“No Power Shortages” Check About to Bounce

“No Power Shortages” Check About to Bounce 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
June 1, 2016

Executive Summary: Summer has arrived early on Taiwan. Electricity use has skyrocketed. On May 30 peak power transfer capacity was only 920,000 kW. The reserve transfer capacity rate was only 2.7%, the third lowest in history. Taiwan was one step away from a red alert and power rationing. Tsai Ing-wen promised “No power shortages” before and after the election. So did Minister of Economic Affairs Roy S. Lee. The new government's energy policy must be more pragmatic and less reckless.

Full Text Below:

Summer has arrived early on Taiwan. Electricity use has skyrocketed. On May 30 peak power transfer capacity was only 920,000 kW. The reserve transfer capacity rate was only 2.7%, the third lowest in history. Taiwan was one step away from a red alert and power rationing. Tsai Ing-wen promised “No power shortages” before and after the election. So did Minister of Economic Affairs Roy S. Lee. The new government's energy policy must be more pragmatic and less reckless.

Historically speaking, reserve transfer capacity rates below 7% usually require power rationing. The reserve capacity rate may suggest that the situation is not that pessimistic. The early arrival of summer caused electricity consumption to soar. That was unexpected. According to Taipower, generators are undergoing maintenance. Work should be completed by July. If the First Nuclear Power Plant's Unit I and the Second Nuclear Power Plant's Unit II begin operation on schedule, "This year's power supply will not be a problem".

Please note this means the First Nuclear Power Plant and the Second Nuclear Power Plant must operate in unison. Only then will power supply not be a problem. But the First Nuclear Power Plant's Unit I and the Second Nuclear Power Plant's Unit II can probably improve transfer rates only 2% to 3%. If they fail to operate normally, power output will be further limited. This pertains to only two units in two nuclear power plants. An even more important question remains. DPP energy policy will eliminate nuclear power plants altogether. The power supply will be reduced 16 to 18 percent. How is that supposed to work out?

The new government's energy policy would replace nuclear energy with renewable energy. The percentage of energy provided by renewable energy sources is expected to increase to 20% by 2025. Renewable energy would completely replace nuclear energy. Therefore according to the new government, eliminating nuclear energy is a no-brainer that will not compromise the power supply. But anyone who knows anything about the realities of power generation, knows the uncertainties and risks involved. Renewable energy is subject to climatic factors. It cannot be used as a base load power source. Over the past decade the increase in renewable energy has been limited. Timely conversion to renewable energy is unlikely. All renewable energy sources, large and small, must be connected to the grid before they can contribute. The construction of such grids in the short-term is impossible.

The new government is painting a pretty picture of a renewable energy future. Can this pretty picture be realized? That remains to be seen. In any event, it cannot alleviate the problem in the short-term. It is certain to result in power shortages. Also, lest we forget, increasing the percentage of renewable energy to 30% will require an investment of 1.5 trillion dollars. The government simply does not have the money. Any investment by private entrepreneurs must be profitable. The cost of renewable energy generation is exorbitant. Electricity rate hikes will be unavoidable. That runs counter to the new government's commitment to "No hikes in electricity rates”.

Minister of Economic Affairs Roy S. Lee, in his first press conference upon taking office, said, "All nuclear power plants will be shut down by 2025. There is no room for discussion. As long as we work together, we will not need power rationing". For a minister to have clear policy objectives and firm beliefs is admirable. But a government energy policy for the next decade based not on practical and feasible plans, but on the blind faith of political parties and ministers is a terrifying prospect.

Any national energy policy planning and implementation requires a long time scale to be effective. A new power plant, from planning to completion and operation, often requires 10 years or more. Look back at some of the presidents who have completed power plants in office. During its eight years in office, the Chen government increased generating capacity by 9.02 million kW. During its term in office, the Ma government increased generating capacity by 2.73 million kW. These were not the result of Chen government initiatives to increase power capacity, but rather its willingness to complete Lee Teng-hui era plans. New generating capacity during the Ma government era was almost entirely the result of earlier plans from the Lee Teng-hui era. The Chen government contributed almost nothing. Over the next three to four years, the Tsai government is expected to undertake Ma government era plans to build eight units that will provide 6.67 million kW of electricity.

The Tsai government intends to shut down all nuclear power plants. But what if renewable energy fails to replace lost capacity as swiftly as expected? When reserve capacity rates plummet to 10% to 7%, into the danger zone or even lower, Taiwan will suffer blackouts or power rationing. The next president, or President Tsai during a second term, will no longer enjoy an energy surplus bequeathed by previous planners. Given the time required between planning and operation, Taiwan will suffer through many years of power shortages.

Just before his appointment as the new government's Atomic Energy Commissioner, Hsieh Hsiao-hsin warned that the development of renewable energy and a nuclear-free homeland, will require "the public to expect power shortages and be resigned to electricity rate hikes". He warned that "if we cannot tolerate blackouts and rate hikes, the goal will be difficult to achieve". The new government has been in office less than two weeks. Yet reserve transfer capacity has already fallen below 3%. This constitutes a warning. It tells the new government that its energy policy must be pragmatic.

This year is an anti-El Nino year. A long, hot summer is inevitable. Power shortages are indeed worrisome. Only recently Roy S. Lee thumped his chest and promised “No power shortages”. But the day before yesterday he changed his tune. He said "Work is not 100% complete", and “We must go all out to deal with it". His is clearly afraid to issue any more boasts. A nuclear-free homeland and increased reliance on renewable energy sources may be a laudable ideal. But even if one is determined to promote them, one must also be pragmatic. One must not allow domestic power shortages. One must implement such a policy gradually. One must not be reckless. Once power is rationed, the livelihood of the people will be at risk, and the people will be in pain. Can the new government really afford to be this careless?

瀕臨跳票的不缺電承諾
2016年06月01日 中國時報

台灣提早進入炎夏，用電量大增，5月30日電力尖峰備轉容量僅92萬瓩，備轉容量率為2.7%，是史上第三低，逼近紅燈的限電警戒一步之遙。總統蔡英文選前、選後，加上經濟部長李世光信誓旦旦「不缺電」的承諾危矣！新政府電力政策應該更務實，切勿冒進。

從歷史經驗看，備轉容量率降到7%以下，缺電進而要限電的機率就大幅提高。雖然以備用容量率來看，情況或許不是如此悲觀，因為這次炎夏提早到達，讓用電量早早飆上尖峰，算是意料之外。根據台電的估算，目前發電機組有些仍在檢修，預計7月後會陸續完成，如果核一的一號機組跟核二的二號機組可在預定時間內加入運轉，「今年的供電情況沒有問題」。

但請注意，這是在核一、二機組加入運轉的情況下，供電才沒有問題。而核一的一號機及核二的二號機大概影響備轉率各約2%、3%，如果未正常運轉，限電機率就會增加。這只是核電廠的兩組機組而已，那麼，更該問的是，依照民進黨能源政策的全面廢核，供電少了16到18%，那又會是怎麼一個景況呢？

新政府的能源政策是要以再生能源替代核電，預計2025年再生能源比例能提高到20%。看起來再生能源完全取代核電，廢核理所當然亦毫不影響供電。但稍微了解實務者就知道，其中潛藏極大的不確定性與風險。再生能源供電量受天候影響，無法作為基載電力；過去十多年再生能源增加比例有限，未來要快速拉升恐難達成；所有大小再生能源廠必須與電網聯結後才能發揮效益，但電網建構不是短期可完成。

因此新政府等於是擘畫了未來美麗的再生能源美景，這個美景成功與否尚未可知，但肯定難以紓緩短期就要碰上的缺電危機。更何況，別忘了把再生能源比例拉到30%，需要投資的金額約1.5兆元，政府肯定沒這筆錢，如果由民間投資，投資人一定是將本求利，再生能源發電成本亦高，電價上漲顯然是難避免，這又違背新政府承諾的「電價不漲」了。

經濟部長李世光在上任後的首次記者會上，堅定地表示，「2025年就是要廢核，沒有討論餘地；而只要一起努力，就有機會做到不會限電。」坦白說，一名部長有堅定的政策目標與信仰，誠然值得佩服；但國家未來十年的能源政策，不建立在實務可行的計畫上，而是建立在政黨與部長的信仰上，也是相當嚇人的。

任何國家的電力政策規畫與建設，都需要長期始能完成見效，一座電廠從提出規畫到最後完工加入營運，動輒耗時10年以上。回頭看幾任總統任內完成的電力設施，扁政府8年共有902萬瓩新機組完工，馬政府時代總共增加273萬瓩新機組；此一結果不是扁政府更努力於電力開發，而是扁政府時代承接李登輝時代的電力開發計畫，數量豐富；馬政府新增供電則幾乎全是更早的李登輝時代的計畫，扁政府幾乎毫無建樹。未來3到4年，蔡政府亦有望承接馬政府時代推動8部機組完工所帶來的667萬瓩電力。

但如果蔡政府全面廢核、再生能源推動速度不如預期，一旦電力備用容量降到10%到7%的限電危險區，或甚至更低時，台灣就難逃缺電、限電的命運。下任執政者、或是蔡政府的第二任任期，再無前人規畫的「供電紅利」可享受；以電廠規畫到營運所需時間來看，台灣至少會有數年陷入缺電陰影中。

新政府原能會主委謝曉星上任前就說，非核家園及發展再生能源，「民眾也要有缺電的心理準備，未來如果遇到漲電費，心中要甘之如飴」，「如果不能承受缺電、漲電費兩個問題，會很難達成。」在新政府上台不到兩周，就出現備轉容量降到3%以下的低檔，也無異於是一項警訊，告訴新政府：能源政策必須務實以對。

今年是反聖嬰年，今夏恐怕酷熱難免，電力供應確實讓人憂心；日前才拍胸脯保證不缺電的李世光，前天馬上改口說「工程沒有百分之百」、「要全力以赴處理」，顯然大話再也不敢講了。非核家園、再生能源比重提高，或許是值得讚許的理想，但縱然要推動也必須務實推動，以讓國內不缺電為最高原則，逐步落實、萬勿冒進，一旦限電開始，將置台灣民生與經濟於痛苦和風險之中，豈可不慎？

Acknowledge the 1992 Communique, Allow Beijing to Withdraw Its Ultimatum

Acknowledge the 1992 Communique, Allow Beijing to Withdraw Its Ultimatum
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
May 31, 2016

Executive Summary: Chen Shui-bian rejected the 1992 Consensus. That was when his troubles and loss of political support began. Tsai Ing-wen must not repeat the same mistake. She has already acknowledged the historical fact that an agreement was reached in 1992. So why persist in self-deception and blank out the historical fact of the 1992 Communique? Tsai Ing-wen is billing herself as a "problem solver". So why not hold high the communique, acknowledge the existence of the communique, and allow Beijing to withdraw its ultimatum?

Full Text Below:

The Taiwan Affairs Office and ARATS have both declared that without the 1992 Consensus, they can no longer conduct with business as usual, therefore cross-Strait communication and negotiation channels have now been suspended. This state of affairs, if ignored, will inevitably render the channels null and void. Once that happens, mutual suspicions arising from insufficient information will make saving the nation ever more difficult. Tsai Ing-wen will spend her term of office in an atmosphere of paranoia. Does Tsai Ing-wen really want matters to come to this? If not, she had better think twice.

A festive inauguration ceremony may be able to project a false image of calm. Tsai Ing-wen may think her 1992 Consensus double talk will allow business as usual, and allow her to plan her next move at leisure. She may think she will be able to turn in a respectable report card at the end of her four-year term. But the current situation is truly bizzare. Tsai Ing-wen appears to have made up her mind. No matter which way the wind blows, she has apparently decided to ignore Beijing's ultimatum regarding the 1992 Consensus.

But the new government is overplaying its hand. Taiwan's economy cannot withstand further turmoil. In any political confrontation, the loser will inevitably be the DPP, and the people of Taiwan will be the ones who pay the price.

Two days before Tsai Ing-wen's inauguration, the Mainland Ministry of Commerce announced its first quarter cross-Strait trade data. Taiwan exports to the Mainland fell by 11.7%. The bad news did not begin now. Last year Taiwan exports to the Mainland declined by 12.4% over the previous year. By contrast, the Mainland's total exports last year declined by only 1.8% over the previous year. Over the past year, Taiwan's exports to the Mainland have suffered a double-digit decline. The main reason is that the Mainland's red supply chain has gradually taken shape. Past projects on the Mainland relied on imports from Taiwan. Today the Mainland relies on its own industrial capacity.

Tsai Ing-wen wallows in Schadenfreude. She pictures herself taking advantage of this trend to end dependence on the Mainland. She yearns to for US and European markets, and hopes to implement her New Southern Strategy. Last year Taiwan's exports to the ten countries of ASEAN declined 14.2%, even more than exports to the Mainland. Exports to Europe declined 10.9%. Taiwan's economic problems, which the DPP wrongly attributes to “over-reliance on the Mainland”, are actually due to Taiwan's inadequate innovation and competitiveness.

The very first question that Tsai Ing-wen should ask is: If cross-Strait political trust is lost, and Taiwan's largest trading partner imposes economic sanctions in retaliation, can Taiwan really reverse its perilous decline?

Beijing's ultimatum, and the subsequent press conferences are revealing. If Tsai Ing-wen remains arrogant and continues to ignore Beijing, all cross-Strait communications and negotiation channels will be shut down. All official contacts, even hotlines, will be shut down. The cessation of communications and negotiations will not be limited to the two major associations. The Economic Cooperation Meetings under ECFA, along with over 20 other agreements will be null and void, and other minor associations will probably close up shop.

If this happens, Taiwan's "orphaned island syndrome" will immediately kick in. Six years ago, when Tsai Ing-wen debated Ma Ying-jeou, she proposed "connecting with the world before connecting with China [the Mainland]”. But today's China is not yesterday's China. Refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus does more than ignore the Mainland. It also ignores the RCEP, which impacts Tsai's New Southern Strategy. As for the TPP, the presidential candidates of the two major parties in the United States have stated their opposition. The TPP's prospects are not bright. In time Tsai Ing-wen may regret not pragmatically accepting the 1992 Consensus. But by then it will be too late.

Tsai Ing-wen trotted out her ROC Constitution double talk. Yet less than 24 hours later, Beijing issued its ultimatum. Clearly it has no hesitation about allowing a new freeze in cross-Strait relations. This of course is a reflection of Xi Jinping's tough style. Eight years of generous concessions, and all Beijing got for its trouble was a rising tide of Taiwan independence sentiment. Beijing is now resentful and wary. It would just as soon dig in its heels, and is in no mood to make further concessions.

Beijing's ultimatum is actually nostalgia for the past. Xi Jinping went to Singapore and met with Ma Ying-jeou, all for the sake of the 1992 Consensus. He did not do this to oppose Tsai Ing-wen. The precondition was that the two sides' political foundation must be sufficiently sound. From that perspective, the ultimatum may loom, but it is clearly well-intentioned.

Chen Shui-bian rejected the 1992 Consensus. That was when his troubles and loss of political support began. Tsai Ing-wen must not repeat the same mistake. She has already acknowledged the historical fact that an agreement was reached in 1992. So why persist in self-deception and blank out the historical fact of the 1992 Communique? Tsai Ing-wen is billing herself as a "problem solver". So why not hold high the communique, acknowledge the existence of the communique, and allow Beijing to withdraw its ultimatum?

聯合／以「九二函電」解除最後通牒
2016-05-31 01:23 聯合報 聯合報社論

兩岸聯繫與協商管道，在國台辦與海協會雙雙發表一段無「九二共識」不能存續的聲明後，已處於空懸的狀態。對這個空懸狀態，如果置若罔聞，勢必日漸荒圮；屆時，兩岸的猜忌與隔膜恐怕就再難以匡復，蔡英文的任期也將在風聲鶴唳中度過。是否要走到這個地步，蔡英文必須再好好思量。

繽紛的就職典禮，也許會讓人產生一種浮晃的錯覺，以為兩岸關係仍可以用過去習以為常的文字包裝，塑造風平浪靜的假象；然後，再慢慢盤計未來。想像中，俟四年任滿，或許依然可以炒出一盤風味不差的佳餚。但現在情勢十分詭異，蔡英文好似業已打定主意，任爾東西南北風，對北京的「九二共識」通牒來個相應不理。

然而，新政府下注的風險委實太高，如今的台灣經濟禁不起更多政治動盪與折騰。這樣的僵持對峙，落在下風的必然是民進黨，而且可能賠上台灣的安定。

就在蔡英文就職前兩天，大陸商務部耐人尋味地公布今年第一季兩岸貿易最新數據，顯示台灣對大陸出口下降達十一．七％。壞消息並非始於現在，去年一整年台灣對大陸的出口總值已較前年減少了十二．四％，但大陸去年整體出口卻僅較前年衰退一．八％。連續一年多來，台灣對大陸出口衰退達到兩位數，主因在於大陸紅色供應鏈日漸成形，過去仰賴自台進口的項目，如今已由大陸自身的產業聚落取代。

蔡英文切莫見獵心喜，以為可以藉此趨勢擺脫對中國依賴，將籃子轉向歐美市場，或以新南向政策取而代之。去年台灣對東協十國的出口，衰退幅度更甚大陸，減少了十四．二％，對歐洲亦衰退十．九％。台灣經濟的病灶，顯非民進黨所宣稱的過度倚賴大陸，而是台灣創新能力與競爭力趨於枯竭所致。

此時此刻，蔡英文執政起步的第一個問號是：若兩岸失去政治互信，台灣能否在第一大貿易夥伴若干報復性制裁與消極性抵制下，仍有力氣爬出衰頹之淵？

這項通牒與後來的記者會皆在預告：一段時間內，蔡英文若仍自傲自慢地不甩北京，兩岸協商平台將即告中斷，包括熱線在內的兩岸官方聯繫溝通機制也將關機。而協商平台中斷不只是「大兩會」，兩岸ＥＣＦＡ下的「經合會」，及二十餘個協議下諸多「小兩會」，皆恐將一併掩門告退。

果真如此的話，台灣的「孤島效應」將一舉爆發。六年前與馬英九辯論時，蔡英文曾謂要「從世界走入中國」，然而，中國已不只是昔日中國，拒認「九二共識」所捻熄的，將不只是中國這盞大吊燈，還有與其新南向政策息息相關的ＲＣＥＰ；至於ＴＰＰ，美國兩黨出線與將出線的候選人皆已表態反對，其前景並不光明。屆時，蔡英文再後悔未務實地接受「九二共識」，豈不太遲？

北京在蔡英文扛出了中華民國憲法之後，竟不到二十四小時即發出通牒，似已抱定不惜讓兩岸進入新冰河期的決心。這固然反映了習近平的強悍作風，也顯示北京當局對於台灣人民竟以高漲的台獨浪潮回報八年讓利耿耿於懷，並深以為戒。此刻寧左勿右、寧硬勿軟，恐是無可再讓。

但反過來看，「通牒」其實也是一個回眸，是對往昔風景的流連。習近平曾為「九二共識」而赴新加坡「馬習會」，他絕不會反對蔡英文也攀此山巔，前提是要雙方政治基礎足夠緊實。由此看，通牒雖步步進逼，豈不也用心良苦？

陳水扁峻拒「九二共識」後的失政與困頓，歷歷在目，蔡英文不可再重蹈覆轍。既然承認了「九二會談」的歷史事實，何必又自欺欺人地抹去會談之後「九二函電」的歷史紀錄？對此，自稱以「解決問題」為念的蔡英文，何不舉起函電電文，宣告她承認這份確然存在的信函，解除最後通牒的警報？

Taiwan's Most Unprincipled Government Ever Owes the Public an Apology

Taiwan's Most Unprincipled Government Ever Owes the Public an Apology
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
May 30, 2016

Executive Summary: Does the DPP intend to copy past KMT behavior verbatim?  Does it intend to take a position and defend it to the bitter end? Does it intend to adopt the very same policies it denounced yesterday and praise them to the skies? Does it intend to be as uncommunicative as the KMT government used to be? Taiwan is being ripped apart. The DPP needs to think about whether to apologize to the Taiwan public. But even more than that, it needs to think about the coming public backlash.

Full Text Below:

Minister of Health and Welfare Lin Chou-yan attended the WHA annual meeting in Geneva on behalf of the DPP government. When he addressed the organization, he repeatedly referred to "Chinese Taipei". Not once did he use the term “Taiwan”. This provoked considerable controversy. Yet President Tsai gushed. She said “Every obstacle was difficult, yet every obstacle was overcome”. The Taiwan United Nations Alliance WHO Information Group declared the result "unsatisfactory but acceptable". Now think back to the 2009 WHA annual conference. The Kuomintang government had just straightened out the mess in cross-Strait relations. For the first time ever, it used the term "Chinese Taipei". It did so in order to qualify for observer status. Then director Yeh Chin-chuan headed the delegation. He had yet to leave the country when the DPP legislative caucus held a press conference, and blasted Yeh Chin-chuan for "selling out Taiwan". Legislator Ye Yi-chun accused Yeh Chin-chuan of "surrendering our sovereignty". Legislator Chai Trong-rong alleged that "Chinese Taipei" simply means "China's Taipei".

It was bad enough that the DPP engaged in name-calling at home. Overseas students went to the meeting venue, surrounded Yeh Chin-chuan, and screamed at him. They even provoked incidents at dinners hosted by diplomatic allies. One female student confronted Yeh Chin-chuan and screamed “Why are you using the term Chinese Taipei?”, “Why are you selling out Taiwan?”, and even more shrilly, she demanded to know "Under what name is Taiwan participating in the WHO?”. She then said, “Yeh Chin-chuan, you are shameless! Don't bother coming back to Taiwan!" In short, the circumstances were the same. The only difference was when Yeh Chin-chuan went, he was accused of "selling out Taiwan". Whereas when Lin Chou-yan went, he was praised as a hero, and commended for "overcoming all obstacles". Yesterday Yeh Chin-chuan. Today Ye Chou-yan. Both represented Taiwan. Both increased Taiwan's international space. But Yeh Chin-chuan was branded a "traitor to Taiwan", while Ye Chou-yan was welcomed back as a conquering hero. If these are not double standards, then pray tell what constitutes a double standard?

In response to blue camp complaints about double standards, Taiwan United Nations Alliance WHO Information Group spokesman Shen Chi-lin offered a truly surreal excuse. Shen said "The DPP and some people on Taiwan perceive your party (KMT), or past governments under your party, as selling out Taiwan. Your party has a certain public image. That is not something that can be explained by an isolated event or an isolated analogy”. In short, if the DPP does it, it's okay. If the KMT does it, it's not. In 2009 the Kuomintang had been in office less than a year. According to the DPP's logic, that year's new mandate was “not really a mandate”.

This sort of “wrong yesterday, but right today” phenomenon has provoked the blue camp to argue that “The DPP owes the KMT an apology!” But frankly, most people think it good that the DPP government has adopted a pragmatic attitude in order to participate in the WHA. They consider such an attitude beneficial to exchanges between Taiwan and the international community. They think it enables Taiwan to better obtain international health information. They consider Taiwan contributing to the international community a good thing. They think consider reluctantly accepting the "Chinese Taipei" name beneficial to cross-Strait peace. They think at least it offers a good beginning for CCP-DPP trust. We wonder why the KMT is demanding an apology?

We consider the KMT demand for an apology pointless. But the DPP really should consider apologizing to the public. The DPP has been in office a mere 10 days. Yet it has reversed itself repeatedly. It has revealed its political double standards. It really should apologize to the Taiwan public. Years ago the green camp surrounded Yeh Chin-chuan and accused him of “selling out Taiwan”, causing enormous turmoil. Yeh Chin-chuan also found “Every obstacle difficult, yet overcame every obstacle”. Forget the allegations that Yeh Chin-chuan "sold out Taiwan". What were the social costs of these allegations for Taiwan? Back then the government increased our participation in international organizations. For that it was skinned alive. Today, the green camp has accepted the same nomenclature and the same agenda -- lock, stock, and barrel. Lin Chou-yan was not even treated as well as Yeh Chin-chuan. Yet Lin Chuan-chou is being praised by everone up and down the ranks of the green camp as a hero. Taiwan society pays no small price for these confrontations and divisions. Never mind an apology. The DPP has yet to express even “regret”.

The DPP's “wrong yesterday, but right today” phenomenon is not confined to this. The newly formed Lin Chou-yan cabinet is billing itself as a "humble cabinet", and boasting that it is "the most communicative government ever". Meanwhile, it is canceling toll free national highway travel during the Dragon Boat Festival. It is collecting tolls on East-West national highways. It is halting the mining of granite in Taroko Gorge. Its long list of high handed measures has shown the public that the new government is neither humble nor communicative. Even many green camp legislators are appalled. They are demanding that the new government communicate with the legislature before introducing new policies. Green camp local leaders are even more incensed. They eventually forced the Ministry of Transportation to reverse its policy of collecting tolls on East West national highways. These complete reversals of policies, like the acceptance of the "Chinese Taipei" name, leave an indelible impression. When the KMT attempted to communicate in the past, all it got in return was condemnation and humiliation. Today, the DPP does not even bother to communicate with anyone. It simply imposes its policies from the top down, without any consultation whatsoever.

Does the DPP intend to copy past KMT behavior verbatim?  Does it intend to take a position and defend it to the bitter end? Does it intend to adopt the very same policies it denounced yesterday and praise them to the skies? Does it intend to be as uncommunicative as the KMT government used to be? Taiwan is being ripped apart. The DPP needs to think about whether to apologize to the Taiwan public. But even more than that, it needs to think about the coming public backlash.

最會轉彎的政府，欠人民一個公道
2016年05月30日 中國時報

衛福部長林奏延首度代表民進黨政府參與日內瓦WHA年會，演說中自稱「中華台北」，完全沒提到台灣，引起重大爭議，但蔡總統大力稱讚，稱許「關關難過關關過」，隨行的台灣聯合國協進會WHO宣達團也宣稱「不滿意但可以接受」！回顧2009年WHA年會，國民黨政府在理順兩岸關係後，首度以「中華台北」名義、「觀察員」身分，由葉金川署長率團出席。結果人還未出發，民進黨立院黨團就開記者會痛批葉金川「出賣台灣」，立委葉宜津認為是「主權的喪失、流失與退讓」，立委蔡同榮更質疑所謂「Chinese Taipei中華台北」，根本等於「中國的台北」。

在國內被罵就罷了，到年會會場還被海外留學生圍剿羞辱，甚至在宴請支持我友邦的晚宴上大鬧。一位女留學生在現場質問葉金川為什麼要用「中華台北」？為什麼要「賣台」？更高聲痛罵「台灣以什麼樣的身分參加WHO，葉金川不要臉，不用回台灣啦！」換言之，腳本其實都一樣，不同的是當年葉金川被羞辱，被罵「賣台」，林奏延則被讚揚，被稱許為「關關難過關關過」，當年的葉金川、今天的林奏延，都代表台灣去拓展國際空間，但葉金川被扣上「賣台」的帽子，林奏延卻是三千寵愛集一身，如果這還不叫「雙重標準」，還要怎樣才算是「雙重標準」呢？

面對部分藍營人士的不平之鳴，台灣聯合國協進會WHO宣達團發言人沈志霖的辯解最傳神：「貴黨（國民黨）或貴黨過去執政的政府，所作所為被民進黨或許多台灣人民稱之為賣台，是因為貴黨至今積累的社會形象有關，並非單一事件單一類比可以解釋。」簡單地說，同樣的事，民進黨做可以，國民黨做就是不行！2009年的國民黨還是剛執政才不滿周年的新政府哪！按照這種邏輯，當年的「新民意」根本就不配稱之為「民意」吧！

這般昨非今是，讓藍營人士逮到機會聲稱民進黨「欠國民黨一個道歉！」但老實說，多數民眾站在國家利益角度思考，會認為民進黨政府以務實態度參與WHA，有益台灣與國際社會的交往，更能及時掌握國際衛生資訊，有機會貢獻國際社會，當然是好事一件，勉為其難接受「中華台北」名稱，對兩岸和平發展道路有正面效益，至少是民共互信正面的開始，真不理解國民黨討這個道歉是要幹嘛？

我們認為國民黨「討道歉」的心態很無聊，但同樣站在民眾的角度出發，卻認為民進黨確實應該好好思考，執政短短10天不斷出現的「髮夾彎現象」，暴露的「雙重標準」政治文化，是否真該向台灣社會道個歉了！當年綠營對葉金川的撻伐與圍剿，曾製造了多少紛擾，引發了多少動盪！同樣的都是「關關難過關關過」，葉金川陷入「賣台」指控不說，當年大量的謾罵與指控，無端耗掉台灣多少社會成本？當年這場好不容易才拓展出的國際參與，被綠營修理得簡直是體無完膚，如今從名稱、定位到議程，綠營一切都是照單全收，林奏延甚至不及葉金川當年的格局，綠營上下卻是對之讚譽有加，而台灣社會當年為這些紛擾所付出的對立與撕裂，不可謂不小！但甭說道歉，連個遺憾都沒有！

老實說，民進黨昨非今是的還不只是這些，剛起步的林全內閣一方面高倡「謙卑內閣」，宣稱要做「最會溝通的政府」，但另一方面從「取消端午國道夜間免費」，到「橫向國道收費」、「停止亞泥在太魯閣採礦案」等一連串讓人民非常感冒的措施，是既看不到「謙卑」，更不見「溝通」，讓不少綠營立委都看不下去，公開要求內閣在推出政策之前，應先主動和立法院溝通說明，綠營地方首長更是憤怒，最後迫使交通部不得不收回「橫向國道收費」政策。這種反差與接受「中華台北」名稱同樣令人印象深刻。過去國民黨主動進行溝通，常換來羞辱與攻擊，如今民進黨甚至完全不溝通，政策就都已經上路了！

如果民進黨一一複製國民黨當年的作為，一一採取當年自己抵制到底的立場，當初痛斥的政策，今天讚揚有加，甚至決策與國民黨政府同樣閉鎖，溝通同樣草率，面對被撕裂的台灣，就不只是該不該深刻反省道歉的問題，而是民意何時反撲的問題。

Tsai Ing-wen's Perilous Diplomatic Strategy

Tsai Ing-wen's Perilous Diplomatic Strategy
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 27, 2016

Executive Summary: Obama has visited Vietnam and Japan in an attempt to firm up his “Asian-Pacific rebalancing" strategy. The new government has retreated from Chong Zi Niao Reef, and surrendered it to the Japanese. Having chosen sides, Tsai Ing-wen's diplomatic policy path is now strewn with obstacles. She faces more than just a few high hurdles on a race track. She is looking at a tightrope strung across a chasm.

Full Text Below:

No sooner had the Tsai Ing-wen government assumed power, then it retreated from Chong Zi Niao Reef. Taipei-Tokyo relations immediately warmed. Six former directors of the American Institute in Taiwan gathered in Taipei, and together shouted approval of Washington-Taipei relations. Tsai Ing-wen's diplomatic policy road map calls for an alliance with the US and Japan based on “shared democratic values”. This rosy picture blanks out a number of ugly realities. They include Ractopamine-laced US pork imports, irradiated foodstuffs from Fukushima, and Tsai Ing-wen's "cling to America's apron strings, cozy up to Japan, and keep the Mainland at arms length” thinking.

Between her visit to Washington last year and her May 20 inaugural address, Tsai Ing-wen has revealed her diplomatic strategy. It is diametrically opposed to Ma's. Tsai has subordinated cross-Strait relations to regional relations. Tsai's diplomatic strategy reflects her "first the world, then the Mainland" thinking. For her, cross-Strait peace is the product of an Asian-Pacific system of collective security. This reveals her “ally with the US and Japan to counter China” mindset. Her diplomatic strategy includes the New Southern Strategy, an “alliance of democratic values” with the United States, Japan and Europe, international cooperation on global issues, and head of state diplomacy.

On Tsai Ing-wen's diplomatic policy road map, foreign relations trump cross-Strait relations. Cross-Strait relations are less important than the cultivation of regional relations. Cross-Strait relations are subordinated to Asian-Pacific security. Tsai has been careful not to ruffle the tiger's fur. But by turning the policy of the past eight years on its head, and subordinating cross-Strait relations to regional security arrangements, Tsai Ing-wen is walking a dangerous diplomatic policy path.

Ma Ying-jeou's "diplomatic truce" and "flexible diplomacy" put cross-Strait policy first. During his term of office he negotiated Taiwan's international space and a cross-Strait peace agreement with Beijing. Now however, cross-Strait negotiations are on hold. Tsai Ing-wen contemplates cooperation with the Mainland only as part of her "New Southern Strategy", and the cultivation or regional relations. This of course is nonsense. The very reason for the “New Southern Strategy" is to eliminate dependence on the Mainland market. But given her refusal to address the essential issues, is cross-Strait cooperation even possible? Not to mention the marginalization her “New Southern Strategy” will face from Beijing's One Belt, One Road, and the AIIB. Politically she will find it even more difficult to overcome Beijing's pressure on ASEAN and India.

An “alliance of democratic values” is the magic incantation in Tsai Ing-wen's diplomatic strategy. Chen Shui-bian held high the banner of human rights in an attempt to insinuate the ROC back into the international framework of human rights. Tsai Ing-wen is placing even stronger emphasis on universal values in an attempt to join a global alliance of values. Her intent is to pit democracy against the human rights situation on the Mainland. With common values as her clarion call, she hopes to cozy up to the United States, Japan and Europe. She hopes to use universal values as her calling card to the international community.

But international diplomacy is based on the harsh realities of international realpolitik, not universal values. EU refugee and humanitarian policy offer a clear lesson in that regard. Obama's lifting of the US arms embargo against Vietnam is intended to counter the Mainland, and has nothing to do with human rights in Vietnam. Chen Shui-bian's "head of state diplomacy" ended up as a "diplomatic lost voyage". That memory lingers. Washington and Beijing's “joint management of Taiwan” makes a mockery of the any “alliance of democratic values”.

Tsai Ing-wen sees international cooperation on global issues as entree to the international community. Humanitarian aid, medical assistance, financial assistance, and anti-terrorism all figure in her "peace activist diplomacy". But in reality great power diplomacy is ubiquitous. For example, the WHO plays an important role in health maintenance, disease prevention, and disease research. Yet during the SARS incident, Taiwan was shut out of the WHO. Vaccinations were made difficult. The US and Japan were unable to open the door for Taiwan. Only when the Ma administration came to power, and the two sides of the Strait reconciled, was Taiwan truly integrated into the global epidemic prevention system and allowed to attend the WHA as an observer. The road to the WHA this year was strewn with obstacles, not without reason. Otherwise, why did the Minister of Health and Welfare never use the term “Taiwan” even once during his lengthy address to the WHA? Why did he consistently use the term "Chinese Taipei"?

With the exception of his peace initiatives for the East China Sea and South China Sea, Ma Ying-jeou made scant reference to values. Instead, through cross-Strait reconciliation, he made numerous diplomatic breakthroughs, including the number of allies and the number of countries that provide visa-free treatment for ROC tourists.  For the Tsai government these were insurmountable hurdles. Foreign Minister Li Ta-wei has announced that the new government will engage in "head of state diplomacy". The planned visits of President Tsai to Panama and Paraguay, which transit the United States, will probably come off without a hitch. But cross-Strait relations may cool or even freeze. Even in the absence of severed diplomatic relations, current diplomatic allies may be difficult to retain.

Obama has visited Vietnam and Japan in an attempt to firm up his “Asian-Pacific rebalancing" strategy. The new government has retreated from Chong Zi Niao Reef, and surrendered it to the Japanese. Having chosen sides, Tsai Ing-wen's diplomatic policy path is now strewn with obstacles. She faces more than just a few high hurdles on a race track. She is looking at a tightrope strung across a chasm.

蔡英文外交路線的風險
2016-05-27 聯合報

蔡英文政府一上台，就從沖之鳥礁退卻，台日關係瞬間回暖；與此同時，美國在台協會歷任六位處長齊聚台北，高喊「美台關係讚」。在蔡英文的外交路線圖上，已勾勒了一個與美日建構民主價值同盟的圖像；圖像半遮半掩的是瘦肉精美豬與福島食品進口的交易，以及「靠美傾日遠中」的交心。

從去年華府之行，到五二○就職演說，蔡英文布建的外交路線圖全然不同於馬政府：兩岸關係放在區域發展中鋪陳，反映「從世界走向中國」的外交軸線；兩岸和平架構在亞太集體安全體系上，隱現「聯美日抗中」的戰略思維。而她的外交政策操作重心，新南向政策、美日歐民主價值同盟、全球性議題的國際合作、元首外交等，皆在這張路線圖上完成標示。

蔡英文測繪外交路線圖的指導原則，是外交政策優於兩岸關係。她把兩岸互動納入「區域發展」的範疇，兩岸關係成為亞太安全的一環。儘管蔡英文小心翼翼，不捋虎鬚，但外交高於兩岸是翻轉了過去八年的路線，蔡英文外交路線圖的挑戰與風險皆在於此。

馬英九的「外交休兵」與「活路外交」，是兩岸政策居上位，任內不斷與對岸就台灣國際空間與兩岸和平協議進行協商。現在，兩岸多項協商擱置，蔡英文僅在「新南向政策」區域發展議題中提到願與對岸尋求合作協力之可能。這當然是空話，「新南向」不就是要擺脫對中國市場的依賴嗎？兩岸必答題沒完成答卷，有合作協力的可能嗎？遑論「新南向」在經濟上必然面臨「一帶一路」與亞投行的擠壓，在政治上更難穿透中共對東協和印度的影響力。

民主價值同盟是蔡英文設計外交地圖的關鍵密碼。陳水扁曾高懸人權價值，要把中華民國重新納入國際人權體系；蔡英文更強調秉持普世價值的精神，加入全球議題的價值同盟。其意在對比中國的民主、人權狀況，以共同價值為號召，深化與美日歐的關係，更標舉普世價值進行國際參與。

然而，外交和國際參與終須回歸國際現實利益和權力規則，而不盡然取決於普世價值。歐盟因難民人道問題而離心離德的教訓就在眼前；歐巴馬全面解除對越南武器禁運，考量的也是制衡中國，而非越南人權。對台灣而言，陳水扁的「元首外交」淪為「外交迷航」的殷鑑不遠，「美中共管台灣」更是對民主價值同盟的嘲諷。

蔡英文也把全球性議題的國際合作，視作通往國際社會的敲門磚；人道救援、醫療救助、經濟援助、反恐合作等，都是她要推動的「積極和平外交」。但現實上大國外交無處不在。例如，世衛組織在醫療援助與疾病防治研究扮演重要角色，但ＳＡＲＳ事件台灣被拒於世衛組織門外，防疫備感艱辛，美日也無法為台灣開門。直到馬政府上台，兩岸和解，台灣才真正被納入全球防疫體系，並以觀察員身分出席世衛大會。今年世衛之路，一波三折，豈是無因；否則，衛福部長林奏延何苦在世衛大會演說隻字未提台灣，只能句句自稱「中華台北」。

除了東海和南海的和平倡議外，馬英九其實沒有太多價值倡議；但通過兩岸和解，卻創造了不少外交突破。從邦交國數、免簽國數到觀光客數，對蔡政府而言，都是難以跨越的高欄。外交部長李大維宣示新政府將積極推動「元首外交」，規劃中的蔡總統出訪巴拿馬、巴拉圭並過境美國，應可順利進行。但是，如果兩岸關係冷和僵持，即使沒有斷交海嘯，迄今累積的外交成果，恐難維持。

歐巴馬串訪越南、日本，意圖鞏固「亞太再平衡」戰略；新政府也藉沖之鳥礁撤艦向日本遞了「投名狀」。選邊後，蔡英文外交路線圖的挑戰與風險，恐怕不只是幾個設在跑道上的高欄，而是一條架在懸崖上的鋼索。

Without the “China Factor”, How Will the KMT Rise Again?

Without the “China Factor”, How Will the KMT Rise Again? 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 26, 2016 

Executive Summary:  The KMT remains the key. It must not remain idle while individuals fight its battles. It must provide checks and balances against the ruling DPP. It must not start strong only to end weak. It must gather its forces, unify the party, allies, and the public, and together oppose the DPP's agenda of Sinophobia. It must seek out people of goodwill from both sides, and together promote peaceful cross-Strait relations.

Full Text Below:

Since January 16, virtually all attention has been focused on the DPP. Only then President Ma Ying-jeou, who visited numerous offshore islands, and still active then premier Chang San-cheng, attracted media attention. In March the KMT was busy with its party chairmanship election. Since then it has done almost nothing of note. It has gradually vanished from the media spotlight. It even failed to comment on President Tsai's inaugural address, on Premier Lin Chuan's abrupt cancellation of revisions to school texts, and the dropping of indictments against Sunflower Student Movement rioters. The KMT did not see fit to comment on any of these major issues. Random individuals spoke out. Otherwise, the KMT was virtually invisible.

The KMT remains the second largest political party on Taiwan. With 35 seats in the Legislative Yuan, it should be checking and balancing the ruling DPP. This is especially true since the Kuomintang has major differences with the DPP over matters of history, national identity, and cross-Strait relations. Unless the KMT highlights its own values, and defends its own beliefs, it will not be able to check and balance the ruling DPP. It will not be able to provide Taiwan with guidance, and will probably be forgotten.

In President Tsai's inaugural address, she openly declared her intention to make cross-Strait relations a regional and global issue. She hopes that membership in the TPP and RCEP will enable her to promote her New Southern Strategy, and “bid farewell to previous over-dependence on a single market”. The single market she referred to was of course the Mainland market. President Tsai also echoed Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's "values ​​diplomacy" rhetoric. She said the DPP wants to promote an "alliance of values". The allies she has in mind are of course the United States and Japan. The target of the alliance is of course the Beijing government. This military confrontation with the Mainland, along with economic alienation from the Mainland, constitutes President Tsai's foreign policy and strategic thinking for the next four years.

Consider the Mainland perception. President Tsai would "reach a consensus and adopt a unified stance against outsiders". By “outsiders” she means of course the Mainland. For the new government, the Mainland is a hostile entity, but one that must be dealt with. Therefore she will deal with it last. It is the “other” that must be dealt with through the "alliance of values". For President Tsai, "the two sides of the Strait are one family” has no appeal. For her, cross-Strait relations is an “adversarial relationship between two enemies”.

President Tsai's strategic blueprint is guaranteed to ring disaster down on Taiwan's head. This is why the KMT remains indispensable. The KMT must expose the DPP's fallacies. It must have the courage to criticize them. The KMT, aka Chinese Nationalist Party, must understand that if it loses its status as a voice for "China", it will lose its soul and its very reason for being. It will become nothing more than a “me too” edition of the DPP. If however, the Chinese Nationalist Party is willing to reinvest the term "Chinese" with meaning, it can find a renewed theoretical basis to establish peaceful relations with the Mainland. It can strengthen Taiwan and influence the Mainland.

The KMT must insist that Taiwan is a pluralistic society with Chinese culture at its core, and not, as the DPP insists, a pluralistic society without any core culture. The Constitution of the Republic of China is a constitution that does not permit separatism. The new government has no right to propose Taiwan independence. It has a duty to ensure that the nation remains whole. Cross-Strait relations are not foreign relations. They are relations between two governments within China that are in a state of civil war. The 1992 Consensus is the political foundation for current cross-Strait exchanges. The KMT must demand that the new government continue to uphold these principles. It must tell the people that  Taiwan cannot participate in regional economic organizations unless it does so in concert with the Mainland. The KMT must loudly proclaim that legally the civil war is not over. It must tell the DPP that the more successful its campaign of de-Sinicization, the more people on the two sides are divided, then the more elusive cross-Strait peace will become, and the greater the possibility of military conflict.

During the Mainland's 30 years of reform and opening, Taiwan made significant contributions to its economic development. Taiwan also preserved traditional Chinese culture. These earned it the respect of the vast majority of people on the Mainland. The DPP is eager to sever all cultural and economic links with the Mainland. As opposition party, the KMT must continue to bear a heavy burden. Pessimistically speaking, it must not allow the Mainland to lose all hope of peaceful reunification. Optimistically speaking, it must let the Mainland feel that Taiwan can play an important part in the revitalization of the Chinese nation. Only then can Taiwan win hearts and minds on the Mainland. Only then, can it they win their respect.

There is no denying that following Taiwan's democratization, the public on Taiwan and the Mainland have become alienated from each other. In recent years Mainland China's power has increased. The cross-Strait balance of power has changed, militarily and economically. Foreign nations have quickly tilted toward the Mainland. The ability of the United States to contain the Mainland is clearly waning. The Mainland made unilateral concessions to Taiwan. But eight years of effort had little effect. Instead they put the DPP in office. Obviously the Mainland must rethink its Taiwan policy. It must not assume that small favors granted unilaterally will change Taiwan. It must think instead of the Mainland and Taiwan “merging into one”.

The KMT remains the key. It must not remain idle while individuals fight its battles. It must provide checks and balances against the ruling DPP. It must not start strong only to end weak. It must gather its forces, unify the party, allies, and the public, and together oppose the DPP's agenda of Sinophobia. It must seek out people of goodwill from both sides, and together promote peaceful cross-Strait relations.

失去中國元素國民黨如何再起
2016年05月26日 中國時報

從1月16日開始，所有鎂光燈幾乎都聚焦在民進黨身上，只剩下勤跑離島的前總統馬英九、九局半仍積極任事的前行政院長張善政，勉強抓到一些新聞。國民黨自3月間忙完黨主席選舉後，幾乎沒有任何讓人眼睛一亮的作為，就慢慢從媒體消音了。甚至蔡總統的就職演說、林全內閣上任立刻宣布廢除課綱微調，撤銷對太陽花學運者的告訴，這些重大事件都沒有看到國民黨的立場宣示，僅少數零星的火力回擊，國民黨似乎隱形了。

國民黨畢竟還是第二大政黨，在立法院擁有35席，應該發揮監督與制衡的功能。特別是國民黨在史觀、國家定位與兩岸關係上與民進黨有著重大的歧異，如果國民黨不能凸顯自己的價值、捍衛自己的信仰，就無法扮演監督與制衡的角色，不能為台灣指引方向，國民黨極可能永遠被人民遺忘。

蔡總統520就職演說，明確將兩岸關係優先性置於區域與全球之後，希望透過TPP、RCEP的參與及新南向政策的推動，「告別以往過於依賴單一市場的現象」，這個單一市場指的是對岸。蔡總統也複誦了日本首相安倍晉三的「價值觀外交」用語，強調民進黨要推動「價值同盟」，其盟友自然是美、日等國，要對付的對象就是北京政府。這種在安全上與大陸對立、在經濟上與大陸疏離的策略，是蔡總統未來4年的對外戰略思維。

在對大陸的認知上，蔡總統宣稱會「凝聚共識，形成一致對外的立場」。這個「對外」，毫無疑問，指的是中國大陸。對新政府而言，大陸是個不友善，但不得不相處，因而要將其放在最後順序，並需透過「價值同盟」與其對抗的「他者」。對於蔡總統而言，「兩岸一家親」不是她的思維，「有敵意的異己」才是兩岸關係的寫照。

蔡總統的戰略藍圖注定會給台灣帶來災難，而這正是國民黨存在的必要。國民黨必須要有智慧指出民進黨邏輯的謬誤，並勇於批判。中國國民黨必須了解，如果失去「中國」這個話語權，等於失去靈魂與丟棄論述，將來只會是個扈從民進黨的尾巴政黨，如果能將「中國」這兩個字賦予豐富的內涵，不僅可以讓國民黨找到再起的理論基礎，與大陸建立和平關係，還可以壯大台灣，影響大陸。

國民黨必須堅持台灣是一個以中華文化為核心的多元文化社會，而不是如民進黨所說，是沒有核心文化的多元社會；《中華民國憲法》是不容許分裂的憲法，新政府沒有權利主張台獨，僅有確保國家不容許分裂的義務；兩岸關係不是外國關係，而是「整個中國」因內戰而形成的兩個分治政府間的關係；九二共識的內涵是目前兩岸事務性交流的政治基礎，國民黨必須要求、監督新政府延續。國民黨必須告訴人民，沒有與大陸的連結，台灣不可能進入區域經濟的結構，更要大聲說出，兩岸的法理內戰沒有結束，民進黨的去中國化愈成功，兩岸人民認同愈分歧，兩岸和平就愈渺茫，衝突的可能就愈大。

大陸改革開放後的30年間，台灣曾對大陸經濟發展做出極大的貢獻，台灣在中華文化方面的維護與堅持，也得到絕大多數大陸民眾的尊重。在民進黨亟欲切割與大陸文化、經濟連結的時候，國民黨一定要接續起這個重擔。從消極面來說，不要讓大陸對台灣完全失去了統的想像空間；積極面來說，讓大陸感覺到，台灣可以在中華民族的振興過程扮演合作推動的重要角色。只有如此，台灣才能得到大陸的民心，也才會得到尊重。

但不容否認，台灣民主化後，台灣社會與大陸的「心靈距離」漸行漸遠，近年大陸綜合國力強勢崛起，不僅兩岸軍力、經濟力、國際力對比快速向大陸傾斜，美國牽制中國的實力明顯衰退，大陸官方更單向對台「讓利」，但8年的努力未見其功，反而造成民進黨執政的變局，顯然大陸對台政策必須從更深層次重新思考，不能企圖用單向思維、片面作為甚至小恩小惠改變台灣，而要從「融一」的角度著手。

關鍵仍在國民黨，要擺脫單兵作戰、零星炮火、有始無繼的散沙式監督，要調和整體戰力，更要結合黨員、黨友及社會「反反中」、企求兩岸和好的所有力量，共同推動兩岸關係和平發展。

Forsaking the Mainland Means Greater Hardship for Taiwan

Forsaking the Mainland Means Greater Hardship for Taiwan 
May 25, 2016 China Times
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 24, 2016

Executive Summary: President Tsai's New Southern Strategy will be among the new government's policy priorities. It constitutes a transparent move toward "economic Taiwan independence". It is certain to strain cross-Strait economic and trade relations. Taiwan has no reason not to cooperate with the Mainland. The two sides should maintain a symbiotic relationship. They must not isolate themselves from each other. This is essential for Taiwan's survival and prosperity.

Full Text Below:

President Tsai's New Southern Strategy will be among the new government's policy priorities. Interpreted positively, it “corrects” the former KMT government's "tilt toward the Mainland". Viewed negatively, it constitutes a transparent move toward "economic Taiwan independence". Either way, it is certain to strain cross-Strait economic and trade relations.

Taiwan has an export-oriented economy. Exports constitute over 60% of its GDP. Investments and consumption constitute only 40%. Its market requires sufficient scale and symbiosis. During early development Taiwan was highly dependent on the North American market. This gradually changed with fluctuations in the global consumer market. Currently nearly 40% of Taiwan's exports go to the Mainland, 24% go to Southeast Asia, and only 10% go to the US. Over half of Taiwan's external investments go to the Mainland. This high degree of integration with the Mainland has provoked concern on Taiwan.

The traditional green camp view is that such links are harmful to Taiwan's economy. They hollow out Taiwan's industry, and reduce domestic investment. This leads to low-wages and unemployment. Cross-Strait links have enabled the Mainland to control Taiwan's economy. Economic dependence on the Mainland must be reduced to ensure Taiwan's economic future. Furthermore, the green camp argues, Mainland economic growth has slowed in recent years. Development potential for Taiwan businesses is now limited. Therefore we must seek out new export markets. If Taiwan is to go its own way, it must rid itself of dependence on the Mainland economy. There may be short-term pain, the green camp concedes, but they must be born in order to survive. The New Southern Strategy is a matter of course.

In fact, whether the Mainland presents an opportunity or a threat to Taiwan, depends on whether Taiwan perceives Mainland China's rise in the proper light. We must point out a few facts. First, Mainland China has the world's second largest economy. Taiwan is dependent on exports and investment. Naturally the Mainland is going to be Taiwan's chief source of economic momentum. Mainland economic growth has indeed slowed. But sheer volume means an annual increase equivalent to that of Indonesia, with its 250 million people.

Second, Taiwan manufacturers began investing in Southeast Asia long ago. Since the 1990s, successive governments have imposed a wide range of investment and export policies. Not one of them has met expectations. Taiwan's economy remains highly dependent on the Mainland. That is the result of market decisions by Taiwan manufacturers. The global recession reduced Taiwan exports to the Mainland, including Hong Kong, by 12.4%. But that was nevertheless better than the 14.2% reduction in exports to ASEAN. Taiwan manufacturers on the Mainland still fared better than those in Southeast Asia.

According to Mainland Ministry of Commerce statistics, by the end of 2015 the Mainland had absorbed 2 trillion NT in capital from Taiwan. That year, listed companies on Taiwan reinvested 213.7 billion NT on the Mainland. This accounted for 39% of the income derived from listed companies worldwide. And that does not even include the astonishing gains derived from rising asset prices. Since 1992, Taiwan has benefited richly from Mainland economic development. How can we possibly give that up?

Taiwan has long been an important part of "Made in China". When the Mainland first began its reform and opening, manufacturing capacity was marginal. Taiwan manufacturers transferred low-end manufacturing operations to the Mainland. This enabled the Mainland to connect with the global supply chain, enabled local industries to combine, and gave birth to local industry groups. During the Mainland's early stages of reform and opening, investment arrived primarily from Taiwan, but also from Hong Kong and Macao, and constituted over half of all outside investment in the Mainland. Taiwan style management spread to all levels. Made in China is now sweeping the globe. Taiwan's historic contribution was indispensable. But Taiwan's past industrial growth and profitability model is rapidly approaching its end.

Taiwan must keep up with rapid transformation on the Mainland. Most large Taiwan businesses still see the Mainland as nothing more than their OEM base. This limits their opportunities for development. Taiwan manufacturers must not be lectured to “Go South!” yet again. Instead, they must have a long-term strategic vision. They must re-examine Taiwan's branding and R&D on the Mainland. The Mainland remains the world's fastest growing market. It has already fostered a number of world-class brands. It also offers opportunities for Taiwan businesses to develop their brands.

Meanwhile, Mainland China is the world's manufacturing center. In a number of forward-looking, high-end realms, Mainland technology and manufacturing lead the world. The Mainland has engaged in years of research and development. Liberation has led to innovation and vitality. The Mainland now leads in electronic payments, e-commerce, unmanned vehicles and drones. It is rapidly catching up in industrial robots. If Taiwan chooses to delink with the Mainland, Taiwan will be the loser.

The new government has condemned the previous government's policies, saying they led to excessive dependence on exports to the Mainland. But the record shows the greatest increase in dependence on the Mainland occurred during the Chen era. It was the result of economic forces, of the Chen government's insistence on changing course and resisting the Mainland, all to no avail. A New Southern Strategy is all well and fine. But we can hardly ignore the most important market of all, the Mainland. The fact is, the new government's ideologically motivated policies are guaranteed to sabotage Taiwan's economy.

Taiwan has no reason not to cooperate with the Mainland. The two sides should maintain a symbiotic relationship. They must not isolate themselves from each other. This is essential for Taiwan's survival and prosperity.

放棄大陸 台灣經濟只會更困頓
2016年05月25日 中國時報

蔡英文總統的新南向政策將是新政府的重點政策，從正面角度解析，是要改變前國民黨政府「過度向大陸傾斜」，從負面觀察卻質疑是為了實現「經濟台獨」。無論如何台灣將迎來兩岸經貿關係緊縮的挑戰。

台灣是出口導向經濟體，GDP超過6成來自出口的貢獻，投資與消費僅占4成，必須與足夠規模的市場依賴共生。台灣在經濟發展初期曾高度依賴北美市場，隨著全球消費市場的相對興衰而逐漸發生變化。目前台灣的出口近40%集中於大陸，24%集中東南亞，只有10%到美國市場；在投資方面，台灣對外投資超過半數以上集中於中國大陸。與中國這樣高度結合共生的發展趨勢，在台灣內部引發不少疑慮。

傳統綠營的觀點認為這樣的聯結對台灣經濟有害，例如：產業空洞化與國內投資不振，導致台灣的低薪與失業；兩岸聯結過深，已使得大陸掌握控制台灣的經濟槓桿，必須降低對中國經濟依賴，才能夠解決台灣經濟未來發展的問題。再者，大陸近兩年經濟成長減緩，台商發展受限，也需另尋出口市場。台灣既然要走自己的路，終究要擺脫對中國的經濟依賴，即使有短期陣痛，也要忍痛熬過，是以新南向政策水到渠成。

然而，中國大陸給台灣提供的是機會或是威脅，其實是台灣如何正確面對中國崛起的思辨，我們也必須指出幾點事實：首先，大陸是世界第二大經濟體，台灣仰賴出口及投資，大陸當然是台灣最主要的經濟動能來源。即使大陸經濟成長趨緩，但規模體量龐大，每年新增的經濟規模就相當於一個2億5千萬人口的印尼。

其次，台灣廠商其實很早就開始布局東南亞。自1990年代起，歷屆政府都在執行各式的分散投資與出口政策，成效卻都不如預期。台灣經濟之所以仍高度依賴大陸，顯然是台灣廠商物競天擇之後的市場選擇結果。再者，在全球不景氣的情形下，儘管去年大陸市場（含香港）占我出口比重年減12.4%，也仍優於對東協的年減14.2%，從比較利益的觀點來看，台灣廠商在大陸仍比在東南亞更具優勢。

根據大陸商務部統計，截至2015年底大陸實際累計使用台資約2兆台幣，當年台灣上市櫃公司認列的大陸轉投資收益達到2137億台幣，占上市櫃公司39%的全球收益，這還不包資產價格上漲帶來的潛在驚人收益。可見自1992年以來，台灣確實分享了大陸經濟發展的紅利，怎可輕言放棄？

台灣一直是「中國製造」的重要成分，改革開放伊始大陸製造微不足道，台灣廠商透過低端製造業務轉移，讓大陸開始與全球供應鏈體系相結合，並催生出本地的產業群聚。改革開放初期階段，以台灣為主體的港澳台外資曾貢獻了大陸半數以上的外來投資，台式管理擴散到中國製造的各個層面。如今中國製造席捲全球，台灣的歷史性貢獻功不可沒。但我們也要正視台灣過去的產業成長與獲利模式，現在已經逐漸接近盡頭。

台灣的衰退危機在於跟不上大陸的快速轉型，多數大型台商仍把大陸視為代工基地，侷限了發展的機會。當務之急不是導引廠商再次進行外延式的新南向，而應以長遠的戰略眼光，重新審視台灣在大陸的品牌與研發布局。大陸仍是世界成長最快的市場之一，已經孵育了若干世界級品牌，也提供了台灣企業品牌發展的可能。

另一方面大陸也是世界製造的中心，在若干前瞻與高端的領域，大陸的科技及製造能力已領先全球。在多年來解放創新研發的活力之後，大陸在電子支付、電子商務、無人車和無人機都有領先，工業機器人也在迎頭趕上。台灣不與其相連結，將是台灣自己的損失。

新政府指責前政府的政策導致台灣對中國大陸的出口依賴程度過高，但統計數據顯示台灣對大陸依賴程度大幅增加是在扁政府時期，這是經濟力量的結果，硬要扭轉、對抗只會徒勞無功。新南向政策很好，但絕對不能不顧好最重要的大陸市場。新政府的作為其實是以政治意識型態主導，勢必傷害經濟。

台灣沒有道理不選擇與中國大陸合作共生，兩岸應該共生而非孤立，這也是台灣生存與發展的必需前提。

DPP CCP Mutual Trust, New Cross-Strait Consensus

DPP CCP Mutual Trust, New Cross-Strait Consensus
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 24, 2016

Executive Summary: The clash over the 1992 Consensus has led to an impasse. The two sides should immediately begin the above outlined four-stage process. It should enable them to reach a consensus. In fact, the above process is how the two sides were able to achieve consensus in 1992. That is a valuable experience the two sides' current ruling parties can draw from.

Full Text Below:

The Mainland has responded to Tsai Ing-wen's May 20 inaugural address. It has underscored the importance of the 1992 Consensus. The new government has explicitly promised to act in good faith. Will the result be an impasse? Will the impasse lead to confrontation?

That would obviously not a blessing for people on either side of the Strait. The last eight years of hard work would go down the drain. That would not be a rational choice for authorities on either side of the Strait. The current impasse must be reevaluated  from a larger, more strategic perspective by both sides in order to arrive at a new solution.

Taiwan must understand a number of realities about its relationship to the Mainland. The first reality is the balance of power. The Mainland is unquestionably more powerful than Taiwan, especially militarily. Taiwan is simply no match for the Mainland. Taiwan's limited retaliatory capacity is probably not a adequate deterrent. In any event direct conflict is obviously not conducive to the well-being of either side. That should not be considered an option.

The second reality is economics. The Mainland is in the middle of an economic downturn. But its leaders are imbued with revolutionary will. Its economic fundamentals pose no major problem. They will not lead to significant short-term fluctuations. On Taiwan by contrast, neither GDP nor exports are likely to grown over the next two years. Income growth will be limited. The new government plans to open up new markets. But in the short-term these will have no effect. The pressures it faces are clearly much greater than those faced by the Mainland. Taiwan's economy cannot reverse its dependence on the Mainland any time soon.

The third reality is the America factor. The balance of power between the Mainland and the US has changed. During the 1995 Taiwan Strait crisis the United States sent aircraft carriers to defend Taiwan. But during the South China Sea dispute, American influence diminished. The protection it provides Taiwan is primarily political. Also, it practices “joint management” of Taiwan with the Mainland. It opposes either side unilaterally changing the status quo. The United States hopes the two sides will not provoke a crisis that changes the status quo. Tsai Ing-wen relies on the United States to counter the Mainland. But she must fully understand US policy, lest excessive dependence result in policy misjudgments.

The fourth reality is differences in the two sides' systems and values. Public sentiment on Taiwan is the main reason for Mainland skepticism toward Taiwan. It is also Tsai Ing-wen's most important source of support. Most people on Taiwan want to maintain the status quo. After Tsai Ing-wen delivered her inaugural address, most people agreed with her. Public support for Tsai Ing-wen exceeded 50%. Even the KMT had no objection. After all, Tsai Ing-wen pledged to deal with cross-Strait affairs on the basis of the Republic of China Constitution and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. This is probably the area of greatest consenuse on Taiwan today. The Mainland must pay closer attention to this, and realize how the public on Taiwan thinks.

Clearly, the Tsai regime faces a difficult situation. It needs to do more to prove it is sincere, and not being provocative. At the same time, the Mainland must understand why the public on Taiwan remains leery. It must resort less to tough talk and tough action. It must minimize the public backlash. Authorities on both sides must of course adhere to their own principles. But they must not clash head on, let alone resort to reunification by military means. There is still room for negotiation. It all depends on the two sides' political wisdom.

The Mainland is deeply skeptical about the DPP, since it has long advocated Taiwan independence.  DPP interpolation and governance reeks of cultural Taiwan independence and de jure Taiwan independence tendencies. Therefore the Mainland can never fully trust it. The DPP harbors many prejudices. It frequently spews anti-Mainland hate speech. The result is an utter lack of trust between the two sides. This, along with the lack of communication channels, renders communication between the two parties difficult, and reconciliation between them impossible.

The new DPP government must improve cross-Strait relations. Both sides must be willing to establish communication channels and know each other better. Tsai Ing-wen has called on the two sides to set aside historical grievances and increase dialogue. The official consultative mechanism has temporarily been suspended. Therefore communications should be reestablished through representatives from the two political parties. The two parties should attempt to understand each other and seek solutions. This cannot be achieved by talking past each other.

Communications can enable the two sides to find where their interests overlap, increasing cooperation to the point where the two sides may benefit each other. The two sides each have internal problems that must be addressed. Cooperation will help them achieve a win-win situation, and help them out of their economic predicaments. Only when the ruling parties on both sides seek common interests and profit from their initial cooperation, will further cooperation be possible.

On such a basis, the two sides may move toward mutual understanding. As the two sides find more in common, they will be able to examine their differences more rationally. Only then will they be able to limit them or even resolve them. Only then will they be able carry on a win/win relationship.

The two ruling parties must come to know each other, benefit each other, and understand each other. Only then will they be able to trust each other. Only then can they enter a new stage of cooperation. Only then can the two sides engage in cross-Strait consultations over major differences and find solutions.

The clash over the 1992 Consensus has led to an impasse. The two sides should immediately begin the above outlined four-stage process. It should enable them to reach a consensus. In fact, the above process is how the two sides were able to achieve consensus in 1992. That is a valuable experience the two sides' current ruling parties can draw from.

啟動民共互信進程 發展兩岸新共識
2016年05月24日 中國時報

大陸接連對蔡英文的520就職演說做了回應，強調了九二共識作為政治基礎的重要性，新政府也明確宣告就職演說已是最大善意。兩岸會不會從此進入僵局，甚至走向對抗局面呢？

這顯然不是兩岸人民之福，更會讓過去8年兩岸付出的辛苦努力付諸東流，不應該是兩岸當局的理性選擇，有必要從更大的格局和戰略高度重新審視當前兩岸執政者之間的僵局，尋求新的解決之道。

首先要弄清楚現在台灣乃至兩岸之間面臨的客觀形勢。第一是實力對比，如今兩岸實力相差懸殊殆無疑問，尤其是軍事實力對比，台灣更不是陸方對手，台灣有限的「報復性武力」，能否產生足夠的嚇阻力量亦大有疑問。不過硬碰硬顯然不利於兩岸人民，應非選項。

第二是經濟問題，雖然大陸正處在經濟下行區間，但上層改革意志堅決，且經濟基本面並無大問題，短期內不至於出現重大波動，反觀台灣，未來2年內無論GDP還是出口都難有起色，民眾收入增長有限，雖然新政府有意開拓新興市場，但也無法短期見效，其所面對的壓力顯然遠大於大陸，而且台灣經濟短期內也難以扭轉對大陸的依賴傾向。

第三則是美國因素，美、中實力對比也同樣今非昔比，1995年台海危機美國或可通過派遣航母來保衛台灣，但如今南海爭議已可看出美軍影響力的式微，其對台灣的保障更多體現在政治層面，而且還是兩方同時管控，亦即兩岸雙方均不應該片面改變現狀，在這種情況下，美方希望兩岸都不要挑釁，以便於維持現狀。蔡英文傾向於依靠美國來平衡大陸的施壓，但必須充分考量美方的政策意圖，切勿過度依賴導致誤判。

第四是制度與價值觀的差異，換句話說就是台灣民意，這是當前台灣面對大陸心存疑慮的主要因素，也是蔡英文此刻最重要的後盾。台灣主流民意還是維持現狀，蔡英文的就職演說發表之後，大部分民眾也表達贊同之意，更讓蔡英文就職後的民意支持度得以突破5成。即便是國民黨，也並不反對蔡英文依據《中華民國憲法》和《兩岸人民關係條例》處理兩岸事務的說法，這恐怕是當前台灣內部的最大公約數。對此大陸應該多加注意，並重視台灣民意所展現的基本態度。

顯然，蔡英文政府面對的局面更為艱困，更需要以實際行動證明自己不挑釁與維持交流的誠意；但與此同時，大陸也應該體諒台灣社會對大陸的疑慮，減少強硬言行對台灣民情的衝擊。對兩岸雙方的執政者來說，雖然各有各的原則堅持，但只要不走向激烈對抗乃至武統的局面，就仍有可以轉圜的空間，端看雙方的政治智慧。

大陸對民進黨的疑慮甚深，蓋因民進黨長期主張台獨，且在問政和施政過程中多有文化台獨乃至法理台獨的傾向，因此無法對其充分信賴；而民進黨對大陸也多有偏見，乃至經常發表反中仇中言論，這進一步導致雙方毫無互信基礎，加上雙方缺乏溝通管道，更讓兩黨之間難以及時溝通彼此的想法，也無法有效處理分歧。

但為了民進黨新政府更有效地處理兩岸關係，雙方必須邁開「互知」的第一步，積極建立溝通管道。既然蔡英文已經呼籲兩岸執政黨要放下歷史包袱，展開良性對話，那麼在目前官方協商機制暫停的情況下，就應採取實際行動，由政黨代表建立溝通管道，相互了解彼此想法，並尋求解套方案，也可化解當前只能「隔空喊話」的尷尬局面。

通過溝通雙方才可以找出利益重疊的部分，並加強合作，從而讓雙方走入「互利」階段。兩岸各自有內部問題需要解決，通過合作實現共贏，顯然有助於雙方各自走出經濟困境。只有兩岸執政黨努力發現共同利益，並不斷獲取合作成果，雙方才有進一步溝通合作的可能性。

在此基礎上，雙方可以邁入「互諒」階段，以不斷累積的共同利益為基礎，兩岸雙方可以更為理性地審視雙方存在的分歧，並採取實際行動管控分歧，乃至積極設法解決分歧，以延續雙方互利的進程。

通過一段時間的互知、互利和互諒，兩岸執政黨之間才有可能累積「互信」，從而真正進入理解合作的新階段，也只有在這個階段，雙方才有可能針對兩岸重大分歧進行溝通協商，並積極尋求解決之道。

在「九二共識」陷入僵局之際，兩岸雙方應該立即著手啟動上述四階段進程，積極創造條件，讓雙方重新達成共識。事實上，上述過程也正是1992年雙方會談乃至之前與之後的兩岸溝通之所以能夠達成共識的經驗所在，值得現在的兩岸執政黨借鑑。

Sincerely Recognize the ROC Constitution, Rationally Confront Cross-Strait Conflict

Sincerely Recognize the ROC Constitution, Rationally Confront Cross-Strait Conflict
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 20, 2016 

Executive Summary: The commemorative beer bottles for Tsai Ing-wen's presidential inauguration feature digital images of her face. They have been flying off the shelves. President Tsai's cross-Strait policy is a digital image, one described as “incomplete”. As the focus is sharpened, the president's true face will be revealed. Is she sincerely honoring the constitution? Is she rationally confronting cross-Strait issues? By then the image will be fuzzy no more.

Full Text Below:

Before Tsai Ing-wen delivered her inaugural address, Beijing officials charged with Taiwan-related issues said the 1992 Consensus is a "question that must be answered". They said it was a "true or false question". Yesterday, the Office of the State Council for Taiwan Affairs said Tsai's inaugural address was “an incomplete questionnaire". President Tsai made no mention of the 1992 Consensus. She said only that she "respected the fact that in 1992 the two cross-Strait associations reached an understanding". That said, her address included other details that had other implications. One detail drew the most attention. Twice she mentioned the Republic of China Constitution. She said "The new government will be based on the Republic of China Constitution, and cross-Strait relations will be handled according to the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area”.

Therefore immediately following her address, several Mainland scholars specializing in Taiwan  issues weighed in. They interpreted her reference to the ROC Constitution as acceptance of the clause "in response to the needs of the nation prior to reunification". They interpreted her reference to the Act as acceptance of the “one nation, two areas” framework, and the “governing cross-Strait relations prior to national reunification" clause. They interpreted it as a move toward "both sides of the Strait are part of one China". Suddenly even the DPP believed the 1992 Consensus may be superseded.

As expected, five hours later Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office issued an official press release. It demanded “recognition of the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence” as the shared political foundation. It said Beijing had taken note of certain relevant statements. But it also said Tsai failed to explicitly recognize the 1992 Consensus and its core meaning. It said Tsai failed to offer specific methods to ensure the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. As a result, the tone remained grim.

In her inaugural address Tsai Ing-wen invoked constitutionalism in an effort to relieve pressure to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She listed two details in an effort to build trust and establish a shared political foundation.

Politically, her address mentioned the East China Sea and South China Sea issues. She said "I was elected president in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China. I have a responsibility to defend the territory and sovereignty of the Republic of China." That was significant.

Economically, she expressed willingness to participate in the RCEP. She said "We would like to participate with the other side on issues related to regional development, and seek opportunities to cooperate and work together." This too was significant.

President Tsai failed to alleviate Beijing's concerns. The 1992 Consensus remains an unresolved red vs green matter. No one knows how it will end. In fact, when it comes to the 1992 Consensus, Beijing long ago seized the initiative. It continues reeling the DPP in. Beijing issues questionnaires. Tsai Ing-wen fills them in. When Tsai Ing-wen cozied up to the "Republic of China Constitution", she should have simply proceeded to recognize a "constitutional one China”, “one China, two areas”, and “one China, different interpretations". Sadly, she ducked the issue of the 1992 Consensus yet again. Therefore no matter how she answers, Beijing will consider it "incomplete".

Beijing has made its position clear. Without the 1992 Consensus, the matter remains unresolved. The Tsai government must either cave in, or prepare for a never ending war of nerves. The only way out is unequivocal support for a "constitutional one China", and "one China, different interpretations”. That being the case, why not simply accept the 1992 Consensus?

The situation is critical. But a glimmer of hope remains. Beijing has not closed the door on constitutionalism. It merely said that the answer was incomplete. Meanwhile, President Tsai seeks a way out through the ROC Constitution. If she can clearly declare that she supports "a constitutional one China", she may be able to "solve the problem". The formula “one China, different interpretations” may still have some life left in it.

Before she delivered her inaugural address, the Tsai regime said “The new government's future political stance will be based on sincerity and rationality". Cross-Strait relations are currently unpredictable. We urge the new government to sincerely honor the constitution, and rationally confront cross-Strait issues.

First take the matter of sincerity. Her address showed that President Cai realizes she cannot jettison the constitution. When Chen Shui-bian said in reference to de jure Taiwan independence, that "Impossible means impossible!”, that was sincerity. When DPP party insiders proposed freezing the Taiwan independence party platform, that was sincerity. President Tsai has pledged to honor the constitution and to speak with sincerity. If so, she can no longer harbor fantasies of "backdoor listing". She must sincerely embrace the Republic of China Constitution, and accept the ROC Constitution's shelter and protection. Next, take the matter of rationality. Rationality means forgoing the use of such expressions as "pandering to China and selling out Taiwan" to tear the current generation apart. It means forgoing the use of such expressions as "natural Taiwan independence" to pigeonhole the next generation. It means resorting to rational debate rather than populist demagoguery. It means establishing a cross-Strait framework conducive to a peaceful win/win relationship.

The commemorative beer bottles for Tsai Ing-wen's presidential inauguration feature digital images of her face. They have been flying off the shelves. President Tsai's cross-Strait policy is a digital image, one described as “incomplete”. As the focus is sharpened, the president's true face will be revealed. Is she sincerely honoring the constitution? Is she rationally confronting cross-Strait issues? By then the image will be fuzzy no more.

誠實接納憲法 冷靜面對兩岸
2016-05-21 聯合報

在蔡英文總統發表就職演說前，北京涉台人士說，九二共識是「必答題」，且為「是非題」。昨天，國台辦對這篇演說的回應是：「這是一份沒有完成的答卷。」
蔡總統未提九二共識，僅重申「尊重一九九二年兩岸兩會達成的共同認知與諒解」等等；但演說亦有幾處細節似另有寓意，最受注意的是，有兩次提及中華民國憲法，如「新政府會依據中華民國憲法、兩岸人民關係條例處理兩岸事務」。

因而，演說後的第一時間，有幾位大陸涉台權威學者將「憲法」解讀為接受了「因應國家統一前的需要」，將「條例」解讀為在一國兩區的架構下「規範國家統一前兩岸人民往來」，並視此為靠近「兩岸一中」。一時之間，連民進黨方面也認為，九二共識可視為就此退場。

詎料，五個小時後，北京國台辦發布了正式新聞稿，破題即指出「堅持九二共識，反對台獨」的共同政治基礎，並稱雖然注意到演說的相關論述，但沒有明確承認九二共識及認同其核心內涵，也未提出確保兩岸關係和平發展的具體方法，言語依然嚴峻。

蔡英文在演說中，努力以「憲法說」化解「九二共識」的壓力，她且安排了兩處細節，均在顯示重建雙方互信及共同政治基礎的善意：

政治面：演說論及東海及南海問題稱：「我依照中華民國憲法當選總統，我有責任捍衛中華民國的領土和主權。」此可視為有意義的訊息。

經濟面：演說表達了參與ＲＣＥＰ的意願，並稱：「我們也願和對岸就共同參與區域發展的相關議題，尋求各種合作與協力的可能性。」此語似為心跡的表達。

但是，蔡總統的這些用心，並未完全解除北京的戒心。九二共識仍將是兩岸紅綠之間的懸案，不知伊於胡底。其實，在九二共識這個議題上，北京始終操主動地位，不斷誘使民進黨進入口袋。北京是批卷者，蔡英文是答卷者。當蔡英文向「中華民國憲法」靠近，其實她應當已是默認了「憲法一中／一國兩區／一中各表」；然而，她又閃避「九二共識」，所以她不論如何作答，皆會被北京指為「沒有完成」的答卷。

北京的姿態已經擺明，沒有九二共識不能了結。蔡政府除非準備破局，或打算迎對沒完沒了的神經戰，其出路應在再將「憲法一中」的內涵具體表明，並以「一中各表」來平衡情勢。然而，倘若走到那一步，為何不接受九二共識？

事態發展至如此嚴峻的地步，卻似有一點可以期待之處。北京仍未封閉「憲法說」，只稱答卷未完成；而蔡總統亦努力在中華民國憲法找出路。倘若說清楚「憲法一中」就能如蔡總統所說的「解決問題」，也許未來「一中各表」的議題仍然具有發展性。

在就職演說發表前，蔡團隊稱，演說將把「未來政府的政治定位在誠實、冷靜的特色之上」。在兩岸關係陷入莫測的此時，我們對新政府的建議是：誠實接納憲法，冷靜面對兩岸。

一、誠實：演說顯示，蔡總統體認到憲法不可離棄。陳水扁說「做不到就是做不到」，即是一種誠實，民進黨內「凍結台獨黨綱」的倡議也是一種誠實。蔡總統既表態回歸憲法，誠實，就是不再存有「借殼上市」的遐想，而誠實接納中華民國憲法所給的承當，也誠實接受中華民國憲法所給的庇護與保障。二、冷靜：就是勿再用「傾中賣台」去撕裂這一代，也勿再用「天然獨」去框限下一代，理智而非民粹，同創一個共生雙贏的兩岸和平互動架構。

總統就職紀念啤酒，以數位馬賽克呈現蔡英文總統的頭像而狂賣。其實，昨日蔡總統的兩岸論述也如一幅數位馬賽克，因而被稱為「沒有完成的答卷」；但當焦點逐漸對準，總統的面容終必真實呈現，是否誠實接納憲法、是否冷靜面對兩岸，就大概不再能有馬賽克的朦朧了。

With Total Government, Tsai Ing-wen Must Bear Total Responsibility

With Total Government, Tsai Ing-wen Must Bear Total Responsibility
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 20, 2016

Executive Summary: Ms. Tsai Ing-wen will be sworn in today. The DPP will enjoy “total government”. The new regime is clearly intent on "de-Sinicizing” Taiwan. But the global economy has taken a downturn, and Taiwan must upgrade its economy. This puts the new regime under enormous pressure. Any economic policy that attempts to de-Sinicize Taiwan will be subject to close scrutiny. If the economy remains in the doldrums two years from today, if wages stagnate and private investment dries up, the Tsai Ing-wen regime will be asked to step down and be judged.

Full Text Below:

Ms. Tsai Ing-wen will be sworn in today. The DPP will enjoy “total government”. The new regime is clearly intent on "de-Sinicizing” Taiwan. But the global economy has taken a downturn, and Taiwan must upgrade its economy. This puts the new regime under enormous pressure. Any economic policy that attempts to de-Sinicize Taiwan will be subject to close scrutiny. If the economy remains in the doldrums two years from today, if wages stagnate and private investment dries up, the Tsai Ing-wen regime will be asked to step down and be judged.

Tsai Ing-wen is determined to de-Sinicize. She refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Therefore cross-Strait relations will not be what they have been for the last eight years. Cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges beneficial to both sides or even to Taiwan alone, will be reduced. Tsai Ing-wen has proposed a "New Southern Strategy" as her response. Although not explicit, its clear intent is to shift Taiwan's export-oriented investments from the Mainland to Southeast Asia and South Asia. These policies, put simply, are yet another form of de-Sinicization.

This trade policy, rooted in political ideology, contains serious blind spots. The blindness may even be willful. The first blind spot is the importance of the Mainland economy. The second blind spot is the time delay.

Mainland China is already the world's second largest economy, its largest exporter, and its second largest importer. Its growth rate has slowed to 6.5% to 7%. But among the major world economies, such a growth rate trails only India's. The Mainland market accounts for 40% of Taiwan's total exports. It is also the destination for most of Taiwan's external investments. These are hard realities that cannot be changed in the short term. Ignoring the importance of cross-Strait trade, or worse, abandoning the Mainland market, means certain disaster for Taiwan's economy. Advocates of the New Southern Strategy say "the Mainland economy is already dying", therefore Taiwan must change direction. These allegations are absurd.

When two economies engage in trade, a gravitational attraction manifests. When the distance between them closes, and one economy is much larger than the other, trade inevitably focuses on the larger one. Furthermore, the two sides share the same culture and the same language. Twenty years ago, during the Lee Teng-hui era, Mainland GDP was only 700 billion dollars. Lee Teng-hui promoted his Southern Strategy, then his “remain patient, avoid haste” policy. The result was clear. Taiwan's economy could not escape the Mainland economy's gravitational field. Mainland GDP has now reached 10 trillion dollars. Yet Tsai Ing-wen wants to shift our trade southward with her New Southern Strategy? The probability of success is vanishingly low.

It matters not whether one focuses on export markets or investments. Even assuming the New Southern Strategy is feasible, it would not take effect overnight. From start, to negotiations, to investments, to concrete economic rewards, would require at least two years and as many as five years before taking effect. Without knowing whether the New Southern Strategy will be a success or a failure, there is no benefit in the Tsai Ing-wen government rushing to dismantle cross-Strait economic and trade relations. Doing so would only provoke a sudden tightening of the Mainland market, and a shrinking of Taiwan's economy. As Premier Chang San-cheng noted, the New Southern Strategy "cannot overtake the Mainland overnight. Wishful thinking will only send shockwaves through Taiwan's economy".

Over the next four years, Taiwan's trade and economic marginalization will become more serious. The past 15 years has been an era of global Free Trade Agreements. Taiwan alas, has been kept out of the loop. Tsai Ing-wen has high hopes for the Tsai regime's sole solution -- the TPP. But the presidential candidates for both major US political parties have expressed opposition to the TPP. Therefore it may be stillborn. Taiwan cannot possibly complete negotiations and join within four years. Only the MTA might prevent Taiwan's economic marginalization. But because the DPP assumed power, the MTA is stillborn. Therefore Taiwan's exports and private investment will be harmed. Can the new government really keep chanting “TPP!” for the next four years? Is there any other way out?

During the Ma administration, the green camp reveled in criticizing the substantial increase in Mainland tourists to Taiwan. They even claimed it was of no help to the economy. But anyone with even a shred of economic sense knows that such allegations are nonsense. If Mainland tourism to Taiwan is substantially reduced, the impact on the growth rate will be secondary. The impact on the job market will be devastating. Tourism is a service industry. It brings far more employment opportunities than high-tech industry, and can absorb more low-end labor.

The new Premier Lin Chuan expects cabinet members to “produce results in the first 100 days". Frankly this is too rushed and too outrageous. The positive or negative results of economic policy are not going to manifest themselves in a mere 100 days. Talk of "producing results in the first 100 days" is mere rhetoric. On the other hand, half a term, or two years, is probably a reasonable time frame.

Two years later, how will people feel about the economy? Such feelings are not a matter of mere numbers. High or low numbers only make sense within a time frame. What's important is that people feel the difference. Has it increased or decreased? Are jobs easier to find? Or does the shadow of unemployment still hang overhead? Such feelings are closely related to whether businesses have increased investment in Taiwan or fled elsewhere. Tsai Ing-wen insists on her de-Sinicization economic policy. Its effectiveness will eventually be subject to rigorous testing. Will the new government pass muster?

全面執政 蔡英文就要全面負責
2016年05月20日 中國時報

蔡英文女士今天就要宣誓就職，民進黨全面執政，非常明顯，新政府將盡量「去大陸化」。但面對這波全球景氣低潮及台灣經濟轉型壓力，「去大陸化」的財經路線很快就會受到嚴格的檢驗，如果2年後，經濟仍低迷、所得與薪資停滯如故、民間投資空洞，蔡英文團隊很快就要被請下「神壇」，面對批判。

蔡英文「去大陸化」政策主軸下，在兩岸政策方面，既然不接受「九二共識」，兩岸關係必然不會再有過去8年的正向良好互動，過去兩岸經貿往來曾有的互利、甚至讓利必然減少。也因此，蔡英文提出「新南向政策」因應，雖未明言，但明顯是要把台灣的出口、投資由面向大陸移到面向東南亞及南亞。這些政策方向，一言以蔽之就是「去大陸化」 。

不過，這種基於政治意識型態產生的經貿政策，很明顯有嚴重盲點，甚至是蓄意視而不見。第一是大陸經濟的重要性，第二是移轉時的時間落差。

大陸已經是全球第二大經濟體、最大出口國、第二大進口市場，雖然經濟成長率放緩到6.5%到7%之間，但在全球各大經濟體中，此一成長率僅稍遜於印度而已；大陸市場占台灣總體出口的4成，也是台灣對外投資最多的國家，這些都是短期內毫無改變可能的「硬結構」，忽視兩岸經貿的重點性，甚至想要揚棄大陸市場，對台灣經濟而言必然是大禍一場。倡導新南向政策者往往以「大陸經濟已不行了」，台灣必須轉向，其言甚謬。

更何況兩個經濟體的貿易往來，存在著所謂的「地心引力」——雙方距離近、一方經濟體龐大，貿易量必然集中於此，兩岸更兼有文化、語言相通的優勢。20多年前，大陸經濟體GDP只有7000多億美元的時代，李登輝提出南向政策、再祭出戎急用忍，結果如何已非常明確──台灣經濟未能脫離大陸經濟的「地心引力」。以現在大陸GDP已達10兆美元，蔡英文卻要把經貿主體移到「新南向」，成功機率讓人擔心。

再者，不論從出口市場著眼，或從企業投資看，就算新南向有可執行性，但也不會是一夕可見效落實，從啟動、談判、投資、落實到真正享受到經濟果實，必然有時間落差，短則2年，長一點要5年以上，才可能見到效果。在新南向成敗難知、毫無效益之時，蔡英文政府如就「急著拆台」，讓兩岸經貿、大陸市場如驟然緊縮，台灣經濟危矣！這也是行政院長張善政對新南向政策的評語：「（新南向）不是一夜就可趕過大陸，若一廂情願，將對台灣經濟造成衝擊。」

未來4年，我們也幾乎已可預見台灣經貿邊緣化問題將更形嚴重。近15年的全球經貿是FTA（自由貿易協定）的年代，而台灣算是完全落了隊。蔡英文寄望甚深、而且是蔡團隊「唯一解答」的TPP，先不談美國兩黨總統候選人先後表態反對推動，可能胎死腹中，台灣也不可能在4年內完成談判加入。唯一可紓緩經貿邊緣化危機的兩岸貨貿，也因民進黨執政而夭折，此對台灣出口與民間投資都會有傷害。新政府不能喊TPP就喊4年吧？是否有其他出路答案呢？

而在馬政府時期，對大幅增加的陸客來台觀光，綠營人士總喜歡批評非議，甚至貶斥為對經濟毫無效益；稍有經濟常識就知這些說法不實。未來如果陸客觀光大幅減少，對經濟成長率減少的衝擊在其次，對就業市場的影響才是致命。觀光產業是服務業，其帶來的就業機會遠遠多於高科技產業，且能吸納更多中低階勞力。

新任行政院長林全要閣員努力交出「百日政績」，坦白說，過急了、也離譜，經濟政策的正負效益不會在短短百日內顯現，「百日政績」大概只能用「說」的。不過，以任期一半的兩年作檢驗，該是妥善的時間點。

兩年後，民眾對經濟的感受如何？這種感受不是單純數字而已，因為數字高低與比較基期有關，因此重要的是民眾感受到的是所得提高還是降低？工作更好找還是失業陰影籠罩？而民眾的這些感受，其實又與企業是在台灣增加投資還是出走有密切關係。蔡英文既執意推動「去大陸化」的經濟政策，其成效最終就要接受全民嚴格的檢驗，新政府，過得了這一關嗎？

Let Taiwan Values Fulfill the Chinese Dream

Let Taiwan Values Fulfill the Chinese Dream
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 18, 2016

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen is not expected to meet Mainland expectations regarding the 1992 Consensus during her May 20 inaugural address. We hope nevertheless that president elect Tsai will put the well-being of the Taiwan public first. We hope she will conduct cross-Strait relations in accordance with the ROC constitutional framework, and do her utmost to avoid cross-Strait conflict. We hope the Mainland will also remain flexible in its attitude and delicate in its handling of future cross-Strait interactions. We hope it will keep in mind the bigger picture, and formulate new Taiwan policies beneficial to both sides.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen is not expected to meet Mainland expectations regarding the 1992 Consensus during her May 20 inaugural address. We hope nevertheless that president elect Tsai will put the well-being of the Taiwan public first. We hope she will conduct cross-Strait relations in accordance with the ROC constitutional framework, and do her utmost to avoid cross-Strait conflict. We hope the Mainland will also remain flexible in its attitude and delicate in its handling of future cross-Strait interactions. We hope it will keep in mind the bigger picture, and formulate new Taiwan policies beneficial to both sides.

The Mainland wants Tsai Ing-wen to reaffirm the 1992 Consensus as the foundation for cross-Strait relations. Over the past six months it has been applying pressure. Taiwan already feels the earth moving and the mountains shaking. But such pressure could be counterproductive. Everyone understands that Beijing's pressure is directed at the Tsai Ing-wen regime. But the effect will not be limited to the new government. The majority of people on Taiwan are likely to feel them. The result could be a backlash.

Tsai Ing-wen is convinced that as long as she does not incite a Taiwan independence incident, the United States, Japan and other countries will stand behind her. Washington has indeed repeatedly expressed its appreciation of Tsai Ing-wen. The US House of Representatives reaffirmed the "Taiwan Relations Act" and its cornerstone "six guarantees".

This ought to remind Beijing that when faced with Tsai regime obstinacy, applying pressure must not be its sole response. Beijing must address 23 million people on Taiwan, not just the DPP government, which will only be in office temporarily. Beijing's Taiwan policy has two parts. One is continued pressure on the DPP government. The other is continued private sector economic, trade, and cultural exchanges. This policy has not changed as a result of changes in Taiwan's political situation. This approach is correct, but may be difficult to implement. After all, the public on Taiwan is to some extent unified. Its perception of the Mainland is subject to government influence. The new government still enjoys considerable public support. If Beijing imposes sanctions on the Taiwan government, the Taiwan public may react negatively. Some members may even side with it against a common enemy. This is especially true in the international arena. Take the WHA for example. If Beijing exerts too much pressure on Taiwan, a public outcry and civil discontent could break out on Taiwan. Beijing may want merely to send the new government a message. But it might wind up hurting the feelings of the public on Taiwan. Therefore Beijing must proceed with caution.

In order to avoid a backlash, Beijing must consider the public reaction on Taiwan when dealing with the new DPP government. It cannot force Taiwan to submit solely by means of pressure and fear. Instead, it should increase public identification with the Mainland through continued peace and cooperation. Any military exercises or threats must be measured. Instead it must demonstrate greater goodwill. In particular it should offer more preferential policies to the general public and SMEs.

Beijing should attempt to win hearts and minds. While attempting to realize the “Chinese Dream”, it must consider the Taiwan issue from a global perspective. Beijing and Washington continue to clash in the South China Sea. Japan longs to pile on. The Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries have seized the opportunity to expand their claims in the South China Sea. But peace remains the main theme of the 21st century. The major powers, and the two sides of the Strait, urgently need to resolve conflicts through communication and dialogue. Beijing must not allow Washington to use the Taiwan issue to apply pressure in the South China Sea, and harm other Chinese strategic interests. Tsai Ing-wen may significantly change ROC foreign strategy. It will cozy up to the United States and Japan, and open up Southeast Asia. This will inevitably affect Mainland China's attempt to establish a new Asian order.

If cross-Strait relations change, if Tsai Ing-wen takes the same path as Chen Shui-bian and defies Mainland China, neighboring countries will gain strategic bargaining chips. This is not beneficial to the Mainland. The Mainland is making every effort to promote One Belt, One Road. The South China Sea dispute may find resolution as the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries improve their political situation. The Mainland must be committed to maintaining peace in the region, and reducing conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This will improve the political atmosphere in the entire region.

The DPP government has adopted a "creeping separatism" approach, hoping to buy time. It imagines that the longer the delay, the wider the division between the two sides. The price the Mainland will have to pay for reunification will then be too high. When the Mainland encounters internal problems, they can then declare independence. The assumption that the Mainland will encounter internal problems is part of a "Coming Collapse of China" theory bandied about for the past 20 years. It has never come to pass, and is long discredited. On the contrary, time is not on Taiwan's side. Mainland China's economy will continue to grow, and with it, its international influence. It is gradually acquiring G2 status. Together with the United States it will maintain order in East Asia. Reunification will merely be a matter of time.

Taiwan has a democratic and pluralistic society. It has an open information age society. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party does not represent the whole of Taiwan. It cannot monopolize mass communications and public discourse. Beijing must see the larger strategic picture.

讓台灣價值成就中國夢的實現
2016年05月19日 中國時報

判斷蔡英文準總統就職演說不會對大陸期待的「九二共識」做出回應，但我們依然期待蔡準總統能以台灣民眾的福祉為念，在中華民國憲政架構下發展兩岸關係，盡最大努力避免兩岸發生激烈對撞。我們同時也期待大陸，以更靈活的態度、細膩的方式，應對未來兩岸互動中即將出現的變動，抓準兩岸和平發展大方向，制訂有利兩岸同胞的對台新政策。

為了迫使蔡英文回到九二共識所確立的兩岸互動軌道，大陸最近半年接連對台灣進行壓力測試，已經讓台灣內部感受到地動山搖的可能威力，但負面效果也可能產生，雖然大家都明白這些事件都是針對蔡英文政府而來，但受影響者絕不會僅限於新政府，廣大台灣民眾乃至整個台灣社會都有可能受到影響，甚至可能由此出現反彈情緒。

蔡英文確信，只要自己不製造台獨事端，美、日等國就會給予台灣大力支持。美國確實也一再表達對蔡英文讚賞之意，美國國會眾議院通過重申《台灣關係法》與「六項保證」為台美關係基石決議案。

這就提醒大陸，面對蔡英文政府的堅持，不能只以施壓方式應對，更何況大陸要面對的主要還是2300萬台灣人民，不僅僅是暫時執政的民進黨政府。現在大陸對台政策已經逐漸顯現兩條路線的格局，即針對民進黨政府持續施壓，另一方面則繼續加強與台灣民間社會的經貿、文化交流，不因台灣政局變動而改變。政策思維正確，但操作層次卻會產生困難，台灣社會畢竟是一個整體，台灣民眾對大陸的觀感也會受到政府影響，現在新政府尚有較高民意支持，大陸對台灣政府的杯葛，容易引起台灣民眾的不滿，甚至引發部分人的同仇敵愾。在國際場合尤為明顯，以WHA為例，若屆時大陸對台灣施壓過度，甚至釀成衝突事件，傳回台灣很容易引發輿論譁然和民間的不滿。大陸可能只是要對新政府給予警告，卻可能連帶傷及台灣民眾的感情，大陸不可不慎。

為了避免出現反效果，大陸在針對民進黨新政府制定政策時，應該充分考量台灣民間社會的反應，同時要改變單純依靠施壓的政策思路，不能依靠增加恐懼感來逼迫台灣接受，而應該通過不斷的和平與合作增加台灣社會對大陸的認同感。軍事演習和威脅言論點到即可，反而應該釋出更多善意，特別是針對台灣民眾和中小企業制定更多優惠政策。

除了爭取民心以外，大陸更應留意「中國夢」的實現，要從全球格局看待台灣問題。大陸與美國在南海問題上持續緊張對立，日本也想加入亂局，菲律賓、越南等國趁機擴張南海聲索權，但和平仍是21世紀大國關係主調，中美雙方亟待通過溝通對話解決矛盾，大陸應避免美國藉台灣問題施壓南海及其他中國戰略利益。蔡英文將大幅調整對外戰略，擁抱美、日、開拓南洋，難免影響大陸著力重構的亞洲新秩序。

若兩岸關係生變，蔡英文政府走上與陳水扁類似的對抗中國路線，將提供周邊國家更多的戰略籌碼，這對大陸不見得有利。大陸正全力推動一帶一路建設，南海爭端也可能隨著菲律賓、越南等國家政局的變動而出現改善的曙光，大陸更應該致力於維護區域和平，減少在台海地區出現衝突的可能性，從而為改善區域局勢創造良好氛圍。

民進黨政府採取「穩健分離主義」思維，希望爭取時間，認為時間拖愈久，兩岸認同愈為斷裂，大陸統一要付出的代價及風險就愈高，一旦中國大陸內部秩序出現問題，就是走向分離的最佳時間。這種論調的假設是「大陸內部秩序出現問題」，這是一種流傳已20年卻始終未實現的「中國崩潰論」思維，早已破產。相反地，時間並不站在台灣這邊，中國大陸經濟將持續穩健發展、國際影響力也會持續上升，漸漸取得G2地位，與美國共同維持東亞秩序，統一就瓜熟蒂落。

台灣是民主多元社會，也是資訊開放的社會，執政的民進黨並不能代表整個台灣，更不可能壟斷資訊的傳播及社會話語權，北京需有大戰略思維。

Taiwan's Maritime Interests Must Not Be Sacrificed Merely to Defy the Mainland

Taiwan's Maritime Interests Must Not Be Sacrificed Merely to Defy the Mainland
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 18, 2016

Executive Summary: Opposing the 1992 Consensus out of sheer spite, even forcing Taiwan to surrender its sovereign territory and maritime interests, can only lead to self-destruction. Only by standing up for Taiwan's interests, and playing our cross-Strait cards in pragmatic fashion, can we protect our interests in the trilateral relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.

Full Text Below:

The Tsai Ing-wen government has pledged to "maintain the status quo". Yet it obdurately refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Its real plan is to change the status quo in the relationship between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing, and the relationship between Taipei, Tokyo, and Beijing. Its real plan is to cozy up to the US and Japan and use the conflict in the South China Sea to defy the Mainland. It seeks to lead Taiwan down a very different path than the KMT. Consider the four variables. The South China Sea conflict is nothing new. Beginning in the 1990s, then president Lee Teng-hui attempted to prevent Taiwan businesses from “going west”. He failed. Beginning in 2010, the ASEAN countries increased economic cooperation with the Mainland. They formed a free trade zone, making great strides forward. By contrast, the DPP government's New Southern Strategy shows no promise whatsoever.

Japan is perhaps the key component of the new government's “anti-China” (anti-Mainland) policy. When Tsai Ing-wen became the DPP's presidential candidate, Japan made no secret it was chummy with Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP. In 1972 Taipei and Tokyo severed diplomatic relations. Since then Japanese officials have never commented publicly on Taiwan election results. They have never offered public congratulations. The Abe cabinet broke from this precedent. He publicly congratulated Tsai Ing-wen on her election victory. This of course amounted to a breakthrough in Taipei Tokyo relations. But is playing the Japan card really in Taiwan's strategic interest? Or does playing this supposed trump card, merely make Taiwan a pawn in Japan's effort to contain China?

Consider relations between Taipei and Washington. To make Taiwan safe and secure, one must first manage relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Over the past eight years, the Ma government has managed relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei by “being close to Washington, being friendly to Tokyo, and being at peace with Beijing”. But this requires a foundation -- the 1992 Consensus. Tsai longs to dispense with the 1992 Consensus. But the Mainland is not the only party that opposes such a change. The US does as well. Tsai Ing-wen wants to pander to US interests, and cling to Japan, in order to strengthen an alliance against Mainland China. But how would such an approach actually play out in real life?

The United States' long-held position has been “maintain the status quo”. Every US President has reaffirmed the premise of one China, constructive cross-Strait dialogue, and opposition to any party unilaterally changing the status quo. It is widely known that divided but peaceful cross-Strait relations are most consistent with US national interests. The US economy is fragile. It cannot withstand unnecessary regional tensions or conflicts.

The US takes a hardline on maintaining the status quo. Former President Chen Shui-bian, as well as  Tsai Ing-wen, who first ran for president in 2012, have both challenged the US on this. Both ran right into a brick wall. Tsai Ing-wen reported to Washington last year. She pledged to maintain the status quo and strengthen trade between Taiwan and the US. She expressed goodwill and was vetted by the US. If Taiwan panders to the US in order to defy Mainland China, how high will the price be? Will the result be worth it?

The history of US diplomacy is a history of ruthless realpolitik. In order to safeguard its own interests, the US frequently betrays its allies. Take our own case for example. The United States secretly sacrificed China at Yalta, in exchange for a Soviet declaration of war on Japan. During the KMT-CCP civil war, it sacrificed the Nationalist government. When the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan, it cooked up the “Taiwan's status is undetermined” argument and sacrificed Taiwan. In order to halt the Soviet Union it did not hesitate to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and cozy up to Mao Zedong. To the United States, Taiwan has far less to offer than the Mainland. Does Tsai Ing-wen really believe the United States government will not sacrifice its Taiwan pawn when the time is right?

The Japanese government values the DPP government. Its common strategic goal is containing Mainland China. But the DPP government cozying up to Japan, includes Taiwan independence elements identifying with its former colonial “motherland”. These people worship Japan. They fantasize about Taiwan's inclusion in the US-Japan Security Treaty. No matter. Acting on any of these delusions will cross a line in the sand. If the DPP is not careful, it will provoke intense anti-Japanese hatred on the Mainland. The danger will be all too real. Such actions also clash with the US desire to maintain regional stability.

Improving relations between Taipei and Tokyo is not necessarily a bad thing. But not if it cavalierly sabotages cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen pledged that upon being elected she would "carefully handle cross-Strait relations, ensure clear communications, offer no provocations, and spring no surprises". She has violated all of these pledges. Tsai Ing-wen's official position on relations between Taipei and Washington is on record. When she was Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council she authored a document entitled "The US, China, and Taiwan Trilateral Security Relationship and Taiwan's Security". It stated that “cross-Strait security requires dynamic peace and stability, Taiwan must go forward”.

But how should Taiwan go forward? It must of course increase its ability to maintain peace and stability. But this is an economic issue. Tsai Ing-wen has turned it into a political issue. She mistakenly equates recognizing the 1992 Consensus with surrender. She considers it coerced. That is why she stubbornly insists that "If we yield on this one issue, the next generation will have no choice".

In fact however, the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus is one China, different interpretations. When Tsai Ing-wen reported to Washington, she pledged to "maintain the status quo of cross-Strait relations under the constitutional framework of the Republic of China". That is in fact one China, different interpretations. Tsai Ing-wen of course understands this. But in order to avoid offending Taiwan independence fundamentalists, she is willing to jeopardize existing peace and stability. As a result, she has made an enemy of the Mainland. In order to gain support from the United States and Japan, she has surrendered our territorial sovereignty. How will she answer to future generations on Taiwan for that?

Consider the Taiping Island and Cong Zi Niao Reef disputes. President Ma resolutely refused to yield to the United States and Japan. He defended the dignity and interests of the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen on the other hand, submitted meekly, in deeply disappointing fashion.

Opposing the 1992 Consensus out of sheer spite, even forcing Taiwan to surrender its sovereign territory and maritime interests, can only lead to self-destruction. Only by standing up for Taiwan's interests, and playing our cross-Strait cards in pragmatic fashion, can we protect our interests in the trilateral relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.

不可為對抗大陸犧牲海洋利益
2016年05月18日 中國時報

宣稱要「維持現狀」卻拒絕接受九二共識與一中概念的蔡英文新政府，真實的盤算是改變台美中及台日中關係「現狀」，以靠向美國、拉攏日本、展望南洋來抗衡中國大陸，帶領台灣走上與國民黨政府不同的道路。四大變數之中，南向並不是新話題，從90年代李登輝前總統開始推動，企圖壓抑台商西進浪潮，卻以失敗告終。東協國家從2010年起開始與中國大陸深化經濟合作、形成自由貿易區，取得非常大的成就，民進黨新政府的新南進政策看不出亮點。

日本可能是新政府抗衡中國大陸政策的核心，蔡英文獲得民進黨提名角逐總統大位後，日本毫不掩飾對蔡英文與民進黨的友好，安倍內閣打破1972年台日斷交以來，日本官員不對台灣選舉結果發表聲明的慣例，公開祝賀蔡英文當選總統，這當然是台日外交關係的突破。不過，日本牌是蔡英文政府強化台灣戰略利益的一張好牌？還是自以為好牌，卻淪為日本圍堵中國大陸的棋子？

談到台美關係，要在台灣安身立命，首要是把美中台關係處理好。過去8年，美中台關係的平衡建立在馬政府採取的「親美、友日、和中」基礎上，基礎的基礎是「九二共識」。蔡英文想跳出「九二共識」框架，偏偏這種改變不只是對岸反對，美國也心生疑慮，因此蔡英文想更倒向美國利益，加緊拉攏日本，以此強化對抗中國大陸的籌碼。只是，這種想像在實際上可行嗎？

美國一向的立場是維持台海現狀，歷任美國總統一再重申在一個中國的前提下，鼓勵兩岸進行持續的建設性對話，反對任何一方片面改變現狀。眾所皆知：分裂而和平的兩岸關係，最符合美國國家利益。畢竟脆弱的美國經貿現況，一點也禁不起沒有必要的區域緊張關係甚至衝突。

美國維持現狀的立場強硬，前總統陳水扁以及2012年首次參選總統的蔡英文，都曾經試圖挑戰而踢到鐵板。蔡英文去年訪美，在承諾維持現狀與加強台美經貿等方面，釋出了足夠的善意，才換來美國的認可。問題是，讓台灣倒向美國來對抗中國大陸，還要賠上多少利益？划算嗎？

檢視美國外交史可知，奉行現實主義的美國，經常為了維護自身利益而出賣盟友。光是對我們，美國就曾在雅爾達密約犧牲中國，換取蘇聯對日宣戰，國共內戰又犧牲國民政府，國府退守台灣又拋出地位未定論犧牲台灣，為防堵蘇聯毫不猶豫與台灣斷交、拉攏毛澤東中國。就美國而言，台灣利益遠小於中國利益，蔡英文政府難道不怕美國必要時又輕易犧牲台灣這個棋子。

日本政府看重民進黨政府，戰略目標是共同圍堵中國大陸。但是民進黨政府對日靠攏，還包含了台獨勢力回歸殖民母國的錯誤認同，及崇日派一廂情願希望台灣納入《美日安保條約》的幻想。不論哪一個，一旦成為具體行動，就是踩踏對岸的紅線，一不小心就會激起大陸民間強烈的仇日民粹主義，危險性十足，也不符合美國維持區域穩定的立場。

強化台日關係不是壞事，但如果魯莽牽動兩岸關係，恐怕就違反了蔡英文自己在當選後國際記者會中的承諾：「處理兩岸關係，積極溝通，不挑釁，也不會有意外。」回顧蔡英文對美中台關係的立場，並非無跡可尋，她在擔任陸委會主委時曾以「美中台三邊關係與台灣安全」為題指出：兩岸需要動態的和平穩定，台灣必須向前走。

問題是台灣該怎麼向前走？基本方向當然是在和平穩定中提高自身的實力。這本該是經濟議題，蔡英文卻弄成了政治議題，還誤以為接受「九二共識」就是屈服、就是不自主，因此說出「只要這條線一讓，那麼台灣的下一代就沒有選擇」。

「九二共識」的核心是一中各表，蔡英文訪美時主張「在中華民國憲政體制下維持兩岸關係的現狀」，這就是一中各表。蔡英文當然懂，卻為了不得罪基本教義派而不惜破壞現有的和平穩定，結果不只對大陸樹敵，還為了爭取美國及日本的支持而在領土主權問題上讓步，這又如何面對台灣的下一代？

從太平島與沖之鳥礁爭議來看，當馬總統堅決不向美、日讓步，強力維護中華民國的尊嚴與利益之際，蔡英文卻過分溫順，令人失望。

在九二共識問題上為反對而反對，甚至迫使台灣在國家主權與海洋利益問題上退縮，將自陷絕境。只有站在台灣的利益基礎上，務實活用包括兩岸關係在內的每一張好牌，才能在美中台三邊關係中尋求最大的利益。

Taiwan and the Mainland are not Antagonists

Taiwan and the Mainland are not Antagonists
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 17, 2016

Executive Summary: For Taiwan, cross-Strait policy is not just another policy. It is the foundation on which the Republic of China rests. It is no exaggeration to call it a matter of life and death. Fail to deal with it wisely, and the ROC's foreign affairs, defense, and economy will all be in jeopardy. How can one afford to be careless? We hope Tsai Ing-wen will promote respect for the Constitution of the Republic of China, as the foundation for cross-Strait relations. We hope the  DPP will improve cross-Strait relations and lay a solid foundation for cross-Strait peace. Returning to the constitution is the right path. Forsake your separatist ideas. This is our final reminder to the Tsai Ing-wen government.

Full Text Below:

For Taiwan, cross-Strait policy is not just another policy. It is the foundation on which the Republic of China rests. It is no exaggeration to call it a matter of life and death. Fail to deal with it wisely, and the ROC's foreign affairs, defense, and economy will all be in jeopardy. How can one afford to be careless?

The DPP has long assumed it can rely on the United States to defend it against Mainland China. Leave aside for the moment the new balance of power between Mainland China and the US. Both Beijing and Washington are concerned about security in the Taiwan Strait. The US recently reiterated that it "does not support Taiwan independence". US support for Taiwan has limits. Xi Jinping considers the "1992 Consensus" the determining factor in whether “the earth will move, and the mountains will shake”. Tsai Ing-wen however persists in rejecting the 1992 Consensus. The earth will not necessarily move and the mountains will not necessarily shake after May 20. But cross-Strait relations are likely to remain in a state of danger and uncertainty indefinitely. May 20 will be an important day. At this critical juncture, for the love of Taiwan, we offer the Tsai government a few last minute reminders.

Beijing is not forcing the DPP to accept the term "1992 Consensus" per se. But the DPP must offer an alternative formulation, one that affirms that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are part of one China, and that expresses opposition to Taiwan independence. Therefore Tsai's talk of “maintaining the status quo", of acknowledging the "spirt of 1992" and the "fact of 1992", of abiding by the "Republic of China's existing constitutional framework", are all unacceptable to Beijing. The Tsai Government has only two choices. One. Cling obstinately to its current position, and expect Beijng to launch a battle of willpower and strength on May 20. Two. Seek an alternative and confront cross-Strait relations in a responsible manner.

The DPP refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus because the DPP refuses to recognize the ROC Constitution. National constitutions are generally divided into three parts. Part one expresses the founding spirit. Part two declares sovereignty. Part Three stipulates the nation's jurisdiction. The ROC Constitution was published in 1947. Several changes were made during the Lee and Chen eras, pertaining to jurisdiction. But the constitution remains rooted in Sun Yat-sen's Three Peoples Principles. The territory remains the same, and its sovereignty belongs to all citizens. None of that has changed. In other words, the ROC Constitution represents the whole of China.

In a democratic nation, adherence to the constitution is taken for granted. But on Taiwan, the spirit and principles of the constitution are often destroyed. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian publicly rejected the founding spirit of the Three Peoples Principles. They publicly advocated "special state to state relations" and "one country on each side". They publicly proclaimed their intention to divide the nation. These men currently receive Republic of China pensions. They wallow in their status as former Republic of China heads of state. They exercised Republic of China governmental authority. Yet they refuse to recognize the legitimacy of their own national government. This is not merely unheared of in history, its is a political and moral outrage, and has left Taiwan in a moral vacuum.

Practically speaking, the DPP has never come to terms with the Republic of China. Biologically speaking, the DPP's “Republic of China” is a parasite living off the real Republic of China. Since the real Republic of China was founded, it conducted the Northern Expedition, fought a war of resistance against Japan, rebuilt Taiwan, ensured Taiwan's security, worked Taiwan's economic miracle, and embarked on the road to democracy. These achievements, in the eyes of Taiwan independence parasites, are nothing more nutrients provided by a host, rather than soil in which a plant may flower. These parasites choose to grovel before Japan whiled spewing venom at Mainland China. Put simply, for these parasites, the Republic of China is nothing more than a host.

This is not the first time the Democratic Progressive Party has been the ruling party. But it is the first time it has enjoyed “total government” status. If the DPP continues to view the ROC as nothing more than a host to a parasite, both will perish. The DPP must see itself as part of the Republic of China. It must switch from parasitism to symbiosis. Only then can both prosper.

If the DPP is able to see this, then cross-Strait relations will no longer be an effort to fill in the sea. It will be as simple as a wave of the hand. The heart of the 1992 Consensus is "refrain from dividing China's sovereignty and territory". This is also stipulated in the ROC Constitution. The DPP need not mention the 1992 Consensus. But it must meet Beijing's demands regarding its meaning. Tsai Ing-wen's only way out is a public declaration that over the next four years, she will faithfully uphold the Constitution of the Republic of China, and promote cultural, educational and cross-Strait relations on that basis.

According to the ROC Constitution, the Democratic Progressive Party, which now enjoys “total government”, must forsake Taiwan independence. The DPP must understand that once it is in power, it no longer enjoys unrestricted freedom of speech, only administrative responsibility. The DPP government must abandon its practice of de-Sinicization. It must solemnly promise the public that it will no longer behave like a parasite. The DPP must forsake its "I Hate China" rhetoric, and enable the two sides to relate in a peaceful and friendly atmosphere.

Maintaining peaceful cross-Strait relations is not difficult. The two sides merely need to acknowledge that they are both part of the whole of China. The benefits of sovereignty will be shared by people on both sides of the Strait. The two governments have a duty to refrain from dividing China's sovereignty and territoriality. On such a basis, the two sides can exercise their jurisdictions in accordance with their respective constitutions. They can respect each other, and refrain from intervention.

We hope Tsai Ing-wen will promote respect for the Constitution of the Republic of China, as the foundation for cross-Strait relations. We hope the  DPP will improve cross-Strait relations and lay a solid foundation for cross-Strait peace. Returning to the constitution is the right path. Forsake your separatist ideas. This is our final reminder to the Tsai Ing-wen government.

台灣與中國不能是對立關係
2016年05月17日 中國時報

對台灣而言，兩岸關係絕不僅是眾多政策中的一環，而是國家大政的基礎，稱其為「生死之門、存亡之道」也不為過，未能明智處理，外交、國防、經濟均將陷入險境，豈可不慎？

民進黨一貫認為，可依靠美國對抗中國，暫且不論近年中、美軍力的新平衡關係，台海安全由中、美共管更是兩國的共同政策，這也是美國日前重申「不支持台獨」的原因。在美國有限度支持台灣的情勢下，習近平將「九二共識」視為兩岸是否地動山搖的咒語，蔡英文卻不願改變「反九二共識」立場，520後兩岸關係雖未必立刻地動山搖，長期陷入高風險與高不確定性狀態卻是合理的判斷。5月20日將是一個重要的日子，在此關鍵時刻，我們本諸真道理性真愛台灣精神，要對蔡政府提出最後幾點提醒。

北京未必強求民進黨接受「九二共識」這4個字，但必須提出另外一個「兩岸同屬一中」及「反對台獨」的表述。從這個角度來看，蔡英文目前所強調的「維持現狀」、「九二精神」、「九二事實」、「中華民國現行憲政體制」都無法為北京所接受。蔡英文政府目前只有兩個選擇，一是繼續堅持現有立場，與北京從520後開始一場意志力與實力的對決，二是尋求解套方案，負責任地面對兩岸。

民進黨之所以不願意接受「九二共識」，歸結原因就是民進黨並不認同中華民國憲法。各國憲法的內容大概分為三個部分，一是立國精神，二是主權宣示，三是治權規範。中華民國憲法公布於1947年，經過李、扁時期的多次修改，中華民國的憲政治權體制有了一些改變，但是憲法的立國精神仍是依據孫中山先生的三民主義，領土的宣示範圍仍為固有疆域，主權行使屬於國民全體，並沒有改變，換言之，中華民國憲法是代表全中國的憲法。

對民主國家而言，遵守憲法是天經地義的事，但是在台灣，憲法的精神與原則卻經常遭到破壞。李登輝及陳水扁兩位元首公然否定三民主義的立國精神，公開主張「特殊國與國」與「一邊一國」等分裂主權國土言論，這種食用中華民國俸給，享受國家元首尊崇，行使國家合法權益，卻不認同自己的國家，不僅是歷史上所罕見，更是政治道德的淪喪，也引發台灣民眾價值的混亂。

就政治實務言，民進黨從來沒有真正認同過中華民國。就生物學來看，民進黨之於中華民國更像寄生關係。中華民國從創建、北伐、抗戰，到台灣後的重建，確保台灣安全，創造經濟奇蹟，走上民主道路。這一些偉大的成就，在以台獨為最終目標的一群人眼中看來，只是寄生的養分，而非感恩的土壤。他們不僅要去中國化，還要去中華民國化，為了區隔與大陸的認同，他們選擇媚日與仇中。簡單地說，中華民國對他們而言，只是宿主。

民進黨不是第一次執政，卻是第一次的完全執政。民進黨如果持續地將中華民國視為宿主，其結果一定是兩者俱亡，民進黨唯有將自己也視為中華民國的一部分，從寄生轉念為共生，才可能一榮俱榮。

民進黨如果能夠有這樣的認知，處理兩岸關係就不再是移山填海之難，而是反掌折枝之易。「九二共識」的核心內涵就是「不分裂整個中國的主權及領土」，這也是中華民國憲法的規範。如果不提「九二共識」，但是又要能夠滿足北京對「九二共識」的堅持，蔡英文520談話唯一的一條路，就是向人民宣示，未來4年將忠誠地遵守中華民國憲法，並依據憲法推動國家的文化、教育及兩岸關係。

依照中華民國憲法，已經完全執政的民進黨必須放棄台獨的主張。民進黨必須了解，執政者沒有言論自由，只有依法行政的責任。民進黨政府也應放棄「去中國文化」的做法，這是向社會表明不再為寄生者的莊嚴承諾。也請民進黨放下「仇中」的言論，讓兩岸可以在和平友善的氛圍下發展。

維持兩岸關係的和平發展並不難，兩岸都應該認知到彼此均是整個中國的一部分，主權所帶來的利益為兩岸人民所共享，兩岸政府也應有責任不分裂整個中國的主權及領土。在這樣的基礎上，兩岸各依其憲法，在其領域內行使憲政治權，相互尊重不干預。

期望蔡英文能在尊重中華民國的憲法基礎上推動政務，在兩岸關係上民進黨應該更有機會與能力提升兩岸關係，為兩岸和平發展奠定堅實基礎。回到憲法正途，放棄分裂主張，是我們對蔡英文政府的第一個最後提醒。