainan City Council, he accused KMT Legislative Yuan Wang Jin-pyng of being a “behind the scenes voter buyer”. But the moment Wang Jin-pyng revealed that he would not seek the Kuomintang's nomination for president, he suddenly became Lai Ching-teh's esteemed "Taiwanese Elder". Lai immediately asked Wang to work with Tsai Ing-wen. The “behind the scenes voter buyer” was suddenly elevated to the status of “Native Taiwanese spokesperson”, eminently worthy of “working with” Tsai Ing-wen. What exactly would Wang be working with Tsai Ing-wen on? Vote buying? Lai Ching-teh's acolytes refer to Lai as “Lai Sheng” or “The God named Lai”. The God named Lai's philosophy is simple. Anyone who defers to him is a saint. Anyone who defies him is a sinner. Such is Lai's “selective indignation”.

The “selective indignation” of DPP and green camp leaders knows no bounds. DPP leaders who are indicted are victims of judicial persecution. KMT leaders who are suspected of bribery are incorrigible villains. Lee Teng-hui proclaims that "Japan is our motherland", that "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan", and that "the comfort women issue has been resolved", provoking public outrage. Tsai Ing-wen responds by calling for "tolerance". Lien Chan attends the September 3rd Beijing parade. The DPP immediately leaps up and spews venom. Tsai Ing-wen demands that the KMT "deal with it".

Amoralism and moralism cannot undermine Taiwan's democracy. Only “selective indignation” and hypocritical double standards can.

社論－極樂悠遊卡 照見台灣道德反覆
2015年08月31日 04:10 主筆室

台灣近20年來政治發展平順，藉著選舉與政黨輪替的實現，民主獲得深化與鞏固，值得國人驕傲。但在個人尊嚴與政治權利獲得確保的同時，政府的治理效能卻明顯退化，激烈的選戰與選舉策略操作及政治人物「頭過身就過」短線思維，形成的「道德反覆」現象，卻對民主價值的合理性造成傷害。

悠遊卡公司發行波多野AV女優卡，遭傳統媒體罵翻，但網路上有一派柯粉與綠營支持者拿著所謂「女性主義」為悠遊卡公司辯護，質疑為什麼波多野結衣不能成為悠遊卡主題人物？這既是性別歧視，也是職業歧視，甚至還以「食色性也」反質疑「偽君子」。

對於性產業、性解放或性工作者要採取什麼樣的態度，台灣的主流價值存有一定的道德判斷，並反映在法律上，對性工作者以及性消費者有嚴格的法律規範，若有逾越即須受罰；反映在社會觀感上，即便不會去大肆譴責如波多野結衣的外國性工作者，但也不會去推崇性工作者，但公股為最大股東的悠遊卡公司大張旗鼓讓AV女優成為產品代言人，卻非主流價值所能接受，這也是AV女優悠遊卡推出後，會引起社會大反彈的緣故。

即便從女性主義或女權的觀點，大部分的女性主義或女權運動者也無法認同悠遊卡公司的作為，認為這是利用男性對女體的偷窺慾行銷，將女體商品化，是剝奪女性主體性的嚴重歧視與公然羞辱。當然，也有另一派女性主義者認為，應把女性從事性工作一般化，視為普通職業，應打破對性工作者的歧視，這才是對女性的真正解放，也有人以荷蘭與北歐國家開放的性產業為例，認為這並不影響他們被視為進步與文明的國家。

進入這種道德論爭，有如進入公說公理、婆說婆理的迷霧，不管認同哪一個理，如果一以貫之的以同樣的標準堅持自己相信的理念，不管是道德虛無或道德極端，至少擁有一致的「道德標準」。但這場爭論中最糟糕的部分，是立場跳躍不定的「道德反覆主義」，見人說人話，見鬼說鬼話，以今非昨，以明非今，不斷自我打臉，採取什麼標準，看的只是合不合自己的政治利益。

這一點，歷史是最好的鏡子，以2002年發生的「極樂台灣」事件為例，一本在台灣市面上販售的日文書《極樂台灣》，赤裸裸地報導台灣情色市場，為日本買春客指引台北色情場所，事件揭露後，當時的馬英九市長，立刻受到包括綠營人士在內的各方撻伐，質疑他掃黃不力，讓台北蒙羞，傷害台北的國際聲譽。民進黨籍的台北市議員也召開記者會，大肆抨擊這本為日本遊客而寫的尋春指南。

在輿論壓力下，馬英九震怒，大舉取締色情行業，販售該書的書商，也被檢方依「妨害風化罪」法辦。當時的綠營支持者，可沒有人出來大聲叫好《極樂台灣》，推崇《極樂台灣》是在為台灣行銷，是幫台北集人氣。極樂台灣風波中，台北市政府至少還站在情色產業的對立面，都受到如此撻伐，而今天，有台北官股色彩的悠遊卡公司大剌剌推出AV女優卡，等於是間接為情色產業背書，柯粉與綠營的支持者，卻能繼續淚推、護航。這不是「道德反覆」嗎？

另一個與悠遊卡公司相輝映的「道德反覆」是200多天不進議會的台南市長賴清德。他在與議會鬥法時，曾指控國民黨籍立法院長王金平是議會賄選的幕後黑手，但當王金平確定不爭取國民黨總統提名後，又成了賴清德口中的「台灣歐吉桑」，希望王應該和蔡英文合作。「賄選黑手」忽然變成應該與蔡英文合作的「本土代表」？請問賴清德，那要與蔡英文合作什麼？合作賄選嗎？前言不對後語、價值錯亂的「賴神哲學」，說穿了，就是順他者聖賢逆他者黑金的「道德反覆主義」。

民進黨與綠營人士其他林林總總的道德跳躍多不勝數。民進黨人士涉案是司法迫害，國民黨議員涉賄是天理不容；李登輝發表了眾人皆憤的「日本祖國論」、「釣魚台是日本的」、「慰安婦問題已解決論」，蔡英文呼籲「包容」；連戰參加九三北京大閱兵，民進黨立刻跳出來痛批、酸諷，蔡英文則要國民黨「處理一下」。

傷害台灣民主的不會是道德虛無，也不是道德極端，而是雙重標準的道德反覆。(中國時報)

Seeing Through Lee Teng-hui's Incitement of Sinophobia

Seeing Through Lee Teng-hui's Incitement of Sinophobia
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 28, 2015

Executive Summary: The 2016 election campaign is heating up. Cross-Strait issues have become the hot topic. Pro-Mainland China and anti-Mainland China clashes are proliferating. Interestingly enough, Tsai Ing-wen herself has deliberately avoided reunification vs. independence controversy. On cross-Strait policy, she talks about "maintaining the status quo". She expresses sympathy for the students who oppose school curriculum revision. She also distances herself from the comfort women issue and the students who oppose school curriculum revision. Former President Lee Teng-hui, Tsai Ing-wen's erstwhile mentor, has been shrilly proclaiming that "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan", and "Japan is our motherland". He has precipitated a new wave of "Sinophobic civil war". Lee is a politically experienced strategic thinker. He is not the "senile old man" most of the media portray him as.

Full Text Below:

The 2016 election campaign is heating up. Cross-Strait issues have become the hot topic. Pro-Mainland China and anti-Mainland China clashes are proliferating. Interestingly enough, Tsai Ing-wen herself has deliberately avoided reunification vs. independence controversy. On cross-Strait policy, she talks about "maintaining the status quo". She expresses sympathy for the students who oppose school curriculum revision. She also distances herself from the comfort women issue and the students who oppose school curriculum revision. Former President Lee Teng-hui, Tsai Ing-wen's erstwhile mentor, has been shrilly proclaiming that "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan", and "Japan is our motherland". He has precipitated a new wave of "Sinophobic civil war". Lee is a politically experienced strategic thinker. He is not the "senile old man" most of the media portray him as.

Lee Teng-hui has been arguing that "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan" for years. But he chose this moment to raise the ante by praising Japanese colonial rule. His assertion that "Japan is our motherland" was motivated by darker strategic considerations. Japan's right-wing conservative Abe regime has been aggressively championing collective self-defense and new national security laws. He has been racheting up his rhetoric regarding the Chinese mainland. Lee's remarks have rallied anti-[Mainland] China elements on Taiwan. Lee has forced people to choose sides on the sensitive issue of sovereignty. He has intensified pro-Mainland vs. anti-Mainland polarization on Taiwan.

The Diaoyutai Islands dispute is a dispute over sovereignty. Lee's affirmation of Japanese colonial rule is a matter of historical record. It is how he feels about it. Strictly speaking, unconditional affirmation of Japanese colonial rule is a hard sell. Even pro-Taiwan independence historians dare not express such extreme views. At most they say Japanese rule exhibited both colonialist and modernist traits. That perhaps qualifies as an affirmation of Japanese colonial rule. But as far as the claim that "Japan is our motherland" goes, Lee Teng-hui is the first politician to make that claim, and will probably be the last.

Lee's affirmation of Japanese colonial rule is not an isolated political stance. It is intimately linked to Lee's repudiation and rejection of Mainland China. Many who sing the praises of Japanese colonial rule concede that Japanese rule was foreign rule. But they argue that Japan modernized Taiwan more thoroughly than China modernized the Mainland. They argue that Japan modernized Taiwan more thoroughly than the Qing Court or the Kuomintang modernized Taiwan. Japan's colonial rule may be a historical fact. But the purpose of singing the praises of Japanese rule over Taiwan is to incite hatred against and intensify opposition to Mainland China. The deeper purpose is to intensify opposition between older generations of so-called "native Taiwanese" who lived under Japanese rule, and so-called "mainlanders" who resisted Japanese military invasion. Its purpose is to label those who are critical of Japanese colonial rule and who affirm resistance against Japan as "pro-China", and to label those who affirm Japanese rule and are critical of resistance against Japan as "native Taiwanese" who "love Taiwan" and "oppose China". The goal is to marginalize pro-China, pro-reunificaiton forces.

Lee Teng-hui is a skilled political strategist. He knows that as long as he raises these issues, he will silence skeptics of Tsai Ing-wen's "maintaining the status quo". He knows he will bring alienated Taiwan independence elements back into the fold. Meanwhile, given Ma Ying-jeou's values, the Ma administration is certain to blast Lee's ideas full force. Given Taiwan society's current indifference to reason and ubiquitous anti-Ma sentiment, the great majority will remain silent. Moderates within the green camp will refuse comment. As a result pro-China, pro-reunification elements will be isolated.

This "Sinophobic civil war" continues to heat up day by day. What Taiwan needs is a merger of pro-China, pro-reunification forces at the grassroots level. Such a pro-China, pro-reunification force must not be equated with blue vs. green political reunification vs. independence. In fact, many traditional supporters of the green camp, even major figures, believe in a rational middle way. They are willing to acknowledge the rise of Mainland China. They hope that cooperation between Taiwan and the Mainland will benefit both sides of the Strait. They feel the two sides should cherish their common culture, history, and national identity. The late Yu Teng-fa was an older generation green camp political leader, and a triad head in Kaohsiung. Although he was a victim of KMT political repression, he championed cross-Strait reunification. In his later years he even served as honorary chairman of the Alliance for the Reunification of China.

The late Su Tung-chi was an advocate of Taiwan independence and a former political prisoner. HIs son Su Chi-hao has repeatedly reminded the DPP that cross-Strait policy is the party's blind spot. He says the DPP "persists in spinning its wheels and clinging to its rigid ideology". He says the DPP "lacks the vision, heart, and intellect to fling the doors open and gaze upon the future". For Su Chi-hao, Taiwan independence was mother's milk. Yet he argues that "the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are both part of the same nation." He urges "the maintenance of cross-Strait stability, guaranteeing a half century of peace". He has long believed that "cross-Strait cooperation benefits both sides, while confrontation harms both sides". These are not isolated examples. In an atmosphere of rising Taiwan independence sentiment, many knowledgeable members of the green camp find it difficult to say what they really think. But in fact their ideas continue to grow within our native soil.

More and more young people believe that Taiwan cannot afford to remain complacent. It must cease barricading itself behind closed doors. Human resource surveys have repeatedly shown that on Taiwan, the younger a person is, the more willing he is to visit the Mainland, face its challenges, and take advantage of its opportunities for education and employment. The younger a person is, the more willing he is to avail himself of the resources of the Mainland to flex his muscles, to help Taiwan prosper, and to benefit both sides of the Strait. This sort of thinking is perfectly normal for many young people. Politically speaking "Sinophobic civil war" may have considerable market appeal. But practically speaking, those who think the two sides should abandon confrontation and seek win/win not only exist, their numbers are growing.

Pro-China and pro-reunification forces are merging and growing, not for myopic electoral advantage, but for Taiwan's long-term survival and prosperity. Not for fleeting political passions, but for the sake of solidarity among Chinese people the world over. This is the new social movement that befits Taiwan's entry into a new era.

看破李登輝激化反中力量的伎倆

2015年08月28日 中國時報

選戰加溫，兩岸關係議題也開始加溫，親中與仇中道路爭議也漸漸蔓延擴大。耐人尋味的是，蔡英文刻意迴避統獨爭議、在兩岸政策上高談維持現狀論，甚至一方面擺出同情反課綱學生姿態，另方面卻刻意在慰安婦議題上與反課綱學生拉開距離。但一手提拔蔡英文從政的前總統李登輝，卻藉「釣魚台屬於日本論」、「日本祖國論」等發動新一波「仇中民主內戰」。以李城府之深、謀略之精，當非一般媒體所謂「老番顛」隨興之作。

李登輝主張「釣魚台屬於日本」已久，但選擇在這段時間丟出，更加碼提出「日本殖民統治肯定論」、「日本祖國論」，很可能有更深的戰略考慮。畢竟日本保守右翼的安倍政權，這段時間以來積極推動集體自衛權、新安保法案，與中國大陸的對立越來越深，李登輝的言論顯然有凝聚、擴大台灣「仇中派」聲勢，一方面在中日間敏感的主權問題上選邊站，一方面激化台灣內部親中、反中爭議的企圖。

如果說釣魚台爭議是現實性的主權爭議課題，那麼李登輝重新丟出的「日本殖民統治肯定論」則是歷史與情感的課題。嚴格說來，徹底的「日本殖民統治肯定論」在台灣的言論市場空間並不大，即使是獨派歷史學者，多數也不敢持如此極端的立場，頂多是曖昧的表明要研究、認識日本統治台灣的性質具有「殖民性」與「現代性」的雙重性格，算是某種「日本殖民統治部分肯定論」。至於主張「日本祖國論」，李登輝可能是政治人物第一人，也很可能是最後一人。

「日本殖民統治肯定論」在政治攻防、話語爭奪上從來就不是單獨存在的，而是和「中國否定論」、「中國排斥論」緊密連結的。「日本殖民統治肯定論」真正要論證的是，即使承認日本是異族統治台灣，但是在現代化的推進上、在治理的績效上，都遠遠超過中國大陸本身，也超過清朝和國民黨統治下的台灣。所以，「日本殖民統治肯定論」雖然是歷史的課題，目的卻是要在現實中激起仇中、反中的情感，其更深層的目的，則是圖謀要激化上一代、上兩代曾經歷日本統治的所謂「本省族群」，與上一代、上兩代曾有抗日經驗的「外省族群」的對立，進而在政治論述上劃定「批判日本殖民統治」、「正視抗日經驗教訓」＝「親中派」，而「肯定日本統治」、「否定抗戰價值」＝「本土派」＝「愛台灣」＝「反中派」的公式，希望進一步邊緣化親中、合中的社會力量。

精於政治謀略的李登輝深知，只要他拋出這一連串的議題，一方面有助於凝聚潛在對蔡英文維持現狀論不滿、疏離的獨派力量，另方面以馬英九的理念與價值，勢必引發府方的全面批判火力，而又以台灣社會近乎不講道理、不論事實的廣泛反馬情緒，中間沉默多數，以至於綠營內部比較中道、理性的力量可能都會噤聲而不表態，使得親中、合中的力量陷於孤立。

面對政治領域日益高漲的「仇中民主內戰」，台灣需要的是在社會層面逐漸凝聚合中、親中的力量與聲量。這裡所稱的「合中」、「親中」力量，不能等同於政治上的統獨藍綠。事實上，不少傳統綠營的支持者、甚至重要人士中，確實存在中道理性、願意正視大陸崛起、希望台灣與大陸走向合則兩利局面，也願意珍惜兩岸同文同種的歷史與民族情感的力量。在老一代的綠營政治領袖中，已故的高雄黑派掌門人余登發，雖然曾受到國民黨的政治壓制，但卻始終支持、認同兩岸統一的主張，晚年還曾出任中國統一聯盟的名譽主席。

已故的台獨政治犯蘇東啟，其公子蘇治灝就一再撰文提醒民進黨：兩岸政策是該黨盲點，「盡在僵化意識型態中打轉」，「沒有大開大闔的遠見、胸懷，沒有宏觀前瞻的視野、思維」。從小受到台獨運動深刻影響的蘇治灝，仍願意主張「兩岸同屬一個中華民族，兩岸維穩，五十年和平不變」，他始終認為「兩岸合作兩利，對抗兩害」，這並非孤例。在獨派氛圍高漲的時候，許多綠營中的有識之士不願也難以表達內心真正想法，但是類似想法、實踐卻不斷在本土土壤滋生。

越來越多年輕人認為台灣不應故步自封，不能再自我閉鎖，人力資源調查一再顯示，越年輕的台灣民眾，越有意願前往充滿挑戰與機遇的大陸求學就業、開拓事業，運用中國大陸的資源，鍛鍊自己、壯大台灣，最後兩岸互利，這是許多年輕人可以接受的思維。在一時的政治硝煙中，「仇中民主內戰」或許有相當市場，但在實際的生活層面、在理性的思維深處、在社會的各個角落，認同兩岸應該拋棄對立、兩岸始終是合則兩利的力量不但存在，而且在成長中。

合中力量的凝聚與發展，不是為了一時的選舉，而是為了台灣長久的生存發展，不是為了昂揚政治激情，而是為了全世界華人社群的團結與光大，這應該是新時代台灣的新社會運動！

Will High Level Cross-Strait Talks Still Be Held Next Year?

Will High Level Cross-Strait Talks Still Be Held Next Year?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 27, 2015

Executive Summary: The SEF and ARATS have just concluded talks in Fuzhou. The two sides signed agreements that will facilitate cross-Strait taxation and airline safety. This will be the last high-level cross-Strait talk held during the Ma administration. The atmosphere during the general election is treacherous. The talks have not garnered much attention. But those in the know cannot help wondering. If the general election next year results in a ruling party change, will high-level cross-Strait talks still be possible?

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The SEF and ARATS have just concluded talks in Fuzhou. The two sides signed agreements that will facilitate cross-Strait taxation and airline safety. This will be the last high-level cross-Strait talk held during the Ma administration. The atmosphere during the general election is treacherous. The talks have not garnered much attention. But those in the know cannot help wondering. If the general election next year results in a ruling party change, will high-level cross-Strait talks still be possible?

Some say the Fuzhou talks may be the last high-level talks the two sides hold for many years. That may sound alarmist, but it is true. Yet the public on Taiwan has yet to treat the problem with the seriousness it deserves. Zhang Zhijun spoke in Fuzhou, saying that, "Without the 1992 consensus, the framework for cross-Strait trust and negotiation could collapse". His words attracted more attention than the bilateral agreement. Tsai Ing-wen may be wondering. Suppose she takes power next year. Will she wind up negotiating with the Mainland, or clashing with it head on?

Tsai Ing-wen's response has been to squeak through by chanting the mantra, "maintaining the status quo". Many on Taiwan are deluded. They assume Tsai Ing-wen has a trick up her sleeve that will have Beijing eating out of her hand. In fact, Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing remain miles apart. The closest she and Beijing have ever gotten, can be summed up in "the existing constitutional framework of the Republic of China", the phrase she blurted out during her visit to the US. This phrase appears to honor public opinion and promote peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations. But her "existing constitutional framework" has a catch. The constitution is clearly a "one China" constitution. So why are Taiwan independence elements silent about Tsai Ing-wen's stance on cross-Strait relations?

Their acquiescence can be explained in two ways. One. Tsai Ing-wen is preparing to turn her back on Taiwan independence, but has yet to inform Taiwan independence elements. She is allowing Taiwan independence elements to think she is merely resorting to campaign tricks. Once she is safetly ensonced in office, she will kick Taiwan independence elements aside. But the likelihood of this is scant. Taiwan independence is the DPP's prime mover, its vote-getting machine. Why would Tsai Ing-wen forsake this endless gusher? That leaves Two. On the matter of "the existing constitutional framework", Tsai Ing-wen has a tacit understanding with Taiwan independence elements. Deceive Washington, Beijing, centrist, and pale blue voters, such that they mistakenly allow an apparently moderate Tsai Ing-wen to ascend to power. She will then be able complete the final mile and fulfill her grand ambition without resistance.

Tsai's apparent about face has momentarily left Beijing disoriented. But dialectical materialist thought is Beijing's forte. A few days later, the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office came right out and demanded of Tsai Ing-wen, "What is the relationship between the two sides? What is the basis for cross-Strait relations? How do you intend to maintain peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations? "

Tsai Ing-wen has yet to show her hand. Beijing is also patiently waiting to see. The 11 talks alrready scheduled will still be held. The second Hsia-Zhang meeting will probably still be held in mid-September. But the price for the transfer of Mainland tourists is has been increased. We are now required to use Taiwan Strait routes. For the moment the two sides appear relaxed. But will cross-Strait relations undergo drastic change in the event Tsai Ing-wen is elected? That remains to be seen.

Beijing's plans are not difficult to discern. The Zhurihe military maneuvers in Inner Mongolia included replicas of the presidential palace in Taipei. That is one hint. The 9/3 anti-fascist victory parade amounts is a high-profile warning to the United States and Japan, aimed deliberately at the Taiwan Strait. Xi Jinping intends to raise the Taiwan issue during his September visit to the US. He intends to pull the rug out from under Tsai Ing-wen. He is attempting to reach an understanding with the United States on how to bring Tsai Ing-wen to heel.

Xi Jinping's strategy will ward off invaders, establish a perimeter around Taiwan, limit Tsai Ing-wen's maneuvering room, thereby keeping her on a short leash. This perimeter is threefold. The first is the interests of the major powers. The second is cross-Strait economic benefits. The third is psychological deterrence. Among these, Taiwan's economic benefits constitute the soft underbelly.

Tsai Ing-wen's plan cavalierly thumbs its nose at these factors. Her defiant attitude reveals a populist impulse to butt heads with the major powers. When addressing a think tank in the US, she touted the democratic values of the Sunflower Student Movement. She described it as a "new political and social force". She promised "to allow this powerful force to influence her decision-making process". But as everyone knows only too well, the Sunflower Student Movement is an artificial, stage-managed, anti-Mainland China exercise. Tsai Ing-wen assumes that her populist rhetoric will compel the United States to back whatever she does. But can the US really be so easily taken for a ride?

While Tsai has been pandering to the United States, her political mentor Lee Teng-hui has been whipping up Japanophile imperial subject sentiments. He has been urging people on Taiwan to repudiate their own ethnic heritage. Tsai Ing-wen has refused to utter a word of criticism. Instead, she has demanded that people show Lee respect. Her behavior reflects the smug superciliousness of her Sinophobic mindset.

Chen Shui-bian ruled for eight years without a legislative majority. The Kuomintang legislative majority acted as a safety valve. Chen dared to demanded the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution". He made international waves and pushed the two sides to the brink of war. If Tsai Ing-wen becomes president and enjoys a legislative majority, how will she moderate demands for Taiwan independence?

Tsai Ing-wen sits, waiting for the presidency to fall into her lap. The scenario offers little promise of cross-Strait peace. On the contrary, the two sides are now more likely than ever to clash head on. When, if ever, will high-level cross-strait talks be held again? How, if possible, can the status quo be maintained?

明年還會不會有兩岸高層會談？

2015-08-27聯合報

海基、海協兩會在福州的會談落幕，雙方簽下了有助兩岸交流的租稅及飛安兩項協議。這是馬政府任內兩岸最後一次高層會談。在大選詭譎的氣氛中，這次會談成果似未受到太多重視；但有識者不能不想到一個更深刻的問題：明年大選如果變天，還可不可能有兩岸高層協商？

有人說，這場福州會談，有可能是兩岸未來幾年最後一次高層會談；聽似危言聳聽，卻也相當真實，但台灣社會尚未認真思考過這個問題。張志軍在福州會談中說：如果沒有「九二共識」，兩岸互信及商談機制可能「坍塌」；此話，其實比兩岸簽下的協議更受矚目。而在蔡英文心裡，她可曾自忖：明年若上台，是要走協商路線，還是要衝突？

對此問題，蔡英文的回答一直是四個字炮製的麻醉劑──「維持現狀」，輕鬆帶過。不少民眾也存有幻想，以為蔡英文會有某些奇招，將北京制得服服貼貼。事實上，蔡英文與北京的差距，至今仍非常遙遠。她與北京最近的距離，是訪美時冒出的一句：「將在中華民國現行憲政體制下」，依循普遍民意，持續推動兩岸關係的和平穩定發展。但這個「現行憲政體制」卻頗有玄機，分明是一個「一中架構」的憲法，蔡英文若要依此推動兩岸關係，獨派何以靜默如斯？

這可作兩種解法：其一，蔡英文準備從台獨轉身，但並不告知獨派，讓獨派以為這只是她的選舉騙術，等到大權在握，再把獨派一腳踢開。但這個走法可能性微乎其微，台獨是民進黨的政治發動機，藉此票源滾滾，蔡英文豈可能自絕於這口噴票油井？那麼，只剩第二個解法，「現行憲政體制」是蔡英文與獨派之間心照不宣的共謀，讓華盛頓、北京以及國內的中間與淺藍選民，誤以為一個溫和中庸的蔡英文將要上台，如此，問鼎大位的最後一哩路上即沒有閃失。

這個轉彎，竟讓北京一時難以拆解，但畢竟辯證思考是北京的擅長，幾天後國台辦即釜底抽薪地直問蔡英文：「兩岸之間是什麼關係，兩岸關係發展的基礎是什麼，怎樣維護兩岸關係和平穩定發展？」

由於蔡英文尚未揭開最後底牌，北京也耐著性子靜觀其變。該上場的十一次會談仍然上場，第二次夏張會也可望在九月中旬登場，但陸客中轉則堆高了代價，必須以海峽航路換取。此刻的兩岸，呈現了外弛內張的狀態，但蔡英文如當選兩岸會不會變生肘腋，則仍是懸念。

從若干跡象，不難探知北京的思路。內蒙古的朱日和軍演乍現仿總統府的建築，是一次暗示；而九三的反法西斯勝利閱兵，則是高調威懾，既對著美日、也著意於台海。而習近平九月訪美，確定列入台灣議題，則是繞到蔡英文的後方拔樁，試圖與美方達成共同管束蔡英文的默契。

習近平採取的策略是堅壁清野，布幾根樁子在台灣周遭，限縮蔡英文的空間，讓她只能在預設的範疇內活動。這幾根樁子，一是大國利益、二是兩岸經濟、三是心理懾迫。其中，經濟更是台灣的軟肋。

然而，蔡英文的政經藍本，對此卻顯得毫不在乎、底氣十足，隱含著要以民粹去衝撞大國秩序的暗喻。她訪美時在智庫的演講，即吹捧太陽花運動的民主價值，將它描述成「新興的政治社會力」，還要「讓這些強大的動能進入決策程序」。但眾所皆知，太陽花是一次人為操弄的反中動員，如此高調地將民粹唱入雲霄，就是自恃可以挾美自重，但美國又豈是如此容易被挾持的？

除了傾美，她的政治恩師李登輝不斷掀起媚日皇民狂瀾，煽動更多人拋棄自我民族根源，蔡英文不但未予切割或批判，卻要求民眾尊重。這些演出，在在反映了她躊躇滿志的反中路線。

陳水扁的八年，以未能過半的國會少數執政，還有多數的國民黨作為安全瓣，他都敢逕以制憲、正名掀起國際狂濤，使兩岸陷入準戰爭邊緣；蔡英文若以總統、國會皆過半取得完全執政，那麼，她要如何澆熄台獨的熾焰？

觀察蔡英文的「坐天」徵象，不僅看不見兩岸關係的和平場景，更可能掀起兩岸衝突的驚天惡浪；那麼，下一次兩岸高層會談將在何年何月？而所謂「現狀」，又將如何維持？

Pre-Summit Beijing-Washington Frictions

Pre-Summit Beijing-Washington Frictions
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 26, 2015

Executive Summary: Relations between Beijing and Washington manifest themselves in many areas of long-term policy. Crisis management mechanisms must be established. So must mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation. These are the most urgent tasks for the Obama Xi meeting. Beijing and Washington must work together toward harmony and a win-win relationship. No one-man show will ever solve their problems.

Full Text Below:

Mainland Chinese President Xi Jinping is about to depart on his first state visit to the United States. Beijing-Washington relations remain a mystery. The Obama Xi meeting remains full of variables.

In early February, White House national security adviser Susan Rice revealed that Xi Jinping would visit the US. Since then, Beijing and Washington have clashed repeatedly. In July, Beijing enacted a "National Security Law" and "Offshore NGO Management Law", raising eyebrows within the international community. Beijing's controls over the media and public speech are increasingly strict. Online and NGO activists have often been subject to interrogation, house arrest, even imprisonment, provoking a backlash in US public opinion. Americans have converged on the official White House web site and petitioned Obama to cancel Xi Jinping's visit. Think tank scholars have appealed to Washington to suspend the content free Obama Xi meeting.

The eve of the Obama Xi meeting is filled with an atmosphere of confrontation. Washington may be hoping to gain bargaining chips. Beijing and Washington are at loggerheads with each other over human rights. Their tit for tat is nothing new. In theory, it poses no obstacle to an Obama Xi meeting. The United States' deterrent actions against Mainland Chinese land reclaimation on islands and reefs in the South China Sea did not have the desired effect. The United States should not rush to cancel the Xi Jinping visit. It should instead attempt to ease tensions in East Asia.

The Obama Xi meeting is a major event for the PRC and USA. A tempest in a teapot is unlikely to affect bilateral relations. US State Department spokesman John Kirby recently said that the United States has yet to receive an official invitation for President Obama to attend the WWII 70th anniversary parade in Beijing. His implication was that if Beijing issued an invitation, Washington would consider participating. Kirby's statement established a friendly atmosphere for the Beijing-Washington meeting, and revealed that the Obama Xi meeting would be held as scheduled.

Beijing and Washington are having great difficulty establishing a new great power relationship. The obstacles are difficult and varied. Old issues persist. New issues arise. The Obama Xi meeting will test Beijing-Washington relations. The key remains how to narrow the differences between Beijing and Washington. The RMB continues to depreciate. Beijing has completed its "fox hunt" for officials who fled to the United States. The Mainland's human rights record continues to deteriorate, and is becoming a thorny issue that the Obama Xi meeting will have to face.

Mainland China is adhering to its path of peaceful development. It is also defending its core interests. Beijing must cope with the global economy, network security, climate change, financial reform, and international terrorism. It is fully prepared to cooperate with the United States. But on sovereignty or territorial disputes, it has absolutely no room for compromise. Xi Jinping's new great power relationship between Mainland China and the US requires respect for each other's core interests and strategic concerns.

Clashes between Beijing and Washington are due mainly to the yawning chasm between the two sides' political values and strategic interests. The US criticizes Mainland China for manipulating its currency, but tolerates the Abe government's quantitative easing. Washington supports Beijing's anti-corruption policies, but refuses to sign an extradition treaty. The US claims it will not provide a safe haven for criminals from any nation, but persistently makes the repatriation of criminals to Mainland China difficult. Recently it even issued a stern warning against Mainland Chinese agents conducting "fox hunting" operations in the United States.

Beijing and Washington agreed to the inclusion of human rights and Taiwan issues in the September Obama Xi meeting. Obviously this was the result of each side sticking to its guns. A new round of human rights talks was held in Washington in mid-August. Beijing and Washington failed to reach a consensus on judicial reform, religious freedom, or racial discrimination. Beijing recently proposed "Three Things to Avoid", namely, double standards, politicization, and "microphone diplomacy", criticizing US human rights policy double standards.

The issue of Taiwan has become part of the Obama Xi meeting agenda, mainly due to changes in Taiwan's internal situation. It shows that Beijing is concerned about the increasing arrogance displayed by Taiwan independence elements. In early August, Zhang Zhijun, director of the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office issued a statement Speaking from Changchun, Jilin, Zhang said the 1992 Consensus means "Taiwan and the Mainland are both part of one China". In mid-August, while visiting the United States, Zhang said relations across the Strait are at a crossroads. One road adheres to the 1992 Consensus, and ensures peaceful development. The other attempts to turn back the clock, and takes the mistaken path toward Taiwan independence. He was warning the DPP that "different choices will lead to different outcomes."

Zhang Zhijun's voice was calm. But it hinted at severe difficulties in future cross-Straits relations. The Obama Xi meeting will inevitably prompt the White House to reaffirm its commitment to its One China Policy and the "three Sino-US joint communiques", and even underscore Wahington's support for the 1992 Consensus, the very thing the DPP wishes to avoid.

Relations between Beijing and Washington manifest themselves in many areas of long-term policy. Crisis management mechanisms must be established. So must mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation. These are the most urgent tasks for the Obama Xi meeting. Beijing and Washington must work together toward harmony and a win-win relationship. No one-man show will ever solve their problems.

試水溫 中美峰會前摩擦不斷

2015-8-26 中國時報

大陸國家主席習近平的首次美國國是訪問前夕，中美關係依然撲朔迷離，「歐習會」似乎充滿了變數。

白宮國家安全顧問萊斯女士2月上旬透露習近平訪美的訊息後，中美摩擦和碰撞就層出不窮。7月間北京頒布新的《國安法》及制定《境外非政府組織管理法》的舉動，引起國際社會側目。北京對媒體與民眾言論的管控愈趨嚴厲，網路、非政府組織、維權人士動輒被約談、軟禁及入獄，激起美國輿論的反彈。美國民眾連結白宮網站請願，要求歐巴馬取消習近平訪美，智庫學者更呼籲華府暫停沒有實質意義的「歐習會」。

「歐習會」前夕營造中美對立氣氛，或因華府想累積談判籌碼。中美因人權問題針鋒相對，非起於今日，理論上不構成「歐習會」的障礙。美國針對中國在南海島礁填土造陸所採取的軍事嚇阻行動，亦未產生預期效果，此刻美國應無貿然取消習近平來訪的理由，遑論緩解東亞的緊張情勢。

「歐習會」是中美間的年度大事，茶壺裡的風暴尚不致於影響雙邊的競合關係。美國務院發言人柯比最近公開表示，美方並未收到北京邀請歐巴馬總統出席抗戰70周年閱兵活動的正式函件，意味如果中方邀請，華府就會考慮採取何種參與方式。柯比的話語或為營造中美峰會的友好氛圍，卻透露了「歐習會」如期舉行。

中美建構新型的大國關係複雜而艱辛，舊的議題糾纏不清，新的問題接踵而至。「歐習會」可以測試中美關係的熱度和走勢，關鍵仍在於中美如何緩解分歧與摩擦。這段時間人民幣持續走貶、令完成潛逃美國、中方海外「獵狐」行動、中國人權紀錄退步，都會成為「歐習會」必須面對的棘手問題。

中國堅持和平發展路線，也強調捍衛國家核心利益。北京面對全球經濟、網路安全、氣候變化、金融改革、國際反恐等議題，充分呈現與美方合作的態度，涉及主權或領土爭端問題，即毫無妥協空間。習近平眼裡的中美新型大國關係，前提要件是彼此尊重對方的核心利益和戰略關注焦點。

中美摩擦與碰撞不斷的主要原因是，雙方的政治價值觀和戰略利益認知差距過大。美國批評中國操縱人民幣匯率，卻容忍日本安倍政府的貨幣量化寬鬆政策；華府支持北京的反腐政策，卻無意和中國簽訂引渡條約；美國自稱不是任何國家罪犯的避風港，但又處處刁難中國遣返罪犯的要求，最近更嚴厲警告中國特工在美國的「獵狐」行動。

中美同意把人權和台灣議題列入9月「歐習會」議程，顯然是各自堅持的結果，前者顯示8月中旬華府召開的新一回合人權對話，中美並未達成司法改革、宗教自由或種族歧視問題的共識。北京最近再提「三個避免」（雙重標準、泛政治化、麥克風外交），就是批評美國人權政策的雙重標準。

台灣問題成為「歐習會」的議程，主要源於台灣內部情勢的變化，也顯示北京對台獨氣燄高漲的憂慮。大陸國台辦主任張志軍8月上旬在吉林長春明確表示，「九二共識」的核心意涵是「台灣與大陸同屬一個中國」，8月中旬訪美時他再次提到，兩岸關係正面臨兩條道路的選擇（堅持「九二共識」延續和平發展之途；選擇「開歷史倒車，重回台獨邪路」），都是警示民進黨「不同的選擇會有不同的結果」。

張志軍的語氣平和，卻隱喻了兩岸關係未來發展的嚴峻和困境。可以預知的是。「歐習會」必然會促使白宮重申恪守「一個中國政策」和「中美三個聯合公報」，甚至於挑明民進黨迴避「九二共識」有違華府的一中立場。

中美競合關係長期呈現於各個政策領域，未來如何妥善建立危機控管與良性對話合作機制，才是「歐習會」的當務之急，終究中美和諧共贏需要雙方共同的努力，獨腳戲永遠解決不了問題。

Taiwan's Gradual Trade and Economic Marginalization

Taiwan's Gradual Trade and Economic Marginalization
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 25, 2015

Executive Summary: Future generations who look back at the international trade and economic situation during the 21st century, will surely zero in on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and regional economic cooperation organizations. These have redrawn the map for international trade, and rewritten the rules of the game. The ROC's chief competitor, South Korea, has signed 12 FTAs with major nations or regions. They include the United States, the EU, Brazil, India, and the Chinese mainland. Among the world's major economies, only Japan has yet to sign an FTA with South Korea. But Mainland Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean foreign ministers reached an agreement in March of this year. The three governments will accelerate FTA talks. The impact on Taiwan's exports will be far-reaching and immense.

Full Text Below:

Future generations who look back at the international trade and economic situation during the 21st century, will surely zero in on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and regional economic cooperation organizations. These have redrawn the map for international trade, and rewritten the rules of the game. The ROC's chief competitor, South Korea, has signed 12 FTAs with major nations or regions. They include the United States, the EU, Brazil, India, and the Chinese mainland. Among the world's major economies, only Japan has yet to sign an FTA with South Korea. But Mainland Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean foreign ministers reached an agreement in March of this year. The three governments will accelerate FTA talks. The impact on Taiwan's exports will be far-reaching and immense.

Taiwan's performance in this area has been lackluster.  Taiwan has signed fewer than 10 FTAs, five of which are with small countries in Central and South America, with which we have diplomatic relations. They add up to a mere 0.2% of our total trade, and constitute a formality of no real significance. We did sign ECFA, an FTA with the Mainland. But ECFA's early harvest list means less than 9% of Taiwan's trade is covered by the agreement. By contrast, once the Mainland's FTA with South Korea takes effect, up to 73% of South Korea's trade will be covered.

The future is even more frightening and pessimism inducing. Two key regional economic and trade organizations are currently under creation. They are the United States led TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), and the Chinese mainland led RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement). The TPP includes 12 countries with a total economic output (GDP) of $ 27 trillion, accounting for 38% of the world's wealth and 34% of the Chinese mainland's trade volume. The RCEP includes 16 countries, with an economic output of $ 21 trillion, accounting for 29% of the global total, and 57% of our trade. These two regional organizations are in the midst of active negotiations. The soonest they may be complete is next year. The latest, the year after that. 

Joining these two regional organizations is essential to Taiwan's economy and trade. Unfortunately so far we have failed to do so. Among the 24 current APEC member nations, only two have not joined the TPP or RCEP. One is the ROC, and the other is Papua New Guinea. If this is not trade marginalization, what is?

Signing FTAs is beneficial for our exports. This is common sense. Suppose Taiwan and South Korea export the same products to the United States. South Korea has signed an FTA and enjoys zero tariffs. Taiwan companies are required to pay 5 to 10% in tariffs, maybe more. Profit margins are already low with 5 to 10% profits. Taiwan will naturally be unable to compete, and will ultimately have to hand over the market to Korea. Unfortunately when faced with these sorts of economic issues, "common sense" is far from common. Many anti-China elements who oppose the cross-strait MTA claim that "FTAs are useless" and have misled the public into opposing FTAs.

Taiwan's economic and trade marginalization is reflected in its exports. For example, Taiwan manufacturers once enjoyed a defacto monopoly in certain niche petrochemical raw materials. But once South Korea's FTA with the  European Union took effect, South Korean companies immediately monopolized the European market. Two months after the US-ROK FTA took effect, South Korea's machine tool exports to the US eclipsed Taiwan's. The tariff on Taiwan's hosiery exports to the US is 14%. South Korea benefits from its FTA. The tax rate on its products is zero. As a result over half of the 600 plus companies in Shetou, Zhanghua, Taiwan's hosiery production region, have closed their doors.

Trade and economic marginalization affects more than exports. Even more lethal and serious is its impact on investments. If exports from Taiwan fail to benefit from tariff concessions offered by regional organizations or FTAs, private investment and even existing plants are likely to move to countries and regions that enjoy preferential tariffs. Recently the Formosa Plastics Group announced that over the next three years, the percentage of its overseas investments will substantially increase, from 25% to as much as 80%. When foreign transnationals decide where to build factories in the Asian-Pacific region, they find Taiwan offers the best conditions. But since it has no FTAs, they look elsewhere. This is why Taiwan's foreign direct investment continues to plummet, and its total is now less than half that of Vietnam and the Philippines. Over the next two years, the PRC-ROK FTA and other major regional organizations will begin to have an effect. Our marginalization will become even more apparent. Can we really remain indifferent?

To overcome this marginalization crisis, Taiwan must join regional economic organizations and sign FTAs with the world's major economies, as soon as possible. The plain truth is that Taiwan cannot sign FTAs with the United States and Europe, because we cannot even get our foot in the door. Even assuming we could sign them, they would not take effect until years later, and would not meet Taiwan's urgent needs today. Taiwan has yet to be invited to join the RCEP or TPP.  The former is Mainland led, Taiwan cannot join while it ignores the MTA. The latter Taiwan can probably join sooner or later. But perhaps only during the second round, no sooner than 2020.

Only the MTA can provide truly meaningful and immediate benefits to Taiwan's trade and economy. It can temporarily defuse the crisis of marginalization. Unfortunately the MTA has been politicized. It has become the target of green camp political party and "anti-[Mainland] China" element demonization. The Ma government may be able to complete negotiations before its term runs out. But it will not be able to implement the MTA before then. Can MTA negotiations continue after next year's election? That is hard to say.

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are favored to win next year's general election. Will they support the MTA? If Tsai is willing to support the MTA, perhaps the Ma government can complete negotiations during his remaining time in office, then let whomever assumes power afterwards take responsibility for its implementation. That would defuse the crisis of Taiwan's trade and economic marginalization to a considerable extent. Otherwise, no matter who winds up in office next year, she will endure the pain of economic and trade marginalization.

溫水煮青蛙的經貿邊緣化危機

2015年08月25日 中國時報

如果後人回顧進入21世紀後的國際經貿變化，主軸必然是FTA（自由貿易協定）及區域經濟合作組織；這股趨勢改寫、重塑了國際經貿的版圖與遊戲規則。我國主要競爭對手韓國，已簽下12個「重量級」FTA，其中包括美國、歐盟、巴西、印度及中國等大型經濟體，全球重要經濟體中，只剩下日本尚未與韓國簽FTA。但今年3月的中日韓三國外長會議已達成共識，將加速3國自貿區的談判，這些對台灣的出口影響深遠而鉅。

台灣這方面的成績乏善可陳，台灣簽下的FTA不到10個，其中5個是與中南美洲邦交小國簽，所占貿易額只有0.2%，徒具形式而無實質意義。即使加上與大陸簽下的ECFA，因ECFA只有早收清單，因此台灣貿易量只有不到9%為FTA所涵蓋。相較之下，韓國在中韓FTA上路後，涵蓋比率可達73%。

未來更讓人悲觀又心驚，亞洲現在進行中，最重要的兩大區域經貿組織分別是由美國主導的TPP（跨太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協議），及由大陸主導的RCEP（區域全面經濟夥伴協定）。TPP有12個國家，在經濟總量（GDP）上有27兆美元，占全球的38%，占我國貿易額的34%；RCEP有16國，經濟總量為21兆美元，占全球總量的29%，占我國貿易額的57%。這兩大區域組織正積極談判中，快則明年、晚則後年可望完成談判上路。

加入這兩個區域組織對台灣經貿有其必要性，但遺憾的是我國至今都未能加入。而目前24個APEC（亞太經合組織）成員國當中，只有兩國未能加入TPP或RCEP：一個是台灣，一個是巴布亞新幾內亞。如果這不叫「經貿邊緣化」，什麼才叫經貿邊緣化？

簽FTA對本國出口的助益以常識思考即可知，如果台韓兩國出口同樣的產品到美國，韓國因有簽FTA而享零關稅，台灣企業則需要支付5～10%、甚至超過10%的關稅，以現在平均5～10%利潤的「微利時代」，台灣產品當然不可能與韓國競爭，最後只能拱手讓出市場。可惜對這種「常識性」的經濟議題，猶有不少「反中人士」，因為反對兩岸貨貿協議而倡導「FTA無用論」，誤導民眾去反對FTA。

事實上，台灣經貿邊緣化的衝擊已反映在出口。例如原本屬於台灣廠商利基產品的石化原料，在韓國與歐盟的FTA生效後，歐洲市場就立刻被韓國廠商搶占。美韓FTA生效後兩個月，台灣工具機輸美市占率就被韓國超越；台灣的織襪產業輸美關稅是14%，韓國受惠FTA產品稅率降為零，結果是台灣織襪產地重鎮的彰化社頭，600多家業者倒閉一半以上。

經貿邊緣化的影響不僅在出口，更致命且嚴重者在投資；由於從台灣出口的商品無法享受區域組織或FTA的關稅優惠，民間新增投資、甚至現有的廠房，都可能移往享有優惠關稅的國家與地區。日前台塑集團就表示，未來3年海外投資比重也將從之前的25%大幅調高至80%；跨國外商在選擇亞太投資設廠國時，即使台灣擁有最佳條件，但也因無FTA加持而被放棄，這也是台灣外商直接投資持續滑落，總額只有越南、菲律賓一半不到的主因。未來兩年，中韓FTA與主要區域組織上路，這種邊緣化的衝擊將更明顯，台灣得無憂乎？

要突破邊緣化危機，台灣必須盡快加入區域經貿組織或與大型經濟體簽FTA。擺在眼前的現實是，台灣不可能與美、歐簽FTA，因為八字沒一撇，達陣機率低，即使完成也會在多年之後，根本難救台灣燃眉之急。加入RCEP或TPP，台灣尚未被接受加入，前者大陸主導，台灣不可能跳過貨貿而可直接加入；後者台灣應遲早可加入，但只能列入第二輪加入國中，加入時間最快也在2020年了。

真正對台灣經貿有實質意義又已有相當進度、可暫時化解邊緣化危機者，只有貨貿了，但貨貿卻被染上太多的政治與意識形態，遭在野黨與「反中」者強力反對。馬政府任內不論是否能完成談判，都不可能讓貨貿上路實施；明年大選後，貨貿談判是否能持續也有變數。

最有希望執政的蔡英文與民進黨，該表態支持貨貿與否，如果蔡願意支持貨貿，也許可由馬政府在最後任期內完成談判簽署，再由下任執政者負責讓其在國內落實，則庶幾乎可在相當程度上化解台灣經貿邊緣化的危機，否則，明年之後不論誰執政，都將飽受經貿邊緣化之痛苦。

Taiwan's Sorrow: Being Deceived by Lee Teng-hui

Taiwan's Sorrow: Being Deceived by Lee Teng-hui
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 22, 2015

Executive Summary: Lee Teng-hui has been playing with other people all his life. But in the end, he could not escape becoming the plaything of history. Why? Because he could never forget how much he cared about “the glory of being born Japanese". Because the ROC won the war against Japan, he was relegated to “the sad fate of being born Taiwanese". Never mind that he was ROC president for twelve years. Never mind that he has lived to be 90. He longs to return to the past, to when he was "born Japanese".

Full Text Below:

Lee Teng-hui has been playing with other people all his life. But in the end, he could not escape becoming the plaything of history. Why? Because he could never forget how much he cared about “the glory of being born Japanese". Because the ROC won the war against Japan, he was relegated to “the sad fate of being born Taiwanese". Never mind that he was ROC president for twelve years. Never mind that he has lived to be 90. He longs to return to the past, to when he was "born Japanese".

When the rest of the world was commemorating and reflecting upon the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, former ROC President Lee Teng-hui was writing a letter to Japan's right-wing media. Lee regaled them on how he and his brother Lee Teng-ching volunteered for the Japanese Army and Navy. Lee boasted that "Taiwanese back then were Japanese, and fought for the motherland". He denounced President Ma Ying-jeou for commemorating the War of Resistance Against Japan. He accused Ma of "harassing Japan", and " currying favor with the CCP". Lee's ludicrous remarks left people stunned. His pro-Japanese rhetoric showed Lee Teng-hui for what he was, a two -faced hypocrite utterly devoid of self-esteem. He is a prisoner of his memories. He is a hostage of history.

Lee Teng-hui was right about Taiwan not taking part in the War of Resistance against Japan. The War of Resistance against Japan was fought by the Republic of China government. Japan used Taiwan as an outpost for its aggression against and plunder of East Asia. But Lee Teng-hui was dead wrong when he said Taiwan and Japan "were both part of one country" 70 years ago. Taiwan was never part of Japan. Taiwan was merely a colony of Japan forcibly annexed through military coercion. Being colonized is no shame. But worship of one's colonial masters, and nostalgia for one's colonial status, 70 years after liberation and democratization, is worse than senility. It is an indication that Lee Teng-hui is a victim of Stockholm Syndrome.

Many Taiwanese similar to Lee Teng-hui consider themselves "Japanese imperial subjects". But Lee Teng-hui served 12 years as President of the Republic of China. He receives generous retirement benefits reserved for former heads of state. Yet he openly proclaims that "Diaoyutai is Japanese territory", and boasts that he "volunteered to serve in the military of the motherland (Japan) in its struggle [against China)". For an individual to undermine the sovereignty of the nation and the dignity of its people in such a manner is truly unique. If the people of Taiwan wish to know the truth about how Lee Teng-hui thinks and feels, they need only read the Japanese press. Whenever Lee speaks to the Japanese press, he reflexively abases himself, and begins uttering remarks appropriate only for a subject of the Japanese empire, and totally inappropriate for the former chief executive of another nation. Does this not humiliate the people of Taiwan? Does this not trample over Taiwan's sovereignty?

Many years ago, President Lee Teng-hui was interviewed by Japanese author Shiba Ryotaro. Lee spoke of "the sorrow of being born Taiwanese".  He lamented Taiwan's prolonged suffering under "rule by foreign regimes". The interview provoked considerable controversy. Some thought it revealed his Sinophobia and Taiwan independence mindset. Some interpreted it as heartfelt Taiwanese Nativist sentiment. Now the answer has been revealed. Lee Teng-hui's real regret was being born Japanese but subsequently relegated to second class Taiwanese status because Japan lost the war. In his mind, even becoming President of the ROC failed to compensate for the loss of his Japanese identity.

While the whole world was reflecting upon wars of aggression and colonialism, Lee Teng-hui, who served as ROC President for over 12 years, completely ignored Japan's war of aggression against East Asia. Lee pretended not to see the reality of Taiwan's colonization. Instead he joined Japan's war of aggression out of "personal reverence" and "patriotic zeal". He sang the praises of Japan and leveled recriminations against the ROC. Was this merely evidence of his idolatry toward all things Japanese? Or was the Republic of China's eight year long war of resistance against Japan, and Taiwan's half century of suffering under Japanese colonial rule, nothing more than bargaining chips?

Ironically Lee Teng-hui, who was once hailed as "Mr. Democracy", is now taking the lead in whitewashing Japan's wars of aggression. These are wars that even the Japanese government itself has publicly apologized for. To Japanese of conscience, Lee Teng-hui's words probably provoke discomfort or even shame. Even more seriously, Lee Teng-hui trumpeted "Taiwanese consciousness" for 20 years. Since then the water has fallen and the reefs are visible. Lee shows only idolatry toward of Japan, and no hint of "Taiwan centric thought". President Ma thinks Lee's remarks have humiliated the people of Taiwan. Does the DPP consider Lee's remarks acceptable? Can anyone serious about Taiwan independence actually consider Lee Teng-hui, who exhibits not one iota of "Taiwanese consciousness", the "Godfather of Taiwan independence"?

This 90 year old man has deeply rooted feelings. It is unlikely that any outsider can ever change his mind. Lee Teng-hui considers Japan his motherland. Opponents of curriculum reform idolize Japan. The "Nativist movement" and "Taiwan independence consciousness" have simmered for years. But beneath the surface of these anti-China sentiments, just how much "Taiwan-centric thought" remains?

Lee Teng-hui used "Taiwan's sorrow" to obscure decades of Japanese thought. Strip that away, and all that remains is beating Japanese heart. How did such a deceitful individual get away with manipulating Taiwan for so many decades? And how can such a society not regress?

台灣人的悲哀與被歷史愚弄的李登輝

2015-08-22聯合報

李登輝這輩子都在玩弄別人，然而，他自己最終也難逃被歷史愚弄的命運。之所以落入這個宿命，是因為他心心念念無法忘懷自己「生為日本人」的光榮；然而，由於中華民國抗日戰爭的勝利，使他掉進了「生為台灣人」的悲哀軌道。即使當了十二年中華民國總統，活到九十幾歲，他卻仍不斷地試圖回到過去，回到他「生為日本人」的時代。

當全世界都在紀念並反省二次大戰結束七十週年，台灣前總統李登輝卻投書日本右翼媒體，以他和其兄李登欽自願加入陸軍和海軍為例，稱當時的台灣人「身為日本人，為了祖國而戰」；他同時指控，馬英九總統紀念抗戰，只是為了「騷擾日本」、「討好中共」。滿篇荒唐言，讓人錯愕。這些媚日辭令，只說明李登輝是一個虛偽、矯情而自卑的雙面人，他是自己記憶的俘虜，也是被歷史困陷的人質。

李登輝說的沒錯，台灣沒有參加抗日；因為當時抗日的是中華民國政府，台灣則是被日本當成在東亞侵略的一個前哨站和掠奪站。但李登輝說台灣和日本七十年前「同屬一國」，則是大錯特錯；因為台灣從來不屬於日本國，台灣只是日本以武力脅迫割據而得的殖民地。被殖民並不可恥，但歷經七十年的解放及民主化，若有人還在崇拜殖民主、思念被殖民的日子，這豈止是「老番顛」，這根本是李登輝的「斯德哥爾摩症候群」。

像李登輝這樣仍以「日本皇民」自居的台灣人或許不少，但是，像他這樣當過十二年中華民國總統、至今仍在享受退休元首禮遇的人，竟能公然說出「釣魚台是日本領土」、「志願入伍為祖國（日本）奮鬥」之類傷害國家主權及尊嚴的人，卻是絕無僅有。一直以來，李登輝的真心話，台灣人都要透過日本媒體才能得悉；而他每次面對日本媒體，就立刻自動矮了三截，說出失格的皇民言語。這些，難道不是對台灣人民的羞辱，對台灣主體性的踐踏？

當年，李登輝在總統任上接受司馬遼太郎訪問，曾說出「生為台灣人的悲哀」，慨嘆台灣長期受「外來政權」統治的無奈。那次談話，引起不少爭議，有人認為那暴露他的反中意識及台獨思想，有人則解讀為他深具本土情懷。如今看來，謎底已經揭曉：李登輝的怨嘆，是嘆他自己「生為日本人」，卻因日本戰敗被貶為次一等的「台灣人」，因而感到悲哀。而在他心目中，即使貴為台灣總統，也不能彌補他失去日本人身分的遺憾。

正當全世界都在反省「侵略」與「殖民」戰爭這兩項主題時，當過十二年台灣總統的李登輝，卻完全忽略日本在東亞發動侵略戰爭的本質，更故意裝作看不到台灣被殖民的事實，而企圖以個人「孺慕之情」及「愛國赤忱」的角度切入日本發動的侵略戰爭，藉由對日本的歌頌，來反責中華民國政府。這是他個人媚日的愚頑表現？或者他以為中華民國抗日八年的歷史、台灣人民遭日本殖民半世紀的悲情，可以被他隻手劫掠並置換？

可笑的是，李登輝當年曾被譽為「民主先生」，今天他卻一馬當先，在那裡幫連日本政府都已公開道歉的侵略戰爭粉飾開脫。那些言論，有良知的日本人聽了，恐怕都會感到不安與不妥，甚至覺得羞愧。更嚴重的是，對台灣而言，李登輝高唱了廿多年的「台灣意識」，如今水落石出，竟只剩下一個「日本崇拜」之碑文，看不出他心中有任何一絲台灣「主體性」之存在。老實說，馬總統認為李登輝的言論羞辱了台灣人民，難道對民進黨而言，不會覺得李登輝的言論不妥嗎？對於那些認真的台獨運動者而言，又豈能接受這樣毫無台灣主體意識的論調，而認李登輝為「台獨教父」嗎？

九十幾歲的老人，根深柢固的感情認同，外界要改變他的想法恐不容易。但值得警惕的是，對照李登輝的「日本祖國論」及反課綱運動之「崇日」，多年來台灣沸沸揚揚「本土化運動」與「台獨意識」，在撇除表面的「反中」泡沫後，究竟還留下多少真實的台灣主體性？

李登輝用台灣悲情遮掩了數十年心思，掀開之後，只剩一顆赤裸裸的日本心。而這麼一個翻雲覆雨的人物，台灣政治竟任其操弄了數十載，社會不倒退才怪。

Tsai Ing-wen's Five Reforms Missing Only Self-Reform

Tsai Ing-wen's Five Reforms Missing Only Self-Reform
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 21, 2015

Executive Summary: The presidential election has reached the stage where the candidates must answer the question, “Where's the beef?” DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen seized the initiative and proposed "Five Reforms". These reforms include "generational justice", "improved government efficiency," "legislative reform", "transitional justice", and "an end to partisan bickering". Tsai Ing-wen characterized them as "new politics". The first three reforms are important. But her road map and direction are unclear. The last two reforms are Tsai Ing-wen's “democratic civil war” tactics, warmed over following her defeat in 2012.

Full Text Below:

The presidential election has reached the stage where the candidates must answer the question, “Where's the beef?” DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen seized the initiative and proposed "Five Reforms". These reforms include "generational justice", "improved government efficiency," "legislative reform", "transitional justice", and "an end to partisan bickering". Tsai Ing-wen characterized them as "new politics". The first three reforms are important. But her road map and direction are unclear. The last two reforms are Tsai Ing-wen's “democratic civil war” tactics, warmed over following her defeat in 2012.

Substantively speaking, the economic data is worrisome. Exports have declined for six straight months. Second-quarter GDP growth fell 0.64%, well below the 3.05% originally forecast. The Comptroller General's Office lowered this year's economic growth forecast to 1.56%, substantially lower than the 1.72% forecast issued in May. A 3% growth rate is not assured. Even 2% is not assured. Economists agree that declines in Mainland and global economic growth are a factor. But structural factors have made Taiwan's economy far worse. Not only does Taiwan's GDP growth rate trail those of the other Asian tigers, it even trails those of the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian countries.

Taiwan's economic problems are severe. Yet Tsai Ing-wen's Five Reforms fail to even mention the economy. Is this an indication of Tsai Ing-wen's congenital contempt for economic development? Or does Tsai Ing-wen know her weaknesses only too well? Does she know that economics is the DPP's Achilles Heel? Is that why she has deliberately avoided all discussion of it?

Tsai Ing-wen has spun her “new politics” as “reform”. Political reform is important. But without a solid economic foundation, political harmony is impossible. Take "generational justice" for example, the first of Tsai Ing-wen's Five Reforms. According to her detailed description, it is subdivided into two categories, "checks" and "slogans".

First take checks. Tsai Ing-wen advocates social housing, affordable high-quality long-term elderly care and child care. Every politician can write social welfare checks such as these. But social welfare checks require sound finances, and sound finances require a prosperous economy.

Now take slogans. Tsai Ing-wen has promised to remove barriers to youth employment and create an environment favorable to new industries. The question is “How?” To remove barriers to youth employment and create an environment favorable to new industries, one must grow the economy. Growing the economy is not rubbing Aladdin's Lamp, or summoning the Winged Monkeys in the Wizard of Oz with a Golden Cap. Wealth does not fall from the skies like rain. One must have a farsighed and viable economic strategy. Where is the DPP's economic statecraft? The DPP has just turned in a blank test paper on economics. How can it even begin to talk about "implementing generational justice"?

Tsai Ing-wen turned in a blank test paper on economics. The DPP lacks confidence in its ability to grow the economy. Taiwan has a trade-oriented economy. To develop its economy, Taiwan must remain open to trade. Since the KMT moved to Taiwan, its economic policies have gone from import substitution to export expansion, and from there on to economic internationalization and liberalization. The KMT took the road of openness. It laid a solid foundation for Taiwan's economic miracle. But its road of openness ran counter to the anti-China Democratic Progressive Party's fundamental policies. The DPP's most serious offense has been to shroud its Closed Door Policy in the guise of Nativism. Along with social movements and student groups, it has obstructed the STA, the MTA, and the FEPZ. Its moves succeeded in sabotaging the KMT's economic achievements. But they simultaneously choked off Taiwan's already constricted economic lifeline.

Taiwan lacks natural resources. A stable energy supply is essential for Taiwan's economic development. The DPP opposes nuclear energy and the use of bituminous coal for power generation. It has placed its hopes on “renewable energy”, ignoring the fact that their limited capacity and exorbitant cost cannot meet overall demand. This pandering to populism has led to the absurdity of expecting power while refusing power plants. This summer, Taiwan's electric power equipment carrying capacity will fall to a mere 5 to 10%. The power supply situation is critical. Experts have repeatedly warned that a power crisis is imminent. It is not a matter of whether, but when.

Without a stable power supply, how can one develop the economy? In recent years, the DPP has created an anti-business climate in order to divide the public along class lines and reap the political dividends. This too, has cast a shadow over economic development.

Drifting sands lack form. Chewed wax lacks flavor. The reforms advocated by Tsai Ing-wen may sound pretty. But without the economy supplying water and cement, they will remain windblown sands. Without the economy supplying flavors, a dish labeled “reform” will remain wax models one may look at but cannot eat.

Tsai Ing-wen should give priority not to her Five Reforms, but to “One About Face” and a “Sixth Reform". The One About Face is to emphasize economics and deemphasize politics. Tsai Ing-wen should clear her head. During the election, she should talk less about politics and more about our economic survival. Exports have declined for the past 6 months. The GDP may fall below 2%. Tell the people of Taiwan how Tsai Ing-wen intends to lead Taiwan out of its economic quagmire?

The "Sixth Reform" is self-reform. Reform Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP's Closed Door Policy. Reform their habit of writing populist policy checks that bounce. Reform their habit of talking politics while neglecting economics. Unless they change this habit of theirs, talk of reform is utterly beside the point.



社論－蔡英文「五大改革」獨缺自我改革
2015年08月21日 04:10 主筆室

總統大選進入端政策牛肉階段，民進黨參選人蔡英文率先拋出「五大改革」訴求，包括「實踐世代正義」、「改革政府效能」、「啟動國會改革」、「落實轉型正義」及「終結政治惡鬥」，蔡英文說，這是「新政治」的實踐。究其內涵，我們可以說，前三項宣示雖然重要，方向與路線圖卻不明，後兩項則是自2012年蔡英文敗選後，「民主內戰」的最後決戰計畫。

在實質評論其內涵前，我們先檢視令人憂心的經濟數據：出口連續6個月衰退、第二季經濟成長率（GDP）跌至0.64%，遠低於原先預測的3.05%，主計總處大幅下修今年經濟成長率預測至1.56%，比5月預測值大幅下修1.72個百分點，不僅無法保三，連保二都做不到。經濟學家分析原因，多認為景氣驟降固然與大陸及全球經濟成長下滑有關，但結構性因素讓台灣經濟更壞，GDP成長率不但是亞洲四小龍之末，更遠遜菲律賓、印尼、越南等東南亞國家。

台灣經濟問題如此嚴峻，五大改革藍圖裡竟然沒有「經濟」？這是蔡英文DNA輕視經濟發展的重要？還是有自知之明，知道拚經濟是民進黨弱項，故意略而不談想要藏拙呢？

蔡英文標舉新政治做為改革指針，不是說政治改革不重要，但沒有穩固經濟地基的社會，政治是不可能安寧的。就以蔡英文列五大改革之首的「實踐世代正義」來說，依其細部描述，大概分為「支票型」與「口號型」的二類主張。

在支票型主張上，蔡英文要推動社會住宅、建立平價優質的長照與托育，這類社福支票，每個政治人物都會開，但支撐這樣的社福支票，靠的是政府良好的財政，而財政之本，則是繁榮的經濟。

在口號型主張上，蔡英文說要掃除青年就業和創業的障礙，創造就業環境。但我們要問「做法呢」？創造就業環境、掃除創業障礙，得先要有業可就、有業可創，其前提仍是發展經濟。而發展經濟，不是摸一摸阿拉丁神燈，或用金帽召喚綠野仙蹤飛天猴，就會從天下掉下來，必須有一套前瞻、紮實與可行的經濟方略。民進黨的經濟治國方略在哪裡？在經濟考卷上交了白卷，如何奢談「實踐世代正義」？

蔡英文的經濟留白，也反映了民進黨對拚經濟的缺乏自信。台灣是外貿導向的經濟體，要發展經濟就必須持續開放，國民黨自遷台以來，從進口替代到出口擴張，再到經濟國際化與自由化，走的就是開放的道路，也為過去台灣創造的經濟奇蹟打下深厚的基礎；但這條開放之路，卻與民進黨反中、拒中的基本政策相牴觸，民進黨長期以來最受詬病，就是以本土包裝的鎖國思維，結合社運團體與學生團體，封殺服貿、封凍貨貿、封阻自由經濟示範區條例，做法雖然成功，也拖垮了國民黨的政績，但也扼殺了本已陷入困境的台灣經濟一線生機。

台灣天然資源極為缺乏，穩定的能源供應對台灣經濟發展至為關鍵。民進黨反核電又反生煤發電，把電力供應的希望，寄託在不管成本或產能都還遠遠不可能支撐整體需求的「再生能源」。這種討好民粹的做法，把台灣帶向「要電不要廠」的荒謬處境，今年入夏後，台灣的電力備載容多只有5%到10%左右，供電情勢窘迫，專家不斷警告，台灣的限電危機不是會不會來，而是多快會來？

沒有穩定的電力供應，如何全力發展經濟？更不要說，近年來，為了透過畫分階級，獲取貧富對立的「政治紅利」，民進黨不斷助燃反商仇富氛圍，也都為經濟發展添上陰霾。

摶沙不能成形，嚼蠟難有滋味。蔡英文的改革主張縱然華麗，如果沒有經濟為其灌泥聚形，將只是風吹即散的空中飛沙；一盤盤放上餐桌的改革大菜，少了經濟主味，都是可以看不能吃的樣板蠟。

蔡英文應優先要提出的不是「五大改革」，而是「一個翻轉」與「第六改革」。一個翻轉是請不要「重政治，輕經濟」，請轉一下腦袋，接下來的選舉，政治少談一點，如何確保生存發展的經濟戰略多談一點，請告訴台灣人民，面對連6個月出口衰退、GDP不保二的警訊，蔡英文要如何領導台灣走出經濟困局？

「第六改革」是自我改革，改革蔡英文與民進黨的鎖國反中、利用民粹濫開支票、講政治不講經濟慣性，這個慣性不改，談再多改革都是白搭。(中國時報)

Can Tsai Ing-wen Replicate The Ko Wen-je Model?

Can Tsai Ing-wen Replicate The Ko Wen-je Model?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 20, 2015

Executive Summary: Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je recently visited Shanghai, to attend the Twin Cities Forum. He has since returned to Taipei without incident. This deep green politician, who succeeded blue camp Mayor Hau Lung-bin, has now successfully maintained cross-Strait exchanges between these two cities. He has introduced an innovation to the status quo, and lived up to public expectations. From the central to local level, changes in the ruling party are being normalized. The Ko Wen-je model offers a non-blue mode for maintaining relations between Taiwan and the Mainland. Ko Wen-je has blazed a new trail for cross-Strait interaction.

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Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je recently visited Shanghai, to attend the Twin Cities Forum. He has since returned to Taipei without incident. This deep green politician, who succeeded blue camp Mayor Hau Lung-bin, has now successfully maintained cross-Strait exchanges between these two cities. He has introduced an innovation to the status quo, and lived up to public expectations. From the central to local level, changes in the ruling party are being normalized. The Ko Wen-je model offers a non-blue mode for maintaining relations between Taiwan and the Mainland. Ko Wen-je has blazed a new trail for cross-Strait interaction.

The year 2000 was the first time the ruling party of the ROC was replaced. Cross-Strait relations were in turmoil. Recently the deep green Ko Wen-je took office in Taipei City.  During the election, many predicted that city to city exchanges between Shanghai and Taipei would be terminated. But this deep green mayor set aside reunification vs. independence battles. He decided to communicate with the other side in a rational manner. He committed himself to the maintenance of benign interactions. After several rounds of negotiation, compromises were reached, and the Twin Cities Forum successfully reconvened. The three day visit to Shanghai by “enfant terrible” Mayor Ko, went off without a hitch. Mainland organizers were deeply relieved. The visit built trust with the Mainland, and will have a positive impact on future relations. It will become a model for positive green camp interaction with the Mainland.

Zhou Zhihuai, Head of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Taiwan, analyzed the Ko Wen-je model. He thinks several factors were involved. First, there was the desire to break new ground in cross-Strait relations. Ko Wen-je began with a negative attitude. He questioned the 1992 Consensus. He denounced what he termed Two Countries, One System. As a result the Mainland lambasted him. But his willingness to continue the Twin Cities Forum and break new ground on cross-Strait relations, led to his "New Perspectives for 2015". He said “One China is not a problem”. He emphasized the importance of the existing political framework. He gained the Mainland's understanding. Secondly, the two sides were willing to communicate.  They did not give up in the face of difficulties. They were willing to adapt. Zhou Zhihuai affirmed Ko Wen-je's flexibility and pragmatism. Meanwhile Ko said, "The Chinese Communists are not our rivals, but our customers". His attitude toward the Chinese Communist Party was positive. Ke said, "Whether we like it or not, [Mainland] China is a problem that must be faced". Clearly he is highly pragmatic. Ko Wen-je displayed flexibility and pragmatism. He was greeted with flexibility and pragmatism from the Mainland in return.

Third, continued expressions of goodwill. Zhou Zhihuai said Ko Wen-je established a Mainland Affairs Committee. During the first group meeting of the subcommittee on Mainland affairs, Ko avoided mention of the two-states theory, of Taiwan independence, and any criticism of the CCP. Ko spoke to the Mainland media twice. He expressed understanding and respect for the 1992 Consensus. He said relations with the Mainland were not international relations. During the Twin Cities Forum, Ko Wen-je reiterated that “The two sides are one family”. He said “the two sides have a political foundation by which they can promote cross-Strait exchanges, peaceful cross-Strait relations, and the interests of people on both sides". He said, "As long as people on both sides approve, I will continue doing this. As long as this is conducive to cross-Strait peace, I will not retreat". These were all expressions of goodwill.

To sum up, the Ko Wen-je model includes three elements: Intent, the willingness to adapt, and goodwill. Whether local or central, all three elements are indispensable to green camp interaction or dialogue with the other side. If the green camp persists in fearing the Mainland, opposing the Mainland, and hating the Mainland. If it is unwilling to break new ground on cross-Strait relations, then it will not be able to take the Ko Wen-je road. If it is unwilling to adapt, it cannot replicate the Ko Wen-je model. Tsai Ing-wen is a clear example. She has reiterated her desire to maintain the status quo, promote cross-Strait exchanges, and hold constructive dialogue. Yet she refuses to change her position on Taiwan independence. She foolishly imagines that as long as she wins the presidential election, the Mainland will change to accommodate the DPP.

The green camp may wish to communicate and adapt. But if its fails to demonstrate goodwill, the Ko Wen-je model will fail. Ko Wen-je established a Mainland Affairs Committee. He declared that cross-Strait exchanges are not international exchanges. Is Tsai Ing-wen willing to change the name of the DPP's "China Affairs Committee" to the "Mainland Affairs Committee"? Is she willing to declare that cross-Strait relations are not international relations?

Is the Ko Wen-je model is a universal model that can be replicated? That remains to be seen. But the Twin Cities Forum was a success, and is merely the beginning of Mainland interaction with Ko Wen-je. Subsequent interactions will require continued effort and the establishment of long term trust. For Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP county chiefs and city mayors, the Ko Wen-je model's three elements should not be seen as a standard, but as a direction. In the future the Mainland will surelyimpose even stricter requirements.

The Twin Cities Forum entailed people taking the initiative and governments providing support. This principle is important, and should provide the DPP with inspiration. People blazing the way has never been a problem. But cross-Strait exchanges ultimately require government support. This includes visits between relatives, trade, investment, intermarriage, tourism, and academic certification. Which one of them was not an example of people stepping on the gas, while government applied the brakes? The people must bypass government restrictions. When the government finds itself unable to apply the brakes, it is forced to liberalize and move forward. This was the case even during the Ma era. The public rushed forward even as government constraints abounded. For example, on coastal wind power projects the private sector hired Mainland work boats. Green camp Sinophobes went online and demanded government action. But the government refused to stand in the peoples' way.

People taking the initiative and governments providing support is a forward-looking process. The authorites on both sides should provide just this kind of support. Take for example the peace agreement. The authorities find it difficult to negotiate. Cross-Strait civilian forums or seminars can pave the way. The government should not stop them, but encourage and support them. It can wait until the public is no longer afraid to discuss a peace agreement, then take over.

社論－蔡英文能複製柯文哲模式嗎？
2015年08月20日 04:10 主筆室

台北市長柯文哲到上海參加雙城論壇，「零意外」返台，他以深綠背景出身的政治人物，從藍營郝龍斌前市長手上，成功維繫了兩岸城市交流關係，在現狀基礎上做出創新，可謂不負眾望。從中央到地方，政黨輪替將常態化，柯文哲模式提供了非藍人士當政後，與大陸維持互動關係的思考方向。可以說，柯文哲模式為兩岸互動關係走出新路。

2000年首次政黨輪替，兩岸關係陷入動盪，這次台北市政權輪替，以柯文哲選舉期間的「深綠」言論，許多人判斷滬台城市交流關係勢必中斷，但這位「深綠市長」以破除「統獨惡鬥」為職志，決心與對岸理性對話，戮力維持良性互動。經過多次折衝妥協，最後終於成功延續舉辦雙城論壇。上海3天行程，有「白目」之稱的柯市長，謹言慎行「零意外」表現，讓大陸主辦方深深鬆了口氣，相信對他與大陸互信關係的累積，會產生非常大的助益，也將成為綠營人士與對岸建立良性互動及對話關係的典範。

中國社科院台灣研究所所長周志懷分析柯文哲模式，認為有幾個要素。首先，有意願突破兩岸關係。柯文哲原本否定、質疑九二共識，又提出兩國一制，因而遭對岸炮轟。但他有意願延續雙城論壇、有意願突破兩岸關係，提出「一五新觀點」，說一個中國不是問題，強調既有政治基礎，用心得到大陸的理解。其次，雙方願意溝通，遇到困難不放棄，願意調整。周志懷肯定柯文哲的彈性與務實，柯曾說「共產黨不是對手，而是客戶」，對共產黨的態度還是肯定的，柯也說過「不論喜不喜歡，中國是一個必須面對的問題。」可見很務實。柯文哲表現出彈性與務實，大陸也以彈性與務實回報。

第三，不斷釋放善意。周志懷說，柯文哲成立大陸事務小組，他在第一次大陸事務小組會議上提到說，不提兩國論，不說台獨，不批中共。柯接受大陸媒體兩次聯訪，表達了解和尊重九二共識，與大陸的交流不是國與國的交流。柯文哲在雙城論壇上一再講「兩岸一家親」、「在雙方既有的政治基礎上，促進兩岸的交流，推動兩岸關係和平發展，謀求兩岸人民最大的利益。」也說「只要有利兩岸人民，我都會積極去做，只要有利於兩岸的和平發展，我都不會拒絕。」這些都是善意的表現。

歸納起來，柯文哲模式有3要素：有意願、溝通調整、釋放善意。未來無論地方或中央，綠營人士想和對岸維持交流互動或打開對話大門，3要素缺一不可。若繼續以恐中、反中、仇中心態對待大陸，沒有意願突破兩岸關係，那就不可能走柯文哲的路。若有意願但不溝通調整，像蔡英文一再表達願意維持現狀，願意推動兩岸建設性交流與對話，但卻不願調整其台獨立場，反而認為只要選贏，大陸就會向民進黨調整，就不可能複製柯文哲模式。

有意願、能溝通調整，但若未能不斷釋放善意，柯文哲模式也會功虧一簣。柯文哲成立大陸事務小組，表態兩岸交流不是國與國的交流，蔡英文做得到把民進黨的「中國事務部」更名為「大陸事務部」，願意表態兩岸關係不是國與國的關係嗎？

柯文哲模式是否具有普遍性或可複製，當然有待觀察，而且這次雙城論壇成功舉辦，只是柯文哲和大陸互動的開始，後續需要繼續努力，不斷累積互信，互動關係才可長可久。對蔡英文和民進黨縣市首長而言，柯文哲模式3要素應該不是標準，而是方向，日後大陸會對他們提出強度更高的要求。

雙城論壇提出「民間先行、政府支持」共識，是非常重要的原則性宣示，對民進黨應有所啟發。長期以來，「民間先行」不是問題，但維繫兩岸交流的重心還是要靠「政府支持」，過去從探親、通商、投資、通婚、觀光、學歷認證等，哪項不是「民間先行」、「政府煞車」？民間有需要先偷跑，政府煞車擋不住了，才被迫開放，政府都是被逼著往前走。即使馬政府時代，民間先行，政府掣肘仍比比皆是，例如，沿海建風力發電，民間租用大陸工作船，仇中人士動輒上綱國家安全予以作梗，卻未見「政府支持」。

「民間先行、政府支持」共識，是前瞻的創舉，兩岸當局都應重視支持。例如，和平協議，官方現在不好協商，兩岸民間可以論壇或研討會等方式先多討論，政府不要作梗，而要鼓勵支持，等民間不再害怕討論和平協議了，政府就可以接手。(中國時報)