Friday, February 26, 2010

Foreign Diplomacy Must Be Neither Blue nor Green

Foreign Diplomacy Must Be Neither Blue nor Green
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 26, 2010

A Republic of China airliner donated to Panama for the purpose of disaster relief, is now being used as the Panamanian president's personal airliner. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has submitted a special report to the Control Yuan. The Control Yuan says our government was clearly duped. But it has urged both the Blue and Green parties to maintain a united diplomatic front. That is not merely how the Control Yuan sees it. That is also how the public sees it.

Frankly, the airliner misuse incident took us to the cleaners. The airliner was a donation, intended for disaster relief. But the president of Panama said he needed it for himself, even when it was needed for disaster relief. Since it was a gift, our government has no right to demand its return. It would be difficult to force the Panamanin president to use it as intended. If the Panamanian legislature or judiciary investigate, the government can of course explain the situation and provide information. Otherwise there is little it can do. Governments and politicians in Latin America are considerably less evolved than they are in more advanced nations. The ROC government looks askance at widespread corruption within these nations. Especially when their politicians embezzle foreign aid we have provided. It is even more intolerable that such corruption has given us a bad name. We have no desire to precipitate a show down and invite a backlash. Also, other politicians may not be any better. We could end up offending the current leader, when his replacements are no better. If the problem is not too serious, it is better to maintain the relationship, as long as it remains within tolerable limits. Therefore the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have been disgruntled, but reacted in a low-keyed manner.

In fact, ever since Taipei and Beijing implemented their "diplomatic truce," the two sides have had a tacit understanding not to recruit the other's diplomatic allies. Governments hoping to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing have been rebuffed. In this regard, Beijing has indeed demonstrated genuine goodwill. Some governments don't understand this new form of cross-Strait interaction. They still resort to blackmail in attempts to extract concessions from Taipei. When they can't, they are shocked and disappointed. Taipei has examined its past practices. It is no longer willing to issue blank checks or swallow its pride. Requests for assistance require the submission of detailed plans. Economic aid requires closer monitoring and greater transparency. These changes require closer communication. They require support from each other's legislatures, citizenry, media, and judiciaries. Only then can we lay a foundation for diplomatic relations between two countries. Only then can we check and balance politicians' empty words or attempts at defamation.

The Control Yuan understands the government's diplomatic quandary. The Blue and Green camps must present a unified front to the outside world. They must not use diplomatic controversies to divide or embarrass society. Many people feel the same way. Taipei and Beijing have declared a temporary cease fire in their battle for Latin American diplomatic allies. The Republic of China's diplomatic service is no longer in constant fear of losing diplomatic allies. It no longer needs to nervously tally up its diplomatic allies. This is because Bejing has eased up, not because the cross-Strait strategic picture has changed. Perhaps over time, the international community will arrive at a new perspective. But a change has yet to occur. Taipei's status on the international stage remains inferior to Beijing's. Beijing's economic strength has also been elevated, relatively speaking, as a result of the global recession. This is the Big Picture Taipei faces. It will be the same no matter who comes to power, Blue or Green.

Behind closed doors, we may engage in lively political debate. But when we throw the doors open to the outside world, Republic of China citizens must act in unision. We share the same fate, the same national interests, and the same vision. We all want a peaceful, secure, prosperous, and dignified environment in which to live. On this there is no difference between any of us. Any political party must subordinate itself to this imperative, and attempt to fulfill the people's basic desires. No political party should use the national interest as a tool for political struggle. They should understand how difficult international diplomacy is. They must not stand on the sidelines and engage in sniping.

Taipei's diplomatic predicament has its roots on the opposite shore. In order to make any breakthroughs, cross-Strait relations must change. A peaceful form of interaction must be found, allowing Taipei to survive and prosper. A truce is not a rest break. Taipei cannot afford to rest. Taipei may engage in cross-Strait reconciliation and attempt to bring countrymen on both sides closer together. But Taipei has no other bargaining chips that can persuade Beijing to maintain a diplomatic truce. The truce provides Taipei with precious time and space, to ensure its future survival. It enables Taipei to maintain its relationships with existing diplomatic allies. Taipei must also seek to return to the international scene. It must shift its energies from past cross-Strait and diplomatic struggles to something more meaningful. For example, we have postponed our efforts to rejoin the United Nations. We have attempted instead to participate in organizations on the periphery, such as those concerned with civil aviation and climate change. The public hopes that our diplomatic service will eventually have something to show for its efforts. Whether Taipei will once again be invited to the World Health Assembly in May as an observer is now the focus of attention.

When it comes to the national interest, there is no Blue or Green. This includes viable, synergistic cross-Strait relations. This includes public aspirations regarding diplomacy, economics, and public welfare. Such a goal may be easy to talk about. But it is one that politicians must take seriously.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2010.02.26
社論-外交不分藍綠 台灣才能走出去
本報訊

針對我國援贈巴拿馬的救難專機被挪用為總統專機事件,外交部特別向監察院進行了報告,監委指責此事分明是被敲竹槓,但也呼籲藍綠兩黨應在外交上一致對外,這不僅是監委的想法,其實也是全民共同的心聲。

說實話,這次專機被挪用事件,台灣確實吃了悶虧。雖說當初是捐贈做為救難等多方面用途,但巴國總統堅持自己有需要用──包括必要時搭機勘災以助效率,既是送出去的禮物,台灣好像沒有硬討回來的權力,也很難強制對方總統如何使用。如果巴拿馬國會或司法機構要追究,台灣可以配合說明原委或提供資料,除此之外,能主控的事項就不是那麼多了。何況,拉丁美洲國家的政治發展和政客品質,很多和先進國家還有一段距離,有些上下其手濫權舞弊的事,台灣也並不認同,尤其如果是援助被A走,台灣還落個壞名聲的話,更是嘔到一個不行。但一方面不希望撕破臉引發報復,二方面也覺得政客們都差不多,得罪了這個也沒有其他比較好的人選,如果事情不是非常嚴重,那還不如維持一個在可容忍範圍內的關係。因此外交部的反應,低調中有些無奈。

其實,自從兩岸展開「外交休兵」後,雙方都遵守不挖對方邦交國的默契,幾個想跟中共建交或兩頭喊價的國家,都碰了一鼻子灰,在這方面,中共確實表達了善意。只是因為這是一種新的兩岸互動模式,有些國家還不理解,依然訴諸過去喊價勒索吃定台灣的伎倆,等討不了好時,難免既不習慣又失望。台灣已深切檢討過去的做法,不再開空白支票或一味委屈求全,對援助的項目要求更詳細的計畫,經援的流向、執行與監督也要求增加透明度,這樣的調整,需要輔佐以更積極綿密的溝通,並且爭取對方國會、輿論、媒體、司法體系等各方面的支持,才能為兩國邦交營造基礎,並制衡政客的予取予求或空口抹黑。

監委認為台灣外交處境艱難,藍綠應該在外交上一致對外,不要利用外交撕裂社會,丟人現眼,這說出了許多人的期盼。現在兩岸在中南美的外交爭奪戰暫時休兵,台灣的外交部門不再像過去那樣一天到晚籠罩在斷交的陰影下,算邦交國數目算得膽顫心驚,這是因為中共略為鬆手,不是兩岸基本盤有任何改變。也許時間久了,國際社會可能醞釀出新的思維,但現在這個變化還沒有發生,兩岸在國際政治舞台上的地位仍然極為懸殊,而且中共的經濟力更因為全球不景氣而相對提高,這是台灣整體的處境與課題,藍綠不管誰執政都一樣要面對。

關起門來,我們內部也許競爭得火花四濺,但打開門來對外時,所有台灣人應該是一個整體,有同樣的命運、同樣的國家利益和同樣的願景。大家都希望在一個和平、安全、繁榮、尊嚴的環境中安身立命,這點你我並無不同,任何政黨都必須服從並努力實現人民的這個基本願望,不該拿國家利益做為政黨惡鬥的工具,也應該對外交工作的難處多些理解與體諒,不要一味在旁邊說風涼話。

台灣的外交困境源自對岸,要尋求突破困境,就必須能讓兩岸關係出現變化,營造一個和平的互動模式,盡量為台灣爭取生存發展的時間與空間。休兵並不是休息,台灣絕對沒有懈怠的本錢;而除了兩岸和解有助拉近人民情感之外,台灣沒有可以說服中共外交休兵的籌碼。但休兵換來的寶貴空檔攸關台灣的生存,除了繼續發展與現有邦交國的關係之外,還必須更積極尋求重返國際社會,把過去兩岸外交纏鬥的心力轉向更有意義的參與。例如我們暫緩加入聯合國的動作,轉而試圖參與民航、氣候變遷等周邊組織,在這方面民眾正等待外交部門交出成績來。而五月世界衛生組織大會,台灣能否再度以觀察員身分獲邀與會,也是大家的關切焦點。

國家利益沒有藍綠之別,這包括了一個可行、能創造良性互動的兩岸關係,以及在外交、經濟、民生等各方面實現人民的願望,這樣的方向說來簡單,卻是政治人物必須嚴肅省思的課題。

Thursday, February 25, 2010

Climate Change and the Green Revolution

Climate Change and the Green Revolution
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 25, 2010

The documentary film "± 2 ℃" documents climate change on Taiwan. It was filmed last August in the wake of Typhoon Morakot. Yesterday, five months later, it premiered in Japan. Government and business leaders attended in droves. The major media provided full coverage. The presidents of the five Yuan attended. Heads of major industrial firms turned out. This film was a sensation, and raised hopes for those concerned about environmental issues.

The documentary "± 2 ℃" was Taiwan's version of "An Inconvenient Truth." The documentary explores global warming and climate change from Taiwan's perspective. People on Taiwan will be among the first climate refugees. We hope the film will teach the public and the government the importance of environmental protection.

Global warming is an old problem. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Panel (IPCC) believes that a two Celsius degree rise in global temperature poses a threat to mankind's survival. If the temperature drops two Celsius degrees, our children and grandchildren may survive. The documentary touched off a new wave of concern for global warming on Taiwan. But besides being emotionally moved, how can the public and the government confront the problem and take effective action?

According to newspaper reports, when President Ma Ying-jeou presided over his Chinese New Years gathering in the presidential palace, he expressed concern over the climate change addressed in the film "± 2 ℃." President Ma urged staffers to implement energy-saving and carbon reduction measures. He urged them to save energy, water, paper, and oil, and work together to save the planet. Non-governmental environmental groups however have been critical. The government has asked the public to save energy and reduce carbon. But the Taiwan Power Company is still rushing to build power plants everywhere. The government continues to give priority to industries such as the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Company and major steel producers. The environment is under assault from massive construction projects and deforestation. Based on public and private sector reactions, we remain in the "concerned" stage. We have a long way to go before we actually implement concrete energy conservation and carbon reduction measures in our daily lives.

The Taiwan region has an island climate. It has the second highest population density in the world. Many are forced to live in places unfit for human habitation. Add to this rapid soil erosion and frequent typhoons. Taiwan will not escape a string of predictable disasters caused by global warming.

Climatologists have warned that global warming is a growing problem. Between 2020 and 2037, the polar icecaps will probably disappear. The sea level will rise six meters. Under the circumstances, people on Taiwan, in Vietnam, Bangladesh, the South Pacific, and the Caribbean will become the world's first climate refugees. Coastal plains on Taiwan lower than 100 meters above sea level will become uninhabitable. Chiayi Tungshih, Pingtung Linbian, Tungkang, and Yunlin Mailiao will be inundated. Next to succumb may be the Taipei Basin, Kaohsiung, and Lanyang Plain. If sea levels continue to rise, the next group to be impacted will be the river delta regions mentioned in the 2009 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report. The most endangered regions on Taiwan are the Lanyang plain, the Taipei Basin (Taipei) and Kaohsiung City.

Last year, during Typhoon Morakot, Mount Ali accumulated nearly 3000 millimeters of rainfall. Scholars estimate that if half of Typhoon Morakot's rainfall had fallen on the Shihmen Reservoir, the dam might have burst. Two or three hundred million tons of water would have inundated Sanxia in Taipei County, Tucheng, Banqiao, and Xinzhuang. Taipei City and Taipei County would have become a veritable "Waterworld." By that time, the Taipei 101 Building would have become a isolated island in the midst of raging waters.

Global warming is worsening. Heavy rainstorms are more frequent. Due to its topography, the prospects for Taiwan are grimmer than for Mainland China, Japan and other regions of Asia. In the future, typhoons will become more frequent and more powerful. Rainfall will become more extreme. Severe droughts are followed by heavy rains. Heat waves are followed by frigid winters. Soil erosion on Taiwan is increasingly serious. Morakot will not remain an isolated case.

Faced with such catastrophes, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Group has asked all governments, including the government of the Republic of China, to invest in a massive green revolution. At this critical moment, we propose that everyone write a letter to the President, urging him, as the leader of the nation, to save our nation, save our children, and fulfill our responsibilities to the global village. He must elevate climate security to the level of national security. The legislature is considering a greenhouse gas reduction act, to be known as the Climate Security Act. The bill will implement global warming measures. The national budget should also be re-allocated. In particular, the budget for national defense should be allocated to green energy, and vice-versa, increasing our investment in green energy. A comprehensive review of energy-consuming industries must be conducted. Only such measures will truly address the issue of climate change

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2010.02.25
社論-面對±2℃ 快進行大規模綠色革命
本報訊

記錄台灣氣候變遷的紀錄片《±2℃》,自去年八月莫拉克風災後籌拍,歷經五個月,日昨舉行首映會,現場政商雲集,各大媒體輪流播放,五院院長、各大企業老闆都同時出席觀看首映。這樣的影片、這樣的轟動,帶給許多關心環境議題的人們無限的期待。

《±2℃》,就像是台灣版《不願面對的真相》,整部紀錄片以台灣的角度探討全球暖化氣候變遷,台灣將會是第一批氣候難民,期待這樣的訴求能喚醒台灣人民與政府對環保的重視。

全球暖化的議題是一個老問題:聯合國跨政府氣候小組(IPCC)認為,全球溫度若上升攝氏兩度,人類將面臨存亡的威脅;若溫度下降兩度,子孫便能存活。紀錄片首映,燃起了台灣新一波對暖化問題的重視。但在大受感動之餘,從民間到政府,台灣應該如何積極面對並採取有效策略才是重點。

據報載,馬英九總統在主持總統府新春團拜時,也關心《±2℃》台灣氣候變遷紀錄片,馬總統期勉總統府員工落實節能減碳,做到省電、省水、省紙、省油,共同愛地球。民間環保團體則批評,政府一方面要求老百姓節能減碳,但台電依然搶著到處蓋火力發電廠,國光石化、大煉鋼廠等高排碳產業依舊是政府的優先推動政策,生活週遭處處大興土木、破壞山林。從政府與民間的反應來看,顯然大家還只是停留在關心階段,在現實生活與政策中實踐節能減碳,仍有一段漫漫遙遠的路要走。

台灣是海島氣候,人口密度世界第二,其中有相當多的人口被迫居住在不適宜人居的地方,加上土地侵蝕率高、颱風多,隨著全球暖化日益加劇所帶來一連串可預知的災難中,台灣將無可倖免。

研究氣候變遷學者警告,隨著全球暖化問題日益嚴重,二○二○年到二○三七年,北極浮冰恐消失,海平面會上升六公尺。在此情況下,台灣和越南、孟加拉、南太平洋、加勒比海一樣,都將成為全球第一批氣候難民,台灣一百公尺以下平原將無法居住。首當其衝的是嘉義東石、屏東林邊、東港及雲林麥寮;接著淪陷的,可能是台北盆地、高雄市及蘭陽平原。海平面如果再上升,第二批衝擊的是聯合國二○○九年列入最危險區的各國家三角洲,台灣同步的危險區域名稱依序則是蘭陽平原、台北盆地(台北縣市)與高雄市。

去年莫拉克颱風,阿里山累積近三千毫米雨量,學者估計,如果一半降雨下在石門水庫可能會潰壩,兩、三億噸的水量,將一路淹過台北縣三峽、土城、板橋、新莊…,台北縣市都將成為水鄉澤國,屆時台北一○一大樓,成了洪流中的一座孤島。

當全球暖化愈來愈嚴重,暴雨暴風極端現象愈明顯的時候,台灣因為地形特殊,災難將比中國、日本等其他亞洲國家嚴峻。未來,颱風會變得越來越強,雨量會越來越極端,大旱後就是暴雨,熱浪後緊接著寒冬,台灣民眾居住的土地侵蝕率會越來越嚴重,莫拉克不會是唯一的。

面對這樣的大災難,聯合國跨政府氣候小組呼籲每一個國家,包括台灣,投入足夠的資金,進行大規模的綠色革命。在這關鍵時刻,我們支持:每一個人寫一封信給總統,從國家高度,拯救台灣、拯救孩子、善盡地球村一分子責任,將台灣的氣候安全,提昇到國家安全的層次;目前在國會將審議中的溫室氣體減量法正名為氣候安全法,將暖化議題,落實在政策法案中;國家預算也應重新分配,尤其是國防預算與綠能預算全部對調,加強對綠色能源的投資;同時全面體檢高耗能產業政策。這樣的作為,才是真正面對氣候變遷的真相與應有的作為。

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

NSC Appointments and the Dual Leadership Dilemma

NSC Appointments and the Dual Leadership Dilemma
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2010


Yesterday Su Chi, the outgoing Secretary-General of the National Security Council, turned over his job to successor Hu Wei-chen. Everyones' attention is now focused on the differences between the two appointees. But everyone has ignored the institutional problems behind the personnel change. Bluntly speaking, President Ma Ying-jeou's "dual executive system" is in trouble and must be rescued.

Su Chi said his phase of the mission is complete, and that he is resigning for reasons of health and family. This of course was a ruse. The real reasons for his resignation are the controversies over foreign relief during the 8/8 Floods and US beef imports. These were major issues among the public and within the administration. Su Chi refused to clarify matters or to brook criticism. He valued his own image, and resigned in a huff. One might say that Su Chi couldn't stand the heat, so he got out of the kitchen. But at a deeper level, the main reason was the failure of the dual executive system.

The dual executive system is a legacy of the French Fifth Republic. In fact the dual executive system, according to both the spirit and the letter of the law, has a single central government leader. When the presidency and the legislature are controlled by the same party, the president is the chief executive. When the presidency and the legislature are not controlled by the same party, the president appoints a premier supported by a legislative majority. This premier is the chief executive. Rather than referring to it as a dual executive system, it would be more accurate to refer to it as an executive power rechanneling system, or chief executive rechanneling system. In other words, under the Fifth Republic, the leader's unique role is integrated into the system, because it rechannels authority as part of its day to day operations.

Our constitution is nominally modeled on the Fifth Republic's. But it is a semi-finished, pale imitation. According to current legal provisions, the president is responsible for cross-Strait relations, foreign diplomacy, and national defense. But the MAC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense are under the Executive Yuan. According to the constitution, the premier is the head of state. As a consequence, two problems have arisen. First, a dual executive system has arisen despite the rule of law. If the president presides over foreign affairs, why was foreign relief for the 8/8 Floods left up to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Conversely, if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must consult the National Security Council over foreign relief, how can the Presidential Office evade responsibility for the decision, and blame the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Secondly, problems have arisen over who formulates national policy. Take US beef imports. The National Security Council considers this a matter for presidential diplomacy. But the Department of Health must deal with its domestic political repercussions. When the National Security Council's decisions departed from the Department of Health's, a major political storm erupted. Nor was that all. During the US beef imports controversy, the Presidential Office, the cabinet, and the Executive Yuan House each found themselves on a different page. Eventually the KMT Chairman and the KMT legislative caucus amended the law, abrogating US beef import decisions made by the Presidential Office and the cabinet. What was this, if not a political circus?

Under the Lee Teng-hui regime, the dual-leadership system wreaked havoc. The public still recalls how Lee Teng-hui, speaking through Liu Tai-ying, humiliated Premier Vincent Siew. During the Chen Shui-bian era, Chen ignored the executive authority rechanneling system. His minority government stonewalled for eight years. Now Ma Ying-jeou is in office. He was elected president with a landslide 7.65 million votes. His party commands an absolute majority in the legislature. Yet he remains incapable of assuming "full authority and full responsibility." The Presidential Office, the cabinet, the Executive Yuan, and the party remain poorly coordinated. Deadlocks between the two executives are common. Su Chi's resignation underscores the seriousness of the problem.

France's dual executive system has already undergone transformation, to a rechanneling system. It should in fact be characterized as a single executive system. The legal provisions that assigned foreign diplomacy and national defense to the president have undermined the formulation of national policy, albeit not as seriously as the legal provisions that assigned cross-Strait issues, foreign diplomacy, and national defense to the president. As mentioned earlier, our dual executive system is a semi-finished, pale imitation of the French Fifth Republic's. It is a camel instead of a horse. Especially unfortunate is President Ma's leadership style. On the one hand, he adheres too rigidly to certain rules, in defiance of all logic. For example, he once declared that disaster preparedness measures and expressing sympathy for disaster victims, were the responsibility of the premier. On the other hand, President Ma lacks the ability to make things happen outside the institutional framework. The government and its policy-making system are fragmented. He lacks the ability to integrate the Presidential Office, the cabinet, the Executive Yuan, and the party, and assume "full authority and full responsibility." The inevitable result has been a dual executive system more akin to a camel than a horse.

The dual executive system is a "semi-finished product." It is deformed. Hence the need for a leadership better able to coordinate and repair the defects in the system. Given inadequate integration between the party and the government, Ma Ying-jeou must become a leader who assumes "full authority and full responsibility." He must ensure that his administration operates smoothly across the board.

從國安會人事交接看雙首長制的困局
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.02.24 03:29 am

新舊任國家安全會議秘書長昨日交接,蘇起下,胡為真上。一般人皆注目於新舊人選的比較,卻忽略了這次人事更易所反映的體制上的問題。直截而言,就是馬英九總統在「雙首長制」的操作上出現了鑿枘扞格,必須設法補救。

蘇起說,他的階段性任務已經完成,以健康及家庭因素而請辭,這當然是場面話。真正的原因是,八八水災是否徵求外援及美牛事件,不論在社會上或在政府內部,皆生重大爭議;蘇起既說不清楚,又不堪議論,顧惜羽毛,遂生倦勤之念。這可以說是蘇起耐不住廚房的熱,但深一層看,主因卻是「雙首長制」之操作失敗所致。

雙首長制緣自法國第五共和制。首須澄明:所謂「雙首長制」,在精神及法制上,其實只有一位中心「首長」。亦即,當總統與國會屬同一政黨時,總統是「首長」;當國會與總統不屬同一政黨時,總統即應任命國會多數所支持者為總理,並由總理擔任「首長」。因此,與其稱之為「雙首長制」,更符實情的稱呼應是「行政權換軌制」或「最高行政首長換軌制」。也就是說,在第五共和制中,首長的獨一地位及國政的整合性,皆因「換軌制」而在實務運作上得以維持。

我們的憲法宣稱是師法第五共和,卻是畫虎不成反類犬的「半成品」。根據我國現行法制,總統有兩岸、外交、國防之權;但是,陸委會、外交部及國防部卻在行政院轄下,而行政院長仍是憲法所規定的「最高行政首長」。於是,出現了兩大難題:一、在法制上,我國居然真正同時存在著「雙首長」。但若謂總統主持外交權,卻為何八八水災是否徵求外援竟據稱是由外交部決定?反過來說,倘若外交部曾請示國安會是否徵求外援,總統府又豈能將一度謝絕外援的決策責任歸咎於外交部?二、國政橫遭切割,整合出現問題。以美牛事件為例,國安會視此為總統的外交權,但在政治效應上必須面對社會的卻是衛生署。當國安會的決策面與衛生署的執行面出現巨大缺口,遂爆發了嚴重的政治風暴。尚不僅此,在美牛事件中,府閣院黨四大部門竟似完全解構,最後居然演出國民黨主席所領導的立院黨團,以修法廢約否決了府閣「雙首長」所制定的美牛決策。這寧非政治奇譚?

雙首長制在李登輝時代已經鬧得烏煙瘴氣,國人應仍記得李登輝借劉泰英之口羞辱行政院長蕭萬長的往事;到了陳水扁時代,則非但拒絕「行政權換軌」,更將「朝小野大」的亂局硬撐八年。如今換成馬英九,即使以七六五萬高票當選總統,在國會又佔絕對多數,卻非但不能「完全執政/完全負責」,且府閣院黨之間整合不佳,及「雙首長」之間鑿枘扞格的情事,亦屢屢出現。蘇起去職,更凸顯了問題的嚴重性。

法國的雙首長制,經由「換軌」的調度,其實可謂是單一首長;而法制由總統主持外交及國防之權,其造成國政切割的傷害,亦不如我國「兩岸/外交/國防」歸為總統權之嚴重。如前所述,我國現行的「雙首長制」,其實是拷貝法國第五共和制的「半成品」,因而畫虎不成反類犬。尤其不幸的是,馬總統的領導風格,一方面太過拘泥於法制上不合權力邏輯的規範,例如他甚至曾一度認為勘災及慰問災民是閣揆的責任;另一方面,馬總統又沒有能力運用體制內外的方法,將支離的政府體系及國政,在府閣院黨之間建立一個「完全執政/完全負責」的全局平台。因而,畫虎反類犬的「雙首長制」的弊害,遂致不可避免。

這個「半成品」的「雙首長制」是一個畸形體制,因而需要更有整合力的卓越領導加以彌縫補罅;面對當前府閣院黨整合欠佳的局面,馬英九應以「完全執政/完全負責」的最高首長自期,務使這個「全局平台」能平順運作!

Tuesday, February 23, 2010

Taoyuan International Airport Requires Tourism Marketing

Taoyuan International Airport Requires Tourism Marketing
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2010

A nation's international airport is its front door. Foreign visitors receive their first impression of a nation through its airport. Their last impression of a nation is also of its airport. Building technology on Taiwan may be advanced. But in many respects the Republic of China's front door is far from satisfactory.

International competition is fierce. It is like sailing against the wind. Failure to advance amounts to retreat. Other countries are progressing by leaps and bounds. If we merely mark time, we will soon be left behind. This is true for both airport facilities and airport services. Governments everywhere are scrambling to create a positive image of their country, by putting on their best face. But the Republic of China has been negligent. Its front door is tasteless and bland. The impression it leaves is negative.

Today the Airports Council International (ACI) made public its 2009 Airport Service Quality Awards. Asian countries shone. The top five airports were Seoul Incheon International Airport, Singapore Changi Airport, Hong Kong International Airport, Beijing Capital International Airport, and Hyderabad Rajiv Ghandi International Airport. Incheon International Airport has come in first for five consecutive years. Changi and Chek Lap Kok Airport have also been leaders. They must be given credit for their international acclaim.

Now let's look at our own Taoyuan International Airport. In 2007 it ranked 14th. In 2008 it fell to 18th. In 2009 it plummeted to 27th. This is disgraceful and humiliating. Why are certain leading international airports always paragons? Taoyuan is the front door to one of Asia's Four Tigers. When even Beijing and Hyderabad are catching up, why is Taoyuan falling behind? The numbers do not lie, and warrant our attention.

Travelers who have visited the aforementioned Asian cities immediately notice the difference, the most obvious difference being popularity. Incheon, Changi, and Chek Lap Kok are popular. They are filled with a wide variety of passengers of different ethnic backgrounds and skin colors, wearing different kinds of clothing. The restaurants overflow with diners. The gift shops overflow with customers. The impression conveyed is one of cutting edge international metropolises, bubbling with dynamism.

Airline security measures, transfers, transiting, and customs clearance are often time consuming. Families loaded down with large and small packages find the experience especially burdensome. Passengers are often stuck at airports for a long time. If the facilities and services are well thought out, the impression it leaves will be dramatic. Word of mouth will spread.

Not every international airport makes the grade. But good airports leave visitors with long-lasting, positive impressions. Some have spacious and comfortable lounge areas, smoking areas, and rest rooms. Some have internet services indispensable to the modern traveler. Some airports understand the needs of transit passengers. They provide showers, hair salons, and leisure facilities, allowing the weary traveler to recuperate. Some provide locally themed restaurants and shops attractive to international travelers.

Taoyuan International Airport, by contrast, is in many respects rather rudimentary. The restaurants are unimpressive, both in quantity and quality. They fail to showcase Taiwan's rich cuisine, and the prices range from excessive to outrageous. The shops lack local color. The terminal building lacks style, both inside and outside. It lacks an overall concept. It fails to provide the services consumers expect and need. Even the handcarts are difficult to use. Travelers are feel alienated and out in the cold. Add to this inconvenient transportation links to the outside world. The Taoyuan Airport and other domestic airports lack connections to local MRT systems. In short, Taoyuan is not an airport befitting an international city.

Other international airports are boldly designed and intelligently operated. By contrast, our tired administrative practices are clearly behind the times. Given existing practices, any breakthrough is unlikely. Therefore international airport operations should be placed under the auspices of the central government. Both the "software" and the "hardware" for the Taoyuan International Airport must be upgraded. Transportation must facilitate the marketing of local tourism, local culture, and other tourist resources. Ways must be found to transform Taiwan into an Asian transportation hub. The upgrading of airport services is merely one link in this chain.

A unified effort is required because Taoyuan International Airport lacks patronage. A lack of patronage increases operating costs. To overcome this problem requires greater government support, at least initially. In the long term however, what is required is a bold and farsighted national marketing plan. Dressing up the nation's front door will require more than just a coat of paint.

It will require higher level decision-making. High-level decision-makers must realize the importance of this issue. Taoyuan International Airport's ranking has been falling steadily. The central government must realize that this is not about Taoyuan Airport alone.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2010.02.23
社論-結合觀光行銷 桃園機場才不會輸人
本報訊

國際機場就像一個國家的大門,外來客接觸到這個國家的第一印象,就是從機場開始;而對這個國家的最後印象,便是離開機場的經驗。無論台灣內部建設得多進步,現在的國家大門,有許多環節實在無法令人滿意。

激烈的國際競爭宛如逆水行舟,不進則退。當其他國家突飛猛進的同時,我們如果還好整以暇原地踏步,那麼很快就會被甩到後頭去。國際機場的軟硬體建設亦復如此,當各國爭相打造光鮮進步的國家大門之際,台灣卻疏於打理門面以致於望之無味無趣,給人的第一印象先就差了。

「國際航站理事會」(ACI)日前公布二○○九年全球服務品質最佳機場,亞洲國家表現亮眼,前五名分別是南韓仁川機場、新加坡樟宜機場、香港赤?角機場、北京機場和印度海得拉巴機場,尤其仁川機場已經是連續五年奪冠,樟宜與赤?角機場也是評比常勝軍,人家能享譽全球,真的有一套。

反觀台灣的桃園國際機場,二○○七年排名十四,二○○八年降至十八名,二○○九年更暴跌到廿七名,成績之遜真是令國人顏面無光。為什麼,幾個頂尖的國際機場總是模範生,連北京、印度的機場也後來居上,亞洲四小龍之一的台灣,排名卻節節倒退?數字不騙人,這其中,一定有值得我們痛切檢討的地方。

造訪過上述幾個亞洲城市的人,通常可以馬上感受到桃園國際機場和其他機場的差距。最明顯的是人氣,仁川、赤?角或樟宜機場人氣搶搶滾,各種種族、膚色、服裝的旅客熙來攘往,餐飲部門高朋滿座,精品店舖川流不息,給人一種充滿活力的國際尖端大都會的感覺。

其實搭機時安檢、轉機、過境、通關通常要耗費不少時間,大包小包攜家帶眷的人尤其麻煩,既然常常需要在機場待很久,其設備和服務是否周到貼心,旅客的感受就會很深刻,口碑也就逐漸傳出去了。

不是每個國際機場都做得好,但好的機場,會讓旅客留下長久的良好印象。有些機場有寬敞舒適的休息區、吸菸區或小憩室,還有現代人不可或缺的網路服務。有些機場體諒到過境旅客的需求,設置了淋浴、理容及休閒等設施,讓疲憊的旅客重新恢復元氣。而展現當地文化特色的餐飲及商店區,更是令旅客流連的地方。

比較之下,桃園國際機場在很多方面都相當陽春,餐飲部門無論是質還是量都乏善可陳,不要說沒能展現台灣的各種美食,價格還貴到離譜。商店部門也缺乏文化特色,航站內外的設計沒有風格。總而言之,整個國際機場的經營,好像沒有一個整體的概念,也不太能從消費者的角度出發提供貼心服務,連手推車都不好用,以致於旅客感覺既冷清又不和善。加上聯外交通不便,國際機場與國內機場至今沒有捷運相通,凡此種種,都稱不上一個國際大都會的格局。

和其他國際機場的用心與氣魄相比,我們習慣的老舊行政管理做法,顯然已經不合時宜也不敷所需了。以既有的運作方式,恐怕難以帶來突破,因此,對於國際機場的經營,政府應該考慮把決策層級拉高到中央。不只是加強桃園機場航站的硬體軟體而已,更要與地方觀光、文化行銷、爭取客源、便利交通等各方面緊密結合,研擬出一個讓台灣成為亞洲交通樞紐之一的總體規劃方案,而機場服務的強化,則是其中之一環。

之所以要全體動起來,是因為桃園國際機場很多問題是出在客源不足上,以致於人氣不旺經營成本增加。這個問題要克服,至少初期是需要政府更多支援;而長期來說,還是需要一個有遠景、有魄力、也有執行力的國家行銷規劃,才能讓國家門面神采煥發,而不只是粉飾一番罷了。

凡此種種,都需要比現在更高的決策層次,也需要決策高層體認到這個問題的重要性。當桃園機場排名一直掉的時候,中央政府應該體認到,這不只是桃園機場的問題而已。

Friday, February 12, 2010

ECFA: Among the Clouds

ECFA: Among the Clouds
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 12, 2010

President Ma Ying-jeou recently took to the battlefield. He spoke directly to the public, explaining the necessity of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). But yesterday National Security Council Secretary General Su Chi announced his resignation, explaining that "this phase of the mission has been accomplished." Communications between President Ma and the public, and between President Ma and his advisors appear to have broken down yet again.

President Ma is of course not so naive as to imagine that a single speech will allay public doubts. But his recent speech has raised new concerns. It has made the prospect of ECFA even more remote. It highlights the government's confused strategy to promote ECFA. ECFA now resides among the clouds.

President Ma's press conference was entitled "Presidential Report: Cross-Strait Economic Agreement." It used plain language to explain its purpose: "helping people do business, enhancing Taiwan's competitiveness." It stressed ECFA's legitimacy. But in order to benefit from this huge business opportunity, some sectors must pay a price. President Ma did not evade this point. He proposed remedies. He attempted to allay public concerns about diminished sovereignty. He said the administration would pay close attention to concerns about equality, dignity, reciprocity and proportionality. In general, President Ma was sincere in his communications. He displayed confidence in his policy. But in terms of content, he seemed to be spinning his wheels. Things he was afraid to speak remained unspoken. Not only did existing doubts remain, even more doubts were raised.

The first doubt concerns the timetable. President Ma said there is no timetable for signing ECFA. But MAC, the Executive Yuan, and the Presidential Office all made clear that the target date was the Fifth Chiang-Chen Meeting during the first half of this year. Now President Ma says there is no timetable. Is President Ma reverting to "political language?" Or as SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung put it, have negotiations over ECFA entered a "more difficult" stage? Current signs suggest it is the latter. President Ma's remark that he has no timetable may also be true. Changes are being made to ECFA's original timetable.

The second doubt relates to the first. If negotiations over ECFA are "more difficult," just how much more difficult are they? Ever since the administration began promoting ECFA, the issues have been over-simplified. To defuse public concerns, this must be addressed. The administration emphasizes only the benefits of signing ECFA. It never talks about where the two sides disagree. Disagreements include terminology, tax relief and tax increase issues, market opening, and the scope and direction of long-term economic cooperation. These disagreements constitute barriers. Problems abound. But so far none of them have been discussed. Perhaps the administration considers it too hard to explain. But to play down the complexity leaves the public with the impression the administration is engaging in "black ops." It raises suspicions about the government's negotiations. CommonWealth Magazine recently released its survey of 1000 Leading CEOs. Ninety percent of them supported ECFA. But nearly half of the CEOs worried that the administration would not be able to protect Taiwan's interests. If even the elites have such misgivings, then misgivings at the grassroots level are probably even deeper.

Can the administration state the issues clearly? That is our third doubt. The administration has sketched out ECFA's broad outlines. But it remains vague about the specifics. The two sides are currently discussing the content of ECFA. Both sides are negotiating over their own interests. Obviously neither side can show its hand prematurely. Obviously the administration cannot say anything for the moment. Therefore the public has been told the same thing about ECFA a thousand times. Hearing the same message a thousand times leads to numbness or even skepticism. Negotiations are ongoing. The details of any imminent market opening have yet to be revealed. Our side has asked for tariff relief. President Ma declared in advance that he would not allow Mainland agricultural products in. This has slowed negotiations to a crawl. How will ECFA look when it finally emerges from the talks? The administration can't be sure. Therefore how can President Ma make it any clearer?

These doubts show that the administration underestimated the ability of the public to rationally debate the issue from day one. It overestimated the power of political ideology. It prettified, simplified, diluted, and blurred the issue. The counterproductive result was public skepticism. After the Spring Festival, the ruling and opposition parties must communicate more closely over ECFA. ECFA must be brought back down to earth, out of the clouds. It must become tangible to the public. The Ma administration must redouble its efforts.

Su Chi may have "accomplished this phase of the mission." But President Ma hasn't.

雲端上的ECFA
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.02.12 03:34 am

馬英九總統最近親上火線,向民眾直接訴求兩岸經濟合作架構協議(ECFA)的必要性及理由;但國安會秘書長蘇起昨日卻以「階段性任務已經完成」,請辭告退。馬總統在社會溝通與內部統御之間,似乎腹背皆出難題。

馬總統當然不會天真地以為,一次的說明就能化解民眾所有的疑問;但是,新的說明卻似乎引出了新的疑慮,將ECFA推向更遠、更高、更不可測的雲端,亦凸顯出政府推動ECFA的策略錯亂。

馬總統在「總統報告:兩岸經濟協議」記者會上,用「幫助人民做生意,提升台灣競爭力」的白話語言,強調ECFA的正當性;但要拿到這個做大生意的機會,當然要付出部分產業會因此受傷的代價。馬總統沒有迴避這一點,也提出了補救作法;更針對民眾疑慮最深的主權矮化問題掛保證,強調政府一定會注意兩岸對等、尊嚴、互惠與比例原則。大體而言,馬總統展現了溝通的誠意,並以充分的準備展現他的政策自信,但總體內容卻似乎仍是原地打轉,說不出口的還是沒說,不只疑慮仍在,還引來更多的問號。

第一個問號是時間表。馬總統說,ECFA簽署沒有時間表,但此前從陸委會、行政院到總統府,都曾明言以今年上半年舉行的第五次江陳會簽署為目標;如今馬總統卻稱沒有時間表,這究竟是馬總統以退為進的政治語言,還是兩岸協商ECFA可能真如海基會董事長江丙坤所言,已進入了「更艱辛」的階段?從目前種種跡象看來,後者成分似乎居多。馬總統的無時間表可能說得實在,卻也讓原本篤定的ECFA簽署時程出現變數。

第二個問號從第一個而來,即ECFA協商的「更艱辛」,到底有多艱辛?自政府推動ECFA迄今,這始終是個被過度簡化的問題,卻是化解民眾疑慮最不可或缺的一項;因為政府僅一味強調ECFA的好處,卻從不解釋兩岸交手的衝突點,包括名稱、相互減免稅項目及幅度、彼此開放市場的進程及範圍,甚至長期經濟合作方向等;這些問題無一不是關卡,甚至處處是難關,卻至今無一談定。這或是政府的難言之隱,但淡化複雜度的結果,反而更予社會「黑箱作業」的印象,對政府的談判更生猜疑。天下雜誌日前公布一千大CEO調查,ECFA雖獲得九成支持率,但有近半數CEO擔心政府沒有能力保護台灣利益;若連社會菁英都有這麼高的疑慮,社會基層的疑懼恐怕更深。

可是,政府現在能講得清楚嗎?這就是第三個問號了。政府對ECFA或能訂下抽象的原則,但對於具體的形貌,卻沒有什麼把握。目前兩岸正在協商ECFA的內容架構,既是雙方利害互有折衝的談判,自不可能先亮底牌,政府現在講不清楚原是理所當然;因而,老百姓聽到的ECFA自然也是千篇一律,因而說一遍跟說一千遍的溝通效應不只鈍化、甚至遞減;另方面,既在談判中,市場開放細節未定,部分我方要求的關稅減免項目,對上彼岸挑戰馬總統設下的不開放農產品原則,也導致協商緩慢。所以,最後談出來的ECFA究竟是個什麼樣貌,政府也沒有把握,馬總統又怎麼可能說得清楚?

種種疑問顯示,ECFA的政策推動,政府一開始即低估了民眾理性討論的能力,卻高估了社會意識形態的驅動力,愈趨美化、簡化、淡化及模糊化的結果,反而更添社會疑慮。春節過後,兩岸ECFA的談判將更趨緊密,台灣內部的朝野溝通亦更形必要。如何將ECFA從雲端霧裡拉回到民間,讓民眾摸得著、感受得到,馬政府確實該再加一把勁了。

不論蘇起是否「完成了階段性的任務」,馬總統還沒有。

Thursday, February 11, 2010

The Ma Administration Should Change Its Strategy for ECFA

The Ma Administration Should Change Its Strategy for ECFA
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 11, 2010

On Februrary 9, President Ma personally took to the frontlines. He went on live television and explained the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) to the public. But after listening to President Ma's speech, pundits said that while they appreciated President Ma's sincerity, the commander in chief personally taking to the frontlines failed to win them over on ECFA.

President Ma's speaking style stresses detailed reasoning and logic. Such a style may convince a rational audience. But it will put emotionally-oriented members of the public to sleep. The problem is that everyone thinks the administration needs to convince emotionally-oriented members of the public. That is why the Ministry of Economic Affairs recently suggested "inviting Yen Ching-piao to present an argument." The Ma Administration should do a better job of communicating the meaning of ECFA to the public. But what strategy should it adopt? What PR theme will do the trick? This is something to which it needs to give serious thought. It must look before it leaps. Here are our views on the matter, and our recommendations.

Until recently, the tug of war between the ruling and opposition parties over ECFA involved the DPP going on the offensive, and the KMT adopting a defensive posture. Going on the offensive meant the DPP alleging that once ECFA was signed, certain industries would be affected and certain people would lose their jobs. It meant alleging that economic and trade exchanges between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland involved hidden risks. it meant alleging that once ECFA was signed, the lives of farmers would become difficult. Adopting a defensive posture meant the KMT frantically arguing this won't happen and that won't happen. It mean frantically arguing that the unemployed would be given counseling, that job applicants would be given loans, and so on and so forth.

Simply put, the DPP is resorting to fear-mongering. It is alleging all manner of negative consequences once ECFA is signed. The KMT is saying "Don't be afraid." It is saying the administration will adopt preventive measures A, B, and C to forestall those negative consequences. But when the administration repeatedly stresses that it will adopt preventive measures A, B, and C, that amounts to an admission that the Democratic Progressive Party's fears are valid. In essence, the KMT is at a disadvantage. Besides, fear-mongering requires no evidence. As long as people experience fear, one has succeeded. But appeals such as "Don't be afraid" require proof. One must endlessly prove that preventive measures A, B, and C will be effective. ECFA hasn't even been signed. The impact on industry has yet to occur. Obviously it is impossible to prove that policies will prove effective in the future. The Ma Administration has been on the receiving end of punishment all the way because it adopted a defensive strategy, in which it bears the entire burden of proof.

We feel that instead of enumerating the benefits of signing ECFA, the administration should make clear the "dire consequences of not signing ECFA." The DPP was in power for eight years. East Asian economic integration increased step by step. Taiwan's trade advantage diminished bit by bit. ASEAN plus One or ASEAN plus Three are gradually taking shape. Taiwan is already "waiting to die." Its GDP is shrinking. Research institutions have known the score for a long time. If the situation fails to improve, in ten years Taiwan will become another Cuba or North Korea. The Ma Administration must break the impasse. It must make clear the consequences of not signing ECFA to the public, through either numbers or words. It must expose the DPP's phobic, Closed Door Mentality. It must make clear that not signing ECFA amounts to perpetuating the Democratic Progressive Party's phobic, Closed Door Policy.

President Ma needs one more change to his strategy. Industrialists, manufacturers, and entrepreneurs who favor ECFA must come forward. They must speak out on behalf of the policy. As everyone knows, signing ECFA will negatively impact a small number of industries. But it will benefit the vast majority of industries. That being the case, why don't the beneficiaries of the policy speak out in its favor? When those impacted by the policy raise a hue and cry, why don't these businesses respond? Take the financial industry for example. The news is filled with reports of financial heads engaging in breach of trust or money laundering. Few of them fulfill their responsibility to society. ECFA may broaden the scope of their operations and increase their profits. They have a clear moral obligation to assist industries negatively impacted by the policy. They have no excuse to sit on the sidelines. The Ma Administration should get the silent beneficiaries of the policy to work with the rest of the community. This will make its media battle much easier.

Beneficiaries of ECFA must speak out in unision. On the one hand they must do so because they are the beneficiaries. They understand the issue the best. On the other hand they must let the DPP understand that it is making an enemy of Taiwan's economy as a whole, and not just the ruling KMT. ECFA was originally perceived as merely the pet project of President Ma and his financial and economic cabinet officials. But many industries have since spoken up. ECFA is now a public welfare issue. Initially the DPP could criticize the President and denounce his ministers with impunity. But in fact its opponent is society as a whole. Therefore the ruling KMT should line up the hundreds of industries benefitting from ECFA in front of the Democratic Progressive Party, and see if the DPP has the guts to vent its spleen at the snation's industries.

The aforementioned proposition is very simple. It can be summed up in two sentences. "Strategically, the administration must go on the offensive. Propaganda-wise, industry must speak out." Instead of micromanaging his subordinates' tactics, Ma Ying-jeou should change his strategy.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2010.02.11
社論-馬政府應調整ECFA宣傳戰略
本報訊

馬總統在二月九日親上火線,以電視現場轉播的方式,向人民解說兩岸經濟合作架構協議(ECFA)的種種面向。但是,在聽完馬總統的賣力演說之後,若干媒體的評論是:人民感受到馬總統的誠意,但似乎並沒有因為統帥親上火線而增加其對ECFA的認同。

由於馬總統個人的演講風格著重說理與邏輯細節,這樣的內容較易說服理性閱聽人,卻會使感性閱聽民眾感到沉悶。但問題是,大家都認為政府最需要說服的對象,似乎就是重感性的一群。也正因為如此,經濟部前一陣子才有「請顏清標出馬」的念頭。馬政府要強化ECFA政策的民意溝通,當然是對的事;但是究竟要採取什麼策略、什麼宣傳主軸去完成這樣的民意溝通,則是要慎思明辨、謀定而後動的。以下,則是我們對此事的看法與建議。

截至目前為止,朝野對於ECFA的政策攻防,很顯然地,是民進黨在攻、國民黨在守。所謂「攻」,是指民進黨拚命指陳ECFA簽署後,會有哪些產業受衝擊、這些產業會有多少人可能失業、台灣與中共經貿往來密切會有多少被裹脅的風險、ECFA簽署後農民生活會如何困難等。所謂「守」,是指國民黨拚命在保證不會這個不會那個、失業者會給予輔導、轉業者會施予貸款等等。

簡單地說,民進黨是在訴諸「恐懼」,強調簽了ECFA的種種負面後果,而國民黨則是在呼籲「不要恐懼」,政府會做好甲、乙、丙種種防範。但是,當政府不斷強調會做好甲、乙、丙時,就等於間接承認了民進黨恐懼訴求的正當性,在本質上就處於劣勢。此外,恐懼訴求不需要證據,只要人民心裡害怕就成功了;但是「不要恐懼」的訴求卻需要不斷舉證其甲、乙、丙種種措施會有效果。然而ECFA還沒簽,產業衝擊也尚未發生,現在要舉證未來政策必然有效,當然十分困難。馬政府之所以一路在挨打,就是因為政府一直是處在一個無法自我舉證的戰略守勢。

我們認為,政府與其要說明簽署ECFA的好處,不如大力宣傳「不簽ECFA的壞處」。事實上,民進黨執政八年,東亞經濟整合一步步在擴張、台灣的貿易優勢一點一滴在流失。在東協加一或加三逐漸成形之後,台灣已經處於一個「坐以待斃」的困局,其GDP的萎縮甚大,研究機構早有估算。這樣的局面若不改善,台灣十年之後就會古巴化、北韓化。馬政府應該要把不簽ECFA突破困局的愁慘結果,用明顯的數據或文字向台灣人民呈現,告訴大家「民進黨鎖國的恐懼」。不簽ECFA,就等於持續民進黨帶來的鎖國恐懼。

馬總統另一項該做的策略調整,就是要讓贊成ECFA的產業、廠商、企業家挺身而出,為這個政策辯護、講話。如所周知,簽署ECFA對少數產業有衝擊,但是對絕大多數產業有利。既然如此,為什麼這些得利者不出來舉雙手雙腳贊成呢?為什麼聽到那些受衝擊的人大聲疾呼,就沒有企業出來回應呢?以金融業為例,國內幾家金融負責人平時的新聞不是背信就是洗錢,幾乎沒有對台灣社會盡任何社會責任,而ECFA若能使他們擴張地盤、增加利潤,他們有百分之百的義務對未來的受衝擊產業提出協助與認養計畫,絕對沒有冷眼旁觀的道理。馬政府若能想辦法把這一群受益但沉默的社會大眾拉近來共同努力,這個輿論戰就容易多了。

請各個受益產業共同為ECFA發聲,一方面固然是因為他們是受益者,且最了解產業的內涵,但另一方面也讓民進黨體會到,他們所面對的敵人是台灣的整體經濟,而不是國民黨政府。先前,ECFA似乎只是馬總統個人的政見、是內閣財經部會的主張。但是,在各產業全面發聲之後,ECFA就該是一個社會公益的議題。先前,民進黨批總統、罵部長可以毫無顧忌。但既然是社會整體議題,當局就該把數百個受惠產業一字排開在民進黨面前,看該黨要如何對全國產業開罵。

我們前述的主張整理起來很簡單,就只有兩句話:「戰略要攻守易位」、「

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

The Democratic Progressive Party Has No Reason to Oppose Absentee Voting

The Democratic Progressive Party Has No Reason to Oppose Absentee Voting
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 10, 2010

The right to vote is one the most basic rights in a democracy. Absentee voting is democratic and progressive. The DPP's opposition to absentee voting is anti-democratic and anti-progressive.
The purpose of absentee voting is to increase political participation by giving citizens unable to return home the opportunity to exercise their voting rights. Transportation barriers and occupational factors deprive many members of the public the opportunity to vote. Absentee voting clears away such barriers, ensuring these citizens' their political rights. Such provisions were implemented in other democratic nations years ago. It is long overdue in the Republic of China. In theory, this ought to have unqualified bipartisan support. Who knew the the DPP would vehemently oppose it?

First, let us be clear. This measure, promoted by the Ministry of the Interior, is not about electronic voting. Nor does it apply to Taiwan businessmen living overseas or on the Chinese mainland. It applies only to Republic of China citizens living in the "Taiwan Region of the ROC." It does not apply to the vast numbers of young people studying or working abroad. It does not apply to the military, police and other special occupations. It does not apply to prison inmates. It originally included Taiwan businessmen living overseas or on mainland China. But because keeping track of overseas absentee ballots might be difficult, the Ministry of the Interior decided not to include Taiwan businessmen living overseas or on the Chinese mainland for the time being. Nevertheless the DPP still obstinately opposes absentee voting. It refuses to allow citizens the means to participate in politics. Its attitude is utterly incomprensible.

The Republic of China has undergone shocks from two ruling party changes. Yet the Blue vs. Green deadlock persists. Many people are disheartened. Recent voter turnouts are substantially lower. Allowing absentee voting would make political participation more convenient. It would help ensure everyones' right to express his political opinion. It is clearly necessary. During the Chen administration, Yu Shyi-kun and Premier Su Tseng-chang indicated their support for an absentee voting system. Who knew that as soon as the ruling party changed, the Green Camp would flip flop? Who knew that as soon as the DPP's political status changed, its political convictions would change?

One of the Democratic Progressive Party's objections for opposing absentee voting is that absentee voting may make manipulating the vote count easier. This objection has two aspects. On the one hand, the Taiwan Region of the ROC has held democratic elections for decades. It has developed a highly effective system for election monitoring. It is extremely difficult for anyone to engage in election fraud at the polling stations. The most appalling incidents of election fraud have occurred outside the polling stations. In recent years, all major incidents of election fraud were committed by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party. During the 2004 presidential election, we had the 3/19 Shooting Incident. The Chen regime issued an executive order forbidding members of the military to leave their barracks. As a result, many citizens were unable to return home to vote. This was an even more chilling means of election fraud than vote stealing. Members of the military prevented from voting were not merely denied the right to cast absentee ballots. They were deprived of their right to return to their voting districts in order to cast their ballots in person.

On the other hand, traditional means of election fraud are seldom seen. The new approach to election fraud is through administrative means. During the 2004 presidential election, the gap between the Chen/Lu ticket and the Lien/Soong ticket was less than 30,000 votes. The number of invalid ballots was as high as 337,000 votes. A quick check of previous presidential election results shows that in 1996 the number of invalid ballots was 117,000. In 2000 it was 122,000. In 2008 it was again only 117,000. In other words, in 2004 the number of invalid ballots was almost three times the average. How can the public not suspect election fraud?

Absentee voting is not electronic voting. It is merely a way for citizens already registered to vote, to to cast their ballots in advance, in accordance with law. One must still go to the polling station in person, with one's identity card and chop in order to cast one's ballot. The polling stations will be normal polling stations. The polling stations where military personnel cast their ballots will not be under the auspices of the military. The polling stations for police personnel will not be ad hoc polling stations specially created for the police. During questioning, DPP officials said there must be supervisory staff. Of course there will be supervisory staff! What sort of question is that?

Some basic concepts must be clarified. Making the exercise of one's voting rights more convenient has nothing whatsoever to do with political manipulation and election fraud. If politicians have personal integrity and self-restraint, there will be no 3/19 Shooting Incidents. There will be no incidents of political manipulation. If laws are strictly enforced, if voting is strictly monitored, it will be impossible to engage in election fraud. These are all matters for which the government and politicians must take responsibility. How can one invoke anti-election fraud measures as a pretext to oppose absentee voting? How can one oppose measures making it more convenient for citizens to exercise their voting rights?

Cross-Strait relations and the political climate on Taiwan are closely related. Hundreds of thousands of Taiwan businessmen and their family members living on the mainland have been denied the right to vote in elections, at all levels. This constitutes a major defect in the political system. Absentee voting is highly controversial. Its credibility will not be easy to establish. We do not think that electronic voting should be implemented precipitously. But what reason is there to oppose the implementation of absentee voting within the "Taiwan Region of the ROC" providing proper measures are taken to prevent election fraud?

Is the Democratic Progressive Party in fact anti-democratic and anti-progress?

民進黨沒有理由反對不在籍投票
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.02.10 03:22 am

選舉權是公民參與民主政治的最基本權利,推行不在籍投票是一項「民主」且「進步」的舉措;民進黨反對採行「不在籍投票」,則是「反民主」與「反進步」的行徑。

實施不在籍投票,目的是為了擴大公民的政治參與,讓無法返鄉的民眾也有機會行使投票權。此項變革,基本上是在排除交通阻隔及職業因素對民眾投票機會的囿限或剝奪,以保障公民參政權。這在其他民主國家早已實施多年,台灣卻姍姍來遲,照理說,這本應是不分藍綠都支持的民主措施;沒想到,民進黨竟大肆反對。

首須釐清者,內政部正在研擬推動的不是「通訊投票」,亦即不包括大陸台商與海外僑民。不居住在戶籍地的台灣公民,包括為數龐大的青年學生和異地工作的年輕族群,以及軍、警等特殊職業,乃至受刑人外,原還有大陸台商及海外人士。但因境外通訊投票較不易掌握,內政部已決定暫不對大陸台商及海外僑民實施此制;在這種情況下,民進黨仍然執意反對不在籍投票,拒絕提供人民便利的參政管道,實在令人莫名所以。

台灣歷經兩度政黨輪替的震盪,藍綠卻對峙未已,許多民眾心灰意冷,最近幾次投票率均大幅降低;因此,開放不在籍投票,讓民眾有更便捷的政治參與途徑,確保民意的普遍表達,更顯必要。扁政府時代,游錫?和蘇貞昌擔任閣揆均曾表示支持建立不在籍投票制度;誰知朝野一易位,綠營的立場隨即翻轉。民進黨難道換了位子竟連民主信念也告翻覆?

民進黨反對的理由之一,是不在籍投票可能較易於「操作」,影響選舉結果。這可分兩方面來說。一方面,台灣實施民主選舉數十年,已發展出極為有效的監票方式,任何人想在投開票所裡動手腳,都已不太可能;真正可怕的「操作」,其實是發生在投開票所之外。近年執政者「操作選舉」的重大事件,皆發生在民進黨手上。二○○四年的總統大選,發生三一九槍擊案,扁政府更啟動國安機制,限制軍人離營,導致許多人無法返鄉投票。這是比「作票」更可怕的「操作」。受阻不能投票的軍人,非但不能「不在籍投票」,甚至連返回戶籍地投票的權利也受剝奪。

另一方面,傳統手法的「作票」已經少見,新手法是「行政操作」。二○○四年總統大選,最後扁呂、連宋兩組人馬得票差距不到三萬票,而廢票數卻高達卅三點七萬票。若查閱歷屆總統選舉結果,一九九六年廢票數是十一點七萬張,二○○○年是十二點二萬張,而二○○八年也僅十一點七萬張。也就是說,二○○四年的廢票,幾達平均值的三倍。其中有無「操作」,豈能不受公評?

不在籍投票,並不是通訊投票;而是有選舉權的公民事前依法申請在外地投票,也就是仍然必須由本人拿著身分證印章到「轉移」的投開票所投票;而那個投開票所亦是依法設置的一般投開票所。軍人的投開票所不是軍人主持的,警察的投開票所也不是為警察特設的。民進黨人質問,謂一定要有監察人員。當然有監察人員,根本是多此一問!

必須澄清的基本觀念是:提升公民行使選舉投票權的便利與機會,與選舉的「政治操作」與「作票」根本是截然不同的兩回事。如果政客自律自清,就不會有三一九槍擊案,就不會有「政治操作」;如果嚴格執法,嚴格監票,就不可能「作票」。這些皆是政府與政治人物必須承擔的責任;豈能因防備操作及作票,而竟反對不在籍投票?而竟反對提升公民行使選舉投票權的便利與機會?

其實,以兩岸關係與台灣政治生態的密切關係,大陸上數十萬台商台眷,若未能在台灣各級選舉中投票表達意見,確實已成為台灣政治的重大缺口。但是,畢竟通訊投票的爭議性極大,公信力亦不易建立;我們也認為不可貿然實施通訊投票。但在台灣境內實施不在籍投票,只要防弊措施周備,有什麼理由反對?

Tuesday, February 9, 2010

Candle in the Wind? The European Credit Crisis

Candle in the Wind? The European Credit Crisis
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 9, 2010

An economic recovery was in sight. The financial markets were on the rise. But a European credit crisis destroyed all optimism and hope. A second recession has renewed concerns about the financial crisis. We are not that pessimistic about future developments. But this incident shows that financial markets and economies around the world remain fragile, and each nation's financial stability remains important.

The Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese debt crises have revealed how precarious the situation is. All three are Eurozone Member States. This raises concerns that the entire Eurozone's economic and financial situation may be at risk. Recently, the European and the American stock markets tumbled in response. Asian stocks were also affected. During last week's "Black Friday" global stock markets tumbled.

On Monday the global financial situation gradually stabilized. On Saturday selling pressure on the Taiwan stock market eased because it was the only market open in the world. On Monday it rose slightly, up three points at closing. Asian stocks continued to fall in response to negative reports. But the decline was not as steep. Last Thursday the British, French, and German markets continued their downward spiral. After negative reports and a sell-off, the markets rose on Monday morning. The financial situation has gradually stabilized.

Globally speaking the European credit crisis is more serious than the Dubai credit crisis. No matter how prominent Dubai might be, it was after all, merely media attention. Based on the size of its economy, Dubai's impact on global financial markets is limited. The impact of Dubai's financial crisis on international markets lasted only one or two days. The European credit crisis is different. First, these three countries' economies are much larger than Dubai's. Their impact is naturally going to be greater. Secondly, these three countries are members of the Eurozone. Those most worried about the market, are not worried about individual countries such as Greece. They are worried about the negative impact on the entire Eurozone. The impact does not compare to that of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis and the financial tsunami. But it is definitely greater than Dubai's, and merits our attention.

Financial markets have stabilized. But Europe's debt crisis is not over. The market is still waiting to see how the Eurozone countries deal with the aftermath. More bad news and the market will once again tumble. The financial tsunami taught the nations of the world a lesson. They will not allow the crisis to fester. The only issue is approach and timing. Just how far must the market fall before it bottoms out?

Lest we forget, the global financial tsunami struck in early August, 2007. The sub-prime mortgage crisis had already struck. For two days in a row, the European Central Bank injected a total of 200 billion USD into the market. The U.S. Federal Reserve followed up with capital injections amounting to 33 billion USD. But after the storm subsided, a chain reaction occurred. Citigroup, AIG and other financial giants, announced huge losses. By the first quarter of 2008 the storm had expanded. By the second half it had swept the world. Therefore the European credit crisis must not be taken lightly. Financial markets have stabilized over the past few days. But that does not mean the crisis has ended.

The European credit crisis shows that the global economy is recovering. Financial markets are growing and have stabilized. But they remain candles in the wind. Without special attention, their flames can easily be extinguished. This is particularly true during a financial tsunami. Governments and central banks spread money around in attempts to rescue the market and save their economies. But after they have stabilized the market, these governments are weakened. They are far less financially solvent than before. Two more tests will follow. One. The government will gradually withdraw its market supports. Normal, private sector market forces will assert themselves. Two. Even more importantly, the ability of governments to support themselves will be put to the test.

After they spread money around to save the economy, governments' financial positions deteriorate. They become heavily indebted. This is not limited to the four nations analysts have mocked as the "ou zhu si guo," or "four Euro-piggy nations." Germany remains strong. But the United States, Japan, Britain and France are in very poor condition. Their deficits are at record highs. They are under immense debt pressure. None of this is news. Fortunately these economies are large enough. They have large enough economic bases. Therefore they may be able to hold out.

The Republic of China's economy has already been integrated into the global financial system. But it is a small economy. It is unable to influence and change the global financial system. It can only passively accept and cope. The Dubai and European credit crises underscore the importance of government financial stability. When the financial tsunami struck, the nations of the world threw money at the problem. Onlookers may be reluctant to criticize the government's finances. But the tsunami has subsided. For the sake of long term economic development, the government must return to normal. It must seek financial stability. Otherwise there is no guarantee that the credit crisis will not appear on Taiwan.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2010.02.09
社論-風中之燭? 從歐洲債信危機談起
本報訊

原本,復甦在望的經濟、漲聲四起的金融市場,一個歐洲債信危機,打落了樂觀希望,二次衰退、二次金融危機之疑慮再起。對未來的發展,我們認為並不悲觀,但由此事件中,我們則可看出全球金融市場與經濟仍然脆弱,及國家財政穩定度的重要性。

從希臘發生債信危機起,西班牙、葡萄牙也先後出現不穩情勢;由於此三國都屬歐元區會員國,外界擔心影響整個歐元區的經濟與金融情勢,近日歐美股市俱以重挫回應,亞股也難置身事外。上周的「黑色星期五」,全球股市也因此重挫。

周一的全球金融情勢,已漸趨穩定;台股因上周六獨步全球的開市,消化部分賣壓,周一以小漲三點作收;亞股雖仍繼續下跌以消化利空,但跌幅已輕。至於歐股方面,英、法、德三個主要國家的股市,在上周四、周五連續重挫,消化利空與賣壓後,周一開盤已出現紅盤。基本上整個金融情勢似已漸趨穩定。

以全球金融市場的眼光來看,歐洲債信危機比杜拜危機嚴重;因為,杜拜名氣再怎麼大,畢竟只是「名氣」而已,以經濟體大小、在國際金融市場的核心或邊陲地位來比較,杜拜的影響有其局限。事實上,杜拜危機對國際金融市場的影響只有一、二天的效應。但歐洲債信危機則不同,第一,這三國是比杜拜大很多的經濟體,影響自然比較大;第二,此三國都屬歐元區的一員,市場最擔心者,倒不是希臘單一國家的問題,而是憂心對整個歐元區的負面影響。因此,其影響雖然不能與由美國次貸風暴引發的金融海嘯相比,但必然較杜拜危機嚴重,值得重視。

目前,雖然金融市場已回穩,但歐洲債信危機尚未結束;市場仍在觀望歐元區國家如何處理善後,如再有利空,仍會再次重挫市場。不過,在經歷金融海嘯、全球救市的經驗後,各國斷不可能放手讓此危機與利空放大發酵;重點只是在處理方式與時機,及在全部事件落幕前,到底市場還要再反應多少才算落底。

不要忘記,全球金融海嘯,其實在二○○七年八月初,次貸風暴時即已顯現;當時,歐洲央行連續兩天為市場緊急注資二千億美元、美國聯準會跟進注資三三○億美元。但是,在市場認為風暴平息後,再出現「連環爆」,花旗、AIG等金融巨人,分別出現並認列鉅額損失。到二○○八年第一季整個風暴擴大,下半年則終而席捲全球。因此,對歐洲債信危機,實不宜掉以輕心。這幾天金融市場的回穩,不代表事件與危機就已結束。

而由歐洲債信危機,也可看出目前全球的景氣復甦、金融市場的上揚,雖似已穩定往光明面行走,但實有如風中之燭,不特別注意呵護,燭火很容易又熄滅。特別是在金融海嘯期間,各國政府與央行「撒錢」救市場、救經濟,勉力穩住市場後,大部分政府實在是「體弱氣虛」,財政能力大不如前。未來的考驗,一個是在政府逐漸撤除對市場的支援後,民間與正常市場力量的承接能力;第二個更重要的是:各國政府本身的支撐能力。

在撒錢救經濟後,政府財政狀況惡化與國家債務變重的國家,可不是只有這幾個被分析家譏為「歐豬四國」的國家而已;除了德國仍較穩健外,美、日、英、法的狀況都相當差;政府赤字創新高、債務壓力沉重,都已不是新聞。所幸的是,這些經濟體夠大、底子也還足,因此還能撐住。

對已融入全球金融體系的台灣而言,我們是小型經濟體,無能影響與改變全球金融體系的動盪,只能被動接受與因應。但由杜拜危機到歐洲債信危機,大家應看得出國家財政穩定度的重要。金融海嘯時,全球撒錢救經濟,或許外界不忍對政府財政過分苛責,但海嘯已退,從國家中長期經濟發展的眼光看,政府仍應回歸常態,力求財政穩健。否則,債信危機難保不會出現在台灣。

Monday, February 8, 2010

A Ruling and Opposition Party Summit Can Be More than Political Gamesmanship

A Ruling and Opposition Party Summit Can Be More than Political Gamesmanship
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 8, 2010

Former Vice President Annette is the founder of the Jade Mountain Weekly. Yesterday she interviewed President Ma Ying-jeou at the Presidential Palace. The two engaged in a number of ascerbic exchanges. Afterwards Annette Lu appeared on a TV talk show. She revealed that she had posed the very same questions to former President Chen Shui-bian.
Annette Lu referred to this dialogue as a "Ruling and Opposition Leaders National Policy Debate." Next week's issue of Jade Mountain Weekly may well be characterized as a "Virtual Debate between Ma and Chen on National Policy." Call it a dialogue. Call it a debate. The person Ma Ying-jeou most needs to dialogue with or debate is DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. It is not Annette Lu. Even less is it Chen Shui-bian.

The Ma administration has been in office for one year and eight months. Pundits have repeatedly stressed the need for direct communications between the ruling and opposition parties. But they have never been able to bring about a meeting between the "two Yings," i.e., Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. According to Annette Lu, Ma has already made it known that he has agreed to such a meeting. Tsai has already acknowledged receipt of Ma's invitation. The very next day however, Tsai Ing-wen announced that while the DPP did not oppose communications between the ruling and opposition parties, "The important thing is that we need to know that the KMT is sincere. Communications must be over substantive issues. If the meeting is merely for the sake of political gamesmanship, there is no really no need."

Tsai Ing-wen's remark is nothing new. In 2008, the DPP lost the presidential election. Morale hit bottom. In the 2009 legislative by-election it scored a victory. Pundits called for a meeting between the "two Yings." A national policy dialogue between ruling and opposition leaders would be beneficial to political development and social harmony. Which party has or lacks political momentum would not be an issue. But Tsai Ing-wen refused to say anything other than "If the meeting is merely for the sake of political gamesmanship, there is no really no need." Ma Ying-jeou repeatedly offered Tsai Ing-wen both verbal and written invitations, but Tsai slammed the door in his face.

Tsai Ing-wen cited "political gamesmanship" as her reason to turn down the president's invitations. She did so with little hesitation. Anyone familiar with politicians' political calculations, knows that "political gamesmanship" is one of the most basic skills of the professional politician. But Tsai Ing-wen ignored a simple fact. Ma Ying-jeou is the one politician for whom this charge simply does not stick. Ma Ying-jeou is widely known as the one person least adept at political gamesmanship. He has been in office one year and eight months. His approval rating has hit rock bottom. Some pundits are even accusing him of "incompetence," largely because he lacks political finesse and is woefully inept at political gamesmanship.

During the Lee Teng-hui era, Huang Hsin-chieh, Shih Ming-teh, Hsu Hsin-liang, and newcomer Chen Shui-bian were all President Lee Teng-hui's guests of honor. The Democratic Progressive Party had just been reborn from the "dang wai" (party outsider) movement. The circumstances were favorable to the party. But its substantive strength was still considerably less than the KMT's. None of the Democratic Progressive Party leaders at the time criticized President Lee of poltical gamesmanship. None of them turned down his invitations. When Chen Shui-bian was in office, he urged opposition leaders to communicate with him. At the time the KMT and PFP had enough legislative seats to impeach Chen. Yet neither the chairmen of the two parties, Lien Chan and James Soong, refused to dialogue with the government. On the contrary. It was Chen Shui-bian who engaged in out of the blue political gamesmanship when he met with Lien Chan and James Soong. First he met with Lien Chan. No sooner had Lien Chan left the presidential palace, than the Executive Yuan announced that it was halting work on the Number Four Nuclear Plant. This led to a series of political repercussions. Lien Chan was no longer willing to meet with Chen. Nevertheless James Soong was still willing to participate in a secret meeting with Chen Shui-bian. Again the one who resorted to political gamesmanship was Chen Shui-bian. First he met with Soong. Then he spread rumors of a "Secret Soong Chen Meeting" between Soong and Mainland official Chen Yunlin.

Lien Chan and James Soong's experiences with ruling and opposition party "communications" have less than pleasant, thanks to Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. Is Tsai Ing-wen concerned that Ma Ying-jeou will engage in the same political gamesmanship that the DPP and Chen Shui-bian engaged in with Lien Chan and James Soong? If so, Tsai Ing-wen's concerns are misplaced. If Ma Ying-jeou had a tenth of Chen Shui-bian's skill at political gamesmanship, he would not be in his current predicament.

If Tsai Ing-wen's objection is that "communications must be over substantive issues," that is another matter. After all, dialogue between political leaders is not idle chatter. Before ruling and opposition party leaders engage in dialogue, they must make careful preparations. The two parties differ on a number of policies, particularly cross-Strait policy. No dialogue can avoid these issues. Therefore the two sides must consider how to allow compromise and concessions. Only then is a dialogue possible. Only then can "substantive issues" be dealt with. Such a goal may appear difficult. But it is not that difficult. Take a random example. Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Lin I-hsiung was determined to amend the laws, lowering the threshold for public referendums. Would Tsai Ing-wen refuse to allow this party elder to visit the presidential palace? Take another example. Legislative Yuan President Wang Jin-pyng and SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung believe the legislature should set up a cross-Strait affairs group. Ma Ying-jeou has so far refused to comment. Would Tsai Ing-wen refuse to meet with Ma in order to get the ball rolling? Years ago the KMT proposed setting up a cross-Strait affairs group. At the time DPP presidential office and executive branch leaders were the ones who stonewalled. Could that be why Tsai Ing-wen is embarrassed to broach the issue?

The Ma administration has been in office for one year and eight months. Ma Ying-jeou is no longer a leader who commands the support of over 70% of the public. Tsai Ing-wen is no longer the Democratic Progressive Party savior who cleaned up the mess left by Chen Shui-bian. A "two Yings" meeting would not benefit either leader at the expense of the other. It would merely benefit the Republic of China. It would merely give a little consideration to its many problems. Tsai Ing-wen must have the courage to transcend the DPP's usual political calculations and mindset. Only then can she emerge from under the shadow of the party's "Princes." Only then can she transform herself into a leader worthy of leading the nation.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2010.02.08
朝野高峰會 可以不是政治操作
本報訊

前副總統呂秀蓮日前以《玉山週報》創辦人的身分,入府專訪馬英九總統,兩人機鋒四起;會後,呂秀蓮即於晚上親上政論節目中透露,相同的問題已經問過前總統陳水扁,可以想見,這場事前被呂秀蓮定義為「朝野領袖的國政對談」,下周呈現在《玉山週報》,有可能成為馬、扁的「紙上國政辯論」。但不論是對談或辯論,馬英九最需要朝野對話的對象是民進黨主席蔡英文,而不是呂秀蓮,遑論隔空虛擬的陳水扁。

馬政府執政一年八個月,輿論三番兩次力陳朝野溝通或直接對話之必要,卻始終無法促成雙英會。照呂秀蓮的說法,已經轉達馬有相同意願見蔡,蔡則表示「知道了」。沒想到,隔天蔡英文一點轉圜都不給,直截了當說,民進黨不反對朝野溝通,「重點在要感受到誠意,溝通要有實質意義,如果只是淪為政治操作,那就不必了。」

蔡英文這句話一點都不新鮮,從二○○八年民進黨敗選,士氣跌到谷底,到二○○九年三合一與立委補選勝利,多數輿論一以貫之鼓勵雙英會,因為朝野領袖的國政對話於政治發展、社會和諧都有利,和哪一個黨氣勢旺或弱無關。蔡英文則從頭到尾只會說,「如果是政治操作就不必了!」這句話讓馬英九不論口頭或書信邀請,都打不開溝通之門。

蔡英文以「政治操作」拒絕總統的對話邀請,說來一點也不勉強,因為對任何熟悉政治算計的政客而言,「政治操作」是最基本的專業技巧。不過,蔡英文顯然忽略了,這句話獨獨用在馬英九身上不具說服力。馬英九是政壇公認最不懂得玩政治的人,執政一年八個月,民意聲望直直落,甚至被若干批評者重話指責為「無能」,大多和他缺乏政治手腕、不擅政治操作有關。

前總統李登輝執政時期,從黃信介、施明德到許信良,乃至後起之陳水扁,無人不是李的座上客,當年的民進黨才從黨外脫胎換骨,形勢雖好,實力卻遠遠不及國民黨,但是,當時的民進黨領袖,沒有人小鼻子小眼睛地批評總統政治操作而拒絕。陳水扁執政時期,力邀在野領袖溝通,當時的國、親兩黨國會席次加起來可以提出總統罷免案,兩位黨主席連戰和宋楚瑜也沒有拒絕入府對話,反倒是陳水扁在會見連宋時,以莫名奇妙的政治操作,前腳會連,連戰座車才離開總統府,行政院就宣布停建核四,以致往後政治波瀾不斷;即使如此,後來連戰不願再與扁見面,宋楚瑜還是密會陳水扁,結果大搞政治操作的還是陳水扁,前腳陳宋會,後腳就放話「宋陳密會」,密會的陳則是對岸的陳雲林。

連宋有這麼不愉快的朝野溝通經驗,全拜陳水扁和民進黨之賜,蔡英文莫非以民進黨或陳水扁之心,度馬英九之腹?果若如此,那蔡英文真是過慮了,如果馬英九有一、二陳水扁的本事,馬的處境不會像現在如此困窘。

如果,蔡英文介意的是「溝通要有實質意義」,那又另當別論,畢竟領袖對話不是閒聊天,朝野領袖對話前,必須經過縝密的前置作業,因為兩黨在若干政策、特別是兩岸關係大方向與政策作為上確有差異,既要談就不可能不觸及這些問題,既要觸及,兩方都必須思考妥協退讓之道,才有可能讓彼此的對話,產生「實質意義」。這樣的目標,看起來有點難,卻沒這麼難,隨便舉例,為公投苦行的民進黨前主席林義雄,念茲在茲的就是修法降低公投門檻,蔡英文難道不能為前輩入府一談嗎?再舉例,包括立法院長王金平和海基會董事長江丙坤都認為立法院應該成立兩岸事務小組,馬英九迄今不肯鬆口,蔡英文難道不能見馬,發揮臨門一腳的功能嗎?除非蔡英文有感於當年國民黨提出國會成立兩岸事務小組,阻擋拒絕的是民進黨府院高層,開不了這個口。

馬政府執政一年八個月,馬英九不再是挾七成以上民意支持的高聲望領袖,蔡英文也不再是才扛起民進黨後扁爛攤子的委屈主席,雙英會沒有誰拉抬誰的問題,只有肯不肯為台灣多做一點點、多想一點點的問題,只有勇敢跨出民進黨最擅長的政治算計與思維,蔡英文才能真正擺脫黨內天王陰影,躍升為足堪領導國政的領袖。

Saturday, February 6, 2010

Soft Power More Important to Taiwan's Security

Soft Power More Important to Taiwan's Security
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 6, 2010

The Obama administration has approved an arms sale to Taipei. Taipei has yet to discuss the sale or respond in any clear manner. Instead, strong protests from Beijing have attracted international attention. In particular, a thesis projecting a naval battle in 2015 has depicted Beijing sinking a U.S. aircraft carrier, and provoked rampant speculation. No matter where Taipei-Washington military procurements might lead, any analysis must consider the triangular relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.
Washington's arms sales to Taipei have long been viewed as a barometer of Washington's commitment to Taipei. This remains true today. President Obama approved this arms sale to Taipei. Taipei must cough up over 200 billion NTD. Yet the Ma administration felt obligated to "thank" Washington. That is why Washington must face Beijing's wrath.

The Ma administration went through the motions of thanking Washington for the arms sale. But the political atmosphere on Taiwan and on the international stage is undergoing subtle changes. From a government perspective, the sale did not include the submarines and F16C/D fighters Taipei wanted the most. Some say this proves Washington is favoring Beijing and dumping Taiwan. From a public perspective, non-governmental organizations have long opposed arms sales and objected to the government's budget allocations. Also, the price of US arms has skyrocketed. As a result, members of the public may not be falling over themselves with gratitude because "The Americans are willing to sell weapons to us." To some extent this reflects greater public confidence that cross-Strait relations are increasingly stable and peaceful.

More importantly, Mainland China is rising. The international community and the United States have formed G2. The tug of war between the two powers has become the new strategic focal point. Some say the probability of large-scale military conflict breaking out between the superpowers is nearly nil. In the event military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait escalates, some netizens scoff, it will not matter how much "tribute" Taipei gave the United States, or how many weapons it bought. Arms purchases are at best "whistling in the dark." Such remarks may be caustic. But Taipei lacks the ability to "maintain peace through strength." That much is indisputable.

As we can see, arms procurement issues are rife with paradoxes. First, Taipei offers Washington money, not to purchase weapons, but protection. Secondly, Washington is willing to protect Taipei, but only for its own interests. Thirdly, even if Taipei buys these weapons, in the event war actually breaks out, weapons by themselves will not Taipei to protect itself. Washington, Beijing, and Taipei have a triangular relationship. Is Taipei's role in this triangle purely involuntary?

Not necessarily. Taipei lacks the ability to "maintain peace through strength." Therefore we must use other means to avoid war. We must take preventive measures. We have no alternative. Taipei must use "soft power" to defend itself and maintain regional stability.

There are many forms of "soft power." The most important is an advanced form of democracy. Economic strength is of course another. Mainland China is rising. Taiwan's relative economic influence has diminished. But in areas such as the electronics industry, Taiwan remains important. Among these, talent and intellect are an important source of strength. Internationally renowed author Thomas Friedman said that Taiwan's human talent was its most important sustainable asset. Culture is another such force. When President Ma visited Central America, he passed through the United States. His host, the Mayor of Los Angeles, personally asked President Ma to help students in Los Angeles learn Chinese. This is one of Taiwan's many cultural assets.

Taipei must have the wisdom to make use of its "soft power." It can use its leverage to ensure peace between Mainland China and the United States. Taipei has used this leverage in the past. The Lee Teng-hui regime prided itself on "making the situation worse," and for being a "troublemaker." It mistakenly assumed that Taiwan independence forces could help the United States contain Mainland China's rise. But such was not the case. Mainland China's rise is a foregone conclusion. The strategic interests of the United States, Japan and other major powers have long ago changed. Some say that only if Taipei-Washington relations are stable, will cross-Strait relations be stable. In fact all three sides of the triangle formed by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei must be stable before the triangular relationship can be stable. That is why Taipei has a crucial role to play. At least it is no longer making trouble and undermining regional security. It is a small but nimble force poised between two larger forces. If it plays its role well, it will be exercising its soft power and ensuring Taiwan's security.

The arms sales controversy continues to rage. Taipei can apply pressure, not by waging war, but by encouraging Mainland China's peaceful rise. The Republic of China has experience with democracy. It has the ability to show Chinese societies the world over the nature of soft power.

台灣的安全感「軟實力」比較重要
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.02.06 03:31 am

歐巴馬政府通過對台軍售,台灣方面還沒有太大動作的討論和回應,反而因為中共強烈抗議,形成國際注目焦點。尤其美方最新一篇模擬二○一五年海戰的論文,描繪中共擊沉美國航空母艦情景,予人無限想像。台美間的軍購議題不管如何發展,說到底,永遠要放在美中台三邊關係中來解讀。

美國對台軍售,在過去很長一段時間(其實直至目前仍如此),被視為美國對台關係承諾程度的一項指標。所以這次歐巴馬總統同意此筆軍售,台灣若買單要付出超過兩千億台幣,馬政府卻要向美國表示「感謝」;而美國也因此必須面對中共的抗議。

但就算這次馬政府行禮如儀感謝美國的軍售,台灣內部和國際間的氣氛還是經歷了一些微妙的變化。從政府角度而言,由於這批軍售並未包括台灣最想要的潛艦和 F16C/D型戰機,有人反而擔心,這更證明了美國繼續偏向「脫台傾中」的立場。從民間而言,由於多年來各種民間團體持續推動反軍武和關注國家預算分配的議題,且這次美方軍售價錢漲得太兇,所以一般民意未見得對於「美國人肯賣武器給我們」表現歡欣感恩。相當程度上,這也是兩岸關係日趨平穩、國人對和平的信心增強的一種反映。

更重要的是,國際間,由於中國崛起,儼然和美國形成並駕齊驅的G2,這兩強之間的抗衡,形成一個新的國際戰略焦點。有人說,超級大國之間,爆發大規模戰爭的機率趨近於零。而萬一真的台海軍事對峙情勢升高,網路上有人譏諷,屆時台灣不管向美國「進貢」多少銀子買來多少武器,但真要用以備戰,恐怕只能達到「走夜路吹口哨給自己壯膽」那種程度的功能。此言雖失之刻薄,但台灣並無「以戰止戰」的本錢,恐是不爭的事實。

這樣來看軍購議題,還真是充滿了很多層次的弔詭:第一,台灣捧著銀子,與其說是向美國買武器,不如說是買美國的保護;第二,但美國是否願意保護台灣,還是以美國本身的利益為優先考量;第三,就算買了武器,萬一真有戰事爆發,武備畢竟仍不足以讓台灣自保。這樣說來,美中台三邊架構當中,台灣難道只是「身不由己」的那一方嗎?

卻也未必如此。台灣沒有本錢走向「以戰止戰」的那一步,就必須要用其他方法來避戰,防患於未然。別的沒有,台灣要用「軟實力」來防衛自己,也幫助維護區域穩定。

「軟實力」有很多種。優質的民主當是最重要的軟實力。經貿力量當然亦是其一,雖在中國崛起的對比下,台灣的經貿影響力比重已減弱,但在例如電子產業領域,台灣仍是舉足輕重。這其中,人才和腦力也是台灣重要的實力基礎,甫來訪的國際作家佛里曼就盛讚,人力是台灣最重要的永續資產。再者,文化力量也是其一。馬總統出訪中美洲路過美國時,地主之一的洛杉磯市長就曾面邀馬總統,幫助洛杉磯學生學習中文,這正是台灣文化的利基之一。

但在所有這些條件之上,台灣最必須以高度智慧來運用的一種「軟實力」,就是在中美二強之間作為和平槓桿的功能。台灣過去不是沒有「玩」過這步棋,當年甚至以「鬧得越大越好」的麻煩製造者角色為樂,誤判傾向台獨的立場可以助美遏制中國崛起。但情勢今非昔比。中國的崛起已是定局,美、日等大國的戰略利益考量早在轉變之中。有人說,台美關係穩定,才會兩岸關係穩定。事實上,以美中台三邊關係而言,其中的任二邊關係均屬穩定,這三角關係才會穩定;正因如此,台灣在其中有一個舉重若輕的角色可以扮演。別的不說,至少不再玩以往那種製造麻煩、攪得區域不安的遊戲,兩大之間巧為小,這個角色扮得好,就是一種使台灣安全加分的「軟實力」。

軍售議題沸騰,但台灣可施力處絕不會是戰爭,而是中國和平崛起的大情境。民主經驗領先所有華人社會的台灣,要明白自己的軟實力何在。

Friday, February 5, 2010

Five Cities Elections: KMT Nominations Most Critical

Five Cities Elections: KMT Nominations Most Critical
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 5, 2010

For the sake of the Five City Elections, the KMT recently changed the staff of its local party headquarters. It actively began recruiting private sector talent. It is making a genuine effort. But its organizational reform efforts may not yield results in time. A short term backlash may undercut its campaign momentum. Most important of all, its nominees must be acceptable to grass-roots voters. The candidates may not be deficient in any respect. They must boast both clean images and governing ability. Only then can they create synergy during the election.

After years of thinning out, KMT party strength is considerably diminished at the grassroots. Compared to its early years, the KMT has fewer human resources, less equipment, and is smaller in scale. When party officials conducted field visits in the past, it was all pomp and circumstance. They were the equals of county executives and city mayors. Their decisions were final. County executives and city mayors could only nod. Even central and local level elected officials were at their beck and call. But the golden age for authoritarian political parties has passed. Today when party officials conduct field visits, they must bow and scrape, and often get the cold shoulder. When nominees for local elections find themselves at loggerheads, they ask central party officials to mediate, not always with success.

Times have changed. Officials from party headquarters have become a nightmare for party workers. They may have devoted a lifetime to the party. But the highest level to which they can probably rise, is local party headquarters chairman. But their positions have now become crosses to bear. In recent years, such positions have become a place to put party officials out to pasture. Outgoing legislators who want to run but who are unelectable, candidates who were pressured to withdraw, and anyone who unsuccessfully sought office, can be placed in these support positions. Such support positions are sources of friction due to post election grievances and local or clan interests. Mediating between the heads of local factions Is even more difficult.

During the January legislative election, the first thing KMT Secretary-General Ching Pu-chung did was to fine tune personnel assignments at local party headquarters. His intention was clear. Swap out unsuitable party officials. Replace them with new people who don't hold old grudges. The advantage is that without old grudges they need not consider personal feelings. The disadvantage is they have no name recognition. They couldn't appeal to peoples' feelings even if they wanted to. But at least old hatreds will not be directed at the new officials. How much front line fighting ability will the newly appointed officials actually demonstrate? We will have to wait and see. Ching Pu-chung should plan for the worst. Local party mediation is a hands-on process. It is unnecessary to trouble the party chairman.

Next, Ching Pu-chung recruited outsiders to conduct an evaluation of the party's use of human resources, and to recruit campaign volunteers for the Five Cities Elections. Judging by past elections, the Democratic Progressive Party, whether it was in the opposition or in office, made far better use of volunteers than the KMT. Young DPP volunteers wrote songs, choreographed dances, and set up websites. Old DPP volunteers engaged in word of mouth campaigning through radio and television talk shows, in the parks, and local farmers markets. These volunteers were campaign workers during the election, and party supporters after the election. They do not seek official assignments. While the KMT was in the opposition for eight years, it began studying this approach. But it never got the hang of it. To recruit older volunteers it always had to mobilize. The most spontaneous of volunteers were older women. But even they were recruited through womens' groups. Youth groups were once an important force behind KMT strength. Youth groups shone at public relations during the Kuan Chung era. But it is far more difficult for young people to rise through the ranks of the KMT than the DPP. The most successful example of a volunteer effort in recent years was the Red Shirt Army. But that was a spontaneous movement. The Chen corruption case outraged the public, creating a supportive social climate. When the Chen corruption case ended, the Red Shirt Army lost its rallying point. Its supporters each had their own political preferences. This political force is unlikely to play a key role in the future.

Ching Pu-chung hopes to use outside forces to transform the party, and to consolidate its volunteer forces. This is an important part of the KMT's effort to change itself into a "campaign machine." This is forward and creative thinking. It is also more in line with the new social and political climate. The reason it has led to criticism has to do with Ching Pu-chung's nominees. They are too controversial. Their character, values, and personal styles have led to fault-finding. Ching Pu-chung has only himself to blame for not investigating his nominees in advance. He must ask these "party outsiders" to talk less and do more, and let the results speak for themselves.

But no matter how one changes one's organizational structure, they remain internal political party matters. Strengthening party efficiency does not equate with election success. The KMT must strengthen itself as an election machine. Election victory must be its highest goal. If one cannot win elections and remain in office, then any party transformation loses its significance. Therefore in the face of any election, the party's nominations remain the key to its success. Loss of political momentum because legislators fought each other during the legislative by-elections is not a major problem. The Five Cities Elections are a far more serious matter. Winning or losing will immediately affect the 2012 Presidential Election.

The DPP is slighter weaker in the central Taiwan region. But it is stronger in the two southern cities. It has many strong candidates. In the north its "Princes" are readying for battle. By contrast, the KMT has no heavy hitters in the south. The New Taipei City Mayor may have trouble winning re-election. The party is unaccustomed to internal debate. It is unable to put forth qualified candidates. Even pollsters are having trouble taking the political temperature. The nomination process and candidates may be flexible. But for the sake of momentum it would be better to present its roster of candidates, and engage in public debate. Election controversy is nothing to fear. Only lively public debate can create momentum. In order to win the Five Cities Elections, the third and most important thing the KMT must do is encourage its leading candidates. The "Princes" of the party must have to the courage to say: I stand behind you!

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2010.02.05
社論-國民黨五都選舉 提名最關鍵
本報訊

國民黨最近為了布局五都選舉,不僅調整地方黨部人事,也積極延攬民間人力公司長才,確實用心良苦。然而,組織結構改革的效能,未必是一時半刻能反映出成績,甚至有可能因為短期反彈直接損傷選舉戰力;最重要的,還是在於披戰袍之人選,能否得到基層民眾認可,參選人從形象到治理能力,缺一不可,輔選才能發揮事半功倍之效。

國民黨基層黨務,經過多年黨務精實,人力資源的配備與規模,相應於早年,縮減甚多。過去黨部主委出門,陣仗與權威,形同縣市首長,黨部主委拍板定案的事,不要說縣市首長只能點頭,從中央到地方民代還得奔走請託;威權政黨的黃金歲月早成歷史,如今黨部主委行走地方,求爺爺告奶奶,還不大有人搭理,地方選舉爭議相持不下,總得請出黨中央出馬,才有機會協調,還不一定擔保成功。

時移勢往,黨部主委已成黨工的夢魘。儘管一輩子奉獻給黨,十之八九最大就做個地方黨部主委,但如今坐上這個位子卻成為人見人嫌的苦差事。尤其最近幾年,這個職務經常成為黨政人事的疏洪道,卸任立委、想選卻選不上者、選舉協調落榜者,但凡坐轎不成者,都可能轉個彎成為扛轎者,這樣的扛轎人在地方,鮮少政通人和,相反的,因為背著選舉恩怨、地方(或家族)利益,想打通地方派系在內的各方山頭,做好調和鼎鼐的工作,就更難了。

國民黨秘書長金溥聰在元月立委補選後,第一樁事就是先微調地方黨部人事,用意很清楚,換掉人地不宜的主委,改派沒有舊恩怨包袱者上任。沒包袱的好處是不必講情面,壞處是:沒人認得你,講情面也沒用,但至少舊仇不至於衝著新人發飆。至於新上任的主委們到底能展現多少第一線作戰指揮官的本事?只能留待觀察,金溥聰應該早做好最壞打算,地方協調之事只能事必躬親,非必要不麻煩黨主席出馬。

接下來,金溥聰延攬外人進入黨部做人力資源再評估,組建五都選舉志工。從歷年選戰觀察,民進黨不論在野或執政,都比國民黨更擅於運用志工,年輕志工寫歌編舞搞網路,老年志工電台公園市場搞耳語,這群志工都是選舉任務編組,選後成為支持者,全無人事負擔;國民黨在野八年,開始學這套辦法,總是學不入味,老年志工還是要靠組織動員,最自動自發的婆婆媽媽,背後多數都還有個婦女會,青年團還是國民黨早年鞏固政權的重要力量,文宣青年軍早在關中時代就發揚光大,但是年輕人想在國民黨出頭,遠比在民進黨裡難多了。晚近搞志工最成功的反而是紅衫軍,但這屬自發性運動,且有扁案的社會大氣候支撐,扁案進入尾聲,紅衫軍也無從依附,對政治人物又各有偏好,這股力量在未來的政治大局中,很難集結扮演關鍵角色。

在這種情況下,如果金溥聰能以外力改造,並強化志工隊伍,對國民黨想轉型成所謂的「選舉機器」,當然是非常重要的環節。這個想法既前進,又創意,更合乎社會與政治變遷後的新情勢;之所以引發批評,實在是因為金挑的人選本身爭議太大,從人品、價值觀到秀型風格,都被人拿著實例挑剔,金溥聰只能怪自己事前沒做過人事調查,然後要求這個「黨的外人」少說多做,拿出成績再說。

但是,不論在組織上如何調整改造,都屬政黨內部事務,強化黨的效能不表示能與勝選畫上等號,國民黨既要調整成選舉機器,勝選就是最高目標,若無法延續勝選延續政權,黨的精實改造就失去意義。因此,面對任何選舉,提名就是黨成敗的關鍵。立委補選輸贏拚氣勢,問題不大;五都選戰就嚴肅多了,輸贏立刻牽動二○ 一二總統大選。

民進黨除中都稍弱外,南部二都戰力雄厚,戰將蜂湧,北部二都都有天王備戰;相對的,國民黨南部二都尚無強棒,新北市還有現任者連任與否困擾,黨內又無熱烈討論的文化,人選端不出檯面,連民調都測不出水溫,儘管提名時程、甚至人選者可以視對手策略彈性因應,但就黨的氣勢而言,寧可人選備出,眾說紛云,選舉不怕爭議,熱烈討論才能造成聲勢,國民黨拚五都,要做的第三件、可能也是最重要的事,就是鼓勵戰將、天王勇敢說出:我願意為黨披上戰袍!

Thursday, February 4, 2010

One China, Different Interpretations, Revisited

One China, Different Interpretations, Revisited
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 4, 2010

Cross-Strait negotiations must undergo a rational process. This will allow the two sides to arrive at clearer objectives. This is what makes so-called "process orientation" different from past "goal orientation."

From a goal oriented perspective, four outcomes are possible. 1. Taiwan independence. 2. Maintenance of the status quo. 3. A Roof Theory political affiliation, such as a confederation or the European Union model. 4. Reunification. These four goals all require a process, namely, "One China, Different Interpretations."

Take independence. The Taiwan independence movement is a parasite in need of a host. Without a One China Constitution to hide behind, the Taiwan independence movement would be a parasite without a host. The Taiwan independence movement, including Chen Shui-bian's eight year long Taiwan independence regime, were parasites inside the Republic of China. They were afraid to jettison the Republic of China, the talisman they knew was sheltering them. Furthermore, given macro level developments globally, on the Chinese Mainland, and on Taiwan, Taiwan independence cannot possibly become the common goal for Taipei and Beijing. The Taiwan independence movement can do nothing, other than reside parasitically within the Republic of China, provoking internal strife.

Now take the other three possible goal oriented outcomes. Maintaining the status quo may be process oriented. The Roof Theory and reunification may be goal oriented. But they still require some sort of process. These processes should be consistent with peace and democracy, and acceptable to the international community. They must establish a civilized example consistent with mankind's expectations. The process will be time-consuming. Without "One China, Different Interpretations," such a process would be difficult to sustain.

Maintaining the status quo means maintaining both the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China. It means maintaining the status quo stipulated in the One China Constitution. The existence of the status quo is actually quite straightforward. The real dispute is over Different Interpretations. The two sides have yet to establish a protocol for expressing what they mean by Different Interpretations. Therefore whether the "Republic of China" is "part of China" has yet to be settled. Therefore whether "Taiwanese" are "Chinese" has yet to be settled. If these two major political identity issues cannot be settled, even maintaining the cross-Strait status quo will be difficult. The goal oriented Roof Theory and reunification will be more difficult still.

As mentioned earlier, any goal oriented program must be peaceful and democratic. Before embarking on any goal oriented program, the public on Taiwan must establish what they mean by "China" and "Chinese." Otherwise, how can they work toward any goal oriented objective? Can the vast majority of the public on Taiwan make the leap from the "Republic of China" to the Roof Theory, or a Third Concept of China? Can they make the leap to any standardized definition of "China," as the basis of their political identity? Without a process, there can be no goals to speak of.

The problem wioth goal orientation is its over-emphasis on a "future One China." It offers no solutions to how to deal with One China today. Process orientation focuses on ongoing processes. It seeks a rational process in order to arrive at clearer goals.

In fact, in 1997, former ARATS chairman Wang Daohan spoke of "One China, In Progress." This was the first time process orientation appeared in cross-Strait dialogue. One need only point to his One China, In Progress to understand Wang's ideological position. He said, "One China does not mean the People's Republic of China. Nor does it mean the Republic of China. It means a unified China created by compatriots on both sides." This is the Roof Theory, the One China, Different Interpretations Theory. Wang said, "The so-called one China, is a yet to be reunified China, a unified China that we are both moving towards." This is the Roof Theory, the One China, Different Interpretations Theory, and process orientation. Wang even said that One China is not present tense, because it is difficult to achieve in the present. But neither is it future tense, because that would reduce One China to a remote destination whose path is riddled with obstacles. Therefore why not refer to it as One China, In Progress? This again is process orientation, One China, Different Interpretations, and the Roof Theory. Suddenly One China has become One China, In Progress.

One China, Different Interpretations is One China, In Progress. One China, In Progress is One China, Different Interpretations. We already have what we need. Why look elsewhere?

Looking back today, Wang had the reputation, the position, and the status. When he put forth his One China, In Progress, his vision was advanced, and his thinking flexible. The horizons he offered were broad, and the road he opened was wide. He was far ahead of his juniors. As we can see, those in the know understood the problems bedeviling Taipei and Beijing. But when it came to Different Interpretations, their views were as different as night and day. In recent years, some in Beijing have said: "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are still part of One China." In March 2008, Hu Jintao spoke of One China, Different Interpretations on the hotline with George W. Bush. This was a variation on Wang's theory. But he apparently experienced a failure of nerve. He stopped referring to it. He retracted it. He hesitated, concerned about the implications. As a result the One China, Different Interpretations and One China, In Progress argument was not given adequate support. Process orientation also lost ground. Under the circumstances how can the two sides seek clearer goals? Ten years ago, Wang could be so open and enterprising. Ten years later, why have we become so closed and timid?

Without a rational process, we cannot clarify our goals. If Beijing will not accept the idea that the "Republic of China is part of China," how can the public on Taiwan accept "China" and consider themselves "Chinese?"

再論兩岸應採「一中各表」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.02.04 03:26 am

我們主張,兩岸關係應當由「合理的過程」,達到「改善之目的」。此即所謂的「過程論」,以有別於過去的「目的論」。

想像中,兩岸未來的「目的方案」有四種可能:一、台獨、二、維持現狀、三、屋頂理論的政治聯結(如邦聯或歐盟模式)、四、統一。這四種「目的」,無一不需以「一中各表」為「過程」。

先說台獨。台獨活動若無「一中憲法」的中華民國為屏障,將連賴以寄生的寄主都沒有。現今的台獨,包括曾經執政八年的陳水扁台獨政府,既寄生在中華民國,也不敢撕去中華民國的護符。何況,如今不論從世界、中國大陸、台灣內部及兩岸關係發展的大局大勢看,台獨皆已無可能作為兩岸關係的「目的方案」;而只是寄生在中華民國的內鬥工具而已。

再談其他三個「目的方案」。維持現狀固然就是要維持一個「過程」;屋頂理論及統一雖是「目的」,但亦仍需有一「過程」。且倘若此一「過程」應當符合和平、民主、國際接納,並能創造文明典範、增添人類價值成就等期待;那就必將是一個很細膩,而且耗時很長的「過程」。因而,若無「一中各表」,此一「過程」即難以維持。

所謂「維持現狀」,就是要維持「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」皆主張「憲法一中」的「現狀」。「現狀」的事實原本如此簡明,問題卻在為如何「表述」而生爭議。由於「一中各表」的「表述程式」在兩岸間未能確立,所以「中華民國」是否「一部分的中國」亦不能確立,以至於「台灣人」是不是「中國人」也不能確立;但若這兩大政治認同皆不能確立,兩岸連「維持現狀」已屬不易,更遑論通往屋頂理論或統一之「目的」?

如前所述,欲實現任何「目的方案」,皆應當符合和平、民主等「過程」。倘若在進入任何「目的方案」前,台灣人對「中國」及「中國人」的認同皆不能建立,將憑何實現「目的方案」?絕大多數的台灣人難道有可能跳過「中華民國」,而直接將屋頂理論的「第三概念中國」或任何統一後的「中國」作為自己的政治認同目標嗎?沒有「過程」,豈有「目的」可言?

「目的論」的偏差,在過度強調「未來的一個中國」;因此對兩岸在「現在進行式」中如何處理「一個中國」的問題沒有對策。「過程論」則是注重「現在進行式」,注重「過程」;期望以「合理的過程」達到「改善之目的」。

其實,一九九七年,前海協會會長汪道涵就曾提出「現在進行式的一個中國」的說法。這可視為兩岸間最早出現的「過程論」。只要節述「現在進行式的一個中國」,即可看出汪道涵的思想體系。他說:「一個中國不等於中華人民共和國,也不等於中華民國,而是兩岸同胞共同締造統一的中國。」(這是屋頂理論、一中各表與過程論)又說:「所謂一個中國,應是一個尚未統一的中國,共同邁向統一的中國。」(也是屋頂理論、一中各表與過程論)不僅如此,汪道涵又說:「一個中國」不是「現在式」,因為目前很難;也不是「未來式」,因為可望不可及,夜長夢多。因此,何不用「現在進行式的一個中國」?(又是過程論、一中各表及屋頂理論)正是:驀然回首,「一個中國」已是「現在進行式」。

「一中各表」就是「現在進行式的一個中國」,「現在進行式的一個中國」就是「一中各表」。已在手中,何勞外求?

如今回顧,以汪道涵的人望、身分與地位,他當年提出「現在進行式的一個中國」,其眼界之寬廣、思路的靈活,與所呈現的境界高遠及出路開闊,竟是如今的後人晚輩所遠遠不能企及。可見,有識者其實皆看到了兩岸的難題,但對如何「表述」卻在思路及境界上竟可別如天壤。近幾年來,北京方面,雖曾有「雖然尚未統一/仍是一個中國」,及胡錦濤在二○○八年三月布胡熱線一度承認「一中各表」等表述,可謂皆是汪道涵論述的折射,但皆惜乎膽識不足,欲言又止,欲放又收,猶豫瞻顧,使「一中各表」的「現在進行式的一個中國」未能凸顯;因此,「過程論」亦失重要憑藉,更遑論兩岸將如何通向「改善之目的」?十餘年前汪道涵能如此開放進取,何以十餘年後今人反而如此閉鎖退縮?

不能維持「合理的過程」,即無可能通往「改善之目的」。如果北京不接受「中華民國是一部分的中國」,台灣人如何認同「中國」,又如何自我認同為「中國人」?

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

Stable Taipei-Washington Relations are a Prerequisite for Stable Cross-Strait Relations

Stable Taipei-Washington Relations are a Prerequisite for Stable Cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 3, 2010

Washington has announced that it will sell 6.4 billion USD worth of weapons to Taipei. Taipei-Washington relations remain stable. But warning signs have appeared. This enormous arms purchase does not include conventional submarines and F-16C/Ds for preemptive defense. It falls far short of our expectations. Frankly, Washington's arms sales to Taipei are on the decline. The Ma administration must be cautious. Because without stable Taipei-Washington relations, there can be no stable cross-Strait relations.
Warming cross-Strait relations have definitely contributed to cross-Strait peace and regional stability. But the relationship remains in the stage of trade and economics and business talks. Significant political differences remain. In particular Beijing has not renounced the use of force against Taipei. The two sides have yet to formally end hostilities. Therefore stable Taipei-Washington relations remain important. This is the result of history, but it is also an objective necessity.

President Ma has reiterated that arms procurements will give Taipei an increased sense of security and self-confidence, allowing it to increase its interaction with the mainland. In other words, without substantive power, cross-Strait negotiations will overwhelmingly favor Beijing. Cross-Strait consultations under such circumstances would never yield positive results. Contrast the Republic of China government and the Hong Kong government. One of the obvious differences is that the Republic of China government has a defensive capability. This gives it a considerably stronger hand at the negotiating table.

Arms sales are a key indicator of stability in Taipei-Washington relations. This particular arms sale accounts for 69% of Taipei's annual defense budget. This may sound frightening, but it is all part of an uncompleted arms purchase from the past. It is nothing new. Washington could have approved this arms purchase immediately, but it delayed for over half a year. This is unprecedented for Taipei-Washington arms sales, and suggests a warning sign. Some people are wondering: could this be the last major arms deal between Taipei and Washington?

Such concerns cannot be completely ruled out. Barack Obama has not been in office long. His advisers are familiar with Asian-Pacific Affairs and cross-Strait affairs. They also understand the Taiwan situation. But key staffers may not share their perceptions, particularly regarding Beijing. Obama's advisers appear to have made their own calculations. This may mean new changes to the future of Taipei-Washington relations.

According to the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, congress did not "obligate" the executive branch to sell arms to Taipei. It merely authorized it to sell defensive weapons to Taipei. Strictly speaking, it is non-binding. The real reason Washington is willing to provide Taipei with defensive weapons has nothing to do with the act itself. It has to do with its political commitment to the island's freedom. The Taiwan Relations Act may include security provisions. But Taipei-Washington arms sales still require Washington's political commitment.

Taipei-Washington arms sales does not amount to a black and white political commitment. Its strength depends upon whether the strategic interests of Taipei and Washington coincide. It is also influenced by the rise of Mainland China. Past US administrations have maintained a balance between Taipei and Beijing. If the Obama administration regards the latter as more important than the former, the Ma administration must beware. This would not be a matter of whether Washington "sells out Taiwan." This would be the inevitable result of strategic developments on the international stage.

Recently the mainstream media in the US, including the New York Times, gave prominent coverage to Washington's commitment to selling weapons to Taipei. The sale was a backlash against Bejing's aggressiveness over the past year. This backlash however, should not inspire schadenfreude. If relations between Washington and Beijing deteriorate, cross-Strait relations will not benefit. No matter which side Taipei takes, it will be in the wrong. If Taipei-Washington relations undergo a chill, confidence on Taiwan will collapse. The resultant chaos will make peaceful cross-Strait relations impossible.

Beijing's antipathy towards Washington's arms sales to Taipei is understandable. Arms sales affect the political relationship between Washington, Bejing, and Taipei. The arms sale may not be the same as cross-Strait politics, but it is definitely a case of "shelving disputes." Since the issue of arms sales can not be resolved in the short term, why not shelve it? Doing everything possible to block arms sales between Washington and Taipei will not help cross-Strait reconciliation. It can only heighten a sense of crisis ion Taiwan.

From a military perspective, Beijing is worried that Taipei will "resist reunification by force" or "maintain the status quo in perpetuity." Actually such concerns are superfluous. Washington has never sold offensive weapons to Taipei. Taipei lacks both strategic depth and defensive autonomy. It cannot withstand long-term ideological turmoil and risk. Its armaments are limited to the minimum required for defense. With the emergence of non-traditional security issues, the ROC military is undergoing restructuring. When the earthquake struck Haiti, Republic of China C-130 transport planes crossed the Pacific to provide disaster relief. The armed forces are undergoing transformation. What threat do they constitute?

Beijing has reiterated that following cross-Strait reunification, the ROC could retain its military. If Beijing means that the ROC military will be nothing more than a police force to maintain law and order, then it is badly lacking in sincerity. Military forces are military forces because they have specialized equipment, specialized training, and specialized tasks. These come mainly from the United States. To ban arms sales between Washington and Taipei is tantamount to cutting off the military's umbilical cord. Our military forces would no longer be military forces. How can Beijing justify such a position? It can only leave the public on Taiwan the impression that Beijing is engaged in a war of reunification.

Washington-Taipei arms sales are the touchstone for stable Taipei-Washington relations. Cross-Strait relations have improved. The defensive needs of the ROC can be adjusted and its armed forces restructured accordingly. But Taipei-Washington relations must not be terminated because of threats. Experience has shown that without stable Taipei-Washington relations, there can be no stable cross-Strait relations. The Ma administration in particular needs to have a sense of proportion. It must not paint itself into a corner.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2010.02.03
台美關係穩定 兩岸關係才穩定
本報訊

儘管美國政府宣布售台六十四億美元軍備,印證台美關係持續穩定,卻也出現某種警訊,如此大筆軍費竟排除常規潛艦和F-16C/D等主動防禦性能的主戰裝備,遠不及我方的預期。老實說,美台軍售已經出現「弱化」趨向,馬政府須謹慎以對,因為沒有穩定的台美關係,就不會有穩定的兩岸關係。

不可否認,近期兩岸關係緩和確實為兩岸和平發展與地區穩定做出貢獻,但這種關係仍處經貿階段和事務性商談,在政治領域尚存巨大分歧,尤其在對岸未承諾放棄對台動武、兩岸未正式結束敵對狀態之前,台美關係的穩定就顯得極為重要,這既是歷史造成,更有其客觀需要。

馬總統多次表示,軍購讓台灣更有安全感與自信心,從而與大陸有更多的互動。換言之,沒有實力做基礎,兩岸協商將一面倒向對岸,不可能出現近期兩岸協商所取得的豐碩成果。拿台灣和香港做比較,一個明顯的差異在於台灣有防衛能力,至少在談判桌前還有底氣。

軍售是台美關係穩定的關鍵指標。這次軍售金額高占台灣今年國防預算六九%,聽起來或許嚇人,但都屬於多年遺留未決的軍備,並無新意。按理說,美方可以很快通過這筆軍購,卻推遲長達半年以上,台美軍售史上從所未見,由此似乎透露出某種警訊。有人開始擔心,這會不會是最後一次且最大一筆的美台軍售?

這種憂慮,確實不能完全排除。美國歐巴馬總統上任不久,他的亞太事務策士熟悉兩岸事務,對台灣處境亦有相當理解,但其核心幕僚未必有相同認知,尤其對中國的看法,歐巴馬身邊的謀士似乎另有盤算,這為今後台美關係增添變數也不無可能。

按《台灣關係法》條文,美國國會並未「責成」行政部門對台軍售,美國同意對台出售防禦性武器,嚴格說也不具強制力,而美國願意對台提供防禦性武器,真正的力道不在法本身,而在於對台灣自由堅定的政治承諾,即便《台灣關係法》有安全條款,美台軍售仍需要美方的政治承諾作為支撐才行。

美台軍售的微妙之處,就在於這種難以訴諸文字的「政治承諾」,它的強弱除取決於台美戰略利益是否一致,同時也深受中國崛起的影響。美國歷屆政府都極盡可能維持其中的平衡,如果歐巴馬政府視後者比前者重要,馬政府就要小心了,這和美國是否出賣台灣無關,而是國際形勢使然的結果。

日前美國主流媒體如《紐約時報》,大篇幅報導美國堅持對台軍售,是對中國過去一年過於強勢而做出的反擊。看到這樣的分析,我們無權幸災樂禍,因為美中關係交惡,對兩岸關係沒有好處,台灣站在哪一邊都不對;如同台美關係疏離,台灣心防潰散,亂局將使兩岸關係無從和平發展。

中共反對美台軍售我們完全理解。在政治層面上,軍售涉及美、中、台三邊關係,其屬性雖和兩岸政治定位不同,但絕對是「擱置爭議」的範疇,軍售問題既然在短期內解決不了,何不將其擱置。對岸極盡全力封殺美台軍售,不但無助於兩岸和解,反而增加台灣的危機感。

從軍事上說,對岸擔心台灣由此而「以武拒統」或「永遠維持現狀」。其實,這樣的疑慮大可不必,美國從未出售攻勢裝備給台灣,台灣既無戰略縱深,國防又不能自主,禁不起意識形態上的長期折騰和冒險,軍備僅止於最低限度的防禦。隨著非傳統安全議題的出現,台灣軍隊開始轉型,海地強震發生後,台灣C-一三○運輸機飛越太平洋賑災,即為軍隊轉型的例證,何來威脅。

對岸曾多次表示,兩岸統一後,台灣可以擁有軍隊,如果視其為警察維護治安,就太沒有誠意了。軍隊之所以是軍隊,就有不同於一般的裝備、訓練和任務,而這些主要來自美國,封殺美台軍售,無異於切斷國軍的臍帶,軍不成軍,對岸如何自圓其說,徒增台灣人民對統戰的印象而已。

美台軍售是台美關係穩定的試金石,隨著兩岸關係改善,它可以按台灣的防禦需要和軍隊轉型而做調整,但決不能因威脅而終止。經驗顯示,沒有穩定的台美關係,就不會有穩定的兩岸關係,馬政府尤其需要掌握其分寸,以免進退失據。