DPP Total Rule Means Total Accountability and Total Responsibility

DPP Total Rule Means Total Accountability and Total Responsibility
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 1, 2016

Executive Summary: Total Rule means the DPP must assume total responsibility for any future political developments. Tsai Ing-wen must be psychologically prepared for this. Tsai Ing-wen must expressly declare that according to the Constitution, cross-Strait relations are not relations between different countries. Only this can allay Mainland concerns about her advocacy of the "two states theory”. Only this will enable her to ensure cross-Strait peace.

Full Text Below:

The DPP legislative caucus has approved, by clear acclamation without objection, legislator elect Su Chia-chuan's appointment as Legislative Speaker, and Tsai Chi-chang's appointment as Deputy Legislative Speaker. Party favorite Ko Chien-min, who was endorsed by the New Tide faction, and who fully expected to win the post, was washed away by the rushing waters. This of course was the result of Tsai Ing-wen's last minute intervention.

Su Chia-chuan pledged to abide by the three principles of legislative speaker neutrality. He would refrain from participation in party activities, refrain from assuming any party posts, and refrain from participating in any party-administration coordination activities. He would resign from the DPP Central Standing Committee. He would refrain from taking part in DPP party activities. He promised to comply fully with Tsai Ing-wen's legislative reform blueprint. He clearly demonstrated Tsai Ing-wen's determination. Ko Chien-min has stepped down. Su Chia-chuan has taken his place. This sends an important message regarding Tsai Ing-wen's future rule.

Ma Ying-jeou was never able to implement the reforms he wanted in the Legislative Yuan. He was often unable to even impose his will upon the Executive Yuan. Tsai hopes to avoid the pitfalls of Ma vs. Wang confrontation. Tsai Ing-wen has a totally different leadership style than Ma Ying-jeou. At this critical moment she has forced the New Tide faction to retreat, mollified party elders, and laid down the law for legislative speaker appointments. Her moves have been measured, and reminiscent of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. This, along with Tsai's three principles of legislative neutrality, amounts to a double victory, in image as well as substance. This is important for Tsai Ing-wen. It is also the right thing to do. To this, we give her our blessings. Tsai Ing-wen has already prepped herself for Total Rule.

For Total Rule to be successful however, a right first step is not enough. If Tsai Ing-wen wants Total Rule, her next step must be total commitment and assumption of total responsibility. This is essential. Only then will Tsai Ing-wen's achievements be hers. Only then can her regime rank among those of Merkel and Thatcher.

Take the assumption of total responsibility. The Democratic Progressive Party won both the presidency and the legislature. At the local level, it won 13 counties and municipalities. Its jurisdiction encompasses a population of over 14 million, more than 60% of the entire population. From the central to the local, from the executive to the legislature, the Democratic Progressive Party has achieved Total Rule over Taiwan. Internally, it is unchallengeable. It has absolute power. Therefore it must assume total responsibility and lead Taiwan in the right direction.

Total commitment must also be reflected in domestic and foreign policy. Internally, Tsai Ing-wen must do two things. One. She must take advantage of Total Rule to liberate government policies from mob sentiment. She must restore rationality to policy debates. She must not allow Taiwan to remain a victim of populist sentiment and endless wheel-spinning. Two. She must practice the true spirit of democracy. She must implement majority rule, in order to rectify the mistakes made by past governments. She must show respect for the minority.

Only respect for the minority can mollify the losing party and its supporters, enable Taiwan to avoid vicious blue vs. green tit for tat retaliation, and end the prolonged democratic civil war.

Respect for the minority will be the acid test for Democratic Progressive Party Total Rule. The DPP must swiftly transform its opposition party defects into ruling party virtues. It must not succumb to the temptation to accuse opponents of “selling out Taiwan”, or launch personal attacks. The KMT has suffered a crushing defeat. But the DPP must not seize the opportunity to engage in “search and destroy”. The KMT and DPP are political competitors, not enemies. A robust opposition is indispensable to Taiwan's democracy. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must exercise wisdom in their treatment of political opposition and private dissident.

Now consider external policy, the most important of which is cross-Strait policy. This has long been Tsai Ing-wen's Achilles Heel, and most dangerous challenge. Tsai Ing-wen must do everything possible to ensure peace with the Mainland. Otherwise, even Total Rule will result in a debacle in the event cross-Strait exchanges collapse. Total Rule will become total collapse.

The first obstacle in the way of cross-Strait peace remains the 1992 Consensus. Its historical origins and DPP supporters' emotional baggage make it difficult for the DPP to accept the 1992 Consensus. But none of Tsai Ing-wen's 1992 Consensus word games have succeeded in replacing it. None of her substitutes have won Mainland acceptance. The problem is that Tsai Ing-wen has never addressed the core issue. Just what are cross-Strait relations? Tsai Ing-wen must clearly and unequivocally declare that according to the Constitution of the Republic of China, cross-Strait relations are not international relations. This is enshrined not only in the text of the constitution, but also in the text of the Council of Grand Justices' Constitutional Interpretation No. 329.

Tsai Ing-wen must expressly declare that according to the Constitution, cross-Strait relations are not relations between different countries. Only this can allay Mainland concerns about her advocacy of the "two states theory”. Only this will enable her to ensure cross-Strait peace.

Finally, Total Rule means the DPP must assume total responsibility for any future political developments. Tsai Ing-wen must be psychologically prepared for this. In the past, central and local governments passed the buck to each other. The executive and the legislature passed the buck to each other. In the future, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP will not be able to shirk responsibility. Tsai Ing-wen might as well roll the dice and go all out to create a political legacy for herself.

社論－全面執政就要全面承擔、全面負責
2016年02月01日 04:10 主筆室

民進黨團無異議鼓掌推舉準立委蘇嘉全、蔡其昌角逐立法院正副院長。已取得新潮流系支持、做好參選萬全準備、聲勢最被看好的柯建銘最後急流湧退，這當然與蔡英文在最後關頭強力介入有關。

緊 接著，蘇嘉全宣示將遵守國會議長中立化三原則，不參加政黨活動、不擔任黨職、不參與黨政協調平台，當選後並辭去民進黨中常委，不介入任何民進黨的活動。完 全照著蔡英文的國會改革藍本照本宣科，其顯現的也是清晰的蔡英文意志。柯建銘與蘇嘉全2人的進退，傳遞出蔡英文未來執政的重要訊息。

鑒於 過去馬英九的意志始終無法在立法院貫徹，以致經常發生「令不出行政院」的困境，為了避免馬王互卡的失敗經驗重演，蔡英文採用了和馬英九截然不同的領導風 格，在關鍵時刻勸退新潮流系，擺平黨內大老，強勢決定國會議長的人事。其出手精準確實，頗有德國總理梅克爾與英國前首相柴契爾的魄力身影，再加上新的議長 宣示了蔡英文主張的議長中立化三原則，在立法院長的布局上，可謂裡子面子雙贏。這是蔡英文重要的、也正確的執政起手式，對此，我們給予祝福也給予肯定。蔡 英文已經做好了「全面執政」的準備。

然而，執政要成功，邁出全面執政的正確第一步是不夠的。蔡英文既已做到全面執政，接下來就要做到全面承擔，並負起全面責任。這兩步做到，蔡英文才有可能成就專屬於她、與梅克爾和柴契爾相輝映的治理傳奇。

以全面承擔言，民進黨不只總統國會雙勝，地方也拿下13個執政縣市，所轄人口超過1400萬人，占總人口也超過6成。可謂從中央到地方、從行政到立法全面主導。民進黨既然掌握了台灣內部已經無人能及的絕對權力，就必須全面承擔，帶領台灣走向正確的國家發展方向。

所 謂全面承擔，必須同時反映在對內與對外的兩個面向。對內的部分，蔡英文要做到兩件事。其一，要運用全面執政的優勢，打破台灣過去民粹綁架政府施政的亂象， 引導台灣回到理性的政策之辯，不要讓台灣繼續被民粹情緒拖進無止盡的虛耗與空轉。其二，則要真正實踐民主精神，除了貫徹多數治理以匡正過去政府部門的失能 外，更要能做到「尊重少數」。

唯有落實對少數的尊重，才有可能讓落敗方與其支持者心服，才有可能避免台灣繼續陷在藍綠相互報復的惡性循環，終結長期的民主內戰。

「尊 重少數」對全面執政的民進黨來說是最關鍵，也是最艱鉅的考驗。民進黨得在短時間內把「在野者的慣性」，轉型為「執政者的格局」，首先不能再動輒扣異議者賣 台帽子或進行人身攻擊。同時雖然國民黨慘敗，但不能存著所謂「乘勝追剿」的傲慢。國民黨是民進黨政治上競爭的對手，不是敵人。一個足夠強健的在野黨，更是 台灣民主政治不可或缺的一隻手、一條腿。蔡英文與民進黨必須擁有這樣的高度去看待在野黨，以及民間的異議者。

在對外的部分，最重要的還是兩岸，這始終是蔡英文未來執政最大的罩門、最險的挑戰，蔡英文務必窮盡一切方法，建立與大陸最起碼的和平互動。否則，即便掌握全面執政的巨大權力，兩岸一崩，全面執政將會變成全面崩盤。

兩 岸和平互動的第一道鎖，仍是九二共識之結。民進黨雖有其歷史淵源與支持者情感的包袱，以至於遲遲不肯正面接受九二共識。但蔡英文到目前為止對九二共識的擦 邊或繞彎，仍未能發揮取代九二共識、取得大陸認同的積極作用。關鍵就在蔡英文並沒有一步到位直指核心問題，也就是兩岸關係究竟是什麼關係？蔡英文應清楚、 斷然宣示，依照中華民國憲法，兩岸不是國與國的關係。這一點不但載於憲法文字，也為憲法的解釋機關大法官會議於釋字第329號解釋文所闡明。

只有明確地依憲宣示兩岸不是國與國關係，蔡英文才有可能化解大陸方面對蔡英文是否主張「兩國論」的疑慮。兩岸的和平互動，才有續保的可能。

最後，全面執政，就必須全面承擔，在未來新政局裡，民進黨要負的將是全面責任，蔡英文要有心理準備，過去中央地方互推責任、行政立法相互怪罪的時代結束了，接下來，發生任何問題，蔡英文與民進黨都將無責可推，也無可迴避。就放手一搏，努力建立蔡英文的執政傳奇吧。

South China Sea Sovereignty is a Non-Partisan Matter

South China Sea Sovereignty is a Non-Partisan Matter
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 30, 2016

Executive Summary: In defiance of Washington's objections, President Ma conducted a whirlwind tour of Taiping Island. The island is ROC national territory, located in the South China Sea. Yet DPP legislators, dripping with sarcasm, objected. They dismissed President Ma as a "caretaker president", saying he should not be “making waves in a disputed area”. Disputes over South China Sea island sovereignty rage on. If President Ma does nothing, our sovereign territory could be occupied by foreign powers while no one is minding the store. Is this really what fellow citizens want to see?

Full Text Below:

In defiance of Washington's objections, President Ma conducted a whirlwind tour of Taiping Island. The island is ROC national territory, located in the South China Sea. Yet DPP legislators, dripping with sarcasm, objected. They dismissed President Ma as a "caretaker president", saying he should not be “making waves in a disputed area”. Disputes over South China Sea island sovereignty rage on. If President Ma does nothing, our sovereign territory could be occupied by foreign powers while no one is minding the store. Is this really what fellow citizens want to see?

President Ma chose to visit Taiping Island at this time because the matter is urgent. The Philippines have demanded arbitration by International Court of Arbitration over the Nansha Islands. It is attempting to have the Nansha Islands downgraded to the status of "reefs" unsuitable for human habitation, in order to nullify our territorial sovereignty over Taiping Island. The International Court of Arbitration is likely to render just such a judgment between March and June, precisely during the handover of power. President Ma chose to visit Taiping Island to show the world that the island is large enough to be habitable, and to show that the island has been ours for a very long time.

The Philippines demand for arbitration is disingenuous. Manila wants all “high tide elevations” in the South China Sea, i.e., all land above water at high tide, to be classified as “reefs”, not islands.  This includes Chung-yeh Island, which the Philippines seized from the ROC several decades ago. If this happens, all EEZs in territorial waters surrounding such islands, out to 200 nautical miles, will be null and void. The starting points for EEZs would be moved to the Philippines coast. This is how the Philippines hopes to embark on territorial expansion.

We are one of six South China Sea claimant countries. But our diplomatic status is limited. We have few channels by which we can express ourselves. This is why President Ma personally visited the island, drank from its wells, fed goats, and burned incense at a local temple. His visit demonstrated that we have inhabited the island since antiquity. He did this to attract international media attention, and to demonstrate that our sovereignty over Taiping Island is hard reality.

As president of the Republic of China, defending its territorial sovereignty is his highest duty. How can there possibly be a “caretaker period” for this? If President Ma did nothing, and allowed a court of international arbitration to rule against us, that would constitute a gross dereliction of duty. Besides, in 2008, Chen Shui-bian, in his capacity as president, visited the island. The South China Sea sovereignty dispute is even more serious today. President Ma can hardly sit idly by. Our territorial sovereignty must not be violated. Every citizen must support this without petty partisan political concerns.

President Ma was originally scheduled to visit Taiping Island last year. US arms sales were just around the corner. As a result, he yielded to AIT pressure. Washington strongly opposed Ma's recent visit for two reasons. One. It feared his visit would lead to a succession of such visits by heads of state from other countries, leading to increased tensions in the South China Sea. Two. President Ma's visit to the island coincided with US Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Beijing. Kerry was preparing to negotiate with Beijing over South China Sea island and reef land reclamation and militarization. The timing was sensitive. The AIT was embarrassed. Washington wondered whether the two sides were working hand in glove. Therefore its tone was particularly harsh.

In any event, our national policy cannot be subject to foreign meddling. The ROC has its own national interests and national dignity. Neither current President Ma Ying-jeou nor future President Tsai Ing-wen, may equate US interests with ROC interests. The ROC is one of the claimant countries in the South China Sea sovereignty dispute. But we have no voice during international negotiations. We have no seat at the negotiating table. We must make ourselves visible however we can. Only then can we avoid being sidelined and sacrificed.

In fact, Washington and its allies are not always on the same page. From time to time the US and Israel publicly criticize each other. But as allies, their relationship remains strong. Momentary discord does not necessarily lead to a complete break. Ma Ying-jeou will step down in May. Washington will seek cooperation with the new president. This crisis will blow over.

President Ma visited the island for another reason. He hopes the new government will continue to defend our national territory and national interests in the South China Sea. But will Tsai Ing-wen do so? Wil she do so in full measure? The Presidential Office notified the DPP ahead of time. It hoped Tsai Ing-wen would assign representatives to accompany Ma to Taiping Island. The offer was rejected. The DPP feared it would be seen as agreeing with the Ma government's South China Sea policy. Its attitude is easy to understand. The election just ended. Tsai Ing-wen wants to distinguish her “new mandate” from the Ma government's. But this is a matter of national territory and national sovereignty. The DPP really has no alternative.

The South China Sea matter is becoming increasingly complex. Our government can find little new to talk about. It can stress the importance of defending Taiping Island. It can call for the peaceful settlement of disputes. It can reaffirm the history of the South China Sea and the ten dotted line. Most importantly however, it must maintain a delicate balance between the different forces in the struggle, in order not to lose its own goals and autonomy. The Tsai Ing-wen government can pay more attention to Washington. It can avoid frontal collisions. It can refuse to sing the same tune as the Mainland. But its position must be the same as the Ma government's.

The Philippines have presented a challenge with its demand for international arbitration. The president must stand up against any actions detrimental to ROC sovereignty and interests, regardless of blue vs. green party affiliation. So must all of our citizens.

聯合／維護南海主權是不分黨派的責任
2016-01-30 03:27 聯合報 聯合報社論

冒著美國反對的逆風，馬總統旋風式地訪視國土南疆太平島。若干民進黨立委則連譏帶諷反對，認為馬總統是「看守總統」，不宜在爭議地區大張旗鼓。然而，正當太平島主權問題驚濤洶湧，馬總統若毫無作為，可能使我國固有疆域在政治「空窗期」為人所奪，這難道是國人樂見之事？

馬 總統選在此際訪視太平島，主要是時間上的緊迫。由於菲律賓向國際仲裁法庭提出南沙諸島的仲裁案，企圖要將太平島降格為「岩礁」，而非適宜人居的島嶼，以否 定我國對太平島的領土權。國際仲裁法庭快則三月、慢則六月，可能將就此作出判決，正落在我國新舊政權交接之際。馬總統毅然登島，就是要向世人展示太平島的 規模和環境為宜居島嶼，以及我國長期經營該島的事實。

菲律賓提出這項仲裁是居心叵測。馬尼拉所期待的裁定是：南海所有的「高潮高地」── 即在高潮時露出水面的陸地，都不算島嶼，而只是岩礁，其中包括數十年前菲國奪自我國手中的「中業島」在內。如此一來，所有島嶼周邊起算的兩百海里經濟水域 都將被取消，經濟海域的起算基準將移至菲律賓沿岸，這是其擴張領土的如意盤算。

儘管我國是南海六個「聲索國」（Claimant Country）之一，但因外交地位局限，無適當表達意見之管道。因此，馬總統才要親自登島，嘗井水，餵山羊，廟宇上香，表明島上自古以來就有人居住。如此，才能吸引國際媒體關注，彰顯我國擁有並實質統治太平島的事實。

作 為中華民國總統，捍衛領土主權是最高義務，這豈能有看守期？如果馬總統毫不作為，任由國際仲裁法庭做出對我不利的裁定，那才是嚴重瀆職。何況，二○○八年 陳水扁也曾以總統身分登島；而今天南海的主權爭議險峻程度又更甚於當時，馬總統不能坐視不管。從領土及主權不容侵犯的角度看，國民應該不分黨派地支持此 事。

馬總統原訂去年底訪視太平島，當時因美國軍售案宣布在即，他接受了美國在台協會之勸阻。此次美國大聲反對，一則怕引發鄰國元首仿效， 增高南海的緊張；二則是馬總統登島之時適逢美國務卿凱瑞訪問北京，正準備就大陸在南海造島及軍事化等問題與中方協商。正因時機敏感，ＡＩＴ難免尷尬，又懷 疑兩岸是否刻意應和，發言語氣便格外嚴峻。

無論如何，我國政策不能受外國干預或左右，中華民國有自己的國格與國家利益，身為總統，無論是 現在的馬英九，或即將接手的蔡英文，都不應該以為美國的利益就是台灣的利益。何況，台灣雖是南海主權聲索國之一，但我們在國際協商的談判桌上並無發言之 地，必須要設法製造自己的能見度，才不會被悄悄淹沒或犧牲。

事實上，美國與盟邦的立場未必永遠一致，它和以色列之間更是不時公開批評；但既是盟邦，就有強固的關係，不會因為一時一事齟齬就撕破臉。馬英九五月卸任，美國要尋求與新總統合作，此一風波很快就會過去。

馬 總統登島的另一目的，是希望新政府能夠延續此一政策，繼續維護我國在南海的領土及利益。問題是，蔡英文會全盤接收嗎？總統府行前曾通知民進黨，希望蔡英文 指派代表同赴太平島，卻遭到婉拒。民進黨擔心的是，如果派人同行，將被外界解讀為同意馬政府的南海政策。這樣的態度，似也不難理解：大選剛結束，蔡英文恃 其新民意付託，或許希望採取有別於馬政府的政策。然而，在領土及主權問題上，民進黨終究沒有太多其他選擇。

夾在日益複雜的南海形勢中，我 國政府能談的，除了強調保衛太平島，宣示和平解決紛爭，以及重申南海十一段線的歷史，其實很難發展出什麼新詞新意。重要的是，要懂得在不同勢力的角力中保 持巧妙的平衡，才不會失去自己的目標和自主性。唯一不同是，蔡英文政府可能更重視美國的意見，不會正面衝撞，也不會留下和大陸「唱和」的印象，但立場和馬 政府應該是一樣的。

面對菲律賓在國際仲裁法庭的挑戰，任何有損中華民國主權及利益的行為，無論藍綠，中華民國總統都必須挺身捍衛，國民亦然。

Taiping Island: We Must Defend Our National Interests

Taiping Island: We Must Defend Our National Interests
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 28, 2016

Executive Summary: President Ma visited Taiping Island. He declared our sovereignty over the island. The pressure he was forced to endure far exceeded any experienced by Chen Shui-bian. Taiwan is under seige, both from within and without. The public on Taiwan must forsake partisan prejudices. President Ma's visit to Taiping Island deserves high praise. It had nothing to do with "pandering to [Mainland] China". It had nothing to do with "selling out Taiwan". It has only to do with defending the dignity and sovereignty of the Republic of China, and maintaining cross-Strait peace.

Full Text Below:

President Ma has finally traveled to Taiping Island and declared our sovereignty over the island. The need to defend our territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea is self-evident. But the political pressure is relentless. Vietnam has lodged a protest. The American Institute in Taiwan, as well as Evan Medeiros, former White House National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs, have both expressed their disappointment to President Ma. President elect Tsai Ing-wen refused to express solidarity between the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan by sending someone to accompany President Ma.

When a head of state travels about on his own nation's territory, he should not have to endure foreign meddling. Yet last year, when President Ma planned to visit Taiping Island, Washington interfered and forced President Ma to cancel his visit. Washington said that the timing was too sensitive, and that the visit would send the wrong message, and would not contribute to the peaceful settlement of South China Sea disputes.

The South China Sea dispute is complicated. Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries have claimed sovereignty over the region. As a result, the Mainland has intensified its construction projects on South China Sea islands and reefs. The United States, motivated by strategic considerations, has also returned to Asia. This has increased the militarization of the South China Sea. Ironically, Taiwan is noticeably absent from the picture. Military confrontation between Washington and Beijing has recently intensified. Tensions have risen. The United States is strong arming neighboring countries to join its military alliance. The Philippines has already chosen sides. Japan may join as well. Even Vietnam, the Mainland's ideological ally, is flirting with the idea. Its position however, remains ambiguous. Clearly Vietnam hopes the US will counter the Mainland. Taipei is under increasing pressure to choose sides.

Taipei finds itself caught between major powers. Its situation is awkward. First. Taiping Island belongs to the Republic of China. According to the ROC Constitution, the South China Sea is an integral part of its traditional territory. Second. The United States is Taiwan's chief guarantor of security. Taipei cannot afford discord with Washington. Also, given improvements in cross-Strait relations, Taipei cannot afford confrontation with Beijing either, particularly on the South China Sea dispute. Cross-Strait cooperation on the dispute may not exist. But our claims overlap. The Ma government has an implicit understanding with the Mainland authorities. Taipei and Beijing have an implicit strategy of mutual support, but one without clear form.

Such is Taipei's dilemma in the South China Sea.  We have territorial sovereignty. But Washington objects. Beijing is aggressively defending its territorial sovereignty. Taipei must defend its territorial sovereignty as well, but cannot afford to offend either Washington or Beijing. Otherwise it will find itself in dire straits. Taipei is being marginalized in the South China Sea dispute. If this marginalization persists, its voice in the Taiping Island and even South China Sea dispute will be drowned out and supplanted by others. This is highly detrimental to our security and sovereignty. Given the tense international environment, President Ma's visit to Taiping Island, and defense of our territorial sovereignty was even more critical, and deserves high praise.

In fact, Taiping Island poses an increasingly obvious risk. Last year, the Philippines submitted 15 claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the United Nations. One claim alleged that Taiping Island is a reef, not an island. Last year, this claim was recognized by the tribunal. According to the ruling, Taiping Island is a reef, based on paragraph 3, Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Allegedly it cannot sustain human habitation or economic activity, therefore cannot have an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This means that Taipei will lose the 200 nautical mile EEZ surrounding the island, and is also likely to lose sovereignty over the territory within the 11 dotted line.

In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a rare statement of protest. President Ma visited Taiping Island, determined to reaffirm our sovereignty. Last year President Ma posted a comment on Facebook. He showed a box lunch containing vegetables grown on Taiping Island. He showed that the island not only had fresh water, it could support the cultivation of fruits and vegetables, and even human life, and was in full compliance with the provisions of UNCLOS.

But publicity alone is insufficient. In the South China Sea dispute, real power is the final arbiter. In this regard, Taipei can rely only on its own military hardware. It cannot expect good faith from neighboring countries or mediation from Washington. The most chilling aspect of this however, is cynical attacks from within Taiwan, by parties oblivious to Taiwan's quandary. Perhaps the DPP believes that only strategic intervention by the United States can ensure our security. Perhaps it thinks the South China Sea dispute is none of Taiwan's concern. If so, it is monumentally mistaken.

Consider cross-Strait relations. The new government must take the Taiping Island dispute and South China Sea dispute seriously. Tsai Ing-wen may not understand why the Mainland is able to trust the KMT. It is not merely because the KMT constantly reaffirms 1992 Consensus. Another reason is that President Ma has never relinquished ROC claims over territory within the 11 dotted line. This provides an important legal foundation for PRC claims over territory within the nine dotted line. President Ma has never coordinated directly with the Mainland. But he has provided the Mainland with strategic support on another level. If Tsai fails to understand this, and refuses to support President Ma's difficult balancing act, she will suffer the consequences of her own ignorance.

President Ma visited Taiping Island. He declared our sovereignty over the island. The pressure he was forced to endure far exceeded any experienced by Chen Shui-bian. Taiwan is under seige, both from within and without. The public on Taiwan must forsake partisan prejudices. President Ma's visit to Taiping Island deserves high praise. It had nothing to do with "pandering to [Mainland] China". It had nothing to do with "selling out Taiwan". It has only to do with defending the dignity and sovereignty of the Republic of China, and maintaining cross-Strait peace.

太平島 台灣要堅持自己的國家利益

2016年01月29日 中國時報

馬總統終於前往太平島宣示太平島主權，對捍衛南海主權的正面價值不言而喻，但承受的壓力也接踵而至。越南提出抗議，美國在台協會及前白宮國安會亞洲事務資深主任麥艾文都對馬總統表示失望，準總統蔡英文也拒絕派人隨行，共同表達台灣朝野的立場。

一國元首在本國領土活動，本不應受到他國的干擾，但去年馬總統規畫太平島之行時，就遭到美國大力阻撓，迫使馬總統未能成行。美國反對的理由是「敏感時刻釋放錯誤訊息、對南海紛爭的和平解決沒有貢獻」。

南海問題非常複雜，越南、菲律賓等多國均聲稱擁有主權，大陸因而加緊建設南海島礁，美國也在重返亞洲戰略指導下，擴大在南海區域的軍事動能，台灣在其中反而是最沒有存在感的一員。近來隨著美中兩強權軍事抗衡增溫，緊張局勢不斷升高，美國拉攏周邊國家加入同盟力度也不斷加大，不僅菲律賓完全選邊站，日本也有擴大參與之勢，甚至中國大陸意識形態盟友越南也跟美國眉來眼去，態度曖昧。顯然，越南正引入美國勢力來制衡大陸，戰略大局逼迫台灣面臨愈來愈緊迫的選邊壓力。

夾雜在大國角力中，台灣角色尷尬，一方面，太平島主權屬於中華民國，依據《憲法》南海屬於我國傳統疆界範圍，二方面美國是台灣安全最大戰略保證，台灣承受不起跟美國齟齬的代價，而隨著兩岸關係的改善，台灣也不想輕易跟大陸對抗，更何況在南海問題上，兩岸雖然沒有合作，但主張重疊，某種程度上馬政府跟大陸方面存在著高度默契，在實質上隱含著戰略的互相支援，只是沒有明確表態和形諸於外的行動而已。

這是台灣在南海問題上的尷尬，主權屬於我國，但美國強力介入，大陸也以積極行動維護主權，台灣既要維護主權卻不能得罪任何一方，否則都會讓自己陷入緊張境地。但問題在於，如果台灣繼續在南海爭議中被邊緣化，那麼未來台灣在太平島的主權維護乃至整個南海議題的話語權，都將漸漸被他國所排擠，這無疑對台灣的安全和主權尊嚴都極為不利。在緊張的國際環境下，馬總統赴太平島為主權發聲，更顯彌足珍貴，應該給予掌聲。

事實上，太平島的潛在危機已經益發凸顯。去年菲律賓向聯合國常設仲裁法庭提交15項訴求，其中包括裁定太平島只是礁岩而不是島嶼，去年底這一訴求得到仲裁法庭的認可。按照這一裁定，太平島將被認定為礁岩，而根據《聯合國海洋法公約》第121條第三款的規定，不能維持人類居住或其本身的經濟活動的礁岩，不應有專屬經濟區，這就意味著台灣將失去太平島周邊200浬的專屬經濟區，更可能進一步失去十一段線的海洋主權。

為此，外交部罕見地決定發表聲明表達反對意見，馬總統也決心親赴太平島宣示主權。去年馬總統還在臉書上秀出來自太平島的蔬菜便當，宣示島上不僅可以有淡水，而且可以種植蔬菜水果，可以進行充分的人類活動，完全符合海洋法公約的規定。

但僅進行宣傳行動還遠遠不夠，在南海爭端中最仰賴的還是實力原則，台灣在這方面也只能依靠自己加強軍備，無法奢望周邊國家的善意和美國的調停。令人寒心的是，台灣內部仍然充滿冷嘲熱諷，卻絲毫不考慮台灣身處夾縫中的困難處境。或許民進黨認為，只需要配合美國的戰略行動就可以維護自身的安全，至於南海問題本就不是台灣的當務之急，這無疑是大錯特錯。

就兩岸關係而言，新政府對太平島與南海問題態度必須慎重。蔡英文或許無法理解，為何大陸可以跟國民黨累積互信，這並非國民黨不斷宣示九二共識那麼簡單，長期以來，馬總統雖然沒配合大陸的南海行動，但也從未棄守大陸九段線主張的最重要依據──中華民國的十一段線主張，這在另一個層面是對大陸的戰略支援。如果蔡英文不能理解其中的奧妙，而對馬總統的平衡舉動不加借鑑，恐怕未來要承受這種無知的苦果。

如今馬總統親赴太平島宣示主權，其承受的壓力遠比阿扁當時大得多，值此內憂外患之時，台灣社會應該摒棄黨派成見，對馬總統的登島之行給予掌聲，這無涉「親中」，更非「賣台」，而是維護中華民國的主權與尊嚴及兩岸的互信與和平。

Tsai Ing-wen: Incrementalism in the Face of Cross-Strait Crisis

Tsai Ing-wen: Incrementalism in the Face of Cross-Strait Crisis
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 28, 2016

Executive Summary: The presidential election has ended. But the future of cross-Strait relations remains a giant question mark. The Mainland appears to be exercising restraint and maintaining a low profile. It has yet to speak ill of President elect Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP. Xi Jinping warned that “the ground will move and the mountains will shake” before the election. So far the surface of the water remains smooth, showing no signs of disturbance. Such restraint is appropriate, and deserves affirmation.

Full Text Below:

The presidential election has ended. But the future of cross-Strait relations remains a giant question mark. The Mainland appears to be exercising restraint and maintaining a low profile. It has yet to speak ill of President elect Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP. Xi Jinping warned that “the ground will move and the mountains will shake” before the election. So far the surface of the water remains smooth, showing no signs of disturbance. Such restraint is appropriate, and deserves affirmation.

But is this merely the calm before the storm? A calm surface does not necessarily mean the absence of powerful undercurrents. People are worried that a storm is brewing, one that will not wait until Tsai Ing-wen's May 20 inauguration. Starting in February, the Ma administration will officially become a caretaker government. The Mainland's Taiwan policy is likely to undergo fundamental change. The situation is dangerous. People cannot afford to remain ignorant. The victorious Democratic Progressive Party must eliminate the danger.

The danger manifests itself on several levels. Take the 1992 Consensus, for example. Before and after the election, Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly fine-tuned her rhetoric in an effort to move closer to the 1992 Consensus. President elect Tsai knows full well that the 1992 Consensus is the cornerstone of cross-Strait relations. Without this cornerstone, not only will the “ground move and mountains shake”, even her precious executive power could come tumbling down.

Tsai Ing-wen has been incrementally "fine tuning" her cross-Strait rhetoric. The Mainland has neither affirmed or condemned her for this. It has however, flatly reiterated its pro forma response: "We insist on adherence to the 1992 Consensus and oppose any form of Taiwan independence. We resolutely safeguard our national sovereignty and territorial integrity". Not only has the Mainland's tone become icy cold, its Taiwan policy has also become harsher. Take Ma Ying-jeou's three cross-Strait achievements for example. They include Mainland tourism to Taiwan, ECFA, and direct cross-Strait airline flights. Direct cross-Strait airlines flights have yet to be affected. But reports are that Mainland tourism will be sharply curtailed. This means the 200 billion dollars in annual expenditures by Mainland tourists will take a hit. Sheng Chi-jen, general manager of the Yun Lang Tourism Group, has warned of hotels closing down. If current cross-Strait negotiations are terminated, can they be restored? That will depend on the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations under review in the legislature, and whether the DPP will ram through its "two states theory" version. It will also depend of course on whether the Mainland side remains willing.

These alerts paint a worrisome picture. The Mainland appears resolute. It will take any and all steps necessary. In the past, the Mainland's cross-Strait policy took into account the US factor, the Taiwan factor, and good will towards the Kuomintang. The importance of these three factors has sharply declined. The only difference is the Mainland has not yet dispensed with decorum when confronted by the new DPP controlled legislature and new DPP president. Taiwan will soon face ever increasing pressure. This is something people cannot take lightly.

Defusing this critical situation requires goodwill and macro level calculations on the part of the Mainland. Even more importantly, it requires action on the part of Tsai Ing-wen. First, Tsai Ing-wen must abandon her intentionally indecipherable cross-Strait policy stance. On the matter of the 1992 consensus in particular, she cannot keep playing her “What's my bottom line?” guessing game. Tsai Ing-wen must step up to the plate and clearly articulate her position on the 1992 Consensus. Just what are cross-Strait relations to her? State to state relations? Special state to state relations? One country, two areas? Or relations between two warring nations?

The Mainland's bottom line is crystal clear. It will not accept the "1992 Spirit" or "1992 historical fact" word games. As the Mainland sees it, one either uses the term "1992 Consensus", or the far more explicit term “one China”.

Tsai Ing-wen must not miscalculate. She must not assume that the Ma caretaker government will provide her with a four-month buffer. One reason is that Tsai Ing-wen refuses to budge even an inch on the matter of a majority party cabinet. She does not want to establish a constitutional precedent. But the main reason is that she is clearly unprepared to take over. On cross-Strait relations in particular, she has no desire to go head to head with the Mainland. As a result, she wants Ma Ying-jeou to continue acting as a human shield for the next four months.

Such calculations ignore the risk of Taiwan remaining idle. They reveal an absence of statesmanship. Tsai Ing-wen overestimates the Ma government's ability to serve as a human shield. Ma Ying-jeou will soon walk off the political stage. That is inevitable, and already in sight. Will the Mainland really feel any qualms about taking punitive action? Will it really feel constrained? Tsai Ing-wen has already rejected the option of a majority cabinet. Ma Ying-jeou has already yielded. He has appointed Chang San-cheng caretaker Premier. Tsai Ing-wen must take advantage of this four-month caretaker period to do several things. First. She must step up to the plate and settle her differences with the Mainland over the 1992 Consensus. The two sides can use different rhetoric. But the nature of cross-Strait relations must be crystal clear. Second. She must earnestly call for "non-state to state relations" wording in the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. She must communicate with the Mainland through multiple channels, and establish a basis for trust. Third. She must use the four-month transition period to promote reconciliation between the blue and green camps, increasing internal unity. Only that will enable a unified response, and enable us to weather the storm. It would at least be better than disunity. Fourth. She must confront the younger generation's rising “natural Taiwan independence” and anti-Mainland sentiment. She must cool things down,  while considering the feelings of people on the  Mainland. She must find the middle ground between “Taiwan First!” consciousness and the “Chinese Dream”. She must meld wisdom with tolerance.

兩岸新危局 蔡英文還在切香腸？

2016年01月28日 中國時報

總統大選結束到現在，兩岸政治關係前景依然不明，大陸方面顯得低調自制，對蔡英文準總統與民進黨並無惡言，呈現風平浪靜景象，並未出現習近平選前說的「地動山搖」。這樣的自制是正確的，也值得肯定。

然而，風平浪靜是否只是山雨欲來前的片刻平靜？表面的平靜並不代表海面下不是洶洶暗流。平靜中卻讓人擔心，真正的風暴正在醞釀中，而且可能不用等到蔡英文5月20日就職，從2月馬政府正式進入看守期間，大陸對台政策恐怕就會有根本性的改變。對此一險峻情勢，國人不能懵懂，贏得執政的民進黨，更須拿出積極行動化險於未然。

這樣的險峻，反映在幾個層面上。以「九二共識」為例，蔡英文從選前到選後，不斷的透過多次微調，試圖貼近「九二共識」。顯然蔡準總統也很清楚，九二共識是兩岸關係的關鍵基石，基石不在，不只兩岸關係地動山搖，她風光贏來的執政權也可能天崩地裂。

對於蔡英文切香腸式的「微調」，大陸既不否定，也未肯定，而是行禮如儀的回到三段論：「堅持九二共識、反對任何形式的台獨、堅決維護國家主權和領土完整。」不只是言語冷漠，在政策行動面上，緊縮式的行動已悄然展開，以馬英九在兩岸3個指標建樹為例：「陸客來台、各項兩岸協議、兩岸直航」，除了兩岸直航目前沒有受波及，陸客來台已傳出大幅緊縮，意謂每年2000億元的陸客消費收入將受到重創，雲朗觀光集團總經理盛治仁已發出旅館倒閉潮的警訊。目前進行中的各項兩岸協議的談判，實質上也陷入全面停擺，能不能恢復，一則要看立法院審議「兩岸協議監督條例」，民進黨會不會強行通過藏有「兩國論」內涵的版本，另一方面當然要看陸方的意願。

這些警訊交織出讓人憂心的畫面，大陸方面似乎顯得心意堅定，會依自己需要與步驟片面行動，過去大陸在決定兩岸政策時，受美國因素、台灣因素、對國民黨感情這「三因素牽絆」的考量似在大幅下降。所差的只是，在民進黨的新國會或新總統走馬上任前，還沒有撕破臉。這將讓台灣未來面臨的壓力愈來愈大。這是國人不能掉以輕心的地方。

欲解此危局，除了涉及陸方善意與全局考量外，更重要是蔡英文的行動。首先，蔡英文必須揚棄過去「猶抱琵琶半遮面」、模糊的兩岸態度。尤其在九二共識的問題上，不能再玩擠牙膏式的「底線猜謎」遊戲。蔡英文必須一步到位，清楚的在九二共識問題上表達立場。兩岸關係究竟是什麼關係？國與國關係？特殊國與國關係？一國兩區關係？或敵對關係？

陸方的底線很清楚，不會接受「九二精神」、「九二歷史事實」這類擦邊球式的文字遊戲，陸方要的是「九二共識」所代表的兩岸關係，不用九二共識名詞，就必須直接面對「一中」問題。

蔡英文不該誤判，算計馬政府的看守期可以幫她贏得4個月的緩衝。在多數黨組閣議題上，蔡英文一步不讓，除了不想創下「憲政慣例」外，最大的原因，顯然是還沒準備好，特別是「兩岸關係」，她不想立刻面臨兩岸的攤牌，於是想讓馬英九繼續當4個月的人肉盾牌。

這樣的算計，未顧念台灣空轉的風險，缺少政治家的格局，同時，蔡英文也高估了馬政府當人肉盾牌的能力。馬英九走下政治舞台已是近在眼前的必然，大陸還會有多少的懸念與掣肘？然而，蔡英文既然已做出拒絕多數黨組閣的選擇，馬英九也已讓步任命張善政為看守閣揆，那就請蔡英文好好把握這4個月的馬政府看守期，做好3件事。　　一是，一步到位解決與大陸的「九二共識」歧異，論述包裝可以各表，兩岸關係的定位卻需要清晰。二是，認真推動「非國與國關係」的「兩岸協議監督條例」，並透過多管道與大陸溝通，建立信任基礎。三是，好好利用4個月過渡期促成「藍綠和解」，內部團結度高，才有整體力量去因應，才有機會越過難關，至少好過分散分裂。四是，面對台灣年輕世代高漲的天然獨與反中情緒，必須擔當降溫者，同時要顧及大陸人民情感，在台灣主體意識與中國夢之間找到中間帶，找到有智慧、能包容的接融點。

Tsai Ing-wen's “Team Taiwan” Must Include Taiwan Businessmen

Tsai Ing-wen's “Team Taiwan” Must Include Taiwan Businessmen
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 27, 2016

Executive Summary: The newly elected Legislative Yuan will convene on February 1. The DPP will enjoy a legislative majority. This will present a major challenge for cross-Strait relations. We hope the DPP legislative caucus will look after Taiwan businessmen as the first step in its cross-Strait policy optimization. As for the KMT caucus, it should stand behind Taiwan businessmen, as it always has.

Full Text Below:

The newly elected Legislative Yuan will convene on February 1. The DPP will enjoy a legislative majority. This will present a major challenge for cross-Strait relations. We hope the DPP legislative caucus will look after Taiwan businessmen as the first step in its cross-Strait policy optimization. As for the KMT caucus, it should stand behind Taiwan businessmen, as it always has.

We are making this appeal because Taiwan businessmen were treated like outsiders during the recent presidential and legislative elections. Also, the election results may alienate Taiwan businessmen.  Therefore we remind the two major parties, as well as other parties in the legislature. Keep Taiwan businessmen in your hearts. Remain their staunch advocates. After all, Taiwan businessmen are members of the Taiwan public. Their contribution to Taiwan's economy is immense.

Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland played a minuscule role in the recent elections. One leader of Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland named Lin returned to Tainan to run for legislator. But he lost by a landslide. The two largest parties, the DPP and KMT, nominated legislators at large, including overseas representatives of Taiwan businessmen. But none of them were Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland. Only 100,000 Taiwan businessmen returned to Taiwan to vote. They had virtually no impact on the election.

During the recent election, the DPP won both the presidency and a controlling majority in the legislature. It now enjoys “Total Rule”. This worries many Taiwan businessmen. Cross-Strait relations may be destabilized. Even more importantly, their individual rights may be jeopardized if Taiwan's political arena no longer comes to their aid. The DPP has long demonized Taiwan businessmen. Will the DPP change its attitude? Taiwan businessmen are deeply concerned.

Taiwan businessmen are particularly interested in the the follow-up agreement to ECFA, i.e., the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.
Continued promotion requires the DPP to take the lead. If the DPP refuses, or complicates matters, it will set back the transformation and upgrading of Taiwan businessmens' industries.

The two sides have already signed the STA, or Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services. But it remains stuck pending review by the newly elected Legislative Yuan. Now that the DPP has won the election, it has new plans for the legislature. It intends first to pass the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations, then review the STA. The DPP has already called for passage of the Oversight Regulations as one of its first acts in the legislature. But will it drag in the issue of the two sides' political status, as it has always? Will it delay the legislative process? That remains to be seen. DPP Legislative Yuan heavyweights have suggested that the STA may need to be “renegotiated". This leaves a huge question mark. Those in the know, realize that the Mainland must be satisfied with how cross-Strait relations are defined. Otherwise resuming STA negotiations will be impossible.

The Ma government has completed negotiations on most items in the MTA. Further negotiation is required only on a few key items. When will the MTA be signed? When will the “final mile” be reached? That depends on Tsai Ing-wen, DPP President-elect. It depends on whether she is willing to clearly recognize the 1992 Consensus. If she is not, the MTA is likely to remain stalled. At the very least, the Mainland side will substantially increase its "ask", leaving our side overwhelmed.

Does the DPP intend to look after Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland? If so, it should implement the ECFA follow-up agreement. It should avoid renegotiating the STA from scratch. It should adopt the current version. It should also adopt the concurrently proposed Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. The ball is currently in Taiwan's court. To implement it, the Legislative Yuan need only follow legislative procedure. Doing so will help Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland. Doing so will help the two sides reach final agreement on the MTA.

The DPP legislative caucus must look after Taiwan businessmen. It must pass the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. It must adopt the current version of the STA. It must listen to Taiwan businessmen. It must invite representatives of Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland to convey their desires to the legislature, as important points of reference.

The DPP legislative caucus must take the interests of Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland to heart. If it does, it will have something in common with the KMT legislative caucus. This could ease past partisan bickering. It could show that the DPP has improved its cross-Strait policy, that it has forsaken populist demagoguery, and is now dealing with ECFA, so badly needed by Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland.

Recently Tsai Ing-wen was in Hsinchu County thanking voters for their support. She said “Taiwanese” should unite to form a powerful "Team Taiwan". If so, Taiwan businessmen should be key members of her call for unity. The DPP must look after Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland. It must offer a new vision of cross-Strait relations.

小英台灣隊不能缺大陸台商

2016年01月27日 中國時報

新一屆立法院2月1日就要成立，新立法院政黨結構由民進黨占多數，將是兩岸關係的一大挑戰。我們期待，立院民進黨團應積極照顧大陸台商，作為該黨「優化」其兩岸政策的第一步。至於國民黨團，自應一如既往，力挺台商。

我們之所以提出這樣的呼籲，是鑒於大陸台商在這次總統和立委大選中，彷如局外人，且選舉結果，亦可能使大陸台商疏離於台灣政治圈；因而要提醒立法院的兩大黨及其他各政黨，在立法工作中，務必把大陸台商放在心裡，且應該要為台商權益強力發聲，畢竟，大陸台商是不折不扣的台籍民眾，且對台灣經濟影響很大。

大陸台商在這次大選中的角色地位甚為微小，雖有一位在大陸擔任台商團體幹部的林姓台商，回台南參選區域立法委員，但以很大票數差距敗選。民、國兩大黨提名的不分區立委名單，各有一位海外台商代表，但都不是大陸台商。這次大陸台商回台投票不足10萬人，對選情幾無影響力。

這次大選結果，民進黨在總統、立委選舉皆大勝，將全面執政。這使頗多大陸台商感到憂心忡忡，除擔心兩岸關係震盪不安外，更擔心自己的切身權益保障事項，在台灣政壇已無奧援。他們也想起，民進黨過去對待大陸台商，曾有非常尖銳的負面評價；現在的民進黨能否大幅調整以往的態度，他們心中仍有不小的憂慮。

具體來說，當前台商權益相關事項，最關鍵的是ECFA（《兩岸經濟合作架構協議》）後續協議的推動工作，需要民進黨方面接棒進行；要是民進黨意願不高，或是橫生枝節，將重挫台商持續發展及轉型升級的動能。

其中，《兩岸服務貿易協議》早已由兩岸雙方簽署，目前還「卡關」在立院，正待新一屆立院予以審議。民進黨勝選後新訂定的立法計畫，是要先進行《兩岸協議監督條例》的立法，再據此審查《兩岸服貿協議》。雖然民進黨已將上述《監督條例》，列為首批立法項目之一，但是否會在立法伊始，就扯出兩岸政治定位爭議，而導致立法進程遲滯，目前是未知數。甚至，民進黨立法院重要人士放話，《服貿協議》要「重啟談判」，更是一大變數。明眼人皆知，除非兩岸關係定位達成令陸方滿意的共識，要重啟服貿談判，是不可能實現的。

至於《兩岸貨品貿易協議》，馬政府目前已完成大多數貨品類項的談判，只剩下少數關鍵類項，尚需雙方討價還價一番。《兩岸貨貿協議》洽簽的「最後一哩路」，何時可以開步到達終點，端視民進黨的總統當選人蔡英文，何時能就是否針對認同九二共識問題，提出更明確的正面說法。若無，《兩岸貨貿協議》洽簽工作很可能會停擺下去，至少陸方會大幅提高「要價」，使我方難以招架。

當前民進黨若有意願照顧大陸台商，應該致力推動落實兩岸ECFA後續協議。其中，《兩岸服貿協議》若能不重啟談判，而沿用既有版本，則連同其前提性的《兩岸協議監督條例》，目前均是操之在台方，只要立院通過相關立法程序，即可正式實施；這樣不但能使大陸台商早日獲益，也會正面影響《兩岸貨貿協議》的最後洽簽議程。

無論如何，民進黨立法院新黨團，有必要高舉「照顧台商利益」大旗，且以此原則來進行《兩岸協議監督條例》的立法，及據此接受及審議《兩岸服貿協議》既成版本；過程中應該多多舉辦大陸台商聽證會，分批邀請大陸台商代表，來立法院表述心聲和願望，以作為重要的立法參據。

立法院民進黨團若能對大陸台商權益「念茲在茲」，那就和國民黨團有了交集，可望緩和以往慣見的「政黨惡鬥」，也表示民進黨的兩岸政策有了創新及優化的內容。切莫再用泛政治化的民粹眼光，去看待大陸台商亟需的《兩岸經貿合作協議》。

蔡英文日前在新竹縣謝票時聲言，要把台灣人都團結起來，變成強而有力的「台灣隊」。既然如此，大陸台商也應該是她要團結的重要對象。民進黨實有必要從照顧大陸台商的角度出發，來試圖為兩岸關係開新局。

Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations: Starting Point for Good Faith CCP-DPP Relations

Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations:
Starting Point for Good Faith CCP-DPP Relations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 26, 2016

Executive Summary: The Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations must comply with the framework for cross-Strait relations. It must comply with the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. It must comply with the 1992 Consensus. These are matters that the DPP under Chairman Tsai must face. This is the touchstone for the new ruling party under Chairman Tsai.

Full Text Below:

President-elect Tsai Ing-wen recently spoke to reporters. She said the consensus reached in 1992 is a matter of historical record. She said she is willing to jointly safeguard the bilateral exchanges and outcomes of negotiations achieved over the past 20 years, based on this historical fact. She is willing to continue promoting peace, stability and closer cross-Strait relations. Following the election, she and other high-level DPP officials are saying they respect the “spirit” of the 1992 talks. Contrast this with their rhetoric before the election. Back then, they said "The 1992 Consensus is merely one of several options", or refused to recognize the consensus altogether. Tsai Ing-wen has clearly moved closer to the center. For peaceful cross-Strait relations, this is a step in the right direction.

But these are merely philosophical musings. What we need to see is their incorporation into actual policy. Does this ultimately represent real change? An opportunity will arise very soon. Late next month, the new legislature will convene. It will review the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations bill. Since the 3/18 student movement, any agreement signed by the two sides must wait for passage of the Oversight Regulations. Unless the ruling DPP choose not to sign any agreements with the other side whatsoever, it must take a stand on the matter.

Some bills failed to pass during the previous legislative session. When the new legislature convenes, these bills will automatically become null and void. We may wish to review some of the Oversight Regulations bills proposed during the previous legislative session, to learn their finer points. Each of these versions have at least two points worth considering. The first is the basis for the legislation, i.e., the definition of cross-Strait relations. The second is the content of the bill, i.e., the extent to which the legislature regulates the negotiation process. In cross-Strait relations, the former is key. Therefore we should examine the various versions to see how they differ.

The KMT version is called the "Taiwan Region and Mainland Region Agreement Protocol and Oversight Regulations". The provisions of Article 1 are explicit: “This article is based on the framework of an existing cross-Strait regulation, the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. It goes one step further, by establishing a Taiwan Region and Mainland Region Agreement Protocol and Oversight Regulations." Therefore, its basis is the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.

Let us look back at the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. The purpose of Article 1 is to ensure the safety and well-being of the people in the Taiwan Area, to regulate exchanges between the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area, and to deal with any legal matters that may arise. Article 2 defines the "Taiwan Area" as Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu and other areas over which the ROC has "Government Jurisdiction". It defines the "Mainland Area" as Republic of China territory outside of the Taiwan Area.

From these two articles alone, we can see the consistency in the ROC Constitution. We can also see the significance of the 1992 Consensus. The Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area defines our nation's jurisdiction and sovereignty differently. Our jurisdiction applies only to the Taiwan Area. But our “sovereign territory” includes both the "Taiwan Area" and the "Mainland Area". Our declared “sovereign territory” includes both the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. This constitutional definition of “sovereign territory” is consistent, and includes all of China's "inherent territory". This concept of sovereign territory is consistent with the 1992 Consensus and one China, different interpretations, under "one China". In other words, according to the ROC Constitution, China's inherent territory, taken as a whole, belongs to the Republic of China. From our standpoint, "different interpretations" means that "one China" refers to the Republic of China.

Sovereignty must be distinguished from jurisdiction. Jurisdiction must not be conflated with sovereignty. The Republic of China's sovereignty and territory must not be confined to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. Doing so would violate the ROC Constitution. It would of course, also violate the 1992 Consensus. Upholding the existing framework of the ROC Constitution means adherence to the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, a law of critical importance. The Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations must be based on these articles. This is essential to our cross-Strait policy path.

During the previous legislative session, Oversight Regulations proposed by the DPP caucus adopted a totally different position. It named its bill the "Taiwan and China Agreement Management Regulations". The purpose of Article 1 was to “regulate agreements concluded between Taiwan and China (hereinafter referred to bilateral agreements) on relevant matters". Article 4 was even more explicit. It referred to equality for the mutual benefit of “both countries”. This version clearly departed from the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. It clearly incorporated the "two states theory" into the name and content of the bill.

The NPP has five seats in the Legislative Yuan. NPP party chairman Huang Kuo-chang reminded the DPP and PFP that they signed a private sector verson of the "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" during the student moment. If they retreat from it, they must explain to the people why. If the majority DPP adopts the student movement version, it means overthrowing the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. It means undermining the constitutional framework, and hence our sovereignty. It means overturning the 1992 Consensus. President elect Tsai and the DPP must be clear about the impact on cross-Strait relations.

The Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations must comply with the framework for cross-Strait relations. It must comply with the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. It must comply with the 1992 Consensus. These are matters that the DPP under Chairman Tsai must face. This is the touchstone for the new ruling party under Chairman Tsai.

以監督條例為民共善意互動起點

2016年01月26日 中國時報

總統當選人蔡英文主席日前接受媒體訪問表示，九二會談達成若干共同認知與諒解是歷史的事實，她願意與大陸共同維護20多年來，雙方依此一歷史事實所建立的交流、協商成果，持續推動兩岸關係的和平穩定與發展。對照她和民進黨其他高階人士於當選後表示尊重九二會談「精神」，及選前說「九二共識只是一個選項」，或更早先不承認有此共識，她顯然正逐步往中間靠近；對於兩岸關係未來的和平發展而言，應是正面的一步。

不過，這些畢竟只是闡釋「理念」的話語，以後還是要看它放到實際政策上，到底代表了怎樣的不變或改變。這種機會很快就會來到，就是下月下旬新立法院開議後，有關「兩岸協議監督條例」的立法。從318學運之後，兩岸間要簽署任何協議，顯然都必須等待「監督條例」先行通過。除非民進黨政府未來不再和對岸簽署任何協議，否則勢必要對此表態。

未通過的法律草案，在新國會開議時都自動歸零，不妨檢視上屆會期中曾出現過的「監督條例」版本，來了解其中的奧妙。各版本值得注意之處至少有二，一是立法的基礎，也就是兩岸關係定位，二是監督的實質內容，也就是國會監管談判過程的程度。就兩岸關係而言，前面一個層面是重點之所在，所以我們可以看看不同版本在這方面有何不同。

國民黨的版本名為「台灣地區與大陸地區訂定協議處理及監督條例」，其第一條條文的說明中言明：「本條例係在現行《台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例》之規範架構基礎上，進一步建構兩岸協議處理及監督機制。」所以其制訂的基礎為《兩岸人民關係條例》。

回過頭來看《兩岸人民關係條例》的內容：其第一條言明立法宗旨為確保台灣地區安全與民眾福祉，規範台灣地區與大陸地區人民之往來，並處理衍生之法律事件。第二條則定義「台灣地區」為台灣、澎湖、金門、馬祖及「政府統治權」所及之其他地區，而將「大陸地區」定義為台灣地區以外之中華民國「領土」。

光看這兩條，就知道此條例和中華民國憲法的一致性，也看出「九二共識」之意義。《兩岸人民關係條例》把我國的「治權」和「主權」視為不同的觀念；治權只及於「台灣地區」，而宣示主權的「領土」則包含「台灣地區」和「大陸地區」。這樣的作法和憲法中「領土」的定義，也就是包含整個中國的「固有疆域」一致。此種主權觀念就是「九二共識、一中各表」中所謂的「一中」，換言之，根據中華民國憲法，中國完整的固有疆域，其主權屬於中華民國。而所謂「各表」，就是從我方立場來看，這個「一中」是中華民國。

如果不把主權和治權分離處理，而把治權視為主權，認為中華民國的主權和領土只限於台、澎、金、馬，其實就等於把中華民國憲法的基礎架構推翻了，那當然也就等於推翻了九二共識。所以，對於中華民國憲法現行架構盡到忠實表達義務的《兩岸人民關係條例》，是非常重要的指標性法案；「兩岸協議監督條例」是否立基在這個條例之上，確實是兩岸政策走向的關鍵。

在上一屆立法院，民進黨團提出的「監督條例」，立場完全不同，其名稱為「台灣與中國締結協議處理條例」，而其第一條立法意旨為「為規範台灣與中國締結協議（以下簡稱兩國協議）之相關事宜，特制定本條例。」其第四條更明言兩國協議應本平等互惠之原則，以保護國民權益，促進「兩國」之合作。此版本顯然脫離了《兩岸人民關係條例》，而明確地將「兩國論」表達於法案名稱和內容中。

在立法院擁有5席的時代力量黨主席黃國昌強調，學運期間民進黨與親民黨都簽字同意民間版「兩岸協議監督條例」，若現在反悔，必須向民眾交代為什麼改變。居於多數的民進黨如果採取學運版本，代表推翻了《兩岸人民關係條例》，推翻憲法的主權架構，也就推翻了九二共識，對兩岸關係可能造成的衝擊，蔡準總統與民進黨應已有清楚的認知。

「兩岸協議監督條例」必須符合《兩岸人民關係條例》與九二共識的兩岸關係架構，這是蔡主席和民進黨必須面對的課題，也是蔡主席所領導新執政黨兩岸政策的試金石。

Opposing Parties Can Resolve Cross-Strait Political Disputes

Opposing Parties Can Resolve Cross-Strait Political Disputes
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 25, 2016

Executive Summary: DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has been elected president. Beijing and Tsai Ing-wen have begun a long-distance dialogue over the 1992 Consensus. This gives cause for both optimism and pessimism. At stake is the welfare of 23 million Taiwan compatriots and a win/win cross-Strait arrangement. Tsai Ing-wen and the Beijing authorities must show sincerity, flexibility, and patience. They must communicate in order to resolve differences. They must move in the same, not opposite directions. Otherwise the gap between the two sides will only widen.

Full Text Below:

DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has been elected president. Beijing and Tsai Ing-wen have begun a long-distance dialogue over the 1992 Consensus. This gives cause for both optimism and pessimism. At stake is the welfare of 23 million Taiwan compatriots and a win/win cross-Strait arrangement. Tsai Ing-wen and the Beijing authorities must show sincerity, flexibility, and patience. They must communicate in order to resolve differences. They must move in the same, not opposite directions. Otherwise the gap between the two sides will only widen.

Beijing's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office issued a statement on election day, then followed up with a press conference. Beijing reiterated its unwavering commitment to the 1992 Consensus. But it also made a gesture of goodwill. If refrained from criticizing either Tsai Ing-wen or the DPP by name. In Tsai Ing-wen's victory speech, press conferences, media interviews, and statements issued by her representative Joseph Wu in Washington, she reiterated her commitment to "consistent, predictable, and sustainable cross-Strait relations" She said cross-Strait relations would be based on the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework, on the results of cross-Strait negotiations, as well as on democracy and public opinion. The two sides have started out on the same page, and are moving twoard resolving their differences.

This is the first round, and both sides have sent out clear signals.

Both sides have made clear their positions. Beijing has examined Tsai Ing-wen's past comments. It has concluding that she is still pussyfooting around the 1992 Consensus. It has therefore issued a warning. This is a negative development. First, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) President Jin Liqun laid out Taiwan's membership requirements: "If an applicant lacks sovereignty, or is unable to conduct its own international relations, it must obtain the consent of bank members willing to be responsible for its conduct". We were originally going to join the AIIB as “Chinese Taipei”, based on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation model. We must now join as “China Taipei”, based on the Asian Development Bank model. This is unacceptable to the KMT. It is even more unacceptable to the DPP. The window for Taiwan's membership has already closed.

Internationally, some people in Britain have asked their government to recognize Taiwan. Some students from Taiwan have protested the Norwegian government, demanding that the nationality on ROC passports be changed. This has angered Beijing. Some on the Mainland have launched massive cyber attacks on Tsai Ing-wen's Facebook page. When the Mainland's CCTV interviewed Tsai Ing-wen, it deliberately broadcast videos of last year's PLA live fire amphibious landing exercises in Xiamen. Since the January 16 election, many Internet users on the Mainland have expressed intense anti-Taiwan independence sentiment. Anti-Mainland sentiment on Taiwan has also intensified. The Internet has become the new cross-Strait battleground. The propaganda war has intensified. Extreme polarization has made comprise increasingly difficult.

Tsai Ing-wen attempted to pass off the "1992 Spirit" as equivalent to the 1992 Consensus. Beijing isn't buying. As Beijing sees it, Tsai continues to evade the essence of the 1992 Consensus, the premise that "the two sides of the Strait are both part of one China". Mainland State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun told US Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken that Taiwan policy will not change as a result of Taiwan's election. Beijing will continue adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing any form of Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen's attitude has become more clear. Beijing's language and countermeasures have become harsher in response. Beijing is increasingly unhappy and impatient.

Eight years later, Beijing and the DPP are once again butting heads. The two have little basis for trust. President Chen's negative precedent makes Beijing reluctant even to "listen to what Tsai says, and watch what Tsai does”. Any disagreeable rhetoric immediately provokes a strong response. This is sure to intensify anti-Mainland sentiment among deep green and young Internet users on Taiwan. This obviously will not motivate Tsai Ing-wen to resolve the impasse over the 1992 Consensus, and casts a shadow over the upcoming legislative session.

Both sides are responsible for these negative developments.

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must immediately desist from issuing incendiary campaign rhetoric. It must substitute the language of responsible governance. In particular, supporters of the DPP in the media and on the Internet must exercise restraint. They must not read too much into Tsai Ing-wen's position statements. For example, Tsai repeatedly make mention of "democracy". The DPP leadership assumed she was criticizing "black box operations". The media on the other hand, assumed she was “invoking the peoples' right of self-determination" in order to provoke Beijing.

The two sides engaged in "remote communication", but found little common ground. Therefore they must avoid provoking unnecessary suspicions and frictions. For the sake of long-term cross-Strait relations, the two sides should seek a point of agreement upon which they can build trust. The "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" offers just such an opportunity. The DPP pledged to give priority to the regulations during the new legislative session. The bill is not being carried over to the new legislative session. Therefore all parties must propose a new version during the new session.

During the previous session, "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" versions covered the political spectrum on Taiwan, from reunification to independence. The DPP is now the majority party in the Legislative Yuan. Therefore it should propose a draft version. The regulation must be based on the premise that the two sides are not different countries. During consideration of the bill, green camp supporters must not exert undue influence on the legislature, online or outside the venue. The “one country on each side” premise must not enter the picture. The Ma government and the pan-blue political parties must not fuss over the details. They must allow the Legislative Yuan to pass the Oversight Regulations, sending a signal to the Mainland beneficial to Taiwan's larger interests.

This is a critical moment. The Beijing authorities must exercise restraint. They must not intensify red vs green confrontation. They must exercise greater patience and demonstrate sufficient goodwill. Eight years later, the two parties can start on the same page, then move forward, toward mutual benefit and a win/win scenario.

相向同行 化解兩岸政治爭議

2016年01月25日 中國時報 主筆室

民進黨主席蔡英文當選新任總統後，北京和蔡英文開始針對「九二共識」爭議展開隔空對話，有令人樂觀的信號，也有負面悲觀的發展。基於維護台灣2300萬同胞最大福祉和兩岸互利雙贏的最高價值，希望蔡英文和北京當局應繼續展現誠意、彈性和耐心，堅持以溝通化解分歧，彼此相向而行，而非掉頭反向讓爭議擴大。

國台辦在大選開票當天發表的聲明及後續記者會談話中，北京展現了堅持「九二共識」堅如磐石的意志，和始終如一的態度；但同時也表現了善意，在選舉期間乃至選後，都未直接對蔡英文個人或民進黨進行針對性的批判。蔡英文在發表當選感言、國際記者會、媒體專訪和銜命訪問華府的吳釗燮相關談話中，多次重申她會建立「具有一致性、可預測性、可持續的兩岸關係」；將以中華民國現行憲政體制、兩岸協商交流互動的成果，以及民主原則與普遍民意，作為推動兩岸關係的基礎。雙方一開始似呈現相向而行，朝化解分歧努力前進。

第一回合，雙方都發出明確的訊號。

彼此基本立場已表明，北京參照蔡英文歷次談話，判定她仍然「繞著九二共識轉圈子」，因而發出警告性訊號，開始出現負面發展。先是亞投行行長金立群對台灣加入亞投行問題明確表態：「不享有主權或無法對自身國際關係行為負責的申請方，應由對其國際關係行為負責的銀行成員同意，或代為申請」；對我申請入會的立場從之前可循亞太經合會「中華台北」模式，退到亞銀「中國‧台北」模式，這已經超出國民黨可能接受的範圍，更無法為民進黨接受，台灣入會的窗戶已經關上。

此時，在國際也出現：英國民眾發動連署呼籲英政府承認台灣、台灣學生向挪威政府抗議台灣護照的國籍欄應改填Taiwan等行動，令北京不快。大陸網民開始大量翻牆對蔡英文臉書進行攻擊，大陸央視也在媒體報導蔡英文專訪時，刻意播出去年解放軍在廈門進行實彈登陸演習的舊影像；自116大選後，大陸網路充斥激烈反台獨的情緒貼文，而台灣鄉民反中的情緒也被激化。兩岸網域成為新的文攻戰場，而且更具高張力衝突與極端不妥協的兩極化對立傾向。

北京當局對蔡英文以求同存異「九二精神」為本的「九二事實說」並不接受，認為蔡仍在迴避接受「九二共識」的核心價值「兩岸同屬一中」這個政治基礎。國台辦主任張志軍明白告訴美國副國務卿布林肯，對台政策不會因台灣選舉而改變，繼續堅持「九二共識」、反對任何形式的台獨；而且隨著蔡英文態度的明朗化，北京的用語和壓制動作似有加重化的傾向，顯示北京的不滿和不耐也在上升。

事實上，北京和民進黨相隔8年再度交手，彼此互信基礎薄弱；更因為有陳前總統的前車之鑑，北京顯然對蔡英文連「聽言觀行」的空間都不願給，對不合意的談話就立即強勢回應，這勢必反過來激化深綠和青年網民反中的強度，明顯不利於蔡英文處理「九二共識」僵局的化解，也為即將開議的立法院運作，投下了陰影。

這些負面發展，兩岸都有可歸責之處。

蔡英文及民進黨方面必須立即從競選語言的辛辣刺激、轉向治國的妥適沉穩。尤其支持民進黨的媒體和網路更應克制言論，不宜對蔡英文立場過度解讀；比如蔡英文多次提到「民主」，黨中央解釋這是對應「黑箱」，卻被媒體解讀為「導入人民自決的權力」，讓北京光聽就冒火。

既然雙方初步「隔空溝通」暫時沒有交集，當下即應避免不必要的猜疑和摩擦。就兩岸關係長遠計，雙方還是應該尋求一個建立互信關係的起始點，「兩岸協議監督條例」應該是契機。民進黨已經宣示，要在新立法院優先審議本條例，基於法案過屆不延續，各黨派必須在新會期重提新版本。

上一屆會期內，「兩岸協議監督條例」各版本幾乎涵蓋台灣從獨到統的所有政治光譜，民進黨既然成為立法院的多數黨，就應負責任提出妥適的黨版草案，其認定標準即在是否體現兩岸「非一邊一國關係」。法案審議期間，綠營應約束支持者不可以在網路和議場外採取干擾立法的不當動員，只要能排除「一邊一國」疑慮，馬政府和泛藍各黨派就不要過度糾結於條文細節，應讓立法院順利通過「監督條例」，對大陸釋出符合台灣整體利益的訊號。

在此關鍵時刻，北京當局也應自我克制，不讓紅綠矛盾和對立升高；以更大的耐心、釋放足夠的善意，讓8年後雙方的再度交手，彼此能相向而行、互利雙贏。

Can Tsai Ing-wen Escape the Washington Beijing Tokyo Net?

Can Tsai Ing-wen Escape the Washington Beijing Tokyo Net?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 22, 2016

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has long been heavy on international relations and light on cross-Strait relations. She advocates using international relations to advance Taiwan independence, and eliminate economic dependence on the Mainland. This however denies DPP foreign policy the cross-Strait bargaining chip, and leads to a power imbalance. In order to join the TPP and link with Japan in the South China Sea, the DPP is likely to make huge concessions to Washington and Tokyo. If Tsai Ing-wen blindly panders to foreign powers while ignoring domestic public opinion, the government may repeat the mistakes of the Ma administration, and lose public support. In other words, the DPP may lose public support, due not to cross-Strait issues, but to the economic and psychological impact of international issues.

Full Text Below:

The DPP has not even had a chance to celebrate. Yet foreign dignitaries are already pounding on the door. Japan Exchange Association President Ohashi Mitsuo, and former US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns sought out Tsai Ing-wen. Nominally they came to congratulate her on her election victory. In fact they came to ascertain Tsai Ing-wen's diplomatic path and policy commitments to their governments. They also came to ascertain her stand on cross-Strait relations. The Japanese media made an even more direct appeal. It expressed the hope that Tsai Ing-wen would revise the KMT's “overly pro-Mainland policy”.

At the same time, Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office issued its first post-election statement. It urged Tsai Ing-wen to "continue adhering to the 1992 Consensus". Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) President Jin Liqun made reference to the provisions of the "Asian Infrastructure Investment Banking Agreement". He referred to Taiwan as “an applicant not entitled to sovereignty or unable to conduct its own international relations". Such applicants, he said, must obtain the consent of "bank members responsible for the conduct of international relations”. This tongue twister means that Taiwan's path to membership in the AIIB will be long and hard. The reason for the Mainland's hardline attitude, is of course, Tsai Ing-wen.

Tsai Ing-wen may have been too equivocal on cross-Strait policy in the run up to the election. She may have left too much to Washington and Tokyo's imagination. Washington believes that Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus was election rhetoric, and that following the election there would be room to maneuver. Therefore, Burns's trip is intended to ensure that Tsai Ing-wen will not cavalierly stir up trouble on cross-Strait issues, thereby adding to Washington's headaches. When Chen Shui-bian took office, Washington reined him in the same way. By contrast, Tokyo believes that Tsai Ing-wen will substantially revise Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy, giving Tokyo greater room to maneuver. The purpose of Ohashi Mitsuo's visit is mainly to explore the possibility of future alliances with Taiwan against the Mainland.

It is foreseeable that Washington's anxiety and Tokyo's delight, result from different readings of Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy. Both are exerting pressure upon the DPP. The tug of war between Washington and Tokyo, along with powerful pressure from Beijing, has changed DPP foreign policy. These changes in foreign policy may increase DPP difficulty with domestic rule.

On the other hand, prior to the election, Tsai Ing-wen made several overly explicit promises. Washington and Tokyo now have overly high expectations. Washington expects that in exchange for TPP membership, the DPP will allow the importation of pork products containing ractopamine into Taiwan, using the same standards as Japan and South Korea. Japan's Abe expects a congenitally anti-China Tsai Ing-wen and DPP to lift the embargo on foodstuffs produced in five counties in the Fukushima disaster area in exchange for a Taiwan-Japan FTA. Ohashi Mitsuo may therefore treat food regulation as an index of whether the DPP values its commitments to Tokyo.

Washington and Tokyo fully expect Tsai Ing-wen to honor her commitments on US pork imports and Japanese foodstuffs. But their expectations are not necessarily in line with public opinion on Taiwan. Any shortfall will leave Tsai Ing-wen between a rock and a hard place, between foreign pressure and domestic opinion. Can Tsai Ing-wen mollify public opinion? That is a thorny issue that Tsai Ing-wen will have to face.

Nor is that all. The East Asian regional conflict between Washington and Beijing is expanding. Tokyo has increased its presence in the South China Sea. Washington and Tokyo want Taipei to take sides. They also want to influence cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen may not be as reckless as Chen Shui-bian. She may not wage "diplomatic war" and demand a "referendum on UN membership" in order to sabotage cross-Straits relations. But Tsai Ing-wen's desire to “ally with Japan to oppose the Mainland”, as well as her collusion with the US in the South China Sea, may jeopardize cross-Strait trust and stability. In other words, the biggest variable affecting cross-Strait relations under Tsai Ing-wen, may not be domestic politics, but international relations.

Tsai Ing-wen has long been heavy on international relations and light on cross-Strait relations. She advocates using international relations to advance Taiwan independence, and eliminate economic dependence on the Mainland. This however denies DPP foreign policy the cross-Strait bargaining chip, and leads to a power imbalance. In order to join the TPP and link with Japan in the South China Sea, the DPP is likely to make huge concessions to Washington and Tokyo. If Tsai Ing-wen blindly panders to foreign powers while ignoring domestic public opinion, the government may repeat the mistakes of the Ma administration, and lose public support. In other words, the DPP may lose public support, due not to cross-Strait issues, but to the economic and psychological impact of international issues.

The Democratic Progressive Party will find itself facing a vast net, consisting of Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, and public opinion on Taiwan. It will find itself pulled apart by these four forces. Tsai Ing-wen faces an enormous challenge. If she is not careful, she will find herself immobilized. In fact, this vast net was spun by none other than the DPP. It must "maintain the status quo" while simultaneously allying itself with Washington and Tokyo against Beijing. This mindset and others, created this web.

聯合／蔡英文如何走出美中日的大網
2016-01-22 02:15 聯合報 聯合報社論

民進黨還來不及開趴慶功，外國政要已前往敲門。日本交流協會會長大橋光夫及美國前副國務卿伯恩斯選後相繼拜會蔡英文，名為道賀，實則要確定蔡英文對兩國的外交路線與政策承諾，也試探她上台後的兩岸關係走向。日本媒體更直接呼籲：盼蔡英文修正國民黨過度「傾中」的政策。

與 此同時，北京國台辦在選後第一時間發表聲明，以「繼續堅持九二共識」向蔡英文喊話。亞投行行長金立群則搬出「亞投行協定」條文，稱我國為「不享有主權或無 法對自身國際關係行為負責的申請方」，因此入會事宜應該由「對其國際關係行為負責的銀行成員」同意或代為申請。這串繞口令，將台灣加入亞投行之路變得又硬 又冷。這種態度，當然也是針對蔡英文而來。

也許是蔡英文選前在兩岸政策上表達得太過曖昧，這讓美日兩國出現不同的政治想像。美國認為，不 承認「九二共識」只是蔡英文的選舉語言，選後應有轉圜空間；因此，伯恩斯此行旨在確保蔡英文在兩岸議題上不會輕率躁動，以免增添美國的麻煩，就如當年陳水 扁甫上台時美國即時給予節制一樣。相形之下，日本則認為，蔡英文的兩岸政策將大幅修正馬英九的路線，使日本在對中政策上享有更大的操作空間；因此，大橋此 行主要是試探未來「聯台抗中」的可能性。

可以預見的是，心懷憂慮的美國及見獵心喜的日本，由於對蔡英文兩岸政策的不同解讀，均將對民進黨的立場產生拉扯。美日的拉力與推力，再加上北京轉趨強硬的態度，都將牽動民進黨對外路線的變化；而對外路線的變化，又可能升高內部執政的難度。

從 另一方面看，蔡英文選前也許因為在若干議題上作出太具體的表態，以致讓美日兩國產生高度的預期心理。美方的期待是，民進黨為了達成加入ＴＰＰ的目標，未來 勢將比照日韓標準開放瘦肉精美豬進口。日方則認為，安倍與蔡英文同樣具有反中的天然基因，民進黨上台之後必定會解除福島災區五縣的食品管制，以交換《台日 自由貿易協定》的簽署；也因此，大橋此行可能把解除日本食品管制議題當成檢視民進黨是否重視對日承諾的指標。

不難看出，在開放美豬及日本 食品的議題上，美日兩國對於蔡英文履行其政策承諾的意願都懷有高度的期待；但這些期待，卻未必與台灣內部的民意潮流吻合。其間的落差，將讓蔡英文在執政 後，在外國壓力及國內民意下出現進退失據的兩難局面。如何撫平國內民意的強大反作用力，將是蔡英文上台後必須面對的棘手問題。

不僅如此， 美中在東亞區域衝突的擴大，以及日本在南海角色的日益吃重，都讓美日兩國更急於爭取台灣的政治表態，也讓它們在兩岸關係上的操作空間變大。蔡英文執政後， 也許不像陳水扁一樣率爾以「烽火外交」及「入聯公投」等作為破壞兩岸關係；但是，蔡英文「聯日抗中」的思維，以及在南海政策上可能與美國聯手合作，卻可能 危及兩岸既有的互信及穩定。亦即，蔡英文上台後，影響兩岸關係的最大變數，未必在國內政治，而是在國際議題上。


蔡英文一向重國際、輕兩 岸，主張從世界走向台灣，以擺脫對大陸的經濟依賴，這將使民進黨在對外政策上少了兩岸關係的這項籌碼，以致失衡傾側。民進黨執政後，為了要進入ＴＰＰ並與 日本攜手南向，其政策走向極可能高度遷就美日。若蔡英文一味地迎合國際，而忽視國內民意，難保不會重蹈馬政府的覆轍，失去民意支持。亦即，未來衝擊民進黨 民意支持度的因素，未必在兩岸，而在國際問題及其引發的經濟效應及心理感受上。

可以預見，執政後的民進黨要面對一張巨大的網，那是由美 國、日本、中國大陸及國內民意四方所交織而成的一張大網，這四股力量之間的拉扯、角力，將構成蔡英文的鉅大挑戰，若不審慎以對，將難以動彈。然而，構築這 張巨網的始作俑者，其實正是民進黨自己，是它既要「維持現狀」又要「聯美日抗中」等思維不斷吐絲交纏的結果。

The Mainland Requires Good Faith from Tsai Ing-wen as well

The Mainland Requires Good Faith from Tsai Ing-wen as well
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 21, 2016

Executive Summary: We on Taiwan often complain that the Mainland does not understand us. But have we asked ourselves whether we understand the Mainland? Understanding is a two-way street. So is communications. So is good faith. Taiwan must free itself from its knee jerk Sinophobia. We on Taiwan must open our hearts and minds. We must make an effort to understand the Mainland, to increase exchanges, and to deepen emotional ties. Only by doing so can we ensure long term cross-Strait peace.

Full Text Below:

The 2016 general election has given the Democratic Progressive Party its long sought “Total Rule”. Some worry that cross-Strait peace may be at risk. They wonder whether darkness is about to descend upon cross-Strait relations. This is a serious matter that affects 23 million people on Taiwan. The fruits of a half-century of economic, social, and political development could evaporate. Even the 21st century “Chinese Dream” is at risk. The matter must not be approached with a surfeit of bravado and deficit of wisdom. It must not be approached as simplistic matter of black vs. white. Above all, it must not be approached based on instinct and emotion.

During the recent election, neither the DPP, the TSU, nor the NPP made the slightest mention of Taiwan independence. Among the three, only the TSU called for opposition to Mainland China. The NPP avoided mention of Taiwan independence and opposition to Mainland China. It confined itself to demands for "change". The KMT played the cross-Strait crisis card, but only half-heartedly. It never made it a major campaign issue. The political climate on Taiwan has clearly changed. Not only are calls for Taiwan independence dangerous, they no longer move voters. Voters were unhappy with Kuomintang ineptitude. The current election is a repudiation of the KMT, not a repudiation of improved cross-Strait relations.

Is cross-Strait peace sustainable? Tsai Ing-wen and Xi Jinping are key. As we all know, Tsai Ing-wen was the godmother of Lee Teng-hui's “Two-States Theory”. Many assume she is "congenitally pro-Taiwan independence". But she is also pragmatic and flexible. During a post-election interview, she said “Actually the other side was quite restrained during the election". She was not thanking Beijing for its goodwill. She was offering Beijing an olive branch. In fact, Tsai Ing-wen is no longer the same person who besieged Chen Yunlin and triggered bloodshed when he visited Taiwan in 2008. Tsai Ing-wen won the 2016 election because she called for cross-Strait peace and diminished public concerns. These voters will prevent Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP from reverting to their former extremism.

Xi Jinping is also key. Beijing has reached out to Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen has acknowledged Beijing's "goodwill". Tsai's response was probably not mere lip service. Mainland demands for reunification on the Internet are loud. Demands for forcible reunification are even louder. When Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP won the general election, official media channels on the Mainland immediately moved to cool public sentiment. Xinhua News Agency published an article entitled “Fear not Clouds Obscuring Our Vision”, saying "Taiwan's future and cross-Strait relations will be decided by Mainland progress". It said "improving cross-Strait relations is still mainstream public opinion on Taiwan". A Global Times editorial told readers that "Voters on Taiwan voted for Tsai Ing-wen, not for Taiwan independence". These articles stressed that Tsai Ing-wen's election victory diluted the reunification vs. independence issue. It paradoxically proved that the basis for cross-Strait peace remains solid. Mainland officials have not called for blood in response to Tsai Ing-wen's election victory. This is a sign of their rationality, and also of Tsai's Ing-wen's gesture of goodwill.

That said, we must acknowledge the potential risks in cross-Strait relations. Consider recent events, such as Taiwan's application to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). On the same day that Tsai Ing-wen was elected, AIIB President Jin Liqun declared that Taiwan does not enjoy sovereignty, therefore AIIB Membership requires the consent of "other members of the Bank responsible for international relations". Taiwan may join the AIIB only under a subsidiary form of sovereignty. The bottom line is clear. Taiwan may join only as "Chinese Taipei". Jin Liqun's declaration provides a glimpse of problems with cross-Strait interactions under Tsai Ing-wen. Does this mean Beijing has laid down the law regarding Taiwan's diplomatic maneuvering room? Does this hardline stance apply only to the AIIB? Will it become Beijing's standard for Taiwan's membership in international organizations? Will we even enjoy our current "Chinese Taipei" status when joining international organizations?

Such tensions are merely the tip of the iceberg. Mainland tourists transiting Taiwan, Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, 23 cross-Strait agreements, the hoped for Tsai Xi summit, and official communications between the MAC and the Taiwan Affairs Office, are all matters of concern. The Mainland authorities and the victorious DPP must avoid these potential crises. Tsai Ing-wen's expression of goodwill is on the right track, but it is not enough. The core issue remains the 1992 Consensus. Sooner or later, she must offer a solution acceptable to both sides.

In 2015, the Academia Sinica conducted a survey. It found that as many as 46.4% of the public on Taiwan would choose Taiwan independence if they could. But as many as 49.7% of the public believe that reunification is likely. The Mainland must understand the public on Taiwan's sense of identity, and the differences in their subjective perceptions and objective reality. It must remind itself of the need to win hearts and minds on Taiwan. Only then can cross-Strait relations remain smooth. Only then can Beijing deepen the emotional links between people on the two sides, and defeat Taiwan independence at its root.

We on Taiwan often complain that the Mainland does not understand us. But have we asked ourselves whether we understand the Mainland? Understanding is a two-way street. So is communications. So is good faith. Taiwan must free itself from its knee jerk Sinophobia. We on Taiwan must open our hearts and minds. We must make an effort to understand the Mainland, to increase exchanges, and to deepen emotional ties. Only by doing so can we ensure long term cross-Strait peace.

大陸也需要對蔡英文釋出善意

2016年01月21日 中國時報

2016大選民進黨完全執政，有人擔心是否意謂兩岸和平發展路線遭到否定，因而憂心兩岸關係的黑暗期是否將掩面而至。這是一個非常嚴肅的議題，不但關係台灣2300萬民眾的身家性命與50年經濟社會和政治發展成果會不會毀於一旦，也關係21世紀中國夢能否順利實現，絕不能以暴虎馮河之勇或非黑即白的簡單邏輯，甚至用直覺式的情緒思考來回答這個問題。

這次選舉，民進黨、台聯與時代力量均未提出台獨訴求，其中僅台聯訴求反中，時代力量不提台獨、不強調反中，而以「改變」為主軸，國民黨卻大打兩岸危機牌，但能量不足，未成為選戰的主軸，可見台彎政治氣候已經改變，台獨訴求不但風險大，也不再具有強大的政治動員能量。人民對現狀不滿才是國民黨失敗的原因。這場選舉是選民對國民黨的否定，而不是對兩岸和平發展的否定。

那麼，兩岸和平發展路線是否具有可持續性呢？蔡英文與習近平將是關鍵。眾人皆知，蔡英文是李登輝特殊兩國論的「孕母」，許多人認為她是「天然獨」，不過，我們也可以確認她在政治上的務實與彈性作風。她在選舉揭曉後接受訪問時表示，「對岸在這次選舉，其實是非常克制的」。這句話與其說是她認知大陸的善意，不如說是想對大陸遞出橄欖枝。事實上，蔡英文已不是2008年陳雲林來台時發動包圍、引發流血衝突的蔡英文。蔡英文能贏得2016年大選，是因為她訴求兩岸和平，減少了許多人對她的疑慮，這一部分民意將是未來制衡蔡英文與民進黨重回偏激路線的屏障。

習近平是另一個關鍵，從大陸對台工作的角度觀察，蔡英文說她感受到大陸的「善意」，這句話應該不是「政治修辭」。大陸網路極統，甚至武統聲勢浩大。蔡英文與民進黨勝選後，大陸官媒立刻開始為統一論降溫。新華社發表〈不畏浮雲遮望眼〉指出：「維護和發展兩岸關係仍是台灣社會的主流民意」、「決定台灣前途、兩岸關係走向的關鍵因素是大陸的發展進步。」環球時報社論告訴讀者「台灣民眾選蔡英文，選的不是台獨。」這些文章都強調，蔡英文選舉時淡化了統獨，反證兩岸和平的基礎仍甚穩固。大陸官方並沒有因為蔡英文勝選而喊殺喊打，是一種理性的展現，也是對蔡英文的善意。

然而，我們還是必須誠實面對當前兩岸關係的險境。我們不妨以最近發生的事件，看看兩岸關係中潛存的危險因子。對於台灣申請加入亞投行，亞投行行長金立群在蔡英文當選次日公開表示，台灣不享有主權，須由「對其國際關係行為負責的銀行成員」同意或代為申請。限定台灣必須以附屬主權的形式才能加入亞投行，但台灣的底線很清楚，就是「中華台北」。金立群的表態，是窺見蔡英文上台後兩岸互動難題的一道縫。這是否代表大陸對台灣爾後外交空間新的強勢定位？這個強勢定位是只限於亞投行，還是大陸對台灣未來想加入的國際組織的一體標準？會不會甚至倒過來影響我們已經以「中華台北」加入的國際組織？

潛在的緊張只是冰山一隅，從陸客中轉、陸客來台、兩岸23項協議到能不能蔡習會，以及維持陸委會與國台辦的官方溝通管道，方方面面都有緊張因子，這才是讓人憂心的地方。對於這些潛在危機，大陸當局與勝選的民進黨，都應該要有更大的誠意與行動避免雙方對撞。蔡英文的善意軟調是正確的，但仍遠遠不夠。最核心的九二共識問題，她終要提出一個兩岸都能接受的解方。

中研院在2015年所做的調查，雖然在主觀意願上台灣有46.4%的民眾選擇獨立。但在未來的客觀認知與預測上，卻有高達49.7%的民眾認為統一難以避免。大陸應深刻理解台灣民心在自我認同與現勢了解，在主觀感性與客觀理性的差異，然後自我提醒，爭取台灣民心，兩岸發展就會平順。這才是促進兩岸人民情感更深化融合，並抑制台獨的根本之道。

我們常抱怨大陸不了解我們，但我們有沒有問問自己，我們又了不了解大陸呢？了解是雙向的，溝通也是、善意也是。台灣必須走出反中的慣性，以開闊的心胸去理解大陸，深化彼此的交往與情感連結，這才是兩岸和平的永續之道。

Tsai Ing-wen's Legislative Reform Requires Speaker Neutrality

Tsai Ing-wen's Legislative Reform Requires Speaker Neutrality
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 20, 2016

Executive Summary: During the 2016 election, Tsai Ing-wen did not merely win the presidency, the DPP also won 68 seats in the 113 seat Legislative Yuan, more than 60% of those available. For the first time ever, the DPP achieved its longed for "Total Rule". The DPP must now abide strictly by the rule of law, cease taking to the streets, and cease behaving like thugs in the legislature.

Full Text Below:

During the 2016 election, Tsai Ing-wen did not merely win the presidency, the DPP also won 68 seats in the 113 seat Legislative Yuan, more than 60% of those available. For the first time ever, the DPP achieved its longed for "Total Rule". The DPP must now abide strictly by the rule of law, cease taking to the streets, and cease behaving like thugs in the legislature.

Total Rule means total responsibility for the DPP, which for the first time in history has achieved a legislative majority. The first task of the DPP in the legislature must be legislative reform. This was the Third Promise in Tsai Ing-wen's presidential campaign Five Promises.

Ko Chien-min aspires to Speaker of the Legislature. In accordance with Tsai Ing-wen's pledge of reform, Ko has presented a reform plan. Ko Chien-min has an opportunity to become Premier. For these two. legislative reform is an unshirkable duty.

"Speaker neutrality" is the first tangible benchmark of legislative reform. During the presidential campaign speaker neutrality was a blue-green consensus. Eric Chu, Tsai Ing-wen, and Ko Chien-min, all saw it as the heart of legislative reform. The question now is, will Tsai Ing-wen follow through. 

Strictly speaking, legislative neutrality in the current political environment, is mere sloganeering. Take Wang Jin-pyng for example. Based on his conduct as Speaker of the Legislature, he is probably the most “neutral" Speaker of the Legislature ever. But his "neutrality" came at a price. During caucus negotiations or legislative deadlocks, Wang Jin-pyng's “neutrality” prevented the KMT majority from passing bills or implementing policies. This prevented the implementation of the democratic principle of majority rule. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen may not want the next Speaker of the Legislature to be a DPP counterpart to Wang Jin-pyng, since he or she would weaken DPP efforts to implement its policies.

In this regard, the DPP majority should “respect the minority", while the opposition minority should “obey the majority". It should define speaker neutrality under the following conditions. Wang Jin-pyng's "neutrality for the sake of neutrality" while speaker subverted the democratic principle of majority rule. But the alternative is not a speaker who obeys the DPP without question, and does not respect the minority party. Speakers of the Legislature in Britain and Japan must resign from their parties. We of course need not go to such extremes. Nevertheless legislative protocol must be objective and neutral.  Speaker neutrality does mean partisan neutrality. It means procedural neutrality.

A speaker must be neutral. Even more importantly, he must have character. He must not be like Wang Jin-pyng during Ma Ying-jeou's administration. In 2012, Ma Ying-jeou changed the KMT's rules, allowing  Wang Jin-pyng to enjoy another term as legislator at large. This enabled him to become speaker yet again. This was a election campaign “marriage of convenience”. Wang's influence enabled him to remain “neutral”, i.e., immune to Ma's influence. Tsai Ing-wen on the other hand, won entirely by her own effort. Ko Chien-min and others have the opportunity to become speaker. But none of them are in Wang Jin-pyng's shoes. Tsai Ing-wen now enjoys a free hand in her speaker appointments. Tsai Ing-wen must consider the speaker's character, experience, image, and professionalism. She must not appoint a speaker solely on the basis of his or her willingness to implement her policies. Since the Speaker of the Legislature will be appointed by Tsai Ing-wen, she must answer for the speaker's performance, good or bad.

Another tangible benchmark is long-condemned back room deals. Strictly speaking, the law prohibits back room deals. The "Legislative Yuan Exercise of Powers Law" stipulates that negotiations must be recorded on video, audio, and published in the public media. In the past, back room deals were immune from prosecution because they increased Wang Jin-pyng's power. Smaller parties were happy to gain disproportionate power. The victims were bills and policies frozen in the legislature. These brought the executive branch to a standstill. This is why the executive branch complained about Wang Jin-pyng. Wang Jin-pyng however, wielded sufficient influence to deal with administrative branch discontent. The new Speaker of the Legislature, by contrast, will be under Tsai's total control. He or she will find it impossible to enage in back room deals. This may be a point in favor of the DPP legislative majority.

A DPP controlled legislature is likely to be united and strong. This will inevitably lead to another kind of imbalance. Smaller parties in the legislature will be marginalized. How will the KMT check and balance the DPP? We have some suggestions for the KMT and other smaller parties. First. Now that the KMT is in the opposition, it must not seek revenge. It must not resort to whatever means are necessary to paralyze the legislature. The NPP, meanwhile, must not become an appendage to the DPP. On public issues that do not involve ideology, the opposition parties must cross party lines. Only then can they increase their power to check and balance the ruling DPP. Second. Opposition parties must make good use of the Internet and people power. Together with the general public, they must increase oversight of the ruling party and prevent abuse. Third. The opposition parties must raise their standards. They must be professional in their interpolation, in order to gain support among the public.

Legislative reform requires a final ingredient. Public consciousness. Voters must change their mindset. They must not equate legislators with aldermen. Legislators must not waste their time glad-handing at market stalls, weddings, and funerals to the neglect of their duties. Legislators must remain in the legislature reviewing bills and budgets. Only this can benefit the public, grow the economy, and ensure government accountability. Unless voters' mindsets change, it will not matter how many changes there are in the ruling party.

蔡英文要改革國會 議長先中立

2016年01月20日 中國時報

2016年選舉，蔡英文不只贏得總統大位，民主進步黨在113席立委中贏得68席，取得穩定過半的6成席次，實現了民進黨第一次「完全執政」。現在民進黨團必須學習廟堂之道，揚棄抗爭思維，不能再草莽問政了。

完全執政是完全責任的開始，第一次取得國會多數的民進黨，在立法院的首要任務，應是國會改革，這也是蔡英文在參選總統時所提出的五大政治改革中的第3個改革項目。

有意問鼎立法院長的柯建銘，也曾依據蔡英文的改革宣言，進一步提出了他的改革計畫，柯建銘有機會成為立法院長，國會改革是2人無可逃避的責任。

「議長中立」是第一個觀察指標，選舉時議長中立議題是少數的「藍綠共識」，朱立倫、蔡英文與柯建銘將之視為國會改革的核心主張。現在蔡英文要如何實踐呢？

嚴格來說，議事中立在當時的政治環境中，口號成分不小。以王金平為例，依他擔任立法院長的表現，應該是「最中立」的立法院長，但他的「中立」並不是沒有副作用的，不管在黨團協商或在處理少數黨癱瘓議事時，王金平頗受批評的一點，是他中立到讓國民黨明明擁有立法院的多數，卻無能通過執政黨的法案與政策，讓民主的多數治理原則無法貫徹。也因此，蔡英文未必希望下一任立法院長是民進黨版的王金平，這將削弱其執行政策的力度。

對此，民進黨應在「多數尊重少數」與「少數服從多數」的平衡中定性議長中立化，雖不必如王金平「為中立而中立」的議事主持風格，損及民主多數決的原則，但也不能找一個完全唯民進黨黨意是從、不尊重少數黨問政權的立法院長。立法院長中立不必極端到如英國及日本，擔任議長就必須退出政黨，但還是應該有一條恰當的線，在議事程序上依議事程序客觀中立地處理議事，也就是，議長中立指的不是政黨立場上的中立，而是議事主持上的中立。

議長中立除了事的屬性外，更重要的是人的屬性。與馬英九執政時王金平擔任院長不同，2012馬修黨規讓王金平續任不分區，王再取立法院長，是一種選舉上的聯盟，王的「實力」迫使馬讓步，是王的「實力」使他有「中立」於馬英九之外的本錢。但蔡英文的當選完全靠自己，柯建銘或其他有機會問鼎院長者，都不是民進黨的王金平，立法院長誰屬，蔡英文有絕對的影響力。就此，蔡英文就必須思考所謂人的屬性，包括議事經驗、社會形象、問政專業都應綜合考量，不能僅從「政策配合度」去思考立法院長人選。因為，既然是蔡英文意志下所能決定的立法院長，那麼蔡英文就必須為這位立法院長的良莠負責。

另一個指標是過去長期被詬病的密室協商。嚴格來說，打破密室協商有法源可循，《立法院職權行使法》中明定協商必須錄影、錄音刊載在公報上，過去密室協商打不破，是因為密室有助於增加王金平對議事掌握的影響力，小黨也樂意取得不相稱的議事權力，受害的則是法案與政策被卡住的行政部門，這也是行政部門對王金平有微詞之處，但王有「實力」應對行政部門的不滿。當新的立法院長，是在蔡英文的影響力範圍內產生的時候，很難有「實力」繼續執行密室協商。這應該也算是民進黨取得國會多數的一種國會議事可能出現的進步。

可以預見民進黨的國會，會是團結而且強勢的國會，也因此，未來會有另一種必然的失衡現象出現，就是小黨在國會角色的邊緣化，以及國民黨要如何制衡的問題。這一點，我們對國民黨和其他小黨有幾個建議，第一，國民黨在野後不能心存報復，也採取無限抗爭手段癱瘓國會，時代力量也不能淪為民進黨的尾巴政黨。在無涉意識型態公共議題上，在野黨要有「跨藍綠合作」的合縱連橫，才能加大制衡的力量；第二，要善用網路公民力量，結合輿論提高對執政者的監督以防止濫權；第三，要提升自己問政品質，用專業去增加問政犀利度，爭取人民的認同。

國會改革還有非常重要的最後一點：人民的自覺。選民心態必須改變，不能再把立法委員當里長用，不要讓立法委員的時間都花在跑攤、婚喪喜慶以致於荒廢議事，應讓立法委員盡可能地留在國會審查法案與預算，為人民的利益、為國家的發展善盡問政之責。選民的腦袋不改變，再多的政黨輪替也沒有用。