Must Taiwan Grovel Before Japan?

Must Taiwan Grovel Before Japan?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
April 29, 2016 

Executive Summary: "How can Taiwan possibly refuse to allow US pork imports?” COA chairman to be Tsao Chi-hung touched off a bombshell last week when he asked this question. He provoked public outrage and invited the well-deserved charge that the DPP reverses its position every time it changes from opposition party to ruling party. This was the reason president elect Tsai Ing-wen covered her bets with Washington before the election. Even more importantly, she covered her bets with Tokyo over the importation of irradiated Japanese agricultural and marine products. Needless to say, this warrants even greater public concern.

Full Text Below:

"How can Taiwan possibly refuse to allow US pork imports?” COA chairman to be Tsao Chi-hung touched off a bombshell last week when he asked this question. He provoked public outrage and invited the well-deserved charge that the DPP reverses its position every time it changes from opposition party to ruling party. This was the reason president elect Tsai Ing-wen covered her bets with Washington before the election. Even more importantly, she covered her bets with Tokyo over the importation of irradiated Japanese agricultural and marine products. Needless to say, this warrants even greater public concern.

US pork imports are not an urgent matter at the moment. US presidential candidates from both major parties oppose the TPP. The matter of Taiwan's accession to the TPP can be postponed until after the new US administration is in place. But the promises the DPP made to Japan must be fulfilled immediately. Ever since the DPP won the election, politicians from Japan and Taiwan have been shuttling back and forth between Tokyo and Taipei on a weekly basis. During nearly every meeting, the Japanese line up to demand an end to the ban on agricultural and marine products irradiated by the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

Japan is eager to resume the exportation of agriculture and marine products from the nuclear disaster area to Taiwan. Powerful political interests are the key. Japan's senatorial elections will begin in July. The Liberal Democratic Party is eager for profits to ensure victory at the polls. Taiwan is one of Japan's largest food importers, second only to the United States. Naturally the LDP is concerned. Therefore Japan has exerted disproportionate pressure on Taiwan. It has even threatened us with bilateral reciprocal agreements. Two days ago, the Japanese government brutally seized a fishing vessel from Taiwan, the Dong Sheng Ji 16, at Chong Zi Niao Reef. This is probably an attempt to pressure Taiwan to resume importation of agricultural and marine products from the Fukushima nuclear disaster area.

Protecting the public by ensuring food safety and by restricting the import of certain products is a universal concern. Even Japan, which is pressuring Taiwan to resume importation of agricultural and marine products from the nuclear disaster area, demands it. Also, the WTO allows import restrictions and food safety measures, providing there is sufficient scientific support, and one's motive is not protectionism. The proof can be presented to the international community and general public. Radiation concerns remain unresolved. Taiwan is hardly alone in restricting agricultural and marine imports from these five prefectures in Japan. Korea, Hong Kong, the United States, and Mainland China have all banned food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster area. In fact, they have restricted imports from areas far from these five prefectures. They have restricted imports from as many as 13 prefectures. Japan has from time to time asked these governments to lift their bans. But radioactive seepage from the Fukushima region continues flowing into the sea. Last year products from Chiba were falsely labeled as coming from Tokyo. This made it difficult for the Japanese to demand that foreign governments lift their import restrictions.

Under the circumstances, Taiwan clearly has the right to institute food safety measures. The key is whether a scientific basis exists. Japan insists that radioactive contamination of agricultural and marine products from the five prefectures is no longer a concern. But so far the scientific tests have been conducted by Japan itself, not objective, authoritative third-parties abroad. Therefore our government must stand firm. Japan may not recognize our test standards. Our government need not rush to the front lines. It need not take a position on whether Japanese food is safe or not. Instead it should seek impartial third party opinions from the international community. This should determine whether agricultural and marine products from the nuclear disaster area are safe and import restrictions should be lifted. That will keep Japan from harping on the issue, and give Taiwan a chance to catch its breath.

More importantly, Taiwan must review its current approach of groveling before Japan. Japan claims an EEZ surrounding the waters of Chong Xi Niao Reef. Its claim flies in the face of international law. It is not recognized by any of Japan's neighbors. We do not recognize it as an “island”. Still less do we recognize Japan's claim of an EEZ. Unfortunately the government – long fearful for Taiwan-Japan relations -- has been afraid of drastic action. The new government sees Japan as a “friend”. Having long lost any sense of self, it reflexively surrenders without a fight, and lacks the courage to assert its rights. Japan takes advantage of Taiwan's weakness to do whatever it wants. The new government's ambivalence toward Japan merely encourages it to make trouble in order to exert pressure on Taiwan.

International relations must never mean unilateral concessions toward a “friendly” nation. On the contrary, too many concessions merely make the “friendly” nation insatiable. The international situation may be unfavorable to Taiwan. Our pro-Japan policy may be difficult to change. But Taiwan can still take advantage of global developments. It can still adopt a policy that balances the Mainland, the United States, and Japan.  The Ma administration's "peace with the Mainland and friendship with the US and Japan" strategy obtained greater breathing space for Taiwan. Taiwan's status in the Western Pacific has been greatly enhanced. The new government may have no desire to continue Ma government policies. But it must demonstrate wisdom. It must understand the political situation in Japan. It must seek maximum advantage for itself, for the sake of the national interest.

Japan is pressuring us to lift food import restrictions. Behind this pressure lies hidden weakness. Therefore we must drive a harder bargain to achieve the best results. Providing the government can stand the pressure, Japan will makes the final concession. Therefore the new government must be decisive and resolute.

The Dong Sheng Ji 16 incident is an opportunity to discuss lifting the ban on agricultural and marine products from the nuclear disaster area, and aggressively fight for Taiwan's fishing rights in the relevant waters. Regarding the Chong Zi Niao Reef EEZ, the new government must firmly reject the Japanese government's spurious claims. It must dispatch ships to protect our fishing vessels. Only that will provide us with the necessary bargaining chips.

Groveling must not remain the way in which Taiwan habitually relates to Japan. Both the Ma government and the new government must adhere to this fundamental principle.

應該對日本逆來順受嗎？
2016年04月29日 中國時報

「台灣哪有能耐不開放美豬？」準農委會主委曹啟鴻1周前釋出這顆轟天雷，各界譁然，咸認為民進黨立場大變，「換位置就換了腦袋」，合理推論，這是在為蔡準總統兌現開給美國的支票打預防針。但另外還有一張更急迫的支票要兌現，就是日本輻射農水產品開放進口，更需要國人關切。

美豬進口問題暫時還不緊迫，美國總統大選兩黨的主要候選人都反對TPP，台灣加入TPP相關問題至少可以拖到美國新政府成立後再表態；但民進黨開給日本的支票，卻必須立刻兌現。從民進黨勝選後，幾乎每周都有日、台政界人士奔走東京、台北間，幾乎每一場拜會都要提到福島核災農水產品解禁問題，密集到形同「擠兌」。

日方急於要求台灣恢復核災區農水產品進口，關鍵原因是巨大的政治利益。日本7月將舉行參議員選舉，自民黨為了勝選急於營造利多，台灣是日本僅次於美國的進口食品大戶，自然會被自民黨高度重視。日方因而對台灣進行不成比例的施壓，甚至以待簽的雙邊貿易互惠協議為要脅。兩天前日本公務船遠赴沖之鳥礁粗暴扣押台灣漁船東聖吉16號，可視為施壓台灣恢復核災區農水產品的插曲。

基於保障國人食安而限制某些產品進口，原本應該是放之四海而皆準的道理，就連施壓台灣恢復核災區農水產品進口的日本，同樣緊握這一安全閥，而世界貿易組織也不禁止因為食安而實施的進口限制，只要有足夠的科學支撐，確認不是貿易保護行為，就可對國際及國人交代。因為輻射疑慮未解，至今除台灣限制日本5縣農水產品進口，至少還有韓國、香港、美國、中國大陸禁止日本核災區食品進口，且限制區域遠超過台灣的僅5縣，甚至對高達13縣設限。日本不時要求這些國家解禁，但因福島輻射汙水持續偷排入海被抓包，去年又發生產地千葉偽標為東京事件，讓日方要求設限國恢復進口的聲音大不起來。

在這情況下，台灣當然有權設立食安安全閥，其關鍵在於科學依據。日方堅稱5縣的農水產品已無輻射汙染疑慮，但迄今提出的科學鑑驗都是日方自行製作，並非國際上客觀權威第三方的查核。對此政府必須堅守立場，雖然日方也可能不承認我方的鑑驗標準，政府也不必跳上火線認定日本食品安全與否，而應該尋找國際公正第三方進行科學鑑驗，並以此為依據，決定核災區農水產品進口限制的開放與否。如此日本也無法再在此問題上糾纏，台灣亦可贏得更大迴旋空間。

更重要的是，台灣需檢討現今對日本「逆來順受」的做法，日方有關沖之鳥礁的經濟水域界定並不符合國際法，也不為周邊各國所承認，我方亦不承認其為島，更不承認其周邊經濟水域。只可惜政府考量台日關係大局始終不敢採取過激舉動，而新政府也因為長期的友日傳統而自失立場、未戰先敗，始終不敢強硬以對。日本也正是抓住台灣的弱點而予取予求，加上新政府對日態度曖昧不清，日方由此認為可以通過製造事端的方式對台灣施壓。

國際關係的互動從來就不應該是單方面的讓步換取對方的友善，相反，過多的讓步只會讓對方得寸進尺。雖然國際情勢對我不利，友日的政策基調也難以改變，但台灣仍可因勢利導，在中、美、日之間採取平衡策略，馬政府的「和中、親美、友日」策略就證明可為台灣贏得更大的國際空間，台灣在西太平洋區域的地位也大為提升。新政府也許不願意承接馬政府的政策，但也必須展現智慧，在深入了解日本政情的基礎上尋找機會為己所用，謀取自己的國家利益。

在食品進口問題上是日方有求於我，施壓的背後其實是在隱藏自己的虛弱，因此我方應有更大的談判空間爭取最大利益，只要政府能夠頂住壓力，最後讓步的只會是日本，因此，政府應該果斷決策，堅持基本主張。

東聖吉16號事件也應視為我方契機，在商談解禁核災區農水產品進口問題時，積極爭取台灣在相關水域的漁權。在有關沖之鳥礁的經濟水域問題上，新政府應堅定否認日方的論述，甚至持續派出護漁艦船表達立場，才能獲得更大的談判空間。

逆來順受不應該成為台日互動的基本模式，馬政府和新政府都應做到有為有守。

The Democratic Progressive Party's Arctic Hysteria

The Democratic Progressive Party's Arctic Hysteria 
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
April 28, 2016

Executive Summary: Taiwan is a long way from the Arctic Circle. But each time the DPP comes to power, it contracts Arctic Hysteria. It forgets everything it said or did when it was in the opposition. That includes everything it said or did regarding the Cross-Strait Agreements Oversight Regulations, US pork imports, electricity rates, and foreign diplomacy. The symptoms are clear and unmistakable. Arctic Hysteria may not be fatal. But "yesterday's truth is today's lie” has consequences. Little by little, it has eroded Taiwan's political conscience, and led to Taiwan's loss of international competitiveness.

Full Text Below:

in his book "South of the Border, West of the Sun", Japanese author Haruki Murakami mentions “Arctic Hysteria”. This is a disease peculiar to the Arctic circle, allegedly caused by a long-term calcium deficiency. During its onset, the patient is indifferent to his surroundings. Sometimes he is loud. At other times he is lethargic. Patients often awaken with no memory of what took place before.

Taiwan is a long way from the Arctic Circle. But each time the DPP comes to power, it contracts Arctic Hysteria. It forgets everything it said or did when it was in the opposition. That includes everything it said or did regarding the Cross-Strait Agreements Oversight Regulations, US pork imports, electricity rates, and foreign diplomacy. The symptoms are clear and unmistakable.

Seven years ago, the Ma government could not resist US pressure. It conditionally allowed US beef imports in accordance with international standards, i.e., the Codex. DPP legislator Chen Ting-fei denounced the Ma government for "having no conscience". Lin Shu-fen denounced the Ma government for “inviting the wolf into our home”. She accused Minister of Health and Welfare Huang Jiang-bing of being an "asshole minister". Today however, COA chairman to be Tsao Chi-hung has changed his tune. He argued that even Japan and South Korea could not stand up to US pressure to allow pork imports. How could Taiwan? This flagrant about face forced Chen Ting-fei to change her tune. She rushed to say that the DPP has no concerns about the safety of US pork. Lin Shu-fen meanwhile, hemmed and hawed, at a loss for words. For the DPP, yesterday's truth is today's lie.

Last year the Sheng Feng 12, a Taiwanese fishing vessel registered in Okinawa, strayed into Philippine waters. It was impounded and the owners fined 100,000 USD. The charge was “poaching”. DPP legislator Chuang Jui-hsiung challenged the Philippines' unilateral allegations. He demanded that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protest, and not let the Philippines say and do whatever it wanted, otherwise people "would find it intolerable". Chuang Jui-hsiung resorted to mockery. He joked that the legislature would no longer provide budgets for vessels, but only for ransoms. Less than a year later however, the Japanese seize the Dong Shen Ji 16 fishing vessel in open waters off the Chong Zi Niao Reef. Chuang Jui-hsiung now meekly insists that if Japan claims we trespassed on her Exclusive Economic Zone, we are hardly in a position to argue.

But did the Dong Sheng Ji 16 trespass upon Japan's EEZ? Chong Zi Niao Reef is Japan's southernmost reef. It is a mere 9 sm in area. At the very most, Japan can claim 12 nautical miles of territorial waters. Instead, Japan claims a 200 nautical mile EEZ. This is a fundamental violation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. UNCLOS stipulates that only islands, not reefs, have EEZs. The DPP is about to become the ruling party. It insists that Japan is Taiwan's friend. Confronted with Japan's abusive treatment, it does not even dare to complain. With such an attitude, how can it fight for the rights of fishermen? How can it fight for the dignity of our nation? Is this attitude not a reflection of the DPP's "Japan Worship Syndrome"?

These two examples are hardly all. The DPP changed the Cross-Strait Agreements Oversight Regulations, from the "two states theory" version before the election, to the "two sides" version after the election. It changed its policy from “no increase” in electricity rates before the election, to demanding that the Ma government “not cut rates” after the election. Wherever one looks, the DPP exhibits clear symptoms of Arctic Hysteria. The DPP did not contract the disease because of a calcium deficiency however. It contracted the disease as a result of political and ideological zealotry. The DPP has lost touch with its professed values, and winds up contradicting itself. Upon awakening, its drunken rants become the standard by which the public judges them.

When the Dong Sheng Ji 16 was impounded, green camp legislator Huang Wei-che not only failed to defend our national sovereignty, he made excuses for Japan. He claimed that Japan “gave the Ma government a slap in the face". This green camp groveling before Japan reveals its indifference to national dignity, the rights of our fishermen, and the interests of our nation. All that remains is seething hatred for political enemies. If this attitude persists, DPP pandering to Japan will become the people of Taiwan's biggest nightmare.

The recent TV drama series "Descendants of the Sun", has inspired a wave of patriotism in South Korea. Young people greet each other by discussing national unity and patriotism. South Korea was once divided by serious geopolitical controversy. But today ruling and opposition forces agree on foreign policy. They present a united front to outsiders. On Taiwan by contrast, political parties are selfish. The ruling and opposition parties bicker endlessly over domestic, cross-Strait, and international policy. They deliberately place obstacles in each others' path. This may be why South Korea has undergone a swift rise, while Taiwan continues to spin its wheels.

Arctic Hysteria may not be fatal. But "yesterday's truth is today's lie” has consequences. Little by little, it has eroded Taiwan's political conscience, and led to Taiwan's loss of international competitiveness.

民進黨的「西伯利亞症候群」
2016-04-28 聯合報

日本作家村上春樹在他的《國境之南，太陽之西》一書中，曾描述一種好發於北極圈地區的「西伯利亞症候群」（Arctic hysteria），據說是因為長期缺鈣所引起。這種病症發作時，病人會對周遭的環境漠不關心，有時大聲咆哮，有時昏睡不醒；這種病人的共通特性就是，醒來之後會忘卻先前發生過的事。

台灣距離北極甚遠，但時值政權輪替期間，這種經常遺忘昨日之我的「西伯利亞症候群」，卻接二連三發生在即將執政的民進黨身上。從兩岸監督條例、美豬、電價和外交議題，都可以看到症候發作的跡象。

七年前馬政府抵擋不了美國壓力，決定根據國際標準（Codex）有條件開放美牛進口，當時民進黨立委陳亭妃痛批馬政府「沒有良心」，林淑芬更斥責馬政府引狼入室，罵衛福部長蔣丙煌是「混蛋部長」。而今，準農委會主委曹啟鴻改口說，連日韓都抵擋不住美豬叩關，台灣有能耐不接受嗎？面對這樣的政策大轉彎，陳亭妃立刻改口說要讓人民知道美豬沒有安全疑慮；林淑芬則一度支支吾吾，不知如何以對。民進黨的昨是今非，由此可見。

我國琉球籍漁船「昇豐十二號」去年誤闖菲律賓海域，遭該國扣押，並以「盜漁」的罪名處以十萬美元的罰鍰。當時民進黨立委莊瑞雄質疑菲國片面指控我國漁船盜漁，要求外交部強烈交涉，不能讓對方予取予求，否則國人「吞不下去」。莊瑞雄還嘲諷說，將來立法院不用編列船艦預算，只要編列「贖金」即可。時隔不到一年，屏東漁船「東聖吉十六號」在沖之鳥礁外海遭日本公務船無理扣押，莊瑞雄卻低姿態地說，日本說我們的漁船擅闖其經濟海域，不能和日本硬碰硬。

問題是，「東聖吉十六號」真的擅闖日本經濟海域嗎？位於日本國境之南的沖之鳥礁，是加起來不過九平方公尺的小島礁，頂多擁有十二浬領海，但日本卻大剌剌劃上兩百浬的經濟海域，這根本違反了一九八二年「聯合國海洋法公約」規定的只有島嶼才能擁有經濟海域的原則。對日本政府的鴨霸做法，即將執政且號稱日本關係良好的民進黨非但不據理力爭，反而一片噤若寒蟬；這種態度，如何為漁民爭取權益，為國家爭取尊嚴？如此低調，難道是民進黨的「恐日症候群」？

除了上述兩個例子，民進黨在《兩岸協議監督條例》草案從「兩國論」轉為「兩岸」，對於電價則從選前宣稱「不漲」到選後轉為要求馬政府「勿降」，處處均可看到民進黨「西伯利亞症候群」的癥狀。民進黨之病，當然並非由於缺鈣，而是因為在野時過度的政治操作及意識形態作祟，而失去了政治價值及自我認知的一致性。也因此，在醒來之後，他們先前的醉言醉語便成為人民檢驗其執政的標準。

在「東聖吉十六號」扣押事件中，綠委黃偉哲不但不維護國家主權，反而替日本說話，說此舉是日本「打臉馬政府」。這種媚日論調，足見其眼中沒有國格，沒有漁民，沒有國家利益，只有政治仇恨。這樣的心態如果不改，五二○之後，民進黨對日本的姑息與諂媚，恐將成為台灣人民的一大夢魘。

最近韓劇「太陽的後裔」在韓國掀起一片愛國風，團結、愛國成為時下年輕人最夯的問候語。韓國過去因地域政治對立嚴重，但如今在對外問題上，朝野口徑一致，團結對外。反觀台灣，在政黨私心的操作下，朝野不但為國內議題爭吵不休，在兩岸政策及國際外交上更處處對立，互扯後腿。兩相對照，韓國這些年能快速崛起，而台灣卻一直在原地踏步，這應是一大原因。

「西伯利亞症候群」也許不是一種致命的病，但是它所產生「昨是今非」的後遺症，卻一點一滴地吞噬台灣的政治良知，也拖垮台灣的國際競爭力。

Opposing Everything Chinese, Groveling Before Everything Japanese?

Opposing Everything Chinese, Groveling Before Everything Japanese?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
April 27, 2016

Executive Summary: The "Dong Shen Ji 16" fishing vessel out of Pingtung was forcibly detained by Japanese government vessels in open waters off the Chong Zi Niao Reef. The owners were forced to put up 1,760,000 dollars in collateral. Otherwise their boat would be impounded and the crew imprisoned by Japan. Ruling and opposition party legislators have responded to this high-handed act with deafening silence. Contrast this to the stink they raised when Kenya repatriated scam artists from Taiwan to the Mainland. No clearer example of “opposing everything Chinese, and groveling before anything Japanese” can be found than this.

Full Text Below:

The "Dong Shen Ji 16" fishing vessel out of Pingtung was forcibly detained by Japanese government vessels in open waters off the Chong Zi Niao Reef. The owners were forced to put up 1,760,000 dollars in collateral. Otherwise their boat would be impounded and the crew imprisoned by Japan. Ruling and opposition party legislators have responded to this high-handed act with deafening silence. Contrast this to the stink they raised when Kenya repatriated scam artists from Taiwan to the Mainland. No clearer example of “opposing everything Chinese, and groveling before anything Japanese” can be found than this.

Did the repatriation of scam artists from Taiwan constitute “an affront to our sovereignty and dignity”?  If it did, then Japan's impounding of one of our fishing vessels constitutes a vastly greater affront to our sovereignty and dignity. Chong Zi Niao Reef has a combined area of only 9 square meters. It is 1800 km from Taiwan, and 1000 km from Okinawa. Is is clearly a reef, and not an island. Yet Japan says it constitutes its southern border. Japan has been building up the reef for years. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, uninhabited reefs lacking significant economic activity do not have Exclusive Economic Zones. Yet Japan unilaterally claims territorial waters extending 200 nautical miles. The Dong Shen Ji 16 was detained 150 nautical miles from Chong Zi Niao Reef. This shows that the impounding of the vessel was highly questionable.

These fishermen eke out an living on storm tossed seas. Scam artists by contrast, resort to lies and deception to cheat people out of their life savings. Yet ruling and opposition party legislators screan “Human rights!” in the Kenyan and Malaysian fraud cases, insisting that Taiwan's sovereignty and dignity have been affronted. But when hard-working fishermen who make an honest living from the sea are arrested by Japanese authorities, their silence is deafening. Are these politicians merely incompetent? Or are they cowards? Green camp legislator Chuang Jui-hsiung from Pingtung had the temerity to say “We cannot butt heads” over the matter. Really? Then why did they butt heads over the Kenyan case? Why the tough talk when the Mainland is the other party?

This dispute differed from previous fishing disputes. The Dong Shen Ji 16 was fishing in open waters near Chong Zi Niao Reef. It neither trespassed nor poached. In fact, when the Japanese issued their warning, Department of Fisheries officials assured them that "As long as you remain outside Chong Zi Niao Reef's 12 mile limit, you will be fine”. Taiwan and Japan had very different perceptions regarding territorial waters and fishing rights. As a result fishermen from Taiwan were subject to false arrest. Do Department of Fisheries officials not bear responsibility for "leading people over the cliff”?

Japan's timing is particularly intriguing. It chose the eve of the handover of authority to seize a Taiwan fishing vessel. Three thoughts come to mind. One. The Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement is being renegotiated. Okinawan fishermen are unhappy about Taiwan fishing boats in waters north of Ba Chong Shan. Japan is deliberately seizing Taiwan fishing vessels to mollify local Okinawan fishermen. Two. The DPP's hatred of “China”, i.e., Mainland China mirrors Japan's. Japan consequently feels no need to offer concessions on fishing rights to win over Taiwan. It knows it can abuse Taiwan callously, and Taiwan will not complain. Three. Japan is using the opportunity to reassert sovereignty over Chong Zi Niao Reef and an Exclusive Economic Zone.

Looking back, fishing vessels from Taiwan have been seized in waters near Chong Zi Niao Reef by the Japanese twice before, once in 2005, and once in 2012. Both times the fishermen were forced to submit collateral before their vessel was released. Given such precedents, why has the government not protested? Japan's Department of Fisheries provided Taiwan fishermen with incorrect information. As a result, the fishermen were arrested. This is incredible. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs did nothing. Only after President Ma convened a national security council meeting and issued an order, did it finally act. How can such a passive response possibly win any concessions from Japan?

Chong Zi Niao Reef was “spoils of war”, given to Japan following World War I. The United States, Britain, France, and Japan carved up territory extracted from Germany. The reef has no historical or cultural connection to Japan. The reef is tiny, but Japan has worked hard to transform it, maintain it, and expand it. By contrast, the Republic of China has Taiping Island in the South China Sea. It is huge, but it has not been managed properly or used to full advantage. When President Ma visited the island, DPP legislators even condemned him as "irresponsible". They accused him of "violating international rules of the game". Given the DPP's attitude, how can anyone expect it to defend our sovereignty over Taiping Island?

When scam artists from Taiwan are repatriated to the Mainland, ruling and opposition party screams “Defend our sovereignty!" When a fishing vessel from Taiwan is seized by Japanese authorities on the other hand, their silence is deafening. Clearly "sovereignty" is merely a pretext by which politicians attract attention. When the time comes to negotiate, they are speechless. They oppose everything related to China. They grovel when dealing with anything related to Japan. By doing so, these politicians show their true faces. They prove that diplomacy without a brain will only lead to self-deception.

逢中必反，遇日腳軟？

2016-04-27 聯合報

屏東漁船「東聖吉十六號」在沖之鳥礁公海遭日本公務船強行扣押，船東昨天被迫繳交一七六萬元訴訟保證金，以期人船免於被押回日本。令人意外的是，對於如此霸道的扣船行徑，朝野立委竟然均默不作聲；比起稍早在兩岸肯亞詐欺犯遣返事件中的喧囂沸騰，有如天淵之別。逢中必反，遇日腳軟，莫過於此。

如果說詐欺犯遣返案攸關主權及尊嚴，此次扣船事件分明和主權與尊嚴更關係重大。「沖之鳥」是兩座加起來面積僅僅九平方公尺的礁岩，其位置距離台灣一千八百公里，距離沖繩一千公里，明明是礁非島，日本卻處心積慮將此建設為其國土南疆。日方多年來雖不斷在礁石上擴增人工設施，依《聯合國海洋法公約》，這樣無人居住且顯無經濟生活的礁岩，不能擁有專屬經濟海域，日本卻片面主張有兩百浬海域。「東聖吉十六號」被扣處，距離沖之鳥礁有一五○浬之遙，顯見日方扣船作為極為可議。

在惡浪中討海的漁民，不過是為生活而打拚；而那些詐騙集團分子，卻是靠著謊言及騙術榨取他人努力的成果。諷刺的是，台灣朝野立委在肯亞案和大馬案中為詐欺犯大聲呼喊人權，又叫罵謂台灣主權受到屈辱；而這次，面對正當討海的漁民在公海被日本拘捕，他們卻毫無反應。這種表現，是反映政治人物的技窮，還是他們吃軟怕硬？屏東綠委莊瑞雄更稱，此事現在「不能硬碰硬」；如果這是理性的話，那麼他在肯亞案時對兩岸關係的冷嘲熱諷，又為什麼裝得那麼硬？

與以往的漁業糾紛不同，這次「東聖吉十六號」在沖之鳥礁外海作業，並無所謂「犯界」或「盜漁」問題。事實上，在接獲日方警告時，正是漁業署官員告訴他們「只要不進入沖之鳥十二浬領海」即可。在這種情況下，我國漁民因台日雙方對於海域作業權的認知差距而枉遭扣押，漁業署沒有「驅民於淵」的責任嗎？

日本選在我政權交替前夕扣押台灣漁船，用意何在，殊堪玩味。綜合而言，觀察重點有三：一，《台日漁業協議》正在重新談判，因沖繩漁民對日本開放台灣漁船進入八重山北方海域迭有不滿，日本此次故意扣押台灣漁船，以舒緩當地民怨。第二，民進黨「反中」的基本立場，和日本不謀而合，因此日方在漁業上對台灣已無特別「讓利」或「籠絡」之必要，這難道是吃定台灣？第三，日本趁機再度宣示它在沖之鳥的主權及經濟海域。

回溯歷史，我國漁船過去在沖之鳥礁海域有兩次遭日本扣押之紀錄，一次在二○○五年，一次在二○一二年，兩次都在繳交保證金後人船獲釋。既有前例，政府為何未採取積極的抗議或交涉作為，漁業署又為何繼續提供漁民不正確的認知訊息，使他們誤蹈禁區，是令人百思不解的事。包括外交部，是在馬總統召開國安會議後下令它向日方交涉後，才採取行動；這種消極、被動的反應模式，何能期其有所斬獲？

值得警惕的是，沖之鳥是日本在第一次世界大戰後美英法日四國瓜分戰果時，從德國手中接收的「戰利品」，與該國並無歷史或文化淵源。儘管該礁岩只是彈丸之地，日本卻極力改造、擴充、維護，當成領土的延伸大力經營。反觀我國，雖在南海擁有偌大的太平島，卻既不用心經營，也不妥善運用。年初馬總統登島時，竟還遭民進黨立委譴責為「不負責任的行為」，指控他「違反國際遊戲規則」。以這種態度，要靠民進黨維護太平島主權，豈非形同「飼老鼠咬布袋」？

從朝野在詐欺嫌犯遣返案中高唱入雲的「主權論」，到如今台灣漁船無端被日扣押後的一片寂然，不難看出「主權」只是供政治人物喊爽的道具；真正到了需要拿出本事交涉的時刻，他們已啞然無言。逢中必反，遇日腳軟，除照射出政治人物的原形，也說明不用腦筋的外交只能自欺欺人。

Does the DPP Really Have the Ability to Reject the 1992 Consensus?

Does the DPP Really Have the Ability to Reject the 1992 Consensus? 
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
April 26, 2016

Executive Summary: The DPP finds itself caught on the horns of a dilemma. It once opposed US pork imports. But it can oppose them no longer. It seeks globalization, and longs to cozy up to the US. But it would willingly see Taiwan and the Mainland clash head on. Everyone knows that enabling US pork imports while preventing cross-Strait peace is a losing proposition. The DPP must ask itself, "Do we really have the ability to reject the 1992 Consensus?"

Full Text Below:

COA chairman-elect Tsao Chi-hung asked, "Do we really have the ability to reject US pork imports?" Actually the DPP should be asking itself, "Do we really have the ability to reject the 1992 Consensus?"

Every time the DPP has gone from being the opposition party to the ruling party, it has reversed itself. Before it opposed US beef and pork imports. It staged a five day, four night “sleep in” on the floor of the Legislative Yuan. It demanded that President Ma step down. It called the Minister of Agriculture an "asshole". It demanded a "zero-tolerance policy". It issued all sorts of tough statements. But today it has surrendered without a fight, saying, "Do we really have the ability to reject US pork imports?"

The DPP has gone from being the opposition party to the ruling party. Therefore its strategic goals have changed. When it was in the opposition, it opposed US beef and pork imports in order to attack the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou. It shouted, "Protect public health, defend the pig farmers, oppose pandering to the US and selling out Taiwan". Now that it is in power, it seeks to join the TPP and ensure friendly Taiwan-US relations. It says, “Do we really have the ability to reject US pork imports?”

The DPP's repeated reversals are of course contemptible. But it realizes that when it goes from being the opposition party to being the ruling party, it must reverse itself. If the DPP believes that joining the TPP is more important than opposing US pork imports, then all it can do is say "Do we really have the ability to reject US pork imports?”

Since globalization is our strategic objective, this is the correct attitude. The Ma government also sought to join the TPP. It also focused on globalization. But when the DPP was in the opposition, it swept aside the Ma government's considerations. It shouted "Protect public health, defend the pig farmers”, and pretended globalization and joining the TPP were of no concern.

When the DPP was an opposition party, it opposed US beef and pork imports. It demanded that Ma Ying-jeou step down as president. Now that Tsai Ing-wen has come to power, it shouts, "Do we really have the ability to reject US pork imports?”

Globalization will improve Taiwan's economy and ensure its political security. Therefore it is a strategic objective that the DPP as ruling party must pursue. That is why the DPP says, "Do we really have the ability to reject US pork imports?” But based on the very same strategic considerations, shouldn't the DPP be also asking itself, “Do we really have the ability to reject the 1992 consensus?"

Globalization is out strategic objective. Therefore we seek to join the TPP and befriend the US.  Globalization is our strategic objective. Therefore we seek to join the RCEP, optimize ECFA, and maintain peaceful cross-Strait relations. In order to join the TPP, the DPP is willing to sacrifice the pig farmers. It says "Taiwan can afford to pay the price". But the DPP also needs to ask itself what price it is willing to pay for repudiating the 1992 consensus? Can Taiwan afford to pay that price?

Globalization is our strategic goal. The DPP's policy on US pork imports contradicts its policy on the 1992 Consensus. The DPP has painted itself into a corner. If is trapped between a globalization that panders to the US, and a delusional "globalization without [Mainland] China". Can Taiwan join the TPP? Perhaps. Although this is far from certain. Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus however, means the end of cross-Strait peace. Taiwan will be unable to globalize. If the two sides clash, the political and economic consequences for Taiwan will be unimaginable.

Merely joining the TPP will not result in Taiwan's globalization. The TPP accounts for only 35% of Taiwan's total trade, and only 33% of Taiwan's total exports. The RCEP on the other hand, accounts for fully 56% of Taiwan's total trade, and 58% of Taiwan's total exports. The DPP seeks to cozy up to the US, while keeping Mainland China at arm's length. It seeks to join the TPP, and is perfectly willing to forgo membership in the RCEP. But suppose Taiwan cannot join the RCEP? Suppose ECFA is undermined? Add unwanted surprises related to the TPP, and we must ask ourselves, does Taiwan really have the ability to endure the consequences?

When the DPP was an opposition party, it opposed US pork imports. Now that it is the ruling party, it asks, “Do we really have the ability to reject US pork imports?" When the DPP was an opposition party, it opposed the 1992 Consensus. Now that it is the ruling party, it needs to ask itself, “Do we really have the ability to reject the 1992 Consensus?” Taiwan's pursuit of globalization, political and economic, depends on cross-Strait relations. The loss of that political foundation could threaten Taiwan's economic and political survival. The DPP must ask itself whether Taiwan can endure the consequences of repudiating the 1992 Consensus. Can it withstand “the earth moving and the mountains shaking”?

The DPP finds itself caught on the horns of a dilemma. It once opposed US pork imports. But it can oppose them no longer. It seeks globalization, and longs to cozy up to the US. But it would willingly see Taiwan and the Mainland clash head on. Everyone knows that enabling US pork imports while preventing cross-Strait peace is a losing proposition. The DPP must ask itself, "Do we really have the ability to reject the 1992 Consensus?"

哪有能耐不接受九二共識

2016-04-26聯合報

候任農委會主委曹啟鴻說：「我們哪有能耐不開放美豬？」民進黨也可自問：「我們哪有能耐不接受九二共識？」

民進黨換了位置就換了腦袋。昔日反美牛、美豬，五天四夜在立法院打地鋪，「總統下台」、「混蛋部長」、「零檢出」什麼狠話都說過，但今天未戰先降，說：「哪有能耐不開放？」

民進黨由在野到執政，因此戰略目標也變了。昔日在野，反美牛美豬，是以打擊國民黨及馬英九為最高戰略目標，高喊「挺國民健康／護豬農利益／反傾美賣台」；如今執政，卻改以「加入TPP」、「友善台美關係」為最高戰略目標，故稱「哪有能耐不開放？」

民進黨這種「髮夾彎」的反覆，固然卑鄙醜惡，但畢竟知道，由在野到執政，不能不換腦袋。民進黨若認為，執政後，「加入TPP」是高於「反美豬」的國家利益，那麼自然就要說：「哪有能耐不開放？」

以「全球化」為國家最高戰略目標，此種覺悟是對的。馬政府的美牛、美豬政策，當然也有「加入TPP」的考量，亦是著眼於全球化；但在野的民進黨卻不容馬政府作此考量，完全以「國民健康／豬農利益」為主張，眼中根本沒有全球化及TPP。

現在，民進黨要執政了，所以，當年反美牛、美豬，對著馬英九喊「總統下台」的民進黨，今日在蔡英文「總統上台」之際，竟喊出「哪有能耐不開放？」

全球化將改變台灣的經濟運作並獲致較大的政治安全，所以，以全球化為國家最高戰略目標，是執政的民進黨應追求的目標，因此改稱「哪有能耐不開放？」而同樣基於全球化戰略思維，民進黨是否也應思考：「哪有能耐不接受九二共識？」

全球化是最高戰略目標，因此要加入TPP，要友善台美關係；同樣的，全球化是最高戰略目標，因此也要加入RCEP，也要優化ECFA，也要維持兩岸關係和平發展。為加入TPP，民進黨若認為犧牲豬農利益，或許可說「這個代價，台灣有能耐付出」；但民進黨亦必須嚴肅自問，若不接受九二共識，台灣將付出什麼代價？那種代價，台灣有無能耐付出？

從全球化戰略目標看，民進黨在美豬政策及九二共識的矛盾，顯見其仍然陷於一種「傾美的全球化」及「沒有中國的全球化」的重大迷思之中。在此種謬誤操作下，台灣「即使」加入了TPP（變數既大且多），卻因否定九二共識而以摧毀兩岸和平發展為代價，台灣即無可能順利完成全球化，且在兩岸鬥爭下，台灣政經體質的惡化勢將不堪想像。

僅加入TPP，不能成就台灣的全球化。例如，TPP對台灣的總貿易額占比約為卅五％，出口總額占比為卅三％；RCEP對台灣的總貿易額占比達約五六％，出口總額占比達五八％。民進黨傾美遠中的操作，不啻擺明了只想加入TPP、卻放棄RCEP。如果台灣不能加入RCEP，且ECFA又發生質變，再加上TPP萬一橫生變數，試問：台灣「哪有能耐」承受此一衝擊？

民進黨在野反美豬，執政即知「哪有能耐不開放」；民進黨在野反九二共識，如今執政亦當知「哪有能耐不接受」。台灣追求全球化，無論在經濟面或政治面，兩岸關係皆是建構全球化的脊柱條件。兩岸關係若失去九二共識的政治基礎，可能會嚴重影響台灣對內、對外整個經濟與政治生存環境。民進黨必須自問，台灣有無能耐面對不接受九二共識所可能引爆的「地動山搖」的後果？

民進黨陷於兩個矛盾。第一個矛盾是，昔日反美豬，今日哪有能耐不開放。第二個矛盾是，追求全球化，只想託庇美國，卻不惜兩岸交惡。如果因此開放了美豬，卻封堵了兩岸關係和平發展的道路，任何人皆知這必是一樁賠本生意。民進黨應當自問，「我們哪有能耐不接受九二共識？」

Sunflower Student Movement: Use Once and Throw Away

Sunflower Student Movement: Use Once and Throw Away
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 24, 2016

Executive Summary: Over the past few years, street protests surged. The Kuomintang failed to keep pace with social change. It failed to respond. As a result the public abandoned it. Conversely, political opportunists who lusted for power hitched a ride on the protests. Once they gained entry to the halls of power however, they refuse to recognize the very people who put them there. They blank out promises made to supporters. They discard younger generation supporters who expected real change, as if they were old shoes. That is perhaps the most grievous betrayal of all.

Full Text Below:

The Sunflower Student Movement and related groups advanced on the Legislative Yuan to protest the DPP version of the "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations". The draft version reneges on five commitments made to the Sunflower Student Movement. Student leader Lin Fei-fan blasted the DPP version for retaining the "memorandum" requirement. He said it was no different from the KMT version. The Sunflower Student Movement is just over two years old. The DPP and NPP benefited from the Sunflower Student Movement, but are changing their tune or in full retreat. How can the Sunflower Student Movement generation not feel indignation? What must the man in the street think?

Back then the protesters included key Sunflower Student Movement players Lin Fei-Fan and Lai Chung-chiang. They also included the "Economic Democracy Connection" and other groups with only a few dozen members. These failed to become part of the system. Protestors included even sympathizers from the New Party. The scene was a far cry from the heyday of the Sunflower Student Movement. Back then its leaders occupied the legislature, and had the power to “summon the wind and rain”. The scene revealed how much the Sunflower Student Movement's luster has faded, and how much its influence has been diluted by realpolitik.

Back then the Sunflower Student Movement opposed the STA and black box operations. It demanded the authoring of “Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations”. Back then DPP legislators aided and abetted student occupation of the legislature. DPP legislators ghost-wrote a so-called "peoples' version” of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. It defined "cross-Strait relations” as “international relations”, and substantially multiplied the obstacles to bilateral agreements, before and after signing, as well as during negotiations. The public has not forgotten these developments. They are clearly noted in the Legislative Yuan's records.

The DPP and NPP rode the Sunflower Student Movement to power. The general public and the younger generation assumed that the ideas raised by the Sunflower Student Movement would be implemented the moment the DPP and NPP assumed power. Little did they know events would take a very different turn. During the election, Tsai Ing-wen did an about face and adopted "maintaining the status quo" as her cross-Strait policy platform. The Sunflower Student Movement denounced the STA as "selling out Taiwan". Premier to be Lin Chuan-che did an about face, and now says "Of course we intend to promote it!” Most critically, the DPP changed the wording of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations back to “two sides” from “two nations”.

Nor was the New Power Party to be outdone. It originally vowed to incorporate the "two states theory" into the "peoples' version” of the oversight regulations. But nothing has been heard of this since. When asked about the DPP's about face, the NPP shined it on, saying "Not having seen the actual text, we are unable to comment". Other comments by the NPP are equally disingenuous. When asked about Kenya's extradition of Taiwan scam artists to the Mainland, Huang Kuo-chang urged "co-operation with the other side". He averred that “politicizing the issue would be unwise”. On US pork imports, Huang Kuo-chang said "Exports are very important for us. Taiwan must go out into the world". He now sings a very different tune than he did during the Sunflower Student Movement.

These changes are highly revealing. The Sunflower Student Movement toppled the KMT, and the green camp rose to power. But since then, it has ignored the demands of the faithful, and reneged on its promises. The protesters' influence has waned drastically. Their high-profile media appeal was merely a stepping stone by which politicians could rise to power. The protestors have been used once and thrown away. Their so-called “ideals” have become utopian fantasies.

Tsai Ing-wen has seized power. Can she meet public expectations? We will soon find out. Student movement leaders who enabled the DPP to seize power must be subject to the same scrutiny. Are today's feeble protests an affirmation of principles, or a song and dance to appease the masses? Two years ago, they took to the streets and occupied the legislature. Do they have their own ideals and opinions? Do they plan to oversee and discipline the DPP?

Over the past few years, street protests surged. The Kuomintang failed to keep pace with social change. It failed to respond. As a result the public abandoned it. Conversely, political opportunists who lusted for power hitched a ride on the protests. Once they gained entry to the halls of power however, they refuse to recognize the very people who put them there. They blank out promises made to supporters. They discard younger generation supporters who expected real change, as if they were old shoes. That is perhaps the most grievous betrayal of all.

The realpolitik of democracy means that no one who rises to power can implement radical social change. No one can meet all the demands made by social movements. But are unscrupulous politicians concerned solely about toppling and replacing their rivals? Are they utterly indifferent about whether their positions are consistent with principles? If so, the result will be "yesterday's truth is today's lie". Populism will proliferate. Methods will become more ruthless. Rational political discourse will come to naught.

太陽花被民進黨用過即棄？

2016-04-24聯合報

太陽花學運相關團體最近前往立法院示威，抗議民進黨版《兩岸協議監督條例》草案未落實當初在太陽花運動時承諾的五大原則。學運領袖林飛帆並批評，民進黨版還保留協議文「備查」的規定，簡直跟國民黨沒有兩樣。太陽花學運剛滿兩周年，因太陽花風潮而獲益豐碩的民進黨和時代力量，卻已不斷改變或退縮了立場。這看在太陽花世代眼中，不免感到憤慨，而一般民眾又作何感想？

當天參與抗議者，除了太陽花要角林飛帆、賴中強之外，尚有其他未進入體制的「經濟民主連合」等團體，僅寥寥數十人；其間，還包括前來聲援的新黨人士。比起太陽花運動在占領國會期間的呼風喚雨，其間差距，何止雲泥。這樣的景象，除顯示太陽花煙火盛會的消散，也說明學運理想被稀釋在政治現實中屍骨無存的慘狀。

當年太陽花學運的主要訴求，是「反服貿」、「反黑箱」，後來更延伸到「制訂兩岸協議監督條例」。當時，民進黨立委不但全程幫占領國會的學生護航，更由民進黨立委代提出所謂「民間版的兩岸協議監督條例」，將「兩岸」定義為「兩國」，並大幅加強兩岸協議簽署前、談判中和簽署後的監督程序。這些事實，均留存在國人記憶中和立法院議事紀錄中。

當民進黨、時代力量乘著太陽花的風潮而起，社會各界和年輕世代都以為，他們在執政後一定會落實貫徹太陽花運動的主張。誰料，事實發展卻大異其趣。大選期間，蔡英文即以「維持現狀」作為兩岸政策主張；對於太陽花指為「賣台」的《服貿協議》，準閣揆林全則強調「當然要推」。此外，最關鍵的《兩岸協議監督條例》，民進黨團則翻臉改提截然不同的版本，將「兩國」改回「兩岸」。

時代力量的表現不遑多讓。儘管該黨宣稱將提「兩國論」入法的「民間版監督條例」，卻未見下文；對於民進黨立場的變化，該黨也僅輕描淡寫地說：「沒看到具體版本，不便評論」。此外，觀察最近時代力量的其他發言，例如在詐欺犯遣返事件中，黃國昌呼籲「和對岸合作」，並說政治刁難不明智；在開放「美豬」議題上，黃國昌則強調：「我們對外貿易非常重要，台灣一定要走出去。」對照他在太陽花學運時的慷慨激昂，已是截然不同的面貌。

這些變化，說明太陽花雖發動了扳倒國民黨的風潮，但綠營取得政權，並未忠實回應群眾的訴求，甚至無法履行自己先前的承諾。相對而言，今天抗議者的聲量大跌，也顯示當年他們的高調訴求，只成了政客奪權的墊腳石，其結果卻是「用過即棄」。所謂的理想，也變成了烏托邦的幻覺。

蔡英文已取得政權，她的作為能否符合民意期待，很快即需接受檢驗。同樣的，那些把民進黨推上台的運動領袖，一樣必須接受檢驗：他們今天的荏弱抗議，究竟是仍在展現堅持，或者只是虛晃一招應付群眾？兩年前走上街頭、占領國會，若果真有自己的理想和見解，那麼今後要如何繼續監督、鞭策民進黨？

過去幾年各式街頭運動風起雲湧，國民黨追不上社會的變化，疏於回應，因而遭到民意吞噬。反過來看，投機的權力競逐者依附這些街頭運動而起，登上權力殿堂後卻翻臉不認人，把當年自己的承諾拋在腦後，把那些渴望「改變成真」的新世代支持者棄如敝屣，堪稱是赤裸裸的政治「變臉」。

就民主政治的現實看，不論誰執政，都不可能對社會作翻天覆地的改造；社運者的訴求，政治人物也未必能照單全收。但政治人物若只想著如何不擇手段扳倒對手，卻不顧立場與原則是否一致，勢將招致「昨是今非」之譏，也只會使社會的民粹口味越來越重，手段越來越激烈。那樣，理性問政終將化為烏有。

Where is Tsai Ing-wen's Vision and Leadership?

Where is Tsai Ing-wen's Vision and Leadership?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 21, 2016

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen must be able to lead the DPP. Otherwise how can she possibly lead “this nation”? Tsai Ing-wen prefers to avoid using the term “Republic of China”. Tsai Ing-wen does lacks even the courage to affirm or deny the Republic of China. How can she possibly offer an enduring vision for the nation? If Tsai Ing-wen wants to offer the nation a vision, she should present them with the vision of her leading the reformation of the DPP.

Full Text Below:

National leaders provide people with two forms of sustenance. First, they provide a vision for the nation's future. Second, they provide leadership, i.e., the wherewithal to realize their vision. It is now less than 30 days to May 20. What has Tsai Ing-wen given us so far?

First consider the matter of national vision. Tsai Ing-wen says she accepts “the historical fact that in 1992, talks led to a common understanding". Yet she refuses to accept the term, “1992 Consensus”. She flagrantly contradicts herself. She has consequently failed to reaffirm the constitution, destabilized cross-Strait relations, and left people on Taiwan bereft of any national vision. Will her ambivalent flip-flopping reassure Taiwan independence advocates that she shares their vision? Will it reassure defenders of the Republic of China that she shares their vision?

Internally, the 1992 Consensus involves constitutional interpretations. Externally, it involves cross-Strait relations. Neither constitutes the whole of government, but together they constitute its backbone. Tsai Ing-wen cannot even screw up the courage to affirm or deny the 1992 Consensus. How can she possibly talk about a national vision?

If she intends to recognize the 1992 Consensus, she should offer a reason for recognizing it. If she intends to reject the 1992 Consensus, she should offer a reason for rejecting it. But she can hardly "promote cross-Strait relations under the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework", even as she rejects the 1992 Consensus. She cannot claim to be "maintaining the status quo", even as she rejects the 1992 Consensus. What sort of national vision can Tsai Ing-wen offer the people under such a self-contradictory framework?

Now consider the matter of leadership. Tsai Ing-wen is party chairperson. She is forbidding political appointees from simultaneously serving as party officials. She is attempting to sever relations between political appointees and the DPP. She wants to undermine support for the DPP. She wants to bypass the DPP. But doing so will make it difficult for her to lead the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen will be unable to lead the DPP. Tsai's failure to reaffirm the constitutional framework, and failure to formulate a coherent cross-Strait policy will make sound governance under a Tsai government impossible.

The vice presidential candidate is one of Tsai's cabinet appointees. This enables the Tsai Ing-wen administration to avoid DPP and ideological influences. The "Oversight Regulations for Agreements between Two Countries” can become the
“Oversight Regulations for Agreements between the Two Sides of the Strait”. The "self-executing provisions" were also Tsai Ing-wen's doing.

Unfortunately the Kenyan case let the cat out of the bag. Legislative Yuan Speaker Su Chia-chuan led the way. He spun the tale according to the "two states theory". Green camp legislators demanded sanctions and incited hatred against “China”, i.e., Mainland China. Tsai Ing-wen's Facebook page used the term "Mainland China". Su Chia-chuan and green camp legislators however used the term "China”. The Tsai Ing-wen administration adopted a low-profile. But the DPP legislative caucus and the party insisted on raising a stink. Loose cannons were everywhere. Merely changing the name of the "Oversight Regulations for Agreements between Two Countries” to the “Oversight Regulations for Agreements between the Two Sides of the Strait” did not put everyone in the DPP on the same page.

In fact the deadlock over the 1992 Consensus was mere spillover from DPP and green camp infighting. Does the public on Taiwan in fact oppose the 1992 Consensus? Does it even understand the 1992 Consensus? Does it understand the two sides' positions, and the meaning of good will? Is the public truly willing to bear the consequences of shattering the 1992 Consensus? Tsai Ing-wen must make the case for the above claims. This may be Annette Lu's cue to tell Tsai Ing-wen what she should say on May 20.

Tong Cheng-yuan, who advocates freezing the Taiwan independence party platform, will be Tsai Ing-wen's Executive Yuan spokesperson. Chen Tian-jy, who continues to support ECFA, will be the Tsai Ing-wen's National Development Council chairman. Blue camp officials David Lee and Chang Hsiao-yue will hold down the diplomatic and cross-Strait border posts. These appointments are intended to prove that Tsai will not depart entirely from the cross-Strait framework established by the 1992 Consensus. Yet she remains ambivalent about the 1992 Consensus. Bullets are flying within the DPP and the green camp, because it lacks an authoritative leader.

Compare today with the year 2000 under Chen Shui-bian. Before the election, the DPP issued its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" and "five noes". By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen cannot break the deadlock over the 1992 Consensus within her own party. Tsai Ing-wen wants "no provocations, and no accidents".  But if the loose cannons in the DPP legislative caucus play bad cop, they will present the biggest obstacle to Tsai Ing-wen's governance.

Tsai Ing-wen must be able to lead the DPP. Otherwise how can she possibly lead “this nation”? Tsai Ing-wen prefers to avoid using the term “Republic of China”. Tsai Ing-wen does lacks even the courage to affirm or deny the Republic of China. How can she possibly offer an enduring vision for the nation? If Tsai Ing-wen wants to offer the nation a vision, she should present them with the vision of her leading the reformation of the DPP.

蔡英文給我們什麼想像力與領導力

2016-04-21聯合報

國家領導人要給國人兩種寄託。一、想像力，就是要建構國家的憧憬。二、領導力，就是要具備足以實現此種憧憬的才能。距五二○已不到三十天，蔡英文給了我們什麼？

先談國家的憧憬。蔡英文稱接受「一九九二年會談歷史事實所達成的共同認知與諒解」，卻拒絕接受「九二共識」四字，充分呈現其自相矛盾；也因此致使憲政認同不能確立，兩岸關係基礎動搖，國家憧憬亦失憑藉。這種曖昧搖擺的立場，豈能給台獨支持者增加什麼想像力？又豈能給支持中華民國者增加什麼想像力？

九二共識，對內涉及憲政定位，對外涉及兩岸關係。這二者雖非國家政務的全部，卻是最重要的脊樑部分。蔡英文如果連「九二共識」四個字都拿不起、放不下，奢談什麼憧憬？

接受九二共識，應有接受的理由；不接受九二共識，也應有不接受的理由。但若說「在中華民國現行憲政體制下，推動兩岸關係」，卻不接受九二共識；或主張「維持現狀」，卻不接受九二共識，這皆不成理由。在如此不能自圓其說的架構下，蔡英文給了人們什麼憧憬？給了大家什麼想像力？

再談領導力。蔡英文自兼黨主席，並使政務官不兼黨職，試圖切割行政團隊與民進黨的關聯，以架空民進黨；但這種想要「繞過民進黨」的作法，卻亦顯現她將陷難以有效「領導」民進黨的困境。蔡英文若不能穩固對民進黨的領導，即無以確立憲政認同及兩岸政策，也就不能建立「穩健執政」的國家願景。

自副總統人選至內閣名單，皆可證蔡英文在行政團隊的「去民進黨化／去意識形態化」；《兩國協議監督條例》變成「兩岸」，及一度出現「自動生效條款」，亦可見蔡英文政策轉向的跡影。

但是，肯亞案卻使蔡英文捉襟見肘。由立法院長蘇嘉全帶頭，以「兩國論」來詮釋事態，綠委的「制裁說」、「仇中論」此起彼落。蔡英文在臉書稱「中國大陸」，蘇嘉全及綠委則爭相攻擊「中國」。由此可見。蔡英文雖全力塑造行政團隊的「低調」風格，但民進黨在立法院及黨這兩塊的「高調」自走砲所在多有。僅是把監督條例由「兩國」改稱「兩岸」，顯不能齊一民進黨的口徑。

九二共識的僵局，其實只是民進黨及綠營內鬥的外溢效應。如今，蔡英文若說：台灣的民意真正反對九二共識，或真正瞭解九二共識在兩岸各自的「原則」與「善意」，或真正願意承擔九二共識一旦破局後可能發生的不可估量的後果；無論是以上的哪一種主張，她皆必須提出足以說服國人的論證。這也許正是呂秀蓮建議蔡英文應為五二○演說辦公聽會的道理。

蔡政府以主張凍獨的童振源為行政院發言人，以「現在仍支持ＥＣＦＡ」的陳添枝為國發會主委，又以李大維及張小月兩名藍軍為外交和兩岸前哨，此皆顯示她無意全然背離「九二共識」的兩岸架構。但她之所以又與「九二共識」若即若離，則是因她在面對散彈四射的民進黨及綠營內部時左支右絀，沒有一言九鼎的領導力。

若與二○○○年的陳水扁相較，民進黨在選前即發表《台灣前途決議文》，並以「四不一沒有」開局；但今日的蔡英文，卻沒有能力使民進黨及綠營為她打開「九二共識」的僵局。今後，這個以「不挑釁／無意外」為著眼而建立的行政團隊，與民進黨在立法院及黨內的自走砲，如何各自扮演「黑臉／白臉」的競合關係，就成了蔡英文政治操作上的最大考驗。

蔡英文必須能夠領導民進黨，否則就難領導「這個國家」（蔡英文避稱中華民國的慣用詞）。一個對中華民國扛不起又丟不掉的蔡英文，必無可能建構可大可久的國家憧憬。因此，蔡英文可給國人的最大想像力，應是她必須表現出能夠引領民進黨轉型的領導力。

Cross-Strait Relationship: A Non State to State Relationship within One Family

Cross-Strait Relationship: A Non State to State Relationship within One Family
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 20, 2016

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen and the Mainland each have their own bottom lines. But a cessation of cross-Strait interaction would exact too high a price on both sides. Therefore both sides should demonstrate wisdom and flexibility. They should seek a new foundation for cross-Strait interaction acceptable to both sides.

Full Text Below:

As soon as Tsai Ing-wen won the election, the Mainland began pressure testing her. But Tsai Ing-wen has obstinately refused to recognize either the 1992 Consensus or affirm the One China Principle. DPP Legislative Yuan Speaker Su Chia-chuan even declared that "People on Taiwan and the Mainland belong to different countries", totally undermining Tsai Ing-wen's commitments. Mainland pressure testing has slowly changed. What was a temporary measure has become a fixed guideline, in the hope that Tsai Ing-wen's new government will realize that refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus or affirm the One China Principle, will have devastating long-term consequences.

Obviously, the price paid will not benefit people on either side. The Ma government has been in office eight years. It obtained increased breathing space for Taiwan. It made a fundamental breakthrough in cross-Strait private sector interaction. People to people exchanges in particular, became the cross-Strait norm. Far too many people have become part of the same circle. They now share the same destiny. If conflict erupts between the two sides, they will be the victims. More and more people enjoy the fruits of improved cross-Strait relations. Peaceful cross-Strait interaction is like the air we breath. We fail to appreciate its existence and importance until it is lost, by which time our daily lives and routines have been affected. Consider the tourism industry. Business owners' find themselves under a dark cloud. This offers us a taste of the pessimism that permeates society today. Some may rejoice. Fewer Mainland tourists mean smaller crowds at tourist spots, and a better experience for themselves. But they fail to realize these “benefits” mean plummeting tourism industry income and even bankruptcy.

Based on individual claims or perceptions, the general public may remain blindly optimistic. But as president, Tsai Ing-wen cannot afford such myopia. She must take a broader view of the problems facing Taiwan. She must consider the welfare of the public, and even the welfare of citizens on the other side of the Strait. She must rethink her view of the cross-Strait political foundation. She must seek solutions to ensure that cross-Strait relations develop peacefully. Obviously this is related to the Mainland's insistence on the 1992 Consensus. In other words, Tsai Ing-wen must put the welfare of people on both sides of the Strait above all else.

Naturally, given the DPP's history and culture, one cannot expect the DPP to accept the 1992 Consensus outright. Nor can one expect her to utter the words "One China". But the DPP must realize that unless it sorts out cross-Strait relations, the Tsai Ing-wen government will fail in its attempt to govern the nation. Tsai Ing-wen should draw from past experience and attempt to make a breakthrough. When Chen Shui-bian delivered his inaugural speech years ago, he may not have explicitly recognized the 1992 Consensus, or affirmed the one China principle. But he publicly acknowledged that people on both sides share common descent, history, and culture. This hardly satisfied the Mainland. But at least it enabled them to let out a breath of air. Chen had at least retained a link between the two sides.

Ko Wen-je's rhetoric is more advanced. He visited Shanghai and declared that he “has no two Chinas problem". He said he had no objection to “both sides of the Strait being part of one family”. Clearly the Mainland is flexible regarding cross-Strait rhetoric from Taiwan. Ko's reference to "both sides of the Strait being part of one family” echoed President Xi Jinping wording, and implied a special relationship between the two sides. Of course for Tsai Ing-wen to affirm that "both sides of the Strait are part of one family” may be difficult. Therefore she may wish to draw on the experience of Chen Shui-bian and Ko Wen-je. She can indirectly imply that the two sides are part of one family. In particular, she can underscore how under the Republic of China's constitutional framework, cross-Strait relations are special, but they are not relations between two independent countries. She may wish to make clear that the two sides are not two independent countries, and that people on the two sides are fellow countrymen, thereby clarifying the relationship between the two political entities. Meanwhile, during future discussions of cross-Strait relations, she may wish to underscore the connection between people across the Strait, and declare that the new government will not treat Mainlanders as foreigners, but will continue to treat Mainlanders as fellow countrymen under the cross-Strait framework.

The Mainland must understand that according to Academia Sinica polls, 49.7% of the public on Taiwan believes that Taiwan will eventually "be reunified [by the Mainland]”. They may fear or resist the prospect. But reunification remains well within the realm of possibility. Sad to say, the KMT government has long been fearful of ridicule and slander when promoting cross-Strait policy. It has lacked the courage to throw open the doors and to make bold decisions. Such considerations need not weigh on the DPP. If the time and conditions are right, it can afford to push cross-Strait relations into new territory. If Tsai Ing-wen acts on behalf of the public welfare, and advances cross-Strait relations into new territory, the Mainland should adopt a forward looking attitude. The Mainland need not compromise on matters of principle. But if under the DPP cross-Strait relations can continue to develop peacefully, the Mainland should remain confident.

Tsai Ing-wen and the Mainland each have their own bottom lines. But a cessation of cross-Strait interaction would exact too high a price on both sides. Therefore both sides should demonstrate wisdom and flexibility. They should seek a new foundation for cross-Strait interaction acceptable to both sides.

兩岸非國與國的一家人關係

2016年04月20日 中國時報

大選結束蔡英文勝選後，大陸立即開始對台灣進行壓力測試，蔡英文依然遲遲未對九二共識或一中原則做出表態，甚至黨內不時出現類似立法院長蘇嘉全宣稱「台灣人民與中國人民屬於不同國家」全然違背蔡英文承諾的脫軌言行，大陸開始慢慢將壓力從臨時性的測試性質變成固定性質的方針，希望讓蔡英文的新政府意識到，不接受九二共識或者一中原則要長期付出代價。

顯然，這種代價絕非兩岸民眾之福。馬政府8年執政，不但讓台灣獲得較寬裕的活動空間，更讓兩岸民間互動有了根本性突破。尤其兩岸民眾間的交流成常態，太多人已深度融入兩岸共同生活圈，成為兩岸命運共同體的一員，兩岸若出現衝突，最大的受害者就是這部分人。不僅如此，還有更大範圍的人們，享受著兩岸關係改善後的成果，兩岸和平互動如同空氣一樣，其存在，大家不覺得重要，一旦失去，正常的生活和工作可能都將受到影響。看看全台旅遊業者的愁雲慘霧，即可管窺當下台灣社會的悲觀氛圍，雖然很多人看到陸客大減還感到一絲欣慰，認為可以減少景區擁擠，保有自己旅行時的品質，殊不知這種小確幸卻是以旅遊業者收入大減乃至破產為代價。

一般民眾或許可以基於個別的主張或觀感而盲目樂觀，身為總統的蔡英文就斷不能如此短視，而應該以更為寬廣的視野審視當下台灣所面對的困境，應以台灣廣大民眾乃至兩岸蒼生為念，重新思考其對兩岸政治基礎的論述，尋找出更能確保兩岸關係繼續向前發展的解決之道。而這當然跟大陸對九二共識或一中原則的堅持有關，換句話說，蔡英文應站在兩岸民眾福祉的高度來面對兩岸這一政治基礎。

當然，從歷史傳統與政治文化觀察，要民進黨接受九二共識應是不可期待的，對「一中」兩個字大概也不會出現順從性的表述，但民進黨應已理解，兩岸關係不理順蔡英文政府不可能有好的政績，相信蔡英文一定會參照過往兩岸交手的經驗，努力尋找可能的突破口。當年陳水扁就職演講中雖未明確承認九二共識和一中原則，但還是公開承認兩岸人民有著共同的血緣、歷史和文化。對此大陸當然不滿意，但也鬆了一口氣，因為這畢竟還是保留了兩岸之間的連結。

柯文哲的論述更為前衛，他以「沒有兩個中國問題」及「兩岸一家親」得以前進上海，從中可以看出大陸對台灣各方的兩岸論述還是保留了靈活的處理空間，「兩岸一家親」不僅是大陸領導人習近平主席的提法，其實也暗含兩岸的特殊關係。當然，要蔡英文全盤接受「兩岸一家親」的提法可能也有困難，那麼不妨調和陳水扁和柯文哲的作法，強調兩岸都是一家人的意涵，特別是將中華民國憲政體制下兩岸屬於特殊關係，但不是國與國關係做出清楚的表態，用兩岸非兩國、兩岸是同胞等概念確立兩岸兩主體之間的關係。同時，在對未來兩岸互動的原則進行論述時，也要強調兩岸人民之間的連結關係，從而向大陸宣告，新政府不會以對待外人的方式看待大陸人民，而在兩岸框架下延續兩岸交流、對待大陸人民。

大陸也應理解，據中研院民調，台灣有49.7%民眾認為台灣終將「被統一」，其中或許存有恐懼或抗拒的因素，但未嘗不是統一的契機。可是，長期以來國民黨政府推動兩岸政策，始終面對憂讒畏譏與動輒得咎的雙重困境，絕無膽識推出大開大闔大決策，民進黨卻沒有包袱，只要客觀條件與時機成熟，未嘗不能將兩岸關係推入一個新境界。蔡英文若能以兩岸民眾利益為出發提出某種程度的新論述，大陸亦應正向面對。這並非要求大陸在原則問題上做出妥協，而是希望大陸能夠體會在民進黨執政下若能持續兩岸和平發展關係所可能開創的空間，大陸對此應更有自信。

蔡英文與大陸方面各有堅持，但兩岸互動中斷卻也是雙方不可承受的代價，因此，雙方都應拿出智慧和靈活性處理兩岸未來互動的基礎，並以建設性的態度創造兩岸都能接受的新論述。

Peace and the Public Welfare Require Mutual Restraint

Peace and the Public Welfare Require Mutual Restraint
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 19, 2016

Executive Summary: Peace is the only way to resolve cross-Strait issues. Tsai Ing-wen and the Mainland authorities must look to peace and the public welfare. Taiwan must offer a declaration acceptable to the Mainland. The Mainland on the other hand, must exercise restraint.

Full Text Below:

May 20 is fast approaching. Meanwhile disputes between the two sides are multiplying. Even those not paying attention have noticed the tense atmosphere. The Mainland says it will not change its policy of peaceful cross-Strait relations. But it has established diplomatic relations with Gambia, reduced the quota for Mainland tourists allowed to visit Taiwan, refused to renew the milkfish imports agreement, and extradited Taiwanese scam artists from Kenya to the Mainland. Numerous disputes have arisen between the two sides. The friendly atmosphere of cross-Strait interaction and understanding have been shattered. The Mainland is obviously testing Tsai Ing-wen.

The Mainland considers the political foundation for sustained cross-Strait relations extremely important. It is the basis for mutually beneficial cooperation. Ambiguity on this matter is unacceptable. Therefore when Tsai obdurately refuses to clearly state her position, the Mainland's only option is to send strong messages reminding the new government of the possible repercussions for cross-Strait relations. For the Mainland, Taiwan policy involves an either/or choice. Taiwan must clearly recognize the 1992 Consensus, and affirm that both sides of the Strait are part of one China. The Mainland can then allow cross-Strait relations to continue, business as usual. Otherwise official interaction between the two sides will be immediately terminated. The Mainland of course has no desire to interrupt private sector exchanges. It will continue allowing economic integration to promote political integration. It will unilaterally liberalize in order toattract more capital and people from Taiwan to the Mainland. Mainland China is confident time is on its side.

But cross-Strait private sector interaction is inevitably complicated by political turbulence. Cross-Strait private sector exchanges have increased exponentially since the past. All manner of disputes require government coordination and standardization. If governments fail to communicate, private sector frictions will inevitably lead to a chill or even conflict, further deepening political confrontation. In other words, without official management, private sector interaction will become risky and detrimental to cross-Strait peace.

Tsai Ing-wen realizes that the Mainland is pressuring her and testing her. She realizes how sensitive cross-Strait relations are. That is why she has yet to direct a single insult at the Mainland. Instead, she has constantly called on the Mainland to demonstrate goodwill, and consider public opinion on Taiwan when formulating Taiwan policy. This approach has been criticized as “using public opinion as a shield against the Mainland”. Nevertheless it shows that Tsai Ing-wen wants to avoid a blow up with the Mainland, and hopes to turn the situation around. Tsai Ing-wen has only one choice. She must adopt a friendly attitude toward the Mainland. She must not offer provocations or change the status quo. She must extend an olive branch, build trust, and take concrete action.

Tsai Ing-wen does not need to cave in to Mainland pressure. But she must speak plainly. Communications between the DPP and CCP are not good. The two parties do not trust each other. Misunderstandings are likely, and if they arise, will be difficult to resolve. Tsai Ing-wen needs to realize that when she demonstrates goodwill toward the Mainland, she may not get an immediate response. That does not mean that the Mainland is setting a higher price. It may simply mean it does not trust the new government. It cannot determine whether the goodwill gesture hides evil intentions. Since the two sides lack sufficient trust, policy must be crystal clear, and minimize any need for interpretation. The policy implications must be spelled out without the slightest ambiguity.

Tsai Ing-wen presumably realizes that the Mainland knows she is exercising restraint. It has yet to officially denounce her. The Mainland still hopes she will issue a clear statement on cross-Strait political relations, enabling the two sides to maintain the status quo. It hopes official exchanges can continue. If the Mainland's asking price for resumption of cross-Strait relations is too high, the public on Taiwan will react negatively toward the Mainland. Identification with the Mainland will diminish. Friction that sets back cross-Strait relations is unnecessary. No opportunity to promote cross-Strait interaction should be passed up. If Tsai can appreciate the Mainland's good intentions, she may be able to break through the bottleneck and seize a golden opportunity. She would then enable the Mainland authorities to justify their actions to the Mainland public. The political basis for cross-Strait interaction would be more secure, and less troubled by twists and turns .

On May 20, Tsai Ing-wen will deliver her inaugural address. We call on Tsai Ing-wen to issue a cross-Strait policy declaration acceptable to the Mainland. We hope the Mainland will not cling to dogmatic slogans, but instead interpret Tsai Ing-wen's policy declaration according to the law. After all, long-term stability in cross-Strait relations must be rooted in the letter of the law, rather than political rhetoric. It must be interpreted legally, not evaluated politically.

Peace is the only way to resolve cross-Strait issues. Tsai Ing-wen and the Mainland authorities must look to peace and the public welfare. Taiwan must offer a declaration acceptable to the Mainland. The Mainland on the other hand, must exercise restraint.

蒼生與和平為念 兩岸需相互克制

2016年04月19日 中國時報

隨著520趨近，兩岸間的糾紛也越來越多，再不敏感的人也意識到其中的微妙氛圍。儘管大陸一再強調推動兩岸關係和平發展的方針不會改變，但從大陸與甘比亞建交、陸客來台配額減少、虱目魚契作不續約，再到肯亞案的嫌犯遣返等問題，兩岸間出現這麼多糾紛，兩岸互動的種種默契和友善氛圍都被打破，這顯然跟大陸正在對蔡英文進行壓力測試有關。

站在大陸的角度，兩岸關係持續發展的政治基礎極為重要，是一切互利合作的前提，容不得任何模糊空間。因此，當蔡英文穩如泰山堅拒明確表態之際，大陸唯一的選擇就是不斷釋放強硬訊號，提醒乃至警告新政府未來兩岸關係出現問題的可能後果。事實上，大陸對台政策的處理原則基本是「零與一」的單選題，要麼就對九二共識或兩岸同屬一中原則進行表態，大陸可以接受，兩岸關係現狀繼續開展，否則兩岸官方互動戛然而止。至於民間層次的往來，大陸方面當然不想中斷，甚至還會繼續以商促政，擴大片面對台開放，以吸引更多資金與人才湧向大陸。因為大陸非常自信，認為時間是站在他們那一邊。

只是，我們必須提醒，兩岸民間的互動難免會因為政治的波雲詭譎而橫生枝節，兩岸民間往來的規模與深度遠遠超越過去，期間必然存在種種糾紛，都需要政府層面的協調、處理與規範，如果政府溝通失靈，民間的摩擦對立會不斷困擾雙方社會，勢必導致民間互動氛圍冷卻，甚至引發社會間的衝突，進一步深化政治對抗。換言之，沒有官方管理的民間互動，將使兩岸進入高風險狀態，這對兩岸和平發展非常不利。

相信蔡英文應該已經意識到大陸對她的壓力測試，也清楚了解兩岸關係的極端敏感，因此蔡英文自始至終未對大陸口出惡言，而是不斷提醒對岸要釋放善意，要以台灣民意為考量來處理對台政策。雖然這種說法被外界批評為「挾民意對抗大陸」，但從善意的角度審視，則可看出蔡英文確實不想與大陸撕破臉，仍然希望事緩則圓。但無論如何，擺在蔡英文的面前只有一個選擇，就是如何以友善的態度處理未來的兩岸關係，消極面要不挑釁、不改變現狀，積極面要遞出橄欖枝、發展信賴關係，並落實到具體行動中。

蔡英文未必需要對大陸的壓力測試買帳，但有必要以更清楚明確的態度表明基本立場，畢竟民進黨與大陸間並無暢通的溝通管道，也缺乏堅實的互信基礎，很容易在互動中產生誤會，或發生誤會時無法及時化解。蔡英文需要理解，當她對大陸釋放善意時，或許暫時得不到大陸的回應，這並非大陸要價過高，而是對新政府缺乏信任，不能判斷善意的背後是否包藏禍心。在雙方尚無足夠互信基礎下，必須盡量降低政策論述的模糊性，盡可能減少被詮釋的空間，有效而準確表達自己的政策意涵。

蔡英文也應該明白，大陸方面其實也對她保持了基本的克制，官方層面未對蔡口出惡言，換句話說，大陸對蔡英文仍然心存期待，仍然希望她能針對兩岸政治關係做出具體的論述，讓兩岸現狀能夠維持，特別是官方層面的互動能夠延續下去。畢竟，對大陸來說，兩岸關係倒退的代價太高，在台灣民眾對大陸負面觀感仍然強烈，台灣的中國認同日趨淡化的背景下，也沒有必要製造摩擦讓兩岸關係倒退，反而應該抓住一切機會繼續推進兩岸互動。如果蔡英文能夠體會大陸的用心，或許就能意識到兩岸關係突破瓶頸的契機，是讓大陸能夠對內有所交代，讓兩岸互動的政治基礎能夠得到保證，未來就不會有太多的波折。

我們呼籲蔡英文在520就職演說中，就兩岸關係的性質做出能讓大陸接受的說明。我們也希望大陸不要堅持教條式、口號式的宣示，而應就蔡英文的表述依據法理脈絡剖析解讀，畢竟兩岸關係的長治久安要建立在法律關係，而非政治宣示上，用法律視角解讀，而非以政治感覺判斷。

和平發展是解決兩岸問題唯一的道路，期盼蔡英文與大陸當局都能以蒼生與和平為念，台灣要針對大陸的基本立場做出可接受的表態、大陸也要做出最大程度的克制。

Kenyan Repatriation and the Broken Window Effect

Kenyan Repatriation and the Broken Window Effect
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 16, 2016

Executive Summary: The 1992 Consensus enabled the Ma Xi summit. But "maintaining the status quo" cannot ensure the repatriation of scam artists to Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen cannot afford willfulness during her administration. Perhaps it is not too late for her to change her mind.

Full Text Below:

If cross-Strait relations were a building, it would now have a broken window. The Kenyan government  arrested a number of Taiwanese scam artists. Beijing had them extradited to the Mainland, provoking condemnation from both the ruling and opposition parties. But on closer examination, this is more than just a simple criminal case. It is one loaded with political repercussions.

Beijing has adopted smoke screen tactics. In distant Africa, it has repeatedly released smoke screens. First it resumed diplomatic relations with Gambia. Then it arrested Taiwanese scam artists in Kenya. Because these incidents occurred far away, the psychological impact on Taiwan should have been more muted. But they may have exceeded Beijing's expectations. The Internet reaches far and wide. Images of Kenyan police breaking into houses were conveyed to millions of homes on Taiwan via cell phone. Many on Taiwan experienced the tension of the scene as if first hand.

Gambia was purely a diplomatic incident. Beijing choose a country that had already severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan two years ago. It was a relatively mild warning. The Mainland rattled its sabre ever so slightly as a deterrent. But the Kenyan case was far more substantial and real. First, eight Taiwanese scam artists were extradited. Then another 37 were caught in the dragnet. Kenya was more than saber rattling psychological intimidation.

Beijing's moves were not intended as justification for applying pressure to Taiwan. Resumption of diplomatic relations with Gambia could be interpreted a number of ways. Beijing could deny that it was issuing a warning to recently elected Taiwanese leaders. It could say the same about the extradition of Taiwanese scam artists. After all, Beijing was investigating a crime. Many of the victims were from the Mainland. It would be easy for the Mainland to argue that it was simply seeing justice done. When the Taiwan Affairs Office published the names of the victims during its press conference, it was arguing just that.

Here is the problem. Five years ago the Philippine government arrested a number of Taiwanese scam artists. Taipei and Beijing had an understanding. Taiwanese criminals would be returned to Taiwan. Mainland criminals would be returned to the Mainland. Now that understanding has been shattered. This is a new cross-Strait scenario. Even the man in the street gets it. This change in the political climate hinges on the 1992 Consensus. Since early March, Xi Jinping and a long line of Mainland leaders appeale to the new regime. But Tsai Ing-wen ignored them. She refused to respond. She refused to answer. Perhaps this is why Beijing is turning the screws.

Why has Beijing allowed this "broken window" in cross-Strait relations? Does it expect Tsai to recognize the 1992 Consensus in her inaugural address? Is this a way of applying pressure? Or has it given up on Tsai altogether, and resorting to drastic measures? When it comes to this issue, a miss is as good as a mile.

The "broken windows theory” says that once a single window is broken, eventually every window will be broken. This principle applies not just to crime. It also applies to politics. Beijing has been making moves for nearly half a month. In particular, it has shattered precedent by arresting Taiwanese criminals. Appeals regarding Mainland victims may move people. But the arrests have nevertheless provoked anger over ROC sovereignty, human rights, and jurisdiction. Tsai Ing-wen is about to be inaugurated. Yet Beijing has escalated confrontation in advance. Why not allow Tsai Ing-wen to comment on the 1992 Consensus first? Has it make it more difficult for Tsai Ing-wen to reverse her position?

What is Beijing's logic? Did Beijing anticipate the condemnation and grief emanating from Taiwan  beforehand? Is this their cross-Strait "new normal"? If so, then Beijing has amended the "peaceful development" strategy it has practiced for the past few years. If so, then it intends to add conflict to peace, and give Taiwan a taste of the razor's edge. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to show her hand. If Beijing acts too hastily, it could make the problem worse. After all, President Ma is still in office. When the Mainland extradites Taiwanese to the Mainland, even Ma Ying-jeou must condemn its action, and Tsai Ing-wen will follow suit. Is the Mainland not concerned about the pros and cons?

Let us leave the domestic uproar aside for the moment. The Kenyan case involves crime, jurisdiction, emotions, hatred, even disputes over sovereignty. All of them bring us back to the 1992 Consensus. For the past five years, the Mainland has returned Taiwanese scam artists to Taiwan, because the 1992 Consensus provides for separate jurisdictions vis a vis criminal prosecutions. Now Beijing has suddenly reversed itself, all because Tsai Ing-wen persists in being evasive about the 1992 Consensus.

The 1992 Consensus enabled the Ma Xi summit. But "maintaining the status quo" cannot ensure the repatriation of scam artists to Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen cannot afford willfulness during her administration. Perhaps it is not too late for her to change her mind.

肯亞遣返案的政治破窗效應
2016-04-16聯合報

兩岸關係若是一幢建築物，如今已被砸出一個破窗。北京將在肯亞涉及詐騙犯罪的台籍嫌疑人，運用與肯亞的外交引渡直接遣送大陸，招來朝野同聲譴責。但深一層看，這並非只是一件單純的刑事案件，還有意在言外的政治弦聲。

北京採用的是一種狼煙戰術，在遙遠的非洲逐次升起煙幕：先是與甘比亞復交，接著在肯亞直接押解台籍詐騙犯；由於事發地遠在天邊，對台灣而言，心理衝擊應不會陡然驟升。但這次事件可能超過北京的估計，由於網路無遠弗屆，肯亞警方破門而入的鏡頭靠著一只手機傳入台灣千家萬戶，讓許多台灣民眾感受到現場的張力。

甘比亞是純外交事件，選一個已跟台灣斷交兩年多的國家建交，其實算是溫和的示警，只是稍露劍鋒讓對手心裡一懾，如此而已。但肯亞案卻放進了真人實事，先是八名涉案台灣人被押返，其後再將另外三十七人一網打盡，這就不是劍未出鞘的心理威嚇而已。

北京預留了此舉並非壓迫台灣的辯解空間。甘比亞復交可以顧左右而言他，稱這不是對候任領導人的警告；遣送詐騙台客亦然，畢竟是在查辦犯罪，畢竟大陸有眾多受害者，大陸不難辯駁這是純粹的司法正義，國台辦記者會臚列一干大陸民眾受害情節，就是這個論調。

問題是，雙方自五年前菲律賓破獲的詐騙案起，即有「兩岸人員分流」的默契，台灣的歸台灣，大陸的遣回大陸。現在規則被打破，無非就是衝著兩岸的新情勢而來，連市井小民都能推想：這一切皆因「九二共識」的變數而起。對於北京自三月初開始由習近平以降各領導人此起彼落對於「九二共識」的呼籲，蔡英文竟然不動聲色，不置一詞，這也許是北京設法加壓的原因。

如今的問題在於，北京任令兩岸「破窗」，究竟是因為還在期待蔡英文在其就職演說中認了「九二共識」，因而略施手段加壓；或者它已不對蔡英文心存幻想，乾脆釜底抽薪？這個判斷，如果失之毫釐，其結果將差之千里。

正如「破窗」理論所預設的，窗子破了一扇，終將引致所有窗子都被砸爛，這不只是犯罪的原理，政治上也如此。北京近半個多月來接連出手，尤其是這次破壞慣例逮人，儘管大陸民眾受害可憐的說詞頗能動之以情，但台灣方面第一時間對主權、人權及司法管轄權的群情激憤，也已被攪動起來。讓人不解的是，正當蔡英文的就職演說才要登場，北京提前發動這場押解事件升高對峙，豈非讓蔡英文的「九二共識」更說不出口？如此，會不會反而阻斷了蔡英文迴旋轉身的可能？

由此反推北京的邏輯，倘若此事件台灣的譴責與悲憤都早在北京事前的估計中，這就是他們想要塑造的兩岸「新常態」；這顯示，北京決定修正過去演繹與實踐了多年的「和平發展」戰略，有意要在和平之中摻入衝突元素，讓台灣品嘗一下剃刀邊緣的滋味。然而，蔡英文畢竟還未揭底牌，北京若過度操切，反而可能讓問題弄得更難以收拾。畢竟，此際仍是馬總統執政，大陸押人遣送的作法，第一時間連馬英九都不能不跳出來譴責，然後由蔡英文跟進譴責；其中得失如何，難道已不遑計較？

撇開國內沸沸揚揚的情緒不談，這次肯亞案將犯罪、管轄、情緒、憎恨，甚至上綱到了主權的糾葛，終歸都須回到「九二共識」議題上進行省察。蔡英文應當如此琢磨：近五年以來，大陸將海外逮捕的台籍詐騙犯皆交台灣解回，正是「九二共識」所拓墾出來「司法管轄權」！而如今北京突然收回，亦是因為她至今依舊對「九二共識」閃爍其辭。

「九二共識」可以撐起「馬習會」，「維持現狀」卻請不回詐騙犯。蔡英文的執政光景，似不宜任性而行。或許，轉念不過一瞬，一切猶未為晚！

Taipei Dome Contract Dissolution: Easier Said than Done

Taipei Dome Contract Dissolution: Easier Said than Done
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 15, 2016

Executive Summary: The Taipei Dome contract may be dissolved or not. But the problem must be solved. Any further delays, and the unfinished steel dome will truly become public security nightmare. Typhoon season is approaching. A necessary prerequisite to solving the problem of the Taipei Dome, is for Ko Wen-je to set aside his arrogance and his prejudices. He must be willing to call a spade a spade. He must be willing to confront the legal and physical realities. He must be willing to admit his mistakes and apologize. He must not leave the debt to future generations. His "Shark Theory" can no longer save him from his dilemma. If he refuses to confront a 37 billion dollar problem today, he will confront a 40 billion dollar problem tomorrow.

Full Text Below:

After a night of consultation, the Taipei City Government and the Farglory Group have agreed to dissolve their Taipei Dome contract. The situation seems clear. Both parties want out. Ko Wen-je is eager to unburden himself of this administrative nightmare. He hopes to halt his precipitous decline in the polls. Farglory's corporate reputation and image have been severely damaged by Ko Wen-je. It has little reason for nostalgia. And as the old saying goes, “You can't fight city hall”. The smart thing to do is simply leave.

But dissolution of the contract is easier said than done. Many agencies are involved. The pros and cons must be weighed. Farglory wants the city to buy back the project for 37 billion dollars. Only then will it agree to dissolution. This means if the city cannot scrape up the money, or if Ko Wen-je cannot find another company willing to take on the project, he can forget it. Ko Wen-je did everything in his power to make things difficult for Farglory. He forced Farglory to shutdown, leaving it utterly demoralized. Now it is Ko Wen-je's turn to ride the tiger. Now he is the one trapped between a high buyout price, and a huge penalty for dissolution. He can neither advance nor retreat.

Ko Wen-je says he can haggle over the price. It is not Farglory's call. That is true. The parties must of course agree. But even a 10% discount still adds up to over 30 billion. Can the city come up with that sort of cash? Or is Ko planning to leave the entire mess behind for the next mayor and the taxpayers to clean up? According to Farglory, the Taipei Dome itself cost 30 billion. Downtime losses, according to third-party estimates, add i[ to 7 billion. That is why Farglory is asking 37 billion. When Ko Wen-je ordered work stopped on the Taipei Dome in May last year, he got to thump his chest and strut about during the following year. But the city was forced to pay over 7 billion dollars for his privilege. Taipei Dome rusting has also increased public safety concerns.

When Ko Wen-je spoke about the Taipei Dome yesterday, he continued passing the buck. He said the “giant rotten egg” lying there is hardly my fault. The public safety issue is hardly my doing. Why blame me? His buck-passing was obvious sophistry. If Ko uncovered a safety issue with the Taipei Dome, why didn't he have Farglory fix it? Instead he insisted on handing down an edict stopping all work. Over the past year, Ko Wen-je has basked in his fans' praise for his "courage". He probably never realized that pounding the table and throwing a fit would cost 7 billion dollars. Countless subcontractors will receive no payment. They will find themselves in debt or even be forced to declare bankruptcy. Does he care?

Can the city scrape up the 37 billion buyout price? If not, then the dissolution of the contract with Farglory cannot proceed. If the contract cannot be dissolved, and the city refuses to allow Farglory to resume construction, the two sides will inevitably find themselves mired in a legal battle with unimaginable consequences. What is the worst possible outcome?  The city will be forced to pay a huge sum in compensation. The Taipei Dome will become a rusting steel skeleton. Huge sums will have to be spent dismantling it. Demolition of the dome would create public safety concerns for the nearby MRT system. The public is frustrated, and Ko Wen-je's credibility has hit rock bottom.

When Chen Shui-bian was Taipei mayor, he want after Matra, builder of the Mucha MRT line, in a fit of anger. He filed lawsuit after lawsuit. His approach differed little from Ko Wen-je's Jihad aainst Farglory. In the end, the city was ordered to pay Matra 1.6 billion, all paid by the hapless taxpayer. Do citizens of Taipei intend to continue allowing Ko Wen-je do whatever he damn well pleases?

Ironically, the moment Ko Wen-je took office, he launched a self-righteous crusade against "Five Major Scandals". He went through the motions on the four other scandals, but bet his reputation for “courage” on the Taipei Dome. Alas, he has reached an impasse. Today, a fairy tale ending to the saga of the Taipei Dome is unlikely. One can only hope that the very consortium “Professor Ko” maligned will help him clean up the mess he created. But how many companies are willing to trust Ko Wen-je and work with the city? Ko hopes to remodel the old Taipei City Council building. He has lowered the base price three times, but still no takers. Taipei City is supposed to host the 2017 World Games. Corporate fund raising was supposed to raise 20 million. But so far no one has contributed a single cent. The business community has been frightened away by Ko Wen-je's indiscriminate attempts to discredit and humiliate Farglory. It is reluctant to deal with Ko. Are any companies willing to assume such a risk by taking on the Taipei Dome? Are they unconcerned about even closer scrutiny by the Ko Wen-je regime? Nor is this merely a question of money. The Ko government insists the dome is unsafe, that it is too large. Can all of this be conveniently forgotten merely because the city signs a contract with another in private?

The Taipei Dome contract may be dissolved or not. But the problem must be solved. Any further delays, and the unfinished steel dome will truly become public security nightmare. Typhoon season is approaching. A necessary prerequisite to solving the problem of the Taipei Dome, is for Ko Wen-je to set aside his arrogance and his prejudices. He must be willing to call a spade a spade. He must be willing to confront the legal and physical realities. He must be willing to admit his mistakes and apologize. He must not leave the debt to future generations. His "Shark Theory" can no longer save him from his dilemma. If he refuses to confront a 37 billion dollar problem today, he will confront a 40 billion dollar problem tomorrow.

解約說得輕鬆 柯P請提完整方案

2016-04-15 聯合報

經過一夜會商，台北市政府與遠雄就大巨蛋達成了「解約」的共識。情況看來很明顯，雙方都想離開泥淖：柯文哲急欲擺脫這個尾大不掉的施政噩夢，以挽救他跌跌不休的民調；遠雄方面，則因企業信譽和形象已被柯文哲打趴，此地已沒什麼好留戀，何況民不與官鬥，走為上策。

但是，「解約」一詞說起來輕鬆，其間卻機關重重，需看全套方案才知得失。遠雄開出的條件是：市府拿出三百七十億元照價買回，該公司就同意解約。言下之意，若市府拿不出錢，或柯文哲找不到其他企業願意出錢幫市府頂下巨蛋，那就休想。換言之，當初柯市府千方百計刁難，強逼遠雄停工，弄得遠雄灰頭土臉；現在，則輪到柯文哲騎虎難下，夾在解約和鉅額價購賠償之間，進退不得。

柯文哲的說法是，金額可以再討價還價，不是遠雄說了算。這點沒錯，雙方當然應該再議價；然而，三百七十億就算打九折，還是三百多億，市府掏得出這麼大一筆錢嗎，或者打算把爛攤子交給下任市長及全體市民？根據遠雄的說法，大巨蛋造價本身為三百億，至於停工損失，根據第三方的鑑價是七十億元，所以加總為三七○億。簡言之，大巨蛋去年五月停工至今，柯文哲威風了一年，卻讓市府要多賠七十億元；而巨蛋鋼架鏽蝕，也增加了公安疑慮。

柯文哲日昨談到大巨蛋時仍然滿口推託說，大臭蛋躺在那裡又不是我的錯，公安疑慮也不是我造成的，為什麼要怪我。這話是詭辯。當初若認定大巨蛋安全有問題，為何不逼遠雄改善再改善，卻非要勒令停工。一年來，柯文哲在享受柯迷為其「魄力」叫好而自得之際，大概萬萬沒想到，他這拍桌一怒的代價竟高達七十億吧？若算上其中許多小包商因拿不到工程款而負債或倒閉，他又於心何忍？

如果北市府拿不出三七○億的價購金，那麼和遠雄解約之事，就可能無法成立。若無法真正解約，市府又仍不准遠雄復工，雙方勢必陷入一場戰火漫天的法律訴訟，後果難以想像。最壞的結局是，市府要付出鉅額賠償，而大巨蛋依然是鋼架廢墟一座，還得動用鉅款去拆，而拆蛋還可能造成捷運的公安疑慮。市民在幾頭皆落空的情況下，柯文哲的信用也就差不多掃地了。

當年陳水扁擔任台北市長時，曾意氣風發地追打木柵捷運線的法商馬特拉，並與之興訟；其手法，跟今天柯文哲痛擊遠雄的情景，差相彷彿。馬特拉案最後市府被判賠十六億元，由全民埋單；今天，台北市民仍然會讓柯文哲為所欲為嗎？

說來諷刺，柯文哲一上任痛打「五大弊案」，另四案早已草草了之，只剩下靠著大巨蛋在撐著柯Ｐ的「魄力」，卻也到了難以為繼的地步。今天，大巨蛋如果要有一個夢幻式的美好收場，恐怕也只能寄望柯Ｐ動輒抹黑的「財團」來幫他收拾，接下爛攤。問題是，現在還有多少企業願意相信柯文哲，與市府合作？最近舊台北市議會的改建案，不斷降低招標底價，仍三度流標。台北市主辦二○一七世大運，原訂向企業界募款廿億元，至今金額仍然掛零。由此可見，企業界對於柯文哲不分青紅皂白抹黑、羞辱財團的作法，早已心寒，皆不願與柯市府打交道。那麼，若有什麼企業敢冒大不韙出來接手大巨蛋，其與柯文哲的關係難道不怕受到加倍檢驗？何況，這不只是錢的問題，柯市府指責大巨蛋的安全性、建築量體過巨等事，難道都可以因私下協議轉手他人而一筆勾銷？

無論是不是解約，大巨蛋的問題都必須設法解決；再延宕下去，未完工的鋼形巨蛋真的會變成台北市的公安夢魘，而且颱風季節馬上就要來臨。我們認為，解決大巨蛋問題的必要前提，是柯文哲得放下自己的傲慢和偏見，學習就事論事，面對法律和現實，並且道歉認錯，千萬不能債留子孫。事到如今，他的「沙魚理論」已經解不了他的危困，今天不面對三七○億的難關，明天就得面對四百億的高牆。