Rethinking Taipei Tokyo Relations Based on National Interest

Rethinking Taipei Tokyo Relations Based on National Interest 
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
August 1, 2016

Executive Summary: The “ruling” over the South China Sea has already led to major changes in East Asian international relations. It has impacted cross-Strait relations. It has changed Taiwan Japan relations. The DPP regime must discard its one-sided policy towards Japan. It must rethink its strategy. It must reject flowery rhetoric for substantive diplomacy. The change in Taiwan Japan Maritime Cooperation Dialogue confirms this necessity.

Full Text Below:

The DPP regime has long seen the "Taiwan Japan Maritime Affairs Cooperation Dialogue" mechanism as a breakthrough in Taipei Tokyo relations. But a few days ago, the dialogue abruptly ended, causing an uproar. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the issues were too many and too varied to deal with, and that out of "caution", it decided to postpone the event.

Taiwan Japan Maritime Affairs Cooperation Dialogue includes cooperation on fisheries, environmental protection, emergency rescue, and scientific research. The Department of Fisheries, the Ministry of Science, and the Ministry of the Interior, have negotiated these issues with the Government of Japan in the past. But they have now returned to square one, and are starting from scratch. The issues may be many and varied. But Taiwan and Japan should have reached a tacit agreement by now. It is not as if they lacked the time.

Take the issues one by one. Taiwan Japan Maritime Affairs Cooperation Dialogue includes fishing grounds, research vessel classification and identification, maritime conservation legislation, and emergency rescue notification mechanisms. These are bureaucratic level technical issues, not politically sensitive issues. The issues may be varied, but the difficulties are not that great.

The agenda was agreed upon long ago. So why have the two governments put the talks on hold? For two reasons. Reason One. The recent “ruling” on the South China Sea demoted Taiping Island to the status of a "reef", provoking a public outcry on Taiwan. This forced the Tsai regime to get tough and protest this “ruling” by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague.

The Japanese government on the other hand, declared that the “ruling” on the South China Sea constituted binding arbitration. It demanded that the parties comply. The gap between our perception and Japan's is huge. That is the reason for the delay. Not because the issues are varied and many, but because the atmosphere has been poisoned.

Reason Two. The Taiwan Japan Maritime Affairs Cooperation Dialogue mechanism was originally intended to resolve differences over Taiwan fishermen fishing in waters near Cong Zhi Niao Reef. Before that, the two sides had already agreed to address only fishing disputes, and shelve any disputes over Cong Zhi Niao Reef sovereignty. They had also reverted to the 2002 Chen era agreement to "first report, then withdraw". The problem is that once Taiping Island was demoted to the status of a reef, the understanding evaporated overnight. Now, if the two sides were to address fishing rights for Taiwan fishermen in the waters near Cong Zhi Niao Reef, that would imply its recognition as an "island". That would assuredly provoke a backlash on Taiwan. Therefore the talks have been postponed indefinitely, not because of the two sides lacked time for preparation, but because the circumstances have changed.

The indefinite postponement of Taiwan Japan dialogue has revealed two blind spots in DPP policy towards Japan. Blind Spot One is the Tsai regime's wishful thinking vis a vis the Japanese government. The moment the DPP came to power, it boasted that it was the most pro-Japanese government ever on Taiwan. During the Tung Sheng Chi 16 incident the Ma Ying-jeou government formally declared that Cong Zhi Niao Reef was merely a reef. But as soon as the DPP came to power, it attempted to pander to Japan. The DPP regime claimed that in order to comply with international law, it was now referring to the reef as “Cong Zhi Niao”. It was no longer specifying whether it was a reef or an island, in order to avoid offending the Japanese.

The recent “ruling” on the South China Sea demoted Taiping Island to the status of a “reef”. The Japanese government added insult to injury. It demanded that the ROC abide by the International Court of Justice ruling. It unilaterally call a halt to the Taiwan Japan Maritime Issues Cooperation Dialogue. When Taiwan Japan relations and Japan's national interests collided, the Japanese government chose its own national interests. The DPP, on the other hand, in order to persuade Japan to assist it in opposing the Mainland, groveled before the Japanese. They not only sacrificed our national interests. They even undermined relations with Japan.

Blind Spot Two is ignoring the impact of regional security on Taiwan Japan relations. As soon as the DPP came to power, cross-Strait relations chilled. The DPP attempted to join the US and Japan in “containing” Mainland China. Under this policy, the DPP must adopt an ambiguous policy on the South China Sea in order to comply with US and Japanese strategy, and avoid the impression that Taipei and Beijing are on the same side. But the “ruling” on the South China Sea has frustrated this attempt. It has put Taiwan and the Mainland on the same side. It has undermined the DPP's original plan for relations with Japan. It has also disrupted the Tsai regime's plan to confine talks with Japan to fishing rights. Its desire to avoid talking about Cong Zhi Niao Reef sovereignty has turned out to be wishful thinking. Public outrage is growing. The status of Cong Zhi Niao Reef has become an unavoidable obstacle to Taiwan Japan Maritime Affairs Dialogue, and become a major concern in DPP Japan relations.

The “ruling” over the South China Sea has already led to major changes in East Asian international relations. It has impacted cross-Strait relations. It has changed Taiwan Japan relations. The DPP regime must discard its one-sided policy towards Japan. It must rethink its strategy. It must reject flowery rhetoric for substantive diplomacy. The change in Taiwan Japan Maritime Cooperation Dialogue confirms this necessity.

從國家利益再思台日關係
2016-08-01 聯合報

一直被民進黨政府視為對日關係新突破的「台日海洋事務合作對話」，日前突然宣布喊卡，引起各界譁然。外交部的解釋是：因為議題眾多、層面廣泛，為求「周延」，故決定延期舉辦。

攤開這次台日海洋合作對話設定的議題，包括了漁業合作、環境保護、海上急難救助及科學合作等四大項。這些，都是過去幾年漁業署、科技部及內政部與日本政府協商過的議題，這次化零為整重新包裝。可見，議題雖多，但台日雙方應早有默契，並非措手不及。

但檢視各議題涉及之層面，這次「台日海洋合作對話」含括漁場作業規範、科研船隻之歸屬認定、海域保育的法令制定、急難救助的通報機制等。這些，均屬官僚層級的技術性議題，並未涉及高層的政治敏感議題。可見，儘管對話面向廣泛，議題難度其實不高。

既然議題設定早有共識，涉及的層面也相當單純，那麼，兩國為何突然宣布延期呢？這可以從兩點觀察：第一，日前南海仲裁案將我國所屬的太平島矮化為「礁」，引發台灣內部民意的不滿；對此，蔡英文政府不得不硬起來，抗議海牙常設仲裁法庭的判決。

對照之下，日本政府卻宣稱南海仲裁案具有法律約束力，更呼籲各當事國能夠遵守；這樣的立場，與我方的認知存在極大的差距。亦即，延期的理由其實不在議題「周延」與否，而在對話「氛圍」不佳。

其次，這次「台日海洋合作對話」，原是為解決台灣漁民在沖之鳥礁附近海域的捕魚問題而發；之前，雙方原已達成「不談沖之鳥主權、只談漁權」的默契，並決定回歸二○○二年扁朝時代訂下的「先通報、後撤離」之規範。問題是，在太平島遭矮化為「礁」後，此默契一夕走調。如今，若台日雙方談台灣漁民在沖之鳥海域的捕魚權益，等於間接承認沖之鳥為「島」，這勢必引發台灣民眾的大反彈。因此，延期的理由亦不在「準備不及」，而在於主客觀情勢轉變。

從這次台日對話的延期，便可以發現民進黨政府的對日政策存在兩個盲點。第一個盲點，是蔡政府對日過度一廂情願。民進黨一上台，便自我定位為有史來最親日的政府。當年馬英九政府因為東聖吉十六號事件，宣布我國公文書稱沖之鳥為「礁」；但民進黨上台後為了迎合日本，以遵守國際法為由改稱「沖之鳥」，而不判定其屬性，以免觸犯日本政府的底線。

但這次南海仲裁案將我國太平島認定為礁，日本政府卻對台灣落井下石，呼籲我國應遵守國際法院的裁定，更片面中斷「台日海洋合作對話」之協商。由此可見，在台日關係與國家利益權衡下，日本政府選擇的是該國利益，而民進黨則為了反中而一味向日本傾斜，不僅喪失國家利益考量，也使對日關係愈發進退失據。

第二個盲點，是忽視區域安全對台日關係的連動性。民進黨上台後，因兩岸關係氛圍轉冷，於是採取聯合美日抗衡中國大陸的策略。在此策略下，民進黨只能對南海問題採取曖昧態度，以迎合美日兩國的戰略，並避免留給外界兩岸聯手的印象。但南海仲裁案出爐後，卻將海域主張受挫的台灣與中國大陸打成一線，進而衝擊到民進黨原先對日關係的布局；同時，也打亂蔡政府對日原本只談漁權、不觸及沖之鳥屬性的如意算盤。在國內民意高漲下，沖之鳥的認定與屬性，已成為台日海洋對話難以迴避的問題，也成為民進黨對日關係的一大隱憂。

南海仲裁案後，東亞國際關係已經出現重大變革，不僅衝擊著兩岸關係，也改變了台日關係。在這種情況下，民進黨政府應該擺脫過往對日一面倒的政策，重新思考戰略，也要跳脫只操弄華麗辭藻、卻缺乏實質內涵的外交模式。「台日海洋合作對話」生變，即是最佳證明。

Do Not Let Hatred of the Mainland Provoke Hatred of Taiwan

Do Not Let Hatred of the Mainland Provoke Hatred of Taiwan
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 29, 2016

Executive Summary: We would remind President Tsai and the DPP that Chen Shui-bian once tried to maintain peace and stability in cross-Strait relations. But long term green camp incitement of anti-Mainland hatred, eventually led to extremism, confrontation, and self-destruction. The DPP has returned to power. The cross-Strait balance of power has already undergone a reversal. Do not allow opposition to the Mainland, demonization of the Mainland, and hatred of the Mainland, ignite flames of anti-Taiwan hatred among the Mainland public.

Full Text Below:

In 2000, Tsai Ing-wen became Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council under President Chen Shui-bian. Over the 16 years since then, her opposition to the 1992 Consensus has never changed. The DPP's party platform and important resolutions, all presume that "Taiwan and China are independent of each other". None of them has ever accepted the 1992 Consensus. During the 2016 election, the DPP did not merely win. It acquired “absolute power”. Any hope that the Tsai Ing-wen regime, which now enjoys “total government”, will change its long held opposition to the 1992 Consensus, is sheer futility. It is akin to drilling ice in search of fire.

President Tsai may avoid harsh rhetoric when referring to the Mainland. She may maintain a low profile. Nevertheless she obdurately refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, and persists in her efforts to separate the two sides permanently. This newspaper has long noted that the Tsai regime's cross-Strait stance, is revealed not by what she says, but by what she does. Consider two important indicators. First, whether the DPP will persist in cultural de-Sinicizaton. Second, whether Tsai will relinquish sovereignty over the South China Sea U-shaped line. The first would sever cultural and historical links between the two sides. The second would abandon the South China Sea in order to sever relations with the Mainland. It would make Taiwan part of the United States and Japan anti-Mainland strategic circle.

In fact, President Tsai's May 20 inaugural address already provided Beijing with the answer. First, regarding cultural identity, Tsai is fabricating a "History of Indigenous Peoples" divorced from Chinese history. Second, regarding trade, Tsai yearns to bid farewell to economic dependence on the Mainland. Third, regarding security, she longs for an "alliance of values" with the United States and Japan. Fourth, regarding the South China Sea, she hopes to retain sovereignty over South China Sea islands, but hopes to renounce the U-shaped line. None of the above four points affirms the 1992 Consensus. On top of which, Tsai would split Taiwan off from the Mainland culturally. She wants economic relations with the Mainland diluted. She wants an adversarial relationship in the South China Sea that distinguishes between “China” and “Taiwan”.

President Tsai recently told the Washington Post what she told voters in her May 20 inaugural address. She said cross-Strait relations must meet with the approval of the Taiwan public and democratic principles. She and the DPP claim that their election victory amounts to a public rejection of the 1992 Consensus. President Tsai trotted out her "natural independence" argument, in an attempt to legitimize her separatism.

But such claims are baseless. People did not vote for the DPP because they disagreed with the KMT on cross-Strait policy. They voted for the DPP because they were unhappy with Ma Ying-jeou's handling of public welfare issues. Any dissatisfaction with the KMT's cross-Strait policy, was not over the 1992 Consensus. It was over the fact that the benefits of cross-Strait exchanges were not shared equally by ordinary people. Opinion polls are nearly unanimous in showing support the 1992 Consensus, which has brought Taiwan security, stability, and a diplomatic truce. Most people want a peace agreement and a formal cross-Strait peace mechanism.

A sense of regional identity is indeed universal. A "natural identification with Taiwan" is a foregone conclusion. But a "natural identification with Taiwan" can hardly be equated with a "demand for political independence". It certainly does not mean Taiwan must sever its connections with the Mainland. Green camp spin doctors persist in conflating "natural identification with Taiwan" with a "demand for political independence". They persist in inciting hatred against the Mainland, in demonizing the Mainland, and in opposing the Mainland, in order to fabricate a “demand for political independence".

The DPP regime is deliberately spinning the KMT's election defeat as a rejection of the 1992 Consensus. It is deliberately misrepresenting a "natural identification with Taiwan" as a "demand for political independence". It is deliberately turning it into a pretext for political separatism, and for joining a US-Japanes alliance against the Mainland. Such an approach is doomed, and can only bring disaster to Taiwan. The Tsai Ing-wen regime has painted itself into a corner. Tsai's willingness to be the United States' lackey elicited no sympathy from the United States. Even her willingness to forsake the U-shaped line, elicited no sympathy from the United States. The United States, based on its own strategic interests, was determined to classify Taiping Island as a reef. A single leaf announces the arrival of autumn. Over the next four years, the DPP regime is destined to become the United States and Japan's pawn in East Asia, at the expense of Taiwan's own security. Is this the DPP's so-called "love of Taiwan"?

The KMT and the people of Taiwan support peaceful cross-Strait and people to people relations. They want Taiwan to remain culturally Chinese. Cultural Chineseness is not limited to cultural identity. It also places Taiwan and the Mainland on an equal footing. It enables Taiwan to continue to benefit from its shared identity with the world's second largest economy. It tells people that hostile cross-Strait relations work against Taiwan's security. In the South China Sea, the two sides should work together to defend their shared economic interests. Only this can persuade Beijing not to give up on cross-Strait peace.

We would remind President Tsai and the DPP that Chen Shui-bian once tried to maintain peace and stability in cross-Strait relations. But long term green camp incitement of anti-Mainland hatred, eventually led to extremism, confrontation, and self-destruction. The DPP has returned to power. The cross-Strait balance of power has already undergone a reversal. Do not allow opposition to the Mainland, demonization of the Mainland, and hatred of the Mainland, ignite flames of anti-Taiwan hatred among the Mainland public.

勿使反中仇中招來反台仇台
2016/7/29 中國時報

蔡英文總統在2000年擔任陳水扁政府的陸委會主委時，就曾率先反對「九二共識」，16年來從未改變。民進黨的黨綱及所有的重要決議文，沒有一個不是以「台灣與中國主權相互獨立」為基礎，也從來沒有接受過「九二共識」。這一次2016年的大選，民進黨不是險勝而是大勝，正處於享有絕對權力、完全執政的蔡英文政府，要其放棄原有的反九二共識立場，無疑是緣木求魚、鑽冰取火。

蔡總統對大陸態度雖然柔軟，姿態也非常謹慎，但她不僅不會接受「九二共識」，反而會繼續創造兩岸永久分離的主客觀條件。本報很早就指出，檢驗蔡英文政府兩岸關係政治立場的觀察點，不在於她說什麼，而是做什麼。其中兩個最重要的指標就是：一、民進黨是否繼續走文化去中國路線；二、蔡英文是否放棄南海U形線的立場。第一點是要切斷兩岸的文化歷史認同的連結，第二點是要以放棄南海權益的方式來切割與大陸的法理關係，加入美、日戰略防中圈。

其實蔡總統在520的就職演說中，已經給了北京答案。第一、在文化認同上，她要建立「原民史觀」，其意涵是要脫離中華史觀。第二、在經貿上，她要「告別」對大陸的依存關係；第三、在安全上，她要加入美國與日本的「價值同盟」；第四、在南海上，她主張南海諸島的主權，但絕口不提U形線。以上四點，沒有一點接受「九二共識」，而且是要與中國大陸在文化上脫離、在經濟上冷卻、在安全上對抗、在南海上切割。

蔡總統在接受《華盛頓郵報》專訪時，做了與520就職演說時同樣的表述，即兩岸關係的政治基礎必須符合台灣民意與民主原則。她及民進黨都認為，大選獲勝就表示民眾不接受「九二共識」。蔡總統並發展出「天然獨」的說法，為其分離主義建立正當性。

但這種思維是站不住腳的，民眾把票投給民進黨，並非完全是對國民黨的兩岸政策不認同，更多是對馬英九政府在民生議題上的治理能力不滿意。即使對國民黨的兩岸政策不滿，也不是因為「九二共識」，而是兩岸的交流成果並沒有讓全民共享。幾乎所有的民意調查均顯示，民眾對於「九二共識」為台灣所帶來的安全穩定、外交休兵還是滿意的，更有過半數以上的民眾主張應該簽署和平協議，為兩岸建立制度化的和平機制。

鄉土認同是任何人都擁有的天性。「天然台」是一個必然存在的認同，但是「天然台」並不必然等於「天然獨」，希望台灣能夠有主體性，也並不表示一定要與大陸完全切割。綠營人士硬要把「天然台」解釋成「天然獨」，並散播「仇中／醜中／反中」情緒，為「天然獨」創造政治基礎。

民進黨政府必須了解，將國民黨的敗選等同於「九二共識」的挫敗、刻意將「天然台」詮釋為「天然獨」、用被誤解的民意為理由以堅持「分離主義」立場、不惜與美日同盟來對抗中國大陸，這樣的做法注定會給台灣帶來災難。但蔡英文政府已把自己逼到了牆角，她對美國的扈從政策並沒有得到美國的善意回應，即使放棄了U形線，也沒有得到美國的同情。美國基於自己的戰略利益，硬是將太平島視為太平礁。一葉知秋，民進黨政府未來的4年，注定要成為美、日在東亞的棋子，置台灣安危於不顧，這難道就是所謂的「愛台灣」？

國民黨及台灣支持兩岸和平發展路線的民間力量應該奮起，堅持台灣在文化上不脫離中國，「文化中國」不僅是文化認同，更是台灣與大陸平起平坐的優勢；在經濟上不需要放棄與全球第二大經濟體連結的任何機會；在安全上要告訴民眾，敵意對抗的兩岸關係不可能給台灣安全；在南海上，兩岸應該攜手共同捍衛南海的經濟利益。只有這樣，北京才不至於完全放棄兩岸和平的希望。

我們也要提醒蔡總統及民進黨，陳水扁曾經希望維繫兩岸關係的和平與穩定，但在綠營長期創造的仇中反中社會氛圍桎梏下，最後還是走上激進與對抗之路，終至覆滅。民進黨再度執政，兩岸實力對比已經翻轉，切莫讓台灣反中／醜中／仇中情結，孕育出大陸民眾反台火種。

Ko Wen-je Speaks, Tsai Ing-wen Should Listen

Ko Wen-je Speaks, Tsai Ing-wen Should Listen 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 28, 2016 

Executive Summary: Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je spoke to this newspaper  on cross-Strait relations. He emphasized mutual understanding. Only then will cross-Strait relations be stable. Since the Tsai regime took office, official cross-Strait relations have become a constant source of anxiety, all due to the 1992 Consensus. People to people relations are threatened by the rise of populism. Ko Wen-je transcended blue, green and red political loyalties, and demonstrated a refreshingly high tolerance for political differences.

Full Text Below:

Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je spoke to this newspaper  on cross-Strait relations. He emphasized mutual understanding. Only then will cross-Strait relations be stable. Since the Tsai regime took office, official cross-Strait relations have become a constant source of anxiety, all due to the 1992 Consensus. People to people relations are threatened by the rise of populism. Ko Wen-je transcended blue, green and red political loyalties, and demonstrated a refreshingly high tolerance for political differences.

The green camp has long nursed a hostile attitude towards the Mainland. It has poo-pooed the Mainland's growth and rise. Ko Wen-je however, differed. He reminded the people of Taiwan that seldom in China's history has everyone had enough to eat. The 1.3 billion people on the other side of the Strait are now reasonably well-off. That such a large economy has not gone off the rails is no easy feat. From an historical perspective, it can be considered a "Golden Age". Taiwan should not continue to deny the Mainland's achievements. It should offer encouragement. This evaluation of Mainland history, is both reasonable and fair.

Emotionally speaking, it was a highly compassionate evaluation. For some time, thinking on Taiwan regarding cross-Strait issues has been highly ego-centric. People see things only from Taiwan's perspective. They refuse to see things from the Mainland's perspective. This has led to bias and paranoia. Ko Wen-je's evaluation of the other side's circumstances, came from the heart. It is an important step towards gaining the other side's understanding.

Rationally speaking, Ko Wen-je's analysis was entirely accurate. If one ignores the historical context, the Mainland is lacking in many ways. It has much room for improvement. It faces many challenges. It has much that can be criticized. But view Mainland evolution from a larger historical perspective, and one realizes it has made tremendous progress. This cannot be denied. Ko Wen-je referred to objective reality. He also appealed to reason.

Ko Wen-je was being fair. He spoke the truth. This is something DPP officials cannot bring themselves to do. This is something President Tsai Ing-wen cannot bring herself to do. This is something that KMT officials, deathly afraid of being labeled “Communist sympathizers”, cannot bring themselves to do. Paradoxically deep green Ko Wen-je, had the courage to say something that risked charges of “Communist sympathies”. In part, this was because Ko Wen-je is fearless, In part, this was because he cannot be easily accused of "pandering to China and selling out Taiwan". As a result, he could get away with being fair and speaking the truth.

In fact, President Tsai Ing-wen has the same political credentials as Ko Wen-je. She could be fair and speak the truth, just as Ko Wen-je did. Just imagine, suppose Tsai Ing-wen had said this. She could have displayed a transcendent rationality unprecedented in history. She could have revealed deep empathy toward the Mainland. If only she were capable of demonstrating such “sense and sensibility”, who knows how many problems bedeviling the two sides could be resolved? How sad that she lacks Ko Wen-je's tolerance and wisdom.

Ko Wen-je has provided Tsai Ing-wen with the necessary inspiration. Such empathy and flexibility opens the door to another political realm. In other words, our empathy towards the Mainland, can win us Mainland empathy towards Taiwan.

Ko Wen-je invoked history. He was fair to the Mainland. As a result, Ko Wen-je earned the right to speak the truth to the Mainland on behalf of Taiwan. Ko Wen-je noted how Taiwan has been occupied by the Dutch, ruled by the Ming and Qing Dynasties, and occupied by the Japanese. Taiwan experienced KMT rule, democracy, citizens' movements, and immigration. Four hundred chaotic years of history shaped Taiwan's pluralistic, open, often clamorous political culture. People are often “passionate but irresponsible”. They often betray a “surfeit of enthusiasm, but a deficit of patience”. Ko hoped the Mainland would be a little more understanding and forgiving.

Without Ko's preface, Ko's remarks would have remained nothing more than parochialism. He would have made demands of others, without making demands of himself. The impact of his words would have been greatly reduced.

Some may find the motives behind Ko Wen-je's high-minded speech suspect. Ko Wen-je's administration in Taipei City is troubled. That may be why he thew open the doors on cross-Strait issues. He could be making a last ditch attempt to salvage his political career. Given Ko Wen-je's flip-flops in the past, such suspicions are not unfounded. We hope Ko Wen-je is not making these calculations. We warn Ko Wen-je against harboring such motives. Voters are not blind. One cannot fool all of the people all of the time. Ko Wen-je's poll numbers continue to plummet. His governance lacks essential consistency. This is a lesson that Ko Wen-je has learned.

Leave aside Ko's motives for the moment. Consider only the results. Ko Wen-je's remarks were highly constructive. For now, he deserves affirmation. Politicians and government heads should be given incentives to say the right thing and do the right thing.

"As long as the two sides can reduce conflict, I am willing to try. As long as the two sides are willing to act in good faith, I am willing to work hard". Ko Wen-je's concluding remark is exactly how Taiwan should be dealing with cross-Strait relations.

柯文哲的話 蔡英文要聽
2016/7/28 中國時報

台北市長柯文哲接受本報專訪談及兩岸關係，強調兩岸要互諒，兩岸關係才會穩健。蔡英文政府執政以來，兩岸官方關係因九二共識爭拗而變得晦暗不安，社會關係也因民粹抬頭而顯得危機四伏，柯文哲這段談話超越了藍綠紅的界線與局限，展現的高度與氣度，令人耳目一新。

長期以來，綠營對中國大陸採取否定、負面的態度，相信大陸即將崩潰，否定大陸的成長與崛起，柯文哲卻提醒台灣人，中國歷史上「人人有飯吃」的朝代沒幾次，對岸13億人口在經濟上已算是「小康」，這麼龐大的經濟體沒出亂子相當不簡單，以歷史眼光來看，可以算「盛世」，台灣不應該繼續否定大陸的成就，應該給予正面的鼓勵。這一段對大陸拉出歷史縱深的評價，說出了在情也在理的「公道話」。

從情而言，這是一段深富同理心的評價，長期以來，台灣在思考兩岸問題時，經常掉進本位主義的陷阱，只從自己的角度想像，不願從對岸的角度思量，而流於一種偏執。柯文哲站在對岸的角度進行評價，這是在情感面上取得對方認同的重要一步。

就理言之，柯文哲的分析確實沒錯。若以斷代的角度來看，中國大陸當然有很多還不足、還不夠的地方。待改進的地方、將遭遇的挑戰、可挑剔的做法，當然仍有不少，但如果拉出歷史的時代縱深來看中國大陸的演變，其進步之巨大，也是不容無視的客觀事實。柯文哲說出了客觀事實，也說出了一個理字。

說也特別，柯文哲這一段「公道話」，不要說民進黨人士說不出口、蔡英文總統說不出口，長期以來懼怕被扣上傾中大帽的國民黨，恐怕也不敢說。反倒是曾被稱為「墨綠」的柯文哲，卻有膽識說出會被扣上「媚共」帽子的政治禁忌。這一方面是柯文哲天不怕地不怕的人格特質所致，另一方面，也是因為「傾中賣台」的帽子不易加諸他身上，讓他有充裕的政治空間說出「公道話」。

其實蔡英文總統和柯文哲有相同的「政治資本」，說出和柯文哲同樣的「公道話」。試想，若這一段公道話由蔡英文說出，不但可以展現其站立於歷史的宏觀理性，也同時釋放她能以同理心看待大陸的溫柔感性，一旦她願意展現這樣理性感性兼具的態度，不知可消弭多少兩岸面臨的風雨，只可惜她沒有柯文哲的氣度與智慧。

柯文哲的話，可以給蔡英文重要的啟發。這樣的同理心，還延伸出了另一個政治上的柔性空間，也就是，用我方的同理心，取得呼籲對岸也應當有同理心的正當性。

正因為柯文哲拉出了歷史縱深，對大陸現狀說出了公道話，也讓柯文哲取得了為台灣向大陸說公道話、進良言的高度與空間。柯文哲說，台灣從荷蘭、明鄭、清朝、日治，再到國民黨政府時期和這幾年的民主、公民運動，加上屬於移民社會，400年來紛紛擾擾的歷史，塑造台灣多元、開放甚至「喧囂」的政治性格；常是「熱情但不想負責、一窩蜂又沒耐心」，他希望大陸看待台灣時，能多一分了解和諒解。

如果沒有前面的公道話，這一段話就會掉入「只要求別人卻不反求諸己」的本位主義陷阱，效果將大打折扣。

當然，也有人從動機論解讀柯文哲這一段「有高度的發言」，認為是由於柯文哲「市政」面臨困局，才會在「兩岸」上選擇大開大闔，為政治生命做最後一搏。以過去柯文哲常有的反覆來看，這一點的擔心不能說全然沒有根據，我們希望柯文哲不是，也提醒柯文哲不可以懷有這樣的動機。選民的眼睛是雪亮的，一時權算只能欺於一時，柯文哲的民調持續滑落，其問政的一致性不夠，是重要因素之一，這一點柯文哲當學到教訓。

動機論之外，「結果論」的檢驗最重要，這一段有高度、有建設性的發言，柯文哲既然說得「對」，就應當給他「對」的肯定。這也是對政治人物、政府首長的一種鼓勵，鼓勵他說「對」的話、做「對」的事。

「只要是可以減少雙方衝突的，都願意嘗試；能增加雙方善意的，也願意去努力。」柯文哲這句結語，應視為對台灣社會如何處理兩岸關係的寶貴建議與提醒。

Loving Taiwan and Defending Fishing Rights: Empty Talk?

Loving Taiwan and Defending Fishing Rights: Empty Talk?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 26, 2016

Executive Summary: The Tsai regime recently proposed turning Taiping Island into a "humanitarian rescue center". Yet it refused to permit its own fishermen to land on the island. Out of one side of its mouth, the Tsai regime issues grandiose boasts. Out of the other side, it orders government agencies to erect barriers to prevent Taiwan fishermen from defending their fishing rights. How ridiculous is that?

Full Text Below:

After six days at sea, fishermen from the Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau regions finally arrived on Taiping Island to proclaim their fishing rights. Ironically, the Tsai regime blocked their way, and prevented them from landing. Eventually crewmen aboard the three vessels cited a lack of drinking water and the need for emergency shelter. As a result, the Tsai regime grudgingly permitted them to make a symbolic landing, but only on the dock next to the boats. Boats carrying reporters from Hong Kong were not allowed to set foot on the island. These shenanigans showed that the DPP government's ringing proclamations about “love for Taiwan”, “defense of fishing rights”, and “defense of sovereignty” are nothing more than empty talk.

From beginning to end, the Tsai regime obstructed this attempt by fishermen from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau to proclaim sovereignty. Originally a dozen or more fishing boats were supposed to participate. But the Department of Fisheries threatened boat owners with fines, impoundments, and license revocations. This forced half of them to withdraw. Once the fleet approached Taiping Island waters, the Ministry of Defense declared that Taiping Island was a "military control zone" requiring a 45 day waiting period, and refused to permit the fishermen to land. In fact the requirement applied only to aircraft wishing to use the landing strip on the island. After long drawn out negotiations, the fishermen finally cited exigent circumstances. Only then were they permitted to berth. The military continues to forbid fishermen from landing on the island. The reporters from Hong Kong are required to remain on the boats.

The South China Sea “ruling” demoted Taiping Island to the status of a "reef". The Tsai regime, having misjudged the situation, fell silent and willingly endured the humiliation. Its conduct raises questions about the ability and determination of the Tsai regime to defend the nation's territory. When private citizens launched protests against the unfair “ruling”, the Tsai regime resorted to bureaucratic stonewalling, leaving the public incredulous. Only two explanations are possible. First, the US government has tightened the screws on Tsai, out of fear that the fishermen's actions will attract attention from the international community. The second is that the Tsai regime itself is indifferent about whether Taiping Island is demoted to the status of a reef, and therefore feels no need to proclaim its sovereignty.

No matter which reason is the real reason, the Tsai regime has painted itself into a corner. First, consider the international strategic picture. Maintaining friendly relations with the United States may be important. But the ROC must not reflexively cave in to any and all US demands. It must not sacrifice its national interests and national dignity. The South China Sea “ruling” demoted Taiping Island's status. It undermined our territorial sovereignty, our nation's image, and our nation's morale. The President should encourage private citizens to register their discontent with the South China Sea “ruling” to the international community. This would reflect public opinion on Taiwan towards the South China Sea dispute as a “claimant country”. But the Tsai regime, as expected, groveled before foreign powers. Worse still, it humiliated its own fishermen in front of foreigners. It behaved like a spineless invertebate.

Second, consider the legitimacy of the national leadership. The Tsai government mobilized various agencies to prevent Taiwan fishermen from affirming out fishing rights. It attitude was bureaucratic. Its justifications were absurd. Its rhetoric was unconvincing. The Taiwan public was shocked. Obviously the Department of Fisheries and the Ministry of Defense were carrying out orders issued by superiors. Obviously they were not acting on their own initiative. Otherwise their actions would not have been so closely coordinated. Clearly the relentless interference reflects national policy. According to the polls, nearly 70% of the Taiwan public thinks President Tsai should land on Taiping Island and proclaim our sovereignty. It is bad enough that she has refused to do so. Worse still, she has ordered government agencies to prevent private citizens from doing so. How are people supposed to interpret her actions? How can they respect a leader such as this?

Third, the fishermen's spontaneous affirmation of fishing rights has attracted enormous attention, both at home and abroad. By contrast, the DPP regime's attempt to smear the fishermen and reporters from Hong Kong as “Communists”, is seen as an attempt to draw attention from the real issue. Executive Yuan spokesman Tong Cheng-yuan said that fishermen landing on the island would not have much impact on the international community. Anyone landing without permission, would merely invalidate our national sovereignty. This assertion is patently absurd. In fact, three reporters from Hong Kong, plus three reporters from Taiwan drew considerable international attention to the trip. They published photographs of the vessels bedecked with ROC flags, and of the captain dressed in an eye-catching ROC flag shirt. Unfortunately, Tsai regime obstructionism caused the BBC, Sing Tao Daily, Ta Kung Pao to focus on how Taiwan authorities made things difficult for Taiwan fishermen. Basically, the DPP regime shot itself in the foot.

Only three reporters from Hong Kong took part in the voyage. Why? Mainly because the Department of Fisheries required reporters to have "crew cards". This kept many reporters from Taiwan from participating. In fact, all three Phoenix TV reporters originally hailed from Taiwan. But they were inexplicably smeared as “Communists”. Clearly the DPP “Cultural Revolution” has escalated to the point where truth no longer matters. The Tsai regime invoked "fear of leaked military secrets" as reason to forbid reporters from landing on the island. But when it imposes such authoritarian measures, what right does it have to mock the Mainland authorities?

The Tsai regime recently proposed turning Taiping Island into a "humanitarian rescue center". Yet it refused to permit its own fishermen to land on the island. Out of one side of its mouth, the Tsai regime issues grandiose boasts. Out of the other side, it orders government agencies to erect barriers to prevent Taiwan fishermen from defending their fishing rights. How ridiculous is that?

愛台灣、護漁權，難道全是空話？
2016-07-27 聯合報

經過六天航行，赴太平島宣示護漁權的漁民終於抵達。諷刺的是，在政府部門一路阻撓下，入港的三艘漁船最後是以「缺水」、「緊急避難」為由獲許停靠，船員僅能在船邊踱步象徵「登島」，其他載有港媒記者的船隻則不得靠岸。這些幕前幕後，暴露了民進黨政府自詡愛台、護漁、護主權的宣示全是空話。

這次漁船的宣示行動，一路飽受政府打壓。原本有十多艘漁船報名，在漁業署揚言罰款、扣船、吊照的威嚇下，半數被迫打了退堂鼓。在船隊駛近太平島海域後，國防部還以太平島是「軍事管制區」為由，聲稱必須四十五天前申請才能登島（這其實是申請搭機登島的規定），拒絕漁民上岸。幾經交涉，漁船最後以緊急避難為由申請靠泊，軍方仍不許漁民登島，同行港媒記者則只能留在海上。

南海仲裁案我太平島被矮化為「礁岩」，政府誤判形勢在先，又默默噤聲、自甘吞忍於後，讓人質疑蔡政府護土的能力和決心。如今，民間自主發動護漁，抗議仲裁不公，政府卻又祭出官僚手段百般阻撓，實讓人百思不解。可能的解釋只有兩個：一是蔡政府迫於美方的壓力，唯恐漁民的行動引起國際社會注目；二是蔡政府本身對太平島遭矮化並不在乎，因此不覺得宣示主權是必要之舉。

不論是上述哪一個原因，都顯示蔡英文政府已逐漸陷入一個自縛手腳的泥沼。第一，從國際戰略的角度看，與美國保持友好關係固然重要，卻不表示台灣必須一味屈從，甚至要賠上國家利益和國格。太平島遭到矮化，使得領海主權受損，國家形象和士氣皆受挫折。在這種情況下，蔡英文總統本來應該鼓勵民間發聲，讓社會不滿南海仲裁的聲音發出來，這才能反映台灣作為南海爭議「聲索國」（Claimant Country）的嚴正立場。孰料，政府不僅一味媚外，更打壓漁民給外人看，表現像個軟骨動物。

第二，從國家領導的正當性看，蔡政府動用各部門阻撓漁船的護漁權行動，不僅態度官僚、理由荒謬，更缺乏說服力，在在讓民眾感到錯愕。不難想像，漁業署和國防部的相繼阻撓，必然都是奉承高層的指示而為，而非出於部門官員之主動，否則動作不會如此齊一。也因此，這一連串的干擾，也必定被解讀為國家領導人的政策方針。根據民調，有近七成的民眾認為蔡總統應親登太平島以宣示主權，她避不親為也就罷了，若竟還指示各部門竭力阻撓漁船登島，試想，民間將如何解讀其立場？又如何尊重這樣的領導人？

第三，從國內外的宣傳效果看，漁民自發宣示漁權，令人刮目；相對的，民進黨政府企圖「抹紅」漁船和隨行港媒，則反而使此行的意義失散了焦點。行政院發言人童振源稱，漁民登島對國際社會不會有太大的宣示效果，任何人未經許可即登島，國家主權將蕩然無存；此話根本大錯特錯。事實上，由於三名港媒隨船加上國內媒體不斷報導，不少國際媒體不僅關注此行，並刊出船上掛滿國旗、船長身著國旗裝的醒目照片。遺憾的是，因為一路折騰，包括ＢＢＣ、星島日報、大公報一度都將報導重點放在「台灣當局刁難」。這樣的反效果，不正是民進黨政府自己造成的？

更何況，船上之所以僅有三名港媒記者隨行，主要是漁業署要求登船記者必須持有「船員證」；如此一來，阻卻了許多原本有意前往的台灣記者。事實上，那三名鳳凰衛視的記者皆出身台灣，卻莫名遭到抹紅，可見民進黨的政治打壓已到了不問黑白的地步。而蔡政府以唯恐「洩漏軍機」為由禁止記者登島，這種威權管制手法，又與它譏嘲的中共政府有何兩樣？

蔡政府日前研商太平島角色，決議推動該島成為「人道救援中心」；如今，卻拒絕本國漁民登島。這種邊說大話、邊耍小手段的作風，不嫌太荒謬嗎？

Taiwan Fishermen Must Not Be Sacrificed to Curry Favor with Japan

Taiwan Fishermen Must Not Be Sacrificed to Curry Favor with Japan
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 26, 2016 

Executive Summary: The Tsai regime's attitude toward maritime cooperation and dialogue with Japan is highly ambivalent. It may even ignore the interests of Taiwan fishermen during negotiations. One cannot help wondering whether it intends to sell out Taiwan's fishermen in exchange for certain strategic interests, real or imaginary. Taiwan and Japan have had a channel for maritime dialogue since the Ma administration. It was originally intended to deal with fishing rights disputes caused by overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones. Taiwan and Japan were able to reach an agreement on fishing rights in waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. They ought to deal with fishing rights around Cong Zhi Niao Reef the same way. But the Tsai regime has already left fishing rights out of the first round of negotiations. It did this without even consulting Taiwan fishermen. One has to wonder. Does the Tsai regime even care about the rights of Taiwan's fishermen?

Full Text Below:

The Tsai regime's attitude toward maritime cooperation and dialogue with Japan is highly ambivalent. It may even ignore the interests of Taiwan fishermen during negotiations. One cannot help wondering whether it intends to sell out Taiwan's fishermen in exchange for certain strategic interests, real or imaginary. Taiwan and Japan have had a channel for maritime dialogue since the Ma administration. It was originally intended to deal with fishing rights disputes caused by overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones. Taiwan and Japan were able to reach an agreement on fishing rights in waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. They ought to deal with fishing rights around Cong Zhi Niao Reef the same way. But the Tsai regime has already left fishing rights out of the first round of negotiations. It did this without even consulting Taiwan fishermen. One has to wonder. Does the Tsai regime even care about the rights of Taiwan's fishermen?

Taiwan fishermen have the right to fish in waters surrounding Cong Zhi Niao Reef, since it is merely a reef, and not an island. Reefs lack Exclusive Economic Zones. Taiwan fishermen are naturally entitled to fish in the area. The South China Sea “ruling” on what constitutes an island and what constitutes a reef defined Cong Zhi Niao Reef as a reef, and not an island. Taiwan has objected to the proposterous classification of Taiping Island as a reef. Nevertheless according to the “ruling”, Cong Zhi Niao Reef is not an island. This is an embarrassment for Japan. On the one hand, Japan is demanding that Mainland China comply with the “ruling”. On the other hand, Japan refuses to comply with the “ruling” as it applies to Cong Zhi Niao Reef. That explains why Japan has remained silent on this issue. It has no desire to draw attention to the fact that Cong Zhi Niao Reef is merely a reef. Taiwan must of course argue its case as vigorously as possible. It must flatly reject Japan's claims regarding Cong Zhi Niao Reef. Sadly, the new regime's political agenda is seriously muddled. It is reluctant to publicly repudiate Japan's claims, because it is terrified of offending Japan. It is also concerned about a domestic backlash. It is afraid it will not be able to pacify Taiwan fishermen. Hence the bizarre situation noted above. On the whole however, the Tsai regime prefers to appease Japan, then maintain as low a profile as it can on the issue.

Since the new regime took office, it has cozied up to the US and Japan, and distanced itself from the Mainland. This is no secret. For the Tsai regime , friendly relations with Japan is of important strategic value. From this perspective, one might argue that the new regime's approach is “logical”. We understand the logic. That does not mean we agree with the logic. Still less does it mean we accept its negative consequences, particularly the harm inflicted upon Taiwan fishermen. The Japanese position on Cong Zhi Niao Reef is obviously pure sophistry and selective enforcement of the law. It refuses to apply the law consistently, but only selectively, when it is to its selfish advantage. The recent Dong Sheng Chi 16 incident is typical. The Japanese have the Tsai regime's number. They know the Tsai regime is terrified of giving offense to Japan. That is why the Japanese are being so tough on Tsai.

Must Taiwan unilaterally cave every time it negotiates with Japan? Or can it consider Taiwan's best interests vis a vis the strategic situation in East Asia? In fact, sound relations with Japan do not require automatically caving in to Japan's demands. International relations have always been a matter of quid pro quo exchanges. Taiwan is hardly the only party that wants something. Taiwan and Japan each want something from the other. Japan regularly sends warships into waters surrounding Cong Zhi Niao Reef. Why? Because it knows full well its claim to an Exclusive Economic Zone is cannot withstand scrutiny. The South China Sea “ruling” is lethal to Japan's claims. The Tsai regime can easily claim that Japan has no right to prevent Taiwan fishing vessels from fishing in waters near Cong Zhi Niao Reef. It can do so in exchange for its silence on Japan's spurious claims to an Exclusive Economic Zone. It need not cave in before negotiations have even begun. This of course can be interpreted as a gesture of goodwill towards the Japanese. But if such gestures of goodwill fail to win concessions from Japan, the Tsai regime must get tough. It must ensure that the Japanese understand Taiwan's concerns. It must  make reference to Japan's spurious claims regarding Cong Zhi Niao Reef.

The Tsai regime's policy toward Japan must be reexamined. Taiwan has close trade and people to people relations with Japan. Sound relations with Japan are of course conducive to Taiwan's economic growth. The Tsai regime assumes that Taiwan's membership in an anti-Mainland axis will win Japanese support for Taiwan, and enable it to resist pressure from the Mainland. But if this is achieved at the expense of the fundamental rights of the people of Taiwan, then it becomes a highly questionable proposition.

During the Ma administration the two sides had no need to compete with each other in the international arena. This enabled the Ma administration to remain tough in the face of Japanese pressure. In order to accommodate Taiwan, Japan had to grant concessions. This enabled the Ma administration to win many concessions for Taiwan fishermen. The Tsai regime's actions show that it lacks this ability.

Cross-Strait friction within the Chinese nation is clearly the result of Tsai regime provocation. As we can see, cross-strait relations affects more than cross-Strait exchanges. It also affects Taiwan's interaction with other governments. The Tsai regime must acknowledge the importance of cross-Strait relations. It must not see the Mainland only as an opponent. It must change its policy towards Japan. Relations between Taiwan and Japan must be equal and mutually beneficial. Only then can the people of Taiwan fully enjoy their rights.

台日友好不能犧牲漁民權益
2016/7/26 中國時報

蔡政府對台、日海洋事務合作對話態度十分曖昧，甚至刻意排除漁會參與，不禁令人憂心，是否企圖犧牲漁權，以交換戰略利益。台、日海洋對話機制的成立，本是為處理雙方經濟海域重疊所造成的漁權糾紛，馬政府執政期間，台、日雙方就釣魚台漁權紛爭達成協議，現在本應繼續處理沖之鳥漁權爭議，但本輪對話卻首次排除漁會參與，甚至未徵詢漁民意見，政府真的有心維護漁民的權益嗎？

漁民前往沖之鳥礁附近海域捕魚，正當性來源是沖之鳥是礁不是島，不能主張經濟水域，台灣漁民自然有權在此區域捕魚。南海仲裁結果出爐，仲裁庭關於島礁界定的嚴格標準，為判定沖之鳥的法理地位提供了充分依據，儘管台灣方面反對仲裁庭有關太平島的界定，但根據仲裁庭的界定，沖之鳥毫無可能被認定為「島」。在這種情況下，日本也陷入尷尬境地，一方面其要求大陸方面遵守仲裁庭的仲裁決定，另一方面又不接受相關判例延伸用於沖之鳥礁上。也正是這個原因，日本在此問題上極其低調，不希望沖之鳥礁議題引起過多關注。對台灣來說，理論上當然應該據理力爭，完全否定日本有關沖之鳥的主張，但現在新政府有其他政治考量，在此問題上陷入混沌不清狀態，既不願意公開否定日本的主張，以免影響台、日關係大局，另一方面又擔心台灣內部反彈，無法安撫漁民反對情緒，於是就有了上述令人匪夷所思的局面，但總體來看，政府還是更傾向於照顧日方的感受，配合在此問題上盡量低調。

新政府上台以來奉行親美日、遠大陸策略，已經不是祕密。對蔡政府來說，建構友好的台、日關係有其重要的戰略價值，因此新政府的做法也在情理之中。我們理解其政策邏輯，不代表我們認可這個邏輯，更無法接受其可能衍生出的負面結果，尤其是對漁民利益的可能損害。具體而言，在沖之鳥議題上，日本方面明顯強詞奪理，且其在沖之鳥附近海域的所謂執法行為也有選擇性，對各國漁船並非一體適用，反而是挑軟柿子捏，前段時間的東聖吉16號事件即是典型表現。某種程度上說，日本吃定蔡政府不敢對日強硬才會如此咄咄逼人。

我們不禁要問，對日協商談判難道只有妥協一途？還是可以在考量東亞戰略格局的基礎上據理力爭，為台灣爭取最大利益？事實上，台灣要鞏固對日關係，並不一定要一味地妥協。國際關係向來強調有來有往，更何況台灣絕非單方面有求於日本，而是台、日互相有求於彼此。日本之所以頻繁派出公務船在沖之鳥附近海域執法，正是因為其有關經濟海域的主張受到挑戰，而這次南海仲裁案出爐，更是對其有致命影響，蔡政府大可理直氣壯要求日本，應允許台灣漁船在沖之鳥礁附近海域捕魚，以換取台灣在相關經濟海域主張問題上低調，而不是像現在這樣，尚未談判就先配合演出。當然，這或許也可以理解為蔡政府向日方釋放的善意，但如果這種善意最終換不來日方的讓步，那麼蔡政府就必須展現強硬立場，讓日本了解台灣的核心關切，並引用相關判例否定日本的主張。

回到蔡政府的對日政策本身，我們也認為有重新檢討之必要。台、日經貿關係密切，民間互動頻繁，友好的台、日關係自然有利於台灣經濟發展，但如果蔡政府台、日關係定位在「準反中同盟」的層面，為了爭取日本對台灣的支持，以抗衡大陸的壓力，因而不惜犧牲台灣民眾的基本權益，那就很有可議之處。

過去馬政府時期兩岸關係穩定，兩岸之間不必為了彼此競爭而在國際場合內耗，因而馬政府在面對日本時也硬氣許多，日本反而為了拉攏台灣而選擇做出讓步，因而馬政府在對日談判中為台灣漁民爭取到許多權益，但現在蔡政府的所作所為卻讓我們看不到這種氣派。

兩岸內耗已經若隱若現，顯然這是蔡政府首先挑起的。從這個角度也可看出，兩岸關係的好壞不光影響到兩岸的直接往來，也牽涉到台灣與其他國家的互動。蔡政府如能正視兩岸關係的重要，不要以對立思維面對大陸，並在此基礎上重新調整其對日策略，將台、日關係回復到平等交往、互利合作的軌道上來，才能夠切實為台灣民眾爭取權益。

Tsai's Refusal to Affirm the 1992 Consensus Spells Double Trouble for Taiwan

Tsai's Refusal to Affirm the 1992 Consensus Spells Double Trouble for Taiwan 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 25, 2016 

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen told the Washington Post that she rejected the Mainland's deadline for affirming the 1992 Consensus. Taiwan now faces a double dilemma. Perhaps Tsai would like to tell the people of Taiwan when they can expect a breakthough? Whether Tsai responds to the 1992 Consensus is secondary. But the president is the nation's leader. Tsai Ing-wen has turned the rudder. She cannot throw up her hands and feign a "The owner isn't here” attitude. Taiwan is adrift. It is being battered by wave after wave. It is an ghost ship that may be overturned any moment.

Full Text Below:

President Tsai spoke to foreign reporters for the first time since assuming office. When the Washington Post asked her about the 1992 Consensus, Tsai said,  "Setting a deadline and demanding that the Taiwanese [sic] government defy the wishes of the people and accept the other side's conditions? That is highly unlikely". Cross-Strait relations are already troubled. Her comments have added fuel to the fire.

The Mainland-based Global Times interviewed academics. The People's Daily published an opinion piece, with attribution. The consensus is that Tsai, for all intents and purposes, has repudiated the 1992 Consensus. Some news channels on Taiwan reached the same conclusion. In response to the turmoil, the presidential office hastily undertook damage control. They accused the media of “reading too much into her statement”. Did Tsai mean to say that "when the bell rang, she would not hand in her test paper”? Perhaps not. But she has for the time being refused to hand in her test paper. That much is fact. More importantly, cross-Strait exchanges made possible by the 1992 Consensus have gradually been hollowed out, and will continue to be hollowed out. The foundation on which cross-Strait exchanges are conducted may eventually collapse. That too is fact. That is the major issue that warrants concern.

The fear that cross-Strait exchanges may end, is not not baseless paranoia. Consider Taiwan's international maneuvering room. The cross-Strait deadlock over the 1992 Consensus has presented the DPP with a double dilemma. Taiwan is being dragged, step by step, down a blind alley. The chief pressure naturally, is coming from the Mainland. The 1992 Consensus means “one China, different interpretations”. In the past Beijing stressed one China. Taipei stressed different interpretations. But Beijing tolerated this and remained silent.

Tsai however, has refused to affirm the 1992 Consensus. The Mainland has responded by highlighting “one China" while downplaying “different interpretations”. This May, during the World Health Assembly (WHA), Tsai was forced to swallow UN Resolution 2758. During the 1970s we referred to this as “the resolution that shut us out and classified us as an outlaw”. This resolution is the harshest possible manifestation of the "one China" principle. The resolution “expelled the Republic of China government from all illegally held positions in United Nations organizations”. It did more than declare that the PRC was the sole legitimate government of all China. It expelled the ROC from the UN.

The DPP refuses to accept the highly conciliatory 1992 Consensus. Yet it prostrates itself before the humiliating UN Resolution 2758. It even failed to do what the Ma administration did – emphasize Taiwan's need for participation. DPP representative Lin Chou-yan made no mention whatsoever of Taiwan, adding to the humiliation.

Worse still, UN Resolution 2758 is not going to remain an individual case that pertains only to the WHA. It will be applied universally, across the board. Tsai Ing-wen has been forced to swallow UN Resolution 2758 on the WHA. She will also be forced to swallow the upcoming September 27 ICAO General Assembly, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports is currently under preliminary planning. Unless Taiwan chooses not to participate, Tsai Ing-wen will yet again be forced to swallow UN Resolution 2758.

The pressure from the Mainland is grim. But Tsai rejected the 1992 Consensus. Therefore this pressure came as no surprise. On the other hand, the pressure from the UN is far more embarrassing for the DPP, since it amounts to betrayal by supposed “allies”. In order to please the United States and Japan, the DPP refused to defend ROC maritime sovereignty. It shrank from asserting ROC fishing rights. It referred to Cong Zhi Niao Reef as Cong Zhi Niao, parroting Japan in denying that it was merely a reef. The DPP was touching in its sincerity. What did it receive in return? It received the South China Sea “ruling”, with its preposterous reclassification of Taiping Island as a “reef”. Embarrassments such as these reflect the ugly reality of the “international community”, as well as the inevitable consequences of Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to maintain friendly relations with the Mainland.

When Ma Ying-jeou came to power, he actively sought friendly relations with the Mainland. In terms of US strategic interests, Taiwan and the Mainland becoming close may have elicited concern in Washington. But diplomatic face saving meant that the US nevertheless had to treat Taiwan with kid gloves. Now however, the United States no longer cares about how it treats Tsai Ing-wen. Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus makes it impossible for Tsai Ing-wen to befriend the Mainland. The South China Sea “ruling” has humiliated Tsai Ing-wen, who will now be regarded as the "little sister".

The American Institute in Taiwan is utterly indifferent to Taiwan's feelings about the South China Sea “ruling”. It leaped forward and claimed that the South China Sea “ruling” is legally binding. Clearly the United States cares not one whit about the Tsai regime's “face”.

Tsai Ing-wen told the Washington Post that she rejected the Mainland's deadline for affirming the 1992 Consensus. Taiwan now faces a double dilemma. Perhaps Tsai would like to tell the people of Taiwan when they can expect a breakthough? Whether Tsai responds to the 1992 Consensus is secondary. But the president is the nation's leader. Tsai Ing-wen has turned the rudder. She cannot throw up her hands and feign a "The owner isn't here” attitude. Taiwan is adrift. It is being battered by wave after wave. It is an ghost ship that may be overturned any moment.

Reaffirm the 1992 Consensus. Refit the ship of state with its old rudder. Or fit it with a new rudder. Demonstrate responsible leadership. Tsai Ing-wen has no excuse for shirking responsibility.

拒絕答卷 台灣陷入雙重壓縮困局
2016/7/25 中國時報

蔡英文總統首次接受國際媒體採訪，對於《華盛頓郵報》關於「九二共識期限」的提問，蔡英文回答：「設定期限，要求台灣政府違反民意去承受一些對方的條件，其實可能性是不大的」。在兩岸關係伏流洶洶的此時，這段談話又為兩岸添了幾許滔滔波浪。

大陸《環球時報》刊出學者訪談，《人民日報》也發表了署名評論，大體都認為是實質拒絕「九二共識」，台灣也有媒體做類似的解讀。鑒於風波擴大，總統府立刻幫蔡英文「收斂」，認為是過度解讀。中性而言，「鈴響交卷，拒絕九二」或許並非蔡英文談話原意，但「暫不交卷」卻是事實。更重要的是，九二共識這個逐漸被掏空的兩岸交流地基，將繼續被掏空，矗立其上的兩岸交流大樓可能逐漸崩塌，也是事實。這一點，才是真正該關心的大事。

擔心兩岸交流大樓可能崩塌，並非杞人之憂。以台灣的國際空間為例，由於兩岸在九二共識上的僵局，民進黨已陷入雙重壓縮的困局，正一步一步把台灣拖進死巷。第一重壓縮，自是來自大陸方面。九二共識的核心意涵是「一中各表」，過去雖然大陸偏向強調一中，我方偏向強調各表，但對這種「各有偏向的表述」，陸方基本上採取默許。

當蔡英文遲不承認九二共識，大陸順勢回到「一中」，更強勢壓縮「各表」，甚至在今年5月台灣出席世界衛生大會（WHA），逼蔡英文吞下曾在1970年代被我方稱為「排我納匪案」的《聯合國2758號決議文》，該決議是最強烈的「一中」表述，其決議載明「從它（蔣介石代表的中華民國政府）在聯合國組織及其所屬一切機構中所非法占據的席位上驅逐出去。」不僅是「宣示獨占」式的一中表述，更是「行動驅逐」式的一中表述。

民進黨不接受最懷柔的「九二共識」，卻在最強悍、甚至已達於屈辱的2758號決議上低頭，同時未依馬政府代表在演講時必提台灣的參與慣例，民進黨派出的代表林奏延還避談台灣，加碼了屈辱。

更糟糕的是，2758號決議不會是中共在WHA設定的「個案框架」，而將是「通案準則」，蔡英文將不只在WHA上吞下2758號決議，例如今年9月27日即將舉行的國際民航組織（ICAO）大會，外交部表示已在進行沙盤推演。但除非台灣選擇不參加，幾可確定，蔡英文必須再次在2758號決議下忍氣吞聲。

第一重壓縮雖然嚴峻，但當蔡英文拒絕接受九二共識的同時，這方面的壓縮尚是「可預見的壓縮」。然而，第二重壓縮，卻是讓民進黨更為難堪的壓縮，即來自盟友的背叛。民進黨為了討好美國與日本，不肯伸張海洋主權、怯於伸張漁權，把「沖之鳥礁」，改稱為「沖之鳥」，幾近附和日本，把沖之鳥礁「去礁化」。種種「真心」，卻在南海仲裁案換來太平島被「去島化」的「絕情」。這樣的難堪反映的是國際社會的現實，甚至正是蔡英文無能維繫兩岸友好關係的必然結果。

馬英九執政時，積極發展與大陸友善交流，從美國的戰略利益言，雖不免顧慮台灣和大陸走太近，但也因為這一層「顧慮」，使得美國反而在外交面上對台灣必須尊重在意。但現在，美國對蔡英文卻「完全沒有顧忌」。拒認九二共識的蔡英文已不可能與大陸交好，在南海仲裁案讓蔡英文難堪，也將被視為「小老弟」該隱忍的委曲。

這一點可以從美國在台協會完全不顧慮台灣感受，在南海仲裁案出爐後的第一時間，即跳出來表態強調南海仲裁具有法律約束力，可以看出連最後一點面子，美方都沒有幫蔡政府保留。

蔡英文在《華盛頓郵報》專訪時表示，不接受陸方對九二共識設定的答卷期限，蔡英文可能更該想想，民進黨對台灣面臨的雙重壓縮困境，能不能告訴台灣人民一個破困突圍的期限？答不答九二共識尚在其次，但身為總統，身為國家的領航人，蔡英文不能在拆了九二共識這個舵盤後，以一種「主人不在家」的心態，兩手一攤，任由台灣在洶湧浪濤的夾擊下，成為隨波漂流、隨時可能傾覆的無主鬼船。

要不就把九二共識重新裝回舵盤，要不就負責任地拿出新舵盤領導台灣，這是蔡英文無可推諉的責任。

Taiwan is in Peril, but Tsai Ing-wen Remains Silent

Taiwan is in Peril, but Tsai Ing-wen Remains Silent 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 22, 2016 

Executive Summary: Since the election, the ruling DPP has been taking one step at a time. But it is now the ruling party. It must answer to the people of Taiwan. It must offer them a clear direction. As Tsai Ing-wen herself conceded during the DPP's recent Party Congress, if ruling party change fails to solve problems, if it fails to effect structural change, the people will be disappointed not only in the DPP, but in democracy itself. Tsai Ing-wen can no longer afford to remain silent.

Full Text Below:

Taiwan is currently beleaguered by a host of problems. Yet President Tsai Ing-wen has evaded responsibility for every one of them, by wishing them  out of existence.

When the “ruling” on the South China Sea was announced, It miraculously demoted Taiping Island to the status of a "reef". The Tsai government publicly declared that it "would never accept it". But it refused to reaffirm the U-shaped line in the South China Sea and Taiwan's historic rights to the territory within. Tsai was determined to distance Taiwan from the Mainland's “joint defense of China's heritage, and resolute rejection of arbitration". As Tsai saw it, this would enable her to avoid association with the Mainland, help her avoid being denounced for selling out Taiwan, and enable the United States and Japan save face.

The DPP recently convened its 17th Party Congress, the first such gathering since its return to power. Delegates proposed two mutually contradictory amendments to the DPP party platform. One did away with the Taiwan independence party platform. The other did away with further reference to the Republic of China. The former put an end to Taiwan independence. The latter de-Sinicized Taiwan and stepped up moves toward Taiwan independence. Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen remained tight-lipped and suppressed both amendments. During deliberations, she declared that she was “maintaining the status quo”. She resorted to the same ploy used to such effect during the general election.

Equivocation, flexibility, and silence on critical issues. This are President Tsai's means for coping with cross-Strait and international problems. How will the new regime deal with the South China Sea issue? It will refuse to echo the Mainland's "joint defense of China's heritage”. It will refuse to mention Ma Ying-jeou's Ten Points Proposal for the South China Sea. It will instead attempt to use the South China Sea issue to gain a pulpit in Asian-Pacific multilateral negotiations, a seat in multilateral organizations, and expand its international presence. The South China Sea issue could become an entry point. It could also become a bargaining chip.

Taiwan's multilateral relations may provide the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia pretexts by which they can intervene. As for cross-Strait relations, Tsai suppressed both extreme amendments during the Party Congress. Tsai intends to do everything possible to suppress cross-Strait controversy and to avoid conflict in the Taiwan Strait.  While "maintaining the status quo", she intends to turn cross-Strait relations into multilateral relations between the Mainland, the United States, and Japan. In particular, she intends to promote her New Southern Strategy. It is not hard to understand why the new regime has resorted to equivocation and flexibility to avoid dealing with difficult international issues.

Singapore is the model of a small nation thriving among larger nations by means of multilateralism. But Singapore's history, geographical advantages, economic openness, and sense of timing, distinguish it from Taiwan. Politically Singapore is resigned to being surrounded by larger powers. It is adept at balancing the interests of its neighbors. It relies on its status as a free port, its transnational investments, its separation of state and economy, its efficient government, and total openness to outside capital. Its economic achievements power its diplomacy. Its success would be difficult to replicate within Asia.

To achieve multilateral win-win, the new regime must find its way as soon as possible. Unfortunately two months after assuming power, the DPP clings to its "maintaining the status quo" strategy. Internally and  externally, its policy remains equivocal. For two months, it has issued no clear foreign policy guideline. Just the opposite. It is aggressively calling for economic localization. The result has been declining imports and exports, and declining foreign investment. Taiwan is geographically small and densely populated. It is highly dependent on outside capital. But the current regime blocks outside capital. This renders its thoroughly deluded "From the world to Taiwan, from Taiwan to the World" logic even more irrelevant.

As Tsai Ing-wen said during the DPP Party Congress, the ruling DPP has been confronted with a series of crises only two months into its term. Responding to them has not been easy. The crises include the Taoyuan Airport flood, the China Airlines strike, the Hsiung Feng missile lauch fiasco, as well as battering from by typhoon. She said "Some of Taiwan's problems are the result of long-term structural defects. Others are the result of short-tem emergencies. But the only thing people care about is what the DPP government intends to do about them". Among these, the crises caused by long-term structural defects are the most serious. They are the ones that will determine Taiwan's future.

Several issues in particular demand clear thinking. First, is alienating Taiwan from the Mainland really necessary for a multilateral win/win strategy? If Taiwan severs its close connection with the Mainland, it will lose it most important economic partner. It will lose a major bargaining chip during negotiations with foreign nations and the other side of the Strait

Secondly, if Taiwan wishes to join the TPP, if it wishes to promote its New Southern Strategy, does it not need to play ball with the US and Japan? How can it permit the importation of US pork? How can it throw open the door to food imports from the Fukushima nuclear disaster area? How can any of these be good for Taiwan?

The DPP has long been adept at gauging public sentiment and inciting public indignation. The “ruling” on the South China Sea will not permit the DPP to exploit the results of “international arbitration”. It will not permit her to sell out ROC sovereignty over Taiping Island in exchange for US opposition to the Mainland. The DPP must be clear on this. Public opinion has enabled the DPP to defeat its opponents. But public opinion may come back to bite the DPP as well.

Since the election, the ruling DPP has been taking one step at a time. But it is now the ruling party. It must answer to the people of Taiwan. It must offer them a clear direction. As Tsai Ing-wen herself conceded during the DPP's recent Party Congress, if ruling party change fails to solve problems, if it fails to effect structural change, the people will be disappointed not only in the DPP, but in democracy itself. Tsai Ing-wen can no longer afford to remain silent.

沉默的蔡英文 危機四伏的台灣
2016/7/22 中國時報

近期台灣遇到的幾個複雜話題，統統被蔡英文總統「巧門」化解於無形。

南海仲裁案裁決結果出爐，太平島成「礁」，蔡政府公開表態「絕不接受」，但隻字未提U形線和台灣在南海的歷史性權利，以區隔大陸在南海仲裁上「共守祖產、一致拒絕仲裁」的提議，既不靠攏一中，又不被罵賣台，還兼顧了美、日的面子。

17日民進黨再度執政後第一次黨代會，代表們分別提出了修改台獨黨綱和撤廢中華民國兩個相互背離矛盾的提案，一個要「中止台獨」，一個要「去中急獨」，都被黨主席蔡英文按下不表，交付中執會研議，機巧延續了蔡英文自大選至今「維持現狀」的一貫立場。

模糊、柔軟、對關鍵性爭議保持沉默，這就是蔡總統因應兩岸問題及對外關係的「巧門策略」。按照這個策略邏輯，對南海問題，新政府最可能的做法是，不正面呼應「維護祖產」的提議，也不正面回應馬英九提出的南海十點建議，而是以南海為契機，藉此謀求亞太地區的多邊談判機會、加入多邊機制，爭取更多國際參與的空間。南海可能是切入點，也可能是籌碼。

未來台灣的多邊外交關係，可能加大美國、日本、東南亞各國的權重；而兩岸關係上，從黨代會擋下兩個極端化提案看來，蔡英文打算將一切可能挑起兩岸爭議的話題抹平在萌生階段，最大限度地避免矛盾激化，在台海兩岸「維持現狀」的情形下，加緊推進陸、美、日之外的更多面向的外部關係，尤其是新南向策略。由此不難理解新政府為何一再以模糊、軟化的行動，來處置尖銳的外部問題。

以小博大、多邊多贏，新加坡堪稱典範。但回顧新加坡歷史，其地理優勢與經濟開放度、時代節點的把握，都與台灣大不同：政治上新加坡接受周邊多個大國的存在，善於營造各國利益均勢；經濟上依託自由港、跨國投資、政經分離等，強力的政府加之充分的對外開放，以經濟成就了外交，這種成功，在亞洲範圍內可以說很難複製。

要經營多邊多贏的格局，新政府應盡速找到明確的路徑。遺憾的是，民進黨執政兩個月，在「維持現狀」的沉默「巧門」指導下，無論內部或外部，政策方向都非常模糊。兩個月來，看不出政府任何積極外向的施政指引，相反是積極對內呼應經濟在地化方向，任令進出口貿易持續萎縮，外來投資繼續衰退。台灣地狹人稠，必須依賴外來活水，但當下情形卻在阻絕外來活水。「從世界到台灣」、「從台灣到世界」的外部邏輯，就更無從談起了。

當然，正如蔡英文在黨代會上所說的，民進黨剛剛執政兩個月，面對了連串危機，因應實屬不易：桃園機場淹水、華航空服罷工、雄三飛彈誤射、颱風重創。她說：「台灣有些危機是長久的結構問題，有些是臨時的突發狀況，但人民唯一在意的，就是民進黨政府如何因應」。這其中，長久結構問題帶來的危機，攸關台灣的未來。

但我們仍應對幾個問題有清晰的思考：首先，背離大陸是不是台灣多邊多贏的必須選項？失去了與大陸的高度關聯，一方面台灣經濟將失卻主要夥伴，另一方面也會在國際空間中失去兩岸關係這個重大籌碼。

其次，如果要加入TPP，要推進新南向，是不是就要更加順應美日的指引，更緊密地捆綁，比如引進美豬？或給福島災區食品開門？對台灣究竟是好是壞?

民進黨歷來善於理解民意，南海仲裁激起的民眾憤慨，不會容許民進黨借國際仲裁結果的機會，以出賣太平島權利為籌碼連美抗中。看清楚民意的風險，民意可擊敗政敵，但也要當心民意反噬。

可以說，自大選以來，民進黨政府一直抱著「走一步，看一步」的戰術，但進入執政期，必須本著對台灣人民負責任的態度，對台灣的未來給出清晰的戰略考量。正如黨代會上蔡英文的自述，如果政黨輪替不能解決問題，不能改革結構，人民不只是對民進黨失望，更會對民主政治失望。小英，不能再沉默了。

Tour Bus Fire: Dangerous Escalation in People to People Enmity

Tour Bus Fire: Dangerous Escalation in People to People Enmity
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 21, 2016 

Executive Summary: People to people cross-Strait relations have recently taken a serious nose dive. It was in this poisoned atmosphere, that the tour bus fire incident occurred. Twenty-four tourists from Liaoning Province were burned to death when a tour bus on Taiwan ran off the road. The incident was both shocking and tragic.

Full Text Below:

People to people cross-Strait relations have recently taken a serious nose dive. It was in this poisoned atmosphere, that the tour bus fire incident occurred. Twenty-four tourists from Liaoning Province were burned to death when a tour bus on Taiwan ran off the road. The incident was both shocking and tragic.

Since President Tsai Ing-wen took office, cross-Strait relations have chilled. The discord began with verbal exchanges between officials from the two sides, and gradually spilled over into the private sector. Consider two recent examples. Taiwan actor Leon Dai was allegedly replaced by a movie director because he was an advocate of Taiwan independence. Dai issued a clarification, but that merely provoked more people from the two sides to lash out at each other. Soon afterwards a homemade video appeared, named "A Taiwan without Mainland tourists is much more serene”. Tsai Ing-wen's "Thinking Taiwan" website praised it. The undisguised bigotry of the video insulted members of the public on the Mainland. In response, Mainlanders lashed back.

Nor was this all. The “Mainland July 20 clamp down on Mainland tourists to Taiwan” turned out to be an unfounded rumor. Nevertheless Taiwan fell off the Mainland list of “Ten Hot Spots” for outbound summer tourism. Public anger on the Mainland has reached the boiling point. Following the tour bus fire, some Mainlanders went online and hinted at "premeditated murder". If the Tsai regime fails to deal with this matter, if it fails to demand that the public on Taiwan exercise restraint, cross-Strait relations may deteriorate or even spin completely out of control.

These developments reveal two qualitative changes. First, cross-Strait official alienation has spread to the private sector, and led to mutual recriminations and hostility. If the situation is allowed to spread, Taiwan's democracy, freedom, and cultural advantages over the Mainland, the very traits that won hearts and minds on the Mainland, will be lost overnight. Second, the green camp's blind hatred of “China”, i.e., the Mainland, is now provoking anti-Taiwan sentiment among ordinary people on the other side. This sentiment is bound to intensity because the DPP regime refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus.

The worsening of cross-Strait relations has spread from officialdom to the general public. Anti-Mainland sentiment on this side, has provoked anti-Taiwan sentiment on the other side. The two governments must pay attention to this alarming phenomenon. Once nationalist sentiment erupts, damage control may be futile. In the past, the opposition DPP's anti-Mainland strategy had no apparent drawbacks. Back then it served merely to hobble the KMT and Taiwan's economic progress. It had no significant impact on the CCP. It os a blind spot in green camp thinking. Taiwan must differentiate between anti-Communist and anti-Mainland sentiment. Anti-Mainland policy must seek support from the Mainland public. Conflating the two is extremely unwise.

Anti-Mainland sentiment will inevitably provoke a reaction. This is to be expected. Therefore anti-Taiwan sentiments from the Mainland are perfectly natural. There is nothing odd about them. Consider the Leon Dai incident for example. From Taiwan's perspective, one can condemn the Chinese Communist regime's intolerance as the cause from behind the scenes. But closer examination shows the DPP treating Mainland students worse than it treats foreign students. Is this consistent with freedom and equality? Worse still, Mainland students who come to Taiwan are among those most sympathetic to Taiwan. Yet we have long ignored their rights and feelings. Any mistreatment Leon Dai might have endured on the Mainland, was a mirror image of Mainland student mistreatment endured on Taiwan. That much is undeniably true. When we point the finger at the CCP, we must ask ourselves, what ever happened to the DPP's claim that it is championing "universal values"?

Twenty-two years ago, the Qiandao Lake incident exploded. Twenty-four Taiwan tourists visiting the Mainland were robbed and murdered. The incident exerted a major impact on the Taiwan public, and diminished peoples' identification with the Mainland. The number of dead from the tour bus fire is exactly the same. This coincidence represents a major setback for cross-Strait relations. It must not to be taken lightly.

Here we would remind the Tsai regime of three points. First, in order to maintain the “divided but peaceful” status quo, we must win the hearts and mind of the public on the Mainland. Therefore, we cannot indulge in anti-Mainland rhetoric. Tsai Ing-wen in particular, must not to allow her "Thinking Taiwan” website to be an agent provocateur. Second, cross-Strait relations must be mended. President Tsai refuses to even mention the 1992 Consensus. But the least she can do is demonstrate goodwill on other issues. She can appeal to the public to control hate speech. She can relax the constraints on Mainland students. Third, the tour bus fire tragedy revealed our own poor oversight of the transportation and tourism industries, and turned it into an international incident. The problem must be addressed in order to show our respect for human life. If done properly, it may restore much of Taiwan's lost lustre.

從火燒車警惕反台對反中的升溫
2016-07-21 聯合報

最近兩岸關係，在「民間」層次出現了一波惡化現象。就在這樣的氣氛中，發生了不幸的火燒車事件，廿四名遼寧旅客全數喪生在即將離台的路上，令人震驚與哀慟。

蔡英文總統上任後，兩岸關係轉冷，原只是雙方官方關係的齟齬與變調，竟逐漸往民間延燒。僅以最近的事例而言，日前發生戴立忍被指為台獨而遭導演換角事件，他發出澄清，更進而引發兩岸民眾你來我往的熱議和互批，情緒高漲。其後，台灣出現一系列民間自製的短片，誇稱「沒有陸客的台灣」反而多了寧靜；小英基金會旗下的「想想論壇」，則發表文章讚揚這些短片。由於其間赤裸裸的歧視情緒，刺痛大陸民眾的民族自尊，對岸網友一片討伐。

不唯如此，觀光業最近傳出陸方有「七二○全面封殺陸客赴台」的禁令，後雖證實為謠傳；但在大陸旅遊平台今夏出境旅遊「十大熱門景點」，向來熱門的台灣竟跌出榜外。可見，大陸民眾抵制台灣的情緒已在發酵；在遼寧陸客團發生措不及防的火燒車慘案後，對岸網友甚至有「預謀殺人」之說。由此看來，蔡政府若再不正視此事，並呼籲民眾節制，兩岸關係可能惡化至難以收拾的境地。

從這些發展，可以看出兩項質變：其一，兩岸官方的冷漠，已擴大為兩岸民間的互斥與敵視。若任由情勢延燒，台灣長期以來靠著民主、自由、文化而贏得大陸民眾好感的優勢，恐將一夕喪失。其二，綠營一味鼓吹的「反中」，如今已經召喚出對岸民眾的「反台」情緒；這點，勢將隨著民進黨政府拒絕承認九二共識而日益惡化。

兩岸關係的惡化從「官方」燒向「民間」，此岸的「反中」情緒點燃對岸的「反台」情緒，是兩岸政府必須共同警惕的現象。因為，一旦民族情緒越過了臨界點，傷害即難再彌補。過去，「反中」作為民進黨的在野戰略，看似無往不利；但觀察其作用點，其實只是有效牽制了國民黨，甚至羈絆了台灣的發展，而不是對中共發揮了打擊效果。這是綠營反中的盲點：對台灣而言，本來「反共」和「反中」之間應有所區別，但「反中」策略遭到濫用之後，原應「爭取大陸民間支持」的目標即被模糊，這一點都不明智。

「反中」勢必招致反作用力，這是可以預期的結果；也因此大陸民間的「反台」情緒隨之而來，自是毫不足奇。以戴立忍事件為例，從台灣的立場，我們固然可以譴責中共政權的不寬容是幕後始作俑者；但反求諸己，台灣在民進黨杯葛下，多年來一直以低於國際學生的標準對待陸生，這又體現了什麼自由平等？更何況，來台陸生其實是中國大陸對台灣最有好感的一群，我們卻始終漠視他們的權利和感受。有陸生稱，戴立忍在大陸的遭遇，其實正是陸生在台灣的遭遇的反射，此言不虛。當我們指控共產黨霸道，民進黨自詡的「普世價值」又在哪裡？

廿二年前的「千島湖事件」，有廿四名進香團台灣旅客遭到劫殺，嚴重衝擊人心，更造成台灣對中國認同的大倒退。這個死亡數字，和遼寧陸客團的火燒車死亡人數完全一樣，此一巧合，是否隱喻著兩岸關係一次反向的大倒退，切勿掉以輕心。

就此，我們要提醒蔡政府三點：第一，要維持兩岸「鬥而不破」的局面，必須爭取大陸民心，因此不可放任島內反中、仇中言論肆無忌憚地發酵，蔡英文尤不可讓「想想論壇」一再成為縱火現場。第二，在修補兩岸關係上，蔡總統縱然拒提九二共識，仍可設法在其他議題上釋放善意，諸如呼籲國內網友節制仇恨言論，乃至放寬陸生待遇等。第三，火燒車慘案暴露我交通及觀光管理的不善，已成國際事件，因此務必當成重要問題妥為善後，以示台灣對生命尊重的一視同仁。如果處理得當，或許多少能挽回台灣失去的形象。

Only Saying No to Independence Allows One to Say No to Reunification

Only Saying No to Independence Allows One to Say No to Reunification
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 20, 2016 

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has pointed herself into a corner. She says she "honors the Constitution of the Republic of China", which rules out no independence. Yet she refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, which means she demands Taiwan independence. If the DPP persists in demanding independence, it cannot expect Beijing to relent. But since it no longer demands Taiwan independence, then why not simply accept the 1992 Consensus, then demand "no reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force”?

Full Text Below:

During the DPP Seventh Party Congress, Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen addressed the General Assembly, yet failed to utter one word about cross-Strait relations.

The General Assembly assigned the matter of "a new constitution that maintains the status quo", and the question as to “whether the name Republic of China should be abolished", to the Central Executive Committee. Some party members say that assigning the matter of “a new constitution that maintains the status quo" to the Central Executive Committee, is the first step toward a new party platform. They said if it is upheld, then the matter of "whether the name Republic of China be abolished" will be also be left to the Central Executive Committee. That would be the first step toward abolishing the name “Republic of China”.

On the same day, Zhang Zhijun, Director of Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office, delivered a public message. He discussed the Taiwan issue and the Taiwan Strait issue in blunt terms. He characterized the Tsai regime in three ways. First, it has continued to promote Taiwan independence after returning to power. Second, it refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, and refuses to acknowledge it core meaning, that both sides are part of one China. Third, its policy declarations and actions are weakening the historical ties between Taiwan and the Mainland, politically, economically, and culturally. Fourth, it has interrupted communications and official negotiations, increasing cross-Strait uncertainty and risk.

Zhang Zhijun said "The one China principle is the cross-Strait compass. Depart from this principle, and the Taiwan Strait is endangered, and could be in serious trouble". Zhang Zhijun reiterated that "There is only one China. Taiwan is Chinese territory, and cannot be split off from it". He invoked the first two points of the old “Three Points”. In 2000, Qian Qichen updated the old Three Points to "There is only one China. The Mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no divisions". This became known as the "New Three Points". The old “Three Points” disappeared from Mainland officialdom. Yet Zhang Zhijun reverted to the wording of the old Three Points.

Zhang Zhijun's implication was clear. First, the 1992 Consensus differences remain unresolved. Second, unless they are resolved, the situation will deteriorate. Third, he concluded by emphasizing "promoting reunification". In contrast, the DPP Party Congress did not once mention cross-Strait relations even once during its General Assembly. Is this a case of “ostrich head in the sand” behavior? Or is this a case of the DPP simply being at a complete loss about what to say?

Zhang Zhijun reverted to the old Three Points language. But he invoked only the first two points. He did not mention the third point. He did not say "The Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of China."

We hope Zhang Zhijun did this consciously. If he did, that means there is still room for "one China, different interpretations". From Zhang Zhijun's perspective, the 1992 Consensus means "one China". Silence regarding the “different interpretations” part is a concession, a goodwill gesture from Beijing. Without "one China, different interpretations", Beijing cannot force the 1992 Consensus on Taiwan, and Taiwan cannot accept the 1992 Consensus.

The Ma administration pondered the 1992 Consensus for many years. It took "one China, different interpretations", and gradually reframed it as "no reunification, no Taiwan independence, no use of force". Had Ma not specified "no reunifcation”, he could not have said “no independence" to voters on Taiwan. Had he not said “no independence”, he could not have said "no reunification” to the Mainland. Although Beijing has never explicitly affirmed the “different interpretations” clause, but it has implicitly accepted it.

The global scenario has changed. The Mainland is now stronger, and Taiwan is now weaker. in fact, the DPP no longer calls for de jure independence at all. During the Party Congress, Koo Kuan-min told reporters that “Frankly we have no need [for the Taiwan independence party platform]. We are already an independent nation. Why do we need to demand independence?” Actually that is what the DPP has been saying, “We are already independent. Therefore we have no need to declare independence”. This is not that far removed from Ma's “no independence”. The only difference between the two is "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation" and "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation". In short, “already independent" is equivalent to "no independence". Once the DPP says "no independence", only then can it say "no reunification". Only then can reunification proceed slowly and cautiously.

Tsai Ing-wen vowed she would "maintain cross-Strait relations in accordance with the ROC Constitution and Regulations Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland China Area”. The ROC Constitution was amended "in response to the needs of the nation prior to reunification". It rules out independence prior to reunification. It also rules out reunification under unreasonable conditions that fail to win peoples' hearts and minds. If Tsai Ing-wen is serious about upholding the ROC Constitution, she can say "no independence” just as easily as she can say “no reunification".

Tsai Ing-wen has pointed herself into a corner. She says she "honors the Constitution of the Republic of China", which rules out no independence. Yet she refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, which means she demands Taiwan independence. If the DPP persists in demanding independence, it cannot expect Beijing to relent. But since it no longer demands Taiwan independence, then why not simply accept the 1992 Consensus, then demand "no reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force”?

Zhang Zhijun omitted the third point in the old Three Points. He left precious room in which the two sides can negotiate.

聯合／說不獨，才能說不統
2016-07-20 05:57 聯合報 社論

民進黨十七屆全代會中，黨主席蔡英文的致詞及大會宣言，竟然沒有一個字提到兩岸關係。

大會將「維持現狀新黨綱案」及「撤廢中華民國案」皆交中執會研議。有提案人說：將「維持現狀新黨綱案」交付中執會，形同宣示了訂定新黨綱的第一步；此說若成立，則將「撤廢中華民國案」交付中執會，是否也可說形同宣示了撤廢中華民國的第一步？

就在同日，北京國台辦主任張志軍在公開演說中，以尖銳的架構議論「台灣問題和台海情勢」。他將蔡政府定性：一、一個堅持台獨立場的政黨上台執政；二、拒絕承認「九二共識」和認同其兩岸同屬一中的核心意涵；三、其政策宣示和行動，從政治上、經濟上、文化上等各方面弱化和切斷台灣同大陸的歷史連結。四、導致了兩岸制度化溝通和協商談判機制的中斷，使兩岸關係增添了不確定性和風險。

張志軍說：「一個中國原則是兩岸定海神針；背離這一原則，台海就會險象環生，就可能出大亂子。」值得注意的是，張志軍恢復使用了「世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國領土不可分割的一部分」的論述，這是久未面世的「老三句」之前兩句。自二○○○年起，老三句經錢其琛改為「世界上只有一個中國，大陸和台灣同屬一個中國，中國的主權和領土不容分割」，這是「新三句」，此後老三句即從大陸高層涉台談話中消失。張志軍這項措辭，應可視作一個翻轉。

張志軍演講的整體大意是：一、九二共識的分歧仍待解決；二、否則事態勢將惡化。三、結尾強調「促統」。相較之下，民進黨在全代會上對兩岸關係無一字著墨，這是鴕鳥心態，或根本已不知說什麼才好？

張志軍重提「老三句」，但只說了前兩句，而沒有說出第三句，那就是：「中華人民共和國政府是代表中國的唯一合法政府。」

我們希望這是張志軍有意識的保留，因為其中仍存有「一中各表」的空間。以張志軍自己的語言而論，在「九二共識」中，「一中」如果是「原則」，「各表」即是「善意」。若無「一中各表」，北京不可能強加九二共識於台灣，而台灣也不可能接受九二共識。

九二共識經馬政府多年的琢磨與推移，已從「一中各表」，逐漸伸展至「不統／不獨／不武」。馬政府若不說「不統」，就對內說不出「不獨」；若不說「不獨」，就對北京說不出「不統」。北京雖迄未正面接受，但也知道這是必須默認的論述。

由於世局丕變，兩岸消長，民進黨其實已不再倡議法理台獨。辜寬敏在全代會向記者說：「（台獨黨綱）講白一點也不必堅持，我們已經是一個獨立國家了，還要堅持什麼？」亦即，民進黨其實已說了「已獨，所以不必再獨」，那麼，離說出「不獨」亦非遙不可及。其間的差異，只須將「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」，代換成「中華民國是一個主權獨立的國家」，「已獨」即成「不獨」。等到民進黨可以說出「不獨」，也就取得了說「不統」的空間。因為，統一自應徐圖慎進。

蔡英文說，「依據中華民國憲法及兩岸關係條例，處理兩岸事務」，而中華民國憲法是「為因應國家統一前的需要」而增修的憲法。「統一前」規範了「不獨」，但「統一前」也規範了不接受不合情理、不能達成心靈契合的統一。蔡英文若持守中華民國憲法，她當然應說「不獨」，也當然可說「不統」。

蔡英文的困境是自陷矛盾。既稱「依據中華民國憲法」，此即是「不獨」；但否定「九二共識」，卻被解讀為主張「台獨」。其實，民進黨若仍是台獨，即不可能奢求北京鬆手；但倘不再是台獨，則又為何不全力藉九二共識以爭取「不統／不獨／不武」的話語權？

張志軍保留了第三句話，這對兩岸都是應當珍惜的空間。

DPP Complacency, Tsai Ing-wen's Anxiety

DPP Complacency, Tsai Ing-wen's Anxiety
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 19, 2016

Executive Summary: The Democratic Progressive Party has convened its first Party Congress since its return to power. The old party princes have all stepped down and been replaced by younger generation leaders. Outside the venue, party members engaged in lively vote buying. But no one mentioned changing the party platform to read, “The DPP shall maintain the status quo". Tsai Ing-wen however reminded everyone of the difficulties the new regime has encountered since assuming power. She reminded everyone that they need to do more than jockey for positions of power among themselves. The DPP was pleased as punch. Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, was anxious. The party and the government were on different pages altogether.

Full Text Below:

The Democratic Progressive Party has convened its first Party Congress since its return to power. The old party princes have all stepped down and been replaced by younger generation leaders. Outside the venue, party members engaged in lively vote buying. But no one mentioned changing the party platform to read, “The DPP shall maintain the status quo". Tsai Ing-wen however reminded everyone of the difficulties the new regime has encountered since assuming power. She reminded everyone that they need to do more than jockey for positions of power among themselves. The DPP was pleased as punch. Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, was anxious. The party and the government were on different pages altogether.

The DPP underwent a major generational power transfer. It was out with the old, and in with the new. New faces appeared and inspired optimism. By contrast, the KMT generational succession has been a failure. It failed to sink roots in the community. It failed to properly manage the transfer of power. On the other hand, how many times has the DPP “rid the party of factionalism”? Factional struggles are going on as we speak. The Party Congress vote buying farce is being being performed right in front of everyone's eyes. The scene is truly ironic.

For decades, the DPP has been demanding that  political parties, the government, and the military divest themselves of their holdings in the media. Its cries are still ringing in our ears. But lo and behold, it is now openly courting the media. It has allowed the CEO of the Sanli TV network to form a “Hai Pai” faction inside the green camp. It has allowed it to squeeze the Frank Hsieh faction out of the DPP Central Standing Committee. Spinning this development as the party's "evolution", or as a “successful party media hybrid", is hardly going to fly. So political parties, the government, and the military must divest themselves of media holdings. But media friendly to the green camp may become part of the DPP. If the DPP validates this sort of logic, how can it possibly talk about transitional justice?

When factions gathered at the Party Congress, and held an “office picnic” during the generational power transfer, Chairman Tsai Ing-wen delivered her keynote speech in solemn tones. This was the reason why. The DPP took power just over two months ago, on May 20. Over the past two months, the Tsai regime has committed one blunder after another. Ministers have committed verbal and physical faux pas. They have mishandled a flood at the Taoyuan Airport, a strike at China Airlines, an accidental launch of a Hsiung Feng III missile in the direction of the Mainland, and the South China Sea arbitration controversy. Yet DPP politicians remain totally  oblivious. They stand by and do nothing. Their demeanor in the Legislative Yuan has been arrogant and insolent. They pass the buck for their own mistakes onto the previous administration. They revel in the fact that the DPP is now in power and conclude “Isn't this fun?” Perhaps this was why Tsai Ing-wen skipped the niceties and bluntly confronted everyone with the question, “Just what ideals and goals are we pursuing?”

This may be the second time the DPP has been in power. But it is the first time it has held a majority of the seats in the legislature. It clearly does not understand what “total governance” means. It clearly does not understand the difference between a Tsai government and a DPP government. In short, it has not thought through any of these matters at all. Because it does not understand the meaning of "total governance", it does not realize its first responsibility is to solve problems. Instead it behaves like an opposition party. It resorts to physical violence, and incites mob passions. It does not seem to realize it is an integral part of the ruling DPP government. That is why the Lin Chuan cabinet, particularly officials with blue camp backgrounds, are furious.

In short, the DPP has long been a party of social movements, accustomed to inciting unrest. The DPP now enjoys “total governance”. But it has yet to discard its social movement mobilization skills and its instinct for creating conflict. It lacks the ability to think and plan for the long term. It lacks the ability to use its authority to solve problems and contribute to the community. When Chen Shui-bian came to power, he was ridiculed as leader who did not know how to lead. The DPP dismissed these charges and blamed “minority government”. Now however, the DPP enjoys “total governance”. Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to abandon the party's populist demagoguery. She hopes to take a more stable, reformist path. But green camp legislators and local officials remain blind to the heavy responsibility of governing. They are intoxicated merely with being in power. This gap in mindsets is the source of Tsai Ing-wen's anxiety.

Tsai Ing-wen's greatest fear of course, is that public expectations for reform will turn to impatience and anger. Will the Tsai regime be able to get on track? If political and economic crises erupt, will the DPP be able to provide effective solutions? Or will it yammer on as it always has, and offer nothing in the way of progress? If the answer is the latter, people will conclude that the change in ruling parties was meaningless. Their hope may turn to disappointment and anger. Was this not the reason the KMT lost power?

For the moment, Tsai regime crisis management has enabled it to squeak by. But is the regime sincere? That remains in question. The DPP may have plenty of momentum, but it lacks all sense of direction. It lacks the ability to see the larger picture. It lacks problem-solving skills. Can the DPP government, and the DPP party, work hand in glove with each other? A huge gap remains. Myanmar champion of human rights Aung San Suu Kyi was in office for a mere 100 days when she was blasted for heading up a "democratic dictatorship". The DPP must be far more careful than it has.

民進黨的自滿，蔡英文的焦慮
2016-07-19 聯合報

民進黨執政後首次全代會選舉結果，眾天王告退，青壯派全面接班。相對於場內外熱鬧的綁票換票，攸關政黨路線的「維持現狀」黨綱提案，卻完全未獲討論；倒是蔡英文在會上細數執政的種種陣痛，提醒大家不能只是汲汲營營爭取權位。民進黨的亢奮自滿，對照蔡英文的焦慮，反映出黨政步調的落差。

民進黨新世代大舉接班，反映了政黨的新陳代謝，新人輩出，是值得樂觀的現象。相形之下，國民黨培植新人的後繼無力，則暴露出扎根和接力的困窘。然而，民進黨不知宣稱「解散」了多少次派系，此刻派系角力卻仍是全代會綁樁固票大戲的主軸，好不諷刺。

更令人側目的是，民進黨高喊數十年的「黨政軍退出媒體」，言猶在耳，這次卻公開向媒體招手，讓三立電視老闆以「海派」之名躋身綠營派系之林，更在中常委之戰擠掉謝系，使其系全軍覆沒。這樣的發展，若要名之為政黨的「進化」，或成功的「黨媒雜交」，恐怕令人難以信服。黨政軍必須退出媒體，但友好的媒體卻可以入駐政黨，這樣的邏輯如果成立，轉型正義還說得出口嗎？

正因為如此，當派系在全代會進行大拜拜、大接班的同時，蔡英文以主席身分發表致詞則難掩沉重。五二○新政府就任至今正好滿兩個月，兩個月來，執政團隊頻頻出包，除了閣員言行失當，從桃機漏水、華航罷工、雄三誤射、台東風災、南海仲裁遇襲，政府的處理飽受批評。然而，民進黨政治人物對此卻似乎感受無多，一味袖手旁觀，更頻頻在立法院表演傲慢、張狂言行，甚至將責任推給前任政府，一副「權力在手，樂趣無窮」的姿態。或許正因如此，蔡英文才省略了客套話，直言要大家問問自己：「我們從政的理想和目標到底是什麼？」

問題在，民進黨雖是第二次執政，更首度贏得了國會過半席次，但對於什麼是「完全執政」，卻似乎還不十分了然；對於「蔡政府」與「民進黨政府」之間到底有何差別，也還沒有思考清楚。正因為不了解「完全執政」的意義，所以缺乏以「解決問題」為先的心態，不時流露出在野黨習性的暴衝和挑釁情緒；也正因未意識到自己已是「民進黨政府」的一部分，所以對林全內閣──尤其是其中若干具有藍營背景的官員，不時怒目橫眉。

簡言之，民進黨拿手的，一直是作為一個「社運型」及「衝突型」的政黨。但今天民進黨完全執政了，它若依然只有社運的動員技巧及製造衝突的本能，卻沒有長期思考和制度規劃的能力，它即難以運用自己的權力來解決問題，回饋社會。上次陳水扁執政，遭到「不會執政」之譏，民進黨當時輕易地把問題推給「朝小野大」之局限。但如今民進黨已完全執政，而蔡英文也企圖揚棄陳水扁的民粹叫囂模式，希望走一條比較穩健改革的路線；然而，綠營立委和地方勢力卻未意識到執政責任的沉重，而一味沉醉在掌權的歡愉之中。這種心態上的落差，正是蔡英文的焦慮所在。

當然，蔡英文更大的焦慮，是民眾對於改革的期待何時會變為對陣痛的不耐。如果執政團隊一直無法步上軌道，如果各種政經危機一再爆發，而民進黨政府卻一直無法提出有效的解決方案，如果老問題總是一談再談卻看不到進展；如此，當人民無法感受到政黨輪替的意義，所有期待即可能轉為失望與憤怒。國民黨之所以失去政權，不正因為如此？

目前看來，蔡政府的危機因應在及格邊緣，但態度是否足夠坦誠則受到質疑；至於民進黨雖衝勁滿滿，卻缺乏方向感，看不到多元思考及解決問題的能力。民進黨政府如何形成黨和政協作並進的隊伍，仍有偌大的差距有待磨合。緬甸人權鬥士翁山蘇姬執政百日，即引來「民主獨裁」的批評，民進黨更須加倍慎之！

National Security Council Can No Longer Remain a Loose Cannon

National Security Council Can No Longer Remain a Loose Cannon
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 17, 2016

Executive Summary: When Tsai Ing-wen first assumed the presidency, she  was desperate to win public trust in the DPP government. Therefore she vowed to maintain the status quo, to comply with the provisions and amendments of the ROC Constitution. These include the "Act Governing Relations Between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area", and constitutional interpretations pertaining to cross-Strait relations. She hoped to ensure "sustainable, incident-free", peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations, and assured everyone during her inaugural address that "We are ready."

Full Text Below:

When Tsai Ing-wen first assumed the presidency, she  was desperate to win public trust in the DPP government. Therefore she vowed to maintain the status quo, to comply with the provisions and amendments of the ROC Constitution. These include the "Act Governing Relations Between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area", and constitutional interpretations pertaining to cross-Strait relations. She hoped to ensure "sustainable, incident-free", peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations, and assured everyone during her inaugural address that "We are ready."

But the new regime has been in power nearly two months. Six months, if one begins counting from the DPP's election victory. The record of the Tsai regime's national security team has been even worse than Cabinet Chief Lin Chuan's characterization of “utter chaos”. Former National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi and other National Security Council members from the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian eras, have expressed grave concerns. They fear that afraid peace in the Taiwan Strait may be set back, or even go from Cold Peace to Cold Confrontation, even to Cold War. Taiwan's prosperity, even its survival, could be at risk.

The Hague “ruling” on the South China Sea was extremely unfavorable. The Tsai regime's national security team was unprepared. When the “ruling” was announced, it lacked any prepared response. It even withdrew our Coast Guard cutters before the announcement, then redispatched warships to the region in a panic. The entire procedure, from beginning to end, was a fiasco. Fortunately, once the “ruling” was announced, the Tsai regime issued a righteous declaration regarding the ROC's sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea, including Taiping Island. It belatedly restored a degree of public confidence in the Tsai regime. The Mainland expressed the same sentiments, and established a fragile basis for cross-Strait interaction and trust, the first since May 20.

But the South China Sea issue requires more than Tsai Ing-wen standing on the deck of the Kangding class Dihua cruiser and making pro forma speeches. Above all the National Security Council must formulate strategic plans. For example, on the South China Sea issue, the two sides need military confidence building measures. We must link the historical 11 dashed line to our sovereignty over Taiping Island. We must link it to “one China” under which sovereignty is unified even though jurisdiction is divided. This does not detract from the reality of Republic of China sovereignty. In fact, it is entirely consistent with Article 4 of the Constitution, which speaks to "inherent territory". This is entirely consistent with the spirit of the 1992 Consensus, and has positive implications for cross-Strait relations.

Furthermore, the South China Sea is the Republic of China's strategic domain, and a symbol of the two sides shared heritage. The Tsai regime national security team cannot see the forest for the trees. It is preoccupied with distancing itself from Ma Ying-jeou's "East China Sea Peace Initiative". It is determined to curry favor with the United States and Japan, while distancing itself from Mainland China. In the process however, it is undermining our national sovereignty and the rights of Taiwan fishermen in our islands' Exclusive Economic Zones. It is also missing an historic opportunity to re-establish trust with the Mainland.

At a deeper level, the key to peaceful cross-Strait relations is whether the national security team can put people first, and get past its "If Ma Ying-jeou did it, then it must be wrong" attitude. It must cease demonizing the 1992 Consensus and turning the 1992 Consensus into an insurmountable barrier.

The National Security Council is the president's advisory body on national security policy. But the National Security Bureau is part of the National Security Council. Therefore "consultation" has a very broad meaning. It includes national strategic planning, defense policy and strategy, national crisis prevention, crisis management, counter-terrorism, as well as post-crisis damage control and communications. According to the Organic Law for the National Security Council, it is the body by which a civilian president commands the military, makes military preparations, wages wars and ends wars. It is an important national security entity whose importance is self-evident.

But with the exception of NSB Chief Yang Kuo-chiang, Tsai Ing-wen's national security team, who are the other members? Are they qualified in national security, national defense strategy, the organization of a professional military? Take the current national security team members for example. National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu and two deputy secretary-generals, along with Advisory Committee members are DPP elites. But can they transcend the DPP's narrow mindset, and put national survival and security strategy ahead of partisan political advantage? So far all they have done is hold forth on "Taiwan warships made by Taiwan. Taiwan warplanes made by Taiwan”. Would such projects be money pits? Would they be pragmatic and feasible? That remains to be seen.

Minister of Defense Feng Shi-kuan is now far removed from national security matters. The “little white dog” animal abuse case, and the Hsiung Feng III missile launch fiasco, highlighted the Tsai regime's incompetence. Has this led to a rare consensus in public opinion? Tsai Ing-wen's handling of the matter has undermined the prestige of the commander in chief and the morale of our nation's military.

President Tsai rarely had any contact with the nation's military in the past. Upon taking office she conduced inspections. Her public statements about the military have been measured. But as far as stabilizing the military, boosting morale, restoring discipline, she still has a long way to go.

Therefore we propose the following. First, Tsai must reorganize the national security team, including the Minister of Defense. Those who need to be replaced, must be replaced. Professionalism and performance must take precedence. They must trump DPP ideology. Appointments must not be a matter of political patronage.

Second, if for the sake of Taiwan's survival and the well-being of the public the Tsai regime must make a complete flip-flop, why not? The national security team should help President Tsai find a way out of her self-imposed "1992 Consensus" quagmire. It should use the South China Sea and Taiping Island issues to build cross-Strait trust. As soon as possible, Tsai should arrange to set foot on Taiping Island and declare our sovereignty.

Third, Tsai must fully implement a National Security Council crisis management mechanism. Restore the office of National Security Council spokesman. Integrate it with the Ministry of Defense, the National Security Bureau, and National Police Administration crisis prevention and communication mechanisms.

"Consulting masters ensures victory. Consulting novices ensures defeat". President Tsai Ing-wen's appointees to the national security team will determine victory or defeat. It all hinges on her whims.

國安團隊不能再荒腔走板
2016/7/17 中國時報

蔡總統當選之初信誓旦旦，要讓台灣人民信任民進黨政府，宣稱將以維持現狀，遵守《中華民國憲法》、憲法增修條文、《兩岸人民關係條例》和大法官釋憲案等作為兩岸關係的規範，以建立「可持續、沒有意外」和平穩定的兩岸關係。她在就職演說中展現了十足的自信，矢言「我們準備好了」。

但新政府上台已近2個月，加上勝選後的執政準備，其實已有半年之久，國安團隊的實際表現，卻比林全內閣的「離離落落」有過之而無不及，前國安會祕書長蘇起及多位李、扁時代的國安人士，都表達對國安團隊的憂心，唯恐台海和平發展倒退，甚至於由冷對抗墜落至綜合性的對立，乃至於冷戰，陷台灣生存發展於險境。

南海仲裁結果對我方極為不利，蔡政府國安團隊事前全無掌握，亦未針對可能情境擬妥備案，以至發生仲裁結果宣布前撤回海巡艦，宣布後又匆匆派出軍艦趕往巡弋的荒腔走板事件。所幸結果出爐後，蔡政府對包括太平島在內的南海諸島為我國固有領土作理直氣壯的立場宣示，總算讓國人稍許恢復對蔡政府的信心，中國大陸也表達同聲一氣的態度，成為520兩岸重啟互動、建立薄弱互信的契機。

不過，南海問題的後續，絕不止於蔡英文登上康定級迪化艦說說場面話而已，最重要的是，國安會是否有進一步的戰略規畫，諸如以南海問題，作為兩岸架構軍事互信的起點，將歷史既有的11段線連結太平島的主權隸屬，既含括兩岸分裂分治前的「一中」，也無損於現實的中華民國主權，更合乎憲法第4條「固有之疆域」與九二共識的精神，對兩岸關係尤有正面的意義。

進一步言，南海是中華民國的主權、戰略要域，更是兩岸共同祖產的象徵，蔡政府國安團隊絕不能見樹不見林，只為與馬英九先前的「東海和平倡議」切割，或為了討好美、日而避諱和大陸立場相近，損害國家主權經濟海域與漁民權益，將錯失與大陸重新建立互信的歷史機遇。

更深入地說，兩岸關係能否和平發展的關鍵，即在於國安團隊是否能以國家、人民為重，是否能走出「凡馬英九皆錯」的迷思，不要再汙名化九二共識，而自陷於與九二共識僅咫尺之隔的困境。

國安會是總統有關國家安全政策的諮詢機關，但由於國安局隸屬於國安會之下，故所謂「諮詢」，其實有十分寬廣的範疇，具體而言，凡國家戰略規畫、國防政策與戰略，包括國家危機預防、危機處理與反恐，以及國家發生危機後的損害管制、危機傳播等。就國安會組織法及職權而言，國安會其實是文人總統領軍，建軍備戰、啟戰、止戰，管控國家安全的重要機制，其重要性不言可喻。

但令人疑慮的是，蔡英文所任命的國安團隊，除國安局長楊國強外，其他成員是否具備國家安全、國防戰略、建軍備戰所需的專業？就現有的國安會成員而言，祕書長吳釗燮及二位副祕書長、諮詢委員等人皆為民進黨精英，但是否能走出民進黨的窠臼，以國家的高度規擘台灣生存發展安全的戰略，迄今為止，除「國艦國造、國機國造」外，乏善可陳，而上述政策是否為錢坑，是否務實可行，亦待檢驗。

國防部長馮世寬早已遠離國防安全實務，他在小白狗虐死案與雄三誤射事件中的荒腔走板表現，是否稱職亦成為朝野及輿論難得一致的共識，蔡英文對其「留校察看」，其實有損三軍統帥的威信與國軍士氣。

另方面，過去與國軍鮮少接觸的蔡總統，雖然在上任後多次視察三軍部隊，發表的談話也四平八穩，但距離穩定軍心、提振士氣、重建軍紀，卻尚遙遠。

因此，我們提出以下建議：其一，重整國安團隊成員，包括國防部長在內，該換則換，以專業及功能考量，超越民進黨意識型態，而非酬庸安插。

其二，為了台灣生存發展，並以全民福祉為念，縱使「髮夾彎」必須轉彎又何妨？國安團隊應協助蔡總統走出「九二共識」的困境，研擬以南海太平島作為建立兩岸互信的槓桿，並盡速安排蔡英文登上太平島，宣示主權。

其三，充實國安會危機處理機制，包括恢復國安會發言人的機制，整合國防部、國安局及警政署等對重大維安事件的預防與危機傳播。

「用師則王，用徒則亡」，蔡英文總統所任命的國安團隊關係國家興替安危，師徒之分，在於蔡總統的一念之間。

New Southern Strategy is an Impossible Strategy

New Southern Strategy is an Impossible Strategy 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 14, 2016

Executive Summary: The new regime is in a hurry to promote its New Southern Strategy. Unfortunately problems have arisen at the Formosa Plastics steel plant in Vietnam, and the China Steel steel plant in India. If this were not enough, the Philippines has demanded arbitration in the South China Sea, adding fuel to the fire. Clearly the New Southern Strategy is far more problematic and risky than the new regime imagined. The new regime must improve relations with the governments on its New Southern Strategy list. It must establish channels by which it can negotiate, solve problems, and sign agreements. Otherwise its New Southern Strategy will remain a pipe dream.

Full Text Below:

The new regime is in a hurry to promote its New Southern Strategy. Unfortunately problems have arisen at the Formosa Plastics steel plant in Vietnam, and the China Steel steel plant in India. If this were not enough, the Philippines has demanded arbitration in the South China Sea, adding fuel to the fire. Clearly the New Southern Strategy is far more problematic and risky than the new regime imagined. The new regime must improve relations with the governments on its New Southern Strategy list. It must establish channels by which it can negotiate, solve problems, and sign agreements. Otherwise its New Southern Strategy will remain a pipe dream.

The Formosa Plastics steel plant in Vietnam required nearly 10 years of planning and construction. Total investment approached 340 billion NTD. It finally began operations. But last month, on the eve of its opening, the Vietnamese government conducted a tax audit, and demanded an additional 70 million USD. Without any evidence, the Vietnamese government blamed Formosa Plastics for marine pollution that resulted in fish kills. This incited public outrage, and the  Vietnamese government fined Formosa Plastics 500 million USD.

Worse still, Formosa Plastics was forced to endure this mistreatment. Formosa Plastics Group Chairman Wang Wen-yuan and Vice President Wang Jui-hua went to Vietnam to deal with the matter, only to find themselves held for ransom. Unless they paid the 500 million USD, they would not be allowed to leave, and the plant would not be allowed to begin operations. Formosa Plastics was forced to pay out 500 million USD before the plant could begin operations.

China Steel factories in India also suffered a serious setback. The Indian government reneged on its agreement. Tariffs on hot-rolled steel raw materials were originally set at 5%. But the Indian government doubled the rate to 10%. By contrast, competitors Japan and South Korea only had to pay 1%. According to China Steel, its plant in India is probably unsustainable, and the company is already "expecting the worst".

The new regime is holding high its New Southern Strategy banner. It is trumpeting a new era of community with Southeast Asia, of trade with India and other nations in South Asia. It seeks to shift Taiwan investment on the Mainland to other parts of the world. Its primary purpose is "de-Sinicization" and increased diversification.

First consider de-Sinicization. Both academia and industry have criticized de-Sinicization as "unrealistic and impracticable".  The Mainland's economy is worth 10 trillion USD. It is the second largest economy in the world. Annual import volume is 2 trillion USD. After the United States, it is the second largest market in the world. By contrast, Southeast Asia's economy is worth 2.6 trillion USD. India's economy is worth 2.2 trillion USD, less than half that of the Mainland. Furthermore, Taiwan and the Mainland share the same culture and the same language. They have been doing business with each other for several decades. The new regime would replace the Mainland with nations in the south. But as objective data and hard reality show, that is simply impossible.

Now consider diversification. It makes sense not to put all one's eggs in one basket. Businesses need to avoid excessive reliance on only a few major customers. The same is true for nations. But when seeking alternatives, one must protect the markets one already has. The new regime's policy has turned cross-Strait relations into a Cold Peace. Attempting to reduce cross-Strait economic and trade relations, in order to shift them to the south is obviously a mistake, and the risk is obviously much too high.

If the new regime is determined to implement its New Southern Strategy and enable companies to invest in the south, it must improve bilateral economic and trade relations with these governments. In the short term this will help companies secure better conditions. In the event companies run into trouble, the government must come forward on their behalf and help them find solutions.

In the mid to long term, it must sign agreements with these countries in Southeast Asia, including investment agreements and tax treaties. It must seek preferential tariff treatment and investment protection. Businesses require government protection. Investments require legal protection. This will encourage companies to adopt the New Southern Strategy. Otherwise, the new regime's New Southern Strategy will remain a solo performance.

Many of those who advocate the New Southern Strategy say that investments on the Mainland are not protected by the rule of law. Guangxi rules, therefore investment risks are high. But the New Southern Strategy has the same problems. In fact, the problems are even more serious. Among the New Southern Strategy target nations, only Singapore boasts clean government and the rule of law. Other nations are plagued by official corruption and unclear laws. The Formosa Plastics steel plant in Vietnam, and the China Steel steel plant case in India, make that all too clear.

When Taiwan companies that have invested on the Mainland encounter problems, the two sides had channels for problem solving. Numerous agreements have been signed in recent years. Taiwan businessmen and Taiwan investments on the Mainland have been afforded protection and dispute resolution mechanisms. The Mainland even had a “pro-Taiwan” policy rooted in political considerations. It gave priority to problems encountered by Taiwan companies. Countries targeted by the New Southern Strategy lack such channels. This is apparent from the new regime's utter lack of response to Vietnam's mistreatment of Formosa Plastics and India's mistreatment of China Steel. The new regime has played dead and said nothing.

We would like to offer the new regime a bit of advice. Putting all one's eggs in one basket is of course inadvisable. But before spreading them all out, take care of the basket first. Otherwise one may wind up throwing good money after bad. To spread the risk by means of the New Southern Strategy, the new regime must first strengthen bilateral relations, and establish channels for problem solving. It must first sign safeguard agreements. Otherwise the New Southern Strategy will remain an Impossible Strategy.

蔡政府別讓新南向變新難向
2016/7/14 中國時報

新政府風風火火推新南向政策時，天外飛來一件台塑越南鋼鐵廠事件，接著又出現中鋼投資印度鋼鐵廠再出問題，而菲律賓提出的南海仲裁案更如雪上加霜。顯示新南向政策可能比新政府的想像與預期更難、風險更高，新政府如果無能強化與新南向政策相關各國政府的關係，建立對口單位、協商出解決問題的機制，簽署需要的各項協定，新南向政策終將成為鏡花水月。

台塑越南鋼鐵廠經過近10年的規畫、興建，總投資金額高達台幣3400億，終於要點火生產營運，但點火前夕，台塑越鋼上個月先被越南政府查稅，要求退還7000萬美元；接著在缺少證據的情況下，越南海域汙染導致魚群大量死亡、引發民眾憤怒一事，越南政府歸因台塑越鋼排放廢水不當，為此被罰款高達5億美元。

更離譜的是台塑不得不「吞下」苦果，原因是台塑集團總裁王文淵、副總裁王瑞華前往越南處理相關事項，結果人被扣住，如不賠出5億美元則恐怕無法離境、高爐點火亦遙遙無期，台塑不得不在點火前就賠出5億美元。

中鋼到印度設廠同樣嚴重受挫，印度政府推翻設廠前的協議，將原本承諾中鋼要進口的熱軋原料關稅從5%驟升至10%，但相較之下，日本、南韓等競爭國只要1%。根據中鋼的說法，印度廠恐怕難以為繼，「已經有最壞打算」。

新政府高舉新南向大旗，要增加與東南亞共同體、印度等南亞大陸國家的經貿往來，把台灣的對外投資從高度集中於大陸導向其他地區，主要目的一個是「去中國化」，一個是減少過分集中化。

對「去中」的目的，學界與業界已多所批評，認為「不切實際，難以達成」，因為大陸是規模10兆美元的全球第二大經濟體，每年進口數量有2兆美元，是全球僅次於美國的第二大市場。相較之下，東南亞共同體經濟規模2.6兆美元，加上印度的2.2兆美元，還不到大陸的一半。加上台灣與大陸文化、語言相同的優勢，及過去數十年的經營，新政府要以新南向取代大陸，坦白說，客觀數據與現實情況都可看出：不可能做到。

但對分散市場、避免集中化的目的，確有其必要。即使是一家企業，也必須避免訂單過分集中特定大客戶的風險，國家亦復如此。不過，開展其他市場商機的同時，也必須保護、維持與原有市場的關係。新政府政策讓兩岸關係陷入「冷對抗」，意圖以冷卻兩岸經貿關係成就新南向，在方法上明顯是錯誤，風險亦高。

如果新政府真心要落實新南向，讓企業願意前往投資、增加與強化雙方經貿關係，必須加強且做到者，最重要的就是政府能與各國政府加強關係，短期而言是幫企業爭取到更佳條件，而且一旦廠商出事，政府可代廠商出面與對方政府對口，協助廠商排除問題。

中長期而言，則是必須與各國或東南亞共同體簽署各項協議，從投資協定到租稅協定、爭取優惠關稅與投資保障等。企業在有政府為倚靠、投資有法律保障下，才可能增加追隨新南向政策的意願。否則，新南向終究只是政府自拉自唱的政策。

許多主張新南向者一直以來的說法是，大陸投資因為法律不落實、人治為主，投資風險很高；但同樣的問題也存在於新南向政策中，甚至更為嚴重。新南向對象國中，大概只有新加坡是政府清廉、法律明確、法治落實的國家，其他國家多存在著相當嚴重的政治不清明、官員貪腐、法治不落實等問題，這從台塑越鋼案與中鋼印度投資案已經非常明確地顯現。

甚至我們可以說，即使同樣存在著這些問題，但企業在大陸投資出問題時，過去兩岸都有對口單位、解決管道；近幾年更已簽署多項協定，對台商在大陸的投資與人身安全都有一定的保障與解決機制。甚至大陸官方過去基於「友台」的政治考量，對台商各項問題都有更高的重視。新南向政策中的國家，台灣顯然尚未建立類似管道與機制，這從政府對台塑越鋼、中鋼印度投資案等問題，毫無反應、不發一語的「裝死」態度即可看出。

我們還是要向新政府進一言，雞蛋過分集中於一籃子並不好，但在分散前要先看顧好這一籃雞蛋，否則可能賠了夫人又折兵；而要落實分散風險的新南向，政府就該先做到強化雙邊官方關係、建立解決問題機制、簽署保障協定等，否則，新南向政策，難矣！