The DPP Must not Misjudge the Cross-Strait Situation

The DPP Must not Misjudge the Cross-Strait Situation
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 1st, 2015

Executive Summary: Cross-Strait relations have developed to the stage where they can no longer go back. Tsai must set aside unrealistic expectations about choosing sides. She must act to preserve the existing cross-Strait protocols, and improve cross-Strait relations. Voters must be vigilant about the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They must apply pressure on the presidential candidates, to prevent them from leading the country in the wrong direction.

Full Text Below:

The fallout from the Ma Xi Summit has now had time to settle. The post-summit election rhetoric can now be filtered out. The elimination of political and emotional factors, now makes an accurate assessment of the Ma Xi summit possible.

The Ma Xi summit raised cross-Strait relations to a new level. Following the Ma Xi summit, the Mainland will give greater recognition to Taiwan's de facto political authority, while simultaneously insisting more firmly that the two sides are part of one China. The Mainland is concerned about cross-Strait relations in the event the Democratic Progressive Party wins the election. The Ma Xi summit is a message about the future. The carrot will be bigger, but so will the stick. Alas, DPP spin control has the public on Taiwan convinced that “Ma Ying-jeou is weak, and the KMT is pandering to the Chinese Communists".

Tsai Ing-wen has criticized the Ma Xi summit for "boxing in Taiwan's future". By itself, this is not wrong. But the "box" will not vanish merely because the DPP refuses to recoginize its existence. Nor will it disappear merely because Tsai Ing-wen is elected. If a DPP regime cannot properly handle the relationship with the Chinese mainland, the "box" will only become smaller, not bigger.

Given these risks, we must be clear in our minds. Can Tsai Ing-wen's ambiguous "maintaining the status quo" cross-Strait policy actually maintain the status quo? Can a static cross-Strait policy cope with an unsettled internal and international environment? If the Mainland "box" becomes smaller, how will the DPP respond? Will cross-Strait relations regress to the Chen Shui-bian era?

Tsai Ing-wen's political intuition is quite good. Following the Ma Xi summit, she told reporters she “would not rule out a Tsai Xi summit". Her reasoning is obvious. Opinion polls and public commentary show that most people approved of the meeting between the leaders. Some however, do not trust Ma Ying-jeou. That lowered support for the Ma Xi summit somewhat. This undoubtedly offers Tsai a golden opportunity. It enables her to take part in a future Tsai Xi summit with even greater public support, and less likelihood of reproach. If a Tsai Xi summit materializes, and resolves political and economic difficulties on Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen could become the highest rated president since Chiang Ching-kuo.

But a Tsai Xi summit will not be the result of internal factors on Taiwan. For Tsai Ing-wen the prospect of a summit remains remote. Mainland China's rapid rise has made it increasingly confident about the Taiwan issue.  Xi Jinping has taken a number of measures to advance cross-Strait relations since taking office. Such initiatives do not imply compromise. Rather they reflect concern that cross-Strait relations have stalled, and a desire to settle the Taiwan issue once and for all.

To some extent, the Mainland has already begun the process of peaceful reunification. Taiwan has avoided political negotiations. But cross-Strait political relations have already taken a giant leap forward. This is the cross-Strait status quo that Tsai Ing-wen must confront once Ma Ying-jeou steps down.

The Ma Xi summit will undoubtedly become the basis for Tsai Ing-wen era cross-Strait relations. Will Tsai be able to use the summit protocols for the two sides' leaders? Will she be able to hold cross-Strait talks as usual? If she can, then her cross-Strait policy will be considered successful. If cross-Strait exchanges are officially suspended because Tsai took power, any Tsai Xi summit will be stillborn. Public officials and private citizens on both sides will conclude that she lacks the inability to deal with cross-Strait relations.

Cross-Strait interaction has made huge strides forward. If official cross-Strait exchanges suffer a setback, the impact on Taiwan will be unbearable. Tsai Ing-wen's regime will probably end early or be crippled.

In fact, cross-Strait relations have already expanded beyond Taipei and Beijing. They now involve Asian-Pacific geopolitics. The Mainland is clearly in competition with the United States in the Asian-Pacific region. The United States has made a pivot back to Asia. It has intervened in the South China Seas in search of support from Southeast Asian countries. The Mainland, meanwhile, is promoting its One Belt, One Road, consolidating cooperative relations with Southeast Asian countries, and challenging the US led international financial and monetary order.

The Southeast Asian countries face fierce competition between Mainland China and the US. They have no desire to offend anyone. They must adopt a balanced strategy to avoid lost opportunities because they chose one side instead of the other. In fact, Taiwan faces the same dilemma. It too must seek a balance between the two. Tsai Ing-wen will bet on the United States. She will even allow herself to be used as a stalking horse against the Mainland. That will undermine the core interests of the Mainland. The impact will not be limited to cross-Strait relations. It will directly impact Taiwan's interests. Take the three major Asian allies of the US. Japan and the Philippines have sided with the United States. Relations with the Mainland, as a consequence, are frozen. South Korea chose cooperation with the Mainland. Bilateral economic and trade relations are warmer than ever. Is Taiwan prepared to suffer the consequences of the former course? Is it ready to endure the pain? The answer, clearly, is no.

Cross-Strait relations have developed to the stage where they can no longer go back. Tsai must set aside unrealistic expectations about choosing sides. She must act to preserve the existing cross-Strait protocols, and improve cross-Strait relations. Voters must be vigilant about the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They must apply pressure on the presidential candidates, to prevent them from leading the country in the wrong direction.

社論－民進黨錯估形勢 兩岸必現陣痛    

2015年12月01日 04:10 主筆室

馬習會經過一段時間沉澱，兩黨為選舉需要釋放干擾性訊息的效應應該可以過濾了。去除政治鬥爭與情感的因素，現在應該是對馬習會歷史定位做出準確評估的適當時機。

馬習會已將兩岸關係推向一個新境界，後馬習會的兩岸關係架構將是「大陸更認可台灣的事實政權，更堅持兩岸中國大原則」。這是因為大陸對民進黨勝選後的兩岸關係產生疑慮，藉由馬習會展現未來「軟的更軟、硬的更硬」策略。但馬習會在民進黨操控下，台灣社會的普遍認知卻是「馬英九軟弱、國民黨親共」。

蔡英文批評馬習會「框限台灣未來」，這句話本身並沒有錯，但這種「框限」不因民進黨否認而不存在，也不會因蔡英文當選而消失，民進黨執政如未能妥慎處理好與中國大陸的關係，「框限」只會更緊實而不會放鬆。

面對可能的風險，我們當然應該弄清楚，蔡英文模糊的「維持現狀」兩岸政策，究竟能否維持現狀？靜態的兩岸政策，能在變動不居的內部與國際環境下做出最正確對策嗎？如果大陸「框限」得更緊實，民進黨將如何回應？兩岸關係會不會回到陳水扁時代？

蔡英文的政治直覺其實很準確，馬習會後在回應媒體詢問時曾表白「不排除蔡習會」。理由很簡單，馬習會的所有民調和社會輿論氛圍都顯示，大部分民眾支持兩岸領導人會面，只是部分人對馬英九太不信任，所以馬習會的支持度比兩岸領導人會面支持度稍低。這對蔡英文來說無疑提供了一個有利的契機，讓她可以在未來以更大的民意基礎籌備「蔡習會」，而不至於像馬這樣動輒得咎。如果「蔡習會」果真實現，並解除了台灣政治與經濟困境，蔡英文有機會成為台灣自蔣經國後歷史地位最高的總統。

不過，「蔡習會」能否成局，絕非台灣內部因素決定，甚至可以說，客觀現實距離蔡英文的期望非常遙遠。快速崛起的大陸在處理台灣問題時愈來愈自信，習近平上任以來採取眾多主動措施推動兩岸關係向前發展，這種主動當然不是妥協讓步的意思，而是對兩岸關係可能停滯不前的憂慮，以及最終解決台灣問題的迫切需要。

某種程度上說，大陸已經在準備將兩岸和平發展時期推進到兩岸和平統一時期的過渡階段。儘管台灣方面迴避政治談判，但兩岸政治關係已經大步前進，這正是馬英九卸任以後蔡英文所要面對的兩岸關係現狀。

馬習會無疑是為蔡英文時代的兩岸關係提供了判定基準，如果蔡能延續兩岸領導人會面機制，並確保兩岸事務性談判照常舉行，那這就意味著蔡的兩岸政策是成功的，如果蔡上台兩岸官方往來中止，蔡習會破局，則注定會被兩岸輿論定調為沒有能力處理兩岸關係。

在兩岸互動融合大步推進的背景之下，如果兩岸官方交流出現倒退，這恐怕將是台灣社會不可承受之挫折，而蔡英文的執政之路恐怕也將提前結束，或進入漫長的跛腳狀態。

不僅如此，兩岸關係的好壞其實已經超出兩岸的範疇，而變成亞太地緣政治的一環，大陸跟美國在亞太地區的競逐態勢明顯，一方面是美國採取實質行動重返亞洲，並通過強力介入南海議題來爭取東南亞諸國的投靠，另一方面則是大陸大力推進一帶一路建設，鞏固與東南亞國家的合作關係，並在金融、貨幣領域挑戰美國建構的國際秩序。

東南亞各國面對中美兩大國的激烈競爭，顯然誰都不想得罪，紛紛採取平衡策略，避免因為選邊站而失去另一方的合作機會。台灣其實也面臨同樣的抉擇，必須在中美兩國之間尋求平衡。但蔡英文將賭注押在美國身上，甚至讓自己成為牽制中國大陸的前鋒，那麼無疑等於侵犯了大陸的核心利益，其影響恐怕就不只是衝擊兩岸關係，甚至會直接損害台灣的實質利益。看看美國在亞洲的三大盟友即可知道，日本、菲律賓選擇站在美國一邊，與大陸關係跌入冰點；南韓傾向跟大陸合作，兩國經貿領域的互動日趨熱絡。對台灣來說，是否已經做好準備選擇前者，並準備好經歷一段陣痛期？答案顯然是否定的。

兩岸關係發展到現階段，已經無法容許倒退，蔡英文必須拋開選邊站這種不切實際的幻想，採取實質行動維繫兩岸既有的互動機制，進而延續兩岸關係的發展趨勢。選民應該對民進黨的兩岸政策心存警戒，並對錯誤的國家方向施壓。(中國時報）

 

If Law Making and Law Enforcement Do Not Change, Neither Will the Next Ruling

If Law Making and Law Enforcement Do Not Change, Neither Will the Next Ruling
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 30, 2015

Executive Summary: All six defendants in the first instance Ting Hsin rancid cooking oil trial have been found not guilty. The public is in an uproar. All three presidential candidates have vigorously condemned the verdict, and backed the prosecution fully. The problem is that law making and law enforcement are behind the times. Criminal investigators are lax when gathering evidence. Judges apply the law mechanically. A public that seeks justice under such a system is certain to be disappointed.

Full Text Below:

All six defendants in the first instance Ting Hsin rancid cooking oil trial have been found not guilty. The public is in an uproar. All three presidential candidates have vigorously condemned the verdict, and backed the prosecution fully. The problem is that law making and law enforcement are behind the times. Criminal investigators are lax when gathering evidence. Judges apply the law mechanically. A public that seeks justice under such a system is certain to be disappointed.

A sound rule of law system requires up to date legislation, well-trained law enforcement personnel, as well as righteous judges with integrity. All three are indispensable. On Taiwan, all three are lacking. Political factors prevent getting to the root of the problem. Barriers have been erected over time that frustrate the rule of law. The verdict in the Ting Hsin case was a let down. Blaming "dinosaur judges" however, misses the point. The verdict was an inevitable consequence of the existing legal system.

The not guilty Ting Hsin verdicts can be chalked up to several factors. One. The Ting Hsin case provoked public outrage. Rancid oil imported from Vietnam was used as raw material. This came as a shock. Yet the "Food Safety and Health Management Law" addresses only the finished product, not the raw materials themselves. The law provided a loophole. Ting Hsin argued that after "refining". the impurities were removed, and that the final product met national standards. In other words, the raw material may make one gag, but it cannot be proven to be harmful to humans. Food safety crises erupt repeatedly. The "food safety law" clearly requires revision.

Two. The Changhua District Prosecutors Office investigated the Ting Hsin rancid imported Vietnamese oil case for only 13 days before it decided to prosecute. Superficially this conveyed an impression of speed and efficiency. In fact, it acted too hastily. Its negligence proved fatal, and resulted in a failed prosecution. The prosecutor in the Ting Hsin case used the "rapid screening method" instead of the standard, officially recognized "column chromatography" method. This led to testing errors. The prosecutors' Vietnam investigation was inadequate. On scene collection of evidence led prosecutors to accuse Ting Hsin of using oil from diseased pigs. Defense attorneys refuted this accusation. Prosecutors collected corroborative evidence in Vietnam six months after they issued their indictment. Yet their investigation record still contained mistakes. Were prosecutors overzealous? Were they inadequately prepared? Either way, they left the accused loopholes by which to escape.

Three. The public was disgusted with Ting Hsin. Yet judges were still willing to stick their necks out and find Ting Hsin not guilty, in spite of extreme discontent among the public. Judges refuses to dance to the tune of mob sentiment. That at least suggests an independent judiciary. Unless of course someone can prove that the presiding judge accepted bribes or was swayed by lobbyists. The public may be deeply dissatisfied. But the most it can say is that the judge was a legal hack. This is precisely the bottleneck that the rule of law on Taiwan has encountered in recent years when it comes to food safety. Populist sentiment notwithstanding, the high walls erected by professional technocrats and legalists, food safety has often gone down in defeat. To solve the problem, one must return to the source, to legislation, to more professional technological and legal gatekeepers, to overcome these gangsters in the food industry.

The Ting Hsin defendants have been found not guilty in the rancid oil case. This is certainly upsetting. But think back to wave upon wave of food safety crises. The culprits were caught, but eventually let off with a slap on the wrist. Ting Hsin is hardly an isolated case. The Flavor Full and Chang Chi cases both caused an uproar. The former company adulterated sesame oil with cottonseed oil. Health authorities fined the company 4.6 billion NT. The latter company passed off cottonseed oil as grapeseed oil. It was fined 18.5 billion NT. But the Ministry of Health and Welfare withdrew the charges and reduced the penalties, for a variety of reasons. The public did not appear too concerned. The Yongchang Company used industrial grade plaster to make tofu. It was recently acquitted. Consumers reacted with indifference. Why is the public indignant about Ting Hsin? Is it only because it makes for a larger target? If so, don't we have a problem with selective perception?

Is the presiding judge in the Ting Hsin case a courageous jurist, or merely a legal hack? We cannot be sure. But it is certain that the normalization of justice on Taiwan cannot rely on public anger, prosecutorial passion, or judges armed with law books. It requires a legal system that has kept up with the times, meticulous law enforcement, and judges with both idealism and wisdom.

The biggest problem now is legislative. Most legislators lack professionalism and vision. Even worse, they lack awareness concerning the role of legislation. Many legislators merely seek time in the spotlight. They seek merely to show off their gift for gab. None seek to address serious issues. Given their mindset, how we can craft appropriate legislation to stop clever profiteers from finding ways around the law? Legislative elections are looming. The public would do well to consider the ins and outs of this problem.

聯合／立法和執法品質不改，下次判決依舊如此

2015-11-30 01:18 聯合報 聯合報社論

      

頂新劣油案一審判決六名被告均無罪，各界譁然，三組總統候選人不約而同強烈譴責，力挺檢方上訴到底。問題是，回頭審視我國立法和執法的品質，法律規範跟不上時代需求，執法者偵查蒐證丟三落四，法官則只能死抱法條；在這樣的體制下，光靠民怨滔天要得到司法正義，注定要失望。

健全的法治，要靠與時俱進的立法、訓練有素的執法人員、以及正直不阿的司法官共同持守，三者缺一不可。在台灣，這些制度性環節環環皆有缺損，但由於種種政治因素作祟，這些問題始終無法逐一獲得正本清源的解決。日積月累，便形成層層牽制、互相拉扯的作用，阻滯社會法治的建立。這次，頂新案的判決結果令人失望，若完全歸咎法官判決太過「恐龍」，恐怕失之簡化；事實上，這是整個法律體制不良的必然結果。

綜合而論，頂新劣油獲判無罪，可歸納為幾項因素：第一，頂新案引起社會群情激憤，主要是摻用了越南進口之餿水油為原料，令人髮指；但是，我國《食品安全衛生管理法》對食品的規範，卻只問成品是否合於標準，而不問原料來源如何。這個法條，變成了頂新脫罪的巧門。頂新辯稱，油品經過「精煉」，所有不合格的雜質均遭去除，最後的成品合於國家標準。換言之，原料雖然噁心，卻無法證明其危害人體。經過一而再、再而三的食安風暴，這部漏洞重重的《食安法》，顯然有大修之必要。

第二，彰化地檢署當初偵辦頂新越南餿油案，僅花短短十三天偵蒐即將頂新起訴；表面上看似效率神速，卻也為了求快，而留下致命疏失，成為敗訴的關鍵。其間的疏誤，例如檢察官檢驗頂新油品採取「快篩法」，而非官方認定標準的「管柱層析法」，致檢驗出現誤差；又如，檢方赴越南的調查缺乏充分的第一現場採證，使其指控頂新油料來源摻有病豬之指控，遭被告律師駁倒。此外，包括起訴半年後再赴越南補強證據，乃至誤繕偵查筆錄等等，都說明檢察官不論是求功心切或準備欠周，都留下了程序疏失，讓被告有機可乘。

第三，在社會民意對頂新反感如此強烈的情況下，法官仍然甘冒大不韙判決頂新無罪，儘管極令外界不滿，但法官不跟隨民意的魔棒起舞，至少顯示了司法的獨立性。除非有人能證明本案法官收受不當賄賂或接受關說，否則，再如何不滿，充其量也只能指摘這是「法匠主義」的判決。然而，這也正是近年台灣法制在食安問題上屢屢碰到的瓶頸：儘管民粹主義聲勢高張，但面對科技主義和法條主義的專業高牆，最後仍往往敗下陣來。要解決此一問題，正本溯源，還是要回到立法上去尋求答案，用更高的科技及法律專業把關來戰勝這些食品界的宵小敗類。

頂新劣油的無罪判決固然令人扼腕，但回顧幾波食安風暴中揪出的大小禍首，最後遭輕輕縱放的，何止頂新一家。包括先前沸沸揚揚的富味鄉及大統長基案，前者被查獲在廿多款香油中摻入棉籽油而遭衛生部門重罰四．六億元，後者則以棉籽油混摻為葡萄籽油遭罰十八．五億，但事後均遭衛福部訴願會以不同理由撤銷裁罰，民眾對此似乎沒有太多關注。包括被控販售「工業石膏」供人製作豆花的永昌公司，近日獲判無罪，消費者也不了了之。那麼，人們獨對頂新案義憤填膺，如果只是因為其目標更大，會不會有選擇性認知的問題？

負責頂新案的法官，究竟是勇敢司法人，抑或是顢頇法匠，我們難以斷言。但可以確定的是，台灣司法要成為讓人足以尋求正義的管道，絕對不能只靠民眾的激憤，或是檢察官的一腔熱血，甚至是法官的滿腹法條；而是必須有跟得上時代變化的法律制度，有一絲不苟鍥而不捨的執法者，更要有理想與智慧兼具的司法官。

目前問題最大的，就在立法這端。我們的立法委員多半缺乏專業、缺乏瞻矚，更缺乏對立法職能的認知，許多立委多數時候只想出個鋒頭、逞個口舌之快，沒有人想認真解決問題。在這種心態下，我們如何能修出適當的法令，來管理那些巧費心思鑽法律漏洞的奸商？正逢立委選舉，民眾不妨好好思考這個問題的本末。

Why is the DPP so Ambivalent about the MTA?

Why is the DPP so Ambivalent about the MTA?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 27, 2015

Executive Summary: The just concluded negotiations on the "Cross-Strait Merchandise Trade Agreement” (MTA) failed to result in an agreement. If we want an agreement by the end of the year, the 13th round of negotiations must be convened with one month. After next year's general election, the cross-Strait political situation will be unpredictable. We hope the two sides realize that the window of opportunity is closing. If if MTA negotiations cannot be completed this year, we may be forced to return to square one.

Full Text Below:

The just concluded negotiations on the "Cross-Strait Merchandise Trade Agreement” (MTA) failed to result in an agreement. If we want an agreement by the end of the year, the 13th round of negotiations must be convened with one month. After next year's general election, the cross-Strait political situation will be unpredictable. We hope the two sides realize that the window of opportunity is closing. If if MTA negotiations cannot be completed this year, we may be forced to return to square one.

MTA negotiations are unique in two respects. One. Rapid progress. According to official press releases, agreement has already been reached on most cross-Strait trade liberalization issues. Only a few difficult issues still need to be resolved. According to negotiators, the "landing zone" is already in sight. Two. Protests continue, but the MTA has yet to become an election issue. What's even more interesting, DPP representatives act as if accelerated MTA negotiations are none of their concern. Their optimistic yet ambivalent attitude has provoked dissatisfaction among civic groups.

The public on Taiwan holds different views on the meaning and impact of the MTA. The PRC-ROK FTA is about to take effect. Talks on the PRC-Japan-ROK FTA are progressing rapidly. The threat to Taiwan industry is increasing. They are less and less competitive. The MTA is not a panacea. But it at least gives domestic industry a fighting chance. The evidence is incontrovertible. Even the DPP, which has long viewed cross-Strait economic dependence with suspicion, now says it “looks forward to its completion”.

Opponents insist that the MTA will increase Taiwan's dependence on the Mainland, and that allowing in Mainland merchandise will sacrifice the interests of local farmers and vulnerable industries. Economically speaking, these allegations are rooted in prejudice. If we do not sign the MTA, does that mean Taiwan industries will no longer be doing business with Mainland China? If we do not sign the MTA, these same industries may be forced to leave Taiwan, to invest and set up factories on the Mainland in order to compete against Japan and South Korea. Merchandise manufactured on the Mainland will not be subject to Japanese and South Korean tariffs. Would this not make Taiwan even more dependent on the Mainland? Would this not hollow out Taiwan even more?

The MTA would allow in more than a thousand items of merchandise to Taiwan. Opponents have grossly distorted the pros and cons. In fact, so-called "opening" means that Mainland merchandise must comply with other WTO member nations' import restrictions. In other words, the ROC has already been importing such items from other nations or regions for at least a decade. Only the Mainland was excluded. Moreover, tariffs on imports from the Mainland will not be reduced one iota.

Recently red bean paste has been cited as an example. Mainland China's tariffs, according to WTO requirements, may amount to 22 dollars per kilogram. But a "special defense mechanism" also applies. That is, once a nation's imports reach a predetermined threshold, one may raise tariffs or even ban imports. If MTA opening accords with WTO conditions, opening to Mainland merchandise does not mean they will enter unhindered. Besides, Mainland products may be cheap, but their quality cannot compare with local Taiwan products.

If we unburden ourselves of fear or bigotry, we see that swiftly signing the MTA is actually to our benefit. Both the blue camp and green camp want an agreement. The only question remaining is when? An agreement this year is much better than one next year.

The general election in January is fast approaching. If the caretaker government conducts negotiations after the election, it will provoke controversy. Therefore everything will be dragged out to May 20th, when the new government takes office. A change in ruling parties next year appears likely. But DPP cross-Strait policy remains elusive in name and vague in concept. How will Beijing react? No one knows. How will post-election politics on Taiwan affect cross-Strait relations? Even the greatest oracle will have trouble predicting. This will of course affect the progress of the MTA. The two sides are currently willing to sign. The political goodwill generated by the Ma Xi summit lingers. The two sides should complete bilateral negotiations in one fell swoop. This will benefit both Taiwan and the Mainland. A project left half-finished will be difficult to complete,  and can only lead to regret.

The issues that haunt the MTA are few in number, but great in difficulty. For example, we resolutely refuse to allow in 707 agricultural products. The Mainland, on the other hand, argues that everything should be covered by normal liberalization. The two sides appear deadlocked on the meaning of "Made in Taiwan", as applied to machine tools or automobiles. Viewed from the perspective of industrial interests and influence, both sides have reasons for their positions. But the MTA will greatly benefit both sides. Over the past six years, ECFA has been subject to countless twists and turns. As long as leaders on the two sides can change their minds, disputes such as these need not obstruct overall progress.

民進黨對貨貿談判為何如此曖昧

2015-11-27 聯合報

剛結束的《兩岸貨貿協議》協商未能收尾完成，若要在年底談完，只剩下個月第十三回合談判這個機會。明年大選過後，兩岸政治情勢非常可能出現許多新變數。我們希望兩岸都必須有機會之窗稍縱即逝的體認，瞭解若今年無法完成貨貿協商，很可能就要歸零重來的挑戰，盡力促成。

這次貨貿協商有兩大特色。第一，是談判進展迅速。根據相關官員對外說明的資料看，兩岸對於絕大部分的自由化議題都已經取得共識，只剩些許難度很高的問題有待解決。套句談判術語，就是「著陸區」（landing zone）已經在眼前了。第二，儘管抗議聲依舊不斷，但貨貿並未成為這次選舉的熱議話題。更耐人尋味的是，民進黨對貨貿加速協商表面一副事不關己、卻又帶幾分樂觀其成的曖昧態度，也引起民間團體的不滿。

對於《貨貿協議》的意義與衝擊，國內各界仍有許多不同看法。隨著《中韓ＦＴＡ》（自貿協定）即將生效，《中日韓ＦＴＡ》進度又不斷加速，我國業者受到的威脅感越來越強烈，產業競爭空間也被壓得越來越小。《貨貿協議》當然不是萬靈丹，但至少能給國內業者多一點對抗和抵擋的武器；這項功能證據鑿鑿，很難否認或抹殺。也因此，連一向對兩岸經濟依賴問題抱持高度戒心的民進黨，都很難不「樂觀其成」。

反對者堅稱，兩岸貨貿協議將導致台灣加深對中國大陸的依賴，並將因為開放陸貨而犧牲農民及弱勢產業的權益。從經濟面來看，這些說法，都可能失之偏頗。請問：難道不簽貨貿協議，業者就從此不再跟中國做生意？反過來說，如果沒有兩岸貨貿協議，業者可能將被迫選擇離開台灣轉赴大陸投資設廠，藉此對抗日、韓的競爭（因為在當地生產無須付關稅）。如此一來，豈不是更加深依賴，而台灣更空洞化？

進一步看，在貨貿協議下擴大開放千餘項大陸貨品，其利弊是非，也受到反對者過度扭曲。事實上，所謂「開放」，是指讓大陸貨品得以「比照其他ＷＴＯ成員國」的條件進口至台灣。換句話說，這些貨品，我國早已對全球其他國家開放至少十餘年，只是當年排除了大陸；何況，陸貨進口時該向我繳交的關稅，一毛也沒減少。

以最近常被提到的紅豆餡為例，我國在ＷＴＯ的關稅稅率高達每公斤廿二元，而且還保留實施「特別防衛機制」的權利。亦即，一旦進口量達到我國預設的門檻時，就可以直接提高關稅，甚至禁止進口。假設《貨貿協議》是按照ＷＴＯ的條件開放，則開放陸貨並不代表它可以如入無人之境般長驅直入。更何況，大陸製品就算價格便宜，但其品質根本無法與台灣本地製品相比。

如果不抱著畏懼或歧視心理，加速洽簽《貨貿協議》的算盤，看來對我方更有利。加上藍綠兩黨都支持完成談判，下一個問題便是：要在何時完成最好？我們認為，今年完成談判，其價值明顯大於明年。

主要是，明年一月中即將大選，選後看守期的政府若還繼續談判，勢必會招致諸多爭議；因此，一切就要被拖到五二○新政府上任再說。尤其，目前看來明年政黨輪替的機率極高，但民進黨的兩岸政策，目前卻只有縹緲的標題和模糊的概念；而且北京到時會如何反應，仍是高深莫測。因此，台灣選後新局對兩岸關係的影響，可能最厲害的「國師」都很難算出，這必將影響貨貿協議的進度。趁著現在兩岸都有意願，「馬習會」後雙方的政治善意猶在，雙邊一鼓作氣完成協商，才是對台灣和兩岸的未來最有利的作法。如果留下一個半成品，或者殘壘，最後無以為繼，將徒呼負負。

貨貿協議剩下的議題，看來數目不多，但難度很高。例如，對於七○七農產品，我方堅持不開放，而大陸則主張應該納入正常化範圍。又如，在涉及何謂「台灣製造」的工具機或汽車的原產地規則上，雙方似乎也仍僵持不下。若只看產業利益及影響，兩岸都有其堅持的理由；但若由完成貨貿協議對台灣及對兩岸的意義，以及為這六年來波折不斷的ＥＣＦＡ譜下最終曲的高度來看，只要兩岸領導人一個轉念，這些爭執都不該是阻礙大局的因素。

Tsai Ing-wen will Affirm Historical Significance of Ma Xi Summit

Tsai Ing-wen will Affirm Historical Significance of Ma Xi Summit
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 26, 2015 

Executive Summary:  Tsai Ing-wen will affirm the historical significance of the Ma Xi summit. If Tsai takes her cue from the Ma Xi summit, if she upholds the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations, she will affirm the historical significance of the summit. Conversely, if she refuses to accept the summit framework, the "vessel of peace” will founder. The consequences will also affirm the importance of the Ma Xi summit.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen argues that the Ma Xi summit “boxed in” the public on Taiwan and limited their options for the future. Since Tsai Ing-wen is likely to become the next president of the Republic of China, she should reconsider the wisdom of her words.

Under democracy no power should limit the right of the people to choose their future. The Ma Xi summit is not likely to either. The Ma Xi summit erected a pulpit on which leaders from the two sides could state their case. It may limit the cross-Strait policy options of the next president of the Republic of China. But it did not limit the ability of people on Taiwan to choose their future. Rather, it limited the cross-Strait policy options of Tsai Ing-wen, who may become the next president of the Republic of China.  

Tsai Ing-wen attempted to shift attention away from her personal agenda to the "people's right to choose". For a presidential candidate, this amounted to mental evasion and  escape from responsibility. First of all, what is current "public opinion", other than a distorted view of history resulting from political indoctrination? Is it really a "natural phenomenon"? Next, does current “public opinion” actually oppose the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations? And lastly, just suppose opposition to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations represents current public opinion. Does that mean Tsai Ing-wen intends to adopt that as her national policy in the event she becomes president of the Republic of China? 

This shows that if the public is free to choose, its options are unlimited. If the public is subjected to political manipulation on the other hand, it may be temporarily deceived by political circumstances. But those in power cannot rule the nation through deception or manipulating the "public right to choose". They must consider global integration, cross-Strait relations, and national power. All of these factors constrain national policy.

Tsai Ing-wen has yet to tell us what she thinks the people's choices are. Does opposition to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations really represent the people's choice? If Tsai Ing-wen becomes president of the Republic of China, will she implement this "people's choice"? Tsai Ing-wen cannot create an illusory "people's choice". Even less can she create a "president's choice".  

Tsai is likely to win the election. The Ma Xi summit may limit Tsai Ing-wen's choices, but it will also lead her in the right direction. As Xi Jinping put it, the 1992 consensus is the compass. Without it, the vessel of cross-Strait peace will founder. As Ma Ying-jeou put it, the Ma Xi summit builds a cross-Strait bridge. The 1992 consensus supplies the rules of the road. Put simply, Taiwan independence is not an option. One China, different interpretations however, is. 

Tsai Ing-wen knows that given global conditions, Taiwan independence is impossible. She hardly needs the Ma Xi summit to “limit her choices”. Besides, the ROC Constitution limits the president of the Republic of China. It denies her the choice of Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen must look not only at how the Ma Xi summit “limits her choices”. She must also look at how the summit leads to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. We cannot say that the Ma Xi summit established a one China, different interpretations framework. But the Ma Xi summit protocols promoted the one China, different interpretations framework. The two men referred to each other as leaders. The summit was held in a third location. Each side paid its own way. For the first time leaders from the two sides agreed that the definition of one China was in dispute. 

The Ma Xi summit slammed the door shut on Taiwan independence. But it half-opened the door for one China, different interpretations. The Ma government has struggled on behalf of "One China, different interpretations" for over seven years. During the Ma Xi summit, the Mainland referred to Ma as “the leader of the Taiwan side”. This does not mean that one China, different interpretations has been firmly established as the cross-Strait political framework. But it does mean that significant progress has been made. The door has been opened part way. Tsai Ing-wen should take advantage of this half-opened door. If she loses the 1992 consensus, how can she possibly revert to the strategic framework of one China, different interpretations?

Xi Jinping of course has reservations about one China, different interpretations. But as the Ma Xi summit shows, he knows that without one China, different interpretations, the 1992 consensus would be unacceptable on Taiwan. Also, to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence, the DPP should be allowed to reaffirm the Republic of China, and to revert to supporting the Republic of China. This would enable the DPP to use one China, different interpretations as a foothold. In other words, Tsai Ing-wen need not choose between Taiwan independence and Chinese reunification. She can choose between Taiwan independence and one China, different interpretations.

Tsai Ing-wen will affirm the historical significance of the Ma Xi summit. If Tsai takes her cue from the Ma Xi summit, if she upholds the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations, she will affirm the historical significance of the summit. Conversely, if she refuses to accept the summit framework, the "vessel of peace” will founder. The consequences will also affirm the importance of the Ma Xi summit.

Whether Tsai chooses to feel “boxed in”, or realizes she has been handed a golden opportunity, depends on herself. That is a choice she must make on behalf of the public on Taiwan. By then, the people's choice must become President Tsai Ing-wen's choice. Tsai Ing-wen must not pass the buck back the people. She must make a choice as President, on behalf of the public on Taiwan.

Either way, Tsai Ing-wen's choice, yea or nay, will confirm the historical significance of the Ma Xi summit.

蔡英文將印證馬習會的歷史地位

2015-11-26 聯合報

蔡英文說，馬習會框限了台灣人民對未來的選擇權。這對於可能成為中華民國下屆總統的蔡英文來說，此話須再斟酌。

因為，就民主政治言，沒有任何勢力應當或能夠框限人民對未來的選擇權，馬習會大概也無法「框限」。但是，在馬習會這個面對世界發言的平台上，其所呈現的兩岸情勢，卻不無可能「框限」下屆中華民國總統對兩岸政策的「選擇權」。所以，與其說馬習會「框限」了台灣人民的選擇權，不如說「框限」了可能成為中華民國總統的蔡英文在兩岸政策上的選擇空間。

蔡英文將焦點轉移至「人民的選擇權」，若是站在未來總統的立場發言，這是避實就虛，也是避重就輕的逃避責任之言。一、現今的「民意」，究竟是扭曲的政治操作所造成的？抑或「天然成分」？二、這樣的民意，是否真正反對「九二共識／一中各表」？三、如果反對「九二共識／一中各表」是真正的民意，但請問，蔡英文若成為中華民國總統，她是否也能貫徹「反對九二共識／一中各表」為堅定不移的國策？

以上所論，是要指出：「人民的選擇」若是出於自由，大可海闊天空；若是出自政治操作，亦可能因一時受到政治情境蒙蔽所致。然而，主政者不能只靠蒙蔽或玩弄「人民選擇權」來統治國家，而必須在世界、兩岸及綜合國力的綜合考量下，行使其受各方制約的國策選擇權。

但是，蔡英文迄未明說她認知的「人民的選擇」是什麼。如果「反對九二共識／一中各表」真是人民的選擇，蔡英文若成為中華民國總統，她也能夠實現這個「人民的選擇」嗎？蔡英文不可操弄出一個海市蜃樓的「人民選擇」，卻無力以「總統的選擇」加以實現。

其實，馬習會對可能勝選執政的蔡英文雖有「框限」，也有「引領」。框限，以習近平的語言來說：九二共識是定海神針，失此，「兩岸和平之舟」就會徹底傾覆。引領，用馬英九的語言來說：馬習會為兩岸築起一座跨海大橋，九二共識則是必須遵守的交通規則。簡單而言：框限，就是不能「台獨」；引領，就是「一中各表」。

蔡英文應當十分清楚，就世局國情言，台獨已絕無可能，因而不必等到馬習會來框限。何況，中華民國憲法，也給了中華民國總統「不可台獨」的框限。正因如此，蔡英文不能只看到馬習會「框限」的部分，而應當重視此會在「九二共識／一中各表」的引領作用。當然，絕不能說馬習會已確立「一中各表」的架構；但從馬習會的儀式（互稱對岸領導人／第三地舉行／帳單自理等），到論述（首度在兩岸最高領導人之間呈現「一中定義」是「爭議狀態」），皆是更進一步地給了「一中各表」以出口，這就是引領。

馬習會關上台獨之門，但也半開了一中各表之門。「一中各表」是馬政府努力了七年多的政策，此番能在馬習會上以「台灣方面領導人」的地位當面對習近平提出，雖尚不能視此為論述已告確立，但必須視為已取得重大進展，所以說這是「半開之門」。蔡英文必須高度珍惜此扇半開之門，如果她丟掉了「九二共識」，試問將如何再站回「一中各表」的戰略架構？

至於習近平方面，對一中各表當然仍有保留。但從馬習會可看出，他亦深知，一方面，若無一中各表，九二共識在台灣即不能存在；另一方面，要化解台獨，應先讓民進黨回到「中華民國」，而回到中華民國，即應給民進黨「一中各表」的立足點。也就是說，對蔡英文來說，她不必在「台獨」與「統一」之間作選擇，但要先在「台獨」與「一中各表」之間作一選擇。

蔡英文將印證馬習會的歷史地位。如果蔡英文接受「引領」，承續並發展「九二共識／一中各表」的路線，馬習會即可確立其歷史地位。反之，倘若蔡英文不接受「框限」，一旦導致「和平之舟徹底傾覆」的後果，當然亦能印證馬習會的分量。

無論是框限或引領，皆要看若成為總統的蔡英文之選擇，那也是她必須代全體台灣人作出的選擇。屆時，「台灣人民的選擇」若非受蔡英文「總統之選擇」的啟導，即是受其挾持；亦即，從國家政策的高度言，蔡英文不能將「選擇權」推給台灣人民，而必須以總統的地位為台灣人民作出選擇。

屆時，蔡英文的選擇，無論正反，皆將印證馬習會的歷史地位。

Free Ourselves from the Beijing-Washington Struggle

Free Ourselves from the Beijing-Washington Struggle
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 25, 2015

Executive Summary: Xi Jinping has declared that both sides of the Strait are one family. This is highly beneficial to Taiwan's in cross-Strait affairs and even international affairs. Any current or future leader on Taiwan must think hard about how take maximum advantage of this premise to increase Taiwan's international trade and economic breathing room, and maximize Taiwan's welfare. If we persist in seeing the Mainland as “Not us” due to ideological bias, we will merely shut ourselves out of international economic integration.

Full Text Below:

The power struggle between Beijing and Washington has escalated. The battlefield has expanded. It has spread from the South China Sea sovereignty dispute, to the TPP vs. RCEP regional economic coopetition, and on to the USD vs. RMB currency war. War is no longer limited to traditional arms races or the geopolitical manipulation of regional conflicts. It has changed into non-traditional monetary and economic war. The Asian-Pacific region in particular has become the number one bone of contention in the struggle for political and economic dominance.

Last week the APEC summit adjourned. This week the East Asia Summit (ASEAN 10 + 8) convened. US President Barack Obama continued to harp on the South China Sea issue. He demanded that Beijing cease land reclamation in disputed waters within the South China Sea. Mainland President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang ignored him. They merely noted that South China Sea issues should be settled peacefully by the parties involved. Nations outside the region must not raise tensions by meddling.

The South China Sea sovereignty dispute has led countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, with whom Mainland China has territorial disputes, to form alliances. Washington has used this as a pretext to meddle in Asian-Pacific affairs. This has been its chief diplomatic strategy. In early October, the US completed first round TPP negotiations.

The TPP originally consisted of only four nations: Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei. It was a very small scale free trade agreement (P4). Its impact on global and regional economic and trade development was minimal. But in September 2008, the United States joined. Member States increased. First round negotiations increased membership to 12 countries, and accounted for nearly 40% of the global GDP. This significantly enhanced its influence. South Korea and Taiwan have actively sought to join second round negotiations.

By contrast, Mainland China has been indifferent to the TPP. The TPP rules of the game were not authored by Beijing, but by Washington. For Beijing, which is eager to gain in international status and to have a voice in international affairs, this is unacceptable. Therefore Beijing has insisted on using the RCEP to negotiate multilateral trade agreements, based on the ASEAN plus 6 model. This will eventually lead to the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Asian-Pacific (FTAAP), and yield the greatest benefits for the Asian-Pacific region.

In fact, the non-traditional war between Beijing and Washington is not merely about consolidating economic and trade footholds in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing has recently aggressively courted Washington's Western allies. It has invited European countries to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. It has injected large sums of money into the EU for major infrastructure projects. It has established RMB currency clearing arrangements with the UK, Germany, and France. All of these moves are luring away Washington's allies. They show that Beijing is nobody's fool.

We have yet to mention Ukraine. Beijing took advantage of the Ukraine crisis to construct Russia's first high-speed rail project, which connects Moscow with Kazan. This expedited the signing a long-delayed Sino-Russian natural gas agreement. More recently, Russia's largest oil company received a 15 billion USD loan from Beijing. The signs are everywhere. The war between Beijing and Washington has spread to the rest of the world. The main battlefield now includes international power politics, foreign trade, economics, and national currencies.

Non-traditional warfare rages between Beijing and Washington. But under the table cooperation continues. After all, the United States has a mature economy highly dependent upon consumption and services. Mainland China is transitioning from foreign demand to domestic demand, from manufacturing to services, from investment to consumption. Economically speaking, cooperation between the two at this stage far outweighs conflict.

On issues that do not involve national interests, such as Internet security, energy conservation, and intellectual property rights, the two governments cooperate more than they conflict.

Beijing and Washington are going head to head. Taipei must seek a middle ground between the two. In the South China Sea sovereignty dispute, for example, Taipei lacks a powerful military. Beijing and Washington are colliding with each other in the South China Sea. Taiping Island, the largest island chain in the South China Sea, is a reminder of Taipei's strategic value. The ROC government should attempt to win international support for the East China Sea Peace Initiative that it advanced in 2012. It should also attempt to implement the more recent South China Sea Peace Initiative. Doing so can elevate the ROC's international stature, and leave it with additional bargaining chips. This is true for the TPP and RCEP as well.  Global economic integration continues to accelerate. Taipei cannot afford to take sides.

The opposition DPP and its presidential candidate insist that Taiwan's future depends upon the TPP, bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and FTAs that integrate us into the global trade system. But they pointedly refuse to include the RCEP, because they erroneously believe we can bypass the Mainland and still participate in global economic integration.

This is a very dangerous idea. The DPP ruled for eight years. During that time it proved that such an approach is utterly infeasible, especially now that the Mainland is more economically powerful than before. Other countries and economic organizations find it impossible to ignore Beijing's views. This is true even for its chief competitor Washington.

Xi Jinping has declared that both sides of the Strait are one family. This is highly beneficial to Taiwan's in cross-Strait affairs and even international affairs. Any current or future leader on Taiwan must think hard about how take maximum advantage of this premise to increase Taiwan's international trade and economic breathing room, and maximize Taiwan's welfare. If we persist in seeing the Mainland as “Not us” due to ideological bias, we will merely shut ourselves out of international economic integration.

跳脫中美角力 拓展台生存空間

2015年11月25日 中國時報

中美兩大強權在國際間角力愈演愈烈，戰場也持續擴大。從南海主權之爭，到TPP與RCEP的區域經濟競合，再到美元與人民幣的貨幣大戰，戰爭型態不再侷限於傳統軍備競賽與操控地緣政治引發的區域衝突，而轉向至非傳統的貨幣及經濟大戰。特別是亞太地區政治及經濟主導地位，漸成為兩強競逐的核心。

上周剛結束的APEC峰會與本周登場的東亞峰會（東協10+8會議），美國總統歐巴馬持續拋出南海議題，要求中國停止在南海主權爭議海域填海造地及開墾建設，大陸國家主席習近平及總理李克強對此都做了冷回應，僅強調南海問題應由當事國直接談判協商和平解決，域外國家不應採取導致地區局勢緊張的行動。

南海主權之爭明白透露，尋求與中國有領土爭議國家如菲律賓及越南的結盟，藉此涉足亞太地區事務，是美國近年來的主要國際外交手段。10月初，剛完成第一輪談判協議的TPP也是如此。

TPP前身原本僅是新加坡、紐西蘭、智利與汶萊所組成的一個小型自由貿易區（P4），對於全球經貿或區域經濟發展的影響可說是微乎其微。但自從2008年9月美國宣布加入後，參與成員國不斷擴充，簽署第一輪談判已多達12個國家，占全球經濟規模將近40%，影響力大幅提升，南韓與台灣已積極表態希望加入第二輪談判。

相形之下，中國對於TPP就相對冷淡，因為TPP遊戲規則並非由中國制定，而是美國主導，這對亟欲爭取國際地位及話語權的中國而言，是不能接受的事實。因此在亞太經濟整合路徑上，中國一直堅持應從RCEP著手，透過東協加6的模式完成區域內的多邊貿易談判，最終推進到亞太自由貿易區（FTAAP），如此才能對亞太地區產生最大效益。

其實，中美非傳統大戰不單純只是亞太地區經貿地位的鞏固之戰，中國近來積極拉攏美國西方盟友的舉動，如邀請歐洲國家加入亞投行、大量挹注資金到歐盟地區協助重大工程建設、與英、德、法建立人民幣貨幣清算安排等，都有向美國挖牆角的意味，也宣示中國已非吳下阿蒙。

更不用說在烏克蘭事件後，中國大陸掌握契機，取得連接莫斯科及喀山的俄羅斯第一條高鐵工程，爭吵多年的中俄天然氣供應協議也塵埃落定，近日俄羅斯最大石油公司更從中國獲得一筆將近150億美元的石油貸款。種種跡象都顯示，中美兩強之間的戰火已蔓延到全世界，主戰場也擴散至國際政治、對外貿易、經濟及貨幣等各個層面。

中美非傳統戰爭雖持續進行，但檯面下仍保有相當程度的合作關係。畢竟從經濟發展階段來看，美國已步入高度依賴消費及服務的經濟成熟期，中國仍停留在外需轉內需、製造轉服務、投資轉消費的經濟轉型期。在經濟層面上，雙方現階段的互補關係遠大於競爭關係。

此外，在其他重大議題上，如網路安全、智慧財產權及節能減排等，只要不牽涉個別國家利益的，中美兩國也多傾向合作大於對抗。

面對中美兩國積極角力的局勢，台灣勢必要找到平衡點。以南海主權之爭為例，台灣背後雖然沒有強大的軍備實力，但在中美競逐南海利益中，擁有南海最大島嶼太平島的優勢，無疑地凸顯了台灣的戰略價值。政府若能延續2012年提出東海和平倡議並成功取得國際支持，提出南海和平倡議路徑圖，將南海議題由倡議付諸行動，將可凸顯台灣國際地位，也有利加大台灣的籌碼。TPP與RCEP的抉擇未嘗不是如此，在全球經濟加速整合的過程中，台灣並沒有選邊站的本錢。

對照之下，在野黨及其總統候選人，頻頻表示未來台灣必須透過TPP、雙邊及多邊FTA的談判與簽署，才能融入全球經貿體系，絕口不提RCEP，也認為台灣可以無視並繞過中國大陸，參與全球經濟整合。

這是非常危險的想法，在民進黨執政8年間，已驗證這樣的做法是行不通的，尤其是當大陸的經濟實力愈加龐大時，其他國家或經濟組織更難忽視中國大陸的意見，即使處於競爭地位的美國，也是一樣。

習近平上台後一直強調兩岸一家親，這對台灣在兩岸事務、甚至是國際事務的推動，都有極為正面的意義。無論是現在或未來可能的領導人，實在應該好好思考如何善用這樣的理念，拓展台灣的國際經貿空間，創造全民最大的福祉。一旦流於意識形態，拒中國大陸於門外，其實也意味著自己將通往國際經濟整合的大門鎖上，自毀前程。

Peace Initiative for the South China Sea

Peace Initiative for the South China Sea
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 24, 2015

Executive Summary: President Ma Ying-jeou has said that he will implement his South China Sea Peace Initiative at an opportune time. Now is an opportune time. During moments of conflict, peace becomes an international imperative. The ROC and the Philippines have signed cooperation agreements on law enforcement. Overall planning and regional implementation of the South China Sea Peace Initiative has already begun. The road map includes three principles: upholding the constitution, respecting international law, and promoting international cooperation. These three principles explain our national policy and merit our continued support.

Full Text Below:

The world's attention is focused on the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris. Nevertheless the South China Sea situation remains a matter of global concern. US warships and long-range bombers have repeatedly entered the South China Sea. The US has declared its determination to “uphold freedom of navigation”. Japan also says it will send warships into the South China Sea. An international tribunal has ruled against Mainland China on the matter of South China Sea islands and reefs, provoking unease in the Mainland media. The dispute will impact the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation council meeting recently concluded on the 19th. Mainland China Premier Li Keqiang proposed five initiatives to resolve the South China Sea issue during the East Asia Summit convened on the 22nd. He presented Mainland China's bottom line, including both carrots and sticks. Storm clouds now hang over the South China Sea.

The Sino-US struggle has threatened the security of neighboring countries in the South China Sea. The ROC Constitution is clear. Taiping Island is under our jurisdiction. The ROC is a stakeholder, but we are denied a voice in international fora. We are denied a voice in bilateral and multilateral organizations. We are denied the opportunity to voice our policy. This may leave us even more marginalized, to the detriment of our sovereignty over Taiping Island. We must make ourselves heard within the international community. We must fight for our rights. Since 2008, the role of the ROC in East Asia has been that of peacemaker. This gives us an opportunity to become involved in the South China Sea.

With regards the disputed waters, our long-standing policy has been that "sovereignty cannot be divided, but resources can be shared". It has been to address the matter of resource use and management first, in order to cool emotions. Then, when the time is right, return and address the sovereignty issue. Our position has enabled us to play an important role in resolving the East China Sea dispute.

In August 2012, President Ma advanced his East China Sea Peace Initiative. He urged the disputant nations to reduce tensions and initiate dialogue in order to facilitate a peaceful settlement of disputes. The folowing year, in April 2013, the ROC and Japan signed a fisheries agreement. This was an important implementation of the East China Sea Peace Initiative. Since the signing of Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement, almost no fishing disputes have arisen, and catches have significantly increased. The two sides have shelved territorial disputes. The international community has acknowledged this contribution to the resolution of East China Sea disputes.

This year, in May 2015, President Ma advanced his South China Sea Peace Initiative. He urged all South China Sea disputant nations to reduce tensions and initiate dialogue, and reach a peaceful resolution to the dispute. On November 5 the ROC and the Philippines signed a fisheries law enforcement cooperation agreement. This established law enforcement cooperation mechanisms, an emergency notification system, and a speedy release mechanism to guard against a repeat of the Kuang Ta Hsing No. 28 tragedy, during which fishermen from Taiwan were shot dead by Philippine Coast Guard personnel.

The ROC has adopted a policy of self-restraint and peaceful settlement of disputes. But it remains unshakable regarding matters of sovereignty. On September 1, 2014, President Ma Ying-jeou issued his South China Sea Islands Map, based on international law. On May 26, 2015, he issued his South China Sea Peace Initiative. On July 7, 2015, he issued his Republic of China Position on the South China Sea Issue. On October 31, 2015, the Republic of China government reaffirmed its position regarding the South China Sea dispute. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release affirming ROC sovereignty over four island chains in the South China Sea. These claims rooted in history and jurisprudence.

Our sovereignty over these Pacific islands is a matter of record, and not subject to distortion by other nations.

In more cautious terms, such disputes inevitably involve constitutional provisions regarding our territorial sovereignty. There is no room for concessions. This is why our position remains firm. We cannot allow outside forces to intervene in the recent South China Sea dispute. We must confront these challenges head on.

Officially the United States has condemned the Chinese mainland for its land reclamation projects. It has raised the issue of freedom of navigation. But the US government says it will not choose sides in territorial and sovereignty disputes among other countries. On this point, it deserves praise and encouragement. It should continue this policy of not choosing sides. Whether to choose sides in the South China Sea dispute has become an important issue for the ROC

The Ma Ying-jeou government's national security policy is "remain close to the US, remain friendly with Japan, and remain at peace with the Mainland". It illusrates the need to address these disputes over surrounding waters. Any bias will arouse suspicions or provoke an intense backlash. The ROC is committed to promoting peace. Bias would be unwise. Carefully maintaining a balance between Taipei-Washington relations and cross-Strait relations is conducive to our national interests. It is also important for stable regional development. Therefore choosing sides is not consistent with our policy interests in the South China Sea dispute.

President Ma Ying-jeou has said that he will implement his South China Sea Peace Initiative at an opportune time. Now is an opportune time. During moments of conflict, peace becomes an international imperative. The ROC and the Philippines have signed cooperation agreements on law enforcement. Overall planning and regional implementation of the South China Sea Peace Initiative has already begun. The road map includes three principles: upholding the constitution, respecting international law, and promoting international cooperation. These three principles explain our national policy and merit our continued support.

我應提出南海和平倡議路徑圖 2015年11月24日 中國時報 全球聚焦巴黎恐怖攻擊的後續發展，但並未降低南海賽局形勢的危險性與全球的高度關切。美國軍艦與長程轟炸機多次進入南海，宣示維持海上航行自由的決心，日本亦聲稱將派遣軍艦進入南海巡邏；國際法庭關於南海島礁管轄權仲裁案的裁決結果不利中國大陸，引發大陸媒體的焦慮感。19日剛剛結束的亞太經合會受到南海議題的糾纏；22日召開東亞峰會，大陸總理李克強提出南海議題五倡議，軟硬兼施表達了中國的底線，南海風雲詭譎。 中美角力下，南海周邊國家安全情勢受到威脅，我國憲法對南海主權有明確的規範，現實政治上太平島為我國管轄範圍，我為相關利益一方，但受到國際活動空間的制約，無法透過雙邊或多邊機制表達我國的政策與立場，很可能使台灣更加邊緣化，進而損害太平島權益。我應戮力在國際社會發聲，爭取應有的權益。2008年以來，台灣在東亞區域政治中所扮演的積極和平角色，已為介入南海賽局開啟機會之窗。 我國海洋政策中對於涉及周邊海域爭端的立場，一向秉持著「主權不能分割、資源可以共享」原則，亦即先解決資源利用和管理的問題，藉以緩和爭議，待適當時機再行處理主權議題。此一立場在東海爭端的解決過程中扮演了重要的角色。 馬總統在2012年8月提出「東海和平倡議」，主張相關國家降低緊張、展開對話，以和平方式解決爭端；隔年（2013）4月我國與日本簽署漁業協議，這是落實「東海和平倡議」的重要發展，重要的是台日漁業協議簽署後，幾乎沒有發生對抗性的漁業糾紛，漁獲量明顯增加，雙方擱置領土島嶼爭議的作法，被國際社會視為東亞海域糾紛獲得解決的重大進展。 今年（2015）5月，馬總統提出「南海和平倡議」，呼籲南海相關國家降低緊張、展開對話，以和平方式解決爭端。11月5日台菲簽署了漁業事務執法合作協定，建立執法合作機制、緊急通報系統以及迅速釋放機制，保障日後不致於發生如「廣大興28號」事件，台灣漁民遭菲律賓海巡署人員槍殺的悲劇。 我國雖然採取自我克制的和平解決爭端原則，對於島嶼主權的主張立場卻絲毫未有動搖，馬英九總統於2014年9月1日發表有關我國「南海諸島位置圖」的國際法意涵、2015年5月26日發表「南海和平倡議」內容、與外交部分別在今年（2015）7月7日所發布的「中華民國對南海問題之立場聲明」以及10月31日的「中華民國政府重申對南海議題之立場」新聞稿，均明白指出我國擁有南海四沙群島的島嶼主權，而且此種主權主張係植基於歷史的連結和法理的基礎。 我國在太平島上的經營事實，也不容許被他國的刻意操作而被抹煞。 更謹慎而論，主權立場無可避免涉及我國憲法中關於領土主權的規定，絕無退讓空間。也因為此一堅定立場，我國必然無法自外於近來在南海爭端的發展，此係我國所需嚴正面對的挑戰。 在國際情勢的相關發展上，美國在官方層面有對於中國大陸填海造陸的指責，也有強調保障海上航行自由的作為，但是美國政府聲明不在其他國家領土與主權議題上選邊的立場，值得吾人稱讚並鼓勵能持續堅持此一「不選邊」原則。同樣地，「是否選邊」也成為我國在南海政策上的重要思考。 馬英九政府「親美、友日、和中」的國安政策證明了在處理周邊海域爭端議題的重要性，因為在政策的選擇上若有任何的偏倚，將必然會引發另一方的猜忌，甚或是激烈反應，這對於積極依賴周邊和緩情勢的我國來說，絕對是不宜也是不智的選擇。因此謹慎地在「台美關係」與「兩岸關係」之間維持穩定平衡，不僅有利於我國國家利益的維持，亦是對於區域內穩定發展的重要根基。所以，「選邊」並不符合我國的南海政策利益。 馬英九總統曾經表示，將在適當時機提出能夠具體落實的「南海和平倡議路徑圖」，現在應當是宣布的時機。在衝突紛擾的當下，和平倡議成為國際清流，加上台菲海上執法合作協定之簽署，一個植基於「南海和平倡議」中「整體規畫、分區開發」概念的架構已然初步成形。而在維護憲法基礎、尊重國際法原則、推動國際合作等三項原則之下的「路徑圖」，不僅有利於展現我國的政策，更是值得延續的基本立場。

Two Doubts about Tsai Ing-wen's TPP Strategy

Two Doubts about Tsai Ing-wen's TPP Strategy
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 23, 2015

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen says that TPP membership will be a case of "first the bitter, then the sweet”. But shouldn't Tsai Ing-wen answer peoples' questions about her TPP strategy? Otherwise her pie in the sky promises before the election, are likely to evaporate into thin air following the election. The public on Taiwan has had its fill of "first the bitter, then the sweet” promises.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen recently pledged that if the DPP returns to power next year, her strategy will be "a nation founded on industry". If so, she faces two challenges. One. The development of new industries on Taiwan, industrial upgrading and transformation. Two. Increased participation in the global trade system and reduced dependence on a single country and a single market. Therefore joining the TPP and signing bilateral and multilateral FTAs is her next target.

Joining the TPP will undoubtedly be one of Tsai Ing-wen's most important post-election fiscal policies. It will change the nation's strategic direction. It will "reduce dependence upon a single country and a single market". In other words, one of her strategic objectives is to resist the pull of the Mainland economy and cross-Strait economic integration. In June Tsai visited the US. In October she visited Japan. More recently she underscored the prep work she has done that will enable Taiwan to join the TPP.

But based on DPP public pronouncements, we doubt Tsai Ing-wen has done the prep work necessary for Taiwan to join the TPP -- for two reasons.

Doubt Number One. How does Tsai Ing-wen plan to perform an end run around Mainland China? The Kuomintang intends to "make peace with the Mainland, then connect with the outside". Tsai Ing-wen insists she can "bypass the Mainland". She quoted a former US official who suggested that changes in cross-Strait economic and trade relations will have no direct impact on Taiwan'e membership in the TPP. But is that really true?

The 12 Member States of the TPP have completed first round negotiations. Taiwan hopes to join the second round. It must commit to economic opening to TPP member states. It must obtain the 12 Member States approval. The TPP is seen as a US Japan alliance, an “anti-China economic aircraft carrier”, whose prime directive is to “contain” Mainland China. The US and Japan may be able to ignore Mainland China and deal directly with Taiwan. But other TPP member states have close economic and trade ties with the Mainland. Last year, the largest trading partner for eight member states, including Malaysia, Australia, and Vietnam, was not the US, but Mainland China. We have no diplomatic relations with these countries. How can we possibly obtain their consent?

The DPP has blasted the Ma government. It says invoking cross-Strait relations when discussing TPP membership is "intimidation". But TPP member states have close trade and economic ties with the Mainland. The DPP thinks it can ignore Mainland China. This DPP optimism represents either sheer naivete, or a willful ostrich “head in the sand” mentality. This is true for the TPP, and also true for bilateral and multilateral FTAs.

Doubt Number Two. Will Tsai Ing-wen's TPP negotiations be subject to public oversight, and if so, how? During the Sunflower Student Movement anti-STA demonstrations, the DPP demanded the passage of "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations". It demanded case by case review of Mainland agricultural and industrial imports, allegedly to avoid "black box operations" that might hurt vulnerable sectors. Yet the DPP's own obstructionism has stalled passage of this very same regulation indefinitely. Joining the TPP will also impact vulnerable sectors. So does Tsai intend to apply the same rigorous standards to the TPP as she did to the STA?

Tsai Ing-wen received the red carpet treatment during her visit to the US in June. She became the first presidential candidate to receive VIP treatment from the US ahead of the upcoming general election. One report claims that Tsai Ing-wen reached an understanding with the United States regarding US pork exports to Taiwan. US Deputy Trade Representative Robert Holleyman recently attended the ninth Taiwan-US Trade and Investment framework agreement (TIFA) meetings. In public and private, he said he hoped that Taiwan would honor its commitment to allow in US pork. He suggested that allowing in US pork would help Taiwan join the TPP. If Taiwan cannot even allow in US pork, how can it talk about joining the TPP?

What did Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP promise the US? That remains a closely guarded secret. The Green Camp and green oriented pressure groups stand shoulder to shoulder, blasting the Ma government relentlessly. But as soon as the issue of US pork comes up, they suddenly fall silent and avert their eyes. If Taiwan expects to join the TPP, US approval is of course essential. Can Tsai Ing-wen really obtain US support without allowing in US pork? If on the other hand, Tsai obtained US support for TPP membership by promising to allow in US pork, how is that not a “black box operation”?

Tsai financial adviser and FSC Chairman Shi Junji recently said that the DPP is “ready for either the worst or the best".  The former includes allowing in US pork and other farm products. The latter hinted at interference from the Mainland. In fact, when Tsai Ing-wen raised the issue of TPP membership during her visits to the United States and Japan, she said more to them than she has to the public on Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen says she has done the prep work necessary to join the TPP. Why not apply the same standards to the STA?  Why not lay her TPP strategy out under the sun, for all to see?

Tsai Ing-wen says that TPP membership will be a case of "first the bitter, then the sweet”. But shouldn't Tsai Ing-wen answer peoples' questions about her TPP strategy? Otherwise her pie in the sky promises before the election, are likely to evaporate into thin air following the election. The public on Taiwan has had its fill of "first the bitter, then the sweet” promises.

對蔡英文TPP戰略的兩點質疑

2015-11-23 聯合報

蔡英文最近宣示，明年若重返執政，定位將是「產業立國」。在此定位下，未來的挑戰有二：一是發展台灣的新產業，推動產業升級轉型；二是進一步參與全球經貿體系，並且降低對單一國家、單一市場的依賴。因此，加入TPP，以及雙邊、多邊FTA的簽訂，將是接下來的重點工作。

毫無疑問，加入TPP，不僅是蔡英文當選後最重要的財經政策之一，更具有調整國家戰略方向的意涵：要「降低對單一國家、單一市場的依賴」。換言之，其戰略目標之一，是因應中國經濟磁吸效應與兩岸經濟整合趨勢。從六月訪美、十月訪日，乃至最近的多次談話，蔡英文都不斷強調有決心讓台灣做好加入TPP的各項準備工作。

但檢驗民進黨陸續提出之說明，蔡英文對於台灣加入TPP是否已做好準備，我們仍有兩項疑問。

第一個疑問是，蔡英文的TPP路徑，如何克服中國大陸的因素？對比國民黨「安陸連外」的TPP路徑，蔡英文的TPP路徑號稱能「繞過大陸」，更引用美國前後任官員談話，暗示兩岸經貿關係變化對台灣爭取加入TPP無直接影響。問題是，這行得通嗎？

TPP第一輪談判的十二個成員國已完成協議，台灣要力拚加入第二輪談判，除須承諾達成TPP成員國的開放政策外，另一關鍵是須獲得十二個成員國同意，才能取得加入TPP門票。TPP被視為美國「聯日制中」的經濟航空母艦，美、日兩國或許可無視中國因素與台灣洽談，然而，其他TPP成員國都與大陸經貿往來密切；其中，馬來西亞、澳洲、越南等八個國家去年最大的貿易夥伴不是美國，而是中國大陸。我國與這些國家均無邦交，如何取得其同意，將是最大變數。

民進黨批評馬政府，說以兩岸關係作為能否加入TPP的關鍵因素，是一種「恐嚇」。但TPP成員國多數與中國經貿關係緊密，民進黨認為可以無視中國大陸因素，若非過於樂觀，就是教大家學鴕鳥。事實上，不唯TPP如此，其他雙邊、多邊FTA的簽訂，亦莫不如是。

第二個疑問是，蔡英文的TPP談判，如何接受國人監督？在去年太陽花學運的反服貿風潮中，民進黨堅持通過《兩岸協議監督條例》，對陸方要求我方開放的農工產品清單逐條逐案審查，以免「黑箱作業」犧牲弱勢部門。在民進黨杯葛下，此一《監督條例》卡關至今，毫無進度。然而，加入TPP對弱勢產業也可能造成衝擊，請問蔡英文：加入TPP的各項開放政策，是否也要比照兩岸服貨貿嚴格監督？

蔡英文六月訪美獲得禮遇，除因她在大選中保持領先美方願意拉高接待規格，另一說法則稱，蔡英文在「開放美豬」議題上，已與美方達成一定默契。美國副貿易代表何禮曼日前來台參加第九屆台美貿易暨投資架構協定（TIFA）會議時，在公開與非公開場合多次表示美方希望台灣信守開放美豬等議題的承諾，亦暗示開放美豬是台灣參與TPP的有利條件。若連美豬這關都過不了，要如何奢談進TPP？

但蔡英文與民進黨態度卻諱莫如深。過去綠營與社運團體站在同一陣線，對馬政府砲轟不絕；現在面對美豬議題，卻偃旗息鼓，避而不談。台灣要加入TPP，美國態度當然是關鍵，如何在不開放美豬的前提下爭取到美方支持，蔡英文可有妙計？相對的，若為爭取美國支持而開放美豬，難道能搞密室黑箱？

蔡英文的財經幕僚、金管會前主委施俊吉日前說，民進黨對加入TPP已有「最好的準備、最壞的打算」，前者包含對開放美豬等農工產品的策略，後者則暗示要面對中國大陸的干擾。事實上，蔡英文訪問美、日時談到加入TPP之事，甚至比在台灣對國人講的還多。既然蔡英文已對加入TPP做好準備，何不以處理兩岸服貨貿爭議同樣的標準，把台灣加入TPP的路徑與戰略，清楚攤在陽光下？

如蔡英文所說，台灣加入TPP，是「先苦後甘」的工程。但蔡英文應先釐清其TPP戰略的疑問，否則，選前畫餅，選後成空，台灣恐將飽嘗「先甘後苦」的結果。

Paris Crisis: Opportunity for Major Power Cooperation

Paris Crisis: Opportunity for Major Power Cooperation
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 20, 2015

Executive Summary: The most incredible stories are not always written by novelists. They sometimes originate in international realpolitik. They are stories of the tug of war between humanitarian impulses and reason, between idealism and power politics. Recently a photo of Aylan Kurdi, a drowned three-year-old boy, evoked infinite compassion for Syrian refugees. Now however, terrorist attacks in Paris have been masterminded by an Islamic State (IS) trained Belgian citizen, and another who entered Europe as a refugee. People are torn between humanitarian and national security concerns. The disaster has swiftly altered their perspective.

Full Text Below:

The most incredible stories are not always written by novelists. They sometimes originate in international realpolitik. They are stories of the tug of war between humanitarian impulses and reason, between idealism and power politics. Recently a photo of Aylan Kurdi, a drowned three-year-old boy, evoked infinite compassion for Syrian refugees. Now however, terrorist attacks in Paris have been masterminded by an Islamic State (IS) trained Belgian citizen, and another who entered Europe as a refugee. People are torn between humanitarian and national security concerns. The disaster has swiftly altered their perspective.

In fact the recent terrorist attack was no surprise. In late October, a series of suicide bombings directed against mosques in Nigeria, resulted in hundreds dead and injured. Before the Paris attacks, Lebanon and Iraq were targeted by suicide bombers who caused hundreds of casualties.

The fight against terrorism long ago spread from Iraq to the Near East and North Africa. It followed refugees into Europe. But Westerners, with their Eurocentric mindset, ignored or suppressed these signals. Information about potential attacks obtained by intelligence agencies were not taken seriously until the Paris bombings. Only then did people realize that terrorism had arrived at their own shores. Clearly the ostrich “head in the sand” mentality is a major concern for free societies.

The remote cause of the Paris terrorist attacks, was policy differences between the Western powers on how to deal with Syria. This enable Islamic State to grow. The United States is determined to overthrow Assad and opposes him at every turn. It accuses the Assad regime of being the main obstacle to the peaceful transition of power. Russia, on the other hand, sees the Assad government as a bridgehead in the Middle East. Not only does it support Assad, it provides it with military aid. Differences in US and Russian policy have led to political chaos in Syria. This has given Islamic State leverage in Syria, enabling it to become the largest exporter of Syria refugees.

The proximate cause of the terrorist attack was French President Francois Hollande's aggressive anti-terrorism campaign. In 2012, Hollande changed the Sarkozy government's anti-interventionist policy toward the Middle East. When the United States and Britain gradually extricated themselves from the Middle East, Hollande sent tens of thousands of troops into North Africa and the Middle East. He even dispatched an aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf to assist in the fight against the Islamic State. This move put France in the vanguard of the EU fight against terrorism. It also turned France into a prime target for IS terrorism.

In 2001, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States promoted neo-imperialism. The UK, Germany, and France were pressured into joining the war on terror in the Middle East. Then in 2008, President Obama decided to withdraw from the Middle East. The geopolitical tug of war left the EU at the forefront of the war on terror. UK and French forces switched roles with the US. They became the main force in the Middle East in the war on terror. In the United States' absence, terrorism in Iraq and Syria rapidly expanded into new areas. The influx of refugees led to growing strategic divisions between the US and the EU. This helped the Islamic State grow.

The fear induced by the terrorist attacks against Paris, have forced the Western powers to once again find points of agreement. These changes have had three effects on international power politics.

Effect One. In the shadow of the terrorist attacks, the United States will be forced to change its passive attitude towards Islamic State. Paris is the first major attack against a Western nation since 9/11. International public opinion is pointing the finger at the US, citing weak counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East. If the United States continues to do nothing, it could once again become the target of terrorist attacks. Obama remains reluctant to send in ground troops. But public opinion, at home and abroad, means that the US will be forced to conduct mop up operations against the Islamic State.

Effect Two. The terrorist attacks against Paris, will encourage the United States and Russia to act in concert against the Syrian problem. The US and Russia were diametrically opposed. They neutralized each other. But Putin has become more aggressive. He accused the G20 of secretly supporting IS. He dispatched over 30 fighter jets to Syria to wage air attacks against IS in cooperation with France. Putin reached out to the EU. This forces the United States to respond. French president Hollande is urging the United States and Russia to work together and form a new coalition against terrorism.

Effect Three. Anti-terrorism has again become a global priority. Discord between the PRC and USA in the South China Sea will gradually diminish. At the APEC meeting Obama stressed economic aid to the Philippines and other nations re: the South China Sea. But Xi Jinping refused to respond, and addressed only the economy. If the United States redeploys its forces to the Middle East, it will weaken America's Asia rebalancing strategy. United States pressure on Beijing in the South China Sea will diminish.

For Paris, the terrorist attacks have been a nightmare. But the humanitarian crisis has also provided an opportunity for major power cooperation. Is this not an incredible development in international power politics?

巴黎的危機 大國合作的轉機

2015-11-20 聯合報

最荒謬的劇情，通常不只出現在小說家筆下，也發生在現實的國際政治中；它是人道與理性的掙扎，也是權力與夢想的拉鋸。先前一張三歲小孩亞藍溺斃海邊的照片，引發世人對敘利亞難民的無限同情；但最近巴黎發生恐怖攻擊，其主謀竟是在伊斯蘭國（ＩＳ）受過訓練的比利時人，另有攻擊者則是以難民名義進入歐洲。人道與安全的拔河，因這場災難而瞬間改觀。

這次的恐怖攻擊，其實早有警訊。十月底，在奈及利亞清真寺曾經連續發生多次自殺炸彈爆炸案，造成上百人死傷；巴黎事件前，黎巴嫩及伊拉克也接連遭到自殺式的恐怖攻擊，造成數百人死傷。

恐怖主義的戰火，早已從伊拉克蔓延至近東及北非，並隨著難民的腳步進入歐洲。但在西方至上的心理作祟下，這些訊息卻不斷地被忽視、被掩蓋，包括情治機構接獲的恐攻情資也未受到真正的重視，直到巴黎爆炸案發生，人們才驚覺恐怖主義的浪潮早已淹至你我的腳下。由此可見，鴕鳥心態是自由社會的一大隱憂。

巴黎恐怖攻擊的遠因，主要源於西方強權處理敘利亞問題的政策分歧，讓伊斯蘭國得到滋長坐大的養分。美國主張推翻處處與其作對的阿塞德政府，認為阿塞德是和平過渡政權的主要障礙，而俄羅斯則把阿塞德政府當成它在中東的橋頭堡，不但支持阿塞德，還積極予以軍事援助。美俄兩國政策的分歧，造成敘利亞政局的動盪不安，讓伊斯蘭國在敘利亞找到擴張的支點，也讓敘利亞成為難民的最大輸出國。

至於這場恐怖攻擊的近因，則由於法國總統歐蘭德積極推動反恐政策。歐蘭德於二○一二年上台後，一改過去薩科奇政府對於介入中東問題的消極態度，在美英兩國逐漸於中東地區退縮之際，他不但出動上萬名軍隊駐紮在北非及中東，並出動航空母艦協助在波斯灣對抗伊斯蘭國。此舉，讓法國成為歐盟反恐的急先鋒，也讓法國被ＩＳ恐怖主義鎖定，成為首要打擊對象。

二○○一年美國的九一一恐怖攻擊後，在美國的新帝國主義推促下，英德法各國被迫捲入中東的反恐戰爭。但是，在二○○八年歐巴馬總統決定從中東撤兵之後，在地緣政治拉扯下，歐盟反而成為反恐戰爭的最前沿。其中，英法聯軍更是主客易位，成為中東反恐戰爭的主力軍。在美國退出的戰力空缺下，近年伊拉克及敘利亞地區的新恐怖主義快速形成並不斷擴大；而美國與歐盟則因為難民潮的衝擊，戰略上愈見分歧，這些都成為伊斯蘭國不斷壯大的溫床。

巴黎恐怖攻擊發生後，在恐懼總和的心理下，終於讓西方強權再次找到合作的施力點，觀察最近的變化，它將對今後國際權力政治板塊產生以下三項轉移效果：

首先，在恐怖攻擊的陰影下，美國勢將被迫改變對伊斯蘭國的消極態度。巴黎的恐攻是九一一之後西方國家首度遭到最大規模的攻擊，國際輿論已將箭頭指向美國在中東的反恐不力；美國若繼續坐視，美國本土可能再度成為恐攻目標。因此，儘管歐巴馬對於出動地面部隊態度仍然猶豫，但在國內外強大的民意壓力下，積極掃蕩伊斯蘭國仍將成為美國的政策選項之一。

其次，巴黎的恐怖攻擊，有助促使美俄兩國對敘利亞問題採取一致的行動。先前美俄的戰略南轅北轍，相互抵銷；但最近普亭的態度相當積極，不僅指責Ｇ20成員國有人暗中支援ＩＳ，更立即增派卅多架戰機投入空襲，與法國聯手行動。普亭積極拉攏歐盟的作法，將迫使美國不得不正面回應；目前法國總統歐蘭德也正在努力敦促美俄攜手合作，以形成新的反恐聯盟。

最後，當「反恐」再次成為全球要務之後，中美兩國在南海問題齟齬的柴火將逐漸轉向。儘管歐巴馬在ＡＰＥＣ會議上仍在強調經援菲律賓等國以協防南海，但習近平則迴避接招只談經濟；而美國若將海外部署轉向中東，必將弱化美國亞洲再平衡的動能，美國在南海問題上對北京施壓的力道也可能逐漸放軟。

一場恐怖攻擊，雖是巴黎的夢魘，但人道危機卻也成為大國合作的轉機。這何嘗不是國際政治上另一場荒謬的權力大戲呢？

Private Sector Demand on the Mainland for Forcible Reunification

Private Sector Demand on the Mainland for Forcible Reunification
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 19, 2015

Executive Summary: The public on the Mainland has long viewed national reunification as an article of faith. Chinese Communist Party propaganda once called for the liberation of Taiwan. It convinced the public on the Mainland that the Taiwan problem might need to be resolved by means of force. The proliferation of Taiwan independence separatist forces have convinced many on the Mainland that only force can ensure reunification.

Full Text Below:

The public on the Mainland has long viewed national reunification as an article of faith. Chinese Communist Party propaganda once called for the liberation of Taiwan. It convinced the public on the Mainland that the Taiwan problem might need to be resolved by means of force. The proliferation of Taiwan independence separatist forces have convinced many on the Mainland that only force can ensure reunification.

But cross-Strait peace has entered the picture. The door has been flung open to cross-Strait exchanges. People from the two sides can finally engage in extensive, in-depth interactions. Taiwanese investment on the Mainland was once a one-way street. Now people, goods, and capital can flow both ways. Given increasing two-way interaction, people on the two sides understand each other better. They value the hard-won peaceful exchange. As a result, talk of forcible reunification has gradually begun to disappear. Mainland officials rarely mention the use of force. They too consider peaceful reunification the best solution. They think buying Taiwan is better than attacking Taiwan.

But beginning with Ma Ying-jeou's second term in office, anti-Mainland sentiment on Taiwan began to increase. A series of agreements beneficial to Taiwan were blocked. Eventually the Sunflower Student Movement reached its peak. This awakened the Mainland public from its slumber. This alerted them to the Taiwan public's obstinate refusal to reunify with the Mainland. The Mainland public cannot understand why the Taiwan public remains ungrateful despite all the Mainland's concessions? The rise of Mainland China has won universal respect. The sole exception is Taiwan, which persists in viewing the Mainland with contempt and hostility.

Cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges are extensive. They are hardly limited to the Mainland's unilateral concessions to Taiwan. People on the Mainland are becoming increasingly affluent. This has bolstered their self-confidence, and intensified their yearing for global respect and equality. Therefore, negative attitudes among the Taiwan public can easily provoke resentment among the Mainland public. As a result, many now believe that the Taiwan public has become completely de-Sinicized. They have lost hope for peaceful reunification, and believe that forcible reunification is the only solution. More and more scholars on the Internet consider the reunification of Taiwan a matter of the utmost urgency. Otherwise the next generation will totally sever any remaining emotional links between Taiwan and the Mainland. Others adopt a geopolitical perspective. The rise of Mainland China will inevitably challenge US global hegemony. Taiwan is the key to the first island chain. Only by taking Taiwan can the Mainland break through the US first island chain, and utterly transform the geopolitical landscape.

Of course such statements cannot be considered public opinion on the Mainland. Many who advocate forcible reunification also note the high cost. This could hinder the rise of Mainland China, and even lead to the loss of strategic opportunities for growth. Therefore they still hope for peaceful reunification to avoid a lose-lose outcome. But the re-emergence of demands for forcible reunification show that more and more people on the Mainland are angry at Taiwan independence rhetoric. They are impatient because cross-Strait political relations have yet to make a real breakthrough.

The public on Taiwan should ask itself why despite a long honeymoon period, cross-Strait private sector hostility has paradoxically increased. Why have so many people on the Mainland who were once friendly toward Taiwan, now hostile. We cannot simply pass the buck to the Mainland public. We cannot simply dismiss them as uncivilized and brainwashed. Many have traveled the world over. Many are members of an elite with global vision. They have access to global information, and have actually participated in cross-Strait civilian exchanges.

The public on Taiwan must realize that people in the private sector on both sides want peace. In order to maintain the status quo, which is cross-Strait peace, we must appreciate the hardships the two sides have endured. Only then can we establish friendship, mutual trust, and perceive the rise of the Mainland in a positive light. Many on Taiwan lack a sense of urgency. The Mainland is undergoing rapid transformation. They do not realize they have lost their edge. They remain trapped in the memory of past glory, unable to extricate themselves.

People can no longer allow themselves to be wantonly manipulated by politicians. They must open their eyes and form their own judgments. They must clearly identify which issues are the politicians' red herrings, and which are matters that truly affect the destiny of the people.

In the face of Mainland demands for forcible reunification, the Taiwan pubic need not panic. After all, these are merely private sector discussions. Mainland officials adhere to existing policy. They avoid mentioning the use of force. Not only that, during the Ma Xi summit, Ma Ying-jeou called for the removal of missiles aimed at Taiwan. Xi Jinping responded positively. There may be follow-up action as a gesture of goodwill, to reduce tensions on Taiwan. But the Taiwan public must be clear. Such gestures of goodwill are the result of the Mainland's increasing self-confidence. It is precisely because their military strength has so dramatically increased, that they are so relaxed. But this means a rapidly increasing imbalance in  cross-strait military power. Taiwan's military has fewer and fewer chips when it confronts the Mainland. Taiwan no longer has the wherewithal to challenge the Mainland.

Under the circumstances, Taiwan can only call for peace, goodwill, and inclusion. Only goodwill and a willingness to integrate ourselves into the vast Mainland market, can soften Mainland calls for forcible reunification. Only peace can ensure Taiwan's future.

如何應對大陸民間武統論升溫

2015年11月19日 中國時報

一直以來，實現國家統一的信念深植大陸民眾心中，早期中共解放台灣的宣傳，也讓大陸民眾深信武力解決台灣的必要性，更何況還有那麼多台獨分裂勢力，更讓大陸民眾堅信，唯有武力才能真正實現統一。

但隨著兩岸進入和平發展期，兩岸交流大門開啟，兩岸人民終於可以真正廣泛、深入地互動，過去單向的台商投資大陸，變成了現在兩岸人員、貨物和資金的雙向流通，兩岸民眾也在日趨緊密的雙向互動中，加深了彼此了解，更加珍惜來之不易的和平交流局面。於是近年來武力統一的言論就漸漸銷聲匿跡，不僅大陸官方很少提及不放棄使用武力，大陸民間也認為和平統一才是最佳方案，甚至出現「買台灣」比「打台灣」代價小的說法。

不過，自從馬英九進入第二任期以來，台灣社會內部反中情緒日漸升高，一系列有利兩岸進一步交流的協議接連受阻，最終更以太陽花學運達到反中的最高峰，這讓大陸民眾驚覺，原來台灣民眾如此抗拒跟大陸統一。大陸民眾更想不通的是，為何大陸對台讓利那麼多，台灣民眾仍然不知感激？為何大陸崛起贏得全球尊重，卻唯獨台灣仍然對大陸人民抱以鄙視和敵視的態度？

兩岸經貿往來牽涉廣泛，或許不能單純以大陸單方面讓利視之，但大陸民眾日漸富裕後，其自信心的提升也是事實，其對贏得世人尊重和平等相待的渴望也愈發強烈。因此，台灣社會對大陸的負面態度很容易令大陸民眾產生反感，很多人據此認為，台灣社會已經全面去中國化，和平統一已經失去希望，武力統一才是唯一的解決辦法。網路上更是時常出現民間學者的分析評論，認為統一台灣已經刻不容緩，否則只會讓台灣的下一代徹底斷絕與中國的情感連結。更有人以地緣政治的角度認為，中國大陸崛起必然會挑戰美國的全球霸主地位，而台灣作為第一島鏈的核心，只有拿下台灣才能讓大陸打破美國構築的第一島鏈防線，從而徹底改變全球地緣政治格局。

當然，這類言論算不上大陸的主流民意，而且，很多人在主張武統的事後也同時注意到，武統的代價高昂，可能會阻礙大陸崛起的步伐，甚至會讓大陸失去發展的戰略機遇期，因此仍然希望台灣能夠和平統一以避免兩敗俱傷的命運。但武統言論的再度興起卻也說明，越來越多的大陸民眾對台灣的抗統促獨言論感到憤怒，對兩岸政治關係遲遲未有實質突破感到不耐。

台灣民眾更應該反思的是，為何經過幾年的蜜月期之後，兩岸民間的敵意反而有了分化，讓許多原本對台友好的大陸民眾開始出現敵意。這不能簡單的將責任推給大陸民眾，以為對方只是不文明、被洗腦，殊不知這其中有很多人都是行遍全球，有國際視野的菁英階層，他們不僅很方便的掌握全球資訊，更實際參與過兩岸民間互動。

台灣民眾應該意識到，兩岸和平的希望在民間，要想延續兩岸和平互動的現狀，就必須首先珍惜兩岸歷盡艱辛才建立起來的友善、互信基礎，並學會帶著善意看待大陸崛起的事實。相當多的台灣民眾缺乏時不我待的緊迫感，在大陸快速發展的時候，卻不知道自己的優勢也已經在迅速流失，反而只會停留在對過去榮景的懷念之中不能自拔。

人民不能再被政治人物肆意地挑撥，要睜開眼睛做出自己的判斷，要清楚辨別哪些是政治人物建構出來的偽議題，哪些才是真正事關人民前途命運的真問題。

面對大陸的武統言論，台灣民眾不必驚慌失措，畢竟這還只是民間的討論，大陸官方仍然堅持既有的政策基調，盡量不觸碰武力的使用，不僅如此，馬習會上面對馬英九所轉達的撤彈訴求，習近平其實也給予正面回應，後續或許會有更多的友善動作釋放出來，盡量減少台灣民間的緊張氛圍。但台灣人民也應該清醒的認識到，大陸釋放善意的前提是大陸對自己實力日漸增長的自信，正是因為軍事實力的快速躍升，才讓其可以有放鬆軍事對峙氛圍的勇氣。但對台灣來說，卻也意味著兩岸軍事實力對比的快速失衡，台灣面對大陸的軍事籌碼也越來越少，台灣可以挑釁大陸的空間也幾乎不會再有。

在這種情況下，台灣面對大陸的時候，所能做的唯有和平、善意和融入，只有自己首先帶著善意，願意努力融入大陸廣闊市場，才能讓大陸武統失去必要性；唯有和平，台灣才會贏得明天。