New Southern Policy: Opiate of the Voters

New Southern Policy: Opiate of the Voters
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 1, 2015

Executive Summary: DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen says that upon becoming president, she will promote a "New Southern Policy". As usual the specifics of her policy are a muddle. But her pledge to "promote trade diversification... improve relations with ASEAN and India" show she has not changed her long-held anti-Mainland stance. She argues that the Kuomintang government's cross-Strait trade policy "unifies" trade. She says she would undo this, by "diversifying" trade, beginning with ASEAN and India.

Full Text Below:

DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen says that upon becoming president, she will promote a "New Southern Policy". As usual the specifics of her policy are a muddle. But her pledge to "promote trade diversification... improve relations with ASEAN and India" show she has not changed her long-held anti-Mainland stance. She argues that the Kuomintang government's cross-Strait trade policy "unifies" trade. She says she would undo this, by "diversifying" trade, beginning with ASEAN and India.

Twenty-one years ago, in 1994, Taiwan already had a "Southern Policy". Back then, Lee Teng-hui was in power. The Mainland underwent reform and liberalization, making it highly attractive to Taiwan-based capital. The Lee regime argued that the Mainland economy was about to implode. It pressured Taiwan business leaders to invest in the ASEAN nations. But all good things must come to an end. In 1997, starting with Thailand, the Asian financial tsunami spread. Turmoil inundated Indonesia. The following year, large-scale anti-Chinese violence erupted. Taiwan business leaders bore the brunt of the violence. Not only did they lose money, some were even beaten and abused. Since then, those Taiwan business leaders who went south have either downsized or pulled out altogether. Taiwan business leaders who rejected the government's "sage counsel", who "risked death" by going to the allegedly "high-risk" Mainland, caught the trade boom express train. Japanese futurist Kenichi Ohmae compared the two paths, and noted that the biggest difference between Taiwan and Japan was that Japanese business leaders were too deferential toward their own government, while business leaders on Taiwan were not. That is why business leaders on Taiwan were more successful.

In fact, whenever the government promotes any economic policy, the most important consideration must be professionalism and rationality, not ideology. The most expedient way to formulate policy is to fall back on ideology. No thinking is required. Decisions can be reached instantly, Answers are ready made. No expenditures are required. The government can of course choose to base its policy on ideology. After all, talk is cheap. But business leaders must invest real money. If they lose it, the government will not compensate them because it gave them bad advice. Ultimately the business leaders themselves will suffer the consequences. Ms. Tsai may have the power to promote policies consistent with her ideology. But Taiwan business leaders' decisions must be rooted in rationality and professionalism. From this perspective, the "New Southern Policy" is superfluous.

Why? Whether one chooses to go west, south, east, or north, the goal is to make a profit. Even brand name companies in advanced countries, configure their production chains based on the profit motive. Over the past 15 to 20 years, the main production chains in East Asia have been located in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Mainland. Japan sends its raw materials and components to Taiwan and South Korea. In both places, semi-finished products are then shipped to the Mainland, then assembled into finished products. From the Mainland, they are then shipped to consumers the world over.

Most manufactured products today are labeled "Made in China". But that does not mean the most profit or added value accrues to the Mainland. Similarly, Taiwan and South Korea are the Mainland's largest export market. But that does not mean Taiwan and South Korea are "dependent" upon the Mainland. One might even say the opposite, that the Mainland is dependent on Taiwan and South Korea.

East Asian division of labor patterns will change. Mainland wage levels are rising. The manufacture of some products may move to Vietnam, where wages and overhead remain relatively low. The Mainland is already moving up the production ladder. It is becoming a supplier of semi-finished materials from Japan to Taiwan or South Korea to the Mainland market, to Europe and the US market "four cornered trade" supply chain. It may well become part of the "five cornered trade" supply chain that includes the Mainland, Europe, the US, and ASEAN. No matter what, when this happens, the government will not need to encourage business leaders to invest in the ASEAN countries. They will do so naturally. Therefore the New Southern Policy is superfluous.

Another change is the Mainland's "One Belt, One Road" and "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank" strategy. This strategy links Mainland-related supply chain countries and regions through infrastructure investment, and facilitates their rapid development. The Mainland will then enjoy lower shipping costs. It will then be able to obtain raw materials from South East Asia, South Asia, Europe, and Russia, and supply finished or semi-finished products to these regions. Once the One Belt, One Road is complete, the Mainland and South East Asia and South Asia will enjoy closer economic relations, just as the United States and neighboring Canada and Mexico enjoy close economic relations.

Tsai has proposed a New Southern Policy. If Taiwan business leaders respond, the results may not meet her expectations. In fact, they may be just the opposite. During the 1990s, South East Asia, South Asia and the Mainland were in competition. Now however, they may be in a cooperateive relationship. If Taiwan imposes a New Southern Policy on Taiwan business leaders, it may actually help the Mainland realize its One Belt, One Road vision. It may actually strengthen cross-Strait economic relations. If Tsai thinks such a policy can weaken cross-Strait economic and trade relations, that is willfull blindness. Responsible national leaders must realize that the Mainland is already the world's second largest economy. It has already signed FTAs with most countries, including ASEAN countries. Taiwan faces marginalization. How can it be saved? Certainly not by foisting a long-discredited, 20 year old policy off on voters suffering from historical amnesia.

We hope that each party's presidential candidate will refrain from ideologically-based policy formulation. We hope they will not just hear what they want to hear. Policies must not be reduced to slogans. The candidates must look at changes in the environment, then evaluate their own strengths and weaknesses. Only then can they arrive at the right decision.

新南向政策 是在麻醉選民

2015年10月01日 中國時報

民進黨總統候選人蔡英文表示，她當選總統以後，要推動「新南向政策」。一如以往，政策的具體內容不明，但從其「推動貿易多元化……強化對東協和印度的整體關係」的聲明可以看出，其基本理念，和過去她長期反中的立場一致，認為國民黨政府的兩岸貿易政策是「一元化」貿易，她要扭轉過來，改成「多元」貿易，而首選是東協和印度。

21年前的1994年，台灣曾經有過「南向政策」。當時李登輝主政，鑑於大陸改革開放後對台商投資的吸引力，以及他們相信大陸經濟勢將崩潰，開始推動台商改到東協投資。但是，好景不常。1997年亞洲從泰國起，金融風暴蔓延。處於風暴中的印尼，在次年發生大規模的暴力排華運動，台商首當其衝；不但金錢損失，有些還招致毆打或凌辱。從那時候起，原先南進的台商或者縮小規模，或者撤資。當時沒聽政府「忠告」而「冒死」前往「高風險」大陸地區投資的許多台商，則搭上了貿易擴張的那班車。這樣的對比下，曾導致日本趨勢家大前研一說，台商和日商最大的不同，在於日商太聽政府的話，而台商不聽政府的話，所以相對地比較成功。

其實，政府推動任何經濟政策，最重要的是要靠專業和理性，不能依靠意識形態。依靠意識形態來做政策最省事：不需要思考，而且決策很快，答案很現成、毫無成本。但是，政府可以依靠意識形態出一張嘴，廠商的投資如果賠錢，政府不會理賠，最後還是要廠商自行承擔後果。蔡女士有權力推動符合她意識形態的政策，但是台灣廠商的決策，應當根據的是理性和專業。從這個角度來看，「新南向政策」的提出，其實是多餘的。

為什麼？西向、南向還是東向、北向，最基本的道理就是到哪裡投資可以獲得利潤。而先進國家品牌大廠也是根據利潤最大法則，決定他們的生產鏈要怎麼配置。在過去15到20年，這個生產鏈主力在東亞的四個地方：日本、韓國、台灣和中國大陸。日本把關鍵原料和組件出口到台灣和韓國，在這兩個地方做成半成品後出口到大陸，再由大陸組裝為成品，運往世界各地的消費者。

這就是為什麼在全世界，雖然大多數製造業的產品都貼了「中國製造」的標籤，不代表最重要的或最賺錢、加值最多的部分在中國大陸。同理，台灣和韓國都以中國大陸為最大出口市場，也不代表台、韓「依賴」中國。甚至可以說剛好相反，是中國大陸「依賴」台、韓。

但是東亞分工的型態本身就會變化。隨著大陸工資水準的上升，有些產品可能改到越南等工資還處於低檔的地方去做，成本比較低廉。更有可能是，大陸自己升級成為半成品原料供應者，也就是從日本到台（韓）到大陸到歐美市場供應鍊的「四角貿易」，可能變成在大陸和歐美之間多加一個東協的「五角貿易」。無論是那一種可能，當這種情況發生時，政府不必鼓勵，廠商自然會到東協投資。所以說，新南向政策可能是多餘的。

還有另外一個變化，就是對岸的「一帶一路」和「亞投行」策略。這樣的策略構想，是要從地理位置上把所有可能和中國大陸有關的供應鏈國家和地區，都藉由基本建設投資的增加，而快速地發展起來。經過這樣的發展，大陸可以用較低廉的運輸成本，取得它所需要來自東南亞、南亞、歐陸和俄羅斯的原料，以及它所供給到這些地區的成品或半成品。所以，一帶一路完成後，大陸和東南亞、南亞的經濟關係勢必增強，一如美國和相鄰的加拿大、墨西哥有密切的經濟關係。

所以，蔡提出「新南向政策」，廠商如果真正響應，最後的結果可能不但不如她所望，而且可能剛好相反。1990年代，東南亞、南亞和中國大陸可能是競爭關係，現在，可能是互補關係。所以台灣經由新南向政策，等於是幫助大陸實現其一帶一路的構想，而最終使兩岸經濟關係更為緊密。如果以為提出這樣的政策，就可以為兩岸的經貿關係降溫，這不是愚昧嗎？負責任的國家領導人應該思考的是，中國大陸已經是世界第二大經濟體，早已與包括東協在內的多數國家簽署FTA，台灣卻陷入邊緣困境，應該如何脫困，而非端出20餘年前早已失敗的政策麻醉選民。

我們希望各黨總統參選人，不要再用意識形態提出政見了，不要只聽得進去你們想聽的意見，使得政見淪為口號，必須看清楚環境的變化與自己的優劣勢，才能做出正確的判斷和決定。

New Southern Strategy: Rationale to Avoid the Mainland?

New Southern Strategy: Rationale to Avoid the Mainland?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 26, 2015

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has announced that if the DPP returns to power, it will promote a "New Southern Strategy" , improving relations with ASEAN and India. In principle, the pursuit of diplomatic, economic and trade pluralism and decentralization is correct. But Tsai trumpets a New Southern Strategy while saying nothing about how to modify the increasingly important Western Strategy. She is clearly being evasive and not seeing the forest for the trees.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen has announced that if the DPP returns to power, it will promote a "New Southern Strategy" , improving relations with ASEAN and India. In principle, the pursuit of diplomatic, economic and trade pluralism and decentralization is correct. But Tsai trumpets a New Southern Strategy while saying nothing about how to modify the increasingly important Western Strategy. She is clearly being evasive and not seeing the forest for the trees.

Tsai either does not want to deal with the Mainland, or does not know how to deal with the Mainland. So she turns a blind eye to it and talks instead about a New Southern Strategy, a Lee Teng-hui era "be patient, avoid haste" strategy, and a Chen Shui-bian era "one country on each side" strategy. The only difference is that Tsai Ing-wen has extended the Lee and Chen era strategies further south, to India.  This is the sum total of her self-proclaimed New Southern Strategy. Its underlying thinking differs little from the Old Southern Strategy. Both pretend that globalization does not require going west to the Mainland, but only going south to South East Asia and India.

Since the 1990s, the ROC government has attempted to avoid excessive investment on the Mainland.  Three times its has promoted a Southern Strategy, encouraging businesses to move to South East Asia. The first time was between 1994 and 1996. The list of destinations Included Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Timor. The second time was between 1997 and 1999, when Australia, New Zealand, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia were added to the list. The third time was between 2000 and 2003, when the ROC became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and ASEAN plus Three (Mainland China, Japan and Korea).

The outcome of these three Southern Strategies was clear. They all ended in failure. The first two strategies were implemented during the Lee Teng-hui era. Between 1995 and 1996, small gains were achieved. Taiwan investments in Thailand, Indonesia and Viet Nam increased significantly. Unfortunately, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia resulted in many investors "flying home with broken wings". Taiwan business people now consider the Southern Strategy one rife with hazards.

The third Southern Strategy was a continuation of Lee Teng-hui's policies during the early years of the Chen Shui-bian era. It was part of Chen's hard line "one country on each side", "scorched earth diplomacy". Eventually it lost when the Mainland offered more generous concessions to foreign investors. As a result, Taiwan businesses flocked westward. During Chen's eight years in office, Taiwan's export dependence on the Mainland and Hong Kong increased to 40% from under 20%. This was clear evidence that the Southern Strategy was a dismal failure. In 2002, former Vice President Annette Lu took part in "secret diplomacy". She travelled to Indonesia to purchase natural gas, but encountered one obstacle after another along the way, and could not continue. She even found herself trapped in the Jakarta Airport VIP Lounge, and forbidden to enter the country. Her troubled journey undermined our national image. A former deputy head of state may have set foot in Indonesia. But in the end it amounted to failed diplomacy. The Southern Strategy has led to one fiasco after another. What chance does it have to succeed today?

We have taken the time to recall the Southern Strategy, a three time losing strategy. Our intent is not to pour cold water on the DPP. It is to remind Tsai Ing-wen and any other future leader, not to repeat the same mistake. Taiwan's over-reliance on trade and economic relations with the Mainland must be corrected as soon as possible. We must avoid excessive reliance on others. But correcting current excesses requires more than merely trumpeting a New Southern Strategy. Proper lines must be drawn between diplomacy and trade, ideals and reality, objectives and means. An overall strategy, phased implementation, and cautious execution are essential. Otherwise success is unlikely.

We have three suggestions for Tsai Ing-wen regarding her New Southern Strategy. One. The level of development, size of market, degree of convenience, and degree of safety required for a Southern Strategy and a Western Strategy differ. The two complement rather than compete with each other. Exclusive reliance on a Southern Strategy is inadequate for Taiwan's economic development. Two. Trade and diplomacy are two interlocking matters. The former relies on bold creativity. The latter relies on judicious execution. When implementing a Southern Strategy, both are indispensable. The scorched earth diplomacy and head-butting that characterized the Chen era is certain to fail in South Eeast Asia and India. Taiwan is no match for the Mainland when it comes to diplomatic offensives. Consider the embarrassment endured by Annette Lu in Indonesia. Three. Over the past several years, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have been inciting anti-Mainland hatred. They must cool such sentiment before they reaching a proper compromise between a Western Strategy and a Southern Strategy. Only then can Taiwan businesses participate in Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank activities and the construction of the One Belt, One Road, These are intimately related to any Southern Strategy.

When the public on Taiwan hears someone blowing the horn a fourth time for a Southern Strategy,  it is likely to react with scepticism. We can only hope that a few years from now, the Western Strategy and Southern Strategy have not both failed.

「新南向」不能只是為逃避面對大陸

2015-09-26 聯合報

蔡英文宣布，若重返執政將推動「新南向」政策，強化對東協及印度的多元夥伴關係。理論上，外交、經貿追求多元與分散，當然是正確的作法；然而，就國家整體戰略和實務看，高談新「南向」支線的開展，卻避談積重日深的「西向」主軸要如何因應調整，則顯然是避重就輕，察秋毫而不見輿薪。

不想或不知如何面對中國大陸的時候，就把臉別過去，轉而談「南向」，「戒急用忍」時代的李登輝如此，「一邊一國」的陳水扁如此，今天的蔡英文也只能跟進。唯一不同的是，蔡英文把原來李、扁時代僅南望東南亞的「南向」，又推向更遠一點的印度；因此，她自命這就是「新南向」政策。但就思維本質而論，新南向和舊南向其實沒有太大差別，因為他們都假裝自己的全球化地圖上沒有西邊的中國大陸，只有南邊的亞洲。

從上個世紀九○年代以來，我國政府為了防止台商對外投資過度集中在大陸，先後推動過三次「南向政策」，鼓勵企業前進東南亞。第一次是在一九九四到九六年，將泰、馬、印、菲、星、越、汶等七國列為對象；第二次在一九九七至九九年，加入了澳、紐、寮、緬、柬五國；第三次則在二○○○到二○○三年，因應我國加入世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）及「東協加三（中日韓）」的形成，再度強調南向。

檢視這三次「南向」政策的執行成果，無可諱言，都是以失敗收場。其中前兩次在李登輝任內，在九五到九六年間曾經略有斬獲，台商投資泰國、印尼、越南三國的比重明顯增加；遺憾的是，遇到九七年亞洲金融風暴及九八年印尼排華事件的摧折，許多投資人鎩羽而歸，台商自此便視南向為畏途。

第三次南向政策，則是在陳水扁執政初期延續李登輝的政策，旨在支撐其「一邊一國」、「烽火外交」的強硬外交路線。然而，這也終於不敵中國大陸加速開放及提高外資優惠的磁吸效應，台商遂絡繹踏上了西進之路。陳水扁任內八年，台灣對陸港的出口依存度從原先的不到兩成提高到四成，正是南向失敗的鐵證。其間，前副總統呂秀蓮二○○二年還上演了一次出入印尼的「祕密外交」，以購買印尼天然氣為由出訪，但沿途一路受阻，不知何以為繼，甚至一度受困於雅加達機場貴賓室內不得入境。如此犧牲形象的困頓之旅，儘管副元首踏上了印尼，終究不過是一場失敗的外交衝撞，「南向」政策演成這樣的奇襲戲碼，如何能有所成？

我們之所以不厭其煩地在此回顧先前三次南向政策的失敗，目的不是在潑民進黨的冷水，而是要提醒蔡英文或其他未來的國家領導人不要再重蹈類似覆轍。目前，台灣的經貿過度依賴中國大陸市場的現象，必須儘快設法調整矯正，以免越陷越深以致生存命脈操之於人。然而，要調整及矯治目前的偏倚，若只是天馬行空地喊出「新南向」，卻不能在外交與經貿、理想與現實、目標與手段之間妥善拿捏，進行有謀略、有步驟的落子布局，並謹慎據以執行，恐怕很難達到預期的效果。

簡單地說，我們對蔡英文的「新南向」有三點建議：第一，基於發展程度、市場規模、便利性及安全性的差異，「南向」和「西進」是兩條互補的路線，而不是平行或彼此替代的政策；畢竟，光靠南向，無法填補台灣經濟發展所需的動力。第二，經貿和外交是兩個環環相扣的工作，前者靠的是勇敢開創，後者靠的謹慎從事；在南向拓展中，兩者均不可或缺。如果仍存有扁政府時代的烽火或衝撞心態，在東南亞及印度勢必碰壁，因為你敵不過中共的外交攻勢。看呂秀蓮在印尼碰壁的窘狀即可想知。第三，蔡英文和民進黨這兩年挑起的「反中」、「仇中」氛圍必須先設法降溫，才有可能在「西進」和「南向」之間取得更佳的戰略平衡。包括如何參與「亞投行」的活動，如何設法在「一帶一路」的建設中爭取到台灣企業可以參與的機會，其實都和「南向」息息相關，無可逃避。

當台灣人民第四度聽到「南向」的號角吹起，就算還聽得進去，恐怕也是半信半疑居多。我們只能希望，幾年後檢驗其成效時，不會看到西進、南向兩線雙雙潰敗。

Maintaining the Status Quo: Tsai Ing-wen's Naive Assumptions

Maintaining the Status Quo: Tsai Ing-wen's Naive Assumptions
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 25, 2015

Executive Summary: Most people on Taiwan hope to maintain the status quo. Recent media surveys show that the number of those who hope Taiwan can "maintain the status quo indefinitely" has substantially increased. The DPP has attempted to spin this in Tsai Ing-wen's favour. It asserts that "Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait arguments are precise and rigorous. She has gradually won the public trust." People on Taiwan really do long for stability and peace. Tsai Ing-wen however, thinks that merely maintaining the status quo will neutralize the Mainland and persuade the United States to ensure smooth cross-Strait relations. Her thinking involves three naive assumptions.

Full Text Below:

Most people on Taiwan hope to maintain the status quo. Recent media surveys show that the number of those who hope Taiwan can "maintain the status quo indefinitely" has substantially increased. The DPP has attempted to spin this in Tsai Ing-wen's favour. It asserts that "Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait arguments are precise and rigorous. She has gradually won the public trust." People on Taiwan really do long for stability and peace. Tsai Ing-wen however, thinks that merely maintaining the status quo will neutralize the Mainland and persuade the United States to ensure smooth cross-Strait relations. Her thinking involves three naive assumptions.

Naive Assumption One. Strategically speaking, Tsai Ing-wen has never offered a clear explanation of what she means by "maintaining the status quo".  Ma Ying-jeou was clear when he advocated "no reunification, no independence, no use of force". He won the approval of the United States and the Mainland. Only then could cross-Strait relations remain stable over the following years. Tsai Ing-wen betrays the same "Don't rock the boat" mentality and tendency to procrastinate as the Ma government. Tsai denounced Ma Ying-jeou's policy path. She too has been responding to the people's desire to avoid war. Alas, she has failed to offer any macro level, long-term cross-Strait policy. Without any long term ideals, how can we revive the spirit of adventure that once inspired people on Taiwan to travel far and wide exploring the world? Allowing oneself to settle into an endless loop, living life day at a time, without any grander goal, will merely leave one lost and directionless.

Naive Assumption Two. "Don't rock the boat" style "maintaining the status quo" thinking. So-called "anti-China" (Anti-Mainland) sentiment is on the rise on Taiwan. Can the status quo really be maintained? That is doubtful. Poll data shows support for maintaining the status quo at new highs. But the public hatred of both the Mainland government and Mainland people is on the rise. This is the predictable result of the DPP's relentless incitement of anti-Mainland hatred over the pat decade. Hatred breeds hatred. If the Chang family is unrelenting in its hatred toward the Li family next door, can one really expect the Li family to become increasingly friendly toward the Chang family? The Mainland has a "Fifty Cent Party" whose populist rhetoric is every bit as extreme as those on Taiwan PTTs. Demands for reunification via military force have become louder. They will not dictate Mainland policy toward Taiwan. But democratic governments and authoritarian governments alike bend before the winds of public opinion. The only difference is that authoritarian governments bend a little less than democratic governments.

For Tsai Ing-wen's "maintaining the status quo" to succeed, she must radically reform the anti-Mainland Democratic Progressive Party. She must reverse the vicious cycle of escalating cross-Strait hatred.

Naive Assumption Three. Maintaining the status quo requires a key. The likelihood of cross-Strait war may be unlikely. But the deterioration of cross-Strait relations will devastate Taiwan. The key to maintaining the status quo is defending the Republic of China and adhering to the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen's definition of the status quo must be rooted in the Republic of China and the 1992 Consensus. If it is, the negative impact on Taiwan can be minimized, and the possibility of maintaining the status quo will be maximized. The farther one departs from the Republic of China and the 1992 Consensus, the more cross-Strait relations will deteriorate and the greater the negative impact on Taiwan will be. The possibility of maintaining the status quo will correspondingly be diminished.

The peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, as the Mainland has reiterated, "did not fall from heaven". It is rooted in the shared recognition that both sides would adhere to the 1992 Consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen has refused to accept the 1992 Consensus. She has refused to repudiate the Taiwan independence party platform. Without the support of the 1992 consensus, how can the rewards of cross-Strait exchanges not evaporate? The destination is remote, and the road is long. Mere lip service to "maintaining the status quo" will not enable Tsai Ing-wen to sprout wings and fly there.

This newspaper has vowed to act as a channel for cross-Strait communication. It would like to remind those on the Mainland and Taiwan who support the status quo, that the number of those advocating both immediate independence and gradual independence has fallen. This should be cautiously viewed as good news. At least the number of those who advocate rational cross-Strait relations has not fallen. The public on Taiwan is increasingly receptive to political reality regarding Taiwan independence. Unfortunately hatred toward the Mainland has also increased. This anti-Mainland sentiment is a toxin, highly destructive of long term cross-Strait relations.

The Mainland is right to insist that Taiwan abide by the 1992 Consensus. This is something we have repeatedly called for. Acknowledging the existence of the Republic of China is the only thing that will enable genuine reconciliation with the Taiwan public, and the dissolution of anti-Mainland sentiment. Tsai Ing-wen no longer speaks of a "government in exile". She has pledged to uphold the Republic of China's constitutional framework, in form if not in spirit. Chiang Ching-kuo's final years witnessed the rise of Taiwan independence. Three decades of political agitation ensued. Yet today, the green camp is paying lip service to the Republic of China, right along with the blue. This is unprecedented on Taiwan. Naturally it must be viewed as significant.

Beijing realizes that the KMT has lost control over politics and policy on Taiwan. It has concluded that Tsai Ing-wen's election victory next year is a foregone conclusion. Therefore it is changing its policy toward Taiwan. It is adopting a unilateral decision-making model. It is seizing the initiative. It is making decisions according to its own time table. It is no longer negotiating with Taiwan. It is no longer seeking Taiwan's consent. The M503 flight path, the amending of national security laws, and the implementation of MTP smart cards, all reflect Beijing's new attitude. We would remind Beijing however that peaceful development and the reduction of public hatred will require "strategic firmness and tactical flexibility".

蔡英文維持現狀的三個天真

2015年09月25日 中國時報

多數民眾希望台灣維持現狀，近日多家媒體調查均呈現，希望台灣「永遠維持現狀」者大幅增加。民進黨的解讀是，「蔡英文主張的兩岸論述非常精確且嚴謹，已慢慢獲得人民的信任。」人民確實嚮往安定和平的生活，但蔡英文若認為只是提出維持現狀論，就能馴服大陸、說服美國，確保兩岸關係的平順，這樣的想法存在著三個天真。

第一個天真，從戰略的角度來看，蔡英文始終未對「維持現狀」的內涵做出清楚的說明，馬英九尚且提出「不統、不獨、不武」的清晰論述，才獲得美中的共同認可，兩岸關係才維繫了多年的穩定。蔡英文的消極性，透露的是與馬政府相同的偏安與拖延的無奈，雖否定了馬英九路線的正當性，也在一定程度迎合了人民的「避戰」期望，但不可能提出宏觀而長遠的兩岸政策。目標上失卻了積極性，就難以引導台灣人找回過去那種面向世界、走南闖北的「闖勁」，只能沉陷在拖一天算一天的停滯迴圈。沒有大目標就會失去方向感。

第二個天真，偏安式的「維持現狀」思考，以台灣目前持續升高的反中情緒氛圍下，能否「維持」也充滿不確定性。民調數據都顯示，維持現狀支持度攀向新高，但台灣人民無論對大陸政府或民眾，其惡感均上升，這也是民進黨過去十多年來持續燃燒反中氛圍的結果。惡感將激化惡感，就如兩家鄰居，很難期待在張家不斷升高其對李家厭惡的同時，李家能對張家愈來愈友善。大陸網路上所謂五毛黨所代表的民粹力量，言論偏激程度不輸給台灣的PTT，武統的聲音愈來愈強，雖然不致於成為大陸對台軍事政策，但不管民主政府或威權政府，都是隨民意之風擺動的草，所差別的只是威權政府的擺幅可能較民主政府為小罷了。

從這一點來看，蔡英文的「維持現狀」要能達陣，關鍵在於她能否根本的改變民進黨的反中本質，用行動逆轉兩岸正在相互堆高的惡感循環。

第三個天真，從方法面言，蔡英文的維持現狀仍必須有操作面的支撐，否則即便兩岸進入戰爭的機會不大，但兩岸關係惡化對台灣的衝擊會造成重創。而操作面的中心座標就是「中華民國」與「九二共識」。如果蔡英文執政，對維持現狀的定義與操作離中華民國與九二共識愈近，兩岸惡化的幅度及對台灣的負面衝擊就愈小，維持現狀的可能性就愈大，反之離中華民國與九二共識愈遠，兩岸惡化與對台灣的負面衝擊就愈大，維持現狀的可能性也就相對減少。

對於兩岸關係和平發展的現狀，大陸方面曾多次重申「不是從天上掉下來的」，必須建立在兩岸雙方認同堅持九二共識、反對台獨這一共同政治基礎上。蔡英文迄今不接受九二共識，台獨黨綱也不放棄。拆掉九二共識地基後，如何維護兩岸交流成果的高樓於不塌？關山迢遞，恐怕不是蔡英文說一句「維持現狀」，就能飛天越過。

本報自許扮演兩岸溝通角色，也要提醒大陸，台灣支持維持現狀者創新高，急獨與緩獨主張均下降，應可視為對台工作「審慎的喜訊」。至少代表兩岸關係在理性面並未惡化，台灣人民更能接受宜遠離台獨的政治現實。但在情緒面上，台灣人民對大陸的惡感卻相對升高，反中情緒是一種感性的負性毒素，對兩岸關係的長期走向不利。

大陸對台堅持九二共識是正確的，一如過去我們一再呼籲，只有面對中華民國的存在，才有可能與台灣人民真正和解，進一步消解反中力量。特別是蔡英文不再提「流亡政府論」宣示遵守中華民國憲政體制後，至少在形式上，中華民國算是藍綠公約數，這是自蔣經國晚年台獨勢力崛起後，政治變遷激盪30年來所首見，當然有其值得重視的意義。

北京認定國民黨在台灣已失去政治控制與政策執行的能力，又評估明年大選蔡英文勝選趨勢似成定局，在對台政策作為上改採「以我為主」的單向決策模式，依自己的時程與需要做決策，不再與台灣協商、取得台灣的同意，M503航道事件、片面修訂國安法到實施卡式台胞證等事件，都反映了北京的心態。我們提醒北京，走和平發展路線要先消除民間惡感，對台工作「戰略堅定、戰術柔軟」是必要的。

Obama Xi Summit: Love and Hate between Major Powers

Obama Xi Summit: Love and Hate between Major Powers
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 24, 2015

Executive Summary: An Obama Xi meeting has been on the back burner for two years. But tomorrow Mainland leader Xi Jinping will finally set off for the United States and meet once again with US President Barack Obama. Obama's term is coming to an end. If nothing unexpected happens, this will be the last meeting between Obama and Xi. It will also be the most intense summit between the Mainland and the US since the Mainland's rise to power.

Full Text Below:

An Obama Xi meeting has been on the back burner for two years. But tomorrow Mainland leader Xi Jinping will finally set off for the United States and meet once again with US President Barack Obama. Obama's term is coming to an end. If nothing unexpected happens, this will be the last meeting between Obama and Xi. It will also be the most intense summit between the Mainland and the US since the Mainland's rise to power.

Relations between major powers such as the Mainland and the US are a sort of international wrestling match. The Obama Xi summit is a diplomatic dance of love and hate. Superficially the two sides may remain polite to a fault. But each side has its own calculations. There is no love lost between the United States and the Mainland. All they have are interests and tactics, including how to counter the other without causing a complete break. Both sides will shake hands and embrace. Each side will have its hidden agenda. Both sides will compromise on sensitive issues. Over the past two years, the two governments have been wracked by anxiety and suspicion. The summit will reaffirm what the dance steps are, so that no one will upset the rhythm and undermine already weak trust.

The Tango is a fast-paced dance. It includes steps forward and backward, as well as turns. Early this month, CCP leaders invited leaders from Russia, South Korea and other countries to attend a military parade. The parade showed they were no longer the "Sick Man of Asia". The United States forced Japan to pass a "security law", to counter the Mainland's military rise in Asia. The Mainland and the US have targeted each other, and are crossing swords everywhere. These are the results of struggles between the major powers.

The Tango has another unique feature, its intensity. It is often brusque and hard. This is to shock the viewer. On the eve of the Obama Xi meeting, the CCP arrested Chinese American businessman Pan Wanfen on charges of stealing state secrets and espionage. The United States accused the Mainland of connivance with Internet hackers to steal US trade secrets. It threatened the Mainland with economic sanctions. Tit for tat between the two countries, both official and private, continues unabated.

The Tango is fierce dance. The partners move forward and backward. They turn and reverse. The moves however, are coordinated. Love and hate. Push and pull. The performance depends on the skill of the partners and their degree of coordination. The Obama Xi summit involves both competition and conflict. Some have even suggest that it is unlikely to yeild any important results. But pragmatism require the two governments to find consensus within conflict, and cooperation within competition. This is to everyone's benefit. At the very least, "jaw jaw is better than war war".

From a macro level perspective, the Obama Xi summit is taking place amidst a global economic recession. The heating up of the South China Sea conflict and domestic worries help ease Beijing Washington differences and confrontation.

First, consider the global economic recession, which differs from the situation two years ago. This time the Mainland has endured both a housing market crash and a stock market crash. Its economy may experience a hard landing. Growth is nowhere as strong as it was before. This will act as a drag on global economic recovery. The CCP devalued the RMB to save exports. This immediately impacted US economic growth. This is one of the main reasons the US Federal Reserve delayed raising interest rates. The Obama Xi summit will focus on economic issues in order to reach a negotiated settlement.

Second. The heating up of the South China Sea conflict. Through its "Asian Rebalancing" policy, the US hopes to strengthen its East Asian allies against the rise of the Mainland's military. But the United States overplayed its hand in the South China Sea. This led to military confrontation. It backfired and provoked the Mainland to accelerate the construction of runways on artificial reefs in the South China Sea. To reduce the prospect of military confrontation between the two, the United States hopes to increase military cooperation and exchanges. When Mainland and US military aircraft require emergency rescue, the two sides will have a predetermined protocol.

Finally, the Mainland and the US each has domestic concerns. Over the past two years, Xi Jinping's anti-corruption sweep resulted in many corrupt Mainland officials fleeing to the US. The two governments have no extradition treaty. The CCP hopes the United States will assist in apprehending these fugitives and repatriating them, especially those with politically sensitive backgrounds such as former United Front Department Heads. US companies on the Mainland fear the theft of trade secrets.They dare not cooperate with Mainland enterprises. The protection of intellectual property rights has become a major concern for US companies. Will the two governments sign an extradition treaty in exchange for the protection of of intellectual property rights? That is something the Obama Xi summit will address. The summit will be a dance of love and hate among major power.

As for Taiwan, the US has repeatedly issued assurances that the US position on Taiwan will not change. But on Taiwan, the fear is that the Obama Xi summit will wind up playing a different tune. When the Mainland US duo becomes a Mainland US Taiwan trio, will Taiwan find itself out of step and not know which way to move?

歐習會：新型大國關係下的愛憎探戈

2015-09-24 聯合報

暌違兩年之後，中共國家領導人習近平再次啟程訪問美國，並將於明天與美國總統歐巴馬舉行領袖會談。隨著歐巴馬任期屆臨尾聲，如無意外，這不但是最後一場「歐習會」，也是隨著中國的崛起，中美交鋒最激烈的一場峰會。

如果把中美之間的新型大國關係看成一場國際角力，那麼這次的「歐習會」，便是一場充滿愛憎的外交探戈。表面上雙方行禮如儀，但在錯綜複雜的舞步算計中，中美兩國並不是擦出感情的火花，而只是在各種權謀利害的爭逐中，要如何維持「爭而不破」、「破而不裂」的局面。所以雙方既要握手擁抱，也要各自暗藏機鋒，但仍不忘在兩國敏感議題上作出妥協。因為中美兩國歷經過去兩年的不安與猜忌，都想趁著這次高峰會再次確認彼此的舞步，以免亂了節拍而破壞了本已薄弱的互信。

探戈節奏明快，常以舞步的進退轉身來互別苗頭。月初，中共邀請俄韓等國領袖舉行大閱兵，來證明自己已非昔日的吳下阿蒙；而美國則迫使日本通過《安保法》，來抗衡中國在亞洲的軍事崛起。中美兩國互別苗頭、處處爭鋒，都源自大國爭勝的心結。

探戈舞步的另一特色，是頓挫強烈，常以果斷、剛強的舞步來震懾他人。在歐習會前夕，中共以竊取國家機密、參與間諜活動的罪名，逮捕了華裔美國商人潘婉芬；而美國則指責中國大陸縱容網路駭客，竊取美國公司的商業機密，並威脅將對中國大陸實施經濟制裁。中美兩國的針鋒相對，從官方到民間無處不在。

探戈舞步雖然激烈，但從兩人舞步的進退、反身和旋轉當中，仍可看到彼此的協調性；其間愛憎、推拉之張力表現，就要看舞者的基本功力及靈犀契合之程度。由此看歐習會，儘管中美兩國在爭勝逞強的過程中齟齬不斷，甚至有人認為這次歐習會難有重要成就，但基於國際現實的考量，兩國仍須從分歧之中尋找共識，從競爭當中謀求合作，以求取最大利益；至少，會晤總比不會為佳。

從大局看，藉由這次的歐習會，在國際經濟大環境不佳、南海問題激化、和兩國內部隱憂等三個議題上，都有助緩解中美兩國的歧見和對峙。

首先，談國際經濟大環境的不佳。與兩年前不同的是，中國大陸這次在股災及房地產崩盤的衝擊下，今年經濟可能硬著陸，成長動力大不如前，將拖累世界經濟復甦的腳步。中共採取人民幣重貶的方式來救出口，立刻衝擊到美國經濟的成長，這也是美國聯準會決定延後升息的主因之一。在這種情況下，這次「歐習會」勢必將主軸放在經濟議題上，共同協商解決之道。

其次，是南海問題的激化。美國的亞洲再平衡政策，主要是希望藉由強化東亞盟國的軍事力量，來抗衡中國大陸的軍事崛起。但美國在南海議題上介入過深的結果，造成雙方的軍事對峙緊繃，反而促使中共加速在南海人工島礁上興建機場跑道。為了降低兩國軍事對峙的不可預測性，美國希望透過這次「歐習會」擴大兩國的軍事合作交流，並就中美軍機在空中遭遇時的緊急反應制訂出雙方可以遵行的規範。

最後，是中美兩國的內部隱憂。近兩年在習近平肅貪掃腐的效應下，大陸不少貪官或經濟犯潛逃美國；由於兩國並無引渡條約，中共自希望美方能協助將這些通緝逃犯緝拿遣返，尤其是具有高度政治敏感度的前統戰部長令計劃之胞弟令完成。另外，美國在中國的企業，因唯恐商業機密被竊取，而不敢與中資企業合作；智慧財產權的保障，已成為美國企業的一大隱憂。中美兩國是否會以簽署智慧財產權來交換引渡經濟犯，是這次「歐習會」關注的焦點。無論如何，這將是一場展現新大國關係的愛憎探戈。

至於在台灣議題上，美國雖一再保證對台灣的一貫立場不會改變，但對台灣來說，最怕的是「歐習會」後，當不同的音樂響起，中美的雙人探戈轉變成美中台的三人探戈，到時候，台灣的舞步不知道要伴隨誰的身影而動？

Time that Tsai Ing-wen Debated Hung Hsiu-chu

Time that Tsai Ing-wen Debated Hung Hsiu-chu
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 23, 2015

Executive Summary: The year 2016 will be a turning point for Taiwan. This election is of critical importance. Candidates must tell voters what they think the current problems are, and how they intend to remedy them. We cannot allow voters to be deceived into supporting candidates, only to become disillusioned upon learning otherwise. The harm inflicted upon the nation, the winning candidates, and the voters is unacceptable. We solemnly urge Tsai Ing-wen and Hung Hsiu-chu to begin debating the issues.

Full Text Below:

DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen's election prospects are bright. Victory appears to be at hand. The DPP has a good chance of gaining a majority in the legislature as well. KMT presidential candidate Hung Hsiu-chu's momentum is weak. She lacks both manpower and funds. Nevertheless she exhibits willpower and determination. Her own party is apathetic. Rivals from within her own party are pressuring her. Yet she stands alone, resolute in her opposition to populist demagoguery and Taiwan independence fanaticism. The election campaign has now reached the point where the candidates must face each other. The two main candidates have begun to share their political views. Voters must set aside their prejudices and look at what the candidates actually advocate.

The DPP recently held a party wide "pledge session". Tsai Ing-wen gave a speech, calling for responsibility, tolerance, reconciliation, unity, commitment, and vision. Taiwan does indeed require unity before it can achieve any sort of vision. All of this requires a responsible government. Tsai's pledges will probably win public support. But how does she intend to fulfill them? How will she bring them to fruition? She refuses to say. She scrupulously avoids mention of specific policies or programs. Energy policy is highly controversial. Tsai Ing-wen pledged that there would be no power shortages following the DPP's return to power. Last week Tsai Ing-wen announced her green energy policy. Green power, including wind power and solar power, would be increased to over 20%. Given current technology, green power is more costly than thermal power and nuclear power. Therefore others have predicted price increases. Yet Tsai immediately fired back, saying that she "did not expect prices to rise within 10 years."

Tsai Ing-wen has made three pledges. But those in the know realize that Taiwan's more serious crisis involves disunity, myopia, and paralysis. The existence of problems is common knowledge. Pointing them out is easy. Solving them is hard. How can Taiwan be united? Tsai Ing-wen says "We are at a crossroads. Division or reconciliation hangs in the balance". In other words, whether we are blue or green, we must unite. These are pretty words. This is the right direction. But how does she intend to achieve this? She refuses to say.

At the very moment Tsai Ing-wen was making her pledge, DPP politicians and party members were red-baiting, accusing others of "selling out Taiwan". So where was the tolerance, reconciliation, and unity Tsai trumpeted? Does it really boil down to "Obey me and live, defy me and die"? Taiwan is wracked by unprecedented political divisions. Whither the tolerance? Whither the reconciliation? Whither the solidarity? Tsai Ing-wen needs to walk the walk. She needs to do so, up close and personal.

Candidates can of course propose specific programs. But Tsai has no intention of proposing any. Besides, the major obstacle to unity on Taiwan has been disagreement on matters of national identity and cross-Strait relations. Allegiance to the Republic of China vs. allegiance to a would-be "Republic of Taiwan", guarantee blue vs. green incompatibility. Today the DPP is holding high the banner of the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen has pledged to uphold the existing constitutional framework. But suspicions of "backdoor listing" remain. That said, consensus has been increased. The issue of allegiances has been partially resolved. A basis for unity has perhaps emerged, Tsai Ing-wen enjoys the home court advantage. She is obligated therefore to make concrete changes.

Consider cross-Strait relations. When the KMT was in power, it reached an agreement with the CCP to treat the 1992 Consensus as the basis for cross-Strait relations. This was not a formal agreement. It was an implicit understanding. Is "one China" the Republic of China? Or is it the People's Republic of China? Each side has its own interpretation. The DPP has long clung to Taiwan independence. It now finds it difficult to accept one China, different interpretations. Today Tsai Ing-wen says she intends to uphold the status quo. She says she has accepted the Republic of China. In doing so, she has implicitly recognized the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen might as well publicly recognize the 1992 Consensus, or suggest an alternative rationale. This would be the first step in unifying Taiwan, and stabilizing cross-Strait relations.

Consider the past. The DPP's pretty slogans have usually contradicted reality. President Chen Shui-bian shouted "higher standards" during his election campaign. But the moment he won, lower standards were the rule, leading to the "Cape 700 million" embezzlement scandal. When Frank Hsieh ran for president, he championed "reconciliation and coexistence", even while his aides were brazenly engaing in red-baiting Hsieh's opponents. Hsieh alleged that the liberalization of cross-Strait exchanges would result in "workers on Taiwan unable to find work, women on Taiwan unable to find husbands, and children on Taiwan would be exiled to Heilongjiang". Hsieh said this to frighten people. Tsai Ing-wen calls for solidarity on Taiwan. But if she fails to offer action, programs, or implementation, the entire exercise will merely become another case of political deceit and rubber checks.

Tsai Ing-wen has stressed vision and responsible government. She elaborated on the vision part. But unfortunately it failed to withstand scrutiny. On energy policy for example, she diverges from Hung Hsiu-chu. But more importantly, experts have exposed Tsai Ing-wen's fallacies. Yet the Tsai Ing-wen camp has yet to offer a satisfactory response. What manner of "vision" is this? How is evasion consistent with "responsible government"? In order to achieve victory, Tsai Ing-wen is relying on current momentum. She is attempting to muddle her way to victory. if so, Tsai Ing-wen's victory will mean the demolition of yet another politician's fancy rhetoric.

Hung Hsiu-chu has also offered her vision and political views. They include opposition to populist demagoguery and opposition to Taiwan independence. These two views have been challenged by the DPP and green camp supporters. Her public policies have been criticized by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party. Will these policies benefit Taiwan? Will they enable voters to enjoy the good life? They too need to be scrutinized.

The global economy faces great uncertainty. The national strength of the United States is waning. This has led to volatility in the East Asian strategic situation. Mainland China's economic and military rise has led to shifts in the international political equilibrium. Consider three factors. The year 2016 will be a turning point for Taiwan. This election is of critical importance. Candidates must tell voters what they think the current problems are, and how they intend to remedy them. We cannot allow voters to be deceived into supporting candidates, only to become disillusioned upon learning otherwise. The harm inflicted upon the nation, the winning candidates, and the voters is unacceptable. We solemnly urge Tsai Ing-wen and Hung Hsiu-chu to begin debating the issues.

請蔡英文與洪秀柱開始辯論

2015年09月23日 中國時報

民進黨蔡英文選情大好，總統大位勝券在握，立委席次也有過半機會。國民黨洪秀柱則聲勢低迷，缺錢缺人，卻展現出堅強的毅力與定力，在黨內冷漠與競爭對手重重壓力下，堅持反民粹、反台獨初衷，孤軍奮戰至今。隨著選戰進入短兵相接，兩位主要候選人開始公布具體政見，選民應暫時放下激情，認真檢視候選人的政見主張。

日前民進黨召開了宛如「誓師大會」的全代會，蔡英文在演說中提出責任、包容和解團結及許諾與願景三宣示。誠然，台灣需要團結，團結才能邁向願景，而這一切都有賴一個負責任的政府，她的宣示應能得到許多民眾的好感與支持。但這些宣示如何做到？怎麼實踐？卻未見論述，更談不上具體的策略或方案。在高度爭議的能源政策方面，曾經保證執政後不缺電的蔡英文，上周公布綠能政策，將把綠電（包括風電與太陽能）供應提高到20%以上。根據現有的技術與成本，綠電遠比火力發電與核電貴，因而外界推論未來電價必漲。但她立刻強調「沒預期10年內電價會上漲」。

首先探究蔡英文的三宣示，明眼人皆知，台灣最大危機在內部不團結、欠缺發展願景，政府又沒有行動力。問題的存在已經是基本常識，點出來也不難，難在於如何解決。以團結台灣來說，蔡英文說，「我們所處的十字路口，要走向分裂還是走向和解，就在一念之間。」亦即不分藍綠，都要團結起來。詞藻是很華麗，方向也很正確，但怎麼做，卻未著墨。

在她宣示的同時，許多民進黨從政黨員與同志，卻仍在編織並拋發台奸大帽，延續長期以來對他人的賣台指控。試問：這是什麼包容、和解及團結？難道順我者生、逆我者亡才能團結嗎？環顧台灣大環境，政治分裂及對立氛圍空前高漲。要怎麼包容？怎麼和解？怎麼團結？蔡英文必須提出行動方案，而且身體力行。

具體方案不是提不出，而是有沒有心要提出。何況長期以來台灣團結的主要障礙，是在國家認同與兩岸關係上彼此沒有交集，中華民國與台灣共和國間的異己關係，造成藍綠絕不相容。如今隨著民進黨高舉中華民國旗幟、蔡英文承諾遵奉現行憲政體制，「借殼上市」的疑慮雖未消除，但共識畢竟已經擴大，認同爭議部分得以解決，團結的基礎可能已經出現，蔡英文已經站上主場優勢，應有具體作為帶動改變。

至於兩岸關係，國民黨執政時期與對岸達成「九二共識」相互諒解基礎。這不是白紙黑字的協議，而是模糊的交集，對所謂的一中，到底是中華民國還是中華人民共和國，雙方各自表述。過去民進黨堅持台獨立場，難以接受一中各表，如今蔡英文提出了台灣現狀說，又接受了中華民國，其實就是對「九二共識」的默認。蔡英文大可公開接受「九二共識」或提出替代論述，這應是團結台灣、穩定兩岸的第一步。

衡諸過往，民進黨高喊漂亮口號實際卻背道而馳，並非罕見。陳水扁競選總統時高喊向上提升，執政卻向下沉淪發生「海角七億」；謝長廷競選總統提倡「和解共生」，幕僚卻大肆「抹紅」對手，更以「兩岸開放交流，台灣將出現『查甫找無工，查某找無尪，囝仔要去黑龍江』」恐嚇民眾。蔡英文呼籲台灣團結，如果沒有相應的行動方案以及具體實踐，恐怕又將淪為政治詐欺或空頭支票。

蔡英文強調願景與負責任的政府，願景部分有很多闡述，不幸卻禁不起檢驗。以能源政策為例，不但洪秀柱的主張不同，許多專家紛紛指出謬誤，蔡英文陣營卻沒有完整回應。請問這是什麼樣的願景？迴避又怎麼會是負責任的態度？從勝選角度來看，蔡英文憑藉目前的支持度，或許可以敷衍應付，模模糊糊迎向勝選，若真如此，蔡英文的勝選終究將是另一個政客華麗詞藻被戳破的開始。

洪秀柱也提出許多願景與政見，其反民粹與反台獨上兩主要願景，曾被民進黨及綠營支持者強烈質疑，她的許多具體的公共政策，也受到民進黨批評與反對，這些政見是否確實有利台灣？是否有利選民未來過好日子？同樣需要接受檢驗。

全球經濟進入高不確定性挑戰、美國國力衰退造成東亞戰略情勢風雲詭譎及中國經濟、軍事力量崛起對國際政治均衡現狀的扭曲，從這三大因素觀察，2016將是台灣的轉捩點，這次選舉非常重要。候選人有義務對選民說清楚、講明白當前的問題與自己的對策，才能讓選民不再「因誤解而熱情，因了解而無情」，對國家、對當選人、對選民不會造成三重傷害。我們提出嚴肅而誠摯建議，請蔡英文與洪秀柱開始辯論。

Does Taiwan Intend to Be a Player, or a Provocateur?

Does Taiwan Intend to Be a Player, or a Provocateur?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 21, 2015

Executive Summary: Recently the CCP announced that it would be holding military exercises off the coast of Fujian, once again touching sensitive nerves on Taiwan. As it has in the past, Beijing issued an official statement, saying "This was merely a routine exercise". But it went a little overboard in its clarification. The Global Times, the CCP party newspaper, quoted a military expert who said that the live-fire exercises "cannot be referred to in the same terms as the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis."

Full Text Below:

Recently the CCP announced that it would be holding military exercises off the coast of Fujian, once again touching sensitive nerves on Taiwan. As it has in the past, Beijing issued an official statement, saying "This was merely a routine exercise". But it went a little overboard in its clarification. The Global Times, the CCP party newspaper, quoted a military expert who said that the live-fire exercises "cannot be referred to in the same terms as the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis."

Taiwan has sensitive ears. In response, Beijing has learned to fine tune its public statements. It no longer shouts at the top of its voice. Instead it has learned to play the "acknowledge" and "deny" game. Just listen to the wording of its denial: "cannot be referred to in the same terms as the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis." In fact, no one asked about 1996. Instead Beijing brought 1996 up itself.

In 1996, Jiang Zemin realized he could not trust Lee Teng-hui. He ordered missiles fired into a no fly zone. Unarmed missiles were fired into the sea just off the north and south coasts of Taiwan. The result merely boosted voter support for Lee Teng-hui. During the 2000 election, Zhu Rongji once again engaged in intimidation. Chen Shui-bian inadvertently benefited. These fiascoes helped Beijing understand the psychology of the Taiwan public, to understand the recklessness of the masses, and to realize that intimidation will only backfire.

History is repeating itself. A third pro-Taiwan independence candidate will probably win the general election. Beijing no longer has any desire to overturn the boat inside the gutter. During the National People's Congress in March, Xi Jinping said, "Without a solid foundation, the earth will move". His tone was mild. It lacked any trace of rancor. As a result it was even more inscrutable.

This does not mean that Beijing is willing to tolerate the din generated by Taiwan independence advocates. Taiwan independence passions today are the highest they have been in history. The Sunflower Student Movement precipitated a wave of anti-[Mainland] China hatred. Lee Teng-hui openly declared that the mother country of the Taiwan people is Japan. Beijing realizes it cannot control Taiwan by itself. Taiwan is controlled in part by the US and Japan. The CCP realizes that for the near future the Mainland will be approaching the home stretch, and that the only obstacles in its way are the United States and Japan.

The 1996 missile crisis and the 2005 anti-secession law show that Beijing considers military reunification a last resort. In 2010, Mainland China surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy. Analysts predicted Mainland China would eventually surpass even the US. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party's global and cross-Strait perspective dramatically changed. The new Politburo realized that economics is the ultimate weapon. As long as the industrial and technological center of gravity shifts toward China and away from the United States, the world's knowledge, talent, and markets will undergo a paradigm shift. The winds will blow from the East instead of the West. Military power will be secondary in importance.

Beijing's recent moves make this change in perspective obvious. The M503 flight path and the reissuing of MTPs as smart cards were both intended to do away with the adversarial mentality on both sides of the Strait. The former was intended to promote the demilitarization of the Taiwan Strait. The latter was intended to tear down the fence between the two sides. These are consistent with Beijing's global strategy of "peaceful development". Military power will of course not be ruled out. But it has been demoted from the head table to the guest table. In its quest to be first among nations, peace will be Beijing's first resort.

Therefore, the recent military exercises are merely warning. CCTV broadcast them in July. Only later did observers recall the Zhu Er He military exercise. A replica of the presidential palace in Taipei was visible. But no departures were made from the regular training pattern. The Maritime Safety Administration in Fujian announced a small-scale no-fly zone for artillery drills below 8000 meters. These served only one purpose, to remind Taiwan to be afraid, lest leaders on Taiwan become too impulsive and make an unexpected move, undermining Mainland China's drive down the home stretch.

Taiwan now has two options. One. Become an active participant as the Mainland makes its drive down the home stretch. Share the fruits of that final mile. Two. Remain a pawn of the United States and Japan, as they attempt to “contain” Mainland China, and become willing cannon fodder rather than see the light.

The United States strongly supports Abe's new "Security Law". As one can imagine, Mainland China and the United States will become caught in a fierce struggle. The US is a regional hegemon and long-term global hegemon. The United States defeated Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Japanese Imperial Army. It used the Cold War to implode the Soviet Union. It apparently intends to dispense with Mainland China in the same fashion. Taiwan is an wonderfully convenient strategic pawn. The United States may reward it or use it as bait. Can Taiwan continue to hide in the cracks between the United States and Mainland China? Voters during the coming election, and the new president next year will have to decide.

台灣要做一個參與者或挑釁者？

2015-09-21聯合報

中共日前在福建沿海軍演的訊息，再次挑動了台灣的敏感神經。北京的官式說法一如以往：「這只是一次例行性的演習」，但這次澄清稍微加碼，中共黨報「環球時報」找來一位軍事專家說，這個實彈演習「與一九九六年的台灣海峽飛彈危機，完全不能同日而語。」

由於台灣島內有許多十分挑剔的耳朵，北京的語言也跟著升級。它不再是大剌剌地吆喝，而是學會了玩弄「承認」與「否認」之間的曖昧。仔細聽這句否認之詞：它「與一九九六年的台灣海峽飛彈危機」不可同日而語；其實並沒有人問起一九九六年，一九九六年卻被不著痕跡地帶了進來。

一九九六年，江澤民對於已失去其信任的李登輝，直接以劃定飛彈彈著禁制區的方式，在台灣南北外海射出沒有炸藥的空心彈；其結果，反而幫李登輝凝聚了選票。兩千年大選，朱鎔基再次出聲恫嚇，又讓陳水扁得利。經過兩次笨拙的演出後，北京重新理解台灣的民眾心理，領略了群眾的盲動性，悟出「恫嚇只會適得其反」的道理。

這次歷史再度回潮，當第三位獨派路線的候選人又將可能贏得台灣的大選時，北京不能再在這個題目上陰溝裡翻船了。習近平在三月人大會議上，只是淺淺一句：「基礎不牢，地動山搖」，他聲調平淡，並不激昂、更非疾言厲色，卻反更讓人難以捉摸。

這並不表示北京已能容忍台獨主張的叫囂。事實上，當前台獨主張在台灣內部的聲勢正達到歷史的最高水位，太陽花示威催化反中浪潮，老邁的李登輝毫不遮掩地公開販賣日本祖國論。然而，北京已意識到，台灣已非一個可以獨自操控全局的自變數，而是一個附屬於美日的因變數。中共清楚，此刻以及往後的一段年月，正是中國的最後一哩路，而橫在這一哩路上的障礙，只有美、日。

一九九六年的飛彈危機，和二○○五年的《反分裂國家法》，可視為北京仍將軍事力量作為統一最終倚恃的證據；但當中國大陸在二○一○年超越日本成為全球第二大經濟體，並被預言終將超越美國成為最大經濟體時，中共的全球視野與兩岸思維顯已大舉翻轉。新的中央政治局似乎體認到：經濟才是最後的決勝武器；只要工業與科技重心從美國移到中國，世界知識、人才與市場都會發生典範轉移，西風改吹東風時，軍事將只是旁枝末節。

北京一些作為，可明顯看出這個認知演變的端倪。M五○三航路的劃設，台胞證的卡式化，目的都在泯除兩岸的心理邊界，前者意在推動台海非軍事化，後者則是兩岸去藩籬化。這些，皆符合北京全球戰略指針——「和平發展」；軍事當然不可能真被廢除，但它已從決定性的主桌上，換坐到次要的客席。在奪取世界第一的旗幟前，和平都將是目空一切的王道。

因此，近期看到的兩次演習，都只有暗示作用。七月在央視播映，但稍後才被觀察者網刻意提點的朱日和軍演，雖出現台北總統府的複製品，卻不脫常規性的訓練格局；此次在福建由海事局公告小範圍的演習禁航區，則僅有高度八千呎的火砲小規模演練。它們都只有一個用意：提醒台灣心存一絲忌憚，免得民心太過躁動，作出意外之舉，破壞了中國走向世界第一的最後一哩路。

橫亙於台灣面前的，因此出現兩個選項：一是作為最後一哩路的積極參與者，分享最後甜美的果實；另一則是作為美、日防堵中國的馬前卒，寧可自我粉碎亦在所不辭？

從美國大力支持安倍通過新的《安保法》，可以想見，在下一個歷史階段，中、美角力將日趨激烈。作為區域霸權與長期的全球單一霸主，美國曾藉著戰爭收伏了威廉德國與納粹德國，殲擊了昭和皇軍，並藉著冷戰瓦解了蘇聯；它對付中國，顯然亦復如此。台灣恰巧是一顆絕妙的戰略棋子，美國可能提供的獎賞也將更為誘人。但台灣能否繼續在美中之間左右逢源，或究竟該作何選擇，這次大選的選民與明年的新總統恐怕都要明辨而慎斷！

How Will Today's Tsai Ing-wen Deal With Yesterday's?

How Will Today's Tsai Ing-wen Deal With Yesterday's?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 21, 2015

Executive Summary: Taiwan's economy is sliding deeper and deeper into recession. DPP chairperson and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen is getting closer and closer to assuming power. Her pronouncements are moving closer and closer to the political center. But conflicts have arisen between her and past DPP economic policies. She needs to explain the differences between her past and present policies. Do they differ? If they do, why?

Full Text Below:

Taiwan's economy is sliding deeper and deeper into recession. DPP chairperson and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen is getting closer and closer to assuming power. Her pronouncements are moving closer and closer to the political center. But conflicts have arisen between her and past DPP economic policies. She needs to explain the differences between her past and present policies. Do they differ? If they do, why?

The most important trade meeting between Taipei and Washington is the Ninth Taiwan-US Trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA), to be held in October in Taipei. Minister of Economic Affairs Teng Chen-chung says "The issue of pork will not be discussed at this time". But as everyone knows, the United States' key interest in the TIFA meeting is US beef and pork imports to Taiwan. Three years ago, AIT Taipei Office Director William A. Stanton gave a speech before leaving office. He said the US beef controversy is a symbol of Taiwan's trade protectionism. If the government on Taiwan bans US beef imports, Taipei will have a hard time restarting TIFA talks with Washington. Taiwan can then forget about joining the TPP. So how do Tsai Ing-wen and DPP stand on this issue?

The US beef and pork import issue is considered a bipartisan battle. It is a typical case. The common people are not consulted. The economic consequences are ignored. When the DPP and Chen Shui-bian were in power, mad cow disease broke out in the US. The government on Taiwan banned the import of US beef. The US government then applied pressure. In 2007, during the sixth TIFA meeting, the US ended TIFA negotiations because Taiwan refused to allow US beef imports. The Chen Shui-bian government attempted to give in and allow imports, but the KMT vigorously opposed and Chen's effort failed.

Following ruling party change, the contestants switched positions. In 2012, in order to restart TIFA, the Ma government prepared to allow US beef containing ractopamine. The DPP expressed opposition, and blasted the Ma government for ignoring public health by allowing in "poisoned beef" from the US. It demanded a "zero tolerance"policy. DPP legislators forcibly occupied the legislature for five days and four nights. Their political theater is still fresh in our memory. In October, TIFA will reconvene. Tsai Ing-wen considers a DPP return to power a foregone conclusion. She has told foreigners "We are confident that next year we will be the ruling party". Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly pledged to join the TPP. Does Tsai seek to mend Taipei-Washington economic and trade relations? Does she seek to persuade the US to support Taiwan's bid for TPP membership? If she does, she and the DPP will need to repudiate their past position on US beef and pork imports. Isn't it time for Tsai Ing-wen to explain her position on US beef and pork imports?

Outside observers have long worried about Democratic Progressive Party rule. Will it impose a Closed Door Policy on foreign trade? Tsai Ing-wen has pledged that the economy will be more open once the DPP takes power. But recall DPP criticism of Ma government fiscal and economic policy, Where was DPP support for free trade? The STA was denounced as "cozying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan". The DPP opposed it to the bitter end. The MTA remains delayed even this day. The DPP leveled "eight criticisms" against the FEPZ test case. It engaged in obstructionism until the bill eventually died, stillborn. The DPP stubbornly insists that free trade will hurt the most vulnerable SMEs.

But pray tell how free trade harms vulnerable industries? Doesn't economic liberalization allow external stimuli and competition to stimulate domestic industrial upgrading? Doesn't it eliminate inappropriate and non-competitive industries and companies? Tsai Ing-wen must explain herself. She must explain how she intends to liberalize Taiwan's economy. She must tell us whether she supports the MTA and STA. If she persists in opposing the STA, does she also intend to oppose the Gold and Silver Conference now under way. After all, it too requires cross-Strait liberalization.

If Tsai's answer is "We must not look only to the Mainland", then she must tell the public and the business community how she intends to persuade the US, EU, and other heavyweight economies to sign FTAs, when she herself refuses to sign the MTA and STA with the Mainland. How can Taiwan's economy and exports ignore the world's second largest economy, yet not be affected?

Are we to understand that upon assuming power, Tsai Ing-wen will repudiate the Tsai Ing-wen of yesterday?

Tsai Ing-wen's election campaign four years ago, trumpeted "fairness and justice". It emphasizes fair distribution and social justice. People on Taiwan have long considered the lack of real estate taxes and capital gains taxes as a cause of social injustice and a reason for the widening wealth gap. Recently the capital gains tax has caught the attention of the Legislative Yuan and the public. The DPP and the KMT have overtly supported its passage while covertly sabotaging it. They have offered a Lin Chuan version of the tax. In fact, the Lin Chuan version is merely one of many versions of the capital gains tax. It is definitely not rooted in the principles of capital gains tax laws. Is this consistent with Tsai Ing-wen's calls for "fairness and justice"?

Focusing on fiscal policy is certainly an option. It is undeniably a professional approach. For the sake of Taiwan's economic development, will the Tsai of today repudiate the Tsai of Yesterday? We hope so. But recall how the opposition DPP deviated from professionalism yesterday. Recall how it incited populist opposition and forced Taiwan to lose years of valuable economic progress.

蔡英文 今日之我如何戰昨日之我

2015年09月21日中國時報

當台灣經濟逐步陷入困境之時，民進黨主席、總統參選人蔡英文也一步步邁向執政，她的政見與發言也愈來愈向中間靠攏。但檢視她與民進黨過去的各項經濟政策主張，卻出現種種矛盾衝突現象，她可能該更明確的告訴民眾，她過去與現在的主張，是否有什麼不同？為什麼會有改變？

台灣與美國之間最重要的經貿會議，第九屆台美貿易暨投資架構協定（TIFA）將於10月在台北召開，雖然經濟部長鄧振中說「豬肉問題這次不會談」，但眾所皆知的是美國在TIFA會議中，始終如一關切的「核心利益」，就是美牛、美豬的進口准入問題。3年前，美國在台協會台北辦事處處長司徒文在卸任前的一次演講中就曾明白表示，美牛爭議是台灣實施貿易保護的具體象徵；如果台灣政府禁止美牛進口，台灣就很難與美國重啟台美TIFA談判，更別說台灣未來要加入TPP。蔡英文與民進黨，到底對這個問題持什麼態度呢？

美牛豬進口問題，堪稱兩黨惡鬥、不問蒼生、不管經濟的「典範案例」。民進黨阿扁執政時期，因美國爆發狂牛症，台灣政府禁止美牛進口，後因美國政府壓力，在2007年第六屆TIFA會議後，美國就因台灣不開放美牛進口，停止TIFA召開。阿扁政府曾經要屈服開放，但因國民黨大力反對而未能成功。

政黨輪替後，遊戲翻過來玩，到了2012年，為了爭取TIFA恢復，馬政府準備開放美牛與瘦肉精，此時換民進黨大力反對，抨擊馬政府枉顧國民健康、開放美國「毒牛」進口、堅持「零驗出」標準，民進黨立委為此占據立法院議場主席台5天4夜的「壯舉」猶歷歷在目。在10月TIFA再次召開之際，已視明年執政為囊中之物、敢於向外賓說「我們確信明年會執政」的蔡英文，多次表示要加入TPP，如果她要做好台美經貿關係，讓美國支持台灣加入TPP，蔡英文與民進黨，大概不得不「與昨日之我作戰」、改支持美牛豬開放了吧？此時，蔡英文是否該明白交代其對美牛豬開放的政策態度？

外界一直擔心民進黨再執政後，對外經貿政策將更封閉，蔡英文則說執政後經濟會更開放。但我們回顧過去民進黨對馬政府財經政策的批判、反對，實在看不出民進黨有多少開放的DNA。兩岸服貿協議在「傾中賣台」的大帽子下，民進黨反對到底，連帶兩岸貨貿亦延誤至今；自由經濟示範區的「試點開放」，也被民進黨提出「八大批評」杯葛到底而胎死腹中；而且民進黨最強調開放不能傷害弱勢中小企業。

但讓人好奇的是哪一種開放不傷害到任何一個弱勢產業？經濟對外開放原本不就是要讓外來的刺激與競爭，激發國內產業升級、淘汰不合適與缺乏競爭力的產業與企業嗎？蔡英文或許應更明白的交代，讓國人了解，她的開放是如何個開放法？更該明白表示她是否支持兩岸貨貿與服貿？如果繼續反對服貿，現在正在進行的兩岸「金銀會」如涉及彼此的開放，是否也要反呢？

如果蔡英文的答案是「眼中不能只有大陸」，那麼也該告訴民眾與企業界，她捨與大陸簽訂的貨貿、服貿，就真有辦法與美、歐等重量級經濟體簽下FTA嗎？台灣經濟與出口要如何能繞過近在咫尺的全球第二大經濟體，而不受影響呢？

難道，蔡英文執政後，要再次「與昨日之我作戰」？

4年前蔡英文競選時，是以「公平正義」為主軸，強調分配的公平與社會正義；而台灣長期對股、房兩市未課資本利得稅，一直被認為是造成社會不公、惡化所得差距的原因。對近來成為立法院與社會焦點的證所稅議題，民進黨有意無意之間的「放水」，支持國民黨「明為修改，實為廢除」證所稅的作法，或是改以提出「林全版」的證所稅因應，但事實上林全版仍只是一個證交稅版本，其作法與涵意絕非稅法原理上的證所稅。這合乎蔡英文強調的「公平正義」嗎？

財經政策固然是一種選擇，但也有其專業；如果為了台灣經濟發展，蔡英文能不惜「與昨日之我作戰」，我們支持、也樂觀其成。但想想當初在野黨偏離專業、民粹式的反對，哎！只可惜又讓台灣浪費了幾年寶貴的時間。

Highlight Taiwan Retrocession: Defend Republic of China

Highlight Taiwan Retrocession: Defend Republic of China 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 18, 2015

Executive Summary: Does the KMT government care about the survival of the Republic of China? Does it value the historical facts about the Republic of China? Does it want to reaffirm the connections between the Republic of China and Taiwan, and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait? If it does, then the 70th anniversary of Taiwan retrocession must be treated as an festival of historic importance. It must be made a grand commemoration, with more substance, more discussion, and more activities highlighting the historic significance of Taiwan's retrocession. This will help preserve the Republic of China. This will differentiate between the real Republic of China and the Taiwan independence movement's "Frozen Republic of China" and "Hollowed Out Republic of China”.

Full Text Below:

The 2016 election, by accident or otherwise, now revolves around the Republic of China -- its definition, its history and its future. Was this an accident? During past national elections on Taiwan, the core issue was usually reunification vs. independence. The dispute was usually between Taiwan independence and opposition to Taiwan independence. It was usually between maintaining the status quo and changing to the status quo. Since the Sunflower Student Movement so-called "natural independence" rhetoric has become ubiquitous. A major battle between reunification and independence is imminent. Tsai Ing-wen is waging a campaign based on maintaining the status quo. While remaining deliberately ambiguous on Diaoyutai, history curriculum reform, comfort women, Japanese colonial rule, and the commemoration of the War of Resistance Against Japan. She has announced her intention to participate in the National Day celebration. As a result, the struggle between reunification and independence has become a struggle between conflicting definitions of the Republic of China and conflicting historical interpretations of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

Was this something other than an accident? Mainland China has risen. Taiwan independence consciousness has deepened. The peaceful development and cross-Strait opening that began in 2005, has now reached a turning point. The political status of the two sides and the Republic of China's survival and future, have become issues the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan cannot avoid. They must deal with the political status of the ROC and PRC. They must clear up questions about the Republic of China and its continued existence. They must resolve a number of lingering historical controversies. These include the meaning of the Xinhai Revolution, the definition of the KMT/CCP civil war, the facts of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the significance of Taiwan's retrocession to China. These issues are inescapable and cannot be avoided.

Under Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP has adopted a "maintain the status quo" path. It has announced that it will accept the constitutional framework of the Republic of China.  It will participate in this year's Republic of China National Day celebration. It has even posed as a defender of the ROC's leadership role during the war, and criticized Lien Chan for attending the victory parade in Beijing. It is deliberately creating a superficial blue-green consensus in order to undermine KMT solidarity and the KMT's historical narrative.

DDP mouthpieces are proclaiming that the DPP has always defended the Republic of China, even though the DPP flatly refuses to repeal the Taiwan independence party platform, and refuses to forsake Taiwan independence. This confirms that the DPP's real intent is to empty the name “Republic of China” of substance. It is to freeze the Republic of China. It is to achieve its end game of Taiwan independence, by hollowing out the Republic of China.

Members of the public and DPP insiders alike are demanding the abolition of the Taiwan independence party platform. The DPP's pro forma response has been to claim that the Taiwan independence party platform has essentially been frozen, and that the Taiwan independence party platform has been replaced by the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. But the Resolution on Taiwan's Future asserts that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country, its sovereignty is limited to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and other nearby islands". It asserts that "Taiwan is called the Republic of China in accordance with the current constitution, but does not belong to the People's Republic of China". The DPP's definition of the Republic of China is temporary, vague, and a total departure from the Republic of China envisioned in the "Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China", "prior to national reunification". Naturally it flatly contradicts Tsai Ing-wen's pledges to "maintain the status quo" and "abide by the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework".

The Resolution on Taiwan's Future is ostensibly a compromise revision of the DPP's Taiwan independence party platform. In fact it is an evasive maneuver by the Taiwan independence movement. Instead of repudiating the Republic of China outright, it asserts that the "Republic of China is Taiwan", and that "Taiwan is the Republic of China". The Resolution on Taiwan's Future is simply the Taiwan independence party platform Version 2.0. Meanwhile, the "Resolution on a Normal Nation" adopted in 2007, calls for the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution. Substantively speaking, it is even more radical than the Taiwan independence party platform. The DPP's "Resolution on a Normal Nation” is even more recent than the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Therefore it represents the DPP's current position. The DPP now postures as "defender of the Republic of China”.  In fact it is deceiving part of the electorate. This deception has been subject to strict scrutiny. The Republic of China government and the ruling Kuomintang must do something about this.

Recently, Lien Chan went to the Mainland to participate in the "70th anniversary Commemoration of the Chinese Peoples' War of Resistance Against Japan and Victory in the Global Anti-Fascist War". His visit provoked political controversy. Initially the dispute was over the historical interpretation of the war. But the Mainland has been changing its interpretation of history. It has been gradually rehabilitating the image and contribution of the National Revolutionary Army, especially in public television programs on the Mainland. Differences have been narrowed. Remaining differences should be controlled and resolved gradually, rather than widened deliberately.  In particular they should not undermine peaceful cross-strait relations.

Lien Chan's visit to the Mainland provoked controversy. It also prompted many people to rethink the ROC government's commemoration of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Why has any commemoration been seen in an increasingly negative light over the past few years? The eight-year long war that led to the recovery of Taiwan is closely related to the legitimacy of the Republic of China on Taiwan, and inseparable from its legality. Why so little interest in commemorating the historical facts? Why have the facts and significance of Taiwan retrocession been buried? Taiwan Retrocession Day is not even accorded the respect of a legal holiday. The so-called commemoration is an afterthought and fails utterly to highlight its historical importance and practical significance.

Does the KMT government care about the survival of the Republic of China? Does it value the historical facts about the Republic of China? Does it want to reaffirm the connections between the Republic of China and Taiwan, and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait? If it does, then the 70th anniversary of Taiwan retrocession must be treated as an festival of historic importance. It must be made a grand commemoration, with more substance, more discussion, and more activities highlighting the historic significance of Taiwan's retrocession. This will help preserve the Republic of China. This will differentiate between the real Republic of China and the Taiwan independence movement's "Frozen Republic of China" and "Hollowed Out Republic of China”.

彰顯台灣光復 才是捍衛中華民國

2015年09月18日 04:10中國時報

2016年這場選舉，意外、或許並不意外，成為圍繞中華民國的定義、歷史與未來之角力戰。說是「意外」，主要在於台灣過去的全國性選舉，核心議題往往是統獨，可能是台獨與反台獨、維持現狀與反親中賣台之爭。尤其太陽花學運後，「天然獨」、「自然獨」說法甚囂塵上，眼見統獨大戰即將再度演出，選戰開打蔡英文卻提出維持現狀論，並對釣魚台、歷史課綱、慰安婦、日本統治台灣時期的評價議題到抗戰紀念等議題，均保持模糊性的態度，又宣布有意參加國慶大典，統獨之戰驟然位移成了中華民國定義之戰、歷史詮釋之戰。

說「不意外」，主要在於隨著中國大陸的崛起，及台獨意識的進一步茁壯，自2005年以來開啟的兩岸和平發展道路，已經到了重大的轉折期，兩岸政治定位的課題、也就是中華民國未來生存發展方向的問題，已經是台灣朝野政黨所無法迴避的大哉問，要處理兩岸政治定位，兩岸都不得不面對「中華民國」的存在，要談清楚中華民國的現在，就不能不清理中華民國歷史遺留的種種難題，遠從辛亥革命的意義與功過、到國共內戰的評價與定位，再到抗戰史實與詮釋，以及台灣光復、回歸中國的事實與意義都是逃避不了、閃躲不了的問題。

民進黨在蔡英文帶領下走上「維持現狀論」道路，也宣布將接受中華民國憲政體制，參加今年的中華民國國慶慶典，更在抗戰史實的爭議中，突兀的扮演連戰的反對者，裝扮成中華民國抗戰史實的捍衛者，刻意塑造了所謂的藍綠共識，很可能其目標只是在裂解國民黨的團結，崩壞國民黨的歷史論述。

而在同一個時空裡，透過發言人之口宣稱一直捍衛中華民國的民進黨，完全拒絕廢除台獨黨綱，從來不願表明反對、放棄台獨主張，這凸顯民進黨的中華民國論述實質上是在掏空中華民國，是「中華民國凍結論」，是讓中華民國空洞化的主張與實踐。

面對社會以及黨內要求廢除台獨黨綱的聲浪，民進黨的回應始終是台獨黨綱已經在實質上被凍結，台獨黨綱已經被後來的台灣前途決議文所覆蓋，然而，台灣前途決議文關於兩岸政治定位的表述是「台灣是一主權獨立國家，其主權領域僅及於台澎金馬與其附屬島嶼」，「台灣，固然依目前憲法稱為中華民國，但與中華人民共和國互不隸屬」，其中中華民國的定位是暫時的、是模糊的，更是完全背離《中華民國憲法增修條文》關於「國家統一前」的前提與未來願景，自然也與蔡英文的「維持現狀論」、「遵循中華民國現行憲政體制論」相矛盾。

民進黨的台灣前途決議文表面上是台獨黨綱的現實修正版、妥協版，但實際上卻是台獨運動的轉進，由否定中華民國改為「中華民國就是台灣」、「台灣就是中華民國」的台獨2.0進化版。至於2007年通過的「正常國家決議文」，則是激進的追求正名制憲，在實質上是比台獨黨綱更激進的文件。依照民進黨人的「覆蓋說」，「正常國家決議文」比台灣前途決議文更為新近，應該才是民進黨當前的主張。民進黨現在擺出了「中華民國捍衛者」的姿態，確實能起著矇混部分選民的作用，這需經過嚴格的檢驗，有待中華民國政府、執政的國民黨拿出切切實實的辦法。

最近，因為連戰前往大陸參加「紀念中國人民抗日戰爭暨世界反法西斯戰爭勝利70周年大會」，引發政治爭議。兩岸本來對抗戰歷史的評價等問題就存在分歧，但這樣的分歧隨著大陸方面史觀的調整，已逐漸接近，尤其在大陸的大眾影視節目中，國民革命軍的歷史形象與評價逐步獲得平反，既存的分歧與爭議應要得到管控，逐步謀求解決，而非刻意擴大，尤其不應因此影響兩岸關係和平發展的進程和氛圍。

由於連戰大陸行的爭議延燒，也促使許多人重新反思，為何過去幾年時間內，中華民國政府在紀念抗戰上越來越消極，八年抗戰與台灣光復息息相關，與中華民國在台灣的正當性與合法性密不可分，為什麼不但抗戰史實與紀念乏人問津，台灣光復的史實與意義也隱而不彰，台灣光復節更是只紀念不放假，所謂的紀念也是聊備一格，無法彰顯其重要性與現實意義。

國民黨政府如果真正在乎中華民國生存與發展，如果真正重視中華民國的史實，如果真正願意豐富中華民國與台灣連結、兩岸連結的論述，在台灣光復70周年的歷史性節日時，必須更盛大的進行紀念，以更紮實的論述與更多元豐富的活動與慶典，來彰顯台灣光復的歷史性意義，這才是真正捍衛中華民國，更與台獨的「中華民國凍結論」、「中華民國空洞化」論述進行明確區隔。

Changes in Mainland Attitude Toward Taiwan

Changes in Mainland Attitude Toward Taiwan
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 17, 2015

Executive Summary: Following last year's March 18 Sunflower Student Movement, authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have made significant efforts to ensure continued bilateral relations. The results however, have been lackluster. The STA, MTA, cross-Strait representative offices, and Oversight Regulations for Cross-Strait Agreements all remain stillborn. Routine cross-Strait consultations seem ineffective. Taiwan has entered election season. Political campaigns are now in full swing. Few anticipate progress in cross-Strait relations. Everyone is waiting for the political picture to clear next May before commenting.

Full Text Below:

Following last year's March 18 Sunflower Student Movement, authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have made significant efforts to ensure continued bilateral relations. The results however, have been lackluster. The STA, MTA, cross-Strait representative offices, and Oversight Regulations for Cross-Strait Agreements all remain stillborn. Routine cross-Strait consultations seem ineffective. Taiwan has entered election season. Political campaigns are now in full swing. Few anticipate progress in cross-Strait relations. Everyone is waiting for the political picture to clear next May before commenting.

Recent developments may worsen cross-Strait relations. Some cross-Strait issues cannot be postponed until a new government takes over ext May. The Ma government and the DPP must each formulate a response.

One. A local police station in Guangdong Province, on the Mainland, recently sent an official document to a police station in Yancheng, Kaohsiung, on Taiwan. Two. Government agencies on the Mainland recently told travel agencies on Taiwan that they should not play audio and video recordings containing ideological, religious, or anti-communist content on tour buses transporting Mainland tourists. Three. The day before yesterday Beijing announced that it was updating Taiwan Compatriot Permits by issuing them as smart cards. These actions failed to accord with Taiwan requirements. Taiwan authorities were not consulted beforehand. Four. Negotiations on five cross-Strait meetings on gold and silver, and round five negotiations on Mainland tourist transit rights remain deadlocked. Beijing refuses to budge. It is no longer making concessions in order to demonstrate goodwill. These piecemeal developments have deeper political implications.

From a neutral or positive perspective, direct contact between agencies on the two sides bypasses red tape, saves time and energy, and allows more efficient operation. Smart cards are helpful for people from Taiwan who wish to tour, visit relatives and friends, or seek employment on the Mainland. But the political status of the two sides remains a sensitive issue. Both sides have their own political considerations. Therefore they must interact with each other in accordance with existing mechanisms or white gloves. They must communicate beforehand. The CCP has unilaterally sent official documents to local agencies on Taiwan. Does this mean that Beijing has decided it no longer cares about Taiwan's political status, or how it may react? Does this mean Beijing has decided to do things its own way, on its own timetable? Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties need to think hard about this.

Rumors are that the CCP recently held meetings addressing its attitude toward Taiwan. It conducted a comprehensive review of cross-Strait relations and potential changes in direction. It anticipates the possibility of political changes on Taiwan. Beijing probably realizes that the Mainland cannot change the outcome of Taiwan's elections. But it knows it must solemnly declare its position and attitude, both for the international community and for voters on Taiwan.

Last month ARATS Chairman Chen Deming said cross-Strait relations will continue to rely on the two cross-Strait committees. This implies private sector interaction. The daily lives of the general public will not be affected. This also implies that the CCP will selectively target groups, political parties, and individuals who promote separatism and sabotage cross-Strait relations. Beijing will make the impact tangible, hence understandable to the public on Taiwan understand. Next week, Xi and Obama will meet. The Mainland and the US may seek consensus. They may decide to implement joint Beijing-Washington management of Taiwan, to ensure that the DPP and the public on Taiwan understand the political realities.

Beijing understands that after eight years of peaceful development, Taiwan has undergone profound changes in social psychology. Taiwan independence ideology has faded. Even if the DPP wins the election next year, Tsai Ing-wen will not dare pursue de jure independence. But the DPP government will undoubtedly maximize de facto independence, because intensifying "Taiwanese consciousness" will enable the DPP to expand its power base and ensure its long-term rule.

Beijing will of course expect Tsai Ing-wen to uphold the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. It will use it to gauge Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP's stand on international and cross-Strait issues. If they cross the line, Beijing will reaction strongly, and hold the Tsai government responsible. The Democratic Progressive Party will find it difficult to avoid expressing support for certain green camp issues, such as whether to join the United Nations. Given the DPP's habitual behavior, Beijing will have no difficulty finding reasons to object.

Beijing has already concluded that the DPP will probably return to power. It is now making preparations. Concrete moves are likely in the near future. President Ma Ying-jeou, Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, and even the public on Taiwan, must be prepared. The Ma government must not do nothing and merely wait to step down. That is not the behavior of a responsible government. Ma's term of office may be running out. But President Ma is still the head of state. He must summon up the courage to make further achievements in cross-Strait relations.

During his term in office, President Ma was responsible for many cross-Strait and international achievements. These were enthusiastically affirmed by the public. He must not backpedal during the final months of his administration. If he does, he will undermine his achievements, tarnish his halo, and leave behind him a legacy of failure.

For DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, victory appears imminent. She must not be so arrogant as to imagine that the Mainland will simply accomodate Taiwan following the election. She must not assume that as long as the DPP refrains from pursuing de jure independence and upholds the "Republic of China", that stability in the Strait will be assured, and that the Mainland will be able to do nothing. That would be egocentric wishful thinking. Tsai must make changes as soon as possible on cross-Strait relations, in anticipation of all possibilities. The general public must see the truth. It must not be deceived by appearances. After all, the ballots are in their hands. If they make the wrong choice, they are the ones who will suffer the consequences.

山雨欲來 對台思維起變化

2015-9-17 中國時報

去年318太陽花運動後，雖然兩岸當局做出許多努力，希望維持雙邊關係持續發展的動能和熱度，但在具體事務上卻顯得乏善可陳。《服貿》、《貨貿》、兩岸互設辦事機構、《兩岸協議監督條例》沒有一項得到落實，兩岸各項定期協商機制顯得有氣無力。在台灣已經進入政治旺季，選戰打得如火如荼的當下，各界更不再對兩岸關係的進展抱持期望，似乎一切靜待明年5月政情明朗後再說。

不過，由近期若干事態的發展看來，兩岸關係的發展隱然之間似有惡化的可能，兩岸一些重大問題，可能拖不到明年5月新政府成立後再議，馬政府與民進黨恐須有因應腹案。

首先，大陸廣東省的公安派出所辦案，竟然直接發文高雄市鹽埕警察分局；其次，大陸相關單位直接通知我方旅行社，略謂不宜在大陸旅台遊客的遊覽車上播放、談論某些涉及意識形態、宗教活動及反共宣傳的影片；另外，北京前天公告全面換發卡式台胞證，並未按照台灣的要求，事前與我方照會協商；第四，近期有關兩岸金銀5會和陸客中轉第5延遠權的談判，北京全然堅守底線，不再刻意讓步示好。這些點點滴滴事件背後應有深層政治含意。

用持平或正面的角度來看，兩岸各單位間直接聯繫，可以避免繁文縟節，節省時間與精力，辦事更有效率，卡式台胞證對台灣民眾前往大陸觀光旅遊、探親訪友、定居工作都有幫助，但兩岸間彼此的定位問題相當敏感，雙方必須有若干政治考量，因此多半按照既有的機制或兩會白手套進行互動，事前也會通氣。中共如今直接和我方相關單位進行交涉、發出公文，這是否意味著北京已經決定，不管或不在乎台灣的立場與可能反應，決定按照自己的規畫和時程辦事。台灣朝野需慎思明辨。

據知，中共最近將召開涉台會議，全面檢討未來兩岸關係的發展方向及應興應革事項，預為因應台灣可能出現的政治變局。北京或許已經了解，雖然大陸無法改變台灣選舉的結果，但是立場和態度必須嚴正表達，既讓國際社會知道，也讓台灣選民理解。

海協會會長陳德銘月前有謂，未來兩岸一家親的政策將會延續下去，這就意味著兩岸民間互動，一般普羅大眾的生活不會受到影響，但言外之意是，中共將選擇性，針對性地對於某些破壞兩岸關係發展，主張分離主義的特定團體、政黨和個人做出一些事情，讓其有感，讓台灣民眾有所理解。下周習歐會，大陸可能設法尋求中美共識，建立中美共管台灣，讓民進黨及台灣民眾理解政治現實的共識。

北京深知，經過8年來的和平發展，已深刻改變台灣社會的心理結構，台獨思想已逐漸淡化，即使民進黨明年勝選，蔡英文不會、不敢、也不能追求法理台獨。但也預見，民進黨政府將會把事實台獨極大化，因為這既對深化、強化台灣主體意識有利，也可讓民進黨繼續擴大其群眾基礎，有利其長期執政。

當然，北京會以蔡英文自己有關遵守中華民國憲政體制的承諾，作為檢驗民進黨政府的行事標準，在國際、兩岸問題上衡量蔡英文的所作所為，若有違逆，就會做出強烈反應，並要求蔡英文政府自行負責。一些涉及綠營價值理念層次的問題，譬如是否加入聯合國等，民進黨執政後將難以迴避，以民進黨的行事風格來看，即使說北京未來蓄意要找藉口恐怕不是難事。

北京已做出判斷，民進黨執政勢所難免，準備開始布局因應，很可能近期內就會有具體行動。馬英九總統、蔡英文主席，甚至台灣民眾都應該有個態度和立場。馬政府不能啥事不做不管，只等安全下莊，這不是一個負責任的政府應為、當為，即使任期所剩不多，但馬總統還是應該拿出國家元首的魄力、氣度和高度，在兩岸關係上做出具體成績。

馬總統任內在兩岸與國際問題上最有建樹，也最受民眾肯定，切勿在最後幾個月發生兩岸關係急速倒退，所有成就毀於一旦的悲劇，失去最後的政績光環，馬總統只能留下失敗的歷史標記。

勝券在握的民進黨和蔡英文主席，不能心存傲慢，認為選後大陸對台思維就會跟著調整，只要不追求法理台獨，「中華民國」庇佑下就可以維持台海安定，就讓大陸莫可奈何，這可能是太過自我中心的一廂情願。蔡英文可能需要盡速針對兩岸關係各種可能的變化，預擬各項備案。至於一般民眾，千萬要看清事務的本質，不要被其表象所迷惑，畢竟選票在自己的手上，做錯了選擇，將來後悔莫及。