Lee Teng-hui's "Two States" have become "Two Friends"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 30, 2009
Lee Teng-hui met with James Soong at Tsui Shan Chuang for two and a half hours. He then announced his latest cross-Strait policy perspectives at a meeting of Taiwan Advocates. He said he had "no objection to deepening exchanges between Taiwan and China." He said "Three links, four links, five links are all okay." He said "You are you, I am me, but you and I are friends."
Lee Teng-hui's two moves reveal an attempt to make up for two major blunders he once committed. Internally, Lee Teng-hui's biggest mistake was to purge James Soong, making a Lien/Soong ticket impossible, and causing the KMT to lose power. It also denied Lee Teng-hui a place in history. He was instead relegated to the status of Godfather of Taiwan Independence. Today, Lee and Soong met in secret. Lee Teng-hui probably regrets the decisions he made back then. In terms of cross-Strait relations, Lee Teng-hui's "National Unification Guidelines" was a failure. His "Special Two-States Theory" was a failure. His Taiwan independence path he adopted after stepping down was a failure. He even went so far as to said "I am not an advocate of Taiwan independence. I have never advocated Taiwan independence." Such examples show that on cross-Strait policy, Lee Teng-hui is a chicken without a head. He has now advanced a new cross-Strait theory. He probably hopes to find a new place for himself in the annals of history.
Lee Teng-hui's new cross-Strait theory, has in effect, radically deconstructed his past cross-Strait theory. Lee Teng-hui has finally acknowledged the rise of Mainland China. He no longer talks about the "Coming Collapse of China." He has finally endorsed the Three Links. He no longer talks about his "No Haste, Be Patient" policy. He no longer stresses his "Two States Theory." He now says "You are you, I am me, but you and I are friends." In fact, such views were forseeable 20 years ago. Lee Teng-hui was in power for twelve years. He has been out of power for nine years. Today, after running around like a chicken with its head cut off for the past 20 years, Lee Teng-hui is finally mouthing words such as these. What is this, if not the very thing Lee himself decried so often and so long? What is this, if not "Taiwan's Sorrow?"
But were it not for Lee Teng-hui's major debacle, we might not have our current domestic political and economic consensus and cross-Strait relations. Lee Teng-hui's squelching of the Lien/Soong ticket brought down the KMT, enabling Chen Shui-bian to seize power with only 39.3% of the vote. But the biggest paradox of all is that an ethnic separatist Taiwan independence political path turned out to be unacceptable not merely to Beijing, but also to mainstream society on Taiwan. In other words, without Lee Teng-hui's "No Haste, Be Patient" policy, and Chen Shui-bian's "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution," leading Taiwan toward a political and economic impasse, would mainstream society on Taiwan ever have experienced today's awakening?
At the same time, between Beijing and Taipei, we have a thought-provoking paradox. After enduring the thunder and lightning of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the Beijing government arrived at a newer and clearer understanding of the Republic of China's political institutions and public mood. This gradually changed its Taiwan policy from one of propaganda attacks and military intimidation, to Hu Jintao's "framework for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations." In retrospect, without Lee Teng-hui bringing down the KMT, how could Lien Chan have made his "ice-breaking journey" and established a KMT/CCP platform? Without Chen Shui-bian's "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution," and "Plebiscite to Join the UN," would Beijing have been willing to affirm the "92 consensus" advance cross-Strait relations to where they are today? Perhaps if the Lien/Soong ticket had prolonged KMT rule, Lee Teng-hui might still be the power behind the throne. Perhaps the public on Taiwan might still be deadlocked over the issue of reunification vs. independence. Perhaps Beijing's policy of propaganda attacks and military intimidation might still be the same. And so on, and so forth. Is this not the ultimate paradox?
Lee Teng-hui now speaks of "cross-Strait friends." But he has yet to resolve the problems he created with his "Two States Theory." Lee Teng-hui has yet to explain what our national identity ought to be during cross-Strait negotiations. Today Lee Teng-hui says "You are you, I am me, but you and I are friends." He no longer advocates Taiwan independence or "Taiwan and China / One Country on Each Side." Why doesn't Lee Teng-hui repudiate, here and now, his past allegation that the "Republic of China no longer exists?" Why not reaffirm the Republic of China, and on its basis establish cross-Strait relations? Why not desist from criticizing the Ma administration, accusing it of falsifying the meaning of the "92 Consensus?" Why not affirm the "One China, Different Expression" consensus reached by the public on Taiwan? It would be one thing if "One China, Different Expressions" had not been publicly endorsed by Beijing. But to defend the Republic of China is something Taipei must do and can do.
Lee Teng-hui has repudiated almost every one of his past positions on Taiwan independence. But if he refuses to reaffirm the "Republic of China," what will his new cross-Strait theory be based upon? He once advocated Taiwan independence, therefore he repudiated the Republic of China. Now that he has revised his position on Taiwan independence, isn't it time he reaffirmed the Republic of China? Is his sole reason for forsaking Taiwan independence to make friends with Beijing? Will refusing to endorse the Republic of China and "One China, Different Expressions" really prevent Taiwan from becoming what Lee Teng-hui referred to as a "pawn nation?" Will it really prevent Taiwan from being manipulated by Beijing?
Lee Teng-hui's soul searching reflects the plight of the Taiwan independence movement. The DPP's "Consensus Conference on Development Strategy" wants only to debate the Ma administration about ECFA. It is terrified of debating the Ma administration on its Mainland policy. Is this not pathetic? It this not ridiculous?
李登輝的「兩國論」變成「兩岸朋友論」
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.30 05:30 am
李登輝在翠山莊密會宋楚瑜兩個半小時，接著又在群策會上宣示他最新的兩岸政策觀點：「不反對台灣與中國深化交流」、「三通、四通、五通都不要緊」，以及「你是你，我是我，但你我是朋友」。
李登輝的這兩個動作，顯示正試圖對他過去所犯的兩大錯誤進行修正補綴。對內而言，李登輝最大的錯誤是整肅宋楚瑜，使連宋配破局，終致國民黨喪失政權，也因而使李登輝自己失去歷史落點，淪落為台獨教父；如今，李宋密會，李登輝自不免會有何必當初的感慨。對兩岸而言，李登輝早期的「國家統一綱領」路線失敗、後期的「特殊兩國論」失敗，卸任後的台獨路線亦告失敗，他甚至說，「我不是台獨，從來沒有主張過台獨」；凡此種種，皆顯示李登輝在兩岸政策上根本是一隻無頭蒼蠅。現在，他又提出了兩岸關係新論，毋寧是想為自己在歷史評價上找尋一個立錐之地。
李登輝的兩岸新論，不啻將他過去的兩岸舊論徹底解構。李登輝終於承認了中國的崛起，不再談「中國崩潰論」；終於贊同三通，不再談「戒急用忍」；也不再強調「兩國論」，而稱「你是你，我是我，你我是朋友」……。這些觀點，其實在二十年前即可預知預見，但如今竟是出自主政十二年、卸任九年如無頭蒼蠅般地嗡嗡亂飛了二十幾年的李登輝口中，這豈不正是台灣人的悲哀？
不過，如果不是李登輝的大失敗，國內政經共識與兩岸關係恐怕也不可能出現如今的新境界。李登輝否定了「連宋配」，拖垮了國民黨，使陳水扁以三十九‧三％的選票取得政權；但弔詭的是，因此在最後也藉以驗證了分裂族群的台獨路線非但是北京所不能接受，亦且也是台灣主流社會所不能接受。亦即，若非李登輝的「戒急用忍」與陳水扁的「正名制憲」，將台灣政經情勢逼入絕境，台灣的主流社會豈會有今日之覺醒？
與此同時，在兩岸之間也出現了一個耐人尋味的弔詭。北京政府在經歷李登輝與陳水扁的雷電風雨之後，對台灣的民主機制與民意內涵顯然亦有新的領悟；其對台政策因而漸由文攻武嚇，轉變至今日胡錦濤主持的「兩岸關係和平發展框架」。回想起來，若無李登輝拖垮國民黨，豈會出現連戰的「破冰之旅」及國共平台？若無陳水扁的「正名制憲」、「入聯公投」，北京又豈有可能以一個各說各話的「九二共識」將兩岸關係推進至今日境地？或許，當年倘若以「連宋配」延續了國民黨政權，而仍由李登輝垂簾聽政，今天台灣的統獨僵局恐怕仍然打不開，北京的文攻武嚇也仍然改變不了。如此這般，豈非弔詭？
然而，李登輝的「兩岸朋友論」，仍舊未能解決「兩國論」的問題。李登輝仍未交代清楚的是：台灣究竟應以如何的國家認同來面對兩岸關係？如今，李登輝試圖以「你是你，我是我，你我是朋友」的說法，來替代「台灣中國／一邊一國」的台獨論述；但李登輝何不就此否定自己曾經說過的「中華民國已不存在了」，重新回到「中華民國」的地位上來建立他的兩岸新論。亦即，不要只是批評「九二共識」為馬政府所假造，而何不也贊同以「一中各表」為台灣全民的共識與底線？「一中各表」尚未被北京公開接受是一回事，但中華民國堅持此義卻是台灣自己可為及應為之事。
李登輝幾乎否定了他過去主張的所有的台獨相關論述，但若不回到「中華民國」的立場，請問這套兩岸新論如何立足？過去是因主張台獨而否定中華民國，如今修正了台獨難道也不回歸中華民國？難道放棄了台獨，只與北京作「朋友」，而不主張中華民國及一中各表，就能如李登輝所說不使台灣成為「棋子國家」，不受中國擺弄？
李登輝的反省，其實反映了獨派的困境。但民進黨的「發展策略共識會議」，卻只想與馬政府辯論ＥＣＦＡ，而完全不敢面對中國政策的黨內大辯論。豈不可悲？豈不可笑？
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Monday, June 29, 2009
Upgrades for Cities? Or Makework for Bureaucrats?
Upgrades for Cities? Or Makework for Bureaucrats?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 29, 2009
With its "examinations," the Executive Yuan has approved the upgrading of three counties and municipalities to the status of Directly Administered Regions. Everyone, especially those from counties and municipalities been selected for upgrading, is excited. They wax eloquent about the imminent improvements in regional well-being upon being upgraded. Alas, we must remind them of an alternate possibility -- bureaucrats may fatten themselves at the public trough.
According to local government guidelines, the upper limit for people on the payroll of a Directly Administered Municipality with population over two million, is 15,400 persons. The Taipei County government currently has about 5,000 civil servants. That means 10,000 more positions will be available. The Taichung County government currently has about 6000 employees. It will be authorized to increase that number by over 9200 persons. The numbers for Kaohsiung County and Kaohsiung City have yet to be determined. Taichung Deputy Mayor Hsiao Chia-chi has vowed to exercise enormous restraint after being upgraded. The Taichung City government may increase the number of its employees by 9,200, Does his vow to increase the number of employees by "only" 1,000 persons qualify as "enormous restraint?" These 1,000 employees represent a 16% increase in the size of its bureaucracy. Taipei City and Kaohsiung City are currently the only two Directly Administered Muncipalities. From top to bottom, the two cities each have over 12,000 employees. Given Parkinson's Law, and the example of Taipei and Kaohsiung, sooner or later these newly upgraded municipalities will increase the number of their employees to the allowable limit.
Some people may ask: What's wrong with increasing the number of civil servants in order to better serve the public following an upgrade? One. Is increasing the number of employees really the only way to improve services given their current bureaucratic structure? Two. Will increasing the number of civil servants necessarily lead to an improvement in the quality of public services? The answer to both these questions is no. At the very least it is not yes.
Payroll expenses for government agencies, from the central government level to the local government level, has long constituted a large percentage of the total budget. Take the central government for example. Annual average payroll expenses exceed 400 billion NT. The payroll is currently between 25 and 30% of the total budget. It exceeds the GDP by over 4 percent. It exceeds the payroll of neighboring countries by approximately 1 to 2%. Take local city and county governments for example. Local municipal governments, including Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, each year spend as much as 400 billion NT on payroll expenses. This figure exceeds even the 300 billion in revenue these cities and counties collect on their own.
If we include cities, towns, and villages, local government payroll expenses exceed 400 billion NT. Death and Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY) is estimated at over half of 800 billion NT. In other words, the public pays taxes. The government budgets expenditures, over half of which is spent on salaries for civil servants. It is hard to convince the public that the number of civil servants and the extent of the bureaucracy is "inadequate." It is hard to convince the public that civil servants cannot provide better services to the public. They have enough people. Payroll expenses represent a large percentage of total expenditures. If public services are still inadequate, shouldn't administrative efficiency be improved, rather than the bureaucracy expanded?
Many precedents have shown that large increases in government agency staff usually fail to increase the quality of services. Instead "front line management personnel" steering those performing their jobs leads to major improvements. The public spends a great deal of money employing more civil servants. But the actual return and improvement in services is far less than the amount paid. In other words, the more bureaucrats one has on the payroll, the more unproductive work is performed relative to productive work. Therefore, can one really expect a proportionate increase in public services and public well-being once a municipality has been upgraded and the number of employees increased? Obviously not.
Moreover, the government must incur a high cost recruiting civil servants. According to expert figures, the average annual salary of civil servants is 120 million NT, far higher than salaries in the private sector. It is also twice the average per capita income. If one considers pensions, the cost is even higher.
Any organization will find it easy to put on fat, and hard to lose it. But for private enterprise this problem is easily solved. The market solves the problem of organizational bloat. Organizationally bloated, over-capitalized private businesses must eventually review their bottom lines. Therefore companies must conduct massive layoffs, streamlining their organization. Otherwise they will be eliminated by market forces. When the same problems occur within a government bureaucracy, the lack of a market-based bottom line, coupled with bureaucratic inertia, ensure that the problem of organizational bloat is never addressed. Personnel are added but never subtracted. The government has been chanting reform and the streamlining of personnel for over a decade. But , the chants have come to nothing. Any reductions in the number of civil servants are largely the "fruits" of privatizing public enterprises. This is why governmental organizations find it easy to put on fat, and hard to lose it.
The upgrading of cities and counties has its pros and cons. But the blind expansion of a bureaucracy invariably spells disaster. We hope the government will give priority to this issue. In upgrading, one must maintain strict controls. Personnel must provide mutual support, or be transferred as needed to avoid bureaucratic bloat. Once municipal governments have been upgraded, the government must appreciate the financial pressures imposed upon government by the blind increase in governmental agencies and personnel. It must outsource as many public projects to improve or expand public services as possible. Otherwise, upgrading will not bring increased well-being. It will be a prelude to disaster.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.29
社論－莫使升格釀成官僚肥化的災難
本報訊
在行政院「會考」通過三縣市升格案後，各界─特別是得到升格通過的縣市，都興奮的描繪升格後，民眾福祉的提升與地方未來的榮景。不過，我們必須提醒另一個面向─官僚肥化的災難。
依照地方行政機關準則的規定，人口超過二百萬人的直轄市，其員額編列可達一．五四萬人；台北縣現在公務員數約五千人，還有一萬人的增加空間；台中縣市府員工數合計約六千人，尚可再增九千多人；高雄縣市的數字則未知。即使升格後的市政府很克制，如台中市副市長蕭家旗說的，升格後台中市政府員額可增加九二○○ 人，但初期「只要先增加一千人」。很克制吧？但，這一千人代表的其實就是官僚一口氣膨脹了十六％。以目前台北市與高雄市兩個直轄市的市府員工數，都在一萬二千多人上下來看，在「有為者亦若是」的效果下，遲早這些新的直轄市員工數都會靠向這個極端數字。
也許，有人會說：升格後增加公務員數，擴大對民眾服務，有何不好？這句話要成立前，要先問兩個問題：第一、現在的官僚組織是否不足，只有增加人數才能提供更多服務？第二、增加員額就一定增加對民眾的服務與提高民眾福祉嗎？這兩個問題的答案，恐怕都是否定的，或至少不是肯定的。
我們的政府單位，從中央到地方，人事費用占預算支出的比例一直偏高；以中央政府而言，平均每年人事費用支出大概在四千多億元，占整體預算的規模都在二五至三○％上下，與ＧＤＰ的比則是在四％多，鄰近其它國家則多在一到二％上下。再看縣市地方政府吧，包含北高直轄市在內的各地方政府，每年人事費決算數字也高達四千多億元之譜；這個數字比縣市自有財源三千多億的數字還高。
如果把包括鄉鎮市考慮在內，地方政府四千多億的人事費用，占歲出決算金額八千多億元的五成以上；換言之，民眾繳稅、政府編列預算支出，有一半以上花在養公務員上。這些數字，很難說服社會大眾說：公務員人數與官僚組織「還不夠多」，所以無法對民眾提供更佳的服務吧？人數夠多、人事支出又占整體支出比重高，如果民眾仍覺服務不足，該檢討改進的是行政效率，不是擴編官僚組織吧？
許多例子都顯示，政府機構人員大幅擴充，通常第一線服務者增加的比例不高，反而是「管理第一線人員」、「督導」業務者，大幅增加。結果就是民眾多花了很多錢增聘公務員，但實際得到的回報與服務，遠低於其付出。換言之，官僚愈多，無用工作取代有用工作的程度愈大。所以，期待升格後的直轄市，大幅擴充員額後，得到如數增加的服務與福祉嗎？顯然不能。
更何況，政府增聘公務員成本相當高，依學者統計，公務員平均年薪是一二○萬元，遠高於一般民間薪資，也是平均國民所得的兩倍。如再考慮退休撫卹，其成本更高。
任何組織都有易肥難瘦的特性，但這個問題對民營企業較容易解決，因為，市場會解決組織肥大問題。組織肥大、成本過高的民營企業，終究會反映在財務數字上，因而讓企業有壓力必須大幅裁員、精簡組織，否則將被市場淘汰。同樣的問題發生在政府官僚單位，因為缺乏市場財務數字的查驗，加上官僚必有的惰性，組織肥大問題從來就無法解決，人員幾乎從來就是「有進沒出」。台灣政府喊了十多年的政府改造、人事精簡，最後不了了之；公務員帳面數字的減少多數來自公營事業民營化的「成果」，即可窺見政府組織易胖難瘦的韌性。
縣市升格之事千頭萬緒、利弊參見，但官僚體系盲目擴充必是災難一場。期望政府能夠先注意此問題。在升格之際，能以總量控管、人員彼此支援或撥用方式，避免官僚體系過分肥大。而升格後的市政府，更應體認盲目擴充組織與人員對財政所造成的壓力，將許多有意強化或增加對民眾服務之項目，儘量以外包方式為之。否則，升格不是幸福的到來，而是另一場災難的序曲！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 29, 2009
With its "examinations," the Executive Yuan has approved the upgrading of three counties and municipalities to the status of Directly Administered Regions. Everyone, especially those from counties and municipalities been selected for upgrading, is excited. They wax eloquent about the imminent improvements in regional well-being upon being upgraded. Alas, we must remind them of an alternate possibility -- bureaucrats may fatten themselves at the public trough.
According to local government guidelines, the upper limit for people on the payroll of a Directly Administered Municipality with population over two million, is 15,400 persons. The Taipei County government currently has about 5,000 civil servants. That means 10,000 more positions will be available. The Taichung County government currently has about 6000 employees. It will be authorized to increase that number by over 9200 persons. The numbers for Kaohsiung County and Kaohsiung City have yet to be determined. Taichung Deputy Mayor Hsiao Chia-chi has vowed to exercise enormous restraint after being upgraded. The Taichung City government may increase the number of its employees by 9,200, Does his vow to increase the number of employees by "only" 1,000 persons qualify as "enormous restraint?" These 1,000 employees represent a 16% increase in the size of its bureaucracy. Taipei City and Kaohsiung City are currently the only two Directly Administered Muncipalities. From top to bottom, the two cities each have over 12,000 employees. Given Parkinson's Law, and the example of Taipei and Kaohsiung, sooner or later these newly upgraded municipalities will increase the number of their employees to the allowable limit.
Some people may ask: What's wrong with increasing the number of civil servants in order to better serve the public following an upgrade? One. Is increasing the number of employees really the only way to improve services given their current bureaucratic structure? Two. Will increasing the number of civil servants necessarily lead to an improvement in the quality of public services? The answer to both these questions is no. At the very least it is not yes.
Payroll expenses for government agencies, from the central government level to the local government level, has long constituted a large percentage of the total budget. Take the central government for example. Annual average payroll expenses exceed 400 billion NT. The payroll is currently between 25 and 30% of the total budget. It exceeds the GDP by over 4 percent. It exceeds the payroll of neighboring countries by approximately 1 to 2%. Take local city and county governments for example. Local municipal governments, including Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, each year spend as much as 400 billion NT on payroll expenses. This figure exceeds even the 300 billion in revenue these cities and counties collect on their own.
If we include cities, towns, and villages, local government payroll expenses exceed 400 billion NT. Death and Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY) is estimated at over half of 800 billion NT. In other words, the public pays taxes. The government budgets expenditures, over half of which is spent on salaries for civil servants. It is hard to convince the public that the number of civil servants and the extent of the bureaucracy is "inadequate." It is hard to convince the public that civil servants cannot provide better services to the public. They have enough people. Payroll expenses represent a large percentage of total expenditures. If public services are still inadequate, shouldn't administrative efficiency be improved, rather than the bureaucracy expanded?
Many precedents have shown that large increases in government agency staff usually fail to increase the quality of services. Instead "front line management personnel" steering those performing their jobs leads to major improvements. The public spends a great deal of money employing more civil servants. But the actual return and improvement in services is far less than the amount paid. In other words, the more bureaucrats one has on the payroll, the more unproductive work is performed relative to productive work. Therefore, can one really expect a proportionate increase in public services and public well-being once a municipality has been upgraded and the number of employees increased? Obviously not.
Moreover, the government must incur a high cost recruiting civil servants. According to expert figures, the average annual salary of civil servants is 120 million NT, far higher than salaries in the private sector. It is also twice the average per capita income. If one considers pensions, the cost is even higher.
Any organization will find it easy to put on fat, and hard to lose it. But for private enterprise this problem is easily solved. The market solves the problem of organizational bloat. Organizationally bloated, over-capitalized private businesses must eventually review their bottom lines. Therefore companies must conduct massive layoffs, streamlining their organization. Otherwise they will be eliminated by market forces. When the same problems occur within a government bureaucracy, the lack of a market-based bottom line, coupled with bureaucratic inertia, ensure that the problem of organizational bloat is never addressed. Personnel are added but never subtracted. The government has been chanting reform and the streamlining of personnel for over a decade. But , the chants have come to nothing. Any reductions in the number of civil servants are largely the "fruits" of privatizing public enterprises. This is why governmental organizations find it easy to put on fat, and hard to lose it.
The upgrading of cities and counties has its pros and cons. But the blind expansion of a bureaucracy invariably spells disaster. We hope the government will give priority to this issue. In upgrading, one must maintain strict controls. Personnel must provide mutual support, or be transferred as needed to avoid bureaucratic bloat. Once municipal governments have been upgraded, the government must appreciate the financial pressures imposed upon government by the blind increase in governmental agencies and personnel. It must outsource as many public projects to improve or expand public services as possible. Otherwise, upgrading will not bring increased well-being. It will be a prelude to disaster.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.29
社論－莫使升格釀成官僚肥化的災難
本報訊
在行政院「會考」通過三縣市升格案後，各界─特別是得到升格通過的縣市，都興奮的描繪升格後，民眾福祉的提升與地方未來的榮景。不過，我們必須提醒另一個面向─官僚肥化的災難。
依照地方行政機關準則的規定，人口超過二百萬人的直轄市，其員額編列可達一．五四萬人；台北縣現在公務員數約五千人，還有一萬人的增加空間；台中縣市府員工數合計約六千人，尚可再增九千多人；高雄縣市的數字則未知。即使升格後的市政府很克制，如台中市副市長蕭家旗說的，升格後台中市政府員額可增加九二○○ 人，但初期「只要先增加一千人」。很克制吧？但，這一千人代表的其實就是官僚一口氣膨脹了十六％。以目前台北市與高雄市兩個直轄市的市府員工數，都在一萬二千多人上下來看，在「有為者亦若是」的效果下，遲早這些新的直轄市員工數都會靠向這個極端數字。
也許，有人會說：升格後增加公務員數，擴大對民眾服務，有何不好？這句話要成立前，要先問兩個問題：第一、現在的官僚組織是否不足，只有增加人數才能提供更多服務？第二、增加員額就一定增加對民眾的服務與提高民眾福祉嗎？這兩個問題的答案，恐怕都是否定的，或至少不是肯定的。
我們的政府單位，從中央到地方，人事費用占預算支出的比例一直偏高；以中央政府而言，平均每年人事費用支出大概在四千多億元，占整體預算的規模都在二五至三○％上下，與ＧＤＰ的比則是在四％多，鄰近其它國家則多在一到二％上下。再看縣市地方政府吧，包含北高直轄市在內的各地方政府，每年人事費決算數字也高達四千多億元之譜；這個數字比縣市自有財源三千多億的數字還高。
如果把包括鄉鎮市考慮在內，地方政府四千多億的人事費用，占歲出決算金額八千多億元的五成以上；換言之，民眾繳稅、政府編列預算支出，有一半以上花在養公務員上。這些數字，很難說服社會大眾說：公務員人數與官僚組織「還不夠多」，所以無法對民眾提供更佳的服務吧？人數夠多、人事支出又占整體支出比重高，如果民眾仍覺服務不足，該檢討改進的是行政效率，不是擴編官僚組織吧？
許多例子都顯示，政府機構人員大幅擴充，通常第一線服務者增加的比例不高，反而是「管理第一線人員」、「督導」業務者，大幅增加。結果就是民眾多花了很多錢增聘公務員，但實際得到的回報與服務，遠低於其付出。換言之，官僚愈多，無用工作取代有用工作的程度愈大。所以，期待升格後的直轄市，大幅擴充員額後，得到如數增加的服務與福祉嗎？顯然不能。
更何況，政府增聘公務員成本相當高，依學者統計，公務員平均年薪是一二○萬元，遠高於一般民間薪資，也是平均國民所得的兩倍。如再考慮退休撫卹，其成本更高。
任何組織都有易肥難瘦的特性，但這個問題對民營企業較容易解決，因為，市場會解決組織肥大問題。組織肥大、成本過高的民營企業，終究會反映在財務數字上，因而讓企業有壓力必須大幅裁員、精簡組織，否則將被市場淘汰。同樣的問題發生在政府官僚單位，因為缺乏市場財務數字的查驗，加上官僚必有的惰性，組織肥大問題從來就無法解決，人員幾乎從來就是「有進沒出」。台灣政府喊了十多年的政府改造、人事精簡，最後不了了之；公務員帳面數字的減少多數來自公營事業民營化的「成果」，即可窺見政府組織易胖難瘦的韌性。
縣市升格之事千頭萬緒、利弊參見，但官僚體系盲目擴充必是災難一場。期望政府能夠先注意此問題。在升格之際，能以總量控管、人員彼此支援或撥用方式，避免官僚體系過分肥大。而升格後的市政府，更應體認盲目擴充組織與人員對財政所造成的壓力，將許多有意強化或增加對民眾服務之項目，儘量以外包方式為之。否則，升格不是幸福的到來，而是另一場災難的序曲！
Friday, June 26, 2009
Does the Democratic Progressive Party Know the Meaning of "Economic Democracy?"
Does the Democratic Progressive Party Know the Meaning of "Economic Democracy?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 26, 2009
The Democratic Progressive Party maintains that its demand for a popular referendum on ECFA is not "political mobilization," but rather a demand for the establishment of "economic democracy."
We would like to ask the DPP a question. Hundreds of FTAs have been signed the world over. Which one of them has ever required a public referendum? Leave aside the European Union, which involved political integration in addition to economic integration. If ECFA must first undergo a public referendum, then one has already revealed one's hand. How can one possibly negotiate with the autocratic Beijing regime? We would also like to ask the DPP another question. You were in power for eight years. You imposed an "Active Management" policy externally, and a "Second Financial Reform" policy internally. When did you ever demonstrate the slightet iota of respect for "economic democracy?" When did you ever offer anyone the opportunity to vote in a public referendum?
Speaking of "economic democracy," the Democratic Progressive Party really ought to reflect on its dismal record during its eight years in power. During last year's Legislative and Presidential Elections, the DPP suffered disastrous defeats. The United Daily News discussed the issue of economics and democracy in its editorials. Now that the DPP has seen fit to dredge up the issue of "economic democracy," let us revisit the past.
On May 1 of last year, the UDN News published an editorial entitled "Partisan Politics: the Global Economy and the Single Member District." We noted that over the past two decades, democratization on Taiwan was equated wtih nativization. The primary yardstick applied in partisan politics was: Are you an "alien political regime" or a "native political regime?" Do you "love Taiwan" or are you "selling out Taiwan?" Are you "Taiwanese" or "Chinese?" But with the rise of globalization, with the rise of Mainland China, with the gradual marginalization of Taiwan, the primary social issue on Taiwan has become economic well-being. The Republic of China has adopted a free market economy. It must cope with globalization. The public expects those in power to enhance their economic well-being. The Republic of China has implemented democracy on Taiwan. The public can vote to determine the future of the nation. Therefore, a future which will improve their economic well-being will receive voter support. A future which will sabotage their economic well-being will encounter public opposition.
The yardstick for partisan political competition on Taiwan has gradually and imperceptibly changed from "democracy equals nativism" to "democracy equals economics." Democracy is no longer the hostage of nativism. Ballots are now perceived as a means by which the public can better its economic well-being.
Accordingly, in 2008, the power of the Taiwan independence movement swiftly declined. The Democratic Progressive Party lost power in part due to its moral degeneracy. But the main reason it lost power was that its Closed Door Policy and polarization of society undermined the peoples' economic well-being. It ran counter to their new understanding of democracy. The results of the 2008 Legislative and Presidential Elections showed that the ideology of Taiwan independence was perceived as economically destructive. Therefore it was judged "anti-democratic." Because economic independence was infeasible, political independence came under question.
In the past, by applying the values of "democracy equals nativism," Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian could use political ideology to determine economic policy. But now, looking forward, based on the yardstick of "democracy equals economics," political parties must allow their economic agendas to determine their political agendas. Under a free market economy, people choose to survive. Under a democracy, people can determine the future of the nation. Any political path that runs counter to the economic well-being of the public, will find it difficult to gain the support of the public on election day.
If the DPP wants to talk about "economic democracy," the DPP should give the above discussion serious consideration. In other words, "economic democracy" ought to imply rational governance. It should not be reduced to the level of public referenda promoted purely for the sake of populist demagoguery.
Over ten countries have signed FTAs with Beijing. Over 20 countries are about to sign FTAs with Beijing. This framework is the largest economic entity in the world. It encompasses nearly half the population of the world. Taipei must not be excluded from this framework. Therefore, from the perspective of "economic democracy," whether to sign ECFA with Beijing is no longer even an issue. The issue is how to sign to our best advantage and not incur losses. To invoke Su Tseng-chang's words, the DPP cannot regain power "merely by criticizing the KMT." In demanding a referendum, the DPP is engaging in populist demagoguery. It is treating ECFA as an electioneering tool. The Democratic Progressive Party should instead fulfill its proper role as an opposition party. Instead of mindlessly opposing ECFA, it should help ensure that the Ma administration and the Beijing authorities craft an agreement that reflects the interests of the public on Taiwan.
The DPP has breached the subject of "economic democracy." Therefore it ought to reflect on its eight years in office, on how it turned its back on the economic well-being of the public, and therefore on "economic democracy." It should attempt to make a rational connection between economics and democracy in its future political and economic discourse. Didn't the Democratic Progressive Party lose power precisely because it violated the precepts of "economic democracy?"
民進黨知道什麼叫做「經濟民主」嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.26 06:36 am
民進黨說：主張簽ＥＣＦＡ須經公投，不是「政治動員」，而是要建立「經濟民主」的機制。
請問民進黨：舉世簽訂數百個ＦＴＡ，哪一個經過公投（歐盟進入政治整合時除外）？議簽ＥＣＦＡ若須經過公投，己方底牌盡揭，將如何與底牌全蓋住的北京專制政府談判？再者，請問民進黨，貴黨過去執政八年期間，對外「積極管理」，對內「二次金改」，又有哪一項尊重過「經濟民主」，更有哪一項曾交付「公投」？
談起「經濟民主」，民進黨確實應當痛切反省自己過去執政八年在「經濟民主」上的惡劣表現。去年立委與總統選舉，民進黨慘敗，本報社論曾經著文討論過「經濟」與「民主」的關聯；值今既然有人提出「經濟民主」的議題，不妨與民進黨溫故知新。
去年五月一日，本報社論題為〈政黨競爭的新標尺：全球經濟與單一選區〉，內文指出：過去二十年，台灣「民主化」的主題是「本土化」；政黨競爭的主要標尺是「外來政權／本土政權」、「愛台／賣台」、「台灣人／中國人」等等。但是，隨著全球化、中國崛起，及台灣邊緣化等的趨勢出現，「經濟民生」逐漸成為台灣的主要社會議題。一方面，由於台灣採行自由經濟並面對全球化，人民率皆期望執政者能改善經濟民生的環境；另一方面，台灣又實行民主政治，人民可以透過選票來操持國家路線。因此，能夠增進改善經濟民生的國家路線，會受到選民支持；對經濟民生不利的國家路線，會遭到選民的反對。
於是，在不知不覺間，台灣政黨競爭的標尺，漸由「民主／本土」的聯結，轉變為「民主／經濟」的聯結。「民主」不再被「本土」的假議題所挾持，「選票」被視為可以改善「經濟民生」的手段。
準此以論，台獨勢力在二○○八年急遽式微，除了是因民進黨失政敗德以外，最主要的原因亦在台獨的鎖國與內耗，不利台灣的經濟民生，所以也就不符合現今的民主認知。二○○八年立委及總統選舉的結果顯示：台獨是「害經濟」的，所以台獨也是「反民主」的；由於「經濟的台獨」不可行，所以「政治的台獨」受質疑。
過去，在「民主／本土」的舊標尺下，李登輝與陳水扁可以用「政治路線」來決定其「經濟路線」；但是，今後在「民主／經濟」的新標尺下，政黨似乎應以「經濟路線」來決定其「政治路線」。因為，在「自由經濟／人民要活下去」，及「民主政治／人民可以選擇國家路線」的交互作用下，任何政黨若堅採與民生經濟背道而馳的國家路線，恐怕難以在民主選舉中獲得支持。
若要談「經濟民主」，以上論述或許可供民進黨認真參考；亦即，「經濟民主」的真諦應反映在「治國理性」上，而不宜淪為「公投」之類的政治操作。
準此以論，面對十餘國家已與中國簽訂ＦＴＡ，且累計二十餘國家即將與中國簽訂ＦＴＡ，此一架構已是接近全球半數人口的最大經濟體，而台灣顯然不可自外於此一架構；故而，若從「經濟民主」的觀點來看，這已不是要不要與中國簽ＥＣＦＡ的問題，而是應當將焦點擺在如何始能趨利避害地簽。亦即，不能「光靠罵國民黨」（蘇貞昌語）。因而，與其玩弄民粹公投，將ＥＣＦＡ當作選舉動員的政治玩具，民進黨何不善盡在野黨的角色，對馬政府及彼岸北京政府，用心用力地在「如何簽」方面表達台灣民間的聲音？
既然民進黨提出「經濟民主」的概念，正可藉此反省過去八年執政期間「經濟」背離「民主」的異象，並設法在民進黨未來的政經論述中，將「經濟」與「民主」作一理性的聯結。民進黨之敗，豈不正是敗在違反「經濟民主」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 26, 2009
The Democratic Progressive Party maintains that its demand for a popular referendum on ECFA is not "political mobilization," but rather a demand for the establishment of "economic democracy."
We would like to ask the DPP a question. Hundreds of FTAs have been signed the world over. Which one of them has ever required a public referendum? Leave aside the European Union, which involved political integration in addition to economic integration. If ECFA must first undergo a public referendum, then one has already revealed one's hand. How can one possibly negotiate with the autocratic Beijing regime? We would also like to ask the DPP another question. You were in power for eight years. You imposed an "Active Management" policy externally, and a "Second Financial Reform" policy internally. When did you ever demonstrate the slightet iota of respect for "economic democracy?" When did you ever offer anyone the opportunity to vote in a public referendum?
Speaking of "economic democracy," the Democratic Progressive Party really ought to reflect on its dismal record during its eight years in power. During last year's Legislative and Presidential Elections, the DPP suffered disastrous defeats. The United Daily News discussed the issue of economics and democracy in its editorials. Now that the DPP has seen fit to dredge up the issue of "economic democracy," let us revisit the past.
On May 1 of last year, the UDN News published an editorial entitled "Partisan Politics: the Global Economy and the Single Member District." We noted that over the past two decades, democratization on Taiwan was equated wtih nativization. The primary yardstick applied in partisan politics was: Are you an "alien political regime" or a "native political regime?" Do you "love Taiwan" or are you "selling out Taiwan?" Are you "Taiwanese" or "Chinese?" But with the rise of globalization, with the rise of Mainland China, with the gradual marginalization of Taiwan, the primary social issue on Taiwan has become economic well-being. The Republic of China has adopted a free market economy. It must cope with globalization. The public expects those in power to enhance their economic well-being. The Republic of China has implemented democracy on Taiwan. The public can vote to determine the future of the nation. Therefore, a future which will improve their economic well-being will receive voter support. A future which will sabotage their economic well-being will encounter public opposition.
The yardstick for partisan political competition on Taiwan has gradually and imperceptibly changed from "democracy equals nativism" to "democracy equals economics." Democracy is no longer the hostage of nativism. Ballots are now perceived as a means by which the public can better its economic well-being.
Accordingly, in 2008, the power of the Taiwan independence movement swiftly declined. The Democratic Progressive Party lost power in part due to its moral degeneracy. But the main reason it lost power was that its Closed Door Policy and polarization of society undermined the peoples' economic well-being. It ran counter to their new understanding of democracy. The results of the 2008 Legislative and Presidential Elections showed that the ideology of Taiwan independence was perceived as economically destructive. Therefore it was judged "anti-democratic." Because economic independence was infeasible, political independence came under question.
In the past, by applying the values of "democracy equals nativism," Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian could use political ideology to determine economic policy. But now, looking forward, based on the yardstick of "democracy equals economics," political parties must allow their economic agendas to determine their political agendas. Under a free market economy, people choose to survive. Under a democracy, people can determine the future of the nation. Any political path that runs counter to the economic well-being of the public, will find it difficult to gain the support of the public on election day.
If the DPP wants to talk about "economic democracy," the DPP should give the above discussion serious consideration. In other words, "economic democracy" ought to imply rational governance. It should not be reduced to the level of public referenda promoted purely for the sake of populist demagoguery.
Over ten countries have signed FTAs with Beijing. Over 20 countries are about to sign FTAs with Beijing. This framework is the largest economic entity in the world. It encompasses nearly half the population of the world. Taipei must not be excluded from this framework. Therefore, from the perspective of "economic democracy," whether to sign ECFA with Beijing is no longer even an issue. The issue is how to sign to our best advantage and not incur losses. To invoke Su Tseng-chang's words, the DPP cannot regain power "merely by criticizing the KMT." In demanding a referendum, the DPP is engaging in populist demagoguery. It is treating ECFA as an electioneering tool. The Democratic Progressive Party should instead fulfill its proper role as an opposition party. Instead of mindlessly opposing ECFA, it should help ensure that the Ma administration and the Beijing authorities craft an agreement that reflects the interests of the public on Taiwan.
The DPP has breached the subject of "economic democracy." Therefore it ought to reflect on its eight years in office, on how it turned its back on the economic well-being of the public, and therefore on "economic democracy." It should attempt to make a rational connection between economics and democracy in its future political and economic discourse. Didn't the Democratic Progressive Party lose power precisely because it violated the precepts of "economic democracy?"
民進黨知道什麼叫做「經濟民主」嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.26 06:36 am
民進黨說：主張簽ＥＣＦＡ須經公投，不是「政治動員」，而是要建立「經濟民主」的機制。
請問民進黨：舉世簽訂數百個ＦＴＡ，哪一個經過公投（歐盟進入政治整合時除外）？議簽ＥＣＦＡ若須經過公投，己方底牌盡揭，將如何與底牌全蓋住的北京專制政府談判？再者，請問民進黨，貴黨過去執政八年期間，對外「積極管理」，對內「二次金改」，又有哪一項尊重過「經濟民主」，更有哪一項曾交付「公投」？
談起「經濟民主」，民進黨確實應當痛切反省自己過去執政八年在「經濟民主」上的惡劣表現。去年立委與總統選舉，民進黨慘敗，本報社論曾經著文討論過「經濟」與「民主」的關聯；值今既然有人提出「經濟民主」的議題，不妨與民進黨溫故知新。
去年五月一日，本報社論題為〈政黨競爭的新標尺：全球經濟與單一選區〉，內文指出：過去二十年，台灣「民主化」的主題是「本土化」；政黨競爭的主要標尺是「外來政權／本土政權」、「愛台／賣台」、「台灣人／中國人」等等。但是，隨著全球化、中國崛起，及台灣邊緣化等的趨勢出現，「經濟民生」逐漸成為台灣的主要社會議題。一方面，由於台灣採行自由經濟並面對全球化，人民率皆期望執政者能改善經濟民生的環境；另一方面，台灣又實行民主政治，人民可以透過選票來操持國家路線。因此，能夠增進改善經濟民生的國家路線，會受到選民支持；對經濟民生不利的國家路線，會遭到選民的反對。
於是，在不知不覺間，台灣政黨競爭的標尺，漸由「民主／本土」的聯結，轉變為「民主／經濟」的聯結。「民主」不再被「本土」的假議題所挾持，「選票」被視為可以改善「經濟民生」的手段。
準此以論，台獨勢力在二○○八年急遽式微，除了是因民進黨失政敗德以外，最主要的原因亦在台獨的鎖國與內耗，不利台灣的經濟民生，所以也就不符合現今的民主認知。二○○八年立委及總統選舉的結果顯示：台獨是「害經濟」的，所以台獨也是「反民主」的；由於「經濟的台獨」不可行，所以「政治的台獨」受質疑。
過去，在「民主／本土」的舊標尺下，李登輝與陳水扁可以用「政治路線」來決定其「經濟路線」；但是，今後在「民主／經濟」的新標尺下，政黨似乎應以「經濟路線」來決定其「政治路線」。因為，在「自由經濟／人民要活下去」，及「民主政治／人民可以選擇國家路線」的交互作用下，任何政黨若堅採與民生經濟背道而馳的國家路線，恐怕難以在民主選舉中獲得支持。
若要談「經濟民主」，以上論述或許可供民進黨認真參考；亦即，「經濟民主」的真諦應反映在「治國理性」上，而不宜淪為「公投」之類的政治操作。
準此以論，面對十餘國家已與中國簽訂ＦＴＡ，且累計二十餘國家即將與中國簽訂ＦＴＡ，此一架構已是接近全球半數人口的最大經濟體，而台灣顯然不可自外於此一架構；故而，若從「經濟民主」的觀點來看，這已不是要不要與中國簽ＥＣＦＡ的問題，而是應當將焦點擺在如何始能趨利避害地簽。亦即，不能「光靠罵國民黨」（蘇貞昌語）。因而，與其玩弄民粹公投，將ＥＣＦＡ當作選舉動員的政治玩具，民進黨何不善盡在野黨的角色，對馬政府及彼岸北京政府，用心用力地在「如何簽」方面表達台灣民間的聲音？
既然民進黨提出「經濟民主」的概念，正可藉此反省過去八年執政期間「經濟」背離「民主」的異象，並設法在民進黨未來的政經論述中，將「經濟」與「民主」作一理性的聯結。民進黨之敗，豈不正是敗在違反「經濟民主」？
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Direct Administration: The Beginning of Problems and Controversy
Direct Administration: The Beginning of Problems and Controversy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 25, 2009
Amidst widespread public doubts, President Ma Ying-jeou's proposal for the island's three directly administered municipalities and 15 counties has successfully passed through the gauntlet. The Ministry of the Interior has swiftly approved Taipei County, Taichung County, Taichung City, Kaohsiung County, Kaohsiung City for direct administration. The status of Tainan County and Tainan City has been left to the Executive Yuan. Regardless of what the outcome for Tainan County and Tainan City may be, these upgrades will substantially alter Taiwan's political future. The impact may be as significant as the freezing of the Taiwan Provincial Government. The consequences should not be underestimated. For the foreseeable future, the political ecology of the central government and local governments will undergo significant political changes. These warrant our concern.
First let's look at Taipei City and Taipei County. President Ma originally proposed the establishment of a Northern Capital consisting of Taipei City, Taipei County, and Keelung City. Not only would it include Keelung City, it would treat Taipei City and Taipei County as a single metropolitan area. But Taipei City and Taipei County will now each be classified as an independent metropolitan area. Keelung City will not be included. If one looks at the map, such a districting scheme makes absolutely no sense. It also makes future planning and construction more complex due to geographical factors. When Ma Ying-jeou became Taipei Mayor, his municipal planning proposals encountered stubborn opposition from then Taipei County Executive Su Tseng-chang. But Taipei City had substantially more financial resources and political clout than Taipei County. Therefore it did not lead to excessive friction. But Taipei City and Taipei County may one day be ruled by rival political parties. Taipei City and Taipei County may one day have roughly the same financial resources. The administration of their MRT systems, rivers and streams, water supply, and school districts may lead to significant conflict. Today the Executive Yuan has agreed to a two "concentric circles" scheme dividing the two municipalities. But the two "concentric circles" may well turn into two "eccentric circles."
Next, let's compare the political power of the central government and local governments. Once the future heads of the three municipalities have been elected, they will represent at least three million votes, and perhaps as many as six million votes. But the Premiership is a non-elective office. When the central government needs to coordinate local affairs, a Premier without a voter base will confront the Mayor of a Directly Administered Municipality with a broad voter base. Such a Premier may find himself or herself at a considerable sdisadvantage. Over the past eight years, the Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung have blasted the central government and even threatened to resign over health care costs, the allocation of funds, and other controversial issues. Such confrontations often led to central government surrender. Once so many disparate administrative regions have been established in northern, central, and southern Taiwan, it will be a miracle if a "Yeltsin Effect" does not take over. If 13 or 14 "Yeltsins" align themselves with each other, it will be a simple matter for them to face down the central government. Unless a president with an even larger voter base rides to his rescue on each and every issue, the Premier is going to find his job harder and harder to perform.
Furthermore, counties and cities other than these will find themselves in even weaker positions. The reason cities and counties are in such a hurry to be upgraded is that they are allocated greater resources. Once cities and counties in northern, central, and southern Taiwan are upgraded, they will of course receive more of the budget than before. But since the national budget is fixed, cities and counties other than these will find their budgets reduced. Taipei City and Taipei County actually have Keelung, a "second tier" city sandwiched in between them. South of Kaohsiung City and Kaohsiung County, one will find Pingtung County, another "second tier" region. By referring to these cities and counties as second tier, we are not discriminating against them. We are merely saying they are being treated as such based on the allocation of funds.
President Ma's intention when he proposed upgrading these cities and counties was to boost their development. But even as he raised the status of these cities and counties, he lowered the status of other cities and counties that were not Directly Administered Regions. This was an example of unwitting blindness on the part of the ruling regime.
Actually, as we mentioned in our previous editorial, besides having issues with land planning, the ROC also has issues with central government allocation of funds to local governments. Ideally financial planning ought to be dealt with first. Upgrading should be dealt with later. Until one has determined who will be the wallflowers and who will be the prom queens, everyone should remain in a veil of ignorance. Candidates for upgrading will then be more likely to consider the plight of the losers. They will be more likely to leave more latitude for themselves in the event they fail to make the grade. Once the list of who is to be upgraded is finalized, opposition will set in. To discuss the allocation of resources at this point will lead to a scramble by each region to maximize its piece of the pie. Rational discussion will be impossible. Unfortunately, we have already inverted the sequence. We have already decided which cities and counties will be upgraded. We have ignored the issue of how financial resources will be allocated. The Executive Yuan has inverted its priorities. Will it be hoisted by its own petard? We will know the answer in a few years.
Those familiar with political maneuvering know that realpolitik is hard to grasp. Some things cannot be rushed. Some things cannot be delayed. Some things make sense but cannot be realized. Some things are unreasonable but progress rapidly and inexplicably. Every political pundit said national land planning could not be rushed, that it would take time. But paradoxically it was the very first campaign promise Ma Ying-jeou fulfilled. No one was surprised when it turned out to be a premature baby with birth defects. What price will Taiwan pay for this half-baked county and municipality upgrade plan? No one knows. The upgrading fiasco is testimony to politicians' myopia.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.25
社論－升格是問題與爭議的開始
本報訊
在眾多質疑聲中，馬總統三都十五縣之議輕舟已過萬重山，由內政部火速審查通過了台北縣、台中縣市與高雄縣市三地的升格案；至於台南縣市，則留待行政院裁決。不論台南縣市的裁定結果如何，這些升格案都將大幅改變台灣的政治風貌，其影響之嚴重性恐怕不小於當年的凍省案，後果不可小覷。在可見的未來，中央與地方的政治生態將產生重大改變，值得關注。
首先，我們看台北縣市的問題。馬總統原先主張的北都，是指北北基；它不但包括基隆市、也將台北縣市含在一起視作一個大都市。但是現在的發展，卻是台北市、台北縣各自獨立為市，但基隆市不在其中。從地圖上來看，這樣的行政區劃分不但毫無章法，也使得未來的建設規畫因地理切割而充滿變數。馬英九在當台北市長時，其市政規畫本即與當時的台北縣長蘇貞昌頗多扞格。但當時由於縣市之間財力與實力皆有差距，尚不至於演變成大摩擦。將來萬一台北縣市又分屬不同黨派，而縣市之間財力相當，則不論是捷運、河川、用水、學區等政務，都會產生相當的衝突。今天行政院同意兩個「同心圓」的地理區分設直轄市，將來恐怕是為兩地的「不同心」，留下了伏筆。
其次，再看中央與地方之間的相對勢力，將來三大直轄市的首長都是民選的，其民意基礎少則三百萬票、大則六百萬票，但行政院長身上卻沒有半張選票。當中央要協調地方事務時，沒有民意基礎的院長碰上有廣大民意基礎的直轄市長，官位與氣勢恐怕是難成正比。過去八年，台北與高雄兩個直轄市對於健保費、統籌分配款等爭議，就輕則炮打中央、重則揚言辭職不幹，而相爭的結果經常是中央敗陣。以後一旦北中南有這麼多處藩鎮割據，不發生「葉爾欽效應」才怪。萬一三、四位葉爾欽串連，要扳倒一個中央部會決策其實是易如反掌。除非有民意基礎的總統事事相挺，否則將來的行政院長，絕對是愈來愈難做事。
再就三都之外的其他縣市而言，其處境也會更為弱勢。大家之所以要搶著升格做直轄市，就是因為直轄市分得的資源較多。在北中南三地升格定案之後，他們分得的預算當然會比原來多。但由於國家預算大餅固定，故這三個直轄市以外的地方，其預算當然會減少。我們可以想見，在台北兩個直轄市裡，竟然有一個基隆市的「二線」城市；而在高雄縣市直轄區以南，又有一個「二線」屏東縣。我們說這些縣市是二線，絕不是主觀上的歧視，而是經費分配上的必然。
馬總統推三都，其原意是要以適當的規模拉抬都會的發展，但在拉抬規模的同時，如何避免對其他非都市的貶抑，卻是主政者未能顧及的盲點。
其實，我們在先前的社論也曾提及：台灣除了國土規畫問題之外，另一個重要的問題就是中央地方財政劃分。理想上，這兩個問題的處理順序應該是先處理財政規畫、再處理升格。在還不確定誰是麻雀、誰是鳳凰之前，大家都還身處無知之幕，討論分配問題比較可能為弱勢者設想，也為自己萬一升格不順而留些餘地。一旦升格案確定，大家一翻兩瞪眼，此時再要討論地方財政劃分公式，那就會面臨本位主義的利益爭逐，再難理性討論。不幸的是，我們今天硬是把推案的次序弄反，竟然先通過縣市升格，卻放著財政劃分法不管。行政院這樣的紊亂施政次序，將來會不會是拿石頭砸自己的腳，恐怕一兩年之後就會見真章了。
熟悉政治運作的人都了解，政府部門的事實在抓不準；有些事想快快不起來、有些事想慢慢不下來、有些事有道理沒進度、有些事沒道理卻莫名其妙地進展神速。每個政治評論家都說國土規畫不能急、要慢慢來。但偏偏它卻是馬總統眾多政見中最早產的。早產兒有種種瑕疵大家見怪不怪，但是將來整個台灣要為這不成熟的縣市升格政策付出多少慘痛的代價，那就不知道了。政客之短視，由升格案可見一斑。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 25, 2009
Amidst widespread public doubts, President Ma Ying-jeou's proposal for the island's three directly administered municipalities and 15 counties has successfully passed through the gauntlet. The Ministry of the Interior has swiftly approved Taipei County, Taichung County, Taichung City, Kaohsiung County, Kaohsiung City for direct administration. The status of Tainan County and Tainan City has been left to the Executive Yuan. Regardless of what the outcome for Tainan County and Tainan City may be, these upgrades will substantially alter Taiwan's political future. The impact may be as significant as the freezing of the Taiwan Provincial Government. The consequences should not be underestimated. For the foreseeable future, the political ecology of the central government and local governments will undergo significant political changes. These warrant our concern.
First let's look at Taipei City and Taipei County. President Ma originally proposed the establishment of a Northern Capital consisting of Taipei City, Taipei County, and Keelung City. Not only would it include Keelung City, it would treat Taipei City and Taipei County as a single metropolitan area. But Taipei City and Taipei County will now each be classified as an independent metropolitan area. Keelung City will not be included. If one looks at the map, such a districting scheme makes absolutely no sense. It also makes future planning and construction more complex due to geographical factors. When Ma Ying-jeou became Taipei Mayor, his municipal planning proposals encountered stubborn opposition from then Taipei County Executive Su Tseng-chang. But Taipei City had substantially more financial resources and political clout than Taipei County. Therefore it did not lead to excessive friction. But Taipei City and Taipei County may one day be ruled by rival political parties. Taipei City and Taipei County may one day have roughly the same financial resources. The administration of their MRT systems, rivers and streams, water supply, and school districts may lead to significant conflict. Today the Executive Yuan has agreed to a two "concentric circles" scheme dividing the two municipalities. But the two "concentric circles" may well turn into two "eccentric circles."
Next, let's compare the political power of the central government and local governments. Once the future heads of the three municipalities have been elected, they will represent at least three million votes, and perhaps as many as six million votes. But the Premiership is a non-elective office. When the central government needs to coordinate local affairs, a Premier without a voter base will confront the Mayor of a Directly Administered Municipality with a broad voter base. Such a Premier may find himself or herself at a considerable sdisadvantage. Over the past eight years, the Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung have blasted the central government and even threatened to resign over health care costs, the allocation of funds, and other controversial issues. Such confrontations often led to central government surrender. Once so many disparate administrative regions have been established in northern, central, and southern Taiwan, it will be a miracle if a "Yeltsin Effect" does not take over. If 13 or 14 "Yeltsins" align themselves with each other, it will be a simple matter for them to face down the central government. Unless a president with an even larger voter base rides to his rescue on each and every issue, the Premier is going to find his job harder and harder to perform.
Furthermore, counties and cities other than these will find themselves in even weaker positions. The reason cities and counties are in such a hurry to be upgraded is that they are allocated greater resources. Once cities and counties in northern, central, and southern Taiwan are upgraded, they will of course receive more of the budget than before. But since the national budget is fixed, cities and counties other than these will find their budgets reduced. Taipei City and Taipei County actually have Keelung, a "second tier" city sandwiched in between them. South of Kaohsiung City and Kaohsiung County, one will find Pingtung County, another "second tier" region. By referring to these cities and counties as second tier, we are not discriminating against them. We are merely saying they are being treated as such based on the allocation of funds.
President Ma's intention when he proposed upgrading these cities and counties was to boost their development. But even as he raised the status of these cities and counties, he lowered the status of other cities and counties that were not Directly Administered Regions. This was an example of unwitting blindness on the part of the ruling regime.
Actually, as we mentioned in our previous editorial, besides having issues with land planning, the ROC also has issues with central government allocation of funds to local governments. Ideally financial planning ought to be dealt with first. Upgrading should be dealt with later. Until one has determined who will be the wallflowers and who will be the prom queens, everyone should remain in a veil of ignorance. Candidates for upgrading will then be more likely to consider the plight of the losers. They will be more likely to leave more latitude for themselves in the event they fail to make the grade. Once the list of who is to be upgraded is finalized, opposition will set in. To discuss the allocation of resources at this point will lead to a scramble by each region to maximize its piece of the pie. Rational discussion will be impossible. Unfortunately, we have already inverted the sequence. We have already decided which cities and counties will be upgraded. We have ignored the issue of how financial resources will be allocated. The Executive Yuan has inverted its priorities. Will it be hoisted by its own petard? We will know the answer in a few years.
Those familiar with political maneuvering know that realpolitik is hard to grasp. Some things cannot be rushed. Some things cannot be delayed. Some things make sense but cannot be realized. Some things are unreasonable but progress rapidly and inexplicably. Every political pundit said national land planning could not be rushed, that it would take time. But paradoxically it was the very first campaign promise Ma Ying-jeou fulfilled. No one was surprised when it turned out to be a premature baby with birth defects. What price will Taiwan pay for this half-baked county and municipality upgrade plan? No one knows. The upgrading fiasco is testimony to politicians' myopia.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.25
社論－升格是問題與爭議的開始
本報訊
在眾多質疑聲中，馬總統三都十五縣之議輕舟已過萬重山，由內政部火速審查通過了台北縣、台中縣市與高雄縣市三地的升格案；至於台南縣市，則留待行政院裁決。不論台南縣市的裁定結果如何，這些升格案都將大幅改變台灣的政治風貌，其影響之嚴重性恐怕不小於當年的凍省案，後果不可小覷。在可見的未來，中央與地方的政治生態將產生重大改變，值得關注。
首先，我們看台北縣市的問題。馬總統原先主張的北都，是指北北基；它不但包括基隆市、也將台北縣市含在一起視作一個大都市。但是現在的發展，卻是台北市、台北縣各自獨立為市，但基隆市不在其中。從地圖上來看，這樣的行政區劃分不但毫無章法，也使得未來的建設規畫因地理切割而充滿變數。馬英九在當台北市長時，其市政規畫本即與當時的台北縣長蘇貞昌頗多扞格。但當時由於縣市之間財力與實力皆有差距，尚不至於演變成大摩擦。將來萬一台北縣市又分屬不同黨派，而縣市之間財力相當，則不論是捷運、河川、用水、學區等政務，都會產生相當的衝突。今天行政院同意兩個「同心圓」的地理區分設直轄市，將來恐怕是為兩地的「不同心」，留下了伏筆。
其次，再看中央與地方之間的相對勢力，將來三大直轄市的首長都是民選的，其民意基礎少則三百萬票、大則六百萬票，但行政院長身上卻沒有半張選票。當中央要協調地方事務時，沒有民意基礎的院長碰上有廣大民意基礎的直轄市長，官位與氣勢恐怕是難成正比。過去八年，台北與高雄兩個直轄市對於健保費、統籌分配款等爭議，就輕則炮打中央、重則揚言辭職不幹，而相爭的結果經常是中央敗陣。以後一旦北中南有這麼多處藩鎮割據，不發生「葉爾欽效應」才怪。萬一三、四位葉爾欽串連，要扳倒一個中央部會決策其實是易如反掌。除非有民意基礎的總統事事相挺，否則將來的行政院長，絕對是愈來愈難做事。
再就三都之外的其他縣市而言，其處境也會更為弱勢。大家之所以要搶著升格做直轄市，就是因為直轄市分得的資源較多。在北中南三地升格定案之後，他們分得的預算當然會比原來多。但由於國家預算大餅固定，故這三個直轄市以外的地方，其預算當然會減少。我們可以想見，在台北兩個直轄市裡，竟然有一個基隆市的「二線」城市；而在高雄縣市直轄區以南，又有一個「二線」屏東縣。我們說這些縣市是二線，絕不是主觀上的歧視，而是經費分配上的必然。
馬總統推三都，其原意是要以適當的規模拉抬都會的發展，但在拉抬規模的同時，如何避免對其他非都市的貶抑，卻是主政者未能顧及的盲點。
其實，我們在先前的社論也曾提及：台灣除了國土規畫問題之外，另一個重要的問題就是中央地方財政劃分。理想上，這兩個問題的處理順序應該是先處理財政規畫、再處理升格。在還不確定誰是麻雀、誰是鳳凰之前，大家都還身處無知之幕，討論分配問題比較可能為弱勢者設想，也為自己萬一升格不順而留些餘地。一旦升格案確定，大家一翻兩瞪眼，此時再要討論地方財政劃分公式，那就會面臨本位主義的利益爭逐，再難理性討論。不幸的是，我們今天硬是把推案的次序弄反，竟然先通過縣市升格，卻放著財政劃分法不管。行政院這樣的紊亂施政次序，將來會不會是拿石頭砸自己的腳，恐怕一兩年之後就會見真章了。
熟悉政治運作的人都了解，政府部門的事實在抓不準；有些事想快快不起來、有些事想慢慢不下來、有些事有道理沒進度、有些事沒道理卻莫名其妙地進展神速。每個政治評論家都說國土規畫不能急、要慢慢來。但偏偏它卻是馬總統眾多政見中最早產的。早產兒有種種瑕疵大家見怪不怪，但是將來整個台灣要為這不成熟的縣市升格政策付出多少慘痛的代價，那就不知道了。政客之短視，由升格案可見一斑。
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
The DPP Denounces the Media but Shirks Its Responsibility
The DPP Denounces the Media but Shirks Its Responsibility
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 24, 2009
The DPP has made a habit of stepping in the blood of the media to reach its goal. This is not news. Years ago the DPP, motivated by of selfish political interest, ripped up newspapers and threatened boycotts. After eight years in power, the DPP regime has left behind a sorrry record of raids against the media, lawsuits against the media, and naked coercion against the media. It resorted to every means at its disposal. This old dog has now run out of tricks. Most disappointing of all, the person who pointed the finger at the media today was none other than Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen, long assumed to be a moderate centrist. She shirked her duty as leader of the opposition.
Tsai Ing-wen accused the China Times of failing to criticize the Ma administration's policies, while deliberately exaggerating power struggles between the DPP Chairman and DPP leaders. She denied coming to Chen Shui-bian's aid only in order to cling the Party Chairmanship. She accused the China Times of attempting to provoke internecine conflict, and of attempting to undermine the image of the party.
We cannot understand why Chairman Tsai made such allegations. Is the election of the chairman of the DPP a subject that the media is not permitted to report and comment on? Did Chairman Tsai read the China Times? If she did, she knows perfectly well the China Times never said the DPP signature drive was launched in order to consolidate Tsai's position as party chairman. Why did she think it was? Could it be she has deep feelings of insecurity? Could it be she harbors an inordinate hosility towards the China Times? We do not wish to speculate. We merely wish to remind Chairman Tsai that the Chairmanship of the DPP has always been a focus of media attention. It makes no difference whether the DPP is power or in the opposition. Years ago, when other media dared not speak on behalf of the Democratic Progressive Party, the China Times held a debate on the Democratic Progressive Party Chairman election. It did so for a simple reason. Taiwan needs a healthy opposition party.
Unfortunately, the Democratic Progressive Party, after eight years in power, is attempting to block media coverage of the Democratic Progressive Party chairman election. Even more unfortunately, the person attempting to muzzle the media is someone who was once Vice President of the Executive Yuan.
Chairman Tsai cannot deny the existence of the Democratic Progressive Party signature drive. The China Times has never evaded the media's responsibility to offer forthright criticisms. Ever since the Chen corruption case exploded, we have been consistent. We expect the DPP to live up to its reputation as a native political party committed to clean government. We want the Democratic Progressive Party to have a clear understanding of the Chen corruption case. We are criticizing the Democratic Progressive Party for failing to emerge from Chen Shui-bian's shadow. We have warned DPP leaders not to sacrifice the DPP in order to shield Chen Shui-bian from prosecution. They must not bury the hopes the public have for a native political party.
After all, the Democratic Progressive Party is supposed to be an asset to Taiwan. It is not supposed to be an asset to Chen Shui-bian. It is not supposed to be an asset to this or that local party boss. We would like to ask Chairman Tsai a question. Just because the China Times holds different views than Tsai on how to save the DPP, is it really necessary to villify the China Times so disproportionately?
Various and sundry Democratic Progressive Party "princes" are fighting over the party chairmanship. Should the media ignore this? If no one expectated anything from the Democratic Progressive Party, if it was dispensable, then no one would bother running for party chairman. After eight years in power, the Democratic Progressive Party is again in the opposition. But the Green Camp "princes" have thrown their hats in the ring. For the DPP this ought to be a gratifying development. Or does Chairman Tsai expect the DPP to give its overwhelming support to Tsai Ing-wen, the way the Kuomintang gave its support to Ma Ying-jeou?
The China Times is a media organization. It has high expectations of the DPP. That is why its criticisms are so severe. It could ignore the struggle among Green Camp "princes" for the DPP party chairmanship, as well as Chairman Tsai's fierce and irrational remarks. We have no desire to engage in wild speculation. But before Chairman Tsai criticizes us, shouldn't she ask herself whether anyone else in the Democratic Progressive Party wants to run for party chairman? Does Chairman Tsai intend to seek a second term? Is she hoping the other "princes" will bow out? No matter what the truth might be, as a member of the media, are we supposed to refrain from reporting and commenting?
Tsai Ing-wen became an official during the KMT era. She was former President Lee Teng-hui's chief of staff. Her experience and professionalism have distinguished her from past politicians. Because of her professionalism and her restrained and precise manner of speech, both Blue and Green Camp leaders and officials find it difficult to speak ill of her. She should not be a populist rabble-rouser. She should not attempt to mobilze Deep Green Taiwan independence zealots. She should pay close attention to her political methods. She should persuade centrist voters to lean toward the Democratic Progressive Party. Following the 2008 presidential election, the Democratic Progressive Party "princes" stepped down. This allowed her to take over the unfamiliar duties of party leader under calm conditions. Why did they do so, if not because they hoped she would lead the Democratic Progressive Party down a different path? Alas, Tsai Ing-wen has backed off.
Does Tsai Ing-wen intend to seek a second term as DPP Chairman? The Democratic Progressive Party "princes" are fighting over the party chairmanship. These are matters of public interest. Is the China Times wrong to report on the heated party chairmanship election?
Tsai Ing-wen accused the China Times of failing to criticize the Ma administration's policies. She was dead wrong. First, the China Times has never pulled its punches when criticizing the ruling administration. The China Times is keeping a close eye on the one man KMT chairmanship election. Secondly, to paraphrase Green Camp "prince" and former Premier Su Tseng-chang: Criticizing the KMT will not restore the DPP to power. Criticizing the media will not absolve the opposition party of its responsibilities.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.24
社論－光靠罵媒體 卸不了在野黨責任
本報訊
民進黨踩著媒體鮮血前進從不是新聞。當年，民進黨人可以為一己政治之需求，公開撕報紙、揚言退報；執政八年，民進黨政府締造的歷史，從搜索媒體、控告媒體，到新聞施壓，無所不用其極，如今再玩不出新把戲，令人遺憾的是，竟是由社會形象溫和中庸的黨主席蔡英文出場，無的放矢地指責媒體，藉以逃避她作為唯一反對黨領袖的責任。
蔡英文指責《中國時報》對馬政府的政策沒有批判，卻刻意炒作報導民進黨主席選舉和黨內生態，指稱聲援陳水扁是為了黨主席保衛戰，藉此製造該黨黨內紛爭，損害民進黨形象。
我們不理解蔡主席為何會做出此一指控？民進黨主席選舉難道不是可受報導與公評之事？蔡主席如果有仔細讀過《中國時報》，應該清楚中時沒有隻字片語提及民進黨連署救扁是為了黨主席保衛戰，她的聯想，究竟是因為自己強烈的不安全感？還是對《中國時報》不公平的敵意？我們並不想揣測，只是必須非常持平地告訴蔡主席：民進黨主席從來都是媒體關切的焦點，不論民進黨執政或在野。當年，在其他媒體不敢為民進黨言的時候，《中國時報》甚至舉辦過民進黨主席選舉辯論，為的只是一個非常單純的理想：台灣需要一個健全的反對黨。
很遺憾，民進黨執政八年之後，竟然企圖阻絕媒體對民進黨主席選舉的報導，我們更遺憾，扮演這個打壓媒體角色的人，竟是曾經擔任過行政院副院長這麼高層職務之人！
蔡主席不能否認，民進黨連署聲援救扁是事實，《中國時報》從來沒有迴避媒體提出諍言的責任，從扁案爆發迄今，我們始終一以貫之，站在期許民進黨勿忘本土政黨標榜清廉初衷的立場，提醒民進黨認清扁弊案之本質、批判民進黨揮棄不了扁陰影的猶豫，甚至從不迴避地預警不能為了扁弊案埋葬民進黨、埋葬台灣對本土政黨的深沉期待。
畢竟，民進黨該是台灣人的資產，不該是陳水扁，也不該是哪個派系天王的資產吧！請問蔡主席：《中國時報》只因為對如何搶救民進黨的見解與蔡英文不同，就必須被汙名化？
民進黨各路天王爭搶黨魁，不該被關注嗎？如果民進黨是一個不被期待的黨，是一個人人皆曰可拋棄的政黨，自然沒有人要競逐黨主席，綠天王競相投入黨魁選舉，這對八年執政之後，頓失政權的民進黨而言，該是樁可喜可賀之事，難不成蔡主席希望民進黨如國民黨萬民擁戴馬英九般，萬民擁戴蔡英文？
身為媒體，《中國時報》若非對民進黨愛深責切，可以不理會所謂綠天王競選黨主席之事，蔡主席如此激烈有失理性的言論，我們並不想妄加揣度，但請蔡主席批評前先想想：民進黨是不是沒有任何人要競選黨主席？或者，蔡主席有意要準備連任，期待其他天王退讓之？不論實情是什麼？作為媒體，難道都不能報導評論？
蔡英文出身於國民黨執政時期，曾為李前總統的幕僚，她的背景和專業，讓她迥異於過去一般認知的「政客」，因為她的專業、她內斂精準的政治語言，讓政壇藍綠黨公職很難對她講出任何難聽的話，因為，她不該是一個只知操作民粹，動員深綠的獨派，她應該是一個講究政治方法論，知曉如何說服中間選民向民進黨靠攏的政黨領袖，二○○八總統大選之後，民進黨天王俱退位，讓她在風平浪靜中接任這個她不熟悉的政黨領袖職務，所為何來？不過就是希望她帶領民進黨走出不一樣的路。但是，蔡英文退縮了。
蔡英文是否要再任民進黨主席？就像民進黨內天王競逐黨魁般，是可受公評之事，《中國時報》報導熱熱烈烈的黨主席選舉，何錯之有？
蔡英文批評《中國時報》對馬政府政策未提出批判，她真的說錯了，第一，《中國時報》從未鬆懈對執政者的批判，即使國民黨主席選舉一人競選，《中國時報》依舊嚴厲監督；第二，套用天王之一的前行政院長蘇貞昌的一句話：光靠罵國民黨，別想再執政；光靠罵媒體，還是卸除不了在野政黨的責任！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 24, 2009
The DPP has made a habit of stepping in the blood of the media to reach its goal. This is not news. Years ago the DPP, motivated by of selfish political interest, ripped up newspapers and threatened boycotts. After eight years in power, the DPP regime has left behind a sorrry record of raids against the media, lawsuits against the media, and naked coercion against the media. It resorted to every means at its disposal. This old dog has now run out of tricks. Most disappointing of all, the person who pointed the finger at the media today was none other than Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen, long assumed to be a moderate centrist. She shirked her duty as leader of the opposition.
Tsai Ing-wen accused the China Times of failing to criticize the Ma administration's policies, while deliberately exaggerating power struggles between the DPP Chairman and DPP leaders. She denied coming to Chen Shui-bian's aid only in order to cling the Party Chairmanship. She accused the China Times of attempting to provoke internecine conflict, and of attempting to undermine the image of the party.
We cannot understand why Chairman Tsai made such allegations. Is the election of the chairman of the DPP a subject that the media is not permitted to report and comment on? Did Chairman Tsai read the China Times? If she did, she knows perfectly well the China Times never said the DPP signature drive was launched in order to consolidate Tsai's position as party chairman. Why did she think it was? Could it be she has deep feelings of insecurity? Could it be she harbors an inordinate hosility towards the China Times? We do not wish to speculate. We merely wish to remind Chairman Tsai that the Chairmanship of the DPP has always been a focus of media attention. It makes no difference whether the DPP is power or in the opposition. Years ago, when other media dared not speak on behalf of the Democratic Progressive Party, the China Times held a debate on the Democratic Progressive Party Chairman election. It did so for a simple reason. Taiwan needs a healthy opposition party.
Unfortunately, the Democratic Progressive Party, after eight years in power, is attempting to block media coverage of the Democratic Progressive Party chairman election. Even more unfortunately, the person attempting to muzzle the media is someone who was once Vice President of the Executive Yuan.
Chairman Tsai cannot deny the existence of the Democratic Progressive Party signature drive. The China Times has never evaded the media's responsibility to offer forthright criticisms. Ever since the Chen corruption case exploded, we have been consistent. We expect the DPP to live up to its reputation as a native political party committed to clean government. We want the Democratic Progressive Party to have a clear understanding of the Chen corruption case. We are criticizing the Democratic Progressive Party for failing to emerge from Chen Shui-bian's shadow. We have warned DPP leaders not to sacrifice the DPP in order to shield Chen Shui-bian from prosecution. They must not bury the hopes the public have for a native political party.
After all, the Democratic Progressive Party is supposed to be an asset to Taiwan. It is not supposed to be an asset to Chen Shui-bian. It is not supposed to be an asset to this or that local party boss. We would like to ask Chairman Tsai a question. Just because the China Times holds different views than Tsai on how to save the DPP, is it really necessary to villify the China Times so disproportionately?
Various and sundry Democratic Progressive Party "princes" are fighting over the party chairmanship. Should the media ignore this? If no one expectated anything from the Democratic Progressive Party, if it was dispensable, then no one would bother running for party chairman. After eight years in power, the Democratic Progressive Party is again in the opposition. But the Green Camp "princes" have thrown their hats in the ring. For the DPP this ought to be a gratifying development. Or does Chairman Tsai expect the DPP to give its overwhelming support to Tsai Ing-wen, the way the Kuomintang gave its support to Ma Ying-jeou?
The China Times is a media organization. It has high expectations of the DPP. That is why its criticisms are so severe. It could ignore the struggle among Green Camp "princes" for the DPP party chairmanship, as well as Chairman Tsai's fierce and irrational remarks. We have no desire to engage in wild speculation. But before Chairman Tsai criticizes us, shouldn't she ask herself whether anyone else in the Democratic Progressive Party wants to run for party chairman? Does Chairman Tsai intend to seek a second term? Is she hoping the other "princes" will bow out? No matter what the truth might be, as a member of the media, are we supposed to refrain from reporting and commenting?
Tsai Ing-wen became an official during the KMT era. She was former President Lee Teng-hui's chief of staff. Her experience and professionalism have distinguished her from past politicians. Because of her professionalism and her restrained and precise manner of speech, both Blue and Green Camp leaders and officials find it difficult to speak ill of her. She should not be a populist rabble-rouser. She should not attempt to mobilze Deep Green Taiwan independence zealots. She should pay close attention to her political methods. She should persuade centrist voters to lean toward the Democratic Progressive Party. Following the 2008 presidential election, the Democratic Progressive Party "princes" stepped down. This allowed her to take over the unfamiliar duties of party leader under calm conditions. Why did they do so, if not because they hoped she would lead the Democratic Progressive Party down a different path? Alas, Tsai Ing-wen has backed off.
Does Tsai Ing-wen intend to seek a second term as DPP Chairman? The Democratic Progressive Party "princes" are fighting over the party chairmanship. These are matters of public interest. Is the China Times wrong to report on the heated party chairmanship election?
Tsai Ing-wen accused the China Times of failing to criticize the Ma administration's policies. She was dead wrong. First, the China Times has never pulled its punches when criticizing the ruling administration. The China Times is keeping a close eye on the one man KMT chairmanship election. Secondly, to paraphrase Green Camp "prince" and former Premier Su Tseng-chang: Criticizing the KMT will not restore the DPP to power. Criticizing the media will not absolve the opposition party of its responsibilities.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.24
社論－光靠罵媒體 卸不了在野黨責任
本報訊
民進黨踩著媒體鮮血前進從不是新聞。當年，民進黨人可以為一己政治之需求，公開撕報紙、揚言退報；執政八年，民進黨政府締造的歷史，從搜索媒體、控告媒體，到新聞施壓，無所不用其極，如今再玩不出新把戲，令人遺憾的是，竟是由社會形象溫和中庸的黨主席蔡英文出場，無的放矢地指責媒體，藉以逃避她作為唯一反對黨領袖的責任。
蔡英文指責《中國時報》對馬政府的政策沒有批判，卻刻意炒作報導民進黨主席選舉和黨內生態，指稱聲援陳水扁是為了黨主席保衛戰，藉此製造該黨黨內紛爭，損害民進黨形象。
我們不理解蔡主席為何會做出此一指控？民進黨主席選舉難道不是可受報導與公評之事？蔡主席如果有仔細讀過《中國時報》，應該清楚中時沒有隻字片語提及民進黨連署救扁是為了黨主席保衛戰，她的聯想，究竟是因為自己強烈的不安全感？還是對《中國時報》不公平的敵意？我們並不想揣測，只是必須非常持平地告訴蔡主席：民進黨主席從來都是媒體關切的焦點，不論民進黨執政或在野。當年，在其他媒體不敢為民進黨言的時候，《中國時報》甚至舉辦過民進黨主席選舉辯論，為的只是一個非常單純的理想：台灣需要一個健全的反對黨。
很遺憾，民進黨執政八年之後，竟然企圖阻絕媒體對民進黨主席選舉的報導，我們更遺憾，扮演這個打壓媒體角色的人，竟是曾經擔任過行政院副院長這麼高層職務之人！
蔡主席不能否認，民進黨連署聲援救扁是事實，《中國時報》從來沒有迴避媒體提出諍言的責任，從扁案爆發迄今，我們始終一以貫之，站在期許民進黨勿忘本土政黨標榜清廉初衷的立場，提醒民進黨認清扁弊案之本質、批判民進黨揮棄不了扁陰影的猶豫，甚至從不迴避地預警不能為了扁弊案埋葬民進黨、埋葬台灣對本土政黨的深沉期待。
畢竟，民進黨該是台灣人的資產，不該是陳水扁，也不該是哪個派系天王的資產吧！請問蔡主席：《中國時報》只因為對如何搶救民進黨的見解與蔡英文不同，就必須被汙名化？
民進黨各路天王爭搶黨魁，不該被關注嗎？如果民進黨是一個不被期待的黨，是一個人人皆曰可拋棄的政黨，自然沒有人要競逐黨主席，綠天王競相投入黨魁選舉，這對八年執政之後，頓失政權的民進黨而言，該是樁可喜可賀之事，難不成蔡主席希望民進黨如國民黨萬民擁戴馬英九般，萬民擁戴蔡英文？
身為媒體，《中國時報》若非對民進黨愛深責切，可以不理會所謂綠天王競選黨主席之事，蔡主席如此激烈有失理性的言論，我們並不想妄加揣度，但請蔡主席批評前先想想：民進黨是不是沒有任何人要競選黨主席？或者，蔡主席有意要準備連任，期待其他天王退讓之？不論實情是什麼？作為媒體，難道都不能報導評論？
蔡英文出身於國民黨執政時期，曾為李前總統的幕僚，她的背景和專業，讓她迥異於過去一般認知的「政客」，因為她的專業、她內斂精準的政治語言，讓政壇藍綠黨公職很難對她講出任何難聽的話，因為，她不該是一個只知操作民粹，動員深綠的獨派，她應該是一個講究政治方法論，知曉如何說服中間選民向民進黨靠攏的政黨領袖，二○○八總統大選之後，民進黨天王俱退位，讓她在風平浪靜中接任這個她不熟悉的政黨領袖職務，所為何來？不過就是希望她帶領民進黨走出不一樣的路。但是，蔡英文退縮了。
蔡英文是否要再任民進黨主席？就像民進黨內天王競逐黨魁般，是可受公評之事，《中國時報》報導熱熱烈烈的黨主席選舉，何錯之有？
蔡英文批評《中國時報》對馬政府政策未提出批判，她真的說錯了，第一，《中國時報》從未鬆懈對執政者的批判，即使國民黨主席選舉一人競選，《中國時報》依舊嚴厲監督；第二，套用天王之一的前行政院長蘇貞昌的一句話：光靠罵國民黨，別想再執政；光靠罵媒體，還是卸除不了在野政黨的責任！
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
Tsai Ing-wen's Attempt to Save the Party has become an Attempt to Save Ah-Bian
Tsai Ing-wen's Attempt to Save the Party has become an Attempt to Save Ah-Bian
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 23, 2009
Tsai Ing-wen assumed the chairmanship of the DPP one year ago. Both she and the public harbored high expectations. Both she and the public hoped she could save the Democratic Progressive Party. Now, one year later, not only has Tsai Ing-wen not saved the party, she is actually launching a "Save Ah-Bian movement."
It is rumored that Tsai Ing-wen is planning a signature drive. She intends to publicly back a signature drive for Chen Shui-bian's release. Such perversions of justice may allow Deep Green elements who support Chen Shui-bian to vent their spleen. But they are tantamount to an admission to mainstream society that Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP can no longer extricate themselves from the "Support Ah-Bian!" and "Save Ah-Bian!" quagmire.
Tsai Ing-wen's approach is to avoid mentioning Chen Shui-bian's corruption, while demanding "due process according to the law" for him. This is akin to tossing away a cup, then attempting to scoop up water without it. Substantive justice and procedural justice are two sides of the same coin. You cannot have the one without the other. Besides, one of the main reasons Chen Shui-bian's trial cannot begin is that he has used every means at his disposal to delay the trial process. This has ensured that the reasons for his detention will not go away. Yesterday Chen Hsing-yu, Chen Chih-chung, and Chao Chien-ming confessed that "their elders instructed them to commit perjury." This shows yet again how widespread the potential for coordinating false testimony may be. Another danger is witnesses reneging on their testimony. Lee Chieh-mu is a good example. And so it goes. The court knows the score. Do Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP really want to use a signature drive to get Chen Shui-bian off scot-free?
The DPP is calling for signatures under the guise of "due process according to the law." But who doesn't know the signature drive is actually a Deep Green appeal on behalf of Chen Shui-bian, asserting his innocence? Besides, the DPP could initiate a signature drive demanding Chen Shui-bian's release. Tomorrow they could demand Chen's release, on the grounds that he is innocent. The day after tomorrow they could demand Chen's pardon, after he has been found guilty, on the grounds of clemency. If Tsai Ing-wen initiates a signature drive demanding Chen Shui-bian's release, the main impact will be to bind herself and the DPP inextricably to the "Save Ah-Bian" juggernaught. There will no end to the matter. She will find herself riding a tiger with no way to dismount.
The county and municipal elections are just around the corner. The DPP's strategy has always been to avoid injecting national issues into local elections. Given its internal and external circumstances this year, this is especially true. Yet the DPP has allowed itself to become entangled in cross-Strait issues, as a result of Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland. It even launched a signature drive demanding a referendum on ECFA. Today it initiated another signature drive for Chen Shui-bian's release. Such moves, coming wave upon wave, merely remind mainstream society that the Democratic Progressive Party has yet to offer a coherent policy on national identity and cross-strait relations. Today, it finds itself bogged down in its "Support Ah-Bian!" and "Save Ah-Bian!" quagmire, unable to extricate itself. The DPP can't even save itself. Does it really expect mainstream society to save the DPP?
One year ago, Tsai Ing-wen told Chen Shui-bian, "You must pay attention, and face justice." A few months ago, Tsai Ing-wen masterminded the Taipei County Executive By-election. She floated Su Tseng-chang' candidacy as a trial balloon. Two months ago, Tsai Ing-wen resolutely opposed the nomination of Chen Tang-shan for Tainan County Executive. She expressed the desire to "eliminate Chen Shui-bian influences" from the party. One month ago, Tsai Ing-wen and Chen Chu co-starred in a Mainland visit drama. They tested the waters, inside and out. But today all that has changed. Chen Chu makes no mention of her trip to the Mainland. Chen Tang-shan sought nomination as the DPP candidate for Tainan County Executive. Chen Shui-bian declared Tainan County the political "epicenter." Su Tseng-chang now sees the Taipei County By-election as the basis for a Chen Shui-bian/Su Tseng-chang Alliance. After which Tsai Ing-wen announced this week her intention to initiate a "Save Ah-Bian!" movement.
Based on the above mentioned political developments, Tsai Ing-wen has clearly gone from saving the DPP to saving Ah-Bian. The Save Ah-Bian signature drive opened Pandora's Box. The number of signatures collected was irrelevant. Whether Chen Shui-bian was released was irrelevant. The "Save Ah-Bian!/Support Ah-Bian!" issue has heated up. If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP lose control, they will be burned. The more people who sign the petition, the harder Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP will find it to free themselves from the tar baby known as Chen Shui-bian. The apprehensions mainstream society have about Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP will become greater and greater. It will no longer matter why Chen Shui-bian is released. The signature drive has become a red carpet rolled out by the DPP, paving the way to his political restoration. Chen Shui-bian is down but not out. He continues creeping forward. The DPP must deal with him. If Ah-Bian is not released, then the signature drive by pro-Chen forces within the Green Camp will be legitimized and sanctified. Given an inch, they will demand a mile. Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic Progressive Party will find them insufferable. In particular, if the "Support Ah-Bian/Save Ah-Bian" signature drive becomes linked to the year end county and municipal elections, what will mainstream society make of such a mind-boggling political development?
Taiwan independence is a dead end. Yet Tsai Ing-wen is afraid to jettison Deep Green Taiwan independence elements. Supporting Chen Shui-bian is a dead end. Yet Tsai Ing-wen is afraid to jettison Deep Green pro-Chen elements. Tsai Ing-wen may feel that in order to save the party she must therefore save Ah-Bian. But the signature drive exerting pressure on the courts may not be able to save Ah-Bian. Saving Ah-Bian, by necessity, runs counter to saving the party.
Saving Ah-Bian and saving the party are diametrically opposed. If one saves Ah-Bian, one cannot save the party. If one saves the party, one cannot save Ah-Bian. Tsai Ing-wen, how did you wind up going down this road, one that spells the end of the DPP?
蔡英文動線：救黨變成救扁
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.23 05:56 am
蔡英文一年前出任民進黨主席，無論是她的自我期許，或是社會對她的期望，都在希望她能救民進黨。如今，一年過後，非但救黨未成，蔡英文且將在本周發動「救扁運動」。
據稱，蔡英文將發動公民連署，以公開的簽名運動主張停止羈押陳水扁。這種扭曲司法審判的手法，也許可以宣洩深綠群眾的挺扁情緒，卻也不啻是同時向主流社會宣告：蔡英文與民進黨已經不可能從挺扁救扁的內鬥泥淖中自拔。
蔡英文的手法是：不談陳水扁一家的貪腐行為，而稱只是聲援陳水扁的「司法人權」；這猶如丟掉杯子，卻仍想盛住那一杯水。司法審判的實質正義與程序正義，本即互為表裡、互為體用；何況，陳水扁之未能開釋，主因之一正是他自己無所不用其極地拖延阻滯審判進行，使羈押原因難以消失；而昨日陳幸妤、陳致中、趙建銘等人皆當庭承認「長輩指示作偽證」，再度顯示扁案無所不在的串證可能（另如李界木翻供）；如此這般，法院自有裁量，蔡英文及民進黨難道想用簽名運動來開釋陳水扁？
民進黨雖假藉「司法人權」的名義號召簽名，但國人誰人不知其實是為「阿扁無罪」的深綠訴求在張目？何況，今天可以連署開釋陳水扁，明天亦可在宣判前連署阿扁無罪，後天則更可在審判後連署特赦阿扁。蔡英文若推動連署開釋阿扁，主要的效應將是：就此把她自己與民進黨，綁在「救扁戰車」上不得脫身，沒完沒了，騎虎難下。
縣市選舉在即，而避免將地方選舉捲入全國議題，向來是民進黨的戰略樞軸；以今年的內外情勢觀，尤當如此。但是，民進黨卻因陳菊登陸掀起中國政策的議題，又發動ＥＣＦＡ公投連署，如今再引爆開釋阿扁的簽名運動，這一波又一波的風潮，不啻皆在提醒主流社會：民進黨對國家認同與兩岸政策根本未作交代，如今更已深陷挺扁救扁的泥淖不能自拔。民進黨救不了它自己，難道還奢望主流社會救它？
一年前，蔡英文告訴陳水扁，「要專心、認真面對司法」；幾個月前，蔡英文操作台北縣長改選，放出蘇貞昌出馬的空氣；兩個月前，蔡英文堅持反對提名陳唐山競選台南縣長，表達「去扁」的心志；一個月前，蔡英文與陳菊合演登陸大戲，試探內外氣候。但是，如今一切皆已豬羊變色：陳菊登陸連「注意事項」也提不出來，陳唐山出馬則陳水扁已宣布台南縣為「震央」，蘇貞昌更巴望台北縣改制延選而正熱中於「扁蘇聯盟」，接著，蔡英文又將在本周宣布「救扁運動」。
從上文所描繪的政治動線來看，蔡英文很明顯地是從「救黨」，變成了「救扁」。連署救扁運動一旦展開，猶如打開了潘朵拉魔盒。不論連署人數多少，亦不論陳水扁是否開釋，「救扁／挺扁」的議題勢將升溫，而蔡英文及民進黨若操控失度，極可能引火焚身。連署的人愈多，蔡英文及民進黨未來就愈難擺脫陳水扁的糾纏；相對而言，主流社會對蔡及民進黨的疑懼也就愈深。至於陳水扁若不論以什麼因素而開釋，這次簽名運動就成了民進黨為他鋪設的崇隆備至的政治復辟紅地毯，且民進黨將面對陳水扁的「趴趴走」；而扁若不能開釋，則綠營內部挺扁勢力經此次簽名運動的正當化及道德化，得寸進尺，亦恐將使蔡及民進黨未來難以消受。尤其，倘若「挺扁／救扁」因簽名運動與年底縣市選舉連成一氣，主流社會將如何解讀這種匪夷所思的政治異象？
台獨沒有活路，蔡英文卻不敢對深綠群眾丟掉台獨餅乾；挺扁沒有活路，蔡英文也不敢對深綠群眾丟掉挺扁的奶嘴。蔡英文此時或許仍然覺得，她是為了「救黨」而「救扁」；但是，簽名向司法施壓未必能救扁，救扁更必定與「救黨」背道而馳。
「救扁」與「救黨」，南轅北轍。救扁就不能救黨，救黨就不能救扁。蔡英文，妳怎麼會走上這條回頭路，這條置民進黨於死地的路？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 23, 2009
Tsai Ing-wen assumed the chairmanship of the DPP one year ago. Both she and the public harbored high expectations. Both she and the public hoped she could save the Democratic Progressive Party. Now, one year later, not only has Tsai Ing-wen not saved the party, she is actually launching a "Save Ah-Bian movement."
It is rumored that Tsai Ing-wen is planning a signature drive. She intends to publicly back a signature drive for Chen Shui-bian's release. Such perversions of justice may allow Deep Green elements who support Chen Shui-bian to vent their spleen. But they are tantamount to an admission to mainstream society that Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP can no longer extricate themselves from the "Support Ah-Bian!" and "Save Ah-Bian!" quagmire.
Tsai Ing-wen's approach is to avoid mentioning Chen Shui-bian's corruption, while demanding "due process according to the law" for him. This is akin to tossing away a cup, then attempting to scoop up water without it. Substantive justice and procedural justice are two sides of the same coin. You cannot have the one without the other. Besides, one of the main reasons Chen Shui-bian's trial cannot begin is that he has used every means at his disposal to delay the trial process. This has ensured that the reasons for his detention will not go away. Yesterday Chen Hsing-yu, Chen Chih-chung, and Chao Chien-ming confessed that "their elders instructed them to commit perjury." This shows yet again how widespread the potential for coordinating false testimony may be. Another danger is witnesses reneging on their testimony. Lee Chieh-mu is a good example. And so it goes. The court knows the score. Do Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP really want to use a signature drive to get Chen Shui-bian off scot-free?
The DPP is calling for signatures under the guise of "due process according to the law." But who doesn't know the signature drive is actually a Deep Green appeal on behalf of Chen Shui-bian, asserting his innocence? Besides, the DPP could initiate a signature drive demanding Chen Shui-bian's release. Tomorrow they could demand Chen's release, on the grounds that he is innocent. The day after tomorrow they could demand Chen's pardon, after he has been found guilty, on the grounds of clemency. If Tsai Ing-wen initiates a signature drive demanding Chen Shui-bian's release, the main impact will be to bind herself and the DPP inextricably to the "Save Ah-Bian" juggernaught. There will no end to the matter. She will find herself riding a tiger with no way to dismount.
The county and municipal elections are just around the corner. The DPP's strategy has always been to avoid injecting national issues into local elections. Given its internal and external circumstances this year, this is especially true. Yet the DPP has allowed itself to become entangled in cross-Strait issues, as a result of Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland. It even launched a signature drive demanding a referendum on ECFA. Today it initiated another signature drive for Chen Shui-bian's release. Such moves, coming wave upon wave, merely remind mainstream society that the Democratic Progressive Party has yet to offer a coherent policy on national identity and cross-strait relations. Today, it finds itself bogged down in its "Support Ah-Bian!" and "Save Ah-Bian!" quagmire, unable to extricate itself. The DPP can't even save itself. Does it really expect mainstream society to save the DPP?
One year ago, Tsai Ing-wen told Chen Shui-bian, "You must pay attention, and face justice." A few months ago, Tsai Ing-wen masterminded the Taipei County Executive By-election. She floated Su Tseng-chang' candidacy as a trial balloon. Two months ago, Tsai Ing-wen resolutely opposed the nomination of Chen Tang-shan for Tainan County Executive. She expressed the desire to "eliminate Chen Shui-bian influences" from the party. One month ago, Tsai Ing-wen and Chen Chu co-starred in a Mainland visit drama. They tested the waters, inside and out. But today all that has changed. Chen Chu makes no mention of her trip to the Mainland. Chen Tang-shan sought nomination as the DPP candidate for Tainan County Executive. Chen Shui-bian declared Tainan County the political "epicenter." Su Tseng-chang now sees the Taipei County By-election as the basis for a Chen Shui-bian/Su Tseng-chang Alliance. After which Tsai Ing-wen announced this week her intention to initiate a "Save Ah-Bian!" movement.
Based on the above mentioned political developments, Tsai Ing-wen has clearly gone from saving the DPP to saving Ah-Bian. The Save Ah-Bian signature drive opened Pandora's Box. The number of signatures collected was irrelevant. Whether Chen Shui-bian was released was irrelevant. The "Save Ah-Bian!/Support Ah-Bian!" issue has heated up. If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP lose control, they will be burned. The more people who sign the petition, the harder Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP will find it to free themselves from the tar baby known as Chen Shui-bian. The apprehensions mainstream society have about Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP will become greater and greater. It will no longer matter why Chen Shui-bian is released. The signature drive has become a red carpet rolled out by the DPP, paving the way to his political restoration. Chen Shui-bian is down but not out. He continues creeping forward. The DPP must deal with him. If Ah-Bian is not released, then the signature drive by pro-Chen forces within the Green Camp will be legitimized and sanctified. Given an inch, they will demand a mile. Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic Progressive Party will find them insufferable. In particular, if the "Support Ah-Bian/Save Ah-Bian" signature drive becomes linked to the year end county and municipal elections, what will mainstream society make of such a mind-boggling political development?
Taiwan independence is a dead end. Yet Tsai Ing-wen is afraid to jettison Deep Green Taiwan independence elements. Supporting Chen Shui-bian is a dead end. Yet Tsai Ing-wen is afraid to jettison Deep Green pro-Chen elements. Tsai Ing-wen may feel that in order to save the party she must therefore save Ah-Bian. But the signature drive exerting pressure on the courts may not be able to save Ah-Bian. Saving Ah-Bian, by necessity, runs counter to saving the party.
Saving Ah-Bian and saving the party are diametrically opposed. If one saves Ah-Bian, one cannot save the party. If one saves the party, one cannot save Ah-Bian. Tsai Ing-wen, how did you wind up going down this road, one that spells the end of the DPP?
蔡英文動線：救黨變成救扁
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.23 05:56 am
蔡英文一年前出任民進黨主席，無論是她的自我期許，或是社會對她的期望，都在希望她能救民進黨。如今，一年過後，非但救黨未成，蔡英文且將在本周發動「救扁運動」。
據稱，蔡英文將發動公民連署，以公開的簽名運動主張停止羈押陳水扁。這種扭曲司法審判的手法，也許可以宣洩深綠群眾的挺扁情緒，卻也不啻是同時向主流社會宣告：蔡英文與民進黨已經不可能從挺扁救扁的內鬥泥淖中自拔。
蔡英文的手法是：不談陳水扁一家的貪腐行為，而稱只是聲援陳水扁的「司法人權」；這猶如丟掉杯子，卻仍想盛住那一杯水。司法審判的實質正義與程序正義，本即互為表裡、互為體用；何況，陳水扁之未能開釋，主因之一正是他自己無所不用其極地拖延阻滯審判進行，使羈押原因難以消失；而昨日陳幸妤、陳致中、趙建銘等人皆當庭承認「長輩指示作偽證」，再度顯示扁案無所不在的串證可能（另如李界木翻供）；如此這般，法院自有裁量，蔡英文及民進黨難道想用簽名運動來開釋陳水扁？
民進黨雖假藉「司法人權」的名義號召簽名，但國人誰人不知其實是為「阿扁無罪」的深綠訴求在張目？何況，今天可以連署開釋陳水扁，明天亦可在宣判前連署阿扁無罪，後天則更可在審判後連署特赦阿扁。蔡英文若推動連署開釋阿扁，主要的效應將是：就此把她自己與民進黨，綁在「救扁戰車」上不得脫身，沒完沒了，騎虎難下。
縣市選舉在即，而避免將地方選舉捲入全國議題，向來是民進黨的戰略樞軸；以今年的內外情勢觀，尤當如此。但是，民進黨卻因陳菊登陸掀起中國政策的議題，又發動ＥＣＦＡ公投連署，如今再引爆開釋阿扁的簽名運動，這一波又一波的風潮，不啻皆在提醒主流社會：民進黨對國家認同與兩岸政策根本未作交代，如今更已深陷挺扁救扁的泥淖不能自拔。民進黨救不了它自己，難道還奢望主流社會救它？
一年前，蔡英文告訴陳水扁，「要專心、認真面對司法」；幾個月前，蔡英文操作台北縣長改選，放出蘇貞昌出馬的空氣；兩個月前，蔡英文堅持反對提名陳唐山競選台南縣長，表達「去扁」的心志；一個月前，蔡英文與陳菊合演登陸大戲，試探內外氣候。但是，如今一切皆已豬羊變色：陳菊登陸連「注意事項」也提不出來，陳唐山出馬則陳水扁已宣布台南縣為「震央」，蘇貞昌更巴望台北縣改制延選而正熱中於「扁蘇聯盟」，接著，蔡英文又將在本周宣布「救扁運動」。
從上文所描繪的政治動線來看，蔡英文很明顯地是從「救黨」，變成了「救扁」。連署救扁運動一旦展開，猶如打開了潘朵拉魔盒。不論連署人數多少，亦不論陳水扁是否開釋，「救扁／挺扁」的議題勢將升溫，而蔡英文及民進黨若操控失度，極可能引火焚身。連署的人愈多，蔡英文及民進黨未來就愈難擺脫陳水扁的糾纏；相對而言，主流社會對蔡及民進黨的疑懼也就愈深。至於陳水扁若不論以什麼因素而開釋，這次簽名運動就成了民進黨為他鋪設的崇隆備至的政治復辟紅地毯，且民進黨將面對陳水扁的「趴趴走」；而扁若不能開釋，則綠營內部挺扁勢力經此次簽名運動的正當化及道德化，得寸進尺，亦恐將使蔡及民進黨未來難以消受。尤其，倘若「挺扁／救扁」因簽名運動與年底縣市選舉連成一氣，主流社會將如何解讀這種匪夷所思的政治異象？
台獨沒有活路，蔡英文卻不敢對深綠群眾丟掉台獨餅乾；挺扁沒有活路，蔡英文也不敢對深綠群眾丟掉挺扁的奶嘴。蔡英文此時或許仍然覺得，她是為了「救黨」而「救扁」；但是，簽名向司法施壓未必能救扁，救扁更必定與「救黨」背道而馳。
「救扁」與「救黨」，南轅北轍。救扁就不能救黨，救黨就不能救扁。蔡英文，妳怎麼會走上這條回頭路，這條置民進黨於死地的路？
Monday, June 22, 2009
ECFA is Merely A Framework: Does It really Warrant a Referendum?
ECFA is Merely A Framework: Does It really Warrant a Referendum?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 22, 2009
President Ma is standing pat. Everyone in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, from top to bottom, is promoting and studying ECFA. Meanwhile leaders of the opposition DPP have not been idle. They are aggressively pushing for a referendum. They hope to combine it with the year end county and municipal elections. First, they want to block the signing of any agreement. Secondly, they want to give a boost to Green Camp county and municipal election candidates. But so far, although the Ministry of Economic Affairs has held public hearings in the northern, central, southern, and eastern parts of the island, media coverage has been limited. Much of the dialogue has been "ministers talking to priests," i.e., shop talk between insiders. The public has a limited understanding of ECFA. It is insufficiently familiar with it. The Blue Camp doesn't know how to defend it. The Green Camp doesn't know how to attack it. The two sides "don't know what they're fighting for, or whom they are fighting for."
In fact, the specific content of ECFA is not yet clear. But based on similar agreements signed by other nations, we can discern ECFA's general outlines. Regional trade agreements signed by nations around the world, such as the European Union, North America Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN, were all made within the framework of the WTO. If the two sides of the Strait do sign ECFA, they are unlikely to violate WTO norms. One need only go online and read the global and regional economic and trade agreements, and Article 24 fo the WTO agreements, to understand the broad outlines of ECFA.
In general, the contents of regional trade agreements are tariff reductions (such as the Free Trade Agreement FTA), investment benefits, industrial cooperation, service sector benefits, and timetables for market liberalization. To actually negotiate so many items one by one would take at least three to five years. That being the case, why has President Ma openly declared that he hopes to sign it by the end of this year or the beginning of next year? Based on the above time line we can see that ECFA is probably a "two stage" affair. The government probably hopes to sign a framework before the end of the year. As for the substance within the framework, it must be negotiated and signed during the next phase. This is the only way one can sign by the end of the year, and talk about the details later.
Since ECFA negotiations are a two-stage affair, the government should explain the matter clearly, in plain language. It must prevent needless public misunderstanding and confrontation.
If the above mentioned "two-stage negotiations" framework is what it has in mind, then ECFA may be signed by the end of the year. After all, at this stage it is akin to a table of contents. A table of contents merely denotes the potential content of various chapters and sections. Once the author agrees to the table of contents, the next stage is to discuss the specific contents of each chapter, and to actually supply it. Only three to five years from now, after it is organized into a complete volume, will it be complete. In the above analogy, Taipei and Beijing are the co-authors of the chapters. They intend to use the next three to five years to fill in the various chapters with cross-Strait economic and trade content. Even if the table of contents indicates ten chapters, if negotiations reach an impasse, some chapters may not be completed. In the end, only six chapters may be completed. Therefore, negotiations over ECFA will address cross-Strait tax rates, industries, early harvests, and service industries. Each chapter may provoke controversies over the need for public oversight and feedback.
The Democratic Progressive Party proposes holding a referendum at the end of the year over ECFA. Its proposal, to approve or disapprove a book that contains only a table of contents, and blank pages in each of the chapters, is utterly pointless. The substantive content will be discussed in the future. One may, if one wishes, hold a referendum regarding future points of contention. But how can one hold a referendum over blank sheets of paper? Suppose the referendum fails to pass? Does that mean the ruling authorities can then sign any agreement they wish? Even one that might be detrimental to our interests? Suppose, on the other hand, the referendum passes, even though they have yet to discuss anything? Does that mean the DPP will refuse to engage in any form of negotiation or engagement whatsoever? How would that be any different from a blind "Closed Door" policy?" Is anyone concerned about "selling out Taiwan?" If so, doesn't that require substantive content within each chapter? So far all we have is a table of contents. So far there is nothing to sell.
Frankly the ruling authorities' are right to adopt a two-stage negotiation strategy. ASEAN plus three is ready to go. It will have an impact on Taiwan. Therefore Taipei must swiftly adopt a rough framework to address the disadvantages it will suffer as a result of ASEAN plus three. That is why ECFA involves two-stage negotiations. That is why its time frame is so protracted. Only then can the public on Taiwan have sufficient opportunity for dialogue. When the opposition DPP understands that ECFA involves a two-stage negotiation process, it should carefully consider whether there is any need to hold a referendum on the first phase table of contents. Does the DPP really want the public on Taiwan to hold a referendum to oppose the publication of any sort of book with any sort of content? If so, then the referendum will have no impact on the public whatsoever, other than reinforce prevailing stereotypes about the Democratic Progressive Party.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.22
社論－ECFA僅是框架目錄 要如何公投？
本報訊
在馬總統意志堅決表態下，經濟部上上下下都在緊鑼密鼓地研究ＥＣＦＡ的議題。另一方面，在野黨也沒閒著；他們積極動員推動ＥＣＦＡ公投，希望能在年底與縣市長選舉結合，一則擋下協定簽署，二則也為縣市長綠軍選將增添幾分氣勢。可是到目前為止，雖然經濟部在北、中、南、東各舉辦過一場座談會，但媒體報導有限，而現場對話又頗多「牧師對神父」的專家語言，社會大眾對ＥＣＦＡ所知甚為有限。也因為如此，ＥＣＦＡ議題的社會熱度始終不夠，藍軍不知要如何辯護、綠軍不知要如何攻擊，雙方都不知道要「為何而戰、為誰而戰」。
其實，雖然ＥＣＦＡ的具體內容還不清楚，但是觀諸世界各國簽署類似協定的內涵，我們也可以大略勾勒出ＥＣＦＡ的可能輪廓。此外，在概念上，全世界各國所簽的區域貿易協定（如歐盟、北美、東協等），都是在ＷＴＯ框架下的地區協定。故兩岸將來若要簽署ＥＣＦＡ，也斷難違反ＷＴＯ的規範。因此，大家只要上網查看世界其他區域經貿協定與ＷＴＯ廿四條等規定，即能了解ＥＣＦＡ的內容梗概。
一般而言，區域貿易協定所涵蓋的內容，不外乎關稅減免（如自由貿易協定ＦＴＡ）、投資互惠、產業合作、服務業互惠、自由化時程等項目。這麼多項目如果真要逐一談判，至少得花上三、五年的時間。既然如此，為什麼馬總統會公開宣示，希望今年底或明年初簽署呢？由以上敘述的時間鋪陳可知，兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，應該是採取「兩階段」簽署法。政府可能是希望在年底先簽定框架（framework），至於框內的實質內容，則在下一個階段再逐步談判、簽署。只有在這種情況下，才有可能做到「年底簽署、細節慢談」的宣示進程。
我們認為，既然ＥＣＦＡ是兩階段談判的規畫，則政府就應該把事情用白話文講清楚，以免民間做無厘頭的虛耗式對話。
如果前述「兩階段談判」的架構屬實，則年底所可能簽署的ＥＣＦＡ，就如同只是一本書的「目錄」。目錄只是摘記各章的章名與可能的節次內容；一旦作者們同意了目錄的內涵，則在下一階段，作者就要逐章研議、撰寫內容，三、五年後集結成冊，才是書冊完整的內容。以上述比喻觀之，則台灣與中國大陸都是各章的共同作者；他們打算用未來三至五年的時間，填寫兩岸經貿的各章內容。在概念上，即使目錄中標示了十章，但若將來談不妥，則各章內容也可能從缺，最後也許只有六章完稿。因此，ＥＣＦＡ真正的談判關鍵，是將來兩岸稅率、產業、早期收穫、服務業等各章內涵，也許每一章都有不少爭議需要民意監督與回饋。
民進黨主張要在年底對ＥＣＦＡ進行公投，就如同要對一本「僅有目錄、內容厥如」的無字天書表示可否，恐怕是相當不切實際的。既然實質內容是要在未來慢慢談，要公投也該是對未來關鍵議題的爭議點公投才是，怎麼會要現在辦「空白公投」呢？萬一空白公投沒通過，難道表示執政當局可以簽署任何不利於台灣的協定？而如果什麼都還沒談公投就過了，這是否表示民進黨拒絕各種形式的談判與接觸？這與盲目鎖國又有什麼差別？如果有人擔心「賣台」，那也要靠章節的實質內容賣；單單是目錄，是沒有東西可賣的。
坦白說，我們認為執政當局採取兩階段談判的策略，是正確的決定。由於東協加三已箭在弦上，即將對台灣產生衝擊，故台灣唯有先在粗框架下簽得早期收穫條款，才可能迅速補給台灣在東協加三中的缺陷。也正因為ＥＣＦＡ是兩階段談判，時間拖得長，台灣社會才能有充分的對話機會。當在野黨了解ＥＣＦＡ是兩階段談判之後，實在應該仔細思索有沒有必要再對第一階段的目錄框架做公投。如果要台灣人民以公投方式「反對出版任何內容的書」，那麼除了坐實人民對民進黨的刻板印象外，恐怕收穫將十分有限。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 22, 2009
President Ma is standing pat. Everyone in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, from top to bottom, is promoting and studying ECFA. Meanwhile leaders of the opposition DPP have not been idle. They are aggressively pushing for a referendum. They hope to combine it with the year end county and municipal elections. First, they want to block the signing of any agreement. Secondly, they want to give a boost to Green Camp county and municipal election candidates. But so far, although the Ministry of Economic Affairs has held public hearings in the northern, central, southern, and eastern parts of the island, media coverage has been limited. Much of the dialogue has been "ministers talking to priests," i.e., shop talk between insiders. The public has a limited understanding of ECFA. It is insufficiently familiar with it. The Blue Camp doesn't know how to defend it. The Green Camp doesn't know how to attack it. The two sides "don't know what they're fighting for, or whom they are fighting for."
In fact, the specific content of ECFA is not yet clear. But based on similar agreements signed by other nations, we can discern ECFA's general outlines. Regional trade agreements signed by nations around the world, such as the European Union, North America Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN, were all made within the framework of the WTO. If the two sides of the Strait do sign ECFA, they are unlikely to violate WTO norms. One need only go online and read the global and regional economic and trade agreements, and Article 24 fo the WTO agreements, to understand the broad outlines of ECFA.
In general, the contents of regional trade agreements are tariff reductions (such as the Free Trade Agreement FTA), investment benefits, industrial cooperation, service sector benefits, and timetables for market liberalization. To actually negotiate so many items one by one would take at least three to five years. That being the case, why has President Ma openly declared that he hopes to sign it by the end of this year or the beginning of next year? Based on the above time line we can see that ECFA is probably a "two stage" affair. The government probably hopes to sign a framework before the end of the year. As for the substance within the framework, it must be negotiated and signed during the next phase. This is the only way one can sign by the end of the year, and talk about the details later.
Since ECFA negotiations are a two-stage affair, the government should explain the matter clearly, in plain language. It must prevent needless public misunderstanding and confrontation.
If the above mentioned "two-stage negotiations" framework is what it has in mind, then ECFA may be signed by the end of the year. After all, at this stage it is akin to a table of contents. A table of contents merely denotes the potential content of various chapters and sections. Once the author agrees to the table of contents, the next stage is to discuss the specific contents of each chapter, and to actually supply it. Only three to five years from now, after it is organized into a complete volume, will it be complete. In the above analogy, Taipei and Beijing are the co-authors of the chapters. They intend to use the next three to five years to fill in the various chapters with cross-Strait economic and trade content. Even if the table of contents indicates ten chapters, if negotiations reach an impasse, some chapters may not be completed. In the end, only six chapters may be completed. Therefore, negotiations over ECFA will address cross-Strait tax rates, industries, early harvests, and service industries. Each chapter may provoke controversies over the need for public oversight and feedback.
The Democratic Progressive Party proposes holding a referendum at the end of the year over ECFA. Its proposal, to approve or disapprove a book that contains only a table of contents, and blank pages in each of the chapters, is utterly pointless. The substantive content will be discussed in the future. One may, if one wishes, hold a referendum regarding future points of contention. But how can one hold a referendum over blank sheets of paper? Suppose the referendum fails to pass? Does that mean the ruling authorities can then sign any agreement they wish? Even one that might be detrimental to our interests? Suppose, on the other hand, the referendum passes, even though they have yet to discuss anything? Does that mean the DPP will refuse to engage in any form of negotiation or engagement whatsoever? How would that be any different from a blind "Closed Door" policy?" Is anyone concerned about "selling out Taiwan?" If so, doesn't that require substantive content within each chapter? So far all we have is a table of contents. So far there is nothing to sell.
Frankly the ruling authorities' are right to adopt a two-stage negotiation strategy. ASEAN plus three is ready to go. It will have an impact on Taiwan. Therefore Taipei must swiftly adopt a rough framework to address the disadvantages it will suffer as a result of ASEAN plus three. That is why ECFA involves two-stage negotiations. That is why its time frame is so protracted. Only then can the public on Taiwan have sufficient opportunity for dialogue. When the opposition DPP understands that ECFA involves a two-stage negotiation process, it should carefully consider whether there is any need to hold a referendum on the first phase table of contents. Does the DPP really want the public on Taiwan to hold a referendum to oppose the publication of any sort of book with any sort of content? If so, then the referendum will have no impact on the public whatsoever, other than reinforce prevailing stereotypes about the Democratic Progressive Party.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.22
社論－ECFA僅是框架目錄 要如何公投？
本報訊
在馬總統意志堅決表態下，經濟部上上下下都在緊鑼密鼓地研究ＥＣＦＡ的議題。另一方面，在野黨也沒閒著；他們積極動員推動ＥＣＦＡ公投，希望能在年底與縣市長選舉結合，一則擋下協定簽署，二則也為縣市長綠軍選將增添幾分氣勢。可是到目前為止，雖然經濟部在北、中、南、東各舉辦過一場座談會，但媒體報導有限，而現場對話又頗多「牧師對神父」的專家語言，社會大眾對ＥＣＦＡ所知甚為有限。也因為如此，ＥＣＦＡ議題的社會熱度始終不夠，藍軍不知要如何辯護、綠軍不知要如何攻擊，雙方都不知道要「為何而戰、為誰而戰」。
其實，雖然ＥＣＦＡ的具體內容還不清楚，但是觀諸世界各國簽署類似協定的內涵，我們也可以大略勾勒出ＥＣＦＡ的可能輪廓。此外，在概念上，全世界各國所簽的區域貿易協定（如歐盟、北美、東協等），都是在ＷＴＯ框架下的地區協定。故兩岸將來若要簽署ＥＣＦＡ，也斷難違反ＷＴＯ的規範。因此，大家只要上網查看世界其他區域經貿協定與ＷＴＯ廿四條等規定，即能了解ＥＣＦＡ的內容梗概。
一般而言，區域貿易協定所涵蓋的內容，不外乎關稅減免（如自由貿易協定ＦＴＡ）、投資互惠、產業合作、服務業互惠、自由化時程等項目。這麼多項目如果真要逐一談判，至少得花上三、五年的時間。既然如此，為什麼馬總統會公開宣示，希望今年底或明年初簽署呢？由以上敘述的時間鋪陳可知，兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，應該是採取「兩階段」簽署法。政府可能是希望在年底先簽定框架（framework），至於框內的實質內容，則在下一個階段再逐步談判、簽署。只有在這種情況下，才有可能做到「年底簽署、細節慢談」的宣示進程。
我們認為，既然ＥＣＦＡ是兩階段談判的規畫，則政府就應該把事情用白話文講清楚，以免民間做無厘頭的虛耗式對話。
如果前述「兩階段談判」的架構屬實，則年底所可能簽署的ＥＣＦＡ，就如同只是一本書的「目錄」。目錄只是摘記各章的章名與可能的節次內容；一旦作者們同意了目錄的內涵，則在下一階段，作者就要逐章研議、撰寫內容，三、五年後集結成冊，才是書冊完整的內容。以上述比喻觀之，則台灣與中國大陸都是各章的共同作者；他們打算用未來三至五年的時間，填寫兩岸經貿的各章內容。在概念上，即使目錄中標示了十章，但若將來談不妥，則各章內容也可能從缺，最後也許只有六章完稿。因此，ＥＣＦＡ真正的談判關鍵，是將來兩岸稅率、產業、早期收穫、服務業等各章內涵，也許每一章都有不少爭議需要民意監督與回饋。
民進黨主張要在年底對ＥＣＦＡ進行公投，就如同要對一本「僅有目錄、內容厥如」的無字天書表示可否，恐怕是相當不切實際的。既然實質內容是要在未來慢慢談，要公投也該是對未來關鍵議題的爭議點公投才是，怎麼會要現在辦「空白公投」呢？萬一空白公投沒通過，難道表示執政當局可以簽署任何不利於台灣的協定？而如果什麼都還沒談公投就過了，這是否表示民進黨拒絕各種形式的談判與接觸？這與盲目鎖國又有什麼差別？如果有人擔心「賣台」，那也要靠章節的實質內容賣；單單是目錄，是沒有東西可賣的。
坦白說，我們認為執政當局採取兩階段談判的策略，是正確的決定。由於東協加三已箭在弦上，即將對台灣產生衝擊，故台灣唯有先在粗框架下簽得早期收穫條款，才可能迅速補給台灣在東協加三中的缺陷。也正因為ＥＣＦＡ是兩階段談判，時間拖得長，台灣社會才能有充分的對話機會。當在野黨了解ＥＣＦＡ是兩階段談判之後，實在應該仔細思索有沒有必要再對第一階段的目錄框架做公投。如果要台灣人民以公投方式「反對出版任何內容的書」，那麼除了坐實人民對民進黨的刻板印象外，恐怕收穫將十分有限。
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