Tsai Ing-wen, Listen to Kin Moy
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 1, 2016
Executive Summary: Everyone knows Tsai Ing-wen is reluctant to accept the 1992 Consensus. But no one knows exactly why she is refusing to accept it. The United States acknowledges that today's cross-Strait achievements are based on the 1992 Consensus. Can Tsai Ing-wen truly afford to ignore AIT Director Kin Moy? Can she truly afford to ignore what he was polite enough not to spell out?
Full Text Below:
On Januar 20, Tsai Ing-wen posted an article in the Liberty Times entitled, "The Historical Facts behind 1992: Promoting Cross-Strait Relations". On January 27, Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Ma Xiaoguang repeated 13 times that Beijing "remains firm on the 1992 Consensus". More recently, on February 24, Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman An Fengshan repeated 16 times that Beijing "remains firm on the 1992 consensus". As Ma and An have made clear, the 1992 Consensus is the “magic talisman” in cross-Strait relations.
This makes it clear that the conflict between Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing over the 1992 Consensus remains unresolved.
On February 4, American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Kin Moy told UDN TV News that everyone's attention is focused on the 1992 Consensus. His message can be summarized as follows.
One. He praised the Ma government's eight year long promotion of cross-Strait exchanges for reducing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. He affirmed the Tsai government's pledge “to ensure the continuance of current exchanges, and to maintain constructive cross-Strait dialogue".
Two. Moy said the United States has taken note of the important role the 1992 Consensus has played in cross-Strait exchanges over the past eight years under President Ma. He affirmed President Ma's contribution to cross-Strait exchanges, and the reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, based on the 1992 Consensus. Kin Moy acknowledged the causal relationship between the 1992 consensus and Ma's cross-Strait policy achievements. He acknowledged that Ma's achievements were the practical result of the 1992 Consensus.
Three. Kin Moy said the US has not taken any position on the 1992 Consensus in the past, but it believes that the 1992 Consensus has been the basis for cross-Strait dialogue over the past eight years. He reaffirmed yet again the role of the 1992 Consensus as the basis for cross-Strait dialogue.
Four. Kin Moy Mei stressed that the US took no position on the basis for cross-Strait dialogue. He said the basis for cross-Strait exchanges should be determined jointly by the leaders and people from the two sides.
Let us sum up Kin Moy's remarks. One. He acknowledged the Ma government's cross-Strait policy achievements. He hoped that the Tsai government would maintain current exchanges. Two. He acknowledged the causal relationship between the Ma government's cross-Strait policy achievements and the 1992 Consensus. He acknowledged that the 1992 Consensus has been the basis for cross-Strait dialogue over the past eight years. In other words, he affirmed the status quo in cross-Strait relations, and the 1992 Consensus as the basis for cross-Strait dialogue over the past eight years. Three. He also said that the US took no position on the basis for cross-Strait dialogue. In other words, the 1992 Consensus is the basis for dialogue established by the Ma administration and Beijing. The US does not take a position on that. But it affirms and admires the cross-Strait policy results. The US takes no position on the basis by which the Tsai government and Beijing establish dialogue. It hopes however, that the Tsai government will continue current exchanges.
To sum up Kin Moy's remarks, the United States affirms the Ma government's cross-Strait policy achievements rooted in the 1992 Consensus. It hopes the Tsai government will continue current exchanges. Should Tsai Ing-wen accept the 1992 Consensus as a basis for dialogue? The United States takes no position. As a matter of courtesy, it respects the Tsai government's policy decisions.
Moy put the ball in Tsai Ing-wen's court. Tsai now faces a dilemma. She wants to continue benefiting from Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy achievements, which are based on the 1992 Consensus. As she put it, she wants to “maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations”. But at the same time, she refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. Alas, Beijing insists on the 1992 Consensus. On this, it is immovable as bedrock. Tsai Ing-wen must ask herself whether Taiwan can withstand the political and economic consequences of her refusal? Kin Moy understands Beijing's position. Is he offering Tsai Ing-wen a word to the wise?
Tsai Ing-wen must pay attention. The United States hopes that the Tsai government will maintain the cross-Strait status quo established by Ma government, based on the 1992 Consensus. Suppose Tsai Ing-wen refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus and fails to maintain the status quo? Will the United States apply behind the scenes pressure forcing Tsai Ing-wen to accept the 1992 Consensus? If so, will the courtesy afforded Tsai Ing-wen with these kind words, become a thing of the past?
Everyone knows Tsai Ing-wen is reluctant to accept the 1992 Consensus. But no one knows exactly why she is refusing to accept it. The United States acknowledges that today's cross-Strait achievements are based on the 1992 Consensus. Can Tsai Ing-wen truly afford to ignore Kin Moy? Can she truly afford to ignore what he was polite enough not to spell out?
且聽梅健華說些什麼
2016-03-01 聯合報社論
蔡英文在一月廿日經自由時報發表「九二歷史事實／推動兩岸關係」；一月廿七日，國台辦發言人馬曉光在記者會上十三次提到「堅持九二共識」；最近，二月廿四日，國台辦發言人安峰山在記者會上，又十六次提到「堅持九二共識」。馬安二人皆強調，九二共識是兩岸關係和平發展的定海神針。
由此可見，蔡英文與北京在「九二共識」上的對峙尚未化解。
在這段期間中，二月四日，美國在台協會台北辦事處處長梅健華接受udn TV專訪，論及九二共識，頗受各方注意。他的相關談話，可以歸納並引伸如下：
一、他肯定馬政府八年來在推動兩岸交流、降低台海緊張的貢獻。並支持蔡英文新政府「延續目前交流成果，持續進行兩岸建設性對話」。
二、他說：「美國留意到九二共識在馬總統過去八年任內在推動兩岸交流過程中扮演的重要角色」，並肯定馬總統過去八年「在九二共識的基礎上」推動兩岸交流、降低台海緊張的貢獻。這些論述，應可解釋為：梅健華承認，馬總統八年來在兩岸政策上的成就，與九二共識有因果關係，在一定意義上可視為「在九二共識的基礎上」所實現的成就。
三、梅健華表示，美方長久以來對九二共識沒有抱持觀點，「但我們相信，（過去八年）雙方的（九二）共識是對話基礎」。這段話，似又在表達他對「九二共識是（過去八年）兩岸對話基礎」的觀察與評論。
四、但是，梅健華強調：「兩岸對話基礎為何，美方並無立場。」他說：「兩岸交流的基礎為何，應該由兩岸領導人與人民共同決定。」
試將梅健華的論述略作整理。一、他承認馬政府在兩岸政策上的成就，並希望蔡政府能「延續目前交流成果」。二、他也承認馬政府在兩岸政策上的成就，與「九二共識」有因果關係，並認知「九二共識是（過去八年）兩岸對話基礎」。也就是說，他肯定兩岸關係的現狀，也對「九二共識為（過去八年）對話基礎」表示接納。三、但是，他說：「兩岸對話基礎為何，美方並無立場。」也就是說，「九二共識」是馬政府與北京共構的「對話基礎」，美國不持立場，但對因此而實現的兩岸成就表達肯定與讚賞。未來，蔡政府與北京將共構何種「對話基礎」，美國亦不持立場，只是寄望蔡政府能「延續目前交流成果」。
歸結梅健華的看法，可解讀為：美方肯定馬府在九二共識上實現的兩岸關係成就，並希望蔡政府能「延續目前交流成果」；至於對蔡英文是否接受九二共識為「對話基礎」，美方不持立場。這是對蔡政府的政策選擇表達尊重，是梅健華表示的禮貌。
如此一來，球就到了蔡英文的手裡。她的處境是：又要延續馬政府因九二共識而實現的兩岸成果（她說「要維持兩岸關係現狀」），卻似又不願接受「九二共識」。但若北京仍然「堅持九二共識／意志堅如磐石」，蔡英文就必須理智斟酌：台灣的政經情勢能否挺得過去？梅健華的弦外之音，有無可能是在知悉或揣度北京的立場後，給蔡英文的善意示警？
更值得蔡英文注意的是：美國希望蔡政府能「維持馬政府（因九二共識）實現的兩岸現狀」，但若因蔡英文不接受九二共識而致無以維持，美國有無可能回過頭來幕後施壓，要蔡英文接受九二共識？屆時，梅健華如今因維護蔡英文政治尊嚴的這些客氣話，會不會成了明日黃花？
國人只知道蔡英文不願接受「九二共識」，但迄今完全不知她何以拒絕接受。如果美國也承認今日兩岸成就是建立在九二共識的基礎之上，蔡英文難道不該認真聽一聽梅健華究竟說了什麼？及其因禮貌而保留了什麼沒說？
Monday, February 29, 2016
Thursday, February 25, 2016
Help Tsai Ing-wen Overcome Cross-Strait Obstacles
Help Tsai Ing-wen Overcome Cross-Strait Obstacles
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 26, 2016
Executive Summary: DPP Legislator Kao Chi-peng's call to purge portraits of Sun Yat-sen from government buildings has provoked a KMT backlash and rallied public opposition. Even the Mainland had harsh words to offer. "What is the agenda? Everyone knows perfectly well.” In response to the controversy, Tsai Ing-wen first tried to go through the motions. She invoked "transitional justice", and spoke of "confronting historical truths". She knows full well that such an action would undermine cross-Strait relations. She is urging the DPP to think more strategically, and calling for a broader discussion of the issue. She appears to applying the brakes on the Sun Yat-sen portrait issue.
Full Text Below:
DPP Legislator Kao Chi-peng's call to purge portraits of Sun Yat-sen from government buildings has provoked a KMT backlash and rallied public opposition. Even the Mainland had harsh words to offer. "What is the agenda? Everyone knows perfectly well.” In response to the controversy, Tsai Ing-wen first tried to go through the motions. She invoked "transitional justice", and spoke of "confronting historical truths". She knows full well that such an action would undermine cross-Strait relations. She is urging the DPP to think more strategically, and calling for a broader discussion of the issue. She appears to applying the brakes on the Sun Yat-sen portrait issue.
As this incident shows, cross-Strait relations present numerous difficulties for Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai has inherited Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait problems. She is now caught in the middle. But her plight is more difficult than Ma Ying-jeou's, for three reasons. Difficulty One. Ma Ying-jeou advocated cross-Strait reconcilation. Opposition to him originated mainly with opponents, not supporters. Tsai Ing-wen's situation is different. She is clearly seeking reconciliation upon taking office. Therefore opposition will come from supporters within her own camp. Opposition will not be limited to DPP supporters, but will also come from deep green NPP elements.
Difficulty Two. Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait stance was largely consistent, from beginning to end. He did not flip-flop endlessly. Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, will be making a complete about face upon taking office. She cannot avoid questions about her integrity.
Difficulty Three. Tsai Ing-wen will be making a complete about face. People within her administration may have trouble keeping up. Hence the Sun Yat-sen portrait firestorm. We would like to think that Tsai Ing-wen was not so foolish as to instruct Kao Chi-peng to release a trial balloon. Presumably the DPP acted on its own. To the Mainland, the discrepancy between Tsai Ing-wen before and after is simply too great. This undermines Mainland confidence in her. They see her saying one thing while doing another. They see her talking through both sides of her mouth.
This means that all three camps, green, blue, and red, should help Tsai Ing-wen overcome these three difficulties. Helping her is not for the sake of Tsai Ing-wen personally, but for Taiwan's future, and long-term cross-Strait peace.
First take the green camp. DPP legislators need to appreciate Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait dilemma. They must not make more trouble for her. The Sun Yat-sen portait issue is a farce. It makes Tsai Ing-wen's plight even more awkward. It makes it harder for her to deal with cross-Strait relations.
Now take the blue camp. Tsai Ing-wen will be making a complete about face. She will be reaping the rewards of the cross-Strait policy authored by Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT. Asking the blue camp to swallow this injustice is asking a lot. Tsai Ing-wen is a person of dubious integrity. But the blue camp knows that cross-Strait relations are important. Is Tsai Ing-wen willing to make an about face and acknowledge the KMT's cross-Strait policy achievements? If she is, then the KMT should give her its blessing. Conversely, if Tsai Ing-wen intends to make an about face, she must act with honor. In her 5/20 inaugural address, she must acknowledge the cross-Strait accomplishments of the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou. She must extend an olive branch to the president and blue camp. This is the way to blue green reconciliation.
Now take the red camp. Despite everything so far, we think the Mainland should allow Tsai Ing-wen more latitude. It should at least "listen to what she says, and watch what she does”. It should not be in too big a hurry to punish Tsai Ing-wen through cross-Strait policy. Take for example, the standoff over the 1992 Consensus. The CCP may wish to consider her pespective. The 1992 Consensus was in fact, a “work in progress”. It was a creative means of creating an ambiguous consensus that simultaneously affirmed the one China principle while qualifying the one China principle. But as Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP see it, they had no role in its creation. They were not party to the consensus. The DPP may find it difficult to swallow the KMT's version of the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen may find it difficult to answer to green camp supporters. Acceptance of the consensus, as is, would amount to political suicide.
The green camp and the red camp, including Tsai Ing-wen and Xi Jinping, should seek a new basis for cross-Strait relations. The Mainland may wish to give the DPP an opportunity to jointly author a new consensus that is nevertheless consistent with the one China principle. The term "old wine in new bottles" comes to mind. The essence of the consensus would remain unchanged, but it would not necessarily bear the name "1992 Consensus". That would provide Tsai Ing-wen with a face-saving measure.
Tsai Ing-wen will need to demonstrate greater sincerity and wisdom. The red and green camps do not trust each other. The two sides must seek some sort of middle ground. A purge of Sun Yat-sen portrais is a de-Sinicization provocation. It must be avoided at all cost. What should the new term for the 1992 Consensus be? Tsai Ing-wen should expand on the foundation established during the Ma Xi summit. Leaders from the two sides can meet. They can establish a newer, even more forward-looking basis for cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen may wish to create a new term for consensus, one able to win approval from the Mainland side.
People on the Mainland consider people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to be members of the same family. President Tsai Ing-wen's difficulties are everyone's to bear. The memory of Chen Shui-bian remains fresh. Tsai Ing-wen would do well to keep the lesson he provided in mind.
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 26, 2016
Executive Summary: DPP Legislator Kao Chi-peng's call to purge portraits of Sun Yat-sen from government buildings has provoked a KMT backlash and rallied public opposition. Even the Mainland had harsh words to offer. "What is the agenda? Everyone knows perfectly well.” In response to the controversy, Tsai Ing-wen first tried to go through the motions. She invoked "transitional justice", and spoke of "confronting historical truths". She knows full well that such an action would undermine cross-Strait relations. She is urging the DPP to think more strategically, and calling for a broader discussion of the issue. She appears to applying the brakes on the Sun Yat-sen portrait issue.
Full Text Below:
DPP Legislator Kao Chi-peng's call to purge portraits of Sun Yat-sen from government buildings has provoked a KMT backlash and rallied public opposition. Even the Mainland had harsh words to offer. "What is the agenda? Everyone knows perfectly well.” In response to the controversy, Tsai Ing-wen first tried to go through the motions. She invoked "transitional justice", and spoke of "confronting historical truths". She knows full well that such an action would undermine cross-Strait relations. She is urging the DPP to think more strategically, and calling for a broader discussion of the issue. She appears to applying the brakes on the Sun Yat-sen portrait issue.
As this incident shows, cross-Strait relations present numerous difficulties for Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai has inherited Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait problems. She is now caught in the middle. But her plight is more difficult than Ma Ying-jeou's, for three reasons. Difficulty One. Ma Ying-jeou advocated cross-Strait reconcilation. Opposition to him originated mainly with opponents, not supporters. Tsai Ing-wen's situation is different. She is clearly seeking reconciliation upon taking office. Therefore opposition will come from supporters within her own camp. Opposition will not be limited to DPP supporters, but will also come from deep green NPP elements.
Difficulty Two. Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait stance was largely consistent, from beginning to end. He did not flip-flop endlessly. Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, will be making a complete about face upon taking office. She cannot avoid questions about her integrity.
Difficulty Three. Tsai Ing-wen will be making a complete about face. People within her administration may have trouble keeping up. Hence the Sun Yat-sen portrait firestorm. We would like to think that Tsai Ing-wen was not so foolish as to instruct Kao Chi-peng to release a trial balloon. Presumably the DPP acted on its own. To the Mainland, the discrepancy between Tsai Ing-wen before and after is simply too great. This undermines Mainland confidence in her. They see her saying one thing while doing another. They see her talking through both sides of her mouth.
This means that all three camps, green, blue, and red, should help Tsai Ing-wen overcome these three difficulties. Helping her is not for the sake of Tsai Ing-wen personally, but for Taiwan's future, and long-term cross-Strait peace.
First take the green camp. DPP legislators need to appreciate Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait dilemma. They must not make more trouble for her. The Sun Yat-sen portait issue is a farce. It makes Tsai Ing-wen's plight even more awkward. It makes it harder for her to deal with cross-Strait relations.
Now take the blue camp. Tsai Ing-wen will be making a complete about face. She will be reaping the rewards of the cross-Strait policy authored by Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT. Asking the blue camp to swallow this injustice is asking a lot. Tsai Ing-wen is a person of dubious integrity. But the blue camp knows that cross-Strait relations are important. Is Tsai Ing-wen willing to make an about face and acknowledge the KMT's cross-Strait policy achievements? If she is, then the KMT should give her its blessing. Conversely, if Tsai Ing-wen intends to make an about face, she must act with honor. In her 5/20 inaugural address, she must acknowledge the cross-Strait accomplishments of the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou. She must extend an olive branch to the president and blue camp. This is the way to blue green reconciliation.
Now take the red camp. Despite everything so far, we think the Mainland should allow Tsai Ing-wen more latitude. It should at least "listen to what she says, and watch what she does”. It should not be in too big a hurry to punish Tsai Ing-wen through cross-Strait policy. Take for example, the standoff over the 1992 Consensus. The CCP may wish to consider her pespective. The 1992 Consensus was in fact, a “work in progress”. It was a creative means of creating an ambiguous consensus that simultaneously affirmed the one China principle while qualifying the one China principle. But as Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP see it, they had no role in its creation. They were not party to the consensus. The DPP may find it difficult to swallow the KMT's version of the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen may find it difficult to answer to green camp supporters. Acceptance of the consensus, as is, would amount to political suicide.
The green camp and the red camp, including Tsai Ing-wen and Xi Jinping, should seek a new basis for cross-Strait relations. The Mainland may wish to give the DPP an opportunity to jointly author a new consensus that is nevertheless consistent with the one China principle. The term "old wine in new bottles" comes to mind. The essence of the consensus would remain unchanged, but it would not necessarily bear the name "1992 Consensus". That would provide Tsai Ing-wen with a face-saving measure.
Tsai Ing-wen will need to demonstrate greater sincerity and wisdom. The red and green camps do not trust each other. The two sides must seek some sort of middle ground. A purge of Sun Yat-sen portrais is a de-Sinicization provocation. It must be avoided at all cost. What should the new term for the 1992 Consensus be? Tsai Ing-wen should expand on the foundation established during the Ma Xi summit. Leaders from the two sides can meet. They can establish a newer, even more forward-looking basis for cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen may wish to create a new term for consensus, one able to win approval from the Mainland side.
People on the Mainland consider people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to be members of the same family. President Tsai Ing-wen's difficulties are everyone's to bear. The memory of Chen Shui-bian remains fresh. Tsai Ing-wen would do well to keep the lesson he provided in mind.
幫助蔡英文跨越兩岸關係高牆
2016年02月26日 中國時報
民進黨立委高志鵬要求廢國父遺像，引起國民黨反彈、
從這一件事可以看出，對蔡英文來說，
其二，馬英九不管在朝在野，其在兩岸問題上的主張「一路走來」，
其三，也因為蔡英文的轉向幅度過大，對內民進黨團隊未必跟得上，
正因為這三個艱難，綠、藍、
先談綠，民進黨立委應了解蔡英文在兩岸的艱難處境，不要再「
次談藍，
再談紅，我們仍認為，大陸方面應給蔡英文多一點空間與包容，
換位思考後，綠與紅、
蔡英文則要展現更大的誠意與智慧，在紅綠缺乏互信下，
對台灣而言、對大陸「兩岸一家親」推動者與支持者而言，
Wednesday, February 24, 2016
Isolationism will Spell Taiwan's Doom
Isolationism will Spell Taiwan's Doom
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 25, 2016
Executive Summary: The Ministry of Labour hopes to relax restrictions on overseas white collar technicians. It has proposed an amendment to the Foreigner Employment Service Law, but has run into stubborn opposition from New Power Party (NPP) legislator Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk. The bill may not get off the ground. The entire world is fighting over talented individuals. Yet politicians on Taiwan are doing their utmost to turn back the clock.
Full Text Below:
The Ministry of Labour hopes to relax restrictions on overseas white collar technicians. It has proposed an amendment to the Foreigner Employment Service Law, but has run into stubborn opposition from New Power Party (NPP) legislator Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk. The bill may not get off the ground. The entire world is fighting over talented individuals. Yet politicians on Taiwan are doing their utmost to turn back the clock. Phison Dongzuo, aka Pan Chien-cheng, is a successful entrepreneur born in Malaysia, and educated on Taiwan. He is the CEO of Phison Electronics Corporation. Pan has issued a heart-felt warning against the DPP's narrow-minded nationalism.
Huang Kuo-chang and others are trotting out elaborate justifications for their opposition. They say loosened restrictions would expose a number of career fields, including shipping, telecommunications, tourism, and finance to increased competition. Low cost workers on the Mainland, who are near by and who speak the same language, would migrate to Taiwan and significantly affect the livelihood of local workers. They would make it harder for young people to find jobs, and reduce their wages. Such outdated arguments might have persuaded people during the 20th century. But any current government that cares about global competitiveness would consider these arguments a joke. If any of Taiwan's competitors learn that this is Taiwan's official position, they will jump for joy.
Why? Simple. Governments the world over are aggressively deregulating. They are loosening policies and laws pertaining to visa issuance for foreign students and workers. They are offering a wide variety of incentives to encourage first-class talent to emigrate and become naturalized citizens. Taiwan, meanwhile, is slamming its door shut. It is erecting daunting barriers to prevent individuals with talent from entering. It is even intent on driving away talented foreigners who are already on Taiwan, who have already contributed to Taiwan. These individuals will surely be snatched up by other countries. So who will be the biggest loser?
Never mind distant regions. Sharp contrasts can be found nearby, right now. The Hong Kong based South China Morning Post recently reported that the Mainland authorities, in order to attract more foreign investment and talent, has officially loosened green card qualification requirements. It has switched from attracting foreign investment to attracting foreign talent. Experts and head-hunters may consider its measures insufficient to attract experienced professionals. But in general they think the effect on foreign talent will be positive.
But here is the really interesting part. Does anyone really imagine policymakers in Beijing haven't thought this through? Do policymakers in Beijing really believe their policies will hurt the livelihood of local workers and make it more difficult for Mainland youth to find jobs? They do not. Their reasoning echoes that of governments the world over. They know that global competitiveness is rooted in brain power, in the ability to innovate. Think about it. Any country would love to attract a talent such as Steve Jobs. How much value can such an individual create? How many jobs? The United States became the world's superpower, because she attracted the first-class talent from the world over. Aren't Mainland China's relaxed requirements for green card eligibility, based on just this sort of strategic thinking?
Taiwan's biggest problem is that its myriad regulations and policies never attract foreign talent. By contrast the Mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao actively create conditions that attract talent from Taiwan. Anyone with even a smattering of knowledge realizes this. How many of Taiwan's top high school graduates are drawn to Hong Kong, Macao, and the Mainland by scholarships? Many talented individuals are poached from the Academia Sinica and top tier universities? In recent years, Taiwan's technology industry has faced increasing bottlenecks. The brain drain of top tier industry professionals is increasingly serious. In 2014, professionals who relocated away from Taiwan accounted for 61.1% of the world's total. Taiwan ranked first in the world.
The opportunities and conditions Taiwan offered to foreign talent lost their attraction long ago. That is why industry is now in a panic. The Ministry of Labor is loosening restrictions on white collar professionals born overseas but who studied on Taiwan. Too bad they are a day late and a dollar short. How much actual impact is this having? That is hard to say. Huang Kuo-chang and other legislators are even demanding that this tiny door be slammed shut. Is this really “loving Taiwan”, or is this “harming Taiwan”?
Phison Dongzuo, aka Pan Chien-cheng, emigrated to Taiwan from Malaysia. He founded an electronics giant with a market value of nearly 50 billion dollars. He employs 1,000 workers. In addition to founding Phison, Pan recently recruited 70 to 80 overseas Chinese white-collar workers. If we count workers in the upstream and downstream industry chain, he has created employment opportunities for over 10,000 people. The world is fighting over people like Pan Chien-cheng. Yet Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk would slam the door in the face of such talented individuals. They would even cast out others already on Taiwan. This sort of isolationist xenophobia was in vogue eight years ago. It was overcome only after great difficulty. Yet Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk would resurrect it. If Taiwan actually turns the clock back and reverts to isolationism, it will lose its competitiveness entirely within a few short years. Jobs will be harder to find, and wages will be lower. The ultimate result of such xenophobic isolationism will be national collapse.
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 25, 2016
Executive Summary: The Ministry of Labour hopes to relax restrictions on overseas white collar technicians. It has proposed an amendment to the Foreigner Employment Service Law, but has run into stubborn opposition from New Power Party (NPP) legislator Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk. The bill may not get off the ground. The entire world is fighting over talented individuals. Yet politicians on Taiwan are doing their utmost to turn back the clock.
Full Text Below:
The Ministry of Labour hopes to relax restrictions on overseas white collar technicians. It has proposed an amendment to the Foreigner Employment Service Law, but has run into stubborn opposition from New Power Party (NPP) legislator Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk. The bill may not get off the ground. The entire world is fighting over talented individuals. Yet politicians on Taiwan are doing their utmost to turn back the clock. Phison Dongzuo, aka Pan Chien-cheng, is a successful entrepreneur born in Malaysia, and educated on Taiwan. He is the CEO of Phison Electronics Corporation. Pan has issued a heart-felt warning against the DPP's narrow-minded nationalism.
Huang Kuo-chang and others are trotting out elaborate justifications for their opposition. They say loosened restrictions would expose a number of career fields, including shipping, telecommunications, tourism, and finance to increased competition. Low cost workers on the Mainland, who are near by and who speak the same language, would migrate to Taiwan and significantly affect the livelihood of local workers. They would make it harder for young people to find jobs, and reduce their wages. Such outdated arguments might have persuaded people during the 20th century. But any current government that cares about global competitiveness would consider these arguments a joke. If any of Taiwan's competitors learn that this is Taiwan's official position, they will jump for joy.
Why? Simple. Governments the world over are aggressively deregulating. They are loosening policies and laws pertaining to visa issuance for foreign students and workers. They are offering a wide variety of incentives to encourage first-class talent to emigrate and become naturalized citizens. Taiwan, meanwhile, is slamming its door shut. It is erecting daunting barriers to prevent individuals with talent from entering. It is even intent on driving away talented foreigners who are already on Taiwan, who have already contributed to Taiwan. These individuals will surely be snatched up by other countries. So who will be the biggest loser?
Never mind distant regions. Sharp contrasts can be found nearby, right now. The Hong Kong based South China Morning Post recently reported that the Mainland authorities, in order to attract more foreign investment and talent, has officially loosened green card qualification requirements. It has switched from attracting foreign investment to attracting foreign talent. Experts and head-hunters may consider its measures insufficient to attract experienced professionals. But in general they think the effect on foreign talent will be positive.
But here is the really interesting part. Does anyone really imagine policymakers in Beijing haven't thought this through? Do policymakers in Beijing really believe their policies will hurt the livelihood of local workers and make it more difficult for Mainland youth to find jobs? They do not. Their reasoning echoes that of governments the world over. They know that global competitiveness is rooted in brain power, in the ability to innovate. Think about it. Any country would love to attract a talent such as Steve Jobs. How much value can such an individual create? How many jobs? The United States became the world's superpower, because she attracted the first-class talent from the world over. Aren't Mainland China's relaxed requirements for green card eligibility, based on just this sort of strategic thinking?
Taiwan's biggest problem is that its myriad regulations and policies never attract foreign talent. By contrast the Mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao actively create conditions that attract talent from Taiwan. Anyone with even a smattering of knowledge realizes this. How many of Taiwan's top high school graduates are drawn to Hong Kong, Macao, and the Mainland by scholarships? Many talented individuals are poached from the Academia Sinica and top tier universities? In recent years, Taiwan's technology industry has faced increasing bottlenecks. The brain drain of top tier industry professionals is increasingly serious. In 2014, professionals who relocated away from Taiwan accounted for 61.1% of the world's total. Taiwan ranked first in the world.
The opportunities and conditions Taiwan offered to foreign talent lost their attraction long ago. That is why industry is now in a panic. The Ministry of Labor is loosening restrictions on white collar professionals born overseas but who studied on Taiwan. Too bad they are a day late and a dollar short. How much actual impact is this having? That is hard to say. Huang Kuo-chang and other legislators are even demanding that this tiny door be slammed shut. Is this really “loving Taiwan”, or is this “harming Taiwan”?
Phison Dongzuo, aka Pan Chien-cheng, emigrated to Taiwan from Malaysia. He founded an electronics giant with a market value of nearly 50 billion dollars. He employs 1,000 workers. In addition to founding Phison, Pan recently recruited 70 to 80 overseas Chinese white-collar workers. If we count workers in the upstream and downstream industry chain, he has created employment opportunities for over 10,000 people. The world is fighting over people like Pan Chien-cheng. Yet Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk would slam the door in the face of such talented individuals. They would even cast out others already on Taiwan. This sort of isolationist xenophobia was in vogue eight years ago. It was overcome only after great difficulty. Yet Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk would resurrect it. If Taiwan actually turns the clock back and reverts to isolationism, it will lose its competitiveness entirely within a few short years. Jobs will be harder to find, and wages will be lower. The ultimate result of such xenophobic isolationism will be national collapse.
招回鎖國幽靈是亂台害台
2016年02月25日 中國時報
勞動部為鬆綁僑外生留台從事技術性白領工作，提出《
黃國昌等提出此一倡議，振振有詞的論述是，將使得包括運輸、
為什麼？理由太簡單，當全球主政者都在積極鬆綁，從簽證、留學、
遠的不談，幾乎就是發生在同時，很值得拿來相對照的一則訊息是，
有趣的地方正是在這裡，
台灣最大的問題是在各種法規與政策上，
台灣的發展機會與提供的條件，對外籍優秀人才早就喪失吸引力了，
來自馬來西亞的群聯電子董座潘健成，在台創立市值近500億元的
Tuesday, February 23, 2016
President Lee Teng-hui Violates the Constitution: Can Tsai Ing-wen Remain Silent?
President Lee Teng-hui Violates the Constitution: Can Tsai Ing-wen Remain Silent?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2016
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen cannot remain silent. Otherwise she will be inexorably painted into a corner, and lose all room for maneuver. Tsai is about to become president. She must abide by the Constitution. She made a commitment to the people. The Constitution explicitly stipulates that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are the "Republic of China's Taiwan Area, and the Mainland Area". Lee Teng-hui's rhetoric is unconstitutional. President elect Tsai must nail Lee to the wall using a second nail.
Full Text Below:
Lee Teng-hui's newly published "The Remainder of My Life" has stirred the pot. Strictly speaking, this book is hardly new. It was published in Japan in 2014. The current edition is merely a translation. The book has been widely criticized for alleging that "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan", and for advocating Lee's two states theory. It sings a tired tune. But the tired tune has caused an uproar because Lee Teng-hui is demanding that Tsai Ing-wen implement his agenda.
Lee Teng-hui claimed that "The Diaoyutai Islands belong to Japan". Tsai Ing-wen knew she could not equivocate on this issue. She had no choice but to make herself crystal clear, so she immediately replied "Diaoyutai belongs to Taiwan". She nailed Lee Teng-hui on this historical fact. Other DPP politicians whom Lee named spoke even more plainly and more caustically.
For example, former premier Yu Hsi-kung said that the Diaoyutai Islands were part of Touchen Township, Yilan County. Lee blasted Yu, saying "Nothing is more foolish than this." Yu Hsi-kun clarified his position. He said the Diaoyutai Islands were incorporated into Ilan County in 1973, not during his term as premier. In addition to pointing out Lee's error, Yu sarcastically noted, "I knew long ago that the Diaoyutai Islands were Republic of China territory, because Mr. Lee Teng-hui said so." Yu pointed out Lee's previous, self-contradictory position.
Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP were not the only ones nailing Lee Teng-hui to the wall. Many fishermen did so as well. Lee Teng-hui seems to have forgotten something. Unless we affirm sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands, we have no legal basis to assert fishing rights within Diaoyutai Island waters. This is why fishermen from Suao denounced Lee Teng-hui as a "lackey of Japan". Lee Teng-hui forfeited sovereignty and humiliated the nation over the Diaoyutai Islands issue. If our fishing rights are not upheld, it directly impacts those who make a hard-scrabble living on the sea. How can they not be outraged?
Lee Teng-hui even nailed himself in his own book, "The Remainder of My Life". Lee praised the Ma government for signing the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement with Japan in 2013. He said, "This, for me as someone who has long looked forward to an early agreement between Taiwan fishermen and Japan, is a truly happy event, a truly historic feat well worth celebrating." But if Ma Ying-jeou had parroted Lee Teng-hui, and argued that the Diaoyutai Islands belong to Japan, what grounds would Taiwan have to negotiate fishing rights with Japan? Japan would never have agreed to this “historic” Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement.
But when the issue is the two states theory, Tsai Ing-wen finds herself in an embarrassing dilemma. During her presidential campaign, she swore to the people, the international community, and the Mainland, that she would abide by the existing constitutional framework. Cross-Strait relations under the existing constitutional framework are explicitly defined as relations between the "Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area", not relations between independent nations. Tsai Ing-wen knows full well that it is one thing to shout “one nation on each side” when one is the opposition party. But if one continues to shout “two states” when one is the ruing party, then “the ground will move and the mountains will shake”. The consequences will be serious indeed. The two states theory approach is infeasible, impossible, and amounts to political and economic suicide. This is why the DPP, which shrilly championed the two states theory during the Sunflower Student Movement, has no choice but to make a complete about face once it assumes power. Political reality and Taiwan's larger interests allow no room for the two states theory. The DPP is pragmatic. Officials on the Mainland do not consider this sufficient to establish mutual trust. But they also consider it a positive sign.
Just as the DPP was preparing to turn the ship around, Lee Teng-hui chose to make waves with his two states theory. In "The Remainder of My Life" Lee claims that "Taiwan has already developed a " Taiwan/Republic of China consciousness". Lee claims that the Republic of China is the Second Republic, and is a separate nation from the People's Republic of China. Lee Teng-hui said he looks forward to a future constitutional amendment, and the full realization of “one nation on each side”.
Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy has long been purposely ambiguous. When faced with this part of “The Rest of My Life” she does not respond the way she did to "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan". When the media demands her response to Lee's characterization of cross-Strait relations as "relations between two nations", she hems and haws.
For one thing, Tsai Ing-wen was the author of Lee Teng-hui's Two States Theory. For another, what she calls the "existing Republic of China constitutional framework" includes future constitutional amendments, and may well be consistent with Lee Teng-hui's rhetoric. This makes it difficult for Tsai Ing-wen to speak plainly.
Political reality requires Tsai Ing-wen to lead the DPP in forsaking the two states version of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. Otherwise exchanges between the two sides cannot be maintained. For Tsai Ing-wen, forsaking the two states version involves considerable political risk. From one side she must face the wrath of Taiwan independence elements. From the other side, she must face the blue camp and the Mainland, neither of which trust her. At this point her best strategy is “ambiguity, ambiguity, and more ambiguity”. But Lee Teng-hui is once again hammering home “state to state relations”. He is clearing up the ambiguity, and reducing the room for ambiguity.
Tsai Ing-wen cannot remain silent. Otherwise she will be inexorably painted into a corner, and lose all room for maneuver. Tsai is about to become president. She must abide by the Constitution. She made a commitment to the people. The Constitution explicitly stipulates that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are the "Republic of China's Taiwan Area, and the Mainland Area". Lee Teng-hui's rhetoric is unconstitutional. President elect Tsai must nail Lee to the wall using a second nail.
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2016
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen cannot remain silent. Otherwise she will be inexorably painted into a corner, and lose all room for maneuver. Tsai is about to become president. She must abide by the Constitution. She made a commitment to the people. The Constitution explicitly stipulates that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are the "Republic of China's Taiwan Area, and the Mainland Area". Lee Teng-hui's rhetoric is unconstitutional. President elect Tsai must nail Lee to the wall using a second nail.
Full Text Below:
Lee Teng-hui's newly published "The Remainder of My Life" has stirred the pot. Strictly speaking, this book is hardly new. It was published in Japan in 2014. The current edition is merely a translation. The book has been widely criticized for alleging that "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan", and for advocating Lee's two states theory. It sings a tired tune. But the tired tune has caused an uproar because Lee Teng-hui is demanding that Tsai Ing-wen implement his agenda.
Lee Teng-hui claimed that "The Diaoyutai Islands belong to Japan". Tsai Ing-wen knew she could not equivocate on this issue. She had no choice but to make herself crystal clear, so she immediately replied "Diaoyutai belongs to Taiwan". She nailed Lee Teng-hui on this historical fact. Other DPP politicians whom Lee named spoke even more plainly and more caustically.
For example, former premier Yu Hsi-kung said that the Diaoyutai Islands were part of Touchen Township, Yilan County. Lee blasted Yu, saying "Nothing is more foolish than this." Yu Hsi-kun clarified his position. He said the Diaoyutai Islands were incorporated into Ilan County in 1973, not during his term as premier. In addition to pointing out Lee's error, Yu sarcastically noted, "I knew long ago that the Diaoyutai Islands were Republic of China territory, because Mr. Lee Teng-hui said so." Yu pointed out Lee's previous, self-contradictory position.
Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP were not the only ones nailing Lee Teng-hui to the wall. Many fishermen did so as well. Lee Teng-hui seems to have forgotten something. Unless we affirm sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands, we have no legal basis to assert fishing rights within Diaoyutai Island waters. This is why fishermen from Suao denounced Lee Teng-hui as a "lackey of Japan". Lee Teng-hui forfeited sovereignty and humiliated the nation over the Diaoyutai Islands issue. If our fishing rights are not upheld, it directly impacts those who make a hard-scrabble living on the sea. How can they not be outraged?
Lee Teng-hui even nailed himself in his own book, "The Remainder of My Life". Lee praised the Ma government for signing the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement with Japan in 2013. He said, "This, for me as someone who has long looked forward to an early agreement between Taiwan fishermen and Japan, is a truly happy event, a truly historic feat well worth celebrating." But if Ma Ying-jeou had parroted Lee Teng-hui, and argued that the Diaoyutai Islands belong to Japan, what grounds would Taiwan have to negotiate fishing rights with Japan? Japan would never have agreed to this “historic” Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement.
But when the issue is the two states theory, Tsai Ing-wen finds herself in an embarrassing dilemma. During her presidential campaign, she swore to the people, the international community, and the Mainland, that she would abide by the existing constitutional framework. Cross-Strait relations under the existing constitutional framework are explicitly defined as relations between the "Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area", not relations between independent nations. Tsai Ing-wen knows full well that it is one thing to shout “one nation on each side” when one is the opposition party. But if one continues to shout “two states” when one is the ruing party, then “the ground will move and the mountains will shake”. The consequences will be serious indeed. The two states theory approach is infeasible, impossible, and amounts to political and economic suicide. This is why the DPP, which shrilly championed the two states theory during the Sunflower Student Movement, has no choice but to make a complete about face once it assumes power. Political reality and Taiwan's larger interests allow no room for the two states theory. The DPP is pragmatic. Officials on the Mainland do not consider this sufficient to establish mutual trust. But they also consider it a positive sign.
Just as the DPP was preparing to turn the ship around, Lee Teng-hui chose to make waves with his two states theory. In "The Remainder of My Life" Lee claims that "Taiwan has already developed a " Taiwan/Republic of China consciousness". Lee claims that the Republic of China is the Second Republic, and is a separate nation from the People's Republic of China. Lee Teng-hui said he looks forward to a future constitutional amendment, and the full realization of “one nation on each side”.
Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy has long been purposely ambiguous. When faced with this part of “The Rest of My Life” she does not respond the way she did to "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan". When the media demands her response to Lee's characterization of cross-Strait relations as "relations between two nations", she hems and haws.
For one thing, Tsai Ing-wen was the author of Lee Teng-hui's Two States Theory. For another, what she calls the "existing Republic of China constitutional framework" includes future constitutional amendments, and may well be consistent with Lee Teng-hui's rhetoric. This makes it difficult for Tsai Ing-wen to speak plainly.
Political reality requires Tsai Ing-wen to lead the DPP in forsaking the two states version of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. Otherwise exchanges between the two sides cannot be maintained. For Tsai Ing-wen, forsaking the two states version involves considerable political risk. From one side she must face the wrath of Taiwan independence elements. From the other side, she must face the blue camp and the Mainland, neither of which trust her. At this point her best strategy is “ambiguity, ambiguity, and more ambiguity”. But Lee Teng-hui is once again hammering home “state to state relations”. He is clearing up the ambiguity, and reducing the room for ambiguity.
Tsai Ing-wen cannot remain silent. Otherwise she will be inexorably painted into a corner, and lose all room for maneuver. Tsai is about to become president. She must abide by the Constitution. She made a commitment to the people. The Constitution explicitly stipulates that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are the "Republic of China's Taiwan Area, and the Mainland Area". Lee Teng-hui's rhetoric is unconstitutional. President elect Tsai must nail Lee to the wall using a second nail.
李登輝違憲 蔡準總統豈可沉默
2016年02月24日 中國時報
李登輝新出版的《餘生》一書，攪動了台灣政治一池春水。
對李登輝的「釣魚台屬日」說，蔡英文自知不能有模糊空間，
例如李登輝說前行政院長游錫堃把釣魚台列入宜蘭縣頭城鎮管轄，「
給李登輝釘釘子的還不只有蔡英文與民進黨，還有許多漁民。
甚至，連李登輝在《餘生》一書中，都給了自己一根釘子。
但在「兩國論」的部分，蔡英文就顯得尷尬。
李登輝卻選在民進黨準備大船轉彎的時候，再掀起兩國之浪。依據《
兩岸政策一向模糊的蔡英文，面對《餘生》這一部分的論述，
當然，一方面蔡英文是李登輝時代「兩國論」起草人，
在政治現實上，蔡英文必須主導民進黨放棄《兩岸協議監督條例》
對此，蔡英文不能沉默以對，否則會讓自己慢慢退到牆角，
Monday, February 22, 2016
DPP Adopts “Accessorization” Style Taiwan independence
DPP Adopts “Accessorization” Style Taiwan independence
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2016
Executive Summary: Sun Yat-sen used to relate an anecdote called "The Lottery Ticket and the Carrying Pole". A longshoreman kept his lottery ticket hidden in his carrying pole. When he won first prize, he was so ecstatic about no longer needing the carrying pole for work, he flung it into the sea. The story reminds people they must not forget their roots while chasing riches. The DPP has been able to assume power, only by virtue of the Republic of China's century old constitutional government. On the one hand, the DPP is protected by the ROC Constitution. On the other hand, it would undermine the Republic of China's legal foundation. Does this not remind us of the longshoreman who trashed his carrying pole the moment he hit the jackpot?
Full Text Below:
DPP legislator Kao Chi-peng recently proposed removing portraits of Sun Yat-sen from government buildings. He would repeal the Republic of China Flag and Emblem Law, and three other laws that affect the display of Sun Yat-sen's portrait. No one would need to bow before the portrait of Sun Yat-sen ever again. Kao Chi-peng said there is no legal definition of the Father of the Nation. Therefore he said, "We need not continue brainwashing the next generation". DPP legislator Wang Ting-yu, meanwhile, proposed amending the National Holiday and Holiday Implementation Regulations. He would make the day Cheng Nan-jung immolated himself a national holiday. The bill is current in its first reading.
The new government has yet to even take office. Yet DPP legislators have already begun rewriting history. What happened to Tsai Ing-wen's solemn promise to practice "humility, humility, and more humility"? After eight years in the opposition, with power nearly in hand, the only thing on DPP officials' minds is settling past scores, not working on behalf of the nation's citizens.
What do DPP legislators have in mind once they have successfully purged Republic of China founding father Sun Yat-sen? What will remain of the Republic of China? They would define Cheng Nan-jung as a martyr by law. What is their next step? Do they intend to make Cheng Nan-jung Taiwan's "founding father"?
Nor is that all. Green camp legislator Chen Chi-mai has plans for the 2-28 Incident. He would amend the penalty clause in the 2.28 Incident Handling and Compensation Regulations. Anyone who "distorts" or "glosses over the historical truth" about the 2-28 Incident, or who "insults the victims and their families", will be subject to five years imprisonment. This means that anyone who discusses the 2-28 Incident must parrot the DPP version, otherwise they may be convicted in a court of law and imprisoned. This dogmatic mindset not only denies people their right to free speech, it even dictates their understanding of history. This foreshadows a form of fascism more frightening even than that of the authoritarian era.
Furthermore, if hanging portraits of Sun Yat-sen constitutes "brainwashing," why isn't removing portraits of Sun Yat-sen not brainwashing? Isn't the deification of martyr Cheng Nan-jung brainwashing as well? Cheng Nan-jung championed freedom of speech. Isn't miscasting him as an advocate of Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation, falsification of history? Isn't dictating our understanding of history and suppressing our freedom of speech, trampling over democracy and human rights?
The world is watching to see how Tsai Ing-wen, who is unwilling to recognize the 1992 Consensus, plans to "promote cross-Strait relations under the constitutional framework of the Republic of China". Take the DPP stance on the Cross-Strait Oversight Regulations. DPP members appear to be moving from the "two states" version to a "two regions" version. Observers consider this shift in positions opportunistic but pragmatic. Does Tsai intend to deal with cross-Strait relations pragmatically? If she does, the DPP cannot adopt an aggressive Taiwan independence stance. Kao Chi-peng would purged Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ting-yu would deify Cheng Nan-jung. Chen Chi-mai would dictate how the 2-28 Incident may be depicted. All of the above are nothing more than "acessorization style Taiwan independence". The DPP cannot embark on genuine independence. All it can do is engage in rhetorical sleight of hand, in order to mollify Taiwan independence supporters. All it can do is allow them to daydream about "virtual nation building" and score imaginary Ah Q "moral" victories. .
The green camp does not dare embark on genuine nation building, not when real bullets would fly. All it can do is act coy and play games. This is the dilemma that the soon to resume power DPP must face. These games may bring the DPP momentary comfort. The DPP is about to rule the nation and serve the people. Yet all it can think about is rewriting history? These actions can only lead to the loss of pubic confidence.
Take the purging of Sun Yat-sen for example. Kao Chi-peng says there has never be a legal definition of the "Father of his country". But as everyone knows, the preamble to the Constitution is quite clear. It reads, "The Republic of China National Assembly, commissioned by citizens in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's teachings upon the founding of the Republic of China, authored this Constitution in order to consolidate national authority, protect civil rights, ensure public safety, and promote public welfare... ". Never mind that revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen overthrew the monarchy and established a democratic republic. Not only did he pioneer democracy in Asia, he is also the source of democracy on Taiwan. Besides, isn't purging Sun Yat-sen while deifying Cheng Nan-jung just a wee bit self-contradictory?
Sun Yat-sen used to relate an anecdote called "The Lottery Ticket and the Carrying Pole". A longshoreman kept his lottery ticket hidden in his carrying pole. When he won the grand prize, he was so ecstatic about no longer needing the carrying pole, he flung it into the sea. The story reminds people that they must not forget their roots while chasing riches. The DPP assumed power only by virtue of the Republic of China's century old constitutional government. On the one hand, the DPP is protected by the ROC Constitution. On the other hand, the DPP would do away with the Republic of China's legal foundation. Does this not remind us of the longshoreman who trashed his carrying pole the moment he hit the jackpot?
孫中山說過「彩票與扁擔」的故事：
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2016
Executive Summary: Sun Yat-sen used to relate an anecdote called "The Lottery Ticket and the Carrying Pole". A longshoreman kept his lottery ticket hidden in his carrying pole. When he won first prize, he was so ecstatic about no longer needing the carrying pole for work, he flung it into the sea. The story reminds people they must not forget their roots while chasing riches. The DPP has been able to assume power, only by virtue of the Republic of China's century old constitutional government. On the one hand, the DPP is protected by the ROC Constitution. On the other hand, it would undermine the Republic of China's legal foundation. Does this not remind us of the longshoreman who trashed his carrying pole the moment he hit the jackpot?
Full Text Below:
DPP legislator Kao Chi-peng recently proposed removing portraits of Sun Yat-sen from government buildings. He would repeal the Republic of China Flag and Emblem Law, and three other laws that affect the display of Sun Yat-sen's portrait. No one would need to bow before the portrait of Sun Yat-sen ever again. Kao Chi-peng said there is no legal definition of the Father of the Nation. Therefore he said, "We need not continue brainwashing the next generation". DPP legislator Wang Ting-yu, meanwhile, proposed amending the National Holiday and Holiday Implementation Regulations. He would make the day Cheng Nan-jung immolated himself a national holiday. The bill is current in its first reading.
The new government has yet to even take office. Yet DPP legislators have already begun rewriting history. What happened to Tsai Ing-wen's solemn promise to practice "humility, humility, and more humility"? After eight years in the opposition, with power nearly in hand, the only thing on DPP officials' minds is settling past scores, not working on behalf of the nation's citizens.
What do DPP legislators have in mind once they have successfully purged Republic of China founding father Sun Yat-sen? What will remain of the Republic of China? They would define Cheng Nan-jung as a martyr by law. What is their next step? Do they intend to make Cheng Nan-jung Taiwan's "founding father"?
Nor is that all. Green camp legislator Chen Chi-mai has plans for the 2-28 Incident. He would amend the penalty clause in the 2.28 Incident Handling and Compensation Regulations. Anyone who "distorts" or "glosses over the historical truth" about the 2-28 Incident, or who "insults the victims and their families", will be subject to five years imprisonment. This means that anyone who discusses the 2-28 Incident must parrot the DPP version, otherwise they may be convicted in a court of law and imprisoned. This dogmatic mindset not only denies people their right to free speech, it even dictates their understanding of history. This foreshadows a form of fascism more frightening even than that of the authoritarian era.
Furthermore, if hanging portraits of Sun Yat-sen constitutes "brainwashing," why isn't removing portraits of Sun Yat-sen not brainwashing? Isn't the deification of martyr Cheng Nan-jung brainwashing as well? Cheng Nan-jung championed freedom of speech. Isn't miscasting him as an advocate of Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation, falsification of history? Isn't dictating our understanding of history and suppressing our freedom of speech, trampling over democracy and human rights?
The world is watching to see how Tsai Ing-wen, who is unwilling to recognize the 1992 Consensus, plans to "promote cross-Strait relations under the constitutional framework of the Republic of China". Take the DPP stance on the Cross-Strait Oversight Regulations. DPP members appear to be moving from the "two states" version to a "two regions" version. Observers consider this shift in positions opportunistic but pragmatic. Does Tsai intend to deal with cross-Strait relations pragmatically? If she does, the DPP cannot adopt an aggressive Taiwan independence stance. Kao Chi-peng would purged Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ting-yu would deify Cheng Nan-jung. Chen Chi-mai would dictate how the 2-28 Incident may be depicted. All of the above are nothing more than "acessorization style Taiwan independence". The DPP cannot embark on genuine independence. All it can do is engage in rhetorical sleight of hand, in order to mollify Taiwan independence supporters. All it can do is allow them to daydream about "virtual nation building" and score imaginary Ah Q "moral" victories. .
The green camp does not dare embark on genuine nation building, not when real bullets would fly. All it can do is act coy and play games. This is the dilemma that the soon to resume power DPP must face. These games may bring the DPP momentary comfort. The DPP is about to rule the nation and serve the people. Yet all it can think about is rewriting history? These actions can only lead to the loss of pubic confidence.
Take the purging of Sun Yat-sen for example. Kao Chi-peng says there has never be a legal definition of the "Father of his country". But as everyone knows, the preamble to the Constitution is quite clear. It reads, "The Republic of China National Assembly, commissioned by citizens in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's teachings upon the founding of the Republic of China, authored this Constitution in order to consolidate national authority, protect civil rights, ensure public safety, and promote public welfare... ". Never mind that revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen overthrew the monarchy and established a democratic republic. Not only did he pioneer democracy in Asia, he is also the source of democracy on Taiwan. Besides, isn't purging Sun Yat-sen while deifying Cheng Nan-jung just a wee bit self-contradictory?
Sun Yat-sen used to relate an anecdote called "The Lottery Ticket and the Carrying Pole". A longshoreman kept his lottery ticket hidden in his carrying pole. When he won the grand prize, he was so ecstatic about no longer needing the carrying pole, he flung it into the sea. The story reminds people that they must not forget their roots while chasing riches. The DPP assumed power only by virtue of the Republic of China's century old constitutional government. On the one hand, the DPP is protected by the ROC Constitution. On the other hand, the DPP would do away with the Republic of China's legal foundation. Does this not remind us of the longshoreman who trashed his carrying pole the moment he hit the jackpot?
民進黨改走「裝飾主義」台獨？
2016-02-23 聯合報
民進黨立委高志鵬最近提出「廢國父遺像」的主張，要修法廢除《
新政府還沒正式上任，民進黨立委就開始大肆清洗與改寫歷史，
依民進黨立委的進程，在去除孫中山的國父地位後，
不僅如此，綠委陳其邁也動起二二八事件的腦筋，要在《
更何況，如果說懸掛國父遺像是「洗腦」，
外界正在觀察，不願承認九二共識的蔡英文，將如何落實她「
不敢真槍實彈邁向「建國之路」，只好忸忸怩怩改走曲徑幽巷，
以「去國父」一案為例，高志鵬說，從無任何法律定義「誰是國父」
There are No Doves and Hawks: There is only the Xi Core
There are No Doves and Hawks: There is only the Xi Core
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 21, 2016
Executive Summary: The new government must begin with the cross-Strait status quo. It must discern the Beijing authorities' political mood. It must allow moderates on the two sides to shake hands, instead of allowing hawks and hardliners to disseminate political propaganda and issue military threats.
Full Text Below:
Talking heads in the media and specialists in academia have long categorized Mainland strategy toward Taiwan as either “hawkish” or “dovish”. They have even labeled specific agencies, officials, and scholars as such. But these so-called hawkish and dovish strategies all fall under category of peaceful reunification. Beijing has different strategies for different groups at different times. It has used both hawkish and dovish strategies simultaneously. Sometimes it tightens its grip with one hand, while relaxing it with the other.
The Taiwan Affairs Office, the Shanghai Taiwan Research Institute, and the Xiamen Taiwan Research Institute, are usually considered dovish. Doves hope to increase cross-Strait trade exchanges, and gradually increase cooperation in culture, media, and education. They hope this will lead the two sides to suspend hostilities, and ultimately lead to peaceful reunification. This approach reached its peak when President Xi Jinping and President Ma Ying-jeou held an historic summit last December.
The military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and hardline official media, are usually considered hawkish. The hawks take national sovereignty very seriously. They hold high the banner of national revival and patriotism. Specific policies include a diplomatic blockade, propaganda war, and military intimidation, including the 1995 and 1996 military exercises held during the Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law passed in response to the 2000 “two-states” theory.
Coincidentally, “Sinologists” in Washington are also categorized as reds or blues, and doves or hawks. Doves advocate exchanges to promote the evolution of democracy on Mainland China. Hawks advocate containment, to force Mainland China to collapse from within. The debate has continued for years. More recently, the call has been for both exchanges and containment. The two strategies alternate. Doves and hawks in Washington and Beijing are a fluid phenomenon. They leave visible tracks. When relations between Beijing and Washington warm, doves prevail. When major disputes arise, doves are attacked and hawks make a rapid comeback.
Many young people have returned to the Mainland. Mainland economic and military might have consequently grown by leaps and bounds. Mainland China has gained unprecedented self-confidence and self-esteem. This has led to a firm foundation of public opinion. No leader can defy the century-long "China Dream", the political objective announced by Xi Jingping at the 18th Central Committee. Mainland China is re-emerging after enduring a century of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. It is increasingly powerful, both diplomatically and military. It is no longer maintaining a low profile. In South China Sea and Diaoyutai Island clashes, it often rattles swords.
But the system on the Chinese mainland differs from the system on Taiwan and the United States. One cannot understand Mainland hawks and doves by referring to the US. Michael Pillsbury is a former Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, and a longtime US defense policy adviser. Last year Pillsbury published a book entitled "The Hundred Year Marathon". This outspoken American moderate has long believed that hawkish rhetoric on the Mainland is confined to the margins, and that nationalism is not mainstream. That is a serious mistake. Hardliners now command policymaking in Beijing. They represent mainstream geo-strategic thinking. They rarely speak in public, but whenever they do, their remarks represent official policy.
The 2012 DPP election defeat taught the party a lesson about the "final mile”. The DPP began making visits to the Mainland. It began making contact with the Taiwan Affairs Office, Taiwan-related think tanks, and financial research organizations. It probably established links with certain officials. Beijing probably did not allow them close to military and diplomatic circles, or the party's propaganda wing. Green camp members were limited to contacts with United Front agencies, and financial and Taiwan-related sectors. Piecemeal contacts may have provided the DPP with piecemeal information that will lead to misunderstandings and mistaken judgments. DPP policy makers may have listened only to Mainland doves, and come away with false impressions.
The DPP cannot afford to misunderstand Beijing. It cannot afford to think it can refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus after 5/20. It cannot afford to assume that “the horses will continue running, and the party-goers will continue dancing”. It must reach an understanding with the Mainland on the cross-Strait political relationship. Still less can it afford to assume that clashes with the US in the South China Sea will elevate the Taiwan issue to the level of a core US strategic interest, replace the US-China relationship, and make Washington join with Taipei to oppose Beijing. When core interests are at stake, neither Beijing nor Washington distinguishes between doves and hawks. This is especially true for the Mainland. When the issue is sovereignty and opposition to Taiwan independence, neither doves nor hawks are going to compromise. Who the leader happens to be will make no difference.
Only dialogue and cooperation can ensure peaceful relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Only dialogue and cooperation can manage differences and minimize harm. To achieve win-win, all three parties must reduce conflict, seek dialogue, and reach consensus. They must not reverse course and make dispute resolution more difficult. The DPP government will play an important role.
The new government must begin with the cross-Strait status quo. It must discern the Beijing authorities' political mood. It must allow moderates on the two sides to shake hands, instead of allowing hawks and hardliners to disseminate political propaganda and issue military threats.
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 21, 2016
Executive Summary: The new government must begin with the cross-Strait status quo. It must discern the Beijing authorities' political mood. It must allow moderates on the two sides to shake hands, instead of allowing hawks and hardliners to disseminate political propaganda and issue military threats.
Full Text Below:
Talking heads in the media and specialists in academia have long categorized Mainland strategy toward Taiwan as either “hawkish” or “dovish”. They have even labeled specific agencies, officials, and scholars as such. But these so-called hawkish and dovish strategies all fall under category of peaceful reunification. Beijing has different strategies for different groups at different times. It has used both hawkish and dovish strategies simultaneously. Sometimes it tightens its grip with one hand, while relaxing it with the other.
The Taiwan Affairs Office, the Shanghai Taiwan Research Institute, and the Xiamen Taiwan Research Institute, are usually considered dovish. Doves hope to increase cross-Strait trade exchanges, and gradually increase cooperation in culture, media, and education. They hope this will lead the two sides to suspend hostilities, and ultimately lead to peaceful reunification. This approach reached its peak when President Xi Jinping and President Ma Ying-jeou held an historic summit last December.
The military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and hardline official media, are usually considered hawkish. The hawks take national sovereignty very seriously. They hold high the banner of national revival and patriotism. Specific policies include a diplomatic blockade, propaganda war, and military intimidation, including the 1995 and 1996 military exercises held during the Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law passed in response to the 2000 “two-states” theory.
Coincidentally, “Sinologists” in Washington are also categorized as reds or blues, and doves or hawks. Doves advocate exchanges to promote the evolution of democracy on Mainland China. Hawks advocate containment, to force Mainland China to collapse from within. The debate has continued for years. More recently, the call has been for both exchanges and containment. The two strategies alternate. Doves and hawks in Washington and Beijing are a fluid phenomenon. They leave visible tracks. When relations between Beijing and Washington warm, doves prevail. When major disputes arise, doves are attacked and hawks make a rapid comeback.
Many young people have returned to the Mainland. Mainland economic and military might have consequently grown by leaps and bounds. Mainland China has gained unprecedented self-confidence and self-esteem. This has led to a firm foundation of public opinion. No leader can defy the century-long "China Dream", the political objective announced by Xi Jingping at the 18th Central Committee. Mainland China is re-emerging after enduring a century of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. It is increasingly powerful, both diplomatically and military. It is no longer maintaining a low profile. In South China Sea and Diaoyutai Island clashes, it often rattles swords.
But the system on the Chinese mainland differs from the system on Taiwan and the United States. One cannot understand Mainland hawks and doves by referring to the US. Michael Pillsbury is a former Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, and a longtime US defense policy adviser. Last year Pillsbury published a book entitled "The Hundred Year Marathon". This outspoken American moderate has long believed that hawkish rhetoric on the Mainland is confined to the margins, and that nationalism is not mainstream. That is a serious mistake. Hardliners now command policymaking in Beijing. They represent mainstream geo-strategic thinking. They rarely speak in public, but whenever they do, their remarks represent official policy.
The 2012 DPP election defeat taught the party a lesson about the "final mile”. The DPP began making visits to the Mainland. It began making contact with the Taiwan Affairs Office, Taiwan-related think tanks, and financial research organizations. It probably established links with certain officials. Beijing probably did not allow them close to military and diplomatic circles, or the party's propaganda wing. Green camp members were limited to contacts with United Front agencies, and financial and Taiwan-related sectors. Piecemeal contacts may have provided the DPP with piecemeal information that will lead to misunderstandings and mistaken judgments. DPP policy makers may have listened only to Mainland doves, and come away with false impressions.
The DPP cannot afford to misunderstand Beijing. It cannot afford to think it can refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus after 5/20. It cannot afford to assume that “the horses will continue running, and the party-goers will continue dancing”. It must reach an understanding with the Mainland on the cross-Strait political relationship. Still less can it afford to assume that clashes with the US in the South China Sea will elevate the Taiwan issue to the level of a core US strategic interest, replace the US-China relationship, and make Washington join with Taipei to oppose Beijing. When core interests are at stake, neither Beijing nor Washington distinguishes between doves and hawks. This is especially true for the Mainland. When the issue is sovereignty and opposition to Taiwan independence, neither doves nor hawks are going to compromise. Who the leader happens to be will make no difference.
Only dialogue and cooperation can ensure peaceful relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Only dialogue and cooperation can manage differences and minimize harm. To achieve win-win, all three parties must reduce conflict, seek dialogue, and reach consensus. They must not reverse course and make dispute resolution more difficult. The DPP government will play an important role.
The new government must begin with the cross-Strait status quo. It must discern the Beijing authorities' political mood. It must allow moderates on the two sides to shake hands, instead of allowing hawks and hardliners to disseminate political propaganda and issue military threats.
沒有鴿沒有鷹 對台只有習核心
2016年02月21日 中國時報
長期以來，媒體評論或專家解析大陸對台政策，經常以「鴿派」或「
一般稱鴿派路線，主要以國台辦及上海、廈門台研智庫為代表。
所謂鷹派，通常指的是軍方、外交部門和立論強硬的官媒。
無獨有偶，華府研究中國事務圈內也有紅與藍或鴿與鷹之分。
中國自大量青壯「海歸派」回國後，
不過，中國大陸體制和美國與台灣不同，
民進黨2012年敗選，記取「最後一哩路教訓」開始勤跑大陸，
民進黨不能對北京有錯誤的想像，以為520後就算不承認九二共識
只有透過對話和合作，才能讓美、中、
新政府應立足於兩岸現狀，看清北京當局目前的政治氣候，
Thursday, February 18, 2016
New Legislature Must Make a Prudent Beginning
New Legislature Must Make a Prudent Beginning
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 19, 2016
Executive Summary: As an old saying has it, the new ruling and opposition parties must show "humility in victory, and grace in defeat”. The ruling DPP must demonstrate humility in victory. On the night of Tsai Ing-wen's election victory, she spoke of humility, and respect for the minority and the political opposition. The defeated KMT is currently a headless fly, mired in internal strife. It must buck itself up. Taiwan needs the KMT to play a part in the legislature. It needs the KMT to offer clear reasoning and provide strong checks and balances. Only then can it provide the necessary leadership for blue camp followers.
Full Text Below:
The new legislature will convene today. This marks the beginning of a new political ecosystem. The DPP will want to implement its “total government”. As the majority party it will have to assume full responsibility. The KMT must learn what it is to be the underdog. It must become an effective opposition party, able to oversee the government and the ruling party. It must prevent DPP abuse of power and corruption. It must prevent the DPP from leading the nation down the wrong path. The blue and green parties have switched roles. The above criteria will reveal whether they are qualified for their new positions.
A prudent beginning is essential. The key will be the two parties' approach to priority legislation. Two pending bills are the key. They are the “Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations”, and the “Articles on the Transfer of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Authority”. These bills will reveal whether the two parties have the proper attitudes and postures for their new roles. The DPP has characterized these two bills as priority legislation. The KMT has not.
First take the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. The DPP initially proposed a "two-states theory” version, entitled the "Draft Bill for Agreements between Taiwan and China". It explicitly referred to agreements between the two sides as "agreements between two nations". Passage of this bill into law, would amount to the passage of the "two-states theory” into law. It would become the first shot fired in the battle for de jure Taiwan independence. It would bring unspeakable catastrophe upon Taiwan. Leave aside the reaction from the Mainland for the moment. Chaos would prevail, on Taiwan, in the US, and among other foreign allies. Not one of them would support us or recognize us.
Tsai Ing-wen knows full well the lethal blowback that would result from such a move. In the wake of her election victory, she began altering the two-states theory version of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. DPP legislative caucus leader Ko Chien-min was more explicit. He said "The content will be modified. At the very least, the name of the regulations will be different".
Considering Taiwan's larger interests, the DPP's move is correct and necessary. We would remind the DPP however, that merely changing the name of the bill, or deleting the words, "agreement between two nations", will not enable the DPP government to squeak by. If the draft bill contains other "two-states theory” content, then any DPP efforts to stabilize cross-Strait relations will be severely jeopardized.
The best way to deal with the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations is for Tsai to follow in Ma's footsteps. Following in Ma's footsteps may provoke discontent among Taiwan independence supporters, and invite opposition ridicule. But that is a price the DPP must pay. After all, the DPP knew full well that its two-states theory version of the regulations was infeasible. But it proposed it anyway, merely to win votes. Its credibility must of course now take a hit.
Turning away from the two-states theory is precisely what we are urging the DPP to do. Anyone with eyes can see how many DPP proposals that guaranteed success during the election, also guaranteed failure during governance. The DPP is now in power. Presumably Tsai wants her administration to succeed. A 180 degree “bootleg turn” is unavoidable. That being the case, the DPP may as well bite the bullet. Whatever it does, it must not flinch. It must not hedge its bets, in a futile attempt to please both sides. It must not attempt to simultaneously eat crow and save face. Otherwise it will wind up with nothing to show on either side.
Now take the “Articles on the Transfer of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Authority”. The KMT demands to know why the DPP considers this such an urgent matter. Its attitude suggests pettiness. It is barking up the wrong tree. It suggests that the KMT has yet to accept its new role as an opposition party.
The clash over the articles is both substantive and procedural. In terms of procedure, the Articles on the Transfer of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Authority are important. The DPP has won a legislative majority. It now wants to make the articles a priority. The KMT also wanted this legislation. So why not respect the wishes of the ruling party? What the KMT should do, is closely monitor the substantive aspect of the articles.
For example, the DPP version of the articles expand presidential authority, and may well be unconstitutional. After all, presidential authority is limited by the Constitution. Article 171 of the Constitution stipulates that "Any legislation that contravenes the Constitution is null and void". In other words, the KMT can safely defer to the DPP on the matter of priority, while noting obstacles to its passage, or voicing doubts as to its constitutionality. It can leave behind a record that enables the public to judge its merits.
This is why we recommend that the Kuomintang adjust to its new role as an opposition party. The DPP enjoys a stable majority in the legislature. Or does the KMT intend to take the same path as the DPP once did, the same path the KMT criticized the DPP for? Does it intend to forcibly occupy the podium? If not, then the KMT will not be able to block passage of the bill. That does not mean it cannot play a powerful role on the matter of substance. During debates over substance, the KMT must put up a fight. It must present clear reasons for its opposition that enable the public to see why the bill is wrong.
As an old saying has it, the new ruling and opposition parties must show "humility in victory, and grace in defeat”. The ruling DPP must demonstrate humility in victory. On the night of Tsai Ing-wen's election victory, she spoke of humility, and respect for the minority and the political opposition. The defeated KMT is currently a headless fly, mired in internal strife. It must buck itself up. Taiwan needs the KMT to play a part in the legislature. It needs the KMT to offer clear reasoning and provide strong checks and balances. Only then can it provide the necessary leadership for blue camp followers.
用一句古諺：「勝不驕，敗不餒」送給「新朝野」。「勝不驕」
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 19, 2016
Executive Summary: As an old saying has it, the new ruling and opposition parties must show "humility in victory, and grace in defeat”. The ruling DPP must demonstrate humility in victory. On the night of Tsai Ing-wen's election victory, she spoke of humility, and respect for the minority and the political opposition. The defeated KMT is currently a headless fly, mired in internal strife. It must buck itself up. Taiwan needs the KMT to play a part in the legislature. It needs the KMT to offer clear reasoning and provide strong checks and balances. Only then can it provide the necessary leadership for blue camp followers.
Full Text Below:
The new legislature will convene today. This marks the beginning of a new political ecosystem. The DPP will want to implement its “total government”. As the majority party it will have to assume full responsibility. The KMT must learn what it is to be the underdog. It must become an effective opposition party, able to oversee the government and the ruling party. It must prevent DPP abuse of power and corruption. It must prevent the DPP from leading the nation down the wrong path. The blue and green parties have switched roles. The above criteria will reveal whether they are qualified for their new positions.
A prudent beginning is essential. The key will be the two parties' approach to priority legislation. Two pending bills are the key. They are the “Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations”, and the “Articles on the Transfer of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Authority”. These bills will reveal whether the two parties have the proper attitudes and postures for their new roles. The DPP has characterized these two bills as priority legislation. The KMT has not.
First take the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. The DPP initially proposed a "two-states theory” version, entitled the "Draft Bill for Agreements between Taiwan and China". It explicitly referred to agreements between the two sides as "agreements between two nations". Passage of this bill into law, would amount to the passage of the "two-states theory” into law. It would become the first shot fired in the battle for de jure Taiwan independence. It would bring unspeakable catastrophe upon Taiwan. Leave aside the reaction from the Mainland for the moment. Chaos would prevail, on Taiwan, in the US, and among other foreign allies. Not one of them would support us or recognize us.
Tsai Ing-wen knows full well the lethal blowback that would result from such a move. In the wake of her election victory, she began altering the two-states theory version of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. DPP legislative caucus leader Ko Chien-min was more explicit. He said "The content will be modified. At the very least, the name of the regulations will be different".
Considering Taiwan's larger interests, the DPP's move is correct and necessary. We would remind the DPP however, that merely changing the name of the bill, or deleting the words, "agreement between two nations", will not enable the DPP government to squeak by. If the draft bill contains other "two-states theory” content, then any DPP efforts to stabilize cross-Strait relations will be severely jeopardized.
The best way to deal with the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations is for Tsai to follow in Ma's footsteps. Following in Ma's footsteps may provoke discontent among Taiwan independence supporters, and invite opposition ridicule. But that is a price the DPP must pay. After all, the DPP knew full well that its two-states theory version of the regulations was infeasible. But it proposed it anyway, merely to win votes. Its credibility must of course now take a hit.
Turning away from the two-states theory is precisely what we are urging the DPP to do. Anyone with eyes can see how many DPP proposals that guaranteed success during the election, also guaranteed failure during governance. The DPP is now in power. Presumably Tsai wants her administration to succeed. A 180 degree “bootleg turn” is unavoidable. That being the case, the DPP may as well bite the bullet. Whatever it does, it must not flinch. It must not hedge its bets, in a futile attempt to please both sides. It must not attempt to simultaneously eat crow and save face. Otherwise it will wind up with nothing to show on either side.
Now take the “Articles on the Transfer of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Authority”. The KMT demands to know why the DPP considers this such an urgent matter. Its attitude suggests pettiness. It is barking up the wrong tree. It suggests that the KMT has yet to accept its new role as an opposition party.
The clash over the articles is both substantive and procedural. In terms of procedure, the Articles on the Transfer of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Authority are important. The DPP has won a legislative majority. It now wants to make the articles a priority. The KMT also wanted this legislation. So why not respect the wishes of the ruling party? What the KMT should do, is closely monitor the substantive aspect of the articles.
For example, the DPP version of the articles expand presidential authority, and may well be unconstitutional. After all, presidential authority is limited by the Constitution. Article 171 of the Constitution stipulates that "Any legislation that contravenes the Constitution is null and void". In other words, the KMT can safely defer to the DPP on the matter of priority, while noting obstacles to its passage, or voicing doubts as to its constitutionality. It can leave behind a record that enables the public to judge its merits.
This is why we recommend that the Kuomintang adjust to its new role as an opposition party. The DPP enjoys a stable majority in the legislature. Or does the KMT intend to take the same path as the DPP once did, the same path the KMT criticized the DPP for? Does it intend to forcibly occupy the podium? If not, then the KMT will not be able to block passage of the bill. That does not mean it cannot play a powerful role on the matter of substance. During debates over substance, the KMT must put up a fight. It must present clear reasons for its opposition that enable the public to see why the bill is wrong.
As an old saying has it, the new ruling and opposition parties must show "humility in victory, and grace in defeat”. The ruling DPP must demonstrate humility in victory. On the night of Tsai Ing-wen's election victory, she spoke of humility, and respect for the minority and the political opposition. The defeated KMT is currently a headless fly, mired in internal strife. It must buck itself up. Taiwan needs the KMT to play a part in the legislature. It needs the KMT to offer clear reasoning and provide strong checks and balances. Only then can it provide the necessary leadership for blue camp followers.
新立法院開議日要慎始
2016年02月19日 中國時報
立法院新會期今天開議，將是國會新生態的開始，
慎始非常重要，開議後最關鍵的表現，
先來看「兩岸協議監督條例」，民進黨原來提出的是被稱為「
蔡英文深知此一「致命後座力」，勝選後即開始陸續釋放「
為台灣大局利益計，我們認為民進黨轉彎是正確的，更是必要的。
處理「兩岸協議監督條例」最好的方式，就是「馬規蔡隨」，
從兩國論轉彎，這也是我們對民進黨新角色要做出的勸告，
接著來看「總統副總統職務交接條例」，
如果把交接條例分為程序議題與實質議題，從「程序面」言，
例如，民進黨版交接條例，其對總統職權的限縮，不無違憲的疑慮，
這也是我們給國民黨「新在野」的角色建議，
Wednesday, February 17, 2016
New Government Should Leverage the MTA
New Government Should Leverage the MTA
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 18, 2016
Executive Summary: Premier Chang San-cheng recently told this newspaper that after more than a year of negotiations, the Merchandise Trade Agreement (MTA) has reached near perfect agreement. The negotiating team must not simply leave. It must continue negotiating. He invited the new government's transition team to review the results, and decide for itself whether anyone “sold out Taiwan”, whether Taiwan's best interests were considered, before deciding what to do next.
Full Text Below:
Premier Chang San-cheng recently told this newspaper that after more than a year of negotiations, the Merchandise Trade Agreement (MTA) has reached near perfect agreement. The negotiating team must not simply leave. It must continue negotiating. He invited the new government's transition team to review the results, and decide for itself whether anyone “sold out Taiwan”, whether Taiwan's best interests were considered, before deciding what to do next.
Consider what Chang San-cheng said, and compare it to the latest Executive Yuan priority legislation list. The "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" draft bill is nowhere to be seen. The Ma government has probably given up on the oversight regulations, the MTA, and the STA, and left their fate to the incoming government's "total rule".
Over the past two years, the importance of the STA and the currently negotiated MTA to Taiwan have been obscured by bickering between the ruling and opposition parties. In the wake of the Sunflower Student Movement, the public expected greater social justice and distributive justice. The Ma government failed to effectively communicate with the public. As a result, the STA and MTA were stigmatized as "black box operations", as "pandering to [Mainland] China", and as "enriching the corporations".
Fortunately, after the mid-January presidential and legislative elections, Taiwan will not hold any new elections for the next two years. Public opinion may revert to rationality and moderation. People may be able to consider just what sort of political, economic, and trade relations Taiwan needs to have with the Mainland? Will the new government reject the STA and MTA negotiated by the Ma government outright? Or will it retain it and allow it to go in force? Will it at least continue negotiations?
The DPP legislative caucus has hurriedly drafted an “Articles for Presidential Authority Handover”. The new version prevents the president from signing any international or cross-Strait treaties during the transition period. That was astonishing, considering that the election is already over. The Democratic Progressive Party is about to enjoy “total rule”. But its "Everybody cheats!” mindset remains strong. The DPP has apparently forgotten that its most urgent duty at the moment is neither oversight nor the formation of a transitional cabinet, but fulfilling its campaign promises and rebuilding the nation.
Beginning today, President-elect Tsai Ing-wen will pay visits to seven major industries. The public has pinned its hopes on the new leader. She would do well to listen to what industrialists have to say about the STA, MTA, and cross-Strait relations. She will meet tomorrow with members of the DPP transition team. She may wish to accept Premier Chang San-cheng invitation to jump in and evaluate the results of past talks, and decide whether they really are utterly worthless?
Enemies during an election are not necessarily enemies in perpetuity. Tsai Ing-wen says she wants to “unite everyone on Taiwan". If so, she should think hard about maximizing “residual value” during the transition period leading up to 5/20. After that, Beijing will inevitably "listen to what she says, and watch what she does”. The STA and MTA are ready to go. Why wait for the final mile, for Beijing to raise the political asking price? Why wait for unforeseen bumps in the road? Why not allow the transition team to scrutinize the STA and MTA and see if it contains anything that “sells out Taiwan”? If the Tsai government agrees with Chang San-cheng that the time is right, why not take advantage of the Ma government's cross-Strait framework? Washington and Beijing think it maintains the status quo. Why not take advantage of the opportunity to "backdoor list" the STA and MTA?
The Ma government was routed during the previous two elections. The main reason was that while pursuing economic growth, it failed to ensure social justice. It failed to reduce the gap between rich and poor, between capital and labor, between big business and small. Once the new government comes to power and demands changes, it too must make the pie bigger. Otherwise what will there be to divide?
During the election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen's economic policy platform called for innovation in five major industries. It did not look only at GDP figures. It also valued full employment and equitable distribution. Tsai is attempting to address the blind spots in Ma's political and economic policy. But she cannot turn a blind eye to the necessity of Taiwan-Mainland cooperation for economic survival. This is what the new government will face in the future. Tsai may wish to use the STA and MTA as touchstones, to find the optimal solution, and avoid a nightmare scenario. She must not procrastinate and hope for the best.
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 18, 2016
Executive Summary: Premier Chang San-cheng recently told this newspaper that after more than a year of negotiations, the Merchandise Trade Agreement (MTA) has reached near perfect agreement. The negotiating team must not simply leave. It must continue negotiating. He invited the new government's transition team to review the results, and decide for itself whether anyone “sold out Taiwan”, whether Taiwan's best interests were considered, before deciding what to do next.
Full Text Below:
Premier Chang San-cheng recently told this newspaper that after more than a year of negotiations, the Merchandise Trade Agreement (MTA) has reached near perfect agreement. The negotiating team must not simply leave. It must continue negotiating. He invited the new government's transition team to review the results, and decide for itself whether anyone “sold out Taiwan”, whether Taiwan's best interests were considered, before deciding what to do next.
Consider what Chang San-cheng said, and compare it to the latest Executive Yuan priority legislation list. The "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" draft bill is nowhere to be seen. The Ma government has probably given up on the oversight regulations, the MTA, and the STA, and left their fate to the incoming government's "total rule".
Over the past two years, the importance of the STA and the currently negotiated MTA to Taiwan have been obscured by bickering between the ruling and opposition parties. In the wake of the Sunflower Student Movement, the public expected greater social justice and distributive justice. The Ma government failed to effectively communicate with the public. As a result, the STA and MTA were stigmatized as "black box operations", as "pandering to [Mainland] China", and as "enriching the corporations".
Fortunately, after the mid-January presidential and legislative elections, Taiwan will not hold any new elections for the next two years. Public opinion may revert to rationality and moderation. People may be able to consider just what sort of political, economic, and trade relations Taiwan needs to have with the Mainland? Will the new government reject the STA and MTA negotiated by the Ma government outright? Or will it retain it and allow it to go in force? Will it at least continue negotiations?
The DPP legislative caucus has hurriedly drafted an “Articles for Presidential Authority Handover”. The new version prevents the president from signing any international or cross-Strait treaties during the transition period. That was astonishing, considering that the election is already over. The Democratic Progressive Party is about to enjoy “total rule”. But its "Everybody cheats!” mindset remains strong. The DPP has apparently forgotten that its most urgent duty at the moment is neither oversight nor the formation of a transitional cabinet, but fulfilling its campaign promises and rebuilding the nation.
Beginning today, President-elect Tsai Ing-wen will pay visits to seven major industries. The public has pinned its hopes on the new leader. She would do well to listen to what industrialists have to say about the STA, MTA, and cross-Strait relations. She will meet tomorrow with members of the DPP transition team. She may wish to accept Premier Chang San-cheng invitation to jump in and evaluate the results of past talks, and decide whether they really are utterly worthless?
Enemies during an election are not necessarily enemies in perpetuity. Tsai Ing-wen says she wants to “unite everyone on Taiwan". If so, she should think hard about maximizing “residual value” during the transition period leading up to 5/20. After that, Beijing will inevitably "listen to what she says, and watch what she does”. The STA and MTA are ready to go. Why wait for the final mile, for Beijing to raise the political asking price? Why wait for unforeseen bumps in the road? Why not allow the transition team to scrutinize the STA and MTA and see if it contains anything that “sells out Taiwan”? If the Tsai government agrees with Chang San-cheng that the time is right, why not take advantage of the Ma government's cross-Strait framework? Washington and Beijing think it maintains the status quo. Why not take advantage of the opportunity to "backdoor list" the STA and MTA?
The Ma government was routed during the previous two elections. The main reason was that while pursuing economic growth, it failed to ensure social justice. It failed to reduce the gap between rich and poor, between capital and labor, between big business and small. Once the new government comes to power and demands changes, it too must make the pie bigger. Otherwise what will there be to divide?
During the election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen's economic policy platform called for innovation in five major industries. It did not look only at GDP figures. It also valued full employment and equitable distribution. Tsai is attempting to address the blind spots in Ma's political and economic policy. But she cannot turn a blind eye to the necessity of Taiwan-Mainland cooperation for economic survival. This is what the new government will face in the future. Tsai may wish to use the STA and MTA as touchstones, to find the optimal solution, and avoid a nightmare scenario. She must not procrastinate and hope for the best.
簽貨貿協議 新政府可借力使力
2016-02-18 聯合報
行政院長張善政近日接受本報專訪時提及，歷經一年多來的談判，
張善政此說，再對照行政院最新提列的優先法案清單，已不見《
過去兩年多來，服貿與在談判中的貨貿，先是在高度的朝野對立中，
所幸，1月中的總統大選、立委選舉結束後，在未來兩年內，
從民進黨立院黨團最近急急如律令般地推動《總統職務交接條例》
今天起，總統當選人蔡英文將展開七大產業之旅，
選舉時的敵人，不會是百無一好永遠的敵人，
馬政府在前兩次大選挫敗的主因，
在大選期間，蔡英文描繪的經濟政策，提到了要發展五大創新產業，
Tuesday, February 16, 2016
May the Two Mainland Sessions Lead to Good Cross-Strait Relations
May the Two Mainland Sessions Lead to Good Cross-Strait Relations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 17, 2016
Executive Summary: The Mainland's National Peoples Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) will hold important meetings on cross-Strait relations beginning on March 3. These are the first such meetings held since the Democratic Progressive Party return to power was confirmed. Mainland President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang will deliver important speeches. The two meetings will introduce a "Ten Three Five Planning Outline", an important indicator of the Mainland's new Taiwan policy. We hope these two meetings will reaffirm the roadmap for cross-Strait peace, and ensure a bright future for cross-Strait relations.
Full Text Below:
The Mainland's National Peoples Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) will hold important meetings on cross-Strait relations beginning on March 3. These are the first such meetings held since the Democratic Progressive Party return to power was confirmed. Mainland President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang will deliver important speeches. The two meetings will introduce a "Ten Three Five Planning Outline", an important indicator of the Mainland's new Taiwan policy. We hope these two meetings will reaffirm the roadmap for cross-Strait peace, and ensure a bright future for cross-Strait relations.
Not long ago, the results of the January 16 general election were announced. The DPP scored a major victory. It won not only the presidency, but a majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan. It has become the largest party on Taiwan, and will be implementing “total rule”. But president-elect Tsai Ing-wen has yet to recognize the 1992 Consensus, nor affirmed that "both sides of the strait belong to one China". As a result cross-Strait relations have been thrown into limbo.
On February 2 of this year, the Mainland held a working conference on Taiwan. They resolved to continue cross-strait economic integration, to expand cross-strait exchanges and cooperation in all areas. But they made no mention of continued “cross-Strait consultations and negotiations". Clearly the Mainland still has doubts about the DPP government's political posture. It is waiting for Tsai Ing-wen to clearly recognize the 1992 consensus before it negotiates with the new government on Taiwan and the DPP.
Where will the Mainland announce the conclusions of its meeting on Taiwan policy? In three ways. One. President Xi Jinping will meet with missions dedicated to Taiwan-issues, and make public their conclusions. Two. Premier Li Keqiang will make public the "Government Work Report". Three. The Mainland authorities will make public the "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" chapters on cross-Strait relations.
Everyone remembers what Xi Jinping said about cross-Strait relations in March last year, on two occasions. He said "Without a solid foundation, the earth will move and the mountains will shake". His wording was harsh. His purpose was to ensure that the DPP respect and recognize the basis for cross-Strait political relations, namely, recognition of the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. In Li Keqiang's NPC and CPPCC government work reports last year, the Taiwan-related part of the presentation focused on efforts to promote cross-Strait dialogue, win/win, economic integration, grass-roots and youth exchanges. They were convinced that peaceful cross-Strait relations were irreversible and irresistible.
The two meetings will introduce the "Ten Three Five Planning Outline". Contrast this with the “Ten Two Five Planning Outline” introduced during two meetings in 2011. A special chapter devoted to cross-Strait relations planning was entitled “Promote Peaceful Cross-Strait Relations and Reunification of the Motherland”. The first sentence began with "insist on peaceful reunification, and the one country, two systems policy". The main body of the chapter however, called for three means by which to promote cross-Strait economic development. They were: establish and improve the cross-Strait economic cooperation mechanism, expand cross-Strait economic cooperation, and support the West Coast Economic of the Taiwan Strait Economic Zone.
In any event, when the two meetings convene this year, the change in ruling parties on Taiwan will be a fait accompli. The new government will take office on May 20. Cross-Strait relations will have entered a new era. Under the circumstances, the policy declaration issued during the two meetings is bound to affect cross-Strait relations. Mainland party and government leaders must craft an appropriately worded declaration in advance of the two meetings. Only then can the two sides reach the greatest agreement.
The highest priority of these two Taiwan-related policy meetings should be the vital interests of the public on Taiwan. The public on Taiwan
wants cross-Strait peace. It wants close cross-Strait exchanges, win/win, and greater common interests that move the two sides towards integration.
This and the election results on Taiwan are two different things. The DPP victory was mainly due to poor performance by the ruling Kuomintang. The DPP victory was the result of internal factors. Cross-Strait relations was not a major factor.
Therefore the two Mainland meetings should not hesitate to reaffirm the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and set the minds of the public on Taiwan at ease. The "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" will be reviewed and finalized by the two meetings this year. Mainland party and government leaders should declare a "cross-Strait peace dividend", and let the public on Taiwan experience more substantive benefits. This will rein in the DPP, and prevent its cross-Strait policy from straying too far from the path.
This being the case, the "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" chapter devoted to cross-Strait policy should expand cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation. For example, the Ten Two Five Planning Outline mentioned support for the Taiwan Strait West Coast Economic Zone. The Ten Three Five Planning Outline should call for "free trade zone and One Belt, One Road exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan". This would increase its appeal to Taiwan. The Ten Two Five Planning Outline referred to "one country, two systems". Does the Ten Three Five Planning Outline need to make the same reference? That is something worth the Mainland's further consideration.
If the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, the two meeting have no choice but to respond. We hope Mainland party and government leaders distinguish between the DPP and the general public. Do not undermine the feelings the general public has toward the Mainland. It can encourage the DPP to move closer to the 1992 Consensus, instead of confronting it. This will prevent shocks to cross-Strait relations. After all, the DPP government will not take office for three months. It still has room to adjust its cross-Strait policy path.
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 17, 2016
Executive Summary: The Mainland's National Peoples Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) will hold important meetings on cross-Strait relations beginning on March 3. These are the first such meetings held since the Democratic Progressive Party return to power was confirmed. Mainland President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang will deliver important speeches. The two meetings will introduce a "Ten Three Five Planning Outline", an important indicator of the Mainland's new Taiwan policy. We hope these two meetings will reaffirm the roadmap for cross-Strait peace, and ensure a bright future for cross-Strait relations.
Full Text Below:
The Mainland's National Peoples Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) will hold important meetings on cross-Strait relations beginning on March 3. These are the first such meetings held since the Democratic Progressive Party return to power was confirmed. Mainland President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang will deliver important speeches. The two meetings will introduce a "Ten Three Five Planning Outline", an important indicator of the Mainland's new Taiwan policy. We hope these two meetings will reaffirm the roadmap for cross-Strait peace, and ensure a bright future for cross-Strait relations.
Not long ago, the results of the January 16 general election were announced. The DPP scored a major victory. It won not only the presidency, but a majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan. It has become the largest party on Taiwan, and will be implementing “total rule”. But president-elect Tsai Ing-wen has yet to recognize the 1992 Consensus, nor affirmed that "both sides of the strait belong to one China". As a result cross-Strait relations have been thrown into limbo.
On February 2 of this year, the Mainland held a working conference on Taiwan. They resolved to continue cross-strait economic integration, to expand cross-strait exchanges and cooperation in all areas. But they made no mention of continued “cross-Strait consultations and negotiations". Clearly the Mainland still has doubts about the DPP government's political posture. It is waiting for Tsai Ing-wen to clearly recognize the 1992 consensus before it negotiates with the new government on Taiwan and the DPP.
Where will the Mainland announce the conclusions of its meeting on Taiwan policy? In three ways. One. President Xi Jinping will meet with missions dedicated to Taiwan-issues, and make public their conclusions. Two. Premier Li Keqiang will make public the "Government Work Report". Three. The Mainland authorities will make public the "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" chapters on cross-Strait relations.
Everyone remembers what Xi Jinping said about cross-Strait relations in March last year, on two occasions. He said "Without a solid foundation, the earth will move and the mountains will shake". His wording was harsh. His purpose was to ensure that the DPP respect and recognize the basis for cross-Strait political relations, namely, recognition of the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. In Li Keqiang's NPC and CPPCC government work reports last year, the Taiwan-related part of the presentation focused on efforts to promote cross-Strait dialogue, win/win, economic integration, grass-roots and youth exchanges. They were convinced that peaceful cross-Strait relations were irreversible and irresistible.
The two meetings will introduce the "Ten Three Five Planning Outline". Contrast this with the “Ten Two Five Planning Outline” introduced during two meetings in 2011. A special chapter devoted to cross-Strait relations planning was entitled “Promote Peaceful Cross-Strait Relations and Reunification of the Motherland”. The first sentence began with "insist on peaceful reunification, and the one country, two systems policy". The main body of the chapter however, called for three means by which to promote cross-Strait economic development. They were: establish and improve the cross-Strait economic cooperation mechanism, expand cross-Strait economic cooperation, and support the West Coast Economic of the Taiwan Strait Economic Zone.
In any event, when the two meetings convene this year, the change in ruling parties on Taiwan will be a fait accompli. The new government will take office on May 20. Cross-Strait relations will have entered a new era. Under the circumstances, the policy declaration issued during the two meetings is bound to affect cross-Strait relations. Mainland party and government leaders must craft an appropriately worded declaration in advance of the two meetings. Only then can the two sides reach the greatest agreement.
The highest priority of these two Taiwan-related policy meetings should be the vital interests of the public on Taiwan. The public on Taiwan
wants cross-Strait peace. It wants close cross-Strait exchanges, win/win, and greater common interests that move the two sides towards integration.
This and the election results on Taiwan are two different things. The DPP victory was mainly due to poor performance by the ruling Kuomintang. The DPP victory was the result of internal factors. Cross-Strait relations was not a major factor.
Therefore the two Mainland meetings should not hesitate to reaffirm the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and set the minds of the public on Taiwan at ease. The "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" will be reviewed and finalized by the two meetings this year. Mainland party and government leaders should declare a "cross-Strait peace dividend", and let the public on Taiwan experience more substantive benefits. This will rein in the DPP, and prevent its cross-Strait policy from straying too far from the path.
This being the case, the "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" chapter devoted to cross-Strait policy should expand cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation. For example, the Ten Two Five Planning Outline mentioned support for the Taiwan Strait West Coast Economic Zone. The Ten Three Five Planning Outline should call for "free trade zone and One Belt, One Road exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan". This would increase its appeal to Taiwan. The Ten Two Five Planning Outline referred to "one country, two systems". Does the Ten Three Five Planning Outline need to make the same reference? That is something worth the Mainland's further consideration.
If the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, the two meeting have no choice but to respond. We hope Mainland party and government leaders distinguish between the DPP and the general public. Do not undermine the feelings the general public has toward the Mainland. It can encourage the DPP to move closer to the 1992 Consensus, instead of confronting it. This will prevent shocks to cross-Strait relations. After all, the DPP government will not take office for three months. It still has room to adjust its cross-Strait policy path.
盼陸「兩會」為兩岸關係開出好局
2016年02月17日 中國時報
大陸全國人大及政協「兩會」定3月3日起舉行，
不久前的1月16日台灣大選投票結果揭曉，民進黨大勝，
大陸已於2月2日舉行今年對台工作會議，
大陸這項對台政策考量，在3月的「兩會」場合將如何呈現呢？
各界都記得，習近平在去年3月的兩會場合，針對兩岸關係發表了「
至於即將在今年兩會端出的《十三五規畫綱要》，對照依據是201
無論如何，今年兩會登場時，台灣執政黨再輪替已成定局，
台灣民眾的願望和切身利益，
這和年初台灣大選結果是兩回事；民進黨大勝，
因此，本次大陸兩會，應義無反顧再次確認兩岸和平發展路線，
既然如此，則《十三五規畫綱要》的兩岸專章，
本次兩會勢必要對仍拒絕接受九二共識的民進黨「有所表示」，
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)